EVOLU

of

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

By Scot MacDonald

FOREWORD

Since February, 1962 , a series of articles has ap -

peared in Naval Aviation News under the title “Evolution o f

Aircraft Carriers. ” They measure up as an authentic, earnes t

attempt to chronicle a history of carriers since the mobil e

airfield idea was initially conceived .

Here , under these covers , are the entire contents o f

those articles . This does not comprise a complete histor y

of carriers- - that history is still being written in seas a -

round the world .

This collection , based on information gathered fro m

many official sources , provides an interesting account o f

how and why the carrier developed as it did . It is the stor y

behind the perhaps better know n tale of carrier operations .

It is the story of change- - change dictated by operationa l

necessity and by technological progress . It is also the stor y

of how naval constructors took full advantage of technologica l

progress , and the lessons learned of operational experienc e

to solve the Navy' s unique problem of taking aviation to sea .

As a result of their efforts and the constant improvement o f

tactics necessary to weld sea and air power together, the air -

craft carrier stands today at th e forefront of Naval power ,

ready and able to defend the nation and to project nationa l

interests to all parts of the world .

Vice Admiral, US N

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air )

February 1, 196 4

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D. C., 20402 - Price 55 cents
AT GUANTANAMO 1913 fleet games, early Naval Aviators, in dark USMC (6), Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC (5), John H. Towers (3),

uniforms, are (L) Victor D. Herbster (NO. 4), Bernard L. Smith, P.N.L. Bellinger (8), W.D. Billingsley (9), and G. deC. Chevalicr (7).

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE AEROPLANE GOES TO SEA

By Scot MacDonald

‘The striking successes of carrier warfare in the Second World War are

important in its own right, is the story of the evolution of sea-air power

lishment. The formative years began almost with the birth of the aircraft

value of the newest weapon in its arsenal.’—James V. Forrestal, SecNav,

First Article in a Series

well known. Not so well known, but equally

as a dominant segment in our military estabitself, for the Navy was prompt to assess the

1944-1947; SecDef, 1947-1949.

J

ULES VERNE , author of startling desk of Capt. W. Irving Chambers in between the Navy and the swelling

science-fiction during the last half 1910. Capt. Chambers had recently number of letter-writers who were

of the 19th century, would have rel- been assigned as Assistant to the Sec- eager to advance their own schemes or

ished some of the sketches, plans, and retary’s Aid for Material, and was designs involving aviation.

ideas for “aeroplanes” that crossed the given the collateral duty of liaison Less than seven years earlier, the

ELY’S AIRCRAFT is loaded aboard a special platform in US S

Birmingham at Norfolk for first take-off from ships, in 1910.

2

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
.

Wright brothers had launched their

pusher biplane into a brief but impressive flight. In the intervening

years, advocates of aviation fought for

recognition—and money.

At first, the Navy’s interest in aviation was skeptical, if not openly discouraging. Twelve years before Chambers entered the picture, “The Joint

Army Navy Board to Examine Langley’s Flying Machine” was formed at

the urging of Assistant Secretary of

the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. A Navy

member reported favorably on it to

the General Board. But the Secretary,

upon the advice of another Bureau in

the Department, decided “the apparatus as [it] is referred to pertains

decide the destiny of nations.” And

he added, “Encumbered as [our big

war vessels] are within their turrets

and military masts, they cannot launch

air fighters , and without these to defend them, they would be blown apart

in case of war.”

The “battleship controversy” was

on, puffed by publicity in a competitive press. Curtiss added weight to his

argument by a series of tests in which

he lobbed 15 out of 22 “bombs” into

targets as large as and shaped like

battleships near Hammondsport, N.Y.

There was a rumor that France was

building an aircraft carrier. More to

the point, a growing group of enthusiasts, the U.S. Aeronautic Reserve,

hers and two other officers were sent;

for the Navy, Chambers, and Naval

Aviation, it was a fortunate decision.

There he met Curtiss and the Curtisstrained pilot, Eugene Ely. At that time,

the Navy had neither an aircraft nor

a designated pilot. In a series of startling tests, Chambers, Curtiss and Ely

demonstrated that this situation must

change, and soon.

Several problems nagged Chambers.

There was not conclusive proof, for

instance, that it was feasible to launch

and land aircraft at sea. And if there

was to be any future for aviation in

the Navy, it had to be demonstrated

aircraft could be operated in, and were

important to, the Fleet. Navy officials,

CAPT. W. I. CHAMBERS was O-in-C of Naval

Aviation jrom 26 Sept. 1910 until 17 Dec. 1913.

strictly to the land service and not to

the Navy.”

On at least two important occasions

between then and 1910, the Navy

participated in or observed the fledgling "apparatus” in flight-in the 1907

Jamestown Exposition and the 1908

tests by the Wright brothers at Fort

Myer, Va. But the Navy Board held

to the attitude that “aeronautics” had

“not yet achieved sufficient importance

in its relation to naval warfare” to

warrant Navy support.

It was not until 1910 that specific

action was taken to alert the Navy

to the potentials of aviation. In one

incident, pioneer Glenn H. Curtiss

successfully flew a prize-winning flight

between Albany and New York. At

its conclusion, he prophesied publicly:

“The battles of the future will be

fought in the air. The aeroplane will

FEBRUARY 1962

CAPT. M.L. BRISTOL relieved Chambers, served

until March 1916, led aviation in Gitmo games.

asked the Navy to appoint a representative who would handle aviation matters. Since this civilian organization

enjoyed semi-official status, Capt.

Chambers was assigned to handle all

correspondence on the subject.

Chambers’ job proved far from

easy. He was given no space to work

in, no clerical help, no operating

money, no authority, and precious

little encouragement. Despite this, he

later wrote to Lt. T. G. Ellyson, “I

am endeavoring to start an office of

aeronautics here in such a way that

things will run smoothly without having them all get into one Bureau and

made a mess of as was the submarine

question.”

In October 1910, the Navy was invited to send the corps of midshipmen

to Halethorpe, Md., where an aviation

meet was to be held. Instead, ChamCAPT. NOBLE E. IRWIN was next leader, held

title, Director U.S. Naval Aviation in WW I.

military and civilian, were still apathetic about the program and gave it

token and grudging cognizance—when

they treated it with any degree of seriousness at all.

The first test was prompted by plans

of a German merchant line to launch

a plane from one of its ships in order

to speed up its mail service. Chambers

was appalled that such an advance

might be made by a foreign power

when the aircraft had been, in fact,

developed by this country. He obtained permission to make a similar

attempt at launching from the deck of

the cruiser Birmingham. The Wright

brothers were contacted, but they demurred; Ely was eager.

A temporary wooden platform was

erected on Birmingham at the Norfolk

Navy Yard. The German line, mindful of the Navy’s experiment, moved

3
AT VERA CRUZ aviation camp, Mexico, pilot

Bellinger, right, poses with ground crew.

up its target date in an effort to be

the first to launch, and thereafter bask

in the honors of claiming a significant

aeronautical first. Luck was not with

them, however. An accident aboard,

caused by a careless workman, forced

a delay of the experiment.

Chambers’ plan went ahead without

a hitch. On Monday, 14 November

1910, Birmingham pulled into the

waters off Hampton Roads, in company with three torpedo destroyers.

Aboard was pilot Ely and his biplane.

Weather was unsatisfactory; visibility

was dropped by a low cloud cover and

there were light showers mixed with

hail.

Ely was not discouraged. He slipped

into the seat of his aircraft near three

in the afternoon and signalled his handlers to let loose. The plane roared off

the platform, took a dangerous dip

when it left the platform, then swung

into the air. In the take-off, the skid

framing and wing pontoons of his

plane struck the water, nearly aborting the flight. The prop tips were

splintered and water splashed over his

goggles. This brief baptism, and a

steady rain, blanketed his vision and

for a moment he swung dizzily in the

air. Finally, he spotted the sandy

beaches of Willoughby Spit and touchdown, ending a 2 1/2-mile flight.

The flight was an extraordinary success, but Chambers tempered his jubilance with native conservatism. Said

he: “After [Ely] had demonstrated

his ability to leave the ship so readily,

without assistance from the ship’s

speed, or from any special starting device, such as that formerly used by

the Wright brothers, my satisfaction

with the results of the experiment was

increased.”

He admitted to pre-experiment perturbation: “The point of greatest concern in my mind, carrying out the

4

.—— .

original program, was the uncertainty

of stopping the ship or changing the

course in time to prevent running

over the aviator in case he should land

in the water.

“His demonstration, that an aeroplane of comparatively old design and

moderate power can leave a ship in

flight while the ship is not under way,

points clearly to the conclusion that

the proper place for the platform is

aft. An after platform can be made

longer, will not require a lessening of

the stays of any mast and its essential

supports can be so rigged as a permanent structure of a scout cruiser as to

cause no inconvenience in arranging

the other military essentials of the

ship’s design.”

News of the feat inspired a New

York Navy Yard worker to design a

light movable platform for installation

above the turrets in battleships for the

purpose of launching aircraft at sea.

Some Navy officials were enthusiastic,

but Chambers was not quite so ready

for this innovation. “Recognizing the

practicability of Quarterman Joiner

[E. C.] Keithley’s idea,” he wrote, he

could “not contemplate the use of

aeroplanes from turret ships in the

immediate future.”

Chambers’ reasoning was cautious.

As a result of the Birmingham flight,

he did not think it necessary to launch

aircraft into the wind. He had already

gone on record as supporting the place-

— —

ment of the platform in the aft section of the ship and saw no reason to

take a different stand. The safety of

pilots was another determining factor:

he feared they would be run over by

the ship if the plane, forced to ditch,

landed forward of the carrier.

Though Ely’s flight opened a few

Navy eyes, it did not loosen the

Navy’s purse strings. Glenn Curtiss,

at this time, offered to teach a Naval

officer the mechanics of flying, absorbing the expense himself. Chambers

recommended the immediate approval

of the plan and Lt. T’. G. Ellyson was

ordered to Curtiss’ San Diego camp.

A series of experiments followed, in

conjunction with the pilot’s training.

Chambers, immensely pleased with

the Birmingham launching, was now

interested in proving it practical to

land a plane aboard a Naval warship.

Another platform was constructed at

Mare Island and permission was obtained to install it on the armored

cruiser USS Pennsylvania. While the

vessel was anchored at San Francisco

on 18 January 1911, Ely launched

from a shore airdrome.

“There was never a doubt in my

mind that I would effect a successful

landing,” Ely is quoted in a March

1911 Naval Institute Proceedings article. “I knew what a Curtiss biplane

could do, and I felt certain that if the

weather conditions were good there

would be no slip.”

PLANE LAUNCHES from catapult on cruiser Huntington. After U.S. intervention in WW I,

catapult was removed from all U.S. ships. Huntington spent war years in convoy escort duty.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
A simple arresting gear had been

installed on the ship’s platform. It

consisted of 22 weighted lines stretched across the deck. On Ely’s plane, a

number of special hooks were fitted,

designed to catch the lines as the plane

made its rollout. In event the juryrigged experimental arresting gear

failed, a canvas screen was fitted to

the end of the platform as an emergency stop.

The landing was, of course, a complete success, and Chambers was now

armed with more ammunition in his

battle to prove the feasibility of employing aircraft at sea. He vowed to

take every opportunity to emphasize

this fact to officers in the Fleet.

Just 31 days after the Pennsylvania

landing, Curtiss taxied a seaplane from

as “auxiliary ships.” He stated, “I do

not believe that we need such a vessel,

even if we could get it,” considering

it “superfluous and inefficient.”

With the hydro-aeroplane, Chambers hoped to find a method of getting

a plane in the air from a fast-moving

vessel without being forced to slow

down the ship or stop. His solution

was to devise a catapult system. Langley, the Wright brothers, and Chanute

had pioneered in this field, but none

of the systems developed quite met

the needs of Naval Aviation.

The catapult was a challenge. Chambers proposed a device using compressed air for thrust. The first test

of it was made at Annapolis, with

Ellyson at the plane’s controls. The

experiment was a failure operationally,

missions and exercises in spotting mines

and submerged submarines. Under

specific instructions from SecNav and

Chambers, the unit, led by Lt. J. H.

Towers, demonstrated the operational

capabilities of the aircraft to stimulate

interest in aviation among fleet personnel. More than a hundred “training” flights were made, carrying interested line officers on local hops to

demonstrate the safety and maneuverability of aircraft, as well as to point

out the superiority of aircraft in scouting and reconnaissance tactics.

Other nations, especially in Europe,

were moving faster in the development of aviation for their navies, allocating more money than the U.S. for

experiments. In the same month that

Chambers was officially retired, in

TO PROVE IT POSSIBLE, Glenn H. Curtiss taxies his Seaplane to USS

Pennsylvania, is hosted aboard, then returns to water and his base.

EARLY CATAPULT in USS North Carolina viewcd from crane. NO v .

1915, LCdr. H. C. Mustin was first to launch from curlier model.

his North Island base to the same ship,

then in San Diego Harbor. The plane

was hoisted aboard, returned to the

water, and taxied back to its base.

This experiment indicated the eventual

liberation of aircraft from being anchored to shore bases, a necessary advancement if the aeroplane was ever to

join the Fleet.

The Navy ordered its first aircraft

the following May. SecNav George

vonL. Meyer had earlier supported appropriations for Naval Aviation. In a

meeting of the House Naval Affairs

Committee he requested and received

$25,000 for aeronautics.

Chambers was against the development of the true aircraft carrier by the

U.S. Navy at this time. He vehemently opposed the seaplane carrier or

hangar ship concept, classifying them

FEBRUARY 1962

but Chambers learned much from it.

He turned the project over to Naval

Constructor H. C. Richardson who,

with suggestions from Ellyson and

Chambers, developed it further.

Three months later, they were ready

to try again. On 12 November 1912,

Ellyson launched in a hydroplane, the

A-3, from a catapult installed in a

barge off Washington Navy Yard.

This time, they met with success.

Curtiss, who witnessed the demonstration, considered it a significant

achievement.

The following January, aviation

joined the Fleet. Chambers sent the

entire aviation unit to Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba, to participate in Fleet operations for the first time. During the

eight-week period beginning 6 January

1913, the unit conducted scouting

June 1913, the British reconfigured the

cruiser Hermes by placing a launching platform on it and using this ship

actively in maneuvers that followed.

The nations vied with each other in

building up their air arms; in the

offing were the faint rumblings that

soon would swell to a roar, eventually

erupting into the outrage of war.

In April 1914, Naval Aviation went

into action for the first time. A crisis

developed in Mexico when a U.S. naval

party was placed under arrest by Mexican police. Pilots and planes were embarked in Birmingham and Mississippi.

Those in the former were dispatched to

Tampico and saw no action. But Lt.

Patrick N. L. Bellinger, leading the

Mississippi detachment, continued

down the coast to Vera Cruz and conducted daily reconnaissance flights.

5
PRIMITIVE ARRESTING GEAR comprised of 22 taut ropes weighted by vania for Eugene Ely’s historic landing. Plane had three hooks beneath

5O-pound sandbags were strung four inches off the deck of USS Pennsyl- it to catch ropes. DFC was awarded Ely posthumously in 1933.

On 5 November 1915, RAdm. W.S.

Benson, the Navy’s first Chief of Naval Operations, visited the Nort h

Carolina and a decision was made to

launch the A B-2 aircraft from a new

and temporary catapult installed

aboard. LCdr. H. C. Mustin, who

headed the Naval Aeronautic Station

at Pensacola, was also aboard. He

climbed into the aircraft and a successful launch was made. Though

Mustin’s launching was satisfactory,

obvious improvements in the system

were necessary. Other pilots tested the

catapult, changes were made in the

unit’s mechanism, and finally, the

catapult was removed altogether. Later

a permanent catapult was installed.

Great Britain was the undisputed

leader in number and operation of aircraft from ships at this time. As the

U.S. was experimenting with North

Carolina, the Royal Navy already had

five vessels from which aircraft operated. First of these were Hermes, a

cruiser converted to carry three seaplanes. Three others, formerly used as

cross-channel turbine steamers, were

outfitted with hangars and partial

flight decks. These were Engadine ,

Empress, and Riviera, pre- Langley

“carriers.” The fifth was a converted

tanker, Ark Royal.

Capt. Mark L. Bristol relieved

Chambers in the winter of 1913.

Mindful of Great Britain’s progress in

carrier experiments, he shot off a memorandum to SecNav:

“I desire to suggest the taking up

of this question at once,” he wrote,

“along the line of purchasing a merchant ship and converting her into an

aircraft ship, and at the same time

considering the plans for a special ship

of this type, developing these plans as

more information is received from

6

abroad. It is strongly recommended

that the bureaus consider the question

of including in the estimates for the

coming year money for the purchase

and fitting up of such a ship with an

idea of recommending to Congress the

appropriations with the provision that

it become immediately available without waiting until [1 July 1916].“

The memo went through the Chief

of Naval Operations who sensibly felt

such a venture premature. In his endorsement, he wrote: “It appears to

the Department that the more immediate need of the Aeronautic Service is

to determine by experience with the

USS North Carolina, now fitted to

carry aeroplanes, the details of such

service upon which the characteristics

of special aircraft ships, if needed,

could be used.” RAdm. Benson concurred with Chambers: it was not wise

to spend large sums of money on carriers when the aircraft itself had not

reached an acceptable state of development. There was still much to learn.

Undeterred, Bristol asked for funds

for two three-million dollar carriers in

his estimates for fiscal year 1917. It

was a futile try. Next, he requested

permission to take the command of

naval air to sea and, upon receiving

it, moved aboard North Carolina. H e

retained command over the Navy’s

aircraft, their development, the shore

establishments connected with aviation, and the shaping of the air service.

Shortly after he assumed command

of North Carolina, Bristol sailed for

Guantanamo Bay to participate in war

games with the Fleet. This 1916 exercise proved the most important participation of naval aircraft in any

Fleet problems to date. By end of the

exercise, the four planes aboard had

logged more than 3890 miles in a

series of tests that proved instructive

and, at the same time, emphasized the

lack of equipment available and that

coordination and planning left much

to be desired.

In the summer of 1916, the organization, morale, equipment and prospects of Naval Aviation reached the

ebb tide mark. The status of naval

air so exasperated the normally reticent

Bellinger that he wrote to SecNav a

detailed, realistic summation of equipment available and experiments conducted. “Aeroplanes now owned by

the Navy,” he noted, “are very poor

excuses for whatever work may be

assigned them.” Viewing current catapults, he continued, they are “by no

means the finished mechanism desired

in some of [their] essential features.”

The letter was frequently quoted by

officers in the Aviation department.

With war imminent, the Appropriations Act of 29 August 1916 helped

pull Naval Aviation out of the doldrums. Granted a million dollars the

year before, this Act now allotted an

additional $31⁄2 million to the development of naval air.

In October, Towers completed a

tour in London as assistant naval attaché and reported to the Executive

Committee of the General Board to

inform it of European progress in aviation. He spoke glowingly of zeppelins, advocated the assignment of

land planes on capital ships, and discouraged the direction of attention

toward aircraft carriers.

“Aeroplane ships cannot keep up

with the Fleet,” he reported, echoing

a widely held conviction. “If [the British] build a ship big enough and powerful enough to keep up with the Fleet,

its cost is so high that they do not

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
consider it worthwhile. They are

rather giving up the idea.”

Towers’ recommendations weighed

heavily with the Board. In its subsequent recommendations, it requested

over 500 planes, in addition to kite

balloons, non-rigid dirigibles, and an

experimental zeppelin. No recommendation was made for the fitting out of

a major ship of the line for the operation of aircraft on the scope of an

aircraft carrier.

The U.S. entered WW I in April

1917. In the years prior to this, Naval

Aviation concerned itself with the

development of aeronautical design

and a continuing series of studies was

implemented to determine the adaptability of planes on ships. The war

interrupted these studies. Instead, emphasis was on expansion in aircraft

inventory, increase in the number of

trained pilots and ground crew men,

and anti-submarine warfare.

In April 1917, RAdm. W. S. Sims,

heading the European naval forces,

recommended to SecNav that, since

German U-boats were sinking tremendous tonnages, attention be directed toward acquiring large numbers of seaplanes for anti-submarine

reconnaissance. He also asked for the

development of seaplane carriers for

small seaplanes. Going a step further,

he advocated the development of vessels from which seaplanes could be

launched directly from their decks.

This emphasis on ASW was a reflection of the experiences of the Allied

nations. Expectations of the British

were high. Sims, in answering SecNav’s request for information on what

Allied nations’ requirements for naval

air support were, revealed the British

preoccupation with ASW problems.

Through Sims, they requested four

seaplane carriers, with a capacity of

six two-seater planes, six single-seaters, and a speed of at least 18 knots.

They also requested four or more seaplane tenders, 100 kite balloons with

necessary manpower to operate and

maintain them, “any number of trained pilots,” and a good 300-hp engine.

But Sims appended a note of caution to these requests. He did not advise the U.S. Navy to develop this line

of aeronautics if it would interfere

with the completion of anti-sub programs already in progress.

Though the British pioneered in aircraft carriers, their emphasis in WW I

—and that of U.S. Naval Aviation—

was on the development of seaplanes.

Throughout this war, seaplanes and

their tenders achieved far greater attention than any other weapon in the

naval air arm arsenal.

The U.S. looked for the super seaplane, one that would be large enough

to carry enough fuel aboard to make a

trans-ocean hop feasible. This was an

attempt to circumvent the worrisome

number of sinkings of cargo ships by

German U-boats; with the stricken

ships went a large number of aircraft

built for flight against the enemy in

Europe. This plane was given the

designation NC and was later to prove

such a flight possible.

In the summer of 1918, the General Board showed considerable interest in the future of aircraft carriers.

It called before it most of the leading

Naval Aviators of the day in an effort

to determine how much importance

to attach to this development. Testimonies presented offered a wide range

of thought on the subject. Several

wanted carriers for ASW work. Towers suggested the conversion of a merchant ship—for experimental purposes.

Others pointed out that aircraft

aboard Huntington were smashed by

concussion when that ship fired a

practice salvo. Only a ship with the

major mission of launching and landing aircraft at sea would do.

The Board deliberated and in September recommended a six-year program of expansion in all branches of

the fleet. For Naval Aviation, it recommended that six carriers be built

within that time span, each having a

700-foot flight deck, with an 80-foot

beam “absolutely clear of obstructions.” Designed top speed was to be

35 knots, with a cruising range of

10,000 miles.

The bright future darkened swiftly

on 2 October when SecNav Josephus

Daniels temporarily put an end to the

project. “The question of building aircraft carriers of special construction

is held in abeyance,” he wrote, “and

no action will be taken until the military characteristics considered advisable by the General Board are submitted, and no action will then be taken

of a positive character unless it appears

probable that these vessels can be completed and made serviceable during the

present war.” This did not put a period

to the program, simply a series of suspension dots . . . until the Armistice.

The British had been mulling over

the problem of ASW and in October

1918 proposed a possible solution to it.

The proposal, at the same time, gave a

keen revelation of the effectiveness of

its carrier operations. Since most submarine sightings and sinkings (there

were few of the latter) made by aircraft were from shore-based seaplanes,

the Royal Navy suggested planes be

given a much wider range than they

enjoyed. They proposed a plan to tow

the planes on lighters or barges to within striking distance of the targets selected. A rear compartment in the

barge would be flooded sufficiently to

float the plane. The aircraft would

then take off, bomb its target and return to home base.

Surprisingly, the plan met with

favor. The British volunteered to

contribute 50 of the lighter units and

asked the U.S. to provide 30, along

with 40 planes. By the end of July

1918, the towed-lighter project saw

the commissioning of a base at KillDURING W W I, British developed a towed lighter from which planes were launched. Rear

compartment was flooded for seaplanes. Here landplane is towed, later launched .

FEBRUARY 1962 7
A MUSTIN SEA SLED holds a Caproni bomber in post-WW I tests at

Hampton Roads. Sled was designed to add launching power to planes.

ingholme, Ireland, with an American

detachment in command. In a dress

rehearsal for the scheduled bombardment of the submarine base at Helgoland, a German zeppelin appeared on

the scene and photographed the entire

operation. The secret type of attack

no longer secret, the British called off

the campaign in August.

The first draft for Naval Aviation’s

request for appropriations after the

war contained no provision for the

construction of aircraft carriers nor

the conversion of a current ship of the

line to carrier characteristics. But on

return from Europe of Capt. Noble

E. Irwin, who then had the aviation

desk in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the entire budget was

revamped, new estimates were made,

and the Navy was subsequently authorized to convert the collier USS Jupiter into the first experimental carrier.

The British, at that time, had three

operating carriers, two training carriers

and two under construction.

In 1919, the General Board met

again, this time centering its attention

on Naval Aviation. It was an exhaustive inquiry from which was produced

a report on “Future Policy Governing

Development of Air Service for the

United States Navy.” In it the Board

stated, “The development of Fleet Aviation is of paramount importance and

must be undertaken immediately if

the United States is to take its proper

place as a naval power.”

At the close of the war, the evolution of thought on carrier designs centered on the development of two types,

one a fast vessel with large radius for

scouting operations with scout cruisers,

and the other a larger, slower vessel to

operate with battleship units as a base

for launching torpedo plane attacks.

The experiments and experiences of

the British Navy in operating aircraft

carriers influenced American thinking

when design and performance were

considered. Their carrier Argus

weighed 18,000 tons and flew 20 Sopwith planes carrying 1000-lb. torpedoes. Its speed was 21 knots. Two

other British carriers, Furious a n d

Cavendish, were designed for scouting

missions, travelled at 32 knots, and

carried reconnaissance planes.

Arguments continued during the

Board meetings. One faction wanted

to convert battleships instead of colliers, but were out-argued by Irwin

who pointed out the lack of stowage

space below decks, the smoke menace

amidships, the small headroom between

decks, and the additional personnel

needed for the fire room. One admiral

protested the conversion. “l believe

the development is going to be so rapid

that by the time you get your carriers

you will find you have to make all

your ships carriers.” But another voice

FIRST SUCCESSFUL launch of a flying boat was

made at Washington Navy Yard in Dec. 1912.

was heard, that of LCdr. E. O. McDonnell: “A plane carrier would carry

15 torpedo planes and, in my opinion,

would be a menace to a whole division

of battleships and in the same way a

fleet of carriers could attack a place

like Hawaii.”

Congress considered converting

cruisers. Merchant ship possibilities

were renewed, but the Board prevailed;

the collier Jupiter was selected.

Even at this late date, a new threat

developed. After Congress authorized

the carrier, RAdm. Benson shelved the

project. Capt. Thomas T. Craven,

who had by then relieved Irwin, found

himself in the awkward position of

facing a Congressional hearing and admitting that the appropriated money

would not be used. He consulted

Daniels who at once reversed the

CNO’s decision and ordered work to

proceed immediately. In January 1920,

Daniels allocated $500,000 for the

conversion and the future of JupiterLangley was assured.

Several years later, LCdr. B. G.

Leighton commented on the controversy surrounding the selection of

Jupiter for the first conversion to a

carrier design. “There is no good

reason,” he said, “why a battleship

might not become an aircraft carrier,

or an aircraft carrier a cruiser.

“The Langley, 14 knots, no guns,

400 officers and men—a converted

collier—is an aircraft carrier. The

Saratoga, 33 knots, eight-inch guns,

three times the size of the Langley

with three times as many men—a

converted battle cruiser—is an aircraft carrier. The British Argus— a

converted passenger ship—is an aircraft carrier. ‘Aircraft carrier’ may

‘mean almost anything!”

8 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

DECISIONS OUT OF JUTLAND

By Scot MacDonald

‘It is impossible to resist the admiral’s claim that he must have complete control of, and confidence in, the aircraft

of the battle fleet, whether used in reconnaissance, gun-fire or air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes.

Therefore the Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required to secure this result.’—Winston S. Churchill.

T

HOUGH THESE WORDS were written in 1936 as a private citizen,

Winston Churchill earlier, as First

Lord of the Admiralty, advocated the

development of aviation in the navy

while the aeroplane was still young.

He was partially responsible for placing the new machines aboard British

ships shortly after the first decade of

this century. As a result, during

World War I Great Britain developed

the aircraft carrier and built a small

number of them before any other

country had a single ship designed

for the operation of planes at sea.

Heavier-than-air craft had its start

in Great Britain four-and-a-half years

after Orville Wright launched the

world’s first successful aircraft at

Kitty Hawk. Mr. Alliott VerdonRoe completed constructing his plane

at Broadside, England. Modeled after

a Wright brothers’ aeroplane, it was

successfully flown on 8 June 1908.

On 2 March 1911, three Royal

Navy officers and one Marine officer

began taking flying instruction given

by a civilian enthusiast. The first of

the four to solo was Lt. Charles R.

Samson who, in the next ten years,

built a distinguished reputation for

being a flamboyant man of action.

In 1912, Horace Short produced

Britain’s first seaplane (Churchill has

been credited with coining this oneword description of the aircraft) and

it was successfully flown by Samson.

Only months earlier, Samson demonstrated the potentials of naval aviation when in December 1911, he testlaunched a Short S.27 biplane from

rail platforms on the foredeck of

HMS Africa while the warship was at

anchor at Chatham. He made a safe

landing alongside, using flotation bags

strapped to the wheels of his plane.

Four months later, in May 1912,

the first British flight from a moving

ship was effected when Lt. R. Gregory, one of the “original four,” took

off from a temporary flight deck of

the battleship Hibernia. The ship was

steaming in Weymouth Bay at a speed

of 10 to 12 knots.

By this time, France already had

an Air Corps, consisting mostly of

landplanes. Between 1912 and 1914,

she experimented with seaplanes aboard

the converted cruiser Foudre, previously used as a mine ship, but apparently lost interest before any notable

advancement could be made. The

ship could not house an effective number of aircraft aboard; the rest were

hangared on the beach at Frejus. But

in number of landbased craft in the

military inventory, and in pilots trained, France was the undisputed leader

in pre-WW I years.

Germany believed her future lay

in the development of lighter-than-air

craft, eschewing experiments in sending heavier-than-air craft to sea. Her

answer to war at sea was the U-boat,

supplementing the High Seas Fleet,

and she used it effectively in the turbulent years ahead. She did develop

landplanes, some with extraordinary

achievement, but it was with Count

Ferdinand von Zeppelin and his airship designs that Germany placed her

national trust.

Italy, at that time (and for many

years after), did not believe carriers

were necessary for her defense. The

prevailing opinion was that the country was so centrally located it was

virtually a land base from which the

Mediterranean could be controlled.

Japan developed aircraft carrier

designs, but details of construction

were not revealed to the rest of the

world for decades.

The United States, after originally

inventing the aeroplane, did not during WW I aggressively push their opCONSIDERED BY MOST HISTORIANS t O be the world’s first true air- the end of the war, she never saw action. Tests conducted during

craft carrier, HMS Argus had flush deck installed. Completed toward construction and post-war operations influenced design of later carriers.

MARCH 1962 9
ON HMS BEN-MY-CHREE during the Dardanelles campaign, a Short

seaplane is lifted over the side. Double-acting ailerons on both wings.

A SOPWITH CAMEL launches from converted HMS Pegasus in 1918.

Note machine gun mounted on wing. Camels were used extensively.

eration at sea. True, the Navy had

equipped at least three ships to operate

aircraft by installing catapults on

them, but the catapults were removed during the war. On the whole,

the military was not encouraged and

seldom financed; civilians had little

motivation for building carriers.

With France the undisputed master

of the landplane, Germany the acknowledged expert in lighter-than-air

craft, and the whole of Europe feeling

the faint stirrings of unrest as early

as 1912, Great Britain was intent on

catching up with and overtaking, if

possible, France and Germany in their

respective aeronautic specialties.

As war years approached and the

German submarine force grew in potential, Britain, as the major sea

power, instinctively sought ways of

adapting aeroplanes for operations

with the fleet while out of flying range

from home bases. Her success eventually gave her a weapon more powerful than those developed by competing powers.

The genesis of the British aircraft

carrier can be plotted with simplicity.

At first, attention was directed to the

launching of aircraft from water.

Both hydroplanes and flying boats

were studied, tested, and developed.

Later, experiments were made in

launching planes from ships, followed

almost immediately with efforts to

successfully retrieve them at sea.

Eventually, the performing advantages of the light landplanes over the

awkward hydroplanes led to efforts

to develop vessels which could take

the landplane to sea. When these

achieved success, the forerunner of

modern aircraft carriers was born.

The gestation period was surprisingly

10

short for such a complicated ship, but

its parturition was forced by the pressures of wartime and an instinctive

fight for survival.

Britain’s first step toward carrying

aeroplanes to sea was to establish an

official air arm. On 13 April 1912,

the Royal Flying Corps was constituted by Royal Warrant and, on 19

June, a Central Flying School was

opened at Upavon Downs. Both the

Corps and the School were planned

for the centralization of aviation activities in the Royal Navy and the

“Military.”

Between 1912 and the outbreak of

hostilities in August 1914, Europe became increasingly restless. In October

1912, following the establishment of

the Corps, Britain commissioned a

number of naval air stations for coast

guard duty. One was placed at Cromarty, Scotland, and the remaining

three in England, by the Channel

coast at Calshot, Yarmouth, and

Felixstowe. Two others were already

in operation, one at Eastchurch and

the other on the Isle of Grain. The

sites were selected to form a chain so

that planes could fly from one station

to the next without requiring an interstop for refueling.

British naval aviation moved more

closely toward the carrier concept

when a wheeled launching platform

was installed in the cruiser Hermes in

June 1913. At first, two seaplanes operated from the ship. Later, she was

capable of carrying a third. By October 1914, Hermes had been fitted

to handle ten.

In the summer months of 1914,

Prime Minister Lloyd George appointed Winston Churchill First Lord

of the Admiralty, comparable to the

Secretary of the Navy in the U.S.

In a series of sudden decisions,

Churchill immediately called out of

retirement brilliant Lord Fisher, a cantankerous admiral who advocated

great changes in the Royal Navy. He

was made First Sea Lord (i.e., CNO).

Almost at the same time, Churchill

elevated the bellicose Sir John Jellicoe

to command the Home Fleet, bypassing several senior officers en route.

Aviation fascinated Churchill. He

flew at every opportunity and encouraged the development of aircraft for

the Navy’s use. In this respect, he was

militant. In the words of Sir Sefton

Brancker, then Deputy of Military

Aeronautics, "The first sign of

Churchill’s policy was his sudden announcement that the Naval Wing of

the Royal Flying Corps had become

the Royal Naval Air Service—this

without any reason or warning to the

War Office.”

His most startling decision was

made shortly before war was declared.

On his own initiative, Churchill called

up full mobilization of the Navy,

risking a veto by the Cabinet and not

waiting for a signature from King

George V. The entire reserve strength

went on active duty; the ranks of

naval aviation broadened with other

units of the fleet. It was one of the

few times in history that a defending

nation’s navy was adequately prepared

upon the declaration of war.

Events moved swiftly. On 28 June

1914, the Austrian Archduke, Franz

Ferdinand, was assassinated by Serbian

students at Sarajevo. On 17 July

Churchill concentrated the fleet at

Spithead for review and maneuvers.

All available naval aircraft took to

the air: 17 seaplanes and two flights

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
, -----

of aeroplanes. On 28 July AustriaHungary declared war on Serbia.

Russia sided with the Serbs and Germany mobilized. On 1 August, the

British planes at Eastchurch were

tuned up. August 4th, England declared war on Germany, and Germany

declared war on Belgium.

At that time, Great Britain had

only one vessel that could even remotely be referred to as an aircraft

carrier, the Hermes. Her wartime

activity was cut short, however. On

the evening of 30 October 1914, she

was torpedoed and sunk. Fortunately,

most of her crew survived.

In short order, an old merchantman

was placed in a shipyard and her superstructure converted to carry and

launch seaplanes from wheeled trolleys. It was the same type installation

used in the Hermes. The merchantman displaced 7450 tons, was slightly

longer than 350 feet, and had a speed

of about 11 knots. This ship, HMS

Ark Royal, was to prove valuable to

the Royal Navy in future years.

In quick succession, other vessels

were converted. The former fast

cross-Channel packers, Empress, Engadine, and Riviera, were fitted with

hangars for seaplanes and equipped

with cranes for hoisting aircraft into

and out of water. Later, an Isle of

Man packet, Ben-my-Chree, was refitted for seaplane operations.

Except for submarine activities—

which proved deadly in the early years

of the war-the German Navy seemed tenaciously timid. The Kaiser adamantly refused to permit the High

Seas Fleet to engage the British, so

it hung reluctantly to safe ports.

There were, therefore, few demonstrations of German belligerence by surface ships at sea. But in the early

months, two engagements are notable,

for they eventually affected some future designs of Royal Navy ships.

I

N S EPTEMBER 1914, the German

cruiser Konigsberg, skulking in the

Indian Ocean, attacked and sank the

British cruiser Pegasus in port at Zanzibar. She then hid in a maze of

channels in the Rufiji Delta on the

east coast of Africa. The Admiralty

knew her whereabouts, but not exact

location. Charts indicated five possible exits for Konigsberg, but there

was only one ship in the area able to

offer chase, Kinfauns Castle.

Not far away, on the island of

Niororo, a civilian stunt pilot, H. D.

Cutler, suddenly found himself commissioned in the Royal Naval Air

Service and his two weathered Curtiss

flying boats in the Air Service’s inventory. He was immediately assigned

to locate the cruiser. Only those familiar with the vagaries of war can appreciate the actions that followed.

On his first flight, Cutler had no

compass, got lost, was forced to beach

on a deserted island and awaited rescue.

Kinfauns Castle found him. Two days

later, his leaky boat repaired, he found

the German cruiser deep up a tideway.

He returned to the ship and reported.

Charts at the home office indicated

the water too shallow to support a

ship of the Konigsberg draft; another

recon was ordered by the Admiralty,

this time with an observer aboard.

Ten days were lost while Cutler

awaited shipment of his second Curtiss; the first now leaked so badly it

was unusable. The ship’s commanding officer observed during the next

flight and confirmed the Konigsberg’s

location.

Sinking of the German cruiser now

became an idee fixe with the Admiralty. The nearest ship of sufficient size

and firepower to do the job was too

far away. Days passed, while Kinfauns Castle awaited help. Cutler

launched again to ascertain Konigsberg’s continued presence, but shortly

after reaching the tideway, his engine

failed. Forced down, he was captured

by the Germans. Aerial reconnaissance

no longer a threat, Konigsberg saw no

reason for leaving her safe anchorage.

It was not until April that Short

seaplanes arrived on the scene to take

up Cutler's recon missions. One of

the planes was shot down on its initial

flight before completing a photo run.

Use of the others was limited: they

could not reach sufficient altitude for

bombing.

Two more months went by before

help finally came—in the monitors

Severn and Mersey. They were equipped with Henri Farmans for spotting,

but even then their job was not easy.

A spirited fight ensued between the

ships, interrupted by a five-day interim for necessary repairs to the Farmans. The battle then resumed and

eventually, under persistent British

gunfire directed effectively by the aircraft, the German cruiser fell.

The third German-British naval engagement of WW I has been entered

in history books as the Battle of the

Falkland Islands.

Over on the China Station, Germany had eight cruisers operating in

these and nearby waters. When Japan

declared war against the Central

Powers, the German squadron, commanded by Adm. Count von Spee,

sailed for South America, bombarding

Papeete and Fanning Island en route.

He was joined by two more cruisers

at Easter Island and, in company, they

proceeded to the coast of Chile. The

Admiralty, intent on destroying this

enemy force, assembled as many ships

as possible off the southeast coast of

South America, and even dispatched

three from the Grand Fleet to join

in the hunt.

Von Spee, still eager for battle, decided to attack the Falkland Islands.

It was a fatal decision: the British

THE FELIXSTOWE F-3, called “Large America,” was a British improvement of Curtiss’ flying boat built before U.S. entered World War I.

MARCH 1962

SILHOUETTE of Sopwith Camel shows machine gunu installed on engine

cowling. Synchronizer developed by Germans permitted this system.

11
——-

squadron came upon him unexpectedly and sank all the German ships,

save one, which managed to escape.

These two incidents—the spotting

and sinking of the Konigsberg and the

Battle of the Falkland Islands—led

to the later development of gun-turret

launching experiments in HMS R e -

pulse, and the construction of Lord

Fisher’s “Hush! Hush!” ships, Courageous, Glorious, and Furious.

The British turret-launching system was designed and developed in

1917. By early 1918, nine battle

cruisers and two light cruisers were

equipped to launch seaplanes from

systems installed over ships’ gun turrets.

Though developed by the British

under the pressures of wartime urgency, the idea was first recorded as early

as November 1910 when New York

Navy Yard quartermaster joiner E.C.

Keithley proposed a design shortly

after Ely’s successful take-off from

the Birmingham. Keithley’s idea was

rejected—too advanced for its timetossed into Navy files and forgotten.

But Fisher’s “Hush! Hush!” ships

have fascinated naval architects and

historians since they were uncovered.

Originally, they were built as cruisers

of a sort under the war emergency

program.

Ships of the Royal Navy describes

them as white elephants. “In design,”

it states, “they suffer from being too

strong and too weak. For light cruiser

work, they are ludicrously overgunned, while the absence of armour precludes their being employed as battlecruisers.”

Apparently, the First Sea Lord

wanted powerfully armed ships of

high speed, capable of navigating very

shallow waters. Officially described as

light cruisers, they were ordered

shortly after the sinking of Konigs -

berg. Subsequently, all three were

converted into carriers, Courageous

and Glorious after the war. Before

Furious was commissioned in July

1917, she underwent the first of several conversions and emerged from the

shipyard initially as an awkward-looking aircraft carrier.

Britain, in the first months of the

war, realized the danger of zeppelin

raids on home shores when the Germans became entrenched in Belgium.

A series of air patrols in the Channel

was immediately established, costing

the Royal Naval Air Service in casualWW I AVRO 504 series biplanes were used extensively by the Royal Naval Air Service.

ties a number of seaplanes and pilots.

In December 1914, the British planned a raid on zeppelin bases at Cuxhaven. This time, they tried a new

tactic, launching the attack with seaplanes based aboard ships. The converted Engadine, Riviera, and Empress

were pressed into service, accompanied

by a screen of destroyers and submarines. The mission was not restricted to the bombing of the airship

sheds, but broadened to obtain as

much information as possible on the

strength of the German Navy in the

area.

On Christmas morning, the ships

converged at a point some 12 miles

north of Heligoland. An hour later,

seven planes took off. En route, they

were attacked ineffectively bv two . .

zeppelins, and, as they neared the enemy’s main naval base, by seaplanes.

Three hours after launching, three

of the seaplanes returned to their

ships, the mission only partly accomplished. The remaining four were

forced to ditch. The crews of three

were rescued by a friendly submarine;

the fourth was captured by a Dutch

trawler.

The seaplanes did not succeed in

finding the zeppelin sheds, thus failing that aspect of the mission. But

they did bring back valuable information on harbors and the number

of German ships in them. The Admiralty was not disappointed.

If any single action gave birth to

the concept of aircraft carrier opera-

, .

tions, says one noted U.S. naval historian, this raid would qualify. Several similar raids were made in later

years of the war, but attention was

directed first at the development of

seaplanes and then of flying boats.

It was not until the last months of

the war that Britain fully realized

the limitations of seaplane characteristics and the superioritv of landplanes.

She then began various experiments

with true aircraft carrier design.

MEANWHIL E , Turkey refused to

remain neutral. Influenced by

Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, the

country was pro-German. On 29 October 1914, Turkish warships, in company with two German cruisers, opened fire on Odessa, Theodosia and Sevastopol on the coast of the Russian

Black Sea. Russia declared war on 2

November, and England and France

followed three days later. The Ottoman Front was opened.

Churchill soon conceived a brilliant

strategy. Had it been successfully

carried out, the war could easily have

been ended in 1915. Instead, the compaign ended disastrously, and the war

dragged on bloodily until November

1918.

He proposed to concentrate British

Forces in the Dardanelles, defeat Turkey, and force the Germans and Austrians to deploy troops and machines

to that area. The Balkan states would

probably join the Allies. And Russia

would make a devastating victory in

the east; the Central Powers would

crumble. It nearly worked.

Though opposed at home and in

France, Churchill ordered the Navy

into action. As soon as a force of

ships was gathered, including A r k

Royal, the British armada headed toward the Dardanelles to force an entrance.

In Ark Royal were six two-seater

seaplanes and two single-seater landplanes. Of these, only a Short seaplane, equipped with a good engine,

was efficient. The rest could barely

get high enough for effective spotting

and could launch only when waters

were calm.

On 5 March 1915, a Sopwith seaplane, manned by a pilot and observer,

took to the air. The plane was to

direct fire on a Turkish fort for the

guns of the new superdreadnought,

Queen Elizabeth. It climbed torturously to 3000 feet and, as the observer

readied to call the shots, the propeller

fell off. The Sopwith plunged to the

sea, under furious fire from the fort.

Miraculously, both men were saved.

More catastrophes followed. The

assault force, entering the straits, ran

into a mine field and lost three battleships. Action was broken off abruptly

by the admiral—although other ships

had managed to toss the Turkish and

German troops into confusion.

Churchill composed a telegram insisting the battle be resumed immedi12 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
ately, but was dissuaded by the Admiralty on the ground that the officer

commanding the situation should be

allowed to make his own decisions.

For the prospect of a shortened war,

later events proved this decision was

unfortunate.

At war’s end, German General

Liman von Sanders, in charge of the

Dardanelles during the battle, wrote,

“If the orders given at that moment

had been carried out, the course of

the war would have been changed

after the spring of 1915, and Germany and Austria would have been

constrained to continue the fight

alone.”

The attack on the Ottoman Front

next centered on Gallipoli, but this

proved a worse disaster. The enemy

learned of the next tactic and buttressed their defenses. The campaign

—doomed to drag on till the following

January—was lost.

Samson arrived on the scene, via

brisk battles at Dunkirk and Belgium,

commanding No. 3 Aeroplane Squadron. Ark Royal moved to the Gulfs

of Enos, Smyrna and Xeros, providing

effective spotting, and returned to her

base at Mudros. Fighting was sporadic,

both a success and a failure—in about

equal measure. The Turks were

worthy adversaries.

By late June the threat of German

submarines in these waters was real,

and Ark Royal was retired to the

safety of Imbros where she functioned

as a depot ship. Barely a week earlier,

Ben-my-Chree was added to the force.

Reconnaissance and spotting flights

were frequent, but the Dardanelles

campaign was now a stalemate.

In early August, a major landing

was effected by the British at night

without opposition. With the enemy

forces nearly all routed and running,

the general in charge failed to press

the attack, In the meantime, reinforcements came up and the battle

raged anew, continuing until the

British realized the hopelessness of the

situation and evacuated, ending the

campaign.

Great Britain recognized the deadliness of the German U-boats early in

the war. Lusitania was torpedoed 7

May 1915 with 1200 lives lost; 139

Americans were among them. Britain

searched for a long-range seaplane that

was capable of carrying heavy bombIoads. In 1914, Sopwith developed a

flying boat he called a Bat, but it was

inadequate.

A year later, Cdr. J.C. Porte was

given command of the Felixstowe

naval air station. He took up the problem, started with Curtiss flying boat

designs, added improvements, and finally produced an operational craft

that weighed between four-and-onehalf and six-and-one-half tons. As

Porte described them, they “carried

sufficient petrol for work far out from

land and big enough bombs to damage

or destroy a submarine otherwise than

by a direct hit.” Called Large Americas, they were operational by the

spring of 1917.

Until 1915, vessels converted for

aviation at sea were designed as seaplane tenders. This year, a new exFIRST LANDING of a British plane aboard a British ship is made in a Sopwith Pup. Deck handlers

help bring the plane to a stop. A few days later, pilot was killed in a second landing attempt.

MARCH 1962

periment was tried and proved sucesssful. The Isle of Man packet, Vindex,

was refitted to launch landplanes as

well as seaplanes. A 64-foot-long deck

was mounted on the ship, and a successful flight from it was made on 3

November by a Bristol Scout. T h e

Scout seaplane was equipped with

wheels which dropped off as the aircraft took to the air. It made a water

landing, taxied alongside the ship, and

was hoisted aboard again. Refitted

with wheels and refueled, the plane

was once more ready to fly.

Two other experiments were made

in attempts to launch aircraft at sea

to provide wider range. In the first,

British Navymen designed a floating

barge upon which seaplanes were towed. Nearing target, the aft compartments of the lighter were flooded, permitting the plane to slide easily into

the water and take off. A variation of

this was a larger platform from which

small landplanes were launched. They

enjoyed a brief popularity and operated in the North Sea early in the war.

In the closing months of hostilities, a

Sopwith Camel was launched in the

same area, engaged and downed a zeppelin. The towed lighter was not refined further and saw comparatively

little action.

The second experiment made by the

British in 1916 tried a new approach

toward launching aircraft at sea. On

their own initiative, two naval officers

made a design that was a departure

from the standard envelope-gondola

airship. The envelope they used was

comparatively small, but they hoped,

capable of lifting an F.E. 2C airplane.

Once aloft and sufficient power given

the plane, the envelope was to be

detached.

Bizarre? Perhaps. At any rate, a

trial launching was made of the contraption on 21 February. The plane

lifted off successfully and was gaining

altitude when the envelope detached

prematurely. One of the officers was

spilled from the plane and the other

crashed with it.

I

N MID-1916, the war’s major sea

battle was fought, the Battle of

Jutland. Earlier in the year, the 20,-

000-ton Cunarder Campania was converted by the British to carry seaplanes and was assigned to Adm.

Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet.

May approached and nearly ended

before the German High Seas Fleet,

13
——. —

now under Adm. Reinhard Scheer,

made a definite move to encounter the

Royal Navy. Jellicoe was ready. Advised in advance that a squadron of

German battle-cruisers had been ordered to Norwegian shores for a show

of force, he ordered Adm. Sir David

Beatty, leading a similar but larger

British squadron, to intercept.

HMS Engadine, operating with

Beatty’s squadron, launched a seaplane

even though outnumbered, the German ships under Adm. Franz von

Hipper, sank two of Beatty’s vessels.

Scheer’s High Seas Fleet crested the

horizon, and Beatty led his remaining

ships on a strategic retreat, north toward Jellicoe.

On the day before, Campania had

conducted a series of successful gunspotting training flights, returned to

her Scapa Flow anchorage about five

Jellicoe assumed his aircraft “carrier,”

Campania, was in company. Thus

Jellicoe at Jutland fought without

benefit of aerial observation.

Briefly, about 1800 on the 31st, the

High Seas Fleet met with the Grand

Fleet. Jellicoe made a thrust to cut

off Scheer’s retreat, but the German

admiral ordered his ships first south

and then east. By this maneuver, he

came up in pursuit along the flank

HMS EAGLE became Britain’s second aircraft carrier. Originally at end of WW I.

planned as a Chilean dreadnought battleship, the ship was converted HMS Argus were

Lessons learned from construction and operation of

applied to this ship, and further tests were made.

for reconnaissance at 1530 on the 31st.

The pilot reported three enemy cruisers and ten destroyers taking a northwesterly course. Fifteen minutes later,

the German ships changed course to

the south. The pilot tried to flash this

signaI by searchlight, but his message

was not received. One of the ships of

the squadron noted the alteration,

however, and the ships shifted in time.

Thereafter, poor visibility and rough

water kept Beatty’s plane on deck.

The two squadrons clashed and,

miles from the main fleet, and awaited

orders.

At 1735, a signal was flashed to all

ships of Jellicoe’s fleet to stand by to

get under way. At 1900 the order to

raise full steam was given and twoand-a-half hours later, Campania was

ready. At 2254, the “proceed” signal

was flashed—but the Campania did

not receive it. Several hours passed

before her C.O. realized that the rest

of the fleet had gone.

Until 0200 the following morning,

of the British ships, turned again and

launched torpedoes, forcing Jellicoe

to retreat.

Scheer then ordered Hipper to engage Jellicoe’s attention while the

High Seas Fleet maneuvered for an

escape route. Scheer found it by 2100,

cutting east across the southerly-moving British ships, and dashed to safety.

At battle’s end, each fleet had lost

several ships, but the British suffered

more heavily in tonnage—by almost

double. In post-battle retrospect, the

14 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Battle of Jutland could easily have

ended in a triumphant victory for the

Allies, had Jellicoe had the advantage

of Capania’s plane to report movements of Scheer’s ships. The German

fleet had no seagoing aircraft. This,

combined with lessons already learned

in previous sea encounters with the

enemy—especially in countering Uboats—strengthened more than ever

the British Navy’s dedication to the

perfecting of the aircraft carrier.

In February 1917, the pacifism of

a patient president broke when, on

the last day of January, Kaiser Wilhelm notified Woodrow Wilson and

the American people that unrestricted

submarine warfare would be commenced on the following day. Diplomatic relations were severed on 3 February, but the President decided to

wait until the next overt act before

asking Congress to declare war.

He did not have long to wait. In

February and March, several U.S. ships

were sunk and in March, the British

Secret Service obtained the famous

Zimmerman note, detailing German

plans against the U.S. The note was

deciphered and passed on to the Americans. Wilson sent his war message to

the Senate on 2 April and war was

declared four days later.

Advances in British naval aviation

were rapid in the closing years of the

war. Furious joined the fleet, and experiments on landing aircraft aboard

were conducted. The first attempt

was successful, though unorthodox;

no mechanical arresting gear was used.

On 2 August 1917, a Sopwith P up

landed aboard. On deck, handlers

grasped hold of lines from the plane’s

wingtips as soon as the motor was cut

and the plane was skidding to a stop.

In the next attempt two days later,

a tire burst upon touchdown, the

plane folded over the side, and the

pilot was killed. Further studies were

conducted and a primitive arresting

arrangement was installed, along with

netting to protect the ship’s bridge.

Other conversions followed promptly. A cruiser of the Hawkins

class was fitted with a flight deck and

commissioned the HMS Vindictive.

This deck was removed after the war.

In 1917, three ships were planned

for conversion to carriers, but work

was delayed intentionally on two of

them. All three figured prominently

in Britain’s post-war development.

The first of these was the Argus ,

originally designed as the Italian liner

Conte Rosso, and is generally considered the first true aircraft carrier.

Argus had a flight deck 558 feet long

by 60 wide and displaced 14,450 tons.

She was the first “island” carrier. her

superstructure moved to a tight location on the starboard side of the ship.

The second was commissioned HMS

Eagle, but was originally laid down as

the dreadnought battleship Almirante

Cochrane under a contract with Chile.

War interrupted completion of the

ship, contracts were renegotiated, and

she was converted to an “island” carrier. She was the only aircraft carrier

to have two funnels.

HMS Hermes, the second carrier to

bear that name, was designed from

the keel up to operate as a carrier, the

first such vessel constructed.

Argus was the first completed, but

saw no action in the war. Convinced

now that the progress of seapower lay

in the future of aircraft carriers.

Great Britain suspended construction .

on the Eagle and Hermes until tests

were made on the first carrier. The

lessons learned were incorporated in

the Eagle —and this carrier was further tested. Results from experiments

on both her predecessors contributed

heavily to the eventual construction

of the Hermes.

The formative, experimental years

of carrier warfare drew to a close

when, on 11 November 1918, hostilities ceased and the Armistice was

signed. Out of the costly, bitter fight

for survival a potent new ship-of-theline developed. Great Britain pioneered in the creation of the modern aircraft carrier.

But at war’s end, the U.S. had no

vessel specifically built to carry aircraft to sea. Primarily, U.S. Naval

Aviation launched patrol flights from

shore bases. During the expansion of

military forces. the Navy's General

Board made concrete recommendations in favor of carrier developments.

After the Armistice, it listened to

exhaustive testimony concerning the

role of aviation in the Navy. Acting

on the Board’s findings, Congress

authorized a small amount of money

for conversion of the collier USS

Jupiter.

When the refitting was completed,

the ex-collier was renamed USS Langley and commissioned on 20 March

1922 at Norfolk, Va. Surrounded by

modern vessels of her day. she appeared to be the strangest-looking

ship to join the fleet since the Federal

ironclad Monitor squatted heavily in

the water during the Civil War. Small

and gangling as she was, USS Langley was the first-born of a large fighting family of powerful Navy ships.

HMS FURIOUS was originally a light cruiser, refitted to operate air- long, 50 wide. Hangars beneath held seaplanes and landplanes. Later,

craft, and recommissioned in July 1917. Flying deck was 228 feet she was provided a landing deck aft, fitted with arresting gear.

MARCH 1962 15
ANCHORED IN SAN DIEGO harbor January 1933, U.S. Navy’s first the recent past. At right is USS Constitution. “Old Ironsides” was

aircraft carrier, USS Langley, provides a startlinq contrast against then on her last major voyage, a tour of important U.S. seaports.

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

LANGLEY, LEX AND SARA

By Scot MacDonald

‘It is the Navy's mission to protect our coasts, our seaborne commerce, and far-flung possessions. Once war is

forced upon us we must take the offensive to win it. The Navy is the first line of offense, and Naval Aviation as an

advance guard of this line must deliver the brunt of the attack. Naval Aviation cannot take the offensive from shore;

it must go to sea on the back of the fleet. I do not believe aircraft on shore can ward off a bombing attack launched,

perhaps, from carriers by night from an unknown point for an unknown objective. On the other hand, a fleet with

adequate aviation of its own can drive the carriers back out of effective range. Both for offense and defense the fleet

and Naval Aviation are one and inseparable.’

—R.Adm. William A. Moffett, USN, October 1925, in the U.S. Naval Institute Proccedings

ONE DAY," said Capt. Thomas T.

Craven, who had relieved Capt.

Noble E. Irwin as Director of Naval

Aviation in May 1919, "one day, when

someone suggested that shoveling coal

was becoming unpopular, we proceeded

to angle for the colliers Jupiter a nd

EXPERIMENTAL autogiro takes off from Langley in September 1931 during tests underway.

16

Jason. Although some conservative

seniors frowned on the plan, in time

and with the Secretary o f the

Navy’s approval, we persuaded Congressional committees of the wisdom

of converting one ship, the Jupiter,

into an aircraft carrier. Having an

entirely inadequate speed, the vessel

could not possibly fulfill all Service

requirements, but she could serve as a

laboratory for determining naval

needs. Naval Aviation took heart.”

At war’s end, Great Britain had the

Hermes, Eagle and Argus in operation,

while Germany successfully converted

the merchantman Stuttgart into a carrier. Capt. Craven was in France at

the time, assigned as Aide for Aviation to Commander U.S. Naval Forces,

and Commander Naval Aviation

Forces (“I was deeply involved in the

complicated business of closing out the

Navy’s aeronautical account”). He

was approached by the Chief of Naval

Operations—and later, by Secretary of

the Navy, Josephus Daniels—and

asked to assume the Office of Director

of Naval Aviation.

Returning to America, he immediately studied the problems of strengthening the Navy’s complement of pilots

and support personnel, obtaining "apparatus suitable for their use,” and

developing tactics.

Cdr. Kenneth Whiting, in a memA 1928 VIEW of Langley at Pearl Harbor

shows Vought O2U Corsairs, UO's, Boeing F2B’s.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
orandum to the Committee on Naval Affairs, sized up the situation:

“When the sear ended those who

had chosen the Navy as a life work,

and especially those of the Navy who

had taken up Naval Aviation, revived

the question of ‘carriers’ and ‘fleet

aviation.’ They found the sledding

not quite so hard as formerly, but the

going was still a bit rough.

“The naval officers who had not

actually seen Naval Aviation working

retained their ultra conservatism;

some of those who had seen it working were still conservative, but not

ultra; they were in the class ‘from

Missouri’ and wished to be ‘shown.’

Others, among the ranking officers

who had seen, had conquered their

conservatism and were convinced.

“This latter group, headed by the

General Board of the Navy, and including Adm. Henry T. Mayo, Adm.

N.C. Twining, Capt. Ernest J. King

and Capt. W.S. Pye, both on the staff

of the commander in chief during

the war, Capt. H.I. Cone and Capt.

Thomas T. Craven, incontinently demanded that ‘carriers’ be added to

our fleets.

“The net result of these demands

was the recommendation that the

collier Jupiter be converted into a

‘carrier’ in order that the claims of

the naval aviators might be given a

demonstration.”

Jupiter did not possess all the characteristics that would have made her

an ideal aircraft carrier, but she did

have many advantages. Commissioned

April 7, 1913 as fleet collier No. 3,

she, with the Neptune, carried the

first Naval Aviation detachments to

France in World War I. At war’s end,

she was scheduled for retirement.

“At the time she was selected [for

conversion to an aircraft carrier],”

Cdr. Whiting pointed out, “her advanCAPT. THOMAS T. CRAVEN, Director of Naval

Aviation, pressed hard in Congressional hearings for conversion of the collier Jupiter.

RADM. WILLIAM A. MOFFETT was first Chief

of Bureau of Aeronautics and was an ardent

advocate of the development of carriers.

A VE-7 AIRCRAFT lands on USS Langley in May 1927, using longitudinal wires on fiddle bridges

for an arresting arrangement. Note tail hook on plane and masts of sailing ship under wings.

tages outweighed her disadvantages.”

The ship was slow and might prove

a drogue to a fast-moving fleet. But

she did have the necessary length to

permit planes to fly off from a specially prepared deck. Her hold spaces

were very large, “with high head room

in them, a difficult thing to find in any

ship. She had larger hatches leading

to these holds than most ships, a factor permitting the stowing of the

largest number of planes.”

Jupiter was electricly-driven, the

first of a few ships in the current fleet

to be so powered. Her top speed was

a comparatively slow 14 knots. One

of the clinching arguments for her

conversion was her small crew requirement. With hostilities over, non-regular Navy men were eager to continue

civilian activities and were leaving

service in large numbers.

Jupiter sailed to Norfolk Navy

Yard where the conversion work was

accomplished. “We thought she could

be converted cheaply,” Cdr. Whiting

said, “—that was a mistake, however.

In any event, she will have cost less

when completely converted than any

other ship we might have selected.

We thought she could be converted

quickly—that was another mistake.

The war is over and labor, contractors

and material men are taking a breathing spell. The recommendation for

her conversion was made by the General Board of the Navy early in 1919;

Congress appropriated the money [on

11 July] 1919; she was promised for

January 1921; she may be ready by

July 1921." She was not. Jupiter’s

designation was changed to CV on

July 11, 1919; she went into the yard

for conversion March 1920, and was

commissiond USS Langley (CV-1)

on March 20, 1922, at Norfolk, Va.

DOUGLAS TORPEDO bomber, DT-2, launches

from Langley’s deck while carrier is berthed.

MAY 1962 17
In the yards, all the coal-handling

gear was removed from the collier and

a flight deck, 534 feet long and 64

feet wide, was installed. At first, it

was planned that this deck would be

completely free of obstruction, and

so it was in the Langley. But in

the Sara and Lex, this view was

changed in favor of an island

placed on the starboard side. This

side was selected for the island’s

location because it provided a better

view of buoy markers in narrow channels. It also facilitated left-hand turns

which pilots preferred, owing to the

torque of the turning propeller. The

island design offered the only practical

solution to problems predicated by

smoke discharge, navigation, fire control, and communications.

An elevator was installed to lift

planes from the assembly and storage

deck to the flight deck. A palisade

was built around this elevator to provide a windbreak, protecting the

planes and men while the aircraft were

being assembled.

For the hoisting of seaplanes, two

cranes with large outreach were installed on the hangar deck, one on either

side of the ship. Traveling cranes

were installed beneath the flight deck

for hoisting planes from the hold and

for transferring them fore and aft to

the ship spaces and elevator.

The collier’s firerooms were located

well aft. This permitted an easier

handling of gasses to guarantee a

minimum interference with planes

when they touched down on her deck.

“She had ample space for machine,

carpenter, metal and wing repair

stowage; spare parts, spare engines, and

shops; for gasoline and lubricating oil

aircraft ammunition. Her living quarters appeared to be a bit crowded, but

sufficient for the work to be undertaken. ”

Smoke pipe plans called for the

provisions of a short smoke pipe on

each side of the ship, clear of the

flight deck. They were interconnected

so that smoke could be discharged on

the lee side. One of the smoke pipes

was designed to hinge downward when

considered necessary to discharge near

the water; the second, to discharge

smoke downward through water spray.

F

ROM M AY 1919 to March 1921,

during his tour as Director of

Naval Aviation, Capt. Craven directed

much attention to the training of pilots. “Pending the completion of facilities that would enable the Navy

to train pilots to fly landplanes from

the deck of a carrier,” he wrote, “arrangements were effected to have

naval flyers instructed in the Army

school at Arcadia, Fla. The entire

naval contingent[s] quickly and easily completed the Army’s course.”

They also received Army training at

Mitchel Field on Long Island and at

Langley Field, Va.

Earlier, LCdr. Godfrey de Courcelles Chevalier led a team of 15 pilots

who were put into training with landplanes, practicing touch-and-go flight

deck landings on a 100-foot long platform constructed on a coal barge at

Washington Navy Yard. The barge

was moved to Anacostia where landing tests were conducted.

Experiments were conducted at

Hampton Roads in which Lt. Alfred

M. Pride participated. A turntable

platform was used, similar to the type

the British developed in WW I—in

turn, an improvement of Ely’s arrangement used on the Pennsylvania.

A BU AER letter dated November 19,

1923, described the Langley and British

systems. The Langley gear, the letter

states, “depends on an athwartship retarding force while the [British] gear

depends on air resistance together with

the resistance set up by fore and aft

cables.” The Langley wires were suspended about ten inches above the

deck. They were not entirely satisfactory, but were used, with some

modifications, in the Lcxington a nd

Saratoga until 1929.

When Langley eventually went to

sea in September 1922, she had an arresting gear installed.

A copy of an order dated February

1, 1923, signed by Executive Officer

Kenneth Whiting, gives a clue to

Langley’s shipboard routine:

“The weather permitting, the ship

will get underway at 9:00 A.M .

tomorrow February 2, 1923, and will

proceed out of the harbor for the

purpose of flying planes off and on

the ship.

“The tug Alleghany will accpnpany

the ship and take station one hundred

yards out and 200 yards astern of

the starboard quarter, steaming at

same ratio of speed as the Langley—

about 6 knots.

“When [pilots are] flying off and

CREW OF USS LEXINGTON (CV-2) line up for admiral's inspection coast. Total accommadtions on board berthed 195 officers and 1927

while the carrier is at anchor in Coronado Roads off the California enlisted men. She was fourth U.S. Navy ship to be named Lexington.

18 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
on, both life boats will be lowered to

rail and manned; the first or second

motor sailing launch, depending upon

which stack is in use will be lowered

to the level of the poop deck, manned

and equipped with grapnels, crash

kits and six men in addition to the

crew. The Boatswain will be in charge

of this boat and will go in the boat.

“The Flight Surgeon will fly over

the ship in a flying boat piloted by

O.M. Darling, ACR, USN. This plane

will maintain station 200 yards behind

and 200 feet above the plane which is

flying off and on.

“This seaplane will start from the

Naval Air Station upon a radio signal

from the ship: Boatswain Fehrer will

go in the tug accompanied by three

men from the Fourth Division and a

crash kit.

“In case of fog tomorrow the ship

will not get underway, but will stand

by until noon; in the event that the

fog is cleared up by that time, will

proceed.

“Steam will be kept on three

boilers and engines in maneuvering

condition. In case plane goes into the

water, the first boat to get to it shall

at once attempt to rescue the aviator,

at the same time making a line fast

to same strong part of the plane, in

order to hold the cockpit above water.

This line if possible should be passed

around one of the ‘A’ frames or engine section, or a longeron in the

vicinity of the cockpit.”

T

HE FIRST take-off from the deck

of the Langley was piloted

October 17, 1922 by Lt. Virgil C.

Griffin in a VE-7-SF. On October 26th,

the first landing was made by LCdr.

Chevalier in an Aeromarine aircraft

while the ship was underway. He had

contributed significantly to perfecting

the arresting gear installed aboard—

still in an experimental stage. His

plane nosed over. Cdr. Whiting, on

November 18, became the first to catapult from the deck of the Langley; he

flew a PT torpedo bomber.

These aircraft—and other types

used at the time—were of standard

design. The Bureau of Aeronautics

decided to delay introducing new

types, although studies of planes built

for carrier operations started with the

conversion of the collier. Vought and

Aeromarine service types were first to

be modified for operations aboard; arresting hooks were installed and the

landing gear strengthened.

For the first three years following

her commissioning, USS Langley had

no regularly assigned squadrons. She

was used as an experimental ship, testing gear and aircraft, and training

pilots and support personnel. For the

first five years of her operations, she

was the only aircraft carrier in the

U.S. Navy. Because of the flight deck

installed, she was quickly dubbed “the

Covered Wagon,” and this was reflected in her official insignia.

Principal purpose of the Langley

was to teach Naval Aviators about

carrier operations, but the early days

were certainly tough on pilots, according to Our Flying Navy, a book

published in 1944. “‘Instrument face’

was the distinguishing mark of the

Langley’s pilots, who loosened teeth

and flattened noses against their instrument panels while negotiating the

hazards of landing on the Langley’s

small flight deck and crude arresting

gear. Planes went overboard, piled up

in the crash barrier, stood on their

noses and came apart. [There were few

fatalities.] But the science of carrier

operations was developed as a monument to these pilots’ perseverance.”

The “small flight deck” was as long

as later-day “baby flattops.”

Arresting gear and catapult systems were tried, modified, improved

upon; pilots qualified for carrier landings and take-offs. In March 1925,

she entered her first fleet exercise, Fleet

Problem No. Five, off the lower coast

of California. Scouting flights from

the carrier now became standard procedure and so impressed official observers that they recommended the

completion of USS Saratoga and USS

Lexington be speeded up.

There was an urgency related to

these tests. Already in the ways were

the keels of two battle cruisers destined for the scrap heap as a result of

the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

A clause within this treaty permitted

their conversion to aircraft carriers.

Tests aboard the Langley were to ininfluence greatly the final designs of

the two ships under conversion. These

converted battle cruisers were to become USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS

Saratoga (CV-3).

At first, the U.S. Navy contemplated the construction of a 39,000-

ton aircraft carrier and initial design

of it was started February 24, 1921.

These plans were laid aside the following November. Because of the 135,-

000-ton limitation in aircraft carriers,

the General Board recommended the

conversion of the two battle cruisers

to carriers. Each was limited to 33,000

tons, with an additional 3000 tons

permissible if protecting armor were

added.

The Board considered building a 30-

knot carrier to operate with the

Scouting Force, and a smaller, 24-

MAY 1962 19
AVIATOR’S READY ROOM in Saratoga is photographed in August 1929. LONGITUDINAL Wires still use on Jan. 11, 1928 for first landing on

Device on fore-table is Morse radio key for practice code transmission. Sara; UO-1 plane flown by Marc Mitscher, S.B. Spangler, passenger.

knot carrier for the Battle Force. It

also weighed the possibility of constructing three separate carriers within the tonnage limitations: one at 10,-

000 tons and 15 knots, another at 20,-

000 tons and 29.5 knots, and a third

at 35,000 tons at 33 or 34 knots. Instead, it returned to the battle cruisers

and went ahead with plans to convert

them. The Langley was not an influencing factor in carrier tonnage

limitations since it was officially listed

as an experimental ship.

Before Langley was commissioned,

Craven became Commandant of the

Ninth Naval District, relieved March

7, 1921 by Capt. William A. Moffett,

who became the last Director of Naval

Aviation. On July 26, 1921 that office

was abolished, replaced by the newly

authorized Chief of the Bureau of

Aeronautics, which Moffett assumed.

MUCH OF THE WORK that wen t

into the design of the abandoned

39,000-ton carrier was adapted in the

design of the battle cruiser conversions. These plans were worked up by

the New Design Section of the Bureau of Construction and Repair.

Draftsman Ernest A. Perham gave a

detailed report on the progress of construction:

“During February 1921, the first

scheme for the stowage of planes in

the hangar was begun and to date,

October 1922, we have drawn up 18

schemes and not even the latest has

progressed beyond the pencil stage.

“There had been a feeling, not

definite enough to be called a requirement, that the ship should carry 100

planes, two-thirds in the hangar ready

20

/or use, and one-third completely assembled in the reserve stowage.

“The first few schemes were as

fragmentary as the data on which

they were based. It was necessary to

start as early as possible as there was

absolutely neither data nor precedent

to work on, and every scheme made,

however poor, gave us so much more

training.

“Scheme #7 was the first that was

based on a hangar of the island type

of ship, and even then we were considering a land plane of 70-foot wing

spread for a large plane.

“When scheme #8 was worked up,

the sizes of the elevators had been

settled and we worked on the basis of

a plane of maximum size, 60-foot

wing spread.

“Scheme #11 was the first in which

we used planes that Aeronautics considered would meet their requirements.

The small plane, a flying boat of 30-

foot wing spread, had appeared several schemes earlier and the large or

bombing plane was the Davis Douglas

type, of 50-foot wing spread. The

wings of the small plane were arranged

to take off bodily and those of the

larger were designed so that the ends

would fold back.”

Armor considerations were the subject of brisk correspondence between

various Bureaus. Preliminary studies

offered a long, sloping, protective deck

at the sides, beginning six feet below

the water line and rising to about six

feet above, to the flat third deck. The

armor was five or six inches thick at

the slopes and three inches on the flat.

Further studies by the New Design

Section produced a change in these

plans, shrinking the flat deck plating

to 23⁄4 inches, with a side belt 121⁄2

feet deep, seven inches thick at the

top and four at the bottom. The Bureau of Ordnance raised “serious objection.” The General Board reviewed

the problem and recommended the inclined deck armor. A new contract

plan narrowed the belt to 81⁄2 feet,

seven inches thick at the top, four

inches at the bottom, a deck 41⁄2

inches thick on the slopes and 21⁄4

inches on the flat.

The matter of battery was also

problematical. Under the treaty, eightinch guns were allowed for this type

vessel. Also scheduled for installation

were anti-aircraft guns and torpedo

tubes.

The Bureau of Aeronautics believed

in January 1922 that anti-aircraft

guns were not necessary. In a letter

written on the 16th of that month,

B U AER stated: “The necessary defense of an airplane carrier against aircraft should be the aircraft carried on

the carrier. It should therefore not be

necessary to install anti-aircraft guns

on board an airplane carrier.” BUAER

also advocated six-inch guns instead

of eight.

But the General Board took exception to these objections the following

April:

“The after eight-inch guns are an

important part of the airplane carrier’s armament; six-inch guns would

complicate the battery and would not

be as efficient . . . .

“The carrier may be able under

many conditions to defend itself with

some success with its own aircraft.

The primary mission, however, of

those aircraft is not the defense of

their carrier, so it may well happen

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
that they will not be available for defense when most needed for that purpose. Aircraft will, of course, be useless as defensive weapons at night

and under certain conditions o f

weather.

“Having these points in mind, the

General Board considered it necessary

to provide a strong anti-torpedo, antiaircraft battery in spite of the encroachment of that battery on the

clear deck space forward.

“Should experience in service and

the development of tactics justify the

removal of any or all of the guns,

they can be removed with almost no

expense or delay, while it would be

a long and expensive job to install

these guns after the ship is completed, should such installation then

appear necessary.”

The draftsman Perham discussed

elevator machinery. In a report, he

wrote as follows:

“The topic of elevator machinery

was actively taken in hand February

1921. Some consideration was given

to wire rope hoist, but the obvious

difficulties caused its rejection.

"Screw actuated elevators appealed

greatly because of the feature of absolute control . . . . AS the investigation progressed, practical objections

arose, such as the wear on the screw,

methods of aligning and especially

the impracticabiIity of obtaining the

necessary speed.

“The Otis Elevator Company then

recommended hydraulic plunger elevators, and as the locations could be

obtained for the plungers, the Bureau

readily consented to the adoption of

this type.

‘As finally worked out, the speed

of the large elevator, 20 x 60 feet in

size, is to be 60 feet per minute and

that of the smaller one, 30 x 36 feet,

is to be 120 feet per minute. When

both are run at the same time, they

will be capable of making round trips

every four minutes.”

Fire protection came into consideration and a fire foam protective system

was adopted, supplemented by a complete sprinkling system in the hangar

and reserve plane stowage.

In original designs, a flight deck

clear of obstructions was considered

basic. Wind tunnel tests were conducted and on July 6, 1921, the island

type was approved. On June 27, the

General Board reported: “The adoption of the smoke pipe type (island

type) [is recommended] as the experiments in the wind tunnel show

that in the flush deck type the gasses

are drawn in against the ship’s side

MAY 1962

and across the deck even with a slight

cross wind. As no attempt has ever

been made to dispose of such an enormous volume of gasses without the

use of a smoke pipe, the success would

be doubtful.”

T

URNTABLE catapults were considered necessary for a long period for

the launching of small planes. But in

January 1922, B UAER knocked them

out of the design as being “not required.” The Bureau did, however,

recommend the installation of catapults in the flight deck. In a letter

dated January 18, 1922, it stated by

way of explanation.

“The preliminary mission of the

carrier is to get planes in the air

quickly, both torpedo planes and combat [fighter] planes. Due to lack of

operating experience, it is impossible

to tell at this time whether this can

be accomplished without the use of

catapults and, if not, how many catapults will be necessary; hence, it is

deemed imperative that at least two

catapults be provided—one forward

and one aft—with structural provisions to increase this number to three

forward and three aft, should operating experience prove this to be necessary.”

The compressed air catapult was

installed in the Langley. Though seldom used, launchings from it contributed to future design. The Saratoga and Lexington were equipped

with fly-wheel type catapults when

the two carriers were commissioned.

On October 3, 1925, USS Lexington slid down the ways of the Fore

River yards of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., at Quincy, Mass.

There were 30,000 people cheering as

aircraft swept low overhead. Three

hours after the launching, she was

towed to a pier in the shipyards for

the installation of machinery and the

completion of her inner structure. On

December 14, 1927, she was formally

commissioned. Nearly a month earlier, on November 16, USS Saratoga

had been commissioned CV-3. It had

been constructed by the New York

Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden,

New Jersey.

Standard displacement of both carriers was 33,000 tons. Each had a

901-foot overall length, a beam of 111

feet, 9 inches, a mean draft of 32 feet,

and 16 boilers, as opposed to the eight

aboard most current carriers. Their

engines produced 180,000 hp, and

their speed was 331⁄4 knots. Armament

included eight eight-inch and 12 fiveinch guns. The cost of building the

Saratoga, according to an August 1952

article in BU SHIPS ]ournal, was $43,-

856,492.59, while the Lexington was

slightly more expensive, $45,952, -

644.83.

Earlier, upon the occasion of the

first take-off from the Langley ,

RAdm. Moffett declared: “The air

fleet of an enemy will never get within

striking distance of our coast as long

as our aircraft carriers are able to

carry the preponderance of air power

to sea. ” In Lexington and Saratoga,

the U.S. Navy had two of the strongest aircraft carriers in all the world.

A SOLID STRIPE painted down center of Saratoga's stack distinguished her from her sister ship,

USS Lexington. Saraatoga was commissioned November 16, 1927, Lexington on Dec. 14, 1927.

21
of Aircraft Carriers

RIERS FROM THE KEEL

By Scot MacDonald

‘Such remarks as I may have to make as to the nature and extent of the air force required by the Navy will be based

upon the assumption that the airplane is now a major force, and is becoming daily more efficient and its weapons more

deadly, . . . that therefore even a small, high-speed carrier alone can destroy or disable a battleship alone, that a

fleet whose carriers give it command of the air over the enemy fleet can defeat the latter, that the fast carrier is the

capital ship of the future. Based upon these assumptions, it is evident that our policy in regard to the Navy air force

should be command of the air over the fleet of any possible enemy.’—Adm. William S. Sims, USN, October 14, 1925

P

LENIPOTENTIARIES of the United

States, the British Empire, France,

Italy and Japan met in Washington

in the early Twenties to reach an

agreement on the limitation of naval armament. The treaty they signed

on February 6, 1922 had a profound

effect on the evolution of aircraft carriers. From the time the U.S. Navy

first embarked upon a carrier-building

program, it was faced with tonnage

limitations established by this treaty.

The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the contracting powers

permitted the U.S. and Great Britain

131,000 tons each, France and Italy

60,000 tons each, and Japan 81,000

tons. Of its allotted tonnage, the

United States had already consumed

66,000 in the Lexington and Saratoga.

Only 69,000 tons remained for future

construction. The Navy gave much

thought and study to the means of

best utilizing this remainder, and, in

1927, when drawing up a five-year

shipbuilding program, the General

Board recommended construction of a

13,800-ton carrier each year.

The program involving this plan was

promptly submitted to the President

who approved it on December 31,

1927. It was subsequently submitted

to Congress which, by act of February 13, 1929, authorized construction

of one 13,800-ton carrier. The Navy

attempted in the following years to

obtain authorization for construction

of the visualized sister ships, but without success. Indeed, before another

carrier was to be authorized, the Navy

had become more interested in larger

ships of about 20,000 tons.

In addition to the legal reasons

which led the Navy to seek a 13,800-

ton carrier, there was a body of thinking on the part of some Naval AviaNAVAL AVIATION NEWS
——.

OPERATING WITH THE FLEET, USS Ranger had 14,500-ton displace- stern. On deck are parked Vought scout bombers, Grumman fighters,

ment. Unusual features were bow arresting gear, small island, stacks at Martin dive bombers in 1937 view. Capt. A.L. Bristol was first C.O.

tors which recognized the utility of

small carriers. This was evident as

early as 1925 when the General Board

briefly considered but rejected the conversion of 10,000-ton cruisers to light

carriers.

Two years later, LCdr. Bruce G.

Leighton, then aide to the Secretary

of the Navy, prepared a study on possible uses of small carriers. In addition

to protection of the battle line, he suggested their suitability for anti-submarine warfare, reconnaissance, and reduction of enemy shore bases.

At about the same time, RAdm.

William A. Moffett argued that British and Japanese experience with small

carriers had made it clear that such

ships could keep more aircraft in operation than could an equal tonnage

devoted to larger ships.

Fleet commanders, who might be

expected to have had a more conservative view of the military utility of

aircraft than did Moffett and Leighton,

expounded concepts that provided further justification for smaller carriers.

For example, the Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, noted in his 1927

annual report that the Fleet was seriously handicapped by the absence of

a carrier with the battle line upon

which spotting planes could land.

Thus, both the aviation protagonists

and the surface commanders recognized the need for carriers which

would perform important roles, even

if they were not of a size approaching

that of the giants, USS Lexington and

USS Saratoga.

Such considerations were in the

genesis of CV-4. When it came to

reducing them to detailed plans for

JUNE 1962

construction of a new ship, very little

had been done. Studies made in 1923

and 1924 had been concerned with

island-type vessels, such as the Lexington and Saratoga, and were not directly applicable to a new design—

which was to be of the flush-deck

variety. In addition, the basic concept

for CV-4 was embodied in the General

Board recommendations of 1927 and

predated the commissioning of L e x

and Sara. Hence, the concept could

not incorporate any lessons learned

TWO-SEATER Vought O3U-3 Corsairs, such

as the one above, operated from USS Ranger.

FIRST LANDING on CV-4 was made June ’34

by LCdr. A.C. Davis; H.E. Wallace, ACMM.

during their early fleet operations.

This concept, as outlined by the

General Board, included a speed of

29.4 knots, a clear flying deck, 12

five-inch anti-aircraft guns and as

many machine guns as possible. On

July 26, 1928, BU A ER elaborated on

this proposed design in a letter to

Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle

Fleet. The flight deck was to be about

86 feet by 750 feet and fitted with

arresting gear. The navigating and

signal bridge were to be under the

flight deck, well forward, with extensions beyond the ships side, port and

starboard.

As for the anti-aircraft battery, it

had been reduced to eight 5-inch 25-

caliber guns located two on each quarter. Anti-aircraft battery directors

were to be provided, but BU A E R

thought that range finders should be

omitted.

Secondary conning stations were to

be located on the starboard side of

the upper deck and combined with the

aviation control station. A plotting

station consisting of flag plot and

aviation intelligence office was also to

be provided.

Despite the fact that the general

concept could not benefit from experiences of the Lexington and Saratoga, the two ships did comment on

plans for the Ranger on the basis of

such experience as they had obtained

during the first year’s operation.

For example, they felt that both

elevators and shop provisions should

receive special consideration above and

beyond that which had already been

given.

“Experience during the present con23
CURTISS HELLDIVERS fly over the USS Ranger during WW II. Spotted OUTRIGGER PARKING, here on the USS Ranger’s starboard side, supon the deck forward are Vought Corsairs and Grumman Hellcats, ported a Boeing F4B-4 in August 1934. This system saved deck space.

centration on both carriers has emphasized the importance of the after

elevator in addition to the two now

contemplated (for CV-4),” wrote

Saratoga’s comanding officer.

“There is required a great deal of

re-spotting of planes in flight operations, and an after elevator will considerably expedite this process. After

planes have landed on deck, it is sometimes necessary to send below a plane

from the after part of the flight deck,

which is now difficult with the flight

deck filled with planes and the elevators forward.”

o

FFICERS ABOARD both Lex and Sara

held informal conferences, the

results of which were passed to BUAER.

Speed was most desirable in aircraft

carriers, but speed also had its drawbacks, as these officers were quick to

point out to their superiors.

“The location of the A&R and general work shops aft is decidedly undesirable,” BU AER informed the Bureau

of Construction and Repair, “and it is

strongly recommended that they be

relocated further forward, if there is

any possible way of doing so. Experience on CV-2 and CV-3 has shown

that it is impossible to do any work

requiring precision or accuracy, such

as cutting a thread, when the ship is

steaming at about 22 knots or more.”

Early in the planning stage, BUAER

encountered head-on the problem of

lighting and night landings. A memorandum written for BU A ER files

pointed out: “The primary difficulty

involved in night operations for airplane carriers is the provision of ade24

quate illumination to enable the pilots

to make safe landings and at the same

time to enable the ship to maintain

darkened ship conditions that will prevent disclosure of the carrier’s provision to surface craft and enemy aircraft. . . . The technical difficulties

in this project are so great that complete success can scarcely be hoped for

for several years and then not without

the expenditure of much more time

and effort than appears desirable at

present.

“Night flying experiments were conducted on the Langley to determine

the type of illuminating equipment

for the Saratoga and Lexington. Although the number of landings made

were not very great, enough information was obtained to determine upon

equipment that would at least provide

for a point of departure for future experiments in an effort to further solve

the basic problem. No carrier night

flying has been conducted since 1925.”

The memorandum was dated June 14,

1929.

This sparked an intensive series of

experiments which caused the introduction of several lighting systems

aboard various carriers. At best, most

of these provided safe illumination for

night landing but were less successful

in maintaining darkened ship. Incandescent lights of low wattage were

tested in various arrangements and intensities. Neon tubes were tried, some

colored green, red, blue or amber. Of

these, plain white was considered the

best—but was not a solution. Even

luminous paint was investigated. The

problem of night deck illumination

was to plague Navy for years to come.

How the problem was handled in

USS Ranger is indicated by a November 1934 report her commanding officer made to BUAER:

“In anything but bright moonlight

when the ship’s outline can be made

out at a reasonable approach distance,

it is very difficult, definitely too difficult, to get in the groove when only

landing deck lights are used. Although

Ranger’s landing deck lights extend

the length of the ship and are well

lined up on each side, which it was

hoped would improve the difficulty

described by Saratoga and Lexington

pilots, the pilot is frequently too near

the ship before he can find out which

way to swerve. If he happens to hit

the groove early, he is well fixed. If

he doesn’t, he sees a jumble of landing

deck lights and can only guess whether

to change course to right or to left.

“With ramp lights turned on in

addition to the landing deck lights,

there is unanimous agreement that

getting in the groove is very easy. Exactly why this is true is not clear, but

the string of lights across the ramp

appears not only definitely to locate

the end of the deck, but also to give

the pilot sufficient basis for setting

his course normal to the lights and up

to the centerline of the deck.

“Athwartship landing deck lights

at bow and stern are no use and would

be hazardous if opened when planes

are landing. (Confusion in getting in

the groove existed whether or not

these lights were opened, worse when

opened.)”

Other problems were of concern to

B U A ER during the design stage of

CV-4. Relatively minor, but illustrative of the care devoted to carrier deNAVAL AVIATION NEWS
sign, was the question of paint color

for interior surfaces. A flurry of correspondence between BU A E R and

B U C&R concerned the color of paint

to use on the deck, overhead, and

bulkheads of the hangar.

This was not so much a problem of

habitability as it was one of weight

limitation and maximum reflective

power. White paint, light gray and

aluminum were considered. Misinformation supplied the Bureau of Engineering caused it to advocate light

gray, but BUAER objected. Tests were

conducted and aluminum proved

lighter and more reflective of the three

paints considered.

Finally, in early December 1929,

plans for CV-4 received approval.

Copies were sent to the Fleet, noting

that major changes could not be made

in them, but that the Bureau would

“be glad to have comment or suggestion with regard to minor points,

should such comment appear desirable.”

By February 1930, active work on

the design of the 13,800-ton carrier

had stopped. Shortly after British

Prime Minister Mr. MacDonald visited

the United States, the President gave

instructions to suspend all work on

this ship, pending the outcome of the

then projected London conference on

naval armament. Months went by, the

President was consulted again, and

again the Navy was told to do nothing

about the ship until the treaty had

been ratified.

The treaty was signed in London

on April 22, 1930. Ratification of

the treaty was advised by the Senate

on July 21, 1930, and by the President

on the following day.

In the meantime, the Navy Department, Office of the Judge Advocate

General, drafted an advertisement

which was published when the ratification restriction was lifted. The advertisement invited bids for the construction of CV-4. The bids were

opened September 3—and proved to

be “bombs.”

All bids submitted far exceeded the

appropriation given the Navy for construction of the ship, the lowest bid

(by Newport News Shipbuilding and

Dry Dock Co.) exceeding the limit

by an estimated $2,160,000.

The four Navy Department bureaus

involved in the construction plans—

B U C&R, BU A E R, BU O R D, BU E N G—

forwarded a joint memorandum to the

Secretary of the Navy requesting a 60-

day extension of the period before execution of the contract in order to consider necessary changes in characteristics which would permit construction

of the carrier within the cost of the

lowest bid.

Permission was obtained and the

various departments reviewed their requirements. Panels of officer-experts

in each were formed to submit recommendations. Out went consideration

of an extra elevator. Out went the

possibility—at this time—of moving

the shops forward, as Sara and Lex had

suggested. Submitting its list of recommended savings, BU AER listed the

elimination of catapults, smokestacks

on one side, sliding doors for the

hangars, securing tracks, and airplane

booms and nets, and requested that

necessary eliminations be made in that

order.

“This bureau feels,” wrote Cdr.

R. K. Turner for BU AER , "that elimination or reduction in the balance of

items considered, namely, arresting

gear, elevators, or gasoline capacity

would seriously affect the characteristics of the ship as an aircraft carrier,

and, therefore, urgently recommends

against any sacrifice in these items.”

By October 2, the Bureaus had

signed another joint letter, addressed

to the General Board, listing their recommendations on how to cope with the

problem of the elimination of design

features. Among other things, Ranger's fire control was to be simplified,

ammunition storage space was to be

reduced, bombing planes were to be

substituted for torpedo planes (this

eliminated the purchase of torpedoes),

deck catapults were to go by the

boards, as were plane booms and

nets. Twenty percent of the flight

deck securing tracks were to be eliminated, as well as housing palisades, and

the voice tube system. Finally, the

arresting gear system was to be reduced. On November 1, 1930, the

contract was signed by Newport

News.

Throughout official correspondence,

the 13,800-ton carrier was referred to

simply as CV-4. On December 10,

1930, the Bureau of Navigation informed a long list of addressees that

“The Secretary of the Navy has assigned the name Ranger to Aircraft

Carrier No. 4, authorized by Act of

Congress dated February 13, 1929. The

assignment of the name Ranger is in

accordance with the Department’s

policy of giving names formerly assigned to those battle cruisers scrapped

by terms of the Washington Treaty.”

On September 26, 1931, Ranger’s

keel was laid. Seventeen months later,

the ship was launched, and on June

4, 1934, she was commissioned.

Though planned originally as a 13,800-

USS YORKTOWN (CV-5) was launched in April 1936 and commis- botb the Atlantic and Pacific before WW II, participating in Fleet

sioned in September 1937. The 19,800-ton aircraft carrier operated in problems and training activities. First C.O. was Capt. E.D. McWhorter.

JUNE 1962 25
ton aircraft carrier, she exceeded this

tonnage by 700 tons. Original plans

also called for a severe flush deck, but,

upon commissioning, she had a small . . .

island.

USS Ranger had eight 5-inch 25-

caliber AA guns, other AA guns in

gallery. She could operate 75 aircraft

and had a complement of 1788, of

whom 162 were commissioned officers.

Her aircraft consisted of four squadrons of bombers and fighters and a few

amphibians. CV-4 also was equipped

with a box arresting gear—a feature

included in other fast carriers until

early 1943.

The General Board had become con2 6

vinced—even before the Ranger was

launched—that the minimum effective

size of aircraft carriers was 20,000

tons. A request for two of these

heavier ships was made in the Building Program for 1934, which was

issued in September 1932. In May the

following year, the Board again submitted this recommendation. As a result, the Secretary of the Navy asked

the President for Public Works Administration funds to build two carriers of this tonnage, in addition to

other ships. USS Yorktown (CV-5)

and USS Enterprise (CV-6) were

authorized.

Files of the Bureau of Aeronautics

housed in the National Archives reveal

a memorandum dated May 15, 1931,

which was to affect the two new carriers:

“The Department has approved a

new building program with two aircraft carriers similar to the Ranger ,

but before embarking on this new

construction, it is suggested that a

careful examination may show many

design changes are desirable.

“The particular improvements in

the Ranger design that should be

considered are: speed increase to 32.5

knots; addition of underwater subdivision to resist torpedo and bomb

explosions; horizontal protective deck

over machinery magazines, and aircraft fuel tanks ; improvement in

operational facility (this includes

hangar deck devoted exclusively to

plane stowage, four fast elevators,

complete bomb handling facilities,

possible use of two flying-off decks,

and improved machine gun anti-aircraft defense).”

The Yorktown was launched April

4, 1936, sponsored by Mrs. Franklin

D. Roosevelt. When the carrier was

commissioned September 30, 1937, her

over-all length was 827 feet, four

inches; extreme beam was 95 feet, four

inches; and standard displacement, 19,-

800 tons. Her trial speed was 33.6

knots.

USS Enterprise (CV-6) was the

seventh Navy ship to bear this name.

Her keel was laid July 16, 1934 and

she was launched October 3, 1936,

sponsored by Mrs. Claude A. Swanson,

wife of the Secretary of the Navy.

She was placed in commission at Norfolk on May 12, 1938. Her specifications were similar to Yorktown’s. She

had accommodations for 82 ship’s company officers and 1447 enlisted men.

As soon as CV-5 and CV-6 were

authorized, the General Board did not

request additional carriers of such

tonnage. It did, however, vainly plead

for a 15,200-ton replacement for the

obsolete Langley. The Langley h a d

been classed as an experimental ship

and did not figure in the U.S. Navy’s

aircraft carrier tonnage limitations. To

replace her with another carrier would

have been to violate the treaty. The

Navy did plan, however, to request

new aircraft carriers when the Lexington and Saratoga reached retirement

age.

Tightening of world tensions in

1938 caused the Navy Department to

reconsider its carrier-building program,

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
and USS Hornet (CV-8) was authorized on May 17 that year. She was

launched December 14, 1940 and commissioned October 21, 1941, with

Capt. Marc A. Mitscher, her first commanding officer.

USS Wasp (CV-7) had been ordered earlier, on March 27, 1934. Her

keel was laid April 1, 1936, she was

launched April 4, 1939, and commissioned April 25, 1940. This carrier

had to be built within what was left

of the 135,000-ton limit set by the

treaty. She was commissioned at 14,-

700 tons. Thus there were left only a

few hundred tons remaining of the

treaty-authorized carrier strength.

Already in the mill, during construction of Yorktown and Enterprise,

were plans for a new class of aircraft

carrier, the first of which would be

known as USS Essex (CV-9).

War clouds were gathering over

Europe and the Pacific. Fleet exercises and war games were stepped up

as international tensions mounted. The

treaties of 1922 and 1930 terminated

December 31, 1936 when Japan abrogated.

In its provisions for Naval Aviation,

the Naval Expansion Act of May 17,

1938 authorized an increase in total

tonnage of under-age naval vessels

amounting to 40,000 tons for aircraft

carriers, and also Authorized the President to increase the number of naval

aircraft to “not less than” 3000. Carriers built as a result of this authorization were the Hornet and Essex.

On September 8, 1939, President

Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of

a limited national emergency and directed measures for strengthening national defenses within the limits of

peacetime authorization. In May 1941,

an unlimited national emergency was

declared. Seven months later Japanese aircraft, launched from carriers,

attacked Pearl Harbor, and within

24 hours, the President went before

Congress and the nation was at war.

USS HORNET (CV-8) was authorized in 1938 when world tensions

mounted, launched in December 1940, commissioned in October 1941.

JUNE 1962

SISTER SHIP to Yorktown and Enterprise, Hornet had a standard displacement of 19,800 tons. First C.O. was Capt. Marc A. Mitscher.

27
AS SHE APPEARED in March 1925 when the first aircraft carrier ap- carrier capability that the first four games lacked. Fleet Problem

peared in the annual war games, USS Langley (CV-1) provided actual V was conducted off California. It provided “valuable experience.”

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

FLATTOPS IN THE WAR GAMES

By Scot MacDonald

‘If the mind’s eye is always directed upon the series of engagements, so far as it can be perceived beforehand, then

it is fixed upon the direct road to its goal, and thereby the movement of our strength acquires that rapidity, that is to say,

our volition and action acquire that energy which the occasion demands and which is not disturbed by extraneous influences.’

ONE OF THOSE whose untiring efforts helped shape the evolution

of the “all big gun battleship,” Adm.

William S. Sims, did not immediately

endorse Naval Aviation—especially

ships carrying naval aircraft—upon

its introduction as a weapon in the

country’s arsenal. In 1909, for instance, he wrote: “According to the

papers, one of the Wright brothers has

stated that it would be impracticable

to hit anything by dropping a projectile from his flying [machine]. That

Wright man is right, all right.”

Sims had a deep appreciation and

understanding of the merits of the

battleship as a weapon system whose

evolution he had fought to promote

and he was not about to write it off,

except on the basis of sound evidence.

During WW I and the years immediately preceding it, aircraft design improved spectacularly. By the end of

the war the U.S. Navy still did not

have an aircraft carrier. His observation of the limited use of such ships

permitted him to state with justification, “All the aeroplane-carrying ships

28

in the world could not make an attack

upon a foreign country unless they

were supported by a battleship force

that was superior to that of the

enemy.”

Not until the end of the war, when

Adm. Sims assumed leadership of the

Naval War College at Newport, did

his thinking undergo a profound

change. At the game board there in

1921, he recognized not only the advantages and potentials of airpower but

also the brevity of the future of battleships. “If I had my way,” he said,

“I would arrest the building of great

battleships and put money into the development of the new devices and not

wait to see what other countries are

doing.”

By March 1922, after witnessing

bombing tests off the Virginia Capes

(in 1921), he had written, “The battleship is dead.”

During Sims’ tenure at the War College, the Navy Department inaugurated a series of war games, fleet exercises, that were conducted during the

next two decades. Through these prob-

—Karl von Clausewitz, On War

lems, the Navy obtained practical experience in testing the “new devices”

under simulated combat conditions.

Naval Aviation had entered fleet

maneuvers as early as the winter of

1912-13 when the entire aviation element—pilots, student pilots, enlisted

men and aircraft inventory (which

then totalled five planes)—was transported to Guantanamo Bay to take part

in planned exercises. From their camp

at Fisherman’s Point where the present

air station is located, they worked to

achieve three goals: first, to prove the

utility of the airplane as a scout under

simulated war conditions; second, to

test its usefulness in detecting mines

and submerged submarines; and third,

to stimulate interest in aviation among

officers in the Fleet.

Naval Aviation next joined the Fleet

in 1914, in connection with actual hostilities in Mexico. At that time, an

A-3 and a c-3, put aboard the Mississippi, saw action at Vera Cruz. Daily

reconnaissance flights kept landing

forces informed of the enemy dispositions inshore. (Three planes placed

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
aboard the Birmingham were taken to

Tampico but did not see action.)

As a result of the experience at Vera

Cruz, Naval Aviators judged the hydroaeroplane more efficient than the

flying boat type then in use. Recommendations were also made on the design of aircraft.

The Navy’s air arm was still very

small when the United States entered

WW I. In the next year, seven months

and four days, while war raged, its

growth was extraordinary. By the time

the Armistice was signed, the Navy

had 2107 planes, 570 of which were

overseas, 15 dirigibles, 205 kite balloons, and 10 free balloons.

Thirteen bases were established in

the U.S. and the Canal Zone, only one

of which, at Galveston, was not yet in

operation. In Ireland, the Navy had

four seaplane stations, one kite balloon

station, a receiving station and a supply

station. Two stations, including a

major assembly and repair base, were

established at Eastleigh, England. Two

more stations and a training school

were built in Italy. There were 18 stations in France, including an assembly

and repair base at Pauillac and a school

at Moutchic. Additionally, the Navy

had a base operating in the Azores, one

in Canada, and a rest station in the

British West Indies. There were less

than 300 officers and men in Naval

Aviation when the war started in April

1917. At war’s end, in November

1918, there were 39,871, of whom

19,455 were abroad.

Naval air operations in this war were

predominantly in support of allied shiP

-

ping, launching aircraft from land

bases for anti-submarine patrols. It

was not until the years immediately

following the war that the U.S. Navy

returned to the theory of integrating

aviation with the Fleet. Although aviation had proven itself, there was still

resistance within the Fleet toward the

imminent merger. A CNO newsletter

of July 30, 1919 carried a report on

Fleet Air Operations:

“Early in January 1919, it was decided

to send a Detachmeent of six H-16 flying

boats to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to operate with the U.S. Fleet for the purpose of

proving to it the use of aircraft in actual

naval operations and of demonstrating the

practicability of maintaining an Air Detachment with the Fleet. It was accordingly decided to operate these flying boats

from moorings and to quarter the aviation

personnel on a ship carrying necessary repair personnel, necessary spare material,

etc., for the upkeep of the squadron.

“In addition to the six flying boats there

was also an airplane division consisting of

two Sopwitb Camels and [a Sopwith] 11⁄2

Strutter on board the USS Texas under

the command of LCdr. E. O. McConnell,

USN.” The Air Detachment also bad a

Kite Balloon Division.

At conclusion of the exercise, the newsletter continues, “Not once when the Air

Detachment was called upon to send

machines for operations with the Fleet has

it failed to send them, and not once when

machines have been sent on a certain mission has he Air Detachment failed to

accomplish that mission. This has required flying in all sorts and conditions of

weather, high winds, rain, fog, and low

visibility. It has required duty in spotting, bombing, scouting, passenger carrying, mail carrying, and all types of work

which aircraft with the Navy can be called

upon to do.”

The report ends with an optimistic,

though probably inaccurate, note: “The

result has been that the officers of the seagoing Navy have been converted to the

belief that aircraft are practicable and

essential to a well rounded Fleet.”

Numerous training periods and exercises were conducted subsequently, in

which aviation participated with the

Fleet, but it was with the annual Fleet

Problem of the Twenties and Thirties

that these maneuvers were conducted

on the largest scale.

“Taking an ever increasing role in

these problems,” says historian LCdr.

James M. Grimes, USNR, in a monograph on the subject, “Naval Aviation

gradually developed and came of age.

The Fleet Problem, therefore, serves as

the measuring rod for this growth to

maturity. It provides an annual check

on what Naval Aviation was accomplishing and the reports and recommendations which grew out of each

problem show how important the problems and their results were in development of aviation in the Navy.”

A study of these problems can be

made successfully by breaking them

down into five groups, studying each

to determine tactics employed and lessons learned. Basically, these groups

are: (1) the days of the “constructive”

carriers, when other ship types were

designated aircraft carriers because of

unavailability of the real thing; (2)

the period when the USS Langley, a

converted collier, joined the games as

the only aircraft carrier in the U.S.

Fleet; (3) the profound effects on

tactical thought precipitated by entry

of the USS Saratoga and USS Lexington into the games; (4) addition of the

USS Ranger; and (5) the years immediately prior to WW II when the U.S.

Navy operated five aircraft carriers.

The first of the Fleet Problems occurred in 1923, in the Panama-Pacific

area. It was a resounding success for

SOPWITH 11⁄2 STRUTTERS, equipped with hydrovanes in the event of a forced landing in the water,

were used by the air detachments in exercises with the Fleet immediately after World War I

AUGUST 1962 29
FLYING BOATS, such as this World War I Curtiss H-16, made up the principal portion of the

aviation units operating with the Fleet in the early post World War II naval exercises.

the Black Fleet, given the mission of Blue, assigned the defense of the Canal.

attacking the defenses of the Panama Blue’s air forces consisted of the

Canal, and a shattering failure for the tenders Wright, Sandpiper and Teal,

and the 18 patrol planes of Scouting

Plane Squadron One (half the planes

were based at Ballena Bay with the

Sandpiper and Teal, the remaining at

Bahia Honda with the Wright), t he

patrol planes based at Coco Solo, and

all the available Army planes.

The Back Fleet was assigned the battleships New York and Oklahoma a s

“constructive” carriers.

Approaching the Canal, one of the

battleship “carriers,” the Oklahoma,

launched a seaplane by catapult to

scout ahead of the force. Early the

next morning, a single plane representing an air group took off from

Naranyas Cays, approached the Canal

from seaward, flew over Gatun Spillway, and dropped ten miniature bombs.

This plane completed its mission undetected and theoretically destroyed the

Spillway.

An official report submitted after the

problem pointed up the susceptibility

of vital parts of the Canal to destruction by air. The report urged, among

other things, that air defenses of the

Canal be strengthened and that rapid

completion of aircraft carriers be effected for offensive and scouting purposes.

Naval Aviation played little part in

the next three exercises. It was not

until Fleet Problem V in March 1925

that USS Langley entered exercises off

the California coast. The second phase
of the problems began; a new element

was introduced.

Basically, the supposition for this

problem was that strained relations existed between Blue (the U.S.) and

Black, an imaginary country in the

area of the Hawaiian Islands. When

Black declared war, its Commander-inChief was ordered to Guadalupe Island

where he was to occupy an unfortified

anchorage from which he was to operate against Blue in the Eastern Pacific.

Black was given the Langley and the

tenders Aroostook and Gannet, a s

well as planes based aboard battleships

and cruisers. The Blue force was considerably smaller, having only 15

cruiser-based planes and two other aircraft based on the Wyoming. Planes

aboard the Wyoming were useless, however, for the battleship was not

equipped with a catapult. Grimes

records:

“The Black War Diary shows that the

greatest part of the air activity during

Fleet Problem V was centered around the

Langley. Scouting flights were conducted

each day as the Black Fleet proceeded

towards Guadalupe. The largest number

of planes used at any one time was ten.

The duration of these flights ranged from

30 minutes to two hours.

“On the last day before the arrival at

Guadalupe, the Langley received a ‘well

done’ for the feat of launching ten planes

in 13 minutes! None of these flights resulted in contacts.

“On March 10, the Langley was ordered

to have her planes ready for an 0530 takeoff the next morning. These planes were to

make an aerial reconnaissance flight over

the anchorage before the Black Fleet entered. This operation never took place,

the problem being terminated at 0508

March 11 by the Chief 0bserver.”

Introduction of the Langley t o

Fleet operations was considered a valuable experience. As a result of this

problem, the Commander-in-Chief,

U.S. Fleet, recommended that the Saratoga and Lexington be completed as

quickly as possible. He also urged that

steps be taken to insure the development of planes of greater durability,

dependability and radius, and that catapult and recovery gear aboard cruisers

and battleships be further improved.

Details concerning Fleet Problem VI,

conducted in 1926, are unavailable.

Pertinent documents on orders, instructions and operation reports are

lost. It is known, however, through

AUGUST 1962

the Annual Report of the Secretary of

the Navy, 1926, that a combined U.S.

Fleet participated in a joint ArmyNavy minor problem and conducted

“strategical and tactical exercises in

the vicinity of the Canal Zone until

the middle of March 1926. Fleet Problem VI was conducted during this

period.”

Just before Fleet Problem VII got

underway in 1927, a joint Army-Navy

exercise was conducted, again testing

defenses of the Panama Canal. USS

Langley provided defense against attacks on ships by land-based Army

planes and was also used for spotting

submarines. This exercise marks the

first time an aircraft carrier was used

to protect ships of the line. Battleshipenemy opposition. This Fleet was then

to oppose the Black Naval Force from

that base. Black’s mission was to provide search and contact scouting, track

submarines, and attack a large convoy

accompanied by a strong escort. The

Langley was assigned to the Blue force.

Again, the converted collier-made-carrier was to provide protection for ships

of the line.

On the last day of the game, Black

conducted a surprise air attack—delivered by 25 land-based aircraft (Mole

St. Nicholas)—against the Blue force.

Shortly before this, Langley maintained

a protective air patrol over the convoy,

but discontinued it hours before the

attack was pressed home. Caught unawares, Langley’s planes were no help.

TYPICAL OF THE EARLY air-cooled engine carrier fighter, scout, and dive bomber types which

flew from the Lex and Sara in Fleet Problem IX were the Boeing F2B-1’s of Bomber Squadron 2.

based planes were used for spotting

during bombardment of the Canal installations.

Canal defenses were again found

weak, but again, “constructive” planes

were used in the attacks. In each of the

two attacks on Miraflores Locks, only

one plane was launched; it represented

the attacking forces. This was not

considered an effective test. Grimes

noted: “In later problems when carriers were available from which attacks in force could be launched and

greater reality could be introduced into

maneuvers, the vital necessity for air

defense of the Canal was to become

even more apparent.”

The seventh Fleet Problem provided

more experience in carrier operations.

Conducted in the Caribbean in March,

Blue Fleet was given the task of escorting a large, slow, overseas convoy

and was then to establish a base under

Even though the problem had officially

terminated by the time Black’s aircraft

reached Blue’s ships, observers considered the attack successful, though

the Commander-in-Chief scored the

clumsy formation of the attacking

planes.

One of the most revealing outcomes

of this problem was the need to allow

aircraft carriers greater latitude in

maneuvering, as dictated by weather

and the position of the enemy forces.

Commander, Air Squadrons, also felt

that he should have complete freedom

of action in employing carrier-based

aircraft in order to get maximum efficiency in air operations.

Fleet Problem VIII, conducted in the

Hawaiian-Pacific area in April 1928,

provided further experience in aircraft carrier operations and scouting

patrols, Langley, Aroostook and Gannet again participated and again air

31
A SIKORSKY AMPHIBIAN, similar to this RS-3, based on the Aroostook, pilot “bombed” the Atlantic side of the Canal without opposition,

represented all the Langley’s squadrons in Fleet Problem IX. Its landed, and informed the “enemy” of what he had just accomplished.

operations were limited to scouting.

Bad weather and heavy seas effectively

limited air operations, but despite uncooperative weather, Commander-inChief, Battle Fleet, noted that a sufficient number of aircraft were

launched from the Langley “to show

that the use of planes from carriers for

all contemplated operations is both

practicable and feasible.”

Of all the Fleet Problems conducted

before 1940, the next, Fleet Problem

IX, undoubtedly received the most

publicity. Conducted in 1929, it saw

the introduction of the world’s largest

aircraft carriers, the Saratoga and Lexington. The problems entered their

third phase. “The experience gained

and the conclusions drawn,” says historian Grimes of this problem, “had a

marked influence on the development

of fleet tactics and strategy in general,

and on Naval Aviation in particular.”

The Panama Canal was again chosen

for the critical area under hypothetical

attack. Previous exercises indicated a

major weakness in defense of the Canal,

protection from air attack, but this

problem was to test the conclusions

reached in the past by providing actual

aircraft carriers and full strengths of

aircraft.

The problem assumed that a war had

existed between Blue (the U.S.) and

two enemy nations, Black (in the

Pacific) and Brown (in the Atlantic).

In airpower, Blue was assigned the Lexington, 145 naval aircraft, and the cooperation of the U.S. Army in the

32

Canal Zone and 37 planes based there.

Black was given the Saratoga and the

Langley. When it became evident that

Langley would not complete overhaul

in time for the games, the tender

Aroostook was substituted, the single

amphibian aboard representing Langley’s 18 fighters and six scouts, though

these aircraft were actually transferred

to the Sara. The Brown force proved

to be a paper power; neither ships,

planes, nor personnel were assigned;

other than in initial planning and estimates of the situation by Blue a n d

Black, Brown ceased to be a factor in

the game.

A detachment from the Blue force,

including the Lexington, transited to

the Pacific side before Black forc e

could launch a surprise attack. On the

same day, the remainder of the Blue

force was to have left Hampton Roads

for the Canal. It was Black’s intent to

destroy the Canal before this second

detachment could complete the passage.

Blue's intelligence indicated that

Black would attempt an attack on the

Pacific side. Actually, Black planned

a surprising two-pronged attack. The

“squadron” aboard the Aroostook was

to make a long-range flight, far beyond

capability of return. Its attack was to

be made on the Atlantic side, at the

conclusion of which, the “planes” were

to land and surrender. Simultaneously,

Saratoga, accompanied by Omaha, was

to attempt a daring tactic: take a wide,

two-day swing to the south and then

launch carrier-based planes for the Pacific attack. This latter demonstration was to make a profound impression on naval tacticians.

On the morning of January 25,

1929, two days before the problem was

to end, the main Blue force, including

the Lexington, came upon Black’s

Striking force. Black’s Battleship Division Five was steaming down wind

while the carrier was steaming up,

preparatory to launching her planes for

an air attack. The battleships opened

fire and, because of the close range,

would surely have sunk the Lexington

in actual battle. For this carrier, it

was a disastrous ending to her first important activity in the problem.

Umpires ruled the carrier “damaged,” however, for the loss of the carrier at this early stage of the game

would have had a profound restriction

on Blue’s capability during the coming

“interesting” part of the problem. Lexington was instead penalized in speed;

she was permitted only 18 knots.

The carrier had already launched

some planes. After the attack by the

battleships, the carrier, running into

rain and reduced visibility, was forced

to recover these aircraft under very

adverse conditions. Noted the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet: “Flight

deck personnel and flying personnel

alike are deserving of great credit for

the manner in which squadrons came

aboard on this occasion.”

The Saratoga, in the meantime, was

steaming south. She was detected by

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
an enemy destroyer upon which she

opened her eight-inch guns. This had

unfortunate results. The destroyer was

“sunk,” but in the process, one of

Sara’s planes, a T3M, was destroyed.

Spotted in the hangar deck just aft of

the forward elevator and 68 feet from

the muzzle of the gun, the plane suffered 36 crushed ribs and some torn

fabric, directly attributable to the blast

from the heavy gun. The eight-inchers

were destined to be removed from the

Saratoga, but not before WW II.

Later that day, the carrier encountered another Blue ship, the Detroit, which continued to track her

through the night, supplying the Blue

commander with vital information.

The Lexington was ordered to give

chase, but because of her reduced

speed could not close during the night.

At 0525 the next day, the Chief Observer canceled this penalty.

The 26th was an active day for the

Saratoga, and not an altogether lucky

one. Near five that morning, while

about 145 miles from Panama, she

launched an initial attack of 70 planes

against the Canal. Her aircraft in the

air, the good times were over for the

Sara. Because of navigational discrepancies, the carrier and the Omaha

contacted Blue’s Battleship Division

Two instead of her own Battleship Division Five. The carrier was under

heavy fire at short range from three of

the enemy battleships and was scored a

“sinking.” Had she escaped this disaster, four torpedoes “fired” from an

enemy submarine at 1200 yards would

have hurt her heavily and possibly sunk

her. At 0656, Sara launched two more

squadrons, at the completion of which,

she had 83 aircraft in the air.

At 0600 the same day, the Aroostook

stopped near Jicaron Island and 17

minutes later her single plane—a Sikorsky amphibian, theoretically representing Langley’s squadrons—took off

to bomb Gatun Locks, Gatun Spillway and Coco Solo. The commander of

the Blue force, though, had committed a blunder by not advising either

Coco Solo or the Army of the substitution. The Sikorsky went about its mission of bombing the Atlantic side of

the Canal, encountering no opposition.

When he completed the job, he landed

at the Atlantic terminal of the Canal,

surrendered to a stunned “enemy” and

confessed his accomplishment.

Saratoga’s problems were not yet

over. Shortly after the Chief Observer

lifted the speed limitation from the

Lexington, Lex launched her aircraft

against her sister ship. The Sara- based

planes, returning from a successful raid

on Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks

and the airfields at Fort Clayton and

Albright, were in the process of landing when the Lexington- launched

planes arrived on the scene. Sar a

“went down” for the third time.

Men in the Lexington had little to

cheer about, though, on the morning of

January 27. Friendly planes of VT-9

took off from their moorings at Balboa

and stood out to attack the Black carrier and bombarding forces. About

0700 they reached a carrier and started

bombing. Later, they learned it was

their own ship, the Lexington.

“This error was understandable,”

said Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet,

“in view of the fact that Saratoga and

Lexington were operating within 12

miles of each other at that time and it

was not possible to distinguish markings, owing to the presence of a large

number of men on turret tops. For

purposes of identification, each turret

top of the Saratoga bore two painted

white stripes parallel to the axis of the

guns. The turret tops of the Lexington were painted conventional war

color.” In later years, Saratoga was

made more easily recognizable by the

painting of a large stripe down the

center of her stack.

Fleet Problem IX marked an outstanding achievement in Naval Aviation. It marked the first appearance of

modern large carriers with the Fleet

in a fleet problem. But the most significant event of this problem, and possibly in any before WW II, was the

employment of Saratoga as a separate

striking force. Its effect on the future

use of carriers was immediate. In the

1930 maneuvers, a tactical unit, built

around the aircraft carrier, appeared in

force organization for the first time.

For many historians of naval warfare, Fleet Problem IX marked the

introduction of the fast carrier task

force. Regardless of its genesis, this

tactical weapon was tested and refined

during the war games of the Thirties.

Addition of the carriers Ranger, Lexington, and Saratoga was to provide

more flexibility and realism in future

games. A discussion of them, as well as

the results of the fleet problems, will be

presented in the following chapter

describing in detail the evolution of

aircraft carriers. * * *

USS LEXINGTON (CV-2) as she appeared in January 1928, a month after that year, she entered the next enthusiastically. Pilots aboard

she was commissioned. Too late to participate in the war games of learned much from the experiences of their colleagues in the Langley.

AUGUST 1962 33
A FAMILIAR VIEW of USS Ranger (CV-4) shows forward palisade placed from wind, spray and water. She entered the Fleet Problems in 1935

aboard carriers with cross-deck tie-downs to protect planes and men and with comparatively light tonnage indicated role of small carriers.

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

LAST OF THE FLEET PROBLEMS

‘The culmination of the year’s operations arrives when the carriers with their squadrons participate in the annual

cruise of the Fleets. On these cruises, the year's efforts to perfect the detail of aircraft operations are given the test of

simulated major campaigns against possible enemies. Our efforts in the past have been crowned with a certain amount

of success, but every success has only indicated new possibilities of the employment of aircraft in fleet operations and

has emphasized the vital importance of continuously operating with the Fleet the maximum number of aircraft that can

be carried on our surface vessels.’—RAdm. J. M. Reeves, USN, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, 1929

R

ADM. REEVES described the yearlong training schedule of Naval

Aviators as the Twenties came to an

end:

“Concurrently with . . . gunnery

exercises, the squadrons are embarked

on the aircraft carriers and they participate in the monthly exercises with

the Fleet. These fleet exercises are arranged to present new and increasingly

difficult problems to all arms of the

Fleet and to insure the effective coordination of these arms in major fleet

operations and engagements.

"It is not sufficient for one officer,

Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, to be

proficient in effectively employing

aircraft. This knowledge must be possessed by all flag officers. To this end,

aircraft on the various carriers, and the

carriers themselves, are assigned from

time to time in fleet exercises to the

various subdivisions of the Fleet. In

part of a problem, the aircraft will cooperate with destroyers; in another

pint, they operate offensively against

34

By Scot MacDonald

destroyers; in another part, they operate with and against submarines; they

operate continually with battleships

and these battleship planes must continue their activities during the attack

of ‘hostile’ aircraft. This employment

of aircraft on widely differing missions

reacts not only to the vast improvement of the air arm, but also and

equally important, it acquaints the

officers of command rank with the

possibilities and effective means of employing aircraft to further the main

mission of the Fleet, the destruction of

the enemy.”

Fleet Problem Nine, conducted in

1929, created a profound impression

on the tacticians of the day. In March

and again in April of 1930 two more

problems were presented the Fleet,

both conducted in the Caribbean, and

both concerned with the versatility of

aircraft carriers as naval weapons.

They were Fleet Problems X and XI.

Fleet Problem X investigated the

maneuvers necessary to gain a tactical

superiority over a force of approximately the same strength and in the use

of light forces and aircraft in search

operations. Carriers were here defined

as a complete tactical unit, operating

with cruisers and destroyers as a highspeed striking force.

The Blue force, representing the

U. S., was assigned both Saratoga and

Langley, while the Black force, a coalition of enemy nations, operated the

Lexington. Earliest control of the

Caribbean was crucial to solving the

problem.

At the outset, neither force knew

exactly where his opponent was, though

Black, through intelligence reports,

had enough information available to

assume the Blue ships would transit the

Panama Canal to the Atlantic side.

The ships already had.

Blue’s commander considered the

water too rough for the safe operation

of seaplanes on the first day of the

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
VOUGHT CORSAIR attached to Ranger’s utility unit was typical of Corsairs used for scouting observation duties during the later war games.

MONOPLANE TYPES, such as this Vought SB2U-1 of VB-3 on the Saratoga, were employed in the Fleet Problems conducted in the late Thirties.

problcm and was reluctant to send his

carrier-based planes, for he expected to

contact the Black carrier force before

dark. The Black ships were in a position just north of the island of Haiti.

By dawn next morning, they had

moved to the west side of the island.

On the second day of the problem,

the Blue commander again called off air

operations because of bad weather and

rough seas. Black, on the other hand,

conducted extensive scouting operations while advancing to the west.

Haitian-based planes scouted from daylight to dark, while Lexington- based

fighters and scouts launched every

three hours for a 12-hour period.

Weather improved on the third day

and the Blue commander ordered his

carrier planes launched. Still neither

side had any idea where the opponent

was. This status continued through

the fourth day, and it was not until the

fifth that contact finally was made.

Saratoga was spotted by Lexington

aircraft and as a result of the attack

that followed, Sara’s flight deck was

damaged. Before her planes could be

respotted for launching off the usable

end of her deck, Sara suffered another

and finishing attack. Lexington next

turned her attention to the Langley and

in two flights of first 15 and then 12

planes successfully placed the converted collier’s flight deck out of commission.

Next, USS Litchfield, one of Saratoga’s plane guards, was dive-bombed

and placed out of action. Blue’s battleships then felt the effects of Lexington’s planes with the result that the

West Virginia suffered the destruction

of two anti-aircraft guns, the California lost an observation plane on

deck, injury or death to personnel,

foretop material damaged, and a 15

per cent reduction in main battery fire;

and the New Mexico, lost four AA

guns as well as an observation plane

still on one of the ship’s turrets.

Neither Saratoga nor Langley took part

in the main action that followed the

destruction of their flight decks.

At its conclusion, Fleet Problem X

demonstrated the suddenness with

which on engagement could be completely reversed by the use of air power.

Scouting planes and scouting operations were also scored, the planes found

wanting in range and the scout pilots

unable to bomb carrier decks when

contact was made.

A month later, Fleet Problem XI investigated further the limitations of

scouting planes as well as their most effective use. After the game, it was

recommended that scouting squadrons

be increased to 18 planes and that a

more suitable scouting plane be developed. It was felt that better flotation

was needed for amphibians and that a

greatly increased range for carrierbased scouts, as well as the ability to

take off with a short run were necessary. Among desirable secondary characteristics were small size, folding

wings, and high speed, even at the cost

of ceiling and armament.

It was also recommended that semipermanent task groups be organized,

each consisting of one large aircraft

carrier, a division of cruisers, and a

division of destroyers. These ships were

to be trained as a unit in frequent

exercises.

The 1931 Fleet Problem (XII),

conducted in the Pacific-Panama Bay

area, had among its tasks exercises in

strategic scouting, in the employment

of carriers and light cruisers, and refueling at sea.

Primarily, this problem dealt with

actions between a fleet strong in aircraft and weak in battleships, and in a

reverse situation where the fleet was

weak in aircraft. At its conclusion, it

was considered that two cruisers and

two destroyers were minimum protection for an aircraft carrier in a carrier

group. Further, the commander of that

group should be stationed in the air35
craft carrier, rather than in a cruiser

or destroyer, so that he could fully

understand the mission of that group

and obtain its quickest cooperation.

Also, it was pointed out, escorting vessels must maintain the speed and proportionate fuel capacity of the carrier.

At the end of the problem, the three

carriers transited the Canal and headed

CANAL ZONE- based aircraft, such as this

early Corsatr, participated in the games.

for Cuban waters and more exercises.

On the last day of March, Capt. Ernest

J. King, commanding Lexington, was

ordered to assist Navy and Marine units

in relief operations in Nicaragua. An

earthquake had destroyed most of the

city of Managua. When Lexingto n

launched five aircraft with medical

personnel and supplies aboard, in addition to provisions, she inaugurated carrier aircraft relief operations in the U.S.

Navy. This was to become a frequent

peacetime mission.

During Fleet Problem XIII, held in

the Pacific-West Coast area in 1932.

the vulnerability of submarines to air

detection and attack, at that time, was

clearly demonstrated. Four out of five

submarines of one force , assigned

scouting missions, were detected by

land and carrier-based planes and

“sunk.” C.O.’s of these submarines

reported their own vulnerability when

operating in an aircraft-screened area.

Aircraft carriers assigned to the

problem were forced to exercise in

widely separated areas of the Pacific.

RAdm. H. E. Yarnell, who commanded the “U. S.” aircraft during the

exercise, noted that in event of actual

war in the Pacific, the number of aircraft carriers on hand would be totally

inadequate to meet the needs.

Also, the admiral pointed out, this

problem was not greatly dissimilar

from all other problems conducted in

the past, in that when one aircraft carrier was assigned to each of the forces

in the war games, each of the forces

invariably made the destruction of the

other’s carrier the prime tactic. This

BOEING F3B-1 was typical of the light fighter

bombers which used dive bombing tactics.

abling her flight deck, and attacked

Crissy Field, San Francisco docks, San

Andreas reservoir, and the drydock at

Hunter’s Point.

This exercise underscored the urgent

requirement for the development of

better planes, particularly carrier

WITH THE PBY’s, VP squadrons made the change bomber and torpedo planes. Adm.

to monoplanes. This one was a target tow-er. Yarnell again pleaded for three addi36 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
tional 18,000-ton carriers which were

permitted under existing treaties.

In the period 1933-34, the Fleet

conducted a series of 20 tactical exercises. The last three of these comprised

Fleet Problem XV, which also proved

the last of the war games of the threecarrier period.

In his official monograph “Aviation

in the Fleet Exercises, 1911-1939,”

historian LCdr. James M. Grimes,

USNR, described the war games: “The

primary effort of the Commander-inChief when drawing them up had been

to introduce realism into fleet tactics

and to simulate as nearly as possible

actual wartime operations. For this

reason, the opposing fleets represented

actual navies of the period. Carrier

operations were extensive throughout

the problem. . . .

“There were several important results of Fleet Problem XV as regards

the development of Naval Aviation. The

most important, perhaps, was the realization brought out by air operations

during the problem, that if the carrier

was to be the offensive weapon it was

considered to be, carrier-based planes

would have to be so armed that they

could carry the offensive to the enemy.

"It was seen that planes carrying

100-lb. bombs were obsolete and of

little use against an enemy force

equipped with planes capable of carrying 500- and 1000-lb. bombs . The

Commander-in-Chief, in his remarks at

the critique held on Fleet Problem XV,

stated that at least three-fourths of the

carrier-based planes should be s o

equipped. ”

USS Ranger joined the Fleet for the

next war game, Fleet Problem XVI,

conducted in 1935. Actually, this

game consisted of five separate exercises, none of them related, spread over

BOEING F4B-4’s were famous carrier fighters.

One is now in National Air Museum collection.

the Pacific from the Aleutians to Midway, to Hawaii. Both the Army and

Coast Guard participated.

The major air operations took place

during the third phase of the problem.

Unfortunately, these were marred by a

series of plane and personnel casualties

that, unfortunate in themselves, also

seriously affected later air and sea operation. Athough valuable experience

was obtained in mass flight of patrol

squadrons, nothing of significance developed in the operation of aircraft

carriers.

Fleet Problem XVII was conducted

in the Panama-Pacific area in 1936.

The exercises (again five) saw extensive use of patrol planes and the effective use of automatic pilot, but there

was no major contribution to, or effect

on, the evolution of carriers, either in

design or tactics.

The question of proper employment

of aircraft carriers was brought up

again in Fleet Problem XVIII of 1937:

Should they operate with the main

body of a fleet or should they operate

at a distance?

Black’s aircraft commander held

that a carrier tied down to a slow main

body formation was certain to be destroyed. “Once an enemy carrier is

within striking distance of our Fleet,”

he said, “no security remains until it,

its squadrons, or both, are destroyed,

and our carriers, if with the main body,

are at a tremendous initial disadvantage

in conducting necessary operations.”

But his force commander took a different view. He felt that carriers

should be an integral part of the main

body and defended his decision to emVOUGHT SBU-I's, last fixed gear biplane dive

bombers, flew in late Thirties war games.

ploy them in such a way, as he did in

this problem. He suggested that

Ranger, because of her small size could

provide scouting and spotting with less

chance of being detected. He hoped

that when Yorktown and Enterprise

joined the Fleet, such an employment

of Ranger might be possible.

Fleet problem XIX was the last of

the Ranger phase of the war games. It

was conducted in 1938 and consisted

of Parts II, V, and XI of the Annual

Fleet Exercises.

In the first phase, the outstanding

performance was a long-range San

Diego-based patrol plane bomber attack which successfully eliminated

Lexington as a carrier unit in the game.

The notable development of the second phase of the war game, Part V,

was an attack on Pearl Harbor,

launched from Saratoga some 1000

miles off the coast of Oahu. Sara’s

town (CV-5) into the war games in 1939, the Fleet problems entered the tense years immediately prior to the United States’ entry in WW II

SEPTEMBER 1962 37
recon group flew over Lahaina area,

photographing beaches and reporting

the enemy’s strength there.

At the same time, Sara sent an attack group which bombed Fleet Air

Base, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field,

Wailupe Radio Station, and returned

to the carrier. This tactic was to be

employed by the Japanese some three

years later, in December 1941.

In phase three (Part XI), the outstanding air operation was an unopposed air attack by Lexington- a n d

Saratoga- based planes launched against

Mare Island and Alameda.

“Excellent experience was provided

in planning and executing a fast carrier task force attack against shore

objective,” says Grimes. “The problem

of defending a coast line, or even an

isolated portion thereof, against fast

enemy raiding forces equipped with

large carriers and protected by powerful surface ships was seen to be one

difficult of solution.”

Yorktown and Enterprise entered

into the 1939 exercises of Fleet Problem XX, which were conducted in the

Caribbean area and off the northeast

coast of South America. The war

games entered their final phase.

Neither Langley nor Saratoga participated.

As a result of this game, reports

indicated that carrier operations

reached a new peak of efficiency; particular credit was given the two new

carriers which, despite inexperience,

contributed significantly to the success

of the problem. These exercises studied

employment of planes and carriers in

connection with convoy escort, development of coordinating measures

between aircraft and destroyers for

anti-submarine defense, attack on mobile patrol plane bases, scouting and

attack by patrol planes, defense of

surface ships against aircraft attack,

and trial of various forms of evasion

tactics against attacking aircraft and

submarines.

The last war game, XXI, was played

.

in 1940 in the Hawaiian-Pacific area.

It consisted of two separate exercises.

Historian Grimes describes them:

“The first exercise was designed to

afford training in making estimates

and plans; in scouting and screening;

in tke coordination of various types of

fighting units; in employing standard

and fleet dispositions; and finally to

train the opposing forces in decisive

engagement.

“The second major exercise of the

problem was designed to afford training in scouting, screening, communications, coordination of types, protection of a convoy, seizure of advanced

bases and finally, decisive engagement."

Between the two major parts of the

problem were two minor exercises in

which air operations played a major

part: Fleet Joint Air Exercise 114A

and Fleet Exercise 114. Exercise 114A

underscored the need for greater coopDURING COMMISSIONING ceremonies at the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, in 1937, men lined

up on the flight deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5). It entered the war games two years later.

38

eration between the Army and Navy in

organizing the defense of the Hawaiian

area. Exercise 114 compared patrol

plane attacks on surface units with

use of planes in high altitude tracking.

The former proved the planes vulnerable, while the latter met with great

success.

Few new difficulties emerged from

this war game. Reiterated was the question of latitude given carrier commanders by force commanders. Yorktown’s commanding officer stated his

belief that success could best be

achieved when aircraft personnel in

carriers operated under a broad directive. The exercise proved again—as it

did in Fleet Exercise 114—that lowlevel horizontal bombing attacks had

little chance of success— especially

against a ship that was not otherwise

engaged.

By 1940, the war games were halted.

Although one was planned for the next

year, worsening of world tensions

caused their cessation. Various tactical

exercises were held instead.

Naval Aviation grew with the war

games. The first phase—the pre-aircraft carrier years-employed “constructive” carriers and merely indicated

to the Navy the potentials of this new

weapon. The Langley phase was an

GRUMMAN F3F biplanes were mainstay of carrier fighters until shortly before WW II.

informative one, but this was more an

experimental ship than an aircraft carrier. The games reached fruition with

the addition of the Lexington a n d

Saratoga in Fleet Problem IX. It saw

the employment of an aircraft carrier

as a separate striking force and introduced a new tactic in the book of naval

strategy. The Ranger phase showed the

potentials of small aircraft carriers, employed with telling effect in WW II.

And the final phase, the addition of

Yorktown and Enterprise, increased

and refined carrier operations in

the critical years prior to WW II.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE JAPANESE DEVELOPMENTS

‘In the last analysis, the success or failure of our entire strategy in the Pacific will be determined by whether or not

we succeed in destroying the U.S. Fleet, more particularly, its carrier task forces.’—Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, IJN, 1942.

‘I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasizing aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had

no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment. . . . We were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States.’—FAdm. Osami Nagano, IJN, 1945.

B

Y C HRISTMAS EVE 1921, the Washington Disarmament Conference

had already been going on for a month

and a half. Participating were Great

Britain, Japan, France, Italy, and the

United States. It was on this day that

Great Britain refused any limitation on

auxiliary vessels, in view of France’s

demand for 90,000 tons in submarines.

The delegates then began to consider

confining the treaty to capital ships

and aircraft carriers.

The Washington Naval Treaty,

signed February 6, 1922, established a

tonnage ratio of 5-5-3 for the capital

ships of Great Britain, the United

States, and Japan, respectively, assigning a smaller tonnage to France and

Italy. The same ratio for aircraft carriers was set, with an overall limitstion of 135,000 tons each for Great

Britain and the U. S., and 81,000 tons

for Japan. It also limited any new

OCTOBER 1962

By Scot MacDonald

carrier to 27,000 tons, with a provision

that, if total carrier tonnage were not

thereby exceeded, nations could build

two carriers of not more than 33,000

tons each, or obtain them by converting existing or partially constructed

ships which would otherwise be

scrapped by the treaty.

December 27 that year, Japan commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the

Hosho (“Flying Phoenix”). This was

a remarkable hoku bokan (literally,

mother ship for aircraft). Though the

British were the first to operate aircraft

onto and off a ship especially designed

for that use, their first aircraft carriers

were conversions. Hosho was a carrier

from the keel, the first of its kind completed in any navy of the world.

Laid down in 1919 at the Asano

Shipbuilding Co. of Tsurumi, the ship

was fitted out at Yokosuka Navy Yard

at a standard displacement of 7470

tons, a speed of 25 knots, with the

capability of handling six bombers

(plus four reserve), five fighters (in

addition to two in reserve), and four

reconnaissance planes, a total of 21

aircraft.

Hosho was indeed a strange looking

craft. She was all flying deck. Originally, she had an island structure and a

tripod mast, but either because of the

small width of her flying deck (and its

attending hazards) or because some

turbulence might have been caused by

it, the island was taken off.

The carrier sported three funnels on

the starboard side. These were of the

hinged type, held upright when not in

use, and swung outboard to provide

additional safety from stack gas. Later,

they were placed in a fixed position,

bending aft and slightly downward.

39
I

.

I

UNDER THE WASHINGTON Naval Treaty, Japan converted a battle cruiser to aircraft carrier characteristics. In 1928, that country’s 2nd carrier was completed and named Akagi, after a mountain.

Hosho’s original armament consisted

of from 14cm single mount guns and

two 8cm single mount high angle

guns. At the outbreak of WW II,

her high angle guns were replaced by

four 25mm twin mount machine guns.

Later, the 14cm guns were removed

and 25mm double or single mount

machine guns were added.

Before continuing with Japanese development, an explanation of the naming of their aircraft carriers is in order.

“Transliteration of the names of

Japanese aircraft carriers into American equivalents is a pretty risky business,” said Mr. Roger Pineau, a frequently published writer on the Japanese Navy after World War II. “It

becomes misleading. The names should

be treated as such and should not be

taken too literally. For instance, when

we speak of astronaut Carpenter, we

don’t visualize a man walking around

with hammer and saw in hand.”

Mr. Chris Beilstein, another expert

on Japanese aircraft carriers, concurs.

“The Shokaku becomes ‘Flying Crane,’

for that is the closest we can translate

the original Japanese. The first Japanese CV’s carried names of mountains

and provinces. These, in turn, were

frequently named after mythological

characters. Shokaku, for example,

could have been a flying crane in an

age-old story, a crane that was named

Shokaku. This is very much like our

real life Misty, the wild horse. Certainly, to translate ‘Misty’ to literal

Japanese would be meaningless to

them, or at best, misleading. It would

be more accurate to translate it ‘Wild

Horse.’ Thus, ‘Misty,’ to the Japanese,

would mean ‘Wild Horse,’ just as we

would erroneously translate Shokaku

as ‘Flying Crane.’

“Think of the problem in transliterating Shangri La into Japanese,”

said Mr. Pineau. “To paint the picture

accurately, it would be necessary to describe Hilton’s book and then go into

President Roosevelt’s fascination with

it. That would be rather difficult to do

in one or two words. Perhaps the

closest would be ‘Paradise of the Ageless’—and this would, in the Japanese

mind, seem a pretty silly thing to name

an aircraft carrier.

“But transliteration has a very real

value—especially to those who have

difficulty in pronouncing Japanese

words. Many competent researchers

don’t even speak the language. The

transliteration is a handy reference

point, but should not be taken seriously, at face value.”

Japanese Naval Aviation dates back

to 1912 when the Navy sent officer

trainees to the U.S., Great Britain, and

France. They returned from France

with two Farman seaplanes, and from

the U.S. with two Curtiss seaplanes.

A beach on the west side of Tokyo Bay,

Oppama, was selected as a site for a

seadrome in the fall of that year and

placed into commission. The first class

at Oppama consisted of four officers

and 100 men.

From 1912 to 1917, ¥3-400,000

(about $150-200,000) was allotted to

the fledgling air arm. In 1918, this

sum was increased to ¥1 million

(about $500,000), and the next year

to ¥2 million.

The first landing on the Hosho was

made by a British civilian, a Mr. Jourdan, on February 22, 1923. States the

Japanese Year Book of 1924-25 :

“

. . . our Naval flight officers are

making similar experiments with good

results.”

(In chronological comparison, Eugene Ely landed on a platform on the

armored cruiser USS Pennsylvania January 18, 1911; USS Langley, the U.S.

Navy’s first aircraft carrier, a converted collier, was commissioned March

20, 1922; the first U.S. aircraft carrier

LATER CODE-NAMED Claude, Mitsubishi Type

96 fighters replaced Japanese Navy’s 90's.

ALSO OPERATING from carriers in the SinoJapanese War were Type 96 attack aircraft.

built as such, from the keel, USS

Ranger, was not commissioned until

June 4, 1934.)

A naval expansion program, decided

upon in 1920, was completed by March

1923. Under the limitations set by the

Washington Naval Treaty, Japan

turned her attention to the conversion

of the battle cruiser (then eight

months under construction at the Kure

Naval Arsenal). This, in 1928, became Japan’s second aircraft carrier,

the Akagi (“Red Castle,” actually

the name of a Japanese mountain).

40 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Akagi displaced over 30,000 tons

standard when completed, had a speed

of 31 knots, and carried 60 aircraft.

She was armed with ten eight-inch and

12 4.7-inch guns. 

A sister ship, the Amagi (“Heavenly

Castle”), was also scheduled for conversion at that time, but sustained

severe damage in the earthquake of

September 1, 1923. She was scrapped

in July 1924 at Yokosuka. In her

place, Japan converted the Kaga (the

name of an old Japanese province) to

an aircraft carrier. Originally, she was

laid down as a 39,000-ton battleship,

but was scheduled for the scrap pile as

a result of agreed disarmament limitations. Conversion was completed in

1928 and she was commissioned the

following year. The 1929 Japanese

in power. Final decision on the size of

the Navy lay in the competence of the

civilian government. Most career officers were hostile to the treaty; those

officers, who supported the civilian

government in the bitter fight that

ensued concerning ratification of the

1930 London Treaty, were either

forced to resign within the next few

years or were placed in unimportant

posts. Militarists, ascending in power,

referred contemptuously to the ratification as “the May 15th Affair.”

The London Treaty carried forward

the general limitations of the earlier

Washington agreement and provided

for further reductions of naval armament. Under terms applicable to Naval

Aviation, the definition of an aircraft

carrier was broadened to include ships

United States Navy’s fourth carrier.

In 1932, naval authorities referred a

second naval replenishment plan to the

Ministry of Finance for study. The

plan called for a total expenditure of

¥460,000,000 (about $230 million),

covering the construction of one aircraft carrier of 8000 tons, other capital and auxiliary ships, and the establishment of eight flying corps on land:

all this to be completed by the end of

1936. This aircraft carrier was never

built.

In 1934, preliminary disarmament

conferences were held in London. Congress had already passed and President

Roosevelt authorized an act that popularly became known as the VinsonTrammell Act. This permitted the

U.S. to construct naval ships to the

SISTER SHIP to Akagi, the Kaga, is shown here shortly after her commissioning in December 1928. Note the unusual stack arrangement.

AN AERIAL VIEW oj Kaga shows the chopped-ofl bow configuration

and the starboard stack. Kaga, even after refitting, bad no island.

Year Book states of Akagi and Kaga:

“They are the pride of the Japanese

Navy, and though slightly inferior to

the Saratoga of the U.S. Navy in respect of speed, the Akagi surpasses the

other in point of the range of her high

angle guns, of which she carries 12

4.7-inchers. The Hosho . . . [is] by far

smaller than the Akagi, but in the

mode of construction [it possesses]

special features of [its] own. The completion of the Kaga, only second to the

Akagi, is a powerful addition to the

Japanese Navy.”

Kaga w a s reported as displacing

26,900 tons standard, but actually displaced over 30,000 tons, had a speed of

27 knots and carried 60 aircraft.

As the signatories of the Washington

Naval Treaty reconvened in London in

1930, Japanese naval officers began to

chafe under the ship construction restrictions imposed upon their nation.

At that time, the armed forces were

unpopular with the liberal government

OCTOBER 1962

of any tonnage designed primarily for

aircraft operations. It was agreed that

installation of a landing-on or flyingoff platform on a warship designed and

used primarily for other purposes

would not make that ship an aircraft

carrier. It also stipulated that no capital ship in existence on April 1, 1930

would be fitted with such a platform

or deck.

The Japanese Navy expanded rapidly

after 1930, at such a rate that it became necessary to conscript men. In

1931, a replenishment plan was authorized the Navy, permitting it to complete construction of the Ryujo (“Galloping Dragon”), a small aircraft carrier of about 10,000 tons laid down in

1929. It was completed in 1933, its

limited deck free of an obstructive

island. Ryujo had a speed of 29 knots,

carried 36 aircraft, and was armed

with 12 five-inch guns. She was

Japan’s fourth aircraft carrier. In June

1934, USS Ranger became th e

tonnage limitations prescribed by the

previous Washington and London

Naval Treaties. Under this authorization, USS Wasp (CV-7) was laid down

in 1936.

Japanese militarists were not eager

to continue in the disarmament pacts.

Wrote U.S. Ambassador to Japan,

Joseph C. Grew, “Japanese attitude

toward the coming Naval Conference

in 1935 London Treaty is intensely

unpopular among the Japanese Naval

officers high and low;” and in separate correspondence, “The situation is

entirely different from that in 1930.

. . . Under present conditions the Navy

alone will have the final say [as to the

size of the Imperial Japanese Navy].”

It boiled down to this: Japan wanted

quantitative as well as qualitative parity in ship power, equal to the United

States and Great Britain. The 5-5-3

ratio was no longer acceptable. Neither

the U.S. nor Britain favored such an

increase in Japanese strength, for,

41
THE SHOKAKU CLASS consisted of two carriers, Shokaku (shown here) gram of 1937, displacing 25,675 tons standard. Zuikaku was first to

and Zuikaku. They were authorized under the Fleet Replenishment Pro- have a bulbous bow

granted equality in armored ships,

Japan would be the major power in the

Pacific, greater than the U.S. and Great

Britain combined; their Fleets were

divided geographically.

Japan persisted. The Japanese Year

Book of 1935 enumerated that country’s “official” reasoning:

“(1) The progress and development

made recently in battleships, aeroplanes, etc., have made it extremely

difficult to effectuate defence operations.

“(2) The remarkable increases in

the air forces of the U.S.S.R. and

China, and the revival of the Far Eastern naval forces of the former.

“(3) The establishment of the naval

port of Singapore by Great Britain,

and the extension and strengthening of

the naval port of Hawaii by the U.S.A.

have had a great effect on the naval

plan of operations in Far Eastern

waters.

“(4) The birth of Manchoukuo

[independence of Manchuria, February

18, 1932] has brought forth vas t

changes in Far Eastern policies. It has

increased the responsibility of the

Japanese Empire as the stabilizing

power in the Far East.”

These were political arguments the

world’s two top naval powers could

not buy. But Japan was adamant, refused compromise and, on December

29, 1934, gave the required two years’

formal notice that after December 31,

1936, she would no longer be bound by

the terms of the Washington and London Naval Treaties. Her act of abrogation unleashed the restraints on

international shipbuilding.

Two more aircraft carriers were laid

down in Japanese ways in 1934 and

1936, the Soryu (“Blue Dragon”) and

Hiryu (“Flying Dragon”). Soryu displaced about 18,000 tons standard, had

a speed of 34.5 knots, and handled 63

aircraft. Hiryu was heavier, 18,500

tons standard, and had a speed of 34.3

knots. Officially, both ships were carried on the books as of 10,050 tons

standard; the true tonnage was not

revealed until after WW II. Both ships

carried the same number of planes and

had the same armament, 12 five-inch

guns.

It was sometime between 1935 and

1937 that naval ship designers configured carriers to provide a surprising

technical innovation. Akagi and Kaga

underwent major modernization at this

time. The lower flight decks were suppressed, the upper flight decks were

extended forward, and the eight-inch

gun turrets and mountings were reduced in Akagi from ten to six, while

Kaga replaced her 12 4.7-inch guns

with 16 five-inchers. Kaga’s unwieldly

funnels were also reduced. The modernization of Kaga, which included

new machinery, added about 11⁄2 knots

to her speed, giving her 28.3, but

Akagi’s modernization cost her several

knots, bringing her down to 28.

configuration. Both were completed in 1941.

But the startling innovation was the

introduction of small islands on the

port side of the carriers Akagi a n d

Hiryu. The remaining carriers had

islands on the starboard (standard)

side—of those that had them at all.

Strategists planned to use these carriers

in a formation that was unique. The

lead carriers in the basic formation

were to be the port-islanded Hiryu and

Akagi, followed by the Soryu a n d

Kaga. This would supposedly allow for

a more compact formation with nonconflicting aircraft traffic patterns.

This formation was used in the Battle

of Midway.

Japan’s next venture into aircraft

carrier construction was the Shokuku

(“Flying Crane”) and Zuikak u

(“Lucky Crane”). These carriers were

kept fairly well under wraps, insofar

as specifications are concerned. They

were authorized under the very ambitious Fleet Replenishment Program of

1937, the same program under which

the famed super battleships Yamato

and Musashi were built.

Shokaku was laid down December

12, 1937 at the Yokosuka Navy Yard,

while Zuikaku was started at Kawasaki

Dockyard May 25, 1938. Basically,

the ships had similar specifications.

They displaced 25,675 tons standard,

had a designed speed of 34.2 knots,

carried 16 five-inch guns in twin

mounts, and could carry up to 84 aircraft, although a normal complement

“

THE SORYU CLASS was first laid down in 1934 and 1936, displacing island on the starboard (conventional) side. She, with other IJN airabout 18,000 tons standard, at a speed of 34 knots. The Soryu had her craft carriers, participated in the Dec. 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor raid.

42 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
was 73. There were no major differences between the ships. Zuikaku,

however, was fitted with a bulbous

bow, the first Japanese warship so designed. Shokuku was launched June 1,

1939, and completed August 8, 1941;

Zuikuku was launched November 27,

CAPTURED ZERO, Mitsubishi Type O, has U.S.

markings here, for U.S. tests early in war.

1939, and completed September 25,

1941.

Completion of both carriers was delayed when the original funnel arrangement was changed in mid-construction

by the Aeronautical Headquarters. As

designed, the funnels were to appear

one on each side of the island bridge,

fore and aft on the starboard side. This

was changed by placing the two funnels immediately aft of the island.

The Japanese did not give either ship

much publicity. Both ships, Zuikaku

and Shokaku, were to figure prominently in most sea battles of WW II

involving naval air. Their design was

based on the best material gathered

from experiences in Akagi, Kaga, and

the Soryu types. Later Japanese carriers (i.e., multiple ship design

classes) were constructed in two

groups: the large to be like Taih o

(with armored flight deck) , and the

medium to be repeats of the Sory u

class. Zuikaku and Shokaku comprised

an entire class.

Japan’s next aircraft carrier was a

conversion. In 1936 the submarine

depot ship Takasaki was under construction. While she was still in the

ways, the decision was made to comFIRST USN monoplanee fighters, Brewster

F2A-1’s, did badly against Japanese Zeroes.

plete the ship as a carrier. Work on

this project was not started until January 1940, but was completed in December that year. The carrier was renamed Zuiho (“Happy Phoenix”).

She displaced 11,200 tons standard,

sailed at 28 knots, and carried 30 aircraft. She was armed with eight fiveinch guns.

A sister ship, Shoho (“Luck y

Phoenix”), converted between January

1941 and January 1942, was originally

named Tsurugisaki, launched as a submarine depot ship in 1934. Zuiho and

Shoho particulars were similar.

Other aircraft carriers were under

construction or conversion. At least

15 more would be commissioned during the war years, produced in growing

restrictions of limited materials, and,

after the Battle of Midway in 1942,

in desperation.

I

N THE FIVE-YEAR period preceding

December 7, 1941, the military of

Japan grew stronger in power. March

1936 the cabinet was dominated by

men in uniform and the development

of heavy industry was pushed. An

extraordinarily ambitious and successful expansion of the Navy was

launched in 1937, the same year hostilities broke between Japan and China.

That same year, the Panay was sunk.

In 1938, the National Mobilization

Bill was passed. In September 1940,

Germany, Italy and Japan concluded

a three-power pact. November 1941,

Japanese Prime minister, Gen. Hideki 

Tojo, stated that British and American

influence must be eliminated from the

Orient.

The Japanese Navy had been conducting intensive training of its officers

and men during this period. Most of

the training, including war games, was

MITSUBISHI TYPE 97 carrier attack aircraft

is typical of early Japanese monoplanes.

conducted in out-of-the-way gulfs and

in the stormy northern reaches of the

Pacific. The men were hardened by the

elements and drilled continuously. To

avoid antagonizing the Japanese, the

U.S. Navy at the same time was instructed to hold all of its fleet problems

in the less satisfactory areas west of

the International Date Line.

By 1941, Japan was determined to

wage war. On November 10, VAdm.

Chuichi Naguma, placed in charge of

the initial attack, issued his first operation order on the mission. The Striking

Force of Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu,

Shokaku and Zuikaku, as well as other

capital ships, sortied from Kure navy

base between November 10 and 18,

rendezvousing on the 22nd in Tankan

Bay in the Kuriles. Adm. Yamamoto

ordered the force to sortie on November 26. On December 2, he broadcast 

a prearranged signal that would launch

the attack on Pearl Harbor: Niitaka

Yama Nobore (“Climb Mount Niitaka”). Five days later, December 7,

the Japanese Navy launched its surprise attack by aircraft, launched from

carriers, at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. The next day, the United

States and Japan were officially at war.

OCTOBER 1962 43
Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE EARLY ATTACK CARRIERS

‘We have hit the Japanese very hard in the Solomon Islands. We have probably broken the backbone of the power of 

their Fleet. They have still too many aircraft carriers to suit me, but soon we may well sink some more of them. . . . We 

are going to press our advantages in the Southwest pacific and I am sure that we are destroying far more Japanese air. 

planes and sinking far more of their ships than they can build.’—Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of United States, 1942. 

A

T THE OUTBREAK of World War II,

the United States had in commission seven aircraft carriers and one

escort carrier. USS Langley, the experimental ship officially classed as

CV-1, had been assigned to duty as a

seaplane tender on September 15, 1936.

After the abrogation by Japan from

disarmament treaties, the U.S. took a

realistic look at its naval strength. By

Act of Congress on May 17, 1938, an

increase of 40,000 tons in aircraft

carriers was authorized. This permitted the building of USS Horne t

(CV-8) and USS Essex (CV-9). On

June 14, 1940, another increase in

tonnage was authorized. Among the

ships built under this program were

the Intrepid and the new Yorktown.

On July 19, an additional 200,000

tons for carriers was authorized.

Adm. H. R. Stark, then Chief of

Naval Operations, reported to the

Secretary of the Navy: “In June 1940,

the Congress granted the Navy an

11% increase in combat strength and,

in July, a further increase of approximately 70%. When these ships and

aircraft are completed, the U.S. Navy

in underage and overage ships will include 32 battleships, 18 aircraft carriers, 91 cruisers, 325 destroyers, 185

submarines, and 15,000 airplanes. . . . 

By Scot MacDonal d

“From 1921 to 1933, the United

States tried the experiment of disarmament in fact and by example.

This experiment failed. It cost us

dearly in relative naval strength—but

the greatest loss is TIME. Dollars cannot buy yesterday. Our present Fleet

is strong, but it is not strong enough.”

Additional tonnage was authorized

December 23, 1941 and July 9, 1942.

USS ESSEX (CV-9) was first of a series of

early attack aircraft carriers of World War II.

CV-9 was to be the prototype of an

especialy designed 27,000-ton (standard displacement) aircraft carrier,

considerably larger than the Enterpise

and smaller than the Saratoga. These

were to become known as the Essex

class carrier, although this classification was dropped in the '50’s.

On September 9, 1940, eight more

of these carriers were ordered and

were to become the Hornet, Franklin,

Ticonderoga, Randolph, Lexington,

Bunker Hill, Wasp and Hancock ,

CV-12 through -19, respectively. Reuse of the Lexington, Wasp a n d

Hornet names was in line with the

Navy’s intent to carry on the traditions of the fighting predecessors:

Lcxington (CV-2) was lost in the

Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942;

Wasp (CV-7) was sunk September

that year in the South Pacific while

escorting a troop convoy to Guadalcanal; Hornet (CV-8) was lost the

following month in the Battle of

Santa Cruz Islands.

It is appropriate to comment here

that the ships’ names at commissioning date did not all bear the same name

at the date of their programming.

Names were changed during construction. Hornet (CV-12) was originally

Kearsarge, Ticonderoga (CV-14) was

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT of Air Group 9 are parked aboard the aircraft During WW II, U.S. sbipyards built and Navy commissioned 16 sister

carrier Essex during her shakedown cruise in the Caribbean in 1943. ships. Including post-war production 24 Essex class were commissioned.

44 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
USS RANDOLPH (CV-15) was the 13th Essex class carrier to be commis- ing to the builder for post-shakedown work. She participated in the Iwo

sioned. She was the first of these carriers to enter combat without return- Jima, Okinawa, and Third Fleet operations against Japan in 1945.

the Hancock, Lexington (CV-16 )

was Cabot, Wasp (CV-18) wa s

Oriskany, and Hancock (CV-19) was

originally Ticonderoga.

Last two of the 13 originally programmed CV-9 class aircraft carriers,

Bennington (CV-20) and Boxer (CV21), were ordered on Dec. 15, 1941.

In drawing up the preliminary design for USS Essex, particular attention was directed at the size of both

her flight and hangar decks. Aircraft

design had come a long way from the

comparatively light planes used in

carriers during the Thirties. Flight

decks now required more takeoff space

for the heavier fighters and bombers

being developed. Most of the first-line

carriers of the pre-war years were

equipped with flush deck catapults,

but owing to the speed and size of

these ships very little catapulting was

done—except for experimental purposes. With the advent of war, airplane weights began to go up as armor

and armament got heavier; crew

size aboard the planes also increased.

It was inevitable, noted the Bureau of

Aeronautics toward the war’s end in

1945, that catapult launchings would

become more common under these

circumstances. Some carrier commanding officers reported that as

much as 40 per cent of launchings

NOVEMBER 1962

were effected by the ships’ catapults.

The hangar area design came in for

many conferences between Bureaus

and much more official correspondence.

Not only were the supporting structures to the flight deck to carry the

increased weight of the landing and

parked aircraft, but they were to have

sufficient strength to support the tricing up of spare fuselages and parts

(50 per cent of each plane type

aboard) under the flight deck and still

provide adequate working space for

the men using the area below.

“At present,” noted the Bureau of

Construction and Repair in April

1940, “it appears that a few of the

smaller fuselages can be triced up

overhead in locations where encroachment on head-room is acceptable, and

that the larger fuselages will have to

be stowed on deck in the after end of

the hangar. The number to be stowed

will depend upon the amount of reduction in operating space in the hangar

which can be accepted.”

Capt. Marc A. Mitscher, then Assistant Chief BU AE R, answered: “The

question of spare airplanes is now

under reconsideration in correspondence with the Fleet and the results

decided upon will have a bearing in

the case of CV-9.”

A startling innovation in CV-9 was

a port side deck edge elevator in addition to two inboard elevators. Earlier,

B U A ER experimented with a ramp

arrangement between the hangar and

flight decks, up which aircraft were

hauled by crane. This proved too

slow. BUSHIPS and the Chief Engineer

of A.B.C. Elevator Co., designed the

engine for the side elevator. Essentially, it was a standard elevator, 60

feet by 34 in platform surface, which

travelled vertically on the port side of

the ship. Capt. Donald B. Duncan,

Essex’s first commanding officer, was

enthusiastic. After the first four

months of operation after commissioning, he wrote to BU AE R:

“The elevator has functioned most

satisfactorily in all respects and it is

desired to point out some of the operational advantages realized with this

type of elevator.

“Since there is no large hole in the

flight deck when the elevator is in the

‘down’ position, it is easier to continue

normal operations on deck, irrespective of the position of the elevator.

The elevator increases the effective

deck space when it is in the ‘up’ position by providing additional parking

room outside the normal contours of

the flight deck, and increases the effective area on the hangar deck by the

absence of elevator pits.”

45
The elevator performed well, its

machinery less complex than the two

inboard elevators, requiring about 20

per cent fewer man-hours of maintenance. Capt. Duncan recommended

that consideration be given using two

deck edge elevators, one on each side.

B U A E R, in forwarding the recommendation to BUSHIPS, offered another

advantage for consideration: a conventional elevator suffering a casualty

while in the “down” position “would

leave a large hole in the flight deck

while the deck edge type would cause

only minor and non-critical loss of

flight deck area.”

BUSHIPS, obviously pleased with the

operational performance of the new

elevator—the first of its kind—reluctantly turned down the recommendation, however. The Bureau

noted that the addition of a starboard deck-edge elevator would not

permit an Essex class aircraft carrier

to transit the Panama Canal. Any

other location for a second such elevator would involve structural and

arrangement changes too extensive to

be considered.

On April 28, 1941, keel for the USS

Essex was laid at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. On

October 2, the following year, her

prospective commanding officer filed

his first weekly progress- and readiness

report to the Chief of Naval Operations. He noted that there was

marked speed-up of work on the ship

during the preceding month and estimated that the ship would probably

be delivered on February 1, 1942.

“There are certain items that have

been authorized for installation on the

CV-9-19 class carrier,” he said, “but

will not be accomplished on this vessel

USS YORKTOWN (CV-10) was third Essex commissioned, sponsored by Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt.

prior to delivery.” The ship was

launched July 31, 1942.

RAdm. Walter S. Anderson, president of the dock trials and inspection

team of CV-9 on December 23, 1942,

noted a few of these discrepancies in

his report:

“Due to late authorization of a

number of changes arising out of

recent war experiences, the volume of

uncompleted hull work was greater

than normal. . . . The Board regrets

that the catapults for this vessel were

not delivered in time for installation,

as military value of the vessel would

be much improved thereby. . . . Only

the starboard flight deck track was

installed . . . . This class of carriers is

designed to include cruising turbines

as part of the main drive turbine installation. However, due to production difficulties and as a result of

efforts to expedite delivery, cruising

turbines were omitted. Space and connections for their future installation

are provided and this can be accomplished with very little alteration . . . .”

Nevertheless, the Board was pleased

and impressed with progress on construction of the Essex. Adm. Anderson recommended acceptance of the

ship. “On 31 December 1942,” he

said, “only slightly over 20 months

will have elapsed since keel-laying,

which is, in the opinion of the Board,

a record worthy of commendation.

This indicates a high degree of cooperation between the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., and representatives of the officers and men of

the ship’s company.” On the last day

of 1942, USS Essex was commissioned.

Capt. Duncan was proud of his new

command, but not so impressed as to

ignore certain discrepancies that still

existed. The ventilation system, for

instance, was less than satisfactory.

B U S HIPS sent representatives to the

ship to assist in correcting discrepancies, during sea trials March 1 in

the North Atlantic and, a month and

a half later, when the ship was again

at Norfolk and still had complaints.

As other CV-9 carriers wer e

launched, the complaints continued to

be registered. BUSHIPS investigated

the ventilation system as installed in

USS Intrepid (CV-11) and outlined

corrective measures in future carriers

of the class.

Requested to comment on the adequacy and operation of the trash

burner installed in the Essex, Capt.

Duncan started off quietly enough. “It

is most unsatisfactory,” he said. Then
he warmed to his subject. “It is doubtful if it could be worse. It is in the

very center of the office spaces. There

is no satisfactory place for collection

of trash waiting its turn to be burned.

All of it has to be carried through the

passageways in the vicinity of the departmental offices. The heat from the

trash burner when it is operating

(which is not often because it is usually broken down) is such as to

make the surrounding spaces almost

untenable.

“The design of the trash burner is

poor. Its construction is worse. The

ship had not been in commission a

month before it practically fell apart.

The brick work fell down, the door

fell off and it suffered other casualties

too numerous to mention. It has taken

constant attention from the Engineer’s

force to keep it operating at all and

the heat generated in the compartment

in which it is located is such that it

is physically impossible for men to stay

in it for continuous operation.”

The trash burner was redesigned.

Lexington w a s commissioned on

February 17, 1943, followed by Yorktown on April 15, Bunker Hill on May

25, Intrepid on August 16, Wasp o n

November 24, and Hornet on November 29 that year. In 1944, Franklin

was commissioned on January 31,

Hancock on April 15, Ticonderoga o n

May 8, Bennington on August 6, and

Randolph on October 9. The last of

the programmed 13 CV-9’s, Boxer ,

was commissioned on April 16, 1945.

The lighting system installed in the

Lexington came under the scrutiny of

BUSHIPS. Generally, it was considered

inadequate—“in intensity and quality’’—in many passageways and compartments, in addition to the running,

signal, and anchor lights. A survey of

the system produced the following

action on the outside lights: the ahead

masthead light was relocated to the

forward edge of the foretruck (frame

92), the ahead range light was moved

forward and shielded from illuminating the deck below, the astern masthead light was moved higher, so as

not to interfere with gunnery, and the

astern range light was removed.

Nineteen more Essex-class ships

were ordered or scheduled, starting

with ten of them on August 7, 1942.

They were Bon Homme Richard (CV31) Kearsarge (CV-33), Oriskan y

(CV-34), Reprisal (CV-35), AnTHE USS COWPENS (CVL-25), was one o f

nine ccruiser-to-aircraft carrier conversions.

tietam (CV-36), Princeton (CV-37),

Shangri La (CV-38), Lake Champlain

(CV-39), Tarawa (CV-40), an d

Crown Point (CV-32)—later renamed Leyte. The last three ordered

were Valley Forge (CV-45), Iwo Jima

(CV-46), and Philippine Sea (CV -

47). The keels were laid for Reprisal

and Iwo Jima on July 1, 1944 and

January 29, 1945, but both were cancelled on August 11, 1945. Six additional 27,000-tonners, CV's 50 through

55, were canceled on March 27, 1945.

In recap, after WW II erupted and

USS INDEPENDENCE (CVL-22) has SBD’s and

TBF Avengers on deck in July 1943 in Pacific.

until its successful conclusion by

Allied forces, the U.S. Navy ordered

32 aircraft carriers of the CV-9 class,

of which the keels of 25 were laid

down. A total of 17 were actually

commissioned during the war years.

The total number of CV-9’s commissioned—including those commissioned after the war—was 24.

Several characteristics marked the

Essex class carriers upon their introduction to the Fleet. The pyramidal

island structure, for instance, rose

cleanly from the starboard side, topped

by a short stack and a light tripod

mast. The port elevator was also a

distinguishing feature, along with the

two inboard elevators. Ticonderoga,

Randolph, Hancock, Bennington and

Boxer, as well as hull numbers from

CV-31 on, had rounded bows extending beyond the flight deck.

Overall lengths varied within this

class; they were either 872 feet long

or 888. It is interesting to note that

they had a uniform water line length

of 820 feet. All were armed with 12

five-inch .38 caliber dual purpose

guns, but some had 17 quadruple

40mm anti-aircraft mounts while

others had 18. A few also had 20mm

AA armament. Generally, there were

accommodations aboard each for 360

officers and 3088 enlisted men.

Except for CV-2 and CV-3, Lex -

ington and Saratoga, the power plants

were increased over other aircraft

carriers in the Fleet. The machinery

was “entirely modern in design and

arranged so as to gain the maximum

resistance to derangement and battle

damage. There are eight control

superheat boilers arranged in four firerooms. Steam lines are such that the

boilers in each fireroom can be connected to one main machinery unit so

that the plant can be operated as four

separate units.” They had four screws.

These carriers had better protecting

armor than their predecessors (again

excepting Lex and Sara), better facilities for handling ammunition, safer

and greater fueling capacity, and more

effective damage control equipment.

T

HE T ACTICAL employment Of U.S.

carriers changed as the war progressed. In early operations, through

1942, the doctrine was to operate

singly or in pairs, joining together for

the offense and separating when on the

defense—the theory being that a

NOVEMBER 1962 47
separation of carriers under attack not

only provided a protective screen for

each, but also dispersed the targets

and divided the enemy’s attack. Combat experience in those early operations did not bear out the theory and

new proposals for tactical deployment

were the subject of much discussion.

As the new Essex and Independence

class carriers became available, these

new ideas were put to the test.

The Independence class carriers—

light carriers, designated CVL’s—

were products of an effort to increase

this country’s sea-going air strength

in the early days of the war. Nine

keels to light cruisers of the Cleveland

class were laid down at the New York

Shipbuilding Corp. yard at Camden,

name was changed to USS Langley

and she was given the designation

CVL. (Actually, all these cruiser-tocarrier conversions were originally

designated CV’s when the decision to

convert was made; all were redesignated CVL’s on the same day.)

The Newar k (CL-100) had a

rougher time of it. On June 2, 1942,

she was changed to CV-30; on June

23, her name was changed to Reprisal,

which she kept for a little over six

months. On Jan. 6, 1943, her name

was again changed, to San Jacinto.

The light carriers displaced 11,000

tons standard. In design, the bridge

was box-like in appearance, with a

small crane forward. They had four

stacks, paired off in twos, on the starJapanese-held island of Marcus. Task

Force 15, which conducted the raid,

consisted of Yorktown (CV-10) ,

Essex (CV-9) and Independenc e

(CVL-22), the cruisers Nashville and

Mobile, the battleship Indiana, and ten

destroyers. Aircraft were launched

from the carriers at a point approximately 130 miles north of the island.

On October 5-6, 1943, RAdm.

Alfred E. Montgomery led Task Force

14 on a second raid on Wake Island.

The task force was comprised of two

task groups, operating a total of six

aircraft carriers— Essex, Yorktown

(CV-10), Lexington (CV-16), Inde -

pendence, Belleau Wood, and Cowpens

—seven cruisers and 24 DD’s, the

largest carrier task force yet assembled.

FAST CARRIER task forces included both Essex and Independence Clas S

carriers, shown above, and viewed from USS Lexington in January 1945.

ON A PHOTO mission, a TBM passes USS Shangri La (CV-38), named

in honor of the Doolittle raid on Japan and paid in full by War Bonds.

N. J., three of them before the war

started. They were to have been the

Amsterdam (CL-59), Tallahasee (CL61), New Haven (CL-76), Huntington (CL-77), Dayton (CL-78), Fargo

(CL-85), Wilmington (CL-79), Buffalo (CL-99), and the Newark (CL100). They eventually became the

Independence, Princeton, Belleau Wood,

Cowpens, Monterey, Langley, Cabot,

Bataan, and the San Jacinto, CVL’s 22

through 30, respectively.

Naming and designating these last

four sometimes went through a rigorous and confusing metamorphosis,

Neither Cabot nor Bataan encountered

any difficulty. The names and designations were reached in June and July

1943 without attending problems

But Fargo was named Crown Point

(CV-27) when the decision was

reached to convert her to an aircraft

carrier. Then, on July 15, 1943, her

48

board side, aft of the island. These

stacks angled out from the hangar

deck and rose vertically above the

flight deck level.

As the Essex and Independence class

carriers joined the Fleet in increasing

numbers, it was possible to operate

several carriers together, on a continuing basis, forming a carrier task

group. Tactics changed. Experience

taught the wisdom of combined

strength. Under attack, the combined

anti-aircraft fire of the task group

carriers and their screen provided a

more effective umbrella of protection

against marauding enemy aircraft than

was possible when the carriers separated. When two or more of these

task groups supported each other, they

constituted a fast carrier task force.

The first attempt to operate a

multi-carrier group occurred on August 31, 1943, during a raid on the

In the course of the two-day strikes,

ship handling techniques for a multicarrier force, devised by RAdm.

Frederick C. Sherman’s staff, were

tested under combat conditions.

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, then

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,

dispatched his congratulations. “The

thorough job done on Wake by planes

and ships of your task force will have

results reaching far beyond the heavy

damage inflicted.”

The words were prophetic. Lessons

learned from operating the carriers as

a single group of six, as two groups

of three, and three groups of two,

provided the basis for many tactics

which later characterized carrier task

force operations. With the evolution

of the fast carrier task force and

its successful employment in future

operations, the rising sun of the

east began slowly to sink in the west.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
ESCORT CARRIERS file in formation during World War II. Viewed from (CVE-57), later renamed USS Anzio, Corregidor (CVE-58), and Nathe Manila Bay (CVE-61) are sister Casablanca class carriers Coral Sea toma Bay (CVE-62), followed by Bogue class carrier Nassau (CVE-16)

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

EMERGENCE OF THE ESCORT CARRIERS

‘The story of the escort aircraft carriers is like a story with a surprise ending. When the United States began to build

them, there was a definite purpose in view—fighting off submarines and escorting convoys. But as the war progressed, the

small carrier demonstrated surprising versatility. It became a great deal more than its name implies. From a purely defensive

measure, the escort carrier emerged as an offensive weapon.’—FAdm. Chester W. Nimitz, USN, CinCPacFlt/CinCPOA, 1945

T

OWARD THE END of World War I,

Great Britain experimented in converting light cruisers to airplane carriers—notably in HMS Cavendish o f

32 knots and about 10,000 tons displacement. But with the signing of

the Armistice, the project was abandoned. Despite this, it was a subject

of interest in the following years.

In 1925, the General Board seriously

considered the conversion of cruiser

hulls to aircraft carriers. Although

treaty limitations restricted the building up of carrier strength, there was

sufficient uncommitted construction

tonnage to permit the building of more

carriers than the U.S. Fleet had. Could

this uncommitted tonnage be best employed in building small carriers? The

Board’s answer can best be summed up

in this excerpt from its report:

“Incomplete studies of the subject

by the Bureau of Construction and

Repair and the meagre information

available concerning the performance

of airplanes from carriers of approximately 10,000 tons displacement does

not justify building them at this time.”

But the subject of “light” carriers

DECEMBER 1962

By Scot MacDonald

was of recurrent interest to the U.S.

Fleet. In May 1927, LCdr. Bruce G.

Leighton prepared a paper in which he

analyzed the problem. He titled it,

“Light Aircraft Carriers, A Study of

their Possible Uses in So-Called ‘Cruiser

Operations,’ Comparison with Light

Cruisers as Fleet Units.” Though the

title may have been cumbersome, the

document was impressive. He forecast

every fundamental combat requirement of the later-day CVL’s and

CVE’s, including the bombing of capital ships, support of fleet operations,

anti-submarine work, scouting and reconnaissance, and the reduction of

enemy shore bases. He concluded that

“all things considered, it might well be

considered as a worthy substitute for

the light cruiser, or even distinctly

preferable to the cruiser.”

For the next dozen years, the subject

interjected itself spasmodically and unsuccessfully into Navy thinking. But

in March 1939, Capt. John S. McCain,

Sr., then commanding the Ranger ,

wrote to the Secretary of the Navy

advocating the building of at least

eight "pocket-size” carriers of cruiser

speed. These were not meant to replace

the CV’s, but to supplement them,

giving force commanders much more

flexibility in the use of ship-based aircraft at sea, without jeopardizing the

much more costly heavy carriers.

RAdm. Ernest J. King, in his endorsement to the letter, was not at all enthusiastic about this scheme. He suggested that existing aircraft carriers

carry the maximum number of planes

permissible as a better solution than the

construction of smaller carriers.

The matter was not entirely dropped,

however, for the Bureau of Construction and Repair was considering, and

even drawing plans for the conversion

of 20- or 21-knot passenger ships,

creating experimental carriers with

short flight decks. By November 1940,

the Chief of Naval Operations brought

these considerations to an abrupt halt,

basing his decision on a letter from

SecNav to the Chairman of the U.S.

Maritime Commission. SecNav wrote:

“The characteristics of aircraft have

changed, placing more exacting de49
mands upon the carrier. These demands are such that a converted merchant vessel will no longer make as

satisfactory an aircraft carrier as was

the case when the plans for those vessels were being drawn.”

In commenting on the beginning of

escort carriers, historian Lt. William

G. Land, USNR (Functional Development of the Small Carrier [CVE])

says, “The escort carrier was forced

upon the Navy by the President.”

Indeed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did actively enter the “light” carrier controversy. Great Britain had

been at war with Germany since September 1939. Since that time and before the U.S. entered the war, large

numbers of U.S.-built military aircraft

were sold to the British. The U.S. had

need for an aircraft-carrying ship to

speed delivery. By mid-February 1941,

RAdm. W. F. Halsey (later Fleet Admiral) had written to Commander-inChief, U.S. Fleet:

“A previously stated expectation,

that the Navy would be called upon to

provide transport for Army aircraft,

has now materialized in the current

diversion of Enterprise and Lexington

to transport 80 pursuit planes from the

West Coast to Hawaii. To continue with

primary reliance on aircraft carriers

for such work, as is our present necessity, seriously endangers the availability

of air-offensive power in the Fleet.”

Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, in endorsing this letter from his Commander

Aircraft Battle Force to the Chief of

Naval Operations, fully concurred and

pointed out that on five separate occasions in the past he had himself urged

such action.

Earlier, on October 21, 1940, CNO

had received a memorandum from the

President’s Naval Aide advising him

that President Roosevelt proposed the

Navy acquire a merchant ship and convert it to an aircraft carrier, accommodating 8 to 12 helicopters (not yet

operated by the Navy) or airplanes

capable of landing or taking off in a

small space. The purpose of this type

carrier was to “provide quick conversions for carrying small planes which

could hover ahead of convoys, detect

submarines and drop smoke bombs to

indicate their locations to an attacking

surface escort craft.”

CNO decided on the last day of 1940

that the Chairman of the Maritime

Commission would be consulted to determine the availability of ships for

this purpose. On January 2nd, it was

found that two Danish ships might

permit conversion, but later investigation proved this would not be possible.

The results of this January 2 conference determined that the ships (two—

one was to be sold to Great Britain)

selected “should be of the same or very

similar design in order that the plans

made for one could be applicable to

both; that the airplanes should be further investigated to determine the type

and availability; that an armament of

four AA pom-poms and one 5” surface

gun should be such as to insure stability

at all stages of loading.” These converted merchant ships were to fill the

need later expressed by Adm. Halsey,

the transport of aircraft, as well as to

provide protection to Allied convoys.

On January 6, 1941, Adm. Harold

R. Stark, CNO, convened a conference

in his Washington office to discuss

merchant-conversion. The autogiro

type aircraft was considered of dubious

usefulness because of its inability to

carry any load other than smoke

bombs; an aircraft, to meet the purpose designed, must have some offensive characteristics. An abbreviated

deck was ruled out. The converted

ship should be diesel-driven in order to

eliminate smokestacks. The decision

was made to obtain from the Maritime

Commission, if possible, C-3 cargo ships.

On the following day, CNO was informed that two diesel-driven C-3 type

ships, the Mormacmail and the Mormacland, would be suitable for conversion and were available. He was told

by President Roosevelt that any plan

which would take more than about

three months to complete conversion

would be unacceptable. This, in effect,

placed pressure on the project. The

idea of substituting “blimps” for autogiros or heavier-than-air craft was

flirted with but, by January 15, was

“out of the picture.”

The Mormacmail was acquired on

March 6, 1941. On June 2—just

within the three-month limitation set

by the President—she emerged from

conversion and was placed in commission as the aircraft escort vessel USS

Long Island (AVG-1), commanded by

Cdr. Donald B. Duncan who, on December 31, 1942, was to be the first

commanding officer of USS Essex.

Early plans for the conversion called

for the installation of a 305-foot flight

deck on the Mormacmail, but the Bureau of Aeronautics required at least

350 feet to safely land SOC Sea Gulls

aboard. Upon commissioning, Lon g

Island had a deck length of 362 feet.

She had one elevator, handled 16

planes, had a trial run speed of 17.6

knots, and berthed 190 officers and

780 men.

The Mormacland, acquired at the

same time, was similarly converted and

was turned over to the British as HMS

Archer (BAVG-1) when it was completed the following November. Experience with the BAVG and the two

British conversions led the British to

believe that the diesel-driven ships were

too slow for their purpose as special

escort vessels—although they were no

slower than the later Bogue carriers.

Long Island was used primarily as a

training ship during the remaining

peacetime months of 1941. She was

subjected to tests and experiments—

much the way USS Langley had been

in her early days—to obtain data

needed for the construction of later

escort carriers. As a result of the

Navy’s experiences with this ship,

other CVE’s were outfitted with two

elevators instead of one, the flight

decks were lengthened, and the antiaircraft power was increased.

On December 26, 1941, SecNav approved the conversion of 24 merchant

hulls for the 1942 shipbuilding program and, in March, ordered the conversion of cruiser hulls which became

the CVL’s. Cdr. Leighton’s 1927 paper

was proving its farsightedness.

Naval Aviation historian, Dr. Henry

Dater, traced the next developments in

a paper published in Military Affairs:

“There were only 20 C-3 hulls available for conversion, ten of which were

earmarked for the Royal Navy and ten

for the United States. The new ships

were improved by the substitution of a

steam turbine power plant for the

diesel engines employed in the Long

Island and Charger [the latter was redesignated CVE-30 and replaced CVE-1

as a training ship when the Long Island

was pressed into service, ferrying

planes and pilots at the outbreak of

war], and by the addition of a slightly

larger flight deck (436 by 79 feet), a

small island, and a considerably larger

hangar space.

“They were referred to either as the

CVE-6 class, from the numerical designation of HMS Battler, or as the Bogue

class, from the first ship to operate

with the U.S. Navy.

50 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
“The remaining four CVE’s authorized for the 1942 program were converted from Cimarron class fast fleet

oilers and were known as the Sangamon (CVE-26) class. These were considerably larger, having a flight deck

of 503 feet by 85 feet, and were able

to accommodate two small squadrons

of aircraft. Because of their size, work

was rushed on them during the summer

of 1942 so that they would be available

for the North African invasion in the

autumn.”

Before the U.S. entered the war,

German U-boats hovered near British

coastal ports and picked off merchant

ships with ease. Land-based RAF planes

drove the German submarines further

out to sea. To make matters more difficult for the enemy, convoys sailed

They left a double space in the middle

in the center of which they placed the

Bogue. The other escorts were placed

around the convoy in a half circle. The

idea was, if possible, to use our catapults and to stay in our center position

when launching our planes so there

wouldn’t be any wide separation. As it

happened, we had westerly winds on

the East-bound convoy so we had to

turn around to launch planes and to

take them aboard. Consequently, the

separation was fairly large due to the

fact that it was what is called a high

speed convoy, ‘nine knots!’”

Though this tactic met with considerable success at first, it was primarily

defensive. A new technique was found

more effective. A small task group

took up a position where it could throw

length of 553 feet, a speed of 18.3

knots, a trial displacement of 23,235

tons, and carried 120 officers and 960

men. They were armed with two fiveinch, 38 calibre guns, two quad and ten

twin 40mm AA mounts. They were

equipped with two hydraulic catapults

forward.

“With the CV’s, except Ranger, being

employed in the Pacific,” wrote historian Land, “planning for the North

African landings depended on the completion of the AO conversions of S u -

wannee, Sangamon, Chenango, a n d

Santee. For this reason, Suwannee had

to cut down on its pre-commissioning

period, fitting out, and shakedown in

order to be substituted in the final

plans for the much smaller Charger,

BOGUE CLASS escort carriers were products of the 1942 shipbuilding USS SUWANEE was one of four escort carriers converted from Cimprogram. They were converted from Maritime Commission C-3 hulls. maron class fleet oilers. They were rushed to completion for battle duty.

closer together, opening up larger areas

of the North Atlantic for the German

subs to search. The Germans solved

this problem by developing the “wolf

pack” technique of operating in

groups, then concentrating for the kill

when convoys were sighted.

“It was this technique which created

the British desire for aircraft escort

vessels in late 1940 and 1941,” wrote

Dr. Dater. “With the entry of the

United States into the conflict the Germans found easy picking off the American coast, but it was only a matter of

time until land-based air on this side of

the Atlantic drove them out to sea once

more. There in mid-ocean was a vast

area in which the convoys did not have

the assistance of aircraft. By early

1943 it became evident that the decisive campaign was to be fought in that

area.”

The air officer of the Bogue d e -

scribed escort procedures during March

and April 1943:

“The ship was stationed inside the

convoy for this work. The convoys were

in columns of five ships each with

about 700 yards between columns.

its support to either of two convoys in

a general area. Escort carrier-based

aircraft scouted ahead, searching out

German U-boats before the submarines

could make contact. This permitted

the carriers to be released from the

difficult maneuver necessary in the

central slot of the convoy. Out of

this technique emerged the successful

hunter-killer tactic that eventually

freed Allied shipping in the North

Atlantic.

The Sangamon class escort carriers,

built as fleet oilers under the Merchant

Marine Act of 1936, were completed in

1939, but in the 1942 shipbuilding

program were slated for reconfiguration to aircraft carrier characteristics.

Only four hulls were on hand. “Had

more oiler hulls been available,” wrote

Lt. Land, “they would have become the

prototype of the small carrier for the

ensuing year’s program. But the overwhelming need for fleet oilers—to

make possible our logistic advance—

prevented this type of hull from being

again used for carriers, until 1944.”

The Sangamons had an over-all

the ex-BAVG which had been doing

regular duty as qualification carrier in

Chesapeake Bay. Santee, likewise, was

barely completed in its essentials and

had had hardly any exercise with its

air group before its first combat operation was to begin.”

Capt. William D. Sample, commanding Santee, wrote of the hectic

early days aboard:

“Santee left Norfolk Navy Yard 13

September 1942 with Yard workmen

still on board and her decks piled high

with stores. During that first month,

the Santee returned to the yard twice

and was never free of the Yard workmen. The completion of the ship continued while the fitting out and shakedown were proceeding together. At the

end of the month, the air group had

operated aboard only a day and a half

and guns had been fired only for structural tests . . . .

“The Navy Yard had done an almost

impossible task in getting the ship out

in time for the pending operations but,

in so doing, only the essentials had

been completed, and it was then necessary for the ship to install, adjust, calibrate and repair until the ship could

DECEMBER 1962 51
ARMY P-40 Warhawk fighter catapults from CASABLANCA (CVE-55) was first of 50 escort COMMENCEMENT BAY class was concerned to

the deck of a Sangamon class to North Africa. carriers mass-produced by Kaiser shipyard. provide trans-ocean convoys witb air cover.

use her battery and equipment . . . .

The service experience necessary to test

many of the questionable features of

the ship’s design was soon obtained in

a wintry gale encountered en route to

Bermuda. The two forward boats were

carried away, the new upper decks

proved to be sieves and the repair work

of the ship’s force got underway in

earnest.”

The carrier Chenango was used, in

the North African operation that followed, as a ferry carrier for Army

P-40's on the outward trip, as a fuel

supply ship while moored at Casablanca, and as a fleet escort—with a

borrowed air group furnishing air

cover-on the return trip.

Her sister ships, however, launched

TBF-1 Avengers, SBD-3 Dauntless and

F4F-4 Wildcat aircraft in support of

landing operations for the capture of

Casablanca and Port Lyautey. They

were units of Task Force 34. As part

of the Northern Attack Group, Sangamon and Chenango assisted troops

landing at Mehedia, not far from

Port Lyautey. Ranger and Suwanee

provided air cover for the Center Attack Group at Fedhala, northeast of

Casablanca. Santee was the only carrier assigned to the Southern Attack

Group, providing combat air patrol

and anti-submarine patrol for the landing force at Safi—the only port in

Morocco, other than Casablanca, that

would permit the landing of 28-ton

General Sherman tanks. It was for the

capture of Casablanca that these tanks

were needed.

Between November 8-11, 1942, Suwanee launched 255 combat sorties;

Santee, 144, and Sangamon, 183.

During Sangamon’s participation in

the Northern Attack Group operation,

her planes were called upon to neutralize a Kasba or citadel, which guarded

the Port Lyautey airdrome. Several

SBD's delivered bombs on target. “The

garrison then,” wrote Samuel Eliot

Morison, “came out with their hands

up and our infantry walked in.” BY

November 15, Sangamon’s part in the

invasion of North Africa was completed and she sailed for Hampton

Roads.

Planes in the Suwanee joined those

based in the Ranger in bombing missions during the Battle of Casablanca.

The Suwanee, like the Santee at Safi,

encountered light winds. Many landings were made aboard with only 22-

knot winds across the deck.

Despite the greenness of the crews in

the Sangamons, generally, they gave a

good account of themselves. Commented CinCLant: “The CVE’s proved

to be a valuable addition to the Fleet.

They can handle a potent air group

and, while their speed is insufficient,

thev can operate under most weather L

conditions and are very useful ships.”

Their missions in the invasion of

North Africa completed, Sangamon,

Chenango, and Suwanee were dispatched to the Pacific. By the end of

1942, U.S. carrier strength in the Pacific had been reduced to the Enterprise and the Saratoga.

In the meantime, President Roosevelt announced a need for more escort

carriers. Shipbuilder Henry J. Kaiser

had impressed the President with the

merits of a plan which would permit

the mass production of escort carriers,

under a program to be supervised by

the Maritime Commission.

The first of these, USS Casablanca

(CVE-55), was commissioned July 8,

1943, and gave its name to the class—

CVE-55 through CVE-104. They

were also referred to as Kaiser class

escort carriers. The Kaiser yard completed its 50-ship program on July 8,

1944. This was an impressive achievement in wartime production program.

The Casablanca class had an over-all

length of 512 feet, 3 inches, a speed

of 19.3 knots, a trial displacement of

9570 tons, and carried 110 officers and

750 men. They had one five-inch, 38

calibre gun and eight twin 40mm AA

mounts. The aircraft complement consisted of 12 TBM's and 16 FM-2's; in

the flight deck was a single hydraulic

catapult, forward.

Final details were worked out for a

new class escort carrier during the

trials of the Sangamon and Santee and

during the planning for the 1944

building program. These ships were

the first Navy-designed escort carriers

for which hull and propeller model

tests were carried out at the David W.

Taylor Model Basin. The design was

formally approved by CNO on December 10, 1942 and the contract was let

on January 23, 1943. The first of these

carriers was the Commencement Bay

(CVE-105) from which the class got

its name. It had an over-all length of

557 feet, a speed of 19 knots, and a

trial displacement of 23,100 tons. Few .

of these ships saw action in the war—

the Commencement Bay was commissioned in November 1944. Only nine

others were commissioned before V-J

Day the following September. They

incorporated all lessons learned since

the Long Island was commissioned.

As the escort carriers gained experience, they earned the respect of the

Fleet by proving themselves versatile

in anti-submarine warfare. The Sangamon class first demonstrated combat

capability in the support of the North

African invasion. The first major carrier-supported amphibious landing in

the Pacific was the capture of the Gilberts and Marshalls. Eight escort carriers participated, two of the Bogue

class, three of the Sangamon class, and

52 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
three of the Casablanca class. The

changing status of these vessels is reflected in their redesignation. Originally identified as aircraft escort vessels (AVG’s), they were redesignated

on August 20, 1942, auxiliary aircraft

carriers (ACV’s), and finally, on July

15, 1943, a directive changed the escort

carrier symbol to CVE, reclassifying

them as combatant ships.

At the end of the North African

invasion, RAdm. Calvin T. Durgin

(then Capt.) evaluated the effectiveness of the escort carriers when he presented his report:

“Due to their low speed, lack of protection and light armament, it is considered hazardous to employ a CVE

group in operation where there is likely

to be an effective enemy opposition.

Such a group can, however, be used to

advantage, and is capable of inflicting

substantial damage to the enemy in

assault where the enemy air and sea

opposition is negligible or when it is

being contained by other superior

forces. When this situation exists, the

CVE is well equipped to provide all

support until landing strips are established ashore, and it can be effectively

employed for bombardment spotting,

combat air patrols over beaches and

surface forces, for all forms of air

reconnaissance missions and for bombing, rocket and strafing attacks.”

His experience with escort carriers

was to stand him in good stead. On

December 13, 1944, the functional

type command, Escort Carrier Force,

Pacific, was created; RAdm. Durgin

was placed in command.

The establishment of this force was

made possible by the increasing number of carriers—notably of escort design—made available to the Fleet. Experience at Palau and Morotai and the

difficulties encountered later at Leyte

all pointed to the need for better planning in advance of operations if the

CVE’s were to perform efficiently their

enlarged responsibilities. Adm. Durgin’s command held administrative

control over all escort carriers operating in the Pacific, except those assigned to training and transport duty.

On December 15, 1944, the escort

carriers provided direct support for

landings on Mindoro, and in the assault

area on the next two days. Between

January 3-22, 1945, 17 escort carriers

covered the approach of the Luzon

Attack Force against serious enemy air

opposition from Kamikaze pilots. This

force of ships, Task Group 77.4, conducted preliminary strikes in the assault

area, covered the landings in Lingayen

Gulf, and supported the inland advance

of troops ashore.

In 1945 the CVE’s saw a great deal

of action. On the last three days of

January, six escort carriers under

RAdm. Sample (as Capt., first C.O. of

Santee) provided air cover and support

for landings by Army troops at San

Antonio near Subic Bay, and at two

other nearby Philippine beaches. In

February, Adm. Durgin directed his

carriers in the battle for the capture of

Iwo Jima. In March, the Okinawa

campaign began, the last, and, for

naval forces, the most violent major

amphibious campaign of World War II.

As Task Group 52.1, Adm. Durgin,

with an original strength of 18 escort

carriers, conducted pre-assault strikes

and supported the occupation o f

Kerama Retto, joined in the preassault strikes on Okinawa, and, from

a fairly restricted operating area southeast of the island, supported the landings and flew daily close support for

operations ashore until the island was

secure on June 21.

The U.S. suffered few losses to the

enemy in these ships. Five carriers of

the Casablanca class were lost in the

Pacific; one Bogue class was torpedoed

in the Atlantic. During the war years,

76 CVE’s of various classes were commissioned, in addition to the Lon g

Island, commissioned months earlier.

Seven more Commencement Bay class

were commissioned during the postwar years. During the war, four sister

ships to Long Island were transferred

to the British, as were 34 additional

escort carriers of the Bogue class. Four

were sunk; at the end of the war, the

rest were returned to the U.S. from

Lend-Lease and were either sold or

placed in the reserve fleet.

Through fulfilling a basic need of

transporting large numbers of assembled aircraft to various theaters of war,

the quickly conceived and executed escort carrier developed into an anti-submarine warfare weapon that defeated

the German U-boat threat in the North

Atlantic. They provided combat capability in the support of fleet operations

in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

In short, they displayed a versatility,

proved under the pressures and urgencies of a war that engulfed the world.

VADM. (THEN RADM.) Calvin T. Durgin was

the Commander Escort Carrier Force, Pacific.

DECEMBER 1962

NINE ESCORT CARRIERS break formation in the Pacific to take up stations. Originally designed

for escort ASW work in the North Atlantic, they were designated combatant ships in July 1943.

53
design. Construction

Evolution

began during World War II. Toward the end of ery, the Midways were the mightiest aircraft carriers in the world.

of Aircraft Carriers

CVB'S: THE BATTLE CARRIERS

‘The life of the Midway also demonstrates the progress of our Navy; the accommodation of our ships to aircraft of high

performance; the use of missiles; exploitation of electronics; the capability to employ a whole family of weapons unheard

of when her keel was first laid. No other navy, no other service of any country, has a single military unit as powerful, as

versatile and as mobile as this great ship.’—VAdm. George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command, 1957.

L

IKE THE CVE’s, the CVB’s were a

direct product of World War II

needs and experience, though their missions were different. The former were

to be most effective in providing closein support of troop landings. The latter was designed to pit against the

enemy the most potent aircraft carrier the world had yet seen.

The CVB’s were to provide a solution to the problem of designing a

tough rugged ship which would have

good aircraft operating features as

well as every possible characteristic

that would enable it to both give and

take punishment. Our early war losses

were caused by our failure to adequately control damage sustained. It

was obvious that we needed a much

sturdier aircraft carrier than we operated in the early years of the war, one

with an armored flight deck and improved compartmentation. The resulting design gave us a new breed of ship,

battle-cruiser fast, battleship rugged,

and with more aircraft operating capacity than anything we had known.

At the same time, aircraft design54

By Scot MacDonald

ers were producing larger, heavier types

to be operated off sea-going carriers.

These higher performance planes, heftier, faster, would place great demands

on the flight decks of the proposed

CVB’s. The planes would require

greater room, and these considerations

added to the over-all weight of the

constructed carrier.

On July 9, 1942, Congress authorized their construction. Already, the

toll on both U.S. and Japanese carriers

had been heavy. In January that year,

the Saratoga was damaged by submarine torpedo and forced to a yard for

repairs. In the Battle of the Coral Sea

in May, the light carrier Shoho w a s

sunk by U.S. carrier-based planes

which, the next day, also damaged the

Shokaku. In this battle, the Yorktown

was damaged; the Lexington, ravaged

by uncontrollable fires, sank. During

the decisive Battle of Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy lost the Akagi,

the Kaga, the Hiryu, and the Soryu,

Yorktown, already damaged at Coral

Sea, was hit again at Midway and on

June 7 was sunk.

Midway was a significant victory

for the Allied forces. While proving

a turning point in the war, it again

conclusively demonstrated the warfare

potential and, in fact, superiority of

carrier aviation. To commemorate the

occasion, the escort carrier CVE-63

was named USS Midway, but on September 15, 1944, her name was changed

to USS St. Lo, relinquishing her name

to the first of a new class aircraft carrier then being built, USS Midwa y

(CVB-41). This battle carrier was

laid down on October 27, 1943. A

sister ship, CVB-42, was laid down as

USS Coral Sea on December 1, 1943,

but upon the death of the President,

was renamed USS Franklin D. Roosevelt. The third large aircraft carrier

built, CVB-43, became USS Coral Sea.

Contracts for the new carriers were

signed August 7, 1942, and by September 18, plans for them were well

under way. On that date, the Chief

of the Bureau of Ships wrote to the

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations

and to several Bureau chiefs, discussing the proposed contract design:

“It will be noted that the island is

shown offset from the side of the

flight deck to the maximum extent

permitted by clearance for passage of

. . . the Panama Canal,” he wrote.

“This location of the island has the

obvious advantage that a straight fore

and aft flight deck runway for airplanes is interfered with to the least

possible extent. It gives a flight deck

width in way of the island of 107

feet.”

This was one of the last times the

Panama Canal was a limiting factor

in the construction of aircraft carriers.

The “Canal block” was broken when

it was later decided to construct a

carrier not to go through it.

Concerning the island structure,

BuShips continued: “Extensive wind

tunnel model tests of the CV-9 class

island with a large number of modifications involving various degrees of

streamlining and attempts to reduce

smoke nuisance on the flight deck

caused by stack gases have been performed. These studies showed clearly

that the details of island contour were

of negligible importance in effect upon

air-flow patterns as compared with the

bulk of the ship and of the island itself.

In view of these conclusions, attempts

to streamline the various essential protuberances on the island and of the

island itself were discarded in the case

of the CV-9 class and, therefore, have

not been incorporated in the present

plans.”

The island structure was the subject of considerable correspondence in

the months and years following. There

was an obvious effort by most bureaus

to keep the island as small as possible.

In this there was general agreement.

Comment and discussion became extensive when locations of specific

spaces in the island were brought up,

as well as uses to which they would

be put. Occasionally, proposed requirements threatened to bloat the

island structure, but as alternate locations were found, it was possible to

keep it to a reasonable size. In October 1942, for instance, the Chief of

the Bureau of Aeronautics, RAdm.

John S. McCain, noted:

“Location in the island of the following space, the functions of which

do not necessarily require island space

STERN VIEW of the FDR shows increased flight

deck space and small island arrangement.

is noted: Pilot balloon room, two

squadron lockers, repair I, flight deck

crew, flight deck control, flight deck

equipment, and one unassigned space.

. . . This bureau considers that effort

should be continued to reduce island

size. ”

The original proposals called for the

installation of two flushdeck type catapults capable of launching VT type

aircraft and one double action type in

the hangar, capable of launching fully

loaded VSB type aircraft. But by October 1942, the General Board considered the complications involved in the .

installation of a hangar catapult and

decided against it. Within the year,

the decision was reached to eliminate

hangar catapults from Essex class carriers, then either under construction or

planned. .

Hangar fires resulting from combat

damage offered particular danger in

both Japanese and U. S. aircraft car- . J L

riers during the early days of the war.

In designing the CVB-41 class carriers

this danger was considerably lessened

by the introduction of four bulkheads

in the hangar, dividing it into three

spaces connected by sliding doors.

Underwater subdivision of compartments and spaces was given considerable attention, in event of torpedo

JATO TAKEOFF is made by a P2V Neptune

from the deck of USS Franklin D. Roosevelt.

or mine hit, and was described as “excellent.” To provide additional protection, the flight deck was armored

with 31⁄2 inches of solid steel, and the

deck side belt armor at the waterline

tapered from 71⁄2 inches to 3.

In 1943, the wave of war in the

Pacific turned against the Japanese as

Allied forces made a concerted offensive, capturing Rendova Island in July.

The Japanese-held airfield at Munda

in New Georgia island was taken by

the Allies, who invaded Bougainvillea

in October and landed on the Gilberts

in November.

That same year, U. S. shipyards

launched and the Navy commissioned

15 CV’s and 24 CVE’s.

In early 1944, the Marshalls were

taken. On the first day of this operation, complete control of the air was

obtained and maintained by carrierbased aircraft. The Marianas were invaded in June and Guam recaptured

in August. Leyte was occupied in

October-November, the opening blows

struck by Task Force 38 under VAdm.

Marc Mitscher. American shipyards,

mass production well organized,

launched 7 more CV’s, 33 more CVE’s.

March 18 to June 21, 1945, the

Okinawa campaign raged. The desperate Japanese had already turned to

the Kamikaze strikes and now introduced the Baka bomb, seriously damaging the carrier Franklin. Between

May and August, carrier-based aircraft

were launched against the Japanese

home islands, destroying or immobilizing the remnants of the Japanese

Navy. On September 2, the formal

terms of surrender were signed and

World War II was over. Eight days

later, on September 10, USS Midway

was commissioned, the first of the

CVB’s, Capt. Joseph F. Bolger commanding. In the following month, on

October 27, 1945, USS Franklin D.

Roosevelt (CVB-42) was commissioned. Construction on USS Coral

Sea (CVB-43) was delayed, the ship

finally being commissioned on October 1, 1947. Three additional CVB’s,

the 44, 56 and 57, were cancelled.

The Midway was a giant among aircraft carriers. She had an over-all

length of 968 feet, an extreme beam

of 136 feet at the flight deck, and had

a standard displacement of 45,000

tons. Midway had a trial speed of 33

knots, four propellers and a shaft

horsepower of 212,000. She was armed

JANUARY 1963 55
with 18 five-inch, 54 caliber single

double-purpose guns, and 21 quad

40mm A.A. mounts. Like the Essex

class carriers, CVB-41 had a deck-edge

elevator in addition to her forward

and aft elevators. She accommodated

379 officers and 3725 enlisted.

These general characteristics held

true for her sister ships. But there

were subtle differences, especially in

the case of the Coral Sea. Comments

in correspondence during construction

of the Midway indicated that a large

CAMERAMAN records the first takeoff from

USS Coral Sea (CVB-43) December 11, 1947.

number o f minor modifications,

learned in the construction of the

CV-9 class carriers, the Midway herself, and from wartime experiences,

would be incorporated in the final

design of CV-43.

Midway had her shakedown in November 1945. Her aircraft aboard

consisted of 57 F4U-4 Corsairs, 5 9

SB2C-4E Helldivers, and 4 F6F Hellcats, totalling 120 aircraft, 17 fewer

than her full complement of 137.

The carrier’s nucleus crew came

from a Carrier Aircraft Service Unit

(CASU) under ComAirLant. Plane

handlers were sent to Great Lakes

where they boarded the training ships

Sable and Wolverine for an approximate six-week period during which

they learned basic carrier work. The

February Naval Aviation News o f

1946 described their later training:

“The men then proceeded to a

CASU, where they awaited shakedown

of a carrier other than their own. Their

own still was building. Most of the

Midway’s original crew leaders shook

down on the USS Antietam and the

USS Charger. On this shakedown,

embryo plane handlers stood battle stations, observed the regular crew at work

and finally assisted. They were supervised by a training officer from ComAirLant who expedited their progress.

CORAL SEA is shown in Mediterranean waters

during last tour before modernization work.

“Following this shakedown, the Midway’s nucleus crew returned to a CASU

near where the ship was building. Here

they were groomed in taxiing, spotting

and parking aircraft. The work [was]

accomplished on a runway painted to

simulate a flight deck. Also, they

familiarized themselves with the aircraft they would be using.”

Midway conducted her shakedown

in the Caribbean, devoting 51 out of

57 days to air and gunnery operations,

simulating all types of wartime conditions. Exercises included fueling escort

ships at sea, damage control drills and

problems, A.A. tracking and firing at

towed spars and drones, emergency

lube-oil drills for engineers, arming

planes, gassing, and use of inert gas.

Air operations involved all types of

flying and battle exercises, climaxing

the tour with a two-day strike against

the Caribbean island of Culebra—a

well-pummeled three-mile tract of

land used by U. S. warships for shakedown training at that time.

USS Franklin D. Roosevelt also conducted her shakedown training in the

Caribbean, under command of Capt.

Apollo Soucek. After post-shakedown

alterations in New York, she was

shifted to Norfolk, where she became

flagship of Adm. Marc Mitscher during the first large-scale training operations since the end of World War II.

These maneuvers of the Eighth Fleet

took place in the western Atlantic between April 19 and May 27, 1946.

In the following year, during Caribbean maneuvers, Sikorsky H03S helicopters were operated. Noted Naval

Aviation News in June 1947:

“It was not the first time a helicopter had operated off a carrier deck.

Four (of them) were with the Byrd

Antarctic expedition. . . . But the

helicopter really proved its worth as a

utility and rescue plane off the FDR,

a showing which may have an effect

on fleet operations of the future.”

Activity of the FDR in the early

post-war years was typical of that of

her sister ships. After an extended

yard period between March 1947 and

July 1948, she completed refresher

training in the Caribbean before leaving for her second tour in the Mediterranean. At this time, the “Berlin

blockade” was formed and the presence of CVB-42 in that area provided

a “show of strength.” This was her

mission for the next five years, as the

Berlin blockade was followed by crises

in eastern Mediterranean countries and

armed aggression in Korea.

In October 1952, the CVB’s were

re-designated attack aircraft carriers

(CVA’s). In 1953 the fleet modernization program was authorized. First

aircraft carrier to undergo rework was

the FDR. The ships were equipped with

steam catapults, hurricane bows, and

the angled-deck design of Project 110.

56
JAPAN’S SECOND aircraft carrier to be named Amagi was of the Unryu

class; the first was sunk at Midway. Sbe accommodated 65 planes.

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE END OF THE ‘BOKUBOKAN’ IN WW II

Japan is beaten, and carrier supremacy defeated her. Carrier supremacy destroyed her army and navy air forces.

Carrier supremacy destroyed her fleet. Carrier supremacy gave us bases adjacent to her home islands. . . . Carrier supremacy

demolished the island air bases and eliminated the air force which was using them. Carrier supremacy made the island naval

bases untenable for such shipping as escaped our subs. Carrier supremacy permitted us to give close, tactical air support to

the troops who stormed the island fortresses.’—VAdm. Marc A. Mitscher, USN, quoted in Naval Aviation News, October 1945

W HEN JAPAN struck Pearl Harbor

on December 7, 1941, she had

the strongest aircraft carrier force in

the Pacific. This supremacy lasted

until June 1942, when the Battle of

Midway was fought and won by the

U.S. Thereafter, the bokubokan

(“mother ship for aircraft”), though

an effective and dangerous fighter, was

an ever weakening force; ships sunk

by U.S. planes and submarines were

not replaced in sufficient numbers and

strength. The study of the Japanese

maritime wartime construction is a

study of desperation in the face of an

inevitable defeat.

At the outbreak of war, Japan had

six fine bokubokan, the carriers Akagi,

Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, in addition to three lighter carriers, the Zuiho, Hosho and Ryujo. The

keels were already laid for others and

some conversions were being made. At

that time, the U.S. had only seven

carriers, widely dispersed. At the Battle of Midway, Japan lost Kaga, Akagi,

Hiryu and Soryu– and never fully recovered from this decisive defeat.

Japan’s first wartime constructed

carrier was the Taiho (“Big Lucky

Bird”), a 29,300-ton ship authorized

under the 1939 estimates. Built at

Kawasaki Dockyard, she was laid down

in July 1941, launched in April 1943,

APRIL 1963

By Scot MacDonald

and delivered in March 1944. She had

a cruising range of 10,000 miles at 18

knots, but could reach 33 knots with

ease. Kawasaki claims her to have been

the most heavily protected flattop in

the world at the time of her delivery.

And well she might have been; her

armor was impressive.

Tahiho had 33⁄4 inches of plating on

the flight deck between her two elevators, covering a distance of some 164

yards. The platforms on these elevators

were two inches thick and weighed 100

tons. Such weight required a low center of gravity for the ship, resulting in

a very short distance between the water

line and the flight deck, the same

height as that of the Hiryu, a carrier

some 12,000 tons lighter.

In designing and constructing this

carrier, the slanting, low smokestacks

of her predecessors were abandoned and

57
CONVERTED TRANS-PACIFIC liner, the Junyo, was originally the Kashi- and accommodated 53 atrcraft. Sister ship, Hiyo, was ex-lzumo Maru.

wara Maru, displaced over 24,000 tons standard, had 12 five-inchers Both were badly damaged by U.S. subs, Hiyo sunk by CVL-24 planes.

she returned to the “stack in island”

type, the stack emerging high on the

island and inclining outwards at 26°.

Taiho was an excellent carrier, but

she had a short life: three months. On

June 19, 1944, during the Battle of

the Philippine Sea, she was hit by a

torpedo from the U.S. submarine Albacore, damaging gasoline pipes and crippling her bow elevator while it was in

the down position. Though her speed

and maneuverability were not seriously

affected, she did lose the ability to

launch aircraft because of the elevator

difficulty. Gas fumes spread through

the ship. In a few hours she exploded

and sank.

Five modifications of the Taiho class

were ordered in the 1942 program,

but none was laid down, owing to

shortages and crowded shipyards.

The Unryu (“Cloudy Dragon”)

class was next to enter the scene. This

ship was constructed under the 1941

estimates. Seven sister ships were

ordered in the 1942 program. Two

were never named and never laid down.

Unryu was a modification of the

Soryu’s, the plans simplified for quicker

construction. She displaced 17,150

tons standard. Sister ships Katsuragi

and Aso were slightly heavier, displacing 17,400 tons , while Ikoma, Kasagi

and Amagi were heavier yet, 18,300

tons. They had a speed of 34 knots,

except for Katsuragi and Aso which,

because of shortages, were equipped

with destroyer type engines and could

only reach a relatively slow 32 knots.

Not one of these ships took an important part in any engagement. Both

Unryu and Amagi were completed in

August 1944 and were used for transport duty. Exactly 105 days after her

commissioning, Unryu was sunk by a

torpedo from the submarine Redfish.

Amagi suffered two attacks from U.S.

carrier-based aircraft while the ship

was at Kure. The second attack, on

July 24, 1945, capsized her.

Katsuragi also came under attack by

U.S. carrier planes four days later, also

at Kure. She suffered minor damage

because she was protected by camouflage. After the war, she was used for

repatriation and was scrapped in 1947.

Neither Aso, Kasagi nor Ikoma was

completed by the end of the war. Aso

was launched November 1, 1944,

Ikoma on October 17, and Kasagi two

days later. They were 60% to 80%

complete when work on them was

halted because of material shortages.

Aso was used as a target ship for

Kamikaze training attacks and did not

survive this abuse. Ikoma was moored

at Shodo Jima where she sustained

bomb damage toward the end of the

war. She and Kasagi were scrapped.

Seven more Unryu class ships were

added to the 1942 program, but they

never got beyond the paper work.

The Japanese wartime carrier construction program, though ambitious,

was not at all successful. What few

successes they did enjoy were short

IN WAR PAINT here, the light carrier lkoma was laid down at Kawaaki dockyard in 1943 but was

never completed. Work on her stopped January 1945. TF 38 planes damaged hull the next July.

58

lived. Since the pressure was on—

especially after the Battle of Midway

—it was natural that they would turn

to quick conversions. In this area, too,

the results were discouraging.

The submarine depot ships Taigei,

Tsurugisaki, and Takasaki were the

first to be converted. They became the

Ryuho, Shoho and Zuiho.

Ryuho’s structure was weak when

she entered the yard for conversion.

While being strengthened and given

carrier characteristics, she was hit by

several bombs from one of the B-25

bombers led by Jimmy Doolittle and

launched from the USS Hornet. This,

of course, delayed completion. When

conversion was completed, she displaced over 15,000 tons standard. She

had a speed of 26.5 knots, was armed

with eight five-inchers, and accommodated 31 aircraft. Ryuho saw much

action, participating in the battles of

the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf in

1944. In March 1945, she was moored

at Kure, bombed by carrier-based U.S.

aircraft, and gutted by fires.

Shoho and Zuiho both displaced over

13,000 tons standard upon completion

of conversion. Zuiho was completed

in December 1940, while Shoho w a s

completed nearly two years later. Both

had a speed of 28 knots, were armed

with eight five-inchers, and accommodated 30 aircraft.

Shoho’s first battle was her last: she

was sunk by carrier-based aircraft of

the Lexington and Yorktown on May

7, 1942, during the Battle of the Coral

Sea. Zuiho was not much luckier. Her

contributions to the Battle of Midway

and the Aleutians campaign were negligible. At the Battle for Leyte Gulf,

she was sunk by carrier-based aircraft.

The conversions of the Ise a n d

Hyuga from battleships proved to be

one of the most puzzling experiments

undertaken by the Japanese after the

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Battle of Midway. Their aft turrets

were removed and abbreviated flight

decks were installed. A large hangar,

an elevator, and two catapults were

added, permitting the ships to launch

all her aircraft in 20 minutes.

The planes scheduled for these ships

were sent to Formosa before the ships

were completed. The conversions were

employed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

By this time, Japan had run out of

aircraft to supply them, and the ships

were used solely in their capacity as

battleships. They were later sunk, in

July 1945, by U.S. carrier-based planes,

Another conversion, that of the

Ibuki from an improved Mogami class

cruiser, also had a rough time of it. She

was authorized under the 1941 program, but shortly after her launching

in May 1943, work on her was halted

for six months while authorities haggled with the possibility of reconverting her into a fast oil tanker—much

needed by the Japanese navy. The decision made, work renewed, this time at a

furious pace. Four of her eight boilers

were pulled out and this space used for

the storage of fuel oil. A hangar and

two elevators were installed, and a

bridge was placed on her starboard

side. She was capable of 29 knots and

could carry 27 aircraft. But work

stopped again, this time when the construction of small submarines took

priority in the shipyards. She was

never finished; at the end of the war

the Ibuki was scrapped.

The most ambitious conversion and

the most disappointing career was that

of the Yamato class battleship Shinano.

Laid down as a battleship but not

completed when hostilities broke, the

possibility of converting her to a carrier was entertained. This possibility

became a necessity after the Battle of

Midway. Survivors of this battle

pointed out serious deficiencies in carrier construction and designers at the

Naval Technical Bureau listened well.

Heavier armored flight decks were

needed to protect them from divebombing attacks. Fuel and ammunition stowage spaces needed redesign.

Originally, plans for the conversion

of the Shinano called for her to act as

a “hotel ship,” supporting land- or

other carrier-based planes; she was not

to carry aircraft of her own. This

plan was changed and by September

1942 the new design was completed

and construction began.

Shinano, basically, was to be a CVB.

Heavy emphasis was placed on armor.

Large bulges below the water line were

to minimize torpedo damage. At the

water line, an eight-inch thick belt of

armor was retained. Four-inch thick

armored deck had already been installed before conversion started and

this deck became the hangar deck.

Rolling metal curtains opened up the

forward two-thirds of this deck for

night operations and rough seas. The

remaining third was closed completely

when the curtain was rolled into place.

Her flight deck and elevators were designed to withstand 1000-lb. bombs.

With this weight, Shinano displaced

68,000 tons during her trials at sea.

The Battle of Midway also called

attention to the ship’s ventilation system. All ducts were protected with

11⁄2-inch armor. Wood was eliminated

from the ship wherever possible. A

fire-resistant paint was introduced, and

a bubble fire-extinguishing system was

installed.

The carrier was launched on November 11, 1944 and commissioned November 19th. On the 20th, yard

workers still aboard, crewed by green

hands, she got underway for Kure

where the air complement was to board.

It was at this point that USS Archerfish picked her out on radar while surfaced. The submarine maneuvered for

position and waited until the carrier

and her three-destroyer escort crossed

her line of fire. Archerfish fired six

torpedoes; four hit the carrier. Slowly,

she flooded and listed; by 1018 the following morning, all hands were ordered

to abandon ship. A few minutes later,

Shinano capsized and sank—with half

her crew still aboard.

For many in the Japanese Navy, the

powerful Shinano was the last hope.

With her sinking, Japanese carrier

aviation died, never to operate again.
HMS ARK ROYAL, a 22,000-tonner, had large hangars on two decks, Navy. In war, her fighters downed or damaged more than 100 enemy

three elevators. She boasted the largest wardroom in the Royal aircraft, her bombers wrecked Sardinian airfields, hit Italian Navy.

Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE WARTIME EUROPEAN CARRIERS

‘Experience with regard to the suitability of the present type of aircraft carrier must still be evaluated. Examination

of enemy naval strategy in ocean warfare leads, however, to the clear recognition of the fact that aircraft carriers or cruisers

with flight decks for use in warfare in the Atlantic definitely cannot be dispensed with.’—Grossadmiral Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief Kriegsmarine, during a mid-1940 conference with the Fuehrer on matters dealing with the German Navy

D

URING W ORLD W AR II, four European nations designed, constructed and/or operated aircraft carriers, or attempted conversions of other

type ships to carrier characteristics:

Great Britain, France, Germany, and

Italy. Great Britain met with extraordinary success, especially in the design of carriers. Among the advances

made were the prototype of the WW

II-produced CVE (structurally, USS

Langley qualifies as the first unintended

CVE) and experiments that eventually

led to the perfection of the “steam

slingshot” catapult. Her experiments

have a continuing effect on the design

of modern carriers. France operated a

converted battleship, the Béarne, and

was building two carriers, Joffre and

Painléve, when war started. These two

carriers were never completed and

France fell to the Axis too early in the

war for her Navy to make any advancements in carrier aviation. At the

same time, Germany’s efforts were fit60

By Scot MacDonald

ful, frustrated and fated to failure.

And Italy, tardily entering carrierconversion efforts, found the war ended

with her ships unfinished.

A starting point in the catalogue of

incredible events that launched the nations of the world into global war was

the assumption as Chancellor of Germany by Adolph Hitler on January 30,

1933. In the following October he

withdrew his country from the disarmament conference and from the

League of Nations. Nearly five years

later, Germany invaded and annexed

Austria. Next on his list was Czechoslovakia in September 1938 which, by

skilled “brinkmanship” on the part of

the Fuehrer, ended in the Munich

agreement. Overconfident now, Hitler

zeroed in on Poland. This was too much

for both England and France and, on

September 3, 1939, they declared war

on Germany, and World War II began.

When war began, Britain had six aircraft carriers in commission and six

more under construction. Of those operating, the 22,000-ton Ark Royal

(most recent addition to the Fleet,

1938) and the converted large light

cruiser Courageous operated with the

Home Fleet. The Furious, stationed at

the Firth of Forth, was used for carrier deck training (but immediately

took up convoy duty in the North

Atlantic). Glorious, sistership to Courageous, was assigned to the Mediterranean, while the Eagle, laid down as

the dreadnought battleship Almirante

Cochrane for Chile in 1913, converted

and commissioned an aircraft carrier in

1924, covered the China Station.

Hermes, the first ship in the world

designed from the keel up as an aircraft carrier, also completed in 1924

(the Japanese Hosho was completed

December 1922), was conducting antisubmarine warfare in home waters.

In addition to the tactical carriers,

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
Britain had one other carrier of lesser,

but still significant, capabilities: the

Argus, worked on between 1916 and

1918 from the Italian liner Cont e

Rosso, was employed on convoy escort

duty.

As the political climate changed in

Europe and war clouds gathered,

Britain made a substantial effort to reinforce her modest and generally venerable carrier fleet. She ordered six new

carriers. When the storm broke, these

six were in various stages of construction: Formidable, Illustrious, Implacable, Indefatigable, Indomitable, and

Victorious. In addition, the 14,500-ton

aircraft depot ship, Unicorn, under

construction in 1939, was to be completed as a CVE.

The first years of World War II

were expensive ones for Britain’s small

carrier fleet. Courageous was the first

carrier casualty of the war. Tracking

down a reported U-boat on September

17, 1939, she turned to receive her

returning planes when the U-29 submarine plowed torpedoes into her.

The carrier sank with more than half

her crew still aboard.

Loss of the Glorious was particularly

heartbreaking. In June 1940, she participated in the British withdrawal

from Norway. Land-based RAF Gladiators and Hurricanes were embarked at

Narvik. This was a particularly hairy

operation, for none of the planes was

configured for carrier landing and the

Air Force pilots were not carqualled;

all landed safely. Presumed low on fuel,

she was ordered to proceed home independently. En route, the carrier was

spotted by the German battleships

Gneisenau and Scharnhorst on June 8,

and attacked. “Chocked” with RAF

FAIREY FIREFLY was World War II two-place

carrier fighter used by the British Navy.

aircraft, she was in no condition to

launch defending planes. Pounded

mercilessly by enemy guns, the ship

developed a list and within an hour

went down.

These losses were balanced in 1940

by the introduction of the Illustrious

(first of her class) and Formidable .

They displaced 23,000 tons each, had a

length of 753 feet and a beam of 95

feet. They were soon joined by Vic -

torious, of the same class, and Indomitable, a carrier in a class by herself. The

latter had two hangar decks.

An early contribution to carrier operations by Illustrious came when she

had installed a search radar system for

the tracking of enemy aircraft. She

was also the first carrier to have a

fighter-direction officer aboard. With

this effective teaming of men and electronics, Illustrious- based planes claimed

75 enemy aircraft in a little over six

months of operation.

HMS Eagle was the first aircraft carrier to launch planes against enemy

surface warships in WW II. On July

9, 1940, carrier-based Swordfish torpedo bombers attacked the Italian fleet

in the Med. Defective torpedoes permitted only limited success: only one

of the Italian destroyers was sunk.

The first successful wartime carrier

strike in history occurred on the night

of November 11, 1940 when two striking forces from the carrier Illustrious

attacked the important Italian Naval

base at Taranto. Winston Churchill

said of this successful raid:

“By this single stroke the balance of

naval power in the Mediterranean was

decisively altered. The air photographs

showed that three battleships, one of

them a new Littorio, had been torpedoed, and in addition one cruiser

was reported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyard. Half the Italian Fleet was disabled for at least six

months, and the Fleet Air Arm could

rejoice at having seized by their gallant

exploit one of the rare opportunities

presented to them.”

The defeats at Taranto and Cape

Matapan (March 30, 1941) finally

gave the Italian admirals, who had been

pleading for an aircraft carrier since

1925, an effective argument in their

dealings with the Italian Air Force

which controlled military aircraft. Several plans were actually drawn up but

the progress of war did not permit the

laying down of keels. Material and

manpower shortages forced the Italians

to abandon the idea of building carriers

from the keel up; instead, they attempted to convert merchant liners.

Early in the war, September 1939,

Dr. Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of

Propaganda jubilantly reported the

sinking of Ark Royal by a German

bomber. This widely publicized error

caused the Third Reich considerable

embarrassment, for the carrier escaped

undamaged and operated effectively

until November 11, 1941, when she

finally fell victim to U-boat torpedoes.

GRAF ZEPPELIN, the only one of four aircraft carriers planned by Never completed, she fell to the Soviets at the end of the war. Seacocks

the German navy to be launched, is shown as she appeared in 1939. opened, she rested on the bottom of a shallow channel near Steffin.

MAY 1963 61
A month later, HMS Audacity met a

similar fate. This ship, converted from

the German prize Hannover, became

Britain’s first escort carrier upon her

completion in June 1941. She was

sunk during a battle between U-boats

and a Gibraltar-U.K. convoy. Her

planes and surface escort destroyed five

enemy subs and the decision was made

to press for the building of more escort

carriers.

Of the losses sustained by the British,

Hermes was the only aircraft carrier

sunk by the Japanese. Fleeing from

Trincomalee just ahead of the expected

Japanese carrier strike, on April 8,

1942, she was spotted by enemy carrier-based planes. Hermes, hit by some

40 bombs, sank in 20 minutes.

Five carriers of the Majestic class

and seven of the Colossus were laid

down, but only the first five of the

Colossus were completed before V-J

day; each displaced 14,000 tons. Four

of eight of the new 18,300-ton Hermes

were produced. They were appreciably

longer and faster than the Colossus

class, comparable to the U.S. Navy’s

first carrier named Enterprise. The

remaining Hermes class was canceled.

Two of the four ships of the new

33,000-ton Ark Royal class were laid

down but none was completed until

well after the end of hostilities.

In addition, the British planned three

45,000-ton Gibraltar class carriers

(others: New Zealand and Malta), but

the project was canceled at the end of

buffer between U.S. amphibious forces

and enemy air fields at Sakishima

Gunto during the invasion of Okinawa.

OTHER European powers with carrier aspirations were less successful. France started the war with one

converted carrier. The efforts of both

Germany and Italy to become carrier

powers were foredoomed to failure.

The French carrier Béarn was laid

down in January 1914 as a battleship

of the Normandie class. She was finally

launched as a battleship in 1920, but

three years later entered the yards for

conversion to a Bâtiment Porte-Avions

and was completed in May 1927.

Béarn displaced 25,000 tons, fully

loaded, had an over-all length of 599

AQUILA, an attempt by the Italian Navy to convert a liner into an Many of her parts were cannibalized from the Graf Zeppelin, but

aircraft carrier, is shown as she appeared at LA Spezia in June 1951. repeated bombings by Allied aircraft never permitted her completion.

Other losses sustained by the Royal

Navy included the Avenger (November 1942) and the Dasher (Marc h

1943), both Archer (U.S. Long Island) class escort carriers, Nabob was

irreparably damaged by torpedo in

August 1944 and Thane suffered the

same fate in January 1945; both were

of the Smiter (U.S. Bogue) clas s

escorts.

Carrier construction of all types was

not pushed in the United Kingdom

during WW II in any way comparable

to U.S. efforts. Anti-submarine warfare craft had the highest priority and

the U.K. depended upon U.S.-built

Lend-Lease CVE’s (in all, 37) for

most of its build-up. Completion of

two of the 23,000-ton Implacable class

was delayed until 1944. Her sister ship

was the Indefatigable.

62

the war. These were to be the British

equivalent of the U.S. Midway class.

During the war, the U.K. operated

five light fleet aircraft carriers (the

Colossus class, in 1945), six fleet carriers of various tonnages, and three

escort carriers—all built in British

yards—in addition to the ten carriers

sunk and the CVE’s lend-leased from

the U.S. Her carrier-based planes

played a vital role in defeating the

U-boat offensive. In the Pacific, Adm.

Sir Bruce Fraser, RN, commanded the

newly established British Pacific Fleet.

The 1st Carrier Squadron, comprising

the Indomitable, Victorious, Illustrious

and Indefatigable, was a unit of this

fleet. Both Indomitable and Victorious

had seen prior action in the Pacific.

Formidable joined the squadron later.

The British group acted as a flying

feet. She had a complement of 875 and

carried 36 to 42 aircraft, including

torpedo, reconnaissance and fighter

planes. She was held in semi-internment at Martinique from the fall of

France in 1940 until 1943. In early

1944 she was taken to the U.S. for rework and emerged as a transport

d’aviation, operated by the French.

I

N 1935, Adolph Hitler announced

that his country would construct

aircraft carriers to strengthen the

Kriegsmarine, the German Navy. The

keels of two were laid down in 1936.

Two years later, Grand Admiral Raeder

presented an ambitious shipbuilding

program called the Z Plan, in which

four carriers were to be built by 1945.

In 1939, he revised the plan, reducing the number to be built to two.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
The German Navy has always maintained a policy of not assigning a name

to a ship until she is launched. The

first German carrier, laid down as Carrier “A”, was named Graf Zeppelin

when launched in 1939. The second

carrier bore only the title Carrier “B”,

since she was never launched. Various

names, including Peter Strasser a nd

Deutschland, were rumored, but no

official decision was ever made.

A review of the Fuehrer’s conferences on matters dealing with the German Navy, the minutes of which were

captured after the fall of the Third

Reich, reveals Hitler’s vacillating interest in the carriers. Marshall Hermann Goering, Commander in Chief

of the Luftwaffe, was resentful of any

incursion on his authority as head of

the country’s air power and he frustrated Raeder at every opportunity.

Within his own service, Raeder found

opposition in Adm. Karl Doenitz, a

submarine man.

By May 1941, the strain on manpower and raw materials was being felt

in Germany. Raeder was still optimistic, however, and informed Hitler that

the Graf Zeppelin, then about 85 per

cent complete, would be completed in

about a year and that another year

would be required for sea trials and

flight training.

Though Hitler continued to assure

Raeder that the carriers would be built,

the Admiral’s war with Goering had

no truce and became increasingly bitter. Goering showed his contempt for

the naval air arm by informing Hitler

and Raeder that the aircraft ordered

for the Graf Zeppelin could not be

available until the end of 1944. Goering’s tactic was a delaying one—and

it worked.

Construction on the carriers had

been fitful from the start. Carrier “B”

was abandoned in 1940 and broken up.

Manpower and material shortages

plagued the Graf Zeppelin.

Prodded by Raeder, Hitler ordered

Goering to produce aircraft for the

carrier and under this pressure, the air

marshall offered redesigned versions of

the JU 87B and the ME 109E-3 whic h

were at that time being phased out of

the Luftwaffe first line squadrons.

Raeder was unhappy, but he had to

accept them or none at all. This forced

another delay in the construction of

the carrier: the flight deck installations

had to be changed.

By 1943, Hitler had become disenchanted with his Navy. Raeder was relieved at his own request and Doenitz,

the submarine admiral, took the top

naval post. This effectively ended the

Graf Zeppelin and work on her stopped.

Had the carrier been completed, she

would have displaced 23,000 tons, had

a length of 920 feet and a beam of 88

feet. Powered by geared turbines, she

was to have a speed of 33.8 knots. Her

aircraft complement was to have been

42, consisting of ME 109T fighters and

JU 87C dive bombers (new designations

for the redesigned aircraft). She was to

have four screws—unusual for the

triple-screw-minded Germany.

The fate of the Graf Zeppelin w a s

as stormy as her conception and berth

pangs. Scuttled by the Germans, she

was raised from the back-water channel near Steffin, by the Soviets in

1946-47. Loaded down with loot, she

was towed into the Baltic in 1947,

headed for Leningrad. East of Rügen,

the ship sank.

With Germany’s abandonment of

aircraft carriers came Italy’s growing

interest in them. The liner Roma was

earmarked for conversion and many

parts of the Graf Zeppelin were transported to Italy for use in the conversion. Of particular interest, according

to eminent naval historian S. A. Smiley,

were the new engines in the ship. Four

independent sets of geared turbines

from the light cruisers Cornelio Silla

and Paolo Emilio were installed, giving

her a designed speed of 30-31 knots.

This, says Smiley, was “a unique marine-engineering pearl.” The ship’s

name was changed to Aquila and was

nearly ready for trials when Italy surrendered. Aquila was sabotaged to prevent the Germans from operating her.

She was repaired later, but was damaged in two air raids, one in 1944 and

the other in 1945. Finally, in 1949, she

was towed to La Spezia and scrapped.

Another Italian effort to produce

an aircraft carrier by conversion was

made when the liner Augustus, a running-mate to the Roma, was put in

hand for conversion in March 1944.

She was first named Falco and then

Sparviero, but was never completed.

Her half-finished hull was bombed and

sunk at Trieste at the close of the war.

A condition of the peace treaty

signed in 1947 after a five-week meeting of the Big Four Foreign Ministers in

New York specified that no battleship,

aircraft carrier, submarine or specialized assault craft could be constructed,

acquired, employed or experimented

with by Italy, blocking her efforts to

be an aircraft carrier nation.

BEARN WAS the only carrier France had completed before the start 1923 and 1927, she had a speed of 21.5 knots, or a radius of 6000

of WW II. Converted to aircraft carrier characteristics between miles at 10 knots. She spent most of the war years at Martinique.

MAY 1963 63
CORAL SEA was the last WW II-built carriers to be reworked extensively in the modernization programs; shown here after Project 110A.

POST-WAR YEARS

‘There has been a spectacular advance in aircraft design technology. The transition from propellor-driven aircraft to

jet power has been fast. We are now undergoing another evolution from subsonic to supersonic speeds at higher altitudes.

. . . By modernization we have utilized our assets of World War II Essex class carriers to the maximum. This has been a military necessity in order to maintain an acceptable degree of combat readiness economically in about half the time required

for new construction. Carrier modernization has been pushed vigorously.’—Adm. Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy, CNO, 1957.

T

HE POST-WAR ERA was one of dynamic change. The aircraft carriers

reflected that change with many modifications designed to equip them to operate the most modern aircraft capable

of delivering nuclear weapons and

launching guided missiles.

Technological developments were

making the Essex class obsolescent. On

June 4, 1947, the Chief of Naval Operations approved new aircraft carrier

characteristics to be incorporated in an

improvement program titled Project

27A. This was the first of a series of

modernization efforts to modify the

Essex carriers to meet changing operating requirements.

USS Oriskany (CV-34) was the first

of the Essex class carriers modernized

under Project 27A. She entered New

York Naval Shipyard in October 1947.

At spaced intervals, she was followed

by Essex (CV-9), Wasp (CV-18) ,

Kearsarge (CV-33), Lake Champlain

(CV-39) , Bennington (CV-20) ,

Yorktown (CV-10), Randolph (CV -

15), and Hornet (CV-12). These programs were conducted at Puget Sound

64

By Scot MacDonald

and Newport News, in addition to the

New York Navy Yard. The Hornet,

last to be modernized under 27A, left

the New York yard in October 1953.

The principal changes involved in

the 27A project were directed toward a

capability of operating aircraft of up

to 40,000 pounds gross weight. The

H4-1 catapults were removed and H-8’s

installed, permitting the launching of

considerably heavier aircraft than the

carrier had been capable of during the

war years. The flight decks were

strengthened and the five-inch guns on

the flight deck were removed to decrease topside weight, to provide more

deck space for parking planes, and to

increase safety aspects of the landing

area. A special weapon capability was

given the last six of the nine carriers

modernized under this project. Elevator capacities and dimensions were increased to accommodate heavier planes.

And special provisions for jet aircraft

were installed—such as jet blast deflectors, increased fuel capacity, as

well as some modern jet fuel mixers.

Three of the ready rooms for pilots

in these carriers were moved down

below the hangar deck, relocating them

from spaces directly under the flight

deck. This increased pilot comfort and

provided better protection. To get the

equipment-laden pilots up to the flight

deck, an escalator was installed abreast

of the island. This provided a single

route for pilots manning their planes;

it prevented confusion from ship’s

company rushing up the normal access

routes to man battle stations.

In April 1947, Franklin D. Roosevelt

entered the yards on Ship Improvement

Program No. 1, which provided her

with a special weapon capability. Her

sister ships, the battle carriers Midway

and Coral Sea, followed. This program

was also extended to the Oriskany ,

Essex and Wasp, which had not received the capability under 27A.

Almost a year before the FDR entered the yards, the first U.S. testing

of the adaptability of jets to shipboard

operations were conducted aboard, on

July 21, 1946. Successful landings and

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
takeoffs in an FD-1 Phantom were made

by LCdr. James J. Davidson. (For

background on the Navy’s first jet

pilots, see NANE W S, March 1963, pp.

6-13.)

The Navy continued to experiment

with heavier aircraft launchings from

carrier decks. In March 1948, carrier

suitability of the FJ-1 Fury jet fighters

was tested on board the Boxer (CV-21)

off San Diego. A number of takeoffs

and landings were made by Cdr. Evan

Aurand and LCdr. R. M. Elder of

Fighter Squadron 5A. The following

month, Cdr. T. D. Davis and LCdr. J.

P. Wheatley made JATO takeoffs in

P2V Neptunes from the deck of the

Coral Sea off Norfolk. This was the

first carrier launching of planes of this

size and weight.

It was inevitable, then, that the

Navy would introduce all-jet squadrons to carrier operations. On May 5,

1948, Fighter Squadron 17-A, equipped

with 16 F H-1 Phantoms, became the

first carrier-qualified jet squadron in

the U.S. Navy. It took three days of

operations to do it, but all squadron

pilots, in addition to Commander Air

Group 17, qualified on the USS Saipan

(CVL-48), with a minimum of eight

landings and takeoffs each.

Project 27A was originally intended

for more than nine carriers, but development of the steam catapult and the

prospective employment of more advanced types of aircraft made it apparent that this project had to be modified

to meet future needs. Accordingly,

Project 27C was initiated.

Hancock, Intrepid and Ticonderoga

were slated for this program—later

identified as Project 27C (axial deck).

Most important of the changes was the

introduction of the steam catapult developed by the British. In 1952, tests

of the catapult installed in the Royal

Navy carrier HMS Perseus were conducted at the Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, at NOB Norfolk, and at sea

during the first quarter of the year.

Reported NANE W S:

“The new catapult fared so well during the tests that the Navy has already

begun an investigation into the adaptability of it to their new flush deck

carrier USS Forrestal, which is now

under construction.

“The new catapult, invented by a

Royal Navy volunteer reserve officer,

Cdr. C. C. Mitchell, O. B. E., of Messrs.

Brown Brothers & Co., Ltd., EdinOCTOBER 1963

HANCOCK WAS the first carrier to receive the C-11 steam catapult. Note the TACAN “bucket”

atop mast for homing, enlarged elevator, and the distinctive bridle catchers at end of catapults.

burgh, uses the principle of the slotted

cylinder, and has no rams or purchase

cables. A hook on the aircraft to be

launched is connected directly to a

piston which is driven along the cylinder by high pressure steam from the

ship’s boilers. A novel sealing device is

used to keep the slotted cylinder steam

tight.

“While the amount of steam required for sustained operation is large,

tests have shown that the boilers can

meet the demand without interfering

with the ship operations.”

The Hancock was the first U.S. carrier to receive the new “steam slingshot,” designated C-11 by the U.S.

Navy. On June 1, 1954, Cdr. H. J.

Jackson, in an S2F-1, was catapulted

from the Hancock in the initial U.S.

operational tests. Throughout the

month, testing continued. A total of

254 launchings were made with the

S2F, AD-5, F2H-3, F2H-4, FJ-2, F7U-3,

and F3D-2 aircraft.

In addition to the C-11 steamcat,

Project 27C (axial deck) also provided

for a strengthening of the flight deck.

The number three centerline elevator

was replaced with a deck edge type of

greater capacity. Other improvements

were made, in addition to those proved

effcient in 27A.

Even as these changes were being

built in the Hancock, Intrepid a n d

Ticonderoga, the Bureau of Aeronautics

proposed, in mid-June 1952, that a

new design flight deck be installed in

the Antietam. The previous May, both

jet and propeller type aircraft were

tested on a simulated angled deck

aboard the USS Midway. The idea was

originated by the British and proved

very effective for them. Antietam’s

deck was to extend outboard on the

port side from the normal flight deck,

65
ANTIETAM TESTS British-designed angled deck in the Virginia Capes evaluation period. Pilots were enthusiastic, for it eliminated

area in April 1953. Fifteen types of aircraft were used during barriers, barricades, and danger of parked planes at runway’s end.

thus allowing aircraft landings to be

angled 10° off the ship’s centerline.

Pushed through the guidance design

stage by the Hull Design Branch of

BUSHIPS in early July, Antietam’s new

deck was completed in mid-December

at the New York Naval Shipyard. At

first called a canted deck, this term

officially gave way to the more familiar

angled deck by OPN AV Notice 9020

on February 24, 1955. It also outlawed

the use of “slanted” and “slewed” in

describing the deck design.

In December 1953, BUSHIPS Journal

reported:

“The final detailed report on the

evaluation of the canted flight deck installed in USS Antietam (CVS-36) reveals that the operational trials have

met with a high degree of success. The

canted deck aircraft carrier appears to

provide the safest, most desirable, and

most suitable platform for all types of

aircraft—those currently in use as well

as those still on the design board—and

is superior to the axial flight deck

carrier in these respects. . . .

“The canted flight deck on Antietam

was finally installed at an angle of

10.5° to the centerline of the axial

flight deck. The landing area of the

canted deck is 525 feet long with a

width at the landing ramp of 70 feet

and narrowing to 32 feet, 8 inches, at

the extreme forward end of the takeoff

area. This gives the effect of ‘flying

into a funnel,’ causing the pilot to head

toward the canted centerline. This

effect aids him in maintaining the

flight and deck path which full y

utilizes the complete length of the

66

canted flight deck.

“Fifteen types of aircraft, both propeller and jet-propelled, participated in

the tests which were conducted in four

phases, extending from December 29,

1952 to July 1, 1953. A total of 4107

landings were made, including touchand-go and arrested landings, during

day and night operations. During the

entire evaluation period there was no

major accident and only a total of eight

minor accidents, none of which could

be attributed to the canted deck

principle.”

The advantages were immediately

manifest. By eliminating the centerline

elevators and using one or more deck

edge elevators (not installed in the

Antietam), more elevators would be

available for bringing up spares from

the hangar and striking “dud” aircraft

below. Once landed, the plane could

easily taxi onto a starboard deck edge

elevator without impeding flight operations.

It was also possible to catapult aircraft and land them simultaneously,

and to launch CAP and interceptors on

short notice. This gave the carrier improved combat readiness.

The pilots were impressed. An extra

margin of safety was given them by

removing the danger of crashing into

gassed and armed planes parked forward

of the landing area. The BUSHIPS Journal commented:

“The clear deck ahead on every carrier pass relieved the pressure on the

pilot. Primarily for this reason, pilots

who have flown from the canted deck

are unanimous in their favorable enthusiasm. This was found to be especially true when Antietam’s canted deck

was rigged to simulate a CVE type

carrier. Pilots flying AF type aircraft

confirmed that part of the mental

strain of carrier landings is relieved

with removal of the barriers and that

landings were much easier. . . .

“Fewer cross deck arresting pendants and arresting gear engines are

required for the canted deck. It is

considered desirable to keep the landing area as far aft as is practical and

safe, yet far enough forward to decrease rates of descent. This can be

accomplished only by limiting the

pendants to a minimum commensurate

with safety and picking optimum pendant locations. Fewer pendants also result in a decrease in topside weight.”

Project 27C (angled deck), which

resulted from the Antietam tests and

modified the original 27A, significantly

changed the silhouette of the aircraft

carriers. The canted or angled deck

was installed and the hurricane bow

of the original Saratoga and Lexington

carriers reintroduced. The project also

allowed for the improvement of the

Mark 7 arresting gear by reducing the

number of deck pendants by one-half

and thereby cutting the ratio of arresting gear sheaves to two to one. The

forward centerline elevator was enlarged. Air conditioning and sound

proofing made the island spaces more

comfortable and efficient. The latest

advancements in deck lighting were

also installed in these attack carriers.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
— . . —

Lexington, Shangri La, and B O n

Homme Richard all received the improvements of this project and they

were so successful that Hancock, Intrepid and Ticonderoga returned to the

yards for this new conversion.

The trend extended, inevitably, to

the Midway class. In September 1953,

the Navy announced new modernization plans for these carriers under a

new program called Project 110. In

May 1954, the Franklin D. Roosevelt

entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

for the conversion. Midway followed

in September 1955. These carriers received the best features of the 27C

(angled deck) conversion which were

incorporated in Project 110. Additionally, they had a modified steam catapult

installed in the angled deck area; full

blisters were added for maximum protection, liquid stowage, and stability,

and the after starboard elevator was

relocated to the starboard deck edge.

With the changes in carrier configuration ran a parallel change in missions and these changes were reflected

in the redesignation of certain carriers

as they appeared in the Navy Vessels

Register.

On October 1, 1952, the very familiar CV and CVB designations went

by the board. The ships were assigned

the designation CVA, reflecting their

reclassification as attack carriers. Prior

to this, only the CV’s were known as

attack carriers, in the Fleet, to distinguish them from the CVB’s. Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carriers

became a new classification in July

1953 and was applied to those attack

carriers assigned to ASW; the followDECISION AND DISPLAY room in first installation of Modular CIC is viewed in Oriskany. The

concept proved so successful that it was later installed in Coral Sea and other aircraft carriers.

ing August 8, five CVA’s were redesignated CVS’s, ASW support carriers.

There were no further changes in

designations over the next two years,

but in July 1955, Thetis Bay (CVE -

90) became CVHA-1. This proved

the first move in the eventual disappearance of escort carriers from the

operational Fleet. The attempt to modify CVE’s for a new role in helicopter

vertical assault operations was abandoned when the experiment proved too

costly. On May 7, 1959, the classification of 36 escort carriers, designated

CVE, CVU, and CVHE, was changed

to AKV, for Cargo Ship and Aircraft

Ferry. New hull numbers were assigned. This ended the role of escort

carriers as combat ships of the Fleet.

On December 30, 1957, USS Saipan

(CVL-48), last of the light carriers,

was decommissioned. On May 15, 1959,

that designation was stricken from the

register when the classification of four

support carriers, CVS’s, and seven light

carriers, CVL’s, was changed to Auxiliary Aircraft Transport, AVT.

The modernization of individual carriers reflected Navy thinking, Navy

accomplishment, and Navy planning.

The programs were successive steps in

what somebody once called “a schedule

of orderly retirement.” As the carriers

aged (some aged “faster” because of

battle damage in WW II), they were

transferred from the CVA designation

ORISKANY was the first of the carriers to be reworked in the postwar modernization program. Angled deck was installed in Project 125A.

OCTOBER 1963

MIRROR LANDING SYSTEM, developed by British, was tested in Bennington by Cdr. R. G. Dosè, C.O., VX-3, Bennington’s C.O. congratulates.

67
to the CVS, then to LPH and retirement, and it all was tied to new construction programs which made it possible to keep the number of operating

CVA’s up to the prescribed limits. As

each new ship was acquired, it took

the top position among the CVA’s while

the one in the bottom position moved

to the top of the next lower class.

USS Coral Sea (CVA-43) was the

complete jet engine test facility; they

are now installed in all new carriers.

She had twice as much stowage for

JP-5 fuel as her sister ships, over a

million gallons, in addition to a 62,000-

gallon capacity for avgas. And although Ranger was the first to have

fuel centrifugal purifiers installed, she

did not rely on them exclusively. When

Coral Sea deployed to WestPac, she had

last aircraft carrier of World War II

design to be extensively reworked during the post-war modernization program. She entered the Puget Sound

shipyard on April 15, 1957, and was

recommissioned January 25, 1960. In

the interim, changes made in her configuration were contained in Project

110A, a modification of the 110 of

her sister ships, FDR and Midway.

The basic changes were the same as

those in Project 110, but 110A added

new features. Of the three deck edge

elevators installed, for instance, one

was placed on the port side near the

LSO platform. This eliminated the

hazardous arrangement of having an

elevator contiguous to the landing

area. It also simplified maintenance

problems and provided the capability

of operating all three elevators during

flight operations.

Existing arresting gear was replaced

with five Mk 7-2 pendant and barricade

engines with the new sheave and anchor

dampers. Coral Sea was the first to

have installed, in the fantail area, a

68

four of them installed and did use them

exclusively. During the first 81⁄2

months of operation, she burned approximately seven million gallons of

JP-5, according to Air Officer Cdr. D.

W. Houck, and did not experience one

case of contaminated jet fuel.

Modular CIC, a clock-like layout of

communications, radar, and other CIC

elements, had been tested in the Oriskany and proved successful. It was

installed in Coral Sea, which became the

second aircraft carrier to have such an

arrangement.

The modernization program extended the lifetime usefulness of the

Essex- class carriers built during WW

II and permitted them and other class

carriers to operate jet-powered aircraft

of increasing designed power without

compromising combat readiness of the

Fleet. The important limiting characteristics of the planes operating from

carriers are landing speed, landing

weight and required end speed, and—in

wooden deck ships—the wheel loading.

Many new developments have had a

profound effect on carrier aviation. In

August 1955, for instance, the constant run-out method of controlling

arrestment was used in the Mk. 5 arresting gear installed in USS Bennington. Its primary advantage was the

ability to arrest a plane with a minimum amount of hook loads. With the

earlier pressure types of controls it was

necessary to stop the aircraft in shorter

run-out in order to take care of inadvertent overspeed of the aircraft. This

put a considerable strain on the planes.

The new system is set for the weight of

the landing aircraft. so that a 60,000-

pound plane would pull out no more

wire than a 10,000-pounder.

Other pilot aids include TACAN

(Tactical Air Navigation System)

which gives pilots bearing and distance

from a carrier, the British-developed

mirror landing system (improved by

the use of Fresnel lenses), and PLAT

(Pilot/LSO Landing Aid Television).

MIRROR LANDING system was first tested

on the U.S. carrier Bennington in 1955.

“We are limited by how far we can

go in modernization programs by the

age of the ship,” said Adm. Arleigh

Burke in 1957. “They are getting old.

Their machinery is wearing out and

they are becoming progressively more

expensive to maintain. Like an old car,

they must be replaced.

“The modernization programs have

been the proving ground for the advances which have been made in carrier operating techniques. But the full

combat effectiveness of these developments can be realized only in new

construction.”

Two years earlier, in 1955, USS Forrestal (CVA-59) was commissioned,

the first of a new class aircraft carrier.

It was a logical step in the evolution

of one of the Navv’s proven and powerful aircraft weapons systems—the

modern ship-of-the-line in the Fleet.

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
T

HE DRAMATIC EVENTS of October

1962 to which President Kennedy

referred were the missile build-up in

Cuba and the immediate U.S. reaction

to this threat. This was one of a series

of incidents occurring since World

War II that endangered the democratic

way of life, incidents effectively neutralized by the presence of powerful

U.S. carrier forces in the area.

The versatility of the current U.S.

carrier fleet is largely due to the operation of what the press has labeled

“super-carriers,” heavy duty aircraft

carriers of the size, power, and potency

of the Forrestals and the nuclearpowered Enterprise. They had a difficult birth.

In April 1945, owing to lessons

learned from their experience in comNOVEMBER 1963

By Scot MacDonald

bat, Carrier Task Force Commanders

requested heavier and larger aircraft to

accomplish war missions. An informal

board was appointed to consider the

carrier requirements of the U.S. Navy.

The hulking CVB’s of the Midwa y

class, which were readying for commission and combat duty, provided a

stopgap supply to the needs of the

Task Force commanders. The Ship

Characteristics Board made various

studies of the problem, and it was decided that the project should be made

a design study for the 1948 shipbuilding and conversion program. Given

the designation “6A Carrier Project,”

one of the carriers was slated to be

built in the 1949 construction program.

Between 1945 and November 1948,

some 78 different designs were made

before final acceptance. On June 24,

1948 Congress passed the Naval Appropriations Act of 1949. This provided funds for construction of the

carrier. The contract was awarded

Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry

Dock Company.

In the planning stage, the new carrier was to weigh 65,000 tons and have

a 1030-foot flight deck, a 130-foot

waterline beam, and four catapults.

Architects went back to original Langley, Ranger and Long Island designs by

sweeping the flight deck clear of an

island structure. Instead, the carrier

was to have had a small island on an

elevator apparatus, to be lowered during flight operations. This was one

69
answer to a BU SHIPS objection to the

flush deck design, predicated on the

fact that a satisfactory method of disposing of stack gases had not been

developed.

All elevators were to be along the

sides of the ship, with a large elevator

at the extreme after end of the flight

deck. Added strength of the flight

deck was to be made possible by reducing the openings in the hangar sides,

so that the ship, from the keel to the

flight deck, could be considered as a

unit, from the standpoint of strength.

This would permit the operation of

aircraft well over 100,000 pounds.

Adm. Marc Mitscher greatly influenced

formation of the project, having been

aircraft carrier. At that time, criticism of the entire concept of carrier

warfare was again voiced by some military leaders. The carrier’s keel was

laid at Newport News on April 18.

On April 23, the views of the Joint

Chiefs were sent to SecDef and on that

same morning Secretary Johnson

ordered work on the carrier stopped.

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan

resigned in protest the next day.

There was no new carrier construction in 1950. However, mid-year

events caused Navy planners again to

renew requests for heavy-duty carriers.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean

forces invaded the Republic of Korea.

Two days later, President Truman anof the new aircraft carrier known as

the United States, the construction of

which was discontinued April 23,

1949, or the aircraft carrier authorized

in Public Law 3, Eighty-Second Congress, first session, it shall be named

the Forrestal.”

At Newport News, the new carrier

was designated Hull Number 506.

Her keel was laid on July 14, 1952.

Mr. Charles P. Roane, Supervising

Naval Architect, Aircraft Carrier

Type Branch, BUSHIPS, commented on

the Forrestal in the November 1952

issue of BUSHIPS Journal:

“The Forrestal incorporates all of

the developments from the other carriers, plus those learned from the

THE FIRST of her class, Forrestal profited from lessons learned

from post-war designs, particularly from the cancelled CVB-58.

A CRUSADER is launched by a powerful catapult system installed

in Forrestal. Angled deck resulted from experiments in USS Antietam.

one of the Task Force commanders

who recommended heavier, more versatile carrier aircraft.

In July 1948, construction of the

carrier was approved by Congress and

President Truman. In March the following year, the President authorized

the name for the new carrier; when

commissioned, she would become USS

United States (CVB-58).

The events of April 1949 occurred

with stunning swiftness and to this

day are subject of discussion in some

military and political circles. On April

13, funds were approved by the House

of Representatives. Two days later,

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson

wrote to General Eisenhower, then

temporary presiding officer of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, requesting that the

Joint Chiefs review the need for a new

70

nounced he had ordered sea and air

forces in the Far East to give support

and cover to Republic of Korea forces

and ordered the Seventh Fleet to take

steps to prevent an invasion of Formosa. On July 3, carrier aircraft went

into action in Korea. USS Valley

Forge, with Air Group Five, and HMS

Triumph, operating in the Yellow Sea,

launched strikes on airfields, supply

lines and transportation facilities

around Pyongyang, northeast of Seoul.

On July 12, 1951, the Navy Department announced a contract for a new

large aircraft carrier (CVB-59), to be

built at Newport News. On July 30,

Congressional action approved the contract. A joint resolution from Capitol

Hill proclaimed:

“Be it resolved that when and if the

United States completes construction

United States. The increase in size of

the Forrestal over the Midway class

comes about as a normal development

in aircraft carrier design. With four

catapults instead of the usual two and

four airplane elevators instead of the

usual three, aircraft operations from

this ship will be greatly improved.

“The new design was planned to

meet added requirements, such as the

servicing and starting of jet aircraft,

maintaining the electronic appliances on

the aircraft in a ready-to-go condition

while the plane is on the deck, blending of aircraft fuels to get a fuel which

can be used in jets without sacrificing

the gasoline capacity, and a flush deck

where the navigating bridge can be

lowered or raised to suit operating

conditions. Stacks comparable to the

Ranger will be used. New type steels,

the result of years of development, will

go into the construction.”

NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
The flush deck design barely left

the drawing board before it was

changed. This design was advanced to

provide optimum landing area and to

eliminate the hazard of island superstructure offered by the axial deck.

At the end of W.W. II, however, the

British developed the angled deck concept and operated lightly constructed

twin-engine attack planes from the

marked-off deck of a British carrier.

U.S. Navy pilots conducted similar

test on the Franklin D. Roosevelt and

the decision to modify the flight deck

of a U.S. carrier was made. Accordingly, the Antietam was reconfigured,

landings and takeoffs were made using

a variety of aircraft, and a final detailed report on the evaluation of the

“canted” or angled deck revealed that

the operational trials met with a high

degree of success. As a result of these

experiments, the Navy ordered a redesign of the deck and operating arrangements on the Forrestal and all

future carriers, as well as reconfiguring

many of the existing carriers during

scheduled modernization periods.

When Secretary of the Navy Dan A.

Kimball announced the awarding of a

contract to Brooklyn Naval Shipyard

for the construction of USS Saratoga

(CVA-60), he said it would be similar

to the Forrestal. But design improvements in machinery since Forrestal

installation were ordered to give Saratoga a somewhat higher speed.

“The importance attached to this

carrier [Saratoga] by the Navy Department,” Secretary Kimball said, “is

emphasized by the Navy’s sacrifice of

other combatant ships in the 1953 program in order that a second large carrier can be added to the Fleet.

“Although the ships sacrificed are

urgently needed to augment the battle

readiness of the Fleet, the Navy decided that the need for the large aircraft carrier is even more urgent in

terms of national security.”

Forrestal was launched on December

11, 1954, and christened by Mrs.

James Forrestal. The ship was commissioned at Norfolk Shipyard on October 1, 1955. The carrier had an

overall length of 1036 feet, a width of

252 feet, and nearly four acres of flight

deck. She displaced 59,650 tons and

had a horsepower rated over 200,000,

and a speed over 30 knots. Four steam

catapults were installed. She had a

complement of 3500 officers and men,

including the air group.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air)

James H. Smith, Jr., spoke at the commissioning ceremonies. “If our way of

life is to survive,” he said, “we must

maintain these two alternate military

postures: the first is to maintain a

powerful and relatively invulnerable

reprisal force which will signal a potential enemy to stop, look and listen

before he risks an all-out atomic war.

The second is to insure that we ourselves will not be forced to change the

character of a limited war because of

fear of ultimate defeat in a series of

them. Fortunately, we need not maintain a completely separate set of forces

for each posture. In this ship and the

variety of aircraft she can service we

combine the two, and we add the multiplier of the ability to appear quickly

at any one of the many far-flung

trouble spots. This is economy of force,

achieved without sacrifice of our objectives.”

USS Saratoga was christened at New

York Naval Shipyard on October 8,

1955. A few token feet of water were

splashed into the new ship’s dry-dock

to “launch” her officially. She was

essentially similar to Forrestal but was

designed to develop considerably more

horsepower. She was commissioned

April 14, 1956.

Sister ship Ranger (CVA-61) had

one outstanding exception to distinguish her when she was commissioned

August 10, 1957. The angle of the

after flight deck was altered slightly,

giving her an overall length of 1046

feet, as compared to the 1039 of ForUSS INDEPENDENCE was commissioned at New York Naval Shipyard, the fourth aircraft carrier

of the Forrestal class. This aircraft carrier had increased arresting gear capability installed.

NOVEMBER 1963 71
restal. Another innovation, an allwelded aluminum elevator, was installed on the port side, replacing the

conventional steel types used on other

Forrestal- class carriers, To expedite

her building, work was started in a

smaller dock. About four months

later, when the Forrestal was launched,

the partially completed Ranger hull

was floated into the larger facility.

CVA-62, the USS Independence ,

was constructed in Drydock 6 at New

York Naval Shipyard, her stem at the

head of the drydock to facilitate material delivery over a truck ramp leading

from the head of the dock to the

hangar deck at the stern. The island

and associated sponson “were not installed in order to avoid blocking off

the large traveling crane. In August,

the extraordinarily complex job of

transferring her to Drydock 5 was

accomplished smoothly and efficiently.

Independence was commissioned at

the New York Naval Shipyard on

January 10, 1959, the fourth carrier of

the Forrestal class to join the Fleet.

Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) and Con -

stellation (CVA-64) were essentially

designed along the Forrestal lines but

developed into a separate class, the

Kitty Hawk class. The major difference is missile capability. Both CVA63 and -64 are armed with Terriers.

The fuel capacity in the Kitty Hawks

is a little greater than the Forrestals,

while avgas capacity is a little less.

The angled part of the flight deck is

some 40 feet longer and the catapults

USS KITTY HAWK, with Terrier missile capability, became the first of a new class CVA.

and elevators have greater capacities.

USS America (CVA-66), now being

built at Newport News, will have an

even longer angled deck than any of

the predecessors. Placed in the Kitty

Hawk class, she is scheduled to be

completed in late 1964.

On February 4, 1958, Secretary of

the Navy William B. Franke announced that the world’s first nuclearpowered aircraft carrier was to be

named USS Enterprise to perpetuate

the WW II carrier and her six predecessors. On that same day, the keel of

the carrier was laid at Newport News.

On September 24, 1960, Adm.

Arleigh Burke, then CNO, delivered

an address during launching ceremonies, in which he described the new

carrier.

“This new Enterprise, the largest

ship ever built, of any kind, by any

nation, will be the eighth Navy ship to

proudly bear that name. Her forbears

have left an enviable record, a record

of courageous, distinguished service.

“We are looking at a major advance

in the art of nuclear engineering. . . .

The problems which were solved, the

know-how that was developed in order

to build this ship, represent a tremendous contribution to our knowledge of

the military and industrial uses of

nuclear energy.

“Her eight powerful nuclear reactors

would enable the Enterprise to cruise

20 times around the world without

refueling. Her great endurance and

her advanced hull design would allow

the ship to make this extraordinary

journey at sustained high speed, exploiting to its utmost the seagoing advantage of mobility.”

From the very first, it was obvious

that designers and builders of Newport’s hull No. 546, the Enterprise,

had hit the jackpot. For the first time,

RAdm. F. S. Schultz, Assistant Chief

BUSHIPS, noted the customary builder’s

trials of a major combat ship were

eliminated, and the ship was presented

to the Navy for acceptance trials on

her first trip to sea.

Enterprise returned to the shipyard

after her six-day Navy acceptance

trials in the Atlantic. A giant broom

USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64), sister ship to Kitty Hawk, fires a class. The angled area of flight deck is some 40 feet longer than the

Terrier missile. Basic design of the Kitty Hawks is of the Forrestal Forrestals, and catapults and elevators installed have greater capacity.

72 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS
was affixed to her masthead to signify

a clean sweep of the trials. Capt. W. M.

Ryan, President of the Naval Board of

Inspection and Survey, stated:

“The ship generally performed in an

excellent manner. The cleanliness and

upkeep were outstanding. The fine

workmanship throughout the ship reflects great credit upon all hands concerned with its building. Like all new

ships there are bugs which must be

worked out, but we feel that there is

nothing that cannot be overcome.”

The plant for the nuclear-powered

aircraft carrier was designed under supervision of VAdm. Hyman Rickover.

Designated CVA(N)-65, Enterprise

was commissioned on November 25,

1961, at Norfolk, with Capt. V. P.

dePoix commanding. The world’s first

nuclear-powered carrier has a length

of 1040 feet between perpendiculars

and an extreme breadth of 252 on the

flight deck. Each of the four deckedge elevators cover about 4000 square

feet. Enterpise is the first carrier to

have elevators for pilots in lieu of escalators. She displaces 85,350 tons.

The communications equipment on

the carrier is believed to be the largest

assortment ever assembled on any ship.

Besides more than 1800 telephones,

there is the complexity of numerous

DOMINATING feature of Enterprise’s silhouette is her box-like island, prickling antennae.

radio circuits, teletypes, a pneumatic

tube arrangement to carry messages

from one station to another, and numerous announcing systems, several of

which have speakers throughout the

ship. She is the first ship of the U.S.

Navy’s Atlantic Fleet to have the

Navy Tactical Data System installed.

NOVEMBER 1963

The Enterprise is equipped with four

type C-13 steam driven catapults with

an energy potential of 60,000,000

foot-pounds. With this power, an aircraft weighing 78,000 pounds can be

accelerated to 160 mph from a standing start, in a distance of 250 feet.

All of the aircraft aboard can be

launched at the rate of one every 15

seconds while using all four cats.

The size of Enterprise’s island structure was dictated by the size of the

two radar screens that flank each of its

four sides. This newly developed radar

system is the most powerful to be installed on a floating platform, according to Capt. de Poix. Its far-reaching,

three-dimensional capability is enhanced by its height above the water

line. The silhouette is distinctive.

“Propulsion and control characteristics of the ship offer great tactical

flexibility,” said Capt. de Poix in mid1962. “There are four rudders, one

almost directly astern of each propeller. This provides excellent maneuverability at all speeds as well as tactical diameters in turns which compare

with much smaller ships. . . .

“Her ability to launch a strike on

the enemy from one position, recover,

and launch another 24 hours later

from an unpredictable position more

than 800 miles away from her previous

strike position will constantly be a

factor in causing the enemy to utilize

protective forces that could be deployed

elsewhere.

“If a show of force is required, Enterprise can be on distant station in a

shorter period of time than any other

ship in the Fleet.”

73

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964 0—721-794