VERNON RAY NEWSOM, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

KAREN NEWSOM,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-4239

_____________________________/

Opinion filed July 6, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.

Robert M. Foster, Judge.

Michael M. Giel of Giel Family Law, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The parties were divorced in 2011. In 2016, the appellee/former wife filed a 

petition for a domestic violence injunction against the appellant/former husband 

alleging he had threatened to kill her and had disparaged her to their daughter. The 

parties were duly noticed of the hearing on the injunction. The former wife and 

counsel for the former husband were both present at the hearing. The former 
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husband’s counsel did not know the former husband’s whereabouts and sought to 

delay the hearing temporarily, but the trial court immediately declined the request. 

The trial court asked the former wife if they were divorced and if she still wanted an 

injunction, which she did. This was the extent of the testimony in support of the 

injunction. The former husband’s counsel’s request to present argument on whether 

an injunction could lie on a threat to kill alone was also denied. The trial court 

promptly entered a final permanent injunction pursuant to section 741.30, Florida 

Statutes (2016). The former husband moved for rehearing on the injunction, 

asserting his tardiness was excusable as it was due to circumstances beyond his 

control. He further argued the injunction was improperly entered without a 

sufficient evidentiary basis. The motion for rehearing was denied. 

On appeal, the former husband argues he was deprived of due process when 

the injunction was entered without an opportunity for him to be heard. We agree. 

“Just as the petitioner has the right to allege and prove the grounds for injunctive 

protection at a full and fair evidentiary hearing, the respondent is entitled to a fair 

hearing and protection from the effects of a final judgment of injunction that lacks 

any evidentiary support.” Johns v. Johns, 101 So. 3d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) 

(quoting Achurra v. Achurra, 80 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)); Parise v. 

Selph, 175 So. 3d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Due process requires that each party 

have a “reasonable opportunity to prove or disprove the allegations made in the 
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complaint.” Id. at 390 (citing Furry v. Rickles, 68 So. 3d 389, 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2011)). The trial court’s actions here deprived the appellant of any opportunity to 

address the allegations in the petition. As such, it was error for the trial court to order 

a final permanent injunction without allowing the appellant the opportunity to be 

present and heard. See Johns, 101 So. 3d at 378 (reversing a permanent domestic 

violence injunction for similar reasons and remanding for a full evidentiary 

hearing); Parise, 175 So. 3d at 390 (reversing and remanding final order granting an 

injunction for protection against repeat violence where the respondent was not 

afforded due process). 

The former husband also argues the injunction was not supported by a 

sufficient evidentiary basis. We agree. As the petitioner, the former wife bore the 

burden of proving the allegations in the petition. The trial court received no evidence 

and simply asked the former wife if she still wanted an injunction. Her statement 

that she did was not a sufficient basis for granting the injunction. See Mantell v. 

Rocke, 179 So. 3d 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (reversing where no evidence or 

testimony was introduced by the appellee to support granting the injunction for 

protection against domestic violence). See also Achurra, 80 So. 3d at 1082 

(considering the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal and reversing 

where the final judgment was not supported by competent, substantial evidence).
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Given the foregoing, we see no need to address the former husband’s 

argument as to whether a threat to kill, without an additional act showing an ability 

to carry out the threat, was a legally sufficient basis upon which to grant the 

injunction. We reverse the final injunction and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, MAKAR and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.