### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-40936

LEE BROWN; RICHARD BADON; BRUCE CRUTCHFIELD; ERIC LENA; WATKINS JACKSON; TIMOTHY HARMON; RAYMOND JOHNSON; MARK JOHNSON; DONALD WIGGINS; ROBERTO CANTU; RAYMOND BALDERAS; MICHAEL AMSBARY; BRIAN BRADSHAW, Plaintiffs - Appellants
v. OFFSHORE SPECIALTY FABRICATORS, INC.; HORIZON OFFSHORE, INC.; HORIZON OFFSHORE CONTRACTORS, INC.; O.W.I. LIMITED (OCEANWIDE INTERNATIONAL); OCEANWIDE HOUSTON, INC.; CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL, INC.; C-MAR AMERICA, INC.; HUMARES BV; OCEANWIDE OFFSHORE SERVICES; C-MAR GROUP HOLDINGS, LTD.; C-MAR GROUP HOLDINGS, INC.; GLOBAL INDUSTRIES OFFSHORE, L.L.C.; GLOBAL INDUSTRIES, LTD.; HORIZON VESSELS, INC.; OFFSHORE EXPRESS, INC.; C-MAR SERVICES (UK) LIMITED; HELIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge: Thi s ap p e al involves a putative class action brought against sever al oil an d gas companies and several companies that provide labor for offshore oil and gas projects. The plaintiffs allege violations of the Racketeer Influ e nc e d an d C orrupt U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 23, 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 10-40936 Document: 00511674932 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/23/2011No. 10-40936

Organizations Act (RICO) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). Under the OCSLA, the plaintiffs pursue b o t h a personal right of action for economic damages and an enforcemen t a c t i o n under the OCSLA’s citizen suit provision for injunctive relief. The district court disposed of all of the plaintiffs’ claims over time, dismissing some and gra n ting summary judgment against others. The court then entered a final judgment dismissing all claims. For the reasons that follow, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. I. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants maintain a hiring scheme to employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf, in violation of RICO and the OCSLA. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants employ workers who are neither citizens nor workers authorized to be in the United States. The plaintiffs argue that the def

e n dants’ conduct violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and there f

ore qualifies as racketeering activity prohibited by RICO. Although the OCSLA provides more specific rules for employing foreign workers

on the O u t e r Continental Shelf—the OCSLA “manning requirements”—the plaintiffs con t e n d that the defendants also violate these requirements. The plaintiffs further assert that this unlawful hiring scheme results in depressed wages and degraded working conditions to the detriment of U.S. citizens and legal residents who work on the Outer Continental Shelf. The initial complaint was file d o n December 17, 2004. Numerous amendments changed the claims and parties involved, but only three claims have su rviv e d for this appeal: (1) a RICO claim against the “Service

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Defendants,” (2) an OCSLA damages claim against al l defendants, and (3) an

1 OCSLA enforcement claim against all defendants. On January 30, 2008, the district cour t di s m i ssed the OCSLA damages claim upon the defendants’ motion, holding that the statut e d o e s n o t create a private cause of action for damages. On July 21, 2008, the di s t ri ct court ordered threshold discovery on the issues r a i s ed by the RICO claim, specifically on the applicability of the INA to the Service Defendants’ conduct, the existence of exemptions to the OCSLA, and the standing and status of the named plaintiffs. One year later, when threshold discovery concluded, the Service Defendants moved separately for summary judgment. The dis t rict court granted summary judgment to the Service D e f e n d a n ts on the RICO claim for two reasons: (1) The laws of the Unit e d States, including the INA, extend only to installations and devices attached to the seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf. Because the Service Def e n d a n t s operate free-floating vessels they cannot have violated the INA and thus cannot have viola t ed RICO. (2) The Service Defendants possess Coast Guard-issued exemptions to the OCSLA mannin g r e qu irements that allow them to lawfully employ foreign workers on the Outer Continental Shelf. The plaintiffs failed to present evidence to undercut the validity of these exemptions. The defendants then filed a joint motion to dismiss and, in the alternative,

a joint motio n for summary judgment on the OCSLA enforcement claim. On August 17, 2010, the district court granted this motion, hol di n g t h a t the

The “Se rvice De fen dant s” are com pani es in the bus ines s of offsho re oil and g as 1 explo ration. The “Se rvice De fen dant s” rem aining in the sui t are Cal Dive Inter natio nal, Inc.; He lix E n e r gy Solu tio ns, Inc.; Ho rizon Of fs hore Contr act ors , Inc.; Ho rizon Of fs hore , Inc.; Ho rizon Vess els , Inc.; Of fs hore Sp ecia lty Fabric ator s, Inc.; Of fs hore Exp r e s s , Inc.; Gl obal Indus tri es Of

fs hore , LLC; and Gl obal Indus tri es , Lt d

. All othe r rem aining def enda nts are “M anning De fen dant s, ” com pani es in the busines s of pr ovidi ng cont rac t labor se rvice s for oil and gas pr oject s. When ref err ing to the “Se rvice De fen dant s” and “M anning De fen dant s, ” coll ect ively, this op inion use s the generi c, “ def enda nts .” 3 Case: 10-40936 Document: 00511674932 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/23/2011No. 10-40936

p l a i ntiffs had failed to comply with the OCSLA’s pre-suit notifica t i o n

r e qu i r e m ents, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court entered a n

a p p e a l able final judgment the same day, dismissing all claims. The plainti f f s appeal. II. We review summary judgments and dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. Copeland v. Wasserstein, Perella & Co., Inc. , 278 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary ju d g m e n t i s proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 56(a). In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, “[w]e must ac c ept the allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. , 391 F.3d 698, 699-700 (5th Cir. 2004). A. 1. We begin by revie w i n g the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ R I C O c l aim. The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in granti n g summary judgment because, regardless of the freefloating character of the Service Defendants’ vessels, the INA still applies to the Service Defendants’ conduct. In the plaintiffs’ view, the INA is triggered when foreign workers step foot on U.S. soil before being taken to the Outer Continental Shelf, and remains effective even if those workers perform the i r work on a free-floating vessel. The plaintiffs argue that the Service Defendants do not fo l l o w t he strictures of the INA in employing foreign workers, and thus engage in racketeering activity under RICO. See18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F). We disagree. Violations of the INA can, of course, constitute racketeering

a ctivity prohibited by RICO. Id. The sections of the INA that qualify as racketeering activity, however, d o n o t o n their own terms include the Outer

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Continental Shelf within their territorial reach. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(38), 1324, 1327, 1328 (prohibiting certain conduct within the United States and defining the United S t a t e s as “the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Is l a n d s o f the United States, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.”). United States law, including the I NA , i s made applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf through the OCS LA

. 4 3 U

. S .C. § 1333(a)(1). See also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire , 477 U.S. 207 , 2 17-20 (1986) (defining the purpose of the OCSLA). The OCSLA provides:

The Constitution and laws

. . . of the United Stat e s are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Cont i n e n tal S h e l f and to all artificial islands, and all installations a n d other devices permanently or temporarily atta c hed to the seabed, which may be er e c t ed thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State . . . . 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) ( 1 )

. T he plaintiffs concede that the Service Defendants’ vessels are free floating, and are neither permanently nor temporarily attached to or erected on the seabed. The OCSLA d o e s n o t , therefore, extend the reach of United States law, including the INA, to the Service Defendants’ vessels. The plaintiffs cite no authority for their theory that the INA, once triggered by workers stepping foot on U.S. soil, remains effective forever, an d we are unpersuaded by such argument. We hold t h a t t h e Service Defendants do not violate RICO because the law t h a t would make their conduct racketeering activity—the INA—does not apply in the place where that condu c t o c c u rred, namely vessels floating on the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf.

5 Case: 10-40936 Document: 00511674932 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/23/2011No. 10-40936 2. The plaintiffs further contend that the exemptions the Service Defendants
possess to the OCSLA manning requ i rements do not shield them from RICO liability b e c au s e those exemptions were fraudulently obtained. We now consider that argument. 2 The OCSLA manning requirements provide that vessels, rigs, platforms, and other structures operating on the Outer Continental Shelf must “be manned

or crewed

. . . by citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted to the Unit e d S t a t es for permanent residence.” 43 U.S.C. § 1356(a)(3). This requirement is s ubject to exemptions that the OCSLA empowers the United States Coast Guard to issue. 43 U.S.C. § 1356. The vessels exempt f r o m the manning requirements include any vessel “over 50 percent of which is owned by citizens of a f

oreign nation or with respect to which the citizens of a foreign nation have the right effectively to control.” 43 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(2). Also exempt

are vessels for which “there are not a sufficient number of citizens of the United States, or alien s l awf

ully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, qualified and available for [a particular type of] work.” 43 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(1)(B). Upon request, the Coast Guard determines whether these statutory standards

are met and whether to issue an exemption to the manning requirements. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 141.5, 141.20. O t h e r circuits have held that compliance with the OCSLA’s mann i n g requirements precludes liability under the general rules of the INA. See United

In dis cus sin g the validi ty of the Service De fen dant s’O CSLA e xemp tio ns, w e do not 2 im ply that violat ing the OCS LA man ning requ irem ents is, its elf, rac ke tee ring activity unde r RICO. See 18 U. S. C. § 1961( 1)( F). We add res s the validi ty of the exem pt ions as an alte rnat ive bas is for sum m a ry j u dgm ent beca use com pli ance wi th the man ning requ irem ents me ans fr eed omf

romRICO li abilit y in this c ase . Nei ther do we im ply that all Service De fen dant s pos se ss ed exem ptions at all tim es . At leas t so me of the Service De fen dant s rely exclus ively on thei r fr ee- flo ating st atus for cer tain per iod s of thei r cond uct

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Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus., AFLCIO v. Reno , 73 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 519 U.S. 807 (1996); Piledrivers’ Lo c al Union No. 2375 v. Smith , 695 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs do not seri o u s ly contest this legal principle, but instead contest whether the Service Defendants’ exemptions are valid. We turn now to that question. Defendants C al Dive International, Inc. (Cal Dive) and Helix Energy Solutions, Inc. (Helix) possess these “foreign control exemptions.” See 43 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(2); 33 C.F.R. § 141.5. The plaintiffs contend that Cal Dive and Helix deceived the Coast Guard in obtaining these exemptions by bareboat-chartering their vessels to a sham foreign company, which then time-chartered the vessels back. According to the plaintiffs, the sham company is closely connected with 3 Cal Div e and Helix: it has no employees, its board of directors includes the President of Cal Dive, 49% of its shares are ow n e d b y Cal Dive and Helix, no money passes through it, and the masters and captains of its ve s s e l s report to Cal Dive and Helix. Because these f a c t s i n dicate that Cal Dive and Helix’s vessels are not under actual foreign control, the plaintiffs argue, any exemption based on foreign control must have been fraudulently obtained.

3 The dem ise or ‘bar eboat ’ char ter is es se ntial ly the leas e of a shi p, usua lly on a long- ter m cont rac t, oft en ass ocia ted wi th a sp ecial fina nce or pur chas e arran geme nt. In a dem isec hart er, itis up to the char ter er to man and equip the vess el.

. . . Altho ugh the ow ner ret ains legal tit le, the char ter er is cons ide red the tem po r ary ow ner, or com mo nly ter me d the ow ner pro h acv ic e . 2 T HOM

AS J. S C HOE NBAUM , ADMIR ALTY & MARITIM E LA W § 1 1-3 (4t h e d. 200 4).
The tim e char ter par ty is a cont rac t of a f fr eightm ent to use a shi p in ord er to shi p good s for a sp ecif ic p e r i o d of tim e. The carrier mak es the shi p's c apac ity availabl e t o t he tim e c hart ere r forthis p urp os e. Id. § 11-5

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We are l o at h to second-guess the Coast Guard’s judgment in issuing foreign control exemptions, especiall y i n t h e light of the deference we owe to agency determinations made pursuant to statutory authority. The plaintiffs ask

us to take an extraordinary step i n i nv a l i d a ting the exemptions. They do not, however, point us to any deceptive conduct by Cal Dive and Helix that would compel us to take that step. “[T]he plain language of Rule 5 6 [] m a n d a t es the entry of sum m ary judgment

. . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The plaintiffs argue that the Coast Guard was deceived because it did not know that the company bareboat chartering Cal Dive and Helix’s vessels would be time chartering them back to Cal Dive and Helix. The plaintiffs make no showing to that effect, and the record evidence suggests the opposite: agents of Cal Dive and Helix stated in affidavits and depositions that they communicated the full scheme of bareboat chartering and ti m e chartering during the exemption application process; the applications for the exemptions stated that the vessels would be performing work for Cal Dive and other companies; and the bareboat charter agreements expressly allow for further chartering. Cal Dive and Helix submitted records to the Coast Guard revealing t h e i r relationship with the foreign company, the company’s financial and organizational structure, and the company’s ownership. In the light of this record evidence, we hold t h a t th e plaintiffs’ showing is insufficient to invalidate the Coast Guard’s determination to issue foreign control exemptions to Cal Dive and Helix. The rest of the Service Defendants possess exemp tio n s of th e oth er variety, available when there are too few U.S. citizens and legal residents to perform a particular type of work. 43 U.S.C. § 1356(c)(1)(B); 33 C.F.R. §§ 141.15, 141.20. The plai n t i f

f s offer no evidence to contest the validity of these exemptions.

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Instead, the plaintiffs offer evidence that some of the Service Defendants, at one time, operated wit h o u t e x e m p tions. We fail to see how this historical fact has
any bearing on the validity of the exemptions the Service D e f e n dants now possess. The plaintiffs also argue that the validity of the OCSLA exe m p t ions, generally, was not an appropria t e t opic for threshold discovery, and that they should have been given m o r e t i m e to develop evidence of their invalidity. We review the district c o u r t ’ s management of discovery for abuse of discretion. Ca r riere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 893 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1990). T h e plaintiffs’ assertion, standing alone, that the validity of the exemptions was not

an appropriate subject for th r e shold discovery, does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion. B. We turn now to the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ OCSLA damages claim. The plaintiffs contend that the OCSLA creates a private right of action for damages. Se e 4 3 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(2). They point to the OCSLA’s jurisdiction and v e n u e provision, which states that, “[a]ny resident of the United States who is injured in any manner through the failure of any operator to comply with any rule, regulation, order, or pe r m i t i s s ued pursuant to this subchapter may bring an action for damages

. . . only in the judicial di s t ri c t having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection.” Id

. We have acknowledged p r eviously that there is “language in § 1349(b) which taken alone might be read broadly enough to support [the] position that [the OCSLA creates] a new cause of action in tort.” Wentz v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 784 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1986). At the sam e t i m e w e h ave rejected that broad reading, preferring instead to read § 1349(b) as a jurisdiction and venue provision only. Romero v. Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. , 939 F.2d 307, 309 n.5 (5th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) (“Private citizens are statutorily empowered to

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commence civil actions to compel c o m p l i a n c e w ith the Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349, but no cause of action ex delicto is founded on that provision.”); Wentz , 784 F.2d at 701 (“The only new private right of action created by § 1349 is contained in § 1349(a). This provision permits a private citizen to bring suit to enforce the OCSLA

. . . .”). This court’s preference is based, in part, on Congress’s s t a t ed intent in enacting § 1349(b) merely to reenact an earlier jurisdiction and venue provision, one which did not contain any language that m i gh t be construed as creating a private right of action for damages. Wentz , 784 F.2d at 701. The plaintiffs seek to limit t h i s precedent, which is plainly contrary to their argument that § 1349(b) c reates a private right of action for d a m a g e s, to

cases of personal injury. W e see no principled reason for doing so. Whether a plaintiff seeks to recover for economic losses, as here, or for personal injury has

no bearing on how we read § 1349(b) in relation to the rest of the OCSLA. We hold that the plaintiffs cannot state a claim for a p rivate right of action for damages under the OCSLA, and the district court’s dismissal was proper. C. 1. Lastly, we must consider the district court’s disposition of the joint motion to dismiss and, in the a l ternative, joint motion for summary judgment on the OCSLA enforcement claim. The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in disposing of their OCSLA enforcement a c t ion based on their failure to give
proper pre-suit notice to the defendants. A person may not brin g an OCSLA enforcement action “prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation, i n w ri t ing under oath, to the Secretary and any other appropriate Federal Official, to the State in which violation

. . . occurred

. . . and to any alleged violator.” 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(2). The sixty-day notice requirement is subject to an exception: “An a c t i o n may be brought

. . . immediately after notification of the alleged violation in any case in which the

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. . . violation

. . . would immediat e ly affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.” 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(3). The plaintiffs argue that their ri gh t s a re immediately affected by the defendants’ conduct. They also a r gu e that some plaintiffs joined the lawsuit

more than sixty days after two plaintiffs, Danny Cunningham and Pablo Rubio Llamas, notified the defendants of the suit, although neither of the two notifying plaintiffs is still a party. Because the defendants’ rights are not prejudiced by this method of notice, the plaintiffs argue that the district court should not have dismissed their claim for their failure strictly to comply with the statute’s notice requirement. Questions of prejudice and fairness notwithstanding, no plaintiff gave the required notice before bringing this action. Under either form of notice allowed by the OCSLA, the notice must be given before, not after, bringing an action. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a). First, the plaintiffs rely on the letter of Danny Cunningham, dated January 18, 2005. The original complaint, in which Danny Cunningham is a named plaintiff, was filed on December 17, 2004, more than a month earlier. Even if we were to accept the plaintiffs’ argument that one person’s notice can

serve as noti c e for all, Danny Cunningham did not give notice, as that word is contemplated in the OCSLA, because his attempted notice was untimely. Second, the plaintiffs rely on t h e letter of Pablo Rubio Llamas, dated August 4, 2005. This letter is dated m o r e t h a n seven months after the action commenced, and only one day before the plaintiffs’ Third Amen d e d Complaint

was filed. The Third Amended Com p l a i n t is the first pleading listing Pablo Rubi o Ll a m a s a s a party. Assuming Llamas “brought” an action by joining a pending lawsuit, and assuming further tha t t h e date on the letter is the date notice was “given,” as the terms “brought” and “given” are used in the OCSLA, then Llamas gave notice before bringing an action. Despite the generous aid of these assumptions, Llamas’s notice is still deficient because he gave it only one

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day before b e c o m i ng a plaintiff. A person can bring an OCSLA enforcement

a c t ion in fewer than sixty days after giving notice only if “the

. . . [alleged] violation

. . . would immediately affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.” 43 U.S.C. § 1349( a) ( 3 )

. Llamas cannot claim this immediacy exception because the only pleading on which Llamas was a party, the Third Amended C o m plaint, states that Llamas “was previously employed by Offshore Speciality Fabricators, Inc. and/or Offshore Express, Inc.” It contains no allegations that Llamas presently works on the Outer Continental Shelf or has plans to seek employment there. The harm for which Llamas sought remedy was past harm, not harm stemming from a violation immediately affecting his legal interests. See id. Pablo Rubio Llamas’s attempted notice was, like that of Danny Cunningham, untimely. It bears men ti o ning again that neither Danny Cunningham nor Pablo Rubio Llamas is still a party to this lawsuit, and that the plaintiffs point to no other person who even attempted to comply with the OCSLA’s pre-suit notice requiremen t

. We cannot agree that deficient attempts at notice given by two former plaintiffs, n e i ther attempt occurring before the original complaint was filed, can anchor all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Because no plaintiff gave the type of notice required by the OCSLA, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ argument that notice by one plaintiff can serve as notice for all. We further note that the plaintiffs’ general approach to the OCSLA’s presuit notice requirement is contrary to the Supreme Court’s direction to strictly construe such statutory requirements. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty. , 4 93 U.S. 20, 30-33 (1989). Pre-suit notice requirements serve goals that judiciallycrafted exceptions ma y di s rupt: (1) allowing government agencies to take responsibility for enforcing regulations; and (2) givi n g t h e alleged violator an opportunity t o b ri n g itself into compliance. Id. at 29. These goals are no less important in multiparty litigation.

12 Case: 10-40936 Document: 00511674932 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/23/2011No. 10-40936 2. The plaintiffs also urge that, contrary to the district court’s holding, they have standing to bring an OCSLA enforcement action. The district court did not clarify whether its dismissal for l a c k o f standing was a dismissal for lack of statutory standing only or whether it believed the plaintiffs also lacked constitutional standing. In the interest of clarity, we will consider the plaintiffs’ standing under the statutory and constitutional standards. The OCSLA provides that, “any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely a f f e c ted may commence a civil action

. . . to compel compliance with this subchapter

. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1). The p l a intiffs contend that, by alleging that the defendants violate the OCSLA on a continuing basis and by seeking injunctive relief, they satisfy this requirement. A prospectively-worded citizen suit provision, like the OCSLA’s, requires that “the harm sought to be addressed

. . . lie[] in the present or the future, not in the past.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. , 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987). We agree that a plaintiff may establish standing with “a good faith allegation of continuous or intermittent vi o l ation,” but this does not free the plaintiff from asserting an interest affected by that continuous violation. Id. at 64. Only one plaintiff alleges current employment on the Outer Continental Shelf. The other plaintiffs allege past employment but no plans to seek future

4 employment there. T h e h a r m of which they complain—depressed wages and d e gr aded working conditions—can only mean past harm because they do n o t presently earn wages or experience the working condition s o n t h e Outer Continental Shelf. Because t h e y c annot demonstrate a cognizable injury

The dis tri ct co urtheld thatthe plai ntif f allegin g current em plo ymen t had standing, 4 but that his OCS LA enf orc em ent clai m st ill fai led beca use all of the plai ntif fs had fa iled to give p re- sui t noti ce. We agree
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required to bring a citizen suit under the OCSLA, the plaintif f s l a ck statutory standing. Constitutional standing is a jurisdictional question. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc. , 634 F.3d 787, 795 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011)

. Our review of

a dismissal for lack of s ubj e c t matter jurisdiction is de novo. Rodriguez v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp. , 628 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 2010). Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to justiciable

c a s e s a n d controversies. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: First, the plaintiff must have suffe r e d a n ‘ injury in fact’.

. .

a n invasion of a legally protected interest which i s . . . concrete a n d particularized

. . . not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’

. . . . Second, there must be a causal connection between t h e injury and the conduct complained of

. . . . Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’

Id. at 560-61 (internal citation omitted). The plaintiffs’ complaint fails the third element, redressability. Enjoining th e d e f endants’ conduct, as the plaintiffs request, will not redress the wages they already lost or the working conditions they already endured. The plaintiffs thus lack constitutional standing, and the district court’s dismissal was proper. III. In sum, we hold that the district court did not err in dispo s i n g o f the plaintiffs’ RICO claim, OCSLA dam a g e s c l aim, or OCSLA enforcement claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is in all respects AFFIRMED

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