PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE 

COMPANY, a Michigan 

corporation, 

 Plaintiff Counter Defendant- 

 Appellee, 

v. 

SUMMIT PARK TOWNHOME 

ASSOCIATION, a Colorado 

corporation, 

 Defendant Counterclaimant. 

------------------------------ 

WILLIAM C. HARRIS; DAVID J. 

PETTINATO, 

 Appellants. 

No. 16-1348 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-03417-LTB)

_________________________________ 

George A. Vaka, Vaka Law Group, Tampa, Florida (Michael L. Hutchinson 

and Kathleen M. Byrne, Treece Alfrey Musat, P.C., Denver, Colorado, on 

the briefs), for Appellants. 

Terence M. Ridley (Michael L. O’Donnell, Evan Bennett Stephenson, and 

Cedric D. Logan, with him on the brief), Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP, 

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff Counter Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 23, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE, and BACHARACH, 

Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Mr. William Harris and Mr. David Pettinato are two attorneys who 

represented Summit Park Townhome Association. While representing 

Summit Park against its insurer, the two attorneys were sanctioned for 

failing to disclose information. In this appeal, the attorneys challenge the 

sanctions based on five arguments: 

1. The district court lacked authority to require the disclosure 

requirements. 

2. The attorneys did not violate the court’s disclosure 

requirements. 

 

3. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees beyond the scope of 

an earlier sanctions order. 

4. The district court’s award of attorneys’ fees resulted in a 

deprivation of due process. 

5. The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded was unreasonable. 

We affirm. Regardless of whether the district court had authority to 

require the disclosures, the attorneys were obligated to comply. They did 

not, and the district court acted reasonably in issuing sanctions, 

determining the scope of the sanctions, and calculating the amount of the 

sanctions. 
3 

I. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were sanctioned for failing to 

comply with the disclosure order. 

This appeal grew out of an insurance dispute. Summit Park sustained 

hail damage and filed a claim with its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance 

Company. The parties agreed that damage had occurred but disagreed on 

the dollar amount of the damage. Auto-Owners sued for a declaratory 

judgment to decide the value. 

Summit Park retained Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, who successfully 

moved to compel an appraisal based on the insurance policy. In the event 

of an appraisal, the insurance policy required: 

[E]ach party will select a competent and impartial appraiser. 

The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, 

either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court 

having jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the 

value of the property and amount of loss. If they fail to agree, 

they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision 

agreed to by any two will be binding. 

Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 1 at 123. 

Based on continuing disputes between the parties, Auto-Owners 

asked the district court to resolve these disputes by ordering an “appraisal 

agreement.” The court did so and ordered disclosure of facts potentially 

bearing on the appraisers’ impartiality: 

An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in 

the outcome of the appraisal proceeding or a known, existing, 

and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an 

appraiser. Each appraiser must, after making a reasonable 

inquiry, disclose to all parties and any other appraiser any 

known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to 
4 

affect his or her impartiality, including (a) a financial or 

personal interest in the outcome of the appraisal; and (b) a 

current or previous relationship with any of the parties 

(including their counsel or representatives) or with any of the 

participants in the appraisal proceeding . . . . Each appraiser 

shall have a continuing obligation to disclose to the parties 

and to any other appraiser any facts that he or she learns after 

accepting appointment that a reasonable person would consider 

likely to affect his or her impartiality. 

Appellants’ App’x, vol. 1 at 245-46. The court warned: “Notice is given 

that, if the court finds that the parties and/or their counsel have not 

complied with this order, the court will impose sanctions against the 

parties and/or their counsel pursuant to the court’s inherent authority.” Id.

at 248 (capitalization removed). 

 Before the court imposed these requirements, Summit Park selected 

Mr. George Keys as its appraiser. This selection led Auto-Owners to 

express doubt about Mr. Keys’s impartiality. But Auto-Owners did not 

object to Mr. Keys or move to compel further disclosures. 

 Mr. Keys and the court-appointed umpire agreed on an appraisal 

award of over $10 million, which was 47% higher than Summit Park’s own 

public adjuster had determined. Auto-Owners then launched an 

investigation, which culminated in an objection to Mr. Keys. In the 

objection, Auto-Owners argued that Mr. Keys was not impartial and that 

Summit Park had failed to disclose evidence bearing on his impartiality. 

The district court credited these arguments, disqualifying Mr. Keys and 

vacating the appraisal award. 
5 

 With vacatur of the appraisal award, Auto-Owners moved for 

sanctions against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, seeking attorneys’ fees and 

expenses based on violation of the disclosure order. The district court 

granted the motion, assessing sanctions against Mr. Harris and Mr. 

Pettinato for $354,350.65 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. 

II. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were bound by the court’s 

disclosure order. 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challenge the district court’s authority 

to enter the disclosure order. But even if the court had exceeded its 

authority, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato would still have needed to comply 

with the disclosure order. If the two attorneys believed that the order had 

been unauthorized, they could have sought reconsideration or a writ; but 

they could not violate the order. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 

(1975) (“If a person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is 

incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply 

promptly with the order pending appeal.”). 

There is “impressive authority for the proposition that an order 

issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must 

be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper 

proceedings.” United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 

(1947). The parties agree that the district court had jurisdiction over the 

subject matter and parties; thus, the attorneys and parties bore an 
6 

obligation to comply in the absence of an appellate challenge. See United 

States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856, 866 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Since the court 

entering these orders had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and [the 

defendant], [the defendant] was bound by these orders until reversed or 

otherwise set aside . . . .”); see also GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers 

Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (applying “the established 

doctrine that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with 

jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or 

reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order”). In light 

of the duty to comply, violation of the order would constitute “‘contempt 

of [the court’s] lawful authority, to be punished.’” United Mine Workers, 

330 U.S. at 294 (quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922)). 

* * * 

Regardless of whether the district court had authority to issue the 

disclosure order, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 

 bore an obligation to comply in the absence of an appellate 

challenge and 

 could be sanctioned for noncompliance. 

III. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato violated the disclosure order. 

The district court concluded that the two attorneys had violated the 

disclosure order. Challenging this conclusion, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 

make two arguments: 
7 

1. The district court misinterpreted the term “impartial.” 

2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato disclosed sufficient information 

about Mr. Keys. 

Both arguments fail. 

A. Standard of Review 

We ordinarily review sanctions under the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Russell v. Weicker Moving & Storage Co., 746 F.2d 1419, 1420 

(10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). But Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato urge a 

legal error consisting of misinterpretation of the term “impartial.” For the 

challenge involving the meaning of “impartial,” we engage in de novo 

review. Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th 

Cir. 2008). We otherwise confine our review to the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. 

B. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato failed to disclose information 

specified in the disclosure order. 

The district court required disclosure of 

 the appraiser’s “financial or personal interest in the outcome of 

the appraisal,” 

 any “current or previous relationship” between the appraiser 

and Summit Park’s counsel, and 

 any other facts subsequently learned that “a reasonable person 

would consider likely to affect” the appraiser’s impartiality. 

Appellants’ App’x, vol. 1 at 245-46. 
8 

1. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not disclose the extent of 

their relationships with Mr. Keys. 

Regardless of whether the district court had correctly defined 

“impartial,” the disclosure order itself was clear in what was required. For 

example, the order expressly required disclosure of the attorneys’ current 

or previous relationships with the appraiser. The failure to disclose this 

information constituted a sanctionable violation regardless of the court’s 

interpretation of the word “impartial.” 

The district court could reasonably find that the two attorneys had 

failed to disclose the extent of their relationships with Mr. Keys. For 

example, the attorneys failed to disclose that 

 other attorneys in their law firm (the Merlin Law Group) had 

worked with Mr. Keys on appraisals for at least 33 clients, 

 Merlin attorneys had represented Mr. Keys on various matters 

for over a decade, 

 Merlin’s founder and Mr. Keys had co-founded a Florida 

lobbying operation, whose “number one goal [was] to protect 

policyholders and the public adjusting profession,” Appellee’s 

Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 812, and 

 Merlin attorneys had served as the incorporator and registered 

agent for one of Mr. Keys’s companies.1

 

1

 The district court also pointed out that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 

had failed to disclose a contingent-fee cap in Mr. Keys’s original contract. 

Auto-Owners asked Mr. Harris in writing for all “drafts, additions, 

amendments and/or revisions” of the agreement with Mr. Keys. Appellee’s 

Supp. App’x at 828. Mr. Harris responded that he would bring a copy of 

the agreement, implying that no other drafts existed. Id. at 827. 
9 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato argue that their disclosures were 

sufficient. They made two disclosures: 

1. “Mr. Keys does not have any significant prior business 

relationship with [Merlin], Summit Park, or C3 Group. Mr. 

Keys has acted as a public adjuster and/or appraiser on behalf 

of policyholders that [Merlin] has represented in the past, 

however, this obviously does not affect his ability to act [as] an 

appraiser in this matter.” Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 292. 

2. “Mr. Keys has acted as a public adjuster and/or appraiser on 

behalf of policyholders that [Merlin] has represented in the 

past. Mr. Keys has no financial interest in the claim, and has no 

previous relationship with the policyholder in this matter.” Id. 

at 298. 

 

Mr. Harris furnished the final version of the agreement, leading 

Auto-Owners to ask Summit Park’s former president whether the agreement 

had ever been revised. He responded: “Not to my knowledge.” Id. at 800. 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato later excused this statement on the ground 

that the former president had not been involved in the discussions with Mr. 

Keys regarding his contract. But Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were 

intimately involved in those discussions, and Mr. Harris—who was 

accompanying the former president at the time—said nothing to correct the 

false statement. Instead, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato waited until after 

completion of the appraisal to disclose the existence of a prior version of 

Mr. Keys’s agreement. 

With this disclosure, Auto-Owners learned that Mr. Keys had earlier 

worked under a contingent-fee cap, which raised his maximum fee based on 

the total amount recovered by Summit Park. This information revealed 

another false statement by Mr. Harris himself. While the contingent-fee 

cap had been in place, Mr. Harris represented to Auto-Owners that Mr. 

Keys had “no financial interest in the claim.” Id. at 327. This 

representation was false: at the time, the contingent-fee cap created a 

financial interest by allowing Mr. Keys to earn a greater fee based on the 

amount of the appraisal. Auto-Owners had no way of learning that the 

representation was false, however, until Mr. Harris eventually disclosed 

the existence of an earlier version of the agreement. 
10 

In addition, Mr. Keys disclosed: 

I do not have a material interest in the outcome of the Award 

and have never acted either for or against Summit Park 

Townhome Association. My fee agreement is based upon hourly 

rates plus expenses... I do not have any substantial business 

relationship or financial interest in [Merlin]. There have been 

cases where both [Merlin] and Keys Claims Consultants acted 

for the same insured but under separate contracts. 

Id. at 307-08. 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato make two defenses of their disclosures: 

1. They disclosed enough information about Mr. Keys’s 

impartiality. 

2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato lacked personal knowledge about 

the undisclosed facts. 

These arguments fail. 

 First, the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had failed to disclose the extent of their 

relationships with Mr. Keys. The two attorneys disclosed only that Mr. 

Keys had worked as an appraiser on behalf of Merlin’s clients, and Mr. 

Keys stated that he lacked a substantial business relationship with Merlin. 

The district court could reasonably find that these disclosures had failed to 

provide meaningful information about the extent of the relationships 

between the two attorneys and Mr. Keys. 

 Second, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato cannot avoid sanctions based 

on their asserted lack of knowledge about Mr. Keys’s contacts with other 

Merlin attorneys. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato knew about some of the 
11 

contacts, as reflected in Mr. Pettinato’s description of his firm’s 

connection with Mr. Keys: “Both Mr. Keys and his staff have assisted me 

as well as my firm in resolving an untold number of large multi-million 

dollar losses to an amicable resolution and settlement to the policyholders’ 

benefit and satisfaction.” Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 704. In 

addition, however, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato bore an obligation to make 

“a reasonable inquiry.” Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 245. In light of this 

obligation, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato could not profess ignorance while 

failing to inquire about contacts with other Merlin attorneys. 

 In these circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion 

in finding a failure to disclose the extent of the relationships between the 

two attorneys and Mr. Keys. 

2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato distort the effect of the 

district court’s definition of “impartial.” 

The district court required disclosure not only of the appraiser’s 

relationship with counsel but also of known facts that a reasonable person 

would consider likely to affect the appraiser’s impartiality. This part of the 

disclosure requirement was tied to the court’s definition of the term 

“impartial.” 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato focus on the court’s definition of 

“impartial,” arguing that it was wrong and that the court failed to 

adequately inform Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato of the scope of their 
12 

obligations. But in the disclosure order itself, the court stated what it 

meant by “impartial”: “An individual who has a known, direct, and 

material interest in the outcome of the appraisal proceeding or a known, 

existing, and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an 

appraiser.” Id. at 245. Because the court stated precisely what it meant by 

“impartial,” Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato knew what was required. And as 

we have discussed, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato could not disobey the 

order even if the court had based the disclosure requirements on a 

misguided definition of “impartial.”2

3. The district court reasonably found a violation of the 

disclosure order tied to this test of “impartial.” 

 Based on this definition, the district court required disclosure of any 

facts that a reasonable person would view as likely to affect the appraiser’s 

impartiality. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato argue that evidence of an 

appraiser’s advocacy was unlikely to affect the appraiser’s impartiality. 

See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condominium Ass’n, 2017 WL 

3184568, at *4 (Colo. App. July 27, 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 948601 

 

2

 The district court ultimately held not only that the undisclosed facts 

would likely affect a reasonable person’s consideration of Mr. Keys as 

impartial (requiring disclosure), but also that Mr. Keys was ineligible to 

serve as an appraiser because of his partiality (requiring vacatur of the 

appraisal award). In vacating the appraisal award, the court expanded upon 

its definition of “impartial.” Vacatur of the appraisal award led to 

sanctions against Summit Park but not against Mr. Harris or Mr. Pettinato. 

These two individuals were sanctioned for violating the disclosure order, 

not selecting a biased appraiser. 
13 

(Colo. Feb. 20, 2018). For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Mr. 

Harris and Mr. Pettinato are right. Still, the district court could reasonably 

view Mr. Keys’s undisclosed prior statements as likely to affect his 

impartiality based on a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome. 

For example, in a presentation to a group of public adjusters in 

Florida, Mr. Keys taught participants how to “harvest the claim money” 

from an insurer during an appraisal. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 2 at 342. And 

one of Mr. Keys’s companies maintains a website stating: “Our purpose is 

simple: To shift the balance of power from the insurer to the policy holder 

. . . .” Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 729. The district court could 

reasonably view these undisclosed statements as proof of a material 

interest in an outcome favoring the policyholder over the insured. 

 Evidence also suggests that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were aware 

of Mr. Keys’s bias. For example, in an advertisement on Mr. Keys’s 

website, Mr. Pettinato endorsed Mr. Keys, saying: “Both Mr. Keys and his 

staff have assisted me as well as my firm in resolving an untold number of 

large multi-million dollar losses to an amicable resolution and settlement 

to the policyholders’ benefit and satisfaction.” Id. at 704. And a profile on 

Merlin’s website reported that Mr. Keys “ha[d] dedicated his professional 

life to being a voice for policyholders in property insurance claims.” Id. at 

723. In this profile, Mr. Keys stated: “I was taught to always handle a 

claim as if my momma was the insured.” Id.
14 

* * * 

 In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had violated the disclosure order. 

C. Waiver 

 Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato contend that Auto-Owners waived its 

objection to the sufficiency of the disclosures by failing to object despite 

knowledge of Mr. Keys’s relationship with Merlin and past expressions of 

bias toward policyholders. We disagree. Auto-Owners had some knowledge 

about Mr. Keys’s bias but did not know much of what had been withheld. 

Without full knowledge of the undisclosed information, Auto-Owners did 

not waive its right to seek sanctions for nondisclosure. 

IV. The district court reasonably interpreted the scope of its 

sanctions order.

In sanctioning the two attorneys, the court invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

Under § 1927, an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 

incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Applying this statute 

in the sanctions order, the court found that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato 

had unreasonably prolonged the proceedings: 

I note that Section 1927 indicates a purpose to compensate 

victims of abusive litigation practices, not to deter and punish 

offenders. With this purpose in mind, I reject Auto-Owners’ 

request for fees for proceedings in this Court that relate to 
15 

conducting the appraisal process and conducting the appraisal 

process itself because Auto-Owners would have incurred these 

fees regardless of Harris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. I grant 

the request, however, as to Auto-Owners’ investigation into 

George Keys and its objections to his participation in the 

appraisal, as this work would not have taken place in the 

absence of Harris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. The award shall 

be assessed against Harris and Pettinato jointly and severally. 

Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 607 (citations & internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challenge the scope of this order. They 

concede that the award covered Auto-Owners’ objection to Mr. Keys 

($186,705.50) and investigation of Mr. Keys ($33,805). But the attorneys 

disagree with the inclusion of attorneys’ fees for 

 Auto-Owners’ preparation of the motion for sanctions 

($51,309.50), 

 Auto-Owners’ preparation of the application for attorneys’ fees 

and expenses ($16,960.50), and 

 Auto-Owners’ other related work ($61,662.50). 

According to Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, these activities fell outside of 

the initial sanctions order. We disagree. 

 In setting attorneys’ fees following the sanctions order, the district 

court explained: 

Thus, viewed properly in its context, my award encompasses 

any fees incurred as a result of Harris’ and Pettinato’s 

misconduct. The fees requested by Auto-Owners for work on 

the third amended petition, the reservation of rights letter, and 

other matters described in the detailed billing records would 

not have been incurred but for Harris’ and Pettinato’s 
16 

misconduct. I therefore conclude they are within the scope of 

the award. 

Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 671. We give deference to the district court’s 

interpretation of its own order. See, e.g., Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. 

Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co., 865 F.2d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1988) 

(“We shall not reverse a district court’s interpretation of its own order 

‘unless the record clearly shows an abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Arenson 

v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 520 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1975))). 

 With such deference, we conclude that the district court reasonably 

interpreted its prior sanctions order. The sanctions order had noted that 

§ 1927 was designed “‘to compensate victims of abusive litigation 

practices.’” Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 607 (quoting Hamilton v. Boise 

Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008)). In light of this 

purpose, the court interpreted its sanctions order against Mr. Harris and 

Mr. Pettinato as encompassing all of the attorneys’ fees and expenses 

resulting from violation of the disclosure order. Id. This interpretation was 

reasonable. 

 The sanctions order expressly included the investigation of and 

objection to Mr. Keys. But the district court could reasonably interpret the 

sanctions order to go beyond the investigation and objection. If Mr. Harris 

and Mr. Pettinato had not violated the disclosure order, Auto-Owners 

would not have had to move for sanctions, seek attorneys’ fees and 
17 

expenses, and complete other work. As a result, the district court could 

reasonably consider these litigation expenses as the product of the two 

attorneys’ misconduct. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for the 

district court to conclude that the earlier sanctions order had encompassed 

attorneys’ fees and expenses from the motion for sanctions, application for 

attorneys’ fees and expenses, and related work involving the motion and 

application. 

V. The district court did not deprive the two attorneys of due 

process. 

Alternatively, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato assert a deprivation of 

due process based on an inability to respond to the district court’s 

inclusion of litigation activities outside of the initial sanctions order. We 

disagree.3

 Auto-Owners filed an application for attorneys’ fees, and Mr. 

Harris and Mr. Pettinato had an opportunity to respond. In the response, 

they could have objected to any of the attorneys’ fees being sought. This 

opportunity supplied due process. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Dabney, 73 

F.3d 262, 268 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he opportunity to fully brief the issue 

 

3

 Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not make this argument in district 

court. Thus, Auto-Owners argues that the argument was forfeited. See 

Richison v. Ernest Grp., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr. Harris 

and Mr. Pettinato disagree, contending that they had no contemporaneous 

opportunity to object to the due-process violation because they learned of 

it only when they received the district court’s written order. We may 

assume, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not 

forfeit their due-process challenge. 
18 

is sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.”); see also Auto-Owners 

Ins. Co. v. Summit Park Townhome Ass’n, No. 16-1352, slip op. at 17-19 

(10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2018) (to be published) (discussing a similar argument 

made by Summit Park Townhome Association).

VI. The amount of attorneys’ fees awarded was reasonable. 

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato also argue that the court awarded an 

unreasonable amount of attorneys’ fees. We disagree. 

We review a determination of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of 

discretion. See AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 

1997). In applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we consider whether 

the district court’s determination appears reasonable in light of the 

complexity of the case, the number of strategies pursued, and the responses 

necessitated by the other party’s maneuvering. See Robinson v. City of 

Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998). But we do not require the 

district court to identify and justify every hour allowed or disallowed. See 

Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996). 

The district court closely reviewed the information in Auto-Owners’ 

request for fees, determining that most of the fee requests were reasonable 

given 

 the circumstances of the case, 

 the hourly rates prevailing in the community, and 

 the use of billing judgment. 
19 

First, the district court concluded that it was reasonable for AutoOwners’ counsel to spend long hours because “Auto-Owners had over $30 

million at stake” and the issues were complex. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 

673-74. This conclusion was reasonable. 

Second, the court considered the local market, the qualifications of 

the attorneys, and the contentiousness of the litigation. These 

considerations led the district court to find that the billing rates had been 

reasonable. In our view, this finding was permissible under the record. 

Third, the court considered the use of billing judgment by AutoOwners’ counsel through concessions such as staffing with lower-billing 

attorneys, declining to charge for all hours worked, and discounting hours 

worked by paralegals and secretaries.4

 The district court acted reasonably 

in considering these concessions. 

For these three reasons, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in calculating the amount of the sanction 

($354,350.65).5

 

 

4

 The district court ultimately reduced Auto-Owners’ fees by $1,098 

for one duplicate entry and one vague entry. 

5

 Alternatively, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato urge reversal for more 

specific findings. But the district court supported its award with detailed 

findings. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato do not say what other findings 

should have been made. 
20 

VII. Conclusion 

The district court did not err in sanctioning Mr. Harris and Mr. 

Pettinato. Regardless of the validity of the disclosure order, compliance 

was required in the absence of an appellate challenge. Mr. Harris and Mr. 

Pettinato violated the order by failing to disclose information bearing on 

Mr. Keys’s impartiality. In light of this violation, the district court had the 

discretion to sanction Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato and set a reasonable 

amount. We therefore affirm the assessment of sanctions.