J-S07004-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DURON BOSTON PEOPLES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2110 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0004220-2009

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: Filed: August 20, 2020

Appellant Duron Peoples appeals from the order dismissing his timely 

first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant claims that the 

Commonwealth committed a Brady2 violation and that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of a former police 

detective’s criminal conviction. Appellant also raises several claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call certain witnesses at 

trial. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Briefly, the trial evidence established that on October 21, 2006, at 

approximately 9:00 a.m., Eric Coxry entered Jonas Suber’s home and fatally 

shot Suber with a .45 caliber pistol. Following an investigation, the 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder, conspiracy to commit 

murder, burglary, and solicitation of murder. At trial, the Commonwealth 

presented evidence establishing that in late September or early October of

2006, Appellant initially offered Donte Carter $10,000 to kill Jonas Suber, 

but Carter refused.

In October 2006, Victor Devalia, Marvin Molina, and Appellant drove 

from Georgia to Chester County, Pennsylvania.

3

 On October 20, 2006, the 

day before Suber’s murder, Devalia drove Appellant to a Home Depot in 

Downingtown where Appellant met Shamone Woods and gave Woods an 

envelope. Later that day, Appellant and Devalia were at Appellant’s home in 

Chester County. Appellant showed Devalia a .45 caliber semi-automatic 

pistol and a .38 caliber revolver that Appellant had hidden in his home. 

According to Devalia, Appellant told him that the .45 caliber pistol is “what 

the big boys used to get the job done.” N.T. Trial, 09/24/2014, at 128. 

Devalia testified that he, Molina, and Appellant then went to the Regal 

Theater in Downingtown. Appellant then donned an afro wig and went into 

the theater for about ten minutes or so, during which time the 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant had residences in both Georgia and Chester County. Id. at 95-

99.
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Commonwealth alleged Appellant gave the .45 caliber pistol to Woods. 

Appellant, Molina, and Devalia then drove back to Georgia. During the

drive, Devalia heard Appellant talking to Woods and telling him to “burn the 

house down.” Devalia testified that Appellant stated that he did not care 

whether the wife and kids were there. Devalia heard Woods reply, “I got 

you.” Id. at 149.

Clarence Milton stated that on October 20, 2006, Woods, Coxry and a 

third individual came to the home where Milton was staying. Coxry showed 

Milton a .45 caliber pistol, and Coxry told Milton that he had been paid 

$20,000 to “take care the whole situation” with Suber. N.T. Trial, 9/23/14, 

at 99-102.

On October 21, 2006, at around 9:30 a.m., Devalia heard Woods tell

Appellant that Suber had been transported to a hospital. N.T. Trial, 

09/24/2014, at 150-52, 155. Appellant then told Devalia that Suber “got 

shot” and smirked. Id. at 153. Devalia asked Appellant who did it, and 

Appellant responded “my man referred a friend.” Id.

We note that the record shows that on October 22, 2006, Bashera 

Grove, Suber’s widow, spoke to Gerald Pawling, who was a detective with 

the Coatesville Police Department at that time. When asked to identify the 

shooter from a photo array, Grove initially selected a photo of Devalia. N.T. 

Trial, 9/22/14, at 110-13; N.T. Trial, 9/23/14, at 77-78. 

Devalia was arrested in connection with the Suber murder in Georgia 

on November 2, 2006. N.T. Trial, 9/24/14, at 155-57, 190-91. Ralonda 
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Spann, Appellant’s paramour, testified that when Appellant learned that 

Devalia was arrested, he became very upset and told her that Devalia had 

not done anything wrong and that if Devalia were convicted, he would “plead 

to everything.” N.T. Trial, 9/25/14, at 226-27, 243-44. The charges against 

Devalia were dropped two weeks later, and he was released. 

On November 10, 2006, Detective Kevin Campbell of the Coatesville 

Police Department executed a search warrant on Appellant’s residence in

Caln Township, Chester County. N.T. Trial, 9/26/14, at 116-27; N.T. Trial, 

9/29/14, at 78-82. In addition to Detective Campbell, three other officers 

took part in executing the search warrant. N.T. Trial, 9/29/14, at 79. The 

police recovered a box of .45 caliber bullets and a loaded .38 caliber revolver

hidden in the laundry room. N.T. Trial, 9/26/14, at 121-27; N.T. Trial, 

9/29/14, at 79, 92. Exhibits C-66E, C-66F, C-70. The police searched 

Appellant’s residence for over an hour but did not find a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol. N.T. Trial, 9/29/14, at 79-80. A fingerprint lifted from the 

box of bullets was later matched to Appellants’ fingerprints. Id. at 92. 

Pawling was among the officers who searched Appellant’s home with 

Detective Campbell. 

On or about August 25, 2009 Appellant was arrested and charged with 

murder, conspiracy, and related offenses.

In April 2014, approximately five months before Appellant’s trial, 

former detective Pawling pled guilty to numerous counts of forgery, access 

device fraud, theft, receiving stolen property, and tampering with public 
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records in an unrelated case. The charges related to Pawling stealing and 

tampering with evidence in the possession of the police. Pawling was 

sentenced in July 2014. 

On October 1, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of first degree murder, 

conspiracy to commit murder, burglary, and solicitation of first degree

murder.4 N.T. Trial, 10/1/14, at 2-4. 

This Court briefly summarized the procedural history of this case in its 

decision regarding Appellant’s direct appeal:

On October 2, 2014, the day after [Appellant’s] conviction, the 

jury convened and sentenced [Appellant] to life imprisonment for 

first-degree murder. On October 24, 2014, the court formally 

imposed the sentence of life imprisonment, along with several 

concurrent sentences for other offenses. However, with respect 

to [Appellant’s] conviction for soliciting Donte Carter to kill 

Suber, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of ten to 

twenty years’ imprisonment.

Commonwealth v. Peoples, 2015 WL 6948437, *1 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 

30, 2015) (unpublished mem.) (footnote omitted) appeal denied, 136 A.3d 

980 (Pa. 2016). This Court ultimately affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance 

of appeal on April 12, 2016. Id.

On April 4, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed an amended petition on 

November 14, 2017, and subsequently filed a second amended petition, 

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 903(a)(1), 3502(a), and 902, respectively.
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which the PCRA court accepted on October 18, 2018. In his PCRA petition, 

Appellant claims the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation when it 

failed to disclose Pawling’s convictions. Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, at 

¶¶ 30-44. Appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

“impeaching” the police’s handling of the investigation based on Pawling’s 

criminal conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 45-52. Lastly, Appellant claims that trial 

counsel was ineffective for not calling several “key witnesses” who, Appellant 

asserted, could provide testimony to rebut the evidence that Appellant 

possessed and gave Woods the .45 caliber pistol that was ultimately used to 

kill Suber. Id. at ¶¶ 53-60.

On March 13, 2019, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of intent to dismiss Appellant’s second amended PCRA petition (Rule 907 

Notice), which stated that Appellant’s issues lacked merit. Appellant did not 

file a response to the Rule 907 notice, and the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition on June 18, 2019. 

PCRA counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on July 18, 2019.

5

 

Appellant timely filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court 

____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court’s order dismissing the instant PCRA is dated June 17, 

2019, but was docketed and mailed to Appellant on June 18, 2019. 

Consequently, the appeal period did not begin until that date. See

Commonwealth v. Gaines, 127 A.3d 15, 18 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) 

(stating that “in computing any period of time under [the] rules involving the 

date of entry of an order by a court or other government unit, the day of 

entry shall be the day the clerk of the court or the office of the government 

unit mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties” (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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submitted a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion referring this Court to its March 13, 

2019 Rule 907 Notice and its June 18, 2019 order denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition.

Appellant raises the following issues:

1. The PCRA [c]ourt erred in determining the [Appellant] was 

not due relief for his claims based on the failure of the District 

Attorney’s Office to disclose the investigation into the illegal 

conduct of former-detective Gerald Pawling as impeachment 

evidence under Brady v. Maryland.

2. The PCRA [c]ourt erred in determining the [Appellant] was 

not due relief for his claims based on the ineffective 

assistance of defense counsel with regard to impeachment of 

the investigation done by former-detective Gerald Pawling.

3. The PCRA [c]ourt erred in determining the [Appellant] was 

not due relief for his claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failure to call key witnesses for the defense.

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

Our standard of review for an order denying a PCRA petition is 

“whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence 

of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” 

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citation omitted). 

(Footnote Continued)_______________________

108(a)(1)). Appellant's notice of appeal was due thirty days from June 18, 

2019, which was Thursday, July 18, 2019. See id. (citing Pa.R.A.P. 903). 

Therefore, Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed.
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Where, as in the instant case, the PCRA court has dismissed a petition 

without an evidentiary hearing, we review the PCRA court’s decision for an 

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 

2013) (stating that “[t]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to 

dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised 

a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled 

him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a 

hearing.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Pursuant to Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 907, a PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a PCRA 

petition without a hearing if the court is satisfied that there are no genuine 

issues concerning any material fact, that the defendant is not entitled to 

PCRA relief, and that no legitimate purpose would be served by further 

proceedings. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Roney, 79 A.3d at 604.

Furthermore, this Court has explained that

[a] petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of 

right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no 

genuine issue concerning any material fact and the petitioner is 

not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose 

would be served by any further proceedings. A reviewing court 

on appeal must examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA 

petition in light of the record in order to determine whether the 

PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine 

issues of material fact and in denying relief without an 

evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1052 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations omitted and some formatting altered). Further, “we may affirm 

the PCRA court’s decision on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 
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94 A.3d 1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

Brady Violation Claim

In Appellant’s first issue, he claims that the Commonwealth committed 

a Brady violation when it failed to inform trial counsel of former detective 

Gerald Pawling’s misconduct and conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. 

Appellant argues that Pawling’s criminal conduct was “impeachment 

evidence” because Pawling participated in the investigation of Suber’s 

murder. Id. at 14-15. Lastly, Appellant contends that if Pawling’s criminal 

conduct was presented at trial, “the jury should have seen the evidence 

collected in a different light.” Id. at 16. Appellant concludes the PCRA court 

erred in declining to hold a hearing on his Brady claim. Id.

The Commonwealth responds that no Brady violation occurred, as the 

evidence at issue was available to Appellant from non-governmental 

sources, including news coverage. Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14. The 

Commonwealth also notes that Appellant, in his second amended PCRA 

petition, essentially conceded that the information about Pawling’s 

convictions was publicly available. Id. at 14-15.

Our Supreme Court has explained that

[u]nder Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor has 

an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to 

the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an 

impeachment nature. To establish a Brady violation, an 

appellant must prove three elements:
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(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, 

either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; 

(2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.

* * *

Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is not 

exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible 

arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the prosecution 

to disclose every fruitless lead considered during a criminal 

investigation. The duty to disclose is limited to information in 

the possession of the government bringing the prosecution, and 

the duty does extend to exculpatory evidence in the files of 

police agencies of the government bringing the prosecution. 

Brady is not violated when the appellant knew or, with 

reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in 

question, or when the evidence was available to the defense 

from other sources.

Roney, 79 A.3d at 607-08 (citations omitted and some formatting altered); 

see also Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013) 

(stating that Brady evidence “cannot have been equally available to the 

defense, and cannot have been discoverable through the exercise of 

reasonable diligence” (citations omitted)). Our Supreme Court has held that

because criminal records are public records readily obtainable by the defense 

from non-governmental sources, they cannot serve as the basis for a Brady

claim. Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 751-52 (Pa. 2014).

Instantly, the PCRA court, in rejecting Appellant’s Brady claim, 

observed that Appellant’s petition acknowledged that Pawling’s guilty plea in 

July of 2014 received “a large amount of news coverage.” Rule 907 Notice, 

3/13/19, at 4 (unpaginated) (quoting Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, at 

10). The PCRA court concluded that
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[Appellant] has, in effect, conceded that this claim is not a 

cognizable Brady violation. . . . An event which received “a 

relatively large amount of news coverage,” and was therefore 

known to the public at large, is not in the sole possession of the 

Commonwealth. Moreover, a person’s conviction of a crime is 

not “evidence” in the “possession” of any Commonwealth agency 

- it is a matter of public record. The court cannot find a Brady

violation, as this evidence was freely available to the defense 

prior to trial.

Id.

Based on our review of the record, we discern no error in the PCRA 

court’s decision. See Grayson, 212 A.3d at 1051; Roney, 79 A.3d at 603. 

Pawling’s guilty plea, which occurred several months prior to Appellant’s 

trial, was not only a matter of public record but also, according to Appellant, 

received a large amount of new coverage.

6

 Therefore, the evidence of 

Pawling’s misconduct and conviction was equally available to the defense. 

See Tharp, 101 A.3d at 751-52; Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264. Accordingly,

____________________________________________

6 Appellant argued the following in his second amended PCRA petition:

It is expected, and would be appropriate for the Commonwealth 

to argue that Gerald Pawling plead [sic], amidst a relatively large 

amount of news coverage, to theft, tampering with evidence, 

forgery, and other crimes, which would cause this not to be a 

Brady issue at all, at least the filing of criminal charges in 2013 

onward to the guilty plea before this [c]ourt in July 2014, this 

was instead a matter trial counsel ought to have known of and 

raised as impeachment evidence. See Exhibit D (Docket 3205-

2013), E (Docket 1000-2014), F (Docket 1006-2014).

Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, at 10.
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Appellant was not entitled to relief on his Brady claim. See Roney, 79 A.3d 

at 607-08.

Trial Counsel Ineffectiveness For Failure to Investigate

Appellant’s second argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate, discover, and use Pawling’s misconduct and conviction

during Appellant’s trial. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. As to the arguable merit 

and reasonable basis prongs of his arguments, Appellant claims that “the 

crimes Pawling plead [sic] to would unquestionably be admissible to impeach 

him and anything that was submitted as discovery materials which had his 

name attached to it.” Id. at 18. Appellant asserts that calling Pawling 

“would have been dramatic and, was absolutely possible given the subpoena 

power of the court and the fact that Pawling signed off on a number of the 

reports and investigation documents which brought [Appellant] to this trial.” 

Id. at 18. Appellant further argues that trial counsel submitted a letter 

indicating that he did not recall being aware of Pawling’s convictions at the 

time of trial, despite the publicity surrounding Pawling. Id. at 18-19 (citing 

Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. C,). 

As to prejudice, Appellant claims that “Pawling’s convictions would 

have called into question the evidence collected and the witnesses’ 

testimony, such that . . . the outcome of the trial would have been 

different.” Id. at 19. More specifically, Appellant argues that the jury would 

have seen the collection of evidence in a different light if the jury had heard 

that Pawling stole from the evidence room in an unrelated case. Id. at 19-
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20. Further, Appellant argues that due to Pawling’s criminal convictions, 

witnesses that Pawling interviewed or “developed as informants,” such as 

Devalia, cannot be considered reliable. Id. at 20.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable 

merit. The Commonwealth acknowledges that a police witness may be 

“cross-examined about misconduct as long as the wrongdoing is in some 

way related to the defendant’s underlying criminal charges and establishes a 

motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 18 (citing Commonwealth 

v. Peetros, 535 A.2d 1026 (Pa. 1987)) (emphasis omitted). The 

Commonwealth argues that because Appellant has not shown that Pawling 

committed any crime or wrongdoing with respect to Appellant’s case, 

evidence of Pawling’s unrelated police misconduct would have been 

inadmissible. Id. at 20 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 

846 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2004)). The Commonwealth also argues that Appellant did 

not establish prejudice because Appellant did not “identify or specify one 

specific instance in the record of how impeaching Pawling could have altered 

the evidence, and thus changed the outcome of the trial” and failed to 

demonstrate “specifically the manner in which [Pawling’s] testimony could 

have altered the outcome of his trial.” Id. at 16, 19 (citations omitted). 

The PCRA court explained its decision to dismiss Appellant’s claims as 

follows:

[Appellant] only speaks in broad generalizations about the 

impact of raising Pawling’s convictions, stating that such 

evidence “would have called into question the evidence collected 
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and the witnesses’ testimony, such that we believe the outcome 

of the trial would have been different.” [Appellant] does not 

provide any further specificity on precisely what evidence in this 

case would be rendered questionable by Pawling’s conduct, nor 

does he provide the identity of any witness or witnesses who 

would be open to cross-examination on any improper behavior 

that Pawling may have exhibited relating to this case. As a 

result, any evidence of Pawling’s behavior would have been 

“unrelated to the present matter and irrelevant,” and counsel 

cannot be ineffective for failing to introduce irrelevant evidence. 

[Appellant] further argues that “to call the former detective as a 

witness—while he is serving jail time for theft from the evidence 

room—would have been dramatic[.]” This position is completely 

unsupported in law, as the perceived “drama” of a court 

proceeding is not in any way determinative of its legal propriety.

Rule 907 Notice, 3/13/19, at 5 (unpaginated).

In reviewing Appellant’s claim, we are guided by the following

principles. It is presumed that the petitioner’s counsel was effective, unless 

the petitioner proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999). Therefore, 

a petitioner must demonstrate

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all 

three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic 

basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors 

and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is well settled that
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[c]ounsel has a general duty to undertake reasonable 

investigations or make reasonable decisions that render 

particular investigations unnecessary. . . . The duty to 

investigate, of course, may include a duty to interview certain 

potential witnesses; and a prejudicial failure to fulfill this duty, 

unless pursuant to a reasonable strategic decision, may lead to a 

finding of ineffective assistance.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 535-36 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). 

In order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

for failing to call a potential witness, a PCRA petitioner must establish that

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, 

the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to 

testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of 

the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a 

fair trial.

Id. at 536 (citation omitted). 

We add that our “case law permits a police witness to be crossexamined about misconduct as long as the wrongdoing is in some way 

related to the defendant’s underlying criminal charges and establishes a 

motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth v. Bozyk, 987 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (citing, inter alia, Peetros, 535 A.2d 1026). “However, if the 

prior police behavior is unrelated to the present matter and irrelevant, the 

trial court is permitted to restrict questioning on the prior incident.” Id.

(citations omitted). Our Supreme Court in Peetros granted the appellants a 

new trial because the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination to 

exclude the prior disciplinary action of a police witness involved in bribery 
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activities with appellants. Peetros, 535 A.2d at 1034; see also

Commonwealth v. Dawson, 405 A.2d 1230 (Pa. 1979) (holding that 

defendant was improperly denied his right to cross-examine police witness 

about his motive to fabricate evidence of defendant’s confession in order to 

obtain conviction where there was an allegation that the officer beat codefendant with a nightstick); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 402 A.2d 1019 

(Pa. 1979) (holding that trial court improperly denied defendant the right to 

cross-examine police officer who faced suspension based on the outcome at 

defendant’s trial); Commonwealth v. Shands, 487 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super 

1985) (reversing conviction and remanding for a new trial because 

defendant was denied the right to cross-examine arresting police officers 

regarding ongoing federal and state investigations into their conduct in 

similar cases which included racial bias, false arrests, and perjury; and 

where the prosecutor doubted their veracity in prior cases). Accord United 

States v. Miles, 480 F.2d 1215 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the defendant 

was properly permitted to cross-examine a police detective about pending 

charges and suspension where the detective may have been motivated to 

testify against defendant to ingratiate himself with his superiors).

Here, the record demonstrates that Pawling’s role in the murder 

investigation began with photographing the crime scene. N.T. Trial, 

9/26/14, at 92-94; Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. B. Pawling was 

present at Suber’s autopsy, along with Detective Kenneth Beam. N.T. Trial, 

09/26/14, at 80-86; Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. B. 
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Additionally, Pawling interviewed Grove, Suber’s widow, on October 

22, 2006, at which time she selected a photo of Devalia from a photo array 

and identified him as the shooter. N.T. Trial, 9/22/14, at 111-15; N.T. Trial, 

09/23/14, at 77-78; Exhibits C-44, C-44A; Second Am. PCRA Pet., 

10/10/18, Ex. B. In January of 2009, Grove identified Coxry as the shooter 

from a different photo array. N.T. Trial, 9/22/14, at 115-17; Exhibit C-44B. 

Grove testified at trial that she initially misidentified Devalia because Suber’s 

brother showed her a picture of Devalia with Appellant. N.T. Trial, 9/22/14, 

at 113-15. 

On November 10, 2006, Pawling went to the Regal Cinemas to follow 

up on Detective Kevin Campbell’s examination of security footage from 

October 20, 2006. Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. B. Pawling 

determined that the theater’s security system had already recorded over the 

footage from October 20, 2006. Id.

Pawling was one of four police officers who served a search warrant on 

Appellant’s residence in Caln Township. Id.; N.T. Trial, 09/29/14, at 79. 

During the execution of that search warrant, police recovered a box of .45 

caliber bullets and a .38 caliber revolver. N.T. Trial, 09/26/14, at 121-27; 

N.T. Trial, 09/29/14, at 79, 92.

The record shows that the evidence presented at trial established that 

Appellant possessed a .45 caliber pistol, the same caliber used to shoot 

Suber. Donte Carter testified that Appellant previously solicited him to kill 

Suber. N.T. Trial, 09/25/14, at 7, 9. Witness testimony of Devalia indicated 
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that Appellant conspired with other individuals to shoot Suber, and Appellant 

was in contact with his co-conspirators after the shooting occurred. N.T. 

Trial, 9/24/14, at 118-22, 148-55. Lastly, Rolanda Spann testified that 

when Appellant heard that Devalia was arrested in connection to the murder, 

Appellant told her that he would admit to everything to prevent Devalia from 

being falsely convicted. N.T. Trial, 09/25/14, at 226-27, 243-44.

Our review of the record reveals that although trial counsel was aware 

of the criminal charges that were filed against former detective Pawling, trial 

counsel did not undertake a reasonable investigation into the nature of these 

charges and their potential impeachment value.

7

 See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 

535-36. Appellant has shown that trial counsel knew of, or should have 

known of, the existence of Pawling as a witness. See id. at 536. However, 

____________________________________________

7 Trial counsel stated in his letter that he had a “vague recollection of Mr. 

Pawling being arrested for crimes relating to fraudulently making an 

insurance claim, or claims, I do not recall the Commonwealth advising me 

that [] Pawling was charged with stealing evidence from the Coatesville 

Police Department, or anything that related to any evidence in [Appellant’s] 

case.” Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. C. 

We note that it is troubling that Appellant’s trial counsel “did not recall being 

aware” of the charges against Pawling, which resulted in Pawling’s guilty

plea to theft, tampering with evidence, forgery, and other crimes, which, 

according to the trial court and the Commonwealth, and, in part, admitted to 

by Appellant, were highly publicized. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 

987 A.2d 638, 666 (Pa. 2009) (stating that the “reasonableness of a 

particular investigation depends upon evidence known to counsel, as well as 

evidence that would cause a reasonable attorney to conduct a further 

investigation.” (citations omitted)).
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Appellant has not shown that Pawling was willing to testify for the defense. 

See id. Therefore, Appellant cannot establish that his claim that Pawling 

should have been called as a witness had arguable merit. See id.; see also 

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043.

Further, based on Pawling’s limited role in this case, as compared to 

the overwhelming and properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s guilt 

presented at trial, we conclude that Appellant has failed to prove unfair

prejudice that would have changed the outcome of the trial based on trial 

counsel’s failure to present Pawling’s wrongdoing, which Appellant has not 

shown to be related to his case. Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective. 

See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, 

Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to call Pawling 

as a witness fails.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Appellant relief on this claim. See Grayson, 212 

A.3d at 1051; Roney, 79 A.3d at 603. 

Trial Counsel Ineffectiveness for Failure to Call Witnesses

Appellant’s final argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

calling several witnesses. Appellant’s Brief at 21-24. Specifically, Appellant 

contends that trial counsel failed to call Shamone Woods, Corporal Jack Wall, 

a ballistics expert, and either Jason Smith or Detective Kevin Dykes. 

Appellant argues that these witnesses would have testified that Appellant did 
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not possess the firearm used to commit the murder, and that he was not the 

“mastermind” of the conspiracy to kill Suber. Id. at 22-23.

The Commonwealth responds that the PCRA court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s claims because PCRA counsel did not submit signed certifications 

as to each of these intended witnesses as required by 42 Pa.C.S § 

9545(d)(1); Pa.R.Crim.P 902(A)(15). Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. The 

Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s failure to include the witness 

certifications was fatal to his claim. Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).

There are two requirements for relief on an ineffectiveness claim 

for a failure to present witness testimony. The first requirement 

is procedural. The PCRA requires that, to be entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must include in his PCRA 

petition “a signed certification as to each intended witness 

stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance 

of testimony.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 

902(A)(15).

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 438 (Pa. 2014) (some citations 

omitted). This Court has held that where a petitioner “failed to provide any 

certification with respect to potential witnesses, the [PCRA c]ourt clearly did 

not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 583 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Initially, we note that although Appellant included a list of witnesses 

that he intended to call at the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court found that 

this information was “not sufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements for 

a PCRA hearing.” Rule 907 Notice, 3/13/19, at 3 (unpaginated). 

Specifically, the PCRA court found that “[Appellant] had failed to provide a 
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signed certification as to each intended witness, and for that reason alone he 

is not entitled to a hearing.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The PCRA 

court, however, chose to address the merits of Appellant’s claim in its 

1925(a) opinion, and concluded that Appellant’s claims were meritless. Id.

The record shows that Appellant’s second amended PCRA petition does 

not contain a certification signed either by Appellant or his counsel with 

respect to his proposed witnesses as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15). The petition contains a witness list, but it lacks 

the identifying information and summary of witness’s testimony. See 

Pa.R.Crim.P 902(A)(15). As Appellant failed to provide such certifications 

with respect to potential witnesses, the PCRA court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Brown, 767 A.2d 

at 583.

Although the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition without an 

evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s specific 

ineffectiveness claims in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Therefore, we will briefly 

examine the merits of those claims. We have already set forth the standard 

for establishing such a claim above. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 536; see 

also Reid, 99 A.3d at 438.

Appellant first argues that trial counsel failed to call Corporal Wall, a 

ballistics expert who prepared a report concluding that the bullets recovered 

from Suber’s body matched bullets recovered in connection with the 

attempted murder of Curtis Self. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant’s next 
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proposed witness, Jason Smith, gave a statement to Detective Kevin Dykes 

in which he stated that on or about September 12, 2006, he saw Shamone

Woods ask Keisha Washington to conceal a silver pistol used in the shooting 

of Curtis Self. Id. at 22; see also Second Am. PCRA Pet., 10/10/18, Ex. G.

8

 

Lastly, Appellant proposed calling Shamone Woods as a witness to testify 

that Clarence Milton “had no access to [Appellant], then Milton would have 

been completely discredited at trial.” Id. at 22-23. Appellant argues that if 

these witnesses had been called at trial, they would have demonstrated that 

Appellant was not the “mastermind” of the conspiracy to murder Suber. Id.

at 23.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant is not entitled to relief on 

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. According to the 

Commonwealth, Appellant did not establish that the proposed witnesses 

were willing to testify on Appellant’s behalf. Commonwealth’s Brief at 22, 

24. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant has not 

established that trial counsel was aware of these potential witnesses nor 

their purported testimony. Id. at 24.

We now turn to Appellant’s claims with respect to the individual 

witnesses.

____________________________________________

8 Appellant suggested that in the alternative, trial counsel should have called 

Detective Dykes to testify about his interview with Smith. Appellant’s Brief 

at 21. Appellant does not present any argument regarding Dykes as a 

potential witness.
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According to Appellant, because Corporal Wall “is a professional . . . he 

would have been available to testify if given reasonable notice, and certainly 

had no reason not to testify as to the information in his report.” Id. at 21-

22. Appellant argues that his trial counsel knew about all of these proposed 

witnesses, and that they were available and willing to testify. Id. at 22. 

Appellant argues that his trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to 

call these witnesses to impeach Devalia, who testified that Appellant had 

hidden a gun in his home, and Clarence Milton, who testified that Appellant 

ordered and paid for the murder of Suber. Id. at 9-10, 22-24. Appellant 

argues that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to call these 

witnesses because they would have discredited Devalia and Milton. Id. at 

24.

With respect to Appellant’s claim regarding the failure to call Corporal

Wall, the PCRA court explained:

In his petition, [Appellant] describes, inter alia, the witnesses 

that should have been called by counsel at trial. However, 

[Appellant’s] argument consists completely—sometimes explicitly 

—of [Appellant’s] mere assumption that a given witness would 

be available and willing to testify on [Appellant’s] behalf. The 

first witness is a ballistics expert, Corporal Jack Wall of the 

Pennsylvania State Police, who prepared a report which, 

according to [Appellant], “states conclusively that the bullets 

from the shooting of [] Suber (10/21/06) matched the bullets 

from the prior shooting of and attempted murder of Curtis Self 

(9/12/06).” (The ballistics report in question is attached to the 

Second Amended Petition as “Exhibit A.”) With regard to 

Corporal Wall’s ballistics report, [Appellant] states that “[t]his 

ballistics report was available to the defense, therefor[e] Mr. 

Harmelin is presumed to have knowledge of it. The writer of the 

report is a professional, we assume he would have been 
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available to testify if given reasonable notice[.]” No evidence 

has been presented that this was the case.

Rule 907 Notice, 3/13/19, at 5 (unpaginated).

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court 

did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s claim regarding Corporal 

Wall. Appellant did not establish that Corporal Wall was available to testify 

at trial. Instead Appellant only provided the conclusory statement that 

because Wall “is a professional, we assume he would have been available to 

testify if given reasonable notice, and certainly had no reason not to testify 

as to the information in his report.” Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. This is 

insufficient to establish the element of availability by a preponderance of the 

evidence. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 536; see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 

1177. 

Next, as to Smith, Appellant argues “[t]here is no indication that Smith 

would not have been willing and available to testify to the information he 

gave in the police interview.” Appellant’s Brief at 22.

The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s arguments regarding Smith’s 

testimony, concluding that they “lack[ed] any sort of specificity, and merely 

reflect[ed] [Appellant’s] uncorroborated hope that certain witnesses would 

have testified on his behalf, and therefore [did] not rise to the level required 

to sustain ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rule 907 Notice, 3/13/19, at 6 

(unpaginated).
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We agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion. Appellant has not shown 

that trial counsel knew or should have known about Smith’s statement, 

which he gave in connection with an unrelated shooting. Further, Appellant 

has not shown that Smith was available and willing to testify. Appellant 

relies on the assumption that Smith would be willing and available to testify 

and that his testimony would be consistent with his statement to the police. 

This is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel by a 

preponderance of the evidence. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 536; see also 

Williams, 732 A.2d at 1177. 

Finally, Appellant argues that his trial counsel failed to call Shamone 

Woods to testify that Clarence Milton did not have “access to” Appellant. 

Appellant’s Brief at 9, 22-23. 

The PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

Likewise, [Appellant] asserts that trial counsel should have called 

[Appellant’s] co[-]conspirator Shamone Woods, and that “Mr. 

Woods ... demonstrates his willingness to answer [questions as a 

witness] by the affidavit attached hereto.” As stated above, no 

such affidavit is attached to the petition, therefore we cannot 

ascertain any intent by Mr. Woods to have testified on behalf of 

[Appellant] at trial.

Rule 907 Notice, 3/13/19, at 5-6 (unpaginated).

We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant did not establish that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to call Woods as a witness. Further, 

Appellant did not demonstrate that Woods was available and willing to testify 
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on his behalf. Therefore, Appellant’s claim fails. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 

536; see also Williams, 732 A.2d at 1177.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing 

Appellant’s second amended PCRA petition without a hearing. See Roney, 

79 A.3d at 604.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/20/20