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http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-mxwl.htm
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Air Force Intelligence Role

in Combating Weapons

of Mass Destruction

Cristina M. Stone

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 39

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

November 2006
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Foreword

After the United States and coalition forces failed to find 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiled after Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president charged a congressional commission with examining US intelligence capabilities 

regarding WMD. No great surprise, the commission found 

that the intelligence community had been “dead wrong” 

in many of its prewar estimates. Air Force intelligence is 

part of that intelligence community and shares responsibility for that failure. Air Force intelligence professionals 

play important combating-WMD roles at combatant commands, components, national intelligence agencies, and 

in operational units.

In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air 

Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; 

targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations 

center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise 

required to fill these positions. She examines the current 

status of the Air Force intelligence WMD expertise and proposes recommendations for improvement, utilizing Air Force 

intelligence-distinctive capabilities (predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operators, and unit-level and AOC operations) 

as a framework for discussion. To get to ground truth on 

the current status, the author conducted interviews with 

current and former WMD analysts and targeteers. Colonel 

Stone believes that in the areas of predictive analysis, targeting, and unit-level and AOC operations, Air Force intelligence training courses do not currently provide the requisite WMD expertise. The author recommends that the Air 

Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert 

organizations across the government to improve training 

for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop 

enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends 

changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD 

expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve 

the nation’s ability to combat WMD.
iv

As with all other Maxwell Papers, this study is provided 

in the spirit of academic freedom and is open to debate and 

serious discussion of issues. We encourage your response.

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College
About the Author

Lt Col Cristina M. Stone, USAF, is the deputy commander, 

55th Operations Group, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. She is a career intelligence officer with unit, air and space operations 

center (AOC), and headquarters intelligence experience. She 

has served as a flying squadron intelligence officer in Korea, 

Central Air Force AOC intelligence analyst, US Air Force 

Weapons School instructor, Checkmate strategist, and Air 

Combat Command intelligence squadron commander. 

She graduated from the US Air Force Academy with a 

bachelor of science degree in military history in June 1988 

and received a master of arts degree in human resource 

management from Troy State University in 1995. She also 

graduated from the US Air Force Weapons School in 1993, 

Squadron Officer School in 1994, Air Command and Staff 

College in 2003, and Air War College in 2006.

v
Abstract

Air Force intelligence professionals play key roles in combating weapons of mass (WMD) destruction at combatant 

commands and components and national intelligence agencies. The Air Force, however, does not adequately prepare 

its intelligence analysts, targeteers, ISR operators, and 

unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and the expertise required to fill 

these positions. This paper examines the current status of 

Air Force intelligence WMD expertise and proposes recommendations for improvement, utilizing Air Force intelligencedistinctive capabilities (predictive analysis, targeting, ISR 

operations, and unit-level and AOC operations) as a framework for discussion. In the areas of predictive analysis, targeting, and unit-level and AOC operations, Air Force intelligence training courses do not provide the requisite WMD 

expertise. The Air Force must leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to 

improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD 

expertise. In the area of ISR operations, the Air Force requires 

enhanced collection capabilities and better marketing of 

existing capabilities across the intelligence community. 

This paper also recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, and marketing 

and collection capabilities to improve the nation’s ability to 

combat WMD.

vii


Combating Weapons

of Mass Destruction

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the 

crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 

weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. 

The United States will not allow these efforts to 

succeed. . . . History will judge harshly those who 

saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the 

new world we have entered, the only path to peace 

and security is the path of action. 

	 	 	 	 	 	 —Pres. George W. Bush

	 	 	 	 	 	 —National Security Strategy of

 —the United States of America

	 	 	 —17 September 200

Shortly after the National Security Strategy was published,

the United States and coalition forces entered Iraq to depose

Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. One of the key arguments

for taking this action was that Saddam posed a threat due

to stockpiled weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which he

might use or provide to terrorists. After Saddam was toppled

and the Iraq Survey Group conducted a thorough search for

these weapons, no stockpiles were found. Recognizing a national intelligence failure, President Bush charged a congressional commission with examining United States intelligence

capabilities regarding WMD. The commissioners concluded

that the intelligence community was “dead wrong in almost

all of its prewar judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass

destruction.”1 As one of 16 members of the intelligence community,2 Air Force (AF) intelligence shares the burden of t

grave failure and must improve its processes to preclude future failure in this critical area of analysis. One of the key AF

intelligence contributions to combating WMD is in the area

of “human capital”—providing intelligence professionals to

combat WMD at combatant commands and components and

national intelligence agencies; however, the Air Force does

not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts, targeteers,

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) op-
erators; and unit-level and air and space operations center

(AOC) personnel with the knowledge and the expertise required to fill these positions.

This paper examines the current status of AF intelligence

WMD expertise and proposes recommendations for improvement, utilizing AF intelligence-distinctive capabilities3

as a framework for discussion. These distinctive capabilities include predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations,

and unit and AOC operations. The author interviewed current and former WMD analysts and targeteers to derive the

data on current status of AF WMD intelligence and capture

recommendations for improvement. The paper begins with

defining baseline terms of reference. It proceeds to examine

each AF intelligence-distinctive capability, discussing current status and existing intelligence gaps. The paper concludes with recommendations for improvement.

Terms of Reference

I will first define key terms: weapons of mass destruction,

Air Force intelligence, Air Force intelligence-distinctive capabilities, and combating WMD. Once defined, these terms

help to establish a baseline for understanding weapons of

mass destruction.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines weapons o

mass destruction as “weapons that are capable of a high order

of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to

destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical,

and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a

separable and divisible part of the weapon.”4 These weapons

are also referred to as weapons of mass destruction/effect

(WMD/E); chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

(CBRN); and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives (CBRNE). For the purpose of this paper,

the term weapons of mass destruction includes chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives.
Air Force Intelligence

The term Air Force intelligence is used throughout this paper to describe appropriate military and civilian intelligence

professionals in the Air Force. The Directorate of ISR, deputy

chief of staff for Air and Space Operations (AF/A2), Pentagon,

Washington, DC, is the staff organization that is responsible

for policy and for organizing, training, and equipping Air Force

intelligence. The Air Force office for intelligence analysis is the

National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), located at

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; however, Air Force analysts proliferate throughout the Department of Defense (DOD)—from

the flying units up to such national intelligence centers as the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security

Agency (NSA).

AF Intelligence-Distinctive Capabilities

The January 2006 AF/A2 “Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Force Development Semi-Annual Newsletter”

identified the AF intelligence-distinctive capabilities as predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations, and unit-level and

AOC operations.5 Definitions for these terms follow.

Predictive Analysis. The DIA white paper, “Implementing Predictive Analysis Technology within DIA/DS-RRA,”

defines predictive analysis as “predicting the intentions

and probable courses of action of human beings, either as

individuals or as populations. Understanding intentions

requires analysts to first understand cultural context, history, behavioral patterns, incentives, and ethnicity in order to understand how the threat has evolved and exists.”6

Within the context of this research paper, predictive analysis refers to Air Force intelligence efforts to understand,

determine the capabilities of, and predict courses of action

of an enemy and its military forces. The terms predictive 

analysis and analysis are being used interchangeably.

Targeting. JP 1-02 defines targeting as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropria

response to them, taking account of operational requirements

and capabilities.”7 This definition is also accepted in AF doctrine.8 In layman’s terms, targeting is linking the right weapons to the right targets to achieve the desired strategic, op-
erational, or tactical effect. The intelligence professionals who

conduct this important mission area are called targeteers.

ISR Operations. JP 1-02 defines ISR as “an activity th

synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of

sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations

function.”9 Examples of ISR operations include imagery and

signals intelligence collection. For the purpose of this paper,

when referencing AF intelligence ISR operations, the term refers to collection, processing, and exploitation operations.

Unit and AOC Operations. This distinctive capability

refers to intelligence activities at operational AF units (such

as flying and ground-based air control units) and AOCs.1

Analysis, targeting, and ISR operations all apply to unit and

AOC operations. It is a separate category as a distinctive

capability because of the unique tactics, techniques, and

procedures that exist within these organizations. This essay addresses the WMD-related issues that impact unitlevel and AOC operations.

Combating WMD

The December 2002 issue of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies three pillars to the

US strategy to combat WMD: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management.11 Counterproliferati

consists of actions taken to “deter and defend against the full

range of possible WMD employment scenarios.” Nonproliferation includes “those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export

controls) taken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction that seek to dissuade or impede access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, materiel, and expertise.”12 Th

final pillar, consequence management, is the response to the

use of WMD on US soil or against US citizens and the actions

taken to become operational again after an attack.1

Combating WMD is a government-wide enterprise, but the

Air Force and AF intelligence play key roles in each pillar of

the strategy. Intelligence professionals provide the analytical

underpinning for counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and

consequence-management operations. AF ISR operations
provide the data analysts need to reach their conclusions on

adversary WMD capabilities. Additionally, intelligence professionals provide the requisite targeting expertise for striking WMD targets should the situation require it.

Background of

the WMD Commission Report

Taken together, the Intelligence Reform Act and the WMD 

Commission’s recommendations constitute a powerful 

force for change in the Intelligence Community. 

	 	 —Amb. John Negropon

	 	 

—Director of National Intelligen

	 	 

—29 September 20

On 6 February 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 13328, establishing the Commission on the Intelligen

Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass

Destruction. The president charged the commission with assessing whether the intelligence community is “sufficiently

authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced”1

to support the US counterproliferation efforts. Specifically,

they were tasked to examine “. . . the capabilities and challenges of the Intelligence Community to collect, process, analyze, produce, and disseminate information concerning the

capabilities, intentions and activities of such foreign powers

relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or

threatened use, or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21s

Century.”15 Although the impetus for establishing the commission was the intelligence failure regarding Iraq’s WM

before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the president asked the

team not only to look at Iraq, but also to look at intelligence

capabilities versus other state and nonstate actors.

The Findings

The commission team interviewed experts from inside and

outside the intelligence community and reviewed thousands

of documents.16 With regards to Iraq, they found that th
primary causes of intelligence failure included the “inability

to collect good information about Iraq’s WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather,

and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis

was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence.”1

In its review of intelligence performance versus other state

and nonstate threats, the team discovered that although

the intelligence community had achieved some significant

successes, it still knows “disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many

of our most dangerous adversaries.”18 The following summarizes the major findings from the report

• Poor target development: not getting intelligence on the issues we care about most. The intelligence community lacks the coordinated collections

strategy required to penetrate some of today’s difficult

target sets (emphasis in original).

• Lack of rigorous analysis. The intelligence community must improve “analytical tradecraft,” to include

techniques, communication skills and subject matter

expertise (emphasis in original).

• Lack of political context—and imagination.

Technical analysis should be weighed against political

context (emphasis in original).

• Overemphasis on and underperformance in

daily intelligence products. Daily CIA-produced

intelligence products tended to be alarmist and misleading (emphasis in original).

•  Inadequate information sharing. Although progress has been made since 9/11, much work still nee

to be done in the area of counterproliferation (emphasis in original).

• Poor human intelligence. Innovation is needed to develop sources in closed societies. Additionally, care should

be taken not to rely too heavily on uncorroborated, singlesource human intelligence (emphasis in original).

• The challenge to traditional signals intelligence.

Advances in telecommunications [have] resulted in
some loss of access. Technological innovation[s] are required to keep pace with technology developments in

the civilian sector (emphasis in original).

• Declining utility of traditional imagery intelligence against unconventional weapons programs. Adversaries are improving denial and deception

techniques to counter traditional imagery collection

(emphasis in original).

• Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)

is not sufficiently developed. Capabilities are not

widely understood or marketed (emphasis in original).

• An absence of strong leadership. Turf wars continue

to make coordination and intelligence integration difficult

and the Director of Central Intelligence was unable to resolve the difficulties.19 (emphasis in original

The commission team made 74 recommendations for correcting these shortcomings in their report; the president accepted 71 for implementation. The recommendations leverage the directives of the Intelligence Reform and Terrori

Prevention Act (IRTPA) of December 2004. This legislation

established the director for national intelligence position, the

National Counterterrorism Center, and directed information

sharing between intelligence community members.20 The

commission’s recommended areas for improvement included

leadership/management (utilizing the IRTPA to integrate the

intelligence community better), collection, analysis, information sharing, integrating domestic and foreign intelligence,

counterintelligence, and covert action.21 The areas of improvement that directly impacted AF intelligence include collection and analysis (including target analysis or targeting)

Combating WMD and Existing Gaps

I believe we can do better . . . to grow intel officers 

that are even more flexible and adaptive in this 

long war, this Global War on Terrorism.

—Gen T. Michael Mos

—Chief of Staff of the United States Air F

—10 October
As addressed earlier, the intelligence community requires

significant improvements in the ability of its members to

combat WMD. To examine AF equity in, and current status of, AF intelligence efforts in combating WMD, this paper utilizes the AF intelligence-distinctive capabilities as a

framework: predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations,

and unit and AOC operations.

Predictive Analysis

Intelligence plays a vital role in ensuring that potential

adversaries do not acquire WMD or, if they already have

it, that they do not expand it. The AF intelligence role in

this mission area is to provide the analytical human capital

to feed the major DOD intelligence analysis agencies that

watch potential enemy capabilities and advise policy and

decision makers. The WMD commission cited “analytical

tradecraft” as a current weakness in the intelligence community. Specifically, the commission report recommended

that tradecraft, “the way analysts think, research, evaluate

evidence, write, and communicate,” be improved.22

AF/A2 recently asked major command senior intelligence officers to review the WMD commission report and

to recommend areas for improvement for AF intelligence. In

the results compiled by the AF/A2 staff, all 11 respond

remarked that AF intelligence analysis needed improvement.23 Some of the more critical remarks follow:

•	 	Pacific Air Forces: “Technical analysis lacking; USAF

intelligence community does not routinely verify WMD

intel assessments through [the] technical review process conducted by knowledgeable subject matter experts with actual WMD experience” and “Need more

USAF Intel resources smart on WMD analysis. . . .”24

•	 	Air Force Materiel Command: “AF [must] reconstitute

strategic analysis ability and address need for technical

collection expertise” and “Provide training/education to

develop greater skills in analytic ‘tradecraft.’ . . .”25

•	 	Air Mobility Command: “We need to return to organizing around specific mission sets and developing [sic]
specialists with [a] high degree of proficiency in that

mission set. . . .”26

•	 	National Air and Space Intelligence Center: “Strengthen

strategic, science and technology, and weapons research/analysis. . . .”27

These comments reflect the need to strengthen AF capabilities to conduct more rigorous analysis and, specifically,

WMD analysis. To get to ground truth on the current status

of WMD analysis in AF intelligence, the author interviewed

current or former WMD analysts by way of e-mail.

The resulting comments were compiled to provide a qualitative rather than quantitative look at the status of Air Force

WMD intelligence. Although the number of interviews was

relatively small, the responses were generally consistent. The

focus was to answer the questions “Do AF WMD analysts have

the requisite training and expertise for the analytical positions

in which they serve?” and “How do they gain the expertise if

they don’t have it?” The interview questions included:

•	 	What is your duty title?

•		What is your background for WMD analysis or targeting?

•	 	Did you attend any training courses before arriving on

station?

•	 	What did you do for in-house spin-up28 training?

•	 	Who do you go to if you have questions?

•	 	What resources did you find helpful in doing your job?

•	 	Do you have any recommendations for anyone moving

into your job?

The author selected individuals to interview by obtaining a

list of intelligence personnel currently serving in WMD analyst

positions from the Air Force Personnel Center, located at Randolph AFB, Texas. To increase the quantity of collected data,

the author asked intelligence peers for recommendations of

personnel with WMD analysis experience. One hundred percent

of individuals contacted responded to the interview questions.

Table 1 captures the answer to the first question. The locations represent a good cross section of the kinds of organizations AF intelligence professionals can serve in as 
1

analysts, including intelligence agencies, combatant commands, subordinate components, and intelligence school.

The backgrounds of the individuals ranged from second

lieutenants straight out of intelligence school to a scientist

cross-trainee who had done WMD-related research during

his studies at the Joint Military Intelligence College.29

Table 1. Interviews with current and former WMD analysts

Duty Title Location

Deputy chief, Estimates DivisionAir Force Intelligence Analysis Agency, Pentagon, Washington, DC

Deputy chief, Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Team

US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL

Chief, TBM/WMD analyst 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, 

Republic of Korea

NCOIC, Asymmetric Threat 

Analysis

607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, 

Republic of Korea

Weapon system intelligence 

integration officer (hard and 

deeply buried targets analyst)

497th Intelligence Group, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC

Section chief, International 

Officers Applications Course 

(WMD course instructor)

315th Training Squadron, Goodfellow AFB, TX

Source: E-mail interviews conducted by author with Capt Stefanie S. Peterson, 18 November 

2005; 2d Lt Sean R. Tucker, 15 November 2005; NCOIC, Asymmetric Threat Analysis, 15 November 2005; Maj James Gehringer, 2 December 2005; 1st Lt Tanya Silvio, 15 December 2005; 

Maj Lourdes Duvall, 10 February 2006; and MSgt Timothy Dukes, 14 February 2006. 

In answering the third question, Did you attend training

before arriving on station? none of the respondents answered

yes with regards to specific intelligence training courses, although several had attended courses (either in residence

or through a mobile training team course) after arriving on

station. These courses included the Oakridge Nuclear Fuel

Cycle Operations Course and the Lawrence Livermore National Labs Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) Course. The respondents did not appear to be

aware of the significant curriculum offered by the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Military Intelligence Training

Center, or the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on

a wide range of WMD-related topics.30 The Intelligence Com-
munity Proliferation Training Catalog provides a consolidated

list of courses offered and is available on the Joint Worldwide

Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).3

The only “standard” answer to the fourth question (What

did you do for in-house spin-up training?) was that all respondents had to do a large amount of self-initiated study

to get “up to speed” for their jobs. The 607th Air Intelligence Squadron had a more robust spin-up that included

turnover with the incumbent and review of significant desk

briefings. Others gained requisite knowledge through the

“fire-hose effect” of learning while doing.32

The answers to the fifth and sixth questions regarding

contacts and resources were as varied as the respondents.

This makes sense since the WMD target set is not the same

for all analysts in all areas of responsibility. For example,

the US Central Command analysts focused on nuclear issues, while the Korea analysts focused more on Scud missile capabilities and North Korean chemical and biological

agents. The most popular resource on the JWICS is the

ATHENA Shared Counterproliferation Information Space, a

Web site managed by the DIA. This Web site includes any

“hot” WMD information and provides links to WMD analysts

across the government. It acts as a digital clearinghouse

for WMD intelligence, but unless an analyst was specifically directed to it, he or she might not become aware of it

during his or her tenure. Within the AF, no central human

intelligence clearinghouse is available to help analysts obtain WMD-related intelligence, direct analysts to available

training opportunities, or connect them with experts within

a field of study. This is a significant gap since AF WMD analysts are currently left to train themselves.33

In response to the final question regarding recommendations for people who would replace them, respondents recommended several options. These recommendations included

attending training en route, finding replacements with a technical background or affinity, and a good turnover with incumbents. The recommendation of a technical background is

worth further elaboration. The WMD analyst for the Air Force

Intelligence Analysis Agency was a chemist who cross-trained

into the intelligence career field. Since WMD-related analysis is highly technical, having a technical or scientific background is extraordinarily valuable, especially given the lack
1

of AF-specific training in WMD analysis.34 The 497th Intelligence Group analyst recommended that individuals new to a

WMD analyst position build relationships with subject-matter

experts early on. She remarked, “I often trolled org charts and

cold-called to find the right person for my specific info deficits.

Not ideal, but I found people to be very willing to help.”35

In summary, interview results revealed that, with the exception of the cross-trained scientist, AF personnel serving

in WMD analyst positions lacked training and experience. Inhouse training and formal courses attended after arriving on

station were critical in getting these analysts “up to speed.” The

reference sources and contacts varied greatly from one organization to another, and some individuals were not aware of the

important intelligence community WMD resources. The interview responses support the WMD commission report finding

on “lack of rigorous analysis,” highlighted in this paper.36

The AF falls short in training for WMD analytical expertise. The AF does not offer specialized training for their WMD

analysts. A review of the Goodfellow Air Force Base plans for

instruction for basic officer and enlisted intelligence courses

reveals that students receive seven and eight hours of WMD

threat instruction, respectively.37 In an interview with the enlisted intelligence course manager, the author discovered that

the WMD course instructor does not receive any additional

formal training beyond what was provided when he or she attended the fundamentals courses. What happens then is that

the eight-hour planned block of instruction usually becomes

much shorter due to the instructor’s lack of expertise. The

situation for the officer course is considerably better, since the

instructor has been teaching the WMD block for two years.

The instructor admits, however, that he did not feel comfortable teaching the subject matter when he first started.38 As a

positive note, the enlisted course has a computer-based training “workbook” that instructors can use to review the WMD

block for study. This tool is not currently available for use to

personnel outside of the training wing.39

In addition to providing better baseline WMD training for

all intelligence personnel, AF intelligence must also look at

providing follow-on training for individuals who end up serving as WMD analysts in various intelligence agencies, combatant commands, and components. Since the AF does not

have a large number of positions that require this kind of ad-
1

vanced expertise and understanding, it is not feasible to create

an in-residence course. However, a computer-based training

course made available to the entire analyst community would

be helpful for any analyst who requires a refresher. This provides an answer to current intelligence questions by giving a

background for a project. Additionally, analysts requiring advanced knowledge could attend any number of courses offered

throughout the WMD intelligence community and the national

laboratories. The Air Force Institute of Technology at WrightPatterson AFB is also currently developing two graduatelevel academic programs on combating WMD: a 10-week overview course designed to meet “immediate educational need

and an 18-month master of science degree in combati

WMD Technology.40

Another challenge these AF WMD analysts face is determining who to turn to when they have a question. There are

many different players in the WMD analysis community, each

with a different “piece of the analytical pie.” To bring the WMD

analytical players together as a community of interest, the director of national intelligence stood up the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) in the Washington, DC, area. The

NCPC is not an analytical agency. The primary charter for the

organization provides a community-wide vehicle for strategic

planning and oversight. As the organization matures, coordination and intelligence sharing among the different intelligence organizations and understanding of what each player

contributes to the fight will likely improve. One of the NCPC’s

current initiatives identifies all the different formal training

opportunities across the intelligence community. A decision

has not yet been made as to how the NCPC will market these

opportunities to intelligence community members.4

On a positive note, AF/A2 is examining several possibilities

to improve basic analysis and to include partnering with universities to enhance analyst training. AF/A2 is also evaluating officer analyst force development.42 At Goodfellow AFB, the

315th Training Squadron (TRS) is revamping the basic course

to introduce additional analytical rigor and to create more of

a building-block approach. The 315th TRS is also establishing a completely new analysis, correlation, and fusion trainin

course that will target individuals who will be working in AOC

analysis, correlation, and fusion flights. In the future such individuals as the Korean Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) and the
1

WMD analysts referred to above will have the opportunity to

attend the analyst training course before arriving on station. Finally, the 315th TRS is also creating a correspondence course

the Predictive Battlespace Awareness Baseline Course. This

course is intended to provide an analytical “baseline” for those

individuals attending any of Goodfellow’s advanced intelligence

courses, but it could be available to other analysts also.43

Targeting

Counterproliferation, as described in the National Strategy 

for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, consists of actions

taken to “deter and defend against the full range of possible

WMD employment scenarios.”44 For the Air Force, one of the

key roles within the broad area of counterproliferation is counterforce targeting. The Air Force Counter-Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (C-CBRNE) Master Plan describes counterforce as defeating enemy WMD capabilities before they can be brought to bear, while minimizing

the potential for collateral damage.45 Air Force intelligence is an

important enabler in this mission, contributing to assessment

of the threat target set and providing targeting expertise.

Air Force intelligence officers serve as targeting experts in

combatant commands, air operations centers, air-to-ground

units, and in intelligence organizations; yet the AF does not

have specialized training for WMD targeting expertise. Basic

training for targeting is conducted in the Combat Targeting

Course (CTC) at Goodfellow AFB. Future targeteers will be

taught to analyze a target as a “system of systems,” analyze

critical nodes, and determine the appropriate weapons to create desired effects. The CTC focuses primarily on conventional

targets and conventional weapons, although discussion of

WMD is included in two of the blocks of instruction.46

WMD targeting requires specialized expertise—the targeteer is not only concerned with the blast effects of the weapons dropped, but the effect of the WMD agents once targeted

is also a concern. The analyst must be able to project the potential dispersal of the agents into the atmosphere and to harness possible collateral damage caused by this release.47 The

expertise for planning against WMD targets resides primarily

within the DTRA and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence

Center (AFMIC). DTRA has fielded several software tools, such
1

as the Munitions Effects Assessment, Integrated Munitions

Effects Assessment (IMEA), and Hazard Prediction and

Assessment Capacity (HPAC). Even though these tools assist

targeteers in conducting prestrike and hazard effects analysis, training in the basic course on these tools is extremely

limited.48 Improved partnerships with DTRA and AFMIC in

syllabus development would enhance training at Goodfellow

and improve AF targeting expertise for WMD.

To gain an understanding of the specific requirements for

WMD targeting expertise, interviews were conducted of targeteers who are currently serving or have served in targeting

positions at combatant commands and air and space operations centers. The author used the same methodology for the

selection of participants and to conduct the interviews as

she utilized for the WMD analysts. Additionally, she asked

the same questions to WMD analysts (listed in the Predictive Analysis section) that she asked to current and former

targeteers with AOC or combatant command experience. The

duty titles and locations included combatant commands and

subordinate components and are listed in the table below:

Table 2. Interviews with current and former targeteers

Duty Title Location

Chief of targets 32d Air Operations Center/ISR Division, 

Ramstein AB, Ger.

Chief of target development European Command, Stuttgart, Ger.

Target duty officer 607th Air Intelligence Squadron, OSAN AB, 

Republic of Korea

Chief of Target Materials Branch US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE

Operations officer of Target US Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, NE

Materials Branch

Counter-Scud targeting officer Combined AOC, Prince Sultan AB, KSA

Source: E-mail interviews conducted by author with Maj Derek Gardner, 2 December

2005; Capt Kasandra T. Traweek, 14 November 2005; and Lt Col Charles Owen,

December 2005.

These individuals varied in background from those with

no WMD experience to one with a doctorate in virology. Of
1

note, the chief of targets in the 32d AOC/ISR Division (the

doctoral degree recipient) was selected for her assignment

under the acquisition intelligence experience exchange tour

(AIEET). This program recruits 10 scientists and engineers

year into the intelligence career field, and it could provide a

viable way to fill WMD analysis positions that have technical

requirements.49 This exchange program also benefits the science and technology community through a more thorough

understanding of intelligence and the intelligence community. When questioned about the value of having a scientist

as chief of targets, the 32d AOC/ISR Division chief remarked,

“Awesome—she delivers info with impact in so many ways.

You never know where the next WMD threat or question

arises, and I think every AOC needs a WMD expert.”50

In answering the question about training courses, all the

individuals had attended the Combat Targeting Course at

Goodfellow AFB; however, only the 32d AOC chief of targets

had attended WMD-related training courses. For spin-up,

all the individuals learned through self-study and contacts

in the field. With regard to contacts, the cross-flow scientist had a vast network of contacts and resources that she

brought into the job from her previous work as a scientist.5

The counter-Scud targeting officer developed a worldwide

network of experts in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations.52

The recommendations these individuals provided included

having a technical or scientific background and familiarity

with DTRA, HPAC, and IMEA models.53 DTRA offers courses

for these models, but DTRA could also provide familiarization

training as required. In mid-2005, a DTRA contractor visited

Goodfellow AFB to familiarize Combat Targeting Course instructors with these models.54 DTRA also provides “flyaway

teams” that could provide training in forward operating areas. The AF targeteers, especially those in an AOC, would

likely not run the models themselves; however, awareness

of their existence and the ability to speak intelligently with

the experts would provide an enhanced capability within the

AOC to understand the WMD target set.

In summary the targeteer interviews yielded results similar to the WMD analyst interviews. With the exception of the

scientist on the Acquisition Intelligence Exchange Tour, the

targeteers interviewed did not have formal WMD training or
1

experience, but rather they had learned “on the job,” as required. Instead of relying on an existing network of contacts

and resources, a few of the respondents were forced to create their own network of experts to fill expertise gaps. The

interview results support the WMD commission’s findings of

“poor target development” and “lack of rigorous analysis.”55

Another targeting challenge is keeping pace with the development of specialized weapons for targeting such WMD as

thermobaric and agent-defeat weapons. These weapons attack and destroy the agents before they can cause extensive

collateral damage.56 The development of two such weapons

was put on the fast track following the attack of 11 September 2001, expediting the normal test and develo

process.57 While the actual weapons were rapidly fielded to

the flying community, instruction on these weapons has not

been fully incorporated into the CTC syllabus.58 Instruction

in the CTC must keep pace with the rapid weapons development to ensure that graduates are prepared to weaponeer for

these weapons when they are asked to do so.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Operations

The data required for analysis and targeting is obtained

through intelligence collection. The disciplines that play

the most critical role in combating WMD, as identified in

the commission report, are human intelligence (HUMINT),

measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), signals

intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).59

The role of AF intelligence within these disciplines and the

utility for combating WMD is described below. Due to classification constraints, the following discussion of each discipline will be general.

HUMINT. JP 1-02 defines HUMINT as “a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provid

by human sources.”60 The WMD commission report specifically highlighted HUMINT as a shortcoming. According to

the commission report, when the October 2002 National 

Intelligence Estimate was written, the intelligence community had “little human intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and virtually no

human intelligence on leadership intentions.”61 Acquirin
1

human sources for information on WMD is difficult at best.

Countries that pursue WMD or have active programs guard

their secrets closely. The more egregious problem in Iraq,

however, was putting complete trust in an untested, single

source provided by another country.62 If a source is questionable or not independently confirmed, intelligence analysts must make it clear to policy makers what is known

and what is assumed.

In AF intelligence the HUMINT business had all but fallen

to the wayside before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The AF ceded

all of its responsibility for this mission to the Defense HUMINT Service in October 1995.63 AF intelligence is current

resurrecting an organic HUMINT capability.64 The focus of

this capability is to generate intelligence of particular value

to AF customers. In combating WMD, AF HUMINT personnel could conduct interrogations and work informants on

the airborne part of the WMD equation: delivery platforms.

They could also become a resource pool for the Department

of Defense HUMINT Service, which produces human intelligence for other WMD analysis areas.

To have a viable HUMINT capability, AF intelligence is

working to determine what the force will look like later, possible mission focus areas, and how HUMINT positions will

fit into officer and enlisted force development paths. Instead

of discouraging young intelligence officers and enlisted personnel from taking HUMINT assignments, Air Force intelligence leadership is working vigorously to define a track

to keep people in the field and ensure they get promoted (a

problem area in the past).65

MASINT. MASINT is “technically derived intelligence that

detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and describes the unique

characteristics of fixed and dynamic target sources. Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities include radar,

laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, spectroradiametric, and seismic sensing systems as

well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling and analysis.”66 While sometimes referred to as “a batch of unrelated

technical intelligence tools, better developed and funded separately rather than under a single label,” MASINT capabilities

can be used to identify WMD presence, especially when analyzed in conjunction with the other intelligence disciplines.67

The commission report found that currently MASINT is not
1

sufficiently developed or understood across the intelligence

community. MASINT played a “negligible role” in Iraqi WMD

analysis, despite its capabilities.68

The Air Force plays a key role in the MASINT arena

through such aircraft and sensor capabilities as the RC-13

Cobra Ball. MASINT assets could contribute to combating

WMD through “detecting the construction of underground

facilities, monitoring the activities at hard-to-find chemical

and biological warfare sites, and coping with increasingly

sophisticated denial and deception measures directed at

conventional imagery and signals intelligence systems.”69

Another AF contribution comes through producing the analysts who interpret the data. In fact, this is a growth field for

the Air Force that is expanding its capabilities in this realm.

Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and NASIC are important intelligence center partners in the MASINT arena.

Secrecy shrouds much of what is done in this realm, adding to the intelligence community’s mistrust of the intelligence

produced. The capabilities of MASINT sensors are not marketed well in the Air Force, let alone across the DOD and

government. A marketing effort would enhance both understanding and utilization across the intelligence community.

SIGINT. SIGINT is “a category of intelligence comprising

either individually or in combination all communications

intelligence, electronics intelligence and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.”70 SIGINT

is the realm of the National Security Agency, although all

intelligence community members play a role. It can play a

critical role in combating WMD because it provides some

insight into what is “being said, planned and even considered.”71 SIGINT has limitations, however, as the enemy ca

intentionally provide false or misleading information or a

smart enemy can move to a communications capability that

is more difficult to exploit. According to the commission report, the SIGINT community lost access to key aspects of

Iraqi communications.72

As is the case with MASINT, the Air Force plays a key

role in SIGINT through such assets as the RC-135 Rive

Joint and analytical capability. The primary AF repository for

SIGINT expertise and management is AIA. AIA plays a key

role in capabilities development and oversight of the SIGINT

mission across the AF. It also plays a key role in developing
20

capabilities and fielding assets that can overcome the challenges discussed earlier.

IMINT. IMINT is “intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors,

lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic

aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced

optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices,

or other media.”73 Although imagery plays an important role

in identifying movement of military equipment and large

numbers of personnel, it can have a limited utility against a

target that the enemy is determined to hide. Enemy denial

and deception techniques utilized at sensitive target areas

can limit the utility of imagery.74 Another problem with imagery is that it may only provide a “snapshot” in time, and

analysts cannot always determine what happened before

or after the shot was taken.75 Imagery is especially limited

against a suspected chemical or biological facility, as activity and storage takes place inside a building and may give

no additional visual signature that would distinguish the

facility from normal industrial activity.76 Transshipment

activity sometimes can be caught, but imagery may not be

able to tell you exactly what’s going on.

AF platforms such as the U-2, Predator, and Global

Hawk are key imagery collection platforms. As in the other

“ints,” the AF also produces the personnel who analyze and

interpret the imagery. The processing, exploitation, and

dissemination of imagery products occurs at such national

agencies as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

and at AF Distributed Common Ground System sites. Imagery analysts at these sites provide analysis in near real

time to support combat operations. AF assets and analysts

also play a critical role in consequence management, as

was evidenced in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,

and Wilma in 2005. The Air Force provided imagery coverage of the impacted areas to assist the federal government

in determining the scope of the damage.77 This type of coverage can play a similar role after a nuclear or high-yield

explosive WMD attack.

In the combative WMD arena, AF sensors and analysts

suffer from the shortcomings of traditional ISR collection

addressed in the WMD commission report.78 The NCPC

chief of staff commented that the best way to counteract
2

the shortcomings of traditional assets is to develop new

technologies and, more importantly, to use “existing technologies in creative ways.”79 ISR operators must remain

flexible and creative when conducting operations against

the difficult-to-penetrate WMD target set. They must also

work to fuse knowledge obtained from all the different collection disciplines to build the true picture of a potential

adversary’s WMD capability.

Unit and AOC Operations

Predictive analysis, targeting, and ISR operations are all

crucial to unit and AOC operations. Planning and executing air, space, and information operations occur at units

and AOCs and include operations against WMD targets.

As such, intelligence personnel at units and AOCs must

have a good baseline understanding of the WMD threat,

and certain individuals within these organizations need a

more detailed understanding. Within the AOC, intelligence

personnel must put the entire threat picture together. They

will pull from each of the AF intelligence-distinctive capabilities for the expertise needed to accomplish this task.

The WMD expertise requirements addressed in the predictive analysis, targeting, and ISR operations sections apply

to the personnel at the AOC.

Unit personnel also have a requirement for WMD expertise

driven by the potential for counterforce targeting and support

for air base survivability. If the unit has an air-to-ground mission, unit aircrews may be asked to deliver thermobaric or

agent-defeat weapons. Unit intelligence personnel support

these missions and should have an understanding of both the

target components and the weapon’s capability.80 Currently,

such DTRA effects tools as HPAC and IMEA are not included

in the suite of intelligence-automation tools available at the

unit level.81 These tools would be helpful for combat missio

planning and for training. When aircrews drop such munitions in training as the EGBU-15 Thermobaric weapon, effects models help to build an understanding of delivery requirements and weapon-performance characteristics.8

Unit intelligence personnel also play a key role in air

base survivability by training base support personnel on

adversary WMD capabilities. Understanding the threat is
22

an important aspect of preparation for and execution of

consequence-management operations. Consequence management is the response to the use of WMD on US soil or

against US persons and the actions taken to become operational again after an attack.83 AF intelligence has equity

in the area of consequence management at the unit level

through base-level intelligence support to decision makers, emergency responders, and force protection. As discussed in the other two pillars of the strategy, the lack of

specialized training on the WMD threat negatively impacts

the ability of unit-level intelligence personnel to provide the

support required before, during, and after an attack. For

example, an intelligence officer who has attended the basic

intelligence officer course received seven hours of instruction on the WMD threat. Once the intelligence officer arrives on station, he or she will also receive the required

CBRNE defense class along with the remainder of the base

populace. At that point, the individual could be assigned as

the intelligence representative to the force protection working group and may be considered the WMD threat expert

for the wing.84 The training received to date would be inadequate for this responsibility. One possible solution would

be to provide training opportunities, training materials, or

some online resources to fill the gap in expertise.

What role does this expertise play in consequence management? When the base is preparing for a potential attack,

intelligence personnel can prepare medical personnel and

leadership and emergency responders on what to expect.

This benefit extends to in-garrison training for medical personnel. The more detailed understanding they have of threat

capabilities and intent, the better prepared they will be for

conflict. The model already exists for this kind of “external” training: aircrew and security forces training. Medical

personnel intelligence requirements likely would not be as

robust as those of aircrew or security forces; however, the

requirement should be formalized and incorporated into AF

intelligence instructions.85

As part of the wing threat working group (TWG), intelligence also plays a key role in force protection before, during,

and after an attack. Intelligence personnel act in an advisory

role to unit leadership with the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and Security Forces. OSI and security forces pro-
23

vide the “local intelligence,” and intelligence personnel are

able to link into higher headquarters and national agencies

to dig for “special intelligence” on the threat. The intelligence

contribution to threat characterization includes understanding of types of agents; delivery methods; and enemy tactics,

techniques, and procedures. These insights can provide a

forecast for future enemy activity, including the possibility

of follow-on attacks.86 Two unit senior intelligence officers

interviewed for this paper indicated advanced training would

be helpful for intelligence TWG representatives.87

Both AOC and unit intelligence personnel would benefit

from tailored, focused WMD analytical support. The numerous agencies that produce WMD intelligence do not create

air or Air Force–centric products. As a result, unit and AOC

personnel resort to wading through the existing body of

data to find what they need. A WMD-focused analytical applications branch (or shop) at NASIC could provide tailored

support and an AF spin to already existing products. The

branch could help point AF personnel to the community experts and identify training opportunities. This shop would

be beneficial for NASIC analysts also, and it could integrate

the delivery vehicle knowledge, which already exists, with

knowledge of the WMD agents and warheads.

Recommendations

How then do we teach and mentor and grow and 

mature and expose our folks and develop an intel 

cadre that is something beyond where we’ve been 

in the past?

—Gen T. Michael Mos

—Chief of Staff of the United States Air F

—13 October

This paper addressed Air Force intelligence areas for improvement in predictive analysis, targeting, ISR operations,

and unit and AOC operations. It also introduced the issue of

reforming AF WMD intelligence in the aftermath of Operation

Iraqi Freedom, established the baseline terms of reference

for discussion throughout the paper, provided background

information on the WMD commission report and relevance

for AF intelligence, stepped through the AF intelligence-
24

distinctive capabilities, and provided analysis of the status

of AF WMD intelligence in each of these areas. Interviews of

current and former WMD analysts and targeteers provided

the baseline data to support the recommendations.

The United States must continue to deal with potential

state and nonstate WMD threats. To prepare our policy

makers and war fighters, intelligence professionals must be

properly trained to understand and assess threat capabilities and intent. Although AF intelligence does not have the

primary responsibility for WMD analysis within the Department of Defense, AF analysts, targeteers, and ISR operators

play a key contributory role to nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence-management operations.

To meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism and

improve the country’s ability to combat WMD, AF intelligence should consider the following recommendations for

AF intelligence areas for improvement:

1.	 	Partner with other intelligence community member

and academia to provide a more robust analytical tradecraft course of study in the intelligence fundamentals

courses. Provide follow-on training at the midcareer level

on managing and teaching analysis.

2.	 	Improve the WMD training currently provided in the

intelligence fundamentals courses. Send course instructors to a one-week WMD overview course provided by CIA or DIA.

3.	 	Identify all AF intelligence WMD analyst positions across

DOD and determine training requirements. Ensure that

reporting instructions reflect the requirement for WMD

threat courses offered by government agencies.

4.	 	Leverage as much as possible from the existing AF

scientist and engineer pool to fill technical analysis

positions through programs such as the AIEET. In the

long term, increase the number of intelligence officer

initial hires with such technical undergraduate degrees as science and engineering.

5.	 	Partner with DTRA and AFMIC to teach weapons effects models (such as IMEA and HPAC) familiarization to the Combat Targeting Course attendees. Send
25

course instructors to advanced training in these models and in WMD fundamentals.

6.	 	Modify the existing Combat Targeting Course to cover

emerging thermobaric and agent-defeat weapons effects.

7.	 	Build a primer (to include training support materials) on the WMD threat for different threat countries

for unit-level intelligence personnel. Coordinate with

DTRA and AFMIC to ensure level of fidelity required

for medical personnel.

8.	 	Reinvigorate AF HUMINT. Provide a force development road map for HUMINT to include command positions.

9.	 	Work with the rest of the intelligence community to

develop IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT capabilities.

10.	 	Market currently existing MASINT capabilities to increase understanding across the intelligence community

11.	 	Create a WMD applications shop at NASIC to tail

the existing body of WMD intelligence to air, space,

and information operations customers.

The AF should seize the opportunity created by the postcommission interest in WMD intelligence to address some

of its long-standing problems in this vital area. To highlight

the significance of this requirement, we once again turn

to the findings of the commission: “There is no more important intelligence mission than understanding the worst

weapons that our enemy possesses, and how they intend to

use them against us. These are their deepest secrets, and

unlocking them must be our highest priority.”88

Notes

1. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United

States (Washington, DC: WMD Commission, 31 March 2005, forwardi

letter to the president).

2. Ibid. The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency

(NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Recon-
26

naissance Office (NRO), Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force

Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Department of State/Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of Justice/Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security/Directorate of

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security/US Coast Guard Intelligence, Department of Energy (DOE)/

Office of Intelligence (IN), and Department of Treasury/Office of Terrorism

and Financial Intelligence (INF).

3. See Air and Space Operations (AF/A2), “Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Semi-Annual Newsletter,” January 2006,

Pentagon, Washington, DC, n.p.

4. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 31

2005), 577.

5. AF/A2, n.p.

6. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, A-6

7. Defense Intelligence Agency, Implementing Predictive Analysis Technology within DIA/DI, http://www.cia.ic.gov/ciau/ProliferationCatalog/

2006_proliferation_ training.pdf, n.p.

8. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 5

9. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.2, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance Operations, 80.

10. In JP 1-02, the air and space operations center is referred to

the Air Force air and space operations center and is defined as “the senior

agency of the Air Force component commander that provides command

and control of Air Force air and space operations and coordinates with

other components and Services.” See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary, 

11. White House, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 2002, 

12. Headquarters United States Air Force, Air Force Counter-Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive Master Plan, 30

June 2004, 1

13. Ibid

14. Executive Order 13328, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilit

of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 6 February

2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040206-

10.html (accessed 19 November 200

15. Ibid

16. Report to the President, 1

17. Ibid

18. Ibid

19. Ibid., 12

20. US House, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of December 2004, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 8 December 2004, n.

21. Report to the President, 

22. Ibid., 1

23. AF/A2, Compilation of MAJCOM SIO WMD Commission Report Feedback, n.p.

24. Ibid. This remark came from Pacific Air Forces.
27

25. Ibid. This remark came from Air Force Materiel Command.

26. Ibid. This remark came from Air Mobility Command.

27. Ibid. This remark came from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center.

28. Spin-up training is the formal or informal position training conducted once an individual reports for duty.

29. E-mail interviews conducted by author wtih Capt Stefanie S. Peterson, 18 November 2005; 2d Lt Sean R. Tucker, 15 November 2005; NC

15 November 2005; Maj James Gehringer, 2 December 2005; 1st Lt Ta

Silvio, 15 December 2005; Maj Lourdes Duvall, 10 February 2006;

MSgt Timothy Dukes, 14 February 200

30. Ibid.

31. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Community Proliferation

Training Catalog, 2006, available on JWICS, http://www.cia.ic.gov/ciau/

ProliferationCatalog/2006_proliferation_training.pdf.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Maj Lourdes Duvall, interview by the author, 10 February 200

36. Report to the President, 2–13

37. 17th Training Wing, Operations Intelligence Apprentice Plan of Instruction, 15 March 2005, 45; and 17th Training Wing, Intelligence Of

Plan of Instruction, 5 May 2004, 41

38. MSgt Timothy Dukes, 315th TRS/DOCB, interview by the author

16 February 2006

39. Enlisted Intelligence Course manager, interview by the author, 3

November 2005.

40. Col Patricia Coomber, PhD, senior military professor, Department

of Engineering Physics, Air Force Institute of Technology; interview by the

author by way of e-mail, 19 April 200

41. Sandi Zielinski, National Counterproliferation Center chief of staff

interview by the author, 13 February 200

42. Maj Tim West, AF/A2XFM, interview by the author by way of email, 3 October 2005.

43. Col Igor Gardner, 17th TRG/CC, “State of Your Schoolhouse 200

Building Future Intelligence Professionals” (address, Senior Intelligence

Officer Conference, Goodfellow AFB, TX, 2 November 2005).

44. White House, National Security Strategy, 17 September 2002, 

45. Headquarters United States Air Force, Air Force Counter-Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive (C-CBRNE) Master Plan, 30 June 2004, 

46. 17th Training Wing, Combat Targeting Course Plan of Instruction,

January 2004, 9 and 1

47. Col Barry R. Schneider, Counterforce Targeting Capabilities and 

Challenges, The Counterproliferation Papers: Future Warfare Series no.

22 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 2004), 2.

48. Maj Derek Gardner, interview by the author, 2 December 2005.

Capt Kasandra T. Traweek, interview by the author, 14 November 2005; 

Col Charles Owen, interview by the author, 5 December 2005; Capt Don

Jones, interview by the author, 16 February 2006; Capt Richard Glade, i
28

terview by the author, 16 February 2006; and Maj Will Hastings, intervi

by the author, 16 February 200

49. Maj Suzanna McNabb, AFPC/DPASA, interview by the author, 5

November 2005.

50. Lt Col Phillip Pratzner, 32d AOC/IRD, interview by the author, 4

December 2005.

51. Maj Derek Gardner, interview by the author, 2 December 2005

Capt Kasandra T. Traweek, interview by the author, 14 November 2005; 

Col Charles Owen, interview by the author, 5 December 2005; Capt Don

Jones, interview by the author, 16 February 2006; Capt Richard Glade, interview by the author, 16 February 2006; and Maj Will Hastings, inter

by the author, 16 February 200

52. Hastings, interview.

53. Gardner et al., interviews.

54. Capt Dana Laclair and Roy Langston, 315th TRS/DOBF, intervie

by the author, 3 November 2005.

55. Report to the President, 12–

56. Ibid., 25–26. Thermobaric weapons are high-temperature incendiary weapons that are designed to burn the chemical/biological agents in

storage areas. Agent-defeat weapons use nontraditional destruction mechanisms (such as puncturing agent canisters instead of blowing them up) to

minimize collateral damage.

57. Ibid., 24.

58. Capt Richard Glade, USSTRATCOM/J2223, interview by the author, 16 February 200

59. Report to the President, 366–90. The commission report also addresses open-source intelligence or OSINT. For the AF, OSINT is an essential part of all-source analysis, but it is not as robust as a separate AF

intelligence mission area and is therefore not included in this paper.

60. Department of Defense Dictionary, 245.

61. Report to the President, 

62. Ibid.

63. Deb Dewey, AF/A2XA, interview by the author, 15 February 200

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Department of Defense Dictionary, 330.

67. Report to the President, 376–77.

68. Ibid., 1

69. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “MASINT: The New Kid in Town,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14 (2001): 14

70. Department of Defense Dictionary, 488.

71. Mark W. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 65

72. Report to the President, 1

73. Department of Defense Dictionary, 250.

74. Report to the President, 1

75. Lowenthal, Intelligence, 63.

76. Report to the President, 1

77. Col Joe Pridotkas, NASIC/CC, interview by the author, 28 February 2006.
29

78. Report to the President, 1

79. Sandi Zielinski, National Counterproliferation Center chief of staff,

interview by the author, 13 February 200

80. Maj Brian Kravitz, 4th OSS/IN, interview by the author, 10 February 200

81. Ibid

82. Angleat Shelikoff, 86th FWS/OA, interview by the author, 8 February 2006.

83. Headquarters United States Air Force, Air Force C-CBRNE Master 

Plan, 30 June 2004, 1

84. Dave Coffey, Air Combat Command IS/FPI, interview by the author,

2 February 2006.

85. Col Michael Ainscough, MD, AF/CPC, interview by the author, 3

February 2006.

86. Coffey, interview.

87. Kravitz, interview; and Maj John Maneri, 20th OSS/IN, interview

by the author, 9 February 2006.

88. Report to the President, n.p.
Abbreviations

AF	 Air Force

AF/A2	 Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Air and Space Operations

AFB	 Air Force Base

AFIAA	 Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency

AFMIC	 Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

AIA	 Air Intelligence Agency

AIEET	 acquisition intelligence experience exchange

tour

AIS	 Air Intelligence Squadron

AOC	 air and space operations center

CAPS	 Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning

System

CBRN	 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE	 chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives

C-CBRNE Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-yield Explosive Master Plan

CIA	 Central Intelligence Agency

CTC	 Combat Targeting Course

DIA	 Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD	 Department of Defense

DTRA	 Defense Threat Reduction Agency

HPAC	 Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capacity

HUMINT	 human intelligence

IC	 Intelligence Community

IMEA	 Integrated Munitions Effect Assessment

IMINT	 imagery intelligence

IRTPA	 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act

ISR	 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JMEM	 Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

JWICS	 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

System

MASINT	 measurement and signature intelligence

NASIC	 National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NCPC	 National Counterproliferation Center

NRO	 National Reconnaissance Office

31
NSA	 National Security Agency

OSI	 Office of Special Investigations

SIGINT	 signals intelligence

TBM	 theater ballistic missile

TRG	 training group

TRS	 training squadron

TWG	 threat working group

USCENTCOM	 United States Central Command

WMD	 weapons of mass destruction

WMD/E	 weapons of mass destruction/effect

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