“Heads, Not Tails:” How Best To Engage Theater 

Ballistic Missiles? 

by 

Ronald C. Wiegand, Col, USAF 

February 2006 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 53 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 53 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 

author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. 

government or the Department of Defense (DOD). In accordance with Air 

Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 

U.S. government. 

ii
Contents

Page 

DISCLAIMER...................................................................II 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS................................................IV 

LIST OF TABLES..............................................................V 

ABSTRTACT..................................................................VI 

CHAPTER1 -- INTRODUCTION............................................1 

CHAPTER 2 -- BACKGROUND -- THREAT AND JOINT 

SYSTEMS........................................................................3 

CHAPTER 3 -- ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE 

SYSTEMS.......................................................................11 

CHAPTER 4 -- RE-EVALUATION OF BPI..............................17 

CHAPTER 5 -- PROPOSED AIR-LAUNCHED BPI WEAPONS 

SYSTEM.........................................................................27 

CHAPTER 6 -- PROPOSED CONOPS....................................35 

CHAPTER 7 -- CONCLUSIONS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................43 

APPENDIX A: GULF WAR SCUD FACTS (1990-91).................47 

APPENDIX B: GROWING BALLISITIC MISSILE 

CAPABILITY...................................................................49 

APPENDIX C: MISSILE DEFENSE TERMS............................51 

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................53 

END NOTES....................................................................59 

iii
Illustrations Page 

Figure 1 – MDA TMD Program Candidates and Engagement 

Envelope.....................................................................4 

Figure 2 – Large Theater with Geo-spearated ABL 

Orbits........................................................................9 

Figure 3 – Small Theater with Overlapping ABL 

Coverage....................................................................9 

Figure 4 – Layering Reduces Sensitiviy to Attack Size.............18 

Figure 5 – Ratio of Required Defender Inventory to Attack 

Size...........................................................................18 

Figure 6 – Layering Reduces Cost per Attacking 

Warhead.....................................................................19 

Figure 7 – Cost per Attacking Object is Sensitive to Probability to Kill 

(Pk)............................................................................20 

Figure 8 – Effect of Imperfect Kill Assessment........................21 

Figure 9 – Effect of Fractionation on the Optimal Allocation of 

Interceptors...................................................................21 

Figure 10 – Number of Surface-Based BPI Sites Needed for Full Coverage 

of Iran.........................................................................24 

Figure 11 – SBI Systems Needed for Full Coverage of North Korea and 

Iran.............................................................................25 

Figure 12 – IRST System Performance...................................29 

Figure 13 – BPI Missile Design Description.............................31 

Figure 14 – Sequence of Events Involved in Boost Phase 

Intercept........................................................................37 

iv
Tables 

Page 

Table 1. Tradeoffs between prefactionation defenses & 

midcourse/terminal defenses.....................................................23 

Table 2. Funding for MDA’s BDM system interceptor program, 2004 to 

2009............................................................................................26 

Table 3. Maximum kinematic range capabilities of BPI/API 

options..............................................................................30 

v
ABSTRACT 

Defending against theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

potentially carrying nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, requires 

100% effectiveness—anything less continues to afford our enemies 

weapons of mass effect. If the U.S. is to be successful in answering this 

threat, a re-evaluation of boost phase intercept (BPI) options is in order. 

This paper highlights the ballistic missile threat and joint defense systems; 

provides an assessment of those systems; re-evaluates BPI merits; and 

proposes a kinetic boost phase solution (with concept of operations) to 

bridge the potential fielding of space-base weapons. Early engagement 

provides better, faster, cheaper and less destabilizing missile defense 

capability. “Heads, not tails” sounds a call to the Missile Defense 

Agency, Strategic Command and all Services to commit to producing BPI 

capability (first kinetic, then directed energy), ahead of other systems and 

upgrades. 

vi
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

9/11 refocused the United States on defense. President Bush’s 

“axis of evil” description accurately drew a line between those states that 

would use or support the use of terrorism and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD), and those states that will not allow that threat to 

remain unanswered. History and future threat assessments all point to 

delivery of WMD by ballistic missiles. Defending against theater and 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (TBM/ICBM), potentially carrying 

nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, requires 100% effectiveness—

anything less continues to afford our enemies weapons of mass effect—

where panic and uncertainty magnify any destructive capability. If the 

U.S. is to be successful in answering this threat, a re-evaluation of boost 

phase intercept (BPI) options is in order. 

In 2003, the US officially withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic 

Missile Treaty in pursuit of a National Missile Defense (NMD). The 

architecture is based primarily on Army/Navy terminal and midcourse 

defense systems, augmented by Air Force BPI directed energy weapons, 

e.g., the Airborne Laser (ABL). Migration to space-based weapons and 

ground-based BPI kinetic energy weapons are planned. Although this 

approach is logical programmatically, it demands hundreds of billions of 

dollars, runs counter to Air Force global power force posture, and delivers 

too little defense, too late (2020 and beyond). Current acquisition 

strategies are attacking this combat deficiency from the tail rather than 

head-on, and recently, seem more focused on the easier and less likely 

threat of ICBMs. The TBM threat is global. It is the more compelling 

ballistic missile threat to the U.S., its allies, and its national interests. It is 

technically more difficult to counter due to: compressed engagement 

timelines inherent to shorter range missiles, and detection and tracking 

problems associated with the large numbers of tactically mobile weapons 

available to both nation states and terrorist groups. The Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) must completely address the theater challenges if it ever 

hopes to have a truly effective national missile defense. 

Although, America and our allies can applaud the technical 

progress of the last decade, the ballistic missile threat remains largely 

unanswered. It appears the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review will slowly 

deliver the death knell to the airborne laser. The Air Force’s ability to 

fulfill its assigned boost phase mission is again in jeopardy. The gap 

1
between capability and national strategy just got more pronounced. 

President Bush introduces the National Security Strategy with this 

statement, 

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads 

of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly 

declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, 

and evidence indicates that they are doing so with 

determination. The United States will not allow these 

efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic 

missiles and other means of delivery.1 

A critical capability to effectively counter this growing “crossroad” threat 

describes boost phase intercept. 

This paper advocates a re-evaluation of BPI options to secure an 

air-launched kinetic energy weapon capability within five years. 

Specifically, it sounds a call to MDA, Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 

and all Services to commit to producing BPI capability (first kinetic, then 

directed energy), ahead of other systems and upgrades. This paper will 

highlight the ballistic missile threat and joint defense systems; provide an 

assessment of current NMD systems and deficiencies; re-evaluate BPI 

merits; and propose a kinetic boost phase solution with concept of 

operations (CONOPS) to bridge the potential fielding of space-base 

weapons. The compulsory tasks to achieve BPI will require national 

determination analogous to our pursuit to walk on the moon, where 

Yankee ingenuity and drive prevailed. Negating the effects of this global 

TBM threat is a constitutional imperative, for it forms the foundation for 

an effective national missile defense. 

2
Chapter 2 

Background—Threats and Joint Systems 

The Scud was a clumsy, obsolete Soviet missile...in the grand scheme of 

warfare, a mosquito. However, the Scud was effective as a terror weapon 

against civilian populations. General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t 

Take a Hero

The U.S. and Coalition forces were far from effective in 

neutralizing the first Gulf War TBM threat. More accurate performance, 

saturation attacks, or even a single WMD impact would have tainted and 

delayed our victory, or even “made it virtually impossible for us to resist 

an enemy offensive or mount an effective counterattack.” 2 Appendix A 

highlights our Gulf War Scud experiences. That was nearly fifteen years 

ago, and yet it came as a surprise—despite the fact that tens of thousands 

of V-1 “buzz bombs” and V-2 ballistic missiles were launched against the 

allies by the Germans over 60 years ago. 

The more pertinent questions now are how has the threat evolved 

since the Gulf War and how is it likely to be employed? The majority of 

the world’s TBMs are in the 300-600 km range class. North Korea, 

China, and the former Soviet states are the largest exporters. Nondemocratic clientele such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and the potential 

for Venezuela to emerge as a rogue state, reflect national security 

concerns. There are four tendencies in TBM development: greater range 

(in excess of 1000 km), much greater accuracy, multiple warheads/decoys, 

and proliferation of WMD. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, 

25 countries have, or may have, TBMs with mass destruction capability,3

and the Rumsfield report states 15 nations have ICBMs.4

 Appendix B 

provides a depiction of this growing ballistic missile threat. The imminent 

threat is not so much the missiles themselves, but rather, the proliferation 

of WMD warheads and those that fractionate (split into multiple submunitions) prior to apogee. 

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), predecessor 

to the MDA, was established to manage and integrate the individual 

Service’s active defense programs into an effective missile defense 

capability.5

 Figure 1 provides an excellent overview of the entire theater 

engagement envelope and common active missile defense terms (also 

listed in Appendix C). 

3
 

Figure 1.

6

 MDA TMD Program Candidates and Engagement 

Envelope 

This chapter will review each phase of intercept (terminal—“the tail”, 

midcourse, and boost phase—“the head”) and the associated weapon 

systems—some of which are fielded and others of which are in various 

stages of development—and , lastly sound a renewed call for a kinetic 

solution. 

The emerging, and often asymmetric, world powers are gaining 

ICBM technologies in the “econo” version. The defense investment 

strategies of these countries are not slanted to the glamour of fighters, 

rather to the practicality of TBMs and cruise missiles. Additionally, 

transnational terrorist organizations are openly pursuing this same TBM 

and WMD capability. In today’s plausible scenarios, the terminal defense 

approach can be easily overwhelmed with saturation, decoys, and 

countermeasures, and thus is woefully inadequate—it kills too few, too 

late. Our National Security Strategy reflects a belief that our national 

interests are more likely to be threatened by regional conflicts and 

terrorism, than by a direct military conflict with one of the major world 

powers. How to prevent and/or respond to regional TBM escalation is a 

prerequisite building block to a viable missile defense at home and abroad. 

The only success in halting ballistic missile launches in WW II and 

the Gulf War was to overrun the launch site on the ground with ground 

forces—air attack proved completely ineffective. Since occupying 

territory at the initial phase of conflict is unrealistic, ballistic missiles have 

to be dealt with in flight. The correct means to counter a TBM attack that 

attempts to overwhelm a defensive architecture is defense in depth. “The 

4
1999 Defend America Act requires a missile defense deployment to be 

augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more 

sophisticated threats.”7 Commonly referred to as “shoot-look-shoot,” 

defense in depth provides multiple opportunities to negate the TBM, 

thereby statistically increasing the probability of kill (Pk), and forces the 

enemy to develop multiple countermeasures. “TBMs should be engaged 

by all means available throughout their entire flight profile.”8 All TBM 

launches must be detected, each missile tracked, identified as a hostile 

threat, successfully engaged, and this information shared with all 

Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to determine battle damage assessment and 

the need for subsequent engagements. 

Building multi-layered missile defense capability is a joint 

endeavor and paramount to victory. Ballistic Missile Defense 

Organization (BMDO) took the approach to begin acquisition of systems 

with low-to-moderate development risk (Army terminal and Navy 

midcourse systems), versus perceived higher technical risk (Air Force BPI 

systems).9 BMDO’s FY1994-99 investment resulted in $12-14 billion for 

terminal defense and less than $100 million for boost phase.10 In July 

2001, Lt Gen Kadish, MDA Director, introduced the Bush 

administration’s missile defense plan, which requested significant funding 

increases, announced withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile 

defense focused on development of a “layered” capability, and introduced 

an evolutionary untried open-ended acquisition process to “deal with 

unprecedented technical challenges” that will “deploy over time different 

combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our national 

strategic objectives.”11 Starting in 2002, much of the program 

performance specifics became classified; therefore, the following 

discussions only draw data from open sources. The FY2003 MDA budget 

increased to $7.6 billion; FY2004 to $9.1 billion; FY2005 to $9.95 billion; 

and most recently, the House approved $8.58 billion for FY2006.12 The 

following provides a brief description of where the money was invested 

and the resulting fielded capability. Chapter 3 will provide an analysis of 

this “evolving” missile defense architecture. The official www.mda.mil

web site provides an excellent unclassified source of systems, progress, 

and issues. 

 In the words of former Air Force Chief of Staff, General 

Fogleman, terminal defense uses “the catcher’s mitt approach”—the 

enemy pitches, we catch. The window of terminal engagement of 

warheads and decoys falling back into the atmosphere is 30 to 60 seconds. 

5
The kill mechanism is a kinetic hit to kill—a “bullet hitting a bullet.” 

MDA terminal defense systems currently include the following systems. 

1. Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) is an 

improvement to the Patriot radar and missile system. It 

provides improved acquisition, identification, lethality, and 

an expanded engagement envelope. It is predominantly a 

point defense capability, i.e., defends a city, base or limited 

operating area. By May 2002, PAC-3 had successfully 

intercepted and destroyed 12 of 13 targets.13 Initial 

operational capability occurred in late FY2002 and was 

fully operational in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The 

Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Israel, and Taiwan are in 

various stages of upgrading their Patriot missiles. South 

Korea and Italy are considering pursuing a similar 

capability. Much of the PAC-3 technical success was built 

on a joint U.S. and Israel venture, which resulted in 

fielding of the Israeli Arrow missile defense system in 

2000. 

2. Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) uses 

large ground-based phased array radar to short and medium 

range ballistic missiles both inside and just outside of the 

atmosphere. The first successful tests occurred in the 

summer of 1999; fielding is planned for FY2007-08.14 It 

is air transportable, has a 40-missile capability, and 

provides for greater area defense than the PAC-3. 

3. The proposed Medium Extended Air-Defense System 

(MEADS) is a cooperative effort with Germany and Italy to 

provide limited and mobile area defense for an Army corps 

or vital assets. It will eventually replace the aging HAWK 

air defense system and leverages the PAC-3 missile. Initial 

planned deployment dates were FY2009, but will likely slip 

or be replaced by PAC-3 outright. 

4. In December 2001, DOD cancelled the Navy Area 

Defense program, citing poor performance, significant 

overruns, and development delays.15

 Midcourse is designed to extend the engagement envelope to 

intercept ballistic missiles during their ascent and exo-atmospheric 

descent. Midcourse provides the longest engagement window, up to 20 

minutes for some ICBMs. Ascent engagement is preferred over terminal 

6
defense due to engagement prior to deployment of countermeasures or 

multiple warheads. 

 

1. The AEGIS/Standard Missile (SM-3) combination is a 

surveillance improvement to the SPY-1 radar and tailors 

the SM-3 to support mid-course intercept of short and 

medium range ballistic missiles. The first successful test 

occurred in 2002 and is slated to have a contingency 

capability in FY2005-06.16 Missile speed enhancements 

(from the current 3 kilometers per second (km/s) 

capability, to 4.5 km/s and eventually 6.5 km/s) are being 

explored to support engagement of ICBMs.17 

2. The Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) will use 

ground-based interceptors to defend the U.S. from a limited 

ICBM attack. It uses the AEGIS SPY-1 radar, a new XBand phased array radar and leverages future space sensor 

capability. In FY2004 deployment began of the Pacific 

Missile Defense Testbed, consisting of GMD interceptors 

at Ft. Greeley, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

California; up to 20 AEGIS/SM-3; X-Band radar at 

Shemya, Alaska; and dedicated Pacific Command PAC-3 

systems.18 As of October 2005, nine GMD interceptors are 

deployed. Recent test failures have curtailed further 

deployments. 

The boost phase is defined from ballistic missile launch until it stops 

accelerating under its own power. It is the most forward-based defense. 

The engagement window varies proportionately based on the ballistic 

missile range, anywhere from 20 seconds up to 5 minutes. General 

Fogleman stated, “Developing the capability to destroy a ballistic missile 

in the boost phase is vital...TBMs are best targeted in the boost phase 

when they are large (intact missile with a very large infrared signature), 

vulnerable, and highly stressed targets.”19 Intercepting a missile in boost 

phase is the “ideal” solution; a large area can be defended and negates 

most countermeasures.20 It is also the most technically challenging 

mission. MDA is currently pursuing two parallel development courses 

(directed and kinetic energy). 

1. ABL is a potentially lethal directed energy BPI 

system—our country's first airborne “death ray.” It also 

provides risk mitigation for MDA’s long-term vision of 

7
space based lasers with relay mirrors. ABL’s infrared 

sensor suite will track theater missiles from launch (after 

clearing the cloud deck) until booster cutoff, with a full 360 

degrees of coverage.21 It will use a high-energy chemical 

oxygen iodine laser mounted on a modified 747-400 

freighter. After extensive distributed simulation studies, 

the laser turret was determined to be best placed on the 

nose of the 747 to afford the greatest weapons engagement 

zone and minimize airflow distortions while lazing. The 

ABL will fire a 5-10 second burst of its megawatt laser to 

impart enough energy on the booster to heat, deform, or 

create structural failure of a vulnerable component.22 In 

engineering terms, the laser must place sufficient fluence 

(joules/cm2

) or irradiance (watts/ cm2) on a one centimeter 

to more than ten centimeter area (target dependent) to 

inflict lethal damage.23 

ABL (YAL-1A) testing was originally to culminate 

in 2003, with initial capability by 2009, and a fleet of seven 

by 2011.24 Although this program continues to make 

substantial strides, its history is replete with delays. 

Chapter 3 will cover persistent challenges to this schedule. 

Of the seven modified aircraft, five will be available for 

operational duty at any given time. This will support only 

one major regional conflict at a time. During a normal 12- 

to 18-hour mission, the ABL will carry sufficient laser fuel 

for 30-40 engagements.25 Effective ranges vary from 200-

400 km, depending on the source quoted. Designed 

operating altitude requirement is 40,000 to 45,000 ft to 

provide 90% probability of having clear line-of-sight. 

Employment is expected to be that typical of other high 

value airborne assets—orbiting around 100 km from enemy 

lines; however, excursions into enemy territory have not 

been ruled out since it packs its own weapon. Below are 

two figures depicting two orbit employments: 

 

 

8
Figure 2. Large Theater with Geographically Separated ABL 

Orbits26

 

Figure 3. Small Theater with Overlapping ABL Coverage 27

The Missile Defense Agency’s newest system is the Kinetic Energy 

Interceptors (KEI). It will be worldwide transportable via C-17s and fired 

from mobile launchers, with full testing scheduled in FY2010-12.28

9
Additionally, MDA plans to integrate the missile into a sea-based 

capability. The $4 billion program (over eight years) is aimed at ICBM 

boost phase capability, with objective aims at also providing some ascent 

mid-course capability. Technological advances in developing 6 km/s 

propulsion capability are showing promise. 

To summarize MDA’s first decade of investment and fielding, 

much progress was made in numerous areas. Essentially, PAC-3 is the 

most mature system and provides worldwide deployable limited point 

defense against TBMs. However, it cannot address ICBMs. AEGIS/SM3 is on the brink of providing our first mid-course engagement capability. 

Declaration of initial operational capability for GMD, signaling the 

beginning of a national defense against the accidental or limited ICBM 

attack, is expected within the next couple of years. All other programs are 

at varying stages of developing or maturing the vast array of needed 

technologies. Kinetic energy weapons are faring better than directed 

energy or space-based solutions. It is a case of reaping ripe technological 

fruit versus genetically engineering the fruit of the future. Persistent 

research and development over time, combined with acquisition of the 

best, will produce an effective national missile defense architecture. The 

realist view is “despite the progress in ballistic missile defense since 1993, 

the U.S. is still years away from effective defenses against a robust threat 

in either national or theater defense.”29 The author’s view is that the 

MDA’s multi-layered and flexible acquisition approach is sound but could 

greatly benefit from a re-evaluation of boost phase options to produce a 

more effective, efficient defense against the more likely TBM threat. An 

assessment of current systems will lead us back to the BPI debate—its 

remaining challenges and significant benefits. “Heads, not tails” is where 

the focus should be. Early engagement provides better, faster, cheaper, 

and less destabilizing missile defense capability. 

10
Chapter 3 

Assessment of Current Missile Defense Systems 

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of 

war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur. 

Giulo Douhet

Currently funded programs are inadequate in addressing today’s 

TBM/WMD threat. The three Army programs (Patriot, THAAD and 

MEADS) are greatly improving our terminal defenses. The Patriot PAC-3 

upgrade improved the sensor, command and control, and missile. The 

fielded result is a larger engagement envelope and improved lethality, 

which sufficiently addresses shortfalls in Gulf War performance. 

Additionally, the Patriot system retains its ability to provide simultaneous 

point defense of enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and TBMs, but full 

missile defense capability requires placing the weapons system in a TBMonly mode. Even with the marked improvements, the Patriot and its 

Israeli counterpart, the Arrow, have inherent limitations. 

To be effective, terminal point defense systems must be prepositioned to protect vital assets/areas in those regions of concern to U.S. 

national security interests. If not, they will be late to need. This constant 

presence on foreign soil has enormous political and fiscal costs, both to 

the U.S. and its allies. This issue also fuels al Qaeda’s justification 

rhetoric of a “defensive jihad.” Constant in-theater deployment also runs 

counter to long-term U.S. military strategy to lessen our “deployed 

footprint,” while being able to project power globally. Additionally, there 

are an inadequate number of terminal defense systems available to protect 

the number of civil and military targets likely to be targeted by an enemy. 

A reliance on terminal defenses implies an “acceptable sacrifice” 

mentality—we can’t defend everything, therefore, we protect what we 

“think” is most important. Therein lies the very strength of a TBM—

military significance has little bearing on effectiveness. The first TBM 

that is successful in threatening life represents a victory. CNN won’t 

portray the dead and wounded, nor will the populace view themselves as 

an “acceptable sacrifice.” Israeli missile defense expert Arieh Stav goes 

even further, to state, 

Arrow is a strategic failure, both conceptually and 

operationally... historical evidence indicates that it 

accelerated the regional TBM/WMD arms race, 

11
undermined Israeli Defense Forces pre-emptive deterrence 

doctrine and cannot achieve the theoretical 99.9% 

effectiveness rates...leakers are likely due to cheap and 

easy deception means available to the enemy.30 

Terminal defense is a legitimate layer in aerospace defense. Its primary 

purpose was and should be to deal with the occasional “leaker,” not the 

foundation of our missile defense. 

Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) addresses some of the 

limitations of Patriot, but still falls short of negating either the political or 

military threat of TBMs. It targets ballistic missiles exclusively; it can’t 

engage aircraft or cruise missiles. Its expanded engagement envelope will 

provide selective “area defense" and limited shoot-look-shoot capability. 

Imagine an umbrella over a city, with Patriot being a subset bubble over a 

specific high value asset. THAAD protects more but still requires prepositioning and sufficient numbers and has a much larger logistic footprint 

than Patriot. It can be deployed two ways—over the high value area or 

forward deployed to extend engagement ranges. Forward deployment is 

doctrinally sound because it contributes to a multi-layered defense. While 

the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) will help share the 

burden of defending Europe and ensure interoperability, it remains caught 

in transatlantic politics, and if fielded, retains the same inherent 

operational limitations stated above. A terminal defense strategy alone 

cannot counter saturation attacks, fractionated warheads, decoys, and 

WMD. Our enemies’ defense investment strategies prove they 

understand this weakness—TBM and countermeasure proliferation 

continue at an alarming pace. Appendix B depicts a 2004 global ballistic 

missile snapshot.31 

Terminal defense against ICBMs is even more problematic. 

The first problem associated with (terminal defense) 

interception of nuclear missiles is the question of 

interception altitude. Less than 10 km would cause great 

damage on the ground, similar to that of a hit made by the 

nuclear warhead itself. Above 40 km would likely create 

an electro magnetic pulse (EMP)...paralyzing all the 

communications systems and electronic systems above 

ground...finally, an enemy may choose to overwhelm a 

defense by deploying large numbers of false targets.32 

12
This fact leads us to MDA’s ramped-up emphasis, since 2001, on 

midcourse phase capability. GMD fielding in Alaska and California is the 

benefactor of this focus. Despite the huge technological progress made to 

date, MDA would be the first to admit this represents an infant’s step 

towards strategic missile defense. Withholding an initial operational 

capability declaration and calling it a Pacific Missile Defense Testbed 

speaks volumes of its not fully tested capability. The bottom line is that 

full deployment was necessary to conduct realistic testing of the entire 

system. The secondary benefit is the world sees some NMD capability, 

but of undeterminable quality. Only Russia and China have the ability to 

attack the U.S. with ICBMs, and current politics make that an unlikely 

scenario. So why the apparent full-court press on fielding Ground-based 

Missile Defense (GMD)? 

There are three primary drivers. First, a 2001 Presidential mandate 

eliminating distinctions between theater and national missile defense 

called for a single integrated system, capable of intercepting missiles of 

any range at every stage of flight.33 Prior to 2004, fielded capability was 

only terminal defense and only addressed the theater threat. GMD 

provided a new and very visible step towards midcourse and strategic 

defense. Second, is the potential deterrent value to those countries 

ascribing to join the “ICBM Club.” However, even if time proves this 

strategy was effective in containing proliferation of the ICBM threat to 

U.S. territory, it will undoubtedly drive our enemies to greater regional 

TBM capability and thus threaten our national interests abroad. This is 

the paradox of attacking missile defense from the tail towards the head. 

Third, ground- based sensors, C2, interceptors, and kinetic kill vehicles 

(KKVs) provide the most fertile development and test environment to 

enable accelerated migration to sea, air and space. This last contribution 

will be the most valuable to all missile defense capabilities. 

AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense addresses the theater midcourse 

layer and will be a welcomed addition to the NMD architecture. It will 

provide a rapidly deployable and mobile defense for coastal areas and 

island/peninsula nations. In addition to the expanded protection area it 

provides over terminal defense systems, it offers a more palatable basing 

solution to our allies and our enemies and is well-suited to existing Navy 

missions. It shares the same limitations of terminal defense: possible 

warhead fall-out in friendly territory, and intercept after fractionation. 

Destroying one out of 10 sub-munitions or even destroying 30% isn’t 

close to the requirement. To combat these deficiencies, AEGIS BMD and 

GMD should serve as the catalyst to developing: faster 

booster/interceptors which better address the range of threats and launch 

13
profiles; more discriminatory engagement of threat warheads through 

better sensors and battle management algorithms; and production of a 

multi- kill vehicle system.34 All are needed, but technology maturation is 

conservatively 10 or more years, given what is already on MDA’s plate. 

 “A successful BPI campaign eases the requirements placed on a 

terminal missile defense system and provides an answer to many of the 

measures an enemy can adopt in order to counter terminal defenses.”35 

The Air Force signaled acceptance of the boost phase mission by making 

ABL a major acquisition program in 1996. At that time, airborne directed 

energy weapons were believed to be ten years in the making. At 20 years, 

lazing should be sized to support UAV concepts, and at 30 years a “Foto 

fighter” and realization of a space-based Global Precision Optical Weapon 

may be possible.36 This vision is proving difficult to implement. 

Although the airborne laser program continues to make substantial strides, 

its history is replete with technical delays and cost overruns. In all 

fairness to ABL, the technology required is of unprecedented quantity, 

complexity and quality, and most freely acknowledged, the program was 

underbid. Those closest to the challenges always believed the initial 

capability would be $2 billion, not the $1 billion wickered into the DOD 

budget. Some early budget-driven design decisions, such as choosing the 

747, which flies too fast and too low, have complicated the technical 

challenges exponentially. Consequently, ABL repeatedly draws the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) eye. In 2002 the GAO identified six 

critical technologies that remain immature. 

1. Devices that stabilize the laser system aboard the 

aircraft (the removal of laser beam jitter, caused by 

vibration in flight). 

2. Optics—mirrors and windows—that focus and control 

the laser beam inside the aircraft. 

3. Optical coatings that enhance the optics’ ability to pass 

and reflect laser energy. 

4. Target tracking hardware and software that involves 

integrating and synchronizing three lasers (range finder, 

target acquisition, and directed energy weapon laser). 

5. Measuring and compensating for atmospheric 

turbulence, which scatters and weakens the laser beam. 

6. Emergency laser shut-off safety systems (toxic 

chemicals and plasma heat dissipation).37

The last couple of years narrowed the challenges down somewhat, but 

a few significant obstacles remain. 

14
1. Target tracking—the beacon laser must not only track 

the ballistic missile, it must track the nose cone and 

maintain discrimination of all missile parts. Due to 

atmospheric disruption, it is equivalent to trying to “bird 

watch from underwater.” 

2. The 747 is a suboptimal platform, as previously stated. 

Compensating for the inherent shock wave off the nose 

turret continues to plague the laser performance. A 

compromise is to fly slower, but the cost is decreased 

altitude of 38,500 ft, and thus another atmospheric impact 

on laser power. 

3. Integrating optics with the airframe is exceptionally 

challenging. The resonator must be developed for up to 11 

inches of random flex from one end of the aircraft to the 

other.38 

In 2004, the ABL program office deferred purchase of the second 

aircraft and pursued a more knowledge-based approach to development.39 

 The operational utility also is in question. The $11 billion program 

will only produce seven aircraft; it would take 14 ABLs to cover two 

major regional conflicts. Five airplanes constantly in theater make 

training and testing with other assets in the states impossible. One issue 

that cannot be minimized is the logistics tail and the unique complexities 

of supporting laser weapons/fuels in various overseas operating locations. 

At present, that is not covered in the bill or in the CONOPS. 

Even if all the technology design specifications are reached, there 

remain the significant shortcomings of directed energy weapons, whether 

they are airborne or space-based. They do not necessarily kill the warhead 

and are susceptible to simple countermeasures. The ABL is not designed 

to kill the warhead due to lazing fuel conservation (platform weight 

limited). Rather, it targets a classified aim point on the booster to create 

the fastest killing fluence. The explosions caused from igniting fuel under 

pressure are certain to be spectacular, but the warhead is tossed down 

track in a random, distorted ballistic path. This is why the real 

engagement envelope and standoff ranges will be critical measurements of 

effectiveness. Additionally, responsive threats that use composite 

hardening, missile rotation (spinning bullet), or surface reflectivity 

enhancements will increase the fluence requirements two to tenfold, 

thereby decreasing ABL’s engagement range and number of shots 

available in one sortie.40 The only counter to these enemy tactics is more 

ABLs. As a high value asset, it will require dedicated fighter protection 

with tanker support and/or significant countermeasures to ensure freedom 

15
to operate. The lumbering 747 and huge heat signature when lazing make 

ABL a lucrative and easy target. Overall, ABL offers a legitimate BPI 

capability to engage some ballistic missiles over enemy territory. 

However, technology maturation and insufficient numbers hinder overall 

effectiveness of this boost phase solution. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense 

Review basically continues suspension of an Air Force production 

decision, and thus, MDA must make hard investment decisions. We are at 

a “tipping point” for boost phase solutions. Although this paper 

unequivocally advocates for kinetic boost phase solutions first, it is critical 

that we do not throw out the directed energy baby with the bath water. 

ABL and its team of experts are not easily reconstituted. Continued 

airborne research and development are essential to achieving directed 

energy migration to space and ground-based systems. 

The newest MDA boost phase pursuit is Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI). It is promising, and combined with midcourse solutions, will 

accelerate development of kinetic boost phase capabilities. It is designed 

to counter the ICBM threat, and thus will require securing of basing rights 

from our allies and integrating this into a sea-based system. Ability to 

counter regional TBM threat will require modification of design and 

CONOPS. Any further assessment would be premature. 

Assessments of the current NMD architecture range from sobering to 

steadily improving. In the 60 years since the V-2 first threatened our 

interests, we managed to field a limited point defense capability with its 

well-documented limitations. To its credit, MDA advanced many 

enabling technologies, and since 2001, more equally embraced all phases 

of ballistic missile threat. As a result, our missile defense potential is 

improving but still falls short in leveraging all that boost phase brings to 

the requirement and addressing the more likely threat—TBMs. 

Specifically, the hope of countering ICBMs with KEI and the uncertain, 

extended future of ABL leave the boost phase equation stagnated and our 

theater defenses hollow. Our nation needed, and still needs, a true kinetic 

theater BPI capability. 

16
Chapter 4 

Re-evaluation of BPI 

The previous chapters provided background, system descriptions, and 

capability assessment of ballistic missile kill capabilities. This chapter 

will borrow from two studies, one done by the RAND Corporation in 1994 

and another from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 2004. The 

purpose is to convince MDA, Congress, and warfighters that the boost 

phase layer is the most critical and efficient layer of defense. Given the 

persistent challenges of directed energy, the subsequent chapters will 

propose air-launched kinetic BPIs be developed and fielded as the number 

one MDA acquisition priority. 

The RAND study focused on determining the optimal allocation of 

resources for multi-layered TMD and addressed two critical elements for 

military and political strategists. First, it provided a valid methodology to 

assess theater candidate systems to determine the most cost-effective 

combination and where additional capability would produce the quickest 

increase in Pk of incoming TBMs. Second, it offered unequivocal proof of 

the boost phase layer’s premium value. RAND’s principal cost drivers 

should be applied to current MDA acquisition plans to prioritize 

investment towards kinetic BPI accordingly. Highlighted below are the 

simple, apolitical, non-parochial “missile defense economics” truths that 

point to the correct military solution both in dollars and lethality. 

1. Figure 4 illustrates that a single layered strategy, i.e., 

present terminal defense, requires three times more 

interceptors than a two layer (add true midcourse), and 

four times more than a three layer (add boost phase) 

TMD architecture.41 

17
Figure 4. Layering Reduces Sensitivity to Attack Size42

2. The preceding ratio is quite insensitive to the total number of 

attacking TBMs for two- and three-layered TMD systems (Figure 

5). Given a 50% Pk, it takes 15 friendly interceptors in a singlelayered defense, whereas it takes 3 interceptors per attacking 

object for three-layered defenses. Two layers are 3.5 times more 

Figure 5. Ratio of Required Defender Inventory to Attack Sizes43 

efficient. Three layers are 5 times more efficient. 

3. The size of a TMD inventory necessary to achieve a demanded 

probability of no “leakers” is highly sensitive to the existence of 

multiple look-shoot opportunities or engagement layers (Figure 6). 

Current MDA core systems require a tactical C2&ISR choice to 

determine which system (Navy or Army) will engage each 

incoming target based on geography. Any subsequent 

18
engagements would be limited to PAC-3 batteries firing, if selfdefense criteria were met. True shoot-look-shoot re-engagement 

options require engaging a ballistic missile in different parts of its 

flight profile. “Multiple layers can dramatically reduce the size of 

the inventory of interceptors required to achieve a stated level of 

outcome—and all other things being equal, the more layers, the 

greater the reduction in cost.”44 An architecture built upon 

terminal defense is impractical, while a boost phase foundation 

provides the greatest efficiency. 

Figure 6. Layering Reduces Cost per Attacking Warhead45

4. In the case of WMD, the demand for no “leakers” increases. 

Effectiveness can be achieved at a relatively small increase in 

expected total system cost, if a complete three-layered architecture 

is pursued.46 Figure 7 reveals two important things. First, it takes 

less than one additional interceptor per attacking object to raise the 

probability of no “leakers” from 18% to 94%.47 This is critical 

justification for getting appropriate multi-layered interceptor 

strengths. There are two ways to buy this efficiency—buy more 

missiles or buy look-shoot-look-shoot opportunities. BPI provides 

both. Buying an 18% solution, when the 94% solution is within 

reach is analogous to “terminal” myopia. Current strategies reflect 

the “acceptable sacrifice” mentality. The U.S. need not sacrifice 

the protection of its people and interests when the solution is both 

possible and affordable. Second, fielding the most lethal 

interceptors is tactically smart, technically possible, and fiscally 

19
imperative. An interceptor Pk improvement of 50% to 75 % cuts 

the number of interceptors required by half. 

Figure 7. Cost per Attacking Object is Sensitive to Probability 

of Kill (Pk)

48 

5. Perfect kill assessment is desired because it saves money. 

Engagement deconfliction is required between all Service systems 

to prevent lingering debris and wasting interceptors on the same 

targets, or those that have already been neutralized. It is important 

to note that kill assessment requires time—shoot, interceptor fly 

out, impact, determine need to shoot again—and decide which 

TMD asset to commit next. In the current proposed architecture, 

this kill assessment time element will be extremely difficult to 

achieve (it requires an ascent or near apogee first intercept). 

Therefore, to achieve the desired Pk, these terminal defense 

systems will have to shoot salvos, thus driving up the costs. Figure 

8 depicts this relationship. 

20
Figure 8. The Effects of Imperfect Kill Assessment49

6. Because fractionating warheads and the use of decoys 

complicate post-fractionation defenses, BPI provides the largest 

payoff. Figure 9 depicts the optimal allocation of TMD 

interceptors against a potential TBM threat capable of fractionated 

warheads. 

Figure 9. Effect of Fractionation on Interceptor Allocation to 

TMD Layers50 

Understanding this paradigm is critical. Investment in responsive 

BPI can create exponential savings by reducing the numbers of 

terminal and midcourse defenses. Overseas pre-positioning of 

21
these defenses is thus minimized. The terminal defense and 

midcourse layers are crucial, but in the right number. Without 

BPI, the U.S. cannot afford the number of defenses required. With 

BPI, it won’t have to place national interests in the “acceptable 

sacrifice” category. 

7. All defenses have a saturation point. The key to a sound joint 

acquisition strategy is to field a system of the right composition 

and right numbers, so as to exceed the enemy’s ability to 

overwhelm it. The number of variables is staggering, but the 

ultimate limitation is always money. The problem of saturation is 

always felt most in the last layer of defense. If the prior layers 

don’t meet their Pk expectations, the subsequent layers may run out 

of interceptors or opportunities to engage every target.51 

Defending against saturation is always best done at the source of 

the threat, especially for ballistic missiles carrying sub-munitions 

that will fractionate soon after booster engine cutoff. Additionally, 

during the boost phase, the TBM does not have much down range 

movement; thus, once successfully engaged by a BPI, any 

remaining debris falls on enemy terrain and does not pose followon targeting problems for midcourse or terminal defenses. Lastly, 

BPI provides the most effective defense against an electro 

magnetic pulse (EMP) attack. “An EMP attack is potentially the 

most devastating one against the U.S. or an ally, producing 

catastrophic effects for which there is no consequence 

management... It could render useless all non-hardened electronic 

components over the target area, reducing it to the equivalent of an 

early 19th century society.”52

8. If terminal defense weapons engagement zone “footprints” 

don’t overlap, it is equivalent to giving the enemy fractionated 

warheads.53 Statistically, more interceptors have to be allocated to 

the previous layers. Overlapping coverage in each layer is 

essential, but most important for terminal defenses. Such coverage 

is mandatory for the system to be fully effective. 

 9. Buy-in costs to different systems directly affect acquisition 

strategy, hence the ABL decision in the mid-90s. The actual 

hardware costs, the number of expected attacking objects, the 

availability of the technology, the overseas logistical footprint, and 

the number of people required are but a few of the factors to 

consider when comparing buy-in costs. MDA’s charter is to 

negate the threat; therefore, this is the most significant 

consideration for determining buy-in costs. If we can’t defend 

22
against fractionation and WMD, then our theater missile defenses 

are ineffective. “Accordingly, fielding the pre-fractionation boost 

phase layer, even in the presence of a large buy-in cost, represents 

a large savings in expected total resources.”54 AEGIS BMD, KEI, 

and GMD advancements have outpaced ABL, and the investment 

equation now favors kinetic BPI. 

To further illustrate the implications of these truths, consider a threat 

consisting of 51 TBMs, each with 10 sub-munitions, and a theater 

commander requirement of >90% Pk 

Table 1. Prefactionation Defenses versus Midcourse/terminal 

Defenses55

that no operational weapons impact on friendly soil. Midcourse and 

terminal defenses have a proven 50% probability of kill at $7 million for 

each engagement. Perfect kill assessment is possible but is not currently 

funded. Boost phase options exist but require further development. Table 

1 depicts the tradeoffs. The maximum savings ($9.3 billion) for this case 

is achieved by investing heavily in the pre-fractionation (boost phase) 

defenses—kill more, sooner, and with less. 

The CBO study concentrates on boost phase alternatives to counter 

ICBMs; however, it provides great insights into requirements for boost 

phase, MDA’s FY2004-09 budget, and the challenges of space-based 

defenses. The analysis data is based on the Iran and North Korea securing 

ICBM capability. Countering the long-standing TBM threat would seem a 

more prudent approach to realizing anti-ICBM capability ahead of an 

enemy’s potential fielding of ICBMs. 

23
Boost phase is the most time compressed engagement problem. In 

the case of ICBMs, two factors drive the number of BPIs required to 

effectively provide area coverage. First is fuel type of the threat ICBM. 

Liquid-fuel boosters burn longer than solid fuel boosters. Second is the 

interceptor speed requirement as a function of commit time. Figure 10 

depicts that solid fuel ICBMs will require roughly twice as many 

interceptor sites to cover Iran, and BPI speeds of 8-10 km/s will be 

required. 

Figure 10. Number of Surface-based BPI Sites for Full Coverage of 

Iran56

TBMs are currently all liquid-fuel, but the trend will be towards solid fuel, 

so the problem isn’t going to get easier over time. Combining other data 

covered in the next chapter, current air launched BPI speed requirements 

are 2-4 km/s minimum, with 4-6 km/s desired, and 6-8 km/s required in 

the future. Figure 11 provides a similar comparison for Space Based 

Interceptors (SBIs). 

24
Figure 11. Characteristics of SBI systems Needed for Full Coverage 

of North Korea and Iran against a Single Liquid-fuel and a Single 

Solid-fuel ICBM57

Space basing can provide BPI access to any point on earth, including the 

interiors of very large countries that can’t be reached by any ground and 

most air-launched BPI concepts. Moreover, the interceptor speed 

requirements decrease to the 2-6 km/s range. On the negative side, SBI 

constellations can only be tailored to a latitude band, not against 

individual countries.58 The real issue is a budgetary show-stopper. CBO 

estimates that the cost of a BPI system which could counter liquid-fuel 

ICBMs launched from anywhere in both North Korea and Iran would be 

between $16-37 billion (2004 dollars) for surface-based, and between $27-

78 billion for space-based. To counter solid-fuel ICBMs from space 

would raise the price tag an additional $30-146 billion!59 SPI is 

theoretically attractive, but until space lift can deliver capability for 

around $1000/lb and kinetic energy technologies mature to produce a 

“certified round” that fires and hits every time, it is not a realistic option. 

MDA’s pursuit of surface-basing also has limitations. Although 

basing is plausible in South Korea, it is problematic to U.S. and allied 

interests in most other scenarios. Sea-basing is a realistic alternative but 

adds significantly to the forementioned costs and supports only littoral 

enemy launches. Surface-based BPI suffers from the worst line of sight 

handicap, little mobility once pre-positioned, and the greatest demands on 

propulsion technology. Air-launched kinetic BPI minimizes these 

25
deficiencies, is more realistic than space-based, and offers a timelier 

alternative than directed energy. 

 Table 2 below illuminates the boost phase budget compared to the 

total MDA budget. It is telling that the boost phase layer never comes 

close to 33%, and in fact, only averages 15% across FY2004-09. As a 

reminder, the $1-2 billion a year is directed increasingly at KEI and antiICBM. 

Table 2. Funding for the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

Interceptor Program60

Instead of spending an indeterminate amount of time and national treasure 

on trial and error acquisition, MDA’s acquisition emphasis needs to shift 

significantly (40-60%) towards boost phase and the theater threat, so as to 

accelerate a more effective and efficient NMD in the next five years. 

26
Chapter 5 

Proposed Air-Launched BPI System 

The development of Air Power in its broadest sense, and including the 

development of all means of combating missiles that travel through the 

air, whether fired or dropped, is the first essential to our survival in war.

 Sir Hugh Trenchard, 1946

The idea of an air-launched BPI is not new. In 1994, the Air Force 

seriously explored and demonstrated through advanced simulation a 

concept of F-15Cs launching BPIs supported with off-board sensor 

tracking. The decision to pursue ABL instead was based on a belief that 

directed energy technologies would mature quicker and better support 

long-range plans to migrate this mission to space. For a brief moment, the 

kinetic BPI concept came back into vogue in 1996. BMDO sponsored a 

three-year study of fielding Tier-2 Global Hawk UAVs with six kinetic 

BPIs each, capable of loitering 40 hours at 65,000 feet.61 Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) scientists believed the UAV, 

sensor, and kinetic boost phase technology was “ready to move forward to 

a demonstration.”62 Congressional interest perked when LLNL compared 

the estimated 20-year life-cycle costs of major BPI systems. The 

UAV/kinetic BPI price tag to support one major regional conflict was 

$1.5-2 billion compared to $5-6 billion for the ABL, or $23 billion for the 

space-based laser (1996 dollars). Additionally, the UAV-carrier concept 

could have been operational in FY03, five full years before ABL.63 Air 

Force concepts failed to gain funding priority because they didn’t mass 

firepower and were perceived as bridled by technology. Those were 

missed opportunities, but current science and technology developments 

afford a second window of opportunity to close the critical boost phase 

gap and enable simultaneous strike of missile launchers. 

By walking through the operational requirements, the desired BPI 

system can be described. Admittedly, some specifics must be extrapolated 

since most funded studies have been surface-based and space-based. This 

reality is a function of airborne BPI being synonymous only with ABL for 

a decade. 

Launch Platform. It must exist in today’s fleet and be on-station 

anywhere in the world within 24 hours. This assumption of some 

intelligence warning and potential launch zones is reasonable for state 

actors, but until space-based BPI is a reality, will require national 

vigilance of non-state threats. Because standoff ranges cannot be 

27
guaranteed in every theater, initial BPI may require closer than desired 

operating ranges; thus, the platform must have inherent offensive and/or 

defensive capability (armament and/or a proven electronic warfare suite). 

It must be able to loiter for 12 hours or more on its TBM defensive 

counter air orbit, preferably without refueling. The higher the operating 

altitude, the greater benefit to detection/commit timelines and engagement 

ranges. It must be able to carry twenty or more BPIs (up to 3000 lbs each-

-12 externally and 8 internally). For comparison: PAC-3 is 640 lbs, 

THAAD is 1220 lbs, and GMD is 22.5 tons.64 The B-52 is the only 

platform that meets the criteria and can routinely operate up to 50,000 ft. 

Regardless of age and premature predictions about retiring the infamous 

workhorse, the B-52 is here indefinitely because it can carry most 

munitions in the Air Force inventory; some forecast service even out to 

2050. The author recommends 28 of the remaining B-52s be converted to 

accept the TMD mission. Tier II and Tier III UAVs provide promising 

follow-on BPI platforms that can augment persistent and interior 

operations. The Israeli IBIS UAV and the Moab kinetic kill vehicle 

should provide many lessons learned. High-altitude airships may also 

prove valuable in the long-term equation and for indefinite threats, e.g., 

North Korea. 

C2 & ISR. BPI and the B-52 are natural fits into the existing Theater 

Air Control System (TACS) architecture. BPI differs in having weapons 

free authority to engage any and all TBM tracks within its weapons 

engagement zone. In other words, ISR connectivity is the pre-requisite 

necessity, and C2 is done to share what is being engaged and by whom 

with the other missile defense layers. Authority to engage in the boost 

phase must be made in an advance, e.g., “stating that if a ballistic missile 

is launched from within a given area, it will be assumed to pose a threat 

and will be engaged.”65 The B-52 will require surveillance and 

intelligence data links (JTIDS and TIBS) to allow reception of cueing data 

and transmission of TBM tracks, weapons guidance, and engagement 

status to the other defense layers. Both of these datalink systems are offthe-shelf strap-on communication systems and already fit in MDA’s 

integrated approach. If ABL achieves operational status, it could function 

as the primary BPI command and control (C2) to de-conflict BPI 

engagements by disparate systems. 

Sensors. Because fighter sensors were inadequate, early Air Force 

BPI concepts relied entirely on off-board cueing of the ballistic missile 

launches and off-board in-flight target updates directly to the BPI. 

Modifications of the entire F-15 and F-14 fleets were price-prohibitive. 

With TIBS and JTIDS, the B-52 will be able to accept cueing from every 

28
overhead (space), airborne, and ground sensor. However, it is best for the 

launch platform to have its own ability to directly track TBMs and provide 

in-flight target updates. The TBM IR signature during boost phase, and 

even early ascent, is like a “Roman candle.” There are two systems 

readily available that would require minor modification for installation in 

the B-52 and/or UAV. Cobra Ball recently added a medium wave infrared 

array, which can also fuse with satellite data.66 The tracking results are 

more than adequate and logistically the easiest to support. The second 

system is a mature BMDO program called EAGLE IR. If it had been 

funded, it would have put IR sensors on all AWACS to provide cueing to 

the Patriot Information Control Center. Figure 12 provides the spectrum 

of IRSTS capabilities readily available. 

Figure 12. IRST Sensor Performance67

Most recently, Air Force Research Laboratories (AFRL) Sensors 

Directorate built a UAV-sized multi-spectral IR sensor using cross 

dispersion prism technologies. Any one of these IRSTs can be coupled 

with a laser radar (LADAR) to provide accurate ranging. 

The limitation of electro-optical/IR sensors is degradation caused by 

weather (cloud decks) and IR interference (ground clutter, sun glint, IR 

29
countermeasures). In the BPI world, these equate to time delays. It would 

be extremely prudent to put phased array radar on the B-52/UAV to 

ensure earliest tracking and ability to simultaneously engage multiple 

targets. Technology for 350 km detection is readily available. Any and all 

boost phase solutions require a fusion all sensors. In the future the 1960’s 

Defense Support Defense (DSP) constellation of infrared satellites will be 

augmented with the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a mix of four 

geosynchronous satellites, and the R&D Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System (STSS) will be restructured. Thus, detection and tracking of 

TBMs is doable now and full of greater capability in the near future. 

BPI. The following table provides a summary of different interceptor 

concepts from a decade ago. 

Table 3. Maximum Kinematic Range Capabilities of BPI/API 

Options68

To achieve a 240 km engagement zone against the 600 km TBM and a 325 

km WEZ against the 1200 km TBM, the interceptor must attain speeds in 

excess of 5 km/s. Additionally, it is important to note, that as long as 

tracking can be maintained, BPI provides some ascent midcourse 

capability. This accentuates the value of boost phase and MDA’s 

integrated approach to maximize look-shoot opportunities. “All of the 

technology to deliver this missile system exists today; solid rocket 

propulsion technology just needs to be sized correctly for the mission.”69 

Figure 13 lays out early design requirements. 

30
Figure 13. BPI Missile Design Description70

It’s time to build it, not study it. The Air Force’s C4ISR Visualization 

Center (Pentagon) and Distributed Mission Operations Center (Kirtland 

AFB, New Mexico) have resident virtual simulation capability to optimize 

and validate any BPI kinetic design. 

The laws of physics haven’t changed, but the recent options in 

satisfying the propulsion requirements have. One is born out of MDA’s 

relationship with industry and one out of AFRL. In December 2003, 

MDA awarded an eight year $4 billion KEI contract for Orbital to design 

the booster and ATK to provide the engine for the 36 ft interceptor.71 KEI 

will deliver a quantum leap in rocket propulsion to 6 km/s and closing 

velocities of 37 km/s.72 Additionally, Raytheon offers a fighter or UAV 

capability by proposing a two-stage AMRAAM that will reach 2.65 km/s 

and is coupled with an AIM-9X seeker head. AFRL’s Propulsion 

Directorate affords another option, well-suited for air delivery. Its 

scramjet research is focused on enabling the development of hypersonic 

cruise missiles with conventional jet fuels (JP-7). Initial flight test of the 

AFRL-DARPA X-51A Scramjet Engine Demonstrator will validate 

HyTech scramjet technology in a missile size (168 inches). This $170 

million program will deliver 2-3+ km/s in FY2009.73 On the surface, this 

is far below the desired 4-6 km/s, but does provide an initial capability 

correctly sized for an air-launched missile. Ongoing AFRL research will 

advance the HyTech scramjet performance into the 3-5 km/s range with 

different fuels, states hypersonic technology planner, Mr. Glenn Liston.74 

Indeed, NASA’s X-43A Hyper-X vehicles recently demonstrated the 

ability of scramjet engines to operate at greater than 3 km/s (Machs 7 & 

10). Scramjets can theoretically be four times as efficient as rocket 

engines by using atmospheric oxygen as the oxidizer, instead of heavy 

solid propellant, thereby reducing vehicle weight and dramatically 

31
increasing the speed.75 The net result is that the missile loadout for a 

given range-speed capability can generally be doubled over what could be 

accomplished with an all-rocket approach. Scramjets can operate up to an 

altitude of 40-45 km, making them capable of TBM intercept. Above that 

altitude, a rocket powered kinetic kill vehicle (KKV—final stage) 

becomes essential. The current MDA approach for ground-based BPI is a 

two-staged rocket with a KKV. However, a rocket-scramjet hybrid 

missile can reasonably provide a 3-4 km/s BPI in the near future, with 

growth to 5 km/s—possibly precluding the need for a KKV stage.76 The 

combined benefit of air launched and rocket-scramjet is two fold: greater 

range, plus the ability to get closer to the threat than ground variants, 

resulting in a larger defended area. The X-51A is scheduled to fly five 

times in FY2009-10. This schedule is funding driven, not technology; 

better funding profiles could accelerate capabilities into FY2007. 

The added benefit of a scramjet approach is a single propulsion 

system (indeed, a single missile design) for multiple functions, thus 

allowing a single B-52 to engage ballistic missiles with BPI and their 

launcher with hypersonic cruise missiles simultaneously (reaching up to 

600 nautical miles under 10 minutes). This one-two punch can drastically 

reduce the number of TBMs our defenses would ultimately have to 

engage. With intelligence of the scripted events associated with ballistic 

mission launches and appropriate ROE in-place, a pre-launch hypersonic 

attack may even be possible. Scramjet BPI options are in the direct MDA 

interest and represent low-hanging technological fruit due to ongoing 

investments by AFRL and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA). Lastly, with advances in detection and identification 

of enemy cruise missiles, the common scramjet approach will also support 

WMD cruise missile engagement over enemy territory. 

Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV). BPI weapons guidance/KKV 

technology exists today. The U.S. has repeatedly proven it can hit a bullet 

with a bullet. The Homing Overlay Experiment successfully 

demonstrated the intercept of an ICBM re-entry vehicle at closures of 10 

km/s; additionally, PAC-3 missile tests produced similar successes.77 The 

latest success was on November 19, 2005 by an AEGIS BMD midcourse 

intercept. The largest technological hurdle to be countered is the extreme 

heating experienced by the IR sensor window during low altitude (below 

25 km) engagements. Specifically, KKVs require a protective IR dome, 

which blinds the missile along most of its trajectory, hence the datalink 

requirement between the tracking sensor and the BPI. Once the eyes 

open, the IR window will still need cooling through ablative material 

coating.78 This technology is maturing smartly due to aggressive testing 

32
across all layers. KEI is bringing bold advances in its Divert and Attitude 

Control System (DACS) as well as in areas of miniaturization and fine 

end-game control.79 Multi-engagement enhancements will bring even 

greater capability against salvo launches. KKVs are designed to hit the 

actual warhead, not the booster, as with ABL. Boost phase can leverage 

either or both destruction mechanisms. MDA should also explore a 

marriage of nanotechnologies in the area of advanced energetics. AFRL’s 

Munitions Directorate recently produced nanodimensional explosive 

composites that enhance explosive performance and improve handling 

safety.80 The concept of lightweight explosives integrated into a KKV 

could potentially add proximity kill capability and a corresponding higher 

Pk, translating into additional benefits for the remaining layers of defense. 

Simulation Validation. Every piece of the architecture is already 

modeled in Air Force and joint operator-in-the-loop simulation facilities—

the B-52 aircraft performance, any TBM threat, the same approved TBM 

scenario used to validate ABL, any BPI performance (missile fly out, 

sensor, guidance, and KKV), AEGIS, Patriot, THAAD, JTIDS, TIBS, air 

and ground threats, Cobra Ball, distributed connectivity to overhead 

satellites, and operators to evaluate the combat utility. Within months, a 

comprehensive test could be accomplished to refine operational 

requirements and CONOPS on the B-52/UAV BPI weapons system. 

MDA’s simulation budget would be well spent towards this effort. Air 

Combat Command’s 505 Distributed Warfare Group, located at Kirtland 

Air Force Base, New Mexico, is a proven entity in supporting such tests. 

MDA Acquisition. Lastly, the B-52 BPI weapons system is a bridge 

to the future. Its presence provides long-term ABL augmentation to effect 

a true multi-layered defense. Enabling technologies will soon allow our 

C2&ISR to target the most appropriate weapons system because the type 

warhead may be known. The growth into the UAV platform is natural and 

should be accelerated. Both the B-52 and UAV should eventually carry 

BPI and air-to-surface missiles to simultaneously target the TBM and the 

launcher—the proverbial one-two punch. Both Army and Navy 

midcourse systems will have less area to defend and thus be able to 

concentrate their firepower, have earlier cueing, and avoid the saturation 

scenarios associated with fractionated warheads, resulting in higher Pks. 

Fielding theater kinetic boost phase capability must not just be our 

focus, but our NMD acquisition priority—one that moves our nation to 

unparalleled action and fields air-launched BPI and a tailored multilayered active defense structure. The time is now. 

33
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34
Chapter 6 

Proposed CONOPS 

Air Force Policy Directive 10-28 provides format guidance. The 

following few pages are submitted to establish a CONOPS foundation. 

1. Purpose. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the 

Air Force must reprioritize their National Missile 

Defense (NMD) acquisition budgets to field a theater 

kinetic air-launched boost phase intercept (BPI) 

capability within five years. The boost phase layer is 

the critical foundation for an effective and efficient 

NMD architecture. The threat of enemies engaging our 

national interests with theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) 

is much more likely than an accidental or limited ICBM 

attack. Therefore, building highly mobile kinetic BPI 

capability is paramount to fielding a correctly 

apportioned layered defense against all missile threats. 

2. Time Horizon, Assumptions, and Risks. Given the 

persistent technical difficulties of directed energy 

programs, it is critical to fill the theater BPI gap within 

five years. Under the Bush Administration, MDA 

budgets are significantly robust; therefore, it is 

unlikely, that funds would be increased again to 

accommodate another new start. MDA must build an 

air-launched kinetic BPI capability within the existing 

budget. By refocusing from strategic to theater 

defenses, plus slowing the fielding of terminal 

defensive systems, MDA’s budget is sufficient to 

accomplish the necessary tasks. The technical 

challenges are formidable, but most are at or near 

maturity under existing MDA programs. Reengineering into a tactical weapons system will actually 

produce BPI capability sooner and serve as risk 

mitigation to the full compliment of MDA boost phase 

defenses. 

3. Description of the Military Challenge. Boost phase is 

the most technically challenging of the NMD layers due 

to the compressed kill chain cycles. The boost phase 

defense gap was to be partially bridged by FY2009 with 

the fielding of the Airborne Laser (ABL), but now that 

35
gap appears to have widened and deepened. MDA’s 

current efforts do little to counter this trend. TBM and 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation is 

the nexus of future regional threats to our national and 

allies’ interests. The challenge of being in the right 

place at the right time with sufficient capability is 

threefold: 

a. reliable intelligence warning to support timely 

BPI deployment; 

b. sufficient number of persistent theater BPI 

weapons systems to be on-station anywhere 

within 24 hours; 

c. avoidance of the political costs associated with 

pre-positioning of the other layers of defense on 

foreign soil. 

For the foreseeable future, it is best met by an air-launched kinetic 

BPI capability, augmented with sea-based boost and midcourse 

systems over time. Ground-based boost phase options can’t close 

the TBM defense gap due to four factors: 

a. unrealistic requirement for weeks to months 

advance warning required to support 

deployment; 

b. the unsatisfactory assumptions of secure prepositioning rights and sufficient numbers to 

cover all regions; 

c. the inherent loss of mission effectiveness due to 

line of sight impacts to already compressed 

engagement timelines; 

d. the inability to counter interior and/or changing 

launch zones. 

4. Synopsis. Space-based and airborne signal combined with 

human intelligence (SIGINT/HUMINT) must produce some 

level of advance warning/predictive analysis of when and 

where a potential enemy (rogue state or transnational terrorist) 

might launch TBMs. This BPI CONOPS assumes 24-hour 

notice as the minimum acceptable to deploy an air-launched 

kinetic BPI defensive capability. Modified B-52s will carry 20 

plus hypersonic BPIs (under 3000 lbs each, reaching velocities 

up to 6 km/s). Having this capability is a deterrent in itself, 

especially if the imminent TBM threat is coupled with WMD. 

In the face of a boost phase defense, an enemy has to weigh the 

36
high risk of absorbing the very effects of their own WMD. 

Upon warning, 8 to 28 of the BPI equipped B-52s will deploy 

to Guam or Diego Garcia for forward staging, as bombers may 

be seen as provocative to the region proper. Actual numbers 

will be classified and depend on the area to be defended, type 

of threat, and probable launch zones. Forward basing on allied 

territory may be required or desired. Host nation, and possibly 

even enemy nation, observers are viable options, given this is a 

defensive capability. 

Figure 14 provides a clear overview describing the 

series of events involved in a boost phase intercept. 

Figure 14. Sequence of Events Involved in Boost Phase Intercept81

a. Threat TBM is launched. This reflects that, 

unless we are launching 100% effective preemptive attacks, the enemy has the initiative and 

that ballistic missile defense is inherently a 

defensive, reactive mission, at least in the initial 

launch sequence. 

37
b. Threat missile becomes visible to sensors. This 

will primarily be done by infrared (IR) 

detection, augmented by radar. The 

combination of space, airborne (off and onboard) and ground ISR will be shared tracking 

data over secure datalinks (TIBS and JTIDS). 

SIGINT and HUMIT pre-cursors may sharpen 

our understanding of the enemy’s potential 

actions. 

c. BPI system acquires target. BPI equipped B52s should be equipped with IR and laser radar 

capability. By system, we infer all on and offboard acquisition and tracking networked 

sensors. Since off-board cueing and target 

updates are integral to BPI fly out, actual 

interceptors will be integrated into the boost 

phase datalink. Acquisition of the target is a 

function of line of sight and cloud clearance 

(nominally, no more than 30,000 ft). To 

minimize detection delays and maximize the 

BPI launch envelop, B-52s will orbit above 

40,000 ft. 

d. Parallel processes occur at this point—

command authority is alerted, the target track is 

established, and launch platform initiates a turn 

towards 45 degrees of the threat axis. The first 

two occur automatically without any operator 

input required. For boost phase intercept, the 

default permission to fire will be pre-authorized, 

unless specifically directed otherwise by the 

theater Combatant Commander. (COCOM). 

The BPI computer on-board each B-52 will 

compute the initial interceptor firing solution 

and share it on the datalinks. Each BPIequipped B-52 must have the ability to track 

and simultaneously engage at least eight TBMs. 

e. Interceptor is launched. Again, no action is 

required by the B-52 crew. Master arming and 

weapons free for BPI weapons only is done 

once the B-52 goes on-station with assigned 

TBM defensive mission tasking. For B-52s 

38
equipped with hypersonic cruise missiles, 

commit authority must be pre-authorized by 

COCOM or coordinated with COCOM’s C2 

agency to allow simultaneous engagement of 

the TBM launch site. 

f. Interceptor flies out to target. It essentially flies 

to a constantly updated lead pursuit predicted 

intercept box, course updates via the datalink. It 

is important to note that this may be a sensor to 

BPI specific datalink, as JTIDS limitations may 

not fully support the engagement requirements. 

Again, kinetic BPI will leverage work already 

implemented by other MDA systems in this 

area. The KKV (as required) will have its 

protective coated IR windows shrouded during 

this portion of flight to protect against extreme 

thermal heating. 

g. KKV acquires the target. Once the KKV 

reaches the pre-determined shroud off point, its 

sensor acquires the target, discriminates the 

missile body, picks an aim point (warhead 

desired, but not required for boost phase), and 

KKV maneuvers to optimize impact. 

h. Intercept occurs. Closing velocities create 

catastrophic destruction of the TBM and its 

warhead over enemy territory. 

i. Battle Damage Assessment, to verify a 

successful intercept, is the next step. If for 

some remote reason the assessment is negative, 

the BPI system must launch a pre-computed 

second BPI (to engage in late boost or early 

thermally relevant midcourse phase) or pass off 

the track to the next layer of TBM defense. 

5. Desired Effects. Deter enemies from launching 

ballistic missiles. If deterrence fails, engage and 

destroy all ballistic missiles at the earliest point of 

flight. This includes the ability to counter salvos aimed 

to overwhelm U.S. and allied defenses. Secondarily, 

use the same system to effectively target launchers 

simultaneously. Bottom line—air-launched kinetic BPI 

will largely negate an enemy’s ability to ballistically 

39
deliver WMD or a WMD effect, and thus form the 

correct foundation for our NMD. 

6. Necessary Capabilities. Chapter 5 outlines required 

technical capabilities and maturation. Operationally, 

this is a pure active defense mission, requiring only one 

change—auto-engage authority for BPI employment. 

Those B-52s equipped with hypersonic cruise missiles 

and without pre-authorization to engage will conduct 

attack operations missions using existing procedures. 

Lastly, establishing counter TBM patrols (CTP) inside 

enemy territory will require COCOM approval and 

adequate counter measures. 

7. Enabling Capabilities. Previously mentioned ISR, 

datalink interoperability, hypersonic propulsion 

advancements, 28 x B-52 modification, and tactical 

KKV are all required. Basing and special weapons 

handling must be established. Again, this CONOPS 

reflects adding a new weapons system to an existing 

mission tasking where tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP) already exist. This CONOPS 

supports all current Air Force Task Force CONOPS. 

8. Sequenced Actions. Intelligence warning and COCOM 

request would result in a deployment order for BPI 

equipped B-52s (operating under a standing 24-hour 

warning order). The required number of 24/7 CTPs 

will be established and maintained until diplomatic 

efforts or successful military actions negate the need. 

Midcourse and terminal defense layers should be 

deployed to provide a multi-layered defense. 

9. Command Relationships / Architecture (as required). 

Default BPI launch pre-authorization should be written 

into existing active defense TTP. COCOM exceptions 

and hypersonic attack operations must be specifically 

addressed in the theater rules of engagement (ROE). 

Datalink architectures must support BPI sensors, battle 

management, and interceptor requirements. No other 

C2 changes are required. 

10. Summary. Fielding a true air-launched BPI capability 

closes the growing TBM and probable WMD gap. It 

also establishes the correct boost phase foundation for 

40
an effective and efficient NMD, and thus, correctly 

defines the midcourse and terminal layers. 

41
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42
Chapter 7 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

For the last decade, the U.S. boost phase capability gap to engage 

TBMs was not filled; thus, our NMD architecture remains hollow and 

overly stressed at best, or at worst, unable to effectively counter WMD 

ballistic missile attacks. Building a NMD from the tail (terminal defense) 

towards the head (midcourse to boost phase) may have been the prudent 

technology approach, but it lacked the boldness required to take the fight 

to the enemy’s neighborhood. Dr. Richard L. Garwin, member of the U.S. 

Congressional commission to assess the ballistic missile threat, stated, “It 

would be complete folly to base our security on a 21st century Maginot 

line.”82 Unless, we purposefully re-evaluate our boost phase options and 

priorities, we will likely end up with the same results as the French 

defenses in World War II. Present MDA acquisition strategies deliver 

TMD capability too late; they are essentially single layered until 2008; 

they are too heavily weighted on systems that require pre-positioning of 

ground forces; and they can’t guarantee the ability to kill most of the 

warheads, especially prior to fractionation. 

The QDR’s judgment of ABL’s potential and timeline clearly define 

not a gap, but a hole, in our missile defense architecture...a sinkhole. The 

boost phase layer should be the foundation of our ballistic missile 

defenses and should be initially focused on the more likely threat—TBMs, 

then ICBMs. The convergence of new technologies and the growing 

operational need open a second window for air-launched kinetic BPI. It’s 

analogous to a residential construction site. Ten years of MDA 

investment represent preparation of the building site, procuring permits, 

lining up subcontractors, and purchasing materials. While the windows 

and doors are the terminal defense, the first thing we must do is lay the 

correct foundation—boost phase intercept. Theater kinetic capability 

represents the footers that define the shape, size, and weight bearing 

capacity. Pouring the foundation concrete is all about the kinetic boost 

phase, and the walls are the single integrated NMD structure that supports 

all else. The second floor is ascent midcourse capability. The roof is post 

apogee midcourse. The amenities, landscaping, and neighborhood patrol 

are directed energy and space weapons. Now is the time to build the 

correct NMD foundation.

This paper is meant to pave a new diagonal runway, one that crosses a 

very mature and sound MDA base of operations but that also allows 

engaging the enemy earlier with more lethal and deterring capability. The 

43
recommendations to MDA, STRATCOM, Congress, and warfighters are 

straight forward: 

1. Immediately commission a six-month operator-in-theloop simulation test to further define the kinetic BPI 

systems requirements and CONOPs proposed in this paper. 

The simulation capability of Distributed Mission 

Operations (DMO) will tie the joint warfighter and the 

acquisition/test/training communities together with 

industry—cradle to grave. 

2. MDA should reprioritize its budget to a minimum of 

30% on kinetic BPI, with the majority focused on 

developing and fielding a theater air-launched capability in 

three to five years. The CBO study estimated $15-24 

billion for a 6 km/s BPI against ICBMs.83 Let’s focus our 

air-launched BPI efforts toward fielding operational 

capability, as outlined in the proposed CONOPS, for $10-

12 billion. 

3. Establish a cutoff decision of 18-months whether to 

pursue rocket, scramjet, or hybrid technologies to address 

the propulsion requirements. This will require a plus-up of 

$20M to AFRL and the KEI project to effect a fly-off in 

early 2007. 

4. To provide the equivalent effect of adding a fourth layer 

(more effective boost and midcourse layers), continue the 

pursuit of multi-kill vehicle capability. 

5. Leverage advancement in sensor technologies (IR and 

radar) to expand their launched kinetic BPI and KEI 

envelopes to include ascent midcourse. 

6. To address regional issues, KEI should be sea-based. 

7. Continue ABL as a directed energy testbed critical to 

the spaced-based laser/relay mirror system. 

The intersection of the most likely and most devastating ballistic 

missile threats, is where our national missile defense must focus. Can we 

negate a rogue merchant ship or submarine TBM launch that creates an 

electromagnetic pulse 40 km above St. Louis, and in an instant, unseats 

the U.S. as the world’s sole hegemon? Can we prevent an enemy WMD 

ballistic attack on an ally that seeks to destroy a sovereign nation or turn a 

regional power balance upside down or drive the world economy into 

chaos? These threats are not only plausible but are being voiced by our 

foes, who don’t have ICBMs. The U.S. must commit to delivering a true 

boost phase capability in sufficient numbers in the next three to five years 

44
to address this combat deficiency. A correctly apportioned layered 

defense will save billions. “Heads, not tails;” it is time to act decisively 

on this re-evaluation of BPI. 

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46
Appendix A 

Gulf War Scud Facts (1990-91) 

- The Iraqis had 500-600 missiles and upwards of 36 transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) but fired only 88 Scuds.84

- The US Defense Support Program (DSP) electro-optical satellites 

detected all 88 launches. 

- Less than 4% of the 42,000 strike sorties were flown against elements of 

the Iraqi ballistic missile target set.85 However, counter-Scud efforts 

represented 11.5% of all new sorties added to the daily air tasking order.86

- The Scud hunts involved AC-130H, F-15E, A-10, F-111F, B-52G, A-6E, 

F-117, F-16C, and F/A-18 aircraft.87 Additionally, there were 

innumerable C2ISR (airborne and ground) and tanker assets also 

committed to support the “four percent” 24-hour anti-Scud missions. 

- “Declassified records noted that in 42 Scud-hunting missions, ordnance 

was dropped only eight times and there were no verified missile kills."88 

U.S. and Coalition air forces found it extremely difficult to locate and 

destroy mobile Scud targets.89

- Scud hunting missions were ineffective if measured in terms of numbers 

of Scud-associated vehicles destroyed—some TELs may have been 

destroyed, but none could be confirmed.90

- The constant pressure of air power did seem to constrain Iraqi Scud 

employment--launches occurred primarily at night (under cloud cover) 

and the number of launches decreased as compared with those in the War 

of the Cities (Iraq/Iran War).91 “Coalition domination of the air and 

vigorous attack operations provided a disincentive to launch Scuds.”92 

- PATRIOT performance has since proven to be far from the initial 

optimistic claims. The Army claimed 80% success in PATRIOT 

employment in Saudi, and 50% success in Israel against Scuds predicted 

to impact in the defended areas.93 The “near-perfect record” proclaimed 

on CNN by political and military leaders was misleading. Yes, PATRIOT 

fired at incoming Scuds, but often at debris caused by tumbling Scuds, or 

the PATRIOT missiles self-destructed when they failed to acquire their 

intended target. Subcommittee investigators spent two months examining 

47
Army and Raytheon evidence, and found strong evidence of a warhead 

destroyed by the PATRIOT in only one case. Additionally, review of 140 

videos provided no conclusive evidence of any Scud warhead kills.94

- Saddam did have chemical, biologic weapons available and for some 

reason chose not to use them as he had in the War of the Cities. Iraq’s 

nuclear capability was assessed as doubtful, although Iraq had over 20,000 

people working both overt civilian and covert military nuclear programs.95 

The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) determined at the time 

of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was less than a year from producing one or 

two nuclear weapons.96

- Factors that minimize the potential impact of Iraq TBMs: 

-- effective diplomacy and Israeli restraint averted escalation of the 

conflict, 

 -- Iraqi Scud modifications were aerodynamically imprecise/unstable, 

thus degrading their long range performance, 

 -- Saddam’s TBM did not employ WMD, nor did he fully leverage their 

effects, 

-- and PATRIOT defenses were perceived to be more effective than they 

actually were by both sides, and attack operations and air superiority 

seemed to minimize Iraq’s ability to carry out Scud operations with 

impunity. 

48
Appendix B 

Growing Ballistic Missile Capability (2004)97

49
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50
Appendix C 

Missile Defense Terms 

ABL - Airborne Laser 

ABM- Anti-Ballistic Missile 

AF - Air Force 

BDA - Battle Damage Assessment 

BECO - Boost Engine Cutoff 

BM - Ballistic Missile 

BMDO - Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 

BPI - Boost Phase Intercept 

CM - Cruise Missile 

COIL - Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser 

CONOPS - Concept of Operations 

CSAF - Chief of Staff of the AF 

C2ISR - Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

DARPA - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DEW - Directed Energy Weapon 

DOD - Department of Defense 

DSP - Defense Support Program 

EW - Electronic Warfare 

GPOW - Global Precision Optical Weapon 

IBIS - Israeli Boost Phase Intercept System 

ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IR - Infrared 

IRSTS - Infrared Search and Tracking System 

JTIDS - Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 

JTMD - Joint Theater Missile Defense 

KEW – Kinetic Energy Weapon 

KKV - Kinetic Kill Vehicle 

LEAP - Light Exoatmospheric Projectile 

LLNL - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

MDA - Missile Defense Agency 

NBC - Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 

NMD - National Missile Defense 

Pk - Probability of Kill 

SECAF - Secretary of the AF 

SM - Standard Missile 

51
SOF - Special Operations Forces 

SRAM - Short Range Attack Missile 

TACS - Theater Air Control System 

TBM - Theater Ballistic Missile 

TEL – Transporter Erector Launchers 

THAAD - Theater High Altitude Air Defense 

TIBS - Tactical Information Broadcast System 

TMD - Theater Missile Defense 

UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

WEZ - Weapons Engagement Zone 

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

52
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ENDNOTES 

 

1

 George W. Bush, President, National Security Strategy, Washington 

D.C., February 2002, i. 

2

 Ronald R. Fogleman, Gen , “On Target for Joint Theater Air Defense,” 

Nation Fire Control Symposium, July 30, 1996, 3. 

3

 A. M. Codevilla, “Defenseless America,” Commentary, 102, September 

1996, 51. 

4 Welch Report. “National Missile Defense Independent Review Team.” 

June 13, 2000, NP. 

5

 M. R. O’Neill, “The U.S. Vision of Theater Missile Defense,” Theater 

Missile Defense: On the Eve of Deployment –1995, Washington DC: 

American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1995, 3. 

6

 R. D. West, “Executing the DoD Theater Missile Defense Program,” 

Theater Missile Defense: On the Eve of Deployment –1995, Washington 

D.C. American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, June 1995, 25 

(updated to include new MDA systems and paper’s proposed boost-phase 

kinetic energy weapon). 

7

 Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Space Based Radar 

to Missile Defense, Washington D.C., June 2004, 19. 

8

 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-01.5: Doctrine for Joint Theater 

Missile Defense, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1996, x. 

9

 West, 24. 

10 D. A. Fulghum, “SRAM/LEAP Concept Stirs Interagency Conflict,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 139, October 11, 1993, 59. 

11 Congressional Research Service (CRS), Report for Congress, Missile 

Defense: The Current Debate, July 19, 2005, 15-16. 

59
 

12 CRS, 4. 

13 Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Link, Patriot Factsheet, On-line 

internet, Available from http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html, 

accessed on December 10, 2005. 

14 MDA Link, THAAD Factsheet. 

15 CRS, 34. 

16 Ibid, 27. 

17 Ibid, 28-29. 

18 Ibid, 24-25.. 

19 Fogleman, Ronald. R., Gen, “Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1995, 78. 

20 MDA Link, BPI Factsheet. 

21 S. J. Kowall, Maj, Air Combat Command Draft Concept of Operations 

for Airborne Laser, Langley AFB VA: HQ ACC/DRAW, May 1, 1996, 2. 

22 Ibid, 2-7. 

23 New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, Directed 

Energy Volume, U.S. Air Force, 1995, vii. 

24 MDA Link, ABL Factsheet. 

25 Fogelman, 75. 

26 Kowall, 6. 

27 Ibid. 

28 “Kinetic Energy Interceptor.” On-line Internet, Available from 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kei/htm. December 10, 

2005. 

60
 

29 Jeffrey A. Larsen & Kerry M. Kartchner, Emerging Missile Challenges 

and Improving Active Defenses, USAF Counterproliferation Center, 

Future Warfare Series, No. 25, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB AL, 

August 2004, 34. 

30 Arieh Stav, The Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East,

Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004, xi-xiii. 

31 MDA Link, Threat Factsheet. 

32 Rueven Pedatzur, “The Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) as an Alternative” 

in The Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East, Ed. Stav, Arieh, 

Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004, 135. 

33 CRS, 4. 

34 MDA Link, Multi-Kill Vehicle Factsheet.

35 J. Pike, “Boost–Phase Intercept,” FAS: Space Policy Project Special 

Weapons Monitor [On-line], Available: 

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/bpi.htm, December 28, 1997, 

NP. 

36 New World Vistas, Directed Energy Volume, v. 

37 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Missile Defense: 

Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks in 

Developing Airborne Laser. Washington D.C., July 2002, 6-8. 

38 James Rothenflue, Lt Col, Interview by the author, November 4, 2005. 

39 GAO, Missile Defense, 7. 

40 New World Vistas, Directed Energy Volume, 52-53. 

41 Larson, E. V., & Kent, G. A., A New Methodology for Assessing MultiLayer Missile Defense Options (MR-390-AF), Santa Monica: RAND, 

1994, 25. 

61
 

42 Ibid. 

43 Ibid. 

44 Ibid, 24. 

45 Ibid, 27. 

46 Ibid, 26. 

47 Ibid. 

48 Ibid, 27. 

49 Ibid, 36. 

50 Ibid, 38. 

51 Ibid, 39. 

52 Grant Hammond, Dr., Interview by the author, December 12, 2005. 

53 Larson, 40. 

54 Ibid, 46. 

55 Ibid, 61. 

56 Congress of the United States, A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

Study, Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense, July 2004, xiii. 

57 CBO, xiv-xv. 

58 CBO, xiv. 

59 CBO, ix & xvii. 

60 CBO, 4. 

62
 

61 W. B. Scott, “Kinetic-kill Boost Phase Intercept Regains Favor,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 144, March 4, 1996, 22-23. 

62 Ibid. 

63 Ibid. 

64 CBO, 37. 

65 CBO, 11. 

66 D. A. Fulghum, “Multi-Sensor Cobra Ball Tackles Missile Defense,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 147, August 4, 1997, 54. 

67 New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, 

Munitions Volume, US Air Force, 1995, 7. 

68 J.A. Isaacson, J.S, Kvity, & D.R. Vaughan, Airborne Intercept: Boostand Ascent-Phase Options and Issues (MR-772-AF), Santa Monica: 

RAND, 1996, 13. 

69 New World Vistas, Munitions Volume, 6. 

70 Ibid., 10. 

71 “Kinetic Energy Interceptor,” 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/kei/htm. 

72 “Hard Kill: Kinetic Energy Missile Interceptor (KEI),” On-line 

Internet, Available from 

http://www.military.com/soldiertech/0,14632,Soldiertech_KEI.html, 

December 10, 2005. 

73 Air Force Research Laboratory, Scramjet Engine Demonstration, 

Technical Description, Wright Patterson AFB, OH, October 20, 2005, 1-4. 

74 Mr. Glenn Liston, AFRL Propulsion Directorate, Interview by the 

author, January 26, 2005. 

63
 

75 Scramjet/Ramjet Propulsion, On-line Internet, 

www.atk.com/AdvancedSpaceSystems/advancespacesystems_scramjet.as

p, Accessed Nov 1, 2005. 

76 Liston. 

77 New World Vistas, Munitions Volume, 8-10. 

78 Dan Rosen, “Boost Phase Intercept of Ballistic Missiles” in The Threat 

of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East, Ed. Stav, Arieh, Brighton: Sussex 

Academic Press, 2004, 187-9. 

79 “Kinetic Energy Interceptor.” 

80 “Nanotechnology Aids the Advanced Energetics Program.” On-line 

internet, available from 

www.afrlhorizons.com?Briefs/Mar03/MN0210.html. Accessed on 1 Nov 

05. 

81 CBO, 8. 

82 Stav, xiv. 

. 

83 CBO, 40 

84 Fogleman, 75. 

85 Fogelman, 76. 

86 M. Kipphut, Lt Col. “Theater Missile Defense: Reflections for the 

Future,” Air Power Journal, 10. Winter 1996, 35-52. 

87 Department of the Air Force. Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol IV: 

Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations, Washington DC:, 

1993, 288. 

88 D. A. Fulghum, “Cobra Ball Revamped for Battlefield Missions,” 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 147, August 4, 1997, 49. 

89 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 295. 

64
 

90 Ibid., 291. 

91 Ibid., 295. 

92 Fogleman, 76. 

93 S. A. Hildreth, “Evaluation of US Army Assessment of Patriot 

Antitactical Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq,” prepared for 

the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and 

National Security, April 7, 1992, 2. 

94 J. Conyers, , Jr., Opening Statement to the Committee on Government 

Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, an 

Oversight Hearing on the Performance of the Patriot Missile in the Gulf 

War, April 7, 1991, 1-2. 

95 Z. Khalilzad, The United States and WMD: Missile Proliferation in the 

Middle East (RP-449). Santa Monica: RAND, 1996, 123. 

96 Ibid., 132. 

97 MDA Link, Threats Factsheets.

65