Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Kendall D. Gott

 

 Global War on Terrorism

 Occasional Paper 5

 In Search of an

 Elusive Enemy:

 The Victorio Campaign
 In Search of an 

 Elusive Enemy: 

 The Victorio Campaign 

 

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

by 

Kendall D. Gott
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gott, Kendall D.

In search of an elusive enemy : the Victorio campaign, 1879-1880 / Kendall D. Gott

p.cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Victorio, Apache Chief, d. 1881. 2. Warm Spring Apache Indians—Kings 

and rulers—Biography. 3. Warm Spring Apache Indians—Wars. 4. Membreño Indians—Wars. 5. Scouts and scouting—Southwest, New—History—19th century. 6. United States. Army. Cavalry, 9th—History. 7. United 

States. Army. Cavalry, 10th—History. I. US Army Command and General 

Staff College. Combat Studies Institute. II. Title.

 E99.A6V534 2004

 979.004’9725’0092—dc22

2004016523
i

Contents

Page

Illustrations ............................................................................................... ii

Foreword..................................................................................................iii

Preface....................................................................................................... v

Text ........................................................................................................... 1

Notes....................................................................................................... 46

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 51

About the Author..................................................................................... 55
ii 

Illustrations

Page

Maps

1. The Area of Operations...................................................................... 16

2. Major Morrow’s Double Envelopment............................................... 22

3. Area of Operations of the 10th US Cavalry Regiment ....................... 35

4. Victorio’s Path to Tres Castillos.......................................................... 41

Photographs

1. Government Pack Mules..................................................................... 11

2. Apache Scouts Drilling With Rifles, Fort Wingate, New Mexico ...... 12

3. Edward Hatch, 9th US Cavalry........................................................... 13

4. Victorio, Chief of the Mimbres Apache .............................................. 15

5. Benjamin H. Grierson, 10th US Cavalry ............................................ 29
iii

Foreword

In Search of an Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign, 1879-1880

represents another in a series of military case studies published by the 

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This work 

examines the US Army’s efforts in tracking down Victorio, the infamous 

Apache chief who raided large tracts of New Mexico and Texas at will, 

terrorizing the entire region. The key point made in this work is that it 

demonstrates the challenges of tracking and capturing or killing a small, 

irregular group of warriors in inhospitable terrain and among an alien 

culture.

Although set in the late 19th century, this case study is still extremely 

relevant for today’s Army. The commanders of the 9th and 10th US Cavalry Regiments faced a skilled adversary who used unconventional tactics 

and methods as well as an international border to seek sanctuary. However, 

it could just as easily have featured the stories of Osceola, Aguinaldo, Pancho Villa, or Osama bin Laden. The similarities to challenges that US and 

coalition forces face in Afghanistan and Iraq are striking. The commanders of the 19th century faced enormous challenges in the rugged terrain 

of the American Southwest as well as a skeptical and often hostile press. 

Again, officers and soldiers who have recently served in Afghanistan and 

Iraq will certainly see parallels here.

As the US Army continues its efforts in combating terrorists where 

they live, the lessons found in this narrative are well worth revisiting.

THOMAS T. SMITH

LTC, IN

Director, Combat Studies

v

Preface

This work represents my first publication since joining the esteemed 

ranks of CSI. I give many thanks to those who gave me this opportunity. 

The goal of this and other special studies CSI has published is to provide 

historical examples of battles, campaigns, and historical figures from 

which leaders of today’s Army can draw lessons and inspiration. Although 

the Victorio Campaign occurred more than a century ago, the tale still 

yields relevant points for the modern battlefield. The lessons here are not 

in using black powder weapons or Napoleonic tactics but in finding the 

key weakness in your enemy and adapting tactics and methods to exploit 

it. This work does not simply prescribe solutions but helps burnish the intellectual tools with which to diagnose the unexpected and create solutions 

using the hard-won experience of successful commanders of the past. The 

story of the Victorio Campaign does this and demonstrates that even under 

the most arduous of circumstances the American soldier will persevere 

until victory is won.

I would also like to extend thanks and appreciation to the staff of the 

Fort Davis Historic Site (National Park Service), Fort Davis, Texas, for the 

contemporary newspapers and materials used in this work, most notably a 

copy of Robert Grierson’s journal. Many thanks also to Don Stivers who 

graciously gave permission to use his painting, Tracking Victorio, for the 

cover.

Kendall D. Gott
1

The US Army has often been called upon to conduct operations in inhospitable climates on rugged terrain against elusive and determined foes. 

Some of the more famous of these characters were Emilio Aguinaldo of 

the Philippines, Pancho Villa of Mexico, and in recent times Muslim terrorist Osama bin Laden. Each of these men faced the superior weaponry 

and materiel of the US Army but put up a persistent struggle nonetheless. 

All of these operations were costly in manpower, were bitterly frustrating, 

and took months of hard campaigning. The areas of operation were in 

foreign lands and often featured a porous border or areas of sanctuary for 

the enemy to receive logistics support and recruits. The Army also faced 

extreme public scrutiny and at times a hostile press.

The Victorio Campaign bears many parallels to ongoing operations 

against Islamic terrorist movements. Victorio was a charismatic leader 

who many indeed considered a terrorist. On the other hand, his followers considered him a freedom fighter and gave him their unswerving 

loyalty. These warriors were fanatical in their support and willingly endured extreme hardship and depredation in the fight against their enemies. 

Victorio’s band was not self-sustaining and received replenishment from 

fellow Apaches that remained on the reservations when operating nearby. 

When ranging over the mountains the band relied on its defeated enemies’ 

captured arms, ammunition, and horses. Like today’s terrorist leaders, 

Victorio used an international border, that between the United States and 

Mexico, to great effect. He knew that both countries were unable to coordinate their efforts through the stifling bureaucracy and political rivalry 

that so often poisoned amicable relations. As a result, Victorio was able to 

raid into one country and avoid pursuit by simply recrossing the border.

Victorio’s opponents faced many of the challenges that are seen in 

current theaters of operation such as Afghanistan or Iraq. The officers and 

men of the US Cavalry were called on to pursue and destroy an enemy 

who had made the nearly barren mountains and harsh climate his home. 

The troopers were better armed and trained than their adversary but had 

great difficulty in bringing their firepower to bear against the agile and 

elusive Apache. There was also a cynical and often hostile press reporting 

on the progress, or lack thereof, against the raiders. The soldiers were a 

long way from home, and supplying them with food, forage, and ammunition was a constant endeavor across the vast tracts of the frontier. Finally, 

the US Army was restrained in pursuing Victorio across the international 

border into Mexico, resulting in a number of missed opportunities to decisively eliminate the threat of Apache raids.

Although the Victorio Campaign was fought more than 100 years ago, 
2 

it still presents lessons and insights for the modern commander. It is a 

story that illustrates the importance of understanding one’s enemy and the 

capabilities and limitations of one’s own troops. The campaign also shows 

the American soldier can adapt to harsh conditions and win against an 

elusive and deadly enemy, in this case the Apache.

The Mimbres Apache

Americans initiated a massive migration to the Western plains in the 

years following the Civil War, and the clash between the settlers and the 

native peoples was inevitable. The displacement of the indigenous tribes 

caused deep resentment and hostility. Armed clashes were frequent. The 

Army strove to separate the new settlers from the native peoples and 

enforce the peace by moving the tribes to reservations and keeping the 

settlers from encroaching on them. From the onset, the Army was overextended across the vast distances of the frontier, facing enormous challenges in logistics and communications.

Although most tribes peacefully confined themselves to the reservations, bands of warriors often left these tracts attempting to return to their 

traditional lands and old ways of life or, in some cases, simply to raid and 

pillage. The years 1879 and 1880 were particularly tense in the southwestern United States as various bands simultaneously sallied out of their 

reservations to return to their old nomadic lifestyle. Although it was the 

Apaches in the Southwest and the White River Utes in Colorado who were 

on the warpath at that time, every reservation saw countless small bands 

of renegades briefly raid nearby ranches and settlers. This meant the Army 

was engaged almost everywhere across the vast frontier, protecting civilians and pack trains from attack or hunting down wayward bands.

The defiant Apache chief Victorio was the principal threat to Western 

settlements during this period. He led a large band of warriors across the 

deserts and mountains of southern New Mexico and Texas, spreading terror and destruction as he struck at will. A wily tactical genius, Victorio 

confounded his enemies by using surprise and speed and crossing the 

international border between Mexico and the United States to thwart 

pursuers. Only after an intuitive regimental commander’s shift in tactics 

did the Army finally gain the upper hand and drive this rogue Apache into 

Mexico where Mexican forces ultimately trapped and killed him on a remote mountain.

The word Apache once struck fear into the hearts of their enemies and 

for good reason. They arrived in the American Southwest in what is now 

known as Arizona, New Mexico, and the Mexican province of Chihuahua 
3

between A.D. 900 and 1200, seizing this territory from its earlier inhabitants. After securing their homeland, the Apache dispersed because the desert terrain would not support a large concentration of people. The Apache 

divided into subtribes, each led by its own chieftain. Chief Victorio’s band 

was known by many names, including the Ojo Caliente (Warm Springs) 

Apache, Mimbrenos, Copper Mine Apache, Chilhennes, Eastern Chiricahuas, or more commonly, the Mimbres.

The desert afforded little means for a sedentary agrarian society, and 

the Apache maintained a mostly nomadic culture with an economic and 

political system based on raiding and plundering. Not surprisingly, this 

kept them at war with their neighbors through the centuries. Constant warfare and the ability to live in the mountains and deserts made the Apache 

renown for their fighting prowess and astonishing ability to endure pain 

and hardship. A tight-knit clan, these people had a callous disregard for 

outsiders, regardless of the hue of their skin, and looked on them all as 

essentially less than human. The tribal social hierarchy was based on the 

warrior, whose status was measured by how successful he was in battle 

and how much plunder he acquired in raids. The great chiefs attained and 

held their power by the force of personality, backed by success in war. 

This hold on power was precarious, however, as the ambitious braves, 

who had been taught from early childhood to hunt, track, ride, and fight, 

vied for position and status for themselves.1

Mobility meant survival to these nomadic people, and it came in the 

form of the horse. The Spaniards introduced the first horses to the region in 

the 1500s, and the Apache got theirs by trading for them or stealing them. 

Able then to efficiently travel long distances quickly, this tribe designed its 

society based on the mobility of the horse and its use in war. Raids were 

primarily aimed at stealing horses from other tribes, from the Spanish, and 

later from the Mexicans and Americans. Interestingly, the Apache never 

developed a devotion or spiritual link with the horse as many other tribes 

did. Although the horse provided mobility in the harsh environment, most 

Apache, in fact, were as much inclined to eat it as to ride it. This certainly 

simplified the problems of provisioning a mobile force in the mountains 

and deserts of the Southwest. Water for the horse and its rider came from 

rivers and springs that were well known to the Apache. If they carried 

anything to drink on the trail, it was usually held in a casually cleaned-out 

length of horse intestines and wrapped around the neck and body of a pack 

animal.2

The Apache initially used the classic weapons of bows and arrows, 

tomahawks, and knives, but by the 1850s, the rifle emerged as the preferred 
4 

weapon. Individual braves often modified their firearms to suit their own 

taste or to repair damage. It was not unusual for rifles to be shortened, 

sights altered or even removed, and leather straps used to secure the barrels 

to the stocks. Routine weapon maintenance and cleaning were almost nonexistent, and the black powder of the era used in firearms was highly corrosive and prone to fouling. The weapons were, at times, highly unreliable 

as a result. Repeating arms were always favored over the muzzle-loading 

models, and Victorio and his band were principally armed with captured 

Springfield rifles and carbines. There were perhaps a few Winchester or 

Henry rifles taken from victims or bought from dealers who thought little 

of the ramifications of providing these weapons. These newer lever-action 

weapons were far superior in firepower to the soldiers’ issued weapons, 

and they gave warriors armed with them a distinctive edge. On the other 

hand, American Indian warriors were stereotypically very poor marksmen, which is contrary to popular perception. This was due to a shortage 

of ammunition for practice and the generally poor condition of their arms 

because of lack of maintenance. Yet at close range the Apache warriors 

were very deadly. Two common tactics were used to compensate for poor 

marksmanship: ambush in the confines of a mountain pass or charging 

across open ground to close the distance as quickly as possible.

The Apache had always resisted the white settlement of their lands, 

even though they were originally allied with the Spanish against their 

Comanche enemies. (The Apache simply turned to raiding against the 

Spanish once the Comanche threat was eliminated.) Striking only when 

they perceived a great advantage and avoiding protracted battles and wars, 

the Apache were the scourge of the frontier. The bloodshed was so intense 

and the countermeasures were so ineffective that the Spanish eventually 

abandoned many of their missions in 1767 in what is now the American 

Southwest. The chaotic period of the Mexican Revolution during the 

1820s ended all government operations to defeat the Apache as generals 

and politicians fought each other in various bids for power. With the government’s attention diverted, the Apache could raid northern and central 

Mexico without fear of reprisals, resulting in much death, destruction, and 

bitter hatred of the Apache by the people throughout the region.

In desperation for an answer to the Apache raids the Mexican federal 

government instituted a bounty system by 1837. Up to 100 pesos were offered for a warrior’s scalp and somewhat less for the scalp of a woman or 

a child. The scalp system became big business as bounty hunters such as 

James Johnson, John Joel Glanton, and James Kirker organized bands of 

men to hunt down Indians. Kirker made more than $100,000 by his grisly 
5

work in one “season” and was a local hero of sorts. Unfortunately, Kirker 

became greedy and cashed in on Mexican scalps too, which were often undistinguishable from Apache scalps. To curtail this practice, Chihuahua’s 

governor changed the system to pay bounty hunters by the week, and 

Kirker retired in protest. The Apache were now provoked beyond reconciliation, and they stepped up their raids and rampage with a vengeance.3

With the rise in violence, separate Mexican states attempted to appease the Apache by offering bribes or goods. This only brought temporary reprieve as the raiders simply turned their attention to another province until it raised its offer. In frustration, the scalp system was reinstated, 

and men like Kirker resumed their work in earnest, once again collecting 

Apache and even occasional Mexican scalps. Blame for the murders of 

these Mexicans was easily shifted to the hostile Indians, further inciting 

the populace.

The Apache thus learned the value of scalps as trophies and adopted 

the practice themselves. Chiefs often gave rewards for the hair of any 

Mexican or American. Although the practice of taking scalps initially curtailed hostile Indian activity, in the long run it did far more damage than 

expected at the time. The escalation of brutality convinced the Apache that 

peaceful coexistence with the Mexicans was impossible.

The Apache acquired another foe after the Mexican War when the 

United States gained some large tracts of their tribal lands. In fact, the new 

international border sliced right through the Apache homeland, dividing 

it between two competing regional powers. Naturally the Apache did not 

recognize a division of their lands, but they did take full advantage of the 

limitations such a border imposed on nations such as sanctuary from a 

pursuing foe lacking authority to cross the border. Interestingly, the initial 

contact between the Americans and Apache was guarded but peaceful. Although the Apache felt no love for the American settlers moving through 

their lands, they were seen as a counterbalance to the hated Mexicans. The 

Apache soon realized there was little difference between Mexicans and 

Americans when it came to them occupying what they considered tribal 

land. The affluent Americans proved to be more lucrative targets for raids 

as well.

By the 1850s it was clear to the United States that the Apache were a 

threat to continued settlement and harmony with its neighbor to the south. 

Mexico lodged loud protests against the United States for failing to stop 

Apache raiders from crossing the border and giving them sanctuary on 

their return. American settlers also placed pressure on their representatives 
6 

in Washington to halt Apache raiding and killing. The US Army deployed 

to the West to protect the citizens, but most of the scattered units were 

recalled to the ast in 1861 for the duration of the Civil War. Augmented 

by only a few local militia units, the remaining military forces were completely inadequate for the task, leaving the hostile tribes to roam virtually 

at will. When the westward migration resumed in earnest after the Civil 

War, conflict was guaranteed as a number of settlers invariably occupied 

the few patches of arable Apache land. Men of dubious character arrived 

to sell whiskey and arms and ran gambling establishments that gladly took 

the Indians’ money. Such contact invariably led to conflict and disputes that 

were most often solved by violence, and this spawned more violence.

The Reservation System

The US government sought to separate the growing number of settlers 

from the indigenous peoples by clearly defining tribal lands and keeping 

the indigenous tribes within them. This goal would evolve into a reservation system whereby the inhabitants were encouraged to plant crops and 

live in settlements, thus giving up the old ways of hunting and gathering. 

It was the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior 

that ran the reservations. Unfortunately, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was 

never accused of being an efficient organization; it was permeated by corruption and mismanagement.

Indian agents were appointed and charged with overseeing reservation operations, issuing clothing and food, and constructing dwellings. 

The successful agents knew their constituents well and kept them peaceful 

and content on the reservation. Agents were also supposed to monitor the 

tribe’s activities, particularly the potential renegade warriors’ activities. In 

fact, the Army counted on the agents to provide advance warning of uprisings or depredations as well as to provide detailed information on the renegade warriors. The results were mixed at best. Contrary to conventional 

wisdom, many agents were naïve in their refusal to accept the notion that 

their charges were anything but peaceful, and they thought that brotherly 

love was all that was required for a solution to the Indian situation in the 

Southwest. Many others were corrupt or simply incompetent.4

Most American Indian tribes negotiated the boundaries of their reservations in good faith with the United States through their agents and 

accepted their fate. The chiefs could see that the sheer number of settlers 

moving into the Western frontier was so great that, in the long run, resistance was futile. Once the tribes were confined and under control, it 

became easy for the government to change or even ignore treaties, and the 
7

tribes were relegated to smaller reservations, often on land incapable of 

sustaining them. With a full stomach and a warm blanket, the American 

Indians might have become resigned to life on the reservation, but often 

rations were short or foul, and corruption and inefficiency often deprived 

them of promised blankets, clothes, and shelter. This left hunting or stealing the only methods of survival, and the reservations did not provide 

enough land for successful hunting. Even the war-like Apache had succumbed to the reservation system by 1871, with separate bands scattered 

over New Mexico and Arizona. Few were content though, and from 1865 

to 1898 the Army engaged in more than 1,000 battles and skirmishes to 

pacify the Western tribes.5

The Army’s ability to deal effectively with hostile tribes was hampered 

from the start by a lack of coordination among the military departments 

and various government agencies. While one commander negotiated a 

treaty in his area another would be conducting combat operations against 

hostile bands that would then cross into the former’s jurisdiction. When 

the pressure became too great, the renegade Indians would simply go to 

the nearest reservation and ask the Indian agent for peace and protection. 

Sanctuary was rarely refused. Army officers felt, often with good reason, 

that the reservations were simply safe havens for hostile Apaches who 

received refuge there as well as weapons, ammunition, provisions, and 

intelligence on troop movements.

The US Army in the West

The US Army was not in the peak of its development during the postCivil War period. In fact, it faced stagnation, being slow in developing into 

a modern force compared to European armies of that era. It was, by and 

large, unseen by and unpopular with the American public. The public’s exposure to the Army was confined to what it read about the Reconstruction 

and military ineptness in catching hostile Indians, a common feature in the 

newspapers of that time. There were a number of Americans who opposed 

the harsh treatment of the native people of the West, and the Army was a 

convenient target for their criticism. The Army’s role, however, was not to 

make policy but merely to enforce it. It would conduct this thankless task 

for more than 20 years on the Western plains, hated by all sides, the victim 

and the perpetrator of American domestic policy.

Congress set the Army’s strength in 1874 at a mere 27,442. There 

were more than 166 scattered forts and outposts meant to guard the vast 

expanse of the Western frontier. These were manned in most cases by 

small commands, seldom larger than a company, usually consisting of no 
8 

more than 50 men. Post commanders were required to take great risks in 

splitting their commands for escort duty, gambling that there would be 

enough troops to do the job at hand and at the same time protect the post. 

The only way for department commanders to undertake large operations 

was to assemble an ad hoc force from a number of forts and outposts for a 

specific mission. This practice stripped areas of Army protection, and the 

force that was formed generally lacked unit cohesion.6

The life of a soldier on the frontier was a dull routine that bore down 

hard on the men. There was tactical drill, stable and herd duty, and parade. 

There was also the monotony of chores and fatigue details necessary for 

the normal operation of the posts such as logging teams for the sawmill, 

work in the garden, and construction work using materials ranging from 

sod and adobe to brick and lumber. Guard duty was tedious, but it added 

an element of danger to the duty. Men were usually not allowed to leave 

camp and had to rely on themselves or alcohol for entertainment and 

diversion. Barracks conditions were often horrendously primitive and 

unsanitary. Officers generally fared little better, despite their position and 

their significantly higher, yet still meager, pay. Few officers and even fewer men brought their wives and families to the frontier outposts. Instead, 

they left them back home or at the larger posts, such as Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, which at that time was the main logistics base and headquarters 

for the Army in the West.

The harshness of Army life deterred most quality recruits; generally 

recruits came from the lower rungs of society. Immigrants and those unable to find jobs elsewhere formed most of the Army ranks. These men 

often showed up at their units with little or no training and tended not to 

get much training upon their arrival. Recruits simply had to learn survival 

in the harsh environment while on the job. For instance, the soldiers were 

allocated 10 rounds of ammunition per month for target practice. Turnover 

in the ranks was also high—between 25 and 40 percent annually by death, 

discharge, and desertion, the latter being the greatest cause.7

The senior officers were by and large veterans of the Civil War and had 

seen their share of combat, although of a vastly different nature. Most had 

returned to their permanent, more junior, ranks during the demobilization 

period and commanded units much smaller than they had previously. As 

seasoned veterans they generally held the respect and admiration of their 

men. The junior officers formed the backbone of the operations against the 

hostile tribes, leading their small detachments with only general guidance 

from above. The vast distances from headquarters and the poor communications required that each commander display a great deal of initiative and 
9

sound judgment. However, promotions for all officer grades were stagnant 

and morale suffered accordingly.

Junior officers serving on the frontier without service in the Civil War 

had received their commissions through the US Military Academy, West 

Point, New York. They were taught general tactics there but not tactics 

specifically tailored to fighting the Indians. Supplemental instruction was 

occasionally given, particularly after difficult campaigns such as those 

against the Nez Perce and Sioux Indians. It is likely that the frontier veterans posted to West Point as instructors passed on their lessons at least informally. The international law courses taught at the academy approached 

the subject of Indian warfare indirectly, somewhat equating it with irregular warfare. Many officers concluded, though, that since the Indians did 

not subscribe to the contemporary laws and customs of war the laws and 

customs did not extend to them either. In effect, the soldiers felt free to 

use whatever methods needed to subdue the Indians. On the other hand, 

the cadets were also taught that principles of humanity and Christian charity dictated that harsh measures were to be tempered and used only when 

absolutely necessary, lest the Americans sink to the level of their foes. So 

communal punishment and the destruction of property, food, and supplies 

were acceptable, yet the wanton slaughter of men, women, and children 

was not. There were indeed a few officers who espoused extermination as 

the means to end the Indian problems in the West, but these men were a 

distinct minority.8

Like West Point, the Army in the field during this period had no formal 

tactics in fighting Indians, although it had experience in doing so dating 

back to Colonial times. The common tactic used was an offensive strategy 

that called for a drive into hostile territory, forcing the tribe to do battle 

or lose its food supply. Another tactic was to conduct a relentless pursuit. 

Even if unable to catch its prey, a unit could simply wear down an Indian 

force, compelling it to leave a given area. Defeating the Indians often became a matter of locating their camps and attacking them by surprise. This 

was achieved by adapting the standard tactics of night marches and dawn 

raids. Experienced commanders also used ruses such as leaving campfires 

burning at night after the troops had moved or hanging back during a pursuit to lull the hostiles into a false sense of security.9

As for materiel, the Army relied primarily on modified Civil War surplus during the Indian war period. Commanders and troops continually 

complained about the regulation service uniforms, as the thin wool garments 

were not sufficient to protect from the harsh winters of the northern plains 

and were far too hot for the rugged Southwestern heat. Lacking support from 
10 

the quartermaster department, soldiers turned to improvisation. Using privately procured clothing items made for a distinctly un-uniform look; officers and men wore shirts and trousers of various colors and materials and 

sported a dazzling array of headgear.

The condition of the weapons was only slightly better. A board of 

Army officers examined and tested more than 100 new infantry weapons 

in 1872, adopting a modified model 1860 Springfield rifle, known today 

as the “trapdoor Springfield.” The standard variant used in the campaign 

against Victorio fired a .45- to .70-caliber center-fire copper cartridge filled 

with black powder. With a muzzle velocity of just over 1,300 feet per second, it was accurate to ranges between 200 and 300 yards.10 This weapon 

was rugged, reliable, and accurate but was outclassed in firepower by 

other popular weapons of the day such as the lever-action rifles Winchester 

made. Soldiers often faced Indians armed with these repeating weapons. 

For close-in fighting, the cavalry was issued either the Colt model 1860, 

modified to use cartridges, or the famous Colt single-action model 1873 

pistol. Sabers were rarely used and were often left behind during a campaign.

Army horses were generally bigger and stronger than their native 

prairie counterparts, but they were accustomed to a diet of grain fodder. Without a steady diet of grain the cavalry horses lacked stamina and 

became easily jaded. The heat and poor water on the trail exacerbated 

this problem. Additionally, the cavalry horses were shod, necessitating 

constant maintenance and shoe replacement in the rocky terrain. In short, 

cavalry units required substantial logistics support, and even when provided, the horses were temperamental in performance. Supplies were 

generally hauled by wagon trains while on campaign, although a few units 

preferred pack mules. The wagons tended to slow columns down, and 

while the mules could traverse the rugged terrain with ease, they could 

not carry loads as efficiently. Either method was extremely vulnerable to 

the fast-riding Apaches’ interdiction. Interestingly, while on a long march 

the infantry generally made better time than the cavalry, being free of the 

need of frequent rest and care for mounts. Infantrymen were not able to 

dash after the swift Apaches, so they were relegated, for the most part, to 

accompanying the supply trains as guards.

One of the Army’s innovators during this period was General George 

Crook. A veteran corps commander of the Civil War and commander of 

the Department of Arizona from 1871 to 1875, Crook studied the Apache 

way of war and decided that major changes were needed. He determined 

that the best way to fight the Apache was to copy their rapid movement 
11

techniques. Crook began using mule trains to speed his columns’ movement. He also stripped the baggage trains and individual soldiers of their 

excessive weight and trained his soldiers in the mechanics of long and 

rapid campaigns.

Crook’s pivotal development was enlisting Indians in the Army as 

scouts for six-month tours. Recruits for the scouts were easy to find by 

going to a rival tribe that harbored ancient hostilities toward the Apache. 

Recruits were also found among the Apache. Many Apache were willing 

to fight against the renegades whom they viewed as a long-term threat to 

their tribe. Regular soldier pay further induced enlistments. These scouts 

were adept at tracking even the most elusive renegades and proved invaluable as guides in finding water, provisions, and trails. Occasionally they 

also served as couriers and engaged in actual combat. During the Victorio 

Campaign, scouts wore various pieces of uniform that best suited each individual, and as a result, the risk of fratricide from the regular soldiers was 

high. Scouts rarely received any military training, and Army discipline did 

not apply. Organized into companies of 26 men and led by white officers, 

the Indian scouts earned a reputation of dependability and valor throughout the Indian wars. Without their efforts, defeating the hostiles would 

have taken far longer and cost many more lives.11

Figure 1. Government pack mules.

National Archives
12 

In response to the public outcry to solve the Indian problems in the 

West, Congress passed legislation in 1866 to increase the size of the Regular Army, which raised the number of cavalry regiments from six to 10 and 

the number of infantry regiments from 19 to 45. Legislation stipulated that 

two cavalry and four infantry regiments “shall be composed of colored 

men.” Thus, the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments and the 38th, 39th, 40th, 

and 41st Infantry Regiments were raised. With few exceptions white officers led these men. By the early 1870s the term “Buffalo Soldier” was commonly used in reference to the black cavalry troops, but today it generally 

applies to all troops of African-American descent who served on the frontier. The term originated with the native peoples and was readily adopted 

by the Army and civilians alike, except for the soldiers themselves who did 

not care for the distinction at the time. The 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments 

formed the backbone of the Army’s campaign against Victorio.12

Major General Philip H. Sheridan, then commanding the Military 

Division of the Gulf, authorized the organization of the 9th US Cavalry 

Regiment under the command of Colonel Edward Hatch on 3 August 

1866. The pay of $13 per month was a great incentive for the former 

slaves who dominated the ranks, and the mustering station found a large 

number of them from the crowded streets of New Orleans, Louisiana. To 

give experience to these new regiments, discharges were authorized for 

men then serving in wartime volunteer “colored” regiments who desired 

to transfer to this regular regiment. These men were highly desired, and 

they eventually filled most of the noncommissioned officer positions. Additional recruits from Kentucky and horses from St. Louis, Missouri, later 

completed the organization of the regiment, which initially had just over 

800 men on its rolls.13

Figure 2. Apache scouts drilling with rifles, Fort Wingate, New Mexico.

National Archives
13

Winter 1866-1867 was spent organizing and drilling the 9th Cavalry 

into an effective unit. The orders regarding stable duty were especially 

strict. Few officers had as yet joined, and the number on duty with the regiment was so small that a scheme of squadron organization was adopted to 

ensure that at least one officer was present with each squadron for every 

drill or other duty. Most of the enlisted soldiers were woefully ignorant of 

military discipline and procedures. Assiduous labor and constant drilling 

made much headway so that by the end of March 1867 most of the regiment was ordered to proceed to San Antonio, Texas. Two companies were 

detached and sent to Brownsville, Texas, remaining there several years. 

By then the officers of the regiment were nearly all appointed and with 

their commands.14

Within seven months of its organization, the 9th Cavalry was ordered 

to western and southwestern Texas to assist in opening up that vast territory to settlement. This territory was harsh and foreboding, with oases, 

Figure 3. Edward Hatch, 9th US Cavalry.

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14 

such as they were, dubbed with appropriate names such as Sulfur Springs, 

Gypsum Bottom, and Hellfire Flat. The regiment was dispersed across the 

district, with the headquarters and four companies at Fort Stockton, four 

companies at Fort Davis, and two companies remaining in Brownsville. 

The regiment’s principal duties were to establish and protect the mail and 

stage route from San Antonio to El Paso, to reestablish law and order in 

a territory that had been in near anarchy during the Civil War, to prevent 

marauding by Indians, and to capture all roving bands and confine them to 

their reservations. In short, the 9th Cavalry was a very busy regiment.

After seven years of patrolling desolate surroundings, the regiment 

was transferred to New Mexico in 1875, with its headquarters in Santa Fe 

and the troops scattered all over that territory and beyond. The general duty 

was about the same as in Texas. During the time the regiment remained in 

New Mexico, various troops and detachments were employed in capturing 

and returning numerous roving bands of Apache to their reservations. By 

the time of the Victorio Campaign, the effective regimental strength was 

about 400 men.

Victorio, Chief of the Mimbres Apache

Victorio had lived through the events that saw his people fall from a 

great warrior tribe to having to settle on reservations. Very little is known 

of his early life, but he was probably born in the Black Mountain Range 

of New Mexico around 1820 and reared as a member of the Eastern Chiricahua tribe, often referred to as the Mimbres Apache. Many in northern 

Mexico at the time thought he was part Mexican or even a full Mexican 

captured on one of the many Apache raids. Somewhat unusual for a chief, 

Victorio had only one wife, to whom he was completely devoted. Victorio 

rode with the famous medicine man, Nana, and Geronimo on raids into 

northern Mexico in the 1850s, and in 1862, he was said to have allied his 

band under chieftain Mangas Coloradas. After Mangas died in 1863, Victorio rapidly rose in influence and emerged as a full tribal leader, forming 

a group of Eastern Chiricahuas and Mescaleros into a tribe of about 400 

fanatically devoted warriors. These warriors fought without mercy to their 

enemies, taking what they wanted and destroying what they did not.15

On the Reservation

The various bands of Apache were forced onto reservations in Arizona 

and New Mexico following General Crook’s successful operations in 1872 

and 1873. Soon after their reservation was established in New Mexico, the 

Mimbres Apache abandoned it and followed Victorio to the Chiricahua

reservation in Arizona, but the climate, food supply, water—almost 
15

everything—felt wrong to them, as they were in a foreign land. Victorio’s 

band stayed there, resisting all pleas and threats until the government 

finally gave in and provided it with a new reservation in 1874. This one 

was located in central New Mexico at Ojo Caliente, or Warm Springs. The 

Mimbres tribe regarded this as its real home and was happy there for the 

next few years.

Unfortunately for all, the United States then decided on a policy of 

concentrating the Indian tribes into larger, more logistically manageable, 

reservations while ignoring intratribal hostilities. Victorio’s people were 

informed that they would have to move again, but they were assured that it 

would be no farther west than the San Carlos Reservation. Victorio and his 

band submitted to this in May 1877. Having to leave their half-ripe crops 

behind, they were bitter and dissatisfied from the start. The flat terrain 

was strange and ugly to these people from the mountains, and they had to 

Figure 4. Victorio, Chief of the Mimbres Apache.

National Archives
16 

share it with the detested Western Chiricahuas. Efforts at integrating the 

Mimbres into the reservation and government affairs failed. Small groups 

of young warriors left the reservation over a period of several weeks in an 

attempt to live by hunting but returned when they were either captured by 

Army patrols or on their own accord when faced with starvation.

Soon, though, Victorio, now nearly 60 years old, fled the reservation 

with about 300 men, women, and children and raided the surrounding 

countryside. Needing horses, Victorio and his band attacked the nearby 

ranches, killing 12 settlers and capturing more than 100 animals. A combined force of reservation police and Army patrols cornered his band in 

the Natanes Mountains, but Victorio was able to extract his people to safety temporarily. Several battles with elements of the 9th Cavalry occurred 

over the next few weeks, with the Apache taking most of the casualties. 

With his people nearly destitute of food, clothing, and weapons and after 

losing more than a third of his people, Victorio took the rest out of the 

desolate mountains to Fort Wingate and surrendered.16

By now the government was convinced that consolidating the Apache 

tribes only exacerbated an already volatile situation. Because the Mimbres

people were so restless, most of them received permission to return to 

Map 1. The area of operations.
17

Warm Springs. They had remained there for only a year when this order 

was once again rescinded in August 1878. Soldiers arrived to escort Victorio and his band back to San Carlos, and the Mimbres were divided into 

fragments after their return. While many warriors stayed on the reservation with its miserable conditions, small bands again chose instead to flee 

into the mountains to live as before, led by such notables as Chiefs Juh, 

Nolgee, and Nana. Victorio led one such band into Mexico for a short 

time but reappeared at the Warm Springs Reservation near Fort Stanton 

in February 1879, having lost a number of his people to exposure and 

disease. He wanted his tribe to settle there and gained permission from 

Indian Agent Russell to remain in the area temporarily until Washington 

was consulted. Meanwhile, the defiant Victorio told those around him how 

preferable life was off the reservation and of his wish to pursue that dream. 

Russell quickly saw him as an agitator and a threat to the peace. Although 

he argued in favor of Victorio’s request to be allowed to remain at Warm 

Springs, the Army refused to grant permission without specific instructions 

from Washington. As government agencies sought a solution, there was an 

uneasy peace at the reservation. This peace was indeed short-lived.

Victorio Takes the Warpath

To date Victorio had not received any punishment for his raiding and 

murders, but public outcry was growing. Tension on the reservation was 

growing too as he confronted Agent Russell over the conditions there. 

Since Victorio’s people were officially there temporarily, pending a decision on their return to the San Carlos Reservation, Russell was not authorized to issue them rations. As a result, they had to fend for themselves and 

were hungry. The heated exchanges over conditions and the rumor that 

Victorio’s men were making tiswin, a narcotic beverage made from malted 

grain and jimsonweed, led Russell to request troops from Fort Stanton 

for his personal protection. When Victorio saw an approaching column of 

soldiers, he and his followers hastily left the reservation for what would 

be the final time. He had heard that there was a new judge and district attorney, and he believed he would be tried for old murders and horse stealing and sent to prison or to exile in Florida. Preferring death to either, he 

fled on 21 August 1879 with about 80 warriors along with their wives and 

children. Victorio’s final abandonment of the reservation surprised Agent 

Russell. He had repeatedly assured the Apache under his charge that their 

families would remain together and they would be established in their new 

homeland before the onset of winter. The Apache he talked to gave him the 

impression they were looking forward to the move.17

Once off the reservation Victorio’s band had to survive using the old 
18 

method, by raiding. Victorio had stolen more than 15 horses from the reservation, but he needed more to maintain his mobility. Within days, 40 

Apache warriors attacked an Army outpost near Warm Springs, killing five 

soldiers and three civilians and making off with the 68 horses and mules of 

Company E, 9th Cavalry, under the command of Captain Ambrose Hooker. A few days later, Victorio struck another outpost some 20 miles south 

of the Warm Springs Reservation. There the scene was repeated, with 

10 soldiers killed and all of the livestock captured. In response, Colonel 

Hatch deployed every company of the 9th Cavalry to the field. Additional 

troops from scattered posts throughout the district were also consolidated 

to meet this threat. Lieutenant Charles Gatewood and his Apache scouts 

were brought in from Arizona. Hatch then deployed detachments led by 

junior officers across New Mexico, with orders to find Victorio’s elusive 

band.18

Victorio’s force varied in size, starting with almost 80 warriors and 

growing to no more than 300 warriors at any given time. Including women 

and children, his band never exceeded 450. Newspaper stories at the time 

claimed his followers included Comanches and Navajos, but that is uncertain. It is believed that a party of Mescaleros under Chief Caballero later 

joined Victorio for a time, which would account for the occasional high 

numbers. As Victorio’s success and fame grew, young warriors flocked 

to him or at least emulated him by raiding in their own local areas. These 

scattered incidents inflated Victorio’s true strength and gave observers the 

impression that he was able to move fantastic distances over a short time.

A detachment of the 9th Cavalry, under Second Lieutenant George 

W. Smith, found a true trail and chased Victorio to the Rio Grande River 

but failed to catch him. Victorio posted braves as a rear guard to push 

large stones down on the pursuing soldiers, thus discouraging pursuit. The 

Apache also knew the terrain intimately, and the braves were simply too 

fast, often riding their horses to death. They would then eat the dead horses 

and steal more to carry on the fight. Always on fresh mounts and often 

splitting into small groups, Victorio and his band crossed into the safety of 

Chihuahua, Mexico, before they could be intercepted. There he extorted 

ammunition and supplies in return for sparing a village or two from destruction. Some villages offered the Apache liquor in the hopes that he and 

his band would become drunk so they could be easily killed later. Victorio 

had seen this trick work far too many times over the years and forbade his 

people to drink the Mexican alcohol.

In the brief period of Victorio’s absence, the new territorial governor 

of New Mexico, Lew Wallace of Civil War fame and author of Ben Hur, 
19

asked Washington for authority to field volunteer companies to pursue 

Victorio. Hastily raised companies such as these were repeatedly shown 

to be useless in cornering the nimble Apache, and they were just as likely 

as not to be ambushed and destroyed by their intended prey. The request 

was refused, but Wallace was assured that federal troops were concentrating in his territory. Not waiting for their arrival, local communities formed 

militias for home defense. The larger towns were thus able to deter major 

Apache raids, but the smaller hamlets could not arm enough men to do the 

same. When Victorio chose to attack them in the future, the small towns 

felt his wrath.19

Convinced they were Victorio’s next target, many settlers and ranchers from across the territory pleaded with civil authorities for protection. 

The press echoed their sentiments, chastising and ridiculing the Army for 

its inability to capture or destroy the wayward Apache. The controversial 

use of “colored” troops was also heavily discussed in the editorials, some 

lacking confidence in their abilities, others decrying the practice of arming 

former slaves at all, and others portraying them as saviors of the troubled 

land. News of real and alleged Indian raids spread rapidly, and incidents 

that had no connection with Victorio were ascribed to him. Officers who 

acted on the supposed validity of these reports instead of on scouts and 

reconnoitering were constantly frustrated in locating Victorio’s trail.

South of the border, officials in Chihuahua were beset by a constant 

threat of revolution and an ongoing economic depression. They were also 

frustrated by Victorio’s raiding when he came south to avoid American 

patrols. They appointed Joaquín Terrazas colonel of the militia and sent 

him to hunt down and destroy Victorio and his band. Terrazas, a seasoned 

veteran of Indian fighting, knew how to campaign in the mountains and 

deserts and held the confidence of the local populace. His ferocity in battle 

was legendary, and he set about organizing a militia force to deal with Victorio, appointing men of competence to key regional positions. This did 

not mean the militias would be effective; in fact, most of them were made 

up of men with little or no training. Many were far more interested in scalp 

bounties and booty than in capturing Victorio. On the occasions when the 

newly organized militias were called out to fight, more often than not Terrazas’ men withdrew when the Apache promised to return to the United 

States without further trouble. When the militias chose to chase Victorio, 

they were usually ambushed and defeated.20

Victorio also had to contend with another paramilitary organization 

called the Texas Rangers. Captain George W. Baylor commanded a Ranger 

company at El Paso that participated in the campaign. It never numbered 
20 

more than 20 men and confined its activities mostly to west Texas, with an 

occasional unauthorized foray into Mexico. These men knew the terrain 

and were expert in tracking, having hunted desperados and renegades for 

years. They were renowned for their firepower as well, being armed with 

state-of-the-art lever-action rifles, a pair of revolvers on their belts, and 

another pair on the saddles for close-in fighting. With such firepower, the 

Rangers could take on many times their number. The Rangers’ contribution to the campaign was primarily as an intelligence-gathering asset, occasionally reporting Victorio’s whereabouts and activities to the Army. By 

September their reports and others made it clear that Victorio was moving 

north out of Mexico and back into the United States.21

Victorio’s Return

A force from the 9th Cavalry led by Lieutenant Colonel Dudley, consisting of Company B under Captain Dawson and Company E under Captain Hooker, searched southwestern New Mexico for signs of Victorio’s 

arrival. Two additional companies (C and G) were nearby and available to 

support this force if needed. Navajo scouts found Victorio’s two-day-old 

trail at the head of the Sierra Blanca Canyon on 16 September, and riders brought word to Captain Hooker and his company to converge at that 

point. Meanwhile Dawson’s troops followed the trail up to the head of the 

Las Animas River where, on 18 September, they stumbled into Victorio’s 

band. Here, within strongly entrenched positions behind rocks overlooking a deep canyon, the Apache awaited the troops’ advance. These were 

conditions Victorio preferred, and he chose to fight the first major battle 

of the campaign here. As the cavalry troops dismounted and advanced up 

the canyon, a single shot killed one of the Navajo scouts, and a withering 

crossfire rained down on the startled soldiers. Hemmed in on three sides, 

the two companies were trapped and cut off from help.

From 3 miles away, Captain Beyer and Lieutenant Hugo of Companies C and G, respectively, rode hard with their units to the sound of 

firing. These companies dismounted and advanced up the canyon, but a 

fierce Apache counterattack stopped them dead in their tracks, routing the 

stunned troops. One five-man detachment under Lieutenant Robert T. Emmet was left behind, but his prominent position and his men’s good marksmanship provided effective covering fire for the withdrawing companies. 

In the confusion and smoke of the battle, Emmet eventually extracted his 

men from their peril and was later awarded the Medal of Honor for his 

gallantry.22

Companies C and G recovered from their initial panic and settled into 
21

the business of rooting out Victorio’s men one by one from the rocks 

above. After a day-long fight with five men killed and one man wounded, 

the cavalrymen were not able to dislodge their enemy from the rocks, but 

had established contact with the trapped B and E Companies. At dusk the 

entire force was ordered to withdraw to avoid encirclement by the hostiles, 

and a flank attack on Victorio’s braves provided a distraction to extract 

Companies B and E. Refusing to leave his wounded to certain death at the 

hands of the Apache, Lieutenant Matthias W. Day advanced about 600 feet 

under heavy fire to retrieve a disabled soldier. His actions earned him the 

immediate ire of Lieutenant Colonel Dudley who wanted to court-martial 

him, but instead a board of inquiry cleared Day and he later received the 

Medal of Honor. Sergeant John Denny also ran a gauntlet of fire to retrieve 

a soldier, and he too received the Medal of Honor. Although personnel 

losses were light—eight killed and a few wounded—the same was not 

true for the horses. Thirty-two mounts were killed and six were wounded 

in the fight, and 53 horses and mules were abandoned, leaving the cavalry 

force largely dismounted. Losses to Victorio’s band were estimated at only 

two or three warriors, but the Apache custom of carrying off their dead 

and wounded made any accurate count impossible. Rumors circulated for 

a brief time that Victorio was killed. What had become very apparent was 

that it was virtually impossible to strike Victorio if he did not want to be 

caught.23

With Victorio’s operating area now known, Major Albert P. Morrow of 

the 9th Cavalry assumed command of operations in southern New Mexico. 

He consolidated his available forces, numbering nearly 200 officers and 

men of four companies and 36 Apache scouts. Seventy-three men of this 

force were still dismounted as a result of Victorio’s earlier raids. Morrow’s 

plan was to send the scouts under Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood and a 

detachment under Captain Augustus P. Blocksom through the Mimbres 

Mountains toward Victorio’s suspected lair. By using pack mules, this 

force would travel light and fast. Meanwhile, most of the force, supplied 

by wagon, would take an old road around the range. The plan was to have 

the forces under Gatewood and Blocksom attack from the west while 

Morrow’s men attacked up a valley from the east, thus trapping Victorio 

between them.24

The plan was doomed from the onset, as Victorio would not allow 

himself to be caught in such a trap. Although the force accompanied by 

pack mules did demonstrate some agility, the force relying on wagons was 

far too slow and cumbersome. By the time Morrow was in position and the 

operation commenced, Victorio was no longer where he was believed to 
22 

be, having left some three days earlier. Undaunted as yet, Major Morrow 

attempted to track and intercept Victorio, combing countless valleys and 

peaks of the rugged mountains. Yet the slow-moving soldiers could not 

catch the agile Apache raiders.

The troops under Blocksom’s command located and followed Victorio’s trail near the Arroyo Seco River. It was now raining constantly, and 

the soldiers were miserable. After three days, scouts determined that Victorio was unaware that he was being followed, for his passage was marked 

Map 2. Major Morrow’s double envelopment.
23

with broken-down animals left to die, and no effort was being made to 

conceal the trail. As the column continued the rain ended, bringing out a 

scorching sun that seared the soldiers in their wool uniforms. The scouts 

went in advance of the column not only to look for Victorio but also to 

look for water, which was now in critically short supply because the troops 

had been on the trail for 11 days.

On 28 September the Apache scouts discovered Victorio’s camp in 

a deep canyon, and a few shots were exchanged. The renegades thought 

that only the scouts were present, but they soon realized their error. Finding Victorio’s camp, the scouts passed the word to the troops. By the time 

Major Morrow assembled his forces, he believed it was too dark to attack 

and ordered the men into bivouac for the night. During the night the scouts 

went cautiously forward to surround Victorio’s camp in the rugged terrain. 

In the early morning, about 80 men were dismounted and moved forward 

to assault the hostile camp, but again the Apache had slipped away. Victorio’s known losses were two dead warriors and a squaw, while the soldiers 

had not lost a man.

The next day, 29 September, Major Morrow had slightly better luck. 

The scouts in advance of his column had again spotted Victorio’s band and 

were engaged in a running gunfight. Although by the time the troops were 

assembled it was late in the day and darkness was approaching, Morrow 

ordered an immediate attack, knowing his foe would not give him another 

chance. The scouts under Gatewood and Blocksom rushed the camp, and 

the soldiers followed, coming under fire from Apache in the surrounding 

hills. The fighting ended with the darkness around 2200. No casualties 

were reported among the soldiers, and three dead Apache were found in 

the camp. Morrow’s men captured about 60 horses and mules, of which a 

dozen were Captain Hooker’s stolen animals. However, Victorio and his 

braves managed to drive off most of their stock and left very little of value 

in their deserted camp. Sergeant Thomas Boyne was later awarded the 

Medal of Honor for bravery in action on this day.25

Victorio did not go far this time. In fact, his warriors simply occupied 

positions among the rocks overlooking their abandoned camp. The steep 

walls of the canyon were about 800 feet high and covered with scattered 

trees and heavy underbrush. At daybreak on 30 September these braves 

began a hot fire on Captain Blocksom’s mounted outposts and then on 

Major Morrow’s camp. The soldiers were under arms in short order, 

returning fire and advancing in small groups, bounding from one rock to 

another. The sounds of battle reverberated up and down the valley, putting 

the participants’ nerve and courage to the test. As the soldiers advanced in 
24 

number, Victorio’s men fell back a short distance and kept fighting. The 

firefight raged up the canyon through most of the day, with the soldiers 

trying to make their way around to flank their enemy and get behind them 

to cut off their escape. Each time they came close to doing so, the Apache 

would simply fall back a short distance and resume firing. By 1500, the 

Apache were driven to higher ground. The consensus among the Army 

officers was that these new positions were impossible to assail. In the 

crags of the steep slope the braves taunted the soldiers. Pools of blood 

and bloody rags left behind were the only evidence that more Apache had 

been hit.26

Faced by the impassable terrain, Major Morrow decided to withdraw 

down the canyon and look for another way to come to grips with Victorio. 

As the blue column trudged off, it came under sporadic fire all the way 

to the desert floor near Curchillo Negro. Captain Francis S. Dodge later 

received the Medal of Honor for his actions that day. Watching the soldiers 

withdraw, no doubt Victorio and his men believed they had repulsed their 

enemy. They had for the moment but at a great cost. A number of braves 

were killed and many were wounded. Among the dead was Victorio’s son, 

Washington. The grieving father decided to head west into the Mogollon 

Range, but the column was slowed to a crawl because the Apache carried 

their wounded.27

Meanwhile Major Morrow regrouped his command and sent out 

scouts to relocate Victorio on 1 October. They returned by nightfall and 

reported the Apache band was only 4 miles from the camp that had been 

captured two days earlier. Morrow ordered Blocksom and his scouts to 

get behind Victorio while he approached up the small canyon to the new 

hostile camp. The plan was to attack simultaneously at daylight. The operation commenced as planned, but the soldiers found only burning fires 

and strips of meat hanging to dry. The camp had been heavily fortified and 

would have been difficult to take had Victorio chosen to defend it. Instead 

the Apache chief chose to take the trail west toward the Mogollon Range.

Scouts were sent out once again and returned on 3 October, confirming that Victorio’s trail led toward the range by way of Malpais Creek. 

Major Morrow took his command to the Warm Springs Reservation, about 

15 miles away, for rations and ammunition and to shoe some of the horses 

and mules. He also sent a report of Victorio’s movements to Fort Bayard 

and requested more men.

Morrow’s command left Warm Springs on 5 October, heading south 

along the North Star Road. The cavalry tried to locate Victorio’s trail by 
25

crossing it or by cutting him off should he veer from the Mogollon Range 

and head toward Mexico. After a march of about 35 miles, Morrow met 

with two detachments from Fort Bayard under the command of Captain 

George A. Purington of the 9th Cavalry and Second Lieutenant James A. 

Maney of the 15th Infantry. After more than five days of searching, these 

officers reported no signs of crossing Victorio’s trail, so Major Morrow 

sent his scouts north again and rested his men while awaiting their report. 

The scouts returned on 16 October, having indeed found signs Victorio’s 

band had crossed the road and were heading west. But finding his trail was 

not enough. Throughout the month Victorio struck at will, attacking and 

burning ranches and settlements. He also discouraged pursuit by fouling 

known water supplies with animal carcasses.

After marching more than 117 miles in 79 hours, Morrow’s command 

was eventually whittled down to just 81 troops and 18 scouts, the rest 

strung behind him with broken-down horses and all short of rations and 

water. Morrow tenaciously pursued Victorio, though, and caught up with 

him on 29 October near the Corralitas River. There was a brief fight, but 

the soldiers could not drive the Apache from their strong position. Low on 

supplies, water, and ammunition, Morrow had little choice but to return to 

Fort Bayard, arriving on 2 November, his force completely used up. Most 

of the horses had been lost to combat casualties, exposure, and lack of 

forage. The men were exhausted, as those who had lost their mounts had 

to return on foot. Although he did not decisively defeat Victorio, Morrow 

apparently drove him from southeastern New Mexico for the time being.

Not surprisingly, the Army came under fire from a hostile press that 

did not understand how the Army could not decisively defeat a small band 

of renegades. Citizens chaffed at the restrictions placed on the Army and 

law enforcement officials in crossing the Mexican border in pursuit.

“Old Vic” was indeed on his way to Mexico, but he was certainly 

not defeated. Along his route he attacked scattered farms and ranches in 

the search for cattle, horses, and weapons. Hearing hostile Apache had 

attacked Mason’s ranch, the good citizens of Mesilla assembled 20 volunteers to go to the rescue. Having already made quick work of the ranch, 

the Apache ambushed the relief column, which retreated to another ranch 

and sent for help. Letting the inept militia go, Victorio turned his attention 

to two supply wagons creaking unsuspectingly toward Mason’s ranch. In a 

matter of minutes 11 men and one woman were killed, and one woman and 

one child were taken captive. More volunteers arrived only to find Victorio 

had vanished and crossed again into Mexico.
26 

Frustrated by Victorio’s raids and the failure to capture him, the various 

civil and military departments began an angry exchange of letters and telegrams. The Army blamed the Indian agents for being lenient and charged 

that the agents should be able to monitor the braves on the reservations and 

report immediately any signs of impending departure. The agents countered that the Army was inefficient and the troops wrongheaded in their 

attitudes toward the Indians. The regional newspapers naturally picked up 

on this friction and were delighted to report on it, adding, of course, their 

own criticism and hostility. Major Morrow took it upon himself to submit 

his own editorial replies, citing he had engaged Victorio and had driven 

him out of the region and into Mexico. These letters drew editorial catcalls 

as editors credited the volunteers at Mesilla for driving Victorio south of 

the border. However, many of the imperiled settlers, miners, and ranchers 

began to realize that far more of them might have perished had it not been 

for the persistence and sacrifices of the long-marching Buffalo Soldiers of 

the 9th Cavalry.28

While the newspapers and various government agencies hurled accusations, Victorio rested his warriors in the Candelaria Mountains in Chihuahua where he remained relatively secure during November. From his 

position, he had an ample water supply and could observe the happenings 

on the plain below. On 7 November a group of Mexicans from the nearby 

town of Carrizal approached his camp, looking for cattle thieves. They 

were ambushed and killed. Another group sent to find out what happened 

to the first was also wiped out in the same place. A plea for assistance 

was sent to Paso del Norte (near present-day El Paso), and 10 of Baylor’s 

Texas Rangers (Company C) from nearby Yselta, Texas, were permitted to 

enter Mexico to help pin down Victorio. When the Rangers and Mexicans, 

in force, arrived at the massacre scene, the Apache were long gone.29

On 28 November another party of Mimbres Apache left their reservation after killing an ox and 15 head of sheep and packing the meat 

on stolen horses. The amount of meat taken was far more than the small 

party’s needs, and this suggested it was destined for a much larger group. 

Speculation that Victorio had reentered the United States was confirmed 

on 1 December when two miners reported spotting him in the Sacramento 

Mountains. Over the next few months Victorio had several clashes with 

cavalry patrols there but always on his terms and when the terrain was to 

his advantage. He and his band maneuvered easily through the country 

that wore down soldiers and their horses after only a few days of active 

scouting.

Victorio sustained his operations primarily by acquiring what he needed 
27

from his defeated foes. His band took arms and ammunition from the dead, 

from traders, and from some of the Mexican sheepherders whom they had 

killed. Since everything Victorio used was readily available and expendable, he could travel light and fast. The one exception to the rule, and his 

primary logistics concern, was water. In the mountains and desert plains, 

even the hardy Apache could not carry large enough amounts of essential water. As such, Victorio had to plan his operations around the water 

sources in the region.

The bloody ambushes near Carrizal spurred the Mexican government into action. The Mexican authorities subsequently informed the US 

Government that they had renewed their pursuit of Victorio and expected 

to drive him back into Texas once again. Forces totaling 500 men, led 

by General Geronimo Treviño and Colonel Joaquín Terrazas, were in the 

field. Both were highly experienced and respected men, and expectations 

for success were high. However, indigenous revolutionary ferment in Chihuahua prevented their effective use since they were overly dispersed to 

keep order in the cities.

Meanwhile Victorio learned of the Mexican forces assembling to 

meet him. Curiously, he did not offer serious resistance and chose instead 

to evade his Mexican pursuers and reenter the United States. Scattered 

reports of the Apache moving north toward the border reached Colonel 

Hatch in early January 1880, and he ordered the entire 9th Cavalry Regiment to the field. For the first time he took personal command of the operation to hunt down Victorio, no longer relying on a subordinate officer 

placed in command of an ad hoc detachment. Hatch planned to use the 

full weight of his regiment to keep continuous pressure on the hostiles 

to wear them down. Learning of Apache movements in the Mimbres 

Mountains, he sent three companies and about 50 Indian scouts into the 

hills to look for Victorio. Major Morrow was in command of this battalion and closed with Victorio on 9 January near the head of the Puerco 

River. Victorio eluded his pursuers but had running firefights with them 

on 17 January in the San Mateo Mountains, on 30 January in the San 

Andres Mountains, and fought there again on 3 February. On 27 January 

Morrow’s supply train was attacked but fortunately not captured. None 

of these engagements was decisive, and the total loss to Morrow was 

three men killed, including Lieutenant Hansell French, and seven men 

wounded. The cavalrymen’s effectiveness was once again reduced by the 

loss of horses and the shortage of provisions, and they were forced to 

return to Fort Bayard. Meanwhile, Victorio seemed to vanish into thin air 

once again, leaving a trail of dead ranchers and settlers in his path, which 
28 

seemed to be heading back to the Warm Springs Reservation.

Over the months, news of Victorio’s exploits naturally made its way 

back to the Mimbres at the Warm Springs Reservation. The warriors who 

had stayed behind no doubt thought of the glory they were missing. Approximately 60 braves were known to have left at various intervals to 

join up with Victorio, but most of the warriors, including the remaining 

chiefs, stayed on the reservation and tried to keep the young braves there. 

However, government officials widely suspected Victorio was getting not 

only substantial reinforcements but also clandestine materiel help from the 

reservation. The answer, it seemed, was to confiscate all of the remaining 

weapons and horses on the Mimbres reservation to prevent Victorio and 

his followers from eventually using them. Without weapons or horses, it 

was reasoned, it would be impossible for braves to join Victorio to aid 

him with substantial logistics. Such a move would help calm the panicked 

civilian populace and help identify hostile Apache. Those who were armed 

could be assumed hostile and thus a legitimate target. To disarm the Mimbres at the reservation, General Philip Sheridan ordered the 9th and 10th 

Cavalry Regiments to converge there on 12 April in an overwhelming 

show of force.

The 10th Cavalry Joins the Search

The 10th US Cavalry was organized at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

in 1866, but this process proved more difficult than that of its sister regiment. Colonel Benjamin Grierson, a cavalry officer made famous during 

the Civil War, set very high standards for potential recruits, which slowed 

the process tremendously. As a result, the completion of the organization 

of eight companies took slightly over a year. In 1880, the 10th Cavalry had 

approximately 550 effectives.30

Finding suitable recruits was not the only difficulty. The racism so common to the era was a major obstacle. Whereas its remote locations rather 

insulated the 9th Cavalry from institutional hostility, the 10th Cavalry’s organization at Fort Leavenworth placed it in a very hostile environment. As 

the headquarters and bustling logistics center for the Army in the West, the 

post afforded no opportunity to insulate the new “colored” regiment from 

the prejudices of the day. The fort’s commander, Brevet Major General 

William Hoffman, was openly opposed to racially integrating the Regular 

Army, and he made life as difficult as he could on the new troops. Many 

officers and men of the post assisted him in that endeavor. Grierson eventually gained permission to transfer the 10th Cavalry to Fort Riley, Kansas, 

and in the summer of 1866 the final four companies joined the regiment.
29

The 10th Cavalry served in Kansas and Oklahoma for the next eight 

years, guarding workers building the Kansas and Pacific Railroad; erecting telegraph lines; and constructing Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Throughout 

these years, the regiment constantly patrolled the local reservations to 

keep the renegades in place. The 10th Cavalry performed well during 

General William T. Sherman’s winter campaigns against the Cheyennes, 

Arapahos, and Comanches in 1867 and 1868. Most of the regiment was 

moved to Fort Concho, Texas, in 1875 to protect mail and travel routes, 

monitor and control the Indian reservations, and protect the settlers from 

outlaws. One company of the 10th Cavalry was sent to Fort Davis, Texas, 

which had been occupied by elements of the 9th Cavalry in 1866 before 

their reassignment to New Mexico in 1875. The arduous duty on the frontier produced tough soldiers who became accustomed to surviving in an 

area that offered few comforts and no luxuries.31

Figure 5. Benjamin H. Grierson, 10th US Cavalry.

National Archives
30 

When orders were received in January 1880 to move his regiment 

from Texas to Warm Springs, New Mexico, Grierson assembled five cavalry companies and designated a small detachment of the 25th Infantry 

Regiment attached to his command to guard his supply train. These companies departed Fort Davis and had brushes with small bands of Apache 

along the entire route. As the 10th Cavalry approached from the east, the 

9th Cavalry closed in on the unsuspecting Mimbres reservation from the 

west. The 9th Cavalry had a detachment of Pueblo Indian scouts under the 

command of Lieutenant Samuel L. Woodward serving as the regiment’s 

eyes and ears. The goal was to quickly disarm the reservation Indians and 

confiscate their horses to deprive Victorio of materiel support.

Reconnoitering by Indian scouts revealed Victorio was holed up in 

Hembrillo Canyon. Colonel Hatch decided to divert his 9th Cavalry Regiment from the Mimbres reservation trail toward that spot. To prepare for 

battle, Major Morrow’s command—consisting of three companies totaling 

75 men, a detachment from the 25th Infantry, and a few San Carlos Indian 

scouts—was quickly brought up to Palomas and refitted with new boots, 

uniforms, and provisions. Captain C.B. McClellan of the 6th Cavalry, with 

85 men and 40 Indian scouts, joined with Morrow to form the main assault 

force to attack Victorio’s camp, scheduled for 8 April. Captain Hooker’s 

force—consisting of three cavalry companies, 20 men from the 15th Infantry, and some Navaho scouts—was sent to swing around to the east side 

of the range to cut off any escape from that quarter. Captain Carroll, with 

four companies totaling about 100 men, was to advance up the Hembrillo 

Canyon in support.32

The plan was a good one and might have worked, but fate threw the 

precise timing off. Unknown to Captain Carroll, the main assault force under Major Morrow was delayed by the need to search for water after reaching a well he counted on and finding the water pump unusable. The assault 

force would not reach its position in time. As for Carroll’s command, it 

had found a source of water that, unknown to the men, had a high alkaline 

content that caused severe nausea and diarrhea for humans and animals 

alike. Captain Carroll and his command were searching for a good source 

of water too but proceeded with the operation as planned. Unaware of 

Morrow’s delay, Carroll and his men pushed up the canyon on 8 April and 

were promptly ambushed by Victorio’s braves who used the rugged terrain 

to their best advantage and nearly surrounded the troops. Upon hearing the 

heavy firing, Captain McClellan hurried his troops forward, apparently 

surprising the Apache, and relieved pressure on the beleaguered cavalrymen. Victorio and his band scattered and vanished among the rocks. 
31

Claims of the number of Apache killed varied, but only one body was 

found. McClellan reported that the hostiles had retreated toward the Mimbres reservation, further strengthening the belief that support was coming 

from there. Colonel Hatch arrived the following day with Morrow’s battalion, assumed command of the assembled forces, and proceeded on to 

the Mimbres reservation. In his haste to ride to the sound of gunfire, Hatch 

missed an opportunity to capture Victorio and his band, which had just 

scampered off the trail as the column of cavalry galloped by.33

The convergence of the cavalry regiments at the Mimbres reservation 

at Warm Springs now continued according to the original plan. Despite 

the brief encounter at Hembrillo Canyon, the separate units converged 

within an hour or so of each other. Approximately 1,000 soldiers suddenly 

appearing on the scene had the desired effect of an overwhelming show 

of force. But the 400 or so Mimbres present, mostly women and children, 

scattered to the winds, believing the soldiers were there to move them to 

another reservation. Agent Russell was surprised as well, not having been 

informed of the plan to disarm the Apache at the reservation and confiscate 

their horses. He pleaded with Hatch and Grierson to be allowed to assure 

the Mimbres that the horses and weapons would be returned once peace 

was restored. Hatch agreed, but Grierson did not feel such leniency was 

wise. It was clear to him that the reservation at Warm Springs had become 

essentially a recruiting and supply base for Victorio. With the Department 

of the Interior feeding and housing the women, children, and elderly, the 

braves were thus free to leave to join Victorio.

When the task of collecting weapons finally commenced on 16 April, 

there were 65 adult males on the reservation; the rest were either in hiding or with Victorio. Agent Russell accompanied the soldiers to each 

encampment within the reservation, assuring each one the weapons and 

animals would be returned. Nautzila, the principal remaining chief, also 

went among his people and encouraged them to remain on the reservation. The effects of Russell and Nautzila’s combined efforts were mixed. 

Despite their assurances, more than 300 Apache soon fled the reservation. 

In once instance, 30 armed and mounted Mimbres, along with women and 

children, were spotted ascending into the mountains beyond the reservation. They were now fair game for the troops. The soldiers formed a line 

and held their fire until the faster, unladed warriors advanced clear of the 

women and children before firing. Fourteen warriors were killed, and the 

rest kept running. About 250 Apache were soon rounded up and returned 

to the reservation as prisoners. They were initially held in the agency corral under abysmal conditions. Conditions gradually improved, but it was 
32 

not until nearly seven months later that their full freedoms were restored. 

More than 200 horses were taken and removed to Fort Stanton. Of these, 

all but 42 later died or were confiscated by the Army and surrounding 

citizens.34

The Tide Starts to Turn

After the fight at Hembrillo Canyon, Victorio and his band headed not 

for the Mimbres reservation but once again for the sanctuary of Mexico. 

He remained undetected until 13 May when a lone citizen gave warning 

that Victorio’s band was spotted and was about to attack the settlement 

next to Old Fort Tularosa. A detachment of 25 troops under Sergeant 

George Jordan was at the nearby Barlow and Sanders Stage Station, and 

saddled up to intercept Victorio. Arriving at the old fort, Jordan found that 

Victorio had not yet attacked and put his troopers to work on erecting defenses and protecting the local populace. Victorio did indeed arrive on 14 

May and launched an attack at dusk. The attack was stopped by heavy fire, 

and a subsequent attack fared no better. This was enough for the Apache 

chief, who turned southwest toward the border. For his action that day 

Sergeant Jordan was awarded the Medal of Honor. The troops were indeed 

fortunate, suffering only a few casualties.35

Local volunteer citizens formed posses to hunt down the Apache but 

failed to find signs of them or were ambushed when they did. Although 

instances of raiding, murder, and destruction continued, Army scouts did 

not find Victorio’s camps again until 23 May when one was spotted in the 

Black Range near the head of the Palamosa River at Cañada Alamosa. 

Traveling light and fast with pack mules, Captain H.K. Parker sent his 

Apache scouts to circle around Victorio’s camp, aiming to block any 

routes of escape. Meanwhile, Parker dismounted his 60 cavalrymen about 

300 yards away and crept up on the sleeping Apache throughout the night. 

By daybreak he was within 50 yards of the hostile camp, which had but 30 

warriors. As prearranged, the scouts then opened up on the Mimbres camp, 

and Parker’s men joined in.

The fight that was suddenly upon Victorio’s men initially stunned 

them, but they reacted quickly. The women deliberately exposed themselves to draw fire away from the warriors who quickly sought cover and 

began returning fire. The exchange of gunfire lasted most of the day before 

the lack of water compelled Captain Parker to withdraw his forces. He was 

able to extract his men and 74 captured horses. Parker estimated that he 

killed about 30 men, women, and children, but there was no way to verify 

that claim. What was clear was that Victorio was badly surprised and suf-
33

fered losses of both people and horses. Victorio almost paid for this with 

his life, being wounded in the fighting, but his enemies did not know this. 

The eager press seized on Parker’s victory, the first good news in months.

Victorio received another blow when Major Morrow’s command took 

up the pursuit as Parker’s force recuperated. It caught up with Victorio’s 

exhausted rear guard on 30 May, killing three warriors and wounding several more. The pursuit ended when the Mimbres crossed the border into 

Mexico where the American forces were forbidden to follow. Six days 

later Morrow’s men intercepted a small party making its separate way into 

Mexico. Two hostiles were killed and three wounded. This marked the 9th 

Cavalry’s last major engagement against Victorio. It spent the rest of the 

campaign blocking its sector of the border and patrolling the area around 

the Mimbres reservation, attempting to deprive Victorio of support.36

This particular phase of the campaign was as frustrating as any other, 

but it was not a failure. Although Victorio’s raids had killed a number of 

civilians and caused extensive losses, the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments’ 

combined efforts had forced him to seek safety in Mexico. Victorio was 

also down to fewer than 200 braves and had lost a large number of his 

animals.37

After the Mimbres reservation affair Colonel Grierson withdrew his 

10th Cavalry from New Mexico, believing Victorio would conduct raids 

into his district of southwestern Texas. Grierson came to this assessment 

by noting the increased level of Indian incidents in that area and reports 

that Victorio was luring recruits from that area. This tactical assessment 

of Victorio’s intentions was strengthened by an incident on 12 May, when 

eight Mimbres Apache attacked a wagon train. Captain Carpenter’s Company H pursued the band to the Rio Grande, believing it was on its way 

to join Victorio just across the border. Grierson also changed the strategy 

of pursuit, the only decisive result of which had been worn-out men and 

horses. Instead of chasing the elusive Apache across the desolate terrain 

Grierson posted detachments at watering holes and mountain passes that 

Victorio was bound to use. The infantry detachments in his district were 

organized to protect the wagon and pack trains shuttling supplies from 

the district headquarters at Fort Concho to Fort Davis and to the cavalry 

columns lacing the deserts to the west.

Victorio had indeed crossed into Mexico, shaking off the pursuit of 

American forces that could not cross the border. There he rested and received more recruits. By the end of July he was ready to cross back into 

the United States, and this time his target was Texas. Now, however, the 
34 

southwestern United States was mobilized and looking for any sign of the 

return of the dreaded Apache. The 9th and 10th Cavalry were deployed 

across the border monitoring likely crossing sites. Texas Rangers, militia 

units, and citizen posses were also vigilant.

South of the border, Colonel Valle sent word in late July to Colonel 

Grierson that his force of 400 Mexican troops was pursuing Victorio. In a 

rare instance of border violations by Mexican forces, Valle’s men crossed 

the Rio Grande in hot pursuit but stopped after a few miles, being completely out of provisions and exhausted. Grierson sent supplies in reply 

to an appeal for help but feared that Victorio may have eluded Valle and 

cut back into Mexico. Grierson was correct. Entering the United States, 

Victorio and his 200 remaining warriors encountered gunfire wherever 

they went. Although able to elude each group of pursuers, the Mimbres

band was taking casualties, and its supply of ammunition and horses was 

becoming increasingly uncertain. Victorio returned to Mexico on 31 July 

only to head north again four days later.38

Colonel Grierson surmised that Victorio meant to reenter the United 

States once more and probably head straight for the Mescalero country 

of southern New Mexico in search of supplies and new recruits. To block 

Victorio Grierson concentrated eight troops of the 10th Cavalry at Fort 

Davis and went there himself. Also at his command were the four companies of the 24th Infantry under Lieutenant John E. Yard already stationed 

at Davis, a troop of the 8th Cavalry, and a detachment of Pueblo scouts 

recruited at the old Indian towns of Socorro and Ysleta, near El Paso. Captain Baylor’s Texas Rangers, based at Ysleta, stood ready to help. Grierson 

also strengthened the subposts along the Rio Grande at Viejo Pass, Eagle 

Springs, and old Fort Quitman, abandoned as a permanent post three years 

earlier. Yet, concentrating combat power was not enough; it was critical to 

determine Victorio’s location to apply it.

The Fights at Tinaja de Las Palmas and Eagle Springs

On 28 July Grierson learned from his scouts, who had crossed the border into Mexico and spoken with Colonel Valle, that Victorio was indeed 

headed north toward the Rio Grande. The companies and detachments 

from the various posts were ordered to converge at a water hole known 

as Tinaja de Las Palmas. When the telegraph lines went dead, Colonel 

Grierson rode east from Fort Quitman the next day to personally assemble 

his command. He took only eight men as an escort through this dangerous 

region. This little band crossed the Quitman Mountains and dropped into 

Quitman Canyon as a courier from Captain John C. Gilmore, commanding 
35

at Eagle Springs, rode up with word that Victorio was in the immediate 

area with 150 warriors. Knowing the area well, Grierson knew Victorio 

would have to stop for water at Tinaja de Las Palmas, which was presently 

unguarded because it held water only after a rain and thus was generally 

an unreliable water source. This assessment was strengthened when a lone 

Apache was spotted reconnoitering in the area.39

Colonel Grierson’s detachment reached Tinaja de Las Palmas at the 

foot of Rocky Ridge and entrenched just short of the crest, naming the two 

tiny forts “Beck” and “Grierson.” Stagecoaches passing in the night were 

stopped, and the drivers were instructed to take word to the subposts at 

Eagle Springs and Quitman to send reinforcements at once. Captain Gilmore sent Lieutenant Leighton Finley and 15 cavalrymen to escort the colonel to Eagle Springs, and they reached Grierson by 0400. But the colonel 

had wanted reinforcements, not an escort, and sent two riders at a gallop 

to bring up whatever forces they could find. Finley’s men constructed another fortification on the lower ridge of the knoll among the rocks. Just 23 

men were available to hold these three rock redoubts guarding the water 

Map 3. Area of operations of the 10th US Cavalry Regiment.
36 

hole. At 0730 Pueblo Indian scouts reported that Victorio was camped in 

a canyon only 10 miles to the south and was preparing to move. Time was 

running out for Grierson and his small band of Buffalo Soldiers.

At 0900, 30 July the weary Apache approached the water hole and 

quickly spotted the blue-clad troops. Victorio sent his men to the east to 

bypass this position, but Grierson would not allow him to get away that 

easily and ordered Lieutenant Finley to charge forward with 10 men. These 

soldiers were caught in a classic ambush as they learned Victorio had deliberately exposed part of his force as bait to lure his foe into a killing zone. 

Finley’s force was out of range of support from the small forts and was 

on its own. The Apache took cover among the rocks and returned fire in a 

skirmish that lasted more than an hour, during which the soldiers were in 

grave danger of being encircled and annihilated in their advanced position. 

Desperate, Finley ordered a charge to break the Apache siege. Hearing 

the sound of battle in the mountains, Captain Viele, with Companies C 

and G, charged down the road from Eagle Springs and joined the battle at 

this critical time. However, in the smoke and dust of battle, the charging 

troopers initially mistook Finley’s detachment for hostiles and opened fire, 

forcing a confused withdrawal from its advanced position back to Grierson’s troops covering the water hole. Luckily the “friendly” fire caused 

no casualties among the cavalrymen. Taking advantage of the confusion, 

Victorio ordered a counterattack, apparently believing there were but a few 

soldiers. The screaming Apache rose up and rushed forward.

Private Samuel Prescott’s horse was shot out from under him, and he 

faced a literal race for his life. Sprinting after his hard-riding comrades, 

he stopped briefly to empty his revolver in the direction of his pursuers, 

which caused them to pause just long enough for him to effect his escape 

by reaching the protective fire of the soldiers on the ridge. Also, once deprived of their cover, Victorio’s men were easy targets. “We then let fly 

from our fortifications at the Indians about 300 yards off,” wrote young 

Robert Grierson in his diary, “and golly you ought to’ve seen ‘em turn tail 

and strike for the hills. If this one man had only got back with the rest we 

could have waited till the Indians got very close to us before firing. . . . 

As it was the sons of guns nearly jumped out of their skins getting away.” 

The reprieve was short though as Victorio’s braves regrouped and renewed 

the battle. It took another hour, but Captain Viele finally fought his way 

through to Colonel Grierson. Seeking to avoid battle against diminishing 

odds, Victorio again tried to bypass the cavalrymen and head north, but 

Grierson ordered another detachment forward that cut off the warriors and 

forced them to turn back.40
37

The odds against Victorio further tipped with the sudden arrival of 

Company A under the command of Captain Nicholas Nolan, who had ridden hard from Fort Quitman. By 1230 the outnumbered Mimbres broke 

contact and scattered south toward the Rio Grande and Mexico. The 

cavalry’s losses were surprisingly light, with only one man killed and 

Lieutenant R.S. Colladay wounded in the four-hour fight. From Victorio’s 

force of about 100 braves, approximately seven men were killed and a 

large number wounded. This skirmish forced Victorio to retreat, but Colonel Grierson knew that his adversary would soon return. The cavalrymen 

salvaged the horse equipment from the dead animals and were back in 

Eagle Springs by nightfall. No one knew it at the time, but this tactical 

defeat meant the beginning of the end for Victorio.41

Colonel Grierson would not have to wait long for Victorio’s return. 

The word that Victorio was in motion again arrived by message from 

Colonel Valle of the Mexican forces in the final week of July. Victorio’s 

advance guard was spotted on 2 August by a detachment led by Lieutenant 

Henry Flipper, who then rode a hard 98 miles in 21 hours to bring this vital 

intelligence to his company commander, Captain Gilmore. Word was sent 

immediately to Grierson who ordered his scattered detachments to converge on Eagle Springs. A detachment under Corporal Asa Weaver made 

contact with Victorio’s main force on 3 August in a surprise engagement in 

which the soldiers had to fight a 21-mile running rear-guard action all the 

way to Eagle Springs. Other patrols confirmed that Victorio and between 

125 and 150 followers with many horses were headed north from the Rio 

Grande toward the Guadalupe Mountains. Grierson ordered his command 

in that direction in an attempt to block the way north into New Mexico. He 

hoped to establish an ambush in Bass Canyon, near the town of Van Horn, 

and amended his orders to his scattered companies to converge there.42

On 5 August the men of the 10th Cavalry marched about 68 miles in 

24 hours to arrive ahead of Victorio. The two companies with Grierson 

reached the canyon but discovered that Victorio had doubled back, slipping through the screen of soldiers and was then riding north on the west 

side of the forbidding Sierra Diablo range. Grierson raced north on the 

east side of the mountains, shielding his command from observation. His 

objective was to reach the watering hole at Rattlesnake Springs, one of but 

two permanent water sources in the region, before Victorio. (The other permanent water hole was located at Sulphur Springs, nearly 50 miles away.) 

It simply became a race to reach the vital source of water first. Interestingly, Grierson countermanded his order to leave the wagons behind and use 

pack mules. Instead, the cavalry would use the vehicles as far as possible.
38 

After traversing the desert and mountains for days, cavalrymen and 

their mounts were worn down, but Grierson and the advance elements of 

the 10th Cavalry marched another 65 miles in under 21 hours and reached 

Rattlesnake Springs, arriving just ahead of Victorio. This rapid advance 

was made possible in great part by the large quantities of forage and water carried in the wagons, a rare example of the use of wagons actually 

speeding an advance. After posting his men in the rocks to cover the water 

source, Grierson awaited reinforcements. Soon Captain Carpenter and two 

more companies joined him and were posted a short distance south of the 

spring in support.

At 1400 on 6 August the Apache slowly made their way down Rattlesnake Canyon toward the spring, unaware of the ambush laid for them. 

They, too, had ridden hard, and both Apache and horses needed water. 

Victorio was tactically off balance and apparently did not have an advance 

guard. Just seconds before the signal was given to the cavalrymen to commence fire, Victorio sensed danger and halted his men. With hostiles who 

were about to bolt in their sights, the troops did not wait; they opened fire 

on their own initiative, and under a hail of lead, Victorio’s men scattered 

and withdrew out of range.

But Victorio’s people needed water and, believing there were only 

a few soldiers present, regrouped and attacked immediately. However, 

Companies B and H were in an overwatch position covering the water, 

and a few massed volleys from their carbines sent the hostiles scattering 

back into the canyon. Stunned by the presence of such a strong force but 

in desperate need of water, Victorio repeatedly charged the cavalrymen 

in attempts to reach the spring. The last such attempt was conducted near 

nightfall and, when it failed, Victorio and his followers withdrew into the 

mountains with the cavalrymen in furious pursuit. Darkness finally halted 

Grierson’s troops.43

Victorio gathered his people in the mountains west of the spring. In 

the light of a new day, to the southeast and about 8 miles distant, a string 

of wagons was seen rounding a mountain spur and crawling onto the plain. 

It was a load of provisions from Fort Davis, guarded by Captain Gilmore 

and his company of infantry. A band of warriors rode out of the mountains 

and attacked savagely but were met with a destructive volley. Colonel 

Grierson sent a company under Captain Carpenter to assist and strike the 

attackers in the rear. The Apache attack disintegrated as the warriors fled 

in confusion to the southwest to rejoin Victorio’s main force as it moved 

deeper into the Carrizo Mountains.
39

Victorio suffered setbacks elsewhere, too. Captain Lebo with Troop 

K belatedly reached Rattlesnake Springs on 7 August. On the way he had 

cut off a band of Mescaleros from the Guadalupe Mountains riding to join 

Victorio, forcing them back to the north. Three companies under Captain 

Carpenter’s command were dispatched to Sulfur Springs to guard the water there. Captain Baylor and 15 Texas Rangers joined Carpenter’s force 

on 8 August and joined in the hunt.44

Victorio’s band felt a major blow when its supply camp atop the Sierra 

Diablo was discovered on 9 August. Attacked by cavalrymen and Rangers, the guards fled, leaving 25 head of cattle, provisions, and some pack 

animals. Victorio was now critically short of food and water and facing 

increasing numbers of soldiers, Rangers, and armed citizens. His people 

were hardy but not indestructible. With resupply uncertain and faced 

by such strength, Victorio slipped his band back across the border into 

Mexico to avoid pursuit. His people had more than 30 braves killed and 50 

wounded, and those remaining were mostly on foot and weak.

Victorio was substantially weakened, and Grierson now had most of 

his command assembled. Giving his enemy no rest, Grierson organized 

his force into three squadrons of two companies each and sent them to 

comb the mountains for a sign of the hostiles. He also maintained guards 

on all the known water sources. Carpenter and Nolan picked up the trail 

on 11 August, but their horses were too tired and thirsty for rapid pursuit. 

Nolan’s men reached the Rio Grande on 13 August. There the Indian 

scouts reported that Victorio had crossed only the night before, but it was 

apparent that the number of wounded and his broken-down stock were 

slowing his pace. This trail was to be the last evidence seen of Victorio in 

the United States.

However, Victorio was still on the loose, and no one could guess when 

he would return. What everyone knew was that the raids and killing would 

continue as long as he lived. To underscore that point, Victorio gave a 

parting salute as his party fled west into the Carrizo Mountains and on to 

Mexico. Passing again through Quitman Canyon the Apache ambushed a 

stagecoach and killed the driver and passenger J.J. Byrne, a Union general 

in the Civil War who had also been a US Marshal in Galveston. At the time 

of his death, Byrne was employed as a surveyor for the Texas and Pacific 

Railroad. The bullet struck him in the thigh, reported Ranger Captain Baylor, “within an inch of the wound he received at Gettysburg.” J.J. Byrne 

bled to death from his wound.45

Worn down by the arduous campaign, Grierson’s 10th Cavalry was 
40 

posted in static positions along the Rio Grande to rest but also to be in 

position to stop Victorio from returning to Texas. Colonel Grierson had not 

destroyed Victorio, but he had outmaneuvered the greatest of the Apache 

chiefs and had prevented him from going where he had planned to go. Few 

commanders on the western frontier could make a similar claim.

Victorio and his band crossed the border, but the Mexican forces 

avoided a decisive battle with them and, in effect, allowed them safe passage. The Apache chief was soon in the Candileria Mountains, nearly 60 

miles from old Fort Quitman. These rugged mountains were safe, but this 

isolated range was devoid of game and could not support his people for 

long. Effectively blocked from returning to New Mexico, Victorio would 

lead his people southeast and deeper into Mexico.

The Last Weeks of Victorio

At this very late stage, the Mexican and American governments finally began to cooperate to trap and destroy Victorio’s band. A powerful 

force assembled under Colonels George Buell and Eugene Carr was given 

permission to cross into Mexico, and by September this operation was put 

into motion. Captain Baylor with 12 of his Texas Rangers and almost 100 

civilian volunteers also supported the cross-border operation. Although 

the spirit of cooperation between the two governments was high, it was 

short-lived. On 9 October Colonel Joaquín Terrazas of the Mexican forces 

requested that all American forces withdraw beyond the border, citing 

they were no longer needed. It seemed obvious to the American officers 

that Terrazas felt he had the situation in hand and did not wish to share the 

glory. It turned out to be a fairly accurate assessment. Although the American officers protested, they complied with the request and subsequent orders from Washington by trekking north. For the Americans, the campaign 

against Victorio was over.46

The Mexican forces in pursuit were under the sole command of 

Colonel Terrazas, principally because Colonel Valles’ force of about 400 

men had just returned from a long campaign and required time to rest 

and refit. Terrazas had spent the month of September scouting through 

the mountains of Chihuahua searching for signs of Victorio and gathering 

men and weapons from the reluctant and unenthusiastic citizens. When 

he sent word to the Americans to return home, he had more than 350 men 

under arms with ample supplies and ammunition and was confident he had 

enough force to deal with the renegade Apache chieftain.

Victorio’s braves, women, and children had spent more than a year on 

the run, and the harsh conditions and deprivation were telling. The con-
41

stant skirmishing with the American Army and Mexican forces had worn 

down the people and animals. The resistance they were now encountering 

was more organized and heavily armed. For reasons known only to Victorio, once he was in Mexico, he turned his people to the southeast to a 

mountain range known as Tres Castillos (Three Peaks). These mountains 

were not particularly imposing and were essentially no more than three 

mounds of rock in a vast open desert. There was little water, sparse grass 

for the animals, and no means of escape except by crossing the open desert 

once again. The mountains here would not be a place of refuge but a final 

trap.

The trails leading to the camp were unmistakable, and Tarahumari 

Indian scouts quickly found its location and reported to General Terrazas. 

Terrazas quickly converged his 350 men on that location and surrounded 

Victorio on one of the mountain peaks on 14 October. For 24 hours the 

adversaries waged a bitter and bloody battle among the rocks. This time 

the Mexican numbers and firepower were decisive. Toward the end, the 

Apache were almost out of ammunition and were reduced to throwing 

Map 4. Victorio’s path to Tres Castillos.
42 

stones. When the fight was finally over, Victorio and 86 warriors were 

dead, and 89 women and children were taken captive. They were held 

in Chihuahua City for the next several years. Only a handful of warriors 

escaped. A Tarahumari sharpshooter felled Victorio with a miraculously 

long shot, although Apache legend persists that “Old Vic” took his own 

life with his knife to prevent being captured.47

The few who escaped, including aged Apache medicine man Nana, 

joined another renegade, Geronimo, in the Sierra Madre to the west and 

carried on the traditions of Victorio. In January 1881 they stopped a 

stagecoach in Quitman Canyon and killed the occupants. Baylor’s Texas 

Rangers took the trail that twisted and turned through mountain and desert. Reinforced, the Rangers surprised the Apache camp high in the Sierra 

Diablo on 29 January. Four warriors, two women, and two children fell in 

the first volley, and the rest scattered and eventually made their way back 

to the reservations in New Mexico and Arizona.

Victorio’s demise had caused a grievous blow to the Mimbres Apaches’ resistance. The number in any given raider band became generally no 

more than 10 warriors and up to 30 being the rare exception. Forays from 

notable Apaches, such as Nana and Geronimo, were brief and were simply 

small affairs when compared to the size of Victorio’s force and the destruction it caused. By 1886 even these Apache were finally and officially 

pacified, and peace came to the Southwest.

The Final Analysis

The Victorio Campaign illustrates how a small band of dedicated and 

hardy people can fight for an extensive time against an overwhelming 

force. By knowing the terrain intimately Victorio usually was one step 

ahead of his pursuers, savagely striking at will and disappearing as a phantom into the mountains. Although his people could endure extreme hardship, he provided them with food and knew where the few sources of water 

were. He was in many ways an asymmetric fighter. He and his band were 

highly adaptive and organized on the basis of an idea alone, that being 

maintaining the old Apache way of life. This coupled with a far different 

set of values and motivations exposed little for the US Army to target and 

neutralize except by overwhelming force over a long period of time.

Victorio and his supporters maintained that, had the Mimbres Apache 

been allowed to stay at the reservation of their choice, they would have 

been peaceful and content. That may or may not have been true, but the 

issue became irrelevant on the initiation of their final departure from the 

reservation. They were convinced there could be no peace with the Ameri-
43

can government, and after a series of murders and stealing, they were 

absolutely correct. The public would not tolerate their simple return to the 

reservation to take up the plow. This left but two outcomes for Victorio: 

victory or death. The inexorable flow of Western civilization across the 

frontier guaranteed the final outcome. The Apache would adapt to the reservation, or they would die trying to maintain their old way of life.

Once off the reservation, the renegade Apache became the US Army’s 

problem. Undermanned and tasked to secure a vast frontier, the Army 

faced enormous challenges. Events showed the officers and men were up 

to the challenge, but they were armed with mediocre weapons, and the 

clothing and equipment were most often unsuited for the environment in 

which they fought. Logistics, too, was a constant struggle, hampered by 

a lack of infrastructure and supply trains that faced interdiction over the 

long distances through hostile territory.

Unfortunately for Victorio he faced two commanders who had adapted well to the situation in the West and made the best use of what was on 

hand. Colonels Edwin Hatch and Benjamin Grierson were both veterans 

of the Civil War and had commanded their regiments on the plains for almost 15 years. They had come to know their men and the terrain in which 

they were to fight. They both used Indian scouts extensively and employed 

the more nimble mule trains when possible.

There are four key elements that brought about the 9th and 10th 

Cavalry Regiments’ defeat of Victorio. The first key element was using 

Indian scouts as trackers and guides. The Indian scouts reliably identified Victorio’s whereabouts and predicted his intentions. They were also 

able to penetrate into Mexico and gather intelligence almost at will, and 

if caught by authorities, the US government could easily disavow them. 

Without the Indian scouts the cavalry would have been limited to pursuit 

operations against a foe that could afford to drive its animals to death, then 

simply steal more and continue on.

The second key element was Colonel Grierson’s decision to forego 

pursuit operations and to place guarding forces to cover the few sources 

of water in his department. This new tactic forced Victorio to come to a 

location where the cavalrymen would enjoy the advantages of defending 

among the rocks. Deprived of water and lacking the firepower to take it, 

Victorio was forced to withdraw in an increasingly desperate search for 

it. In the end it seemed as though Grierson was one step ahead of his wily 

adversary. Given Grierson’s control over the available water sources, 

Victorio had few choices. Faced by a strong cavalry screen and short on 
44 

water, he returned to Mexico to meet his fate a few weeks later. Although 

the Mexicans claimed the credit for finally ending Victorio’s reign of terror, it was the US Army’s efforts that weakened him to the point that it was 

possible to do so.

Separating Victorio’s band from the support it received from the reservation at Warm Springs was the third key element. Although the cavalry 

used heavy-handed methods, disarming the reservation Indians and confiscating their horses severely curtailed the potential support Victorio could 

receive from that quarter.

The fourth key element in defeating Victorio was Colonel Grierson’s 

determination to relentlessly seek battle with Victorio’s band. Constantly 

on the run, the Apache found it increasingly difficult to rest and regroup. 

This strategy required Grierson to keep his men in the field, and the cost in 

supplies and horses was immense. He also had to contend with an increasingly frustrated public and the press. However, over time, patience and 

arduous efforts wore Victorio’s band down to a point at which it fled to the 

safety of Mexico.

The lessons of the Victorio Campaign are as relevant today as they 

were in the 19th century. Commanders must understand the enemy’s 

doctrine and exploit its weaknesses as Colonel Grierson did by abandoning 

pursuit operations and depriving Victorio of essential water. Commanders 

and staffs must also look beyond their formal training in devising flexible 

tactics and strategy, and preparing their units for sustained operations 

that could last for months. This work is intended as a historical example 

of a successful campaign against an evasive fugitive and his band of 

supporters.

Directly correlating Victorio’s story to modern operations shows that 

commanders and staffs must identify and exploit key weaknesses in their 

enemies just like Colonel Grierson did. In the case of modern terrorist 

organizations, depriving them of sanctuary and logistics, denying international borders to shield their activities, and neutralizing or isolating 

popular support are axioms. Applying unrelenting pressure on terrorist 

organizations keeps them constantly on the run, weakens them by attrition, and prevents them from establishing secure bases and logistics support. Other avenues through which to bring international terrorists to bay 

may include intercepting signals, penetrating the organizations through 

human intelligence sources, and using indigenous and coalition forces. By 

following these tenets, so aptly illustrated by the persistent cavalrymen in 

the Victorio Campaign, elusive enemies can be tracked, worn down, and 
45

defeated. Open press reports indicate that many of these tenets are being 

used against bin Laden and his terrorist organization. The campaign also 

illustrates that commanders must seek out and neutralize a key weakness 

in their elusive enemies. For Victorio it was the sources of water in an 

arid land. By physically occupying theses sites the cavalrymen forced the 

Apache to come to them. Victorio’s edge in mobility was neutralized, and 

the fruitless pursuit operations ended. The cavalrymen fighting Victorio 

showed a tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond the capabilities normally assigned to them. Today’s Army continues this tradition 

in Iraq and Afghanistan.
46 

Notes

1. Joseph A. Stout, Jr., Apache Lightning: The Last Great Battles of the Ojo 

Calientes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 4. American Indian tribes 

were exceptionally diverse in customs that reflected the region in which they 

lived. The Apache was perhaps the extreme of the warrior culture.

2. Particularly while on the warpath, the Apache would pay little heed to 

the needs of their animals, reasoning that if they broke down they would be the 

next meal. Besides, the next target would provide replacements.

3. Stout, 14-16. 

4. C.L. Sonnichsen, The Mescalero Apache (Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1958), 147; Stout, 31. Army officers were assigned as Indian 

agents in an attempt to end bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption. Banning 

this practice in 1870 returned these men to their regiments that sorely needed 

experienced leaders. It also removed these gentlemen from what was considered 

an unseemly assignment and removed all temptations to become caught up in 

various illegal activities that plagued the system.

5. Sonnichsen, 142; Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and 

Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 58.

6. Ibid., 58-59. Cavalry companies were authorized 100 men at this 

time, but losses due to disease, casualties, and desertions thinned the ranks. As 

stated before, recruits were generally hard to get. The organizational term cavalry 

“troop” was not in use at this time; the term “company” is used throughout this 

work.

7. Ibid., 59-60.

8. Ibid., 61-63. The US Infantry and Cavalry School was not yet established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That would occur in 1881.

9. Ibid., 73.

10. Wilbur D. Jones, Arming the Eagle: A History of the United States 

Weapons Acquisition Since 1775 (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College Press, 1999), 164.

11. Stout, 34. George Crook was born on 8 September 1828 near Dayton, 

Ohio. He graduated from West Point in 1852 and saw duty in the Pacific Northwest. During the Civil War he was colonel of the 36th Ohio, appointed brigadier 

general of volunteers, and commanded a brigade in Virginia. He commanded a 

cavalry division in the Army of the Cumberland in the Chickamauga campaign. 

Crook received a brevet promotion to major general in 1864 and commanded 

a corps in the Shenandoah Valley campaign. He was captured in Cumberland, 

Maryland, and was exchanged in March 1865. Crook finished the war in command of a cavalry division in the Appomattox campaign. Although he did not invent the idea of using Indian scouts, he made full use of them. After the campaign, 
47

the Apache scouts started wearing red headbands for identification. By 1886 the 

Indian scouts were issued regulation uniforms with distinctive insignia. George 

Crook died on 21 March 1890 in Chicago. See also Douglas C. McChristian, 

“Pueblo Scouts in the Victorio Campaign,” The Military Frontier, A Symposium 

to Honor Don Russell, Buffalo Bill Historical Center, Cody, Wyoming, 2-4 May 

1986. Copy held at Fort Davis National Historic Site. McChristian is a historian 

with the National Park Service and former superintendent of the Fort Davis National Historical Site.

12. William H. Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 19-21.

13. James A. Sawicki, Cavalry Regiments of the US Army (Dumphries, VA: 

Wyvern Publications, 1985), 169-70.

14. Colonel Edward Hatch was born on 22 December 1832, in Bangor, 

Maine, and was a lumber dealer and a seaman before the Civil War. He entered the 

service as a captain in the 2d Iowa Cavalry in August 1861 and was a colonel eight 

months later. Fighting at the Island No. 10 siege and later at the battle of Corinth, 

Hatch participated in Grierson’s raid in June 1863. He raided into northern Alabama and Tennessee and was brevetted to brigadier general in April 1864 and 

given command of a cavalry division in time to fight against Hood in the Franklin 

and Nashville campaign. After the war Hatch was sent west and brevetted to major general in 1867. Hatch was the colonel of the 9th Cavalry from its organization 

until his retirement. He died on 11 April 1889 at Fort Robinson, Nebraska.

15. Stout, 76-77. Victorio was known by many names in his life, including 

Victoria, Vitoria, Vittorio, Beduiat, Bidu-ya, Lucero, “Light,” and Laceres. His 

sister was the famous female warrior, Lozen. Members of the tribe were fanatically loyal to him and allegedly threatened to save Victorio from capture by killing him and eating his body.

16. Ibid., 84-85.

17. Dan L. Thrapp, Victorio and the Mimbres Apache (Norman, OK: Oklahoma University Press, 1974), 219-20. This book is the definitive work on Victorio and the campaign. The actual incident that prompted Victorio to leave the 

reservation for what would be the final time varies with a wide number of sources. 

Whatever that incident was, he was not happy there, and it took little provocation.

18. Ibid., 236-37; Leckie, 210-11. A native of Ohio, Charles B. Gatewood 

graduated 23d in the West Point class of 1877.

19. Stout, 46, 92. Stout is unnecessarily critical of Governor Lew Wallace, 

charging him with having more interest in his writing pursuits than his official 

duties. Although a prolific writer, Wallace was not known for dereliction of duty. 

Incidentally, Ben Hur was published on 12 November 1880.

20. Ibid., 84-85, 111-12. Many Mexicans were still very bitter about the 

losses incurred in the Mexican War of 1846. They had no problem allowing the 
48 

Apache to simply walk away and let the US Army deal with the matter.

21. Walter P. Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense

(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1974) and Robert M. Utley, Lone Star 

Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2002) are two excellent sources on the history of the Texas Rangers.

22. Marcos E. Kinevan, Frontier Cavalryman: Lieutenant John Bigelow 

With the Buffalo Soldiers in Texas (El Paso, TX: Western Texas Press, 1998), 

220; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of 

the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, vol. III (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 

1891), 287; Stout, 95-97. A native of New York, Robert Temple Emmet graduated from West Point in 1877. He had been with the regiment for two years at the 

time of the campaign.

23. Thrapp, 238-40. Dan L. Thrapp, The Congressional Medal of Honor: 

The Names, the Deeds (Forest Ranch, CA: Sharps and Dunnigan Publishing, 

1984), 657-58, hereafter cited as Medal; Cullum, 293. A native of Ohio, Mathias 

Day graduated from West Point in 1877, placing seventh in his class. Sergeant 

John Denny received the Medal of Honor on 27 November 1894. See also Stout, 

97-98.

24. Ibid., 63. Albert P. Morrow was generally considered an excellent officer 

and had entered the service as a sergeant in a Pennsylvania infantry regiment in 

1861. He was transferred to the cavalry in 1862 and elected to second lieutenant. 

Morrow was eventually brevetted to colonel for gallantry and assigned after the 

war to the 6th Cavalry as a captain. He was transferred in 1867 to the 9th Cavalry 

as a major, where he would serve until his promotion to lieutenant colonel. He 

returned to the 6th Cavalry in 1882. See Cullum, 277-78. Augustus P. Blocksom 

of Virginia graduated 22d in the same class.

25. Thrapp, 241-42; Thrapp, Medal, 650-51; Stout, 99-102. He received his 

award on 6 January 1882.

26. Thrapp, 243-44; Stout, 100.

27. Leckie, 212; Thrapp, Medal, 658. The awards were presented on 2 April 

1898.

28. Kinevan, 220, 222. The newspaper accounts vary widely from locality to 

locality and reflect the editor’s opinion. Contemporary journalistic standards were 

low, and sensationalism was the norm. The historians at the Fort Davis Historical 

Site kindly provided copies of several contemporary articles.

29. Sonnichsen, 169-70; Leckie, 214.

30. Kinevan. This work presents a detailed account of the organization of 

the 10th US Cavalry Regiment. See also Stout, 61-62. Benjamin H. Grierson 

was born on 8 July 1826 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and was a music teacher 

and storekeeper. During the Civil War he was a major in the 6th Illinois Cavalry 

and was later promoted to colonel. Grierson pursued the enemy cavalry after Van 
49

Dorn’s Holly Springs raid and led his own daring raid through Tennessee and 

Mississippi in June 1863. He was appointed to brigadier general and commanded 

a cavalry division in the Army of the Mississippi. He campaigned against the Indians and commanded the Department of Arizona and the Districts of New Mexico 

and Indian Territory. Grierson retired in 1890 and died on 1 September 1911 in 

Omena, Michigan.

31. Stout, 62. See also Edward L.N. Glass, The History of the Tenth Cavalry: 

1866-1921 (Fort Collins, CO: The Old Army Press, 1972), 12-23, for a detailed 

history of the regiment before the campaign.

32. Leckie, 215-16; Stout, 129.

33. Stout, 132. Although it may seem unusual for a water pump to be in this 

remote location, it was not uncommon at the time. Ranchers and stagecoach companies often installed pumps or dug wells to provide water for their animals in the 

deserts and mountains.

34. Sonnichsen, 182-84; Leckie, 218-19.

35. Leckie, 220-21; Thrapp, Medal, 672. Some can argue that the “Buffalo 

Soldiers” did not receive much credit for their exploits. However, of the 17 Medals of Honor awarded for action in 1879, five went to members of the 9th Cavalry. 

For the three awarded for 1880, one went to a soldier in this regiment. Many 

soldiers serving during the frontier wars did not receive pensions automatically, 

but service in specific regiments active in particular campaigns was a basis for 

qualification. The Victorio Campaign was not officially recognized until 1917.

36. Leckie, 222; Stout, 140-42.

37. Leckie, 222. Again, Victorio maintained his mobility and provisions by 

stealing stock from ranches or capturing it from the Army. This was a significant 

blow to him.

38. Report of Colonel B.H. Grierson to the Assistant Adjutant General, 

Department of Texas, 20 September 1880, Document G, Report of the General 

of the Army, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, vol. I (Washington, DC: US 

Government Printing Office, 1880). A copy is held at the Fort Davis National Historic Site (National Park Service), Fort Davis, Texas. Hereafter cited as Grierson’s 

Report, this text is used extensively in this work in detailing the chronology of the 

battles of the 10th Cavalry and Grierson’s assessments and rationale.

39. Leckie, 225; Douglas C. McChristian, “Grierson’s Fight at Tinaja de 

Las Palmas: An Episode in the Victorio Campaign,” Red River Valley Historical 

Review (Winter 1982), 54-59. Hereafter cited as Grierson’s Fight, this fight is also 

known as the Battle of Rocky Ridge.

40. Ibid, 60-61; Robert K. Grierson, Journal Kept on the Victorio Campaign 

in 1880, 24, copy held at Fort Davis National Historic Site (National Park Service), Fort Davis, Texas, and cited with permission. Hereafter cited as Robert’s

Journal, this is a very colorful account of the campaign in which the young Robert 
50 

made daily entries while accompanying his father on the campaign. Some of the 

minor details do not match his father’s official reports, but he often adds more 

detail to the rather bland official documents.

41. Leckie, 225; Grierson’s Report, paragraphs 16 to 20. See also Grierson’s 

Fight, 61.

42. Robert’s Journal, 32-34. Lieutenant Henry O. Flipper of Georgia was 

the first African-American graduate from West Point, ranking 50 in his class of 

76. He forfeited potential greatness by trying to conceal a shortage of commissary 

funds at Fort Davis in 1881. Flipper was court-martialed for allegedly embezzling 

almost $4,000 and making five false official statements. Although cleared of the 

embezzlement charge, he was convicted of making false statements and dismissed 

from the service on 30 June 1882 for conduct unbecoming an officer. President 

William J. Clinton pardoned him in 1999.

43. Thrapp, Medal, 653-54. Captain Louis Carpenter, one of the distinguished Indian fighters of the period, earned an outstanding record during the 

Civil War in which he received two brevets for gallantry at Gettysburg and one 

at Winchester. Carpenter was a captain and troop commander in the 10th Cavalry 

until 1883 and retired a brevet brigadier general in 1899. In 1898 he was awarded 

a Medal of Honor “for distinguished conduct during the Indian campaign in Kansas and Colorado, September and October 1868, and on the forced march Sept. 

23-25, 1868, to the relief of Forsyth’s scouts.” Carpenter died in 1916.

44. Webb, 400. It was fortunate for Victorio that he did not attack another 

supply train that was in the area. It was part of Captain Livermore’s company 

from the 8th Cavalry and was protected by an escort with a Gatling gun. Although 

a formidable weapon, it was never brought to bear during the campaign.

45. Ibid., 401.

46. Sonnichsen, 197; Leckie, 229-30. When Colonel Buell went into Mexico, he took a 400-gallon water wagon that he invented himself. In 1997 Turner 

Network Television released a movie titled “Buffalo Soldiers.” The end of the 

show depicted a scene in which the cavalrymen intentionally allowed the Apache 

to escape, signifying a bond between them against a white oppressor. In truth, the 

soldiers did their duty admirably and did not hesitate to engage the Apache. For 

their part, the Apache felt no kinship with the black soldiers and did their best to 

kill them. This was a bitter campaign, and the movie scene was pure Hollywood 

with a political agenda.

47. Thrapp, 301-304, is a detailed account of the final battle. Various accounts of Victorio’s death were told after the fight, including one where he was 

mounted on a fine white horse. Victorio wore no distinctive garments and was 

probably identified only after the battle.
51

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Grierson, Robert K. Journal Kept on the Victorio Campaign in 1880. Copy held at 

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55

About the Author

Kendall D. Gott retired from the US Army in 2000, having served as 

an armor, cavalry, and military intelligence officer. His combat experience 

consists of the Persian Gulf War and two subsequent bombing campaigns 

against Iraq.

A native of Peoria, Illinois, Mr. Gott received a B.A. in history from 

Western Illinois University in 1983 and a Master of Military Art and 

Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1998. Before returning to Kansas in 2002 he 

was an adjunct professor of history at Augusta State University and the 

Georgia Military College. In October 2002 he joined the Combat Studies 

Institute where he researches and prepares articles and studies on topics of 

military history. His book-length works include In Glory’s Shadow: The 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment During the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991,

and Where the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort 

Donelson Campaign, February 1862.
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