CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH 

DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION: NEVER 

DIVIDE THE FLEET? 

by 

Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

June 2004 

Occasional Paper No. 36 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air War College 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH DECENTRALIZED 

EXECUTION: NEVER DIVIDE THE FLEET?

Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

June 2004 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for 

Strategy and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect 

long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for 

U.S. national security. Copies of No. 36 in this series are available 

from the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 

Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6460. 

Occasional Paper No. 36 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 

Contents 

Page

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

Author........................................................................................................ iii 

Acknowledgements.....................................................................................iv 

Abstract........................................................................................................v 

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 

II. Origins of Control and Execution Doctrine ...........................................5 

III. Political Influence Centralizing Airpower Control and 

Execution .............................................................................................21 

IV. Impact of Technology on Control and Execution ..............................30 

V. Additional Options for Control and Execution....................................44 

VI. Conclusion..........................................................................................56 

Notes..........................................................................................................60 

i
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Air

University, the U.S. government, or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is 

the property of the United States government. 

ii 
Author 

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel F. Baltrusaitis is currently the Deputy 

Director, CHECKMATE Division on the Air Staff. He is a native of 

Pennsylvania and graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 

1983 with a degree in Electrical Engineering. Colonel Baltrusaitis began 

his flying career at Williams Air Force Base Arizona where we was a 

distinguished graduate of Undergraduate Pilot Training and a T-37 

instructor pilot. In 1988 he was selected as initial cadre in the B-1B, 

flying it operationally at Grand Forks Air Force Base. He then went to 

Edwards Air Force Base and was the top graduate of the Air Force Test 

Pilot School. While at Edwards he was involved in conventional weapons 

development for the B-1B and B-52. Colonel Baltrusaitis was 

subsequently assigned as the Deputy Director for Engineering, 

Operational Support Office, at the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO), where he worked solutions for providing national intelligence

products to operational users. In 1999 Colonel Baltrusaitis returned to the 

cockpit, retraining into the venerable U-2, and in 2001, he assumed 

command of the 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic 

of Korea. He is a command pilot with over 3,300 hours in 45 different 

airframes. Colonel Baltrusaitis holds Masters Degrees in Space Studies 

from the University of North Dakota, Airpower Art and Science from the 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), and Strategic Studies 

from the Air War College. Colonel Baltrusaitis is a graduate of Air

Command and Staff College, SAAS, and the Air War College. 

iii
Acknowledgements 

I would like to thank my advisor, Lt Col Court Holmberg, USAF, 

of the Air War College Center for Strategy and Technology for his tireless 

advice and prodding during this effort. Also, Dr. Grant Hammond who 

sparked this concept in numerous trips to the whiteboard. I also wish to 

thank Dr. Tom Hughes, Col Keith Gentile, Col John Geis and the many 

people who gave so willingly of their time by enduring many of the 

previous editions and revectored my writing. Finally, I must thank my 

family for their love and support throughout the process. 

iv 
Abstract 

Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, the 

U.S. Air Force’s capstone doctrine document highlights the tenet of 

centralized control with decentralized execution as crucial to the effective 

application of airpower. However, numerous forces are changing the 

applicability of that doctrine. U.S. involvement in wars with limited aims, 

combined with the technology that allows senior commanders to see the 

common operational picture and view from the cockpit, is driving the Air 

Force toward the centralized airpower execution. At the same time, the 

development of Network Centric Warfare can either centralize or 

decentralize the control and execution of airpower depending upon its 

implementation. Airmen, however, have long held to the doctrine of 

centralized command with decentralized execution without serious 

thought to the impact of the political environment and technological 

advances on this doctrine. Although Air Force doctrine has changed 13 

times based on over 50 years of experience, the doctrine of centralized 

control with decentralized execution has not been seriously challenged. 

This study explores the foundations of command and execution 

and explores options other than centralized control with decentralized 

execution of airpower. The paper explores and defines the characteristics

of control and execution and provides a historical review of the foundation 

of the Air Force’s tenet of centralized control with decentralized

execution. It then addresses the impact of technology and political 

constraints on current operations and the most effective application of 

airpower. Finally, the paper frames technologies and strategic situations

where centralized command and decentralized execution is not the most

effective way to employ airpower. The paper concludes with doctrinal 

recommendations for a more flexible mindset on the proper control and

execution of U.S. airpower. 

v

Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...1

I. Introduction 

The system of command of military air power should 

consist in having the greatest centralization 

practicable...Unity of command is essential to air forces. 

These can not be operated efficiently in time of war if 

scattered and assigned to ground and water organizations. 

William ‘Billy’ Mitchell 

An incident during Operation Southern Watch, the patrolling of 

Iraqi airspace following the first Gulf War, demonstrated one of the major 

disconnects between U.S. Air Force doctrine and practice. Saddam

Hussein had once again violated U.N. Resolution 688 by firing on 

coalition aircraft, and the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF SWA)

Commander had directed airstrikes against an Iraqi radar site in the town

of Al Nasiriyah in accordance with the standing rules of engagement. Due 

to the political sensitivity of the coalition mission in southern Iraq, the JTF

SWA Commander took great pains to ensure that coalition airpower struck

the proper target, limiting collateral damage. Airborne Warning and 

Control System (AWACS) controllers directed a U-2 into the area to 

image the target. The imagery immediately provided the commander a 

picture of the target area. Unfortunately, the commander needed more 

information and directed an F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System 

(TARPS) to image the target. Analysts assessed this image in near real 

time on a nearby aircraft carrier and sent it to the commander. He now 

had enough information to direct strike aircraft into the area, but not 

enough information to satisfy his requirement for weapon release with 

minimal collateral damage. To gain the necessary information, the JTF

SWA commander directed the strike aircraft’s run-in heading and required

the pilot to describe the target seen in his targeting pod over the radio. 

Once satisfied that the pilot identified the proper target, the JTF SWA 

commander directed release of a laser guided precision bomb, destroying 

the target with minimal damage to the surrounding neighborhood. This 

pattern was repeated numerous times during Operation Southern Watch.1

 

The JTF SWA Commander had exercised centralized control with 

centralized execution of airpower in that he controlled all aspects of the 

weapon engagement from the Combined Air Operations Center. This, of 
2...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

course, is contrary to the U.S. Air Force doctrinal mantra of centralized 

control with decentralized execution.

Although meeting the Southern Watch objectives, airmen at the 

tactical level were confused and frustrated at what they considered higher 

headquarters micromanagement. The pilots were highly trained and 

experienced and considered this kind of personal attention an insult to 

their technical competence. In fact, their frustration stemmed from the 

fact that they were highly trained and knew that airpower is best employed 

through centralized control and decentralized execution. Further, Air 

Force doctrine and tactics contained no guidance on the highly restrained 

application of airpower. 

Yet, these pilots had just participated in a textbook example of

centralized execution. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, the Air Force 

capstone doctrine document, highlights the fact that decentralized 

execution is crucial to the flexibility of airpower. It states, “Just as central

to the proper application of airpower is the concept of decentralized 

execution. Delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable 

lower-level commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control 

and to foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical 

flexibility.”2

 Did the JTF SWA commander not understand the most 

responsive and flexible employment of airpower? Were the fighter pilots 

unfit to perform their mission? Has technology and political reality made 

the U.S. Air Force’s central tenet of centralized control with decentralized 

execution outdated? 

This paper aims to explore the Air Force’s tenet of centralized 

control with decentralized execution. Airmen have long strived for the 

most effective employment of airpower via centralized control, under an 

airman, combined with decentralized execution. This arrangement proved 

effective during Desert Storm. However, one must ask if this is still the

most effective method to employ airpower. More importantly, is it the 

only way to employ airpower, or is there a more appropriate combination 

in the centralization and decentralization of control and execution based 

on technology and strategic context? 

This paper explores the foundations of command and execution 

and explores options other than centralized control with decentralized 

execution of airpower. To set the stage for discussion of the control and 

execution of airpower, this paper will explore and define the 

characteristics of control and execution. Once a common framework is

established, this paper will provide a historical review of the foundation of 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...3

the Air Force’s tenet of centralized control with decentralized execution 

by tracing its roots from experience in World War I through the Gulf War. 

It will then address the impact of technology and political constraints on 

current operations highlighting the most effective applications of 

airpower. Finally, the paper will frame technologies and strategic 

situations where centralized command and decentralized execution is not

the most effective employment of airpower. The paper concludes with 

doctrinal recommendations for a more flexible mindset on the proper 

control and execution of U.S. airpower. 
4...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...5

II. Origins of Control and Execution Doctrine 

The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest 

asset...such concentrated use of the air striking force is a 

battle-winning factor of the first importance. Control of 

available air power must be centralized and command must

be exercised through the air force commander if this 

inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are 

to be fully exploited. 

Army Field Manual 100-20 Command and Employment of Air 

Power 

21 July 1943 

Current Air Force doctrine fails to adequately and consistently 

define the central terms of command, control, and execution. This causes

major weaknesses in the debate of command, control, and execution 

concepts because there is no agreed upon definition of the terms. The lack 

of definitions breeds semantic problems that distract from discussion on

the central tenet. This chapter aims to define the concepts of command, 

control, and execution as they relate to the execution of airpower by first 

discussing the characteristics of command, control, and execution. Once 

defined, the discussion will highlight the historical development of Air 

Force command and control philosophy. By clarifying these concepts, 

discussions can more adequately address future command, control, and 

execution of airpower. 

Command 

Air Force doctrine is unified with the joint community in its

definition of command. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8, Command and 

Control, uses the Joint definition of command from Joint Publication 1-02, 

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: “The authority that a 

commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by 

virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and 

responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning 

the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling 

military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.”3

 Important 
6...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

aspects in the definition of command are that it is a legal authority for the 

direction, coordination, and control of military forces. Commanders may 

delegate authority to accomplish the mission; they cannot delegate the 

responsibility for the attainment of mission objectives.4

Control 

Implicit in the definition of command is control. In fact, without 

control there is no reason for command. Control is the path for passing 

intent of the operation, its objectives, and its desired effects to subordinate 

echelons. In Joint Publication 1-02 and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8, 

control is defined as, “the process by which commanders plan and guide

operations.”5

 According to Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8, control 

occurs before and during execution (hinting at centralized execution), and 

time and distance factors often limit the direct control of subordinates 

(hinting at decentralized execution). Control may be procedural, as in the 

generation of an Air Tasking Order, or it may rely on delegation of 

authorities and “commander’s intent” as methods to control forces. The

commander’s intent should specify the goals, priorities, acceptable risks, 

and limits of the operation.6

 Control encompasses the responsibility for 

implementing orders or directives. Control is not a system, but a process 

whereby the commander exerts influence on subordinate units. Command 

is the authority to direct forces while control is the process of directing 

those forces.7

 

Unfortunately, Air Force doctrine from the earliest days considered

command and control synonymous, when actually they have always been 

quite different. This causes confusion in the discussion of the centrality of 

airpower command and control. The two issues are quite different and 

should be handled differently. The first point of confusion revolves 

around the issue of command. Should a single air officer such as the 

JFACC command airpower, or should it be parceled out to separate 

commanders? Second, should the single commander centrally control his 

assets so that he can concentrate effects, or should he allow decentralized

control so that lower echelon commanders can develop and implement 

plans in accordance with the JFACC intent? Command is an issue of 

organizational doctrine while control is an issue of operational doctrine. 

This study assumes that unity of command is essential and that centralized 

command assures that unity. Discussion will focus on the control and
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...7

execution of airpower. For example, a commander may provide 

objectives that subordinate commanders pursue independently through 

decentralized control. 

Execution 

Current Air Force doctrine is very weak on both the origins and 

definition of decentralized execution. Due to the lack of an accepted 

definition, there is great disagreement among airmen on the meaning of 

decentralized execution in the employment of airpower. Joint doctrine 

defines decentralized execution as the delegation of execution authority to 

subordinate commanders, but it fails to define execution itself.10 Air

Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, defines

decentralized execution as, “delegation of execution authority to lowerlevel commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control and to 

foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.”11 This

is not really a definition but rather a rationale for decentralized execution. 

These definitions as applied to the Air Force basic tenet leave the airman 

wondering which lower-level commanders are receiving execution 

authority and when does control end and execution begin. Air Force

doctrine neither adequately defines execution nor does it delineate the 

lines between control and execution. There are no Air Force definitions of

“execution” in the Air Force Glossary (Air Force Doctrine Document 1-2) 

or the primary documents of Air Force Doctrine Documents 1, 2, or 2-8. 

This paper will attempt to fill that void with a definition of execution as it 

applies to Air Force operations. 

Foundations of U.S. Air Force Control and Execution 

Doctrine 

Historical Development 

World War I provides the basis for Air Force centralized control 

doctrine. During World War I, US ground unit leaders commanded air 

elements, and air units were organized as integral parts of these ground 

units. Subordinate Air Service commanders could suggest missions, but 
8...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

final decisions rested with higher unit ground officers. Airpower was very 

useful for localized operations, but it could not be massed to provide 

significant, theater wide effects. Because command was not centralized,

control of assets was fragmented. The attack on St. Mihiel in September 

1918 proved the necessity of centralized control of airpower to air 

advocates. This was the first air action to mass air elements against a 

theater objective. General Billy Mitchell controlled the operation under 

First Army, but he actually reported directly to General Pershing and 

General Headquarters. He controlled an air force that was much larger 

than that of the First Army alone. Although he controlled a large force, he 

did not have command authority over all units. He was frustrated with the

difficulties of not having command of the force. Mitchell states, “As is

usual under these conditions, every objection has to be overcome, and 

every reason has to be advanced as to the necessity for such things as

distinguished from the concentration of maximum force in another 

place.”12 In short, centralized control allowed massing of airpower effects 

while centralized command made the job easier. St. Mihiel was a 

smashing success for allied airpower and allowed Americans virtually 

complete protection from German air interference.13 

Mitchell’s experience and success in controlling air units during 

the war formed the basis for his desire to command and control air 

centrally. He believed that for any given operation, available air units 

should be placed under the centralized control of an Air Service 

commander. The purpose of centralization was to concentrate force at the 

vital point, which was not necessarily the ground forces point of attack.

14 

However, the War Department and Secretary Baker took the opposite 

view. According to Secretary Baker’s 1919 Annual Report, the separation 

of the air arm would weaken overall military efficiency. The benefits of 

theater unity of command would be offset by the loss of training synergy. 

He states, “The temporary unified control which might be achieved during 

combined actions was no substitute for continuous, integrated training and 

operations.”15 The Army was concerned that lack of day-to-day 

interaction would provide less coordinated support to the army, a 

complaint that rose many times in the succeeding years. 

By 1935, General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force was formed, and 

while airmen stressed the mobility and adaptability of a centralized air 

force, air advocacy was split between the GHQ Air Force and the Air 

Corps. GHQ Air Force contained combat units, while the Air Corps was

responsible for war planning, acquisition, and air staff functions. General 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...9

Benjamin Foulois argued that this command structure divorced the 

authority for training and operations from the functions and responsibility 

of procurement, experimentation, etc.16 Training Regulation 440-15,

Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service, described 

the advantage of GHQ Air Force as, “...possible to rapidly concentrate 

superior forces at important point when necessary.”17 However, the

doctrine stressed that once the land campaign began, “...air forces further 

the mission of the territorial or tactical commands to which they are 

assigned.”18 Interwar doctrine stressed the need for centralized control of

airpower. General Patrick, Commander GHQ Air Force, clearly stated the

need for centralized control of theater air assets as early as 1923: “The 

principle of concentration of air force becomes a maxim.”

19 However, 

official doctrine and organization was, in effect, a compromise between

the extreme viewpoints of both air and ground officers.20 In 1939, the 

divided air authority was recognized and corrected by placing GHQ Air 

Force under the Air Corps. The main arguments for centralized control 

continued to stress the ability of airpower to mass forces in time and space 

to gain air superiority and strike against critical centers. 

Operation Torch and Kasserine Pass 

Observing the success of the British against the Luftwaffe in the 

Battle of Britain, airmen continued to press for unity of command and 

centralized control. According to Brigadier General Carl Spaatz, “A great 

part of this British success has, undoubtedly, been due to the realization

for the necessity of a unified command which centralizes control of all 

military air matters under an air high command concerned solely with air 

matters.”21 Centralized command and control was essential in gaining air

superiority and repelling the German attack of the English islands. 

The British had fought the Italians and Germans in Libya and 

Egypt since September 1940. They learned that air superiority was crucial 

to successful ground operations and that one key to air superiority was 

centralized control. Air Marshal Coningham established liaisons at all 

command levels and collocated his headquarters with Eighth Army 

headquarters. The liaison system allowed decisive use of small 

concentrations of airpower.22 Airpower was so successful in the Western 

Desert that General Montgomery became a staunch supporter of 

Coningham’s system and published a directive on the effective use of 
10...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

airpower. Montgomery highlighted major tenets that are still accepted 

today: 

The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility, and this 

enables it to be switched quickly from one objective to 

another in the theater of operations. So long as this is

realized, then the whole weight of the available air power 

can be used in selected areas in turn; this concentrated use 

of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first 

importance.23

He also emphasized the need for concentration:

It follows that control of the available air power must be 

centralized, and command must be exercised through 

R.A.F. channels. Nothing could be more fatal to successful 

results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets

placed under command of army formation commanders, 

with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier 

must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over 

air striking forces.24

Clearly the British learned hard lessons on the most effective organization

and control of airpower. Unfortunately, the Americans would have to 

relearn some of the same lessons. 

Although air leaders where arguing for centralized command and 

control of air assets, U.S. forces entered World War II with airpower

divided both in organization and doctrine. Field Manual 1-5, Employment 

of the Aviation of the Army, dated 15 April 1940, continued to allow split 

control of army aviation. The manual states, “portions of GHQ aviation 

could be attached to armies or corps for the accomplishment of specific

missions, but they were to revert to GHQ control as soon as the necessity

for the attachment ended.”25 Unfortunately, attached armies were 

typically unwilling to release local control. With this untenable command 

arrangement, airmen would be unable to concentrate airpower at the 

moment it was most needed. 

U.S. forces for Operation Torch did not implement the West 

African derived British doctrine because it conflicted with Field Manual 1-

5, and the forces were already en-route to the battlefield when the British
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...11

lessons were first published.26 U.S. employment of airpower early in the

European war was split into an Army controlled element and an Army Air 

Forces element. An air commander controlled the bomber and fighter 

commands while an Army ground commander controlled the Air Support 

Command, which was tasked to support ground forces.27 Many airmen

were irked by the fact that the Army commander had final decision over 

which targets the Air Support Command would strike, even though in 

reality the Army Commander, Major General Fredendall, rarely interfered 

with target selection, and Air Support Command made most decisions.28 

This arrangement did not last long however, as Eisenhower 

centralized control of allied air forces. He agreed with Air Chief Marshal 

Sir Arthur Tedder who wanted to centralize air forces including tactical 

aviation in December 1942.29 Eisenhower understood and encouraged the 

centralized command of air resources and demonstrated his conviction 

when he denied the permanent apportionment of air units to Major 

General George S. Patton after the successful landing of his division.30 By

January 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had met at the Casablanca 

conference and approved the unified command for all Allied air forces in

the Mediterranean.31 Major General Carl Spaatz assigned Brigadier

General Laurence Kuter to command the newly created Allied Air Support 

Command, to centralize the command, and hence control, of all tactical air 

units in Northwest Africa. Thus, by the time of the famed battle for 

Kasserine Pass, tactical airpower was functionally already under 

centralized control.32 

Air Force operational history attributes the foundation of 

centralized control doctrine to Operation Torch and Kasserine Pass by 

highlighting the danger of breaking airpower into “penny packets,” but the 

lessons to be learned are much more complex. By the time of Kasserine 

Pass, airpower was already centralized under one air commander. The

true lesson of Kasserine Pass was that air units were ineffective mainly 

due to insufficient training, lack of equipment, and poor weather. 

Aircrews were sent to England on the assumption that they would finish 

training there. Instead, they were shipped to support the invasion of 

Northern Africa. General Jimmy Doolittle estimated 75 percent of his 

airmen arrived in theater only partially trained. To compound the lack of 

training, few of the ground units were equipped with mobile anti-aircraft 

weapons to defend themselves from attacks by the Luftwaffe.33 Due to 

this lack of self-protection, ground units looked for air umbrellas as 

protection, putting allied airpower on the tactical defensive.34 Due to poor
12...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

weather, in the height of the battle for Kasserine Pass, Allied Air Support 

Command flew an average of only 365 sorties a day in all of Northwest 

Africa.35 Kasserine became the siren song for generations of airmen 

concerning centralized control; but at closer inspection, it actually 

highlights the dangers of operationally employing inexperienced airmen 

into combat. 

Kasserine Pass provided airmen several lessons over and above the 

need for unity of command. The primary lesson is that a quickly 

assembled, under-trained, under-equipped military force, will suffer when 

encountering a battle-hardened and experienced adversary.36 Kasserine 

Pass and Operation Torch did show that unity of command likely produces

better results than fragmented command. Moreover, it showed that 

airpower is most effective when the air force commander is collocated 

with the headquarters of the largest ground formation in the theater.37 

However, airmen must not be too attached to Kasserine Pass as the 

watershed event highlighting the dangers of decentralized control of 

airpower since unity of command and centralized control of airpower was

already established. 

Kasserine Pass did give airmen a ‘red herring’ event for continuing 

their advocacy for an independent air force and centralized control of air. 

They argued that split command caused the disintegration of unity of 

command and concentration even though air forces were already 

centralized for the battle. However, it did provide a convenient

opportunity for airmen to change operational doctrine and organizational

relationships in favor of command of air forces under an airman. Army 

Chief of Staff General George Marshall authorized Eisenhower to form a 

team of air and ground officers to revise the existing air doctrine while the 

shocking defeat provided the proper environment for reform in

Washington.38 Army Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of 

Air Power, dated 21 July 1943, reflects many of Coningham’s

propositions on air employment.39 The manual equates centralized

command with centralized control to provide unity of effort and maximize 

the speed and flexibility of airpower. It states, “...control of available 

airpower must be centralized and command must be exercised through the 

air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a 

decisive blow are to be fully exploited.”40 The lessons of Africa became a 

fixed underpinning for basic Air Force doctrine. Army Field Manual 

100-20 codified the Air Force independent command relationships and 

centralized air command.41 The Air Force position on centralized control 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...13

as a means for flexibility and concentration has remained unaltered since 

World War II.42 Among airmen, serious inquiry into the effectiveness of

other control arrangements ceased in 1943. The Air Force then turned its 

eye toward how to execute a centrally devised plan to maximize the

principal qualities of airpower: speed and flexibility. 

Decentralized Execution Foundation 

Although implicit in the air operations of World War I through 

Korea, decentralized execution became an Air Force doctrinal tenet with 

the 1971 release of Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic 

Doctrine. It contained the first written use of the term “decentralized

execution” in Air Force doctrine. Subsequently, every edition of Air 

Force Manual 1-1, including its current iteration as Air Force Doctrine 

Document 1, highlights the need for decentralized execution to harness the 

flexibility of airpower. 

The 1971 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 linked the centralized 

control of air assets with decentralized execution as fundamental to

employing airpower effectively. Basic doctrine presented the concept as a 

characteristic of aerospace forces: 

To realize the full potential of these characteristics,

aerospace forces must be centrally allocated and directed at 

a level which permits exploitation of diverse capabilities in

support of overall objectives. Concurrently, mission 

control and execution of specific tasks must be 

decentralized to a level which permits maximum 

responsiveness to local conditions and requirements. These 

complementary concepts—centralized allocation and

direction and decentralized control and execution—are 

fundamental to the effective application of aerospace 

power.43

This paragraph, a sub-paragraph under “Characteristics of Aerospace 

Forces”, leads the reader to believe that decentralized execution is the 

inherently proper method of airpower employment. Although this is the 

first reference to execution in Air Force doctrine, “execution” is never 

defined and the doctrine makes no reference on what levels of command 

are appropriate for control and execution. 
14...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

The 1975 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 simplified this concept 

into the now familiar Jominian maxim: centralized control and

decentralized execution. The document listed centralized control and 

decentralized execution as a basic principle of aerospace employment in

modern combat. Once again, Air Force Manual 1-1 did not define 

decentralized execution, what level of command should control airpower, 

or where the demarcation lies between control and execution.44 

The 1979 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 split control and 

execution into their individual components and expanded the discussion of 

each: 

Under the principle of decentralized execution, higher 

echelons of command define missions and tasks, and then 

direct lower echelons to conduct the operations. This 

principle allows lower echelon commanders to maintain a

responsive and effective force and frees high echelon 

commanders to focus aerospace power on achieving overall 

mission objectives. This arrangement in no way limits the 

operational commander’s authority nor lessens his 

responsibility; it places details for mission planning at the 

action level.

At the same time, higher echelon commanders must ensure 

that the capabilities of their forces are not exceeded. This 

philosophy is required because a single commander cannot 

personally direct all of the detailed actions of a large 

number of air units or individuals. (Emphasis in original) 

Decentralized execution allows for the wider use of 

judgment in employing the capabilities and characteristics 

of warfare systems.45

This rendering provides the most clarified reasoning in doctrine on the 

relationship between superior and subordinate commanders involved in 

decentralized execution and reveals Air Force reasoning behind the 

principle. The doctrine still does not describe the tasks of control and 

execution, but it does give the airman a basic understanding of the 

concept. 

The description of decentralized execution takes a cyclic path in

subsequent doctrine. In one manual it is barely described, and in the next, 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...15

it is captured in great detail. The 1984 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1 

minimally described decentralized execution, stating that it provides the

flexibility for subordinate commanders to use ingenuity and initiative in 

attacking targets.46 Eight years later, the 1992 Air Force Manual 1-1 

Volume II provided the most in-depth discussion to date on the foundation 

of the concept and importance of the tenets of aerospace power. 

According to Vol. II, decentralized execution was raised to the level of 

tenet in reaction to the centralized direction of bombing of North Vietnam.

The document suggested that decentralized execution first appeared in the 

1971 Air Force Manual 1-1 as a reaction against the extensive control, or 

“centralized control run amok,” exerted by the Johnson administration in

the bombing campaign against North Vietnam. According to Vol. II, 

President Johnson not only took personal control of targets, but he also 

dictated timing, ordnance loads, sorties, and alternate targets.47 Although 

the document considers this level of control as “control run amok,” it is 

simply a rather unsuccessful example of centralized execution at the 

strategic level. President Johnson controlled all parameters of high 

visibility missions to ensure his political objectives were met. Essentially,

he restricted the flexibility of subordinate commanders to local 

circumstance, the definition of centralized execution. 

The 1992 Air Force Manual 1-1 did address the fact that changes 

in technology would affect the timelessness of decentralized execution: 

“The complementary concept of decentralized execution also raises some 

thorny problems. Modern technologies seem to make decentralization of 

many important decisions increasingly inappropriate or even 

unnecessary.”48 Although the writers of Air Force Manual 1-1 

acknowledged the impact of technology on the execution of airpower, this 

concept has seen little doctrinal discussion since. 

The current Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic Aerospace 

Doctrine, replaced the Air Force Manuals in 1997 as the Air Force basic 

operational-level doctrine. It posits that centralized control and 

decentralized execution are critical operating tenets for successful 

airpower employment. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 describes 

decentralized execution as delegation of execution authority to lower-level 

commanders essential to achieve effective span of control and to foster 

initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.49 This edition

of Air Force Doctrine Document 1, however, lacks sufficient detail on

how decentralized execution provides the most effective use of airpower 
16...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

considering advances in technology and the sophistication of the world 

stage. 

Implications 

Several factors need to be highlighted when considering the basic 

tenet of centralized control. First is that the doctrine was formulated at a

time when the Air Force was struggling for independence. Indeed, the 

struggle for centralized control was inextricably tied with the struggle for 

Air Force independence. An independent Air Force could not exist as 

long as air forces were under subordinate command of army commanders. 

Army Field Manual 100-20 became the airman’s emancipation 

proclamation.50 The doctrine was used in a public relations campaign that

advocated the need for an independent Air Force while highlighting the 

ideas of Douhet and Mitchell. Brigadier General Lawrence Kuter 

persuaded a Saturday Evening Post writer to present a piece on Army Air

Force operations that discussed the coequal and coordinate ideas presented 

in Army Field Manual 100-20.51 This document provided the official 

support for strategic air campaigns and the centralization of air for

supporting ground operations. As long as the Army Air Force was 

struggling for independence, airmen would be unable to consider anything 

other than centralized command under an airman. 

Another condition worth noting is that Air Force control doctrine is 

fundamentally based on experiences in total conventional war. Airpower 

experience that matured late in WWI and throughout WWII provided the 

foundation for centralized control doctrine. Both reflected conflicts of 

total war, where all resources were employed against the enemy. These 

wars were fought in a circumstance where each belligerent nation totally 

directed its resources to the conduct of war.52 Victory in battle was 

necessary to meet war aims, and destruction of the enemy’s military and 

industrial capacity was the main mechanism for achieving victory. 

Centralized control provided the means for shifting severely limited

resources throughout the theater. Air superiority required both total 

attention of the air forces and concentration due to the limited assets

available. Evident in all early doctrinal writing is the need for the 

flexibility of airpower to concentrate for mass effects both in the air and 

on the ground. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...17

Finally, from a technology perspective, this doctrine developed 

when large numbers of aircraft were required to achieve a given effect. 

Incredible improvements in aerospace technology may have made this

doctrine obsolete as technological development changed the meaning of 

mass and concentration. For example, during World War II, over 9,000 

two-thousand-pound bombs and 3,000 sorties were required to destroy a 

60 x 100 foot target. By the time of Desert Storm, only 30 bombs and 8 

aircraft were required to achieve the same damage with unguided bombs. 

U.S. dominance in the areas of stealth and precision has reduced these 

numbers to the case of one target, one bomb.53 Combined with situational 

awareness provided by systems such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System (JSTARS), Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS), and the U-2, single aircraft are now able to produce the effects 

of bombardment groups during World War II. A single B-2 can now 

engage and destroy 16 targets on one mission. These improvements are 

not only evident in the strike community, but air mobility has shown a 

corresponding improvement as well. During the peak of operations of the 

Berlin airlift in 1948-1949, U.S. forces moved 1.7 million ton miles 

(MTM) per day. Desert Shield/Desert Storm far surpassed earlier airlifts 

by moving 17 MTM per day.54 Interestingly, doctrine concerning the 

control of airpower has changed little considering these monumental 

improvements in aircraft capability. 

The tenet of decentralized execution has the impact of dogma in 

today’s Air Force. Little consideration has been given to the impact of

technology on execution doctrine. Airmen address the need for 

decentralized execution without a true understanding of the meaning and 

impact of the term on operations. Many confuse the concept of 

decentralized execution with the physical dispersion of operations. There 

is an important distinction between decentralization and distribution.

Distribution refers to geographic or spatial location while decentralization 

is a quality independent of location.55 Although in the past geographic 

distribution implied a level of decentralization, modern communications 

have overcome the effects of spatial distance. Because of this,

geographically separated units may be centralized to the point wherein a 

single senior commander can make execution decisions. 

In summary, doctrinal descriptions of the fundamental tenet of 

airpower have failed to adequately define decentralized execution. 

Doctrine neither adequately defines execution nor delineates a suitable

definition of decentralized versus centralized execution. Instead, it tends
18...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

to describe the results of proper execution while leaving the reader to

ponder what decisions are being made where. 

Execution of Airpower 

Considering the primacy of the centralized command with 

decentralized execution tenet in Air Force doctrine, the lack of definition 

is disturbing. This terminology vacuum distracts from serious study on 

the effectiveness of the employment of airpower, and it invites the airman

to take only a haphazard view toward his basic doctrine. Webster’s 

dictionary defines execution as, “to follow out or through to the end; to 

carry out into complete effect; to complete; to finish; to effect; to 

perform.”

56 Although useful, this definition fails to shed sufficient light

on the meaning of decentralized execution. Based on an informal poll of

Air War College students, execution can be defined across a spectrum of 

actions ranging from any action after an execute order to deploy, to when 

the Air Tasking Order is published, to takeoff of tasked aircraft, to the 

actual release of ordinance. Clearly, the lack of definition makes the 

concept of centralization or decentralization difficult to discuss. Several 

students at the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space

Studies have attempted to apply a better definition of execution in an 

airpower context. One defined it as, “the act of launching a vehicle or 

formation, marshaling, maneuvering, and accomplishing an airpower role 

for the purpose of supporting a strategy. Execution begins upon the

assignment of a mission to an operator and weapons system at the lowest 

level of an organization”57 Another definition posited was, “those actions 

taken to accomplish a mission, after a higher echelon assigns it to a 

unit.”58 The critical attribute of execution is that it begins with the 

assignment of a task at the lowest level and requires some type of action

be taken to completion. For this paper, execution includes unit level 

actions taken to employ/deploy air assets from the receipt of tasking to the 

termination of the mission. Execution is decentralized if decisions after 

mission assignment lie with the operator of the weapon system, and it is 

centralized if detailed decisions reside in a higher command authority or 

automated system controlled by that authority.59 This definition provides 

the framework for analysis of the Air Force central tenet. 

Air Force doctrine does not consider numerous factors when 

discussing the effectiveness of the control and execution of airpower. One 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...19

prominent factor affecting the degree of control over command and 

execution is the political context in which the air operation is conducted. 

Although current doctrine states that commanders may deviate from 

doctrine due to circumstances, it does not do an adequate job of presenting 

situations where alternate control and execution methodologies may be 

desired. The next chapter provides an analysis of political factors

affecting the degree of control necessary for a successful air campaign. 

Decentralization and centralization are a matter of degree, and in 

most air operations the amount of centralization will be a matter of degree. 

There will be operations across the control and execution spectrum. For 

the purposes of this paper, the amount of centralization of both control and 

execution will be based on the majority of the air effort with full 

knowledge that some operations will be controlled entirely separate based 

on the mission. 
20...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...21

III. Political Influence Centralizing Airpower

Control and Execution 

While nations have always aimed in war to gain their 

objective with the least cost, in modern war, achieving 

decisive political aims may not require achieving decisive 

military results. 

General Wesley K. Clark 

Waging Modern War 

Sixty years of centralized control doctrine and thirty years of

decentralized execution doctrine have given the concepts the standing of 

dogma within Air Force doctrinal discussions. Numerous factors have 

converged in the last decade to lead airmen to believe that this central 

doctrinal tenet needs serious examination. First, the employment of force

in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq in the last decade has revealed a significant 

amount of centralization in both control and execution due to political 

concerns in each of these limited conflicts. The political circumstances of 

these conflicts required high level decision makers to manage force 

application, often to the annoyance of lower level commanders. Second, 

technology has provided the commander with the option to either 

centralize or decentralize his control and execution options. On one hand, 

advanced sensors, combined with long range, and high bandwidth 

communications provided the senior commander an unparalleled amount 

of information to facilitate control and execution of air forces. On the 

other hand, the networking of sensors and weapon systems gave the lowest 

level commander an unheard of level of situational awareness where he

could take advantage of transitional opportunities through the 

decentralization of command and execution. Amazingly, with the 

profound technological developments since the First Gulf War and 

political complexity of missions, there has been relatively little discussion 

in Air Force professional journals on alternative methods for controlling 

and executing airpower. Airmen have tended to view warfare very 

mechanistically without regard to the human element and friction, leaving 

them to not question their doctrine seriously.60 Experience in the last

decade shows that airmen still are reluctant to apply the lessons learned 

from events that do not ‘fit the mold.’ 
22...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

If the technology and political context are not enough to warrant 

alternate control and execution options, then there are several military

reasons for considering other approaches. First, the increase in the speed

of real time operations can quickly overwhelm a centralized decision

making authority. Second, centralized command and control presents an 

adversary with a single critical center of gravity (COG) regardless of 

where it is located. Such a COG will require significant defenses to 

protect it from either physical or information attacks.61 Clearly, a 

discussion of command and execution authority is important and requires 

an analysis of when one method is more appropriate than another. 

Political Context 

While U.S. forces are primarily armed, trained, and equipped to 

win wars, they are increasingly used for a wide range of political purposes. 

Air Force doctrine tends to emphasize conventional state-versus-state 

conflict rather than smaller scale contingencies. However, as U.S. forces 

continue to be involved in actions ranging from peace enforcement to low 

level military action, doctrinal guidance needs expanding.62

The political context of the application of military force

significantly impacts the level of control and execution authority required 

for airpower. U.S. involvement in limited wars or small-scale 

contingencies where political stakes are high but the need for 

overwhelming force is low requires a different control and execution 

structure than large-scale conventional war. Small-scale contingencies 

such as operations Deliberate Force, Allied Force, or Southern Watch 

require a very measured and controlled use of force, while large-scale 

actions such as the Gulf War or Korea could accept a less restricted use of 

force. Therefore, the type of war changes the amount of control required 

over planning and execution. 

Desert Storm 

Desert Storm represents the model execution of the airman’s tenet 

of centralized control with decentralized execution. General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf, Coalition Commander, was given fairly wide latitude on the 

application of military force.63 The Joint Forces Air Component 

Commander, Lieutenant General Charles Horner, exercised air command 

and control during the Gulf War. The Gulf War was the first conflict 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...23

since World War II where U.S. air forces were under some form of unified 

control. The forces were tasked through an integrated Air Tasking Order

that focused effects while preventing conflicts. The single air plan 

implemented Schwarzkopf’s vision while it allowed lower echelons to 

execute the tasking. Decentralized execution was required due to the large 

number of forces deployed. General Horner executed over 112,000 sorties 

with roughly 2,800 aircraft.64 He deployed air forces that were so large 

that operations had to be decentralized to maintain an adequate span of 

control. Air Force doctrine clearly addresses the conventional application 

of airpower in large-scale conflict, but it does not address the impact of 

political or coalition context in small-scale contingencies. The case 

studies below highlight the fact that centralized control with decentralized 

execution is, in many cases, not the appropriate employment of airpower. 

Deliberate Force 

Operation Deliberate Force represents the challenge of employing 

airpower in a politically charged environment where airpower assets strike 

quickly to achieve limited political goals. The entire operation lasted only 

16 days (30 August to 14 September 1995), and the total sorties were only 

a minor fraction of those flown in Desert Storm. Nonetheless, NATO’s 

first sustained air strike operation offers insight into the aspects of

controlling the employment of airpower for the effect of coercion of an 

opponent to limited objectives. 

NATO executed Operation Deliberate Force as a subset of 

Operation Deny Flight, supporting United Nations (UN) peace operations 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina.65 The main objective of Operation Deliberate

Force was to coerce Bosnian Serbs to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other 

UN-mandated safe areas in Bosnia.66 In an attempt to maintain separation

between the UN and NATO missions to allow UN impartiality, NATO 

airpower employment was approved through a “dual-key” chain of 

command established earlier for Operation Deny Flight.67 Lieutenant 

General Michael E. Ryan, Allied Air Forces Southern Command 

(AIRSOUTH), was designated Combined Force Air Component 

Commander (CFACC) and exercised control over NATO air forces. 

However, NATO also had to coordinate target assignments with the 

commander United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Lieutenant 

General Rupert Smith, and Commander of UN forces in the former 

Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier. American forces were 
24...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

operating under NATO command to achieve objectives authorized by the 

UN. Figure 1 shows Deliberate Force command relationships.68 Due to

the dual-key arrangement, General Ryan’s actual execute decisions in 

Operation Deliberate Force depended on a series of delicate diplomatic 

arrangements between the NATO and UN command structures.69 

Figure 1. Deliberate Force Command Relationships 

General Ryan and the Combined Air Operations Center not only 

centrally controlled the air war, but they were also very involved in 

numerous execution decisions. Because General Ryan was extremely 

concerned with the impact on NATO politics due to fratricide or collateral 

damage, he personally selected each target that the aircrews attacked 

throughout the operation.70 General Ryan took a direct role in the air plan 

execution by personally directing actions. He moved his headquarters 

from Naples to the Coalition Air Operations Center in Vicenza to be 

personally available during the execution. He felt that personal 

accountability was required in an operation this sensitive.71 This tight 

control was also exercised by the Combined Air Operations Center over 

executing aircraft. Special instructions issued by the Combined Air 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...25

Operations Center directed pilots to attack only their assigned targets,

even if that meant dropping a weapon in a crater. The Air Tasking 

Message specified loads and standard configurations with little flexibility 

at the unit level for determining appropriate loadouts. Additionally, 

because of collateral damage concerns, General Ryan and his staff even 

directed tactics such as number of passes and allowable weapons-release

pulses.72 Although Airborne Command and Control Center aircraft were 

deployed to provide decentralized execution authority, major decisions

were all passed to the Combined Air Operations Center making the 

Airborne Command and Control Center a veritable communications

relay.73 In a sense, the Combined Air Operations Center provided General 

Ryan with a Napoleonic view of the battlefield for overseeing and 

controlling events.74 Convinced that “every bomb was a political bomb,” 

Ryan wanted accountability to rest on his shoulders alone.75

Due to the lack of doctrine concerning centralized execution of air

assets, subordinate units were frustrated and confused with the heavy 

interaction by the Combined Air Operations Center and AIRSOUTH. The 

assessment at the unit level was that the low tolerance for mistakes seemed

to take the judgment out of the cockpit.76 General Ryan kept battle 

damage assessment (BDA) on close hold, even keeping it from tactical 

units. He had the following reasons for BDA control: 1) He did not want 

his judgment second guessed, 2) he did not want outside organizations 

making assessments of BDA, and 3) he did not want to be held to his first

assessment if it should change. Although Ryan withheld BDA due to 

concerns about behind-the-back political maneuvering, tactical units 

suffered by flying combat missions with no idea of the real ground 

situation.77 Ryan not only centrally executed the air operation, but by 

controlling vital information to subordinate units, he essentially

guaranteed their need for centralized command and centralized execution. 

Despite all the problems of NATO/UN coordination, Deliberate 

Force successfully met NATO goals. The operation demonstrated the 

inherent flexibility of airpower not through decentralized execution, but 

through a tightly planned and executed air campaign crafted by General 

Ryan and his staff. NATO air units flew 3,535 sorties and dropped more

than 1,100 bombs with minimal collateral damage and only one aircraft 

lost. The air campaign was designed specifically for a potentially

explosive diplomatic and alliance situation where centralized execution 

minimized unfavorable effects.78 Thus, the centrally executed airpower 

campaign successfully met both U.S. and NATO objectives. 
26...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Allied Force 

In response to Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO 

airpower again launched a major offensive in Operation Allied Force in 

1999. Initially envisioned as a short operation, the aerial bombing of 

Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia lasted for seventy-eight days. During 

the period between March 24 and June 7, NATO conducted an air 

campaign against Yugoslavia in an effort to halt continuous human rights 

abuses against ethnic Albanians. Once again, due to political constraints 

and the lack of commitment to introduce ground forces, NATO air forces

were called upon to coerce Milosovic to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.79 

NATO command structure was similar to Deny Flight with the

exception that UN coordination on targets was not necessary since no UN 

troops were on the ground in Kosovo. Lieutenant General Michael Short, 

the Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, who was also the 

Combined Force Air Component Commander, now became the U.S. Joint 

Force Air Component Commander as well. General Short commanded all 

NATO air forces under NATO authority and also reported through 

American channels as the 16th Air Force Commander. As Combined 

Force Air Component Commander, General Short had operational control 

over all of the air assets assigned to the theater, including B-2s that flew 

round-trip bombing missions directly from the United States.80 Allied

Force command structure is shown in Figure 2.81
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...27

Figure 2. Allied Force Command Structure 

Once again, NATO air assets were employed to support a 

campaign of limited objectives against Milosevic. Like Operation 

Deliberate Force, General Short planned a campaign that tightly controlled 

the execution of air assets to limit civilian casualties. Like Operation 

Deliberate Force, General Short was forced to execute an air campaign for

limited objectives in a politically charged environment. The plan’s stated 

aim was to reduce Serbia’s ability to continue abusing the Kosovars, with 

the declared goals of achieving a halt to Serbian ethnic cleansing in 

Kosovo; a withdrawal of all Serbian military, police, and paramilitary 

forces; the return of all ethnic Albanian refugees; and the political 

groundwork for a settlement that would allow Kosovar autonomy under 

continued Yugoslav sovereignty.82 The plan was conceived as a coercive

operation to inflict enough pain to persuade Milosevic to capitulate to 

NATO demands. 

During the course of the campaign, NATO developed mechanisms

for delegating target approval authority to military commanders. For 

selected categories of targets—for example, targets in downtown 

Belgrade, in Montenegro, or targets likely to involve high collateral 

damage—NATO reserved approval for higher political authorities. 

NATO leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations were 
28...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military operations, thereby 

helping to sustain the unity of the alliance.83

The need to coordinate the target approval for 19 NATO nations 

required centralized control and execution of the air war by General Short 

and the Combined Air Operations Center. Allied Force was an extremely

politically charged effort highlighting competing priorities on target 

selection and national sensitivities to collateral damage. Quite often 

control and execution decisions migrated to higher-echelon commands 

with the Combined Forces Commander directly involved in targeting 

decisions and national leaders exercising veto power over specific target 

sets. 

Due to the relatively limited air campaign, the Combined Forces 

Air Component Commander was able to exercise a large degree of control 

as seen earlier in Operation Deliberate Force. Once again, Allied Force 

was a relatively small air campaign in geographical scope, the number of 

sorties flown, and the political objectives desired. Centralized control and 

execution prevailed due to the level of precision required to limit collateral 

damage. Due to the limited nature of the conflict, theater sensor and 

communications capabilities allowed close monitoring and control of 

execution; thus, centralized execution provided the means for the Air 

Component Commander to effectively manage military and political 

objectives. 

Implications 

The Deliberate Force and Allied Force case studies highlight the

hypothesis that centralized control and execution is the an effective, and 

possibly the most effective, use of airpower when conflicts for limited 

objectives are pursued in a politically charged environment. Although 

opinions differ on alternate courses of action, these two case studies 

highlight the fact that political environments exist where a very measured 

application of force is required. In fact, this environment has become the 

norm for the application of military power in the late 20th century. Air

Force participation in Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied 

Force, and Deliberate Force emphasize the use of centralized execution to 

manage the application of airpower. In each instance the operation’s small 

scale, limited objectives, and excellent communications allowed the 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...29

C/JFACC to pay individual attention to the execution of the air effort and 

thereby to achieve the desired political and military objectives. 
30...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

IV. Impact of Technology on Control and Execution 

The creative leader is the one who will rewrite doctrine, 

employ new weapons systems, develop new tactics and who 

pushes the state of the art. 

John O. Marsh, Jr. 

Secretary of the Army

June 8, 1981 

Not only does the political environment affect the control and 

execution of airpower, but also the technology available to the commander 

for controlling and employing airpower. Stealth, precision, long-range 

high bandwidth communications, and information networking have

changed the basic calculus of command and control. Additionally, 

technologies such as autonomous network agents, long duration 

autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), autonomous weapons 

seekers, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) dramatically

change the command and execution functions for the commander. In 

order for airpower doctrine to be relevant, it needs to address the changes 

that technology brings to command and control. 

Information and Decision Systems 

Networking of command and control along with intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information is driving execution in 

polar opposite directions. In Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace 

Campaigns in 2010, Colonel Jeffery Barnett argues that information 

technologies, combined reliable communications, stealth and precision 

drive the centralization of airpower command and execution.84 During 

recent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, along with Operations Northern 

Watch and Southern Watch, this relationship seems to ring true. The 

ability of sensor information and political leverage to converge in a single 

location tends to centralize airpower control and execution as seen in the 

Allied Force case. On one hand, information technologies such as sensor 

fusion and long-range communications allow the commander to centralize 

airpower execution in situations where he has adequate span of control 

and political sensitivities are high. On the other hand however, Network 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...31

Centric Warfare proponents argue that the same technologies should 

provide the push to decentralize both control and execution.85 Network 

Centric Warfare theorizes that control will decentralize as subordinate 

units with dominant knowledge make execution decisions based on 

commander’s intent.86 They propose that “self-synchronization” will

allow a “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” command structure that 

executes the commander’s intent within a bounded limit.87 Although 

Network Centric Warfare provides exciting possibilities, it also clashes 

with traditional military culture. 

Information gathering capability has increased dramatically in the 

last half of the twentieth century; the commander’s ability to ‘see’ a 

battlefield has also improved dramatically. The Coalition Air Operations 

Center developed during Allied Force was the centralized controlling and 

execution element. Data-link and communication architectures allowed 

the Coalition Air Operations Center to have an unprecedented situational 

awareness of the tactical situation. The Coalition Air Operations Center 

received real-time surveillance and intelligence feeds from national 

intelligence assets, Airborne Warning And Control System, Joint STARS, 

Rivet Joint, U-2, and the Predator and Hunter UAVs, and it synthesized 

this information into the Balkan Operational Picture to monitor the

campaign in near real time. The overarching picture presented a

networked view of information received from all the various intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance assets in theater as well as satellite 

imagery, allowing Lieutenant General Michael Short, the Combined 

Forces Air Component Commander, and the Coalition Air Operations 

Center to adjust to real-time developments in theater. 

A principle feature of the Balkan Operational Picture was the 

situational awareness it provided not only to the Coalition Air Operations

Center but also to higher and lateral command centers as well as to the 

National Military Command Center in the Pentagon. This availability of 

rapid and widely disseminated information to all levels of command 

seriously affected General Short’s ability to exercise sole control in the 

employment of airpower due to the influence on decision making from 

higher echelons. The influence of higher echelons slowed the targeting 

process by limiting allowable targets, which nearly forced the air plan to 

run out of targets early in the air campaign. 

In addition to General Short and the Coalition Air Operations 

Center receiving near-real-time information, modern communications 

allowed Short and the Coalition Air Operations Center to communicate 
32...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

execution decisions directly to the cockpit, sometimes bypassing airborne 

command elements. A series of remote transmission sites tied to a robust 

system of both military and pre-existing commercial lines allowed clear

and secure communication throughout Bosnia, Kosovo and parts of 

Serbia. The system was intended to greatly expand the ability of airborne 

command elements to communicate with the Coalition Air Operations

Center, but it also allowed the Coalition Air Operations Center to speak 

directly to strike aircraft. The following transcript highlights the friction 

when the Coalition Air Operations Center has better situational awareness 

than the cockpit on the scene: 

About 5 o’clock in the afternoon, we had live Predator 

video of three tanks moving down the road in Serbia and

Kosovo. As most of you know, my son is an A-10 pilot, or 

he was at the time. We had a FAC [Forward Air 

Controller] overhead and General Clark [Gen. Wesley K. 

Clark, SACEUR] had the same live Predator video that I 

had. “Mike, I want you to kill those tanks.” I quickly 

responded, I had something else in mind, “Boss, I’ll go 

after that for you.” When shift time came, [Maj. Gen.] 

Garry Trexler was on the floor, finishing up in the daytime, 

and Gelwix arrived to take the night shift. I was there 

because the SACEUR wanted those three tanks killed. We

had a weapon school graduate on the phone talking 

direction to the FAC on the radio. Call went something 

like this: “A lot of interest in killing those tanks, 421. I’d 

like you to work on it.” “Roger.” Two or three minutes 

went by, and 421 clearly had not found those tanks. The 

young major’s voice went up a bit and said, 

“ComAirSouth, and SACEUR are real interested in killing

those tanks. Have you got them yet?” “Negative.” About 

two more minutes went by and the weapons school 

graduate played his last card. “General Short really wants 

those tanks killed.” And a voice came back that I’ve heard 

in my house for the better part of 30 years and he said, 

“God damn it, Dad, I can’t see the fucking tanks!”88 

Unfortunately, this radio exchange highlights the frustration at the tactical 

level when training and doctrine do not address centralized execution. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...33

The Air Operations Center as a weapon system was born as a result 

of the availability of real-time intelligence and robust communication 

systems that could transmit command decisions by the air component 

commander directly to airborne aircraft. The level of control and 

information available to General Short during Allied Force allowed him to 

alter the execution of on-going missions to meet rapidly changing mission 

requirements. Short re-tasked entire packages while they were airborne 

based on detailed information available at the Air Operations Center that 

was perhaps better than information available at the aircraft involved in 

the missions. The Coalition Air Operations Center was privy and 

responsive to the Coalition Forces Commander, who also had access to the 

same information, and in-turn, ordered attacks against targets he viewed 

on his displays. While Allied Force demonstrated that advances in 

sensors, data-links, and communications technologies have made

centralized execution feasible, certain lessons on its desirability can be

drawn. 

Admiral James Ellis, Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern 

Europe, notes a warning on the dangers of centralized control and 

execution of airpower at the Air Operations Center. In an interview in 

early September 1999, he states that too much information has the 

potential to reduce a military leader’s awareness of an unfolding situation.

Too much data leads to sensory overload, “...uncontrolled, it will control 

you and your staffs and lengthen your decision-cycle times.”89 

Information superiority overload can actually degrade mission 

performance, or even worse, it can be exploited by a cunning foe. 

To avoid this paralysis at the staff level, advocates of Network 

Centric Warfare advocate direct access to information by subordinate 

commands. Direct access to information empowers leaders at lower 

levels, since they do not have to rely on higher levels for time-sensitive,

decision-quality information. In Network Centric Warfare, units at all 

levels have greater access to alternative, albeit frequently conflicting, 

sources of information. This proliferation of information to all levels 

allows ‘intent-based’ leadership as opposed to ‘directive’ leadership. 

Leaders no longer have to direct tasks and organizational relationships; the 

freedom and proliferation of information allows subordinate leaders to 

make decisions based on the intent of the leader. 

Network Centric Warfare is the networking of intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and combat elements into a 

distributed network providing the warrior with the combat oriented
34...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

version of the Internet. The forecast architecture for Network Centric 

Warfare will probably comprise three elements: the sensor grid, the 

information grid, and the shooter grid.90 The sensor grid architecture is 

depicted below in Figure 3.91

Figure 3. The Grid 

The sensor grid encompasses a networked collection of diverse 

sensors such as radars, radio frequency and infrared receivers, optical 

devices, acoustic systems, and people. These sensors could be on orbit, in 

the air, on the ground, or at sea. Some would be permanently in place, 

others plugged in as and where needed and available.92 This grid provides 

the eyes and the ears to the combat force and forms the foundation of the 

overall system. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...35

The information grid is the nervous system of the battle network. 

It comprises the transmission system of information of all types and 

includes communications satellites, data-transmission lines, microwave 

relays, computers, and command centers. The information grid transmits 

sensor information, recommendations and orders, intelligence, and realtime information about operations, logistics, and other functions—

information that today is centralized at the Air Operations Center for the 

Joint Forces Air Component Commander’s staff to plan, monitor, and

control operations.93 

The shooter grid draws from the sensor and information grids to 

pair weapons incorporated into it with targets and then to guide weapons 

to targets as necessary. Pairings can be assigned in real time from the 

overall commander or based on the initiative at the lowest level as a result 

of advanced situational awareness.94

The shooter grid is not limited to air assets only, but it 

encompasses the whole combat power of the U.S. military. The advantage 

of a network approach is that, for example, an Army Tactical Missile 

System, an Air Force Joint Standoff Weapon, a Navy Tomahawk missile, 

or an armored platoon can target a surface-to-air missile easily. 

Assignments can be made in real time as threats emerge, concentrating

combat power on enemy targets. The shooter grid, reinforced by Global 

Positioning System (GPS), digital maps, computers, and display systems, 

can accurately merge data from sensors. The combination of all grids will 

make it common for ships, aircraft, and other weapon-launching platforms

to have engagement-quality information about targets that their own 

sensors have not detected.95

Decision-quality information provided via a distributed network 

empowers individual aircraft and commanders to cause strategic effects 

aligned with the commander’s intent. Lone combat units armed with 

knowledge of desired effects and outcomes, coupled with outstanding 

battle space awareness, enable positive strategic outcomes. When combat 

units plug into the network, the action cycle shortens because they are able 

to adapt to emerging situations. Parallel war is the ultimate byproduct 

when dominant battle space knowledge combines with a networked 

shooter grid.96 Because of the modern information barrage, today’s 

leaders can either be delayed by ambiguous information and distracting 

subordinates or they can produce a clear intent and empower subordinate 

organizations to take advantage of emerging opportunities.97 

Decentralized empowerment frees organizational authority allowing
36...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

subordinate units to exercise initiative and agility and to apply unlimited 

firepower.98

The challenge of Network Centric Warfare is not technical, but 

cognitive and doctrinal; it requires a new way of thinking. Integration into 

the wired battlefield causes the diffusion of power away from the highly 

centralized hierarchies that now make up military command and control. 

Once individual soldiers or aircraft plug into the network, selforganization begins to emerge. As the soldiers interact with the grid, they

produce synergistic, emergent properties not displayed by the individual 

components. They learn from experience, change to apply lessons 

learned, and anticipate what is needed to be successful in the future.99 

This diffusion of authority and adaptability creates real difficulties for 

very large organizations that depend on strong, hierarchical control.100 

According to Dr. Wheatley, a behavioral theorist, the danger in Network 

Centric Warfare is that strategy gives way to reaction: 

They [the U.S. Army] have the technology to move

information down to the lowest level so that it is possible

for the men inside tanks to have as much information as

their commanders.... But once you give that information to 

tank crews, and they start working for their own safety, 

their own victory, how are they going to respond to 

commands from above? And what happens to battle 

strategy? Is it in the head of the commander, or do you just 

train the crews and let them figure it out for themselves as 

the situation demands?101 

Complexity theorists illustrate self-organization by pointing out that New 

York City never runs out of food. The city is a model of a self-adaptive

system that meets the strategy of self-survival. No one is in overall charge

of feeding New York; no detailed movement plans are drawn up; no 

master schedule of shops and supermarkets is distributed. However, 

market forces drive the supply system; the city manages to feed itself 

anyway.102 

Clearly, the challenge for military strategy is to assess the

situations where centralized control and execution are necessary while 

allowing for the advantages of the self-adaptive advantages brought by 

Network Centric Warfare. In recent conflicts, airpower employment with 

“the grid” shows a propensity for centralized execution due to the 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...37

convergence of information and communications with the air component

commander at the Air Operations Center. This experience is based on 

situations where political stakes were high, war aims were low, and span 

of control was small, allowing for the commander’s individualized 

attention. In large-scale, dynamic, complex engagement situations, the 

decentralized aspects of Network Centric Warfare are advantageous. The 

challenge today is to experiment and refine Network Centric Warfare 

approaches so that self-adaptive behavior can be leveraged to support the

Air Component Commander’s strategy. 

Unmanned and Autonomous Systems 

The technology advances of autonomous intelligent agents sifting 

data in the Air Operations Center, self-thinking UAVs and UCAVs, and 

improved peer-to-peer communications allows the decentralization of

control. Integration of these technologies into the wired battlefield causes

the diffusion of power away from the highly centralized hierarchies that 

now make up military command and control. 

Future battles will have unmanned systems as forward 

sensor/observers to detect and identify high-value targets combined with 

autonomous UCAVs to strike the identified targets. This future addition 

of multi-use unmanned air vehicles is likely to change the nature of air

warfare. The Air Force currently relies on unmanned Predator and Global 

Hawk to provide long duration surveillance; however, unmanned air 

vehicles are just the beginning of the robotic combat zone. In 

Afghanistan, the Hellfire-armed Predator essentially became the first 

UCAV.103 In 2001, an unmanned Global Hawk performed an aviation 

first by flying autonomously across the Pacific Ocean to Australia.104 

These systems will likely proliferate eventually taking over long duration 

and critically dangerous missions, but due to communications bandwidth 

constraints future systems will operate more autonomously. 105 

The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Project 

Agency are developing UCAVs that will complete unaided missions that

today require a great deal of human interaction. These UCAVs will be 

given an objective and will be able to independently execute a mission

with limited human interaction after the mission is put into the UCAV. 

However, several recent Global Hawk crashes highlight the dangers of 
38...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

autonomous systems. Programming mistakes or programming without 

understanding employment concepts can cause critical errors.106 

There will even be smart and dumb UCAVs where the smart 

UCAV will direct the operations of the less smart, cheaper vehicles.

107 

The infusion of smart autonomous vehicles that interact with each other 

within the battle space will likely create a less linear battle space where 

Air Component Commanders will have less control. Research shows that

autonomous systems will likely decentralize control and execution ability 

and cause swarming behavior in the battle space.108

The trend towards fully autonomous systems seems inescapable 

and Air Force doctrine should address the changes in battlefield control 

and execution necessary for autonomous systems. Current military

thinking is particularly careful to indicate that human decision-making 

will be involved at some level in the operation of autonomous systems. 

However, there is no reason why this should be so. Quantum increases in 

processing power combined with self-learning computer programs will 

continue to increase autonomy in the battle space. Inevitably, the need to 

make decisions in split-second timing will remove the human from battle 

space decisions. In fact, several weapon systems already fielded have 

relegated the human-in-the-loop to a ‘kill-switch’ operator.109 This

infusion of self-adapting weapon systems on the battlefield is likely to 

diffuse both execution and control decisions away from the commander 

and into the weapon system itself. Air Force doctrine and thinking need to 

address the impact on control and execution when autonomous systems

lead to swarming behavior. 

Swarming Behavior 

Organizationally, a swarm is a collection of autonomous, 

continuously sensing and reacting members who have local

communication with other nearby autonomous members. An autonomous 

member generally reacts as an individual according to internal rules and 

the state of its local environment as opposed to obeying orders through a 

hierarchy or reacting in lockstep to a rigid set of rules. In a swarm, these 

autonomous members are highly interconnected, but not to a central hub. 

Since there is no center of control, management and execution is 

distributed throughout the system.

110 This distribution and interaction 

allows for continual interactions among the agents as they form and 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...39

reform in fluid, shifting networks and shifting hierarchies as well. These 

fluid networks may persist for some time or may break down and 

recombine rapidly based on the available agents, rule set, and 

environment. Information may flow quite freely from one agent to the 

next about conditions near them in the model; with distributed knowledge 

there is no centralized hub for dispensing top-level commands among all 

the agents.111 

Independent tactical systems with self-thinking will likely show 

characteristics of swarm behavior. Swarming will likely have the biggest 

impact on organization, command, and control of airpower in the future 

and has the greatest likelihood of changing the way U.S. forces fight. 

Rand studies suggest that the technologies supporting swarming already 

exist; for example, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions

and very advanced communications form the basis for swarm behavior.112 

Swarming has tremendous impact on command since it is the outgrowth of 

highly decentralized execution systems. 

A move toward swarm behavior is more a function of 

experimentation and doctrine, cultivating an appropriate turn of mind, and 

an agile networked command and execution function. This notion already 

seems to be borne out by the Marine Corps’ experiments with its Sea

Dragon operational concepts, which use existing technology and 

emphasize networks.113 Numerous independent devices are likely in the 

battle space of the future. According to developing concepts, autonomous 

military tactical devices will likely be able to process information, sense 

their environment, move, and communicate, thus forming the fabric of a

decentralized battlefield network. Extreme miniaturization of the 

processors and vehicles allows the development of concepts such as 

"surveillance dust," a cloud of millions of microscopic airborne sensors 

that could blanket a target area for extended periods to gather and report 

data. 114 The battle space of the future may have a "mesh" of thousands of 

small robots, each several inches in size, scattered across a battlefield to 

do both surveillance and attack functions, or clusters of orbiting smallscale satellites providing near-continuous ground coverage at relatively 

low cost.115 These trends point to a battlefield dominated by offensive

platforms sharply different from today, begging the question of their 

impact on command and execution.

The mesh of autonomous unmanned platforms could change 

command from plan-based to goal-based, where the actual execution of 

military operations is created on the fly by constantly innovating 
40...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

participants at the lowest level. They respond to changing situations 

without requesting or needing permission. In future campaigns, leaders 

may draw up a list of fixed and mobile targets and attach point values to 

them. Then units on the ground, in the air, and at sea could autonomously 

pick targets available within their area of influence. The commander 

would review periodic progress, adjust point values if needed from time to 

time, and basically stay the hell out of the way of the swarm.

116 With the

introduction of swarming autonomous units, command and execution 

radically changes. 

Swarming has already been seen in military operations providing a

diffuse network that is very effective yet difficult to counter. For example, 

the Vietcong exhibited a degree of swarming behavior in their attacks 

during the Tet Offensive in 1968. While the attacks were ordered by 

Hanoi, the attackers themselves enjoyed a very large degree of freedom of 

action—in line with Mao’s strategic dictum of “strategic centralization, 

tactical decentralization.”

117 Current terrorist organizations also exhibit a 

large degree of networking and swarming. For example, Hezbollah uses a 

swarming approach to counter Israeli commando raids in southern 

Lebanon. Small, distributed units converge on Israeli patrols based on 

general instructions. Like antibodies, units using cellular communications

and general directions have been able to converge on any intruder in a 

given area. No central leadership is required, and Israeli commandos have

found themselves overwhelmed more than once by swarming attacks from 

which they sustain serious losses. The inability of the Israeli military to 

deal with these Hezbollah swarms may have contributed to Israel’s 

unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Finally, Al Qaeda has 

engaged in “strategic swarming” by striking simultaneously, or with close 

sequencing, at widely separated targets from dispersed cells, thereby 

swarming to concentrate effects. This strategy was seen in the embassy 

bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the World Trade Center and Pentagon 

attacks, and the recent bombings in Kenya.118 Al Qaeda exhibits the 

qualities of decentralized command and decentralized execution through a 

diffuse network that acts on specific timing yet general execution 

instructions from the group’s leadership. 

As beneficial as swarming seems, its decentralized nature does

have serious disadvantages. Resources are not efficiently allotted and 

duplication of effort is always rampant.119 The military case requires a

necessary mechanism to provide top-down direction when needed to focus 

swarms on necessary objectives. To do this without succumbing to the 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...41

temptation to over control events in the field may become an essential 

element of information-age command.120

Implications 

In summary, the advances in information and decision systems, the 

prevalence of unmanned systems, and the trend toward automation results

in the development of systems that take the human out of the loop, with 

the potential of shifting system behavior into a realm where command and 

execution are at odds with one another. The proliferation of long duration, 

unmanned autonomous devices, combined with automated decision aids, 

greatly increases the speed of combat. The additional development of 

very cheap and very small military systems will also help to move combat 

even further out of human control and decision making. The combination 

of these advances has the potential for synergistic effects in warfighting. 

Decision-making will likely decentralize to take advantage of the strengths 

of the grid. Humans may retain symbolic authority, but automated 

systems move too fast and the factors involved are too complex for realtime human comprehension. When computers become self-learning, the 

situation will be even further from anything humans can reasonably expect 

to understand, much less intervene in successfully. Doctrine and training 

need to address the fact that technology may make it necessary to 

decentralize control and execution of airpower. 

Initial Air Force implementation of these new technologies is 

showing a tendency to centralize not only control but also execution.

Technology leaps from Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom has allowed 

Air Operations Centers to have excellent situational awareness of tactical 

events. However, this awareness combined with excellent 

communications has led commanders to manage execution decisions at the 

tactical level. Numerous images are available of senior leaders watching

events unfold in front of video walls and computer consoles while 

personally directing aircraft hundreds of miles away. This preoccupation 

with information may be acceptable in small operations but risks

overwhelming the command center in large-scale operations. One must 

ask what is happening tactically while captivating real-time UAV video 

mesmerizes the operations center. 

The question for the military is whether we will also take the lead

in new operational concepts for exploiting information and 
42...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

communication on the battlefield. New technology allows the Air Force 

to look at emerging concepts for the control and execution of airpower. 

Centralized control with decentralized execution may not provide the most 

effective employment of air assets. The Air Force must aggressively 

experiment with network and swarming concepts and update Air Force 

doctrine to take full advantage of the flexibility that these new 

technologies afford. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...43
44...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

V. Additional Options for Control and Execution 

New conditions require, for solution – and new weapons 

require, for maximum application – new and imaginative 

methods. Wars are never won in the past. 

General Douglas MacArthur 

Military doctrine evolves from military theory and experience and

addresses how best to use military power. It is intended to be a collection 

of best practices based not only on history and experience, but also on 

emerging technological developments. Experience over the last decade

shows the Air Force is leaning toward centralized execution in the

application of airpower. Deliberate Force and Allied Force highlight the

fact that the Air Force currently employs airpower contrary to its own 

central tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air

Force has fallen victim to one of the most dangerous doctrinal problems—

the tendency to let doctrine stagnate. Current operational and command 

and control doctrine is on the verge of being irrelevant because the 

supporting assumptions have not been reexamined for continued validity. 

Changing circumstances must constantly be evaluated because it changes 

the calculus of past experience.121 Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Basic 

Aerospace Doctrine, states these tenets require informed judgment in 

application. It highlights that employment requires a skillful blend of the 

tenets to tailor them to the ever-changing operational environment.122 Air

Force Doctrine Document 2-8, Command and Control, adds that political 

considerations tend to centralize command at a higher level while 

admitting that execution decisions may be outside the normal chain of 

command.123 Although it is admirable that current doctrine addresses the 

fact that operational conditions dictate the levels of execution, it does a 

disservice to serious study by touting centralized command, decentralized 

execution as a bumper sticker phrase. Current doctrine does not

adequately provoke thought on the control and execution of airpower in a 

complex international environment. Additionally, it does not address the

impact of emerging technology on control and execution. This chapter

will explore the possible combinations of command and execution and ask 

what technologies or situations make these combinations applicable. 

Control and execution can each be considered as either centralized

or decentralized and can collectively be presented in a quad chart with 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...45

each quadrant representing one of the four combinations of command and 

execution. Although pure centralization or decentralization exists only in 

theory, thinking of these extremes highlights the characteristics of each 

method of command and control. Figure 4 illustrates the possible

combinations of command and execution. 

Centralized Control 

Decentralized Execution 

Centralized Control 

Centralized Execution 

Decentralized Control 

Decentralized Execution 

Decentralized Control 

Centralized Execution 

Figure 4. Command and Control Matrix

Each quadrant is examined for its suitability for airpower. The conditions

and technical developments that will likely drive the commander from the 

basic tenet into one of the other three quadrants are highlighted. 

Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution 

Centralized control with decentralized execution is the hallmark of 

desired air operations as stated in existing doctrine. Arguments for this 

employment strategy highlight that centralized control was proven in 

Africa in 1943 and in the Battle of Britain.124 The greatest advantage of

centralized control and decentralized execution is that it allows the 

demonstration of initiative at the lowest levels. A Cold War version of Air 

Force Manual 1-1 linked decentralized control with a superior culture and 

way of life. It states: 
46...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

This heritage produces leaders who are able to trust the 

commanders and individual members of our armed forces 

to make good decisions and to perform to the best of their 

abilities. This is an organizational strength that must be 

maintained. This aspect of our national character makes 

possible the rapid action-and-reaction that is not found in 

highly centralized societies.125 

Air Force Manual 1-1 linked airpower performance under centralized 

control, decentralized execution to our national character as a democratic 

people. Decentralized execution became a key tenet of our command and 

control philosophy by harnessing the initiative of lower echelon 

commanders in the conduct of an air campaign while maintaining overall 

broad guidance and direction from above. 

Operation Desert Storm highlights the advantages of centralized

control and decentralized execution. The majority of air assets were 

centralized under Lieutenant General Charles ‘Chuck’ Horner who tasked 

sorties through the Air Tasking Order. Due to span of control and 

available technology, however, airpower execution had to be 

decentralized. Units were tasked by an Air Tasking Order, but significant 

preparation was accomplished at the unit level. The 300 to 900-page Air 

Tasking Order became the synchronization mechanism for orchestrating 

the massive quantities of airpower flying through hostile airspace. The 

Air Tasking Order provided a mechanism for the efficient and safe

management of air assets through centralized control. Roughly 47,000 

total strike sorties with an additional 340 air-to-air sorties per day were 

flown; high levels of synchronization and deconfliction were required.126 

Execution was predominately decentralized with units executing the Air

Tasking Order, but making tactical decisions at lower levels. Airborne 

Warning And Control System and airborne command element aircraft

managed tankers and diverts real-time. The Airborne Command and 

Control Center controlled strike missions just beyond the fire support 

coordination line.127 There were no cases of air-to-air friendly fire and no

mid-air collisions.128 Additionally, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System aircraft directed attacks against moving targets including 

SCUDs.129 

Centralized control with decentralized execution is optimized for 

large-scale military operations such as World War II or Desert Storm. In

each of these scenarios, centralized control was necessary for assignment 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...47

of tasks, apportionment of aircraft, and synchronization of an incredibly 

complex plan. Centralized planning was essential due to the large scale of 

operations, while execution was necessarily decentralized due to span of 

control and the improved fidelity of information at tactical locations. The 

air commander was not able to maintain fine detail on the operation and 

required distributing execution tasks to subordinate commanders. 

Although centralized control with decentralized execution was

successful in Desert Storm, future commanders need to be aware of the 

possible pitfalls of this command scheme. The biggest complaint of largescale centralized control is that it is not responsive to emerging threats. 

Many argue that the Air Tasking Order is too rigid and long lead times in 

its preparation hamper the flexibility and versatility of airpower.130 For

example, in Desert Storm the Air Tasking Order cycle took at least 

40 hours from the first planning meeting to first sortie.131 Improvements 

to the planning cycle have still not significantly shortened the cycle below

24 to 36 hours. Additionally, the Air Tasking Order system has not been 

significantly tested in a fluid ground battle; for the most part, U.S. 

airpower has been so dominant that enemy reaction on a massive scale has 

been absent.132 A significant workload is placed on combat operations to

build flexibility into the system with real time aircraft assignments when 

fluid situations erupt. Another limitation is the breakdown of coordinated 

effort under decentralized execution, especially in a defense against a 

large strike. Decentralized execution degrades defensive operations when

nodes operate autonomously. In a dense threat environment, the Air 

Component Commander needs to deconflict firing decisions across a 

broad array of defensive weapons. Although by decentralizing execution

each individual defender is more survivable, they are also more likely to 

engage the wrong target or decoys. 

In general, centralized command with decentralized execution is

ideal for situations where the C/JFACC will have a large span of control 

and the battle space is relatively fixed. Centralized control allows the 

assignment of tasks, apportionment of aircraft, and synchronization of an 

incredibly complex plan while delegating detailed planning to the tactical

level. However, a significant workload is placed on lower echelons to

build flexibility into the execution when fluid situations erupt. 
48...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Centralized Control, Centralized Execution 

Centralized control with centralized execution predominates in

wars of convenience or optional warfare. Wars of convenience are 

conflicts where the U.S. does not have an overriding national interest, but 

intervenes for motivations such as influence in world politics. Objectives

differ from traditional military operations, and a great deal of control over 

the execution is required to ensure the desired effects are realized. The 

purpose of the intervention is not necessarily to win a war but to influence 

behavior. When a state has an option to participate in a conflict, all 

military considerations acquire a different perspective.133 Diplomacy 

rather than military necessity dictates the pace and use of airpower. 

Military effectiveness is not as important as the desired political effect.134 

Governments applying any kind of military force in the peacekeeping 

environment are likely to be far more sensitive to criticism than when they 

are committed to conflicts involving vital national interests. In wars of 

convenience, the government has a choice about getting involved or not, 

and domestic politics has an overarching impact on conflict objectives. A 

democratic government is likely to be sensitive to the impact on domestic 

politics of events in peacekeeping.135 Centralization of execution appears 

to correlate tightly with the ambiguities associated with peace operations 

and similar small-scale missions. Political sensitivities and concern about 

public perceptions may induce commanders to adopt procedures they 

might never consider in higher-intensity combat.136 In wars of

convenience, minimizing damage is a prime military consideration.137 In

short, involvement of airpower in wars of limited U.S. interest begs for 

centralized control and centralized execution. War aims are very 

measured; speed and flexibility do not dominate as much as controlling 

the escalation of violence. Ultimately, the failure of airmen to recognize

political realities and their implications has serious implications for 

airpower employment. For example, General Short’s desire to prosecute a 

Desert Storm-like campaign during Operation Allied Force directly 

conflicted with the political objectives of the NATO alliance. 

In Fighting by Minutes, Robert Leonhard argues that the 

centralization of control is highly dependent on information flow. He 

argues that good decisions are not the goal of military operations, but 

rather that good and timely decisions are necessary. Good and timely 

decisions are best made at the level where information reaches the 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...49

decision maker. Technology has forced execution decisions to higher

levels because of the marriage of communications and ISR information at 

higher headquarters. Previously the greatest source of battlefield 

information was reported from subordinate units, but now the senior 

commander or Air Component Commander receives information from 

numerous tactical and national sources with greater fidelity and precision 

than the tactical operator.138 Today, the Air Operations Center often has a 

better tactical picture than the operator. This trend pushes decisions to the

Air Operations Center and the Air Component Commander. Current Air 

Force doctrine does not address the realities of centralized execution, but 

as Operations Deliberate Force, Allied Force, and Southern Watch have 

shown, high-level decision-making for execution decisions is becoming 

the de facto doctrine in air operations, especially in wars of convenience. 

Emerging Air Force doctrine of effects-based operations will also 

centralize both the control and execution of airpower employment. 

Effects-Based Operations takes national and joint force objectives and

clearly links them to desired results, not to the enabling physical 

actions.

139 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, defines effects 

as “the operational or strategic level outcomes that (Air Force) functions

are intended to produce.”140 Effects are either direct or indirect, have an 

order based on time, and can accumulate and cascade in a system.

141 The

challenge in assessing operational and strategic effects is the difficulty in 

accurately linking specific actions to outcomes. The analysis required for 

effects-based targeting is very complex and traditionally is performed at 

Air Operations Center level or above. The Air Force has used Joint

Warfare Analysis Center products to assist in achieving effects-based 

operations.142 The sophisticated analysis necessary for effective EffectsBased Operations centralizes planning and execution decisions at the Air 

Operations Center and above. 

Helmut von Moltke warned of the dangers of micromanagement. 

One of von Moltke’s greatest fears was that technologies such as the 

telegraph would enhance the capability of upper echelons to interfere in 

the conduct of operations by requests for information and advice, or even 

criticisms, without a full appreciation for the actual circumstances at the

front. He warned of the dangers of commanding “with a telephone cord 

attached to the commander’s back.”143 The Prussian doctrine of

Auftragstaktik ensured flexibility and innovation. Von Moltke fostered 

independent thinking in subordinates: “Diverse are the situations under 

which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It 
50...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can 

be given.”144 Of course, mission orders are ideal for large-scale war and

not in situations where national interest is low yet political stakes are high. 

The commander must determine the appropriate command and control 

relationship based on the conflict’s nature. Another danger of centralized 

control and execution is the inability for coalition partners to participate in 

operations. U.S. forces will frequently operate in coalition with allies and

partners, and commanders must be able to control both U.S. and coalition 

forces. Technological sophistication must not inhibit U.S. forces from 

communicating with allies and coalition partners. Finally, the most 

significant danger of a centrally controlled and executed conflict is that it 

builds a significant center of gravity for the adversary to attack. Current

Air Force doctrine calls for a centralized Air Operations Center with

intelligence and communications feeds converging into one location. This

single command and control entity presents an extremely critical center of 

gravity, regardless of its location, and it is vulnerable to either

conventional or unconventional attack. With highly centralized execution, 

lower echelons are likely to paralyze without the command and guidance 

from upper echelons.145

Decentralized Control, Centralized Execution 

Decentralized control with centralized execution from an Air 

Component Commander perspective is most readily apparent in the

employment of high cost Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

assets. Because of their high cost, their employment in space, or both,

these assets are often controlled at a level above the Air Component 

Commander, although he gets coordination input on operation of the 

assets when they are in theater. Reconnaissance satellites are the best 

example of a decentralized control with centralized execution system. 

Keplerian laws of orbital motion govern satellite orbits. Any orbit that is 

lower in altitude than a geostationary orbit requires the satellite ground 

track to move over the surface of the earth. The Air Component 

Commander cannot control the ground tracks over his territory; he can 

only input requirements for when the satellite passes overhead. 

Additionally, due to the limited availability of these complex, expensive 

assets, they are controlled by agencies that are not under the command and 

control of the air component commander or even the combatant 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...51

commander. The Combined or Joint Forces Air Component Commander,

through the Joint Force Commander, makes requests for information for 

each satellite pass. That request is weighed against the requests of other 

users. In short, the Air Component Commander has little control of the 

asset in his area of responsibility. He does, however, have significant 

input into the tasking requests and the routing of information after the 

reconnaissance is completed. It can be said that the execution of the 

mission is centralized while control is decentralized. 

As the preceding discussion implies, this execution scheme is most 

applicable for the execution and tasking of assets that are very limited in 

number or one-of-a-kind. These assets require such a considerable 

investment or possess such unique capabilities that their use needs to be 

coordinated across commands, and even when deployed to an area of 

responsibility, the commander may have constraints or limitations for their 

use. The execution ends up being an elaborate scheme to optimize the 

asset’s use; efficiency is the goal. For satellite reconnaissance assets, the 

goal for the commander is to get the most critical intelligence per pass; 

therefore execution is centralized. The commander cannot afford to waste 

one of his valuable opportunities in the name of versatility or flexibility. 

Decentralized control with centralized execution optimizes limited 

resources but is not necessarily time sensitive to theater needs since the 

control is performed at a level above the commander. For time critical 

tasks the commander must coordinate with the controlling authority for 

priority. With high priority, these assets can be time sensitive, but that

requires the higher controlling authority to agree with the theater 

commander or his air component commander. The primary disadvantage 

of this command scheme is that the local commander loses flexibility and 

versatility over use of the asset. 

Decentralized Control, Decentralized Execution 

Decentralized control with decentralized execution is the ultimate 

expression of American independence and innovation. To be effective, 

decentralized control and execution must be prosecuted by a force with a 

common vision. Training and technology are essential for this command 

scheme to be effective. 

One of the greatest obstacles is the fact that decentralized control 

and execution does not fit easily into the current hierarchical organization
52...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

of the military; in fact, they are at odds with one another. Hierarchies tend 

to be slow and plodding in response to new and unique information. At 

each level of command, information is filtered, added, deleted, and 

modified. This time consuming process often results in information either

not reaching the right people or getting there too late to be of any use. 

This creates a cascading effect that slows the dissemination of decisionquality information to the proper level. This last point, not getting 

information to the right people on time, is often cited as a failure of the

intelligence community. Research on military command indicates that 

flatter organizations with decentralized control more successfully counter 

the uncertainty of warfare. Martin Van Creveld, in Command in War, 

posits that higher decision levels require more time and more information 

to counter a given amount of risk.146 His research suggests that decisionmaking at the lowest possible level with limited interference by 

intermediate command is the trademark of successful military

organizations. 

The need for networked and decentralized command and execution

is at odds with military hierarchies whose identifying characteristic is 

control of information. Decentralizing and networking information 

provides access to information at all levels of command. Shared 

information helps reduce uncertainty and improve a commander’s 

decision-making cycle. To guard against information overload, new 

technological innovations such as computer smart agents and data mining 

are needed to permit commanders at all levels to tailor their information

gathering capabilities to meet their specific needs. Distributed information 

gathering and networked intelligence enables military organizations to 

make decisions based on the requirements caused by shorter timelines. 

Today, all levels of military command and control systems have greater

access to information. To rapidly act on information, the command 

system needs to change from one of ‘direction’ to one of ‘intent.’ 

Realizing that today’s environment is dynamic and shifting, soldiers must

make decisions at the lowest possible levels based on commander’s intent. 

Leaders must allow lower echelons to follow the intent, thus freeing the

higher echelon commander for strategic decisions.147 By providing intent, 

the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop of decision-making is not 

slowed by passing information linearly up and down command levels. 

The technology advances of intelligent agents sifting data in the 

Air Operations Center, autonomous UAVs and UCAVs, and improved 

peer-to-peer communications allows the decentralization of control. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...53

Integration of these technologies into the wired battlefield causes the 

diffusion of power away from the highly centralized hierarchies that now 

make up military command and control. As discussed in the previous 

chapter, once individual soldiers or aircraft plug into the network, selforganization begins to emerge. As the soldiers interact with the grid, they

produce synergistic, emergent properties not displayed by the individual 

components. They learn from experience, change to apply what has been 

learned, and anticipate what is needed to be successful in the future.148 

This diffusion of authority and adaptability creates real difficulties for 

very large organizations that depend on strong, hierarchical control.149

The current problem with these information technology advances 

is that Air Force doctrine lags behind business and the civilian sector in 

decentralizing control and execution to become operationally agile. With

the proper doctrine and organization, decentralized control and execution

is likely to prove useful in a wide spectrum of conflict. It should also be 

effective against a broad range of adversaries. Providing clear intent to 

subordinates and rapid decentralized decision-making combined with 

swarming the adversary from all directions should be an effective strategy 

against either massed or dispersed opponents. A true networked yet 

decentralized force operates in clusters capable of operating against foes 

of any size, combining to confront large field armies and aggregating far 

more loosely in operations aimed at countering guerrillas and other 

unconventional forces.150

The major challenges to implementing networked, decentralized 

forces are organizational in nature. For example, for Network Centric

Warfare to work, “jointness” will have to broaden and deepen. True joint

doctrine and training are necessary conditions for the rise of an integrated 

capability that highlights both the data gathering and the fire capabilities

of all the services in myriad settings, across the spectrum of intensity of

future conflict. Decentralization of the command and control of airpower 

is necessary for dispersed forces to affect opponents operating in a 

nonlinear battlespace.151

Although effective in industrial age warfare, centralized control 

places limitations on timeliness, flexibility, and tempo and creates

potentially serious problems should we face an adversary that is operating

at a faster operations tempo than U.S. forces. Decentralized organizations

are very diffuse and agile and are difficult to target using hierarchical

structures. As noted earlier, Al Qaeda exhibits qualities of decentralized 

command and decentralized execution through a diffuse network that acts 
54...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

on specific timing yet general execution instructions from the group’s

leadership. Al Qaeda has engaged in “strategic swarming” by striking

simultaneously, or with close sequencing, at widely separated targets as 

seen in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the World Trade

Center and Pentagon attacks, and recent bombings in Kenya.152 The

challenge in countering organizations such as Al Qaeda is finding an 

organizational structure that is adaptive enough to react faster than the 

opponent’s organization itself. It is highly unlikely for a hierarchical 

organization to successfully counter a capable, decentralized threat.

Decentralization is not appropriate for wars where a specific 

political result is vital and mistakes cannot be tolerated. Additionally

decentralization requires highly trained, effective subordinates to make the

proper operational decisions to ensure unity of effort. Decentralized 

organizations allow a large span of control, but without organizational 

vision and a shared sense of purpose, they can often degenerate into chaos. 

Decentralization causes an inefficient use of resources, duplication of 

effort is rampant, and some efforts may not be attempted at all. The

danger of the fixation on time and streamlined schemes to attack time 

sensitive targets is that many targets are not strategically important enough 

to expend valuable resources against. In a time sensitive situation with 

decentralized control and execution, ‘Chuckie Cheese Mole in the Hole’

targeting is likely. Any target that pops up becomes a time sensitive 

target. The fallacy of opportunity targeting it that it assumes that any 

target identified by real-time reconnaissance is worth the expenditure of 

airpower to affect. It presupposes an abundance of strike capability and a 

lack of important fixed targets.153 

Implications 

Centralized control of airpower is a means, not an end. An 

informed and intelligent unity of effort towards common objectives is the 

goal. With rapid advances in computers, communications, and artificial 

intelligence, centralized control is no longer necessary or even desired in 

all situations. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 states, “Centralized control 

and decentralized execution of air and space forces are critical to force 

effectiveness,” but effectiveness may take many forms.154 Effectiveness 

can be measured by targets per sortie, number of long-term political 

objectives met, absence of negative press, lack of friendly casualties, or 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...55

simply presence. Each measure may require a different approach to the 

command and execution of airpower. 

There is no magic formula for success and certain steps must be 

taken to ensure that airpower is most effectively employed. The first step 

is to determine an accurate picture of the nature of the conflict. According

to Clausewitz, that determination is the most significant and 

comprehensive question the commander must ask: “The first, the supreme,

the most far-reaching act of judgment that the commander makes is to 

establish the type of campaign upon which he is embarking.”155 Today’s 

technology and the nature of military operations do not change that fact. 

Any command and execution system that does not match the conflict will 

likely fail. 

In Command in War, Martin Van Creveld determined that

successful armies did not turn troops into automatons and did not attempt

to control everything from the top. He concluded that commanders must 

give lower echelons wide latitude and demand that they fill that latitude 

with initiative. They must be properly trained, equipped, and organized to 

take advantage of initiative.156 Of course, initiative must be weighed 

against the political stakes involved and the corresponding acceptable 

amount of independent military operations. In short, the commander must

manage risk by using a command and execution scheme that balances risk 

with initiative. Centralized control with decentralized execution is a 

mantra in Air Force doctrine without regard for political circumstance or 

technological advancement. Air Force doctrine needs to address the fact 

that conditions and circumstances exist where centralized control with 

decentralized execution is neither the most appropriate nor the most 

effective employment of military airpower. 
56...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

VI. Conclusion 

Doctrine is indispensable to an army...Doctrine provides a 

military organization with a common philosophy, a

common language, a common purpose, and a unity of 

effort. 

General George Decker, 16 December 1960 

The Air Force doctrine of centralized control and decentralized 

execution has reached the status of dogma. Technology and political 

constraints continually change, and thus, military doctrine should also

change as it relates to strategy. For the naval strategist, maxims such as

“never divide the fleet” became outdated as advances such as long-range 

gunnery and over-the-horizon communications changed the calculus of 

war. Airmen, however, have long held to the doctrine of centralized 

command with decentralized execution without serious thought to the 

impact of the political environment and technological advances on this

doctrine. Aviation technology has changed dramatically since World War

II, but the central tenet of airpower has remained relatively consistent. 

Additionally, the political environment for the employment of airpower 

has also dramatically changed, and the Air Force is involved in limited 

scale conflict to a much greater extent than envisioned during WWII. 

Although Air Force doctrine has changed 13 times based on over 50 years 

of experience, the doctrine of centralized control with decentralized 

execution has not been seriously challenged. 

Several factors need to be highlighted when considering the basic 

tenet of centralized command. First, the doctrine was formulated at a time

when the Air Force was struggling for independence. As was mentioned 

earlier, the struggle for centralized control was inextricably tied with the 

struggle for Air Force independence. An independent Air Force could not 

exist as long as air forces were under subordinate command of army 

ground commanders. As long as the Army Air Force was struggling for 

independence, airmen would be unable to consider anything other than 

centralized command under an airman. Now that the Air Force has been

an independent service for over half a century, airmen must be

comfortable with this fact and allow themselves to consider subordination 

of airpower when necessary. Second, Air Force control doctrine is 

fundamentally based on experiences in total conventional war. These 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...57

wars were fought in circumstances where each belligerent nation directed 

all of its resources to the conduct of war. Victory in battle was necessary

to meet war aims, and destruction of enemy military and industrial 

capacity was the main mechanism for achieving victory. Arguably, since 

World War II, all conflicts have been politically constrained with limited 

objectives. Third, from a technology perspective, this doctrine was 

developed at a time when large numbers of aircraft were required to 

achieve a given effect. Immense improvements in aerospace technology 

may have made this doctrine obsolete. 

One impasse to the serious discussion of the validity of centralized 

command and decentralized execution is the lack of an effective definition 

of execution. This ambiguity has allowed all manner of air execution to 

be lumped into the central tenet’s bin. In recent conflicts, the Air Force 

has operated with relatively centralized execution authority, but current 

doctrine does not reflect this fact. This conflict between doctrine and 

employment causes confusion and resentment among airmen at the tactical 

level. It has also led airmen to accuse senior leaders of micromanagement,

while the leaders were only implementing intellectually and politically 

appropriate command and execution schemes for the unique 

circumstances. Without definition and discussion these misunderstandings

about the proper employment of airpower will continue. Not defining and 

clarifying execution leaves its interpretation to the tactician. One man’s 

decentralized execution becomes another man’s micromanagement. 

Execution needs to be defined by tasks and level of command to provide 

the language for discussion of the optimal employment airpower. To 

clarify discussions this paper defines execution as unit level actions taken 

by wings and below to employ/deploy air assets from the receipt of 

tasking to the termination of the mission. The critical attributes of 

execution are that it begins with the assignment of a task at the lowest

level and requires some type of action taken to completion. Execution is

decentralized if decisions after mission assignment lie with the operator of 

the weapon system, and it is centralized if detailed decisions reside in a 

higher command authority or automated system controlled by that 

authority. 

The Deliberate Force and Allied Force case studies highlight the

fact that centralized control and execution is the most effective use of 

airpower in conflicts where limited objectives are pursued in politically 

charged environments. Although opinions differ on alternate courses of 

action, these two case studies highlight the fact that political environments 
58...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

exist where a very measured application of force is required. In each 

instance the operation’s small scale, limited objectives, and excellent 

communications allowed the C/JFACC to pay individual attention to the 

execution of the air effort. 

Centralized control of airpower is a means, not an end. An 

informed and intelligent unity of effort toward common objectives is the 

goal. With rapid advances in computers, communications, and artificial 

intelligence, centralized control is no longer necessary or even desired in 

all situations. Commanders must manage risk by using command and 

execution schemes that balance risk with initiative. Centralized control 

with decentralized execution is a mantra in Air Force doctrine without 

regard for political circumstance or technological advancement. Air Force 

doctrine needs to address the fact that conditions and circumstance exist

where centralized control with decentralized execution is not the most 

effective method for employing airpower. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...59
60...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Notes 

1

 This sequence of events is from the author’s personal experience. 

While deployed as U-2 pilot and operations officer all weapon 

employment decisions were centrally controlled by higher headquarters to 

the point where AWACS needed to obtain CC or DO approval for 

weapons releases, even if they were in accordance to the standing rules of 

engagement. 

2

 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 

(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), September 1997), 

23. 

3

 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8, Command and Control, 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, 16 February 2001), 2. 

4

 Ibid., 2. 

5

 AFDD 2-8, 3. 

6

 AFDD 2-8, 3. 

7

 Maris McCrabb, “A Normative Theory of Air and Space Power 

Command and Control,” (Maxwell AFB, AL: essay, School of Advanced 

Airpower Studies, 1997), 3. 

8

 AFDD 2-8, 3. 

9

 AFDD 2-8, 4. 

10 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 12 April 2001, 

as amended through 25 September 2002), 143. 

11 AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 

September 1997), 23 

12 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army 

Air Arm 1917-1941, (1955; new imprint, Washington D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1985), 5. 

13 Ibid., 6. 

14 Ibid., 6-7. 

15 Ibid., 23. 

16 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine; Volume 1: Basic 

Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1960, (Maxwell AFB, AL:

Air University Press, December 1989), 74. 

17 Greer, 41. 

18 Futrell, 78. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...61

Notes 

19 Greer, 26. 

20 Futrell, 78. 

21 Ibid., 104. 

22 Stephen J. McNamara, Lt Col, USAF, Air Power’s Gordian Knot: 

Centralized Versus Organic Control, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 

Press, August 1994), 10. 

23 Vincent Orange, Coningham: A Biography of Air Marshal Sir 

Arthur Coningham, (London: Methuen, 1990), 134. 

24 Ibid., 134. 

25 Futrell, 96. 

26 McNamara, 12-14. 

27 McNamara, 12. 

28 Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World

War II, (New York: Random House, 1993), 190. 

29 Daniel R. Mortensen, “The Legend of Lawrence Kuter: Agent for 

Airpower Doctrine,” in Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the 

Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine 1940-1943,” Daniel R. 

Mortensen, ed. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 99. 

30 Ibid., 97. 

31 David Syrett, “Northwest Africa,” in Case Studies in the 

Achievement of Air Superiority, Cooling, Benjamin Franklin, ed., 

(Washington D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 238. 

32 McNamara, 15. 

33 Perret, 191. 

34 Clayton Chun, K.S., Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century:

A Basic Primer, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 2001), 

155. 

35 Syrett, 243. 

36 Mortensen, 94. 

37 Syrett, 233. 

38 Mortensen, 115. 

39 Chun, 158. 

40 War Department Field Manual FM 100-20, Command and 

Employment of Air Power, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 21 July 1943), 2. 

41 Mortensen, 94. 

42 McNamara, 36. 
62...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Notes 

43 Air Force Manual 1-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28 September 

1971, 2-1. 

44 Air Force Manual 1-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 15 January 1975, 

3-1. 

45 Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, 14 February 1979, 5-2. 

46 Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, 16 March 1984, 2-21. 

47 Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume II, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 

United States Air Force, March 1992, 114. 

48 Ibid., 114-115. 

49 AFDD 1, 23 

50 Thomas Alexander Hughes, Over lord: General Pete Quesada and 

the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II, (New York: The Free

Press, 1995), 110. 

51 Mortensen, 133. 

52 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1999), 188. 

53 Richard P Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War, 

(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 283. 

54 Thomas A Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power 

Survey, Summary Report, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 

1993), 186. 

55 David K. Gerber, Adaptive Command and Control of Theater 

Airpower, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1999), 7-8. 

56 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, Springfield, MA, C. & 

G. Merriam Co., 1998, on-line, Internet, 4 December 2002, available at 

Hhttp://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=executeH. 

57 Gerber, 6. 

58 Mustafa Kopruco, “The Limits of Decentralized Execution: The 

Effects Of Technology On A Central Airpower Tenet,” (Maxwell AFB, 

AL: master’s thesis, School for Advanced Air and Space Power Studies, 

June 2001), 7. 

59 Gerber provides an excellent discussion on the differences between

centralization and decentralization as it applies to the execution of

airpower assets. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...63

Notes 

60 For an in-depth discussion on airmen’s mathematic approach to

tactics and doctrine see, Barry D. Watts, The Foundations of U.S. Air 

Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air

University Press, December 1984). 

61 Gerber, 2-3. 

62 Maris McCrabb, Col., “US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign 

Planning,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University

Press, January 2000), 81. 

63 James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack and Dana J. Johnson, A 

League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War, (Santa Monica: Rand, 

1994), xi. 

64 Ibid., 290, 305. 

65 “Fact Sheet—Operation Deliberate Force,” GlobalSecurity.org, 

n.p.; on-line, Internet, 7 December 2002, available from

Hhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deliberate_force.htmH. 

66 “Statement by Secretary General of NATO,” NATO Press Release 

(95)79, 5 September 1995, on-line, Internet, 7 December 2002, available 

from Hhttp://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-079.htmH. 

67 Bradley S. Davis, “The Planning Background,” in Deliberate 

Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen 

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 2000), 45-46. 

68 General Michael E. Ryan, “NATO Air Operations in BosniaHerzegovina,” briefing slides, 17 September 1996. 

69 Ibid., 60. 

70 Christopher M. Campbell, Col., “The Deliberate Force Air 

Campaign Plan,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air

Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University

Press, January 2000), 111. 

71 Ibid., 136. 

72 Mark J. Conversino, “Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August-14 

September 1995,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University

Press, January 2000), 160. 

73 Ibid., 162-163. 
64...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Notes 

74 John C. Orndorff, “Aspects of Leading and Following: The Human 

Factors of Deliberate Force,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in 

Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 

University Press, January 2000), 355. 

75 Paul C. Forage, “Bombs for Peace: A Comparative Study of the 

Use of Air Power in the Balkans,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 28, No. 

2, Winter 2002, 

76 Conversino, 160. 

77 Orndorff, 360-361. 

78 Conversino, 168. 

79 Report to Congress: Operation Allied Force, 31 January 2000,

Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 16-24 available at 

Hwww.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdfH. 

80 Koprucu, 69. 

81 Report to Congress, 20. 

82 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, 

(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 182-183. 

83 Allied Force report to Congress, 24.

84 Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of Aerospace 

Campaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, January 

1996), 109. 

85 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick Stein, Network 

Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 

(Washington D.C.: DOD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999). 

86 Ibid., 152. 

87 Mark R. Sickert, “Network-Centric Warfare and the Operational 

Concepts of War: A Synergistic Effect,” (Newport, RI: US Naval War 

College Thesis, 16 May 2000), 1. 

88 Kopruco, 71. 

89 Elaine Grossman, “U.S. Commander in Kosovo Sees Low-Tech

Threats to High-Tech Warfare,” Inside the Pentagon, 9 September 1999, 

1. 

90 Arthur Cebrowski and John Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its 

Origin and Future,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, 124 (January 1998), 

28-35, on-line, Internet, 12 Dec 2002, available from 

Hhttp://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htmH; 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...65

Notes 

David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Fred Stein, Network Centric 

Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, on-line, 

Internet, 12 Dec 2002, available from 

Hhttp://www.dodccrp.org/NCW/ncw.htmlH,; and Frederick Stein, 

“Observations on the Emergence of Network Centric Warfare,” in 1998 

Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium 

Proceedings, June 1998, on-line, Internet, 12 Dec 2002, available from

Hhttp://www.dodccrp.org/steinncw.htmH. 

91 Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint 

Operations, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 30 May 1995), II-12. 

92 Ibid. 

93 Ibid. 

94 Stein et al., Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging 

Information Superiority.

95 Paul Murdock, “Principles of War on the Network-Centric 

Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force,” Parameters, Spring 2002, 86-

95. 

96 Lawrence E. Casper, et al, “Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security

Strategy for the Next Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996, 84. 

97 Christopher Hoenig, “Lose the ‘E’,” CIO Enterprise Magazine, 1 

September 2000, available from

Hhttp://www.cio.com/archive/090100_lead_content.htmlH. 

98 Scott F. Murray, Maj., “Battle Command, Decisionmaking, and the 

Battlefield Panoply,” Military Review, Jul-Aug 2002, on-line, Internet, 13 

November 2002, available from Hhttp://wwwcgsc.army.mil/MILREV/English/JulAug02/murray.aspH. 

99 Linda Beckerman, "The Non-Linear Dynamics of War," Science 

Applications International Corporation, 1999. 

100 Thomas K. Adams, “The Real Military Revolution,” Parameters, 

Autumn 2000, 54-65. 

101 Quoted in Adams. 

102 David Berreby, "Complexity Theory: Fact-free Science or 

Business Tool?" Strategy and Business (First Quarter, 1998), on-line, 

Internet, 13 Dec 2003, available from Hhttp://www.strategybusiness.com/press/prnt/?ptag-ps=&art=14737&pg=0&format=printH. 
66...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Notes 

103 Rebecca Grant, “The Afghan Air War,” Air Force Magazine, 

September 2002, on-line, Internet, 13 Dec 2002, available from 

Hwww.afa.org/media/reports/afghanbook/Afghanbk.pdfH. 

104 “Global Hawk Makes Historic First Unmanned Flight to 

Australia,” 24 April 2001, on-line, Internet, 15 Dec 2002, available from 

Hhttp://www.spacedaily.com/news/uav-01d.htmlH. 

105 Kurt A. Klausner, Lt Col, USAF, “Command and Control of Air 

and Space Forces Requires Significant Attention to Bandwidth,” Air and 

Space Power Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 4, Winter 2002, on-line, Internet, 15 

Dec 2002, available from

Hhttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/klaus

ner.htmlH. 

106 At least one Global Hawk has been lost to simple programming 

error, see “Global Hawk Crashes in Afghanistan in a Setback for HighTech Drones,” Los Angles Times, 1 January 2002, on-line, Internet, 15 

Dec 2002, available from

Hhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020101-attack01.htmH.

107 Marc J. Pitarys, “DARPA/USAF Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 

System Demonstration Program,” briefing presented to Lt Col Mark 

Fitzgerald, 28 Oct 2002. 

108 Adams, “The Real Military Revolution.” 

109 The Navy Phalanx and Army Patriot system have autonomous 

acquisition, track, target, and engage capability due to the time sensitivity

required for point defense. See William B. McClure, Technology and 

Command: Implications for Military Operations in the Twenty-First 

Century, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Center for Strategy and 

Technology Occasional Paper No. 15, July 2000), 13. 

110 Adams, “The Real Military Revolution.” 

111 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming & The Future of 

Conflict, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 48-49. 

112 Ibid., 5. 

113 Ibid., 5. 

114 Lonnie D. Henley, “The RMA After Next,” Parameters, Winter 

1999-2000, 46-57. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...67

Notes 

115 Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, McNair Paper 28 (Washington: 

National Defense University, 1994). 

116 Joel Garreau, “Cell Biology Like the Bee, This Evolving Species 

Buzzes and Swarms,” Washington Post, 31 July 2002, C01. 

117 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 21. 

118 Ibid., 53. 

119 Adams, “The Real Military Revolution.” 

120 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 49. 

121 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An 

Introduction to National Securtity Processes and Problems, (Maxwell 

AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1988), 166-167. 

122 AFDD 1, 22. 

123 AFDD 2-8, 7. 

124 McNamara, 10. 

125 AFM 1-1, 14 February 1979, 5-3. 

126 James A. Winnefeld, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the 

Gulf War, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 157. Thomas A. Keaney

and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, 

(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), 65. 

127 Ibid., 141. 

128 Ibid., 264. 

129 Ibid., 142. 

130 Ibid., 111. 

131 Ibid., 136. 

132 Ibid., 138. 

133 Tony Mason, Air Vice Marshal, Air Power: A Centennial 

Appraisal, (London: Brassey’s, 1994), 243 

134 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1966), 170-176. 

135 Mason, 184 

136 David M. Keithly and Stephen Ferris, “Auftragstaktik, or Directive 

Control, in Joint and Combined Operations,” Parameters, Autumn 1999, 

118-133. 

137 Karl W. Eikenberry, “Take No Casualties,” Parameters, Summer 

1996, 109-118. 
68...Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution

Notes 

138 Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of 

War, (Westport, CT: 1994), 108-122. 

139 “Effects-Based Operations,” Doctrine Watch #13, 30 November 

2000. 

140 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, (Washington 

D.C.: GPO, 22 January 2000), 7. 

141 “Effects,” Doctrine Watch #14, 16 February 2001. 

142 “Effects-Based Operations.” 

143 Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: The Literature and 

Commentaries, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1993), 

148 

144 Werner Widder, Major General, “Auftragstaktik and Innere 

Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership,” Military Review, Ft 

Leavenworth Kansas, Command and General Staff College, Sep-Oct 

2002, on-line, Internet, 13 Nov 2002, available from Hhttp://wwwcgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/SepOct02/wider.aspH. 

145 US forces vigorously attacked the Iraqi centralized control system

in Operation Desert Storm. The Air Force correctly identified Saddam

Hussein’s highly centralized, hierarchical organizational orientation as a 

vulnerability. The vigorous attacks are credited with paralyzing units on 

the Saudi-Iraq front and seriously degrading the Republican Guard. 

Ironically, American airpower had a similar organizational orientation and 

similar vulnerabilities. 

146 Martin J. Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1985), 274. 

147 Bruce J. Avolio and Surinder Kahai, “Please Leave the ‘E’ in ELeadership, CIO Enterprise Magazine, 1 September 2000, available at

http://www.cio.com/archive/090100_lead_sidebar1_content.html. 148 Linda Beckerman, "The Non-Linear Dynamics of War," Science 

Applications International Corporation, 1999. 

149 Thomas K. Adams, “The Real Military Revolution,” Parameters, 

Autumn 2000, 54-65. 

150 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 78. 

151 Ibid., 85. 

152 Ibid., 53. 
Centralized Control With Decentralized Execution...69

Notes 

153 In the Allied Force example in Chapter 5 General’s Clark and 

Short were very involved in the targeting of three Serbian tanks in a 

Kosovo village. Due to limitations in the cockpit General Short’s son was 

unable to target the tanks. In retrospect those three tanks had little impact 

on the course of the campaign highlighting the weaknesses of time 

sensitive targeting. 

154 AFDD 1, 21. 

155 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87-88.

156 Van Creveld, 270.