AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The Vital Link

The Tanker’s Role in Winning America’s

Wars

DAVID M. COHEN

Major, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

March 2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cohen, David M., 1965–

The vital link : the tanker’s role in winning America’s wars / David M. Cohen.

 p. cm.

“Fairchild paper.”

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-088-4

 1. KC-135 (Tanker aircraft). 2. Airtankers (Military science—United States.

I. Title.

UG1242.T36.C65 2001

358.4’183—dc21 00-054834

This Fairchild Paper, and others in the series, is available

electronically at the Air University Research web site

http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers”

then “Special Collections.”

ii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

RESEARCH STUDY LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . xiii

 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

 2 STRATOTANKER HISTORY: COLD WAR

TO DESERT HEAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Tanker Goes Tactical: Vietnam . . . . . . . 4

Refueling across a Line in the Sand:

 Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 3 AGING TANKERS COME OF AGE:

RECENT TANKER EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . 11

Velocity Equals Distance over Time . . . . . . . 12

Damn the Boneyard: Full Speed Ahead! . . . . 13

Allied Force: The Tanker Shines . . . . . . . . 16

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

 4 KC-135 FORCE STRUCTURE:

WHEN TO SAY WHEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Monsters under the Bed . . . . . . . . . . 22

“We interrupt this program . . .” . . . . . . . . 25

On the Horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

 5 “VOTE” FOR AIR REFUELING . . . . . . . . . . . 33

If It IS Broken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

VOTE Early and Often . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

I Can See Clearly Now . . . Or Can I? . . . . . . 41

Train Like You Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

iii
Chapter Page

The Family that Trains Together,

 Fights Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

VOTE Yes! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Where to, Mister? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Command and Control for Air Refueling Forces . . 38

 2 Proposed Command and Control

for Air-Refueling Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Table

 1 Tanker Accomplishments—SEA . . . . . . . . . . 5

 2 Aircraft Combat Radii and Target

Distances—Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Map

Allied Force KC-135 Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Photographs

KC-135 Stratotanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

iv
Page

Gen Curtis E. LeMay, commander in chief,

 Strategic Air Command, October 1948–

June 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

“Peace is our Profession:”

SAC’s KC-135 and B-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

F-105s Taking Fuel from a KC-135

during the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

KC-135 Refueling F-4G Wild Weasels

during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

RC-135 Being Refueled by a KC-135 . . . . . . . 12

Pacer CRAG Modified Cockpit in a KC-135 . . . . 14

F-16s Refueling over the Balkans

during Allied Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

KC-135 Refueling a B-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Lt Gen Michael C. Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

A C-141 Heads Down: An “Airbridge”

behind a KC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

America’s Core Tanker for Many Years to Come . . 51

v
Maj David M. Cohen was born in 1965 at RAF South Ruis -

lip, United Kingdom, and grew up in Omaha, Nebraska.

Graduating in 1987 from Boston University with a bachelor’s

degree in aerospace engineering, Major Cohen was commis -

sioned through Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps

(ROTC) and was assigned as a laser systems engineer at the

Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, New

Mexico. After being selected for pilot training, Major Cohen

reported to Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma, in December

1990. Following pilot training, Major Cohen was assigned as a

KC-135 copilot at Loring Air Force Base, Maine. Subsequent

assignments included Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, and

McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas.

A KC-135 instructor pilot, Major Cohen has held numerous

positions in tanker wings including chief of Wing Long-Range

Scheduling and Operations Group executive officer. In August

1999, Major Cohen attended Air Command and Staff College

(ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he earned

honors as a distinguished graduate.

His paper, “The Vital Link: The Tanker’s role in Winning

America’s Wars,” won the 2000 ACSC/Airlift-Tanker Associa -

tion Mobility Research Award. Major Cohen is currently

assigned to the National Imagery and Mapping Agency in Bethesda, Maryland, as a military liaison. A graduate of the Air

Force Advanced Instrument School and the Air Mobility OpAbout the

Author

David M. Cohen

vii
erations Course, Major Cohen is a senior pilot with over 2,100

hours of worldwide experience in the KC-135, T-37, and T-38.

Major Cohen and his wife Pamela have three children, Con -

nor, Chana, and Benjamin.

viii
Preface

In the fall of 1991, the Air Force was running short of

cockpits for their pilots. As a result, about one-half of my pilot

training classmates were “banked,” that is, they were given

nonflying jobs for about three years until cockpits opened up.

At the assignment pick for undergraduate pilot training (UPT)

Class 92-03, I was faced with the choice of a T-37 to Vance Air

Force Base, Oklahoma, a KC-135A to K.I. Sawyer Air Force

Base, Michigan, or a KC-135R to Loring Air Force Base,

Maine. I took the R-model to Loring, and without sounding too

dramatic, it changed my life forever.

With the exception of Antarctica, the tanker has taken me to

every continent on the planet. I flew the first KC–135 airlift

mission supporting the Somalia relief effort, and earned com -

bat time over Iraq. I greased a landing in Rio de Janeiro with

15 general officers on board, and delivered six new F-16s to

the Republic of Singapore. In short, I’ve done an unbelievable

number of things in the “Mighty Stratotanker,” and wouldn’t

trade them for the world (with the exception of the five sum -

mer tours in Southwest Asia).

I’m told you can’t love inanimate objects, and I suppose

feelings of affection for an entire weapon system would be

ridiculous as well. That said, I have a great deal of respect for

the KC-135, its history, and those crews, planners, maintain -

ers, and support personnel who have kept a 40+ year-old

airplane flying and supporting vital national objectives. I also

give my thanks to those tanker crews and maintainers who

have given the ultimate sacrifice, most recently, in the woods

outside Geilenkirchen, Germany, nearly two years ago.

My goal in writing this paper was to get the message out

that tankers are important. We’re usually a footnote in any

war story or statistic, but try fighting without us. It just won’t

happen.

A number of people have helped me with this work by pro -

viding background, data, interviews, guidance, and general

encouragement. Thanks go to my research advisor, Lt Col

Ladonna Idell, who helped me focus and cut through the red

tape.

ix
A great deal of appreciation goes out to Maj Scott Wilhelm,

AMC/ XPY, who not only sponsored this research project, but

coordinated my temporary duty (TDY) to Scott Air Force Base

and guided me to a product that I hope will be useful as he

finishes up the “Tanker Requirements Study–2005.” Thanks to

Cols Tom Stickford, John Brower, and Stephen German; Lt

Cols Rick Scarine, Ed Breen, Richard Simpson, Steve Adams,

Cathy Clothier, and James Mikolajczyk; and Majs Chris

Bence, Brad Davis, Dave Ryer, Steve Tucker, Ed Hamby, Ter -

ence Holton, Bryan Riba, Bob Green, and John Goff for their

time and inputs. A big thanks goes to Dr. Ken Beck at US

Transportation Command for the reams of reports and Power

Point files he sent me on Operation Allied Force. Special gratitude goes to Maj Scott Mischo for providing a candid,

insightful picture of tanker operations during Allied Force, at

an Applebee’s in the middle of a tornado warning!

Finally, words cannot express the appreciation and love I

have for my family. My wife, Pamela, and children, Connor

and Chana, have held up like troopers for their first Air Force

move. They’ve been understanding when I’ve been home late,

cooped up in my office at the computer, and frustrated over

various problems. Through it all, though, they’ve been there

for me, and they have no idea how grateful I am. To our

expected bundle (if you ever stumble across these pages)—I

may not always be home for dinner, and I may be gone for a

while to far-off places, but know that, like your Grandpa Paul

before me, I do these things so that you will grow up safe,

strong, and healthy. “Patriotism” and “pride” may seem like

sappy clichés; just know that your dad not only believed in

them, but dedicated his life to upholding them.

Maj David M. Cohen

 Montgomery, Alabama

March 2000

x
Abstract

This paper focuses on the unique and vital capabilities of

the US Air Force’s KC-135 tanker fleet. Specifically, historic

and current tanker usage, tanker operational employment,

and the capability of today’s tanker fleet are analyzed, with

emphasis on force structure and force management. Given

that the KC-135 is the USAF’s primary air refueling asset and

that no planned replacements are due on the flightline for

some time, how can the current KC-135 method of employment and force structure support future DOD and coalition

operations?

Since its inception in the mid-1950s, the KC-135 has undergone numerous configuration as well as mission changes.

One constant throughout has been the reliance of the nation’s

airpower on this critical asset, whether it was sitting alert

during the cold war, or providing mission essential fuel for

F-117s en route to Baghdad during the Gulf War.

The success of combat operations in Operation Allied Force

was made possible due to the rapid, massive, and professional

employment of the KC-135 in the theater of operations. This

success, however, can be attributed more to the actions of the

tanker community than to any planned, deliberate inclusion

of air refueling assets into the operations plan.

In light of decreasing budgets, aging airframes, increased

downtime for maintenance, and an explosion in the operations

tempo, this paper proposes a four-pronged methodology addressing tanker vision, organization, training, and

employment, as the correction needed to get the KC-135

weapon system back on centerline. This will allow the tanker

to effectively aid the Air Force in successfully deterring conflict

and if needed, quickly win the nation’s future wars.

xi
Research Study Limitations

The KC-135 shares its air-refueling mission with the

younger KC-10 Extender. The KC-10, with its large cargo volume, is also used extensively in the airlift role. Because of

this, the relatively fewer number of KC-10s compared to KC135s, and the need to focus this research, only the KC-135 is

addressed. However, any discussion as it relates to the train -

ing, planning, and execution of tanker assets can be easily

applied to the KC-10 in the tanker role as well.

A great deal of data exists supporting the need for a robust

KC-135 aircraft and crew force structure. Unfortunately, due

to the nature of this research project, much of this data is

beyond the scope of this paper. It is highly recommended that

interested readers contact those sources listed in the bibliography to get a better understanding of KC-135 requirements

as they relate to future combat scenarios.

Analysis of the future world environment and the subsequent 2-major theater war scenario are based solely on the

conclusions of the US Commission on National Security/21st

Century (USCNS/21). Though there are numerous studies

and analyses of the world of the future, USCNS/21’s work was

chosen by this author for its completeness and its sponsor -

ship by the Department of Defense.

The commission’s prestigious makeup gives its analysis and

findings much credibility. Headed by former US Senators Gary

Hart and Warren Rudman, the commission includes former

Air Force Secretary Donald Rice, former Speaker of the House

Newt Gingrich, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger,

and former United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young.

The intent in using and citing USCNS/21’s work exclusively

is not to ignore any other opinions on future world events;

rather it is used as a background to examine how the KC-135

may be employed in future conflicts to support US national

interests. 

xiii
Chapter 1

Introduction

Expressed in plain English, we’re willing to pay the price,

willing to do whatever it takes to secure terms favorable to

the United States and our allies. Thanks to . . . air refuelers,

the message that we’re prepared to stick with it—no matter

what—resonates loud and clear!

—Sheila Widnall

—Secretary of the Air Force

—August 1993–October 1997

Aerial warfare has become an intricate ballet. Fighters must

be able to hunt down and defeat the enemy, while remaining on

station providing protective coverage to friendly aircraft. Bombers need to maneuver to get to their targets, in many cases,

thousands of miles away. While all this is going on, personnel

and supplies are constantly flowing into the theater in transport

aircraft that have been cruising down recently established airbridges—airborne lines of communication linking the continental United States (CONUS) and a theater, or multiple theaters.1

No part of this dance of airpower, though, could be conducted

without the use of inflight refueling, providing airlift, combat,

and combat support aircraft the means to deploy directly to the

theater without making refueling stops.

As the core USAF air

refueling asset, the KC135 Stratotanker is the

principal enabler of aerial combat and support

operations. With the

cold war over and the

tanker’s nuclear single

integrated operational

plan (SIOP) mission

overshadowed by a conventional 2-major thea- KC-135 Stratotanker

1
ter war (2-MTW) concept, the tanker now operates in two

distinct, but overlapping environments—airbridge operations,

supporting deployment of strategic airlift, bomber, and fighter

assets into a theater of operations; and combat support operations, providing needed fuel to shooters and support aircraft

in the combat zone.

Unfortunately, current air refueling doctrine is potentially

confusing and awkward. Additionally, the current tanker force

structure is inadequate for a 2-MTW operation, as shown in a

scenario presented in chapter 4 and appendix A. Compounding this, air refueling forces do not train as they should fight,

and no common vision exists for tankers. Given that the KC135 is the USAF’s primary air refueling asset and that no

planned replacements are due for some time, how can the

current KC-135 method of employment and force structure

support future Department of Defense (DOD) and coalition

operations?

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–6.2, Air Refueling, 19 July 1999, 75.

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Chapter 2

Stratotanker History:

Cold War to Desert Heat

If you gave us money for jet airplanes, I would buy tankers,

not airplanes for MATS [Military Air Transport Service,

ancestor of Air Mobility Command] . . . I think we would

increase our combat capability more in that manner.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay

—Commander in Chief

—Strategic Air Command

—October 1948–June 1957

On 11 July 1954, the KC-135 was

ordered. 1 A little over two years later,

the first Stratotanker rolled off the

Boeing line and was delivered to Stra -

tegic Air Command (SAC), adding to

the striking power of the nuclear deterrent, particularly the B-52 intercon -

tinental bomber force Gen Curtis E.

LeMay had built. 2

The primary mission for these new

aircraft was to support the B-52s in

their nuclear single integrated opera -

tional plan (SIOP) missions. As much

as one-third of the tanker fleet was

preflighted, “cocked on,” and ready for

immediate launch. For the tanker crews, one out of every

three weeks was spent on alert, alongside their bomber brethren at bases throughout the United States.3

 “During the alert

tours the aircrews are fed and billeted in close proximity to

their aircraft to ensure they can respond in minimum time.”4

Though away from their families during alert, crews would

pull very little temporary duty (TDY) away from their base. This

is in contrast to the KB-97 days when tankers had to be prepositioned along the bombers’ flight path. “As the Air Force moved

Gen Curtis E. LeMay,

commander in chief,

Strategic Air Command,

October 1948–June 1957

3
toward an all-jet powered tanker fleet, the need no longer

existed for slower tankers to be positioned along the route of

flight far in advance of the actual movement of aircraft.”5

The Tanker Goes Tactical: Vietnam

The KC-135 was born to support long-range strategic nu -

clear attack missions. It is doubtful that in the 1950s anyone

could have anticipated the tactical employment of the airplane

in a low intensity conflict over the jungles of Southeast Asia

(SEA). Nevertheless, SEA is where tankers and their crews

found themselves as early as 1964.

The tactical environment may be defined in numerous ways.

For purposes of this paper, the tactical environment (and employment in it) will cover those combat and combat support

operations occurring near or beyond the forward edge of the

battle area (FEBA), in or near weapon range (land, sea, or

airborne) of hostile forces, or out of range of friendly rescue

forces. It is in this environment in SEA that the KC-135 began

to cut its tactical teeth.

The first tactical KC-135 refuelings occurred on 9 June

1964. Operating out of Clark Air Base, Philippines, four tankers

provided pre-strike refuelings to eight F-100s. 6 These would be

the first of an eventual 194,687 SEA tanker sorties, offloading

over eight billion pounds of fuel, as shown in table 1.7 These

air refuelings permitted not only increased striking distances

for bombers and fighters, but also allowed for additional loiter

“Peace Is Our Profession”: SAC’s KC-135

and B-52

F-105s Taking Fuel from a KC-135

during the Vietnam War

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time of combat air patrols assisting in the rescue of downed

pilots. 8

These tactical, or “Young Tiger,” missions were novel for

tanker crews. “Tankers had to handle, on an ad hoc basis,

dozens of fighters that were sometimes in danger of simultaneous flameouts from fuel starvation. . . . Mission planning times

were severely reduced, and the conduct of the mission was

continually adjusted to meet current situations.”9 This was a

unique situation for crews that were used to a full day of mission planning for orchestrated missions against a single bomber.

The importance of tankers in SEA, presented in table 1, cannot be overemphasized. “Without tankers, the whole character of

the war would have changed. The politically sensitive B-52s

would have required much closer basing to Vietnam. . . .

Tactical fighter missions would have been less effective and far

more complicated and hazardous. More ground troops would

have been necessary to protect additional bases in South Vietnam. Additionally, it is difficult to conceive of any operation on

the scale of Linebacker II without air refueling.”1 0 Despite

operating in the hostile combat environment, tanker crews

Year Number of

Tankers

Tanker

Sorties

Fuel Offload

(billions of pounds)

1965 55 9,200 .315

1966 75 18,200 .850

1967 75 23,000 1.100

1968 92 32,000 1.600

1969 94 28,000 1.400

1970 91 19,540 .888

1971 51 14,400 .619

1972 172 34,700 1.400

Total 88 (average) 179,040 8.200

Source: Walter J. Boyne, “The Young Tigers and Their Friends,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 6 (June 1998):

on-line, Internet, 8 December 1999, available from http://www.afa.org/magazine/0698tigers.html.

Table 1

Tanker Accomplishments—SEA

COHEN

5
routinely went into harm’s way to provide gas to imperiled

receivers. So many saves were credited to tanker crews that

the term had to be formally defined. 1 1 Gen Chuck Horner, joint

forces air component commander for Desert Storm sums up

his feelings:

I myself can remember in Vietnam being over Hainan island, almost

out of gas. And here comes a KC-135, way up north of where he ought

to be because of the enemy threat. And turning around to get in

behind, getting enough fuel to get home. 1 2

Despite the gargantuan number of sorties flown, only four

tankers were lost during the war, none to enemy action. 1 3

Refueling across a Line in the Sand:

Desert Storm

Two hundred fifty-six KC-135s participated in Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm.1 4 Given the assembly of this

massive tanker armada, the operational control (OPCON) of

the tankers is interesting. SAC’s B-52s that were deployed to

the desert had a change of operational control (CHOP) to the

commander in chief (CINC) of US Central Command (USCINC -

CENT), Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf. The KC-135s, however,

were not CHOP’d to US Central Command (USCENTCOM). 1 5

This remarkable fact speaks volumes to the importance SAC

placed on keeping a tight rein on its tanker force. Gen Lee

Butler, commander in chief, SAC (CINCSAC), countered those

who questioned the CHOP of the B-52s to USCENTCOM, “If I

had wanted to have a real impact on the conduct of the war, I

would have recalled the tankers!”1 6 Later, a SAC post-war after

action report would recommend that all tankers in theater be

CHOP’d to the CINC. 1 7 In fact, it is advocated later in this

report that in future operations, doctrine specify that deployed

tankers engaged in intratheater air refueling be CHOP’d to the

theater CINC.

The Gulf War air refueling numbers are most impressive,

especially when compared to the extremely short duration of

the war relative to that of Vietnam. “Of the total number of

Desert Storm sorties by category, air refueling ranked third

behind attack and airlift.”1 8 Nearly 14,000 combat sorties were

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6
flown by US tankers, offloading approximately 725 million

pounds of fuel to around 50,000 receivers. 1 9 This is impressive

considering that approximately every minute of each of the 43

days of combat a tanker was offloading 11,700 pounds of fuel

to another receiver.

The operational impact tankers had in Desert Shield and

Desert Storm is incalculable. As US forces hurried to establish

a presence in the Saudi desert in August 1990, the need to get

the personnel and equipment into the theater became imperative. Cargo and supplies required the rapid delivery of airlift.

In addition, fighters had to be deployed into the theater. This

set up a high demand on the limited air refueling assets.

Initially, General Schwarzkopf placed the top air-refueling priority on getting the fighter units into place.2 0 This required

nearly 100 tankers for both the Pacific and Atlantic airbridges.

The airlift air-refueling effort was no slack effort, though.

From August to November 1990, an average of 65 airlift missions per day required tanker support. This number swelled to

125 missions per day until the cease-fire. 2 1

In the area of combat support missions, the Gulf War Air

Power Survey noted that air refueling “was absolutely essential. . . . The tanker contribution to Desert Storm is what

KC-135 Refueling F-4G Wild Weasels during Desert Storm

COHEN

7
made [the air campaign] work.”2 2 Gen Merrill A. McPeak

summed up the tankers’ contribution in the Gulf War by saying, “No tankers . . . no Desert Storm.”2 3

Notes

1. Robert F. Dorr, “Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker,” in “The Making of the

Weakest Link,” Lt Col Stephen C. German (research paper, Air War College,

April 1994), 8.

2. A. T. Lloyd, ed., “Thirty Years Young,” in “Air Refueling: The

Cornerstone of Global Reach–Global Power,” Lt Col Stanley J. Dougherty

(research paper, Air War College, April 1996), 27.

3. Maj Henry N. Gant, Deterrence in the Pace of Explosive Peace,

Research Report number AU-ARI-91-7 (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.:

Air University Press, August 1993), 25.

4. Ibid.

5. Maj Philip A. Iannuzzi Jr., “50 Years Without Air Refueling Doctrine,”

in Airlift/Tanker Quarterly 5, no. 2, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 October 1999,

available from http://www.atalink.org/atq/volume5.2c3.html.

6. Walter J. Boyne, “The Young Tigers and Their Friends,” Air Force

Magazine 81, no. 6 (June 1998) on-line, Internet, 8 December 1999,

available from http://www.afa.org/magazine/0698tigers.html.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Lt Col Stanley J. Dougherty, “Air Refueling: The Cornerstone of

Global Reach–Global Power” (research paper, Air War College, April 1996),

27.

11. Boyne.

12. Lt Gen Charles Horner, interviewed by Kurt Sayenga, Wings Over

The Gulf: Volume III – The Final Assault , in “Tactical Air Refueling:

Undocumented Past, Future Requirement,” Maj Keith W. Moncrief (master’s

thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, November 1996), 18.

13. Ibid.

14. John Warrick, “Air Force Gives Itself an A-Plus on War Role,” in

“Tanker Operations in a Composite Wing Concept,” Lt Col Roger G. Raper

(research paper, Naval War College, 20 May 1991), 3.

15. Lt Col Stephen C. German, “The Making of the Weakest Link”

(research paper, Air War College, April 1994), 1.

16. Gen George Lee Butler, address, in “The Making of the Weakest

Link,” Lt Col Stephen C. German (research paper, Air War College, April

1994), 1–2.

17. Strategic Air Command, Postwar Tanker Training Conference

After-Action Report (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: Headquarters Strategic Air

Command, 19–20 August 1991), part II, para. 3-f.

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18. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey,

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force), 190.

19. United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Report to

Congressional Requesters: Operation Desert Storm—An Assessment of Aerial

Refueling Operational Efficiency in Dougherty’s “Air Refueling: The Cornerstone of Global Reach–Global Power,” 34.

20. Douglas Menarchik, Powerlift-Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic

Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order, in “50 Years Without

Air Refueling Doctrine,” and Maj Philip A. Iannuzzi Jr., Airlift/Tanker

Quarterly 5, no. 2, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 26 October 1999, available from

http://www.atalink.org/atq/volume5.2c8.html.

21. Dougherty, 34.

22. Keaney and Cohen, 228; GAO, “Aerial Refueling Operational

Efficiency” in Dougherty’s “Air Refueling: The Cornerstone of Global Reach–

Global Power,” 35.

23. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works 1990–1994 in Dougherty’s

“Air Refueling: The Cornerstone of Global Reach–Global Power,” 35.

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Chapter 3

Aging Tankers Come of Age:

Recent Tanker Experience

The tanker has been described as a force multiplier. What it

has really been is a time machine. It has flown beyond its

expected life span, enabling this nation to prosecute its

wars and other operations on its own terms. . . . In return it

has demanded very little other than meticulous care in the

maintenance of its place in the launch stream.

—Lt Col Stephen C. German

—Student, Air War College

—August 1993–June 1994

As the cold war ended and the immediate nuclear threat

subsided, Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) tanker and bomber

fleets came off of alert. Perhaps more significantly, on 1 June

1992, SAC stood down and the tankers were moved under US

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its air component, the recently established Air Mobility Command (AMC).

For the single integrated operational plan (SIOP), this required

a new command and control system.

SAC’s successor for nuclear operations is the unified US

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). For the tankers, the

commander in chief of USTRANSCOM (USCINCTRANS),

through AMC, retains operational control (OPCON) until the

jets are cocked on SIOP alert, at which time OPCON transfers

to the commander in chief of USSTRATCOM (USCINSTRAT). 1

Day-to-day, peacetime SIOP training activities fall under

AMC, in coordination with USSTRATCOM. The 15th Air Force

commander is dual-hatted as commander, Combined Task

Force (CTF)-294, whose peacetime role is to manage any

tanker forces on alert. During increased tensions and war, the

CTF-294 commander is USCINCSTRAT’s “go-to-guy” for tankers, managing and directing the generation of aircraft and

crews for their SIOP mission.2

11
Velocity Equals Distance over Time

The tanker has been described as a time machine.3 Perhaps

a more accurate description would be a time and distance

machine. 4 These two factors make the tanker an invaluable

keystone across all of the Air Force’s core competencies.5

The time factor evolves from the fact that the KC-135 supports operations that allow receiver aircraft to remain airborne

without stopping to refuel. Depending on the weapon system,

this may save many hours, which would otherwise be required

for each landing and ground refueling needed to get from one

point to another.

Time also effects combat operations and contributes to

economy of force. By allowing certain receivers, such as the

RC-135, E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS),

or a flight of F-15s working a combat air patrol (CAP) to remain airborne longer, fewer aircraft are required to share station-keeping. In the case of the AWACS, an asset in high

demand like the KC-135, extending the on-station time from

12 to 18 hours by providing inflight air refueling would deRC-135 Being Refueled by a KC-135

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crease the number of E-3 airframes required by one-third. For

the F-15s flying CAP, two or three air refuelings equates to

fewer required jets, fewer pilots (which works to increase crew

rest capabilities), and more time between launches (reducing

maintenance).

As a distance machine, the tanker offers a relative shortening of distances as airborne forces are no longer married to

routings that provide ground refueling stops (table 2). In addition, with fewer forward-deployed bases and limited receiver

beddown locations, the tanker’s worth mushrooms. “Increase

the distance from the point of departure . . . to the target, and

you need more tankers.”6 As friendly forces eliminate enemy

air defenses and press further into enemy territory, the distances to new targets increase. Tankers support the increased

fuel needs generated by these larger distances.7

Damn the Boneyard: Full Speed Ahead!

As the KC-135 approaches its golden anniversary, some

changes will be necessary to not only make the tanker more

user-friendly for its crews, but also to allow it to continue to

operate worldwide for many years to come. These changes,

which the KC-135 force must both undergo and work around,

will have an impact on the tanker force structure and how the

KC-135 can support future US military operations. An example

AIRCRAFT COMBAT RADIUS (NM) TARGET DISTANCE (NM)

F-117 550 To Baghdad—905

F-15E 475 To Western Scud Areas—680

F/A-18 434 Red Sea Carrier to Kuwait

City—695

B-52G 2,177 Diego Garcia to Kuwait—2,500

Source: Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report (Washington,

D.C.: Department of the Air Force), 228.

Table 2

Aircraft Combat Radii and Target Distances—Desert Storm

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of these changes is Pacer CRAG (Compass, Radar, and Global

Positioning System[GPS]).

Pacer CRAG is an extensive and radical upgrade to the

tanker fleet. Included in the upgrade is the installation of a

ring laser gyro, color weather radar, GPS, Traffic Collision

Avoidance System (TCAS), a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), a flight management system (FMS), and a “glass

cockpit.”8 In addition, the jets will undergo upgrades that will

allow them to comply with the new Reduced Vertical Separation Minima standard, being implemented by AMC as the

Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) system.9 The result of

all this high-tech wizardry is the eventual phase-out of the

navigator position on the aircraft, as the two pilots and boom

operator will have the tools at their disposal to execute the

mission.

The problem with these upgrades is the time required. Current plans call for the upgrades to be completed by 2005,

though recent analysis shows the fleet may not be finished

until 2007. 1 0 Given the timeline and the number of aircraft

involved, at any given time a significant portion of the KC-135

Pacer CRAG-Modified Cockpit in a KC-135

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fleet may not be available for deployment operations. Two reasons are that the aircraft are undergoing upgrades and unmodified aircraft may not be allowed to operate in certain

airspace. During Operation Allied Force, Pacer CRAG-modified

aircraft were denied access to 16 of 19 North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) European nations due to concerns about

Pacer CRAG components causing radio interference. 1 1 As a

result, non-Pacer CRAG jets had to be swapped out of other

operations, sent to Allied Force, and backfilled with Pacer

CRAG aircraft. 1 2 The headache in terms of additional sorties

and coordination was enormous. Eventually, waivers were ob -

tained to operate in the airspace of these European countries,

though it took two months to secure the waivers that carried

the restriction that the aircraft could only operate single-ship,

potentially reducing combat capability. 1 3

While this illustrates limitations as a result of the upgrades,

it is clear that in the future, as international rules increase

(particularly the requirement for aircraft to be GATM-compliant) and Pacer CRAG-type equipment becomes the standard,

the lack of upgraded aircraft (with accompanying headaches

similar to those experienced in Allied Force for modified jets)

may cause a significant portion of the fleet, those jets awaiting

modifications, to be denied access to the most advantageous

airspace or even be shut out of a theater of operations all

together. What does this mean to the KC-135 as it shoulders

the burden of the next conflict? It means that this limited

resource, which is so vitally needed in nearly every US military operation, may be available in such reduced numbers as

to severely handicap the operation.

This situation of improvements and upgrades is not unique

to the KC-135. However, it may impact the tanker the most.

There is a trade-off associated with any upgrade program. If

more aircraft are pushed through the modification line to fin -

ish sooner, you are left with fewer available jets for any requirement. On the other hand, stretching the process out

pushes the final completion date back to the point where you

may not have some aircraft available in the out years. How

this zero-sum game plays out depends on the situation.

Should a major need for more tankers develop, it may be

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possible to slow or even stop the modification timeline. Unfortunately, this will further delay the final modification completion date.

Ultimately, any modifications affect the overarching issues,

namely tanker force structure and force management. If a

robust tanker force structure is required, modifications are

delayed. This means that necessary upgrades are postponed.

On the other hand, if modifications are continued at the same

pace allowing for timely upgrade completion, inadequate assets are available for operations. Constant vigilance is required to monitor this dynamic and adjust upgrade timelines

as needed. Failure to properly do so may impact US military

operations and hamstring US efforts in global engagement. 1 4

Allied Force: The Tanker Shines

In 1998, as the world watched ethnic cleansing produce

enormous amounts of human suffering in the former republic

of Yugoslavia, US planners began to evaluate possible military

options. When Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic refused

to allow NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo to protect the

Albanian population, US military forces began to mass in the

region. In early 1999, the first tanker units deployed to the

theater. As the possibility of conflict increased, additional

tanker units were deployed.

F-16s Refueling over the Balkans during Allied Force

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On 24 March 1999, the US and NATO began Allied Force.

As far back as September 1998, a small group of US Air

Forces in Europe (USAFE) tanker planners began to produce

an air refueling plan for a short air campaign. In fact, the plan

that eventually was employed on 24 March was well thoughtout had the war lasted for only two or three days.1 5 Unfortu -

nately, due to political constraints, it would take 78 days of

combat operations before the Serbian leadership would acquiesce to NATO demands.

Over the course of these 78 days, KC-135s would fly 4,324

intratheater refueling sorties, offloading 188.1 million pounds

of fuel to 17,751 receivers. 1 6 It took an additional 1,023 sorties

to deploy and redeploy Air Force and Navy units. Furthermore,

306 air-refueling sorties were flown to support the B-2s operating nonstop from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to

their targets and back to Whiteman. 1 7

Tankers prevailed over numerous obstacles to make Allied

Force happen. Said Secretary Cohen, “Our aerial-refueling

fleet overcame extended sortie durations and high usage rates

to deploy and support a multinational air force.”1 8 He contin -

KC-135 Refueling a B-2

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ued, “Deployment to Europe of aircraft based across the

world, coupled with the wide range of bases used by combat

aircraft in the theater, made aerial refueling a challenge.

Nonetheless, active and reserve component tankers provided

multiple air bridges for aircraft transiting to the theater, while

also supporting over 24,000 combat sorties.”19

Beddown locations became a problem early on. Due to limited

beddown bases and the shear volume of tankers, KC-135s were

scattered all over the theater, as shown in the following map.

The problem was that the tankers had to fly further to get to the

refueling tracks. This caused them to burn more of their own

fuel and decreased the amount available for offload. The reason

for this is that all but a small amount of the fuel in the KC-135

is available for offload. This, however is the same fuel that the

tanker burns. Thus, a zero-sum situation exists whereby if the

tanker burns more gas, less is available for offload; conversely, if

the tanker offloads more gas, it is unable to fly as far (or as

Allied Force KC-135 Basing

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long). This point is many times not understood by receiver

aircraft planners. The domino effect of this situation was the

need for more tankers to accomplish the mission.

This lack of beddown locations will become more the norm

than the exception as permanent US overseas presence is

reduced. For Allied Force , this created basing and logistics

problems. In future conflicts, as is shown in chapter 4, these

difficulties may be compounded by extreme distances that

require more tankers than are available.

In chapter 5, Allied Force’s tanker planning and operations

are further examined. Despite problems that may have occurred, it was the yeoman effort of the tanker crews, staffs,

maintainers, and other support personnel that allowed the

KC-135 to be “at the heart of the fight.”2 0

Notes

1. Air Mobility Command (AMC)/DOXS, Presentation, “SIOP Mission in

AMC,” n.d. Just as the tankers moved under AMC, a similar arrangement

holds for the bombers who where transferred to Air Combat Command.

2. Ibid.

3. Lt Col Stephen C. German, “The Making of the Weakest Link”

(research paper, Air War College, April 1994), 2.

4. Maj Scott Wilhelm, AMC/XPY, E-mail to author, 8 October 1999.

5. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September

1997, 29–35. US Air Force core competencies are air and space superiority,

precision engagement, information superiority, global attack, rapid global

mobility, and agile combat support.

6. Lt Col James Pritchett, chief tanker planner, US Central Command

Air Forces, interviewed by author, 20 November 1999.

7. Ibid.

8. 350 th Air Refueling Squadron, Pacer CRAG Spotlight 1, no. 1 (March

1999): 1.

9. AMC, “KC-135 Modification Schedule,” November 1999.

10. Ibid.

11. Operation Allied Force was a NATO air campaign in early 1999, the

goal of which was to stop Serbian aggression and allow NATO peacekeeping

forces on the ground in Kosovo. US Transportation Command,

“CINCUSTRANSCOM Congressional Testimony Support Presentation,” 30

September 1999.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Global Engagement: “Our strategic approach uses all appropriate

instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and

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nonstate actors, exert global leadership, and remain the preferred security

partner for the community of states that share our interests.” Department

of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States of America

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 6.

15. Maj Scott Mischo, chief of Readiness, 32 AOS, interviewed by

author, 2 December 1999.

16. Lt Gen William Begert, USAFE/CV, Presentation, “Kosovo Lessons

Learned: Air Force and Air Mobility,” n.d.

17. Ibid.

18. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Kosovo After-Action

Review , Joint Statement of Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, and Gen

Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 October 1999,

10–11.

19. Ibid.

20. Lt Gen William Begert, “Kosovo & Theater Air Mobility,” Aerospace

Power Journal XIII, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 12.

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Chapter 4

KC-135 Force Structure:

When to Say When

Air refueling tankers are critical to the national strategy.

Initially, they are required to establish the airbridge to get

combat, combat support, and air mobility forces to the

theater of operations. Once in theater, combat and combat

support forces depend upon refueling assets used in a

warfighting role to allow them to prosecute the air war.

 —Air Mobility Command

 —Strategic Mobility Plan

A National Security Strategy [NSS] for a New Century identifies three core objectives: enhance US security, bolster America’s economic prosperity, and promote democracy abroad.1

Additionally, the National Military Strategy [NMS] of the United

States of America lists two national military objectives: promote peace and stability, and defeat adversaries. 2

 The KC-135

is, in fact, an integral component in the achievement of these

objectives.

That both of these documents imply a globally capable military force dictates the need for air-refueling capability. The

KC-135’s force multiplier and enhancement qualities fit perfectly into the NMS’s definition of strategic enablers —those

assets, “critical to the worldwide application of US military

power and our military strategy.”3 A keystone to the success of

both the NSS and NMS is that the United States maintain and

enhance its air-refueling capability to ensure the capacity to

remain engaged worldwide. 4 Without an adequate tanker force

structure, US forces would not be able to rapidly project national power worldwide. Additionally, insufficient air-refueling

assets would limit US ability to employ force, if required.

Clearly, the tanker force is crucial to US national security and

military strategies.

21
The Monsters under the Bed

“There is an unfortunate tendency today to assume that the

end of the Cold War has resulted in a more stable global

environment and a more secure future for America. Unfortu -

nately, reality does not support this assumption. . . . In many

respects, the world is a more unstable and dangerous place

today than it was 25 years ago.”5

The Department of Defense (DOD) has commissioned a

group to examine what the world of tomorrow may look like

from a security perspective. The United States Commission on

National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) has completed

the first phase of its charter by taking a look at several factors

effecting future world security issues and hypothesizing how

these may effect US interests. 6

The commission has identified a number of possible occurrences that do not bode well for a stable, secure international

environment, requiring minimal US military involvement.

Though it is not likely that “total wars” will erupt, conflict will

undoubtedly be present, and as was shown during Allied

Force, US air assets can be employed to major theater war

(MTW) levels without the conflict itself being an MTW. “While

the likelihood of major conflicts between powerful states will

decrease, conflict itself will likely increase.”7 The commission

also believes, “The United States will be called upon frequently

to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances and with

the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces.”8 Specifically,

USCNS/21 identifies a number of conflict-prone regions. “Major powers—Russia and China are two obvious examples—may wish to extend their regional influence by force or

the threat of force. Conflicts among old adversaries may continue, such as between India and Pakistan.”9

 To understand

what this means for the US military and more specifically, the

KC-135 force, examine three regions where US interests and

the chance for military conflict are high—Europe, East Asia,

and the Greater Near East (Morocco to India).

In Europe, two areas could spark conflict. First, “Russia’s

post-communist future could mire Europe in pressing security

concerns if that future produces either chaos and disintegration or a reborn authoritarianism prone to imperial ambiFAIRCHILD PAPER

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tion.”1 0 Second, “trouble could come from the states located

between western Europe and Russia, where the prospects of

economic and political reform vary markedly.”1 1 To be sure,

any conflict in Europe would be of vital concern to the United

States. In addition, the potential for escalation of any conflict

involving nuclear-capable Russia is cause for global concern.

In the Balkans, USCNS/21 sees continued unrest, with little end in sight. “No enduring settlements to the conflicts in

Bosnia or Kosovo are likely to emerge from the US and North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-brokered agreements that

ended the wars there.”1 2 This portends another region of “permanent temporary” presence for US military forces (as in

Southwest Asia [SWA]), stretching them thinner and increasing the operations tempo. While basing on the continent may

be available, it is unlikely that the capacity of potential bed -

down locations and their proximity to the fight would be advantageous given the recent experience of Allied Force and the

commission’s prediction of conflict areas.

In East Asia, the commission has identified a traditional,

but very real threat. “A new nationalist China could become

decidedly hostile to the United States, and that hostility could

be reciprocated.”1 3 One of the most devastating conflicts

USCNS/21 predicts could revolve around “Taiwan in which

the United States strongly sides with Taipei, a crisis made

much more likely by Taiwan’s renouncing of its ‘one China’

policy in July 1999.”1 4 But Taiwan is only one source of ignition for a US-China military conflagration. An aggressive

China confronting a nuclear-armed, reunified Korea and/or a

militarily assertive Japan may also bring the United States

into a confrontation with China.1 5 The threat in this region

may be even higher than that of Russia due to tremendous

Chinese military, economic, and technological advances in recent years.

Finally, in the Greater Near East, USCNS/21 believes,

“Avoiding major warfare and the occasional violent regime collapse will not be easy over the next 25 years. . . . More than

one major regional war will probably occur, causing a deterio -

ration of the general regional security environment.”1 6 The

commission identifies three sets of state actors who may be

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involved in armed conflict in the future: India and Pakistan,

Iran and Iraq, and Israel and its Arab neighbors. Though the

United States maintains a presence in the region, it may be

insufficient to stem the tide of war. “It is highly unlikely that

all or most of these conflicts will actually break out over the

next 25 years. But it is even less likely that none of them will”

(emphasis in original). 1 7

How does all this effect the US military in general and the

KC-135 force in particular? First, the commission sees warfare continuing to push the technological envelope for weapons. “Conventional weapon systems will be characterized by

an increasing emphasis on speed, stealth, lethality, accuracy,

range and networked operations.”1 8 In addition, “There will be

a greater premium on highly integrated and rapidly deployable

forces.”19 As a “time and distance machine,” the tanker will

enable and enhance these capabilities by reducing movement

time of aircraft, equipment, and personnel, increasing combat

distances, and extending sortie duration.

Second, it is apparent that a permanent US forward presence will become difficult. “The political cost of such bases

within American alliances will likely rise.”2 0 For the KC-135

force, this means more deployments from stateside bases.

More significantly, though, it means the shooters and supplies

will have to travel farther to get to the fight, necessitating a

greater reliance on air refueling. In a joint Kosovo after-action

report to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William S. Cohen and Gen Henry H.

Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) said that

Allied Force “tanker missions were longer than would typically

be the case in a major theater war.”21 A soothing statement,

but why would this be the case? How would an MTW cause

our tanker bases to be closer and the missions to be shorter?

Consider operations near Taiwan or Pakistan, where potential

beddown bases may be further from the battle area than they

were during Allied Force. The fact is that, despite large investments in overseas infrastructure, the current environment

consists of limited access to useable beddown bases in nontraditional theaters. Tanker and receiver missions will be

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longer, driving a need for more tanker aircraft and crews than

are currently required.

Consider Europe, where, for almost 60 years, US military

forces have been permanently based, providing a strong, stabilizing force. This force has operated within NATO for the

better part of six decades. In the face of the European Union

and the amalgamation of the continent’s states, USCNS/21

believes this force may change. “It is hard to see how a truly

integrated and independent European defense force could coexist with NATO.”2 2 A nonexistent or weakened NATO could

cause the permanent US presence in Europe to evaporate.

“The US military presence would probably diminish sharply,

though the United States might still remain engaged in peacetime through periodic deployments.”2 3 These deployments during peacetime and the movement of forces during a conflict

scream for a robust, modern tanker force. This need and the

requirement for combat support tankers to operate from

widely dispersed bases highlight the importance of maintain -

ing current tanker assets, employing them wisely, and quickly

evaluating candidates to fill future air refueling requirements.

“We interrupt this program . . .”

To evaluate whether the current KC-135 force structure is

appropriate for today and the future (as presented by

USCNS/21), this paper examines a scenario in which US

forces must use current assets to handle two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. It is early January. United Nations

(UN) sanctions against Iraq have been relaxed based on pressure from France, Russia, and China. China has continued its

development of high technology weapons, both conventional

and nuclear. In response, Taiwan has protested that this development and subsequent buildup are threatening Taipei’s

security. The United States issues statements supporting Taiwan’s independence and makes vague promises to help assist

Taiwan should China become overtly aggressive.

The Chinese announce a major arms sale to Iraq, including

new aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and an upgraded comCOHEN

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mand and control system. US protests are answered by Iraqi

claims of self-defense, based on Iran’s increasing capabilities.

As February ends, the Chinese begin moving troops and

equipment south, causing an increased state of alert for the

Taiwanese military. US forces in the Pacific are also in higher

readiness states. In late March, US satellites detect a missile

launch from China with a southern trajectory. Taiwan is notified and launches alert aircraft to thwart a potential Chinese

attack. The Chinese missile, a test shot over Taiwan, suffers a

major engine malfunction not long after launch. This failure

causes the missile’s flight path to shorten, impacting just 20

miles south of Taipei. Luckily, the missile is unarmed. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese alert jets are directed to attack a Chinese naval vessel monitoring the test in the Formosa Straight.

As the fighters engage the ship, alert messages are sent by

both militaries. Within 24 hours, aerial engagements dominate the skies. Despite US and UN diplomatic efforts, neither

side will back down. China sees a unique opportunity to retake “its” island. Taiwan is fighting for its survival.

US forces are directed into the theater under the command

of the commander in chief of the US Pacific Air Command

(USCINCPAC). An airbridge is begun almost immediately with

US tanker resources based in Japan and the United States.

Fighters and bombers from various US bases are deployed,

utilizing the airbridge tankers and tankers deployed to the

region. Beddown bases are not plentiful, with Korea, Japan,

Australia, and Diego Garcia selected for US aircraft. C-5s and

C-17s bring in Army troops for forward positioning, while Marines plan to go ashore in Taiwan and help with the island’s

defense. The initial stages of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)

are activated. A presidential selected reserve call-up is underway for Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units.

The Formosa War, as it is being called, does not go well for

Taiwan. Chinese fighters are rapidly gaining air superiority,

while their bombers attack strategic positions and soften the

area targeted for invasion. As US air forces enter the fight,

able to transit the long distances from their bases to the

combat zone due to an increasing number of tankers arriving

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in theater, they are challenged by the high number of Chinese

aircraft.

Approximately three weeks into the Formosa War, two corps

of Iraqi troops, supposedly in eastern Iraq to thwart Iranian

aggression, suddenly drive into Kuwait. US forces engage, but

due to surprise and the speed of the attack, are forced to

withdraw toward the Saudi Arabian border. Unlike the last

invasion of Kuwait, Iraq does not stop, nor does it appear as if

it will wait for massive US reinforcements to arrive prior to

invading Saudi Arabia. Within hours, the president orders

forces into the Gulf region, calls up more Reserve and National

Guard units, and activates the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement (VISA) forces and increases stages of the CRAF.

Active duty tanker forces are now augmented heavily by ANG

and AFRC units. An additional airbridge is constructed to SWA.

Additional fighters, bombers, and combat support aircraft are

directed (and in some cases redirected) to Saudi Arabia, streaming into what is now the second major theater war.

How does this scenario play out? Good question. Appendix

A shows a table indicating the number of KC-135s being used

by day for this scenario, as well as the assumptions and

planning factors used to produce the numbers.2 4 Particular

attention should be paid to days 32 through 59. For these 28

days, tanker requirements exceed the 472 combat-coded KC135s currently owned by the US Air Force. 25 In plain language,

the Air Force is short of tankers; a shortage that could be

compounded because the further the conflict moves from the

established support infrastructure, the worse this scenario

gets. This will force the Joint Force Air Component Commanders (JFACC) to play a negative sum game, effectively choosing

the lesser of all evils. Take tankers away from the counterair

mission and air superiority is at risk. Pull tankers from airbridge missions and critical supplies and equipment may not

arrive in theater on time. Short tanker support for the strategic attack mission, and the enemy may not be defeated

quickly. Clearly, there is reason for serious concern about the

current tanker force structure’s ability to support US military

operations.

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Some may argue that the force structure’s basis of “nearly

simultaneous” provides a longer gap between the two conflicts

than just the three weeks given in the scenario. Why? How

does one dictate to an opponent when he may or may not

begin aggressive actions? “It is foolish to assume . . . that an

adversary could not move fast enough on a second front to

take advantage of heavy US engagement on a first front.”2 6

This raises the question about the entire force structure

basis, the 2-MTW. Is it really a strategy, or is it justification

for not being able to counter anticipated threats? “The ‘twowar strategy’ often referred to, is a misnomer. It is not a

strategy. It is a force-sizing standard.”2 7 Obviously, some

measure must exist on which to base force structure. However, when that force structure is short of the critical resource

of air-refueling capability, the needed combat and combat

support aircraft cannot get to the theater quickly, vital supplies and equipment do not arrive in time, and the shooters in

the fight will not have the endurance or distance capability to

accomplish their missions. In short, without adequate air-refueling assets, the United States and its allies spill more blood

and expend more resources in a longer, more protracted war.

The only thing worse would be if the previous sentence ended

in a plural.

On the Horizon

What does this mean? It certainly indicates that the USAF

cannot afford to lose any KC-135s. In fact, it speaks loudly to

needing more tanker aircraft. A Tanker Requirements Study

for Fiscal Year-2005 (TRS-05) is being conducted at AMC with

final results due out early in 2001.2 8 It is vital that the TRS-05

recommendations be reviewed and acted upon quickly. The

AMC Strategic Mobility Plan doesn’t forecast a new tanker

coming online until 2013.29 Given that it takes approximately

17 years to achieve initial operating capability (IOC) of a new

tanker, the acquisition timeline is already four years late to

meet a 2013 IOC.3 0 All the while, the KC-135 is aging as the

average age of the Stratotankers approaches 60 years!3 1 Waiting 13 years to begin to fill the tanker requirement gap is an

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eternity considering the consequences of not being fully able

to fight the nation’s wars. It is a gap that must be closed

quickly and with an airframe that fully supports the air-refu -

eling mission.

One area of force structure shortfall that can be remedied

much quicker is that of crew ratio. Currently, AMC active duty

units are manned at a 1.36-crew ratio (1.36 crews per aircraft), while other active duty units and the ARC are manned

at 1.27.3 2 These ratios are based on cold war SIOP mission

requirements.3 3 It has become clear from recent operations

that these numbers are inadequate to support contingency

operations. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Allied Force, the SECDEF and CJCS reported, “Although we succeeded in providing the tanker support needed

to sustain the air campaign, we are reviewing our tanker

forces and crew ratios to determine whether they are sufficient

to meet future needs in either major theater wars or other

contingencies.”3 4 Generally in contingencies, higher crew ratios are requested to support alerts, improve crew rest capability, and help augment staffs. Allied Force operations required equivalent crew ratios of 1.8.

The AMC initiative is to increase the number of KC-135

crews by 75, thereby upping the crew ratio to approximately

1.56.3 5 This will achieve two outcomes. First, it will work toward lowering the operations tempo and number of TDY days

for the crew force. Second, and perhaps more importantly, an

increased crew ratio of 1.56 will make any required increases

in crew ratios for future contingencies less difficult to achieve,

and therefore, better support the CINCs in achieving their

objectives.

Notes

1. The White House, A National Security Strategy for A New Century ,

December 1999, iii.

2. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States

of America, 1997, 11.

3. Ibid., 27.

4. Ibid., 7.

5. Congressman Floyd D. Spence (Indiana), chairman of the House

Armed Services Committee, Opening Statement for the Full Committee

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29
Hearing On Hart-Rudman Commission Report , 5 October 1999; on-line,

Internet, 11 January 2000, available from http://www.house.gov/hasc.

6. The commission is also referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission

for its co-chairs, Gary Hart and Warren Rudman.

7. USCNS/21, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,

Major Themes and Implications, 15 September 1999, 8; on-line, Internet, 15

January 2000, available from http://www.nssg.gov.

8. USCNS/21, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century,

Supporting Research and Analysis , 15 September 1999, 140; on-line,

Internet, 15 January 2000, available from http://www.nssg.gov.

9. Ibid., 47.

10. Ibid., 59.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., 66.

13. Ibid., 78.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 79.

16. Ibid., 90.

17. Ibid., 91.

18. Ibid., 49.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 56.

21. Senate Armed Services Committee, 14.

22. Ibid., 63.

23. Ibid.

24. This discussion does not include KC-10s operating in the tanker

role. The premise of the scenario was to address KC-135 requirements only.

Additionally, a 2-MTW scenario will require a tremendous amount of airlift,

no doubt, to opposite ends of the planet. The KC-10’s invaluable airlift

capability will remove many of its kind from the air refueling arena.

25. Specifically, these are primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI).

PMAI are aircraft assigned to a unit for performance of its wartime mission.

This includes all USAF KC-135s, subtracting maintenance, modifications,

and training and test aircraft. Additionally, 24 training-coded aircraft are

assigned to the KC-135 schoolhouse at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

Given that tanker pilots still need to be produced, even in a war, one

scenario may have 14 jets called up for combat duty. This raises the

number of available KC-135s to 486. In spite of this augmentation, tanker

shortages still would exist from day 34 through day 54.

26. John T. Correll, “Back to Win-Hold-Win,” Air Force Magazine 82, no.

10 (October 1999): n.p.; on-line, Internet, available from http://www.afa.

org/magazine/editorial/10edit99.html.

27. Ibid.

28. Air Mobility Command, 50.

29. Ibid.

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30. Headquarters AMC, Air Mobility Master Plan, in “The Making of the

Weakest Link,” Lt Col Stephen C. German (research paper, Air War College,

April 1994), 23.

31. “Air Force Almanac,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 5 (May 1999):

64-65.

32. Air Mobility Command/XP, “Initiative Background Paper FY02-07

POM On KC-135 Squadrons (PE 41218F) KC-135 Aircrew/Maintenance

Shortfall CCN 02A2M121MM,” n.d.

33. Ibid.

34. Senate Armed Services Committee, 14.

35. USTRANSCOM, Presentation: “USCINCTRANS House Armed Services

Committee Hearing Information,” n.d.

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31
Chapter 5

“VOTE” for Air Refueling

Unlike airlift, which must maximize efficiency because

requirements often exceed available resources, combat

support air refueling places a premium on effectiveness.

—Lt Gen William Begert

—Vice Commander 

—US Air Forces in Europe

—August 1997–August 1999

Identifying problems in the force structure alone is insufficient. Force structure is only one part of the bigger picture for

the KC-135; force management must also be reviewed. For the

tanker force, Allied Force would expose both operational and

doctrinal weaknesses. Having been in the inventory for nearly

half a century, it would seem that KC-135 employment concepts

would be tried, true, and etched in stone. However, since the

KC-135 moved from SAC’s single integrated operational plan

(SIOP) mission to one of “Global Reach” under Air Mobility Command (AMC), the tanker has been a square peg forced to fit into

the round hole of airlift. The ensuing discussion and recommendations fall short of recommending Tanker Command. However,

tankers are not airlifters and attempting to force them into airlift

doctrine and operating structures creates ineffective command

and control arrangements which will only confuse the war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC) and diminish the effectiveness

of this limited national resource.

To help correct some of the air-refueling shortcomings, recommendations will be made for the KC-135, founded on a

focused methodology the author calls vision, organization,

training, and employment (VOTE). This four-pronged approach to improve the effectiveness of tankers will reap rewards in the form of better planning and provide the warfighting CINC with the force multiplier and enabler that is the

KC-135.

33
If It IS Broken . . .

One hundred seventy-five KC-135s were deployed to Allied

Force with the percentage of available tankers deployed nearly

equal to that of Desert Storm.1 Initially, the analysis justifying

the tanker requirement went very well. However, as the major

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offensive, Papa

Bear, progressed in its planning, the tanker requirements

could no longer be evaluated accurately due to a lack of experienced tanker planners.2

 This caused the initial Papa Bear

requirement for tankers to be exaggerated. 3 The reasons for

this are discussed later.

Three areas of the operation require review to help find and

fix problems: (1) tanker planning available to the combatant

commands (specifically looking at US Air Forces Europe

[USAFE], but also focusing on other commands); (2) difficulties assembling tanker planning expertise once the shooting

started; and (3) the implementation of tanker doctrine and the

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR).

Maj Scott Mischo was the chief of Tanker Plans for USAFE

prior to and during Allied Force. He and a handful of others were

the only air-refueling experts resident in USAFE. 4 As the thea -

ter’s link back to AMC, the Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) in USAFE coordinated the movement of AMC aircraft in Europe. However, despite this conduit, AMC was not

actively engaged in determining tanker requirements for Allied

Force. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that no US

European Command (USEUCOM) deliberate plan for an Allied

Force-type operation existed that Major Mischo and his planners

could modify.5 This situation, however, is not unique to USAFE.

The mindsets that “tankers will always be there” and “tankers are assumed” have become part of the Air Force’s mental

lexicon. In 1994, the Air War College’s wargaming exercise,

CAMPEX, addressed tanker employment by saying, “Air refu -

eling . . . assumed to be present in adequate supply. Our

experience in testing Campex with previous classes showed

that the addition of these assets increased the complexity of

the simulation without contributing to the outcome.”6 Five

years later, the Air Command and Staff College war game,

Tropic Thunder, made a similar claim.7 It is not surprising

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then, that the Air Force fights, and plans to fight, using the

same inadequate assumptions with which it trains. Under US

Southern Command, US Army South Functional Plan 6150-

99, Ecuador Volcano Response Plan lists the following under

paragraph 1-f, Assumptions: “(7) (U) Refueling support will be

available to support the deployment of forces.”8 A slew of questions abounds. Where will the tankers come from? How many

tankers will be needed? From where will the tankers operate?

Is sufficient ramp space and ground support equipment available at the beddown locations? Has any thought been given to

employing KC-135s in a region of active volcanoes given that

the KC-135 operating manual is clear that the jet will not be

flown through volcanic ash? 9

Likewise, the US Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) war plans

may be incomplete. Despite detailed plans for the first 72

hours, tanker requirements for the Korean theater have many

holes, including unknown Navy air-refueling requirements

due to lack of inputs from Navy planners.1 0

Certainly, these tanker considerations should not drive

these or any other operation. However, it is becoming nearly

impossible to simply assume unlimited, timely tanker support. For all intents and purposes, though, that is where the

combatant commands have migrated, and one of the only

things that didn’t cause this line of reasoning to blow up in

NATO’s face during Allied Force was a lack of (another?)

MTW.1 1 Tankers may not always be available in the unlimited

quantities the CINCs presume and desire.

During Allied Force , as the supporting command, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was to provide USEUCOM what they requested under the secretary of defense’s

(SECDEF) tasking. The issue though, becomes who is validating the tanker requirements for the CINCs? Typically, a third

party confirms the need for, and level of refueling support

requested and USTRANSCOM, AMC, and the Tanker Airlift

Control Center (TACC) process this validated request. For Allied Force, J-33, the Joint Operations Division-Europe was

supposed to balance USEUCOM’s tanker requests with other

priorities and validate them. However, with no tanker expertise in J-33, the philosophy was that the CINC knew best and

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35
he was given a blank check for tanker requests.12 And with

over one-half of the KC-135 fleet residing in the ANG and

AFRC, these ARC jets and crews would have to be tapped. The

method to accomplish this was through a presidential selected

reserve call-up (PSRC), mostly of tanker units, and the institu -

tion of a stop-loss program, preventing active duty personnel

in specific career fields from separating or retiring. 1 3

The long-term effects of using the Air Force Reserve Command

(AFRC) for Allied Force, especially the PSRC, may not be known

for some time. Civilian employers of those reservists called up

may be hesitant in the future to allow the reservist leave for

voluntary reserve days. Against the background of this call-up

(that actually covered less than two months of operations), many

senior AFRC leaders believe that a PSRC for anything less than

180 days does more damage to employer-AFRC relations than

the good of the call-up. Given the desperately needed support of

civilian employers for guard and reserve members participating

in other than planned training activities and deployments,

PSRCs must be evaluated carefully. 1 4

Another question, already alluded to, lurks in the darkness.

What if a second large operation occurred simultaneously with

Allied Force? It is not inconceivable that Iraq or North Korea

would have found US preoccupation in Kosovo an ideal opportunity to further their interests militarily. Given that tankers

are nearly irreplaceable in almost any air campaign, where

would the extra tankers have come from?1 5 The point of these

questions is that once shooting starts, it is nearly impossible

to plan for future operations and execute today’s missions

with a small staff, led by an O-4 with no “top cover,” as

occurred during Allied Force.

This discussion, then, leads to the second argument,

namely, that once the war started, a lack of experienced personnel stretched the tanker planning shop to the breaking

point. This contributed to the Papa Bear requirement for additional tankers that may not have been needed in such quantities—there were not enough qualified tanker planners to analyze the numbers.1 6 Major Mischo was extremely qualified; he

was a former KC-135 instructor pilot, had training in air op -

erations center (AOC) operations, and had been involved in

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the Allied Force tanker plan from day one. As talented as he

was, though, he could not run the operation by himself while

also developing future tanker requirements. Requests for augmentees in most cases provided motivated, but untrained personnel. In one case, an officer in a nonflying staff assignment

had been sent, despite almost no recent experience in the

KC-135 or tanker operations. Given the amount of time and

energy needed to train him that would have detracted from

prosecuting the war, he was returned home.1 7

While the war was progressing, Headquarters AMC was not

directly involved in the tanker planning. This is curious given

the need for additional tanker planners in the theater. As the

KC-135 weapon system manager, AMC

had access to an entire headquarters

staff and the resources of four active

duty KC-135 wings. Nevertheless, the

resources were never requested. There

are some possible reasons for Headquarters AMC’s extremely low profile regarding tanker planning during Allied

Force. First, Lt Gen Michael C. Short,

the combined forces air component

commander (CFACC), had worked with

Major Mischo on the initial plans and

put a lot of faith in him. 1 8 It is understandable that General Short felt comfortable with his tanker planner,

wanted to maintain that relationship

during the war, and may have been concerned about using

unknown AMC planners. Clearly, he wanted to own the guy

that wrote his tanker plan. To their credit, AMC had, in fact,

been attempting to place an O-6 KC-135 operations group

commander in the theater to act as a tanker director in the

CAOC. For reasons explained later, it would take nearly two

months for this colonel to arrive at the CAOC in Vincenza.1 9

Second, the tanker combat planning background of some

officers on the Headquarters AMC staff was questionable. As

AMC was attempting to analyze the Allied Force air tasking

order (ATO) to confirm the need for the tanker force requested

Lt Gen Michael C. Short,

combined forces air

component commander,

Operation Allied Force

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37
from USAFE, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) AMOCC

was informed that the Headquarters AMC personnel involved

could not read the air tasking order.

2 0 Obviously, there are

personnel at HQ AMC, most notably in the tactical air control

center (TACC), who would have experience in tanker combat

operations and with ATOs. Nevertheless, the staff members

responsible for the analysis of the tanker requirements were

not experienced and provided little in the way of support to

the air refueling plans of Allied Force. Thus, despite what would

have seemed like a natural source of tanker combat planning

and expertise, AMC was, for the most part, out of the loop.

This Air Force-wide tanker planning problem was high -

lighted when the SECDEF and the chief of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (CJCS) told SASC, “We also found that our ability to plan

in theater, in real time, for the most effective use of our tanker

fleet was limited.”2 1 How did the Air Force get to this situation

where building tanker planning experience and including

competent tanker planners in sufficient quantities has become

Source: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6.2, Air Refueling, 19 July 1999, 34.

Figure 1. Command and Control for Air Refueling Forces

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such a problem? To look for answers, first consider current

tanker doctrine.

Figure 1 identifies the command and control structure as

described in AFDD 2-6.2, Air Refueling Doctrine. In the words

of Bill Paxton’s character in the movie Twister, “What the hell

is that!?”2 2 Simplicity, a fundamental principle of war, is vio -

lated with every twisted turn, overlapping box, and intersecting line in the above “spaghetti diagram.”2 3 In addition, consider the descriptions of this command structure from AFDD

2-6.2 in appendix B.

If the wiring diagram appears confusing, the description only

exacerbates this chaos. For example, five different organizations,

TACC, AMOCC, AMD, ARCT, and the air refueling plans section

within the combat plans division of the AOC, are responsible for

planning, tasking, and executing air refueling missions. If the

AOC director controls combat and combat support, why is the

DIRMOBFOR responsible for air refueling (as an air mobility

function)? Who does the air refueling planning section (collo -

cated with combat plans—not part of combat plans!) report

to—the DIRMOBFOR, the AOC director? Who has final approval

of the air refueling part of the ATO—the DIRMOBFOR, the AOC

director? Clearly, this whole organizational scheme is confusing

at best, unmanageable at worst.

The entire DIRMOBFOR and subordinate structure exists

because “the global nature of air mobility [requires] special

attention . . . to balance these resources with national requirements and priorities.”24 On an intertheater level, this makes

sense, and will, in fact, be advocated later. However, in an

intratheater role, what makes air refueling so special as to

require its own separate organizational arrangement? Airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, in high

demand globally, are in shorter supply than tankers and they

don’t have their own command structure separate from the

joint forces air component commander (JFACC) and AOC.2 5

Air Force doctrine, as defined, is “authoritative, but not

directive.”2 6 Against this background, it is easy to see why

General Short may have preferred to use his own tanker planning organization and people that he knew and trusted, versus

trying to build a system around the doctrine of air refueling

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39
command and control. Additionally, the Allied Force command

and control “fell onto an existing AOC structure. The CAOC at

Vicenza, Italy, was formed in 1993 for Balkan operations, and

it evolved over the years as the focus of operations shifted

from a no-fly zone to peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”2 7

Mobility command and control, as prescribed, is simply too

confusing to comprehend in a peacetime situation, and a

nightmare maze of thin, thick, and dashed lines of even less

relevance when preparing to kill people and destroy things. If

the JFACC/CFACC can’t readily understand and use a tanker

command and control structure, then the structure serves no

purpose. Adding more people to an already mind-boggling air

refueling and mobility command and control system would

only add extra confusion and uncertainty. This might explain

why General Short may have balked at not only additional

help for his tanker planners, but also the addition of a senior

AMC officer to act as AMC’s air-refueling liaison to the CAOC.

VOTE Early and Often

The KC-135 weapon system can be much more effective in

helping the combatant commanders implement the US’s military instrument of power. Four areas must be addressed to

make this happen. First, the tanker force must have a vision

of its own creation and development. Second, the organization of tanker assets and planning functions, both in the

peacetime training environment and in a shooting war, must

be overhauled and simplified to infuse tankers directly into

the tactical planning functions and conduct training along

these lines to mirror how the tankers intend to fight.

Third, this training must be formalized within a peacetime

structure and given senior leadership oversight to ensure that

not only will the tanker crews successfully accomplish their

combat missions, but that they will survive in the process.

Fourth, tanker employment during war and other contingencies, as it relates to doctrine, must be simplified and acknowledge that in the combat support role, the tanker is no longer

a mobility asset, but a combat aircraft and a shooter’s best

friend.

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I Can See Clearly Now . . . Or Can I?

A vision is “a long-term conception of where we are going . . .

[it] is also a picture of the future.”2 8 For the KC-135 weapon

system, there appears to be no vision.2 9 Where is the KC-135

going? How is the tanker adapting to a changing environment? Who should be asserting this vision? In the “good old

days” of alert, there was no question that “Mother SAC” was

the custodian of the tanker force and provided it with a very

clear mission: be prepared to get the bombers to their targets

and act as America’s guardians of peace through nuclear deterrence. Today, though, who is providing the stewardship for

the tanker force, so that it may help further US interests? It

appears that air refueling’s senior leadership as well as its

customers have defined the KC-135’s vision for it without a

clear understanding of how air refueling enables, enhances,

and extends our military forces.

Tanker crews have long prided themselves on “always being

on time, on track” and have a reputation for making the mission happen.3 0 The anecdotal stories of tankers “leaning forward” abound. 3 1 While this is excellent customer service, it

does little to insert the KC-135 into the fight. Rather, it makes

the tanker an ancillary piece of the air campaign. Instead of

being handed the air-refueling requirement after the shooters

have developed their plan, a tanker planner should work with

the shooters as they develop their strike packages and in -

gress/egress routes to offer suggestions on how best to maximize the limited tanker assets.

With the absence of a formal current vision, the KC-135

vision statement appears to be “Whatever You Want.” Instead,

it should read more like, “Air Refueling Experts and Integral

Team Members, Vital to Supplying the Force and Bringing the

Fight to the Enemy.” Without this vision, the tanker force will

continue to wallow in an ethereal plane, as pseudo-mobility

assets—not a part of the shooter community, yet not totally

integrated into the airlift world. The KC-135 is a major

weapon system. It should act and be treated as such.

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41
Train Like You Fight

“On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight as well or

as poorly as they are trained.”3 2 This seemingly logical statement is lost on the tanker community and its senior leadership. Training requirements exist for crews to maintain currency, but what about to fight? What training exists to

prepare crews and planners to integrate and participate in the

process of executing an air campaign? Where is the combat

mentality in the tanker community?

Red Flag exercises allow some semblance of combat simula -

tion for KC-135s, but tanker crews’ participation is limited at

best.3 3 The shooters get their fuel prior to the start of the war,

marshal, fight, conclude the war, take a post-strike fuel onload if needed, and then go home. 3 4 Rarely do the tankers get

the opportunities to practice their tactical maneuvers.3 5 Even

if targeted, the tankers would not have enough room to maneuver defensively due to the limits placed on their airspace at

the Nellis range complex. 3 6 More importantly, though, tanker

planners are not involved. The AMC detachment at Red Flag is

simply told what time the tankers need to be on track and

how much to offload.

A step in the right direction can be found at Fairchild Air

Force Base, Washington. Here, the KC-135 Combat Employment School teaches a five and one-half month-long course to

KC-135 crews.3 7 The goal is to provide KC-135 crews hands-on

experience in dealing with crisis and combat flying scenarios,

a working knowledge of joint combat environments, and a

baseline of planning and doctrinal procedures in combat and

contingency operations.3 8 This course, along with the new

Tanker Planner Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida, represents

initiatives designed to integrate tankers into the fight.3 9

More can be done, though. A wider-reaching solution is to

create Combined Task Force-Combat Air Forces, or CTF-CAF.

This would be a peacetime organization much like CTF-294 is

in relation to US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). It

would be responsible for the integration and planning of

tanker assets into Air Combat Command exercises and daily

training activities. Since this function will entail much sched -

uling coordination, the TACC will be the responsible AMC

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organization, with the TACC vice commander dual-hatted as

CTF-CAF commander. A small planning staff will be assigned

to integrate with Air Combat Command (ACC) planners and

schedulers as well as staff agencies at Joint Forces Command.

On selected daily training sorties (likely for a week at a time)

and for larger exercises, tanker planners will work side-byside with their shooter counterparts. For exercises, the tanker

planners will be part of the ACC strategy, combat plans, and

combat operations sections, where they will learn how the

combat air forces put missions together, while showing what

the tanker brings to the fight and how it can best be used.

This will allow the tankers and shooters to develop an understanding of each other’s planning processes and requirements. For the next war, these same people, having trained

together, will be better able to fight together.

A critique of CTF-CAF may be the sheer cost of temporary

duties to facilitate these meetings. Using the tanker to shuttle

people during regularly scheduled training sorties will alleviate the airfare. The investment of per diem and billeting costs

for two tanker planners for a week at their ACC host’s base

(approximately $1,100) is pittance compared to saving just an

hour of KC-135 flying time (approximately $2,000) in combat

when the air-refueling asset could be better used elsewhere.

Additional administrative and budgetary issues may surface,

though they could undoubtedly be worked out.

The Family that Trains Together,

Fights Together

Now that the tankers and shooters have trained together

and been integrated into the combat plans and combat operations sections for peacetime exercises through CTF-CAF, it is

time to restructure the doctrine that currently places artificial

barriers between them. To begin, the proposed structure (fig.

2) is such that a continuum of force types exists. On the far

left reside the combat forces, to include combat supporting

tankers. Integrated into the Combat Plans, Combat Operations, and Strategy Divisions are tanker planners working directly for the AOC director. These air-refueling experts’ only

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43
mission in life is to plan, coordinate, and develop air tasking

order inputs for combat (shooters) and combat support

(AWACS, etc.) air refuelings. The tankers in theater executing

combat air refueling are under the operational control of the

JFACC/COMAFFOR and dedicated to that mission. These

tankers and their planners are dedicated to the combat theater just like the fighters and bombers. Should the DIRMOBFOR or TACC need any of them to support theater or strategic

mobility operations, the JFACC will set priorities and decide if

they can be spared for noncombat operations.

In the center are mobility forces supporting combat. These

are forces that support the combat and theater operations but

are not involved with the actual “shooting.” Here, the DIRMOBFOR has authority under the JFACC and directs the Air

Mobility Division (AMD), consisting of the Air Mobility (AMCT),

Air Refueling (ARCT), and Airlift Control Teams (ALCT). The

AMCT and ALCT teams’ responsibilities are the same as those

spelled out in the current mobility and air refueling doctrine.

The ARCT works those air-refueling missions not involving

Figure 2. Proposed Command and Control for Air-Refueling Forces

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combat operations. In addition, TACC directs AMC-controlled

mobility assets coordinated through an AMC-provided Air Mo -

bility Element (AME). Air refueling operations that may reside

in this area include terminal legs of an airbridge moving fighters or supporting strategic or noncombat lift into/out of theater, or the rotation of tanker units into/out of theater.

The far right end of the spectrum deals with strategic mobility. Here is where the heavy strategic airlift activities are controlled. Air-refueling operations under this area may be airbridges or support for the strategic airlift, flown from home

station or an intermediate location outside of the combat theater. These assets are controlled exclusively by AMC’s TACC.

To summarize this new air refueling command and control

structure , it is important to note that the DIRMOBFOR and

associated structure is removed from controlling tankers in -

volved in combat operations. These assets are managed solely

through the AOC director and his strategy, combat plans, and

combat operations staffs. These staffs will include not only

fighter, bomber, intelligence, and surveillance planners, but

also the air refueling experts, working directly with the same

people they trained with as a result of CTF-CAF. 4 0 These

tanker aircraft and their planners belong to the combat theater in exactly the same way as the fighters and bombers they

are supporting, with no requirement for “top cover,” because

they work for the same “team.”

VOTE Yes!

A vision created by the KC-135 community, for the KC-135

community is vital to establishing a direction and sense of

purpose within the weapon system. But a vision alone is not

enough. Organizational changes must follow. These include

establishing CTF-CAF with the full support of, and direction

from Air Force senior leadership, and reorganizing how we

conduct wartime air refueling operations. This will allow

tanker crews and planners to best learn, coordinate, and in -

sert themselves into the Combat Air Forces’ planning and

execution process. This will benefit both communities and

ease the transition when it’s time to fight the nation’s wars.

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45
The same people who trained together will fight together in a

nearly seamless arrangement and with a spirit of cooperation.

Finally, air refueling will be executed in the theater using a

continuum that defines operations more clearly and will allow

the JFACC to view integrating his air-refueling assets as a

sound process, not a nightmarish coordination exercise. With

the implementation of these changes, the headaches and possibly wasteful use of air refueling resources will be blunted

before they become detrimental to US military capability.

Notes

1. A few disclaimers: first, the following discussion of US operations in

the Kosovo campaign, also known as the “Air War Over Serbia” (AWOS), is

held in absence of the final after-actions report. At the time of this writing,

the official analysis is still being compiled and reviewed. Nevertheless, as

presented here, the data assembled and interviews conducted provide a

reliable, beneficial review of events as they occurred in the eyes of those

involved. Lt Gen William Begert, USAFE/CV, Presentation: “Kosovo Lessons

Learned: Air Force and Air Mobility,” n.d. Additional aircraft were deployed

to theater outside of the map titled Allied Force KC-135 Basing.

Additionally, numerous tankers transited in and out of the theater

supporting airbridge activities.

2. Maj Scott Mischo, chief of readiness, 32 AOS, interviewed by author,

9 January 2000.

3. Ibid.

4. Mischo interview, 9 January 2000. A total tanker planning staff of

four officers (two each, USAFE Air Mobility Operations Control Center and

32 AOS) and two NCOs (USAFE AMOCC) are assigned in USAFE.

5. Maj Scott Mischo, chief of Readiness, 32 AOS, interviewed by author,

2 December 1999.

6. Air War College, “Campaign Planning,” CAMPEX 94 in “The Making of

the Weakest Link,” Lt Col Stephen C. German (research paper, Air War

College, April 1994), 13.

7. Air Command and Staff College, “ACSC Distance Learning,

Multimedia Edition Version 2.1,” CD-ROM, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.:

ACSC/DED June 1998. Beginning with the 1999–2000 version, the ACSC

Distance Learning program no longer uses Tropic Thunder. The

replacement does account for the need for air refueling assets.

8. US Army South Functional Plan 6150-99 (U), Ecuador Volcano

Response Plan (Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico: Headquarters, US Army South,

1 December 1999), 2.

9. Air Force Technical Order (T.O.) 1C-135(K)R-1, “Flight Manual—USAF

Series KC-135R/T Aircraft,” Change 46, 15 August 1998, 7–14.

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46
10. Maj Steve Tucker, AMC, Regional War Planner, interviewed by

author, 7 December 1999.

11. As shown previously, the Pentagon does not consider Allied Force a

“major theater war,” though the Air Force does.

12. Col Stephen C. German, vice commandant, Air Command and Staff

College, interviewed by author, 25 February 2000.

13. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News

Release, “Secretary Cohen Announces Presidential Selected Reserve

Call-Up,” 27 April 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 21 October 1999, available

from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1999/b04271999_bt197-99.

html.

14. Lt Col James Mikolajczyk, Air National Guard advisor, Air War

College, interviewed by author, 16 December 1999.

15. Col Stephen C. German, vice commandant, Air Command and Staff

College, interviewed by author, 14 January 2000. The tankers would have

most likely been pulled from Allied Force.

16. Mischo interview, 2 December 1999.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Mischo interview, 2 December 1999.

21. Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing On Kosovo After-Action

Review , Joint Statement of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, and

Gen Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 October

1999: 14.

22. Bill Paxton, Twister, Warner Brothers and Universal Pictures, 1996.

23. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,

September 1997, 11.

24. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 28

September 1998, 57.

25. 32 E-3s versus 550 KC-135s. “Air Force Almanac,” Air Force

Magazine 82, no. 5 (May 1999): 63.

26. AFDD 2-6.2, Air Refueling, vii.

27. Begert, “Kosovo & Theater Air Mobility,” 16–17.

28. Maj Bryan Zak, “Today’s Air Force Requires Big L’s That Support

and Encourage Little l’s,” Concepts for Leadership, AU-24 (Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 221.

29. Maj Brad Davis, AMC/DOOO, Chief of Tanker Operations Policy,

interviewed by author, 6 December 1999.

30. “Without tankers, we could not have fought this war.” General Short,

Operation Allied Force Combined Forces Air Component Commander in “Air

Mobility Doctrine Implications Of The Air War Over Serbia: An Interim

AMC/XPD Assessment,” Lt Col D. Richard Simpson, Directorate of Plans

and Programs, Air Mobility Command, n.d.

31. Anecdotal examples include: “If four tankers are needed, six are

provided;” “If you need your tankers at 1300, they’ll be there at 1230.”

COHEN

47
32. Mischo interview, 2 December 1999. No excess tanker capability

existed in Allied Force. Due to the limited airspace and tanker tails, the

exact number of KC-135s had to arrive at the assigned track, precisely at

the ATO-directed time.

33. Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters,

Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), 1–5.

34. Lt Col Richard Scarine, Mobility Operations, Red Flag Operations,

interviewed by author, 9 November 1999.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. TSgt Karen Petitt, “KC-135 pilots, navigators become

multi-dimensional experts with new Combat Employment School,” AMC

News, 7 January 2000, np.; on-line, Internet, available from http://public.

safb.af.mil/hqamc/news/january/000104.htm.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. The JFACC and AOC director may build their staffs based on

whatever expertise they feel is needed. AFDD 2, 68.

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48
Chapter 6

Conclusions

People hate change, and with good reason. Change makes

us stupider, relatively speaking. Change adds new

information to the universe; information that we don’t know.

Our knowledge—as a percentage of all the things that can

be known—goes down a tick every time something changes.

—Scott Adams

—Author, The Dilbert Principle

Without a doubt, air refueling is an indispensable capability

that the United States Air Force possesses; it is critical to

fighting today’s wars. It is “important to the style of waging

war that we’ve built.”1 Air refueling allows the war fighter to

get to the fight. “Global Power” is only a catch phrase without

the nearly unlimited range tankers give the combat air forces.

Not one single fighter or bomber is able to “reach out and

touch someone” without first having made the journey into

the theater—a journey that would be much more time consuming and costly (in terms of national treasure and precious

resources) without air refueling.

A C-141 Heads Down: An “Airbridge” behind a KC-135

49
Tankers also enable the logistics flow by building airbridges,

allowing the people, supplies, and equipment necessary for

the prosecution of war to arrive over great distances in time

frames measured in hours, not days.

Once in theater, tankers assume a new role—combat support .

Providing vital air refueling to the shooters allows their effective

combat range to increase dramatically. Air patrol, command and

control, interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance missions provide longer coverage and require fewer aircraft and

crews in theater when supported by tankers.

Tankers, however, are not an unlimited resource—only a

fixed number remain, with no replacement due for some time.

In addition, while continuing to age, KC-135s exist in inadequate numbers to support the strategy of fighting two nearly

simultaneous major theater wars. For the crews, increasing

the KC-135 crew ratio is imperative. Referring to the cold war

era, Gen Charles T. Robertson Jr., USCINCTRANS and AMC

commander said, “Today, the tanker crew ratio that served us

well through those years . . . simply can’t, I repeat ‘can’t’,

sustain the pace of modern high intensity air operations.”2

Tankers must be better integrated into combat operations.

Simply assuming air refueling will be provided is a thought

process that has become inadequate and potentially dangerous. KC-135s don’t just appear. They must be integrated into

operations from the beginning.

Finally, a course of action must be put in place to revitalize

and restructure the tanker force and the manner in which it

supports the US military strategy. Developing a vision for the

weapon system establishes a basis for all other actions and

defines for air-refueling customers what the tanker’s capabilities are and what it brings to the fight.

Tankers need to work in peacetime with those they will

support in war. Establishing CTF-CAF enables the tankers

to be integrated into the combat planning and operations

activities while giving the shooters and air-refueling experts

insights into what each does to create a better synergy with

these national resources.

Finally, it is critical to the future success of the tanker that

the doctrine for command and control of air-refueling assets

FAIRCHILD PAPER

50
be changed. Tankers working with combat and combat support aircraft need to fall directly under the JFACC with their

planners working in the AOC directly for the AOC director.

The DIRMOBFOR has a place, but not in the role of in -

tratheater air-refueling operations.

Where to, Mister?

The future for the US military is uncertain. To be sure, it

will include a changing world environment where technology

and information create battlefields devoid of the human carnage of past conflicts, but with devastating destruction nevertheless. For the USAF, the ability to project and utilize massive, precise force will still be an option that the political

leadership will look to for quick, “clean” results.

To support this worldwide presence, air refueling will be crucial. With fewer overseas bases available and conflict-ravaged regions stretching to the far reaches of the globe, the

KC-135 will continue to be the US military’s force enabler

and force multiplier—a role it has played exceptionally well

for nearly half a century, and will continue to play long

into the future.

Notes

1. Maj Scott Wilhelm, AMC/XPY, interviewed by author, 7 December

1999.

America’s Core Tanker for Many Years to Come

COHEN

51
2. Gen Charles T. Robertson Jr., commander, US Transportation

Command and Air Mobility Command, address to the Airlift/Tanker

Association Annual Convention, Dallas, Texas, 6 November 1999; on-line,

Internet, 4 January 2000, available from http://public.scott.af.mil/hqamc/

speeches/ata_99.htm.

FAIRCHILD PAPER

52
Appendix A

KC-135 Usage

in a 2-Major Theater War Scenario

Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Airbridge-Asia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Asia 23 31 38 46 54 62 70 77 85 93 101

Airbridge-Middle East

Theater-Middle East

TOTAL 123 131 138 146 154 162 170 177 185 193 201

Day 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Airbridge-Asia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Asia 109 116 124 132 140 148 155 163 171 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 100

Theater-Middle East 21

TOTAL 209 216 224 232 240 248 255 263 271 275 396

Day 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Airbridge-Asia 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Asia 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Middle East 29 36 44 52 60 68 75 83 91 99 107

TOTAL 404 411 419 427 435 443 450 458 466 474 482

Day 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Airbridge-Asia 100 100 97 93 90 87 83 80 77 73 70

Theater-Asia 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Middle East 114 122 130 138 146 153 161 169 175 175 175

TOTAL 489 497 502 506 511 515 520 524 527 523 520

Day 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

Airbridge-Asia 67 63 60 57 53 50 47 43 40 37 33

Theater-Asia 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Theater-Middle East 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

TOTAL 517 513 510 507 503 500 497 493 490 487 483

Day 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Airbridge-Asia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30

Theater-Asia 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 100 100 97 93 90 87 83 80 77 73 70

Theater-Middle East 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175

TOTAL 480 480 477 473 470 467 463 460 457 453 450

Day 67 68 69 70

Airbridge-Asia 30 30 30 30

Theater-Asia 175 175 175 175

Airbridge-Middle East 67 63 60 57

Theater-Middle East 175 175 175 175

TOTAL 447 443 440 437

Total Number of KC-135s Employed for a Hypothetical 2-MTW.

White Numbers on Black BackgroundIndicate Exceeding Total of 472

Available Combat-Coded KC-135s

53
Graphic Display of Total Number of KC-135s Employed for a

Hypothetical 2-MTW.

A number of assumptions are made to produce the above

information. These assumptions, however, are based on docu -

mented operational usage, rates, and support for combat and

airlift forces.1 They are, however, based solely on open-source

material (unclassified) and represent a number of interpretations, interpolations, and extrapolations of the published data.

The intent is not to prove conclusively that inadequate KC-135

forces exist; rather it is to show the thin line between tanker

force structure capabilities and requirements. The assumptions are highlighted below:

(1) The initial baseline for airbridge tankers is 100 KC-135s

for five weeks. One hundred tankers were used in Desert

Shield/Desert Storm to support both the Pacific and

Atlantic airbridges, helping to move both the shooters

and the strategic airlift forces into the theater. 2

(2) The airbridge begins to decrease after five weeks. This is

based on the fact that approximately five weeks after the

deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield,

Gen Chuck Horner told Gen Norman Schwarzkopf that

he now had logistics capability for a seven-day conflict.

54
The interpretation of this is that US forces could fight at

least a defensive holding action, with some offensive

capability, for an initial period of seven days.3 Therefore,

the rate at which combat forces and material enter the

theater decreases, since adequate numbers of shooters

and amounts of material are already in place.

(3) After the initial five-week airbridge push of 100 tankers,

the airbridge decreases over three weeks to a constant

level of 30 aircraft for the duration of the conflict. The

airbridge then becomes primarily a tool to move ongoing

strategic airlift into theater. Three weeks were chosen

because for Desert Storm, Secretary of the Air Force

Rice estimated that by early October, “the Air Force had

what it needed to carry out a strategic campaign.”4 A

constant level of 30 tankers for airbridge operations is

based on two airbridges—a Pacific airbridge requiring

three tankers per airlifter, and an Atlantic airbridge

requiring two tankers per airlifter. This allows a

minimum of five airlifters per day per airbridge. More air

refueled airlift is possible if the tankers can be

maintenance-turned in the same day (i.e. triple-turning

the jets allows 15 air refuelings for airlift per day per

airbridge). Further, additional airlift sorties, not utilizing

inflight air refueling, will be flown using intermediate

refueling stops and “staged” crews. It is also assumed

that advanced stages of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

(using aircraft that cannot be air refueled) have been

activated to augment AMC strategic airlift, as happened

in the Gulf War. 5

(4) The number of tankers deploying for combat operations

is based on:

(a) Approximately 15 active duty tankers are

permanently stationed at Kadena Air Base, Japan,

and are, therefore, considered in the first day

numbers of those deployed to Asia. Likewise, it is

assumed that eight tankers are supporting

Operation Southern Watch in Saudi Arabia and five

tankers are in Turkey supporting Northern Watch.

These are included in the first day numbers of those

deployed to the Middle East.

(b) Approximately 210 US fighters and 12 US bombers

moved into SWA in the first three weeks of Desert

55
Shield. 6

 It is assumed that the tankers that take the

receivers into the theater will remain in theater

themselves. Based on recent fighter and bomber

overseas deployments from Allied Force, three

KC-135s are used for two fighters, while two tankers

are used for a deploying bomber. 7 This translates

into 152 tankers in three weeks, or approximately

eight tankers moving into theater per day.

(c) The total number of tankers in each theater is

capped at 175 based on Allied Force, which both the

secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief of

staff have classified as a major theater war for the

Air Force.8

Notes

1. The numbers into the Asia theater may actually be higher than those

given here, taking into account longer distances to the deployment bases

from the US and longer distances from expected beddown bases for both

tankers and receivers. Additionally, “withhold” aircraft, deemed necessary

for other missions, may not be available for deployment to either theater.

2. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen , Gulf War Air Power Survey

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1994), 190.

3. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War

(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995), 99.

4. Ibid.

5. Keaney and Cohen, 4.

6. Ibid.

7. Tanker Airlift Control Center, A/R Tasking, Operation Poenix Duke II,

7 December 1999. (Fighter Data); Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Public Affairs), DOD News Briefing, Brig Gen Leroy Barnidge Jr.,

commander, 509th Bomb Wing, 5 May 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 22

February 2000, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

May1999/t05051999_t0505asd.html. (Bomber Data)

8. Gen Michael E. Ryan, chief of staff, US Air Force, “Serving Above and

Beyond,” address to the Air Force Association National Convention,

Washington, D.C., 14 September 1999, 2; on-line, Internet, 9 January

2000, available from http://www.af.mil/news/speech/current/spch15.

html; and “Whit Peters on the Issues,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 10

(October 1999): n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 January 2000, available from

http://www.afa.org/magazine/1099peters.html.

56
Appendix B

Excerpts from AFDD 2-6.2, Air Refueling

Air Mobility Command’s primary command and control organization, the TACC is the central planning, scheduling,

tasking, and execution agency for all operations involving

AMC forces...

The AMOCC [Air Mobility Operations Control Center] is the

theater air component commander’s command and control

layer for the planning, coordination, tasking, and execution of

theater operations...

...The COMAFFOR/JFACC [Commander Air Force

Forces/Joint Forces Air Component Commander] controls

combat and combat support through the AOC [Aerospace Op -

erations Center] Director and the Strategy, Combat Plans, and

Combat Operation Divisions. The COMAFFOR/JFACC controls air mobility forces (air refueling and airlift) through the

DIRMOBFOR and the Air Mobility Division...

The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the Air Mobility Division (AMD) and is responsible for coordinating all air mobility

functions and for integrating air mobility into the air and

space assessment, planning, and execution process...

In order to achieve unity of effort, the DIRMOBFOR must

coordinate with the AOC director to ensure all air mobility

operations supporting the JFC are fully integrated with the

ATO [Air Tasking Order] cycle and deconflicted with other air

operations...

The Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes the JTF’s [Joint Task Force’s] air mobility mission which

includes air refueling operations...

An ARCT [Air Refueling Control Team] within the AMD is

responsible for planning, tasking, and executing all air refueling missions employing tankers attached to the JTF...

An intratheater air refueling plans section collocated with

the combat plans division develops combat support air refuelings within the ATO production process...

57
When coordination with the JTF is required to conduct in -

tertheater air refueling operations, the AME [Air Mobility Element] in the AMD acts as a forward extension of the TACC to

affect all required coordination within the JTF. 1

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-6.2, Air Refueling, 30–38.

58
Glossary

2-MTW 2-major theater war scenario

ACC Air Combat Command

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command

ALCT Airlift Control Team

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMCT Air Mobility Control Team

AME Air Mobility Element

AMOCC Air Mobility Operations Control Center

ANG Air National Guard

ARC Air Reserve Component (ANG & AFRC)

ARCT Air Refueling Control Team

CAF Combat Air Forces

CAP Combat Air Patrol

CFAC Combined forces air component

commander

CINC commander in chief

CINCSAC commander in chief, Strategic Air

 Command

CJCS chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CTF Combined Task Force

DIRMOBFOR director of Mobility Forces

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

GATM Global Air Traffic Management System

GPS Global Positioning System

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

MTW major theater war

NAF numbered air force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NMS national military strategy

NSS national security strategy

PSRC presidential selected reserve call-up

SAC Strategic Air Command

SASC Senate Armed Services Committee

SEA Southeast Asia

SECDEF secretary of defense

SIOP single integrated operational plan

59
SWA Southwest Asia

TACC tanker airlift control center

TDY temporary duty

UN United Nations

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USCINCSTRAT commander in chief, US Strategic

 Command

USCINCTRANS commander in chief, US Transportation

 Command

USCNS/21 US Commission on National

Security/21st Century

USEUCOM United States European Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

60
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66
Index

Air Force Reserve Command: 36

air refueling: 4–6, 21, 49, 34, 51

air refueling command and control

structure: 45

air refueling missions: 39

air refueling plan: 17

air tasking order: 38

airbridges: 1, 50

Allied Force: 16–17, 19, 22, 34–37

beddown bases: 18

CAMPEX: 34

combat support: 50

Combined Task Force-Combat Air

Forces: 42

Desert Storm: 6

economy of force: 12

force management: 16, 33

force structure: 28–29, 33

Headquarters AMC: 37

integrated operational plan: 11

KC-135: 1, 3–4, 6, 12–13, 15, 21, 24, 28,

33, 37, 40, 45, 50

KC-135 Combat Employment School: 42

KC-135 crews: 29

KC-135 force structure: 25

military strategies: 21

mobility command and control: 40

mobility forces: 44

national security: 21

operational control: 6

Pacer CRAG: 14–15

Papa Bear: 34, 36

Red Flag: 42

strategic enablers: 21

tactical environment: 4

tanker crews: 41

tanker doctrine: 34

tanker employment: 34

tanker force: 40–41

tanker force structure: 16

tanker planners: 42–43

tanker planning: 34, 36–39

tanker requirement: 28, 34–35, 38

tankers: 5, 11–12, 17, 33, 50

time and distance machine: 24

training requirements: 42

United States Commission on National

Security/21st Century: 22

upgrades: 15

USCNS/21: 25

67
The Vital Link

The Tanker’s Role in Winning America’s Wars

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Emily Adams

Copy Editor

Diane Clark

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson