FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT May 23, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN TH E U

NI TE D S TA TE S CO URT OF AP PE AL S FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 07- 1045 3

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00062 CV -JTC -3 JOHNE L E DWARD TA YL OR, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us WARDEN ROSE W ILLIAMS, Res po nd en t-Ap pe ll ee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ (M ay 2 3, 200 8) Befo re TJ OFLAT, AN DERSON an d C OX, Circ ui t J ud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: T he pe tit ion er , Joh ne l E dw ar d T ay lor , is se rv ing se nte nc es in a G eo rg ia28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( a ) p ro vid e s th at: 1 [t]he Sup re me Court , a

Justi c e the re of

, a c ir c uit jud g e , o r a

dis tr ic t c ourt

sh a ll e nte rt a in a

n a pp lic atio n f

or a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s in be ha lf of a pe rs on in c us tod y purs ua nt t o th e jud g me nt o f a

State c ourt

on ly on the g ro un d th at he is i n c us tod y in v iol atio n o f t

he Con sti tut ion

or laws or tr e atie s o f t

he Un ite d St ate s. 28 U.S.C. § 22 44 (d )( 1) state s, in p e rt ine nt p art : 2 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a wr it of habea s corpus by a per son in custody

pursuant to the judg ment of a State c ourt. The limit ation shall run from the latest of – (A) the date on whic h the judg ment beca me final by

the conc lusion of direc t reviewor the e x piration of the time for seekingsuch re view . . . . 2 pr iso n f or m ur de r an d po sse ssi on o f a fi re ar m . O n Ju ly

8, 200 5, he c ha lle nge d th e co nst itu tio na l va lid ity

of his c onvi ct ion s inape tit ionf or aw ri t of ha be as c or pus fi le d w iththe U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt f or the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 22 54. O n O ct obe r 26, 200 6, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e 1 w ri t a s ti m e- barr ed

by the one -y ear statut e of

li m itatio ns c re at ed

by the A nti Terro ris m an d Eff ect iv e Deat h P en al ty A ctof 1 99 6 (“ AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d )( 1) . H e the re af

te r fi le d ati m el y

not ic e of appe al , a nd w e gr an te d hi s 2 ap pli catio n f

or ac er tif ic at e of appe al ab ili ty

( “ CO A ”) a s to one iss ue : w he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

w he n it f ound that the G eo rg iapr oc ed

ur al r ule , w hic h de em s a pe tit ionf or pos t- co nvi ct ionr el ie f fi le d w he n it is re ce ive d and m ar

ke d a s f ile d by the clerk of the petitioned court, governs the date when A ED PA ’ s one-y ear li m it at io ns pe rio d i s t ol le d.3 I. O n D ec em

be r 1, 199 8, aS pa ldi ng C ounty S upe ri or Co urt j ur y f ound T ay lor guilt y of felony m urder and possessio n of a fir earm during th e com

m issio n of a cr im e. T he sup er ior

c ourt the re af

te r se nte nc ed

him to lif e im pr iso nm en t onthe m ur de r ch arg e an d a co ns ecu ti ve fiv e-year ter m forth e fi rear m

po ss es si on off

en se . H is c onvi ct ion s and s en te nc es w er e af fi rm ed by the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt on Jul y 5, 200 0. T ay lor

v. S ta te , 532 S . E . 2d 3 95 ( G a. 200 0) . T ay lor did not m ove the c o u rtf o r ar e h e a r i n g o r

s e e kaw r i to f

c e rt i o r a r i f

r o m th e U n i t e dS t a t e s S up r e me Co urt. A cc or din gly , his c onvi ct ion s be cam e fi na l onO ct obe r 3, 200 0. S ee S up. Ct. R. 13 (“ [A ] petition for a wr it of certiorari to reviewa j udgm ent in any case, civil or crim inal, enter ed by a state c ourt of last resort . . . is tim ely when it is filed w iththe Cl er

k of thi s C ourt w ith in 9 0 day s a ft er e ntr y of j udgm en t. ”) ; B ond v. Moo re , 309 F . 3d 7 70, 774 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( hol din g th at A E D PA ’ s st at

ute of lim itatio ns d oe s no t be ginto run un til the 90- day w ind owf

or se ek ing aw ri t of certiorar i in the Suprem e Court expires. ). On January

17, 2001, Tay lor signed anddeposited a pro se petitio n for a w ri t of ha be as c or pus, dir ec te d to the S upe ri or Co urt of Ch attoo gaCo unty , int o th e pr iso n m ai l sy ste m . T he c le rk of that c ourt f

ile d T ay lor ’ s pe tit ionon F eb ru ar y 2, 2001 . On Augus t 26, 2002, following two evidentiary hearings, the superior courtUnder the fe dera l “mailbox rule,” a pro se fede ral ha beas pe tition i s deeme d to be filed 3 on the date it is delivere d to prison authorities for mailing . Alexander v. Sec ’y , Dep’ t of Corr., No. 06-12501, slip op. at 2 n.4 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2008) . After filing his petition, Taylor reta ined counsel a nd, on Dec ember

21, 2005, counsel filed a n amende d habea s petition. We reviewa district cour t’s deter mination that a § 2254 petition is t ime-bar red unde r 4 AEDPA de novo. Wade v. Battle, 379 F.3d 1254, 1259 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004). 4 de nie d r el ie f. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt de nie d T ay lor ac er tif ic at e of pr oba ble ca use to ap pe al that de ci sio n onO ct obe r 25, 200 4. O n Ju ly 8, 200 5, T ay lor , pr oc ee din g pr o se , sig ne d th e habe as pe tit ionnow before us and presum ably delivered it to the prison authorities for m ailing. It w as rece ived by

the clerk of the United States District C ourt for the N orthern District of G eo rg iaf

our day s late r. W ar de n W ill iam s, the r es pond en t, m ove d th e co urt t o

3 dis m iss the pe tit iona s un tim el y , a rg uin g th at T ay lor f ai le d to f ile it w ith in AE DP A’ s one-y ear lim itations period. A s noted abo ve, the district court dis m iss ed the pe tit iona s ti m e- barr ed on O ct obe r 26, 200 6. II. A. In this case, AE DP A’ s one-y ear lim itations period began to run on Oc tober 3, 200 0, the und isp ute d date that T ay lor ’ s c onvi ct ion s be cam e fi na l. S ee 28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (1 )( A ). T hus, abse nt a tol lin g of the one -y ear lim itatio ns p er iod , T ay lor ha d un til O ct obe r 3, 200 1, to fi le the ins tant p et iti on. 4In addition to the statutory tolling provision, we have re cog nized that equitable tolling 5 is warr anted “ in rare circ umstances.” See Diaz v. Sec’ y for De pt. of Corr., 362 F .3d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 2004). B eca

use Tay lor has not invoked this exception and it is not i ncluded within the COA, we do not a ddress it. See Murr ay v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 ( 11th Cir.1998) (holdingthat “appe llate re view is limit ed to the issues spec ified in the COA”) . This period of 362 da

y s is calculate d by

takingthe number of

day s from Oc tober 3, 6 20 00 , whe n T aylor ’s c onvic tio n b e c ame fi na l, t o Jan ua ry 17 , 2 00 1, wh e n T aylor

signe d h is s tate habea s petition (106 day s), and a dding to them the numbe r of da y s that elapsed be tween O ctober 25, 2004, when the G eorg ia Supreme Court de nied Tay lor’s application for a c ertificate of pr ob a ble c a us e to a pp e a l, a nd July 8, 20 05 , whe n T aylor

de liv e re d h is f

e de ra l ha be a s p e tit ion

to the prison authorities for

filing ( 256 day s). This period of 378 da

y s is calculate d by

takingthe number of

day s from Oc tober 3, 7 2000, when Ta

ylor’s convic tion became final, to Fe bruar y 2, 2001, when the c lerk of the 5 A E D PA ’ s li m itatio ns p er iod is tol le d w hil e “ a pr ope rl y f ile d a ppl ic at ionf

or St at e p os t-c on vi ct io n o r ot he r co ll at eral rev ie w . . . is pe nd in g.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d )( 2) . T ay lor

a rg ue s th at

w e shou ld u se January

17, 200 1, the da te he 5 sig ne d hi s st at e habe as pe tit iona nd d ep osi te d it int o th e pr iso n m ai l sy ste m , a s th e d a t e th a tth e p e t i t i o n w a s p r o p e r l y f i l e df o r t o l l i n g p u r

p o s e s . Wa r d e n Wi l l i a ms responds that February

2, 2001, the date the cle rk of the Superior C ourt filed Tay lo r’s pe ti ti on , is th e ap pr op ria te da te to be gi n t ol li ng th e li m it at io ns pe rio d. T his dis tin ct ionis of

utm ost im portanc e. I f tol lin g be gan onthe da te T ay lor sig ne d hi s pe tit ion , the n on ly 362 day s pa sse d be fo re he f ile d hi s f ed er al pe tit ion . 6 How ever, if tolling b egan on February 2, 2001, when Tay lor’ s state petition wa s fi le d by the c le rk of the S upe ri or

Co urt, the n 37 8 day s e la pse d, a nd the ins tant petition would be tim e-barr ed under AE DP A. O ur decision in th is case, 7S u

p e r i o r C o urtf i l e d h i s s t at e h a

b e a s p e t i t i o n( 1 2 2 d ays ) , an d a d d i n gt o th e mth e numb e r o f d ays that elapse d betwee n October 25, 2004, when the G eorg ia Supreme Court de nied Tay lor’s application for

a ce rtificate of proba

ble ca use to appe al, and July

8, 2005, when Ta

ylor delivere d his feder al habe as petition to the prison authorities for f iling (256 da

y s). In contra st to many

of our c ases a

naly zing the “pr operly

filed” la nguag e, the que stion 8 befor e us today

require s an inquiry

focuse d on when the pr oper f iling occ urre d rathe r than w h e th e r a p r o p e r f i l i n ge v e r o c c ur r e d . F o r a d i s c u s s i o no f

th i s l at t e r an d m o r e c o mp l e x i n qu i r

y, see Siebe rt v. Campbell, 334 F.3d 1018 ( 11th Cir. 2003). Th e un de rs tand a

ble e xplanatio n f

or thi s ju dic ia l si le nc e is t

hat G e or g ia

did no t e sta bli sh 9 a limitations period for the f iling of ha

beas pe titions until 2004. S ee 2004 G a. L aws Ac t 661 (codifie d as ame nded at O.C.G.A . § 9-14-42) . 6 the re fo re , tur

ns o n w he n T ay lor

“pr ope rl y

f ile d” his state ha

be as pe tit ion , the re by tol lin g th e one -y ear lim itatio ns p er iod f or f ili ng h is f ed er al pe tit ion . 8 B. To d et erm in e whe n a st at e h ab eas pe ti ti on ha s b een “pr op erl y fil ed ,” we loo k to the appl ic ab le state lawgov er nin g f ili ngs. S ee A rt

uz v. Be nne tt, 531 U . S. 4, 8, 121 S . Ct . 361 , 364 , 148 L . E d. 2d 2 13 ( 2000 ); W ad e v. Battl e, 379 F. 3d 1 254, 126 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . A t the out se t, it is im portant t o no te that the particular question before us has not b een addressed by the Ge orgia courts. S ee W ad e, 379 F . 3d at 12 58 n . 2 ( “ [W ] e ar e aw ar e of no G eo rg iac ourt a

ppl y ing the m ai lbo x r ule to ini tia l pr o se state ha be as pe tit ion s. ”) . Ala ck of e xpl ic it G eo rg ia 9 precedent on an issue, however , does not absolv e us of our duty “ to decide what th e st at e co ur ts wou ldho ldif fa cedwit h [t he is su e].” Arcene au x v . Texa co , Inc .,In Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e 10 adopted a s binding pre cede nt decisions of the for mer F ifth Circuit handed down pr ior to October 1, 1981. 7 623 F.2d 924 , 926 (5th Cir. 1980 ) (c itations om itted). W e m ust anticipate what 10 the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt w oul d say . S ee E rn ie H ai re F or d, I nc . v. F or d M oto r Co ., 26 0 F .3d12 85 , 12 90 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). InMa ssa lin e v. W ill iam s, 554 S . E . 2d 7 20, 722 -2 3 ( G a. 200 1) , the G eo rg ia Suprem e Court adopted the m ailbox rule when a pro se prisoner seeks to appeal fr om asup er ior

c ourt de ci sio n de ny ing his ha be as c or pus pe tit ion . A dopt ing the re as oni ng o f H oust on v . L ac k, 487 U . S. 266 , 108 S . Ct . 237 9, 101 L . E d. 2d 2 45 (1 988) , the Ma ssa lin e co urt r ec ogni ze d th at am ai lbo x r

ule w as ne ce ssary

be ca use of the “ uni que obs ta cl es ” fa ce d by pr o se pr iso ne rs : U nli ke li tig an ts who are not inc ar ce rate d, pr o se pr iso ne rs c an not m oni tor the pr oc es sin g of

the ir appe llate f

ili ngs to e nsur e that the clerk of the c ourt tim ely

rec eives them . . . . And, of course, being pro se , the y c an not r el y on the ir law y er to en sur e the sa fe a nd t im el y filing of their appeals. P ro se prisoners also m ust entrust th eir legal pa pe rs to the pr iso n of

fi ci al s, e ve n th oughthe w ar de n is ty pic al ly the na m ed de fe ndant i n aha

be as c or pus ac tio n. Massaline, 554 S. E. 2d 72 0 at 552-53 (citing Houston, 487 U.S . at 270-72 , 108 S. Ct. at 2382, 101 L. E d. 2d 245). The r ationale of Massaline applies equally in the case at hand. W e discern no b as is f or dis tin gui shi ng b etw ee n apr o se pr iso ne r fi lin g aha be as pe tit iona nd aThe Ge org ia Supreme Court’s c oncer n for pr o se prisoner s seekinghabea s relief does 11 not ext end to pro se pr isoners see king non ha beas r elief. A s the court state d in Ril ey v. State, 62 6 S. E. 2d

11 6, 11 7 ( Ga . 2 00 6) , “ the ma ilb ox ru le e sta bli sh e d in Ma ssa lin e do e s n ot e xemp t a pro se pr isoner fr om complying w ith the statutory require ments to file a timely notice in any

non ha be a s c ri min a l or

c ivi l f ili ng .” Se e , e .g ., Min g le do rf f v . St ok e ly , 4 77 S.E .2 d 3 74 , 7 75 (G a . Ct . App. 1996) (r ejec ting the ma ilbox rule in the c ontextof a ne g lige nce a ction broug ht by a prisoner pr oc e e din gpr o s e ). Th is d ist inc tio n is g ro un de d in Ge or g ia ’s vig or ou s p ro te c tio n o f “ a pr o s e pr iso ne r’ s a

bil ity to p ur su e his c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o h a be a s c or pu s. ” Ma ssa lin e v. Willi ams, 554 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. 2001) ; see a lso Ga. Const. art. I , § 1, ¶ XV. 8 pr o se pr iso ne r fi lin g aha be as appe al , a nd w e ha ve no r ea son to b el ie ve that the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt w oul d f ind one . “ [A ] dopt ing am ai lbo x r ule f or pr o se prisoners prom otes judicial fa irness and helps assu re that habeas c orpus cases are decided on the m erits and not the ov erly technical application of procedural rules.” Id . a t 72 2. 11 W e the re fo re hol d th at

T ay lor ’ s st at e habe as pe tit ionw as “pr ope rl y f ile d” w he n T ay lor

de posi te d it

int o hi s pr iso n’ s m ai l sy ste m on J anuary

17, 200 1. T his w as thr ee day s pr ior

to the e xpi ratio n of

A E D PA ’ s on e- y ear lim itatio ns p er iod a nd thu s w as ti m el y . T he j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s a cc or din gly va cate d, a nd the cas e is rem an de d fo r fu rth er p ro ceed in gs . VACATED andREMANDED.9

CO X , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng: My gue ss i s th at

the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt w oul d de ci de thi s c as e the sa m e w ay tod ay ’ s c ourt de ci de s it . T he r es ult is ce rt ai nly

e qui ta ble . Ade ci sio n to certify a question of state law to the suprem e court of that state is a discre tionary one, E sc are no v . No lti na C

ruc ibl e & R ef

rac tor y Co rp. , 139 F . 3d 1 456, 146 1 ( 11th Cir. 1998 ), but in my

view a proper exerc ise of our discretion in th is case re quires ce rt if ic at ion . A lon g th e w ay

to re ac hin g th e re sul t the c ourt r ea ch es tod ay it ove rr ule s sub sil en tio som e G eo rg iapr ec ed en t and d ec ide s an im portant que sti on of Geor gi a la w. T oday ’ s de ci sio n f

ind s li ttl e supp ort i n G eo rg iapr ec ed en t. G eo rg ia ’ s C ivi l Pr ac tic e A ct

( “ CP A ”) , G a. Co de A nn. §§ 9 -1 1- 1 to - 133, “ ap pli es in habe as c or pus proceedings with regard to question s of pleading and p ractice .” R olland v. M art in , 637 S. E . 2d 2 3, 24 ( G a. 200 6) ( quot ing Sta te v . J aram illo , 620 S . E . 2d 7 98, 800 (G a. 200 5) . U nde r the CP A , “ [a ] c ivi l a ct ionis co m m en ce d by

f ili ng a c om pla int w iththe c ourt. ” G a. Co de A nn. § 9- 11- 3( a) . T hus in G eo rg ia , ape tit ionf or aw ri t of ha be as c or pus is “pr ope rl y

f ile d” w iththe c ourt. G eo rg iaha s no t l ibe ra lly int er pr et ed the phr as e “ w iththe c ourt. ” “ Whil e som e fe de ra l c ourts a llo wpr o se inm at es to fi le c er

ta in c ivi l pl ea din gs w iththe j ai le r, suc h ar ule doe s no t pr ev ai l i n G eo rg ia . ‘ A c ivi l a ct ionis co m m en ce d by

f ili ng a c om pla int w iththe c ourt. ’ A nd10

fil in g ‘wit h t he co ur t’ do es no t m ean de po si ti ng th e co m pl ai nt in th e m ai l.” M ing le dorf f v . Sto ke ly , 477 S . E . 2d 3 74, 375 ( G a. Ct . App. 199 6) ( ci ta tio ns om itt ed ). N oth ing in Mas sa li ne v. W il li ams , 554 S . E . 2d 7 20 ( G a. 200 1) , or in an y o t h e r Ge o r g i ad e c i s i o n , o v e rr

u l e s p r e c e d e n tt h a tac i v i l a c t i o n i s c o mm e n c e db y a proper filing “ with the court.” T he ha be as appe al s st at

ute a t i ssu e in M

ass ali ne , G a. Co de A nn. § 9- 14- 52( b) , inc lud es asim ilar re qui re m en t, that ha be as appe al s m

ust be f ile d “ w iththe clerk. ” O ver a vigorous dis sent, the suprem e court held, c onsis tent with other Ge orgia statutes inclu ding a “ with the cler k” requirem ent, that a prisoner’ s notice of appeal and certificate of pr obable cause to appeal denial of habeas relief are de em ed f ile d “ on the da te [ the pr iso ne r] de liv er s th em to pr iso n auth or iti es f

or forw arding to the clerks of this Court and th e superior court . . . . ” 554 S.E .2d at 7 2 2 - 2 3 . B u t , Ge o r g i ac o u rt s h a v e n o tye te x p a n d e dt h i s n a rr o wa n dju d i c i a l l ycrea te d e xc ep ti on , whi ch , bef or e to da y , app li edon ly to h ab eas ap pe al s. In R ile y v. Sta te , 626 S. E. 2d 11 6 (Ga . 2006), the G eorgia Suprem e Court sa id , “ M ass ali ne . . . by

it s e xpl ic it te rm s a

ppl ie s on ly

in the narr owc ont ex t of habeas corpus appeals to perm it a pro se prisoner’ s notice of appeal to be deem ed filed on the date delivered to prison authorities.” Id . a t 11 7. A lth oughthe iss ue before the Riley court wa s not whether the m ailbox rule appli ed to initi al habeas11

fi lin gs, the c ourt tw ic e ex pli ci tly li m ite d M

ass ali ne ’s app li cat io n t o “ ap pe al s.” A lso , in M

cC ros ke y v. Sta te , - -- S. E . 2d- -- , N o. 07- 2173 , 200 8 W L 518 219 (G a. Ct . App. F eb . 28, 200 8) , the G eo rg iaCo urt of Appe al s r ef

use d to e xte nd M

ass ali ne to a pro se pr iso ne r’ s no tic e of dir ec t a ppe al . T w o f ed er al dis tr ic t c ourts i n G eo rg ia , the N orthe rna nd M idd le D istri ct s, ha ve r el ie d on Rileyin hol din g, in unpu bli she d op ini ons, that the m ai lbo x r ule do es no t ap pl y

to in it ia l h ab eas fil in gs . See Phillip s v. Brown , N o. 07- 0160 1, 200 8 W L 140 712, *3 n . 2 (N . D . G a. Jan. 11, 200 8) ( ci tin g Riley ) (“ [I ] t a ppe ar s th at , unde r G eo rg ialaw , thi s [ pr iso n m ai lbo x] r ule doe s no t a

ppl y to the or igi na l f

ili ng of astate ha be as pe tit ion . ”) ; G re en v . Ne lso n , N o. 06- 0012 0, 200 7 W L 246 0770 , *3 ( M. D . G a. A ug. 24, 200 7) ( ci tin g Riley ) (“ T he G eo rg iaMa ilb ox r ule doe s no t apply to the filing of the origin al state habeas petition, only to the appl ic ati on f

or ce rti fic ate of prob abl e ca use to appe al a nd t he not ic e of a

ppe al of the state habeas petition .” ). I w oul d c er

tif y the que sti on t o th e G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt.