COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00445-CV

LEONARD HORNSBY AND SUE ALLEN APPELLANTS

V.

TARRANT COUNTY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT

APPELLEE

----------

FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

I. Introduction

In three issues, Appellant Leonard Hornsby appeals the trial court‘s 

summary judgment for Appellee Tarrant County College District (TCCD) and its 

order disqualifying his attorney, Appellant Sue Allen. In two issues, Allen 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

appeals her disqualification. We affirm the trial court‘s judgment as to Hornsby 

and we dismiss Allen‘s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Hornsby was already employed by TCCD as an academic advisor when 

TCCD advertised in 2004 for two counselor positions for its counseling center.2 

Hornsby applied for both positions, and TCCD‘s screening committee placed him 

on the list of four candidates that it recommended to Dr. Earnest Thomas, the 

south campus president. Dr. Lonzetta Smith-Allen, Hornsby‘s supervisor, also 

recommended him for the job. TCCD hired no one and re-advertised the 

openings in 2005. The revised job postings stated that bilingual ability was

―highly desired.‖

Hornsby applied again in 2005. The screening committee again 

recommended Hornsby, this time to Dean Juan Garcia, who had been placed in 

charge of the counseling center. On December 9, 2005, Garcia sent an email to 

Smith-Allen requesting the resumes of six specific candidates, all of whom had

Hispanic surnames. After Smith-Allen complied, Garcia sent Thomas an email 

indicating that three of the six candidates were scheduled for an interview, but 

TCCD again hired no one. Garcia sent a letter to Hornsby on May 31, 2006,

indicating that the positions would be reposted to attract more applicants and that 

Hornsby should reapply if he was still interested.

 

2

The parties dispute whether the 2004 advertisements indicated that 

bilingual ability was a desired skill for the positions.
3

The 2006 posting again included the statement that bilingual ability was

―highly desired,‖ and it had a closing date of July 8, 2006. Hornsby reapplied and 

was among five candidates recommended by the screening committee. Three 

candidates, including Hornsby, were not bilingual; the remaining two candidates 

were bilingual but had no counseling degree. The posting required a master‘s 

degree in counseling or a related field and three years‘ experience in counseling. 

Hornsby had a master‘s degree in counseling. On June 4, 2007, TCCD hired a

bilingual candidate who did not have a counseling degree but had more 

academic advising experience than Hornsby, had a master‘s degree in Higher 

Education Administration and a minor in counseling, and had a certificate of 

completion in psychology.

Hornsby sued pro se on June 26, 2007, alleging race discrimination.

3

In 

March 2008, TCCD hired Hornsby for the remaining counselor position.

Allen first appeared on Hornsby‘s behalf in his first amended petition on 

October 10, 2007. Representing Hornsby, Allen asked Angela Robinson, 

TCCD‘s attorney, when she might be able to take screening committee member 

Steve Rakoff‘s deposition; in response, Robinson told Allen that Rakoff was one 

of her clients and agreed to make him available. Allen then called Rakoff directly 

to find out what he knew about the case. Allen also told Rakoff she was 

deposing him because of his screening committee knowledge, and she advised 

 

3Hornsby subsequently added claims for age discrimination, but he does 

not appeal the trial court‘s summary judgment on those claims.
4

him of a potential retaliation claim by TCCD against him. Allen also spoke to two 

other screening committee members, Freddie Sandifer and Sandra Johnson,

multiple times during the pendency of this suit and advised them on their own

lawsuits against TCCD before she was hired by Hornsby.

Approximately one year after Hornsby hired Allen, TCCD learned that Allen 

had contacted TCCD‘s employees and filed a motion to disqualify Allen under 

rule 4.02 of the disciplinary rules of professional conduct. Allen asked for, and 

the trial court granted, time for her to retain counsel before the hearing on 

TCCD‘s motion.

Before the hearing on TCCD‘s motion, the trial court informed the parties 

that it wanted to address alternative sanctions at the hearing, including striking 

Rakoff, Sandifer, and Johnson as witnesses instead of disqualifying Allen. At the 

hearing, TCCD argued that during trial it might be ―[b]oxed into . . . having to call 

those witnesses,‖ so their exclusion would possibly harm TCCD more than

Hornsby because the jury would wonder ―[w]hy aren‘t we hearing from these 

witnesses for [TCCD]?‖ TCCD also argued that it would need those witnesses to 

rebut Smith-Allen‘s testimony that the screening committee told her that Hornsby 

was the top candidate and Hornsby‘s theory that TCCD ―changed its procedure 

in the way it hired counselors.‖ The trial court ultimately ordered Allen 

disqualified.

The trial court made the following findings of fact as to the disqualification:
5

18. Attorney Sue Allen admits that she communicated with the 

Current [TCCD] Employees and Ms. Smith-Allen concerning the 

Hornsby Lawsuit.

19. Attorney Sue Allen further admits that Mr. Rakoff, Ms. Johnson 

and Mr. Sandifer are current employees of [TCCD] and were 

employees at the time of the communication.

20. Attorney Sue Allen admits that [s]he spoke with the Current 

[TCCD] Employees outside of the presence of counsel for [TCCD]

and without the consent of [TCCD]‘s Counsel.

21. At the time of her communications with the Current [TCCD]

Employees, Attorney Sue Allen was representing Leonard Hornsby.

22. At the time of her communications with the Current [TCCD]

Employees, Attorney Sue Allen communicated with those employees 

about the subject matter of the Hornsby Lawsuit.

23. At the time of her communications with the Current [TCCD]

Employees, Attorney Sue Allen was not authorized by law to do so.

. . . .

25. [TCCD]‘s counsel had not been notified of any meeting between 

[Mr. Sandifer, Ms. Johnson,] and Attorney Sue Allen relating to the 

Hornsby Lawsuit.

. . . .

28. The billing records submitted by Attorney Sue Allen on the 

Hornsby Lawsuit show a conference with Mr. Sandifer on August 13, 

2008, two days prior to his deposition and which lasted one half 

hour.

29. Attorney Sue Allen spoke with both Ms. Johnson and Mr. 

Sandifer after their depositions.

. . . .

32. At his deposition, Mr. Rakoff stated under oath that Attorney 

Sue Allen had called him at his office at [TCCD]‘s South Campus 

and he had a conversation with her concerning the Hornsby Lawsuit.
6

33. During the ex parte communication with Mr. Rakoff, Attorney 

Sue Allen discussed the issue of retaliation as it related to Mr. 

Rakoff‘s testimony in the Hornsby Lawsuit.

. . . .

38. On September 16, 2010 [TCCD]‘s Motion for Sanctions and to 

Disqualify Counsel was heard.

39. At the Motion hearing [TCCD] presented Mr. Sandifer, Ms. 

Johnson, Mr. Rakoff and Attorney Sue Allen as witnesses.

40. The demeanor of the Current [TCCD] Employees was guarded, 

intimidated and they demonstrated selective memories.

41. Attorney Sue Allen‘s influence over the Current [TCCD]

Employees was evident during their testimony in their words, 

recollection and demeanor.

42. In response to an inquiry to Mr. Sandifer as to why he called Ms. 

Allen after his deposition rather than [TCCD]‘s attorney, Mr. Sandifer 

responded ―Because she [pointing to Attorney Sue Allen] is my 

attorney.‖

43. As members of the search or screening committee involved in 

the screening of candidates for the counseling position, Mr. Rakoff, 

Mr. Sandifer and Ms. Johnson are persons whose conduct is part of 

the subject of the Hornsby Lawsuit.

. . . .

46. In support of Hornsby‘s Opposition to Summary Judgment the 

testimony of Mr. Rakoff and Mr. Sandifer was offered by the Plaintiff 

to support Mr. Hornsby‘s assertion that these witnesses were acting 

on behalf of [TCCD] as members of the screening committee and 

they found Mr. Hornsby more qualified for the position sought than 

the candidate which was selected.

. . . .
7

48. This evidence [finding of fact #46] contradicts Ms. Allen‘s 

September 16, 2010 representations that the testimony of the 

Current [TCCD] Employees has no bearing on the Hornsby Lawsuit.

. . . .

51. Attorney Sue Allen engaged in conduct prohibited by the Texas 

Rules of Disciplinary Conduct 4.02 when she improperly contacted 

the Current [TCCD] Employees.

52. As members of the search committee, the Current [TCCD]

Employees are persons whose acts or omissions may make [TCCD]

vicariously liable for the matter at issue.

53. Attorney Sue Allen, in order to avoid the appearance of 

impropriety, should have avoided contact with the Current [TCCD]

Employees outside the presence of [TCCD]‘s counsel.

54. Attorney Sue Allen‘s continued representation of the Plaintiff in 

this case would result in irreparable prejudice to [TCCD]‘s ability to 

defend.

55. Disqualifying Attorney Sue Allen from this case and abating the 

trial for thirty days will not cause a rendition of an improper judgment 

or prevent Mr. Hornsby from properly presenting his case to this 

Court.

56. Disqualifying Attorney Sue Allen is the least sanction which can 

be imposed while still balancing the rights of [TCCD] to not be 

prejudiced.

57. Unethical conduct has occurred, is admitted by Attorney Sue 

Allen and the proper measure to be taken by this Court is 

disqualification.

In its conclusions of law, the trial court stated:

1. Texas Rule of Disciplinary Conduct 4.02 specifically prohibits an 

attorney from contacting a party the attorney knows to be 

represented by counsel.

. . . .
8

2. [TCCD] is a governmental entity. In the case of an organization 

of [sic] entity of government, Texas Rule 4.02 of Disciplinary 

Conduct prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party 

concerning subject of the representation with persons having a 

managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization that relates to 

the subject of the representation and with those persons presently 

employed by such organization or entity whose act or omission may 

make [the] organization or entity vicariously liable for the matter at 

issue. The rule is based on the presumption that such persons are 

[so] closely identified with the interests of the entity of government 

that [its lawyers] will represent them as well. 

3.

. . . .

During the discovery process, Attorney Sue Allen improperly 

contacted the Current [TCCD] Employees who participated on the 

search committee. The appropriate sanction for this improper party 

contact is disqualification of Attorney Sue Allen from the Hornsby 

Lawsuit.

4.

. . . .

Attorney Sue Allen, in order to avoid the appearance of 

impropriety, should have avoided any form of contact with the 

Current [TCCD] Employees outside of the presence of [TCCD]‘s 

Counsel. [Because she] failed to do so, [TCCD] was unfairly 

prejudiced to a greater extent than Mr. Hornsby will be in retaining 

new counsel.

5.

. . . .

. . . Attorney Sue Allen admits to having conferred with Mr. 

Rakoff, Mr. Sandifer and Ms. Johnson about the Hornsby Lawsuit 

without the knowledge of [TCCD]‘s counsel. This conduct was 

inappropriate and establishes that a specific identifiable impropriety 

did occur. . . . [TCCD] has shown that the likelihood of public 

suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interest which would be 

served by Attorney Sue Allen‘s continued participation in the 

Hornsby Lawsuit.
9

The Court has balanced the limited, but substantial right of Mr. 

Hornsby to select counsel against the conduct of Attorney Sue Allen. 

Attorney Sue Allen‘s continued representation of the plaintiff in 

this case would result in ―irreparable prejudice‖ to [TCCD]‘s ability to 

defend.

6. Public policy concerns are readily apparent given the multiple 

conversations Attorney Sue Allen had with the Current [TCCD]

Employees regarding the subject matter of Mr. Hornsby‘s claim. In 

such a case, the law is clear that a court is obligated to take 

measures against such conduct occurring in connection with any 

proceeding before it. [Citation omitted.]

7. Discussion of a retaliation claim necessarily involves discussion 

of the underlying lawsuit because the two are inextricably linked. 

This is sufficient to support a disqualification of counsel. [Citation 

omitted.]

8.

. . . .

The sanction of disqualifying Attorney Sue Allen is the least 

sanction which can be imposed while still balancing the rights of 

[TCCD] to not be prejudiced by Attorney Sue Allen‘s 

communications with Steve Rakoff, Freddie Sandifer and Sandra 

Johnson.

Following Allen‘s disqualification, Hornsby and Allen petitioned this court 

for a writ of mandamus, which we denied. See In re Hornsby, No. 02-10-00482-

CV, 2011 WL 582663, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2011, orig. 

proceeding) (mem. op.). No attorney appeared for Hornsby thereafter in the trial 

court, even though the trial court gave him time to find new counsel, and he did 

not attend the summary judgment hearing that was postponed and reset after his 

attorney was removed from the case.
10

TCCD filed a second motion for summary judgment on Hornsby‘s claims

and its affirmative defenses, and the trial court granted the motion. This appeal 

followed.

III. Summary Judgment 

In his first issue, Hornsby asserts that the trial court erred by granting 

summary judgment because record shows the existence of genuine issues of 

material fact as to whether Hornsby was rejected or denied the positions in 

question, whether Hornsby was qualified for the positions, whether TCCD had 

nondiscriminatory reasons for the hiring delay, and whether TCCD had proved a 

business necessity for its actions.

We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 

315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). When, as here, the trial court‘s judgment 

rests upon more than one independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party 

must assign error to each ground, or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground 

to which no complaint is made. Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).

In its second motion for summary judgment, TCCD raised five grounds. Its

third ground was that Hornsby failed to complete the necessary administrative 

prerequisites to sue under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act 

(TCHRA), including filing a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission–

Civil Rights Division within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 

Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Villanueva, 331 S.W.3d 125, 129–30 n.3, 134 (Tex. 
11

App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (noting that failure to file a complaint and 

pursue administrative remedies within the 180-day window for filing a 

discrimination claim under the TCHRA creates a jurisdictional bar). Because 

Hornsby does not challenge this ground on appeal, we overrule his first issue. 

See Scott, 890 S.W.2d at 948.

IV. Disqualification

In his second issue, Hornsby asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion by disqualifying his attorney and that the trial court‘s findings in support

of the disqualification were arbitrary and unreasonable.

A. Standard of Review

We review the disqualification of an attorney for an abuse of discretion. 

See Allen v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 315, 327 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Syntek Fin. 

Corp., 881 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1994)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it

acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, that is, if the act is 

arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire 

v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).

B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Challenged by Hornsby

In an abuse of discretion review, findings of fact and conclusions of law 

explain the trial court‘s ruling and aid us in reviewing the propriety of the ruling.4 

 

4

Findings of fact, although not required, can properly be considered by the 

appellate court in an appeal from any judgment based in any part on an 
12

See In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 761 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). 

Conclusions of law may not be challenged for factual sufficiency, but they may be 

reviewed to determine their correctness based upon the facts. BMC Software 

Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). If the reviewing 

court determines that a conclusion of law is erroneous but the trial court rendered 

the proper judgment, the erroneous conclusion of law does not require reversal. 

Id.; H.E.B., L.L.C. v. Ardinger, 369 S.W.3d 496, 513 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2012, no pet.).

On appeal, Hornsby challenges findings of fact numbers fifty-four and fiftysix and the italicized portion of conclusion of law number five:

54. Attorney Sue Allen‘s continued representation of the Plaintiff in 

this case would result in irreparable prejudice to [TCCD]‘s ability to 

defend.

56. Disqualifying Attorney Sue Allen is the least sanction which can 

be imposed while still balancing the rights of [TCCD] to not be 

prejudiced.

5.

. . . .

 

evidentiary hearing. See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 

443 (Tex. 1997); see also Int’l Union v. General Motors Corp., 104 S.W.3d 126, 

128–29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that findings of fact and 

conclusions of law are appropriate following an evidentiary hearing if the trial 

court is called upon to determine questions of fact based on conflicting evidence, 

but not when the trial court rules without determining questions of fact); 

Samuelson v. United Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 79 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding that when the abuse of discretion standard of 

review applies to a trial court‘s ruling, findings of fact and conclusions of law, 

while helpful, are not required).
13

. . . Attorney Sue Allen admits to having conferred with Mr. 

Rakoff, Mr. Sandifer and Ms. Johnson about the Hornsby Lawsuit 

without the knowledge of [TCCD]‘s counsel. This conduct was 

inappropriate and establishes that a specific identifiable impropriety 

did occur. . . . [TCCD] has shown that the likelihood of public 

suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interest which would be 

served by Attorney Sue Allen’s continued participation in the 

Hornsby Lawsuit. 

The Court has balanced the limited, but substantial right of Mr. 

Hornsby to select counsel against the conduct of Attorney Sue Allen. 

Attorney Sue Allen‘s continued representation of the plaintiff in 

this case would result in ―irreparable prejudice‖ to [TCCD]‘s ability to 

defend. [Emphasis added.]

C. Analysis

Rule 4.02 of the disciplinary rules of professional conduct states in part:

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause 

or encourage another to communicate about the subject of the 

representation with a person, organization or entity of government 

the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer regarding that 

subject, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 

authorized by law to do so.

. . . .

(c) For the purpose of this rule, organization or entity of government 

includes: 

(1) those persons presently having a managerial responsibility 

with an organization or entity of government that relates to the 

subject of the representation, or 

(2) those persons presently employed by such organization or 

entity and whose act or omission in connection with the 

subject of representation may make the organization or entity 

of government vicariously liable for such act or omission. 

Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof‘l Conduct R. 4.02, reprinted in Tex. Gov‘t Code Ann., 

tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 10, § 9 (West 2013). Comment four to this rule states,
14

This Rule is based on the presumption that [persons presently 

employed by the entity in question] are so closely identified with the 

interests of the organization or entity of government that its lawyers 

will represent them as well. If, however, such an agent or employee 

is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel that 

presumption is inapplicable. In such cases, the consent by that 

counsel to communicate will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule.

Id. cmt. 4.

A trial court can abuse its discretion by not disqualifying an attorney who 

violates the disciplinary rules of professional conduct. See In re Basco, 221 

S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2007). However, it is not necessary for an attorney to 

violate a disciplinary rule in order to be properly disqualified. In re Nitla S.A. de 

C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002). Even if a lawyer violates a disciplinary 

rule, the movant must show that it was actually prejudiced by the lawyer‘s 

conduct. Id.

When an attorney‘s conduct gives the strong appearance of impropriety, 

casting doubt upon the integrity of the legal profession, the court should act to 

guard that integrity. See, e.g., Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 

123, 129, 131–32 (Tex. 1996). The appearance of impropriety requires a

specifically identifiable occurrence of improper conduct and the ―likelihood of 

public suspicion or obloquy outweigh[ing] the social interest in obtaining counsel 

of one‘s choice.‖ Ussery v. Gray, 804 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1991, no writ).

The choice of sanctions, including disqualification, is within the trial court‘s 

discretion, subject to the requirement that the sanction be ― ̳just.‘‖ Richmond 
15

Condos. v. Skipworth Commercial Plumbing, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 646, 661 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh‘g) (quoting TransAm. Natural

Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991) (orig. proceeding)).

Here, the record reflects that Allen was told that Rakoff was represented 

by TCCD‘s counsel before she contacted him. Further, Rakoff, Sandifer, and 

Johnson were decision makers in the counselor selection process, and they 

eliminated over eighty applicants for the positions in question. Indeed, Hornsby 

relied on the screening committee‘s recommendations to support his 

discrimination claim. Thus, Allen was prohibited by rule 4.02 from contacting 

them but nonetheless proceeded to do so. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof‘l 

Conduct R. 4.02(c)(2). By the time that Allen took Hornsby‘s case, she had

talked to Johnson and Sandifer over thirty times, and she continued to 

communicate with them during the pendency of this suit. She had also advised

them on their own suits against TCCD before she was hired by Hornsby.

In its unchallenged findings of fact, the trial court found that Allen‘s 

influence over Rakoff, Sandifer, and Johnson was apparent by their ―words, 

recollection and demeanor‖ during their testimony at the hearing on TCCD‘s 

motion to disqualify Allen, and the record of the hearing supports this finding. 

Thus, TCCD demonstrated that it was prejudiced by Allen‘s prohibited contact 

with Rakoff, Sandifer, and Johnson. See Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422.

Additionally, the trial court asked for and received argument on lesser 

sanctions at the hearing. Robinson argued that Allen‘s disqualification was the 
16

only way the trial court could preserve TCCD‘s ability to call Rakoff, Sandifer, and 

Johnson as witnesses without Allen‘s influence. Thus, the record supports the 

trial court‘s finding that Allen‘s disqualification was the least sanction available. 

See Richmond Condos., 245 S.W.3d at 661. The trial court also found that to 

avoid the appearance of impropriety, Allen should have avoided contact with 

TCCD‘s current employees outside the presence of TCCD‘s attorney. By

representing screening committee members, engaging in ex parte 

communications with them, and advising them on retaliation ramifications while 

suing their employer over an issue in which they had played a role, Allen created

the appearance of impropriety and created public suspicion or obloquy such that 

her disqualification was required. See Ussery, 804 S.W.2d at 237. Thus, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying Allen for her 

contacts with TCCD‘s employees. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614. We overrule 

Hornsby‘s second issue.

V. Waiver

In his third issue, Hornsby claims that TCCD waived the right to raise

Allen‘s disqualification by waiting an unreasonable time before presenting the 

issue for decision. However, Hornsby points us to no place in the record where 

he or Allen complained to the trial court that TCCD had waived its right to move 

for Allen‘s disqualification. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see also Euler v. Marks, 

No. 09-09-00344-CV, 2011 WL 378972, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 3, 

2011, pet. dism‘d w.o.j.) (holding that affirmative defenses and avoidance claims 
17

must be pleaded to the trial court to preserve them for appellate review). 

Therefore, we overrule Hornby‘s third issue.

VI. Allen’s Appeal

In two issues, Allen attempts to appeal her disqualification by the trial 

court, alleging that the trial court‘s finding that she violated rule 4.02 by 

communicating with TCCD‘s employees was arbitrary and unreasonable and that 

her disqualification was arbitrary absent proof of an ethical violation that harmed 

TCCD. However, because Allen was not a party named of record in the trial 

court, she has no standing to bring this appeal. See In re J.M.R., No. 02-07-013-

CV, 2007 WL 1502103, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2007, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Consequently, we dismiss Allen‘s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

VII. Conclusion

Having overruled Hornby‘s three issues, we affirm the trial court‘s

judgment. Because Allen has no standing to appeal her disqualification, we 

dismiss her appeal for want of jurisdiction.

BOB MCCOY

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED: May 16, 2013