USMC

US Marine Corps

PCN 143 000081 00

MCWP 3-34.1

Military Police Operations

USMC

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, 

both men and women are included.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

9 September 2010

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1, Military Police Operations,

provides the doctrinal basis for employment of military police (MP) in support of

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. This publication addresses MP

tasks, functions, objectives, and capabilities occurring in peace, crisis, and war. It also

describes how military police serve as a MAGTF force-multiplier by interacting and

supporting tactical-level expeditionary activities.

This publication is designed for commanders and staff planners who are responsible for the

conduct of activities in support of expeditionary operations and operations other than war.

It provides information to facilitate planning and execution of MP operations regarding

support of mission assurance, limited detainee operations, law and order operations, MP

planning and training, and corrections. It also identifies logistic requirements, physical

security, customs, and military working dog employment.

This revision supersedes MCWP 3-34.1 dated 13 October 2000.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

GEORGE J. FLYNN

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000081 00

DISTRIBUTION A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ A-1 

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Overview

MP Support to Mission Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Military Working Dog Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Limited Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Planning and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

United States Customs and Border Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Chapter 2. Military Police Personnel

MEF or MAGTF Provost Marshal or Provost Sergeant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

MP Major Subordinate Command Staff Officer and/or SNCO . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

MEF MP Support Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Major Subordinate Command MP Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

CID Chain of Command and Investigations Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Investigations Officer (MOS 5805) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Criminal Investigators (MOS 5821) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Corrections Officer (MOS 5804) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

MEU or Special Purpose MAGTF Mission Assurance Officer

and MP Detachment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-4

Corrections Officer or Specialist (MOS 5804 or 5831) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Detention Operations Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Detention Legal Advisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Detention Facility and RDF Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Chapter 3. Mission Assurance

Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Antiterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Chapter 4. Law and Order Operations

Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Law and Order Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Host Nation Law and Order Operations Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
iv ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Chapter 5. Military Working Dog Operations

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Types of Military Working Dogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Supported Unit Questions for the MWD Handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Veterinary Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Medical Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Field Kennels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Chapter 6. Limited Detainee Operations

The Geneva Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Personnel Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Civilian Internee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

Detainee Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

Detainee Reporting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13

Internment Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14

Detainee Identification Band and Identification Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15

Chapter 7. Planning and Training

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Training of In-Lieu-of-Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Military Police and Law Enforcement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Training for Units Deploying to Conduct Detention Operations . . . . . . . . . . 7-5

Personnel Deploying to Conduct Detention Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6

Appendices

A Customs and Border Clearance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B Sample Military Police Support Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C Physical Security and Crime Prevention Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications
CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

Military police (MP) support Marine air-ground

task force (MAGTF) operations during peace,

conflict, and war. As described in the National

Defense Strategy (June 2008) and The Long War:

Send in the Marines, there is an unparalleled need

for police skills worldwide as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal technology advancements

increase. Military police identify and help reduce

these threats at all levels of conflict across the

range of military operations (see fig. 1-1) and provide support within assigned areas through performance of their mission and support capabilities.

The Marine Corps’ military police have the capability to function across the range of military

operations. Not all police forces of the other Services and other nations can replicate this functional capability and utility. Since there is an

abundance of multinational, interagency, and joint

security services, the early involvement of MP

leaders and staffs in the operations planning process is essential. Early involvement ensures the

proper development of security responsibilities,

communications, connectivity, liaisons, processes, and rules of interaction among all forces.

The ultimate goal is the phased employment of

MP forces to support the commander’s operation

plan. Military police assets are limited; therefore,

they are not able to perform all functions simultaneously. Specific functions are performed at specified times as determined by the supported

commander’s priorities, the intensity of the conflict, the phase of the operation, and the availability of MP resources. The MAGTF commander,

upon advice from the senior MP commander or

provost marshal (PM), establishes priorities and

courses of action (COAs) for MP support.

Military police possess specialized training and

skills (i.e., law enforcement, accident and criminal

investigations, use of force and continuum of

force expertise, military working dog [MWD]

employment, customs support) that differentiate

them from other forces, increase their utility to the

commander, and typically possess organic transport at the lowest level of employment to perform

their mission. Mobility, weapons systems, and

training enable military police to react quickly to

changing situations and changes in priorities or

conditions during operations, resulting in problem resolution and potential return to normality

for the populace.

To meet Marine Corps and joint responsibilities,

military police provide support within assigned

areas through performance of their mission and

support capabilities in support of the operational

commander. The areas of support include mission

assurance, law and order operations (LOO), MWD

operations, limited detainee operations (LDO),

planning and training, and US customs and border

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency

Operations

Major Operations and

Campaigns

Military Engagement, Security

Cooperation, and Deterrence

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations.
1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

operations. Military police also perform specialized functions within these areas, including accident investigations, criminal investigations (e.g.,

tactical site exploitation, evidence collection and

processing, interrogations, protective services

operations [PSO]), physical security, forensics,

and biometrics. In addition, military police

enhance interoperability through liaison and coordination with interagency law enforcement organizations, joint, multinational, host nation (HN), and

nongovernmental organizations.

MP Support to Mission Assurance

Military police capabilities contribute to the support of mission assurance. The ever-changing

enemy and environmental situation requires military police to advise the commander of the probable impact a COA has with respect to mission

assurance. Military police conduct vulnerability

assessments to identify command areas that are

vulnerable to terrorist attack. These assessments

and the criminal and tactical information gathered

by military police, criminal investigation division (CID), and the Naval Criminal Investigative

Service (NCIS) assist in the development of unit

plans that are dedicated to safeguarding property

and personnel. Military police also provide PSO

for key government leaders, flag officers, and

civilian dignitaries. They also function as a training cadre that assists in providing the required

antiterrorism training.

Law and Order Operations

Military police LOO are conducted to maintain

and extend the commander’s discipline and control by providing a lawful and orderly environment in which to operate. During LOO, military

police establish liaison with HN police and conduct joint patrols with HN or multinational forces

to maintain order and conduct security operations,

thereby enhancing interoperability. The level and

type of operation determines the requirement for

additional MP support. The level and type of

operation determines the requirements for LOO

support. Law and order operations include measures that are necessary to conduct—

z Law enforcement operations.

z Criminal investigations, site exploitation, evidence collection, interrogations, and protective

services.

z US customs support operations.

z Joint, interagency, multinational, and HN police

operations and training.

z Police intelligence operations.

Law Enforcement Operations

An evolving criminal threat may have an adverse

effect on military operations and require commanders to take actions that will reduce the negative impact on forces, resources, and operations.

As part of this effort, military police—

z Enforce laws and appropriate directives of the

commander.

z Provide crime prevention and physical security.

z Conduct traffic accident investigations and law

enforcement patrolling.

Military police also enforce the MAGTF commander’s main supply route (MSR) regulations

and traffic circulation plans to keep MSRs free

for priority military movement. Military police

maintain liaison and coordinate with other

Department of Defense (DOD) police organizations, HN military and civilian authorities, and

multinational police organizations. A coordinated

law enforcement effort removes the conditions

and opportunities that promote crime, thereby

maintaining military discipline and preventing

diversion of military resources.
Military Police Operations_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3 

Criminal Investigations,

Site Exploitation, Evidence Collection, 

Interrogations, and Protective Services

Marine expeditionary force (MEF) MP support

companies provide CID support to the MEF and

MAGTF. Offenses committed against US forces

and properties degrade military discipline,

morale, and operational capabilities. These

crimes and offenses must be investigated to support the commander’s responsibility to protect

personnel, supplies, facilities, readiness, and

operational capabilities. Military police and/or

CID will conduct criminal investigations, site

exploitations, evidence collection, interrogations,

and protective services. Depending upon the type

and seriousness of the offense under investigation, military police investigators (MPIs)-, CID-,

or NCIS-led investigations may be conducted in

coordination with other DOD and HN investigative agencies.

Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and

Host Nation Police Operations/Training

Military police LOO may involve operations,

training, and liaison with joint, interagency,

multinational, and HN military or civilian

police, or a combination thereof. The status-offorces agreement (SOFA), standing rules of

engagement (SROE), standing rules for the use

of force (SRUF), and other guidance serve as the

basis for MP law and order activities. As part of

these operations, military police may, in situations where the local national authority has deteriorated or been eliminated, conduct law

enforcement operations and investigations; provide initial assistance and training to HN military and civilian police forces; or assist in the

creation, training, and operation of these forces.

United States Customs Support Operations

Customs support is a requirement when US personnel return to a customs territory of the United

States (CTUS). Military police provide customs

support and border control to ensure units and

individuals comply with United States Customs

and Border Protection (CBP), other Governmental agencies, and United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA) requirements. In the absence

of CBP personnel, customs-certified military

police, often aided by MWD teams, conduct military customs inspections to enforce US customs

laws and regulations. While conducting customs

support operations, military police may be

required to establish and operate or assist HN

authorities with border security operations.

Appendix A addresses customs support operations in more detail.

Police Intelligence Operations

Police intelligence operations (PIO) support,

enhance, and contribute to the commander’s protection program, situational awareness, and battlefield visualization by portraying relevant threat

information that may affect the operational and

tactical environments. This threat information is

gathered while conducting MP tasks. Police intelligence operations include the following:

z Demonstrating MP and CID capability to collect relevant threat information actively or passively.

z Ensuring that all information collected while

conducting MP tasks continues to be reported

through the proper MP channels so that it can

be analyzed by the appropriate battalion, regiment, or higher level staffs.

z Maintaining constant liaison and communication with the following:

 Higher headquarters.

 Psychological operations units, as appropriate.

 HN police and other law enforcement agencies.

 Joint, interagency, and multinational forces.

 Staff judge advocate (SJA).

 Civil-military operations center.

 Civil affairs teams.

 Mission assurance officer.
1-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Military Working Dog Operations

The MWD program effectively integrates

expertly trained MWD handlers and highly intelligent breeds of dogs into MWD teams. These

teams are employed in dynamic ways that continue to evolve and be a highly trained asset that

commanders continue to use around the world.

These specialized teams aid commanders in conducting stability and warfighting operations.

Being modular and mobile makes these teams

very agile, enabling them to deploy rapidly and

integrate quickly into operations. In order to perform joint operations, multiechelon tasks, and

interagency missions, these teams maintain a high

tempo of operations. As technology and world

security situations evolve, the MWD team will

continue its transformation to provide commanders the unique capabilities required to be combat

force multipliers on the battlefield and support

mission assurance efforts.

Limited Detainee Operations

As an integral part of the full range of military

operations, there is the requirement to prepare

for and conduct intensive detainee operations.

Combat and stability operations in the war on

terrorism and the long war continue to result in

the detention of known or suspected criminals,

combatants, and civilians as military forces seek

to support emerging democracies, eliminate terrorists, and quell insurgencies. Modern military

actions, whether in a contiguous or noncontiguous environment characteristic of the war on

terrorism, result in the capture of many and varied detainees. The detainees of the war on terrorism differ significantly from the traditional

enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) of past conflicts

and present a much greater security threat during processing, escorting, and handling.

Personnel conducting detainee operations must

ensure that these operations are performed in a

manner that reduces the possibility of incidents of

abuse involving US Armed Forces and detainees.

All detainees will be provided the protections of

the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War until some other status is

determined by competent authority. Professional

performance by military police of the detainee

operations mission is critical for sustaining goodwill between the HN and international population.

The Secretary of the Army is designated as the

executive agent for the administration of the

DOD EPW Detainee Program per Department of

Defense directive (DODD) 2310.01E, The

Department of Defense Detainee Program.

Military police support the MAGTF and assume

the responsibility for detainee operations.

Detainee operations apply to any person captured,

detained, held, or otherwise under the control of

DOD personnel (e.g., military, civilian, contractor employee). Detainee operations do not apply

to persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes, except where the United States is

an occupying power across the range of military

operations. Detainees may fall into the following

categories as defined in DODD 2310.01E:

z Enemy combatants (ECs), including both lawful and unlawful.

z EPWs.

z Retained persons (RPs).

z Civilian internees (CIs).

The handling of detainees is an administrative,

tactical, and operational consideration that must

be addressed during planning to prevent forces

from being hindered by large numbers of EPWs

and CIs.

Note: During Operation Desert Storm, multinational forces detained 86,743 EPWs and

CIs and only 1,492 were categorized as innocent civilians. During Operation Iraqi

Freedom, multinational forces detained over

25,000 EPWs and CIs.

When faced with large detainee control responsibilities, the conduct of detainee operations by military police enhances MAGTF effectiveness.
Military Police Operations_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1-5 

Military police assumption of these efforts mitigates the diversion and tasking of other MAGTF

resources to conduct detainee operations, which

aids in maintaining combat strength. Although

military police provide the MAGTF commander

with these unique capabilities, detainee operations

are manpower-intensive. To maximize the capabilities of limited MP assets, the MAGTF commander must prioritize MP missions and tasking.

Even though military police support the MAGTF

by undertaking detainee operations, commanders

and staffs should understand the following:

z The law of war.

z The US policy governing provisions for handling detainees.

z The objectives, principles, and the MP role in

detainee operations.

The MEF MP support companies provide corrections and detainee expertise. The MEF major subordinate command (MSC) MP companies may

conduct LDO, but are not resourced to conduct

intensive detainee operations. Military police

detachments assigned to Marine expeditionary

units (MEUs) are not equipped to conduct detention operations without severely degrading all

other capabilities and support to the MAGTF.

Marine expeditionary units require significant

augmentation and mitigation in order to conduct

detention operations.

Planning and Training

Military police provide subject matter expertise

and training for in-lieu-of MP forces and MP and

law enforcement (e.g., detective, criminal investigations) training for infantry and other Marines,

providing them with additional skills needed to

carry out assigned missions and tasks. Each MSC

has a staff noncommissioned and commissioned

officer assigned to provide MP planning, training,

coordination, and oversight. Military police provide specialized and general support planning and

training as required by supported units. Specialized support is primarily located in the MEF with

the MP support company under the MEF headquarters group. If additional planning, training,

or MP support is required beyond the organic

capability of MSC military police, the MSCs

should request support from the MEF.

United States Customs and Border Support

Military police provide the commander a high

degree of flexibility through the execution of

customs operations. Personnel, equipment, and

material entering the CTUS must meet customs,

postal, immigration, agriculture, and other Federal agency requirements. During the redeployment of forces, customs-trained military police,

working with joint and US Federal agencies,

help to ensure compliance with regulations and

applicable provisions of international agreements

by detecting and investigating violations.
CHAPTER 2

MILITARY POLICE PERSONNEL

The mission, enemy or potentially hostile elements, and operational environment influence the

composition and employment of MP assets. The

MP commander task-organizes personnel and

equipment for the assigned mission. 

The MAGTF commander may task-organize MP

units as required. Consolidation of MP personnel

and resources creates a more robust MP unit

capable of executing a wider range of operational

tasks while allowing greater support flexibility

throughout the MAGTF area of operations (AO).

To maintain capabilities, an MP platoon (1 officer

and 40 enlisted) is normally the lowest level of

unit employed.

A variety of command and control options may

be employed to use limited MP assets efficiently

based upon an analysis of the mission. Those

options include:

z Decentralized control and decentralized execution.

z Centralized control and decentralized execution.

z Centralized control and centralized execution.

The traditional option of decentralized control

and decentralized execution retains MP units in

each MSC. Military police remain assigned to the

respective MSC MP commander and are organic

to the MSC, which provides administrative and

logistical support. While this method is the most

responsive to the individual MSC commander’s

needs and is useful when the MAGTF elements

have wide geographic separation, it may be difficult to rapidly coordinate MP capabilities.

Centralized control and decentralized execution

combines MAGTF MP assets to form an MP

unit under a single commander. This MP unit

provides either general support throughout the

MAGTF AO or direct support to subordinate

elements as required. The MAGTF commander

retains the ability to shift MP assets as the situation dictates. This method of employment may

be best suited in a combat environment where

subordinate elements are collocated or share

common boundaries. In addition, this method

provides for a timely response to a supported

element’s needs, yet allows the senior MP commander to analyze and direct MP activities,

while the MAGTF command element provides

administrative and logistical support.

During centralized control and centralized execution, MAGTF MP assets are placed in a MP

unit under a single commander (e.g., the MEF

PM or the senior MP company commander may

be designated as the MEF MP commander) and

this MP unit provides general support to the

MAGTF. While this is the least traditional

method of employment, it may be preferred

when the MAGTF mission is peacekeeping or

humanitarian assistance within a limited AO.

The MAGTF command element also provides

administrative and logistical support. 

Each MAGTF commander may designate a

MAGTF PM under the cognizance of the

MAGTF operations assistant chief of staff/operations officer. Each MEF has a field grade MP

officer assigned as the MAGTF PM and a senior

staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) assigned

as the provost sergeant. The MEFs have an MP

support company in the MEF headquarters group

to provide MP specialized support. Each MEF

MSC (e.g., Marine division, Marine aircraft wing,

Marine logistics group) has an MP officer and

SNCO serving on the staff to provide MP planning, coordination, and expertise and an organic

MP company to provide operational support.

Each MEU has an MP officer assigned as the

mission assurance officer and a detachment

assigned to the MEU command element.
2-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

MEF or MAGTF Provost

Marshal or Provost Sergeant

The PM provides the MAGTF commander with

MP employment subject matter expertise and

coordinates MP activities to ensure the proper

allocation of limited resources. The PM is responsible for ensuring that military police are tasked

according to the concept of operations and the

priorities established by the MAGTF commander.

This position is normally held by a senior MP

officer on the MEF staff. If the PM deploys or is

not staffed, the provost sergeant will perform

these duties. If both are present, the PM is responsible and the provost sergeant supports him. The

following are PM duties and responsibilities:

z Advises the MEF or MAGTF commander on

matters pertaining to MP operations.

z Supervises and coordinates MP assets and

operations within the MAGTF.

z Supervises joint prosecution and exploitation

center (JPEC).

z Coordinates law enforcement matters between

MSCs.

z Provides MP planning for the MEF.

z Coordinates MP training for the MEF.

z Coordinates MEF and MAGTF law enforcement matters with other Services and or HNs.

z Coordinates and oversees matters pertaining to

detainees.

z Advises the commander on mission assurance.

z Oversees the use of biometrics in the MEF.

z Coordinates and oversees the law enforcement

advisor program in the MEF.

MP Major Subordinate

Command Staff Officer and/or SNCO

The following are duties and responsibilities of

this position:

z Advises the MSC or MAGTF commander on

matters pertaining to MP operations.

z Supervises and coordinates MP assets and

operations within the command.

z Coordinates law enforcement matters between

subordinate commands.

z Provides MP planning for the MSC.

z Coordinates MP training within the MSC.

z Coordinates MSC law enforcement matters

with the MEF, other Services, and HNs, as

appropriate.

z Coordinates and oversees matters pertaining to

detainees.

z Advises the commander on mission assurance.

z Coordinates and oversees biometrics program

in MSC.

z Coordinates and operates the law enforcement

advisor program in the MSC.

MEF MP Support Company Commander

The following are duties and responsibilities of

this position:

z Coordinates MP support through the MEF PM.

z Provides MP general support to include training and planning.

z Provides MP specialized support in the following areas:

 Mission assurance support (e.g. physical security, nonlethal weapons [NLWs]).

 Criminal investigation support (e.g., tactical

site exploitation, PIO, evidence collection

and processing, interrogations, PSO, biometric support).

 Traffic accident investigation support.

 MWD support (e.g., drug and explosive detection, patrolling, tracking, specialized

search).

 Corrections expertise and advisory support

in planning, conducting, and supporting detainee operations.

 Supervision of MP specialized planning and

training.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2-3 

Major Subordinate

Command MP Company Commander

The following are duties and responsibilities of

this position:

z Coordinates MP support through the MCS MP

staff officer.

z Conducts MP operations (i.e., mission assurance,

LOO, LDO, planning, and training) in support of

the MSC or as directed per this publication.

z Provides centralized and decentralized support

as required.

z Provides MP training.

CID Chain of Command

and Investigations Officer

During deployments, CID investigators are operationally controlled by the MEF PM or senior MP

officer assigned to a command where CID

Marines are assigned. Any issues concerning

investigations (e.g., taskings, requests for investigations) are the responsibility of the investigations officer and PM or senior MP officer within

the command.

Investigations Officer (MOS 5805)

The following are duties and responsibilities of

the investigations officer:

z Serves as the subject matter expert for all matters pertaining to criminal investigations, protective service details, evidence collection,

processing, storage and disposition, criminal

intelligence, and criminal interrogations.

z Serves as MEF or MAGTF liaison concerning

MEF or MAGTF criminal investigations and

CID capabilities.

z Supervises all criminal investigators (i.e., military occupational specialty [MOS] 5821)

assigned throughout the MEF or MAGTF.

z Ensures the Consolidated Law Enforcement

Operations Center/Department of the Navy

Criminal Justice Information System criminal

reporting systems are incorporated into the

documentation of the investigations.

z Tracks MEF or MAGTF criminal investigations and CID operations.

z Oversees the daily operation and administration of the CID as follows:

z Case management (e.g., requests for assistance, forensic examination requests, command

notifications, SJA briefs).

z Staffing issues.

z Training (e.g., Consolidated Law Enforcement

Operations Center/Department of the Navy

Criminal Justice Information System, predeployment criminal investigator training, in-service

criminal investigator training, documentation

procedures, HN judicial process).

z Oversees the placement and delivery of orders

for investigative equipment.

z Maintains, revises, and updates fragmentary

orders (FRAGOs), standing operating procedures (SOPs), and other pertinent directives.

z Conducts liaison with HN and other military

and civilian law enforcement agencies.

z Provides status reports on investigations of

interest to MEF PM, SJA, or commanders.

z Maintains standards for training of CID staff

personnel.

z Makes the necessary notifications and/or referrals to agencies deemed appropriate.

z Coordinates and provides advice in the use of

biometrics in the MEF.

z Coordinates and operates the law enforcement

advisor program.

Criminal Investigators (MOS 5821)

Criminal investigators are assigned to the MEF

MP support company and provide support to the

MEF unit. Duties of criminal investigators are
2-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

based upon the type of mission assigned and may

include the following:

z Conducts criminal investigations.

z Conducts protective security operations.

z Plans and conducts law enforcement and investigations training, including site exploitation,

evidence collection and exploitation, and tactical questioning (TQ).

z Collects, processes, stores, and disposes of

evidence.

z Advises commanders and their staffs on law

enforcement and criminal investigations.

z Serves as and conducts the duties of a law

enforcement advisor when assigned.

z Conducts criminal intelligence operations.

z Makes the appropriate notifications.

z Employs and advises units on the use of

forensics and biometrics.

z Supports JPEC operations.

z Conducts liaison with US, HN, multinational,

and other military and civilian law enforcement organizations as required.

z Employs and advises units on the use of investigative equipment.

Corrections Officer (MOS 5804)

The following are duties and responsibilities of

the corrections officer:

z Serves as the subject matter expert for all matters pertaining to detainee handling procedures.

z Serves as MEF or MAGTF liaison concerning

MEF, MAGTF detention facilities, and the

administration and operation of regional detention facilities (RDFs).

z Supervises all corrections specialists (i.e.,

MOS 5831) assigned throughout the MEF and/

or MAGTF.

z Ensures biometric automated toolsets and/or

other biometric tools are incorporated into the

detainee processing procedures at each detention facility or RDF.

z Tracks MEF and/or MAGTF detainees from

detention facility or RDF through internment at

theater internment facilities (TIFs).

z Provides accountability for detainees evacuated from detention facilities or RDFs to theater medical treatment facilities.

z Oversees daily operation and administration of

detention facilities or RDFs in the following

areas:

 Supplies (e.g., detainee uniforms, identification bracelets, warning signs, mattresses,

blankets, forms, biometric automated

toolsets).

 Staffing issues.

 Training (e.g., biometric automated toolsets,

predeployment, in-service corrections training).

z Prepares and submits MEF or MAGTF daily

detention report.

z Requests the appropriate force protection

equipment.

z Provides regular assessments of detention

facilities and RDFs and ensures operational

readiness of each facility.

z Maintains, revises, and updates FRAGOs,

SOPs, and other pertinent directives.

z Updates MEF and MAGTF detentions web

page.

z Provides detention operations input for MEF or

MAGTF command chronology.

z Maintains standards for training of detention

facility or RDF staff personnel.

MEU or Special Purpose MAGTF Mission 

Assurance Officer and MP Detachment

Mission Assurance Officer

Each special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) or

MEU is assigned an MP officer who is specially

trained to perform duties as the MAGTF mission

assurance officer. This MP officer is responsible
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2-5 

to the commander. Tasks performed by the MEU

or SPMAGTF mission assurance officer include

the following:

z Develops unit plans to protect personnel and

equipment and to preserve combat power.

z Advises the commander on mission assurance

issues.

z Conducts vulnerability assessments of ports,

points of embarkation or debarkation, and

other forward areas while deployed and/or during predeployment site surveys.

z Liaises with HN authorities, NCIS, and the

Department of State for force protection measures abroad and to coordinate law enforcement matters while deployed.

z Conducts MP training throughout the MAGTF

(e.g., NLWs, detainee operations, evidence

collection and handling, customs operations,

level I antiterrorism awareness).

z Advises the commander on law enforcement

and mission assurance matters during COA

development and mission execution and develops MP support estimates (see app. B) of the

situation for MAGTF operations.

z Enhances unit preparedness through the identification, procurement, employment, and maintenance of force protection systems and

equipment.

z Supervises and coordinates MP assets and

operations within the MEU or SPMAGTF.

z Trains and/or supports HN, joint, and combined law enforcement activities.

z Gathers and disseminates information within

the MAGTF and submits police information

and intelligence to the MAGTF G-2 or S-2.

MP Detachment

When assigned, MP detachments provide specialized support to the MEU or SPMAGTF. The

MP detachment is operationally controlled by the

MEU or SPMAGTF command element through

the MEU or SPMAGTF mission assurance

officer. The MP detachment or cadre provides

the MAGTF commander with mission assurance

support capabilities, and the mission assurance

officer suggests methods to detect and defeat the

terrorist threat and plans and coordinates the MP

operations. The MEU and SPMAGTF subordinate elements may also have organic MP detachments. The MEU or SPMAGTF MP detachment

is task-organized to provide the MAGTF commander capabilities in—

z MP support.

z NLW training and employment, per Marine

Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-15.8,

MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal

Weapons (NLW).

z Mission assurance planning and assessments.

z Criminal investigations.

z Accident investigations.

z Physical security.

Corrections Officer or

Specialist (MOS 5804 or 5831)

Mission support requirements determine the

number of corrections specialists in a corrections detachment. The MAGTF and MEF MSC

commanders may request that the corrections

specialists support deployments and operations

with a detention requirement. Typically, a minimum of two SNCO corrections specialists are

assigned to each detention facility or RDF and

are designated as the staff noncommissioned

officer in charge (SNCOIC) and the operations

or training chief.

The corrections officer’s or specialist’s capabilities enhance the commander’s ability to protect

forces and assets. Each MEF has a cadre of corrections specialists assigned in the MP support

company and controlled by the MEF PM. Corrections specialists enhance the effectiveness of law

enforcement and other operations by providing
2-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

subject matter experts to assist in the area of

detention operations. In-garrison corrections specialists are employed at Levels I, II, and III DOD

correctional facilities and pretrial confinement

facilities. Corrections specialists deploy in support of any unit conducting detention or internment operations. During conflict, deployments,

and field environments, assigned corrections

detachments provide subject matter experts to

assist in the following areas:

z Predeployment detention operations training.

z Development of the detention facility or RDF

SOP.

z Development of the detention facility or RDF

plan of the day (POD).

z Development of the detention facility or RDF

detainee rules and regulations.

z Development of the detention facility or RDF

in-service training plan.

z Daily supervision and operation of each detention facility or RDF.

z Development of a corrections training team.

Detention Operations Officer

This position is held by an officer (i.e., MOS

5803) or corrections chief warrant officer (i.e.,

MOS 5804). Responsibilities of this position are

as follows:

z Serves on the MEF or MAGTF staff and

reports to the PM.

z Assumes responsibility for overall operation of

all detention facilities and RDFs.

z Coordinates detainee transfers from detention

facilities and RDFs to the TIF.

z Advises the MEF or MAGTF commander and

staff on operational planning, status of detention facilities, and detainee processing.

z Prepares the weekly brief concerning the number of detainees in detention, special status,

upcoming releases, and other items of interest.

z Responds to high visibility requests for information concerning detainees in MAGTF custody.

z Responds to detainee related queries from

MAGTF staff.

z Serves as MEF or MAGTF detentions liaison.

z Provides assessments and site visits to all

detention facilities and RDFs to ensure operational readiness and compliance with MEF and

MAGTF SOPs.

z Maintains, updates, and revises MEF or

MAGTF detentions Web site.

z Maintains standards for detainee handling and

administration of detention facilities and RDFs

for MEF or MAGTF personnel and MSCs.

z Ensures all MEF or MAGTF personnel

assigned to detention duties are trained in

accordance with applicable standards.

z Ensures biometric automated tool sets and/or

other biometric tools are incorporated into the

detainee processing procedures at each detention facility and RDF.

Detention Legal Advisor

Depending on the situation, either a judge advocate assigned as a detention legal advisor, or the

cognizant command's SJA, will be responsible to

ensure that the detention facility commander

receives legal advice on international law and

domestic laws, rules, and regulations in all

aspects of the detention facility’s operation. These

operations include intake processing, holding,

review, and release. Additional responsibilities of

the detention legal advisor include the following:

z Reviewing and overseeing detainee packages,

if applicable.

z Reviewing and providing advice on the detention facility’s internal SOPs and regulations.

z Reporting all allegations of detainee abuse.

z Reviewing and overseeing all investigations of

detainee abuse.

z Inspecting and overseeing detainee interrogations.

z Inspecting the detention facilities on a regular

basis.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2-7 

z Serving as the primary liaison for external

visitors (e.g., International Committee of the

Red Cross [ICRC], other government agency).

z Serving as the primary liaison to MSCs and

properly constituted release and review boards

on detainee-related issues.

z Maintaining the traditional legal functions,

which includes advising the facility commander of legal issues affecting the operation

of the facility.

Detention Facility and RDF Positions

Detention Facility and RDF Officer in Charge

This position is held by at least a noncommissioned officer and is, preferably, not a rotating

position. The officer in charge (OIC) may also

appoint a primary and alternate custodian to

ensure a custodian is available at all times.

Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Oversees the daily operations, staffing, safety,

security, and well-being of all personnel (e.g.,

guards, detainees) housed or working within

the detention facility or RDF.

z Conducts a daily head count of each detainee,

noting and taking action on any problems.

z Documents the daily head count in the detention facility or RDF master log.

z Signs every Department of Defense (DD)

Form 2708, Receipt for Inmate or Detained

Person, associated with persons held in the

detention facility or RDF or delegates signature authority to SNCOIC. 

z Ensures all detention facility or RDF guard

force members have read and understand the

commanding general’s intent for detention

operations.

z Ensures all detention facility or RDF guard

force members have read and understand the

rules for guards.

z Ensures all detention facility or RDF guard

force members have received all available

preservice detention operations training, to

include rules for use of force classes, prior to

standing guard watch.

z Ensures preservice training documentation is

well-maintained.

z Reports any mistreatment of detainees immediately to the next detention operations officer or

his designee.

z Ensures proper handling, documentation, and

storage of all evidence and property within the

detention facility or RDF.

z Appoints property and evidence custodians, in

writing, to collect and preserve detainee property and evidence.

z Limits access to property and evidence to custodians, OIC, and SNCOIC.

z Ensures detainee confinement procedures are

in accordance with applicable orders, directives, and SOPs.

z Ensures only official visitors are allowed

access to detainees.

z Establishes and publishes the detention facility

or RDF POD.

z Ensures a credentialed medical authority

examines each detainee at least every 24 hours.

The daily sick call fulfills this requirement.

z Ensures that each detainee’s personnel file is

reviewed by the detention facility or RDF’s

detention review authority within 72 hours of

confinement.

z Conducts random and unannounced inspections of the facility to verify detainees are

being treated firmly, fairly, and consistently

with dignity and respect in accordance with the

detention facility or RDF SOP.

z Maintains a facility SOP and posts orders and

emergency plans.

z Ensures biometric automated tool sets and

other biometric tools are incorporated into

detainee processing.
2-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Detention Facility or RDF SNOIC

The SNOIC position is usually held by MOS 5831.

Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Assists the detention facility or RDF OIC and

assumes the responsibilities of the OIC during

times of absence.

z Conducts a daily head count of each detainee,

noting and taking action on any problems.

z Documents the daily head count in the detention facility or RDF master log.

z Assesses and implements the most effective

NLWs.

z Trains and supervises the use of biometric

automated tool sets and other biometric tools

employed in detainee processing.

Detention Facility or RDF

Operations and Training Chief

This position is usually held by MOS 5831.

Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Assists the detention facility or RDF SNCOIC

and assumes responsibilities of the SNCOIC

during times of absence.

z Supervises the day-to-day detention operations, conduct of guard shifts, and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs).

z Assists in daily head count of each detainee,

noting and taking action on any problems.

z Documents daily head count in the detention

facility or RDF master log.

z Trains and supervises the use of biometric

automated tool sets and other biometric tools

employed in detainee processing.

Detention Facility and RDF Shift NCOIC

This shift NCOIC is held by the senior noncommissioned officer of a guard watch. Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Executes the POD.

z Conducts guard mount.

z Supervises the guard section.

z Maintains all required detention facility or

RDF logs and documentation.

z Supervises the use of biometric automated

tool sets and other biometric tools in detainee

processing.

Detention Facility and RDF

Property and Evidence Custodian

This position is held by a SNCO. Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Inventories property and evidence and annotates the results on an Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations (OPNAV) Form 5527/22,

Evidence/Property Custody Receipt, or Department of the Army (DA) Form 4137, Evidence/

Property Custody Receipt. Either form may be

used based upon the situation in a given operational area and the chain of command.

z Ensures the delivering unit verifies the date

and signs the “Released By” block on the

OPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.

z Ensures the property and evidence custodian

signs the “Received By” block on OPNAV

Form 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.

z Seals all evidence in a large envelope or container.

z Marks across the seam of the sealed envelope

or sealed container, annotating the signature of
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2-9 

the person sealing the evidence, date, time, and

detention facility or RDF number of the

detainee.

z Attaches a copy of OPNAV Form 5527/22 or

DA Form 4137 to the envelope or container.

z Attaches a label to items too large for a container, with the signature of the person inventorying the evidence, annotating the date, time, and

detention facility or RDF number of the detainee.

z Stores all evidence pertaining to a detainee in a

secure evidence and property room that is

accessible only to property and evidence custodians, OIC, and SNCOIC.

z Ensures that a copy of OPNAV Form 5527/22

or DA Form 4137 accompanies all property

and evidence pertaining to a detainee.

z Inventories all property and evidence weekly

and annotates all inventories in the property

and evidence log.

z Verifies the integrity of sealed containers or

documents.

z Records the specific number of bills of each

denomination and nomenclature of the money

seized, on OPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form

4137 rather than simply indicating “cash”

(e.g., five 25,000 Iraqi Dinar notes, six $100

US dollar bills, serial numbers).

z Annotates the serial number for seized firearms

on OPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.

If there is no serial number, the firearm will be

labeled identifying the date, location, and

detainee detention facility of RDF number

from whom the firearm was seized. A photograph of the firearm will also be included.

z Maintains the property and evidence log to be

able to track the chronological movement of

evidence to and from the property and evidence room.

z Records when the evidence custodian is not

available or on duty, who the alternate custodian is, and when he assumed duty.

z Documents any access to the property, securing and inventorying the property and evidence

room following access. Inventories evidence if

it changes hands or the detainee is transferred.

The evidence will be signed for by the person

assuming custody by utilizing OPNAV Form

5527/22 or DA Form 4137.

z Ensures when a detainee is released that he

will not receive a confiscated weapon without

showing a valid weapons authorization card.

z Ensures that improvised explosive device (IED)

materials will not be returned.

Detention Facility and RDF Guards

Guard positions are held by Marines with the

rank of sergeant and below. Responsibilities of

these positions are as follows:

z Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, and

consistently with dignity and respect.

z Reads and understands the commanding general’s intent for detention operations and rules

for guards prior to standing guard watch.

z Receives preservice detention operations training prior to working in the detention facility or

RDF.

z Maintains custody, control, and discipline of

detainees in the detention facility or RDF.

z Conducts periodic inspections, searches, head

counts, and roll calls.

z Follows orders and instructions given by the

detention facility or RDF OIC, SNCOIC, and

shift NCOICs.

z Reports the mistreatment of detainees to the

chain of command (i.e., OIC, SNCOIC, operations and training chief, or shift NCOICs)

immediately. 

z Utilizes biometric automated tool sets and

other biometric tools in detainee processing.
CHAPTER 3

MISSION ASSURANCE

The mission assurance process ensures that

assigned tasks or duties can be performed in

accordance with the intended purpose or plan.

This chapter is a summation of the activities and

measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting infrastructures are available to the DOD to carry out the National

Military Strategy. It links numerous risk management program activities and security-related functions, which include force protection;

antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection;

information assurance; continuity of operations;

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives defense; readiness; and

installation preparedness.

The mission assurance process creates the synergistic effect required for the DOD to mobilize, deploy,

support, and sustain military operations throughout

the full range of military operations. As part of the

mission assurance program, commanders establish

a plan that incorporates the programs, activities,

and functions defined by DODD 3020.40, Defense

Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), and the

military police provide the commander with the

capabilities that contribute to the unit’s ability to

develop a plan and be able to accomplish the mission set forth in the plan.

Although the above is a complete list of mission

assurance functions, the military police only provide support to force protection, antiterrorism,

and critical infrastructure protection.

Force Protection

Military police provide support to force protection within the areas of assessments, PSO,

NLWs, MWD operations, biometrics, and LOO.

Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-2, Campaigning, states that force protection safeguards

our own centers of gravity and protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates critical vulnerabilities. In stability operations, force protection may

include protecting the supported nation’s population, infrastructure, and economic or governmental institutions. An inherent command responsibility—force protection—also encompasses

precautions taken against terrorist activities that

target US forces or noncombatants. Leaders are

responsible for ensuring that Marines are properly prepared to meet, counter, and survive

threats that may be confronted throughout the

battlespace; thus, conserving combat power for

application at a decisive time and place.

Force protection is designed to protect military

personnel, civilian employees, family members,

facilities, and equipment. This protection is

accomplished through a systematic approach

that integrates the planning and application of

antiterrorism and combating terrorism measures, physical security, operations security,

LOO, and personal protective measures, which

are supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. The Navy/

Marine Corps Departmental Publication

(NAVMC) 2927, Antiterrorism/Force Protection Campaign Plan, clarifies the issue of antiterrorism as it relates to force protection and also

provides commanders with a source document

upon which to institutionalize local programs.

Note: For operating forces, force protection

will normally be addressed in the operation

order or operation plan’s Appendix 15

(Force Protection) of Annex C (Operations).
3-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Assessments

Assessments are essential to the development of

an effective mission assurance program. Threat

assessments form the basis for planning, justification of resource expenditures, and contribute to

the planning and establishment of specific force

protection condition measures. The Navy Antiterrorism Analysis Center prepares area threat

assessments to provide the commander with an

updated analysis of the threat in a particular AO.

The local threat assessment may also be obtained

via the resident NCIS office.

Vulnerability assessments provide the commander a threat-based analysis and self-assessment tool to evaluate the unit’s vulnerability to

terrorist attack. In a tactical environment, vulnerability assessments enhance the unit security posture by improving stationary asset security. The

more vulnerable a unit, the more attractive it

becomes to terrorists.

Vulnerabilities identified during assessments provide justification for establishing specific force

protection condition measures and actions. Prior

to deployment, vulnerability assessments must be

conducted to identify the appropriate force protection measures and to reduce risk. Military

police assigned to the MAGTF should be integrated into the vulnerability assessment team and

predeployment site survey team.

Military police reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist

attack by—

z Focusing on those elements directly related to

combating terrorism, including preventing terrorist acts, and if prevention fails, limiting

mass casualties.

z Identifying vulnerabilities that could be exploited

by threat groups and recommending options to

eliminate or reduce those vulnerabilities.

z Concentrating on areas identified by the commander as being essential to mission accomplishment.

Protective Services Operations

Commanders may be required to perform PSO to

reduce individual or group vulnerability to terrorist attack. To assist in PSO, CID and military

police provide personal security for key US Government leaders, flag officers, and civilian dignitaries. Depending upon availability and

completion of the US Army Protective Service

Training Course, CID may coordinate PSO for

Marine Corps commands. In addition, CID and

military police may also support HN and foreign

law enforcement PSO.

Nonlethal Weapons

Military police are trained to use the lowest level

of force necessary to control incidents in war,

peace, civil support, and stability operations.

Because military police use NLWs daily in the

performance of their law enforcement missions,

their skills are highly developed for NLW use in

military operations.

Military police are the Marine Corps’ primary

user of NLWs and munitions, MWDs, and

crowd control devices, such as the riot baton.

The traditional MP role in crowd control and

LOO requires the use of NLWs under certain

conditions and under restrictive SROE. Accordingly, military police use of NLWs affords the

MAGTF commander additional flexibility and

options for action.

Military police also provide the commander a

force that can function as a training cadre for the

application of NLWs. Military police attend the

Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons

Instructor Course (INIWIC), which is the only

formal DOD nonlethal training course. Marine

Corps military police are directly involved with

the INIWIC and in the development of DOD

NLW doctrine. They incorporate applicable

NLW capabilities into programs of instruction for

both the instructor- and user-development
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 3-3 

courses. The INIWIC is designed to provide commanders with instructors that are well-trained in

the employment of NLWs, who, in turn, can train

their Marines.

Because of restrictions imposed under international law, limitations may apply to the use of

certain NLWs, depending on the nature of the

operation. For example, the United States Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of

riot control agents, including OC [Oleoresin

Capsicum] (also known as pepper spray), as a

method of warfare in certain operations. Those

operations may include consensual peacekeeping

and peace enforcement operations in accordance

with the Charter of the United Nations, Chapter

VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,

Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.

Restrictions, as well as permissive use, may be

addressed in the rules of engagement, but military police should consult with the cognizant

SJA for guidance if there is any doubt regarding

the use of NLWs. Refer to MCWP 3-15.8 for

more information.

Military Working Dog Operations

Special MWD capabilities significantly enhance

the commander’s ability to protect forces and

assets. Chapter 5 addresses MWD operations in

more detail.

Biometrics

The protection of information and physical assets

is vital to the national security of the United

States, and biometrics—methods of human identification using physiological or behavioral characteristics—can enhance national security and

provide a higher level of identity assurance by

augmenting security systems.

In the MP community, CID and physical security

specialist are the primary users of biometrics. The

CID uses biometrics for site and evidence exploitation, investigations, forensics, and evidence collection and processing. The CID and physical

security specialists provide biometrics subject

matter expertise for the MEF. Physical security

specialists provide biometrics for access control,

electronic security systems, intrusion detection

systems, and automated access control systems.

Biometrics may also be used in detainee operations and include physiological, behavioral, and

authentication applications as follows:

z Physiological biometrics include the following:

z Iris.

z Fingerprint, including the nail.

z Hand, including the knuckle, palm, and vascular.

z Face.

z Voice.

z Retina.

z DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid].

z Odor.

z Earlobe.

z Sweat pore.

z Lip.

z Behavioral biometrics include the following:

 Signature.

 Keystroke.

 Voice.

 Gait.

z Authentication biometric-based applications

include the following:

 Workstation.

 Network and domain access.

 Single sign on.

 Application logon.

 Data protection.

 Remote access to resources.

 Transaction security and internet security.

Law and Order Operations 

Military police conduct LOO to provide commanders a lawful and orderly environment. They also

implement proactive law enforcement measures to

reduce opportunities for crime and terrorism. The

conduct of LOO supports mission assurance.

Chapter 4 addresses LOO in more detail.
3-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Antiterrorism 

Antiterrorism support provided by the military

police includes conducting training and crime

prevention and providing physical security capabilities. An MP officer assigned to a MEU or

SPMAGTF staff is qualified to function as the

MAGTF mission assurance officer and is responsible for coordinating antiterrorism training, planning, and execution. The MP officer suggests

ways to detect and defeat the terrorist threat and

the MP detachment provides the commander with

antiterrorism capabilities.

Training

Antiterrorism training provided by military police

to individual units includes—

z NLWs.

z MP mission-oriented training for Marines assigned as in-lieu-of forces.

z MP and law enforcement training to develop

the necessary skills to accomplish a mission.

Chapter 7 addresses training in more detail.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

Crime Prevention

Military police provide commanders with crime

prevention plans that include prevention,

enforcement, and education on recognizing,

countering, and preventing criminal and terrorist

activities. As part of crime prevention, military

police investigate and report criminal activities

that will assist the commander in maintaining

unit order and discipline. Appendix C provides

crime prevention checklists.

Physical Security

Physical security provided by military police

includes—

z Employing physical measures designed to

safeguard personnel.

z Preventing unauthorized access to equipment,

installations, material, and documents.

z Safeguarding personnel against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. 

Normal MP involvement in physical security is

limited to providing units advice for security in

their AO. When assisting in security enhancement planning, military police provide practical

and executable advice on the use of physical

security equipment that may include—

z Perimeter barriers.

z Protective lighting.

z Security containers.

z Locking mechanisms.

z Intrusion systems.

z Personal identification.

z Access control.

z Movement control.

Appendix C provides physical security checklists.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical infrastructure protection is a risk management program that focuses on determining the

risk of loss to the Marine Corps’ critical assets

and infrastructures from all threats and hazards. It

assesses the resultant impact on the ability to execute and sustain core capabilities, missions, and

functions and comprehensively manage risks.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 3-5 

Military police conduct assessments (see Assessments, page 3-2) and make recommendations to

commanders on actions that can be taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the risks resulting

from the determination of vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending upon the

risk, these actions could include changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), adding

redundancy, selection of another asset, isolation,

hardening; or guarding.

Additional support to critical infrastructure protection is provided by MP physical security specialists, who assist in the design and employment

of physical security intrusion detection systems,

electronic security systems, barrier plans, and

access control systems to reduce risk.
CHAPTER 4

LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS

Law and order operations are important to maintaining combat readiness and efficiency. A key

factor in the success of these operations is the

MP’s ability to use and apply the force continuum

(see fig. 4-1), identify probable cause, and operate

with restraint under designated authority. Military police have the authority to enforce laws,

directives, and regulations; conduct criminal and

traffic accident investigations; and control populations and resources to provide commanders

with a lawful and orderly environment. They also

implement proactive law enforcement measures

to reduce opportunities for crime and conduct

LOO within their authority and jurisdiction.

While military police may have the authority to

apprehend a suspect, the military may not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate charges. The concept of

jurisdiction discussed in this chapter refers to the

authority of military police to apprehend military

personnel and to detain civilians.

Law and order operations that are implemented

by military police include the following:

z Authority.

z Jurisdiction.

z Command and control.

z Law and order functions.

z HN LOO support (e.g., training, police station

operations).

Authority

Authority is the lawful right of designated persons or agencies to exercise governmental power

or control. The authority of the military police to

enforce military law, orders, and regulations by

apprehension or detention, if necessary, is derived

from the President, as Commander in Chief of the

United States, and the Uniform Code of Military

Justice (commonly referred to as UCMJ). The

UCMJ specifies the types of persons that are subject to its provisions and articles.

Reasonable

Perception

Reasonable

Response

Assaultive

(serious bodily

harm/death)

Assaultive

(bodily harm)

Resistant

(active)

Resistance

(passive)

Deadly force

Contact

controls

Defensive

tactics

Compliance

techniques

Verbal

commands

Complaint

(cooperative)

Figure 4-1. Force Continuum Model.
4-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

The continental United States (CONUS) authority of the military police over persons other than

those subject to the UCMJ is derived from Federal law and the policies and orders of the military commander.

The outside of the continental United States

(OCONUS) MP authority is founded in the laws

of the country concerned, international agreements, and the UCMJ. In some countries, a

SOFA authorizes one government to take action

in cases where both governments could take

action. In the absence of an international agreement or SOFA provisions that provide otherwise,

MP authority may be limited. Military police

should consult with the cognizant SJA for advice

on MP authority OCONUS. 

Persons Subject to

Uniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ, as established by Congress, provides

one basic code of military justice and law for the

Military Services. The code authorizes the President of the United States to set rules of evidence,

pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedures and to maximum punishments for violations of the UCMJ.

Under this authority, the President issues the

Manual for Courts-Martial United States. This

publication is an executive order implementing

the provisions of the UCMJ and primary source

document for matters relating to military justice

and establishing the military law of evidence.

Active duty military personnel, as well as some

retired members and other personnel enumerated

in Article 2 of the UCMJ, are subject to the provisions of the UCMJ. Military police have the

authority to take appropriate action with persons

subject to the UCMJ. This authority is not limited

to military reservations or Federal property.

Persons Not Subject to

Uniform Code of Military Justice

Commanders and military police are advised to

consult the local SJA concerning the circumstances warranting detention of persons not subject to the UCMJ. In areas under military

jurisdiction or control, military police may detain

the following persons who are not in the Military

Services or subject to UCMJ: 

z Persons found committing a felony or a misdemeanor might be detained long enough to be

turned over to civil authorities.

z Persons found violating properly promulgated

military regulations.

z Persons cited for violating the Assimilative

Crimes Act, not including felonies or breaches of

the peace, might be referred to a US magistrate.

z Civilians may be subject to military authority in

situations involving martial law or hostilities.

Persons Subject to Posse Comitatus Act

Within the United States, the Posse Comitatus

Act (PCA) generally limits direct military

involvement with civilian law enforcement.

Department of Defense directive 5525.5, DOD

Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, also provides guidance in this area, as does

Secretary of the Navy instruction 5820.7C, Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

Although the PCA does not apply to the use of

armed forces abroad, DODD 5025.5 applies PCA

restrictions to extraterritorial military assistance

to law enforcement. In case of compelling or

extraordinary circumstances, the Secretary of the

Defense may consider exceptions to the prohibition of direct military assistance to law enforcement outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

United States.

The PCA restrictions are divided into three broad

categories—use of information, use of equipment and facilities, and use of military personnel. These restrictions are governed by a complex

set of regulations and are highly nuanced. Some

direct assistance by military personnel is strictly

prohibited as follows:

z The interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or

similar activity.

z A search or seizure.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 4-3 

z An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

z The use of military personnel for surveillance

or pursuit of individuals, as undercover agents,

informants, investigators, or interrogators.

Military authorities may provide some permissible direct assistance or training, information,

equipment, or expert advice; but such assistance

will depend on the specific facts, circumstances,

and statutory or regulatory authority. For example, Military Purpose Doctrine addressed in the

Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge

Advocates, covers actions where the primary

purpose is to further a military interest, such as

investigative actions related to the enforcement

of the UCMJ. Another example is DODD

3025.12, Military Assistant for Civil Disturbances, which requires presidential authorization for the use of military forces, except in

limited emergency circumstances. Commanders

and military police should consult with their cognizant SJA before providing support to civilian

law enforcement.

Jurisdiction

Military jurisdiction is the extent of and limitation on the rights of an armed force to exercise

authority and control over persons and offenses

(i.e., limits the exercise of authority). The jurisdiction of every offense or incident depends upon

the status of the suspect, international agreements and treaties, military interest in the offense,

and other factors (e.g., legal, administrative,

actual offense, civilian intent in the case, media

interest). Military jurisdiction is exercised

through the application of military law, orders,

and regulations and extends to military personnel

whether or not they are in an area under military

control. The military may have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction to try persons subject to the

UCMJ regardless of where the offenses are committed, while civil jurisdiction is exercised

through the application of Federal and state law.

Under international law, the HN normally has

primary jurisdiction to prosecute nonmilitary

offenses committed within its borders by members of a visiting force. This authority may be

further defined or surrendered to military authorities through SOFAs and other treaties or agreements, depending upon the nature and

circumstances of the offense. This limitation to

prosecute does not prohibit commanders from

taking administrative action against suspects. The

SJA should be consulted when questions exist

concerning military jurisdiction. While conducting LOO in geographic areas, military police

operate under exclusive, concurrent, and proprietary jurisdictions.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Under exclusive jurisdiction, the US Government

assumes sole jurisdiction over the designated area.

Many military installations have exclusive Federal jurisdiction. On these installations, the Federal Government exercises executive, legislative,

and judicial authority. To facilitate exclusive jurisdiction and to avoid the difficult task of enacting

and maintaining a code of criminal laws appropriate for areas under its jurisdiction, Congress

passed United States Code, Title 18, Crimes and

Criminal Procedure, part I, chap. 1, sect. 13,

Laws of States Adopted for Areas Within Federal

Jurisdiction. This statute, based on the Federal

Assimilated Crimes Act (FACA), provides that all

acts or omissions occurring in an area under Federal jurisdiction, which would constitute crimes if

the area were under state jurisdiction, will constitute similar crimes, similarly punishable, under

Federal law. This act does not assimilate crimes

based upon state statutes that are contrary to Federal policy and law, such as civil rights legislation,

nor does it assimilate state law if there is an existing Federal statute or law on the subject.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when the US Government and the state or local governments exercise simultaneous authority over an area.
4-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Essentially, this type of jurisdiction is dual jurisdiction. Under dual or concurrent jurisdiction,

state criminal laws are applicable in the area and

can be enforced by the state, as well as the Federal Government, under FACA.

Proprietary Jurisdiction

Proprietary jurisdiction applies in instances

where the US Government has ownership to an

area but has not retained jurisdiction. In this

case, the US Government has the same rights as

any other landowner. The state retains jurisdiction over the area and has the authority to

enforce laws in the area. The FACA does not

apply to areas of Federal proprietary jurisdiction. In such areas, military police exercise

authority in compliance with the instructions of

the appropriate commander.

Command and Control

The commander determines when MP assets are

needed and can be afforded for dedicated LOO.

When required by the commander or when battle

intensity permits, the commander typically

employs military police for limited LOO and to

conduct LDO. Military police will typically conduct a full-scale dedicated LOO before an operation begins and after the AO has matured. In a

peacetime environment, military police conduct

extensive LOO.

Military police performing LOO enhance the

commander’s combat readiness, efficiency, and

command and control by—

z Preventing the diversion of military resources,

thereby aiding in the maintenance of combat

strength.

z Suppressing opportunities for criminal behavior.

z Assisting and protecting forces.

z Preserving good order and discipline.

z Assisting intelligence organizations in obtaining a complete tactical intelligence picture by

collecting and providing criminal and operational data and information.

z Providing liaison to civil or military law

enforcement agencies.

Law and Order Functions

Military police will often conduct LOO simultaneously with other tasks. They also implement

and perform physical security measures for designated critical assets, crime prevention measures,

and selective enforcement measures as part of

their mission assurance support and other tasks.

Crime is detrimental to MAGTF operations and

can cause a severe deterioration in morale. Military police assist the commander in curtailing and

eliminating criminal activities by enforcing law

and order and preserving good order and discipline. Based upon the MAGTF commander’s

concept of operation, military police employ the

following LOO functions:

z JPEC establishment and operation.

z Law enforcement.

z MWD operations.

z Traffic enforcement and investigations.

z Criminal investigations.

z Crime prevention and physical security.

z US Customs support operations.

z Police intelligence operations.

z Joint, multinational, and HN police operations.

Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center

Military police perform a critical role in the

establishment and operation of the JPEC. The

JPEC supports HN security forces’ development

of internationally accepted criminal investigative and forensic practices and also synchronizes
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 4-5 

multinational force intelligence and criminal

prosecution efforts associated with—

z Detainees and detainee-related evidence.

z Site and evidence exploitation.

z Document exploitation.

z Criminal investigation and other battlefield

material.

Law Enforcement

An efficient and effective law enforcement effort

eliminates the conditions and opportunities that

promote crime. Successful law enforcement operations maintain combat readiness and efficiency

by preventing the diversion of personnel and

resources to fight crime and by maintaining military discipline. Marine Corps Order (MCO)

5580.2B, Law Enforcement Manual, provides

specific guidance concerning the establishment of

law enforcement operations aboard Marine Corps

installations and may be used in tactical situations

or serve as the basis for development of appropriate law enforcement TTP.

Patrol Operations

The key to an effective law enforcement effort is

an aggressive MP patrol operation. The method

of MP patrol depends upon the mission, number

of military police available, terrain, time of

response, and level of HN support. Military

police establish patrols to—

z Meet prescribed objectives.

z Protect designated resources.

z Identify and apprehend or detain offenders.

z Provide a deterrent and/or presence and prevent

crimes.

z Provide an ability to respond quickly.

Desk Operations

Military police establish desk operations to—

z Coordinate and document MP patrol activity.

z Receive complaints and calls for assistance.

z Refer incidents to the appropriate investigative

agency for further action.

Military Working Dog Operations

Military working dog teams enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement operations with

capabilities to detect explosive devices, explosive residue, and controlled substances and to

detect, track, control, and apprehend personnel.

They are used in peacetime environments to

extend MP resources and contribute to the detection, investigation, and prevention of criminal

activity. The MWD teams support a variety of

MP operations, which are discussed in chapter 5.

Mission support requirements determine the

number of functional MWD teams that make up a

wartime, mission-oriented MWD team. During

wartime operations, MWD teams—

z Help detect and deter the enemy.

z Support force protection operations by augmenting security forces and assisting in the protection of key personnel.

z Support population control by augmenting dislocated civilian (DC) and crowd control forces.

z Assist in temporary internment operations.

Traffic Enforcement

and Accident Investigations

Traffic accidents account for a large number of

deployed military casualties. Military police help

to reduce the number of noncombat traffic accident casualties (i.e., civilian and military) and

loss of equipment through enforcement of HN

and command traffic regulations (i.e., commander’s MSR regulation measures). As accident investigators, military police also assist HN

or other authorities investigate accidents involving US personnel or property.

Types of Accidents Investigated

Providing they do not interfere with the tactical

mission or mission-essential operations, the
4-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

types of accidents military police investigate

include those—

z Resulting in the fatalities of US military personnel.

z Involving US military personnel and equipment, as well as HN persons and/or property.

z Involving substantial vehicle damage and/or

multiple vehicles.

Investigative Services

Through the investigation of traffic accidents,

military police serve to—

z Identify the personal, environmental, and

equipment factors that caused or contributed to

the accident.

z Document the facts of the incident for criminal or civil actions that may result from the

accident.

z Expedite HN litigation.

Traffic Enforcement Measures

Based upon the operational and political environment, traffic enforcement measures may include—

z Traffic circulation plan development.

z Operator license and dispatch checks.

z Safety inspection checkpoints.

z Vehicle load and route restriction enforcement.

z Speed control measures.

Main Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement

Military police units support the commander’s

MSR regulation measures as stated in the established traffic regulation plan, the unit’s SOPs, or

command directives. They provide MSR regulation enforcement to keep the routes within a commander’s AO free for priority tactical and

sustainment operations and by controlling highway traffic activities to support military force

movement. Enforcement efforts focus on ensuring

that only authorized traffic uses controlled MSRs.

The traffic regulation plan contains specific measures to ensure smooth and efficient use of the

road network (e.g., classified routes are used

only by authorized traffic within their timetable

schedule, vehicles are prevented from traveling

on roads that are too narrow for their passage or

will not support their weight) to ensure that the

route remains unobstructed. The plan also

assigns military route numbers and names, direction of travel, highway regulation points, and

preplanned MP traffic control points (TCPs).

Military police use TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, and defiles at critical points

to monitor MSRs and enforce command regulations. Mounted MP teams patrol between static

posts to observe traffic and road conditions, to

gather information on friendly and enemy activity, and to assist stranded vehicles and crews.

Military police units place temporary route signs

to warn of hazards or to guide drivers unfamiliar

with the routes. Using these measures, MP units

exercise jurisdiction over the road network in the

AO and, when possible, will coordinate with the

HN to expedite movement on MSRs. Any

changes in road condition and enemy activity

along MSRs are reported immediately through

MP channels.

Military police units employed with engineer,

logistic, explosive ordnance disposal, and aviation

forces may establish movement corridors to provide secure movement of military traffic through

uncontrolled terrain. Based upon published movement tables, the combined movement corridor

forces will open a safe passage route through

uncontrolled terrain.

Criminal Investigations

Crimes occurring within an AO may require an

in-depth investigation. Military police investigate offenses committed against US personnel or

property, and occasionally crimes committed by

HN citizens. There are two types of criminal

investigations on the battlefield—minor crimes

(e.g., petty theft) or major incidents and serious
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 4-7 

offenses (e.g., alleged war crimes). Minor crimes

are usually investigated by military police or

MPIs. Major incidents and serious offenses, especially those involving death, serious bodily

injury, and/or war crimes, are referred to CID.

The CID investigative authority originates from

the PM or from the commander to whom the CID

element is attached.

The NCIS role varies and will be dependent upon

the operation. The CID investigators provide

criminal investigative support to commanders,

including investigation, fingerprinting, evidence

collection, and exploitation. When authorized,

CID personnel initiate the appropriate criminal

investigations during these operations, conduct

interrogations as required, and conduct criminal

intelligence operations in support of PIO.

The commander immediately notifies the chain of

command, the SJA, CID, or NCIS upon receiving information concerning alleged war crimes

committed by Marines. The CID will notify

NCIS as appropriate. It is extremely important

that alleged war crimes be investigated promptly

by CID or NCIS and not by an investigating

officer appointed by the command. Close coordination between the SJA, CID, and NCIS during

war crime investigations is essential.

Commanders are prohibited from interfering with

the investigations or impeding the use of investigative techniques. When a commander objects to

the opening of a criminal investigation of a serious incident for operational or other reasons, that

commander must report the circumstances immediately via the chain of command—Security

Division, Plans, Policies, and Operations—to the

Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Joint investigative activities, such as drug or

blackmarket suppression teams, may involve

investigators from NCIS, CID, military police, or

other US Services or agencies, and may require

close liaison and cooperation with HN or allied

civil or military agencies.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

Crime Prevention

Crime prevention is accomplished through a

heightened degree of awareness and education.

Units aware and educated on the detrimental

effects of criminal activities often police themselves to maintain unit integrity and morale. Military police provide the commander with

awareness programs, as well as instruction and

information on recognizing, countering, and preventing criminal activities.

The objective of crime prevention is to provide a

secure environment for military personnel operations. Crime prevention employs proactive measures aimed at protecting persons and property. A

successful crime prevention effort focuses on the

number, type, location, and causes of crimes

being committed. After causes are identified, military police employ preventive techniques by

planning, implementing, evaluating, modifying,

and developing new crime prevention measures.

Physical Security

A strong physical security program supports the

crime prevention effort by helping to identify,

reduce, eliminate, or neutralize conditions favorable to criminal activity. As part of the overall

physical security effort, military police conduct

physical security inspections and surveys of designated mission-essential or vulnerable activities within a command. Physical security

inspections and surveys also identify measures

to reduce the opportunity and desire for engaging in criminal acts.

Physical security measures supplement the mission assurance process and enhance the overall

defensive posture. Trained force protection and

physical security personnel, using current information and technology, can provide the commander a

defense in depth (e.g., security posts, barriers,

access control, electronic security systems, identification controls, technology, biometrics) against
4-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

identified and perceived threats. Physical security

personnel support the mission assurance process

by assessing vulnerabilities and conducting a

physical security survey.

A physical security survey is a systematic evaluation of a facility or activity’s overall security.

Physical security personnel identify security deficiencies and recommend active and passive corrective measures through surveys. A physical

security survey addresses—

z Structural design information and deficiencies

(e.g., walls, doors, ceilings).

z Tactical employment of physical barriers and

obstacles. 

z Preventive and compensatory security measures and procedures.

z Employment of physical security aids, equipment, and devices (e.g., lighting, fencing,

locks, key and lock control, portable electronic

security measures).

z Access and control procedures of US and HN

civilian and military personnel and equipment

within an AO.

In addition, physical security specialists provide

subject matter expert support in the use of biometrics in physical security applications. Biometrics

are utilized in access control, electronic security

systems, intrusion detection systems, and automated access control systems.

US Customs Support Operations

Military police provide customs support and border control to ensure units and individuals comply with CBP, other US Governmental agencies,

and USDA requirements. In the absence of CBP

personnel, customs-certified military police,

often aided by MWD teams, conduct military

customs inspections to enforce US customs laws

and regulations. While conducting customs support operations, military police may be required

to establish and operate or assist HN authorities

with border security operations. Border control is

maintained for—

z Security.

z Customs and tariff enforcement.

z Protection of the civilian economy.

z Apprehension of criminals, absentees, terrorists, and persons of intelligence interest.

Control is maintained through the establishment

of authorized road or rail crossing points, border

patrols, and control posts. Essential to the success of these operations is constant liaison with

HN and neighboring country authorities. Military

police conducting these operations will—

z Establish the identity of US military members

crossing borders, determine the purpose of travel,

and examine vehicles and travel documents.

z Instruct US military members to make oral or

written customs declarations as required.

z Conduct searches of vehicles, luggage, and any

other property being imported or exported by

US military personnel.

z Seize contraband items that are in violation of

customs regulations.

Appendix A addresses customs support operations in more detail.

Police Intelligence Operations

Success in MP LOO relies upon the use of essential information and intelligence, which aids in

the crime prevention and criminal investigation

process. While performing PIO, military police

collect, analyze, and disseminate information and

intelligence as part of other missions.

The MP information operations complement the

command intelligence program by integrating

information with military intelligence and providing the commander with a complete and relevant

intelligence picture for military operations. Military police use TQ while conducting PIO. Department of Defense directive 3115.09, DOD
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 4-9 

Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, provides detailed

information concerning TQ.

Joint, Interagency, Multinational,

and Host Nation Police Operations

Military police LOO may involve patrols with

joint, interagency, multinational, HN military or

civilian police, or a combination of these groups.

The SOFA, SRUF, SROE, rules of interaction,

force continuum, and other guidance have an

impact on MP LOO activities. When conducting

these LOO, military police must maintain constant liaison with other DOD police organizations, HN authorities, and allied police agencies

to develop employment options that best support MAGTF operations. As part of these operations, military police may, in situations where

the local national authority has deteriorated or

been eliminated, provide assistance and training

to HN military and civilian police forces or

assist in the creation of these forces as authorized by competent authority. 

Joint investigative activities, such as drug or

black market suppression teams, may involve

investigators from NCIS, CID, military police, or

other US Services or agencies. Such operations

may require close liaison and cooperation with

HN, allied civil, or military agencies. The CID

investigators also work closely with counterintelligence teams, pooling their resources to gather

information on certain activities (e.g., underground activities, terrorist groups, black marketing). In addition, CID investigators are trained to

handle hostage incidents, hostage negotiations,

and related terrorist incidents.

Host Nation Law and

Order Operations Support

Military police HN LOO support includes training and police operations support (e.g., station setup, administration, evidence collection, storage,

and processing).

Host Nation Police Training Programs

Authorized police training programs for HNs

should be targeted to the level of officer that is

being trained. Senior police officer level training

should address those things relevant to the

administration of effective police operations,

including planning, personnel, logistics, training,

and police information operations. Basic police

officer training should focus on police skills that

would be most beneficial to them, including

unarmed self-defense, weapons training, and

application of restraints.

There are several categories of team and police

training categories. Those categories are—

z Transition teams training.

z Police transition teams training.

z Executive level training.

z Mid-level police supervisor training.

z Basic police officer training.

z Field training officer (FTO) program.

z Support personnel training.

z In-service training.

Transition Teams Training

The primary mission of transition teams is to

advise the security forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, and

infantry tactics. The intent is to make HN forces

capable of conducting independent counterinsurgency operations tactically, operationally, and

logistically. When executing military operations,

transition teams call for US close air support, indirect fire, and medical evacuation as necessary.

They also perform the critical role of liaising

between the foreign unit and nearby US units to

ensure that each unit is aware of and can assist the

other in their operations. Transition teams also

monitor and report on the capabilities of the fledgling security force. They work with their HN

counterparts to enhance the understanding of the

rule of law and fundamental human rights.
4-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Note: In both Operation Enduring Freedom

and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the transition

teams are considered a central part of the

strategy to train and equip national security

forces. One of the primary missions of the US

military in Iraq is the training of competent

Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, transition teams had assisted in the training and

equipping of approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000

members of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi

police and national police forces.

Police Transition Teams Training

Police transition teams provide a similar function

for the HN police forces. These teams vary

greatly in size based upon the AO and level of

threat. They may include military police units and

contracted civilian personnel.

Executive Level Training

The US forces tasked with training HN police

personnel must ensure that HN police forces

have capable management in the top ranks. Military police leaders should consider assigning

experienced senior MP personnel to positions

with their HN police force counterparts to serve

as executive trainers and advisers. Military

police planners, working with police experts

from the Department of Justice and the Department of State, should also develop formal training programs for executive level police

personnel. Executive level personnel will require

knowledge of general administration and the

internal functions of the organization in order to

manage the ongoing operations of a large police

organization. Executive level police training considerations include the following:

z Recruiting police officers and staff.

z Managing police records. This includes case

file management and statistics on various

police data (e.g., calls for service, location of

incident, time of incident, day of the week of

the incident, category of incident [e.g., accident, request for assistance, robbery, murder],

demographics of the victims and perpetrators,

affiliations of the victim and perpetrators).

z Conducting internal affairs operations. This

function ensures professional standards are

maintained and that officer violations and

internal security issues are investigated. Preemployment investigations may also be

aligned under this function.

z Distributing and scheduling patrols and planning special events.

z Planning contingency operations.

z Developing criminal information and intelligence.

z Staffing and training specialty sections. These

sections include patrol, criminal investigations, special reaction team, and traffic.

z Managing police desk operations. This includes

supervision and monitoring desk and communications operations, such as dispatch and

electronic communications.

z Managing an evidence room. This includes evidence collection requirements, chain of custody

documentation, and processing and control of

evidence stored in the evidence room.

z Issuing and controlling police credentials.

Issued credentials must be strictly controlled

with credential data and personnel information

stored in a secure location and/or database.

z Managing licensing and permit functions.

z Managing jail facilities.

z Managing court liaison requirements. The

court liaison coordinates for prisoner pretrial

release, transfer of prisoners to permanent

detention facilities, and case preparation.

z Establishing SOPs. Procedures are required to

maintain order, professionalism, and credibility

within the organization. The SOPs may

include—

 Police procedures.

 Uniform and equipment standards (e.g., uniform appearance, accessories, weapons, duty

equipment).

 Vehicle equipment requirements.

 Radio protocols.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 4-11 

 Protection equipment (e.g., helmets, vests,

chemical protection equipment).

 Desk operations.

 Jail operations.

z Providing logistic training. Training should be

focused on how to understand and manage the

various aspects of logistical support required

for the organization. At a minimum, training

should include the following:

 Budget training.

 Procurement of equipment and services.

 Maintenance operations (e.g., vehicle fleet,

communications equipment).

 Supply operations (e.g., supply distribution,

accountability of equipment, establishing a

supply and/or logistic discipline program).

z Maintaining a comprehensive training program. At a minimum, a police training program

should include the following:

 Preservice training.

 In-service training.

 Mid-level and senior-level management

training.

 FTO.

Mid-level Police Supervisor Training

The HN police force units only become effective

when their leaders and staffs can effectively plan,

prepare, execute, and assess police operations. The

training program for mid-level managers should

include the professional development that is necessary to maintain management proficiency, consistent application of policy, and dissemination and

understanding of organizational goals and objectives. Initial mid-level police supervisor training

should focus on building effective leaders and

staffs for small units, then progressively move into

higher echelons of supervisory training. Both

executive and mid-level training should be focused

at the police station level. A cadre of carefully

selected low- and mid-level police leaders can be

provided an advanced level of education at formal

strategic-level schools. This cadre can, upon their

return home, assume leadership positions, and

become faculty for HN schools. However, these

programs are expensive and time-consuming.

Basic Police Officer Training

If possible, basic police officer training should

occur in established training academies with standardized programs of instruction. The training

should be conducted by experienced law enforcement personnel on basic police procedures,

weapons proficiency, and survival skills. During

initial training, law enforcement trainers must

observe and conduct the training. More experienced HN police are selected as assistant instructors and demonstrators. Over time, the HN

assistant trainers will become the primary trainers. The majority of the training is hands-on practical exercise training.

Field Training Officer Program

The FTO program is on-the-job training directed

at new police officers. This training is executed

with an experienced police officer certified as an

FTO, in order to ensure that new police officers

are trained and evaluated and can meet established standards. The standards should be

extracted from a critical task list and administered by an FTO who is familiar with police protocols and the patrol sector in which the trainee is

being trained and evaluated. The senior MP

officer present establishes FTO program certification standards and critical tasks based upon

mission analysis of requirements for the location

of the program.

Support Personnel Training

Police forces, just like military forces, need support personnel in order to be effective. This

requires training teams in support of these functions. Specially trained personnel required by

police forces include armorers, supply specialists, communications personnel, administrative

personnel, and vehicle mechanics. Support personnel should not be counted against the number

limit of sworn HN police officers, as they do not

conduct law enforcement activities.
4-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

In-service Training

In-service training is a periodic refresher and professional development training provided to all

officers throughout their service. The SOP establishes the frequency and number of hours

required. The length and location of in-service

training may range from 15 minutes during guard

mount to extended periods on specialized training

sites. Training should be based upon assessments

conducted by police management and supervisors; and it is driven by observations and objectives identified by mid-level and senior leaders.

Subject areas of in-service training may include

weapons proficiency, ethical conduct, officer survival, and identification of threats or criminal

activity. Leadership may often use in-service

training as a venue to focus on policy changes or

reinforcement, identified shortcomings in performance, new equipment, or special events training.

Subjects are limited to the needs of the organization. Training should be focused on patterns,

trends, and tactics of criminal and other threats

(e.g., insurgents, transnational criminals that may

be active in the area). This information is critical

for police officers to understand in order to effectively and efficiently counter the threat and

achieve their mission objectives.

Host Nation Police Station Support Operations

A police station is most effective when support

operations (e.g., police station requirements and

protection, administration, personnel, evidence

processing, highway patrol) are streamlined and

developed to work in concert with the efforts of

the police officers.

Police Station: Renovation,

Rebuilding, and Protection

During the initial standup of police stations, different types and sizes of stations should be established

based upon a mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available-time available.

Effective policing requires a base of operations

from which police forces can operate. The police

station provides a static, recognizable landmark

for the public to access the police with reports

and complaints or to provide and receive information necessary to the maintenance of a stable

environment. In many operations, military police

will be faced with situations where little or no

police infrastructure is present. This may be

attributed to long-standing neglect, inadequacies on the part of the HN, natural disaster, or

combat operations.

During operations where significant destruction

attributed to natural or manmade disaster or

where adequate police infrastructure does not

exist, renovation or rebuilding of police stations

is critical. Military police, in conjunction with

civil affairs, other multinational forces, governmental agencies, and the HN forces, must assess

the existing police structures and requirements

for possible new structures and to coordinate for

construction support.

If required, military police must provide input for

the creation of a statement of work. The statement of work must address all construction

requirements for the police station, including discussion of protection requirements.

Regardless of the physical structure or layout of

the various police stations, basic protection measures need to be in place before police operations

begin. Police personnel and facilities are often

targeted by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents;

therefore, police personnel, equipment, and facilities require robust security and protection measures. Many of these measures may take weeks or

months to construct. Protection measures include:

z Protection in depth.

z Standoff distance.

z Access control.

z Barriers and blast mitigation.

Notes: In order to be most effective, police

stations must be closely linked to a court system to adjudicate the offender and a prison

facility to incarcerate the convicted.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 4-13 

Vehicle impound lots must also be a planning

consideration in the establishment of police stations. Police require locations to secure seized

vehicles and property being held for evidentiary

value. Stations should have a centralized lot that

supports a number of stations (e.g., at the district

level), a temporary lot, and a lot constructed for

long-term storage.

Police Station: Administration

Military police assist in the establishment of

administration and personnel functions (e.g.,

developing forms, processing procedures) and setting standards for daily operations (e.g., supply

systems). Personnel must be familiar with the

scope of police powers, authority, and jurisdiction. Reference materials should be on hand for

quick reference and offense codes should be established for use in recordkeeping and administrative

action. Patrol reports and security checklists (see

app. C) must be developed and used to record pertinent information and activities. Military police

should not force the use of US forms since the use

of existing or development of new local forms will

give ownership to the HN police force. The US

forms may be used if there is no existing form that

meets a requirement and the local police officials

agree to adopt the form in-lieu-of creating their

own version. An organizational supply system is a

key part of police operations. Military police can

assist in the development of logistical accountability systems, acquisition of supplies, and recordkeeping requirements as follows: 

z Maintenance procedures and service agreements for maintaining fleet operations and

equipment.

z Policy letters and SOPs to standardize supply

and maintenance operations, desk operations,

police administration functions, database management, and evidence procedures. 

z Guidelines for maintaining readiness, benchmarks for organizational goals, and reasonable

standards for LOO training that ranges from

basic to advance tactics and procedures. 

z Communications protocols, such as call signs

and radio procedures for daily communication,

operations security procedures, information

systems security procedures, and communications security measures.

z Public affairs procedures by establishing guidelines and methods regarding release of information to the media while protecting the public

and not compromising ongoing operations. The

intent should be to tell the “good news story” to

show where progress is being made.

Police Station: Personnel

Police Officers. Police officers responsible for

evidence collection and storage should receive

training in crime scene processing. Personnel

selected for these positions should be experienced officers.

Police officers should be specifically identified to

work juvenile cases. Care must be exercised to

process and handle juvenile offenders separately

from adult offenders. 

An interpreter should be provided for MP operations (i.e., training, mentoring, and conducting

joint operations) with HN police personnel. Any

interpreter selected to translate in police operations must receive a background check, be cleared

by the appropriate authority, and be trained by

MP leadership or police assistance team on specific police procedures and operations.

Support Personnel. The successful management

of a police station depends upon administrative

specialists, recordkeepers, budgeting personnel,

personnel specialists, facilities personnel, and custodial staffs. These critical staff positions should

not count against the number of sworn positions

identified for the individual police stations. Support positions do not require sworn police officers nor do they require any police training.

However, they do require some level of security

clearance and a background investigation.
4-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Dispatchers and others working at the control or

dispatch center should receive training in dispatch procedures and be graduates of a police

academy. They must also receive training in

administrative functions to allow them to track

and record police operations as they occur. Dispatchers prioritize and dispatch responding patrols

with guidance from the shift and desk supervisors.

Other personnel essential in sustaining police

operations include mechanics, electricians, and

communications and supply specialists. All

police stations should have a maintenance facility and motorpool within the police department

compound. The supply specialist should be

trained in equipment issuance, accountability,

and procurement measures.

Police Station: Information

Systems Development and Management

Common crime information databases greatly

improve interoperability among local HN police

agencies and can link them to international police

intelligence sources, such as Interpol (the world’s

largest international police organization). Military

police provide the capability to train foreign military and civilian police concerning the establishment of police information files and automated

police databases. Developing and sharing police

information with the appropriate HN and international agencies is crucial in environments where

criminals (e.g., terrorists, insurgents) threaten stability. Military police coordinate these efforts with

international police and intelligence agencies.

Systems Development. Military police or contractors train HN police and provide initial training to

forces in the development and management of

police information systems. In countries where

the government, including its law enforcement

entities, has been precarious and/or corrupt, there

may have been no development or management

of police information. If a database (i.e., automated information system) does exist, military

police should assess whether the existing system

is functional and if so, commence training and

incorporation as soon as possible. An existing

system provides local familiarity and cultural

considerations, but if no system exists, military

police or contractors must assist in developing

and managing a police information system that

will be executable within the skill, experience,

and cultural parameters of the HN police personnel. Considerations during the development and

management of the information system may

include the following:

z Establishing police information requirements

(e.g., biometrics).

z Establishing police statistical requirements.

z Establishing a police information collection plan.

z Gathering information directed from the collection plan.

z Establishing a database and training operators.

z Establishing supporting documents.

z Conducting analysis of the information to

determine police intelligence value.

z Training HN military and civilian police personnel to manipulate the information system

for maximum efficiency and benefit.

The establishment of the automated information

system is an extremely important part of setting

up a modern policing capability and should also

accommodate the development of a centralized

data storage capability that is accessible to all

police and security agencies. When designing and

implementing these automated information systems, the following must be considered:

z Incorporating a security program into the system.

The system must be secure and not accessible to

unauthorized users.

z Developing an information management system

that will provide support—combining administration, logistics, training, operation reporting,

vehicle registration, police reporting, and penal

information.

z Determining additional law enforcement

reports needed, such as daily activity logs and

other automated entries.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 4-15 

z Providing law enforcement access to automated

police records from a centralized database.

z Conducting queries expeditiously from a centralized database for real-time information and

quick compilation of crime statistics.

Note: The development and maintenance of a

database is paramount to recording and storing police information. A database promotes

easy retrieval and analysis of the data. Initially information management experts may

be required to establish and train on the database, providing data for assessment of the

HN’s capabilities. The end state is to transfer

the responsibility of database population,

analysis, and maintenance to the HN or international police agency as soon as possible.

Information Gathering. Information must be gathered in accordance with the collection plan.

Reporting and documentation procedures must also

be developed and trained to accommodate relevant

information received by patrols that may not have

been driven by the collection plan but may provide indicators of emerging crime. These findings

will be documented through review of standard

police reports and field interview documentation.

As military police and contractors train their HN

police counterparts, extensive use of joint collection teams and multinational police operations will

aid the training and mentorship of the HN police

and accelerate familiarity with information gathering as specified in the collection plan.

All information gathered must be filed and organized to promote easy retrieval and analysis of

the data to gain maximum benefit. Ideally, the

data will be filed in electronic form within a

secure database. At a minimum, the HN or international police should establish the following

types of files:

z Area. Area files include information on definable geographic areas that have activities of

police interest. Such areas include residential

and recreational—where the general population

might gather and where unfriendly populations

congregate (e.g., drug trafficking or other illicit

activities; areas controlled by criminals or

insurgents to recruit, train or meet; areas that

may provide supplies and equipment to irregular threat forces).

z Activity. Activity files contain all information

of interest to the HN or international police.

These files capture information regarding people, activities, functions, and properties. Military police and contractors cannot necessarily

apply the laws of the United States to these

files, but may use them as a guide in establishing the database for or with the HN or international police. The HN or international police

will need to make the legal determinations

when they assume responsibility of the files.

Such categories of these files may include participants in demonstrations or individuals

involved in other criminal activity.

z Individual. The HN or international police

may develop dossiers on any person considered significant. Individuals are identified as

significant because of their involvement in

activities, leadership, contacts, or type of symbols displayed that reflect religious, economic,

social, or political affiliations. Once they are

in place, the authorizations and legalities of

these files will be determined by the HN or

international authorities.

z Investigative. Investigative files are compiled

by police on individuals who are suspected of a

crime. Military police and contractors should

mentor the HN or international police concerning how to capture information (e.g., forms)

that may be used in MP investigations. This

will assure that critical information is captured

concerning a crime or incident.

Once the database has been established and populated, the military police and HN forces will
4-16 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

establish the types of administrative documentation (e.g., reports) needed and the format that

will provide maximum benefit to the users for

criminal analysis purposes.

Criminal Analysis. The purpose of conducting

analysis of police information is to determine its

police intelligence value. This information is

valuable to US forces, the HN, and the international community. For US forces, it assists commands in protection efforts, mission assurance

support areas, base defense, antiterrorism efforts,

crime prevention measures, counterterrorism,

investigations, and prosecutions. A viable criminal analysis capability allows the HN to identify

criminals, criminal activities and groups, locations of crime and activity, and correlations

between categories of criminal activity and

enables predictive analysis. It is critical to establishing and maintaining a mature and viable

police and investigative organization that can be

effective in enforcing laws and investigating

criminal activity.

Police Station: Highway Patrol

The mission of the highway patrol is to provide

law enforcement and security along highways and

major roadways, ensuring the safety of all citizens, international visitors, and the free flow of

national and international commerce. Military

police should assist in the development of the HN

highway patrol’s capabilities. A part of this development includes designing mutually-supportive

jurisdictional boundaries, which will cross other

national police jurisdictions. By the nature of the

mission, the highway patrol becomes a key conduit of police information across local police

boundaries. The development of a highway patrol

will also assist in US and multinational force freedom-of-movement. Highway patrol officers

should attend the basic police training academy

and receive specialized training focused on their

unique mission. Key tasks for the highway patrol

may include the following:

z Providing deterrence and interdiction of terrorists, weapons, and supplies through active

patrolling of highways.

z Searching, locating, securing, reporting, and

coordinating the timely discovery of explosive

devices.

z Responding rapidly to incidents and accidents

along highways and major roadways.

z Providing emergency first aid.

z Coordinating evacuation of injured persons

and aiding disabled motorists.

z Investigating criminal and traffic complaints and

violations along highways and major roadways.

To aid the HN patrol in the accomplishment of

these key tasks, a comprehensive registry should

be developed to track vehicles and their registered keepers. Military police should assist the

HN police in developing policies, procedures,

and model programs that encourage the effective

and efficient administration of jurisdictional

driver licensing and control requirements. Considerations include the following:

z Facilitating the exchange of ideas and information on issues concerning licensing and control, law enforcement, education, research, and

judicial and governmental communities.

z Promoting liaison with other safety-related

organizations.

z Facilitating the establishment of vehicle licensing and registration as a means of deterring

criminals from disguising stolen cars with the

identity of others.

z Safeguarding personal information to prevent

personal data from being accessed by unauthorized persons. The issue of identification reliability, integrity, and confidentiality is critical

and must be of prime concern to all citizens

and law enforcement officials.
CHAPTER 5

MILITARY WORKING DOG OPERATIONS

The MWD teams are employed in dynamic ways

that continue to evolve into a highly trained asset

that commanders continue to use around the

world. These specialized teams aid commanders

in conducting stability and warfighting operations.

Being modular and mobile makes these teams

very agile, enabling them to deploy rapidly and

allowing them to quickly integrate into operations.

The MWD program effectively integrates expertly

trained MWD handlers and highly intelligent

breeds of dogs that maintain a high tempo of operations in their support of joint operations, multiechelon tasks, and interagency missions. As

technology and world security situations evolve,

the MWD team will continue to adapt in order to

provide commanders the unique capabilities

required to be combat multipliers on the battlefield and support mission assurance efforts.

The Marine Corps MWD program provides varying MWD capabilities that are matched to the

mission or task by the supported commander.

Although all MWDs are different, their detection

and warning capabilities are a combined result of

the MWD’s superior senses of sight, sound, and

smell. The MWDs can be a force multiplier when

properly employed in military operations on

urbanized terrain with the infantry and other

Marines. Failure to match the MWD capabilities

to the mission creates a wasted resource and

increases the potential for failure.

Mission

The MWD teams provide commanders with a

force multiplier in the following areas:

z Explosives detection.

z Drug detection.

z Intruder detection.

z Human tracking.

z Patrolling.

z Nonlethal apprehension of combatants.

z A psychological deterrent.

Organization

The MWD platoon is organized under the MP support company in each MEF. The platoon commander or sergeant, kennel master, assistant

kennel master, training SNCOIC, and chief MWD

trainer provide leadership for the MWD platoon.

The MWD platoon is broken down into three

squads containing all of the MWD disciplines.

These squads provide scalable elements to support

the MAGTF. Each squad has an assigned SNCOIC

squad leader or trainer and a subject matter expert

trainer for each MWD discipline. Each of these

disciplines is unique and requires extensive training in the development of and maintenance of

team proficiency. Because of these unique disciplines, and the extensive training requirements of

the MWD, it is important that command relationships for forward deployed elements of the MWD

platoon are identified prior to deployment. The

MWDs may also be task-organized into detachments of varying sizes and compositions to support other MAGTFs (e.g., SPMAGTFs, MEUs). In

these cases, MWDs should be requested by the

MAGTF commander from the MEF, after analysis of the unit’s mission.

The MWD platoons provide the MAGTF commander with mission capable MWD teams. These

MWD teams, composed of a Marine and an

MWD, are trained as a cohesive element that may

be attached to a ground combat element, logistics

combat element, or aviation combat element—as

an individual team or as part of a larger element

as dictated by the mission.
5-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Capabilities

The MWD’s heightened senses of sight, smell,

and hearing, coupled with obedience and patrol

training by a certified dog handler, provides a significant detection capability, as well as a physical

and psychological deterrent. In addition, the

MWD provides a psychological advantage to the

unit and significantly enhances the commander’s

ability to protect forces and assets. On- and offleash, MWDs provide the commander an added

deterrence factor and the ability to address and

potentially neutralize the threat from IEDs. The

MWDs also enhance the MAGTF’s ability to

locate weapons and explosives caches and conduct

other appropriate missions. Depending upon the

MWD’s type of training, they can also detect and

locate a person or explosives faster than a human

can, even when obstacles, distance, or terrain

might obscure the threat from human detection.

Public knowledge of MWD team detection capabilities provides commanders with a formidable

deterrent wherever the MWD team is employed.

The MWDs are trained for detecting drugs and

explosives, tracking, scouting, patrolling, and

performing building and area searches. Like other

highly specialized equipment, MWDs enable

commanders to perform their mission more effectively with a significant savings of manpower,

time, and money.

Employing MWDs with different capabilities

(see table 5-1) to work together may prove very

effective. For example, during route clearance,

units can use specialized search dogs (SSDs) to

sweep the roads and find caches and combat

tracker dogs (CTDs) to follow the tracks of possible insurgents that were initiated from the site

of an SSD find. When MWDs are collocated

and working as a single unit their effectiveness

is improved

Table 5-1. Military Working Dog Program Capabilities

Assignment by Type of MWD

Operational Task MWD Functions P/DDD P/EDD SSD CTD

Main or alternate supply route Explosive detection and tracking X X X

Inspection Explosive and drug detection X X

Entry control point Explosive, drug detection, and patrol X X X

Quick search Explosive detection X X

Vehicle control point Explosive and drug detection X X X

Cordon and knock Explosive detection, tracking, and patrol X X X

Raid Explosive detection, tracking, and patrol X X X X

High value target Explosive, drug detection, patrol, tracking X X X X

Search and rescue Tracking X

Perimeter security Patrol X X X

Crowd control Patrol X X
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 5-3 

Types of Military Working Dogs

Patrol Dog

Patrol dogs (PDs) can be used as tactical enhancements to support combat operations. The PD in the

Marine Corps is normally dual-certified as either

an explosive detector dog (EDD) or drug detector

dog (DDD). These types of MWDs are referred to

as patrol/explosive detector dog (P/EDD) and

patrol/drug detector dog (P/DDD). The PD teams

enable the commander to employ less Marines and

apply their resources to other areas. This force

multiplier is especially valuable in area security,

force protection, and antiterrorism operations. One

benefit of MWD employment is the deterrence of

criminal activity and/or infiltration. The obvious

presence and well-published activities of MWD

teams can successfully deter trespassers, vandals,

violent persons, infiltrators, and other would-be

criminals. When the desired task is to deter unauthorized or suspicious individuals, an MWD team

should be assigned to that location both day and

night. The PD’s contribution is most effective

when the MWD team is utilized as a walking

patrol. As a walking patrol, the PD team can check

or clear buildings, perimeters, and open areas.

Mobility significantly increases the potential area

of coverage. In addition, PD teams can and should

be utilized as a tool for area defense and providing warning and response. The PDs are trained to

apprehend suspects at or near a crime scene, stop

those who may attempt to escape, and protect their

handlers from harm. Some PDs may also be utilized for the following:

z Supporting antiterrorism operations.

z Supporting force protection and antiterrorism

efforts.

z Assisting in military police investigations.

z Walking and mobile patrols.

z Checking and searching building.

z Identifying and apprehending individuals.

z Locating suspects who have left the scene of a

crime.

z Protecting high-risk personnel.

z Performing area searches.

z Supporting the control of civil disturbances.

z Assisting in perimeter security.

z Detecting external intrusion.

z Assisting the response force.

z Supporting entry control points (ECPs).

z Supporting high-risk targets.

z Patrolling vulnerable areas.

z Performing combat patrols.

z Manning observation posts and listening posts.

z Supporting EPW operations.

Drug Detector Dog

The DDD provides commanders with unique

capabilities in combat support environments.

The DDDs in the Marine Corps are normally

dual-certified with the capability of a PD and is

referred to as a P/DDD. These dual-certified

MWD teams should perform normal patrol

duties when not required for specific detection

work because they can quickly lose their patrol

proficiency if they are not assigned to perform

their full range of capabilities. Commanders

have a very effective means of detecting the possession and/or use of controlled substances with

the employment of a DDD team. The drug detection capabilities of the DDDs can be used to

maintain the order and discipline of US forces as

well as combatants and other persons involved in

operations (e.g., EPWs, DCs, CIs, refugees,

other detained/interred persons during time of

war or conflict). Commanders should request

drug detector support when drug use or exposure to illicit drugs are anticipated or suspected

in the following environments:

z Contingency and combat operations.

z Low intensity conflicts.

z Extended deployments.

z Whenever Marines come in regular contact

with civilians.
5-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

The DDD is trained to detect the odor and location of the source of illicit drugs and drug-associated paraphernalia. In order to maximize the

accuracy of the DDD’s response, the DDD will

not be trained to detect explosives. The DDDs are

trained to recognize the scent of certain illegal

substances through a program of practice and

reward. When the DDD responds on any of the

substances the DDD is trained to detect, the

MWD handler will provide an appropriate reward.

The DDDs are not employed to search people.

The DDD teams can be utilized for the following: 

z Investigations.

z Health and welfare inspections.

z Barrack searches.

z Workplace searches.

z Random gate inspections.

z Area searches.

z Vehicle searches.

z Postal support.

z Aircraft and luggage searches.

z US customs searches.

z Predeployment and redeployment searches.

Explosive Detector Dog

The EDD is trained to detect the odor and location of the source of an explosive. In the Marine

Corps, EDDs are normally dual-certified with the

capability of a PD. This type of MWD is referred

to as a P/EDD. In order to maximize the accuracy of the EDD’s response, the EDD will not be

trained to detect drugs. These dual-certified

MWD teams should perform normal patrol duties

when not required for specific detection work

because they can quickly lose their patrol proficiency if they are not assigned to perform their

full range of capabilities. The EDD teams are

critical when conducting searches or performing

investigations involving explosives to ensure personnel and facilities are safe and protected from

would-be terrorists. The EDD teams are particularly useful if there is a requirement to locate one

or more explosive item(s) that may have been

hidden in an area. The EDDs should not be used

once a suspicious item has been identified or to

confirm suspicious items. If there is reason to

believe an item contains explosives, explosive

ordnance disposal should be employed. The

deterrent value and the detection capabilities of

EDD teams are a very effective countermeasure

to terrorism. Public knowledge that EDD teams

are in use is a deterrent to persons who may try to

use explosives illegally. The knowledge that

explosives can be detected by EDD teams at

entry points or in places where explosives have

been hidden can prevent a person from attempting to commit a terrorist act. An EDD team can

conduct a significantly more effective search of

an area or facility in a much shorter time than a

large number of personnel can. Using EDD teams

reduces the potential risks associated with explosive searches, while enhancing detection results.

The EDDs are not to be used to search people.

The EDD teams can be utilized for the following:

z Bomb threat incidents.

z ECP searches.

z Checkpoint searches.

z Random gate searches.

z Investigations.

z Health and welfare inspections.

z Building and area searches.

z Vehicle searches.

z Postal support.

z Aircraft and luggage searches. 

z Predeployment and redeployment searches.

z Protective services missions.

Specialized Search Dog

The SSDs are trained off-leash to detect the odor

and presence of specific explosives. This specialized ability makes the SSD a valuable tool to help

commanders maintain law and order while

enhancing safety procedures. The SSD can be

employed as an antiterrorism and force protection

asset or in combat operations worldwide. The

SSDs are single-purpose MWDs that detect IEDs,

explosive components, and weapon caches onand off-leash, up to 100 plus meters from the
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 5-5 

MWD handler. The SSDs may be utilized to

search on-leash, but this is not the preferred

method. The SSDs are capable of searching vehicles, buildings, roadways, and open areas. They

are primarily used in support of the operating

force but may be employed in-garrison as an

EDD. The SSDs provide the commander a viable

asset in detecting IEDs, explosives and explosive

components, and weapons caches off-leash. The

SSDs may be directed (i.e., controlled) through the

search pattern by voice command, hand and arm

signals, a combination of both, or voice command

via radio. The SSDs should not be used to search

people but may be utilized for the following: 

z Bomb threat incidents.

z Checkpoint searches.

z Investigations.

z Health and welfare inspections.

z Building and area searches.

z Postal support.

z Aircraft and luggage searches.

z Predeployment and redeployment searches.

z Protective services missions.

z ECP searches. (This is not a preferred use

because the EDD is better suited to this task

and it eliminates specialization of SSD.)

z Random gate searches. (This is not a preferred

use because the EDD is better suited to this task

and it eliminates specialization of SSD.)

Combat Tracker Dog

The CTDs are a single purpose MWD: they provide the commander with the capability of tracking. When supporting the operating force, the

CTD can re-establish contact with ECs, relocate

friendly personnel, or conduct reconnaissance of

an area. The CTDs are capable of working in both

urban and rural environments, day or night. If a

CTD is required to work at night, night vision

should be provided to the handler, enabling him to

read the dog’s alerts. The CTD will track humans

(i.e., groups and specific individuals) and may

alert on a human presence (i.e., strongest scent

and specific scent). The CTD will close on the

quarry using the strongest scent—groundborne,

windborne, or waterborne. A CTD can track in or

over vegetation, routes, sand, water, concrete, and

asphalt. To conduct a successful track, a CTD

needs an adequate starting point that is not contaminated with extraneous humans. Because of

the nature of casting and conducting a track when

employed in a combat zone, the CTD team

requires dedicated security and cover as the handler is focused entirely on controlling the animal.

The CTDs are capable of tracking the following:

z Enemy personnel:

 Makers of IEDs and explosives.

 Planters of IEDs and explosives.

 Handlers of IED and explosives.

 Enemy personnel from points of origin.

 Snipers (including while hidden).

 Fleeing enemy personnel (maintaining contact).

z Friendly personnel:

 Who are lost.

 Missing in action.

 Taken as a prisoner.

Supported Unit

Questions for the MWD Handler

The MWDs’ capabilities will vary from team to

team, depending upon experience, training, and

the dog-handler relationship. To enhance the

employment of MWD teams, supported units

should answer the following questions in order to

understand the MWD team’s capability:

z What is the MWD’s endurance level—how

long will he be able to work?

z What odors are the MWD trained to detect?

z What types of missions has the MWD previously performed?

z How well does the MWD work off-leash?

z Is the MWD aggressive toward Marines?

z Is the MWD aggressive toward civilians?

z How well does the MWD travel in vehicles?

z Has the MWD ever been transported via helicopter?
5-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

z How well does the MWD work at night?

z What is the MWD’s maximum effective offleash distance?

z What action does the MWD take upon finding

a suspected target?

z What is the MWD’s medical condition?

z How much water and food does the MWD

consume daily?

z What is the MWD’s reaction to gunfire?

z How is the MWD rewarded?

z How will the MWD react if his handler is

wounded or killed, and what actions should be

taken if this does occur?

z How is the MWD team-certified?

z How experienced is the handler?

z How can the MWD team be integrated with a

fire team, squad, or platoon?

z What are the required and/or recommended

work and rest cycles in order to maintain the

MWD’s effectiveness?

z What is required if a MWD bites someone?

Planning Considerations

When MWD teams are employed they participate in all phases of the unit’s mission; therefore.

it is essential that the kennel master, handler, MP

staff officer or SNCO, MP support company

commander, or PM participate in mission planning. The handler and the kennel master may also

recommend ways to use the MWD team. In addition to the commander’s concept and mission,

enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available-time available, the handler must consider the following:

z Length of tactical employment.

z Climate and environment.

z Location and size of area to be covered.

z Condition and type of terrain.

z Prevailing wind direction.

Combat operations require the handler’s full

attention to maintain focus on working and controlling their MWDs. This severely reduces the

handler’s ability to employ his weapon rapidly

and effectively if enemy contact occurs; therefore, the MWD team operates within the “buddy

system” concept used on all Marine Corps combat operations. Because the handler is almost

totally focused on his dog, it is in the best interests of all concerned to assign a two-man buddy

team to the handler so they can maintain the

mutual support and all-encompassing security

necessary in a combat, contingency, or military

operations on urbanized terrain environment.

 WARNING

Units employing MWDs must establish procedures for use of weapons to ensure MWDs are

not accidentally shot and to protect them

from indigenous personnel and animals.

Usually MWD teams work in front of or on the

flanks of other personnel or the protected facility,

but not so far that the accompanying Marines cannot provide security for the team. The team should

be downwind from potential locations or avenues

of approach of the person(s) and/or explosive(s) to

be detected. This improves the chances of providing early warning. If the MWD team is supporting a patrol that is moving directly into the wind,

the team may have to move left or right of a lineof-march to take advantage of the prevailing wind.

If the situation or terrain dictates, the MWD team

can traverse while the supported unit continues on

a direct route.

The MWD handlers must socialize the dog into

the supported unit immediately. The handler is

responsible for training the dog to be tolerant and

obedient, regardless of the environment. Familiarity with members of the unit will reduce

aggression toward unit personnel. In order to

maintain discipline of the MWD, supported unit

personnel must strictly adhere to the following:

z Do not feed the MWD. Only the handler is

authorized to feed the MWD.

z Do not play with or pet the MWD, except

under the handler’s direct supervision.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 5-7 

z Do not make any move or gesture that an

MWD may interpret as a threat to his handler.

z Do not think of the MWD as a pet or mascot.

The MWD team should rehearse with the supported unit prior to a mission so that everyone

can become accustomed to working with the

MWD. Supported unit personnel must know what

to do if a handler is seriously wounded or killed.

A MWD that has worked closely with a supported unit and developed a tolerance for one or

more of the individuals will usually allow one of

them to return it to the kennel. If the MWD will

not allow anyone near its handler, other handlers

must be called in to assist.

Normally handlers are armed with a sidearm and

may carry a weapon with a sling. These weapons

are primarily for the defense of the handler and

the MWD. The handler focuses on working and

controlling the MWD. The recommended weapon

for a MWD handler is the M-4 because the

shorter length of the weapon provides the handler more flexibility and movement while working the MWD during an operation. The shorter

barrel of the M-4 also prevents the MWD from

being struck in the head during operations.

Both training and health present unique planning

considerations. Training must be considered

while conducting field training and during

deployments. Training aids, such as explosives

and/or narcotics, are required to maintain MWD

team proficiency. Finding and employing a site to

effectively train, kennel, and provide medical

treatment must also be taken into consideration.

While an MWD team may be employed in various austere environments, it is essential to provide veterinary support if the care required is

beyond the capabilities of the handler.

Transportation

The MWD team can be transported by ground,

air, or water. In both combat and garrison, the

allocation of transportation assets is essential to

allow for effective employment, training, and

care. During training, the ability to transport

MWD to training sites, as well as to veterinary

facilities, must be planned for and adequately

sourced. During tactical missions when the MWD

is not being employed, the preferred method of

kenneling is to keep the MWD in a kennel crate if

possible and supportable; however, it is understood there will be times when this will not be

possible or supportable. The kennel crate can be

taken apart, but the load plan must take into

account that the MWD team requires additional

space in the transportation vehicle. Advantages

and disadvantages of transporting the MWD in

the kennel crate include the following: 

z Advantages:

 MWD handler can man a weapon if necessary.

 Better for the MWD’s rest management.

 Safety of friendly forces is enhanced (e.g.,

eliminates the potential for the MWD biting

a Marine).

z Disadvantages:

 Logistical footprint (i.e., ability to be transported in the field).

 The MWD may be isolated from the supported unit, limiting camaraderie and cohesion.

The MWD can be transported by a variety of

means, ranging from tactical aircraft to armored

vehicles. However, in each case, the safety of

both the MWD and the vehicle crew must be considered. For example, in an M1114 up-armored

HMMWV [high-mobility multipurpose wheeled

vehicle], the placement of the MWD may interfere with the operation of the turret gunner, especially if the kennel crate is employed. The MRAP

[mine-resistant ambush-protected] armored vehicles also provide unique challenges because of

the layout of seating and the elevation of the crew

compartment. A medium tactical vehicle replacement should be used for transport only as a last

resort because of the extreme height of the troop

compartment and the lack of environmental controls. The MWD can safely travel in all types of

assault support aircraft. Consideration should be

made to allow handlers to control the MWD
5-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

effectively without interfering with aircrew operations. In some cases, the MWD may require

being transported on aircraft without the advantage of the kennel crate. It is essential that the aircrew and other passengers are briefed concerning

the safety considerations involving the MWD.

When MWDs are transported by ships or are

embarked for amphibious operations, the MWDs

should be kenneled in their kennel crate. A designated area should be established so that personnel other than MWD handlers do not have access

to the MWDs. When possible and feasible, the

preferred method would be for the MWD teams

to fly and meet the unit at a deployed location.

Veterinary Support

The US Army Surgeon General provides professional veterinary support for the entire MWD

program through the Army Veterinary Corps.

This responsibility includes the following:

z Providing medical and surgical care.

z Conducting inspections to ensure that MWD

kennel facilities are safe and sanitary.

z Prescribing an adequate feeding program for

MWDs.

z Instructing handlers and supervisors in all matters related to the health of MWDs, including

first aid for MWDs.

z Conducting research to improve the DOD

MWD program.

The responsible veterinary corps officer (VCO)

provides treatment for the diseased or injured

MWD at the kennel facility or at the installation

veterinary treatment facility. The US Army Veterinary Corps is responsible for equipping the veterinary treatment facility and providing medical and

surgical supplies. The VCO is responsible for the

MWD veterinary treatment record and related

information about examinations, immunizations,

and treatment. The VCO instructs MWD handlers about dog health, care, feeding, and first aid.

This instruction helps the MWD handler to

develop a better understanding of the MWD’s

health needs and improves the MWD handler's

ability to care for the MWD. The VCO prescribes an appropriate feeding program based

upon the MWD's health, the climate, and working conditions. The VCO is involved in the

review of all plans for new MWD kennel facility

construction or modifications. This ensures that

potential health and safety hazards can be corrected before construction begins.

In the combat environment, the PM or kennel

master must coordinate with the responsible VCO

to ensure proper support. Additionally, MWDs

must be routinely evaluated prior to and after

employment, like any other Marine. In some theaters, the use of prophylactic medications is

required for preventative medicine purposes. The

effective coordination and planning with the VCO

is required to maintain both combat effectiveness

and readiness.

Medical Concerns

The MWD handler is trained to know how and

when to use items deployed in the first aid kit.

For example, he can assist with intravenous fluids, sutures, medications, and splints with the

help of a corpsman. The most common medical

concerns for MWDs are overheating, diarrhea,

cuts, abrasions, and eye irritations. A wounded or

sick MWD may be evacuated by air if necessary.

Environment

Some environmental situations severely restrict or

prohibit the use of MWDs. Before employing

MWDs, the following factors should be considered:

z MWD employment near petroleum, oils, and

lubricants must be limited. These elements can

damage a MWD’s paws and affect his sense of

smell.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 5-9 

z MWDs are prohibited from areas contaminated

with chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear (CBRN) agents because there are no

protective devices for them.

z MWDs may work in open areas where riot

control agents are in use if the wind velocity is

normal; however, they should be closely monitored and taken to a veterinarian if they show

signs of distress.

Other environmental concerns may also impact

the use of the MWD. In some theaters, the presence of disease carrying vectors, feral animals,

and other circumstances (e.g., heat, humidity,

amount of water, type of soil) may pose risks to

MWD that may hinder effective employment.

Field Kennels

An MWD field kennel may be constructed out of

any available resources. The design is not standard and varies from site to site, depending upon

the location, mission, and duration of operations. Using a concept similar to constructing

fighting positions, the MWD field kennel will be

improved as needed or until a permanent MWD

kennel facility is completed. Using tents and

shipping crates may be a hasty method of setting

up an MWD field kennel. Although this method

is not optimal for sustained operations, it may be

useful until other accommodations can be coordinated. Kenneling of MWDs and billeting of

Marines, excluding handlers, should be separate.

The tents should be erected at a location that

allows the MWDs a safe place to rest away from

other troop activities after operations. Whenever

possible, terrain or buildings should be used as a

barrier between troop activity and the MWD

field kennel. Never place the MWD field kennel

near motor pools, dining facilities, or high noise

areas. In some areas of operation, it may be possible to obtain the use of a building or other

structure for temporary kenneling. In these cases,

the building must be well-ventilated, free of hazards (e.g., chemicals, bare wires, holes, debris)

and structurally sound. Engineers are often used

to assist in the improvement of a MWD field

kennel. In addition, fencing should be erected

and dog runs created. Procedures for using a

shipping crate (e.g., Vari Kennel, kennel crate)

as temporary kenneling of a MWD are detailed

as follows:

z The interior, exterior, and ground beneath the

shipping crate must be cleaned daily to prevent

the accumulation of moisture, waste, or insect

infestation.

z The shipping crate must be raised 4 to 6 inches

off the ground to allow for adequate drainage

and to reduce parasite-breeding environments.

z In hot climates, place the shipping crate under

trees with a tarpaulin or plywood to provide

shade and ventilation. Adequate shade and

cover must be provided for the MWD. Kennel

areas should be cleared of all objects that can

injure the MWD.

z Spread gravel, if available, around and under

the shipping crate to allow for drainage and the

easy removal of solid waste.
CHAPTER 6

LIMITED DETAINEE OPERATIONS

United States forces must recognize that the ability to determine detainee intent will be increasingly more complex in the future. It may be

difficult to determine the identity of the enemy.

Civilians may lose their protective status by taking

an active and direct part in hostilities. Detainees,

current and future, understand how their behavior

can influence decisions up to and including the

national level, which may divert the efforts of the

military detention operations.

Detainee operations are conducted to enhance

MAGTF effectiveness when faced with large

prisoner and detainee control responsibilities.

Through the use of collection points and holding

areas, military police provide the commander

with the ability to collect, process, guard, protect, account for, and transfer EPWs and CIs.

Military police enhance the tempo of operations

by effecting the quick control and evacuation of

prisoners from the forward battle area to temporary holding areas and, in joint operations, to US

Army EPW and CI holding facilities. In addition,

military police aid in the movement of forces by

clearing the AO of EPWs and CIs.

For additional information concerning detainee operations, see MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War,

Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other

Detainees, and MCWP 5-12.1, The Commander’s

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations.

The Geneva Conventions

Detainee operations are governed by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which were ratified by the United States and came into force for

the United States on 2 February 1956. Comprised

of four treaties, the Geneva Conventions provide

internationally recognized humanitarian standards

for the treatment of victims of war. It is DOD policy to comply with the law of war during all

armed conflicts. Therefore, the United States is

obligated to adhere to the Geneva Conventions

and the law of war during all armed conflicts.

However, such conflicts are characterized, and

present in all other military operations regarding

the treatment of EPWs, CIs, and detained persons.

Geneva Convention (I) for the

Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field

This Convention provides for the protection of

members of armed forces and other persons who

are wounded and sick on the battlefield. It provides for members of the conflict to take all possible measures to—

z Search for and collect the wounded and sick.

z Protect them against pillage and ill treatment.

z Ensure their adequate care.

z Search for the dead and prevent their being

despoiled.

Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration

of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 

Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea

This Convention deals with the humane treatment and protection by the parties to a conflict

that involve armed forces members and other persons at sea who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked and the protection of hospital ships and

burial at sea.

Geneva Convention (III) Relative to

the Treatment of Prisoners of War

The governing motive of this Convention is to

provide for the humane treatment of EPWs by the
6-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

parties involved in a conflict. It regulates, in detail,

the treatment of EPWs, including the following:

z Care, food, clothing, and housing.

z Discipline and punishment.

z Labor and pay.

z External relations.

z Representation.

z International exchange of information.

z Termination of captivity.

Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

This Convention deals with the general protection

of populations against the consequences of war,

the status and treatment of protected persons, and

the treatment of CIs.

Protection Provisions

of the Geneva Convention

The provisions of the Geneva Convention provide

the EPWs and CIs with the applicable and entitled protections from their time of capture until

release or repatriation. 

The EPW or CI must receive humane treatment

without distinction founded on race, sex, nationality, religious belief, political opinions, or other

similar criteria. The EPWs or CIs may not be

murdered, mutilated, tortured, and degraded.

Individuals and capturing nations are responsible

for acts committed against EPWs and CI that are

in violation of the Geneva Convention. 

The EPWs and CIs are entitled to respect and

honor as human beings. They are to be protected

against acts of violence, insults, public curiosity,

and reprisals. They are not to be subjected to

physical mutilation or to medical or scientific

experimentation, only normal medical, dental, or

hospital treatment. 

No form of coercion may be inflicted upon

EPWs and CIs to obtain information. Those who

refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted,

or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous

treatment. Female EPWs and CIs are to receive

treatment at least as favorable as that accorded to

male EPWs and CIs.

United States Governing

Policy of the Geneva Convention

In accordance with the Geneva Convention, US

policy directs that EPWs and other enemy personnel captured, interned, detained, or held in

custody during the course of a conflict shall be

afforded humanitarian care and treatment from

the moment of custody until final release or repatriation. The observance of this policy is binding

on US personnel.

This policy also applies to the protection of

detained or interned personnel whether their status is that of prisoner of war, CIs, or a criminal

suspected of a war crime. The punishment of

criminals is administered by due process of law

and under legally constituted authority. The

administration of inhumane treatment, even if

committed under stress of combat and with deep

provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under national law, international law, and

the UCMJ.

Personnel Categories

Detainees

The term detainee means any person captured,

detained, held, or otherwise under the control of

DOD personnel (military, civilian, or contractor).

Detainees may also include ECs (lawful [i.e.,

EPWs] and unlawful), RPs, and CIs (see DODD

2310.01E). It does not include personnel being

held for law enforcement purposes, except where

the United States is the occupying power.

Enemy Combatants

An EC is a person engaged in hostilities against

the United States or its coalition partners during
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 6-3 

an armed conflict. The term EC includes both

lawful ECs and unlawful ECs.

Lawful ECs, who are entitled to protections

under the Geneva Convention, include members

of the regular armed forces of a state party to the

conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized

resistance movements belonging to a state party

to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable

at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide

by the laws of war; and members of regular

armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the

detaining power.

Lawful ECs are EPWs upon capture, and they are

entitled to combatant immunity for their lawful

precapture warlike acts. They may be prosecuted,

however, for violations of the law of war. If so

prosecuted, they still retain their status as EPWs.

Unlawful ECs are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in or support acts

against the United States or its coalition partners

in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of the war on

terrorism, the term unlawful EC is defined to

include, but is not limited to, an individual who is

or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda

forces or associated forces that are engaged in

hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.

Enemy Prisoners of War

Captured enemy personnel may be presumed to

be EPWs immediately upon capture if they are

armed and uniformed. See MCO 3461.1 for more

information. Captured personnel must receive the

same treatment to which EPWs are entitled until

competent military authority has determined that

their status is otherwise. The Geneva Convention

defines EPWs as the following:

z Members of the enemy armed forces, as well

as members of militias or volunteer corps

forming part of such armed forces.

z Members of other militias and members of

other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to an

enemy power and operating in or outside their

own territory, even if this territory is occupied,

provided that such militias or volunteer corps,

including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: 

 That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

 That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance. 

 That of carrying arms openly.

 That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

z Members of enemy regular armed forces who

profess allegiance to a government or an

authority not recognized by the detaining

power.

z Persons who accompany the armed forces of

the enemy without actually being members

thereof, such as civilian members of military

aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units, or of services

responsible for the welfare of the enemy armed

forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they are

accompanying.

z Members of crews, including masters, pilots,

and apprentices, of the merchant marine and

the crews of civil aircraft of the enemy power,

who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

z Inhabitants of nonoccupied territory, who, on

the approach of US forces, spontaneously take

up arms to resist the invading forces, without

having had time to form themselves into regular

armed units, provided they carry arms openly

and respect the laws and customs of war.

z Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the

armed forces of a country occupied by US

forces, if the commander considers it necessary

by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even

though they may have been originally liberated

from EPW status while hostilities were going on

outside the occupied territory.
6-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Civilian Internees

A CI is a civilian who is interned during an

armed conflict, occupation, or other military

operation for security reasons, for protection, or

because he has committed an offense against the

detaining power. Such individuals, unless they

have committed acts for which they are considered unlawful combatants, generally qualify for

protected status in accordance with the Geneva

Convention, which also establishes procedures

that must be observed when depriving such civilians of their liberty. The CIs are to be accommodated separately from EPWs and persons

deprived of liberty for any other reason.

Retained Person

An RP is a special category for medical personnel

and chaplains because of their special skills and

training. Although they are not EPWs, they may

be retained by the detaining power to aid EPWs,

preferably those of the armed force to which the

RP belongs. Per the Geneva Convention, RPs will

receive the same benefits and protection as

EPWs. An RP is a person who falls within one of

the following categories:

z A person who is a member of the medical service of an enemy armed force.

z A medical person of an enemy force exclusively engaged in—

 Searching, collecting, transporting, or treating wounded or sick personnel.

 Preventing disease.

 Administering a medical unit or establishment.

z A chaplain attached to an enemy armed force.

z A member of the International Federation of

Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or

another voluntary aid organization. The organization must be duly recognized and authorized

by its government. The staff may be employed

in the same duties as medical personnel if the

organization is subject to military laws and

regulations.

The following privileges and considerations are

extended to RPs because of their professions:

z Correspondence privileges that are over and

above those afforded to EPWs.

z Facilities to provide medical care, spiritual

assistance, and welfare services to EPWs.

z Transportation for periodic visits to EPW

branch internment or resettlement facilities and

hospitals outside the EPW internment or resettlement facility to carry out medical, spiritual,

and welfare duties.

z Work assignments that are restricted to medical and religious duties that they are qualified

to perform.

z Quarters that are separate from EPW quarters,

when practicable.

United States Military Confinees

Military police have a continuing mission to

detain, sustain, protect, and evacuate US military

confinees. In CONUS, corrections specialists are

the primary performers of this mission.

During contingency operations, a corrections

detachment is the ideal organization to perform

US military prisoner internment operations. The

US Army is the executive agent for US military

prisoners. These confinees must be segregated

from the EPWs and CIs and evacuated as rapidly

as possible to a US Army facility.

During a deployment or contingency operation,

when possible, Marines awaiting trial remain

with their respective units unless they are a hazard to the mission, themselves, or others. In these

cases, they are detained in pretrial confinement

under MP control. These confinees are moved to

confinement facilities outside the combat zone

when possible.

Dislocated Civilians

A DC is a civilian who left his homes for various

reasons. His movements and physical presence

can hinder military operations and he most likely
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 6-5 

requires some degree of aid (e.g., medicine,

food, shelter, clothing). A DC may not be native

to the area or to the country where he is residing. Dislocated civilian is a generic term that is

further subdivided into the following categories: 

z Displaced person. A displaced person has been

dislocated because of war, a natural disaster, or

political or economic turmoil. Consequently,

the motivation for civilians to flee and establish status under international and domestic

laws may vary, as does the degree of assistance

required, and the location for relief operations. 

z Refugee. The United Nations Convention

Relating to the Status of Refugees states that a

refugee is a person who “owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion, is

outside the country of his nationality, and is

unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to

avail himself of the protection of that country.”

z Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian who is

removed from his place of residence by military direction because of personal security or

other requirements of the military situation.

z Stateless person. A stateless person is a civilian

who has been denationalized, whose country of

origin cannot be determined, or who cannot

establish his right to the nationality claimed.

z War victim. A war victim is a civilian who suffered an injury, a loss of a family member, or

damage to or destruction of his home because

of war.

z Migrant. A migrant is a worker who moves

from one region to another—by chance,

instinct, or plan.

z Internally displaced person. An internally displaced person may have been forced to flee his

home for the same reasons as a refugee, but he

has not crossed an internationally recognized

border.

z Expellee. An expellee is a civilian who is outside the boundaries of his country of nationality

or ethnic origin and is being forcibly repatriated to that country or a third country for political or other purposes.

Until their status is determined, the DCs are initially processed and handled the same as EPWs

and CIs. Civil affairs units, in coordination with

HN authorities, work to resettle DCs and refugees. Military police support these efforts by

assisting in the collection, evacuation, and resettlement of these persons. During operations, military police ensure that DC and refugee traffic

does not adversely affect military maneuver and

mobility by redirecting these persons out of

harm’s way. The DC camps are established in the

same manner as EPW and CI facilities. When

detainees are contained in a facility for extended

periods, dissatisfaction and restlessness may

result. Commanders and military police should

expect and be prepared for demonstrations, disturbances, or riots. Effective communication and

rumor control measures, coupled with professional, humane treatment by security forces, will

minimize the possibility and severity of disturbances in the internee population.

Military police conduct straggler control operations to assist commanders in maintaining combat strength by locating and returning stragglers to

their units. Military police locate stragglers at

TCPs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles, or while

on patrol. For large numbers of stragglers, special

posts and collection points are set up along MSRs

or military police can operate straggler posts at

established TCPs, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

To expedite movement on MSRs, military police

conduct DC control operations. Although the HN

usually takes measures to control the movement

of their populations during a conflict, a massive

flow of civilians can seriously affect the movement or security of military units. If needed, military police redirect or prevent the movement of

civilians when their location, direction of movement, or actions hinder military activity. During

control operations, military police direct DCs to

secondary roadways and areas not being used by

military forces.
6-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Detainee Operations

Objectives of Detainee Operations

Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention,

a capturing power is responsible, from the

moment of capture or apprehension, for proper

and humane treatment of detainees. The use of

biometric systems should be leveraged during all

phases of detention operations for optimum organizational purposes. The EPW and CI detainment operations must provide for—

z Implementation of the Geneva Convention

provisions.

z Humane and efficient care and full accountability for persons captured or detained

because of foreign military or related operations.

z Appropriate support of the military objectives

of the United States.

Principles of Detainee Operations

To achieve detainee operations objectives, military police employ the following principles:

z Employ humane treatment.

z Support prompt evacuation from the combat

zone.

z Provide instruction to troops on the provisions

of international agreements and regulations

relating to EPWs and CIs.

z Support integration of procedures for EPW

and CI evacuation, control, and administration

with other combat, combat support, and combat service support operations.

Detainee Functions

Military police, via the PM or MP staff officer,

assist the MAGTF commander in the development of plans, policies, and procedures pertaining

to EPWs and CIs. During operations, military

police focus their efforts on collecting, safeguarding, processing, evacuating, and transferring

EPWs and CIs. Specific guidance on legal and

capturing unit requirements for EPW handling

procedures can be found in MCO 3461.1.

Detention

Although detainees are normally interned by the

US Army, in some situations the Marine Corps

may be assigned a detention mission. Detainees

are selectively assigned to appropriate detention

facilities that best meet the needs of the detaining power and the detainee. Some detainees

(e.g., ECs) that hold violent opposing ideologies

are held in separate facilities in an effort to isolate them from the general population and preempt any unforeseen problems. Once they have

been assigned to a facility, they may be further

segregated because of nationality, language, or

other reasons. Within each facility, detainees are

further segregated into the following categories:

z Leaders—both perceived status and positions

of authority.

z Hostile elements (e.g., mutually hostile religious, political, ethnic groups).

z Security risks (e.g., agitators, radicals, uncooperative detainees).

z Suspected criminals.

z Civilian from military.

z Military by rank (i.e., officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted).

z Deserters and those who surrendered from

those who resisted capture.

z Minors and females. If possible, keep small

children with their mothers.

z Adult males.

z Groups of CIs, RPs, or EC, if known.

z Nationality.

z Other persons (not noted in one of the previous

categories).

When segregating detainees by the preceding categories they may be further assigned to separate

compounds. Females are always interned in compounds separate from males. Further separation

may be necessary, depending upon security issues.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 6-7 

As general policy for the conduct and sustainment

of detainee operations at detention facilities, educational, religious, recreational, safety, agricultural,

and employment and work programs should be

encouraged and supported. These programs will be

based upon practicality, operational considerations, and type of detainees held. When possible,

adequate facilities, instructional materials, and recreational equipment will be provided for such

activities.

Civilian Internee Operations

Military police collect, process, evacuate, safeguard, and, if established, transfer CIs to US

Army internment camps. The handling of CIs and

EPWs is similar; however, CIs are normally not

processed or interned with EPWs. The CI camps

provide for separate internment and complete

administration of interned civilians. These camps

are operated in the same manner as EPW facilities, with regard given to the fundamental differences between the two categories. For example,

special consideration is given to the age, physical

condition, and the ability of civilians to adjust to

detainment conditions. Separate quarters are provided for family groups when the detainment of

more than one member of a family is necessary.

The conditions for internment of civilian persons

in a CI camp is authorized and directed if such

persons satisfy the requirements for CI status and

one of the following two conditions applies:

z Internment has been determined by competent

authority to be necessary for imperative reasons of security to US forces in the occupied

territory.

z Internment has been directed by a properly

constituted military court, sitting in the occupied territory, as the sentence for the conviction

of an offense in violation of penal provisions

properly promulgated by the occupying force.

Detainee Processing

Depending upon the number of EPWs and CIs

anticipated, military police are likely to require

augmentation. An MP platoon can guard up to

500 captives and a company can guard up to 2,000

during limited, short-term detainee operations at a

collection point or temporary holding area. During

detainee operations, military police—

z Perform security tasks (e.g., searching, segregating).

z Conduct field processing (e.g., security, medical, evacuation)

z Execute collection control measures (e.g., deliver

detainees).

Security Tasks

Military police receive EPWs and CIs from operating forces as far forward as possible. When

receiving prisoners, military police perform the

security tasks detailed in the following paragraphs.

Receiving and Securing

The detainee is received from the capturing command and secured to prevent escape, or harm to

the detainee or capturing unit personnel. Restraint

devices are applied to limit detainee movement

and prepare for additional processing. Military

police treat EPWs and CIs humanely, but firmly,

at all times. To maintain control and ensure

understanding, military police issue instructions

to EPWs and CIs in their native language. These

instructions also include a warning of the serious

consequences that may result from violations of

such instructions. While detained, captives may

complain about the food, clothing, living conditions, or their treatment. Displays of conflict must

be brought under control quickly and properly

and the offenders segregated and isolated. By

quickly restoring order using the force continuum,

military police can maintain effective control of
6-8 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

EPWs and CIs. Excessive force provides the captives a rallying point for future disturbances and

can be the basis for enemy propaganda. To

counter disruptions, military police develop and

rehearse plans for defusing tense situations, handling unruly captives, and quelling riots.

Searching

The detainee is searched to neutralize him by

confiscation of weapons, personal items, and

items of potential intelligence or evidentiary

value. Military police search each EPW and CI as

soon as they are captured or received and whenever custody is transferred. Searching is conducted for the safety of friendly forces and

detained persons; to gather information; and to

confiscate weapons, documents, and contraband

ensuring that procedures for evidence collection

and property accountability are strictly followed.

Tagging

Each detainee will be tagged using DD Form

2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture

Tag, which provides the only official detainee

tracking number prior to receiving an internment

serial number (ISN). All confiscated items will be

linked to the detainee using the ISN. 

Segregating

Military police segregate EPWs and CIs into separate groups of officers, noncommissioned officers,

enlisted, civilians, and males and females. Segregation, and the resulting interruption of the enemy

chain of command, is crucial to the security and

control of prisoners. Detainees are prevented from

communicating with one another or from making

audible clamor, such as chanting, singing, or praying. Uncooperative detainees are silenced by muffling them as appropriate. The EPWs and CIs may

also be silenced to prevent them from planning

escapes or disruptions.

Safeguarding

Safeguarding refers to the MP obligation to protect the safety of detainees and ensure the custody

and integrity of confiscated items. Military police

must safeguard detainees against combat hazards, from conflict with each other, and from

improper treatment. Military police also safeguard EPWs and CIs by ensuring that they

receive humane treatment. It is the responsibility

of the unit that captures and holds detained persons to ensure their safety throughout all phases

of detention operations.

Evacuating

Military police quickly transport detainees from

their point of capture to collection points to avoid

risks associated with that location. Speedy

removal from familiar surroundings lessens the

likelihood of an attempted escape and reduces the

exposure of the detainee to the battlefield. To

facilitate the rapid movement of EPWs and CIs to

collection points, military police make maximum

use of available transportation.

Field Processing

During the performance of their security tasks,

military police are responsible for field processing of the detainees (e.g., medical care, evacuation, temporary holding areas).

Proper field processing of detainees, EPWs, CIs,

and their associated evidence and property is

essential for security and effective control of prisoners and intelligence gathering purposes. Processing also helps to establish the condition and

welfare requirements of detainees, EPWs, and CIs.

Field processing actions include the following:

z Individual searches.

z Segregation and interrogation.

z Sanitation.

z Medical care.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 6-9 

z Classification.

z Evacuation.

z Temporary holding areas.

z Security.

Individual Searches

Immediately upon capture, detainees, EPWs, and

CIs must be disarmed and searched for concealed

weapons and for equipment and documents of

particular intelligence value. Detainees should be

searched each time custody is transferred and

searches should be documented.

During this phase of processing, items that may

be of interest to intelligence personnel are confiscated by the military police and turned over to

interrogation teams. Military police work closely

with military intelligence teams to determine if

captives and their equipment have intelligence

value. Normally military police permit detainees,

EPWs, and CIs to retain personal effects while

retaining and documenting unauthorized items

and contraband in accordance with theater regulations and the MAGTF SOP. Examples of personal

items that are normally permitted to be retained

on the detainee’s person include the following:

z Money.

z Valuables.

z Protective equipment (e.g., helmets, protective

masks).

z Articles used for clothing or eating, with the

exception of knives and forks.

z Identification cards or tags.

z Badges of grade and nationality.

z Articles having a personal or sentimental value,

to include religious items.

Segregation and Interrogation

Only trained and certified intelligence personnel

will conduct intelligence interrogations. In accordance with DODD 3115.09, DOD personnel

responsible for detention operations, including

military police, security forces, master at arms,

and other individuals providing security for

detainees, are responsible for ensuring the safety

and well-being of detainees in their custody in

accordance with applicable law and policy. They

will not directly participate in the conduct of

intelligence interrogations.

Sanitation

Military police provide detainees, EPWs, and CI

with sanitation facilities and supplies as soon as

possible to permit them to disinfest themselves

and their clothing. Soap and washing facilities are

also made available when possible.

Medical Care

Military police coordinate and ensure that medical

care, equipment, and supplies are administered to

detainees, EPWs, and CIs. Although they are not

normally assigned to medical facilities to process

or guard captives, military police may be tasked to

escort prisoners to medical facilities for care. Military police process these captives after medical

personnel classify their physical condition.

Classification

Before evacuation, detainees, EPWs, and CIs are

medically classified as walking wounded, nonwalking wounded, or sick. Walking wounded and

sick are evacuated through MP evacuation channels. Nonwalking wounded and sick are delivered

to the nearest medical aid station and evacuated

through medical channels.

Evacuation

Military police coordinate the prompt evacuation

of detainees, EPWs, and CIs out of the battlespace. The evacuation chain moves from the

forward collection point to the rear area holding

areas. In a joint operation, detainees, EPWs, and

CIs are moved to a US Army internment camp.
6-10 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

While in a multinational environment, detainees

may be transferred to forces from other nations.

Throughout the evacuation process, military

police treat detainees, EPWs, and CIs humanely

by ensuring that—

z They are not used to shield areas or facilities

from attack.

z They are not retained for psychological operations.

z Food (e.g., religiously appropriate), potable

water, appropriate clothing, shelter, and medical attention are provided if necessary.

z They are provided protective facilities and

equipment in case of CBRN attack.

z Rigorous security is maintained to prevent

escape and to protect US forces.

z The ability to conduct religious practices (e.g.,

prayer) is provided.

Temporary Holding Areas 

When distances or conditions preclude the completion of detainee, EPW, and CI movement,

military police may establish temporary holding

areas along the evacuation route. If possible, military police select existing facilities that provide

shelter from the elements as well as a perimeter

fence, wall, or other barrier for security.

Security

Specific guidance concerning security requirements during the evacuation process, as well as

other information on internment operations, can be

found in Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40, Internment/

Resettlement Operations.

When and where appropriate, NLWs should be

used by properly trained personnel. See Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B

(S) (NOTAL), Standing Rules of Engagement for

US Forces/Standing Rules for the Use of Force,

and MCWP 3-15.8 for more information concerning the employment of NLWs.

Once field processing is completed, the military

police are responsible for delivery of the detainees

to collection points, as appropriate.

Trench or Cover

Fighting

Position

Construction Supplies

 Barbed wire

 Concertina

 Long and short pickets

 Staples and anchors

 Water cans (5 gallon)

W

L

Latrine

Trench or cover

Triple strand concertina

Water

Figure 6-1. Initial Collection Point.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 6-11 

Collection Control Measures

To support EPW and CI collection and evacuation efforts, military police establish initial collection points, central collection points, and

holding areas. Normally, military police establish and operate collection points to the immediate rear area of forward units in a linear

battlespace or near supported units in a nonlinear battlespace, but they may be located wherever they are needed. If possible, collection

points should be located near MSRs to ease the

movement of detainees, EPWs, and CIs to the

next echelon of detainment and to facilitate the

transportation of supplies and medical support.

Once transported to the collection areas, military

police will use the appropriate biometrics systems and tools, such as biometric automated

toolsets, to identify, track, and document

detainee information.

Initial Collection Point 

Military police set up and operate initial collection points to receive prisoners quickly from

operating forces and to support the pace of the

operations as shown in figure 6-1. The establishment of initial collection points allows for the

rapid transfer of the custody of captives by capturing forces, without hindering their own combat effectiveness. At initial collection points,

military police conduct security tasks, process

and secure the captives, and prepare them for

evacuation to a central collection point or holding area. Every detainee should be processed initially with a capture tag and assigned an ISN as

soon as possible.

The size of the initial collection point enclosure

and the placement of internal facilities, services

(e.g., water, latrine, trench, cover), and force

protection vary based upon the situation. Supplies and instructions on components are discussed in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data.

Construction Supplies

 Barbed wire

 Concertina

 GP medium tent* 

 Long and short pickets

 Staples and anchors

 Water cans (5 gallon)

Fighting position

GP medium tent**

Latrine**

Triple strand concertina

Trench or cover**

Water**

To receiving and

processing area

156’

152’

15’ 15’

31’

13’

16’ x 33’

** Tent, water, latrine, and trench or cover in each compound

* 20 EPW per GP medium tent authorized

GP = general purpose

Figure 6-2. Central Collection Point.
6-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

The duration of stay at each echelon is driven by

security, operational conditions, availability of

transportation, and theater regulations. For example, the exploitation of intelligence from a

detainee at the tactical level may require the

holding unit to maintain the detainee for an

unspecified time. Throughout each phase of

detention operations, and between each echelon

of custody, it is critical that the humane treatment

of detained persons remains consistent and that

strict accountability of detainees, property, and

evidence is maintained.

Central Collection Point

A central collection point is larger than an initial

collection point, but the considerations for setup

and operations are the same. The detainees,

EPWs, and CIs are held at central collection

points until they can be transferred to holding

areas. Military police use existing structures when

possible to reduce construction requirements as

shown in figure 6-2. The size, compound configuration, placement of internal facilities, field processing site, and military intelligence screening

site vary based upon the situation. Instructions for

the use of triple strand concertina wire can be

found in FM 5-34. Central collection points will

be established as required.

Holding Areas

A holding area is a temporary structure, building,

or enclosed area, where detainees, EPWs, and CIs

are held pending further evacuation. Holding

areas accommodate more captives for longer

stays than collection points. Most holding areas,

like collection points, are temporary facilities that

must be able to move with little or no notice.

Prisoners are interrogated and detained in holding

Receiving

and field

processing

Intelligence/

screening and

interrogation

20’

20’

20’ 20’ 20’

316’

372’

C C

126’

156’

C C

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

50’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

50’

10’

20’

10’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’ 30’

30’ 30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

50’

C C

10’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’ 30’

30’ 30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’ C C

50’

10 ft wooden gate

Centerline/separation

Cover

Barbed wire

GP medium tent

Latrine

Triple strand concertina

Water

GP = general purpose

Construction Supplies

 Barbed wire

 Concertina

 Long and short pickets

 Staples and anchors

Figure 6-3. Holding Area.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 6-13 

areas until they can be evacuated further to the

rear. Although holding areas are temporary facilities, captives may remain at a holding area until

they can be moved to a more permanent detainment facility.

Usually one holding area is set up to support

each MAGTF conducting operations. The first

consideration in the selection of an EPW holding area is that it be adjacent to the evacuation

route (i.e., MSR). Related considerations include

the location of suitable existing facilities, proximity to supply areas, and protection from enemy

activities. Holding areas are operated on an austere basis and should be designed to meet the

minimum requirements necessary for the temporary retention of detainees, EPWs, and CIs. Figure 6-3 is an example of a holding area with

four, 120-person segregation compounds. This

area includes receiving, field processing, screening, and intelligence collection sites.

Detainee Reporting System 

The Detainee Reporting System (DRS) is the

mandated detainee accountability database for all

DOD agencies and operations. The DRS may not

be used in multinational operations. The key

functions of the DRS at a detention facility and

RDF include the following:

z Assigning ISNs.

z Documenting detainee transfers, releases, and

repatriations.

z Recording detainee deaths.

z Recording detainee escapes.

The timely and accurate reporting of data through

the DRS is critical in order to ensure detainee

accountability. As detainees are collected and

processed, the Geneva Convention require that

their information be forwarded to the appropriate

authorities and failure to do so may bring

unwanted scrutiny upon the US Government for

neglecting its duties under international laws.

The National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC)

is the executive agent designated by the US Army

Office of the Provost Marshal General to receive

and archive all detainee information. The NDRC

provides detainee information to the ICRC to fulfill US obligations under the Geneva Convention

and various agencies in the DA, DOD, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, and the Congress of the

United States. The NDRC’s principal responsibility is to ensure the collection, storage, and appropriate dissemination of detainee information as

required by MCO 3461.1, and DODD 2310.01E.

The NDRC directs the development of a DRS and

issues blocks of ISNs to theater detainee reporting centers (TDRCs).

The TDRCs function as field operations agencies

for the NDRC. They report all detainee data

directly to the NDRC. The TDRCs are responsible

for maintaining information on all detainees and

their personal property within an assigned table of

organization. They obtain and store information

concerning all detainees in the custody of the US

Armed Forces. This also includes detainees captured by US Armed Forces and transferred to

other powers for detention or those received from

other powers for detention by US forces—either

temporarily or permanently. The TDRCs serve as

theater repositories for information pertaining to

detainee accountability and ensure the implementation of DOD policy. They provide both the initial and replenishment blocks of ISNs to the units

performing detainee operations in-theater as they

are needed and will request additional blocks of

ISNs from the NDRC as needed. The detention

facility and RDF request ISNs from the TDRC

and forward all information concerning the detainees to the TDRC.

Once an ISN is issued, the issuing activity should

provide detainee information to the TDRC. The

ISN will be used as the primary means of identification throughout the detainee's detention. It is

used to link the detainee with biometric data,

personal property, medical information, and

issued equipment.
6-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Internment Serial Number

The ISN is the DOD-mandated identification

number used to account for and/or track detainees

(see fig. 6-4). Once an ISN is assigned, it is used

on all detainee documentation. The ISN is generated by the DRS. The DRS is the only approved

system for maintaining detainee accountability. It

is the central data-point system used for reporting to the national level and sharing detainee

information with other authorized agencies. The

ISNs are normally issued within 14 days of capture, regardless of where detainees are held, or

according to applicable policy. The following

components comprise the ISN:

z Capturing power—a two-digit alpha character

code representing the capturing power. Only

country codes found in the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 58-12, The Department of Defense Human Intelligence System,

are used.

z Theater code—a one-digit number representing

the command/theater under which the detainee

came into US custody.

z Power served—a two-digit alpha character code

representing the country that the detainee is

fighting for. Only country codes found within

the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 58-12

are used.

z Sequence number—a unique six-digit number

assigned exclusively to an individual detainee.

The DRS assigns these numbers sequentially.

If a detainee dies, is released, repatriated,

transferred, or escapes, the detainee’s number

is not reissued during the same conflict.

z Detainee classification—a two- or three-digit

alpha character code representing the

detainee’s classification. Current classifications

are CI, RP, and EC.

The detainee information is reported through the

TDRC to the NDRC. The TDRC is collocated

with the commander of the detainee operations.

This may be at the detention facility or RDF if no

commander of the detainee operations is

appointed. Once the DRS creates an ISN, no

component may be changed or corrected at theater level without approval from the NDRC. All

changes to ISNs must be requested in writing and

approved by the NDRC. 

When required by law and/or policy, the NDRC

provides detainee information (e.g., point of capture, country of origin, injury status, internment

status) to the ICRC to satisfy the obligations of the

Geneva Convention. The ICRC uses this detainee

information to give the detainee’s status to his

respective government. Commanders should

attempt to standardize the tracking of detainees

US9AF-000234RP

Capturing Power

Theater Code

Sequence Number

Power Served

Detainee Classification

Figure 6-4. Internment Serial Number.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 6-15 

from the point of capture through the issuance of

an ISN. The number assigned by DD Form 2745

is the only authorized tracking number that may

be used before the assignment of an ISN. After an

ISN is assigned, previously completed documents

should be annotated with the assigned ISN. For

example, medical channels should use the DD

Form 2745 number first and then use the ISN once

an ISN has been issued to the detainee. The DRS

will cross-reference the ISN and the DD Form

2745 numbers for administrative purposes.

If a detainee is inadvertently issued a second

ISN (e.g., due to clerical error, recapture), the

processing personnel will contact the NDRC,

which will correct the sequence, since gaps are

not permitted in the official records and numbering of detainees.

Detainee Identification

Band and Identification Badge

The requirements for identifying a detainee by

name and ISN are many and varied. Among the

more common reasons are—

z Verifying detainee rosters against the actual

compound population.

z Identifying compound work details.

z Matching detainees with their individual medical records.

z Checking the identities of detainees to be transferred or released against actual transfer rosters.

z Tracking through medical channels.

The detainee identification band or badge (e.g.,

produced by biometric automated tool sets) permits

rapid and reliable identification of each detainee.

Identification bands or badges enhance facility

administration and operation. The detainee's ISN

and last name are recorded on the identification

band and secured to the detainee’s left wrist. If the

appropriate bands are not available, a medical

wristband or similar item may be used.

When the identification band has serious deterioration or the ISN and name are obscured, the

identification band will be replaced with a new

one. Periodic random checks of detainee identification bands will detect normal wear and tear and

any efforts to destroy the bands. When inspecting for normal wear and tear, also check for any

evidence of detainees exchanging bands. Such

exchanges are very possible and should be

expected; however, removal of the identification

band by the original wearer will result in damage

that is easily detected. When positive identification is essential, such as for transfer or hospitalization, the identification band should be

examined carefully for any evidence of such tampering. Additionally, periodic routine inspections

will be conducted of randomly selected identification bands during compound inspections or at

other opportune times. These random inspections

will help detect any attempt to tamper with or

exchange an identification band.
CHAPTER 7

PLANNING AND TRAINING

Military police SNCOs and commissioned officers provide both MP specialized and general

planning and training support at the MEF, MEF

MSC, and company levels. Each MSC has a staff

noncommissioned and commissioned officer

assigned to provide MP planning, training, coordination, and oversight. Specialized support is

primarily located in the MEF with the MP support company under the MEF headquarters group.

If additional planning, training, or MP support is

required beyond the organic capability of MSC

military police, the MSCs should request support

from the MEF. The Marine Corps establishes and

task organizes in-lieu-of MP units when requirements for MP units exceed MP unit availability.

In-lieu-of MP units are non-MP units trained to

conduct certain MP tasks.

Planning

The planning efforts of the military police reflect

the combination of the multiple and diverse

capabilities of all participants in a joint, interagency, or multinational environment. Military

police keep lines of communications open and

provide coordination to offset the cultural challenges presented by this interoperability. Such

challenges include the following:

z Political objectives differences.

z Capabilities differences.

z Cultural and language differences.

z Legal and policy constraints.

z Media involvement and impacts.

z Compromising sensitive processes, procedures,

and equipment.

z Command and control.

z Communications (e.g., digital, analog equipment

differences).

Considering these challenges, MP plans must

also accommodate the differences involved when

planning functional capabilities and consider the

different actions encountered in transitions

throughout the full range of military operations.

The MP leaders must understand how to connect

operational objectives to tactical tasks. By

describing their objectives and grouping them by

desired and undesired effects within the AO, MP

force planners can help guide the initial analysis.

This, along with the commander’s intent and

planning guidance, helps MP staffs identify

potential tasks and functions for military police.

In addition to defining MP forces and resources,

interaction with other agencies must be considered. Coordination is the key to mission success

in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. Extensive communication

with the civil support staff and planners aids in

the coordination of issues; therefore, MP efforts

may require contact with the following nonmilitary agencies:

z Government organizations.

z Interagency law enforcement organizations.

z Nongovernmental organizations.

z International organizations.

z International humanitarian organizations.

z HN authorities and agencies.

The MEF, MEF MSC MP officers, and SNCOs

provide MEF- and MSC-level planning. Additionally, the MEF MP support company and

MEF MSC MP companies provide planning support to individual units within the MEF and MEF

MSC. If MP planning requirements exceed the

MSC’s capability, support should be requested

from the MEF.
7-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Interagency Coordination

By understanding the influence of other agencies,

commanders can add diplomatic, informational,

and economic depth to their military efforts. The

capabilities of the US military allow other agencies

to interact with foreign powers from a position of

strength and security. Unified action of all US

Governmental organizations is a desired end state

in any conflict. In order to achieve this end state,

commanders must recognize the challenges associated with interagency cooperation and proactively

mitigate the friction inherent in interagency operations with effective prior planning, coordination,

and training. Military police provide a vital linkage

between the commander and interagency law

enforcement agencies. Military police support the

commander’s intent through the conduct of interagency coordination and liaison at the lowest operational levels in order to resolve potential conflicts

and maximize the benefits of unified action.

Training of In-Lieu-of-Forces

Military police provide MP mission-oriented

training for Marines assigned as in-lieu-of MP

forces or when Marines have been assigned a

mission that requires specialized skills (e.g., evidence collection, site exploitation, TQ, detention

operations). When the Marine Corps fields inlieu-of MP units, it is recommended that MP

SMEs fill key staff positions in these units to provide critical MOS expertise. In-lieu-of forces lack

the requisite training, knowledge, and experience

to provide all of the MP doctrinal functions

required in a deployed environment.

Military police predeployment training should

focus on specific assigned tasks, such as LDO.

Ideally, in-lieu-of MP units will be embedded

with MP subject mater experts who would participate in unit predeployment training and

deploy with the unit to theater. Predeployment

training should include the equipment that is currently being used at the in-theater location of

deployment. In-lieu-of MP units should incorporate scenario-based training that includes use of

friendly force tracker, biometrics, electronic

countermeasures equipment, force continuum

TTP, and IED detection and response. Marines

should also experience training that simulates

conditions in the AO, for example—

z Handling differences that are associated with

HMMWVs [high-mobility multipurposewheeled vehicles] that have the additional

weight of added armor.

z Enduring cramped quarters for tasks that last

12 or more hours, while wearing the required

personal protective equipment.

In-lieu-of MP forces should receive both predeployment and during deployment training as follows:

z Basic in-lieu-of MP training should be accomplished prior to the deployment and follow-on

training should be accomplished during the

deployment after arriving in-theater.

z Basic in-lieu-of MP training should be accomplished by the military police organic to the

MEF MSC, if available, and the MEF, if not

available. Additional support should be

requested if the requirement is beyond the

MEF's ability to support. Basic MP skills training should focus on the individual and collective tasks necessary for anticipated missions

per NAVMC 3500.10, Military Police and

Corrections Training and Readiness Manual.

z Follow-on MP training should focus on specific mission tasks after the mission analysis

has been completed.

z Refresher MP training should be accomplished by an organic MP (i.e., MP detachment

assigned to a command or unit) detachment

while en route, if possible.

z An operational MP unit already deployed in-theater could provide a mobile training team (MTT)

to train an in-lieu-of MP force once in-theater.

z Teacher-to-student ratio should be 1 to 25,

which is in accordance with Training and Education Command’s standard student-instructor

ratio for classroom instruction.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 7-3 

The following MP training in CONUS occurs

during predeployment:

z MP training for designated in-lieu-of military

police is conducted by the MEF MP support

company, MSC MP company, MSC MP staff

officer, MEU MP detachment, or MP MTT.

Time should be allowed for the proper training

and access to additional personnel and equipment, if required.

z Adequate training areas are determined as

required by mission analysis for the MP training being conducted.

z MP training occurs during MEU or other

MAGTF workups and preparations required to

deploy.

z The Military Police Center of Excellence has

developed an in-lieu-of MP program of

instruction and MP course descriptive data.

z Mojave Viper or an alternative venue, such as

Cajun Viper, ensures that MP training provides

the in-lieu-of MP appropriate skills and prepares the in-lieu-of MP for battle.

During deployment, MP trainers will complete the

required MP training for in-lieu-of MPs. Military

police trainers may be sourced from in-theater MP

units or organic MP trainers.

Military Police and

Law Enforcement Training

The MEF MP support company and MEF MSC

MP companies can provide specialized training to

enhance the skills of deploying Marines for certain missions (e.g., detective, criminal investigations, MP skills, law enforcement skills). It is

recommended that commands integrate law

enforcement training into predeployment training

programs and exercises. Reservists who are law

enforcement professionals can be identified and

aligned with units to serve as trainers. In order to

gain experience, additional types of training provided for deploying Marines are as follows:

z Participating in local, state, and federal law

enforcement organization, providing on-thejob training.

z Participating in command-coordinated “ridealong” events with local law enforcement

organizations.

Law Enforcement Advisor

The purpose of the law enforcement advisor is to

provide the commander with an experienced law

enforcement perspective on criminal network

enterprise operations within his AO. Based on

specific operational requirements, law enforcement advisor personnel may be sourced from the

interagency law enforcement community, contracted support (e.g., US Army’s Law Enforcement Professional Program), MP, CID, NCIS,

Marine Corps reservist, or civilian police officer

(with the appropriate depth of applicable law

enforcement training and experience).

The threat confronting deployed forces may

incorporate an operational framework including

guerilla, insurgent, and profit-motivated organizations exhibiting strong criminal network characteristics. Conventional military forces and

associated information collection methods and

analytical processes, even when augmented with

special operations experts, lack the full range of

skill sets and experience necessary to understand and attack complex criminal and insurgency networks. Law enforcement advisors with

the requisite anti-criminal, network analytical,

and investigative skill sets may be used by US

military units when required by the mission.

Law Enforcement Advisor Responsibilities

The responsibilities of law enforcement advisor

personnel embedded within a Marine Corps unit

will vary according to the requirements of the

commander and the nature of the operation. The
7-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

following list provides an overview of law enforcement advisor tasks used to effectively understand,

identify, target, penetrate, interdict, and suppress

criminal (i.e., insurgent) and IED networks:

z Identify criminal hot spots—both meeting

places and IED locations—and advise commanders and staffs on methods to recognize

signs of radicalization in assigned AOs.

z Identify methods to enhance local community

participation in police information and intelligence gathering.

z Cultivate community and individual assistance

by understanding the local leadership, centers

of influence, and activities within the community (e.g., normal verses abnormal activity).

z Identify the threat and AO dynamics through

cultivation of community support networks

and identification of deceptive means that may

be employed to source, produce, deliver,

emplace, and detonate IEDs.

z Provide advice and support to deliberate offensive actions that result in the ability to effectively attack, disrupt, and neutralize criminal

and IED networks.

z Examine, recommend, and support means and

activities that discourage the regeneration of

IED cells, including activities intended to create

confidence and earn the trust of HN and local

populations.

z Advise and mentor Marine forces as they collaborate with and build capacity among HN

police and security forces.

z Advise on and support actions that ensure HN

law enforcement and security forces maintain a

visible, capable, responsive, and proactive

presence in order to instill confidence within

the population.

z Support JPEC and joint interrogation and

debriefing center operations as required.

z Serve as the supported battalion commander’s

law enforcement criminal network subject

matter expert and primary training resource

for police skills in the absence of military law

enforcement personnel.

z Coordinate directly with law enforcement advisor counterparts at higher and subordinate

headquarters and neighboring units to ensure

the unity of effort and synchronization of effort.

z Apply a law enforcement countercriminal perspective to the execution of counterinsurgency

operations to the supported battalion’s area of

responsibility.

z Coordinate with HN law enforcement assets to

strengthen and encourage trust, confidence,

cooperation, and information sharing between

local assets and the supported unit.

z Accompany mounted and dismounted patrols

on street-level operations in hostile threat

environments within the supported battalion’s

AO to instruct and mentor on law enforcement

TTP and to provide immediate feedback and

assistance.

z Participate in TQ and debriefing of suspects

and detainees.

z Provide assistance to the development of

detainee packages by the unit or HN law

enforcement and security forces.

z Coordinate operational and tactical investigations and judge advocate general investigations as directed.

z Conduct site exploitation.

z Train, mentor, and advise Marines in conducts

of site exploitation.

Law Enforcement Training, Tactics, and Procedures

The emerging trend involving the blending of

military and law enforcement related TTP is

designed to enhance warfighting capabilities with

specialized law enforcement skills (e.g., forensics, evidence collecting, site exploitation [i.e.,

crime scene processing], profiling, TQ). The

application of these skills will enable Marines to

confirm and exploit targets, as well as expand the

unit’s capability to respond to hybrid threats
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 7-5 

across the full range of military operations. The

law enforcement TTP will enable Marines to—

z Develop the ability to conduct forensics, evidence collection, and sensitive site exploitation.

z Develop the ability to conduct biometrics collection and exploitation (e.g., fingerprints, DNA

[deoxyribonucleic acid], facial recognition).

z Develop the ability to conduct AO-specific

profiling.

z Develop an understanding of criminal network

enterprise operations.

z Develop criminal and forensic intelligence

capabilities.

z Develop surveillance skills.

z Develop tactical interviewing and questioning

techniques.

z Provide training in criminal patrolling tactics.

z Identification of insurgents, foreign fighters,

criminals, and bombmakers via street contacts,

interviews with suspicious people, sources, and

contacts with local community members and

the criminal element on a daily basis.

z Patrol in active insurgent areas during times of

enemy activity. Maximize efforts and personnel to attack problem areas. Every patrol has a

directed purpose.

z Vary times and locations of patrols. Concentrate efforts after dark when insurgents and

criminals conduct IED operations, move weapons and explosives, and emplace IEDs to

restrict the enemy’s ability to work at night.

z Display a proactive, aggressive patrol with an

offensive mindset and interview anyone displaying suspicious or unusual behavior.

Immediately conduct aggressive control techniques by checking for weapons, car alarms,

cell phones, cameras, large amounts of cash,

the digging of holes, and the usage or dealing

of drugs.

z Interdict IED and terrorist and criminal cells

and disrupt the flow of components to build

IEDs and vehicleborne IEDs (e.g., electronics,

long-range cordless phones, satellite phones,

cell phones, machine shops, car repair shops,

car dealerships).

Training for Units Deploying

to Conduct Detention Operations

Units preparing to deploy with a detention operation mission should receive mission-oriented

training prior to deployment. Training should be

tailored to the deploying location’s detention

standard in the AO. Usually the corrections specialists provide the training, sometime augmented by the military police, in conjunction

with either the local MEF corrections specialists

or the MTT.

Training for units deploying to conduct detention operations includes, but is not limited to,

the following:

z Detention facility or RDF detention operations.

z Detention facility or RDF guard duties.

z SROE or rules for the use of force.

z NLWs.

z Handcuffing techniques.

z Detainee transporting, escorting, and release.

z Temporary detention facilities.

z Training tailored to the AO standard and intensity level requested by the deploying unit.

z Required training aids, role players, and facilities that are conducive to realistic training.

z Training should be based upon the corrections

instructor and unit input.

z Convoy operations scenarios to simulate

detainee transfer and release operations.

z Riot formations and cell extractions.

z Specific training on the detention facility or

RDF SOP that the unit will use during the

deployment.

z Language training.

z Geneva Conventions training.

z Biometrics and biometric automated tool sets

usage.

z Property accountability.
7-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

z Evidence handling and processing.

z Communications.

z Law of war.

The OICs and SNCOICs also require specific

predeployment training to address their responsibilities, reports, and supervisory duties at the

detention facility or RDF.

Personnel Deploying to

Conduct Detention Operations

Corrections specialists and all other personnel

engaged in detention operations shall receive the

following minimum predeployment training:

z Basic area language training.

z Rule of law.

z Criminal mind-set and staff awareness.

z Universal precautions on diseases.

z SRUF and SROE.

z Contraband and control procedures.

z Restraint procedures.

z Accountability procedures.

z Emergency actions for fire, escape, bomb

threats, and disorder.

z Main gate and sally port procedures.

z Visitation and escort procedures.

z Tower guard procedures.

z Disciplinary and adjustment procedures.

z Unarmed self-defense.

z Forced cell move and riot control procedures.

z NLWs and INIWIC qualification.

z Biometric automated tool sets.

z Evidence collection, handling, and storage procedures.

z Ground transport procedures.

z Air transport procedures.

z IED awareness.
APPENDIX A

CUSTOMS AND BORDER CLEARANCE PROGRAM

It is DOD policy to assist and cooperate with US

and foreign HN border clearance agencies in halting the flow of contraband into the US and foreign countries and enforcing this policy when

entry is through military channels. This policy

applies to the export of US goods to and through

other countries and enforcement of DOD policy

to eliminate the flow of contraband and unacceptable products to other nations. Areas of enforcement include compliance and enforcement of US

and foreign laws and regulations and customs

requirements (e.g., agriculture, immigration).

Note: The DOD acknowledges the primacy

of the Department of Homeland Security,

CBP, and the US Citizenship and Immigration Services over cargo and personnel moving into the CTUS. They also acknowledge

that those officers or inspectors may delay,

impound, or otherwise prohibit the entry or

export of military cargo into or from the

CTUS, without obstruction by the DOD, the

Services, or defense agencies.

Military police provide commanders a high

degree of flexibility through the execution of

customs operations. During the execution of

these operations, commanders and their staff

(e.g., geographic combatant commander,

deployed commander, staff officers) should be

familiar with the military customs inspection program per DODD 5030.49, DOD Customs Inspection Program, and DOD Regulation 4500.9-R,

Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), applicable to all international movement of DOD

cargo and personnel at the time they cross the

border. In the MEF or MAGTF, military police

are trained as military customs inspectorsexcepted (MCI-Es) and customs and border

clearance agents (CBCAs). They coordinate with

joint and US Federal agencies to ensure compliance with regulations and applicable provisions

of international agreements by detecting and

investigating violations and conducting inspections concerning the CTUS. Responsibilities,

training, and certification needed to perform

these duties are detailed in this appendix.

When deemed to be beneficial to the DOD, CBP,

or USDA, preclearance programs may be established. Under certain circumstances (e.g., major

unit rotations, redeployments in conjunction with

exercises and contingency operations), cargo and

personnel returning to the United States can be

“precleared” (e.g., inspected and/or certified at the

point of origin instead of at the US border). These

preclearance programs will be initiated only when

the theater command, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the

respective US agency or agencies explicitly agree

to their establishment. Procedures for requesting

the establishment of a preclearance program are

detailed in DOD 4500.9-R, chapter 506. 

Responsibilities

Military Services

z Establishes points of contact for coordination

and implementation of the program within

their respective components.

z Ensures that the shipment sponsor’s shipping

activities prepare customs documents (e.g., foreign country, CBP) for use by carriers and government agencies to gain entry or exit for DOD

shipments. 

z Takes any actions required to correct program

deficiencies.

z Provides facilities and other assets, through

inter-Service or defense agency support agreements, for the performance of customs and

border clearance functions.
A-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

z Furnishes information to USTRANSCOM to

resolve customs and border clearance issues

(e.g., preclearances) per DOD 4500.9-R,

chapter 506.

z Provides representation on committees or working groups as requested by USTRANSCOM. 

z Assists USTRANSCOM in the development

and collection of metrics data and the evaluation of the DOD Customs and Border Clearance Program (CBCP).

z Provides customs and border clearance documents necessary for entry officials to clear personnel and cargo entering or exiting the United

States or foreign countries.

z Follows the theater, destination, and in-transit

country national customs and movement certification requirements contained in theater

transportation regulations.

Geographic Combatant Commander

z Implements and enforces provisions of DOD

4500.9-R.

z Establishes and coordinates any unique customs and/or border clearance requirements for

countries in the commander’s areas of responsibility during deployments or redeployments

and in support of exercises or contingency

operations.

z Designates a customs and/or border clearance

coordinator.

z Forwards any written supplementary guidance

to USTRANSCOM (TCJ5/4).

z Ensures Service components designate, in

writing, DOD or other personnel as CBCAs

and that those personnel are properly trained.

z Establishes quality control procedures to

ensure the effectiveness of the DOD CBCP.

z Disseminates information within the command

to all DOD members, employees, and family

members concerning the prohibitions, restrictions, requirements, and penalties pertaining to

the importation of illegal narcotics and drugs,

prohibited firearms, and other contraband.

z Establishes policy and official guidance on control and retention of war trophies or souvenirs. 

z Provides details on prohibitions, restrictions,

requirements, and penalties that pertain to the

entry or exit from their theater of operations to

USTRANSCOM (TCJ5/4), as it impacts the

DOD CBCP.

z Assists USTRANSCOM in the development

and collection of metrics data and evaluation of

the DOD CBCP.

z Keeps the subunified commands informed on

issues relating to customs or border clearance.

Geographic Combatant Command

Customs and Border Clearance Coordinator

z Coordinates the DOD CBCP for the theater

commander.

z Serves as the primary point of contact for the

customs or border clearance requirements on

matters of importance concerning the entry or

exit of DOD-sponsored movements.

Deployed Commander

z Ensures that unit personnel (i.e., military,

civilian, and contractors) are briefed on CBP

and USDA entry requirements prior to their

redeployment to CONUS or OCONUS and

that all unit equipment or sustainment stocks

returning to CONUS and OCONUS are

cleaned and inspected per USDA-recommended procedures. See DOD 4500.9-R,

chapter 505, for details.

z Ensures that shipping, customs, and border

clearance documentation, is available for each

shipment or passenger and that documentation

is prepared and free of abbreviations or acronyms to ensure entry or exit. 

z Implements requirements in DOD 4500.9-R

(chapter 501, paragraph D.9) and maintains

performance quality that will ensure customs

or border clearance agencies (i.e., foreign and

domestic) certification.

MEF, MAGTF PM, or

MEF MSC MP Staff Officer

z Establishes and conducts a military customs

program as directed and per DOD 4500.9-R.

z Appoints, provides training for, and obtains

proper certification for MCI-Es and CBCAs

per DOD 4500.9-R and appropriate regulations.
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ A-3 

Military Customs Inspector-Expected

z Performs duties per DOD 4500.9-R and US

and/or foreign country border clearance

requirements. 

z Inspects or examines baggage, professional

equipment, and cargo as authorized in established memorandums of understanding and

designated on that person’s Customs Form 55,

Designation, Customs Officer-Excepted. All

passengers and crewmembers are subject to

inspection. The degree to which accompanied

baggage or equipment is inspected or examined is dependent upon the discretion and judgment of the MCI-Es. “Dumping” of baggage

contents is against both DOD and CBP policy

and is prohibited.

z Accomplishes inspections in a courteous and

professional manner.

z Inspects only active duty military personnel.

Civilian personnel will be inspected by a CBP

officer.

z Reports any contraband discoveries (e.g.,

drugs, firearms, explosives) to the closest CBP

port director and the installation commander

immediately.

Customs and Border Clearance Agents

z Performs duties per DOD 4500.9-R and US

and/or foreign country border clearance

requirements.

z Inspects and certifies that DOD-owned material, personal property, and passengers are

acceptable for entry into the United States and

notifies the appropriate legal authorities if contraband is discovered.

z Represents the commander in performance of

inspections and ensures that the proper and/or

required documentation accompanies all shipments or personnel.

z Ensures that customs and border clearance

violations are expeditiously reported to the

proper legal authority or military agency for

disposition.

z Conducts all inspections and examinations in a

professional, expeditious, and courteous manner.

z Does not, under any circumstances, collect or

accept duty payments.

Training and Certification of

Military Customs Inspectors-Excepted

and Customs and Border Clearance Agents

The MCI-Es and CBCAs will be trained per

DOD 4500.9-R. Training will be provided and

approved by CBP and USDA. Training may be

accomplished in CONUS or at an overseas location. Upon successful completion of the training,

CBP and USDA will provide certification for the

trainees. Certified trained personnel will be

appointed as CBCAs on orders issued by the

sponsoring Service component and those orders

will include an effective termination date.

The geographic combatant commander and the

Service component commander will coordinate

the request to the Service for sourcing of military

law enforcement or other designated personnel to

act as CBCAs for the duration of the redeployment. All personnel designated for MCI-E or

CBCA duties will be E-4, the civilian equivalent,

or above. 

In some cases CBP may approve DOD personnel

as certified trainers. When a “train the trainer”

process is approved, commanders will be

required to— 

z Use a CBP and USDA-approved CBCA training curriculum.

z Provide program management, as well as any

command-specific training.

Employment

Marines trained as MCI-Es or CBCAs will perform their duties according to DOD 4500.9-R and

other implementing regulations. They represent

their commanders by performing inspections and

examinations, reporting violations to their supervisor and validating shipping documents. The

MCI-Es or CBCAs are employed to inspect

DOD-sponsored cargo, military impedimenta,

ships, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel.
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APPENDIX B

SAMPLE MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE

The following sample format may be modified as necessary to meet situational requirements.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.__ of __copies

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND

PLACE OF ISSUE

Date/time group

Message reference number

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission

a. (U) Basic Mission. State the mission and its purpose as described in the 

basic plan.

b. (U) Purpose of the Estimate

(1) (U) Determine if military police (MP) capabilities are sufficient to 

support proposed courses of action (COAs).

(2) (U) Determine which COA is most desirable from an MP support 

standpoint.

(3) (U) Determine what measures must be taken by the commander to 

overcome MP support problems and/or limiting factors in supporting 

each COA.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

a. (U) Enemy Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Reference may be made 

to the Intelligence Estimate.

(2) (U) Major Capabilities. Enemy tactical capabilities likely to affect 

friendly MPsupport matters.
B-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(3) (U) Other Capabilities and/or Limitations. Enemy capabilities and/or limitations likely to affect the MP or tactical situation.

b. (U) Own Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of MP Support Elements. May be shown as a situation 

map or an overlay appended as an annex.

(2) (U) Courses of Action. A statement of the COA under consideration. 

c. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Those likely to affect the MP support situation, 

such as weather, terrain, hydrography, communications routes, and local resources. 

d. (U) Current MP Support Status. A brief description of the current MP support status, which includes planned or known changes before and during the period covered 

by the estimate. Follow-on subparagraphs address typical MP support areas of concern; if possible, state specific quantities. 

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support 

organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described 

in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (9) below. 

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any. 

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support 

Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit. 

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements. 

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards. 

(d) (U) Personal Services Support
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ B-3 

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(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities. 

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Mission Assurance Support Operations

(4) (U) Law and Order

(5) (U) Military Working Dogs

(6) (U) Limited Detainee Operations

(7) (U) Planning and Training

(8) (U) Corrections

(9) (U) Customs Support

e. (U) Assumptions. A statement of those assumptions made for the preparation of 

this estimate. An example of the critical assumption is the estimation of the length of 

time for the entire operation and for each COA (if different).

f. (U) Special Factors. Items covered elsewhere, such as state of training of MP support personnel or task organizations.

3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant 

factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those problems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all considerations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.

a. (U) Course of Action #1

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support 

organization or task organization is described using the following format: 

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay. 

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described 

in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in paragraphs (2) through (9) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any. 
B-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support 

Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit. 

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be received, and the quality of the replacements.

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors affecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards. 

(d) (U) Personal Services Support

(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Mission Assurance Support Operations

(4) (U) Law and Order

(5) (U) Military Working Dogs

(6) (U) Limited Detainee Operations

(7) (U) Planning and Training

(8) (U) Corrections

(9) (U) Customs Support

b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

4. (U) Evaluation. From an MP support standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, 

summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.

5. (U) Conclusion

a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be 

supported from the MP support viewpoint.

b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or 

all remaining COAs can be supported from MP support viewpoint citing the disadvantages that render the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ B-5 

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c. (U) MP Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be resolved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.

d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve MP support 

problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

/s/

ANNEXES: (As required)
APPENDIX C

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION CHECKLISTS

Military police provide commanders with crime prevention plans that include prevention, enforcement

and education on recognizing, countering, and preventing criminal and terrorist activities. As part of

crime prevention, military police investigate and report criminal activities that will assist the commander

in maintaining unit order and discipline. This appendix contains installation perimeter, facilities and

building, port and harbor security, and transportation checklists.

A. Installation Perimeter Checklist

1. Perimeter security

a. Physical barriers

(1) Yes/No. Is there some type of physical barrier; e.g., wall, fence around the installation? If yes,

describe. Include guard towers, antivehicle ditches, ground sensors, and exclusion zones if

applicable. (Use continuation sheets if necessary.)

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

(2) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish the property line?

(3) Yes/No. Is the barrier a deterrent to entry. If not, explain.

(4) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish personnel control?

(5) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish vehicle control?

(6) Yes/No. Are there any holes/breach points in the barrier or fence line?

If so, where?

(7) Yes/No. Are there any places along the barrier/fence where the ground is washed away?

If so, where?

(8) Yes/No. Are there any places where streams and/or drainage ditches and tunnels enter the

perimeter barrier? If so, where?

(9) Yes/No. Are the above entry points protected? If so, which ones?

(10) Yes/No. Is there a clear zone on each side of the barrier/fence?

What is the clear zone distance on the exterior of the barrier/fence?

(11) Yes/No. Does the perimeter meet the minimum DOD stand-off distance requirement?
C-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

 What is the distance from the nearest building to the barrier/fence in feet?

(12) Yes/No. Is the clear zone obstructed by obstacles/material near the fence? If so, what?

(13) Yes/No. Are there any poles near the barrier or fence that can be used for entry or exit?

If so, where?

(14) Yes/No. Are there any trees or shrubbery in the clear zone? If so, which ones?

(15) Yes/No. Should trees be removed or shrubbery trimmed? If so, which ones?

(16) Yes/No. Is there a scheduled maintenance/landscape contract to keep the clear zone cut to

allow a continuous unobstructed view of the barrier/fence?

(17) Yes/No. Are there any openings other than gates or doors in the barrier or fence that are

unprotected? If so, where?

(18) Yes/No. Are there “No Trespassing” signs posted on the fence exterior at regular intervals in

local and English languages?

(19) Yes/No. Is the entire fence line within easy view of patrolling guards or closed-circuit TV?

If not, what area is not visible?

(20) Yes/No. Is the perimeter barrier/fence inspected regularly?

(21) Yes/No. Is immediate action taken to repair reported perimeter damage?

(22) Yes/No. Are vehicles allowed to park near the barrier/fence, both internally and externally?

(23) How much time would it take to penetrate the barrier/fence using one of the following?

______________ Wire cutters

______________ Power tools

______________ Vehicle

______________ Explosives

______________ Other hand tools 

 (24) How many entrance points to the perimeter?___________

How many different exits only?____________

 b. Gates and doors

(1) Yes/No. Are all gates/doors secured and operating properly? If not, which ones?

(2) Yes/No. Do swing gates close without leaving a gap? If not, which ones?

(3) Yes/No. Are gates, which are rarely used, properly secured and frequently checked?

(4) Yes/No. Are the locking devices adequate? Do they do the job?
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ C-3 

(5) Yes/No. Are alarm devices used on any gates? If not, which ones?

(6) If alarms are used, do they provide:

Yes/No. A local signal?

Yes/No. A signal at a guard office?

(7) Yes/No. Are alarms checked for operating efficiency on a regular basis?

(8) Yes/No. Are any entrances or exits controlled by closed-circuit television or card access?

(9) Yes/No. Are there any gates or doors where closed-circuit television or card access could be

used to control access/exit?

(10)Yes/No. Are entrances posted with “No Trespassing” signs in the local language and

English?

(11) Yes/No. Has a key control system been established to control issuance of keys and locks?

(12) Yes/No. Are key and lock inventories current?

(13) Yes/No. Is there a back-up set of keys? Are they inventoried and kept separate from the primary set?

(14) Yes/No. Are all perimeter areas lighted during hours of darkness?

(15) Is lighting manual or automatic (circle one: manual/automatic)?

(16) Yes/No. Are all entrance/gates well-lighted?

(17) Yes/No. Does perimeter lighting also cover adjacent buildings? Should it?

(18) Yes/No. If lights burn out, do light patterns overlap for continuous coverage?

(19) Who is responsible for turning lights on/off?

(20) Who is responsible for maintenance?

c. Security personnel

(1)Are guards:

Yes/No. Exposed by lighting?

Yes/No. Protected by lighting?

(2) Yes/No. Do lights at gate(s) illuminate interior of vehicles?

(3) Yes/No. Are critical areas along the perimeter well-lighted?

(4)Yes/No. Is there an auxiliary power source? Is it automatic or manual? If manual, who

employs it and how long does it take to employ?

(5)Yes/No. Is there a guard service that supplements the overall antiterrorism plan?
C-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

(6)Yes/No. Are background checks conducted on contractor guard personnel?

(7)Yes/No. Is there a rapid response force? Required response time? How often is the rapid

response time exercised?

(8) How many guards and shifts are provided?

(9) What is the nationality of the guards? Do they speak the native language and English?

(10)Yes/No. Is there an effective communication(s) system with all guards, both military and

contract, with all gates and patrols and supervisors?

(11)Yes/No. Are guards, both military and contract, properly trained and qualified on their

assigned weapons?

(12)Yes/No. Have all personnel who perform law enforcement and security duty been trained in

the proper use of deadly force?

(13)Yes/No. Is the above training documented and (terrorist) scenario based?

(14)How do guards/security personnel initiate an emergency alarm?

d. Other significant concerns (e.g., emergency procedures, shelters, security enhancements)

(1) What emergency evacuation procedures exist? Are these rehearsed?

(2) Yes/No. Are any internal/external sensors employed to enhance the security posture? If not,

should there be?

(3) Yes/No. Do bomb shelters exist? At offices? Living areas?

(4) Yes/No. Are the bomb shelters maintained in safe order? Lighted? Communications?

(5) Yes/No. Have requirements for bomb shelters been coordinated with Service components/

higher headquarters for funding and fielding support?

(6) Yes/No. Are military working dogs, night vision devices, x-ray detection systems, intrusion

detection systems, ground sensors, closed-circuit television, day and night surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, advanced communications systems, or any other security related

equipment used or required to enhance the antiterrorism posture of this installation?

(List and use continuation sheets as necessary)

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

e. Host nation (HN) coordination.

Yes/No. Has coordination and/or a formal memorandum of understanding been initiated with

any HN official (name and title) for additional security support, including personnel, equipment,

perimeter layout, response forces?
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ C-5 

2. Airfield security. The following questions are provided to supplement specific airfield security concerns. These questions are not all-inclusive of airfield operations and may be further supplemented:

a. Yes/No. Does the airfield command have an installation security plan that covers the entire facility to include tenant responsibilities? Elaborate:_______________________________________

b. Location of airfield:_____________________________

c. Unit inspected:___________________________________

d. Date of this inspection:__________________________

e. Last time base was inspected:______________

f. Yes/No. Were previous deficiencies corrected?

g. Inspectors:________________________________________

h. Personnel contacted:____________________________

i. Type of airfield? US Military? US/Multinational collocated? Civilian use?

j. What type of security forces/guards are employed at this base?

____ US military police

____ US Navy master at arms

____ US Air Force security forces

____ Multinational

____ Contracted US or local nationals

k. Yes/No. Are these security personnel trained in the use of deadly force?

l. Yes/No. Is there sufficient stand-off distance from runways to the nearest civilian property?

m. Yes/No. Are alerted aircraft afforded adequate security?

n. Yes/No. Are air operations susceptible to surface-to-air missile attack?

If so, explain countermeasures (e.g., thread surveillance, external perimeter security, host nation

patrols).

o. Yes/No. Are any runway approaches or take-offs over water?

If so, is emergency watercraft immediately available to effect rescue operations?

p. Yes/No. Is perimeter fencing and lighting in sound condition?

q. Yes/No. Are bilingual “No Trespassing/Restricted Area” signs posted at regular intervals along

the perimeter barrier?

r. Yes/No. Are military and civilian aircraft parked in the same area?
C-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

s. Yes/No. Is the control tower entrance continuously secured/guarded?

t. Yes/No. Is emergency lighting systems for security as well as approaching aircraft available? Is it

tested periodically?

u. Yes/No. Are security response forces on-call? What is their minimum response time?

3. General comments ________________________________________________________

 ________________________________________________________________________

 ________________________________________________________________________

4. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________

b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________

c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________

B. Facilities and Building Checklist

1. General information and background

a. Date of this inspection:____________________________

b. Unit inspected:____________________________

c. Location/site (include grid coordinates):___________________________

d. Last time this facility/building was inspected:_____________________

e. Yes/No. Were previous deficiencies corrected?

f. Inspectors:_________________________________________

g. Personnel contacted:____________________________

2. Facility – building specifics

a. Purpose of this structure:______________________

b. Number of floors:_________________________________

c. Approximate number and (nationality) of occupants: _______________________________

d. Type of construction:

 ___Reinforced concrete

 ___Tilt-up concrete panels

 ___Reinforced masonry

 ___Unreinforced masonry
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ C-7 

 ___Brick

 ___Trailer

 ___Metal

 ___Wood frame

 ___Other_______________________________

e. Number of entrances:______exits:______

Does this building create a likely threat target? Explain.

f. Describe the intervening distance between perimeter barriers and the nearest structure (internal or

external) (e.g., open cleared flat land)___________________________________

g. Distance from building to perimeter (______ft).

h. Distance to vehicle parking from this building (outside of perimeter______ft).

i. Yes/No. Are exterior power facilities/transformers/fixtures vulnerable to tampering or sabotage?

j. Identify external perimeter obstacles/vulnerabilities (e.g., buildings, dumpsters, parking areas,

streets).

k. What physical security measures have been initiated or exist that mitigate perimeter threats

(e.g., other buildings, barriers, distance, berms, walls, guards, patrols, host nation assistance).

List:

(1)_______________________________________

(2)_______________________________________

(3)_______________________________________

(4)_______________________________________

l. Protection against glass fragmentation:

___ Shatter resistant window treatment

___ Window frame reinforcement

___ Thermally-treated safety glass

___ Polycarbonate

___ Steel doors

___ Door frame reinforcement

___ Heavy duty hinges

___ Other_________________________________________
C-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

m. Blast protection initiatives:

___ Walls

___ Berms

___ Sealed doors

___ Heavy curtains

___ Sealed windows

___ Steel grates

___ Extending perimeter

___ Shutters

___ Landscaping

3. Facility – building specifics

a. Access, alarms, guard

(1) Yes/No. Are procedures established to control access to the building?

(2) Yes/No. Is a visible identification system established to distinguish employees, residents, and

visitors?

(3) Yes/No. Are entrances and exits to this building alarmed?

(4) Yes/No. Are entrances and exits controlled by guards? If yes, circle one: US, multinational,

and/or contract.

(5) Yes/No. Guards: 

___ Are guards trained and qualified on their individual weapons

___ Are guards trained on use of deadly force

___ Is training documented

___ Are background checks conducted on contract guards

___ Are guards bilingual

___ Do guards incorporate land line communications

___ Can guards communicate with central control security desks and with installation entry

control points

(6) Yes/No. Are guards equipped with:

___ Night vision devices

___ CBRN protection
Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ C-9 

___ Portable communications

___ Body armor

___ Individual weapons/type

___ Binoculars

(7) Yes/No. Are closed-circuit television and/or motion detection systems employed?

(8) Yes/No. Are windows alarmed, grilled, shatter resistant with protective window film?

(9) Yes/No. Does the facility have exterior lighting?

(10) Yes/No. Is the lighting adequate? Does it cover all dead spaces? Do lights overlap to compensate for burnout?

(11) Yes/No. Are outdoor accesses to the building such as fire escapes, roof doors, air vents, and

utility openings secured?

(12) Yes/No. Are interior doors to personal rooms, offices, closets, and restrooms locked at

night, on weekends, and when unoccupied or unattended?

(13) Yes/No. Is there a security check system that ensure item #12 above is accomplished when

the facility is unattended?

(14) Yes/No. Is a positive key control and accountability system established?

(15) Yes/No. Are visitors escorted while in the facility?

(16) Yes/No. Is incoming mail examined?

(17) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel trained not to reveal personal information, itineraries, security

measures, home addresses/unit locations or addresses, and telephone numbers to strangers?

(18) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel instructed on how to report suspicious activity?

(19) Yes/No. Are guards/sentries posted to overwatch this building? Is this considered a critical

requirement?

b. Emergency procedures

(1) Yes/No. Does the building have a safe haven?

Does it have:

___Emergency water

___Emergency lighting/power

___Emergency medical supplies

___Uninterrupted communication

___Solid core door
C-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

___Emergency escape

___Latrine facilities

___Proper ventilation

___Dead-bolt locks

(2) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel trained on actions to take in case of a terrorist attack? 

(3) Yes/No. Are terrorist attack and postal bomb drills conducted periodically?

(4) Yes/No. Does the building have an emergency power source such as a generator?

(5) Yes/No. Is the back-up source periodically tested to ensure sound and safe operating conditions? And tested? Are additional operators trained?

(6) Yes/No. Is there an effective intercom and emergency public address system such as “giant

voice” utilized at this building?

(7) Yes/No. Is there a back-up?

(8) Yes/No. Is there an emergency evacuation plan? Is it posted on all floors and rehearsed on a

periodic basis?

c. Internal building security/safety

(1) Yes/No. Do personal rooms have a door viewers?

(2) Yes/No. Are dead bolt locks installed on entry doors?

(3) Yes/No. Do windows have effective locking devices?

(4) Yes/No. Are elevators available and used in this building?

(5) Yes/No. Do elevators connect controlled access floors with public access floors?

(6) Yes/No. Do elevators service a parking garage?

(7) Yes/No. Do elevators that service garages stop automatically at the lobby? Are elevator passengers observed by personnel at the lobby level before traveling to subsequent floors?

(8) Yes/No. Are there any open stairways to upper or lower levels? Are these stairways supervised or monitored by closed-circuit television?

(9) Yes/No. Are custodial services provided by a contracted, local national source?

(10) What hours do custodial personnel work?

(11) How and whom supervises the custodial staff?

(12) Who approves the employment of custodial staff?

(13) Yes/No. Does the custodial staff have keys to all rooms? Are these controlled? Is the custodial staff permitted to leave the building with these keys?
Military Police Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-11 

(14) Yes/No. Is there any control exercised over the custodial staff entering and leaving the

building?

(15) Yes/No. Are packages carried by custodial personnel inspected when entering and leaving

the building?

(16) Yes/No. Does the building have a sprinkler system?

(17) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with smoke alarms?

(18) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with carbon monoxide alarms?

(19) Yes/No. Is the building serviced by a local fire department? Is this department on the installation or in the local community?

(20) Yes/No. What is the fire department estimated response time to this building? Day? Night?

(21) Yes/No. How many floors can the fire department ladder platform reach?

(22) Yes/No. Based on item #21 above, have alternative emergency evacuation plans been initiated and rehearsed?

(23) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with an audible local fire alarm to alert occupants?

(24) Yes/No. Does the alarm system enunciate at a central control desk and identify the exact

location/floor of the incoming alarm? Is the system periodically tested?

(25) Yes/No. Are fire alarm pull boxes located on each floor?

(26) Yes/No. Does each floor have an appropriate number of fire extinguishers? Are these extinguishers checked and serviced accordingly?

4. Yes/No. Has the command conducted a risk assessment concerning the safe and secure occupancy of

this building? Does such a risk, if any, outweigh the operational/mission necessity for remaining in

the building?

5. Based on the explanation in paragraph 4 above, should the occupants in this building relocate and is

such a move time–sensitive? What alternative locations have been considered?

6. General comments __________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

7. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):________________________________________________

b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________

c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________
C-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

C. Port and Harbor Security Checklist

1. General description. The medium of water presents unique challenges and stressful demands on security resources and equipment used to build a well-rounded physical security system. This checklist

should be used to supplement the integrated principles of installation/perimeter security detailed in

the installation perimeter checklist.

a. Provide a general description of the port site

________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________

b. Security planning

(1) Yes/No. Has a security officer been appointed on orders?

(2) Yes/No. Does the port facility have a current port security plan (PSP)? Date of plan?

Does the plan include:

___ Preventative measure to reduce opportunities for introduction of bombs

___Procedures for evaluating and handling bomb threats

___Policy for evacuation and safety of personnel

___Procedures to be used to search for bombs

___Procedures in the event a bomb or suspected bomb is found on the port

___Procedures to be taken in the event of a bomb explosion or detonations

(3) Yes/No. Does the port have a counter sabotage program?

(4) Yes/No. Are physical security/vulnerability assessments conducted at least semiannually?

(5) Yes/No. Are threat assessments conducted periodically? How often? By whom?

(6) Yes/No. Has the port commander conducted a “risk analysis” concerning the local terrorist/

criminal threat?

(7) Yes/No. Have “Restricted Areas” been designated in writing and applicable signs posted

throughout the port area?

(8) Yes/No. Are security measures in effect to protect:

___ Electrical power facilities

___ Communication centers/equipment

___ Arms, ammunition, off-loaded

(9) Yes/No. Are special after-duty hours and weekend security checks conducted on restricted

areas?
Military Police Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-13 

(10) Yes/No. Are breaches in these security checks promptly reported to the chain of supervision?

(11) Yes/No. Does the port have a privately owned vehicle (POV) parking plan?

(12) Yes/No. Does the parking plan include:

___ Restriction of POV parking in exclusive and limited areas

___ Fenced/enclave parking in controlled areas

___ Restricted parking near perimeter fence lines/barriers

(13) Yes/No. Does the port have a traffic control plan? Is the emergency evacuation?

c. Security force

(1) Yes/No. Is the present security force adequate to handle the stated port security mission? 

Explain._______________________________________________________

(2) What is the composition of the security force? (circle) US military, multinational, host nation

contract, US contract?

(3) Yes/No. Are security posts, both fixed and mobile, provided with standard operating orders?

(4) Yes/No. Are all guards trained in the use of deadly force? Is this training scenario-based and

approved by the serving judge advocate and senior military/police officer?

(5) Yes/No. Are security force orders reviewed at least monthly for currency?

(6) Yes/No. Are security force personnel inspected by a supervisor prior to being posted each

shift?

(7) Yes/No. Are multinational and host nation contract guards bilingual?

(8) Yes/No. Do supervisors inspect each post at least twice per shift?

(9) Yes/No. Is there a rapid reaction force available? What is the minimum response time? Is this

response time commensurate with the latest threat assessment?

(10) Yes/No. Do security personnel report or record their presence at key locations in the port?

___ Portable watch clocks

___ Telephones

___ Hand-held or vehicle radios

Other means?_______________________

(11) Describe the host nation/multinational security support provided on the water side of this site:

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________
C-14 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

(12) What additional security measures are implemented for those vessels at anchorage? Who

provides this service?

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

(13) Yes/No. Are guard assignments, times, and patrol routes varied at frequent intervals to avoid

establishing routines?

(14) What type and how many watercraft are involved in the port security mission? 

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

(15) Do these craft have viable communication with shore-based security forces? Is there a language barrier?

(16) Yes/No. Are all security force personnel qualified on their assigned weapon(s)? Do they

familiarize with these weapons on a quarterly basis?

(17) Yes/No. Are security force vehicles properly equipped with emergency equipment (e.g.,

lights, communications, siren, public announcement system, proper markings)?

(18) Yes/No. Are security force weapons and ammunition properly secured and accounted for

when not in use? Briefly explain procedures:

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________

d. Personnel and vehicle movement control

(1) Yes/No. Is a pass and badge identification system in effect to limit access to the port?

Is this system further supplemented at restricted areas?

(2) Yes/No. Is the pass and badge system used for all personnel entering the port, particularly

host nation and third country national personnel?

(3) Yes/No. Is there positive access system in place for visitors and contractors? Are visitors

escorted?

(4) Yes/No. Are issued badges serialized and strictly controlled for accountability?

(5) Yes/No. Are lost badges replaced with badges bearing different serial numbers?

(6) Yes/No. Have procedures been established for issuance of temporary badges for those personnel who have forgotten their permanent badges?

(7) Yes/No. Are badges of such design and appearance as to enable guards, and other personnel,

to recognize quickly and positively the authorization and limitations applicable to the

bearer?
Military Police Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-15 

(8) Yes/No. Are procedures in existence to ensure return of badges upon termination of employment or reassignment?

(9) Yes/No. Are POVs and contractor vehicles that routinely have access to the port registered at

the security office?

e. Perimeter barriers (See installation perimeter checklist)

f. Protective lighting

(1) Yes/No. Does the protective lighting incorporated for this port meet adequate intensity

requirements?

(2) Yes/No. Are the zones of illumination from the lamps directed downward and away from the

guard personnel?

(3) Yes/No. Is perimeter protective lighting utilized so that security patrols remain in comparative darkness?

(4) Yes/No. Are lights checked at least weekly for proper operation prior to darkness?

(5) Yes/No. Do light patterns overlap to compensate for burned-out lamps?

(6) Yes/No. Is there a back-up power source for all electrical power?

(7) Yes/No. Is the above source protected?

(8) Yes/No. Is the backup power system easily operated? Are there additional trained operators

on each shift that can safely operate this equipment?

(9) The above protective lighting questions extend to any contiguous body of water. Are these

areas protected with required lighting as well? Who is responsible for water-side lighting?

2. Yes/No. Do foreign vessels have access to US designated ports? If yes, explain security procedures for:

a. Foreign personnel entering the US port:_____________________________________________

b. Foreign vessels at anchor:________________________________________________________

c. Off-loaded cargo, in-transit and/or stockpiled cargo within the US designated port area:

_____________________________________________________________________________

3. General comments

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

4. Recommendations

 a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________________

 b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________________

 c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________________
C-16 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

D. Transportation Checklist

1. General description. The following questions are intended to increase awareness, stimulate thinking

and preparation, and enhance transportation protective measures where the threat of terrorist activity

is a vital concern.

a. Vehicle identification

(1) What type and quantity of vehicles are used for local transportation?

Tactical:

Nontactical:

Commercial:

(Hardened)

b. Host nation:

(1) Yes/No. Are vehicle safety and maintenance checks conducted prior to usage?

(2) Yes/No. Are vehicles kept in good mechanical condition?

(3) Yes/No. Is maintenance properly documented?

(4) Yes/No. Are vehicles searched prior to use after being parked in a nonsecure area?

(5) Yes/No. Are vehicles secured when not in operation? How? Is off-street secure parking

available?

(6) Yes/No. Have vehicle exhausts (e.g., commercial vehicles) been modified to preclude insertion of an explosive device? If yes, explain procedure:

__________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

(7) Yes/No. Do vehicles have:

___ Communications 

___ Backup communications available

___ Alarm systems

___ Locking gas caps

___ First aid kits

___ Spare tire

___ Road repair tools

(8) Yes/No. Are commercial vehicles rotated among users to confuse possible surveillance

activity?
Military Police Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-17 

(9) Yes/No. Do drivers have constant communication with a dispatcher, unit operations office, or

US Embassy? Briefly explain __________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________

(10) Yes/No. Are drivers instructed in off-base defensive driving techniques?

(11) Yes/No. Are drivers and passengers provided preconvoy predeparture briefings on:

___ Accident reporting and what to do

___ Vehicle breakdowns

___ Safe havens

___ Emergency actions during contact

___ Reporting suspicious activity

(12) Yes/No. Are convoy routes routinely surveyed for possible terrorist activity/vulnerability? Is

this information properly disseminated on a timely basis?

(13) Yes/No. Are departure and return times varied to inhibit predictability?

(14) Yes/No. Is travel off-base limited to mission essential activity?

(15) Yes/No. Are alternate escape routes included in each mission essential travel serial? Do

travelers confirm their understanding and familiarity with these plans?

(16) Yes/No. Are escorts provided for each convoy?

(17) Yes/No. Are escorts armed? If yes, by order of whom?

(18) Yes/No. Are all armed personnel trained in the use of deadly force? Is this documented?

(19) Yes/No. Is the training in the use of deadly force terrorist scenario-based?

(20) Yes/No. Is the training in deadly force approved by the local servicing Judge Advocate and

senior military/security police officer?

2. General comments __________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

3. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________

b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________

c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________
GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations

CBCA . . . . . customs and border clearance agent

CBCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Customs and Border

Clearance Program

CBP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Customs

and Border Protection

CBRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear

CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civilian internee

CID . . . . . . . . . . . .criminal investigation division

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

CONUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . continental United States

CTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat tracker dog

CTUS . . . . customs territory of the United States

DA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of the Army

DC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dislocated civilian

DD (form) . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . drug detector dog

DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DODD. . . . . . . . Department of Defense directive

DRS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Detainee Reporting System

EC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy combatant

ECP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..entry control point

EDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . explosive detector dog

EPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy prisoner of war

FACA . . . . . . . . Federal Assimilated Crimes Act

FM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manual

FRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary order

FTO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field training officer

G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or higher

intelligence staff officer

HN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..host nation

ICRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International Committee

of the Red Cross

IED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvise explosive device

INIWIC . . . . . . .Interservice Nonlethal Individual

Weapons Instructor Course

ISN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . internment serial number

JPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .joint prosecution

and exploitation center

LDO . . . . . . . . . . . . . limited detainee operations

LOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . law and order operations

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force

MCI-E . . . . . military customs inspector-excepted

MCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps order

MCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP . . .Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary force

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit

MOS . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialty

MP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military police

MPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military police investigator

MSC . . . . . . . . . . . . major subordinate command

MSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .main supply route

MTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mobile training team

MWD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military working dog

NAVMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navy/Marine Corps

departmental publication

NCIS . . . . . Naval Criminal Investigative Service

NCOIC . . . . . noncommissioned officer in charge

NDRC . . . . . National Detainee Reporting Center

NLW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nonlethal weapon

OCONUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . outside the continental

United States

OIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . officer in charge

OPNAV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Office of the Chief

on Naval Operations

PCA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Posse Comitatus Act

PD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . patrol dog
Glossary-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

P/DDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .patrol/drug detector dog

P/EDD. . . . . . . . . . .patrol/explosive detector dog

PIO . . . . . . . . . . . . police intelligence operations

PM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . provost marshal

POD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . plan of the day

PSO . . . . . . . . . . . . .protective services operations

RDF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . regional detention facility

RP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . retained person

S-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officer

SJA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff judge advocate

SNCO . . . . . . . . . .staff noncommissioned officer

SNCOIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff noncommissioned

officer in charge

SOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . status-of-forces agreement

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedures

SPMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . special purpose MAGTF

SROE . . . . . . . . . . .standing rules of engagement

SRUF . . . . . . . standing rules for the use of force

SSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . specialized search dog

TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . traffic control point

TDRC . . . . . . . theater detainee reporting centers

TIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . theater internment facility

TQ................................ tactical questioning

TTP . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures

UCMJ . . . . . . . Uniform Code of Military Justice

US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States

USDA . .United States Department of Agriculture

USTRANSCOM . . . United States Transportation

Command

VCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . veterinary corps officer
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-3 

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

area of operations—An operational area defined

by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically

encompass the entire operational area of the joint

force commander, but should be large enough for

component commanders to accomplish their

missions and protect their forces. Also called AO.

(JP 1-02)

area of responsibility—The geographical area

associated with a combatant command within

which a geographic combatant commander has

authority to plan and conduct operations. Also

called AOR. (JP 1-02)

biometric—Measurable physical characteristic

or personal behavior trait used to recognize the

identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual. (JP 1-02)

biometrics— The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 1-02)

biometrics-enabled intelligence—Intelligence

information associated with and or derived from

biometrics data that matches a specific person or

unknown identity to a place, activity, device,

component, or weapon that supports terrorist/

insurgent network and related pattern analysis,

facilitates high value individual targeting,

reveals movement patterns, and confirms

claimed identity. (DODD 8521.01E)

civilian internee—A civilian who is interned

during armed conflict, occupation, or other military operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she has committed an

offense against the detaining power. (JP 1-02)

civil support—Department of Defense support to

US civil authorities for domestic emergencies,

and for designated law enforcement and other

activities. (JP 1-02)

contraband—Material, goods, plant and animal

products, agricultural pests and hazards, and

other articles prohibited entry into the Customs

and Border Territory of the United States or host

nation country, including controlled substances,

as identified in 21, United States Code 812,

Schedules of Controlled Substances, and

restricted items when the conditions of the

restriction have not been met. (DOD 4500.9-R) 

controlled substance—1. A drug or other

substance, or immediate precursor included in

Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the Controlled

Substances Act. (JP 1-02) 

counterdrug operations—Civil or military

actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug

trafficking. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency—Comprehensive civilian

and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency

and to address any core grievances. (JP 1-02)

customs territory of the United States—The 50

United States, the District of Columbia, and

Puerto Rico Not included are American Samoa,

Guam, Johnston Island, Midway Island, the Virgin

Islands of the United States, Wake Island, or the

former Panama Canal Zone. (DOD 4500.9-R)

deadly force—Deadly force is force likely to

cause death or serious physical injury. 

defense in depth—The siting of mutually

supporting defense positions designed to absorb

and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial

observations of the whole position by the enemy,

and to allow the commander to maneuver his

reserve. (JP 1-02) 
Glossary-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily

used by the Department of Defense that includes

a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally

displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. See also displaced

person; evacuee; internally displaced person;

migrant; refugee; stateless person. (JP 1-02)

displaced person—A broad term used to refer to

internally and externally displaced persons

collectively. See also evacuee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

evacuee—A civilian removed from a place of

residence by military direction for reasons of

personal security or the requirements of the military situation. See also displaced person; expellee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

expellee—A civilian outside the boundaries of

the country of his or her nationality or ethnic

origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that

country or to a third country for political or other

purposes. (JP 1-02)

force continuum—The wide range of possible

actions ranging from voice commands to application of deadly force that may be used to gain

and maintain control of a potentially dangerous

situation.

force protection—Preventive measures taken to

mitigate hostile actions against Department of

Defense personnel (to include family members),

resources, facilities, and critical information.

Force protection does not include actions to

defeat the enemy or protect against accidents,

weather, or disease. (JP 1-02). 

host nation—A nation which receives the forces

and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit

through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

improvised explosive device—A device placed or

fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating

destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military

stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary

components. Also called IED. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—

The systematic, continuous process of analyzing

the threat and environment in a specific

geographic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP 5-12C)

interagency—United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department

of Defense. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person—Any person who

has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their

home of places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of

armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,

violations of human rights or natural humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an

internationally recognized state border. (JP 1-02)

joint interrogation and debriefing center—

Physical location for the exploitation of intelligence information from detainees and other

sources. Also called JIDC. (JP 1-02)

law enforcement agency—Any of a number of

agencies (outside the Department of Defense)

chartered and empowered to enforce US laws in

the following jurisdictions: The United States, a

state (or political subdivision) of the United

States, a territory (or political subdivision) of the

United States, a federally recognized Native

American tribe or Alaskan Native Village, or

within the borders of a host nation. Also called

LEA. (JP 1-02)

Marine Corps installations—Those installations, bases, and/or stations under the control,

supervision, jurisdiction, or responsibility of and

operated by the Marine Corps or unit of the

Marine Corps.
Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-5 

migrant—A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national

boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02)

military jurisdiction—The extent of and limitation on the right of an armed force to exercise

authority and control over persons and offenses.

mission assurance—A process to ensure that

assigned tasks or duties can be performed in

accordance with the intended purpose or plan. It

is a summation of the activities and measures

taken to ensure that required capabilities and all

supporting infrastructures are available to the

DOD to carry out the National Military Strategy. It links numerous risk management program

activities and security related functions—such as

force protection; antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection; information assurance; continuity of operations; chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense;

readiness; and installation preparedness—to

create the synergistic effect required for DOD to

mobilize, deploy, support, and sustain military

operations throughout the full range of military

operations. (DODD 3020.40)

nonlethal weapon—A weapon that is explicitly

designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing

fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and

undesired damage to property and the environment. Also called NLW. (JP 1-02)

operational environment—A composite of the

conditions, circumstances, and influences that

affect the employment of capabilities and bear on

the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

physical security—1. That part of security

concerned with physical measures designed to

safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized

access to equipment, installations, material, and

documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (Part 1 of a 2

part definition, JP 1-02) 

Posse Comitatus Act—Prohibits search, seizure,

or arrest powers to US military personnel.

Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to

permit increased Department of Defense support

of drug interdiction and other law enforcement

activities. (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force

as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code,

Section 1385) (JP 1-02)

preservice training—Initial law enforcement

training conducted before an individual begins

service in law enforcement duties, police, criminal investigations, and detention operations.

refugee—A person who owing to a well-founded

fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular

social group or political opinion, is outside the

country of his or her nationality and is unable or,

owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself

or herself of the protection of that country. See

also dislocated civilian; displaced person;

evacuee; expellee; stateless person. (JP 1-02)

retained person—Individuals under the custody

and/or control of the Department of the Defense

according to Reference (g), Article 33. (DODD

2310.01E)

sensitive site exploitation—A related series of

activities inside a captured sensitive site to

exploit personnel documents, electronic data, and

material captured at the site, while neutralizing

any threat posed by the site or its contents. Also

called SSE. (JP 1-02).

stability operations—An overarching term

encompassing various military missions, tasks,

and activities conducted outside the United States

in coordination with other instruments of national

power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure
Glossary-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

environment, provide essential governmental

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

stateless person—A person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation

of its law. See also dislocated civilian; displaced

person; evacuee; expellee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

supporting distance—The distance between two

units that can be traveled in time for one to come

to the aid of the other.

supporting range—The distance one unit may

be geographically separated from a second unit

yet remain within the maximum range of the

second unit’s weapons systems.

tactical questioning—Direct questioning by any

Department of Defense personnel of a captured or

detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical

intelligence information, at or near the point of

capture or detention and consistent with applicable law. Also called TQ. (JP 1-02)
REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Geneva Conventions of 1949

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the

Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members

of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949 

Federal Publications

Federal Statutory Laws

Manual for Courts-Martial United States

National Defense Strategy

Uniform Code of Military Justice

United States Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, part I, chap. 1, sect. 13, Laws of States

Adopted for Areas Within Federal Jurisdiction

Department of Defense Issuances

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

2310.01E The Department of Defense Detainee Program

3000.3 Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons

3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW)

3020.40 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)

3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)

3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

3115.09 DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning

5030.49 DOD Customs Inspection Program

5111.10 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC))

5525.5 DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials

8521.01E Department of Defense Biometrics

Department of Defense Regulation (DODR)

4500.9-R Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR)
References-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Defense Intelligence Agency Manual

58-12 The Department of Defense Human Intelligence System

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3121.01B (S) (NOTAL), Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces/Standing Rules for the Use of Force

Joint Publication (JP)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

2-0 Joint Intelligence

3-01.1 Countering Air and Missile Threats

3-03 Joint Interdiction

3-06 Joint Urban Operations

3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

3-07.3 Peace Operations

3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations

3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volumes I and II 

3-16 Multinational Operations

3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations

3-26 Counterterrorism

3-27 Homeland Defense

3-28 Civil Support

3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations

3-57 Civil-Military Operations

3-60 Joint Targeting

3-63 Detainee Operations

3-68 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction

Possee Comitatus Act (PCA)

Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publications (NAVMCs)

2890 Small Wars Manual

2927 Antiterrorism/Force Protection Campaign Plan

3500.10 Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

3-07 Stability Operations (proposed FM 1-04.10)

3-19.1 Military Police Operations (proposed FM 3-39)

3-19.13 Law Enforcement Investigations (proposed ATTP 3-39.12)

3-19.15 Civil Disturbance Operations (proposed ATTP 3-39.33)
Military Police Operations __________________________________________________________________________ References-3 

3-19.17 Military Working Dogs (proposed ATTP 3-39.34)

3-19.4 Military Police Leaders’ Handbook (proposed TC 3-39.30)

3-19.50 Police Intelligence Operations (proposed ATTP 3-39.20)

5-34 Engineer Field Data

3-19.40 Internment/Resettlement Operations 

27-10 The Law of Land Warfare (proposed FM 1-04.10)

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrine Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1.0 Marine Corps Operations

1-2 Campaigning

1-3 Tactics

2 Intelligence

3 Expeditionary Operations

5 Planning

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-1 Intelligence Operations

2-2 MAGTF Intelligence Collection

2-3 MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis

2-4 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Dissemination

3-02D Combating Terrorism

3-15.8 MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)

3-33.8 Peace Operations, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace 

Operations

3-33.5 Counterinsurgency

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

5-12 The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-17A Engineer Field Data

3-31.4B Cordon and Search, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and 

Search Operations

3-33.8A Advising, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces

Marine Corps Interim Publications (MCIPs)

3-33.01 Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency

3-34.01 Military Working Dogs in Urban Terrain

3-35.01 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

3461.1 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees
References-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

5530.14A Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual

5580.2B Law Enforcement Manual

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP)

3-07.11M Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Maritime Interception Operations

Miscellaneous

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

Capstone Concept of Operations for DOD Forensics

Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 

Combat Hunter Handbook

Biometrics Smartbook

Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates

Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

JCISFA SFA Planner’s Guide

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare

USAID Fragile States Strategy

USAID Security Sector Reform

Weapons Technical Intelligence Handbook

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

United States Chemical Weapons Convention
USMC

USMC