United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 15, 2021*

Decided October 19, 2021 

Before

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1264 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES K. GOODPASTURE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 3:07-CR-30185-SMY-1 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

James Goodpasture appeals the district court’s imposition of various special 

conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence for violating the conditions of a 

previously imposed term of supervision. We agree with Goodpasture that the district

court did not adequately justify restrictions on his computer and internet use, and we 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. Rule 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 21-1264 Page 2 

vacate just that portion of the revocation sentence and remand for the limited purpose 

of allowing the district court to reconsider whether to impose that condition. We 

otherwise affirm.

I 

In 2007, law enforcement officers discovered a gun while executing a search 

warrant at Goodpasture’s residence after three teenage boys reported that he had 

solicited them to perform sexual acts. They told police that Goodpasture asked them to 

ejaculate into plastic bags, supposedly for him to donate to a sperm bank. One boy also 

alleged that he slept at Goodpasture’s home, and Goodpasture sexually molested him 

while he slept. Goodpasture denied the boys’ allegations, but he admitted that he 

owned the gun found in his home. Goodpasture pleaded guilty in the Southern District 

of Illinois to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court 

sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment plus three years’ supervised release.

As relevant to this appeal, Goodpasture has three prior convictions for sex 

offenses against children under 13 years old. He also has one prior conviction for failing 

to register as a sex offender. Finally, Goodpasture has two prior convictions for driving 

under the influence of alcohol and one for possession of a controlled substance. 

All these convictions are from the 1980s and 1990s, but Goodpasture’s sex 

offenses, in particular, continue to loom over him. While Goodpasture was in prison for 

the current firearm conviction, the government petitioned to civilly commit him as a 

“sexually dangerous person” under 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). A federal court in North 

Carolina granted the petition, finding that Goodpasture was likely to reoffend. United 

States v. Goodpasture, 697 F. App’x 184 (4th Cir. 2017). As part of a modification of his 

sentence for the firearm conviction, Goodpasture agreed to several conditions of 

supervision tailored to sex offenders. And, after four years, he successfully petitioned to 

remove his “sexually dangerous person” status and end that detention. Case No. 5:15-

hc-2188-BO (E.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2020). Although two experts opined that Goodpasture 

was still dangerous, the district court in North Carolina agreed with a defense expert

who testified that Goodpasture no longer suffered from pedophilic disorder or 

experienced uncontrollable sexual urges toward children. 

Shortly after this decision, Goodpasture finished the custodial portion of his 

criminal sentence and began serving supervised release at a residential reentry center.

Eight months later, however, his probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised 

release based on nine alleged violations of the conditions. He missed a session of his
No. 21-1264 Page 3 

required sex-offender treatment, kept a box-cutter in his locker at the reentry center, 

and failed a breathalyzer test, violating both his conditions of supervision and the 

reentry center’s rules. Finally, Goodpasture violated his location-monitoring 

requirements on five occasions by failing to give notice or obtain approval. 

Goodpasture offered innocent explanations for most of these violations, but he 

nonetheless admitted them. 

The district court revoked Goodpasture’s supervision, sentenced him to one year 

of imprisonment and two years of supervised release, and continued the sentencing 

hearing to allow Goodpasture time to review the proposed conditions of supervised 

release. Goodpasture then objected to the following conditions: (1) computer- and 

internet-monitoring and prohibition of social media use; (2) location monitoring and 

home confinement; (3) total abstinence from alcohol consumption with remote testing 

and alcohol treatment for one year; (4) warrantless searches upon reasonable suspicion; 

and (5) notifying third parties of his criminal history. He argued that these conditions 

were not warranted by his personal characteristics or anything in his criminal history.

The district court overruled Goodpasture’s objections.

II

On appeal, Goodpasture renews his challenge to these conditions. We review for 

an abuse of discretion, looking at whether the district court explained, consistent with 

the factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(d), its reasons for imposing them. United 

States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A condition “cannot involve a greater 

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the goals of sentencing. 

Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 2013)). 

A 

We start with the restrictions on computer and internet use, which allow the

Probation Office to access all Goodpasture’s computing, internet, and electronic storage 

devices, to install monitoring software, and to conduct random searches. Further, he

must notify any current or potential employer of his internet restrictions, as well as any 

third party who may use the same devices that he uses. Finally, Goodpasture’s

probation officer can bar him from all activity on “social media sites” and limit him to 

possessing only one internet-capable device. The district court explained that it imposed 

these restrictions “[d]ue to Mr. Goodpasture’s conviction for Aggravated Criminal

Sexual Abuse, his previous designation as a sexually dangerous person, his lack of sex 

offender treatment, [and] his most recent sex offender evaluation and subsequent
No. 21-1264 Page 4 

recommendations.” When Goodpasture objected that his previous convictions did not 

involve the internet, the court responded that they “occurred at such time when access 

to the internet and internet-based sexual offenses were not prominent as they are 

today.” 

We agree with Goodpasture that the district court’s findings do not support the 

imposition of these restrictions. Computer-monitoring conditions are usually tied to 

computer-facilitated offenses. United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2014); see 

also United States v. Morgan, 987 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2021). But, as Goodpasture points 

out, he did not use a computer or social media to effectuate any of his prior offenses.

Indeed, there is no evidence that he has ever used a computer or the internet, much less

for an illicit purpose such as soliciting minors or viewing child pornography. The

presentence investigation report suggests his older convictions involved victims to 

whom he had in-person access (at least one was a household member), and the conduct 

in 2007 did not entail computer use. The court’s explanation—essentially, that he might

have used a computer if internet usage had been more prevalent at the time of his 

offenses—is merely speculative. The imposition of this condition, at least on the present 

record, is not reasonably related to the underlying conviction or his history and 

characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 

Computer-related restrictions should also be “defined to some degree of 

precision.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 858 (quoting United States v. Cary, 775 F.3d 919, 927 (7th 

Cir. 2015)). Yet the district court imposed a blanket restriction against all social-media 

use, including legal activity for which Goodpasture may have a First Amendment right. 

See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that statute making it a 

felony for sex offenders to access all social media violated First Amendment). And it did 

not explain why the monitoring should extend beyond his personal devices into the 

workplace. Cf, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d at 856 (affirming computer-monitoring requirement 

after court added exception for computers that defendant needed to access for 

employment).

The district court’s justification for these broad restrictions is not clear from the 

record. The government insists that “judges generally impose computer search 

requirements on sex offenders,” but that status alone does not justify computer 

monitoring in all cases. Baker, 755 F.3d at 525–26 (concluding that failure to register as 

sex offender is not a computer-facilitated offense justifying monitoring condition). The 

district court needed to tie the restrictions to Goodpasture’s individual characteristics. 

Apart from referencing Goodpasture’s sex offender status, however, the court only
No. 21-1264 Page 5 

referenced in passing his failure to attend sex-offender treatment and subsequent 

recommendations from a “recent sex offender evaluation.” But the court did not 

elaborate on how Goodpasture’s admission to missing a single treatment session makes 

him likely to use a computer to reoffend. And the recent evaluation and 

recommendations to which the court referred are not apparent from the record. No 

evaluation was submitted at sentencing, and neither party has identified a report

anywhere in the record that the court could have been referring to. 

The government argues that we should nonetheless uphold the restrictions 

because Goodpasture previously agreed to the same conditions. But Goodpasture 

agreed to a modification of his (then prospective) conditions only as part of his effort to 

obtain release from civil commitment. He then (unsuccessfully) endured those 

conditions when his original prison sentence in this case ended. He was not precluded 

from objecting when he came before the court for a new sentence in the revocation 

proceedings, although the district court could consider his prior stipulation in imposing 

new conditions and give it the weight the court determined was appropriate. No matter 

what was appropriate in the past, the court had to justify the conditions it imposed. See 

United States v. Manyfield, 961 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Do not overread our limited conclusion. We are not saying that there is no 

factual basis for the imposition of a supervised-release condition limiting Goodpasture’s 

computer or internet use. Our more limited conclusion is that the present record does 

not support the district court’s imposition of the condition.

As we discuss below, the district court adequately justified its conclusion that 

Goodpasture poses a risk to the community, and it had broad discretion to fashion 

conditions of supervision that it believed would mitigate that risk. Computer 

restrictions—perhaps even broad restrictions—may be appropriate here. If the district 

court chooses to impose particular restrictions, however, it must tailor them to

Goodpasture’s personal history and circumstances and explain why they are necessary 

to achieve the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d)(1); Kappes, 782 F.3d at 845. Put most simply, Goodpasture’s sex-offender status 

cannot serve as a categorical justification for blanket computer-related restrictions. 

B 

Regarding Goodpasture’s challenges to the remaining conditions, the district 

court acted within its discretion. Goodpasture first challenges the decision to place him 

under location monitoring and confine him to his residence, except for certain pre-
No. 21-1264 Page 6 

approved activities. He argues that his prior location-monitoring violations involved 

obligations at work or difficulties getting to and from the workplace, his sex offenses 

are decades old, and his sexually-dangerous-person designation was vacated. 

But as the district court pointed out, Goodpasture admitted to violating his 

location-monitoring requirements five times; his employment-related excuses do not 

change his confessed failure to comply with requirements such as alerting his probation 

officer to his whereabouts. And even if Goodpasture is not “sexually dangerous” for 

purposes of the civil-commitment statute, the district court could still consider his sex 

offenses and personal background. See § 3553(a)(1). As the district court noted, two of 

three experts in his recent civil-commitment proceedings testified that Goodpasture was 

dangerous. Further, although the allegations against Goodpasture for soliciting and 

assaulting teenage boys in 2007 did not result in federal charges, the conduct was 

included in the presentence investigation report that the court reviewed before 

imposing this condition. Based on this evidence that Goodpasture continued to reoffend 

until his most recent incarceration, and that at least some experts thought he would 

reoffend in the future, the court reasonably concluded that monitoring is required to 

deter further offenses. 

Goodpasture next challenges the condition requiring him to participate in one 

year of remote alcohol testing and treatment for alcohol abuse. The district court based

this provision on his history of substance abuse—including two convictions for driving 

under the influence—and his illicit consumption of alcohol during his last term of

supervision. Goodpasture insists that he is free from substance-abuse problems. But we 

have upheld similar testing requirements for defendants who were not actively 

struggling with substance abuse, so long as their backgrounds suggested a risk for such 

abuse. See, e.g., United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant who 

quit drinking but had prior conviction for driving under the influence); United States v. 

Paul, 542 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2008) (defendant with no history of drug use but a 

history with alcohol that suggested a risk for drug abuse). Given Goodpasture’s 

background and previous failure to abstain from alcohol as required, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by imposing this condition.

We are likewise unpersuaded by Goodpasture’s objection to the special condition 

allowing a probation officer to conduct warrantless searches of his property “upon 

reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of release.” 

Again, the court imposed this condition because of Goodpasture’s prior controlledsubstance convictions and alcohol consumption during supervision. Goodpasture 
No. 21-1264 Page 7 

repeats his arguments about the staleness of his substance-abuse convictions. But his 

recent violation for alcohol use alone justified the condition. See United States v. Neal, 

810 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2016). Further, Congress explicitly authorized this condition 

for felons, like Goodpasture, who are required to register under the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 

Last, Goodpasture challenges the requirement to notify third parties of “risks 

that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or history of criminal conduct, whether 

or not resulting in criminal charges.” The district court adequately explained, however,

that this requirement was necessary to deter future criminal conduct in light of his sexabuse convictions and past failure to comply with the Illinois sex-offender registry. As 

with the location-monitoring requirements, the court imposed this condition after

considering Goodpasture’s entire background, including the civil-commitment 

proceedings and the conduct described in his presentence report. And, to the extent that 

this condition is redundant with the condition that prohibits him from contact with 

minors, as Goodpasture argues, any redundancy is harmless. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 854. 

We note that we have repeatedly directed courts to specify the identities or 

categories of persons and the types of risks to which third-party-notification conditions 

apply. See United States v. Canfield, 893 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. 

Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2016). The district court cited Goodpasture’s sex 

offenses to justify this condition to, but the written condition is not limited to risks of 

sexual abuse. We do not understand Goodpasture to have raised an argument that the 

condition is unconstitutionally vague, so we need not decide the issue. To the extent 

that this condition can be better tailored, Goodpasture may seek modification. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(2); United States v. Hunt, 930 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2019). 

III

One final note. The government asks that any remand allow for plenary 

resentencing, so that the district court can increase the prison term to balance any 

easing of the conditions of supervision. This is appropriate when we can discern some

interplay between vacated supervised-release conditions and the rest of the sentence. 

See, e.g., Kappes, 782 F.3d at 866–67. But the sentencing transcripts give us no reason to 

believe that the strict computer-monitoring and social media restrictions that we vacate

offset what would have otherwise been a longer prison sentence. After settling on 12 

months’ confinement and two years’ supervision, the district court held a separate 

hearing two weeks later on the conditions of supervision. The court did not encourage 

re-argument about the length of confinement or supervision or suggest that it would 
No. 21-1264 Page 8 

revisit the terms if it sustained any of Goodpasture’s objections. Because these 

components of the sentence were discrete, we conclude that a limited remand on only 

the computer-use restrictions is appropriate. See Manyfield, 961 F.3d at 997. 

IV

For these reasons, we VACATE the restrictions related to computer and internet 

use, AFFIRM the rest of the sentence, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 

with this order.