2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-2-2012

Desmond Maynard v. VI Comm Labor

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 10-3476

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Desmond Maynard v. VI Comm Labor" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 1073.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1073
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-3476

_____________

DESMOND L. MAYNARD,

 Appellant

v.

CARMELO RIVERA,

COMMISSIONER OF THE VIRGINS ISLANDS

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; 

CHERYL MARTIN-LIBURD

______________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN 

ISLANDS – APPELLATE DIVISION

(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00171)

Chief Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gómez

District Judge: Honorable Raymond L. Finch

Superior Court Judge: Honorable Patricia D. Steele

______________

Argued December 5, 2011

______________

Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit 

Judges.
2

(Opinion Filed: April 2, 2012)

Shawn E. Maynard-Hahnfeld, Esq. (argued)

Law Offices of Desmond L. Maynard

P.O. Box 8388

St. Thomas, VI 00801

Counsel for Appellant Desmond Maynard

Tina Gillespie La Borde, Esq. (argued)

Legal Services of the Virgin Islands, Inc.

1832 Kongens Gade

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellee Cheryl Martin-Liburd

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to determine whether the 

individual needs of an employee can justify noncompliance

with an employer’s reasonable administrative order. The 

Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act (the “WDA”) permits 

the termination of an employee “who wilfully and 

intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, 

and instructions of the employer.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 

76(a)(4). Here, in lieu of providing his employees with a

paycheck, Appellant Desmond Maynard (“Maynard”) paid 

his employees in cash, requiring that they endorse an 

unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment. After receiving 

cash remuneration one week in September 1996, Appellee 
3

Cheryl Martin-Liburd (“Martin-Liburd”), an employee of 

Maynard’s, refused to endorse the paycheck presented to her 

as a receipt for Maynard. Her refusal led Maynard to fire her 

for noncompliance. At a hearing before the Virgin Islands 

Department of Labor (“DOL”), Martin-Liburd testified that 

she needed a signed paycheck to apply for and receive 

government financial assistance. She had never shared this 

information with Maynard before the hearing. 

The Appellate Division of the District Court held that, 

given Martin-Liburd’s need for written verification of her 

income, Maynard’s order was unreasonable and that MartinLiburd’s resulting termination was in violation of the WDA. 

The Appellate Division also awarded Martin-Liburd back 

pay. We hold that the Appellate Division erred by 

considering Martin-Liburd’s individual needs when 

determining the reasonableness of Maynard’s order. 

Maynard’s directive was an archetypal administrative order 

for which Martin-Liburd’s compliance was not dependent on 

her wants or desires. We will reverse the Appellate 

Division’s July 19, 2010 Order.

I.

Maynard operated a legal practice in the Virgin 

Islands—the Law Offices of Desmond L. Maynard. The firm 

had several employees. On each pay day, which occurred on 

Mondays, Maynard would provide his employees with a 

paycheck. Employees would typically spend their one hour 

lunch break travelling to and from a local bank to cash their 

paychecks. Based on the proximity of the bank, coupled with 

long lines, this process often caused employees to exceed 
4

their allotted one hour break for lunch.

1

Faced with complaints from his employees about time 

expended going to the bank and his desire to decrease 

unproductive time spent by his employees, Maynard decided 

to alter the manner in which he paid his employees. He began 

paying his employees in cash, whenever possible,

 

2

In March 1995, Martin-Liburd commenced

employment as a legal secretary at Maynard’s firm. When 

she began work there, he had already implemented the cash

payment policy. On many occasions, Martin-Liburd was paid 

in cash and endorsed the unsigned paycheck as written proof 

of payment. The exchange of cash for an unsigned paycheck

was a regular occurrence. 

and then 

either simultaneously or soon thereafter handing his 

employees an unsigned paycheck, which they endorsed as a 

receipt of payment.

On September 30, 1996, Martin-Liburd was once again 

paid in cash. That same day, Martin-Liburd was presented 

 1 The facts underlying this appeal arose in the mid1990s. At that time, lines were unavoidable if a person 

sought to conduct any business at the bank, as communication 

with a bank teller was necessary to facilitate financial 

transactions. Modern advancements in technology now 

permit a person to transact a plethora of bank-related business 

either online or at an automated teller machine, rendering the 

problem Maynard’s employees faced a historical relic.

2 Maynard made payroll disbursements in cash

whenever he had cash on hand at the office.
5

with a paycheck not signed by Maynard, the payor, and asked 

to endorse the paycheck and return it to the office manager. 

Martin-Liburd refused. Maynard approached Martin-Liburd 

to discuss her refusal to sign the paycheck. Martin-Liburd 

replied that the paycheck was invalid without Maynard’s 

signature. Maynard persisted that the paycheck functioned 

merely as a receipt. 

On October 1, 1996, Maynard again approached 

Martin-Liburd and asked her once more to endorse the 

paycheck, as requested. Martin-Liburd again refused. In 

response, Maynard informed her that she would be terminated

if she did not comply. After a verbal disagreement between 

the two, Martin-Liburd left the building. That day was 

Martin-Liburd’s last at Maynard’s firm. 

Following her discharge, Martin-Liburd filed a 

complaint against Maynard with the DOL, alleging that she 

was wrongfully discharged in violation of the WDA. V.I. 

Code Ann. tit. 24, §§ 76-79. At the DOL hearing, MartinLiburd stated, for the first time, that she needed a signed 

paycheck from Maynard so that she could apply for and 

receive financial assistance from the Women, Infants, and 

Children Program (“WIC”), operating under the Virgin 

Islands Department of Health, and food stamps.

3

 3 The parties focus solely on Martin-Liburd’s 

eligibility for WIC financial assistance. Going forward, so

shall we.

 MartinLiburd contended that she was ineligible for WIC support

without verification of her income. It is unclear from the 

testimony, however, whether Martin-Liburd ever 

communicated to Maynard that she desired a signed copy of 
6

the paycheck to submit to WIC.

4

On February 19, 1997, Carmelo Rivera, the DOL 

Commissioner, found that Martin-Liburd was wrongfully 

discharged and awarded her back pay. Maynard filed a 

petition for a writ of review with the Superior Court of the 

Virgin Islands, pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1421. On 

August 23, 2005, the Superior Court affirmed the DOL’s 

decision. The Superior Court held that Maynard’s order was 

unreasonable because it denied Martin-Liburd proof of her 

income necessary to apply for and receive WIC assistance, 

rendering her termination in violation of the WDA. Maynard 

appealed to the District Court for the Virgin Islands, 

Appellate Division (the “Appellate Division”).

 Nevertheless, the WIC 

certification form introduced at the hearing indicates that 

proof of income could be established through a number of 

means, including: (1) an unemployment check; (2) paycheck 

stubs for all working members of the household; or (3) the 

most recent W2 form. Martin-Liburd testified that she never 

provided Maynard or his office manager with a copy of this 

form.

5

 4 Martin-Liburd repeatedly testified that she informed 

Maynard and his office manager that a signed paycheck was 

necessary so that she could “take care of [her] business.” 

(App. 43, 45.)

 

5 Had Maynard appealed the Superior Court’s decision 

after January 29, 2007, the appeal would have been filed with 

the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, which assumed 

appellate jurisdiction from the Appellate Division of the 

District Court as of that date. See Hypolite v. People of the 
7

On July 19, 2010, the Appellate Division concluded

that “reasonable minds could disagree as to whether 

Maynard’s order to Martin-Liburd was reasonable” under the 

WDA. Maynard v. Rivera, No. 2005/171, 2010 WL 

2851616, at *3 (D.V.I. July 19, 2010). Given this 

disagreement, the Appellate Division held that the deferential 

standard of review applicable to evidentiary findings by the 

DOL did not permit reversal of the Superior Court’s decision. 

Id. at *4. The Appellate Division also affirmed the award of 

back pay. Id.

In dissent, Chief Judge Gómez argued that the majority 

created a “new wrongful discharge standard” in which the 

needs of the employee governed the determination of whether 

an employer’s order was reasonable. Id. at *4 (Gómez, C.J., 

dissenting). Chief Judge Gómez argued that Maynard’s order 

was a classic administrative order, which courts uniformly 

have agreed are reasonable. Id. at *5.

II.

The Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to review 

the DOL’s findings under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1421. The 

Appellate Division exercised appellate jurisdiction over the 

Superior Court’s order, pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a). We 

have jurisdiction to review the Appellate Division’s Order, 

pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).

AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the Appellate Division’s Order, we 

employ the same standard of review as that applied by the 

Superior Court, the first tribunal to review the DOL’s 

 

V.I., No. 2007-135, 2009 WL 152319, at *2 (V.I. Jan. 21, 

2009) (per curiam).
8

decision. Tyler v. Armstrong, 365 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 

2004). The Superior Court reviewed the DOL’s factual 

findings under the substantial evidence standard. V.I. Code 

Ann. tit. 24, § 70(b). We, too, employ this standard of review 

as to the Appellate Division’s factual determinations, 

inquiring whether there existed “relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Soubik v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 

Programs, 366 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2004). As with other 

legal inquiries, the Appellate Division’s interpretation of the 

WDA is reviewed de novo. See Bryan v. Ponce, No. 2008-

004, 2009 WL 586733, at *2 (V.I. Mar. 6, 2009).

III.

The WDA provides that an employer can lawfully fire 

an employee for one of nine enumerated reasons. V.I. Code 

Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a). As a result, the WDA amounts to a 

“statutory abrogation of the common law rule of at-will 

employment applicable in the Virgin Islands.” Kretzer v. 

Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (D.V.I. 2002). 

A presumption exists “that an employee has been wrongfully 

discharged if discharged for any reason other than those listed 

in Section 76(a).” Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 222 (3d 

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, 

§ 76(c). While an employer is prohibited from firing an 

employee for any reason not listed, the WDA “cover[s] all or 

almost all legitimate reasons for discharge.” St. Thomas–St. 

John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Gov’t of the U.S. V.I., 218 

F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2000).

At issue in this appeal is the fourth justification that 

permits the termination of an employee “who wilfully and 

intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, 
9

and instructions of the employer.”6

 6 In full, the WDA permits the termination of any 

employee:

 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 

(1) who engages in a business 

which conflicts with his duties to 

his employer or renders him a 

rival of his employer;

(2) whose insolent or offensive 

conduct toward a customer of the 

employer injures the employer's 

business;

(3) whose use of intoxicants or 

controlled substances interferes 

with the proper discharge of his 

duties;

(4) who wilfully and intentionally 

disobeys reasonable and lawful 

rules, orders, and instructions of 

the employer; provided, however, 

the employer shall not bar an 

employee from patronizing the 

employer's business after the 

employee's working hours are 

completed;

(5) who performs his work 

assignments in a negligent 

manner;
10

76(a)(4). 

A. Analytical Framework

Before we determine whether Martin-Liburd’s 

termination was in violation of the WDA, we must first 

address the analytical framework governing her claim.

The parties assert that the Supreme Court’s threeprong test for evaluating federal employment discrimination 

claims, established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies with equal force to claims 

brought under the WDA, a territorial law. As support, the 

parties cite to Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 

 

(6) whose continuous absences 

from his place of employment 

affect the interests of his 

employer;

(7) who is incompetent or 

inefficient, thereby impairing his 

usefulness to his employer;

(8) who is dishonest; or

(9) whose conduct is such that it 

leads to the refusal, reluctance or 

inability of other employees to 

work with him.

V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(1)-(a)(9).
11

NA, 168 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D.V.I. 2001), in which the district 

court first applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to the 

WDA. Id. at 503-05. In that case, the district court reasoned 

that the McDonnell Douglas test was applicable because the 

WDA was borne out of the same congressional intent 

underlying federal employment discrimination statutes. Id.

Under the modified McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework that the district court promulgated, a

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of wrongful 

discharge. This requires a showing that: “(1) he was an 

employee; (2) of a covered employer; (3) he was discharged; 

and (4) the discharge was wrongful.” Id. at 504-05. The 

employer then bears the burden of production “to articulate 

some legitimate, statutorily-approved reason for the plaintiff’s

discharge.” Id. at 505 (citation omitted). “Finally, after the 

employer has offered one or more of the statutorily-approved 

reasons for its actions, the burden of production under the 

third and final prong shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reason is 

pretextual.” Id.

As we have noted, with the creation of the Superior 

Court of the Virgin Islands (formerly the Territorial Court), 

the district court has long been divested of original 

jurisdiction over matters arising purely under territorial law. 

Parrott v. Gov’t of the V.I., 230 F.3d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 2000). 

An inexorable consequence of divestment was the district 

court’s inability to continue contributing to the development 

of Virgin Islands local law. Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 

F.3d 355, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2007). With the establishment of 

the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, the final say on

territorial law now rests with the Virgin Islands’ highest
12

court.

7

When Rajbahadoorsingh was decided, it was

understandably impossible for the district court to look to 

guidance from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands—a 

court not yet in existence—to determine what analytical 

framework to apply to claims brought under the WDA. 

Although its jurisprudence is nascent, the Supreme Court of 

the Virgin Islands has yet to speak on this issue. While we 

are without guidance from the highest court, we can “garner 

assistance from the decisions of the state’s intermediate 

appellate courts in predicting how the state’s highest court 

would rule.” Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 

1996) (citations omitted). Of course, that, too, is another 

impossibility, for the Virgin Islands has no intermediate 

territorial appellate court. We have recognized that in such 

situations the decisions of the Superior Court of the Virgin 

Islands can be used as a gauge for ascertaining state law. 

Edwards, 497 F.3d at 361. And the Superior Court has cited 

Rajbahadoorsingh and applied the McDonnell Douglas

framework to claims brought under the WDA. See, e.g.,

Fenton v. C & C Constr. & Maint., Inc., No. SX-96-CV-791, 

2007 WL 1202867, at *2-4 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2007).

 Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 94 

(3d Cir. 2010). 

Tasked with predicting what analytical framework the 

Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would apply to a 

 7 The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands’ ultimate 

authority to adjudicate purely local civil matters is subject to 

this Court’s authority, for a period of fifteen years following 

the Supreme Court’s creation, to review all final decisions by 

writ of certiorari. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613.
13

wrongful discharge claim, Edwards, 497 F.3d at 361-62 n.3, 

we question the justification for the approach taken in 

Rajbahadoorsingh. In Rajbahadoorsingh, the district court 

attempted to draw a parallel between the legislative intent 

underlying federal employment discrimination statutes and 

the WDA. 168 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04. Although the district 

court quoted from McDonnell Douglas’s discussion of 

congressional intent leading to the passage of Title VII, the 

district court provided no analogous discussion for the WDA. 

Absent any indication as to the Virgin Islands legislature’s 

perceived goals in promulgating the WDA, the 

Rajbahadoorsingh court’s attempted parallel falls short.8

We also cannot find support for the Rajbahadoorsingh

court’s conclusion that the McDonnell Douglas framework 

applies because both Title VII and the WDA share “the 

practical purpose of bring[ing] the litigants and the court 

expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate question.” 

Rajbahadoorsingh, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). While this purpose is certainly 

laudatory, it serves as an imprecise means to justify importing 

a legal test from a distinct sphere of employment litigation. 

More importantly, considerations of fairness and efficiency 

are the cornerstones of civil litigation in general and are not 

exclusive to employment matters. See Grider v. Keystone 

Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009).

Although we have reservations regarding the 

 8 This Court’s diligent research has failed to disclose 

any legislative history to support the Rajbahadoorsingh

court’s parallel to federal employment discrimination 

legislation.
14

application of the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework 

to WDA claims, we need not resolve the issue here. Our 

inquiry remains the same regardless of whether or not we 

apply the framework. The parties do not dispute that MartinLiburd has established her prima facie case of wrongful 

discharge, as required by the first prong. Moreover, MartinLiburd has alleged no facts to support a finding of pretext in 

accordance with the third prong. Indeed, the parties devote 

their arguments solely to the second prong of the McDonnell 

Douglas test—whether Maynard terminated Martin-Liburd 

for failing to follow a reasonable order. See V.I. Code Ann. 

tit. 24, § 76(a)(4). We turn now to that question.9

B. Reasonableness of Maynard’s Order

At the heart of this appeal lies an issue that has long 

been the subject of academic debate: the proper balance 

between the exercise of employer authority and the protection 

of employee rights. The debate is one that divided the 

Appellate Division. Placing emphasis on its seemingly

deferential standard of review, the majority agreed with the 

Superior Court that Martin-Liburd’s need for written 

verification of her income rendered unreasonable Maynard’s 

order directing her to endorse the unsigned paycheck. 

Maynard v. Rivera, No. 2005/171, 2010 WL 2851616, at *3-4 

(D.V.I. July 19, 2010). The dissent disagreed with what it 

characterized as a “new wrongful discharge standard” that 

 9 In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division

omitted any reference to, and did not apply, the McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting test. Given that our inquiry is 

unaffected by the application of the test, we will not address 

this omission.
15

placed improper emphasis on the personal needs of 

employees when analyzing the reasonableness of an 

employer’s order. Id. at *4-7 (Gómez, C.J., dissenting).

The WDA provision at issue permits the employer to 

terminate an employee “who wilfully and intentionally 

disobeys reasonable and lawful rules, orders, and instructions 

of the employer.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4). Our 

inquiry into this provision focuses on the term 

“reasonableness.” The question before us is whether 

Maynard’s order directing Martin-Liburd to endorse an 

unsigned paycheck as a receipt of payment was reasonable. 

As a matter of policy, courts have long been loath to 

interfere in the general day-to-day operations of a business.

10

 10 Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice 

Need Glasses? Unlawful Retaliation Under the Title VII 

Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 

14 Lab. Law. 373, 407 (1998) (“[T]he courts are not, were not 

intended to be, and should not become, personnel managers 

overseeing the day-to-day affairs of American businesses.”).

 

Indeed, it would be improvident for courts to regulate the 

permissible manner in which an employer may choose to 

conduct his business and the company policy implemented to 

facilitate growth and profitability. That is not to say that

courts are handcuffed from using judicial means to remedy 

unlawful employment practices. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. N. 

Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476-77 (3d Cir. 

2011) (discussing framework of Title VII litigation). But 

where the employer’s order reflects a routine administrative 

matter, courts have historically upheld such orders as 

reasonable when subject to challenge. See, e.g., In re 
16

Stanczyk, 912 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)

(concluding that employer order directing employee to attend 

mandatory training program was reasonable); Noah v. 

Lindbergh Inv., LLC, 320 S.W.3d 212, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 

2010) (determining that employee was discharged, in part, for 

failing to follow employer’s reasonable order that employee 

immediately meet with employer to discuss employee’s 

absence from assigned shifts).

Maynard’s standing order requiring his employees to

endorse their unsigned paychecks as proof of payment in cash 

is a paradigmatic example of a reasonable administrative 

order. It is customary in financial transactions to require a 

receipt for any cash payment, a convention borne out of both 

mutual convenience and financial accounting necessity. 

Without a receipt, Maynard could potentially be liable in an 

action brought by one of his employees claiming that he was 

never paid for time worked. As prevalent as they are, receipts 

can take many forms—be they a computer printout, a handdrawn slip, or, in this case, a paycheck endorsed by the payee 

but unsigned by the payor. Maynard implemented his cash 

payment policy to serve his own interests as well as the 

interests of his employees. While his employees benefited 

from not having to spend their lunch hour on certain Mondays 

trekking to the bank to cash their paychecks only to stand on

long lines, Maynard no longer had to pay his employees for 

nonproductive company time when his employees would 

inevitably exceed the allotted one hour for lunch. The 

method by which he chose to pay his employees undoubtedly 

constituted a reasonable administrative decision.

We are unpersuaded by Martin-Liburd’s attempt to 

undermine the reasonableness of Maynard’s chosen method 

of procuring a receipt. Martin-Liburd argues that the
17

unsigned paycheck was an invalid negotiable instrument.

Although we agree with that proposition, it does little to 

advance Martin-Liburd’s cause.

11 Here, the paycheck was 

never intended to fulfill its traditional role of providing 

remuneration. Instead, the paycheck functioned as a mere

receipt of payment.12

Further, there is no credence to Martin-Liburd’s 

argument that regardless of whether Maynard’s order was

facially reasonable, it was unreasonable as applied to her. In 

essence, Martin-Liburd argues that the needs of individual 

employees should not only be imported into our analysis 

under the WDA but that those needs should trump 

compliance with an employer’s reasonable administrative 

order. We cannot endorse Martin-Liburd’s proposition

because the reasonableness of an administrative order cannot 

be dependent on each employee’s personal needs, whether 

known or unknown to his employer.

 That the paycheck could not be 

tendered at the bank is not in dispute or relevant. 

13

 11 On several occasions prior to September 30, 1996, 

after having been paid in cash, Martin-Liburd, and other 

employees, endorsed the paycheck as requested.

 We agree with the 

12 As Maynard acknowledged, he never intended for 

any unsigned paycheck to be a negotiable instrument given 

that an employee already would have been paid in cash.

13 We do not address the possibility that where an 

employer is aware that his order jeopardizes an employee’s 

health or safety, the practical consequences of the order on 

the employee’s individual circumstances should be 

considered in determining whether the order is reasonable. 

See, e.g., McLean v. Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 383 A.2d 
18

dissent that “[o]ur focus, in this context, should be on the 

request of the employer.” Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at *6 

(Gómez, C.J., dissenting). Martin-Liburd provides no support 

for her argument that employee compliance with an 

employer’s administrative order is necessary only to the 

extent that the order does not conflict with the employee’s 

individual desires. This is a bald assertion with no support 

that we can discern.

Employers promulgate a litany of reasonable 

administrative orders designed to ensure the systematic

management of company affairs. An understanding exists in 

the relationship between employer and employee that the 

employee will abide by these orders. If an employee were

entitled to unilaterally forego compliance with reasonable 

administrative orders, company officials would lose the 

predictability associated with compliance. The employee’s 

obligation to comply with the order would be illusory and 

dependent solely on the employee’s willingness to obey. We 

cannot countenance, as Martin-Liburd has argued, an 

employment relationship whereby the employee is vested 

with the authority to pick and choose what facially reasonable 

administrative orders to follow. 

In its majority opinion, the Appellate Division

 

533, 535 (Pa. 1978) (finding employee’s refusal of 

employer’s request to drive truck with failing brakes not 

willful misconduct). Moreover, we do not imply that an 

employer’s administrative order would be reasonable where it 

conflicts with an employee’s needs, as recognized by federal, 

state, or territorial law. However, this case raises none of 

these concerns.
19

concluded that “reasonable minds could disagree as to 

whether Maynard’s order to Martin-Liburd was reasonable.” 

Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at *3. Given its review under 

the substantial evidence standard, the majority determined 

that the “two permissible views of the evidence” required 

deference to the Superior Court’s factual determination that 

Martin-Liburd was wrongfully terminated for failing to 

comply with an unreasonable order. Id. (quoting John F. 

Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d 

Cir. 1986)). But the substantial evidence standard that the 

Superior Court itself applied is self-limiting, applying only to 

“[t]he findings of the [DOL] Commissioner as to the facts.” 

V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 70(b) (emphasis added). While the 

reasonableness of Maynard’s order is a factual question, see 

Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 224, the substantial evidence standard 

does not insulate legal precepts present in the Superior 

Court’s decision. See Bryan, 2009 WL 586733, at *2 (“[The] 

standard of review in examining the Superior Court’s 

application of law is plenary.” (citation omitted)).

Herein lies the foundational error in the majority’s 

decision. The majority’s constrained interpretation of its 

standard of review precluded it from conducting the 

necessary plenary inquiry under the WDA. Only by 

exercising such review would the Superior Court’s flawed 

interpretation of the WDA—rendering talismanic the 

employee’s individual needs when evaluating the 

reasonableness of an employer’s order—have been apparent. 

The WDA requires only that Maynard’s order be reasonable, 

not that the order satisfy a constantly evolving scale of 

reasonableness based on each employee to whom that order is 

directed. 

We agree with the dissent that the majority’s 
20

determination amounted to an untenable intrusion into an 

employer’s inherent freedom to require uniform employee 

compliance with a reasonable administrative order. MartinLiburd’s desire to obtain a signed paycheck to qualify for 

financial assistance from the WIC program “is beside the 

point” and provided no justification for failing to obey 

Maynard’s reasonable order. Maynard, 2010 WL 2851616, at 

*6 (Gómez, C.J., dissenting). Her termination was therefore 

permissible under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76(a)(4).

Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s finding that 

Martin-Liburd was terminated in violation of the WDA, and 

we will reverse the award of back pay.14

 14 Although the reasonableness of Maynard’s order 

was unaffected by Martin Liburd’s needs, what also is 

apparent is that Maynard had provided numerous employees 

in the past with written verification necessary to obtain 

government assistance and even had done so on previous 

occasions for Martin-Liburd. (App. 19, 107.) While MartinLiburd was not permitted to disobey Maynard’s reasonable 

administrative order simply due to her individual needs, 

Martin-Liburd acknowledged that she never provided 

Maynard with the WIC certification form (App. 68), and only 

stated during her final protest of Maynard’s request that a 

signed paycheck was needed for her “personal business,” 

(App. 47). And even this was untrue. Although MartinLiburd claimed that she “needed” a signed paycheck, the 

WIC certification form introduced at the DOL hearing 

indicated that Martin-Liburd could have verified her income 

through a number of means, only one of which required the 

submission of a signed paycheck. (App. 176.)
21

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 

Appellate Division’s July 19, 2010 Order.