INFORMATION

WARFARE

INFORMATION

Forging Communication Strategies 

for Twenty-first Century Operational Environments

J A M E S P. FA R W E L L

WARFARE

Marine Corps University Press 

Quantico, Virginia

2020

MCUP MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY PRESS 
DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions 

of Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. The information contained in this book was accurate at the time of printing. Every effort has been made to secure copyright permission on excerpts and artworks reproduced in this volume. Please contact the editors to rectify any 

inadvertent errors or omissions. The production of this book and other MCUP products is graciously supported 

by the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Farwell, James P., author. | Marine Corps University (U.S.). Press, issuing body. 

Title: Information warfare : forging communication strategies for twenty-first-century operational environments / 

by James P. Farwell. 

Other titles: Forging communication strategies for twenty-first-century operational environments 

Description: Quantico, VA : Marine Corps University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references. | Summary: Information Warfare recognizes that a communication strategy is an intrinsic component of a national 

strategy. Farwell builds on the foundation laid by historical and contemporary thinkers who recognized the 

need to forge a communication strategy to conduct effective information warfare. The author defines a communication/information warfare strategy that is persuasive and credible. He distills key factors to frame the strategic thinking for information warfare. The book is innovatively organized in two parts: First, Farwell delivers 

a concise treatise about the key steps for a communication strategy. It includes historical and current examples 

that offer deep insights. Deference is made to the military concept of operational art. The examples illustrate 

the environment, the problem to be addressed, and the approach to be used. This instructional section is amply 

footnoted to provide tremendous depth. Second, an easy-to-use workbook employs a step-by-step methodology 

with questions for the reader to address in creating and evaluating their own communication strategies”— 

Provided by publisher. 

Identifiers: LCCN 2019056335 | ISBN 9781732003095 (paperback) 

Subjects: LCSH: Information warfare. | Strategy. | Communication. 

Classification: LCC U163 .F37 2020 | DDC 355.4—dc23 | SUDOC D 214.513:IN 3 

 

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019056335

Published by

Marine Corps University Press

2044 Broadway Drive

Quantico, VA 22134

www.usmcu.edu/mcupress

1st Printing, 2020

ISBN # 978-1-7320030-9-5 
FOR JOE GAYLORD

Foreword xi

Preface xiii

Acknowledgments xvii

Introduction: What Makes a Winning Information Warfare Campaign? 3

The Fallujah Illustration 5

Looking to World War II History 6

Forging a Communication Strategy for Information Warfare 8

What Is Communication Strategy? 9

How This Book Is Organized 9

Chapter 1: Understanding Strategy for Information Warfare: 

What are You Trying to Accomplish? 15

Define What Constitutes Winning or Success 15

Determine Where to Acquire Necessary Knowledge 17

Define Your Strategy 18

What Are Operations and Tactics? 20

Chapter 2: Know Your Strategic Situation 23

Historical Examples 23

Malaysian Emergency of 1948 – 60 23

Battle of the Little Bighorn 23

Battle of the Teutoburg Forest 26

Modern Examples 27

Iraq 27

Afghanistan 27

Philippines, 2013 28

Yemen 28

Ethiopia, 2006 28

Contents

Contents | vii
Chapter 3: Know Your Enemy 32

Historical Examples 33

Pakistan 33

Napoleon in Spain, Italy, and Russia 34

Modern Examples 37

America and Iraq 37

Afghanistan 47

Somalia 48

Chapter 4: Know Your Partners—Foreign and Domestic 53

Know Your Foreign Partners 53

Modern Examples 54

Afghanistan 54

Pakistan 55

Know Your U.S. Government Partners 56

Afghanistan 56

Chapter 5: Recognize Target Audience Culture 

as an Operational Environment 60

Historical Example 60

Pearl Harbor 60

Modern Examples 61

Somalia and General Anthony Zinni 61

11 September 2001 and Osama bin Laden 61

Somalia and Ethiopia, 2006 62

Panama 63

2003 Iraq War 63

Chapter 6: Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist 66

Twenty-four Characteristics of a Communication Campaign Plan 66

Narrative, Story, Theme, and Message 73

Chapter 7: Campaign Leadership 85

Leadership Models 86

Leadership Traps to Avoid 87

Turf among Leaders 88

Integrate Communication Strategy with Kinetic Strategy 88

viii | Contents
Chapter 8: Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging 90

Ensure Actions Support Messages 90

Know Your Weak Points and Vulnerabilities 91

Know Your Strengths and How to Leverage Them 92

Avoid Inflating Claims 93

Project Confidence 94

Be Creative — Especially with Younger Audiences 96

Capitalize on Your Resources 99

Chapter 9: Including Social Media in Your Strategy 104

Social Media: What Is It? 105

Difference from Traditional Media 106

A Historic Geographic Shift 106

Going Viral 107

Using Social Media to Influence Target Audiences 107

Social Media as an Intelligence Tool 109

Direction of Social Media 110

Emerging Technologies and Their Impact on Operations 110

Emerging Capabilities 111

Changing Communication Response Times 112

Tactically Using Social Media 112

Examples of Military Application of Social Media Outlets 112

Chapter 10: The Changing Information Environment 115

Demographic Changes 115

Cultural Change 115

Political Change 116

Media Change 117

Political Party Changes 118

Technology Changes 118

Chapter 11: Determining Campaign Effectiveness 120

Key Questions 120

Factors that Help Measure Effectiveness 121

How to Measure Effectiveness and Target Audience Analysis 123

Chapter 12: Special Comment on Hybridity 128

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Approach 129

China’s Three Warfares Approach 129

Contents | ix
NATO’s Definition of Hybrid Warfare 132

American Notions of Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare 133

The Need for New Thinking 135

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook 139

Selected Bibliography 170

About the Author 178

x | Contents
Foreword

Through the long and varied history of the U.S. Marine Corps, one thing has remained consistent: its 

ability to recognize when change is needed and adapt to the situation. A significant factor that contributes to the Corps’ adaptability is the constant focus on training and education that every Marine —

officer and enlisted—receives throughout the length of their career. In the 36th Commandant’s Planning 

Guidance, 2015, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. highlighted how the Corps can continue to meet those 

changing needs: “The challenges of an increasingly uncertain, complex, and decentralized operating 

environment will continue to place new demands on our leaders at all levels. Our recruiting standards, 

manning policies, training, and education must constantly evolve to produce Marines who can meet 

those challenges.”1

As a Corps, we must move away from the Industrial Age educational approach of listening to a lecture, memorizing facts, and then regurgitating those facts. For Marines today, training and education 

must be understood as vastly different exercises of the mind and body. Marine Corps training refers to 

job-oriented training aimed at accomplishing the tasks associated with the military mission. It prepares 

us for what we know we will have to do in combat. The concept of education itself seems intuitive: 

learning in an academic setting. However, distinctions for our purposes must be made because education entails much more than that simple concept—it also prepares us for dealing with the unknown 

in combat. For our purposes here, though, higher education generally refers to a university education 

that qualifies the degree holder to work in a professional field. Further education generally includes 

postgraduate studies focused on a master’s or doctoral degree. As one of the youngest Service schoolhouses, where does that place Marine Corps University (MCU) on the degree-granting spectrum and 

what is our responsibility to the servicemembers who attend?

In July 2018, when I assumed command of Training and Education Command, I looked at studies of 

the university, such as the U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings, from prior commanding generals including my own tenure as president and the current administration. While much good is being accomplished at MCU, there is always room for improvement. In 

particular, MCU must offer an Information Age approach focused on active, student-centered learning, 

through which students are challenged to work as groups to learn by doing and also to learn from each 

other. Our graduates should have the ability to think critically, recognize the need for change, and act 

xi
without waiting for instructions.2

 Our measure of 

effectiveness needs to be our students’ capabilities 

once they leave MCU rather than how they perform while they are here.

One of the most important aspects of MCU is 

its strong publishing program that helps to add 

knowledge across many different areas. These 

publications are representative of much of the 

great thinking and writing going on at MCU and 

they are the basis for what we are trying to do as 

we prepare our students for future challenges. 

A perfect example of this publishing effort is the 

book you are currently reading.

James Farwell’s book offers MCU the opportunity to bridge the gap between classroom instruction and real-world action with a thorough 

discussion of communication and strategy. Farwell builds on the foundation laid by national 

strategy thinkers who recognize the need to develop a comprehensive communication strategy 

to conduct effective information warfare. This text 

provides a concise treatise on the steps for developing and implementing a communication strategy and includes key historical and contemporary 

examples for deeper insight. The military concept 

of operational art is fully supported by examples 

that illustrate the environment, the problem to be 

addressed, and the approach to be used. As the 

title indicates, Information Warfare is intended as 

an easy-to-use workbook that guides the student 

step by step, while posing the questions necessary 

for executing an effective communication strategy. 

It also includes lengthy footnotes that will fully inform and illustrate how to accomplish classroom 

and mission goals.

I firmly believe that this book will have a significant impact in an area that has too often been neglected in our operations. We need to understand 

information operations better and integrate it into 

everything we do in the operating environment. It 

is a growth industry that we have mainly paid lip 

service to in the past—to our own detriment, as 

amply demonstrated in the book. I encourage all 

MCU faculty and students to read and study the 

contents of this book as a start in the process of 

reaching a better understanding.

Major General William F. Mullen

Commanding General, USMC Training and

 Education Command

1. 36th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2015: Innovate, Adapt, 

Win (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2015), 2.

2. TECOM Commander’s Guidance (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine 

Corps Training and Education Command, 2018).

Endnotes

xii | Foreword
Preface

I am honored to write a preface for James Farwell’s book on information warfare. His opening examples—rooted in the work of Dr. Joseph L. Strange — draw on the experiences of Abraham Lincoln and, 

notably, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 

As the Allies launched the invasion of Normandy, there was no question in the orders received by 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower: enter the continent of Europe to defeat the German Wehrmacht. Indeed, 

President Roosevelt’s strategy to defeat Nazi Germany and then-militarist Japan was clear. He laid the 

foundation for the strategy with his pronouncement in the Atlantic Charter’s four freedoms: freedom of 

speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. He followed this expression 

of the four basic freedoms with a stirring speech before Congress to the American people. He roused 

Americans with his aggrieved expression of the sneak attack by Japanese forces on our air and naval 

forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory. Standing before Congress, Roosevelt’s forceful words about 

the surprise attack on 7 December 1941 as “a day that will live in infamy” stirred America to action. The 

president clearly communicated U.S. strategy to the American people, and his fireside chats continually 

communicated what was at stake and articulated progress. 

Three war years later, General Eisenhower, acting as supreme Allied commander of Europe, on D-Day 

formulated a communication strategy encapsulated by the succinct phrase a “great crusade.” Eisenhower communicated this well to all soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen with his order on that day.

We know the rest of this history. There is now a pressing need to further study history so that we 

may use the lessons from the past to understand our present challenges and prepare for the future. 

Communication of the World War II strategy to Americans, our Allies, and our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen was based on a well-designed and -practiced strategy. It is this design and practice of 

a communication strategy that this book encapsulates. In teaching how to forge a winning communication strategy, Farwell provides a real service to the Department of Defense community. 

Information Warfare recognizes that a communication strategy is an intrinsic component of a national 

strategy. Farwell builds on the foundation laid by historical and contemporary thinkers who recognized the need to forge a communication strategy to conduct effective information warfare. The author 

defines a communication/information warfare strategy that is persuasive and credible. He distills key 

factors to frame the strategic thinking for information warfare. The book is innovatively organized in 

two parts:

xiii
• First, Farwell delivers a concise treatise about the key steps for a communication strategy. It includes historical 

and current examples that offer deep 

insights. Deference is made to the military concept of operational art. The 

examples illustrate the environment, 

the problem to be addressed, and the 

approach to be used. This instructional 

section is amply footnoted to provide 

tremendous depth.

• Second, an easy-to-use workbook employs a step-by-step methodology with 

questions for the reader to address in 

creating and evaluating their own communication strategies. 

Each chapter is a robust learning experience, 

guiding the student from an initial explanation 

of what a communication strategy is and why it 

is an essential component of an information warfare campaign through methods for determining a 

strategic situation. This is a first-rate exposition of 

historical examples that illustrate key lessons, particularly in aligning cultural understanding. For 

example, Farwell cites the Malaysian rebellion, 

General George A. Custer at Little Bighorn, and 

the Roman–Germanic battle in the Teutoburg Forest, superbly illustrating aligned or misdirected 

approaches. 

Failure to understand the enemy is key to 

a failed communication strategy, and Sun Tzu’s 

dictum “know your enemy as well as yourself” 

is discussed in detail.1

 Using contemporary illustrations from the United States’ wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Farwell succinctly illuminates what 

must be done and what must be understood. Failure to consider aspects of communications and 

achieve information dominance and failure to understand cultural precepts are presented. In each 

case, historical and modern illustrations caveated 

with lessons to be learned are presented.

As a nation, the United States is expert at building partnerships. Our Revolutionary War experience in gaining France as an ally and partner and 

our ability to understand England at the negotiating table for our independence provide a keen 

backdrop to building domestic and foreign constituencies for common actions. 

In these chapters, Farwell presents a how-to 

workbook on what questions need to be addressed in knowing your partner as well as yourself. This approach of knowing, understanding, 

and appreciating partners, potential opponents, 

and their cultures is replicated throughout the 

subsequent chapters. Many current examples 

from Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated with 

examples from Panama, Somalia, and Ethiopia 

along with historical examples from World War II. 

Each example is succinctly parsed to illustrate the 

points to be learned.

Farwell also provides a checklist for building a communication campaign that includes 24 

characteristics of good communication strategies. 

One of the characteristics is the ability to measure 

progress; another is “sharing with relevant parties so that everyone is on the same page,” using 

Operation Eagle Claw (Iran, 1980) as a case study; 

another is to define keys to success. In each case, 

the checklist provides methods for ensuring the 

communications message is clear. Establishing a 

campaign’s narrative, story, theme, and message 

is thoroughly explicated with useful examples.

An entire chapter is devoted to campaign leadership and to explaining a leadership model based 

on four actions: listen, learn, help, and lead. Farwell offers the examples of Winston Churchill and 

Roosevelt against Adolf Hitler in World War II, 

xiv | Preface
Lincoln and his team of rivals compared to Jefferson Davis, and President Eisenhower’s military 

background in national security decision making 

to illustrate the concept that leadership makes the 

difference between winning and losing.

Farwell offers a list of profound and pithy dos 

and don’ts for communication strategies, using 

current and historical illustrations and observations. The Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 is 

a superb example of the necessity for actions to 

support a message and for leaders to project confidence, competence, and the fact that a strategy 

aimed at achieving a defined outcome exists. 

The author stresses the need to use and integrate social media in the communication strategy. 

This is a capital idea. He illustrates the need for, 

and the success of, social media messaging inherent in designing the communication strategy. The 

global target audience is rising astronomically. 

Demographically, the audience is huge and growing exponentially. How can intelligence be used to 

measure trends; changes; outcomes? 

Farwell’s final instructional chapter investigates the changing nature of the information environment in the past five years. He concludes 

that cultural, political, media, and political party 

changes are occurring alongside dramatic technological change. This is one of the underpinnings 

for the communication campaign.

He concludes with a workbook that poses a 

series of questions to evaluate a communication 

campaign. Key questions are asked, factors are 

presented that help to measure effectiveness, and 

techniques are listed for measuring effectiveness 

and target audience analysis. This is helpful stuff.

Information Warfare is an instrument for learning about the need to design and implement communication strategies today. I highly recommend 

it be used in professional development programs 

in the business and diplomatic community. Most 

importantly, I fervently advise that this book 

should be studied and used throughout the military, especially the special operations community. 

Farwell’s superb text makes the lessons and insights he offers actionable and practical. 

Michael D. Krause, PhD

Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret)

1. Sun Tzu on the Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise 

in the World, trans. Lionel Giles (London: Luzac, 1910).

Endnote

Preface | xv

The concept for this book came from Dr. Francis X. Reidy of the Joint Special Operations University 

(JSOU) in Tampa, Florida. The author thanks him for suggesting it and hopes that operators, planners, 

and commanders find the book useful.

William Knarr, Robert Nalepa, and others currently or formerly associated with JSOU provided gracious assistance and encouragement. 

Jack C. Guy spent a great deal of time going through the manuscript line by line. I appreciated his invaluable input. My thanks also are owed to Randy Hagan, Paul Huxhold, Tim Nye, Tony Gendra, and 

Robert L. Gibson for reading the manuscript and making comments.

Dr. Ronald A. Faucheux and Celinda Lake, two of America’s top pollsters and strategists, offered 

important comments and additions that were especially helpful. The author has worked closely with 

them both and with Joe Gaylord for many years. Conversations and thinking over a long period of time 

with those three individuals added enormously to the manuscript. Wally Clinton was very helpful in 

illuminating social media analytics. Dr. Michael Krause, who wrote the preface, was especially helpful 

and supportive. Thanks also are due to Frank Hoffman, King Mallory, Neville Bolt, Greg Hicks, George 

Beebe, Ofer Fridman, David Betz, Al Bynum, Bill Parker, Chris Stewart, Ed Goeas, Scott McDonald, Bob 

Giesler, Mike Dabadie, Vaughn Fitzpatrick, Darby Arakelian, Stephen Padgett, Marvin Weinbaum, John 

Matheny, Stephen Nitzschke, Sandy Wade, Ambassador Brian Carlson, and Andy Welsh. These individuals all shared their experience and expertise in conversations over a long period. They informed and 

illuminated my thinking. There are many others whom I cannot name who also provided outstanding 

input or inspiration that made this work possible.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are my own and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the views expressed.

Acknowledgments

xvii

INFORMATION

WARFARE

Communication strategy and information warfare are about shaping and changing behavior and managing expectations using language, action, images, or symbols to achieve a desired effect or end state. 

Academics spend a lot of time defining information warfare.

1

 This fixation and lack of consensus on definitions should not obstruct the clear thinking required for effective information warfare strategy development. 

Joseph S. Nye Jr., former dean of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, has 

observed that in today’s threat environment, stories—not kinetic action—may decide who wins conflicts.2

 The current Ukraine conflict, ongoing at time of publication, illustrates that point. Russia and 

Ukraine have each used kinetic action to support their respective narratives, not vice versa. Moscow 

has pushed the narrative that pro-democracy revolutions lead to chaos and civil war; Kiev argues that 

separatism leads to misery. Journalist Peter Pomerantsev observes that “what actually happened on the 

ground was almost irrelevant—the two governments just needed enough footage to back their respective stories. Propaganda has always accompanied war, usually as a handmaiden to the actual fighting. 

But the information age means that this equation has been flipped: military operations are now handmaidens to the more important information effect.”3

The 2006 Lebanon War offers an earlier example. The Palestinians combined kinetic activity with 

effective strategic communication that discredited Israeli action within the international community. 

Always quick on the rebound, Israel applied the lessons learned to achieve success in subsequent engagements with Palestinians.4

Carl von Clausewitz famously declared that “war is merely the continuation of politics by other 

means.”5

 From ancient times, information warfare has played a key role in armed conflict. Roman politician Scipio Africanus the Younger (a.k.a. Scipio Aemilianus) used it through brutal action to subdue 

Spanish dissent.6

 Napoleon Bonaparte’s Italian campaign can be viewed as an exercise in strategic 

communication, which he exploited to gain power in France. Napoleon capitalized on the power of 

newspapers and social networks, art, poetry, personal appearances, and other information tactics to 

gain power as first consul.7

 George Washington used false propaganda during the American Revolutionary War to discredit the British.8

 In the twentieth century, Vladimir Lenin used movies on freight 

trains to shore up his revolution. William J. Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operatives 

Introduction

3

WHAT MAKES A WINNING INFORMATION WARFARE CAMPAIGN?
adroitly used information warfare in carrying out 

their missions.9

 Information warfare played a key 

role in the Vietnam War, as well, and it has been a 

characteristic of the recent conflicts in Iraq, Syria, 

and Afghanistan.

Kinetic or traditional military operations have 

driven conventional strategy, operations, and tactics. Strategic communication has bolstered the 

use of military force, but force has traditionally 

determined victors and losers. The current era 

presents a different threat environment characterized by new challenges. Evolving, proliferating 

technology renders the nature of our age radically 

different from past eras. As author Joshua Cooper Ramo puts it, in forging goals and strategies, 

and understanding the dynamics that shape success, context matters.10 Even if you think you have 

solved a specific problem, context endures. Incorrectly interpreting the context of a problem will 

produce incorrect solutions. 

The internet has transformed the use of communication, blurring the boundaries between war 

and politics and elevating the importance of information.11 But technology is only one aspect of 

information warfare. Every form of traditional 

communication—personal, broadcast, print—as 

well as actions may come into play. What is different is that in a highly connected world, information can play a role equal to or superior to that of 

kinetic action. 

Networks and connectivity define the nature 

of the current era. Successful strategy requires understanding the power of networks and how to 

capitalize on them. Connections expand our ability to communicate and to create new links with 

people, groups, organizations, and movements. 

Networks form when nodes—which can comprise people, computers, mobile devices, drones, 

or any connective object — emerge. Professor 

Manuel Castells describes networks as a set of interconnected nodes; or, quoting his academic articulation, “that specific form of enterprise whose 

system of means is constituted by the intersection 

of segments of autonomous systems of goals.”12

Networks are complex, distribute power, and consist of complicated pieces. Connectivity enables 

small pieces to combine into powerful ones. Castells observes that network-based social structures 

form a highly dynamic, open system, susceptible 

to innovating without threatening its balance. He 

argues that crises and conflicts that characterize 

this century require an understanding of economy, 

culture, and society.13 A “shift from traditional 

mass media to a system of horizontal communication networks organized around the Internet” 

have produced radical changes in the communication of information.14 Digital networking technologies power new social and organizational 

networks that transcend geographic sovereignty 

and form a global system.

These developments impact the nature of information warfare today. The Islamic State 

has exploited networks and connectivity using social media campaigns to recruit, mobilize, and influence. During the 2003 Iraq War, 

al-Qaeda and the al-Anbar Province tribes 

used networks to advance their interests. The 

U.S. military has exploited expertise in networks and connectivity to enhance its own 

capabilities. The ability to identify and penetrate insurgent networks proved vital to Coalition success in Iraq, especially after 2007.15

China’s Three Warfares concept is rooted in identifying, understanding, and exploiting networks.

The existence of networks is not new. Leaders 

from Julius Caesar to Martin Luther to Napoleon 

and modern leaders have tapped into networks 

to exert influence. Technology has revolutionized 

4 | Introduction
the speed at which we receive, digest, process, 

and project information. Events that a century ago 

may have afforded the time to think and make a 

measured decision may today require instant action. Knowledge that used to require months or 

years to acquire can be learned in hours or days. 

The ability to move faster than the competition 

can afford a cutting edge. These critically affect 

strategic thinking today. Those who master networks and connections can gain a decisive edge in 

competition for influence.16

This is increasingly true as engagements and 

conflicts occur on terrain or in areas shared by 

civilian and fighting forces and changes expectations of what laws of armed conflict, rules of engagement, and related actions are tolerable to the 

United States’ values and laws, as well as to the 

international community. Commanders and operators need to tailor strategies, operations, and 

tactics. No precise and consistent formula governs 

what will work for strategic communication and 

information warfare, as each new situation mandates a tailored response. 

Generally, information warfare is an element of 

warfare.17 But warfare connotes violence. China’s 

approach eschews the use of kinetic action, although its initiatives are backed by military force. 

Commanders need to understand the parameters 

within which they can forge and execute information warfare—and how to use nonmilitary means 

to achieve desired goals or end-states.

A sophisticated, actionable approach to information warfare is vital in carrying out the 

2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).18 The NDS 

acknowledges an increasingly complex global 

security environment characterized by overt 

challenges to the free and open international order and the reemergence of long-term, strategic 

competition between nations. The NDS adopts 

the view that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose competitive challenges to U.S. prosperity 

and security in an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield combined across domains, and 

that they do so with increasing speed and reach. 

In meeting the new challenges, the U.S. military 

must build capacity and expertise to conduct information warfare. 

This book examines how to forge strategies, 

operations, and tactics using strategic communication as a tool of information warfare to exert 

influence and gain advantage in this competitive 

threat environment.

The Fallujah Illustration

In 2004, two battles led by U.S. Marines were 

fought in the city of Fallujah, Iraq. Each offers key 

insights into the nature and importance of strategic communication and information warfare. 

The first battle took place in April, after insurgents murdered and mutilated four civilian contractors employed by Blackwater USA who were 

motoring through the city, as well as five U.S. soldiers in Habbaniyah. President George W. Bush 

saw the photos of the slain contractors and ordered immediate retaliation.19 On 3 April 2004, the 

Joint Task Force ordered I Marine Expeditionary 

Force (I MEF), commanded by Lieutenant General 

James T. Conway, to attack and reestablish security in the city. Marine commanders on the ground 

objected to immediate action. They wanted time 

to prepare the battlefield and to ensure they had 

adequate forces and firepower; they had two 

battalions but wanted three.20 Higher authority 

ignored the recommendations of ground commanders and ordered the Marines into action. 

In Operation Vigilant Resolve (First Battle of 

Fallujah), which commenced on 4 April, the Marines achieved military success in battling insurIntroduction | 5
gents holed up within the city.21 Unfortunately, 

civilians as well as insurgent fighters became casualties. As of 2019, Al Jazeera had evolved into 

a sophisticated, professional news operation. In 

2004, however, the reverse was true. Al Jazeera 

reporter Ahmed Mansour and his cameraman 

Laith Mushtaq, the only two nonembedded journalists, supplied footage. It depicted faked and 

distorted images of children and helpless civilians 

as victims of cavalier U.S. firepower and tactics. 

Some images were faked by photographing a doll 

on a pile of rubble to imply U.S. forces had killed 

children, for example, while other images were 

taken from previous conflicts and used to misrepresent the current conflict. Al Jazeera neglected 

to report that insurgents used civilians as human 

shields and fired from inside schools, mosques, 

and hospitals.22

The insurgent propaganda strategy—a classic illustration of information warfare—worked. 

Iraqis watched Al Jazeera and became outraged. 

Iraqi Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi declared American operations “illegal and unacceptable.”23 The influential Shia cleric Muqtada 

al-Sadr warned the United States to withdraw or 

face a revolution, declaring that the Americans 

“will be fighting an entire nation—from south to 

north, from east to west.”24 Even Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a U.S. ally, was sharply critical.25 L. Paul Bremer III, head of the Coalition 

Provisional Authority, came under sharp pressure 

to call off the offensive.

Ground commanders objected because they 

were close to victory. For unclear reasons, their 

views were not communicated to President 

Bush.26 Intimidated by Iraqi anger fueled by insurgent propaganda, Bremer and Lieutenant General 

Carlos Sanchez, the commander of U.S. ground 

forces in the country, caved to Iraqi pressure.27 On 

9 April, Bremer announced that the United States 

would commence a unilateral ceasefire.28 The 

outcome represented a stunning setback for U.S. 

forces. 

As U.S. commanders in Iraq took stock, one 

factor stood out: insurgents had won through the 

adroit use of information warfare. The Marines 

had acquitted themselves brilliantly in the actual 

fighting. They would have achieved their military 

objectives in a battle for which they had believed 

additional time and resources were prudent, but 

well-conceived and -executed enemy information 

warfare carried the day.

The Marines applied lessons learned on information warfare in November 2004, when Coalition forces launched a second, successful attack on 

Fallujah. The Coalition developed and executed a 

strategic communication plan that dominated media coverage and seized control of the narrative. 

It neutralized adversary efforts to characterize the 

fighting on their terms. It drove a credible message that the Coalition assault aimed to liberate 

Fallujah from violent extremists. As a tactical action, battling for local control of one city, the Coalition succeeded. They seized the city and drove 

out the insurgents. They won the shooting war 

and the information war—both were integral to 

victory.

A broader lesson emerged as well: a tactical 

victory had strategic effects. Iraqis watched with 

growing anger over the fierce firepower directed 

toward their fellow citizens. The two battles of 

Fallujah led to widened hostilities in 2005, arguably among the most difficult years in Iraq that 

Coalition forces experienced.

Looking to History

History provides important illustrations for how 

communication strategy made the difference in 

6 | Introduction
whether the United States entered World War II 

united or divided. Though President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt was caught off-guard by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, it played into his strategy 

of portraying the United States as a peace-seeking 

nation and a victim of Japanese aggression that required a response. Roosevelt knew war was coming. But he expected that Japanese action would 

occur in the Far East, and he was actively preparing for conflict with both Japan and Germany. 

That Japan acted before Germany was ironic, as 

Roosevelt’s major concern was Germany, not Japan—and while Japan had largely regional interests, Hitler wanted to conquer the world.29

Historian Richard M. Ketchum argues that 

Roosevelt had no doubt that war with Japan 

would break out, although “a cardinal principle 

of the Roosevelt administration’s policy was to 

put off that date as long as possible.”30 Americans 

were not psychologically prepared for war, making Roosevelt very cautious as he maneuvered to 

find unity in Congress and with the public.31 Historians David E. Kaiser and Nigel Hamilton note 

that Roosevelt was also concerned about avoiding 

war as long as possible until the United States was 

prepared militarily to wage it.32

The key strategic moves involved no shooting. 

They pivoted around Roosevelt’s communication 

strategy. Roosevelt worried about antiwar sentiment. Views differ about the quality of Roosevelt’s 

leadership leading into the war. Once declared, 

he was resolute. Until then, his public actions wavered. Inaction followed strong speeches. Most 

historians agree he hoped not to lead the nation 

into war.33

Roosevelt showed a masterful sense of strategic communication in conveying at every turn 

the message that the United States wanted peace. 

Nothing epitomized that desire more in the face 

of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s 

desperate pleas for the United States to enter the 

war than their conference at Placentia Bay, off 

Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, at which 

cameras filmed a service showing Britons and 

Americans praying together. While Churchill 

hoped to depict the image of alliance for war, historian Nigel Hamilton points out that Roosevelt 

“was determined that the imagery reflect his joint 

declaration of principles of peace—and how better than by showing men worshiping God together!”34 Roosevelt had his own camera team film the 

service to ensure that it communicated the appropriate message.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson said, “The 

question was how we should maneuver [Japan] 

into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”35 Ketchum 

emphasizes that Roosevelt believed victory required a united Congress. For that, he needed the 

support of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Hull 

would give his support only if Japan initiated hostilities.36 Roosevelt avoided giving Japan any pretext that it could cite as evidence that the United 

States had provoked war. Roosevelt needed unity 

in Congress.37 With Pearl Harbor, he got it; all but 

one isolationist voted to declare war against Japan, Germany, and Italy.38

Roosevelt’s challenge paralleled the one confronting President Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln recognized that only if the South fired the first shot 

could he persuade the North to fight. Far wiser 

than Jefferson Davis, Lincoln baited Confederate 

forces into acting at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, 

then aggressively mobilized public support. Lincoln’s grasp of information strategy affected the 

outcome of the American Civil War.39

Napoleon Bonaparte was equally adept in 

his understanding of information warfare. He 

Introduction | 7
amassed enormous power while nearly laying 

waste to Europe through continuous warfare from 

1799 to 1815. But his path to power in France, 

made possible by the Italian campaigns, lay in his 

grasp of how to use propaganda. Napoleon was a 

genius at information warfare and strategic communication, using propaganda to portray himself as a hero in an era when the French sought 

heroes.40 His entire Italian campaign in 1796–97 

was an exercise in building an image profile as a 

military genius and statesman as part of a calculated campaign to become first consul of France. 

He was the first leader to recognize how to exploit newspapers to glorify his achievements. 

He commissioned poems for fallen officers—and 

made sure they were broadly disseminated, which 

helped to show he cared about and honored those 

who served under him. He made himself visible 

at scientific meetings, the theater, and the opera, 

communicating the image of an enlightened intellectual. When he traveled to Egypt, he brought 

along 160 scholars to record his discoveries and 

other intellectual achievements.

Napoleon courted painters. They repaid him 

with paintings that made him look heroic. Poets 

wrote tributes. Sculptors made busts of his head. 

Playwrights dramatized his exploits. In case anyone failed to receive the message, artists such as 

Antoine-Jean Gros were on hand to mythologize 

his courage and the virtues of a military leader 

through romanticized portraits of him, such as 

Gros’s Bonaparte at the Pont d’Arcole. Depicting—

falsely—a swashbuckling Bonaparte leading his 

troops to storm the bridge during the Battle of 

Arcole in 1796 near Verona, Italy, the portrait is 

a powerful vision of a conquering hero, fated by 

destiny and inflamed with passion, whose courage seizes victory. The painting was turned into 

engravings that achieved wide distribution.41 Napoleon thought about his image in military and 

political dimensions and recognized the impact 

that it could have in influencing the outcomes of 

conflicts.

The lesson for students of information warfare is that communicating that your leadership is 

uniquely outstanding builds credibility and clout. 

This is the point that Cathal J. Nolan makes in The 

Allure of Battle: in today’s world, a cult of leadership has emerged that places a false premium 

on the generals as the decisive factor in winning 

wars.42 Nolan’s well-argued book raises a valid 

point, but it seems naïve to believe that building 

and projecting the image of top-tier generals fails 

to boost morale on our side while intimidating or 

raising doubts among the enemy. Though they 

have both supporters and critics, during the periods General Stanley A. McChrystal and General 

David H. Petraeus led U.S. Army forces, they each 

projected the character of a strong, capable general. Their images bolstered U.S. efforts. 

Forging a Communication Strategy 

for Information Warfare

Until recent times, warfare was largely decided 

by a combination of kinetic action and, arguably, 

attrition and will.43 Succeeding in current and future threat environments requires forging and 

articulating prevailing narratives that work in tandem with traditional military action. The rise of 

nonstate actors in conflicts and the shift in power 

from hierarchies or institutions to individuals and 

to networks is accelerating this development.44 In 

Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL) showed, while it enjoyed battlefield 

success, the potential for “highly strategic types 

of evolutionary network advantages” that infuse 

warfighting with narratives.45 While ISIL suffered 

catastrophic defeats on the battlefield in 2017 and 

8 | Introduction
2018, its actions demonstrated how conventional 

distinctions between the “tangible and intangible, 

lethal and non-lethal dimensions of operations” 

have changed. The U.S. military must not only 

match but exceed that capability.46 

An earlier book by the author analyzed core 

components of strategic communications.47 General Stanley McChrystal, British Army Major 

General J. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Shimon 

Naveh, British Army General Rupert A. Smith, 

Carl von Clausewitz, David Kilcullen, and others 

have evaluated the operational military or political aspects of campaigns.48 Smith especially recognizes the importance of information warfare 

and communication strategy in the new threat 

environment, in which engagement and conflict 

will mostly occur in areas populated by civilians 

rather than on a conventional battlefield on which 

opposing armies face one another.

Steve Tatham and Andrew Mackay (with foreword by General McChrystal), on the other hand, 

have written astutely on the need to conduct influence operations to change behavior.49

Rand senior analyst Linda Robinson has 

written an important book, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare, 

which describes how special operations forces 

(SOF) teams have operated in Afghanistan.50

While its focus is not explicitly on communication 

strategy, SOF teams’ work with Afghan villages 

offer numerous examples for applying the principles we discuss. The book is required reading for 

operators.

Information Warfare acknowledges the precepts 

those important authors embrace. Its focus differs in providing a step-by-step guide for actually 

forging and executing a communication strategy 

to conduct information warfare. Commanders and 

operators need to understand what factors drive 

any strategy. That includes the policy that animates a strategy and what decisionmakers must 

know to forge and execute a winning information 

war. Strategy exists at the operational, tactical, and 

grand levels. The precepts set forth here apply at 

all of those levels.51

What Is Communication Strategy?

Communication strategy employs words, actions, 

symbols, or images to mold or shape and influence a target audience’s attitudes and opinions to 

achieve specific effects, objectives, or end states. It 

is about persuasion that changes behavior.

Key factors that frame strategic thinking for information warfare are: 

1. A powerful idea or cause that drives strategy.

2. A clear vision for what constitutes winning or 

success (i.e., end states and outcomes).

3. Clear definitions of the obstacles to success.

4. An actionable strategy that employs operations and tactics designed to produce success.

5. Well-constructed, actionable plans.

6. Operations and tactics to execute strategy.

7. Metrics that measure the effectiveness of a 

strategy.52

Success in military campaigns usually requires 

both kinetic and communication strategies. No 

single formula leads to success. Sometimes kinetic 

activity takes precedence, while at others, information warfare is more pivotal. 

How This Book Is Organized

First, the reader learns about the key steps for 

developing a communication strategy, centered 

around the military concept of operational art.

53 Operational art thinks in terms of the environment, 

as understood from knowledge and experience; 

Introduction | 9
the problems to be addressed, as informed by the 

external and internal factors that affect how one 

changes the state of affairs from the current one 

to achieving conditions that satisfy a desired end 

state; and the approach to be used in solving problems through iterative creative thinking. It is a sophisticated approach. The work draws on historical 

and current examples that offer deep insights and 

illustrate the environments, the problems to be addressed, and the approaches to be used.

Military commanders employ a different language than political or corporate actors. They desire strategies, operations, and tactics that carry 

out their intent to achieve conditions that satisfy a 

desired end state. This work’s approach incorporates the notions of operational art, although it may 

employ slightly plainer language to describe what 

to do and how. This instructional section is amply 

footnoted to provide tremendous depth.

Second, an easy-to-use workbook outlines a 

step-by-step methodology for creating and evaluating communication strategies. The reader is intended to address supplied questions about their 

developing communication strategy.

This text discusses counterinsurgency (COIN) 

and counterterrorism (CT), which have both inspired fierce debate. This work expresses no 

opinion on the merits of that debate, but a communication strategist must understand the spectrum 

of ideas, theories, or notions that a commander 

may embrace for action. This book does not focus 

on public affairs; that is a separate subset of communication and lies largely outside the scope of 

this work. 

1. See, for example, L. Scott Johnson, “Toward a Functional 

Model of Information Warfare: A Major Intelligence Challenge,” Studies of Intelligence, no. 1 (1997); David Stupples, 

“What Is Information Warfare,” World Economic Forum, 3 

December 2015; and Roger C. Molander, Andrew Riddile, 

and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New 

Face of War (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research 

Institute, Rand, 1996). 

2. As quoted in Information at War: From China’s Three Warfares 

to NATO’s Narratives, Beyond Propaganda series (London: 

Legatum Institute, 2015), 2.

3. Peter Pomerantsev, This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the 

War Against Reality (New York: Public Affairs, 2019), 108–9.

4. See Col Thomas X. Hammes (USMC), The Sling and the Stone: 

On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).

5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., 3 vols., trans. Col J. 

J. Graham, vol. 1 (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, 

1918), Kindle ed. 

6. Alvin H. Bernstein, “The Strategy of a Warrior-state: Rome 

and the Wars against Carthage, 264–201 B.C.,” in The Making 

of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Williamson Murray 

et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 

63.

7. See James P. Farwell, Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 67.

8. Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 66.

9. See Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who 

Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New York: 

Free Press, 2011).

10. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and 

Survival in the Age of Networks (New York: Little, Brown, 

2016), 251. Ramo sets forth an acutely insightful analysis 

of this era. See also Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for 

Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 

2014); and Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 

2d ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). Castells is 

Endnotes

10 | Introduction
arguably the most influential thinker about the rise of social networks.

11. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media 

Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 

Basic Books, 2017), 9.

12. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 187. Castells wrote 

a multivolume work entitled The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (1996–98). Castells defines networks

broadly, ranging from stock markets to the European Union, 

drug cartels to television networks.

13. In his preface to the 2010 edition of The Rise of the Network 

Society, the crises that Castells cites include the global financial crises; religious fundamentalism; national, ethnic 

and territorial cleavers; the widespread resort to violence 

as a way of protest and dominations; climate change; and 

the growing incapacity of political institutions based on the 

nation-state to handle global problems and local demands. 

14. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, xviii.

15. See Gen Stanley McChrystal (USA, Ret), My Share of the Task: 

A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2013).

16. Romo defines paradoxes that define challenges the U.S. faces, including the mismatch between broad national interest 

and ever-narrowing traditional means, decline in trust in 

institutions, impact of innovation, massive impact small 

forces can have on larger ones. The Seventh Sense, 76.

17. The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint 

Publication (JP) 1, does not define information warfare. It 

describes but does not define either war or warfare. See 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1, incorporating change 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

2017). The Department of Defense dictionary also does not 

define these terms. See Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 2007).

18. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military’s 

Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Department of Defense, 2018), 2.

19. William Head, “The Battles of Al-Fallujah: Urban Warfare 

and the Growth of Airpower,” Air Power History 60, no. 4 

(Winter 2013): 32–51.

20. Robert Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah,” Atlantic, July/August 2004. Kaplan was on the ground during the April operation and bore firsthand witness.

21. The term insurgents is used here because al-Qaeda formed 

after the battle, although the man who emerged as its most 

famous leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, participated. He and 

his forces claimed responsibility for killing 27 American military personnel in and around Fallujah, according to Head, 

“The Battles of Al-Fallujah,” 38.

22. Head, “The Battles of Al-Fallujah.”

23. “Iraqi Governing Council Members Denounce U.S. Actions,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 April 2004.

24. “Iraqi Governing Council Members Denounce U.S. Actions.”

25. Tony Karon, “What We Learn from Fallujah,” Time, 12 April 

2004.

26. It is unclear why ground commanders’ views were not communicated to the president. The author speculates that this 

failure was due to a combination of the president not asking 

the right questions and Bremer arrogating all expertise to 

himself while suppressing views contrary to his own. 

27. Azriel Peskowitz, “IO on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield: 

Three Case Studies,” Global Security Studies 1, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 100–14; and Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline 

Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam, 2005), 

210–15.

28. Head, “The Battles of Al-Fallujah.”

29. Dr. Joseph Strange identified the challenges that presidents 

Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt confronted in 

maneuvering to place the North and the United States, respectively, into the Civil War and World War II conflicts. 

This aspect of the book you are holding draws on the ideas 

expressed in Strange’s outstanding work, Capital “W” War: 

A Case for Strategic Principles of War, Perspectives on Warfighting No. 6 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps War College, 

1998). During the 11 months prior to Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt made only four references to Japan, to keep the focus 

of the American public on Europe. Roosevelt always viewed 

Hitler, with his ambition for global domination compared 

to Japan’s regional aspirations, as by far the greater threat. 

See Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi Germany

(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 40. See also 

Michel Fullilove, Rendezvous with Destiny: How Franklin D. 

Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America into the 

War and into the World (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 

10. Casey’s fascinating book makes the point that even after Pearl Harbor, Americans were reluctant to fight, and 

even then, it was to extract revenge against Japan. Casey, 

Cautious Crusade, 49. Indeed, newspaper coverage between 

December and March 1942 heavily outweighed coverage of 

the war against Germany, and many argued, to Roosevelt’s 

consternation, that Japan represented the more immediate 

danger. Fullilove, Rendezvous with Destiny, 48–49. Americans 

showed little interest in fighting the entire German nation, 

whom they—and Roosevelt—distinguished from Hitler 

and the Nazis. Fullilove, Rendezvous with Destiny, 58–302.

30. Richard M. Ketchum, The Borrowed Years: 1938–1941 (New 

York: Random House, 1989), 671. Like Winston Churchill, 

Roosevelt underestimated Japan. Ketchum is critical of Roosevelt’s sloppy strategic evaluation of Japanese intentions 

and capabilities, even as Japan misread American resolve. 

Ketchum, The Borrowed Years, 692. Ironically, while hoping to 

Introduction | 11
avoid war with Germany, Ketchum says that the isolationist 

America First policy supported a tough policy in the Pacific. 

Still, Roosevelt “was reluctant to put matters to the test.” 

Ketchum, The Borrowed Years, 677.

31. Casey, Cautious Crusade, 44. Casey argues that Roosevelt 

lacked strong support for formal involvement in war.

32. David Kaiser, No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War (New York: Basic Books, 2014); and Nigel 

Hamilton, The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941–1942

(New York: Houghton, Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). Kaiser also 

acknowledges that the White House, in Henry Stimson’s 

words, conducted its “diplomatic fencing . . . so as to be 

sure that Japan was put into the wrong and made the first 

bad move — over move.” Kaiser, No End Save Victory, 304. 

The need to prepare for war and not fight until the United 

States was ready is a theme of Kaiser’s book, but Hamilton 

affirms his view.

33. See Lynne Olson, Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and 

America’s Fight Over World War II, 1939–1941 (New York: 

Random House, 2013), 358, 400, 404, 406–7. Olson’s book 

offers a lucid account of Roosevelt’s struggle against isolationists. Olson, Those Angry Days, 395. Citing opinion polls, 

she argues that Roosevelt’s views lagged behind those of 

Americans, although a lot of his top military commanders, including Army Gen George C. Marshall, had hoped 

to avoid war. Once he saw war was inevitable, Marshall 

shifted course and pushed hard for war preparations. While 

Roosevelt held back from the political fracas in Congress, 

Marshall led the successful fight to extend the draft and prevent the effective dissolution of the 1.4-million-man army. 

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the extension by 

a single vote, 203 to 202. See also Susan Dunn, 1940: FDR, 

Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler—the Election Amid the Storm (New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), which focuses on 

the 1940 election and illuminates the divisions on the eve 

of World War II; and James P. Duffy, Lindbergh vs. Roosevelt: 

The Rivalry that Divided America (Washington, DC: Regnery 

Publishing, 2010). Duffy is more sympathetic to Charles 

Lindbergh.

34. Hamilton, The Mantle of Command, 30.

35. Ketchum, The Borrowed Years, 697. Ketchum goes on to 

stress that the “question was how to arrange things so that 

the United States could intervene [in Japanese strikes in 

Thailand or Malaya] without somehow seeming to be the 

aggressor or the instigator of the hostilities.” Although polling showed Americans supported a strong stand against 

Japanese imperialism, there was “little enthusiasm” for 

going to war to defend European colonies in Southeast 

Asia. Ketchum, The Borrowed Years, 697. Historian Joseph E. 

Persico argues that Roosevelt did not want or necessarily 

expect war with Japan and that his attention was focused 

on Germany. Certainly, Pearl Harbor caught Roosevelt offguard. He thought any conflict would surface in the Far 

East. See Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Centurions: FDR and 

the Commanders He Led to Victory in World War II (New York: 

Random House, 2013), 104–5.

36. Ketchum, The Borrowed Years, 702.

37. See Strange, Capital “W” War. His views echo Gordon W. 

Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 402 (also cited by Strange). 

For more, see Ketchum, The Borrowed Years; and Wayne S. 

Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). 

38. See Casey, Cautious Crusade, 47. Historians such as Nigel 

Hamilton point out that had Germany not declared war on 

the United States, Congress would not have declared war 

on Germany. Not bound by the 1940 Tripartite Treaty with 

Japan to enter the war, Hitler foolishly believed that Pearl 

Harbor would occupy U.S. attention and make his own efforts to achieve victory easier. See Hamilton, The Mantle of 

Command, 88 – 90, 94.

39. See Strange, Capital “W” War, 7. Strange provides an excellent description of Lincoln’s dilemma. He leans heavily 

on Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (New 

York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937), 135, 205 – 6. See also Ronald 

C. White Jr., A. Lincoln: A Biography (New York: Random 

House, 2009), 407 – 9. White points out that in his inaugural address, Lincoln had declared: “The government will 

not assail you [emphasis original]. You can have no conflict 

without being yourselves the aggressors.” In deciding to 

resupply Fort Sumter, Lincoln had overruled his cabinet in 

full recognition of what lay ahead. White quotes Lincoln as 

telling his friend Orville H. Browning: “The plan succeeded. 

They attacked Sumter — it fell, and thus did more service 

than it otherwise could.” White, A. Lincoln, 408. For an excellent strategic analysis of the Civil War, see MajGen J. F. 

C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961 (New Brunswick, 

NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961). Fuller disagrees with 

Strange’s argument that Jefferson Davis, president of the 

Confederate States of America, was baited into allowing his 

forces to fire the first shot at Fort Sumter. Carl Sandburg 

concurred in his epic four-volume study of Lincoln, The War 

Years, that Davis ordered Gen P. G. T. Beauregard to fire the 

first shot, leaving the timing to his discretion. Indeed, Davis’s willingness to initiate hostilities was the decisive factor 

in his selection as president of the Confederacy over Alexander H. Stephens, who made clear he would never issue 

such an order. (Stephens became vice president.) Fuller’s incisive analysis of Jefferson’s strategic blunders — focused on 

a combination of ill-advised offensive action and defending 

Richmond, VA, instead of placing major forces in Tennessee, where the North might have been stymied—should be 

read by any student of strategy. Historian William Trotter is 

equally harsh on Davis for replacing Gen Joseph E. Johnston 

12 | Introduction
as commander of Confederate forces in the western theater. 

Johnston’s abilities are hotly debated. Trotter rates him as 

equal to Robert E. Lee, a brilliant tactician, who, as historian and politician Newt Gingrich has observed, employed 

speed, mobility, and ferocity to devastating effect. Arguably 

Johnston’s desired approach to dealing with Union Gen 

William T. Sherman — a Mao-like strategy of forcing a war 

of attrition on Sherman — might have stymied Sherman’s 

march to the sea. Extremely brilliant at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, Sherman recognized the challenge 

when he later met with Johnston to negotiate a peace. Perhaps fortunate for Sherman, he had to face Johnston in war 

for a limited period. Davis despised Johnston and replaced 

him with the ineffective LtGen John Bell Hood at a critical 

point on 17 July 1864. See William R. Trotter, Silk Flags and 

Cold Steel: The Civil War in North Carolina, vol. 1, The Piedmont (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair, 1988; Kindle ed., 

2013). An obvious lesson is that the quality of leadership 

can decide who wins or loses. After the war, Sherman and 

Johnston remained good friends for life.

40. See Philip Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

41. See: “Bonaparte at Arcole,” Napoleon.org, History Website 

of the Fondation Napoleon; Dwyer, Napoleon; and Andrew 

Knighton, “Napoleon: The Great General Also Used Propaganda to Boost His Popularity,” War History Online, 5 

January 2017.

42. Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars 

Have Been Won and Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2017). Nolan’s book is a significant contribution to the study 

of what matters in winning wars and is splendidly written, 

although arguably he too lightly dismisses the impact the 

right generals can have on outcomes.

43. See Nolan, The Allure of Battle. Nolan argues that too often 

people overstress the role of great commanders or “decisive” battles as determining the outcome of warfare. In his 

view, most wars represent a triumph of attrition over enemies, as well as superior resources and manpower. 

44. See Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, 5. While many people share and have written about the view he expresses, he 

articulates this notion succinctly in his study of Twitter’s 

impact on conflict.

45. Dr. Shalini Venturelli, “Dynamic Innovation and Evolutionary Capabilities of ISIL,” in Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense Strategic 

Multilayer Assessment Team, 2014), 35.

46. Venturelli, “Dynamic Innovation and Evolutionary Capabilities of ISIL,” 35. The entire document is an excellent commentary and required reading.

47. Farwell, Persuasion and Power.

48. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961; B. H. Liddell Hart, 

Strategy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967); Shimon 

Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of 

Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Gen Rupert 

Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World

(New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 2008); John A. 

Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of 

Chicago Press, 2005); and David Kilcullen, The Accidental 

Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

49. Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham, Behavioural Conflict: 

Why Understanding People and Their Motives Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict (Military Studies Press, 2011).

50. Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the 

Future of American Warfare (New York: Public Affairs/Perseus Books, 2013).

51. What role does State Department public diplomacy and 

Broadcasting Board of Governors international broadcasting play in the ideas this book describes? The answer is that 

while in theory the State Department has the lead for strategic communication, in practice foreign service officers tend 

to be dismissive of it in favor of statecraft. Public diplomacy 

should be an important part of the department, but since 

the dissolution of the United States Information Agency in 

1999, diplomacy plays a secondary role for career officers. 

The Global Engagement Center was established in 2016 to 

coordinate communication with the U.S. government, but 

thus far has enjoyed limited success, despite a hard-working 

and competent workforce, in part due to funding issues. In 

any event, this book focuses on the military’s role.

52. The focus is on those deemed most relevant to information 

warfare or communication strategy, but factors such as geography, ideology, and the organization of government and 

military institutions are important. See Williamson Murray 

and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The 

Making of Strategy, 1–24.

53. See Art of Design, Student Text, Version 2.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, 2010). It lays out the 

U.S. Army’s notion of operational art, centered on eight topics: the objective; levels of war; operational factors (space, 

time, and force); the four questions pertaining to objectives 

and end states; sequences of action; resources; likely chance 

of success or failure; and theater geometry and center of 

gravity.

Introduction | 13

Information warfare is about communication strategy. Forging and executing effective strategy requires 

avoiding the trap of allowing academic definitions to obstruct the operational requirements. It is about 

managing information and communication technology to gain a competitive edge. It embraces more than 

language. It entails the use of language, action, symbols, and images to shape perceptions and influence 

attitudes and opinions to change behavior in the interest of achieving a desired end state or effect. 

Strategy requires a well-defined, clearly understood picture of success. Influence planners must be part 

of developing a strategy from the outset. The key steps are:

• Define winning or success. What is the desired outcome?

• Define the specific effects to be achieved, especially as a kinetic effect may be no different than 

a nonkinetic one.

• Figure out where to acquire the knowledge necessary to forge a winning strategy.1

• Develop your strategy.

• Develop plans for operations that will carry out the strategy.

• Develop the tactics — combined to form operations — that implement a strategy.

• Define metrics so that you can measure success or failure.

Define What Constitutes Winning or Success

In elections, it is easy to define success: you win or you lose. The candidate is elected or a proposition put 

to a referendum vote passes or fails. Only in the game of horseshoes does one receive prizes for second 

place.

Legislative battles often afford clear-cut goals. Either desired legislation passes, fails, or passes in an 

amended form. The definition of winning in a legislative battle, however, is generally pretty clear to the 

interested parties.

Chapter 1

15

UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION WARFARE: 

WHAT ARE YOU TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH?
National security policies are notorious for their 

lack of clarity at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels and the failure to take these into account 

when forging strategies. Partly, this stems from 

the diverse agendas that drive the goals of warfare, which can make it difficult to define the goals 

being fought for. In forging strategy, it is vital to 

discern what distinctions exist among coalition 

partners or key players regarding their covert and 

overt goals. 

Partner and key player goals may differ dramatically and they may, along with the means 

used to forge alliances, affect the complex relationships between the parties. Engagements and 

conflicts we are likely to encounter during the next 

two decades seem likely to stress the need to build 

coalitions among or between states, organizations, 

and nonstate parties. Coalition building and maintenance is a complicated, nuanced process, and information strategy lies at its heart.2

This book’s introduction cites the tactical battles 

of Fallujah as a core example of why and how clear 

purpose matters. Adroit information warfare by 

insurgents cost Coalition forces the first battle as 

Marines were about to achieve military success. Coalition dominance in both spheres netted victory in 

the second battle. As a tactical operation, the second 

success was brilliant. Yet, at the operational level in 

Iraq, it produced serious blowback that led many 

to fear that the war would be lost. The strategic situation may have mandated fighting the battle, but 

failure to forge and execute an effective, clear-cut 

national strategy that anticipated and considered 

Iraqi reaction to battles such as this cast a shadow. 

Indeed, although in 2005 the U.S. Marines began 

turning things around in al-Anbar Province, a dismal air of gloom prevailed in many quarters. 

The 2003 Iraq War itself is a case study in what 

happens when there is a failure at the outset to define winning. Some favored ousting then-Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to prevent his acquisition 

or use of weapons of mass destruction (or as the 

military terms them, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives). Lieutenant 

General F. John Kelly talked about establishing democracy in Iraq — a very different goal.3

 The Department of State had a plan it called the Future of 

Iraq, but whatever its merits, which were debated, 

this plan sat on a shelf. The Department of Defense 

took over planning for Iraq but failed to define what 

constituted winning or success.4

 Senior commanders 

developed sharp differences with the White House 

and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld about 

how events in Iraq were unfolding and what success 

was achieved.5

Skeptics have worried that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has lacked a clear definition of success 

or a desired end state or even a coherent strategy 

for winning. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has concluded 

that between 2001 and 2017, U.S. efforts to stabilize 

insecure and contested areas failed. SIGAR blasted 

the failure of military and civilian parties to coordinate effectively.6

The International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) defined its mission as supporting the government and growth in capacity of the Afghan 

National Security Forces and facilitating improvements in governance and socioeconomic 

development to provide a secure environment for 

sustainable stability that is observable to the population.7

 Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. 

Gates expressed the mission as to “ ‘deny the Taliban momentum and control, facilitate reintegration, 

build government capacity selectively, grow the Afghan security forces, transfer security responsibilities, and defeat al Qaeda.’ ”8

 He argued that end 

state was vital, as Afghanistan had status as a base 

16 | Chapter 1
for extremist jihadism where native and foreign 

fighters had defeated a superpower and caused 

its collapse at home. Gates argued that a Taliban 

victory would strengthen “extremist Muslim mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning 

and who is losing.”9

A joint statement in January 2013 by President 

Barack H. Obama and Afghan President Hamid 

Karzai seemed consistent with ISAF’s pronouncement.10 Others have suggested, less formally, that 

the United States would be satisfied to ensure that 

Afghanistan does not serve as a safe haven for terror networks or al-Qaeda. At the time of this writing, negotiations between the United States and the 

Taliban have focused on securing a withdrawal of 

U.S. forces in exchange for a commitment by the 

Taliban to prevent terrorist organizations from using the nation as a launchpad for terrorist activities 

elsewhere. Although presented to the American 

public as a negotiation for a peace accord, the Taliban has long been willing to negotiate with the 

United States, as long as the discussion is confined 

to two topics: returning Taliban prisoners and withdrawal from Afghanistan of U.S. and Coalition 

forces. Not surprisingly, former ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan C. Crocker, among others, has denounced the deal as a surrender.11 Ironically, there 

is no evidence that even should the Taliban try to 

deliver on such a commitment that it has the power 

to do so in a nation with a large number of competitors for power.

One aspect of the Afghanistan quagmire—a war 

that has gone on longer than both World Wars and 

Korea combined—has been the absence of a coherent political/military/diplomatic strategy for 

winning.12

The SIGAR report sharply criticized the failure 

of U.S. military and civilian parties to coordinate effectively. It blasted the U.S. government for failing 

to forge or execute a cohesive strategy for allocating 

military or civilian resources. In short, there was 

never a workable, defined strategy for winning.13

It bears stressing: a clear definition of the mission 

and the desired outcome, tactically, operationally, 

and strategically — bearing in mind that tactical 

units like special operations forces (SOF) often create strategic effects — directly affects the narrative, 

story, theme, and messages that govern and drive 

what is done, when, and how. 

Determine Where to Acquire 

Necessary Knowledge

Figuring out where to acquire the knowledge to 

forge a winning information strategy is vital. World 

War II planning offers a classic example; the Iraq 

War provides a modern one.

• World War II: President Roosevelt’s 

Army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, appointed Lieutenant Colonel 

(later general) Albert C. Wedemeyer to 

develop the Victory Program in 1941, 

which became the blueprint for how 

to defeat Nazi Germany. Wedemeyer’s first task was to find out where he 

could find the information required 

to create the program. He succeeded. 

Wedemeyer’s imagination and disciplined effort made a difference.14

• Iraq: General Petraeus needed to divide 

his time among various political activities to gain critical knowledge that 

enabled him to make and implement 

decisions. For example, he spent 30 percent of his time with Iraqi leaders, 30 

percent in the field, 10 percent at headquarters, and 30 percent on matters 

relating to Congress and the executive 

branch in Washington.15

Understanding Strategy for Information Warfare | 17
Define Your Strategy

Military, information operations, and strategy 

expert and retired U.S. Army special operations 

officer Jack C. Guy, who currently serves on the 

faculty of the Joint Special Operations University, 

thinks of strategy this way: “strategy equals ends 

plus ways plus means.”16 A U.S. Army War College 

publication states that “strategy is about how (way 

or concept) leadership will use the power (means 

or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic 

locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support 

state interests. Strategy provides direction for the 

coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve 

specified objectives.”17 The means include, as Guy 

points out, the essential elements of power such as 

diplomacy, information, military, and economics 

(DIME), “but the key is the objective or the ends.”18

There are other definitions to think about. B. 

H. Liddell Hart famously defined strategy as “the 

art of distributing and applying military means to 

fulfill the ends of policy.”19 In that view, invading 

Normandy was a strategy for defeating Germany 

in World War II. 

Clausewitz, whose classic work On War is heavy 

on philosophy, is more often quoted than illuminating.20 He states, “Tactics is the theory of the use 

of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory 

of the use of combatants for the object of war.”21

Clausewitz focused on victory, not peace. He 

adhered to Napoleon’s view on victory, as well, 

perhaps forgetting that Napoleon wound up on 

Saint Helena in the South Atlantic. He agreed that 

strategy is an instrument of policy.22 His conception 

of grand strategy related to his views on the center 

of gravity: a point in the enemy’s organism—military, political, social, etc. — that if lost or defeated, 

collapses the enemy’s national will. In his general 

principles of war, strategy aims to defeat an enemy’s center of gravity, which forms the basis of an 

opponent’s power at the operational, strategic, or 

political levels.23

Clausewitz considers strategy in the context 

of three objectives for war: (1) defeat the enemy’s 

armed force; (2) gain possession of the enemy 

army’s material elements; and (3) gain public 

opinion.24 Where Clausewitz stands out is in articulating his holy trinity of principles that determine 

the outcome of warfare: “passion, chance, and reason.”25 Passion, including hatred and animosity, is 

a characteristic of the people. Chance and probability fall into the realm of the commander and their 

army; the quality of reason (political purpose), to 

which war is subordinate, is primarily the concern 

of government.26 As King’s College, University of 

London, professor David Betz points out, “war itself has not changed,” although changes in technology have complicated its dynamics.27

Critics such as Major General J. F. C. Fuller argue that Clausewitz focuses too much on violence 

rather than what should be the real end of conflict: 

the achievement of peace.28 Still, Clausewitz acknowledges that political objectives should determine the aim of military force and the effort to be 

made, although he saw war and politics as parallel 

as well as separate but related activities.29

Commentators such as B. H. Liddell Hart suggest that Clausewitz’s insistence on destruction of 

the enemy no matter what is easy to misconstrue. 

Hart declares, “The object in war is to attain a better peace — even if only from your own point of 

view.”30

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes places the debate about strategic purpose in the context of 

Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW). In his view, that 

unfolds over a timeline that exceeds the duration of 

a single event and is rooted in the understanding of 

a strategic situation. Fourth-Generation Warfare’s 

18 | Chapter 1
aim shifts away from the destruction of enemy 

forces to influencing political decisions. Hammes 

argues that it is

to convince the enemy’s political decision 

makers that their strategic goals are either 

unachievable or too costly for the perceived 

benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. 

Still rooted in the fundamental precept that 

superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and 

military power, 4GW makes use of society’s 

networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous 

generations, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead . . . 

it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision 

makers to destroy the enemy’s political will.31

Retired Israeli Defense Forces Brigadier General Shimon Naveh views strategic campaigns as 

a “complex of operations and actions, aimed at accomplishing a strategic goal. . . . The campaign, like 

the theatre, is related to a comprehensive aim and 

a defined framework of time, space, and force.”32

Strategy allocates resources and provides a framework for articulating operations and tactics that 

achieve defined strategic aims. Naveh’s approach 

is sophisticated and nuanced.

Naveh argues not for destruction of an enemy, 

but inflicting “operational shock” that defeats an 

enemy’s ability to achieve its aims and knocks out 

its operational equilibrium. Successful operations 

attack the enemy’s center of gravity by identifying 

exact points of enemy strength and weakness; creating operational vulnerabilities; and exploiting those 

through maneuvering strikes.33

Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui 

echo that argument in contending that information 

warfare needs to focus on a maximum point of impact through the choice, timing, and combination of 

a strategy’s dominant orientation, spheres of operation, tools, means, and directions.34 In their view, 

future strategy—including information warfare—

needs to reimagine the scope of dominant tools 

available to achieve the ends of warfare in seeking 

to secure desirable outcomes other than physical destruction of an enemy. As one looks over the horizon, one cannot rule out kinetic conflict between 

states. But as the Chinese strategists ably observe, 

state aggression may well prove better deterred or 

defeated by economic, diplomatic, and other nonkinetic strategies and tactics.

Naveh’s notion applies to information warfare, 

which aims to defeat the enemy’s ability to achieve 

its goals. Destruction may be a goal of warfare. 

Savvy commentators like British general Rupert 

Smith draw a distinction between confrontation 

and conflict. Confrontation aims to change an enemy’s intention. Conflict aims for destruction.35 In 

his view, use of force may instead aim for containment, deterrence, coercion, or destruction.36 Smith 

argues well. 

The point of using force may or may not be destruction. But as Naveh points out, strategically, 

destruction may not be an achievable or intended 

outcome of conflict. Naveh argues that victory is 

better achieved by frustrating enemy capabilities 

and the adversary’s ability to achieve its aims. Smith 

recognizes that where there is war among people—

Bosnia and Iraq offer good examples —“information, not firepower, is the currency upon which it is 

run; and information is neither purely military nor 

purely political.”37 From that perspective, “military 

force can only achieve tactical results.”38 What matters is the political objective. Achieving that requires 

intelligent integration of information strategy.

One may leave to military theorists different 

definitions of the object of war. What is important 

for communication strategists is to understand how 

Understanding Strategy for Information Warfare | 19
a commander views it. Information strategy supports or is supported by kinetic activity. But while 

its tools—including television, radio, print, or social 

media—may be employed as weapons and provide 

the trigger for destruction, most information warfare does not, per se, cause physical destruction.39

There is a theoretical bog here that theorists revel 

in. Avoid it. You do not need to go there to devise 

effective communication strategy.

Internationally respected political consultant 

Ronald A. Faucheux offers a practical view of communication strategy that applies squarely to how 

you develop one. It is, he says, “how you position 

yourself and allocate resources to maximize your 

strengths and minimize your weaknesses in achieving goals. It is a concept. It is a way to win.”40 

In short, a strategy describes concisely how you 

will achieve your strategic goals. In the end, your 

strategy is your roadmap to winning.41

What Are Operations and Tactics?

Discussions on military tactics can become complicated. Let us keep the analysis to plain speaking. 

An operation is “a sequence of tactical actions with 

a common purpose or unifying theme.”42 T. E. Lawrence’s classic definition of tactics remains valid. 

While strategy sets goals, allocates resources, and 

defines a timeline, operations develop campaigns 

that tie a series of battles together to achieve strategic goals.43 Tactics are “the means towards a strategic end, the particular steps of its staircase.”44 They 

are specific actions taken to implement a strategy. 

Tactics are the battles: the techniques, procedures, 

and actions for fighting.45

One may forge strategy at the tactical level. The 

Second Battle of Fallujah illustrates that well. It 

was a local conflict taking place within a large national theater of war. That is distinct from grand 

strategy, which views the achievement of strategic 

objectives—success or winning—from a broader 

perspective. In Iraq, the grand strategy required a 

clear plan of how all the elements—all operations—

are integrated to support a strategy that achieves 

national policy aims.

Information warfare takes place at all three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The role of 

media cuts across all of them. What happens tactically may be broadcast across different operational 

theaters internationally. Events in Fallujah affected 

how Iraqis nationally felt toward Coalition efforts 

and the conflict; they affected international opinion. 

The kinetics may have a local effect, but those same 

actions, especially in what Rupert Smith terms war 

among the people—conflicts that entwine combatants 

and civilians — will gain wider coverage and the effects will extend beyond the tactical level. 

Forging effective communication strategy requires thinking through effects in all three dimensions, not merely at the tactical or operational level. 

Today’s battlespace exists in living rooms around 

the world. How events are portrayed in traditional 

and social media, opinion in a wider operational 

area, and international opinion, can affect the outcome of a battle. The first battle for Fallujah in April 

2004 offers a classic illustration, as explicated further in chapter two.

1. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful 

Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941, CMH Pub 93-10 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1992). This work explains how then-Army major Albert C. 

Wedemeyer gathered the information to frame problems, 

propose a strategy, and devise concepts of operations across 

multiple theaters to defeat Germany. Ironically, Wedemeyer 

made no apology for his pro-German perspectives, for which 

Gen George Marshall shielded him from criticism.

Endnotes

20 | Chapter 1
2. Cols Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui insightfully argue that 

the 1991 Gulf War—Operation Desert Storm—amassed an 

international Coalition that came together for very distinct 

goals. They note that warfare agendas in prior eras exhibited greater clarity between overt and covert goals. Qiao 

Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 27–28. 

Note that the diversity of players who can affect the outcome of a modern conflict is far greater and their influence 

may be manifested in complex combinations of dimensions 

to affect the outcomes.

3. Richard H. Shultz Jr., The Marines Take Anbar: The Four-Year 

Fight against Al Qaeda (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 2013), 33. See also George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: 

America in Iraq (New York: Garrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005), 

58–59.

4. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 34–35. U.S. Central Command commander Army Gen Tommy R. Franks blew off 

the idea of post-war planning, referring people to Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz.

5. Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2009), 

37 – 40. 

6. Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan

(Arlington, VA: Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2018).

7. “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived),” 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (website), 1 September 

2015.

8. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New 

York: Borzoi Books/Knopf, 2014), 375, loc. 6792 of 11052, 

Kindle.

9. Gates, Duty, 374, loc. 6781 of 11052, Kindle.

10. “Joint Statement by President Obama and President Hamid 

Karzai of Afghanistan, January 11, 2013,” GovInfo.gov.

11. Ryan Crocker, “I Was Ambassador to Afghanistan. This 

Deal Is a Surrender,” Washington Post, 29 January 2019.

12. This point is among the lessons learned in the SIGAR report Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. SIGAR’s report is a blistering indictment of failed U.S. 

and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) efforts.

13. Stabilization.

14. See Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New 

York: Henry Holt, 1958), in which he describes how he 

accomplished the task. Wedemeyer had a key advantage: 

aside from graduating from the U.S. Military Academy at 

West Point, he spent time at the German war college Kriegsakademie in Berlin between 1936 and 1938, gaining crucial 

insights into German military strategic thinking. See also 

John J. McLaughlin, General Albert C. Wedemeyer: America’s 

Unsung Strategist in World War II (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2012); and Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a 

Doubtful Present. Ironically, like many U.S. military officers, 

including Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Wedemeyer was an isolationist who not only opposed U.S. entry 

into World War II but was unapologetically pro-German 

and anti-Semitic. See Olson, Those Angry Days, 100, 363, 414. 

Still, Olson credits Wedemeyer for his brilliant and “stunningly prescient analysis that ended up serving as the basic 

blueprint for U.S. military planning.” Olson, Those Angry 

Days, 415. It bears noting that Gen Marshall protected isolationists, including Gen Stanley D. Embick, who opposed 

aid to Britain and U.S. participation in the war prior to Pearl 

Harbor and made him the Army’s most influential strategist. Olson, Those Angry Days, 447. Army Col Truman Smith, 

a personal advisor to Marshall who had served as the U.S. 

military attaché to Berlin, opposed war with Germany and 

disliked Roosevelt to the end. Initial supporters of America 

First policies included future presidents John F. Kennedy 

and Gerald R. Ford, future Supreme Court justice Potter 

Stewart, and many others who changed their views once 

war commenced.

15. See, for example, Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: 

Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 249.

16. Jack Guy, interview with author, June 2013, hereafter Jack 

Guy interview.

17. Harry R. Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke 

and the Army War College Strategy Model,” in J. Boone 

Bartholomees Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, vol. 1, Theory of War and Strategy, 5th 

ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012), 45. 

For more on national security strategy, see Steven Heffington, Adam Oler, and David Tretler, eds., A National Security 

Strategy Primer (Washington, DC: National War College, 

National Defense University, 2019).

18. Jack Guy interview.

19. Hart, Strategy, 335.

20. A view also expressed by J. F. C. Fuller: “As the book 

stands—incomplete and unrevised—it is largely a jumble 

of essays, memoranda, and notes set together in no very 

precise form.” Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 60.

21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Col J. J. Graham (Mobile Reference), loc. 416 of 4382, Kindle. 

22. The often-quoted language, which is not dissected in this 

book about information strategy, examines war in the context of an international environment in which struggle 

predominates. Clausewitz states that war changes like a 

chameleon depending on the circumstances, but consists 

of a “wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence 

of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked 

upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and 

chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the 

Understanding Strategy for Information Warfare | 21
subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it 

belongs purely to reason.” Clausewitz, On War, loc. 644 of 

4382, Kindle.

23. Graham, commenting on Clausewitz, On War, loc. 4343 of 

4382, Kindle. See also Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 

69.

24. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 69.

25. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (New York: Knopf, 1993) as quoted in David 

Betz, Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of 

Conventional Military Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2015), 7.

26. Betz, Carnage and Connectivity, 12.

27. Betz, Carnage and Connectivity, 4.

28. Betz, Carnage and Connectivity, 76. Clausewitz acknowledges 

that war is an instrument of policy, but his theme is the destruction of the enemy. If an enemy is destroyed, there is not 

much room for political maneuver. Military strategy must 

serve defined political ends, not the other way around, although in practice, political dithering in Washington results 

in de facto delegation to the military of policy making by default, which is not necessarily the most prudent approach, 

no matter how capable our commanders. That happened in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.

29. See Smith, The Utility of Force, 59 – 61. Clausewitz, On War, 

loc. 467 of 4382, Kindle: “[T]he political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining 

both the aim of the military force and also the amount of 

effort to be made.” 

30. Hart, Strategy, 366.

31. Col Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in 

the 21st Century (Saint Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 208.

32. Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, 12 – 13.

33. Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, 18 – 19.

34. Ling and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 141 – 44.

35. Smith, The Utility of Force, 189. They emphasize especially 

the importance of moving beyond military operations to 

achieve warfighting objectives, as nonmilitary operations 

to achieve military objectives may prove more powerful. 

Smith, The Utility of Force, 144.

36. Smith, The Utility of Force, 382.

37. Smith, The Utility of Force, 377. Smith astutely observes that 

future wars will likely fall into this category, spurred by 

media coverage.

38. Smith, The Utility of Force, 378.

39. See, for example, Farwell, Persuasion and Power. In Rwanda, 

radio was used effectively as a weapon, directly triggering 

murder. The Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in Iraq 

used it indirectly to inspire violence.

40. Ron Faucheux, as quoted in Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 

155.

41. Less helpful is the Pentagon’s definition of strategy: “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to 

achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010 

[as amended January 2011]), 365. In his witty, provocative 

book, The New Rules of War, National Defense University 

professor Sean McFate takes a stab at defining grand strategy at a conceptual level. Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: 

Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder (New York: William 

Morrow, 2019), 74. His suggestion that “grand strategy is a 

policy that governs how a country behaves in international 

relations” comes up short. McFate, The New Rules of War, 

77. But his description of the characteristics of certain grand 

strategies, such as those adopted by ancient Rome and Britain, is worth reading.

42. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 174.

43. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed. (1929), s.v. “T. E. Lawrence,” and Lawrence’s commentary on guerrilla warfare 

commissioned specially for that edition.

44. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed. (1929), s.v. “T. E. Lawrence,” on guerrilla warfare.

45. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 215.

22 | Chapter 1
Chapter 2

It seems obvious that you need to understand your strategic position and the strategic situation. Modern and ancient history, however, is full of examples of leaders who failed to do so. 

Consider these questions when assessing your strategic situation: 

• What is happening in the theater of operations?

• What dynamics drive the strategic situation?

• Who has the momentum and why?

• Where is the momentum headed?

• What is your narrative, story theme, and message?

• Who are the target audiences?

• What language should be used to express the above?

• What channels and messengers should be used?

Historical Examples

Malaysian Emergency of 1948 – 60. During the 1950s, Sir Robert Thompson, who served on the staff of 

the British director of operations, helped defeat an anticolonial-driven insurgency led by the Malayan 

National Liberation Army (MNLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). A key to 

Britain’s successful communication strategy lay in the recognition that Malays wanted independence 

from Britain. Thompson’s campaign recognized that and promised Malays their independence. The decision proved a decisive factor in a sophisticated strategy that separated insurgents from the population 

as part of a successful counterinsurgency conflict.1

Lesson: Successful strategy aligns messages with an understanding of culture, national aims, and 

popular aspirations. The British understood what the population desired and tailored their campaign strategy to meet those desires.

Battle of the Little Bighorn. General George Armstrong Custer’s ill-fated battle on 25 – 26 June 1876 

against the Sioux and Cheyenne in eastern Montana has inspired an avalanche of books, art, and commentary. In addition to its relevance to modern information strategy as a demonstration of the failure to 

understand an adversary’s culture and a strategic situation, this historical tragedy is also used today by 

adversaries such as al-Qaeda in their propaganda to discredit the United States in its efforts to counter 

violent extremism.2

 Little Bighorn illustrates important lessons.

23

KNOW YOUR STRATEGIC SITUATION
Lessons: 

1. Recognize when circumstances mandate 

that an enemy will fight. The historian Evan 

S. Connell has remarked that Custer’s Last 

Stand at Little Bighorn “has been resurrected 

so often that General Custer is beginning 

to rival Lazarus.”3

 Perceptions differ on 

how the U.S. troops expected the tribes to 

respond. Historian Nathaniel Philbrick was 

writing about American Indians, not Iraq, 

but his point applies to both cultures. Philbrick points out that the U.S. government 

misjudged how Native American tribes 

would respond to the destruction of their 

buffalo herds, upon which they depended 

for food and sustenance, and to demands 

that tribes give up their lands and move 

to reservations so that Americans could 

exploit the discovery of gold in the Black 

Hills. The loss of buffalo and the land they 

roamed posed an existential threat to tribes’ 

survival.4

 That many white pioneers and 

settlers simply butchered buffalo for the fun 

of it intensified the tribes’ volatility.5

It was a dark chapter in U.S. history. The 

government entered into 354 treaties with 

Native American tribes, and it broke every 

one.6

 Civil War icons such as Philip H. Sheridan declared, “The only good Indians I ever 

saw were dead,” a statement later made 

famous in the epigram that “the only good 

Indian is a dead Indian.”7

 He did not stand 

alone. General William Tecumseh Sherman 

also called for the extermination of indigenous peoples.8

 Newspapers echoed the 

sentiment. President Ulysses S. Grant turned 

a blind eye to the slaughter. Why would any 

U.S. officer or soldier expect the native tribes 

to perceive them or the federal government 

as anything except deeply hostile to their 

future? Ironically, that was arguably not 

Custer’s view, but he did not make policy.9

Custer opposed extermination, although he 

favored opening up the Black Hills for prospecting and extinguishing the Sioux’s title to 

the land granted by an 1868 treaty.10

Compare lack of understanding of 

Native American tribes’ concerns to Paul 

Bremer’s failure to grasp that disbanding the 

Iraqi Army and banning even many school 

teachers from the ability to earn a livelihood 

and feed their families would alienate them 

and help foster insurrection. It is a mistake 

repeated time and again. Japanese Imperial 

Navy admiral Isoroku Yamamoto made it 

in supporting the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

General Douglas MacArthur made it in 

failing to anticipate that the Chinese would 

intervene in Korea.11

2. Ensure that a communication strategy is 

rooted in realistic expectations. The federal 

government wanted the Sioux to become 

farmers, despite the fact that the tribe had 

no agricultural tradition.12 That ignorance 

echoed that which Rajiv Chandrasekaran 

attributed to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Afghanistan. USAID ignored savvy counsel that 

one could move farmers off poppy into cotton, which would grow in Afghan soil and 

be profitable. Instead, USAID pigheadedly insisted they grow other crops. But 

the terrain was wholly unsuited and economic prospects were limited. Not surprisingly, farmers refused, and USAID efforts 

failed.13 Key lesson: target audience analysis will provide insight into what the audience wants and will motivate it to behave 

24 | Chapter 2
in a manner that helps achieve a desired 

objective or outcome.

3. Do not allow pride to drive your strategy.

Custer’s decision to divide his forces has been 

debated. The debate about military strategy 

lies in a different venue; it is his communication strategy that is relevant here, as it was 

integral to his view on warfare. He boasted 

that “his regiment could whip and defeat 

every Indian on the plains.”14 Custer’s main 

tactic was the cavalry charge. Many believe 

that charging blindly into the fray was rooted 

in a vain belief that he was lucky, coupled 

with sheer bravado. Nathaniel Philbrick 

comments that charging a large village such 

as the one at Little Bighorn “makes no logical 

sense. But cavalry charges are not about logic; 

they are about audacity, about using panic 

and fear to convince the enemy that you are 

stronger than they are, even if that is not even 

close to being the case.”15 Music accompanied this display of bravado. Custer always 

brought a band along with him into combat.16

As the cavalry charged, the band struck up 

“Garry Owen” — his version of shock and 

awe. 

Apparently, Custer did not expect the 

Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne warriors to stand 

and fight, ignoring stern warnings from his 

scouts.17 Driven by hubris and failing to think 

things through, he got himself and his entire 

troop — approximately 220 soldiers (the exact 

number is not clear) — killed.

Similarly, the U.S. decision to wage the 

first battle for Fallujah was driven by the 

hubris that ignored sage advice from U.S. 

Marines who knew the score, rather than by 

a cohesive strategy that prepared and shaped 

the battlefield, enabled victory, and looked 

ahead to what seizure of the city would 

achieve.18

4. Do not be seduced by myths of heroism or 

invincibility. Errol Flynn’s movie version of 

Custer’s Last Stand and most paintings that 

memorialize the event falsely portray the 

battle and its participants. Little Bighorn was 

a debacle built on a policy of ethnic extermination, and Custer was a disgrace, not a hero. 

Our enemies are ruthless in distorting the 

truth about the United States and its values. 

But the facts support criticism over the treatment of the tribes—a sentiment perhaps 

voiced most vehemently by the tribes themselves.19

5. Understand what the enemy is saying.Custer 

did not grasp the realities of communication 

with an adversary. He had smoked a peace 

pipe with Cheyenne warriors led by Medicine Arrow and Little Robe and promised 

he had come in peace. A skeptical Medicine 

Arrow warned Custer that they would kill 

him should he break his word.20 Lesson: it 

pays not merely to hear but also to listen.

Historian Nathaniel Philbrick argues 

that while Sitting Bull was renowned for his 

strength and desire to resist the settlers, “at 

the Little Bighorn, he [Sitting Bull] did not 

want to fight. He wanted to talk. . . . As he 

recognized . . . our children are best served 

not by a self-destructive blaze of glory, but by 

the hardest path of all: survival and accommodation.”21 Custer did not grasp that, 

nor did the other generals involved in the 

campaign. They made no effort to try. Some 

may dispute Philbrick’s conclusion, but if he 

is correct, Custer made a tragic, avoidable, 

and costly mistake. The point is not whether 

Philbrick is correct, however; historians 

Know Your Strategic Situation | 25
may argue about that. It is the questions he 

poses: What is the enemy’s real intent, and 

can we achieve our objectives without kinetic 

engagement? Mao Zedong was right. Politics 

is war without bloodshed. Why fight if it can 

be avoided and goals still can be achieved?

The Little Bighorn and the slaughter of 

tribes and their food sources have special 

relevance today. Al-Qaeda propaganda frequently cites what U.S. policy did to its own 

indigenous peoples to discredit U.S. efforts 

to counter the organization’s violent extremism. Knowing our own history is critical in 

enabling us to deal with some of its darker 

aspects.22

Americans tend to focus on recent and 

current events. For others, what happened 

hundreds or more than a thousand years 

ago may hold emotionally explosive contemporary relevance. That held true in Bosnia, where different parties laid claim to land 

based upon dominance over it at different 

periods of history.23 It is true for China.24 It 

is true in Arab cultures, where the Crusades 

resonate as if they happened yesterday. It is 

true in Iran, which views its relations with 

the West through the lens of more than a century of troubled interactions.25

Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. In 9 CE, Rome 

suffered one of its worst defeats when Germanic 

tribes massacred three of Rome’s 28 legions. Rome 

was all-powerful in its world, but had a small 

army — between 125,000 and 150,000 soldiers. 

Rome did not replace the legions until Tiberius 

became Emperor six years later.26 The debacle 

occurred when provincial governor Publius 

Quinctilius Varus allowed an ambitious German 

leader, Arminius — whom he supposed an ally—

to trick him into leading the legions and the civilians accompanying them deep into the Teutoburg 

Forest. Aside from simply misjudging the enemy, 

Varus failed to understand the strategic situation 

he had entered, presuming he was governing a 

peaceful province. 

A contemporary Roman historian, Velleius Paterculus, recorded the Roman governor’s naïveté:

When given the German command, he [Varus] 

went out with the quaint preconception that 

here was a subhuman people which would 

somehow prove responsive to Roman law 

even where it had not responded to the 

Roman sword. He therefore breezed in—right 

into the heart of Germany—as if on a picnic. 

. . . Meantime the Germans, a race combining 

maximum ferocity with supreme guile (and 

being born liars besides) fawned upon Varus 

. . . marveling at his jurisprudence and flattering him regarding his civilizing mission.27

Two thousand years later, the 2003 Iraq conflict 

offered a parallel lesson. Larry Diamond, advisor 

to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 

quoted one diplomat’s impression about the Americans in Baghdad’s Green Zone: “What struck me 

about the palace was the completely self-referential 

character of it. It was all about us, not about them 

[the Iraqis]. People would walk around the palace 

with a mixture of venal and idealistic motives. 

None of them knew Iraq.”28

Lessons:

1. Know your enemy. Varus misjudged the 

interests, cultural values, aspirations, and 

desire for independence among the Germanic 

tribes. Their rebellion and fatal ambush of his 

legions came as a total surprise. Target audience analysis is a persistent requirement for 

influence operations. One lesson applicable 

26 | Chapter 2
today is that populations are not monolithic. 

An analyst’s insight is vital to understanding 

the demographic differences among target 

audiences so that messaging may be calibrated to each audience segment.

2. Presume nothing about the loyalty of ostensibly peaceful populations and calibrate 

communication strategy accordingly. Varus 

thought that the Germanic people could be 

ruled as subjects of Rome. His actions taken 

in that misperception inspired deep hostility 

and motivated the people to action. He had 

no strategy for winning them over or keeping 

them peaceful. Not surprisingly, they rose up 

against him when his policies became rooted 

in oppressive rule. They lulled Varus into 

letting down his guard. 

Varus lived 2,000 years ago, but the lesson 

that applied to him also applies, in its own 

way, to Afghanistan, where, as author Bing 

West points out, villages that seemed friendly 

and grateful one minute could turn on U.S. 

troops in a flash.29

3. Communication strategy requires dependable intelligence about what the enemy is 

up to. Varus failed to achieve this goal from 

the outset. He did not consider the Germanic 

people his enemy. He made foolish assumptions about the population, instead of 

viewing his situation with an open but skeptical perspective.

A different analogy applied in Iraq. West’s 

study of the battles for Fallujah revealed 

that the insurgents lacked the commandand-control hierarchy that, for example, the 

Viet Cong had. They wore no uniforms, operated from their homes, and had a lack of military communications that (at least initially) 

could be intercepted, “yet they all know 

one another.”30 He analogized as well to the 

American Indian tribes, bonded by common 

hatred of an enemy but launching different 

raids at different times for different reasons. 

Communication strategy must anticipate 

such challenges.

Modern Examples

Iraq. Nathaniel Philbrick stated the following critical question: How will a society facing changes that 

produce inescapable catastrophe deal with it? Fear 

of the future is critical to people on the verge of 

cataclysm. It can imbue even the most trivial incident with overwhelming significance.31 In Iraq, the 

minority population of Sunnis had long controlled 

the country. Ousted from control as Coalition forces 

toppled Saddam Hussein, Shiites violently targeted 

Sunnis. At the same time, Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer had banned many Sunnis 

from earning a living. Failure to grasp that Sunnis 

perceived an existential threat to their existence 

nearly produced military defeat for Coalition forces. 

Only effective Coalition outreach, commencing in 

al-Anbar Province, persuaded Sunnis that al-Qaeda 

was an unacceptable alternative and reversed the 

situation.

Lesson: Iraq is full of lessons. A critical one 

is to recognize how people in other societies 

and cultures will perceive how actions and 

events affect their well-being, prosperity, cultural integrity, or survival and how they will 

respond.32

Afghanistan. Afghan politics are driven by a 

very complex tribal structure. Special operations 

veterans like Major Jim Gant have offered a cogent 

argument, worth studying, for why success in that 

culture requires winning “one tribe at a time.”33

Linda Robinson has catalogued concrete examples 

Know Your Strategic Situation | 27
of how understanding the ethnographics, tribes, 

villages, and key players at the local level can spell 

the difference between success and failure, and 

how achieving that was key to special operations 

teams successes.34 Former U.S. speaker of the House 

Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill once said that all politics is local.

Example: Special operations operators who 

this author interviewed all held the view 

that understanding the political and military 

dynamics of Afghanistan required a nuanced, 

subtle, detailed knowledge of the provinces, 

villages, tribes, clans, families, and key individuals who comprise a decentralized culture. 

Philippines, 2013. U.S. special operations forces 

have played a key role in providing useful advice to 

the Philippine military in countering violent Islamic 

extremism in the southern part of the nation. Recognizing that a smaller footprint serves the interests 

of the United States and our Filipino partner, U.S. 

special operations forces have calibrated the assistance. That decision is integral to a communication strategy. It has cut off the ability of violent 

extremists to credibly argue that the United States 

occupies the country or controls the government.

Lesson: Think carefully about what degree of 

visibility aids or undercuts an operation. The 

low profile taken by U.S. special operations 

forces in the Philippines, ceding the lead to 

Filipinos, has worked well. It has insulated 

both parties from enemy propaganda that 

would undercut U.S. aid by decrying foreign 

intervention, and it has bolstered the strength 

of the Philippine government.

Yemen. Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh 

permitted the United States to strike at al-Qaeda 

operatives with General Atomics MQ-1 Predator 

drones inside Yemen, providing the United States 

kept quiet about it. In November 2002, U.S. military forces tracked down al-Qaeda leader Abu Ali 

al-Harethi in the northern province of Marib and 

killed him with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. Arguably, al-Harethi was the mastermind behind the 

USS Cole (DDG 67) bombing.

35 Unfortunately, a 

high-ranking U.S. defense official praised the strike 

on CNN. A furious Saleh felt this revelation made 

him look hypocritical. He ordered the United States 

to cease Predator operations.36 The failure to grasp 

the fragile, explosive, fluid state of Yemeni politics 

cost the United States eight years, until 2010, when 

Saleh lost power and the Predators swung back into 

action.37

Lesson: Gear strategy to a realistic assessment 

of what an ally finds politically plausible. 

Saleh faced a complex political situation in 

Yemen. In his view, visible U.S. action lacked 

a political foundation among Yemenis and 

could prove destabilizing. He was understandably upset when a U.S. official breached 

a U.S. commitment to stay below radar. Do 

not ask political or military allies in another 

country to provide more support than is politically feasible. Control information as part of 

a strategic communication plan.

Ethiopia, 2006. The United States funded warlords in Somalia on the theory that they opposed 

al-Qaeda and could help keep it at bay. But the 

warlords themselves lacked credibility and aroused 

fierce hostility among Somalis.

Lesson: Be careful about the friends you 

choose. Backing the warlords complicated 

rather than solved the problem the United 

States needed to address.

28 | Chapter 2
1. See Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: 

The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: F. A. Praeger, 

1966). Thompson’s five basic principles of counterinsurgency have achieved the status of catechism. See also Nagl, 

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, which discusses various 

insurgencies, including Malaya.

2. Younus Abdullah Muhammad declared in the al-Qaeda propaganda publication Jihad Recollections: “America’s role as an 

imperialist nation started at their very root with the genocide 

of an entire indigenous population, the American Indians.” 

Younus Abdullah Muhammad, “The Predications of the 

Conquering of Rome,” Jihad Recollections 1 (April 2009), as 

quoted in “Younus Abdulla Muhammad — Contributor,” on 

“The Life and Legacy of American Al-Qaeda Online Jihad 

Pioneer Samir Khan,” MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project, Western Defense Studies Institute (website), 29 

September 2012.

3. Evan S. Connell, Son of the Morning Star: Custer and the Little 

Bighorn (San Francisco, CA: North Point Press, 1984), 361. 

4. At one point, 8 million buffalo roamed the prairies. They 

were hunted nearly to extinction before the federal government facilitated their comeback in the twentieth century.

5. Larry McMurtry, Custer (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

2012), 39.

6. McMurtry, Custer, 94.

7. Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 179–80; and Nathaniel Philbrick, The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull and the Battle of the 

Little Bighorn (New York: Peguin, 2010), 287.

8. In a letter to his brother, John Sherman, Gen Sherman declared: “The more Indians we can kill this year the fewer 

we will need to kill the next, because the more I see of the 

Indians the more convinced I am that they must either all 

be killed or maintained as a species of pauper.” William T. 

Sherman to John Sherman, 23 September 1868, Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters (New York: Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1894), 321–22. Historian James Donovan 

had no doubt that Sheridan and Sherman favored extermination. See James Donovan, A Terrible Glory: Custer and the 

Little Bighorn—The Last Great Battle of the American West (New 

York: Little, Brown, 2008), 91. Sherman’s role in the Civil War 

is fraught with irony. His “march to the sea” dealt a lethal 

psychological blow to Southern hopes. No one disputes his 

remarkable ability. His strategy to conduct psychological 

warfare to break the will of the South and the operational 

and tactical imagination he employed to carry out his strategy mark him as perhaps the North’s top general, along 

with another master strategist, Ulysses S. Grant. See Hart, 

Strategy, 149–55; and Charles Royster, The Destructive War: 

William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans (New York: Vintage, 1993). However, Sherman’s tactic 

of conducting violent war on innocent civilians arguably 

satisfies the modern definition of terrorism—perpetrating 

violence on civilians for political aims. See Sherman’s letter 

to Henry W. Halleck declaring: “We are not only fighting 

armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, 

rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.” William T. Sherman to Henry W. Halleck, 

24 December 1864, Civil War Era NC (website), accessed 24 

May 2019; and Trotter, Silk Flags and Cold Steel, loc. 3362–3373 

of 6371, Kindle. Sherman critics charge that Sherman did 

not believe in racial equality and refused to allow African 

Americans to serve as soldiers in his army. See Michael Fellman, “A White Man’s War,” Civil War Times Magazine, 19 

November 2009; and Steven Hancock, “William T. Sherman: 

Hero or Villain?,” Civil War Diary (blog), 3 September 2011. 

But Stanley P. Hirshson, The White Tecumseh: A Biography of 

General William T. Sherman (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1997) 

disputes Fellman’s view and argues that he was not racist. 

Sherman’s champions argue that no matter what, his attitudes should be judged in the context of the times and that 

while wreaking physical destruction, Sherman’s campaign 

was relatively bloodless. Certainly, once hostilities were 

concluded, he was gracious toward Gen Joseph E. Johnston in offering terms that were rejected in Washington by 

Lincoln’s successors. See Royster, The Destructive War; and 

Noah Andre Trudeau, Southern Storm: Sherman’s March to 

the Sea (New York: Harper, 2008). Royster’s fine book offers 

a very sympathetic account of Sherman and his career. He 

notes that sentiment among many Northerners toward the 

South was harsh. An Ohio legislator proposed “one million 

dollars to pay for the scalps of rebels.” Royster, The Destructive 

War, 79, emphasis original. Senator John Sherman declared 

on 9 July 1862: “you cannot conduct warfare against savages unless you become half-savage yourself.” Royster, The 

Destructive War, 81. “Talk of regeneration,” Royster wrote, 

“included talk of extermination and depopulation.” Royster, 

The Destructive War, 81. In Royster’s view, a combination of 

Northern opinion and difficult fighting to take Vicksburg, 

MS, persuaded Sherman that breaking the South’s will 

to fight required harsh measures, although his “march to 

the sea” inflicted mainly damage on property, not civilian 

deaths. He justified war on civilians on the theory that all 

Southerners—civilians and military—bore a “collective responsibility” for the war. Royster, The Destructive War, 117. 

At the outset of the war, Sherman had been teaching in Louisiana. His objection to the Confederacy lay not in opposition 

to slavery (Royster, The Destructive War, 90, 109), but what he 

viewed as a treasonous desertion of the union. The weakness 

in Royster’s account is that he glosses over Sherman’s extremist views toward the Indian tribes. Trudeau argues that 

Endnotes

Know Your Strategic Situation | 29
Sherman’s destruction has been exaggerated in a detailed 

account of a well-executed campaign and desire to restore 

postwar normality. Sherman’s brutally extremist views toward the tribes, however, seem evident. Grant was complicit 

in the war against the Native Americans, although excellent 

historians such as Jean Edward Smith make a strong case 

that he is vastly underrated. See Jean Edward Smith, Grant

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), Kindle. Smith praises his “peace policy” toward American Indians (Grant, loc. 

9936 of 21625, Kindle), and argues that he restrained Gens 

Sherman and Phil Sheridan and was conciliatory (Grant, 

loc. 10926–10937 of 21625, Kindle), putting a peace policy 

in place by 1869 (Grant, loc. 11087 of 21625, Kindle). Smith 

feels Custer’s battle and corruption in the Indian Service did 

much to undermine a humanitarian bent in Grant. Smith, 

Grant, loc. 11367 of 21625, Kindle.

9. Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 241. Connell’s view is that 

whatever Custer’s opinions, he did not make policy. His 

job was to follow orders. A review of what Custer said and 

did makes it hard to take a benign view of him. He was 

cold-hearted and cruel to his own soldiers. Many of his colleagues disliked him. Gen Sheridan used him but did not 

trust him. His attack on Black Kettle in 1868 at Washita was 

particularly telling. He led a murderous assault on a Cheyenne camp, killing women and children, then he ordered the 

senseless slaughter of more than 700 horses. Philbrick quotes 

a Cheyenne woman as remembering the very “human cries 

of the ponies, many of which were disabled but not killed 

by the gunfire.” Philbrick, The Last Stand, 136. See also McMurtry, Custer, 64 – 65. Ironically, in 2013, the roles seem to 

reverse themselves, as American Indian leaders supported 

the slaughter of wild horses in New Mexico, while former 

Governor William B. Richardson and conservationists like 

Robert Redford battled to save them. See Fernanda Santos, “On Fate of Wild Horses, Stars and Indians Spar,” New 

York Times, 10 August 2013. As to Custer, the romantic aura 

ascribed to him in film does not survive scrutiny. His men 

shot deserters who tried to surrender, while Custer himself shot a Confederate officer during the Civil War who 

tried to surrender. Apparently, he wanted—and kept—the 

dead officer’s expensive saddle and sword and his fine thoroughbred horse. Philbrick, The Last Stand, 30 – 31. As with 

Sheridan and Sherman, a key quality that stands out about 

him is bloodlust.

10. Donovan, A Terrible Glory, 90. 

11. See David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the 

Korean War (New York: Hyperion, 2007); and Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 99–100. 

12. McMurtry, Custer, 222.

13. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War within the 

War for Afghanistan (New York: Knopf, 2012), 200 – 4, 330.

14. Donovan, A Terrible Glory, 219. See also Connell, Son of the 

Morning Star, 276. Connell poses the question of why Custer 

thought he could achieve with one regiment what an army 

would have difficulty accomplishing. He suggests that 

Custer trusted too much to luck. 

15. Philbrick, The Last Stand, 172. See also Connell, Son of the 

Morning Star, 278 – 79.

16. McMurtry, Custer, 67. 

17. McMurtry, Custer, 7. Nor, McMurtry writes, did the Indians 

expect an attack.

18. Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for 

Fallujah (New York: Bantam, 2005), 60.

19. See, for example, Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded 

Knee: An Indian History of the American West (New York: Bantam, 1972); and William S. E. Coleman, Voices of Wounded 

Knee (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). For a 

critical examination of how foreign publics may perceive the 

United States and its values, and the sense that American 

films and television not only transmit an ideology that may 

incite hostility, but are themselves ideology, see Ziauddin 

Sardar and Marryl Wyn Davie, Why Do People Hate America?

(Cambridge, UK: Icon Books, 2003). The issue here is not 

whether one agrees with their views, but to comprehend 

and be able to address them, and to factor in criticisms of 

the United States, in forging communication strategy.

20. Medicine Arrow famously kicked ash on Custer’s boots, signifying either a warning, contempt, or a curse — or all three. 

See Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 202; and Philbrick, The 

Last Stand, 123.

21. Philbrick, The Last Stand, 312. In 1890, Sitting Bull was murdered by police at Wounded Knee, SD. Philbrick quotes 

Lakota tribe members from Sitting Bull’s village as stating 

years later that had Custer simply asked for a council instead 

of attacking, “he could have led them all into the agency 

[reservation] without a fight.” Philbrick, The Last Stand, 144.

22. Not helpful is the romantic myth that has grown up around 

Custer. Contemporary historians laud him as a hero. Bad 

poetry by Walt Whitman and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 

and paintings or illustrations by William Cory, John Mulvany, and F. Otto Becker inaccurately depicted a glorious 

last stand by bluecoats led by a gallant leader with flowing 

locks, portrayed by Errol Flynn in the 1941 movie They Died 

with Their Boots On. Actually, Custer’s hair, as Connell points 

out, was short; it was too hot to wear Army bluecoats; and 

the motley group he commanded “might be mistaken for a 

limping drunken mob of itinerant farmhands.” Connell, Son 

of the Morning Star, 362. Instead, history is left with an image, 

as Connell puts it, of “fantastically painted redskins whirling 

in barbaric splendor around a disciplined unit of whites in 

uniform blue coats.” Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 356.

23. See Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

30 | Chapter 2
24. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011). 

Kissinger observes that Mao Zedong was facile in citing 

ancient Chinese history to analogize to current strategy.

25. The history of the Iranian relations with the West is too 

complex for this book. Suffice to say the picture is more 

complicated than modern media suggests. One might start 

in 1872, when, “for a paltry sum, [baron Julius de Reuter] 

acquired the exclusive right to run [Iran’s] industries, irrigate its farmland, exploit its mineral resources, develop 

its railroad and streetcar lines, establish its national bank, 

and print its currency.” Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: 

An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 31. George N. Curzon, 

then a member of British Parliament, described this as “the 

most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire 

industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that 

has probably ever been dreamt of, much less accomplished, 

in history.” Honorable George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, 1892), 480. 

One can examine the role of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), formed in 1908, and its impact on Iranian culture and politics. See Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 48 – 49; and 

Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between 

Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 24. By 

1914, the British government had control of APOC, and left 

Iran with a small 16-percent royalty on net profits, which 

inspired deep bitterness. See Dr. Mohammad Malek, “Oil in 

Iran between the Two World Wars,” Iran Chamber Society 

(website), 10 July 2008. Iranians drew the lesson, continuing 

through the present, which in no way justifies its vicious 

hostility toward the existence of Israel, that the West would 

always treat Iran and its citizens as pawns to control oil 

while trampling on Iranian interests and sovereignty. World 

War II persuaded Iranians that the West would employ 

military force to abuse Iranian sovereignty— also a complicated issue, as Reza Shah Pahlavi had flirted with the 

Nazis, prompting the Allies to oust him. Iranians would argue he acted out of nationalism, not empathy for Germany. 

The U.S.-backed coup that ousted the only democratically 

elected leader of Iran in more than a hundred years, Mohammad Mosaddeq, directly led the 1979 revolution and its 

aftermath. See Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, chapter 5; Pollack, 

The Persian Puzzle; and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: 

The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 1988).

26. Barry Strauss, Ten Caesars: Roman Emperors from Augustus to 

Constantine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2019), loc. 445 

of 7371, Kindle.

27. See Velleius Paterculus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti [Compendium of Roman History], trans. Frederick W. Shipley 

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924), 117–18. 

Shipley translates Paterculus in these words: “[H]e entered 

the heart of Germany as though he were going among a 

people enjoying the blessings of peace. . . . But the Germans who with their great ferocity combine great craft, to 

an extent scarcely credible to one who has had no experience with them, and are a race to lying born” trumped up 

various lawsuits and won Varus’s trust by feigning gratitude for his settlement of the fictitious disputes to blind 

him to the treachery that they planned and brutally executed. The battle was a catastrophe for Rome. It cost Rome 

a province and all of its garrisons. The Nazis revered what 

they viewed as the noble and heroic virtues of Arminius. 

Nazi propaganda cited his achievements, rooting the National Socialist Regime in Germany’s history and casting 

Arminius as a unifying hero. See Job Mestrom, “Arminius 

in National Socialism: How the Nazis Presented Antiquity 

in Propaganda” (master’s thesis, Raboud University 2016), 

3 – 4.

28. Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New 

York: Times Books, 2005), 298. Rajiv Chandrasekaran made 

a similar point in Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside 

Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Knopf, 2006).

29. Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of 

Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2011), 55.

30. West, No True Glory, 18.

31. Philbrick, The Last Stand, 64.

32. Israeli concern about Iran’s nuclear program raises similar 

concerns. 

33. Maj Jim Gant, “One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (blog), 2009. Gant 

argues for embedding tribal engagement teams in Afghan 

villages to forge bonds of trust and help empower them to 

provide for their own security. See also Col Ty Connett and 

Col Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than 

Village Defense,” Special Warfare, July–September 2011.

34. Robinson, One Hundred Victories. The book focuses on Afghanistan but her examples and the lessons to be drawn 

from them apply to other nations, societies, and cultures.

35. “U.S. Kills al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen,” Associated Press/

USA Today, 5 November 2002; and Mark Mazzetti, The Way 

of the Knife (New York: Penguin, 2013), 85–87.

36. Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 100–1.

37. See Peter Baker, “Obama’s War Over Terror,” New York 

Times, 4 January 2010; and Bill Roggio, “US Kills AQAP 

Leaders in Airstrike in Southern Yemen: Report,” Long War 

Journal, 9 June 2011.

Know Your Strategic Situation | 31
32

Chapter 3

You must understand the role your enemy plays in affecting your winning communication strategy. 

Identifying who you are fighting and understanding their attributes may spell the difference between 

victory and defeat. You need to know who they are; how they see themselves; their roots, history, values, traditions, priorities, friends, and allies. You need to understand what is important to them and 

what is not. You need to understand how to communicate with them and through what channels and 

what messengers to use to effectively engage with them. You need to be able to explain to them what 

you are doing, how it affects them, what their stakes are, and why they should support your efforts or, 

failing that, decline to oppose them. 

The general precept “know your enemy” is of critical importance. It is far easier to see who or what 

you expect or want to see, rather than to be objective. Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said, “If you know the 

enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but 

not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 

yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”1

 This is about two confluent notions. 

First, identifying your enemy is not always easy because enemies often avoid showing themselves. 

Ask any veteran of Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. You need to devise dependable approaches to identifying the enemy. That is partly about intelligence collection and information gathering. It is about identifying every source possible as well as who can provide a means of identifying an enemy, including 

apparent friends whose agenda is hostile to yours. 

Second, understanding your enemy. What motivates, inspires, threatens, or frightens an enemy? 

What coalitions does the enemy belong to—and what is the nature and composition of such coalitions? 

Understanding these things enables you to identify seams or divisions in coalitions and stories, narratives, themes, or messages that can create division or defection.

Mao Zedong stated, “Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor in knowing the enemy, 

and some are the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of 

war.”2

Questions to ask include:

• Who is the enemy and how do you define them? 

• How does the enemy see themselves?

• What does target audience analysis reveal as you break down a population into its demographic elements and the histories of their individual provinces, towns, villages, or valleys?

KNOW YOUR ENEMY
Know Your Enemy | 33

• How is the enemy organized?

• What is the enemy’s objective? 

• How does the enemy define winning?

• What obstacles to success confront the 

enemy?

• Which of these obstacles can communication strategy surmount?

• What is the enemy’s communication 

strategy?

• What are the enemy’s story, narrative, 

themes, and messages?

• What language is the enemy using to 

express the above?

• How credible and persuasive to an enemy’s target audiences as well as to its 

own supporters and allies is the enemy 

message?

• Who comprises the enemy’s target audience(s)?

• What channels and messengers are the 

enemy using?

• How effective is the enemy’s strategy?

Historical Examples

Pakistan. President Yahya Khan launched an 

invasion of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 

March 1971, after the 1970 parliamentary elections 

deadlocked. Bengali nationalism and political 

self-interest by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ignited the war. 

Understanding what happened requires a look at 

the formation of Pakistan.

After World War II, the United Kingdom 

granted India its independence. Negotiations produced two new states: Pakistan and India. Pakistan was created for Muslims, while India was 

predominantly Hindu. Pakistan was an awkward 

creation. It comprised two geographically and culturally distinct areas 1,000 miles apart. East Pakistan was culturally uniform and citizens spoke 

Bengali. Its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, led 

the Bangladesh Awami League. 

West Pakistan (now Pakistan) was ethnically 

diverse and its feudal class produced the political leadership. Its citizens considered themselves 

superior to the Bengalis. Its population comprised 

four main ethnic groups: Punjabis, Pushtuns, Sindhis, and Baluchis; there were also other minorities. The elites spoke English, while much of the 

population spoke Urdu. Language differences and 

action by the west, which took a disproportionate 

share of the government budget and key government and military posts, fueled tensions.

Not until 1956 did Pakistan’s Constituent 

Assembly frame a constitution. It divided the 

National Assembly equally between East Pakistan 

and West Pakistan and made Urdu and Bengali 

national languages. Democracy was short-lived, 

however. In 1958, General Mohammad Ayub 

Khan seized power, jettisoned the constitution, 

declared martial law, and became president. Khan 

strengthened the economy, supported free enterprise, aligned Pakistan with the West, and worked 

to stabilize Pakistan. In 1962, he lifted martial law 

and enacted a new constitution, although it was 

flawed in giving an equal number of seats in the 

assembly to the less populous West Pakistan. He 

earned praise as one of Pakistan’s most able chiefs 

of state. One could argue that had Pakistan continued on the course Khan set, it could have avoided 

many problems that have beset it during the past 

50 years and emerged, as India has, as a confident 

economic powerhouse.3

Khan lost credibility when India defeated 

Pakistan in a 1965 war over Kashmir. Bengalis 

felt repressed by his rule, which treated them as 

second-class citizens. Their sentiments moved 

toward seeking greater autonomy and perhaps 

independence from West Pakistan. Complicat-
ing matters—fatally for Pakistan’s fortunes at 

the time—was the emergence of the charismatic 

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Initially, he served as Khan’s 

foreign minister. After India’s victory, he resigned, 

founded the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and 

emerged as a Khan critic. Politicians are fond of 

pledging eternal friendship, but in politics eternity 

can be brief.

Popular discontent in 1969 forced Ayub Khan 

out of office. Another general, Yahya Khan, replaced him. Yahya Khan had poor political instincts. Like his predecessor, he set aside the 

constitution and declared martial law. He picked 

the wrong time for that action, however, as Pakistanis had wearied of military rule.

Bhutto and East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman, who led the Awami party, joined together to 

force an election in 1970. Yahya Khan set a “one 

person, one vote” rule. It was statesmanlike but 

lit the fuse for civil war because, predictably, East 

Pakistan’s larger population earned it a majority of the assembly seats, while the PPP won the 

most seats in the West. Bhutto and Rahman each 

wanted to be prime minister. That conflict played 

into the hands of the army, which had anticipated 

a political deadlock to be broken by making Khan 

the president. Rahman was also charismatic, but 

he lacked Bhutto’s backroom political skills. Khan 

was prepared to cede power to Rahman, but Rahman mucked up matters by demanding too much. 

Stoked by Bhutto, rumors circulated that Rahman 

was acting in league with India to control Pakistan. Deadlock persisted. Egged on by Bhutto, 

who kept warning Khan that Rahman and the Indians were colluding, Khan launched an invasion 

of East Pakistan. Bhutto assured him it would be 

an easy victory. It was more like genocide.

Muslims populated West Pakistan while the 

Bengalis, who populated the east, were mainly 

Hindu. “Kill three million of them,” Khan declared, “and the rest will eat out of our hands.”4

Khan neglected to consider how India’s prime 

minister, Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi, also a 

Hindu, would respond. She sent in the Indian 

Army, which inflicted a humiliating defeat. The 

repercussions of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 

are still felt today in continuing tensions in Kashmir and Pakistani paranoia about India’s involvement in Afghanistan, and a general (rather 

absurd) fear that given the right opening, India 

would invade Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan’s military has exploited this paranoia since the nation’s 

inception to maximize its influence and power.

Lesson: Carefully think through how parties 

perceive themselves as having a stake in your 

actions and the message such actions will send. 

Yahya Khan never anticipated the Indian intervention. Religious motivations also complicate 

matters. Muslims of West Pakistan looked down 

their noses at the Hindus in Bengali. Their sense 

of innate superiority prompted indiscriminate 

violence and murder. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamic extremists have used religion 

to bolster their credibility and to discredit Westerners. Action and pledges by the Islamic State 

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to restore the caliphate 

have proven to be its most resonant message. 

It pays to understand that people of the same 

faith will often act vigorously to support fellow 

believers who confront political challenge or violence from those of other faiths.5

Napoleon in Spain, Italy, and Russia. As discussed 

in chapter 1, Napoleon Bonaparte displayed flashes 

of tactical genius. Political savvy marked his ascent 

to power, yet he was erratic and rarely strategic 

except at the tactical level. He turned in his best 

performances directing smaller armies, such as at 

34 | Chapter 3
the Battle of Austerlitz, where line of sight enabled 

him to control maneuver and firepower. He had a 

strong grasp on the power of communication strategy and information warfare, however. His battle 

campaigns in Italy at the end of the eighteenth century were aimed primarily at building his image 

as a hero and the savior of French fortunes.6

 That 

approach and effective networking paved his way 

to becoming first consul and later emperor.

However, Napoleon failed to think long term or 

within a grand strategic framework. His posture 

of humility at home was seldom on display in Italy. Professing to be a liberator, he reigned over a 

repressed population like a monarch while looting 

and pillaging. His failure to align actions and propaganda led to uprisings in 1806 that undercut the 

French position.7

He lacked sound strategic reason to invade 

Spain or to oust Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, 

with whom he had postured an alliance. Napoleon 

substituted one form of authoritarian rule for another. This ploy backfired and demonstrated what 

happens when strategy conflicts with a target audience’s aspirations and desires. The Spanish peninsular campaign (1808 – 14), as well as Napoleon’s 

campaigns in Italy and Russia, offer instructive 

lessons.

Lessons: 

1. Avoid hubris in evaluating the strategic situation. Napoleon started a war without understanding how the Spanish would react. Their 

hostility was immediate. Historian Frank 

McLynn notes that “even those sympathetic 

to the Emperor concede that his Spanish policy was one of his greatest errors.”8

 Bonaparte 

blamed advisors for misleading him about 

Spanish opinion but proceeded to wade into 

a morass that drove a wedge between himself 

and core political supporters. Napoleon was 

on a “downhill slide towards ultimate disaster” beginning in May 1808.9

Napoleon’s experience is instructive. His 

military challenges paralleled some that Coalition forces confronted in Iraq and that may 

crop up in future confrontations or conflicts. 

In Iraq, some Iraqis sided with the United 

States, hoping to move Iraq to peace and stability. Others remained aloof and focused 

on preserving their own safety. Many Iraqis 

viewed al-Qaeda as foreigners and the Americans with open hostility.10 In Spain, Napoleon deposed Charles IV and installed his 

own inept, corrupt brother, Joseph Bonaparte, who was named King Joseph I of Spain. 

Joseph enjoyed support from Afrancesados

(the “Francophiles”). But most Spaniards remained aloof. The Spanish guerrillas who opposed Napoleon achieved historical fame. 

Though they never numbered more than 

50,000, they attacked the French ruthlessly.11

McLynn has described the guerrillas as “the 

rock on which Napoleon’s Spanish adventure foundered.”12 Romanticized as freedom 

fighters, “mostly they were old-style bandit 

chiefs whose activities were legitimated by 

the struggle for Ferdinand.”13

Al-Qaeda beheaded prisoners and tortured them. The Spanish guerrillas skinned 

French captives alive, placed them between 

wooden boards and sawed them in half, 

plucked out eyes, and, according to one 

account, even boiled a French general alive. 

The French took hostages, summarily executed priests and captives, wiped out the 

population of Saliente, raped women, and 

smashed the heads of babies against walls. 

Employing a tactic unlikely to win hearts and 

minds, General Jean-Marie-Pierre Doursenne 

Know Your Enemy | 35
kept the bodies of three guerrillas hanging 

outside his window as a warning of what 

would happen to those opposing the French.14

History often rhymes. 

2. Grasp the role of religion. In both Iraq and 

the Peninsular War, religion played a key 

role in information warfare and attests to its 

influence. Al-Qaeda denounced the Coalition forces as infidels and foreign occupiers. 

No less vehement about Napoleon’s occupation of Spain, the Spanish Roman Catholic Church declared the French to be “former 

Christians and modern heretics” and pronounced that killing a Frenchman was no 

greater sin than killing an animal.15

3. Know when to fold. The French excited such 

popular hostility that the British saw a target of opportunity and intervened in 1808. 

Napoleon should have understood that the 

war in Spain was a loser and withdrawn his 

army. Instead, perhaps fearing loss of prestige, he simply distanced himself from the 

campaign.16 His decision compounded the 

difficulties confronting France in Spain and 

led to its defeat there. The Spanish were not 

going to yield to French hegemony, and, 

aided by the British under the leadership of 

Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, France became bogged down in a bloody, 

unwinnable war. Distracted by conflicts on 

other fronts and blinded by arrogance, Napoleon ignored ground realities and did not recognize the futility of pursuing an ill-judged 

invasion. It underscored his weakness as a 

grand strategist.

4. Understand the power of nationalism. During 

the 1948 – 50 insurgency in Malaya, the British 

made nationalism work for them in defeating 

a Communist insurgency led by Chin Ping, 

who had been Britain’s most trusted guerrilla 

in fighting the Japanese. The Masses’ Movement reached into most towns and villages. 

The flaw that the British exploited was that 

few Malaysians were in the Malayan National 

Liberation Army. It was almost entirely Chinese, many of whom were unwelcome squatters. The British embarked on a resettlement 

program that moved half a million Chinese 

to protected villages. Police work interdicted 

supply to guerrillas through difficult jungle 

terrain. Led by Lieutenant General Sir Harold 

Biggs, the British forged an “us versus them” 

narrative. It was well conceived and executed, 

and it paid off, capitalizing on nationalism and 

antiforeigner sentiments to discredit, isolate, 

and defeat the Communists.17

In contrast, Napoleon’s behavior caused 

Spanish nationalism to work against him; the 

Spanish monarchy may not have inspired 

strong devotion, but Napoleon’s invasion and 

the manner of the French occupation ensured 

a debacle. Some saw in Spanish nationalism 

a rebellion against a foreign occupier driven by a message of “us versus them” that 

trumped Napoleon’s suggestion that he had 

come as an ally to help Spain fight the Portuguese. Nothing could detract from his forcing 

Charles IV and his heir to abdicate in favor of 

Napoleon’s brother. 

Similarly, as discussed above, al-Qaeda 

in Iraq undercut its appeal by seeking to impose its version of Islamic life on Muslims 

who opposed what that life meant to them. 

That al-Qaeda was led by and mobilized 

non-Iraqis who dealt arrogantly with the 

tribes in al-Anbar enabled U.S. Marines to 

exploit Iraqi hostility to forge bonds of trust 

and effective alliances.

36 | Chapter 3
5. Recognize a losing cause. Napoleon’s Spanish morass was insignificant compared to his 

Russian catastrophe. Aside from his strategic 

stupidity in launching a major new war on 

the other side of Europe while struggling in 

Spain, the Russian campaign affirms the cost 

of failing to think things through. Militarily, 

the 1812 Russian fiasco is depressing even to 

read about. Napoleon planned poorly and 

had inadequate logistics, an inept military 

strategy, and incompetent military leadership. Films portray the Russians as wily adversaries who capitalized on a harsh winter 

to destroy Napoleon, when actually, the invasion went wrong from the start.18

His communication strategy was equally 

flawed. McLynn observes that, typically, Napoleon positioned his invasion as a crusade 

for liberty. But that required aligning his rhetoric with action: giving Poland its independence and the Russian serfs their freedom.19

The thought seems never to have seriously 

crossed his mind, and he paid the price. 

Napoleon’s arrogance drove his mindset. He cheerfully ousted Charles IV from 

his throne and substituted his brother as the 

new ruler and never stopped to ask himself 

how the Spanish might respond to his imperialism, or to show that the new leadership 

he ordained might be a change that served 

the interests of the Spanish. It is not clear that 

any logical argument would have enabled 

the French, who executed their operations 

and tactics with brutality and arrogance, to 

overcome Spanish nationalism. But having 

embarked on that conflict, he would have 

benefited by asking hard questions such as 

what success would look like and what was 

plausibly achievable. Napoleon did not think 

that way. He focused on winning battles, not 

winning over continents.

Modern Examples

America and Iraq. Your ability to accurately identify and understand your enemy can tip the balance 

between victory and defeat, a point excellently 

illustrated by the two battles for Fallujah, Iraq, 

fought in April and November 2004. It is worth 

looking at these battles closely and drawing lessons. 

Discussing Americans in Baghdad’s Green 

Zone, Larry Diamond, advisor to National Security 

Advisor Condoleezza Rice, concluded that Americans were constrained by a myopic world view 

that focused on Western ideas or beliefs. Journalist 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran reports in detail on the strategic awkwardness of a U.S.-led effort that failed to 

consider Iraqi perspectives. He eviscerates Western 

leadership that did not understand the political, 

cultural, or social dynamics of Iraq.20

The most glaring example of blindness was 

arguably Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 

head Paul Bremer’s decision right after arriving 

in Iraq to disband the Iraqi Army and ban members of the Baath Party from holding jobs. The ban 

included school teachers and lower-ranking civil 

servants who had been forced to join the party for 

political reasons.21 Those individuals and their families needed their jobs to survive. Most had anticipated that the Iraqi Army and Baath Party would 

continue to function to some extent to maintain 

order in the society. Criminals would be purged 

but the organizations had to be viable to maintain 

stability. Bremer ignored the reality that his actions 

would help create a reservoir of alienated Iraqis 

who joined and fueled the insurgency.

The al-Anbar Tribes: The prize for blindness in 

discerning tribal culture in al-Anbar Province in 

Know Your Enemy | 37
western Iraq is a split decision between Bremer and 

terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In his excellent book, The Marines Take Anbar, scholar Richard 

Shultz examines the cost that both sides paid for 

their ignorance during the first battle, in April 2004.

Bremer showed neither a comprehension of the 

importance of Sunni tribes in al-Anbar Province 

as a center of gravity there, nor did he appear to 

grasp their political/social dynamics. Shultz argues 

that the “central U.S. goal should have been to 

keep them [Sunnis] out of the hands of both the 

former regime elements and the Salafi jihadists.”22

In his view, officials were more interested in transforming Iraq than stabilizing it. There was scant 

understanding of a variety of elements, including: 

1) tribal history and what that history meant to 

the al-Anbar tribes, who were Sunni; 2) the fear 

of a Shia revenge campaign; 3) their demand for 

respect, a value they thought abused by American 

tactics of kicking in the doors of houses; 4) their 

worldview, which saw Americans as invaders and 

occupiers, and a historical narrative that demanded 

defiance; 5) the centrality of honor in their code of 

values; 6) the notion of collective duty to a tribe 

rather than individual right; 7) the salience of 

religion; 8) the need to demonstrate manliness in 

a male-dominated society; 9) the identities of key 

political actors and how they operated; 10) the need 

to be open to working with tribal leaders; and 11) 

a recognition that the tribes did not want to adopt 

Western ways or become like us.23

The U.S. Marines figured that out. Shultz 

details how they applied their learning, courage, 

and expertise in adapting to winning the fight in 

al-Anbar Province against al-Qaeda with a strong 

counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. It is worth 

recounting some key points that Shultz brings 

out; his book is important reading for any servicemember entering a theater of operation.

Shultz points out that the Marines have a culture 

of learning and adapting in combat. They learned 

from hard experience in western Iraq. Despite problems caused by the rotation of units, commanders 

reached out to local Sunni leaders to forge common 

ground against a common enemy whose values and 

agenda were hostile to these Iraqis. They capitalized on the fears that Sunnis harbored of Shias—

whose population comprised a majority in Iraq and 

whom Saddam Hussein had brutally repressed—to 

offer partnership and security. The effort required 

was arduous, but eventually the Sunnis perceived 

the Americans as their hope for survival against the 

Shia rather than as their enemy. 

The Sunni tribes offered partnership in fighting al-Qaeda, to whom sheikhs were losing 

power and at whose hands they faced murder. 

Working closely together with Iraqis built trust. 

They opened mosques that al-Qaeda had closed. 

They exploited an egregious mistake in al-Qaeda’s 

strategic approach. In 2006, al-Qaeda announced 

that its goal was to build an Islamic State modeled 

on the austere tenets of Salafism. The Sunnis were 

devout Muslims—but not Salafists. They did not 

like what al-Qaeda stood for, much less its violence 

conducted against anyone who dissented from its 

strictures or authority.

That was bad enough. But al-Qaeda, comprised 

of many non-Iraqis, were arrogant. They felt 

superior and made no effort to hide that sentiment. They displayed ignorance of Iraqi culture 

and failed to show respect to local Sunnis, 

wounding pride and alienating locals. They also 

failed to understand that Iraqis believed in the 

value of revenge. Shultz cites the “Arabic rule 

of five,” which holds that “ ‘if you do something 

to someone, then five of his bloodline will try to 

attack you.’ Kill a sheik and the whole tribe will 

come after you.”24

38 | Chapter 3
Marines capitalized on al-Qaeda’s failure to 

offer security and a united front in defeating the 

terrorists and shielding Sunnis from Shias. This 

was classic COIN. The hard work paid off, using a 

clear build-and-hold approach rooted in an inkblot 

strategy that secured areas one place at a time.25

The Marines helped to train police, strengthening 

security that was provided by locals whom Sunnis 

knew and trusted. They increased the capability of 

the Iraqi Army, strengthening its ability to fight. 

Throughout this process, the Marines took pains 

to communicate that they would stand firmly with 

the Sunnis and stay with them. The Sunnis were 

not interested in friends for a day or a week. They 

wanted allies on whom they felt they could count 

for the long term. The Marines lived among the 

tribes, conducted patrols and joint operations, and 

step-by-step proved rather than merely asserted 

friendship and alliance.

What made the Marines special? In fairness, Bing 

West points out that the U.S. Army’s 82d Airborne 

Division, which preceded the Marines in al-Anbar, 

had made vigorous efforts to forge local ties only to 

be rebuffed.26 It is plausible that it took living under 

al-Qaeda’s brutal repression and coming to terms 

with the Sunnis’ loss of power in Iraq to motivate 

the tribes eventually to side with the Americans. 

But as a matter of strategy, Shultz’s view on what 

the strategy should have been makes sense.

Lesson: Changing behavior may require 

changing how a target audience sees itself.

In Iraq, once the tribes saw themselves as 

victims of a worse evil (al-Qaeda) than Americans (foreign, non-Muslim intruders), the 

Marines’ goal of forging an alliance became 

more plausible.

Zarqawi made the opposite mistake. He 

tried to impose an Islamic State modeled on 

Salafism on the Iraqis, who rejected the idea. 

When they resisted, he instituted a ruthless 

campaign of terror. His people beheaded and 

killed people, including police officers and 

tribal leaders. His people forced themselves 

into marriages with locals, held an unrealistic 

view of Iraqi jihadi, and considered themselves morally superior.27

On the other side of the coin, journalist Mark Urban notes that Zarqawi’s tactics 

were driven by an information strategy 

aimed at establishing himself. Zarqawi was 

a Jordanian criminal who went to Iraq, not 

a native Iraqi. He understood that Arabs 

would respond to sensationalism and that 

it would attract volunteers from Syria or 

Saudi Arabia.28 He achieved short-term gain 

but long-term loss. Zarqawi may or may not 

have inspired support through a strategy that 

focused violence on foreigners. The lesson is 

that short-term gains can prove costly when 

you fail to think through the long-term implications.

The Fallujah Battles: The Coalition victory in 

the second battle for Fallujah in November 2004 

turned heavily on understanding how insurgents 

there—including former Baath Party members, 

former members of Saddam Hussein’s army, and 

foreign jihadis—viewed propaganda and had 

employed it successfully during the first battle 

in April 2004.29 That understanding enabled Coalition forces to forge and execute a successful 

integrated information and kinetic strategy that 

defeated the insurgents and ended insurgent 

dominance of the city. The two battles for Fallujah 

offer important lessons. The strategies that both 

sides employed reveal much about how to judge 

the enemy and to anticipate its information strategy and counter with effective communication 

strategy.30

Know Your Enemy | 39
Lessons: 

1. Information, not kinetic warfare, may be what 

determines the outcome; do not underestimate the enemy. Insurgents won the first 

battle. They won partly by prevailing in information warfare.31

Four information challenges haunted the 

Coalition. First, the city was full of civilians 

who refused to be, or could not be, forced to 

evacuate.32 That helped insurgents use civilians to drive a wedge between themselves 

and the Coalition. Second, there was no information campaign to mitigate reports about 

civilian casualties among Iraqi and international public opinion.33 Third, although the 

CPA developed a public affairs plan to support the offensive, it did not address the Arab 

press.34 Fourth, there was no strategic plan 

for Fallujah that specified what seizure of 

the city would accomplish.35 Coalition commander Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, 

Paul Bremer, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld supported heavy use of military action, despite objections from the U.S. 

Marines on the ground, who protested that 

it was the wrong strategy.36

An attack was ordered, and the Marines 

attacked. Insurgents responded with adroit 

use of propaganda to discredit the Coalition. 

The tactics were devious but effective. 

Al-Qaeda claimed U.S. troops used nightvision goggles to see through women’s 

clothing.37 They showed dead babies on Al 

Jazeera at the main hospital, alleging they 

were victims of air strikes. Absent Western 

media to provide factual reporting, the 

insurgent narrative dominated the media.38

At the same time, insurgents appropriated the 

hospital as a command and control center—a 

place from which to spread false propaganda 

that they knew Coalition forces were likely 

to bombard.39

Violence ginned up insurgent recruiting 

among the religiously inclined and former 

Baathist elements threw in their support. 

Across Iraq, Iraqis perceived Coalition offensives as an attack on their whole society.40

Dexter Filkins reported that the insurgents undid every U.S. effort made to win 

over Fallujah residents. They blew up a brick 

factory the Americans had repaired. They 

shot teachers from a school the Americans 

had painted. Troops offered candy to children, but the children believed propaganda 

claims that it was poisoned.41 Insurgents 

placed teddy bears among the rubble before 

photographers showed up to convey the false 

impression that Americans were indiscriminately firing at civilians.42 Doctors declared 

hundreds had been killed in just a few days 

of battle, while children told the press that 

their parents had been gunned down. Many 

Sunnis sided with the insurgents.43 Al Jazeera 

aired stock footage from previous battles and 

claimed it was from the current battle.44

Insurgents vigorously conveyed and 

distributed the message that the April attack 

was an act of revenge by Marines for their 

casualties with the goal of punishing innocents for the actions of a few and that it killed 

civilians. 

General McChrystal noted that Arab 

satellite television fostered the perception 

that Americans were committing atrocities, using artillery to hit mosques or wipe 

out whole families. American newspapers 

repeated the claims.45 Across Iraq, insurgents 

showed their fighters photos of Abu Ghraib 

40 | Chapter 3
prison and warned how badly they would be 

treated if captured.46

2. Communication strategy fails when lacking local key stakeholder support. The Coalition obtained no buy-in for the attack from 

key players. They did not present a credible rationale that justified the attack to Iraqis 

or persuaded them it was being conducted 

in a reasonable, realistic way. General Petraeus consistently made the point that ultimate success depends on local leaders and 

that cultivating Iraqi leaders who were seen 

by their people as legitimate was vital to 

success.47

His grasp of that political necessity was 

central to his success in commanding the 

2007 surge. Success eluded Lieutenant General Sanchez, Bremer, and U.S. Central Command commander General John P. Abizaid, 

who overruled Marine protests. Their mistake was costly.

Within days after the battle commenced, 

the Association of Muslim Scholars called 

for a general strike and demanded the United States get out of Iraq. The Iraqi Governing Council protested the action, and the 

Iraqi leader Adnan Pachachi denounced 

the attack as illegal.48 Pressure applied from 

many directions spooked the top U.S. leadership — including President Bush (who, 

unforgivably, was never advised of the Marines’ firm contrary view)—into backing 

down from an achievable victory.

If your own people or allies fail to support what you stand for, you are probably 

going to fail.

3. Communication strategy must look at the 

broader impact of tactics. Complicating 

matters, Bremer and Sanchez did not adequately anticipate the wider national impact 

of the battle on attitudes, opinions, and behavior.49 Result: although Coalition forces 

would have prevailed militarily, the political 

blowback persuaded Bremer to call off the 

attack.

4. Failure to create a foundation for an information strategy unleashes consequences 

not easily reversed. The CPA did not have a 

strategy for addressing and embracing Arab 

media, including its bias or inaccuracies. As 

Marines attacked and Western media outlets 

feared capture and/or beheading, their television networks pooled video shot in Fallujah by Arab cameramen approved for entry 

into the city by the insurgents. Predictably, 

the pictures depicted destruction and death 

at the hands of the Marines.50 

Other Arab media outlets unrelentingly 

broadcast the “plight” of civilians in Fallujah. 

The internet amplified the message of Marine callousness and sped protests around the 

world on a minute-by-minute basis. During 

April 2004, a Google search on the term Fallujah jumped from 700 to 175,000 stories, many 

critical of Marines. Between 4 April and 13 

April, the CPA documented 34 Al Jazeera stories that distorted or misreported events.51

Failure to incorporate the Arab media 

into its communications strategy neutered 

core U.S. messaging, while the volume alone 

validated insurgent messages. The mass of 

anti-American stories inspired the mistaken conclusion that the insurgent propaganda was factual. 

Credibility drove national and regional 

support for the insurgents. This was achieved 

not just in the media, but in fiery sermons delivered at Sunni mosques. Clerical endorseKnow Your Enemy | 41
ment spurred spontaneous support and 

mobilization of new fighters. The insurgents 

boosted their credibility by labeling their resistance an intifada, associating themselves 

with the Palestinians and their occupation 

of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whose situation aroused empathy among many Iraqis. 

Lack of a strong U.S. narrative elevated insurgent credibility. Enemy propaganda that 

goes unchallenged is more likely to be—and 

here was—accepted as believable, credible, 

and persuasive. 

Failure to consider the agenda and motives of the Arab media outlets with access to a 

battle produced an inevitable problem. Qatarbased Al Jazeera and Saudi-based Al Arabiya are both Sunni and both supported their 

Sunni brothers in Iraq. Such sectarian positions naturally influenced such media outlets 

to favor the insurgent narrative. Jack Guy 

worked as a senior information operations 

advisor on the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 

Kabul in 2010. According to Guy, “That happened because we had not done our Target 

Audience Analysis at the command level. As 

a broader lesson looking to the future, too 

many Political Advisers (POLADS) are simply not schooled in this.”52

The second battle for Fallujah produced many 

other lessons as well.

Lessons: 

1. Information operations and public affairs 

worked jointly to ensure message discipline, 

consistency, and efficiency. The role of public affairs is much debated. The author’s 

work, Persuasion and Power (2012), discusses the hypocrisy of many public affairs officers in espousing the view that their role is 

to “inform” and not to “influence.” Actually, 

they engage actively—and correctly—in influencing audiences.53

Army General Mark T. Kimmitt’s adroit 

handling of the Abu Ghraib fiasco was a masterpiece of political campaign management. 

During the Iraq war, a CBS Sixty Minutes episode broadcast allegations that U.S. military 

personnel had abused the human rights of 

Iraqi prisoners.54 The events transpired between November 2003 and March 2004. A report to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

of an investigation led by Major General 

Antonio M. Taguba found that the U.S. Army’s 800th Military Police Brigade personnel were guilty of punching, slapping, and 

kicking detainees; jumping on their bare feet; 

videotaping naked male and female detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in sexually 

explicit positions for photographing; forcing 

groups of male detainees to masturbate while 

being photographed or videotaped; positioning a naked detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head and attaching wires to his 

fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electronic 

torture; using military working dogs without 

muzzles to intimidate and frighten detainees; 

and other abuses.55

The revelations and accusations were a 

political debacle for the United States, whose 

ability to operate in theater depends on seizing and maintaining the moral high ground 

and communicating that it conducts operations in a manner consistent with American 

values that respect the dignity of human beings and fair play.56 The military removed 

Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski of duty 

as the commander at the prison.

42 | Chapter 3
Kimmitt got the facts, developed a narrative, and then reached out to the media proactively to disseminate the narrative. He got 

ahead of the story and made it clear that the 

United States would handle the controversy 

with transparency and that the matter was an 

aberration and did not reflect American values. In a 28 April 2004 statement, he praised 

a U.S. soldier for coming forward with the 

facts and placed matters in context:

That soldier came forward. He presented 

evidence to his chain of command. The 

chain of command brought it forward. 

General Sanchez, upon hearing it, immediately started a criminal investigation. . 

. . That outcome . . . has resulted in criminal charges being levied against six soldiers. . . . [This behavior] does not reflect 

the vast majority of coalition soldiers, 

vast majority of American soldiers that 

are operating out of Abu Ghraib Prison. 

We have had thousands, tens of thousands of detainees in Abu Ghraib. We 

have understood that a very, very small 

number were involved in this incident, 

and of the hundreds and hundreds of 

guards they have out there, a small number were involved in the guards.

I’m not going to stand up here and 

make excuses for those soldiers. I’m not 

going to stand up here and apologize for 

those soldiers. If what they did is proven 

in a court of law, that is incompatible 

with the values we stand for as a professional military force and its values that 

we don’t stand for as human beings.57

As Kimmitt promised, the military 

prosecuted and imprisoned offending soldiers and discharged them from the Army. 

Confluently, Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld testified before House and Senate committees and underscored the message that conduct at Abu Ghraib had been 

“fundamentally un-American.”58 The U.S. 

military ensured that the events were placed 

in context, as did Rumsfeld. Military police 

lacked proper training, for which there was 

no excuse. Still, they confronted a difficult, 

hazardous situation. Documents revealed 

that inmates vomited after meals, sharpened 

toothbrushes into makeshift weapons, and 

initiated attacks on soldiers and riots. One 

detainee regularly covered himself in his 

own feces.59

Abu Ghraib seriously damaged U.S. 

credibility everywhere. But instead of burying the facts and lying about them, prompt 

action to get the facts out and ensure that audiences heard all sides of events limited the 

damage.

In contrast, the Jessica D. Lynch fiasco 

was a poorly handled mess, but it aimed 

at influencing audience response. Private 

First Class Lynch was a soldier fighting in 

the 2003 Iraq War who went missing in action and was presumed a prisoner of war 

(POW). Actually, she sustained injuries when 

her Humvee crashed after her convoy had 

taken several wrong turns. Her gun jammed 

with sand, so she could not use it. She was 

taken prisoner and taken to a hospital in 

an-Nasiriyah, where Iraqi doctors and nurses treated her well. An alarmed U.S. military 

dispatched special operations personnel to 

rescue her from what they surmised were 

life-threatening circumstances. They stormed 

the hospital at which she was recuperating 

Know Your Enemy | 43
and in no danger, a point she made in dismissing any talk that she had been a hero.60

Public affairs personnel had glorified the incident to the media as an example of heroic 

rescue by courageous operators worthy of an 

action thriller. The story backfired when the 

truth came out, and public affairs personnel 

looked silly.

The point—for those who think that in 

practice the Pentagon treats public affairs as 

an exercise in putting out just the facts rather 

than capitalizing on perceived opportunities 

to drive narratives, themes, and messages—

is this: in both the Abu Ghraib scandal and 

Lynch episode, public affairs officers acted to 

influence audiences as surely as any psychological operation or political campaign. 

Here is the reality: public affairs have 

both the right and the duty to influence target audiences. Communication consultants 

and directors for political figures and private companies understand that. Respect 

the precept that truth is our ally. The media’s 

role is to provide a channel through which 

to reach target audiences. However, government makes policy, and its servants should 

explain, defend, and advance the policy. If 

unable to competently perform that job, the 

solution is to fire the incompetents and hire 

public affairs officers who can do it properly 

and effectively. 

During the November 2004 Fallujah battle, the commanders understood that communications needed to be tightly organized. 

The public affairs and psychological operations teams were unified. It was a smart decision that drew misplaced criticism from those 

who did not understand communication 

strategy or information warfare. 

Bottom line: do not allow Pentagon definitions or bureaucratic turf sensitivity to 

obstruct good communication strategy.

2. Anticipate how kinetic and information activity will resonate locally where an operation 

unfolds, as well as more broadly. Commanders understood that winning the battle 

required securing political support nationally 

among insiders and the Iraqi public, within 

the international community, among partners, and among local citizens affected by the 

fighting. This time they defined the goals of 

the operation and calibrated kinetic action to 

satisfy that requirement. There is no formula, but the care taken to address each target 

audience and to satisfy its concerns helped 

achieve victory.

3. The language used to define operations and 

actions matters. Originally, commanders 

named the second battle Operation Phantom 

Fury. Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi argued 

that the operation needed a name that would 

resonate politically with the population. It was 

renamed al-Fajr (New Dawn). The aim, Allawi 

said, was to seize and maintain control of the 

narrative in the media coverage throughout 

the Arab world and throughout the country, 

so that everyone would understand what the 

Coalition was doing, why it was necessary, 

and why Iraqis benefitted from the operation. 

New dawn was a phrase more likely to resonate with Iraqis. It helped drive the message 

that ejecting insurgents from Fallujah would 

produce a better quality of life and security 

inside the city, free from the fear of terrorists.61

Although the second battle elicited a national 

blowback, that situation stemmed from earlier 

strategic failures. Allawi made a good suggestion and commanders wisely heeded it. 

44 | Chapter 3
Information operations expert Jack Guy, 

who has advised on the ground in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, adds this observation: “Locals 

always have good ideas (to a point) that 

are often better than the American-Iraqis, 

American-Afghans, or American-other nationals we hire for specific situations. The 

caveat is that too much time in the U.S. may 

deteriorate their sense of home and render 

their counsel counterproductive.”62

4. Inspire support from local allies by showing 

them you will win. Coalition forces needed 

Iraqi forces to participate in the operation. 

Concerns abounded about how they would 

perform. Coalition forces addressed that 

partly by taking pains to show their Iraqi 

allies the extent of Coalition forces and logistical support. It proved a huge confidence 

builder.63 The lesson is that one should never presume that allied units will believe that 

siding with U.S. forces will help ensure victory. Take action that inspires moral will and 

loyalty.64 Show that playing on your team 

will pay off.65

5. Use local forces when possible in attacking 

local, high-visibility, and sensitive targets.

Giving the lead to local units fighting in the 

cause of their own nation and for their own 

people is smart.66 They know their culture, 

their people, what is important to them, how 

to best communicate effectively with them, 

and they speak the same language as fellow 

citizens. From the United States’ standpoint, 

if we are helping people to protect their nation, they ought to bear responsibility for 

taking the lead in providing such protection.

6. Encourage local leaders to take the lead and 

do the talking. Allawi was wisely designated 

as the key spokesperson. General Petraeus 

has stressed the importance of giving the lead 

to local leaders. Quoting T. E. Lawrence, he 

noted: “Better the Arabs do it tolerably than 

that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and 

you are to help them, not win it for them.”67

Allawi was better than tolerably good during 

this battle. He was tough, courageous, talented, and effective.

7. Understand foreign populations’ ability to 

see through a communication ruse. Novelist Louis L’Amour wrote that just because 

someone does not speak English does not 

mean they do not have good ideas.68 In other 

words, do not confuse failure to speak English well for stupidity. 

In Afghanistan, the Marines in Nawa 

District positioned District Governor Abdul 

Manaf to front for them in dispensing aid. 

Manaf was more than happy to play the role, 

which made him seem big and important. 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported that this action thrilled the Marines and USAID, who 

thought the Afghan government was trying 

to help them.69 Locals saw through the ruse, 

and it undercut the credibility of the effort. 

The lesson is obvious: do not think that people who talk, walk, dress, act, and look differently are fools.

8. Achieving information dominance is critical. Winning the information battle was a 

make-or-break issue in Fallujah. Commanders thought in terms of an information operations threshold: the point at which enemy 

information-based operations aimed at international, regional, and local media coverage 

might undermine the Coalition forces’ ability to conduct unconstrained combat operations.70 Coalition forces embedded more than 

90 journalists representing more than 60 meKnow Your Enemy | 45
dia outlets to help disseminate and drive the 

Coalition narrative, themes, and messages.

Coalition forces worked vigorously to 

communicate that they would make every 

effort to avoid civilian casualties. One tactic 

was to frighten civilians into leaving while 

reminding them they owed the insurgents 

no loyalty.71 Coalition forces understood that 

al-Qaeda would stoop to any level to accuse 

them of firing at civilians, even though, as in 

Afghanistan, they never hesitated to hide in 

buildings inhabited by women and children 

or use them for shields.72

9. Deny the enemy opportunities to spread 

false propaganda. Coalition forces moved at 

the outset of the operation to seize the hospital, denying insurgents a second opportunity to use it as a center for its information 

warfare.73

10. Employ combat cameras to obtain footage 

that supports and helps drive your narrative 

factually. In conducting the operation to seize 

the hospital, Coalition forces deployed one 

combat cameraman and two advisors outfitted with helmet-mounted video cameras 

to tape the operation. The helmet-mounted 

video was used to feed the media. Correspondent Kirk Spitzer was embedded with 

the force, providing a third-party source to 

footage. He broadcasted video clips via satellite to the CBS news facility in London for 

rebroadcast by CBS in New York. Other combat cameramen captured other aspects of the 

action.74 These efforts ensured that the images of the action communicated through the 

media put out the facts, not distorted enemy 

propaganda.

11. Show the media the torture houses used 

by the enemy and characterize them with 

language that drives the message about 

enemy barbarity. Coalition forces showed 

embedded media the torture, slaughter, and 

execution houses, and consciously employed 

that language to characterize what the media 

was seeing.75 That helped define the players, 

justify Coalition action, maintain the high 

ground, and discredit the enemy. This media 

blitz was coordinated tactically, operationally, and strategically—meeting the definition 

of a good information operation.

12. Let the media, not the government, tell the 

story. U.S. government sources—military 

and civilian—are less credible to audiences 

than the media. Provide the media with the 

information, characterize it in a manner consistent with desired narrative, story, theme, 

and message—then let the media tell it. The 

identity of the messenger makes a difference, 

as audiences judge credibility. The media is 

more credible than any government or army. 

Coalition forces did that well.76

13. Develop a message that resonates with civilian populations affected by an operation.

Civilians did not want better water plants, 

bland assurances about a better life, or money. They wanted jobs. Messaging directed 

toward Iraqis stressed that aligning with the 

Coalition would produce government that 

created good jobs.77

14. Mount a campaign to secure buy-in from local populations as well as regional leaders.

Allawi helped muster support from regional 

leaders such as Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah II while 

informing Iraqis about the impending assault. He made clear the target was terrorists, 

not the people of Fallujah. He made clear that 

nonmilitary options had been exhausted.78

46 | Chapter 3
15. Avoid the trap of using enemy brutality as 

the justification for kinetic action; focus on 

positive benefits to civilians. In Fallujah, 

some pressed for messaging about insurgent atrocities against locals. However, that 

message was not credible, although it might 

be in a different situation. In Fallujah, the 

U.S. military felt that showing pictures of 

dead civilians could backfire. People might 

see it as proof of Coalition brutality, not insurgent terrorism.79 The key here is to let local (host nation) media play an active role in 

messaging.

16. Advise civilians how to protect themselves.

During the first battle, civilians filled Fallujah. 

During the second, Coalition forces caused 

most to evacuate. Those who remained behind were advised to stay out of the way and 

off the streets, not to call out, and not to carry 

a weapon. Painstaking efforts were made to 

avoid civilian casualties.80

Civilian casualties are a challenge in any 

conflict. Major General Richard F. Natonski and other commanders understood that. 

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing 

West — a former U.S. Marine — dwells on it 

incisively in The Wrong War, a controversial, 

unsparing critique of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and the doctrine of COIN.81 West 

argues that “war required agonizing decisions between protecting your own soldiers 

and placing civilians at risk.”82 In Afghanistan, West argues, civilian casualties alienated a population that was happy to accept 

U.S. aid and in many ways became dependent on it. Yet, it declined to support U.S. or 

ISAF troops and often turned on them, no 

matter how hard they worked to help and 

protect the local population.

Dexter Filkins reported the same thing 

about Iraq.83 Soon after Saddam Hussein 

was ousted, Filkins found himself with Ali, 

a medical assistant who had been hauling 

dead and wounded from buildings that 

the Americans had bombed. “I saw how 

the Americans bombed our civilians with 

my own eyes,” he quotes Ali as saying. Ali 

told him that had “forfeited his support” 

for Americans, despite having no love for 

Saddam.84

It bears noting that COIN supporters 

suggest that West misinterprets the doctrine, which they argue is about control and 

convincing the population that you are going to win rather than winning hearts and 

minds, as they feel West believes.85

17. Look for ways to instill paranoia among the 

enemy. Action, not just words, is integral 

to communication strategy. Coalition forces heightened enemy paranoia by killing 

high-value targets. Any action that heightens anxiety among the enemy may interfere 

with its judgment and cause it to commit 

mistakes. Uncertainty and fear are critical to 

instilling paranoia.

18. Evaluate how local, tactical victory may affect a national narrative and its impact on 

national strategy. Coalition forces scored 

a decisive military victory, but this success 

provoked a national backlash. Sunnis saw 

in the sacking of Fallujah a new narrative of 

American brutality and occupation that justified national resistance.86 In the aftermath, 

violence in Iraq intensified; the challenge 

grew harder, not easier.

Afghanistan. At the time of this writing, the United States and the Taliban have signed a peace 

Know Your Enemy | 47
accord. Nevertheless, understanding how groups 

like the Taliban function is essential in countering 

such enemies. The Taliban uses many tactics, including print, to communicate its messages. They 

warn against cooperating with the Afghan government or the Coalition. They employ videos to 

influence the media and internet users. They also 

use traffic stops to help identify collaborators 

and intimidate potential government allies. Killing government officials and allies gives teeth to 

Taliban communications and illustrates the confluence of words and action in forging communication strategy. Jack Guy makes the point that “the 

Taliban plan their activities for the effects they 

want to achieve and will commit forces against 

overwhelming odds to do so. They intuitively understand information warfare.”87

Somalia. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid advised General Anthony C. Zinni that before visiting tribal leaders he should arrive with food and 

medicine rather than guns, so that the first time 

they see U.S. forces they associate Americans as 

different from other militias and gun toters. Do 

not surprise anyone, he warned; prepare the way. 

Surprise visits by armed groups can communicate 

intent for conflict in an area in which a party can 

be a friend one day and an enemy the next. General Zinni heeded his advice. Aidid’s point about 

friends becoming enemies was borne out when 

Task Force Ranger was sent to arrest him later 

on, igniting the incident referred to as Blackhawk 

Down. The point is to understand the culture and 

the agendas of a culture’s leader. Agendas shift. 

When it served Aidid to be friendly with Americans, he showed friendship. When his agenda 

clashed with the American agenda, he did not 

hesitate to shift posture and proved himself an 

able adversary.

Endnotes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Seattle, WA: 

AmazonClassics, 2017), loc. 727 of 3205, Kindle.

2. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1963), 88, as quoted in 

Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 

3d ed. (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005), 36.

3. See Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 60–69.

4. “Case Study: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971,” Bangladesh—Audacity of Hope (blog), 26 December 2013; and Robert Payne, Massacre: The Tragedy at Bangla Desh and the 

Phenomenon of Mass Slaughter throughout History (London: 

Macmillan, 1973), 48. See also James P. Farwell, The Pakistan 

Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination and Instability (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011).

5. See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military 

(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2005), 58, 62, 66; Tariq Ali, The Duel: On the Flight 

Path of American Power (New York: Scribner, 2008), 77; and 

Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron, 54 – 57.

6. See Dwyer, Napoleon.

7. David A. Bell, The First Total War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 270–72.

8. Frank McLynn, Napoleon: A Biography (London: Jonathan 

Cape, 1997; Kindle ed., 2002) loc. 7800 of 15527, Kindle. 

9. McLynn, Napoleon, loc. 7827 of 15527, Kindle.

10. Bell, The First Total War, 284. 

11. Bell, The First Total War, 285. One should caution against 

simplifying a more complex strategic picture. Napoleon 

was at times adept in his use of information strategy. At 

other times, it eluded him, costing him dearly. Napoleon’s 

reputation as a commander rests on his erratic tactical brilliance, which shone brightly at battles such as Austerlitz 

and Friedland. Deeply flawed judgment proved a calamity 

in Russia, Spain, Egypt, Leipzig, and Waterloo and in his 

general inability to discipline and harness his impulses to 

48 | Chapter 3
Know Your Enemy | 49

conduct warfare. He was a poor strategist once he got beyond the tactical level and conducted warfare because he 

felt impelled to do so. He allowed his large, and largely 

useless, family to exploit his power for wealth and position. He was hit-and-miss in his selection of marshals, often 

seeming unable to distinguish those with exceptional ability, such as Louis-Charles-Antoine Desaix, Louis-Nicolas 

Davout, André Masséna, and Jean Lannes, from mediocrities such as Joachim Murat, Emmanuel de Grouchy, Michel 

Ney, and, arguably, Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult, although 

Soult has his defenders. See Peter Hayman, Soult: Napoleon’s 

Maligned Marshal (New York: Sterling, 1990). In a much earlier book, R. P. Dunn-Pattison agrees with Hayman. See R. 

P. Dunn-Pattison, Napoleon’s Marshals (London: Methuen, 

1909). Picking the right people to achieve your goals counts.

12. McLynn, Napoleon, loc. 8941 of 15527, Kindle.

13. McLynn, Napoleon, loc. 8953 of 15527, Kindle.

14. Bell, The First Total War, 290.

15. Bell, The First Total War, 287.

16. See McLynn, Napoleon, loc. 8878 of 15527, Kindle.

17. See Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), 139 – 42. Taber’s book is a classic study of 

guerrilla warfare. See also Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and 

Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (McLean, VA: 

Brassey’s, 1990).

18. At Austerlitz, Napoleon had about 85,000 soldiers. For his 

Russian campaign, he assembled 650,000 for his Grande 

Armée. A smaller army lent itself to tight discipline, rapid 

movement, and adroit maneuver tactics that enabled Napoleon to concentrate power at critical points. See Robert 

Asprey, The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: Basic 

Books, 2001); and McLynn, Napoleon. McLynn is incisive in 

deconstructing Napoleon’s triumphs and defeats.

19. McLynn, Napoleon, loc. 9927 of 15527, Kindle.

20. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside 

Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Knopf, 2006).

21. George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: 

Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). Bing West asserts that both 

the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

had the opportunity to object to Bremer’s decision but failed 

to follow through. See West, No True Glory, 24. Most reports 

suggest that the military on the ground in Iraq understood 

that Bremer was making the wrong decision and said so 

but were overruled.

22. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 27. The discussion on the 

tribes is drawn from Schultz’s analysis, 27 – 32, 37 – 38, 45. 

Shultz places part of the blame for missteps on Condoleeza 

Rice, as well, but Bremer was the one with authority on the 

ground to make decisions during his time there. Bremer evidently doubted the tribes would or could pose a challenge 

to central authority in Baghdad. Shultz, The Marines Take 

Anbar, 53. In No True Glory, Bing West reported that the 82d 

Airborne, which preceded the Marines in Anbar after the 

invasion, made vigorous overtures to local notables for help 

and conducted civil reconstruction such as building a soccer 

stadium that locals then trashed. He notes that 82d Airborne 

leaders complained that the CPA failed to deliver sufficient 

resources to get much done, a challenge complicated by the 

need to obtain congressional approval for releasing money. 

He cites as examples the idiotic requirements that instead 

of hiring local seamstresses to sew uniforms for Iraqis or 

acquiring vehicles for Iraqi police, competitive bids had to 

be taken within the United States. It was time-consuming 

and financially wasteful — and sent the wrong message to 

already skeptical audiences whose support the Coalition 

needed to win. 

23. In Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of 

the SAS and the Secret War in Iraq (London: Little, Brown, 

2011), 31, the author records one Iraqi’s reaction to American tactics: “We don’t like Saddam; he was a dictator. But 

the Americans, they handcuff us, they put us on the floor in 

front of our wives and children. It’s shameful for us.” See 

also West, No True Glory, 15.

24. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 136.

25. The term inkblot strategy refers to subduing a large hostile 

region with a relatively small military force. The occupying force establishes a number of small safe areas that are 

dispersed across the region and then pushes out, extending 

its control until eventually the spots join the way ink spots 

spread on a piece of paper. Historically, the inkblot strategy 

is associated with the Vietnam War. See Greg Mills, “Calibrating Inkspots: Filling Afghanistan’s Ungoverned Spaces,” RUSI Journal (August 2006).

26. West, No True Glory, chapter 3.

27. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 133, 136, 140, 148. Shultz 

provides an excellent analysis of al-Qaeda’s mistakes.

28. Urban, Task Force Black, 47.

29. There’s a debate about whether al-Qaeda in Iraq was there 

under that name.

30. Carter Malkasian of the Center for Naval Analyses has written incisively about the first battle. See Carter Malkasian, 

“Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle 

of Fallujah,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (June 2006): 

423 – 52, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600765843. Gen 

Stanley McChrystal has offered key insights on the challenge that the strategic situation there presented. See Gen 

Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New 

York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013). A team led by Dr. William 

Knarr of the Joint Special Operations University and by Maj 

Robert Castro conducted an intensive analysis for the Institute of Defense Analyses that examined both battles. See 

William Knarr et al., Seizing the Peninsula, a Vignette from The 

Battle for Fallujah: An Education and Training Resource Guide

(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011); Dr. 
William Knarr and Maj Robert Castro, Institute for Defense 

Analysis Non-Standard Document NS D-3787, Log H 09-

000669, “The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the Myth-buster,” 

May 2009, a short version of the following study; Dr. William Knarr and Maj Robert Castro with Dianne Fuller, The 

Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the Myth-Buster, IDA Paper P-4455

(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2009), the 

full study report; and transcripts of interviews with key participants in the Fallujah battles by Dr. William Knarr used to 

inform the aforementioned reports, provided to the author 

by Dr. Knarr, which are also available on DVD appendices to the printed reports. New York Times journalist Dexter 

Filkins has written an excellent first-hand account of his 

time in Iraq and Afghanistan and was present for the second battle. See Dexter Filkins, The Forever War (New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2008); and West, No True Glory. Comments 

on these battles and material from which the author extrapolated lessons draw on their superb scholarship. 

31. Important analogies: (1) Afghanistan. Andrew MacKay and 

Steve Tatham argue that in Afghanistan “the true asymmetry of the campaign is that the Taliban rely on 90 percent 

psychology and 10 percent force where we rely on 90 percent force and 10 percent psychology in an environment 

where perception is reality, memories are very long, and enemies are easily made.” In their view, the Taliban are waging 

a communications war and “understand that public opinion 

is probably the Achilles heel of the international community.” MacKay and Tatham, Behavioural Conflict, 57. (2) Bosnia. 

MacKay and Tatham incisively dissected how Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic used propaganda to wage war 

against NATO forces. Milosevic believed he confronted a 

bombing war and a media war and resolved to win the latter. He geared up a well-oiled propaganda machine to do 

so. He silenced hostile journalists and independent media. 

State-controlled broadcasts referred to NATO as criminals. 

It broadcast footage and news reports alleging that NATO 

was bombing hospitals and causing ecological disasters. Milosevic exploited centuries of ethnic tension, old folk tales, 

and stirring poetry to drive the message that Kosovo had 

always been and would remain Serbian. He stoked Serbs 

with images that equated NATO with Nazis, and Serbian 

ministers entered internet chat rooms to drive Milosevic’s 

messages. MacKay and Tatham, Behavioural Conflict, 29–31.

32. In interviewing LtGen John Sattler, Malkasian suggested 

that all but 5,000 out of 250,000 civilians were evacuated. 

See LtGen John Sattler, commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Dr. Carter Malkasian, CNA, interview with 

Bill Knarr and Maj Robert Castro, 6 December 2005, 14, 

transcript provided to author by Dr. Knarr, hereafter Sattler interview. Bing West has reported that the insurgents 

consisted of a hard core of 20 leaders, controlling about 600 

“tough fighters plus a thousand part-timers who would 

grab a weapon to defend the city of Islam or whatever 

someone told an impoverished, impressionable teenager 

to defend.” West, No True Glory, 63.

33. MajGen Richard Natonski, commander, 1st Marine Division, 

LtCol Michael McCarthy et al., interview with Bill Knarr, 

9 December 2005, 28, transcript provided to author by Dr. 

Knarr, hereafter Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview. McCarthy served as the fire support coordination officer in the 

Civil-Military Operations Center. Natonski and McCarthy 

et al. interview, 5. To understand how media can dramatically portray events, view Jeremy Scahill’s 2013 documentary 

Dirty Wars. The national security correspondent for The Nation, Scahill offers withering criticism and skepticism about 

America’s approach to fighting violent extremism. This author strongly disagrees with his conclusions, which treat an 

operational error in Afghanistan causing civilian casualties, 

for which the U.S. apologized, as a dark military conspiracy; 

absurdly infer that the decision to back Somali warlords, 

which was made by civilian policy makers in Washington, 

was made by the military or other government personnel; 

and argue that killing al-Qaeda volunteer Anwar al-Awlaki 

(who also placed his son in harm’s way) was wrong. The implication that SOF forces are cavalier in inflicting casualties 

among civilians is notably egregious. Actually, a study of 

2,245 counterterrorism missions conducted in Afghanistan 

from May 2010 through April 2011 revealed that 84 percent 

saw no shots fired, while 1,862 missions captured or killed 

the intended target and/or their associates (83 percent). 

LtGen John F. Mulholland, USA, “U.S. Army Special Operations Command State of the Command Brief” (PowerPoint 

briefing, 3 June 2011), 14, as cited in Jim Thomas and Chris 

Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special 

Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 19. Still, it is important to 

comprehend and anticipate how events may be reported. 

The film’s interview with retired Gen Hugh Shelton in defending a JSOC operation in Afghanistan offers a valuable 

case study in how not to conduct a press interview and what 

to avoid. 

34. West, No True Glory, 60. Anticipated phases and timelines for 

the operation, West reported, were not laid out—warning 

the population, consulting with allies, gaining Iraqi agreement, preparing the media, consulting with Congress, and 

marshaling forces.

35. West, No True Glory, 60. The first battle was a response to 

the murder of four American contractors as they crossed 

through Fallujah. Apparently, President George W. Bush, 

Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Bremer and his coterie wanted to send a message that such action would not be tolerated, without tying that sentiment to a cohesive strategic 

plan. It bears stressing that the order to proceed overruled 

protests from U.S. Marine commanders on the ground ar50 | Chapter 3
guing against the attack. The Marines preferred a different 

approach that would reduce the insurgency, install capable 

Iraqi security forces, and revive Fallujah prosperity. West, 

No True Glory, 58 – 61.

36. I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) Brief to Gen John Abizaid, Camp Fallujah, 9 April 2004, as cited by Malkasian, 

“Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle 

of Fallujah,” 435. 

37. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah.” Malkasian served as an advisor to 

I MEF in Iraq from February 2004 to February 2005. The discussion on the history of the first battle for Fallujah draws on 

his commentary. He points out that in Vietnam, Viet Cong 

successes in Long An enabled the Communists to execute 

propaganda that brought new people into the movement. 

He argues that in 2000, the hasty withdrawal from Lebanon 

of Israeli Defense Forces may have caused Palestinians to 

perceive violence as a useful means to attain their aims. 

Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah,” 425–26. See also Jeffrey Race, War 

Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: California University Press, 1973), 191; and 

Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 125. Malkasian cites 

all of these sources.

38. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 79.

39. Knarr and Castro, “The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster,” 13.

40. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah,” 435. He notes that dissatisfaction 

with political and economic conditions stiffened anti-Coalition sentiment.

41. Filkins, The Forever War, 83. West makes the same point in 

No True Glory, chapter 1.

42. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 130, 131, 143.

43. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah,” 438.

44. Comments by LtGen James Conway, Camp Fallujah, 29 

April 2004, and an interview with LtGen John Sattler at 

Camp Pendleton, 10 November 2004, as cited in Malkasian, 

“Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle 

of Fallujah.” 

45. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 131.

46. Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 43.

47. LtGen David Petraeus, USA, “Learning Counterinsurgency: 

Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review (January/February 2006): 2–12. See also West, No True Glory, 60.

48. Anne Barnard, “Anger over Fallujah Reaches Ears of the 

Faithful,” Boston (MA) Globe, 12 April 2004.

49. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah,” 424.

50. West, No True Glory, 92–93. After the Egyptian military ousted Mohamed Morsi as president in 2013, Egyptian television stations were also caught using old footage to portray 

current events. Maintaining a lookout for such distortions 

and calling them out is a key element in maintaining message discipline.

51. West, No True Glory, 92–93.

52. Jack Guy, interview with author, 1 June 2013.

53. The book offers a detailed analysis of the different forms of 

strategic communication, including information operations 

as it embraces psychological or military information support operations, public diplomacy, propaganda, and public 

affairs. Those who wish to know more should read Farwell, 

Persuasion and Power.

54. “Introduction: The Abu Ghraib Files,” Salon, 14 March 2006; 

and Seymour M. Hersh, “Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense Mishandled the Disaster at Abu Ghrabi,” New Yorker, 17 May 2004.

55. MajGen Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 

800th Military Police Brigade (Washington, DC: Joint Task 

Force, 2004). Originally classified, the report was made 

public.

56. An important distinction lay in the status of the detainees. 

On 7 February 2002, President Bush signed a statement declaring that the Geneva Conventions did not apply “to our 

conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the 

world.” See White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention,” press release, 7 February 

2002. The administration stated that the Geneva Convention 

would apply to Taliban detainees but not “to the al-Qaeda 

international terrorists.” The Abu Ghraib detainees were 

treated as al-Qaeda operatives.

57. “Text of Remarks by Gen. Kimmitt on Prisoner Abuse in 

Iraq, 2004-04-30,” Voice of America, 30 October 2009.

58. David Holloway, 9/11 and the War on Terror (Edinburgh, UK: 

Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 48.

59. Josh White, “Abu Ghraib Guards Kept a Log of Prison Conditions, Practices,” Washington Post, 25 October 2004. 

60. “Jessica Lynch Fast Facts,” CNN, updated 3 April 2018. Officials later presented her with the Bronze Star, Purple Heart, 

and POW medals for her service and captivity. The experience also netted Lynch a million-dollar book deal with 

publisher Alfred A. Knopf.

61. Knarr and Castro, The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster, 50 – 51; BGen Erwin F. Lessel, director of strategic communications, Multi National Forces–Iraq, interview 

with Bill Knarr, 28 December 2005, 6 – 7; and Natonski and 

McCarthy et al. interview, 17.

62. Jack Guy, interview with author, 5 April 2018.

63. Knarr and Castro, “The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster,” 16.

64. LtCol Michael McCarthy put it this way: “[The Iraqis] didn’t 

really know what was going on, but once they took a look 

Know Your Enemy | 51
around and saw tanks and Marines and soldiers, and guns 

and helicopters, you could see their calmness: ‘We are actually on the winning team this time.’ They realized that they 

weren’t getting kicked in, they weren’t getting shoved into 

the city with us just watching them, but we were there with 

them, and they were on the team, and that they were on 

the right side.” Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 37. 

65. Journalist Dexter Filkins, who was on the ground during 

the second battle, reported that in fact this was an American 

battle and dismisses assertions that Iraqis were shouldering 

the burden. See Filkins, The Forever War, 192. Military servicemembers who were interviewed off the record argue 

that Filkins overstates his point.

66. MajGen Richard Natonski took pride in that aspect of the 

second Fallujah battle. See Natonski and McCarthy et al. 

interview, 34.

67. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from 

Soldiering in Iraq,” 3. 

68. Louis L’Amour, Ride the River: A Novel (New York: Bantam, 

2010), 40.

69. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 196.

70. LtGen Thomas Metz and LtCol James Hutton, “Massing 

Effects in the Information Domain: A Case Study for Aggressive Information Operations,” Military Review (May/

June 2006): 2–12, as cited in Knarr and Castro, The Battle for 

Fallujah: Al Fajr, the Myth-Buster, 51.

71. Metz and Hutton, “Massing Effects in the Information Domain”; and Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 28.

72. See Chandrasekaran, Little America, 38. Fear of killing civilians was a key factor in the development of COIN doctrine.

73. Knarr and Castro, The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster, 57 – 59; and Knarr, Seizing the Peninsula, a Vignette from The Battle for Fallujah, 23–24.

74. Knarr and Castro, The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster, 60–61; and Knarr, Seizing the Peninsula, a Vignette from The Battle for Fallujah, 24–29.

75. Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 41, as cited in Knarr 

and Castro, The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the Myth-Buster, 41.

76. See Col Bob Napp comments in Natonski and McCarthy et 

al. interview, 42. 

77. Napp comments in Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 

30. Said Napp: “One of the key things on the leaflets [we 

distributed] was identifying what was of value to the Iraqi 

people as opposed to what was of value to us.” 

78. Knarr and Castro, “The Battle for Fallujah: Al Fajr, the 

Myth-Buster,” 6.

79. Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 30–31.

80. Natonski and McCarthy et al. interview, 30–31.

81. West, The Wrong War, 29–30, 43. This book is not the venue 

for debating the merits of COIN versus counterterrorism 

(CT) or other notions. Fred Kaplan, John Nagl, and others 

strongly espouse COIN. See Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: 

David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013); and Nagl, Learning 

to Eat Soup with a Knife. West offers a searing indictment of 

the view that COIN applied well to Afghanistan. In Little 

America, experienced journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran sides 

more with West’s view. Many argue that vital elements 

of COIN were not implemented in Afghanistan. Karzai’s 

government was viewed as corrupt and incompetent and 

provided no cause or catalyst to rally citizens. The inkblot 

notion of progressively securing areas in which populations 

could be protected—and identified through a census—did 

not occur. At this writing, the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

has yet to meet standards of proficiency that would enable 

it to take over the fighting if American troops withdrew, 

although some argue that the ANA is improving steadily 

and moving toward shouldering the real burden of fighting. 

They argue also that lack of air support as the United States 

withdraws from the country presents a huge obstacle to the 

ANA’s ability to succeed. A final problem confronting application of COIN in Afghanistan is that Pakistan has provided 

a sanctuary to which the Taliban can flee. In Duty, Robert M. 

Gates quotes Gen McChrystal’s concisely stated point that 

CT can disrupt but not defeat an enemy. McChrystal states: 

“CT operations are necessary to mitigate a sanctuary but 

to defeat a terrorist group, host nation capacity must grow 

to ensure a sustainable level of security. . . . Without closein access, fix and find methods become nearly impossible. 

Predator [drone] strikes are effective where they complement, not replace, the capabilities of the state security apparatus, but they are not scalable in the absence of underlying 

infrastructure, intelligence, and physical presence.” Gates, 

Duty, loc. 6599 of 11052, Kindle.

82. West, The Wrong War, 29–30.

83. Dexter Filkins favorably reviewed West’s book for the New 

York Times, commenting: “As ‘The Wrong War’ shows so 

well, the Americans will spend more money and more lives 

trying to transform Afghanistan, and their soldiers will sacrifice themselves trying to succeed. But nothing short of a 

miracle will give them much in return.” Dexter Filkins, “The 

Next Impasse,” New York Times, 24 February 2011.

84. Filkins, The Forever War, 89.

85. See Andrew Exum, “In Afghanistan with our Warrior Elite,” 

Wall Street Journal, 19 February 2011. Exum admires West’s 

on-the-ground reporting but argues that, unlike most military professionals whom Exum, himself a veteran, dealt 

with regarding Afghanistan, West misconstrues both the 

doctrine of COIN and the approach to winning that the 

United States has taken in this difficult conflict.

86. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 105 – 06.

87. Jack Guy interview, 4 April 2017.

52 | Chapter 3
Chapter 4

Knowing foreign partners, allies, and those with whom you must deal and understanding their interests 

and agendas matters as much as dealing with other parties in the U.S. government. Effective partner forces 

can provide “manpower, local knowledge, and political legitimacy.”1 The most effective partnerships require “trusting relationships built over time around shared goals,” a point essential to special operations 

forces as well as general purpose forces.2

Know Your Foreign Partners

U.S. policy generally favors strong partnerships with allies in countering violent extremism, providing 

for common defense, and battling transnational crime. We operate through NATO, the United Nations 

(UN), and country-level organizations. Often, our interests and theirs coincide; at other times, they do 

not. The conflict in Afghanistan has dramatically shown how differently our NATO partners viewed 

their mission. It has affected their rules of engagement, strategic considerations, definition of success, 

allocation of resources, and other key decisions.

In Iraq, General McChrystal built an impressive killing machine in his SOF-led Task Force 145 (2006). 

Yet substantial tensions arose between the United States and the British Special Air Service (SAS) contingent, which held a different view of strategy and treatment of prisoners.3

Communication strategy must understand how partners view a situation or partnership and realistically calibrate it to the realities.

Here are key questions to ask about foreign partners: 

• What is the basis for the partnership?

• What are the key interests for each party?

• What are their overt and covert agendas, and how do they affect partnership dynamics? How 

can you influence them to effect a positive strategic outcome?

53

KNOW YOUR PARTNERS—FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
• How indispensable to the United 

States is the partnership?

• How does the United States operate in 

practice to foster or maintain the partnership?

• What leverage does the United States 

have to secure support for U.S. strategic views or interests?

• What weaknesses from the U.S. viewpoint characterize the partnership?

• Is the partner really a partner, or is it 

a partnership in name only? To what 

extent, and how, do you envision the 

partner making their contribution to a 

joint effort?

• Have U.S. troops trained regularly with 

the partner’s military? Do we have ongoing mission training?

Modern Examples

Afghanistan. This book does not aim to catalog 

the complex, complicated challenges that the Afghan conflict has presented. However, it is worth 

citing one glaring example to illustrate the potential pitfalls of dealing with foreign partners: former President Hamid Karzai. At the time of this 

writing, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah are 

fighting over the 2020 presidency. But our experience with Karzai offers key lessons. In theory, 

he was a U.S. partner and ally, yet he publicly accused the United States of harassing and torturing civilians; colluded with the Taliban through 

daily talks; and employed rhetoric that vilified 

the United States.4

 Karzai was widely viewed as 

corrupt while blaming foreigners for all corruption and exempting his own family members from 

such charges.5

 He turned out or subverted competent local leaders in favor of his own hacks.6

 It 

is apparent that Karzai stole the 2009 presidential election.7

 Although the official U.S. policy 

in Afghanistan favored COIN, Bing West points 

out that Karzai blocked efforts to organize local 

militias, while for their part, Afghans often did 

not organize to defend themselves.8

 Karzai opposed efforts to build up local government.9

 He 

demanded the United States commit American 

troops to costly battles in strategically irrelevant 

places simply to advance his election prospects.10

One must, however, recognize two realities. 

First, Karzai’s rhetoric was often meant for home 

consumption and directed to his Pashtun base. He 

is a Pashtun in a Northern Alliance capital. That 

was and remains a key issue for target audience 

analysis. Second, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) 

was roundly disliked by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as it smacked of the militias 

that supported warlords after the downfall of the 

Taliban, and the ANSF did not want to deal with 

that threat again.

Politicians like Karzai can turn any partnership 

into a catastrophe. He was not the first. He will 

not be the last. Forging a communication strategy 

requires asking hard questions about so-called 

allies to understand the realities of the relationship and to calibrate strategy to those realities and 

U.S. policy. Too often that has not happened in Afghanistan. It is a vital lesson.

Lessons:

1. Do not presume that the interests or agendas 

of foreign partners and the United States 

align or are consistent. In Afghanistan, the 

mercurial Karzai held a different worldview 

from that of most U.S. policy makers, and it 

affected commanders and action officers at 

every level, as well as their ability to forge an 

effective communication strategy. National 

security journalist Fred Kaplan raised this 

issue, citing Dr. Stephen D. Biddle, who 

54 | Chapter 4
posited the powerful question: What strategy 

is prudent when a host government has a 

different view from the United States of its 

best interests — as Karzai did? What if the 

host government’s agenda favors a particular 

group, not the national population?11 Strategy 

must assess the existence and significance of 

such differences and adjust to them.

2. Do not presume foreign partners’ actions 

will not subvert U.S. actions. Figure out what 

they might support and calibrate communication to that. A key message commanders 

such as General McChrystal tried to communicate to Afghans was that U.S. forces 

would stand with them, offering protection 

and opportunity. Karzai’s actions in foisting 

his patronage pack on villages and provinces, 

his corruption, his autocratic approach 

aimed at centering power in his hands, and 

his ineffective leadership undercut U.S. intentions.12 You cannot change people like 

Karzai. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, is 

viewed as more honest but the government 

remains corrupt despite efforts to clean it up.13

However, you can identify specific actions 

or operations that such partners cannot or 

will not subvert and build strategies around 

those.

3. Recognize that coalitions shift. Today’s 

partner may be tomorrow’s adversary. Coalitions are often fragile, and agendas that 

bring together parties — state and nonstate 

actors alike — may collapse. While in office, 

Karzai was alternately friendly and hostile 

to the United States in his public statements. 

Pakistan has played both sides despite the 

billions in foreign assistance that the United 

States has provided. Think ahead to how 

events or actions can affect the dynamics of 

an existing partnership, how to maintain one, 

and how to address frictions and possible 

future conflicting agendas.

4. Be prepared to forge a coalition on an issue if 

it does not already exist. Seek out commonalities. Build a community of interests. Maintain 

and strengthen the coalition through information, travel, engagement, and networking.14

Pakistan. The politics of Pakistan are complex, 

nuanced, and riddled with fear, insecurity, and a 

culture of conspiracy, paranoia, and treachery. Pakistanis are proud and feel the United States has 

treated Pakistan like a second-class friend, and 

charge that the United States has abandoned it 

at critical junctures. This book offers no venue to 

dissect or debate U.S.-Pakistan policy. But it is apparent that in fighting violent extremists, Pakistan 

has played on both sides—at one turn, accepting 

U.S. aid dollars and helping track down al-Qaeda 

operatives, at another helping the Taliban fight the 

United States. Pakistan has lied about its nuclear 

weapons program, which may fall at risk should 

the Taliban expand its influence and power inside 

Pakistan—which it fully intends to do.15 

Communication strategies that affect parties 

such as Pakistan or members of its military require sensitivity. When the United States killed 

Osama bin Laden, there was debate about how 

to handle Pakistani chief of Army Staff Ashraf 

Parvez Kayani and what to say. The Pakistanis 

were in a tough position. If they said they did not 

know bin Laden was hiding there, they looked 

incompetent; if they did know, they were complicit. It is not surprising that Pakistan’s National 

Assembly conducted a special hearing to find out 

why it was caught by surprise.16 The fact is, the 

United States and Pakistan had different interests. The United States said it would track down 

Know Your Partners—Foreign and Domestic | 55
bin Laden no matter how long it took and accomplished that mission. From Pakistan’s viewpoint, 

the United States breached its sovereignty and 

made it look bad. 

Lesson: Every level of engagement with such 

nations requires words, actions, and signals 

that communicate what you want, what you 

are doing, and why you are doing it and factors in their viewpoints, recognizing that they 

may differ or prove incompatible with yours.

Know Your U.S. Government Partners

Understand the role played by the different U.S. entities that have a stake in what you are doing. That 

includes U.S. government-funded entities (e.g., 

USAID), and recognized U.S. entities with no government affiliation, including private businesses 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

Key Questions:

• Do the different parts of the U.S. government engaged in an operation or 

conflict share the same or a compatible 

vision? 

• Do they agree on the same strategy and 

tactics?

• Is their risk assessment consistent or 

compatible with yours?

Afghanistan. U.S. Marines secured independence 

from the command as a condition of agreeing to deploy to Afghanistan on a requested schedule. Even 

as the commander of U.S. forces, General McChrystal lacked authority to order them where to deploy. 

In committing troops to the theater, Lieutenant 

General James T. Conway obtained authority to 

maintain operational control over the Marines.17

NATO forces operated under their own rules of 

engagement.18 Different commanders in Afghanistan held different views about whether COIN or a 

kill/capture counterterrorism strategy made more 

sense. They all followed their own best judgment.19

USAID in Afghanistan had its own priorities. 

These often collided with the military’s COIN strategy. Experts saw cotton as an ideal crop to replace 

heroin poppies, but USAID refused action to capitalize on that.20 American officials, including the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), have 

held a different view than the military and other 

U.S. security operations on how to deal with drug 

trafficking.21 The merits of that debate lie elsewhere. 

The point is that communication strategy needs to 

account for the conflicting views among stakeholders whose partnership and cooperation are vital 

to achieving victory. In Afghanistan, the military, 

USAID, diplomats, and the DEA had different, 

often contradictory, priorities. Those wanting to 

fight drugs clashed with the military, because the 

warlords whom the military found useful allies 

were involved in the drug trade.22 When experts 

suggested that cotton was one profitable crop that 

could earn farmers enough income to make weaning them off of growing poppies plausible, USAID 

clashed with proponents because its bureaucracy 

proved too inflexible to make it happen and its 

leadership worried that such action would lead to 

clashes with U.S. political champions of the domestic textile industry.23 The conflicts between various 

U.S. government parties presented a strong impediment to waging effective warfare against the Taliban.

As noted previously, U.S. ambassador Karl 

Eikenberry and the military command viewed the 

strategic situation in Afghanistan differently and 

advocated different strategies. Richard Holbrooke, 

President Barack Obama’s envoy to Afghanistan, 

wanted to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, 

effect political reconciliation, and apprehend highlevel drug dealers.24 The military believed that was 

56 | Chapter 4
unrealistic. When Holbrooke proposed a strategy to 

pursue reconciliation, General David Petraeus reportedly replied, “That’s a 15-second conversation. 

Not now.”25 Vali Nasr, one of Holbrooke’s senior 

aides, wrote that the White House acceded to the 

military and “did not want to try anything as audacious as diplomacy.”26

Lesson: these conversations represent the 

need for a strong strategic communication 

plan at the National Security Council level 

that the White House chief of staff oversees, 

to ensure consistent action across the government, including the Department of State’s 

USAID, which, as journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran makes clear, merits infamy for ignoring 

good advice and following its own bureaucratic impulses.

In Iraq, the use of private security contractors by the U.S. government and private 

companies created so many challenges that 

the Iraqi government eventually moved to 

limit their activities. The most famous private contractor, Blackwater (now renamed 

Academi) was banned after Blackwater personnel guarding a U.S. embassy convoy killed 

14 civilians in Baghdad in 2007.27 The Iraqis 

banned foreign security contractors from the 

12 major oil fields being developed by international companies, placing pressure on U.S. 

forces, arguing that the companies, using 

heavily armed mercenaries, were reckless operators who killed innocent civilians and escaped justice.28 The first battle of Fallujah was 

ignited when four U.S. contractors were murdered as their convoy drove through downtown Fallujah. The lesson is that the priorities 

of private companies — Blackwater, for example, provided security to Bremer and the U.S. 

embassy — and the American military might 

overlap, but operational differences and different resources led to significant problems 

in conducting information warfare. The approach to any situation is to assess who the 

players are and to ascertain which ones, especially if associated with the United States, 

can inadvertently cross-pressure a communication strategy. 

1. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 12.

2. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 12. Thomas 

and Dougherty argue that in Afghanistan, village stability 

operations (VSOs) have proven successful. These rely on 

four confluent efforts: “gaining the trust of village elders, 

building local security capacity, strengthening local civilian 

institutions and infrastructure, and effectively conveying information about these efforts to target populations” through 

military information support operations (MISO). Communication strategy lies at the heart of such indirect mission 

activity. Efforts by civil affairs teams (CATs) are critical to 

VSO success. Gaining trust enables three lines of operation, 

typically carried out in four phases: shape, hold, build, and 

expand and transition. The approach entails bringing tangible benefits to the local population. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 25. Note that Bing West and Rajiv 

Chandrasekaran have questioned whether in practice certain of these efforts in Afghanistan have worked as intended 

or generated active support for the government or sustained 

action by locals against the Taliban. One lesson ChandraseEndnotes

Know Your Partners—Foreign and Domestic | 57
karan’s reporting drives home is to take care in communication strategy to avoid overpromising.

3. See Mark Urban, Task Force Black, 80. Urban details the differences of view throughout his book, which focuses on SAS 

activities and the British view of events in Iraq.

4. Kevin Sieff, “U.S., Karzai Agree on Wardak Withdrawal,” 

Washington Post, 20 March 2013; Matt Smith, “ISAF Chief: 

Karzai Claim of U.S., Taliban Collusion Is ‘Categorically 

False’,” CNN, 11 March 2013; and Alissa J. Rubin, “Karzai 

Bets on Vilifying U.S. to Shed His Image as a Lackey,” New 

York Times, 12 March 2013.

5. Leslie H. Gelb, “To Hell with Karzai,” Daily Beast, 12 March 

2013; “Karzai Blames Foreigners for Corruption,” Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 December 2012; and Matthew 

Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Intractable Afghan Graft 

Hampering U.S. Strategy,” New York Times, 7 March 2012.

6. See Chandrasekaran, Little America; Sardar Ahmad, “Karzai’s New Cabinet Seen as Return to Patronage Politics,” 

Telegraph, 11 January 2010; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Karzai 

Visit a Time for Tough Talk on Security, Corruption,” Brookings, 8 January 2013; and George Packer, “The Last Mission: 

Richard Holbrooke’s Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam 

in Afghanistan,” New Yorker, 21 September 2009. 

7. “Karzai Stole Election, Says Carter,” Dawn, 18 September 

2009. Gen McChrystal records in his memoir that Abdul 

Rahim Wardak advised the United States to “waste no more 

blood or treasure” should the 2009 elections fail. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 330.

8. West, The Wrong War, 23.

9. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 168

10. West, The Wrong War, 79.

11. Kaplan, The Insurgents, 340 – 41. Many believed that the facts 

belied the notion that Karzai was a true strategic partner. 

Biddle served on Gen Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment team in Afghanistan and is a senior fellow for defense 

policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

12. See Packer, “The Last Mission”; Chandrasekaran, Little 

America; McChrystal, My Share of the Task; West, The Wrong 

War; Kaplan, The Insurgents; and remarks of Ambassador 

Karl W. Eikenberry in Robert Mackey, “U.S. Ambassador’s 

Riposte to Karzai,” The Lede (blog), New York Times, 20 June 

2011. Many feel Eikenberry’s well-publicized cable to the 

White House blasting Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner” and the fallacy of presuming that the Afghan 

government was a dependable ally willing and able to step 

in and provide basic services have proven accurate. Even 

leaders such as Fred Kaplan, a proponent for COIN about 

which Eikenberry expressed doubt, concurred that “the ambassador’s main points were so clearly accurate.” Kaplan, 

The Insurgents, 315.

13. John F. Sopko, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Efforts: The Afghan Government Has Begun to Implement an Anti-Corruption 

Strategy, but Significant Problems Must Be Addressed, SIGAR 

18-51 Audit Report (Arlington, VA: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2018), 1.

14. Brian E. Carlson, State Department liaison to the Pentagon 

and former ambassador to Latvia, interview with author, 

18 June 2018. 

15. See Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron; Mazzetti, The Way of the 

Knife; and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons 

Conspiracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2007).

16. The author points out the problem that the attack posed for 

Pakistanis: “They believe that the attack placed them in an 

untenable position: either they did not know bin Laden was 

there, rendering them ignorant or incompetent; or else they 

were willing conspirators.” Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron, 

258. In 2013, Mark Mazzetti wrote of Kayani’s response: “He 

could either appear complicit in hiding Osama bin Laden or 

incompetent for being able to stop the world’s most hunted 

man from taking refuge in the middle of his country. He 

chose the latter.” Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, 289.

17. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 64 – 65.

18. Richard Norton-Taylor and Julian Borger, “NATO Tightens 

Rules of Engagement to Limit Further Civilian Casualties 

in Afghanistan,” Guardian, 8 September 2008.

19. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 154 – 60, 211, 212; and McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 307, 321.

20. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 64 – 65. Another challenge 

he identified that affected communication strategy was 

USAID’s insistence on funding massive projects that benefitted large U.S. contractors, when development proponents 

such as Richard Holbrooke sought to direct more funds 

through Afghan ministries and local aid organizations. 

Apparently, 70 percent of U.S. aid went to overhead, and 

only 30 percent to the Afghan people. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 198.

21. See Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling 

the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: Thomas Dunne Book, 

2009).

22. See Peters, Seeds of Terror.

23. See Chandrasekaran, Little America.

24. Vali Nasr, “The Inside Story of How the White House Let 

Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, March/

April 2013; and Packer, “The Last Mission.” 

25. Nasr, “The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan.” Nasr was a senior advisor 

to Holbrooke and maintains that the Taliban were ready 

for talks as early as April 2009. Other experts challenge 

that assessment, arguing that all the Taliban was ready to 

negotiate for was the release of their people locked up in 

Guantánamo, and that the only talks that might have any 

opportunity of succeeding required participation by all key 

ethnic groups, including the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazara, not 

58 | Chapter 4
just the United States and the Taliban. See James P. Farwell 

and Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Transition in Afghanistan: Securing the Best Achievable Outcome,” Atlantisch Perspectief

36, no. 4 (June 2012).

26. Nasr, “The Inside Story of How the White House Let Diplomacy Fail in Afghanistan.” Despite what Nasr asserts, 

it is important to note that personal dislike of Holbrooke 

by key White House personnel apparently contributed to 

skepticism or rejection of his advice, perhaps as much as 

holding a different perspective on how to resolve the Afghanistan conflict. 

27. “Iraq Wants to Limit Private Security Contractors,” Al Arabiya News, 8 February 2012.

28. “Iraq Bans Security Firms on Oil Fields,” UPI.com, 19 March 

2012.

Know Your Partners—Foreign and Domestic | 59
Chapter 5

The social norms, values, customs, shared beliefs, and behaviors in a society all can influence how people 

make judgments about right and wrong, assess what is important, and suggest what to do and what not 

to do, as well as how and with whom.1

Establishing an understanding of a target audience’s culture needs to be done at the outset of any 

operation. It is vital, as former U.S. ambassador to Latvia Brian E. Carlson has observed, to understand 

whether or how a topic that interests the United States engages a foreign audience and, if so, how and in 

what manner. That understanding helps to define how you will prioritize resources, what you both will 

and will not say or do, and the time frame and operational phases within which you will act.2

“Who are they?” Carlson asks as he analyzes cultures. “What do they think about a subject on which 

you wish to engage? Why do they think or feel that way? What do key words mean to them? Where do 

they get information on this subject? Who do they trust? Who do they listen to or follow? Are there gatekeepers whose ‘permission’ is required before the audience will act or change behavior?”3

In examining narratives to articulate for target audiences, psychological operations (psyops) experts 

Major Gregory S. Seese and Patrick Hanlon insightfully point out that understanding any target audience 

and influencing its behavior requires forging a narrative keyed to seven elements: 1) how the audience’s 

community was created; 2) what it believes; 3) what symbolizes it; 4) how it routinely behaves or responds to certain situations; 5) the words its members use to describe themselves and what they do; 6) 

who they are and never want to become; and 7) who leads them.4

Historical Example

Pearl Harbor. Just as with bin Laden, Admiral Isoroku Yamamato and the Japanese misjudged America’s character and will to fight. Pearl Harbor was Japan’s version of a shock and awe strategy. Hoping 

to cripple the United States’ spirit and frighten Americans by communicating the message that JaRECOGNIZE TARGET AUDIENCE CULTURE 

AS AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

60
Recognize Target Audience Culture as an Operational Environment | 61

pan was all-powerful, Japan expected Americans 

to pressure their government to negotiate a settlement with Japan. At no point did it occur to Japan that Americans would stand and fight. That 

was critical to Japan’s strategic thinking, as many 

Japanese leaders doubted they could win a prolonged war. Their misjudgment provoked World 

War II. The Japanese mistake came from drawing 

the wrong lesson from Japan’s 1905 war with Russia, when the same strategy succeeded.

One notes again that at the outset of World 

War II, President Franklin Roosevelt confronted 

precisely the same challenge, as he maneuvered 

through sophisticated communication strategy—

manifest in his words and deeds—to create a situation in which Japan fired the first shot, insulating 

Roosevelt from any charge that he had provided a pretext that forced Japan into conflict. Roosevelt knew that Americans needed to be united, 

but uniting the country, in his view, would have 

been impossible unless peace proponents agreed 

that America was the aggrieved party.5

Modern Examples

Somalia and General Anthony Zinni. Never presume you know what is best for people in another 

society. Do not apply Western values or worldviews. Look at the world through the eyes of the 

foreign audiences you deal with. Operating successfully in a clan-dominated society such as Somalia, General Zinni pointed out that knowing 

how they operate and interact with one another is vital. Somalis have no concept of individual 

responsibility. Only the clan can accept responsibility.6

 That had important consequences when a 

decision was made to announce a $25,000 reward 

for Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s capture. It was foolish. Somalis interpreted it as a declaration of war 

on an entire clan, not a plan to constrain one individual. The avoidable Blackhawk Down incident 

flowed directly from the failure of leaders subsequent to Zinni to recognize that reality.

Lesson: When entering a different cultural 

environment, set aside Western preconceptions. Think differently. Think about the local 

culture, history, and norms, and how actions 

will affect people and their anticipated response. Do not think like an American. Think 

like someone who lives and breathes the culture of the target audience. 

11 September 2001 and Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden thought that attacking the Twin 

Towers in New York City would galvanize Americans to pressure the U.S. government to get out of 

what bin Laden defined as Muslim lands. Instead, 

bin Laden provoked an all-out war that led to his 

death.7

 He drew the wrong lesson from the October 1983 attack on U.S. Marines in Beirut, which 

killed 241 American servicemembers and caused 

President Ronald W. Reagan to withdraw the U.S. 

military from the city.8

 Bin Laden deluded himself 

into believing that pressuring the United States by 

inflicting casualties on its troops or killing civilians would cause the nation to back away from 

a fight. Instead, Americans embarked on a noholds-barred effort to hunt him. Far from achieving his goal, bin Laden became the most-wanted 

criminal on the planet while alienating his Taliban hosts, whom he double-crossed after promising Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar not 

to take action that would cause problems for him.9

Americans did track down bin Laden and kill 

him, fulfilling a pledge to do so, no matter where 

he was or how long it took.10

Lesson: Use communication strategy to make 

clear to an adversary that the cost of opposing or attacking your forces exceeds any de-
sired benefit. Communication strategy must 

anticipate how adversaries may perceive —

and misjudge — your intentions. That hinges 

on developing as complete an understanding 

of an adversary as possible. Effective communication strategy can play a pivotal role in deterring or preventing conflict.

Corollary: Increasingly, the emergence of hybrid warfare is leading to the use of weaponized social media to advance political or 

military objectives. In 2016, Russia meddled 

in U.S. elections. One option that President 

Barack Obama considered and declined to approve was using computer malware for offensive or retaliatory action. The option remains 

on the table in surmounting future challenges. 

A critical challenge lies in the danger of rapid 

escalation. Prudent use of malware may well 

argue for communicating with an adversary 

ahead of time as to the risks it exposes itself to 

through cyber warfare. For example, the United States in theory might caution Russia that 

hacking into election machinery to alter outcomes or voter registration rolls may prompt 

an attack on a Russian power grid or some 

other target. It is important to define limits on 

the use of cyber tools, because the escalatory 

risks can prove enormous. In that context, cyber tools should be seen as potential elements 

of information warfare.11

Somalia and Ethiopia, 2006. First, the United States 

supported brutal warlords in Somalia because they 

postured themselves as anti–al-Qaeda. But the 

warlords alienated Somalis and the Mogadishu 

business community, accomplishing this under the 

auspices of a so-called Alliance for the Restoration 

of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. Supporting warlords backfired on the United States, however. Somalis responded by establishing the Islamic Courts 

Union (ICU). The ICU quashed the warlords and 

restored order, amid a raft of hostility toward the 

United States.12

Then the United States supported Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia to oust the ICU. Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia had been tense for 

many years. Many believe that the United States 

misread the situation and the Somali population’s 

likely response to intervention.13 Ousting the ICU 

gave rise to Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate that 

used antiforeigner sentiment to recruit and mobilize 

an extremist army that terrorized and brutalized the 

population.14

Lessons:

1. Facts on the ground trump any communication strategy; and actions are a key 

element of strategic communication. 

Backing the warlords was a mistake. Be 

careful about the allies you choose and 

how populations perceive these allies and 

your actions, whether direct or indirect.

2. Ill-judged action may worsen the situation. The Ethiopian troops were accused 

of brutality in their own right, compounding Somali hostility and compromising 

any chance that an antiextremist message 

to the mostly Sufi Somalis might resonate. 

Analogy: At this writing, Syria is torn 

by civil war. Its brutality is evident in 

the high numbers of civilians who have 

been killed. One striking feature of the 

conflict is that both Bashar al-Assad’s 

government and certain Sunni rebels appear to have committed atrocities. Arming the rebels with heavy weapons may 

have been a good idea, but once ISIS 

appeared on the scene and presented a 

common enemy to other Sunnis, rebels 

62 | Chapter 5
against the regime who ostensibly represented pro-Western forces intermixed with 

those such as Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra 

Front) or Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 

which identified with al-Qaeda, and the 

parties were known to swap weapons.15

Panama. General Manuel Noriega misread American will when his troops murdered Marine Corps 

First Lieutenant Robert Paz and beat up a Navy 

lieutenant and his wife (who was also sexually 

harassed). Noriega presents an interesting case of 

arrogance blinding a ruthless, street-savvy leader. 

In 1970, Noriega was a rising figure in the Panamanian military. Media reports claimed that the 

U.S. government had recruited him as an asset 

but removed him in 1977 after he got involved 

in drug trafficking. According to media reports, 

the United States reengaged after the Sandinistas 

gained power in Nicaragua. Apparently, Noriega 

also acted as a double agent for Cuba and the Sandinistas, fueling tensions with the United States.

In 1989, Noriega annulled a presidential election that Guillermo Endara had won, a move that 

prompted President George H. W. Bush to beef up 

U.S. forces stationed in the Panama Canal Zone. 

On 16 December 1989, an off-duty U.S. Marine 

was shot to death at a Panamanian Defense Force 

roadblock.16 Bush responded by launching Operation Just Cause, which ousted Noriega on the 

grounds that he threatened Americans living in 

Panama and the security of the Panama Canal.17

Noriega surrendered, was taken to the United 

States and tried for drug trafficking, and was 

handed a 40-year jail sentence.18

Lesson: There is a corollary to 9/11. It is important to communicate the cost of committing hostile actions against the United States. 

The use of loudspeakers to blare music at 

Noriega once he sought refuge in an embassy offers a good example of psyops (today 

called MISO) — a communication strategy —

to force a party out from hiding or a refuge. 

2003 Iraq War. This conflict serves as a case study 

for the need to understand how the physical environment (geography), history, social organization, 

religion, beliefs and values, and the economy confluently influenced what strategy offered the best 

opportunity for success.19

Lesson: The failure of Coalition forces and 

leaders such as Paul Bremer to understand 

these factors and how the social and political 

dynamics they generated caused frustration 

and nearly the defeat of Coalition forces.

Recognize Target Audience Culture as an Operational Environment | 63

1. See Col Hershel L. Holiday, USA, “Improving Cultural 

Awareness in the U.S. Military” (master’s strategy research 

project, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 2–3.

2. Ambassador Brian Carlson, interview with author.

3. Ambassador Brian Carlson, interview with author.

4. Patrick Hanlon and Maj Gregory Seese, “Deconstructing 

Narratives: Using Primal Branding to Design Oppositional 

Narratives,” IO Sphere (Fall 2013). They astutely state that 

psyops’ mission is to influence behavior, not just attitudes 

and that behavioral change lies at the root of the psyops 

mission.

5. See Strange, Capital “W” War, for an excellent description of 

Roosevelt’s strategy. In his book, MajGen J. F. C. Fuller offers 

a provocative analysis of Allied strategy leading up to and 

through World War II that provides an alternative — and 

highly critical—view of the strategies that Churchill and 

Endnotes
64 | Chapter 5

Roosevelt adopted. Fuller argues these were naïve, created avoidable strategic debacles, and produced a Cold War 

stalemate instead of a clear-cut victory. 

6. MajGen Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature and the Need for Cultural Awareness 

and Flexible Thinking” in Strange, Capital “W” War, 266 – 68. 

Gen Zinni’s entire quote is worth repeating: “What I need 

to understand is how these societies function. What makes 

them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their 

society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the 

way they think, compared to my values and the way I think 

in my western, white-man mentality? My mentality, which 

has absolutely zero applicability here but which drives 

everything I do. My decision-making, my military way of 

METT and T [Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops 

and support, and Time available], my way of building my 

synchronization matrix, my top-down planning, and my 

battlefield geometry — all is worth absolutely zip in this 

environment where the enemies are abstract: starvation, 

anarchy and disorder. Where the problems you’re going to 

face have nothing to do with military operations which are 

a small piece, secondary to everything else. The situations 

you’re going to be faced with go far beyond what you’re 

trained for in a very narrow military sense. They become 

cultural issues; issues of traumatized populations’ welfare, 

food, shelter; issues of government; issues of cultural, ethnic, religious problems; historical issues; economic issues 

that you have to deal with, that aren’t part of the METT-T 

process, necessarily. And that rigid military thinking can 

get you in trouble. What you need to know isn’t what our 

intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, 

and to present to you. An assumption going in is that you 

know what’s best for them; that you’re trying to implant 

Jeffersonian Democracy, ultimately. Jefferson, Locke and 

Rousseau all have one thing in common in a place like Somalia—they’re three dead white men. End of discussion. 

So, try to implant these theories by all us great western 

nations, and you might have a little problem. If you don’t 

understand the tribal structure of the Kurds, if you don’t 

understand who Chaldeans are, and the Assyrian Christians, and Uzbeks, and Uzars; if you don’t understand Habr 

Gedir, and Issaq, and Abgals; if you don’t understand the 

complexity of the clans and their interrelationships in Somalia, you’re in trouble. And if you understood that there is 

no concept of individual responsibility in Somalia, then you 

wouldn’t do a stupid thing like put out an arrest warrant 

on Aideed and a $25,000 reward on his head. When you do 

this, you declare war on his clan. Only the clan can accept 

responsibility. And if they do, they pay a dia, in effect blood 

money, in payment of a wrong that they have accepted as 

a wrong that they have committed, or a member of their 

clan has committed. When you go fight them then, why is 

it that the women and kids are out in the street committing 

atrocities on American bodies? Because you went to war 

with the clan. You declared war on the clan. You’re there 

to eradicate the clan. Your enemy is Habr Gedir. And when 

you go to war with the clan, the whole clan fights. And you 

can’t understand that in a western context or a western view 

of the world. Because what you’re out to collect and what 

your decision process is all about is alien to that particular 

environment.” Emphasis original.

7. Dr. Fawaz A. Gerges presented his argument that while 

Osama bin Laden did not like the United States, the goal 

of 9/11 was less about ideology than to change the U.S. 

government’s attitude about maintaining a presence in 

these lands at the Sovereign Challenge Conference held at 

the U.S. Strategic Command in October 2005. He describes 

bin Laden’s miscalculation in his book The Far Enemy: Why 

Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 

Press, 2005), 162 – 64. See also Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron, 

256 – 58, on the U.S. commitment to track down Osama bin 

Laden. 

8. Farwell, The Pakistan Cauldron; and Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden–from 9/11 to Abbottabad

(New York: Crown, 2012).

9. This point is documented in Adrian Levy and Cathy ScottClarke, The Exile: The Flight of Osama bin Laden (London: 

Bloomsbury, 2017). They reported that bin Laden had 

arrived in Pakistan before the Taliban took power. Levy 

advised that Mullah Omar allowed bin Laden to remain 

but warned that al-Qaeda action such as the 1998 Nairobi 

bombing made him uneasy. Mullah Omar had specifically 

warned bin Laden against provoking the United States as a 

condition for offering Taliban hospitality. Bin Laden ignored 

the directive. Omar also had been tipped off that bin Laden 

was planning other global terrorist attacks, which especially 

angered him. His frame of mind was to allow Pakistan—as 

it was a Muslim state — to apprehend and seize bin Laden. 

After 9/11, the mood shifted. Even though the al-Qaeda 

shura had opposed the attack, Levy says there was a sense 

of euphoria about the harm inflicted on the United States. 

One reason that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 

encouraged Omar to refuse to turn over bin Laden was that 

ISI did not want to be perceived as turning over a new folk 

hero to the Americans.

10. The United States did not stop with bin Laden. U.S. forces 

have killed his cohorts in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and anywhere they are found. “U.S. Kills al-Qaeda 

Suspects in Yemen”; and “Pakistan: U.S. Drone Kills Senior 

Al Qaeda Leader,” Associated Press, 9 December 2012.

11. See James P. Farwell, “Countering Russian Meddling in 

US Political Processes,” Parameters 48, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 

37 – 47.

12. Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, chapter 8, 137 – 43. Mazzetti 
reports that the U.S. government sent weapons and suitcases containing $200,000 to favored warlords.

13. Jeremy Scahill, “Blowback in Somalia: How U.S. Proxy Wars 

Helped Create a Militant Islamist Threat,” Nation, 7 September 2011. Scahill argues that of the 13 Islamic Courts, 12 were 

really clan courts with no connection to global jihad and that 

the United States and Ethiopia showed poor judgment and 

acted on poor information.

14. Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife, chapter 8; and Armin Rosen, 

“How Africa’s Most Threatening Terrorist Group Lost Control in Somalia,” Atlantic, 21 September 2012.

15. Mariya Petkova, “Where Is al-Qaeda in Syria?,” Al Jazeera, 

1 March 2018.

16. “This Day in History: December 20, 1989 — The U.S. Invades 

Panama,” History.com, 9 February 2009.

17. Peter Eisner, “Manuel Noriega, the Invasion of Panama and 

How George H. W. Bush Misled America,” Newsweek, 18 

March 2017. Eisner argues that Bush’s rationale was false 

and that Bush had no justification for the invasion. He reported that officials advised him privately that Noriega 

could be persuaded to leave office without an invasion. The 

author’s belief is that Bush was looking for an excuse to 

show the world that the United States was willing to assert 

its military power in an effort to end a perception emanating 

from the American withdrawal from Vietnam that it was 

reluctant to employ its military to advance or protect U.S. 

national security interests.

18. See Larry Rohter, “Noriega Sentenced to 40 Years in Jail on 

Drug Charges,” New York Times, 11 July 1992; Maureen Mahoney, “President W. H. Bush, Masculinity, and America’s 

invasion of Panama City in 1989,” NeoAmericanist 1, no. 1 

(Fall/Winter 2005 – 6); and Eytan Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post–

Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter 

1995–96): 529. The commentary provides a good history of 

U.S. efforts to depose Noriega.

19. See Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 8–25. He observes that 

geography “is the starting point for understanding how and 

why” Iraqis see themselves. Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 

11. The Marine Corps produced the Iraq Tribal Study, which 

stands out as a model for cultural analysis and helped decode the beliefs and values of the Sunni Arabs of al-Anbar 

Province. These were derived from Bedouin tribal traditions, Islam, and Arab culture and shaped Sunni identity. 

They affected self-perceptions and expectations and directly 

affected Sunnis’ hostility to foreign domination that helped 

fuel resistance to the Coalition, until the Coalition adapted 

its strategy to successful COIN tactics and capitalized on 

al-Qaeda mistakes to turn the tide in al-Anbar. See Lin Todd 

et al., Iraq Tribal Study—Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd 

Tribe, the Albu Mahal Tribe, and the Albu Issa Tribe (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

Recognize Target Audience Culture as an Operational Environment | 65
Chapter 6

This chapter builds on the first five and provides a checklist of the key steps you should consider in 

building an effective strategic communication plan. The author’s political campaign colleague, Joseph 

Gaylord, whom the American Association of Political Consultants has named a campaign manager of 

the year and who was a founder of the National Republican Congressional Committee’s college for 

candidates and campaign managers, merits credit for shaping political consulting industry thinking on 

this topic.

Twenty-four Characteristics of a Communication Campaign Plan

1. Written down. Plans that are too complicated lead to miscommunication and confusion. Writing 

down a plan instills disciplined, clear thinking. You can revise, enhance, or deviate from it operationally, but a written plan provides a roadmap for prudent thinking. A written plan can be distributed to necessary parties to ensure they understand the commander’s intent and operational 

details. It helps avoid confusion or misunderstanding. You can refer to it again and again and reduce the risk of word-of-mouth misinterpretations, enhancements, or oversimplification.

2. Engages with stakeholders. Once a plan is written down and distributed, commanders at relevant levels should visit with the operators to make certain they understand, to answer questions, and to entertain suggestions.1

 Input from stakeholders maximizes the opportunity 

to spot and correct flaws, gain new perspectives, learn new options, and improve the plan.

3. Oriented toward winning. General George S. Patton is reputed to have declared: “America loves a 

winner and will not tolerate a loser. This is why America has never, and will never, lose a war.”2

Vince Lombardi put it this way: “Winning is not a sometime thing; it’s an all time thing. You don’t 

66

BUILDING YOUR STRATEGY—YOUR CHECKLIST
Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 67

win once in a while, you don’t do things 

right once in a while, you do them right all 

the time. Winning is a habit. Unfortunately, 

so is losing.”3

 A winning attitude inspires 

everyone around you. If you do not play to 

win, do not play. A strategy must exude that 

attitude and always aim to succeed.

4. Realistic. There is no point in executing a 

strategy that sets unrealistic goals. You need 

to assess the strategic situation objectively, 

examine the strengths and weaknesses of 

your narrative, measure how they stack up 

against those of the adversary, and devise 

an actionable, realistic plan. Plans that are 

confusing, unclear, too broad, untimely, or 

impossible to carry out become self-defeating. 

Plans need to be as simple as possible. Using 

a football analogy, Vince Lombardi won 

acclaim for an approach to coaching that 

focused on top-notch execution of what he 

termed the fundamentals in coaching, starting 

with making sure his players got fit and 

mastered the art of blocking and tackling. 

Campaigns that employ too many contingencies and too many elements risk failure 

through lack of coordination, integration, and 

cohesion. 

5. Divisible, with assigned responsibilities.

Information warfare plans often involve 

many moving pieces at many levels. The 

Fallujah battles offer a good example. Those 

involved in information operations and 

public affairs had to coordinate closely in 

communicating a narrative, story, themes, 

and messages to a broad range of Iraqi citizens — insiders and outsiders to politics and 

the military — local media, the international 

media, the international community, to those 

involved in the operations, and to Coalition 

forces generally. You have to divide the tasks, 

assign them with clear lines of responsibility 

for performance and clear lines of reporting, 

and ensure accountability.

6. Measurable to ensure progress. As much as 

possible, it is essential to know what parts of 

a plan are working, with whom, when, and 

why. Gaining that information enables you 

to either persevere with the current plan or 

improve on it with necessary adjustments to 

ensure success. Detecting problems enables 

you, at a minimum, to know what deficiencies are in your plan and hopefully solve 

them.4

In Iraq, Coalition leaders terminated the 

First Battle of Fallujah amid pressure levied 

by Iraqi political leaders and unfavorable 

media. They calculated that the cost of military victory outweighed the benefits, and 

as a result insurgents scored an enormous 

propaganda victory. Under new leadership 

later in 2004, the Coalition studied what 

had gone wrong in April and applied those 

lessons to win the second battle of Fallujah 

in November.

The presidential election in 2012 offers 

an appropriate analogy. Voters responded 

positively to candidate Mitt Romney’s 

performance in the first debate and poorly 

to incumbent Barack Obama. Obama went 

into the debate without making a serious 

effort to properly prepare. Obama is an 

extremely intelligent individual, but it strikes 

this author that he fell victim to conceit and 

underestimated his opponent. He did not 

articulate his ideas in a compelling or clear 

manner and did not seem presidential, and 

it appeared as though the debate was a 

nuisance to him.
President George H. W. Bush made 

a similar mistake in debating candidate 

William J. “Bill” Clinton in 1992 when he 

betrayed ignorance about the price of milk 

and kept looking at his watch. The message 

he conveyed was that he was too important 

to bother with explaining his record, views, 

or vision to voters. Bush was commonly 

regarded as one of the most gracious and 

talented individuals to occupy the Oval 

Office, but the president’s behavior during 

this debate turned off voters.

In 2012, Obama’s savvy team recognized that he needed to do better in the next 

two debates. They did not let hubris further 

obstruct the execution of the campaign. That 

held true for the candidate, as well. His team 

objectively assessed what Obama needed to 

do to improve and worked closely with him 

to correct the flaws evident during the first 

debate. Although some on his team maintained after the election that the outcome 

was never in doubt, the president took no 

chances. His preparation for the second and 

third debates was intensive, and he more than 

held his own with Romney in them. 

7. Shared with and distributed to relevant 

parties so everyone is on the same page. 

The failure to share key information with 

stakeholders and decision makers can turn 

success into a debacle. It produces gaps in 

information critical for decision making. It 

leaves unanswered key questions that make 

all the difference in whether or how an operation is carried out.

Consider Operation Eagle Claw, the 

failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 

1980. It illustrates the consequences when the 

plan is not shared with every party involved 

and the right questions are not asked—

or answers by those in the know are withheld in deference to the military hierarchy 

of decision making. This operation lacked 

unified command and an integrated mission 

rehearsal. The operational plan called for six 

helicopters. Lieutenant General Charles H. 

Pitman did the final briefing for Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. 

Jones. Pitman revealed years later that Jones 

had failed to ask whether the mission could 

be carried out with only five helicopters. 

Pitman failed to volunteer that information. 

That prevented Jones from communicating it 

to the White House and it proved a missing 

piece of information that governed whether 

the White House gave the green light or 

aborted the mission.5

The author interviewed former National 

Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski about 

what the White House knew about the operational plan. Brzezinski confirmed that he 

had not known the mission required only 

five helicopters. Although at the time of the 

interview and reflecting back on events, he 

was philosophical, at the time of the incident he had made clear that he would have 

urged President James E. “Jimmy” Carter to 

greenlight the rescue had there been a basis 

for doing so. There was one; he just did not 

know about it.

Ironically — here is a mystery — both the 

Delta Force commander, Army Colonel 

Charles A. Beckwith, and the Desert One 

commander, Air Force Colonel James H. Kyle, 

seemed unaware that the mission could be 

carried out, in Pitman’s view, with just five 

helicopters. Pitman worked with the helicopter teams and in interviews with the author, 

68 | Chapter 6
he was adamant that the rescue attempt using 

only five helicopters had been successfully 

rehearsed. This fact was never disclosed to 

the White House by either Jones or Defense 

Secretary Harold Brown.6

 The White House 

deferred to Beckwith, who decided to abort 

the mission. The issue is not whether Beckwith made the correct decision; it is the fact 

that vital information relevant to how decision makers viewed their options was not 

shared with them at a critical point. 

Perhaps Beckwith made the right call. 

That debate is for others to resolve. But hypothetically, presuming the mission had gone 

ahead and succeeded, a successful hostage 

rescue might have changed the outcome of 

the 1980 presidential election. It may have 

affected whether U.S. Special Operations 

Command, created in the wake of the operation’s failure, was established. Sharing 

information with those who matter makes a 

decisive difference.

8. Ensure unity of command and control. In the 

military, unity of command means that forces 

fall under one responsible commander who 

has the authority to direct all forces in pursuit 

of a unified purpose. In the words of one 

soldier, “one mission, one boss.”7

 The principles of unity of command are well known. 

It produces a better relationship between 

superiors and subordinates; clear authority, 

responsibility, and accountability; reduces 

duplication of work; facilitates rapid decision 

making; fosters good discipline; encourages 

teamwork; boosts morale and inspires a 

positive attitude; and leads to higher productivity.8

It seems common sense, but Iraq and 

Afghanistan illustrate where command and 

control was not unified. In Iraq, the ground 

commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo 

Sanchez, did not get on with Coalition Provisional Authority chief Paul Bremer. No one 

is willing to state exactly who empowered 

Bremer to do what. Not surprisingly, Coalition efforts between military and civilian 

officials were poorly coordinated and did 

not work well.

One reason that the Iraq surge worked 

well was that General David Petraeus and 

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker joined forces 

and worked cohesively as a team to provide 

coordinated leadership.9

In Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was generally at odds with military 

commanders. Journalists Mark Mazzetti 

and Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported strong 

differences between White House officials 

and Afghanistan-Pakistan envoy Richard 

Holbrooke.10 USAID had different ideas 

about civil reconstruction in Afghanistan 

than other officials. The U.S. Marines maintained control over their forces independent 

of General McChrystal.11 Chandrasekaran 

reported that Marine independence posed 

challenges in mounting a coordinated, 

winning effort in Afghanistan, although 

on-the-ground experts such as Jack Guy 

reported that he was unaware of Marines 

ever responding negatively to McChrystal, 

a highly admired and respected commander 

whose work in Iraq and the results he and his 

team produced are legendary.12

Eagle Claw was a mess because it lacked 

unity of command, to which the response 

afterwards — a good response — was the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to cut through 

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 69
inter-Service issues and assure unity of 

command for special operations. Failure to 

mount a cohesive effort for much of the time 

has been a challenge for the United States in 

Afghanistan.

9. Integrated with relevant command authorities. This is a corollary to the above precept. 

Lack of cohesion is self-defeating at all levels.

10. Forward-thinking and avoids fighting the 

preceding campaign. The changes that are 

sweeping the world are effecting a massive 

transformation. Terrorism and violent actors 

have become horizontally dispersed over 

distributed networks. Cyber capabilities, 

such as those employed in Iraq by Task Force 

145 to track down Zarqawi and in Afghanistan to find and eliminate bin Laden, have 

transformed the capacities for intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and 

the way warfare is conducted. The emergence of adversarial networks has mandated 

that U.S. forces develop their own networks, 

because it takes a network to beat one. The 

strategy to deal with those foes differed from 

the strategy used in Fallujah, although all 

efforts employed some of the same capabilities.

Future conflicts are likely to be asymmetrical, not set battles between two armies 

on a conventional battlefield. They will be, 

as British general Rupert Smith astutely 

has written, wars among people.13 Combatants and noncombatants will be physically 

entwined. 

In the future operating terrain, special 

operations forces (SOF) are shifting, as 

Admiral William H. McRaven (Ret) has 

stated, away from direct missions to focus on 

indirect missions.14 Strategies need to account 

for the new operating terrain and the challenges that new adversaries — or existing ones 

such as al-Qaeda — will present. 

Strategies and tactics need to keep pace 

with how the world is changing and how 

technology is evolving. World War I arguably 

offered the most dramatic example of leadership that failed to keep pace with changing 

technology. Millions of soldiers died or were 

wounded when nineteenth-century tactics 

confronted twentieth-century weapons.

11. Defines the keys to success. Communication strategy requires the development of a 

narrative, story, themes, and messages. These 

will be addressed below. They require understanding what factors provide the cutting 

edge that spells success, such as 

• Integrating narrative, story, themes, 

and messages into the variables that 

frame successful information warfare.

• Identifying the key points that strike 

a responsive chord with target audiences.

• Recognizing that audiences may 

not be a single, unified target. They 

may consist, as Colonel Thomas X. 

Hammes wrote, “of fragmented interest groups that shift sides depending on how a campaign affects their 

issues.”15

• Identifying the most credible messengers.

• Identifying the most credible channels 

of communication.

• Anticipating how an adversary will 

articulate messages advocating its 

ideas while discrediting yours.

• Anticipating and preparing to rebut 

adversary actions/responses. 

70 | Chapter 6
• Anticipating media coverage and how 

to address it. Hammes has described 

how, during the First Intifada in 1987, 

the Palestinians relied on the power of 

the international media to neutralize 

Israel’s military power and political 

process.16

• Recognizing that an organization’s or 

nation’s image can be shifted.17

• Recognizing that different sides may 

see a different message, even witnessing the same dynamics.18

• Understanding and allocating available resources to ensure the success of 

your communication strategy.

• Forging a clear plan that lays out your 

communication strategy.

• Defining metrics to evaluate success 

or failure.

• Recognizing that success does not 

require achieving 100 percent of your 

goals. A chance at 51 percent success 

may be all you can achieve, and it may 

be highly desirable.19

12. Defines team management and how the 

plan will be implemented. Effective communication strategy requires cohesive efforts 

by a team to achieve a clearly defined set of 

objectives. Identify:

• Who is on the team?

• Who is in charge of/leads the team?

• Who does the team leader report to, 

how, and when?

• What are they going to do; what are 

their responsibilities?

• Who will give instructions to various members of the team?

• Who will supervise what each team 

member does?

• How will performance be monitored?

• How will corrections or changes to 

strategy be made?

• How will communication within the 

team be facilitated?

• What timeline governs execution of 

the plan?

• How will the plan be integrated 

with efforts by other parties outside 

the team?

• How will monitoring be accomplished, and by whom?

• How will metrics be developed and 

applied, and by whom?

13. Defines how information strategy will coordinate with and be integrated into military

(kinetic) operations. Define how the plan 

integrates communications and kinetic operations. Define the challenges both sides 

confront. 

• What obstacles to success are posed? 

• What information strategy, operations, and tactics can overcome the 

obstacles, including enemy propaganda? 

• How will these integrate with kinetic operations envisioned by the military? 

• Who are the points of contact between kinetic and information aspects of an operation? 

• How will these parties coordinate 

their actions? 

• What processes or channels will be 

used to ensure coordination?

14. Integrates information and intelligence. Actionable information and intelligence are critical to communication strategy. Importantly, 

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 71
not all relevant intelligence affecting communication strategy is classified. Social media 

intelligence and open source data are often 

more valuable. So is grasping how the media 

may cover a story, and anticipating challenges and opportunities.20 Researching opinions 

and knowing what is flowing through the rumor mill matter.21

It is important to get your facts straight. 

The most effective communication strategies 

are rooted in facts and truth. Identify enemy 

lies and distortions; knowing their tactics offers keys to discrediting their narrative, stories, themes, and messages. In fact, rumors 

may be your medium.

Integrate information about key political players: where do they stand on specific 

issues and what are their likely or intended 

roles and responses? Both Fallujah battles 

provide a case study for why this information matters.

15. Provides for ongoing iteration and updates 

of information and intelligence. No strategic 

communication plan is set in stone. It should 

evolve and modify as events change. The iterative process requires keeping an open mind, 

reaching out for information, and forging a 

process to ensure that the communication 

team digests and processes new information 

and acts on it.

16. Addresses efforts to overcome language 

barriers. Translation proved a barrier in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Bing West suggested using Skype or other technology to link back 

to Americans who are fluent in particular 

languages or dialects with whom forwarddeployed personnel could connect in real 

time.22 He argues that in Afghanistan, units 

in the field “were not linked in real time with 

equally talented interpreters.”23 The United 

States failed to capitalize on the availability of thousands of Afghan-Americans fluent in tribal dialects who could have been 

linked. In his words, when a unit went outside the wire, every “farmer could be greeted by a friendly Pashto voice over a headset, 

while the patrol leader on another headset 

asked questions.” In West’s view, the United 

States squandered a significant high-tech advantage.24 The approach might have enabled 

the military to identify key leaders and players at the local level and create an actionable 

database about every male in every district. 

Solutions will vary according to time and circumstances. The key point is that mistakes in 

language translate into miscommunication. 

That can spell disaster in forging a communication strategy. Identify, anticipate, and devise a plan to surmount this challenge.

17. Cites helpful examples. This book has used 

examples throughout to illustrate challenges 

and solutions. Communication plans should 

do the same. They provide context and help 

the team to make sense of the narrative, story, themes, and messages that drive the strategies.

18. Has a vision. What kind of campaign are 

you creating? Is it tailored to the realities of 

the situation? Will it help achieve success? 

19. Defines the key players. Who is indispensable to success; important to success; helpful 

to success; unnecessary? Distinguish between 

these groups and tailor strategy and tactics 

for each.

20. Defines the need for collaboration and identifies collaborators. Whose help do you need 

to make the plan work? How are you going 

to get them on board? Who will be the points 

72 | Chapter 6
of contact? How will communication be facilitated? How will you establish and maintain operational security with them?

21. Defines the obstacles to success. Who presents them? What is behind the obstacles? 

Where do they occur? How do the obstacles 

manifest themselves? How tough are the obstacles to overcome? Why might the obstacles frustrate achievement of success? What 

has the opponent done in the past, what is he 

doing now ,  and what he is likely to do that 

creates obstacles? What sources and credible 

information inform you about the obstacles?

22. Defines how each action step in the plan 

connects to and helps surmount the identified obstacles, considers targets of opportunity, and makes provision to address 

unanticipated or new obstacles. Message 

discipline and focused messaging connect 

action in a way targeted to surmount obstacles. Events, distractions, and unanticipated 

problems can distort action. Communication strategy may look easy on paper, but 

execution can prove fragile. Focus on the 

objective and overcoming defined obstacles. 

Deal with other issues separately. Important 

to note is that most influence activities do 

not take place overnight. These programs 

take time, tweaking, and constant evaluation. Senior leaders must recognize that 

reaction to a specific event will normally 

come from the public affairs staff, in conjunction with the IO plan and operators.

23. Budgets the resources a campaign requires.

Define financial costs and define the resources required: people, assets, technology, and 

transportation — everything a plan requires. 

Define communication requirements in 

terms of physical assets to get the job done, 

from cameras and recording devices to cyber 

capabilities.

24. Lays a strong foundation for an information 

campaign. Like building a house, without 

the foundational roots, your plan will wobble and eventually crumble under pressure. 

• Understand what comprises success.

• Create a series of steps that build visibility and awareness for an issue.

• Take steps to ensure that a target 

audience understands the issue or 

action you are addressing. Only believable or credible actions or messages create support, motivation, 

and mobilization of support.

• Define the objectives.

• Conduct thorough target audience 

analysis.

• Get organized.

• Think through the plan carefully.

• Identify where you will acquire the 

knowledge required to forge a winning campaign and how you will access it.

• Obtain as many ideas and as much 

input as possible.

• Understand how, if it becomes visible, different parts of the news media 

will cover the story and how to drive 

a positive message about why and 

what is being done, and the results 

achieved.

• Set a timeline. When do you want 

what portion accomplished?

Narrative, Story, Theme, and Message

Key precept: control the debate and discourse by 

positioning your narrative, from which flow story, 

theme, and message. 

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 73
Narrative provides the broader context.25 For 

example, in World War II, America fought for the 

four freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. 

The stories that flow from that narrative involve 

character, time, space, events, and objective placed 

in settings and recounted for rhetorical purposes.26 The United States invaded Normandy to free 

Western Europe from the Nazis and open a second front to crush Hitler. The themes included the 

notion that American forces stood against tyranny 

and evil, while one message was that America 

would fight until the Nazis were defeated.

In Iraq, al-Qaeda invoked the crusader narrative: Christian crusaders arrived to oppress Muslims, killing more than 200,000 until the heroic 

Saladin drove them out.27 The core narrative was 

that “non-Arab, non-Muslim invaders” steal 

riches from Arab lands “while proclaiming allegiance . . . to a more righteous religion.”28 Modern crusaders, allied with Israel, had returned 

to plunder Iraqi resources, torturing Iraqis and 

keeping them weak, using the government as a 

puppet. Iraqis must do something—rise up in 

opposition and kill Americans. The theme was 

American oppression; the message was that 

Americans would stop at nothing to oppress Islam 

and steal Iraqi wealth.

Similarly, in 1994, Republicans won control of 

the U.S. House of Representatives. They invoked 

a narrative: taxes, spending, and big government 

deprive America of its future. Their story was 

that Democrats wanted to raise taxes to fund big 

spending programs that benefited other people. 

The theme was that Republicans supported a contract with America to save the future. The message was that Republicans stood for the middle 

class, less government, lower taxes, and a balanced budget while Democrats stood for special 

interests, big government, higher taxes, and an 

out-of-control deficit.

Each strategic situation was different, but the 

requirements for communication strategy in each 

was the same. Communication strategy needs a 

strong narrative, stories, theme(s) and message(s). 

To define these, ask:

What are the issues? Frame the issues. What is 

this conflict or engagement about? What cause are 

you fighting? People need something to believe 

in—people, ideas, concepts. Information strategy 

should explain these and make them clear to build 

motivation and support.

Who are the players? Who are the stakeholders? Who does the outcome affect? Who are the 

potential winners and losers — and why? For what 

cause or outcome are the players fighting? This includes the host nation.

What are the motivations and choices? Define 

the stakes and the choices. People must decide. 

A communication plan should make clear what 

winning and losing means to affected audiences. 

Such choices may impact different audiences differently.

Example: in countering violent extremism, 

the United States has pushed a message that 

it stands for a future rooted in hope, jobs, 

opportunity, and security while violent extremists offer one rooted in fear, poverty, repression, and violence.

Example: al-Qaeda in Iraq drew on the narrative of the Crusades to argue that the new 

war was a continuation of an old one, reviving past ambitions of infidel foreigners to 

subdue Muslims and pillage their wealth. 

Therefore, the stakes were Iraqi pride, culture, security, religion, and integrity versus 

brutal occupiers who exploited Muslims. The 

Taliban has argued a similar choice.

74 | Chapter 6
Example: during the 2012 presidential campaign, President Obama defined the election 

as a test for whether voters would elect a 

president for the rich and powerful, who admits he ignores 47 percent of the people, or 

one who will promote social justice and prosperity for all Americans.

Example: historian Steven Casey has documented the remarkable challenges that confronted Franklin Roosevelt in mobilizing 

Americans for war even after Pearl Harbor. 

People were angry at Japan (not Germany), 

but the cry to go after the Japanese was far 

more muted than films portray. As Casey put 

it, the attitude of most Americans was “permissive rather than pressuring,” and few 

Americans were “calling vehemently for an 

immediate attack.”29 Even in late 1942, Casey 

observes, Roosevelt worried about uniting 

Americans behind the war effort.30

As late as July 1942, Winston Churchill was 

arguing for an offensive in the Mediterranean. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to forget about 

fighting Germany and strike at Japan. Roosevelt overruled them and insisted on action 

against Germany in 1942. His firm decision 

making led to Operation Torch, the invasion 

of North Africa.31 But first, he had to persuade 

Americans that Germany was a problem. People recognized that Hitler and the Nazis were 

evil, but that sentiment did not transfer to the 

Germans as a people. Indeed, Roosevelt took 

care to distinguish between the two, but—perhaps surprisingly — stirring up Americans to 

fight Hitler as an evil monster bent on world 

domination was a challenge. 

His strategy is relevant to operations today. Here is how Roosevelt—a smart leader 

who played his cards close to the vest—went 

about solving the problem. He understood 

that the key to demonizing Hitler lay in 

making his evil understandable. There was 

no CNN at that time, and many Americans 

found the scale of German atrocities that 

were unfolding hard to believe. There was 

surprising (for modern audiences) support 

for a compromise peace if the German Army 

tossed out Hitler and agreed to stop the war 

and discuss peace.32

How did Roosevelt make the truth understandable? In June 1942, he selected a single event, the 

Nazis’ brutal retaliation in Lidice for Reinhard 

Heydrich’s assassination, to illustrate evil. The administration’s plan included five elements:33

1. Used prominent, credible voices including Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, and Rex Stout to 

attest to German barbarity, countering skepticism among many Americans who doubted 

the Germans were capable of such atrocities.

2. Used experts who discussed how the Nazis 

were desecrating religion and using slave 

labor.

3. Avoided exaggeration and let the facts — which 

were compelling — speak for themselves. They 

avoided over-dramatization.

4. Focused on Nazi atrocities against civilians in 

occupied countries. They cited the Nazis’ own 

figures for those executed — in the hundreds, 

rather than the thousands — being slaughtered, 

as the smaller figure would provoke outrage 

and was more comprehensible and believable.

5. Named names, and let the culprits know the 

world was watching. It is surprising how often those who commit atrocities — including 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban — point the finger 

at other parties. That was also true of the Nazis. They tried to conceal, not publicize, their 

worst atrocities.

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 75
All of these strategies are applicable to wars 

such as in Iraq and Afghanistan and conflicts in 

East Africa with terrorist organizations like AlShabaab.

What is your rationale? Define a credible rationale relevant to target audiences. Credible rationales 

answer the following questions:

1. Why are we doing what we do?

2. How are we doing it?

3. What does it mean to targeted audiences? 

How do they benefit?

4. Why should they support our cause — or at 

least stay neutral and avoid supporting the 

enemy?

Is your message clear? Ensure message clarity 

so that audiences will better hear and understand. 

Apply the tenets of the Maxwell Grid, developed 

by nationally renowned political consultant John 

Maxwell.34 The message grid asks five confluent 

questions:

1. What do we say about ourselves?

2. What do we say about our adversary?

3. What does the adversary say about itself?

4. What does the adversary say about us?

5. Do we do what we say we do?

Compare and contrast judgments. Then make 

judgments as to which messages define a credible 

rationale and provide a foundation for a strong 

narrative, story, theme, and message that support 

a cause. 

Caveat: do not allow ideology fostered by politicians to blind your strategy to an objective analysis. U.S. forces entered Iraq in April 2003, and by 

October–November 2003, violence against them 

had begun to escalate. U.S. Central Command 

commander, General John Abizaid, correctly termed 

the situation a classical guerrilla war. Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his close advisors rejected reality, insisting the violence was a 

product of Baathist “dead-enders” trying to regain 

power or by foreign fighters who had aligned with 

the Baathists.35 Effective communication strategy 

requires a clear-eyed, objective assessment of what 

is happening, not political fantasy.

Does your message resonate? Reason persuades, 

but emotion motivates. The key to motivation is 

using images, symbols, or stories that tap into the 

emotions and experiences in an audience, stimulate 

a response, and channel that response in support of 

your cause.36 This is why thorough target audience 

analysis with ongoing revision is so important.

Example: The “Daisy” television advertisement created for President Lyndon B. Johnson’s reelection campaign in 1964 was shown 

only once to a national U.S. political audience during a broadcast of “Monday Night 

at the Movies.” It opens with a little girl 

picking petals off a daisy. She counts aloud. 

As her count reaches 10, the image freezes. 

The camera zooms to her eye as an off-screen 

announcer calls the countdown. As it reaches 

one, the viewer is in the center of her pupil, 

where a nuclear explosion is overlaid. The 

voice of Johnson pronounces, as mushroom 

clouds rise, “These are the stakes: to make a 

world in which all God’s children can live, or 

to go into the dark. We must either love each 

other or we must die.”37

The advertisement wrecked the campaign 

of Republican candidate Senator Barry M. 

Goldwater, about whom voters felt uncomfortable in the face of accusations that he had 

an itchy finger on the nuclear trigger. The 

creator of the advertisement, formally titled 

“Peace, Little Girl,” Tony Schwartz, said that 

Goldwater could and should have countered 

it by endorsing it and offering to pay for it—

coopting the message.38 Instead, the Gold76 | Chapter 6
water campaign cratered, became defensive, 

and never regained lost momentum.

Example: al-Qaeda tried to enforce its rule by 

ruthlessly beheading opponents. The goal was 

to instill fear. It achieved that goal masterfully. 

Unfortunately for the terrorist organization, 

this backfired, rousing the anger and hatred 

of Iraqis and helping motivate them — especially tribes in al-Anbar Province — to oppose 

them. Similarly, in Somalia, the violence of 

Al-Shabaab perpetrated on Somalis for even 

simple things like ringing a bell — which the 

al-Qaeda group said reminded people of 

Christianity — instead rang a bell in the hearts 

of citizens and helped turn many Somalis 

against it.

Example: prior to the Second Battle of 

Fallujah, U.S. forces took Iraqi counterparts 

to see the iron mountain of logistics built 

up to support the looming November 2004 

attack. The sight had a great emotional impact, 

boosting morale and persuading Iraqis that 

they were on the winning side.

Do you have credible messengers? Fallujah illustrates the need to use messengers who have credibility with target audiences. During the November 

2004 battle, Coalition leaders put Iraqi leaders out 

front, to report and to articulate the narrative, story, 

themes, and messages. They correctly judged that 

Iraqis were more credible messengers to Iraqis than 

Americans. The same lesson has been applied in 

the Philippines, where U.S. special operations forces 

have maintained a low profile in favor of Filipinos, 

who have taken the lead in combating violent actors 

like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro 

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on the island of 

Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Host nation 

spokespersons make the best messengers, in words 

and actions.39

On the other side of the coin, the fact that Zarqawi and a lot of his fighters were foreigners, not Iraqis, hurt their credibility in appealing to Iraqis, who 

perceived that despite a common Arab ethnic background, the foreigners shared different beliefs and 

values. That helped undercut al-Qaeda’s credibility.

Are you using the right channels of communication? Choose channels of communication that 

your target audience accesses and trusts. The most 

effective way to communicate with target audiences is face-to-face. That helps build bonds of 

trust. You have to have friends before they are 

needed, not just when they come in handy. In 

many cultures around the world, tribal cultures 

facilitate and accentuate the importance of kinship 

ties and personal engagement and communication. In al-Anbar Province, that engagement was 

integral to the success of U.S. Marines in forging 

bonds of trust with Iraqi tribes. To build the necessary trust, you must:

1. Identify the channels through which target 

audiences receive information. In Africa and 

many developing nations, radio is an important channel through which people receive 

information. That has been notably true in 

Somalia. But avoid hasty generalization. You 

need to ascertain how credible the radio station is. If audiences perceive that it reflects the 

views of a particular party or ideology, they 

will make allowances. The Rwandan genocide proved that radio in the hands of racial extremists — there, the Hutu — could be a 

deadly weapon.40

2. The internet offers important channels of 

communication. It is especially useful in 

disseminating information to the media. In 

Afghanistan, the Taliban has been adept at 

exploiting the internet to distribute videos 

of its purported successes to online media to 

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 77
reach urban audiences while depending upon 

radio to reach those in rural areas. Looking 

ahead, internet access is exploding exponentially, especially among younger populations in the southern and eastern regions of 

the globe. There were more than 4.1 billion 

internet users as of December 2018, compared 

to 3.9 billion in mid-2018 and 3.7 billion 

in 2017. Asia has the most internet users, 

accounting for 49 percent of all internet users 

(down from about 50 percent in 2017). Europe 

is a runner-up with 16.8 percent of all internet 

users. China has the most users: 802 million; it 

accounts for one-half of the users worldwide, 

trailed by India, with more than 500 million 

users.41

3. Paid media, speeches, print, flyers, night 

letters (e.g., unsigned leaflets distributed 

clandestinely) — there are endless ways to 

communicate a message. The key is to select 

what works. Be aware of accessible channels, 

evaluate in what context they are most credible and to whom, figure out how to gain 

access, and employ them properly.

Are you using the right language to communicate your message? Native language is one challenge. Using the correct words is another and can 

alter receptivity to your message. 

The choice of campaign title for Fallujah in 

November 2004 is a good example. Prime Minister 

Allawi insisted on renaming Operation Phantom 

Fury as al-Fajr, which translates to New Dawn. The 

messages contained within the operation names 

were different. One suggested the use of force to 

achieve objectives while the other indicated that 

the battle was about a better future.

The Global War on Terrorism illustrates how 

an innocent mistake can boomerang. During 

remarks on arrival at the south lawn of the White 

House on 16 September 2001, President George 

W. Bush announced, “This crusade, this war 

on terrorism is going to take a while.”42 Europeans whose support Bush was hoping to elicit 

cringed.43 Al-Qaeda jumped into action, quoting 

his statement frequently and producing a video 

that elicited the narrative of the Crusades to paint 

the invasion of Iraq as a modern sequel to repress 

Islam and loot Muslim lands.44

Does your message enable coalition-building 

and persuade new allies? American political 

leaders tend to articulate messages about foreign 

policy in ways that appeal to domestic audiences. 

But it is essential to appeal to and inspire allies, 

as well. That is a function of words, symbols, and 

actions.

The U.S. Marines in al-Anbar depended on 

deeds more than anything else to build coalitions. 

We have discussed the efforts of the Marines at 

length. Richard Shultz provides the best account 

of how they succeeded in winning the trust of 

Iraqi tribes in al-Anbar, who united with them to 

turn the tide against al-Qaeda.45

President George H. W. Bush demonized 

Saddam Hussein to galvanize support for Operation Desert Storm but was careful in his statecraft 

with foreign leaders to pledge that once Kuwait 

was liberated and Saddam defeated, American 

forces would halt the war. That commitment, 

expressed in clear language and backed by his 

action, enabled Bush to assemble a broad international coalition to take on Saddam. The president’s 

messaging was an adroit use of communication to arouse support at home — a key center of 

gravity for the war — while also enlisting a very 

wide range of support within the international 

community — also a key center of gravity for the 

war, backed by a UN Security Council resolution, which conferred legitimacy upon the war.46

78 | Chapter 6
Can you neutralize those who will not support 

your campaign? The first aim of an information 

strategy is to win over people. The second is to 

deny their support to the opposition. Conflicts 

often do not draw every member of a population into their midst. Counterinsurgency expert 

David Galula pointed out that insurgents aim to 

win over the population, or at least keep it submissive.47 While Galula focused on counterinsurgency, 

his point applies frequently to political situations. 

While many people refrain from becoming politically active or taking sides, especially in controversial matters, you do not need the entire population 

to support your cause. One may achieve success by 

persuading specific elements of the population that 

is sitting on the cross-benches. A relatively small 

shift of three to five percent of the population can 

prove decisive to winning a campaign.48

Can you persuade your adversary’s allies 

that you will win and the adversary will lose, to 

neutralize these allies or gain their support? Information strategy should motivate those aligned 

with the opposition to move at least to a position 

of neutrality, either on the merits of an argument 

or by persuading audiences that the opposition is 

going to lose. People do not like to be on the losing 

side. In warfare, the stakes for individuals are high 

for their security or survival.49 Motivate means 

motivate to act; behavior, not merely influencing 

attitudes or opinions, is the goal.50

1. Create effective themes and messages that 

support your objectives. Great intentions fall 

flat without clarity of message to support 

buy-in from target audience(s).

• Describe, define, and differentiate 

your story from your narrative. The 

nature of story was discussed previously. Good stories explain what is 

being done and why in personal terms; 

they are about actions people take; 

they must communicate that action 

benefits target audiences.

• Messages flow from narrative and 

story. Keep core messages simple 

and concise. The themes to carry 

your messages should support, more 

concisely, what you are doing and why. 

Use the message grid to compare your 

narrative, story, theme, and message 

to the enemy’s and see how they stack 

up. Where is your edge? Where is 

theirs? How do you strengthen yours 

and overcome theirs? 

• Frame the issue. Define what is at 

stake. What are the choices? Who 

wins? Who loses? Define the stakes 

in terms that benefit your cause; 

this will fundamentally affect where 

people stand. The definition of what 

the United States and al-Qaeda each 

stand for is a good example. The issue 

at stake is the future. The choices include hope or pessimism; wealth or 

poverty; security or fear; and freedom 

or repression.

• Messaging is an iterative process. You 

may start with or give emphasis to a 

particular message, then evolve it or 

shift to other messages. This holds true 

in the language and slogans used to 

help drive themes and messages, even 

though the content remains consistent.

• Create a message timeline. Release 

messages on a defined timeline using 

media best suited for the target audience. Some are best reserved for later. 

Ensure you have several messages in 

reserve should the campaign require 

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 79
modification or should the first fail to 

resonate. Messaging should be supportive to operations and care should be 

taken not to commit message fratricide. 

This is why timelines are so important 

at every level. 

• Define the target audiences. Different 

audiences may respond differently to 

different messages. Be consistent—

especially across a theater of operations — but tailor messages to strike a 

responsive chord with particular audiences. The inconsistency of tactics in 

Iraq in 2003 – 4 created confused messaging and undercut Coalition credibility to Iraqis.

• Be memorable. Being memorable is 

about being concise and relevant, and 

striking an emotionally responsive 

chord. Think of messages as a bumper 

sticker: short, to the point, easily repeatable. In politics, these are sometimes 

referred to as “zingers.” The caveat: 

zingers lose their energy when overused. A zinger connected to a deed 

achieves double the impact.

• Respond to attacks. Unanswered negative messages become truth to audiences, especially if repeated by multiple 

parties in multiple channels over time. 

Answer attacks in the medium in which 

they are launched and respond quickly. 

Thus, if an opponent attacks on radio, 

use radio to answer. If the attack is 

done on social media, respond on social 

media.

2. Mobilize your target audience(s). Identify, 

define, and segment target audiences and ascertain what it will take to get their attention and 

mobilize their support. There is no formula. 

There are multiple methods for targeting, and 

some may need to be used in concert with one 

another. Use multiple channels simultaneously 

and activate networks that enable their use—

personal contact, news media, social media, 

paid media, and print.

3. Understand and potentially employ communication strategy unconventionally. The Russian doctrine of reflexive control innovatively 

seeks to employ information to the enemy to 

exert control over him.51 Timothy Thomas cites 

Colonel S. A. Komov’s key elements to information warfare that he deemed vital. Each of 

these should be factored into whether they may 

strengthen a communication strategy:

• Distraction, by creating a real or imaginary threat to one of the enemy’s most 

vital locations (flanks, rear, etc.) during 

the preparatory stages of combat operations, thereby forcing them to reconsider the wisdom of their decisions to 

operate along this or that axis; 

• Overload, by frequently sending the 

enemy a large amount of conflicting 

information; 

• Paralysis, by creating the perception 

of a specific threat to a vital interest or 

weak spot; 

• Exhaustion, by compelling the enemy 

to carry out useless operations, thereby 

entering combat with reduced resources; 

• Deception, by forcing the enemy to 

reallocate forces to a threatened region 

during the preparatory stages of combat 

operations; 

• Division, by convincing the enemy that 

he must operate in opposition to coalition interests; 

80 | Chapter 6
• Pacification, by leading the enemy to 

believe that pre-planned operational 

training is occurring rather than offensive preparations, thus reducing their 

vigilance; 

• Deterrence, by creating the perception 

of insurmountable superiority; 

• Provocation, by forc[ing] them into taking action advantageous to your side; 

• Suggestion, by offering information 

that affects the enemy legally, morally, 

ideologically, or in other areas; and 

• Pressure, by offering information that 

discredits the government in the eyes 

of its population.52

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 81

1. Although he fared less successfully as a political candidate, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 

Gen Wesley K. Clarke, USA, earned respect from people 

for doing that. The late Col Daniel D. Devlin Sr. cited a case 

in which Clarke and his staff had devised four options and 

laid them out at a meeting, after which, the room cleared; 

Devlin stayed behind. Clarke asked him what was on his 

mind, and Devlin proposed consolidating two of the ideas 

and substituting a new one. A flag officer also in the room 

tried to cut Devlin off, but Clarke told the admiral to be quiet and listened patiently as Devlin laid out his suggestion. 

Clarke nodded and said, “That’s a better idea than the one 

I had.” Clarke ordered the admiral to reassemble the staff 

and announced that Devlin had offered an improvement 

that would be incorporated into his plan. Clarke then visited all of the action officers involved in the operation to 

make certain that his commander’s intent was clear, to satisfy questions, and to take suggestions. That is the epitome 

of good leadership. Col Devlin, conversation with author, 

February 2008.

2. “Quotes,” GeneralPatton.com, accessed 5 May 2018. 

3. Hannah Hutyra, “115 Vince Lombardi Quotes to Use in the 

Game of Life,” KeepInspiring.me, accessed 5 May 2018. 

4. See MajGen Michael T. Flynn, USA (Ret), Capt Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for 

Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: 

Center for a New American Security, 2010). Their excellent 

report offers sweeping changes to the way the intelligence 

community thinks about itself from a focus on the enemy 

to a focus on the population. Focusing too many resources 

“and brainpower on insurgent groups” has left the intelligence apparatus, they argue, “unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate 

and the people we are trying to persuade.” Flynn, Pottinger, 

and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, 4. They propose specific initiatives to solve the problem using field analysts to collect 

information at the grassroots, much like journalists; integrating information collected by all stakeholders (civilian 

and military); dividing work along geographical instead of 

functional lines and provided district assessments covering 

governance, development, and stability; providing data to 

teams of information brokers in regional commands as part 

of stability operations information centers to organize and 

disseminate information; placing the information centers 

under and in cooperation with State Department senior 

civilian representatives administering governance, development, and stability efforts in regional commands; and 

ensuring that the information centers are staffed by “the 

most, most extroverted and hungriest analysts.” Flynn et 

al., Fixing Intel, 4 – 5.

Endnotes
82 | Chapter 6

5. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 124.

6. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview with author, March 

2016. Brzezinski says they relied on that information and 

deferred to Beckwith when he decided to abort the mission. But at the time, Brzezinski acknowledged deep angst 

about whether to recommend to President Carter to order 

the mission to proceed.

7. MSgt Justin Strain, “Unity of Command Still Important 

Principle,” Joint Base Charleston (website), 16 August 2007.

8. See, for example, Gaurav Akrani, “Unity of Command 

Principle — Meaning Example Advantages,” Kalyan City 

Life (blog), 3 February 2012.

9. See Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus 

and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New 

York: Penguin Press, 2009).

10. See Chandrasekaran, Little America; and Mazzetti, The Way 

of the Knife.

11. Chandrasekaran, Little America.

12. Jack Guy, interview with author, June 2013.

13. Gen Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 

Modern World (London: Penguin, 2006).

14. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense 

Program before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 113th 

Cong. (5 March 2013) (posture statement of Adm William 

H. McRaven, USN, commander, U.S. Special Operations 

Command), 19–24.

15. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 214. Hammes’s book is 

essential reading. The corollary to his point in politics is that 

while one may expect people to take one side or another on 

tough issues, in reality they stand on both sides of them.

16. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, chapter 8, 89–110, 207. 

Hammes offers an incisive description of how the First Intifada succeeded using peaceful tactics while the second, 

in 1993, which employed violence, backfired. These are 

important case studies, superbly described and analyzed.

During the First Intifada, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) published pamphlets ordering demonstrators 

to refrain from using weapons. PLO leaders understood 

that an uprising by a discontented population that could 

focus its anger “could not match the Israelis in a conflict 

based on the use of weapons. It simply gave the Israelis 

license to use lethal force.” Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 

99. He noted that weapons would also eliminate a powerful image: that of young Palestinians armed with rocks 

and bottles facing heavily armed Israeli troops. The PLO 

formed an anonymous Unified National Command (UNC) 

and produced handbills warning not to use weapons and 

defining what the PLO viewed as achievable goals. Women 

and children interposed between Israeli security forces and 

demonstrators where television cameras were present and 

forged tactics to ensure their presence, providing drivers, 

translators, vehicles, access, passports, and contact. The Palestinians drove two messages. One portrayed the fight to 

the international community as a contest between a brave 

and oppressed people against a brutal occupier. The second 

argued to Israelis that there would be no peace while Israelis 

occupied West Bank territories. Palestinians employed welldressed, articulate spokespeople to convey their messages 

through multiple channels: the media, international forums, 

conferences, even Israeli soldiers who, Hammes writes, had 

trouble reconciling the firing of rubber bullets at teenagers 

and women going about their business with their self-image 

as protectors of Israel. The impact of these tactics paralyzed 

Israelis, whose leadership failed to grasp the dynamics at 

play and thus failed to develop a coherent response. The 

Palestinians succeeded in persuading their side that Israel 

could be resisted while damaging Israel’s reputation in the 

international community. 

17. During the Second Intifada, Israel’s shrewd prime minister, 

Ariel Sharon, capitalized on Palestinian violence to turn the 

tables on Palestinians, who turned themselves into international pariahs through use of suicide attacks and bombings. 

The stupidity of Palestinian tactics shifted the narrative 

away from peace for land to one about a battle to destroy 

Israel. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 125.

18. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 128, describes the lessons 

Hammes drew from the two intifadas.

19. This is a point Ambassador Brian Carlson stresses in teaching public diplomacy to foreign service officers, and he is 

correct.

20. Bremer and his team did not do this during the First Battle 

of Fallujah and paid a stiff price for their failure. The team 

that led the second battle did, and it paid huge dividends.

21. In Iraq, al-Qaeda spread rumors about vaccinations administered by U.S. veterinarians to cattle. Rumors can create 

destructive anxiety by making plausible connections between concrete events and real social anxieties. The bovine 

poisoning rumor had a narrative, story, theme, and message, which was: the Crusades were a Western attempt to 

pillage and destroy Islam; today, U.S. forces are repeating 

the pattern. This narrative provided context. The bovine 

story invoked the crusader narrative to tell a story about 

“non-Arab/non-Muslim invaders plunder[ing] Arab lands 

for riches while proclaiming allegiance to a high power and 

a more righteous religion.” This narrative defined the U.S. 

occupation across Iraq: that U.S. forces were poisoning cattle, using helicopters to stir up dust storms, and using technologies to cause draught as they invaded Iraq to pillage oil 

fields. The rumor portrayed American forces as an existential threat and the Iraq government as weak and ineffective. 

The message delivered was: Iraqis must rise and resist the 

occupation. This example is drawn from Daniel Leonard 

Bernardi et al., Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extrem-
ism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (New Brunswick, 

NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), an excellent study of 

the nature and impact of rumor-mongering. See also Cass R. 

Sunstein, On Rumors: Why Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe 

Them, What Can Be Done (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009); Patrick B. Mullen, “Modern Legend and Rumor 

Theory,” Journal of the Folklore Institute 9, no. 2 (1972): 95–109, 

https://doi.org/10.2307/3814160; and Nicholas DiFonzo, 

The Water Cooler Effect: A Psychologist Explores the Extraordinary Power of Rumors (New York: Avery, 2008).

22. Bing West, The Wrong War, 176. West delivers a searing indictment of the Afghan war. He argues that talented generals such as David Petraeus, Stanley McChrystal, and others 

lacked required support from Washington. He believes the 

corrupt, incompetent Afghan government and the sanctuary provided to the Taliban in Pakistan rendered victory 

unachievable.

23. West, The Wrong War, 176. West observes that the Pentagon ignored Google’s assertion that it could translate voice 

from one language to another in less than a second. Yet, 

technology could prove counterproductive. West says that 

battlefield update assessments substituted arms-length information/intelligence input to generals for whom gaining 

a strategic or tactical appreciation is possible only by being 

on the ground.

24. West, The Wrong War, 176.

25. In academic terms, Professor Edward Branigan defines narrative as a “perceptual activity that organizes data into a 

special pattern which represents and explains experience.” 

It organizes events into a chain with a beginning, middle, 

and end that “embodies a judgment about the nature of 

events as well as well as demonstrates how it is possible 

to know, and hence to narrate, the events.” It is a way we 

organize events to understand the world. Edward Branigan, 

Narrative Comprehension and Film (New York: Routledge, 

1992), 3. Politically, narrative provides the context for action 

that enables people to give it meaning.

26. See Chong et al., Narrative Landmines, loc. 332 of 2523, Kindle. Their explanation of the relationship between narrative 

and story is excellent. Edward Branigan describes story as 

a “mental reconstruction of some of the events of the narrative which are not witnessed by the spectator.” Branigan, 

Narrative Comprehension and Film, 119–20.

27. Chong et al., Narrative Landmines, loc. 456 of 2623, Kindle.

28. Chong et al., Narrative Landmines, loc. 1056 of 2523, Kindle.

29. Casey, Cautious Crusade, 89, loc. 2333–2340 of 8464, Kindle.

30. Casey, Cautious Crusade, 78, loc. 2112 of 8464, Kindle.

31. In Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Centurions: FDR and the 

Commanders He Led to Victory in World War II (New York: 

Random House, 2013), 221, the historian suggests that Operation Torch was partly motivated originally by Roosevelt’s 

desire to win a victory that would bolster Democratic prospects in the 1942 elections, although Dwight Eisenhower 

decided on 8 November — five days after the election — for 

the invasion. In opting for North Africa, Persico recounts 

that Roosevelt rejected Gen George Marshall’s preference 

for an early invasion of France. Persico, Roosevelt’s Centurions, 184 – 90.

32. Casey, Cautious Crusade, 76, loc. 2082 of 8464, Kindle.

33. Casey, Cautious Crusade, 68 – 70, loc. 1819 – 1832 of 8464, 

Kindle.

34. Discussed in Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 222.

35. See Urban, Task Force Black, 25 – 26; and West, No True Glory, 

21. Richard Schultz argues the same point in The Marines 

Take Anbar.

36. For full descriptions of what this means, see Farwell, Persuasion and Power; James P. Farwell, “Violence as Propaganda,” Survival 54, no. 5 (October–November 2012): 203 – 14, 

https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2012.728353; and James 

P. Farwell, “Jihadi Video in the ‘War of Ideas,’ ” Survival 52, 

no. 6 (December 2010 – January 2011): 127 – 50, https://doi

.org/10.1080/00396338.2010.540787.

37. Library of Congress, “ ‘Daisy’ Ad (1964): Preserved from 

35mm in the Tony Schwartz Collection,” 7 September 2016, 

video, YouTube. 

38. Tony Schwartz and Monique Luiz, Peace, Little Girl: [Daisy 

political spot] (1964) political television advertisement, Tony 

Schwartz Collection, Library of Congress, video.

39. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) launched Operation 

Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) in January 2002. 

The operation illustrates special warfare by, with, and 

through partners in working to satisfy mutual security interests. The 2002 Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) exercise 

that killed terrorist Abu Sabaya had Philippine troops in the 

lead, with the United States providing only tactical training, 

ISR, logistical, and civil affairs support. See Mark Bowden, 

“Jihadists in Paradise,” Atlantic, 1 March 2007; and Maj Matthew J. Gomlak (USA) and Maj Stephen Fenton (USAF), 

“Real Results: Military Partnerships in the Philippines,” 

Special Warfare 25, no. 3 (July–September 2012): 37. The 

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), 

consisting of 600 SOF personnel, has continued to provide 

assistance to the Philippine forces.

40. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, which examines how radio was used as a weapon to kill in Rwanda.

41. “Internet Stats and Facts for 2019,” HostingFacts.com, accessed 13 August 2019.

42. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Remarks by the 

President upon Arrival,” press release, 16 September 2001.

43. Peter Ford, “Europe Cringes at Bush ‘Crusade’ against Terrorists,” Christian Science Monitor, 19 September 2001. 

44. Al-Qaeda, “The Return of the Crusaders,” 7 September 

2005, Archive.org, video, 38:46. Farwell, “Jihadi Video in 

the ‘War of Ideas,’ ” discusses the video.

Building Your Strategy—Your Checklist | 83
45. Schultz, The Marines Take Anbar.

46. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678, Iraq-Kuwait, S/RES/678, (29 November 1990).

47. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 5.

48. This also holds true in U.S. politics. The Obama reelection 

campaign in 2012 spent nearly $1 billion. Enormous portions of these funds were directed to identifying, recruiting, 

and mobilizing new voters, persuading a narrow band of 

swing voters and emerging base voters to get out and vote. 

Similar tactics decided the 2012 U.S. Senate race in Colorado, and target audience analysis was equally decisive in the 

recount that decided the 2012 U.S. Senate race, as Al Franken’s team figured out which of the contested ballots were 

more likely to support his campaign and focused efforts on 

getting those counted. A small number of voters decided the 

outcome of both races. See Sasha Issenberg, The Victory Lab: 

The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns (New York: Crown, 

2012), a fascinating discussion of cutting-edge voter identification and turnout efforts utilizing scientific methods.

49. Convincing the al-Anbar tribes that the Coalition forces 

would prevail was, as Richard Shultz observed, a key element to the success of U.S. Marines. As World War II broke 

out, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini temporized 

about what to do. Many of his close advisors, including 

his son-in-law Count Ciano and his military, were opposed 

to Italy’s entrance into the war on Hitler’ side. Mussolini 

only moved when he saw France capitulate to the Nazis, 

calculating that Germany would be victorious.

50. See also Mackay and Tatham, Behavioural Conflict.

51. These comments draw on Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s 

Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic 

Military Studies 17, no. 2 (April 2004): 237 – 56.

52. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” 248 – 49.

84 | Chapter 6
Chapter 7

Leadership often means the difference between victory and defeat. Britain would have lost World War 

II without Winston Churchill. Germany probably lost the war because Adolf Hitler’s early diplomatic 

victories gave way to blunder after blunder, leadership mistakes compounded by a failure to organize 

a cohesive general staff, and often-freewheeling, tactically talented generals fearful of disclosing to Hitler what they really thought.1

 That the American North was led by Abraham Lincoln and the South by 

Jefferson Davis clearly affected the outcome of the American Civil War and the future of U.S. history. 

President Dwight Eisenhower’s knowledge of national security quashed recommendations on several 

occasions to employ nuclear weapons. Whatever the merits of the 2003 Iraq War, it gave rise to the 

emergence of a new generation of highly talented U.S. officers who might not otherwise have had the 

opportunity to become recognized; they made a difference in that conflict.

History offers many illustrations of why and how leadership matters. Napoleon’s admirers thought 

of him as a hero, able to “seize hold of opinions, of opportunities, and of fortune.”2

 Napoleon’s close 

collaborator, Claude-Francois de Meneval, declared that the emperor “took not only the initiative in 

thought, but also attended personally to the detail of every piece of business.”3

 Armand-AugustinLouis de Caulaincourt, who served as Napoleon’s ambassador to Russia, characterized his leadership 

as the product of applying “all his faculties, all his attention to the action or discussion of the moment,” 

a keen edge, as “few people are entirely absorbed by one thought or one action at one moment.”4

Napoleon was no shrinking violet about himself. “In war men are nothing, it is one man who is all,” 

he declared.5

 Napoleon liked to rant about the moral force of a disciplined army in which one soldier 

could overcome three. He claimed that the secret of success lay in the personal touch between officers 

and their troops.6

 He had a point, although Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and 

George Patton offer strong examples.7

Today, we do not need heroes of the moment—the ideal to which French revolutionaries aspired—

or the Roman ideal of “great men.” We need smart, disciplined, organized leadership that motivates, 

encourages, and inspires leadership from below. 

85

CAMPAIGN LEADERSHIP
Great leaders motivate by providing a role 

model. They articulate and personify a cause

and why that cause matters; this inspires people 

to follow. Loyalty to leaders and the ability and 

energy of a leader matter. However, there is a 

reason that causes more often spark revolutions, 

rather than the personal ambitions or personalities 

of those who lead revolutions.

An excellent study of the Fallujah battles by the 

Joint Special Operations University illustrates the 

difference between the Napoleonic approach to 

strategic thinking and the excellence of U.S. military leadership—which relied on strong leadership 

from the top, but team collaboration—at its best.

Leadership Models

In forging an effective campaign team in politics, 

former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and 

his senior counselor, Joe Gaylord, set forth a leadership model rooted in four characteristics. Their 

model also applies to information warfare. These 

characteristics look beyond the capacity of those in 

a hierarchical organization, such as the military, to 

pull rank. Such behavior is a poor motivator. The 

best campaign leaders “listen, learn, help and lead.” 

In Campaign Solutions, Gaylord defined what those 

notions mean. The following principles draw on his 

thinking, which Gingrich also preached:

Listen. Ask questions, listen to what people 

say, and understand and appreciate why they 

are saying it. The worst mistake you can make 

is to kowtow to conventional wisdom, or 

presume that solutions that worked in the last 

campaign or war will work in the current one.

Learn. Check what you hear for accuracy 

and meaning, whether the source is a so-called 

expert or insider, a broadcast or print story, a 

discussion with an interested stakeholder, or 

some other source. Always consider the implications and options of what you learn. This 

book discusses the impact of rumor later, but 

it is important to understand how powerful 

rumor can be in molding or shaping attitudes 

and opinions. Rumor, often derived from 

street talk or perhaps undependable human 

intelligence (HUMINT) or signals intelligence 

(SIGINT), is inherently questionable, but this 

does not render it valueless.8

During the Iraq War, a classified email 

newsletter, The Baghdad Mosquito, distributed to an elite group of military officers and 

policy planners provided interesting insights 

collected from a weekly panel of prominent 

Iraqi locals who reported to the Coalition 

Provisional Authority on a variety of social, 

economic, and political issues.9

 It was useful 

to read the language in which issues were 

discussed as well as to pick up possible intelligence in formulating strategies and the 

language employed in delivering themes 

and messages. 

Blogger Rusty Barber noted that rumors 

reported at one point included:

• “Ice vendors in Baghdad are selling ice 

blocks made of contaminated water.”

• “Iraqis now call the current Baghdad 

security ‘Enforcing the Terrorism.’ ”

• “Citizens, especially Sunnis, cannot go 

to Sadr City to pick up their ration card 

items as it is too dangerous of a journey. 

This was purposely done so that their 

rations can be sold by individuals who 

will funnel funds to the Mahdi Army.”10

Obviously, more concrete intelligence 

derived from HUMINT or cyber tools, and 

the analysis derived from those, factor into 

assessments on the accuracy of information. 

86 | Chapter 7
General McChrystal described in detail the 

efforts of Task Force 714 in evaluating intelligence that enabled Coalition forces to track 

down and eliminate terrorist Abu Musab al 

Zarqawi.11

Help. Leadership requires the articulation of 

vision and offering direction. It is about encouraging a communication team to think unconventionally and make clear that all ideas 

are welcome. Any indication that an idea or 

suggestion would be scoffed at, especially by 

a higher-ranking authority, has a chilling effect. No team can afford that; in military and 

government hierarchies, in particular, that is a 

sensitive issue. A mid-level State Department 

official once stated to the author that putting 

forth a major idea that is rejected could impair 

prospects for promotion. That attitude is precisely the mindset that kills creative thinking.

Lead. Leading follows listening, learning, 

and helping. Gaylord correctly states that you 

need to say to the team: “Here’s my vision, 

my suggested strategy, projects, and tactics. 

But what do you think? So, then the cycle of 

listen-learn-help-lead begins again.”12

Leadership Traps to Avoid

Effective leadership requires avoiding four major 

traps.

1. Thin skin. In any large or small organization, 

people will have different ideas. Do not be 

afraid of criticism. Those who devise plans 

easily lose objectivity about them. Criticism 

should be welcomed, evaluated, and factored 

into planning, especially when it comes from 

members of the same strategy team.

2. Big head. Self-confidence inspires others 

to see you as a strong leader. Arrogance 

suggests that you are self-centered. Gaylord 

puts it this way: “If you hear that you are 

coming across as too full of yourself, it’s time 

for a reality check. Ask friends or staff why 

you are perceived that way. Or maybe it’s just 

something in your manner that can be easily 

corrected.”13

3. Weak vision. An effective communication strategy requires knowing and understanding what constitutes success and forging 

a vision that can achieve it. The United States’ 

early efforts in Iraq after toppling Saddam 

and during much of the Afghanistan conflict 

have drawn wide criticism for lacking a clear 

vision of what U.S. forces wanted to achieve. 

No communication strategy can effectively 

support unclear policy decisions about 

mission or the commander’s intent. 

4. Lack of courage. You must be able to challenge or offer alternatives to conventional 

wisdom or higher authority’s ideas. The 

best communication strategies can provoke 

vicious turf battles or cause conflict with other 

commanders or authorities who see their own 

ideas undercut, diminished, or challenged. 

In Iraq, Paul Bremer banned all but the lowest 

members of Saddam’s Baath Party from holding 

government jobs and disbanded the Iraqi Army 

just as U.S. officers had painstakingly succeeded 

in setting the stage to reassemble it.14 It took a 

strong leader like General David Petraeus to stand 

Bremer down, as he persuaded him that the order 

banning Baathists—which would even cover 

teachers and throw tens of thousands of Iraqis out 

of work—would shatter the efforts and progress 

Petraeus and his team were making in Mosul.

Tact and discretion are hallmarks of dealing 

with high authorities. But the death knell for forging and executing any strategy is succumbing to 

Campaign Leadership | 87
the fear of challenging conventional wisdom or 

doctrine. Figure out how to adroitly promote your 

ideas and persuade relevant authorities to buy 

into them.

Turf Among Leaders

Protection of turf often raises concerns and 

obstructs the exchange and flow of information. In 

Iraq, General McChrystal reported, a disconnect 

between senders and receivers presented serious 

issues in gaining a clear picture of the enemy and 

inspired internal distrust within our own forces.15

Outstations rarely saw the benefits of intelligence collected, while analysts lacked context 

to evaluate it. Breaking down walls of mistrust 

and ensuring that information and analysis is 

shared is critical for communication strategy, as 

well as broader military, political, and diplomatic 

strategy. The fusion of efforts by the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

and other elements of the military was essential to 

the remarkable success that his forces achieved.16

Integrate Communication Strategy 

with Kinetic Strategy

As noted earlier, you must align communication 

and kinetic strategies. The failure to integrate 

information strategies properly into the assault 

on Fallujah—a failure attributable to Lieutenant 

General Sanchez and Paul Bremer—is a perfect 

example of this precept. Let us examine the First 

Battle of Fallujah. Triggered by the murder of four 

U.S. contractors in the city, there followed two 

battles for the city, in April and November 2004. 

The U.S. Marine-led attack on the city was instigated to signal resolve.17 The first battle provided 

propaganda victory to the insurgents and, as Dr. 

Carter Malkasian of the Center for Naval Analyses 

wrote, “renders a cautionary lesson on using military force to signal resolve in an unconventional 

conflict.”18

One reason that Operation Eagle Claw, aimed 

at rescuing hostages, failed in Iran was competition among Services that led to the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command to 

ensure cohesion. U.S. Africa Command and U.S. 

Southern Command represent efforts to integrate 

civilian and military leadership. 

An ongoing struggle persists within the 

Department of Defense between the public affairs 

officers, who incorrectly perceive themselves as 

the stewards of communication and apply their 

espoused notion of “informing but not influencing” inconsistently, and the psychological 

operations (or, military information support operations) personnel over whether or where to draw 

the line between their activities. It is a draining, 

useless debate. Both should aim to influence 

target audiences. 

Similarly, DOD often takes the position that the 

State Department holds the lead on communication strategy. But the State Department has shown 

time and again its reluctance to engage target 

audiences outside the category of statecraft and 

public diplomacy, through which foreign publics 

are engaged, informed, and influenced. This reluctance stems partly from the cultural hesitations 

within that department; it is also partly due to 

resources. These issues need to be worked out for 

any strategy that raises issues of turf.

88 | Chapter 7
1. See Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, chapter 4. 

Naveh’s searing exposition of German strategy, operations, and tactics portrays famous generals such as Heinz 

W. Guderian and Erwin Rommel as tactically brilliant but 

strategically flawed. Historian Richard Overy points out 

that Hitler did not form a general staff as that notion is generally understood, but acted as his own chief of staff — a 

decision that Overy argues proved disastrous. See Richard 

Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: W. W. Norton, 1997).

2. Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, compte de Guibert, Oeuvres 

militaires de Guibert, vol. 4 (Paris: Chez Magimel, 1803), 74, 

as quoted in Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 42.

3. Baron Claude-Francois de Méneval, Mémoires pour servir a 

l’histoire de Napoléon 1er, depuis 1802 jusqu’à 1815, vol. 3 (Paris: Dentu, 1894), 50 – 51, as quoted in Fuller, The Conduct of 

War, 1789–1961, 43.

4. Armand-Augustin-Louis de Caulaincourt, With Napoleon in 

Russia: The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, vol. 1, English trans. (New York: William Morrow, 1935), 

92, as quoted in Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 43. 

Napoleon’s approach stressed reliance on offensive action, 

trust in speed to economize time, strategic surprise, concentration of superior force at critical moments, and a carefully 

thought-out protective system that served as a base of operations. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 49, 52. Fuller 

argues that his surprises were strategic, not tactical, but that 

in the overall scheme, Napoleon lurched from one battle to 

the next, driven by an impulse for war, not political vision.

5. A. M. Broadley, Napoleon in Caricature, 1795–1821, vol. 1 

(London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1911), 99 – 100, as 

quoted in Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 45.

6. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961, 46.

7. See Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the 

Modern World (New York: Crown, 2004). Khan was a political and military genius who inspired extraordinary affection and loyalty. Napoleon was amazingly erratic. He 

was on his game at Austerlitz and Friedland but off it amid 

fiascos like Waterloo, Leipzig, and the entire invasion of 

Russia. Napoleon’s flaws became evident when he commanded larger armies, whose movements he was unable 

to properly control and maneuver. It bears noting that he 

won Marengo thanks to Gen Louis Desaix and Jena thanks 

to Louis-Nicolas Davout, two of his greatest commanders.

8. Joseph R. Gaylord, interview with author, 20 May 2019; and 

Joseph R. Gaylord, Campaign Solutions (Washington, DC: 

American Solutions, 2010), 8, which sets forth these ideas 

in the context of U.S. campaigns.

9. Daniel Pipes, “The Baghdad Mosquito,” DanielPipes.org

(blog), 23 March 2004.

10. Rusty Barber, “Iraq: Baghdad’s Rumor Mill,” United States 

Institute of Peace, 18 June 2007.

11. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, chapters 12 and 13.

12. Gaylord, Campaign Solutions, 8. 

13. Gaylord, Campaign Solutions, 10.

14. Kaplan, The Insurgents, 74; and Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 

190 – 95.

15. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 105 – 6, 117, 149.

16. See also Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, Secret 

Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

2011). Lamb and Munsing describe how cross-agency efforts 

were vital to success and the need for the kind of fusion 

that McChrystal has also written about. British journalist 

Mark Urban reported in Task Force Black that the JSOC operations killed approximately 3,000 insurgents and captured 

between 8,000 and 9,000. British Special Forces captured or 

killed 3,500. He notes: “Dead men’s shoes are quickly filled. 

What happened in Iraq was very different. By insisting that 

each of his five or six task forces carry out multiple takedowns every night, McChrystal set a pace of operations that 

probably removed from the streets (by arrest or elimination) 

most of the membership of AQI.” Urban, Task Force Black, 

270 – 71.

17. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah.” Malkasian served as an advisor to 

I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Iraq from February 2004 to February 2005. The discussion on the history of 

the first battle for Fallujah draws on his commentary. He 

points out that in Vietnam, Viet Cong successes in Long 

An enabled the Communists to execute propaganda that 

brought new people into the movement. He argues that in 

2000, the hasty withdrawal from Lebanon of Israeli Defense 

Forces may have caused Palestinians to perceive violence 

as a useful means to attain their aims. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah,” 425–26. See also Race, War Comes to Long An, 191; and 

Bloom, Dying to Kill, 125.

18. Malkasian, “Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the 

First Battle of Fallujah,” 423.

Endnotes

Campaign Leadership | 89
Chapter 8

Communication strategy is about more than words. Deeds, images, and symbols are equally important. 

All need to be consistent in messaging.

Ensure Actions Support Messages

Actions should support rhetoric and message. Contradiction—planned or unanticipated—will undermine 

your credibility.

Example: Afghanistan. USAID promised that reconstruction in Afghanistan could proceed rapidly 

and effectively. Its failure to do so contradicted assurance that the United States could succeed in rebuilding the country. Whether a shift to that goal around 2006 made sense is irrelevant to this topic. USAID 

wanted quick results in Afghanistan to show success, so it built schools and clinics, but failed to fund 

teachers and doctors. USAID funded a highway from Kabul to Kandahar, but failed to ensure it was 

built with a deep enough layer of asphalt to withstand snow; consequently, heavy snows and subsequent melts washed away parts of the road. The gap between promise and accomplishment eroded the 

credibility of a strategy intended to show that U.S. efforts were improving the quality of life for people.1

General McChrystal found that Afghan leaders desired commitment more than additional troops. 

They lacked faith in their own government and had a “primal fear” of abandonment.2

 Going to Helmand 

Province, General McChrystal described a key meeting with Marjah elders who had come to discuss the 

impending operation; they wanted to avoid civilian casualties and to clean out corrupt police and officials. “Finally, if you come, you must stay. If you don’t, the Taliban will return and we will all be killed,” 

they told McChrystal.3

 General McChrystal reassured them, “Your conditions represent our intentions 

for this operation.” The general later wrote: “And they did.”4

 Doubtless McChrystal was sincere, yet the 

situation raises a serious question: How could commitment square with the U.S. withdrawal of most 

troops by 2014? One can understand the elders’ concerns. The Taliban has been ruthless in killing allies or 

collaborators of the government or U.S./ISAF forces. The question was not resolved well in Afghanistan. 

DOS AND DON’TS IN ACTIONS AND MESSAGING

90
Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 91

Lesson: failure to maintain commitments, 

especially where they affect the lives and 

deaths of people, will shred credibility. Journalist Ann Jones, who was embedded with 

U.S. troops in Afghanistan, argues that many 

Afghans became deeply hostile over the perception of broken promises about aid, civilian 

casualties, and a corrupt Afghan government.5

Example: Iraq, 1975, and Operation Desert 

Storm. As U.S. secretary of state, Henry Kissinger 

colluded with the former shah of Iran to encourage the Kurds to rise up in Iraq against Saddam 

Hussein and channeled $15 million to their fight 

for self-determination. But when Iran and Iraq resolved a border dispute, Saddam yanked his support and then launched a ruthless campaign to 

crush the Kurds. Kissinger pithily advised a congressional committee: “Covert action should not be 

confused with missionary work.”6

 Americans have 

short memories, but people in countries affected by 

American actions have long ones. The Iraqis, notably the Shiites, remembered the failure of American 

forces to support them when these forces stood by 

as the Shiites rose up against Saddam after Operation Desert Storm only to be slaughtered by his 

forces while U.S. forces failed to provide support. 

One should not be surprised that many Iraqi Shiites 

are skeptical about trusting the United States 

Example: Syria, 2019. Once again, the Kurds feel 

threatened by the potential desertion of U.S. troops 

with whom they fought against ISIS and whose 

support has been vital to inflicting battlefield defeats on the terrorist movement. As this book goes 

to press, the Kurds will look back on what they 

view as Kissinger’s betrayal and contemplate 

whether in 2019, a U.S. draw-down from Syria will 

expose their 60,000 fighters, who aligned with this 

country, to an onslaught from Turkey.7

Know Your Weak Points and Vulnerabilities 

Can communication strategy make a real difference? 

Bing West argues in The Wrong War that the political 

and cultural dynamics of Afghanistan rendered the 

war unwinnable for U.S. strategies.8

 Others sharply 

dispute West’s views about that doctrine. This book 

is not the venue to resolve the debate, however the 

question West poses is real: Is success for an operation or conflict plausible or worth the cost?9

As you evaluate an area of operations and form 

a communication strategy, remember to: 

• Watch out for gaffes. Ambassador Karl 

Eikenberry made a district visit and 

walked past the district governor, himself a former convicted criminal who 

had done time in a German prison for 

attempting to murder his stepson, and 

embraced a former police chief whom 

locals viewed as a corrupt pedophile. 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran said, “Marjah residents couldn’t understand what message 

the top American diplomat in Afghanistan was trying to send them.”10

• Be cognizant of local leader agendas.

Local leaders pushing their own agendas 

will play off different parts of the U.S. 

government to promote their interests at 

American expense. In Afghanistan, many 

U.S. officials wanted to crack down on 

corrupt leaders, such as Ahmed Wali 

Karzai, who stymied officials by leveraging relationships with the military or 

other parts of the U.S. government.11 As 

the U.S. Army’s 82d Airborne Division 

entered Iraq in 2003, it reached out to local 

leaders in an effort to find allies. Understanding who had influence and their 

agendas proved very challenging.12 Key 

leader engagement (KLE) is important 
to information operations. Competent 

preparation for these encounters is almost 

as important as following up the impact 

of the meetings in affecting action.

Know Your Strengths 

and How to Leverage Them

Recognize and understand what assets you possess 

to forge and execute a communication strategy. 

Such assets can include people, channels, equipment, and affiliated influence. 

Realistically assess your credibility among the 

target audience you are attempting to persuade. 

Credibility flows from developing an image that 

resonates positively with a target audience. Partly 

that is about capturing and holding the moral high 

ground. One cannot overstress the importance of 

communicating moral strength. No one illustrated 

that better than President Roosevelt, for whom—

as historian Nigel Hamilton records in his superb 

study of Roosevelt’s presidential decision making—

the moral basis for a coalition that brought together 

as many allies as possible was vital to ensuring 

unity at home and among allies. He consistently 

invoked morality as a fundamental rationale for 

the Allied effort and drew that as a key distinction 

between what the Allies and the Axis fought for.13

Partly, it is about explaining who you are, what 

you are doing, why you are doing something, and 

what it means to a target audience. Image is about 

far more than slogans, slick photographs, or great 

media. It is about communicating with target audiences a strong sense of integrity about yourself and 

your cause.

Apply the cultural knowledge you developed in 

selecting which strengths to emphasize. Have a realistic assessment of what you are capable of doing 

to build credibility and the available options that 

strengthen your position.

Example: Barack Obama’s 2012 U.S. presidential campaign. Obama had the power of incumbency and thus the tools of the presidency to raise 

money, create headlines, get a message out, and 

to drive that message. Obama’s use of paid media returned marginal dividends, but his uniquely 

sophisticated use of social media — especially 

Facebook —to identify and mobilize voters was 

unprecedented.14 The campaign drew from top 

minds in the private sector as well as political professionals to forge its strategy. 

The Obama campaign monitored its voter contact tactics to increase effectiveness. Political strategist and voter contact expert Walter D. Clinton, 

who consulted for the campaign, said that “never 

in my 40 years’ experience have I seen this combination of true grassroots techniques driven by 

modern technology. It made a decisive difference 

in mobilizing the president’s base constituency. 

It expanded and energized that base, and it succeeded, amid a very close election, in motivating 

voters who otherwise would have stayed home to 

get out and vote for the president.”15

The carefully crafted — and well-tested —messages and repetitive contacts through multiple 

channels motivated people to vote and played a 

key role in helping the Obama campaign to gain 

three quarters of the billion dollars it raised from 

small donors contacted online. 

Example: 2003 Iraq War. In Iraq, the Coalition 

had access to major media, social media, and paid 

media. It capitalized on the rumor mill. It networked extensively through engagement with local and national leaders, following the precepts 

that General Petraeus set forth in his 14 observations on engagement there. The action steps he 

defined were integrated with Coalition communication strategy.16 The victory in the Second Battle of Fallujah and the success of the surge — even 

92 | Chapter 8
though the longer-term political outcome in Iraq 

remains unresolved — emanated from adroit leverage of these strengths. 

• U.S. communication strategy acquires 

unique strength from support available 

through kinetic force. As seen above, 

this was crucial to inspiring enthusiasm 

among Iraqi soldiers as Operation al-Fajr 

was launched to take Fallujah back from 

insurgents.

• The United States achieved success in 

Operation Desert Storm by assembling 

a coalition of many nations. President 

George H. W. Bush capitalized on the 

perception that the United States was the 

world’s only superpower while seizing 

the moral high ground, posturing American forces as liberators fighting an 

evil tyrant, and communicating—and 

honoring—specific constraints on the 

strategic and tactical goals that the Coalition would achieve. 

Precise, measured employment of integrated 

communication and kinetic strategy produced a 

brilliant achievement, marred only by the mistake 

in encouraging the Shiites to rise up without providing them support when Saddam Hussein unleashed a murderous assault against them. 

Lesson: do not encourage allies to act in the 

perception that you will support them unless 

you are prepared to do so.

Avoid Inflating Claims

Maintaining credibility is crucial to information 

operations. That requires avoiding statements or 

pronouncements that inflate the success of operations. Here are key examples that illustrate this 

precept.

Example: Vietnam. During the Vietnam War, 

the U.S. government constantly talked up the prospects of success. U.S. Army commander General 

William C. Westmoreland claimed he could see the 

“light at the end of the tunnel.”17 The inflated claims 

came back to haunt President Johnson after the 1968 

Tet offensive, which prompted the nation’s prestigious news anchor, Walter Cronkite, to conclude 

that the time had come for the U.S. to get out of 

Vietnam. Cronkite called the war a draw and fatefully pronounced: “We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, 

both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any 

longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest 

clouds.”18 Having inflated expectations, Westmoreland and Johnson found their credibility shattered. 

Johnson was forced to abandon ambitions for a 

second term. 

Military personnel, diplomats, politicians and 

journalists will long debate the merits and potential for winning that war. Yet, the irony of Cronkite’s 

pronouncement is that Tet produced a stunning 

victory. But it was reported as a debacle. The impact 

on public opinion and loss of public support for the 

war is hard to overstate.

Our military was understandably frustrated. 

Initially caught off-guard, the U.S. military recovered swiftly and dealt the enemy a devastating 

blow.19 Yet, while a military defeat, information 

aspects made Tet a huge political victory. A key 

Communist objective had been to persuade Americans that the war was not winnable; Communists 

achieved that goal.20

Tet provided a keen lesson for General David 

Petraeus, an avid student of military history. 

Taking command in Iraq in 2007, he downplayed 

expectations while executing a brilliant kinetic 

and communication strategy that reversed a military situation.21 General Stanley McChrystal was 

Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 93
equally careful when taking command in Afghanistan. Both commanders understood that winning 

involved hard fighting, and in no small measure 

depended on how audiences judge events. They 

recognized the impact of perceptions and communication strategy in shaping or changing behavior.

Example: Afghanistan. An operation in the 

Taliban stronghold of Marjah, Operation Moshtarak 

(together in the Afghan Dari dialect), launched by 

U.S. Marines and ISAF forces was ballyhooed as 

a model for future success and a new beginning 

in Afghanistan, winning the hearts and minds of 

Afghans. General McChrystal declared, “We’ve got 

a government in a box, ready to roll in.”22

But Marjah proved painstaking and difficult. 

Some viewed the operation a failure, others saw it 

as a draw, while still others branded it a misleading 

exercise in media hype and misinformation.23

Marjah consisted of farmers’ homes and markets 

in an agricultural area. The Associated Press published an article stating that “ ‘Marine commanders’ . . . expected 400 to 1,000 insurgents to be 

‘holed up’ in the ‘southern Afghan town of 80,000 

people,’ ” and that Marjah was “the ‘linchpin of 

the militants’ logistical and opium-smuggling network.’ ” ABC News characterized the place as the 

“city of Marjah” and heavily populated.24 Expectations were quickly frustrated. Finding mixed success, Jamestown Foundation expert Michael Innes 

wrote that “perhaps most frustrating for many 

observers is the manner in which political pressures 

have apparently skewed expectations of progress,” 

with the definition of success shaped by “requirements set in the political capitals of NATO member 

states.”25

When General McChrystal shifted focus to Kandahar, he recognized that expectations for Marjah 

had been unrealistic. His communication strategy 

for Kandahar wisely lowered expectations.26

Project Confidence

Ensure that you clearly communicate that you 

know what you are doing and will prevail. If target audiences — as well as partners, allies, and 

your own people — do not believe you will win, 

chances are good that you will fail. Great communication strategists exhibit imagination, boldness, 

and a willingness to take risks. Confidence is manifested in confluent ways:

• A clearly-stated, easily understood story, narrative, theme, and message. Confusion or lack of clarity suggests you do 

not know what you are doing or lack the 

confidence that an operation or campaign 

will succeed. 

• Message discipline. One of the most 

difficult things in campaigns or operations to do well is maintain message discipline. That means ensuring that actions 

and messages, whether communicated 

through language or other means, remain 

consistent and mutually supportive.

• Accessibility to media. You do not need 

to explain strategy or tactics to the media. 

Doing so may not be prudent. However, 

the media will cover events; that is its job. 

It is critical that you get out the points 

that define your message and drive them. 

Hiding from the media suggests lack of 

confidence and is likely to inspire stories 

that a strategy is beset with problems. 

• Accessibility to partners and allies. They 

want to know what you are doing, how, 

why, and what it means to them. Staying 

ahead of the curve in engaging with them 

shows confidence and is more likely to 

inspire their support and cooperation.

• Communication with your own team, 

from top to bottom. People need to un94 | Chapter 8
derstand a commander’s intent and how 

a strategy, plan, and operation execute 

that intent. 

• Decisive action consistent with messaging. Backing up communication with 

decisive action that supports a message 

makes it meaningful, gives it teeth, and 

reinforces your trustworthiness.

• Competent, confident, and accessible 

leaders. Providing visible leadership 

from commanders and spokespersons 

that exude leadership in appearance, 

posture, voice, composure, expression, 

and action.

Example: Winston Churchill. Churchill stands 

out for his ability to use communication to define 

his leadership and the cause for which he stood. 

He took office as prime minister at age 65 after having been a public figure for decades. His 

speeches were immaculately crafted on note cards 

and carefully thought through before he delivered 

them. Every speech aimed to shape the public’s 

mood or attitude toward a subject. Everything 

about the way he presented himself was masterfully calculated for effect. His command of language and projection of strength and resiliency 

gave voice to an entire nation during its darkest 

hours. Churchill’s message that England would 

not give in but would stand, fight, and prevail 

was clear, uncompromising, and exuded the confidence of the resolute.27

Example: John F. Kennedy. Kennedy had a 

knack for compartmentalizing his private and 

public life. Historians such as British journalist 

Henry J. Farlie and Frederick Kempe have criticized his leadership.28 Still, as a public figure, 

Kennedy transformed the American political landscape. His formidable communication skills and 

style changed expectations for American leaders at home and abroad. His inspiring speech in 

Berlin in 1963 exuded command and confidence, 

illustrated the power of speech in projecting resilience and strength, and reminds us what American values and strong leadership mean to those 

for whom freedom is about life and death.29 In 

a modern era of cynical skepticism, Kennedy’s 

speech reminds us of how well the right U.S. leadership, communicated in vivid, concrete, relevant 

language that specifically addresses the concerns 

and sentiments of an audience, can resonate.

Example: Ronald Reagan. After his nearassassination, President Ronald Reagan’s poise, 

grace, and wit restored confidence to a shaken 

nation. Few understood how close death had come. 

His charisma shined during his two most famous 

speeches: Normandy, where he praised the heroes 

of Operation Overlord while calling for a strong 

Atlantic alliance against Communism; and his 

1986 eulogy to the seven Challenger astronauts.30

Author, journalist, and presidential speechwriter 

Peggy Noonan wrote both of these elegant speeches, 

but Reagan’s vibrancy, conviction, and confidence 

brought them to life and forged a connection with 

his auditors. Reagan pursued a broad strategy of 

projecting strength, calm, resolution, and vision 

in efforts to strengthen the United States, revive 

confidence after the failed presidency of the Carter 

administration, and defeat Communism. As with 

Churchill and Kennedy, Reagan spoke not merely 

for himself. Each gave powerful voice to the feelings 

and emotions of their citizens. 

Example: Julius Caesar. Historically, no leader 

has exceeded Caesar’s skills at communication 

strategy on or off the battlefield, despite the fact 

that his final accession to power blinded him to 

ground realities and led to his assassination. As a 

commander, Caesar experienced the same hardships 

as his troops.31 He led from the front in tough batDos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 95
tles against formidable opponents and shared the 

profit of plunder with his men, who acclaimed him 

imperator (commander).32 Many celebrated examples 

define his leadership and communication strategy. 

It bears stressing: as with many great leaders, 

Caesar’s effectiveness as a communicator and in 

forging communication strategy flowed from his 

strength and character. He was conscious of his 

image. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy notes that 

images of Caesar on busts or coins “radiate power, 

experience and monumental self-confidence, and at 

least hint at the force of personality of the man.”33

Unlike Napoleon, who never faced a general 

equal to his ability when he was on his game, 

Caesar confronted several capable leaders, including Pompey the Great, who was widely viewed 

as the outstanding military leader of the day; his 

immensely able chief deputy Titus Labienus, who 

defected to Pompey after both fell out with Caesar; 

and the charismatic Gallic chieftain Vercingetorix.34

Caesar’s career is full of telling examples. In his 

first major battle in Gaul against the Helvetii, he 

confronted a superior force that had proven itself 

by defeating German tribes in different battles. Not 

surprisingly, this formidable adversary inspired 

anxiety. Caesar needed to keep his troops calm and 

stiffen their resolve. He adopted a simple strategy 

to communicate his own resolve and courage and to 

inspire his legions. He sent his horse away to signal 

that he would fight on foot alongside every soldier, 

exposing himself to the same danger, and delivered 

a speech that roused his men to action. This was 

even more significant than it might seem. Suetonius records that Caesar rode a “very remarkable 

horse, with feet almost like those of a man, the hoofs 

being divided in such a manner as to have some 

resemblance to toes . . . and the soothsayers having 

interpreted these circumstances into an omen that its 

owner would be master of the world.”35 The horse, 

historian Philip Freeman says, “adored Caesar and 

would not allow anyone else to ride it.”36

In thinking about information strategy, Caesar 

was always conscious of the need to communicate 

clearly with troops under his command or, in those 

chaotic days of the Roman Republic, the voters 

whose support he sought. He used his commentaries and medals to gain visibility and credibility. 

He understood the importance of communication 

strategy. He was an excellent strategist and he executed strategy adroitly.37

Be Creative—Especially 

with Younger Audiences

The differences among audiences of various ages require that you gear messages differently for different generations. Young audiences reject hard sales 

pitches or lectures. The U.S. military is infamous 

for its almost liturgical reverence for PowerPoint 

presentations. Its “just the facts, ma’am” approach 

to dealing with the media resonates haphazardly. 

Younger audiences seek to engage and to interact—with one another as well as with you. As 

author Clay Shirky pointed out in Here Comes Everybody, technology has triggered the emergence of 

new social media and fundamentally altered the 

way that young audiences communicate and think 

about communicating.38 It is now a two-way street. 

Newspapers, radio, and television were one-way 

communication: one party communicating a message to many. Letters, facsimiles, and telephones 

are one-to-one direct communication technologies, 

which paved the way for interactive engagement 

using social media.

U.S. politics offers a striking example of how 

the generational divide affects this equation. When 

it came to reaching the crucial 18- to 29-year-old 

demographic, the 2012 Barack Obama presidential campaign came to a startling realization: that 

96 | Chapter 8
fully 50 percent of its targets in this key demographic proved unreachable by telephone, a traditional method of direct voter contact. However, 85 

percent of them were friends with an Obama 2012 

campaign supporter who was also a Facebook 

app user. The Obama campaign responded by 

launching “targeted sharing” to Facebook friends 

who were voters in swing states. The campaign 

contacted 600,000 people, who in turn reached 5 

million voters. Twenty percent of those 5 million 

took some action, such as registering to vote.39

Few nations are as wired as the United States. 

Internet usage abroad is limited, but it is rapidly 

growing. The impact of internet usage was manifest in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. All 

sides in the Syrian Civil War—the world’s first true 

cyberwar—use the internet and cellular technology 

extensively for strategy, operations, tactics, communication, and command and control. Younger generations, even in less affluent countries, connect on 

the internet or social media through smart phones. 

Jack Guy has advised top military leaders extensively in Afghanistan. He notes that in a nation of 

30 million people, there are more than 16 million 

mobile phones, supported by four major mobile 

phone purveyors. Mobile phones are the fastest 

growing industry in the country. The impact of this 

technology on the economy as well as on youth, 

who are networked globally, has proven essential 

in keeping the Kabul government alive.40

One sees this shift toward engagement in 

commercial marketing. Consumer and business 

buyers, notes author Shama Kabani, want to make 

up their own minds about what they need. The key 

to selling is to engage with consumers and help 

them search for and find the answers they want.41

Commercial marketing differs from political and 

national security communication strategy in many 

ways, but on this point the parallel is real.

News media that capitalizes on the tools of 

the internet enables many to communicate with 

many in real time. This evolution has dramatically 

reshaped the social and political dynamics that 

define the environments in which communication 

strategy is forged and executed.

Two prominent strategies that eschewed traditional media and capitalized on new media illustrate the broader precept.

Example: Egypt. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings 

in Egypt were engineered by a group of young, 

tech-savvy individuals who had grown weary 

of Hosni Mubarak’s repressive political system 

rooted in “force and favors.” Upheaval in Tunisia 

had forced President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee 

on 14 January 2011 in the wake of mass popular 

protests.42 Revolution erupted in Egypt on 25 

January 2011 as thousands protested the Mubarak 

regime.43

But the revolution really began several years 

before, on 23 March 2008, when young Egyptian 

activists calling themselves the April 6 Youth Movement launched a Facebook page to support a textile 

workers’ strike. Within a few weeks, 70,000 individuals had joined the call for strikes. Three years 

later, the organizers were ready to move against 

Mubarak’s regime. They forged a strategy to overcome state security tactics traditionally employed 

to preempt protests by organizing cells of 30 – 50 

activists. Each would group in a preselected spot 

in Cairo. Each cell had a single person to direct 

members to the main rendezvous point. A viral 

video featuring Egyptian activist Asmaa Mahfouz 

told the youth: “Don’t be afraid of the government.”44

That was critical: once demonstrators got over 

fears about the government and its security apparatus, the revolution moved forward. Protestors in Ukraine, the Philippines, and elsewhere 

Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 97
had used social media for command and control 

and to provide protestors information to evade 

security points. But the Tahrir Square protests 

were a triumph of information strategy. The 

strategy tapped into deep resentment against the 

regime; employed interactive social media tools 

like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to provide 

information and direction; and combined with 

satellite television broadcast from Al Jazeera to 

achieve a critical mass that forced the army to 

stage an unstated coup that ousted Mubarak.45

The Egyptian regime, led by the late President 

Mohamed Morsi and controlled by the Muslim 

Brotherhood, proved to be just as or more authoritarian than Mubarak’s, but in ousting the prior 

regime, the April 6 Movement’s leadership showed 

that while improvising in an atmosphere of uncertainty and heightened tension, a cohesive communication strategy can mobilize a population and 

more or less peacefully oust a regime. The leaders 

creatively used their tools to change behavior and 

got results.

Future engagements and conflicts seem less 

likely to entail all-out war, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Look instead for asymmetrical engagements that entwine information strategies and 

tactics in dealing with repressive state regimes or 

armed adversaries. 

Key Lessons: 

• Strategy needs to creatively determine 

what channels your audiences are tuning 

into, or you will miss the opportunity to 

reach them; and

• New tools of social media have transformed the way people communicate. 

Instead of top-down communication 

through vertical hierarchies of command 

and control, knowledge is increasingly 

shared horizontally and democratically. 

Everyone — within specific target audiences —

can have a say in the discourse. Yes, state monitoring can penetrate veils of anonymity. Still, the 

internet facilitates anonymous discourse, which 

expands the sources and diversity of discourse. It 

also lessens control over accuracy of the information communicated, opening discourse to accidental 

or deliberate misinformation. This transformation 

in how and through what channels information is 

distributed places a premium on creative thinking.

Example: Syria. The Syrian Civil War is complicated and a detailed analysis lies beyond the scope 

of this book. What is relevant is that both the regime 

and the rebels have capitalized imaginatively on 

social media to achieve confluent goals: 

• Communicating narrative, story, message, and themes to Syrian and international audiences; 

• Collecting information and intelligence, 

including through cyber hacking; 

• Disrupting adversary communication 

and tactics;

• Gaining momentum while slowing down 

that of the opposition; 

• Pumping up morale by communicating 

success; and

• Establishing command and control. 

Key lesson: This bloody conflict demonstrates 

that technology is an enabler of, but not a substitute 

for, thinking and smart ideas.

Example: Hong Kong, 2019. As this is written,

protests occurring in Hong Kong illustrate two sides 

of information warfare. Protestors seek autonomy 

from authoritarian rule in Beijing while mainland 

China seeks to repress dissent. Each has employed 

different tactics of information warfare to achieve 

its desired end state. 

China makes extensive use of surveillance technology. Young people have led the protests, which 

98 | Chapter 8
started out as a rejection of a proposed extradition 

law that would allow suspects to be sent to China 

for trial. Protestors have shown pluck and ingenuity in safeguarding their identities from potential 

retaliation by authorities who employ mass data 

collection, thousands of security cameras, television 

news footage, and sophisticated facial recognition 

technology. Chinese authorities have used facial recognition technology to log more than 6.7 million 

coordinates of the movement by individuals within 

a span of 24 hours. Authorities have a tool that captures and analyzes body shapes and how people 

walk to identify individuals.46

In the meantime, China is waging a disinformation war against the protestors, portraying to 

mainland Chinese and the world images of police 

violence as emanating from protestors. State television showed an image of a woman counting out 

cash on a Hong Kong sidewalk—implying that the 

protestors are paid provocateurs. China’s strategic 

goal is to provoke nationalist and anti–Western 

sentiment. It uses state and social media, distorting 

the context of images and videos, to communicate 

its message that the demonstrators are a portent of 

terrorism.47

Despite its aggressive tactics, China’s handling of 

Hong Kong reveals the flaws in its heavy-handed 

approach. Its campaign appears to be backfiring. 

The state news agency Xinhua and the tabloid Global 

Times resorted to adopting cultural revolution rhetoric in characterizing protestors as a “ ‘Gang of 

Four’ endangering Hong Kong.” But arguing that 

the protests are ignited by malign external forces 

is undercutting Chinese diplomacy abroad. Twitter 

and Facebook terminated hundreds of accounts that 

appeared to be part of a “coordinated state-backed 

operation” seeking to sow discord in Hong Kong.48

Protestors cover their faces with masks. They 

decline to give names. They purchase single-trip 

train tickets with cash rather than using their storedvalue electronic cash cards that forward information 

on travel and locations to a central repository.49 They 

have deleted all of their Chinese phone applications, such as WeChat, Aipay, and the shopping app 

Taobao. They use virtual private networks (VPNs) 

on smartphones to use with the secure messaging 

app Telegram to hide from cyber monitors. They 

use only secure digital messaging apps and have 

gone completely analog in movements. They take 

no selfies or photographs of the chaos. While wellcoordinated, the protestors remain intentionally 

leaderless. They share protest tips and security 

measures with people they had met just hours before. 

They use Telegram to plan meet-ups, and change 

user names on the app so that it sounds nothing like 

their actual names. They change the phone number 

associated with the app. They use SIM cards without 

a contract. They avoid snapping close-up images, 

limiting photography to wide shots.50

How the protests and Beijing’s response play out 

may provide insight into opportunities for turning 

China’s Three Warfares concept, discussed in chapter 

12, against it, to undercut its efforts to strengthen 

global credibility as part of its 2049 plan to make 

China the world’s dominant state.

Capitalize on Your Resources

Understanding what resources are available to a 

campaign and when to use these resources is integral to success. Resources do not refer solely to 

money. Human resources are just as critical as financial resources; it is human capabilities, suitability to 

meet the requirements of a campaign, enthusiasm, 

morale, confidence, and energy that form the team 

and support elements that develop and execute a 

winning strategy.

There is almost never enough time, money, or 

human resources to do everything a mission or plan 

Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 99
requires. The test for developing a worthy strategy 

is not whether you can be creative or effective at 

any cost; it is whether you can devise a workable 

strategy within the limits imposed, internally 

(within a command), or externally (by events or an 

adversary). If a mission requires meeting a certain 

threshold that cannot realistically be reached, it is 

important to stand tall and say so. However, that 

does not ensure success, as illustrated by General 

James Conway and the Marines’ warning to Paul 

Bremer and Lieutenant General Sanchez that the 

battleground for the First Battle of Fallujah lacked 

proper resources and preparation. Al-Qaeda won 

that battle. The problem, however, was corrected for 

the second battle, and the Coalition employed every 

available resource deemed necessary to prevail, 

which enabled Coalition forces to win.

100 | Chapter 8

1. Critics, including the agency’s inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, question what it has achieved with 

$100 billion in aid provided to that country. Joel Brinkley, 

“Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan,” World Affairs Journal 175, no. 5 (January/February 

2013): 13 – 23.

2. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 318.

3. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 363.

4. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 363 – 64.

5. See Ann Jones, “The Total Failure of COIN,” American Conservative, 1 July 2010. Jones argues that the U.S. effort was 

a failure at almost every level, while saluting the Taliban 

for assessing the successful surge in Iraq and figuring out 

tactics to counter a similar strategy in Afghanistan through 

their own surge. Her views echo those of Bing West, except West concluded that the aid did not advance U.S. 

interests. West writes that Afghans were grateful for any 

cash or help, but such gestures did not motivate them to 

become pro-American or fight the Taliban. Neither writer 

can be called soft-hearted peaceniks. Their criticism is that 

Afghanistan has produced a costly U.S. failure. Journalist 

Peter Bergen offers a contrary assessment. He argues there 

are now 6 million children in school, compared to 1 million 

under the Taliban; that 1 in 3 Afghans now own a phone, 

compared to almost none while the Taliban held power; 

that 6 in 10 Afghans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. 

military presence in the country (some would challenge 

this polling statistic’s validity); and that the murder rate in 

Afghanistan is lower than in Washington, DC. In Bergen’s 

view, the Taliban “are getting squeezed where it hurts” in 

Helmand Province as well as in Kandahar. He is also more 

optimistic about Afghanistan’s economy, which could make 

the country a world leader in lithium. See Peter Bergen, 

“Why Afghanistan Is Far from Hopeless,” Time, 17 March 

2011. Jones’s assessment and West’s pessimism was also 

challenged by U.S. Special Operations personnel who the 

author interviewed; the author expresses no opinion on 

whose view is more accurate; this work’s focus is on what 

you need to think about to forge a communication strategy 

or conduct information warfare.

6. See Walter Isaacson, Kissinger (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 564; and “1972–1975, Iraq: The Fine Art of Betraying Kurds,” Press for Conversion!, no. 51, May 2003, 27.

7. Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “Mazlum Kobani Called 

the U.S. ‘Comrades in Arms’ against ISIS. Now the U.S. Is 

Eyeing the Exit,” New York Times, 12 May 2019; and Jane Ferguson, “Kurdish Control in Syria Threatened by U.S. Troop 

Withdrawal,” news segment, PBS News Hour Weekend, 11 

May 2019.

8. See also Octavian Manea, “The Wrong War: An Interview 

with Bing West, a Sequel,” Small Wars Journal 7, no. 5, 6 

May 2011.

9. On Iraq, the Bush administration’s case is well known. For 

the opposition to it, see Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack 

Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, 15 August 2002; “Former Bush 

Envoy, Centcom Chief Calls Iraq War a Blunder,” NBC News, 

25 May 2004; and Richard Clarke, “Iraq War ‘Enormous 

Mistake,’ ” FreeRepublic.com, 26 June 2004. 

10. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 143. 

11. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 162 – 63; Peters, Seeds of Terror; Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti, and James Risen, “Brother of Afghan Leader Said to Be Paid for C.I.A.,” New York 

Times, 27 October 2009; Abdul Waheed Wafa, “Brother of 

Karzai Denies Links to Heroin,” New York Times, 6 October 

Endnotes
Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 101

2008; and James Risen, “Intrigue in Karzai Family as an Afghan Era Closes,” New York Times, 3 June 2012.

12. See West, No True Glory, chapters 1 and 3.

13. Hamilton, The Mantle of Command, 83, 112.

14. See Jonathan Alter, “Did Hipster Tech Really Save the 

Obama Campaign,” Wired, 6 June 2013.

15. Walter D. Clinton, interview with author, 14 May 2013. Clinton is a legend in political campaign circles. He got his start 

with Matt Reese, the godfather of Democratic party campaign organizing and the strategist credited with helping 

John F. Kennedy to win the pivotal West Virginia primary. 

That victory spurred Kennedy on to the White House, partly thanks to Lyndon B. Johnson’s failure to timely contest 

the nomination. See Robert A. Caro, The Passage of Power: The 

Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 2012).

16. Petraeus’s 14 observations are: 1) “Do not try to do too much 

with your own hands”; let locals lead, as it’s their war; 2) 

act quickly, to avoid becoming an army of occupation; 3) 

“money is ammunition,” as one focuses on reconstruction, 

economic revival, and restoring basic services; 4) “increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success”; 5) analyze the costs and benefits prior to operations, e.g., ask if 

it takes more bad guys off the street than it creates by the 

way it is conducted; 6) “intelligence is the key to success,” 

a precept Gen McChrystal’s team put to lethally effective 

use; 7) “everyone must do nation-building,” not just civil 

affairs personnel; 8) “help build institutions, not just units,” 

such as ministry capacity and not just army or police units; 

9) “cultural awareness is a force multiplier”; 10) COIN requires more than military operations—it needs to establish 

a political environment that reduces support for insurgents 

and their ideology; 11) “ultimate success depends on local 

leaders”; 12) commanders must train subordinates well, because corporals and lieutenants are strategic players whose 

actions make a difference; 13) leaders must be flexible and 

adaptable; and 14) “a leader’s most important task is to set 

the right tone” and communicate that tone to subordinate 

leaders and troopers. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” 3.

17. Terry H. Anderson, “The Light at the End of the Tunnel: The 

United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 12, no. 4 (October 1988): 443 – 62, https://doi

.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1988.tb00036.x. Three of the most 

compelling dissections of the failure of President Lyndon 

B. Johnson and his team to level with the American people — perhaps to some extent guided by self-delusion—are 

David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: 

Random House, 1972); Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: 

John Paul Vann and American in Vietnam (New York: Modern 

Library, 2009); and H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to 

Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997). McMaster levels 

a stunning indictment of the behavior of Johnson and his 

defense secretary Robert McNamara’s conscious deceit to 

win the 1964 presidential election, as well as offering a critique of U.S. military decision making. One notes that while 

Sheehan, Halberstam, and others do not believe the war 

was winnable, in recent years a contrary school of thought 

has argued that had Congress continued to fund the South 

Vietnamese army, Hanoi would have been defeated. See, for 

example, Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 

1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 

and Stephen J. Morris, “The War We Could Have Won,” New 

York Times, 1 May 2005. Morris argues that by 1974 – 75, the 

south was winning and would have prevailed. He believes 

it lost when antiwar groups in Washington persuaded Congress to cut back on American aid in 1974. See also: Lewis 

Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harvest, 

2007). Sorley argues that Army Gen Creighton W. Abrams 

understood how to defeat the Communists, and his leadership helped to turn things around. The author of this book 

on information warfare worked closely on various matters 

with Nha Hoang, a key South Vietnamese negotiator at the 

Paris Peace Accords talks held in Paris during 1975. For the 

rest of his career, he remained bitter at what he considers the 

duplicity and treachery of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in negotiating away a winning war to the north.

18. CBS Evening News, “50 Years Ago: Walter Cronkite Calls 

for the U.S. to Get out of Vietnam,” 27 February 2018, YouTube video, 00:53.

19. See Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, whose reporting records 

just how close a call the Tet offensive became. Historian 

James Willbanks points out that “there was a flow of intelligence, but nobody was putting it all together. Perhaps 

more important, the intelligence we were getting flew in 

the face of our own preconceived notions about how the 

war was going.” “Interview—James Willbanks: Tet’s Truths, 

Myths and Mysteries,” Historynet.com, 5 December 2012; 

and James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

20. See “Interview — James Willbanks.” 

21. The effect of the surge, of course, was only temporary. In 

the long run, as the United States left Iraq, only the Iraqis 

could secure their own future. Whether or how they may 

do so remains unclear at this writing. 

22. See Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Offensive Is New War Model,” New York Times, 2 February 2010; Andrew J. Bacevich, 

“ ‘Government in a Box’ in Marja,” Los Angeles (CA) Times, 

17 February 2010; and Gregg Jaffe and Craig Whitlock, “Afghan City Is Now More than a Battle,” Washington Post, 22 

February 2010. “This is the start of a new strategy. This is our 

first salvo,” one senior military official told the Post. Jaffe 

and Whitlock, “Afghan City is Now More than a Battle.”
102 | Chapter 8

23. See Jones, “The Total Failure of COIN”; Jim White, “Marja Serves as Microcosm of Military Failure in Afghanistan, 

But Failure Is Country-Wide,” Empty Wheel (blog), 7 May 

2012; Chandrasekaran, Little America, 138 – 47; and West, The 

Wrong War.

24. Gareth Porter, “Fiction of Marja as City Was U.S. Information War,” Inter Press Service, 8 March 2010.

25. Michael A. Innes, “Perceptions of Success and Failure in 

ISAF Operations in Marjah, Afghanistan,” Terrorism Monitor

8, no. 24 (17 June 2010).

26. Chandrasekaran, Little America, 161.

27. Those interested in Churchill during the war years should 

read William Manchester and Paul Reid, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, Defender of the Realm, 1940–1965 (New 

York: Little, Brown, 2012); and Lynne Olson, Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest 

Hour (New York: Random House, 2011), which offers an 

extremely insightful view of how Churchill operated and 

his communication skills, as well as those of key Americans, including Edward R. Murrow, W. Averell Harriman, 

and Ambassador John Gilbert Winant, who helped forge a 

solid alliance between Britain and the United States during 

World War II. Nigel Hamilton severely criticized Churchill’s 

judgment, meddling, and egomania, but pointed out that 

what Roosevelt found attractive and indispensable was his 

moral courage.

28. Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation (London: Methuen, 1973); and Frederick Kempe, Berlin 

1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on 

Earth (New York: Putnam, 2011). Even Robert Caro, who 

clearly admired Kennedy, acknowledged his ineffectiveness 

in dealing with Congress, although his superb portrayal of 

Kennedy as a candidate and political operator is compelling. See Caro, The Passage of Power. Caro’s account of Kennedy’s assassination is gripping, and his account of how 

Lyndon Johnson passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act presents 

a masterpiece of Johnson’s own communication strategy in 

achieving what Kennedy had failed to do.

29. Mentor in a Box, “John F. Kennedy’s Speech in Berlin,” 31 

March 2012, YouTube video, 10:31.

30. Reagan Foundation, “Normandy Speech: Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-Day 6/6/84,” 16 April 2009, YouTube video, 13:21; 

and “President Ronald Reagan: Address on the Challenger 

Disaster,” 17 March 2008, YouTube video, 4:29.

31. Lucius Mestrius Plutarch, Life of Julius Caesar, trans. John 

Dryden (Ann Arbor, MI: Charles River Editors, 1991), loc. 

337 of 1084, Kindle: “His contempt of danger was not so 

much wondered at by his soldiers, because they knew he 

coveted honor. But his enduring so much hardship, which 

he did to all appearance beyond his natural strength, very 

much astonished them.” 

32. Philip Freeman, Julius Caesar (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 88.

33. Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus (New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 61. Additionally, Plutarch 

recorded that during the 10 years Caesar fought in Gaul, 

he took 800 towns, subdued 300 states, defeated 3 million 

adversaries and killed 1 million, and took captive another 

million. Plutarch, Life of Julius Caesar, loc. 313 of 1084, Kindle. Judged in the context of his times, his exploits were 

remarkable, although in today’s world, the party most likely 

to express interest in his actions would be the International 

Criminal Court, which would charge him with genocide. 

See “Article 6. Genocide,” in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (The Hague, Netherlands: International 

Criminal Court, 2011). Always on his game, Mark Twain 

summed up Caesar this way: he conducted war against the 

barbarians not out of revenge “but because he wanted their 

land and desired to confer the blessings of civilization upon 

their widows and orphans.” Mark Twain, The Mysterious 

Stranger (Auckland, New Zealand: Douglas Editions, Floating Press, 2009), chapter 8, loc. 355575 of 54078, Kindle; also 

quoted by Freeman, Julius Caesar, 2. His actions in Rome 

echoed his strength. As a young man, he married Cornelia, 

the daughter of Lucius Cornelius Cinna, a rival to Lucius 

Cornelius Sulla, who had seized power in Rome. Worse, 

Caesar was the nephew of another Sulla foe, Gaius Marius. 

Sulla showed the allies of Marius and Cinna no quarter. He 

ordained the murder of many, providing a reward to any 

who killed those appearing on a death list while seizing the 

property of the deceased for the state. As historian Philip 

Freeman pithily put it, Sulla “managed to combine murder 

and fund-raising on a grand scale.” Freeman, Julius Caesar, 31. Caesar’s mother successfully lobbied Sulla to spare 

Caesar, but Sulla demanded that he divorce Cornelia. In an 

era in which marriage was often viewed as transactional, 

Caesar, who loved his wife, refused. Freeman, Julius Caesar, 

31; C. Suetonius Tranquillus, The Twelve Caesars, trans. Alexander Thomson, revised and corrected (Lawrence, KS: Digireads, 2004), loc. 94 of 12910, Kindle; Goldsworthy, Caesar, 

59. When his aunt, Julia, the widow of Marius, died, Caesar 

ignored possible retribution from Sulla and presided over a 

very public funeral, at which he ignored Sulla’s prohibition 

against displaying images of Marius and led a procession 

bearing symbols of Marius’s victories. Sulla was seen as the 

champion of the wealthier classes, while Marius was more 

populist. The gesture made Caesar popular. He also made 

a public oration eulogizing Cornelia, and Plutarch credits 

him as the first Roman to do so. See Suetonius, The Twelve 

Caesars, loc. 127 – 137 of 12910, Kindle; Plutarch, Life of Julius 

Caesar, loc. 146 – 163 of 1094, Kindle; Goldsworthy, Caesar, 

98–99; and Freeman, Julius Caesar, 50 – 52.

34. Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, loc. 668 of 12910, Kindle. Sue-
tonius notes that when “the issue of a battle was doubtful, 

he sent away all the horses, and his own first.” Suetonius, 

The Twelve Caesars, loc. 659 of 12910, Kindle.

35. Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, loc. 668 of 12910, Kindle. Caesar reciprocated his horse’s affection and later dedicated a 

statue to his horse at the temple of his ancestral deity, Venus 

Genitrix. Alexander the Great had a similar relationship to 

his renowned horse, Bucephalus. Pliny records that Alexander got the fierce horse after no one else proved able to tame 

it. At only 12 years old, Alexander promised his father, King 

Phillip II of Macedonia, that he would pay for it should he 

be unable to tame it. See Plutarch, The Complete Collection of 

Plutarch’s Parallel Lives (Oxford: Acheron Press), loc. 26495–

26504 of 29380, Kindle; and Pliny (the Elder) (John Bostock, 

Henry Thomas Riley Tr.), The Natural History of Pliny, vol. 

2. Caesar’s choice of a similar horse was almost certainly a 

strategic communication decision to associate himself with 

the legendary Alexander.

36. Freeman, Julius Caesar, 130.

37. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 65. In addition, the author conducted telephone interviews with historian Adrian Goldsworthy on the topic during the course of summer 

2012.

38. Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing 

without Organizations (New York: Penguin, 2008).

39. Patrick Ruffini, “Going Inside the Cave,” Engage, 20 December 2012; and “Inside the Cave: An In-Depth Look at 

the Digital, Technology, and Analytics Operations of Obama 

for America” (PowerPoint presentation, Engage Research, 

2013), 83.

40. Jack Guy, series of interviews with author, June 2013–March 

2019. 

41. Shama Kabani, The Zen of Social Media Marketing: An Easier 

Way to Build Credibility, Generate Buzz, and Increase Revenue

(Dallas, TX: BenBella Books, 2016), 10.

42. Angelique Chrisafis and Ian Black, “Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali 

Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protestors Claim Victory,” Guardian, 15 January 2011.

43. “Egypt: Thousands Protest against President Hosni 

Mubarak,” Guardian, 25 January 2011.

44. Amy Goodman, “Asmaa Mahfouz and the YouTube Video 

that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising,” 8 February 2011, 

video and transcript, DemocracyNow!, 25:28.

45. See “Revolution in Cairo: April 6 Youth Movement,” PBS 

Frontline, 22 February 2011. Note the video of a July 2008 

Australian television profile of the democracy activists and 

their use of social media embedded on the webpage.

46. Christopher Bodeen, “Hong Kong Protesters Wary of Chinese Surveillance Technology,” AP News, 13 June 2019.

47. Steven Lee Myers and Paul Mozur, “China is Waging a Disinformation War Against Hong Kong Protestors,” New York 

Times, 13 August 2019. 

48. Anthony Dapiran, “Beijing Is Shooting Its Own Foot in 

Hong Kong,” Foreign Policy, 22 August 2019.

49. Bodeen, “Hong Kong Protesters Wary of Chinese Surveillance Technology.” 

50. Shibani Mahtani, “Hong Kong Protestors Coordinate 

Tech-savvy Effort to Beat Chinese State Surveillance,” Independent, 16 June 2019.

Dos and Don’ts in Actions and Messaging | 103
Chapter 9

What channels are available to reach your intended audiences? Some audiences depend on television 

(e.g., those viewing Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya). Others prefer word of mouth (e.g., Somalia). Still others have restricted access to the internet. Government censorship or filtering impacts how audiences 

receive information. This chapter provides an overview of social media—what it is, how it can and 

should be used, and when it can be an effective part of your communication strategy. 

Thomas Elkjer Nissen of the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen has articulated the 

emerging role of social media in engagements and conflicts and how it is being weaponized.1

 He 

demonstrates how, during the past 15 years, social network media has “become an integral part of the 

conflict environment” and progressed ever since Kosovo in 1999.2

 It includes counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians, and clashes in Lebanon, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Social media now plays an important role in the politics of nearly every 

nation, and its utility has been demonstrated by forces that represent democratic and authoritarian 

powers.3

As Rupert Smith pointed out, the internet has connected audiences globally, rendering every home 

with a television or computer a battlefield for control over the narrative.4

 Journalist David Patrikarakos 

has offered excellent illustrations for how Palestinians and Israelis have employed Twitter to control 

the narrative, and in doing so, achieving international strategic effects.5

 Retired Marine Corps colonel 

Thomas X. Hammes also wrote brilliantly about the impact of information warfare.6

 In examining how 

social media has been weaponized, Nissen and others have defined many of its tactics and potential in 

influencing perceptions and opinions in the battlespace. As Nissen notes and David Kilcullen, former 

advisor to General David Petraeus, has pointed out, all of this occurs as the character of conflict has 

grown more urban, enabled by technology, and—by becoming more accessible to broad swaths of parties — empowering. That is rendering war more about local power, money, and control.7

INCLUDING SOCIAL MEDIA IN YOUR STRATEGY

104
Including Social Media in Your Strategy | 105

The bottom line is that social media networks 

play an increasingly pivotal role in contemporary 

conflicts. Regardless of the specific social media 

platform, they are “all online technologies and 

practices that people use to share content, opinions, insights, experiences, perspectives, and 

media themselves.”8

In the past few years, and notably since 2016, 

any analysis of the use of social media must 

account for the increasingly pervasive use of 

so-called fake news (i.e., propaganda) that has 

permeated much of the discourse about the use 

of social media. The intervention by Russia in the 

U.S. elections in 2016 has provided strong impetus 

and awareness of disinformation tactics.9

 The 

increasing use of bots and fake accounts for social 

media posts complicates the challenge.10 The onset 

of artificial intelligence will further intensify the 

challenge.

A detailed discussion of social strategies and 

tactics lies beyond the scope of this book, but 

operators need to comprehend the utility of social 

media networks and technologies and how to 

capitalize on them, recognizing that they continue 

to rapidly evolve. 

Social Media: What Is It?

Social media refers to internet-hosted digital tools 

used for sharing and collaboratively creating 

information by individuals and communities.11 It 

empowers individuals to participate in dialogue.12

A staggering 4.333 billion people in the world 

were active internet users as of July 2019, encompassing 56 percent of the global population.13

While technical definitions of social media vary, 

most agree that it is online media whose primary 

purpose is reader/viewer cocreation or reader/

viewer interaction. This includes most blogs and 

all forums, microblogs (e.g., Twitter), discussion 

boards, websites, and sharing sites (e.g., YouTube, 

Pinterest, Instagram, Facebook). Any website that 

invites viewers to interact with the site and with 

other visitors falls into the broad definition of social 

media. 

Social media offers many benefits for individuals 

and organizations, but there are drawbacks. The 

ability to reach global audiences is both a blessing 

and a curse; it also enables the uninformed (and 

others) to widely propagate narratives that bear 

little relation to the truth, distorting debate and 

spreading misinformation.

Traditional media, whether print or digital, such 

as daily newspapers or television, offers a more 

tightly controlled information environment. It is a 

one-way street; information flows in one direction 

only, with publishers and broadcasters serving as 

gatekeepers to decide what is disseminated. Social 

media is a multidirectional highway, but one that 

lacks proper lanes, speed limits, and dead ends. 

Scholars Jennifer Aaker and Andy Smith label 

the successful use of social media the “Dragonfly 

Effect.” Their model is based on the mechanical 

functions of a dragonfly’s four wings. Each wing 

serves a different purpose, but they all must move 

in harmony. An effective social media communications campaign should emulate this. 

• Focus on a single, measurable goal.

• Grab attention—cut through the noise 

that clutters other social media chatter. 

• Hook the audience with a personal 

connection or higher emotion to engage 

an audience more fully.

• Take action that moves audiences from 

being listeners to team members. If 

you have a call-in number, make sure 

you have someone there to answer the 

phone who can do something with the 

call.14
The theory applies to military operations or 

strategy. All four components (wings) are vital to 

effective communication.

Difference from Traditional Media

Social media differs from traditional media in 

its interactive component and user-generated 

content. Social media comes in different forms, 

including blogs, microblogs, wikis, forums, 

podcasts, social networking sites, and virtual 

worlds. 

• Blogs are websites that allow users a 

venue for publishing their points of 

view, allowing readers to comment, 

and carrying on conversations using 

the commenting feature. This medium 

has become popular in target countries 

where media environments are tightly 

monitored and controlled.

• Microblogs are websites similar to blogs, 

but with user-generated content limited 

to 140 characters. This medium allows 

users to quickly and efficiently disseminate information to large networks in 

short segments. Twitter is an example.

• Wikis are informal information sites that 

allow users to create and edit content 

on webpages. Wikipedia is the classic 

example.

• Forums are online discussion sites that 

often include reposting of traditional 

media content. Many forums are password protected or require registration 

to participate and/or view discussions. 

• Podcasts are online digital audio or 

video media files.

• Social networking sites such as MySpace 

and Facebook allow users to list interests and link to friends, sometimes 

annotating these links by designating 

trust levels or qualitative ratings for 

selected friends.

• Virtual worlds are computer-based 

simulated environments that allow 

users to socialize via online personalities (avatars).

Social media generally reaches fewer people 

than well-circulated newspapers or magazines, 

but social media platforms are extremely dynamic. 

New topics constantly emerge and are readily 

overtaken by even newer topics. Different types of 

social media will rise and fall in popularity, making 

it challenging to maintain visibility of some sites 

and issues.15 

A Historic Geographic Shift

The global online population is shifting dramatically and growing fast. Today about one-third 

of the world’s population is online.16 New users 

tend to be young and from the developing world. 

Nearly one-half the online population is under 

age 25. Users in the developing world increased 

from 44 percent to 62 percent from 2006 to 2011.17

The most striking shift has come from 

burgeoning populations in the southern and 

eastern parts of the globe. In 2011, Atlantic and 

European populations accounted for only 35 

percent of online users. The Asia-Pacific region 

boasted 45 percent of users even though only 24 

percent of those populations had access to the 

internet.18 

Most of the new users will use mobile devices 

as 3G services spread throughout the Asia-Pacific 

region.19 Many developed nations there already 

boast a 90-percent penetration rate. Globally, there 

are 3.3 billion smartphone users in the world 

today, and 5.13 billion people have mobile devices 

106 | Chapter 9
in 2019. There are nearly 9 billion mobile connections among a world population of 7.7 billion.20

Going Viral

Communication specialists deftly use social media 

outlets to propagate a narrative. You need to watch 

for the pitfalls of doing so. Those who obtain 

information through social media do not always 

distinguish between a trained communications 

expert and a novice blogger. When a story becomes 

popular online, it can spread like an uncontrolled 

virus and reach audiences beyond the world of 

social media. That is called going viral.

Narratives that go viral elude an obvious 

pattern. They vary in content and format. Some 

are video clips, texts, games, images, webpages, 

emails, or audio recording. Some are hilarious 

anecdotes of animal behavior, political mishaps, 

songs, or even online ads.

Using Social Media 

to Influence Target Audiences 

When does it make sense to use social media? It 

depends on the target audience. Those with limited 

access to the internet or heavily state-controlled 

internet usage may still find it is a key source for 

KEY SOCIAL MEDIA TYPES 

Social media is evolving, with new tools, 

services, and consumers: 

Including Social Media in Your Strategy | 107

• Blogs (WordPress, Blogger)

• Conversation applications 

(Facebook Messenger)

• Crowdsourcing (Tweetbrain, 

YahooAnswers)

• Discussion forums

• Gamification

• Geolocation

• Image content sharing services 

(Pinterest, Instagram)

• Microblogs (Twitter)

• Mobile calling (callwave)

• Multimedia

• News aggregators (digg)

• Photograph sharing (Flickr, Picasa)

• Podcasts

• Search (Google, Ask, Bing)

• Social bookmarking

• Social knowledge

• Social networking (Facebook, 

MySpace, LinkedIn) 

• Video sharing networks (YouTube)

• Virtual worlds (Second Life, 

Kaneva)

• Wikis (Wikipedia)
command and control, collecting or receiving information or intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance. Rebels fighting Bashar al-Assad’s government 

found themselves in that position.

Where internet connectivity is more widespread, 

social media can be vital to reaching key decision 

makers. Social media can add depth, reach, and 

perspective to a campaign that use of traditional 

media sources cannot equal. 

Social media invites shorter texts. Language is 

often less formal and often grammatically deficient. 

That is not necessarily bad. In Twitterville, Shel Israel 

comments that “Twitter lets us behave online more 

closely to how we do in the tangible world.”21 David 

Patrikarakos has offered keen insights into how 

Twitter is reshaping conflict, empowering individuals, and breaking down traditional barriers that 

existed when institutions acted as gateways to information. The impact, for example, that a single Palestinian tweeter, Farah Baker, had on shaping public 

perceptions was so strong that it sent the imaginative Israelis scrambling to match her messaging 

with their own ingenuity. In Ukraine, the power of 

Facebook has proven indispensable to marshalling 

support for anti-Russian forces.22

The internet can be weaponized to communicate a message through action. In 2015, Russia 

launched BlackEnergy, a malware program. It struck 

the power grids of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of 

western Ukraine, knocking out electrical grids 

during a cold period. Former FBI agent and social 

media expert Clint Watts accurately points out that 

such attacks sought to damage infrastructure and 

undermine Eastern European countries through 

humiliation and confusion. The actions communicated a message about power and the price of opposition, and it inflicted harm.23

Understand how target audiences consume social 

media information and engage by using social 

media tools. Persuasive messaging must blend into 

the social media environment. Tone, language (e.g., 

colloquial speak), acceptable misspellings for shortening phrases (e.g., Twitter users’ preference), and 

the frequent inclusion of website links embedded in 

social media text are important. 

Watts has offered compelling insights into the use 

of weaponized social media that operators may have 

to contend with. Effective social media armies, he 

contends, consist of three types of accounts:

• Hecklers: these identify and drive wedge 

issues into target audiences, talking up 

online allies and arming them with 

propaganda that confirms audience 

member beliefs. They also target social 

media adversaries to arouse hostility 

against them. Hecklers, he says, do not 

hack computers. They hack minds. They 

seek to change audience perceptions on 

issues or personalities. They try to batter 

adversaries off social media.

• Honeypots: these aim to lure unsuspecting targets into engagement that 

may cause them to divulge location or 

personal information that forms valuable 

intelligence. This is the type of tactic that 

an enemy can be expected to use against 

soldiers. You might receive a Facebook 

message from an account that appears 

to belong to a gorgeous woman or handsome man. The profile image will seem 

real, but it may be an avatar—an artificially generated image. The account’s 

goal is to gain insights and intelligence. 

• Hackers: sometimes highly networked 

with honeypot accounts, these attackers 

may deliver malware to elicit valuable 

personal information. The danger that 

hacking or honeypots pose for field oper108 | Chapter 9
ators is that if they can penetrate firewalls or overcome passwords and steal 

personal information, they may find a 

fact they can use to blackmail you.24

Such tactics require commanders and operators to learn and apply basic lessons of cybersecurity defenses, starting with password security and 

staying on the alert to guard against spearphishing—

getting tricked by attackers when receiving apparently legitimate emails into giving away passwords 

or other personal or sensitive information.25

Bots present an increasing threat. German 

researchers concluded that bots are “capable of massively distributing propaganda in social and online 

media” and can be “partly responsible for election 

results.”26

Bots enable operators to flood voter perceptions 

with false or misleading assertions. They can overwhelm the capacity of humans to respond. Aided 

by a coming era of artificial intelligence (AI), the 

dangers posed by bots will escalate. Foreign service officer Matt Chessen has articulated the dangers of a dystopian social media environment that 

this poses in his report The Madcom Future, which 

this book’s author recommends to every reader.27

Chessen points out that soon enough, the image of 

a close friend you may see on your cell phone, tablet, or computer may be an avatar yet know more 

about you than any friend — or even you —know. 

The potential for use offensively and defensively 

in tactics and operations is enormous. It is vital for 

operators to learn how to use them tactically. Your 

cell phone or tablet is a mobile office, if used correctly. Just ensure that proper steps for encryption 

are taken to preserve security at rest, in transit, and 

at destination and that use of mobile devices or 

computers comports with the security guidelines 

that govern your operations. Never presume the 

adversary is less sophisticated than your side. ISIS 

demonstrated a high order, and state proxies or 

states aligned against us are supple, flexible, agile, 

and imaginative.

Social Media as an Intelligence Tool

Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) and open 

source intelligence (OSINT) are invaluable in developing situational awareness and strategy. For example, tracking social unrest in social media channels 

provides key data points:

• What are the topics being discussed? 

• Who are the key messengers?

• Where are they spreading these messages?

• Are there discernible networks?

• How are they doing it?

• What is the reaction to these messages 

and messengers?

• Are there countermessages emerging?

Intelligence analysts and military operators can 

use social media analysis in a variety of ways to aid 

them in fulfilling their missions.

• Early detection and assessment of emerging issues

• Identification and tracking of key communications by influential individuals, 

organizations, and their networks

• Analysis of recurring communications 

and messages and how they shape attitudes and behaviors to push perceivers to act

Social media enables you to monitor unofficial 

online dialogue. It helps detect emerging narratives and key voices that have resonance, which can 

enable an intelligence analyst to track discourse on 

issues and key messages in open source media and 

Including Social Media in Your Strategy | 109
to apply emerging technology to assess the resonance of each. It helps develop countermessaging 

and countermessengers. It enables you to help analyze an entire media campaign related to a military 

operation: editorials, authors, media type, etc.

Measuring how audiences are exposed to certain 

messaging—favorable or unfavorable to your military strategy and desired outcome—aids in determining support or opposition to on-the-ground 

tactical military efforts.

Direction of Social Media

Technology is advancing what is possible in social 

media. Various platforms illustrate how the social 

media landscape is rapidly changing and affecting 

the capacity of parties to articulate story, narrative, 

theme, and message, as well as to recruit and mobilize.28

• Twitter has acquired unprecedented influence. Diverse parties including ISIL, 

Israel, Palestine, Russia, and famously, 

President Donald J. Trump, have employed it extensively and demonstrated its impact.

• Facebook is closing in on the 2 billionuser mark each month. ISIS used it, 

YouTube, and Twitter extensively to 

intimidate enemies and to recruit, mobilize, and drive its narratives.29 Yet, the 

example of Facebook shows how rapidly situations evolve. In late November 

2017, Facebook reported that it was successfully removing 99 percent of content 

related to militant groups tied to the 

Islamic State and al-Qaeda, blunting 

their ability to exploit the platform.30

Some have argued that Facebook appeals 

to older generations, but political campaigns as well as violent extremist groups 

such as ISIS have made strong efforts to 

capitalize on it.

• YouTube is used by 1.3 billion people. 

About 300 hours of YouTube content 

are uploaded to the site every minute. 

Nearly 5 billion videos are watched on 

it every day. About 80 percent of those 

age 18 – 49 watch it, and 60 percent prefer 

online video platforms to live television.31

• Instagram enables you to post photographs with a caption. It is especially 

popular with younger audiences.

• Chirp is an enhanced shared media, 

offering a free, open-source tool for programming amateur radio. 

• Flayvr is a photo and video sharing 

program. It is a gallery app that organizes 

photographs and videos into moments.

• Conversations is a tool to integrate social 

media and interoffice communications 

into business operations.

Emerging Technologies 

and Their Impact on Operations 

The internet and social media rank among key 

drivers that influence people around the world. 

They fuel emotions, shape perception, and provide understanding into what motivates and 

shapes behavior. Technology is enabling us to understand the emotional affinity between language 

and target audiences, and how language can be 

used to motivate audiences to act. This technology 

moves us beyond measuring sentiment—whether 

a party holds a favorable or unfavorable view toward statements, ideas, or people—into understanding emotional triggers that can be integrated 

into strategy, operations, and tactics.

These drivers affect every country and culture. 

They affect messages articulated by influencers. 

110 | Chapter 9
Emerging technologies are enabling us to help 

measure how influencers affect outcomes. The information derived can support

• Operational plans

• Current and emergent operations

• Strategic planning operational teams

• A better understanding of intelligence 

and enemy objectives

• Strategic appreciation of ground realities

• Commanders’ strategic planning process

• Understanding to help identify and 

counter adversarial story, narrative, 

themes, and message

• Measuring the impact of influencers and 

operations on target audiences

Emerging Capabilities

New automated technologies have had a dramatic 

effect on the collection of information and intelligence.32

• Technology enables real-time searchbased capabilities on most social media 

outlets; adversary communications in 

print, broadcast, and online; image/

object data extraction; social network 

mapping; sentiment detection; automatic 

translation; and internet infrastructure 

monitoring.

• Social media collection includes custom 

drawing and indexing of sources on both 

the light web and dark web.33

• Information can be collected on internet 

providers, domains, uniform resource 

identifiers (URI), and autonomous system numbers (ASNs) for organizations 

and individuals, as well as on passive 

domain name systems (DNS). 

• Advanced machine learning algorithms 

and natural language processing technology can help measure emotions 

and motivations. It can ingest any text 

content: emails, instant messages, social 

media, online news, print newspapers, 

and television and radio broadcasts. It 

can analyze audience response within 

minutes.

• Technology can be used to measure the 

effectiveness of messaging on target 

audiences; rank the persuasive influence of individual groups on specific 

subjects; and identify extremists not in 

contact with known radicals, foreign terrorist organizations, or criminal organizations.

• Technology enables advance warning of 

social unrest disruptions.

The ideal technology would enable measuring 

the persuasive impact on audiences in any medium. 

Changes in an individual’s emotional response to 

events, messages, or people can be important security indicators. Gathering metrics that enable analysts 

to establish an individual’s emotional baselines and 

to receive alerts when those emotions depart significantly from the norm is important. Such technology 

uses emotional metrics that correlate strongly with 

the likelihood of violent action. Certain emotional 

affinity scores correlate strongly, for example, with 

the recruitment into violent extremist organizations. 

The approach employs four vectors. Rooted in 

the science of Plutchik’s Wheel of Emotions, two 

are emotional: grief to ecstasy and loathing to admiration. Two are motivational, observes George Beebe, a leading former social media analytics expert 

with the CIA: apathy to attention and calm to panic.

34

The intersection of emotional and motivational responses generates inclination toward behavior and 

changes in that behavior.35

Including Social Media in Your Strategy | 111
Changing Communication Response Times 

The speed at which information is put out and the 

need to respond affects the pace at which military 

commanders must respond in real-time. That has 

changed the way communication strategy must be 

thought through and executed.

Social media amplifies the widespread intentional use of disinformation. Misdirection is not new. 

What is new is the proliferation of disinformation 

unwittingly by online users who trust their social 

media networks and aid in the widespread dissemination of false information.

Afghanistan-based Taliban elements have used 

social media outlets to spread disinformation. 

Through Facebook and Twitter, Taliban members 

have used social media for recruitment and to spread 

false or misleading information. In 2012, NATO 

forces voiced concern about keeping pace with the 

Taliban’s use of social media, which outpaces that 

of NATO and U.S. forces in the information warfare 

campaign.36 

Countering anticipated disinformation campaigns in social media must form part of your communication strategy.

1. Be prepared to disseminate countermessages 

through preidentified online supporters. 

2. Assess the damage. How far has the disinformation spread, for example, beyond online 

media into traditional channels? 

3. Assess the strength of your message against 

the disinformation through the use of monitoring tools. Whose narrative is dominant: 

yours or the enemy’s?

4. Recognize lessons from any disinformation 

campaign to plan ahead in future campaigns.

Tactically Using Social Media 

Social media is a game changer. Using it well may 

spell the difference between victory and defeat for 

an operation. Small Wars Journal author Jeff Gilmore 

raise key points regarding the power and value of 

social media as it impacts several feared dictators:

1. Dictators live in fear of the power that is represented by social media:

• China and Iran banned certain social 

media sites (e.g., Facebook) due to 

loss of information control.

• If social media scares these established forces, why does the U.S. 

military not more fully invest in embracing the power of social media 

tools?37

2. Nonprofit organizations and cause-driven 

entities flood the system with core messages and track the receptivity to their online 

themes, adjusting as necessary.38 

• Militaries can draw a lesson from 

their work. Anticipating counterstrategy messaging is one part of the 

solution. A second is having the capacity to nimbly respond in a social 

media environment with core messaging, using effective messengers 

without bottleneck delays in the approving authority channels. Close 

coordination with public affairs can 

help ensure this is achieved.

Examples of Military Application 

of Social Media Outlets

Social media users have used such channels as a 

personal outlet for commenting or venting, not 

fully appreciating the potential impact their comments or postings could have. 

In Abbottabad, Pakistan, in early May 2010, 

a computer programmer began tweeting about 

the noisy helicopter above his quiet town. This 

tweeter, Sohaib Athar, was unknowingly tweet112 | Chapter 9
ing live accounts of the takedown of Osama bin 

Laden. His simple tweets describing a helicopter 

above Abbottabad at 0200 quickly generated more 

than 14,000 followers.39 The tweets captured an innocent blogger’s curiosity about the purpose and 

ownership of the helicopters. 

Militaries have used social media to help manage wartime public perception. The Israel Defense 

Forces (IDF) launched a media campaign following its November 2012 military operation in Gaza: 

Pillar of Defense. It included a constant stream of 

updated postings on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube during Israeli airstrikes. Israel used these 

outlets to promote its cause and generate support. 

One Twitter account, @IDFSpokesperson, urged 

followers to retweet its core message if they supported the Israeli airstrikes. The IDF used a similar tactic with Facebook, requesting viewers to 

share a flier-style image with other friends to signify support for Israeli actions.40

Hamas responded with its own Twitter messaging. User @AlqassamBrigade declared, “Our 

blessed hands will reach your leaders and soldiers 

wherever they are.”41 This message was less about 

influencing social media consumers than making 

a threat against Israeli military action. 

In Ukraine, David Patrikarakos described how 

anti-Russian Ukrainian civilians used Facebook 

to recruit volunteers and supply its forces against 

pro-Russian forces and Russian troops.42 The success of Egyptian protestors in igniting the Arab 

Spring by using Facebook to organize and demonstrate was political, but the flexibility and agility 

of the tool offers a lesson for operators.43

Weaponized social media is already playing a 

pivotal role in engagements. Its potential is growing and evolving. Operators and commanders 

need to understand how adversaries use it and 

how to capitalize on its potential to advance their 

own strategies, operations, and tactics.

Including Social Media in Your Strategy | 113

1. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia: 

@Characteristics_of_Contemporary_Conflicts (Copenhagen, 

Denmark: Royal Danish Defence College, 2015).

2. Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia, 6.

3. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet 

Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).

4. Gen Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 

Modern World (London: Vintage Books, 2007), 286 – 90.

5. Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, chapters 1 and 2.

6. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone.

7. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the 

Urban Guerrilla (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015); 

also cited by Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia, 18.

8. Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia, 35.

9. See United States v. Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, No. 

1:18-MJ-464 (E. D. Virginia 2018). The indictment spells 

out the activities of the Internet Research Agency. See also 

“Continuing Transparency on Russian Activity,” Facebook 

Newsroom, 22 November 2017.

10. Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, eds., Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary, working 

paper no. 2017.11 (Oxford, UK: Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, University 

of Oxford, 2017), 4.

11. Anthony Mayfield, What Is Social Media? (London: iCrossing, 2008), 5–7. 

12. Tim Finin et al., “The Information Ecology of Social Media 

and Online Communities,” AI Magazine 29, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 

77–91, https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v29i3.2158. Since 

2000, global internet users increased by more than 400 percent. Bandwidth increased from 11,000 gigabits per second 

(gbits/s) in 2006 to nearly 80,000 gbit/s in 2011. See The 

World in 2011: ICT Facts and Figures (Geneva, Switzerland: 

International Telecommunication Union, 2011).

13. J. Clement, “Worldwide Digital Population as of July 2019,” 

Statista.com, 17 September 2019. 

14. Jennifer Aaker and Andy Smith with Carlye Adler, The 

Dragonfly Effect: Quick, Effective, and Powerful Ways to Use 

Social Media to Drive Social Change (London: Jossey-Bass, 

2010), 9.

15. Finin et al., “The Information Ecology of Social Media and 

Online Communities.” 

Endnotes
114 | Chapter 9

16. The World in 2011, 1.

17. The World in 2011, 1.

18. “World Internet Users and 2019 Population Stats,” Internet 

World Stats, 30 June 2019.

19. “India Ranks 14 in Mobile Broadband Readiness Index 

among 17 Asia Pacific Nations,” Telecomlead.com, 18 November 2011.

20. “How Many Phones are in the World?: 1 Billion More Mobile Connections than People Worldwide,” Bankmycell.

com, accessed 28 October 2019.

21. Shel Israel, Twitterville: How Businesses Can Thrive in the New 

Global Neighborhoods (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2009), 

10.

22. See Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters.

23. Clint Watts, Messing with the Enemy: Surviving in a Social 

Media World of Hackers, Terrorists, Russians, and Fake News

(New York: HarperCollins, 2018), 139.

24. Watts, Messing with the Enemy, 82–83.

25. Watts, Messing with the Enemy, 82. He notes that such emails 

trick unsuspecting users into clicking on a link that redirects 

them to a watering hole—a fake page that requests a username and password. It can look legitimate and attackers are 

ingenious at disguising fake sites as genuine ones. Watts, 

Messing with the Enemy, 140.

26. Watts, Messing with the Enemy, 140.

27. Matt Chessen, The Madcom Future: How Artificial Intelligence 

Will Enhance Computational Propaganda, Reprogram Human 

Culture, and Threaten Democracy . . . and What Can Be Done 

About It (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017). 

28. Sam Peters, “New Social Media Technologies of 2013 (So 

Far),” Technorati, 7 May 2013, source no longer available. 

Social media has evolved substantially since Peters wrote 

his commentary. Discussing in depth how to use platforms 

such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube would require a 

separate book, and the author has consciously limited discussion of these platforms.

29. Maya Gebeily, “How ISIL Is Gaming the World’s Journalists,” Global Post, 26 June 2014. See also Michael Weiss and 

Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: 

Reagan Arts, 2015); and Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: 

The State of Terror (New York: Ecco, 2015).

30. Julia Fioretti, “Facebook Reports Progress in Removing Extremist Content,” Reuters, 28 November 2017. 

31. “36 Mind Blowing YouTube Facts, Figures and Statistics—2017,” Fortuneloads, accessed May 2018.

32. The Sasser Group/Hoplite Industries, SecDev Group, 

Palantier, IBM, and others offer various services for harvesting social media and big data (extremely large data sets that 

are difficult or even impossible to analyze using traditional 

data-processing methods).

33. A variety of terms related to the web are often bandied 

about, including dark net and light, dark, or deep web. The 

term dark net refers to networks not indexed by search engines and only available to specific people or groups, requiring authorization or specific software and configurations. 

The term light web refers to a special place on the internet 

that appears to preserve its golden age and often carries a 

nostalgic appeal. The term dark web refers to websites that 

use the public internet but require specific software for access and are not indexed by search engines to ensure anonymity for those who may be sharing illegal data. The term 

deep web refers to about 90 percent of the internet that is just 

below the surface of the world wide web and is not searchable but can be accessed by entering a direct web address.

34. George Beebe, interview with author, June 2017. Information theory and the science of using the Wheel of Emotions 

is rooted in the psycho-evolutionary theory of emotion pioneered by Dr. Robert Plutchik. His research centered on the 

study of emotions, violence, and psychotherapy process.

35. This approach was used by Element Data (formerly BehaviorMatrix), an innovative company that the author has advised. At this writing, Element Data has sold its technology 

to another entity whose plans are unknown. Its technology 

could identify key communicators and the emotional and 

motivational impact messages have on microsegmented 

audiences. A distinguished retired British colonel, Dr. Steven Tatham advocates a somewhat different approach. He 

favors the use of “multisource, scientifically verified, diagnostic methodology undertaken in-country and in the local language to identify specific motivations for behavior.” 

See Steven Tatham, Using Target Audience Analysis to Aid 

Strategic Level Decisionmaking (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 

College Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 8. 

36. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Taliban Infiltrate Social Media,” 

Washington Times, 22 August 2012.

37. Jeff Gilmore, “Where Is Lt Zuckerberg?,” Small Wars Journal, 

9 January 2013. 

38. “Nonprofits Drive the Message through Social Conversations,” eMarketer, 20 February 2013.

39. While Americans tend to be asleep at that time of night, 

Pakistanis stay up late. The town was very active at the time 

of the attack. Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez 

Kayani, for example, was working at his desk as the attack 

unfolded.

40. Max Fisher, “Why Is Israel Tweeting Airstrikes?,” Washington Post, 16 November 2012.

41. Anna Henderson, “Twitter Wars,” St Andrews Foreign Affairs 

Review, 30 January 2013.

42. Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, chapter 4.

43. See Jose Antonio Vargas, “Spring Awakening: How an 

Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook,” New York Times, 

17 February 2012. 
Chapter 10

Information warfare and communication strategy must consider how dramatically the information 

environment has changed during just the past five years—and how it seems likely to change during 

the next five to 15 years. These changes are confluent and affect one another.1

 The 2018 National Defense 

Strategy recognizes that “rapid technological change” is impacting an “increasingly complex security 

environment.”2

Demographic Changes

Most countries are experiencing major cultural changes that are reshaping their political environment. 

In the United States, the demographics and ethnicity of the voting public have shifted—and will continue to do so — with the influx of Latin Americans. Two of every five babies born in this country today 

are Latino. We saw the impact of ethnic and generation delineation in the 2012 elections. Upheavals 

also are affecting other nations. Younger generations drove the Arab Spring, which reconfigured the 

political dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East. Japanese and Russian populations are aging, 

a shift that may seem to have no immediate impact but offers longer-term consequences. Asian nations 

teem with younger generations who see their future differently than their parents did; they hold different worldviews and expectations. Information strategy, at a strategic or tactical level, must account for 

the impacts of these changes.

Cultural Change

Understanding a culture (cultural awareness) is vital, but a key element in that understanding lies in 

grasping that change is occurring and in recognizing the nature of the changes, as well as how these 

are reshaping the environment for any communication strategy. Consider social gatherings in the United States. Compared to a decade ago, one is more likely to see same-sex partners than someone lighting 

THE CHANGING INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

115
up a cigarette. One can argue, as Joseph Gaylord 

does, that U.S. culture today has grown coarser in 

the language that individuals use with one another. His insight certainly holds true if one examines 

mass entertainment, such as the lyrics to music 

or film and television. In Afghanistan, champions of success claim that civil society is emerging 

as vibrant and viable, demanding transparency in government, respect for the rights of women, competency, and integrity.3

 Whether one views 

this as a cultural or political change, to the extent 

the assertion is valid, it represents a different environment for communication strategy.4

Political Change 

The efforts of the United States and its allies to 

counter violent extremism, the threat of which continues to mutate and evolve, requires new strategies. Al-Qaeda has surfaced as a more urgent 

threat in Mali and Sahel nations in Africa. The Arab 

Spring is causing major shifts in North Africa and 

the Middle East. The conflict in Afghanistan, upheaval in Pakistan, concerns about Iran’s aggressive 

foreign policy, and the emergence of India and China in new ways onto the world stage are reshaping 

the political environments in their regions. 

Colombia offered a dramatic example of how a 

single political event could reshape the political environment of a country. Oscar Morales watched a 

news report that portrayed the brutal treatment of 

hostages by the rebel group Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC), especially the story 

of a baby born in captivity to a woman it had kidnapped. Morales created a Facebook group called 

One Million Voices against FARC with the message “No more kidnapping, no more lies, no more 

death, no more FARC.” It gained 100,000 members 

in a week. Email, Google Docs, instant messaging 

platforms, and Skype — all free tools — were used 

to rally and communicate with organizers around 

the world. Planning information was placed on 

Facebook, but organizers built a public webpage to 

reach beyond Facebook users. The message went 

out in 17 different languages. 

Morales’s efforts produced protests in 45 Colombian cities and towns, with 1.5 million protestors coming out in Bogota alone.5

 The impact was 

historic. Until then, Colombians faulted the government for failing to protect citizens against kidnapping. Afterward, they shifted the blame to 

FARC for conducting kidnapping. The shift vastly bolstered the government’s battle against FARC. 

Morales’s strategy might have been impossible 

a decade ago. It illustrates how interactive engagement over the internet and through social media 

is empowering individuals in new and powerful 

ways. The 2011 Tahrir Square protests in Cairo were 

a logical extension of what Morales accomplished. 

Most observers had long thought that President 

Hosni Mubarak held tight control over Egyptian 

politics. He had exploited the controlled use of civil society organizations as a safety valve for people 

to express opinions and discontent.6

 But as economic problems and anger about corruption worsened, 

Tunisia’s 2010 – 11 Jasmine Revolution against its 

own president inspired a similar rebellion in Egypt. 

The trigger was pulled on 6 June 2010, when police seized and beat to death 28-year-old Khaled 

Said as he entered an internet café in Alexandria. 

Protests broke out and continued throughout the 

summer. In January 2011, thousands of protestors 

poured into Tahrir Square, the symbolic heart of 

Cairo. Mubarak lost control of the situation and, 

while ostensibly resigning, was effectively ousted 

by his colleagues in Egypt’s military.7

 Protest leaders employed Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and text 

messages to initiate and coordinate protests, report 

on events, and foster interaction between protestors 

116 | Chapter 10
and other social sectors of the Egyptian society and 

the international community as well as mass media. 

Luis Fernando Baron has insightfully observed 

that social media tools were central “in the process 

of framing the public messages that emphasized 

a) the ability and opportunity for the Egyptians to 

produce social change, b) the importance of mobilization and taking to the streets, c) the protests 

as legitimate ways to obtain political reforms, 

and d) young Egyptians as leading that historical 

process.”8

Unfolding events deprived pro-democracy forces of their revolution when the Muslim Brotherhood won new elections and promptly exposed 

themselves as hostile to religious tolerance and 

democratic freedoms. Popular anger enabled General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to seize power and win 

new elections. He remains president of Egypt today. These developments show that popular movements can effectively use social media to overthrow 

an authoritarian regime, even though success may 

be short-lived.

Media Change

The media has changed significantly in the past 

few decades. As Clay Shirky observed, the advent of social media has produced a new world 

in which everyone may be a journalist, publisher, or producer. Social media outlets have undercut the power of television and radio stations or 

networks and of publishers to act as gatekeepers 

and filters for what audiences hear. Indeed, as the 

media cries out for protection of journalists suspected of obtaining leaked classified information, 

one must now ask: Who qualifies as a journalist? 

Is it restricted to New York Times employees and 

the like? Why is a person employed as a journalist more worthy of legal protections than a nonprofessional blogger or occasional internet user who 

posts to social media? Those who object to giving 

bloggers the professional status of journalists argue that traditional journalists are trained to investigate and report and to abide by higher standards 

of integrity and professionalism. The U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that bloggers have legal status and are afforded protections 

as journalists in terms of First Amendment rights.9

But all one needs to do is take a cursory look at the 

current social media environment to recognize that 

many bloggers will repeat rumors without taking 

the time to investigate and find the levels of corroboration that a traditional media outlet requires.

These changes have created greater opportunities to reach greater audiences. In some places—including the United States—they are also creating 

greater isolation, as people seek news outlets that 

reflect their perspectives, engage with individuals 

who share common interests or views, and shut 

out other voices. The impact of social media is discussed below. But one bottom line is that the internet and sites such as YouTube have empowered 

individuals as producers and journalists.

Daniel Leonard Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, 

Chris Lundry, and Scott W. Ruston have produced 

an excellent study of how rumors affect the media environment.10 They point out that the internet 

enables people to enter discourse using low-cost 

technology to recast media stories through interpretation or mash-ups, adopting or adapting news 

content, spreading rumors that affect public perceptions and the credibility of players in a political crisis — in Singapore, for example, the escape 

of terrorist Mas Selamat Kastari from a highsecurity prison. 

Producer/journalist Neville Bolt raises a similar argument in noting that the gatekeepers (i.e., 

the institutional press) have lost their traditional 

power to determine what is news and the inforThe Changing Information Environment | 117
mation that is fed to the public by traditional news 

organizations. In past eras, they served to filter 

out stories that could not be corroborated. The argument in favor of the way this operated is that 

it produced a media environment in which readers or viewers debated the implications of stories 

in which content was accepted as fact rather than 

challenging whether a story had its facts straight at 

all.11 One sees this in U.S. politics every day, as opposing political players accuse each other and the 

news media of disseminating the now-ubiquitous 

“fake news.” It is an unwelcome development, but 

we need to deal with its reality and the implications that require communicators to get their facts 

straight, explain the facts clearly, and provide appropriate documentation. These efforts may not 

keep adversaries from denouncing what is said 

as false, but taking the time to bolster the credibility of factual assertions can make the difference in 

whether audiences find a communication credible, 

believable, and persuadable.

Political Party Changes

In the United States, the changes in the political 

and cultural landscape have created polarization 

and partisanship that has spilled over into the media. Political changes in other parts of the world 

also are having an impact on those nations. Financial problems besetting the European Union 

threaten its existence and its capacity or willingness to partner with the United States on security 

issues that affect our interests. The U.S. drawdown 

or withdrawal from places such as Afghanistan 

and Syria, and the backlash in Iraq against Iranian 

ambitions — it is not clear what will actually transpire — will have regional consequences and seem 

likely to reshape the interests and postures of political parties there. Communication strategy needs to 

understand what changes are occurring and their 

impacts.

Changes occur constantly in different countries. 

The 2018 elections in Pakistan produced a new 

government led by Imran Khan. The former prime 

minister, Nawaz Sharif, is the subject of criminal 

charges. The military’s chief of Army Staff, Qamar 

Javed Bajwa, and the army have taken firm control 

of security policies. That has shifted the dynamics of Pakistani politics and affects how the United 

States should engage with Pakistan, although the 

role Pakistan is playing in Afghanistan frustrates —

perhaps unfairly — many U.S. policy makers. The 

conflict with terrorist organizations in the Sahel 

and other African nations is reshaping the dynamics of that region. The point is that communication 

strategy, the key tool in information warfare, must 

account for the current political situation in a place 

but also peer over the horizon to anticipated shifts.

Technology Changes 

The bottom line is that social media relates to rapid 

technology changes and how those changes affect 

communication strategy and may affect it further 

with future — currently unknown —changes. These 

changes also impact how we need to think about 

dissemination and receipt of information. 

118 | Chapter 10
1. This section draws on conversations between James Farwell and Joe Gaylord between 2016 and 2019. Mr. Gaylord 

and the author have worked together in election campaigns 

since 1989.

2. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military’s 

Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Department of Defense, 2018), 1.

3. Nader Nadery, “Afghanistan’s Civil Society Blossoms,” 

Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2013.

4. For more on culture’s impact on strategy, see Matthew Slater, ed., Patterns of Influence: Strategic Culture Case Studies and 

Conclusions (Quantico, VA: MCU Press, 2020). 

5. See Brannon Cullum, “Oscar Morales and One Million Voices Against FARC,” Movements.org, 23 July 2010.

6. Hamdy A. Hassan, “Civil Society in Egypt under the 

Mubarak Regime,” Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences 2, 

no. 2 (2d Quarter 2011).

7. See Ann M. Lesch, “Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the Revolution,” Middle East Policy Council 18, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 35–48, 

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00496.x.

8. Luis Fernando Baron, “More than a Facebook Revolution: 

Social Movements and Social Media in the Egyptian Arab 

Spring,” International Review of Information Ethics 18 (December 2012): 90.

9. Obsidian Finance Group LLC v. Crystal Cox, 12-35238 (9th 

Cir. 2014), a defamation case in which a blogger sued for 

an allegedly defamatory blog post. The court held that in 

a matter of public concern, liability requires proof of fault 

and actual damages. The blogger raised allegations of fraud, 

corruption, money laundering, and other illegal activities 

against Summit Accommodators Inc., which a bankruptcy 

custodian had retained in connection with a bankruptcy. 

One factor that makes the case interesting is that Cox, the 

blogger, was accused of having a history of making similar 

allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retractions.

10. Bernardi et al., Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (New Brunswick, 

NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012).

11. Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the 

New Revolutionaries (London: Hurst, 2012).

Endnotes

The Changing Information Environment | 119
Chapter 11

Assessing the effectiveness of a communication campaign is important and should be part of any plan 

to apply lessons learned. 

Key Questions

• What did the strategy achieve in changing behavior? 

• What was the most powerful factor about the campaign that influenced behavior?

• What impact did the campaign have on molding, shaping, and influencing attitudes, opinions, 

and beliefs? Most critical, did that impact have a causal connection on the behavior of target 

audiences? Why or why not?

• Operational design for the military envisions the creation of certain conditions that satisfy a 

desired end state. What role did the campaign play in realizing that end state?

• Did it measurably neutralize or paralyze the enemy’s ability to exert command and control?

• Did it measurably deny the enemy’s ability to achieve its objectives?

• Did it change the minds of adversarial policy decision makers, and if so in what way?

• Did it cause adversaries to believe that they are losing or will be defeated? If so, on what basis?

• Did it affect the kinetic performance or information warfare of the other side? If so, how, when, 

and what was the impact?

• Did it create confusion, distraction, or deception in the mind of the enemy? If so, how, when, 

and what was the impact?

• Did the campaign reframe an issue raised by the enemy in terms favorable to your side?1

• Did the campaign succeed in properly branding the enemy in terms favorable to your position?2

• Did the campaign discredit and marginalize the enemy and its rationale?

• Did the campaign make effective use of symbolism?3

• Did the campaign avoid tactics that enabled the enemy to use symbolism against you?4

DETERMINING CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS

120
Determining Campaign Effectiveness | 121

• Did the campaign identify our narrative, story, themes, and messages with 

citizens, effectively communicating why 

we are acting and that our actions benefit them? Did the campaign provide a 

frame of reference that made such communication comprehensible?5

• Were the considerations identified earlier in this book satisfied (knowing the 

culture, enemy, strategic situation, etc.)?

• Did the campaign enable your side to 

claim and maintain the moral high 

ground?

• Did the campaign take into account how 

the enemy was organized to fight and its 

rules of engagement?

• Did the campaign stir up division among 

enemy forces?

• Did the campaign effectively trumpet 

success?

• Did the campaign engage fully with 

target audiences to achieve its goals? If 

not, what more should have been done? 

What should have been done differently?

• Did the campaign expose deceptive or 

fraudulent tactics of the enemy in a credible way? For example, in the April 2004 

Fallujah battle, al-Qaeda manipulated Al 

Jazeera to convey a false image of what 

was happening. In the campaign you 

executed, did that occur? Was the enemy 

tactic countered, and if so, how successfully—and why and how?

• Did the campaign expose and capitalize 

on enemy hypocrisy, whether inconsistent statements or actions?

• Did the campaign identify and capitalize 

on enemy statements and actions to turn 

them against the enemy and discredit it?

• How rapidly did the campaign respond 

to unfolding events?

• Did the campaign identify and capitalize on targets of opportunity?

• Did the campaign win over allies in local 

or foreign governments, including partner allies like NATO countries who may 

form a part of a broader coalition?

• Did the campaign mobilize an active 

minority within a target population who 

helped the United States succeed?

• What does the data show in comparing 

performance metrics (e.g., how many: 

clicks did a webpage receive, viewings 

did an ad receive, mentions did a news 

media story make of the message) versus qualitative metrics (how well did the 

campaign actually work: the answers to 

the questions above)?

• What traps were avoided? For example, 

in Iraq, storekeepers told U.S. military 

translators they were glad to see them, 

then told reporters such as Anthony 

Shadid they could not wait to see infidels out of the country or killed. 

Factors that Help Measure Effectiveness

• Decide what must be monitored and 

monitor those things. In Iraq, insurgents measured effectiveness partly by 

monitoring Iraqi, U.S., and international 

media. Those that succeeded were emulated. Those that failed ceased to be used. 

It is vital to monitor what an enemy 

asserts and what and how its claims are 

covered, as that will give insight into 

how they are framing issues and results. 

It affords a base for comparison as we 

judge whether our own information tac-
tics preempt or counter what the adversary says.

• The number of attacks on civilian or military targets. 

• Polling/focus groups/mall intercepts 

that reflect attitude and opinions of the 

population as 1) their security, 2) government credibility, 3) U.S./Coalition 

assistance, 4) tactics, 5) adversaries, and 

6) optimism.

• Intelligence data from all sources on relevant points, especially in assessing the 

adversary’s order of battle, tactics, aims; 

actions of the populace; what the government is doing and needs to do; and 

other factors that will vary from situation 

to situation.

• Willingness of key influencers to enter 

governing coalitions or to support our 

cause.

• Willingness of influencers to cooperate 

in providing intelligence.

• Willingness of influencers to cooperate 

in kinetic action against the adversary.

• Military casualties. 

• Civilian casualties; this clearly affects our 

ability to convince the populace that we 

are helping not hurting and that we can 

prevail.

• Media coverage outside the United States 

conveys a sense of how our narrative resonates abroad, especially among coalition 

partners and allies. 

• Polling data inside the United States 

provides quantitative data and insight 

into where voters stand and how well the 

administration’s narrative of events and 

its messages that flow from that narrative 

resonate and reverberate. That affects our 

will—a key center of gravity—and our 

range of options.

• Media coverage inside the United States 

influences attitudes and opinions at 

home, and is a key element in winning 

the will of the people.

• Polling data among coalition partners is 

important because it provides quantitative data and insight into how well our 

narrative and messages that flow from 

it resonate and reverberate among those 

audiences.

• In dealing with Muslim audiences, coverage by Arab media is increasingly 

important as an indicator of feelings 

on the so-called Arab Street and among 

influencers. Many Arabs view issues in 

a transnational, cultural context rather 

than purely a national one.

• Statements by Muslim influencers provide insights into the thinking of elites in 

nations in which democracy is fledgling 

or nonexistent.

• Information obtained on what is being 

said at the grassroots in ways particular 

to different cultures. This is an intelligence function.

• Public statements by key political and 

opinion leaders. Examine what politicians say in public more than what they 

say in private. 

• Comparison between what political and 

opinion leaders say in English and what 

they say in their own language; these 

may be contradictory.

• Comparison between stories carried by 

local newspapers in their native language and what a translated version of 

the paper may say.

122 | Chapter 11
• The number, frequency, and quality of 

defections from adversary groups are an 

indication of adversary morale and the 

impact of our own narrative and tactics.

How to Measure Effectiveness 

and Target Audience Analysis

The science of measuring the effectiveness of action 

and target audience analysis is evolving. No single 

tool applies the same to each situation. Those interested in learning more about the sophistication of 

cutting-edge techniques should read Sasha Issenberg’s The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning 

Campaigns, noted above, which carries the history up 

to but not including President Barack Obama’s 2012 

reelection, when social media analytics and target 

audience analysis were carried to even higher levels.6

Traditional methods of audience analysis remain 

important, and the techniques and approaches that 

Obama’s campaign employed to identify, persuade, 

or mobilize potential supporters should be used in 

tandem with them. These may or may not apply 

as well to foreign audiences, especially in zones of 

conflict. Conducting cultural anthropology to understand the social, economic, political, and historical 

dynamics is crucial for foreign target audiences. And 

do not forget the incomparable Yogi Berra, who is 

reputed to have said, “I observe a lot by watching.”7

One might add listening and engaging to that task. 

What is learned on the ground through understanding and engaging with target audiences can 

provide a fountainhead of vital, relevant information.

The point is: judge and assess each situation on 

its own merits in light of the audience, and requirements, means, and objectives.

1. Polling8

What is it? Polling, says pollster Celinda 

Lake, “is a scientific backing of public 

opinion. Polling surveys public opinion by interviewing a random sample 

of people. A sample is drawn from the 

population universe tested. Each respondent is chosen by chance. Everyone in a 

scientific sample has an equal chance of 

being selected. Polls examine statistical 

data across different demographic and 

regional groups. Attention is paid to unbiased wording of questions.”9

Objectives. Assess public opinion on 

an issue or, as relevant, political leader 

or candidate. Determine which messages work or do not work. Segment 

audiences and examine the impact on 

attitudes and opinions among base 

audiences (those whose opinions are 

hard and fast) and swing or persuadable audiences (those whose opinions 

can be moved). Lake says, “Polling is 

often used to create a roadmap to victory 

or for groups on issues. Knowing your 

base and persuasion targets is critically 

important.”10

Determine resonance. Two messages 

may appear to generate the same support. But one needs to know if one gains 

support among swing voters and if 

one simply solidifies a base. President 

Barack Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign made wide use of social media to 

communicate messages. A large number 

of potential messages were tested. The 

instinctive judgments of political experts 

proved wrong. Opinion testing helped 

identify what struck a responsive chord.

Avoid mistakes. Good polling helps ascertain both what must be said in communicating a message and what must 

not be said.

Determining Campaign Effectiveness | 123
Quantitative findings. Used in conjunction with other methods of sampling 

opinion, polls help quantify findings 

and to project those findings onto the 

population at large whose attitudes and 

opinions one wishes to test. 

Picture in time. Polling provides a picture in time of the dynamics of a strategic situation. You want to know what 

works and what does not; to compare 

competitive strategies; understand what 

people, groups, messages, and ideas are 

credible; and help define a communication objective. Positive responses today 

may be reversed tomorrow, or as political campaign professionals would say, 

a 10-point lead two months before an 

election does not guarantee victory, just 

as a 10-point deficit does not guarantee 

defeat.

Caveat. There is controversy about how 

reliable polling is in conflict zones or in 

repressive regimes. Pollsters generally 

insist populations can be accurately 

polled. But in Afghanistan, some have 

questioned whether polling that suggests a positive response to U.S. presence is entirely accurate. Years ago, in 

Nicaragua, the Sandinista leader Daniel 

Ortega felt pressured to finally hold an 

election. He took a survey to find out 

how the vote would turn out. The poll, 

conducted by a highly respected U.S. 

polling firm, suggested he would win. 

He called the election and lost. Many 

believe that the poll was accurate in 

recording what respondents said—but 

that fearing the phone calls came from 

Sandinistas, people who disliked Ortega 

lied about their true feelings. Respondents often try to please the interviewers 

and often worry about confidentiality.

Caveat. Response rates vary. In Muslim 

countries, women often will have lower response rates than men.

Caveat. Use polls and other forms of 

opinion testing to confirm judgments, 

not as a substitute for them, even where 

the data may run counter to instinctive 

judgments.

Caveat. Polling should not be a covert 

activity. But do not release poll results 

to the press without carefully considering the impact — especially of a future 

poll that contradicts the data in the one 

you are releasing.

2. Focus groups

What are they? A focus group provides 

qualitative research aimed at understanding the language in which people 

express ideas and nuances, the connections, the way people think about 

things, the information they have, and 

how they respond to new images and 

information. Focus groups allow people to explain the how and why. They 

can elaborate when a survey response 

would have been “I don’t know” or “I’m 

not sure.”

How many participants? Usually 10 – 12 

people discussing topics presented to 

them. They typically last about two 

hours. There are different views on how 

best to conduct them, and the right answer may vary from culture to culture. 

Homogeneity. It is important to ensure 

homogeneity within the group along demographic and attitudinal dimensions 

124 | Chapter 11
that are correlated to the topic to encourage full participation.

Separations. Separate participants by 

gender, race, tribe, etc. to ensure open 

and honest discussions and to be sensitive to cultural issues.

Moderators. Match moderators to 

groups for a more open discussion. Top 

experts such as Celinda Lake, Douglas 

E. Schoen, and Ron Faucheux take care 

to match moderators to group participants and to create safe spaces in which 

people can freely express themselves. 

For example, use women to moderate a 

focus group for women; use an Afghan 

male to moderate a focus group of Afghan males.

Objectives. Explore participants’ concerns in their own words, determine 

their intensity of interest, and discover the sources of their ideas and opinions. They can help ensure that questions 

posed in a public opinion survey are 

asked in the right way using the best 

language.

Channels for conducting them. In person, online, or by telephone.

3. Individual interview

What is it? In-depth one-on-one interviews with 40 – 100 people about selected topics. This is a very effective way to 

gauge the attitudes, opinions, and beliefs of influencers. These interviews can 

last up to an hour (compared to 20 minutes for a telephone poll, although personal interviews can be much longer). 

They are more expensive but provide the 

depth required to obtain relevant information about complex topics.

How are they conducted? Usually by 

phone but, if possible, in-person interviews are better.

4. Mall testing11

What is it? A form of individual interviewing that explores attitudes, opinions, and beliefs in a setting conducive 

to open expression of reactions to television, radio, or print ads or ideas presented to individuals. Increasingly, mall 

testing can also be done online.

How is it done? Individuals enter a private booth or a private area, where in 

seclusion a message is presented, and 

they provide responses.

Advantage. Schoen points out that these 

tests avoid the groupthink that can 

take over a focus group.12 (Online focus groups can avoid some of that problem.) Mall testing produces an objective 

set of responses.

5. Dial testing

What is it? Dial testing is a focus group 

that uses dials or meters to record audience reaction to speeches, interviews, 

advertisements and any public messages. The results enable you to evaluate 

the impact, resonance, and effectiveness 

with target audiences of that discourse.

How is it done? In-person and online 

dial testing is a methodology to obtain 

moment-to-moment reactions to stimulus like ads, speeches, statements, debating, and messaging. Dials can elicit both 

conscious and unconscious responses. 

Dial groups typically include 25 – 1,000 

people online. That enables researchers 

to examine divisions by demographic 

and attitudinal groups.

Determining Campaign Effectiveness | 125
Advantage. Moment-by-moment research is a good way to measure the 

effectiveness of specific words and 

phrases in your message, as well as the 

tone and style of the messenger delivering the message. Two cautions: first, 

make sure all the participants have a 

clear, common understanding of the rating system used; second, beware of the 

amount of time between what is said 

and the respondent’s reaction. If you do 

not attend to these carefully, it will be 

hard to get an accurate measure of reactions.

6. Message development and research 

What is it? “A good research plan requires both quantitative and qualitative 

research to develop and test messages. 

You need both if you want the precision that good message development 

requires.”13

Advantage. Polling and research disciplines the message development process. 

When someone asks, “Why should we 

use this phrase instead of that phrase?,” 

research provides a data-backed answer.

7. Ad and message testing

What is it? Qualitative research is an art 

and science. You have to know how to 

listen and how to determine what is important if you want to draw the right 

conclusions.

126 | Chapter 11

1. In countering violent extremism, this is about changing the 

narrative, story, theme, and message. For example, many 

objected to the term militant jihadism to describe violent Islamists, as jihad is a positive word for most Muslims. Instead, 

frame the conflict as a fight to defeat a death cult of political 

fanatics who murder innocent civilians while trying to hijack a religion to suit a political agenda. Do not characterize 

them as “warriors.” Gen Wesley Clark and Kal Raustiala, 

director of the Burkle Center, offered the same point in an 

excellent opinion piece, “Why Terrorists Aren’t Soldiers,” 

New York Times, 8 August 2007.

2. In Malaysia, framing the issue properly was Britain’s key to 

victory. The decision of British Gen Sir Gerald Templer to 

change the vocabulary made a significant difference in dealing with rainforest people, who had been referred to as sakai 

(slave). British troops were ordered to refer to them as orang 

ulu (people of the campaign). Steve Tatham, retired British 

officer and former British defense attaché and commander 

of British forces in Afghanistan, interview with author, 15 

January 2015. See also Steve Tatham, Losing Arab Hearts and 

Minds: The Coalition, Al Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion

(London: Front Street Press, 2006); and Nagl, Learning to Eat 

Soup with a Knife. More critically, the British rebranded the 

Malayan Races Liberation Army as the Communist Terrorist 

Organization. That cut the legs out from under their nationalist appeal. Indeed, a key to defeating the Communists 

was to show the populace that the Communists, led by the 

Chinese, were not Malays and did not have their interests 

at heart. See Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.

3. There is no formula, but this tactic requires identifying 

symbols that resonate with a local population and employing them to support our efforts and discredit those of an 

adversary. It may mean ensuring that new initiatives are 

announced by local leaders with no U.S. representatives 

in sight. It may mean using adversary weapons employed 

to murder innocent civilians as icons to define what they 

really stand for. It may mean observing a visible protocol 

in dealing with tribal leaders that respects local tradition 

Endnotes
that al-Qaeda, which in Iraq has used violence in efforts to 

enforce its own ideology, has eschewed. 

4. During Operation Desert Storm, U.S. troops were apparently based away from population centers. The current Iraq 

conflict presents a different war. Images that insurgents 

have broadcast on the internet portraying Americans as 

crusaders bent on destroying Islam are powerful. Precaution is vital to minimize exposure, perhaps by restricting 

religious symbols to U.S. camps and banning them from 

tanks, weapons, or uniforms.

5. This was difficult to accomplish in rural Afghanistan early 

in the war. Rural Afghans had no frame of reference to understand what the Twin Towers were. 

6. Issenberg focuses on what the 2008 Obama campaign 

viewed as the challenge of attempting to identify which voters might oppose him because of his race. They thought it a 

revelation when they realized valuable information could 

be obtained by asking voters—who might be untruthful 

as to their own voting intentions—whether they thought 

their neighbors would support a black candidate. Obama’s 

campaign was only 20 years behind such thinking and research conducted in Louisiana politics on the issue. See also 

Jim Rutenberg, “Data You Can Believe in,” New York Times 

Magazine, 20 June 2013. 

7. Michele Gorman, “Yogi Berra’s Most Memorable Sayings,” 

Newsweek, 23 September 2015.

8. Some of this analysis draws on interviews and longtime 

working relationships with three nationally respected U.S. 

pollsters: Celinda Lake, president of Lake Research Partners; Dr. Ronald Faucheux, president and CEO of Fauchaux 

Strategies; and Dr. Douglas E. Schoen, chief executive officer 

of Schoen Consulting.

9. Celinda Lake, interview with author, June 2013, hereafter 

Lake interview.

10. Lake interview.

11. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 51. Douglas E. Schoen 

and Mark Penn are credited with pioneering the technique 

for politics. Both served as pollsters for President Clinton. 

Schoen serves as a pollster and strategic adviser to New 

York Mayor Mike Bloomberg. 

12. Farwell, Persuasion and Power, 51.

13. Dr. Ronald A. Faucheux, president and CEO of Faucheux 

Strategies (a national, nonpartisan polling firm with national 

and international clients), interview with author, July 2019. 

Previously, Dr. Faucheux was president of Clarus Research 

Group, a Washington-based polling and research firm.

Determining Campaign Effectiveness | 127
Chapter 12

This chapter differs from the preceding in that it aims to explain new approaches that Russia and China 

embrace in using strategic communication as part of information warfare to achieve political and military objectives. Different parties label this set of emerging ideas as new generation warfare, hybrid 

warfare, and gray zone warfare. The elements of information warfare apply to each but there is a lot of 

confusion about them; the discourse is complicated and nuanced, and a detailed analysis lies beyond 

the scope of this book. This chapter seeks to clarify the core precepts associated with Russian, Chinese, 

NATO, and U.S. views. 

For the purpose of this book, strategic communication is defined as the use of words, actions, images, 

or symbols to mold or influence the attitudes and opinions of target audiences as a means to shape 

their behavior to advance interests or policies or to achieve objectives or a defined end state.1

 The 

Pentagon’s notion of strategic communication focuses on process and understanding how to forge a 

strategy and it is not very useful to this discussion. It is important to recognize that a distinction can be 

drawn between information warfare and strategic communication. Warfare connotes the presence of 

violence.

Most descriptions of what American experts term hybrid warfare entail violence, not merely information. NATO’s definition embraces violence, but its notion of hybrid warfare is so broad it can be 

construed to include almost anything. The New York Times has published a commentary arguing that 

the Russian chief of the General Staff, Army general Valery V. Gerasimov, has pitched information 

operations as a form of warfare.2

 The Russian military does not embrace a notion of hybrid warfare/

new generation warfare, but its political and academic commentators do. Russia expert Ofer Fridman, director of operations at the King’s Centre for Strategic Communications, King’s College London, has set the record straight, pointing out that Gerasimov has never enunciated a new military 

SPECIAL COMMENT ON HYBRIDITY

128
Special Comment on Hybridity | 129

doctrine. His speeches and writing discuss nonmilitary means — including “ ‘hybrid methods . . . 

to achieve political goals with a minimal military 

influence on the enemy . . . by undermining its 

military and economic potential by information 

and psychological pressure, the active support of 

the internal opposition, partisan and subversive 

methods.’ ”3

 But he wrote in the context of justifying an increase in Russia’s capacity to wage kinetic warfare by strengthening its armed forces.4

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Approach

Russians invoke the term hybrid warfare, which 

they have taken from the American use, but their 

notion of it is distinct. Fridman, Mark Galeotti, 

and Oscar Jonsson have conducted in-depth studies into the complexities of Russian thinking and 

their works on the topic are invaluable. Russian 

commentators have developed different interpretations of hybrid warfare, but the Russian military 

does not embrace a nonkinetic notion of warfare.

The Russian military refers to new generation 

warfare. It may employ information and strategic 

communication before, during, and after an operation, but Russia sees information as a tool to support military action. For Russia, new generation 

warfare entails the use of armed force. There is no 

warfare that is won purely by nonmilitary means, 

because—in this view—that is not war. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s theory of unrestricted 

warfare similarly envisions a mix of military force 

with indirect nonmilitary means as one strategy to 

achieve the goals of an armed struggle.5

General Gerasimov’s commentaries and 

speeches underscore that point. Gerasimov called 

for new ideas in the context of recent military experience. He identified information warfare as 

one form of strategic activities that armed forces 

should pursue. He argued that Russian adversaries possess a hybrid capability that could be used 

to destabilize Russia, so Moscow needed its own 

hybrid capability using military and nonmilitary 

responses to counter internal and external threats. 

The internet is one tool of hybrid capabilities.6

 The 

perspective from which Gerasimov wrote is defensive.7

Russian military thought draws a distinction 

between the notion of gibridnaya voyna (hybrid 

warfare) and the use of military means in a fullscale military operation that may entail use of information and strategic communication to achieve 

an end. While not part of Russian military doctrine, hybrid warfare represents, to some degree, 

the Kremlin’s strategic behavior. The Kremlin 

clearly employs nonmilitary means to disrupt and 

undercut social and political cohesion in the West.

 Russia’s notion of new generation warfare 

implies violence, economic pressure, subversion, 

and diplomacy through strategic communication 

as defined earlier. Its scope entails psychological 

warfare and can be viewed as a form of political 

warfare. Fridman notes that gibridnaya voyna “focuses on ways that political players undermine 

their adversaries by eroding their domestic and 

international political legitimacy and stability by 

employing a mix of predominately nonmilitary indirect means and methods.”8

Gibridnaya voyna embraces color revolutions 

staged in former Russian states that Russia believes the West has organized as part of a longrange scheme to oust Vladimir Putin and his 

regime from power.

China’s Three Warfares Approach

Today, China employs a doctrine of “Three Warfares,” that includes legal warfare, media public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare.9

While this approach dominates its current strate-
gic thinking, in the late 1990s, Colonels Qiao Lang 

and Wang Xiangsu offered useful insights as to 

the potential for information strategy as part of 

a notion of unrestricted warfare that respects no 

rules or limits.10 Such warfare uses information 

and public opinion to achieve strategic goals.11

Many believe China practices that approach 

through its trade, cyber, financial, and other policy initiatives. These reflect China’s desire to maneuver for psychological advantage and to use 

information warfare as a tool in multidimensional 

spaces to paralyze an adversary, gain the upper 

hand in a game with no rules, and force an enemy 

to submit to one’s will.12

China’s Central Military Commission endorsed 

the Three Warfares approach in 2003, recognizing that nuclear weapons are essentially unusable 

and that kinetic force offers undesired solutions. 

A lot has been written on the Three Warfares, but 

this section draws heavily on a 2013 Pentagon 

study, China: The Three Warfares.

13 Its analysis of 

the Three Warfares is excellent. Many of the recommendations also offered in the 500-plus-page 

study raise controversial questions and are debatable. The study itself best explains the Three Warfares approach.

China’s Three Warfares is war by other means. 

It consists of three confluent thrusts.

• Psychological warfare seeks to influence

and/or disrupt an opponent’s decisionmaking capability, to create doubts, foment antileadership sentiments, to deceive opponents and to attempt to 

diminish the will to fight among opponents. It employs diplomatic pressure, 

rumor, false narratives, and harassment 

to express displeasure, assert hegemony, and convey threats. China’s economy is utilized to particular effect: China 

threatens sale of U.S. debt; pressures U.S. 

businesses invested in China’s market; 

employs boycotts; restricts critical exports (rare minerals); restricts imports; 

threatens predatory practices to expand 

market share, etc.14

• Media warfare (also known as public 

opinion warfare) is a “constant, ongoing activity aimed at long-term influence of perceptions and attitudes.”

It leverages all instruments that inform 

and influence public opinion including 

films, television programs, books, the 

internet, and the global media network 

(particularly Xinhua and CCTV) and 

is undertaken nationally by the PLA, 

locally by the People’s Armed Police, 

and is directed against domestic populations in target countries. Media warfare aims to preserve friendly morale; 

generate public support at home and 

abroad; weaken an enemy’s will to 

fight; and alter an enemy’s situational 

assessment. It is used to gain “dominance over the venue for implementing 

psychological and legal warfare.”15

• Legal warfare (or “lawfare”) exploits 

the legal system to achieve political or commercial objectives. It has a 

prominent role in the warfare trilogy. 

Lawfare has a range of applications. 

They range from conjuring law to inform claims to territory and resources, 

to employing bogus maps to “justify” 

claims. In a distorted application of 

domestic law, for example, Beijing designated the village of Sansha on the 

Paracel Islands as a Hainan Prefecture 

to extend China’s administrative writ 

130 | Chapter 12
into the South China Sea. China also 

uses UNCLOS provisions and other 

legal conventions for unintended purposes.16

China’s approach is rooted in nationalism and 

its concept of sovereignty. It assigns to itself a 

superior status among nations — a radically different notion than sovereignty as envisioned by 

the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is designed to 

counter the projection of U.S. power. The United 

States is among four key audiences that China targets as part of its broader military strategy of antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) in the South China 

Sea. The United States embraces the notion of a 

maritime commons and free passage as an anchor 

of its strategic position in Asia. China would restrict U.S. power projection by setting the terms 

for U.S. access. 

It applies its doctrine to employ coercive economic inducements to nations in the region to 

counter U.S. naval presence. China justifies its position through a restrictive interpretation of the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(UNCLOS), adopted and signed in 1982.17 Its objective is to counter U.S. surveillance operations 

and routine U.S. Navy deployments. The Three 

Warfares are used to expand China’s global reach, 

fueled by its resources and energy demands. The 

doctrine aims to neutralize concerns and gain 

support among regional governments, business 

communities, and the public for its ambitions. 

The Three Warfares seeks to hinder U.S. offshore 

control strategy, establishing a naval blockade to 

create a no-man’s sea between the China mainland coast and the first island chain. Its success relies on the cooperation of third parties. It aims to 

condition public opinion in states including the 

Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia to 

inhibit those governments from providing the facilities and support needed to service U.S. naval 

operations in the South China Sea and to deny the 

United States a favorable regional political environment.

The report China: The Three Warfares, written 

for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, describes how the Three Warfares has 

been used as an offensive weapon not previously 

considered in the West. It offers an asymmetrical 

approach that stands outside most U.S. military 

thinking and challenges the United States to think 

anew about what approaches, consistent with 

American values, are likely to prove most effective as China seeks to establish itself as the premier power in the twenty-first century.18

China’s Three Warfares concept is what should 

alarm the United States and other members of 

the international community. It eschews violence 

or kinetic operations, setting it apart from most 

definitions of warfare. One has to assess it in the 

context of a sophisticated, long-term strategy to 

integrate Europe, Africa, and Asia as an economic 

system with China at its center.19 The concept is 

part of a grand strategy that includes enticing 

less-affluent nations as well as Europe into its 

Road and Belt Initiative, a Trojan horse that loans 

money to nations for infrastructure—but requires 

the debtor to use the borrowed money to employ 

Chinese workers, not works of the debtor nation. 

Nations such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan have 

discovered to their regret that the loans create a 

debt trap, potentially reducing them to a form of 

economic slavery as a tributary state. One needs 

to be clear-sighted about China’s goals. China 

talks about them openly. It rejects Western constitutional democracy. It rejects the notion of universal values, such as human rights. It rejects a world 

order comprised of sovereign states who treat one 

Special Comment on Hybridity | 131
another as partners in favor of one that it dominates. It would end a rule-based international 

order. It stands for suppressing freedom of expression at home. 

China expert Jonathan Ward observes that 

abroad it actively attacks Western values, targeting Chinese students overseas to sustain party 

doctrine.20 It uses brutal concentration camps to 

suppress Islam. China seeks to establish itself as 

economically supreme in the world, possessing 

the overwhelming share of global gross domestic 

product. The Chinese system embraces an authoritarian model that functions through a vision of 

comprehensive social management. It talks about 

asserting sovereignty over its own territory, but 

the parameters of that territory keep expanding. 

It shows no respect for the intellectual property of 

other nations. Reportedly, China is guilty of half 

the illegal fishing and half the human trafficking 

in the world.21 While eschewing military force, 

it employs economic coercion to force nations to 

submit to its will.22

China propagates a strategy that touts five 

principles: 1) respect for territorial integrity; 2) 

mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference 

in internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.23 At the core of its 

national goals is, as Graham Allison sums up, “a 

civilizational creed that sees China as the center of 

the universe.”24 The principles may sound reasonable on their face. China invokes them to justify 

its actions. In fact, they represent a sophisticated 

form of diplomatic sophistry.

These points vastly oversimplify a complicated relationship with China. What policies the 

United States should pursue must be left to political policy makers; this book expresses no opinion 

on that. But China’s ambitions, its sophisticated 

Three Warfares concept—which is also an outgrowth of precepts discussed in Unrestricted Warfare—define obvious challenges for the United 

States.

There is no simple counter, although one may 

argue that while rooting the precepts in U.S. values, we should adapt the Three Warfares concept 

and add a fourth concept to it: diplomatic warfare. 

Each of these requires strategies, operations, and 

tactics rooted in actionable legal authorities, resources, and doctrine that the United States currently lacks. 

China poses such a threat. The United States 

needs to decide and understand what its relationship with China can or should be and how to 

use strategic communication to achieve desired 

goals. The year 2049 lies not far over the horizon. U.S. security interests mandate confronting 

this challenge, forging international alliances and 

partnerships to address it as an international community — and to do so smartly and immediately.

NATO’s Definition of Hybrid Warfare

NATO’s definition of hybrid warfare means everything and nothing, rendering it more or less 

unproductive. It defines hybrid warfare to include “propaganda, deception, sabotage and 

other non-military tactics,” characterized by increased “speed, scale and intensity, facilitated by 

rapid technological change and global interconnectivity.”25 NATO’s commander, General Philip 

M. Breedlove, USAF, defines it as “a continuum 

of threat, including unconventional and conventional methods” that “bridges the divide between 

the hard and soft power.”26

In 2010, NATO defined hybrid threats as 

“those posed by adversaries, with the ability to 

simultaneously employ conventional and nonconventional means adaptively in pursuit of their 

objectives.” In setting forth a strategic approach, 

132 | Chapter 12
NATO states that hybrid threats will apply pressure, across the entire spectrum of conflict, with 

action that may originate between the boundaries 

artificially separating its constituents. They may 

consist of a combination of every aspect of warfare and compound the activities of multiple actors. Experience from current operational theaters 

has demonstrated that adversaries can now conduct hostile actions through a broad array of conventional or unconventional means and methods, 

and have a favourable outcome against a force 

that is superior, both technologically and militarily.27

NATO sets forth a “comprehensive approach” 

and a “framework response.” As Ofer Fridman 

observes, its approach covers everything: military 

and nonmilitary, covert and overt, “combined to 

achieve certain political goals.”28 These set forth 

general precepts for how NATO should address 

hybrid threats, but it is hardly an action plan, a 

cohesive doctrine, or a strategy. NATO needs to 

think through its notions of hybrid warfare and 

information warfare, including the relationship to 

both of strategic communication.

American Notions of 

Gray Zone and Hybrid Warfare

Many American military officers use the term gray 

zone warfare to describe warfare that combines 

kinetic and nonkinetic means. General Joseph L. 

Votel, USA, and his colleagues have described the 

gray zone in these terms: “The Gray Zone is characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in 

nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet 

short of conventional war.”29

They describe gray zone warfare as unconventional warfare that involves an indirect application of power to leverage foreign population 

groups to advance or maintain U.S. interests. It is 

discretionary and clandestine. It may be covert. 

It can be, Votel et al. argue, subtle or aggressive. 

The United States employed unconventional warfare to support the mujahideen (those engaged in 

jihad) in Afghanistan in their battle against the 

Soviet 40th Army. The concept animated Kurdish Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq during the 

2003 invasion of that country. Tactics Votel et al. 

identify include mobilizing “mass protests, work 

slowdowns or stoppages, boycotts, infiltration of 

government offices, and the formation of front 

groups.” These, they contend, can undermine 

“the military, economic, psychological, or political 

strength or morale of the government or occupation authority.”30

Other tactics include sabotage against military 

or industrial facilities, economic resources or other 

targets. Guerrilla warfare operations are carried 

out against military or security forces to reduce 

their effectiveness or hurt their morale. Much of 

Votel and his colleagues’ writing focuses on examples from World War II and the Cold War. A core 

challenge is that the United States’ military strategies, operations, and tactics need to be rooted in 

the core American values of freedom, respect for 

life, embrace of democratic processes, fair play, 

justice embodied in the rule of law, and the goal 

of achieving peace and stability in the world. Gray 

zone warfare is a label, not a defined concept. One 

challenge confronting the U.S. Department of Defense is to develop concepts, doctrines, and actionable strategies to define and make the concept 

actionable.

The more common term for this is hybrid warfare, a term attributed to Frank Hoffman of the 

National Defense University, currently serving as 

a special advisor to the secretary of defense and 

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. HoffSpecial Comment on Hybridity | 133
man’s thinking is informed by the work of multiple scholars, including Michael Evans, Colin Gray, 

Stephen Bank, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, and 

John Robb.31

Hoffman articulates two related concepts: hybrid warfare and hybrid threats. Hybrid warfare 

“incorporate[s] a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including 

indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”32 Hybrid threats encompass “any 

adversary that simultaneously and adaptively 

employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, 

irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior 

in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”33

Hoffman’s focus is tactical and operational. He 

considers himself an operator, not an academic, 

and his approach aims to support operators. He 

argues that convergence characterizes the evolving character of conflict that includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the 

kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of 

military force and the interagency community, of 

states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities 

they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the 

converging modes of war. What once might have 

been distinct operational types or categorizations 

among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and 

irregular warfare have less utility today.34

At its core, Hoffman’s view of hybrid warfare 

embraces violent conflict between regular or conventional forces and irregular or nonstate forces, 

such as militias or guerrilla forces, and involves 

the use of kinetic and information operations in 

a blurred or blended nature of combat. Hybrid 

wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the 

fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. They exploit modern technical capabilities. 

Hoffman’s approach offers guidance for tactical 

and operational activities in a battlespace.

He cites the 2006 Lebanon War, or the Second 

Lebanon War, as an example. A nonstate actor, 

Hezbollah, combined kinetic warfare and strategic communication in fighting the Israel Defense 

Forces. Israelis insist they won. The better view 

is that they learned and applied the lessons from 

a conflict that produced for them an unsatisfactory outcome to achieve subsequent success.35 The 

conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan provide 

further illustrations of major armed hostilities that 

combined different types of military forces, actions, and technology with strategic communication to achieve political and military objectives.36

Hoffman has been critical of U.S. military efforts—notably the 2003 Iraq War—to employ information warfare to battle adversaries such as 

Islamist extremists: 

Today, many small groups have mastered 

“armed theater” and promoted “propaganda 

of the deed” to arouse support and foment 

discord on a global scale. There are a plethora of outlets now in the Middle East and an 

exponentially growing number of websites 

and bloggers promoting a radical vision. 

These outlets constantly bombard audiences 

with pictures, videos, DVDs, and sermons. 

Ironically, in Iraq and in the Long War we are 

facing a fundamentalist movement that is exploiting the very modern and Western technologies to reestablish an anti-Western social 

and political system.37

In modern hybrid conflicts, Hoffman argues for 

achieving dominance in the cognitive domain, declaring, “We have to recognize that perception matters more than results in the physical battlefield.”38

134 | Chapter 12
We have to influence and shape audience behavior rather than imposing our will. Majors Timothy 

B. McCulloh and Richard B. Johnson, USA, vary 

Hoffman’s ideas in formulating seven principles 

of hybrid warfare that add nuance but do not alter 

the thrust of his thinking.39

Hoffman’s approach recognizes the pivotal importance that networks and connectivity play today. His concept of hybrid warfare is not new; it 

has been employed since ancient times. The Germans employed it to defeat the Romans in 8 – 9 

CE.40 Portuguese irregulars helped the British defeat the French in the Peninsular War, 1807–14.41

The American Revolutionary War pitted colonial 

militias against British regulars and Hessian mercenaries.42

Colonials befuddled a Britain that had underestimated the American support for independence. 

But the gold medal for imagination in the use of information warfare goes to Lieutenant General Lord 

Charles Cornwallis. His loss to General George 

Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette at Yorktown, Virginia, was the action of a player who knew 

when to fold in the face of overwhelming enemy 

superiority, not the dunce too many American children grew up imagining. Strategically imaginative, 

Cornwallis had earlier moved into Virginia and, in 

a stroke of genius, offered to free the enslaved people there, who comprised 40 percent of the state’s 

population. Half of them defected, providing intelligence and other support. Cornwallis knocked 

the American patriots back on their heels. His 

gambit demonstrated imaginative strategic communication. Had Cornwallis’s jealous superior, Sir 

Henry Clinton, left Cornwallis to his own devices, 

Cornwallis might have shifted the momentum of 

the war, despite conventional wisdom that for the 

British, who underestimated colonial sentiment for 

independence, the war was unwinnable.43

William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS) operatives adroitly used information warfare in carrying out their missions during World 

War II.44 Vietnam presented war by Communist 

guerrillas as well as mainline North Vietnamese 

units against U.S. and South Vietnamese conventional forces. Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan are 

poster children for Hoffman’s notion of hybrid 

warfare. These conflicts are about warfare. They 

entail violence and armed hostilities or confrontation. Strategic communication plays a role, but 

in support of military action. Hoffman’s notion is 

sound and relevant in that context.

The Need for New Thinking

The United States needs to develop a doctrine, 

strategy, and approaches for information warfare 

and the strategic use of communication and needs 

to organize itself to execute them. This stands 

apart from the urgent challenge that China poses. 

China’s coherent, integrated grand strategy to 

achieve global supremacy by 2049 excludes from 

its doctrine the application of violence. China relies on nonmilitary means — backed up by military power — to achieve its goals. 

Discussions of hybrid warfare (or whatever 

label is placed on its variants) are too Russiacentric. Unless we allow matters to escalate out 

of hand—always a challenge—it neither poses, 

nor does it wish to pose, an existential threat to 

American prosperity or survival. Russia is a regional disruptor with whom this nation can and 

should, as President Ronald Reagan and Prime 

Minister Margaret Thatcher concluded years ago, 

do business, identify areas of mutual security concern, and lessen tensions rather than allow rising 

emotions to escalate relations out of control. No 

one expects Russia to become a trusted ally or best 

friend to the West. Reagan’s adherence to the RusSpecial Comment on Hybridity | 135
sian proverb “trust but verify” stands.45 We need 

to be hard-nosed, clear-sighted, and realistic in 

dealing with the Kremlin and Russians. They play 

tough; we need to play tough. Still, the security 

interests of Russia and the West mandate identifying and acting on common security concerns, 

especially how to counter Chinese economic imperialism, not looking for reasons to heighten hostilities between them.

What other challenges require strategies that 

employ strategic communication to gain a competitive advantage? Drug cartels pose a clear 

and present danger within our own borders. 

The current debate tends to treat drug dealing 

as a high-intensity crime, and it is. It is also lowintensity conflict and terrorism, which requires in 

its solution a whole-of-government approach that 

includes the military.46

Migration has disrupted Europe. Pressure on 

U.S. borders has polarized American politics and 

raised questions about America’s relationship to 

nations south of its border. Dealing with these 

challenges requires an approach that entails strategic communication or information warfare. The 

U.S. military will continue to engage in Africa and 

the Middle East. Information warfare and strategic communication will play a key role in the nation’s strategies, operations, and tactics.

The United States needs to forge a strategy 

on a grander scale — one that takes into account 

the most urgent challenges, with approaches that 

avoid nonmilitary means and focus on the use of 

information to exert influence on target audiences 

and, in line with the National Defense Strategy, 

accord this nation a competitive edge for influence 

in the emerging threat environment. Information 

is a vital element in satisfying this requirement. 

The U.S. government is neither organized nor 

able to meet this requirement, and its survival 

and prosperity depend upon surmounting this 

challenge.

1. See Farwell, Persuasion and Power, which analyzes the notion 

at length in light of historical examples.

2. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ 

Operations as a Form of War,” New York Times, 2 March 2019.

3. Valery Gerasimov, ‘Po opytu Sirii: Gibridnaya voyna trebuyet 

vysokotekhnologichnogo oruzhiya i nauchnogo obosnovaniya’

[According to the experience in Syria: hybrid war requires 

high-tech weaponry and scientific foundations], VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kurier, 9 (2016), as quoted in Ofer Fridman, 

Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicisation (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 98. 

4. Ofer Fridman, “On the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’: Why the West 

Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch,” Prism 8, no. 2 (2019). 

Fridman is a lecturer in war studies and ranks among the 

top experts on the topic. This book’s comments on Russian 

discussions of hybrid warfare/new generation warfare 

draw heavily on his work, as well as that of Mark Galeotti, 

Oscar Jonsson, and Frank Hoffman (through his writing 

and author’s engagements with him by email in 2019). See 

Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring 

the Lines between War and Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid 

Warfare”; Mark Galeotti, Russian Political Warfare: Moving 

Beyond the Hybrid (New York: Routledge, 2019); Frank G. 

Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars

(Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007); 

and Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 

Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 34 – 39. These 

scholars have intensively studied the Russian literature 

and pronouncements on this modality of war. The failure 

of many Western leaders to do so has produced misinterpretation of Russia’s strategic view. Both the West and RusEndnotes

136 | Chapter 12
Special Comment on Hybridity | 137

sia are guilty of mirror-imaging in assessing one another’s 

strategic intentions and goals. Each misses signals the other 

communicates. The Ukraine conflict illustrates the knock-on 

consequences of this failure.

5. Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 159.

6. Internet Trolling as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Latvia 

(Riga, Latvia: NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence, 2015).

7. Roger N. McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 97–105.

8. Ofer Fridman, “A War of Definitions: Hybridity in Russia 

and the West,” in Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, James C. 

Pearce, eds., Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare: New 

Labels, Old Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2019), 75.

9. See Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army 

and Information Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, 2014). 

10. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing, 

China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 12. 

In their words, “it is likely that a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern soldier 

than a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps.” Liang 

and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 44. Information warfare 

encompasses a far broader spectrum than cyber (digital) 

domains but includes it. They refer to it as network space, a 

“technological space that is formed by a distinctive combination of electronics technology, information technology 

and the application of specific designs.” Although written 

in the 1990s, Liang and Xiangsui were clear-sighted in envisioning the longer-range potential for cyber engagements 

(including theft of intellectual property to ruthlessly loot 

an adversary’s military and strategic assets and degrade 

its strengths) or conflicts. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted 

Warfare, 42. Ofer Fridman’s analysis of their book is worth 

reading. See Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 11–19.

11. Ying Yu Lin, “China’s Hybrid Warfare and Taiwan,” Diplomat, 13 January 2018.

12. Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare. As with this book, 

its footnotes are important. The book was written in reaction 

to the U.S. success in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. 

Some argue that it represents neither a revolution in military 

thought nor an executable doctrine for future warfare, but 

rather is a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures 

that have been used before and will be used again. See Maj 

John A. Van Messel, USMC, “Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese Doctrine for Future Warfare?” (master’s thesis, U.S. 

Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, 

2005). 

13. Professor Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares (Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, 2013). See also Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005).

14. Halper, China, 12, emphasis original.

15. Halper, China, 12–13, emphasis original.

16. Halper, China, 13, 23 – 101, emphasis original.

17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982).

18. See Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” Atlantic, 31 

May 2017.

19. Jonathan D. T. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory (Washington, 

DC: Atlas Publishing and Media, 2019), loc. 3282 of 6590, 

Kindle. This work draws upon Ward’s writing, but he is one 

of many who — in this author’s opinion — correctly espouses similar views. See also Francois Bougon, Inside the Mind 

of Xi Jinping (London: Hurst, 2019); and Newt Gingrich, 

Trump vs. China: Facing America’s Greatest Threat (New York: 

Center Street, Hachette Book Group, 2019). Former Speaker 

of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich is a strong 

ally of President Donald J. Trump and much of his recent 

writing aims to support the president. This book scrupulously has avoided wading into domestic political debates 

or partisanship. Our security interests must rise above party 

politics; this author cites Gingrich’s book because it offers 

an excellent analysis of the security challenge that China 

poses to the United States. This analysis, with which this 

author concurs, stands separate from whether one supports 

or opposes the president. 

20. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory, loc. 3433 of 6590, Kindle. 

21. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory. Ward discusses this at length 

but he is one of many China experts that have cautioned 

about Chinese ambitions. See, for example, Bradley A. 

Thayer and John M. Friend, “The World According to China,” Diplomat, 3 October 2018; Allison, “What Xi Jinping 

Wants”; Katsui Nakazawa, “Xi’s Overly-Ambitious Goals 

Triggered US-China Trade War; Talk of Becoming World No. 

1 Backfired,” Nikkei Asiana Review, 12 July 2018; and Julian 

Baird Gewirtz, “China’s Long March to Technological Supremacy: The Roots of Xi Jinping’s Ambition to ‘Catch up 

and Surpass’,” Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2019.

22. Ward, China’s Vision of Victory, loc. 3900 of 6590, Kindle.

23. “Principles of China’s Foreign Policy,” teaching unit, 

1950 – 2000, Asia for Educators, Columbia University (website), accessed 28 October 2019.

24. Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants.”

25. “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (website), 8 August 2019.

26. Philip Breedlove, “Foreword,” in Guillaume Lasconjarias 

and Jeffrey Larsen, eds., NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats

(Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2015), xxii, as quoted 

in Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare, 154; and Lasconjarias 

and Larsen, NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, 51.

27. “Part II—Hybrid Threats,” in Bi-SC [Strategic Command] Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (Norfolk, VA: NATO Allied 
Command Transformation, 2010), also cited by Fridman in 

Russian Hybrid Warfare, 154.

28. Fridman, “A War of Definitions,” 75.

29. Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray 

Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter, January 2016): 

102. 

30. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” 

104.

31. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.”

32. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 29.

33. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed 

Forces Journal (1 October 2009).

34. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” 34. See also 

Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 28.

35. See Hammes, The Sling and the Stone. Hammes’s book offers 

an excellent analysis of Fourth Generation War, emphasizing the pivotal role that strategic communication and shaping audience perceptions plays in determining outcomes.

36. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.”

37. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 52.

38. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 53.

39. Maj Tim Mcculloh and Maj Rich Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, 

Joint Special Operations University Report 13-4 (Tampa, 

FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2013), as discussed by Fridman in Russian Hybrid Warfare, 38. The principles address uniqueness of hybrid warfare to geographic, 

culture, and historical settings; the existence of a specific 

ideology within the hybrid force; a perceived existential 

threat that drives a hybrid force to abandon conventional 

warfare; asymmetry between hybrid forces and adversaries; 

a mixture of conventional and unconventional elements in 

technologies, weapons, and tactics; and imposition by hybrid organizations of a war of attrition in both the physical 

and cognitive domains.

40. James Lacey, “Conquering Germania: A Province Too Far,” 

in Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds., Hybrid 

Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World 

to the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

2012).

41. Richard Hart Sinnreich, “That Accursed Spanish War: The 

Peninsular War, 1807–1814,” in Hybrid Warfare.

42. Williamson Murray, “The American Revolution: Hybrid 

War in America’s Past,” in Hybrid Warfare.

43. See Gregory J. W. Urwin, “When Freedom Wore a Red Coat: 

How Cornwallis’ [sic] 1781 Virginia Campaign Threatened 

the Revolution in Virginia,” in Richard G. Davis, ed., The 

U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers 

from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008). Cornwallis’s 

strategy degenerated operationally into a certain chaos, for 

lack of strong support of the initiative by his superiors. Had 

the British carried Cornwallis’s strategy to its logical conclusion and implemented it with discipline, vigor, and decisive 

action, the outcome of the war might have been different, 

even in the face of other challenges confronting the British.

44. See Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who 

Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New York: 

Free Press, 2011).

45. See Suzanne Massie, Trust But Verify: Reagan, the Russians 

and Me (Blue Hill, ME: Hearttree Press, 2013), chapter 13; 

and Nina Porzucki, “Suzanne Massie Taught President Ronald Reagan the Important Russian Phrase, ‘Trust but Verify,’ ” PRI.org, 7 March 2014. Massie points out that Reagan 

asked not “what did the Kremlin think,” but “what did the 

Russians think?” Massie, Trust But Verify, chapter 13. 

46. James P. Farwell and Darby Arakelian, “War on Our Doorstep: Not a Mere Crime Problem,” Strategic Studies Quarterly

8 (Spring 2014): 40 – 54.

138 | Chapter 12
Workbook

REMEMBER THE KEYS TO SUCCESS 

WINNING COMMUNICATION STRATEGY WORKBOOK

1. Clear vision for success and desired outcome

2. The powerful idea or cause that drives the vision

3. Understand the strategic situation

4. Actionable strategy and obstacles to success

5. Actionable plans

6. Smart, well-executed operations and tactics

7. Metrics to measure outcomes

139

To print additional copies of the Workbook section, visit www.usmcu.edu/MCUPress/
I. ESTABLISH A CLEAR VISION FOR SUCCESS AND DESIRED OUTCOME

What objective or conditions for an end state define success or a desired outcome? 

Why are you trying to achieve that objective?

What does achieving it mean to target audiences? How do they benefit?

As you begin planning, in what manner do you expect to achieve the objective? 

In executing operations, whose law are you using: that existing in a theater of operations or ours? 

If ours, do we want the law to change?1

If we are dealing with foreign leaders, who are we going to deal with: the present leaders of a state or 

culture within a theater of operations, or do you prefer others? Are you changing the present leadership entirely? If not, who stays?

140 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What resources do you anticipate are required?

II. WHAT CAUSE DRIVES YOUR STRATEGY AND OPERATION?

What larger cause justifies your strategy and operation and will arouse popular support, compared 

merely to advancing your own interests?

III. DEFINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

What is the strategic situation or operating environment in your theater of operations? What is the current state of affairs? What assumptions govern this analysis?

What dynamics drive it?

Who are the key players who can influence the outcome of your operations?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 141
Do these influencers support or oppose your operation, and why?

What role will these influencers play? Will they be passive or active? If active, will they use force for or 

against you? If so, which?

Which of these influencers are indispensable:

Very important:

Somewhat important:

Not that important: 

If they oppose your operation, how do you anticipate neutralizing them or motivating them to switch 

to support?

142 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Is there kinetic conflict in the theater of operation or is it relatively peaceful or stable? What is it and 

how will that affect operations? Who are the players, who has momentum, and what is the state of affairs at the outset of the operation?

Do your operations aim to affect ongoing conflict within the theater, or is there a separate aim? How 

might one affect the other locally at the purely tactical level (where a battle occurs), the theater level (a 

nation or broader area encompassing a series of tactical activities), or the strategic level (the national 

or international)?2

IV. WHAT IS THE TARGET AUDIENCE/OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CULTURE? 

What are the key beliefs, social norms, customs, and behavior relevant to your operation?

What role does geography play in the culture?

What role does history play in the culture, and how might it affect the operation?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 143
What role does religion play in the culture, and how might it affect the operation?

What role do ethnic groups and tensions play in the culture?

What role do tribes, clans, families and the ties of family play in the culture? Is this a culture in which 

tribal vs. individual identity dominates?

What key values drive different groups within the culture (e.g., honor, revenge, loyalty, respect for elders or chiefs)?

What other factors about the social organization within the theater of operations are relevant to success?

What is the political structure within the theater of operations? Who holds what power, how is that determined, and how does it relate to social organization within a theater of operations?

144 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What economic factors within a theater of operations affect the operations?3

What role does nationalism play in the theater of operations, and how will that affect operations?

What law governs behavior (e.g., civil state law, tribal or religious law, custom)?

Is the theater of operations within what is effectively an ungoverned space? If so, what is the anticipated impact on operations?

How will you communicate your intentions in a manner consistent with the local culture(s)?

What bonds of trust or relationships can you draw on to enable effective partnerships and to provide 

manpower, local knowledge, or political legitimacy?

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What history of working with local populations exists and how do you anticipate that will affect your 

planning and your ability to succeed?

V. IDENTIFY THE ENEMY 

What motivates the enemy? What is its cause? What are its goals or desired outcomes?

How do enemy goals or desired outcomes differ from yours?

How is the enemy organized?

What is the enemy’s narrative, story, theme, and message to maintain its current position? Do you anticipate it will alter those elements in opposing your operation? 

Narrative:

Story or stories:

146 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Themes:

Messages:

Who comprises the enemy’s target audience(s)? 

How credible, believable, or persuasive is the enemy narrative, story, theme, and message? With what 

audiences? Why (agree with cause, fear, anxiety, etc.)?

Enemy supporters or those leaning to support the enemy:

Neutrals:

Enemy opponents:

What channels does the enemy use to communicate its messages?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 147
What messengers does the enemy use and why were they chosen? 

How can you show that their threats will not deter your forces and make your threats to them credible?

Will the enemy respond kinetically? What mandates or motivates it to fight?

What is the enemy’s capacity to respond using cyber capabilities or social media to drive its messages?

Who comprise the enemy’s key allies or links within the traditional news media (e.g., satellite television, radio, newspapers, etc.)? 

How efficient or effective is the enemy in exploiting links or alliances within traditional media (e.g., 

getting propaganda to them quickly or getting their message aired)?

148 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
VI. IDENTIFY DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PARTNERS

Who are your partners?

What is the basis of the partnership with each?

What are the key interests of each partner?

What role do you anticipate they will play in the operations? What resources will each provide?

How will the role of each partner affect command and control for different aspects of operations?

How important are these partners to achieving a successful outcome? Why?

Indispensable:

Very important:

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 149
Somewhat important:

Not that important:

What interests or worldviews does each partner hold that differs from yours, and how might that affect 

the operations?

Do you anticipate that any partner might take action that could subvert or undercut a successful 

outcome? Do they share the same or a compatible vision? Is their risk assessment compatible with 

yours? Do they concur on the strategy, operations, and tactics envisioned? How might the issues that 

these questions pose be addressed, forestalled, or countered?

Possible subversion of outcome:

Risk assessment:

Compatible vision:

Concurrence on strategy, operations, tactics:

What leverage do you have to support or maintain the partnerships? 

150 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Who will coordinate or ensure coordination between you and your partners, and in what manner will 

that be achieved?

What weakness(es) exist in the partnerships and how will these be addressed to ensure a successful 

tactical, operational, and strategic outcome?

Some in the military insist on separating influence activities under the rubric of information operations 

and public affairs by erecting a firewall.4

 Where that occurs, how will coordination between these functions be achieved, and who will ensure that it is?

How are coordination and cooperation for communication strategy going to be achieved within the 

interagency, from collection, processing, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence and provision of resources?5

What steps are you taking to ensure that partners and allies—foreign, domestic, within the interagency, 

and on your operational team—have access to information about what you are doing, why, how, and 

what it means to them?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 151
VII. FORGING A STRATEGY

Where will you acquire the knowledge of the operating environment that enables you to forge a winning strategy and develop plans for operations and tactics?6

What are the obstacles (problems presented) to achieving success?

Who presents the obstacles? 

What is behind the obstacles or drives them?

Where do the obstacles occur?

Why would the obstacles frustrate success?

What has the enemy done in the past that helps you to understand what to expect?

What sources of information can inform you about expected obstacles?

152 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What is your strategy for the operation and for tactics to be employed?7

Operations:

Tactics:

What is the strategic narrative? What you are doing, why, and how do your actions help achieve the 

strategic goal?

What actions using information strategy will you take to support operations and tactics?

Operations:

Tactics:

What are the most important keys to success?

What points will most likely strike a responsive chord with your target audiences and stir their emotions, including excitement, awe, or anger, and trigger top-of-mind things that help people to remember 

your points?8

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 153
What stories can be communicated to help audiences make sense of events; why you are conducting 

the operation; and why does it benefit them? 

What is your key theme?

What are your core messages for each targeted audience?

What is the credible rationale for each message?

What elements of the message achieve emotional resonance among your targeted audience (for example, using story, concept, image, symbol, etc.)?

What elements of your message use reason or facts to persuade logically?

154 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What actions are you taking to ensure your narrative, story, theme, and messages are communicated in 

the right language, which is nuanced and culturally tuned to a specific audience?

What makes your narrative, story, theme, or message memorable?

How will your narrative, story, theme, and messages enable coalition building or gain new allies?

What are the stakes for target audiences in the outcome? Why does it matter for them?

How does your message claim and retain moral high ground?

How does your narrative, story, theme, or message neutralize allies of the enemy or win over undecided (persuadable) audiences—bearing in mind that these elements may be communicated by word, 

action, symbol, image, or a combination of these?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 155
Would use of humor strengthen the message or help discredit the enemy, and if so, what action will 

you take to employ it?

Who are the target audiences for each theme and message (you may have many)?

Who are your most credible messengers and how will you employ them?

How do you anticipate the enemy will counter your narrative, stories, messages, or themes? What 

narratives, stories, messages, themes? What channels? What messengers?

Attacks must be answered. How do you plan to answer enemy propaganda?

How does each aspect of the communication strategy help overcome each identified obstacle to 

success? 

156 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What actions will maintain message discipline?

Create a message grid. Answer the following:

What do we say about ourselves?

What do we say about the enemy?

What does the enemy say about itself?

What does the enemy say about us?

VIII. TEAM MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Who is on the communication strategy team?

Who is in charge of the team and leads it?

Who does the team leader report to; how and when?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 157
How will you integrate information strategy with relevant command authorities?

What are the responsibilities for each team member?

Who will give instructions to whom on the team?

Who will supervise what each team member does?

How will performance be monitored?

How will corrections or modifications to strategy be made?

How will communication within the team be facilitated?

158 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
How will you enable sharing to ensure relevant parties have the right information on a timely basis?

How will the operational plan be integrated with parties outside the team?

What metrics will apply and who will develop and apply them?

IX. DOS AND DON’TS IN ACTIONS AND MESSAGING 

Are your messages, actions, symbols, and images consistent?

What steps are you taking to ensure consistency and message discipline?

What specific actions support each message point?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 159
What are the strong points in your strategic messaging and what makes them strong?

How can you further strengthen them?

What are the weak points in your strategic messaging and what makes them weak?

How might you rectify these weaknesses?

How do the agendas of local leaders affect messaging?

What steps are you planning that will realistically project confidence in success?

160 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
What steps are you taking to ensure that your narrative, story, themes, and messages are clear and 

understood? How are you testing them, aside from using the formal methods noted at the end for this 

section (see pg. 168)? You may want to express the idea to a small group of colleagues first. What did 

they remember? What did they hear? What was their response? Was it consistent with your intention?

What steps that provide visible leadership from commanders and spokespeople and that help project 

confidence and optimism will you take?

X. INTEGRATING INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE INTO THE PLAN

Where will you obtain the information and intelligence to forge and evaluate the plan?

Social media intelligence (SOCMEDINT):

Open source intelligence (OSINT):

Human intelligence (HUMINT):

Signals intelligence (SIGNIT):

Other(s):

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 161
What rumors are circulating among different target audiences, and what impacts might they have on 

the information strategy? 

The rumors:

Narrative and narrative landscape for each rumor:

Audience for each rumor:

Impact of rumor (e.g., wedge, clarification, fear/anxiety, etc.):

Channels, extent, and breadth of circulation of each rumor:

How would using rumors offensively help achieve the desired outcome for your operations? 

What actions will enable you to effectively launch helpful rumors? 

XI. INTERACTING WITH THE NEWS MEDIA 

What steps will you take to communicate your narrative, story, theme, or message to relevant news 

media in a timely way? You need to keep ahead of the story, anticipate negative coverage, and consider that in today’s world, media with global reach makes the living room part of the battlefield.

162 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Will members of the media be embedded in your operations?

Who is in charge of handling the news media?

How will you ensure that the news media’s cooperation respects operational security?

How will you address unfavorable coverage?

Are you making provisions to include combat camera crews in the operation and to get out its footage 

to relevant parties on a timely basis? How?

What special steps are you taking to ensure that media from other countries with potentially hostile 

perspectives toward your actions respect fact and truth and do not distort the story or be used by enemy for propaganda?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 163
XII. HOW EFFECTIVE WAS YOUR CAMPAIGN?

What did the strategy achieve in changing behavior? 

What was the most powerful factor about the campaign that influenced behavior?

What impact did the campaign have on molding and shaping attitudes, opinions, and beliefs? Did that 

impact have a causal connection to the behavior of target audiences? Why or why not?

Did you measurably help to neutralize or paralyze the enemy’s ability to exert command and control?

Did you measurably help deny the enemy’s ability to achieve its objectives?

Did you change the minds about adversarial decision makers and if so in what way?

164 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Did you affect the performance of the other side kinetically or in information warfare? If so, how, when, 

and what was the impact?

Did you create confusion, distraction, or deception in the mind of the enemy? If so, how, when, and 

what was the impact?

Did the campaign reframe an issue raised by the enemy in terms favorable to your side?

Did the campaign succeed in properly branding the enemy in terms favorable to your position?

Did the campaign discredit and marginalize the enemy and its rationale?

Did the campaign make effective use of symbolism?

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Did the campaign avoid tactics that enabled the enemy to use symbolism against you?

Did the campaign identify your narrative, story, themes, and messages with citizens, effectively communicating why you are acting and that your actions benefit them?

Did the campaign enable you to claim and maintain the moral high ground?

Did the campaign consider how the enemy was organized to fight and its rules of engagement?

Did the campaign stir up division among enemy forces?

Did the campaign effectively broadcast success?

Did the campaign engage fully with target audiences to achieve its goals? If not, what more should 

have been done? What should have been done differently?

166 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Did the campaign expose deceptive or fraudulent tactics of the enemy in a credible way? Was the 

enemy tactic countered, and if so, how successfully; why and how?

Did the campaign expose and capitalize on enemy hypocrisy, whether inconsistent statements or 

actions?

Did the campaign identify and capitalize on enemy statements and actions by turning those against 

the enemy to discredit it?

How rapidly did the campaign respond to unfolding events?

Did the campaign identify and capitalize on targets of opportunity?

Did the campaign win over allies in local or foreign countries who may form part of a broader 

coalition?

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 167
Did the campaign mobilize an active minority within a target population who helped us succeed?

What does the data show in comparing performance metrics (e.g., how many clicks did a webpage 

receive, viewings did an ad receive, mentions did a news media story make of the message) against 

qualitative metrics (how well did the campaign actually work: the answers to the questions above)?

XIII. OPINION TESTING

Do you plan to employ any form of opinion testing to test messages or for metrics?

If so, which ones?

When?

Who will conduct such testing?

168 | Winning Communication Strategy Workbook
Endnotes

1. Whether the source law is civil law, tribal, religious, or customary law.

2. See the discussion of the battles of Fallujah. The second 

battle produced military victory but also complicated the 

strategic situation across Iraq.

3. For example, illicit activity such as growing opium, smuggling, or other criminal activity, as well as legitimate economic activity.

4. As noted in the book discussion, during the Second Battle 

of Fallujah these functions were wisely consolidated. As 

discussed in Farwell, Persuasion and Power, the distinctions 

often drawn are in many ways absurd.

5. See the discussion in the book of how Gen Stanley McChrystal achieved this with cross-functional teams in Iraq.

6. See Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), which explains 

how then Army Maj Albert C. Wedemeyer gathered the information to frame problems, propose a strategy, and devise 

concepts of operations across multiple theaters to defeat 

Germany.

7. The goal in World War II was to effect Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. Opening up a second front by invading Normandy was a strategy to achieve that goal. The 

invasion itself required strategy for operations and tactics. 

This book is focused on strategy at the operational and tactical levels. Forging a strategy is an iterative process, and 

strategies and plans will undergo new iterations during 

development as more questions are asked, more information and intelligence collected, more thinking occurs, and 

suggestions provided. See also Art of Design Student Text, 

Version 2.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army School of 

Advanced Military Studies, 2010) section 2.1.1.2, and 2.2.2. 

These sections set forth the conceptual framework for operational design. It employs its own language: learning; 

understanding the difference in the existing and desired environment; critical thinking; drawing distinctions to grasp 

what makes a new situation different, unique, or similar to 

other situations; identifying what information is relevant; 

taking a systems approach that sees the whole picture in 

an operating environment and the relationship of action to 

logical lines of operation, so that information can be placed 

within a strategic context; and creative thinking. It is easy 

to get lost in jargon. This workbook’s approach incorporates 

the elements of operational design but translates them into a 

framework that communication strategists will more easily 

employ.

8. See Jonah Berger, Contagious: Why Things Catch On (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 2013) from which this formula is 

drawn; and Farwell, Persuasion and Power.

Winning Communication Strategy Workbook | 169
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About the Author

James P. Farwell is a recognized expert with an international reputation in legal and policy issues for 

cyberwar and cybersecurity and in strategic communication, especially as affecting political issues in 

North Africa, the Middle East, and Pakistan. He has served as a consultant for various political campaigns and to the U.S. Department of Defense, including Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Special Operations–Low Intensity Conflict, 

U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.

He is an associate fellow of the Centre for Strategic Communication, Department of War Studies, at 

Kings College, University of London; a nonresident senior fellow of the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC; and a visiting scholar at Tulane University’s A. B. Freeman School of Business in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Farwell publishes widely on national security issues and is the author of two books, The Pakistan 

Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination and Instability (2011) and Persuasion and Power: The Art of Strategic Communication (2012), as well as the chapter “Issues of Law Raised by Developments and Use of 

Neuroscience and Neurotechnology in National Security and Defense,” in Neurotechnology in National 

Security and Defense: Practical Considerations, Neuroethical Concerns (2014). He is the coauthor of Communication Strategy: How to Forge One That Wins (2015) and The Architecture of Cybersecurity: How General 

Counsel, Executives, and Boards of Directors Can Protect Their Information Assets (2017).

178