Thomas Holcomb

and the Advent of the

Marine Corps Defense Battalion,

1936-1941

by

David J. Ulbrich

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

QUANTICO, VIRc}rNIA

2004
The device reproduced on the front cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous

use in the Unite States. It first appeared, as

shown here, on Marine Corps buttons

adopted in 1804 With the stars changed to

five points this device has continued on

Marine Corps buttons to the present day.
Thomas Holcomb

and the Advent of the

Marine Corps Defense Battalion,

1936-1941

by

David J. Ulbrich

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

2004
Other Publications in the Occasional Papers Series

Vietnam Histories Workshop: Plenary Session. Jack Shulimson, editor. 9 May1983. 31 pp.

Vietnam Revisited; Conversation with William D. Broyles, Jr. Colonel John G. Miller, USMC, editor. Il

December 1984.48 pp.

Bibliography on Khe Sanh USMC Participation. Commander Ray W. Strubbe, CHC, USNR (Ret), compiler.

ApriI 1985. 54 pp.

Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushm asters: The History of the Development of the L VT Through World War 11.

Major Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Ret). 1986. 272 pp.

Leadership Lessons and Remembrances from Vietnam. Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC

(Ret). 1988. 93 pp.

The Problems of U.S. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea. James Angus MacDonald, Jr. 1988. 295 pp.

John Archer Lejeune, 1869-j 942, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett,

USMC (Ret). 1988. 123 pp.

To Wake Island and Beyond Reminiscences. Brigadier General Woodrow M. Kessler, USMC (Ret). 1988.

145 pp.

Thomas Holcomb, 1879-1965, Register ofHis Personal Papers. Gibson B. Smith. 1988. 229 pp.

Curriculum Evolution, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1920-j 988. Lieutenant Colonel Donald

F. Bittner, USMCR. 1988. 112 pp.

Herringbone Cloak-GI Dagger, Marines ofthe OSS. Major Robert E. Mattingly, USMC. 1989. 315 pp.

The Journals of Marine Second Lieutenant Henry Bulls Watson, 1845-1848. Charles R. Smith, editor. 1990.

420 pp.

When the Russians Blinked: The US. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Major John M. Young, USMCR. 1990.246 pp.

Marines in the Mexican War. Gabrielle M. Neufeld Santelli. Edited by Charles R. Smith. 1991. 63 pp.

The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the US. Navy. General Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret). 1992.

89 pp.

James Gui/irle Harbord, 1866-1947, Register of His Personal Papers. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L.

Bartlett, USMCR. 1995. 47 pp.

The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps. Captain David A. Dawson, USMC. 1995. 247 pp.

Marine Corps Aircraft: 1913-2000. Major John M. Elliot, USMC (Ret). 2002. 126 pp.

Occasional Papers

The History and Museums Division has undertaken the publication for limited

distribution of various studies, theses, compilations, bibliographies, monographs, and

memoirs, as well as proceedings at selected workshops, seminars, symposia, and

similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value for audiences interested

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and exploitation.
FOREWORD

Often historical events are recorded with the benefit of perfect hindsight That is, the way

events end are often considered to have been the way they begun. David J. Ulbnch

examined a portion of the Conmiandancy of Lieutenant Gênerai Thomas Holcomb from

1936 to 1943 to illustrate this When Holcomb took over the Marine Corps it numbered

17,239 officers and men The Fleet Manne Force consisted of two brigades of 1, 500 men,

with no heavy artillery or armor, and about mne squadrons of aircraft. When Holcomb left,

the Corps had expanded to 309,559 men and women, with four amphibious divisions, 15

mdependent battalions, and four aircraft wings. When the war ended m 1945, 485,053

Marines staffed six divisions and five aircraft wings This exceeded the vision and

planning that started the conflict and provided the foundation for today's Marine Corps

and its place in the defense establishment

Thomas Ho/comb and the Advent of the Marine Corps Defense Battalions, 193 6-1941

examines what General Holcomb had to begin with in this expansion and how he

administered and managed the largest Marine Corps increase Defense Battalions serve as

the case study for this examination as they occupied a significant place in the strategic

pnorities of Holcomb and the Marine Corps during the pre-war era It is Mr Ulbrich's

contention that Holcomb, more than any other Marine, guided the Corps' World War II

mobilization and then directed its participation during that conflict. He thnctioned as a

leader, manager, publicist, and strategist Holcomb, Ulbrich notes, deserves much credit

for forging the modem seabome service that helped defeat Japan in the Pacific and later

distinguished itself during the Cold War.

Mr. Ulbrich is a doctoral candidate at Temple University under Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin

The work reprinted here was Mr. Ulbrich's Master of Arts thesis at Ball State University.

He completed this work in 1996 with Dr. Phyllis A. Zimmerman. Mr Ulbrich received his

bachelor degree at the University of Dayton He is the author of numerous articles and

reviews includmg "Clarif'ing the Origins and Strategic Mission of the U.S. Marine Corps

Defense Battalion, 1898-1941," which appeared in the October 1999 issue of War and

Society Mr. Ulbrich is the 2003 Manne Corps Heritage Foundation General Lemuel C.

Shepherd, Jr., Memorial Dissertation Fellow and has received numerous other honors and

awards in the course of his work. The Shepherd Fellowship supports research for his

dissertation, "Managing Marine MobilizationS Thomas Holcomb and the U.S. Marine

Corps, 1936-1943," at Temple University

W. Ripley

lonel, U.S. I1'ariine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marme Corps History and Museums

i
Ii

PREFACE

First, I would like to thank Professor Phyllis A. Zimmerman of Ball State University's

History Department. Her supervision has been truly instrumental in my historical and

professional development From the moment I visited Ball State as a prospective graduate

student to the completion of my thesis, Professor Zimmerman has been thoughtful and

patient despite my meandering progress and my bad habit of spelling "defence" like the

British.

Next, I would like to thank Professors Kevin Smith and E Bruce Geelhoed, my readers

Their knowledgeable and stimulating comments helped transform my thesis from

awkward musings to a more cohesive piece of scholarship.

Next, I would like to thank Lt. Col. E. Lesley Medford, USMC (Ret.), of the 7th Marine

Defense Battalion. His contact enabled me to conduct a survey of Marine veterans from

the 7th Defense/Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The responses have added color to my thesis.

Next, I would like to thank the Marine Corps Historical Foundation for awarding me the

1994-1995 Marine Corps Thesis Fellowship. This grant allowed me to spend four weeks

conducting research in Washington, D.C. Benis M. Frank, Fred Graboske, Evelyn A.

Englander, Richard A. Long, Amy J. Cantm, and Charles Melson ably assisted me in my

research at the Marine Corps Historical Center. Barry Zerby of the National Archives

pointed me toward many classified documents

Next, I would like to thank several people who provided indispensable support Glenda

Riley, Abel A. Alves, Lawrence Birken, Loren Gannon, Linda Jones Hall, Cynthia K

Thomas, and Cynthia Webb. These people gave me a sympathetic ear, a critical reading,

or candid advice as needed.

Next, I would like to thank Professors Raymond White and John Heitmann, former history

department chairs of Ball State Umversity and University of Dayton respectively. Both

gave me much-needed fmancial and logistical support during this project

Next, I would like to thank my father, Col. Richard W. Ulbrich, USAF (Ret.), for many

interesting and inspiring conversations about imlitary history.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my late mother, Jill G. Ulbrich (1936-1996), who was

deeply loved and is sorely missed.

David J. Ulbnch
TABLE OF CONTENTS

'il

FOREWORD i

PREFACE ................................... ii

INTRODUCTION .

- V

CHAPTER 1 1 ADVANCED BASE THEORY TO REALITY, 1898-1939 . 1 INTRODUCTION ........ ....... ................. I

SELLING BASE DEFENSE THEORY TO THE CORPS AND THE NAVY

ADVANCED BASE DEFENSE THEORY TAKES SHAPE . .. 2

WORLD WAR I'S IMPACT ON THE CORPS AND BASE DEFENSE. - 3

STRATEGIC AND FISCAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WORLD WAR I - 4

THE "ORANGE" PLAN AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CORPS .6

THE GREAT DEPRESSION . . . 7

EFFECTS OF THE 1932 ELECTION ON THE CORPS .. 9

FORMATION OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE. . . .. . 10

HOLCOMB'S APPOINTMENT AS MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT. 11

RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS. .. 12

CULMINATION OF BASE DEFENSE THEORY: THE DEFENSE BATTALION .. 13

CONCLUSION . .. 15

CHAPTER2 . 16

THE TURNING POINT, 1939-1940 . 16

INTRODUCTION . ... 16

FRUGALITY IN THE CORPS DURING THE 19305 ............ 16

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND CREATION OF THE RAINBOW PLANS 17

BUREAUCRATIC AND FISCAL PROBLEMS.. . 18

EXPANSION FOSTERED BY OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II . 19

MARINE REACTIONS TO WAR 19

MORE EXPANSION . . 20

HOLCOMB'S MANAGEMENT STYLE

GROWING PAINS 22

WAR IN EUROPE WORSENS

RAMIFICATIONS FOR DEFENSE BATTALIONS...... 25

THE 1940 ELECTION AND THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION .. 26

CONCLUSION .................. . . - 27

CHAPTER 3 . .. ....... ... 28

THE RACE FOR PREPAREDNESS, 1941 28

INTRODUCTION ....... . ................. 28

NEW WAR PLANS AFFECT THE CORPS ........................ - 28

EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL INADEQUACIES 30

MEETING THE CHALLENGES .. . .. ... 31

PUBLICITY AND RECRUITMENT ... 32

DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE BATTALIONS, JANUARY TO JULY 1941.. . - 34

BARBAROSSA'S RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE CORPS 36

"ARE WE READYrn" ... .. 37

EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE BATTALION'S SIGNIFICANCE 38

LACK OF READiNESS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1941 .39

CONCLUSION . .40

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE .... APPENDIX 1 ..42

COMMANDANTS OF THE MARINE CORPS 1891-1947 ...42

APPENDIX 2 . 43

STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS 1895-1945 ... . .43
'V

APPENDIX 3... . . .

. 44

EXPENDITURES BY THE MARINE CORPS, 1933-1943 - - 44

APPENDIX 4 - . . - RAINBOW PLANS . . . . 45

APPENDIX 5 . . - -. - 46

MARINE DISTRIBUTION EFFECTIVE 30 NOVEMBER 1941 .. ------------- 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY - 47

PRIMARY SOURCES - --. 47

SECONDARY SOURCES -- 51

NOTES ... - . - - -- - 58
INTRODUCTION

PROLOGUE WHAT IS MILITARY H!STORY

Throughout history, war has been an integral part of the human condition Despite

apparent advances in civilization, wars still occurred and have merely become more

sophisticated with the passing years. Military history is the study of this "organized

societal violence." Traditional, "old" military historians wrote about great commanders

and grand campaigns in sweeping pen-strokes. They traced the movements of brigades,

surveyed the roughness of terrain, and evaluated the leadership styles of generals!

The "new" military history offers a richer, more comprehensive study ofwar Broader

social aspects of the soldier receive much-needed consideration 2 Psychological,

orgamzational, and logistical issues also get factored into the military equation For

example, the so-called "grunt" in the trenches receives greater attention His psyche,

morale, and masculinity become fair game for exploration3 Interservice and civil-military

relations garn clarification through institutional studies Logistics receives magmfied

consideration. The military adage "the army travels on its stomach" rings more true than

ever.5 Military history is not limited to the conflicts themselves The often-tenuous peace

between wars must also be investigated.6 In sum, the "new" military history explores the

strategic, tactical, economic, political, social, diplomatic, industrial, and technological

effects on wars.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL VOID

Historians of the Marine Corps have conducted significant research on the development of

the Fleet Marine Force' s amphibious assault mission However, little has been written

about the evolution of the defense battalion. From 1900 until 1940, advanced base

defense's significance in Naval strategy surpassed or equaled amphibious assault During

1940 and 1941, establishing defense battalions fell to the Corps' second priority.7

Likewise, few studies have examined Thomas Holcomb. As Commandant from 1936

through 1943, he installed the Corps as the premier seaborne support force and supervised

its massive expansion.8 My study will blend military history with biographical,

institutional, business, and political history

Most histories of the Corps seem to have been written by Marines, about Marines, and

perhaps even for Marines Historians affiliated with the military dominate the secondary

scholarship on the Marine Corps Whereas their association certainly carry definite

advantages, these authors also retain biases, prejudices, and sympathies which color their

interpretations while not necessarily weakening their studies.9

The seminal work on the Marine Corps history is Allan R. Millett's Semper Fzdelis The

History of the United States Marine Corps published in 1980 and expanded in 1991.10

While displaying meticulous research and groundbreaking analysis, Milieu largely

relegates base defense to secondary status in favor of amphibious assault. His book's tenth

chapter, titled "The Creation of the Advanced Base Force, 1900-1916," describes

advanced base theory. But, Millett does not return in detail to base defense during

subsequent chapters. Advanced base defense and its culmination in the defense battalion

V
are given cursory coverage. The Corps' amphibious assault role monopolizes Millett's

space from the i 920s until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Other historians of the Marine Corps also downplay base defense in favor of amphibious

assault as the Corps' mission most worthy of study ' On one level, this concentration is

warranted because of the glorious role amphibious assault played in the Pacific War. But,

on another level, overemphasis of amphibious assault excludes other essential areas of the

Corps' long-term development.

Consequently, a historiographical void exists. A critical and analytical investigation of

Holcomb and the defense battalion has not been written Using recently declassified

records, this thesis addresses two such neglected areas by establishing Thomas Holocmb

as an important facilitator for the defense battalion, the Corps' "umque" and "smgle, great

mission" until the late 193 Os. In recent works, Nathan Prefer and Craig M. Cameron argue

that the base defense was one of the Corps' primary missionsif the primary missionfrom 1898 until the 1930s.'2 My research confirms and adds to their assertions by

unearthing material from the National Archives and conducting surveys of Manne

veterans of the 7th Defense Battalion 13 Several other works also treat the base defense or

Thomas Holcomb either directly or m part. These histories complement my research 14 PURPOSEAND SCOPE

Commandant Thomas HoI 'nb was an excellent strategist, manager, and publicist.

Understanding his actionE i help illuminate the mentality and institutions of the military

and government prior to urld War II. The defense battalion provides a case study for

examining Holcomb's leadership. Defense battalions also clearly found theirroots in longstandmg advanced base defense theory.

As Commandant from 1936 to 1943, Holcomb directed the Corps' expansion including the

creation of the heavily armed defense battalion. On a tactical level, planners designed

these units to defend island outposts against air, sea, and amphibious assaults Likewise, in

holdmg island bases in the central and western Pacific, defense battalions fit into the grand

strategy of the United States Navy. They comprised one half of the Corps' dual missions:

amphibious assault and base defense. Fmally, defense battalions served an equally pivotal

public relations function olcomb struggled to market the Marine Corps as a vital and

unique branch of the Ant. an military.

Serious challenges confronted Commandant Thomas Holcomb. For example, he was

plagued by lack of funds, promotion stagnation, slow supply lines, and the isolationist

tendencies of Congress and the American public. Throughout this study, the Corps'

complete dependence on outside forces becomes abundantly clear. Sometimes Holcomb

benefited from events beyond his control. Other times, he fought to turn seemingly

damaging events into advantages for the Corps.

Chapter One traces the development of advanced base defense from theory in 1898 to

reality in 1939 with the advent of the defense battalion. Before World War I, the Manne

Corps struggled to present itself as fulfilling a particular mission: advanced base defense.

During the 1920 and 1930s, the Corps barely survived isolationism's budgetary onslaught.

But, with threat of the Japanese looming ever larger in the Pacific, Marines established

their tactical and strategic dual mission: base defense and amphibious assault. The

vi
offensive gradually grew to overshadow the defensive. Upon promotion to Major General

Commandant in 1936, the multi-talented Holcomb not only played politician and salesman

but also oversaw strategy and tactics.

Chapter Two begins with the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in September of 1939 War

in Europe awakened America's desire for preparedness and accelerated the rearmament

program. However, low budgets continued to plague the Marines. In addition to strategy

and tactics, the defense battalion increased its vital public relations role m the civilmilitary relationship. This involved not only reiterating the Corps' mission but also

obtaining scarce resources. Once again, Holcomb played the roles of salesman and

politician. But, he could accomplish very little without outside forces' assistance. With the

successful reelection bid by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in November 1940, the

Corps' future brightened.

Chapter Three recounts the increasingly positive developments for the Corps in 1941

ABC-1 Talks and an upgrade to RAiNBOW 5 fimily establish the Corps as the ideal base

defense and amphibious assault force As expansion accelerated, interservice rivalries for

resources arose. Throughout 1941, Holcomb primarily faced administrative and

bureaucratic challenges obtaining a share of resources and guaranteeing that the resources

were in the right place at the right time. These challenges triggered new managerial and

logistical obstacles. An over-abundance of officers replaced the previous problem of

stagnation in the officer corps Difficulty in allocation and transportation of men and

material replaced the former appropriation of men and equipment. Yet, despite Holcomb' s

efforts, the Marine Corps' full combat readiness remained largely fictional on the eve of

the attack of Pearl Harbor.

vil
CHAPTER 1

ADVANCED BASE THEORY TO REALITY, 1898-1939

INTRODUCTION

The United States Manne Corps' advanced base force originated in theory in 1898 and

evolved into the defense battalion m 1938. Before World War I, the Corps had struggled to

find a distinct purpose for existence America's victory in the Spamsh-American War had

made advanced island bases became necessary to protect mtemational interests. After

World War J, strategists added an amphibious assault component to complement advanced

base defense The Corps presented itself as the logical choice for this dual defensive and

offensive mission. However, the return to "normalcy" with its budget cuts and isolatiomst

national strategy hampered the Corps' attempt to carve out its strategic niche The Great

Depression compounded the fiscal problems facing the Corps Several events positively

influenced the Corps' situation. First, in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt became President With

the assistance of several members of Congress, he raised the level of military

preparedness. Second, m 1936, Roosevelt promoted Thomas Holcomb to Major General

Commandant (MGC) of the Marine Corps. Uniquely gifted in administration and public

relations, Holcomb ably led the Corps through its expansion from peace to war Finally,

when international tensions in the l930s required a military buildup, the Corps moved to

fulfill its dm4 mission of base defense and seizure. Advance base defense matured m 1939

with the advent of the defense battalion

SELLING BASE DEFENSE THEORY TO THE CORPS AND THE NAVY

Throughout its first 122 years of existence, the Umted States Marine Corps acted as

constabulary secunty and seaborne soldiers. While America remained a continental power,

those two missions remained sufficient for the Corps. The defeat of Spain in 1898

propelled America into the great power fraternity This watershed event transformed both

America's position in the world and the Corps' role in Naval strategy Obtaining overseas

possessions like the Philippmes, Guam, and Wake increased overseas strategic and

economic responsibilities Hawaii ceased to be America's defensive frontier. A new

defensive perimeter extended to the Philippines.2

The significance of an enlarged dominion was not lost on the General Board of the United

States Navy. A larger fleet and a new Naval strategy were necessary to project American

force over a larger area. Naval planners realized that the American fleet could dominate

the seas only if bases existed from which to operate. To fulfill this strategic requirement,

the Navy's General Board charged the Marine Corps with defending the outlying bases.

Thus, the theory of advanced base defense was born3

In 1902, Marine Captain Dion Williams published "The Defense of Our New Naval

Stations" m Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute.4 According to his article, the

Corps' place in the new Naval strategy derived from Alfred Thayer Mahan's basic

postulate: any war in which America might become involved would beat least in its

early stagesa naval conflict.5 In his application of Mahanian strategy, Williams

I
advocated utilizing islands like Guam and Samoa as safe harbors, coaling stations, repair

facilities, and supply depots. Those island bases became known as "advanced bases"

Because the United States Navy would virtually monopolize the bases, Williams believed

those bases "should be entirely controlled by the Navy, and not as in the case of the forts

and shore stations of the continental territory, by the army 6 Keeping the Corps

subordinate to the Navy would alleviate the problem of umf'ing command between Navy

and Army. Preaching to the skeptics among his fellow Marines, Williams proclaimed the

Corps to be the obvious choice to defend the Navy's bases. Williams also believed that

these expanded responsibilities justified an increase in the Corps and the Navy strengths.7

Thus, he set the stage for further development of the theory of advanced base defense.

Because the Corps' strength stood at less than 10,000 men and officers between 1900 and

1910, many Marines viewed the base defense mission with little enthusiasm Only a few

innovative officers like Williams, Robert H. Dunlap, Eli K. Cole, John H Russell, and

John A. Lej eune showed any genume interest in advanced base defense. With shortages o

men and equipments, Commandant George F. Elliot remained reluctant to detach men

from other more traditional duties on board ships and in American territories

ADVANCED BASE DEFENSE THEORY TAKES SHAPE

During the first decade of the new century, advanced base defense made some progress

toward acceptance. For example, Dion Williams outlined a plan in 1907 to organize both

fixed and mobile defense forces. Little more than planning had yet resulted. In 1910, a

turning point in the development of advanced base defense occurred. At the direction of

the Navy Department and the General Board, newly appomted Commandant William P

Riddle founded the Advanced Base School In this program, Marines explored issues like

artillery placement, communications, logistics, and staff organization. The school prepared

its students for maneuvers, the goal of their peace-time education With proper training

and equipment, the General Board believed that Marines would effectively fulfill the base

defense mission.9

In 1914, drawing-board theories came of age in a simulated attack against Culebra, a small

island in the Caribbean. Elements of the United States Atlantic Fleet attacked 1,723

Marines defending the island The Marine Advanced Base Brigade succeeded beyond

expectations. Moreover, "in an extraordinarily efficient manner," this unit quickly fortified

the island, harassed the attacking flotilla, and repulsed amphibious assaults. The Advanced

Base Brigade lasted as a unit until 1919. Significant for the long-tern development of the

Corps as well as advanced base defense, three future Marine Corps CommandantsGeorge Barnett, John A. Lejeune, and Wendell C Nevillereceived practical field

experience at Culebra 10 Beyond the tactical lessons of fire control and reserve placement learned at Culebra, Naval

planners also explored strategic issues in several significant reports written under the

auspices of the Naval War College. According to one study written in 1913, possible

adversaries in a Pacific war included Germany, Japan, or Great Britain. Japan' s victory in

the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 placed it as the dominant power in the western Pacific.

Because of a deficiency in natural resources, Japan jealously eyed the resource-rich Asian

mainland. Thus, any southward or westward expansion would inevitably bring Japan into

2
direct conflict with America's expanding strategic and commercial interests m the area

American security dictated the need for a strong Naval presence and its corollary of safe

Naval bases"

Guam was the archetype for a potential advanced base Strategically, this island formed

the hub of a wheel with trading routes and communication lines as the spokes From a base

on Guam, the United States "fleet would bear on every point from Singapore to

Vladivostok." Naval strategists conceded that units on Guam would likely face Japan's

local military superiority Yet, despite its acknowledged theoretical importance, Guam

remamed vulnerable to potential attack as of 1913.12

By 1915, the Marine Corps was recognized as ideal advanced base force. A Naval War

College report offered two conclusions that specifically placed the Corps and advanced

base defense in their strategic contexts.

In the event of war, particularly with a Naval power, it will be necessary for

the fleet to have with it, or at its disposal, a force properly equipped and capable

of seizing and holding one or more temporary bases in advance of its permanent

bases; and

The Marine Corps, m view of this training and relation to the Navy, is the

force best suited to perform such work)3

Once again, while the Navy' s acknowledgement of the Corps as "the force best suited to

perform" base defense was a victory, neither the Navy nor the civilian government

allocated the resources to make base defense a reality.

WORLD WAR I'S IMPACT ON THE CORPS AND BASE DEFENSE

From the Corps' internal perspective, the war in Europe affected base defense theory in

several tangential, yet significant, ways. Involvement in the conflict strengthened

America's military in general and the Corps mparticular. Civilian leadership heeded

previous recommendations for more men and better matériel The Corps greatly benefited

from heightened American preparedness in at least two ways: an increase in manpower to

one-fifth of Naval manpower and increases in appropriations for the development,

training, and maintenance of advanced base forces.14 Marine involvement in World War I represented a departure from its usual duties as

constabulary and shipboard security. As part of the American Expeditionary Force,

Marines sewed as infantry in the trenches of France. While trench warfare did not directly

affect advance base theory, Marines still gained valuable combat experience. For example,

many of the Corps' future leaders like Thomas Holcomb won their spurs in the trenches.

In addition, courageous Marine exploits in battles like Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thierry

made for good publicity. To describe battle-hardened veterans, nicknames like "devil

dogs" and the "old breed" emerged in Manne lore. Participation in World War I also

helped consolidate important features like the Marine Corps Reserves, Women Marines,

and Marine Aviation.'5

3
STRATEGIC AND FISCAL RAMIFICATIONS OF WORLD WAR I

World War I intensified potential antagonism between the United States and Japan. The

European powers had focused all their resources on the continent and did not give

sufficient attention to the Far East. As a result, Japan was left with a relatively free hand in

the region. Japan obt2ined Germany' s Pacific possessions as part of the Treaty of

Versailles. Consequently, the stage was set for future conflict between Japan and

America.'6

Because the United States emerged from the war as the premier world power, American

strategic and commercial interests around the world increased. These interests required a

strong military for protection For example, advanced base defense constituted a major

part of Naval strategy in the Pacific. In 1919, strategic planning for the use of advanced

bases was enlarged to include the logistical support for submarmes, another offensive

weapon Bases, submarines, and a fleet in the Pacific implied preparation for a potential

conflict with Japan. With an offensive war in mind, Naval planners needed Marine units

both to defend American bases and seize Japanese bases Thus, an amphibious component

grew in significance. Once again, the Corps promoted itself as the logical choice for both

halves of the mission: defense and seizure.'7

In 1920, John A. Lejeune became the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He envisioned a

Corps that would defend and seize bases. But, in his nine-year tenure as Commandant,

Lejeune faced numerous challenges resulting from lower budgets in America's return to

normalcy. Internally, he introduced several reforms like establishing a board to oversee the

promotion process and reorganizing the Marine Corps Schools. The new promotion

procedure gave Lejeune "an officer corps balanced between proven troop leaders and staff

specialists." Moreover, the reorgani7ed Manne Corps Schools "gave the Commandant an

important vehicle for propelling his officers to new professional heights and indoctrinating

them m Headquarters policy." Both these reforms also helped mamtam esprit de corps

among commissioned and enlisted personnel. Lejeune's reforms did not succeed entirely.

During the interwar years, an officer could expect to retire after thirty years as a senior

captain or junior major. Promotion stagnation made high morale difficult to maintain. For

all the setbacks, future Marine generals like Thomas Holcomb, Alexander Vandegrift, and

Holland Smith flourished under Lejeune's leadership.'8

During Lejeune's Commandancy, the Corps attempted to solidify its place in American

strategy. To help accomplish this task, Marine Major Earl H. Ellis published the two

definitive works on bases and Pacific Naval strategy in 1921. His Navy Bases: Their

Location, Resources, and Security and Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia expanded

on previous studies for the Naval War College. These two reports served as the foundation

for the eventual development of the Fleet Marine Force in 1933. Moreover, Ellis

prophesied the importance of advanced base operations in the World War JI.'9

In Navy Bases, Ellis reasserted the significance of outposts in supporting the fleet. Before

World War I, guaranteeing the Monroe Doctrine had required merely defending the

hemisphere. With greater strategic and economic considerations in the 1 920s, insurance of

the Open Door Policy in the Far East consisted of offensive and defensive objectives. Ellis

believed that successful maintenance of outlying bases insured a successfül Naval

campaign.2°

4
Because of its "power and position" as "the only purely Pacific world power," Ellis

pointed to Japan as America' s principal adversary in the Pacific He accurately predicted

that Japan would take the offensive and attempt to capture America's outlying bases.

Therefore, the Japanese would build a buffer zone for themselves In his

recommendations, Ellis identified the Manne Corps, since it was a component of the

Navy, as the best force to seize and defend advanced bases. This assertion represented a

consistent and continuous attempt by the Corps to market itself with a sigmficant

purpose.2'

Ellis' Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia served as a companion work to Naval

Bases Operations outlined a strategy for seizure and defense of islands in the Pacific

mcludmg the Japanese-held Marianas, Marshall, and Caroline island chains Imagining a

potential campaign in the Pacific, Ellis discussed the probable amphibious assaults and

surface battles From America's strategic perspective, these maneuvers commenced with

the capture of the Marshall Islands and climaxed with the seizure of the Palau Islands. The

Japanese fleet would also be met and decisively defeated As the Mannes captured bases,

these same bases must be held against potential counterattack Consequently, training for

both seizure and defense should take place simultaneously22

Ellis' evaluation of Pacific strategy became even more crucial because of the 1922 Five

Power Treaty. This agreement among the great powers compounded America's strategic

disadvantage in the western Pacific by setting a ratio of 5:5:3 for American, British, and

Japanese capital ship tonnage. Whereas Japan needed to safeguard only one ocean, the

United States and Britain needed to safeguard three To make matters worse, the Five

Power Treaty prohibited the United States from fortimg bases in the western Pacific;

bases in the central Pacific and eastern Indian Ocean had to suffice. Upholdmg the Open

Door and protecting American temtories justified a strong Corps: "a mobile force to

accompany the Fleet for operations on shore in support of the Fleet " Consequently, the

Corps found itself firmly ensconced in its strategic niche: both seizure and defense of

bases in the Pacific. Although the Five Power Treaty limited the size of capital ships and

placement of Naval bases, it did not limit support to auxiliary umts like Marine advanced

base defense forces.

In a pair of 1923 articles in Marine Corps Gazette, Commandant John Lejeune and Marine

General Rufus Lane restated Ellis' argument seizing and defendmg advanced bases was

paramount to success in war. Like previous Naval writers, both Lejeune and Lane

appealed to the Mahanian theory of Naval strategy: a strong ocean-going fleet enabled a

nation to project military force on a global scale. In a potential war with Japan, "control of

the Pacific was essential in order to defeat Japan ... there is no question that without

victory at sea there would be no victory on land or in the air." However, achieving

supremacy in the Pacific posed a major obstacle for the Navy and the Marine Corps. The

Navy had to project military force in the East Asian region despite the overwhelming local

advantage enjoyed by the Japanese. Although base seizure had played a secondary role in

earlier Naval strategy, it increased in significance because of the Five Power Treaty of

1922.24 Both Lejeune and Lane explicitly attempted to sell the Marine Corps as the ideal

force to support the United States Navy in a future conflict.

Marketing the Corps and obtaining the necessary resources to fulfill its mission became

the next goal. To accomplish this, Lejeune attempted to improve relations with Congress,

5
the Presidency, and the American public.25 Yet, despite efforts by and on behalf of the

Corps, reductions in force persisted during the i 920s and 193 Os. After World War I, the

American public's interest in the military waned Frugality was the watchword In 1922, a

suggested strength of 27,000 Marines would enable the Corps to meet "peace-time

requirements, and make possible some preparations for the future "But a civilian

administration and public wishing for a return to normalcy rejected the suggestion and

even lowered Marine manpower from 21,000 in 1922 to 19,000 in 1926. Promotion

stagnation compounded the manpower deficiencies. Moreover, difficulties inrewarding

worthy officers with rank advancement made retention of these sanie officers

problematic. 26

Although severe shortages existed, the dark cloud of budget cuts did have its silver lining

As aide to Conmiandant John H Russell from 1934 to 1936, Charles F. Good observed

that every Marine received various assignments and developed multiple skills.

Furthermore, because of the Corps' small size, a natural cross-training and flexibility

resulted. For example, the "overhead people, like the mess force and administrative

people, all had baffle stations " Then expansion did occur in the late 1930s, the Corps was

better prepared to make a rela, y smooth transition.27

TLE "ORANGE" PLAN AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CORPS

Because of the difficulties inherent in meeting the Japanese threat, American military

strategists formulated a series of contingencies called the ORANGE Plan. The 1926

ORANGE Plan envisioned "an offensive war, primarily Naval, directed toward the

isolation and exhaustion of Japan, through offensive operations against her Naval forces

and economic life."28 According to military historian Edward S. Miller, younger Naval

strategists or "cautionaries" gradually concluded that a long war of attrition would be

necessary to defeat Japan.29

Hypothetically, while the Army and the Marine Corps held the Philippines and other

Pacific bases, the American fleet would fight itsway across the Pacific. The Japanese

Navy would be engaged and deteated in a decisive baffle Simultaneously, the Jaj5anese

would be deprived of their island bases and eventually forced into capitulation. In Rising

Sun in the Fac j/ìc, military historian Samuel Eliot Monson underscores the necessity of

island bases in the ORANGE Plan The Navy's strategists saw Midway and Wake as

excellent bases for patrol planes and submarines. In addition, Guam served as a key point

for the Pacific conflict. Mothson bluntly states that Guam "would be of tremendous

assistance in this defensive phase of thewar ...." It could be used as supply depot and a

forward base to neutralize Saipan'°

The interservice report Joint Action of the Army and Navy (1926) summarized the mission

and purpose of the Marine Corps within the ORANGE plan's grand strategy3' The

Departments of War and the Navy designated several duties. These entailed the provision

and maintenance of forces:

(a) For land operations ni support of the fleet for the initiai seizure and defense of

advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to

the prosecution of the Naval campaign.

6
For emergency service in time of peace for the protection of the interests of

the United States in foreign countries.

For Marine detachments on vessels of the fleet and for interior protection of

Naval shore stations32

Of these, the first was "fundamental." The constant argument for Naval bases did bear

fruit because the ORANGE Plan contained "a new mandate for the Corps " Toward this

end, the Marine Corps carved out its nicheS dual missions of amphibious assault and island

defense.33 However, theory did not intersect with reality; the Corps' significance in

strategy did not translate into increases in Manne appropriations, equipment, and

manpower

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The stock market crash of 1929 precipitated an even greater military downsizing Budget

cuts intensified the financial woes plaguing the Marine Corps. The Federal Governmentgoaded by an economy-minded and isolationist publicslashed the personnel in the

Marine Corps and the Navy. From 1931 until 1934, the Corps received a 24.4 percent

reduction and the Navy a 5.6 percent reduction The budgetary onslaught occuned on at

least two levels Political scientist Samuel Huntington labels one level of attackers as

"business pacifists;" this group saw a nnhtary buildup as a misuse of resources which

could have been more wisely spent elsewhere The other level of attackers could be called

the "anti-business-military partnership;" this group believed the military buildup was

merely an outlet for over-production34

During this dark period, Commandant Wendell C. Neville continued to strengthen the

Corps' status as a seabome military force He proclaimed the Corps to be "versatile in the

extreme." Justifrmg this statement, he explained the Corps furnished the Navy with units

capable of both land and sea duty. Neville also outlined the Corps' educational system.

Marines attended the Army Artillery School, Motor Transportation School, Signal Corps

School, Flight School, the War Colleges, and the Command and General Staff Schools.

This helped establish professionalism and maintain esprit de corps among commissioned

and enlisted personnel.35

However, not all Neville's insights were so positive. For example, He felt that Marines

needed to be individuals with great motivation and dedication. Neville observed that "a

discontented man, or an ambitious man who sees nothing ahead, does not re-enlist. Pay,

living conditions and opportunities for advancement have a direct relation to efficiency

and morale." Stagnation of promotions and low pay remained a serious problem, which

only budget increases could alleviate.36

The Navy also consistently promoted the Corps as the premier seabome support force

According to Lieutenant Commander E. W Broadbent in 1931, the Corps essentially

operated as the United States Navy's private army. He asked and answered two rhetorical

questions in the following: "Why should the Navy mamtfiln its own army9 What does it do

with this army9 The answer to these question lies almost entirely in one word 'bases."37

This statement mirrored the Marines' own rhetoric. Broadbent even quoted Lejeune's

1923 article verbatim. Both authors considered the Corps' mission to be "vital to the

7
successful operation of the fleet m war." Although Broadbent concentrated on the

amphibious assault, his article clearly showed the Marine Corps' importance for defensive

and offensive operations in Navy strategy

On a purely functional level, the Navy also utilized the Corps as a deterrent to the Army's

interference in the Pacific. The Navy justified this action because the Army proved

inadequate for the base defense mission First, Army units lacked the necessary training in

amphibious warfare and seamanship. Second, tanks, heavy artillery, and large supply

trains encumbered the Army Conversely, Marine units possessed mobile yet potent

weapons like the 75 mm pack howitzer. Third, the Army's strategists did not support the

Naval emphasis in the ORANGE Plan because they believed it was unwise, expensive,

and inglorious for the Army Furthermore, the ORANGE Plan placed the Philippines in a

vulnerable position and expected Army units to hold it for as long as six months Finally,

unity of command was absolutely crucial to the success of any missionespecially an

amphibious assault. Fire control aboard the support ships must be carefully coordinated

with close air support and landing operations. With the Marine Corps as a component of

the Navy, problems of Army-Navy cooperation or competition might hopefully be

avoided.40 The Joint Board of the Army and Navy ideally should have coordinated j oint

operations between the two branches. However, before the Second World War, lack of

communication made any such cooperation problematic.4'

In addition, national priorities were neither established nor followed. On the international

scene, a clear foreign and military policy was needed. The situation in the Far East grew

increasingly ominous because of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 A

constant thirst for the natural resources of China heightened Japanese ambitions Yet, the

Hoover Administration' s decidedly domestic focus failed to formulate a consistent policy

in the Far East.42

Faced with fiscal obstacles, the Corps continued to develop within the strategic framework

of assault and defense of advanced bases. While fortification plans for Wake, Palinyra,

Guam, Midway, and other Pacific islands began in the early 1930s, base construction and

maneuvers slowed to a standstill because the Federal government concentrated on a

domestic agenda.43

Without coherent guidance in foreign policy from the civilian government, the armed

services attempted to unravel American objectives by themselves. The military, as a

whole, perceived national strategy as defensive. The United States Army was ill prepared

for any conflict, defensive or otherwise. For their part, the Navy's strategists saw a

twofold mission: first, defend American possessions and interests in the Far East; and,

second, safeguard the Monroe Doctrine in the Westen Hemispheret

Military strategists' conclusions led to more tenuous preparation for nonexistent goals.

Confüsion arose because the American tendency toward isolationism ignored an

increasingly tense international situation. Contemporary Marines also drew similar

conclusions regarding strategy and civil-military relations. From his perspective as

Military Secretary to the MGC during the late 1930s, a critical Alexander Vandegrift

concluded that the military failed to specify exact threats. Moreover, he indicted a number

of groups in the following:

s
This was the job of the State Department, the Army and the Navyeach of

which almost totally neglected it In turn the true significance of vital

international issues escaped in whole or in part officers of the armed forces,

members of Congress, and the bulk of the American peopleY

Consequently, any efficient civil-military harmony was limited, if not negligible If this

absence of conmiunication was not bad enough, the military's infrastructure could not

follow a well-defined strategy even if one had existed

EFFECTS OF THE 1932 ELECTION ON THE CORPS

The Corps had languished under the Hoover Administration from 1929 through 1932 But

in the election of 1932, Franldin Roosevelt ascended to the Presidency Having served as

Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the First World War, President Rdosevelt looked

sympathetically on the Navy and the Marine Corps' plight He favored and supported both

seaborne services. Roosevelt's election to the Presidency "came as a relief to the Navy"

In a letter to the newly elected President, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) William V

Pratt conveyed the general satisfaction within the Navy in the following- "a pleasure .. to

know that the fate of the Navy lies in the hands of a man who so loves it as you do ,,46

Historian Lester H. Brune asserted that President Roosevelt eventually "became the

necessary catalyst, uniting previously uncoordinated military and diplomatic actions and

seeking a unified national security strategy." Brune's position is similar to most historians'

positions.47

In the framework of American civil-military relations, the executive branch supervised the

"external" or "operational" aspects of the military. The major question was "how" to use

the military Thus, the executive branch specifically dealt with the following areas.

"number and type of ships, the number and status of personnel, the extent and location of

the shore establishment, and the administration of the Navy Department " For advice in

these matters, President Roosevelt increasingly relied on the military staffs rather than his

civihan staffs m the War and Navy Departments. He enjoyed "very close and direct

working relationships with" military leaders like CNO Harold Stark and Army Chief of

Staff (COS) George Marshall. The military's task included generating contingency plans

and coordinating these plans with national objectives. For his part in the civil-military

relationship, Roosevelt increasingly presented "the armed forces with unprecedented

direction, guidance, and coordmation " Thus, he circumvented the State, Navy, and War

Departments and partially displaced Congress. Military advisors were at least on par with

the diplomatic and political advisors to the President. Relative coordination and even

cooperation existed between the Presidency and the military. However, competition and

rivahy persisted among the armed services.49

The Navy and the Marine Corps also gained powerfül allies in Congress because of the

1932 elections Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA) assumed the influential chainnanship

of the House Naval Affairs Committee In this capacity, "Uncle Carl" acted as patron samt

for both seabome services. As a self-proclaimed "big Navy man" like Roosevelt, he

provided instrumental support in passing the 1934 and 1938 Naval Appropriation Bills and

thus promoted expansion of the Navy and Marine Corps. The following epitaph showed

Vinson's significance during the dark days of the Depression: "It is evident, that without

9
the staunch and unwavering persistence of this farsighted Georgian, the Umted States

Navy would have been far worse off that it was in December of 1941 "50

In addition to Vinson, Representative Melvin Maas (R-MN) also proved instrumentai in

expanding the Corps. In his role as ranking Republican on the House Naval Affairs

Committee, he worked closely with Vmson to sponsor legislation to fortify Guam and

institute reforms m the Navy's promotion system Maas personally embodied civilmilitary relations as both Member of Congress (1925-1933 and 1935-1945) and Lieutenant

Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve.5'

Despite the presence of military advocates in the White House and Congress, increasesin

defense spending were neither guaranteed nor punctual. In acquiring appropriations in the

late 1 930s, the Marine Corps and the Navy constantly competed not only with a closefisted public but also with the Army and its COS George Marshall for limited resources.

During the above-mentioned 193 1-1934 manpower reductions in the Navy and the Manne

Corps, the Army suffered no reduction in personnel. Marshall did not always like the

Marine Corps; at times, he was a "bitter rival." For example, although theArmy may have

won the struggle for manpower, Marshall quipped in 1933 that the Corps consistently

seemed to possess better clothing than the Army. Furthermore, Marshall thought that

Marines "have more money, because they are popular with Congress, and I believe they

are less rigidly held to account for details of their expenditures ...." Whereas the rivalry

between the military services hindered efficient cooperation, the competition did have the

virtue of forcing each branch to concentrate on a particular task.52

FORMATION OF THE FLEET MARINE FORCE

lIn 1933, the ongoing effort to implement a more structured purpose in the Marine Corps

culminated in the creation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Initially, two small mitts at

Quantico and San Diego comprised the whole FMF. The new name replaced the previous

Marine Expeditionary Force. This former title catteda pair of negative connotations: first,

it sounded too much like an interventionist unit, as it had functioned in the First World

War, and, second, the former title of Marine Expeditionary Force too broadly described

the narrowly defined roles of seizure and defense of bases According to Commandant

John Russell, the Marine Corps "should have a striking force, well equipped, well armed

and highly trained, working as a unit of the Fleet under the direct orders of the

Commander-in-Chief" The FMF fulfilled these criteria and thus formed an instrument to

integrate the Corps into the Naval strategy. In addition, interservice, administrative, and

command mechanisms were also established.53 According to future member of the ist

Defense Battalion William J. Van Ryzin, the FMF's early days were primarily concerned

with defense. Effective public relations prescribed a defensive vocabulary to appeal to

isolationist tendencies of the American public.54

As the l930s progressed, the military's strategists risked bad publicity by shifling moving

from a purely defensive emphasis to a combination of offensive and defensive emphases.

Despite the Britain's amphibious fiasco at Gallipoli in World War I, Marine and Naval

tacticians believed ship-to-shore assaults were feasible. Through meticulous planning, the

tactical advantages retained by defenders could be and were overcome. Lessons were thus

learned from Gallipoli. The key to a successful amphibious landing was the principle of

10
combmed arms "only the Marine Corps with a narrowly defined mission.. appears to

have emphasized a balanced, all-arms approach to combat"55 Planners covered six areas:

command relations, Naval gun support, aerial support, ship-to-movement, securing the

beachhead, and logistics. Moreover, during landing exercises, mutually beneficial lessons

could be learned by both the assaulting and the assaulted Marines In sum, the FMF

"provided the Navy with a 'type-force' of reinforced infantry with the specific mission of

executing landing operations."56

J

In 1934, the Manne Corps compiled the Tentative Manual ofLanding Operations for the

Navy. This handbook of amphibious operations displayed the classic example of the

Corps' appreciation for all aspects of strategy and tactics. In summarizing all the previous

work of Navy and Marine Corps planners, the Tentative Manual solidified the Corps' duty

to support Naval operations "by land operations in the seizure, defense, and holding of

temporary advanced bases ...." The Tentative Manual subsequently equated the term

"temporary advanced base" with "a Naval base of temporary nature" and "an advanced

base." A base's transitory importance in a Naval campaign made it relevant to the Corps'

mission

Naval strategy and tactics placed a premium on the mobility of the FMF. In contrast, the

Army guarded bases of a more permanent nature or relieved Mannes for more activities

directly supporting the fleet. Ironically, neither the Army nor the Navy wanted to allocate

their own resources for such a specialized assignment. This resulted in the Corps' isolation

and insulation; Marines used their monopoly on advance base operations to develop

unique tactics.58

HOLCOMB'S APPOINTMENT AS MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT

Despite all the Corps' posturing, the Great Depression's low defense budgets lingered

Mannes still used equipment from the First World War and overstretched their limited

manpower. In addition, the Corps faced other problems: promotion bottlenecks, low

morale, interservice rivalries, and Congress's budgetary restraints.59 At the low point in

this quagmire, Thomas Holcomb assumed the rank of MGC of the Manne Corps in

December of 1936.

Holcomb's background and experiences in the Corps for over thirty-five years prepared

him for his command responsibilities. He was born in 1879 and began his career in the

Corps as a second lieutenant in April 1900. Although Holcomb was not a graduate of the

Naval Academy, he served with distinction in a variety of assignments from China to the

Philippines. He also launched the Manne Corps Rifle Team and competed on the team at

the National Matches, winning the national championship in 1911. During the First World

War, Holcomb broadened his experience as commandmg officer of the 2nd Battalion, 6th

Marines m the Army Expeditionary Force. His leadership at the Battle of Belleau Wood

won him decorations and promotions. Eventually, he joined the staff of the Army' s 2nd

Division. Holcomb's stint in France afforded invaluable training in administration as well

as combat leadership. He even attracted the attention of soon-to-be Commandant John A.

Lej eune.

Under Lejeune's direction, Holcomb distmguished himself at the Army and Navy War

Colleges. With education and experience behind him, Holcomb eventually became the

11
head of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia m early 1935. Under bis direction,

base defense and amphibious assault theories matured. Holcomb impressed thenincumbent Commandant John H Russell enough to be promoted over more senior officers

for the next Commandancy6°

Serving as MGC until 1943, Holcomb played the pivotal role in the growth of the Corps as

strategist, administrator, and publicist His fellow Marines, the Navy, the Congress, and

the White House respected him While serving as Holcomb's aide from 1937 to 1940,

Robert H Williams saw Holcomb as a "plain spoken" and "very alert" leader Moreover,

his leadership "inspire[d] confidence and trust and a belief in his judgement

Williams' praise was mdicative of a seemingly universal admiration for Holcomb from the

highest-ranking officer to the lowliest enlisted man.61 Marines serving in the lower ranks

made similar observations: Holcomb "was the father of the modem Marine Corps," "was a

good General," "held the Corps together," "tried his best to enlarge the Corps," and "was a

damn good salesman."62

Holcomb performed several indispensable jobs during his Commandancy administrator

supervismg the increasing size of the Corps, strategist perfecting the Corps' amphibious

assault techmques, and salesman cajoling the civilian government into supportmg the

Corps. During his first two years of command, Thomas Holcomb concentrated on relations

with the public and Congress. Both were essential reforming the Marine Corps because it

was almost totally dependent on external patrons for existence. Public support provided

the best avenue to gaming financial support from Congress.63

RELATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS

The Corps developed a impressive public relations machine. Like his predecessors,

Holcomb constantly attempted to bolster the image of "the Leathernecks as America' s

paramount fighting force" in the eyes of the American public and their Congressional

representatives. In a letter to Alexander Vandegrift, Charles Lyman summarized the value

of good self-promotion for the Corps: "Friendships must be built up with the other

branches of the service, with Congress, and with civilians who enjoy an influential status,

if we are going to secure essentials and cease to be a 'shoe string' organization."

Following this postulate, Holcomb used his position as a platform to promote the Corps'

missions and the need for men and matériel to complete these missions. Publicity came in

many forms: radio broadcasts, motion pictures, Civil War battle reenactments, public

addresses, and periodical articles."

Almost immediately upon assuming command of the Corps, Thomas Holcomb launched

his publicity campaign A 1937 speech to the Women' s Patriotic Conference on National

Defense exemplified his pro-Corps rhetoric. Holcomb began by reflecting on global

turmoil: "mankind is ruled no longer by law but by man Government is by decree and

fiat." In this unpredictable world, the United States of America stood as a "bulwark" of

order and civility. From this introduction, Holcomb presented the Marine Corps as an

integral element of America's first line of defense. Specifically, he identified the seizure

and defense of island bases as "axiomatic" and "vital" to Naval success in a Pacific

conflict. Holcomb's assertion was not new; he had merely reiterated Mahan's ingrained

Naval postulate. In his conclusion, Holcomb called for increased financial support for the

12
Corps. Although he clearly pointed to a defensive mode, particularly for the FMF, he also

skillfully suggested an offensive amphibious mandate.65

Beyond courtmg public opinion, Thomas Holcomb also initiated better relations with

Congress. He devoted significant energy to encourage passage of bills which benefitted

the Corps; he even enlisted retired Marines like John A. Le] ernie to help lobby Congress

Specific items to be covered in appropriations bills included ration allowances, small arms

ammunition, automobiles, and war reserve ammunition. In 1937, Holcomb believed that

the Corps won a victory when the money appropriated for these items was reduced rather

than deleted from that year's bill 66

The 1938 Naval Personnel Bill served as a prime examplealbeit largely unsuccessfulof Holcomb' s lobbying efforts This legislation called for improvements in the Manne

Corps. Long-standing problems had existed regarding promotion schedules, so this bill

called for a reform of the promotion system. On the top end of the ranks, general officers

were limited to serving seven years at their current grade and allowed only two reviews for

promotion before retirement. This measure would presumably expedite advancement in

rank The 1938 bill also entailed raismg Corps strength to one-fifth of Naval strength,

raising the percentage of privates first class from 25 to 40 percent, and raising the officers

to enlisted men ratio from 4.5 to 5.5 percent. Aside from the "decided improvement" of

calling for increased manpower, the 1938 personnel bill failed to appropriate the necessary

funds to raise manpower67

Before passage, the 1938 Naval Personnel Bill had been deleted from the 1938 Naval

Expansion Bill. Representative Carl Vinson pushed the Naval Expansion Bill through

Congress in May of that year It authorized an increase m capital ship tonnage Of course,

it was noteworthy that the Japanese occupation of China succeeded in awakening

Congress out of its budgetary stupor. As for relevance to the Corps, the 1938 Naval

Expansion Bill called for strengthening or the establishment of Naval bases in American

territories Thus, the Corps stood to benefit from the expansion. However, the base

expansion proposal was also stricken from the final legislation in spite of Vinson's

patronage. Those opposing Vinson, particularly Republican Representatives like Hamilton

Fish and Frank Church, believed that reinforcing Guam would provoke the already

militant Japanese rather than discourage them. While Holcomb and his Congressional

patrons did not always improve the Corps' level of preparedness, they certainly stemmed

the tide of ever-decreasing appropriations, which had troubled the Corps for fifteen

years.68

CULMINATION OF BASE DEFENSE THEORY THE DEFENSE BATTALION

In opposition to dissentmg Congressmen, the final report of the Navy's Hepburn Board

endorsed the fortification of Pacific Naval basesespecially Guam but also Midway,

Palmyra, Johnston, and Wakein theft report of December 1938 Specifically, the

Hepburn Board recommended that these outposts be fully developed and equipped for use

by submarines, aircraft, and surface vessels. Because Naval and Marine strategists had

constantly preached this message since the turn of the century, the recommendation was

not innovative. The recommendation was indeed more urgent than ever in light of

Japanese aggression in China and the German threat in Europe.

13
Members of the Hepburn Board contended that fortifications on western Pacific bases

were strategic imperatives. Furthermore, these officers firmly believed that this deterred

Japanese expansion against the Philippines, Southeast Asia, Midway, and even Hawaii.

Agreement on this deterrent effect was not limited to the military Stanley Hornbeck, a Far

East expert in the State Department during the 193 Os, saw the presence of United States

forces in the Western Pacific as having "done much to prevent an open conflict with

Japan." Whether deterrent or not, bases on the western Pacific islands had nothing

resembling fortifications. Consequently, the Hepburn Board's edict generated interest in

fortifiing and supplying these outlying bases.69

The escalation of global tensions also prompted a greater desire for a strong defense of

American strategic and economic interests. As a result of the ominous international

situation, military strategists replaced the ORANGE Plan with the RAINBOW Plans The

new contmgency plans designated Marine Corps "defense detachments" to be organized

and stationed on Wake, Palmyra, Johnston, and Midway." The potential threat from both

Japan and Germany caused a complete overload of already limited military resources

Because restricted capabilities allowed only restricted goals, military strategists

formulated the RAINBOW Plans in early 1939 This series of contingency plans amended

the ORANGE Plan to allow for a war against Germany, Italy, and Japan under a variety of

circumstances.

RAINBOW's most basic priority assumed hemispheric protection and, in the case of war,

concentration on victory in Europe. This emphasis relegated outlying possessions like the

Philippines and Western Pacific islands to defensive nature at best and marginalized them

at worst.7' On one level, the shift from the ORANGE to the "RAINBOW Plans did not

appreciably alter the Marine Corps' role in strategic planning." Its mission still

encompassed two goals: defense of advanced bases and assault against enemy bases. But,

on another level, the Corps' theoretical role shifted back toward a defensive accent

h use baffle schedules did not prescribe when an offensive would commence in the

PE .uìc 72

In accordance with the Hepburn Board's recommendations, advanced base defense theory

culminated in 1939 with the advent of Marine defense battalions, "up-to-date versions of

the technical regiment in the old Advance Base Force." The units played "static defense"

roles by "sacrificing tactical maneuverability for strategic mobility." Composed of about

one thousand heavily-armed leathernecks, a defense battalion' s sole purpose consisted of

securing an island base in the face of enemy air, sea, and land attack. Although "modest"

in manpower, a defense battalion boasted impressive firepower: twelve 3-inch anti-aircraft

(AA) guns, forty-eight 50 caliber AA guns, forty-eight .30 caliber AA guns, and 6 Navy

5-inch guns. Defense battalions upgraded the usual Marine light infantry unit to a

combination of an artillery and a heavy infantry unit. Strategically, these units had the

virtue of rapid deployment and self-sufficiency Thus, they were a "logical outgrowth" of

Naval strategy and the Corps' mission.73

homas Hol 'b and Marine Brigadier General Charles Barrett created the defense

tttalion to ji..donn the Corps' defensive duties in RAINBOW. Lower ranking Marines

also provide evidence of the connection between Holcomb and defense battalions

According to a 7th Defense Battalion Marine, Robert F. Cyperski, Holcomb "saw the need

for first line defense before war." Furthermore, Salvatore J. Butta of the 7th believed

14
Holcomb "was very gung-ho about [defense battalions] in the Pacific area." Perhaps

Antonio Santaniell of the 7th best summarizes Commandant Holcomb's role: he "was a

strong advocate of defense battalions He fought to get more men and equipment,

especially in the beginning of the war."74

CONCLUSION

Although advanced base defense theory and Naval strategy coalesced in the defense

battalion, the practical formation of any units exceeded available resources. The Corps had

established itself as the ideal base defense and amphibious assault force. Naval strategists

had also championed the Corps as the ideal seabome force. The Roosevelt Administration

even recognized the consequences of maintaining military readiness in general and

Marine-held Pacific bases in particular. However, the practical problem of inadequate men

and matériel remained a constant Thomas Holcomb and the Marine Corps only partially

achieved the goal of a genuine defense force. Circumstances beyond Holcomb's control

would have to raise the fortunes of the Marine Corps and the defense battalion German

and Japanese hostility and hence American reaction would have to thaw ever closer to

motivate Congressional fünding of the military Meanwhile, the Corps continued its

struggle for a share m the limited resources. Likewise, Thomas Holcomb's methodology

continued to stress the Marine Corps defense battalion' s unique capability as a base

defense force Less conspicuously, he also further enlarged the role of amphibious assault.

15
CHAPTER 2

THE TURNING POINT, 1939-1 940

INTRODUCTION

This second chapter examines Commandant Thomas Holcomb's role in the ongoing

development of the defense battalion during 1939 and 1940. The changing international,

interservice, and the internal Corps contexts helped shape Holcomb' s efforts to achieve

preparedness. The increasingly strained international situation rendered the ORANGE

Plan obsolete. The new, more flexible RAINBOW Plans replaced ORANGE. In the

updated contingency plans, the Corps' dual missions of base defense and amphibious

assault became more significant Interservice rivahies intensified as Holcomb competed

with a resource-hungry Army for attention from an isolationist public and Congress.

Internally, numerous difficulties plagued the Corps For example, meager resources had to

be divided between the offensive mandate of amphibious assault and the defensive

mandate of advanced bases. In these contexts, the defense battalion was a boon for the

Corps: it provided a valuable tool for public relations, enabled the Corps to obtain more

resources, and fulfilled an essential strategic function However, the defense battalions

also drained valuable men and matériel from other areas. In both external and internal

matters, Holcomb's leadership played crucial roles in the Corps' move toward

preparedness. Ultimately, the election of 1940 empowered Congress and President

Roosevelt to raise America's military preparedness.

FRUGALITY IN THE CORPS DURING THE 1930S

Because of the spartan budgets of the i 930s, the American military suffered.A chorus of

historians observe the military's impotence prior to the Second World War Military

historian Maurice Matloff bluntly summarizes their observations, "Twenty lean years had

their effect, and by 1939, the armed forces were in no condition to conduct major military

operations of the type required in the world-wide conflict ...." Although threats multiplied

in Europe and the Pacific, an isolationist political environment hampered efforts to rearm.

Appropriations, manpower, and the quantity and quality of weapons slumped. In short,

"preparedness went down by default."

These "lean years" compounded problems for the Corps. When servmg as Military

Secretary and later as Assistant to the MGC in 1940, Brigadier General Alexander A.

Vandegrift observed first-hand the way Holcomb handled the Corps' numerous problems

These observations reveal some important features of Holcomb's leadership and

organization. Holcomb and his staff at Headquarters faced the nearly overwhelming job of

"trying to get two dollars of value out of each one dollar received ...." This took all of

Holcomb's ability as a "imaginative planner and administrator" to overcome external

budgetary obstacles He took several steps to minimize the problems of appropriations.

First, he demanded that his division chiefs document every 'lot and title" of their projected

expenses. When testif3dng before Congress, he never bluffed or overestimated the

importance of a given request. On the contrary, Holcomb Mmitted any lack ofjustification

within his projections when questioned by legislators. He then sought a satisfactory

16
answer for the legislators as soon as possible. Holcomb's fiscal thoroughness and honesty

won him respect with Congress Thus, when the votes occurred, Congress was inclmed to

be sympathetic to the Corps' plight2

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND CREATION OF THE RAINBOW PLANS

The Japanese protested the 1938 Hepburn Board's recommendationsespecially the

fortification of Guam and other western Pacific islands The Japanese recogrnzed the

strategic sigmficance of Amencan bases in the Pacific Japan's own Mahaman strategy

called for securing Guam, Wake, and Midway; in this respect, the Japanese Navy formed a

"faithful mirror image of its American opponent in strategy " In pursuit of their Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese also contmued their conquest of China with

impunity. As early as 1938, the Japanese mobilized to control the valuable natural

resources of South East Asia. Meanwhile, tensions in Europe also escalated as Nazi

Germany occupied Czechoslovakia. As the world moved toward war, the Americans

remained aloof in their isolationism Although the Umted States Fleet was moved to the

Pacific and Naval talks with the Britain's Royal Navy commenced, even such token

moves as concentratmg the fleet in the Pacific badly stretched Naval resources

Thus, serious threats on the European continent and in the western Pacific had made the

ORANGE plan obsolete. It had presumed a unilateral American conflict with Japan. The

growing probability of war with multiple enemies and allies mandated more flexible

contingency plans, resulting in the approval of the five RAINBOW Plans in June 1939.

These plansand their de facto alliances that they implieddrastically transformed

American strategy. For example, according to RAINBOW 2, Anglo-French forces focused

against Germany; and by default, the task of confronting the Japanese fell to America.4

While the new RAINBOW Plans significantly altered American grand strategy, they did

not appreciably alter the Marine Corps' mission within this strategy. The Navy intended to

deploy defense battalions at Midway, Pearl Harbor, San Diego, and Paths Island. In time

of war, these would be "temporary" deployments. If attacked, defense battalions would

resist enemy assault until relieved by the fleet All plans assumed the Pacific fleet would

quickly and decisively relieve the island outposts. Or, m an offensive Naval campaign, the

defense battalions would accompany amphibious forces and secure newly-seized islands

from counterattack. In the ensumg island -hopping campaign, the defense battalions would

advance with the amphibious forces. In either event, Navy planners slated Army irnits to

provide "permanent" garrisons as the Corps' forces moved forward. Consequently, under

RAINBOW, the Corps' mission still consisted of amphibious assault and base defense

To fulfill the latter mission, Holcomb ordered the formal organization of four defense

battalions. He designated the FMF's 1st and 2nd Battalions, 15th Marines as the "nuclei of

the four Defense Battalions " Due to severe manpower limitations, the battalions would

receive thirty percent of their personnel from regular units and the remaining seventy

percent from the reserve. However, months passed before adequate men and matériel were

brought together to form a single defense battalion.6

17
BUREAUCRATIC AND FISCAL PROBLEMS

Fortification of island bases had been recommended by the Hepburn Board but moved

slowly, if at all. In mid-i 939, Marine and Naval officers toured several Pacific islands.

They envisioned Wake and Johnston as "advanced Fleet Air Bases," outposts for the U. S.

Fleet, and commumcation relays. As of early August, their reports titled "The Defense of

Wake" and "The Defense of Palmyra" repeated Naval strategists' time-honored base

defense theory: the Japanese must be denied the use of these islands. As a corollary, the

strategists expected an offensive campaign against the Japanese Strategically, possession

of these bases were a zero-sum game, an equally time-honored vestige of the ORANGE

Plans. In reality on August 31, 1939, CNO Harold Stark criticized Naval preparedness in a

report to the Secretary of the Navy. One of the "critical deficiencies" found by his report

"was the lack of Pacific bases west of Hawaii." In addition to emphasizing the defensive

aspects of the Corps' mission, Stark's report also cited the Navy and Marine Corps'

complete inability to seize island bases.7

Even though a defense battalion's manpower was meager in numbers, the proposed

reassignment of several thousand nonexistent Marines to four new units proved

-npossible. Likewise, defense battalions required a significantly greater number of

weapons and amount of ammunition than other Marine units. Defense battalions combined

artillery batteries and heavy infantry in a "composite infantry-artillery umt" The weapons

and equipment to supply these heavily armed units either did not exist or dated back to

World War I. To solve this dilemma in the fall of 1939, the War Department agreed to

place Anny units under the Navy' s commandthus relieving the Mannes of secunty and

garrison "duties at all Naval stations outside the continental United States except those

Marines in China and the Philippines " These Naval stations included Coco Zolo, Balboa,

Pearl Harbor, Guam, Guantanamo, and Sitka Some 900 Marines were transferred to duty

in defense battalions. Furthermore, the War Department agreed to contribute 59,000

rounds of 3" AA (High Explosive) ammunition and some 5 million rounds of .50 Cal AA

(Ball, Armor Piercing, and Tracer) to the Corps.8

However, exchange of ideas and promises at the departmental level did not filter down to

the service level. In one case, when the Anny inventoried their ammunition, the Corps'

requirement constituted "senous reduction of critical items in the hands of Army troops

and ammunition reserves "The request for 59,000 rounds of 3-inch AA (High Explosive)

constituted 25 percent of the Army's total stock; and the request for I million rounds of

.50 Cal. (Armor Piercing) constituted 40 percent of total stock. Hence, the Army refused

to comply with the Corps' ammunition request.9 In another case, some Navy officers

refused to support procurement of supplies to fortifS' and defend Pacific islands like Wake.

Despite the emphatic recommendations of the Hepburn Board, Wake did not receive its

allotment because CNO Leahy and Rear Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant, had previously

believed that this atoll offered little except "as merely an air transit point reinforcing

Guam."10

The disruption caused by the formation of defense battalions was not limited to relations

with the other services. Internally, the Corps also experienced the frustration of robbingPeter-to-pay-Paul. Four defense battalions required approximately 2900 Marines. Because

it had been designated to include defense battalions, the FMF would therefore have to cut

its total amphibious assault force of almost 4100 to 1200 Marines. Holcomb attempted to

18
alleviate this drain by transferring 900 Mannes from Naval station garrisons to the FMF,

calling up 6600 reserves, and enlisting 3600 recruits On paper, Holcomb's solution more

than compensated for personnel shortages. But, in reality, his solution was overly

optimistic First, Holcomb fully expected to reduce enlisted reservists by at least 20

percent due "to various reasons" like age or physical unfitness. Second, the need for more

promotions to warrant officer (WO) lowered the regulars' total by 12 percent Fmally,

until they gained proper training and expenence, the raw recruits greatly diminished the

FMF' s level of combat readiness. As a result, demand for troops was much greater than

supply."

EXPANSION FOSTERED BY OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR Il

During its struggle for resources, an international mcident pushed the Corps toward

expansion. On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland shattered the

delusion of peace War, possibly engulfing the world, ominously loomed on the horizon

President Roosevelt responded by proclaiming American neutrality The majority of

Americans favored such an aloof reaction to the outbreak of war. Yet German aggression

also gradually raised public support for mcreased defensive preparedness. RAINBOW 2

went into effect. This plan resembled ORANGE but anticipated multiple allies and

enemies. So the military benefited from what Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison

called "this present emergency."2

As the German blitzkrieg raced across Europe, President Roosevelt declared a "limited"

national emergency. Justif'ing the need for a strong defense became easier By October

1939, CNO Stark decided to station a defense battalion in San Diego rather than the

previously assigned Midway The Navy could speedily move a defense battalion to

Midway in a crisis as soon as the atoll was properly fortified 3 Before September 1939, Holcomb had concentrated on guaranteeing the Corps' mere

existence. But, the outbreak of war in Europe served as a turning point for the Corps.

Existence or purpose ceased to be issues. Expansion surfaced as the major issuenot if

but how much and how fast. Yet the reality of unpreparedness continued because only two

defense battalions could be fully equipped instead of the original four In addition, the

Corps lacked Marines to staff the most basic posts at Pearl Harbor. Construction had been

scheduled; but no substantial fortifications existed in late 1939 on Midwaylet alone

more westward islands like Wake or Guam."

MARINE REACTIONS TO WAR

Thomas Holcomb's finely tuned publicity machine capitalized on the opportunity

provided by the war-tom international arena. According to Marine Corps historian Robert

Lindsey, "the uneasy situation of the mid to late l930s marked a sort of milestone for

Marine Corps public relations." Holcomb shifted his emphasis m publicity to recruitment

He utilized an impressive array of media to broadcast the Corps' essential role and attract

recruits. As a rule, Holcomb did not envision "cheap" propaganda as publicity, on the

contrary, he sought "legitimate publicity." For example, he provided Manne guards for the

1939 World's Fair even though this duty stretched his already limited personnel.'5

19
The 1939 film The March of Time was one of the most striking pro-Marine

advertisements It showed precision marching units from the Corps, the Coast Guard, and

the National Guard. One observer noticed that the Marines exhibited a "fme appearance

and military bearing " Moreover, they "put the Coast Guard and National Guard to shame

with their precise drill and manual" Members of the Marine Corps Headquarters Staff

also responded positively because they believed The March of Time gave the Corps a

positive image To help create such favorable publicity, Holcomb cultivated well-placed

contacts within the media like Henry R Luce of Time and Life, Inc Holcomb also called

on former leathemecks like Sam Meek of J Walther Advertising Company for assistance.

James Roosevelt epitomized the Manne-media connection. He was son of the President,

an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve, and a vice president m Samuel Goidwyn's

production company. Thus, James Roosevelt was m a position to promote the Corps'

image. But, even with the publicity efforts of Holcomb, recruitmentremained slower than

expected 16 Recruitment was not the only area making little headway. Procurement and organization

also floundered Everything from housing to ammunition to weaponry required attention

Holcomb apologized to his unit commanders for all the "difficulties in meeting demands

For example, Holcomb intended to station the ist Defense Battalion at Pearl Harbor as

had been previously planned However, immediate setbacks included a shortage of

housing and an a overabundance of duties for the 725 men once they arrived. In theory, a

defense battalion' s functions did not entail secunty duty for a given base. These units were

designed as rapid deployment defense detachments. But, in practice, the Marines helped

provide security for Pearl Harbor.17

Organizationally, a defense battalion's armament incorporated both anti-aircraft and coast

defense guns. Preparation to repel air, sea, and amphibious assaults overwhelmed the

normal chain of command. Typically, a lieutenant colonel commanded a battalion. But,

numerous "weapons functions" and "widely separated stations" required not only a more

senior officer of colonel' s rank but also a possible redesignation of defense battalion to

"defense regiment" or "composite artillery regiment." Likewise, a need arose for more

lower-ranking officers and more decentralized command structure. This flexibility would

allow elements of a given defense battalion to operate semi-autonomously. This command

structure worked well m the defense of Wake Island in December 1941. During the

Japanese amphibious assault, elements of the ist Defense Battalion lost contact with the

command post. These Marines continued to hold their positions and even counterattacked

against the landing force.18

MORE EXPANSION

During early 1940, the mternational situation worsened. German forces successfully

crushed Anglo-French forces m Europe and crippled their ability to meet Japan's threat.

Realizing this, Japanese forces found little resistance in their conquests in Asia. With the

fall of France in May of 1940, American strategists grew desperate The contingency plans

moved to a worst case RAiNBOW 4: "A unilateral defense of the Americrn,s extended to

include the area below 10 degrees south latitude and the eastern Atlantic." The key terms

m this summary of RAINBOW 4 were "unilateral defense" of the western hemisphere.

Because of England' s impotence, the United States of America stood truly "isolated"

20
between the double menace of Germany in Europe and Japan in the Pacific. Roosevelt

reacted by restrictrng trade with Japan and keeping the U.S. Fleet stationed as a deterrent

at Pearl Harbor. To help relieve America' s strategic crisis, Army Brigadier General

George V Strong drafted the "Strong Memorandum," calling for a "purely defensive

posture in the Pacific." Roosevelt was not alone in his reactions against the increasing

international tensions Pro-security Senator Edward R. Burke and Representative James

W Wadsworth pushed for mobilization via conscription.'9

Because of multiple threats and corresponding military weakness, Congress passed the

"Two Navy Act" in July 1940. Among other items, this act authorized construction of

more than 300 new warships and nearly quadrupled the Navy's budget frqm $1.8 billion to

$6.3 billion This act also included significant increases in Corps strength: expenditures

rose from $33 million in 1940 to $67 million in 1941, and manpower rose from 28,000

Marines in 1940 to 64,000 Marines in late 1941. Congress' willingness to raise $1 billion

in new taxes testified to the public's greater concern for national security 20

With the geometric increase of defense budgets in fiscal year 1940 and later in 1941, an

mflux of personnel occurred. The military experienced incredible expansion as a result of

the Second World War: 200,000 men in 1939 to over 12 million men in 1945 For its part,

the Marine Corps grew from 16,000 men in 1936 to over 300,000 in 1943 Smooth

expansion did not occur The services risked promoting officers of questionable

competence According to diplomatic historian Mark Stoler, a so-called "managerial

revolution" occurred. It modeled itself on the massive industrialization in the early

twentieth century. According to the "managerial revolution," leaders took a decentralized,

or line and staff; approach to operations. Holcomb was emblematic of this managerial

style 21

HOLCOMB'S MANAGEMENT STYLE

Holcomb split Marine Corps Headquarters into several divisions and departments Plans

and Policies, Aviation, Public Information, Reserve, Recruiting, Inspection, Personnel and

Supply. Each performed specific tasks.22 Alexander Vandegrift illustrated Holcomb's

technique in the following:

The general was not one to waste time with unnecessary administrative routine

When a problem arose he assigned it to the concerned division; if it involved

several divisions, then Holland [Smith] or I was to have the answer Reasoning

that a given problem normally concerned one division more than another,

Holcomb saw little value in today's highly touted staff conferences which he

considered a waste of time ... Once satisfied with a solution, he accepted it as his

decision and responsibility, then stuck to it, often moving mountains in its

accomplishment.23

Thus, Holcomb employed a decentralized or, line and staff; style of management. This

corresponded with a Commandant's established function as administrator rather than field

commander. Theoretically, delegation of authority allowed Holcomb to concentrate on

matters external to the Corps. These included interservice and civil-military relations.24 As

Holcomb's assistant, Alexander A Vandegrift performed the duties of a chief of staff He

21
handled the micromanagement of the Corps. Vandegrift's quote also typified the

adn±ation for Holcomb felt by many of his subordinates 25 In dealing with Congress, the President, or the American public, Holcomb and his

subordinates demonstrated the qualities of salesmen. In this capacity, they extolled the

virtues of the Corps Periodically, influential members of Congress and the Roosevelt

administration inspected Marine training camps and other facilities. During these visits,

they witnessed precision drills, observed target practice, and were wined and dined,

courtesy of the Corps. Marine hosts went out of their way to accommodate the

Congressmen during the personal tours. On one occasion, Brigadier General William P

Upshur discovered that Representatives Scrugham and Plumley "had had some military

service "Upshur "bore down on that angle and talked to them 'as one soldier to another'

which they very much likedit tickled them." During this same visit, Secretary of the

Navy Charles Edison attended some of the Marine activities. Upshur took advantage of the

opportunity to supply Edison with a memorandum listing items needed to raise the FMF to

a higher level of preparedness 26

Even with the encouraging budget hikes, the Corps remained inadequately prepared for its

re :ibilities. Expansion proved no small task. The strength of the mid-1940 Corps

sto 28,000 men and officers. Holcomb could expect further expansion and

mot 4.ation. He predicted an increase to 34,000 by October. In answer to a request by

Representative Carl Vmson, he also projected additional growth to 50,000 men for Fiscal

Year 1941. Three reasons insured the Corps' growth First, bylaw, the Corps maintained

its personnel at twenty percent of the Navy's personnel Second, the international situation

worsened with the collapse of European allies. Third, the newly appointed Secretary of the

Navy Frank Knox pressured a reluctant President Roosevelt into authorizing the Corps'

expansion by 15,000 men Evaluating Knox, Rolcomb "confidentially" described himas a

"real, take charge" administrator. Consequently, Holcomb felt that the Corps found itself

in a "most healthy situation ... that has not existed for many years." Defense battalions also

benefited from expansion with an augmented force of 6,600 men in six units.27

GROWING PAINS

Holcomb however faced serious obstacles in training raw recruits and the recalled

reservists and retirees. Because Marine recruits at Paths Island skyrocketed from 190 to

1,600 per month, difficulties in rank allocation and promotion arose. Many newly formed

units lacked competent officers and NCOs. For their part, raw recruits went through an

abbreviated basic training supervised by generally inexperienced drill instructors (DIs). It

was noteworthy that, before the per-World War II expansion, DIs had often served ten to

fifteen years in the Corps before assuming their duties in basic training. The shortage of

NCOs compounded the overabundance of ill-prepared Marines No more did the problem

of stagnation of promotion exist as it had during most of the mterwar years. Quickened

training resulted in Marines of questionable quality being trained by DIs of questionable

qualifications and being commanded by officers of questionable ability Ifthat did not

place enough pressure on the establishment, the Corps trained with equipment of First

World War vintage. Consequently, units were being stationed with questionable combat

readiness.28

22
In an effort to quicken yet not cheapen the training process, recruits received thorough

marksmanship and physical training while at boot camp in San Diego or Paths Island

This inculcated Marines' most basic skills as riflemen. Upon arriving at their initial

assignments, the new Marines learned the advanced tactics and field skills at new bases

like Camp Pendileton In the officers' ranks, various schools drew particular types of

officers Reserve officers enrolled in the Jumor and Base Defense Weapons Courses at

Quantico; regular officers attended the Senior Course at Quantico; and, the Basic Course

at Philadelphia drew from the batch of new second lieutenants Whether officers or

enlisted men, new recruits m the late i 930s enjoyed one advantage They had all been

hardened while enduring the Depression years. As for motivation behmd their enlistment,

the recruits eagerly joined the Corps as much for employment as for patriotism29

Growing pains were not limited to the enlisted ranks. Newly commissioned reserve and

regular officers had little time to learn their staff responsibilities before facing either

promotion or transfer to another unit. As a result, three distinct groups of officers emerged

in the Corps. career officers, green Officers Candidate Course (0CC) graduates, and

reserve officers of questionable qualification. A reserve WO or senior NCO could be

called back to active duty as a captain. In this capacity, he was equal in rank to a twentyyear captain with tours of duty in Nicaragua and China and perhaps a stint at the Naval

War College, in addition, this new captain commanded lieutenants fresh out of 0CC and

semor NCOs with fifteen years experience. Because of the rapid manpower build-up,

experience and qualification in the chain of command was problematic.'°

Because he was responsible for internal supervision of the Corps, Vandegrift attempted to

reconcile rank with competency. Determining the truly competentwhether younger or

olderleaders took time. Officers and senior NCOs had to be tested under stress to prove

their mettle. If an errorin assignment were to occur, experienced WOs or NCOs would

accompany less experienced commissioned officers. By waiting, Vandegnfl hoped to

avoid the mistakes of 1917 in which experienced officers led inexperienced NCOs.

Another delicate situation occurred; career Marines sometimes resented bemg out-ranked

by reservists called to active duty. To alleviate this tension, Holcomb shrewdly removed

the "R" from the USMCR designation of the reserves Consequently, all were Marines

without distinction.3'

In an effort to quickly tram a greater number of officers, the Platoon Leaders Classes

(PLC) at Quantico and San Diego expanded under the auspices of the Marine Corps

Schools (MCS) A forerunner of Officer Candidate School (OCS), the PLC was originally

directed in 1935 toward college graduates. Relatively certain of expansion by the late

thirties, Holcomb enlarged the PLC and thus enlarged the pool of officers from 1936

through 1940. A more rigorous training program provided the Corps with a batch of "high

quality" reserve officers. But, when the "first ripples of mobilization started" in July 1940,

the PLC failed to provide enough officers capable of handling combat leadership. Thus,

PLC eventually evolved into the Officer Candidate Course (0CC). This demonstrated that

expansion was taken seriously by the officers in the Corps: "the 0CC had the task of

assessmg the candidates for leadership potential and discharging those men who did not

measure up to the physical demands or emotional stress of combat officership." In

addition to a comprehensive study of drills, infantry weapons, and small unit tactics, a

Marine's officer training included a "rudimentary knowledge of leadership skills."32

23
In addition to manpower, the Corps faced other critical deficiencies Fulfilling the dual

mission of amphibious assault and base defense presented the Corps with another

perplexing dilemma In this respect, procurement in mid-1940 proved no better than a year

or ten years earlier. Successfully establishing itself as the ideal force for both base defense

and amphibious assault proved to be a pyrrhic victory in some ways. Supplying either

amphibious or defense missions stretched the Corps' already meager resources;

acquisition of the necessary manpower to undertake both missions proved logistically

impossible

As of June 1940, less than half of the total items requested by the FMF were on hand For

instance, the FMF had only 900 machine guns (of any size) "on hand" out of

approximately 3300 machine guns of their "total requirement;" furthermore, no 37mm

anti-tank guns, 60 mm mortars, 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, or 20 mm anti-tank guns existed.

These anti-aircraft and anti-armor items were essential to both amphibious and defense

operations. Ammunition proved to be the most grievous area of unpreparedness. Of

projectiles above .50 caliber, 2.5 units of fire were "on hand" and 4.5 units were "on

order" out of the 22 5 umts required for fill combat readiness. In the areas most relevant

to amphibious assault, less than twenty percent of the necessary equipment had been filled

or ordered. Finally, future "on order" items due for the most part in 1941 or 1942 failed to

match the FMF's total requirement. Consequently, speaking of Manne Corps preparedness

m 1940 was not as appropriate as speaking of unpreparedness primarily because

appropriations and equipment allocations had not increased proportionately to military

threats.33

WAR IN EUROPE WORSENS

On the international scene, the Battle of Britain raged throughout July 1940. Even with

additional American fmancial and material aid, the fate of Great Britain hung in the

balance. France's capitulation reduced Great Britain to a purely defensive position. The

United States of America stood alone. In the Pacific, the situation was even more grim.

Vichy France ceded rights to Southeast Asian bases to the Japanese Britain could send no

strong opposing force to confront the Japanese in that arena. Thus, according to Allan R.

Millet, "by default the United States, not yet involved in the European war, became the

leader in the coalition against Japan."34 In this quote, "coalition" must be mterpreted

broadly because no formal coalition existed. Roosevelt could do little more than increase

support for China, use economic sanctions to deprive Japan of the raw materials in

Southeast Asia, trade antiquated American destroyers for British bases in the western

hemisphere, and begin establishing an advanced base on Midway. Congress voted to raise

taxes to pay for a two-ocean Navy including 15,000 aircraft.35

The Corps benefited slightly from this movement toward preparedness. Because of

heightened international tension, a detachment from the ist Defense Battalion finally

landed on Midway in July 1940 Other elements of this "overextended" unit occupied

PaJmyra and Johnston islands. However, the long-awaited deployment of a defense

battalion drained the Corps' scarce resources.36

While the seriousness of the international situation may not have been fully known,

concern filtered down to the Corps. The need for a large, powerful Corps grew

24
proportionately with this Japanese threat To fulfill the anticipated strategic mission, the

Marine Corps made great effort brmgmg the FMF to full battle readiness. According to

mid- 1940 projections, the FMF would make up half of the Corps' total strength or 25,000

enlisted men. This m turn would be subdivided into force headquarters totaling 99 men,

six defense battalions totalmg 4,344, three Marine brigades totaling 16,557, and two

aviation wings totaling 4,000. Within the FMF, the twm mandate of island seizure and

base defense formed a "division of labor." Of course, this remained only a projected

distribution. By fall 1940, a 50,000 man Corps corresponded to the increasing threat in the

Pacific And, by April 1941, the need had subsequently grown to 75,000 men.37

RAMIFICATIONS FOR DEFENSE BATTALIONS

Although the unit had been acclaimed as the culmination of base defense-theory, few

people seemed to know the exact rationale behind a defense battalion Defense battalions

had roots reaching back to the turn of the century. The name "defense" was more than a

mere public relations ploy. The defense battalion also fulfilled viable tactical and strategic

functions Marme First Lieutenant Robert D Heinl, Jr , picked up the gauntlet to define

and to justi' the defense battalion m his 1940 article "Marine Coast Artillery The

Defense Battalions "He originally intended to publish his piece in the Coast Artillery

Journal. But, due to the "restricted nature of the information contained" in his article,

Marine Corps Headquarters blocked its publication and distributed Heini's article directly

to Marine officers.38

Reminiscent of Ellis's work twenty years earlier, Heini's article outlined the basic tenets

of base defense: strategic mobility and tactical immobility. While heavily armed and wellframed, defense battalions were not large enough to repel a "hostile main effort." Heinl did

not expect them to repel a determined invasion He assumed that any force large enough to

overpower a defense battalion would necessanly "attract correspondingly strong elements

of the U.S. Fleet." The defense battalion would be most effective against small flotillas

composed of cruisers or lighter vessels and small amphibious forces of battalion size. In

retrospect, the defense of Wake Island verified Heinl's basic premise.39

HemI also explained some practical aspects of base defense. For shore-to-ship warfare, a

defense battalion employed the old Navy 5-inch gun. With minor modification for coast

defense, this weapon's high mll77le velocity and advanced fire control equipment gave it

good accuracy and long range The 5-mch gun also proved to be easily transported,

handled, and installed A defense battalion's three or four batteries either operated jomtly

or, if communications with headquarters were lost, individually. 3-inch anti-aircraft,

searchlight, and sound detector batteries completed the artillery component. Defense

battalions utilized two machine gun batteries for beach and anti-aircraft defense. As with

the rest of the unit, economy of force was a premium in the machine gun batteries. By

following the Corps' principle that every Marine was a riflemen and by borrowing from

the Navy's "battle-stations" method, each Marine in a defense battalion had his regular

duty and a combat duty during action. Thus, the defense battalion was designed to achieve

self-sufficiency as well as eliminate overhead personnel for transportation,

communication, or installation.40

25
In his closing paragraph, Hemi proclaimed that the defense battalion "liberates infantry

and other artillery units of the [FMFJ from any inherent responsibility for the protection of

bases." But, efficiency only occurred on paper The Corps still lacked adequate personnel

and equipment. In fact, during the latter half of 1940, no fully equipped, fully manned

defense battalions existed on a given base. The equipment did not exist, and training

occupied personnel.4'

THE 1940 ELECTION AND THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION

Whereas the tension in the international arena made military appropriations a little easier,

a strong isolationist strand still ran through the American public. Funds were not made

available in a timely fashion to meet growing military threat The Corps' growth and

military readiness hinged on generous appropriations. For the defense battalion, the Corps,

and the American military as a whole, the 1940 national election proved to be the major

watershed m American diplomacy and strategy.42 Because elected officials had been

hamstrung by an isolatiomst American public, the election gave breathing room to

officials sympathetic to the Corps' plight No longer did Roosevelt and the Members of

Congress need to worry as much about offending isolationist voters Their isolationist tone

slowly shifted to a non-belligerent interventionist tone. On a practical note m December

1940, President Roosevelt reappointed Thomas Holcomb to a second term as

Commandant of the Marine Corps This vote of confidence empowered Holcomb to

continue working for a strong Corps.43

Holcomb immediately recognized the 1940 election' s significance and capitalized on it in

two ways. First, he attempted to gain publicity However, not all the publicity was so

positive For the Navy Day issue of L!fe, the Corps had received scant coverage. Holcomb

complained in a letter to the publisher that the issue "disappomted" him because it was

"not of a character particularly calculated to increase [the Corps'] prestige." After

Holcomb' s complaints, the publishers of Life agreed to run a separate story on the Corps

in early l94l.

Perhaps because the publishers of Lê felt guilty about their limited coverage of the Corps,

"grateful" Holcomb later received excellent exposure on the November 11, 1940 cover

Time. This story was in press before the election occurred The "National Defense"

-er story also painted the Corps in a positive light Beginning with basic training, raw

;ruits became inculcated "with the conviction that a Marine is better than any other

righting man ...." Moreover, the transformation from civilian into Marine bordered on a

religious experience. Intermingled with anecdotes about bravery and history, the article

stated that "the Corps has been built to function with a minimum of trouble ... to be

prepared for anything." In addition to the publicity from Time, the Corps also gained

favorable exposure from a program on NBC radio commemorating the Corps' birthday on

November 1 Ø45

Second, Holcomb wrote newly elected Senators and Representatives to congratulate them

on their victories and plug the Corps as the ideal force. In one letter to Senator-elect Ralph

O. Brewster of Maine, Holcomb congratulated Brewster on his victory and expressed great

enthusiasm for his appointment to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Holcomb wrote a

similar letter to Senator-elect C Wayland Brooks of Illinois, a former Marine. Holcomb

26
hinted that Brooks should also attempt to gain a place on the Senate Naval Affairs

Committee

CONCLUSION

1939 and 1940 proved to be eventfiul years for the United States Manne Corps. Following

the Hepburn Board's recommendation, defense battalions became a reality However, an

isolationist American public and its Congress nullified any effort to raise the defense

battalionsor the whole militaryto combat readiness. Too few men had too many

responsibilities. As with most military achievements during this period, the Corps and the

defense battalion gamed support primarily because of international pressures: war m

Europe and threats in the Far East. Germany's smashing victories led the American public

and the Federal Government to the realization that the globe, as well as the number of

American allies, shrank with every passmg day. Likewise, Japan' s contmued aggression

also prompted an increased interest in niilitaiy preparedness. The Corps benefited in part

because American strategy called for a defensive war m the Pacificthe perfect

assignment for a defense battalion. Support for military preparedness peaked with the

election of 1940. Following this election, establishing the importance of the Corps and the

defense battalion ceased to be an issue. New administrative and bureaucratic challenges

faced Holcomb in 1941 as he and the Corps attempted to attam preparedness.

27
CHAPTER 3

THE RACE FOR PREPAREDNESS, 1941

INTRODUCTION

Following the 1940 election, Congress appropriated and Roosevelt approved finds for

military expansion more readily. The American public gradually supported preparedness

This final chapter recounts Commandant Thomas Holcomb's ongoing struggle to gain

men and equipment in 1941. The military' s speculative tone changed to a confident tone

As a result, the Marine Corps' situation improved immeasurably as the drive for

preparedness began. Plan DOG and the ABC Talks detailed the Anglo-American response

to the Axis threat The Corps maintained a high profile in each of these contmgencies

Training and deployment of amphibious forces and defense battalions inched forward

Holcomb primarily dealt with bureaucratic and logistical challenges as he attempted to

balance the offensive and defensive components of the Corps' mission. Responsibilities

expanded more quickly than resources became available. The Corps remained perpetually

six months behind Holcomb also contended with the Navy's slow supply system and

competed with the Army and the Allied powers for scarce resources.

NEW WAR PLANS AFFECT THE CORPS

During the final weeks of 1940, CNO Harold R. Stark completed work on an assessment

of America's future strategies. His "Stark Memorandum" outlined four scenarios labeled

Plans A through D He grappled with the problem of economy of force. In the foreseeable

future, the American militaiy did not possess the resources to fight two major wars on two

fronts Severely limited military power forced Stark to choose from among several

unsatisfactory options.2

Plan A called for a unilateral defense of the Western hemisphere. An isolationist American

public remained relatively detached from the global conflict as found in RAThBOW 4.

Plan B called for an offensive war concentrated in the Pacific against Japan with Dutch

and British assistance. This plan assumed that Allied assistance would be modest because

the British and Dutch resources focusedon Europe Likewise, Britain would be left to fend

for itself. Plan C called for equally strong efforts in both Atlantic and Pacific. This would

have been impossible because of the scarcity of American resources Finally, Plan D

called for a concentrated effort against Germany and a defensive stance against Japan in

the Pacific. Economy of force could thus be directed against Germany and Italy. Later

known as Plan DOG, this last contingency rested on at least two assumptions: first, war

appeared probable and perhaps inevitable; and second, the European theater represented

the more immediate priority. Obviously, the Marine Corps figured heavily in each

contmgency.3

The military had long expected a conflict between the United States and Japan in the Far

East. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Naval strategists expected a Japanese strike in the

Westen Pacific. During his tenure as a Vice Admiral before World War II, Ernest J. King

observed, "the trend of events following the outbreak of war in Europe indicated that the

28
war would eventually engulf the United States and become global in all its aspects " King

made his observation as part of a 1944 report. Although hindsight undoubtedly skewed his

perspective, the statement certainly contained shades of fatalism and determinism.

Expectations of war were not limited to the highest-ranking officers in the Navy; they

trickled down through the Corps' ranks5

In his introduction, CNO Stark recognized that America's "national objectives"

necessitated the "preservation of the territorial, economic, and ideological integrity of the

Umted States." Of all adversaries, Germany was the most immediate threat Achieving

"national objectives" compelled America to sustain Britain agamst almost certain defeat

by Germany Stark predicted that a British defeat would relegate America to Plan A, a

purely unilateral defense of the Western Hemisphere. However, following Plan DOG' s

victory in Europe, forces could be concentrated in a Pacific offensive. In his conclusion,

Stark recommended joint talks with British, Canadian, and Dutch military planners 6 Plan DOG formed a nucleus for the American-British-Canadian Talks (ABC-l) lasting

from January through March of 1941. The resulting report outlined America's support of

the Allied Powers Plan DOG modified American strategy for working with the Allies and

revised RAINBOW 5 to account for France's capitulation Fighting Germany was the

highest pnonty. In the Pacific, the United States would attempt to avoid war with Japan

In the event of hostilities, American Naval forces would maintain a "strategic defense"

which included "limited" or "tactical" offensives in the Central Pacific. Allied planners

conceded that ABC-1 meant the probable losses of Guam and the Philippines. They also

hoped their "strategic defense" would divert Japanese forces from East Asia and relieve

the pressure on the British forces remaining there By May 1941, the Joint Army-Navy

Board accepted Plan DOG and ABC-1. In the long term, ABC-1 encapsulated the Allies'

war-winning strategy.7

While Roosevelt never officially approved Plan DOG or ABC-1, Stark and Naval

strategists proceeded with their specific recommendations Stark redirected the war effort

to "Germany First" and dc-emphasized the Navy's initial role in the Pacific However, in

the event of America's entrance into the war, the Marine Corps' role in the Pacific

remained the same or perhaps expanded. Two "tasks" specifically were given to the

Corps: first, defense of outlying island bases like Wake, Midway, Samoa, Palmyra,

Johnston, and Guam; and, second, seizure of island chains like Carolmes and Marshalls. In

a "strategic defense," both "tasks" were intertwined. Amphibious assault and base defense

were important because the Corps had to capture and sustain possessions.8

High-level correspondence confirmed that both seizure and defense of advanced bases

received great attention. In a letter on 10 January 1941, Admiral Robert Ingersoll ordered

Holcomb to orgamze six new defense battalions as soon as he had completed the

organization of the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. The amphibious assault ann of the FMF

held top priority, and base defense held second priority Six new defense battalions raised

the total to twelve with a complement of over 10,000 Marines.9

In a different communication, Stark also ordered the 3rd Defense Battalion to Midway and

the ist Defense Battalion to be divided between Palmyra and Johnston. A sense of urgency

was evident in still another of Stark's letters:

29
The existing situation requires the Johnston and Palniyra Islands be provided as

expeditiously as practicable with defensive garrisons capable of defending the

installations and operating forces present against minor raids

Island bases constituted the outer Ime of American defenses

Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander ui Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC),

concurred with Stark' s directives Moreover, Kimmel wholeheartedly advocated

"permanent" garrisons and "acceleratecï construction on these islands On a more

practical level, the bases needed refrm. tors, distilling equipment, and other

transportation and support material. In general, the construction on the Western Pacific

bases was less than thirty percent completed as of March 1, 1941. A report by the Navy's

Bureau of Yarc 3nd Docks optimistically estimated completion dates in late 1941 and

early 1942.11

From the evidence, several conclusions can be drawn. First, Plan DOG and ABC-1 clearly

enhanced the Corps' position in American strategy Second, although it had top priority,

the amphibious assault mission did not monopolize all resources. Plan DOG's proposed

"strategic defense" assumed that island bases would change hands. These bases either

needed to be held if in American possession or retained if taken from Japan. Either way,

defense battalions would prove essential Thus, base defense clearly shared importance

with amphibious assault; defense complemented seizure. Third, American commanders

presumed that a war with Japan would erupt sooner or later In fact, a February 1941 letter

from Kimmel to Stark warned, "that a surprise attack (air, submarine, or combined) on

Pearl Harbor is a possibility."2

EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL INADEQUACIES

Under the auspices of increasing preparedness, Holcomb requested authorization for

71,000 regular and reserve Marines by 1942. This number far exceeded the 45,000 regular

and reserve Marines mobilized by early 1941. As always, Holcomb repeatedly complained

that existing men and equipment lagged far behind the actual requirement. The Navy also

began pressuring the War Department and the Army to fill the Corps' requests for

ammunition and weapons. To make matters worse, the Corps depended almost entirely on

the other services because it did not have its own ordnance department to develop new

weaponry. Holcomb and Stark even solicited aid from Representative Carl Vinson,

Chairnian of the House Naval Affairs Committee and long-time patron of the Corps.'3

The Corps drifted slowly toward combat readiness in accordance with the Plan DOG and

the RAINBOW Plans. By March 1941, seven defense battalions had been formed, and

Midway had received its full complement of Marines. This was encouraging. Yet much

work still had to be done to achieve fulJ combat readiness. Only five of the seven defense

battalions "could be considered as being reasonably well trained and prepared to carry out

the mission of defending small bases against minor raids." The two units lacking "certain

major items" depended on the Army to relmquish it equipment According to one estimate,

bringing the defense battalions to 11,11 readiness would take four months.'4

The FMF's ist and 2nd Marine Divisions also faced severe shortages. These two

amphibious assault units possessed only fifty percent of theft manpower and forty percent

30
of their required equipment. A report on the FMF' s deficiencies predicted a sixteen month

delay until 1 July 1942 before one hundred percent manpower could be achieved.'5 The

amphibious assault units' lengthier "speed of attainment" seemed to indicate the

importance of base defense because defense battalions had a shorter "speed of attainment"

Naval strategists have long assumed that the Western Pacific bases would be attacked first

and therefore would need to be supplied more quickly.

With war looming on the horizon, Roosevelt initiated the Lend-Lease Program in March

1941 The program was a blessing and a curse. From the British perspective, Lend-Lease

placed America's potential mdustrial might squarely behind their war effort However,

from the American military's perspective, helping the British created another level of

competition and exacerbated already critical shortages of both men and equipment The

industrial expansion siphoned off available resources: "a handicap which .[the Corps]

never encountered before." Whereas America' s armed services formerly competed among

themselves for limited men and equipment, Lend-Lease amplified their rivahy. For

mstance, acquiring comfortable shoes, let alone modem weapons or sufficient

ammunition, posed problems for the Corps.'6

MEETING THE CHALLENGES

While Holcomb unsuccessfully endeavored to overcome the Corps' external challenges,

he entrusted Alexander Vandegrift with finding solutions to the Corps' mternal challenges

Delegating responsibility and authority to his subordinate demonstrated Holcomb's

consistent line and staff management. The Corps' internal difficulties included command

structure and training, among others.'7

Vandegrift planned to reform the FMF's command structure He wanted to place Manne

divisions directly under a fleet' s commander. By localizing control, Vandegnft hoped to

avoid the iitherent communication and administration problems caused by exercising

leadership from several thousand miles away. He also introduced some important reforms

within the Manne divisions of the FMF. When they had been trained, competent officers

would form "a tactical command" made up of the commanding officer (CO) and a small

tactical staff Of course, having a "staffin being" required officers to hold the positions

By spring of 1941, not enough officers had been trained or commissioned.'8

Both the Marine Corps and the Navy still lacked competent officers and enlisted men to

fill vacancies Possible solutions to the Corps' manpower shortages floated around

Vandegrift's office. Because recruitment sagged during the spring months, Marine

Brigadier General Charles Price recommended that former leathernecks be offered reenlistment and placed on active duty at posts near their homes. From his perspective as

CO of the Department of the Pacific based in San Francisco, manpower limitations

severely handicapped operations. His enlisted men shouldered double duty in security

guard companies and in the FMF. Price theorized that the re-enlisted Marines could

perfonn these extraneous guard duties. Consequently, his Marines could focus on training

in amphibious assault and base defense, theft primary duties 19 Vandegrift also continually faced a scarcity of experienced officers. Anecdotes abound

concerning their quick transfer from assignment to assignment. To help fill the officers'

ranks, college semors were eventually commissioned in the Marine Reserve. Having

31
inexperienced officers was considered as bad as having no officers Without sufficient

training, they hurt the morale of their subordinates and incurred the jealousy of their peers.

To avoid placing inexperienced officers on line, Vandegrift directed recent college

graduates to complete the Platoon Leaders Course before receiving their commissions.

Afterward, they went on active duty and attended courses specifically designed for

Reserve officers.2°

PUBLICITY AND RECRUITMENT

Holcomb concentrated his persona; energies on external challenges like public relations,

interservice relations, and Congressional relations. With war looming larger in 1941,

Holcomb intensified his public relations campaign He spent much of his time generating a

positive image for the Corps. Holcomb expanded his message from an almost purely

defensive accent to include the offensive capabilities of the Corps.21

From his position as the Corps' chief salesman, Holcomb employed "every means

available to keep the Marine Corps favorably before the people." He took full advantage

of the networks which had been developed over decades. Holcomb contacted J G.

Harbord, a fellow leatherneck at RCA, to help improve the Corps' image and therefore

increase recruitment. Harboard, in turn, tried to arrange radio programming which

presented the Corps in a positive fashion. Elsewhere, Holcomb used his contacts to obtain

"colorful Maxine Corps scripts" by the "finest writer in radio" and "excellent pictures" in

periodicals like Life and Saturday Evening Post These carefully refined sights and sounds

helped perpetuate the Corps' image as America's premier fighting force. Military histonan

Craig M. Cameron claims that Marine recruits "were looking to join the service of Captain

Flagg and the old 'Horse Marines' of Peiping.

Holcomb articulated his publicity agenda in a letter to Admiral Ernest J. King,

CINCLANT. With regard to an article forthcoming in Lê, Holcomb wrote, "it is fine

clean publicity ... of a type that could not be bought and will serve, I believe, a very useful

purpose "The article explicitly highlighted the Corps' ability "to carry on amphibious

operations as part of the Fleet." The pictures and written word held a deeper, implicit

message: the Corps was being portrayed as an integral part of the Navy and the Fleet?3

Because publicity had become so complicated, Holcomb replaced the Publicity Section in

the Adjutant and Inspector's Division with the autonomous Division of Public Relations

(DPR) in July 1941. Its responsibilities included supervising and coordinating all of the

Corps' publicity efforts.24 According to General Vandegrift,

All officers are urged to submit direct to the Director of Public Relations any idea

they may have as to fostering public relations or furthering publicity, and also to

submit in the same manner photographs, etc., which are believed to have news

value.25

Thus, the DPR also formed the focal point for generating ideas for better publicity. Under

its auspices, the Corps' recruitment was stimulated by publishing the magazine The

Marine Recruiter. It is noteworthy that, by delegating the task of Corps public relations,

Holcomb applied line and staff management. Instead of giving more responsibilities to his

"old-line administrative departments," Holcomb made "new-line staff agencies" like the

32

,,22
DPR directly responsible to his Commandant's office. This methodology helped smooth

the roughness inherent in rapid expansion26

Because the Lend-Lease program lured potential recruits to industnal jobs with high pay

and draft exemptions, recruiting methods themselves also changed Competition for

available manpower became very intense as 1941 wore on. Interservice resentment

increased as the Navy, Army, National Guard, and Coast Guard scoured areas for recruits

Recruiting officers expanded their search from the usual urban centers to include the rural

areas. No stone was left unturned27

Dunng the Depression, recruiting had run on a shoestring budget Service in the Corps

appealed to young men by offering employment, excitement, and travel But, by mid1941, this message was not alluring enough. The cost per recruit gradually formed the

basis for determining the cost of recruiting. Before increasing the numbef of recruits, the

required amount of money and resources needed to be increased?8

In response to the new difficulties in recruitment, Charles Price offered a comprehensive

program to enhance the process. He wanted recruitment to become intertwined with public

relations. Specifically, Pnce argued that Manne recruiters should target small towns with

advertisement in local newspapers and broadcasting on local radio networks This more

"mdividwil" touch included publicizing news about a leatherneck that would interest

people in his hometown. Puce also advocated revisions in Corps' posters He believed that

the poster should tell a story and illustrate life in the Corps. Attention was given to the

smallest detail To appease mothers of young men under eighteen years old, Puce advised

that Corps publicity should soft pedal the fierce looking Marine prepared to stick a

bayonet in someone. The boys may like that idea but, if you have to get the mother' s

consent, she will not consent to having her little boy j ab human beings with a bayonet.29

Recruitment did not end when recruits completed basic training. The new Marines

themselves served as potential recruiting tools They should be stationed far away from

their homes and encouraged to write home about the new lives. In this way, a "little

brother and schoolmates may become moculated with the Marine bug." Finally, Price

believed that retired leathemecks could be effectively utilized as recruiters. He submitted

his recommendations in a long letter to Alexander Vandegrift.3° Presumably, Vandegrift

would have then forwarded Pnce's suggestion to Holcomb and the DPR Line and staff

management would therefore have functioned up and down the chain of command.

Young men who joined the Corps before Pearl Harbor confirm the effect of publicity on

recruitment. In a recent survey of the 7th Defense Battalion, Marines cited a number of

"reasons" for enlistment. Of thirty-five single responses, patriotism and duty motivated

twenty to join the Corps Among the remaining fifteen responses, six indicated a desire "to

be Marines "either the appeal of an "elite" organization or the desire to avoid being

drafted m the Army It can be inferred from the majority of responses that the Corps

presented a certain image that influenced young men. Finally, only five responses

indicated a need for employment The relatively few recruits merely seeking employment

in the Corps verified that less "gung ho" young men had other options for mere

employment. Conversely, young men who joined the Corps before Pearl Harbor wanted to

be Marines.3'

33
DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE BATTALIONS, JANUARY TO JULY 1941

During the first six months in 1941, defense battalions floundered. Manpower and

equipment hovered around half strength. Construction of advanced bases fared even

worse. As of April, construction on Guam had not been started Construction on Midway

and Wake had begun but did not become remotely suitable for defense until the fall of

1941 The Corps and its resources were spread too thmly Operational demands

accelerated more quickly than the Corps' ability to keep pace.32

At the highest level of Naval leadership, grandiose schemes evolved like the "Plan for the

Expansion of the U.S Marine Corps, Report and Recommendations by the General Board,

May 6, 1941 "This report recommended that the Corps should grow to 123,000 officers

and men. This total included from twenty to forty percent "replacement personnel for

casualties in the initial stages of combat" and an extra ten percent active personnel "not

available" for active duty. Consequently, the fully combat ready strength of the Corps

would be closer to 75,000 Marines. This figure was the strength for Fiscal Year 1942

previously authorized on 18 April 1941. Its combat ready strength should also have been

ceduced by thirty to fifty percent

According to the "Plan for Expansion," the FMF would be expected to climb over 61,000

officers and men Of these, 29,000 would serve m the ist and 2nd Marine Divisions.

Defense battalions were given 6,800 Mannes for eight units, a comparatively small

amount. They were subdivided into four light and four heavy units Light differed from

heavy defense battalions in their armament The former employed 5-inch guns and lighter

AA guns; the latter would upgrade to the 6-inch gun and heavier AA weaponry

Deployment depended on the situation and the particular base.34

Significantly, the "Plan for Expansion" also created support units for the defense

battalions. 12,500 Marines would serve in separate infantry battalions, balloon barrage

squadrons, and base defense aircraft groups Of these complementary units, the separate

infantry battalion served as a strategic reserve in an "active defense." This enabled a

defending force to make strong counterattacks if an enemy's assault force established a

beachhead. Most Marines in regular defense battalions had their pnmary battle

assignments in artillery or machine gun batteries. As a result, the defense battalion had

few men for a strategic reserve. On big islands like Samoa, planners believed that infantry

support would be essential for a successful defense. Together with the defense battalions,

the support units totaled nearly 20,000 Mannes or one third of the whole FMF. Even in

May 1941, advanced base defense remained a vital part of the Corps' mission35

In its recommendations, the "Plan for Expansion" called for the Corps' growth "as rapidly

as it is practicable to procure, equip and tram the necessary officers and men " The plan

also recommended that "replacement supplies" be stockpiled for an emergency. However,

the 'Plan for Expansioif' had no foundation in reality. Not enough money was

appropriated. Some of the units like the separate infantry and the balloon barrage

battalions were never deployed. Throughout the summer of 1941, the Corps hovered

around 50,000 Marines.36

Severe shortages persisted in weaponry, ammunition, and equipment for defense

battalions. As of May 1941, only two defense battalions, the 2nd and the 4th, could be

considered equipped and trained. But their readiness would drain other units of

34
experienced Marines and essential material The remaining units like the 3rd and the 5th

lacked both "considerable equipment" and sufficient training. In the 5th' s case,

"considerable equipment" mcluded everythmg from 3-inch AA guns to height fmders to

sound locators Ammunition was the most conspicuous shortage. The 2nd and 4th Defense

Battalions could have achieved combat readiness within one month's time if only the

necessary ammunition was "made available " Combat readiness would have also meant

depriving other units of their experienced officers and NCOs"

To be combat ready, a defense battalion required 22.5 units of fire. According to one prewar estimate for 3-inch AA guns, 22.5 umts of fire translated into 75,000 rounds shared

among twelve guns. This amount would last approximately four months in time of war In

actuality, a single defense battalions' "on hand" ammumtion averaged 1 5units of fire Or,

in terms of time, a single defense battalion could fight about ten days before running out of

ammunition

No relief could have been obtained from other military services. As of May 1941, the

Navy's inventory of 3-inch AA ammunition "on hand" was approximately 13 units of fire

The Army's inventory "on hand" included 42 units of fife. Army and Navy stockpiles

combined for 55 units of fire. Thus, bringing a single defense battalion up to 1h11 combat

readiness depleted forty percent of the military's 3-inch A A. ammumtion Manne defense

battalions hardly had adequate ammunition with which to practice, let alone fight a battle

Little hope was in sight with May's "production of about 20,000 rounds per month

reaching 100,000 a month by end of year."38

Members of the 7th Defense Battalion verify the Corps' poor state of readiness. This unit's

veterans paint an abysmal picture of the western Pacific island of Samoa. Veterans

described theft level of readiness as "very low," "ragged," and "lousy." Worse still, the

unit was spread too thinly to be able to adequately protect Samoa, a large island

Deficiencies in weapons and ammunition contributed to the 7th' s pathetic state Artillery

included reconditioned 6-inch guns and World War I-vintage Lewis guns These "archaic"

and "obsolete" weapons were "the Army and Navy's cast offs." Neither radar nor weapon

cleaning equipment existed?9

Both quality and quantity of ammunition contributed to the 7th's lack of readiness

Marines did not trust theft ammunition because of its "unpredictable quality." For some

weapons, the 7th only possessed 1000 rounds or enough for 72 hours of combat. Edward

T. Peniston, an enlisted man m the 7th, recalled that his irnit was not capable of any

sustained defense against a detemiined assault in 1941 40

Although many problems existed, at least two areas within the Corps were encouragmg.

First, "morale was excellent." When questioned about the effect of low manpower and old

equipment on the 7th' s morale, Harold M Benscoter said "Hell, we were Marines" Other

veterans concurred that they took "pride in surviving insurmountable odds." Sharing the

shortages of material and the hardships of boot camp actually raised theft level of morale

and esprit de corps4'

Early in 1941, Congress appropriated $15 million to purchase land at New River in North

Carolina This new 24,000-acre base provided the necessary space to house and train the

thousands of recruits expected in the coming months. The FMF used New River for its

offensive and defensive exercises. Marines practiced assaulting the beaches with Naval

35
gunfire and close air support They tested landing craft On the defensive side, base

defense tactics also improved. Marine gunners operated all types of AA and anti-ship

artillery. New River was ideal because use of live ammunition did not endanger civilians

or property Thus, this instillation simultaneously accommodated amphibious assault and

base defense. New River's training facilities enabled the Corps' to train up to 2,500 new

recruits per month. Still, fiscal setbacks continued to plague the Corps as Congress slowly

appropriated the money to construct the facilities.42

BARBAROSSA'S RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE CORPS

On 22 June 1941, Adolf Hitler surprised the world by launching BARBAROSSA, the

attack on the Soviet Timon. Nazi Gemiany sortied an enormous force. more than 150

divisions with more than three million Axis soldiers along a one thousand mile front.

During the summer and fall of 1941, the German army raced across Western Russia and

recreated its blitzkrieg of 1939 The initial German victories devastated the Soviet Army

The Russo-German conflict had positive and negative effects on America and Britain. On

one hand, it eased the pressure in Western Europe. Because Germany focused so many of

its resources against the Soviet Union, England gained valuable breathing room.

Conversely, BARBAROSSA allowed also Japan freer movement on the Asian continent.

Large segments of the Soviet Army were moved from their positions in Siberia to meet the

German threat. These forces had previously detened further Japanese expansion on the

Asia continent. Japan faced a choice: either continue its uninhibited advance in China or

turn south toward South East Asia. If Japan had chosen to continue its northern advance in

China and Siberia, then the Western Allied forces would have gained some time. Instead,

Japan chose a southward advance, which brought an immediate confrontation with

America and England43

President Roosevelt reacted to Japan' s aggression m China by freezing Japanese assets in

America He hoped this action would discourage further movement into South East Asia,

but Roosevelt's action imtiated a de facto embargo on American oil exports to Japan. Far

from discouraging any further advances, Japanese expansion surged forward at a greater

pace A thirst for natural resources increased as its reserves dwindled.M

RAINBOW 5 took effect because of the serious shift in the Far East. On 21 July 1941,

CNO Stark distributed copies of the "U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan- Rainbow Five

(Navy O-1, Rambow Five)." This plan's "Estimate of Enemy Action" speculated that

Japan would initially capture Malaysia and the Philippines, thus disrupting Allied

communication and supply lines Meanwhile, a Japanese offensive against China would be

sustained but at a lower level of mtensity. Finally, the Japanese Navy would destroy Allied

forces.

Among other specific details, RAINBOW 5 assumed that the Japanese military would

attempt to insulate itself behind a network of fortified island bases including Guam, Wake,

Midway, Samoa, and others. This assumption further justified Corps' dual mission. By

placing defense battalions on these Western Pacific islands in harm's way, RAINBOW 5

validated America's need for advanced base defense. To bolster the number of defense

battalions, Naval planners even laid plans for the U S Army to train and deploy its own

version of defense battalions.45

36
Like ABC-1 and Plan DOG, RAINBOW 5 called for a concentrated offensive against the

German and Italian forces in Europe In the Pacific, American forces would employ a

strategic defense with limited tactical offensive operations The Pacific strategy entailed

containing Japanese expansion and mamtaimng supply lines to the Far East and

Australia46 Whether in the ORANGE, RAINBOWS 1 through 4, DOG, or ABC-1 plans,

the Manne Corps' dual mission changed very little even though America's war plans

changed significantly The FMF continued to be the amphibious assault and base defense

arms of the Pacific Fleet Both parts of the dual mission served important strategic

purposes: defense complemented offense

"ARE WE READYIll"

The answer to the September 1941 report "Are We ReadyIll" was negative In early

June, Commandant Holcomb had reported the Corps' most "critical deficiencies" to CNO

Stark These included every conceivable weapon from Ml Garands to 155 mm howitzers,

tanks to aircraft. As for ammunition, Holcomb did not quote specific numbers or types; he

bluntly wrote that "shortage exists for all the above weapons "In addition, the Corps

lacked a full quota of "all major items of fire control equipment and accessories "The

essential instruments included altimeters, height finders, observation telescopes, aiming

circles, automatic gun control equipment, data transformation systems, flank spotters, and

directors for both 3-inch and 37 mm AA guns 48

By the end of summer in 1941, some progress toward readiness apparently had been made.

Personnel shortages saw sigmflcant improvements The Corps rose to an active strength of

56,000 officers and men. Congress appropriated and President Roosevelt approved funds

to bring this figure to 75,000 by 31 March 1942. With subsequent authorization by the

Congress and the President, the "Are We Ready - III" report expected the Corps' strength

to reach 104,000 by 31 March 1942 mcludmg 62,000 Marines assigned to the FMF. Six

new defense battalions and a 3rd Marine Division were planned.49

During the summer and fall of 1941, the Corps experienced net gains of 2,500 recruits per

month and 1000 newly commissioned officers per year. These numbers supported

manpower projections for 75,000 Marines by the end of March 1942. While the Corps

expenenced increases in absolute terms, its expanding duties greatly exceeded its 1941

strength of 56,000 Marines in relative terms?

Limited manpower was not the Corps' only inadequacy. Supplies of equipment and

weapons saw little improvement The FMF boasted no more than 10 units of fire for any

particular weapon. Most units like the ist, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Defense Battalions averaged

only 3 or 4 units of fire. Shortages in .50-caliber ammunition were especially grievous. In

holding an island, 50-caliber machine guns performed two vital functions as anti-aircraft

and beach defense weapons. The "Are We Ready - III" report of September 1941

confidently predicted that the "situation in regard to Weapons and Ammunition of the

defense battalions in the Pacific area will approach a reasonably satisfactory condition by

i January 1942." The confidence proved to be in yam

Full combat readiness remained further from being a reality than a few months and a few

units of fire. Any suspicion that requirements were exaggerated should be viewed in light

of the Corps' starvation-level of supplies. Chronic shortages had troubled the Corps for

37
more than two decades When requesting fùnds for men and equipment, Holcomb always

tried to honestly present his budget. As seen before, his reputation for requesting only

necessities often gained Congressional favor.52

EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE BATTALION'S SIGNIFICANCE

Because defense battalions absorbed men and equipment, it is believed that these units

negatively affected the Corps' overall readiness Accordmg to eminent Marine Corps

historian Allan R Millett, the defense battalion was the product of "military faddists"

These units as well as aviation units depleted the Corps of its "most mtelligent recruits."

As a result, the FMF's amphibious assault units "would have to do with few skilled

officers and noncommissioned officers "To Millett, this drain on manpower by special

units like the defense and raider battalions became more "onerous" after the United States

entered the war.53

However, Millett's "onerous" label does not apply to defense battalions prior to the attack

on Pearl Harbor. While amphibious assault had a higher priority, advanced base defense

also played an absolutely essential role in America's Pacific strategy. RAINBOW 5

anticipated a standoff in the Pacific and highlighted the importance of base defense.

Therefore, the fact that so many Marines were assigned to defense battalions ultimately

testified to these units' significance

A few Marines also assert that serving in defense battalions hurt individual careers. Their

assertions are over-generalizations. Before Pearl Harbor, most Marines did not connect

slow promotions with their service in the defense battalions The demand for officers and

senior NCOs was so great during the pre-war expansion that almost anyone could quickly

rise in rank. Admittedly, defense battalions saw lift le action when compared to amphibious

assault forces after America entered the war. A command at Midway in 1944 might have

been a dead end. However, this did not imply that a Manne's career would be hurt by a

tour of duty with a defense battalion, especially in 1941. Individuals held a number of

assignments throughout their careers, any of which could help or hurt a career If service

in defense battalions truly did hurt careers, more evidence would exist in the sources.54

Herem lies compelling evidence for the significance of defense battalions These units

drew a large number of qualified Marines because of the advanced base defense's vital

strategic mission. In December 1941, 5,265 Marines served in the six defense battalions.

This figure amounted to twenty percent of the 26,560 Marines in the entire FMF. Serving

in a base defense unit required specialized mathematical skills for radar operation, AA

direction, and coastal artillery direction. Not every Marine possessed these skills Thus,

defense battalions might be considered "elite" umts." If the defense battalion had been a

mere fad, then it would not have drawn such qualified Marines.

Manpower distribution offers more evidence for base defense's importance. A defense

battalion required a CO of colonel's rank. Commandant Holcomb justified this

requirement in the following: "The fire power of a defense battalion is greater than that of

an Anny AA regiment, and, in personnel and weapons, compares favorably with a light

cruiser." In addition, a tour with the defense battalion offered a potentially independent

command, a opportunity which every Marines desired Such high ranking officers as

Colonels were in great demand elsewhere.56 Once again, if the defense battalion hadbeen

38
a fad, then it would have neither warranted nor attracted colonels as CUs. Therefore, the

quality and rank of the Marines within the units further testified to the defense battalions'

sigmficance.

LACK OF READINESS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1941

During the latter half of 1941, publicity remained positive and effective. Holcomb

continued to promote the Corps wherever and whenever possible. Although recruitment

declined slightly m October, the Officer's Candidate School churned out many qualified,

albeit inexperienced, Marine officers. Likewise, the Corps stayed on a time table to reach

its 75,000 plateau by the end of March 1941. This was only a small comfort because the

international situation grew increasingly threatening.57

As November 1941 passed, mcessant equipment shortages and sluggish equipment

distribution plagued the Corps and its defense battalions. A CINCPAC report titled "Study

on Defenses and Installations at Outlymg Pacific Bases" updated the developments on

Wake, Midway, Palniyra, and Johnston islands. All these advance bases urgently needed

more 50-caliber machine guns for anti-aircraft defense and .30-caliber machine guns for

beach defense. In Wake Island's case, eighteen .50-caliber guns comprised its "present

actual armament" This amounted to only thiry percent of Wake's allotment of sixty 50-

caliber guns, CINCPAC's recommended number "required for a reasonable defense under

our assumptions."58

On numerous occasions, Admiral Kimmel pleaded with CNO Stark for support "I do not

think that the few machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other

activities and I hope that the ammumtion situation will be remedied very shortly." In a

similar letter, Kimmel lamented that "it is practically certain that these umts will fight

before the Army will and their needs must be given pnority." Despite such high level

patronage, Wake's Defense Battalion was not given priority quickly enough. Independent

sources in the Corps confirm these and other deficiencies on Wake.59

The "Study on Defenses" detailed mucÑ more than current state of readmess. It also

underscored the significance of advanced bases to America's Pacific strategy, a postulate

dating back to the Spanish-American War. The study acknowledged that an attack on

Wake was a foregone conclusion Naval strategists expected that the Japanese Navy would

attempt to capture and convert Wake into their own advanced base. The ist Defense

Battalion's primary objective was holdmg the island. If its holding action proved

impracticable, then the secondary objective became the slowing of a Japanese advance.

Simultaneously, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be sortied to fight the Japanese and relieve

Wake. Clearly, possessing Wake Island was a zero-sum game.6°

The situation in the Far East steadily deteriorated as the Japanese moved to open conflict

with the United States. The distant rumblings of war grew more immediate to the Corps'

lower ranks. Captain James Devereux, CO of the ist Defense Battalion on Wake, received

an "Ultra Top Secret" communication which bluntly warned that the "international

situation indicates you should be on alert " Despite this foreboding message, Devereux

received no reliable intelligence on an attack. The attack on Pearl Harbor provided the

biggest warning.6'

39
During the final days preceding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel

attempted in vain to get more troops, weapons, and equipment to Midway and Wake. A

few obsolete Brewster Buffalos were delivered to the bases. Kinunel even requested that

the Army dispatch troops to support the Marines already on the island bases. His

assistance proved to be too little and too late. By the time Wake's reinforcements were

scheduled to arrive, the war had started.62

Woodrow Kessler, a Marine stationed with the 1st Defense on Wake, speculated that his

unit's pathetic state of readiness resulted not from any lack of imagmation, intelligence, or

foresight on the part of the military but rather from the uncertainties of the appropriations

from a pacifist-oriented society and Congress.63

Kessler blamed the American public and civilian leadership for the military's lack of

preparedness Most Americans probably could not conceive that Japan was actually

capable or daring enough to sail several thousand miles across the Pacific to attack Pearl

Harbor While the isolationist feelings and indecisive policies shared some blame, fault

also rested with the military and its logistic system. The Army and Navy failed to

coordinate a timely transfer of equipment to the defense battalions on the Western Pacific

islands. Furthermore, unity of command within the Navy should have averted some

problems of logistics and communication. However, the problems occurred just the

same 64

CONCLUSION

The failure to adequately supply the defense battalions and the rest of the Corps did not

result from a lack of effort by Commandant Thomas Holcomb. The Corps controlled too

few resources and encountered too many challenges. Disputes among services or

individuals undoubtedly contributed to a low level of readiness. Maybe the sluggish

wheels of bureaucracy turned too slowly. Both these factors played roles. Most obviously,

in exanñiiing the Corps' "on order" requisitions and "on hand" inventories, sufficient

equipment simply did not exist in late 1941. None of the armed services boasted anything

close to full combat readiness. In a memorandum for President Roosevelt dated 27

November 1941, COS Marshall and CNO Stark wrote that "the most essential thing now

from the United States' viewpoint is to gain time." As became horribly evident two weeks

later, time was not a luxury that America enjoyed.65

40
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

In examining Commandant Thomas Holcomb and the development of defense battalions,

this thesis accomplishes two objectives First, it traces the development of advanced base

defense from its inception at the turn of the century to its advent with the defense battalion

m 1939. Much more than a fad,' base defense constituted the Corps's mam mission before

World War I. During the 1920s and 1930s, amphibious assault shared the top prionty with

base defense. Fmally, as war erupted in 1939, amphibious assault gradually supplanted

base defense as the Corps' s premier mission. Yet, this shift in priorities did not

marginalize the defense battalion Defendmg outlymg bases continued to play a vital role

in Navy strategy and Marine publicity until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

When war came, 400 leathernecks on Wake proved that a defense battalion was also

tactically viable The ist Defense Battalion' s "tough fighters" held Wake in a spirited, if

futile, baule. The Marines repelled an amphibious assault and sank two Japanese

destroyers before surrendering with no hope of relief The stubborn defense of Wake has

since become part of Marine lore. It inspired the defense battalion's motto, "Send us more

Japs "2 Later m the war, the umts' names were changed to Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)

Battalion. The updated versions of the base defense force secured beachheads from

counterattack and protected the amphibious assault forces from enemy aircraft.

Second, this thesis establishes Commandant Thomas Holcomb as the Marine most

responsible for the Corps's expansion before World War II. Despite all the obstacles

facing the Corps, Holcomb did everything within his power to raise the readiness of

defense battalions and the Corps He excelled as a publicist, strategist, and manager.

Defense battalions influenced Holcomb's actions in all three areas. Defensive vocabulary

appeased America's isolationist tendencies; Naval strategy in the Pacific demanded

defense battalions complicated the Corps's attempts to obtain and distribute resources

Holcomb guided the Manne Corps's massive expansion from just over 17,000 Marines in

1936 to nearly 65,000 in late November 1941 and nearly 300,000 when he retired at the

end of 1943 Beyond his involvement with defense battalions, he also supervised the

development of amphibious assault forces. From Washington, Holcomb coordmated

America' s counter-offensive across the Pacific. Perhaps military historian John W.

Gordon pays the most eloquent tribute to Thomas Holcomb in the followingS

In terms of personality, style, and even intellectual equipment, Holcomb seems to

have been not unlike George C. Marshall .. . Holcomb was a sort of 'mimMarshall,' juggling far tinier resources but coping with the vaster geographic

sweep of the war in the Pacific. He was, for the Marine Corps, very much its 'true

"organizer of victory."3

However, neither the defense battalion' s importance nor Holcomb' s diligence could bring

the Corps to full combat readmess by December 1941. The military was unable to match

strategic objectives like defending island outposts with tactical necessities like equipping

the defenders. Japan's initial advantage lasted only a short time until the America

recovered. Dunng World War II, the Marine Corps's amphibious assault capabilities

eventually supplanted base defense in the final defeat of Japan.

41
APPENDIX I

COMMANDANTS OF THE MARINE CORPS 1891-1 947

Source: Millett, Semper, 653.

42

Charles Heywood 1891-1903

George F. Elliot 1903-1910

William P Biddle 1911-1914

George Barnett 1914-1920

John A. Lejeune 1920-1929

Wendell C. Neville 1929-1934

Ben H. Fuller 1934-1936

Thomas Holeomb 1936-1943

xander A. Vandegrift 1944-1947
APPENDJX2

STRENGTH OF THE MARINE CORPS 1895-1945

YEAR OFFICERS MEN

43

1895 76 2,100

1898 116 4,700

1900 187 5,520

1910 334 9,267

1916 341 10,056

1918 2,462 72,639

1920 962 16,085

1926 1,177 17,976

1936 1,199 16,040

1940 1,556 26,369

1943 21,938 287,621

1945 37,664 447,389

Source: Milieu, Semper, 654.
APPENDIX 3

EXPENDITURES BY THE MARINE CORPS, 1933-1943

Sources: Navy Department, Naval Expenditures, 1933-1943, "Statement 1," Summary of

Naval Activities; Historical Abstracts of the United States; and Statistical Abstracts of the

United States (1991)

44

YEAR AMOUNT

(in thousands of

then-year dollars)

AMOUNT

(in thousands of

1990 dollars)

PERCENTAGE OF

TOTAL NAVAL

EXPENDITURE

1933 19,007 191,989 4.4

1934 15,358 150,568 3.8

1935 19,079 181;7o4 33

1936 21,170 199717 4.0

1937 22,276 202,509 4.1

1938 23,253 215,306 40

1939 24,572 231,811 3.7

1940 33,189 310,177 37

1941 67,743 599,495 3.0

1942 242,364 1,938,112 2.8

1943 493,144 3,680,179 24
APPENDIX 4

RAINBOW PLANS

RAINBOW i A unilateral defense of the Americas above the latitude 10 degrees south

RATNBOW 2 A war in the western Pacific in association with Britain and France, the

United States exerting its maximum effort in this theater and not in Europe

RAINBOW 3 A unilateral war in the western Pacific

RAINBOW 4 A unilateral defense of the Americans extended to include the area below

10 degrees south latitude and the eastern Atlantic

RAINBOW 5 A war in Europe in association with Britain and France, whereby United

States forces would be sent to the eastern Atlantic and to Europe and!or

Africa "in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or

both"

Source. Major, ibid , 246.

45
* Quantico, Parñs Island, San Diego, Camp Elliot, New River

** 4th MAR (Philippines), 801; 1 SepBn (Philippines), 725; ist MarBrig(Prov) (Iceland),

3,972.

Source: Rough, ibid., 56.

46

APPENDIX 5

MARINE DISTRIBUTION EFFECTIVE 30 NOVEMBER 1941

Continental U.S (non-FMF)

* Major Marine Corps Bases 14,707

Posts and Stations (43) 10,089

Headquarters and Staff 780

Recruiting (4 Districts) Mi

Total 26,423 41 %

Overseas (non-FMF)

Posts and Stations (24) 3,367

Tactical Units ' 5,498

Shipboard Detachments 3,793

Total 12,658 18 %

FMF, Continental U.S

ist MarDiv 8,918

2d MarDiv (less dets) 7,540

2dDefBn 865

istMAW 1,301

2dMAW 682

Misc.

Total 19,939 31 %

FMF, Overseas

5 Defbns (Pacific) 4,399

2d MAW (elements) (Pacific) 733

2d MarDiv (elements) (Pacific) 489

Total 5,62i 9%

GRAND TOTAL 64,641
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IvL4 Mzlztaiy Affairs

USNIP: United States Naval Institute Proceedings

JMH. Journal ofMthtary Histoty

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MiLlett, Allan R "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A

Historical Perspective." Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy

Sciences 4 (April 1979): 1-71.

Morton, Louif "Interservice Co-operation and Political- Military Collaboration " In Total

War and Cold War. ed. Harry L. Coles. Columbus: OSUP, 1962

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American Naval History, 1775-1984. ed. Kenneth J. Hagan Westport, CN:

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26.

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Chiefs ofNaval Operations. ed. Robert W. Love, Jr. Annapolis: Naval

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Military Effectiveness Volume II The Inter-war Period, ed. Allan R. Millett

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Walter, John C. "Congressman Carl Vinson and Franklin D. Roosevelt: Naval

Preparedness and the Coming of World War II, 1939-1940 " Georgia

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Weigley, Russell F. "The Interwar Army, 1919-1941." In Military Effectiveness Volume

II. The Interwar Period, ed. Allan R Millet and Williamson Murray. Boston:

Allen, 1988.

54
PUBLISHED BOOKS

Baer, George W One Hundred Years ofSea Power The US Navy, 1890-1900. Stanfor&

Stanford UP, 1994.

Barlett, Merriji. Lejeune A Marine 's Life, 1867-1942. Columbia: University of South

Carolina Press, 1991.

Braisted, William Reynolds The United States Navy in the PacifIc, 1909-1922. Austin

University of Texas Press, 1971

Brune, Lester H. The Origins ofAmerican National Security Policy Sea Power, Air

Power, and Foreign Policy. Manhattan, KS MAIHA, 1981.

Cameron, Craig M. American Samurar Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct ofBattle in

the First Marine Division, 1941-1951 Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.

Cressman, Robert J "A Magnificent Fight "The Battle for Wake Island. Annapolis Naval

Institute, 1995.

Donovan, James A., Jr. The United States Marine Corps New York: Praeger, 1967

Doubler, Michael D Closing with the Enemy How GIs Fought the War in

Europe, 1944-1945. Lawrence University Press of Kansas, 1994.

Geellioed, E Bruce. Charles E. Wilson and the Con troversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to

1957. Detroit Wayne State University, 1979.

Hagan, Kenneth J. This People 's Navy The Making ofAmerican Seapower New York.

Free Press, 1991.

Hemi, Robert Debs, Jr. Soldiers of the Sea The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962.

Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations. Cambridge: Beiknap, 1957.

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and Its Practice in the PacifIc. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1951

Keegan, John. The Face ofBattle. New York: Penguin, 1978.

Lmdsey, Robert. This High Name Public Relations and the US Marine Corps. Madison.

University of Wisconsin Press, 1956.

Love, Robert W., Jr. History of the U S Navy. 2 Vols. Harrisburg, PA. Stackpole, 1992.

55
Metcalf, Clyde H. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New York G.P Putham,

1939

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. The U S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945.

Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1991.

Millett, Allan R. Semper Fidelis The History of the United States Marine Corps. Rev, ed

New Yorlc Macmillan, 1991

In Many a Strfe General Gerald C Thomas and the US Marine Corps,

191 7-1956. Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute, 1993.

Monson, Samuel Elliot The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931-April 1942 Boston:

Houghton-Miffim, 1948

Moskin, J. Robert. The u s. Marine Corps Story Rev, ed. New York: McGraw-Hill,

1987

Preston, Richard A, et.al. Men at Arms A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships

with Western Society 5th ed. Fort Worth. Holt, 1991

Sherrod, Robert. History ofMarine Corps Avation in World War IL Washington,

Combined Force Press, 1952.

Shulimson, Jack The Marine Corps ' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898. Lawrence:

University of Kansas Press, 1993.

Simmons, Edwin H. The United States Marines Their First Two HundredYears, 1775-

1975. New York: Viking, 1976.

Smith, Kevin E. Conflict over Convoys Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in World

War Two. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun. New York Free Press, 1985.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War A History of United States Military

Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973; Bloomington: TUP, 1977.

Zimmerman, Phyllis A. The Neck ofthe Bottle George W Goethals and the

Reorganization of the US Army Supply System, 1917-1918. College Station:

TexasA&MUP, 1992.

UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

Costello, Daniel Joseph. "Planning for War. A History of the General Board of the Navy,

1900-1914." Ph D diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968.

56
Dwan, John Edward, II "Franklin Roosevelt and the Revolution in the Strategy of

National Security. Foreign Policy and Military Planning Before Pearl Harbor"

Ph D diss, Yale University, 1954

Enders, Calvin William. "The Vmson Navy." Ph D diss , Michigan State Umversity,

1970.

(}reenwald, Bryon W "The Development of Antiaircraft Artillery Organization, Doctrine,

and Technology in the United States Army, 1919-1941 "M.A thesis, Ohio

State University, 1991.

Infuisio, Frank J. "The U. S. Marines and War Planning, 1900-1941." M.A. thesis, San

Diego State Umversity, 1974

Kajiwara, Naoki. "The U S Marine Corps and the Defense of Advanced Bases. Evolution

of Tactics and Organizations, 1900-1941 "unpublished manuscript, 20 August

1994.

Lancirum, Susan. "Carl Vmson A Study in Military Preparedness." M.A thesis, Emory

University, 1966

Prefer, Nathan N. "An Uncertain MissionS The Role of the U.S. Marine Corps m National

Defense, 1880-1947." Ph D diss., City University of New York, 1985

57
NOTES

INTRODUCTION NOTES

1. Richard A. Preston, et.aL, Men at Arms- A History of Warfare and its

Interrelationships with Western Society, 5th ed. (Fort Worth. Holt, 1991), 5

2 See Richard Koim, "The Social History of the American Soldier. A Review and

Prospectus for Research," American Historical Review 86 (June 1981): 553-567, John

Whiteclay Chambers, TI, "The New Military History Myth and Reality," Journal of

Military History 55 (July 1991): 395-406; Peter Paret, "The New Military History"

Parameters 21 (Autumn 1991): 10-8; John Shy, "The Cultural Approach to the

History of War," The Journal ofMilitary History 57 (October 1993): 13-26.

3. For the now-classic example of "new" military history, see John Keegan, The Face of

Battle (New York: Pengum, 1978). For other more recent works, see Craig M.

Cameron, American Samurai- Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the

First Marine Division, 1941-1951 (Cambridge: Cambndge UP, 1994); and, Michael

D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy. How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944 1945

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994).

4. Fred Greene, "The Military View of American National Policy: 1904-1940"

American Historical Review 66 (January 1961)- 354-77; E. Bruce Geethoed, Charles

E. Wilson and the Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit: Wayne State

University, 1979); Mark A. Stoler, "The 'Pacific-First' Alternative m American

World War II Strategy" International History Review 11 (July 1980) 432-52.

5. Phyllis A Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle George W Goethals and the

Reorganization of the US Army Supply System, 1917-1918 (College Station- Texas A

& M UP, 1992); Kevin Smith, Conflict over Convoys- Anglo-American Logistics

Diplomacy in World War Two (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).

6. Allan R Millet and Williamson Murray, ed., Military Effectiveness, 3 volumes,

(Boston: Allen, 1988). For the most part, my thesis is in this genre of studying the

peace between wars.

7. Charles D. Melson, Condition Red. Marine Defense Battalions in World War II

(Washington Marine Corps Historical Center, 1996). I am also indebted to Mr.

Melson for allowing me to see an early draft of his monograph. It is noteworthy that

the vast majority of Melson's work deals with defense battalions during World War

II The several pages dealing with pre-Worid War II development bolster my thesis'

argument.

8. John W. Gordon, "General Thomas Holcomb and 'The Golden Age of Amphibious

Warfare" Delaware History 21 (September 1985): 256-70. Gordon has a chapter on

Holcomb forthcoming in an anthology on Marine Corps Commandants to be edited

58
by Allan R Millett and published by Naval Institute Press. I was not able to gain

access to this forthcoming work.

9 In his article titled "The New Military History," Peter Paret raises another criticism of

this genre: "Official history is written to provide a record, to fix the past firmly in our

consciousness, but often also to lay bare the lessons for today and tomorrow that the

past is thought to offer." Criticism and second-guessing with benefit of hindsight is

not necessarily the task of historians. Accordmg to Paret, "this utilitarian spirit, the

belief in relevance, seems to be more pronounced in official histories" (Paret, ibid,

12)

10 Allan R Millett, Semper Fidelis The History of the Marine Corps, rev ed (New

York: Free Press, 1991), 346.

11 For other works that also emphasize amphibious warfare, see Holland M. Smith, The

Development of Amphibious Tactics in the US Navy, reprint (Washington USMC,

1982); JoIm H. Russell, "The Birth of the FMF" USNIP 72 (January 1946) 49-51,

Jeter A Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The US Marine Corps andAmphibious Warfare

Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1951); Frank O.

Hough, et.al., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, vol 1, History of the U S. Marines in

World War I (Washington: USMC, 1958), Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and

Purpose A Developmental History of the US Marine Corps (Washington, DC

USMC, 1973); Edwin H. Simmons, The United States Marines Their First Two

Hundred Years, 1 775-1975 (New Yorlc Viking, 1976); and J Robert Moskin, The

US. Marine Corps Story, rev, ed. (New York. McGraw-Hill, 1987). For a purely

narrative history of defense battalions, see Charles L Updegraph, Jr., US Marine

Corps Special Units of World War II (Washington: USMC, 1977), 61-73. This

chapter does not do justice to the overall significance of the defense battalion.

Because Updegraph lumps this unit in with balloon battalions, parachute battalions,

and raider battalions, his work perhaps contributes to the notion that defense

battalions were fads.

In addition to Melson's monograph, see Nathan N. Prefer, "An Uncertain Mission

The Role of the U.S. Marine Corps in National Defense, 1880-1947" (Ph D diss.,

City University of New York, 1985), 68; and Cameron, ibid., 35-7. I use Prefer and

Cameron's data and arguments to justify my claim that defense battalions were much

more than mere fads.

Much of the material from National Archives remained classified until my research

visits during spring 1995. Some of the most valuable mformation was found in

correspondence, reports, and inventories. The survey's questionnaires provided both

factual and anecdotal elements primarily from enlisted Marines' perspectives. These

responses added a human element to my thesis.

For example, Frank J. Infuisino, Jr., "The United States Marine Corps and War

Planning (1900-1941)," (M.A. thesis, California State University, San Diego, 1973).

In part, Infiasino narrates the development base defense and seizure. His thesis agrees

59
with much of my thesis' argument but lacks the recently declassified material found

in my research Naoki Kajiwara, "The U.S Marine Corps and the Defense of

Advanced Bases: The Evolution of Tactics and Organizations, 1900-1941,"

(Unpublished manuscript, 20 August 1994). Kajiwara places base defense in a

strategic context and traces the evolution of unit-level tactics and organization of base

defense. But, he does not deal with base defense's institutional significance in the

Corps' relationship with the Navy, Congress, and the American public. Both InThsino

and Kajiwara were invaluable. Graham A. Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, "Continuity

and Consensus: The Evolution of the Marine Advance Base Force, 1900-1922," in

Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, ed. David H. White

and John W. Gordon (Charleston, SC Citadel, 1977). Cosmas and Shulimson

examine the history of the advanced base force While this article is helpful until the

Washington Naval Treaty, my research contends that base defense remained very

important after 1922.

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

The advanced base force had been called a number of names over the decades of its

development. These included advance base brigade, advanced base defense

regiments, base defense forces, defense detachments, and fmally defense battalions.

W. H- Russell, "Genesis of the FMF Doctrine," MCG 39 (November 1955): 16-7;

Millett, Semper, 272; Hough, ibid., 7.

George Dewey, General Board Report No. 51, 6 October 1900, Archives Branch,

Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University

Dion Williams, "The Defense of Our New Naval Stations" USNIP 28 (June 1902):

182-3, Frank H. Schofield and E. H. Ellis, "Report of Naval War College Committee

on Defense of Guam," 14April1913, General Board Subject File (GBSF) 1900-1947,

GB 422, Box 120, Record Group (RG) 80, National Archives (NA) Secondary

literature also acknowledges Guam' s importance in strategy; for example see Louis

Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," MCG 41 (August 1957): 36-43; Daniel Joseph

Costello, 'Planning for War: A History of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-

1914" (Ph D diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968), 167-72, 221-4;

William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacflc, 1909-1 922

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971): 33, 441-52.

For Mahan's Naval strategy, see his major works: The Influence of Sea Power upon

History (Boston, Little: 1890) and Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812, 2

vols. (reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969) For an overview of Mahan, see

Phillip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," Makers of Modern

Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton. Princeton

UP, 1986), 444-80. For an excellent commentary applying Mahaman principles to the

first half of the twentieth century, see Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War

60
A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: MacMillan,

1973; Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1977).

6. Williams, ibid., 182-3.

7 Williams, ibid, 187-90; C Martin, "The Selection and Defense of Naval Bases"

Journal of the United States Artillery 35 (January-February 1911): 2, 6.

8 Naoki Kajiwara, "The U. S Marine Corps and the Defense of Advanced Bases The

Evolution of Tactics and Orgamzations, 1900-1941," (Unpublished manuscnpt, 20

August 1994), 2-3; and Cosmas, "Continuity," 31-3

9 President, General Board (PGB), to Secretary of the Navy (SecNav), "Duties of

Marines and their connection with Advanced Base Outfits," July 21, 1913, GBSF

1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80, NA. See also Millett, Semper, 271-81;

Infusino, ibid., 34-7, R. D. Heini, "The Cat with More than Nine Lives" USNIP 80

(June 1954), 656-71.

George Barnett, memo for SecNav, 8 December 1914, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432,

Box 163, RG 80, NA; Graham A Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, "The Culebra

Maneuver and the Formation of the U.S. Manne Corps' Advance Base Force, 1913-

1914," in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History, ed. Robert

William Love Jr. (New York: Garland, 1980), 293, 299-306, Melson, ibid., 2

Schofield, ibid., 1-3, 9-15. This report was laced with racist remarks about the

Japanese (pp 1-2).

PGB to SecNav, 26 February 1913 op. cited in Costello, 223; A. W. Hinds, "The

Island of Guam as a Naval Base" USNIP 41 (May 1915). 449-55, Robert William

Neeser, Our Navy in the Next War (New York: Scribner, 1915), 163-5

Eli K. Cole, lecture delivered at the Marine Corps Barracks in Philadelphia, PA, 19

June 1915, pp 1-6, File 1975-10, Adjutant and Inspector's Office General

Correspondence (A&I) 1913-1932, Box 234, RG 127, NA.

George Bamett, memo for SecNav, December 8, 1914, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432,

Box 163, RG 80, NA; John A Lejeune, lecture, "Defense of Advanced Bases by

Mobile Forces," 21 May 1915, File 1975-10, A&I, 1913-1932, Box 234, RG 127,

NA; Millett, Semper, 284.

15 Gibson B. Smith, Thomas Holcomb, 1879-1965, Register of His Personal Papers

(Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1988), 1-2; Cameron, ibid.,

22-5; Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun. The American War with Japan (New

York: Free Press, 1985), 24; Prefer, 110-4. For a general overview, see Millett,

Semper, 288-318.

16. Earl H. Ellis, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (1921; Washington: GPO,

1992), vi; Milieu, Semper, 218-9; Russell, "Genesis," 18.

61
17 Joint Board (IB) to Secretary of War (SecWar), "Strategy of the Pacific," 18

December 1919, op. cited in InThsino, ibid., 140-2, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

to MGC, "Function of the Marine Corps in War Plans," 28 January 1920, and memo

from CNO to MGC, January 28, 1920 op. cited in Infûsino, ibid, 152-3; GB to

SecNav, 10 August 1932, "Examination of the Organization and Establishment of the

United States Marine Corps," GBSF 1900-47, GB 432, Box 163, NA; Hough, ibid, 8

John A. Lejeune, "The Umted States Marine Corps, Present and Future" USNIP 54

(October 1928). 861; memoir of Russell N. Jordahl (1970), MCOHC, 13; C1yd J

Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G-P Putnam,

1939), 542-3, Millett, Semper, 322-8 For a recent biography, see Memil Barlett,

Lejeune- A Marine 's Lfe, 1867-1942 (Columbia- University of South Carolina Press,

1991).

Memoir of Samuel B Griffiths, 11(1968), MCOHC, 29; Ellis, Advanced, v-vi; A. A.

Vandegrifi and Robert B. Asprey, Once a Marine (New York: Norton, 1964), 61,

Hough, ibid., 8-10; Moskm, ibid., 459-61; Millett, Semper, 325-6, Russell, "Genesis,"

19-20; Infusino, ibid, 50-1, 78; Simmons, ibid., 125. Earl H Ellis has been a

mysterious and controversial figure in Marine Corps History. For the most recent

reading of his life, see Dirk Anthony Ballendorf, "Earl Hancock Ellis: A Final

Assessment," MCG 74 (November 1990) 79-87.

Earl H. Ellis, Navy Bases- Their Location, Resources, and Security (1921;

Washington: GPO, 1992), 3-6, 10-23, 30, 48.

Iibid,30,48.

Ellis, Advanced Base, 39-50.

J. M. Scammell, "Our Naval Bases m the Pacific" Infantry Journal 30 (January

1927): 19-29, see also George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power The US

Navy, 1890-1900 (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994), 91-9; Edward S. Miller, War Flan

Orange. The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 189 7-1945 (Annapolis Naval Institute,

1991), 83.

John A. Lejeune, "The United States Marine Corps," MCG 9 (May 1924): 250-3;

Rufus H. Lane, "The Mission and Doctrine of the Marine Corps," MCG 8 (March

1923): 6-7, 9; Ben H Fuller, "The Mission of the Marine Corps," MCG 15

(November 1930): 7; Raymond O'Connor, r. ïval Strategy in the Twentieth

Century," Naval War College Review 21 (February 1961): 4-10.

Lejeune, "United States," 250; Millen, Semper, 322-8; Baer, 91-2, Ronald Spector,

"The Military Effectiveness of the US Armed Forces, 1919-39," in Military

Effectiveness Volume I.!. The Interwar Period, ed Allan R Millet and Williamson

Murray (Boston: Allen, 1988), 86.

HQMC, memo for GB, Il February 1922, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG

80, NA; memoir of Russell N. Jordahl (1970), MCOHC, 13; Krulak, ibid., 142-3. For

62
secondary commentary, see Millett, Semper, 654, Greene, ibid., 360-1, Spector,

Eagle, 20-1; Kajiwara, ibid, 6-7; Calvin L. Christman, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the

Craft of Strategic Assessment," Calculations Net Assessment and the Coming of

World War II, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Free Press,

1992), 238; Millen, Semper, 320; Philip T. Rosen, "The Treaty Navy, 1919-1937," in

In Peace and War Interpretations of American Naval Histoty, 1775-1984, ed.

Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, CN Greenwood Press 1984).

Victor Krulak, First to Fight An Inside View of the US Marine Corps (Annapolis,

MD: Naval Institute, 1984), 142; memoir of Charles G. F. Good, Jr. (1970), Marine

Corps Oral Historical Center (MCOHC), 90; Russell, ibid., 17; Spector, Eagle, 25.

"Jomt Amiy and Navy Basic War PlanORANGE," 6 October 1920, op. cited in

Imfusino, ibid., 145.

Miller, ibid, 79. The secondary literature on ORANGE is voluminous For example

see, Millen, Semper, 320; Spector, Eagle, 56-7, Steven T. Ross, ed., Plans to Meet the

Axis Threat, 1939-1940, vol. 3, American War Plans (New York Garland, 1992), vu;

Lester H. Brune, The Origins of American National Security Policy Sea Power, Air

Power, and Foreign Policy (Manhattan, KS MA!HA, 1981), 110-8, Stoler, "PacificFirst," 433; Maurice Matloff and Edwin M Snell, United States Army in World War

II Strategy Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-2 (Washington OCMH, 1953), 1-

2, 6-9.

HQMC, memo for GB, 11 February 1922, GBSF 1900-47, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80,

NA; Brune, ibid, 108-9; Morison, ibid., 33.

Millett, Semper, 328, Weigley, American, 255.

E. W Broadbent, "The Fleet and the Marines," United States Naval Institute

Proceedings 57 (March 1931): 370; GB to Sec Nay, 10 August 1932, "Examination

of the Organization and Establishment of the United States Marine Corps," GBSF

1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80, NA.

Gordon, "Golden," 259; O'Connor, ibid., 8-9; Millett, Semper, 319; Kajiwara, ibid,

9; Robert Debs Heini Jr., Soldiers of the Sea. The United States Marine Corps, 1775-

1962 (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1962; Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1991),

3 00-2.

Heinl, Soldiers, 668-9; Huntington, Soldier, 291-3.

W C. Neville, "The Marine Corps," USNIP 55 (October 1929): 863; Jack Shulimson,

The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898 (Lawrence: University of

Kansas Press, 1993), 208-9.

Broadbent, ibid., 865-6; Allan R. Millett, In Many a Strife. Gerald C. Thomas and the

US Marine Corps, ¡917-1956 (Annapolis: Naval Institute. 1993), 98; Cooper, ibid.,

104-5. The Army also faced promotion problems during the lean twenties and thirties,

63
George Marshail advocated a shift to a merit-based program (Larry I Bland and

Sharon R. Ritenour, ed., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol 1, "The

Soldierly Spirit," December 1880-June 1939 [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981],

325-6, 348, 390-1, 480).

Broadbent, ibid., 369.

E B. Miller, "The Marine Corps. Its Mission, Organization, Power, and Lirmtation,"

MCG 17 (November 1932): 10-11; Prefer, ibid., 67-72.

39 O'Connor, ibid, 5-lo; Russell F Weigley, "The Interwar Army, 1919-1941," in

Militaì'y Effectiveness Volume II The Interwar Period, ed Allan R. Millett and

Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen, 1988), 265-6.

40 Broadbent, ibid., 369; Miller, ibid, 10-li, 18; H.C. Pierce, "The New 75-mm Pack

Howitzer," MCG 15 (March 1930): 3 1-2.

41 Christman, ibid., 224-5; Kenneth J. Hagan, This People 's Navy The Making of

American Seapower (New York: Free Press, 1991), 3 i4-5; and Robert William Love,

Jr., "Fighting a Global War, 1941-1945," in In Peace and War Interpretations of

American Naval Histoiy, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1984),

265; Spector, "Military," 87.

Baer, ibid., 120-3.

Dion Williams, "The Temporary Defense of a Fleet Base" MCG (February 1931): 12;

Robert Lindsey, This High Name- Public Relations and the US Marine Corps

(Madison: University of Wisconsm Press, 1956), 42-4.

44 Spector, "Military," 81; Greene, ibid., 355-77; See also Stetson Conn, "Changing

Concepts of National Defense in the Umted States, 1937-1947," MA 28 (Spring

1964): 1-7.

45. Vandegrift, ibid., 90; For the U.S. Army's situation, see Weigley, "Interwar." For a

specific explanation of the Monroe Doctrine from approximately the mid-1930s, see

F. B. Upshaw, "A Naval View of the Monroe Doctrine," n.d., GBSF 1900-1947, GB

433, Box 163, RG 80, NA.

46 George Fielding Eliot, The Ramparts We Watch- A Stua5.' of the Problems ofNational

Defense (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), 6-7, Hagan, ibid., 281.

47. Brune, ibid., 106. See also Spector, Eagle, 21-2; William Emerson, "Franldin

Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II" M1 22 (Winter 1958-9): i8i207; and John Edward Dwan, II, "Franldin Roosevelt and the Revolution in the

Strategy of National Security: Foreign Policy and Military Planning Before Pearl

Harbor." (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, i954), 8-ii, 128-30.

64
48. Susan Landrum, "Carl Vinson A Study in Military Preparedness" (M A. thesis,

IEmoiy University, 1966), 29, Lmdsey, ibid., 44.

49 There is a general consensus regardmg Roosevelt's popularity with the Navy and the

Corps Mark A. Stoler, "U. S. Civil-Military Relations in World War II," Parameters

21(1991) 61-9, Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military Consultation

in the Umted States," Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955). 175, Millett, Allan

R. Milieu, "The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military A

Historical Perspective," Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy Sciences 4

(April 1979) 23-26; George V Fagan, "FDR and Naval Limitations," USNIP 81

(April 1955): 414; Emerson, ibid., 181-3.

50 Memoir of Clifton B. Gates (1969), MCOHC, 97, Senator Phillip Lee Goldsborough

to Estell Smith Kepler, 3 February 1933, Juhan C Smith Papers, Manne Corps

Personal Papers Collection (MCPPC), Box 28, Marine Corps Historical Center

(MCHC). See also, John C. Walter, "Congressman Carl Vinson and Franklin D

Roosevelt: Naval Preparedness and the Coming of World War II, 1939-1940,"

Georgia Historical Quarterly 64 (Fall 1980). 294, 298, 305; Julius Augustus,

Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington- GPO, 1959),

47-50; Hagan, ibid., 28 1-7, 294.

51. "Biography," MGC to Melvin J Maas, 12 January 1933, both in Melvin J. Maas File,

Reference Section, MCHC; Heinl, Soldiers, 297.

52 Marshall to John L De Witt, 16 October 1933, Marshall Papers, vol 1, 401;

Vandegrift, ibid., 89-90; Gordon, "Golden," 261-2; Samuel P Huntmgton,

"Interservice Competition and Political Roles of the Armed Services," in Total War

and Cold War, ed. Harry L Coles (Columbus: OSUP, 1962), 180-5; Millett, Semper,

628.

53 MGC to CNO, "Expeditionary Force," 17 August 1933, and MGC to L. McCarty

Little, "Fleet Marine Force," 5 December 1933, both in File 1975-10, Personnel

Department General Correspondence (PDGC), 1933-1938, Box 135, RG 127, NA.

See also Russell, "Birth," 49-51; Millett, Semper, 330-7; W. H. Russell, ibid., 22,

Prefer, ibid., 157-8; Hough, ibid., 11-4; Heini, Soldiers, 299-305; Infusino, ibid., 84-

93; Metcalf, ibid, 550-1.

54 Memoirs of William J. Van Ryzin (1975), MCOHC, 74-6; Ryzm eventually joined

the First Defense Battalion. In addition, a consensus of histonans concur that the

Marine Corps highlighted the island defense component of the FMF's mission for

purposes public relations. For example, Millett, Semper, 319; Isely, ibid , 74-5; Heinl,

Soldiers, 306; Spector, Eagle, 27; Kajiwara, ibid., 11.

55 Heinl, Soldiers, 315; Spector, "Military," 84-6; Clifford, ibid., 58-9, Robert Sherrod,

Histoiy of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington, Combined Force

Press, 1952), 30-33.

65
56 Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose A Developmental History of the United

States Marine Corps 1900-1970 (Washington USMC, 1973), 45-8; Isley, ibid, 5;

Weigley, American, 255-7, Millett, Semper, 319, 331-3, Heini, Soldiers, 300-2.

Marine Corps Schools, Tentative Manual ofLanding Operations, 1934, Marine Corps

Historical Library (MCHL), MCHC, paragraph 1-1, 1-2, 1-5, 1-8, 1-22, 3-120;

K.rulak, ibid., 81-2; John Breckenridge, "Some Thoughts on Policy, Strategy, and

Comparative Power" and "A Discussion of Power," 21 November 1934, Julian C

Smith Papers, MCPPC, Box 29, MCHC. For further commentary, see also, Isley,

ibid, 36-44; Clifford, ibid., 46-8; Hough, ibid., 14-22, Millen, Semper, 331-7, 343;

Milieu, In Many, 110-5; Spector, "Military," 84-5.

Weigley, "Inter r," 258-62; see also Kajiwara, ibid., 21-6.

Memoirs of Thomas E. Bourke (1969), MCOHC, 19. Promotion bottlenecks were not

limited to the Corps and the Navy. According to George Marshall, the promotion

bottleneck also affected the Army during the Depression years (Marshall to Philip E.

Gallagher, 27 September 1932, Marshall to Edgar T. Collins, 30 September 1932,

John J. Pershing to Marshall, 20 December 1935, all in Marshall Papers, vol. 1, 379-

81, 479-80).

60 Memoir of Oliver P. Smith (1969), MCOHC, 78-9; memoir of Samuel B. Griffith II

(1968), MCOHC, 30-1; Smith, Thomas, l-2; "Portraits of the Commandants," MCG

59 (November 1975): 31-97; Gordon, "Golden," 256-61; MilIeu, Semper, 325. With

the exception of a chapter on Holcomb by Gordon in Millet's forthcoming anthology

on Commandants, this article is the only lengthy treatment of Holcomb.

Memoir of Robert H Williams (1979, 1980), MCOHC, 65-6; memoir of Oliver P

Smith (1969), MCOHC, 79, Lyman to Alexander A Vandegrifi, 22 July 1938,

Alexander A. Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC.

See author's questionnaire with responses from 80 Marines veterans of the 7th

Defense Battalion 31 of 80 surveyed Marines responded to the following question

"What role (1936-43) did Commandant Thomas Holcomb play in the development of

the Marine Corps in general and the defense battalion in particular? Was he an

administrator, strategist, salesman, etc.?" Those who did not respond to this question

claimed either they joined too late to know anything of Holcomb or their ranks were

too low to have any knowledge of Holcomb's role as Commandant.

Millet, Semper, 334-41; Cameron, ibid., 27; Kenneth W. Condit, et.al, A Brief

History of Headquarters Marine Corps Staff Organization, rev. (Washington: USMC,

1970), 15; Gordon, "General," 256-60, 269, Heinl, Soldiers, 306, Furer, ibid. 551-3.

Lyman to Vandegrift, 22 July 1938, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC;

Cameron, ibid., 43-5; Gordon, "Golden," 263; Lindsey, ibid., 48-9.

Thomas Holcomb, speech, "The Contribution of the Marine Corps the National

Defense," 27 January 1927, Thomas Holcomb File, Reference Section, MCHC. For

66
another example of Marine self-promotion, see Clayton B. Vogel, speech, "The

Marines and Our First Lme of Defense," October 1938, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC,

Box 2, MCHC, Millett, Semper, 336. The U.S Army also endeavored to gain

appropriations publicizmg itself. In speech to the West Virgima American Legion

Convention on 4 September 1938, George Marshall makes a similar appeal for

support of national defense (Marshall Papers, vol 1, 620-5).

66 Holcomb to D.C. MeDougal, 7 March 1937, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box I,

MCHC. For examples of Lejeune's lobbymg, see Lejeune to Holcomb, 24 January

1938, and Lejeune to Holcomb, 20 April 1938, both in Holcomb Papers, MCPPC,

Box 2, MCHC, George Killen, survey questionnaire, 1995.

67. McDougal to Vandegrift, 22 July 1938, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC

Holcomb' s correspondence which evaluates the 1938 Personnel Bill includes the

following Lej eune to Holcomb, 24 January 1938, Holcomb to Richard P. Williams, 2

March 1938, Holcomb to Gilder Jackson, 7 April 1938, Lejeune to Holcomb, 20 April

1938, Holcomb to John C Beaumont, 27 April 1938, Holcomb to David I. Walsh, 9

June 1938, Holcomb to McDougal, 15 June 1938, Thomas Holcomb to Lyman, 30

June 1938, all in Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC.

68 Calvin William Enders, "The Vinson Navy" (Ph D. diss., Michigan State University,

1970), 116-20; Landrum, ibid., 57-9, 79, Walters, ibid., 301-2.

Statutory Board on Submarine, Mine, and Naval Bases, 1938, memo for Secretary of

the Navy, 1 December 1938, World War II Command File, Operational Archives,

Box 63, Naval Historical Center (NHC); Holcomb, letter to Hany K. Pickett, 12

December 1938, Accession Number (AN) 127-77-30, Box 2, National Records

Center (NRC); Louis Morton, "Interservice Co-operation and Political-Military

Collaboration," in Total War and Cold War ed. Harry L. Coles (Columbus: OSUP,

1962), 153; Morison, ibid., 32-4, Spector, "Military," 74; Metcalf; 554-5; Matloff,

United, 3.

Holcomb, letter to D. C. McDougal, 25 May 1937; John H. Russell, letter to

Holcomb, 11 October 1937; Diek, letter to Holcomb, 19 February 1938; all in

Thomas Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box I, MCHC; Thomas Holcomb to Harry K

Pickett, "Obtaining infonriation in regard to certain United States Possessions in the

Pacific Ocean," 12 December 1938, AN 127-77-30, Box 1, NRC; memoir of William

W. Buchanan (1969), MCOHC, 12-4; Charles L Updegraph, Jr., US Marine Corps

Special Units of World War II (Washington: USMC, 1977), 61-2; MilIeu, Semper,

343-5, Infusino, ibid., 90-2.

Brune, ibid., 108-11; Ross, ibid., x-xii; Stetson Coni, "Changing Concepts of

National Defense in the United States, 1937-1947," MA 28 (Spring 1964) 1-7; Baer,

ibid, 146,152.

Infusino, ibid., 108; Kajiwara, ibid., 12-4; Furer, ibid., 560, Matlog ibid., 6-10.

O'Connor, ibid., 8-9.

67
Memoir of William W. Buchanan, (1969) MCOHC, 38; memoir of Russell N JordaN

(1970), 78; memoir of Samuel G. Taxis (1981), 40-4; memoir of Henry R Paige

(1970), 37-8, James A Donovan, Jr., The United States Marine Corps (New York

Praeger, 1967), 74-8; Isley, ibid, 74-5; Henil, Soldiers, 305-307; Milieu, Semper, 268-

9, 344-5; Melson, ibid., 4-5.

Robert F. Cyperski, Salvatore J. Butta, Antomo Santaniell, Charles H Petersen, all in

Survey Questionnaires.

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

Maurice Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations 1939-1940" USNIP 79

(July 1953) 741-2; Huntington, "Interservice," 180; Millett, For the Common

Defense, 388; Fagan, ibid., 411.

2. Vandegraft, ibid., 86-9; 11 Feb 1939, JCF to Holcomb, 8 March 1939, Holcomb to A.

S. Carpender, 9 March 1939, 12 January 1940, Holcomb to Clifton Woodrum, all m

Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 3 and 4, MCHC

3 CNO to Department Chiefs, 16 Feb 1939, Division of Plans and Policies, War Plans

Section, General Correspondence (DPPWPSGC) 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA, JCF

to Holcomb, 11 Feb 1939, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 3, MCHC; Eliot, ibid.,

161-76, 234, Frederick J. Nelson, "Guam-Our Western Outpost," USNIP 66

(January 1940): 83-8. Millen, Many, 130-2; Hough, ibid, 59-62; Spector, Eagle, 40-

5; Major, ibid., 243-5; D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in the

Pacific War," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed.

Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986), 706-7.

For an overview of the RAINBOW plans, see Matloff, United, 4-Kajiwara, ibid., 13,

Infusino, ibid., 94-6, 108; Dwan, ibid, 56-5; Greene, ibid, 374-5.

J. B. Earle, memo for the CNO, 8 September 1939, SecNav to SecWar, 29 September

1939, both in DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA; Updegraph, ibid., 62-3.

Holcomb to Commanding General FIvIF, 28 March 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box

4, RG 127, NA; Holcomb to A. W. Johnson, 27 April 1939, Holcomb Papers,

MCPPC, Box 3, MCHC. For a study of Marine Reserve, see Reserve Officers of

Public Mfairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps Reserve: A History (Washington, DC:

MCHQ, 1966).

Chairman, GB to SecNav, memo, "Are We Ready?" 31 August 1939, File 425, GB

Records, RG 80, NARA cited in Millen, Semper, 342; "The Defense of Wake" and

"The Defense of Palmyra," 11 August 1939, DPPWPSGC 1921-43, Box 34, RG 127,

NA; memoir of Lester A. Dessez (1970), 157, MCOHC; memoir, Taxis, 53; See also

Miller, ibid., 241-3. For a brief biography of Stark, see B. Mitchell Simpson, III,

68
"Harold Raynsford Stark, 1 August 1939 to 26 March 1942," Chiefs of Naval

Operations, ed. Robert W. Love, Jr. (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1980).

Stark, memo for Holcomb, 7 August 1939, Marshall to President Roosevelt, 11

August 1939, George V. Strong to Marshall, 11 August 1939, alI in DPPWPSGC

1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA; memoir, Paige, 37-8; Carolyn A Tyson, A Chronology

of the United States Marine Corps, 1936-1946, Volume 2 (Washmgtow USMC,

1977), 7.

Marshall, memo for Stark, August 18, 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127,

NA.

10 Miller, ibid., 242-3

Il Memo, 15 August 1939, Holcomb to Stark, August 17, 1939, both in DPPWPSGC

1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA, Eliot, ibid., 230-l; Heinl, Soldiers, 306-7

12 Henry A. Larsen, memo for Holcomb, 12 Oct 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4,

RG 127, NA; Furer, ibid, 41-2, 560-1; Vandegrift, ibid., 92-4; Millen, Semper, 345,

Millet, Many, 132-3

13 Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, 9 October 1939, Larsen to Holcomb, 12

October 1939, both in DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA; "the Defense of

Midway," DPPWPSGC 1921-43, Box 33, RG 127, NA

14. Robert L Demg to Holcomb, 26 Oct 1939, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 3, MCHC.

The Army was in a similar situation; see Weigley, Thstoiy, 423-30.

15 Lindsey, ibid 49; Vandegrift, ibid, 91

Holcomb to Vandegrift, 22 March 1939, Holcomb to Denig, 6 Nov 1939, both in

Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 3, MCHC; Alan Brown to Campbell, 12 Oct 1939,

Vandegrift to Brown, 28 Oct 1939, Vandegrift to Leo D. Hermle, 13 Nov 1939, all in

Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC, Marine Corps Administrative History,

typed manuscript (Washington: Marine Corps Historical Division, 1946), (MCAIJ), 8-

9, Gordon, "Golden," 263, Vandegrift, ibid., 91

Updegraph, ibid., 64; Holcomb to Denig, 6 Nov 1939, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC,

Box 3, MCHC, Vandegrifi to Gilder D. Jackson, 10 July 1940, Vandegrift Papers,

MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC.

P. A del Valle, memo for Holcomb, 22 Dec 1939, DPPWPSGC 1915-46, Box 14,

RG 127, NA; memoir of James P S. Devereux (1970), MCOHC, 92-3; memoir,

Taxis, 40-58. For secondary commentary, see Inflismo, ibid., 99-101, Kajiwara, ibid.,

15-6, Rough, ibid., 49. For basic studies of Wake, see Millet, Semper. 355-6; Hough,

ibid, 108-14.

69
Mark W. Lowenthal, "The Stark Memorandum and the American National Security

Process, 1940," in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History, ed

Robert W. Love, Jr (New York: Garland, 1980), 354-5, Kimmel to Thomas Hart, 9

February 1940, "Reflections of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of

U.S. Far Eastern Policy," 4 July 1940, Stanley to Sumner Welles, 21 September 1940,

all in Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor

Attack, 79th Congress, ist Session, GPO 1946 (Hearings), 2444-48, Hagan, 292,

Weigley, History, 426-9.

Clifford, ibid., 61; Millet, Semper, 345; see Appendices 3 and 5

21 Stoler, "U.S -Military," 62, Spector, "Military," 77; Vandegrift to Hermle, 13 Nov

1939, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC.

22 MCAH, ibid, 1-lib, Purer, ibid., 551-55.

23 Vandegnfl, ibid., 88.

24. Dr. Phyllis A. Zimmerman, associate professor of military history at Ball State

University, likens a Commandant's role to that of a college president.

25 Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II

(Washington: GPO, 1959), 551. Regarding the Assistant to the Commandant's duties,

see Vandegrift to Roice L. Biffle, ii March 1940, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2,

MCHC. This was part of a petition filed by a sergeant denied promotion; it was

directed to Assistant Vandegrift.

26 William Upshur to Holcomb, 25 April 1940, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 4,

MCHC; letter to Vandegrift, 22 August 1940, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2,

MCHC

27 Holcomb to Upshur, 12 July 1940, Hoicomb to George P. Eliot, 17 July 1940,

Holcomb to Eliot, 24 July 1940, Holcomb to Vinson, 24 July 1940, Eliot to Holcomb,

17 August 1940, ail in Hoicomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 4, MCHC; Vandegrift to

Holcomb, 15 July 1940, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; Milieu, Semper,

347.

Vandegrift to Biffie, ii March 1940, Lloyd to Vandegrift, 2 August 1940, both in

Vandegrifi Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; Upshur to Hoicomb, 25 April 1940,

Holcomb t. 'inson, 24 July 1940, both in Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 4, MCHC;

Cameron, thd., 56-9; Millett, Semper, 348-49; Heinl, Soldiers, 315, Millett, Many,

134. For a discussion of the promotion stagnation during Lejeune's Commandancy,

see memoir of Russell N. Jordahi (1970), MCOHC, 13; Krulak, ibid., 142-3; Millet,

Semper, 322-4.

Holcomb, memo for Eliot, 24 July 1940, Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 4, MCHC; 8

August 1940, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; E. B. Sledge, With the Old

Breed (Novato: Presidio Press, 1981), chapter 1; Milieu, Semper, 347-8; Salvatore J.

70
Butta, Robert F Cyperski, R. B. Dunkleberger, A. G Smith Jr., Robert L. High,

William McGuire, Steven Kiraly, Truxton Ringe, Odell C. Reid, Donald J. Brisbois,

Edward J Dieckmaim, all in Survey Questionnaire

30 John Marston to Vandegrift, 21 June 1940, Vandegnft Papers, MCPPC, Box 2,

MCHC; Heini, Soldiers, 3 15-7; Millet, Many, 15-6

31 Vandegrift to Marston, 29 June 1940, Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC;

Heml, Soldiers, 307

Milieu, Many, 134-6; Heinl, Soldiers, 305, Simmons, ibid., 138.

Memo for Holcomb, 16 June 1940, DPPWPSWP 1915-46, Box 14, RG 127, NA,

Vandegrift to Marston, 29 June 1940, Vandegnft Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC.

34 Millett, Semper, 351-2.

4 July 1940, Hearings, 1989-97; HemI, Soldiers, 310-11; Miller, ibid, 243, Milieu,

Semper, 345; Major, ibid, 258-9; James, ibid., 709; July 16, 1940, "Reflections on

certain features of the Far Eastern situation and certain problems of U.S. Far Eastern

policy, July 4, 1940," Hearings, 1989-97. For further explanation, see James H

Herzog, "Influence of the Umted States Navy m the Embargo of Oil to Japan" Pacific

Historical Review 35 (August 1966): 317-28.

Vandegrift to Leech, 8 July 1940, Vandeguft to Jackson, 10 July 1940, both in

Vandegrift Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; memoir, Loomis, 98-9.

Eliot to Holcomb, 17 August 1940, Holcomb, memo for Eliot, 24 July 1940, both in

Holcomb Papers, MCPPC, Box 4, MCHC, letter to Vandegrift, 22 August 1940,

Vandegrifi Papers, MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; Kajiwara, ibid., 14.

Memoirs, Van Ryzin, 74; 6 November 1940, Holcomb to All Officers, Charles

Melson's Personal Library. For an earlier version of Heini's article see 15 August

1939, "Defense Battalions," DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA

39 6 November 1940, Holcomb to All Officers, Charles Melson' s Personal Library.

40 Ibid.

6 November 1940, Holcomb to All Officers, Charles Melson' s Personal Library;

Heinl, Soldiers, 310-li, 8 July 1940, 10 July 1940, both in Vandegnft Papers,

MCPPC, Box 2, MCHC; Miller, ibid., 243.

Hearings, 2448-9; MilIeu, Semper, 397; Lowenthal, ibid, 355.

Gordon, "Golden," 263-4.

71
44 Holcomb to Otis Swift, 29 October 1940, Daniel Longwell to Holcomb, 12 November

1940, Otis Swift to Holcomb, 13 November 1940, Holcomb to Longwell, 14

November, 1940, Longwell to Holcomb, 25 November 1940, alI in Holcomb PPC,

Box4

45 "National Defense," Time 3620 11 November 1940, 21-3, Crosby Maynard to

Holcomb, 6November 1940; Sam Meek to Holcomb, 8 November 1940; Holcomb to

Meek, 12 November 1940; Holcomb to Henry R. Luce, 12 November 1940; Meek to

Holcomb, 15 November 1940; Luce to Holcomb, 15 November 1940; Holcomb to

James G. Harbord, 12November 1940; all in Holcomb PPC, Box 4. See also Gordon,

"Golden," 263-5; and Cameron, ibid., 49-88.

CHAPTER 3 NOTES

1. CNO to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCASIA, April 3, 1941, Hearings, 2462-3.

2 Lowenthal, ibid., 352-61, Ross, ibid., xiv.

Ross, ibid., 244-8; Lowenthal, ibid., 355-7; Infusino, ibid., 96.

Ernest J. King, US Navy at War 1941-1945 Official Reports to the Secretary of the

Navy (Washington Navy Dept. 1946), 37. For the most part, the whole military

believed that a war with Japan would inevitably occur

Woodrow Kessler, To Wake and Beyond Reminiscences (Washington: USMC,

1988), 15; see also Joan E. Sparks (Mrs. Ernest W. Sparks), James Martin Callender,

George Killen, Maurice Gremillion, Survey Questionnaire; Baer, ibid., 177-8;

Melson, ibid, 1-3, 5-6.

"Plan DOG," op. cited in Ross, ibid., 227-9; Lowenthal, ibid, 258-9; Morison, ibid.,

49-51; James, 'bid, 711; Brune, ibid., 116.

"ABC-1 Annex 3," 27 March 1941, Hearings, 1504, 1511-3; CNO to CINCPAC,

CINCLANT, and CINCAF, April 3, 1941, Hearings, 2462-3 Numerous secondary

sources include James, ibid, 711, Brune, ibid., 116-7, Millett, Common, 397-8;

Inflisino, ibid., 97-8; Major, ibid, 255-6; Morison, ibid., 49-53, 184; Hough, ibid, 64;

Updegraph, ibid., 65.

8 "ABC-1 Annex 3," 27 March 1941,Hearings, 1511-2.

Ingersoll to Holcomb, 10 January 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA

Stark to Director of Ship Movement Division, 17 January 1941, Stark to Kimmel, 26

February 1941, both in AN 1277-77-30, Box 2, NRC

72
11 K.inimel to Stark, 11 February 1941, Kimmel to Stark, 18 February 1941, Ingersoll to

Kimmel, 19 February 1941, alI in AN 1277-77-30, Box 2, NRC; Ingersoll to

Holcomb, 10 January 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA, Holcomb to

J. W Greenslade, 30 January 1941, GBSF 1900-47, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80, NA,

Bureau of Yards and Dock, 1 March 1941, GBSF 1900-47, GB 425, Box 135, RG 80,

NA.

12 For, the third conclusion, see CNO to C1NCPAC, CINCLANT, and CINCASTA,

April 3, 1941, Hearings, 2462-3; James H Reid to Stark, 2 February 1941, A G. Kirk

to Stark, 20 February 1941, both m GBSF 1900-47, General Conespondence of CNO

and SecNav (GCCNOSN), Box 54, RG 80, NA, Kimmel to Stark, 18 February 1941,

AN 127-77-30, Box 1, NRC; Homer C. Votaw, "Wake Island," USNIP 67 (January

1941). 52-5; Infusmo, 96, Millett, Common, 398.

13. M. E Shearer to Vandegnft, 29 January 1941, Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2,

MCHC, Holcomb to Stark, 9 January 1941, Holcomb to Vinson, 9 January 1941,

Holcomb to Charles C. Long, 30 January 1941, all in Holcomb Papers, PPC, Box 5,

MCHC, Charles H. Petersen, Survey Questionnaire; Millett, Semper, 346-9.

14 "Marine Expeditionary Force," n.d. [28 February 1941], "Training Units of the Fleet

Marine Force," n.d. [1 March 1941], both in GBSF 1900-47, GB 425, Box 135, RG

80, NA; Ingersoll to Department Chiefs, 28 February 1941, AN 1277-77-30, Box 2,

NRC; see also Melson, ibid , 4-6

15 "Marine Expeditionary Force," n.d [28 February 1941J, "Training Units of the Fleet

Marine Force," n d [1 March 1941], both in GBSF 1900-47, GB 425, Box 135, RG

80, NA, Ingersoll to Department Chiefs, 28 February 1941, AN 1277-77-30, Box 2,

NRC.

16. CNO to CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCAF, 3 April 1941, Hearings, 2462-3;

Breckenridge to Vandegrift, 2 April 1941, Vandegrift to Marston, 21 April 1941,

Price to Vandegrift, 8 May, all in Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC; MGC,

Memo for CNO, 2 June 1941, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, memo for SecNav, 3

June 1941, GCCNOSN, 1940-7, Box 51, RG 80, NA; Infúsino, 97-100, 108, Millett,

Common, 398.

17 Vandergrift to Denig, 4 March 1941, Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC; CNO to

MGC, 29April1941, DPPWPSGS 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA

18 Kimmel to Chester W. Ninñtz, 2 Feb 1941, Hearings, 2460; Vandegrift to Pnce, 11

March 1941, Price to Vandegrift, 9 April 1941, both mVandegrift Papers, PPC, Box

2, MCHC.

Breckinridge to Vandegrift, 2 April 1941, Price to Vandegrift, 9 April 1941, Price to

Vandegrift, S May 1941, all in Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC.

Vandegrift to Denig, 4 March 1941, Vandegrift to Lyman, 6 March 1941, Vandegrift

to Price, 11 March 1941, Vandegrift to Dave [9], 21 August 1941, Vandegrift to

73
Marston, 25 August 1941, alI n Vandegrift Papers, PPCC, Box 2, MCHC; Antonio

Santaniell, Raymond L. Valente, both in Survey Questionnaire.

21. Holcomb to Smith, 10 March 1941, Holcomb Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC; see also

Lindsay, ibid , 45-53.

22 Holcomb to J.G Harbord, 17 June 1941, Lawrence {?J to Holcomb, 18 June 1941,

Harbord to Holcomb, 18 June 1941, Meek to Holcomb, 24 June 1941, all in Holcnmb

Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC; Gordon, "Golden," 263; Cameron, ibid., 48

23. Holcomb to Smith, 10 March 1941, Meek to Holcomb, 24 June 1941, both in

Holcomb Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC.

24 Lindsay, ibid, 50

25 op. citedinibid,50.

26 Condit, ibid., 15-8; Lindsay, ibid., 50-1.

27. Chairman, GB, to SeeNav, 7 May 1941, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80,

NA; Price to Vandegrift, 8 May 1941, Vandegrift to Price, both n Vandegrift Papers,

PPC, Box 2, MCHC; Infusino, 104-5; Condit, 15-7.

28 Chairman, GB, to SecNav, 7 May 1941, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80,

NA; Price to Vandegrift, 8 May 1941, Vandegnft Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC

Price to Vandegrift, 8 May 1941, Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC.

30 Ibid

It is noteworthy that some of the surveyed leathernecks made multiple responses. For

instance, a given respondent might have cited both patriotism and employment as

reasons for his becoming a Manne. While such irregularity negates scientific

conclusions, the survey does indicate that service as a Marine satisfied recruits'

reasons for enlistment. Consequently, the Corps' public image or, to use Craig M.

Cameron's word, "myth" would have implicitly helped shape their expectations. See

Robert L. High, et. al., all in Survey Questionnaire. In my survey, the reasons for

enlistment in the Corps were even more conspicuous. Patriotism, Duty, and Proof of

Manhood comprised 25 of 28 responses. Employment shrank to only three responses.

Obviously, then, young men chose the Corps over a number of alternatives, all in

Survey Questionnaire. For further explanation, see also Cameron, ibid., 21-88; and

John W. Gordon, "The U.S. Marine Corps and an Experiment in Military Elitism: A

Reassessment of . Special Warfare Impetus, 1937-1943," Changing Interpretations

and New Source;, in Naval Histoy, ed Robert William Love, Jr. (New York:

Garland, 1980), 362-73.

32. Millett, Many, 138-9; Hough, ibid., 97-100.

74
33. CNO to MGC, 29 April 1941, DPPWPSGC, 1926-1942, Box 4, RG 127, NA;

Chairman, GB, to SecNav, 7 May 1941, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80,

NA; MCAH, 12

34 Chairman, GB, to SecNav, 7 May 1941, GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80,

NA.

CNO to CINCPAC, 6 May 1941, AN 127-77-30, Box 1, NRC; memo, "Defense of

Bases Established for the Support of the Fleet," 13 May 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42,

Box 1, RG 127, NA; Chairman, GB, to SecNav, 7 May 1941, GBSF 1900-1947, GB

432, Box 163, RG 80, NA, memoir, Pfeiffer, 130-1; Edward T. Peniston, Survey

Questionnaire; Kajiwara, ibid., 22-3, 27-8.

Memo, "Defense of Bases Established for the Support of the Fleet," 13 May 1941,

DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 1, RG 127, NA, Chairman, GB, to SecNav, 7 May 1941,

GBSF 1900-1947, GB 432, Box 163, RG 80, NA, Millett, Seinper, 346-7; see also

Updegraph.

CNO to MGC, 29 April 1941, CNO to MGC, 12 May 1941, both in DPPWPSGC,

1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA, Memo, "Defense of Bases Established for the Support

of the Fleet," 13 May 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box I, RG 127, NA; CINCPAC

to CNO, 28 May 1941, AN 127-77-30, Box 2, NRC.

38 Memo, "Defense of Bases Established for the Support of the Fleet," 13 May 1941,

DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 1, RG 127, NA; Stark to Marshall, 22 May 1941,

DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 1, RG 127, NA; Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, 2 June

1941, GCCNOSN 1940-7, Box 51, RG 80, NA; "Are We Ready III - Additional data

on Defense Battalions covering period 1 March 1941 to 15 September 1941," 16

September 1941, DPPWPSGC 1940-1, Box 15, RG 127, NA; E. J Deickmann,

Survey Questionnaire; Iitsmo, 106. For a study of the Anny's anti-aircraft artillery

situation in the late 1930s and early 1940s, see Bryon W Greenwald, "The

Development of Antiaircraft Artillery OrgPrni7ation, Doctrine, and Technology in the

Umted States Army, 1919-1941" (M A. thesis, Ohio State University, 1991), 114-8.

Ingersoll to Holcomb, 10 January 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA,

Jean P. Kirsh, R.B. Dunldeberger, John Volentine, Charles H Petersen, George B

Bell, William H Raquet, Otis R Strong, Antonio Santnrnell, Edward H. Walker, Jack

N. Munay, Nicholas Sutton, Raymond L Valente, Truxton Ringe, Denton G

Moulton, Franklin S. Rubi, Odell C. Reid, John H Wilson, Walter J. Ken, Harry

Calcutt, Kenneth Patrick, all Survey Questionnaire. Wake also lacked radar among

other things (see memoir, Devereux, 104-5).

Walter C. Coleman, Otis R. Strong, Franldin S. Rubi, E. J. Deickmann, Edward T.

Peniston, all in Survey Questionnaire.

Holcomb to Smith, 10 March 1941, Holcomb Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC, Salvatore

J. Butta, Robert F. Cyperski, R B. Dunkleberger, A. G. Smith Jr., Robert L. High,

William McGuire, Steven Kiraly, Truxton Ringe, Odell C Reid, Donald J. Brisbois,

75
Edward J Dieckmann, all m Survey Questionnaire; only Walter F. Stanley felt the

poor equipment and lack of manpower had a "bad effect on morale," (Survey

Questionnaire), Bough, ibid, 66, Cameron, ibid, 36.

Holcomb to Smith, 10 March 1941, Holcomb Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC;

Breckenridge to Vandegrift, 2 April 1941, Vandegrift, memo for F E Beatty, 15 July

1941, Vandegrift to Marston, 25 August 1941, all in Vandegrift Papers, PPC, Box 2,

MCHC, Vandegrift, ibid, 95-7; Millett, Many, 151.

Kimmel to Stark, 26 July 1941, Hearings, 2239-42, Major, ibid., 258-60; Millett,

Common, 398-9, James, ibid., 712-4; Millett, Many, 150.

Major, ibid., 259; Herzog, ibid., 3 17-28.

"U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan - Rainbow Five (Navy 0-1, Rainbow Five)," 21

July 1941, Hearings, 2569-88, Infusino ibid., 102.

"U.S Pacific Fleet Operating Plan - Rainbow Five (Navy O-1, Rainbow Five)," 21

July 1941, Hearings, 2569-88.

Voluminous secondary material is available on pre-war strategies and war plans. For

example, see Updegraph, ibid., 61-2; Millett, Semper, 343-5; Greene, 374-5, Infúsino,

ibid, 90-6, 108; Kajiwara, ibid., 12-4; Furer, ibid., 560; O'Connor, ibid., 8-9; Maurice

Matloff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations. 1939-1940" USNIP 79 (July 1953):

741-2; Huntington, "Interservice," 180; Fagan, ibid., 411; Lowenthal, ibid., 355-7;

Inflisino, ibid., 96.

48 Holcomb to CNO, 3 June 1941, GCCNOSN 1940-7, Box 51, RG 80, NA; 23 June

1941; Bough, ibid., 68-9. These sources corroborate the recollections from the

Marines m the 7th Defense Battalion. Accordmg to Truxton Ringe, the 7th eventually

"did not get 90 nun AA guns with microwave radar and more modem seacoast

artillery until 1944-5" (Survey Questionnaire). See also Hany Caicutt, Denton G.

Moulton, both in Survey Questionnaire

"Are We Ready III - additional data covering period 1 March 1941 to 15 September

1941," 16September 1941, DPPWPSGC 1940-1, Box 15, RG 127, NA.

Vandegrift to Price, 13 September 1941, Vandegrifi Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC;

"Are We Ready III - additional data covering period 1 March 1941 to 15 September

1941," 16 September 1941, DPPWPSGC 1940-1, Box 15, RG 127, NA.

51 "Are We Ready Ill - Additional data covering period 1 March 1941 to 15 September

1941," 16 September 1941, "Are We Ready III - Additional data on Defense

Battalions covering period 1 March 1941 to 15 September 1941," 16 September, both

in DPPWPSGC 1940-1, Box 15, RG 127, NA; Holcomb, memo for CNO, 3 June

1941, GCCNOSN 1940-7, Box 51, RG 80, NA, Kimmel to Stark, 12 August 1941,

Hearings, 2243-5; 12 August, Vandegrift Papers, PPC, MCHC; "Rough draft for

76
Kimmel' s letter," August 16, 1941, Hearings, 2185, Kimmel to Stark, 22 August

1941, Hearings, 2245. For the Army's situation, see Weigley, History, 432-7

52 James M. Callender, George W. Kauen, Maurice J Gremillion, Survey Questionnaire;

Vandegrift, ibid, 86-9.

53 Millett, Seinper, 346-7.

54 "Are We Ready III - Additional data on Defense Battalions covering period 1 March

1941 to 15 September 1941," 16 September, DPPWPSGC 1940-1, Box 15, RG 127,

NA; memoir, Taxis, 55-6, memoir, Paige, 40, memoir, Dessez, 157, 164, memoir,

Van Ryzin, 77 George Shultz, Donald Regan, and numerous officers of colonel's

rank and higher served as members of defense battalions and anti-aircraft battalions,

their successors Few Marines seem to have been hurt by their service with 7th

defense battalion (see Survey Questionnaire). Only Francis Loomis, Jr., believed he

had to leave the defense battalion to advance his career (memoir, Loomis, 70-2).

55 Memoir, Paige, 40; memoir, Dessez, 157, memoir, Taxis, 50-1, Robert L. High,

Antonio Santamell, Kenneth Patrick, all in Survey Questionnaire; Hough, ibid., 65

There is some hesitancy among Marines and historians to call any leatherneck umt

"elite." See Gordon, "U.S. Manne," 361-373. Although Gordon's article deals

prmiarily with the raider battalions, it can be easily applied to defense battalions The

idea of an "elite" unit in the Corps did not sit well because leathernecks considered

the whole Corps to be elite

56. MGC to CNO, 5 September 1941, DPPWPSGC 1926-42, Box 4, RG 127, NA Mr.

Benis M. Frank, Chief Military Historian of the Marine Corps, also helped clarifS' this

section for me

57 Holcomb to Henry Leonard, 24 October 1941, Holcomb's Broadcast Transcript, 22

November 1941, both in Holcomb's Papers, PPC, Box 5, MCHC; Vandegrfit to Emile

P. Moses, 24 Oct, Moses to Vandegrift, 27 Oct, Vandegrift to Marston, n.d.

[November 1941], all in Vandegrifl Papers, PPC, Box 2, MCHC

58 "Study on Defenses and Installations at Outlying Pacific Bases," 21 October 1941,

AN 127-77-30, Box 2, NRC.

59 Kimmel to Stark, 26 July 1941, Hearings, 2240; Kimmel to Stark, 12 August 1941,

Hearings, 2243; CINCPAC to OPNav, 29 October 1941, CINCPAC to OPNav, 2

December, 1941, both in AN 127-77-30, Box 2, NRC Regardmg Wake, see Kessler,

ibid., 9-10, 23-4, 41-2; John P. S. Devereux, The Stony of Wake Island (Philadelphia:

Lippincott, 1947), 36-9; memoirs, Devereux, 104-5; CNO, memo for MGC, 24

October 1941, MGC, memo for CNO, 28 October 1941, all in AN 127-77-30, Box 1,

NRC.

Memoirs, Devereux, 107; Heini, Soldiers, 323; Miller, ibid., 292.

Kessler, ibid., 23.

77
62 CTNCPAC to OPNav, 28 November 1941, Hearings, 2481, Kimmel to Stark, 2

December 1941, Hearings, 2253-5; CINCPAC to CNO, 2 December 1941, Hearings,

2481-5

63. Kessler, ibid., 11-12, see also memois, Pfeiffer, 179; Kimmel to Stnrk, 2 December

1941, Hearings, 2253-5 In addition, the Survey Questionnaire is rife with finger

pointing at the Army, Navy, Congress, and the American public.

64 Memoirs, Devereux, 98

65. Stark and Marshall, memo for Roosevelt, 27 November 1941, Hearings, 1083;

Morrison, ibid., 184, 227-9, Baer, ibid., 179.

CONCLUSION NOTES

1 Millett, Semper, 346.

Odell C. Reid, Survey Questionnaire; Weigley, American, 255; Kajiwara, ibid, 29-

31 The sources on the defense of Wake are voluminous. The most recent major work

is Robert Cressman, 1995. This book has extensive primary and secondary sources in

its bibliography.

Gordon, "General," 269; Hough, ibid., 56, Millett, Semper, 654.

78