New Perspectives in Policing 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

m a r c h 2 0 1 1 

Moving the Work of Criminal Investigators Towards Crime Control 

Anthony A. Braga, Edward A. Flynn, George L. Kelling and Christine M. Cole 

National Institute of Justice 

Executive Session on Policing and 

Public Safety 

This is one in a series of papers that will be published as a result of the Executive Session on 

Policing and Public Safety. 

Harvard’s Executive Sessions are a convening 

of individuals of independent standing who take 

joint responsibility for rethinking and improving 

society’s responses to an issue. Members are 

selected based on their experiences, their reputation for thoughtfulness and their potential for 

helping to disseminate the work of the Session. 

In the early 1980s, an Executive Session on Policing 

helped resolve many law enforcement issues of 

the day. It produced a number of papers and 

concepts that revolutionized policing. Thirty years 

later, law enforcement has changed and NIJ and 

Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government are 

again collaborating to help resolve law enforcement issues of the day. 

Learn more about the Executive Session on 

Policing and Public Safety at: 

NIJ’s website: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/ 

law-enforcement/executive-sessions/welcome.htm 

Harvard’s website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 

criminaljustice/executive_sessions/policing.htm 

In many fundamental respects, the investigation 

process, though showing some advances, seems 

to have been relatively uninfluenced by significant changes in policing, the crime problem and 

technological advances made in the past thirty 

years. In the main, it is our view that progress 

in police criminal investigation efforts remains 

largely isolated from broader police efforts to 

respond more effectively, more efficiently, and 

more resolutely to the crime problem in general. 

— Horvath, Meesig and Lee,
 

National Survey of Police Policies and Practices 


Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: 


Twenty-Five Years After Rand (2001:5).
 

Introduction 

Over the last three decades, policing has gone 

through a period of significant change and 

innovation. In what is a relatively short historical time frame, the police have reconsidered 

their fundamental mission, the nature of core 

strategies of policing, and the character of 

their relationships with the communities they 

serve. This reconsideration is now broadly conceived of as community and problem-oriented 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 | New Perspectives in Policing 

policing. Within the community and problemoriented policing paradigm shift, many innovations have developed, including broken windows, 

hot spots, pulling levers, Compstat and other policing approaches (Weisburd and Braga, 2006). These 

changes and innovations grew out of concern that 

core policing tactics, such as preventive patrol, 

rapid response to calls for service and follow-up 

investigations, did not produce significant impacts 

on crime and disorder. There is now a growing consensus that the police can control crime when they 

are focused on identifiable risks, such as crime hot 

spots, repeat victims and very active offenders, and 

when they use a range of tactics to address these 

ongoing problems (Braga, 2001, 2008a; Skogan and 

Frydl, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004). In the United 

States, these police innovations have been largely 

implemented by uniformed patrol officers rather 

than criminal investigators. 

W hile Anglo-Saxon policing — the basis of 

American policing — originated during the early 

19th century, criminal investigation is largely 

a 20th-century phenomenon. During the first 

stages of Anglo-Saxon policing — at least until the 

beginning of the 20th century — detective work 

remained largely in the private sector, although 

small detective units developed in the United 

States, England and France. In the United States, 

detectives were generally viewed as low-status 

operators, as much given to bringing trouble and 

corruption into police departments as solving community problems. Their status and mystique were 

enhanced when J. Edgar Hoover took over the corrupt Bureau of Investigation during the 1920s and 

through a variety of measures, ranging from strict 

behavioral standards for investigators to shrewd 

publications programs, created what was considered an incorruptible and proficient Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) (Reppetto, 1978). Hoover’s 

and the FBI’s status were so high that urban police 

departments modeled their overall strategy and the 

role of criminal investigators on the FBI model. The 

question of the “fit” between a federal law enforcement model and an urban police model aside, the 

impact of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI on local 

police departments and their strategies should not 

be underestimated, even today. 

The basic work of the criminal investigator has 

changed little since the “standard” model of policing (also known as the “professional” or “reform” 

model) popularized during the 1950s, although 

forensic technology has evolved considerably. In 

terms of controlling crime, investigators essentially conduct ad-hoc reactive investigations to 

hold offenders accountable for crimes in the hopes 

of generating deterrence through making arrests. 

Criminal investigators clearly play an important 

role in delivering justice to crime victims. However, 

in their investigation of cases, they gain intimate 

knowledge of repeat victims, high-rate offenders 

and locations that generate a disproportionate 

amount of criminal incidents. Investigators hold 

valuable information on recurring crime problems 

and could occupy a central role in developing creative responses to stop the next crime instead of 

responding to it. Unfortunately, few police departments have been successful in their attempts to 

reorient the work of criminal investigators more 

broadly towards crime control. 

It is our belief that criminal investigators are more 

valuable to police crime-control operations than 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 3 

most police executives realize. In most police 

departments, the “fruit” of an investigation is the 

arrest and subsequent conviction of a criminal 

offender. Indeed, the work of criminal investigators in apprehending serious offenders can be 

incredibly creative, involve dogged persistence and 

include acts of heroism. We believe that the fruit of 

their labor can be the investigative results as well 

as the incorporation of investigative knowledge 

and actions into crime-control strategies. Relative 

to other police department staff, criminal investigators have special expertise in the following areas: 

●	 Interviewing skills (for interviewing victims, 

witnesses and offenders). 

●	 Developing and managing of informants. 

●	 Conducting covert surveillance, including the 

use of advanced surveillance technologies. 

●	 Identifying and locating potential witnesses and 

sources of intelligence. 

●	 Preserving and developing evidence. 

●	 Preparing cases for prosecution and liaising with 

prosecutors in the lead-up to, and conduct of, 

a trial. 

●	 Protecting, managing and preparing witnesses 

for trial. 

●	 Sequencing of investigative steps in an inquiry, 

so as to optimize chances of success. 

●	 Maintaining knowledge of, and in some cases 

relationships with, criminals and criminal 

groups. 

Apart from the last one, all these skills are generally much more concentrated among investigators 

than uniformed patrol officers. For the last one, the 

investigators’ crime “knowledge” tends to be more 

offender-centric, whereas patrol officers’ knowledge is more naturally place-centric, victim-centric 

and crime-type-centric. 

Many of the skills listed above contribute to the 

ability of investigators to handle a case from start 

(crime incident report) to finish (conviction), which 

patrol officers usually cannot do except in really 

simple cases, because the structure and schedule of normal patrol operations generally do not 

allow it. With their special knowledge and skill 

set, investigators can advise uniformed patrol 

officers on the nature of local crime problems and 

supplement their crime-control efforts with their 

expertise in conducting surveillances, doing undercover work, and interviewing victims and offenders. 

Investigators can also collaborate with analysts to 

develop in-depth descriptions of recurring crime 

problems. Our point is that criminal investigators 

are not being fully utilized by most police departments in their management of recurring crime 

problems. In essence, the “crime control loop” is 

not complete without the participation of criminal investigators in the problem-solving process 

(Sparrow, 2008). 

In this paper, we develop an argument that police 

departments need to engage in a critical examination of the work of their investigators and recognize 

their importance in understanding and controlling 

recurring crime problems. Police departments and 

managers need to inspire a spirit of innovation 

and creativity among investigators in responding 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 | New Perspectives in Policing 

to crime that goes beyond simply managing their 

caseloads and making arrests. As with uniformed 

patrol operations in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, it is 

time for a period of innovation in the work of criminal investigators that develops their potential for 

controlling crime rather than handling only the 

cases that come their way. Throughout this paper, 

we use the broad term “criminal investigators” 

rather than more specific terms such as “detectives” 

or “inspectors” to represent sworn police personnel 

who are charged with completing follow-up investigations of crimes that are not solved by patrol 

officers. Follow-up investigations include primary 

activities such as interviewing victims and checking the crime scene, secondary activities such as 

collecting physical evidence and canvassing for 

and interviewing witnesses, and tertiary activities such as interviewing suspects and informants, 

discussing the case with other police personnel, 

checking departmental records, and conducting 

stakeouts (Eck, 1983).1 

We begin by briefly reviewing the implications of 

key research studies on the work of criminal investigators and acknowledging the limits of existing 

practices for effective crime control. We then consider the relevant ideas from newer approaches to 

crime prevention and control — such as problemoriented policing and intelligence-led policing 

— that are helpful in reorienting investigators to 

address ongoing crime problems. We then survey 

the experiences of several large police departments 

in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia 

in implementing strategic changes to the operations 

of their criminal investigations bureaus. We conclude by offering some broad, guiding principles for 

police executives and policymakers to consider in 

moving the work of criminal investigators towards 

crime control in their jurisdictions. 

Research on the Effectiveness of 

Criminal Investigators 

Within police departments, criminal investigators are smaller in number, have an elite status, 

and benefit from special perks such as promotions, 

not wearing uniforms, earning higher salary or 

increasing overtime opportunities, and enjoying considerable discretion of their use of time. 

Criminal investigators have a more clearly defined 

mission than patrol officers: to arrest the criminal 

(Walker, 1992). Success in this mission can have 

great moral significance to the investigator, just 

as arresting a serious criminal gives the officer 

a tangible sense of protecting the community. 

Investigators also enjoy a romanticized reputation 

as being effective crime fighters in books, movies, 

and television. These factors lead to an investigator culture that privileges their crime-fighting 

efforts as superior to patrol-based strategies and, 

at least partially, separates them from the rest of 

the department. 

The bulk of criminal investigation work, however, is 

not as exciting or as successful as it is portrayed in 

the media or by the police themselves. As Herman 

Goldstein (1977: 55-56) suggests in his classic work 

Policing a Free Society: 

It borders on heresy to point out that, in 

fact, much of what detectives do consists 

of very routine and rather elementary 

chores, including much paper processing; 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 5 

that a good deal of their work is not only 

not exciting, it is downright boring; that 

the situations they confront are often 

less challenging and less demanding 

than those handled by patrolling police 

officers; that it is arguable whether special skills and knowledge are required 

for detective work; that a considerable 

amount of detective work is actually 

taken on a hit-or-miss basis; and that the 

capacity of detectives to solve crimes is 

greatly exaggerated. 

Goldstein’s observations were supported by a 

series of research studies in the 1970s and early 

1980s that debunked the mythology of criminal 

investigators (Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia, 

1977; Ericson, 1982; Royal Commission on 

Criminal Procedure, 1981). Exhibit 1 summarizes 

the key research findings of three well-known 

research studies on the work of criminal investigators (Bayley, 1998). 

It is important to recognize that it is difficult to 

apply general characterizations based on these 

research studies to the work of all criminal investigators within and across police agencies. The 

work of particular investigators, such as those 

involved in dealing with terrorism, organized 

crime and homicide, can be far from the routine 

Exhibit 1. Findings of Seminal Research Studies on Police Investigation of Serious Crimes 

1.The vast majority of crime that police investigate is brought to their attention by the public. Police discover very little crime on their own. Except for a few 

proactive investigations into corruption, vice, and organized crime, most criminal investigations involve crimes that have been committed, not those in progress or not yet committed. 

2.The essential ingredient in solving almost every crime is the identification of the suspect by the public. If the offender is not caught on the spot, success 


depends on the victim or witnesses providing information that specifically identifies the likely suspect, such as a name, address, license plate number, or 


relation to the victim. If an offender has not been identified by the public for detectives, the chances of solving any crime fall to about 10 percent.
 

3.Contrary to fictional portrayals, detectives do not work from facts to identification of suspects; they work from identification of suspects back to facts that 

are necessary to prosecute and convict them. The primary job of detectives is not to find unknown suspects, but to collect evidence required for a successful 

prosecution of known suspects. Although fictional detectives are constantly warning against the danger of forming a hypothesis too early, that is precisely 

what real detectives do most of the time. For all the drama of novels, movies and television, the fact is that criminal investigation is largely a matter of processing paperwork. This does not make it easy. Knowledge of the law and of people is critically important. But it is work that does not rely on the skills of 

Kojak or Dirty Harry. Instead, it requires the steady discipline and persistence of an accountant or bank examiner. 

4.More crimes are solved through information provided by arrested or convicted offenders — called “secondary clearances” — than are solved by the original 

work of the police. Indeed, the major opportunity for raising clearance rates — the ratio of solved crimes to reported crimes — lies in having the police 

work more systematically to encourage criminals to confess to previous criminal acts. 

5.Detectives generally have more information about particular crimes than they can assimilate and use. Furthermore, physical or forensic evidence makes only 

a small contribution to either detection or prosecution. 

6.Neither the way in which criminal investigation is organized nor caseloads of detectives affect the success police have in solving crimes. 

Sources: Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia (1977), Ericson (1982), Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981) and as summarized by Bayley (1998: 72-73). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6 | New Perspectives in Policing 

work summarized here. Nevertheless, volume 

crimes, such as burglary, larceny, assault and 

robbery, drive the bulk of investigative activity 

in police departments. The vast majority of these 

volume crime investigations can be regarded as 

matters of routine detective work. 

The landmark Rand Corporation study is generally 

recognized as the most influential of these studies, as it directly observed detective operations in 25 

police agencies and surveyed detective practices in 

an additional 156 police departments (Greenwood 

and Petersilia, 1975). The major findings of the Rand 

study include: the most serious crimes are solved by 

the responding patrol officer through information 

obtained from the victim or victims, rather than leads 

developed by investigators; in more than half of the 

cases solved, the suspect’s identity is known or easily 

determined at the time the crime is reported to police; 

an investigator’s time is largely consumed reviewing 

reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate 

and interview victims on cases that experience has 

shown are unlikely to be solved; and many investigations are conducted without any hope of developing 

leads, but simply to satisfy victims’ expectations 

(Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilia, 1977). 

Certainly, the issues raised by the Rand study 

were informed by earlier critical examinations of 

the nature of police work. For instance, the U.S. 

President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 

and Administration of Justice Task Force on the 

Police (1967) questioned the principles underlying investigator deployments and lamented the 

poor coordination between patrol and detective 

divisions. Systematic observation work by Albert 

Reiss, Jr. (1971) revealed that 87 percent of all arrests 

observed were made by patrol officers who were the 

first to respond to the crime scene and immediately 

obtained the eyewitness testimony of victims and 

witnesses. Reiss and Bordua (1967:43) suggested 

that most crimes “solve themselves in the sense 

that the violator is ‘known’ to the complainant or 

to the police at the time the crime initially comes to 

the attention of the police.” Coupled with data from 

the FBI on the low probability of arrest for Index 

crimes,2 these studies collectively raised questions 

about the effectiveness of criminal investigators in 

holding offenders accountable for their crimes. 

This body of research suggests that investigative 

results, such as arrests, are beyond the control of the 

investigator. According to this circumstance-result 

hypothesis (Eck, 1992), random circumstances — 

such as the presence of a witness, whether the 

victim marked his or her stolen property, and the 

presence of physical evidence — determine case 

outcomes. In contrast, the effort-result hypothesis 

suggests that the work of criminal investigators, 

such as interviewing victims, cultivating informants and checking records, increases the 

likelihood that the crime might be solved. While 

this idea has been perpetuated mainly through 

mythology, there is some research evidence to support the position that investigative effort matters 

(Ward, 1971; Folk, 1971). 

In 1979, the Police Executive Research Forum 

(PERF) examined logs completed by patrol officers 

and detectives, official reports, and observations 

of investigators at work to describe the investigative process in DeKalb County, Ga.; St. Petersburg, 

Fla.; and Wichita, Kan. (Eck, 1983). The PERF 

research suggested that both circumstance-result 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 7 

and effort-result hypotheses had some validity. 

Based on the PERF study, Eck (1992: 31-32) argued 

that the investigative process implicitly works to 

divide cases into three groups: 

1.	 Cases that cannot be solved with a reasonable amount of investigative effort.
 

2. Cases solved by circumstances, which 


only requires that the suspects be 


arrested, booked and interrogated, and 


a prosecutable case prepared.
 

3. Cases that may be solved if a reasonable
 

level of investigative effort is applied to
 

them, but will not be solved otherwise.
 

These findings suggest that robust case-screening procedures and effective management 

interventions could improve the functioning of 

investigative units. During the 1970s and early 

1980s some departments attempted to develop 

better case-screening procedures to ensure that 

criminal investigators were investing their efforts 

in those cases that were most likely to generate 

an arrest rather than spending time on cases 

that were not. In the management realm, an 

experiment in Rochester, N.Y., found that varying factors, such as including patrol officers in 

investigations and engaging a team approach 

to unsolved incidents, could improve the likelihood of making an arrest (Bloch and Bell, 1976). 

Another review of investigative best practices in 

six police departments concluded that strategic management principles and practices could 

influence clearance rates (Bloch and Weidman, 

1975). The issues that influenced the “solvability 

factors” associated with investigative work 

included: budgeting and allocating resources; 

improving relationships with the prosecutor; 

interacting with the public, especially victims 

and witnesses; improving relationships between 

investigators and patrol officers; decentralizing 

detective assignments, particularly in neighborhood team policing approaches; using civilian 

employees for investigative tasks; assigning personnel; supervising and training investigative 

personnel; improving investigative procedures; 

and conducting investigative activities not 

related to specific cases. 

Unfortunately, positive research findings that 

clearance rates could be influenced by casescreening procedures and varying investigative 

resource-allocation schemes were often countered by research that reported largely negative 

findings. For instance, Greenwood (1970) found 

no relationship between arrests and cases per 

detectives for burglaries and found a negative 

relationship for assaults. Indeed, even the PERF 

study observed that investigations seemed to be a 

low-payoff endeavor under even the best circumstances (Eck, 1983). Eck (1992:33) later concluded 

that “it is unlikely that improvements in the way 

investigations are conducted or managed will 

have a dramatic effect on crime or criminal 

justice.” 

Today, in spite of the evidence available 

through both research and practice, very few 

U.S. police departments are experimenting 

with new approaches to the management of 

criminal investigators and their work. A recent 

National Institute of Justice-sponsored survey 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8 | New Perspectives in Policing 

of investigative practices in 1,746 U.S. law enforcement agencies concluded that there was little 

meaningful change in the basic work of criminal 

investigators (Horvath, Meesig and Lee, 2001). As 

will be discussed later in this paper, this stands in 

stark contrast to the trajectory of criminal investigation practice in other countries, most notably the 

United Kingdom (Neyroud and Disley, 2007; Tilley, 

Robinson and Burrows, 2007). 

Of course, over the last 30 years, there have been 

noteworthy improvements in specific investigative practices, such as the development of more 

effective and just ways of interviewing victims, witnesses and suspects; the implementation of proper 

methods of conducting perpetrator lineups; and the 

handling of physical evidence. Forensic technology available to investigators has vastly improved 

their ability to make links between crimes and 

offenders. For instance, a recent National Institute 

of Justice-sponsored experiment using DNA to 

solve property crime found that the collection 

and analysis of physical evidence at crime scenes 

improves the ability of investigators to identify, 

arrest and prosecute criminal offenders (Ritter, 

2008). Another evaluation found that the addition of 

ballistics imaging technology to the Boston Police 

Department’s Ballistics Unit significantly increased 

their ability to link gun crimes committed with the 

same firearm (Braga and Pierce, 2004). 

While this paper is not a review of the effects of 

improved investigative techniques and forensic 

technology on investigator performance, we believe 

that it is important to note that, despite these 

improvements, clearance rates have remained 

relatively stable over the last 35 years in the United 

States. As figure 1 shows, the probability of arrest 

for violent crimes and property crimes has hovered 

around 46 percent and 17 percent, respectively, 

between 1971 and 2007. The clearance rate for 

homicide, the most thoroughly investigated crime, 

decreased from 79 percent in 1976 to 61 percent in 

2007. 

While improved investigative techniques and 

technology have arguably improved the likelihood 

that the “right” people are being arrested for their 

crimes, these advances do not seem to translate 

into an increased probability of arrest for offenders. If one of the assumed crime-control tenets of 

the standard model of policing involves investigators trying to prevent future crimes by generating 

deterrence through arrests (Skogan and Frydl, 

2004), their ability to do so today does not seem 

meaningfully different from the past. These innovations represent enhancements to the same basic 

investigative process rather than strategic changes 

to prevent crimes from happening in the first place. 

This is not to say that criminal investigators have 

no value. In a noteworthy number of cases, good 

investigative work results in the identification and 

apprehension of serious criminals. The persistent 

determination and resourcefulness of some investigators in apprehending perpetrators is extremely 

impressive. However, when the totality of police 

operations is considered, the cases solved by criminal investigators account for a very small part of 

police business (Goldstein, 1977). And if police 

departments are serious about crime control, the 

work of the criminal investigator clearly needs to 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 9 

Figure 1. Clearance Rates for Homicide, Violent Crime and Property Crime in the United States 

0 

10 

20 

30 

40 

50 

60 

70 

80 

90 

100 

Percent

Percent Homicides Cleared 

Percent Violent Crimes Cleared 

Percent Property Crimes Cleared 

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 

Sources: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/cleared.cfm, 

U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics online, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4202007.pdf,
 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm.
 

Accessed June 10, 2009
 

be adjusted to go beyond arresting offenders in 

the hopes of generating a deterrent effect. 

Developing a Crime-Control Orientation 

Since the 1980s, police departments have been 

experimenting with a much broader idea of crime 

control and prevention. Proactive efforts to control crime were advanced by the publication of 

Herman Goldstein’s seminal article on problemoriented policing (Goldstein, 1979). He argued 

that police departments were much too focused 

on how they were organized to do their work 

rather than on the crime problems they needed 

to solve. Goldstein (1979, 1990) further suggested 

that greater operational effectiveness could be 

accomplished through detailed analyses of crime 

problems and the development of appropriate 

solutions, rather than by effecting improvements 

in organization and management. The problemsolving process requires “identifying these 

problems in more precise terms, researching 

each problem, documenting the nature of the 

current police response, assessing the adequacy 

of existing authority and resources, engaging 

in a broad exploration of alternatives to present 

responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing from among them” (Goldstein, 

1979:236). Since Goldstein’s article many police 

departments have experimented with this 

problem-oriented approach, and the available 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10 | New Perspectives in Policing 

evaluation research suggests that problem-oriented 

policing is effective in dealing with a wide range of 

crime problems (Braga, 2008a; Skogan and Frydl, 

2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2010). 

Although Goldstein envisioned the problemoriented approach as a departmentwide activity, 

it has largely been implemented by uniformed 

patrol officers.3 Similar to uniformed patrol officers responding to repeated 911 calls for service, 

the work of most criminal investigators can also be 

thought of as “incident-driven policing” (Eck and 

Spelman, 1987). Investigators respond to recurring 

incidents, attempt to gather enough information to 

generate a warrant or make an arrest, and rarely 

look for the underlying conditions that may be 

causing like groups of incidents. Like Goldstein, 

we believe criminal investigators should go further 

than responding to case after case, that they search 

for solutions to recurring problems that generate 

the repeated incidents. Investigating unsolved incidents is an important task and still must be done, 

but criminal investigators should respond systematically to recurring crimes arising from the same 

problem. In order for criminal investigators to be 

more efficient and effective, they must gather information about incidents and design an appropriate 

response based on the nature of the underlying 

conditions that cause the problem(s). A data-driven 

analytic approach, led and supported by investigators, would best position police departments to deal 

with recurring problems that generate the bulk of 

their cities’ crime. 

Criminal investigators, like patrol officers handling emergency calls for service, are constantly 

being called upon to deal with new crimes as they 

occur. Police executives will need to develop new 

case-management practices and provide analytic 

support to criminal investigators in ways that 

parallel the changes to patrol operations when 

problem-oriented policing approaches were being 

implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. These administrative arrangements will position investigators 

to manage their caseloads and work on crimecontrol strategies. If appropriate control strategies 

are implemented, there should be a net reduction in 

investigator caseloads through the effective management of recurring crime problems. 

With their working knowledge of victims, offenders and locations, criminal investigators are well 

positioned to contribute valuable information on 

the nature of crime problems. Figure 2 provides an 

example of some of the insightful data that investigators may connect between crime events when 

two gun crimes are linked through ballistics imaging technology. 

Research suggests that crime tends to cluster 

among a few problem places, offenders and victims (Braga, 2008a). For instance, Spelman and 

Eck (1989) examined several U.S. studies and estimated that 10 percent of the victims in the U.S. are 

involved in 40 percent of victimizations, 10 percent 

of offenders are involved in more than 50 percent of 

serious crimes, and 10 percent of places are the sites 

of about 60 percent of calls for service. For certain 

crimes, such as gun violence, these concentrations 

can be much higher. A 2006 analysis of serious gun 

violence in Boston found that only 1 percent of the 

city’s youth ages 15 to 24 participated in gangs but 

gang violence accounted for 50 percent of all homicides in the city (Braga, Hureau and Winship, 2008). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 11 

More recently, Braga, Papachristos and Hureau 

(2010) revealed that less than 5 percent of street 

block faces and street corners accounted for 74 

percent of all gun assault incidents in Boston 

between 1980 and 2008. 

Criminal investigators, if properly oriented 

and managed, could be very useful in controlling crime by addressing these identifiable 

risks. Criminal investigators are occasionally 

involved in specific initiatives, such as Boston’s 

well-known Operation Ceasefire, as important 

contributors to an effective preventive crime-control and prevention strategy (Kennedy, Piehl and 

Braga, 1996). The working knowledge and experiences of the Boston Police Department’s Youth 

Violence Strike Force detectives informed the 

strategic problem analysis of youth violence and 

led to the development of an innovation response 

to gang violence in Boston (Kennedy, Braga and 

Piehl, 1997). Boston Police detectives also played 

a central operational role in implementing the 

Ceasefire strategy that was associated with a near 

two-thirds reduction in youth homicide in Boston 

(Braga et al., 2001). Boston Police detectives continuously developed actionable intelligence on 

latent and active gang disputes, worked with 

federal law enforcement partners to identify and 

Figure 2. Type of Investigative Information Linked by Ballstics Imaging Matches 

Ballistic Evidence Link 

● Caliber of firearm 

Gun Crime 

Event 1 

Gun Crime 

Event 2 

Information that is 

always available 

● Crime type 

● Data of crime 

● Time of crime 

● Location of crime 

Information that is 

sometimes available 

and variable in quality 

● Witness interviews 

● Victim interviews 

● Arrested offender interviews 

● Intelligence on violent groups, 

individuals and conflicts in

 area 

● Other physical evidence 


(fingerprints, DNA, etc.)
 

If a gun is recovered 

● Type, make, model 

● First purchaser and dealer for

 traceable gun 

● Other physical evidence 

(fingerprints, DNA, etc.) 

Information that is 

always available 

● Crime type 

● Data of crime 

● Time of crime 

● Location of crime 

Information that is 

sometimes available 

and variable in quality 

● Witness interviews 

● Victim interviews 

● Arrested offender interviews 

● Intelligence on violent groups, 

individuals, and conflicts in 

area 

● Other physical evidence 


(fingerprints, DNA, etc.)
 

Source: Braga (2008b:296). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12 | New Perspectives in Policing 

shut down pipelines of illegal guns to gang members, and supported community-based and social 

service agencies in their efforts to provide services 

and opportunities to gang members who wanted 

them. 

There are obviously other examples of investigators 

leading innovative crime control and prevention 

efforts. For instance, detectives in the Mesa (Ariz.) 

Police Department assumed primary responsibility for the Crime Free Multi-Housing Program, 

convened meetings with residents and property owners, and implemented crime prevention 

through environmental design measures to address 

crime and quality-of-life problems (Cosgrove and 

Wycoff, 1999). These efforts were associated with 

a reported 70- to 80-percent reduction in calls for 

service (Cosgrove and Wycoff, 1999). In the Kirkholt 

Burglary Prevention Project in Rochdale, England, 

inspectors collaborated with probation officers 

and Home Office Crime Prevention Unit researchers to understand the nature of repeated burglary 

victimization in a public housing estate. Analysis 

revealed that once a home was burglarized, it was 

four times as likely to experience a repeat burglary 

relative to homes that had not been burglarized. 

The team then designed an innovative response to 

the problem that included the development of small 

neighborhood watches (called “cocooning”) around 

victimized apartments and the removal of coin-fed 

gas meters from victimized apartments that were 

attractive to burglars (Forrester, Chatterton and 

Pease 1988; Forrester et al., 1990). The intervention 

resulted in a 75-percent reduction for the entire 

Kirkholt estate, not just in the protected homes. 

While there has been growth and development in 

problem-oriented policing as an idea and a policing movement, its emergence has been slow. In 

2000, Michael Scott, the Director of the Center for 

Problem-Oriented Policing, reflected on 20 years of 

accumulated experience in problem-oriented policing and observed that the approach was still in its 

infancy and did not occupy a central role in many 

police departments (Scott, 2000). More recently, 

Weisburd and his colleagues (2010) lamented the 

lack of evaluation research on the crime-prevention 

benefits associated with problem-oriented policing. Nonetheless, the prominence of the concept 

has been influential in educating police executives 

and line-level officers on the possibilities of using 

analysis to form operational strategies and deal 

with ongoing crime problems. 

The rapid emergence of Compstat, a management 

accountability structure intended to focus police 

efforts to control crime through the relentless measurement of crime trends and patterns (Bratton, 

1998; Silverman, 1999), has pushed many police 

departments towards data-driven strategies to 

identify recurring crime problems. While Compstat 

would seem like an ideal platform to engage departmentwide problem-solving, its implementation 

and execution have been inconsistent. At its best, 

Compstat is a powerful analytic and administrative tool. However, a recent Police Foundation 

survey found that the Compstat process can 

often stifle creative problem-solving approaches 

through its stiff reinforcement of traditional topdown management structures and tendency to 

generate responses that do not go much beyond 

concentrating police resources at the locations of 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 13 

problems (Weisburd et al., 2003). To facilitate creativity, Compstat meetings need to be oriented 

towards deeper analyses of crime problems and 

actively encourage the implementation of alternative approaches to the standard time and place 

deployments used by many departments to deal 

with crime issues.4 Obviously, to move the work 

of criminal investigators towards crime control 

and prevention, police departments would also 

need to explicitly incorporate their work with the 

expanded focus of prevention into the Compstat 

process. 

Criminal investigators have also been driven 

towards prevention through the continuing 

development of what has been called “intelligence-led policing.” According to Jerry Ratcliffe 

(2008:89), the intelligence-led model is “a business model and managerial philosophy where 

data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal 

to an objective, decision-making framework that 

facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic 

management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.” 

In practice, the intelligence-led approach has 

renewed a perspective that assumes crime can 

be controlled through a police focus on active 

offenders via more sophisticated analytical and 

tracking capabilities. 

The adoption of this model has been accelerated 

by post-9/11 challenges of homeland security 

and the inclusion of local police departments in 

operations emanating from the 9/11 attacks and 

other violent terrorist actions across the globe.5 

Expanding transnational criminal networks 

have also challenged law enforcement agencies 

to improve their collection and analysis of criminal intelligence. While there are acknowledged 

similarities with the problem-oriented policing 

approach in the collection and analysis of data to 

drive innovative crime reduction strategies, the 

intelligence-led model focuses more exclusively 

on prolific offenders, criminally active groups 

and networks; engages a business model more 

allied with traditional hierarchical command 

models; and places a greater emphasis on detection and enforcement (Ratcliffe, 2008). 

To varying degrees, problem-oriented and intelligence-led approaches and Compstat have guided 

police departments towards strategic crime prevention based on timely data and intelligence 

collection, analysis and tailored responses. 

Coupled with strong public expectations that 

police can control crime (a demand perpetuated by the police themselves), ongoing crime 

problems and new homeland security responsibilities, some police departments have taken up 

the challenge of reorienting the role of criminal 

investigators towards crime control. 

Moving Investigators Towards Crime 

Control in the U.S., Australia and the 

U.K. 

While the work of criminal investigators in many 

U.S. police departments has changed little since 

the 1950s, we believe that the policing field is 

beginning to make steady strides towards revolutionary changes in the orientation of criminal 

investigators. Like the seminal ideas on dealing 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

14 | New Perspectives in Policing 

with crime in communities (Goldstein, 1979; Wilson 

and Kelling, 1982) and case studies documenting 

early community policing efforts (Sherman, Milton, 

and Kelly, 1973; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986) that preceded Harvard’s first Executive Session on Policing, 

there is a growing body of practical experience that 

suggests certain police departments have started to 

recognize the importance of criminal investigators 

in controlling crime rather than simply responding 

to unresolved incidents. In this section, we present 

descriptions of selected key elements of practical 

experiences in the United States, Australia and the 

United Kingdom that represent varying dimensions 

of the movement towards crime control. 

Milwaukee Police Department6 

The Milwaukee (Wis.) Police Department serves 

a city of 600,000 residents. Milwaukee is the 

22nd-largest city in the United States, with the 

seventh-highest poverty rate in the nation. The 

Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) employs 

2,000 sworn officers and 700 nonsworn personnel. Its Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) has 

an authorized strength of 243 detectives and 38 

supervisors. 

The MPD is characterized by at least two historical trends. First, beginning in the 1960s, it isolated 

itself from both the professional police community 

and from any form of community accountability. 

Partially as a consequence of this isolation, it has 

evolved into the 21st century as a police department stuck in mid-20th-century police thinking. 

When, for example, Edward A. Flynn was sworn in 

as police chief on January 7, 2008, he was only the 

second chief hired from outside the organization in 

its 154-year history. Second, from the 1960s on, the 

MPD has been dominated by a detective culture 

and strategy that further isolated it from professional development and Milwaukee communities. 

While the former is not central in this summary, a 

few comments about it will help readers to understand the complexity of the issues. 

During the 1940s and early 1950s, the MPD was a 

leader in the development of community relations 

programs, aspects of which were fundamental to 

the later development of community policing. The 

MPD not only developed one of the most highly 

touted community relations programs of the era, 

it developed training materials that were used by 

cities and police departments throughout the country. This orientation was fully abandoned, however, 

during the reign of Chief Harold Breier (1964-84), 

who rose to the top of the MPD through the detective bureau. His policies completely reversed the 

earlier trends. Breier led the adoption of programs 

and practices that isolated the MPD from the community. His reforms most powerfully affected the 

work of the detectives as they became isolated 

within the department and almost completely 

disconnected from the community they were supposed to be serving. The detectives became a power 

unto themselves, answerable only to themselves. 

Much needed to be done to bring the MPD into 

the 21st century. As recently as 2008, the MPD 

had no functioning system for producing reliable 

crime data in a timely manner and no effective 

crime analysis function. Two measures mattered: 

response time and clearance rates for violent crime. 

Crime meetings were held with senior commanders 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 15 

infrequently and using old data. The seven police 

districts were responsible for handling calls for 

service, taking crime reports and dealing with 

community problems. A mix of special uniformed units and the CIB targeted crime. 

In 2008, the MPD committed to fixing these 

problems and reorienting itself around its newly 

articulated mission of “reducing crime, fear 

and disorder.” The goal of the department was 

reformulated. It now was to create and support neighborhoods capable of sustaining civic 

life. This meant the MPD would be built around 

the newly christened Neighborhood Patrol 

Bureau consisting of the seven districts and the 

Neighborhood Task Force, which was an amalgamation of several specialty units under one 

commander. Its mission was to function in support of district-based anticrime initiatives. Patrol 

was strengthened in a variety of ways. District 

commanders were empowered. The Information 

Technology Division started producing accurate 

and timely crime data. The Crime Analysis Unit 

was expanded. Foot patrols were reinstituted. 

“Light duty” officers handled calls for minor 

offenses. Crime numbers started to decrease. 

Interestingly, even as the number of citizen 

contacts resulting from car stops and field interviews tripled, the number of citizen complaints 

declined. 

Daily crime briefings were held via conference 

call and webcam. At the table were the chief, his 

assistant chiefs and, in a first for MPD, the detective division commanders. Using conference 

call, the district commanders and the detective 

commanders, for the first time in the department’s history, talked to each other every day 

about the past 24 hours’ crime as well as emerging patterns and trends. It was, for CIB, the 

beginning of changes that many would experience as wrenching. 

Reforming CIB so that crime prevention would 

be part of its mission started with the personnel changes. Chief Flynn promoted a respected 

career investigator and appointed him to command the Neighborhood Patrol Bureau. He also 

promoted a district commander who had spent 

his career in uniformed patrol to lead CIB. With 

these changes, interbureau collaboration would 

begin and be modeled by commanders at the top. 

The new assistant chief was charged with making CIB part of the Milwaukee Police Department 

again and getting CIB to accept its role in crime 

control and prevention. The rationale that drove 

reconsidering the basic functioning of investigators was that detectives, in the course of their 

many investigations, accumulate vast amounts 

of information about victims, offenders, criminal 

networks, and the methods of operation of various criminal undertakings. Detectives also get a 

sense of the geographic distribution of criminals 

and their enterprises. The problem was this information was not shared with those who could use 

it to develop crime-prevention strategies: crime 

analysis and patrol. If detectives were considered intelligence officers, then part of their core 

mission would be to inform the deployments 

of patrol resources and to improve the skills 

of those officers in writing crime reports and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

16 | New Perspectives in Policing 

canvassing neighborhoods. In this view, the relationship between CIB and the Neighborhood Patrol 

Bureau would need to be virtually seamless, with 

detectives being responsible for the effectiveness 

of patrol operations in the control and prevention 

of those crimes about which they have learned so 

much in the course of prior investigations. 

Articulating a vision is far easier than implementing one. The greatest barrier to reform in CIB was a 

dysfunctional detective subculture. For instance, a 

major belief, deeply rooted in the cultural identity 

of CIB, was that patrol operated subordinate to CIB. 

It was often a very challenging exercise to reorient a 

proud and suspicious group of investigators towards 

crime prevention and intelligence functions and 

convince them that the reduction of crime, fear and 

disorder was every bit as much a part of their core 

function as it was for the uniformed members of the 

Neighborhood Patrol Bureau. 

Before CIB could be changed, the bureau first 

needed to be better managed. Several key management initiatives were established to better focus 

the CIB management team on top priorities. These 

management initiatives were designed to address 

a bureau that was rife with antiquated processes 

and procedures, lacked technology systems, paid 

little attention to performance measures, and 

lacked quality financial oversight. For instance, 

accounting for the expenditure of overtime funds 

was virtually nonexistent; grants frequently went 

unspent or were spent down in a hurry without 

careful planning near the end of budgetary cycles. 

In response to these financial management problems, an Investigation Management Division 

was created where the management of overtime, 

grants, clerical operations, budgets, personnel and 

resources were centralized. This has resulted in a 

much better managed CIB. Operational divisions 

now concentrate on their respective missions and 

the management division concentrates on CIB’s 

finances. 

Property crimes have large negative impacts on 

the economic stability of the city and the quality 

of life in neighborhoods. CIB upgraded the status 

of the investigation of property crime by assigning high-performing detectives to the property 

crimes division and mandating urgency in the 

investigation of these crimes. The name of the 

Crimes Against Property Division was changed to 

the Neighborhood Investigations Division to reflect 

the reality that people are the actual victims of 

property crimes and these events affect feelings of 

safety and security across affected neighborhoods. 

This new division was also the testing ground for 

an innovative decentralization pilot project that 

would eventually lead to the next phase of reforms 

in CIB. Rather than specializing in particular property crime types across large geographic areas, 

detectives were assigned to investigate all property 

crimes occurring in specific neighborhoods. The 

detectives were also required to work in close partnership with patrol officers to develop innovative 

problem-oriented solutions to address recurring 

crime problems such as hot spot locations, repeat 

victims and high-rate offenders. 

All of the CIB divisions have, for many years, been 

located at the Police Administration Building in the 

downtown section of the city. The decentralization 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 17 

pilot project assigned one detective lieutenant and eight detectives to the Third District, 

an area with high rates of violent and property 

crime. In addition to their criminal investigation, 

intelligence development and problem-solving 

responsibilities, the pilot project detectives had 

staff development duties. They acted as team 

leaders for groups of patrol officers who were 

assigned to the same geographic areas. The detectives worked on improving the report writing and 

field interview skills of “their” officers. Detectives 

were, for the first time, “embedded” in the dayto-day operations of patrol personnel. Detectives 

became familiar with district neighborhoods 

and the crime problems in those neighborhoods. 

The skill sets of the police officers assigned to the 

district were enhanced as well. The pilot program was not without its challenges. The district 

detectives felt isolated from their downtown 

counterparts and there were challenges with 

sharing information fluidly across district and 

CIB lines. Nevertheless, as detectives and officers 

continued to work together and share information, the MPD command staff considered the 

pilot program to be a success and an important 

step forward in the development of a geographically based structure of the CIB. 

The Vice Control Division and the Intelligence 

Division (which focused on gangs, primarily) 

were two high-performing units, if the measure was arrest activity. A careful examination 

of their work, however, revealed much redundancy. Both were characterized by high numbers 

of street- level drug arrests and both tended to be 

“informant-driven” rather than data-driven. The 

goal was to focus their efforts where they would 

have the greatest impact on crime and neighborhood stabilization. Therefore both divisions 

have been combined into the Organized Crime 

Division (OCD). This division works closely 

with the Intelligence Fusion Center to ensure 

its deployments and investigatory priorities are 

aligned with actionable intelligence information. 

Another very important reorganization was 

the creation of a Violent Crimes Division (VCD), 

which brought together the Homicide Division 

and those divisions responsible for robberies and aggravated assaults. Separating these 

units, each with its own commander, once again 

retarded information exchange. Homicide was 

totally closed off to the other units, reinforcing 

its elite status but stalling the crime prevention 

potential of focusing on the same offenders across 

crimes. Today’s victim of an aggravated assault 

with a firearm is often tomorrow’s homicide suspect. But in practice, homicide detectives shared 

information on a “need-to-know” basis and they 

determined need. The new configuration had 

one captain commanding all the units’ investigation of violent crimes. Briefings that were once 

reserved for homicide unit members were now 

open to all in both VCD and OCD, once again 

enhancing information flow and the potential 

for crime control. 

The reform process continued with the eventual merger of the Neighborhood Investigations 

Division and portions of the Violent Crimes 

Division to create three geographically based 

divisions. The new geographic divisions, each 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

18 | New Perspectives in Policing 

headed by a captain, are designed to replicate 

the early work of the pilot project, with one major 

exception — the detectives operate out of police 

headquarters. Each geographic division is responsible for two or three district areas. These divisions 

are designed to provide a one-stop shop for district 

commanders, who now have a single point of contact within CIB with whom they will coordinate 

their investigative support needs. The design also 

creates a peer-to-peer network that provides lieutenants and detectives the opportunity to work 

directly with their district counterparts on the dayto-day crime problems in neighborhoods for which 

they share geographic accountability. The peer-topeer network replaces a bureaucratic command 

center structure that operated as a clearinghouse 

for incoming felony investigations, with little 

thought being put into coordination, ownership or 

geographic accountability. 

The ability to move forward with the reforms at 

a rather rapid pace was enhanced by the implementation of several technology systems. CIB 

revolutionized criminal investigation information sharing with the districts through the use 

of a Microsoft SharePoint platform designed for 

collaboration. District commanders, supervisors 

and officers now have the ability to seek data on 

demand. The CIB’s SharePoint information-sharing 

platform has been so successful that each district 

and many other department divisions have developed robust SharePoint sites as well. Information 

now flows across bureau, district and division lines 

flawlessly. Not only has SharePoint successfully 

changed how information is exchanged, but the CIB 

worked with the Information Technology Division 

to develop an electronic case management system 

to replace an antiquated paper and pen system. 

The department’s Tiburon Records Management 

System had a built-in case management module that had never been activated due to outright 

resistance. The electronic case management system 

allows supervisors to monitor caseloads, ensure the 

completion of follow-up activities and hold their 

subordinates accountable. 

Since 2008, when the reform efforts in the MPD 

were commenced in both the patrol and investigations divisions, overall violent crime has declined 

by 31 percent while property crimes have decreased 

by 16 percent. Homicides declined 32 percent the 

first year and have remained steadily below the 

prior 20-year average. Furthermore, UCR clearance 

rates have improved. The clearance rates for homicide, rape, robbery, burglary and theft all exceed 

national standards for cities the size of Milwaukee 

and are improvements over prior years. Change has 

been experienced as stressful by some but it has 

clearly not interfered with achieving the agency’s 

mission. 

If one were to grade the Milwaukee experience of 

rethinking and reformulating the detective function, the grade would be an “incomplete.” The 

initiative is still unfolding. The MPD does deserve 

credit for seeking to address existing shortcomings 

of the traditional criminal-investigations process 

highlighted in existing academic research. In 

addition, the notion of including an “intelligence” 

component in the daily work of detectives is imaginative, consistent with the emerging philosophy of 

intelligence-led policing and responsive to issues 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 19 

related to police agencies’ approach to their 

homeland security responsibilities. 

It is important to recognize that the MPD tackled 

the difficult task of dealing with and changing 

distinct police subcultures. Certainly the feel and 

culture of a patrol squad room in a district station 

has similarities to the squad area of a detective 

unit. But there are strong and distinct differences 

between the subcultures of uniformed and nonuniformed policing. In Milwaukee, the selection 

and promotion process has historically strengthened a predictably strong detective subculture by 

giving criminal investigators preferential treatment in promotions to executive management 

positions in the department. Milwaukee senior 

leaders are to be commended for taking on the 

challenge of the changing subculture, as well as 

pursuing institutional reforms. The progress that 

has been made in both arenas in a relatively short 

period of time, while still incomplete, could be 

regarded as an “incomplete plus.” 

New York Police Department 

Since Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly was 

selected to lead the organization for a second time, 

the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has 

made a sustained effort to re-orient its investigative elements towards a nontraditional mission 

of prevention.7 With New York City having more 

than 8.3 million residents, the NYPD deals with 

a very large volume of crime. In 2008, the NYPD 

responded to 48,430 violent Index crimes and 

149,989 property Index crimes.8 Its many investigations are managed and supported by the 

Detective Bureau, the Organized Crime Control 

Bureau and the Real Time Crime Center (RTCC). 

The Organized Crime Control Bureau includes the 

Narcotics and Gang divisions that focus investigative resources on gang and drug problems (e.g., 

observation arrests, buy-and-bust operations and 

major case investigations). In addition to normal 

investigations, the Detective Bureau manages 

the NYPD Forensic Evidence Initiative and Cell 

Phone Theft Reduction Initiative. The Forensic 

Evidence Initiative focuses on optimizing the 

collection and analysis of DNA, fingerprint and 

ballistic evidence to reduce crime. The Cell Phone 

Theft Reduction Initiative focuses on the expeditious electronic tracking of stolen cell phones 

and the utilization of cell phone calling records 

to reduce cell phone theft. 

Commissioner Kelly recognized that the ability 

of the NYPD to control crime could be further 

enhanced by improving the ability of the organization to collect and manage crime and 

intelligence data and support investigative work 

through real-time crime analysis and strategic 

information products. Over the course of 2004, 

the NYPD Real Time Crime Center was established to track, analyze and respond to emerging 

crime trends, provide immediate investigative 

support, and facilitate strategic deployments of 

investigative resources. RTCC provides detectives 

with a wide range of NYPD, New York state, federal and open-source data; a conduit to Regional 

Intelligence Support Center data (New York/New 

Jersey High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area); and 

real-time support for homicides, shootings and 

other serious crimes. RTCC was designed to put 

relevant investigative information into the hands 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20 | New Perspectives in Policing 

of detectives before they leave the squad room, at 

crime scenes and over the entire course of the 

investigation (including phone information, victim and suspect information, pattern analysis and 

mapping analysis). RTCC Investigative Response 

Vans respond directly to the scenes of homicides, 

shootings and other major crimes and provide critical real-time investigative and intelligence support 

to the detectives in the field. RTCC also warehouses 

investigative data for future use and has specialized databases for investigators, including parolee, 

probationer, summons and pawn shop databases. 

The NYPD also developed the Detective Bureau’s 

computerized Enterprise Case Management System 

(ECMS) that functions as a records management, 

case management, intelligence storage, quality 

assurance and performance measurement system. 

ECMS helps to identify gaps in the investigative process by tracking a wide range of activities such as 

canvases for witnesses and videos, interviews and 

interrogations, prisoner debriefings, computer 

queries, intelligence gathering and dissemination, physical evidence collection and analysis, 

electronic surveillance, identification procedures, 

investigative records acquisition, prevention tactics, 

and case-closing results and justifications. ECMS 

provides Detective Bureau supervisors and executives with critical information regarding arrest, 

investigative and intelligence activity for individual 

detectives as well as entire detective squads. This 

enables the NYPD to hold detective managers and 

individual detectives accountable for the quality of 

their work, the results of their investigations and 

their overall performance. When issues arise in the 

quality of detective work, the NYPD addresses them 

through formal centralized and decentralized 

training regarding investigative techniques and 

prevention tactics as well as individual supervisorto-detective quality assurance and performance 

conferrals. 

Compstat still serves as the NYPD’s central management and accountability structure to ensure 

that the department’s executives and middle 

managers are doing their jobs in controlling crime. 

Compstat, however, has evolved to include the 

review of precinct-based investigative activities 

that are designed to prevent crime from occurring. 

The Deputy Commissioner of Operations and Chief 

of Detectives review data regarding crime conditions and detective activity, and hold all Detective 

Bureau executives and supervisors accountable 

for their understanding of crime problems, use 

of resources, and development of strategies and 

tactics to prevent the next crime from occurring. 

To support the Compstat process, the Organized 

Crime Control Bureau and Detective Bureau conduct smaller scale versions of Compstat. 

In general, the Detective Bureau’s reorientation 

towards prevention involves intelligence collection and analysis to identify and understand 

repeat offenders, gangs, criminally active groups 

as well as persons, conditions and locations that 

cause ongoing crime problems. Precinct-based 

detective squads have geographic responsibility 

for investigating as well as preventing felonies and 

serious misdemeanors. The Detective Bureau conducts focused criminal investigations and criminal 

enterprise dismantlement operations to prevent 

identified high-rate offenders from committing 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 21 

additional crimes. A premium is placed on 

using post-arrest investigative tactics to ensure 

successful prosecutions of offenders. Detectives 

are encouraged to collaborate with patrol personnel to utilize alternative crime-prevention 

tactics such as pretext interviews, confidential 

informant operations and overt surveillance to 

address criminal recidivists. When patterns are 

detected, individual investigations will be aggregated into a pattern and transferred to centralized 

investigative units for further focused action. 

For example, the NYPD established a Central 

Robbery Division to deal with ongoing robbery 

problems by employing both traditional and 

alternative investigative techniques with the goal 

of preventing the next robbery from occurring. 

The NYPD approach requires extensive collaboration and coordination within the organization 

and with its external partners. Emphasis is 

placed on training and having a well-developed 

set of procedures regarding basic investigative 

techniques, required computer queries, proper 

methods of collecting physical evidence, intelligence analysis, identification procedures, 

electronic surveillance and best practices in 

developing alternative problem-solving strategies. The NYPD also officially recognizes 

exemplary investigative prevention efforts to 

encourage other detectives to engage similar 

work. 

Victoria Police, Australia 

The Victoria Police provides police services to the 

citizens of Victoria State, Australia.9 With a population of some 5.3 million residents in a mix of 

urban, suburban and rural communities, Victoria 

is the second largest state in Australia. In 2007­

08, the Victoria Police responded to 42,947 crimes 

against the person and 281,184 property crimes.10 

The organization of the Victoria Police is reflective 

of its large size; the agency has some 11,100 sworn 

personnel with 2,400 civilian staff spread across 

339 police stations. The force is spread across a 

vast area of nearly 92,000 square miles with some 

central departments and five regional divisions. A 

centrally based division, the Crime Department 

is responsible for “major crimes” (e.g., homicide 

and organized crime) while “volume crimes” (e.g., 

burglary and theft) are usually handled by investigators in one of the five regional divisions of the 

Victoria Police. 

In 2005, under the leadership of then Chief 

Commissioner Christine Nixon, the Victoria 

Police initiated a review of the existing structure and practices of the Crime Department. 

Over the next several years, the Victoria Police 

implemented sweeping changes to the Crime 

Department so it would be better positioned to 

prevent, detect, and prosecute major crimes. The 

new model was designed according to the following principles (Boston Consulting Group, 2005:4): 

●	 Strategic because modern policing is as much 

about staying ahead of criminals as it is about 

catching up with them. 

●	 Dynamic because the ability of the police to 

prevent, investigate and prosecute crime must 

evolve at least as quickly as criminals’ ability 

to find new or more effective ways to profit 

from it. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

22 | New Perspectives in Policing 

●	 Collaborative because the magnitude of the 

challenge is such that investigators need to be 

able to draw on capabilities from across the 

force, as well as from partners outside it. 

●	 Developmental because the model must 

provide the means to continuously improve 

the skills and processes needed to anticipate 

and meet evolving challenges. 

While the implementation of a new major crimemanagement model required many innovations, 

two elements are particularly relevant for our 

broader discussion on the work of criminal 

investigators: (1) the restructuring of the Crime 

Department so investigators’ work would be more 

appropriately focused on dealing with crime 

problems, and (2) the development of a new performance measure to better manage the work of 

investigators. In this section, we briefly review 

these two innovations. 

Figure 3 shows the areas of responsibility and 

the focus of the work undertaken by each of the 

investigative squads under the configuration of 

the Victoria Police Crime Department prior to the 

implementation of the new major crime management model. 

Figure 3. Former Configuration of the Victoria Police Crime Department 

Crime Dept. Task Forces 

Commander 

Business 

Services 

Strategic 

Directions 

Exhibit 

Mgt. 

Organised 

Crime 

Tactical 

Response 

Organised 

Crime 

Org. Motor 

Vehicle Theft 

Violent 

Crime 

Homicide 

Arson 

Missing Persons 

Cold Case 

Sexual Crimes 

Serious 

Crime 

Armed Offenders 

Prison 

Casino 

Asian 

Major 

Drug 

Investigation 1 

Investigation 2 

Investigation 3 

Major 

Fraud 

Initial Action 

Investigation 1 

Investigation 2 

Investigation 3 

Computer 

Crime 

Criminal 

Proceeds 

Source: Boston Consulting Group (2005:9) 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 23 

Within their areas, the squads were largely 

autonomous in determining their investigative 

priorities. As described in the Boston Consulting 

Group (2005) report, squad personnel determined 

how the squad’s resources — people, technologies 

and other assets — were deployed in responding 

to crimes. Since investigators tend to stay in a 

squad for long periods of time, they tend to build 

very deep expertise in investigating and prosecuting particular types of crimes. Periodically, 

cross-force, multidisciplinary task forces were 

formed to deal with specific, high-priority matters. While this model served the Victoria Police 

well, it was considered too static to deal with new 

crime challenges and not well-suited to preventing crimes. As the Boston Consulting Group 

(2005: 9-10) observed: 

Aside from the formally established taskforces, there is little joint work across 

the squads, or between the squads and 

investigators in the Regions. Resources 

— human and other — tend to be ‘siloed’ 

in particular areas. Because decisions on 

priorities and the allocation of resources 

are made inside the squads and divisions, 

it is difficult to ‘scramble’ a high calibre, 

cross-functional, properly resourced 

team to deal with an immediate or 

emerging threat that falls outside the 

squads’ charters or cuts across several 

of them. The squads, working within set 

budgets and still accountable for their 

ongoing workloads and business-asusual objectives, can understandably 

resist losing skilled personnel and other 

resources to taskforces or joint operations. And, because there is no clear, 

force-w ide understanding on how 

resources are deployed and priorities set, 

there is no shared view on whether these 

arrangements are the best the force can 

muster to deal with specific incidents or 

threats. 

Figure 4 presents the configuration of the Victoria 

Police Crime Department under the new crimemanagement model. Given the design principles 

noted above, several features of the model should 

be noted in changing the work of investigators. 

Investigative work is managed through 16 sections of criminal investigators responsible for 

substantive crime areas and working in established crime task forces. While the staffing of the 

16 sections is relatively stable, the new model 

allows for easy movement of investigators across 

sections based on need or new investigative 

connections across substantive areas. The assignment of personnel is flexible and facilitates the 

rapid development of new work groups should a 

new crime challenge be uncovered. Crime theme 

desks, composed of nonsworn analysts and sworn 

personnel, are charged with examining intelligence and crime data to monitor existing trends 

for new problems and persistent issues in 26 specific areas. The crime theme desks work with the 

investigative sections and any new work groups 

to better understand the dynamics, situations, 

and relationships generating crime problems 

through more in-depth analysis. The information products produced by the crime theme desks 

are shared with the Crime Strategic Advisory 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

24 | New Perspectives in Policing 

Group and Corporate Governance Group that work 

directly under the Assistant Commissioner that 

commands the Crime Department. These data are 

used to set investigative priorities, make decisions 

about personnel and resources in particular crime 

areas, and measure performance of particular work 

groups in controlling crime. 

The Victoria Police also developed a new performance measure for investigative work to help senior 

managers hold line-level investigators accountable for addressing and resolving priority crime 

problems — weekly time attribution. When investigators submit their time sheets, they now report 

information on the work performed — proactive 

or reactive and case type — along with the hours 

worked. These data enable managers to look at the 

number of investigative hours invested in particular 

crime themes and the types of investigative actions 

taken by work groups and investigators. Coupled 

with crime data and a case management database 

that documents specific actions within particular 

investigations, the time attribution performance 

measure allows senior managers to ensure that 

the work undertaken fits departmental priorities. 

These data also help managers assess whether 

investigations are being handled properly and 

whether existing resource investments are having 

the desired crime control impacts. 

Figure 4. Current Configuration of the Victoria Police Crime Department 

Detective 

Superintendent Tasking

and Coordination - 

Operations (3)

Detective

 Superintendent - 

CSG (3)

Assistant Commissioner Crime 

Manager

Operations 

Support

Crime Strategic Advisory Group Corporate Governance Group 

Operations Support

Crime

Secretariat

Finance

Workcover

People 

Performance and 

Development

Management & 

Administrative

Support

Workgroup

Performace and 

Delvelopment

Information

Technology

HR

Logistics &

Exhibits Office

Armed Crime Task Force

Clandestine Laboratory Squad

Crime Tasked Operations

Drug Task Force

Homicide Squad

Purana Task Force

Santiago Taskforce

Sexual Offenses and 

Child Abuse Unit

Arson & Explosives Squad

Belier Task Force

Criminal Proceeds

E-Crime

Fraud Squad

Org. Motor Vehicle Theft Squad

Petra Task Force

Sexual Crimes Squad

Crime Strategy

Group

Specialist Resources

Forensic

Lawyers

Forensic

Accountants

Listening Device

Monitors

Transcribers

Criminal 

Profiler

Tasking and 

Coordination Support

Cultural Liaison

Officers

Crime Theme Desks 

Consorting Kidnapping Extortion &

Blackmail

Product

Construction Sex Crimes Suspicious Deaths

 Missing 

Persons E-Crime Identity Crime

 Criminal 

Proceeds

Firearms 

Trafficking

 Vehicle

Theft Corruption Organized Crime Gangs Vulnerable Groups Drugs Robbery Fraud Gaming andRacing

Corrections Industry Related

Crime Arson Family Violence

Burglary &

Theft

Politically

Motivated

Crime Theme Desks 

Provided by

Security Intelligence Group

412 St. Kilda Road 452 Flinders Street
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 25 

United Kingdom Police Agencies 

Over the last 30 years, criminal investigators 

in the U.K. have been pushed towards engaging crime control as a central part of their work 

through the adoption of professional standards 

that represented a new philosophy of partnership and innovation.11 A series of crises resulted 

in the establishment of several national commissions and critical reviews of past practices. These 

assessments made strong recommendations for 

sweeping changes to the work of criminal investigators and provided an important opportunity 

to advance a reform agenda. In our discussion of 

strategic crime-control work in the U.K., we highlight the importance of embracing a professional 

development model, clear business practices, and 

the institutionalization of standards and training as methods of changing both the culture and 

work of criminal investigators. 

The effort and commitment of a number of professional organizations such as Centrex, the National 

Centre for Policing Excellence, the Association of 

Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and today’s National 

Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) deserve 

much credit in stimulating change and enhancing the quality and breadth of investigative work 

in 43 police agencies in England and Wales. These 

organizations continue to drive the adoption of 

innovative practices through the production and 

dissemination of practical guides and the delivery of high-quality professional development 

opportunities for investigators. 

Investigators in the U.K. police forces operate 

very differently today when compared to their 

predecessors from the 1970s. This transformation did not occur quickly and without anguish. 

Particular commissions in the 1980s and early 

1990s, such as the Royal Commission on Criminal 

Procedure (RCCP), the Byford Commission and 

the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) 

that reviewed police activities of the previous 

decades, served as central catalysts for reform 

in policing in the U.K. In particular high-profile 

cases,12 the Commissions suggested that, at times, 

the ends — arrest and conviction — justified some 

very problematic means — ignoring exculpatory 

evidence or operating outside the law. These 

reviews brought scandal to U.K. police forces 

and exposed some concerning patterns of corruption. In particular, concerns were raised over 

appropriate confinement and confession procedures for suspects and the noteworthy absence of 

sound technology and science in investigations. 

As a result of these miscarriages of justice at the 

hands of criminal investigators, the management 

of investigators became far more structured and 

standardized. Key management elements now 

include commitments to individual and organizational professional development, adhering to 

routine performance review and measurement, 

and engaging a philosophy of managing risk and 

minimizing harm. 

Standards and Professional Development. 

Both the RCCP and RCCJ strongly suggested 

that U.K. police investigators needed to become 

more professional and better trained (Home 

Office, 1993; RCCP, 1981). Historically, investigators were trained on the job by more senior 

officers who themselves had received little more 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

26 | New Perspectives in Policing 

than on-the-job training. Now, in addition to other 

competencies, every investigator completes the 

Management of Serious Crime Course before beginning work as an investigator. There are levels of 

investigators, and demonstration of success in each 

level is required for advancement to the next. The 

Professionalizing Investigation Programme (PIP), a 

joint program of NPIA and ACPO, aims to “improve 

the professional competence of all police officers 

and staff who are tasked with conducting investigations.”13 PIP provides development opportunities 

not just for new investigators but also offers an array 

of training and development offerings across three 

levels to maintain proficiency throughout a career. 

The Senior Investigative Officer (SIO) is a PIP level 

three with status designating the investigator as 

being certified and credentialed to investigate 

homicides. SIOs must have national accreditation 

that requires annual reaccreditation based on evidence of continual professional development. The 

SIO is the most accomplished of the investigators. 

PIP endeavors to improve the management of all 

aspects of the investigative process and includes 

training and assessment (Neyroud and Disley, 2007; 

Stelfox, 2007). 

There are also initiatives in the U.K. to develop 

values-based leadership and management training. 

For example, the Core Leadership Development 

Programme exposes all ranks to the qualities 

of leadership and supervision and devises standards for training and accreditation of those who 

manage and supervise investigations. The establishment of the NPIA and its very mission signals 

the commitment to fostering a “culture of continuous improvement” (Neyroud and Disley, 2007:556). 

Examination of the NPIA website reveals a number 

courses, professional development opportunities, 

and training on and description of standards.14 

The National Intelligence Model (NIM), created by 

the Police Reform Act of 2002, is the operational 

business model for law enforcement, adopted by 

ACPO and implemented across police forces in 

England and Wales (Association of Chief Police 

Officers, 2005, 2007). Among several ambitions, 

NIM strives to push police officers and investigators away from simply responding to crime 

incidents towards the control and prevention 

of recurring crime problems. NIM ensures that 

the operational disciplines and resources within 

a local command unit (many are the size of a 

medium-sized U.S. police agency) are deployed 

and coordinated effectively. NIM also introduces 

standard national intelligence-led approaches to 

dealing with identified crime problems through 

three core components — prevention, intelligence 

and enforcement — and draws upon a menu of suggested tactics (Association of Chief Police Officers, 

2005). When compared to past practices, NIM 

represents an important new model for deploying 

investigative resources based on data collection 

and analysis in a proactive manner, enhancing 

standards in the investigative process, and making 

professional development central to improving the 

work of criminal investigators. Its business model 

demonstrates a commitment to a new order for U.K. 

investigators via its clearly articulated standards 

and intentional push towards problem-solving and 

strategic partnerships in investigative work. 

Inspection and Accountability. U.K. police services are now routinely subjected to internal and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 27 

external review and inspection through a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms range 

from the individual investigators’ professional 

development review (PDR) to force comparisons 

on performance by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 

Constabulary (HMIC). Investigators prepare their 

own PDR to provide “examples and evidence of 

good performance and competence” as well as to 

set forth areas for professional development that 

are aligned with their force (Neyroud and Disley, 

2007). PDRs are reviewed with supervisors and 

serve as a benchmark and a roadmap for personal 

professional development. PDRs are utilized and 

considered at times of promotion and job change. 

The continuous public monitoring of police force 

performance is required by Parliament and facilitated by HMIC and ACPO.15 The HMIC website 

provides access to the HMIC Report Card, a comprehensive comparison of force performance. The 

website includes a tool that allows the viewer to 

select and compare individual forces with one 

another. A common minimum standard comparing a variety of policing processes (including 

investigative work) is used to benchmark and 

rank each force in England and Wales. The website also includes detailed information on the 

value produced by monetary expenditures. These 

are, of course, not the only methods of review and 

accountability in the U.K. There are local criminal justice review boards and individual police 

force websites that provide data to the public on 

detection and other police activities. 

Management of Risk and Minimizing Harm. In 

accordance with the strategic business plan set 

forth by NIM, other strategic initiatives and specific operations illustrate the new emphasis on 

crime control and strategic partnerships. MultiAgency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA) 

is a national strategy that is implemented 

locally and managed by criminal investigators. 

MAPPA requires the cooperative work of three 

“Responsible Authorities” (police, probation and 

prison services) in their joint management of 

high-risk individuals to prevent new crimes from 

happening.16 Traditional investigative activities 

are employed by the coordinating team as necessary; however, their primary role is to prevent 

crimes by likely offenders through the analysis 

and sharing of crime and intelligence data and 

coordinated action by partnering agencies. 

Operation Haul, completed in 2008, represents 

an application of the NIM business model that 

illustrates how criminal investigators have 

shifted their work towards crime control in the 

U.K. Operation Haul, and other major investigations, was composed of teams that focused on 

integrating the key NIM elements of prevention, 

intelligence and enforcement as means to investigate a string of crime incidents to apprehend 

offenders and to prevent additional crimes from 

occurring. Operation Haul was a multiyear investigation that encompassed five regional police 

agencies and resulted in the arrest and conviction of a criminal network responsible for thefts 

in country homes, businesses and banks over 

several years.17 The investigation involved a blend 

of traditional activities, higher level interdiction 

efforts and innovative crime control actions. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

28 | New Perspectives in Policing 

Strategic crime control and prevention efforts 

by investigators can be seen in many aspects of 

Operation Haul. Efforts of the regional crime group 

(a selected team of officers drawn from five forces 

to create a large working group) included a proactive arm within the enforcement team. That group 

was charged with using intelligence and analysis to 

prevent the targeted criminal network from committing new crimes. The Operation used frustration 

and disruption techniques and other police activity 

to prevent offenses from occurring. These activities 

included using heightened uniform patrol in areas 

where intelligence analysis suggested new crimes 

were likely to occur. In these areas, the criminal 

network was targeted for minor offenses, such as 

traffic violations; and when possible, the officers 

made arrests of, and executed warrants on, network 

members who committed low-level crimes. 

Operation Haul also focused tightly on trying to 

prevent repeat victimization by dealing with the 

repeat theft of cash at particular Automatic Teller 

Machine (ATM) locations, and the repeated burglary and robbery of antiques and other property 

at country estates. In an effort to reduce the criminal network’s success with ATMs, the inspector 

contacted the British Banking Association to 

seek funding and support to target-harden ATMs 

that were regularly being ripped out of walls 

using industrial backhoes. The British Banking 

Association was appreciative of the team’s outreach efforts and enthusiastically cooperated. The 

investigators then collaborated with the Arts and 

Antiques Register to limit the criminals’ ability to 

make profits through the subsequent sales of stolen 

goods. The partnership with the Arts and Antiques 

Register was designed to make the resale of stolen 

goods very difficult and to facilitate the recovery of 

stolen property being sold in antique sales markets. 

Finally, in an effort to engage citizens living in or 

caring for large manor homes, investigators and 

crime prevention officers worked with the National 

Trust Country House Owners Association to create 

Manor Watch — a neighborhood watch group networked around large country estates. Manor Watch 

distributed crime-prevention advice that included 

warnings from previous victims, enabled targethardening efforts by crime prevention officers, and 

facilitated the flow of intelligence from community 

members to investigators. 

Setting up productive communications with citizen 

groups and private businesses required securing 

support from key stakeholders across several force 

jurisdictions (similar in size to U.S. counties) such 

as the county high sheriffs, area members of parliament and other locally elected officials. Information 

sharing included personal briefings to these groups 

to explain the nature of recurring crime problems 

and the steps being taken by the police to address 

these issues. While these briefings were controlled 

in what sensitive information was distributed, the 

detailed dialogue on a live investigation was an 

extremely unusual move for U.K. investigators 

(the audience of victims and their elected bodies 

were unaccustomed to dealing with the police in 

these matters). Nevertheless, the work of investigators to secure these community partnerships was 

highly productive. The Manor Watch partnership 

produced actionable intelligence that furthered 

the law enforcement goals of Operation Haul while 

challenging victims to deal with their own security 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 29 

issues that were causing them to be attractive targets for the criminal network.18 

Conclusion 

Criminal investigators were at the forward edge 

of the reform/professional strategy of policing 

that dominated police thinking and practice from 

the 1930s to the 1970s. Despite the evolution of 

community and problem-oriented policing during more recent decades, the functioning, status 

and organizational role of criminal investigators 

have changed little. Nevertheless, a small number of police departments in the United States 

and Australia, and police departments in the 

United Kingdom, have recognized that the work 

of criminal investigators needs to be expanded 

from a sole focus on traditional investigative 

activities towards a broader strategic crimecontrol orientation. It is important to note that 

none of the police departments discussed here 

has abandoned the important investigative task 

of holding offenders accountable for their crimes. 

This remains a central function of criminal investigators. However, these police departments 

have recognized that investigators can generate 

tremendous value when involved in strategic 

crime-control efforts. Many investigators have 

rich insights on recurring crime problems and 

can be used much more creatively in dealing 

with the underlying conditions, situations and 

dynamics that cause crime problems to persist. 

The change efforts described here can be viewed 

as bringing criminal investigations into line with 

community policing by incorporating some of 

the basic principles of problem-oriented policing into their work. Goldstein’s (1979, 1990) 

influential framework of problem identification, 

problem analysis, creative response development 

and ongoing assessment undergirds the varying approaches used in Milwaukee, New York 

City, Victoria and across the United Kingdom to 

move criminal investigators towards controlling 

crime. Research has found this analytic approach 

to addressing recurring crime problems to be 

an effective way for police departments to control crime (Braga, 2008a; Weisburd et al., 2010). 

Spreading these ideas from uniformed patrol to 

criminal investigators seems like a promising 

way to orient them towards crime control that 

is well-rooted in a growing base of scientific evidence on its crime-prevention benefits. 

There were other common strategic change 

themes that arose from the efforts of these 

selected departments to move the work of criminal investigators towards crime control. Some 

of the key ideas included improving crime and 

intelligence data collection and analysis, implementing appropriate internal management 

accountability structures, developing professional standards and relevant performance 

measures, and integrating a wide range of partners into the process. In this paper, we have 

focused mainly on making the linkages between 

case investigation and crime control. This leads 

to an important and nontrivial organizational 

problem: how should the various responsibilities for proactive and problem-solving work be 

allocated between criminal investigators and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30 | New Perspectives in Policing 

patrol officers? There are varying ways this division 

of labor may be accomplished: 

●	 Assign detectives to patrol units, and work with 

those units. 

●	 Expect detectives to provide intelligence, but 

leave problem-solving responsibilities with 

patrol groups. 

●	 Hold detectives responsible for specific crimecontrol projects. 

●	 Utilize detectives (with their special skills) as a 

deployable central resource upon which other 

units can draw at will. 

Clearly, this list is not intended to be exhaustive 

and we believe that police organizations need to 

engage a thoughtful planning process to make the 

organizational changes that best suit their operational environment. The experiences in Milwaukee, 

New York, Victoria and the United Kingdom provide some guidance on how these changes might be 

implemented in varying organizations and settings. 

In moving criminal investigators towards a more 

active role in crime control, police executives are 

forced to confront the powerful culture of criminal investigators and the associated mythology that 

surrounds their work. Obviously, changing police 

organizations and their cultures is very difficult 

work. As Dorothy Guyot (1979) famously described, 

creating change in police departments can be like 

“bending granite.” The process will take considerable political will and persistence by the chief 

executive and other true believers in the department. However, as the reform work described in 

Milwaukee suggests, changing the deep-rooted 

detective culture is by no means insurmountable. 

Based on our review, we certainly believe that it is 

a process that is well worth engaging and has great 

potential to improve public safety. 

Endnotes 

1. In many U.S. police departments, patrol officers 

play a central role in primary investigative activities, and also participate in secondary and tertiary 

investigative activities. In the United Kingdom, 

partly empowered civilians handle primary investigative activities. 

2. Generally, about 21 percent of Index crimes were 

cleared by arrest during the 1970s, according to 

the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program. An 

offense is “cleared by arrest” or solved for crime 

reporting purposes when at least one person is: (1) 

arrested; (2) charged with the commission of the 

offense; and (3) turned over to the court for prosecution. An offense is also counted as cleared by 

arrest if certain “exceptional” conditions pertain, 

including suicide of the offender; double murder; 

deathbed confession; offender killed by police or 

citizen; confession by offender already in custody; 

extradition denied; victim refuses to cooperate in 

prosecution; warrant is outstanding for felon but 

prior to arrest the offender dies of natural causes or 

as a result of an accident, or is killed in the commission of another offense; or, handling of a juvenile 

offender either orally or by written notice to parents in instances involving minor offenses where 

no referral to juvenile court is customarily made. 

Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook 

of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, http://www. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 31 

albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4202007.pdf 

(accessed June 10, 2009). 

3. For instance, Cordner and Biebel (2005) 

reviewed the problem-oriented policing activities of the San Diego Police Department, an 

agency internationally known for its departmentwide commitment to the approach, and 

found that only 13 percent of detectives were 

involved in active problem-solving efforts. The 

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) surveyed 547 police agencies and reported that only 

12.4 percent of departments had implemented 

community policing and instituted some major 

changes, such as geographic decentralization of 

detectives to specific areas, to the structure of 

the investigative function (Cosgrove and Wycoff, 

1999). The PERF report authors further noted that 

the problem-solving function was still primarily assigned to the patrol division and in only a 

handful of departments were detectives expected 

to assist in problem solving. 

4. However, we should not forget that “shallow 

problem solving” (Braga and Weisburd, 2006) that 

is often characteristic of Compstat and other similar analytic efforts, assists many departments to 

deal with routine and minor matters for which 

full-blown analysis is unnecessary or redundant 

— given the circumstances. 

5. It can be argued that the 9/11 attacks and 

the need to prevent such attacks in the future 

contributed to the current reconsideration of 

detective work. The desperate need for intelligence about future attacks gave evidence that 

the investigation of past events for the purpose 

of prosecution, while certainly appropriate in the 

pursuit of justice, was insufficient for stopping the 

next terrorist attack. Moreover, as the parallels 

between common crime and terroristic crime 

became more apparent, the same issues began 

to surface about criminal investigation in general. “Asking the next question” — i.e., pursuing 

the problem that gave rise to the case — appears 

to be relevant to routine urban police work. 

6. The material in this section is based on the professional experiences of authors Chief Edward A. 

Flynn and Professor George L. Kelling in working 

with the Milwaukee Police Department to reform 

the work of their detectives. 

7. We would like to thank Commissioner Raymond 

Kelly, Chief of Detectives Phil T. Pulaski (formerly 

Deputy Commissioner Operations) and Deputy 

Commissioner Michael Farrell for arranging a 

one-day site visit that included presentations 

by key investigative personnel and focus group 

discussions (September 30, 2008). This brief 

description of the New York Police Department’s 

efforts to reform the work of their detectives is 

drawn from materials and qualitative insights 

provided during that site visit. 

8. For more information, see http://www2.fbi.gov/ 

ucr/cius2008/index.html (accessed November 14, 

2010). 

9. We would like to t hank former Chief 

Commissioner Christine Nixon and current Chief 

Commissioner Simon Overland for arranging a 

two-day site visit that included presentations 

by key investigative personnel and focus group 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

32 | New Perspectives in Policing 

discussions (March 16-17, 2009). We particularly 

would like to thank Superintendent Craig Howard 

for his helpful presentation and in-depth discussion of changes to the Crime Department. This brief 

description of the Victoria Police Department’s 

efforts to reform the work of their investigators 

is drawn from materials and qualitative insights 

provided during that site visit. Interested readers 

should also consult a recent report by the Boston 

Consulting Group (2005) on the development of a 

new model for the work of criminal investigators. 

10. The property crime rate in Victoria includes all 

offenses relating to property including stolen and 

damaged property (such as graffiti and other forms 

of vandalism). The inclusion of these offenses in 

the property crime category explains the relatively high, by U.S. UCR standards, property crime 

rate in Victoria. Victoria Police Annual Report, 

2007-2008, http://www.police.vic.gov.au/content. 

asp?Document_ID=49 (accessed June 30, 2009). 

11. We would like to thank a number of police 

executives for time spent in discussion that led 

to greater insight and enhanced understanding 

of the U.K. experience of criminal investigators. 

The in-depth conversation and consultation combined with the sharing of written materials by Chief 

Constable and Chief Executive Peter Neyroud of the 

National Police Improvement Agency contributed 

to the understanding of the professional development scheme in U.K. policing and its contribution 

to culture change (March 17, 2010). Appreciation is 

also extended to Detective Superintendent Mark 

Warwick, Thames Valley Police, Counter Terrorism 

Intelligence Unit South East, for several telephone 

communications (March and May 2010) that facilitated understanding of Operation Haul and the 

various applications of the National Intelligence 

Model to the work of investigators. 

12. Revelations of specific cases — the Confait case 

(a homicide), and the Guilford Four and McGuire 

Seven (both involving terrorism and the IRA) — 

prompted the formation of the RCCP and later the 

RCCJ as well as the Police and Criminal Evidence 

Act (1984). In these cases, suspects were convicted 

and served a number of years in prison before the 

detective work was exposed as fraudulent. The 

review commissions uncovered the concerning common problem across these cases that the 

responsible detectives had little training, management and supervision. There have been several 

public examinations of policing in the U.K. and a 

number of standing bodies and commissions that 

provide oversight. Those referenced here are small 

in number and are meant to be illustrative and not 

exhaustive. 

13. See http://www.npia.police.uk/en/10093.htm 

(accessed May 8, 2010). 

14. For additional information, see http://www.npia. 

police.uk/en/5237.htm for courses in investigative 

skills, core programmes, specialist programmes, 

and further links to PIP and SIO (accessed 

November 14, 2010). 

15. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s 

(HMIC’s) tagline on the website is “inspecting policing in the public interest.” http://www.hmic.gov.uk/ 

Pages/home.aspx (accessed May 8, 2010). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 33 

16. See http://www.npia.police.uk/en/10510.htm 

(accessed May 8, 2010). 

17. Operation Haul was activated in November 

2005 and culminated in 2008 with the arrest 

and later conviction of multiple members of the 

criminal network known as the Johnson Clan. It 

is difficult to account with specificity the actual 

amount of cash and antiques that was stolen 

but it is estimated to be in excess of £30 million 

and possibly £80 million which is in accordance 

with court records and other public accounts. 

Interested readers should consult “Operation 

Haul” in the Investigative Practice Journal, 

September 25, 2008. 

18. Many of the procedures utilized in Operation 

Haul such as managing victims and witnesses, 

managing investigations and more are described 

in Practice Advice for the Implementation of a 

Volume Crime Management Model (National 

Centre for Policing Excellence, 2004). This is an 

excellent resource for further reading. 

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Policing Improvement Agency. 

Bayley, David (ed.). 1998. What Works in Policing. 

New York: Oxford University Press. 

Bloch, Peter, and David Bell. 1976. Managing 

Criminal Investigations: The Rochester System. 

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Bloch, Peter, and Donald Weidman. 1975. 

Managing Criminal Investigations: Prescriptive 

Package. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office. 

Boston Consulting Group. 2005. A Major Crime 

Management Model for the Victoria Police. Final 

report to the Victoria Police. 

Braga, Anthony A. 2001. “The Effects of Hot Spots 

Policing on Crime.” Annals of the American 

Academy of Political and Social Science, 578: 

104-125. 

Braga, Anthony A. 2008a. Problem-Oriented 

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John E. Rolph, Eugene S. Meieran, and Carol V. 

Petrie. National Research Council and National 

Academy of Engineering. Washington, DC: The 

National Academies Press. 

Braga, A nt hony A., Dav id Hu reau, a nd 

Christopher Winship. 2008. “Losing Faith? Police, 

Black Churches, and the Resurgence of Youth 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

34 | New Perspectives in Policing 

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Braga, Anthony A., Andrew V. Papachristos, and 

David Hureau. 2010. “The Concentration and 

Stability of Gun Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 

1980-2008.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 26 

(1): 33-53. 

Braga, Anthony A., and Glenn L. Pierce. 2004. 

“Linking Gun Crimes: The Impact of Ballistics 

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Executive Research Forum. 

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Ericson, Richard. 1982. Reproducing Order. Toronto, 

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55. Operations Research Center. Cambridge, MA: 

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Goldstein, Herman. 1977. Policing a Free Society. 

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CA: Rand Corporation. 

Greenwood, Peter, Jan Chaiken, and Joan 

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Horvath, Frank, Robert Meesig, and Yung H. 

Lee. 2001. National Survey of Police Policies and 

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Kennedy, David M., Anthony A. Braga, and 

Anne M. Piehl. 1997. “The (Un)Known Universe: 

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In Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention, edited 

by David L. Weisburd and J. Thomas McEwen. 

Crime Prevention Studies, Volume 8. Monsey, NY: 

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Kennedy, David M., Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony 

A. Braga. 1996. “Youth Violence in Boston: Gun 

Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a UseReduction Strategy.” Law and Contemporary 

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Ducks, Ravenous Wolves, and Helping Hands: 

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and Administration of Justice. 1967. Task 

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moving the Work of criminal Investigators Towards crime control | 37 

Weisburd, David, and John Eck. 2004. “What Can 

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Marie McNally, Roseann Greenspan, and James 

Willis. 2003. “Reforming to Preserve: Compstat 

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Author Note 

Anthony A. Braga is a Professor in the School 

of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University and 

a Senior Research Fellow in the Program in 

Criminal Justice Policy and Management at 

Harvard University. Edward A. Flynn is Chief 

of the Milwaukee Police Department. George 

L. Kelling is Professor Emeritus in the School of 

Criminal Justice at Rutgers University. Christine 

M. Cole is the Executive Director of the Program 

in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at 

Harvard University. 

The authors would like to thank Darrel Stephens, 

Malcolm Sparrow and Peter Neyroud for their 

thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this 

paper. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs presorted standard

National Institute of Justice postage & fees paid 

Washington, DC 20531 *NCJ~232994* doJ/niJ 

permit no. g –91 Official Business 

Penalty for Private Use $300 

NCJ 232994 

Members of the Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety 

Chief George Gascón, San Francisco 

Police Department 

Mr. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of 

National Drug Control Policy 

Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. 

Metropolitan Police Department 

Dr. John H. Laub, Director, National 

Institute of Justice 

Ms. Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Visiting 

Scholar, New York University 

Professor Tracey Meares, Walton Hale 

Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School 

Chief Constable Peter Neyroud, Chief 

Executive, National Policing Improvement 

Agency (U.K.) 

Ms. Christine Nixon, Chair, Victorian 

Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery 

Authority (Australia) 

Chief Richard Pennington, Atlanta Police 

Department 

Mayor Jerry Sanders, City of San Diego 

Professor David Sklansky, Professor of 

Law, Faculty Co-Chair of the Berkeley Center 

for Criminal Justice, University of California, 

Berkeley, School of Law 

Mr. Sean Smoot, Director and Chief Legal 

Counsel, Police Benevolent and Protective 

Association of Illinois 

Professor Malcolm Sparrow, Professor of 

Practice of Public Management, Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University 

Chief Darrel Stephens, CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department (retired) 

Professor Christopher Stone, Guggenheim 

Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice, 

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 

University 

Mr. Jeremy Travis, President, John Jay 

College of Criminal Justice 

Mr. Rick VanHouten, President, Fort Worth 

Police Association 

Professor David Weisburd, Walter E. Meyer 

Professor of Law and Criminal Justice; 

Director, Institute of Criminology, Faculty 

of Law, The Hebrew University; and 

Distinguished Professor, Department of 

Criminology, Law and Society, George 

Mason University 

Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, 

Police Executive Research Forum 

Chief Anthony Batts, Oakland Police 

Department 

Professor David Bayley, Distinguished 

Professor, School of Criminal Justice, 

State University of New York at Albany 

Dr. Anthony Braga, Senior Research 

Associate, Lecturer in Public Policy, 

Program in Criminal Justice Policy and 

Management, Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University 

Chief William J. Bratton, Los Angeles 

Police Department 

Chief Ella Bully-Cummings, Detroit Police 

Department (retired) 

Ms. Christine Cole (Facilitator), Executive 

Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy 

and Management, Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University 

Commissioner Edward Davis, Boston 

Police Department 

Chief Ronald Davis, East Palo Alto 

Police Department 

Chief Edward Flynn, Milwaukee 

Police Department 

Colonel Rick Fuentes, Superintendent, 

New Jersey State Police 

Learn more about the Executive Session at: 

NIJ’s website: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/executive-sessions/welcome.htm 

Harvard’s website: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/executive_sessions/policing.htm