William B. Ruger Chair

of National Security Economics Papers

Number 2

Economics and Maritime Strategy:

Implications for the 21st Century

Proceedings

A Workshop Sponsored by the

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

Newport, Rhode Island

6–8 November 2006

Richmond M. Lloyd, editor

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

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The Naval War College expresses appreciation to the Naval War

College Foundation, through the generosity of the William B. Ruger

Chair of National Security Economics, in the preparation and presentation of this workshop.

The views expressed in the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily

reflect the opinions of the Naval War College or the Department of

the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Ruger Papers may be addressed to

Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security

Economics, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport,

RI 02841-1207; by telephone at 401.841.3669; or by e-mail at

richmond.lloyd@nwc.navy.mil. Our website is http://www.nwc

.navy.mil/nsdm/Rugerpapers.htm.

ISBN 978-1-884733-42-0

Printed in the United States of America

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Developing a New Maritime Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Opening Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN

President, U.S. Naval War College

Panel I: Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Maritime Strategy in a Gobalising World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Geoffrey Till, Professor of Maritime Studies,

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

The United States and Maritime Strategy: A Parochial View from Newport. . 

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt, Professor of Strategy and Policy,

U.S. Naval War College

Panel I Summary of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Moderator: Dr. John H. Maurer, Chairman, Strategy and Policy

Department, U.S. Naval War College

Panel II: Economic Prosperity and Maritime Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Economic Prosperity and Maritime Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Richard N. Cooper, Maurits C. Boas Professor of International

Economics, Harvard University

Asia’s New Wealth and Its Implications for Maritime Strategy . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Ellen L. Frost, Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics,

and Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

National Defense University

Panel II Summary of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Moderator: Dr. Peter Dombrowski, Chairman, Strategic Research

Department, U.S. Naval War College

Panel III: Economics and Emerging Maritime Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

India and the United States: Economic, Strategic, and

Maritime Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies

Program, Brookings Institution

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“Economics” and Established Maritime Powers: Resource Implications of the

New Maritime Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Robert O. Work, Senior Defense Analyst, Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments

China’s Economic Rise: Impact on U.S.-Australian Alliance . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger, Economic Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command

Panel III Summary of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Moderator: Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Associate Dean of

Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor of

National Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

Panel IV: Terrorism, Proliferation, Transnational Crime, and Migration . . . . . . 

The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Real Is the Terrorist Threat? . . . 

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Centre for Political Violence

and Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore,

and Senior Fellow, Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies,

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

WMD Proliferation: The Nexus between State, Nonstate, and

Antistate Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Mohan Malik, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Irregular Warfare, Armed Groups, and the Long War: A New Analytical

Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Andrea J. Dew, Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and

International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University

Panel IV Summary of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Moderator: Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz, John Nicholas Brown

Academic Chair of Counterterrorism and Professor of National Security

Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

Panel V: International Cooperation in Securing the Maritime Commons. . . . . 1

Legal Interoperability Issues in International Cooperation Measures to Secure

the Maritime Commons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Professor Craig H. Allen, Charles H. Stockton Professor of International

Law, U.S. Naval War College

Addendum: International Cooperation in Securing the Maritime

Commons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Professor Craig H. Allen, Charles H. Stockton Professor of International

Law, U.S. Naval War College

International Cooperation in Securing the Maritime Commons . . . . . . . 1

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, German Navy (Retired)

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Panel V Summary of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Moderator: Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn, Security, Strategy, and Forces

Course Director, National Security Decision Making Department, U.S.

Naval War College

Working Discussion: Findings and Recommendations for Maritime Strategy. . . 1

Moderator: Ambassador Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic Researcher,

Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War College

Concluding Discussion: Findings and Recommendations

for Maritime Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Moderator: Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National

Security Economics, U.S. Naval War College

Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security

Economics, U.S. Naval War College

Participant Biographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

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Introduction

Workshop Focus

The purpose of this workshop is to provide a collegial forum for a small and select group of 

tional security specialists to explore the role of a maritime strategy in furthering the twin goa

economic prosperity and security.

Workshop Background

Globalization can be viewed as the flow of goods, services, funds, people, technology, and 

formation across borders. In the twenty-first century it is characterized by increasing volu

and speed. Economic productivity and prosperity have been enhanced by the free flow

goods, services, monies, ideas, and talents with world trade expanding and world GDP gr

ing over the last several decades. A major portion of these flows occurs on the global marit

commons.

The National Security Strategy of the United States calls for igniting a new era of global e

nomic growth through free markets and free trade. It seeks to expand the circle of developm

by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy. And it seeks agendas for 

operative action with other main centers of global power.

Unfortunately, there is a dark side to globalization, which comes from the vulnerabilities of 

international system. Terrorism, proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destr

tion, transnational criminal activities, and forced migration are significant threats to global se

rity. The global maritime commons provides the highways for these security threats.

Thus, the National Security Strategy focuses on defeating global terrorism, preventing atta

against the United States and friends, defusing regional conflicts, and preventing access to 

the use of weapons of mass destruction. Besides engaging the opportunities of globalization 

necessary to confront the challenges of globalization.

This workshop explores the important relationships between economics and security, with 

phasis on a maritime strategy. Its purpose is to contribute to the development of a marit

strategy in support of the overarching grand strategy of the United States. The workshop is 

ganized using the above construct.

Workshop Venue and Format

A total of 29 participants attended this, by invitation only, workshop held at the Naval War C

lege in Newport Rhode Island. The College and its staff provide a professional environm

with full computer and graphic support, to facilitate small group workshops in exploring t

specific issues.

Panelists prepared and presented their papers (approximately 1500–2000 words) on topic

their choice within the subject area of their respective panel. Following a brief presentatio

each panelist’s paper, all participants engaged in extensive discussion of the papers and the 

cus of the panel. All discussions were conducted under a non-attribution policy.

All papers (some longer versions have been included), summaries of working group discussi

(prepared by each panel moderator), and key findings and recommendations are include

this monograph. Workshop findings will inform the development of a maritime strategy 

rently underway.

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This monograph is available to the general public at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ns

Rugerpapers.htm

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

The Ruger Chair was established to support research and study on the interrelationships 

tween economics and security. A fundamental premise is that without security it is difficu

have economic prosperity and without prosperity it is difficult to have security.

The intent of this Ruger Chair–sponsored workshop is to support individual research, publ

tion, and a continuing dialogue on matters important to national security economics. 

hoped that research done for this workshop will provide participants with the building blo

for further research and publication.

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Developing a New Maritime Strategy

The Navy is setting out a series of strategic plans to guide its way ahead in the 21st Century. 

Maritime Strategy is one element of a larger four-part structure that includes:

Vision sets the ends. The Navy’s vision is Sea Power 21.

Strategy is the ways and means to achieve the ends set forth in the vision. The new Marit

Strategy will fill this role.

Tactics, as addressed in the Naval Operations Concept, comprise the way resources are u

and applied by the warfighter.

Resources are finite, and the Navy Strategic Plan will inform and guide programmers in 

development of the budget submission.

• The process for creating a new maritime strategy isn’t about updating an exis

document . . . it focuses on a new strategy to address current challenges and to guide 

Navy in an entirely new, globally-connected environment that has not existed in 

past.

• It will build on the vision outlined in Sea Power 21, account for the ability to shape 

environment, and provide the structure and guidance needed for fleet operatio

concepts in homeland defense, the War on Terror, irregular warfare and conventio

campaigns.

• The Maritime Strategy will connect with published guidance and will serve as the ov

arching guidance, complementing the vision of Sea Power 21 and its tenets of Sea Str

Sea Shield and Sea Basing, which define Navy capabilities.

• To develop the strategy we are seeking a competition of ideas, beginning with a serie

forums focused on internal and external audiences to accurately define 

environment. We encourage dissenting views and will build a document considering 

input of all. The development process will pass through five phases.

• Phase I: Collect Inputs and Analyze Strategic Environment. This begins the proc

and continues through all phases.

• Phase II: Develop Maritime Strategies. Discuss strategic theories in public forum

order to socialize initial concepts.

• Phase III: Test, Examine and Refine Alternatives. The Navy will legitimize 

validate proposed strategies through the testing and gaming process and analysi

results.

• Phase IV: Synthesize and Report. The Navy will synthesize successful strategies 

one comprehensive strategy.

• Phase V: Sustainment. The Navy will continue to promote and uphold principle

the Maritime Strategy, ensuring its enduring value and legitimacy.

Using a linear and collaborative approach, input will be sought from individuals and organ

tions such as OSD, the Joint Staff, Combatant and Component Commanders, USMC, USC

business and academia, the Interagency, and our friends around the world.

We see a new maritime strategy influencing the next cycle of strategic thinking, including 

next Navy Strategic Plan and into the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

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These are dynamic times. The maritime security environment is constantly changing. And 

strategies and strategic documents must change with them as necessary to remain relevant. 

a continuous cycle.

“Where the old Maritime Strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that 

economic tide of all nations rises—not when the seas are controlled by one—but rather w

they are made safe and free for all.”

—Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operatio

(Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, 14 June 20

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Agenda

Economics and Maritime Strategy:

Implications for the 21st Century

A Workshop Sponsored by the

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

6–8 November 2006

Monday, 6 November 2006

1840 Depart Hotel

1900 Welcome Dinner, President’s Quarters AA

Tuesday, 7 November 2006

0740 Depart Hotel

0800 Welcome Continental Breakfast, Decision Support Center

0840 Opening Remarks

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN, President, U.S. Naval

War College

0845 Panel I: Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World

Dr. Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political

Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Geoffrey Till, Professor of Maritime Studies, Defence Studie

Department, King’s College London

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt, Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S.

Naval War College

Moderator: Dr. John H. Maurer, Chairman, Strategy and Pol

Department, U.S. Naval War College

1015 Break

1030 Panel II: Economic Prosperity and Maritime Strategy

Dr. Richard N. Cooper, Maurits C. Boas Professor of

International Economics, Harvard University

Dr. Ellen L. Frost, Visiting Fellow, Institute for International

Economics, and Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute of National

Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Moderator: Dr. Peter Dombrowski, Chairman, Strategic

Research Department, U.S. Naval War College

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1200 Lunch, RADM Joseph Strasser Dining Room

1330 Panel III: Economics and Emerging Maritime Powers

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy

Studies Program, Brookings Institution

Mr. Robert O. Work, Senior Defense Analyst, Center for Strate

and Budgetary Assessments

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger, Economic Adviser, U.S. Pacific Comma

Moderator: Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Associate Dean o

Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor of

National Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

1500 Break

1515 Panel IV: Terrorism, Proliferation, Transnational Crime, and Migration

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Centre for Political

Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore, and Senior Fellow, Jebsen Center for

Counter-Terrorism Studies, Fletcher School of Law and Diploma

Dr. Mohan Malik, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Stud

Ms. Andrea J. Dew, Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science

and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harva

University

Moderator: Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz, John Nicholas Bro

Academic Chair of Counterterrorism and Professor of National

Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

1645 Adjourn

1650 Return to Hotel

1845 Depart Hotel

1900 Dinner

Wednesday, 8 November 2006

0740 Depart Hotel

0800 Continental Breakfast, Decision Support Center

0845 Panel V: International Cooperation in Securing the Maritime Common

Professor Craig H. Allen, Charles H. Stockton Professor of

International Law, U.S. Naval War College

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, German Navy (Retired)

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Moderator: Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn, Security, Strategy, and

Forces Course Director, National Security Decision Making

Department, U.S. Naval War College

1015 Break

1030 Working Discussion: Findings and Recommendations for Maritime

Strategy

Moderator: Ambassador Paul D. Taylor, Senior Strategic

Researcher, Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War

College

1200 Lunch

1315 Concluding Discussion: Findings and Recommendations for Maritime

Strategy

Moderator: Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair 

National Security Economics, U.S. Naval War College

1445 Concluding Remarks

Moderator: Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair 

National Security Economics, U.S. Naval War College

1500 Adjourn

1515 Depart to Airport

Participants:

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Retired), Director, Center for Strategic Stud

Center for Naval Analyses

Rear Admiral (LH) Philip Hart Cullom, USN, Director for Strategy and Policy, OPN

Dr. Eric V. Thompson, Director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Nav

Analyses

CDR Paul J. Tortora, USN, OPNAV N3/5 Strategic Action Group

LtCol Kelly P. Houlgate, USMC, Strategic Analyst, Strategic Initiatives Group,

Headquarters Marine Corps

Professor Don Marrin, Assistant Research Professor, War Gaming Department, U.S.

Naval War College

Dr. Derek S. Reveron, Associate Professor of National Security Decision Making, U.S.

Naval War College

CDR Alan L. Boyer, USN, Workshop Administrative Assistant, Military Professor,

National Security Decision Making Department, U.S. Naval War College

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Opening Remarks

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN

President, Naval War College

This workshop, sponsored by Professor Rich Lloyd, the Naval W

College’s William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Econom

is a key element of a broader undertaking to craft a new marit

strategy for the United States of America. The focus of this wo

shop is a consideration of the implications of economics and m

time strategy in the globalized environment of the twenty-

century. This is truly important work, because, in an era of glo

ization driven by our ability to exchange information instan

neously with every corner of the globe and our ability to trave

air in a matter of hours to every capital city on the planet, we wo

do well to remember that virtually all of the raw and finished go

propelling the global economy moves by sea. So, too, the sea 

be misused and undermine the stability of global markets, pro

ing state and nonstate actors a medium to transport weapons of mass destruction and t

means of delivery; giving terrorists and modern-day pirates an avenue of attack; or aiding 

gimes engaged in forced migration. Clearly, if we take the global maritime commons 

granted, we risk imperiling both global economic prosperity and international security.

To aid in developing a new maritime strategy, a strategy that will both inform and support 

emerging grand strategy of the United States, this workshop brings together people of extra

dinary talent and value to our effort. This is an intellectual effort, requiring diverse expertis

the economic, political, and military disciplines. The extraordinary range and depth of persp

tive, authority, and intellect of the participants in this workshop will serve the Navy and the na

well as we move downrange to articulate and clarify America’s maritime strategic options 

the twenty-first century.

It is worth noting how well this workshop fits within the overall effort to develop a new marit

strategy. In the CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations] speech at the Current Strategy Forum h

last June at the Naval War College, he highlighted how the effects of globalization drive 

need for a new strategy.

• Expansion of interdependent world markets

• The friction created in those market-based economies by “the race for energy.”

• Global instant access to ideas and ideologies.

“Let’s be frank,” the CNO said: “The reason we do not have such a new maritime strategy 

ready is that the scope and the scale of threat—the complexity of this globalized era, and 

staggering pace of change seem almost impossible to plan for.” In the same speech, the C

made clear that this strategy must be “far above anything Mahan could have envisioned in 

day.” Such an effort is indeed at the level of what Sir Julian Stafford Corbett defined as “gr

strategy.”

The stakeholders in this broader effort are many. The Coast Guard and the Marine Corps 

fully integrated (after all, we are talking about a “maritime” strategy), and we have participa

across many governmental agencies, the commercial sector, and the other services. We a

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have developed an extensive agenda with our international naval partner nations to make s

that there is comprehensive opportunity for them to participate.

The guidance we have from the CNO is that our process be open, inclusive, auditable, and 

signed to enable a competition of ideas. We have avoided establishing precepts that might a

ficially constrain debate. Yet some most certainly emerge as lynchpin strategic notions to 

considered. One, for example, may be found in this quote from the CNO’s recent interview 

Sea Power Magazine: “Where our previous maritime strategy was designed just to defeat a 

gle enemy at sea, our new one must be centered upon building partnerships across the world

No one disputes that we are a maritime nation. It follows that a maritime perspective is fun

mental to any grand strategy for the United States. And when we consider the fact that gr

strategy is defined by the art of maximizing the influence of a nation—or groups of nations—

support policy objectives in war or peace, the special character and traditions of maritime for

present themselves as particularly relevant to an era of globalization.

At the end of this workshop, I have no doubt that we will be a lot more confident about 

where, why, and how maritime forces of this nation can matter most in advancing econo

prosperity and security.

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Panel I

Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World

Dr. Barry R. Posen

Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technolo

Dr. Geoffrey Till

Professor of Maritime Studies, Defence Studies Department, King’s College Londo

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt

Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College

Moderator:

Dr. John H. Maurer

Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College

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Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Dr. Barry R. Posen

Ford International Professor of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Since the emergence of the Global War on Terror, now termed the Long War, as the c

terpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. grand strategy debate has n

rowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. T

are variants of a “primacy” strategy. One is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “

shore balancing.”1 All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive devel

ment. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that glo

ization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy t

does either version of primacy.

Below, I offer a brief characterization of globalization and speculate on its positive and nega

results. I then discuss the three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy 

bate, and their suggested remedies. I also discuss the military strengths and weaknesses of 

United States to gauge which strategy’s remedies are most feasible.

For purposes of this discussion, globalization is the umbrella term that captures the curr

worldwide extent of capitalism and the material facts that have enabled this extension. To

we see voluminous international trade and investment, as well as extensive global sup

chains. This is enabled by redundant, reliable, high-capacity, and inexpensive global transp

tation networks—mainly sea transport, but also air and land. It is also enabled by capacio

real-time, global means of communication.

The positive results of globalization are clear. Labor, capital, and talent have been mobilized 

a massive scale. An intense international division of labor has permitted very great efficien

and high productivity. This has made for high growth in many countries, and remarkably h

growth in a few.

It is arguable that globalization has also produced some negative results. In particular, it 

made for tremendous disruption of traditional societies.2 The general improvement in the w

fare of people the world over has permitted a massive population explosion, which has not 

subsided. Many of these people are moving into large urban areas. Wealth is unevenly dist

uted in most of these societies, so cities fill up with the poor and the insecure. Millions of peo

are thus “socially mobilized” for participation in politics. They demand security and good g

ernance, but existing state structures are often overwhelmed. Thus millions of people are 

nerable to appeals by extremists of every type. The most common type of appeal m

traditional nationalist and religious themes and harks back to a better past.

As globalization creates new political demands, the international transportation and commu

cation linkages that facilitate international trade and investment also offer opportunities 

13

1. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 

no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5–53, summarizes the immediate post–Cold War grand strategy debate in the

United States. In that article the term “neo-isolationism” was used instead of “restraint.” More recently the

term “off-shore balancing” has come into use.

2. Jonathan Kirshner, “Globalization, Power, and Prospect,” Chapter 11, pp. 321–338, in Johnathan Kirshn

ed., Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006), argues that globalization has these

disruptive effects. See also Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” Internation

Security.

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organized “antisystem” groups to move people and resources around the globe. These may 

employed to organize domestic opposition to particular governments, such as the Tamil Tig

are. Globalization also provides opportunities for transnational antisystem parties such as 

Qa’ida.

The Global Distribution of Military Power

Any grand strategy must address the global distribution of military power. Typically this is m

sured in terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, military manpower, and m

items of military equipment. By most measures, the United States is far and away the grea

military power in the system and arguably has the longest global reach of any power in hist

This situation, a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, quickly came to be seen as natura

many in the U.S. political elite, so much so that reflection on the remaining limits to U.S. m

tary power was rarely seen.

A qualitative assessment of U.S. military power relative to others is also necessary. Broa

speaking, the United States enjoys what I have called “command of the commons.”3 T

United States commands the sea, the air at altitudes above 10,000 feet, and space. If it wish

it can drive others from these media. There is little that others can do about it. Competitio

this realm depends on areas of great U.S. superiority—military research and development, 

tensive economic resources, highly skilled military professionals. It is plausible that U.S. co

mand of the commons has been an important enabler of globalization. That said, the mili

advantages of the United States and other western powers diminish in the “contested zones

the littorals; the skies below 10,000 feet, where cheap antiaircraft weapons are effective; and 

land—wherever the use of infantry is more appropriate than the use of armored vehic

Though the United States certainly can fight effectively in these zones, the fights are likely to 

more demanding, and many more nation-states are likely to be capable of tilting with U

forces. The contested zones remain contested because in these areas quantities of motiva

soldiers matter; background noise reduces the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence-gathering te

nologies; and the weapons necessary to do damage are cheap and plentiful.

The Two Variants of Primacy

Both mainstream Republican strategic thinkers and mainstream Democratic strategic think

have learned to love the preeminent material power position that the collapse of the So

Union bequeathed to the United States: primacy has captured the hearts of both parties. 

this discussion I will term the strategy of the current Bush administration “national liberalis

and the former Clinton administration “liberal internationalism.” Both agree that the Un

States faces no peer competitor and that it is difficult, for a host of reasons, for the other con

quential powers to coordinate a coalition to truly “balance” American power, especially Am

can military power. Both strategies are committed to maintaining this preeminent po

position for as long as possible, though neither Democrats nor Republicans have yet tested 

willingness of the American people to pay significant costs to do so.

Both strategies are predisposed to use U.S. power for a variety of positive purposes abroad

particular interest to both parties are failed or failing states or particularly illiberal states, w

meaningful military capabilities, in particularly sensitive geostrategic regions (often ca

“rogues.”) To the extent that globalization is partly responsible for these problems, both 

“national liberals” and the “liberal internationalists” still seem inclined to deal with these pr

lems in the places they emerge. Democrats came to these beliefs in the 1990s, while m

14

3. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” Internationa

Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46.

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Republicans then demurred.4 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the fact that 

perpetrators had profited from al-Qa’ida’s cozy relationship with the Taliban regime in Afgh

istan, Bush administration strategists have come to share the view that these kinds of threats 

important.5 So-called neoconservatives within the Republican Party were the strongest ad

cates of this view.

Both schools of primacy believe that weak, failing, or rogue states are hatcheries of terrori

fanaticism, bloodshed, crime, and weapons of mass destruction. These problems in one pl

are expected to spread to other places. Containment is not an option; failed states or illib

militant ones, should, if at all possible, be turned into successful democratic states through U

advice, cajoling, pressure, and occasionally direct intervention.

The main thing that “national liberals” and “liberal internationalists” disagree about in inter

tional politics relates to legitimacy. What is legitimacy worth relative to capability? Where d

legitimacy come from? For purposes of this discussion, legitimacy means that an action ta

by the United States, alone or with its allies, is acceptable to others, regardless of whether t

agree with all or even most of the specific reasons for the action. Liberal internationalists beli

that legitimacy is worth quite a lot in international politics, and that loss of legitimacy is the sa

as the loss of material power. Liberal internationalists believe that legitimacy derives from 

eral processes in international politics, which means that key U.S. actions, especially large on

emerge from a process of give and take within distinctly international institutions. The Un

States typically will have more power than others within these institutions and can usually d

decisions in the direction it wants, if it is a bit clever, a bit patient, and a bit willing to comp

mise. These small costs are expected to produce large dividends in political support, or at le

toleration.

National liberals believe that legitimacy matters less than material power. U.S. interests sho

not be amended, and U.S. actions should not be delayed for the purpose of generating le

macy. Legitimacy is nice to have, but not necessary. In any case, national liberals see legitim

as arising from American distinctiveness. The United States is seen as the key liberal democr

power. Other states are simply expected to understand this. U.S. actions in international pol

enjoy inherent legitimacy. In any case, U.S. actions are intended to produce more liberal dem

cratic states, and this too makes the action more legitimate. Legitimacy matters less to the 

rent crop of Republican strategists than it does to Democratic strategists, and lib

international institutions are not seen as key contributors to legitimacy in any case.

For any future U.S. naval strategy, the similarities across the two parties matter more than 

differences. The likely trajectory for U.S. grand strategy is more of the same, with some cau

introduced by the Iraq experience. Both versions of primacy need command of the commo

including command of the sea, to preserve the United States as the predominant glo

power—this allows the United States to keep the power of other states divided. Both version

primacy need command of the sea in order to go where they wish to go to affect failed state

problem states, and that could be anywhere. Both versions of primacy will remain commit

at least in theory, to regime change, which means an enduring requirement for “forcible en

capability. Finally, both strategies need the Navy to have the ability to serve as the focus 

15

4. See the final strategy document of the Clinton administration, “A National Security Strategy for a Global

Age,” The White House, December 2000. Among other things, the document is noteworthy for its freque

references to globalization. Echoing many of these themes is G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughte

codirectors, “Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century,” Final Pa

of the Princeton Project on National Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

Princeton University, September 27, 2006.

5. “The National Security Strategy of the United State of America,” The White House, March 2006; and the

“Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” U.S. Dept. of Defense, February 6, 2006.

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large coalition. Republican Party strategists have nothing against military cooperation w

other states in a traditional alliance mode—the United States leads and others follow. T

value alliances as traditional tools of power.

To the extent that both versions of primacy retain their interest in the internal makeup of ot

states, both will need to confront the “contested zones.” Iraq ought to have taught a les

about how difficult these areas can be for the United States. It is too early to tell, howe

whether or not this experience will cause a revision of the inclination inherent in both prim

strategies for direct military intervention on land to organize failing or failed states, or to reor

nize rogue states.

Democratic party strategists, with their interest in institutions and legitimacy, may be willin

pay some costs in military efficiency to ensure that others participate in agreed military actio

They may need a military that is a bit more capable of “waiting” for international institution

sort out decisions, and a bit more capable of integrating disparate, perhaps even ineffect

national militaries into a multinational effort in order to ensure legitimacy going into an act

The former may put a somewhat higher premium on the ability to enforce sanctio

embargoes, and blockades, and the latter a bit more of a premium on “plug and play” co

mand and control, as well as diverse understanding of other navies and other cultures.

Restraint

Advocates of “restraint” differ significantly from the mainstream views in the two parties.6 M

of these people are academics, realist theorists of international politics. Politically they run 

gamut from Republicans, to Democrats, to Libertarians. They are the intellectual heirs of 

British Empire’s “offshore balancing” strategy. Advocates of restraint tend to believe that 

United States is quite secure, due to its great power, its weak and agreeable neighbors, and 

vast distance from most of the trouble in the world, distances patrolled by the U.S. Navy. T

see the risk of a global anti-U.S. coalition as small. They see an enduring U.S. interest in en

ing that no great Eurasian superstate emerges through conquest that could rival U.S. pow

And they would argue that the United States should, through its own internal efforts, match 

far as possible the internal efforts that others make to grow their own power. If this proves 

possible, offshore balancers would join with other powers affected by such growth to form 

balancing coalition.

These thinkers do not share the view that failed states, or illiberal states with some mili

power, constitute great threats to the United States, threats that need to be dealt w

proactively. To the extent that globalization plays a role in fostering domestic and internatio

radical movements, these strategists are loath to intervene directly in the internal politic

other states to manage these problems. These strategists understand why and how the c

tested zone is a major enduring military problem for the United States. Rather, they would 

verage U.S. command of the sea, air, and space to limit the freedom of movemen

troublesome actors. They acknowledge that terrorism is a problem, but the first rule should 

to do no harm. They accept that “national-ism” is at least as powerful as “liberal-ism.” Lib

practices and institutions may have universal appeal, but each culture must find its own wa

these practices. The surest way for the United States to slow this development is to attac

“Made in the U.S.” label on it, which energizes nationalist resistance. Restraint advocates 

not want the United States to confront local nationalisms, if this can be avoided.

16

6. Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home America: The Strategy of Restrain

the Face of Temptation,” International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5–48, offers the clearest

statement of this grand strategy, and the most systematic argument supporting it.

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The main military capability that advocates of restraint wish to protect is the ability to use 

sea lanes to assist allies, in order to protect regional balances of power. On this matter they h

no essential disagreement with primacists of either stripe. These strategists believe that str

states are frightened of their immediate strong neighbors, so there is a tendency for regio

power balances to form. If they need a little push, the United States should have the capab

to provide that push. Countries striving to balance powerful neighbors and desirous of U

help will have a strong interest in protecting their own waters and their own ports. Thus, fr

the point of view of traditional security concerns, the U.S. Navy would concentrate on the o

oceans. Given the state of technology, this means the defense of civilian and military transp

shipping against submarine threats and against long-range aviation armed with antis

missiles.

U.S. naval power is a key enabler of either primacy strategy that the United States co

choose, and given the trends in U.S. politics, the capabilities on hand will likely prove as att

tive to the next administration as they are to the present one. The trouble in Iraq has put the 

macy strategies under an unflattering light, but there is still little evidence that elites h

learned much. Continuity is more likely. We can, however, see the likely direction of U.S. gr

strategy in the event of higher costs in Iraq, or reverses elsewhere. A strategy of restraint wil

clude many familiar roles for the Navy. That said, presuming that future administrations m

tain a positive view of globalization, then the Navy will also find itself having to deal with so

of its negative consequences. Globalization is socially disruptive and makes enemies for 

United States. These enemies can take advantage of the relative improvement in the eas

moving people and materiel around the world to do real, if limited, harm to the societie

democratic countries. The Navy may find a second mission in watching over the peacetime 

lines of communication to reduce the prospects for those who would use them to do harm to 

and to our friends.

17

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Maritime Strategy in a Gobalising World

Dr. Geoffrey Till

Professor of Maritime Studies

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Today, two competing models of naval development reflect both the national security persp

tives of states and the current state of globalisation. The biggest issue confronting national le

ers when contemplating naval policy is, therefore, first to work out their attitudes 

globalisation.1

Model 1: National Navies

The first model of naval development reflects the Westphalian state system, with its assum

tions of unending competition between states for power influence, land and resources, ideo

ical supremacy and its preoccupations with military power. Basically naval developm

conforms to the notion that international politics is about who gets what, when, and how—

that the provision of security is the fundamental justification for the state.

The characteristics of the national approach include an assumption that seapower is ab

bringing influence to bear on the behaviour of other states. The preoccupation is therefore p

competition—when navies take each other as providing the benchmark for naval devel

ment. Naval development in one country is based upon, and possibly aimed against, the na

development of others. It is a case of like against like and broadly symmetrical conflict.

The main indicator of this is the search for decisive battle. Mahan, perhaps unfairly regarded 

the apostle of this approach for Mahan’s Creed, which emphasised the importance and the 

itary character of seapower, was widely accepted and dominated naval development thro

the twentieth century, given its preoccupations with the first and second world wars and 

cold war.

But perhaps it’s a new world now, calling for a new model of naval development—domina

by a new style of Globalisation, driven not simply by states in their pursuit of the capacity 

trade with advantage, but more by companies in search of free markets and individuals in

tent on free information and open access and now technologically empowered to ge

Globalisation—the argument goes—is based on an expectation of mutual, though not ne

sarily equal, benefit to all, and on a set of liberal but universal trading values. These values h

resulted in the development of a world society which reduces the capacity of states for in

pendent action and is thoroughly sea-based.

This is a world which picks out continents, trade routes and capital flows but ignores nation

depends on sea-based trade and is expected to double or treble over the next 20 years.

But the system, however sophisticated, has always been vulnerable, especially now, with 

‘just enough just in time’ philosophy. Modern industries plot the passage of containers in qu

ters of an hour.

19

1. On this issue, Sam J. Tangredi [Ed.], Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington: National Defense

University Press, 2002) and John Baylis and Steve Smith [Eds.], The Globalization of World Politics (Oxfo

Oxford University Press, 2001) are both good places to start.

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9/11 suggests that today’s threats are especially serious because of the emergence of new ty

of threat. The target was uniquely significant—the World Trade Towers. These people ar

about arguing for a bigger slice of the cake; they want to destroy the bakery—the system

other words. They are, however, half-supported by masses of people who do want a big

slice of the cake, and who might be detached from this level of support by the development 

more equitable trading system. Hence the need for significant ideological, social and econo

strands to the defence of the system.

Deliberate attack of, and lack of support for, the system are but two of the threats facing this s

based trading system. Others include maritime crime, resource degradation, environmental 

terioration and inadvertent damage caused by conflicts ashore.2

An important element in all this is the unpredictability of future events. Iran 1979 is a good 

ample of combinations of events which weren’t expected and perhaps could not have b

predicted. The Iranian revolution did not make sense in conventional Western terms.

In the mid-1970s Iran was oil-rich, with more doctors per head of the population, more ho

tals, more tarmac roads, better water supplies than anywhere else in the Middle East, and y

was here that there was a mediaeval backlash in the form of the regime of the ayatollahs. Th

were people who just do not sign up to the values of a world system that was producing all th

apparent benefits. Naval planners therefore have to cope with the possibility of strate

surprise.

This range of known and unknown threats requires navies, and the need to act together in co

mon defence of the common benefits of the global system. Hence the emergence of the sec

model of naval development:

Model 2: Collaborative Navies

With his talk of a community of interests and righteous ideals, Mahan has gone before us.

Navies of this sort have an internationalist, a collaborative, almost collective world outlo

They see their role as defending the system, directly at sea and indirectly from the sea. Their 

pacity to do so depends on four necessary naval capacities or roles.

1: Maintaining Sea Control

Now the focus in sea control is on the littoral rather than the open oceans. The U.S. Navy is n

the biggest coastal navy in the world—only it operates on other peoples’ coasts. Here it, and 

allies, face a different kind of asymmetric threat and respond accordingly in sizing and shap

their fleets.4

Sea control now requires a focus on force protection and ‘battlespace dominance’ in the litto

where conditions are different than on open ocean and land-based threats are more appar

For many navies, this is a major shift in emphasis from the old perspectives of the Cold W

20

2. These are detailed in my Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 310–

378. In many ways this article is a development of the last chapter of that book.

3. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902), pp. 177–178.

4. The emergence of the Littoral Combat Ship in response to such events as the attack on the USS Cole

illustrates something of a global trend.

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2: Maritime Security: Maintaining Good Order at Sea

Good order is threatened by everything from international crime, to direct attack and envir

mental crisis.5

Good order at sea has to involve increasing awareness of the importance of the issue, the 

ation of a motivating overall policy at all levels and its execution by navies and other marit

agencies. While its immediate focus may be on the ‘home game’, globalisation means ther

an important ‘away game’ to win as well. For navies of the collaborative sort, Maritime Se

rity6 operations call for naval forces capable of constabulary and low-intensity operatio

They’ll need to cooperate fully with each other and with coastguards for this.

There are differing ways of doing this, reflecting different geographical situations, level

threat, constitutional approach, history, etc., and no single right answer. But one common 

ture is the fact that this has to be a maritime, rather than a strictly ‘naval’, approach. But m

approaches will usually involve naval capacities to some degree. Even high-intensity capac

are of value for good order tasks, though rarely designed for them. This development may r

resent a challenge to naval traditions, even possibly to the law of the sea.

3: Maritime Power Projection

Corbett provides the United States with a useful reminder that mankind’s destiny will ultima

be decided ashore. Indeed, the land is the source of most maritime disorder. The security pr

lems in the waters around Indonesia, for example, are largely a problem of the lack of gov

nance ashore. At sea, therefore, navies are usually dealing with the symptoms of the probl

not its causes.

Because maritime power projection is about helping deal with the causes, navies are at t

most important for their effect on land. Here they are defending the system indirectly by w

they do from the sea rather than at sea.

Because it is the area where most people live, most industries can be found and through wh

most trade is conducted, the littoral is where the threats are located and so becomes the nat

arena for maritime power projection.

Clearly, ‘moving sea and air forces to deliver fire is not enough to win the global war on ter

ism, much less more conventional wars. As the only armed force with the staying power and 

strength to clear and occupy key points on the ground, the army alone can impose lasting po

cal and cultural change.’7 Accordingly, navies have the key role at the strategic, operational 

tactical levels of enabling this to happen though their contribution to joint and combined ex

ditionary task forces.

The naval contribution rests on the capacity to manoeuvre from the sea and includes the tra

portation of forces, their supply and sustainment, their support with different kinds of offen

airpower and their protection against all forms of air attack. This includes a major emphasis 

the advantages of sea-basing, a phenomenon as evident in Europe as it is in the United State

21

5. Till, op. cit., pp. 310–350.

6. The appearance of the concept of Maritime Security (with capital letters) around the world in the last coup

of years is noteworthy.

7. Donald A. Macgregor, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (London: Praege

2003), p. 55.

8. See my Naval Transformation, Ground Forces and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea Basing Debate

(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming) for a discussion of this.

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This shift towards the creation of Joint and Combined Expeditionary Task Forces has major 

plications for naval force development. It requires a shift in U.S. and European navies aw

from open ocean operations in defence of sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Drastic changes in the navies of Scandinavia are interesting not just for a radical change of 

but also because they exemplify a contributory strategy—the acceptance, in other words, of 

fact that resource limitations mean that no single nation can solve its security problems on 

own, and that a collective maritime effort is required, with all the loss of sovereignty that 

implies.

Maritime power projection is about influencing the behaviour of other states and other peo

It works in times of peace as well as of conflict. It is a question of deterring adversaries from 

welcome actions and compelling them into welcome ones. In many ways it either sets the p

conditions for more kinetic forms of intervention ashore, or hopefully makes it unnecessar

is, in other words, a major and often forgotten contribution to the resolution of conflicts asho

The same can be said for the friendlier aspects of naval diplomacy which are aimed at reas

ing allies. This is, accordingly, an increasing part of contemporary maritime strategy.

4: Maintaining the Maritime Consensus

If maritime security as already discussed is the home game, a global maritime consensus 

precondition for the distant water variant—the away game.

Experience in the Gulf shows that navies are especially useful for this because their flexib

means they offer governments a means of calibrating and so facilitating their participation

The ongoing debate about the Thousand Ship Navy is now focussing on what it means 

how such a maritime consensus might best be delivered. Because the term implies a hierar

cal and military-dominated approach, the term itself should probably be sunk and the conc

redefined as a global maritime community of major stakeholders in the system who are pled

to defend it against all manner of threats. A sense of naval togetherness is an important prec

dition for this; sustaining it through mutual cooperation, combined exercises, staff exchan

and port visits therefore becomes increasingly important. Here the quantity of assets availa

for such is likely to be as important as their quality.9

But all this assumes that that Globalisation will continue and that there is a strong sense of in

national community which in the future can be expressed and acted upon in maritime wa

Has Globalisation a Future?

Globalisation may anyway be systemically frailer than we think and so more vulnerable to 

‘other worlders.’ Some people and some regimes seem to be working to a different set of ru

as though living on another planet.

Less dramatically, some analysts, for example, argue that our comforting optimism about 

future of globalisation depends on the assumption of sufficient resources. They go on to 

that this is proving an illusion, most obviously in the availability of oil. A steep rise in 

22

9. This is a major problem for navies facing resource limitations. The decline in the number of workaday frig

in Europe in favour of fewer more expensive and more capable platforms is a matter of concern.

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demand, especially from China, Japan and the rest of the Asia-Pacific, is coinciding with a 

minal fall in the discovery of new reserves.10

Anticipating that they shall soon have to start scraping the bottom of the barrel, states are 

ready manoeuvring so they can cope with a less secure energy future, and even now that is 

acerbating relations.

Take China and Japan, for example. They are in dispute over islands which straddle potenti

important marine oil fields. They are both competing for stocks in the volatile Middle East. T

Chinese are heavily engaged in regimes which the United States regards as dangerous and 

reputable (Sudan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran). The Chinese are moving into the Ind

Ocean, watched warily by India.

In all these ways, there are still strong Westphalian tendencies in the way that states behave 

their consequent impact on the system. Given the difficulty of predicting future events and 

flecting the possibility that globalisation may not march ever onwards, nations, the argum

goes, had better prepare for a bleaker, less collegiate, more individual future as well. 

Thomas Friedman points out, war could ‘unflatten’ the world.11

Despite the onset of globalisation, states and the national perspective still continue. Indeed, 

tudes towards globalisation and its maritime requirements may often reflect the kind of 

tional’ perspectives that actually help determine its character and extent, as they arguably 

before.12 These, in turn, will help determine the size, shape and role of the fleet. They sug

that the ‘national’ rather than collaborative model of navies still obtains.

Back to the National Approach?

Nowadays, as before, this more traditional approach is characterised by an emphasis on 

control and peer competition of the Mahanian sort that dominated naval events through 

whole of the twentieth century, which call for platforms optimised for high-intensity ‘fleet v fl

engagements, as Admiral Gorshkov used to call them. They are expensive, and probably o

mised for open ocean operations rather than land attack. Weaponry and sensor m

emphasise ASW, anti-air, anti-ship missiles, etc.—capacities that until a few weeks ago, 

couldn’t expect non-state forces of disorder to possess or use. Defensive mining is another ch

acteristic of this approach.13

‘National’ navies also tend to regard the sea as a frontier that needs to be defended individu

and exclusively. They have a strong focus on home waters and a marked disinclination to co

promise with neighbours. They exhibit lower levels of effective compliance with internatio

maritime conventions, and limited involvement in multilateral enforcement arrangeme

They have an inherent suspicion of anything that threatens to subvert sovereignty, or to co

promise national traditions, cultures and standard operating procedures—the kind of thing

short, that complicates antipiracy policies in the Strait of Malacca.

23

10. Jeremy Leggett, ‘Dark Secret: What They Don’t Want You to Know About the Coming Oil Crisis’, The

Independent, January 20, 2006.

11. Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century (London: Pengu

2006), p. 498. See also Charles Kruathammer’s reference to the ‘natural way of nations’ in ‘But not at the

UN’, Time, October 23, 2006, p. 33.

12. In Friedman’s Globalisation 1 period, dominant nations sought consciously to encourage the kind of

globalisation that would allow them to trade with advantage. Navies at that time were in the business of

expanding the system, not just protecting it. Friedman, op. cit., pp. 7–9.

13. Joris Janssen Lok, ‘Back to Mine: Finnish Navy Seeks to Boost Its Underwater Weapons’, Jane’s

International Defence Review, November 2006, p. 44.

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To make this possible, national navies make every effort to maintain independent all-round 

pabilities in order to guard against the unknown and to maintain options, by constructing a 

anced fleet.

The same thinking is seen to justify the defence of a national defence industrial base. This 

plains the attractions of economic self-reliance which lead countries as varied as Iran and In

into the determined development of indigenous industrial capabilities, even though this m

make cooperation technologically and politically more difficult.

Conclusion: The Problem of Fleet Balance

These two competing visions of the world’s future are crudely drawn, and so are the marit

behaviours and capabilities they call for. But certain caveats need to be entered straight aw

First, neither globalisation nor the protective function of naval power is new, though the ex

might be. For many centuries, in fact, the patterns of global trade have been driven by ma

forces which no one can control even if they wanted to. Navies have had this collective sys

defence role, alongside their ‘national’ roles, to some degree for several centuries.14

Nor are such roles, or the capacities they require, mutually exclusive alternatives. Indeed, s

naval capacities as amphibious warfare ships and ship-borne helicopters can be as valuable 

humanitarian relief operations as for maritime power projection.

Accordingly, most states blend both approaches to some degree. Take the United States, for 

ample. On the one hand they have a recent thoroughly joined-up naval and maritime secu

policy (at least in theory), and the current CNO is pushing heavily for his collaborative “Th

sand Ship Navy.” On the other, there’s substantial concern about the modernisation of the C

nese navy and about the future situation in the east and South China seas, and so they eng

in a unilateral pursuit of U.S.-based technological excellence that may make it difficult for e

their closest allies to keep up with them.

The Indians, the Pakistanis, the Japanese, the Koreans exhibit the same mixed approach.

Generally speaking, though, there has been a major shift from the national to the collect

The question is the extent to which the future of globalisation will allow this shift to contin

Addressing this issue, and its maritime implications, is central to the task of designing a n

and crafting a doctrine.

So what do naval force developers and doctrine writers do to cope with a world that, des

our best efforts, remains unpredictable in many of its essentials? How do they approach 

problem of balance between contending approaches? How do they make for a fleet that’s su

ciently versatile to cope with many of the consequences of our inherent inability to pred

That’s what we’re here to discuss!

24

14. Cooperative naval action against the Barbary pirates in the early nineteenth century, the issuance of an

international code of signals and the Royal Navy’s later campaign against slavery are good examples of th

Certainly the Royal Navy believed it was acting in the interests of the whole world in this and other acts o

common defence. Not everyone would have agreed with this perception, such as the first nations of Cana

northwest, or China’s Ming Dynasty. The attitude is nicely satirised in Sellar and Yeatman, 1066 and All

That, with their reference to ‘the important International law called Rule Britannia, technically known as

Freedom of the Seas.’

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The United States and Maritime Strategy:

A Parochial View from Newport

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt

Professor of Strategy and Policy

U.S. Naval War College

The title of this paper reflects the Naval War College’s role in the creation of maritime strat

for the U.S. Navy. Throughout the twentieth century, the Naval War College has contribute

the Navy’s efforts to manage threats and plan for conflict, first with Japan (“War Plan Orang

and later with the Soviet Union (the Maritime Strategy). In addressing the dramatically chan

environment of the twenty-first century, this paper will take a very parochial view—a U

centric vision of maritime strategy, based on the long tradition of historical and strategic sc

arship at the Naval War College.

As we think about the maritime strategy, and particularly its relationship with global econom

it is worth reexamining first principles and historic precedents. Strategy, as taught here at 

Naval War College, is the bridge between military operations and policy—the conscious c

sideration of effectively utilizing military forces (in war and peace, as shall be discussed bel

to achieve national objectives. We base our study of strategy on five major theoretical wo

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influe

of Sea Power Upon History, Sir Julian Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 

Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War. Each of these works raises timeless principles that relat

the problem we will wrestle with over the next two days—Economics and Maritime Strate

Implications for the 21st Century.

The first issue to consider is how narrowly to define the term “strategy.” Is it, as some of the c

sic theorists hold, solely about the use of military force in wartime? Even the master of West

strategic theory, Clausewitz, approaches this issue with some caution. He notes that war c

sists of two elements—war proper and preparation for war—and specifically and consciou

focuses on the former at the expense of the latter. This theoretical construct has contribute

enormous misunderstanding of his work, which tacitly recognizes not only the importanc

economics (to provide the sinews and preparation for war) but also the importance of dip

macy. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, although largely focused on how to wage war, includes 

crucial contribution of how to “win without fighting.” Mao also understands the importanc

preparing adequately for conflict before engaging in open combat.

Maritime strategy encompasses more than simply the preparation of maritime forces for w

fare. This is explicit in Mahan, who lists six critical factors in determining relative sea powe

includes not only naval operations at sea, but also amphibious operations and support 

ground forces, including the opening of peripheral theaters, as detailed by Corbett. H

Strachan raises this issue in a recent (and excellent) article on the varying (and sometimes c

tradictory) meanings of the word “strategy”: “The military historian needs to confront an e

tential question: why is there strategy on the one hand and naval strategy on the other?”

In the best academic tradition, one way to answer this question is by raising another quest

Why do most powers only adopt a partial or mixed maritime strategy? The answer is that m

states face immediate threats to their security, either from internal conflict or from neighbo

states. Maritime power in the modern era is intimately connected with the economic bene

associated with the sea and maritime trade. Maritime strategies encompass both war 

peace, because true maritime powers have major interests in the peacetime economic or

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Commerce and the utilization of oceans is crucial to sustaining the economic basis of both 

tional prosperity and national security. This requires the maritime power to play an active 

in responding to a wide range of threats, but handled wisely, a maritime strategy supports b

the national interest and the broader collective good.

A true maritime strategy can be exercised only by a power (a) that can defend and expand 

access to those economic benefits that contribute to its continued maritime dominance and 

that lacks a threat from neighboring continental states. This has only been true of a few m

states in the modern era—states that are both unique and literally insular. The Netherlan

protected to some extent from invasion by land by the ability to flood large parts of its territ

was a leading maritime power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Britain, an isla

was uniquely positioned to take on this role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. T

United States, a continent-sized virtual island—assuming no emerging major threats from M

ico or Canada—shared and later assumed this role in the twentieth century. The United Sta

remains a maritime nation, and its economy and security are intimately connected with 

maritime domain. As a result, the United States needs a maritime strategy that is more than s

ply a good guide to naval operations in wartime.

Geoffrey Till’s paper elegantly assesses U.S. maritime strategy as poised between two comp

ing visions—a national tradition based on the Westphalian system of sovereign states, an

collaborative vision based on emerging economic globalization. I will offer a second, but 

contradictory, perspective, which focuses on the demands of war and peace. The demand

wartime—in this case, not just the Global War on Terror/Long War, but also including other 

tential threats to regional and global stability—are concerned primarily with the deploym

threat, or actual use of military forces, operating alone or in coalition. The requirement

peacetime—management of the global economic order—of necessity require a broader 

more collaborative approach, including the use of coalitions, international cooperation 

agreements, and the negotiation, perhaps, of new legal frameworks for good order at s

These competing requirements will dominate the debate over resource allocation and strate

choice.

History provides us with some other factors or indicators that may be helpful as we consider 

future and the role of maritime power. The first is the changing face of economic geograp

Which areas of the world are now most important for global trade? What distinct requireme

might this new geographic reality impose on maritime powers, alone or in coalition? Seco

given changes in economics and geographic priorities, how have threats to international e

nomic stability and global order changed? Have new threats arisen? Old ones receded in 

portance? What are the ramifications of these changes for a maritime strategy? Third, given 

changes in priority and threats, what are the benefits and challenges of operating in coaliti

Are there costs to collaboration, and if so, what might they be?

Maritime strategies always reflect the dominant economic geography of the period. In the 

teenth–eighteenth centuries, the major arenas of maritime competition were the Medite

nean, Atlantic, and Caribbean. The Caribbean’s importance in the global economy wane

the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century the Pacific Ocean became increasingly 

portant. The Indian Ocean and Pacific rim have become the focus of maritime geography in 

twenty-first century, reflecting the rise of Asian economies and the importance of energy fl

from the Persian Gulf.

As economic geography changes, so do the critical chokepoints through which trade and co

merce must pass. Britain’s focus on the Western Approaches, the Strait of Gibraltar, and 

Baltic passage reflected not only crucial maritime trade routes but also the key areas from wh

it could contain and dominate its French and Spanish (and possibly Russian) enemies. T

Cold War maritime strategy revolved around the Kola peninsula, the Greenland-Iceland

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gap, and the eastern Mediterranean. Today, the major chokepoints have shifted east—

Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, and (perhaps) the Taiwan Strait are of critical inte

to maritime trade and security.

Geography also provides the means to contain regional maritime powers and potential glo

competitors. Even the most powerful maritime states prefer to be able to control the seas 

their own use, and deny them as much as possible to prospective adversaries. When the str

gle for sea control takes place on the oceans rather than the littorals, it demonstrates that 

dominant maritime powers have lost at least some of their ability to contain their oppone

From the 1750s until the end of the Napoleonic period, a powerful fleet in the Western 

proaches not only ensured British channel shipping but also effectively contained the Fre

Atlantic squadron and protected Britain from invasion. In the early 1900s, British focus shi

to containing the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea—a mission that was largely s

cessful. During the Second World War, however, Britain was forced to win the Battle of the 

lantic far from British shores, and Britain’s possessions in the Mediterranean and Indian Oc

were seriously threatened. Today, the U.S. Navy increasingly focuses on the littorals, sugg

ing the absence of a major maritime competitor. This condition, however, is neither perman

nor irrevocable.

One of the primary ways to contain potential competitors geographically and to ensure p

ence in critical regions is through the use of bases—one of Mahan’s greatest interests. Maha

fascination with colonies and bases reflects not only his profound respect for history, but a

the technological realities of his era. Without bases, a coal-fired fleet has enormous diffic

operating in periods of either war or peace, as amply demonstrated by the passage and los

the Russian Baltic Fleet in 1905. Colonial possessions were important for both base facil

and economic exploitation in the mercantilist period.

Today, base rights are often the result of historical legacy and are subject to the domestic p

tics of the host country. They continue to be crucial for access to distant regions, to provide 

litical influence in areas of potential instability, and to provide for a deterrent posture aga

more serious threats. One area of serious concern for the maritime strategy is the problem 

managing risks while still maintaining adequate base facilities. Large base complexes are 

creasingly vulnerable to proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Use of their facilities in c

may be denied or constrained by local political opposition. Efforts to provide for remote, s

sustained bases removed from the shores of allies and adversaries alike may prove either te

nologically infeasible or economically unaffordable. At the same time, public commitmen

withdrawing from major base complexes will raise political concerns in our allies and may 

bolden potential adversaries or competitors, weakening perceptions of our commitmen

maritime security, with consequent effects on maritime trade.

This maritime strategy must also reflect the changing nature of threats to global order and 

gional stability. Geoffrey Till has raised the key issue of state versus nonstate actors in his pap

Maritime powers must also consider the rise of other naval powers, whether regionally focu

or global in scale. Some regional naval powers evolve into much more serious threats o

time—Russia was a Baltic power in the eighteenth century and became first a Black Sea po

in the nineteenth century and then a Pacific and later a global power in the twentieth centu

Japan started as a power in Northeast Asia at the turn of the twentieth century but by 1

threatened multiple adjacent regions including Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, 

Australia.

Regional powers can prove significant obstacles to even a dominant maritime power, part

larly when located at strategic chokepoints. Britain went to great lengths to maintain acces

the Baltic in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the maritime threat of Fascis

aly caused enormous difficulties for British planners from 1935–1943. Powers with glo

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reach force maritime powers to fight for sea control in an oceanic, vice littoral, environm

Both Nazi Germany and the USSR sought to restructure the global system and possessed 

resources to endanger maritime commerce on a global level.

Threats to the system do not have to be openly hostile. The role of neutrals and reluctant pa

ipants in the prevailing economic system can shape the nature of maritime strategy in both 

and peace. U.S. concerns over the rights of neutral shipping remained an element of conc

for the Royal Navy for over a century. The continental system briefly menaced British e

nomic vitality from 1807–1812. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, oil and ene

flows have been a major potential constraint on both the exercise of maritime power and 

maintenance of a commercial global economy. Today we even see China successfully cont

ing information flows, despite the presence of a seemingly pervasive global internet.

One key element in the creation of a U.S. maritime strategy will be the balancing of current 

projected or potential threats. The United States is currently fighting a “long war” again

transnational nonstate movement that pursues its political ends through terrorism (am

other means). This conflict imposes significant military and economic costs on the United Sta

that will shape, to some extent, the size and role of the future U.S. Navy and its ability to ca

out any maritime strategy. These costs include the impact of prolonged operations on 

ground forces of the United States and the need to assign naval personnel to provide a w

range of assistance and support functions, the need for greater maritime domain awaren

and a gradual drawing down of some oceanic capabilities (including antisubmarine warfare

favor of more littoral ones (interdiction).

On the other hand, while the United States may not discern an emerging peer competitor, 

nificant regional powers are expanding their maritime capabilities in core maritime areas. 

though none of these states is necessarily a U.S. adversary (and two, in fact, are democraci

each is creating significant regional maritime power in areas of intense commercial and e

nomic importance. China continues to pursue greater maritime reach and capability. It is a

building a formidable capacity to menace Taiwan, although whether a war in the Taiwan S

will ever occur remains an uncertain proposition at best. India’s maritime doctrine seeks to 

pand Indian influence to encompass the entire Indian Ocean, from East Africa to the Indo

sian archipelago. Indian maritime interests have been matched by a naval moderniza

program and increased naval cooperation—Indian naval vessels engage in exercises wit

wide range of partners and have recently engaged in humanitarian missions throughout the 

dian Ocean and in the Mediterranean during the Lebanon crisis of 2006. Japan is extendin

own maritime reach to the Straits of Malacca. Finally, even weaker maritime powers (includ

Iran) are now taking advantage of existing and emerging technologies to create a formida

anti-access capability, which can threaten vital chokepoints and complicate U.S. military in

vention in times of crisis.

The absence of a global threat, and the interest of many nations in maritime security and e

nomic stability, increase the opportunity for sharing burdens and operating in collaborat

Economic stability and maritime security require international cooperation and the mai

nance of international law. In addition, maritime powers have traditionally maintained t

position through sharing the benefits of sea power. The United States currently has a vital e

nomic and national interest in the status quo and must recognize that it can neither maintain 

prosperity in isolation from the international system nor maintain the system by itself. Beca

most other states either do benefit or potentially can benefit from the existing international e

nomic order, the United States should, whenever possible, engage them in helping keep go

order at sea and collaborate to the maximum extent possible in peacetime. U.S. leaders

must also recognize, however, that states that collaborate with us in peace may not choos

follow us into war. A maritime coalition is not necessarily the same as a wartime alliance.

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If we are designing the maritime strategy with a 20- to 30-year vision, planners must cons

four key issues for which there are no obvious answers. The first is the relative priority of 

ward presence versus homeland defense. For decades the U.S. Navy could achieve the la

by focusing almost exclusively on the former. Today, the availability of destructive technol

and ease of its transfer and use make homeland defense a greater priority than ever. A sec

issue is whether the United States should seek to dominate or manage technological chan

The Royal Navy successfully maintained its maritime dominance throughout the ninetee

century through the management of technological change. The United States seeks a stat

constant technological transformation. It is not clear, given current economic and indus

trends, whether the United States will be able to continue dominating the technological aren

A third issue is whether the maritime strategy should focus on the preparation for war (man

ing the global economic system and the maritime environment) or on war proper (the L

War). The former requires more emphasis on the oceanic environment and the crucial 

lanes in the Pacific and Indian oceans, while the latter is more littoral-focused and cen

around the Middle East. Finally, the United States must consider the role of coalitions and 

plomacy. The United States currently does not face a peer competitor or system-challeng

power. If such a threat does emerge in the near future, it will be the result of a coalition of ho

regional and medium powers. Realistically, this can only come about if the United States al

ates significant players in the international system, or if we withdraw from the system and oth

must fill the vacuum. It is worth remembering that the only serious challenge to British marit

dominance—the naval campaigns of 1778–1782—came about as the result of a coincide

of British strategic overstretch, British naval disarmament, and the diplomatic alienation 

neutrality) of all the other major European powers.

The virtues of collaboration and coalition-building, vice unilateralism or isolationism, are o

ous: greater economic benefits to all participants in the international system, and enhanced 

bility in the maritime domain. The 1000-ship navy concept is an important step in 

direction. The U.S. Navy’s role is vital in ensuring the stability of the system, as well as in de

ring and defeating threats to it. This conference, and others like it, will help shape the strat

that will make it possible, and I’m delighted that we all have this opportunity to play a rol

that process. Thank you.

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Panel I: Maritime Strategy in a

Globalizing World

Summary of Discussion

Dr. John H. Maurer

Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department

U.S. Naval War College

The Ruger Conference began with presentations given by Panel I, consisting of Barry Pos

Geoffrey Till, and Timothy Hoyt. Their presentations triggered a lively, informative, and 

sightful discussion about globalization, nationalism, and grand strategy.

A leadoff question about globalization led to a wide-ranging discussion about the position 

the United States in the international strategic environment. One panelist highlighted h

many around the world identify the United States as the principal agent of globalization. “

are globalization HQ,” he put it. The military predominance of the United States’ armed for

serves as an enabler of globalization. Those around the world who oppose globalization co

to view the United States as the cause of their problems. The backlash against globalization 

ten targets the United States. The United States thus might benefit if it were not so closely ide

fied with globalization. Another panelist argued that globalization means states within 

international system are more open to outside influences. One participant argued that Am

can decision makers and analysts must ask the fundamental question of whether globaliza

is an unalloyed good. Another aspect to consider is to calculate the benefits and costs of glo

ization for the United States. In response, one participant noted just how difficult it is to und

take an assessment of the benefits and costs associated with an open international econo

system. Trying to determine when the costs of an open international economic order, as m

sured in defense effort, outweigh the benefits poses an extraordinarily difficult analytical ta

Another topic discussed was whether a maritime country such as the United States can insu

itself from regions in the third world that are caught up in large-scale violence. One particip

noted that the famous maritime strategic thinker Sir Julian Corbett quoted approvingly 

maxim of the sixteenth-century philosopher Sir Francis Bacon: “He that commands the se

at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.” Does that strategic pri

ple still hold in the twenty-first century? One of the panelists argued that it did: a dominant m

time power can protect itself to a remarkable extent from regions shaken by violence. T

violence, the panelist argued, could be contained. The United States might even consider w

ing off regions that would require a major effort to pacify. Commanding the maritime co

mons, then, confers strategic advantage and affords a range of strategic options to the Un

States. The international system is not so tightly knit together as is often assumed by policy 

strategic analysts, and the United States actually has considerable freedom of action on 

world stage.

The efficacy of following a grand strategy of offshore balancing provoked a lively discuss

One panelist also argued that those who propose a grand strategy of offshore balancing for 

United States have respect for the power of nationalism. Attitudes about nationalism are a 

marker in distinguishing between competing points of view about the strategic wisdom of o

side intervention. While the fighting in Iraq has induced more caution among American d

sion makers, there still exists in the United States an influential body of opinion in favo

undertaking interventions in an attempt to reengineer the politics of countries in the develop

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world. Liberal internationalism, in other words, remains the dominant worldview of Ameri

policy makers despite the fighting in Iraq.

Another panelist highlighted that the experience of Great Britain provides an historical exam

of offshore balancing as a grand strategy. In 1914, for example, Britain could not afford 

stand aside when Germany invaded France and Belgium. Britain had no real choice but to f

with coalition partners to prevent Germany from overthrowing the balance of power in Euro

The British example, then, can show the limitations of a grand strategy of offshore balancing

a similar way, the United States might find that it cannot afford to stand aside in an impor

region engulfed in violence. A hardheaded calculation of the risks inherent in a new versio

containment is difficult to undertake.

One conference participant highlighted how important it is for the United States to find the r

fit between force structure and the country’s overarching strategic aims. One panelist remin

participants, however, how in the past naval planners have often not received clear guida

about policy objectives from their political masters. Instead, naval leaders and planners h

had to define roles and missions that are essential for a country’s security and develop capa

ties to operate in the maritime domain to meet those tasks. Alfred Thayer Mahan meant for 

famous studies on The Influence of Sea Power upon History to educate policy makers and 

public, as well as naval officers, about the strategic importance of navies in determining the 

curity and prosperity of great powers.

One panelist brought up the important issue of domestic political considerations in shaping 

defense budget. Force planning and development do not occur in a domestic political vacuu

A domestic political consensus for a larger force structure might not exist in the United Sta

Technology would provide a substitute for numbers. One conference participant argued 

during the 1990s the United States was moving toward a force structure best suited to a gr

strategy of offshore balancing. A panelist expressed the view that the United States alre

spends a considerable amount on defense. The United States, in his view, is unlikely to prov

more resources for defense. Consequently, naval leaders must focus their resources on core na

missions and provide for the country a buffer from security threats.

The presentations made by Barry Posen, Geoffrey Till, and Timothy Hoyt, along with the s

sequent discussion, completely fulfilled the expectation of conference organizers. The pane

were commended for their presentations framing the choices in grand strategy that face 

United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Panel II

Economic Prosperity and Maritime Strategy

Dr. Richard N. Cooper

Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics, Harvard University

Dr. Ellen L. Frost

Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics, and Adjunct Research Fellow

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Moderator:

Dr. Peter Dombrowski

Chairman, Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War College

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Economic Prosperity and Maritime Strategy

Dr. Richard N. Cooper

Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics

Harvard University

This conference is about grand strategy and maritime strategy. I suggest that the United State

incapable of having a coherent grand strategy, at least in peacetime. The interests and value

Americans, while bearing common elements at a high level of generalization, are too dive

and specific, and the U.S. political system operates in a too-cacophonous and inconsistent w

to adhere consistently to any grand strategy. This does not mean that individual Americ

cannot outline coherent grand strategies or fancy themselves as grand strategists. But their 

servations and recommendations will simply merge into the general cacophony of political 

course in the United States.

President Bush notwithstanding, the United States is not now at war. It has a hateful advers

in al-Qa‘ida, capable of doing harm through specific acts against Americans or allied perso

but it is not capable of threatening the viability of the United States as a state or the Ameri

political and economic systems, except insofar as Americans allow it to do so.

Ideally, a maritime strategy would be the naval component of a grand strategy. In the abse

of a grand strategy, any maritime strategy will necessarily have a somewhat ad hoc charac

But that does not mean that some sensible things cannot be said about it.

Americans have achieved an unprecedented level of material prosperity, and they have bu

flexible and innovative economic system, supported by rule of law, capable of producing, 

taining, and augmenting that prosperity. Americans clearly value it and seek even higher le

of prosperity—hence they share widely this particular national objective, although a few 

senting voices fear the environmental consequences.

Prosperity presupposes a minimum level of physical security, from external, internal, or e

natural causes (such as earthquakes or contagious disease). Americans expect governmen

federal and local, as appropriate—to provide such protection, supported by private initia

and action.

Americans have high respect for their constitutional processes, even while having low resp

for elected politicians. Foreigners were amazed at the lack of protest in the United States o

the presidential election of 2000. Americans accepted the decision by the Supreme Court, e

though the entire process surrounding the Florida election was arguably deeply flawed.

Although some Americans are reluctant to acknowledge it, U.S. prosperity is deeply depend

on engagement with the rest of the world. Some dimensions of this dependence are obvio

such as the importation of oil (now over half of consumption) and other minerals; export m

kets for high agricultural production; and large capital inflows to supplement U.S. domestic s

ings. Other dimensions are less obvious, such as the immigration of talented individuals; 

importation of fertile ideas from elsewhere, especially Europe and Japan; the immigration 

young unskilled workers, supplementing the slowing growth of American-born (and incre

ingly educated) workers; and competition provided by foreign products, which not only h

sustain a high standard of living but also prods cost-reducing productivity increases or prod

and design innovation by U.S. firms.

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Thus, Americans have an interest in preserving, maintaining, and enhancing world prospe

through a viable international economic system. The United States has taken the lead in 

past half century and, as 30 percent of the world economy, must continue to take the lea

maintaining and improving the international economic system. There is no likely alternative to 

United States. Other countries are unlikely to take grand initiatives (although they do from tim

time), not least because no global initiative can succeed without the active cooperation of 

United States, and Americans are more likely to engage seriously if they have taken the initiat

Much is heard these days about the rise of emerging countries, most notably China and In

but also Russia, Brazil, and others. The journalistic hype needs to be put in quantitative p

spective. Table 1 reports one plausible projection of the world economy, adapted from the U

Department of Energy (DOE), to the year 2025. In it China and India are assumed to do w

that is, to enjoy rapid growth without serious stumbles. But the United States is also expecte

grow during the next few decades, and it starts from a much higher base. Thus, China is p

jected to grow by 7.2 percent a year in dollar terms, to $8.1 trillion in 2025, in dollars of 20

(DOE projects China’s annual growth at 6.2 percent; I have augmented it by 1 percent a yea

allow for some real currency appreciation; similarly for India. I have also incorporated the 2

upward revision of Chinese GDP.) The United States is projected to grow by 2.8 percent a y

which, if anything, is on the low side. Even so, China’s economy remains less than 40 perc

the size of the U.S. economy in 2025, and with four times the population Chinese will rem

much poorer than Americans, even though they will be over three times richer than they are 

day. China will recently have passed Japan, the world’s second largest national economy, in s

India’s starting position is behind China’s, and its growth, while a very respectable 6.2 perc

annually in dollar terms over the period 2000–2025, is below China’s. India will have reac

about 11 percent the size of the U.S. economy by 2025, making the two together less than 

the size of the U.S. economy.

Largely for demographic reasons, the European Union (controlling for size of membership) 

Japan will both decline in relative terms (e.g., Japan from 43 percent of the United State

2000 to 32 percent in 2025). But both will still remain large economies, important players in 

world economy, and important trading partners of the United States.

One sometimes sees much larger figures for China and India, and smaller figures for Japan 

Europe. These are based on purchasing power parity conversion rates. While allowing for 

ferences in local purchasing power is appropriate—indeed, necessary—when comparing st

dards of living across countries, it is entirely inappropriate when comparing the impact o

country on the world economy. World trade and investment take place at market excha

rates, not ppp conversion rates; and even military equipment and, increasingly, high-qua

personnel command world prices. As noted, allowance has been made in the figures of Tab

for some (1 percent a year from 2000) real appreciation of the currencies of China and In

relative to the U.S. dollar.

One implication of the relative size and wealth of the United States is that it will be able 

outspend any other country, or indeed any small collection of countries, under any head

such as national defense or research and development, if Americans choose to do so. Am

rich countries today, the United States (along with Japan) has the lowest tax burden, at ab

32 percent of GDP (taking into account all levels of government). Poor countries are abl

raise even less revenue (relative to GDP), generally around 20 percent, although their capa

to raise revenue will rise with development. Americans have an exceptional aversion to ta

tion but can be persuaded to support expenditures necessary to deal with any perceived 

tional emergency. One potential additional source of revenue for all countries, but especi

for the United States, during the next two decades would be a tax on carbon emissions to a

seriously adverse climate change.

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What should be the future maritime strategy of the United States, by which I mean what kin

fleet should the U.S. Navy (USN) be ordering now, and what kind of doctrine and train

should it provide to naval and marine personnel in the coming decades?

A simple (and probably sensible) component of that strategy might be to maintain a navy th

no less than three times the sum of the next largest three navies (perhaps not counting close 

lies such as Britain and Japan in the reckoning). Such a policy should discourage any ot

country from challenging frontally the USN and its current dominant position in the wor

oceans. It would imply that, as today, the main threats to the USN would not come from ot

navies, but from air- and even land-based missiles, and, in future, space-based platforms 

can reveal the location of U.S. surface ships and perhaps compromise or even eliminate U

observation and communication satellites on which the USN increasingly relies. Regional na

threats might emerge—for example, from submarines—but the USN would have the capa

to reinforce any region where such a threat emerged and to replace any losses. (All referen

to the USN are meant to include, where appropriate, the Marine Corps, since a navy’s capa

to influence developments on land is limited without the Marines.)

A more ambitious strategy would be to configure the U.S. Navy for sea basing, that is, for pr

sion at sea of headquarters, intelligence, logistics, supply, and air support for a significant la

based operation, until sufficient land is acquired to move some of these functions ashore.

A still more ambitious strategy, but with different objectives and orientation, would be to cre

and maintain a navy that, along with allies in close coordination, could police the seas agains

undesirable human activity, for example, to suppress piracy, trade in drugs, movements of we

ons of mass destruction and even lesser weapons, movements of “most wanted” persons, mo

ments of slavers and kidnappers—that is, a role of global law enforcement, insofar as that can 

done from the sea, obviously in cooperation with land-based law enforcement authorities.

The United States could easily afford the first strategy, even if other countries decided to a

ment their existing naval forces significantly. It spends more today on naval forces than all ot

countries put together. It could also afford the second strategy, at least for modest land enga

ments, if it chose to do so, but that would probably call for more resources than are now be

provided. Whether it could afford the third strategy would depend on exactly how ambitiou

was in scope and how much cooperation the United States received from other countries

would have to be a collective endeavor, partly for resource reasons, partly because the Un

States could not effectively carry out the assignment in the absence of close and continuing 

operation with other key governments, plus at least the acquiescence of those not actively 

gaged in cooperation. The constraint on the third strategy, with enough suitable partners, is 

likely to be economic resources than political resolve to persist in a task that at best would t

many years and indeed would have no clear termination date.

Table 1

Projections of GDP to 2025

(trillions of 2005 U.S. dollars)

Country 2000 2025

USA 10.94 22.04

China 1.42 8.05

India 0.49 2.37

Japan 4.74 7.09

Source: Adapted from Department of Energy World Energy Outlook, 2004

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Asia’s New Wealth and Its Implications for

Maritime Strategy

Dr. Ellen L. Frost

Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics

Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studie

National Defense University

National wealth is a strategic asset. Western prosperity contributed substantially to victory in 

Cold War, not only because of America’s ability to outspend the Soviet Union but also beca

Western lifestyles and ever-higher standards of living eclipsed those behind the Iron Curtain

the wrong hands, however, wealth can be destabilizing: consider the booty amassed by 

mond traders in Africa, kleptocrats in Russia, and warlords in drug-trafficking regions of 

ghanistan. How wealth is distributed also shapes prospects for stability and growth, altho

this factor is not decisive.

In Asia, the focus of this essay, the combination of globalization, technology, and high level

education has spurred the highest growth rates in the world, created jobs, and contributed 

nificantly to peace and stability.1 Asia’s new wealth is heavily concentrated in maritime c

and coastal regions. Predictably, however, rising prosperity in these regions brings new thre

and revives old ones. What does Asia’s new wealth imply for U.S. maritime strategy in As

In brief, I argue that the U.S. Navy and, in some circumstances, the U.S. Coast Guard are be

suited to cope with wealth-induced changes in Asia’s strategic landscape than is the Army 

the Air Force. But the mission of U.S. naval forces stems from developments beyond the Nav

control (notably U.S. policy in the Middle East and the resurgence of China). This means th

“maritime strategy” is necessarily reactive. The strategic challenge is that the balance of rela

influence in Asia is slowly shifting away from the United States in favor of China. This shift is 

zero-sum, but, since China’s future evolution is unknown, it carries long-term risks. A serie

small but meaningful steps taken in Washington could help restore U.S. influence.

The Strategic Setting

On the one hand, Asians have more freedom to construct their own future than at any tim

recent history. The Cold War’s rigid overlay has melted away. No government exports rev

tion or seeks to overthrow another. The peaceful settlement of disputes is now an establis

habit. (China insists that Taiwan is a domestic issue.) Democratization of one kind or anot

has made strides. Most governments are stable or nearly so. Islam in Southeast Asia is beco

ing infected by extremists but inherits a moderate tradition. Regionwide stability and mar

oriented economic policies have raised living standards and brought into being a large mid

class.

On the other hand, many Asian governments still struggle to complete the process of nati

building. Globalization has complicated their task by widening the income gap betw

39

1. I define “Asia” to include the 10 members of ASEAN plus China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and India

The “ASEAN 5” are the five founders of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand. The other members of ASEAN are Brunei, and the “CLMV” countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myan

and Vietnam. With the growing exception of Vietnam, Brunei, and the CLMV countries do not play a

significant role in the trends analyzed here.

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“winners” and “losers.” Per capita income in coastal regions continues to rise faster than 

comes in the interior.2 The financial crisis of 1997–98 toppled governments, sent millions b

into poverty in hardest-hit Indonesia, and revealed both the weaknesses and the interdep

dence of Asian economies. Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) temporarily ha

business activity, and an avian flu pandemic would be far worse. The attacks of Septem

11, 2001, inspired a hidden network of terrorists to bomb and kill. Pirates armed with h

technology equipment find rich pickings off the coast of Indonesia, Malaysia, and India, 

on the high seas.

Environmental threats to maritime areas deserve special mention. Oil spills are increasing. P

ple are flooding into port cities, severely straining water and sewage resources. Disease spre

more rapidly in overcrowded maritime cities than elsewhere. The tsunami of December 2

was particularly devastating because large sections of the natural barrier to tidal waves—m

grove forests—have been cut down. Meanwhile, global climate change is raising the likeliho

of violent storms; insurance companies are already hinting of higher rates. Unless somethin

done to curb and transform energy consumption, rising water levels associated with clim

change will flood maritime areas, the heart of Asia’s new prosperity.

Another challenge associated with rising prosperity is the revolution in shipping. In 1958, 

largest container ship had a capacity of 58 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), the standa

ized global unit of measurement. Today’s largest ships can carry over 6,000 TEUs, and des

ers are planning ships capable of carrying 13,000 TEUs. Ranked according to TEUs actu

handled, the world’s top six ports are all in Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, Pusan, Shang

Kaohsiung, and Shenzhen. (U.S. ports Los Angeles and Long Beach were ranked seventh 

thirteenth, respectively.) Most other ports in Asia cannot currently handle huge container sh

Bigger ships and fewer available ports spell more opportunities for terrorists to attack highly 

ible targets.

The Resurgence of China

Of all the structural changes in Asia’s strategic landscape, none stands out more forcefully t

the resurgence of China as a commercial powerhouse and magnet for investment. All devel

ing countries in Asia except Singapore have become more dependent on trade, particul

trade with China. China has become the number-one or number-two trading partner for m

countries in the region. (China itself has become more dependent on markets in Europe 

North America.) China’s sheer size and market power convey implicit leverage.

What is remarkable is not so much the level of economic prosperity (millions of Chinese are 

at the poverty line) as the speed of change. Although China’s share of world trade was o

about 4 percent in 2000, China has accounted for about 12 percent of the growth of w

trade since then. Although China’s oil consumption is only about one-third the U.S. level, in 

past decade China has accounted for 30 to 40 percent of the growth in demand for oil. By 2

China will likely import 70 percent of its oil needs, as opposed to 40 percent today.

40

2. This connection between prosperity and maritime regions is not unique to Asia. Jeffrey Sachs and two of 

colleagues found that the regions of the United States, western Europe, and temperate-zone east Asia tha

within 1,000 kilometers of the coast account for only 5 percent of the world’s inhabited land but at least 3

percent of the world’s GNP (measured in terms of PPP). In Asia, the poorest countries are landlocked Lao

and self-isolated Myanmar (Burma). See Gallup, John Luke, and Jeffrey Sachs, with Andrew D. Mellinger

“Geography and Economic Growth,” paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development

Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20–21, 1998.

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China’s new wealth has enabled Beijing to take advantage of a relatively new geopolit

trend: the widespread use of commercial diplomacy, particularly so-called free-trade ag

ments (FTAs). The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 presented China with a perfect oppo

nity. Although the United States had extended assistance to Mexico during a similar crisis th

years earlier, it did nothing to help Thailand. China got credit for not devaluing its currency 

offered FTAs to Thailand and subsequently to ASEAN as a whole. (The value and depth of 

China-ASEAN FTAs are open to question, however.) Beijing also uses “infrastructure dip

macy” with great skill, financing and manning huge infrastructure projects in other countrie

without the “strings” imposed by other donors.3

Most Asians now see China as an economic opportunity rather than a security threat. T

companies are scrambling to find a niche in China-centered production networks. Asian g

ernments believe that China’s recent military buildup is aimed at Taiwan and does not threa

them directly. They note that China ceased exporting revolution long ago and needs a peac

environment to pursue economic modernization, its number-one priority. Beijing has set

virtually all of its land-based border disputes and has put its maritime ones on the back bur

at least for now.

India takes a slightly different strategic view. Indians seek closer engagement with Chin

economy and have mended fences with Beijing, but they are wary of China’s growing pow

India participated in the tsunami relief effort and has strengthened ties with South Korea 

Japan and launched negotiations for an India-ASEAN FTA. Along with Australia and New Z

land, India was invited to the first-ever East Asian Summit, held in Malaysia in December 20

But although India is a maritime power and strategic player, it has not accumulated eno

wealth to win respect.

Asian Perceptions of the United States

Asians worry that the United States has lost high-level strategic interest in the region, part

larly Southeast Asia. Concerns center on America’s costly war in Iraq, steadfast support fo

rael’s policies in the Middle East, post-9/11 fixation on antiterrorism forces, and huge defi

and the influence of anti-China “hawks.” Asian officials complain that American officials p

sue a U.S.-centered agenda instead of listening to what Asians need. This perception cont

utes to a shift in the balance of relative influence in favor of China. This shift is not zero-sum 

much of it is healthy, but it calls for strategic attention.

The Asian Integration Movement

The combination of mounting economic interdependence, cross-border threats, China’s ris

power, and America’s perceived neglect are prompting national governments to revive and 

celerate a drive toward closer regional integration. Their agenda includes many maritime co

ponents, such as antipiracy operations. The most significant is the “Eye in the Sky” networ

joint patrols in and over the Strait of Malacca, conducted by Singapore, Indonesia, 

Malaysia.

ASEAN, established in 1967, has been in the driver’s seat of the integration movement. Its h

mark statement of principles is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Of the vari

41

3. For a more complete discussion, see my chapter, “Promise or Threat? China’s Commercial Diplomacy in

Asia,” in William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., China and the Balance of Influence in Asia

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming). See also Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global

Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strat

Studies, National Defense University), October 2006.

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regional organizations that ASEAN has brought into being, the grouping known as ASEAN 

(ASEAN plus China, South Korea, and Japan) has become the most institutionalized. Ch

makes subtle efforts to marginalize Japan in this forum but takes care not to dominate it.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) is trans-Pacific in scope and is thu

benign strategic counterweight to ASEAN + 3. Taiwan is a “member economy,” and s

Hong Kong. APEC lost altitude in the 1990s, and its 1994 commitment to “free and open tr

and investment in the Asia Pacific” by 2010 (2020 for developing countries) has lapsed into 

scurity. But APEC conducts much useful work, especially in the energy field but also in m

nitty-gritty areas such as customs, visas, and port security. Australia’s chairmanship in 2007 

fers a perfect opportunity to revitalize APEC and restore some of America’s lost influen

Some advocate a “Free Trade Area of the Pacific” (FTAAP). Such an agreement would em

pan-Asian trade agreements in a wider context and could spur the European Union, India, 

Brazil to revive and complete the now-faltering Doha round of global trade negotiations.4

Implications of Asia’s New Wealth for Maritime Strategy

U.S. forces in the western Pacific and Indian oceans face no major threat. They cannot devi

freestanding maritime strategy because their main missions are determined by events 

trends beyond their control. They must be reactive, and what they must react to is too comp

to be defined and pinned down in enough detail to be meaningful.

According to the National Security Strategy, U.S. forces are part of a mission that includes fi

ing terrorism, preventing attacks on U.S. allies and friends, defusing regional conflicts, and p

venting access to and the use of weapons of mass destruction. These threats hav

complicated anatomy, but at least two of them—terrorism and nuclear proliferation—are ar

ably fanned (if not caused) by U.S. policies in the Middle East and by long-standing U.S. 

clear and nonproliferation policies, respectively. The other two—preventing cross-bor

attacks—are being managed primarily by Asians or, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, in 

Six-Party Talks.

As for the Navy’s traditional missions, U.S. naval forces already dominate the high seas. Mo

over, if called on to do so in a crisis, they could blast open a major sea lane or strait. They pr

ably cannot achieve “maritime domain awareness” on their own, but U.S.-sponsored train

and joint exercises are slowly strengthening local capabilities in the region. (Excessive classif

tion, however, remains a problem.)

What remains is influencing events onshore. In my view, U.S. maritime forces are best suite

this mission. At the risk of sounding superficial, ground combat forces move too slowly (

should not be sent to Asia anyway), and Air Force planes fly by too quickly. Naval forces m

at the right speed—not too fast, not too slow—and can hover on the horizon. The mere sigh

reassuring or threatening. The technology, training, and education that the Seventh Fleet 

offer are prize assets. Senior naval officers have extensive experience in the Asia Pacific 

strong military-to-military ties. They understand the need for diplomatic subtlety and 

nuanced, slow-moving nature of Asian-style negotiations.

The U.S. Coast Guard, too, is well suited to the new strategic environment. Maritime Asi

where a lot of threats arise. Illegal human trafficking, drug smuggling, the plundering of end

gered resources, the ferrying and financing of terrorists, and a variety of other threats cluste

maritime zones and pose a bigger risk to U.S. friends and allies than conventional attack.

42

4. C. Fred Bergsten makes the case for a FTAAP in “Plan B for World Trade: Go Regional,” Financial Times

August 16, 2006, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?Research ID=655.

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What Can the Navy Do?

The Navy is already in a strong position in Asia and faces no near-term threats. Over time

China gets richer and consumes more oil, Beijing will naturally want to acquire larger na

forces and reduce its dependence on the United States to protect its oil imports from the Mid

East.5 Whether that prospect is alarming or not depends on how China’s domestic polity ada

to engagement with the global economy and global society in the next 10–20 years.

To help restore U.S. influence in Asia, the Navy should press authorities in Washington to

• Sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and submit it to Congr

perhaps as part of a larger package. U.S. officials apparently fear that the TAC wo

preclude humanitarian intervention and jeopardize sanctions against Myanm

(Burma), thus arousing Congressional opposition, but these issues can be hand

quietly, vaguely, and implicitly, Asian-style.

• Jointly propose a full U.S.-ASEAN summit meeting.

• Commit the United States to revitalizing APEC, including high-level representat

adequate budget resources, and support for trans-Pacific trade initiatives. Presid

Bush’s November 2006 trip to Asia signaled first steps in this direction.

• Reduce the excessive classification of systems and technologies, which dilutes the va

of joint exercises.

• Revise the allocation of budget expenditures to reflect greater responsiveness to As

needs.

43

5. For a more complete discussion, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, China’s Search for Energy

Security: Implications for U.S. Policy (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2006).

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Panel II Discussion: Economic Prosperity

and Maritime Strategy

Summary of Discussion

Dr. Peter Dombrowski

Chairman, Strategic Research Department

Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

American maritime strategists often assume that maritime security is a prerequisite for a sta

and growing global economy. After all, most of the world’s commerce by weight, volume, 

value travels across the high seas; the oceans (and the ocean floors) themselves are a sourc

wealth from activities ranging from fishing to deep-sea mining. American strategists also gen

ally believe that it is the responsibility of the United States to provide maritime order, either 

ing alone or in concert with other maritime powers. For most of the post–World War II per

the U.S. Navy has assumed this role, even if sometimes by default, as it sought to combat 

spread of the Soviet navy’s influence across the globe.

These assumptions are seldom challenged and have been repeated in official documents 

commentaries by analysts friendly to the maritime services, including the U.S. Navy, the U

Marines, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Rather, many strategic and policy debates center on w

roles and missions each service should assume to ensure American and thus global econo

security. Others, such as the recent international dialogue over U.S. Chief of Naval Operati

(CNO) Admiral Michael Mullin’s proposed 1000-ship Navy, center on the relationship betw

American maritime services and those of the rest of the world. Last year, for example, the C

argued that the Navy should join with its counterparts to guard against nontraditional secu

threats—such as piracy and maritime terrorism involving nonstate actors—in addition 

threats to national security by neighboring states.

The question remains often unasked, however: what exactly is the relationship between m

time security and global economic prosperity? If we can find answers to this question we 

better determine the responsibility of the United States for using its maritime services to pro

the global commons, either unilaterally or in conjunction with other nations.

The U.S. Economy

Despite being a continental economy more self-sufficient than many other countries, 

United States has become interdependent with the world over the last fifty years. First as a la

exporter of goods and now as an enormous importer, the nation depends on the rest of 

world for everything from petroleum products to high-technology goods. The bulk of this tr

in goods leaves and arrives via megaports in Asia and Europe. American workers and consu

ers enjoy the economic prosperity they currently possess in large part because the country is 

terconnected with the dynamic global economy. Even when the United States is not direct

recipient of a good, American firms, including financial services firms, have interests in co

merce moving from point to point in other parts of the world. In brief, the United States has 

enormous interest in the success of, not only its own society, but that of nations as diverse 

Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Russia, Germany, Japan, and China.

The successful American economy is the foundation for American diplomatic, political, 

military power in the world. Although this is widely acknowledged, the analytic proc

45

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currently being used to help develop a new maritime strategy has, at the direction of the CN

not yet emphasized the resource implications of the new maritime strategy. The reasons und

lying this guidance are wise. If the strategy development process focused on resource disc

sions it might quickly devolve into debates over force structure and naval platfo

characteristics. It would allow greater entrée for partisans of various acquisition programs 

operation communities to introduce their firmly held convictions about the wisdom of their 

projects relative to those of others. Yet, as both panelists Dr. Richard Cooper and Dr. E

Frost acknowledge, a vibrant American economy allows the state to tax citizens and extract 

material and financial resources necessary to fund the maritime services, including the Na

Of course, in a democracy, the public’s tolerance for taxes and thus military spending depe

in part on the demonstrated return on its investments.

America’s new maritime strategy must therefore guard the security necessary for Ameri

prosperity in an interdependent international economy without undermining the very sourc

the predominance of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corp, and Coast Guard.

Global Economy, Key States, and Regions

Many economists have a relatively sanguine perspective on global security in the future. T

believe, rightly or wrongly, that the global economy is on an upward trajectory and that 

path will not only increase the wealth of nations and the living standards of individuals but a

in the end, lead to a less conflictual world order. The fundamental rationale underlying this 

sessment is that globalized economic growth will remove many traditional sources of inter

tional conflict. National leaders will no longer seek advantage over their neighbors and enem

by acquiring territory, destroying mutual economic interests, or even undertaking actions 

might harm the global economy, because they realize that in an interdependent economy s

actions will weaken their own prosperity and prospects for future economic growth.

Of course, many international relations scholars, especially those from the Realist tradition, 

skeptical of these claims. International relations scholars in general often point to the mult

sources of conflict, both inter- and intrastate, from ethnic divisions to religious and cultural 

ferences. Realists also note that differential economic growth rates can lead to destabilizing c

flicts as rising economic powers seek political and military analogs to their growing mate

wealth. Moreover, the rising tide of a globalized world economy may lead to controversies o

relative and absolute gains that defy hypotheses about democratic and commercial peace

The Economics and Maritime Strategy panel rightfully highlighted the fastest growing regio

the global economy: Asia. Take, for example, the case of China. Statistical projection

China’s economic growth out to 2020, made with modest trend line extrapolations, give the 

to alarmist predictions that China will soon surpass the United States as the world’s lar

economy. Yet projections and trends tell us little about how China will seek to use its grow

economic resources. Current strategic thinking in the United States remains of two minds ab

the rise of China. Some fear that China will modernize its military in order to challenge 

United States and other regional powers in Asia, such as Japan. Others believe that Chin

leaders, perhaps under the influence of a growing business community, will recognize their o

dependence on the free flow of commerce. They will be loath to take steps—whether by se

ing reunification with Taiwan by force or by challenging the American Navy’s role in protec

freedom of the seas—that might weaken its vulnerable and dependent national economy

The new maritime strategy will be written in a context where strategists remain uncertain a

the impact of China’s rise, not just on the Sino-American bilateral relationship, but on inte

gional relations and the overall global economic and political balance.

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Impact on Maritime Strategies

Regardless of the lack of quantitative or qualitative evidence of a direct relationship betw

maritime security and prosperity, our experts and workshop participants appear to agree th

strong American maritime presence is important. Dr. Cooper laid out an ascending set of 

tions, from a minimalist approach that would keep the size of American naval forces at “no 

than three times the sum of the next largest three navies (perhaps not counting close allies s

as Britain and Japan in the reckoning)” to a more maximalist approach that would “be to 

ate and maintain a navy which, along with allies in close coordination, could police the s

against all undesirable human activity.” Given the predominance of American power and 

enormous economic advantages over potential competitors, all options except the last could 

accomplished using U.S. taxpayer funds. The maximalist approach would be more difficult 

the United States alone, but it could be achieved with the cooperation of other maritime p

ers. This, however, would require a multilateral approach to security that only now is beginn

to reemerge in American defense strategy. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 

chael Mullin, has already spent more than a year working out the details of collective marit

security. From the germ of an idea represented by the 1000-ship navy concept to the rece

identified global maritime partnership, Admiral Mullin’s vision is closing in on reality.

Ellen Frost took a straightforward approach that considered what the Navy should look like 

future dominated by Asian economic growth and the continuation of globalization. The flex

ity and attention to traditional roles, such as protecting commerce, that she advocates may 

deed be the only way forward.

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Panel III

Economics and Emerging Maritime Powers

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution

Robert O. Work

Senior Defense Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger

Economic Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command

Moderator:

Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens

Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor o

National Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

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India and the United States: Economic,

Strategic, and Maritime Implications

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program

Brookings Institution

Any “National Security Strategy” that is ahistorical and culturally uninformed is unlikely 

maximize American interests. On both counts, American strategy in the Indian Ocean reg

especially as it pertains to India, the region’s most important maritime state and rising econo

power, has more often than not been tone-deaf. This shortcoming was especially notable d

ing the Cold War, when the Indian Navy (IN) was seen as a Soviet auxiliary, and India 

thought to be the putative leader of a hostile nonaligned movement. Of course, Indians 

their own stereotypes of the United States, and for nearly twenty years, from 1970 onwa

American policy was seen as part of a China-Pakistan-U.S. axis that had India’s containmen

not suppression, as its chief objective.

These days are certainly over, and for a number of reasons both Washington and New D

have come to a more realistic (and optimistic) understanding of the possibility of strategic co

eration between the two states.

• The end of the Cold War forced both sides to reassess the U.S.-India relationship. T

reassessment took several years to complete—and in some places in India America is 

regarded as a threatening state—but by and large the two states interact as “norm

great powers should.

• The 1998 Indian nuclear tests began the process of removing the proliferation issue fr

the top of the bilateral agenda. The U.S.-India nuclear deal, if consummated, wo

complete that process.

• India’s economic growth spurt has attracted strong American corporate interest, 

American companies now comprise a significant India lobby in Washington.

• With the exception of elements of India’s left, support for closer U.S.-Indian relation

strong across the political spectrum in both states.

• India’s military capabilities are now more realistically seen for what they are: limited, 

highly professional, and thus capable of significant growth.

• Both India and the United States keep a wary eye on China; in both countries opin

about the question of whether China’s rise will be hostile or benign is fairly eve

distributed among strategic elites, including the military.

• Pakistan and India-Pakistan relations are not addressed by America’s current natio

security strategy. That strategy does not adequately deal with the prospect of (a) anot

India-Pakistan crisis (or war), (b) Pakistan’s role in fomenting what most American po

makers would call terrorism (but which Pakistanis regard as legitimate freed

struggles), (c) Pakistan’s economic and political incoherence, and (d) remain

questions about Pakistan’s nuclear program.

This paper looks ahead five to seven years and explores those areas where we see an impor

intersection between economic growth, maritime strategy, and strategic ties between 

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United States and India. Our assessment is preliminary,1 but our major conclusions are (1) 

the Indian Ocean and maritime security will be the most likely area of military cooperat

(2) the autonomous growth of economic ties between India and the United States provides 

ballast for the overall strategic and political relationship, ruling out any major swing towar

new hostility, (3) Pakistan, not China, is likely to be the major area of contention betw

Washington and New Delhi, and (4) India can do little regarding America’s concerns about 

rorism, and the issue has the potential to be divisive.

An Oceanic Partnership

The nadir of U.S.-Indian relations occurred when the USS Enterprise was ordered to play so

unspecified role in or near East Pakistan toward the end of the 1971 India-Pakistan war. For 

next twenty-five years the USS Enterprise was a ghost ship, spooking every U.S.-India 

logue. For India the ship symbolized an American attempt to deny India its greatest military 

tory (indeed, its only victory of any consequence) and to stymie India’s quest for great po

status. For the Nixon administration (and others) 1971 was a mere sideshow in the greater C

War, and Indian anger was further proof of New Delhi’s strategic immaturity and pro-So

leanings. For many years, American admirals regarded India as a Soviet surrogate.

This has now changed. The IN (and Coast Guard) are now seen, and see themselves, as a na

ral partner to the United States and other American allies in a whole range of maritime-rela

activities.2 Both states have a common interest in keeping the oil and gas flowing from the G

to points east (India is now a major importer of hydrocarbons, most of it seaborne); the na

engage in annual exercises; they have cooperated on antipiracy operations, especially 

Southeast Asia; Indian frigates have escorted U.S. submarines through the Malacca Strait; 

there was close cooperation during the tsunami, cooperation that was politically beneficia

both countries.

Professionally, each navy holds the other in high regard, and IN flag rank officers, once v

critical of the United States, have now reversed course, even if they are skeptical of Ameri

strategies in Iraq and elsewhere. For the first time the United States is seen as a source of qua

ships and advanced naval technologies, and the recent sale of a landing craft is likely to be o

the first of many significant transfers. Washington missed the opportunity of providing In

with a carrier;3 an alert Pentagon should not miss such an opportunity again.

Politically, naval cooperation is easy to do with India. The major Indian ports are located in 

gions that are fast-developing and have an outward-looking perspective on the world, 

where there is already a great deal of U.S. investment. India also has a few unsinkable airc

carriers in the form of the Andaman Islands. Access to Indian bases there could be of g

value to the U.S. Navy (USN) for operations in the South China Sea and elsewhere. C

versely, nothing is heard now of American facilities at Diego Garcia, long the subject of scath

Indian criticism.

Strategically, this cooperation could extend to stabilizing weak and failing states in the Ind

Ocean region, especially those affected by natural disaster or whose failure might interr

52

1. This paper is drawn from a larger book project that examines the modernization of the Indian military and

prospects for U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation over the next seven to eight years.

2. The breakthrough came when the head of the Japanese Coast Guard invited the Indian Coast Guard to j

in antipiracy operations (after an attack on a Japanese ship), bypassing Japan’s constitutional restrictions 

overseas military engagement.

3. The USS Ranger was available, and offering it might have preempted a costly purchase of the Gorshkov.

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energy supplies.4 Implicitly, it puts the United States and India in a position to balance any C

nese naval expansion. New Delhi and Beijing are already engaged in a soft competition for p

access at the mouth of the Persian Gulf (and in Burma, where the United States has writte

self out of the game); this competition is likely to intensify. Washington should enable Indi

match up with China at sea.

Economics: Ballast for State-to-State Relations

In a 1999 report the Council on Foreign Relations noted that there was no ballast for U

Indian relations. That has dramatically changed with the rapid growth of the Indian econo

and the participation of many leading American firms in that growth. Indian growth is expec

to continue at more than 8 percent indefinitely; this could be even greater were India to acce

ate its own reform program (the major bottlenecks are regional and local bureaucracies, un

laws that inhibit the restructuring of Indian and foreign corporations, and domestic political 

moil in some parts of India, notably the north and the east). One consequence of this gro

has been major investments in the United States by Indian companies; another has been 

formation of an effective lobby in Washington, comprised of American companies with sig

cant Indian investments.

Overall, while there may be much to quibble about, the rate of growth of economic ties 

been astonishing, and generally beneficial to the United States, despite the offshoring of so

medium-technology American jobs.5 This trend is likely to continue indefinitely.

Our Pakistan Problem (and India’s)

The intellectual groundwork for current American policy was laid down in the early years of 

first Reagan administration. Confronted with a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both Wash

ton and New Delhi concluded that a rapprochement of sorts made sense. For Washington 

was an opportunity to protect Pakistan’s flank and to “wean” the Indians from the Soviet Un

for the Indians this was an opportunity to try to weaken or reduce American military suppor

Pakistan. These calculations led to Rajiv Gandhi’s 1985 visit and an American policy that s

in effect, that we now had two friends in South Asia, India and Pakistan—the precursor of 

“dehyphenization” policy of recent years.

However, this policy had and has one major flaw: it does not include an American attemp

grapple with the India-Pakistan rivalry. After the Kennedy administration, Washington gave 

on attempting to move the two states toward a meeting point on Kashmir, contenting itself w

pious statements about the need for dialogue and reconciliation during the several wars 

numerous crises that characterized India-Pakistan relations from 1965 onward. While Ame

has put itself squarely between the two states, this has only served to encourage each to us

bilateral relationship with Washington to influence Washington’s ties with its rival. No Am

can administration has had the courage or imagination to move any further (as some h

done in the Middle East, where our friends are enemies, and the Balkans and elsewhere). T

policy of smiling neglect works well when there are no India-Pakistan crises, but these have 

curred with depressing regularity and, since 1990, have had nuclear overtones.

53

4. India offered its full cooperation to the United States in conducting operations in Afghanistan; this was a k

element in Musharraf’s decision to provide such support himself. India may still play a major role in

Afghanistan, and it has a significant economic and consular presence there already.

5. On balance, offshoring helps the American economy by making American firms more efficient, although t

does create some angst in the United States regarding lost jobs (and India is high on the list of states that a

perceived as having benefited from offshoring). Ironically, Indian companies have diversified, establishing 

centers in Ireland and West Virginia.

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Competing Terrorist Paradigms

If the National Security Strategy seriously focuses on “defeating global terrorism,” it is either 

tally misconceived or totally misstated. Terrorism is a tactic of the weak; it has many causes 

is present in many societies. While we see the gradual eradication of smoking in public pla

attempting a defeat of global terrorism is tantamount to a defeat of all smoking (or perhaps 

breath). Obviously, what American policy makers really mean by such language is the defea

radical Islamist terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland and foreign properties and ass

but their rhetorical excess has led to serious backlash in a number of states and has proba

worsened the problem.

In India’s case, America’s Orwellian phraseology has led to a demand for U.S. support aga

India-directed terrorism that originates in Pakistan. Indeed, one pillar of the new U.S.-In

strategic relationship is that it provides India with leverage over the United States, which in t

is expected to pressure Pakistan. This has worked, but the whole structure has two crit

weaknesses.

First, it means that New Delhi’s first phone call will be to Washington when there is another 

rorist attack by Islamist extremists in India. Washington, in turn, may, or may not, put press

on Pakistan (which will deny responsibility in any case). Absent an overall strategy for regio

reconciliation or normalization, America’s fallback position is one of hope, and as Geo

Schultz once said, hope is not a policy.

Second, New Delhi is now facing a critical turn in its own “war on terrorism.” Far more seriou

afflicted than the United States, India has lost control over a quarter of its districts; in almos

cases these “terrorists” are not Islamists, but indigenous tribals, religious minorities, Mao

and others, who are the product of a massive social “churning” that has produced greater 

pectations and greater frustrations, especially among the mal-educated young. A smaller p

nomenon, but one even more chilling, is the growth of radical extremism among Ind

Muslims, hitherto regarded as docile and satisfied. One of the great ironies here is that India 

fused to negotiate on Kashmir for fear that to do so would trigger unrest among the 150 mil

Muslims in India proper; today, both Kashmir and the fringes of this enormous community 

in open rebellion.

Conclusion

U.S.-Indian strategic ties are undergoing rapid change. We will know more about the scope 

depth of this change after Congress acts upon the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal. Ind

growing military competence, especially at sea, could be a special asset for the United Sta

just as its booming economy benefits American companies and (by and large) the Indian p

ple.6 Optimism is in order, but only if it is tempered by prudence and a finer-grained und

standing of regional pitfalls than America has shown in the past.

54

6. After a decade of growth and reform, India still has over half of the world’s poorest people.

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“Economics” and Established Maritime

Powers: Resource Implications of the New

Maritime Strategy

Robert O. Work

Senior Defense Analyst

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

So it was back to the old, old naval question, first posed in American history by John Adams in

1775: “What think you of an American Fleet?” In other words, is the Navy necessary? Is it afford

able? How should it be composed? For every naval nation, these are the unchanging questions o

external and internal naval policy, the questions of need, function, and structure. The arguments

have always been long; the answers have never been simple. In 1986, the US Navy had defined

the purpose of its existence in terms which, by 1990, appeared to be out of date. Knowing full wel

it was not going to be disestablished overnight, it understood that its role for the 1990s must be re

defined. If not, then undoubtedly, it would suffer greater proportional cuts than its sister—and rival—

services. [emphasis added]

Stephen Howarth

To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–19911

The Navy has launched an impressive, multifaceted effort to redefine its role in a globali

world. A key aim of this effort will be to explain the increasingly important relationship betw

global economic growth and stability and maritime security.2 However, as Stephen Howa

suggests, the project has two other important, if unstated, “economic” goals: to protect 

Navy from future budget cuts and, if possible, to increase the level of resources dedicated 

American naval power.

Others at this conference are far better qualified to discuss the first of these aims. This paper 

address the second.

The Search for the New Naval Holy Grail

A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, and after a century of defining itself first 

foremost in terms of sea control and naval superiority, the U.S. Navy continues its relent

search for a new naval holy grail—a new maritime grand strategy. The last naval holy grail, 

simply titled Maritime Strategy, was discovered in the early 1980s. It was unexpectedly sh

tered with the demise of the Soviet Union and its powerful navy. This surprising, disorien

event prompted the Navy to mount a concerted search for its replacement, which continue

this day.

55

1. Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991 (New York: Random

House, 1991), p. 556. This one-volume history is particularly valuable for two reasons: it is written by a

British author, not an American, who provides an approving but distinctly outside view of the rise of the U

Navy to the position of number-one naval power in the world; and it ends just at the end of the Cold War

which began an as-yet-unending search for a “unified field theory” of naval power in the twenty-first-cent

2. One has only to read the remarks made by Admiral Mike Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, at the 2006

Current Strategy Forum to understand the importance he places on the intersection between economic

stability and maritime security in a globalized world. See “Remarks as Delivered by Admiral Mullen to the

Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June 14, 2006,” accessed online at

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/ Mullen/CNO_CSF140606.pdf on October 30, 2006.

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To qualify as the new naval holy grail, the new maritime strategy must do three things at on

be embraced by and inspire those American fighting men and women who make their pro

sional living by operating on, over, under, and from the sea; be understood and welcomed 

U.S. political leaders and the American people, who will then seek and approve the funds n

essary to translate into reality the sea services’ preferred “needs, functions, and structure”; 

be accepted, if not outright applauded and supported, by U.S. naval allies.3 Several promis

strategies, stretching back to the 1991 The Way Ahead, have already been uncovered in 

search for the new grail.4 However, they were found not to possess its three defining, mira

lous powers and were subsequently discarded. Thus, the search for the new naval holy g

continues apace.5

Admiral Michael G. Mullen became the twenty-eighth Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in J

2005. One year later, at the Current Strategy Forum in Newport, Rhode Island, he announ

a change in search tactics for the grail. To sum up, Admiral Mullen seeks to “elevate the disc

sion of sea power” by instituting a five-phase process designed to gather inputs from inte

and external experts, audiences, and sources, thereby sparking a competition of ideas. T

competition of ideas deliberately seeks to encourage and include dissenting views. His des

end result is a framework “with which we can attempt to make sense of the world around us, 

challenges we face, and the demands on our time and resources.” This framework will, in 

sence, provide the map needed to find the Grail, ultimately leading to a completely new m

time grand strategy that aims “to address current challenges and to guide the Navy in 

entirely new, globally connected environment that has not existed in the past.”6

The methods and inclusiveness of Admiral Mullen’s search for a new strategy have been w

received by naval proponents both in and out of uniform. For example, Paul Bracken, in an 

ticle for the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, wrote:

The distinctive feature of the US Navy’s new maritime strategy is that it did not start with the an

swer. In this, it is quite different from much strategic thinking in the United States in recent years

Instead of jumping to the right answer—“the global war on terror,” “strategic balancer,”—it calls

for a productive conversation over the next year to identify the concepts and issues that go into a

maritime strategy. This marks a turning point in the style of American strategic thinking of giving

56

3. Sam Bateman, “Analyzing the New U.S. Maritime Strategy,” Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies,

August 11, 2006, accessed at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/Perspective/IDSS0792006.pdf on

October 28, 2006. Mr. Bateman opined that any new maritime strategy would have to pass these three te

for it to be successful.

4. For a wonderful recapitulation of U.S. Navy strategies that have failed to pass muster as the naval holy gr

see Dr. John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategies in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Naval War Col

Newport Papers, No. 27 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September 2006). For a shorter discussi

see Peter M. Swartz, principal author, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2006),” a dra

PowerPoint briefing prepared by the Center for Naval Analysis, dated May 17, 2005.

5. The Navy has made it clear that no existing document can be updated or modified to qualify as the new g

From “Developing a New Maritime Strategy,” talking points developed by the Navy’s director of informat

undated.

6. The embedded quotes come from Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy, “What I Believe: Eight Tenets That

Guide My Vision For the 21st Century Navy,” Proceedings, January 2006, accessed online at http://

www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/proceedingsjan06.html, 28 October 2006. For a good description of 

“competition of ideas” the Navy seeks, see the remarks made by Rear Admiral J. L. Shuford in “Presiden

Forum,” Naval War College Review, August 2006. The description of the new strategy development proc

is described in “Developing a New Maritime Strategy,” CHINFO. As described in this document, the five

phases of the process are as follows. Phase I: Collect Inputs and Analyze Strategic Environment; this begin

the process and continues through all phases. Phase II: Develop Maritime Strategies; this involves the

discussion of strategic theories in public forums to socialize initial concepts. Phase III: Test, Examine and

Refine Alternatives; the Navy will legitimize and validate proposed strategies through the testing and gami

process and analysis of results. Phase IV: Synthesize and Report; the Navy will synthesize successful strate

into one comprehensive strategy. Phase V: Sustainment; the Navy will continue to promote and uphold

principles of the Maritime Strategy.

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instant answers with little attention to their risks or consequences... While the maritime strategy

does not advance a single answer, it does offer promising avenues to explore. These involve tech

nology and global alliances in a calculated relationship of large ends and means, the definition o

grand strategy. [emphasis added]7

Few would argue that such a conversation would be unproductive; any deliberate, inclus

and truly open dialogue about maritime strategy will be sure to yield positive results, eve

they are nothing more than a restatement of the value of maritime power to the United Sta

However, it is not entirely clear what positive result the Navy most desires from its contin

search for the new grail. The Navy and Marine Corps already have approved strategic vision

Sea Power 21 and The 21st Century Marine Corps, respectively. Admiral Mullen has alre

announced the makeup of his desired 313-ship future battle fleet, as well as the 30-year pla

build it. The CNO and Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) also recently published a n

Naval Operations Concept (NOC), which is described as “the latest in an evolutionary se

that describes how the Navy–Marine Corps team will contribute to the defense of our natio

In addition,

This document provides our “Commanders’ Intent” to guide the considerable creativity and judg

ment of our Sailors and Marines in applying a set of principles and methods within the framework

provided by Sea Power 21 and The 21st Century Marine Corps. The end-state is de-centralized

decision-making and execution based on broad, centralized guidance.9

Vision. Force structure. Commanders’ intent. Operational guidance. It would be reasonabl

assume that most of these things might normally spring from the very maritime grand strat

the Navy is searching for. One would at least expect that the future fleet size and architect

and the NOC would spring from an articulation of maritime grand strategy. Given that both 

ready exist, what are the most important outcomes the Navy hopes to achieve through its c

tinued search for the grail?

A Focus on Increased Prestige, Influence, and Resources

One desired outcome is surely to raise the level of discourse about sea power within the U

Navy and Marine Corps, and to inspire a new generation of naval leaders. In this regard, 

CNO and CMC both appear to relish the prospect of intense debate and intellectual jous

within and between the two sea services. As they wrote in the NOC:

We understand that this discourse may become passionate. During World War II, Vice Admira

Richmond Kelly “Terrible” Turner and Lieutenant General Holland M. “Howlin’ Mad” Smith

were renowned for their volcanic arguments about operational design, force organization, and

tactics during the drive across the Central Pacific, yet together they formed an unbeatable team

and wrote one of the greatest chapters in our history. . . . The Naval Service, and the nation, is

well served when we follow their example of teamwork guided by open and frank discussion.10

Another outcome is to define sea power in a more inclusive way, specifically to excite and 

volve the greatest number of foreign naval allies; hence the CNO’s emphasis at the Curr

Strategy Forum on building naval partnerships in a globalized, interconnected world wh

“nobody can go it alone.” As indicated by his vision for a “1,000-ship Navy,” as well as ot

57

7. Paul Bracken, “Maritime Strategy and Grand Strategy,” Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies,

September 26, 2006, accessed at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Perspective/IDSS1032006.pdf o

October 27, 2006.

8. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, and General Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Naval Operations Concept, 20

p. 1, accessed at http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/concepts/ServiceConcepts/NOC%20FINAL%2014

%20Sep.pdf, on October 26, 2006.

9. Ibid., p. 1.

10. Ibid., p. 2.

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new concepts such as the Global Fleet Station, the CNO is clearly intent on defining a n

world of maritime partnerships and exploring new ways for cooperative naval action in ev

region of the world.11

Both of these goals are admirable, and well worth the time and effort. Unquestionably, h

ever, the Navy’s search is also focused on exploiting the second of the grail’s mystical pow

an ability to garner increased prestige, influence, and resources for the Department of the Na

The important relationship between the Navy’s strategy and resources was well captured 

Samuel P. Huntington in an article titled “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” fou

in the May 1954 edition of the Naval Institute Proceedings:

The second element of a military service [the first being what he called the strategic concept of the

service] is the resources, human and material, which are required to implement its strategic con

cept. To secure these resources it is necessary for society to forego the alternative uses to which

the resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the military service. Thus, the re

sources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public sup

port of that service. The service has the responsibility to develop the necessary support, and it can

only do so if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the na

tional security. [emphasis in the original]12

At the very least, then, Navy leaders hope a new strategy will favorably influence U.S. polit

leaders as they craft new national strategies and thereby protect the Navy from future bud

cuts; at most, they hope it will be used by U.S. political leaders to articulate and justify an 

creased contributory role for the DoN in future national strategies, and a concomitant rela

increase in the DoN’s overall budget topline. These goals are at least partly acknowledged 

the Navy’s Director of Information, who has announced that the new strategy is to be publis

in 2007, in time “to influence the next cycle of strategic thinking, including the next Navy S

tegic Plan and into the next [Quadrennial Defense Review].”13 Although there is no conc

mention of the Navy seeking increased resources, the implication is clear: Navy leaders h

not only to influence their own plans, but the course of future national defense plans, and

extension, future funding streams.

This is by no means a subsidiary goal of the strategy. Protecting the DoN’s budget line is ab

lutely critical if Admiral Mullen and the Navy have any hope of executing their plans. This 

plains why the CNO accompanied his announcement of a 313-ship future battle fleet ta

with a clear caution that achieving the target would require the Navy to make some dram

adjustments. He decreed that the associated shipbuilding plan be built on the assumption of 

future defense budgets and DoN toplines, thereby pointedly avoiding any hint that the exe

tion of the Navy’s plan would depend on an increased allocation of DoD resources. In ot

words, to build a 313-ship fleet, the Navy would need to reallocate money within its own 

pected resource stream.14

This will be no mean feat; the Navy’s own analysts have calculated that building the 313-s

Navy will require yearly average shipbuilding budgets of approximately $15.5 billion a yea

Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 dollars (counting nuclear refueling costs). Outside agencies, such as 

58

11. “Remarks as delivered by Admiral Mike Mullen to the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newp

Rhode Island, June 14, 2006”; see especially p. 8.

12. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” United States Naval Institute

Proceedings, May 1954, p. 483.

13. “Developing a New Maritime Strategy.”

14. See, for example, Captain J. F. McCarthy, USN, “Recapitalizing the Navy’s Battle Line,” a PowerPoint

presentation given to at a Department of the Navy Media Roundtable on June 8, 2006, slide number 16.

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Congressional Budget Office, put the cost much higher, at over $21 billion a year.15 Even 

lower numbers prove to be correct, however, the Navy will still need approximately $4.4 bil

more per year in average shipbuilding funds than the Congress appropriated over the previ

20 years.16 In order to free up that much additional money within its own topline, the Navy 

need to do the following:

• Limit real increases in personnel costs. The average yearly costs for active-d

personnel have long risen at rates higher than those for the overall Navy budget. To k

the amount of money spent on personnel flat (adjusted only for inflation), Adm

Mullen plans to continue the aggressive reduction in the Navy’s overall active-duty 

strength started by Admiral Clark. In effect, he intends to offset any real increase

personnel costs by reducing the number of people serving on active duty.

• Limit real increases in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. Navy operations 

maintenance costs have also been steadily increasing as a share of Navy topline. T

shipbuilding plan depends on these costs being frozen at current levels, and then ris

only enough to keep pace with inflation.

• Reduce research and development (R&D) costs and keep them low. In line with 

predecessor’s thinking, Admiral Mullen intends to shift money from R&D toward s

production, and to keep future R&D at much lower levels than in the recent past.

• Prevent requirement and cost growth in any Navy shipbuilding program. To accomp

this, the CNO resuscitated the moribund Ship Characteristics and Improvement Bo

to reinstitute a more vigorous scrub of future ship requirements and identify unnecess

requirements in existing programs. He also instituted stringent cost controls.

• “Fence” shipbuilding funds. The CNO decreed that maintaining stability in the ye

shipbuilding budgets and construction rates would be among his top procurem

priorities. While stating that he intends to better balance the Navy’s investment portfo

protecting the shipbuilding fund from cuts implies that should procurement funding 

lower than expected, aviation and other programs would be among his first targets 

adjustments.

Achieving any of these goals will present a stiff challenge, primarily because they each dep

to some degree on factors outside of the Navy’s direct control. As just one example, if the C

gress authorizes more research and development money than the Navy requested—as they 

in the FY 2007 budget just passed—the Navy will be obliged to pay for it, which will upse

carefully calibrated budget and shipbuilding plans. As a result, the chance that all of these 

jectives will or can be met simultaneously is extremely remote.17 Moreover, there is always 

possibility that internal savings generated within the Department of the Navy will be diverte

other, more pressing DoD priorities. In other words, even if the Navy is successful in hold

down spending in one area of its budget, there is no guarantee that the savings can or wil

applied to other DoN programs.

59

15. Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, May 2006), pp. 25–

The report can be found online at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7232/05-31-Navy.pdf.

16. McCarthy, “Recapitalizing the Navy’s Battle Line,” slide number 18.

17. For example, DFI International Corporate Services recently concluded that “pressures will prevent a wide

range of acquisition programs from unfolding as the Navy and DoD desire.” See DFI International Corpo

Services, “Navy Investment Plans: Plans Versus Reality, and Implications for Market Opportunity,” a

PowerPoint presentation given to the National Defense Industrial Association, April 26, 2006.

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This makes it all the more important that, at the very least, the Navy be resourced at plan

budget levels. Far better would be if the Navy was to receive additional resources. Obviou

having to contend with budgets that are smaller than forecast will make an already-diffi

planning problem even tougher, while getting more resources than expected will provid

hedge against unexpected budget shocks and increase the likelihood the CNO will be abl

build his preferred future fleet. Developing a maritime grand strategy that garners increased 

fluence, prestige, and resources for the Navy is therefore an important, if not overriding, inst

tional goal.

Benchmarks for the Future Grail

Indeed, the emphasis placed on this goal is implicitly revealed by two earlier strategies 

served, for a time, as the naval holy grail. Not surprisingly, both are frequently cited by Navy 

ficers in discussions about the effects the new maritime strategy is expected to achieve. In eff

they serve as the benchmarks for the new grail. They are as follows:

• The strategy of commercial and military sea control, articulated first in Alfred Tha

Mahan’s The Influence of Seapower on History. Mahan’s masterwork, published 

1890, figuratively lit the fuse that fired the U.S. Navy along a 55-year trajectory that t

it from being one among many competitors in the global naval race to being 

unchallenged world naval power. As Admiral Mullen said in his remarks at the Curr

Strategy Forum, Mahan “...was perhaps the first to truly advance the discussion of 

power. This new maritime strategy will elevate it far above anything he could h

envisioned in his day.”18

• The aforementioned Maritime Strategy, developed in the early 1980s under 

leadership of then-secretary of the Navy John Lehman. The Maritime Strategy was 

modern reincarnation and expansion of Mahan’s thinking about the importance of 

control, with a twist of transoceanic power projection. It clearly defined the purpos

naval forces in a potential war against the Soviet Union, and provided the strate

rationale for the subsequent development of the “600-ship Navy.” As Admiral Mu

approvingly remarked at the Current Strategy Forum, “It was a strategy for—and of—

time and it worked, prevailing across presidential administrations, Chiefs of Na

Operations and varying budget cycles.”19

These two examples have five things in common, which provide important clues about 

Navy’s hopes for the new strategy. First, both strategies were preceded by dramatic cont

tions in the size of the U.S. battle fleet. Between 1865 (the end of the American Civil War) 

1888, the American battle fleet fell from nearly 700 commissioned ships to only 43.20 Eight 

cades later, between 1968 and 1978, the active fleet dropped from 932 to 531 ships as m

World War II vessels reached the end of their productive service lives. During this post-Vietn

drawdown, every component of the battle fleet was affected: the number of carriers drop

from 23 to 13; the number of cruisers fell from 35 to 28; amphibious warships were cut fr

157 to 67; submarines from 105 to 75; and destroyers from 219 to 95. 21 Worse, in 19

60

18. Remarks delivered by Admiral Mike Mullen to the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport,

Rhode Island, June 14, 2006, p. 8.

19. Ibid., p. 3.

20. Peter M. Swartz, Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002 (Alexandria, V

Center for Naval Analysis, July 31, 2002), pp. 26–27; Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Fo

Levels, 1886–1916,” accessed online at http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4b.htm#1886 on

October 29, 2006.

21. Naval Historical Center, “US Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–,” accessed online at http://www.histo

.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1945 on October 29, 2006.

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President Jimmy Carter announced his alterations to the five-year shipbuilding plan submi

by his predecessor, President Gerald Ford, cutting the number of ships in the 1979 to 1

shipbuilding plan from 156 to 70.22

These numbers tell an important story: in the two periods running up to the articulation of 

new strategies, the Navy’s relevance to prevailing national security policies was questioned

a result, naval leaders had a hard time justifying the budget resources necessary to sustain 

battle fleet.

Second, both strategies were published during periods of intense naval competition, when 

United States’ relative position among world naval powers was either low or directly thr

ened. Between 1865 and 1884, the U.S. Navy dropped from being number 2 among world 

val powers to number 12. In addition to a dramatic reduction in its fleet size, the Navy a

lagged in technological innovation, largely eschewing steam propulsion, iron armor, or ri

cannon in new warship construction. In a world in which the armored battleship was rapidly 

coming the primary measure of naval power, the small, U.S. frigate/cruiser-centric battle f

“was quite inadequate to carry out its planned wartime employment strategy of coastal defe

and commerce raiding, let alone take on a concentrated naval battle fleet.”23 As the U.S. po

cal leadership began to look beyond America’s continental borders, U.S. weakness in 

global maritime competition became a big national security issue.

Nearly a century later, even as the U.S. battle fleet continued its precipitous decline, the So

Navy, under the energetic leadership of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, was making a str

bid for the number 1 spot in the global naval pecking order.24 Indeed, Admiral Elmo Zumw

CNO from 1970–74, concluded that in any year after 1970, the U.S. Navy would likely co

out the loser in a confrontation with the Soviet Navy, with only a 35 percent chance of victor

In other words, both strategies were developed during periods when the Navy’s rank and 

was dispirited by its service’s national security role and its confidence in its warfighting abil

was at a low point.

Third, and most importantly, both strategies helped to trigger or justify dramatic increases in 

level of national resources devoted to the Navy, and in the size and capabilities of the U.S. ba

fleet. Mahan’s writings helped to convince the U.S. political leadership that the United Sta

needed a navy that could compete against the world’s best—to enforce the Monroe Doctr

to protect its shores from foreign invasion, or to protect U.S. economic interests and main

access to world markets. Indeed, these writings helped to shape the first naval holy grail 

were instrumental in providing the impetus and rationale behind the building of a “New Na

that was better able to compete in the global naval competition.26

61

22. Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991, pp. 532–33.

23. Swartz, Sea Changes: Transforming U.S. Navy Deployment Strategy, 1775–2002, p. 27.

24. For example, see Dr. Donald Chipman, “Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy,” Air University Review,

July–August 1982, accessed online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/ 1982/ju

aug/chipman.html on October 30, 2006.

25. Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991, p. 531.

26. As described by one noted naval historian, “At the end of the nineteenth century, in the interval between 

Anglo-German-American crisis over Samoa and the Spanish-American War, the Congress reshaped the n

to meet new national goals. Having rounded out its continental borders, the United States was seeking...a

place of equality with the greatest navies of Europe.” See Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The

Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 389. This radical transformation of the 

battle force from a frigate force focused on commerce raiding to a battleship force focused on the destruct

of an opposing battle line is often referred to as the building of the “New Navy.” See Howarth, To Shinin

Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991, pp. 231–34.

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The results of this nationally sanctioned effort were quite impressive. In 1890, the year Ma

published The Influence of Seapower on History, the battle fleet numbered 42 ships, with 

battleships; it was number 12 among world naval powers. By 1900, the United States was nu

ber 6 with a bullet, with 140 battle force ships and eight battleships, and many more ships un

construction.27 In 1901, 60 ships of all classes were on the way, and the $78 million approp

tions bill passed in the fall of that year was the largest appropriation in U.S. peacetime histor

In 1905, courtesy of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s crushing defeat of the Russian navy, the U

Navy, with 174 active ships and 12 battleships, rose to number 5 among the world’s navies, 

hind those of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The delivery of no less than 13 battlesh

and armored cruisers in 1907, followed by six more in 1908, increased the size of the flee

181 ships, including 25 battleships, and vaulted the U.S. Navy to the number 2 spot, beh

only the Royal Navy. From that point on, the U.S. battle fleet never fell below third among 

world’s naval powers.29

Although perhaps not as large in terms of absolute numbers, the Maritime Strategy hel

spark a similarly impressive fleet buildup and modernization program during the 1980s. 

1981, the battle fleet had fallen to its post–Vietnam War low of 521 ships.30 On the day he 

sworn in as the secretary of the Navy in February 1981, John Lehman asserted that the ba

fleet should be composed of no less than 600 modern warships, including 15 carrier ba

groups, four surface battle groups built around recommissioned and modernized World W

battleships, and 100 nuclear attack submarines. Later, during the 1981 Current Strategy 

rum, Secretary Lehman hailed the return of naval strategy and promised that by 1990 

United States should and would have “outright naval superiority over any power or pow

that might attempt to prevent our free use of the seas and the maintenance of our vital inter

worldwide.”31 This was music to the ears of naval advocates, who had been demoralized by 

subsidiary wartime convoy escort role envisioned for the Navy by the Carter administratio

The Maritime Strategy embodied Secretary Lehman’s bold vision and thus became the n

naval holy grail. It was accepted as the maritime component of the national military strate

explaining how the battle fleet would actually be used in war against the Soviet Union, not 

the Soviet navy. It described the benefits of “horizontal escalation” and forward offensive op

ations around the periphery of the Soviet empire. It showed how all U.S. and allied naval for

might play in this global campaign. It also reinvigorated the Navy, spurring debates and in

lectual foment, and focusing fleet exercises, war games, operational experimentation, and b

tle tactics.32 It also was used to justify every component of the “600-ship Navy.” Although 

fleet ultimately reached a high of 594 ships, six short of Secretary Lehman’s stated goal, it w

far more capable fleet, with new systems such as the Aegis and New Threat Upgrade an

warfare combat systems; the SQQ-89 digital antisubmarine warfare combat system and L

Airborne Multipurpose System; the Mk-41 vertical launch (missile) system; and new weap

such as SM-2 surface-to-air missiles, the Harpoon antiship cruise missile, and the Tomaha

land attack missile.

The Navy now plans for a future battle fleet of 313 ships, 33 more vessels than the 280 warsh

now in commission. This planned fleet expansion of 12 percent is very similar to the 15 perc

62

27. Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1886–1916.”

28. Hagan, This People’s Navy, p. 232.

29. Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1886–1916.” The U.S. Navy gave up the

number-two spot to the German navy for a short time before World War I. See Howarth, To Shining Sea

History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991, p. 295–96.

30. Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–.”

31. Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775–1991, p. 537; see also the remarks

delivered by Admiral Mike Mullen to the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode

Island, June 14, 2006.

32. Swartz, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2006),” slides 75–94.

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fleet expansion planned for in the 1980s. Indeed, the current circumstances are also simila

those in the early 1980s in that in both instances the size of the future fleet was known bef

the development of their associated strategies. This provides further evidence that the N

sees the strategy’s primary role as securing the resources necessary to build its desired f

rather than illuminating the character of the fleet it should build.

Fourth, because the two strategies were developed during times when there was a clearly 

fined naval threat, their implementation plans could be sharp and focused. Imbued with 

spirit of Mahan’s holy grail, which held “that the true mission of a navy was acquiring comm

of the sea through the destruction of an enemy fleet,”33 and faced by a world in which th

were many potential naval adversaries, DoN plans to build a New Navy capable of executin

sea control strategy could be carefully focused. All new-construction ships were rationali

and designed for one mission: to take on and beat the best battle lines in the world, regard

of which nation operated them. New Navy ships were defined first and foremost by their r

tionship and contributions to the actions of the battle fleet’s growing armored battle line.

From 1890 up through the end of Word War I, the only difference in Navy war plans was 

foreign navy or combination of navies the U.S. battle line might have to fight, as forecast in a 

ries of famous “color plans” developed by U.S. strategists and planners in the early twent

century. After the First World War, however, U.S. Navy war planning became even more 

cused. By the early 1920s, the number of likely naval adversaries had shrunk to one—the 

perial Japanese Navy. As a consequence, Plan Orange, the war plan to confront and defeat 

Japanese, became the sole focus of Navy war planning. The subsequent results spoke for th

selves: after nearly two decades of war gaming and planning, the World War II Pacific ca

paign offered few surprises to Navy officers. As Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz famou

remarked after World War II, the only thing that took the fleet off-guard during its long strug

across the Pacific was the appearance of kamikazes.34

The Navy’s plans in the late 1970s and early 1980s benefited from a similar ability to focus o

single enemy. At that time, the Soviet navy posed the only credible threat to U.S. naval supr

acy. As mentioned earlier, every battle force vessel in the Maritime Strategy’s “600-ship Na

could therefore be justified by its contributions in a prospective war with the Soviet Union, b

serving as part of the Navy’s strategic deterrent force, the nuclear attack submarine force, a 

rier battle group, a battleship surface action group, an amphibious task force, a trans-Atla

convoy, or an underway replenishment group. 35 Additionally, the distinction between the M

itime Strategy and the Navy’s war plans against the Soviet Union was quite narrow. In fact, 

strategy in many ways played the role of a modern-day Plan Orange. Like that earlier plan, 

Maritime Strategy served to focus fleet exercises, war games, research and development, 

selection of new weapons, and, just as importantly, the intellectual discourse inside the Navy

In these two cases, when naval planners were confronted by clear naval threats, two implicit 

sumptions helped shape the implementation plans that derived from the strategies: first, 

fundamental task of naval leadership was to concentrate its efforts on building a battle fleet 

pable of defeating the most likely enemy fleet; and second, that this fleet would handle all s

sidiary naval tasks. One practical result was that spending money on special-purpose ships 

did not contribute to the singular goal of defeating an enemy navy was generally regarded 

waste of resources. Said another way, naval tasks such as peacetime forward presen

63

33. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” p. 487.

34. See Rear Admiral J. L. Shuford, “The Naval War College’s Twin Mission,” in “President’s Forum,” Nava

War College Review, Summer 2005.

35. See, for example, the cruiser and destroyer force-level objectives for the “600-ship Navy” in Norman Polm

Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 14th edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 110.

36. Swartz, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2006),” slides 75–94.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:42:45 PM
humanitarian assistance, or crisis response were generally considered “lesser included” use

tasks for the main battle fleet.37

Finally, both examples shared an important commonality in their development, in that b

strategies were preceded by indirect attacks against the direction of national strategies 

plans—and especially against the prevailing view about the Navy’s role in pursuing nationa

curity policy objectives. These indirect attacks took the form of “conversations” between na

leaders and the political elites and the American people. This approach was approvingly 

out by Samuel P. Huntington in the aforementioned article, “National Policy and the Transo

anic Navy.” In the year this article was published (1954), the fleet had fallen from its W

War II high of 6,768 ships to “only” 1,113 ships. Although this was a substantial increase o

the post-war low of 634 ships, reached just before the invasion of South Korea, the Eisenho

administration’s evolving New Look defense program, based on the idea of massive retaliat

favored the expansion of long-range aerospace power over the expansion of the battle fleet.

Huntington’s article was thus published at a time when the U.S. Air Force was receiving 

lion’s share of Department of Defense resources. To redress the situation, Huntington prod

the Navy’s leadership to more effectively explain its “strategic concept” and relevance to p

World War II national policy to the American people “through a systematic, detailed elabo

tion and presentation of the theory of the transoceanic Navy against the broad backgroun

naval history and naval technology.” The article’s implicit message was that if the Navy did 

or could not explain its ongoing shift away from the Mahanian strategy of sea control and 

ward transoceanic power projection on the Eurasian supercontinent, it would continue to 

in the defense resources battle.39

Huntington’s approach, or one very close to it, is widely believed by naval proponents to h

been instrumental in changing the Navy’s fortunes—in laying the foundation for the succ

enjoyed by both the strategy of sea control outlined in Mahan’s Influence of Seapower on H

tory and the Maritime Strategy in gaining increased resources for the battle fleet. For exam

in an insightful article written in the Naval War College Review in 1997, titled “Mahan’s Fo

bears: The Debate Over Maritime Strategy, 1868–1883,” Benjamin Apt wrote:

Between 1868 and 1883, a number of American naval officers of various ranks, lamenting their

service’s decline, began to promote advanced military ship designs and equipment through orga

nized publicity. They wrote articles, held lectures, and formed organizations that eventually

helped to persuade Congress and the Department of the Navy to re-create the fleet. When the

Navy did begin its restructuring in the early 1880s, the warships it ordered derived much from the

ideas of these advocates of modernization.

The writings of the would-be naval reformers in the 1870s can be described as a “conversation,”

one in which they praised, debated, and built upon one another’s arguments and tracked the

64

37. This helps to explain why the contemporary Navy, still equipped with vessels designed to fight the Soviet

Union, is now forced to use guided missile cruisers with 400-man crews for counterpiracy patrols off the c

of Africa. Even the exception proved the rule: during the 1920s and 30s, the Yangtze River Patrol, the As

Fleet, the Caribbean Banana Fleet, and periodic naval deployments to European waters were generally

equipped with and accomplished by obsolete ships that no longer contributed to planned fleet warfighting

operations. See Bernard D. Cole, “The Interwar Forward Intervention Forces: The Asiatic Fleet, the Bana

Fleet, and the European Squadrons: The Battle Fleet Trains While the Gunboats Fight,” a paper prepared 

the U.S. Navy Forward Presence Bicentennial Symposium, June 21, 2001.

38. Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–,” accessed online at http://www.hist

.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1945 on October 29, 2006. For a discussion of the impact of Eisenhower

New Look, see Herman S. Wolk, “The New Look,” Air Force Magazine Online, accessed at http://www.a

.org/magazine/Aug2003/0803look.asp on November 1, 2006.

39. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” p. 493.

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extraordinary contemporary pace of naval science .... Interest in technology was a leading impe

tus behind those who sought an enlarged U.S. Navy following the Civil War.

A further motivation of the reformers was a correlative of their desire for an aggressive application

of technology. They became exponents of an internationalist, ultimately imperialist, vision o

America’s role in world politics .... Before the Civil War, U.S. overseas shipping had sailed in the

safety afforded by British control of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. This arrangement had

suited both countries. England’s policy was to retain unrivaled military dominance of the seas

which in turn had spared the United States the expensive construction and training of an ocean

going navy.

In the postbellum years, American naval reformers no longer assumed this division of roles. They

foretold a United States that would be more competitive with the mother country, as well as with

the European powers that were then expanding their own navies. But if the reformers doubted

that Britain could continue to preserve its predominance, there is no suggestion of it in their cen

tral writings. What is evident, rather, is that the navalists simply wanted a more powerful navy

saw the means for developing it, and rationalized why the country would need one.

40

Conducting a conversation with the nation’s political leadership and the American people, d

ing which the Navy attempted to make the case for a more powerful fleet, also played an imp

tant advance role for the Maritime Strategy. In 1979, U.S. naval leaders responded to Presid

Carter’s aforementioned shipbuilding cuts with The Future of U.S. Sea Power. The explicit p

pose of the document was to elevate debates on the Navy’s budget to the strategic level, in

ence national military strategy, and influence perceptions about the U.S. Navy held by both 

U.S. political leadership and the Soviets. Its powerful, clear, and simple messages about the 

portance of sea power and the role of the U.S. Navy in any conflict against the Soviet Un

were repeated by the CNO and naval officers in defense symposia, public forums, and bef

Congress; were reinforced by fleet exercises; and shaped the play at the Global War Gam

held annually at the Naval War College.41

By describing the search tactics for the new naval holy grail in terms of having productive c

versations or conversations with the American people, naval proponents thus appear to be 

plicitly signaling that they believe the time has come to explain more forcefully the Navy’s 

in future defense strategies and policies, and possibly to argue for an expanded role. By do

so, they would naturally hope to influence the “next cycle of strategic thinking” and, indirec

to increase the level of national resources devoted to building the future fleet.

To sum up, then, the two models that the Navy is using to gauge the ultimate success of the n

maritime grand strategy—and to determine whether or not the new strategy warrants the titl

the new naval holy grail—are strategies that were formulated when the Navy was down. B

were developed after times when the fleet had contracted, and when a dispirited Navy rank 

file sought a more central, relevant contributory role in national defense policies and strateg

Both were preceded by direct conversations with the American public, which were sub

quently credited with helping to reverse the Navy’s fortunes and garnering increased prest

influence, and resources for the service. Finally, because they were developed in times o

clear and compelling threat, the plans to execute the strategies could be sharply focused.

Said another way, the two guiding strategies had an important institutional “economic” imp

they helped to spur an upturn in the value of the Navy’s stock in national defense policies 

strategies. As a result, the strategies made all those holding the stock richer—and happier 

more productive.

65

40. Benjamin Apt, “Mahan’s Forebears: The Debate Over Maritime Strategy, 1868–1883,” Naval War Colleg

Review, Summer 1997, accessed online at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1997/summerart5su97.ht

on October 27, 2006.

41. Swartz, “U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970–2006),” slides 65–72.

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The Right Models?

The Navy’s desire to seek increased prestige, influence, and resources is natural, and a ref

tion of its fervent belief in the importance of a strong American navy. However, before rest

ing a renewed search for the naval holy grail, one has to ask a single, critical question: are th

two previous strategies—not to mention Huntington’s approach for taking the question of 

Navy’s relevance directly to the American people—the right models for establishing the n

search pattern for a naval maritime grand strategy? Perhaps not, for several reasons.

First, the only similarity between current circumstances and those that led to the strategy of 

control and the New Navy, and the Maritime Strategy and the “600-ship Navy” is that the c

temporary battle fleet is the end result of a dramatic decade-and-a-half drawdown. In 1987, 

battle fleet numbered 594 ships.42 On September 30, 2006, after a steady two-decade-long 

cline, the U.S. battle fleet numbered 280 ships—representing a hefty 53 percent reductio

commissioned battle force ships.

That is where the similarities end. No naval challenger now threatens the U.S. Navy; even a

its substantial decline in numbers the U.S. battle fleet remains unchallenged atop the global 

val pecking order. Although the battle fleet numbers fewer ships than at any time since 19

the Navy likely enjoys a wider margin of naval superiority than at any point since the 

1940s.43 Why? Because while the U.S. fleet is smaller than at any time in over 70 years, so 

are the rest of the world’s navies. No foreign navy comes close to operating the total numbe

major warships now found in the U.S. battle fleet. The U.S. Navy operates 12 of the world’s 

full-deck aircraft carriers; it operates approximately twice as many nuclear-powered attack s

marines as the rest of the world combined; its 71 major surface combatants have a cumula

missile magazine capacity greater than that of the 366 major surface combatants in the nex

largest navies; its amphibious fleet is far more capable than any other comparable fleet, and 

combat logistics forces are the largest in the world.

A simple comparison of aggregate fleet warship tonnages helps to highlight the great dispa

between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies in terms of combat capability and capacity. As na

analyst Geoffrey Till explains, “[t]here is a rough correlation between the ambitions of a n

and the size and individual fighting capacity of its main units, provided they are properly m

tained and manned.”44 Aggregate fleet warship tonnage can therefore be used as a sim

proxy for a navy’s overall fighting capabilities and to help identify the key competitors now 

the global naval competition.45

The comparisons of fleet aggregate tonnages are quite stunning. The U.S. battle fleet alo

composed of modern, large, and commodious warships, comes in at an aggregate displa

ment of 2.85 million tons. In contrast, only seven other countries operate war fleets that 

place more than 100,000 aggregate tons, and 10 more operate fleets that displace betw

50,000 and 100,000 tons. In other words, at this point in time, the U.S. Navy faces 17 cred

competitors in the global naval race. In order of aggregate tonnage, these competitors are R

sia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, France, Taiw

66

42. By comparing ship levels in Naval Historical Center, “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–.”

43. See, for example, A. D. Baker III, “World Navies Are in Decline,” Proceedings, March 2004, pp. 32–49.

44. Geoffrey Till, “Can Small Navies Stay Afloat?” Jane’s Navy International, May 1, 2003.

45. For the purposes of the following comparison, the following types of warships are included: aviation powe

projection platforms (ships that can support fixed-wing and/or vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) or sho

take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) tactical aircraft); surface combatants with a full load displacement

(FLD) greater than 2,000 tons (considered capable of overseas deployment); and submarines with

submerged displacements greater than 450 tons (i.e., a German Type 205 coastal defense submarine

equivalent). Data is based on fleets in commission on January 1, 2005.

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Turkey, Brazil, Canada, Spain, Italy, Germany, Australia, South Korea, Greece, and the N

erlands. Together, the navies of these 17 countries account for 2.66 million tons of the en

rest of the world’s (ROW) aggregate warship displacement of 3.03 million tons (88 percen

At the height of its naval dominance, England strove to achieve at least a “two-navy standa

That is, British naval planners aimed to maintain a navy that was as large as the combined fl

of the closest two naval powers. In terms of aggregate warship tonnage, then, the United Sta

enjoys a “17-navy standard.” Indeed, at 94 percent of the total aggregate ROW tonnage, 

U.S. war fleet displaces nearly as much as all other warships in the world’s navies, combined

Moreover, a quick scan of the competitors reveals that 14 of the 17 navies are from countrie

lied with or friendly to the United States, and the fifteenth is from a country we now count 

“strategic partner” (India).46 Only two of the 17 countries are considered potential naval co

petitors: Russia and the People’s Republic of China. The Russian navy—assuming all o

ships are 100 percent operationally capable (a highly questionable assumption)—comes i

630,628 tons, while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) totals 263,064 to

This means the DoN Battle Force out-displaces the combined fleets of its two biggest poten

naval competitors by over three to one. Given these circumstances, there is simply no way 

Navy leaders can reasonably justify a major expansion in the size of the battle fleet in terms 

credible threat to U.S. naval global superiority.

The Navy would be equally hard-pressed to make a strong case that the service is in immin

danger of losing its daunting lead. The Department of the Navy, with a yearly budget toplin

approximately $125 billion dollars, receives 2.6 times more money than Great Britain’s en

military, and twice as much as the combined defense budget expenditures of both Russia 

China.47 Most naval analysts believe that, barring a major change in defense spending, neit

Russia nor China will likely be able to mount a credible naval threat for at least two decades

A. D. Baker III, long-time editor of Combat Fleets of the World, wrote:

. . . the US Navy remains by a vast gap the world’s most powerful, and . . . has been steadily in

creasing its margin of power over any possible protagonist—or even groups of protagonists . . 

[T]he Navy’s fleet is essentially unchallengeable, and its aircraft inventory is far larger than that o

any foreign nation’s air forces, land- or sea-based. From the standpoint of military technology

there is simply no other nation with the same naval capabilities, and it appears that no challenger

will be likely to appear for two to three decades . . . . 48

Robbed of any justification to argue for a larger fleet in terms of diminishing fleet capacity 

U.S. drop in the relative global naval standings, Navy leaders will also find it hard to argue 

they are being unfairly penalized in the overall allocation of the nation’s resources devoted 

national defense. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of the Navy has consiste

received a slightly higher percentage of the overall defense budget than either the Departm

of the Air Force or the Department of the Army, except in years when the Army was hea

67

46. As former secretary of state Henry Kissinger recently said, “Now India is, in effect, a strategic partner, not

because of compatible domestic structures but because of parallel security interests in Southwest Asia and 

Indian ocean, and vis-à-vis radical Islam.” Henry A. Kissinger, “Implementing Bush’s Vision,” Washington

Post, May 16, 2005, p. A17. See also Michael Sirak, “U.S. Signs Defense Pact with India,” Jane’s Defense

Weekly, July 13, 2005, p. 15; and Michael Barone, “An Emerging Alliance with India,” Jewish World

Review, July 5, 2005, found at http://www.JewishWorldReview.com.

47. These comparisons are drawn from “Largest Military Expenditures, 2005,” compiled by the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, accessed online at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0904504.html 

October 29, 2006. Many would argue, however, the true level of defense expenditures in these two count

particularly China.

48. A. D. Baker III, Combat Fleets of the World 1997–1998 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), p. x

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committed in combat operations.49 Simply put, they have little to complain about. This wo

make it difficult for naval proponents to justify a large internal shift of DoD resources to 

Navy.

Under any circumstances, such an argument would be unlikely to gain traction given the w

defense expenditures are now allocated among the three departments. As implied by Hunt

ton, between 1783 and 1954 U.S. peacetime expenditures on defense were based on a do

nant service model. To save money in peacetime, defense resources were allocated to 

service most clearly aligned with U.S. national security policy; only in time of war would all 

vices be fully funded. As a result, up through 1890, when the primary threats to the Repu

were on the North American continent, the dominant service was the Army, and it was the 

cus of most peacetime defense expenditures. Between 1890 and the start of World Wa

when threats were perceived as originating across the ocean, the Navy was the dominant 

vice, and it received the bulk of peacetime defense allocations. Between 1947 and 1954, w

nuclear deterrence and preparing for nuclear warfighting was the dominant national secu

focus, the U.S. Air Force was the dominant service, and it was the benefactor of most peacet

expenditures.50 However, Huntington himself recognized that DoD was beginning to turn aw

from this model. As he then wrote:

Perhaps the first necessity of the Navy . . . is for it to recognize that it is no longer the premier ser

vice but is one of three equal services all of which are essential to the implementation of American

Cold War policy. The second necessity is for the Navy to insist, however, upon this equal role.51

Huntington’s words were prescient. In 1961, the new Kennedy administration adopted 

Strategy of Flexible Response. Among other things, this strategy called for the Departmen

Defense to develop a balanced portfolio of land, air, sea, space, and special operations capa

ities, and it was the official death knell to the dominant-service peacetime budget alloca

model.52 Indeed, since the subsequent introduction of the DoD Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting System (PPBS) in the early 1960s, each of the three departments has recei

roughly the same share of the defense budget pie, and changes to their allocations have b

mostly on the margins. If anything, this “1/3-1/3-1/3” budget split became even more 

trenched with the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which mandated an increa

emphasis on interdependent joint operations; since 1990, the variation in defense bud

shares allocated to the three departments has been minuscule.53

Navy planners are understandably wary of the Army’s recent very public attempt to garner 

creased resources due to the stresses associated with a hard, four-year-long war in Afghanis

and Iraq. In August 2007, the Army adopted Huntington’s approach to the extreme, refusin

submit what they claimed would be a broken program if held to the administration’s bud

guidance. The Army’s chief of staff, with the apparent approval of the secretary of defen

pressed the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for nearly $139 billion in 

2008, some $25 billion more than the amount originally earmarked for the Army. As obser

by one national news magazine, this budget increase is double the government’s annual spe

ing for customs, immigration, and border protection combined.54

68

49. See Table 6, “Department of Defense Budget by Service,” in Steve Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 2007 Defen

Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2006).

50. See Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” pp. 483–93.

51. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” p. 493.

52. See Caryn E. Neumann, “Kennedy Administration (1961–63), National Security Policy, accessed online a

http://www.espionageinfo.com/Int-Ke/Kennedy-Administration-1961-1963-United-States-National-Securit

Policy.html on November 1, 2006.

53. Table 6, “Department of Defense Budget by Service.”

54. “The Third Battlefront: Money,” U.S. News and World Report, October 30, 2006.

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Although the chief of staff of the Army made it clear that he did not want the extra mone

come at the expense of either the departments of the Navy or the Air Force, Navy and Air Fo

leaders held their collective breaths. They watched to see how much money the Army wo

get from its brazen tactics, and whether OMB would increase the overall DoD budget topline

the Army suggested, or order the DoD to handle the problem by reallocating money within 

own topline. In the end, OMB increased the DoD budget topline by approximately $11 bill

from which DoD leaders directed that $7 billion go to the Army, $1 billion apiece to the D

and the Air Force, and $2 billion to a management reserve for high-priority DoD initiative

Although the Army’s move therefore did not result in cuts to the DoN and Air Force toplin

from the perspective of Navy and Air Force planners the Army was successful in increasing 

overall budget allocation. Both services will likely believe that they must counterpunch—to 

sist” (Huntington’s word) on an equal increase in defense resources. This appears to be 

what is happening. Early reports are that the requests for the follow-on FY07 defense sup

mental total an astounding $160 billion dollars, with the Army asking for $80 billion, the 

Force $50 billion, and the DoN $30 billion.56

The Army’s aggressive public move to push for more resources and the oncoming mach

tions over the FY07 Supplemental suggests that the only viable strategy for increasing 

DoN’s budget is for Navy planners to argue for a dramatic increase in the overall allocatio

defense dollars, which would raise the allocations for all departments. However, even this 

proach will be difficult to pull off. In real dollars, the United States is spending more on defe

than at any time since 1952, when the U.S. military was conducting high-intensity, multi-co

offensive combat operations against the Communist Chinese on the Korean Peninsula. S

another way, adjusted for inflation, the United States is spending more than it did at any tim

the Vietnam War or during the 1980s Reagan defense buildup. And these comparisons do 

include the additional tens of billions of dollars now being allocated to the Departmen

Homeland Security.57

Some argue that focusing on the overall amount of absolute defense spending is far less in

mative than focusing on the percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) spent on 

fense. Using percentage of GDP as the baseline, the overall burden of defense spending on 

U.S. economy has been steadily decreasing. Today’s defense expenditures amount to appr

mately 3.8–4.0 percent of the GDP, a far cry from the 15 percent in the early 1950s, the 10 p

cent in the mid-1960s, and the 6 percent in the 1980s.58 Thus, the argument goes, the na

could easily afford a major increase in defense spending, raising all service boats in a tid

dollars.

However, this argument has its own problems. Percentages of mandatory spending—due 

marily to increases in personal entitlement programs such as Social Security—are now m

higher than at any time in the past, and the percentage is rising as the baby boomers begi

reach retirement in 2008. Of course, as mandatory spending increases, discretionary spend

naturally decreases. The Government Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress 

audits and evaluates the performance of the federal government, forecasts that increase

mandatory spending for entitlement programs and continuing deficit spending will result 

69

55. “England Directs $7 Billion Increase in Army’s FY-08 Budget Request,” Inside the Pentagon, October 6,

2006, p. 1; “England Sets Aside $2 Billion for FY-08 High Priority Needs,” Inside the Air Force, Novemb

2006.

56. “Services Propose Additional $160 Billion for FY-07 Supplemental,” Inside the Pentagon, November 3,

2006.

57. See Table 2, National Defense (050) Budget Authority, FY 1946-FY 2011, in Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 2

Defense Budget Request.

58. See Graph 3, “National Defense Outlays as a Share of GDP,” in ibid.

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“fiscal tsunami” in the next decade unless major changes are made.59 Navy leaders arguing 

a dramatic increase in defense budget spending without concomitant tax increases would h

to contend with counterarguments that such increases would simply be making a bad fiscal s

ation worse. On the other hand, if they argue for tax increases to help pay for increases in 

defense budget, Navy leaders would be arguing against the stated fiscal policy of the admi

tration—a risky proposition.

A Range of Diffuse Challenges

Navy hopes on having a conversation within the service and with the American political lead

ship and people, in which it offers a “systematic, detailed elaboration and presentation of 

theory of” the twenty-first-century Navy to increase the “public confidence with its impor

role in national defense” and to trigger a sustained increase in future resources, thus faces 

uphill battle.60 If this were not daunting enough, the contemporary national security envir

ment will make it extremely difficult to convey the Navy’s role in national defense in an easy

understand way.

Unlike in 1890 and 1980, the U.S. Navy faces not one but a bewildering array of threats. It 

thus be far more difficult to articulate a maritime grand strategy—a strategy that lays out a 

gle theory (i.e., strategic concept) for the twenty-first-century Navy. As the 2006 QDR expla

there are four different types of potential future threats the U.S. armed forces must prepare 

traditional challenges involving confrontations against another state’s military forces; irreg

challenges involving conflicts against enemy combatants who are not part of the regular m

tary forces of nation states; catastrophic challenges involving adversaries seeking to or actu

trying to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and disruptive challenges involv

state and nonstate actors trying to upend the United States’ ability to maintain its qualita

technological edge or to project power.61 The battle fleet must be able to handle all of these 

parate threats.

In more concrete terms, the Navy of today has to simultaneously fulfill its role as ultimate gu

antor of the broad ocean commons, a role it assumed after World War II, when Great Brita

mighty Royal Navy proved no longer up to the task; along with the Coast Guard, it must sec

the maritime approaches to the United States and help defend the homeland from attack; 

gether with the other services, it must fight and win the Long War—a global struggle aga

radical Islamists and other violent ideological groups; be prepared to support conventional j

military campaigns; be prepared to operate in a proliferated world, in which the likelihood 

nuclear weapons use will likely be higher than at any point since 1962; be prepared to vent

into an increasingly capable Chinese maritime anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networ

help thwart any overt Chinese move to invade or coerce the Republic of Taiwan; prepare it

for a wider future maritime challenge; and guard against a wide range of technological, disr

tive challenges.

Faced by such a wide array of challenges, it is not at all clear the Navy itself has sorted out h

to best array these threats, much less how it intends to prioritize its efforts to confront them. T

closest it has come is acknowledging that the future battle fleet must be designed to meet 

challenges: fighting the Long War and hedging against the rise of a major maritime challen

70

59. Matt Crenson, “GAO Chief Warns Economic Disaster Looms,” accessed online at http://www.examiner.co

a-367406~GAO_Chief_Warns_Economic_Disaster_Looms.html on October 30, 2006. See also Governm

Accounting Office, “The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook, September 2006 Update; The Bottom Line:

Today’s Fiscal Policy Remains Unsustainable,” GAO publication GAO-06-1077R.

60. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” p. 493.

61. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.” Office 

the Secretary of Defense, February 6, 2006), p. 3.

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like China. This has led at least one respected naval analyst to argue for a bi-modal navy, w

one part of the battle fleet focused on “ ‘small’ operations, expeditionary in nature, in which 

Navy will continue to participate,” and the other part focused on a “distributed fleet that is 

fensively disposed yet can suffer losses and fight on.” This idea in itself is very significant; un

the two models for naval strategy previously discussed, it indicates the Navy may no longe

disposed toward regarding “small wars” or theater-shaping activities as lesser-included case

a broader naval war, and that it will require unique forces optimized for these roles.62

However, even a bi-modal battle fleet might be insufficient to cover the full range of fut

threats the Navy must prepare for. For example, two possible new missions in securing 

ocean commons are protecting the burgeoning offshore oil and gas infrastructure, which for 

first time presents adversaries with ocean targets whose destruction would result in disrupti

to both worldwide distribution and production; and guarding the array of undersea fiber o

cables that now bind, connect, and drive the global economy. How do these roles figure 

the Navy’s plans? Will they require new, specialized capabilities? Similarly, sea-based ball

missile defense is an important capability for homeland defense, a proliferated world, and op

ations against a Chinese maritime A2/AD network. Yet, to this point, the Navy has been re

tant to expend its own resources on the mission, content instead to let the Missile Defe

Agency fund most sea-based ballistic missile defense capabilities. Is the U.S. Navy going to f

embrace this mission? Finally, in terms of disruptive challenges, the undersea arena may be 

the verge of a third revolution, in which undersea superiority will be decided by clashes 

tween undersea combat networks consisting of large manned submarines; smaller man

submarines; remotely operated and autonomous underwater vehicles (ROVs and AUVs, 

spectively); ubiquitous ocean sensors; and surface, air, and space-based anti–undersea war

capabilities. While the Navy has long dominated the second regime, in which nuclear-powe

submarines were the dominant systems, what are its strategy and plans to ensure it domina

the next?

Questions to Ponder

The wide range and diversity of potential future naval threats prompts a bevy of question

the Navy’s search for a new single maritime grand strategy the right approach? Is a single u

fied maritime strategy even possible, or desirable? Would the Navy be better advised at 

time simply to describe the maritime component of the National Security and National Mili

Strategy, as did the earlier Maritime Strategy? Even if a maritime grand strategy is desira

given the great lead the U.S. Navy now enjoys in the global maritime competition, the lack 

near-term threat, and the difficulty in directly arguing for a bigger share of the DoD budget 

major increase in the overall defense budget, will its tenets be so broad and diffuse as to di

the galvanizing effect the Navy obviously hopes the new strategy will trigger? Will a conve

tion with the American people really help to illuminate the priorities among the many c

lenges the battle fleet faces? Or should the conversation with the American people be dela

until further passionate debates and discussions occur inside the Navy and the Marine Cor

Would it be better to first develop a family of separate operational concepts focused on e

evolving threat, and then to produce an integrated naval operational concept and strategy a

that? Said another way, would explaining how the Navy intends to help win the Long War

play a central role in the operations against nuclear-armed regional adversaries, and to b

any future aggressive maritime challenges be a better conversation to have with the Ameri

people?

71

62. Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (ret), “A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy,” paper

dated October 1, 2006, and presented to the Center for Naval Analysis Forum on Maritime Strategy, Octo

26–27, 2006. pp. 11–12.

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More fundamentally, are the two earlier maritime grand strategies that now guide the Nav

search for the new naval holy grail the right models? Both were written when the Navy’s c

tributory role in the nation’s defense was being questioned and when its position in the glo

maritime pecking order was being threatened. Both were designed, either directly or indirec

to help raise the value of DoN shares in the American defense market. Perhaps the focus of 

DoN’s effort should be guided by entirely different approaches—such as strategies adopted 

other great naval powers during times when they did not face a major threat and when t

could not justify or command disproportionate increases in the amount of resources devote

maintain, much less expand, their maritime capabilities.

For example, would it be better to follow models of navies trying to hold what they had

other words, would it be better to follow models of navies trying to hold what they had and 

sitioning themselves for a time when actual threats developed more fully? If so, this would ar

that naval planners look as deeply inward as outward and concentrate on developing new in

tutional strategies for maintaining excellence on a tightly constrained budget. It might also 

gue that the Navy worry less about developing a maritime grand strategy and more ab

developing a maritime competition strategy that protects its design, industrial, research and 

velopment, and technological bases; rethinks the way it designs and builds its warships; and 

cuses on approaches, like widespread modularity, that will give the battle fleet utility across a 

wider range of operational challenges. In this regard, one possible model to inform these eff

is the English naval competition strategy adopted between 1815 (the defeat of Revolution

France) and 1860 (the appearance of the HMS Warrior), when the British Royal Navy sto

unchallenged on the high seas but faced a number of ongoing but minor security challen

numerous potential future technological and disruptive challenges, and a number of poten

future naval challengers.

The answers to these varied questions, while important, are beyond the scope of this pap

They are left for another time and place. However, if this paper suggests one thing, it is 

while the “economics” of the new naval strategy should be an important consideration in its 

velopment, the Navy should be realistic in its expectations over the strategy’s impact on fut

resource allocations. In other words, the Navy should not expect any major increases in fut

budgets. Instead, it should make plans, at least in the short run, for flat or perhaps even dec

ing budgets, and adjust its desires, plans—and strategies—accordingly.

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China’s Economic Rise:

Impact on U.S.-Australian Alliance

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger

Economic Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command

INTRODUCTION

China’s spectacular economic trajectory is shaking Asia and much of the world. At first m

U.S. and Asian leaders saw China as a commercial and military threat. But before long, As

leaders came to see China’s economic rise as a blessing rather than a threat.

Competing U.S. and Aussie Perceptions

In an interview marking his tenth anniversary in office, Australian Prime Minister Howard h

lighted the rising Sino-Australian economic relationship.1 He said Australia “would be cra

not to cultivate its economic ties to China. But he underscored that Australia would “not 

overboard” with China. That said, Howard rolled out the red carpet for Chinese officials in A

tralia. And Beijing did much the same when Howard visited China in late June/early July 20

In contrast, U.S. President Bush treated Chinese President Hu differently during his visit. W

Hu visited Washington the Bush administration refused to classify it as a “state” visit. Inste

Hu was given a “working lunch.” And in an administration that carefully choreographs ev

little detail and every person invited to the White House, Hu was subjected to prolonged he

ling by a Falun Gong protester at the opening ceremony. Even worse was the introductio

the Chinese national anthem as that of the “Republic of China,” the formal name for Taiwan

short, Bush gave Hu the cold shoulder.

To be fair, Hu did get to see Bill Gates. In fact, Hu also spent lots of time with the U.S. busin

community. In this regard, China will soon overtake Japan as America’s third-biggest exp

market. U.S. exports to China rose nearly 37 percent in the first five months from a year earli

And it’s true that American companies operating in China enjoyed another year of strong p

its in 2005. U.S.-affiliated companies enjoyed record earnings of $3.2 billion in 2005.

That said, corporate America goes out of its way to hide its successes in China. Why hide a U

corporate success story? U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade Fran

Lavin says the U.S. export strength tends to get “washed out of people’s minds” because 

ports from China are so much larger.3 The United States reported an $82 billion trade de

with China for the first five months of 2006. The media is quick to bash China for this im

ance. CNN’s Lou Dobbs frequently criticizes U.S. corporations that are reportedly expor

U.S. jobs to China. Given all this negative publicity in the United States about China linke

outsourcing and manufacturing job losses, it makes U.S. corporations unpopular if they 

about doing well in China. Such economic nationalism has taken its toll on U.S. foreign di

investment (FDI) in China, which dropped 22.3 percent in 2005, from $3.9 billion in 2004 

$3 billion in 2005.

The key point is that Australian exports of raw materials to China create jobs in Australia an

a political winner. In contrast, U.S. commercial relations with China are a political loser. CN

Lou Dobbs would argue that Chinese exports to the United States kill U.S. jobs. Consequen

most U.S. corporations want to fly under the radar and hide their hand when they deal w

China.

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Sino-Australian Shared Prosperity

Let’s now contrast Australia’s economic relationship with China with its longstanding econo

ties to the United States. Australia’s commodity and service exports to China are booming

contrast, the United States is losing the economic high ground with Australia. Sino-Austra

merchandise trade skyrocketed 248 percent between 2000 and 2005. In contrast, U.S.-Austra

trade has been virtually flat—growing only 13 percent between 2000 and 2005. Five years 

Australia traded twice as much with the United States as with China. Today the situation has 

versed itself. Australia now trades twice as much with China as with the United Stat

Tradewise, China is more important to Australia than the United States is.

China’s emergence in the north as the world’s manufacturing center has a counterpart in 

south. Australia is supplying much of the iron ore, nonferrous metals, coal, and higher edu

tion that fuel China’s industrial revolution. China’s economic growth and its impact on 

world’s demand for resources is the key factor driving Australia’s outstanding export per

mance. Aussie exports of resources to China alone surged by 87 percent to $8.3 billion in 20

Take iron ore tonnage. Tonnage of Australian exports to China tripled between 2002 and 2

to 112 million tons. China’s global demand has also raised global prices. Australia’s iron 

miners received a 71 percent price increase in 2005 and gained a further 19 percent hik

2006.5

China’s growth is vital to Australia’s prosperity. Australia’s Reserve Bank Governor 

MacFarlane recently stated that in the past three years Australia’s terms of trade have increa

by around 30 percent. He pinpointed global demand for resources and the rise of China as 

driving factors.6 The economic flow-on effects include strong growth in business investm

rising corporate profits, and an increase in stock prices. The strong demand from China 

continued in 2006. In the ten months to April 2006 Australian exports to China soared 

US$14.5 billion—a 42 percent rise compared to the same period last year.7 The result is a 

lemma for Canberra. It must somehow strike a balance between its increasingly important co

mercial relationship with China and its longstanding security ties to the United States.

COMPETING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

In contrast to Australia, the realists in Washington, D.C., tend to perceive China as both a co

mercial and a military threat. In their eyes, the economic rise of China drives the rise of Chin

military power. They see China’s charm offensive and shared prosperity with U.S. allies 

friends in Asia as part of an overall Chinese military strategy.8 At a strategic level, this Chin

shared prosperity with Australia and other countries in Asia arguably gives Beijing a stak

stability and makes war less likely than when China’s trade in the region was at a low level. 

if war breaks out between China and Taiwan, China’s shared prosperity in the region increa

the risk for the United States (due to possible access denial to U.S. bases and places) at the 

erational level of war.

Back in August 2004 Australian Foreign Minister Downer publicly told the Chinese in Bei

that Australia was not bound to help the United States defend Taiwan in a China-Taiwan w

Today—two years after Downer’s comment—Australia’s trade with China dwarfs its trade w

the United States. Australia will try hard to placate the United States while bending over ba

wards not to antagonize China and jeopardize its highly prized economic relationship w

China.

Some U.S. observers dismiss Downer’s statement and say the United States can always co

on Japan for U.S. unrestricted access to bases in Japan in a Taiwan scenario. In fact, they 

this is even more likely today. They point to recent Sino-Japanese maritime tension over co

peting energy claims in the East China Sea. Maybe so. But Japan now trades more with Ch

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than with the United States. In addition, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on 18 

vember 2006 that since new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China on 8 Octo

2006, Sino-Japanese relations have “improved dramatically and are now back on trac

Mr. Abe rejects the idea that Sino-Japanese relations are in a downward spiral toward conf

In fact, Abe says close Sino-Japanese shared prosperity outweighs any political friction. In 

words, “During the Koizumi administration, trade has doubled and Japanese investmen

China rose by 20 percent in 2005 from 2004. If relations were bad, this wouldn’t have h

pened. China benefits from current economic relations and doesn’t want to destroy it. It’s 

same with Japan.”

If Abe would not go to war with China when Japanese national interests are at stake, then it

least problematic that Japan would go to war simply to protect U.S. national interests in Taiw

Due to China’s shared prosperity with countries in the region, the U.S. military cannot coun

access to a so-called network of cooperation security locations (CSLs) in South and SE Asia 

China-Taiwan conflict. As a result, the U.S. Navy will need two carriers to win such a scenari

COMPETING U.S.-AUSTRALIAN ENERGY PERSPECTIVES

Washington also sees China as a threat on the energy front. This U.S. economic national

was visible in 2005 when China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a 70 perc

Chinese government–owned company, made a $19.6 billion offer to buy Union Oil Comp

of California (or UNOCAL), the U.S. oil and gas group.10 It was the biggest overseas bid at 

time by a Chinese company, the first to trigger a contested takeover battle with Chevron 

the first to be made in a politically strategic sector in the United States.

Most U.S. lawmakers argued that the CNOOC bid should be vetted on traditional national 

curity grounds. They feared the United States would be losing a national energy asset if they 

not work to block the CNOOC bid. They had mental images of CNOOC somehow hoard

UNOCAL energy for Chinese consumers. They argued that CONOOC threatened U.S. ene

security. In the end, the U.S. Congress effectively blocked any Chinese takeover of UNOCAL

U.S. lawmakers were ill-advised. Their fears are at odds with how the global energy market 

tually works. For starters, oil is a fungible commodity. For every barrel of oil China might di

for its exclusive use, China would import one less barrel of oil from other sources. The glo

price and availability of oil to the United States would remain exactly as before. While denia

access to oil can be used as a military tool in wartime, this depends not on ownership but on 

ability to secure installations and blockade oil lanes. China is vastly more vulnerable to an 

squeeze than the United States with its unchallenged navy. A national security issue does e

here, but it cuts the other way. Washington should (a) promote free trade and (b) beef up U

naval presence in the Asia and Pacific to protect it.

Sino-Australian Energy Ties

Now let’s contrast this U.S. tension with China on the energy front with Sino-Australia ene

relations. In early April 2006 China and Australia signed a nuclear safeguards treaty, wh

punctuates an increasingly important economic relationship. The treaty could pave the way 

exports of uranium to China for peaceful uses. China is searching for new supplies of uran

as part of its strategy to diversify energy supplies away from coal-fired power stations. As pa

its new-year economic blueprint, China is committed to reducing air pollution and reliance 

coal. By 2020 China hopes to increase fourfold the amount of nuclear energy it produces. A

yet Australian Prime Minister John Howard says that Washington’s efforts to curb nuclear 

richment worldwide may well be at odds with the energy requirements of Australia.11

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Then in late June 2006 the prime ministers of China and Australia, Wen Jiabao and J

Howard, proudly presided over the landing in China of the first commercial shipment of liq

fied natural gas (LNG). Mr Howard called the LNG shipment, part of an $18 billion long-t

contract guaranteeing supplies for 25 years, the largest single trade deal for Australia 

“hugely significant” for its resource-dependent exports. He said it could be not only a big d

in its own right, but the beginning of an enormous additional segment of Australia’s trade w

China.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

China’s shared prosperity with U.S. allies and friends means that U.S. access to bases 

places is problematic at best in a China-Taiwan scenario. Without guaranteed U.S. acces

Asian bases and places for U.S. offensive and defensive operations, the U.S. military need

beef up its naval presence at U.S. bases like Guam and Pearl Harbor, where access is far m

reliable.

On the energy front, U.S. denial of access to oil is an important military tool in wartime. But 

depends not on whether or not China owns UNOCAL or some other U.S. oil company. It 

pends on the U.S. Navy’s ability to secure installations and blockade oil lanes. China is va

more vulnerable to an oil squeeze than the United States. A national security issue does e

here, but it cuts the other way. Washington should (a) promote free trade and (b) beef up U

naval presence in the Asia and Pacific to protect it.

Notes

1. FT.com, 28 February 2006.

2. FT.com, 26 July 2006.

3. FT.com, 26 July 2006.

4. Discussions with officials from U.S. Commerce and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), February and Ma

2006.

5. Australian Financial Review (AFR), 6 July 2006, p. 11.

6. Australia’s Reserve Bank Governor Ian MacFarlane, testimony before Australia’s federal parliament,

February 2006.

7. AFR, 6 July 2006.

8. See Milton Osborne, The Paramount Power: China and the Countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute

Paper 11, 2006.

9. Bloomberg.com, 18 November 2006.

10. FT.com, 24 June 2005.

11. See Rafael Minder, “Howard Says Australia Must Assess Impact of Nuclear Alliance,” FT.com, 20 July 20

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Panel III: Economics and Emerging Maritim

Powers

Summary of Discussion

Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens

Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed

Research and Professor of National Security Decision Making

U.S. Naval War College

The main topic during the discussion period for Panel III was the role of China. The issue ess

tially boils down to the question of China’s willingness to seek peace and prosperity in a U

underwritten system of globalization or, alternatively, to seek global power within an archi

ture of its own making. This debate provides the context for such questions as the Taiw

Strait, China’s diplomatic offensive to increase its influence, China’s military strategy and fut

force structure, the attitude of emerging powers (India) and medium-size states (Australia

Asia toward China and the United States, China’s access to energy, and U.S. policy tow

China.

The point was made that China believes its legitimacy arises not from democracy but from e

nomic growth, which is the only means available to it to ensure stability. The formula is Ch

becomes strong, China becomes prosperous, China becomes democratic. The Chinese see 

Gorbachev model as getting things backward. To unleash democracy first is to unleash cha

This accounts for the Chinese focus on economic growth and provides an understanding 

China’s priorities in the region. In fact, China is now a status quo country, a far cry from its M

ist past. Indeed, China has become so status quo that it has begun to substitute sustainable e

nomic growth for maximum economic growth because of the environmental costs associa

with the latter.

This hierarchy suits other states in the region, especially those of middling power—e.g., Aus

lia, which has become very dependent on trade with China. This dependence has led som

ask if Australia would support the United States in a time of crisis. The rule for a middle po

seems to be to try to avoid choosing sides during peacetime. The consensus was that Austr

would abide by this rule but in the event of a crisis, say in the Taiwan Strait, it would support 

United States.

The United States sees its self-appointed role in Asia as a force for stability, preventing arms 

ing by reassuring not only friends and allies but also potential competitors. The United Sta

has done this in Asia by means of bilateral treaties, acting as the hub to a variety of spo

China envisions multilateral security architecture. These competing arrangements will b

source of disagreement in the future as both the United States and China attempt to exp

their influence in the region.

The main source of conflict between the United States and China remains the Taiwan St

but even this is a less likely flash point now. Taiwan remains an emotional issue for the Chin

and the principal danger is miscalculation. Even though the danger is reduced, part of 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees a potential conflict involving Taiwan as a “meal tick

and so has an incentive to play up the likelihood of Taiwanese independence. It is in the U

interest to keep Taiwan under control. If things remain stable, this potential flash point could 

away altogether in the next decade or so.

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The Japanese fear that the new U.S. maritime strategy is a harbinger of U.S. withdrawal fr

the Western Pacific. We are already discussing the shift of forces from Japan to Guam. The p

ception of U.S. withdrawal from WestPac contributes to a loss of U.S. credibility.

China and India remain at odds. India is concerned about Chinese geopolitical penetration 

the Indian Ocean region. China polls very poorly in India, and the recent rapprochement 

tween India and the United States probably represents a balancing maneuver on the par

India.

The critical uncertainty for the region is China’s goal for the future. If it can be accommoda

into the U.S. system of globalization, and if Taiwan does not declare independence, the lik

hood of conflict is relatively low. If China wants to become a great power, things are a l

more problematic. In such a scenario, it is possible to envision a replay of the geopolitical str

gle between Great Britain and Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century, which 

suredly brought nineteenth-century globalization to an end.

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Panel IV

Terrorism, Proliferation, Transnational Crime

and Migration

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

Director, International Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, Th

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University,

Singapore

Dr. Mohan Malik

Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Andrea J. Dew

Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School 

Government, Harvard University

Moderator:

Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz

John Nicholas Brown Academic Chair of Counterterrorism and Professor of Natio

Security Decision Making, U.S. Naval War College

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The Threat to the Maritime Domain: How Re

Is the Terrorist Threat?1

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism

Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and

Senior Fellow, Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Introduction

Armed groups seek to attack aviation, maritime, and land transportation targets. In the clas

threats, the terrorist intentions and capabilities to strike transportation infrastructure h

grown dramatically since September 11, 2001. Although land transportation remains more 

nerable to attack, aviation remains the preferred target of multiple threat groups. Since 

Qaeda used commercial aircraft to attack America’s iconic targets, multiple attempts to ta

aviation have been detected and disrupted by security, intelligence, and law enforcement. T

UK authorities disrupted an elaborate plot in August 2006 to attack a dozen aircraft from L

don bound for the United States. The threat has been sustained.2 Similarly, the successfu

tacks on land transportation targets in Madrid on March 11, 2004; in London on July 7, 20

and Mumbai on July 11, 2006; demonstrate both the dispersed and enduring nature of 

threat. The failed attack in London on July 21, 2006, and several attempts in continental 

rope and elsewhere, demonstrate that the threat is recurrent.

To assess the current and emerging threat, it is necessary to understand how armed groups 

ploit the maritime domain. The lack of understanding of the guerrilla and terrorist interface w

the maritime environment has led to a hyping of the threat. This has led the commercial 

naval community to invest billions of dollars in protecting and securing maritime assets. Wh

the real threat to onshore and offshore maritime infrastructure from sea, land, and air? This 

per will examine the development of maritime terrorist and guerrilla capabilities and how gu

rilla and terrorist groups have penetrated the maritime domain both to support their operati

and to mount attacks.

81

1. I would like to thank Professor Rich Lloyd, The William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at 

Naval War College, and Professor Jeff Norwitz, The John N. Brown Academic Chair of Counterterrorism 

the Naval War College, for their invitation to speak at the Economics and Maritime Strategy Ruger Chair

Workshop, November 7–8, 2006, and to write this paper.

2. On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid, wearing a TATP-laden operational shoe bomb, boarded a Paris-to

Miami-bound American Airline flight. In Operation Snagged, an identical shoe bomb was recovered from 

St. James Street, Barton, on November 27, 2003. In Operation Dover Port, Andrew Rowe was arrested a

port in France on October 26, 2003. He was planning to attack Heathrow. On September 15, 2004, a ful

operational shoe bomb mailed from Thailand to California was detected at the Carson mail facility in

California. In 2005, an Algerian terrorist prosecuted in Northern Ireland had a manual advising the bomb

to detonate his shoe bomb in the aircraft toilet. Global Pathfinder Database, International Centre for Polit

Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, accessed November 11

2006.

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Understanding the Maritime Domain

A study of maritime-capable groups worldwide demonstrates that only a few armed gro

have developed the capabilities to mount attacks on maritime targets. Most groups exploit 

maritime environment to transport goods and personnel.3 The attacks in the aviation dom

are not restricted to aircraft. Armed groups seek to attack not only aircraft, ships, and land tra

portation but also airports, ports, and land transportation hubs. Attacking an airport could h

the same effect as attacking an aircraft. Similarly, an attack on a railway station could have 

same effect as attacking a train. Likewise, an attack on a port will have the same effect—o

greater effect—than an attack on a ship. Unlike the aviation and land transportation doma

the maritime domain naturally does not constitute an attractive domain to attack. The terro

preference is to attack a high-profile national symbol. In a globalized world, an attack on an 

craft in any part of the highly visible aviation arena will have global implications. In contras

damaging a ship on the sea surface, bombing an airliner in the skies or an international airp

will draw extensive publicity and generate fear. As such, the threat to aviation and airpor

very high compared to the threat to the maritime and land domains.

It has been argued that hardening aviation and airport targets has shifted the threat to marit

targets. Certainly threat displacement has taken place, but still, due to the potential for h

publicity, the terrorist preference is to attack hardened targets. After 9-11, more than a do

plots to attack airlines, both in the sky and on the ground, have been foiled or aborted. T

demonstrates that contemporary terrorists are keen to identify the gaps and loopholes in se

rity and penetrate the aviation domain rather than strike the maritime domain.

In most cases, guerrilla and terrorist groups will attack a maritime target only if it is attractiv

profitable. Attacking a ship on the high seas is like a tree falling in the forest. Guerrilla and 

rorist groups seek to mount low-cost, high-impact attacks. As armed groups seek publicity, t

preference is to attack a target near the waterfront or in port. Furthermore, most groups do 

have access to large boats or ships that can operate outside territorial waters. Except to s

cargo or kidnap personnel and passengers, the guerrillas and terrorists prefer to attack tar

not far away from shore. As such, guerrilla and terrorist target choices reduce the threat to m

time infrastructure. By nature, most guerrillas and terrorists are landlubbers.

Understanding the Maritime Threat

Maritime guerrilla and terrorist capabilities are an extension of the land capabilities. Howe

maritime intentions are different from maritime capabilities. Translating intentions into capa

ities requires significant human expertise (experience and training) and resources. If a guer

and terrorist group can develop its understanding and knowledge of the maritime environm

it will begin to exploit that domain. In the early phases, most groups use the maritime envir

ment to support land operations and, second, to mount attacks.

At this point in time, only a few groups have the domain expertise. Even fewer groups have 

veloped the capacities to operate out at sea. If they are to operate in a sustained manner, t

must possess or have access to a fleet of craft, usually fishing craft, and seafarers. The ove

terrorist and guerrilla know-how and understanding of operating in the maritime domain 

limited. The body of knowledge and understanding is growing by direct transfer and 

82

3. It is very much like the terrorist and the extremist use of the Internet. Instead of mounting attacks on

information infrastructure, terrorist and guerrilla groups use the Internet to disseminate propaganda, raise

funds, train, rehearse, and coordinate operations. Likewise, the maritime domain is primarily a medium to

support operations and not to mount attacks.

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emulation. More armed groups are likely to mount guerrilla and terrorist tactics in the marit

domain in the future.

Among the contemporary terrorist and guerrilla groups, only half a dozen groups have de

oped maritime attack capabilities. The most prominent among them are the Palestin

Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Free Aceh Movement, 

Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Al Qaeda, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 

consider two case studies: Al Qaeda and the LTTE. Of these two groups, the LTTE has bu

state-of-the-art blue-, brown-, and green-water capability, both for support and attack ope

tions. To penetrate the maritime domain, the LTTE operations serve as a model for other 

rorist and guerrilla groups.

The LTTE Maritime Structure

The LTTE maritime organizational structure provides insight into the future capabilities of 

rorist and guerrilla groups seeking to operate in the maritime environment.

1. Sea battle regiments

2. Underwater demolition teams

3. Sea Tiger strike groups

4. Marine engineering and boat-building unit

5. Radar and telecom unit

6. Marine weapons armory and dump group

7. Maritime school and academy

8. Recruiting section

9. Political, financial, and propaganda section

10. EEZ-marine logistics support team

11. Reconnaissance team and intelligence section

12. Welfare and registry.

The LTTE was able to build a robust maritime infrastructure because of the initial assistanc

received from India’s foreign intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

1986–87, RAW trained LTTE members in Vishakapatnam, a seaport in Andhara Pradesh, 

facilitated the LTTE’s construction of a blue-water fleet. After the LTTE declared war on 

government of India in 1987, the LTTE maritime capabilities suffered extensively. After 

LTTE support structures moved out of India’s sphere of influence, the LTTE built up a state

the-art shipping and procurement network in Europe to procure and ship dual-user techn

gies and weapons. For instance, the LTTE procured 60 tonnes of high explosives from 

Ukraine and transported it onboard MV Baris (previously MV Illiyana, and thereafter 

Tara 1 and MV Venus) during the peace talks in 1994. After the shipping network in Eur

was disrupted under Indian pressure, the LTTE strengthened its existing financial, procu

ment, and shipping network in Southeast Asia. The LTTE used its commercial presenc

Southeast Asia to build operational bases, primarily using Myanmar’s island of Twante a

thereafter, Thailand’s Pukhet. The LTTE boatyard in Pukhet was building a minisubmar

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After the Thai authorities shut down the boatyard, the LTTE moved its boat-building activ

to New Zealand. Boat designs procured in Australia and built in New Zealand were used 

maritime suicide attacks in Sri Lanka.

As the LTTE is not an Islamist group, it is not perceived as a threat by most foreign gove

ments. Thus, the LTTE continues to operate both in Sri Lanka and globally through fr

cover, and sympathetic organizations. They include trading and commercial firms, especi

fertilizer and shipping companies.

Al Qaeda’s Maritime Structure

In contrast to the LTTE, Al Qaeda does not possess a permanent and robust infrastructure d

cated to maritime operations. Unlike the LTTE, Al Qaeda has neither a blue- nor a brown-w

fleet. Although two dozen ships linked with Al Qaeda members, supporters, and families h

been identified by the intelligence community, to date no ship has been intercepted transp

ing weapons. However, Al Qaeda mounted a number of terrorist attacks, successfully and 

successfully. Al Qaeda leadership tasked its operations leader in the Arabian Peninsula4— A

al Rahim al Nashiri, alias Abu Bilal, alias Mullah Bilal, alias the Prince of the Sea, a specialis

explosives—to mount maritime attacks in 1999. Osama bin Laden specifically instructe

Nashiri to attack oil supertankers. A Saudi of Yemeni roots, al Nashiri operated largely ou

Yemen, both with Al Qaeda and with other Islamist groups. He had links with individuals 

groups in the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa.

As there was no dedicated maritime component in Al Qaeda, the rest of the organization 

sisted al Nashiri. For instance, Tawfiq bin Attash alias Khallad, deputy of Khalid She

Mohamed (9-11 mastermind), visited with al Nashiri and his associates to support his ope

tions both in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. By watching videos of Al Qaeda recordi

of LTTE maritime attack on international television channels,5 Al Qaeda copied LTTE marit

tactics as well as developed their own repertoire of tactics. They included blowing up explosiv

laden vessels near naval, merchant, and cruise ships; blowing up explosives-laden vessel

seaports; using big ships, including tankers, to crash into smaller vessels; diving aircraft 

ships, including into an aircraft carrier; using underwater demolition teams to destroy sh

and sinking ships in narrow channels. Responsible for attacking the USS Cole and MV L

burg, al Nashiri succeeded in blowing up explosives-laden boats near naval and merchant ship

Even in the conduct of maritime operations, Al Qaeda had no problem with working with l

minded individuals and other groups. As a result, Al Qaeda traces were found in maritime op

ations mounted by other groups. Al Qaeda trained in Iraq and funded an operational ce

Turkey that was planning and preparing to strike an Israeli cruise ship. Other leaders and m

bers of Al Qaeda and its associated groups attempted a number of other maritime attacks

Singapore, working with Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members mounted surveillance 

84

4. Al Nashiri, the first head of the Al Qaeda organization in the Arabian peninsula, was succeeded by Youse

Aiyyari. After al Aiyyeri was killed by Saudi security forces in May 2003, Abu Hazim al Shair al Yemeni, a

former bodyguard of Osama and a poet, was appointed. Abu Hazim al Shair recruited pilots to attack

Heathrow. Abu Hazim al Shair was succeeded by Abdu Aziz al Mukrin. After al Mukrin was killed, he was

succeeded by Salih Sufi. There has been a very high attrition rate of the Al Qaeda leadership in the Arabi

peninsula. As the bulk of the recruits and finance for Al Qaeda originated in the Arabian peninsula, Osam

handpicked the leaders of the Arabian peninsula. While most of them were former bodyguards of Osama 

Laden, they had long-standing contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed and Tawfiq bin Attash, also a forme

bodyguard of the al Qaeda leader.

5. CNN’s Nic Robertson recovered about 200 tapes from the Al Qaeda registry in Afghanistan. There were f

clips of LTTE maritime attacks.

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U.S. warships. Video footage of U.S. ships was recovered both in the residence of a JI mem

in Singapore and in the bombed residence of Abu Hafs in Afghanistan. In Malaysia, Al Qa

associate group Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) planned to kill U.S. sailors but, fearing 

taliation, aborted the operation. Tawfiq bin Attash flew to Malaysia and planned to attack U

vessels in Port Klang in Malaysia. Al Qaeda’s senior representative in Southeast Asia, Oma

Farouq, an Iraqi-Kuwaiti, and Ghalib, a Somali, planned a suicide attack on U.S. vessels ex

cising off Surabaya, Indonesia.

Al Qaeda Maritime Operation

Al Qaeda’s road to maritime attacks developed the same way most other threat groups gra

ate from support to attack operations. Al Qaeda used trawlers and other vessels to transp

arms, ammunition, and explosives from Yemen to neighboring countries. In fishing vessels

Qaeda also transported explosives into Kenya for the East Africa attack in August 1998. An 

Qaeda cell in Yemen began planning to hit USS The Sullivans in the spring of 1999 and m

preparations in the summer of 1999. Al Qaeda began recruiting Saudis of Yemeni backgrou

and Yemeni residents, including those who wished to be suicide operatives. Al Qaeda prepa

tions included leasing a safe house for six months, installing a gate, procuring a truck, and p

curing and modifying a boat to accommodate more explosives. On January 3, 2000, w

USS The Sullivans arrived in port, the explosives-laden suicide boat was launched from 

nearby beach. From weight, the boat sank almost immediately. USS The Sullivans depar

unaware of the attempt. The boat and explosives were recovered the next day for use in 

USS Cole attack. As Al Qaeda in Yemen needed financing to execute the next attack, they 

cided to meet with Tawfiq bin Attash in Singapore. As there were visa requirements for Sin

pore, they shifted the venue of the meeting to Thailand. Two Al Qaeda members, Nibras 

Quso, departed for Bangkok, where they met with Khallad, who gave them the money. A

returning to Yemen, they made preparations in the spring and summer of 2000 to attack 

USS Cole.

In preparation for the USS Cole attack, Al Qaeda built a much more extensive land infrastr

ture. A metal fence was built around the house they rented in an Aden suburb to keep their 

tivities hidden from neighbors. In addition to renting a new safe house and adding a hig

fence, Al Qaeda rented another apartment with a harbor view. This safe house functioned 

the perfect observation post. Al Qaeda modified the boat, painted it, laid a red carpet, and r

ted the insulation. Although the neighbors reported the noise of construction and power o

ages, the authorities failed to investigate. Compared to the USS The Sullivans attack, 

investment Al Qaeda made to ensure the success of the attack on USS Cole was signific

Learning from the USS The Sullivans failure, Al Qaeda rehearsed the operation. To ensure 

the boat had the right quantity of explosives, Al Qaeda conducted a dry run. Al Qaeda e

tested the explosives. One month before the attack, in keeping with the standard operating p

cedure for Al Qaeda leaders, al Nashiri departed for Afghanistan.

The USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer (DDG), had a crew of 346. The 154-m-long and 

m-wide ship had a displacement of 8422 tons. The ship had a maximum speed of 33 knots

armaments included antiaircraft missiles, antiship missiles, torpedoes, a 5-inch gun, and P

lanx CIWS. The sequence of events was:

0849 local—USS Cole moors for refueling in Aden Harbor

1115 local—Ship is approached by small boat; two adult males aboard

1122 local—Boat comes along port side of USS Cole

Detonation immediately afterward

The execution phase of the attack was less than 30 minutes; the attack phase was 7 minu

The sneak attack killed 17 and injured 42, most sailors gathering at the galley area for lun

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The repairing of the ship cost US$250 million. The one-billion-dollar ship was out of comm

sion for two years. The U.S. government did not retaliate against Al Qaeda. In the eyes of 

jihadists, USS Cole was America’s state-of-the-art warship. In retaliation for the attacks on 

U.S. embassies in East Africa in August 1998, USS Cole had fired cruise missiles at the 

Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. As such, the attack against USS Cole was considered a huge 

tory. Al Qaeda wanted to exploit the publicity to recruit and generate support. Al Qaeda lead

ship had instructed Quso to videotape the attack, based on a pager code, but he overslept 

the day of the attack. Osama bin Laden was keen to screen the USS Cole attack video at 

son’s wedding in early 2001. Osama authorized US$5,000 to buy the camera equipment 

videotape the attack. Thus, Quso did not endear himself to Osama. Although the failure to 

eotape the attack was a disappointment personally for Osama, the attack itself was a signific

victory for Al Qaeda.

Two years after the attack on USS Cole, Al Qaeda reconstituted its personnel and resource

mount a second attack in Yemen. The next visiting U.S. warship was to be the next target. 

when the naval ship failed to turn up, Al Qaeda attacked MV Limburg, a target of opportun

A Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), the 25-crew MV Limburg was Belgian-owned 

French-flagged. The 332-m-long and 58-m-wide ship has a displacement of 300,000 tons. 

Limburg has a capacity for 2.16 million barrels, but the cargo at the time of the attack 

397,000 barrels. Early morning on October 6, 2002, when Limburg was within visual rang

shore (~3 nm), an attack boat rammed the starboard (seaward) side. The oil tanker was m

ing slowly toward the terminal, and a pilot boat was coming along the port side. While one c

member was killed, 90,000 barrels of oil spilled. As in the USS Cole attack, a safe house 

used with a walled courtyard, and the boat was transported to a launch site just before the 

tack. Directed by al Nashiri, two suicide bombers in an explosives-laden boat attacked the ne

stationary vessel. Unlike in the case of the USS Cole, Al Qaeda targeted an oil tanker instea

a warship. Furthermore, Al Qaeda leveraged an existing indigenous extremist network. It c

sisted of former members and supporters of the Islamic Army of the Abyan, a group that 

dismantled by the Yemeni authorities two years earlier. The Al Qaeda plan was for the att

on MV Limburg to coincide with a simultaneous land-based attack. Although the Al Qa

leadership had mentioned economic targets, the attack shocked the maritime community. T

Yemeni authorities briefly held the ship owner, thinking that an accident on board the Limb

had caused the oil to spill.

Within a month of the attack on MV Limburg, al Nashiri was tracked down and captured

Nashiri was escaping from Yemen to Malaysia. He was planning and preparing several m

time operations. When al Nashiri was arrested in November 2002, a 180-page dossier of 

gets was recovered from his laptop. An operation al Nashiri was planning against U.S. and 

ships in the Strait of Gibraltar, off the northern coast of Morocco, was disrupted in June 20

Three Saudi Al Qaeda members with Moroccan wives pretending to be businessmen con

tuted the attack team. They had received US$5,000 and direction from Nashiri to mount 

connaissance on both land and maritime targets. When the Al Qaeda reconnaissance cell 

disrupted in June 2002, no explosives were found. NATO maritime forces responded 

boarding high-risk and suspicious ships, and German naval ships escorted tankers through 

Strait of Gibraltar.

Maritime Attack Capabilities

Most terrorist and guerrilla groups can build maritime support capabilities by chartering ship

leasing boats. But to mount sustained attacks, they must build their own fleet and person

Unlike the LTTE, Al Qaeda failed to harness its existing expertise to operate in the maritime 

main. Al Qaeda failed to build a dedicated maritime infrastructure of personnel and resour

to attack maritime assets. Although Al Qaeda had experts who understood the marit

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:42:54 PM
domain and operational infrastructure, it failed to grow its expertise. It was largely because 

group’s capabilities were scattered and had no permanent safe haven near the sea.

After the attack on USS The Sullivans failed, Al Qaeda explosives expert Abdul Rahma

Mohajir al Masri designed a shaped charge. A trainer at al Farook in Mes Aynak, southeas

Kabul (before the camp moved in 2000 to Kandahar), Abdul Rahman al Mohajir served un

Abu Mohamed al Masri and later Hamza al Rabbiyah, the successive heads of training.6 

reputation as the successful designer of the USS Cole attack was such that the leader o

Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, requested the then head of Al Qaeda’s external ope

tions, Faraj al Libi, to dispatch Abdul Rahman al Mohajir to Iraq.7 Instead, the Al Qaeda lead

ship on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border offered Hamza al Rabbiyah, but Zarqawi prefer

Abdul Rahman al Mohajir. Zarqawi, who had mounted one maritime attack, was keen to 

his expertise to mount more maritime attacks. Zarqawi also funded an attack to hit an Isr

cruise ship in the Turkish Mediterranean port of Antalya. However, Zarkwai, too, failed to 

velop a permanent operational infrastructure—both personnel and resources—dedicated to 

tacking maritime targets.

Immediately after Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda also con

ered hijacking an aircraft and crashing it onto a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean. T

U.S. government released a NOTEM (note to mariners) of the impending threat. Unti

Qaeda operational leaders with the competence to operate in the maritime domain were c

tured or killed, Al Qaeda’s maritime capabilities focused on mounting surface operatio

Nonetheless, Al Qaeda was planning to build an underwater diving capability. Recoveries fr

the residence of Abu Hafs al Masri, alias Mohammed Atef—the Al Qaeda military comman

killed in November 2001—included a diving manual. The Al Qaeda documents indicated 

the group had recruited a specialist who understood diving, diving medicine, and closed-cir

and semiclosed-circuit gear. As the group needed operational cover, Al Qaeda intended to 

list the support of commercial and recreational divers to build an underwater diving capabi

Furthermore, Al Qaeda had plans to establish its own diving schools. When Al Qaeda’s in

structure in Afghanistan was dismantled and its plans disrupted, its associated groups inves

in building diving capabilities in Europe and in Asia. Although the Al Qaeda attempt to pe

trate a diving school in Holland was detected, its training activities continued uninterrupte

Southeast Asia. With the assistance of Arab diving instructors, the ASG in the Philippines 

trained at least 40 of its members in Jolo, Sulu archipelago, Mindanao since 2001.

With the diffusion of Al Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad focusing on killing Westerners in la

numbers, several of its associated groups are behaving like Al Qaeda. On February 27, 20

ASG mounted an operation using a member of the Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movem

Redento Cain Dellosa, trained by JI, planted an explosives-laden television set in the tou

compartment of Super Ferry 14, plying between Manila and the southern Philippines. Nex

the television IED the bomber left a plate of hot food to indicate that he was a passenger w

had briefly stepped out of his cabin. The explosion and the subsequent fire killed 

87

6. After Al Qaeda was dislodged from Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman al Mohajir accompanied Hamza al Rabb

to South Waziristan and thereafter to North Waziristan. Under pressure from the Pakistani military, Al Qae

dismantled its camps in South Waziristan and moved to North Waziristan to establish camps. Only the

Chechen, Uigurs, and Central Asian jihadists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan remained in the sout

When Abdul Rahmana al Mohazir was killed by Pakistani forces in April 2006, he was head of training in

Waziristan.

7. Zarqawi’s driver was captured and Zarqawi’s computer seized by the United States in February 2005.

Correspondence recovered from the computer showed that instead of Abdul Rahman al Mohajir, Faraj al 

offered Hamza al Rabiyyah. Later Faraj al Libi told CIA interrogators that Zarqawi did not have the skills 

Hamza al Rabbiyah and that is why Zarqawi insisted on Abdul Rahman al Mohajir.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:42:55 PM
passengers; it was the worst maritime terrorist attack in history. Several other attempts to bo

ferries, before and after the sinking of Super Ferry 14, were frustrated by the Philippine auth

ties. However, the threat of terrorist groups planting bombs on ferries is very real, both 

Southeast Asia and beyond. Thus, future maritime threats to ships will not only be from surf

and underwater attacks but also from carrying a bomb on board a ship.

Lessons Identified

Most guerrilla and terrorist groups learn incrementally. Most groups are not innovative but 

tative. Contrary to the prevalent view, they learn both by emulation and technology trans

More than the direct transfer of technologies, they copy technologies, tactics, and techniqu

For instance, Al Qaeda’s attack on USS Cole was a copycat of LTTE’s attack on Abheetha, a 

Lankan navy supply ship. On May 4, 1991, Abheetha was anchored 6 miles north of P

Pedro, northern Sri Lanka, when an explosives-laden suicide boat rammed it. The att

caused extensive damage to the ship, and killed six and injured 18 naval personnel. The LT

maritime suicide wing (Black Sea Tigers) members Captain Sithambaram and Cap

Jeyanthan were also killed.

Similarly, it is very likely that one attack inspires another. After the alarm and publicity gen

ated after Al Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, many terrorist and guer

groups became interested in mounting attacks in the maritime domain. Within a month of 

USS Cole suicide bombing on October 12, the terrorist “copycat effect” was demonstra

LTTE suicide stealth boats breached the defenses of Trincomalee, the most protected Sri L

kan naval port, and destroyed a fast personnel carrier on October 23; and a Palestinian Ham

suicide boat attacked an Israeli naval craft on November 7, 2000. As the bomber detona

prematurely, only the skin of the Israeli craft was damaged.

To attack maritime targets, terrorist groups build their support and operational infrastructu

on land, not at sea. Thus, the logical starting point in preventing future maritime attacks i

disrupt and degrade the terrorist infrastructure on land. The USS The Sullivans, USS Cole, 

Limburg, and several other case studies demonstrate that both maritime terrorism and pir

should be fought on land. As the terrorist and criminal infrastructure and personnel are ba

on land, they can be identified and targeted much more effectively by law enforcement and 

telligence services operating on land. The failure to detect the planning and preparations 

maritime terrorist or piratical attack on land will lead the terrorist group or the criminal grou

successfully launch the maritime attack. In a maritime terrorist or piratical attack, the time 

terrorists and pirates spend out at sea is a few minutes. Unless the method, the place, and 

exact time of the attack is known, it is not possible to interdict a maritime terrorist or piratica

tack out at sea. As such, the maritime police units and navies have a very limited opportunit

successfully respond to maritime terrorism and piracy.

Conclusion

Most threat groups exploit the maritime domain for support, not offensive operations. M

groups are interested in developing and expanding their range of maritime capabilities. O

time, most threat groups with access to water move from conducting support operation

guiding surface and underwater attack capabilities. Traditionally maritime terrorist techn

gies originated in the Middle East, but now they can be seen increasingly in Asia. In the com

years, the Asian threat groups are likely to innovate certain technologies and tactics that Mid

Eastern groups are likely to copy.

Compared to the threat to aviation and land transportation, the threat from terrorism to na

ships and commercial shipping is medium to low. While the maritime assets are vulnerabl

terrorist attack, the actual threat to maritime assets is medium to low for two reasons. First, v

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few terrorist groups have the capabilities to attack maritime targets. Second, very few attrac

maritime targets could be attacked without expending many resources. Although naval ves

can be protected by enhanced perimeter security, it is neither feasible nor cost-effective to p

tect every merchant vessel. An effective strategy for consideration by law enforcement and 

telligence services should include (a) creating dedicated maritime counterterrorist comma

to target terrorist groups with land-based maritime assets, (b) securing waterways used by sh

operating in areas where terrorist and criminal groups are active, and (c) protecting cruise 

ers, oil tankers, LNG and LPG carriers, and other vessels transporting strategic cargo opera

in areas where terrorist and criminal groups are known to be active.

The threat of a maritime attack is of low probability. Depending on the target attacked, the c

sequences can be medium or high. As 95 percent of the world’s trade moves by sea, even if 

vessels are attacked in a single day, shipping will continue. Certainly the rising insurance pre

ums and investment in security will increase the cost of transportation and goods. However, 

dependence of nations on the maritime environment percent or trade and commerce is of s

paramount consideration that governments and the private sector will not seek alterna

modes of transport. If the number of maritime attacks increases, governments and the priv

sector will invest excessively in securing the maritime domain. As of today, most of the inv

ment to secure the maritime domain is driven by fear, not by an understanding of the thre

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WMD Proliferation:

The Nexus between State, Nonstate, and

Antistate Actors

Dr. Mohan Malik

Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

There is a great deal of pessimism on the WMD (weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, biol

cal, and chemical) proliferation issue. The norms and rules that governed the nuclear road d

ing the Cold War seem irrelevant. The era of nuclear multipolarity is already with us in wha

still a unipolar world. Nuclear weapons continue to be seen as a security asset rather than a 

curity liability. More countries are exploring uranium enrichment and nuclear power progra

that could be diverted to produce weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IA

chief warned recently that as many as 30 countries could soon have technology that would 

them produce atomic bombs in a very short time. Many believe that the world is on the thre

old of a dangerous nuclear arms race.1 Major-power rivalries are intensifying. Nearly all nuc

weapon states (NWSes) are developing new generations of nuclear weapons, revising nuc

doctrines, upgrading delivery systems, or increasing the number of nuclear weapons in t

stockpiles.

Post-Iraq, post–A. Q. Khan affair, the United States suffers from a serious credibility problem 

the proliferation issue. Post-Iraq, the United States is seen as lacking both the clout and 

credibility to build a broad international coalition that would dissuade countries from going 

clear. Moreover, the United States is trying to put out the fire with the help of those who star

the fire in the first place. But they do not share the U.S. perceptions of the proliferation c

lenges. What the West sees as a breakdown in nonproliferation is seen by others as a legitim

push for national security. As is well known, America’s rogue model is someone else’s 

model. Those states and nonstate actors that want to end the U.S. hegemony will not give 

Proliferation and terrorism are their only weapons in this struggle. For example, as far as No

Korea is concerned, the biggest issue for the United States is proliferation, but for China the 

gest issue remains stability (and Taiwan). The Chinese and the Russians are also happy 

those who want nuclear weapons share their primary objective of limiting U.S. power wo

wide. Beijing and Moscow are more interested in having profitable commercial ties with 

clear wannabes and in curbing U.S. unilateralism than in doing anything substantive to c

proliferation. But the proliferation challenge cannot be met in the absence of great-power c

sensus, which is surely lacking on North Korea and Iran. The growing perception is that the m

jor Western powers or the P-5 no longer have the stomach, or the unity, to impose sanction

take military action against rogue, proliferating states. This perception has prompted several 

clear abstainers (and others who gave up their nuclear programs after the end of the Cold War

reconsider their nuclear posture. This group includes Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Brazil, South 

rica, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.2

The global nonproliferation regime, based on the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Tre

(NPT), seems to be unraveling.3 The 2005 NPT Review Conference ended in utter failure. A

91

1. George Jahn, “More Nuclear Worries,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 17, 2006; William J. Broad and Dav

Sanger, “Fraying of Old Restraints Risks a Second Nuclear Age,” New York Times, October 14, 2006; Dafn

Linzer, “Optimism Turns to Anxiety on Curbing Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, November 3, 2006, p. 23

2. Andrew Grotto, “Who’s Next to Go Nuclear?” Washington Post, October 15, 2006, p. B03; “Nakasone

Proposes Japan Consider Nuclear Weapons,” Japan Times, September 6, 2006.

3. Brooks Tigner, “EU: Nonproliferation Efforts in Jeopardy,” Defense News, September 18, 2006, p. 4.

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the failure of the 2010 NPT Review Conference could have serious proliferation 

geopolitical consequences. Treaties and regimes that fail to adapt or change with change

the international power structure fall by the wayside. The rise of new powers and their quest 

multipolarity, nonstate actors, forces of globalization, growing energy use in the age of glo

warming, and technological developments are adding new challenges to the regime. This 

per examines WMD proliferation by state and nonstate actors and, more importantly, the ne

between them. It outlines the key features of the “Second Nuclear Age” before focusing 

WMD terrorism by nonstate and antistate actors. It concludes with a discussion of counterpr

eration measures to strengthen the regime and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

Proliferation by States:

First- and Second-Tier Horizontal Proliferation

For the purposes of analysis, I divide horizontal proliferation into three tiers: first, second, 

third tiers. The commitment of the three old NWSes to the cause of nonproliferation is dou

ful. When it comes to their friends and allies, they have either turned a blind eye or activ

supported proliferation, in violation of their NPT commitments. National interests, balance

power considerations, and alliance commitments always override international treaty comm

ments. While Russia helped China’s and Iran’s nuclear programs, the United States turne

blind eye to Israel’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons quests during the Cold War years. 

China, WMD proliferation remains an important tool of Beijing’s “containment through pr

ies” strategy: China has long used nuclear and missile proliferation to pressure the Un

States to curb its arms sales to Taiwan and contain its Asian rivals (Japan and India) by arm

North Korea and Pakistan. But the Chinese are not alone in the proliferation business a

more. They are now in the dubious company of the second-tier nuclear powers that are equ

busy in the proliferation business. In fact, the Chinese have been thoroughly beaten in the p

liferation game by their own former clients and allies. Long-time recipients of Chinese W

technology, second-tier proliferators (such as Pakistan and North Korea) are now prolifera

to third-tier nuclear aspirants (such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Burma). Prolifera

through networking among second- and third-tier nuclear states has opened the Pandora’s 

that has the potential to unravel the nonproliferation regime. The new challenge thus com

from “within” the NPT, as member states (such as North Korea, Iran, and Brazil) abuse their 

cess to nuclear capabilities.

Third-Tier Proliferation

What we need to worry more about is proliferation encounters of the third kind. Third-tier p

liferation takes place through the brotherhood of rogue states and nuclear networking am

nonnuclear NPT member states, private-sector companies, scientists, technicians, and terro

that operate a kind of “Nuclear Wal-Mart.” As the A. Q. Khan saga illustrates, if the price is ri

everything is up for sale. A sort of “yellow pages” directory exists for the supply of Chinese 

bomb designs, nuclear materials, technical expertise, and after-sales service, from North Ko

to North Africa and northern Europe. The IAEA believes that the Khan nuclear network has 

been completely dismantled. A combination of “rogue state” and mass-casualty terrorists 

worst-case scenario that has shaped the Bush administration’s security policy toward Ir

Libya, North Korea, and Iran. This concern was expressed in the Quadrennial Defense Rev

released on February 6, 2006: “The prospect that a nuclear capable state may lose contro

some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the U.S. and its allies fac

While it is true that no nation would dare launch a nuclear attack for fear of reprisal, it is equ

true that rogue states have, can, and will use terrorists as proxies. The conventional wisdom 

that the chances of a state intentionally providing nuclear weapons to a terrorist organiza

are very low, because every nuclear device has a signature that can be traced back to the s

of its origin, and that would invite massive retaliation. But in reality, tracing the origin 

92

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radioactive material is not so easy. It is a scientifically complicated and time-consuming p

cess. Besides, when there are only five or nine nuclear powers from whom such bombs can 

directly acquired, as of today, it may be difficult. However, as more and more countries b

the bomb, tracing the originator/seller will become harder and harder, and the incentive 

make a sale will increase. Then there is the prospect of a nuclear weapon state losing con

over its arsenal, through seizure, subversion, or sabotage by terrorists.

The China Connection

Of all the five declared NWSes, China continues to be instrumental in fueling proliferation 

ses large and small, imminent and somewhat more distant. In fact, very few second- and th

tier nuclear weapons programs have not directly benefited from China’s assistance. Unfo

nately, with the exception of Libya and Iraq, such cooperation continues to date.4 During 

last two decades, Chinese airspace, military airfields, and ports have been used to transp

WMD and related technologies between Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 

parently, the A-bomb design that A. Q. Khan delivered to the Libyans in the shopping ba

his Islamabad tailor was of a Chinese nuclear weapon tested on October 27, 1966. The C

nese government has not explained how the nuclear warhead design documents reac

Libya. It is inconceivable that Chinese security agencies were unaware of Pakistan’s nuc

dealings with North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya.5 The 2004 Report to the Cong

of the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission highlighted the consequen

of China’s dangerous liaisons with rogue regimes that have made it easier for nonstate ac

to acquire WMD:

The consequence of more than 20 years of China’s direct transfers of WMD and related technolo

gies is that the United States now faces enhanced threats from rogue states or terrorist groups tha

can acquire WMD capabilities. Unfortunately, even in light of overwhelming evidence of the in

creased threat to global security, Chinese entities continue to proliferate.

6

While Beijing has taken important steps to strengthen its nonproliferation laws and policies, 

acceptable proliferant activity still continues. The dominant view on China’s proliferation ac

ities is that the worst is behind us and that China has now completed the transition from 

challenger to an upholder of the global nonproliferation regime. However, long-time Ch

watchers see little or no evidence of Beijing’s abandoning its national security strategy based 

the principle of “containment through surrogates” that requires proliferation to countries 

can countervail its perceived rivals and enemies. I argue that to serve its broader national se

rity interests China has very cleverly played “the proliferation card” by exploiting loophole

the nonproliferation regime and contradictions in major power relationships. Despite Chin

membership in the NPT, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Reg

(MTCR), and other control regimes, China continues to provide nuclear/missile assistance t

friends and allies (Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea) when doing so undermines the securit

China’s perceived enemies (India, the United States, and Japan). Put differently, Chinese 

eign policy objectives with respect to Taiwan and Pakistan, Beijing’s desire to maintain 

93

4. Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of WMD and Missiles: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research

Service (Library of Congress Report, Order Code RL31555, updated August 8, 2006). http://www.fas.org

spp/starwars/crs/RL31555.pdf.

5. Mohan Malik, “A. Q. Khan’s China Connection,” China Brief 4, Issue 9, April 29, 2004, pp. 3–5; China,

Pakistan, and the Bomb: The Declassified File on U.S. Policy, 1977–1997, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchi

NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/press.htm.

6. “China’s Proliferation Practices,” 2004 Report to the Congress of the U.S.-China Economic & Security

Review Commission, 108 Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2004), pp. 123–

150.

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status quo on the Korean Peninsula, and its goal to end U.S. hegemony (or unipolarity) ov

ride any interest in pursuing nonproliferation objectives. Therefore, it is not a sheer coincide

that the United States, Japan, South Korea, and India—countries that either see China as t

rival or have had strained ties with China—find themselves subjected to nuclear blackmail, 

rorism, intimidation, and coercion by countries—Iran, North Korea, Pakistan—that happe

be China’s key friends and allies.7

The 2006 Report to the Congress of the U.S.—China Economic & Security Review Comm

sion accused China of failing “to meet the threshold test of international responsibility in 

area of non-proliferation” by aiding Iran’s nuclear, missile, and chemical programs and re

ing to effectively use its leverage to bring North Korea back into nuclear weapons nego

tions. The report concluded that “despite its rising power and wealth, China may not 

willing or ready to play a responsible role in an international system aimed at encourag

peace and stability.”8 It noted that China in recent years has allowed the transfer of weap

and technology across its territory from North Korea to Iran: “From April to July 2003, Ch

reportedly gave overflight rights to Iranian II-76 cargo planes that flew to North Korea at le

six times to pick up wooden crates suspected of containing cruise missiles. But after a U

protest in June 2005, China denied overflight rights for an Iranian plane departing fr

North Korea.” Nonetheless, North Korean overflights to Pakistan, Burma, and other count

continue. The repeated imposition of U.S. sanctions against Chinese entities for prolifera

activities has not deterred “serial proliferators” that “have no fear of government control

punishments.”9 China has also refused to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initia

(PSI), which raises questions about whether China will cooperate in a United Nations emba

against North Korea.10

China is reportedly conducting biological and chemical weapons research in violation of B

logical Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention obligations. Furtherm

Beijing’s nuclear force expansion and modernization programs have accelerated in rec

years. China’s third-generation nukes will be far more mobile, accurate, and reliable than its 

isting arsenal. As in the past, as China develops newer weapons, it might pass on older one

its friends and allies. There has long existed a wide gap between China’s words and deeds 

the nonproliferation subject.

The WMD Proliferation Modus Operandi:

The Nexus between State and Nonstate Actors

Despite all the hype over nonstate actors, the reality is that nonstate actors can neither exist 

survive without some degree of state support. Unlike terrorism, proliferation certainly does 

take place without state support. For example, A. Q. Khan did not buy intermediate-range 

listic missiles from North Korea to protect his numerous residential properties in Islamabad 

to protect the Pakistani state. He was only implementing an agreement brokered by the C

nese that former Prime Minister Bhutto had signed during her Pyongyang visit in 1993. A

Khan worked for the glory of the Islamic ummah. There is a nexus between state and nons

actors, and the proliferation modus operandi is surprisingly very similar. It passes through f

stages:

94

7. Mohan Malik, “The Proliferation Axis: Beijing-Islamabad-Pyongyang,” Korean Journal of Defense Analys

XV, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 57–100; Justin Bernier, “China’s Strategic Proxies,” Orbis 47, no. 4, Fall 200

pp. 629–643.

8. Carol Giacomo, “China’s Role in Peaceful World Questioned,” Reuters, October 31, 2006.

9. Bill Gertz, “Congressional Study Cites China as Nuc Supplier to North Korea,” Washington Times, Octob

31, 2006.

10. Alexa Olesen, “Why China Reluctant to Board Ships of N. Korea,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 18, 200

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• First, complete denial and protestations of innocence.

• Second, when that becomes unsustainable, denial of state sponsorship and di

involvement.

• Third, responsibility is shifted to “renegades,” and blame is put on some ro

individuals or nonstate actors; this is followed by some token action against them.

• Finally, when sanctions are imposed, some stronger action is taken (in the form 

making new policy guidelines, blaming previous administrations, and “sacrificing” so

“bad apples”), and new assurances are made that “past proliferation activities have n

been completely and permanently shut down.”

Whether it is China or Pakistan, this cycle is repeated with each new nuclear revelation.

The “Second Nuclear Age”: Major Characteristics

In his book Fire in the East, Paul Bracken argued that the “Second Nuclear Age” began in 1

when India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and China upped the nuclear/missile ante.11 This 

naled the end of Western dominance of Asia, which began in 1498—500 years ago—w

Vasco da Gama’s landing in India and the subsequent European colonization of Asia. In 

“Second Nuclear Age,” the future of nuclear deterrence lies in multilateral rather than bilat

deterrence (as was the case during the Cold War), both at the interstate and nonstate a

levels.

At the interstate level, we are now moving toward multiple nuclear deterrence games. The 

features of the “Second Nuclear Age” include:

(a) New global nuclear balance of power (United States–Russia–China)

(b) New regional bilateral nuclear balances (China and India; India and Pakistan; No

Korea and Japan; Israel and Iran)

(c) From bilateral to trilateral (China-India-Pakistan) and multilateral (United Stat

China–Russia–India–Pakistan–North Korea–Iran) complex and unpredictable nuc

deterrence games

(d) The dangers of nuclear gang-ups (Pakistan and China versus India, or an India-Is

nuclear alliance versus the China–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia nuclear axis)

(e) Nuclear blackmail (Iran, North Korea)

(f) Nuclear ambiguity (Japan, Taiwan)

(g) Third-tier proliferation (nuclear networking among nonnuclear NPT member state

reach “near-nuclear status)

(h) The Age of N-Revelations (South Korea, Taiwan); N-Breakouts (North Korea, Iran)

Temptations (Japan, Taiwan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Afr

Egypt, Turkey)

(i) The doctrine of preemption (United States versus Iraq; Israel versus Iran?)

In the “Second Nuclear Age,” China and India might compete with each other to offer 

tended nuclear deterrence umbrellas to their friends and allies just as the United States and 

U.S.S.R. did during the Cold War. New potential blackmails appear on the horizon, beca

95

11. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York:

HarperCollins, 1999).

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deterrence, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder. Sudden, unexpected nuclear cr

could emerge between new nuclear powers. If the past is an indicator of the future, it is wo

remembering that the world came very close to nuclear catastrophe several times—thro

accidents and near uses—even when only so-called “responsible” P-5 state actors were 

volved. We cannot be 100 percent sure that nuclear weapons will never be used again. 

clear weapons matter as weapons of coercion and blackmail and as bargaining ch

Therefore, new concepts, new models, and new theories are needed to manage the comp

multilateral nuclear power balances of the future.

At the nonstate actor level, the old theories of arms control and deterrence cannot deter n

threats posed by nonstate actors because only nation states are parties to arms control ag

ments, not nonstate actors. Nonstate actors thus add a whole new dimension. Deterre

works against people who want to live, not against those who want to die. So stopping ter

ists without an address is much more difficult than deterring North Korea, Pakistan, or Ir

which have targets of value, including capitals and leaders. That’s the crux of the problem 

face today. In the movie adaptation of Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears, neo-Nazis 

their hands on a lost atom bomb and Baltimore goes up in smoke. That’s one scenario. At 

nonstate-actor level, the breakup of states also creates the danger of WMD falling into 

hands of separatists and fanatics. We cannot rule out the possibility of a civil war fought w

nuclear weapons. If there were two rival factions in Pyongyang or Islamabad, for exam

the international community would be forced to support the side that controls nuclear for

One can imagine a scenario in which the Saudi government fragments and control over 

clear weapons, should the Saudis have acquired them, falls into the hands of Saudi pow

brokers who are supporters of Osama bin Laden, or who are at least sympathetic to his ide

WMD Terrorism: Why Worry?

There are several reasons for worrying about WMD terrorism. Nuclear terrorism, in particu

appeals to groups seeking spectacular, dramatic, and psychologically potent results and wre

ing massive socioeconomic damage on the enemy. Countries that go nuclear often find th

selves subjected to terrorist wars or low-intensity conflicts (LIC), because nuclearization r

out the option of waging conventional interstate wars. Faced with advanced technology, 

nature of war changes. This is what military historian Martin Van Creveld means by the “tra

formation of war.” So nuclearization is one of the root causes of terrorism.

Nuclear terrorism acts range from distributing small amounts of radioactive material by ma

“dirty bombs,” improvised nuclear devices (INDs), or an intact nuclear weapon (INW) sto

from a state arsenal or gifted/sold by “rogue states.” There is fear that some “states of conce

(e.g., North Korea or Pakistan or entities within them) might give or sell nuclear weapon

materials, if they have not already done so. In addition, there is the danger of unauthori

assistance from scientists or custodians of nuclear weapons or seizure of nuclear weap

during civil war, coup, and chaos in a nuclear-armed failing state. While no terrorist gro

have yet resorted to nuclear terrorism, there is worry that lack of attention and action by sta

increases the terrorist risk unnecessarily. An Islamic state or terrorists might be tempted to 

nuclear weapons against Israel, India, or the United States in the belief that the assured reta

tion against the Muslims would serve its cause of uniting the entire Islamic ummah agains

enemies.12

There have long been concerns about the Russian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear sto

piles. A thriving black market already exists in nuclear materials and terrorists in Europe, 

Central and South Asia have been found with WMD literature. al-Qa‘ida, Chechen separat

96

12. Noah Feldman, “Nuclear Holocaust: A Risk Too Big Even for Martyrs?” New York Times, October 27, 2006

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the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and other jihadi organizations are on the lookout. S

zures of smuggled radioactive material capable of making a terrorist “dirty bomb” have d

bled in the past four years in Europe. Smugglers have been caught trying to traffick danger

radioactive material more than 300 times since 2002, according to the IAEA figures.13 As 

clear power becomes more attractive to developing countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, C

ada, and South Africa are expressing interest in enriching uranium to sell on the world mar

Growing reliance on nuclear energy, in turn, increases the potential for nuclear terrorism.

Furthermore, with relatively little radioactive material obtained from a power plant or med

facility, terrorists could construct a “dirty bomb” or a radiological dispersion device (RDD

radiation emission device (RED). A group with a few thousand dollars could obtain radioac

material. Technical information necessary to build a functional nuclear weapon is widely av

able. The secret of the bomb is no longer a secret. The social, economic, and psychologica

fects of a dirty bomb would be more serious than its physical or radiological effects.

Increasing interest in exploiting biological and chemical agents for mass deaths by terrorist 

ganizations is another cause for worry. And last but not least, attacks against and sabotag

nuclear power plants could result in the release of large amounts of radioactivity. The fea

that al-Qa‘ida-type groups might be planning an attack even more lethal than those of 9/

The 9/11 attacks cost the world economy $3 trillion. A nuclear 9/11 would cause a global e

nomic depression and widespread chaos and panic. Some governments might fail to cope w

the threat and surrender to terrorists’ demands, while others would fall.

A Nuclear 9/11

Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear power stations, causing the release of large amount

radioactivity, is a plausible scenario. A 9/11-style attack on a nuclear installation would hav

devastating impact, far worse than the Chernobyl (1986) and Three Mile Island (1979) a

dents. There are about 440 commercial nuclear power reactors in more than 30 countries. 

curity at most nuclear research reactors is very limited, making them easy targets. Attack mo

include airplane crashes; commando raids by land, water, or air; or cyber attacks. Diagram

power plants have been found in terrorists’ hands. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ra

Binalshibh, two organizers of the 9/11 attacks, acknowledged that they had thought of strik

nuclear power plants but did not do so for fear that the attack could “get out of control.” 

cently, police in Canada (2003), Britain (2004), Australia (2005), and India (2006) claime

have foiled planned attacks on nuclear reactors by arresting several people with links to jih

organizations.14

Who Can Do It?

Charles Ferguson and William Potter identify four types of nonstate actors that might pur

nuclear terrorism (Table I).15 These groups have different political aims, geopolitical conte

technical capabilities, and psychological and religious motivations. Although most terro

groups are not going to use WMD, the open-source data show a growing interest by terrorist

WMD weapons and materials. First are the apocalyptic groups that are so fed up with this 

holy world that they just want to blow it up. Religious extremist groups, such as Aum Shinri

97

13. Lewis Smith, “Smuggled nuclear waste cases double,” London Times, October 7, 2006; “Radiological

Material for 5 “Dirty Bombs” Recovered in Chechnya,” Moscow News, August 4, 2006. http://

www.mosnews.com/news/2006/08/04/dirtybombs.shtml

14. In August 2006, India, fearing a missile attack by terrorists, placed its nuclear installation near Bombay on 

war footing. See Manoj Joshi, “Why BARC beckons the terrorist,” Hindustan Times, August 12, 2006, p.1

15. Discussion here relies on Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Ne

York/London: Routledge/Taylor & Frances, 2005).

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(which carried out the nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) and David Koresh, 

lieve that the end of the world is close and they want to purify this world via violent uphea

These groups, driven by religious passion, are usually led by charismatic but paranoid lead

who can use WMD.

The second category is that of nationalist/separatist groups (such as Sri Lanka’s LTTE, Russ

Chechens, India’s Kashmiris, China’s Uighurs, the Kurds in Turkey, and the Maoists in Ne

fighting for homelands or autonomy, which will not turn to nuclear terrorism because their 

sire for domestic and international support serves as a major constraint against acts of mass 

lence. Third are single-issue groups, which are mostly misfits or fundamentalist crazies such 

proenvironmentalists, animal liberation activists, antiabortion advocates, and even the anti

clear movement. They may turn to lesser forms of terrorism, such as radiological dispersion 

vices, or even nuclear hoaxes, much the way anthrax hoaxes have been used to disr

abortion clinics. Such groups, however, would not engage in mass destruction.

Table I

Nonstate Actors That Might Pursue Nuclear Terrorism

PROBABILITY

Apocalyptic Groups: “Unholy World”

Extremist religious groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, David Koresh . . . High

Nationalist/Separatist Groups: “Homelands”

Chechens, Kashmiris, Uighurs, the Kurds, LTTE . . . Very Low

Single-Issue Groups: “Misfits”

Antinuclear and proenvironment groups, animal liberation, antiabortion advocates . . . Low

Anti-State Actors: Extremist Ideologies of Holy Warriors

Al-Qa‘ida, LeT, Jamat-ul-Dawa, Int’l Islamic Front, Hezbollah, Jamaiah Islamiah . . . Very High

Fourth are anti-state actors or politico-religious extremist organizations, in the business of w

ing “holy wars” in this “unholy world,” that have the propensity for mass-casualty terrori

Seeing violence as a sacred divine duty, they lack any political and moral constraints. Pos

11, al-Qa‘ida, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jamat-ul-Dawa, Jamaiah Islamiah, Hezbollah, and ot

“antistate” actors are of primary concern. An “antistate actor” is defined as an extremist 

gious ideology or ideological movement with political objectives that seeks to establish glo

supremacy and advocates the complete destruction of the modern state system through 

conventional warfare, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. Comintern, with 

goal to establish a global communist utopia during the early Cold War years, and al-Qa‘ida 

day, with its stated goal to establish a worldwide pan-Islamic caliphate, fit this description. 

like other nonstate actors, “antistate actors” such as al-Qa‘ida do not accept the primacy 

legitimacy of the nation states in the international system. They believe in the sovereignty 

preeminence of the ummah [the world Islamic community], which overrides state loyalty 

state sovereignty. The main point here is that the number of organizations highly motivate

use WMD is very small but not zero. And it’s always those in small numbers that cause all 

bloodshed and wars and wreak havoc. The conflicting perspectives between state 

antistate actors on nuclear weapons and their use are summarized in Table II.16

98

16. For details, see Mohan Malik, “The Clash between State & Anti-State Actors,” Asian Affairs 30, no. 3, Fal

2003, pp. 177–199.

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Table II

The State versus the Antistate: Nuclear Peace versus Nuclear Jihad

THE STATIST’S PERSPECTIVE THE ANTISTATE-ACTOR’S PERSPECTIVE

State security and survival are paramount. One of the

main prerogatives of state actors is to ensure the maintenance of their territorial integrity.

Islam’s spread and survival are of paramount im

tance. State security or national survival is irrele

because the very idea of separate nation states 

anathema to antistate actors.

Nuclear weapons are meant to ensure territorial integrity and national independence.

The nation state is not indispensable. The destru

of the modern state system may well be a prereq

to the creation of Dar-ul Islam.

Nuclear weapons are to be acquired when the very survival of the nation state is seen as at stake.“It is the religious duty of all Muslims to acquire 

clear, biological and chemical weapons to terroriz

enemies of Allah.”—Osama Bin Laden

Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence, not

weapons of war.

All weapons, including WMD, are usable weapo

achieve victory over nonbelievers and enemies o

faith.

Nuclearization brings an end to map-making exercises

and freezes the territorial status quo. Nuclear weapons

may be of little use in wresting politico-military concessions from others.

Nuclearization paves the way for waging low-cost

intensity conflict/terrorist wars without fear of re

tion and can help in settling territorial disputes o

vorable terms via coercion, subversion, and blackm

The resolution of the Palestinian and Kashmir disputes

will lead to peace and stability.

Their resolution will bolster the Islamic ummah

solve and cause in Chechnya, Xinjiang, Minda

southern Thailand, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Eu

and North America . . . and eventually pave the wa

the creation of a pan-Islamic caliphate.

“Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are India-specific only.” Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb” should be used to de

the broader interests of the entire Muslim ummah

Nuclear weapons are the “crown jewels” and symbols

of a strong state.

Al-Qa ‘ida is not concerned with the nukes’ status-

bol value, as they need weak, failing, and war

states to thrive and accomplish their objectives.

A nuclear war must never be fought. The taboo on the

nonuse of nukes must not be broken.

There is absolutely nothing to fear from a nuclear w

Al-Qa‘ida and WMD Terrorism

For the foreseeable future, al-Qa‘ida and its affiliated organizations are the group most likel

use WMD terrorism. This is so because al-Qa‘ida’s goal is not the creation of a separate ho

land, but conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. Al-Qa‘ida sees itself fighting the enemies of Is

wherever in the world they are. It seeks to expand the frontiers of Islam and double the Org

zation of Islamic Countries’ (OIC) membership from 57 to 100 plus. Al-Qa‘ida wants to est

lish a new pan-Islam-dominated world order in which the West is driven out of the Hous

Islam, moderate Muslim regimes are toppled, and a global Islamic caliphate based on Shar

is established. The Islamic discussion of nuclear weapons is intertwined with the concept of 

cide bombing. Creating mass casualties to obtain maximum media coverage of the devasta

comes naturally to them. These jihadis are natural-born killers.

Al-Qa‘ida’s leadership has long expressed an interest in WMD. In 1998, Osama bin La

called it a “religious duty” to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons “to terrorize the enemie

Allah.” His position has been confirmed by others, including the Saudi radical cleric Sh

Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd, who issued a fatwa on May 21, 2003, endorsing the use of WM

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titled “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infid

[Risalah fi hukum istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamel didh al-kuffar]. The fatwa document 

plicitly claims a justification in Muslim religious tradition for using “nuclear, chemical, or bio

ical weapons.” One quotation illustrates its general tenor: “If a bomb that killed ten millio

them and burned as much of their land as they have burned Muslims’ land were dropped 

them it would be permissible, with no need to mention any other argument.” In sum, al-Qa

has a clear religious-political agenda. It is in for the long haul. Its struggle has roots that go b

to the Crusades almost a millennium ago. On several occasions, al-Qa‘ida operatives have t

(albeit unsuccessfully) to acquire nuclear materials over the past decade. The example 

Abdullah al-Muhajir (Jose Padilla) is a case in point. Documents found in Afghanistan sh

that while al-Qa‘ida’s efforts were far less sophisticated, it is determined to get nuclear we

ons. Al-Qa‘ida’s ideology, goals, public statements, and actions all indicate they would cond

nuclear attacks if they had them. Likewise, if Hezbollah had a suitcase nuclear bomb, t

would certainly use it against Israel.

Why Hasn’t It Happened Yet?

Disincentives for the Pursuit of WMD Terrorism

The aforementioned discussion of worst-case scenarios relating to WMD terrorism might r

the question: why hasn’t it happened yet? Fortunately, to date, no nuclear detonations h

occurred, nor have there been any “dirty bomb” attacks. Analysts attribute this to four 

reasons:

1. Implementation challenges

2. Response (massive retaliation) fears

3. Philosophical or moral issues

4. Insufficient capability.

First of all, the War on Terrorism has certainly disrupted al-Qa‘ida operations, removed s

havens (Afghanistan), and disrupted financing activities. Some experts argue that al-Qa

might have succeeded in its objective if it had controlled Afghanistan for a few more years. 

sides, new airport, port, and border security measures have been taken. Radiation sensors 

being installed at ports all over the world. Some argue that the risk of terrorists using chem

and biological weapons (CBW) has been exaggerated. To date, there have been very few ca

of CBW use by nonstate actors. A major reason is that the effects produced by CBW are usu

delayed and spread over time. This works against their use by terrorists who want spectacu

massive impact through their attack and instant worldwide publicity, shock, and awe thro

such attacks. The March 1995 attack by Aum was not very effective: it resulted in 12 deaths 

1,000 injured. The low number of casualties highlights the limitations of terrorism involv

chemical weapons.

Secondly, “the response factor” or massive retaliation fears also work against WMD’s ac

use. This is borne out by the testimony of two organizers of the 9/11 attacks, who contempla

striking nuclear power plants but did not do so for fear that “the attack could get out of contr

A good example of the moral and philosophical constraint is the case of Chechen separatist 

bels who placed an RDD containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in 1995. A Chechen re

leader had second thoughts and soon alerted the media, and the bomb was never detona

Finally, building nukes is not easy. It requires massive resources invested over decades. Ja

nese sect Aum Shinrikyo spent half a decade acquiring nuclear weapons, but turned to che

cal weapons after it failed to become history’s first nonstate nuclear power.

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What Can We Do to Prevent a Catastrophe?17

Cracks in the global nonproliferation regime have been evident for a long time as a result 

variety of pressures. Can the NPT, based on the power realities, principles, and norms of 

mid-twentieth century, curb proliferation in the early twenty-first century? The regime works 

the principles of assurance, persuasion, dissuasion, and coercion, but if any country is cau

violating nonproliferation treaties, there is no punishment. The UN just cannot enforce com

ance and punish the violators. In theory, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could act against 

violators, but the UNSC itself suffers from a crisis of legitimacy. Besides, nothing can be don

one or more P-5 nuclear powers choose to undermine the regime. More often than not, the 

act only if their vital national interests are affected. In the absence of great-power concert, W

proliferation seems unstoppable. To make matters worse, the IAEA does not have the organ

tional capacity to catch those cheating in time. The examples of China, North Korea, Lib

and Iran also show that signing the NPT or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does not mean 

a country will not proliferate. When confronted with violating the treaty, North Korea sim

walked away from it without any punishment. Now Iran is threatening to do the same. The g

eral consensus is that the IAEA needs much stronger verification power and the UNSC need

take bolder and complementary action to reverse the previous decade’s growing trend 

proliferation.

There is no option but to strengthen and reinforce the existing regime with new global ag

ments, norms, and understandings and shared responsibilities and obligations that will c

loopholes and expand export controls, and, in particular, to bolster the NPT and the IAEA 

adding new protocols and stricter verification. The NPT ought to be fine-tuned to achieve be

balance between compliance with obligations and rights, between better nonproliferation c

trols and better guarantees of access to the fuel supply for peaceful purposes. Since prolife

tion does not take place without state support, there is a need to understand and undermine 

nexus between state and nonstate and antistate actors. UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 is 

first legal document that declares proliferation by nonstate actors to be a threat to internatio

security. It calls for measures to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons, materials, and facil

against attack or sabotage worldwide and builds a global consensus or alliance against W

terrorism. In this context, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the 

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the 

clear Terrorism Control Convention of 2004, and the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuc

Terrorism are also welcome steps. These measures should be supplemented with steps to 

duce the threat of “loose nukes,” miscalculation, and accidents in South Asia, North Korea, 

the Middle East by promoting effective command and control in new nuclear states (e.g., P

stan). In addition, robust international mechanisms for information sharing and crisis mana

ment should be established. Improved counterterrorism measures (e.g., law enforcement 

intelligence capabilities) and effective border security and airport and port security measu

can curb illicit trafficking in WMD materials by antistate actors.

Since WMD technology is often carried by sea, post-9/11 fears of a “dirty bomb” being ship

into the country in a container prompted the Bush administration to establish the Container 

curity Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seek to improve natio

and international capabilities for detecting and interdicting WMD technology and mater

Along with the controversial doctrine of preemption and development of missile defenses, 

CSI and PSI constitute four important elements of the counterproliferation strategy that seek

neutralize the threat posed by the nexus between rogue states and nonstate state actors by 

feating, attacking, detecting, and interdicting WMD. However, 100 percent screening and 

tection is impossible, as there are still many holdouts who believe that counterprolifera

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measures violate national sovereignty and international law. While Russia and India rem

ambivalent, China is the most important holdout. Indeed, China’s horizontal and vertical 

clear proliferation policies will become a determining factor in shaping the “Second Nuc

Age” in the twenty-first century. In short, the threat of WMD terrorism is real. It could hap

anywhere in the world (New York, London, Tel Aviv, Bombay, Brussels, Paris, Moscow). P

vention is the best option. We are in a race between catastrophe and cooperation that we c

not afford to let the other side win.

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Irregular Warfare, Armed Groups, and the

Long War: A New Analytical Framework

Andrea J. Dew,1 Research Fellow

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Introduction

The end of the Cold War was heralded as ushering in a new era of world peace. The realit

the 1990s and twenty-first century, however, has been a rash of bloody internal conflicts 

has stretched from Bosnia to Central Asia, across the Middle East, and throughout Afri

Moreover, war since 1990, with the exception of Desert Storm and the first phase of Opera

Iraqi Freedom, has been different from the modern Western understanding of armed comb

War has been unconventional and irregular. War has also been dominated by non-state arm

groups.4 Conventional militaries, the United States included, have a poor track record in fi

ing these kinds of unconventional conflicts against unconventional foes.5 The insurgency 

Iraq is illustrative of the dire consequences of not grasping these changes in the nature of glo

armed conflict.

The root causes of these unconventional conflicts are complex and often overlap, each ca

exacerbating the other. In some areas in the world, weak, corrupt, and failing states are par

the problem.6 The end of the Cold War also unleashed powerful ethnic, ethnonational, 

gious, and communal differences; and identity differences between people have been mani

lated by competing ethnic and religious elites to gain power. In other areas of the world, inte

and transnational violence has been the route to state resources and power, secession, or gr

autonomy.7

Internal conflicts of the types we have seen in Somalia, Chechnya, and Bosnia, will continu

occur in the twenty-first century and will be characterized as follows: irregular conflict will c

tinue to challenge state legitimacy and authority, and there will be a proliferation of arm

groups motivated by national, transnational, and messianic principles. The internal wars of 

twenty-first century will continue to have transnational and even global dimensions charac

ized by the irregular and unconventional use of force by various types of armed groups.8

In the past, however, the policymakers and military commanders of modern states—includ

the United States—have often failed to grasp the nature of this new battlefield. Indeed, 

policymakers the perception is the reverse: that conventional warfare prevails and thus that 

United States is more than adequately prepared to dominate the future face of war. Noth

could be further from reality. In the U.S. defense community, however, there are early si

that the threat from armed groups is being acknowledged. For example, the 2006 Quadren

Defense Review (QDR) talks about the United States facing a “long war” that is “irregular in 

nature.” The QDR also emphasizes that the enemies in this fight “are not traditional conv

tional military forces.”9 In this irregular warfare, current and future U.S. military missions 

feature counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In each, the main adv

sary will be an armed group—often more than one, as Iraq illustrates—which makes the imp

tance of understanding the threat from armed groups even more salient.

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Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: Who Are the Warriors of

Contemporary Combat?

In order to fight an unconventional enemy, we must, as Sun Tzu exhorts, know our enemy; 

must understand their capabilities, their concepts of warfare, their culture of war and pea

from this information, we can learn how they fight.10 In assessing non-state armed groups 

also important to remember that many have emerged out of tribal, clan, religious, and ot

traditional identity divisions. Thus, the starting point to such an approach is to develop an 

derstanding of the cultural foundations of non-state armed groups. This can be achieved by 

derstanding the values, institutions, and ways of thinking that persist generation a

generation, and by understanding how culture and tradition influences the way armed gro

think about, and fight, war.

The term “non-state armed groups” includes insurgents, terrorists, militias, and crim

groups. These armed groups are characterized by their ability and willingness to challenge 

authority and legitimacy of states and even the international system, and they can attack wi

and across state boundaries, and even globally. Such groups operate through clandestine or

nizations, depend on intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, and mask their ope

tions through denial and deception. These transnational groups are enabled by globaliza

and information-age technologies; they employ violence in unconventional, irregular, and 

creasingly indiscriminate ways; and their operations often are not constrained by the laws 

conventions of war. Moreover, their operations deliberately bypass the superior military po

of nation states to attack political, economic, and symbolic targets.11

Based on this assessment, the following new six-part framework for analyzing irregular war

and non-state armed groups is proposed. Policymakers, intelligence analysts, and mili

planners should consider: (1) the armed group’s overall concept of warfare; (2) their organ

tional approach and command and control structure; (3) their area of operations; (4) the ty

and targets of operations; 5) the constraints and limitations on warfare; and (6) the role of o

side actors. The remainder of this paper discusses each of these six aspects based on the exp

ences of conventional militaries and their unconventional foes in Somalia, Chechn

Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the conclusions presented here provide a general overview 

trends in irregular warfare. Moreover, the six-part framework can also be applied to individ

non-state armed groups to assess their way of war and to develop nuanced and flex

counterstrategies for the “long war” ahead.12

1. Concept of Warfare

In assessing non-state armed groups, the first issue to address is the overarching concept of w

fare for a group. Thus, it is important to consider these questions: What are the traditional c

cepts of war that persist over time, and to what extent are they relevant today? Why do th

groups fight and what are the roles of honor, revenge, tribal and family loyalties, and religio

conflict? What are the methods—informal doctrine—of combat? What do those methods 

tail, and have they been adapted? To what extent are members versed in these mode

fighting?

An assessment of post–Cold War conflicts in Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq sh

that traditional concepts of warfare still remain very relevant. Moreover, armed groups can 

only execute operations based on these traditional ways of war but can also adapt them to 

time and setting in which they are fighting. War in traditional societies can stem from a hos

motivations that include honor, revenge, tribal and family loyalties, religion, and resistanc

invasion or occupation. These long-established precepts of traditional warfare are not foun

the doctrinal manuals that guide modern armies. But they can be deduced from armed gr

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narratives—stories of raids, ambushes, heroism, treachery, and victory passed down from g

eration to generation. It is possible to uncover these protracted, irregular, and unconventio

principles through detailed study and observation of the culture and history of armed grou

2. Organizational Approach—Command and Control

Second, to assess how non-state armed groups are organized to fight, it is important to cons

their command and control structure. How do these armed groups organize to fight? To w

extent is organization decentralized, based on local hierarchies, and focused on small un

Who commands, and what is the approach to leadership?

The answer to these questions can be derived from the cultural background and history of c

flict of these groups. Tribal, clan, and religious warriors take orders from local leaders and 

usually mustered into local units rather than a single centralized control center. The Afg

Mujahideen, for example, were mostly composed of local forces under the command of a lo

leader. Moreover, although the membership of armed groups can number in the thousan

they are organized to fight in small group units—no battalions here—and assembled for irre

lar operations, such as ambushes and hit-and-run strikes.

Traditional command and control systems have been adapted to modern weapons, new e

mies, and the situational context. Moreover, the communal fighting units and command 

control systems that persist in traditional societies can mobilize rapidly and adapt to fight m

ern foes. The transformation of the rural Chechen style of fighting to suit the urban canyons 

Russian tanks in Grozny is another example of this adaptation.

3. Area of Operations

The next issue to consider in assessing non-state armed groups is their area of operations (A

This can be local, regional, or global, and it is important to understand whether the AO is stil

ral or if armed groups have adapted to urban situations. Moreover, since many non-s

armed groups operate in states with weak, failing, or failed central governments, it is also 

portant to consider whether their AO is in ungoverned territory and whether these areas are 

limits for government forces.

In Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, traditional warriors have capitalized on supe

local knowledge of the social setting, terrain, and enemy activities. In particular, informa

dominance of the rural AO, as the Afghan Mujahideen demonstrated, can provide intellige

that is highly advantageous. Moreover, as the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents have shown, so

non-state armed groups have demonstrated flexibility and adapted traditional concepts of 

to the urban AO. Armed groups are able to extend the battlefield regionally, as demonstra

by the Chechen terrorist strikes inside Moscow. In addition, some armed groups are able to p

ject power globally, and groups like al-Qa‘ida have turned Iraq into the central front of t

global jihad.13

4. Types and Targets of Operations and Constraints, and

5. Limitations on Warfare

The fourth and fifth aspects to consider in building a new analytical framework focus on 

types of operations carried out by non-state armed groups and the constraints and limitati

on warfare. These include issues such as to what extent have traditional irregular operati

broadened to use new tools such as suicide attacks? To what extent do targets include p

tected individuals and protected facilities? Do the international laws of armed conflict gov

the use of force? How have the customary codes on the proportional use of force and statu

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noncombatants been modified? Are prohibitions against targeting protected individuals and 

cilities eroding?

In many theaters of unconventional combat, the limits on operations, targeting, and constra

on violence are eroding.14 Armed groups still use guerrilla war tactics. Afghan Mujahideen 

ployed them effectively against the Soviets, as have Iraqi insurgents against the United Sta

However, armed groups are no longer confining their operations to guerrilla tactics. The 

conventional repertoire now includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—car bombs, 

cide attacks, and roadside explosives; kidnapping and beheading noncombatants; and 

desire to acquire WMD. Iraq and Chechnya are illustrative. Moreover, targets, as Iraq also il

trates, include everyone from contractors to aid workers and journalists, and everywhere fr

hospitals to schools and mosques.

6. Role of Outside Actors

The final aspect to consider is the role of outside actors—state and other non-state actors—

encouraging and enabling non-state armed groups to fight. Do outside actors provide supp

and assistance? What kind of help do they provide, and why? Are they transforming con

from a local security problem to one with global linkages? How are outside actors fanning 

flames of conflict with money, radical ideology, and extremist fighters?

The events of 9/11 and the insurgency in Iraq both demonstrate how much the role of outs

support for armed groups has diversified since the end of the Cold War. This is especially tru

the role of al-Qa‘ida and the Salafi Jihad movement in local internal conflicts. In particular, o

side groups have a key role in providing financial support and jihadi warriors to local fig

which transforms local conflicts into part of the global jihad. Outside actors are often un

strained in whom they target—the beheadings of foreign workers in Iraq by global jihadi fi

ers, until recently led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, are a case in point—and this can add to 

destabilizing character of conflicts involving non-state armed groups.

Conclusions

If U.S. soldiers are to overcome irregular warriors in the “long war,” military commanders 

quire a clear-eyed understanding of their adversary’s way of war. Not to be conscious of 

adapt to it can be very costly in blood and treasure: indeed, “Mogadishu, Grozny, the Hi

Kush mountains and Afghan plains, and the Sunni triangle of Iraq are all deadly reminder

past ugly surprises” in which conventional militaries underestimated their unconventio

foes.15

As the 2006 QDR acknowledges, current and future US military missions against irreg

forces will feature counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In each, 

main adversary will be an armed group—and often more than one, as the post–Operation I

Freedom experience in Iraq illustrates. To combat these armed groups—the insurgents, ter

ists, and militias—it is necessary to develop a robust new framework for understanding 

profiling the war-fighting modus operandi of armed groups. This paper presents such a fra

work using historical, anthropological, and cultural studies to discuss overall trends. This 

part framework can be applied on a case-by-case basis to a range of non-state armed group

build the flexible and adaptive profiles necessary to combat future insurgents, terrorists, 

militias.

Notes

1. Andrea J. Dew is the former Research Associate for the ISS Program at the Fletcher School, Tufts Univer

Medford, Mass., and is currently a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affa

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:42:56 PM
2. Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflicts Report (Waterloo, Canada: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

2006).

3. The framework for this paper is drawn from Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents,

Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (Columbia University Press: New York,

2006).

4. See, for example, assessments of post–Cold War conflicts by Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflicts Repo

(Waterloo, Canada: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2006).

5. See Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, “Counterinsurgency, by the Book,” New York Times,

August 7, 2006; and Richard H. Shultz Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The

Warriors of Contemporary Combat (Columbia University Press: New York, 2006).

6. On weak and failing states, see, for example, Robert Rotberg, ed., Why States Fail: Causes and

Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Chester Crocker, “Engaging Failing States,”

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003; I. William Zartman, Collapsed States (Boulder, CO: Lynne

Rienner, 1997); Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi

Press, 2003); Robert Dorff, “Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability,”

Parameters, Spring 1996.

7. For an in-depth discussion of arguments on root causes of internal conflict, see, for example, Donald

Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), Ted Robert Gurr,

Minorities at Risk (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), K. J. Holsti, The State, War

and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Donald M. Snow, Distant Thunde

Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World, 2nd edition (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); Snow, Uncivi

Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 1996); William 

Odom, On Internal War: American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents (Durha

NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Small Wars and Insurgencies Journal (Special Issue: Non-State Threa

and Future Wars) 13, no. 2 (Autumn 2002); Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 20

(College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003); and Mary

Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press

1999).

8. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2015, published in 2004, concludes that internal and

transnational conflict will present a recurring cause of global instability and that these conflicts will becom

increasingly lethal. Weak and failing states will generate these conflicts, threatening the stability of a

globalizing international system. See www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/2015_files/2015.htm.

9. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006,” February 6, 2006, p. 10.

10. On Sun Tzu, see Samuel B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 196

11. Summarized from Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Douglas Farah, Itamara V. Lochard, Armed Groups: A Tier-On

Security Priority (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, Institute for National Security Studies, INSS

Occasional Paper 57, 2004). For one of a number of recent studies criticizing U.S. failure to distinguish

between the specific armed-group threats in Iraq, see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nations/documen

rand_04_01.pdf (accessed on April 1, 2005). See also Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks, “Pentagon

Blamed for Lack of Postwar Planning in Iraq,” Washington Post, April 1, 2005, A3.

12. This framework is drawn from Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, p. 37.

13. The declassified key finding of the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate notes that “the Iraq jihad is

shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspi

more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.” Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence

Estimate. “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” April 2006 (accessed October 

2006); available from www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf.

14. Traditional cultures have strict rules against such targeting, but in Somalia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and I

these restrictions have seriously waned.

15. Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, p. 270.

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Panel IV: Terrorism, Proliferation,

Transnational Crime, and Migration

Summary of Discussion

Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz

John Nicholas Brown Academic Chair of Counterterrorism and

Professor of National Security Decision Making

U.S. Naval War College

The fourth panel, Terrorism, Proliferation, Transnational Crime, and Migration, sparked a s

ited discussion of threat, risk, and vulnerability. Provocative, insightful, and stimulating, pa

members Rohan Gunaratna, Mohan Malik, and Andrea Dew highlighted the entire spectrum 

terrorist threats—from primitive (small arms and machetes) to catastrophic (nuclear) atta

and the emerging importance of armed groups as the future of conflict changes. Conside

the advance of global terrorism, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime, what shou

maritime strategy embrace to address these threats? Can the world's navies confront th

challenges?

Rohan Gunaratna noted that global terrorism has changed in the past five years. Iraq, not 

ghanistan, is the epicenter for America’s war on terrorism. Additionally, ideology is the prim

driving factor. Movement of personnel, goods, and technologies is where global terrorists 

focusing attention. Consequently, maritime capability and the world’s oceans will undoubte

be an avenue of transportation. Gunaratna’s personal review of captured documents rev

al-Qa‘ida has mature plans for maritime operations, including diver training. Neverthel

Gunaratna maintained that maritime strategies are limited in their efficacy to counter the m

time terrorist threat. “I strongly believe,” said Gunaratna, “that the Navy cannot play a rol

fighting the maritime terrorist threat. Maritime counterterrorism is largely fought by law enfo

ment and the land forces.” According to Gunaratna, terrorists recruit, plan, organize, equip

source, and reorganize on land. He observed that terrorists’ actual time at sea is short an

only a small part of the attack trajectory.

Mohan Malik argued that WMD proliferation, and, in particular, nuclear potential, will be a 

fining challenge in the maritime environment. Using the world’s oceans, groups who espo

anarchy and unrest will take advantage of the unmanageable littoral regions. He spoke ab

traditional proliferation worries at the levels of the state and non-state actor. Particularly intr

ing was his introduction of the concept of groups that seek to destroy traditional nation sta

Malik labeled them “anti-state” actors. His concern is that proliferation of WMD in the hand

anti-state actors will make their ruinous goals more obtainable.

Andrea Dew captivated the audience with a groundbreaking analysis of how armed groups 

become tier-one security threats. She offered that since 1985, more than 60 states have exp

enced conflict in which non-state armed groups have been involved. The United States fa

non-state armed groups in Somalia in 1993, and the Soviet Union faced non-state arm

groups in Afghanistan. Today, Russia faces a non-state armed group in Chechnya, and 

United States faces non-state armed groups in Afghanistan. Moreover, an armed gro

Hezbollah, demanded attention and strategic reactions from regional powers and the inter

tional community during the summer of 2006. And in Iraq, U.S. efforts to stabilize that cou

have been effectively thwarted by non-state armed groups. Dew introduced a six-part fra

work for approaching armed groups, which seem to dominate in failed, failing, and flai

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states. Armed groups have a root cause. They don’t simply emerge from nowhere. Nevert

less, traditional concepts of war remain relevant, though they must be adapted to the twe

first century. Dew’s presentation provided a fascinating view into the heart of what may wel

the future face of war.

Workshop participants were quick to pepper the panel with questions and counterpoints. O

observation dealt with how fighting terrorism has been solely about “building military and 

lice capacity” to engage terrorists kinetically. Rather than looking to solve cultural grievan

nations have been focused on creating force-on-force solutions that have failed, as exempli

by Israel. Ronald Reagan was paraphrased to the effect that our real strategy should be to t

potential enemies into friends. History is full of examples in which terrorist armed gro

evolved into responsible movements that legally became part of the government: evide

Russian Bolsheviks, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador, and the 

rican National Congress under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. The point was not simpl

look at armed groups as objects against which to wage war, but to find ways to reduce their 

mand for violence.

Another participant opined that all too often, security practitioners engage in “fearmongeri

by exaggerating the threat from armed groups and terrorists. Furthermore, without empir

data, it’s hard to see how U.S. national interests are threatened simply by the potential for c

strophic attack. Along the same line, another participant observed that terrorists, who ope

out-of-area, rarely translate their activity into strategic effectiveness. In response to these vie

one panelist maintained that global groups have mature out-of-area infrastructure for pro

ganda, recruitment, fund-raising, procurement, safe houses, training, and communicatio

The panelist used the September 11 attacks to show how U.S. foreign policy, particularly a

relates to Iraq, has certainly suffered on a strategic level from such groups. These are substa

ated facts and not fabricated fearmongering. Likewise, the panelist’s own access to orig

documents and “insiders” contradicts charges of hyperbole.

As pertaining to globalization, one participant noted that although terror groups do feed 

modern information technology, it’s not accurate to refer to this as globalization’s “dark sid

Rather, it’s the regions that are least globalized that trigger armed groups. The lack of global

tion seems to have negative consequences. Expanding hope and individual potential thro

ever-increasing globalization is a way to defeat the root causes of terrorism. An added thou

dealt with the concept of collective security as an antidote to proliferation by nation state

evidence the belief that “nukes” keep you safe from U.S. attack. Upon reflection, American 

eign policy should focus on reducing the incentive for state proliferation.

Why do people fight? What’s the catalyst for local anger to become global in scope? Th

questions framed another fascinating line of discussion. Global struggles begin with a lo

cause. Understanding the root cause of conflict explains why some armed clashes beco

global and some remain regional. Strategies to address global conflict have to consider why 

belligerents fight in the first place.

In sum, the three panelists and the strategic conversation that followed their prepared rema

framed the security environment in novel ways that will aid scholars and practitioners w

wrestle with a new maritime strategy.

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Panel V

International Cooperation in Securing the

Maritime Commons

Professor Craig H. Allen

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt

German Navy (Retired)

Moderator:

Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn

Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director, National Security Decision Making

Department, U.S. Naval War College

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Legal Interoperability Issues in Internationa

Cooperation Measures to Secure the

Maritime Commons

Professor Craig H. Allen

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law

U.S. Naval War College1

The life of the law has not been logic, but experience.

—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common L

Introduction

I would first like to say that I much prefer the phrase “securing the commons” to the more p

vocative and inaccurate “command of the commons.” The latter is impossible to objectively 

sess and, more important to me, a legal oxymoron. The commons are just that: a shared sp

not subject to any nation’s sovereignty or control, and, for that reason, a space where all sta

have an obligation to promote and enforce the public order necessary to prevent a traged

those commons, whether by overuse, abuse, or malevolent misuse. The U.S. approach 

flected in the National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005) eschews any pretension to “co

mand” of the maritime commons, calling instead for enhanced maritime domain awaren

and an active, layered defense, together with measures to reduce vulnerability and impr

consequence management readiness.

In a workshop of distinguished economists, I confess my lack of competency on all matters 

volving the dismal science and will instead focus my remarks on some of the salient legal iss

raised by the title of this panel—more specifically, on legal interoperability issues. On this qu

tion I am happy to report that over the past five years or so the law has adapted to our o

tragic “experience” (to quote Justice Holmes) in a number of proactive ways, in an effort to 

ticipate conflicts and eliminate them where possible. However, more work lies ahead.

Combined operations—particularly coalition operations—are one area where more remain

be done. The U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook sets the scene. It explains that

The United States often chooses to participate in operations alongside other nations. While some

of these operations are conducted within an established alliance such as NATO, others are coali

tion action. Coalition action is multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances

usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Recen

examples are Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unlike NATO opera

tions, coalition action by its nature does not have a predetermined structure or decision-making

process.

[One] disadvantage of coalition action is that it often raises significant interoperability issues tha

need to be resolved to ensure success of the operation.

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1. Charles H. Stockton Chair in International Law, U.S. Naval War College. I am indebted to Colonel Micha

Hoadley, JAGC, USA, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, for his insights into legal interoperability

issues and for alerting me to the U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook coverage of the subject; and to

Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, of the U.S. Naval War College faculty, for sharing his recent fir

hand experience on the subject.

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Interoperability issues arise for a number of reasons. First, the coalition partner may have differ

ent legal obligations, such as being signatory to a treaty to which the United States is not a party

and which the United States does not consider customary international law. Second, the United

States and the coalition partner may both be legally bound by a provision of international law, by

treaty or custom, but may interpret their obligations differently. Finally some differences may no

result from law at all, but from the application of domestic policy.2

Planning for multinational operations in the maritime commons may take one of several for

In established alliances, such as NATO, planners can address interoperability issues thro

prior agreements, such as the Allied Publication series and the NATO standardization ag

ments (STANAGs). In what is sometimes referred to as proactive, “Phase Zero” planning, 

geographic combatant commanders prepare theater security cooperation plans for their ar

of responsibility. Those plans typically call for military-military exchanges and other relati

ship-building measures with other forces in the theater, to improve military capabilities 

interoperability. Finally, there is the ad hoc planning approach, hopefully drawing on plann

models and templates.

Actual maritime security operations within the various theaters may be carried out unilaterally

established alliances, such as NATO, or by coalition actions, such as the Commander Task Fo

150 operations in the far western Indian Ocean and Red Sea approaches off the Horn of Afr

Other recent, and nongeographically specific, partnering initiatives include the Proliferation 

curity Initiative and the 1,000-ship navy concept—now called the Global Maritime Partnership

At-sea maritime operations take a variety of names, including maritime security operati

(mentioned above),4 or more specific labels, such as maritime interception operations,5 m

time interdiction operations,6 or maritime law enforcement operations.7 In some cases the le

basis for the maritime operation comes from a UN Security Council resolution or a right of in

vidual or collective self-defense, but in many of the boardings the legal basis for the “end gam

ultimately lies in the extraterritorial application of some nation’s domestic law. Regardles

the form of the cooperative arrangement, the participating states often come to the table w

divergent rule sets (legal authorities and restrictions).8 Despite the pressure of globalization 

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2. U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesv

Va.: U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2006), at pp. 527–30.

3. The U.S. Navy CNO has called the 1,000-ship navy “a network of international navies, coast guards,

maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers and local law enforcement, all working together.”

4. Maritime security operation missions include ensuring freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and 

protection of ocean resources, and securing the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, dru

trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne

immigration. Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Naval Operations Conce

(2006).

5. U.S. Navy, Maritime Interception Operations, NTTP 3-07.11/CGP 3-07.11 (2003) (defining “interception

the “legitimate action of denying suspect vessels access to specific ports for import or export of prohibited

goods to or from a specified nation or nations, for purposes of peacekeeping or to enforce imposed

sanctions.”). “Expanded” MIO refers to interception operations in the absence of a collective security

measure.

6. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, Jt. Pub. 3-03 (1997), whic

defines interdiction as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential

before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.” Within the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime

Security framework, interdiction is described as “actions taken to divert, delay, intercept, board, detain, o

destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, people, and cargo.” “Interdiction” is the favored term in most NA

countries. It is also used in the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles.” On th

other hand, it is disfavored by some states, particularly China.

7. Maritime law enforcement operations refer to activities by officials with the legal authority to detect crimes

apprehend violators, and gather the evidence necessary to support prosecution.

8. For the lawyer, legal interoperability questions are typically analyzed under the “conflict of laws” framewo

Proactive lawyers seek to avoid conflicts by, for example, working to unify and/or harmonize the laws, or 

least being clear about which law will apply to a given transaction, through insertion of a choice of law cla

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harmonize the law and make it more uniform, differences continue to exist, whether on mat

of trade, immigration, maritime crime, security cooperation, disclosure of intelligence, or the 

terpretation or application of law of the sea or law of armed conflict issues. As a result, the p

ticipating states must confront several recurring legal interoperability issues. For this synop

several issues are highlighted for possible discussion:

• Rules of Engagement

• Rules regarding the right to exercise self-defense

• Targeting issues (i.e., what is a “military objective”; proportionality issues)

• Use of certain means and methods (landmines, chemical riot control agents)

• Status and treatment of detainees

• Status of armed forces (SOFAs, VFAs, Article 98 agreements)

• Access to information and intelligence.

Theater security cooperation plans can help avoid or mitigate some of the common le

interoperability problems, but they have never received the funding needed to reach their 

potential. In some cases, the divergent rule sets can in fact be harmonized into “combi

forces” rules, as in the case of Combined Rules of Engagement (CROE). Another commo

used approach to work through or around such issues calls for the participating states to col

tively prepare a “legal matrix” that displays the key elements of their respective rule sets and 

veals any variations. The difference in the two approaches is an important one: in the first, 

relevant rules are in fact harmonized (often, however, by reducing the rules to the least co

mon denominator); in the latter, national differences are maintained, but once collected 

the matrix by the operational commander they are at least available for communication to 

participating units, though classification issues and other objections might impede the full r

ization of that goal.

The U.S. Naval War College, with the support of its International Law Department and the a

iated Naval Reserve components, has taken the initiative to address a number of these re

ring issues, by, for example, sponsoring flag- and general-officer-level courses for Combi

Forces Maritime Component Commanders, where interoperability issues can be analyzed 

minimized as much as possible; and by its work on drafting model CROE and on collecting 

clarifying the discordant laws governing maritime exclusionary zones. One subject where ad

tional efforts to promote legal interoperability are needed is in intelligence matters.9

Legal Interoperability on Intelligence Matters

It has become commonplace to criticize the intelligence community for its secretive, sto

piped approach, which, as famously described by the U.S. 9/11 Commission, impedes t

ability to “connect the dots.” While such criticism might be politically popular, it revea

shameful disregard for the underlying legal and policy issues, to say nothing of the practical 

itations that militate against wider disclosure of some classified information. Nevertheles

number of recent studies, presidential directives, statutes, and international agreements h

called for greater intelligence-sharing. Not surprisingly, the 9/11 Commission was among 

first. Congress soon followed, demanding greater intelligence-sharing in the 2004 Intellige

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9. The author is indebted to Captain Santiago R. Neville, USN, the RADM Edwin Layton Chair in Intelligenc

the Naval War College, and to Captain Maureen Neville, USN, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Naval

Intelligence Detachment at NWC, for their helpful suggestions on intelligence interoperability issues.

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Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The new catchphrase admonishes that the old “need

know” restriction must give way to a “need-to-share” approach, an approach that’s incre

ingly facilitated by the policy directing members of the intelligence community to “write for 

lease.”10 In 2003, the states participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative agreed t

Statement of Interdiction Principles that provides a framework for intelligence-sharing 

counterproliferation operations. In 2004, the G-8 states entered into an agreement that ca

upon the member states to pass legislation if necessary to ensure that terrorism information 

be shared internally with police and prosecutors and externally with other countries. The 

agreement also recommended that each state ensure it can legally use a variety of “specia

vestigative techniques,” such as wiretaps, audio and visual surveillance, and interception 

electronic communications.

The call for greater intelligence-sharing in some areas of common concern and concerted 

tion carried over into the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting pla

One of those supporting plans lays out the means to achieve greater Maritime Domain Awa

ness (MDA); another provides the framework for Global Maritime Intelligence Integration. 

any discussion of sharing must give careful consideration to the applicable legal limits on do

so. It is almost certainly the case that some components of the MDA system, or informatio

the MDA system, will not be disclosable to foreign nations under existing law. Doing so may 

veal sources and methods in a way that may cost the lives of the former and the long-term ef

tiveness of the latter. Within the United States, we must also grapple with the legal restricti

on providing proprietary information and information obtained through intelligence chan

to law enforcement agencies—a question only partly addressed by the Foreign Intelligence S

veillance Act, USA PATRIOT Act, and Maritime Operational Threat Response plan. This is 

the forum to explore these technical and partly classified interoperability issues. Let me just 

that more work might be needed, either to clarify the restrictions or to at least avoid unreas

able expectations on the part of coalition partners.

Let me close with a short list of some of the recurring intelligence- and law-rela

interoperability issues that coalition commanders and operators and their intelligence offi

and lawyers should be prepared to address and respond to (I would be happy to discuss an

these with the distinguished panelists):

• A request to disclose the factual basis for invoking the right of self-defense (i.e., proo

an imminent threat) to the UN Security Council, a regional security body, or a coali

partner.

• A request by a partner state to disclose the basis for concluding that a potential ta

constitutes a “military objective,” or that striking that target would not violate 

prohibition on “disproportionate” use of force.

• A request by a partner state (or flag state) to disclose the basis for a boarding, sea

seizure, or arrest, where the governing legal standard is “reasonable basis to believ

“probable cause to believe,” or something similar.

• A request from a partner state (or an international criminal tribunal) to disc

intelligence for use in a criminal prosecution. In U.S. prosecutions, this issue is addres

in the less-than-pellucid or -predictable Classified Information Procedures Act.

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10. See, e.g., Director of Central Intelligence, Directive 8/1 (June 4, 2004) (defining “write to release” as: “A

general approach whereby intelligence reports are written in such a way that sources and methods are

disguised so that the report can be distributed to customers or intelligence partners at lower security levels

essence, write-to-release is proactive sanitization that makes intelligence more readily available to a more

diverse set of customers. The term encompasses a number of specific implementation approaches, includ

sanitized leads and Tearline reporting.”).

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Conclusion

In a workshop of legal experts from around the world, held in this same room last week, 94 p

cent of the experts stated that they believe future U.S. Navy operations will be “more co

bined.” Assuming they are right, the effectiveness of future international cooperation 

securing the maritime commons will require us to continue to work toward resolving le

interoperability questions. Experience has shown that information-sharing not only serve

improve security-related decision making, it can also be an effective trust-building measure

though there are plainly good reasons to facilitate timely and effective information-sharin

many cases, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that increased disclosure might com

the expense of the long-term effectiveness of the intelligence community. The solution to le

interoperability issues is not to eliminate every national restriction, but rather to carefully rev

the disclosure laws and policies, to ensure any unnecessary restrictions on disclosure are 

moved, to follow the write-for-release policy when drafting intelligence products as much 

possible, and then to ensure that our maritime security partners understand the remaining 

strictions on disclosure and the reasons for them.

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Addendum

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International Cooperation in Securing the

Maritime Commons

A Food for Thought Paper Based on Practical Experience in

International Cooperation

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt

German Navy (Retired)

Introduction

It is of utmost importance to define the political aim that should be achieved by the anticipa

international cooperation. The already elaborated twin goals economic prosperity and secu

are providing excellent guidance on the so-important operational level. But what we need, t

is an overarching object for our efforts. That is due to the recognition that we are dealing wi

process-orientated matter.

Globalization is an economic phenomenon—but with numerous various aspects. Taking th

aspects seriously, we need a broader approach, as given by the above-mentioned twin go

So my suggestion is to use “Freedom of the Seas” as the political aim. Maritime power—for 

ample, the 1000-ship navy—is the operational level. In accordance with Alfred Thayer Mah

the three pillars of maritime power are naval power, a powerful merchant navy, including 

ability and capability for sea exploitation and environmental protection, and, as the third pi

the control of strategic points, today called “choke points” or “hot spots.” Mahan came to 

conclusion that these are the preconditions of the maritime power of one single nation. I th

they are valid in international operation as well.

Factors Creating the Framework for Cooperation

First of all, we are dealing simultaneously with national states and independent internationa

stitutions and networks.

Secondly, the exploitation of the whole richness of the sea is already an important process 

the maritime agenda. It includes trade and industrial and scientific activities. It will increas

importance.

Thirdly, the environmental point of view is already a valuable cause for international coope

tion. It will increase its influence on all kinds of international activities, mostly in the field of e

nomic development. I think we should give this factor a lot of attention.

Last but not least, it is very valuable to take the cultural and/or intellectual dimension into 

count. There are various approaches possible. I want to put my focus upon two of them: firs

the fact that the free movement of people and ideas is playing an active part in the developm

of the hearts and minds of people; and secondly, that different mentalities are playing a m

role in all kinds of international cooperation. This difference has to be accepted and to be ta

as a given. As an example, I want to underline the different ways of executing leadership 

board our ships and in our staffs.

As a summary it is very obvious that three out of the four factors are directly or indirectly rela

to economic prosperity as the major driving force of our global world.

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The fourth one is what I call the “software” of any kind of international cooperation. It is cr

ing a possible link between various mentalities—ways of thinking and solving tasks.

So it is not all about money; it is about people as well.

Practical Experience

Thinking about where we, the military, come from, we know that international cooperation 

been happening in some parts of the world for decades. And this cooperation is still ongoin

we are discussing our way ahead.

NATO was established in 1949 as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as an organisa

focused on the Atlantic Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been executing land op

ations. With the diminishing of SACLANT, the navy’s guardian in Norfolk, Virginia, ther

only limited promotion for the maritime origin of the alliance. But it is still the only and most 

veloped organisation for international cooperation in the maritime commons. NATO unit

all sizes had been a “fleet in being” during the Cold War and are now “fleets in operation,” 

posing the threat caused by terrorists. Almost 60 years of cooperation have developed a h

standard of common understanding, common procedures, and a high degree of standard

tion. It is a true story of success.

But at the same time areas of concern have become apparent, too: the technical gap, the dim

ishing influence of the smaller nations (navies), the still-existing different leadership policies 

the perception of a lot of nations, inside and outside of NATO, that the alliance is a purely U

led organisation. This makes some initiatives for more and deeper international coopera

more difficult than they should be.

The experience of NATO can and should be used as a tool for shaping internatio

cooperation.

Another example is the Partnership for Peace program. Established in the early 199

colocated but separate from NATO Headquarters, it offered a very comprehensive train

schedule. This schedule has been shaped to the different demands of the participating nati

(navies) and worked for cooperation as well as for integration. It has worked well in the reg

of northern Europe. It cannot be used as a blueprint for other regions, but it is offering a lo

very successful advice for our way ahead.

The Mediterranean Dialogue is another way to establish links for a closer cooperation. The si

tion is different from that in northern Europe, and it needs more patience and preparation 

reach the goal. Some of the basic work has been done by NATO’s Southern Command in 

ples. This has been further taken by the regional seapower symposium hosted by the Ita

navy every second year. The focus was on regional cooperation to produce a white shipp

plot. Another topic was the coordination and cooperation inside the territorial waters of the 

ferent North African nations in order to achieve a better picture of the situation.

Even a real-world operation such as “Enduring Freedom” is a proof of the willingness and a

ity for cooperation in a certain region in order to achieve a common goal.

My experience in maritime-related matters from the EU’s perspective is very limited. But th

due to the fact that the EU has not been focused on maritime matters, and still is not in secu

the maritime commons. The “Green Paper” published in June 2006 about “The Future M

time Policy: Taking Stock of the Process” is a very encouraging approach and offers the opp

tunity to include naval options to the concept. A quotation from a speech given by a membe

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the European Commission responsible for fishery and maritime affairs, Mr. Joe Borg, prese

an inside look into the commission’s activities:

A new holistic maritime policy is needed, because globalization is fast increasing its pace and

magnitude, generating more trade and economic interactions between the different regions of the

world. In these circumstances, Europe will depend even more on its seaports and its merchan

fleet, its shipyards, the marine equipment, and its logistics. This is why the commission in its stra

tegic objectives for the current mandate has recognised the need, within the context of the Lisbon

Strategy for growth and jobs, of a thriving maritime economy.

Meetings like the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commanders Course for flag-le

officers, which took place here at the Naval War College in September this year, are unique 

cilitators for increasing cooperation. Continuing with this region-oriented approach and ke

ing in mind the different national interests is the first step in creating the global awareness th

needed for the realisation of the twin goals. In addition to what I have laid down above, th

are a lot of international security agreements, bilateral as well as multilateral, that can be use

promote the vision of the 1000-ship navy and bring it to reality.

When I look at my catalogue of questions guiding me through my practical experience, I w

to add some information of a different kind than the above-mentioned.

It is always a very crucial and sensitive task to manage the decision of who will be in the lea

any kind of international operation, seminar, or training. In our anticipated cooperation, 

not always appropriate to link the overall responsibility together with the effort made by the 

dividual participating nation. A well-balanced method is required and must be decided at 

of the flag-level courses.

Funding is a crucial issue in all kinds of international cooperation. The participation 

nonparticipation of a nation is not alone a question of willingness or of political approval bu

ten a question of resources available. But common training is a prerequisite for achieving 

goal and developing a mutual understanding in operating together.

For the time being, the U.S. command structure is sufficient for the organisation and the ne

sary administration. In addition to this, the already-existing seapower symposia will be used 

important places for discussions and decisions. And there is an urgent need to estab

seapower symposia in all regions of the world. The International Seapower Symposium tak

place here at the Naval War College should be seen as the forum to deal with all matters that 

related to the step-by-step realisation of the 1000-ship navy.

Conclusion

A strong motivation to participate in this international effort is needed. A precondition for p

ticipation is a common assessment, based upon trust and confidence, about the threat on 

hand and information management on the other hand.

Including representatives from international and national organisations dealing with the s

with emphasis on coastguard-like organisations, the merchant navy, and international m

time law, will serve the idea of a broader approach.

And last but not least: tasking a professional company to develop a media campaign to work 

the different regional seapower symposia will enhance acceptance and understanding ins

and outside the military.

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Economics and maritime strategy are very much related to each other. In the discussion ab

what is the important factor of our globalization process, economics are, in the perception 

the peoples, the only factor.

In international cooperation at sea, answering the question how we can achieve our goal is a 

about trust and confidence. And it is about the willingness and ability of the big actors in the 

tual maritime commons to create a situation where, on one hand, a strong leadership is provid

but on the other hand the smaller actors have a fair chance to bring their ideas and abilities

cluding responsibility and leadership, into the process of establishing the 1000-ship navy.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:13 PM
Panel V: International Cooperation in

Securing the Maritime Commons

Summary of Discussion

Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn

Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director

National Security Decision Making Department

U.S. Naval War College

The maritime commons is defined as that oceanic part of the globe beyond the territorial sea

nation states, including the airspace above. Other “global commons” include Antarctica 

space. Because they are “common,” it is a misnomer to suggest that they can be “command

in any meaningful sense—they can only be kept secure. This notion dates back to Grotius, w

recognized that states needed access to the sea for survival and that rule sets needed to be fa

ioned and observed in everyone’s best interest. While the environment cannot be command

vessels using these commons can be regulated by the state “flagging” the vessel. Much of 

day’s “nontraditional” threats stem from the inability or unwillingness of flagging states to e

cute these responsibilities. This requires international intervention.

The discussion of international maritime cooperation must be driven by the rule sets of the 

quired maritime security missions. The range of possible options runs from law enforcement 

tivities, such as stopping illegal fishing, up to the military mission of defending the homel

against an assault from the sea. Many missions of maritime security traditionally fall to a coa

force (coast guard), and others to a national navy. The determination of the dividing line 

tween these two tasks is one of the most difficult tasks facing nations. Nations should emp

the concept of “comparative advantage” when making this determination, while recogniz

that there will be situations in which the legally empowered force (coast guard) will not have 

wherewithal, and vice versa. Incidents such as the armed attack of a merchant vessel or 

closing of an important strait are representative of those needing close attention, since it is 

entirely obvious into whose purview they fall.

Although most threats in both areas emanate from the land, the requirement for maritime se

rity forces is not trivial. Upwards of 600,000 vessels ply the world’s waterways, and they are 

mendous targets for terrorists and pirates.

A first principle must always be that international law remains supreme—the Spanish Mar

who took down the North Korean vessel with missiles being shipped to Yemen were ultima

not as powerful as international law. Yemen received the missiles.

Another dilemma facing maritime planners is that different nations establish different manda

and rules of engagement for their forces. Little can be done to make these interpretations u

form; however, the United Nations continues to receive high levels of legitimacy from all 

tional bodies, empowering all its subsidiary bodies to continue to press for universal standa

A recent conference of legal experts concluded that the need for regional and multilateral 

enforcement efforts at sea would grow significantly. The world’s navies have developed “wo

arounds” that take some of the burden off structured international law; however, what is clea

that today’s international regime cannot stand down from its current approach before there 

more viable alternative.

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Actual international maritime cooperation has been moving in a positive and realistic direc

for some time. The best modalities of international maritime cooperation are the extant fra

works and institutions. Using them to build even sturdier frameworks should be encourage

a step-by-step approach. The pinnacle consultative body along these lines should be the U

Naval War College’s biennial International Seapower Symposium (ISS), in which the leader

virtually all the world’s navies (and many coast guards) assemble to discuss international m

time cooperation. In addition, there has been a proliferation of regional seapower sympo

(RSS) (for example, those led by Italy in the Mediterranean and Singapore in Southeast A

applying these practices in a regional format. The U.S. command structure of regional comb

ant commands has the capacity to assist all regional seapower symposia while not presumin

take the lead. While this movement should keep an eye to the region, there would be no sub

tute for the nation state as the fundamental building block. National sovereignty must rem

the guiding principle.

Since active membership in these regional arrangements would be situational (rather than p

manent and enduring), the ability to integrate smoothly and seamlessly into the regional str

ture is crucial. The likelihood of “coalitions of the willing” is greater as the maritime thre

become more nontraditional rather than existential. Nations will ebb and flow into the regio

maritime arrangements. This is to be encouraged and expected.

There is also a need to establish baselines and benchmarks in maritime security training at 

regional level. The Theater Security Cooperation plans of the United States could set train

standards. Then we ought to measure national training levels so that we neither overtrain 

undertrain participating navies and coast guards. Additionally, we should take into acco

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and bring them actively into the training regime. E

ciency should be a watchword, because many navies are driven by resource limitations. 

must maximize the use of the Internet to disseminate the rich ideas produced by the ISSes 

RSSes and ensure that we eliminate all obstacles to participation.

The U.S. Navy’s new Naval Operational Concept was designed to open as wide as possible 

range of missions of maritime security. It was written by all three American sea services—

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—with an eye toward maximizing cooperation activ

with allies and searching for ways to foreclose the options of maritime adversaries. Co

guards must necessarily be treated as equal partners in this endeavor.

Some theaters will necessarily be more advanced than others in international maritime coop

tion. In the European area, NATO has long held the preeminent role and has devised a unive

set of standards. While the European Union (EU) has played no role to date, it is showing 

creased interest in adding to maritime security and domain awareness in the European theate

An example of a mission in need of universal standard principles is the rescue and repatria

of refugees at sea. While all mariners consider it their sacred duty to rescue survivors at sea, 

tion states adjacent to the incident show no uniform willingness to provide these victims s

harbor. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has done much work in this area, 

nations have yet to take on this formal obligation.

Technological tools are being used widely and effectively. In particular, the Automatic Iden

cation System (AIS) is required for all vessels exceeding 300 tons. This is the maritime equ

lent of IFF. However, while some of the information it provides is mandatory, others (such 

cargo) are optional. Thus, unless there are universal mandatory standards, its utility can be 

ited. Extending the AIS to smaller vessels can also be a huge benefit, since 90 percent of all v

sels are smaller than 300 tons. For example, Singapore requires all vessels to have AIS insta

and is much more capable of detecting the “anomalies” that require closer observation. T

world needs to move in this direction.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 2:26:01 PM
Working Discussion: Findings and

Recommendations for Maritime Strategy

Moderator:

Ambassador Paul D. Taylor

Senior Strategic Researcher, Strategic Research Department, U.S. Naval War Colle

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:15 PM
Working Discussion: Findings and

Recommendations for Maritime Strategy

Ambassador Paul D. Taylor

Senior Strategic Researcher, Strategic Research Department

U.S. Naval War College

In this session, participants used networked computers equipped with Web-IQTM softwar

register anonymously their responses to five broad questions related to the themes treated 

the previous panels. Their written comments were displayed and provided the basis for oral 

cussion. The highlights of the written and oral comments in response to each of the questi

follow.

Question 1. How can U.S. maritime strategy contribute to U.S.

grand strategy over the next two to three decades?

The maritime strategy should focus on issues that transcend short-term politics. It should se

for example, to make the connection between economic and physical security. In a globali

world, both opportunities and threats are heavily maritime in nature. Prosperity depends on 

cure maritime transportation and healthy fisheries and marine environment, and homeland 

curity cannot be assured without acting beyond the shoreline.

Participants saw many opportunities opening for a fresh look at strategy: a new secre

general at the United Nations, a change of leadership in the U.S. Congress coming in Janu

2007, and a new U.S. administration taking office in January 2009. The new administra

will have to publish a new National Security Strategy within its first eighteen months. All th

openings give the Chief of Naval Operations and the commandants of the Marine Corps 

the Coast Guard the chance to have a major influence on a new direction, not only for marit

strategy but for grand strategy as well.

The preparation of a new maritime strategy also presents an opportunity to reunite the sea 

vices with the country and to restore appreciation of the United States as a maritime natio

can also make the point that U.S. grand strategy is maritime, because it concerns how 

United States will use the sea to achieve its goals. The United States cannot affect the plac

wants to influence without using the sea. For the United States to be a land power anywh

but in North America, it must also be a sea power.

Question 2. How can economic and security strategies be

formulated and executed to maximize the outcomes in both

domains?

Economics and security may not be distinct domains. Broader than defense, security inclu

economic, energy, and environmental security. A constant of U.S. economic strategy has b

its emphasis on open trade and investment, and security strategy can support that objectiv

should do so in a way that avoids unnecessary interference with the market.

Just as security is necessary for markets to function and for the economies of the United Sta

and its commercial partners to flourish, healthy economic performance creates the resour

needed for the forces that provide maritime security. Globalization of manufacturing and 

search and development is a recent phenomenon with security implications. Similarly, 

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:15 PM
economic policy that results in large amounts of U.S. sovereign debt being held by fore

states may affect U.S. security by reducing freedom of action.

While globalization generally increases economic prosperity, it is not without its costs. In ad

tion to causing economic dislocations, globalization can conflict with cultural and social valu

especially in traditional societies. Some of these negative effects can be mitigated by stren

ening institutions that prevent abuses, like banking supervision and the rule of law genera

Organizationally, the U.S. government is not well structured to integrate economic and secu

considerations. The agencies primarily responsible for economics, Treasury, Commerce, 

the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, talk only rarely with the agencies principally char

with security, namely Defense, State, and Homeland Security. The National Security Cou

has not functioned well as a coordinating body to bring the work of the two groups toget

More movement of professional personnel from agency to agency could facilitate the coord

tion of complex strategies.

Question 3. What are the implications for maritime strategy of

rising economic powers, e.g., China and India?

As they continue to grow economically, both China and India will increase their depende

on the maritime domain to transport their exports and import energy and other raw mater

This factor can provide the basis for cooperation with the United States, emphasizing comm

interests and shared responsibilities for the security of seas.

Several participants opined that China and India would find it difficult to cooperate on m

time security because they had many areas of friction and tension. China’s rivalry with 

United States could also hinder cooperation, and China’s growing economic ties with ot

Asian nations could result in a loss of U.S. access to bases in the region. In this event, Guam 

Pearl Harbor would become increasingly important and the United States might have to 

crease its reliance on aircraft carriers. India may not be the natural strategic partner of 

United States that some have hoped. Even if the two countries share interests, improvemen

their relationship requires patience and difficult negotiation. Both China and India see their 

as naturally related to a decline of the United States.

Maritime strategy needs to recognize the unique demands of different regions. In contras

East Asia, the greatest need in West Africa is probably protection of fisheries and other asset

exclusive economic zones—EEZs. Also, it is important to recognize the importance of other 

gions beyond Asia, for example, Latin America and Russia.

While many participants stressed the need to work with emerging powers to persuade them 

adopt a cooperative approach to maritime strategy, one suggested that success would dep

on the willingness of emerging powers to accommodate themselves to a global economic 

tem led by the United States. He commented that the difficulty Germany had working wi

the Pax Britannia late in the nineteenth century was not an encouraging precedent. Another 

pert noted that China and India had already bought into the global system, and not all the 

portant institutions were dominated by the United States in any case.

Question 4. How can a maritime strategy integrate responses t

traditional threats from states and nontraditional threats from

nonstate actors?

Participants suggested two general approaches to dealing with these two categories of thre

One was a balanced fleet with multipurpose forces and adaptable and flexible sailors 

marines. The other was a bimodal navy, with one part focused on one type of threat and 

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:15 PM
other on the other type. Responding to traditional threats may require combat. Conversel

key requirement in dealing with nontraditional threats is sustainability, because the effort m

have to go on for years.

A good place to start in designing the maritime strategy would be to parse out who would be 

sponsible for any type of threat. Is a problem primarily one of law enforcement at sea, for exa

ple, in which case the Coast Guard should be front and center? If it is a land issue, the Ma

Corps should have the lead among maritime forces.

In the case of terrorism, planners should focus their attention on weapons of mass destruct

The world may have to live with certain terrorist activities, but shipping WMD by sea canno

tolerated. The maritime equivalent of air traffic control could help in this effort.

Question 5. What do our friends and allies expect from U.S.

maritime strategy, and what can the United States expect from

them?

The United States cannot by itself do what is needed to execute a maritime strategy. Theref

it must necessarily find ways to work with other countries.

Everyone should expect each state to act in its own best interests. This approach implies a h

degree of cooperation among countries whose interests overlap. To facilitate this process, 

United States needs to be inclusive and sensitive to the particular approaches of less fam

maritime partners, for example, Pakistan in CTF-50. Often it would be a mistake for the Un

States to speak of leading a maritime coalition or even setting the agenda. Tsunami relief s

ceeded because it was a self-organizing and mutually supporting humanitarian effort.

The United States needs to hear out its friends and partners. The country shares a huge co

monality of interests with other countries, but U.S. officials sometimes kill dialogue by emp

sizing the war on terror, which some others do not see as a war. NATO’s Operation Ac

Endeavor has succeeded because, even though it has counterterrorism and counterprolife

tion objectives, naval forces are expected to do something about illegal immigration and d

trafficking. The operation has fostered cooperation by dealing with interoperability and co

dence building.

The International Seapower Symposium and regional seapower symposia provide useful f

for developing cooperation among navies based on shared interests. Combatant command

are also in a good position to develop cooperative maritime activities within their areas of 

sponsibility. The Chiefs of Defense Conference in the Pacific region has been a good vehicle 

this coordination and might be strengthened by creation of a permanent secretariat. In 

Americas, the U.S. Southern Command has worked with countries in the region to develop 

tional military strategies, which provide a strategic rationale for organizing secu

cooperation.

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:15 PM
Concluding Discussion: Findings and

Recommendations for Maritime Strategy

Moderator:

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics, U.S. Naval War College

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:17 PM
Concluding Discussion: Findings and

Recommendations for Maritime Strategy

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

U.S. Naval War College

In this session, participants were asked to suggest areas of research that should be explored 

ther by the Navy as it develops a future maritime strategy. These research topics will info

multiple lines of research supported by the Navy through future workshops, conferences, 

research projects.

A most useful area of study is energy. The overlap of energy security, national security, and 

tional strategy is not always considered in depth. If you focused on energy strategy and m

time strategy, you would have a very interesting project. This involves a large numbe

countries throughout the world.

Different consuming countries have adopted different strategies for securing their energy. In

and China are “pressing every button” they can to secure energy. They are using many wa

since energy is so important to sustaining economic growth. At their level of developmen

1 percent rate of growth in energy supplies equates to a 1 percent rate of growth in their GD

they cannot secure increasing amounts of energy, then the rate of growth of their econom

will slow. This raises a political issue: how does a nation explain to itself that it cannot get all 

energy that it needs or wants? A useful line of research is the study of the internal political d

sion-making process used within a nation to develop its energy strategy. A comparative st

of China, India, Japan, and others would be revealing.

You need to go beyond the study of just a few consuming countries. You need the perspect

of both consumers and producers. At a recent conference in Istanbul it was striking how ene

security means different things to different nations. It is important to understand and recon

these competing definitions. Within the consumer group, for example, there are two compe

definitions. Countries like China want to lock up supplies physically through upstream eq

investments in the energy supply chain. In contrast, the American idea is to get oil to the ma

and let it then flow based on market forces.

This workshop purposely did not have a panel explicitly dealing with energy because sev

follow-on workshops will be devoted to this most important issue. The Naval War College 

hold a conference on “Maritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy” on 6–7 Decem

2006. In early 2007 there will be a workshop that will include energy issues and maritime st

egy. The suggestions made here will be very helpful.

The environment and resources in general are another set of important issues. Climate cha

is being taken more seriously, and energy is an important aspect of it. The many contribu

factors need to be dealt with in a more holistic fashion. The energy strategy study done by 

Rocky Mountain Institute a few years back is an example of such an approach.

Drought is a major concern in the Asia Pacific region, including Australia and China as we

elsewhere. Food security is tied in as more crops are potentially diverted to biofuels. Water in

curity is a very big issue in China. Water insecurity should be the focus of a sepa

conference.

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An entire workshop should be devoted to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

maritime strategy. Investment in nuclear power plants as part of various nations’ energy st

egies has proliferation implications. At a recent international law workshop held here, m

participants expressed concern over the future viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regi

How many scofflaws will it take to weaken international cooperation and take down the nuc

nonproliferation regime?

While we talked about international cooperation here, it is equally important to strengthen 

teragency cooperation within the U.S. government. How do we get out of the age

stovepipes so that all elements of power—diplomatic, information, military, and econo

(DIME)—are brought to bear in a coordinated fashion? Recent proposals to apply the conc

of Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation to all agencies is worth exploring. It was suggested 

you have to get into the personnel system right down to the individual. Until incentives ar

place to cooperate, bosses will not be supportive and may even penalize cooperation. The s

change within the military toward joint assignments since Goldwater-Nichols, where now s

assignments are mandatory for promotion and sought after as career-enhancing, was cited 

positive example.

Development and security is another important research area. While we discussed ways to d

with threats and challenges (the supply side), it was suggested that we need to look at the 

mand reduction side. This means greater focus on all instruments of power. Many of the c

lenges emanate from the need for social, political, and economic development. Two examp

are crop substitution in Colombia being hampered by the lack of roads and infrastructure to 

legal products to market, and the ring road in Afghanistan.

Additional suggestions are bringing together all the major maritime participants from big c

tainer shipping companies to port authorities; and exploring ways to empower the Navy 

building partnership capacities through changes in policy, legislation, or funding.

Finally, it is all about resources. Can a single naval force structure handle the full range of m

sions, or is there a need for more specialization and a division of labor? What is the f

criterion for deciding how much is enough?

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Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:17 PM
Concluding Remarks

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

U.S. Naval War College

During this workshop we have explored how a maritime strategy could further the twin goa

economic prosperity and security, two objectives that most nations of the world seek and sh

in common.

Our intent was to provide a collegial forum for the exchange of ideas and perspectives 

would create a solid research foundation for the development of a maritime strategy. You h

provided us with a very rich menu of ideas and concepts, as well as many pragmatic sugg

tions that will be of value to the Navy as it formulates a maritime strategy in support of the U

grand strategy.

I want to thank all of you for the research you did in preparing your papers and for y

thoughtful contributions throughout this workshop. Your papers and the extensive discussi

we had within the focus area of each panel provide many valuable insights and significant p

spectives. We hope that your work here will provide you with the building blocks for further 

logue, research, and future publications.

We will quickly produce a monograph that will include all of your papers and summaries of 

discussion throughout the workshop. We expect to have this monograph available online 

the general public in early December. (Our website is http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ns

Rugerpapers.htm.) Printed copies will be available in early 2007. (Send request for printed c

ies to the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics at richmond.lloy

nwc.navy.mil.)

We will keep you informed of follow-on workshops and conferences that will be of professio

interest to you and will benefit from your participation.

Again, thank you so very much for the extensive work you did in preparing for and participa

in this workshop.

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Participant Biographies

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, USN

President, U.S. Naval War College

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Off

Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to U

Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Comman

Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in Franc

the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master’s degrees in public administra

(finance) from Harvard and in national security studies and strategy from the Naval War C

lege, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 4

he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to 

staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy

speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 6

He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten mon

later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the U

Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destro

Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Le

Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of sta

the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a 

vision chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the J

Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission area and the Abraham Linc

Carrier Strike Group. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legisla

Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command 

Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser Destroyer Group 3 in Aug

2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.

Professor Craig H. Allen

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law

U.S. Naval War College

Professor Craig H. Allen is the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Na

War College, and the Judson Falknor Professor of Law, University of Washington, Sea

Washington. Professor Allen joined the University of Washington School of Law faculty 

1996, following his retirement from the U.S. Coast Guard. His teaching and research inter

include maritime and international law, national and homeland security law, and constitutio

law issues in the conduct of international relations. He is a licensed master mariner, a fellow 

the Nautical Institute and the Royal Institute of Navigation, and a member of the U.S. Marit

Law Association and the U.S. Navigation Safety Advisory Council. Professor Allen is on 

board of editors of Ocean Development and International Law and authored Farwell’s Ru

of the Nautical Road (Naval Institute Press, 2005). His forthcoming book Marit

Counterproliferation Operations and the Law will be published by Praeger in early 2007. H

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on leave from the University of Washington for the 2006–2007 academic year while serving 

the faculty of the Naval War College.

Commander Alan L. Boyer, USN

Military Professor

National Security Decision Making Department, U.S. Naval War College

Commander Alan Boyer is a 1987 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a surface war

officer. He teaches strategy, security, and force planning to mid- and senior-grade U.S. and 

ternational military officers and mid-grade U.S. government civilian personnel. Comman

Boyer also conducts research on international security issues, military technology, energy, C

tral Asian and European affairs, globalization, and economic statecraft. He was a governm

adviser to the 2006 Defense Science Board Summer Study on Technology Vectors. His la

research project was on the challenge of maritime security in the Mediterranean. Comman

Boyer’s recent work includes “U.S. Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Risks, Ends, and Mean

Naval War College Review (Winter 2006) and “Recreating the Silk Road: The Challenge 

Overcoming Transaction Costs,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (November 2006

Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program

Brookings Institution

Stephen Philip Cohen has been senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Inst

tion since 1998. In 2004 he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of 

five hundred most influential people in the field of foreign policy.

Professor Cohen was a faculty member at the University of Illinois from 1965 to 1998. Fr

1992–93 he was Scholar-in-Residence at the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, and from 1985–

a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, where he dealt w

South Asia. He has taught at Andhra University (India), Keio University (Tokyo), 

Georgetown University, and now teaches in the South Asian program of Johns Hopkins Sch

of Advanced International Studies.

Dr. Cohen regularly appears on American national radio and television, and many foreign 

dio and television services. He has served on numerous study groups examining Asia sp

sored by the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Foundation, and 

National Bureau of Asian Research; he is currently a member of the National Academy of 

ences Committee on International Security and Arms Control and a trustee of the Public E

cation Center. Dr. Cohen was the cofounder and chair of the workshop on Secu

Technology and Arms Control for younger South Asian and Chinese strategists, held for 

past ten years in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and China, and was a founding member of the 

search Committee of the South Asian strategic organization, the Regional Centre for Secu

Studies, Colombo.

Dr. Cohen has written, coauthored, or edited ten books. These include The Idea of Pakis

(September 2004), India: Emerging Power (June 2001, with Japanese, Indian, Chinese, 

Taiwanese editions), The Pakistan Army (revised edition, 1998), The Indian Army (revised 

tion, 2000), the coauthored Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisi

South Asia (1995), India: Emergent Power? (2002), and Perception, Politics, and Securit

South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (2003). Edited books include Nuclear Prolifera

in South Asia (1990) and South Asia after the Cold War (1993), and a coauthored book on 

Kargil and 2002 crises is nearing completion.

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Professor Cohen received B.A. and M.A. degrees in political science from the University of C

cago, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin. He has conducted 

search in China, Britain, India, Pakistan, the former Soviet Union, and Japan. He recei

grants from several major foundations and serves as a consultant to numerous governm

agencies.

Dr. Richard N. Cooper

Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics

Harvard University

Richard N. Cooper is vice chairman of the Global Development Network and a member of 

Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Executive Panel of the U.S. C

of Naval Operations, the Aspen Strategy Group, and the Brookings Panel on Economic Ac

ity. He has served on several occasions in the U.S. government, as chairman of the Nationa

telligence Council (1995–97), Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (1977–81), Dep

Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs (1965–66), and senior staff ec

omist at the Council of Economic Advisers (1961–63). He was also chairman of the Federal 

serve Bank of Boston (1990–92). He studied at the London School of Economics as a Mars

Scholar, and he earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University.

Recent Publications

• Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment (with others)

• Macroeconomic Management in Korea, 1970–1990 (with others)

• Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy

• What the Future Holds (with others)

Rear Admiral (LH) Philip Hart Cullom, USN

Director for Strategy and Policy

OPNAV

A native of Flossmoor, Illinois, Rear Admiral Philip Hart Cullom graduated with distinc

from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979 with a bachelor’s degree in physics. He also holds a m

ter’s degree in business administration with distinction from Harvard Business School.

At sea, his first assignment, after completing the Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Training Progr

was onboard USS Truxtun as main propulsion officer and reactor training assistant. During 

tour he was named Forces Afloat Junior Officer of the Year (1984) for the Pacific Northwes

the Retired Officers’ Association. From 1989 to 1990, as Operations Officer of the USS Jess

Brown, he participated in Caribbean drug interdiction operations and joint operations w

South American navies during UNITAS XXX. Throughout Operation Desert Storm he ser

as reactor electrical assistant of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. From 1993 to 1994, as Execu

Officer of USS Mobile Bay, he participated in Operation Southern Watch in the Arabian G

During 1998 and 1999, he served as Commanding Officer USS Mitscher, deploying to 

Mediterranean, Adriatic, and North Sea. The ship was awarded the Meritorious Unit Comm

dation for its 1998 deployment and the Golden Anchor and Battle Efficiency Awards for 19

As Commander, Amphibious Squadron Three, Rear Admiral Cullom deployed in August 2

as Sea Combat Commander for the First Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG-1) in support of 

erations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

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Ashore, Rear Admiral Cullom was a shift engineer and staff training officer for the A1W nuc

prototype at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and later served as special assistant to 

Chief of Naval Operations’ Executive Panel (OP-00K). Selected as a White House Fel

(1994–1995), he served as the special assistant to Dr. Alice Rivlin, Director of the Office 

Management and Budget, working principally on policy involving national security. He w

subsequently assigned to the Joint Staff (J-8 Directorate) as a defense resource manager, 

alyzing federal and defense-wide macroeconomic and budgetary trends. Post-command

headed the Strategy and Concepts Branch (N513) on the OPNAV staff and served as dire

of Defense Policy and Arms Control for the National Security Council at the White House 

der both presidents Clinton and Bush. From late 2001 until 2003, he served as the head of O

cer Programs and Placement (PERS 424/41N) for all surface nuclear–trained officers. A

completing his major command assignment, he served as the chief of staff for Comman

Second Fleet/Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic until September 2005. In October 2005 

reported as Director, DEEP BLUE in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washingt

D.C., and in February 2006 he was assigned as the director for Strategy and Policy (N5SP

the OPNAV staff.

Rear Admiral Cullom’s personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal (

awards), Legion of Merit (three awards), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Meritori

Service Medal (two awards), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (three awar

Joint Service Achievement Medal, and Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.

Andrea J. Dew

Research Fellow

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Andrea Dew is a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affa

Ms. Dew’s research interests include anthropology, political psychology, and all aspects of 

impact of technology on society and security. Her current research focuses on space, satell

international security, and counterterrorism. Ms. Dew’s dissertation at the Fletcher Sch

Tufts University, looks at commercial remote sensing and U.S. space and security policy, 

she has co-authored a book on how to analyze modern insurgencies and nonstate arm

groups, titled Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (w

Richard H. Shultz, Columbia University Press, 2006).

Dr. Peter Dombrowski

Chairman, Strategic Research Department

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Peter Dombrowski is a professor and chair of the Strategic Research Department at the Na

War College. Previous positions include director of the Naval War College Press, co-edito

International Studies Quarterly, associate professor of political science at Iowa State Univers

and defense analyst at ANSER, Inc. Dr. Dombrowski is the author of over thirty books, artic

monographs, book chapters, and government reports. He recently completed two edited 

umes, Guns and Butter: The Political Economy of the New International Security Environm

(Lynne Reinner, 2005) and Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War Coll

Review Reader (Naval War College Press, 2005), and a book coauthored with Eugene Gh

Buying Military Transformation: Technological Innovation and the Defense Industry (Colu

bia University Press, 2006). He received his B.A. from Williams College and an M.A. and Ph

from the University of Maryland.

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Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn

Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director

National Security Decision Making Department

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Fedyszyn is the course director of the Security, Strategy, and Force course. He joined 

Naval War College faculty after a 31-year naval career, serving in six different cruisers and 

stroyers. His most recent military assignments were as Russia branch chief for the Internatio

Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and as the U.S. naval attaché to Russia. A 

mer surface warrior, he commanded the USS Normandy (CG 60) and USS William V. P

(DDG 44) and also served in numerous strategy, policy, and long-range-planning billets for 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations. He received an M.A. 

a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University and was a former member of the political science 

ulty at the U.S. Naval Academy. He specializes in NATO, naval strategy, Russian politics, 

American foreign policy.

Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt, German Navy (Retired)

During his long and distinguished career in the German Navy, Vice Admiral Feldt served in 

merous command, operational, and staff billets. He has extensive experience in the area

maritime cooperation and NATO operations. In September 2006, he was a speaker at the U

Naval War College’s inaugural Combined Forces Maritime Component Commanders cou

Prior to his retirement in 2006, he served as the Chief of German Naval Staff. He also served 

the Commander in Chief, German Fleet; Commander, Military District Command I, Coast; 

sistant Chief of Staff Operation and Logistic, HQ AFNORTHWEST; Commander, Destro

Flotilla; Chief of Division PV, FMOD; Chief of Branch, Personnel Policy Matters, Naval S

Squadron Commander of the 2nd Frigate Squadron in Wilhelmshaven; and Commanding 

ficer of the destroyer Hessen. During the first six years of his career Vice Admiral Feldt serve

the German Minecountermeasure Flotilla, three years as a Commanding Officer of a MSC

these years he gained a lot of experience in littoral warfare at the tactical and operational lev

Dr. Ellen L. Frost

Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics

Adjunct Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Univer

Dr. Ellen L. Frost is a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics and an adju

research fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Stud

(INSS). She has just written a book on the Asian integration movement and the resurgenc

maritime Asia. She is also advising INSS on the rise of China, its impact on the rest of Asia, 

its implications for U.S. policy.

Dr. Frost served as counselor to the U.S. Trade Representative (1993–95), as Deputy Assis

Secretary of Defense for International Economic and Technology Affairs (1977–81), in vari

positions in the Treasury Department (1974–77), and as a legislative assistant in the U.S. S

ate (1972–74). During the 1980s she worked in the corporate sector. She is the author of 

Richer, For Poorer: The New US-Japan Relationship (1987) and Transatlantic Trade: A Str

gic Agenda (1997), and is coeditor of The Global Century: Globalization and National Secu

(2001), as well as numerous articles. In 2002–04 she was a member of the National Comm

sion on U.S.-Indonesian Relations. She currently serves on the Public Diplomacy Council 

on the board of trustees of EnterpriseWorks/VITA, a nongovernment, nonprofit organiza

dedicated to poverty relief in the world’s poorest countries.

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Dr. Frost is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and the Internationa

stitute of Strategic Studies in London. Born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1945, she receive

Ph.D. from the Department of Government at Harvard University, where she specialized in 

politics and foreign policy of China; an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diploma

where she studied international relations and Soviet foreign policy; and a B.A. from Radc

College.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Senior Fellow, Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Rohan Gunaratna is a researcher based in Singapore whose field of specialisation is terrori

particularly Islamic terrorism, and especially groups in Southeast Asia such as Jem

Islamiyah (Indonesia) and Abu Sayyaf (the Philippines). He is the author of Inside Al-Qaeda

well as many other publications. Dr. Gunaratna has links throughout media, academic, 

policy making circles.

Dr. Gunaratna is the director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism and Polit

Violence at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies of Nanyang Technological Univer

in Singapore; a senior fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violen

University of St. Andrews, Scotland; and an honorary fellow at the International Policy Insti

for Counter Terrorism in Israel. He has also served as a consultant to the United Kingdom 

United States law enforcement communities.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly P. Houlgate, USMC

Strategic Analyst

Strategic Initiatives Group, Headquarters Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Kelly P. Houlgate is an infantry officer and has served with the 1st, 2

3rd, and 4th Marine Divisions as a Rifle Platoon Commander, Rifle Company Executive O

cer, Weapons Company Commander, Rifle Company Commander, and Reserve Infa

Company Inspector-Instructor. He has served as a tactics instructor and platoon commande

both the Basic School and Officer Candidates School. LtCol Houlgate has completed 

afloat Mediterranean deployments, first with SPMAGTF-Theodore Roosevelt, and then w

the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and has deployed to Okinawa, Kuwait, Iraq, 

malia, and off the coasts of Haiti and Bosnia.

LtCol Houlgate graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and has attended the Amphibi

Warfare School and School of Advanced Warfighting. He currently serves as a strategic ana

in Headquarters Marine Corps’ Strategic Initiatives Group.

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt

Professor of Strategy and Policy

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt is a professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, wh

he has taught since 2002. He lectures on strategy, terrorism, counterinsurgency, military tra

formation, and contemporary conflict, and also teaches an elective course on South Asian 

curity. He received his undergraduate degrees from Swarthmore College, and his Ph.D

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International Relations and Strategic Studies from Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. N

School of Advanced International Studies in 1997. Professor Hoyt taught graduate course

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service from 1998–2002, in addition to teach

for the Naval War College’s College of Distance Education’s Strategy and Policy seminar at 

Pentagon. In October 2003, he testified before two subcommittees of the House Committee 

International Relations regarding terrorism in South and Southwest Asia. Dr. Hoyt is the aut

of Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy (Routledge, 2007), which examines the 

of the military industry in the national security policies of India, Israel, and Iraq, and is be

ning work on several book-length projects, including an analysis of American military strat

in the twenty-first century and a study of the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 19

2005.

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd is a member of the Security, Strategy, and Forces faculty in the 

tional Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College and holds 

William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics. He is the director of the Latin Am

can Studies Group, which coordinates all college activities in Latin America. His research 

teaching interests include strategy and force planning, national security and economics, 

fense and international economics, and logistics. He is coeditor of nine textbooks for the Na

War College on strategy and force planning. He lectures on contemporary national defe

topics at various sites throughout the United States and South America. He chaired the Na

War College’s self-study efforts that led to congressional authorization for the college to awa

M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and to the accreditation of this degre

Dr. Mohan Malik

Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Dr. Mohan Malik is a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, 

waii. He is a trained sinologist and has research interests in Asian geopolitics and nuclear pr

eration issues. Dr. Malik is the author of Dragon on Terrorism, The Gulf War: Australia’s R

and Asian-Pacific Responses, coeditor of Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, 

editor of Australia’s Security in the 21st Century, The Future Battlefield, and Asian Defe

Policies. He has contributed numerous book chapters and published over 150 articles on As

security issues in journals such as Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, Arms Control, Australian Jou

of International Affairs, China Quarterly, China Report, China Brief, Comparative Strate

Contemporary Security Policy, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Issues and Studies, Jane’s In

ligence Review, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, The Korean Journal of Defense Analy

Orbis, Pacific Affairs, Pacifica Review, Parameters, and World Policy Journal. He has also w

ten for the International Herald Tribune, the Japan Times, the Australian, Asia Tim

YaleGlobal Online, Force, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and the Hindustan Times. Dr. Malik 

done consultancy work for the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the A

tralian Department of Defence (Army), and the UK-based Jane’s Information Group.

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Professor Don Marrin

Assistant Research Professor

War Gaming Department, U.S. Naval War College

Professor Don Marrin is an assistant research professor in the War Gaming department at 

U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he is responsible for developing 

executing war games, workshops, and symposia for naval, joint, and coalition audiences.

A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and U.S. Naval War College, Professor Marrin serve

a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy for 22 years, where he developed an expertis

C4ISR (Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 

Reconnaissance) while serving at U.S. Central Command, on the U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenho

Battle Group staff, and at the Naval War College.

Professor Marrin has served as the game director for a number of events associated with 

Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), including a series of events conducted at the Naval W

College to examine maritime-related issues following the attacks of 9/11/2001. He coordina

the seminar portion of the 17th International Seapower Symposium, conducted at the Na

War College in September 2005, and served as the moderator for the MDA panel discussion

the NCC/NSC regional symposia in Yokosuka, Japan, in October 2005 and Naples, Italy

April 2006. He is currently involved with the planning and execution of the New Maritime St

egy project being conducted on behalf of the Navy Staff (OPNAV N3/5).

Dr. John H. Maurer

Chairman, Strategy and Policy Department

U.S. Naval War College

John H. Maurer, the chairman of the Strategy and Policy department, is a graduate of Yale U

versity and holds an M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher Schoo

Law and Diplomacy. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he was executive 

tor of Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs and held the position of senior research fellow at 

Foreign Policy Research Institute. In addition, he served on the Secretary of the Navy’s a

sory committee on naval history. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbrea

the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, and naval arms control 

tween the two world wars, and a recently published study about Winston Churchill’s views 

British foreign policy and strategy. At present, he is working on several research project

study about the transformation that occurred in naval warfare during the era of the two w

wars, and a book about Winston Churchill and Great Britain’s decline as a world power

June 2001, he received the U.S. Navy’s Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Retired)

Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Center for Naval Analyses

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret.), is a vice president and director of the Ce

for Strategic Studies, a division of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)—a not-for-profit, fed

ally funded research center in Washington, D.C. The Center for Strategic Studies conducts 

search and analyses that focus on strategy, political-military issues, and regional secu

studies. The center has a particularly strong Asian security research team, known as Pro

Asia, as well as growing Middle East and European teams.

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During his navy career Rear Admiral McDevitt held four at-sea commands, including an airc

carrier battlegroup. He received a bachelor of arts degree in U.S. history from the Universit

Southern California and a master’s degree in American diplomatic history from Georgeto

University. He is also a graduate of the National War College in Washington, D.C.

He was the director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the 

Bush administration. He also served for two years as the director for Strategy, War Plans 

Policy (J-5) for US CINCPAC. Rear Admiral McDevitt concluded his 34-year active-duty car

as the commandant of the National War College in Washington, D.C.

In addition to his management and leadership responsibilities as the founder of the Center 

Strategic Studies he has been an active participant in conferences and workshops regarding 

curity issues in East Asia and has had a number of papers published in edited volumes on 

subject.

Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz

John Nicholas Brown Academic Chair of Counterterrorism and

Professor of National Security Decision Making

U.S. Naval War College

Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz completed a B.S. in criminal justice at Eastern Kentucky Univ

sity. Following Army service as a commissioned officer, Mr. Norwitz entered law enforcemen

Colorado Springs, where, as a patrol officer, his specialties included SWAT team sniper as w

as commander of the bomb squad. He joined the Naval Criminal Investigative Service in 1

and served tours in California; Washington, D.C.; Japan; and Rhode Island; specializin

counterintelligence and counterespionage. He twice received the Navy’s Meritorious Civi

Service Medal. In 2001, Mr. Norwitz graduated from the Naval War College and joined 

NSDM faculty. In addition to crafting an elective course concerning terrorism, he has been p

lished in the Naval War College Review, Military Review, Journal of Homeland Security, 

Officer Review. His scholarly work appears in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understand

the New Security Environment (McGraw-Hill, 2003); American Defense Policy, 8th ed. (Jo

Hopkins University Press, 2005); and Practical Bomb Scene Investigation (CRC Press, 200

His articles have been translated into Spanish and Portuguese for publication in South Am

ica. He lectures extensively across the country and for allied militaries on matters relating to 

rorism and homeland security. Mr. Norwitz holds the John Nicholas Brown endow

Academic Chair of Counterterrorism at the U.S. Naval War College and is presently working 

a book concerning armed groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, 

Counterinsurgency.

Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens

Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and

Professor of National Security Decision Making

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens is associate dean of Academics for Electives and Directed 

search and professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newp

Rhode Island. He specializes in the planning of U.S. strategy and forces, especially naval 

power projection forces; the political economy of national security; national security organ

tion; strategic geography; and American civil-military relations. From 1990 to 1997, Dr. Ow

was editor-in-chief of the quarterly defense journal Strategic Review and adjunct professo

International Relations at Boston University. Dr. Owens is a contributing editor to National 

view Online, writing primarily on security affairs and the character of American republi

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government, and a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. His 

ticles on national security issues have appeared in such publications as International Secu

Orbis, Armed Forces Journal, Joint Force Quarterly, The Public Interest, The Weekly S

dard, Defence Analysis, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette, Compara

Strategy, National Review, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Jerusalem Post, St. Lo

Lawyer, Washington Times, and Wall Street Journal. He is coeditor of the textbook Strat

and Force Planning, now in its third edition, for which he also wrote the chapters titled “T

Political Economy of National Security” and “Thinking About Strategy.” He currentl

working on a book for the University Press of Kentucky tentatively titled Sword of Republi

Empire: A History of U.S. Civil-Military Relation. Dr. Owens earned his Ph.D. in politics fr

the University of Dallas, a master of arts in economics from Oklahoma University, and his 

from the University of California at Santa Barbara.

Dr. Barry R. Posen

Ford International Professor of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Insti

of Technology and the director of the Security Studies program. He is also on the Execu

Committee of Seminar XXI, an educational program for senior military officers, governmen

ficials, and business executives in the national security policy community. He has written 

books, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks and The Sources of M

tary Doctrine. The latter won two awards: The American Political Science Associatio

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award, and Ohio State University’s Edward J. Furniss 

Book Award. His most recent article is “Command of the Commons: The Military Founda

of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003). Prior to coming to M

he taught at Princeton University, and he has also been post-doctoral fellow at the Center 

International Affairs at Harvard; Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fell

Rockefeller Foundation International Affairs fellow; Woodrow Wilson Center fellow, Smith

nian Institution; and most recently Transatlantic fellow, German Marshall Fund of the U.S. 

Posen’s current activities include research on European Union Defense Policy, the role of fo

in U.S. foreign policy, and innovation in the U.S. Army, 1970–1980.

Articles

“The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27–47 (.p

1.33Mb).

“The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” International Secu

26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 39–55.

“Exit Strategy: How to Disengage from Iraq in 18 Months,” Boston Review, January/Febru

2006.

Dr. Derek S. Reveron

Associate Professor of National Security Decision Making

U.S. Naval War College

Dr. Derek S. Reveron is an associate professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval W

College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received a diploma from the Naval War College

M.A. in political science, and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Illinoi

Chicago. He specializes in U.S. foreign policy, civil-military relations, and intelligence. He is 

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author of Promoting Democracy in the Post-Soviet Region (2002), the editor of America’s V

roys: The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy (2004), and the coeditor of Flashpoints in the W

on Terrorism (2006). His numerous book chapters and articles have appeared in Orbis, 

fense and Security Analysis, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, L

Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, and the National Review Online. Additionally, he sits 

the editorial board for the Defense Intelligence Journal and the Naval War College Review. 

fore joining the Naval War College faculty, Dr. Reveron taught political science at the Joint M

tary Intelligence College, National Defense University, and the U.S. Naval Academy. As 

officer in the Navy Reserves, he has held various positions with NR VP-90, Atlantic Intellige

Command, Office of Naval Intelligence, Joint Analysis Center (European Command), 

preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger

Economic Adviser

U.S. Pacific Command

Dr. Leif R. Rosenberger has been the economic adviser at the U.S. Pacific Command si

1998 and has worked for four combatant commanders. He has a dual reporting chain: 

reports to Rear Admiral Michael C. Tracy, director for Strategic Planning and Policy (J5), 

Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. He is also a member of Ad

ral Fallon’s Special Staff.

Dr. Rosenberger analyzes the strategy and performance of 43 economies in Asia and the 

cific. As chairman of PACOM’s Economic and Security Working Group, he harmonizes 

economic and security elements in all aspects of PACOM activities (including maritime secu

the war on terrorism, war plans, and theater security cooperation activities with all the count

in Asia and the Pacific.

Dr. Rosenberger also plays a large role in strategic outreach activities to shape the socioe

nomic environment in Asia and the Pacific.

• He collaborates with U.S. embassies in Asia and U.S. economic agencies in Washing

(such as U.S. Agency for International Development, Commerce, Treasury, and 

Federal Reserve) on the formulation and execution of U.S. economic policies.

• He initiated and stood up the first U.S. interagency conference to address the Underly

Conditions that Foster Terrorism held at the Army War College in 2005. The sec

conference is planned for PACOM in March 2006.

• He performs outreach with academe, international government organizations (such 

the UN Development Program, the World Bank, and the IMF), Asian regio

organizations (such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] forum and 

Asian Development Bank), nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and, last but 

least, the all-important private sector.

• He works closely with Professor Stuart Hart at Cornell University Business Schoo

harmonize U.S. military activities with ground-breaking activities in the private se

and NGOs to reduce poverty and tap into the fortune at the bottom of 

socioeconomic pyramid.

• On the military side he collaborates with the Civil Military Affairs branch of the U.S. Ar

to improve the lives of Asian and Pacific people at the grassroots level.

Dr. Rosenberger is on the Board of Advisers at World Info in Silicon Valley, California, and 

Board of Southeast Asian Advisers at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in Sea

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Washington. In recent years he has done pro bono work as the senior fellow for Internatio

Finance and vice chairman of the Board at Trans-Oceanic International Limited, a humani

ian organization based in Hawaii with global reach.

Before coming to PACOM, Dr. Rosenberger was professor of economics for ten years at 

U.S. Army War College, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Academic Chair of 

search. He won five faculty-writing awards. His America and the World Economy course 

one of the largest and most popular two-semester courses ever given at the Army War Colle

He also worked at the Strategic Studies Institute, CIA, and DIA.

With the exception of the chapter on North Korea, Dr. Rosenberger is the author of each ch

ter in Volume 1 and Volume 2 of Asia-Pacific Economic Update, 2005. He also wrote two ch

ters in Volume 3 (“Towards Food Security” and “A Socio-Economic Strategy Against Vio

Extremism”). In addition, he is the author of Volume 1 of Asia-Pacific Economic Update, 2

and co-author of Asia-Pacific Economic Update, 2000.

Former drug czar General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey favorably reviewed his book Ameri

Drug War Debacle (Avebury, 1996). In recent years he has published “The Major Econo

Challenge in the Global Security Environment: Competing in an Interdependent World,

Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, Robert H. Dorff, The Search for Security U.S. Grand St

egy for the Twenty-First Century, 2003; “The Changing Face of Economic Security in Asia,

Sheldon Simon (ed.), The Many Faces of Asian Security (NBR, 2001); “Understand

Changes in Asia’s Economic Landscape,” in Paul Taylor (ed.), U.S. Strategic Traditions 

Regional Realities (U.S. Naval War College, 2001); and “Asia’s New Economic Volatility,

The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Fall/Winter 2000.

Dr. Rosenberger currently teaches International Finance and Trade in the Executive MBA P

gram at the University of Hawaii. He spent his sabbatical year of 1997 as a visiting scholar 

the economic faculty at Harvard University, funded by a Secretary of the Army Research 

Study Fellowship. He was also a visiting professor of international relations at Providence C

lege and an adjunct professor of economics and political science at Dickinson College.

He is a 1989 graduate of the U.S. Army War College, where he was a winner of the stud

writing award. He also attended the Senior Leaders in National Security Program at the K

nedy School of Government at Harvard University. He holds a B.A. with honors from Harv

University, a master’s from Boston University, and a Ph.D. from Claremont Graduate Sch

He studied Chinese politics and foreign policy at UCLA and did postdoctoral work in inter

tional business at Brigham Young University.

Ambassador Paul D. Taylor

Senior Strategic Researcher, Strategic Research Department

U.S. Naval War College

Ambassador Taylor is a senior strategic researcher in the Strategic Research department of 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies and senior adviser to the Latin American Studies Group 

the Naval War College. Currently also teaching elective courses on Latin America and 

United States and on international economics, he spent a career in the U.S. Foreign Serv

and four years as an international business executive responsible for establishing the L

America subsidiary of a multinational satellite broadcasting firm. He served as U.S. amba

dor to the Dominican Republic and was assigned in 1992 as professor and international aff

adviser to the President of the Naval War College. He taught the core curriculum in the Strat

and Policy department and in the National Security Decision Making department.

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He also was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for overall relations with Mex

and economic relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Ambassador Taylor was 

signed diplomatic duties for periods of two to three years each in Ecuador, Thailand, Br

Spain, and Guatemala. He served for two years on the staff of the Peace Corps in Washing

and in Ecuador and for three years on active sea duty as a commissioned officer in the U

Navy. His languages include Spanish and Portuguese. He studied economics at Harva

where he received an MPA, and politics at Princeton, leading to an AB.

Dr. Eric V. Thompson

Director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Naval Analyses

Eric V. Thompson is the director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Na

Analyses, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ federally funded research and development c

ter. Dr. Thompson’s specialty is Middle East political/military affairs. He has traveled ext

sively in the Middle East and worked closely with U.S. and regional and military leaders. 

most recent work has addressed Iraq and Afghanistan, military cooperation with member sta

of the Gulf Cooperation Council, military-to-military relations with Egypt, interoperability w

Turkish and Algerian maritime forces, and coalition-building for military operations in 

region.

Dr. Thompson’s research and analysis extend beyond the Middle East region. He has par

pated in studies of interoperability with allied navies, the implications of the deployment of t

ater ballistic missile defense systems, the use of distance learning technology in preparing 

coalition operations, the effectiveness of Partnership for Peace programs, and future secu

cooperation priorities for the U.S. military.

Dr. Thompson is also an adjunct professor at Catholic University of America, where he teac

graduate classes on terrorism and national security issues. Prior to joining CNA, he was an 

junct professor of international relations and history at the Virginia Military Institute, where 

taught courses in Middle East history, Middle Eastern politics, and American government, 

served as the director of the Model Arab League program.

His publications have appeared in the Middle East Journal, The Miller Center Report, and M

dle East Insight, and he has presented papers at several conferences including those of 

American Political Science Association, the Association of Third World Studies, and the F

eign Policy Association.

Eric V. Thompson holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virgi

and a B.A. in political science from Vassar College.

Dr. Geoffrey Till

Professor of Maritime Studies

Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Formerly the dean of academic studies at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Dr. 

is now professor of maritime studies in the Defence Studies department at King’s College L

don. Before that he was professor of history at the Royal Naval College Greenwich. He 

taught at the Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth; in the Department of Systems Scie

at the City University; in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where 

completed his M.A. and Ph.D., and for the Open University. With the help of a NATO Defe

fellowship he was a visiting scholar at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey; late

held the Foundation Chair in Military Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps University, Quant

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Virginia. He is also currently visiting professor at the Armed Forces University, Taiwan and se

visiting research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.

Research Interests

• Modern Maritime History

• Contemporary Maritime Strategy and Policy

• Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Selected Publications/Conference Papers

• Airpower and the Royal Navy 1914–1945 (London: Jane’s, 1979)

• Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1984)

• The Sea in Soviet Strategy (London: Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1989)

• Modern Sea Power (London: Brassey’s, 1987)

• Series editor of a ten-strong series on navies and technology (London: Brassey’s)

• Coeditor of the Navy Records Society Centenary Volume, 1993

• Series editor of the Frank Cass Naval History and Policy series

• Amphibious Warfare (Leicester: SCSI, 1997)

• Seapower: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 1994)

• Geoffrey Till (ed.), Seapower at the Millennium (Gloucester: Sutton Publishing, 200

• With G. D. Sheffield (eds.), Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Cent

(London: Macmillan/Palgrave, 2003)

• Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004)

• “Maritime Airpower in the Interwar Period: The Information Dimension,” in Journa

Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (June 2004)

• “Holding the Bridge in Troubled Times: The Cold War and the Navies of Europe,

Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005)

• The Development of British Naval Thinking (London: Routledge, 2006)

CDR Paul J. Tortora, USN

OPNAV N3/5 Strategic Action Group

CDR Paul Tortora received his commission in May 1989 from the U.S. Naval Academy, wi

BS in mathematics and minor in Spanish, graduating with merit. Upon completion of subm

rine officer nuclear power training, CDR Tortora served on the fast-attack nuclear submar

USS Sturgeon and USS Batfish, deploying to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, earn

his gold dolphins as a submarine warfare officer and qualifying as a naval nuclear enginee

CDR Tortora was then assigned to the U.S. Naval Academy, where he served as the senior 

missions officer, Spanish instructor, and submarine warfare instructor. During this assignm

he requested and received a lateral transfer into Naval Intelligence. His first assignment as 

intelligence officer was at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), where he served as the divis

head for the International Programs Office and special programs coordinator for bilatera

forts in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

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From May 2000 to June 2002, CDR Tortora served as the intelligence officer for Amphibi

Squadron Eight, deploying with the Wasp and Bataan Amphibious Ready Groups. During 

eration Enduring Freedom, he provided afloat intelligence to the initial seizure of Camp Rh

in Afghanistan and assisted in the targeting and capture of fleeing Taliban and al-Qa‘ida, to 

clude detention and interrogation afloat. Following this deployment, he was awarded the 

tional Military Intelligence Association’s VADM Rufus Taylor Award for Intellige

Leadership.

CDR Tortora then served as the deputy executive assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligen

immediately followed by assignment as the Secretary of the Navy’s personal intelligence off

from Nov 2002–June 2004, where he also served as the naval aide, and director, White Ho

Liaison Office. From July 2004–Oct 2006, CDR Tortora was assigned as the director of train

for the Center for Naval Intelligence, Dam Neck, Virginia.

CDR Tortora is currently assigned to the OPNAV N3/N5 Strategic Action Group at the Pen

gon, which is tasked with coordinating efforts on the new maritime strategy development.

His personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Co

mendation Medal, and Navy Achievement Medal. He holds a M.S. in management from 

University of Maryland University College, and an M.A. in National Security and Strate

Studies from the Naval War College.

Robert O. Work

Senior Defense Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)

Areas of Expertise: Defense Strategy, Defense Transformation, and Maritime Affairs

Mr. Work has written several monographs on naval transformation, the Littoral Combat S

future fleet platform architectures, and seabasing. He has also prepared a series of reports 

the future defense challenges, including the changing nature of undersea warfare; power p

jection against regional nuclear powers; and power projection against future antiaccess/a

denial networks. He has also directed and analyzed several war games for the Office of Net 

sessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense; contributed to DoD studies on global basing 

emerging military missions; and provided support for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review

During a distinguished 27-year career in the Marine Corps, Robert Work held a range of 

command, leadership, and management positions. He retired from the Marine Corps in 2

after 27 years of active service, having served in a variety of command and staff positions. 

last assignment was as military assistant and senior aide to the Honorable Richard J. Dan

71st Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Work has a bachelor of science in biology from the University of Illinois, a master of scie

in systems management from the University of Southern California, a master of science 

space operations from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a master’s in international pu

policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is an adjunct p

fessor at George Washington University, where he teaches defense analysis and roles and m

sions of the armed forces, and is a visiting lecturer at the Canadian Forces College.

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