Assault from the Sea

The Amphibious Landing at Inchon

by Curtis A. Utz

No. 2 The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series
Assault from the Sea

The Amphibious Landing at Inchon

by Curtis A. Utz

No. 2

The U.S. Navy in the Modern World Series

Series Editor

Edward J. Marolda

Former Head, Contemporary History Branch

“The Navy and Marines 

have never shone more 

brightly than this morning.”

General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur

Naval History and Heritage Command

Department of the Navy

Washington, D.C.

2020
Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Committee on Naval History 

William D. Wilkinson, Chairman 

CAPT Edward L. Beach, USN (Retired) 

David R. Bender 

John C. Dann 

RADM Russell W. Gorman, USNR (Retired) 

Richard L. Joutras 

VADM William P. Lawrence, USN (Retired) 

Vera D. Mann 

Ambassador J. William Middendorf II 

VADM Gerald E. Miller, USN (Retired) 

Clark G. Reynolds 

Betty M. Unterberger 

Use of ISBN

This is the official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified 

to certify its authenticity. The print edition is catalogued under ISBN 0-945274-27-0.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Utz, Curtis A., 1962–

Assault from the sea : the amphibious landing at Inchon / by Curtis A. Utz. 

p. cm. — (The U.S. Navy in the modern world series ; no. 2)

1. Korean War, 1950–1953—Campaigns—Korea—(South)—Inchon.

2. Korean War, 1950–1953—Amphibious operations. 3. United States. Navy—History— 

20th century. 4. Inchon (Korea) —History, Military.

I. Title. II. Series. 

DS918.2.I5U89 1994 

951.904\2—dc20 94-34662 

Contents

Foreword................................................................................................................................... vii

Introduction.................................................................................................................................1

Korea: The ‘‘Cockpit of Asia’’ ...................................................................................................3

Reduced Forces ...........................................................................................................................7

The Road to War ..........................................................................................................................8

North Korean Invasion and UN Reaction ..............................................................................11

Counterstroke ............................................................................................................................18

MacArthur Sells Inchon ...........................................................................................................19

Preparing for Operation Chromite ........................................................................................21

A Time of Deception and Uncertainty ....................................................................................24

Into the Gale...............................................................................................................................26

‘‘Ten Enemy Vessels Approaching’’ .......................................................................................29

‘‘Land the Landing Force’’ .......................................................................................................32

A Short Interlude.......................................................................................................................35

Storming Ashore at Red Beach ................................................................................................38

Taking the Initiative at Blue Beach .........................................................................................41

A Night in Inchon ......................................................................................................................43

Objective: Seoul ........................................................................................................................44

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................52

Vignettes

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Note Regarding 2020 Republication

This digital edition of Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon has 

been edited and updated from the original book, published in 1994. The updates were 

done with the assistance of the author, Curtis A. Utz. 

Foreword 

This is the second study in the Naval History and Heritage Command’s monograph 

series, entitled “The U.S. Navy in the Modern World.” The purpose of the series is to bring 

to the attention of today’s naval personnel and other readers the contributions of the naval 

service to the nation, in war and peace, since 1945. During the Cold War, the Navy helped 

resist Communist aggression, deter nuclear and conventional attack on the United States, 

protect American trade at sea and ashore, strengthen regional alliances, and foster the 

growth of democratic and free market institutions worldwide. The strength and overseas 

presence of the U.S. fleet often resolved crises without the use of force. But when force was 

necessary, the Navy fought hard and well. 

In light of the Navy’s current emphasis on littoral operations, I believe that Assault from 

the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon, by Curtis A. Utz of our Contemporary History 

Branch, is an appropriate title for the series’ second work. His monograph demonstrates 

how the Navy’s veteran leadership, flexible organization, versatile ships and aircraft, and 

great mobility gave the theater commander, General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, 

the ability to launch a devastating offensive against the North Korean invaders of South 

Korea. 

In addition to the efforts of Mr. Utz, many others were involved in the production of 

this work. This project was skillfully supervised by Dr. Edward J. Marolda, who heads 

the Contemporary History Branch. As always, Dr. William S. Dudley, the center’s senior 

historian, provided invaluable advice. I also wish to thank Professor Roger Dingman of 

the University of Southern California, a distinguished authority on the Korean War; and 

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), Director of Marine Corps History 

and Museums and an Inchon veteran, for their helpful comments and observations. 

The views expressed are those of Mr. Utz alone and not those of the Department of the 

Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government. 

Dean C. Allard 

Director of Naval History 

(1994)
On the cover: “Inchon,” Prismacolor, by combat artist Herbert C. Hahn. This drawing depicts landing craft headed for Red Beach 

during the evening assault, as Inchon burns in the background. Destroyers firing in support of the landing, as well as LSTs, stand 

offshore. To the right is Wolmi Do and the causeway leading to Inchon. (Navy Art Collection 88-191-BB)

Introduction 

On 25 June 1950, the army of the Democratic People’s Republic of (North) Korea 

stormed across the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of (South) Korea. North 

Korea’s Communist leader, Kim Il Sung, intended to destroy the rival government 

and abolish the division of Korea that resulted from international tensions after World War 

II. Kim launched the attack because he, and the Communist leaders in Moscow and Beijing, 

believed that the United States would not protect South Korea. They had made a critical 

mistake, however, because President Harry S. Truman roundly condemned this blatant act 

of aggression and persuaded the United Nations (UN) to resist the invasion. Truman also 

ordered U.S. ground, air, and naval forces into combat in Korea. Thus began the Cold War’s 

first major armed conflict. 

Weakened by the drastic cutbacks in defense spending after World War II, the U.S. 

armed forces were hard pressed to delay, much less stop the onrushing North Korean 

People’s Army (NKPA). Only a small number of Navy carrier and Air Force planes were on 

hand to strike enemy front-line units and supply convoys. A hastily gathered and deployed 

Army unit made a brave but futile stand in central South Korea. By early August, the 

hard-charging NKPA armored and infantry forces had pushed the U.S. Eighth Army and 

Republic of Korea (ROK) troops into an ever-tightening pocket around the port of Pusan 

on the southeastern tip of South Korea. Barring a dramatic turn of events, it looked like the 

U.S. and the ROK troops would be forced to evacuate the Pusan perimeter under fire, much 

as the British and French had done at Dunkirk in World War II. 

The effort to rescue South Korea, however, was underway. General of the Army 

Douglas A. MacArthur, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Far East, and Commander in Chief, 

United Nations Command (CINCUNC), persuaded his superiors in Washington to approve 

an amphibious assault at Inchon, a major port 110 miles behind enemy lines on South 

Korea’s west coast. Because of the port’s treacherous waterways, he reasoned that the North 

Koreans would not expect an attack there, so it would be relatively poorly defended. The 

UN force could advance rapidly from Inchon and capture the nearby key air base at Kimpo 

and then mount an attack on Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea. Seoul was also 

the key link in the NKPA’s line of communications and once taken would then serve as an 

anvil on which an Eighth Army offensive from Pusan would hammer the enemy army. The 

hoped-for result of this coordinated action was the complete destruction of the NKPA and 

the recovery of all of South Korea. 

Inchon was a classic demonstration of how naval forces can be decisive in regional wars 

and littoral operations. During July, August, and early September 1950, fleet units in the 

Far East established superiority in the Yellow Sea and in the air over it. The presence there 

of surface ships, submarines, carrier aircraft, and shore-based patrol planes served to deter 

or, if necessary, warn the CINCUNC of Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war. Control 

of the sea and the air also blinded the North Koreans about UN military movements. This 

enabled the 230 ships of Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force 7, which steamed 

toward the west coast of Korea in mid-September, to achieve a clear advantage over their 

foe through strategic surprise. 

1
On 13 September 1950, Struble’s forces began their assault from the sea against Inchon. 

Carrier-based aircraft squadrons, as well as cruisers and destroyers, devastated enemy 

fortifications, coastal artillery batteries, and supply points for two days. Then, on the 15th, 

landing ships and transports began disembarking the 1st Marine Division, which quickly 

seized Inchon. By the 19th, the Marines captured Kimpo air base, into which flowed Marine 

close air support aircraft and Air Force supply transports. U.S. Army troops also pushed out 

from the beachhead and on the 27th linked up with their comrades advancing north from 

the Pusan perimeter. UN casualties were light, especially when compared to the thousands 

of dead, wounded, and captured North Korean soldiers. 

Provisioned by the Navy’s transport and cargo ships, Marine, Army, and South Korean 

troops captured Seoul on 28 September. Only a battered remnant of the NKPA was able 

to flee South Korea and the closing UN trap. Because of Chinese intervention in October 

1950, the struggle in Korea would drag on for almost three more bloody and inconclusive 

years. Inchon, however, was a strategic masterstroke that clearly turned the tide of battle in 

the opening phase of the war. 

Korea: The ‘‘Cockpit of Asia’’ 

Korea has long been an Asian battleground. The mighty Genghis Khan and his 

Mongol horde swept into Korea in the 13th century. For the next 600 years, the 

Mongols and their successors to the throne of China dominated the diminutive 

Kingdom of Korea. Every year, the Korean king pledged his fealty to the emperor in Beijing, 

but aside from this connection with the outside world, the Koreans jealously guarded their 

isolation. In fact, the Korean monarchs banned overseas trade and discouraged contact 

between their subjects and foreigners. The ruggedness of the coastline and the perilous 

seas around the Korean peninsula helped enforce their royal edicts. Outsiders appropriately 

referred to Korea as the “Hermit Kingdom.” In the latter half of the 19th century, Americans 

learned just how serious the Koreans were about their desire to be left alone. In 1866, the 

Koreans massacred the crew of American merchant schooner General Sherman, which 

had run aground in the Taedong River near Pyongyang. The Navy dispatched Commander 

Robert W. Shufeldt, commanding officer of the screw sloop of war Wachusett, to discuss the 

incident with the King of Korea. The monarch refused to deal with him. 

Despite this rebuff, U.S. naval leaders in the Far East convinced Washington that Korea 

could be “opened” for trade and diplomatic relations. The visits of Commodore Matthew C. 

Perry and his “black ships” to Japan in the 1850s, which stimulated the Japanese to cultivate 

contacts with the Western world, clearly influenced these officers. In 1871, Rear Admiral 

John Rodgers led five U.S. Navy warships up the Salee River until they were under the guns 

of the Korean forts above Inchon. The Koreans, as they had done in the past, greeted the 

foreigners with gunfire. Rodgers’s ships returned fire and put ashore a landing party of 

Sailors and Marines, who seized the forts. The admiral, however, did not have enough men 

to march on the Korean capital and impose a treaty on the king, so the Americans and their 

ships withdrew. 

U.S. Sailors battle Korean 

troops during Commodore John 

Rodgers’s attack on the forts near 

Inchon in 1871. Artist unknown.

(NHHC NH 79942)

2 3
The Navy now enlisted the support of the Chinese, who encouraged the royal head of 

the subordinate kingdom to work with the Americans. Finally, on 22 May 1882, in sight of 

the U.S. screw sloop Swatara, Commodore Shufeldt and Korean officials signed a treaty 

that provided for peace, friendship, and an exchange of diplomats. The agreement also 

granted the United States most-favored-nation treatment with special trading rights on the 

peninsula. The Koreans hoped this unique relationship with the United States would help 

fend off their more demanding neighbors, particularly the Japanese. 

This proved an illusion, however, because the American interest in Korea faded even as 

the focus of the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians sharpened. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s 

sound thrashing of the Chinese fleet in the naval Battle of the Yalu in 1894, during the SinoJapanese War, ended Beijing’s domination of Korea. Russian designs on the kingdom met 

the same fate as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. That conflict, fought 

partly on the Korean peninsula, was capped by the Japanese destruction of a Russian fleet 

in the Strait of Tsushima and the declaration of a “protectorate” over the country. President 

Theodore Roosevelt, in the interest of balancing Japanese and Russian power in Northeast 

Asia, endorsed Tokyo’s direction of Korean affairs. Finally, in 1910, Japan formally annexed 

the kingdom, establishing a brutal regime that lasted until Japan’s defeat by the Allied 

powers in 1945. 

Before the end of that global conflict, Allied leaders agreed to set up a United Nations 

“trusteeship” over Korea, with the United States and the Soviet Union occupying Korea on 

either side of the 38th parallel, which was intended to be only a temporary dividing line. 

After disarming Japanese forces, the occupying powers planned to withdraw and restore 

Korea’s independence. To carry out this mandate, in August 

and September 1945, Soviet and U.S. troops moved into 

their respective occupation zones in North and South 

Korea. 

Ideological conflict and balance-of-power politics after 

World War II soon disrupted the process of Korean unifica-

tion and independence. The world witnessed the dawning 

of the “Cold War.” The United States and the other Western 

allies were increasingly at odds with the USSR and its ruth-

less dictator, Joseph Stalin. The Soviets suppressed basic 

freedoms and undermined governments in Poland, 

Czechoslovakia, and the other Eastern European nations 

that had been occupied by the Red Army. Moscow fueled 

an insurgency in Greece and made territorial demands on 

Turkey and Iran. In 1946, Mao Zedong’s Chinese 

Communists launched an all-out campaign against Chiang 

Kai-shek’s Nationalist government that would culminate 

several years later in the conquest of the entire mainland of 

China. The Soviet menace loomed especially large in 

August 1949 when the USSR detonated an atomic bomb, 

ending the U.S. monopoly of these weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Commodore Robert Shufeldt circa 

1880� As a commander, Shufeldt inves-

tigated the 1866 massacre of the crew 

of the American schooner General 

Sherman in Korea’s Taedong River� In 

1882, as a diplomatic representative 

of the United States, he negotiated a 

treaty of friendship with the King of 

Korea� (NHHC NH 79263)

A map of Korea, 1952.

The 38th parallel divides 

the peninsula in two and, 

after World War II, U.S.

forces occupied the ter-

ritory south of the line 

and the Soviet Union held 

the territory to the north.

(LC Geography and Map 

Division)

45
Meanwhile, in Korea, the Soviets supported the ascendancy of Kim Il Sung, a 

Communist leader whose forces had fought 

the Japanese in North China and Manchuria 

during the war. U.S. officials favored Dr. 

Syngman Rhee, an American-educated 

nationalist, and his ardent anti-Communist 

supporters. In both sections of the country, 

the Korean antagonists suppressed their 

opponents, often ruthlessly. Voters south of 

the 38th parallel eventually elected Rhee as 

the first president of the Republic of Korea, 

formally established on 15 August 1948. The 

following month Kim Il Sung announced his 

leadership of a second political creation, the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

During the next year and a half, the two 

Korean governments engaged in low-level 

hostilities. They sent agents, saboteurs, and 

raiding forces across the 38th parallel and 

fought artillery duels along the dividing line. In the last six months of 1949 alone, there were 

over 400 “border incidents.” 

With the establishment of friendly regimes in their respective occupation zones, the 

USSR and the United States withdrew their occupation forces. The Soviet armed forces left 

behind a military advisory group and large amounts of World War II-vintage munitions and 

equipment, including tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. The North Korean armed forces 

continued to grow in numbers and capability under Soviet tutelage. 

Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea. An 

American-educated nationalist, Rhee was a vehement 

anti-Communist. (LC P&P LC-U9-366 #33)

Kim II Sung, leader of the People’s 

Democratic Republic of Korea, 

gives a speech in 1948 with a 

depiction of a united Korean peninsula behind him. (DOD)

Except for the 500-man Korean Military 

Advisory Group (KMAG), the United States 

withdrew all of its forces from Korea by June 

1949. They left behind large quantities of 

small arms and ammunition but, unlike the 

Soviets, no tanks, medium or heavy artillery, 

or combat aircraft. The administration of 

Harry S. Truman opposed giving Rhee such 

“offensive” weapons, fearing that he would 

try to unify Korea by force. The Americans 

thought Rhee’s new government needed only 

U.S. training of its armed forces, modest arms 

supplies, and economic and political support. 

The simultaneous drawdown of U.S. 

conventional forces and reliance on military 

advisers and assistance reflected the Truman 

administration’s global approach to the threat 

posed by the Soviet Union and its allies after 

World War II. In 1947, President Truman 

proclaimed a new strategy for dealing with 

the Communists’ militant and expansive policies-containment. The United States and her 

allies would prevent the spread of Communist 

ideology and Soviet influence by strengthening the economies, political systems, and military organizations of friendly countries. The 

containment strategy anticipated using U.S. 

ground troops, tactical aircraft units, combat 

fleets, and other conventional forces to defend 

only vital national interests. 

Reduced Forces 

At the end of World War II, the U.S. armed forces comprised 12 million men and 

women who had answered the greatest call to the colors in American history. This 

massive establishment fielded 95 infantry, armor, airborne, and Marine divisions; 

92,000 aircraft; 1,307 warships; and 82,000 landing craft. But, with the war now over, the 

American public clamored to “bring the boys home.” Operation Magic Carpet and similar 

movements transported millions of American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines home 

to the United States and then discharged them from the military. 

Another motivation for the reduction of the military establishment was Truman’s desire 

to improve America’s financial health. Being the “Arsenal of Democracy” in World War II 

had been a great drain on the public treasury of the United States and had disrupted the 

President Harry S. Truman. He implemented the containment strategy to deal with Communism but believed 

in strengthening at-risk nations with American military 

equipment and advisers, rather than deploying large U.S.

conventional forces overseas. Indeed, he acted to reduce 

U.S. defense expenditures during the 1945–1950 period.

(NA 80-G-K-4192) 

6 7
production of consumer goods. Truman believed that it was more important to balance the 

budget and encourage the private sector than to buy new weapons or station large forces 

overseas. 

Key leaders in Washington also suggested that the United States could reduce defense 

spending significantly because America had the atomic bomb. Proponents concluded that 

the American atomic arsenal (which was not that powerful or ready for war during the 

1945–1950 period) either would deter or defeat Soviet invasions of vital areas, such as western Europe. The U.S. Air Force, separated from the Army in 1947, believed that the delivery 

of atomic weapons should be the mission of only its bombers. The Air Force argued that 

this made conventional forces, especially Navy carrier forces, much less valuable and that 

they should be reduced in number and capability. The Navy countered that a balanced military establishment, in which no weapon system or service predominated, best served the 

global interests of the United States. 

All the services were involved in sometimes acrimonious disputes over dwindling 

budgets, their respective roles and missions in the new postwar world, and unification of 

the defense establishment. James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense (the National 

Military Establishment, later to become the Department of Defense, was established in 

1947), literally worked himself to death trying to accommodate the differing views of each 

service. His successor, Louis V. Johnson, an incompetent political appointee with little 

experience in defense matters, reinforced Truman’s inclination to drastically cut the defense 

budget. Johnson also accepted the proposition that only the Air Force should be allowed 

to conduct long-range atomic bombing. Without consulting the Navy’s civilian or military 

leaders, he canceled construction of United States (CVA-58), the first aircraft carrier 

designed to carry atomic-capable aircraft. In the uproar over this and other issues, collectively called the “Revolt of the Admirals,” Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned 

in protest and his successor forced Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO), to retire. 

During the period from 1945 to 1950, all the services suffered from the loss of critical 

resources. The last budget approved by Congress before the outbreak of the Korean 

War provided for only 238 naval combatants, including six fleet aircraft carriers, one 

reduced-status battleship, and nine carrier air groups; six battalions and 12 aircraft squadrons for the Marines; and 14 reduced-strength Army divisions. Even the favored Air Force 

was expected to operate with 48 air groups instead of the 71 it considered essential. 

The Road to War 

I

n early 1950, international miscalculation over Korea resulted in war. For several years, 

Kim Il Sung had urged his Communist patrons to support a North Korean invasion of 

South Korea, but they refused him each time. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the 

People’s Republic of China did not want a major war to break out in northeast Asia. Stalin 

was more concerned about the growing strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

alliance in Europe. Mao Zedong was concentrating his forces for the invasion of Taiwan and 

climactic last battle with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. 

The United States did not want a war 

in Asia, either. The Truman administration 

focused its attention and the combat power 

of the U.S. military on Europe. Truman 

and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, 

were determined to limit U.S. Far Eastern 

commitments, a desire unfortunately made 

public. On 12 January 1950, Acheson told the 

Washington press corps that the United States 

would fight to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the 

Philippines but, by failing to mention them, 

neither Taiwan nor Korea. So, when Kim once 

again asked Moscow and Beijing to approve 

his plans to conquer South Korea, they agreed, 

although Mao Zedong was somewhat reluctant. 

However, Mao promised to send the substantial number of ethnic Koreans in the Chinese 

Communist forces back to Kim. 

By the late spring of 1950, the North 

Koreans had amassed formidable military 

forces. The NKPA then consisted of 135,000 

men. The principal ground elements of this force were ten infantry divisions, an armored 

brigade, two independent regiments, and border constabulary troops. Two of these divisions recently had returned from China; many of the other soldiers were veterans of Mao’s 

forces. The NKPA fielded 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, hundreds of light and medium artillery pieces, and numerous heavy mortars. The North Korean air force included 70 Yakolev 

Yak-3 and Yak-7 fighters and 60 Ilyshin Il-10 “Shturmovik” attack planes, all propeller 

driven. The navy operated a few small patrol boats. 

The Republic of Korea military was inferior to the NKPA in quantity and quality. The 

ROK army, composed of eight infantry divisions, various support units, and headquarters 

elements, numbered only 100,000 men. They lacked good field artillery and had no tanks. 

The air force flew only 20 unarmed training planes. The South Korean navy (ROKN) 

manned 17 old U.S. and Japanese minesweepers, a few picket boats, one tank landing 

ship, and one subchaser, renamed Bak Du San (PC-701), which the U.S. Navy sold to the 

Koreans in 1949. 

The U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific in June 1950 were a pale reflection of the 

mighty armada that surrounded the battleship Missouri (BB-63) at Tokyo Bay in September 

1945. Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, a veteran of World War II amphibious operations in 

the Philippines, commanded the Seventh Fleet, based at Subic Bay in the Philippines. In 

this fleet steamed fleet aircraft carrier Valley Forge (CV-45), heavy cruiser Rochester (CA124), eight destroyers, four submarines, and five logistics support ships. Fleet Air Wing 1, 

with two patrol squadrons, provided the fleet with long-range search and reconnaissance 

aircraft. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Japan, led a force that 

consisted of light cruiser Juneau (CLAA-119), the four ships of Destroyer Division 91, and 

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval 

Forces, Far East, by Navy combat artist Herbert Hahn.

Navy Art Collection (88-191-aq)

8 9
the seven minesweepers of Mine Squadron 3. Also under Admiral Joy were the five ships 

of Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s Amphibious Group 1. Joy was also Commander Naval 

Forces, Far East, and in the event of an emergency, Seventh Fleet would come under his 

direction, as well. 

The closest American ground forces to the Korean peninsula were the four infantry 

divisions of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army, which served as the 

occupation force for Japan’s Home Islands. Walker’s units—the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry 

Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division (also infantry)—were in poor shape. Because of 

postwar defense cutbacks, these units were severely undermanned and badly equipped. 

Much of their material had been salvaged from World War II battlefields and restored in 

Japanese shops. Lacking adequate training and resources, and softened by occupation duty, 

the American troops in Japan were ill-prepared for war. 

Manpower and material shortages also hobbled the U.S. Far East Air Force (FEAF), 

commanded by Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF was made up of three 

air forces—the 20th, 13th, and 5th, which operated from Okinawa and the Mariana Islands, 

the Philippines, and Japan. FEAF operated mostly jet-powered Lockheed F-80 Shooting 

Stars in both the fighter and fighter-bomber roles, even though they were not well suited 

to the latter mission. The only planes in FEAF designed solely for the attack role were the 

propeller-driven Douglas B-26 Invaders of the 3rd Bombardment Wing (Light). Also flying 

with FEAF were North American F-82 Twin Mustang all-weather fighters, Boeing B-29 

Superfortress bombers, and Douglas C-54 Skymaster transports.

While the United States could not assume it would be supported by its World War II 

allies in any new crisis, Australian and British forces operated in the region during early 

1950. Australian occupation forces stationed in the Japanese islands were an infantry battalion, a fighter squadron equipped with North American F-51 Mustangs and the frigate 

HMAS Shoalhaven (K-535). The UN was fortunate that in June 1950 light aircraft carrier 

HMS Triumph, two light cruisers, two destroyers, and three frigates of the Royal Navy’s Far 

East Station were steaming toward Japan to escape the summer heat at their Southeast 

Asian homeports. 

South Korean military leaders 

brief visiting dignitaries on the 

defenses at the 38th parallel on 

18 June 1950. Listening intently 

are John Foster Dulles, President 

Truman’s special representative 

and later Secretary of State; Sihn 

Seung Mo, the South Korean 

Minister of Defense; and U.S.

military advisers. Few Americans 

or South Koreans, however, 

expected a North Korean invasion.

One week after this photograph 

was taken, North Korean tanks 

and infantry units poured through 

this position. (NA 111-SC-342614)

As U.S., Australian, and British forces in the Far East carried out business as usual in 

the late spring of 1950, there were ominous developments on the Korean peninsula. After 

months of probing south across the border, in May the NKPA suddenly halted such activity. 

Intelligence sources in Taiwan and South Korea warned that the Communists would soon 

take stronger armed action. These warnings, however, fell on deaf ears. American political 

and military leaders believed that none of the countries interested in the Korean situation 

would benefit from a war on the Korean peninsula. KMAG officers told visiting American 

officials that all was quiet on the Korean front. On 19 June, the Central Intelligence Agency 

forecast that the North Koreans would continue their low-level hostilities near the 38th 

parallel but not launch a major attack across it that summer. 

North Korean Invasion and UN Reaction 

Early on the morning of 25 June 1950, the hills around the 38th parallel reverberated 

with artillery fire. This caused little alarm among the American advisers, however, 

because of the numerous border incidents that had occurred there during the past 

year. This complacency soon changed to shock as they discovered North Korean combat 

forces in their midst. When U.S. Army Captain Joseph R. Darrigo neared the railroad 

station at Kaesong, five miles south of the parallel, he discovered several NKPA battalions 

detraining! Overnight, the Communists had connected their rail lines to those in the south 

and rushed troops forward. He now knew that this was no border incident—this was an 

invasion! 

By early afternoon, NKPA infantry and armored formations, heavily supported by aircraft and artillery, were attacking all along the border. As T-34 tanks spearheaded the main 

assault on Seoul, landing forces stormed ashore at several places on the east coast and outflanked ROK positions. 

The ROK navy subchaser Chirl 

San (PC-704) sorties from San 

Francisco on her way to South 

Korea in June 1950� Her sister 

ship, Bak Du San (PC-701), 

engaged and sank a Communist 

steamer loaded with troops and 

headed for the critical port of 

Pusan on the first night of the war� 

(NHHC NH 85490)

10 11
Some of the South Korean units fought well, but many did not. None was equipped or 

trained to hold off a mechanized assault. Surprised as they were, most of the ROK units 

disintegrated or retreated in the face of the powerful offensive. At least one South Korean 

unit, however, scored a victory over the attackers. After putting to sea with the few other 

combatants of the ROK navy, the newly arrived submarine chaser Bak Du San discovered 

a 1,000-ton armed North Korean steamer off the east coast. In a vicious surface battle, the 

South Koreans sank the steamer, whose 600 embarked soldiers were meant to land and 

seize Pusan. This proved to be one of the most important fights of the campaign, for it 

prevented the short-term loss of this key port, soon to be vital to the survival of UN forces 

in Korea. 

Meanwhile, chaos reigned in Seoul. With South Korean defenses around the capital crumbling, U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio ordered the evacuation of American 

dependents. Protected by the destroyers Mansfield (DD-728) and De Haven (DD-727), 

the Norwegian freighter SS Rheinholdt took on the evacuees at Seoul’s port, Inchon, and 

headed for Japan. In the next several days, Air Force transports flew other Americans and 

UN personnel out of nearby Kimpo and Suwon airfields. During these evacuation operations, escorting U.S. fighters shot down seven North Korean fighter and attack planes. 

Even though surprised by the North Korean invasion, President Truman and his advisers in Washington took immediate action to oppose it. Truman called for an emergency 

meeting of the UN Security Council to consider the North Korean aggression. The council 

met only 23 hours after the start of the invasion and it discussed a resolution advocated by 

the United States that condemned the North Korean aggression, demanded an end to hostilities, and called for the restoration of the 38th parallel dividing line. With the USSR’s delegate absent because of an earlier dispute over the UN’s failure to seat the People’s Republic 

of China on the Security Council, there was no Soviet veto, and the council passed the resolution. Then, on the 27th, the Security Council approved a second resolution encouraging 

UN members to come to the armed assistance of the Republic of Korea. 

Left to right: Royal Navy Captain A.

D. Torlesse, Commanding Officer 

of HMS Triumph; Rear Admiral 

John M. Hoskins, Commander 

Task Force 77; Vice Admiral Arthur 

D. Struble, Commander Seventh 

Fleet; and Rear Admiral William G.

Andrewes, Commander of British 

Commonwealth Forces, confer on 

board the heavy cruiser Rochester (CA133), flagship of the Seventh Fleet, 

on 1 July 1950. As in many other 20th 

century conflicts, the U.S. and British 

navies fought side by side in Korea.

(NHHC 80-G-416423)

Meanwhile, despite earlier uncertainty over the importance of South Korea to America’s 

interests, Truman decided that U.S. forces should defend the country. Truman and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) were concerned that the attack on Korea was only a diversion for a 

major Communist offensive in Europe. Still, they ordered the combat deployment of air 

and naval forces in the Far East, including the Seventh Fleet, to the Korean theater. 

The Seventh Fleet was important not only for the help it could provide to UN forces 

fighting in Korea but for its impact on North Korea’s potential military allies, the People’s 

Republic of China and the USSR. Fearing that the Communists might mount a regional 

offensive, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait and then 

made that directive public. Truman wanted to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of 

Taiwan as well as an attack on the mainland by Chiang’s Nationalist forces. After steaming 

from Subic Bay on 27 June, the Seventh Fleet sent carrier planes flying up the Taiwan Strait 

as it passed close to the island on the 29th. Throughout the Korean War, Seventh Fleet 

forces operated along the coast of China, from the Yellow Sea in the north to Hainan in the 

south, discouraging the Chinese use of the sea and the air over it. Beijing later revealed that 

it respected the power of the fleet’s air, surface, and subsurface forces. 

The fleet also maintained naval forces in the waters around the Soviet Far East. Shorebased patrol planes kept a close watch over Soviet air and naval bases. U.S. submarines also 

prowled the waters off Vladivostok and the straits from the Sea of Japan. 

Meanwhile, as units of the Seventh Fleet headed for the Yellow Sea at the end of June, 

Admiral Joy’s naval forces, Japan, dispatched units to Korea. Early on the 29th, cruiser 

Juneau and destroyer De Haven deployed off Korea’s east coast to stop Communist seaborne 

movement and to bombard enemy ground forces advancing down the coastal road. In the 

confusion during the withdrawal of South Korean forces to the south, Juneau tragically sank 

the ROKN minelayer JML 305, which the cruiser took for an enemy ship. 

Early in July, Joy sent part of Struble’s Seventh Fleet dashing into North Korean waters 

to hit the enemy’s central nerve center, the capital at Pyongyang. Struble’s Striking Force 

(Task Force 77), reinforced by several of Rear Admiral William G. Andrewes’s Royal 

Navy warships, mustered 24 ships. On 3 and 4 July, only eight days after the North Korean 

invasion, planes from Valley Forge and HMS Triumph pounded the air base, rail yards, and 

bridges near Pyongyang. 

In addition to launching Navy carrier and Air Force bombing attacks against the advancing North Korean forces, General MacArthur ordered Air Force transports to deploy a 

hastily assembled Army infantry-artillery team, Task Force Smith, to Korea. NKPA armor 

and infantry units overran and destroyed this brave force of 24th Infantry Division soldiers 

in a bloody action near Osan on 5 July. 

MacArthur pleaded with the JCS for reinforcements to stop and then counterattack the 

invading NKPA. Since General Omar N. Bradley and the service representatives of the JCS 

suspected that Korea was only a Communist diversionary move, they were reluctant to dispatch a sizeable portion of the understrength U.S. armed forces to the Far East. The gravity 

of the UN situation in Korea and MacArthur’s insistent pleas, however, soon persuaded 

them to grant most of the general’s requests. 

12 13
Naval forces answered the call for help with alacrity. During July and August, Pacific 

Fleet units streamed into the Korean theater. These included heavy cruisers Helena (CA-75) 

and Toledo (CA-133), and Essex-class carriers Philippine Sea (CV-47) and Boxer (CV-21). 

The latter ship brought with her from the U.S. West Coast 171 aircraft, including 146 F-51 

Mustang fighters desperately needed by the Air Force. Boxer set a transpacific speed record, 

reaching Yokosuka, Japan, in only eight days. Also dispatched to Korea were the Pacific 

Fleet’s two escort carriers, Sicily (CVE-118) and Badoeng Strait (CVE-116). Sicily embarked 

antisubmarine aircraft and 30 other fighter, attack, and transport planes. Badoeng Strait

embarked not only Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 214, assigned to the ship, but also the 

aircraft of three squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 33. The UN naval contingent 

expanded with the arrival in Korean waters of the Royal Navy’s light cruiser HMS Kenya

and British, Canadian, New Zealand, Dutch, and French destroyers and frigates. 

Those reinforcements soon entered the fray. On 27 July, Toledo shelled positions on the 

east coast of Korea, and on 5 August, planes from Philippine Sea attacked targets at Iri, 

Mokpo, and Kunsan. Early in August, VMF-214, the “Black Sheep” squadron of World War 

II fame, and VMF-323, based respectively on Sicily and Badoeng Strait, began to strike 

enemy forces ashore. 

Smoke billows skyward as Valley 

Forge (CV-45) attack planes hit the 

North Korean oil refinery at Wonsan 

on 18 July 1950� In a demonstra-

tion of naval mobility, UN carrier 

forces hit enemy targets on both 

Korean coasts that summer� (NHHC 

80-G-7979876)

British destroyer HMS Cockade

(D-34), here moored at Sasebo, 

Japan, in July 1950, was one of 

many naval units deployed to 

the combat theater by America’s 

British ally. (NA 80-G-417995)

Aircraft carrier Boxer (CV-21) takes on 

board U.S. Air Force F-51 fighters at 

Naval Air Station, Alameda, California, 

in July 1950 for transportation to the Far 

East. (NA 80-G-418776)

Captain John S. Thach, a highly deco-

rated World War II veteran and orig-

inator of the “Thach Weave” fighter 

tactic, and commanding officer of the 

escort carrier Sicily (CVE-118) dis-

cusses a mission with two of his pilots, 

1st Lieutenant Roland B. Heilman 

(left) and Major Robert P. Keller of 

VMF-214. Marine fighter squadrons 

operating from Sicily and Badoeng Strait

(CVE-116) flew hundreds of ground 

support sorties during August 1950.

(USN 417110)

14 15

The eight-inch guns of heavy cruiser 

Helena (CA-75) bombard Communist 

forces ashore� Throughout the summer 

of 1950, cruisers and destroyers rained 

thousands of shells on enemy troops, 

armored vehicles, and supply trucks

all along the coast of South Korea�

(NHHC NH 96898)
UN air forces responded in similar fashion. In early July, General Stratemeyer ordered 

several of his Philippine-based squadrons to Japan. He also ordered that some fighter-bomber squadrons be reequipped with F-51 Mustangs stockpiled in Japan, because his 

F-80s experienced difficulty in the close air support role and they could not operate from 

the rough Korean airfields. In addition, the Air Force deployed several B-29 bomber groups 

to the western Pacific. The Australian F-51 squadron in Japan also joined the FEAF. 

As important as naval and air forces were to the Allied defensive effort in Korea, 

ground forces were absolutely essential. On General MacArthur’s orders, Admiral Doyle’s 

Amphibious Group 1, Military Sea Transportation Service cargo ships and Japanese 

time-chartered ships transported three infantry divisions (24th, 25th, and 1st Cavalry) from 

Japan to Korea, where General Walker quickly plugged them into the front line. Only the 

understrength 7th Infantry Division remained in 

Japan. MacArthur also requested and received the 

infantry and artillery battalions needed to bring 

his Eighth Army divisions up to battle strength. 

The JCS also ordered the U.S.-based 2nd Infantry 

Lance Corporal Bob Bell, a crew chief of No. 77 

Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, “sweats 

out” the safe return of his unit’s F-51 Mustangs 

from a strike in Korea. Australian air, naval, and 

ground forces fought well alongside their UN 

allies. (NASM 4A 31741)

Bound for Korea, leathernecks of 

the 5th Marine Regiment board 

the attack transport Pickaway

(APA-222) in San Diego, 

California, on 12 July 1950.

(NA 80-G-416566 )

Men of the 5th Marine Regiment 

withstand an enemy mortar 

barrage on 3 September as 

they defend the high ground 

near the hotly contested 

Naktong Bulge. Less than two 

weeks later, these Marines 

would storm ashore at Inchon.

(NA 127-GK-234K-A-2231)

Division, a regimental combat team (RCT) from the 11th Airborne Division, and various 

armor, artillery, and engineer units to the Far East. 

Marine combat units and Navy amphibious forces were especially critical to 

MacArthur’s anticipated operations on the Korean peninsula. Supported by General Clifton 

B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, MacArthur persuaded the JCS to fully man 

and equip the 1st Marine Division and deploy the unit to Korea by mid-September. General 

Cates partially filled the understrength division with Marines pulled from bases throughout the United States, but this was not enough. President Truman then approved Cates’s 

request for mobilization of the entire ground element of the Marine Corps Organized 

Reserve and attached Navy medical units. The first contingent of the division to arrive in 

Korea was the 5th Marine RCT. 

The amphibious ships that transported the Marine units from the United States also 

bolstered Admiral Doyle’s amphibious force. The newcomers included three dock landing 

ships (LSDs), two attack transports (APAs), one tank landing ship (LST), and one medium 

landing ship. To complement this force, Doyle got control of LSTs operated by the Army in 

Japan and enlisted the assistance of the Shipping Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP), 

a civilian occupation agency that controlled Japanese merchant shipping. In the SCAJAP 

inventory were 34 former U.S. Navy LSTs, manned by Japanese, and Doyle quickly integrated 17 of them into his force. 

Despite the growing strength of UN ground, naval, and air forces, the North Korean 

offensive rolled on. Thin U.S. and ROK defensive lines often were broken by coordinated 

NKPA tank assaults and infantry flank attacks, which led to a series of demoralizing retreats. 

With his command in dire straits, General Walker ordered UN forces to withdraw behind 

the Naktong River, the last natural barrier to Pusan, on 1 August. This defensive bastion 

soon became known as the Pusan Perimeter. 

To stiffen the ground defenses, MacArthur reinforced the Eighth Army with the 2nd 

Infantry Division and the Marine Brigade, 

comprised of the 5th Marine RCT and 

MAG-33. During the first two weeks of 

August, the NKPA launched four major 

attacks. The Marine Brigade repelled two 

of them, including a serious penetration 

in the vital “Naktong Bulge” sector. Navy 

cruisers and destroyers provided gunfire 

support that helped repel assaults near 

the coast, as well. In early September, the 

Marine Brigade countered one last NKPA 

breakthrough at the Naktong Bulge. 

Throughout this period, U.S. Air 

Force, Navy, and Marine, as well as British 

and Australian, planes struck targets 

throughout Korea. Navy Underwater 

Demolition Team (UDT) and Marine 

reconnaissance detachments executed 

Tanned and sweating gunners of the Army’s 64th Field 

Artillery Battalion operate a 105mm howitzer in defense of 

the Pusan Perimeter. Fighting with determination and skill, 

General Walker’s Eighth Army units defeated one NKPA 

attack after another during the brutally hot summer of 1950.

(NHHC SC-347107)

16 17
raids ashore from the high-speed transport Horace A. Bass (APD-124). By 4 September, 

Communist forces were spent. There would be no more major attacks on the perimeter, 

but MacArthur expected the NKPA to be just as tough on the defense as it had been on the 

offense. The general had no intention of launching the Eighth Army on a frontal assault 

against the dogged North Koreans. 

Counterstroke 

MacArthur, the veteran commander of numerous littoral operations in the 

southwest Pacific during World War II, was quick to see the strategic possibilities offered by the Korean peninsula. Less than one week after Kim Il Sung’s 

Communist legions poured across the 38th parallel into the Republic of Korea, CINCUNC 

began to consider how he could defeat his landbound adversary. MacArthur’s visit to the 

Korean battlefield on 29 June convinced him that the NKPA would push the underequipped, battered, and demoralized ROK army, even if bolstered by U.S. reinforcements, 

far to the south of Seoul. MacArthur felt that his forces could turn the tables on the enemy 

by exploiting one key advantage over them—strategic mobility. He decided that a decisive 

stroke, an amphibious assault somewhere behind NKPA lines, could liberate South Korea. 

MacArthur concluded that his enemy was most vulnerable to a landing on Korea’s west 

coast at Inchon. Capture of this sizeable port and the nearby air base at Kimpo would 

enable the UN to mount a major attack on Seoul, not only the capital of South Korea but 

the key road and rail link in the NKPA’s line of communications. A northwestward UN 

offensive from the Pusan Perimeter would then push across the peninsula, trapping most of 

the enemy army in the south. The U.S. divisions from the perimeter would also link up with 

the units at Inchon. The isolated NKPA formations would be forced to surrender or be 

crushed between the UN forces. Success at Inchon could lead to a glorious, one-stroke UN 

victory in the war, a prospect the gifted but vain MacArthur could only relish. 

General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur 

grasps the arms of Army Chief of Staff 

General J. Lawton Collins (left) and Chief 

of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest P.

Sherman on their arrival at Tokyo airfield on 21 August 1950. Two days later, 

MacArthur turned in a masterful performance to persuade his guests that the proposed amphibious assault at Inchon would 

succeed. (NHHC 80-G-422492)

MacArthur Sells Inchon 

MacArthur selected the small Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group ( JSPOG) 

of his Far East Command (FECOM) staff to bring his concept to fruition. The 

general’s advocacy of an amphibious operation sometime before October and 

selection of Inchon as the site were, according to Admiral Struble, the general’s “earliest 

and most important” decisions. 

Planners were free to concentrate on overcoming the Inchon site’s difficulties, and they 

were serious, indeed. In the words of Lieutenant Commander Arlie G. Capps, Admiral 

Doyle’s gunnery officer, “We drew up a list of every natural and geographic handicap—and 

Inchon had ‘em all.” The approaches from the Yellow Sea were two restricted passages, 

Flying Fish and Eastern channels, and they joined at Palmi Do island. Palmi Do stood 

at the end of the narrow Salee River, 10 miles downstream from Inchon. Both channels 

and the Salee could be easily blocked by mines. In addition, the normal harbor current at 

Inchon was a dangerously quick two to three knots and sometimes even eight knots. The 

anchorage was small, there were few docks and piers and no landing beaches—in the usual 

meaning of that term—only sea walls, piers, salt pans, and “rocks with patches of sand.” Just 

offshore, a triangular-shaped island, Wolmi Do, and an islet, Sowolmi Do, separated the 

city from the Salee River. 

Several heights dominated the landing area. The 315-foot-high Radio Hill on Wolmi Do 

completely commanded the harbor. Presenting a sheer cliff to the harbor side and rising 

to 102 feet, Cemetery Hill guarded the 800-yard-long causeway that led to Wolmi Do. 

Observatory Hill, 238 feet high, and the smaller British Consulate Hill overlooked the city 

itself. 

Perhaps the most critical factor was Inchon’s extreme tidal range of 32 feet, which 

limited a daylight landing to three or four days each month. Tidal waters had to be 

high enough to cover the wide mud flats that fronted the city. Since the highest tides in 

September occurred in mid-month, the JSPOG selected 15 September as D day. FECOM 

had less than two months to plan an assault that normally took three to five months of 

work. Nonetheless, MacArthur’s headquarters issued Operation Plan 100-B, code-named 

“Chromite,” with Inchon as the objective. 

Doyle and many of the officers on the staff were concerned that Inchon might be too 

risky, so they investigated alternative sites. Doyle dispatched Horace A. Bass and her UDT/

Marine team to scout Kunsan, which they found to be better suited to an amphibious 

assault. The JSPOG prepared a plan for a Kunsan operation, just in case MacArthur 

changed his mind on the attack site. 

Although commanders in the Far East understood the difficulties of the proposed 

assault, the JCS was “somewhat in the dark.” On 20 August, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, 

the CNO; General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff; and other high-ranking 

officers flew from Washington to MacArthur’s Tokyo headquarters for a briefing on the 

planned amphibious operation in Korea. 

18 19
This detailed map of the Inchon area, prepared in 1950, clearly shows the narrow passages and numerous 

mud and tidal flats in the approaches to the harbor. (LC Geography and Map Division)

Admiral Doyle’s staff summarized the details of the assault: weather, hydrography, 

landing craft, beaches, naval gunfire, and air support. Intelligence on the enemy forces at 

Inchon suggested that only a few weak units operated there and that the harbor’s defenses 

were not completed. Doyle, a veteran of Guadalcanal and other World War II landings, 

ended the briefing with the statement that “the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible.” This reinforced the misgivings already felt by some of the assembled officers, so they 

asked probing questions about alternative landing sites such as Kunsan. 

MacArthur, at that time revered by many Americans as a military genius and legendary 

hero, slowly rose to address the assembled officers. In his well-known theatrical style and 

sonorous voice, the general spent the next 45 minutes delivering an oration that awed 

his audience. MacArthur never swayed from his choice of Inchon as the landing site. He 

observed that because the conditions at Inchon were so difficult, the enemy would not 

expect a landing there. Success at Inchon could end the war, while a seizure of Kunsan or 

another alternative site would be indecisive and lead to a brutal winter campaign. Looking 

at Admiral Sherman, the general spoke with conviction: “The Navy has never let me down 

in the past and it will not let me down this time.” Concluding this masterful performance, 

MacArthur quietly but forcefully stated, “We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them!” 

Preparing for Operation Chromite 

When Sherman and Collins returned to Washington, the JCS formally approved 

MacArthur’s intention to assault Inchon on 15 September, and this spurred 

FECOM’s preparation effort. MacArthur’s greatest concern was the availability 

and readiness of ground troops for Chromite. Many of the forces that he hoped to hold in 

reserve for the amphibious assault at Inchon had been thrown into battle on the Naktong 

or would arrive in the theater late. The 5th Marine RCT of his primary assault force, the 1st 

Marine Division, spent much of August and early September fending off NKPA thrusts into 

the Pusan Perimeter. 

The unit had only eight days to rest from combat, prepare for the amphibious operation, and embark for the passage to Inchon. The division’s third regiment would not arrive 

in the Far East until two days after the landing. When MacArthur ordered the 2nd Infantry 

Division, his first choice for the Army component, to the front in Korea, he had to replace 

it with Major General David G. Barr’s half-strength 7th Infantry Division based in Japan. 

The Army channeled to Barr’s division all arriving replacement personnel, including 

experienced noncommissioned officers from the schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, and 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This was still not enough, so MacArthur authorized the division to 

incorporate over 8,000 Korean troops, called KATUSAs (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. 

Army). Finally, for lack of alternatives, the American planners were compelled to use the 

understrength, ill-equipped—but enthusiastic—1st Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment 

as the reserve contingent and Inchon mop-up unit. 

Doyle’s staff focused their efforts on the operational aspects of Chromite. They decided 

that amphibious ships and craft would approach Inchon by way of Flying Fish Channel, 

which was a rougher seaway than Eastern Channel but less subject to enemy artillery fire. 

20 21
Two days prior to the landing, cruisers, and destroyers would steam into the harbor to shell 

Wolmi Do and check the waters for mines. 

Even though the Japanese and American tide tables did not agree, planners estimated 

that high tides would occur shortly after sunrise and then just after sunset on 15 September. 

Since most of the amphibious ships would need daylight to navigate the narrow, swift 

waters of Flying Fish Channel and the Salee River, the planners decided that the smaller 

initial landing would take place on the morning tide. A reinforced Marine battalion would 

storm ashore at Green Beach on Wolmi Do and seize this island that dominated the harbor. 

With close air and naval gunfire support, the unit was expected to hold off any North 

Korean counterattacks during the day. The main assault would occur as the tide rose in the 

evening. Two Marine battalions would land at Red Beach, just north of the causeway from 

Wolmi Do, and seize the three hills in town. An entire Marine regiment would land at Blue 

Beach, three miles to the south of Red Beach. 

Both “beaches” were in actuality built-up industrial areas largely bounded by sea 

walls. Vehicle and personnel landing craft (LCVP) and medium landing craft (LCM) were 

responsible for deploying the leathernecks to shore at Red Beach. Tracked landing vehicles 

(LVT), also known as amtracs, would transport the Marines in the first waves at Blue Beach 

because the approach crossed two miles of mud flats covered by shallow water. LCVPs 

would bring in the rest of the regiment in later waves. Navy and Marine planners concluded 

that both beachheads were defensible, even though separated by the built-up section of 

Inchon. 

The planners paid special attention to logistics support, which would be vital to the success of not only the initial assault on Inchon but also the breakout to Seoul. They knew that 

the existing port facilities were rudimentary, and even those would probably be destroyed 

in combat. Initially, all material would have to be moved across the beach. In addition, 

the narrow approaches from the sea would allow only a few ships at a time to operate off 

Inchon. 

The Navy’s LSTs, which were designed to operate in shallow water and unload cargo 

directly onto the beach, were key to success at Inchon. Doyle assembled 17 U.S. Navy LSTs 

and 30 Japanese-manned SCAJAP vessels. The admiral, understanding the importance of 

keeping the Marines supplied with ammunition and equipment in the early, critical stage 

of the landing, planned to leave some of his LSTs aground as the evening tide receded. 

They would be replaced by other ships with the following morning’s tide. Hence, the LSTs, 

which in World War II were often referred to by their crews as “large, slow targets,” would 

in this instance be “large, stationary targets.” 

The planners knew that accurate intelligence was critical to the success of an operation as complex as an amphibious assault. Consequently, in late August, the FECOM 

acted to gather more information about the waterways leading to Inchon. On 19 August, 

the Canadian destroyer HMCS Athabaskan (DDE-219) escorted a ROK navy vessel to 

Yonghung Do, an island only 14 miles from Inchon. Lieutenant Commander Ham Myong 

Su led a small team ashore where they found the inhabitants sympathetic to the South 

Korean cause. Armed with this information, on 1 September FECOM dispatched to the 

island Navy Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, a former LST skipper. Under the noses of nearby 

NKPA island garrisons, Clark’s team gathered information on surrounding waterways. The 

The “Blackbeard of Yonghung Do” 

Accurate intelligence of Inchon and its water 

approaches was absolutely vital to the success 

of Operation Chromite, and no one did more 

to provide that information than Lieutenant 

Eugene F. Clark, a daring and resourceful naval 

officer. 

The staffs planning Chromite needed detailed 

information on the Inchon harbor, the local 

tides, the waterways leading to the port, and 

enemy defenses. While UN forces fought to 

hold the Pusan Perimeter, South Korean naval 

forces raided the peninsula’s west coast and 

occupied Yonghung Do, an island only 14 miles 

from Inchon. 

Far East Command decided to dispatch a reconnaissance team to the island under Lieutenant 

Clark. This 16-year veteran had joined the Navy 

as an enlisted man, earned a commission, and 

commanded an LST and a transport after World 

War II. Because Clark knew that Inchon was the 

actual site of the forthcoming UN invasion, he 

decided he would kill himself rather than divulge 

that information if captured by the enemy. 

During the operation, the lieutenant carried 

a grenade with him everywhere because he 

believed it to be “more certain than ... a pistol.” 

His small team included two South Korean 

interpreters, both of whom had served as officers in the Japanese military during World War 

II, and an individual identified in one account as 

a “U.S. Army major” but who may have been a 

member of a U.S. intelligence agency. 

Clark’s team landed on Yonghung Do on 1 

September and quickly organized a force of 

local men and boys to keep watch on the nearby 

enemy-held island of Taebu Do. As a gesture of 

good will, Clark dispensed rice and dried fish 

to the islanders. Clark, who later said he felt 

like Blackbeard the pirate, equipped Yonghung 

Do’s one motorized sampan with a .50-caliber 

machine gun and armed his men with carbines 

and submachine guns. To acquire information 

about the enemy, the team seized local fishing 

sampans—interrogating crewmen who generally professed loyalty to South Korea—and 

explored Inchon harbor. Clark’s young Korean 

comrades also infiltrated Inchon, Kimpo air 

base, and even Seoul and returned with valuable intelligence. 

Clark informed Tokyo that the Japaneseprepared tide tables were accurate, that the 

mud flats fronting Inchon would support no 

weight, and that the harbor’s sea walls were 

higher than estimated. Clark also reported that 

Wolmi Do was heavily fortified and studded with 

Soviet-made artillery pieces. Grateful naval 

planners incorporated these facts into the landing plan. 

The North Koreans were aware of Clark’s 

presence on Yonghung Do, but they sent only 

small parties to the island to investigate. On 7 

September, however, two days after several 

British ships bombarded Inchon, the enemy 

sent one motorized and three sailing sampans 

Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, standing at the far right, on Yonghung Do. Pictured with him are his interpreters, several 

of his young followers and, probably, a South Korean navy officer. (OPAR Manson & Cagle Papers)

22 23
loaded with troops to Clark’s hideaway. South 

Korean lookouts spotted the approaching 

boats, so Clark and his men got their “flagship” 

underway. As the antagonists closed on one 

another, a 37-millimeter antitank gun mounted 

in the bow of the Communist motorized craft 

opened up. A shell splashed well in front of 

Clark’s sampan. Undeterred by this poor shooting, and in “Nelsonian style,” Clark directed 

his flagship to close to within 100 yards of the 

enemy squadron. His .50-caliber machine gun 

raked two of the North Korean vessels, sinking 

one and demolishing another. Witnessing this 

slaughter, the remaining boats fled the scene. 

After Clark reported this engagement to headquarters, the destroyer Hanson (DD-832) 

showed up to take off the team. Clark, who had 

not asked to be extracted, instead requested 

Hanson’s skipper to pound Taebu Do. Hanson

blasted the island with 212 five-inch rounds, and 

Marine Corsairs covering the destroyer also 

bombed and strafed the North Korean lair. 

The team stayed on the island and continued 

their mission. Clark scouted Palmi Do, an island 

centrally located in the approaches to Inchon, 

and reported that Canadian raiders had only 

damaged the lighthouse beacon. Tokyo ordered 

Clark to relight the lamp at midnight on the 15th. 

On 14 September, Clark’s team left Yonghung 

Do for Palmi Do and repaired the light. 

Meanwhile, the North Korean commander 

at Inchon sent a contingent to wipe out the 

bothersome force on Yonghung Do. At dusk 

on the 14th, the enemy troops crossed the 

mud flats from Taebu Do to Yonghung Do. The 

Communists overwhelmed the island defenders and executed over 50 men, women, and 

children. 

Clark avenged their sacrifice for the UN cause 

when he activated the beacon atop the lighthouse at midnight on 15 September. With this 

light to guide them, the ships of the Advance 

Attack Group safely threaded their way through 

the treacherous approach to Inchon. 

In recognition of his heroic work off Inchon, the 

Navy awarded Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark the 

Silver Star, and the Army presented him with 

the Legion of Merit. 

lieutenant informed Tokyo that the Japanese tide tables were accurate, the area’s mud flats 

would support no weight, sea walls were higher than estimated, and Wolmi Do was heavily 

fortified and bristled with numerous artillery pieces. Clark reported that even though 

the Canadians had disabled Palmi Do lighthouse, it was easily repairable. Tokyo told the 

intrepid officer to relight the beacon just after midnight on 15 September. 

A Time of Deception and Uncertainty 

As important as it was to provide friendly forces with current intelligence, it was 

absolutely vital to deny the enemy information on the UN landing site. Without the 

element of surprise, the Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers might find a heavily armed 

and dug-in enemy waiting for them at Inchon. 

To prevent such a catastrophe, MacArthur’s command staged an elaborate deception 

operation. The purpose was to encourage the North Koreans to believe the landing would 

occur at Kunsan, 105 miles south of Inchon. FEAF bombers began isolating Kunsan on 5 

September by bombing roadways and bridges leading to the port. On 6 September, Admiral 

Andrewes’s cruisers and destroyers bombarded Kunsan, a day after shelling Inchon. During 

early September, planes from HMS Triumph and Badoeng Strait hit railroads and bridges 

from Kunsan north to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, ROK navy small boats raided enemy positions along the west coast. Disinformation was also part of the deception effort. On a Pusan 

dock, Marine officers briefed their men about the landing beaches at Kunsan despite the 

numerous Koreans within earshot. 

As the actual landing date came closer, activity near Kunsan increased. In addition to 

the regular FEAF attacks, on 11 September B-29 bombers struck Kunsan’s military installations. During the night of 12–13 September, the British frigate HMS Whitesand Bay (F-633) 

landed U.S. Army special operations troops and Royal Marine Commandos on the docks, 

who made sure the enemy knew of their short presence ashore. 

“Scratch One,” by Navy combat artist Herbert Hahn, depicts carrier planes dropping bridge spans in the campaign to 

deny enemy front-line units supplies and reinforcements. (Navy Art Collection 88-191-BA)

Air Force Douglas B-26 Invaders 

of the 3rd Bomb Group (Light) 

fire rockets at boxcars and other 

targets in the rail yard at lri, near 

Kunsan. Attacks like this one were 

intended to deceive the North 

Koreans about the true site of the 

forthcoming Allied amphibious 

landing. NASM 4A 39327

24 25
FECOM worked even harder to keep the true destination of Admiral Struble’s task 

force secret. With men, supplies, and ships concentrating in the ports of Japan and at 

Pusan, there was no way to hide the fact that an amphibious operation was about to take 

place. So widespread was the speculation that the press in Japan referred to the impending 

landing as “Operation Common Knowledge.” Confirming MacArthur’s worst fears, in 

early September, counterintelligence agents uncovered a North Korean–Japanese spy ring. 

When the leader of the ring was arrested, he had a copy of the Chromite operation plan. No 

one knew if he had been able to transmit the plan to Pyongyang. 

Not only were UN commanders uncertain about how the North Koreans would react 

to an amphibious assault, but also about how the Chinese and Soviets would respond. 

Communist ships and aircraft operated from bases that were only 100 miles from UN fleet 

units in the Yellow Sea. The 80 submarines of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet at Vladivostok 

also posed a potential threat. U.S. submarines, surface ships, and patrol aircraft, based on 

shore and afloat, maintained a constant watch in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan to 

detect any hostile activities. 

Anxiety rose on 4 September when the radar picket destroyer Herbert J. Thomas (DDR833) picked up an unidentified aircraft contact heading from Port Arthur in Manchuria 

toward the UN task force in the Yellow Sea. Air controllers vectored a flight of four Fighter 

Squadron 53 Vought F4U Corsairs from the combat air patrol toward the intruder. Thirty 

miles north of Task Force 77, the Corsair pilots saw one twin-engined plane dive and head 

for Korea. The flight leader, Lieutenant (jg) Richard E. Downs, closed on the suspicious 

aircraft. It was an American-made Douglas A-20 Havoc light bomber, many of which were 

provided to the USSR in the World War II lend-lease program. The A-20, emblazoned with 

the red star of the Soviet air force, suddenly fired at Downs. After receiving permission 

from Valley Forge, Downs opened up on the “hostile.” Downs overshot the target, but his 

wingman riddled the bomber and sent it slamming into the ocean. When crewmen from 

Herbert J. Thomas recovered the pilot’s body, they confirmed that he was a Russian. Leaders 

in Washington and Tokyo wondered if this event presaged Soviet and possibly Chinese 

intervention in the war. 

Into the Gale 

Soon after the ships of Admiral Doyle’s amphibious armada put to sea from the ports 

of Kobe and Yokohama, Japan, they faced age-old enemies—howling winds and 

raging waters. Navy weather planes and aerologists had warned Doyle days earlier that 

Typhoon Kezia was headed his way, which caused him to speed up the fleet’s loading and 

departure process. Hard work on the docks and on board the ships allowed the task force 

to sortie by 11 September, one day ahead of schedule. Doyle’s flagship, Mount McKinley

(AGC-7), already being pounded by the rising swell, was the last vessel to leave Kobe. Still, 

on the 12th, Kezia battered the fleet with 90-knot winds and massive waves. Doyle later 

described it as the worst storm he ever experienced. 

The tempest sorely tested the ships and Sailors of the flotilla. After losing her port 

engine, LST 1048 had to fight to maintain steerageway. The salvage ship Conserver (ARS39) came alongside the struggling landing ship and floated down a hawser. Working on a 

wet, pitching deck, the LST’s sea and anchor detail chocked the line into place and soon 

had secured a towing cable passed by Conserver. While only making six knots, the two ships 

proceeded together and reached Inchon on time for the fight. 

On 12 September, Captain Norman Sears’s Advance Attack Group and three attack 

transports stood out of Pusan with the 5th Marines embarked. After a second Naktong 

Bulge battle, the regiment barely had time to refit and integrate reinforcements from the 

United States. Before leaving Pusan, Marine leaders selected Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. 

Taplett’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, to make the initial assault on Wolmi Do. 

Meanwhile, Doyle’s Mount McKinley steered for Sasebo, Japan. There, MacArthur 

came on board with his entourage, which included ten of the general’s favorite journalists, 

all of whom Doyle later quipped “wanted to travel in the light of the sun.” They joined 

Major General Edward M. Almond, Commander X Corps; Lieutenant General Lemuel C. 

Shepherd, Commander Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Major General Oliver P. Smith, 

Commander 1st Marine Division, and their respective staffs, all of them cramped in one 

relatively small ship. 

The ships of Task Force 90 faced perilous seas, such as those depicted in Herbert Hahn’s “Heavy Weather,” as they fought 

to make way during Typhoon Kezia. (Navy Art Collection. 88-191-C)

26 27
By 14 September, the entire invasion force was headed for the Yellow Sea and Inchon. 

Admiral Struble’s Joint Task Force 7 comprised forces from nine nations, including 230 

warships, amphibious ships, and auxiliaries; the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry 

Division; 21 aircraft squadrons; and special amphibious, engineer, logistics, and UDT units. 

His subordinate, Admiral Doyle, was responsible for executing the actual assault and getting 

the Marine and Army troops ashore. 

As laid out in Joint Task Force 7 Operations Plan 950, Struble divided his command into 

six components. The aircraft of the Fast Carrier Force (Task Force 77) flew fighter cover, 

interdiction, and ground attack missions. Admiral Andrewes’s Blockade and Covering 

Force (Task Force 91) carried out prelanding deception operations with naval gunfire 

and air strikes, protected the amphibious force from surface and air threats, and patrolled 

the waters off the west coast of Korea. The patrol squadrons and seaplane tenders of 

Rear Admiral George R. Henderson’s Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (Task Force 99) 

stood ready to provide aerial escort for the transports and search the surrounding waters. 

Logistics support was the responsibility of Captain Bernard L. Austin’s Service Squadron 3 

(Task Force 79).

As detailed in Amphibious Group 1 Operation Order 14-50, Doyle led the major invasion element, the Attack Force (Task Force 90). This formation included all the amphibious 

and transport ships, a gunfire support group, and the escort carriers embarking Marine air 

squadrons. Additional Navy transports, Military Sea Transportation Service ships, and 

chartered merchantmen would start bringing in the 7th Division on 18 September. Once a 

beachhead was established, Almond would take charge of forces ashore and direct their 

push toward Seoul and the UN forces advancing north from Pusan.

Fast transport Wantuck (APO-125) and dock landing ship Comstock (LSD-19), loaded with 

Marines and their equipment, shape a course for Inchon. (NA 80-G-423221)

‘‘Ten Enemy Vessels Approaching’’ 

On the morning of 13 September, 

Rear Admiral John M. Higgins’s 

gunfire support ships steamed 

up the narrow channel toward Inchon. 

At 1010, during the day’s first flood tide, 

destroyers Mansfield, De Haven, Lyman 

K. Swenson (DD-729), Collett (DD-730), 

Gurke (DD-783), and Henderson (DD785), followed by cruisers Rochester, 

Toledo, HMS Jamaica, and HMS Kenya, 

entered the outer harbor. Aware that one 

disabled ship could block the vital channel, 

destroyer officers had their boatswain’s 

mates rig towing gear to quickly pull a 

damaged or grounded ship out of the way. 

Repair parties, armed with Browning 

automatic rifles, carbines, and submachine 

guns, stood by to repel enemy boarders 

who might attack from nearby sampans 

or the mud flats. Overhead, a combat air 

patrol of Task Force 77 Grumman F9F 

Panther jets provided cover. 

At 1145, a lookout on Mansfield

cried out, “Mines!” Commander Oscar 

B. Lundgren, De Haven’s commanding 

officer and a mine warfare expert, spied 

the menacing black shapes of 17 contact 

mines. The three leading destroyers fired 

on the mines with their 20mm and 40mm 

guns, plus small arms. A thunderous 

explosion tore through the air, and a 

plume of muddy water leapt skyward 

as one mine exploded. Captain Halle C. 

Allen, Commander Destroyer Squadron 

9, ordered Henderson to stay behind and 

eliminate the remaining mines. Soon 

afterward, the destroyer Sailors discovered from the piles of Soviet-made mines they spied 

ashore, that the enemy was in the process of completely mining the water approaches to 

Inchon. 

As the ships moved to their firing positions, propeller-driven Douglas AD Skyraiders 

from Philippine Sea blasted Wolmi Do with bombs, rockets, and gunfire. The cruisers 

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander Task Force 90; 

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander Joint Task 

Force 7; and Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, Commander 

Task Group 90.6, confer on board Struble’s flagship, 

heavy cruiser Rochester (CA-124), on 13 September 1950.

(NHHC 80-G-668791)

As many American bluejackets before them in the 200-year 

history of the U.S. Navy, these Lyman K. Swenson (DD729) Sailors—left to right) Fire Control Seaman Byron M.

Waters and Seamen Lavon Shaw, Warren F. Rosenberger 

and Rodolfo Rodreguez—prepare weapons to repel boarders as the destroyer approaches Inchon. (NA 80-G-420046)

28 29
remained in the outer harbor, while the destroyers dropped anchor above and below the 

island. The destroyers swung on their anchors on the incoming tide, bows downstream, 

prepared to exit quickly, if necessary. The gunners loaded their five-inch guns, trained them 

to port, and located their assigned targets. 

“Ten enemy vessels approaching Inchon,” the North Korean commander radioed in the 

clear to NKPA headquarters in Pyongyang. He added, “Many aircraft are bombing Wolmi 

Do. There is every indication that the enemy will perform a landing.” The Communist 

officer assured his superiors that his defense force was prepared for action and would throw 

the enemy back into the sea. 

De Haven’s gun director, Lieutenant Arthur T. White, saw North Korean soldiers run 

out and load a gun just north of Red Beach. White requested permission to open fire, and 

Lundgren gave it. De Haven’s fire, which quickly eliminated the enemy weapon, proved to 

be the opening salvo of the prelanding bombardment. 

The after turret on Toledo (CA133) fires a salvo of eight-inch 

rounds at targets near Inchon 

during the preinvasion bombardment. (NA 80-G-419913)

North Korean guns emplaced ashore 

returned the fire of the Allied surface ships, 

sometimes with telling effect� (Left to 

right) Pipefitter 3rd Class George Broome, 

Seaman Apprentice Edgar O� Smith, and 

Engineman 1st Class David L� Bollingham 

pose with a hole blown in the destroyer 

Collett (DD-730) by a Communist 76mm gun� 

(NA 80-G-420889)

The object of this effort was to stimulate the enemy guns in Inchon and emplaced on 

Wolmi Do to return fire so the UN ships could target and destroy them. For a long eight 

minutes, the North Koreans failed to rise to the bait. But then the defenders, men of the 

918th Coastal Artillery Regiment, wheeled out their weapons—mainly Soviet-made 76mm 

antitank guns—and opened fire, hitting Collett seven times, Gurke three. The response was 

devastating. The gunfire support ships poured 998 five-inch rounds into the island and 

defenses in front of the city. At 1347, with many enemy guns silenced, Allen signaled the 

retirement order to his destroyers, which headed for the open sea. The cruisers provided 

covering fire for this movement and then brought up the rear of the column. 

Before the ships could clear the harbor, however, one of the few remaining Communist 

guns exacted revenge on Lyman K. Swenson. Two North Korean shells exploded just off 

the destroyer’s port side, killing Lieutenant (jg) David H. Swenson. Enemy fire wounded 

another eight men in the bombardment force that day. 

That night Higgins and Allen conferred with Struble in Rochester. Although pleased 

with the day’s action, Struble ordered the ships and aircraft to give Wolmi Do “a real working-over” the following day. The mine threat remained because gunfire had eliminated only 

three of the devices, and the task force minesweepers were several hundred miles away 

from Inchon. Because of the lack of small combatants, the minesweepers had been assigned 

to troop transport escort duty. Struble now ordered the ships to make best speed to the 

operational area, even though they would not arrive until 15 September. Soon after midnight, the admiral dismissed his officers so they could grab a few hours of sleep and prepare 

for the next day’s combat. 

The following morning, the ships of the bombardment group hove to, with colors at 

half-mast and crews at quarters. A boatswain’s mate in Toledo piped “All hands to bury the 

dead.” After a simple service, a Marine rifle salute, and the playing of “Taps,” bluejackets 

committed Lieutenant (jg) Swenson’s remains to the deep. Somber but determined after 

this ceremony, the men of the cruiser-destroyer group again prepared for action. 

Sailors prepare to commit the body of Lieutenant (jg) David Swenson to the deep on the morning of 14 

September. (NA 80-G-420016)

30 31
The ships once again moved up Flying Fish Channel. As the force closed Inchon, Toledo

fired on one mine, exploding it. The damaged Collett dropped off and destroyed another 

five of the deadly “weapons that wait.” 

At 1116, when they came in range of targets ashore, the cruisers loosed a salvo. NKPA 

gunners then opened up on HMS Kenya, the closest cruiser to shore. Captain Patrick W. 

Brock, RN, Kenya’s skipper, felt that “the enemy gunners were either very brave or very 

stupid,” because even before the cruiser could return fire, attack aircraft obliterated the 

offending guns. In the next 75 minutes, the destroyers hurled over 1,700 five-inch shells into 

Wolmi Do. The cruisers reentered the fray and, as Marine and British Fleet Air Arm pilots 

spotted targets, they blasted positions near Inchon and on Wolmi Do. One Valley Forge pilot 

observed that “the whole island,” referring to the once-wooded Wolmi Do, ‘‘looked like it 

had been shaved.” 

The Advance Attack Group, then in the Yellow Sea, stood in toward Flying Fish 

Channel. Near dusk and sixty-five miles from the objective, Commander Clarence T. Doss 

Jr., in charge of three rocket bombardment ships (LSMRs), spied a huge pillar of smoke on 

the horizon to the east. Doss knew this meant that UN ships and planes were plastering the 

enemy defenders. He passed that “welcome news” to all hands. 

‘‘Land the Landing Force’’ 

J

ust after midnight on D day, 15 September, the Advance Attack Group and the bombardment group formed into an 18-ship column and entered Flying Fish Channel. Two 

hours later, lookouts in the lead ships noticed a rhythmically flashing light in the darkness ahead of them. The rotating beacon atop the Palmi Do lighthouse guided each ship 

safely through the narrow passage. Lieutenant Clark, who had activated the light, shivered 

in his lofty perch not only from the chilly night air but also from the thrill of seeing the fleet 

steaming into Inchon. 

At 0508, Mount McKinley dropped anchor in the channel, and the gunfire support ships 

and amphibious vessels moved to their assigned positions. At 0520, Doyle hoisted the 

traditional signal that had preceded many amphibious assaults in naval history: “Land the 

landing force.” 

Marines in Horace A. Bass, 

Naval gunfire from heavy cruiser Toledo

(CA-133) explodes a Soviet-made sea 

mine in the approaches to Inchon on 14 

September. If the enemy had had more time 

to lay mines off Inchon, the result might 

have been disastrous to the operation.

 (NA 80-G-419911)

Diachenko (APD-123), and Wantuck

(APD-125) climbed into the LCVPs 

that would carry them to shore. 

Fort Marion (LSD-22) prepared to 

disgorge three utility landing ships 

carrying tanks and equipment. At 

0540, the cruisers and destroyers 

inaugurated the third day of shelling 

Wolmi Do and other targets in and 

around Inchon. Soon after first light, 

Marine Corsairs launched from 

Badoeng Strait and Sicily and once 

again churned up Wolmi Do with 

bombs, rockets, and machine gun 

fire. Task Force 77 fighters formed 

combat air patrols to seaward and 

scoured the roads behind Inchon for 

enemy reinforcements and supplies. 

Fifteen minutes before L hour, 

set for 0630, two of the ungainly 

LSMRs began an ear-splitting, 

2,000-rocket barrage of the reverse 

slope of Radio Hill on Wolmi Do. 

Their object was to destroy any 

remaining mortar positions and 

prevent reserves from reaching the 

defenders of the island. Commander 

Doss’s third ship, LSMR 403, moved 

in front of the LCVPs on their way 

to the shore and raked Green Beach with rockets and 40mm fire. That done, signalmen on 

the control vessel lowered flags signaling the assault. The coxswains in the first wave put 

their controls at full throttle, and the landing craft roared across the line of departure. 

To cover the final run into the beach, Corsairs from VMF-214 and VMF-323 screamed 

over the LCVPs and strafed the shoreline. Two destroyers using proximity-fuzed ammunition scoured the forward slope of Observatory Hill and the waterfront with deadly airbursts 

of shrapnel. 

At 0633, G and H Companies of Colonel Taplett’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, stormed 

ashore. When three men stepped off one LCVP, they sank in water well over their heads. 

Not wanting a repeat of the tragic experience at Tarawa in World War II when many 

Marines drowned because they had to move long distances through neck-high water, the 

boat crews moved their vessels closer to the shore. Succeeding waves brought in the rest 

of Taplett’s Marines and ten M-26 Pershing tanks, including one equipped with a flamethrower and two more with bulldozer blades. 

Plan for the Inchon assault showing the three beaches and the planned 

positions for gunfire support destroyers and LSMRs. (USMC)

32 33
The Marines advanced rapidly across the island. Company H seized and fortified the 

Wolmi Do end of the causeway to Inchon, while engineers sprinted onto the roadway to lay 

an antitank minefield. Company G assaulted Radio Hill and by 0655 the stars and stripes 

flew over that position. 

Meanwhile, Taplett landed with his I Company, which moved into areas supposedly 

secured by the assault units. North Korean troops, hidden in caves on the east side of the 

island, fired on several I Company squads. When, despite the pleas of a Marine interpreter, 

the NKPA soldiers refused to surrender, a tankdozer entombed them in their positions. 

By 0800, Taplett reported Wolmi Do secured. His leathernecks dug in to fend off any 

counterattacks and herded the few prisoners of war (POWs) into a dry swimming pool. 

Some of the NKPA soldiers fought to the last; others, especially local Koreans recently 

“recruited” by the Communists, readily surrendered. Fanatical enemy troops, however, 

soon opened up from the nearby islet of Sowolmi Do with light antiaircraft weapons. A 

reinforced rifle squad and several tanks rapidly moved against them. Supported by Marine 

Corsairs, the ground force quickly silenced the enemy guns. 

With the outer harbor secured, at the cost of only 17 wounded, the first phase was now 

over. General MacArthur asked Doyle to send the following message to Task Force 90: 

“The Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning.” With a large 

smile, the old soldier then turned to the Army, Navy, and Marine officers gathered on 

Doyle’s flagship and said, “That’s it. Let’s get a cup of coffee.” As he drank his cup of thick 

Navy java, MacArthur penned a message to General Bradley and the other Joint Chiefs: 

“First phase landing successful with losses slight. All goes well and on schedule.” 

With the first waves safely ashore 

on Wolmi Do, General MacArthur 

and several of his key officers 

share a light moment on the 

bridge of Mount McKinley (AGC7). Standing behind MacArthur 

are (left to right) Rear Admiral 

Doyle, Brigadier General Edwin 

K. Wright, and Major General 

Edward Almond, Commander of 

the X Corps. (NHHC SC-348448)

A Short Interlude 

Now began the long, eight-hour 

wait as the tide receded and rose 

and the sun began to set in the 

direction of the Yellow Sea. Not until 

then could the other Marine units storm 

Red and Blue beaches. The Navy-Marine 

task force did not stand idly by during 

this period. The troops on Wolmi Do 

improved their fighting positions, and 

naval combatants and aircraft continued to 

pound the enemy on the mainland. 

During this temporary lull in the 

battle, Admiral Struble’s barge came 

alongside Mount McKinley, and he asked 

if anyone would like to tag along with 

him for a closer look at Wolmi Do and 

the other beaches. “Certainly,” replied 

MacArthur. Soon, the general, Almond, 

Shepherd, and three other flag-rank 

officers joined Struble in his barge. After 

inspecting Green Beach, they moved over 

toward Red Beach. Shepherd reminded 

MacArthur that because the boat was less 

than 1,000 yards from shore, an enemy soldier might “take a pot shot” at the commander of 

all UN forces in the Korean theater. Struble promptly ordered his coxswain to return to the 

flagship. 

Meanwhile, in response to the seizure of Wolmi Do, the enemy headquarters in Seoul 

frantically ordered the 70th Regiment near Suwon and the 18th Division, then approaching 

the Pusan Perimeter, to head toward Inchon. But this action was tardy, because despite two 

days of bombardment and the garrison commander’s warning on the 13th, North Korean 

authorities did not believe Inchon to be the site of the main amphibious assault. No doubt 

thanks to the UN deception operations, Communist commanders were fixated on Kunsan 

until too late. The enemy reinforcements would not be able to reach the battle area by the 

evening of the 15th, when the Navy-Marine assault forces would hit Red and Blue beaches. 

The NKPA garrison at Inchon, composed of the 226th Marine and 918th Coastal 

Artillery Regiments, was a motley force that included some South Koreans forced into 

service. The 226th had been further weakened when headquarters earlier sent a large 

detachment toward Yonghung Do to knock out Clark’s guerrillas. In addition, after the loss 

of Wolmi Do, the best-prepared position in the harbor, the 918th was in bad shape. 

The North Korean defensive effort was further hampered by attacks every hour and a 

half by eight Marine Corsairs, which dropped fragmentation bombs and napalm. The latter 

A Soviet-made 76.2mm antitank gun, emplaced by the 

enemy on one of the strategic hills overlooking the harbor 

of Inchon, rests in silence after the battle. (NA 80-G-420387)

34 35
ordnance was especially effective against enemy troops, whether dug in or exposed. In 

addition, to keep pressure on the enemy, 12 Navy carrier aircraft rotated between Yellow 

Sea combat air patrol and strike operations inland. 

One of the latter missions proved to be extremely lucrative. While flying along the road 

to Suwon, Ensign Eldon W. Brown Jr. of VF-53 stitched a long row of neatly stacked 

wooden crates with machine gun fire. When the rounds impacted, there was a massive 

explosion, the force of which violently jolted Brown’s plane. He climbed quickly, but an 

enveloping cloud of dust and debris passed him at 4,000 feet. In Inchon harbor, miles away, 

ships rocked at their anchors. Mount McKinley radioed the strike leader, Lieutenant 

Commander Joseph M. Murphy, and asked him, “What the hell happened?” Murphy 

replied dryly, “We just exploded some ammunition.” 

On that critical day, 15 September, 

aircraft carrier Boxer arrived on station 

and ready for battle, culminating two 

months of Herculean effort by her crew. 

During that time, the ship crossed the 

vast expanse of the Pacific three times, 

fighting typhoon Kezia on the last passage, 

to transport badly needed aircraft to UN 

forces in the Korean theater. But this effort 

took its toll on a ship that was scheduled 

for an overhaul before the outbreak of 

war. Early on the 15th, a reduction gear 

in the engineering plant suffered a major 

casualty. With no time to lose, the chief 

engineer and his engine room crew, or 

“snipes,” used their skills and experience 

to coax 26 knots out of the damaged 

propulsion system. Through their efforts, 

Boxer was able to join Task Force 77 and 

launch her first air strike on time in support of the Inchon landing. 

As the day wore on, elements of Naval 

Beach Group 1’s Amphibious Construction 

Battalion—the Seabees—came in with the 

tide. Off Wolmi Do, they began building 

a pontoon dock and causeway, but the vicious tides carried away two sections. Despite 

this setback, the Seabees completed the pontoon causeway in time for the twilight assault. 

Meanwhile, other Seabees crossed Wolmi Do. They would advance with Taplett’s men an 

hour after the Red Beach landing to determine the extent of damage to the harbor facilities 

and sea walls. 

At 1445, for the second time that day, Doyle ordered his signalmen to communicate 

the order to the amphibious force, “Land the landing force.” To prepare the beaches for 

the 1730 H hour, Higgins’s destroyers and cruisers increased the tempo of their fire. Toledo

Engine room personnel, often called the “black gang” 

or “snipes,” had to use all their skills to maintain speed 

to make sure that their ships arrived on time off Inchon.

(NA 80-G-419918)

and Rochester slammed salvos of eight-inch rounds into the roads east of Inchon, creating 

a gauntlet of steel for enemy reinforcements trying to reach the city. The British cruisers 

blasted the area around Blue Beach while De Haven and Lyman K. Swenson shelled the 

buildings near Red Beach. The structures near the waterfront belched fire and smoke. Navy 

Skyraiders and Marine Corsairs, whose missions were coordinated by a team from Tactical 

Air Control Squadron 1 in Mount McKinley, added their firepower to the maelstrom. 

Meanwhile, off Red Beach, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 5th Marine Regiment 

climbed down rope nets draped on the sides of Henrico (APA-45) and Cavalier (APA-37) 

and joined their comrades crowding into the LCVPs and LCMs bobbing alongside. In front 

of Green Beach, the men of the 11th Marines prepared to go ashore. Farther south, the 1st 

Marines squeezed into LVTs for the long ride over the mud flats to Blue Beach. 

For many of these Marine veterans of World War II amphibious assaults, the Inchon 

operation was different. In the bottom of each landing craft were two long planks that the 

men could use to reach shore if their vessels got stuck in the mud. Other landing craft carried wooden or aluminum ladders with hooks at the top for scaling sea walls. In other boats, 

Marines stood by with sledgehammers to pound grappling hooks attached to cargo nets 

into the sea walls. 

During the 20 minutes before H hour, the shore bombardment force fired as many 

rounds as it had in the previous nine hours. Rochester and Toledo plastered the hills of 

Inchon, while the destroyers scoured the landing areas with airbursts. Like her two sisters 

off Blue Beach, LSMR 403 sent 2,000 five-inch rockets, at the rate of 100 per minute, 

screaming over the heads of the Marines and Sailors heading for Red Beach. 

Despite all this firepower, the enemy dropped rounds into the wave of approaching 

boats. Before the fire of a destroyer off Blue Beach knocked out an NKPA gun, rounds 

from this weapon destroyed one LVT with a direct hit. Gurke and close-air-support 

planes quickly silenced a high-velocity gun on Observatory Hill that tried to duel with the 

Americans. Flying a massive ensign, the small, unarmored LSMR 401 engaged another 

enemy weapon with her single five-inch gun. Even though the gun crew had to manually 

ram shells into the breach because of a mechanical problem, they kept up a high rate of fire 

that scorched paint off the barrel. 

Navy LCVPs, loaded with Marines 

of the 5th Regiment, proceed in 

formation for the line of departure 

on the approach to Red Beach. The 

crudely built ladders standing erect 

in the bows of these craft enabled the 

Marines to scale the high sea walls 

barring their way to inland objectives.

(NA W&C #1418)

36 37
Storming Ashore at Red Beach 

I

n this crescendo of exploding bombs, rockets, and shells, Horace A. Bass, the control 

ship for Red Beach, gave the signal for assault. Coxswains in the eight LCVPs of the first 

wave gunned their engines and conned their boats across the line of departure. Corsairs 

strafing the beach rained 20mm shell casings on the Sailors and Marines in the landing craft. 

The assault forces welcomed all of this extra firepower. The causeway on the right 

flank of Red Beach reminded Marine Captain Francis I. “Ike” Fenton Jr., Commander of 

Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, of the bloody World War II battle of Tarawa. Fenton 

considered the worst—if the enemy occupied the causeway, “we were going to have a tough 

time making that last 200 yards to the beach.” 

At 1731, the first LCVP hit the sea wall just ahead of the others in the boat wave. 

Coxswains skillfully used their engines to hold their boats in place as Marines tossed grenades over the wall. Amidst the explosions, ladders clattered against the rocks, and riflemen 

scrambled “over the top.” NKPA machine gunners in the few bunkers still unscathed 

sprayed the top of this rampart, cutting down some leathernecks and pinning others near 

the sea wall. The Marines had landed, but just barely. 

Nearby, a Navy coxswain rammed his LCVP into a breach in the sea wall. The Marines 

stormed ashore right under a machine gun, fortunately silent, which protruded from a 

pillbox. This platoon from Company A quickly grenaded the position, and six wounded 

Koreans stumbled out to surrender. Marines rapidly cleared nearby trenches, advanced into 

town, and secured the massive Asahi Brewery on the flank of Cemetery Hill. At the base of 

the Wolmi Do causeway, Company E occupied the Nippon Flour Company compound. 

Not everything at Red Beach went so well. Most of Company A was pinned down, 

and the second wave troops crashed in amongst them. First Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez 

silenced one pillbox and moved to attack a second when an enemy burst hit him. Lopez 

fell on the grenade he was about to throw, sacrificing his life to save his men. The NKPA 

gunners continued to fire, killing two more Marines. Company A finally destroyed the pillbox, but above them loomed Cemetery Hill. Then, the platoon at the brewery attacked the 

back side of the hill and captured several dozen dazed enemy infantrymen. These victories 

had a cost; eight Marines lay dead on the little flat in front of the graveyard knoll, and Navy 

corpsmen tended another 28 wounded leathernecks. 

Although the 5th Marines held Cemetery Hill, the NKPA still threatened Red Beach. 

Observatory and British Consulate hills remained in enemy hands and until they fell, 

Communist troops could fire directly into the landing area. It was especially critical that the 

Marines on Red Beach take the high ground because the assault waves would be followed 

by the LSTs loaded with ammunition, vehicles, and supplies. Without this resupply, it was 

unlikely that the Marines could hold their positions overnight. 

The consolidation of Red Beach continued, but in ragged fashion. One passenger in the 

fifth wave, New York Herald-Tribune reporter Marguerite Higgins, remarked on the scene. 

She described a “strange sunset combined with the haze of flaming docks,” which created 

a panorama “that a movie audience would have considered overdone.” Poor visibility contributed to a breakdown in coordination. The LCVPs of the fourth and fifth waves became 

intermingled, and many touched land in the wrong areas. These boats carried the two 

infantry companies that were to seize the most important position in Inchon, Observatory 

Hill. Hindered by battle smoke and a late afternoon drizzle, it took the two companies 

several minutes to reorganize ashore. One platoon and a mortar section, however, almost 

immediately struck out for their objective. 

Meanwhile, the eight LSTs destined for Red Beach maneuvered offshore. Each ship had 

embarked only 500 tons of supplies to lighten their loads and thus prevent grounding in the 

mud flats. All of the LSTs carried the same proportion of food, water, ammunition, fuel, 

and vehicles, ensuring that the loss of any one ship would not be catastrophic. Doyle’s staff 

calculated that the Marines needed a minimum of 3,000 tons of material to hold during the 

night. The planners also figured that because of the hostile environment of Inchon harbor 

and expected enemy opposition, two of the eight ships would be lost. At 1630, in the wake 

of the assault waves, LST 859 crossed the line of departure. She was followed at five-minute 

intervals by her seven sisters. The LST skippers knew this would be a difficult approach, 

even in a nonbattle situation, and what they saw ahead of them heightened their anxiety. 

Gun flashes from the battle at Cemetery Hill dominated the north end of Red Beach. Large 

groups of Marines hugged the waterfront in the center of the beach, apparently unable to 

advance inland.

By the time the second ship, LST 975, crossed the line, LST 859 was already taking fire. 

Communist gunners on Observatory Hill sprayed the landing ships with heavy machine gun 

rounds, and rifle bullets clanged on their superstructures. NKPA mortars firing from within 

the city quickly struck several ships. A fire began to blaze among the ammunition trucks on 

board LST 914, but alert Sailors and Marines put it out with CO2 canisters and fog dispensers. A burst of automatic weapon fire holed eight drums of gasoline on LST 857, and the 

deck ran with the volatile fuel. In response, the LSTs wildly swept the beachhead with their 

three-inch, 40mm, and 20mm guns in an attempt to stop the enemy fusillade. 

Ashore, the 2nd Battalion’s Weapons and Headquarters companies came under intense 

“friendly” fire from the LSTs. These units, which had not yet suffered casualties, soon 

counted one killed and another 23 wounded. The platoon on Cemetery Hill abandoned the 

crest and harbor face for the Inchon side, preferring to confront the NKPA heavy machine 

guns on Observatory Hill rather than the LSTs’ weapons. Some Navy LST gunners, however, were on target, destroying a North Korean automatic weapon firing at the men on 

Cemetery Hill. 

Despite some disorganization and both enemy and friendly fire, the 5th Marines continued to move forward. Company E took British Consulate Hill at 1845 as the lone rifle 

platoon and mortar section seized a portion of Observatory Hill. By 2000, and after a sharp 

firefight, Fenton’s Company B secured half of the hill. Company D occupied the rest of the 

position, even though a Communist machine gun killed one Marine and wounded four 

others, including the unit’s medical corpsman. This Sailor refused evacuation until he had 

treated the wounds of his comrades and ensured their safety. 

38 39
Baldomero Lopez, A United States Marine 

1st Lieutenant Baldomero Lopez represented 

the best of the Korean War-era Marine Corps. 

Lopez displayed dedication to the Marine 

Corps, concern for his men, dynamic combat 

leadership, personal bravery, and a willingness 

to sacrifice his life for his fellow leathernecks. 

The son of an orphaned Spanish immigrant, 

Lopez enlisted in the U.S. Navy during World 

War II. He served with distinction until the service discovered that he was underage, which 

mandated his discharge. Undeterred, Lopez 

applied for and was admitted to the U.S. Naval 

Academy. Graduating in Class 1948-A on 6 June 

1947, 2nd Lieutenant Lopez entered the Marine 

Corps. Because he had boxed at the Academy, 

he earned the nickname “Punchy.” He served 

with the Marines in North China and then joined 

the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, 

California. 

Lopez was scheduled for schooling at Quantico, 

Virginia, when the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps ordered the Marine Brigade at Pendleton 

to ship out for Korea. In the words of a fellow 

Marine officer, Lopez “couldn’t stand it. Before 

the brigade sailed, Punchy swore he would 

move heaven and earth and get out to us.” Sure 

enough, Lopez was among the replacements 

when the brigade returned to Pusan after the 

Naktong battles to refit for Inchon. The eager 

officer, now a 1st Lieutenant, took command of 

the 3rd Platoon, Company A, 5th Marines. 

Company A made one of the initial assaults at 

Red Beach. Since Lopez was the only platoon 

leader without combat experience, the company 

commander placed the other two rifle platoons 

in the first wave and his in the second. Despite 

this precaution, two of the three platoons, 

including Lopez’s, were soon pinned down just 

over the sea wall. Automatic weapons fire from 

two pillboxes crisscrossed the area. With other 

waves coming in, Lopez knew that the situation 

called for decisive action. 

In the face of enemy fire, Lopez led a fire team 

in an attack on the two positions. The intrepid 

officer silenced one bunker with a grenade. Just 

as he pulled the pin of another grenade, a burst 

of machine gun fire hit him in the chest and right 

arm. Badly wounded, he dropped the grenade 

and its arming handle flew off. The entire fire 

team was now at risk. Shouting “Grenade!” the 

lieutenant swept the live ordnance against his 

side. Lopez smothered the explosion with his 

own body, sacrificing his life for the lives of his 

men. 

In recognition of this selfless act, the Navy 

Department awarded 1st Lieutenant Baldomero 

Lopez the Medal of Honor. His courage and 

self-sacrifice are remembered by fellow Marines 

when they serve with USNS Baldomero Lopez, 

a maritime prepositioning ship named in his 

honor in 1985 by the Secretary of the Navy. 

First Lieutenant Baldomermo Lopez, USMC, scales 

the sea wall at Red Beach. Minutes after this photo 

was taken, Lopez sacrificed his life to save his own 

men and earned the Medal of Honor. 

(NHHC NH 96876 )

Taking the Initiative at Blue Beach 

Meanwhile, the assault on Blue Beach had gone better. First, several U.S. destroyers and the LSMRs raked Won-do and Tok Am, small bits of land flanking the approach route taken by the landing craft, and the British cruisers shelled high 

ground just behind the beach. Then, over 170 LVTs, including 18 gun-equipped armored 

amtracs (LVT(A)s) of the Army’s 56th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, moved toward Blue 

Beach in 25 waves. The first wave, consisting of all the LVT(A)s, crossed the line of departure at 1645. With the help of four guide boats manned by Navy UDTs, the first three waves 

made landfall where they were supposed to, although some of the LVT(A)s remained just 

offshore firing on the beach. Confusion, however, soon set in among the remaining waves. 

Established procedures called for 32 guide boats to direct a landing of this size instead of 

the four available. Rainsqualls and smoke from the fighting at Inchon spread across the 

approach waters off Blue Beach, so succeeding waves could not guide on the first three. 

Visibility degenerated so quickly that the primary control ship could not even see the landing area. In addition, unanticipated crosscurrents threw many of the amtracs off course. 

A number of the more experienced amphibious warfare officers realized that a disaster 

could occur if they did not take bold action. One such Marine, Major Edwin H. Simmons, a 

veteran of World War II Pacific landings, grew concerned when the LVT in which he was 

embarked cut across several boat lanes. Simmons pulled out his map, sought out the LVT 

driver, and asked him if he had a compass. “Search me,” replied the Marine, a recently 

recalled reservist, “six weeks ago I was driving a truck in San Francisco.” Many of the other 

amtracs were manned by inexperienced crews and, because the craft had been hastily 

pulled out of storage, some lacked radios and other essential equipment. 

Amtracs carry elements of the 1st Marines toward Blue Beach as LSMR 401, positioned near Wolmi Do, fires five-inch 

rockets at enemy gun emplacements ashore. (NHHC 80-G-420024)

40 41
The Vital LST 

The Tank Landing Ship (LST), which proved so 

crucial to UN success at Inchon, was developed 

during World War II to deploy tanks, vehicles, and 

critical supplies directly onto assault beaches 

soon after infantry troops stormed ashore. The 

ships used a ballast system that allowed them 

to operate effectively on the open ocean, in 

shallow coastal waters, and on the beach. The 

LST had a 328-foot length and 50-foot beam 

and could carry a 2,100-ton load. These ships 

were the stars of many World War II amphibious 

operations, and their crews proudly served in 

them; but because the LSTs could only muster 

10 knots of speed, Sailors sometimes referred 

to them as “large, slow targets.” 

Because of defense cutbacks, by January 1950, 

only 135 of the 1,051 LSTs America produced 

during the war remained in commission worldwide. The Shipping Control Administration, 

Japan (SCAJAP), an occupation agency responsible for inter-island trade and the return of 

Japanese POWs from other parts of Asia, operated another 39 LSTs. A few others served the 

U.S. Army in Japanese waters. 

Soon after the sudden outbreak of war in 

Korea, the Navy feverishly concentrated LSTs 

in Far Eastern waters. These vessels would 

be essential to the transportation of vehicles 

and supplies from Japan and to MacArthur’s 

amphibious operations in Korea. Vice Admiral C. 

Turner Joy, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Far 

East, quickly pressed into service the SCAJAP 

and Army LSTs. Several of these ships were 

returned to Navy control in the summer of 1950 

and were manned largely by reservists recalled 

to duty. Many of these ships were in a serious 

state of disrepair. 

Lieutenant Erwin E. J. Hauber, Executive Officer 

of LST 799, described his former SCAJAP ship 

as overrun with “rats bigger than footballs” and 

stinking with the “penetrating odor of fish heads 

and urine.” The American Sailors rearmed their 

LSTs with guns removed from frigates, which 

the Navy had provided to the Soviet navy in 

the World War II lend-lease program and the 

USSR then returned to U.S. control. Test firing 

these weapons was an adventure; some of the 

20mm antiaircraft guns failed to stop firing or 

“ran away.” One gunnery officer feared that a 

decrepit three-inch gun would explode, so he 

tied a 45-foot lanyard to the firing key. 

The crews of the 17 American-manned LSTs and 

30 Japanese-manned SCAJAP LSTs of Rear 

Admiral James H. Doyle’s Task Force 90 performed small miracles to prepare their ships for 

Operation Chromite. For instance, when 

Lieutenant (jg) Leslie H. Joslin, MSC, was 

ordered to set up an operating room on board 

LST 898, the officer and his men turned to 

Joslin’s resourceful team and scrubbed the 

small, filthy space assigned to them, brought on 

board a mountain of supplies, “scrounged” 

medicines from the Army, and installed an operating table that they had removed from mothballed U.S. ships tied up at Kobe since World 

War II. Thanks to the ingenuity and plain hard 

work of American and Japanese Sailors, when 

LST 898 and her sister ships departed for 

Inchon, they were ready for action. 

The SCAJAPsbeached at Wolmi Do, 19 September 1950. Visually uninspiring, the Navy and SCAJAP LSTs were essential to the success of the Inchon landing. (NA 80-G-426420)

Despite these handicaps, company-grade Navy and Marine officers took the initiative 

to restore order and put the troops ashore at the best locations. Even though the amtracs 

landed most of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, two miles to the left of their designated beach, 

others disgorged their passengers close to intended landing areas near the sea wall. Thirty 

minutes after H hour, the units at Blue Beach started moving inland. 

For a second time that day, the senior UN commanders decided they needed a closer 

look at Inchon. In the fading daylight and with mortar rounds exploding in the water 

nearby, Admiral Struble’s barge brought Generals MacArthur, Shepherd, and Almond 

alongside the sea wall at Blue Beach. A Marine noncommissioned officer bellowed, with 

characteristic directness, “Lay off, you stupid bastards! We’re going to blast a hole in the 

wall!” With equal vigor the coxswain retorted, “This is Admiral Struble’s barge!” The leatherneck responded, “I don’t give a shit whose barge it is, get it clear before I blow the sea 

wall!” An amused Struble directed the coxswain to back off immediately. Thirty seconds 

later, a large section of sea wall was blown sky high. 

Meanwhile, the Marines at Blue Beach pressed on toward their objectives. On the 

right flank, an LVT silenced a machine gun nest in a tower 500 yards inland, and the 3rd 

Battalion, 1st Marines, seized several commanding hills and forced an NKPA company to 

flee their well-prepared positions on Tok Am. On the left flank, the regiment’s 2nd Battalion 

killed 50 NKPA soldiers, captured another 15, and secured the large hill east of Inchon, at a 

cost of one Marine killed and 19 wounded. 

A Night in Inchon 

Marine reinforcements also headed for Green 

Beach in the twilight. Inchon’s severe currents 

swept off course some of the underpowered 

amphibious trucks, or DUKWS, which carried the 105mm 

guns of the 11th Marines’ two howitzer battalions. By 2150, 

however, all of the “ducks” had waddled ashore, and the 

artillerymen had registered the guns to fire in support of 

the infantry. After these units came two Marine armored 

companies, equipped with Pershing tanks, which rumbled 

across the causeway and prepared to push toward Kimpo 

and Seoul. 

During the night, Lyman K. Swenson and other 

destroyers and cruisers of the bombardment force fired star 

shells over the Red Beach perimeter so that the Marines 

could detect enemy movement. Not all sightings, however, 

resulted in combat. In the light of one illumination round, 

Captain Ike Fenton, who was relieving himself at the time, 

reacted with surprise when a heavily armed enemy soldier 

emerged from a hole at his feet. Instead of attacking the 

startled American officer, the North Korean bowed deeply 

and surrendered his weapon. 

Navy Seabees (left to right) 

Electrician’s Mates Troy Edwards, 

Julian Perez, and Joseph D. Edson 

install floodlights on Red Beach 

at night on the 15th so that naval 

forces can sustain their critical 

over-the-shore logistics operations.

(USN 420068)

42 43
Throughout the night, Navy surgeons and corpsmen 

of the 1st Marine Division and medical personnel in the 

LSTs at Red Beach tended the wounded, whose numbers 

were far below the 300 projected by Doyle’s staff. The joint 

task force suffered 174 wounded in action and 14 nonbattle 

injuries. The improvised operating room set up by the 

surgical team in LST 898 treated only 42 military and 32 

civilian cases. One man was missing, and another 21 had 

been killed in action. 

As 15 September ended, it was clear to all that the 

landing had succeeded. The joint task force had sustained 

relatively few casualties and lost only two planes (whose 

pilots were recovered). General Shepherd, a veteran of 

many landing operations, credited much of this success to the Task Force 90 commander: 

“Doyle is a great commander and is the best amphibious naval officer I have ever met.”

Navy corpsmen treat wounded 

Marine Gerald E. Beck at Inchon.

NA 80-G-420224

Objective: Seoul 

UN forces were now firmly ashore, but the seizure of Inchon was only the opening 

phase of the campaign to cut off the North Korean Army and liberate South Korea. 

The next step was to capture Seoul, whose military, political, and psychological 

importance was paramount. Critical to this effort was the fleet’s ability to keep pumping 

reinforcements, transportation resources, ammunition, fuel, and supplies into the ever-expanding beachhead.

By the time the LSTs backed off Red Beach with the rising tide on the 16th, the men of 

Naval Beach Group 1 and the Marine Shore Party Battalion had unloaded 4,000 tons of supplies and equipment. Another nine fully loaded LSTs soon replaced the first group on the 

beach, and the resupply process continued unabated. Other logistics ships and craft disembarked material onto the pontoon dock installed by the Seabees. 

Two days after the initial assault 

at Inchon, Seabees unload 

attack cargo ship Alshain (AKA 

55) landing craft onto the pontoon dock built by the naval 

constructionmen at Wolmi Do.

(USN 420358)

Over-the-Beach Logistics 

The success or failure of an amphibious operation often depends on how soon the assault 

forces get resupplied with ammunition, 

weapons, vehicles, food, and fuel. It is equally 

important for naval logistics forces to keep 

supplies and troop reinforcements flowing into 

the beachhead. If they do not, the enemy might 

push friendly forces into the sea or prevent a 

breakout from the coast. At Inchon, the lack of 

adequate port facilities or sea room in which 

to stage logistics ships made it essential that 

the naval logistics forces rapidly move supplies 

“over the beach.” 

The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Army had 

developed sophisticated methods and organizations for over-the-beach logistics support 

based on their experiences in the Pacific in 

World War II. Naval Beach Group 1, commanded 

by Captain Watson T. Singer, included beachmasters and small boat units that, along with the 

1st Marine Division’s Shore Party Battalion led 

by Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe, directed 

the movement of supplies to the beach and 

then inland. Watson’s group also included UDTs 

that cleared obstacles and Seabees responsible for reconstructing the harbor installations 

and initially operating the port. The Army’s 2nd 

Special Engineer Brigade, which had supported 

MacArthur’s campaigns in the southwest Pacific 

during World War II, took over port operations 

from the naval units. 

On the afternoon of the 15th, the Seabees 

built a large pontoon dock and causeway at 

Green Beach on Wolmi Do. After the evening 

landing, some of Singer’s Sailors and Crowe’s 

Marines had to unload, organize, and distribute 

the supplies from the eight LSTs temporarily 

immobilized on Red Beach on the evening’s 

high tide. Bringing order out of the dark and 

chaotic night challenged Crowe, who came up 

through the ranks and was decorated for heroism at Guadalcanal and Tarawa. Enemy snipers 

in Inchon shot at Crowe’s leathernecks and 

Singer’s Sailors, outlined as they were in the 

glare of the floodlights installed by the Seabees. 

Nonetheless, the men continued to toil throughout the long night to accomplish their vital 

mission. All of the LST captains withdrew their 

emptied ships on the morning’s high tide. 

By the 19th, one day after the 2nd Special 

Engineer Brigade took over port operations, 

the Navy, Marine, and Army shore parties had 

unloaded every ship of the first echelon. Army 

engineers and the Seabees also had trains 

operating almost eight miles inland. Once the 

airstrip at Kimpo was opened for business, Air 

Force transports flew in critical aviation gas 

and ordnance for the Marine aircraft operating 

there. 

By the 22nd, the multiservice logistics forces 

had pushed ashore a staggering amount of 

material: 25,512 tons of cargo, 6,629 vehicles, 

and 53,882 troops. As a result, MacArthur’s 

assault forces were able to seize their lodgement ashore, defend it from counterattack, and 

speedily break out of the coastal enclave. 

Four “high-and-dry” LSTs disgorge supplies onto Red Beach 

on or about 16 September. 

(NHHC 80-G-420027)

44 45
American troops inspect a Soviet-made T-34 tank destroyed by Marine fire on the road from Inchon to Seoul. Allied 

ground, air, and naval gunfire defeated every enemy armor attack against the Inchon beachhead. (NA 8O-G-421166)

South Korean marines attach a prisoner-of-war identification tag to a North Korean soldier who tried to evade capture 

in Inchon by donning civilian clothes. The ROK marines, 

responsible for “mopping up” the city, also tracked down 

and severely dealt with Communists involved in atrocities.

(NA 80-G-426429)

Early on the morning of the 16th, a 

column of six North Korean T-34 tanks 

rumbled down the road toward Inchon. 

Two flights of VMF-214 Corsairs operating from Sicily pounced on the Soviet-built 

armored vehicles about a mile short of 

Marine lines. Even though enemy antiaircraft fire turned one plane into a fireball, 

the other F4Us destroyed or heavily 

damaged half of the enemy force. Still, 

the intrepid Communist tankers kept on 

coming toward the ridgeline fighting positions of the 5th Marines. Suddenly, Marine 

Pershing tanks crested the rise, chose their 

targets, and destroyed the rest of the T-34s 

with accurate fire. 

The way now clear of the enemy, the 

infantrymen of the 1st Marines and the 

5th Marines advanced and around 0730 

linked up east of Inchon. South of town, the leathernecks occupied an abandoned coastal 

artillery position and captured a 120mm mortar battery. At the same time, General Smith 

ordered the 3rd Battalion, 1st KMC Regiment, into Inchon to mop up enemy troops and 

sympathizers, whose hiding places local 

civilians gladly revealed. Incensed by civilian reports of Communist atrocities, for 

the remainder of the day the South Korean 

Marines ruthlessly sought out the North 

Koreans and other “subversives.” 

As UN forces secured Inchon and 

strengthened the beachhead on the 16th, 

the UN command took other steps to 

engage the North Korean army. General 

Walker’s Eighth Army attacked out of the 

Pusan Perimeter, working to prevent the 

early withdrawal of NKPA units from the 

southern front. Then, the U.S. Army and 

ROKN mounted an operation to cut the 

north-south road at Changsa-Dong on 

the peninsula’s east coast. A Korean LST 

attempted to land a guerrilla force, but the 

ship grounded and broached just offshore. 

The irregulars finally made it to the beach, 

only to be attacked by a nearby North 

Korean garrison. The operation a failure, 

the battleship Missouri and cruiser Helena

and Air Force F-51 Mustangs hit the enemy with their fire so another LST could extract the 

guerrillas. 

On the 17th, the North Koreans counterattacked the UN beachhead at Inchon, so 

Communist reinforcements might have time to reach Seoul. Early that morning, the North 

Korean air force made its one and only assault on the amphibious force off Inchon. A pair 

of YAK fighters dove on the warships anchored south of Wolmi Do. Except for a lone Sailor 

on sentry duty at the stern of the cruiser Rochester, who fired his rifle at the planes, the 

crew of the cruiser was caught off guard. The enemy planes dropped several bombs on the 

Americans, but the only weapon that hit a ship failed to explode. The YAKs then strafed 

HMS Jamaica, mortally wounding one seaman and hitting two others. The Royal Navy 

took its revenge, splashing one of the attackers with fire from four-inch guns and automatic 

weapons. The cruiser’s skipper, Captain Jocelyn C. S. Salter, RN, later felt that it was “foolhardy” of the North Koreans “to go for two cruisers when they had a choice of transports 

and freighters galore.” 

As that futile attack ended, an NKPA rifle battalion supported by a platoon of T-34s 

advanced against the lines of the 5th Marines. The North Korean units, which made no 

reconnaissance of UN positions, moved into a trap. The 5th Marines quickly destroyed 

the tank column. To the south, Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s leathernecks had a tougher fight. 

Elements of the 1st Marine Regiment with the help of five Corsairs, fought their way 

through a heavily fortified defile on the road to Seoul. 

American and South Korean troops process 

North Korean prisoners of war on Wolmi Do.

(NA 80-G-420390)

46 47
Much to the distress of General Smith, MacArthur went ashore that morning and 

insisted on traveling just behind the front line, at one point directing his jeep driver to a 

ridge crest to observe a firefight. Smith was greatly relieved when CINCUNC returned 

safely to Mount McKinley, particularly when he learned that his Marines had flushed seven 

heavily armed NKPA soldiers from the culvert on which MacArthur’s jeep idled as he 

viewed some burning T-34s. 

With the NKPA attack spent, the 5th Marines seized the south end of Kimpo air base, 

and a KMC battalion advanced to cover their left flank. North Korean counterattacks that 

night failed to dislodge the Americans from Kimpo. Artillery fire from the 11th Marines and 

small arms fire decimated the ranks of the enemy infantry forces moving against the air base 

perimeter. 

American Marines inspect a 

North Korean Ilyushin IL-10 

“Shturmovik” (Soviet-built) 

attack bomber seized when U.S.

forces overran Kimpo airfield.

Except for one foray against the 

fleet, the North Korean air force 

could do little to help the defenders of Inchon. The Allies had 

clear superiority in the air. (NA 

80-G-420388)

On the 18th, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, stormed Hill 123. Assistance in this attack 

came from HMS Kenya, which poured 300 six-inch rounds on the enemy. Still unbeaten, 

NKPA gunners inflicted 30 casualties on the Americans when they shelled the slopes of the 

hill. Throughout the hour-long barrage, the senior naval medical officer present, Lieutenant 

Robert J. Fleischaker, MC, moved about the hill to treat the wounded without regard for his 

safety. The Navy awarded Fleischaker the Bronze Star for his bravery under fire. 

In support of the 5th Marines, the cruisers Rochester and Toledo, and U.S. Navy 

Skyraiders bombarded Communist forces on both sides of the Han River northwest of 

Kimpo. Despite these heavy attacks, the naval aviators reported that the enemy units were 

“still active.” 

That same day, the Joint Task Force 7 transports began disembarking several Army 

units. The 7th Infantry Division’s 32nd Infantry Regiment landed and advanced to cover the 

1st Marine Division’s right flank. The 96th Field Artillery Battalion and the 2nd Engineer 

Special Brigade also came ashore, with the engineers relieving the KMC battalion in Seoul. 

On 19 September, the 1st Marine Division continued to advance on Seoul. The 5th 

Marines, still within supporting distance of the task force cruisers, prepared to cross the 

Han north of the capital. To the south, the 1st Marines began a three-day battle for the 

industrial suburb of Yongdungpo. 

Critical close air support for this fight would 

come from VMF-212 and night-fighting squadron 

VMF(N)-542, which flew into Kimpo from Japan that 

day. Marine Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, 

the X Corps tactical air commander, directed these 

units. FEAF’s Combat Cargo Command, with C-54 

and Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcars, also began flying 

ammunition and aviation gas into Kimpo on the 19th. 

The experienced Air Force cargo handlers of the 1st 

Combat Support Unit (Provisional) quickly unloaded 

and pushed forward the vital material. 

The UN advance toward Seoul continued on the 

20th and the 21st. After an initial setback, Marine 

LVTs carrying the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed 

the Han River and, with the assistance of Sicily’s 

VMF-214 fighters, established a lodgement on the 

far bank. The ground force received a welcome reinforcement when the Army’s 31st Infantry Regiment, 

the ROK 17th Infantry Regiment and the 7th Marines 

came ashore at Inchon. The Sixth Fleet’s attack trans-

(Left to right) Airman William J. Ewsuk, 

Aviation Ordnanceman 2nd Class Francis L.

Diamond, and Airman Joseph F. Bellina arm 

a Vought F4U Corsair of Fighter Squadron 

24 on board Boxer (CV-21). Success in 

combat depended on the professional skill 

and plain hard work of everyone on the 

Navy team. (NA 80-G-420997)

“Corsair,” by Herbert Hahn, depicts Fighter Squadron 63 F4Us hitting enemy positions with rocket fire to clear the way 

for American tanks advancing on Seoul. (Navy Art Collection 88-191-bg)

48 49
port Bexar (APA-237) and attack cargo ship Montagu (AKA-98) had completed the long 

journey from the Mediterranean to deliver one of the 7th Marines’ battalions. 

As these reinforcements moved up to the front, the Communists struck back. On the 

21st, NKPA troops crossed the Han and assaulted South Korean marine positions northwest of Kimpo airfield. Carrier aircraft and the naval gunfire of Toledo obliterated the 

Communist attacking force. In addition, Navy Skyraiders reduced enemy resistance in 

Suwon before the 7th Division’s Reconnaissance Company occupied the city. 

U.S. Marines focus their attention on North Korean snipers 

during the costly house-to-house fight for Seoul, the South 

Korean capital. (NA W&C #1422)

Heavily armed Corsairs of Fighter 

Squadron 24 and Douglas AD 

Skyraiders of Attack Squadron 65 

warm up prior to the launching of 

another ground support mission.

(Bob Lawson)

As these actions took place, as planned, Admiral Struble dissolved Joint Task Force 7 

and turned over operational control of Chromite to General Almond. Almond desperately 

wanted to take Seoul by the 25th—exactly three months after the North Korean invasion. 

He believed that the Communists must be on the brink of collapse. General Smith was not 

as optimistic. 

The leathernecks assaulted Seoul’s 

western defenses on the 22nd and found 

enemy resistance especially strong. The 

Seoul garrison now included several heavily armed and well-led NKPA units that 

had been rushed to the city from all directions. The Marines had to battle their way 

through Seoul, house to house, street to 

street. The fighting battered the South 

Korean capital. Marine casualties, light up 

to that point, steadily mounted. Navy surgeons and corpsmen, especially the latter 

who often exposed themselves to enemy 

fire when helping wounded Marines, paid 

a heavy price for their bravery. By midday 

on the 24th, every corpsman with F 

Company, 5th Marines, had either been killed or seriously wounded. NKPA soldiers cut 

down Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class James J. Ergesitz as he pulled a wounded Marine from a 

fire-swept slope. Communist mortar rounds hit the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines’ aid station 

and wounded a surgeon, Navy Lieutenant Francis T. H’Doubler, MC. He continued to treat 

casualties until incapacitated by another wound. Chief Hospital Corpsman Wayne D. 

Austin, already hit in the face and ankle, took over and tended 40 more men before being 

relieved. Only when a replacement arrived did Chief Austin, wounded once more, consent 

to evacuation. For his actions, Austin received the Navy Cross. 

General Almond, dissatisfied with 

the Marine progress through the city, 

moved the 32nd Infantry and the 17th 

ROK Infantry across the Han to flanking 

positions. The enemy continued to fight 

with determination and skill, but Almond 

was persuaded that their resistance would 

be short lived. Just before midnight on the 

25th, he declared Seoul liberated. 

To the leathernecks and Soldiers in 

the city this was a cruel joke, because the 

NKPA still held 60 percent of the city and 

that night launched three counterattacks. 

Despite taking heavy casualties, the 

North Koreans stubbornly hung on until 

28 September. Even the next day, when 

General MacArthur and President Rhee 

presided over a ceremony returning the 

capital of the Republic of Korea to its 

people, attendees could hear the sound of 

artillery and small arms fire coming from 

the northern suburbs. 

Meanwhile, General Walker’s Eighth 

Army had broken out of the Pusan 

Perimeter, raced to the northwest, and 

joined forces with Almond’s X Corps. 

When the 1st Cavalry Division’s legendary 

7th Cavalry Regiment met elements of the 

7th Infantry Division near Osan, on the 

morning of 27 September, the campaign 

for South Korea was almost over. Of the 

70,000 North Korean soldiers engaged at 

Pusan, much less than half escaped death 

or capture. Only 30,000 men, with virtually 

no heavy weapons, recrossed the 38th 

parallel into North Korea. A better coorMarines prepare to raise the U.S. flag over Seoul on 26 

September, even though fighting would continue in outlying districts for several more days. (NA 111-SC-349478)

7th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division soldiers shake 

hands and hold up unit insignia to mark the 28 September 

linkup of the Inchon and Pusan forces south of Suwon.

(NA 111-SC-349366)

50 51
dinated attack by the Eighth Army that concentrated on isolating forces, rather than racing 

to Inchon, might have netted the entire NKPA. Nonetheless, the bloody campaign in South 

Korea and the hasty retreat from Pusan had exhausted and demoralized the survivors of the 

once mighty NKPA invasion force. Of paramount importance, the UN forces that stormed 

ashore at Inchon had achieved their primary purpose—the liberation of the Republic of 

Korea.

Conclusion 

The amphibious assault at Inchon showed how the skillful use of naval force enables 

theater commanders to bring decisive power to bear on enemy nations touched by 

the sea. The cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and carriers, along with UN air forces, 

first secured control of the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the air spaces over these 

waters. This unexpected display of strength led North Korea’s international Communist 

supporters to reconsider their policies regarding the Korean peninsula.

After eliminating the North Korean air force, UN ship- and land-based air power 

battered military facilities in North Korea and logistical lines to the Communist troops in 

South Korea. At the same time, U.S. and Royal Navy warships bombarded NKPA front-line 

troops and supply routes near the coasts, providing vital support to the U.S. and ROK 

ground units. Because of post-World War II defense cutbacks, however, the lack of ships, 

aircraft, and material ready for combat almost doomed the UN cause in Korea in July and 

August 1950.

Control of the sea and the ability to assemble and organize enough merchantmen, transports, and cargo ships allowed the UN command to move reinforcements to the Far East 

from all parts of the world. General MacArthur, the theater commander and an experienced 

practitioner of amphibious warfare, knew that he now possessed a clear advantage over his 

enemy. He was able to choose the best time and place to strike the rear of the North Korean 

army. If success crowned his efforts, he would liberate South Korea.

The naval forces in the Far East, under the command of Admirals Joy, Struble, and 

Doyle, then worked to execute MacArthur’s concept. Despite the difficulties in gathering 

relevant intelligence and assembling the variety of units needed, these veteran commanders 

and their expert staffs quickly planned the assault of a site that presented many physical 

problems. They then coordinated the necessary naval, air, and ground force for the complex operation.

Almost every type of naval unit contributed to the victory at Inchon. Carrier-based 

Navy and Marine planes and surface combatants prepared the battlefield and, in conjunction with the Air Force, helped to deceive the enemy about the actual invasion area. 

Continued attacks by naval air and surface forces throughout the landing, consolidation, 

and breakout phases of Chromite added considerably to the woes of the North Korean 

defenders. Other naval units cleared Inchon’s approach waters of mines. Most importantly, 

the Sailors manning the assault ships and craft and the Marines storming the enemy’s positions exhibited the skill and bravery necessary to the success of any opposed landing. Once 

ashore, the 1st Marine Division soundly defeated their foes and secured the objectives with 

typical courage and professional skill.

The Navy, particularly its often forgotten support services, remained critical to the 

success of the operation. Corpsmen, surgeons, and chaplains were on hand to treat the 

wounded and comfort the dying. The ungainly LSTs provided essential materials and services for the beachhead. The Naval Beach Group’s Seabees, UDTs, beachmasters, and boat 

units, and the Marine Shore Party kept vehicles, equipment, and supplies flowing across 

the beach. Transports and cargo ships brought in additional U.S. and ROK soldiers and 

Marines. Oilers, tenders, and stores ships supplied combatants on station, enabling the fleet 

to remain off Inchon and to provide the ground forces with continued naval air and gunfire 

support.

Often in war, good intelligence, careful planning, and bold execution favor one side 

with relatively light casualties, and this was the case at Inchon. During the first seven days of 

Chromite, the joint task force counted approximately 70 killed, 470 wounded, and five missing. Because of the bloody fighting for Seoul, the toll rose to 600 killed, 2,750 wounded, and 

65 missing. At the same time, UN forces killed 14,000 North Korean soldiers and captured 

another 7,000.

Of greater importance, Admiral Struble’s joint task force carried out the theater commander’s directive to strike the NKPA a lethal blow and drive the aggressors from the 

Republic of Korea. To General MacArthur, “the Navy and Marines ... never shone more 

brightly” than at Inchon.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who one Marine general regarded as “the best amphibious naval officer I have ever met,” 

awards Silver Star medals for bravery to landing craft Sailors (left to right) Seaman Chancey H. Vogt, Seaman William H.

Tagan, Engineman Fireman Richard P. Vinson, and Seaman Apprentice Paul J. Gregory. (NA 80-G-423716)

52 53
Acknowledgements 

The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of several groups, organizations, 

and individuals who assisted in the preparation of this volume. The staffs of the Prints 

and Photographs Division and the Map and Geography Division, both of the Library of 

Congress, the National Archives Still Picture Branch and the Archives Division of the 

National Air and Space Museum provided critical materials for the project. I am grateful 

to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Director of Naval History; Captain William D. Vance, USN, Deputy 

Director; and Dr. William S. Dudley, Senior Historian, for their continued support. The 

series editor, Dr. Edward J. Marolda, provided useful direction, comment, and assistance in 

preparing this volume. My thanks also go to Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC 

(Ret.), Director of Marine Corps History and Museums; Professor Roger Dingman of the 

University of Southern California; Dan J. Crawford, Robert V. Aquilina, and Amy Cantin, 

Marine Corps Historical Center; Dr. Vincent A. Transano, Command Historian, Naval 

Facilities Engineering Command; Anne C. DeAtley, Det 9, 1st Combat Camera Squadron, 

USAF; and Robert L. Lawson. My coworkers in the Naval History and Heritage Command 

also provided tremendous assistance in their various specialties, including editor Sandra K. 

Russell, art director Charles C. Cooney, and typesetter and photographer JO1(SW) Eric S. 

Sesit, Naval Aviation News Branch; Chuck Haberlein and Ed Finney, Photographic Section; 

Bernard F. Cavalcante, Gina Akers, John L. Hodges, Kathleen M. Lloyd, and Mike Walker, 

Operational Archives Branch; John C. Reilly Jr., Ship’s History Branch; Ella Nargele, 

Information Security Specialist; Glenn E. Helm and Jean L. Hort, Navy Department 

Library; S. Gale Munro and the late John Barnett, Navy Art Collection Branch; and Steven 

D. Hill and Judith A. Walters, Naval Aviation History Branch. The support, advice, information, comments, and technical skill provided by my colleagues in the Naval History and 

Heritage Command History and Archives Division—Jeffery G. Barlow, Robert J. Cressman, 

Richard A. Russell, Robert J. Schneller, and Gary E. Weir—contributed significantly to the 

success of this project. I also thank my wife, Ruth, who reviewed several drafts and clarified 

my sometimes awkward and confusing presentation. 

About the Author 

Curtis A. Utz is a historian with the 

Naval History and Heritage Command. 

He graduated from the University of 

Maryland where he earned a Bachelor of 

Arts degree in history in 1984. He served 

as a historical interpretation technician 

with the National Park Service and an 

intern at the Smithsonian’s National Air 

and Space Museum. In 1989, he completed 

a Master of Arts degree in history at the 

University of Maryland. Mr. Utz has 

worked as a freelance military historian 

and researcher. He served as a historian 

with the Contemporary History Branch 

from 1992 through 1994. Mr. Utz authored 

the first volume in this series, Cordon of 

Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

54 55
Suggested Reading List and Sources 

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950–1953. New York: Times Books, 1987. 

Cagle, Cdr. Malcom W. and Cdr. Frank A. Manson. The Sea War in Korea. Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 1957. 

Field, James A., Jr. History of United States Naval Operations: Korea. Washington: GPO, 

1962. 

Heinl, Robert D. Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign. Philadelphia: J. B. 

Lippincott Company, 1967. 

Karig, Capt. Walter, Cdr. Malcom W. Cagle and LCdr. Frank A. Manson. Battle Report, 

Volume VI: The War in Korea. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952. 

Montross, Lynn and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona. U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 

1950–1953, Volume II: The Inchon–Seoul Operation. Washington: GPO, 1955. 

In addition to secondary sources, the author used primary materials held by the Naval 

History and Heritage Command, as well as the Marine Corps Historical Center’s Reference 

Section and Personal Papers Unit. 

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