United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-30555

Sidney Arnold, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Steven W. Williams, deputy, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:17-CV-00344-SDD-RLB

Before Barksdale, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:

We WITHDRAW the prior opinion filed September 24, 2020 and 

substitute the following.

After Deputy Steven Williams approached, questioned, and “reached 

to grab” Sidney Arnold just outside Arnold’s home, Arnold fled, fell off a 

fence, and dislocated his shoulder. Arnold sued Williams pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of various constitutional rights and under 

Louisiana tort law. The district court disposed of all claims either through 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal or Rule 56 summary 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 23, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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judgment. Because Arnold plausibly alleged an unreasonable search, we 

REVERSE the dismissal of Arnold’s unreasonable-search claim under 

§ 1983 and REMAND for consideration of qualified immunity on that claim.

However, because Arnold either failed to state a claim or failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact for his remaining claims, we AFFIRM the 

district court in all remaining respects.

I.

Sidney Arnold and his brother lived in a garage apartment attached to 

a house while they worked for the homeowner.1 On March 18, 2017, Arnold 

awoke around 2:00 AM to discover Deputy Steven Williams, an officer of the 

East Baton Rouge Parish Sherriff’s Office, just outside the garage apartment, 

standing under the carport. Deputy Williams told Arnold that he saw an open 

door on the house, and he pointed to the open door. Arnold stepped out of 

the garage apartment to see where Deputy Williams was pointing. Deputy 

Williams then asked Arnold for his name and driver’s license. Arnold gave 

his name but told Deputy Williams that he did not have a driver’s license.

Further, he told the deputy that the open door led to a laundry room but that 

the house could not be accessed from that laundry room.

Deputy Williams then “told” Arnold to come to his police car so he 

could determine Arnold’s identity. Arnold declined and said, “No, sir, I will 

1 All facts described in this section are taken as true from Arnold’s original 

complaint in order to properly address the 12(b)(6) dismissals of Arnold’s § 1983 claims 

and his intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002). Of course, legal conclusions couched as facts are not taken as 

true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Some additional record facts are 

considered below in treatment of the summary judgment on Arnold’s negligence claim. 

Those facts are identified as record facts, rather than allegations in the complaint, and they 

are construed in the light most favorable to Arnold, who opposed the summary-judgment 

motion. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014).

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wake the lady who owns the home and she will tell you who I am and that I 

live here and work for her.” Arnold then knocked on the homeowner’s 

window. The homeowner emerged and confirmed that both Arnold and his 

brother lived in the garage apartment. Deputy Williams, however, was not 

satisfied with the homeowner’s word, “and he reached to grab Sidney Arnold 

and Sidney Arnold ran.”

Arnold ran towards the backyard and Deputy Williams gave chase.

Arnold attempted to climb a fence, but instead he fell over it and dislocated 

his shoulder. Arnold was apprehended and taken to the hospital. Arnold was 

ultimately arrested and jailed for twenty days. All charges, however, were 

dropped for lack of probable cause.

Arnold filed a civil action against Deputy Williams under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and Louisiana tort law. The § 1983 claims asserted illegal search and 

seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, false arrest and false 

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violation of substantive and 

procedural Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 The 

Louisiana tort law claims alleged negligence and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress.

Deputy Williams moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of Arnold’s 

claims. The district court granted the motion as to all of Arnold’s § 1983 

claims and as to his intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The 

court denied the motion as to the negligence claim because “[b]reach and 

causation are fact bound determinations inappropriate for resolution at the 

pleading stage.” The case proceeded through discovery, and Deputy 

2 The district court correctly observed that only the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause, and not the Fifth Amendment’s, applies to state law enforcement officers, 

such as Deputy Williams.

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Williams then moved for summary judgment on the remaining negligence 

claim. The district court granted the motion and rendered judgment in favor 

of Deputy Williams, dismissing the matter in its entirety.3 Arnold now 

appeals the 12(b)(6) dismissals of his § 1983 and intentional-infliction-ofemotional-distress claims and the grant of summary judgment, as well as the 

district court’s ruling on three evidentiary issues.

II.

The district court dismissed both Arnold’s unreasonable-search claim

and his unreasonable-seizure claim under Rule 12(b)(6). We review 12(b)(6) 

dismissals de novo. Walker v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 734 (5th 

Cir. 2019). Rule 8 requires that a plaintiff’s pleading contain “a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That is, the “complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if the 

plaintiff alleges facts that, accepted as true, allow a court “to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

3 The district court’s order is styled as a “Judgment,” and it states that it dismisses 

“this matter in its entirety.” On its face, then, this judgment is an appealable final order. 

However, the district court’s dismissal of Arnold’s unreasonable-seizure and maliciousprosecution claims were made “without prejudice to the filing of a motion for leave to 

amend.” Arnold did not amend his complaint. This raises an issue similar to the “finality 

trap” we addressed in Williams v. Seidenbach, 958 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). In 

Williamswe determined that voluntary dismissal without prejudice of some claims does not 

prevent an appeal on the remaining claims resolved through partial final judgment. Id. at 

344. Here, two of Arnold’s claims were involuntarily dismissed “without prejudice to the 

filing of a motion for leave to amend,” and the district court later entered judgment 

purporting to dispose of all claims. Because Arnold declined to file a motion for leave to 

amend and because the district court’s judgment disposes of “this matter in its entirety,” 

we construe that judgment as an appealable final decision.

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Id. While the court must accept the facts in the complaint as true, it will “not 

accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal 

conclusions.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

plead “two—and only two—allegations . . . . First, the plaintiff must allege 

that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege 

that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state 

or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The doctrine 

of qualified immunity, however, adds a wrinkle to § 1983 pleadings when 

qualified immunity is relevant. Section 1983 claims implicating qualified 

immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in 

Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a 

defendant’s answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a 

heightened pleading standard. Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (5th 

Cir. 2016); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, 

because qualified immunity is “not simply immunity from monetary 

liability” but also “immunity from having to stand trial,” there is an interest 

in qualified immunity entering a lawsuit “at the earliest possible stage of 

litigation.” Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1989)).

This immunity-from-suit interest does not require that the plaintiff’s 

original complaint exceed the short-and-plain-statement standard of Rule 8.

Anderson, 845 F.3d at 589–90. Rather, “a plaintiff seeking to overcome 

qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has 

alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”

Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). That is, a plaintiff must 

plead qualified-immunity facts with the minimal specificity that would satisfy 

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Twombly and Iqbal. Furthermore, if the defendant first raises qualified 

immunity, the district court, “‘may [then] in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff 

file a reply tailored to [the defendant’s] answer [or motion to dismiss] 

pleading the defense of qualified immunity.’” Anderson, 845 F.3d at 590

(alterations in original) (quoting Shultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433–34 (5th 

Cir. 1995)).

In this case, Arnold broadly addressed qualified immunity in his 

original complaint by alleging that Deputy Williams “knowingly violated” 

“clearly established law.” Williams explicitly raised qualified immunity in 

his memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, but the district court 

did not require Arnold to file a Shultea reply tailored to the defense of 

qualified immunity. In his memorandum in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss, Arnold addressed qualified immunity, albeit in a merely conclusory 

fashion: “The Court should find that qualified immunity does not apply to 

this case.” In dismissing Arnold’s unreasonable-search and unreasonableseizure claims, the district court did not determine if Williams is entitled to 

qualified immunity on those claims. Rather, it granted 12(b)(6) dismissal 

because it concluded that Arnold did not plausibly allege a search or seizure.

We first consider whether Arnold plausibly stated either an 

unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure by turning to the two 

elements of a § 1983 claim set forth in Gomez: (i) deprivation of a federal 

right; and (ii) action under color of state law. Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640. The 

district court correctly recognized that Arnold sufficiently pleaded the 

second element, action under color of state law, for both the unreasonablesearch claim and the unreasonable-seizure claim. In reviewing Arnold’s 

complaint, we determine that Arnold also plausibly alleged the first element

as to the unreasonable-search claim but not as to the unreasonable-seizure 

claim.

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Arnold’s complaint consists of a narrative recitation of facts followed 

by a series of legal claims. Although the complaint is difficult to follow, the 

factual allegations in combination with the short legal claims plausibly state a

search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Arnold alleges that 

Williams entered the curtilage of Arnold’s home, questioned him, and then 

asked him for identification. Arnold then summarizes these facts with the 

legal claim that “[a]ctions taken related to the stop, seizure and search were 

objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law.”

We hold that Arnold’s complaint plausibly alleges a trespassory 

search of his home. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5, 7 (2013) (“When 

‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, 

houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’ . . . [A]n officer’s leave to 

gather information is sharply circumscribed when he steps off [public] 

thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment’s protected areas.”)

(quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)). The complaint 

alleges that Arnold found Williams lingering in an odd part of the curtilage—

under the carport—at an odd hour—2:00 a.m—and that Williams 

immediately asked for identification from Arnold when he emerged. There 

is nothing in the complaint to suggest that Williams knocked; to the contrary 

Arnold alleges that “he was awoken by the sound of someone outside his 

door.” Arnold alleges actions that would fall outside the “implicit license” 

afforded private visitors. See id. at 8. These details make plausible the 

allegation that Williams’s search of the curtilage of Arnold’s home was 

unreasonable insofar as it infringed on Arnold’s reasonable expectation of 

privacy and exigent circumstances were lacking. See Katz v. United States, 

389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. 

Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978).

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Conversely, Arnold’s further assertions that Williams “wanted his 

name” and “wanted to see a driver’s license” and then “told” Arnold to 

come to his police car do not plausibly allege a seizure. Supreme Court and 

Fifth Circuit caselaw makes clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs 

in one of two ways: either an officer applies physical force or an officer makes 

a show of authority to which an individual submits. See California v. Hodari 

D., 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 

254 (2007); Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 170 (5th Cir. 2015). Arnold 

alleges at most an attempt to apply physical force when he says that Deputy 

Williams “reached to grab” Arnold. He simply does not allege actual 

physical force. Arnold does allege a show of authority on behalf of Deputy 

Williams, particularly when he alleges that Deputy Williams “told” him to 

go to the car. Arnold does not, however, allege that he submitted to that 

authority. Cf. Carroll, 800 F.3d at 170. He alleges instead that when Deputy 

Williams told him to go to the car, he declined. Further, he alleges that when 

Deputy Williams reached to grab him, he fled. The complaint lacks 

allegations that would allow us, drawing all reasonable inferences in Arnold’s 

favor, to conclude that Arnold plausibly alleged a seizure within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment.

At the 12(b)(6) stage of litigation, it is inappropriate for a district court 

to weigh the strength of the allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (2007) 

(“[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed 

based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find 

evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of 

the factfinder.”). Instead, the district court must simply decide if the 

complaint plausibly alleges a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. By 

stating a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 and stating facts that make 

plausible an unreasonable search, Arnold meets the minimal pleading 

standard necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on that claim, at 

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least as to the two § 1983 elements set forth in Gomez. He has not done so 

for his unreasonable-seizure claim.

Ordinarily, after determining that a plaintiff had plausibly alleged 

constitutional violations, we would turn to the qualified-immunity analysis. 

Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018). Here, 

however, “the district court found the complaint deficient on its face and 

never reached” qualified immunity. Id. “Because as a general rule, we do 

not consider an issue not passed upon below, we remand for the district court 

to decide in the first instance whether [qualified immunity] defeats” 

Arnold’s unreasonable-search claim. Id. (internal quotation marks and 

footnotes omitted). We therefore reverse the dismissal of the unreasonablesearch claim and remand for the district court to consider qualified immunity 

before proceeding to the merits of the case. We however affirm the dismissal 

of the unreasonable-seizure claim.

III.

The district court dismissed Arnold’s remaining § 1983 claims and his 

intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim on 12(b)(6) grounds. The 

court also granted summary judgment on Arnold’s negligence claim and 

issued three evidentiary rulings. We affirm the district court on these 

dismissals, the summary judgment, and the evidentiary rulings.

Arnold’s remaining § 1983 claims include false arrest/false 

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and procedural and substantive due 

process. Because each of these was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we review 

the dismissals using the same standard described above for the unreasonablesearch and unreasonable-seizure claims.

Arnold failed to state a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, because 

he failed to plausibly allege that his ultimate arrest was false. The district 

court was wrong to seemingly adopt the “‘heightened’ pleading 

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requirement” urged by Williams. As explained above, § 1983 claims 

implicating qualified immunity are not subject to a heightened pleading 

standard. Anderson, 845 F.3d at 590. Nevertheless, after reviewing the 

record, we agree with the district court that “the sparse and conclusory 

factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim for false arrest/false 

imprisonment.” Because Arnold’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly 

allege false imprisonment or false arrest, 12(b)(6) dismissal was proper.

Specifically, to state a § 1983 claim for false arrest/false 

imprisonment, Arnold must plausibly allege that Williams “did not have 

probable cause to arrest him.” Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 

(5th Cir. 2004). It is unclear from the complaint when exactly Arnold claims 

he was arrested and detained, but, based on the sequence of events in the 

complaint, this arrest must have occurred after Arnold fled and fell over the 

backyard fence. The complaint does not plausibly explain why Arnold’s 

flight and his trespass onto the neighboring property would not constitute

probable cause for Williams to arrest him. Failing to plausibly allege an 

essential element of a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, Arnold failed to 

state a claim.

Arnold also failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution under 

§ 1983 because, as the district court correctly observed, there is no 

freestanding right under the Constitution to be free from malicious 

prosecution. Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2020). Rather, 

facts amounting to malicious prosecution are properly alleged as part of an 

actual Fourth Amendment claim, such as unreasonable search or seizure.

There is no independent constitutional claim for malicious prosecution.

Similarly, Arnold failed to state a claim for a violation of procedural 

and substantive due process because resort to a generalized remedy under the 

Due Process Clause is inappropriate where a more specific constitutional 

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provision provides the rights at issue. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 

(1994). In those situations, the specific provision, “not the more generalized 

notion of ‘substantive due process,’” better guides analysis of a plaintiff’s 

claims. Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Here, 

Arnold’s rights are protected by the unreasonable-searches-and-seizures

clause of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Arnold fails to state a claim under 

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. He also fails to state a 

claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because Deputy 

Williams was an officer of the state of Louisiana rather than of the federal 

government. We affirm the dismissal of all of Arnold’s § 1983 claims beyond 

his unreasonable-search claim.

We affirm also the district court’s dismissal of Arnold’s intentionalinfliction-of-emotional-distress claim under Louisiana law. Arnold simply 

failed to allege any conduct “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly 

intolerable in a civilized community.” White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 

1205, 1209 (La. 1991).

Finally, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment and 

the three evidentiary rulings appealed by Arnold. The first evidentiary ruling 

is a denial of Arnold’s motion to strike documents offered by Williams. This 

court reviews a motion to strike for abuse of discretion. Cambridge Toxicology 

Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir. 2007). Arnold does not argue 

that the district court abused its discretion, but only that the district court 

“improperly considered the documents.” Without a basis in the briefs or in 

the record to establish an abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The second evidentiary ruling is a denial of Arnold’s motion to 

supplement his opposition to Williams’s motion for summary judgment with 

a declaration by Arnold’s brother Jason Arnold. “We review a district 

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court’s denial of a motion to amend or supplement pretrial materials, such as 

briefs in opposition to summary judgment, for abuse of discretion.” Shepherd 

ex rel. Estate of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 

2019). Arnold argues only that the district court “improperly disregarded 

the declaration” and not that it abused its discretion. Further, nothing in the 

record supports a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion, and 

so we affirm.

The third evidentiary ruling is a denial of Williams’s motion in limine

to exclude testimony by Arnold’s expert Lloyd Grafton. In his original brief, 

Arnold incorrectly states that the district court excluded Mr. Grafton’s 

testimony from evidence. In his reply brief, “Mr. Arnold’s counsel admits 

she misread the limine order” and that Mr. Grafton’s testimony was not 

excluded from evidence. Nevertheless, Arnold argues that the district court 

“completely ignored” Mr. Grafton’s testimony in its summary judgment 

analysis. To the extent that Arnold still challenges the district court’s denial 

of the motion in limine regarding Mr. Grafton, we affirm the district court.

Mr. Grafton’s report remains part of the record available to this court as we 

review the grant of summary judgment on Arnold’s final claim of negligence.

“This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court. Summary 

judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Petro Harvester Operating Co. v. Keith, 954 F.3d 686, 691 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Reviewing the 

record, including Mr. Grafton’s report, we conclude that there is no genuine 

dispute of material fact as to Arnold’s negligence claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under Louisiana 

law, a police officer making an arrest owes a duty to act reasonably under the 

totality of the circumstances. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 

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322 (La. 1994).

4 None of the disputed facts identified in the Appellant’s 

reply or raised by Mr. Grafton’s report or present elsewhere on the record 

are material to Williams’ duty to act reasonably; none of them would “affect 

the outcome” that Williams acted reasonably in carrying out the arrest.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We affirm the grant 

of summary judgment on Arnold’s negligence claim.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED in part and 

AFFIRMED in part, and the case is REMANDED.

4 The Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth the following factors to consider when 

evaluating the reasonableness of a means of arrest: “(1) the known character of the arrestee; 

(2) the risks and dangers faced by the officers; (3) the nature of the offense involved; (4) 

the chance of the arrestee’s escape if the particular means are not employed; (5) the 

existence of alternative methods of arrest; (6) the physical size, strength, and weaponry of 

the officers as compared to the arrestee; and (7) the exigency of the moment.” Mathieu, 

646 So.2d at 322–23.

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