UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. LUIS ENRIQUE SALAZAR BENITEZ, Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-8094 (D.C. No. 2:16- CR-00020-ABJ-1) (D. Wyo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , MURPHY , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Mr. Luis Salazar Benitez pleaded guil ty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court sentenced him to 135 months’ imprisonment, and Mr. Benitez did not appeal. Nine months later, Mr. Benitez filed a moti on to compel his former attorney to furnish his criminal case file. The district court denied the motion because Mr. Benitez had no t cited any authority showing that

* We have determined that oral ar gument would not ma terially help us to decide the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)( 2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. This order and judgment does not constitute bind ing precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But this order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 24, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 the court had the power to order such relief. Mr. Benit ez filed two more motions to compel over the following months. The district court denied these motions, again relying on the lack of any cited authority showing the power to order such relief. Mr. Benitez appeals the di strict court’s denial of his second and third motions to compel, arguing that the rulin gs violated the Firs t, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendmen ts and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 , 242, and 1001. Because Mr. Benitez had failed to assert a valid basis for jurisdiction, the district court denied the motions. Technically, however, th e motions should have been “dismissed” rather than “denied.” Before addressing the merits of Mr. Benitez’s mo tion, we must ensure not only our own jurisdiction but also the district court’s. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998 ). Federal district courts have limited juri sdiction, which is estab lished by the Constitution and federal statutes and may not be expanded by judicial decree. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994 ). The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on Mr. Benitez. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 342 & n.3 (2006); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Ci r. 2005) (noting that pro se litigants must follow the same pr ocedural rules th at govern other litigants).3 The district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Benitez’s criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. But § 3231’s grant of ju risdiction ended upon entry of the final judgment. See United States v. Asakevich , 810 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 2016) (con cluding that § 3231 does not provide jurisdiction for a district court to consid er a post-convic tion motion); accord United States v. Spaulding , 802 F.3d 1110, 1116–17 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an argument that § 3231 creat ed jurisdiction to set as ide a guilty plea after entry of a final judgment). Mr. Benit ez filed his motions to compel months after the district court had entered a fina l judgment. Therefore, § 3231 did not create jurisdicti on to consider th e second and third mo tions to compel, and Mr. Benitez must establish juri sdiction under some other source. Mr. Benitez does not id entify any other source to support the district court’s jurisdiction. He generally points to the Constitution as the authority underlying his claim, but nothing in the Constitution would empower the district court to order a third-party to produce documents in a closed criminal case. As the movant, Mr. Benitez bore th e burden to estab lish the district court’s jurisdiction over his sec ond and third moti ons to compel. See p. 2, above. He failed to carry his burden, preventing the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the motions. See United States v. James , No. 17-1217, 2018 WL 1560251, at *3 (10th Cir. Ma r. 29, 2018) (unpublished) (concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the4 defendant’s post-judgment motion to compel his fo rmer attorney to turn over records in hi s criminal case); United States v. Woods , No. 15-3304, 2016 WL 3457754, at *2–3 (10th Cir. June 23, 2016) (unpublished) (same). When the district court lacks juri sdiction over a mo tion, the proper disposition is “dismissal” rather than “denial.” City of Boulder v. Snyder , 396 F.2d 853, 856 (1 0th Cir. 1968); accord Pagants v. Blonstein , 3 F.3d 1067, 1073 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, we have directed district courts to “dismiss” motions seeking orders for records from their prior attorneys. James , 2018 WL 1560251 , at *4; Woods , 2016 WL 3457754, at *3. Here, the district court recognized that it lacked jurisdiction, but ordered “denial” rather than “dismi ssal.” Technically, th e motions should have been “dismissed” rather than “denied.” We th erefore vacate the district court’s rulings an d remand with instructions to dismiss the second and third motions based on a lack of jurisdiction.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge