U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–552PDF 2018

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN ASIA: U.S. ECONOMIC

STRATEGY AMID CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2017

Serial No. 115–101

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Daniel F. Runde, William A. Schreyer Chair and director of the Project 

on Prosperity and Development, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 6

Mr. Roy Kamphausen, senior vice president for research, The National Bureau of Asian Research ........................................................................................ 21

The Honorable Jonathan N. Stivers, commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission (former Assistant Administrator, Bureau for 

Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development) ........................................... 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Mr. Daniel F. Runde: Prepared statement ............................................................ 9

Mr. Roy Kamphausen: Prepared statement .......................................................... 24

The Honorable Jonathan N. Stivers: Prepared statement ................................... 37

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

Mr. Daniel F. Runde: Material submitted for the record ..................................... 64

Written responses from the witnesses to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 65

(1)

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE IN ASIA: 

U.S. ECONOMIC STRATEGY AMID 

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. Hello, everybody. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material 

for the record, subject to length limitations in the rules. 

Good afternoon, and thank you to my colleagues on the subcommittee and the panel for coming together to discuss the future 

of U.S. economic engagement. And I have to give a shout out to Mr. 

Engel, the ranking member. He is in Financial Services, and they 

have 15 votes teed up, ready to go, so he will be here as soon as 

he can. 

President Trump has just returned from his first trip to the AsiaPacific, a region the White House has taken to calling the Indo-Pacific region. The long trip, which began on November 3, is the longest trip to Asia by an American President in more than 25 years 

and a fitting reminder of the importance of the region to American 

interests. 

Going forward, the trip will surely be an inflection point for the 

U.S. policies toward the region. One of the most important aspects 

of this policy will be our economic engagement, which is what we 

have gathered to discuss here today. 

The discussion about U.S. economic engagement in Asia frequently centers on trade, but the Asia-Pacific is still a developing 

region, and too often the discussion does not give sufficient attention to what the United States must do before the important development and trade promotion work that is a precursor to robust 

trading relationships. 

The United States already has the tools needed for this important work. U.S. development finance institutions—OPIC, the OverVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:22 Mar 05, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AP\111517\27552 SHIRL
2

seas Private Investment Corporation; the USTDA, which is the 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency; and others—leverage private 

investment to promote development and economic activity abroad. 

These institutions are increasingly important because their work 

is in line with a larger tectonic shift in how capital moves in the 

developing world. Over the last few decades, private capital has 

outstripped assistance from donor governments to constitute 90 

percent of financial flows into developing countries. Deepening U.S. 

development finance authorities will make foreign assistance more 

effective by working with this trend rather than against it. 

A model focused on public-private partnerships would also be 

more sustainable in times of budgetary constraints. Development 

finance institutions frequently operate at little or no cost. OPIC remitted $239 million to the U.S. Treasury in fiscal year 2016. 

And, finally, a development-finance-based approach is rooted in 

U.S. national interests as well, promoting U.S. business abroad and 

opening up new export opportunities for U.S. industries. 

Despite these advantages, development finance is consistently 

undervalued as a part of overall development assistance strategy. 

To begin to remedy this, I have introduced the Economic Growth 

and Development Act, which would create a one-stop shop for private-sector participation in overseas development, and I am currently working on more expansive legislation that would consolidate, reform, and improve U.S. development finance mechanisms. 

I hope that the panel will share with us today their own recommendations for improving our development finance efforts. 

While U.S. economic engagement in Asia adjusts, China’s economic engagement strategy, known as ‘‘One Belt, One Road,’’ or, 

more recently, the ‘‘Belt and Road Initiative,’’ is well underway. 

The Belt and Road Initiative itself is a development finance undertaking—a multitrillion-dollar response to the substantial unmet infrastructure needs of the Asia-Pacific region, designed to build 

roads, bridges, ports, and other infrastructure across Eurasia and 

the Pacific and Indian Oceans to increase China’s economic 

connectivity with the nations who have joined. 

While infrastructure investment is desperately needed across the 

region, there is more to the Belt and Road Initiative than meets 

the eye. Though China has promoted the program as generous 

‘‘win-win’’ assistance to its fellow developing nations, the Belt and 

Road seems motivated primarily by self-interest. 

Belt and Road projects are financed by Chinese institutions at 

high rates not typically found in the development context, conducted by Chinese corporations that are often state-owned enterprises, utilize Chinese labor and material, and seem to add little 

to local economies and can bring unsustainable debt burdens. 

The program also seems too closely aligned with China’s strategic and military interests to be more than just mere coincidence. 

In one illustrative example, China built an economically unviable 

port in the hometown of Sri Lanka’s corrupt former leader, converted its interest to equity when Sri Lanka could not service the 

resulting debt, and now owns a port along its maritime energy supply route through the Indian Ocean. 

In contrast, U.S. development finance efforts can offer an alternative that is healthier for the region while furthering our own inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:22 Mar 05, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AP\111517\27552 SHIRL
3

terests. U.S. programs have the high standards and transparency 

that Belt and Road projects often lack and are demand-driven by 

market forces, not state-owned corporations and military strategists. 

So, as we discuss U.S. development finance in Asia today, it will 

be helpful to do so in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And I hope the panel can discuss how U.S. Efforts can counter 

the potential negative aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the hearing record. 

And I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Deutch. Do you have 

a comment you want to say? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

4


27552d-1.eps
5


27552d-2.eps
6

Mr. DEUTCH. I do not. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. 

And, with that, we are thankful to be joined today by Mr. Daniel 

F. Runde, the Schreyer chair and director of the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Roy Kamphausen, senior vice president for 

research at the National Bureau of Asian Research; and the Honorable Jonathan N. Stivers, a Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and former Assistant Administrator to the USAID bureau for Asia. 

And, with that, we are going to start with your testimonies. You 

guys know how the buttons work and the timers and all that? That 

is good. 

Mr. Runde, if you will, let’s hear your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL F. RUNDE, WILLIAM A. SCHREYER 

CHAIR AND DIRECTOR OF THE PROJECT ON PROSPERITY 

AND DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you 

for inviting me to testify before you today. 

I hope to use my time to talk about two things: First, the 

changed world in which we find ourselves, especially in Asia. Simply put, China is eating our economic and diplomatic lunch in Asia. 

Second, the critical role that enhanced U.S. development finance 

capabilities can play in countering Chinese economic influence as 

part of a larger U.S. economic strategy for Asia. We need to take 

a series of concrete steps, as the American Government, so that we 

can continue to lead and have an ability to shape the future. 

My bottom line is that the Congress can take a series of steps 

to strengthen OPIC and other bilateral and multilateral instruments of American power. Congress should spend its limited political and policy time on strengthening and reforming the institutions we already have, including multilateral institutions, and take 

USAID’s Power Africa model and apply it to different sectors in 

Asia, including power and infrastructure. I believe the United 

States will get much more benefit out of a reformed and strengthened OPIC compared to a merger of government offices and agencies. 

Let me talk about change to Asia. While recognizing the great diversity across the continent, it is safe to say this is not your grandparents’ Asia. Asia is much freer, is more interested in trade and 

foreign direct investment, is rapidly urbanizing and aging, needs to 

close a massive infrastructure deficit, and wants a deeper partnership with the United States around science, technology, and innovation. We need different approaches in Asia. 

We also need to understand what China is doing, because China 

is a full-fledged soft-power competitor to the United States. China 

has over 3 million young people joining its workforce every year. 

Employing so many young people every year is a real issue for 

China. China’s need for jobs and access to alternate trade routes 

has necessitated the creation of a new model on different terms, 

7

one built on quick, one-stop-shop financing and one that leverages 

its state-owned enterprises. 

China also has displayed a willingness to periodically overlook 

human rights, environmental or social standards in the way that 

it approaches these things. 

The One Belt, One Road initiative is a prime example of a Chinese effort that leverages all aspects of this model described above. 

It is also, frankly, a good idea. Recreating the old Silk Road land 

roads, cutting transit times for goods and services, would be an economic boon. We cannot stop One Belt, One Road, nor should we. 

The United States and its allies should instead seek to influence 

the soft infrastructure of One Belt, One Road. And I have submitted some documents for the record about that. 

Let me move to development finance. Let me first define ‘‘development finance institutions.’’ Development finance institutions are 

government or quasi-government institutions that provide equity, 

loans, or other financial support for private-sector projects in lowand middle-income countries. The Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation is the United States’ DFI. DFIs are not a solution to 

all of our challenges in Asia, but they must be part of a larger economic and political strategy for Asia and the developing world. 

DFIs are powerful and precise development tools, and DFIs are 

one reason that there has been a massive expansion of cell phones, 

for example, in Africa and Asia. In the late 1990s, no normal investor believed that there was a mass consumer market for cell 

phones. DFIs provided the capital and provided a demonstration effect that others could make money in the African cell phone sector. 

As I said, though, DFIs are not a solution for every problem, and 

they cannot do things that grants or technical advice or diplomacy 

can do. DFIs usually need a private-sector sponsor, a business partner. They provide money in the form of a loan. They sometimes 

take a minority ownership position or provide highly specialized 

advice. 

DFIs need clear rules of the game. They need some level of security and a functioning state. There are things that USAID and 

MCC provide that DFIs can’t, and there are things that USTD and 

export credit agencies like U.S. Ex-Im Bank provide that DFIs cannot. 

So what are we to do about all this? Well, I think there are several things this Congress should be doing. The first is that the Congress should ask the administration to produce a U.S. economic 

strategy to go with our national security strategy. 

Second, I would recommend that the Congress work with the administration to provide the following enhanced instruments for 

OPIC: OPIC is not permanently authorized. It ought to go to a 10-

year authorization. Congress needs to raise OPIC’s ceiling of total 

investments that it can make. It is currently $29 billion; it should 

go to $58 billion. OPIC ought to be able to keep some of its profits. 

OPIC ought to create a funding stream for early-stage financing 

for innovators and entrepreneurs in developing countries. We 

should dilute or remove the U.S.-content requirement, especially in 

U.S. national-security-priority countries. OPIC needs a limited 

amount of what is called equity authority—basically, the ability to 

make minority ownership stakes in a small number of projects. 

8

And OPIC should dilute or even remove its so-called carbon cap. 

This carbon cap puts a limit on carbon emissions related to the totality of the projects financed by OPIC. President Trump was just 

in Vietnam and talked about doing more projects in Vietnam with 

OPIC. The carbon cap will hold back OPIC’s ability to work in Vietnam and other countries that are not the poorest of the poor. 

Development finance capabilities will only get us so far; we need 

to do a lot more in trade. I know this is important to you, Chairman. We need to make sure that the trade facilitation agreement 

gets done in Asia. We need to provide the money for it in the 150 

account and then that AID and our diplomats at the State Department follow through on that. That is a win-win for the United 

States and for developing countries. 

Fourth, regarding AID—and I know I am running out of time—

that we should take lessons from the Obama-era’s Power Africa 

and apply it to Asia. We also need a strategy for exiting middleincome countries. And I would encourage AID to return to the use 

of enterprise funds. 

Regarding TDA, it is one of the best and most efficient agencies 

in the U.S. Government. It does a series of things, highly leverages 

its money. But I would seek a larger congressional appropriation 

for TDA. I would not merge it with OPIC for a series of reasons, 

in that they don’t overlap almost at all. I can answer questions 

about that. 

Six, regarding the U.S. Ex-Im Bank, we need a fully functioning 

Ex-Im Bank. It is completely absurd that we don’t have a functioning Ex-Im Bank. Currently, you can only approve deals of only 

$10 million. There is currently $30 billion in U.S. Ex-Im Bank applications waiting right now. This is crazy. 

Seventh, our bilateral agencies and our multilateral agencies 

need to move much more quickly and in a coordinated way. Japan’s 

aid agency and its DFI have reduced their door-to-door approval of 

infrastructure projects to 11 months in response to AIIB and the 

Chinese, and so should we. 

Eighth—and I will stop here—with regard to multilateral development banks, we need to rethink about how we use the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. The Asian Development 

Bank is a great asset to the United States. If they were to come 

to us for a special capital increase, I think we should consider it. 

I believe this committee ought to consider doing hearings about the 

United States and the Asian Development Bank. 

I will stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Runde follows:]

9


27552a-1.eps
10


27552a-2.eps
11


27552a-3.eps
12


27552a-4.eps
13


27552a-5.eps
14


27552a-6.eps
15


27552a-7.eps
16


27552a-8.eps
17


27552a-9.eps
18


27552a-10.eps
19


27552a-11.eps
20


27552a-12.eps
21

Mr. YOHO. No, I appreciate your input on that, and those are all 

great points, and I look forward to hearing more about that. 

Mr. Kamphausen? Is that correct? 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. Good. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROY KAMPHAUSEN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN 

RESEARCH 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

I am a China guy, and so my role is to talk about the Belt and 

Road. And I am basing my comments largely on a recent monograph that we published at NBR, and glad to provide a copy to you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 

1949, the Chinese leadership has had two overwhelming foreign 

policy goals: One, the restoration of what China considers as its national domain and boundaries; and, two, the restoration of China’s 

historical position at the center of Asia as the preponderant power 

in the region. 

These two restorations are really the heart of what President Xi 

Jinping in China has called his ‘‘China dream’’ for the rejuvenation 

of the great Chinese nation, which he hopes to fulfill by the 100th 

anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. 

And so, understood in the light of China’s longstanding foreign 

policy goals, the Belt and Road Initiative is, I believe, an early test 

case which offers us a glimpse of the sort of integration under Chinese-led norms that Beijing would like to see emerge in Eurasia. 

The Belt and Road Initiative is very important to the Chinese 

leadership. As mentioned by the chairman in his opening statement, more than $1 trillion has been dedicated, at least in principle, to funding projects. President Xi Jinping is personally engaged, including making an appearance at the multinational Belt 

and Road Forum in May of this year in Beijing. And the Belt and 

Road has been written into the Chinese Communist Party charter 

in the most recent 19th Party Congress. It tells us how important 

this initiative is to leadership. 

As an overview, the Belt and Road Initiative sets the general 

long-term direction for China and seeks to mobilize and coordinate 

the use of all available national resources—political, economic, diplomatic, military, and ideological—to pursue both internal, in terms 

of economic development, and external, both strategic and national 

security objectives, in an integrated way. 

And so I would like to focus on how those three areas—economic, 

security, and strategic—really come together from Beijing’s perspective. 

On the economic side, one way to think of Belt and Road is as 

a new Chinese stimulus package, similar to that introduced after 

the 2008 global financial crisis. And it is intended to sustain Chinese economic growth, the development goals notwithstanding. The 

crucial difference is that, this time, the activity will take place outside of Chinese territory, and, in effect, the plan is to export some 

22

of the overcapacity that developed as part of the response to the 

2008 global financial crisis. 

From a security angle, in the near term, Belt and Road has significant potential to increase China’s military footprint in the region, Central Asia, and beyond in an effort to secure China’s periphery, a central goal of the Chinese leadership. The geographic 

scope of BRI extends over regions that, together, form an arc of instability, where the security situation can be volatile due to a variety of factors, including ethnic and religious violence, territorial 

disputes, and destabilizing spillovers. 

And, finally, on the strategic side, the Belt and Road Initiative 

is a way to secure China’s periphery, address internal security 

challenges, those which have international linkages—and I am 

thinking primarily of terrorism here—and to respond to the Chinese perception of a challenge from the United States. Chinese authorities believe that, by providing economic development, they will 

help secure China’s most restive provinces in the west of China, 

which have connections to international terrorism originally in 

Central Asia. 

More broadly, at a strategic level, Belt and Road reflects Beijing’s 

regional and global ambitions. It is an instrument to consolidate 

China’s position at the heart of Eurasia, in a space where U.S. influence is rather limited. The initiative is intended to counter what 

Beijing perceives as the U.S.’s unacceptable containment of China 

off of its eastern seaboard. 

So how does the Belt and Road actually expand Chinese influence? Very briefly, China portrays itself as the magnanimous provider of public goods through development projects and proposes a 

list of possible areas for cooperation under the umbrella of Belt and 

Road and then urges other countries to get on board China’s train 

of development. It offers material incentives in the form of investment, infrastructure projects, and general economic and security 

benefits to members that choose to take advantage. But, in return, 

it expects that recipient countries will tacitly agree not to challenge 

China’s core interests, criticize its posture, or seek to change its political system. 

But there are some predatory aspects of Belt and Road, and I 

will end with these, just by ticking them off. 

First, the bidding process. It is not at all clear that there is any 

evidence of a competitive bidding process for projects. 

State subsidies. China’s loans are, in reality, state subsidies for 

China’s companies to build infrastructure with Chinese materials, 

using Chinese workers. 

Third, it is not really a development effort. Only 23 percent of 

the Chinese aid funding falls under the OECD’s definition of aid, 

mostly given to projects without a development intent and that 

have a grant element of under 25 percent. 

Debt burden for host states. And the chairman referred to this 

in his opening statement. Loans can be financially unsustainable 

for poor countries—over 6 percent, in many cases. Sri Lanka, for 

example, owes 10 percent of its debt to China. 

Who gets the jobs? Xi Jinping has said, since Belt and Road was 

launched, more than 180,000 local jobs have been created, but 

there is no transparent record of that. 

23

Who gets the revenue? Revenue generation formulas from infrastructure projects are completely unclear. For instance, Pakistan 

will reportedly receive only about 9 percent of the revenues from 

the terminal marine operations at the new Gwadar Port. 

And then there is the endemic corruption, environmental impacts, economic leverage that China poses on countries that fall 

under the program, and so forth. 

So, in conclusion, I would submit that just because we in the 

West may not have fully grasped what Belt and Road is all about, 

it does not make the initiative foolish, unimportant, or doomed to 

fail. For now, China has the initiative, and its projects under Belt 

and Road have gained an undeniable momentum. 

But Beijing’s plan to reshape the economic and political map of 

Eurasia is still in its early stages, and there will be many obstacles 

on the road ahead. The United States can and must come up with 

a comprehensive strategy to better defend our existing order in 

ways that serve our own national interests. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kamphausen follows:]

24


27552b-1.eps
25


27552b-2.eps
26


27552b-3.eps
27


27552b-4.eps
28


27552b-5.eps
29


27552b-6.eps
30


27552b-7.eps
31


27552b-8.eps
32


27552b-9.eps
33


27552b-10.eps
34

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Stivers, if you would. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JONATHAN N. STIVERS, 

COMMISSIONER, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (FORMER ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT) 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the invitation to testify today. It is an honor to be back before this subcommittee, especially alongside such distinguished colleagues. 

Before I begin, I would like to make clear that the views I express today are my own and not necessarily to be attributed to the 

U.S.-China Commission. 

This morning, the bipartisan U.S.-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, on which I serve as a Commissioner, submitted to Congress its 2017 annual report. The Commission is 

tasked by Congress to examine the national security and foreign 

policy implications of the U.S. trade and economic relationship with 

China. 

This year, we spent some time analyzing the One Belt, One Road 

Initiative. We conclude that China is expanding its presence on the 

world stage through both coercion and a charm offensive, thereby 

creating pockets of influence, leverage, and control. The charm offensive is typified by One Belt, One Road, which seeks to bring 

more than 60 countries into China’s economic and strategic orbit. 

It is time for a new U.S. economic and development strategy for 

the Asia-Pacific region in order to effectively compete with China’s 

growing influence and investment. In my view, the discussion 

about U.S. economic engagement in Asia has been overly focused 

on trade policy. This new strategy should prioritize development financing and our foreign assistance tools, some of our greatest 

strengths, in a strategic way, coordinated with our allies and partners, in order to advance our national interest in a stable, prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific region. 

The Asia-Pacific region, which I include India in that, is absolutely vital to the security and prosperity of the American people. 

It is the most dynamic and one of the youngest and fastest-growing 

regions of the world. U.S. companies invest more in ASEAN and 

its members than our investment in China, Japan, and India combined, and they are responsible for over 1⁄2 million U.S. jobs and 

has tremendous potential for future U.S. exports. 

In the coming years, the countries of this region will play an increasingly pivotal role in world affairs. The question isn’t whether 

but how the Asia-Pacific region develops, and the type of development will make all the difference. And there are different competing models out there. 

While the U.S. is consumed by a lot of other issues, China is not 

only investing in becoming a high-tech powerhouse, which our annual report describes in much detail, but it is also placing itself at 

the center, strategically and economically, of the fastest-growing region of the world. 

35

China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative includes about $900 billion 

worth of projects, mostly financed by the China Development Bank. 

The state implicitly guarantees its debt, and its assets dwarf those 

of the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. 

Key aspects of China’s development model include: First, relieving China’s overcapacity in its slowing industrial and construction 

sectors of its state-owned enterprises. In short, as has been said 

earlier, China builds the infrastructure with its own materials, its 

own workers, and sends the recipient country the bill for it later. 

Less planning is devoted to the impact or the sustainability of 

these projects for the country and its impact on the people. 

Second, expanding China’s access to strategically important maritime and overland trade routes. Page 3 of my written testimony 

shows these routes in a nice map. 

Third, gaining influence and using its new economic leverage to 

coerce other countries. 

Fourth, taking advantage of low standards on transparency, 

leading to a higher debt burden for developing countries. And while 

the international community and this Congress pursued debt relief 

for poor countries two decades ago, China is now reburdening these 

countries with predatory loans that create dependence on China. 

China often uses the term ‘‘win-win’’ to describe its economic activities, but Asian officials sometimes joke that ‘‘win-win’’ usually 

means China wins two times. 

While Asian governments generally want Chinese investment, 

they would prefer more competition and higher-quality options. In 

many cases, Chinese investment has sparked backlash because its 

development model is exclusively focused on helping China, and it 

often facilitates corruption, displaces communities, and harms the 

environment. 

It would be expensive for the U.S. to compete with China dollar 

for dollar on building infrastructure in Asia. But due to the limitations of China’s development approach, it isn’t necessary. The U.S. 

Can compete with China for fewer dollars and greater effectiveness 

if our resources are used in a strategic way. 

And so I would submit the following recommendations. I have 

seven of them in my written testimony, but I will mention a few 

here. 

First, economic and development assistance to the East Asia-Pacific region should be significantly increased. Currently, the region 

only receives 3 percent of all nonmilitary U.S. foreign assistance. 

These low levels ensure that efforts to compete with China and 

Asia are vastly underfunded. And making matters worse, the 

Trump administration budget request included a 46-percent cut to 

development assistance in the region. 

The best way to compete with Chinese investment is to provide 

the needed resources to increase our competitive advantage in what 

we do the best: Global health, fighting pandemics and infectious 

diseases, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, food security, environment protection, governance and rule-of-law initiatives that 

promote stable economies and democracies. These development initiatives are tremendously successful, but, without the resources, we 

simply can’t adequately help shape this all-important region. 

36

Second, the U.S. should provide stronger support for institutions 

that are best positioned to compete with China on infrastructure. 

Last week, in Asia, President Trump stated he would support additional infrastructure development in Asia. Unfortunately, these announcements are not consistent with his budget request, which zeroed out OPIC, reduced funding for the World Bank, and cut the 

U.S. contribution to the Japan-led Asian Development Bank in 

half. 

It is my understanding that the Trump administration is considering some sort of larger development financing reform, and I 

would be happy to have a discussion about that in more depth with 

my colleagues and with the Members. But, in short, I would say 

bringing our development institutions together under one agency 

that improves coordination is a lot better than creating yet another 

development agency bureaucracy with an independent commission. 

And then, third, as opposed to China, the U.S. has strong allies 

and partners in the Asia-Pacific, and we should double our development efforts to empower those counterweights, namely India and 

ASEAN. We should assist India with gaining membership to the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, support Prime Minister 

Modi’s Act East policy, and help India with its own domestic development challenges. And, in addition, a strong and unified ASEAN 

has the potential to push back on China. And the U.S. can help the 

ASEAN Secretariat become more effective. 

And, also, on Taiwan, Taiwan has a new southbound policy as it 

seeks to diversify its economy. And Taiwan has a lot to bring to the 

table, with good development practices and a democratic model. We 

should be finding ways, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, 

to coordinate and utilize those resources for both Taiwan and the 

U.S.’s larger goals. 

So, in conclusion, Beijing’s main advantage has been that, for the 

last two decades, the U.S. has diverted its focus from Asia while 

pursuing other challenges. The U.S. can no longer ignore the strategic competition that is underway in the Asia-Pacific region. And 

the challenge now is for the administration and Congress to develop a more effective strategy to compete with China and make 

sure it has the resources to be successful. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stivers follows:]

37


27552c-1.eps
38


27552c-2.eps
39


27552c-3.eps
40


27552c-4.eps
41


27552c-5.eps
42


27552c-6.eps
43


27552c-7.eps
44

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate everybody’s testimony. Great. You guys 

are spot-on. And I look forward to this, because it is so important, 

as you brought up. 

Mr. Stivers, you brought up how we have kind of pivoted from 

the Asia-Pacific over the last decade or so. The last administration 

had a strategic patience, where we were kind of just spectators on 

the sideline, and we can’t afford to do that. And China has run 

with the One Belt, One Road Initiative. My records show that they 

have invested over $4 trillion to $5 trillion in the last decade. And 

it is an investment in the future. You know, it is an investment in 

the future of their development and trade and things like that. We 

need to make sure that we are at the table. 

And, you know, the thing that concerns me is, after the 19th 

Party Congress in China with Xi Jinping, he was quoted as saying, 

‘‘China should take center stage in the world,’’ adding that ‘‘no one 

should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests.’’

And we just did a codel, and we were in Vietnam, Singapore, and 

Hong Kong, and while in Hong Kong, I reiterated these words. And 

I brought up: These words sound threatening toward America’s interests, proposing China wants to supplant America’s leadership 

and knock us off the world stage. This will not be tolerated. If 

China cares to share the world stage with us or any other world 

powers, we would be willing to do so. And then I asked them to 

please convey that message to Beijing, which I am sure it was. 

The important thing is, their initiative, like you brought up and 

the members of the panel brought up, they are investing in hard 

assets; they haven’t learned the soft power. And all you have to do 

is look at their past history, how they treated Hong Kong, with the 

50-year transition, the agreement, they are not living up to that; 

how they treated South Korea. When South Korea asked to have 

a THAAD system for their own security, China retaliates against 

South Korea instead of North Korea and does economic damage to 

South Korea. 

The bottom line is it makes these countries—if America’s presence is not there economically, in trade, or in military support, 

these countries are looking and they are not wanting to but they 

are going to pivot closer to China. And it is not just South Korea; 

it is the ASEAN nations. 

And we have had the privilege of meeting with all the Ambassadors from those nations. And it was interesting, because we just 

had our 50th year anniversary of ASEAN, our 40th year for involvement with that. And I asked them, why has ASEAN been 

such a successful pact? And they said it was because of America’s 

leadership. And so, when coming back from this trip, from that region, everybody said they want us back, it is important that we are 

back, and they want to focus on trade and the initiatives. 

So my question is, how should the significant capital infusions 

brought to Asia by the Belt/Road Initiative affect our decisions in 

the future? 

The one thing that we can do, that I don’t think China has quite 

gotten there yet, is the relationships that we build, that we, as we 

invest in the country, we want the best for that country, you know. 

45

And I think it has been brought up by the panel that, you know, 

it is a win-win. 

A double win for China, that was pretty good. 

But about the allocations of our development assistance, which 

would you recommend? 

And you brought up about combining these agencies. We have a 

bill that is looking at that. Mr. Kamphausen, you were talking 

about streamlining it, and our bill will streamline that whole process. And we will share that with you in due time. 

But, Mr. Stivers, what would you do different as far as our aid? 

Mr. STIVERS. Well, in terms of a reorganization, I am not sure 

that the different development agencies need to be combined into 

one. My worry, from my standpoint and also having worked at 

USAID, is that it is so difficult to coordinate across agencies. Even 

for the State Department and USAID, it is a challenge to coordinate and make sure we are working from the same page. 

And so, when you have 10, 12, more than that, development 

agencies, it is very hard for the administration, it is very hard for 

our country, to compete with China, which is a top-down, authoritarian model, which can just decide which path they want to go 

and everyone goes in that direction. 

So creating more agencies and more bureaucracies, I don’t think 

anyone wants to do that. But, unfortunately, that has been done 

in the past, because it is so difficult to try to do any kind of serious 

foreign aid reform. And I know this committee has worked on that 

issue and hasn’t been able to get there because it is so difficult. 

And so, again, my fear is that we would create another one that 

would make it more difficult. 

And so you can streamline or combine certain agencies at one 

point, but there does need to be, I believe, more centralization in 

terms of our foreign assistance. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. Kamphausen? 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Very quickly, I think we want to make sure 

that we don’t convey to countries that desperately need development aid that the U.S. is opposed to aid for them because it comes 

from China. 

I will share an example. 

Mr. YOHO. Agreed. 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Each year, I have the privilege of briefing a 

delegation of Pakistani generals that comes to our National Defense University, twice this past year. And on both occasions, we 

have talked about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is 

an important part of the Belt and Road, $42 billion worth of 

planned investment in four types of projects, mostly energy. And 

Pakistan is desperately in need of more energy. 

And it came out in the course of the discussion, one of the generals finally said, it sounds to me like your problem with CPEC—

and I don’t have a problem with CPEC, but—your problem, America’s problem with CPEC is that it is Chinese in origin. And so your 

strategic competition with China is making us a bill payer if you 

oppose it too strenuously. 

And so we need to be very clear that the penalty is not paid by 

countries that desperately need the development aid. 

46

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate that. And, you know, the thing is it is not 

against China, you know, because I wish them the best of luck, but 

it is not at our expense. 

And I am going to go to Mr. Ted Deutch from Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Stivers, you said that President Xi is expanding China’s 

presence on the world stage through coercion and a charm offensive. 

So I would like the three of you to talk about that, One Belt, One 

Road and how it works, how the investments lure countries in—

they welcome the investments, obviously—and how that turns into 

coercion. How does that actually play out? 

Please, Mr. Runde. 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you. 

Let me just first say that every country I visit in Asia, they want 

more America, not less America, to your point. 

I would just make one other point, and then I will respond to 

your question, Mr. Deutch, in that I think there are fewer and 

fewer poor countries in Asia. If I think about this subcommittee’s 

footprint and when you think about countries, as I said, this is not 

your grandparents’ Asia. And so, over the next 10 years, you are 

only going to go have one or two or a handful of countries eligible 

for IDA, meaning the softest loans from the World Bank. 

And so what that means is that the kinds of things that they 

want from the United States and from the rest of the world aren’t 

going to be traditional foreign aid. There are going to be pockets 

of poverty in those countries, but, in many ways, those countries 

ought to be able to fund and finance much of the basic human 

needs. 

And I think that is one of the reasons you have seen the uptake 

of things like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Every 

Member of Congress I have ever met knows what the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank is. They all know what it is, and they 

don’t like it. I don’t necessarily like it either. But it reflects, I 

think, the fact that—what I say is that, if we don’t meet the hopes 

and aspirations of countries, they will take their business to the 

Chinese. And I think the hopes and aspirations of countries in Asia 

are changing and evolving, and we need to change with their hopes 

and aspirations. And we should really——

Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry. Since you brought it up—we will get 

back to this if we have time. But since you brought it up, let’s talk 

about the Asia Infrastructure Bank. 

Mr. RUNDE. Yes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So there is this investment bank that has been created. Most of our allies, our European allies——

Mr. RUNDE. Have joined. 

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Have joined. We have not. So I understand that people tell you they don’t like it, but was that a wise 

choice, does it continue to be a wise choice, for us to not be a part 

of that? 

Because when you talk to the Chinese, they will tell you all they 

are trying to do is make these investments to help develop the 

area. 

47

Mr. RUNDE. I think that we ought to be strengthening the institutions that we built as a result of—in the rule-based international 

order of things like the Asian Development Bank. My view is that 

we ought to be strengthening the Asian Development Bank and 

strengthening our bilateral instruments first. 

I have a very hard time imagining that any administration would 

come to the U.S. Congress and ask for several hundred million dollars to put into a Chinese-led initiative. I have a very hard time 

imagining that it would even be politically feasible. I am not necessarily sure I would want to do that either. I would rather work 

on a whole series of other things first before even contemplating 

that. 

And regarding your question regarding One Belt, One Road, I 

think that it goes to my point about meeting the hopes and aspirations. It is actually a good idea. If you actually can cut the travel 

time across the Eurasian land mass, this is a great accomplishment. It is a good thing to do. 

I don’t think we can stop the One Belt, One Road, nor should we 

try to. But what we should be trying to do is influence the soft infrastructure around the One Belt, One Road. I have written a report that I am submitting for the record about the soft infrastructure of the One Belt, One Road, things like, how do we use the European Bank for reconstruction and development, how do we use 

the Asian Development Bank, the two regional development banks 

that will most—we should have them be financing infrastructure 

projects along the One Belt, One Road. 

We should work to have—there was a discussion about—we 

didn’t talk a lot about this, but there is an obscure topic but, I 

think, an important topic around the issue of government procurement. Most of the decisions about buying railroads or building 

bridges or building airports or power are often in the hands of government procurement officers in developing countries. And I know 

this seems like an obscure topic, but it relates to American jobs 

and American business. Just bear with me. I know it is a little obscure. But, in essence, we have told developing countries for 50 

years to use one rule book that has go with the lowest bid and lowest bid procurement. And if we go with lowest bid procurement, because they are the cheapest, the Chinese are winning on low-bid 

procurement. 

In the last 5 years, we have been able to change the rule book 

at the World Bank, which is the de facto set of standards for procurement in the developing world, to use a concept called lifecycle 

cost. It is the kind of thing you use when you buy——

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. And I appreciate that, but I don’t have a 

whole lot of time. But I appreciate that. 

But I want to ask, the soft infrastructure and changing the rules, 

we are way into the weeds. Big picture? Big picture, China is making massive infrastructure investments, and the way you describe 

it, it looks like we are trying to sort of pick up the scraps. 

I mean, Mr. Stivers, what do the Chinese think that they are 

getting from it? And how do they turn those investments into political power? 

Mr. STIVERS. China is using—again, they are using their charm 

offensive with OBOR, with these projects, but they are also using 

48

economic coercion after that. You see this in all places in Asia. 

Some of the democratic openings that have happened in the region, 

whether it is in Burma or Sri Lanka, there has been a direct China 

component to that, where countries have responded negatively and 

there has been backlash to certain projects. 

We have talked about Sri Lanka. I think the chairman mentioned it in his statement. In Burma, the Myitsone Dam was a 

huge dam that was built as—I think it is part of OBOR now, and 

I think China puts everything as part of OBOR in terms of its 

projects. But they didn’t do any kind of environmental or social assessments. It is deeply unpopular in the country. This a country 

and a people, a proud people, that don’t want to be dependent on 

China. 

And so you have countries where there is significant popular 

backlash, if not the governments, all over the region. 

Just real quick on AIIB, I really don’t think the U.S. should be 

joining it, first of all, because we don’t have a couple hundred million to contribute to it. And, second of all, we don’t know if AIIB 

is going to be an instrument of Chinese foreign policy yet. We don’t 

know if they are going to have high standards of development yet. 

And I think being on the outside and holding our membership as 

a possibility while other countries are inside of it trying to maneuver is a better place for the United States to be in regards to AIIB. And just, third of all, about that, AIIB has only lent $2 billion, 

which is a small number compared to as much financing is going 

on. And China still retains 26-percent voting power in AIIB, and 

I am not sure we want to be a part of that yet. 

Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The Chair will recognize himself, the acting Chair, at this time 

for 5 minutes. 

The President just got back from an almost-2-week trip to the region of the world that we are discussing here this afternoon. And 

he once again used a term that I wouldn’t necessarily use, but I 

am not President, so he gets to say what he wants, but this, kind 

of, ‘‘America first.’’ And he said, well, all countries consider themselves first. 

And, clearly, China’s attitude is really ‘‘China first.’’ And you 

gentlemen testified to that earlier when you talked about what you 

get when you enter into one of these mega-projects or even a smaller project with the Chinese. You do get Chinese money, but you get 

Chinese workers and you get a Chinese asset and, overall, Chinese 

profits. And they are pretty much there probably forever, for the 

most part. 

Do the other countries, by now, do they realize, you know, what 

they are getting when they jump into bed with China on one of 

these mega-projects? 

Mr. Stivers, do you want to——

Mr. STIVERS. I think some do, some don’t. And we talk about this 

a little bit in the U.S.-China Commission, our annual report. 

Some countries, like Thailand, are more economically advanced. 

It is a strong middle-income country, and they are able to push 

back on China on a lot of these projects. But you have a country 

49

like Burma, who doesn’t have the expertise to analyze a lot of the 

details of these very complicated infrastructure deals. They don’t 

know what they are signing up for, in terms of these loans that 

they are getting. And I think that certain countries know what 

they are getting into, and they negotiate in a very tough way with 

the Chinese. Others don’t have the leverage to push back, in many 

cases. 

And so I think that some of the work that USAID does to help 

these countries improve their governance, improve their capacity to 

analyze economic deals—a lot of this, I guess we call it soft power, 

but it is some of the really good work that we do—can really help 

these countries push back on things that will harm their country 

in the long term. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Let me go to another area here. TPP, unfortunately, became a 

campaign issue in the last race. And both sides—and I don’t want 

to get too political here, but the Democratic candidate, in particular, who had a history of being basically pro-TPP, I think because of Bernie and a lot of his supporters ended up getting 

dragged way to the left on this and ended up being against it, and 

Trump was pretty much always against it, I think. So you had both 

major candidates being against it. And I think, to some degree, we 

have marginalized ourselves as a result of that, and now China is 

much more in the driver’s seat because of our absence to affirm 

that. 

What can we do about it at this point? I know the President has 

talked about how he doesn’t believe in regional trade agreements, 

he wants bilateral trade agreements. And I have met a number of 

times with some of his people about that and their optimism for accomplishing that. But are there any suggestions you gentlemen 

would make to the administration on how they can actually move 

forward with that, if that is their philosophy? 

Mr. Kamphausen? 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Very quickly, in my own discussions with representatives from Japan’s METI, I think they think in very sophisticated terms about: Whatever we do in terms of our bilateral 

deals, have them being TPP-ready for the future point at which, 

you know, common sense might prevail and we will see the need 

to return to a multilateral setting. 

So the Japanese even use the term ‘‘docking station,’’ where a bilateral agreement could then, if you imagine a space shuttle kind 

of setting, actually merge back into what TPP has become. And I 

think there is a lot of value to that. We don’t want to sacrifice the 

standards; we want to have TPP-level standards. And so, at that 

future point, they can potentially be joined back in. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Runde? 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you. 

I would encourage this subcommittee to hold hearings on prospects for a U.S.-Japan bilateral free trade agreement. I think to the 

point Mr. Kamphausen was making, I think we need to think 

about Lego building blocks for coming back. I would like to see us 

return to something like a TPP. 

And I think, as well, we need to take a look at trade and investment agreements across Asia, and we should start with our close 

50

allies and emerging economies of ASEAN. If it sounds a little bit 

like TPP, well, maybe there is something to that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And I am almost out of time here, but let me raise one—and I 

will toss this to you, Mr. Stivers, since you brought it up. And that 

is Taiwan. 

I happen to be one of the founders of the Congressional Taiwan 

Caucus and have been there 10, 11 times, something like that, over 

the years, very involved with Taiwan. And they have been interested, obviously, in a bilateral trade agreement with us or being in 

TPP, or, even prior to U.S. discussing TPP, they want to be more 

involved in this. And, obviously, the PRC does everything possible 

to suppress Taiwan because they consider them a territory and all 

the rest. 

What can we do, what should we do, to make even closer our relationship with one of our key allies in the region, Taiwan, whether 

it is trade or other things? I know getting into the military is probably beyond the confines of this hearing, but anything you would 

like to say relative to Taiwan. 

Mr. STIVERS. Absolutely. I mean, Taiwan has so much resources, 

so much expertise, when it comes to global health, when it comes 

to development. And they have this new southbound policy, so it 

is in their interest to diversify away from their dependence on 

China. So you have a confluence of interests here. And, of course, 

the Southeast Asian countries, they want Taiwan’s economic activities. And so you have a confluence of interests here. 

And I think that—I didn’t include this in my testimony because 

I haven’t really thought this out in too much detail. But if there 

are ways, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, for our entities, for our Government to help Taiwan join some of these—obviously, the international organizations, which, you know, you are a 

big supporter of Taiwan joining, but if we can do some more things 

bilaterally to help them do what they are already trying to do. I 

think they need some help diplomatically with some of the inroads 

in these countries. Again, they have so much to offer. 

And could I mention TPP for a moment? 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. STIVERS. As a member of the Obama administration, I was 

always concerned that TPP was not enough as an economic component of the Asian rebalance. You know, whether you are for it or 

against it, the Asia rebalance needed a better economic component 

to it. 

And, also, not every country in Southeast Asia liked TPP. A lot 

of the countries were worried about losing market share to Vietnam. And so this is not something everyone in Asia wanted except 

for China. 

But more groundwork needs to be done in the region so that 

these countries have the standards where they are able to enter 

into a high-standard agreement. Vietnam needs a labor sector. 

They don’t have that. They don’t have free association there. There 

are the beginnings of that now, but not at a point where I think 

we can connect them to our economy and meet the high standards 

that TPP set out. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

51

And my time has expired. 

Mr. Bera, if you would allow me just a couple seconds here to say 

one last thing. I am going to give you additional time too. It is not 

like there are others champing at the bit to get into this. 

But I would also just put in a pitch here for legislation that I 

have introduced, along with some of my Democratic colleagues, and 

that is the Taiwan Travel Act. 

Right now, the high leadership of Taiwan—President, Vice President, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister—cannot come to the 

United States. One of our strongest allies. They can transit 

through the U.S., but we can’t meet in our Nation’s capital, for example, with others that are—essentially, it is a de facto country. 

It is not a country in name, but it functions as a country. It has 

for a half-century. And it is a democracy. They freely elect their officials, unlike the PRC. 

The PRC can come here. They get red-carpet treatment. Our 

close ally, the President can’t come here. Twenty-six Members had 

to fly up after votes some years back to meet with President Chen 

Shui-bian in New York City after votes one evening, and we got 

back, like, 3 o’clock in the morning, because we couldn’t meet with 

him here in our Nation’s capital. 

It is disgraceful. It is a slap in the face to our close ally. And we 

ought to change that, and we need to pass that legislation. 

Thank you. And I am off my rant now. And I will now recognize 

the gentleman from California for as much time as he wants. 

Mr. BERA. Well, thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

And thank you to the witnesses. I am sorry I missed your opening statements. I had a conflict. 

But if I just think about the post-war, post-World War II world 

order, it was a U.S.-led world order. And, you know, in many ways, 

the U.S. leadership, in helping rebuild Japan, helping rebuild Europe, you know, answering the call to protect South Korea, and 

helping rebuild South Korea, and the way we approached the world 

in the last 70 years made the world a more prosperous place, lifted 

a lot of people out of poverty, and made those 70 years much more 

peaceful than the prior 70 years, when two world wars and endless 

conflicts occurred. 

So for us to start to withdraw from the world is a big mistake. 

And, you know, Mr. Chabot touched on pulling out of TPP. As a 

Democrat that supported the deal, I do think in our lifetime this 

potentially is our biggest foreign policy blunder. Because when we 

think about trade and engagement, it is not just about commerce 

and economic activity; we are also thinking strategically. And that 

is very different than how the Chinese necessarily think about this. 

We think it is a good thing to help other countries develop their 

infrastructure, develop values, intrinsically, within their own country, of what democracy looks like. It does create competitors for us, 

but that is not necessarily a bad thing either, because it also creates markets for us to sell our goods and services. 

The next 70 years may be a slightly different world order. It may 

not be America going alone. And I actually think it won’t be an 

America alone. It will be America working with partner nations 

that share similar values of democracy, of free markets, of opportunity, of human rights, working together. 

52

And, you know, I was in Japan a few weeks ago at the Mount 

Fuji Dialogue, and we were talking about that. And, you brought 

up, you know, how do we preserve TPP? One thing that we discussed with, you know, Prime Minister Abe, as well as the Diet 

members, they all get that they are going to have to keep moving 

forward. And we have seen the TPP 11 countries moving forward 

in this past week. But they also very much want the United States 

to reengage. 

And there is a clear message, and, you know, if any of those TPP 

11 countries are watching or listening, keep that deal intact. Keep 

as high standards as possible intact. Because I have to believe, 2 

years from now or 4 years from now or at some point in the near 

future, we will realize that, you know, we have to do business with 

some of the most vibrant economies in the world. Our businesses, 

our farmers, they are all realizing this very rapidly. And, you 

know, they have to talk to their workers, they have to talk to the 

folks here back home. 

By losing those markets, it doesn’t mean those jobs are coming 

back here. It means we are going to have trouble selling our goods 

and services there. Once we lose market access, it is very hard to 

get that market access back. 

So we do have to have a real conversation about trade and, you 

know, the impacts of trade here domestically but also the fact that 

95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside of the United 

States. 

I would put our workers up against anyone else’s workers, I 

would put the quality of our products up against the quality of 

products that, you know, China is making, and we will win. And 

we shouldn’t be afraid of that competition, as long as it is a fair 

playing field. 

I also am very critical of how China approaches things. Where 

we approached it in a benevolent way, wanting to lift those other 

countries up, China approaches investment in these other countries 

in a very China-centric way. 

You know, there was a Member of Congress who was in Thailand 

recently and, you know, was traveling on a beautiful, brand-new 

road in Thailand and mentioned to the cab driver, ‘‘Hey, this is a 

great road.’’ And, you know, the cab driver said, ‘‘Yeah, the Chinese 

built it.’’ And he said, ‘‘Oh, you must feel great about it,’’ and he 

said, ‘‘No. You know, they came here, they brought their workers, 

they built the road, and they left.’’ They didn’t do anything to build 

that sustainability, to help Thailand build—and that is a fundamental difference in how we engage in the world and how the Chinese engage in the world. And, you know, those Asian nations recognize that. So it is incredibly important. 

You said I could go on as long as I wanted. 

So I just—I think it is incredibly important. I get we have domestic issues that we have to address here. We have a lot of folks that 

are being left behind. But it is incredibly important for us not to 

withdraw from the world and to stay engaged in a different way. 

You know, if there were, you know, one or two things that we 

as Congress ought to focus on, given the current political realities 

right now, you know—and maybe we will just go down the line—

to not necessarily counter One Belt, One Road, because I also think 

53

the Asian nations know they have to do business with China, and 

they don’t want to be considered a pawn in between China, but to 

offer an alternative to One Belt, One Road, what would those 

things be? 

And maybe we will start with you, Mr. Runde. 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you, Mr. Bera. I broke my neck from nodding 

my head in agreement with everything you said. Thank you very 

much for your comments. 

Sir, I think that this subcommittee has, I think, an opportunity 

to use its platform to—I think this has been a very important conversation. I really appreciate you all convening this. I think that 

having—every country I go to, they want more American engagement, not less American engagement. 

The second thing is I think that we need to work as closely as 

possible with our allies. I agree with you, Mr. Bera. I think our 

first conversation in Asia should always be with Japan, a great 

ally, who wants to work with us on these issues. Obviously, we always want to work with Australia, you know, who has been with 

us in every conflict since World War I, and then, of course, India 

and South Korea and Taiwan, a great nation as well. So I think 

we have lots of friends, and we should use them. 

The other thing I would just say is that the world is not going 

to wait on us. When we have fights, internal fights, between the 

Congress and the executive branch on things like the IMF quota 

reform, which is an obscure topic, the Chinese said, ‘‘I have $2 trillion in the bank. I am going to start my own bank.’’ The AIB was 

a direct result of our disagreement in the United States on the obscure topic of IMF quota reform. 

They will not wait for us. If we don’t meet the hopes and aspirations of countries, they are going to turn to China. And it is not 

necessarily because they want to; because it is the only game in 

town. So we have to offer a counter-narrative and counter-alternative. 

A mix of that are things, yes, like trade. Like I said earlier, I 

think we should be beginning a U.S.-Japan free trade agreement 

discussion. I think that is a start. But I think we should look at 

other allies and how do we deepen our trade and investment relations. Let’s start with on a bilateral basis, given that that seems 

to be the Trump administration’s preference for the moment. 

But then we need a strengthened OPIC. We need a stronger, 

larger OPIC. We need to strengthen USTDA. We need a functioning Ex-Im Bank. It absurd that it is not fully functioning. 

I will stop there, sir. 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. Well, I, too, agreed, Mr. Bera, with almost everything you said, with perhaps one amplification. The Chinese absolutely think in terms of Belt and Road and their broader set of 

investment and development initiatives as having a strategic orientation. The Chinese are intent to avoid direct confrontation with 

the United States, on the one hand. On the other, they are also 

equally intent on building their own comprehensive national power 

in ways that would, at a future point, allow them to challenge us. 

So the first point is to absolutely understand that we are in a 

strategic competition with China now and to behave accordingly. 

54

The second is that we can sometimes, in our system, take that 

first point and, as a policy response, blame China for what it has 

accomplished. And this plays very poorly in the region. It sounds 

a lot like sour grapes and a country that is in a great power decline. And so we need to pair a constructive message with an accurate assessment about the competition that we are in. 

And then the third point is, my two colleagues who are experts 

in the field have talked about the institutional streamlining that 

we can and need to do in order to make our delivery of development and investment aid more effective, and I think those make 

a lot of sense. 

And the last point is just an observation. We are still early in 

the process of what China is becoming. And to the point about the 

cab driver observing that the Chinese had done it and left, in a 

broader sense, there are still a lot of questions about Chinese staying power once they have initiated and completed projects, or even 

not completed projects. And so there is an opportunity for us there, 

as well 

Mr. STIVERS. I would say that I think strategic competition is the 

right frame for China these days. I mean, we talked about a responsible stakeholder, and we tried to get China to be a better 

player and to work better with international institutions through 

the years. They are pursuing their own interests, and they are not 

going to deviate from their own interests, no matter how much we 

want to try to influence them to go a certain direction. 

And so, understanding that, it is a strategic competition, and we 

have to recognize that. And we have to make sure that what we 

do best, which I think is development. USAID is the preeminent 

development agency in the entire world. We do global health better 

than anyone. We do infectious disease better than anyone. We do 

education, we do food security, we do disaster relief better than 

anybody. Humanitarian assistance. Nobody can compete with the 

United States on these things. 

But we don’t have the resources to do them at a high level, so 

we are not even funding what we do best. We don’t need to start 

building infrastructure in Asia. The U.S. doesn’t need to do that. 

We should support the institutions that do do that. And Japan and 

Korea and others, the Asian Development Bank in particular, they 

need to be well-resourced, and they haven’t been. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. First, it is the Financial Services Committee that 

decided to have 20 rollcall votes just as this group was meeting. 

Second, I want to make the point that this is not a zero-sum 

game. We want people in the world to live better. Development is 

good, and if China will make that happen, that is helpful. But 

China is not for really giving aid. China is selling infrastructure on 

favorable financing terms. That isn’t aid; that is loans. 

And if the projects are not helpful to the country’s economy, it 

is a lose situation for the country. And if the project is so bad that 

the country can’t find a way to pay the debt, then it is a lose-lose 

situation for both the Chinese banks and the developing country. 

55

From a standpoint of our global relations, trade is good. But from 

the standpoint of our economy, trade is good when it is balanced 

or even favors us in the trade balance. 

I think it was my first quarter here back long ago—I had hair, 

I was new—and the USTR testified that if we could sign an agreement that increased our exports by a billion and increased our imports by $2 billion, that would be great because it would be $3 billion of additional trade. That is not the policy we should have now. 

Looking at China’s Road and Belt, you know, some of these have 

had setbacks, both financial and logistical. It will be interesting to 

see how viable it is. Second, we need to see whether it hurts our 

interests. It may hurt our national security interests if China is obtaining naval bases, in particular, or bases from which they could 

do intelligence gathering. Third, how is this all going to be financed? It is not aid, it is sales, and seems to be more analogous 

to the Import-Export Bank than to USAID, maybe halfway between 

OPIC and the Export-Import Bank. 

So how can we deal with infrastructure? First, we have the multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the 

Asian Development Bank. We have our direct foreign bilateral aid. 

I have mentioned OPIC, which doesn’t really cost us much compared to what it is able to finance but exists to help development 

as much as it does to be an arm of our economy. And then the flip 

side of that is the Export-Import Bank, which is primarily focused 

on building jobs in the United States but also finances infrastructure and development. 

And then we can do joint ventures with others in the—what is 

the new term?—Indo-Pacific region. I am going to have to learn 

how to pronounce that quickly. 

I should note that our annual funding of OPIC and the Asian Development Bank is about $100 million each. In contrast, China is 

doing several billions of dollars. Also, our bilateral foreign aid to 

Asian countries is not large. It was $1.3 billion for South Asia and 

East Asia and a similar amount if you look separately for Afghanistan, Pakistan. About half the aid goes to economic development, 

the other half for social development, health, education. 

And I will want to look at aid in particular areas. And I will kind 

of preview the questions, and then I will ask them, believing that 

I have not only an opening statement but time to ask some questions. 

I will want to look at Pakistan in the sense of whether an appropriate amount of our aid is going to the non-Urdu-speaking areas, 

particularly Sindh; will want to ask whether Burma should be getting any aid of any kind, given their treatment of the Rohingya. 

Speaking of the Rohingya, are we doing enough to help Bangladesh 

deal with the—I believe it is 500,000 refugees. 

So let me first ask Mr. Stivers, are we doing enough to make 

sure that a proportionate part of our aid in Pakistan goes to Sindh? 

I realize you are no longer getting a paycheck focused on that, you 

have left government, but I will still ask you the question. 

Mr. STIVERS. I will have to defer the Pakistan question. Pakistan 

is not in my wheelhouse. I apologize for that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand. 

56

Do either of the other two witnesses—then that will be a question for the record for whoever wants to respond. 

And let’s—who wants to respond to the issue, I know we not giving much aid to Burma, but should we be giving any, given their 

treatment? 

Mr. Stivers? 

Mr. STIVERS. Yeah, I was hoping I wouldn’t be asked that question today, because it is—I worked at USAID. I was the Assistant 

Administrator of the Asia Bureau, and we worked very hard on the 

democratic reform that we had there. And we spent a lot of money 

empowering civil society in terms of running the election there. 

Very proud of the steps that country had made. It is extremely disconcerting, the issues that have happened with the Rohingya and 

the ethnic cleansing or genocide or whatever the appropriate term 

is. 

I think that the administration has taken some real steps and 

put some real resources into helping that refugee community in 

Bangladesh. I can’t think of a worse country for refugees to go to 

than the most densely populated, one of the poorest countries in 

the world. And there is no question that Bangladesh does not have 

the capacity to handle this kind of influx of people. I don’t think 

you can think of a higher number that Bangladesh would need to 

improve conditions for these people there. 

In terms of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anybody have a recommendation as to 

what—I call it a supplemental appropriation. Obviously, it wouldn’t 

be a separate bill. But how much more should the United States 

be giving to Bangladesh to focus on the refugee issue? Does anybody have an opinion? 

Mr. STIVERS. I don’t think Congress can come up with a high 

enough number, to be honest with you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well——

Mr. STIVERS. I think as much as Congress could do. Because the 

needs are infinite. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand. 

Mr. STIVERS. But——

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to go on to Sri Lanka, what examples 

where we have a limited return on Chinese infrastructure investment, such as the seaports, related to debt problems. What lessons 

should we learn from some of the financial difficulties of the seaport development problem in Sri Lanka? Does anybody have any 

focus on that? 

Mr. STIVERS. I mentioned earlier that the two big democratic 

breakthroughs that have happened in the Asia-Pacific region have 

been in Burma and Sri Lanka over the last few years, and both 

have a direct China component to it. Two countries where there 

has been a popular backlash to Chinese investment on projects, on 

major OBOR—they would call them OBOR; we call everything 

OBOR now—but two major Chinese projects. And I think Burma 

opened up their country because they didn’t want to be dependent 

on China. And I think Sri Lanka was a similar situation. 

And I think that goes to show the power of the backlash to the 

Chinese on projects. And I think that is important to watch. And 

57

I think it is a sense of how much concern there is in the region 

about dependence on Chinese. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

The flip side of this is the effect it could have on China. The sovereign debt of more than half of the countries China is targeting 

under the One Belt, One Road program are not rated as investment-grade securities. Chinese lenders are nevertheless extending 

tens of billions of dollars of credit toward the One Belt, One Road 

projects. 

If those projects fail or if there is a default on the loan, could 

there be an effect on Chinese banks that is significant enough to 

affect the U.S. economy? And, in general, does China guarantee its 

banks against loss on these loans? 

Mr. Stivers. 

Mr. STIVERS. Yeah, in terms of the China Development Bank, 

they do guarantee their assets. And, you know, China has lost a 

lot of money on these projects. Venezuela is a great example. China 

is losing a lot of money with the situation there in Venezuela. 

But, you know, authoritarian governments, this is a state-driven 

enterprise. So they are not trying to make profits, necessarily. 

Sometimes they do, sometimes they don’t. They have foreign policy 

objectives and domestic economic objectives, which we talked about. 

Those are the priorities. And if they take a loss somewhere, they 

withstand it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Uh-huh. 

I will just add a comment, because I know you will just be—on 

questions about southern Pakistan, you will be responding for the 

record. But the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the Pakistani 

component of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is seen in the Pakistan Sindh province as a strategic partnership between the Pakistani Armed Forces and Beijing to exploit Sindh’s resources, particularly coal in the Thar region. And it causes a repression of local 

Sindhi voices of dissent against either the projects or injustices in 

general. And, of course, in Sindh, we have seen a number of disappearances. 

So, for the record, if you can give us some guidance on what our 

policy ought to be with, it seems, the Pakistani Armed Forces turning over resources from Sindh to China without any beneficial impact to local people. 

So I will wait to read your answer on that. 

I want to thank the chair for indulging me and will not mention 

the name of the chairman who delayed me for 45 minutes without 

consulting with Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO [presiding]. They are just not as—their etiquette is not 

as nice as ours here. No, I appreciate your input because you always come well-prepared, and I appreciate your input into that. 

We are about at the close, if you can bear with me for a few more 

minutes. 

You know, when we look at that ASEAN nations, that whole region, you know, we all know there are 630-million-plus people 

there, $2.5 trillion in trade, and we have pivoted our strategy, but 

it is time and we are seeing a pivot back. 

You know, as we traveled to South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, 

Hong Kong, Singapore, everybody was saying how bad it was that 

58

we pulled out of the TPP, and I reminded them that, you know, not 

that we can vote on it in the House, but the Senate wasn’t going 

to pass it, and candidate Clinton said she was not going to approve 

it. I think President Trump did a very smart thing, getting rid of 

it early. 

And while we were over there, we were promoting FTAs with 

every country we went to—Vietnam. You know, of course, Singapore has a great one. South Korea has one. We mentioned it to 

Japan, all the other regions in there, Hong Kong and Taiwan, to 

have free trade agreements, to bolster our presence and the caliber—and the thing that people said that they want more than 

anything is rule of law—respect contracts, respect intellectual property. And that is what they are not getting when they see these 

other countries. 

And, you know, being with a construction background somewhat 

before I was a veterinarian, what I saw were a lot of buildings 

being built where people built shopping malls, you know, they built 

infrastructures, but they couldn’t maintain them. And so I think 

your recommendation is—I applaud China for doing what they are 

doing. And I think we ought to tag along and build businesses 

there and pick up the pieces, as we do other investments in those. 

And my last question—and you guys can weigh in on this. In 

2016, about a quarter of OPIC projects were in Asia. Is this an appropriate allocation? And should OPIC be funding more investments in Asia? 

Mr. Runde? 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you, Chairman. 

I want to first say I completely agree with you. We need to be 

thinking about our trade and investment relationships with all of 

our allies in Asia. I don’t know, sir, if you were in when I said this 

earlier, but I encourage us to have a bilateral free trade agreement 

with Japan as well. And I hope this subcommittee will host a hearing on a bilateral free trade agreement with——

Mr. YOHO. I think you will see a resolution coming up in the nottoo-distant future. 

Mr. RUNDE. Thank you, Chairman. 

So I think that OPIC is one of our greatest tools. It is not well 

understood. I would like to see OPIC—we have written for the 

record a number of reports about OPIC and how to use it better. 

I certainly think that we should be spending at least 25 percent 

in Asia. And I think, if we are thinking about—I think we have to 

look at Asia not only as an economic and business opportunity for 

the United States—and China looks at Asia as an economic and 

business opportunity for them. We should be doing the same. 

And I do think that we should have at least 25 percent of our 

portfolio of investments from OPIC in Asia. I do believe that is the 

case. I think we should be thinking about more, not less. 

Mr. YOHO. Anybody else? 

Mr. Kamphausen, you said that the Belt/Road Initiative is China’s stimulus initiative, increases China’s military footprint. It is 

a way secure China’s periphery and a way to consolidate China’s 

initiatives and investment. And I think it is a smart business move 

for them. But I just think, again, going back to Xi Jinping’s comments after the 19th Congress, I think that shows their strategy. 

59

And, you know, with the ASEAN nations or any of the regions 

in that area that we decide to do FTAs, what I would see is a structure. And I had mentioned this, and I guess you guys mentioned 

it too, about: Have countries being able to plug in and out. You 

know, if we are in agreement, kind of like a Lego block model, 

where they plug in, and they just build upon that. And if a country 

where members say, you know, it is not working, you need to leave, 

they can be removed too. 

And I think that is something that we need to look at, as we revamp how we do foreign policy, how we do our trade agreements. 

And what I can assure you is there are going to be some strong 

initiatives coming out on economic growth and development aid, 

and the restructuring of some of these organizations to streamline 

them, or requesting more money when we roll these out to be put 

in there. Because this is an investment in our future, and we want 

to focus on national security, economics, trade, and cultural exchanges. 

Go ahead, Mr. Kamphausen. 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. If I may offer a quick comment since you 

raised the topic, it is clear that this is an experimental field for the 

Chinese as they think about how they secure the Belt and Road. 

Mr. YOHO. Yeah. 

Mr. KAMPHAUSEN. And there are at least three different models 

that they are thinking about. 

In Pakistan, they are essentially outsourcing the security problem. So they are funding the fielding of essentially a Pakistani 

Army division to secure the Belt and Road projects. That is one 

model. And it works. The Pakistani Army is an effective and coherent force, and so it makes sense in that context. 

The other two are perhaps a little more sketchy. One is to essentially take demobilized PLA troops, because China has been in the 

process over the last several years of demobilizing its armed 

forces—downsizing, I should say—taking those troops and then 

making them private security entities. And we understand the 

challenges we have had with that system. Imagine the Chinese trying to implement a coherent approach to that. 

The third is to look at even more hybrid forms of security and 

really imagine that the problems will sort themselves out and leave 

them to the industries or the companies that are imagining them 

themselves. 

My broader point is to suggest, if we were to think in a forwardlooking way, consistent with your view that there are pieces that 

we might need to pick up and make sense of, a lot of this could 

go south. The Chinese bets about how to secure their own initiative 

might not work. They have not done this before. And there are potentially not obligations we might sense but there are opportunities 

that we might be in a position to respond to consistent with our 

own goals. 

Mr. YOHO. Go ahead, Mr. Stivers. 

Mr. STIVERS. There are some major changes going on in the Chinese economy now. They are trying to rebalance their economy 

from going from this export-led dynamo to a consumption-oriented 

economy. And I would argue that when they do these OBOR 

projects and they export these raw materials, this overcapacity, 

60

what that is doing is propping up these inefficient state-owned enterprises and delaying real reform in their economy. 

And I think that is really bad for the United States, because they 

are not opening up their economy to the United States, and that 

is why I don’t worry so much about trade issues in terms of visa-vis China, because China is not going to sign some major trade 

agreement, they are not opening up their economy. And I think, by 

going down this road with the way they are implementing OBOR, 

it is delaying reform and it is delaying a lot of the needed reforms 

that their economy needs to make that would be good for China 

and the U.S. and the world economy. 

Mr. YOHO. One quick question, and then I have a statement. 

What funding levels would be needed for an effective development 

institution? Just real quickly. 

Mr. RUNDE. So I believe OPIC does about $4 billion a year. I 

would like to see it do double that amount. As I said earlier, we 

need to raise the credit card limit on OPIC, A. USTA does around 

$70 million a year in terms of what the Congress allocates, and I 

would double that. 

And then I think we ought to be thinking—so I would say it is 

not necessarily about additional—there are only marginal appropriations, but the Congress has within its power to, you know, put 

its foot on the gas in terms of giving additional authorities and 

strengthening these institutions that already exist. 

Mr. YOHO. Anybody else? 

You guys brought this up, and so I have to comment on it. China 

is new at this, in the development. They have been around for a 

long time as a nation, as a culture. We can’t hold a candle to that. 

But the thing that we do have is 241 years of developing a nation, 

trade, and working in a market economy. And there are a lot of 

trials and tribulations that we have learned over 241 years. And 

I think it will work out well. We will not allow ourselves to be supplanted from the world stage. 

And I appreciate your input. I look forward to sharing our bill 

with you when they do come out and get your feedback on it. 

With that, this meeting is adjourned, and thank you for your 

time. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

62

f


27552n.eps
63

f


27552m.eps
64

The following documents, submitted for the record by Mr. Daniel F. Runde, William A. Schreyer Chair and director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, are not reprinted here but may be 

found at: http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106635

• ‘‘A New Development Agenda’’

• ‘‘A Path to US Leadership in the Asia-Pacific: Revitalizing the Multilateral 

Financial Institutions’’

• ‘‘Closing Aid Programs in Middle-Income Countries: A Big Opportunity’’

• ‘‘Development Finance Institutions Come of Age’’

• ‘‘English Language Proficiency and Development’’

• ‘‘Fixing Trade Facilitation: The Trillion-Dollar Development Windfall’’

• ‘‘Global Infrastructure Development’’

• ‘‘Implementing the Forthcoming WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement’’

• ‘‘Pay to Play Leadership: Why Investment in the Multilateral Development 

Banks Is Critical to U.S. National Security’’

• ‘‘Quality Infrastructure: Ensuring Sustainable Economic Growth’’

• ‘‘Shaping the Asia-Pacific Future’’

• ‘‘The Clock Has Started on TFA Implementation’’

• ‘‘The Role of U.S. Soft-Infrastructure in Influencing the Reconnecting of Asia’’

• ‘‘The WTO Trade Facilitation Agenda: 2015’s Biggest Development Opportunity’’

f

65


27552f-1.eps
66

Æ


27552f-2.eps