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United States Army in Vietnam

Engineers at W

by

Adrian G. Tr

Center of Military History

United States Ar

Washington, D.C., 2010
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Traas, Adrian George, 19

 Engineers at war / by Adrian G. Tra

 p. cm. — (The United States Army in Vietna)  .  Vietnam War, 19

1975—Engineering and construction. 2. Military engineering—Vietnam—

History—20th century. 3. Military engineers—Vietnam—History—20th 

century. 4. Military engineers—United States—History—20th century. 5.

United States. Army. Engineer Command, Vietnam—History  I. Center 

Military History. II. Titl

 DS558.85.T73 20

 959.704’34—dc22

 2010036741

CMH Pub 91–14–1

First printing

Cover: Jungle Clearing by Sp4c. William E. Shuman, a construction draftsman 

for Company B, 815th Engineer Battalion (Construction), at Pleiku.
v

United States Army in Vietnam

Richard W. Stewart, General Edi

Advisory Committee

(As of 9 July 2010) 

Reina J. Penningto

Norwich Universit

William T. Allis

Georgia Southern Universi

James J. Carafano

The Heritage Foundatio

Lt. Gen. Robert L. Caslen J

U.S. Army Combined Arms Cen

Brig. Gen. Patrick Finnega

U.S. Military Acade

John F. Guilmartin Jr

Ohio State Universit

Brig. Gen. Sean B. MacFarla

U.S. Army Command a

General Staff Colle

Michael S. Neibe

University of Southern Mississippi

Mark P. Parillo

Kansas State Universit

Lt. Gen. John E. Sterling J

U.S. Army Train

 and 

Doctrine Command

Larry Stubblefiel

Deputy Administrative Assista

to the

Secretary of the Ar

Col. Bobby A. Towe

U.S. Army War Colle

Steve Voge

Washington Post

Paul M. Wester Jr.

National Archives and Records Administra

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief of Military History

Chief Historian Richard W. Stewa

Chief, Histories Division Joel D. Meyerson

Chief, Publishing Division Keith R. Tidm

. . . to Those Who Served

ix

Foreword

The military engineers who supported the U.S. Army in Vietnam wro

a proud record of achievement that spanned nearly two decades of 

war. Starting with a handful of advisers in the mid-1950s, Army engineer

landed in force with U.S. ground units in 1965 and before long numbered more

than 10 percent of the U.S. Army troops committed to the fight. Working i

one of the world’s harshest undeveloped regions, and under constant threat 

from an elusive and determined foe, the engineers met every test that came 

their way. They built ports and depots for a supply line that reached halfway

around the globe, carved airfields and airstrips out of jungle and mountain 

plateaus, repaired roads and bridges to clear the advance for the combat infantryman, and constructed bases for an army whose communications grew in 

complexity with each passing year. They were often found in the thick of the

fighting and fought as infantrymen as part of a long tradition of fighting while 

building. When the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War began to wind down,

the engineers were given another demanding mission, imparting to the South

Vietnamese Army their specialized skills in construction and management.

They left in place a robust infrastructure to support the South Vietnamese a

they vainly struggled for survival against the armored spearheads of the North

Vietnamese Army

Engineers at War is the eleventh volume published in the United States Arm

in Vietnam official series. Like its companion volumes, it forcibly reminds us that 

the American soldier in Vietnam was courageous, infinitely adaptable, and tireless in pursuit of the mission. For the engineers, that mission and their comrades

sustained them, in the best engineer tradition, even as the political and popular 

will to sustain the fight diminished. Their story and dedication should inspire all

soldiers as they face a future of sustained operations around the world.

Washington, D.C.    RICHA

30 September 2010 Chief Historia
x

The Author

Lt. Col. (Retired) Adrian G. Traas, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and received his education at schools 

in Milwaukee and Delafield, Wisconsin, completing high school at St. John’s

Military Academy in Delafield, commission and bachelor of arts degree in

history from Marquette University, and a master of arts degree in history from 

Texas A&M University. His military education includes the engineer basic an

advanced courses, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

the Air War College.

Colonel Traas served in a variety of command and staff positions as an

officer in the Corps of Engineers from 1957 to 1989. He was company commander of engineer units in Korea and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; post engineer 

in Verona, Italy; executive officer and commanding officer of the 64th Engineer

Battalion (Base Topographic) with headquarters in Leghorn, Italy, and mapping projects in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Iran; assistant professor of milita

science at Texas A&M; chief of the Combat Support Branch and staff offic

in the Concepts and Studies Division at the U.S. Army Engineer School, F

Belvoir; and professor of military science at Marquette. He served two tours 

in Vietnam: the first tour as S–3 and executive officer with the 19th Engineer

Battalion (Combat) and contract liaison and installation master planning 

officer with the 45th Engineer Group; the second tour as an adviser with the

South Vietnamese 30th Engineer Combat Group, a deputy engineer with th

Third Regional Assistance Command, and later deputy region engineer 

Corps. Prior to his military retirement, he served in administrative positions 

and as a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military Histor

He is the author of From the Golden Gate to Mexico City: The U.S. Army 

Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War, 1846–1848 and contributed to The 

Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps and The United States and Mexico 

at War: Nineteenth-Century Expansionism and Conflict. He currently holds the 

title of visiting professor at the Center of Military History.
xi

Preface

Engineers at War describes the experiences of engineers in support of 

combat operations and carrying out construction in a distant theater. “The performance of United States Army Engineers in Vietnam, “wro

General Harold K. Johnson, the Army chief of staff, “adds another brillian

chapter to their history.” The building effort in South Vietnam from 1965 t

1968 allowed the United States to deploy and operate a modern 500,000-man

force in a far-off undeveloped region. Although the engineers faced enormous

construction responsibilities, the Army’s top priority remained providing

combat support to tactical operations. As a result, ground combat troops with

their supporting engineers were able to fight the enemy from well-established 

bases, which gave U.S. and allied forces the ability to concentrate and operate

when and where they wanted. Although most of the construction was temporary, more durable facilities—including airfields, port and depot complexes,

headquarters buildings, communications facilities, and an improved highway 

system—were intended to serve as economic resources for South Vietnam

In the course of research and writing an engineering history,I have use

many statistics. During the conflict, reports and correspondence used both the 

English and Metric Systems of measurement such as kilometers and miles and

meters, yards, and feet. Engineers frequently used kilometers to measure road 

distances and feet to measure bridge spans. For consistency,  used the English

System of measurement.

In researching and writing this book,I have received guidance and hel

from many people. At the Center of Military History much help and encouragement came from my colleagues in the Histories Division. Since comba

operations involved a considerable part of the book,  relied on the knowledge and resources of the historians working on the combat volumes. Thes

include George L. MacGarrigle, John M. Carland, Dale W. Andrade, a

Erik B. Villard. Help was also gleaned from the extensive files of Vincent 

H. Demma and the work done by Charles R. Anderson, Andrew J. Birtl

Graham A. Cosmas, Richard A. Hunt, William M. Hammond, and Da

W. Hogan. Much credit goes to Joel D. Meyerson who helped me put the 

manuscript in final form. Thanks also go to John Schlight and Jeffrey J

Clarke who helped me early in the project.

I would like to recognize those in the Center’s chain of command. Th

efforts and encouragements by a succession of branch chiefs are appreciated: John Schlight, Jeffrey Clarke, Joel Meyerson, and Andrew Birtle. M

thanks also go to several History Division chiefs: Col. James W. Dunn, 
xii

Lt. Col. Richard O. Perry; Cols. Robert H. Sholly, William T. Bowers, 

Clyde L. Jonas; Richard W. Stewart, and Joel Meyerson I also apprecia

the support given by several chiefs of military history: Brig. Gens. Douglas

Kinnard, William A. Stofft, Harold W. Nelson, John W. Mountcastle, a

John S. Brown; and Jeffrey Clarke.

Others at the Center of Military History contributed to this work. Staff at

the Center under the leadership of Keith R. Tidman, Beth F. MacKenzie, an

Diane S. Arms guided the manuscript to publication. Hildegard J. Bachma

dedicated her editing talents to put a final touch to the book, cartographer 

Sherry L. Dowdy prepared the maps, and Gene Snyder designed the layout 

the book. Contractor Anne Venzon created the index. Much credit for gathering research material for the book goes to Hannah M. Zeidlik and Robert K

Wright, former chiefs of the Historical Resources Branch; Frank R. Shire

the current branch chief; James B. Knight, former librarian; and Rebecca

C. Raines and Jennifer A. Nichols of the Force Structure and Unit Hist

Branch.

Very helpful recommendations came from the panel review convened 

by Richard Stewart, the Center’s chief historian and panel chair I wish 

thank the members of the panel: Brig. Gen. Gerald E. Galloway (USA, R

University of Maryland and former Corps of Engineers officer; John C. 

Lonnquest, Corps of Engineers History Office, who provided extensive written 

comments; Donald A. Carter, Histories Division; Keith Tidman, Publishin

Division; and Joel Meyerson, then acting chief of the Histories Division. 

Those very helpful outside the Center of Military History include Richar

L. Boylan, National Archives and Records Administration; Richar

Sommers, U.S. Army Military History Institute; William C. Heimdahl 

Wayne W. Thompson, Office of Air Force History; Jack Shulimson, Histo

and Museums Division of the U.S. Marine Corps; Edward J. Marolda, U.S

Naval Historical Center; Vincent A. Transano, Lara D. V. Godbille, and 

L. Nichols, U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, Port Hueneme, California; Martin

Gordon and Michael J. Brodhead, Corps of Engineers History Office; Larry

D. Roberts, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; 

the numerous employees at various research facilities, especially the staffs at 

the Library of Congress and the Command and General Staff College library

Of course,  alone remain responsible for the interpretations and conclusions expressed in this book. The hope is that my service as an enginee

officer who served two tours in Vietnam will lend some credibility to the 

engineer story.

Washington, D.C.  ADR

30 September 201
xiii

Contents

PART

Engineers Enter the War

Chapter Page

1. The Path to War. 

Early Years. 

 Intervention.

2. Engineers Cross the Pacific. .

 The 35th Engineer Group (Construction) Deploys

Digging In. 

 The Buildup Quickens.

 Supply Deficits.

 A New Engineer Brigade

More Units on the Way. .

3. First Battles. .

Early Operations  .

 A Base for the 1st Cavalry Division.

 A Second Division Arrive

 The Ia Drag 

4. Organizing the Construction Effort. .

Preliminary Proposals  .

 The Construction Boss Concept.

 A New Directorate

Operational Control. . 

 Toward an Engineer Command. 

Other Engineers. . 

5. Building the Bases, 1966. . 

 The Cam Ranh Complex.

 Secondary Coastal Port . 

Qui Nhon’s Development. .
xiv

Chapter Page

Highlands Camps. . 

More Work at Phan Rang. .

Long Binh and the II Corps Shild 

 New Berths for Saigon.

Projects in the Delta. . 

Logistical Troubles Continue. .

Finance and Its Predicaments. .

PART

Supporting the Offensiv

6. Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966. . 

 III Corps Battles.

 Th II Corps War

Manpower. . 

Forward Airfields. .

 Tunnels. 

 The Land-Clearing Weapon. 

7. The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Attleboro. . 

 The Western Highlands. 

On the Coast. . 

 The Delta. 

 III Corps Agai

8. To I Corps. . 

Duc Pho and Chu Lai  . 

Highway 1 and Other Assignments. .

9. Completing the Bases. . 

 Southern and Centra II Corps

Farther North. .

 III and IV Corp

 The Saigon Projects.

Funding, Overbuilding, and Logistics. . 

 Summing Up. 

10. Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968. . 

 Strategy in Mid-Passage. 

 The Saigon Arc

Operational Control Revisited. .

On the II Corps Border.

 Summer Battles in the Highland . 

Dak To. .
xv

PART 

Changing Course

Chapter Page

11. Tet, January–March 1968. . 

Defending the Coast. . 

 Roads and Bases in the Highlands. 

 The Fight for Saigon and the Delta.

 Restoring Logistics i I Corps.

 Return to Normal.

12. The Aftermath, April–December 1968. . 

 Relieving Khe Sanh.

 Th A Shau

 Two More Enemy Highpoints. 

 Assessing Construction. 

 Streamlining the Effort. 

 New Approachs .

13. The Land Lines of Communication. . 

Early Roads and Rails. 

 Initial Restoration Arrangements

 Running the Programs. 

 Sustaining Highway Improvement.

 The Builders. 

 A Legacy. 

14. Year of Transition, 1969. . 

 The State of the Construction Progrm .

 Troop Withdrawals and Realignments.

Vietnamization. . 

 Turning Over Base . 

 Supporting Combat. 

15. Year of Cambodia, 1970. . 

Engineer Consolidation. . 

 Toward the Sanctuaries.

Main Attacks. .

 Secondary Assauls .

Operations After Cambodia. .

Facilities Upgrades and Transfers. .

16. Last Battles and Departure. . 

Laos: The Plan. .

 The Operatio . 

 Redeployments and Reorganizations.
xvi

Chapter Page

Operational Support After Laos. 

Winding Down the Construction Program. . 

Last Transfers. .

Bowing Out. . 

17. Conclusion. . 

Control and Management. . 

Materiel and Maintenance. . 

Engineer Technique. .

 The Soldiers.

Bibliographical Note. . 

Glossary. . 

Map Symbols and Terms. . 

Index. . 

Table

No.

1. Percent of Work in Place at Selected Locations, January 1969. .

2. Engineers in South Vietnamese Armed Forces Improvement a

Expansion Program, 1968–1973. . 

Charts

1. 18th Engineer Brigade, December 1965. .

2. MACV Engineer Division, May 1965. 

3. MACV Construction Directorate, February 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4. Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam

November 1967. .

5. Army Construction in Place by Category, Troops, and Contracto

January 1969. . 

6. U.S. Army Engineer Command Organizations, October 1971. 

7. U.S. Army Engineer Support Organizations, May 1972.

Maps

South Vietnam, 1965–1966. . . . . . 

1. Cam Ranh Bay, 31 December 1965. 

2. Qui Nhon Area, 31 December 1965.

3. III Corps Tactical Zone, May–December 19

4. II Corps Tactical Zone, July–November 19

5. An Khe Base Camp, 31 December 1965.

6. Battle of the Ia Drang, November 196 .

7. Cam Ranh Bay, 31 December 1966. .
xvii

No. Page

8. Tuy Hoa Air Base, June 1967.

9. Qui Nhon Area, 31 December 1966. 

10. Pleiku Area, 31 December 1966. .

11. Long Binh Base, 31 October 1966. . 

12. Saigon Base Development, October 1966. 

13. IV Corps Tactical Zone, 1966–1967.

14. III Corps Tactical Zone, January–September 19

15. II Corps Tactical Zone, January–September 196

16. Western Highlands, October 1966–June 1967. . 

17. 1st Cavalry Division Operations, October 1966–June 1967. . 

18. Operation Cedar Falls, 8–26 January 1967. 

19. III Corps Operations, October 1966–June 1967

20. I Corps Tactical Zone, 1966–April 1967

21. Souther I Corps, April–May 1967

22. Chu Lai Area, March–August 1967. 

23. Tet Offensive, 1968. 

24. I Corps Tactical Zone, April–December 1968

25. The Engineer Groups, December 1968.

26. Indochina Railroad System, 1966

27. Road System, 1960s.

28. Cambodian Incursion,III and IV Corps Tactical Z

May–June 1970. . 

29. Cambodian Incursion,II Corps Tactical Zone, May–June 1970

30. Lam Son 719, Area of Operations, January–April 197

31. Easter Offensive, March–May 1972. . 

Illustration

The Dong Nai River Bridge on the Saigon–Bien Hoa Highw

Generals Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Maxwell D. Taylor

 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNam

and President John F. Kennedy, 1961. 

Teams of Army and Navy Engineers Carried Out Building Project

South Vietnamese Engineers Undergo Bridge Construction Training

Cam Ranh Bay’s First Deep-Draft Pier. 

Engineers of the 35th Group Transfer to a Landing Craft.

Crews Pave Concrete Pads at Night. 

Cam Ranh Bay Piers and Causeway. 

DeLong Pier Nearing Completion, 1965. 

Maj. Gen. Robert R. Ploger

Engineers Carry Out a River Reconnaissance.

Troops Clear the Helicopter Area at the Base Camp at An Khe

Bulldozer Used for Building Roads. 

The Future Camp Radcliff, August 1965

Engineers Clear a Landing Zone. .

Troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Advance at Landin

Zone X-Ray.
xviii

The 18th Engineer Brigade Staff at Its Headquarters in Saigo

General William C. Westmoreland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Brig. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn. 

General Dunn Visits the 45th Engineer Group Headquarter

in Qui Nhon. .

The 18th Engineer Brigade Headquarters Building at Dong Ba Thin. 

DeLong Piers at Cam Ranh Bay. .

Cam Ranh Bay Airfield. 

Port Under Construction at Vung Ro Bay. .

DeLong Pier Under Construction at Qui Nhon. .

Phan Rang Airfield. 

Port and Warehouses Under Construction at Newport. .

Dong Tam Base Camp. .

Sampans Haul Rock from Vung Tau to Long Binh.

Engineers of the 1st Division Encountered Obstacles Along Roads. 

A 1st Engineer Battalion Mine-Clearing Team. 

Soldiers Training on Helicopter Ladders. 

Men of the 39th Engineer Battalion Build a Conglomerate Bridge. . 

A 1st Division Soldier Enters a Tunnel During Crimp.

Rome Plows Clear Vegetation. .

Lt. Col. Joseph M. Kiernan. . 

Aerial View of the Se San River

A Soldier Places MX19 Matting at New Plei Djereng Special Forces Cmp 

An M4T6 Raft Carries a Vehicle Across the Ea Krong Rive

Surveying and Site Preparation at Duc Lap. 

Work Crews Apply a Nonskid Compound to Duc Lap Airstrip.

Men of the 15th Engineer Battalion Use an Airboat in the Delta. .

Detonating Cord Is Lowered into a Tunnel. 

An M4T6 Raft Is Used as a Patrol Boat

Men of the 39th Engineer Battalion Lay MX19 Matting. . 

Airfield Work at Duc Pho Nears Completion. 

The Seabees and RMK-BRJ Improve the Chu Lai Bas

Chu Lai Base Hosted a Jet Airfield and Logistic Facilities. .

Mines Pose a Constant Hazard Along Highway 1. .

RMK-BRJ Paves a Portion of Highway 1. 

The 19th Engineer Battalion Set Up a Main Base Camp. 

Wooden Barracks and Administrative Buildings Replace Te

at Cam Ranh Bay. .

T–2 Power Tankers and Land-Based Power Plant Produce Electricity. 

Butler Warehouse Building at Long My. . 

New Transformer Station.

RMK-BRJ Built Several Headquarters Complexes at Long Binh.

Engineers Completed the Dong Tam Base in Late 1968. .

MACV Headquarters Complex at Tan Son Nhut

A Ribbon-Cutting Ceremony Marked the Opening of the Newpo

Deep-Draft Port .......  . 

Deep-Draft Port at Newport. .

Page
xix

A Modified D7E Bulldozer. .

Aerial View of Anti-Ambush Clearing.

Transphibian Tactical Tree Crusher.

An Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge. 

Strong Enemy Defenses on Hill 875 Included Trenches.

Burnt Remains of Bridge Along Highway 1 North of Qui Nhon

Bunkers Were the First Line of Defense. . 

View of Hai Van Pass. . 

Destroyed French-Type Concrete Bridge. .

A 290M Scraper. 

A CH–54 Flying Crane Lowers a Dry Span Bridge. 

Aerial View of the Kham Duc Airfield. 

Enemy Mortar Attack at Kham Duc. .

Housing for Vietnamese Civilians Under Construction in Saigon. .

Mountaintop Firebase in the  Shau Valley. 

Pacific Architects and Engineers’ Headquarters in Saigon. 

Vinnell Corporation’s Central Control Room at the Long Binh

Power Plant. . 

Maj. Gen. David S. Parker. 

Progress Continues Along Highway 4. .

Crane Used for Construction. . 

Mandarin Road, Early 1930s. .

President Ngo Dinh Diem Inaugurates Railroad Service

South Vietnamese Railway Workers Repair Tracks

Installation of Floating Balls at the Phu Cuong Bridge. .

The Phu Cat Quarry and Asphalt Plant. 

Barges Haul Rock to the Delta. .

Phu Cuong Bridge Under Construction. . 

Troops Build New Bong Son Bridge.

A South Vietnamese Army Engineers Panel Bridge.

Bien Hoa Bridge Was Part of New Bypass Road North of Saigon

Flatcars on Front of a Train South of Phu Cat. 

Port at Cam Ranh Bay. .

Ship-to-Shore Pipeline at Cam Ranh Bay.

Aerial View of Cam Ranh Bay. 

Seabees Pour Concrete for Wonder Arches at Da Nang Air Base

Wonder Arches at Bien Hoa Air Base. 

L-Shaped Helicopter Revetment. 

South Vietnamese Soldier Learns to Operate a Grader.

A CH–47 Chinook Helicopter Drops Off Preassembled Culvert. .

Bridge Under Construction Along Route 547. 

Maj. Gen. John A. B. Dillard. 

An Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge in the Fishhoo

 Area of Cambodia. 

Soldiers Uncover a Huge Complex Known as the City. .

A Sheridan Crosses an Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge.

A CH–54 Flying Crane Transports Fixed-Span Bridging.

Page
xx

The Thien Nhon Airstrip Used a Section of Highway 22 as a Runw

Supplying Enough Maps Strained the Remaining Map Depot. . . . . . . . . 

Rollers in Front of Combat Engineer Vehicle Expedited Mine Clearing. .

Col. Kenneth E. McIntyre. .

A Dump Truck and Rome Plow Clear and Widen Highway 9.

An Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge at Bridge 33. 

A Bucket Loader and Bulldozer at Work on Red Devil Road.

A CH–54 Flying Crane Drops Off Equipment at Khe Sanh Airfield.

Aerial View of Reopened Khe Sanh Airfield

Excavating a Tactical Operations Center. .

Aerial View of Firebase Bunker Hill. 

Third Regional Assistance Command Headquarters at Plantation.

Col. Le Van Nghia Inspects the Repaired Bridge at Go Dau Ha

DeLong Pier Is Towed to Cam Ranh Bay.

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: cover, United States Ar

Engineer Command; pp. 4, 400, United States Operations Mission to Vietnam,

Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961; 7, 324, Corbis; 8, 116, 277, 290, 437, 453, 

U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, Port Hueneme, California; 9, 155, 177, 196, 46

535, Department of Defense; 23, 149, 248, Dunn, Base Development in South 

Vietnam; 24, 30, 44, 62, 90, 184, 239, 315, 533, Office of the Chief of Engineers 

(OCE) History; 21, 29, 52, 63, 88, 113, 123, 127, 169, 171, 212, 213, 214, 215, 

222, 227, 228, 286, 289, 299, 370, 372, 375, 377, 392, 399, 429, 439, 444 (bottom), 

448, 454, 475, 476, 493, 494, 497, 498, 501, 508, 575, U.S. Army Center o

Military History; 60, 191, National Archives and Records Administration; 

Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968);

74, Associated Press; 85, Engineer Command, Special Operational Repo

Lessons Learned, 31 January 1967; 100, 106, 255, 256, 266, 275, 346, 347, 

349, 410, 420, 433, 555, 557, 561, 562, Author’s Collection; 159, 309, 381, U.

Army Procurement Agency, Procurement Support in Vietnam, 1966–1968; 201

1st Engineer Battalion, Always First, 1965–1967; 204, U.S. Army Heritage an

Education Center; 139, 242, 268, 282, 305, 307, 444 (top), 455, OCE Briefing, 

“Military Engineering in South Vietnam,” 5 January 1968; 245, Marolda,

Illustrated History of Vietnam; 259, Michael McCabe; 382, Vinnell Corporation 

(Northrop Grumman); 335, Donald G. Lindberg; 342, Hurricane,II Field Fo

Vietnam, Magazine; 364, 1st Cavalry Division Yearbook, August 1965–1969

387, 395, 416, 422, 432, 485, 505, Kysu’, Engineer Command Magazine; 525, 

531, 536, 538, Col. Kenneth E. McIntyre

Page
Part One

Engineers Enter the W

1

The Path to War

The decision to commit American troops to Vietnam, first brigades, then 

divisions, launched the engineers, and the rest of the support establishment, on a rapid buildup for war. At the start of 1965, as the Communist 

insurrection neared victory, South Vietnam had about 23,000 U.S. advisers 

and support troops, including some one hundred military engineers who, 

along with contracting firms, managed facilities and performed construction 

on a limited scale. Base development planning had barely scratched the surface, hampered by a dearth of staff engineers and the absence of a broadly 

accepted concept of operations that could serve as a point of departure for 

future work on ports, airfields, and roads. When the first large contingent of 

Army engineers went ashore in June with the combat forces, the construction 

troops faced immense demands for preparation and coordination in order to 

shift the development of the battlefield into high gear on short notice. The 

lateness of the hour and the steeply mounting scale of engineer effort required 

left unsettled whether the combat units could be adequately supported in the 

early months of the war.

Early Years

American planners had been concerned for years about the state of South 

Vietnam’s defenses, but until 1965 improvements had been hard to come 

by, as successive administrations had enforced limits on the degree of U.S. 

involvement in that country’s affairs. When the First Indochina War ended in 

1954, and the United States supplanted France as South Vietnam’s protector 

against Communist attack, international prohibitions set by the 1954 Geneva 

Agreements against establishing new military bases in the South shaped 

the next five years of American contingency planning for Southeast Asia. 

Thailand became the cornerstone of American strategy in that part of Asia, 

and the Republic of Vietnam a secondary holding action. Almost all operational preparations were aimed at launching an expedition into the Laotian 

panhandle and points farther north, and readying northeast Thailand with 

stockpiles, airfields, and forward bases through a robust program of military 

construction while South Vietnam would be thinly defended along its borders.1

1

 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States Army in 

Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), pp. 357–58; Richard 

Tregaskis, Southeast Asia: Building the Bases: The History of Construction in Southeast Asia

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 13, 16.
Engineers at War

2

If intervention came to Southeast Asia, construction support would fall 

to the Army and Navy engineering corps. Throughout most of its history, the 

Army Corps of Engineers had served as a combat support branch supporting 

troops in the field, as a construction agency for the Army and, later, the Air 

Force, and as an office to carry out civil works in the United States. Likewise, 

the Bureau of Yards and Docks carried out major building programs for the 

Navy and the Marine Corps. To avoid duplication of effort, the Department 

of Defense had divided overseas construction responsibilities between the 

Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and, to a lesser degree, 

the Air Force. The Navy was given responsibility for Southeast Asia, including 

South Vietnam. In December 1955, the Navy established an engineering office 

in Bangkok, Thailand, initially to supervise contractors building air bases in 

that country. Because the military advisers in Vietnam had little engineering 

capability, they asked the Bangkok office to design and supervise any military 

assistance construction projects in South Vietnam.2

As long as the peace lasted in the 1950s, American construction projects in 

Vietnam remained modest and generally out of the spotlight and were financed 

with nonmilitary aid. A road network in the Central Highlands designed to 

open the remote area to Vietnamese settlement kept U.S. contractors and 

South Vietnamese Army and civilian engineers busy through the end of the 

decade. The project had the additional benefit of connecting the highlands 

with strategic terrain across the border in southern Laos. Runway construction in Vietnam fit the contingency plans as well. Worried that the state of the 

country’s airfields would slow troop deployments by air in case of war, the U.S. 

Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon drew up plans to improve airfield facilities at key locations. But since the United States continued to abide 

by the restrictions under the Geneva Agreements against building new military 

bases, a logical recourse was to use economic assistance to build commercial 

airfields as a subterfuge. In 1956, a contractor hired by the U.S. Operations 

Mission, the agency charged with carrying out economic assistance in developing countries, completed a new north–south concrete runway at Saigon’s 

international airport, Tan Son Nhut. Further improvements followed, and 

Saigon soon had an airfield capable of handling military jet aircraft paid for 

by foreign aid.3

2

 Erwin N. Thompson, Pacific Ocean Engineers: History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

in the Pacific, 1905–1980 (Honolulu: Pacific Ocean Division, n.d.), p. 211; Lt. Gen. Carroll H. 

Dunn, Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–1970, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: 

Department of the Army, 1972), pp. 16–17; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 13, 15, 19; Edward 

J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959–1965, United 

States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department 

of the Navy, 1986), p. 24. For an overview of the Corps of Engineers, see The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers: A History (Alexandria, Va.: Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2007). 

Army engineer responsibilities during this period are outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 

5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations, May 1961, pp. 38–41. 3

 Spector, Early Years, pp. 306–08, 360; Robert F. Futrell, The Advisory Years to 1965, 

United States Air Force in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 

United States Air Force, 1981), p. 52; Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift, United States Air Force in 

Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), 
3

The Path to War

In 1957, the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem, on a state 

visit to the United States, received a pledge of additional assistance, including a package for the rehabilitation of his coastal highways laid waste during 

World War II and the Indochina War. Underpinning the pledge lay the belief 

in Saigon and Washington that the new nation was on the road to political 

stability and, with generous financial support assured from the United States, 

the economic future was bright. As before, the Operations Mission took the 

lead on the highway project. One segment of road, a twenty-mile stretch from 

Saigon northeast to Bien Hoa, became a model for observers of what a wellrun economic aid program in Vietnam could accomplish. “The Bright Spot 

in Asia,” an article in an American weekly magazine, described the positive 

developments in South Vietnam. The country’s bright future was based on 

interviews with leading aid officials and senior members of the military advisory group. Other reports spoke of Diem’s enormous popularity and effectiveness. All failed to heed the embers of insurrection igniting in the countryside.4

Initially, the scattered and sporadic nature of the violence misled almost 

every professional. As late as 1959, the chief of the advisory group was playing 

down the internal security threat represented by the Communist guerrillas, or 

Viet Cong, and declined to recommend that South Vietnamese Army combat 

units interrupt their training to join in pacification. But even as military officials were publicly affirming the point of view that the menace was overdone, 

the United States was shifting toward a progressively stronger counterinsurgency policy and the logistical wherewithal to support it. In 1960, at the direction of the State and Defense Departments, the embassy and military mission 

in Saigon drew up a comprehensive plan of political and military action that 

they hoped would help Diem reverse the trend on the battlefield. One year 

later, certain that the situation was worsening and that U.S. policy to contain 

Communist expansion was under attack in Southeast Asia, the administration 

of John F. Kennedy raised the level of American commitment to the Diem 

government, and the first U.S. military units entered South Vietnam. With 

this deployment, Special Forces teams, Army and Marine helicopter units, Air 

Force transports, Navy patrol boats, and more advisers descended on South 

Vietnam in 1961, quadrupling the American presence in the theater to 3,200 

men. This number more than tripled again in 1962. A full military field headquarters, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), headed 

by a four-star Army general, took up station in Saigon in February 1962. 

While the advisory group headquarters stayed on as a subordinate element 

pp. 42, 161–62; S. Sgt. Bob Reid, U.S. Air Force (USAF), “Vietnam Engineers in War,” Military 

Engineer Field Notes, Military Engineer 55 (1963): 243; United States Operations Mission 

(USOM), Annual Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 1962 (Saigon, 1962), pp. 22–23, 28–29, Historians 

files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C. 4

 Robert G. Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 

1963), pp. 102–29; Spector, Early Years, pp. 304, 315–16; USOM, Activity Report of the Operations 

Mission to Vietnam, 30 June 1954 to 30 June 1956 (Saigon, n.d.), pp. 38–40, USOM, Annual Report 

for FY 1961 (Saigon, 20 November 1961), pp. 23–26, both in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

4

until 1964, the winds of change were tending in one direction: American units 

were entering the war.5

The Defense Department paid close attention to all facets of the deployment, including construction. Under the auspices of the Defense Department, 

theater-planning conferences met regularly in Honolulu at U.S. Pacific 

Command headquarters starting in December 1961. Almost everything short 

of combat troops, said Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the first 

meeting, would be offered to the South Vietnamese, with the survival of that 

nation the highest priority. During the conference, McNamara approved construction of a new airfield at Pleiku City in the western highlands, fuel storage 

tanks at Qui Nhon on the central coast, ammunition storage bunkers at several sites, and a refueling station at Tan Son Nhut. Other airfield projects were 

already under way at Bien Hoa, and Da Nang on the northern coast, and these 

too received support. What McNamara refused to authorize was the use of 

5

 Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked 

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 69–80; Spector, Early Years, pp. 333–35, 

362–65; Admiral U. S. G. Sharp and General William C. Westmoreland, Report on the War 

in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 

77, 80; Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950–1969, Vietnam Studies 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), pp. 20–23, 27–31, 41–42. For more on 

Special Forces, see Col. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971, Vietnam Studies 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), pp. 3–18.

The Dong Nai River Bridge on the Saigon–Bien Hoa Highway was built with 

U.S. economic assistance.
5

The Path to War

U.S. engineer troops on construction projects. The entire building effort would 

be undertaken by civilian contractors under Navy management. This would 

have the effect of keeping U.S. troop ceilings in Vietnam within authorized 

limits, and would leave the Army and Navy engineer units serving on active 

duty in the Far East free to continue their projects elsewhere.6

This approach, relying on civilian construction contractors in a war zone, 

continued for the next three years, and seemed to most observers a worthwhile 

solution to the limited demands of a counterinsurgency campaign. The biggest 

contractor was the joint venture of two large firms: Raymond International of 

New York City and Morrison-Knudsen of Asia, Inc., based in Boise, Idaho. 

Known as RMK, the two firms had a proven record of handling construction projects overseas. The initial contract was of a fixed-price type, in which 

the consortium’s profit depended upon the efficiency of its operations. After 

several false starts, missed deadlines, and changed requirements because of the 

war’s innumerable vagaries, the Navy shifted to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, 

assuming most of the risk of construction and furnishing RMK with materials and equipment and paying its transportation costs. By the end of 1962, 

RMK employed more than 3,000 workers, of whom 2,900 were Vietnamese. 

The contract was expected to last a couple of years, and the firm would be 

responsible for the demobilization of its workforce when work neared completion. Little was it realized that this contract would continue almost to the end 

of the American involvement in the conflict, nearly eleven years later.7

To oversee the civilian construction projects, the Navy’s Officer in Charge 

of Construction, Southeast Asia, located in Bangkok had established a branch 

office in downtown Saigon in February 1961. The first contracts it administered were to Thomas B. Bourne Associates, a Washington, D.C. company, 

which designed plans for new and improved airfields at nine locations, including Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Da Nang. The Saigon office also awarded a 

contract in October to the Tudor Engineering Company and Pacific Architects 

and Engineers, Inc., a joint venture of two California firms, to design air control and warning stations at Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut. At the end of 1961, 

when the RMK contract began and the scope of work expanded dramatically, 

the Bureau of Yards and Docks elevated the title of the Saigon branch from 

the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction, Republic of Vietnam, to the 

Deputy Officer in Charge of Construction, Republic of Vietnam. In addition 

to managing the U.S. contracts, the Navy’s construction office in Saigon hired 

some thirty local contractors, mostly Vietnamese firms, to join in building 

facilities for incoming units. Some of these projects were delayed by funding 

6

 Marolda and Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat, pp. 164–65; Headquarters 

(HQ), Commander in Chief, Pacific, “CINCPAC Command History, 1961” (Honolulu: Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration, 1962), p. 103, CMH 

(hereafter cited as CINCPAC History, date); CINCPAC History, 1962, pp. 198–99; CINCPAC 

History, 1963, p. 106; Rpt, HQ CINCPAC, Secretary of Defense Conference, 16 Dec 61, pp. 

1–2, 45, 48, Historians files, CMH. 7

 CINCPAC History, 1962, p. 198; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 28–31; Capt. Charles 

J. Merdinger, U.S. Navy (USN), “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam,” in Vietnam: 

The Naval Story, Frank Uhlig Jr., ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 228–53.
Engineers at War

6

restrictions on peacetime contracts, such as the need to gain congressional 

approval for jobs exceeding $175,000, and a requirement mandating the use of 

American-made construction supplies that caused some projects to be redesigned mid-stride. Once the contractors shifted their work on facilities into 

higher gear, however, U.S. advisers and support troops began to move from 

their temporary quarters, which were often little more than tent cities, into new 

semipermanent cantonments.8

Between 1962 and mid-1964, South Vietnam experienced a mini-building 

boom as construction projects funded by the United States sprang up in a 

dozen cities and towns across the country. During this period, RMK completed most of its assigned projects, including a pair of jet-capable airstrips 

at Bien Hoa and Da Nang and two smaller all-weather runways at Pleiku and 

Can Tho, a town in the Mekong Delta. The work gave the small but expanding 

South Vietnamese Air Force greater capability to fly tactical support missions 

and to transport soldiers and materiel from region to region. With the completion of the runways, each of the country’s four military zones—I Corps, II 

Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps—had a modern and centrally located airfield. 

Those sites also supported the growing number of U.S. aviation companies 

that were arriving in South Vietnam. To improve the country’s limited port 

facilities, the firm built a new deep-draft pier at Cam Ranh Bay in II Corps, a 

sandy peninsula on the south-central coast that sheltered one of the world’s 

fine natural harbors. The aim during these years was still limited—to support 

an advisory effort that, by most projections, was expected to peak in 1964 and 

then slowly decline in size as the South Vietnamese armed forces gained in skill 

and confidence. Hardly anyone paid attention to the engineering requirements 

that would be needed if the United States changed its policy and decided to 

commit large numbers of troops over a relatively short period of time.9

As the number of U.S. troops climbed, the need for Army engineers to support them grew apace. The steady influx of new units, particularly the helicopter companies that required a high degree of engineer support, put a strain on 

8

 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 22–23, 27, 33, 35; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 77; 

Merdinger, “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam,” p. 234; Info Sheet, Office Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), Department of the Army (DA), 6 Jun 62, sub: Status 

of Military Construction, South Vietnam, Incl. in Information Book for Chief of Staff, U.S. 

Army, Visit to MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), 10–17 Jun 62, Historians 

files, CMH; Joint Logistics Review Board, Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era, Monograph 1, 

Advanced Base Facilities Maintenance (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, ca. 1970), 

p. 12 (hereafter cited as JLRB, Monograph #, title); JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 51. 9

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 81; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 32–33, 36, 39–

47, 64–65, 66, 149; CINCPAC History, 1962, p. 198, ibid., 1963, pp. 108–10, and ibid., 1964, 

fig IV-11; Ltr, RMK (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen) to Brig Gen Daniel A. Raymond, Dir 

of Construction, MACV, 23 May 67, sub: Observations of the Deputy Chairman, Raymond, 

Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones (RMK-BRJ) Operating Committee, Incl. 

in Rpt, Brig Gen Daniel A. Raymond, sub: Observations on the Construction Program, RVN 

[Republic of Vietnam], 1 Oct 65–1 Jun 67, 1 Jun 67, Historians files, CMH (hereafter cited 

as Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program). For more on RMK’s accomplishments during this period, see Diary of a Contract, NBy (Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks) 

44105, January 1962–June 1967, RMK-BRJ, Jul 67, pp. 1–76, U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, Port 

Hueneme, Calif. (hereafter cited as Diary of a Contract).
7

The Path to War

the limited number of specialists such as plumbers, electricians, refrigeration 

technicians, and water supply experts. By the middle of 1962, the permanent 

engineer element in the Army component in Vietnam, the U.S. Army Support 

Group, Vietnam, stood at only four officers and thirty-six enlisted men, not 

enough to engage in planning or any degree of support.10 There had been a 

high-level request just a few months before to increase the number of engineers, 

but it had not come to fruition. Following the visit of General Maxwell D. 

Taylor, the personal military adviser to President Kennedy, to South Vietnam 

in October 1961, the general had recommended sending a 6,000- to 8,000-

man flood relief task force, primarily engineer troops, to the monsoon-ravaged 

Mekong Delta. While the engineers fulfilled their humanitarian mission, Taylor 

also expected them to improve the military infrastructure in the delta where 

the insurgency was at its most active. In the end, President Kennedy opted not 

to send the flood relief force because he wished to keep the American troop 

commitment as small as possible.11 

10 Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 109–10; Futrell, Advisory Years to 1965, p. 111; Rpt, Feb–Jun 

62, Office of Engr, pt. I, pp. 1, 4, in Staff Office Rpt, Jan–Jun 62, n.d., U.S. Army Support 

Group, Vietnam, Historians files, CMH. 11 United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, 

12 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), bk. 2, ch. IV.B.1, pp. 58–101, 

114–37, bk. 11, pp. 327–28, 331–44, 359–66, 410–21; Marolda and Fitzgerald, From Military 

Generals Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and Taylor, 

Secretary of Defense McNamara, and President Kennedy, 1961
Engineers at War

8

A second and more modest request for Army engineers came in early 1964 

when the U.S. Operations Mission asked for three engineer officers with civil 

engineering backgrounds and 112 engineers, organized into eight advisory 

teams, to carry out a variety of civic action projects in the delta. Four small 

teams of Army engineers had arrived a year earlier for four-month tours and 

had succeeded in making some headway in the countryside. Three teams had 

gone to Can Tho where they had advised South Vietnamese officials on jobs 

ranging from equipment maintenance to well-digging. The fourth team had 

deployed to the highlands, building and repairing Special Forces camps, and 

working alongside several U.S. Navy Seabee (construction battalion) Technical 

Assistance Teams, which had a more robust presence in Vietnam than the Army. 

But the Operations Mission soon reevaluated its civic action plan and withdrew the troop request following the poor results of the government’s Strategic 

Hamlet and New Life programs, two controversial schemes to concentrate rural 

Assistance to Combat, pp. 122–29; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. 

Norton and Co., 1972), pp. 216–40, 245–47; Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command 

in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 2006), p. 20.

Beginning in 1963, teams of Army and Navy engineers carried out building projects such as this dispensary by the Seabees.
9

The Path to War

people into small defended enclaves. An expansion of Army civic action would 

have to await better days.12

So, apparently, would support of the South Vietnamese Army. Despite 

their small numbers, the engineers did their best to train their Vietnamese 

counterparts in such areas as equipment maintenance, staff planning, and 

the management of supplies and equipment. Two advisers were stationed at 

the Vietnamese Engineer School at Phu Cuong, fifteen miles north of Saigon, 

to improve its standards of education. Still, the number of engineer advisers 

through 1963, one per infantry division and a few at corps level, was woefully 

inadequate to give the South Vietnamese Army the help it needed. Deadline 

rates for South Vietnamese engineer equipment hovered near 50 percent, and, 

a forty-mile stretch of highway between the cities of Pleiku and Kontum took 

a South Vietnamese engineer construction battalion nearly three years to 

finish, even though the United States funded most of the heavy subgrading.13

12 Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, p. 194; Marolda and Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance 

to Combat, p. 355; Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), “History of U.S. Army 

Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 January–31 December 1964” (Honolulu: Military History 

Division, Office of the Asst CofS, G–3, 1965), pp. 227, 229–30. 13 Spector, Early Years, pp. 260–62; Lt. Col. Ralph F. Lentz, “Little Fort Belvoir of Southeast 

Asia,” Army Information Digest 19 (August 1964): 17; Maj. Gen. Robert R. Ploger, U.S. Army 

Engineers, 1965–1970, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974), 

South Vietnamese engineers undergo bridge construction training
Engineers at War

10

With no hope of meeting its expanding requirements with Army engineers, 

the U.S. command once again turned to contractors. In 1963, under a costplus-fixed-fee arrangement with U.S. Army Support Group, Pacific Architects 

and Engineers took over facilities engineering services at U.S. installations. 

The initial contract provided for support at Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, 

Nha Trang on the central coast, and Soc Trang, a helicopter base in the 

delta. The company’s first main office consisted of a six-man squad tent in 

the Air Force headquarters section of Tan Son Nhut. Early priorities were to 

resolve maintenance problems plaguing electrical generators, water purification plants, and other utilities equipment. Over time, Pacific Architects and 

Engineers also began to supervise local contractors in the construction of new 

cantonments as part of the country’s mini-building boom. Within a year, the 

firm had grown to 762 employees, more than double its original labor force, 

and had extended its reach to four additional sites as the number of American 

support troops continued to rise.14

In fact, the entire contracting effort—RMK, Pacific Architects and 

Engineers, and the local firms—was outgrowing its makeshift beginnings and, 

by the summer of 1963, was recording significant headway on every front. In 

July, a new cantonment with wooden barracks opened at Pleiku capable of 

housing an aviation battalion. Named Camp Holloway for CWO2 Charles 

E. Holloway, an Army helicopter pilot who was killed in action in Phu Yen 

Province in December 1962, it featured a new mess hall, officers and enlisted 

men’s clubs, a barber shop, a laundry, and even an indoor theater. Flight 

line and other operational facilities were either completed or in progress. 

Meanwhile, cantonments and other facilities were going up for other aviation 

units at Bien Hoa, Vung Tau on the coast southeast of Saigon, and Vinh Long 

in the delta. Projects for the 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang were expected to 

be completed by 1 April 1964 and for the 39th Signal Battalion’s station at Phu 

Lam just south of Saigon by 30 May 1964.15

But though the construction effort was showing signs of progress, the military and political situation continued to deteriorate. With each passing month, 

the Viet Cong gained strength and expanded their foothold in the countryside, 

while American aid could not reverse the trend. The enemy was proving more 

resilient than expected; the South Vietnamese forces less effective than hoped. 

Even though U.S. helicopter companies were replacing their old and slow 

H–21 Shawnees with the more powerful UH–1 Iroquois, or “Huey,” the Viet 

pp. 26–27; Comments of Col William J. Parsons, Ofc Asst DCSLOG (Materiel Readiness), DA, 

16 Jan 63, p. 5, on Briefing, Brig Gen Frank A. Osmanski, Asst CofS J–4, MACV, for Paul R. 

Ignatius, Asst Sec Army (Installations and Logistics), 11 Dec 62, Historians files, CMH. 14 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 27–28; JLRB, Monograph 1, Advanced Base Facilities 

Maintenance, pp. 12, 18; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 89–90; Eric D. Johns, History, Pacific 

Architects and Engineers Incorporated: Repairs and Utilities Operations for U.S. and Free World 

Military Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, 1963–1966, [Saigon, n.d.], pp. 5–14, copy in CMH 

(hereafter cited as PA&E History, date). 15 CINCPAC History, 1963, p. 106; Rpt, Jul–Dec 63, Office of Engr, pt. I, pp. 2–6, in Staff 

Office Rpt, Jul–Dec 63, n.d., U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, Historians files, CMH; John 

D. Bergen, Military Communications: A Test for Technology, United States Army in Vietnam 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), pp. 82–83.
11

The Path to War

Cong were adapting to the threat. At the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, a 

Viet Cong unit defeated a much larger South Vietnamese force supported in 

part by the newer helicopters. 

The status of the South Vietnamese government was hardly more encouraging. In May 1963, a Buddhist uprising in Hue, Saigon, and other cities threatened the stability of the government and the increasingly unpopular president, 

Ngo Dinh Diem. The crisis worsened in August when Diem authorized a 

violent crackdown on the Buddhist monks who had originally organized the 

rebellion. With the overall trends looking bleak, the way forward pointed to 

an even larger advisory force and a greater demand for engineering and construction support. And, for the first time, U.S. planners began to examine in 

a serious way the logistical and engineering obstacles the United States would 

face if it chose to intervene in Vietnam on a larger scale.16

Intervention

The situation in Vietnam continued to worsen as 1963 drew to a close. 

On 1 November 1963, a coterie of South Vietnamese generals engineered a 

coup that overthrew the government and led to the death of President Diem. 

Three weeks later, President Kennedy met his death from an assassin’s bullet 

while on the campaign trail in Dallas, Texas. While the twin shocks did not 

immediately alter the U.S. approach to the war, they set the stage for a deeper 

American commitment to Vietnam. The military junta that came to power 

after the death of Diem proved to be fractious and inept, giving the Viet Cong 

even greater opportunity to spread their influence. A second coup in January 

1964 only served to increase the instability of the South Vietnamese government and degrade the effectiveness of its armed forces. In the United States, 

meanwhile, Kennedy’s successor as president, Lyndon B. Johnson, pledged to 

continue and, if necessary, to increase U.S. military support for the embattled 

South Vietnamese state. As the frequency and intensity of Viet Cong attacks 

grew with each passing month, so did the pressure for greater American intervention in the conflict.

The inadequacy of the logistical base in South Vietnam, and the inability 

of the base development plans to keep pace with even a small U.S. buildup 

became evident by the summer of 1964. In August, General William C. 

Westmoreland, the MACV commander, advised Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, 

the head of Pacific Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of problems 

accepting a 4,700-man buildup any faster than the nine months called for in 

earlier planning. Advancing the deployment of additional advisers and aviation troops to 30 September, Westmoreland noted, would cause particular 

trouble at airfields already saturated with aircraft and troops, and further 

deployments would result in overtaxed and overcrowded bases. The MACV 

commander added it would take five months to construct facilities for the new 

troops, and his entire logistical and administrative base was already operating 

16 Gelb with Betts, Irony of Vietnam, pp. 80–89; Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: 

U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 22–44. 
Engineers at War

12

on a shoestring. Furthermore, real estate would have to be acquired through 

local channels, sometimes a slow process, because land and facilities could not 

simply be commandeered.17

With little or no planned increase in the number of military engineers 

assigned to Vietnam, it became evident that a large contractor force would 

have to be kept in the country. Anticipating the deployment of more forces to 

South Vietnam, the Army, Navy, and Air Force commands developed a broad 

spectrum of project requirements that, in turn, greatly expanded RMK’s labor 

force and scope of work. By the end of 1964, the firm’s strength had grown 

to nearly 4,000 and the company was building $1.2 million worth of projects 

every month, a figure projected to increase to $12 million per month by early 

1965.18 Pacific Architects and Engineers also expanded its operations as the 

war heated up. In early August, a clash between U.S. Navy destroyers and 

North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin led President Johnson to 

authorize one-time air strikes against North Vietnam. Immediately afterward, 

MACV called on the firm to improve air base defenses, a task typically done 

by troops. In short order, the contractor erected emergency shelters, sand bag 

bunkers, security fences, and perimeter lighting at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, 

and other airfields. By September, the firm was devoting approximately 80 

percent of its construction effort to this work.19

Despite the expanded contractor effort, a prodigious amount of work 

remained to be done before South Vietnam could support even a modest 

increase in U.S. forces. MACV OPLAN (Operation Plan) 32–64, published 

in mid-1963, provided a detailed outline of South Vietnam’s logistical facilities and highlighted the many improvements that would be needed to support 

a large U.S. expeditionary force. The airfield directory listed 251 usable and 

abandoned fields, most of which were small and unimproved. The commercial 

fuel storage facilities were barely adequate for South Vietnamese needs and 

could not hope to support an expanded U.S. presence. In evaluating ports, 

the MACV plan noted that Saigon and Da Nang were the country’s only 

primary points of entry. Da Nang, however, lacked deep-draft piers, which 

meant that the United States would have to employ over-the-beach techniques. 

While Cam Ranh Bay on the central coast had tremendous potential as a port, 

and Pacific Command had successfully lobbied to have the deep-draft pier 

built under the Military Assistance Program, years of work would be required 

before the sleepy fishing village became a modern naval harbor. In the meantime, OPLAN 32–64 identified smaller ports that could be used, as well as 

coastal landing sites suitable for landing cargo in over-the-beach operations. 

17 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. H-8; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 24; Msg, 

COMUSMACV (Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) MACJ3 7738 to 

CINCPAC, 11 Aug 64, sub: Additional Support, RVN; Msg, CINCPAC to Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (JCS), 12 Aug 64, sub: Additional Support RVN; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 93. 

Messages in Historians files, CMH. 18 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 65, 71, 77–78; Observations of the Deputy Chairman, 

RMK-BRJ Operating Committee, 23 May 67; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 96; Ltr, 

RMK to Raymond, 23 May 67. 19 PA&E History, 1963–1966, pp. 14–21.
13

The Path to War

Recognizing the vast amount of work to be done and the limits on his engineering resources, General Westmoreland set his construction priorities for 

the future in the following rank order: airfields, roads, railroads, ports, and 

logistics bases.20

In late 1964, General Westmoreland recommended the deployment of an 

Army logistical command and an engineer construction group to support the 

growing needs of his command and the expanding war. The MACV staff under 

Brig. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, the J–4 (assistant chief of staff for logistics), 

had foreseen the need for a centralized logistical organization as early as 1962, 

but a proposal had not made it out of the headquarters. General Osmanski 

revived the idea in 1964 with a plan that included a robust construction capability. Justifying the need for engineer troops, Osmanski explained that RMK 

faced an increasing backlog, and the deployment of a 2,700-man engineer 

group of three battalions would help close that gap. Although RMK was in 

the process of increasing its monthly work in place, Osmanski pointed out 

that the firm would take twenty months just to complete its current backlog. 

MACV estimated that the construction program by late January 1965 would 

exceed $130 million. This information served as the basis for requesting the 

engineer group.21

The Navy disagreed with Osmanski, arguing that RMK could satisfactorily carry out an increased workload. In Honolulu, R. Adm. James R. 

Davis, the chief of the Pacific Division of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, 

and Pacific Command’s adviser on construction in Vietnam, declared that 

the firm’s “mobilization and rate of construction accomplishment can and 

will be promptly expanded as required by further program expansion.” In 

Washington, R. Adm. Peter Corradi, the head of the Bureau of Yards and 

Docks, backed this position. Admiral Corradi added that there were no major 

constraints in the way to prevent the contractor from expanding operations 

provided plans and procurement actions were done in advance. He also cautioned the Defense Department to defer consideration to have an engineer 

group coordinate construction in Vietnam because any shift of responsibility 

from the Navy’s construction office in Saigon would be disruptive.22

Notwithstanding these arguments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed 

Osmanski’s plan on 15 January 1965 and recommended dispatching an 

20 Joint Tables of Distribution, MACV, 1 Jul 63, p. 7; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 45–46; 

JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 22, H-5; JLRB, Monograph 12, Logistics Planning, pp. 

27–28; COMUSMACV OPLAN (Operation Plan) 32–64, Phase II, 1 Jul 63, with four changes 

through 16 Nov 67. Joint Tables of Distribution and OPLAN 32–64 in Historians files, CMH. 21 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 24 Dec 64, sub: Improvement of U.S. Logistic System in RVN, 

Historians files, CMH; Msg, Osmanski MAC 370 to Lt Gen Richard D. Meyer, Dir of Logistics, 

JCS, 26 Jan 65, sub: Engineer Const Gp for RVN, Westmoreland Message files, CMH; Lt. Gen. 

Joseph M. Heiser, Logistic Support, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1974), p. 9; Joel D. Meyerson, “War Plans and Politics: Origins of the American Base of 

Supply in Vietnam,” in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare From the Middle Ages to the 

Present, ed. John A. Lynn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 281–87. 22 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 107 (quotation); Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 24 Dec 64, 

sub: Improvement of U.S. Logistic System in RVN; Msg, Meyer JCS 163 to Westmoreland, et 

al., 14 Jan 65, Westmoreland Message files, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 80.
Engineers at War

14

advance party to Saigon to set up the logistical element. Defense Secretary 

McNamara approved the plan in principle but, in no hurry to commit ground 

troops, decided further justification was warranted, particularly for the engineer group. In late January, he dispatched a Defense Department task force to 

Vietnam to make an on-site inspection and to review the management of the 

construction program. By early February, the team concluded that an engineer 

group was not needed at the time, but it did agree to recommend the deployment of a scaled-down logistical command. The team also proposed augmenting the Navy construction office in Saigon and increasing its responsibility for 

technical engineering support for U.S. forces. As far as depending on RMK 

to carry out an expanded construction role in Vietnam, the team felt that the 

firm had virtually unlimited capacity for expansion and a proven capability 

to work in a combat theater. Besides, the team noted that Seabee battalions 

stationed in the Pacific could be called upon for rapid augmentation. On 12 

February, McNamara’s deputy, Cyrus R. Vance, approved the team’s report. 

This decision proved shortsighted. One month later, the need for the engineer 

group became critical.23

On 7 February, and again on the eighth and eleventh, President Johnson 

ordered reprisal air raids against the North after guerrillas struck American 

installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon, killing thirty-two soldiers and wounding 

more than a hundred. A few days later, dissatisfied with the uncertain trajectory of his reprisal policy, the president took the next step up the rung of 

pressure toward a wider war, authorizing the start of the bombing offensive 

called Rolling Thunder and inviting discussion on dispatching an expeditionary ground force of soldiers and marines. An engineer group was only

one element in the administration’s debate on escalation as the commitment 

of ground troops hung fire through February into March. But once the White 

House tilted the issue in favor of intervention, other decisions followed that 

clarified the course of construction policy, not quite as quickly as General 

Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed was required, but with 

enough forward momentum to begin shifting the theater of operations to a 

wartime footing.

The need for military engineers received confirmation in the weeks that followed when officials in the theater and the Defense Department started weighing plans of action to deploy American combat units. Initially Westmoreland 

recommended an aggressive enclave approach, with infantry battalions 

deployed in beachheads along the coast and an infantry division rushed to the 

Central Highlands as a blocking force to counter a growing concentration of 

North Vietnamese regulars in the border area. He also laid out a more ambitious option taken from the theater’s OPLAN 32–64 of a full corps force on 

the northern border and on into Laos in order to isolate the southern battlefield from enemy reinforcement. The Joint Chiefs after quickly endorsing the 

23 Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 9; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 107; Msg, Westmoreland 

MAC 582 to Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, 6 Feb 65, Westmoreland Message files, 

CMH; Memo, Cyrus R. Vance, Dep Sec Def, for JCS, 12 Feb 65, sub: COMUSMACV Plan for 

Introduction and Employment of a U.S. Army Logistical Command, Historians files, CMH.
15

The Path to War

enclave approach expanded it to three full divisions—two American and one 

South Korean—toward the end of March.24

By this time, the theater’s construction shortfalls had begun to loom large 

in official Washington. The tactical requirements alone for engineers were 

giving pause to the top-level service and secretariat staffs that were puzzling 

over the use of force and its costs. Every scenario now seemed fraught with 

limiting logistical factors and other dangers. The deployment of a division 

to the highlands, officials now believed, would absorb an engineer group all 

by itself, and was simply unsustainable without a buildout at the port of Qui 

Nhon, repairs to Highway 19 (the main east–west artery), and expansion of the 

Pleiku airfield. As for pitching a corps-size force on the northern border and 

in the Laotian panhandle, it would take every engineer battalion in the active 

Army and several from the reserves, and would require massive concurrent 

construction projects in Vietnam and Thailand, none of which could begin, 

given the realities of logistical lead time, until the autumn at the earliest.25

But there were deeper problems with Vietnam, inadequacies endemic to the 

country and the American commitment that had been understood for years, 

and all through March the logistical and construction professionals attempted 

to grapple with them, laying out with increasing clarity and urgency the steps 

the administration needed to take immediately to prepare the theater for war. 

Their recommendations addressed fundamental sources of unreadiness: from 

the importance of developing direct sea access to Vietnam by dredging and 

constructing new ports along the coast, and pre-positioning lighterage and 

construction material within a few days’ sailing time of Vietnam, to streamlining administrative procedures for funding construction, and deploying the 

full logistical command and engineer construction group, and even laying 

the political groundwork for mobilizing the Reserves and National Guard to 

ensure that the combat troops received enough support.26

These were the overriding issues for the military leaders, what they believed 

to be the perils facing them, when President Johnson in March took control of 

24 Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ41 6125 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb 65, sub: Southeast Asia 

Logistic Actions, Historians files, CMH; Cosmas, Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, pp. 202–03; 

William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1976), 

p. 126. 25 Memo, Acting Ch of Engineers for DCSOPS (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

Plans), 26 Mar 65, sub: South Vietnam Engineer Estimate, Pleiku-Kontum, with Incl, Engineer 

Strategic Studies Group, South Vietnam Engineer Estimate, Pleiku-Kontum, Mar 65, box 8, 

68A/5926, Record Group (RG) 319, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 

Washington, D.C.; Memo, DCSOPS for CofS Army, 26 Apr 65, sub: Engineer Estimate, U.S. 

Army Corps Force Southeast Asia, with Incl, Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Engineer 

Estimate, U.S. Army Corps Force Southeast Asia, Apr 65, box 9, 68A/5926, RG 319, NARA; 

William C. Baldwin, The Engineer Studies Center and Army Analysis: A History of the U.S. 

Army Engineer Studies Center, 1943–1982 (Fort Belvoir, Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1985), p. 129. 26 Memo, Office CofS Army, 22 Feb 65, sub: VN Discussions; Msg, Commander in Chief 

USARPAC to CINCPAC, 19 Mar 65, sub: Contingency Planning for Southeast Asia/Western 

Pacific; Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 20 Mar 65, sub: Emergency Construction Requirements, 

Southeast Asia, all Historians files, CMH; Meyerson, “Origins of the American Base of 

Supply,” pp. 282–83.
Engineers at War

16

the debate on intervention, settling on a gradualist approach to troop deployments. His decisions offered the possibility of even larger commitments in the 

future while postponing potential trouble with Congress and the public. A 

first decision in early March put Marine units at Da Nang when the Rolling

Thunder raids started over North Vietnam. Because the mission was limited

to providing for air base defense, few officials regarded the troops as the beginning of an American ground war. Over the next two weeks, however, on 15 and 

20 March, the president opened Vietnam to larger deployments, ordering the 

dispatch of dredges to theater harbors along with LSTs (landing ships, tanks), 

and approving two large construction projects—a new runway at Da Nang 

air base in an effort to handle the rising tempo of operations and a jet airfield 

farther south at Chu Lai to catch the theater’s overflow—two projects Pacific 

Command had been pushing as construction priorities since the fall of 1964.27

The main objective of the support professionals, a decision for a full logistical command and engineer construction group, emerged during a meeting of 

the National Security Council on 1 April. After weeks of high-level controversy 

over the question of ground troops, the president deferred the three-division 

force that the military leaders recommended but authorized what amounted 

to its support train for deployment, plus two more battalions of marines and 

an expansion of their mission. If the decision represented a continuation of 

the policy of incrementalism, it still constituted a serious commitment of 

American ground troops, providing for a complete theater logistical command 

totaling 5,900 soldiers, plus 13,000 more spaces in over a hundred logistical 

and engineer units, among which was a second engineer group to help lay the 

base for any additional commitments of forces he might later make.28

The president would make three such commitments in the weeks that followed: a task force of the 173d Airborne Brigade that landed at Bien Hoa and 

Vung Tau in early May and two Army infantry brigades—the 2d Brigade, 1st 

Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division—scheduled 

for enclaves on the central coast in early summer. The hope in military circles 

was that the engineers would arrive just as quickly or even more so, and pace 

the rate of arrival of the rest of the support package and the combat units. 

But already, according to officials at the Department of the Army, there were 

signs that the engineer deployment was slipping badly, reinforcing old fears, 

Westmoreland’s among them, that the support base would never be ready 

to receive the infantry and properly sustain it. At the last possible moment, 

27 John M. Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, 

United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

2000), pp. 15–18; Msg, JCS 007929 to CINCPAC, 26 Mar 65, sub: COMUSMACV Requirement 

for Additional LST Support, Historians files, CMH; “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War 

in Vietnam, 1960–1968,” Part 2, “1965–1966” (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1970), ch. 20, pp. 12–14, CMH; Jack Shulimson and Maj. Charles M. Johnson, 

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 

(Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978), 

pp. 6–15, 29–30. 28 Msg, Sharp to Gen Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman JCS, 27 Mar 65, sub: U.S. and ROK 

(Republic of Korea) Deployments, Westmoreland Message files, CMH; National Security 

Action Memorandum 328 to Sec State, et al., 6 Apr 65, box 13, 70A/5127, RG 330, NARA.
17

The Path to War

engineer units in the United States were preparing to deploy, but on a schedule that raised questions about the soundness of the support buildup for the 

fighting that lay ahead.29

29 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 108–09.

2

Engineers Cross the Pacific

The expanding engineer involvement came about more as a reaction to 

growing U.S. military strength rather than the execution of carefully 

drawn-up plans. When President Johnson directed the increase of support 

troops on 1 April 1965, the initial engineer increment consisted of one group 

headquarters, two battalions, three separate companies, a platoon, and three 

detachments. As more combat troops arrived in the summer and fall, additional increments of engineers filtered in. By November, three groups and ten 

battalions were building ports, airfields, and bases throughout the country and 

providing tactical support to combat units. And from the first, the demands 

placed upon the engineers were immediate and taxing.

The 35th Engineer Group (Construction) Deploys

On 10 April 1965, Col. William F. Hart, the commanding officer of the 

35th Engineer Group (Construction) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, received orders 

to deploy the group headquarters to South Vietnam. The 84th Engineer 

Battalion (Construction) at Fort Ord, California, and the 864th Engineer 

Battalion (Construction) at Fort Wolters, Texas, were to accompany the group. 

Planning began at once to transport equipment and supplies to nearby ports 

to be put aboard cargo ships bound for Vietnam. On 3 May, advance parties 

from the 35th Engineer Group and 864th Engineer Battalion departed by air 

for Saigon. Lt. Col. Thomas C. Haskins, the group executive officer, headed 

the two advance parties. Lt. Col. James E. Bunch, the commanding officer of 

the 864th, and members of his staff made up the second advance party.1

The deployment of the 35th Group was not trouble-free. Although the 

ninety-eight-man headquarters company had a high manpower readiness 

rating, the Army’s deployment criteria, which specified a six-month period 

of remaining service and other conditions, created immediate turbulence. 

1

 Two assigned battalions, the 46th Engineer Battalion (Construction) at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, and the 168th Engineer Battalion (Combat) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, remained 

behind for the time being. Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr Gp, 8 Jul 65, p. 1, 

Historians files, CMH; Interv, Maj John F. Hummer, 16th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col James E. 

Bunch, Commanding Officer (CO), 864th Engr Bn, 1 May 66, Vietnam Interview Tape (VNIT) 

10, p. 1, CMH. Depending on tables of organization and equipment and modified tables of 

equipment, the construction battalions were authorized approximately 900 troops organized in 

a headquarters and headquarters company, an engineer equipment and maintenance company, 

and three engineer construction companies. For a summary of the types of engineer units, their 

functions, strengths, and types of equipment, see Ploger, Army Engineers, app. D, pp. 215–18. 

Also see FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations, September 1965.
Engineers at War

20

Ultimately, only four of the original complement of twenty officers and warrant officers deployed to Vietnam: Colonel Hart, the executive officer, the 

adjutant, and the commander of the aviation section. Replacements reported 

just before embarkation, and they did not get acquainted with the unit until 

aboard the troop ship on its way to Vietnam.2

The 864th Engineer Battalion’s problems were on a much larger scale. 

Colonel Bunch had only nine days to get his equipment to the port at 

Beaumont, Texas, to meet the 21 April shipping deadline. The nearly 900-man 

battalion also lost about one-third of its strength, including many important 

officers and noncommissioned officers. Among the key staff officers only the 

adjutant remained. Because Bunch traveled with the advance party, he did 

not meet his new executive officer and operations officer until the main body 

arrived at Cam Ranh Bay.3

After reaching Saigon, Colonel Haskins met with Col. Robert W. Duke, 

the commander of the recently activated 1st Logistical Command. Haskins 

now learned that the 35th Group would report to the logistical command. 

Duke and his staff had evaluated anchorages, road nets, and security requirements and had selected sites for base areas. It was evident that expansion of 

port and airfield capacities at Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau would be 

major tasks facing the group. The port of Saigon alone could not handle the 

number of ships coming over to unload troops, equipment, and supplies. A 

MACV survey had concluded that despite some construction problems, the 

sandy Cam Ranh peninsula and its well-protected natural harbor would make 

an excellent port and logistical complex. Haskins and his team began developing a plan to distribute the first increment of 2,300 engineer troops expected 

to arrive by the end of the month. On 10 May, Colonel Bunch and his thirtyseven-man advance party flew from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay to prepare for 

arrival of the group. Five days later, General Westmoreland gave the go-ahead 

to develop bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and elsewhere.4

Concurrent with this planning, MACV initiated a series of requests for real 

estate. The basis for acquiring real estate was a provision in the 1950 Pentalateral 

Agreement between United States, France, and the three Indochina states, which 

stipulated that the host country would provide land at no cost. In South Vietnam, 

real estate was either requested from the Joint General Staff for governmentowned land or leased from private owners. In some cases, the Vietnamese government would purchase private land, and MACV would reimburse the government. The United States also paid the cost of indemnification and relocation 

when squatters were on the property, but the title itself was obtained and held 

2

 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 32, 38; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr Gp, 

pp. 1–2; Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 5–112D, Engr Gp (Const), 9 Nov 61. 3

 Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, p. 1.

4

 Heiser, Logistic Support, pp. 9–11, 15; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr 

Gp, p. 2; Interv, Maj John F. Schiller, 15th Mil Hist Det, with Col Robert W. Duke, CO, 1st 

Log Cmd, 3 Jan 66, VNIT 1, pp. 5–7, CMH; Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, p. 2; 

Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, “Command History, 

1965” (Saigon, Vietnam: Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary, MACV, 1966), pp. 

107–08, CMH (hereafter cited as MACV History, date).
21

Engineers Cross the Pacific

by the Vietnamese government. This system was satisfactory as long as small 

plots were involved and time was not a factor, as was usually the case during the 

advisory years. But the arrival of marines and Seabees to build a jet airfield at 

Chu Lai in May revealed problems with current practice. Only two weeks before 

the marines landed, MACV dispatched two Army captains, an engineer and a 

finance officer, to negotiate with government officials and land owners for “each 

fruit tree, each banana tree, rice paddy, thatched hut and grave” at the construction site. Because this involved payment to 1,800 different property owners, the 

transaction was barely completed in time. Time was also a consideration at Cam 

Ranh Bay. By the time the Vietnamese government approved U.S. entry onto the 

peninsula, advance elements were already ashore. The U.S. Command expressed 

little concern about these formalities given its sense of tactical urgency and the 

fact that the peninsula was virtually uninhabited. The State Department took a 

different position, however, by not pronouncing itself satisfied with the legality 

of the occupation until an investigation was completed during the summer.5

Upon reaching Cam Ranh Bay, the advance party got right to work. The 

current tenants of the peninsula, the South Vietnamese Navy, provided the 

engineers one of the old French military buildings, a fortuitous move because 

the Americans did not bring any tents. With only hand tools, Bunch and his 

party prepared a temporary landing beach and installed “dead-men” (buried 

logs used as anchors) to hold down the LSTs now beginning to frequent the 

nascent port.6

5

 MACV History, 1965, pp. 108, 124 (quoted words, p. 124); Interv, Schiller with Duke, 3 Jan 

66, p. 7; Dunn, Base Development, p. 29. 6

 Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, pp. 1–3.

When the 35th Engineer Group arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, the only deep-draft 

pier was the one built by RMK in 1964.
Engineers at War

22

The main body of the 35th Engineer Group departed San Francisco on 

13 May aboard the U.S. Navy Ship (USNS) Eltinge, a World War II Liberty 

ship just out of mothballs. Aboard the Eltinge were the group headquarters, 

the 84th and 864th Engineer Battalions, the 513th Engineer Company (Dump 

Truck), the 584th Engineer Company (Light Equipment), the 178th Engineer 

Company (Field Maintenance), and the 53d Engineer Company (Supply Point). 

The Eltinge was expected to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay around 30 May. The ship, 

however, suffered repeated mechanical breakdowns and ended up being towed 

to Midway Island. At Midway, the troops and cargo were transferred to the 

USNS Barrett. Meanwhile, three ships carrying equipment proceeded on, and 

they arrived weeks before the main body. The Barrett continued to its original destination, Subic Bay in the Philippines, before proceeding to Vietnam. 

Colonel Haskins flew to the Philippines from Saigon to brief commanders and 

staff officers. When plans were finished, he flew back to Saigon to complete 

preparations for landing and deploying the group.7

 

When the ships carrying the equipment arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 22 

May, the small group of engineers and transportation troops on the scene faced 

a daunting task. Dump trucks, bulldozers, graders, and the multitude of other 

construction equipment were slung off the ships and on to the peninsula’s sole 

pier. It took four days to unload the first vessel. After sitting on board the 

ships for almost a month, most of the construction equipment and vehicles 

had dead batteries and flat tires. Maintenance and repairs could not be done 

because the operators were on the Eltinge and later the Barrett. Colonel Bunch 

and his party pitched in by using makeshift jumper cables to start the equipment and vehicles. Then the officers and senior noncommissioned officers, 

trying to recall how to operate the equipment, managed to drive the items off 

the crowded pier to a parking area in the sand. Finally, after about a week and 

a half of round-the-clock effort, they finished the unloading.

On 9 June, the USNS Barrett dropped anchor off Cam Ranh Bay. On 

hand to receive the disembarking troops were Brig. Gen. John Norton, the 

commander of the U.S. Army Support Command; the advance parties; and 

some Transportation Corps soldiers. The ship’s captain had balked at entering the bay because his charts did not show an approved harbor there, so the 

troops had to debark over the side of the vessel into landing craft. It took two 

to three hours until the offloading began. After half the troops came ashore, 

a driving rainstorm struck the bay, soaking everyone, a welcome relief from 

the extreme heat. Once ashore, the group headquarters, the 864th Engineer 

Battalion, the four separate engineer companies, a finance detachment, and 

Company D, 84th Engineer Battalion, moved to preselected defense positions 

in the sand dunes. The Barrett and the rest of the 84th Battalion proceeded to 

Qui Nhon.8

7

 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 38; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr Gp, p. 1. 8

 Interv, Schiller with Duke, 3 Jan 66, p. 8; Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, pp. 2–3; 

Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr Gp, p. 1; Capt. Lindbergh Jones, “Operations 

at Cam Ranh Bay,” Military Engineer 58 (July-August 1966): 10.
23

Engineers Cross the Pacific

Digging In

After building a campsite and getting the equipment in working order, 

the group commenced the transformation of the sandy peninsula into a depot 

and port. The first task required removing a large sand dune in order to build 

a LST ramp on the south beach. Bulldozers and earthmoving scrapers leveled other areas and gradually a road network began to take shape. Initially, 

bulldozers cut the first trails through the deep sand, twenty to thirty feet in 

places. These first tracks were so unstable that soon bulldozers were positioned 

at various points to tow stalled vehicles. After a few weeks, vehicle and equipment operators developed techniques to maneuver in the sand. They reduced 

tire pressure below the minimum prescribed standard, and climbed the dunes 

by moving along the contours instead of attempting a direct approach. Still, 

sand was a never-ending problem. Its abrasive action on moving parts caused 

maintenance problems on nearly all equipment. Traveling by foot through 

the deep sand also sapped the men’s energy. Finally, the gleaming granules of 

sand magnified the already intense heat inside the dark green tentage. When 

the occupants raised the tent sides for ventilation, onshore winds carried even 

more sand into offices and troop quarters. Sand also crept into kitchens, foodstuffs, and clothing. Only the constant breeze, albeit mixed with sand, seemed 

to offer some relief from the searing sun.9

9

 Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, pp. 3–5; Jones, “Operations at Cam Ranh Bay,” 

pp. 10–11.

Engineers of the 35th Group transfer to a landing craft at Cam Ranh Bay, 

June 1965.
Engineers at War

24

The daytime heat forced the engineers to adjust work schedule and construction procedures when they started work on the depot buildings and troop 

housing. Temperatures, intensified by the reflection from the white sand, rose 

to 120 ̊F. To avoid the effects of the heat as much as possible, crews worked 

in two shifts to take advantage of the cooler night air. One shift worked from 

0100 to 1100 and the second began at 1500, working until 0100. The 35th 

Group also adopted special procedures to prevent damage caused by the 

intense heat. Crews set forms during the daylight hours, leaving the heavier 

work of placing concrete slabs to the evening hours. This practice served both 

to protect the men and ensure that the concrete properly set before the heat of 

the day removed the hydration water. At least the sand could be used to make 

a low-grade concrete that proved adequate for floor slabs and hardstands. The 

abundant supply of sand also made it possible to fill the large numbers of 

sandbags used in bunkers, revetments, machine gun positions, and steps.10

Until infantry troops arrived, the 35th Group provided most of the security on the peninsula. During the first night, the engineers placed temporary 

machine gun positions and listening posts along the high dunes. Some nervousness prevailed. Colonel Bunch recalled: “I think every shadow got a hole 

10 Jones, “Operations at Cam Ranh Bay,” p. 12; Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, pp. 2–4.

Because of high daytime temperatures, crews pave concrete pads for 

buildings at Cam Ranh Bay at night.
25

Engineers Cross the Pacific

shot in and there were very few VCs [Viet Cong] in the area I’m sure, but my 

people didn’t realize that so they were actually more of a hazard to themselves 

than they were to anyone else.” Though the Viet Cong made their presence 

felt with some long-range, ineffective sniping, the 1,200 engineers ashore that 

first day seemed sufficient. While getting settled, the 35th Group worked out 

a mutual security plan with the local South Vietnamese naval commander, 

but diverting engineers to guard duty imposed a heavy burden on operations. 

Colonel Bunch used 160 to 170 men per day for manning defenses and patrolling. On 12 July, an infantry battalion from the 1st Infantry Division came 

ashore and took over the defense of the peninsula. In October, South Korean 

troops assumed security responsibility for Cam Ranh Bay peninsula and the 

surrounding area.11

Meanwhile, the 84th Engineer Battalion, less Company D, completed 

its sea voyage to Qui Nhon on 11 June. While Transportation Corps lighters 

moved equipment ashore, the construction battalion, under the command of 

Lt. Col. Joseph J. Rochefort, started setting up a base camp just west of the 

city near the intersection of Highway 1 and Route 440. After settling in, the 

battalion embarked on the long-term transformation of the port city and surrounding area into a large logistics base. Soon, permanent beach ramps for 

landing craft were completed, and landfill operations were under way for a 

supply depot. With the help of a platoon from the 497th Engineer Company 

(Port Construction), the 84th installed two 4-inch marine pipelines to pump 

petroleum products from tankers offshore. Just south of the city, the battalion began building ammunition storage pads and set up an improvised rockcrushing plant next to Highway 1. Here, too, sand was abundant, not as loose 

as at Cam Ranh, but still enough to cause equipment breakdowns.12

While the troops got situated at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay, the 84th 

Battalion’s Company D transshipped from Cam Ranh to Vung Tau, some 

thirty-five miles southeast of Saigon. After setting up its tent camp on the 

Vung Tau peninsula, the construction company began turning the port town 

and the surrounding area into a combat support base designed to relieve 

Saigon of some of its offloading and storage burdens. The most urgent task 

facing the engineers was improvement of the existing shallow-draft port facilities, a major project for a company-size unit of two hundred men. Unlike the 

sandy and mountainous terrain at Cam Ranh and Qui Nhon, the Vung Tau 

peninsula was marshy. The company commander, 1st Lt. Reed M. Farrington, 

learned that the plans for the depot did not take the marshy soil into account. 

A redesign became necessary, and the staging depot complex fell behind schedule. Despite such setbacks, the officers and men of Company D carried out 

their assignment. Operating with a minimum of supervision and support from 

higher headquarters, getting whatever supplies they could from local vendors, 

11 Interv, Hummer with Bunch, 1 May 66, pp. 2–3; Jones, “Operations at Cam Ranh Bay,” p. 10.

12 Maj. Gerald E. Galloway, “Essayons: The Corps of Engineers in Vietnam” (Master of 

Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1968), p. 

35, copy in CMH; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 84th Engr Bn, 14 Oct 65, pp. 2–3, 

Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

26

Company D fended for itself until the 46th Engineer Battalion (Construction) 

arrived in September.13

All the while, the war continued to go badly for the South Vietnamese. 

Viet Cong main forces and guerrillas, steadily increasing in numbers and 

effectiveness, were systematically bleeding Saigon’s forces in large and small 

engagements. In April, Westmoreland and Sharp proposed hastening troop 

deployments, raising U.S. strength to 82,000 plus 7,200 troops from Australia 

and South Korea. On 5 May, the 173d Airborne Brigade was airlifted from 

Okinawa to Bien Hoa to relieve South Vietnamese Army forces of some of 

their security responsibilities and to free them to counter the enemy threat. In 

early June, MACV confirmed the presence of elements of a North Vietnamese 

division in northern II Corps. The command also suspected another division 

to be nearby in the Laotian panhandle. By mid-June, two new military leaders 

took over control of the government. Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu became the 

de facto chief of state, and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky assumed the 

premiership. Washington now realized that the new government would need 

even more U.S. combat troops to help stem the tide.

More men were on the way. On 10 July, President Johnson ordered the 

deployment of an additional 10,400 logistical and engineer troops. Four days 

later, five engineer battalions received orders to Vietnam. On the twenty-eighth, 

Johnson announced the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 

to II Corps. The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division had also been alerted 

for Vietnam. By August, the add-ons would increase the number of soldiers 

committed to the war to 210,000, followed in September with a further requirement of 9,800 support troops, many of them engineers.14

One of the five engineer battalions alerted for deployment to Vietnam 

was the 87th Engineer Battalion (Construction) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Lt. 

Col. John J. McCulloch, who assumed command in June, faced problems 

that confronted other deploying units that summer. Most of the problems 

in themselves were not unusual. The difficulty stemmed from the number of 

problems arising simultaneously. Manpower shortages plagued the battalion 

immediately. While needing more soldiers with construction skills, the 87th 

lost 40 percent of its men because of reassignments, discharges, and other 

reasons. The Army alleviated the shortage to some degree by assigning combat 

engineers as substitutes. Colonel McCulloch also took measures to adjust his 

organizational equipment for service in Vietnam. He obtained more tents, 

some salvaged household refrigerators, and water distributors, and left behind 

unneeded items such as space heaters. On 26 July, McCulloch and his advance 

party of sixty-seven men departed for Saigon. Following several delays and 

a rough flight, McCulloch’s party arrived in Saigon on 4 August only to find 

that the battalion’s destination had changed. Instead of the Saigon region, the 

87th Battalion would be assigned to the 35th Group at Cam Ranh Bay. While 

in Saigon, McCulloch made arrangements with the 1st Logistical Command 

13 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 49–50, 79. 14 Cosmas, Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, pp. 200–56; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 

47–49.
27

Engineers Cross the Pacific

for some missing items, including enough tentage for the entire battalion and 

small electrical generators. Most of the advance party then flew on to Cam 

Ranh Bay.15

The main body of nearly eight hundred men arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 

24 August and set up camp. During the next four months, the 87th Engineer 

Battalion built roads to the northern end of the peninsula and began building 

a 6,400-man cantonment, a petroleum tank farm, and a seven-and-a-half-mile 

fuel pipeline from the port to the new air base under construction by RMK. 

The 35th Group also asked the battalion to conduct tests to stabilize the sand. 

The 87th tried combinations of cement, crushed coral, asphalt, crushed rock, 

water, and decomposed granite, mixed in various degrees with sand, on the 

routes to the depot area and the ammunition supply point. For the time being, 

a mix of the decomposed granite and cement at an eight-inch thickness and 

moist cured for seven days afforded a substantial base course. Eventually, this 

method became the standard base course for all depot roads at Cam Ranh 

Bay.16

Also arriving on the same day as the 87th Engineer Battalion was the 497th 

Port Construction Company. This versatile unit of slightly more than two 

hundred men, previously based at Fort Belvoir and commanded by Capt. Paul 

L. Miles, proceeded to lay the ground work for the arrival of a DeLong pier, a 

prefabricated self-elevating barge pier developed by the DeLong Corporation 

of New York City. While the 87th Engineer Battalion worked on a combination rock fill causeway and panel bridge connecting the shore to the pier, the 

port construction company built a 550-foot sheet-pile bulkhead to protect the 

pier from beach erosion.17

Several other engineer companies arrived. The 102d Engineer Company 

(Construction Support), commanded by Capt. Jesse M. Tyson Jr., reached 

Cam Ranh Bay in late August with its quarrying, asphalt paving, and other 

specialized equipment. Captain Tyson and his lieutenants had no experience 

in asphalt production, but by using the knowledge of some of the noncommissioned officers, the 102d set up a plant. The unit began crushing rock in 

early November, and when rock production reached sufficient quantities, 

the roads around the peninsula received a topping of asphalt pavement. The 

553d Engineer Company (Float Bridge), commanded by Capt. Richard L. 

Copeland, arrived a few days after the 102d. In October, the company put 

its M4T6 bridging equipment to good use, beginning regular ferry service to 

the mainland. Because of the heavy traffic, especially dump trucks hauling 

laterite—a soil rich in secondary oxides and used as a subgrade—to the peninsula, the 553d soon assembled a longer and swifter raft.18

15 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 33–35; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 87th Engr Bn, 5 

Oct 65, pp. 1, 3, Historians files, CMH. 16 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 50, 53–54; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 87th Engr Bn, 

pp. 1–5; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 42–43; Lt. Col. James M. Mueller, “Taming the Sands of 

Cam Ranh Bay,” Military Engineer 58 (July-August 1966): 238–39. 17 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 50–53; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 54–55. 18 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 56–58; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 46–47; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 

1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 35th Engr Gp, 19 Jan 66, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

28

The landing of Lt. Col. Paul D. Triem’s 62d Engineer Battalion 

(Construction) (from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri) at Cam Ranh Bay on 28 

August marked the arrival of the fourth Army construction battalion and the 

second to be diverted from its original destination. Originally ordered to Qui 

Nhon to build an airfield, Triem received last-minute instructions to construct 

an airfield at Phan Rang farther down the coast. This change in plans illustrated 

the shifting priorities taking place during the hectic buildup that summer and 

the desperate need for another jet-capable airfield in South Vietnam. Studies 

at the Qui Nhon site had found it to be impractical from an engineering and 

security standpoint, which meant the proposed airfield at Phan Rang suddenly 

assumed the highest priority after that at Cam Ranh Bay. The advance party 

had already reached Qui Nhon, and the transport ship carrying the rest of the 

battalion approached the coast when MACV decided to shift the battalion. 

Colonel Triem sent the heavy equipment to Phan Rang by landing craft and 

moved the lighter equipment by road. After reaching Phan Rang the following 

month, the 62d Engineer Battalion started to build a 10,000-foot AM2 aluminum matting airstrip and cantonments. One construction company remained 

at Cam Ranh until November to help build the depot.19

By early September, the Cam Ranh peninsula began to take on the appearance of a bustling military facility. In the first month, the engineers dug in and 

tackled the environment. Within the first thirty days, the 35th Group built a 

tent and sandbag camp, lengthened the existing 1,100-foot airstrip to 1,400 

feet, and built new roads or reinforced existing ones in the southern part of 

the peninsula. To relieve some of the congestion on the port’s sole deep-draft 

pier, work crews expanded the LST unloading site on the beach and extended 

the existing 350-foot-long pier to 600 feet. Mid-August saw the completion 

of temporary motor pools, storage platforms, and storage areas for fifty-fivegallon petroleum drums. More engineers arrived, and the group headquarters 

refined plans for the building of a vast port and logistical complex. RMK was 

also hard at work in the northern part of the peninsula, building the country’s 

sixth jet-capable airfield. By early September, with help from the contractor, 

the 35th Group completed more than thirty miles of all-weather road. In the 

port area, work proceeded feverishly to prepare the site for the arrival of the 

DeLong pier.20

Unfortunately, weather, as it often would in Vietnam, plagued progress 

or caused damage. In late 1965, the northeast monsoon rains washed out the 

unpaved roads crisscrossing the peninsula before they got paved. Heavy traffic 

and saturated subgrades combined to create a morass that could only be cured 

by removing the roadbed or mitigated by heavy applications of sand. The first 

monsoon that troops experienced in this part of Vietnam clearly showed the 

need for rapid paving and paying more attention to preserving the existing 

19 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 50, 55; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 45; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 

Oct–31 Dec 65, 62d Engr Bn, 8 Jan 66, p. 1, Historians files, CMH. AM2 matting consisted of 

2-by-12-foot or 2-by-6-foot panels with honeycombed interiors that could be laid by hand. The 

latest in runway matting, it was designed to support landings of jet aircraft. 20 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 47; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 142.
29

Engineers Cross the Pacific

vegetation. Strong winds caused the sands to drift like snow, a problem further exacerbated when unaware work crews cleared areas of their scanty scrub 

cover. This problem would be minimized later by planting grass and erecting 

snow fences.21

As for the arrival of the DeLong pier, the U.S. Army Materiel Command 

made arrangements to tow the only available pier stored at the Charleston 

Army Depot in South Carolina. The command obtained a contract tug, and on 

11 August the tug, with the pier in tow, left Charleston for the long voyage via 

the Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. After eighty-one days at sea, the 300-by-90-

foot steel pier arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 30 October. By then, the engineers 

had completed the connecting causeway and sheet-pile bulkhead. DeLong 

engineers advised the 497th Port Construction Company on the emplacement 

and elevation of the pier. This work was completed in mid-December 1965. As 

1966 dawned, Cam Ranh Bay boasted two deep-draft piers.22

The Delong pier had many advantages over conventional construction. 

The pier, essentially a barge supported by eighteen tubular steel caissons six 

feet wide and fifty feet long, could easily be moved into position. If harbor 

depths exceeded the caissons’ lengths, then workers installed additional fiftyfoot sections. Pneumatic jacks attached to large collars around the caissons 

21 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 62; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 83. 22 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 54–55; Arsenal for the Brave: A History of the United States 

Army Materiel Command, 1962–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, U.S. Army Materiel 

Command, 1969), p. 136; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 3–4.

Deep-draft piers at Cam Ranh Bay in January 1966 showing the RMK pier built in 

1964 at left and the recently completed DeLong pier and causeway on the right
Engineers at War

30

were used to jack the barge up on its legs to a usable height. Because of the 

mud conditions at Cam Ranh Bay, work crews joined three lengths of caissons 

totaling 150 feet for each leg. Although two sections could be joined before 

erection, the third had to be welded in place, a process that required twenty 

days. Most of the fittings and hardware of the barges and caissons arrived 

in poor condition, but the port construction crews succeeded in repairing or 

rebuilding the pier’s vital components. The first DeLong pier at Cam Ranh 

Bay took forty-five days for construction by sixteen men. Estimates showed 

that constructing a timber-pile pier would have required at least six months by 

a forty-man construction platoon, plus supporting equipment and operators 

and a large number of hard-to-get timber piles and lumber.23

Such advantages inspired a demand for more of the unique piers. 

Logisticians and engineers recognized that the quickly assembled mobile piers 

could save valuable man-hours in readying the Vietnamese ports to receive the 

large influx of war materiel. The Army identified requirements for additional 

DeLong piers at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau. On 6 December, 

Secretary McNamara gave his approval for the Army Materiel Command 

to purchase more piers from the DeLong Corporation. Initially the contract 

called for delivery of twenty-one pier barges, seven measuring 300 by 80 by 

13 feet (A-type barge or unit) and fourteen units measuring 150 by 60 by 10 

23 1st Lt. David P. Yens and Capt. John P. Clement III, “Port Construction in Vietnam,” 

Military Engineer 59 (January-February 1966): 20; Dunn, Base Development, p. 55; Ploger, 

Army Engineers, p. 52. For early background of the DeLong pier, see 2d Lt. Robin R. Forsberg, 

“Portable Piers and Packaged Ports,” Army Information Digest 9 (September 1954): 55–59.

DeLong pier at Cam Ranh Bay nearing completion, December 1965
31

Engineers Cross the Pacific

feet (B-type barge or unit). (One of the seven units was slated for Okinawa.) 

Manufacturing of the pier barges and caissons would be in Japan, thus cutting the towing time to eighteen days and reducing manufacturing costs. 

Procurement of jacks, compressors, valves, and other mechanical items from 

manufacturers continued in the United States. DeLong Corporation then 

married the components at the ports. In April 1966, McNamara authorized a 

further increase in the funding and number of DeLong units.24

During the summer and fall of 1965, RMK completed a 10,000-foot AM2 

aluminum matting expeditionary runway at Cam Ranh Bay on an all-sand 

subgrade. Based on lessons learned from the Seabees at the Chu Lai airfield, 

RMK paid attention to stabilizing the loose, granular particles before placing the rectangular aluminum honeycombed panels. Workers flooded the 

sand with sea water and compacted it with rubber-tired rollers. Following the 

compacting and grading with equipment borrowed from the 35th Group, the 

contractor applied a bituminous sealer, and in September began laying airfield matting. By 1 November 1965, the firm’s deadline date, a runway, parallel 

taxiway, high-speed turnoffs, and a parking apron (totaling some 2.2 million 

square feet of aluminum matting and 1.3 million square feet of pierced steel 

planking) were ready. South Vietnam now had five airfields (Tan Son Nhut, 

Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay, with a sixth, Phan Rang, 

under construction) that could handle jet fighters. RMK completed other 

facilities at the Cam Ranh air base and began preparations to add a second 

runway, a 10,000-foot concrete runway, before moving its workforce to help 

the depot projects in February 1966.25 (Map 1)

The Buildup Quickens

While construction accelerated, the increases in the U.S. troop commitment 

during the summer imposed immediate manpower burdens on the engineers. 

Army planners had assumed that any augmentation to the existing force structure 

would come from the reserve components. In order to maintain a high degree of 

readiness, the Army kept a large proportion of combat formations in its active 

forces. Nearly one-half of the engineers and engineer equipment were in reserve 

units. When President Johnson decided in July not to call up the National Guard 

or Reserve units, the burden to furnish the engineer units fell on the active-duty 

force. This meant that nearly all the active combat and construction battalions in 

the United States would deploy to Vietnam. The training base would have to be 

24 Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 136–38. 25 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 143–46, 148; USAF Airfield Construction in South 

Vietnam, July 1965–March 1967, Historical Division, Directorate of Information, Headquarters, 

Seventh Air Force (AF), n.d., pp. 110–12, copy in Historians files, CMH; Memorandum for the 

Record (MFR), MACJ02, sub: J–4 Briefing 2 Feb, Base Development at Cam Ranh Bay, 3 

Feb 66, Historians files, CMH; C. M. Plattner, “The War in Vietnam: U.S. Air Buildup Spurs 

Base Construction,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 84 (14 March 1966): 76; E. T. Lyons, 

“Aluminum Matting Runways in Vietnam,” Military Engineer 58 (July-August 1966): 245.
Engineers at War

32

expanded and new units organized, equipped, and trained to meet future Vietnam 

deployments and worldwide commitments.26

With the increase in troop levels under way that summer, General 

Westmoreland asked for more engineer battalions. Before a deployment 

26 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 6, 8. For a list of active-duty engineer units in the United 

States and those deployed to Vietnam, see ibid., pp. 12–16.

1

1

Ammunition Storage

Air Force Cantonment Area

M4T6 Raft Site

RMK Pier

DeLong Pier 1

POL Storage

Ammunition

Storage Area

POL Jetty

Cantonments

Depot

LST Ramps

South Beach

Barge Off-Loading

Army Aireld

to Nha Trang

10,000 Foot AM2 Runway and Taxiway

Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base

Dong Ba Tinh

Army Aireld

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

CAM RANH BAY

Cam Ranh

31 December 1965

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

CAM RANH BAY

Map 1
33

Engineers Cross the Pacific

conference convened at Pacific Command in early August, the MACV commander stated that he needed ten engineer battalions, five combat and five 

construction, excluding the organic battalions assigned to the 1st Infantry and 

1st Cavalry Divisions. This number increased to twelve during the conference 

to meet an emergency requirement for more facilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

approved this number, but before the end of the month Westmoreland added 

three more construction battalions to his request. This brought the total to 

fifteen, all needed in South Vietnam before the end of the year. Westmoreland 

pointed out that engineer units in country and scheduled for deployment still 

could not complete the required facilities before 31 December.27

The Army did what it could to meet Westmoreland’s requirements. On 

21 August, the Department of the Army informed MACV that five engineer 

combat and five construction battalions should be in Vietnam by December. 

By then, the Army had no choice but to deploy combat battalions as substitutes 

for the construction battalions, since all but two of the active-duty construction battalions in the United States had been deployed or alerted for duty in 

Vietnam. The only other active Army construction battalions were committed 

in Europe, Korea, Thailand, and other parts of the world. Approved mobilization plans included another eight construction and three combat battalions, 

but these units still needed to be manned, equipped, and trained. Accordingly, 

the Army nominated two of the nine remaining deployable engineer combat 

battalions in the United States for duty in Vietnam, and two more combat 

battalions became candidates to meet MACV’s latest request. Deploying one 

of the two remaining construction battalions would round out the total of fifteen, which would not be reached until September 1966. In addition, the Army 

promised a light equipment company and a construction support company for 

two of the combat battalions. These two companies gave the combat battalions 

some comparable capabilities of two construction battalions. This, however, 

left the Army short of these types of companies in the United States.28

For the last year, the 70th Engineer Battalion (Combat) at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky, had been readying itself for deployment. Because of its prolonged 

alert status, the 70th managed to avoid many of the manpower problems that 

plagued the construction battalions ordered to Vietnam. Lt. Col. Leonard 

Edelstein, the battalion commander, had almost all his key men on hand when 

the word came to deploy this first nondivisional engineer combat battalion, 

some 580 troops, arrived in mid-June. New standard road graders and the 

multifuel series of trucks had also reached the battalion.29

27 Fact Sheet, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations to Army Chief of Staff, 23 Aug 

65, sub: COMUSMACV Requirements for Army Engineer Battalions, Historians files, CMH; 

Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 25 Aug 65, p. 35, CMH. 28 Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 25 Aug 65, p. 35, and 1 Sep 65, pp. 36–37, CMH; Msg, 

DA 729240 to COMUSMACV, 21 Aug 65, sub: Army Engineer Battalions for RVN; Status of 

Deployment Spreadsheets, Incl to Memo, Dep CofS for Mil Opns for Army CofS, 4 Aug 65, 

both in Historians files, CMH. 29 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 32–33; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 29–30, 32; Quarterly Cmd 

Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, 12 Oct 65, pp. 1–3, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

34

The battalion’s destination was Qui Nhon. Equipment shipped out of the 

port of Mobile, Alabama, in mid-July arrived in Qui Nhon well before the 

main body, making the 70th one of the few engineer battalions of any type 

to find its equipment waiting on the shore. Troops followed a few weeks later. 

The advance party reached Qui Nhon on 16 August, and with the help of the 

84th Engineer Battalion it moved the equipment to an assembly area. When 

the main body arrived on the nineteenth, operators moved vehicles and equipment to a base camp outside the city. Two days later, Companies A and C, 

escorted by security forces of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, moved 

up Highway 19 to An Khe. There, the two companies helped launch the construction of a huge base camp for the 1st Cavalry Division, then en route and 

expected to arrive by mid-September. The rest of the battalion moved to An 

Khe a few weeks later.30

When the USNS Mann carrying the 70th Engineer Battalion reached Qui 

Nhon, it also disembarked the headquarters of the 937th Engineer Group 

(Combat) commanded by Col. Roland A. Brandt. The 937th Group assumed 

responsibility from the 35th Group for all projects and nondivisional engineer units in the northern II Corps area. From August until December, the 

group concentrated its efforts on Qui Nhon and An Khe with a smaller force 

at Pleiku. In Qui Nhon, the major emphasis was the development of the port, 

depot, and fuel storage facilities and the construction of a 400-bed hospital. 

At An Khe, the group supervised the 70th Battalion’s work on the 20,000-man 

division base camp. By October, work had also started there on a 140-bed 

hospital and a second access road to Highway 19. In December, the engineers 

launched a major self-help effort to build a cantonment of the tropical-type 

wooden buildings to house the division and its support units. By the end of 

the year, group units were also building facilities for U.S. units at Pleiku. The 

937th Group also supported the development of the Republic of Korea (ROK) 

Capital Division’s base camp in an area dubbed ROK Valley approximately 

twelve and a half miles west of Qui Nhon.31

September marked the arrival of the second nondivisional engineer combat 

battalion, the 19th from Fort Meade, Maryland. The battalion, commanded 

by Lt. Col. Amos C. Mathews, disembarked at Qui Nhon on 2 September 

and moved into the 70th Engineer Battalion’s former base camp outside the 

city. Priority to offload the 1st Cavalry Division, which arrived at the same 

time, caused delays getting the battalion’s equipment ashore. By the end of the 

month, the battalion began to work on several construction projects. These 

included the expansion and improvement of the ammunition depot and taking 

over the construction of a 50,000-barrel petroleum storage area and refueling 

facility from the 70th Engineer Battalion. The 19th also helped South Korean 

30 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 33, 75; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 29–30, 32; Quarterly Cmd 

Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3. 31 Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 937th Engr Gp, 15 Oct 65, pp. 2–5, and 1 Oct–

31 Dec 65, 937th Engr Gp, 15 Jan 66, pp. 2–5, both in Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army 

Engineers, pp. 75–78; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 25, 27, 29, 32; The Logistics Review, U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, 1965–1969, vol. 7, Engineering Services System, (U.S. Army, Vietnam, n.d.), pp. T-46, 

T-48 (hereafter cited as Logistics Review, USARV, vol. 7, Engineering Services System).
35

Engineers Cross the Pacific

engineers build access and perimeter roads for the Capital Division’s base 

camp. Before the end of the year, the battalion completed a macadam heliport 

for fifty UH–1 helicopters, a maintenance area, and a cantonment for two 

U.S. Army aviation companies at Lane Army Airfield near the Korean camp. 

Like the 70th Engineer Battalion at An Khe, the 19th found itself doing work 

typically done by a construction battalion. To help carry out its work, the 

19th was supported by the 509th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) from Fort 

Riley, Kansas, which arrived about the same time. When the bridge company’s 

vehicles reached Qui Nhon the following month, the unit was used as a dump 

truck company.32 (Map 2)

The fifth Army construction battalion ordered to Vietnam, the 46th from 

Fort Leonard Wood, had its destination changed from Qui Nhon to the Saigon 

area. Its primary mission would be to turn Long Binh Plantation, a formerly 

cleared area now overgrown with scrub jungle fifteen miles northeast of Saigon 

on Highway 1A, into a major logistics base. Upon disembarking at Vung Tau 

on 27 September, the battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. George G. Hagedon, 

32 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 36; Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 19th Engr Bn, 15 Oct 

65, p. 2, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Dec 65, pp. 2–3, both in Historians files, CMH.

1

1

19

441

441

440

6B

ROK VALLEY

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

US Ammunition

Supply Point

POL Facility

Submarine POL Facility

Qui Nhon

Army Aireld

Depot

POL Facility

Port Facility

LST, LCU, LCM Ramps

to Phu Cat 

to An Khe

to Tuy Hoa

Pontoon Pier

Lane Army

Aireld Complex

South Korean

Base Camp

31 December 1965

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

QUI NHON AREA

Map 2
Engineers at War

36

took control of Company D, 84th Engineer Battalion, and the work in the port. 

The 46th’s Company D proceeded to Qui Nhon to replace the 84th’s Company 

D. Within a few weeks, the companies were exchanged—Company D of the 

46th became Company D of the 84th and Company D of the 84th became 

Company D of the 46th. This exchange would recur in Vietnam to avoid moving 

two like units over long distances to their parent units. By 4 October, the 46th 

completed its move to Long Binh, built its base camp, and began its first major 

construction project, a 400-bed facility for the 93d Evacuation Hospital. Next, 

the battalion built a tactical operations center for the arriving 1st Division at 

Di An several miles to the west, several tropical buildings for the MACV flight 

detachment at Tan Son Nhut, and a large ammunition storage area at Long 

Binh covering some eight and a half square miles. To keep up the high pitch of 

construction, the battalion worked two 10-hour shifts, seven days a week with 

the men getting off an average of two and a half days per month. However, the 

departure of many experienced equipment operators and other troops due to 

separation from service and retirement made it difficult to maintain two shifts. 

Only a few replacements arrived, and by the end of the year the battalion was 

164 men below its authorized strength of 895. Hiring 325 Vietnamese workers 

helped somewhat.33

Supply Deficits

From the outset, shortages of materials slowed the construction effort. 

The underdeveloped economy of Vietnam forced logisticians to import most 

construction items. Initially, lumber, airfield matting and membrane, DeLong 

piers, generators, and prefabricated buildings were all scarce. These items, 

except lumber, required long lead times. Although sand, rock, and gravel could 

be obtained in Vietnam, the initial paucity of quarries in secure areas and 

the scarcity of crushing and screening equipment had forced the engineers 

to consider even importing crushed rock. As early as December 1964, U.S. 

Army, Pacific, proposed pre-positioning lumber, barbed wire, airfield matting, 

and other construction stocks within a few days’ sailing time of Vietnam. In 

Washington, the chief of engineers prepared several estimates of construction materials needed to support the buildup in Southeast Asia. The engineers 

recommended $70 million in obligating authority to buy and place additional 

materials in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff passed the proposal on to 

Pacific Command, but the command requested only $10 million. This measure, authorized in April 1965, proved too little and too late when the 35th 

Engineer Group arrived at Cam Ranh Bay two months later. Although the 

1st Logistical Command had submitted requisitions, the depots in Okinawa 

did not receive significant deliveries of material until December. Only small 

quantities of plumbing and electrical components arrived. Meanwhile, the 

35th Group pressed the logistical command for urgently needed stores of 

timber and cement. Instead of waiting for supplies from the United States, 

33 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 79–81; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 48–49, 51; Quarterly Cmd 

Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 46th Engr Bn, 13 Jan 66, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH.
37

Engineers Cross the Pacific

the command placed orders with the procurement office at U.S. Army, Japan, 

for offshore acquisition in the Far East. When the requirement for electrical 

generators, ranging in size from 100 to 1,500 kilowatts, came up, these, too, 

were purchased in Japan.34

All units complained about not getting the right amount of construction 

materials. According to Colonel McCulloch, shortages of lumber, nails, plumbing and electrical fixtures, and reinforcing bar put his 87th Engineer Battalion 

at Cam Ranh Bay well behind schedule. In Qui Nhon, Colonel Mathews’ 19th 

Engineer Battalion started work on the fuel storage facility on 7 September 

only to be hamstrung by shortages of culvert, steel tanks, piping, and fittings. 

The steel tanks did not arrive until early December. Shortages of culvert also 

held up roadwork and heliport construction at the South Korean camp outside 

Qui Nhon. Rain-damaged bags of cement were issued by the 82d Engineer 

Supply Point Company to the 19th with the admonition “take it or leave it.” 

The 62d Engineer Battalion reported a loss of 294 platoon days at Phan Rang 

because of shortages of cement, culvert, and matting. At Long Binh, Colonel 

Hagedon complained of shortages of cement, nails, hinges, plywood, lumber, 

screening, and culvert. Projects, especially the 400-bed hospital, were held up 

because of the lack of cement.35

Under these conditions, engineers made use of whatever they could 

get their hands on. Maximum use was made of locally available materials. Expedients were common solutions. For example, the 46th Engineer 

Battalion substituted napalm cylinders for culvert, and the 19th Engineer 

Battalion welded fifty-five-gallon drums and also used napalm cylinders. 

The 84th Engineer Battalion resorted to applying boat oil to control dust. 

Some materials such as airfield matting came from different manufacturers 

and did not match. At Phan Rang, the 62d Engineer Battalion found that 

M8 airfield matting used in the parking areas had slight dimensional variations which, multiplied over several rows, caused improper seating of the 

bayonet lugs. This problem was solved by welding and banding the bayonet 

lugs under the locking slot.36

From both an equipment and construction material outlook, rock-producing quarries had become a critical concern. When the engineers arrived, 

they found only a few old French rock quarries in operation. It did not take 

long to realize that rock was a scarce and critical resource in a country where 

much of the terrain was sandy and marshy. Since construction of the base 

34 Interv, Schiller with Duke, 3 Jan 66, p. 29; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 161, 163, 

165–66; Special Operational Report–Lessons Learned (ORLL), 1 Jan–31 Oct 65, DA, 23 Aug 

66, incl. 3, pp. 3–4, Historians files, CMH; Msg, DA 709720 to CINCUSARPAC [Commander 

in Chief, United States Army, Pacific], 2 Apr 65, sub: Stockpiling Construction Materiel and 

Equipment, Historians files, CMH; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 65, 35th Engr Gp, p. 2. 35 Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 87th Engr Bn, p. 6, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 84th Engr Bn, p. 

2, 1 Oct–1 Dec 65, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 4–5, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 62d Engr Bn, p. 8, and 1 Oct–31 

Dec 65, 46th Engr Bn, p. 3. 36 Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 19th Engr Bn, p. 3, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 62d Engr Bn, 

p. 5, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 46th Engr Bn, 13 Jan 66, 

p. 3; Section III, Lessons Learned, 19th Engr Bn, 13 Mar 66, p. 3, Incl to Command Rpt for 

Quarterly Period Beginning 1 October 1965, 31 Dec 65, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

38

complexes and roads depended on adequate supplies of rock for base course 

foundations and concrete, one of the first things the engineers did was to 

find a source of rock and set up quarries and crusher sites. This the 864th 

Engineer Construction Battalion did at Cam Ranh Bay by reopening an abandoned quarry used earlier by RMK. Outside Qui Nhon, the 84th Engineer 

Construction Battalion found a quarry site but had to build three miles of 

access roads to get to it. To speed up production, the 84th built a makeshift 

plant to feed the crusher. Using dunnage from cargo vessels in the harbor, the 

resourceful quarrymen built a lumber retaining wall. Then they covered it with 

a salvaged 21⁄2-ton dump truck bed with attached channel beams and pierced 

steel planks to provide a funnel onto the feeder of the crusher. This improvised plant became the highest volume producer of crushed granite in South 

Vietnam until contractor plants reached heavy production levels in late 1966.37

Meanwhile, the Army made an effort to get more rock crushers to Vietnam. 

On 19 October, fifteen sets (thirteen 75-ton-per-hour and two 225-ton-perhour) of quarrying and crushing equipment were authorized for shipment. 

Both 225-ton-per-hour sets were undergoing rebuilding at the Granite City, 

Illinois, depot. The first set was expected to reach Vietnam by the end of 

January 1966 and the second by the end of March. Five of the 75-ton-perhour sets were ready for shipment except for two 100-kilowatt generators per 

crusher. These generators were being purchased.38

The Navy’s construction material stock position before the buildup fared 

somewhat better. Of the established pre-positioned war reserve requirements for 

forward bases, the Navy had 51 percent already available in stockage, known as 

the Advanced Base Functional Components System. Developed by the Navy in 

World War II to meet the needs of the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, 

this functional components system provided deploying naval engineer units 

with material or prefabricated packages of components to build complete overseas facilities. In Vietnam, the 30th Naval Construction Regiment at Da Nang 

oversaw supplies and construction materials for four Seabee battalions and two 

Marine Corps engineer battalions.39

Like the Navy, the Army had a program known as the Engineer Functional 

Components System. Developed during the Korean War, the Army’s system 

consisted only of data published in three technical manuals (5–301, 5–302, and 

5–303), which provided staff guidance, plans, construction details, and bills of 

materiel for the specific buildings and facilities. The Army intended to use the 

system as a basic planning guide based on building blocks for constructing 

bases in a theater of operations. The data in the manuals could be used to 

order and construct individual buildings or facilities or even an entire installation in a single requisition.40

37 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 44, 48, 123–24. 38 Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 3 Nov 65, p. 56, CMH.

39 For a full description of the Navy’s functional components system, see JLRB, Monograph 

6, Construction, pp. 26, 33, 163–64, 172, 183, and B-3 to B-6. 40 Ibid., p. 33; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 47, 115–16.
39

Engineers Cross the Pacific

The Army found the Engineer Functional Components System unsatisfactory in Vietnam and would end its use in late 1966. Although the 

engineer system saved a certain amount of preparation in compiling long, 

complicated bills of materials and thousands of separate requisitions, it did 

not include many required facilities. The design criteria also did not turn 

out to be compatible with requirements. All the structures in the system 

were wooden and designed for a temperate climate as opposed to tropical 

Vietnam. Modifications were allowed when requesting materials for individual structures. Corrugated steel roofing replaced the tar paper called for 

in the specifications. The locally adapted tropical-type buildings also needed 

more screening. However, if a single requisition for an entire installation 

went forward, an entire bill of materials including insulation, roofing felt, 

and tar paper arrived, for depots in the United States did not stock the materials as sets. Instead, some depots only carried certain components. Pallets 

of lumber, crates of nails, and electrical and plumbing fixtures arrived in 

bulk, making identification with a specific project a major problem. Material 

lists were not updated to meet current construction practices. Old designs 

still included World War II–vintage electrical wiring known as knob and 

tube wiring and incandescent light fixtures instead of fluorescent. Design 

standards also turned out to be lower than those adopted for Vietnam. This 

resulted in excesses of component items and shortages of requested modified 

items.41

The Navy appeared more satisfied with its system. During the buildup in 

Vietnam, the Seabees and contractor used many elements of the Advanced 

Base Functional Components System. Despite some degree of obsolescence, 

the components system provided the Navy the building blocks for the planning and construction of bases ashore. An example of construction with the 

Advanced Base Functional Components System was the Da Nang Hospital 

built almost entirely of Quonset huts.42

The Air Force looked to the Army and Navy to provide the bulk of materials and construction forces to build airfields in Southeast Asia. The Navy 

administered the procurement of materials for the contractor before the 

buildup under the Military Assistance Program and Air Force construction 

funds later. Since contingency plans did not call for additional major air bases 

in Vietnam, Army engineer units faced difficulties in getting sufficient quantities of airfield matting. Air Force civil engineers and construction squadrons 

deploying to Vietnam also required materials for base maintenance and construction. To meet the supply needs of the first two Red Horse squadrons 

(Rapid Engineering Deployment and Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, 

41 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 47, 116–18; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 166–67; 

Logistics Review, USARV, vol. 7, Engineering Services System, p. T-49. For an analysis of the 

Engineer Functional Components System, see Engr Studies Ctr Rpt no. 159, Analysis of the 

EFCS [Engineer Functional Components System], Jun 67, Historians files, CMH. 42 Edwin B. Hooper, Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics 

in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Division, Department of 

the Navy, 1972), pp. 37, 75, 170; Merdinger, “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam,” 

p. 244.
Engineers at War

40

Engineering), due to arrive in early 1966, the Air Force Logistics Command 

assembled supply packages of lumber, cement, pipe, and other materials, 

which later deploying squadrons took with them. Although base supply offices 

requisitioned additional materials, they could not keep up with the demand.43

Although the Air Force depended on the Army and Navy to do major 

construction, the air service also developed construction support packages for 

its bases. The priority of effort went to operational facilities—runways, ramps, 

taxiways, and facilities to support weapons systems, followed by maintenance 

facilities. “Grey Eagle” supply kits airlifted to Vietnam contained minimum 

support equipment such as tents, electric generators, portable runway lights, 

and vehicles. In June 1965, the Air Force also contracted for inflatable shelters that could be erected quickly and easily to provide enough covered space 

for maintenance of fighter aircraft, critical components, ground equipment, 

ammunition, and war readiness materiel. When more permanent operational 

facilities were completed, base civil engineers turned their attention to building 

more permanent administrative and living facilities. They replaced tents with 

barracks and the portable generators with permanent generating plants.44

The key to much of the early construction in Vietnam was keeping engineer 

equipment in operation. It did not take long for breakdowns in equipment to 

occur under heavy use. Unlike other units in country, engineers typically operated on a two-shift schedule, approximately twenty hours a day. While a tank 

ran three or four hours a day, a bulldozer ran much longer, with little time out 

for maintenance. Heavy use—especially of bulldozers, scoop loaders, and fiveton dump trucks—led to breakdowns, with equipment remaining inoperative 

for long periods because of poor resupply of repair parts. By November 1965, 

the wear and tear, humidity, sand, and the lack of spare parts were affecting engineer operations. Of 1,218 pieces of Army construction equipment in 

country, 190 had been deadlined (down for repairs) for more than seven days.45

Units that had only fifteen days of repair parts in stock and no provision for automatic resupply soon faced critical shortages. The 510th Engineer 

Direct Support Maintenance Company arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in June 1965 

without its stockage of repair parts. The unit remained ineffective until stocks 

began to arrive some ninety days later. The 70th Engineer Battalion, which 

arrived at Qui Nhon with only fifteen days’ stockage plus a few extra parts, 

saw its readiness drop to a little more than 50 percent in forty-six days because 

of the lack of replacement parts and maintenance support units. Five of seven 

TD20 bulldozers were down as well as fifteen of the battalion’s thirty-nine 

43 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 163–64, 172; Contemporary Historical Evaluation 

of Combat Operations (CHECO) Rpt, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), Project Red Horse, pp

9–10, copy in Historians files, CMH. 44 John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–1968, United 

States Air Force in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United 

States Air Force, 1988), p. 169; Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1965

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 336. 45 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 120–21; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 50, 201–02; Quarterly 

Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 18th Engr Bde, 15 Oct 65, pp. 9–10, Historians files, CMH, and 1 

Jul–30 Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, p. 3.
41

Engineers Cross the Pacific

dump trucks. When the 19th Engineer Battalion was informed that no spare 

parts were available in Vietnam for seven new HD16 bulldozers scheduled for 

issue to the unit before its departure from the United States, the 19th elected to 

take its old TD18 bulldozers. But three of the older bulldozers were inoperative when offloaded in Qui Nhon, and spare parts were unavailable. Due to 

their age, the TD18s became a perpetual maintenance problem. It did not help 

that the 578th Engineer Direct Support Company only reached Qui Nhon in 

late November, five months after the first two construction battalions. Worse, 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, did not have a heavy maintenance capability in the command or depot stocks to borrow equipment for use as “floats.” The command 

did not expect the first two engineer heavy-equipment maintenance companies 

to reach Vietnam until the end of 1966.46

To compensate, Army Materiel Command began assembling special push 

packages of spares for airlift to Vietnam. A special sixty-day shipment was 

flown to Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay in July when construction equipment 

began breaking down. Washington took a similar action to get electrical generators to Vietnam. Although a thirty-day shipment of engineer repair parts 

reached Saigon on 19 October, it proved to be only partially effective in removing equipment from deadline. Assemblies and components, such as torque 

converters, engine clutches, radiators, and axles, were in greater demand than 

repair parts.47

The rate of equipment down for repairs continued to worsen as 1965 drew 

to a close. In early December, the Army reported 36 percent or 49 of the 136 

bulldozers in Vietnam were deadlined. The shortage of repair parts became 

so serious that in December, following one of his visits to Vietnam, Secretary 

McNamara authorized an emergency airlift system known as the Red Ball 

Express. The engineers took advantage of this rapid delivery system, and 

complete bulldozer tracks and other heavy items seemingly inappropriate for 

airlifting across the Pacific were soon being delivered. This around-the-clock, 

seven-day-a-week operation helped to get at least some equipment back into 

operation. Sometimes parts arrived within ten days after requisitioning. Still, 

by late February 1966, the engineers’ deadline rate remained high—23.5 percent or 445 out of 1,852 pieces of equipment were inoperative.48

46 Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 18th Engr Bde, pp. 9–10, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 18th 

Engr Bde, 18 Jan 66, p. 9, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, Historians files, CMH, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 19th Engr 

Bn, pp. 4–5, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, p. 3; Special ORLL, 1 Jan–31 Oct 65, DA, incl. 3, p. 

17; Situation Report of Engineer Equipment in South Vietnam, incl. 17, and Ltr, Commanding 

General (CG), 18th Engr Bde to CG, 1st Log Cmd, sub: Engineer Maintenance Support, 13 

Jan 66, incl. 17, tab B, Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) Liaison Officer Trip Rpt, no. 

1, 15 Mar 66, OCE Historical Ofc, Fort Belvoir, Va.; Msg, CG, USARV AVD-MD 50482 to 

CINCUSARPAC, 6 Feb 66, sub: High Mortality of Engineer Construction Equipment and 

MHE [materials handling equipment], box 11, 69A/702, RG 319, NARA. 47 Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 209–11; Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 2 Mar 66, p. 56, CMH; 

Trip Rpt, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Supply and Maintenance, 17 Dec 65, p. 2–1, 

Historians files, CMH. 48 Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 253–54; Heiser, Logistic Support, pp. 50, 176; Ploger, Army 

Engineers, p. 69; Dunn, Base Development, p. 122; Special ORLL, 1 Jan–31 Oct 65, DA, incl. 3, 

p. 17; Situation Rpt on Engr Equipment in South Vietnam, incl. 17, tab A, OCE Liaison Officer 
Engineers at War

42

Among the most recalcitrant pieces of equipment were bulldozers. In 

January 1966, Army engineers in Vietnam had twelve makes and models, and 

less than 20 percent of the bulldozers had been removed from deadline status 

through Red Ball–furnished repair parts. The problem was this: at the beginning of the buildup, the Army had found it difficult to come up with enough 

engineer equipment to meet the requirement of its units. Consequently, bulldozers, scrapers, and cranes of several makes and varieties, including hard-tosupport Korean War–vintage items, were drawn from depots and active and 

reserve units throughout the United States and shipped to Vietnam. The diversity of repair parts required by this equipment created a logistical nightmare. 

At the end of January, the deadline rate for bulldozers in Vietnam had risen to 

47 percent. While there were plans to reduce the number of makes and models 

to three, with preference to the Caterpillar D7, the D7s would not be shipped 

before the summer. As an interim measure, the Army Materiel Command sent 

over 118 Allis Chalmers HD16Ms. Recognizing that another make and model 

complicated the repair parts problem, officials recommended that the Allis 

Chalmers be used only in the Cam Ranh Bay area. Requirements in Vietnam 

were such, however, that the HD16Ms had to be split between Cam Ranh Bay 

and Saigon. It was summer before the bulldozer deadline rate dropped below 

25 percent.49

A New Engineer Brigade

Between June and September 1965, all nondivisional Army engineer 

units came under the command of Colonel Duke’s 1st Logistical Command. 

Planning for Army construction centered in the command’s small Engineer 

Office, which in May was transferred from the support command following 

the activation of the logistical command. During August, the Engineer Office, 

staffed with seven assigned officers augmented by temporary duty soldiers of 

the 539th Engineer Detachment (Control and Advisory) on Okinawa, concentrated on preparing the Army’s construction program in Vietnam, acquiring 

real estate, coordinating construction work done for the Army by civilian firms, 

overseeing facilities engineering, and requisitioning construction materials. Lt. 

Col. Floyd L. Lien, who became command engineer in August, found himself 

in an unusual position of directing the work of the 35th and 937th Engineer 

Groups, both commanded by colonels.50

Colonel Hart also found himself in an unusual position soon after his 35th 

Engineer Group set up shop at Cam Ranh Bay. Colonel Duke charged him 

with the added responsibility of establishing the Cam Ranh Bay Logistical 

Trip Rpt no. 1, 15 Mar 66; Msg, CG, USARV AVD-MD 50482 to CINCUSARPAC, 6 Feb 66, 

sub: High Mortality of Engineer Construction Equipment and MHE. 49 Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 248–52; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 181; MACV 

History, 1966, p. 282. 50 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 5, 65; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 19; History, 539th Engr Det, 

1965, p. 14; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 23; Interv, Schiller with Duke, 3 Jan 66, p. 24; 

Interv, Maj John F. Schiller, 15th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Floyd L. Lien, Engineer, 1st Log 

Cmd, 7 Aug 66, VNIT 29, pp. 1–9, CMH.
43

Engineers Cross the Pacific

Area and commanding all the logistical troops in the vicinity. Colonel Hart 

and his staff took on other functions ranging from mail, chaplain, and medical 

services; overseeing a military police detachment; and establishing and operating depots for all supplies. This arrangement lasted for the better part of three 

months until the 504th Quartermaster Depot arrived and took over logistical 

support for the area on 7 August.51

The decisions to send more American troops in the summer of 1965 

included the newly activated 18th Engineer Brigade. A brigade headquarters 

seemed appropriate because of the growing number of engineer units. During 

the late summer of 1965, the 18th Engineer Brigade prepared for its move to 

Vietnam. Under its acting commander, Col. C. Craig Cannon, the brigade’s 

Headquarters Company assembled at Fort Bragg. Most of the 34 officers and 

110 enlisted men came from the 159th Engineer Group (Construction) alerted 

earlier for deployment. A small advance party led by Colonel Cannon reached 

Saigon on 3 September, and the brigade’s main body followed on the twentyfirst. The headquarters settled in several former U.S. Operations Mission 

buildings next to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Nondivisional units placed under 

18th Brigade control consisted of the 35th and 937th Groups, four construction (62d, 84th, 87th, and 864th) and two combat (19th and 70th) battalions, 

and nine separate companies—altogether over 6,200 men. Before the end of 

the month, the brigade assumed operational planning and supervision for 

forty-four construction projects at nine separate locations in II, III, and IV 

Corps.52

In the meantime, the Army selected an engineer general officer to command the 18th Brigade. General Harold K. Johnson, the Army chief of staff, 

advised Westmoreland that “in view of the monumental tasks confronting this 

brigade and to provide the requisite skill and experience I feel that a brigadier 

general should command it.” Westmoreland readily agreed and placed the brigade directly under U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), the successor headquarters 

of the U.S. Army Support Command. Although Westmoreland also assumed 

command of USARV, General Norton, who became deputy commanding 

general, ran the command on a day-to-day basis. The MACV commander 

decided not to place the brigade under the 1st Logistical Command because he 

believed the latter already had enough problems associated with the logistical 

buildup. In addition, a large share of the brigade’s effort would be supporting 

the Air Force, and Westmoreland wanted a general officer to coordinate and 

negotiate priorities at a senior level. Late in the evening of 12 August, Lt. 

Gen. William F. Cassidy, the chief of engineers, called the recently promoted 

51 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 41; 1st Lt Wallace R. Wade, Spec Charles Miele, and Spec 

Edward C. Swab, A History of Cam Ranh Bay Through June 1966, Cam Ranh Bay Sub Area 

Cmd, Nov 66, p. 86, box 18, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA. 52 Msg, DA 723668 to COMUSMACV, et al., 14 Jul 65, sub: Deployments to RVN, Historians 

files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 63–69; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 18th Engr 

Bde, 15 Oct 65, pp. 1–6, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Lt Col Lewis C. Sowell Jr. with Maj 

Gen Robert R. Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, pp. 2–3, Senior Officer Oral History Program, U.S. 

Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; Ltr, Ploger to Office, Chief of 

Engineers, n.d., Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

44

Brig. Gen. Robert R. Ploger and 

informed him that he would command the 18th Brigade.53 The surprised Ploger, who had just become 

the New England Division Engineer, 

was given short notice to rendezvous 

with the advance party. He arrived 

in Saigon on 5 September.54

Not all nondivisional engineers 

were assigned to the 18th Brigade. 

When General Norton asked Ploger 

to prepare a letter of instruction to 

assign engineer units and missions, 

the question of engineer maintenance and supply units came up. 

Ploger did not argue against assigning these units to the 1st Logistical 

Command. He knew that the Army 

was undergoing a reorganization to 

transform technical service maintenance and supply units into functional organizations. Besides, he felt 

he already had enough to handle, 

and preferred to attack supply and maintenance problems from a position 

of control but not operational responsibility. The 1st Logistical Command 

Engineer retained facilities engineering responsibilities, mainly overseeing 

Pacific Architects and Engineers and utilities detachments, and served as the 

clearinghouse for the command’s construction requirements.55

When General Ploger reported for duty, General Norton agreed that the 

18th Brigade commander should hold the dual responsibility of 18th Engineer 

Brigade commander and U.S. Army, Vietnam, engineer. Such an arrangement 

eliminated the need for duplicate staffs at brigade and the USARV headquarters and conserved scarce manpower resources. Holding both offices gave 

Ploger procurement and management authorities and put him in an ideal 

53 General Ploger received his commission in the Corps of Engineers upon graduating from 

the U.S. Military Academy in 1939. During World War II, he served as commander of the 129th 

Engineer Battalion, 29th Infantry Division, which participated in the D-Day assault on Omaha 

Beach and in later operations in France and Germany. Subsequent assignments included staff 

positions in Washington, D.C.; liaison work with the Atomic Energy Commission; engineer district work on Okinawa; and command of an engineer group at Fort Lewis, Washington. Interv, 

Sowell with Ploger, 16 Nov 78, sec. 7, p. 32. 54 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 63; Msg, Gen Johnson WDC 6543 to Westmoreland, 2 Aug 

65 (quotation); Msg, Lt Gen John L. Throckmorton, Dep COMUSMACV MAC 3994 to 

Westmoreland, 5 Aug 65; Msg, Westmoreland HWA 2069 to Gen Johnson, 6 Aug 65, all in 

Westmoreland Message files, CMH. 55 Interv, Maj Roy Bower, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Maj Gen Robert R. Ploger, CG, Engr 

Cmd, Vietnam, 8 Aug 67, VNIT 89, pp. 5–6, CMH; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st 

Log Cmd, 19 Feb 66, p. 14, Historians files, CMH.

General Ploger 

(shown as major general)
45

Engineers Cross the Pacific

position to oversee the allocation of equipment and material resources. He 

transferred several officers from the brigade to the small USARV Engineer 

Office, which up until then consisted of Lt. Col. Andrew Gaydos and one or 

two enlisted men. The brigade staff absorbed the bulk of engineer staff matters. Ploger assigned Col. William W. Watkin, who had just arrived in country, 

as his deputy at USARV headquarters. Colonel Cannon, the deputy brigade 

commander, ran the day-to-day operations at the brigade. This dual-hatted 

role idea would be adopted by several other senior staff officers. In time the 

surgeon, the provost marshal, and the aviation officer commanded brigadesize troop units.56

General Ploger’s first major act was to draft a blueprint to carry out 

the rapidly expanding construction load and other support requirements. 

Following a suggestion made by General Norton, Ploger on 7 October issued 

a one-page policy statement entitled “Our Objectives and Standards.” The 

document emphasized the brigade’s purpose: to serve the combat forces and 

support the “man with the rifle.” Ploger also admonished his commanders and 

staff to make sure that drainage, roads, and associated utilities were included 

in project design and construction. Brigade units would devote their primary 

efforts to the needs of others. Improvements to engineer camps were never to 

be refined beyond those of the units they supported.57

General Norton also suggested that Ploger present the engineer picture to 

the MACV commander. On 4 November, Ploger briefed General Westmoreland 

on the brigade’s construction program. He reported that Army projects for 

fiscal years 1965 and 1966 totaled some 170 battalion-months, a battalionmonth comprising the expected outcome of either one construction battalion 

or one combat battalion plus a light equipment company. These figures did not 

include work to be done for the Air Force. At this time, the brigade consisted 

of 7,900 officers and men, or the equivalent of 8.4 battalions. This magnitude 

of work when compared to the brigade’s capability meant that almost two 

years would be required to complete its projects, provided the brigade did not 

commit troops to the support of tactical operations, a very unlikely prospect.58

Ploger highlighted several factors affecting engineer priorities. Primary 

support would go to the tactical forces followed by building the logistical 

facilities. The construction effort would meet the minimum needs of units, 

then gradually improve the living conditions in the base camps. Besides the 

backlog of work, the engineers faced other problems, including shortages of 

construction material, breakdowns of equipment, complex real estate arrangements, and peacetime construction procedures in a war zone. “The inescapable 

conclusion,” Ploger remarked, “is that engineer operations in the foreseeable 

future will be a continuous allocation of shortages.”59

56 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 86–87; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, pp. 6–7; 

Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jun–31 Aug 65, USARV, 15 Nov 65, p. 12, Historians files, CMH. 57 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 65, 67 (quoted words, p. 65). A copy of this statement is on 

p. 219. 58 Ibid., pp. 67, 201. A copy of this briefing is on pages 199–204.

59 Ibid., pp. 201–04 (quotation, p. 204).
Engineers at War

46

In concluding his briefing, Ploger emphasized priorities and standards 

of construction. Since a substantial portion of the work dealt with building 

troop cantonments, he pointed out that commanders should follow six prescribed levels of physical improvement. These ranged from Standard 1, no 

site preparation, to Standard 5, modified, which would include buildings and 

waterborne sewage systems. Standard 2 called for leveling sites for the camps 

and building roads while troops put up their own tents. Standard 3 added 

floors and wooden frame buildings for kitchens, administration, storehouses, 

infirmaries, and bath houses; electrical distribution to the buildings; and, 

piped water from a storage tank. Standard 4, which Ploger recommended as 

the current objective for cantonment construction, improved the tents with 

the addition of wood frames and electrical distribution throughout the camp. 

If units expected to remain at the same location for more than twelve months, 

buildings could be added under Standard 5.60

Westmoreland concurred with the gradual upgrading to Standard 4 and 

a priority list that Ploger submitted during the briefing. The fifty-five (later 

fifty-nine) priority categories ranged from immediate tactical and operational 

requirements to less urgent but still required items. Essential and basic tasks, 

such as clearing and grubbing of troop areas, field fortifications, and clearing of fields of fire around defense perimeters, topped the list. Water supply 

points, ramps for landing craft, airstrips, roads and hardstands at ports, hospitals, ammunition storage areas, and communications facilities came next. 

At the bottom of the list were officer billets and chapels. His rationale regarding the inclusion of chapels was to make sure they were not left out. Initially 

mess halls and service clubs could be used for religious assemblies. He also 

requested that the MACV commander admonish all commanders that they 

must lower their expectations at least for the time being. Instead, the troops 

should be encouraged to do as much cantonment construction as possible 

through self-help on a gradual scale of upgrading and not to rely entirely on 

engineers. Westmoreland agreed and advised his senior commanders of these 

points during meetings.61

Ploger presented the same briefing to other commanders in late 1965 and 

early 1966. He briefed Maj. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen, commander of Field 

Force, Vietnam (the tactical headquarters set up at Nha Trang by General 

Westmoreland in September 1965 to command and control U.S. Army combat 

units in II Corps), and Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, commander of the 

1st Infantry Division, informing them where things stood and trying to gain 

their agreement to keep construction to the essentials. Since he began to travel 

extensively to check on progress and lend encouragement to engineer soldiers, 

Ploger checked for deviations. Sometimes he found slight variations from the 

standard when his troops helped a commander to carry out a pet project. “I 

was aware of it,” he recalled, “but there was no point in hassling at it.” He tried 

to point out that use of materials for nice-to-have projects deprived others of 

60 Ibid., pp. 67, 204–11; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, p. 21.

61 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 69, 204, 229–30; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, 

pp. 22–25; MACV History, 1965, p. 127.
47

Engineers Cross the Pacific

more essential requirements. Commanders always tried to better the lot of 

their soldiers, and the misuse of materials remained a pervasive problem.62

More Units on the Way

More engineer units arrived in the last three months of 1965 or were on their 

way. In October 1965, a third Army construction group and another combat 

engineer battalion arrived. Two combat battalions arrived in November, and 

on New Year’s Day 1966 two more combat battalions joined the brigade. The 

299th Engineer Battalion (Combat) from Fort Gordon, Georgia, and the 630th 

Engineer Company (Light Equipment) from Fort Bliss, Texas, landed at Qui 

Nhon on 22 October. Neither unit immediately operated at full capacity; the 

299th had to wait nearly a month for its equipment to arrive. Offloading took 

time, and by the end of the year the light equipment company still had some 

of its equipment aboard a ship anchored at Cam Ranh Bay. Working under the 

direction of the 937th Engineer Group, the 299th joined the 19th, 70th, and 

84th Engineer Battalions in northern II Corps. The 299th Battalion’s initial 

projects in the Qui Nhon area included taking over the ammunition depot and 

roadwork. A reinforced platoon was also dispatched to Pleiku to work on base 

development projects.63

On 30 October, the headquarters of the 159th Engineer Construction 

Group arrived from Fort Bragg, set up headquarters at Long Binh, and took 

control of 18th Brigade units and operations in III and IV Corps. The group, 

commanded by Col. James H. Hottenroth, had been brought up to strength 

over the summer after losing troops to the 18th Brigade. The group inherited 

the 46th Engineer Construction Battalion at Long Binh, and by the end of 

the year it added two engineer combat battalions, two separate companies, 

and several detachments. In early November, the 588th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat) from Fort Lee, Virginia, arrived at Vung Tau followed later by its 

equipment on other ships. The estimated shipping time of twenty-seven days 

stretched to forty-four days for one ship and fifty-seven days for the other 

two ships. Initially the battalion worked on base development projects for the 

1st Division at Phu Loi and Di An and the 173d Airborne Brigade at Bien 

Hoa. Shortages included lumber in all sizes, culvert, sandbags, barbed wire, 

dynamite, and fuses. In late November, the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion 

from Fort Polk arrived. Like other engineer units its equipment arrived later, 

7 December. Early efforts also included base development projects for the 1st 

Division.64

On New Year’s Day 1966, the 20th Engineer Battalion (Combat) from 

Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and the 39th Engineer Battalion (Combat), 

and the 572d Engineer Company (Light Equipment) from Fort Campbell, 

62 Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, pp. 24–26 (quotation, p. 26).

63 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 79; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 

2–3, 5; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 37. 64 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 79–80, 83; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 48–49, 51–52; Quarterly 

Cmd Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 159th Engr Gp, 14 Jan 66, pp. 1–4, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 588th Engr Bn, 

13 Jan 66, pp. 1–4, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3, all in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

48

Kentucky, joined the 35th Group at Cam Ranh Bay. Shortly after its arrival, 

the 39th Engineer Battalion, the 572d Light Equipment Company, and a South 

Vietnamese engineer float bridge company built a badly needed 1,115-foot 

M4T6 bridge across the bay. It took two days to assemble the rafts and one day 

to install the bridge between the peninsula and the mainland. When General 

Larsen flew over the site on 8 January, he could only exclaim “Where did that 

damn thing come from?” Just the day before a ferry offered the only crossing. 

Later in the month, the 20th Engineer Battalion, helped by light equipment 

and dump truck companies, renewed work on an Army aviation base at Dong 

Ba Thin on the mainland side of the bay. The arrival of the two combat battalions also enabled the group to accelerate the construction of warehouses, 

open storage hardstands, and a convalescent hospital in the northern part of 

the peninsula.65

By the close of 1965, the equivalent of some twenty Army, Navy, and 

Marine Corps engineer battalions; many smaller engineer units, including 

Air Force civil engineering teams; and civilian contractors were building the 

operational, logistical, and support facilities required for the expanding U.S. 

and allied commitment. By then U.S. troop strength had reached 184,300. The 

18th Engineer Brigade had grown to over 9,500 men consisting of three groups, 

ten battalions, and an assortment of separate companies. (Chart 1) Several 

thousand Army engineers were also assigned to the two divisions (1st Infantry 

and 1st Cavalry), two separate airborne brigades (173d and 1st Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division), one infantry brigade (3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division), 

and the logistical command. Some 2,100 Seabees were assigned to the 30th Naval 

Construction Regiment’s four construction battalions. Marine Corps engineers 

totaled nearly two thousand men in two battalions and smaller units. As early 

as August 1965, the Air Force deployed small specialized construction teams 

(dubbed Prime Beef—a combination nickname and acronym for Base Engineer 

Emergency Force) to Southeast Asia on temporary duty tours to augment the 

base engineers. Prime Beef teams built cantonments, installed utilities, and 

quickly erected revetments to protect aircraft from enemy shelling. Meanwhile, 

the Air Force was readying battalion-size Red Horse civil engineer squadrons 

to undertake larger projects at air bases. In August, the Navy’s construction 

consortium added two more construction firms, J. A. Jones Corporation and 

Brown and Root, to form Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, and 

J. A. Jones, better known as RMK-BRJ. Before the end of the year, the RMKBRJ’s workforce jumped from 2,000 to 22,000. Pacific Architects and Engineers’ 

workforce rapidly multiplied from its 2,000-person ceiling in June 1965. Plans 

were under way to construct several deep-draft ports with satellite shallow-draft 

ports; to build airfields, depots, and other facilities within these port complexes; 

to improve the roads inland from the ports; to build inland bases; and finally to 

expand the roads to these bases.66

65 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 56–59, 84 (quotation, p. 58); Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 79–81; 

ORLL, 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 35th Engr Gp, 15 May 66, pp. 1–2, 5–6, Historians files, CMH. 66 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 84; Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 14; Tregaskis, Building the 

Bases, p. 183; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 18th Engr Bde, 21 Jan 66, p. 1; MACV 
49

Engineers Cross the Pacific

Concentration on base development would become much harder because 

of the increasing demand to support tactical operations. By the end of the 

year, the construction backlog reached 212 battalion-months. The pool of military engineer units, however, had just about reached bottom. With the arrival 

of the 20th and 39th Engineer Battalions in the first days of 1966, General 

Ploger could look forward to receiving only a few more units by summer. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense had approved the 

deployment of up to twenty-five engineer battalions, but that number was 

simply not available without calling up the reserves. The Department of the 

Army in its annual report for 1965 noted that engineer resources in the United 

States “could not provide balanced support to current combat forces and that 

currently deployed engineer units fall considerably short of meeting balanced 

force requirements.” Newly activated Army engineer construction battalions 

could not be expected for some time.67

History, 1965, p. 126; Shulimson and Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, app. F; PA&E 

History, 1963–1966, p. 30. 67 MACV History, 1965, p. 128; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 109; Army Buildup 

Progress Rpts for 6 Oct, 3 Nov, and 1 Dec 65, CMH; Special ORLL, 1 Jan–31 Oct 65, DA, incl. 

3, p. 2 (quotation).

35th Engr Group

(Construction)

Cam Ranh Bay

18th Engr Bde

Saigon

159th Engr Group

(Construction)

Long Binh

937th Engr Group

(Combat)

Qui Nhon

62d Engr Bn

(Construction)

Phan Rang

19th Engr Bn

(Combat)

Qui Nhon

46th Engr Bn

(Construction)

Long Binh

87th Engr Bn

(Construction)

Cam Ranh Bay

864th Engr Bn

(Construction)

Cam Ranh Bay

70th Engr Bn

(Combat)

An Khe

84th Engr Bn

(Construction)

Qui Nhon

299th Engr Bn

(Combat)

Qui Nhon

168th Engr Bn

(Combat)

Di An, Lai Khe, Long Binh

588th Engr Bn

(Combat)

Cu Chi, Lai Khe, Long Binh

10,217

9,510

Authorized Troops

On Hand Troops

Source: Cmd Rpt, 31 Dec 65, 18th Bde

Chart 1, Ch 2

Chart 1—18th Engineer Brigade, Dec

3

First Battles

By the summer of 1965, substantial numbers of U.S. Army and Marine 

ground forces, with supporting air and naval elements, had deployed to 

South Vietnam. Initially assigned to guard the air bases at Da Nang and Bien 

Hoa, American ground troops were soon committed by General Westmoreland 

to “the points of maximum peril on a ‘fire brigade’ basis.” In the south, he built 

up U.S. forces—the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Infantry Division—in 

a protective arc around Saigon. The evidence presented to the MACV commander also suggested that the North Vietnamese Army intended to cut South 

Vietnam in half along Highway 19 from Pleiku in the highlands to Qui Nhon 

on the central coast. To counter this threat, Westmoreland deployed the 1st 

Cavalry Division to the Central Highlands. While the cavalry division took on 

the mission to open—and to keep open—Highway 19, other reinforcements, 

including the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, stiffened South Vietnamese 

forces on the strategically critical highly populated coast.1

Organic engineer units—companies with separate brigades and battalions with divisions—accompanied the combat forces. Organized to help the 

movement of friendly troops and impede the movement of the enemy, combat 

engineers also found themselves assigned projects in the base camps. Still, by 

virtue of their mission the combat engineers bore the brunt of the support for 

the maneuver elements.

Early Operations

The first Army engineer unit of appreciable size to reach South Vietnam 

was the 173d Engineer Company, 173d Airborne Brigade. In early May 1965, 

the three-thousand-man brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. Ellis W. 

Williamson began arriving to protect Bien Hoa Air Base and the airfield and 

port at Vung Tau. Engineer elements consisted of a brigade engineer, Maj. 

Harold P. Austin, his small staff, and the 152-man 173d Engineer Company 

commanded by Capt. Thomas L. Morley. Immediately upon arrival, the company’s 1st Platoon at Vung Tau and the 2d Platoon at Bien Hoa helped the 

infantry battalions dig in and set up water and shower points. By 12 May, the 

rest of the company, which included an equipment section and bridge platoon, 

reached Bien Hoa, where the airborne brigade set up headquarters and a base 

camp on high ground northeast of the airfield. The brigade quickly settled in 

and went to work building bunkers for protection against mortars, digging 

1

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 98–99, 107 (quoted words p. 98); MACV Concept of 

Operations, 30 Aug 65, an. A (Intelligence), p. A-1.
Engineers at War

52

trenches, clearing fields of fire, and erecting barbed wire barriers. From the 

bunkers and trenches, the paratroopers could see about 656 feet of open area, 

which then gave way to thick brush and, finally, jungle farther north.2

While the 173d Engineer Company helped the brigade settle in, Major 

Austin’s office coordinated base camp development with the Navy’s Officer in 

Charge of Construction; ordered engineer equipment and supplies; and reconnoitered roads, helicopter landing zones, existing and potential airstrips, water 

sources, and river crossing locations. This and information gathered through 

other sources became the basis for selecting convoy routes used in operations. 

In essence, Major Austin and his successor, Maj. Merritt R. Holcomb, who 

replaced him on 7 July, operated like a division engineer, but did not command 

the engineer company. Captain Morley, who was soon promoted to major and 

2

 Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co (Abn), 173d Abn Bde (Sep), 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, n.d., p. 10; 

Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 May–31 Jul 65, 173d Abn Bde, 15 Aug 65, p. 1; Annual Hist Supp, 1965, 

173d Abn Bde (Sep), n.d., p. 36, app. C, all in Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 

5; Carland, Stemming the Tide, p. 23.

Engineers of the 173d Engineer Company, 173d Airborne Brigade, carry out a 

river reconnaissance in one of their inflatable rafts.
53

First Battles

replaced by Capt. Mark S. Sowell Jr. on 4 July, ran the company on a day-today basis.3

Although the 173d Engineer Company concentrated on base construction, elements of the company were dispatched to the field. During May, 

the Viet Cong ended a two-month lull and launched attacks against South 

Vietnamese forces. In northern III Corps, the enemy’s Dong Xoai campaign 

began on 11 May with an attack on the capital of Phuoc Long Province, Song 

Be. Overrunning most of the town, the attackers held their ground into the 

next day. Two days following the attack, a twelve-man team from the engineer company, led by M. Sgt. Earnest F. Pena, arrived to boost the defenses 

of the joint Special Forces and MACV advisory camp at Song Be. The team 

quickly built and fortified bunkers, repaired perimeter fences, dug defensive 

emplacements, and helped guard the camp. Meanwhile, back at the Bien Hoa 

camp, a fifteen-man demolition team on 14 May joined a paratroop company 

patrolling outside the perimeter. As the brigade’s two infantry battalions—the 

2d Battalion (Airborne), 503rd Infantry, at Bien Hoa and the 1st Battalion 

(Airborne), 503d Infantry, at Vung Tau—moved out on independent operations, engineer demolition teams joined the infantry companies in the field. 

The Viet Cong offered little resistance to these initial forays.4

Then, during the night of 9 June, a paramilitary Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group (CIDG) camp and adjacent district headquarters compound just west 

of Dong Xoai in Phuoc Long Province came under attack. Most of Seabee 

Team 1104 had arrived from Tay Ninh City a few days earlier to improve the 

CIDG camp. For the next fourteen hours, Seabees, Special Forces troops, 

and advisers fought alongside their allies against an overwhelming enemy. 

Following an intense mortar barrage, the attackers breached the barbed wire 

defenses, overran the CIDG compound, and penetrated the district headquarters compound. The surviving Americans and some South Vietnamese held 

out in the district headquarters building, calling in air strikes. One wounded 

Seabee, Construction Mechanic Third Class Marvin G. Shields, carried the 

seriously wounded Special Forces commander from one of the defensive 

berms to the district headquarters building. Then Shields and a Special Forces 

officer, 2d Lt. Charles Q. Williams, second in command of the Special Forces 

detachment, manning a 3.5-inch rocket launcher, destroyed a Viet Cong 

machine-gun position. Shields was wounded again and later died aboard an 

evacuation helicopter. By then most of the Americans had been picked up by 

U.S. Army helicopters. Two of the Seabees, who had become separated during 

the fighting, were later found by a South Vietnamese Army relief force still 

holding out in the area. For a time, the 173d Airborne Brigade was poised to 

intervene, but the enemy withdrawal eliminated the need.5

3

 Annual Hist Supp, 1965, 173d Abn Bde, pp. 64–66.

4

 Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 10–11; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 May–31 

Jul 65, 173d Abn Bde, pp. 1, 3–15; Annual Hist Supp, 1965, 173 Abn Bde, pp. 36, 64. 5

 Shields and Williams received the Medal of Honor. Later the Navy awarded the Navy Unit 

Commendation Medal to members of the Seabee team present at the battle. COMCBPAC Reports, 

Special Edition Seabee Teams, October 1959–July 1968, “Helping Others Help Themselves,” 

(Commander Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1969), pp. 45–51, copy in 
Engineers at War

54

The Viet Cong shift to larger attacks led Westmoreland to request and 

get approval to deploy U.S. ground troops on unlimited offensive operations. 

Near the end of June, the 173d Airborne Brigade, now enlarged to three 

infantry battalions with the arrival of an Australian task force, and with all 

battalions at Bien Hoa, extended operations farther afield. In one operation, a battalion-size force of paratroopers penetrated Viet Cong–controlled 

War Zone D just beyond the Dong Nai River some six miles north of the 

brigade base camp. Then, on the twenty-eighth, the entire brigade and South 

Vietnamese Army troops ventured deep into the enemy redoubt. During the 

three-day sweep, demolition teams from the 173d Engineer Company uncovered and blew up mines and booby traps; cleared helicopter pads and landing 

zones; and destroyed Viet Cong tunnels, supply caches, and weapons emplacements. The rest of the engineer company joined with the gun jeeps of Troop 

E, 17th Cavalry, and M113 armored personnel carriers and M56 self-propelled 

antitank guns of Company D, 16th Armor, to form a composite battalion to 

patrol the roads and protect the brigade’s command element and artillery.6

On 6 July, the 173d Engineer supported the brigade in another operation 

in War Zone D. The brigade’s three battalions made airmobile assaults in an 

attempt to close a trap around the Viet Cong just north of the Dong Nai. 

While demolition teams moved out with the infantry, the rest of the company 

under Captain Sowell moved into an artillery firebase south of the river. At the 

firebase, the engineers’ mission was to serve as a security force for the artillery 

and to run platoon-size patrols to clear the area to the north and east while 

the armor patrolled to the west and south. Besides inflicting casualties on the 

Viet Cong, the airborne brigade uncovered a large base complex consisting of 

mess halls, classrooms, latrines, and an extensive tunnel system. More than 150 

booby traps were found during the operation. The engineers returned to Bien 

Hoa on the ninth and resumed base development work.7

The next operation took the 173d Airborne Brigade south to Phuoc Tuy 

Province. Leading off the operation on 28 July, the brigade’s artillery battalion 

and the 173d Engineer Company moved by vehicle convoy along Highway 15 

to an artillery firebase near Vung Tau. In the process, the task force cleared the 

highway for the first time in months, allowing the South Vietnamese Army to 

resupply a garrison at Binh Gia along the way. The following day, the brigade’s 

Historians files, CMH (hereafter cited as “Helping Others Help Themselves”); Tregaskis, Building 

the Bases, pp. 117–33; Shelby L. Stanton, The Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in 

Southeast Asia, 1956–1975 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 120–23; After Action Rpt 

(AAR), Dong Xoai, Phuoc Long Province, 5th Special Forces (SF) Gp (Abn), 1st SF, 7 Jul 65, 

Historians files, CMH. 6

 Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 11–14; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 May–31 

Jul 65, 173d Abn Bde, p. 15, incl. 15; Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961–1971, Vietnam 

Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), p. 64; The First Three Years: A 

Pictorial History of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) (Brigade Information Office, n.d.), 

Section III, “Combat,” 5 May 65–Jan 66, copy in CMH. 7

 Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 11–15; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 May–31 

Jul 65, 173d Abn Bde, p. 16, incl. 17; F. Clifton Berry Jr., Sky Soldiers, The Illustrated History 

of the Vietnam War (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), pp. 24–25; Pictorial History of the 173d 

Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat”; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 64.
55

First Battles

two U.S. battalions began the operation with an airmobile assault. While the 

two battalions swept the area to sever a suspected Viet Cong supply route 

and other brigade forces set up blocking positions, the engineer and armor 

companies, now relieved of their security mission at the firebase, checked out 

reported Viet Cong locations and caches. The significance of the campaign 

was evident: the airborne brigade was no longer confining itself to the Bien 

Hoa bridgehead.8

 (Map 3)

Meanwhile, a second U.S. Army infantry brigade, the 2d Brigade, 1st 

Infantry Division, arrived in Vietnam. The 3,900-man unit, organized to operate on its own much like the 173d Airborne Brigade until the remainder of 

the division followed, left Fort Riley, Kansas, in June 1965. Company B, 1st 

8 Pictorial History of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat”; Hist Rpt of the 173d 

Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, p. 15.

20

14

14

13

15

4

4

1

1

1

22

X X

5 ARVN

X X

25 ARVN

X

1 1

X X

10 ARVN

XXX

ARVN III

X

13

X X

1 X

2 1

I I

1 Royal Aust Regt

X

173

IV CTZ

II CTZ

 CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

XUAN LOC

VO DAT

SONG BE

BIEN HOA

DI AN

PHU LOI

PHUOC VINH

LAI KHE

DONG XOAI Special Forces Camp

DUC HOA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

WAR ZONE C

WAR ZONE D

IRON TRIANGLE

PHUOC TUY

BINH TUY

BINH

THUAN

LONG KHANH

PHUOC LONG

BINH DUONG

HAU NGHI A

LONG AN

GO CONG

KIEN HOA

KIEN TUONG

DINH TUONG

GIA DINH

TAY NINH

BIEN HOA

QUANG DUC

BINH LON G LAM DONG

An Loc

Loc Ninh

Tay Ninh

Cu Chi

Bearcat

Long Binh

Tan An

SAIGON

My Tho

Ba Ria

Vung Tau

Ham Tan

Gia Nghia

Bao Loc

Phan

Thiet Phu Cuong

Ben Cat

CAMBODIA

CAMBODIA

May–December 1965

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Engagement

Enemy Base Area

Corps Boundary

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Map 3
Engineers at War

56

Engineer Battalion, commanded by Capt. Michael Volpe, deployed with the 

brigade. Plans called for the 2d Brigade to guard Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh 

Bay, but a change in plans sent the brigade to Bien Hoa, freeing the 173d 

Airborne Brigade for use as a mobile reserve. After a three-week sea voyage, 

the 2d Brigade reached Cam Ranh Bay. One battalion task force, including an 

engineer platoon, disembarked to guard the base in the early stages of development. The balance of the brigade proceeded to Vung Tau and from there to 

Bien Hoa where, under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade, 

it would help protect the air base.9

After reaching Bien Hoa, the 2d Brigade moved into an area about two 

miles southeast of the flight line. Men of the brigade immediately set about 

clearing the elephant grass, thick brush, and ant hills that clogged the encampment site. Despite daily downpours and nightly sniping, the troops, sometimes 

working around the clock, cleared the area. Other tasks included building 

artillery gun emplacements and clearing fields of fire along the outer perimeters. As the brigade extended operations out from the encampment, Company 

B provided demolition teams, cleared areas of dud explosives, built bunkers, 

reconnoitered roads, and helped set up ambushes. Back at camp, the company 

built more than twelve and one-half miles of interior roads, drainage systems, 

buildings, and a tactical operations center.10

Company B provided a platoon to each infantry battalion during the 

operations of the 2d Brigade. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, and Company 

B’s 1st Platoon remained in the Cam Ranh Bay area for approximately three 

weeks. The engineer platoon worked on roads, bunkers, and helipads. In 

early August, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, moved with the 173d Airborne 

Brigade to II Corps. The brigade’s third infantry battalion, the 2d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, carried out operations around Bien Hoa. In September the 2d 

Battalion, 16th Infantry, ran the first battalion-size operation in Long Thanh 

District, southeast of Bien Hoa, followed by a one-day operation in Tan Uyen 

District to the northwest. The presence of extensive Viet Cong activity in 

the area led to further battalion sweeps. In one encounter, the engineers used 

800 pounds of explosives to destroy a Viet Cong tunnel. With the 2d of the 

18th Infantry back from the Central Highlands, the brigade mounted a twobattalion operation, which resulted in the first encounter with the enemy and 

the destruction of well-defended, dug-in positions. On 29 September, the 1st 

of the 18th relinquished its mission at Cam Ranh Bay to the recently arrived 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and rejoined the 2d Brigade. For the first 

time since reaching Vietnam, the brigade’s battalions and engineer company 

were together at one location.11 (Map 4)

9 Vietnam, the First Year: A Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, (Tokyo, 

Japan: Brigade Information Office, n.d.), “Company B, 1st Engr Bn,” and “Deployment to 

Vietnam” sections, copy in CMH. 10 Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, “Company B, 1st Engr Bn,” 

section; Always First: A Pictorial History of the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 

October 1965–March 1967 (1st Engineer Battalion, n.d.), “Company B” section, copy in CMH. 11 Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, “Deployment to Vietnam” and 

“Company B, 1st Engr Bn,” sections.
14

1

21

14

19

14

1

1

11

20

1

X

101

29 Jul–10 Nov

1

X X

1 CAV

X X

23 ARVN

XXX

ARVN I I

X X

22 ARVN

X X

CAP ROK(-)

X

2 ROK

XXX

FFV

X

101

10 Nov–

1

SOUTH 

CHINA 

SEA

I CTZ

III CTZ

AN KHE

PLEIKU

QUI NHON

CAM RANH

DONG BA THIN

PHAN RANG

BAN ME THUOT

NHA TRANG

QUANG TIN

QUANG NGAI

KONTUM

BINH DINH

PLEIKU

PHU BON

PHU YEN

DARLAC

KHANH HOA

QUANG DUC

TUYEN DUC

BINH THUAN

PHUOC

LONG

LAM DONG

BINH TUY

LONG

KHANH

PHUOC TUY

NINH

THUAN

Dao Phu Qui

CAMBODIA LAOS

Da Lat

Kontum

Cheo Reo

Tuy Hoa

Gia Nghia

Tung Nghia

Bao Loc

Ninh Hoa

Phan Thiet

July–November 1965

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Engagement

Corps Boundary

Map 4
Engineers at War

58

The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, followed an even more vagabond road as a mobile brigade. Originally slated to relieve the 173d Airborne 

Brigade at Bien Hoa so that the 173d could return to Okinawa, the 1st Brigade 

instead was dispatched to II Corps where the strategically important areas 

between Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay were still wide open and at risk. Like 

the 173d, the 3,600-man 1st Brigade consisted of qualified paratroopers, but 

was bigger, having three airborne infantry battalions and a three-platoon engineer company, Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion. Upon reaching Cam 

Ranh Bay on 29 July, the brigade set up camp on the mainland at Dong Ba 

Thin where, unlike the soft sands of the Cam Ranh peninsula, the ground was 

so hard that Company A engineers used road-cratering charges before digging 

could commence on defensive positions. As the brigade set up a rough-andready encampment, the paratroopers started on-the-job training from squadsize patrols to a brigade-size operation west of Nha Trang. The brigade also 

underwent intensive training in airmobile tactics. Starting in late August, the 

brigade in Operation Highland provided security for the 1st Cavalry Division

by protecting the port of entry at Qui Nhon, clearing Highway 19, guarding 

convoys, and initially securing the airmobile division’s base area at An Khe, 

allowing the division to move safely inland. In mid-September, the brigade 

ran into a strong enemy force north of the An Khe Pass in the largest encounter with the enemy to date by U.S. Army forces. Between 2 October and 10 

November, the 1st Brigade screened the arrival and deployment of the South 

Korean Capital Division in the Qui Nhon area. It did the same for the Korean 

2d Marine Brigade at Cam Ranh Bay. Company A engineers supported the 

brigade in the field with minesweeping and demolition teams. Having completed its pathfinder assignment of opening up II Corps to follow-on reinforcements, the brigade moved on to Phan Rang, some twenty-five miles south 

of Cam Ranh Bay.12

One of the airborne engineer company’s tasks during Operation Highlan

was to clear land mines around the An Khe airstrip inside the base. Inhabitants 

were consulted to get an idea of minefield boundaries. Using mine detectors 

and probing with bayonets at first, the 2d Platoon found two old unmarked 

minefields containing U.S. antipersonnel mines. Mines found were destroyed 

in place with one-half-pound explosive charges. The plastic M14 blast-type 

mines were especially difficult to detect. One of the undetected M14 mines 

was stepped on and detonated by a soldier who had just probed the area; he 

lost part of his foot. Once reasonably assured there were no antitank mines, a 

remote-controlled bulldozer traversed the area mainly to detonate undetected 

M14 mines. Then the bulldozer pulled a sheepsfoot roller over the area several 

times to compact the soil. Several M16 bouncing antipersonnel fragmentation 

mines were found in the Song Ba riverbed inside the base just west of the 

12 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 53; Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, Field Force Vietnam 

(FFV), 15 Oct 65, p. 6, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, FFV, 14 Jan 66, pp. 9–10; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 

Jul–30 Sep 65, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 18 Oct 65, pp. 1–3, all in Historians files, CMH.
59

First Battles

airfield. Most of those were pointed out by a Vietnamese boy who grazed his 

cattle in the area. Altogether Company A removed 225 mines.13

In November, MACV asked the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to 

set up a new base camp and to protect Phan Rang Air Base, then undergoing 

transformation into a jet fighter field. In addition to building the air base, the 

62d Engineer Construction Battalion was charged with building a cantonment 

for the paratroopers. Company A of the 326th helped when it could but spent 

most of the time in the field supporting the brigade’s tactical operations. The 

brigade continued to spend most of its time away from its base camp. Shortly 

after the brigade’s arrival at Phan Rang, two infantry battalions and supporting troops were airlifted to Bien Hoa to support operations in III Corps. The 

units returned to Phan Rang on 22 December.14

After the 173d Airborne Brigade returned from the highlands in early 

September, it resumed operations the following month in War Zone D and 

the enemy Iron Triangle, and provided security for units of the 1st Infantry 

Division as they moved into base camps near Saigon. The Iron Triangle region 

lay northwest of Saigon, and its features included fairly level terrain covered 

by patches of dense second-growth jungle mingled with an undergrowth of 

bamboo and other foliage. To soften up the Viet Cong redoubt, Air Force B–52 

Stratofortress heavy bombers, in their first direct-support mission, bombed 

suspected enemy locations. Four task forces swept through the approximately 

sixty-square-mile area, but encountered only light opposition. Left behind, 

however, were large numbers of booby traps and command-detonated mines. 

Demolition teams, which landed with the heliborne assault forces, destroyed 

enemy camps, bunkers, and tunnels. At the close of the operation, General 

Williamson prematurely remarked: “The Iron Triangle is no more.” Later in 

the month, the brigade cleared the nearby Phu Loi–Di An region for the 1st 

Division.15

A Base for the 1st Cavalry Division

While these operations were under way, the 16,000-man 1st Cavalry 

Division readied itself for the long sea voyage to South Vietnam. A 1,000-man 

advance party, which included Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion, arrived 

at the division’s base camp at An Khe in late August. The An Khe area in 

western Binh Dinh Province, selected as a forward combat base by General 

Westmoreland, afforded the airmobile division a lodgment from which to 

operate in a wide radius. An Khe also lay within reasonable distance from Qui 

Nhon for ground resupply along Highway 19. While the 1st Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, guarded the region, the advance party led by Brig. Gen. 

John M. Wright Jr. laid out unit traces and fixed the approximate size of the 

13 AAR, Opn Highland, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, 5 Dec 65, incl. 13, p. 1, Historians files, 

CMH. 14 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 53; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, FFV, pp. 10–11.

15 Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 17–18; Berry, Sky Soldiers, pp. 29–32; 

Pictorial History of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat” (quoted words).
Engineers at War

60

camp. Wright then gathered all available officers and enlisted men in the party 

to clear trees and brush by hand. He placed the division’s heliport near the 

center of the base and announced that the 3,000-by-4,000-foot field would 

“look exactly like a fine golf course.” According to Wright, clearing by hand, 

instead of using engineer equipment, would preserve the turf and minimize 

the dust caused by the swirling blades of the division’s helicopters. The division hired large numbers of civilian refugees to continue with the work. The 

heliport became known as the Golf Course.16

Meanwhile, Colonel Edelstein’s 70th Engineer Combat Battalion arrived 

from Qui Nhon, where the unit had just disembarked, to work on the base 

camp. Tasks included building an access road from Highway 19 to the division base area, maintaining the existing pierced steel plank airstrip at An Khe, 

helping clear the large division heliport, and providing a company on standby 

to maintain Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe. Work on the eight-mile 

access road began on 28 August. The goal was to complete the road before the 

main body of the division began arriving on 11 September.17

16 Interv, Lt Col David M. Fishback with Lt Gen John M. Wright Jr., 1 Mar 83, 2:382–92 

(quoted words, p. 391), Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI; Westmoreland, A Soldier 

Reports, p. 189; Maj. J. D. Coleman, ed., 1st Air Cavalry Division: Memoirs of the First Team, 

Vietnam, August 1965–December 1969 (Tokyo, Japan: Dai Nippon Printing Co., n.d.), pp. 25–

26, 181; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 54; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), 9 Jun 67, sub: 

Seven Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 18, box 16, 74/053, 

RG 319, NARA. 17 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, 12 Oct 65, p. 2; AAR, Opn Highland, 

70th Engr Bn, 5 Oct 65, p. 1. Both in Historians files, CMH.

Troops clear the helicopter area at the 1st Cavalry Division’s new base camp at 

 An Khe.
61

First Battles

It soon became apparent that more earthmoving equipment would be 

needed to complete the road by the required date. Initially, a grader and several bulldozers were borrowed from the 84th Engineer Battalion in Qui Nhon. 

This was followed a week later by two front loaders and two more graders 

from the 632d Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and a section containing 

twelve 5-ton dump trucks from the 513th Engineer Company (Dump Truck), 

both companies also at Qui Nhon.18

Since all entrances to the 1st Cavalry Division area were constricted by the 

Song Ba River on the east and Hon Cong Mountain on the west, a massive 

rock-tipped hill, and one or more villages along the way, a relatively narrow 

corridor remained through which to build the road. Although the engineers 

tried to follow the high ground to the camp, more than 30,000 cubic yards of 

fill had to be used to stabilize the sandy silt, which formed the subgrade of 

the major portion of the road. Removing the sandy silt would have entailed a 

prohibitive excavation effort within the limited time available. To make matters 

worse, a high water table would have made the soil completely unstable and 

virtually untrafficable to engineer equipment. Instead, just the top layer of soil 

and vegetation was removed, ditches cut, and the road topped off with four 

to six inches of laterite or decomposed granite. This method stabilized the soil 

and produced a suitable wearing surface in dry weather. Initially Edelstein’s 

Company A hauled fill from an open-pit rock quarry on Highway 19 about 

two and one-half miles from An Khe, and Company C opened another pit 

at the base of Hon Cong Mountain on the western edge of the base little 

more than one-half mile from the road project. Later, the Highway 19 site was 

abandoned because of the longer haul distance, and both units used the Hon 

Cong Mountain pit. The most time-consuming part of the project involved 

the installation of numerous drainage facilities. A drainage survey revealed 

the need for nine bridges and thirty-one culverts, but bridge materials and 

culverts were not available at the time. Concrete culverts were procured locally, 

and supply channels managed to provide 540 feet of corrugated metal culvert. 

Bridging remained unavailable, and it became necessary to depend entirely on 

culverts. Unfortunately, culverts could not handle the flow of water during 

heavy rains. Working two 10-hour shifts with 2-hour maintenance breaks 

and using all available earthmoving equipment, the battalion completed the 

access road, dubbed Route 70, on the night of 11 September. Much work still 

remained, including widening sections of the road from a single lane to two 

lanes. The road also ran through a village and could not be widened until 

arrangements were made through civil affairs channels.19

During this period, security was a major concern, and soldiers had to 

be diverted from work sites and placed on guard duty. Although the 70th 

Engineer Battalion’s bivouac areas and work sites were within the thinly held 

perimeter of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, this provided little protection against isolated sniper fire and small guerrilla bands during darkness. 

18 AAR, Opn Highland, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2–3. 19 Ibid., pp. 3–6; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Cav Div, 10 Jan 66, p. 24, 

Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

62

Since the paratroopers were usually conducting operations requiring most of 

their men, isolated work sites such as the quarries and access road were usually 

protected by the engineers themselves. Security forces at each site usually consisted of four men with machine guns and M79 grenade launchers. Strict policies were adopted to avoid friendly casualties. Returning fire to disperse one or 

two snipers was restricted to small areas to avoid hitting the outer perimeter 

manned by the airborne brigade or in some other area occupied by friendly 

troops. Actually, only a few sniper rounds were received, and progress at the 

work sites was not impaired.20

In mid-September, the main body of the 1st Cavalry Division came ashore 

at Qui Nhon and moved inland to An Khe. Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, 

the commanding general, recognized the vulnerability of the highlands base 

camp. In a directive, he called for a small and compact camp that could be 

defended with few troops. Construction of Camp Radcliff (named in honor 

of Maj. Donald G. Radcliff, the first member of the division to lose his life 

in Vietnam) became a cooperative effort of all units on the base under the 

supervision of the division’s 8th Engineer Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. 

Robert J. Malley. To provide the link between the division and other engineer 

organizations assigned to help build the base, Colonel Malley assigned one 

of his officers as Assistant Division Engineer, Base Development. This small 

20 AAR, Opn Highland, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 6–7.

Heavy-duty equipment such as this bulldozer from the 70th Engineer Battalion 

was used to build roads at the 1st Cavalry Division’s Camp Radcliff.
63

First Battles

office clarified division priorities into guidance for the other engineers in the 

area.21

Because of an ever-increasing number of base projects, the engineers could 

only respond to the most urgent requests and frequently worked around the 

clock. One pressing assignment for the 8th Engineer Battalion was to level the 

top of Hon Cong Mountain for use as a signal relay station. With their light and 

modular equipment designed for transport by Army helicopters, which eliminated the need to cut an access road to the top, the airmobile engineers got right 

to work. Within three days, trees and vegetation had been cleared, a small bulldozer had been airlifted in to clear a helipad, and a larger bulldozer, a D6B, at 

22,000 pounds, had been flown to the mountaintop in sections and reassembled 

to start moving dirt and rock. Over the next thirty days, the D6B, working with 

demolitions teams, cleared a 200-by 400-foot area and cut 12 to 14 feet off the 

top of Hon Cong Mountain. The engineers also built a security fence around 

the site and constructed bunkers for the radio vans. During their work on the 

hilltop, the engineers drew Viet Cong attention and exchanged weapons fire with 

the enemy for several nights. In the following months, more radio equipment, 

21 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 54–55; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 72.

The future Camp Radcliff shown here on 30 August 1965 would soon be transformed from a small tent city to a large base camp of wood frame and metal prefabricated buildings.
Engineers at War

64

an Air Force weather station, artillery counterbattery detectors, and an Armed 

Forces Radio Service transmitter were placed on the hilltop.22 (Map 5)

Gradually, the engineers transformed Camp Radcliff’s tent city into a 

permanent combat base. In addition to the access road, the 70th Engineer 

Battalion also built a nine-mile perimeter road. After completing the roads, 

the 70th turned to building logistics facilities, protective bunkers, more roads 

within the camp, and Quonset huts for a 140-bed mobile surgical hospital. By 

early December, the 1st Cavalry Division began a major program to construct, 

22 Memoirs of the First Team, p. 181; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven 

Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 18; Capt. Paul G. Cerjan, 

“Vertical Envelopment - with Bulldozers,” Military Engineer Field Notes, Military Engineer 60 

(January-February 1968): 17; Bergen, A Test for Technology, pp. 152–53.

19

19

70

70

I I

Hon Kong Mountain

Song Ba

Perimeter Barrier

to Pleiku

Golf Course Heliport

Bailey Bridge

An Khe Aireld

Logistics Area

2d Surgical Hospital

to Qui Nhon

An Khe

31 December 1965

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

AN KHE BASE CAMP

Map 5
65

First Battles

on a largely self-help basis, tropical-type building cantonment facilities for the 

twenty thousand men of the division and supporting units. Getting lumber 

through supply channels was very involved and slow, and only limited amounts 

were received. Timber was abundant in the area, and time-consuming efforts 

were soon under way to authorize local procurement. Pacific Architects and 

Engineers, which set up its facilities engineering shop in September, was able to 

get enough material to prefabricate kits to build latrines and showers.23

Another high-priority task was to build a strong perimeter defense. With 

the help of the 70th Engineer Battalion and some two thousand Vietnamese 

laborers, the 8th Engineer Battalion built a truly formidable obstacle system. 

Over time, the engineers built a defense perimeter one hundred yards in depth 

around the base camp. The perimeter consisted of four layers of barbed wire 

fences, a layer of claymore antipersonnel command-detonated mines, and 

inner and outer cattle fences to keep people and animals from straying into the 

mines that guarded the succeeding layers of wire. Vietnamese laborers worked 

for the most part outside the fence clearing vegetation. The claymore mine, 

developed by the Army before the war and introduced into combat in Vietnam, 

was designed as a one-shot, directional-fragmentation weapon that could be 

aimed to cover a specific area. Consisting of a plastic body, a fixed slit-type 

sight, four adjustable legs, electrical wire connections, and hand-held firing 

device, the claymore when fired spread steel fragments over a wide area. The 

weapon became quite popular for use in permanent and temporary defense 

positions and ambushes. In considering the terrain and the interlocking fields 

of fire, the division laid out long sections of the perimeter in a straight line 

to make it easier for helicopter gunships to help defend the base. The 70th 

Engineer Battalion further embellished the perimeter with 1,032 lights on concrete poles and sixty-eight guard towers, each equipped with a searchlight.24

To give the 70th Engineer Battalion at An Khe a greater construction 

capability, Colonel Brandt dispatched additional engineers and equipment 

from 937th Group resources. Although the 70th with its array of bulldozers, 

front loaders, and graders had more construction equipment than the lightly 

equipped 8th Engineer Battalion, it lacked the heavy equipment to do all of 

the required base camp construction. More equipment and operators from the 

Qui Nhon–based 632d Light Equipment Company were borrowed, increasing the light equipment element to a platoon. During the first months, the 

70th Engineer Battalion had to make do with 80 to 160 Vietnamese hired to 

crush rock by hand, an unsophisticated but necessary means to obtain the 

all-important material. Not until the newly arrived 630th Engineer Company 

23 Quarterly Cmd Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Cav Div, 10 Jan 66, p. 24, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 

937th Engr Gp, 15 Jan 66, pp. 3–4; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 70th Engr Bn, 7 May 66, pp. 2–6, 

Historians files, CMH; PA&E History, 1963–1966, p. 32. 24 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 19; Lt. Col. Albert N. Garland, ed., Infantry in Vietnam

(New York: Jove Books, reprint of 1967 Infantry edition, 1985), pp. 257–59; Interv, Fishback 

with Wright, 1 Mar 83, 2: 397–98, 401–02; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 937th Engr 

Gp, pp. 4–5; ORLLs, 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 937th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 66, p. 5, 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 70th 

Engr Bn, p. 5, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 66, pp. 3, 6, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

66

(Light Equipment) joined the 70th in early 1966 did the battalion get the benefit of a 75-ton-per-hour rock crusher.25

Maintaining the 4,200-foot airfield runway became a chronic problem for 

the 70th Engineer Battalion. Company C formally took over maintenance of 

the airstrip from South Vietnamese Army engineers on 29 August. Already 

on the scene was a platoon the 84th Engineer Construction Battalion had dispatched earlier to repair defects in the combination M8 and M6 pierced steel 

plank matting, which caused dangerous breaks in the airstrip’s surface. Using 

an arc welder left behind by the 84th’s platoon when it returned to Qui Nhon, 

the 70th’s welding crew worked almost continuously to keep the airfield in 

operation. The condition of the strip under unusually heavy C–130 transport 

traffic deteriorated to the point that the welders could not keep up repairs. 

Despite all the effort, C–130 aircraft suffered frequent cuts and blowouts of 

landing gear tires. The Air Force complained bitterly, but the airfield had 

become so indispensable to 1st Cavalry Division operations that its closure 

for repairs could not be tolerated. This precluded engineer work crews from 

removing the old matting and repairing the base, a critically required task. 

A number of methods were considered, and the decision was simply to lay 

another layer of matting over the existing runway. By working only at night or 

during light traffic over a period of six nights, work crews placed some 1,500 

linear feet of M8 matting. At the end of each night’s work, welders fused the 

second layer’s leading edges to the old surface. To compensate for the undulations in the existing pierced steel planking caused by base failures, a layer of 

crushed rock was placed on the low areas before placing the second layer of 

planking. This was only a temporary expedient, and plans were drawn up to 

build a new parallel runway.26

A Second Division Arrives

In October 1965, the rest of the 1st Infantry Division arrived to take up 

positions on the northern approaches to Saigon. While preparing for the deployment, General Seaman, acting on guidance from the Army chief of staff, General 

Johnson, began to reorganize the division from its mechanized configuration to 

a force considered more suitable for the counterinsurgency and jungle warfare in 

Vietnam. The result was a lighter organization, and units and equipment considered inappropriate to Vietnam stayed behind. These included the two armor 

battalions and units assigned to employ nuclear weapons, such as the Honest John 

missile battalion and the atomic demolitions platoon from the engineer battalion. To make up for the loss of the armor battalions, the Army transferred two 

infantry battalions from another division. In turn, the division’s two mechanized 

infantry battalions were reorganized as standard dismounted infantry battalions, 

thus building the division around nine infantry battalions. The armored cavalry 

25 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 4–5, 8–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr 

Bn, pp. 3, 8. 26 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 30; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 209; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jul–30 

Sep 65, 70th Engr Bn, p. 2; AAR, Opn highland, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2.
67

First Battles

squadron, which did retain its M48A3 Patton diesel-powered tanks, replaced the 

older M114 armored reconnaissance vehicles with M113 armored personnel carriers, which had better overall reliability and mobility. Training geared to counterinsurgency warfare followed in the short time remaining before deployment. 

In mid-September, the division started to embark at ports along the west coast.27

The commander of the 1st Engineer Battalion, Lt. Col. Howard L. 

Sargent Jr., readied the battalion for its deployment. By the time the division began its move, the engineer battalion reached its authorized strength 

of over nine hundred men and made necessary adjustments in equipment. 

At first, there was a possibility that the battalion’s float bridge company 

would remain behind to lighten the division. Considering the large number 

of rivers in Vietnam, the Army and MACV agreed to keep the bridge unit. 

To satisfy the division’s lighter configuration, the heavier Class 60 floating bridge, which required a large crane to emplace the heavy steel deck 

bays, was replaced by the aluminum-decked M4T6 (Class 50–55) bridge. 

Manpower alone could easily place the twenty-two hollow sections, known 

as balk, in staggered pattern in each bay. The battalion’s six 60-foot scissorstype armored vehicle launched bridges and four M48 tank launchers were 

left behind to lighten the division. Yet, the battalion was allowed to keep 

its four M48 tankdozers, the only tanks in the division outside the cavalry 

squadron brought to Vietnam, to provide armor protection to the engineers and infantry. Special training for the 1st Engineer Battalion included 

demolitions, jungle warfare, counter-ambush techniques, Viet Cong booby 

traps, and the M4T6 bridge.28

The vessels carrying the 1st Division reached Vietnam between 1 and 30 

October. After disembarking at Vung Tau, the troops were flown to Bien Hoa 

and trucked to a nearby staging area. Supplies and equipment came through 

Vung Tau and the port of Saigon. After picking up its equipment, the division dispersed to four base camps north of the capital under the protection 

of the 2d Brigade and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Division headquarters 

and support troops moved to Di An, the 1st Brigade to Phuoc Vinh, the 3d 

Brigade to Lai Khe, and the division artillery to Phu Loi. These bases together 

with the previously established camps at Bien Hoa were positioned to guard 

the approaches to Saigon from the northwest, north, and northeast and to 

block enemy movement between War Zones C and D. Although the Viet 

Cong avoided a major fight, the 2d Brigade and the 173d Airborne Brigade 

encountered large numbers of mines and booby traps, mostly the commanddetonated directional type. In all, the division succeeded in moving over 9,600 

27 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, n.d., pp. 1–2, 6, 12, Historians files, 

CMH; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 63–66. 28 Pictorial History of the 1st Engineer Battalion, Deployment to RVN; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 

1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, p. 11; 1st Engineer Battalion Unit Historical Rpt, 1965, 30 Mar 

66, p. 2, Historians files, CMH (hereafter cited as 1st Engineer Battalion History, 1965); Msg, 

DA 729121 to CG, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 20 Aug 65, sub: Float Bridge Requirements, 

Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

68

troops and their equipment and supplies to their destinations in III Corps 

without loss of life or serious injury to anyone.29

After picking up their equipment at the Saigon port, elements of the 1st 

Engineer Battalion moved to the base camp sites that would house the units 

they supported. Company A moved north to Phuoc Vinh to support the 1st 

Brigade, and Company C proceeded up Highway 13—III Corps’ main northsouth artery—to Lai Khe to support the 3d Brigade. This left Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company and Companies D and E (the bridge company) 

for the clearing and development of the division’s camps at Di An and Phu Loi 

just north of Saigon. At each camp, the engineer companies began constructing defenses and facilities. Initial tasks included clearing fields of fire and 

building roads, portable tent floors, wood buildings, security fences, bunkers, 

concrete floors, and helipads.30

At the same time, the 1st Engineer Battalion’s intelligence section reconnoitered the area. Roads and bridges leading to Tay Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, and 

Vung Tau were surveyed. Wells were checked to determine their capacity for 

use as water points. Over twenty sites were located for possible laterite pits 

for use in road and hardstand construction. Reconnaissance teams also made 

soundings along the channel on the Dong Nai River for ferrying heavy equipment from Saigon to Tan Uyen north of Bien Hoa.31

At first, little base development support came from the 18th Engineer 

Brigade. The only other engineer battalion in the area, the 46th Construction 

Battalion, had arrived about the same time, and it was committed to projects 

at Long Binh and Vung Tau. Construction support from the engineer brigade 

began picking up toward the end of the year with the arrival of the 168th and 

588th Engineer Combat Battalions. By then the 46th Engineer Battalion was 

able to complete the 1st Division’s tactical operations center at Di An.32

In October, with some of the combat and support units still settling into 

their base camps, the 1st Division starting seeking out the Viet Cong. General 

Westmoreland had given General Seaman free rein to operate in a fan-shaped 

area opening northward from Saigon over a distance of some thirty-four miles 

in a region ranging from grasslands to rolling forested hills. Over the next 

three months, the 173d Airborne Brigade, under the operational control of 

the 1st Division, conducted many company-size and smaller operations east 

and northeast of the capital city. The 1st Division sought out the enemy in 

battalion-size or larger operations, mostly north of Saigon. Some of these 

operations resulted in major encounters with the Viet Cong.33

The 173d Airborne Brigade’s biggest battle to date took place during 

Operation Hump. In early November, the 173d again entered War Zone D to 

29 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, pp. 12, 23; Carland, Stemming the Tide, 

pp. 66–68; Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, “Deployment to Vietnam” 

and “Company B” sections. 30 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, p. 23; 1st Engineer Battalion History, 

1965, p. 3. 31 1st Engineer Battalion History, 1965, pp. 1–2.

32 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 48–49, 51–52.

33 Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 73–76.
69

First Battles

hunt down an enemy force reported massing near the confluence of the Dong 

Nai and Song Be Rivers. In one sharp battle, the enemy tried to encircle one of 

the brigade’s battalions. The dense jungle and close fighting made resupply and 

evacuation impossible. On the early morning of 9 November, engineer teams 

were lowered from hovering helicopters to clear landing zones. With their power 

saws, they cut down trees, some 250 feet high and 6 feet in diameter, allowing 

helicopters to land and pick up casualties. The enemy, identified as a hard-core 

Viet Cong regiment, had been decimated and left behind more than 400 dead.34

In November and December, the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, teamed up 

with the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division in search-and-destroy operations in the area between Highway 13 and the Michelin Rubber Plantation to 

the west. During Operations Bushmaster I and II, the brigade encountere

strong Viet Cong forces at Bau Bang, Trung Loi, and Ap Nha Mat in the 

fiercest fighting by units of the division thus far. The sharp battles resulted 

from chance encounters or enemy ambushes on returning convoys. During 

its sweeps, the brigade uncovered large caches of food, medicine, and supplies. Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, provided a composite platoon and 

34 AAR, Opn Hump, 173d Abn Bde, 19 Dec 65, pp. 1, 5–6, 9; 173d Abn Bde, Critique of 

Operation Hump, 19 Nov 65, pp. 14–15, both in Historians files, CMH; Hist Rpt of the 173d 

Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 18–19; Berry, Sky Soldiers, pp. 33–40; Pictorial History of the 

173d Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat.”

Engineers use hand tools to clear a landing zone.
Engineers at War

70

demolition teams, which helped the infantry destroy several camps, training 

facilities, tunnel complexes, and defense works.35

During November, the 2d Brigade continued clearing operations outside 

the 1st Division’s base camps at Di An and Phu Loi. During Operation Viper,

which lasted until the end of the year, American troops located more than 

seventy Viet Cong tunnels and thirty-four camp sites. The division also found 

out how well the enemy had designed his defenses. Viet Cong camps were 

protected by perimeters of sharp wooden punji stakes, five-foot-deep trenches 

with firing ports, bunkers, and occasionally barbed wire. Often a system of 

tunnels branched out from the center of the camps. Company B engineers 

who ventured into the tunnel complexes also found compartments consisting 

of kitchens, dispensaries, classrooms, and living quarters, an indication of the 

many enemy complexes awaiting discovery.36

Before the year ended, other operations extended the reach of American 

forces in III Corps, but this time the action took place east of Saigon. During 

Operation New Life, which ran from 21 November to 17 December, the 173d 

Airborne Brigade moved by air to the air strip at Vo Dat in Binh Tuy Province 

and joined with South Vietnamese forces to prevent the rice harvest from falling into enemy hands. North of Vo Dat, in the La Nga Valley, a large group of 

refugees from North Vietnam had arrived in 1954 and transformed the once 

virgin jungle into the fifth highest rice-producing area in South Vietnam. In 

1963, the Viet Cong moved in and with little resistance confiscated one half 

of the rice crop. They came back the following year and took the entire crop. 

During New Life, the airborne brigade saturated the area with patrols and

sweeps. In the end, the farmers harvested their crops without interference and 

officials restored district-level government to the thirty thousand inhabitants 

of La Nga. During the operation, the 173d Engineer Company together with 

Australian engineers repaired over twenty-seven miles of local roads, built 

eleven bridges, and completed several civic action projects. For the first time, 

the 173d Engineer Company took along its bridging, assault boats, and construction equipment. Besides putting up a thirty-eight-foot dry span, the bridge 

platoon joined forces with Troop E, 17th Cavalry, to patrol the La Nga River. 

Using two assault boats, the twenty-man river patrol set out on 4 December, 

traveling about thirty miles. Along the way, the patrol discovered several caves, 

tunnels, and hidden sampans. At one point, the patrol came under fire, and the 

boats took several hits. While the engineer operators guided the boats out of 

range, artillery fire was directed on the enemy.37

35 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, pp. 17–18; AARs, Opn Bushmast

I, 1st Inf Div, 21 Dec 65, p. 4, and Opn Bushmaster II, 1st Inf Div, 30 Dec 65, p. 5, both i

Historians files, CMH; 1st Inf Div Info Release, Battle of Ap Nha Mat, 20 Feb 67, Vietnam 

Interview (VNI) 137, CMH. For more on the 1st Division’s operations to the end of 1965, see 

Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 84–92. 36 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Inf Div, p. 17; Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 

1st Infantry Division, “Deployment to Vietnam” and “Company B, 1st Engr Bn,” sections. 37 AAR, Opn New Life, 173d Abn Bde, 26 Jan 66, pp. 1–3, 12, 24, Historians files, CMH; 

Pictorial History of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat”; Hist Rpt of the 173d 

Engr Co, 1 Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 19–21.
71

First Battles

From Operation New Life, the 173d Airborne Brigade moved directly to 

Operation Smash, another search-and-destroy mission in a loosely coordinated

operation with the 1st Division’s 2d Brigade. Intelligence had indicated that 

the Viet Cong might be planning a major assault in the Xuan Loc area during 

the Christmas holiday period. The 173d’s battalions patrolled west of Route 2, 

and the 2d Brigade worked east of Highway 15. During the week-long operation, demolition teams of the 2d Platoon, 173d Engineer Company, attached 

to the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, saw action. On 18 December, the airborne 

infantry and engineers successfully assaulted a strongly defended trench system 

manned with heavy machine guns. On the same day, the engineers escorted by 

Troop E, 17th Cavalry, moved south along Highway 15 toward Vung Tau to 

repair the road. In typical fashion, the Viet Cong had blocked the highway 

with ditches and other obstacles. Sniper fire caused the engineers to bring two 

squads for additional security. By the end of the operation, work crews filled 

some sixty ditches along fourteen miles of thoroughfare. On 22 December, the 

brigade returned to Bien Hoa to enjoy the Christmas holiday. It found a much 

improved base camp. Members of the engineer company who had remained 

behind not only upgraded the living quarters, but they also had built a new 

mess hall in time for Christmas dinner. As for the 2d Brigade, it saw no Viet 

Cong but found bases and destroyed supply caches. While the effects on enemy 

operations could not be determined, U.S. commanders believed that they had 

prevented a holiday offensive. More importantly, the presence of their units at 

some distance from the capital had served notice that the Americans were now 

here to stay in these contested parts of III Corps.38

The units under General Seaman’s command gained valuable experience 

as they roamed throughout III Corps. Air transports and helicopters airlifted 

infantry task forces to airstrips and landing zones prepared and maintained 

by combat engineers. During these operations, combat engineers carried out a 

variety of tasks. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided mine detector and demolition teams, set up water points, maintained supply roads, and built bridges 

and rafts. The battalion’s tankdozers proved very popular with the infantry by 

clearing paths through the jungle, exposing tunnel complexes, and detonating 

booby traps.39

Securing Highway 13, which ran through the enemy’s well-entrenched 

strongholds of War Zones C and D, continued to be one of the priorities 

involving the divisional engineers. Like most Vietnamese national highways, 

Highway 13 had a bituminous surface treatment, adequate for the limited 

volume and weight of traffic before the U.S. buildup. The combination of an 

insufficient subgrade and poor drainage, heavy rains, Viet Cong sabotage, little 

maintenance by the South Vietnamese, and the pounding from heavy military 

convoys had resulted in a complete breakdown of the road. The 1st Division 

was determined to break Viet Cong control and open the road to a normal 

38 AAR, Opn Smash, 173d Abn Bde, 26 Jan 66, pp. 1–2, 5–8, Historians files, CMH; Pictorial 

History of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Section III, “Combat”; Hist Rpt of the 173d Engr Co, 1 

Jan–31 Dec 65, pp. 21–22. 39 1st Engineer Battalion History, 1965, p. 3.
Engineers at War

72

flow of commerce. The 1st Engineer Battalion concentrated on clearing mines 

and making repairs. Since the 1st Division had arrived at the end of the rainy 

season, the engineers did not have to worry about the road being inundated in 

many places.40

To help the infantry destroy enemy tunnel complexes, the 1st Engineer 

Battalion organized a platoon made up of armored personnel carriers 

mounted with flamethrowers. Referred to by Colonel Sargent as the “Tunnel 

Killer Team,” the platoon also used tankdozers, smoke pots, scoop loaders, 

and air compressors to carry out its mission. After the engineers inserted an 

air hose, the air compressor drove smoke through the tunnel exposing other 

holes in the dense jungle growth. Demolitions, scoop loaders, or tankdozers 

then sealed the holes. Still, the dense jungle could conceal other holes. Sargent 

reported that during the air compressor’s first use, other holes could not be 

found. He concluded there must have been other holes because the compressor 

never idled, an indication of high pressure in the tunnel.41

The Ia Drang

While General Seaman extended his reach in III Corps, General Kinnard’s 

immediate task in II Corps was to secure his base at An Khe and to hold open 

the highway to the coast. To do so, the 1st Cavalry Division on 6 October 

dispatched elements of the 2d Brigade to take control of the Vinh Thanh 

Valley, a Viet Cong–dominated rice-growing area located about twelve and 

one-half miles east of An Khe. Operation Happy Valley, which lasted until 

19 November, involved air assaults, patrols, night ambushes, and civic action. 

Units of the 3d Brigade eventually replaced the 2d Brigade. While Happy

Valley continued, the 1st Cavalry Division launched Shiny Bayonet, a fiveday thrust into the Suoi Ca Valley in an attempt to find and destroy North

Vietnamese units reported operating northeast of the division base. Little contact was made, but the cavalrymen gained experience operating in the field.42

During the two operations, the division’s 8th Engineer Battalion dispatched 

elements appropriate for the mission. Companies B and C, respectively, supported the 2d and 3d Brigades. In addition, Company B constructed the Vinh 

Thanh Special Forces camp in the Vinh Thanh Valley complete with defensive 

fortifications, wire, underground bunkers, interconnecting trenches, quarters, 

and a dispensary. The engineers also did daily minesweeping and clearing along 

Highway 19 and Route 3A leading to the camp. Another task for Companies B 

and C was road maintenance. During this work, each company lost a 3/4-ton 

dump truck to land mines.43

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.; Ltr, Lt Col Howard L. Sargent, CO, 1st Engr Bn, to Chief of Engrs, 14 Nov 65, 

Historians files, CMH. 42 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 65, 1st Cav Div (Ambl), 10 Jan 66, pp. 13–15, Historians 

files, CMH. 43 Memoirs of the First Team, p. 27; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven 

Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 18–19, 31–33, 36.
73

First Battles

The assumption was that the 1st Cavalry Division’s next operation would 

also be in Binh Dinh Province, but instead the division found itself increasingly oriented to the western highlands. In an uninhabited and rugged area 

between the Cambodian border and the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, some 

twenty-five miles south of Pleiku City, the North Vietnamese had concentrated 

three regiments. The Chu Pong Massif, with peaks rising to over 2,300 feet, 

dominated the area. A river, the Ia Drang, flowed along the mountain’s northern edge, generally to the northwest. The dense vegetation provided excellent 

concealment for the enemy. On 19 October, Plei Me came under attack by one 

of the regiments. The South Vietnamese hesitated dispatching a relief force, 

fearing to leave Pleiku undefended. On 22 October, General Kinnard sent a 

battalion task force, including an artillery battery, to secure Pleiku upon departure of the relief force. Then, seeing an opportunity for combat, he obtained 

permission the following day to transfer the entire 1st Brigade to Pleiku. In a 

series of leapfrog moves by helicopter, the air cavalry’s artillery kept the South 

Vietnamese column under cover of its 105-mm. howitzers. The relief column 

cautiously advanced, beating off a fierce attack before reaching Plei Me on the 

twenty-fifth.44

These events led to the Pleiku Campaign, the 1st Cavalry Division’s first 

real combat test as a fighting force. On 27 October, General Westmoreland 

visited the division’s 1st Brigade outpost at Landing Zone Homecomin

south of Pleiku, where he gave General Kinnard the go-ahead to seek out and 

destroy the enemy in the western highlands. For the next two weeks, the 1st 

Brigade and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, combed the jungle near Plei Me, 

making occasional contact with the enemy.45

At that point, on 9 November, General Kinnard substituted the 3d 

Brigade. On the fourteenth, Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore’s 1st Battalion, 7th 

Cavalry, made an airmobile assault into Landing Zone X-Ray, adjacent to 

the Chu Pong range. Without realizing it, the battalion had deployed almost 

on top of two North Vietnamese regiments. The North Vietnamese fell on the 

cavalry battalion. Over the next two days, in some of the fiercest fighting of 

the war in an area covered with high grass interspersed with ant hills nearly as 

high as a man’s head, the battalion and reinforcements from the 3d Brigade 

beat back repeated assaults. Artillery at nearby Landing Zone Falcon and

Air Force fighter-bombers pounded suspected enemy concentrations around 

the perimeter. The Air Force also unleashed B–52 raids on enemy positions and supply routes. At great risk, UH–1 Hueys flew in reinforcements, 

ammunition, medical supplies, rations, and water and carried off the dead 

and wounded. At dawn on the sixteenth, the Americans still held the landing 

zone. The North Vietnamese withdrew toward the sanctuary of Cambodia, 

44 AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, 4 Mar 66, pp. 10, 18–25, Historians files, CMH; 

Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data 

(September 1965–March 1966), p. 38; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 99–104; Sharp and 

Westmoreland, Report, pp. 99, 110; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 189–90. 45 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 190; AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, pp. 27–67, 

76; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 74–75; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven 

Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 37–44.
Engineers at War

74

but in the process bloodied the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, in an ambush near 

Landing Zone Albany. The 2d Brigade moved in and chased the enemy to the

border. General Kinnard sought permission to enter and finish off the North 

Vietnamese units, but officials in Washington rejected the request. President 

Johnson had decided that the United States sought no wider war and would 

fight the ground war solely within the borders of South Vietnam. Unable to 

pursue the enemy into Cambodia, American efforts west of Pleiku quickly 

petered out. On November 26, the troops returned to An Khe, satisfied in the 

knowledge that airmobility coupled with strong artillery and air support had 

dealt a blow to the North Vietnamese.46

The 8th Engineer Battalion provided continuous support throughout the 

Pleiku Campaign. Companies A, B, and C provided direct support to the 1st, 

2d, and 3d Brigades, respectively. In turn, platoons were attached to the infantry battalions, and squads or demolition teams deployed with the infantry 

companies to clear landing zones and booby traps. The 3d Brigade deployed 

46 AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, pp. 69–132; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 

Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 44–50. 

For more on the Pleiku Campaign, see Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 111, 113–47; John 

A. Cash, “Fight at Ia Drang, 14–16 November 1965,” in Seven Firefights in Vietnam by John 

A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, U.S. Army, 1970), pp. 3–40; Joseph L. Galloway, “Fatal Victory,” U.S. News 

& World Report (29 October 1990): 32–34, 36–37, 40–43, 44–45, 47–51; and Lt. Gen. Harold G. 

Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle 

That Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1992), pp. 59–327.

Troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, advance at Landing Zone X-Ray

where attached engineers also fought as infantry.
75

First Battles

nine five-man demolition teams from Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion, to 

its three infantry battalions, three teams to each battalion. Besides overseeing 

the committed units, Colonel Malley and his staff reconnoitered the roads 

and bridges and areas for landing zones and airstrips. At Stadium, a forward

support base southwest of Pleiku astride Highway 19, the battalion set up a 

water point and provided the tactical units with a continuous supply of water 

throughout the operation. Water was a special problem at X-Ray because the 

nearby streambed was dry, making the cavalrymen totally dependent on the 

water hauled in by helicopters.47 (Map 6)

47 AAR, Pleiku Campaign, 1st Cav Div, pp. 1, 5; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 

67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 18; AAR, 

Ia Drang Campaign, 8th Engr Bn, 16 Dec 65, p. 1, Historians files, CMH; Carland, Stemming 

the Tide, p. 126.

567

509

509

14B

14B

6C

6C

14

14

19

19

19

III

ARVN TF

X X

1 CAV

X X

1 CAV

STADIUM

DUC CO

LZ ALBANY

LZ X-RAY

PLEI ME Special Forces Camp

Special Forces Camp

NEW PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp

Se San

Prek Drang

Ia Drang

Ia Drang

CHU GOUNGOT

CHU PONG MASSIF

C A M B O D I A

S O U T H V I E T N A M

Plei Ya Te

Plei Beng

Thanh An

Pleiku

Plei Toun Breng

BATTLE OF THE IA DRANG

November 1965

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 500 800 and Above

Ground Movement

Air Assault

Enemy Retreat

Engagement

0

0 10 Kilometers

Miles 10

Map 6
Engineers at War

76

Seven engineers from Company C were at X-Ray clearing helicopter landing areas and fighting as infantry. The largest area available to land helicopters was vulnerable to enemy fire, and Colonel Moore noticed a smaller area 

just east of his battalion command post that could take two helicopters if 

some trees were removed. He turned to his engineer demolition team leader, 

Sgt. George Nye, to clear the trees. As the enemy fire intensified Nye recalled, 

“You could see the enemy, and suddenly we were part of the 1st Battalion, 7th 

Cavalry. It’s tough to try to be an infantryman and a demolition specialist at 

the same time, but we did it. We blew those trees; no sawing. The intensity of 

fire made working with a saw tough, working without a weapon. By blowing 

the trees we could spend more time fighting.” After the enemy withdrew from 

X-Ray, the remaining engineers collected and destroyed 100 enemy rifles and 

machine guns, 300 to 400 hand grenades, 7,000 rounds of ammunition, 3 cases 

of rocket-propelled grenades, and 150 entrenching tools.48

Throughout the forward areas, hasty building tasks characterized the 

8th Engineer Battalion’s work in the field. CH–47 Chinook helicopters lifted 

equipment, in sections if necessary, to job sites. After the attack on Plei 

Me, Company A, less the 3d Platoon and reinforced with equipment from 

Headquarters Company, moved to the camp to repair the airfield, destroyed 

unexploded shells, and buried enemy dead. A major effort included filling a 

large bomb crater, some fifty-five feet wide and twenty feet deep in the center 

of the runway. At Stadium, Company A worked on field fortifications and

extended the runway. As the brigades moved in and out of the area, Companies 

B and C took over engineering tasks. Company C continued maintaining the 

airstrip at Stadium, filling ruts caused by CV–2 Caribou and C–123 Provider

aircraft. By this time, it had become routine for the airmobile engineers to 

build landing zones, participate in reconnaissance missions and infantry 

patrols, clear mines, and repair roads.49

During the Pleiku Campaign, the 8th Engineer Battalion suffered its first 

battle deaths. While on a road reconnaissance near Stadium, a jeep from the

company headquarters hit a mine, killing two noncommissioned officers and 

wounding two other engineers. When the North Vietnamese struck the perimeter at Stadium in a mortar and ground attack, Company C defended an

assigned sector, which the enemy failed to penetrate. Company C lost one soldier killed in action and three wounded. The demolition teams from Company 

C attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, at Landing Zone X-Ray suffered 

two deaths. By the end of the Pleiku Campaign, the 8th Engineer Battalion 

had lost six killed and thirteen wounded.50

48 Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, pp. 76, 116, 161–63, 199 (quoted words, pp. 

76 and 162); AAR, Ia Drang Campaign, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 3–4. 49 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 18–19; AAR, Ia Drang Campaign, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 

2–4.50 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 19; AAR, Ia Drang Campaign, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 3–4 

and incl. 1; Galloway, “Fatal Victory,” p. 45; Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, p. 

76.
77

First Battles

Following the Ia Drang battles, General Westmoreland decided to move 

another brigade into the highlands to provide a permanent American presence. 

Between 18 December 1965 and 23 January 1966, the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry 

Division, moved from Hawaii by sea and air to Pleiku. Two infantry battalions 

disembarked at Cam Ranh Bay and flew to Pleiku, while the third flew direct 

from Hawaii. The preparations begun in 1962 to build an airfield at Pleiku 

capable of handling large transport planes now proved well worth the effort.51

The Hawaii-based 25th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick C. 

Weyand, had long prepared for operations in the Far East. Tapped as the Army’s 

immediate reaction force in the Pacific, the Tropic Lightning Division often 

participated in deployments and exercises to Thailand, Taiwan, and Okinawa. 

The division specialized in jungle warfare and counterinsurgency operations. 

In January 1963, soldiers of the 25th Division responded to MACV’s call by 

volunteering to serve as aerial door gunners to protect UH–1 helicopters. With 

the departure of the 3d Brigade, the rest of the division prepared itself for the 

long sea voyage leading to a different destination northwest of Saigon.52

As the 3d Brigade began to arrive and set up its base camp on the high 

ground northeast of Pleiku, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division guarded the 

surrounding area. The 3d Brigade soon took over its own defenses, placing 

priority on building a perimeter and an austere base camp at the same time. 

Accompanying the 3d Brigade was Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion. 

Attached to Company D were a bridge platoon from Company E, 65th 

Engineer Battalion, and two water supply teams, an engineer equipment section, and a medical section from Headquarters Company.53

As 1965 came to an end, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division directed their 

attention to Binh Dinh Province east of An Khe. Company C, 8th Engineer 

Battalion, supported the 3d Brigade in Operation Clean House, the division’s 

last major operation of the year. Between 17 and 30 December, short but fierce 

encounters took place in the Suoi Ca Valley a few miles west of Highway 1 and 

north of Qui Nhon. The 1st Platoon attached to 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 

and the 3d Platoon attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, served primarily 

as infantry, while the 2d Platoon attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 

did extensive demolition work that included blocking caves believed to be used 

by the enemy. The balance of the company used its own and borrowed equipment from Headquarters Company to maintain roads leading to the brigade’s 

forward support element.54

51 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 198; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, Oct–Dec 65, 25th Inf Div, 

n.d., pp. 4–6, and ORLL, 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 23 Jun 66, pp. 1–2, both in 

Historians files, CMH. 52 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, Oct–Dec 65, 25th Inf Div, pp. 8–9; The 25th’s 25th . . . in Combat, 

Tropic Lightning, 1 October 1941–1 October 1967, 25th Infantry Division, 25th Div Public 

Affairs Ofc, n.d., pp. 129–67, 179–81, copy in CMH. 53 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, Oct–Dec 65, 25th Inf Div, Part II, incl. 9; Msg, CG, 25th Inf Div to 

Asst Div Cmdr-2, 12 Dec 65, sub: Holokai XI & XII, Historians files, CMH; ORLL, 1 Jan–30 

Apr 66, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, p. 2. 54 Memoirs of the First Team, p. 30; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven 

Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 19, 51–56.
Engineers at War

78

The 8th Engineer Battalion’s Intelligence Section was also hard at work. 

Throughout December, the section’s reconnaissance troops flying in a UH–1D 

helicopter at treetop level recorded data on all major roads in the II Corps area. 

The reconnaissance engineers also landed at the bridge locations to determine 

their types and vehicle-carrying capacities.55

By year’s end, General Westmoreland believed that the emergency phase of 

the war had passed. Combat engineers assigned to the divisions and separate 

brigades had settled into a pattern of closely supporting infantry, armor, and 

artillery units in the field. Base development responsibilities remained secondary 

missions, only accomplished on a regular basis by troops remaining behind at the 

base camps. As for nondivisional combat engineer support, it remained under centralized command and concentrated on base development, providing operational 

support when necessary. Because the buildup proceeded so rapidly, construction 

had been done on a crash basis. As the engineer effort grew in size, the need for 

organizational and managerial changes soon became evident.

55 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 19.
4

Organizing the Construction Effort

With the arrival of contingents of Army engineers, Navy Seabees, 

Marine Corps engineers, Air Force engineers, and civilian contractors, U.S. construction strength mounted rapidly. Changing requirements for 

facilities from which to conduct or support combat operations and deployments interfered with the establishment of construction priorities, which, in 

turn, depended on the availability of labor, equipment, materials, and sites, 

for which there was intense competition among the services. Because of the 

rapid buildup, construction was initially accomplished on a crash basis under 

existing command and control arrangements. As the number of engineer units 

increased, the requirement grew to organize the construction effort.

Preliminary Proposals

Before 1965, several engineering offices in South Vietnam were involved in 

construction matters, but no single agency exercised supervision and control. 

Although the Navy’s construction offices in Bangkok and Saigon provided 

some supervision of the construction program, the engineering offices within 

MACV planned and set priorities. MACV did this through three separate 

offices: the Base Development Branch, J–4; the Engineer Branch, Directorate 

of Army Military Assistance Program Logistics, J–4 (formerly the Engineer 

Advisory Branch, Military Assistance Advisory Group [MAAG]); and a small 

Engineer Branch within the Headquarters Commandant, which had the housekeeping responsibility for the headquarters. The Army’s Support Command 

engineer, the Air Force’s 2d Air Division civil engineer, and the Navy’s Public 

Works provided engineering support to their respective services. Added to this 

were the contractors; Vietnamese Army engineers; Army, Navy, and Air Force 

engineer detachments; and Pacific Command and its subordinate service commands and their engineering staffs in Hawaii.1

Rules governing who would control a coordinated construction program 

in Vietnam, however, had yet to be worked out. In December 1961, the U.S. 

buildup had been expected to increase the tempo of construction, and the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group established an office to obtain real estate 

and monitor and coordinate construction matters for all U.S. military personnel in the country. Later these functions were passed to the MACV Base 

Development Branch. This small branch, however, had limited authority and 

concerned itself with other matters. It watched out for possible duplication 

of facilities or inequitable construction standards among the services, saw 

1

 Joint Tables of Distribution, MACV, 1 Sep 64, pp. 47–50, Historians files, CMH. 
Engineers at War

80

that military assistance construction projects fitted into contingency and base 

development plans, prepared base development portions of MACV war plans, 

and acquired real estate. Funding and approval of projects continued to be processed through service channels, and the office did not oversee construction. 

The Base Development Branch was strictly a planning and coordinating office 

with “primary cognizance” over construction matters. Initially the branch was 

headed by a Navy commander, assisted by an Army major, who also served as 

real estate officer, and a Marine Corps major. The branch underwent an organizational change in September 1964 when an Army colonel was authorized as 

the chief, assisted by a Navy commander and an Air Force major.2

A loose organization known as the U.S. Construction Staff Committee 

composed of representatives from the various U.S. agencies met primarily 

to coordinate construction for the Vietnamese military forces and civilian 

agencies. Chaired by the MACV J–4, the committee included representatives 

of the Engineer Branch, Directorate of Army Military Assistance Program 

Logistics, J–4; the U.S. Operations Mission; the Deputy Officer in Charge of 

Construction, Republic of Vietnam; the U.S. Army Support Command; and 

other MACV and service agencies in South Vietnam. The modest requirements for the U.S. advisory teams, the MACV staff, and the small number of 

U.S. military units took up little of the committee’s time.3

During the spring of 1965, the Engineer Branch, Directorate of Army 

Military Assistance Program Logistics, J–4, expanded its attention beyond 

military assistance projects. Col. Kenneth W. Kennedy took over the branch 

in November 1964, and under his tenure the branch assumed a larger role 

planning U.S. base requirements. Kennedy and members of his staff reconnoitered and prepared a major study for the development of Cam Ranh Bay 

as a logistics base. He also participated in the J–4 proposal to deploy an Army 

logistical command and engineer group to Vietnam in anticipation of a future 

military buildup. Throughout this time, Kennedy advocated the creation of a 

MACV command engineer office.4

Colonel Kennedy’s proposal received strong backing from Lt. Gen. 

Walter K. Wilson, the chief of engineers, and Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln, 

deputy chief of staff for logistics, also a Corps of Engineers officer. During 

the Department of Defense team’s visit to Vietnam in January 1965 to investigate the logistical command and engineer group proposals, it also recommended that command engineering responsibilities should be passed to the 

Navy’s construction office in Saigon. Generals Wilson and Lincoln strongly 

disagreed. Wilson mainly disagreed, not because the Deputy Officer in Charge 

2

 Ltr, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, to CINCPAC, 8 Feb 

62, sub: Report of Chief, MAAG, Vietnam for Period 2 Sep 1961 to 8 Feb 1962; Joint Tables 

of Distribution, MACV, 1 Jul 63, p. 7 (quoted words); Joint Tables of Distribution, MACV, 1 

Sep 64, pp. 47–50; Interv, Capt E. Gregory, Mil Hist Br, MACV, with Col Kenneth W. Kennedy, 

MACV Engineer, 10 Nov 65, p. 1, box 6, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 3

 MFR, Col Kenneth W. Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam: Nov 1964–Nov 

1965, pp. 6–7, OCE Hist Ofc. 4

 Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 10 Nov 65, p. 1; MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts 

on Vietnam, pp. 1–2.
81

Organizing the Construction Effort

of Construction in Saigon lacked effectiveness in supervising contract construction, but, rather, because of the need for a command engineer with a 

sufficient staff to plan and advise on all military engineering matters for the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Lincoln supported Wilson and 

noted that the team’s proposal considered the engineer mission only within 

the scope of construction, facility, and real estate matters. “Such an arrangement,” he argued, “would require a Navy Civil Engineer to perform a role for 

which he has no background.” In mid-March, after his visit to Vietnam, Lt. 

Gen. William F. Cassidy, the chief of engineer’s designee, lent his support. Lt. 

Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., the deputy chief of staff for military operations, who 

also looked into the proposal during his visit to the theater, agreed with the 

engineers when he reported his findings to the chief of staff, General Johnson. 

As a result, the MACV engineer, the Army contended, logically had to be a 

Corps of Engineers officer.5

On 7 April 1965, Colonel Kennedy was appointed MACV engineer. The 

appointment came when the J–4, with General Westmoreland’s concurrence, 

notified him that in addition to heading the Engineer Branch, he would also 

be the director of Army Military Assistance Program Logistics and take over 

direction of the Base Development Branch, with the mission of planning and 

supervising construction of facilities needed for the buildup. A few days later, 

Kennedy was on his way to Hawaii to attend the deployment planning conference at Pacific Command headquarters. Within twenty-four hours after his 

arrival, he prepared a hasty base development plan estimated to cost $266 

million. Troop construction requirements totaled 113 battalion-months for 

Army construction units and another 21 battalion-months in Seabee effort. 

The Army and Navy representatives at the conference made tentative agreements to deploy eight Army and three Navy construction battalions. They also 

recognized that construction would lag far behind the imminent buildup of 

combat forces, that construction would be austere, and that operations would 

have to be supported across the beach. But Kennedy later recalled: “Many 

forgot this as soon as they got ashore.”6

Returning to Saigon, Kennedy was shocked and dismayed to find out that 

the Support Command engineer, Lt. Col. Edmond J. Cochard, had briefed 

General Taylor, now the U.S. ambassador to Saigon, without coordinating 

with the MACV engineer. Taylor, who initially resisted the U.S. buildup, only 

approved the deployment of five construction battalions, three less than the 

5

 Ch of Engrs, Summary Sheet, 13 Feb 65, sub: Engineer Staff for MACV, and Addendum 

to Summary Sheet, Lt Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln, DCSLOG, to CofS Army, 19 Feb 65, sub: 

Engineer Staff for MACV (quoted words), Incls in Memo, Secretary of the General Staff 

for CofS Army, 27 Feb 65, sub: Engineer Staff for Hq MACV; Memo, Lt Gen Bruce Palmer, 

DCSOPS, for CofS Army, 25 Feb 65, sub: Engineer Staff for Hq MACV, all in Historians files, 

CMH; Interv, Lynn Alperin, OCE Hist Ofc, with Brig Gen Kenneth W. Kennedy, 23 Apr 84, 

pp. 297–98, OCE Oral History Interview Collection; MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts 

on Vietnam, pp. 1–2. 6

 MRF, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, pp. 2–3 (quoted words p. 3); Interv, 

Gregory with Kennedy, 10 Nov 65, pp. 1, 3; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 23 Apr 84, pp. 

299–306.
Engineers at War

82

number Kennedy and the conferees had agreed upon in Hawaii. Fortunately, 

Kennedy found this out in time to change the message sent to the Department 

of the Army. The modified message read that five battalions were needed at 

once with the other three to be provided on call. In any case, Kennedy recognized that the engineers needed to improve coordination.7

In May, further reorganization affected Kennedy’s MACV engineer operations. He was relieved of his duties as director of Army Military Assistance 

Program Logistics, and those functions were absorbed by the J–4. A separate 

MACV Engineer Division was formally established under J–4 supervision. 

Two new branches were added: Real Estate and Operations and Studies. With 

the arrival of U.S. military units now under way and with the need to acquire 

land for new bases, Kennedy had no recourse but to take the arriving 64th 

Engineer Detachment (Terrain Analysis) and assign the topographic unit to 

the Real Estate Branch. The U.S. Construction Staff Committee continued to 

meet with Kennedy, who served as the executive secretary.8

 (Chart 2)

As the buildup intensified so did the burden on the Engineer Division. 

Twelve officers and ten enlisted men were authorized; their workload increased 

by three to four times. Colonel Kennedy shuttled between Saigon and Honolulu, 

attending more planning conferences at Pacific Command headquarters. The 

7

 MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, p. 3; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 

23 Apr 84, pp. 307–08. 8

 MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, p. 4; Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 

10 Nov 65, p. 1; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 23 Apr 84, pp. 312–13; Misc files, MACV Real 

Estate Br, 15 Oct 65, Historians files, CMH.

MACV

J—4

* Original advisory sections of Engineer

Branch, Director of Army Military Assistance

Program Logistics, J–4

** Assumed control in April 1965

Source: Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 10 Nov 65

MACV

Engineer Division

Engineer

Services * Real Estate TroopOperations *

Materiel * Base

Development **

Operations

and Studies

Chart 2—MACV Engineer Division,
83

Organizing the Construction Effort

planners struggled to develop a basic construction program and justify supplemental funds for all the services. As the scope of engineer activities expanded 

with the buildup, the J–4 on 15 November underwent another reorganization. 

This included elevating the MACV engineer to the J–4 deputy for engineering 

and finally authorizing additional personnel. But the engineer staff increased by 

less than half to eighteen officers and seventeen enlisted men.9

During this time, Kennedy faced practices that made coordinating and 

controlling construction difficult. Engineer offices of service headquarters 

continued to submit projects through their service chain of command for 

funding and approval and had a free hand in assigning work to troops. For 

instance, Army requirements proceeded through the U.S. Army, Pacific, which 

reviewed all Army construction projects in the Pacific and integrated them 

into a priority listing. The avalanche of work involved in base development 

planning overwhelmed the small MACV engineer staff, and more of this 

responsibility was delegated to the service commands. This meant the Army 

Support Command and its successor U.S. Army, Vietnam, would prepare base 

development plans for II, III, and IV Corps, the Air Force’s 2d Air Division 

for specified air bases, and the III Marine Amphibious Force for I Corps.10

Without clear-cut control, the MACV Engineer Division began exerting more 

influence in construction matters. The division reviewed plans for new projects 

exceeding $25,000 and had authority to establish priorities. As a MACV staff 

office, the division issued regulations outlining base development procedures, 

the acquisition of real estate, and construction standards. When the subordinate 

service headquarters received approval and funding from their services, Kennedy 

had the option to do the work either by troops or contract. Projects considered 

more suitable for accomplishment by contract, usually larger and more complex 

projects in more secure areas, were passed on to the Deputy Officer in Charge 

of Construction in Saigon. This arrangement made sense because the Navy construction office in Saigon had increased its architect-engineering capability. It also 

helped that the Bureau of Yards and Docks had raised the Saigon office to an 

independent Officer in Charge of Construction to handle growing construction 

requirements. Projects not sent to the Officer in Charge of Construction were 

assigned to the Army and Navy commands in Vietnam. Those projects assigned 

to U.S. Army, Vietnam, were further delegated to the 1st Logistical Command 

and later the 18th Engineer Brigade. Although more projects were assigned to 

the growing number of Army engineer units, the logistical command also looked 

to Pacific Architects and Engineers to carry out much of the construction. In I 

Corps, the III Marine Amphibious Force assigned its troop projects to the 30th 

Naval Construction Regiment or a Marine Corps engineer battalion.11

9

 Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, p. 9; Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 

10 Nov 65, pp. 2–3; Dunn, Base Development, p. 18. 10 Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 10 Nov 65, pp. 4–6; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 23 

Apr 84, pp. 313–15; MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, pp. 4–5; JLRB, 

Monograph 6, Construction, p. 86; MACV History, 1965, p. 127. 11 Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 23 Apr 84, pp. 314–15; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 106; 

MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, pp. 8–9; MACV History, 1965, p. 127; 

Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 22 Sep 65, p. 34, CMH.
Engineers at War

84

As MACV engineer, Kennedy also used his position to call on help from 

other agencies. In his role as senior adviser to the South Vietnamese Army 

engineers, he exerted influence over the employment of those units. In several 

instances, the South Vietnamese engineers prepared beach unloading sites 

and campsites, and gave other help during the initial buildup. Help also came 

from the U.S. Operations Mission. Since Viet Cong harassment had stopped 

almost all aid projects, the mission made equipment and materials available 

for U.S. military use. For instance, nine hydraulic dredges were placed under 

the MACV engineer’s control, and several metal prefabricated warehouse kits 

were transferred to the military. This enabled the engineers to build some badly 

needed warehouses at Da Nang, Cam Ranh, and the Saigon port.12

One of Kennedy’s high-priority projects was Cam Ranh Bay. After General 

Westmoreland decided to transform the sandy peninsula into a major base 

in May 1965, interest by the three services began to snowball. Months later 

Kennedy remarked: “At first we couldn’t get anybody to put anything there 

but now we can’t keep people out and it’s now one of the most overcrowded 

facilities that I know of.” He advocated putting the air base on the mainland. 

Westmoreland, Kennedy, and Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, commander of the 

2d Air Division, boarded the MACV commander’s helicopter and reconnoitered the area from the air. Westmoreland then ordered the aircraft to land 

at a spot on the northern part of the peninsula and made up his mind to put 

the airfield there. After listening to Kennedy’s proposal for a mainland site, 

Westmoreland noted he understood the rationale, but his preference remained 

with the peninsula location primarily for security reasons. During the building 

of Cam Ranh Bay, Kennedy held weekly planning sessions with representatives of the agencies concerned to decide funding and location. They divided 

the peninsula functionally into four areas: a northern sector for the Army for 

later development into a convalescent hospital and a replacement and recreation center, a sector for the Air Force base, another sector for the Army port 

and depot complex, and a small sector on the southeast corner for a Navy 

facility.13

The arrival of two senior engineering officers in September placed 

Kennedy, still a colonel, in the unusual position of directing an admiral and 

a general. R. Adm. William F. Heaman, arrived to take over temporarily as 

Officer in Charge of Construction. General Ploger’s arrival the same month 

to take command of the 18th Engineer Brigade added to Kennedy’s predicament. As uncomfortable as this arrangement may have appeared, Kennedy’s 

relations with the two were excellent. Besides, he figured the two flag officers 

had enough to handle. At the end of November, he ended his tour and turned 

over the office to Col. Daniel A. Raymond, a brigadier general designate.14

12 MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: Thoughts on Vietnam, pp. 7–8.

13 Quote from Interv, Gregory with Kennedy, 10 Nov 65, p. 13; MFR, Kennedy, 8 Feb 71, sub: 

Thoughts on Vietnam, p. 11; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, 23 Apr 84, pp. 318–22; Development 

of Cam Ranh Bay, 1st Log Cmd, 30 Oct 66, p. 1, box 13, 68A/4975, RG 319, NARA. 14 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 106, 183, 187; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, pp. 341–

44; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN to CINCPAC, 18 Aug 65, sub: Construction Effort, 

Historians files, CMH.
85

Organizing the Construction Effort

The Construction Boss Concept 

Back in Washington, high-level officials in the Department of Defense 

had come to the opinion that control of the construction program needed 

to be tightened. After his visit to South Vietnam in July 1965, Edward J. 

Sheridan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for properties and installations, in his role as deputy overseer of Defense Department construction 

matters, recommended a central office within MACV other than the J–4 to 

coordinate the military building effort—a construction boss or “construction czar.” During his visit to Cam Ranh Bay, he expressed concern over 

what appeared to him to be vague construction responsibilities between 

troops and contractors. General Westmoreland initially agreed but later 

indicated that the situation had improved to his satisfaction. In an exchange 

of messages with Admiral Sharp at Pacific Command, he pointed out that 

Sheridan’s visit came at a time his command faced a herculean task to plan 

and formulate construction requirements. Westmoreland believed that 

Kennedy’s office had been strengthened and the staff had gotten valuable 

experience. He also felt the impending arrivals of General Ploger and his 

brigade headquarters and Admiral Heaman as the new Officer in Charge 

of Construction would give him the organizations and expertise to satisfy 

construction requirements.15

Neither Sheridan nor Defense Secretary McNamara shared Westmoreland’s 

views. McNamara felt that the job warranted an Army major general. By then, 

Sheridan seriously considered selecting Brig. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn, an Army 

15 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 87; MFR, Lt Col John E. Gray, OCE, 27 Jan 66, 

sub: Conference of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations), Ofc 

Asst Sec Def (Installations and Logistics), with Brig Gen Carroll H. Dunn, Carroll H. Dunn 

Papers, CMH; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN to CINCPAC, 18 Aug 65, sub: Construction 

Effort; Msgs, Sharp to Westmoreland, 26 Aug 65, and Westmoreland MAC 4356 to Sharp, 27 

Aug 65, both in Westmoreland Message files, CMH.

The 18th Engineer Brigade staff at its headquarters in Saigon. 

General Ploger is fifth from the left in the front row.
Engineers at War

86

engineer serving in Korea as deputy chief of staff of Eighth Army, as best qualified to run the theater’s construction program. When McNamara visited Saigon 

in November 1965, he was dismayed to find no progress on the construction czar 

proposal. Upon his return to Washington, he directed General Earle G. Wheeler, 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to examine the problem. In a series of messages to Sharp and Westmoreland, Wheeler presented the Defense Department’s 

case for a construction czar. He pointed out that construction projects in Vietnam 

cut across all the services and were financed, controlled, and executed by several 

agencies, including a civilian contractor. He also noted that the defense secretary 

had departed Saigon with the realization that the construction program would 

grow to the billion-dollar level. Besides the appointment of a construction chief, 

Wheeler added that Washington would authorize a large expansion of the MACV 

engineer office to about 150 men. The Army general heading this organization 

would report directly to Westmoreland, not the J–4. Wheeler summed up by 

noting that the chiefs of the services’ engineering officers agreed.16

Westmoreland continued to support the status quo. He argued that his 

new deputy chief of staff J–4 for engineering, soon to be General Raymond, 

exercised sufficient control over the construction program, and that Admiral 

Heaman, besides serving as the Officer in Charge of Construction, also helped 

the J–4 as a special assistant for contract construction. He also felt satisfied 

with his three construction agencies: the 18th Engineer Brigade, the 30th 

Naval Construction Regiment, and the Officer in Charge of Construction. 

What he really wanted, besides sufficient funding for the construction program, was more flexibility in using the construction funds allocated to him. 

Wheeler responded that every effort would be made to allow more flexibility 

and emphasized the best way to isolate any construction problems would 

be to assign such responsibility to a single manager. This approach would 

simultaneously reduce a large workload on the J–4. He also recognized that 

Dunn, who would soon be a major general, might cause some rank disparity 

with the J–4, a brigadier general. This could not be helped.17

On 8 December, Westmoreland answered that he could not solve logistical and construction problems by changes in organization. He had a 

board of officers look at the construction czar proposal, and it reaffirmed 

his position to keep the J–4 in charge of a strong engineering organization. 

Westmoreland also independently solicited the views of Admiral Heaman, 

who fully indorsed the board’s findings. The MACV commander felt his 

deputy assistant chief of staff J–4 for engineering did everything in the 

Defense Department’s proposal. During McNamara’s visit in November, 

he had outlined what he considered to be major construction problems. 

These did not include organization or management within his command. 

16 Msg, Wheeler JCS 4658–65 to Sharp, 1 Dec 65; Msg, JCS 7886 to CINCPAC, 4 Dec 65, 

both in Westmoreland Message files, CMH; MFR, Gray, 27 Jan 66, sub: Conference of Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations), Ofc Asst Sec Def (Installations 

and Logistics), with Dunn, Dunn Papers, CMH. See also Cosmas, Years of Escalation, 1962–

1967, pp. 281–82. 17 Msg, Westmoreland MAC 6176 to Sharp and Wheeler, 5 Dec 65; Msg, Wheeler JCS 4761–

65 to Westmoreland and Sharp, 7 Dec 65, both in Westmoreland Message files, CMH.
87

Organizing the Construction Effort

Instead, MACV’s problems were the lack of construction units, the lack 

of spare parts for construction equipment, and the delays in the delivery 

and distribution of critically needed building materials. Westmoreland 

especially disliked the funding restrictions that precluded rapid responsiveness to new requirements. He agreed that an augmentation of twenty-four 

people for his engineering office would improve its effectiveness. He also 

pointed out that a separation of the construction from the overall logistics function could cause more problems than it would solve. “Aside from 

[the] proliferation of staff elements,” Westmoreland argued that, “the close 

coordination between construction, movement control and transportation 

would be impaired.”18

By this time Westmoreland believed that the Pentagon was trying to tell 

him how to do his job. “It is incredible to me,” he recorded in his personal 

notes, “that higher headquarters would suggest how a subordinate command would be reorganized to do the job the commander is responsible for. 

Nevertheless, this proposal has been raised on several occasions, and despite 

my position, it is still an issue.” Sensing he would lose the argument anyhow, 

he proposed to Sharp another way to use General Dunn. In a carefully crafted 

backchannel message, Westmoreland suggested raising the rank of his J–4 to 

major general and putting Dunn in that position. “It has become increasingly 

clear to me,” he wrote, “that the magnitude of the logistics mission confronting 

the command calls for a J–4 of greater rank and more varied experience.” He 

praised the effectiveness of his current J–4 but noted “that an Army engineer 

officer is most likely to combine general logistic experience with competence 

to manage the extensive construction program.” Therefore, he concluded, the 

Defense Department should reconsider the construction czar proposal since 

the J–4 would be an Army engineer.19

On 18 December, Wheeler provided further guidance. He explained 

that the construction program—now approaching $1 billion—amounted to 

nearly one-half of the entire Corps of Engineers’ construction effort, both 

civil and military. This fact had impressed the chairman and seemed to prove 

that MACV required “powerful organizational arrangements.” Such a strong, 

centralized organization under a “construction boss,” Wheeler added, would 

receive “quick, top level approval” to Westmoreland’s appeals for more flexibility in the construction program. Without a construction boss in MACV, 

Wheeler predicted, “it is practically certain that procedures giving such flexibility will not receive approval, at least not at this time.”20

Although Admiral Sharp had supported Westmoreland, he realized something had to be done. He identified the construction problems in Vietnam 

to be those concerned with funding, the lack of construction personnel and 

18 Quote from Msg, COMUSMACV 43885 to CINCPAC, 8 Dec 65, sub: MACV Construction 

Staff Augmentation, box 44, 71A/2351, RG 330, NARA; Westmoreland Historical Notes, no. 2, 

8 Dec 65, Westmoreland History files, CMH; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 87. 19 Westmoreland Historical Notes, no. 2, 8 Dec 65; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 87; 

Msg, Westmoreland MAC 6257 to Sharp, 8 Dec 65, Westmoreland Message files, CMH. 20 Msg, Wheeler JCS 4934–65 to Westmoreland and Sharp, 18 Dec 65, Westmoreland 

Message files, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 204.
Engineers at War

88

General Westmoreland

equipment, and the long supply 

lines. If an Army engineer served as 

the J–4, then, according to Sharp, 

the MACV construction office 

should be headed by a Navy Civil 

Engineer Corps rear admiral. By 22 

December, Sharp agreed with the 

points brought out in Wheeler’s 18 

December message and withdrew 

his suggestion for the Navy engineer 

construction boss if it would help 

settle the matter. He also wanted to 

make sure that they did not set up 

the construction agency outside the 

MACV staff, with the agency’s operation left to “Westy’s judgement.” 

Realizing that further debate over a 

construction boss seemed fruitless, 

Sharp recommended that they “get 

on with setting him up.”21

On 20 December, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff recommended establishment 

of the position of construction boss, and on 6 January 1966 the deputy secretary 

of defense, Cyrus R. Vance, concurred. “It should be clearly understood,” Vance 

stated in a memorandum to Wheeler, “that the ‘engineer construction boss’ has 

full authority to discharge the responsibilities placed on him, and that such 

authority rests in him and not in the MACV-J4.” Sharp alerted Westmoreland, 

and Westmoreland promptly requested General Dunn for assignment as his J–4 

with authority vested in him to coordinate and control all construction projects. 

Brig. Gen. John D. Crowley, his current J–4, would serve as deputy J–4 and 

concentrate on matters other than construction. Westmoreland was convinced 

this approach offered him the most effective and efficient arrangement. This 

would permit Dunn to arbitrate conflicting interests involving port operations, 

transportation, and related matters essential to support construction. In another 

message to Sharp the following day, Westmoreland reiterated his concern that 

his construction boss should have control over funding allocations and expressed 

“strong views as to how my staff should be organized.”22

21 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 87; Msg, Sharp to Wheeler, 22 Dec 65, Westmoreland 

Message files, CMH. 22 Memo, JCS JCSM–891–65 for Sec Def, 20 Dec 65, sub: Construction Management 

in Vietnam, quoted in Msg, JCS 1836 to COMUSMACV, 17 Jan 66, sub: Construction 

Management in Vietnam, Dunn Papers, CMH; Memo, [Cyrus R.] Vance for Chairman, JCS, 

6 Jan 66, sub: Construction Management in Vietnam (first quotation), OCE Hist Ofc; Msg, 

Wheeler JCS 103–66 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 6 Jan 66; Msg, Westmoreland MAC 0179 to 

Sharp and Wheeler, 9 Jan 66, sub: Construction Czar; Msg, Westmoreland MAC 0215 to Sharp, 

10 Jan 66 (second quotation), all in Westmoreland Message files, CMH.
89

Organizing the Construction Effort

Wheeler replied on 13 January that no one had intended to tell Westmoreland 

how he should organize his staff. Still, Defense Department officials expressed 

skepticism over the proposal to make Dunn the J–4 and whether one officer 

could handle both jobs. Wheeler pointed out that pursuing the J–4 proposal 

“will inevitably delay the decentralizing of functions and funds as you have 

requested.” Reflecting on his experience as a general staff officer, the chairman 

did not see any problems of “rank inversion” between Crowley and Dunn. 

Westmoreland’s proposal, Wheeler added, might be the best solution, but he 

frankly doubted it. Two days later, Wheeler reiterated these concerns to both 

Sharp and Westmoreland. In discussing the matter with Secretary Vance, he 

learned that any relaxation of controls by the Defense Department “over the 

construction effort was predicated upon the construction boss being neither 

the J4 nor reporting through the J4 to COMUSMACV.”23

On 14 January, Wheeler informed Sharp and Westmoreland that Secretary 

McNamara had approved and issued a memorandum outlining interim procedures for construction management in Vietnam. In essence, Westmoreland’s 

construction boss had supervision and directive authority over all military 

and civilian agencies involved in military construction in the country. To help 

carry out this vast task, the engineering staff would be increased by three to 

four times the number of additional people requested by MACV. McNamara’s 

construction charter contained Defense Department policies dealing with 

approval and reprogramming of construction funds and standards of construction. The charter also gave to the MACV commander broad authority to 

issue construction directives within fifteen broadly defined functional categories (for example, cantonments, ports, maintenance buildings, hospitals, and 

airfield pavements). Westmoreland now had the authority to transfer funding 

from one category to another, provided the amount did not exceed 10 percent of the receiving functional category. The following month, McNamara 

amended this charter along with subsequent policy memos dealing with fiscal 

accounting and construction reporting procedures.24

Westmoreland decided to accept, at least for the time being, assigning 

Dunn solely as his construction chief. He still had reservations about the wording in Secretary Vance’s 6 January memorandum. In a message to Wheeler 

on the eighteenth, he complained: “It is inconceivable that ‘full’ authority be 

vested in one of my subordinates and not in me and further that I be restricted 

in the authority I might choose to delegate to my J4 in the interest of carrying 

out my broad and demanding responsibilities.” Still, he concluded “there is 

nothing to be gained at this juncture by making an issue of what I consider 

an arbitrary and unprecedented decision by Secretary Vance.” One week later, 

23 Msg, Wheeler JCS 205–66 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 13 Jan 66; Msg, Wheeler JCS 

227–66 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 15 Jan 66, both in Westmoreland Message files, CMH. 24 Msg, Wheeler JCS 213–66 to Sharp and Westmoreland, 14 Jan 66, Westmoreland Message 

files, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 204–05; Memos, [Robert S.] McNamara for JCS 

and Secretaries of Military Departments, 14 Jan and 12 Feb 66, sub: Construction Approval 

Procedures for South Vietnam; JCS JCSM–39–66 for CINCPAC, 14 Jan 66, sub: Construction 

Management in Vietnam, all in MACV Dir of Const, Plans and Opns Div, Development of the 

Construction Directorate, 15 Jun 70, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

90

General Dunn

Westmoreland learned that Time

magazine was preparing an article 

about construction in Vietnam. He 

decided to announce that General 

Dunn would be designated as his 

director of construction, not MACV 

engineer, since he would not have 

any troops under his command.25

In mid-January, Dunn left his 

assignment in Korea and proceeded 

to Washington to be briefed on the 

construction picture in Vietnam.26

He met with Sheridan and members 

of the Southeast Asia Construction 

Group. This group, established the 

previous September, monitored and 

supported the military construction 

programs presented to Congress. 

Its members included people from 

the Defense Department’s installations and logistics office and an 

Army colonel, an Air Force colonel, and a Navy captain from the services engineering offices. Dunn also met 

with Sheridan’s chief, Paul R. Ignatius, the assistant secretary of defense for 

installations and logistics. Ignatius pointed out that Secretary McNamara 

had granted to General Westmoreland a broad construction charter, which 

gave wide managerial latitude to his construction chief. Dunn would be given 

ninety days to develop a detailed construction program, while minimizing the 

inflationary effect of a huge construction program on the South Vietnamese 

economy. He also considered Dunn to be his representative in Saigon. Dunn 

25 Msg, Westmoreland MAC 0459 to Wheeler, 18 Jan 66, Westmoreland Message files, CMH; 

Westmoreland Historical Notes, no. 3, 25 Jan 66, Westmoreland History files, CMH. 26 Upon his graduation from the University of Illinois with a degree in mechanical engineering, Dunn was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1938 through the Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps and was selected to serve in the Regular Army. During World War II, he served as commander, 105th Engineer Battalion, 30th Infantry Division, which arrived in Normandy shortly 

after D-Day. He led the battalion across France to the Elbe River in Germany. Subsequent 

assignments included command of the 1153d Engineer Group (Combat) in France; Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G–4, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Swift, Texas, and Fort Lewis, Washington; 

instructor at the Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and the Engineer Section, General 

Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo, Japan, during the Korean War. After promotion to 

colonel, he served as Executive Officer to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C.; Director 

of the Army Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi; student at the Industrial 

College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C.; Area Engineer, Thule, Greenland; and 

Director and Deputy Commander of the Titan II Missile System Construction Program. As 

a brigadier general, he served as Division Engineer, Southwestern Division, Dallas, Texas; and 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, Seoul, Korea.
91

Organizing the Construction Effort

took this comment as a hint of the detailed control that would be exerted by 

the Defense Department over his operations in the war zone.27

On 18 January, Dunn and Sheridan met with members of the Military 

Construction Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Both 

soon found themselves the recipients of an informal hearing before the entire 

subcommittee gathered in the office of Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes of 

Florida, the chairman. Sikes remarked that the subcommittee had recently 

toured South Vietnam and voiced concern about the lack of construction 

battalions and lighterage to unload ships. Congressman Charles D. Long of 

Maryland asked about the engineer’s views on the call-up of reserve construction battalions. Dunn replied that deployment priorities should include units 

needed for the logistics base buildup, but he could not address the manner of 

providing such units. Long also came up with some interesting statistics. He 

foresaw a requirement for sixty construction battalions in Southeast Asia plus 

some 60,000 civilian laborers. South Vietnam had only 23,000 skilled workers, and the congressman prodded Sheridan for the Defense Department to 

make contractors run training programs raising the skill levels of Vietnamese 

workers.28

Dunn next met Air Force engineering officials. Brig. Gen. Guy H. Goddard, 

the deputy director for construction in the Air Force’s Directorate of Civil 

Engineering, pointed out that air base construction, although approved and 

funded, did not receive high enough priority. The chief problem, according 

to Goddard, stemmed from the Army’s failure to live up to its troop support 

agreement for construction in Vietnam and Thailand. Goddard also pointed 

out that the new Air Force Red Horse squadrons, organized to repair airfields 

and do light construction tasks, could not alleviate the airfield construction 

gap. The civilian head of the secretary of the Air Force’s installations office 

expressed similar concerns.29

In his meeting with R. Adm. A. C. Husband, chief of the Navy’s Bureau 

of Yards and Docks, Dunn was briefed on the problems faced by the Officer 

in Charge of Construction. First was the long lead times in letting contracts, 

and this tied up funds. The admiral pointed out the shortages of LSTs and 

lighterage and the backup of ships carrying construction materials. To make 

matters worse, the South Vietnamese government imposed enough red tape, 

which made it difficult to hire workers from other countries. It took a long 

time to get real estate. Equipment deliveries were frequently delayed. The 

27 MFR, Gray, 27 Jan 66; sub: Conference of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Properties and Installations), Ofc Asst Sec Def (Installations and Logistics), with Dunn; MFR, 

Gray, 27 Jan 66, sub: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) Meeting with 

Gen Dunn, MACV Engr Designate, Dunn Papers, CMH; Dunn, Base Development, p. 43; 

Engineer Memoirs, Lieutenant General Carroll H. Dunn (Alexandria, Va.: Office of History, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, 1998), p. 102. 28 MFR, Gray, 27 Jan 66, sub: Appearance of Gen Dunn Before Military Construction 

Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee, Dunn Papers, CMH. 29 MFRs, Gray, 27 Jan 66, sub: Briefing of Gen Dunn, by the Department of the Air Force 

Directorate of Civil Engineering, and Conference of Gen Dunn with Deputy for Installations, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations and Logistics), both in Dunn 

Papers, CMH.
Engineers at War

92

Navy’s office in Saigon needed more specific instructions by the using agencies 

and increased staffing to prepare plans. In several cases, contractors could not 

disengage from projects after completing most of the work because of add-on 

refinements by the customers. Refinements could be better done by military 

engineers. To obtain a better balance of troop and contract construction, the 

Navy engineers advised assigning construction troops in areas threatened by 

the enemy. Dunn also learned that the Navy’s contracting effort, running at a 

rate of some $14 million per month, would gradually climb to $40 million by 

October 1966.30

Dunn’s whirlwind visit to the capital included meeting more officials. He 

attended meetings with the Army chief of engineers, members of the Army 

Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff J–4. The new construction chief wrapped 

up his stay by resolving some questions in a final conference with Ignatius 

and Sheridan. Dunn pointed out his concern with the fiscal accountability 

restrictions in McNamara’s 14 January memorandum, which he felt, if not 

resolved, would impede management of the construction program. The construction charter called for funds to be apportioned to each service by Defense 

Department categories, altogether forty-five separate accounts. Dunn suggested 

a breakout of funds not further than the three services. Otherwise he would 

become a “chief accountant” at the expense of his construction management 

function. Ignatius agreed, and the Defense Department made this and several 

other administrative changes in a memorandum signed by McNamara on 12 

February. In addition, the Officer in Charge of Construction would maintain 

fiscal accounting for the contracts it administered. This practical arrangement 

did not last long. Later, the Defense Department reinstated restrictive funding 

and accounting procedures.31

A New Directorate

On 15 February 1966, the MACV Directorate of Construction became 

operational. Besides overseeing the construction program, General Dunn as 

the director of construction also assumed control of the advisory effort for the 

South Vietnamese Army engineers. Structured along functional lines, the new 

directorate organized the former MACV engineering office into seven main 

divisions: Administrative, Engineering and Base Development, Construction 

Management, Real Estate, Program Management, Plans and Operations, and 

Engineer Advisory. The initial organization called for 144 people, about onehalf Army, one-quarter Navy and Marine Corps, and one-quarter Air Force. To 

30 MFR, Gray, [1] 8 Jan 66, sub: Briefing of Gen Dunn, MACV Engr Designate, by Navy 

Bureau of Yards and Docks, Dunn Papers, CMH. 31 MFR, Gray, 1 Feb 66, sub: Principal Level Conference to Resolve Funding Procedures for 

the South Vietnam Construction Program, Dunn Papers, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, 

pp. 204–05; Memo, McNamara for JCS and Secretaries of Military Departments, 12 Feb 66, sub: 

Construction Approval Procedures for South Vietnam; Memo, Department of Defense (DoD) 

Comptroller for JCS and Service Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management, 7 Mar 66, sub: 

Fiscal Procedures and Accounting for Construction in Vietnam, both in MACV Dir of Const, 

Plans and Opns Div, Development of the Construction Directorate, Dunn Papers, CMH.
93

Organizing the Construction Effort

reflect the joint makeup of the directorate, MACV assigned a Navy civil engineering corps captain as the deputy and an Air Force engineer lieutenant colonel 

as the executive officer. Army engineers headed five of the divisions while Air 

Force engineers headed the other two (Engineering and Base Development, 

and Program Management). The Engineer Advisory Division remained entirely 

staffed by the Army.32 (Chart 3)

When Dunn reported to Westmoreland, he put any doubts about his 

role to rest. McNamara’s memorandums in effect delegated to the director 

of construction the authority to decide requirements and set priorities, which 

bothered Westmoreland. In one of Dunn’s first meetings with the MACV 

commander, Westmoreland alluded to the fact that the secretary of defense 

32 Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 05240 to CINCPAC, 18 Feb 66, sub: Construction 

Management Organization, MACV; MACV Directive 415–2, 15 Feb 66, Construction: Mission 

and Functions of the Director of Construction, p. 1, in MACV Dir of Const, Plans and Opns 

Div, Development of the Construction Directorate, Dunn Papers, CMH; Joint Tables of 

Distribution, Construction Directorate, MACV, 1 May 66, pp. 1–7, Historians files, CMH.

Director of

Construction

   

Officers    23        14         12          49

Enlisted Men  19          4           6          29

Total     43        18         18          78

Source: Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, p. 163

Deputy Director

Engineering/Base

Development Division

Real Estate

Division

Construction

Management Division

Program

Management Division

Plans and

Operations Division

Executive Officer

Administrative Division

Engineer 

Advisory Division*

Army   Navy   Air Force  Total

*Totals do not include the Engineer Advisory Division.

Chart 3—MACV Construction Director
Engineers at War

94

had given this authority to his construction chief. Dunn responded: “I know 

for whom I work, and obviously the priorities that are going to be set are those 

which you feel are the ones needed.” After that conversation, Dunn recalled 

the two had a good working relationship, and “never once did he fail to back 

me up completely in the decisions that I reached.”33

Dunn’s first task as director of construction was to sort out the growing 

number of projects required by the three services and to work out a priority 

list. Kennedy and Raymond, the latter now Dunn’s deputy, had thrashed over 

these same problems. But Dunn had a Defense Department charter that gave 

him the authority to approve what each service did with its construction funds. 

This authority clearly allowed him to allocate troops, contractors, or a mix 

of both to each major project. The breakout for the building effort remained 

essentially the same. Seabees and Marine Corps engineers supported all the 

services in I Corps. Army engineers supported the services in the other three 

corps. The large construction consortium of RMK-BRJ continued to work on 

projects throughout the country.34

Between 1965 and the spring of 1966, MACV’s construction priorities 

began taking a dramatic turn. In 1965, General Westmoreland topped his 

list with improving airfields and related facilities, then improving roads and 

railroads, rehabilitating and expanding ports, and building logistics facilities. 

Putting logistics facilities at the bottom of the priority list, however, created 

another problem. Deep-draft vessels brought about 90 percent of all military 

supplies and equipment into the country. Of that amount, construction materials alone constituted about 40 percent. This presented an ironic situation. 

Increased shipping carrying the materiel for the buildup was backing up offshore, which, in turn, delayed construction of the ports and storage facilities 

needed to resolve the shipping backup. The same limited berth space at the 

Saigon port also had to make way for ships carrying U.S. economic assistance 

and other commercial shipping. Secretary McNamara, during his visit to South 

Vietnam in November 1965, voiced his annoyance over what he considered 

overlapping and conflicting priorities exemplified by the glut of ocean-going 

ships anchored off the mouth of the Saigon River at Vung Tau waiting their 

turn to use the Saigon port. Colonel Raymond and the Officer in Charge of 

Construction came up with a quick estimate to fund the urgently needed port 

work and presented the defense secretary with a revised program. Following 

McNamara’s visit, Westmoreland reevaluated the priorities and shifted more 

effort to port improvements and logistical facilities.35

For some time, Air Force officials had complained about what they 

termed inadequate construction support. Even when airfield work ranked 

at the top of the priority list, the air service criticized the lack of support 

33 Engineer Memoirs, Lieutenant General Carroll H. Dunn, p. 103 (quotation). 34 Ibid., pp. 212–13; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 204–05. 35 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 36, 51; Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 17; Tregaskis, Building 

the Bases, pp. 188–90; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJOO 42038 to CINCPAC, 28 Nov 65, sub: 

Priority of Construction, RVN, box 4, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; Interv, Stuart I. Rochester 

with Maj Gen Daniel Raymond, 11 Jan 80, pp. 71–72, OCE Hist Ofc; MACV J–4 Briefing, 28 

Nov 65, Historians files, CMH.
95

Organizing the Construction Effort

to complete new airstrips and improve older ones at Cam Ranh Bay, Phan 

Rang, Qui Nhon, and Tan Son Nhut. As far back as June 1965, the Pacific 

Air Forces had requested two reinforced Army engineer battalions to operate under Air Force control. Westmoreland, however, insisted on establishing an integrated priority list and keeping the Army engineer troop 

construction effort under Army control.36

When Dunn arrived in Saigon, he found his staff engaged in the planning stages reflecting the recent changes in priorities. Westmoreland had just 

postponed construction of a jet fighter base and supporting port complex at 

Tuy Hoa. The air base work, scheduled to start on 1 February, had dropped 

in priority following the review giving preference to ports. Although the 

MACV commander confirmed the need for three additional air bases, their 

siting would be determined by existing and programmed port projects. New 

air bases requiring port facilities that only supported those bases, like Tuy 

Hoa, dropped to a lower priority. Besides, MACV had just received $4.3 million to design and construct the first increment of a new large port complex, 

Project Newport, to improve Saigon’s port capacity. In addition, desi

work by the Officer in Charge of Construction continued for another highpriority job, a new MACV headquarters complex in Saigon. This project, 

which had Westmoreland’s personal interest, required delicate, high-level 

negotiations for valuable real estate. Negotiations were also under way with 

Vietnamese officials to resolve real estate problems encountered by RMKBRJ at its University quarry site outside Saigon.37

Then there were additional construction requirements driven by expected 

increases in U.S. and allied strength. At another joint planning conference 

held in Hawaii in early February 1966, Westmoreland asked Sharp for more 

troops. From a seventy-one battalion force arranged with McNamara the preceding summer, the MACV commander now foresaw the need to increase his 

combat force to 102 infantry battalions, 79 U.S. and 23 allied. The increase of 

American troop strength to 429,000 included many support troops, and this 

meant a further increase in the base construction program.38

By the spring of 1966, Dunn refined construction priorities using the 

Defense Department’s fifteen functional categories. He divided these categories into five priorities. The command grouped port facilities, airfield 

pavements, and communications facilities under Priority I. Airfield support complexes, hospitals, maintenance support buildings, and liquid fuel 

36 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, p, 66; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN 22789 to 

CINCUSARPAC, 2 Jul 65, sub: USARPAC FY 1966 Construction Requirements Priority 

List; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN 27583 to CINCPAC, 6 Aug 65, sub: Engineer Troop 

Support for USAF in RVN, both in box 26, 77/53, RG 319, NARA. 37 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, p, 66; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN 22789 to 

CINCUSARPAC, 2 Jul 65, sub: USARPAC FY 1966 Construction Requirements Priority List; 

Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ4-EN 27583 to CINCPAC, 6 Aug 65, sub: Engineer Troop Support 

for USAF in RVN; Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 23 Jan 66, sub: Airfield and Port 

Construction; Disposition Form (DF), MACV Dir of Const to Ch, Hist Br, MACV, 19 Feb 66, 

sub: Historical Summary [1–31 Jan 66]. Second and third msgs and DF in Historians files, CMH. 38 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 192–93.
Engineers at War

96

storage followed under Priority II. Priority III included ammunition storage, cold storage, warehouse storage, and administrative buildings. Projects 

in Priority IV encompassed lines of communications (roads and railways), 

shed storage, and open storage areas. Cantonments placed last in Priority 

V. MACV listed the Newport project as the highest priority followed 

more port work at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Vung Tau. 

The command also listed the other Priority I projects, including the runways, aprons, and taxiways at four air bases (Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phan 

Rang, and Phu Cat), and several sophisticated communications systems. 

While outlining the priorities in answer to a query from the U.S. Embassy 

in Saigon, MACV also pointed out that troop self-help was to be used 

to the maximum to build the cantonments. Ongoing plans to move many 

support units out of Saigon resulted in the command giving Long Binh the 

highest priority in the cantonment category.39

A few weeks after his arrival, General Dunn presented an up-to-date 

status report on military construction to Admiral Sharp during his visit to 

Saigon. Dunn pointed out that the funding picture, including the anticipated 

Fiscal Year 1966 supplemental appropriation, now totaled approximately 

$861 million. Since troop labor involved only the cost of materials, Dunn 

noted that this amount would total just over $1.2 billion if the work was 

assigned to a contractor. He also mentioned the add-on of another $1.3 billion in contract costs for new projects outlined in the February conference in 

Hawaii, increasing the construction program to approximately $2.5 billion in 

contract values. To bring home the impact of getting the job done with his 

available resources, Dunn pointed to another chart depicting a month-bymonth execution capability by military engineers and contractors. Together, 

the U.S. construction forces could complete about $601.4 million in work 

during 1966. This meant that, at the same rate of accomplishment, it would 

not be until mid-November 1967 before a start could be made on the new 

requirements.40

During the briefing, Dunn emphasized the need to have fund authorization for the added projects before beginning work. At least five to six months’ 

lead time was necessary to obtain certain construction materials. Longer lead 

times were necessary to get plants and specialized equipment such as dredges. 

Unless advance procurement funds became available, the MACV construction 

chief warned that advance procurement would have to come out of the command’s operating funds, thus cutting back on the rate of ongoing work.41

Dunn believed that by the end of 1966, minimal acceptable facilities 

could be completed to support tactical and logistical operations. This could 

only happen after giving close attention to priorities and carefully allocating 

resources. American forces, however, would still be left “with much less than 

39 Memo, Dunn for Dep Amb William Porter, 20 May 66, sub: MACV Military Construction 

Priorities, Historians files, CMH. 40 MFR, MACV Dir of Const, 3 Mar 66, sub: General Dunn’s Briefing for Admiral Sharp 

on 3 March 1966, Historians files, CMH. 41 Ibid.
97

Organizing the Construction Effort

the needed facilities for the desired degree of efficiency in operations and 

economy of effort.” Although he expected that the installation of additional 

DeLong piers and other port work would provide adequate port capacities by 

August 1966, much remained to be done in ancillary facilities—hardstands, 

transit storage, access roads, and other improvements—to increase the efficiency of port operations. The same applied to the need for tactical jet airfields. 

He cited the minimum aircraft “beddown” requirements that were developed 

at a Pacific Command conference in January. Dunn went on to say that the 

expeditionary airfield construction, and expansion at existing airfields, should 

meet essential operational needs. Prefabricated runways and additional aprons 

would be in service that year, but some effectiveness, efficiency, and safety margins would be sacrificed. The permanent airfield pavements and upgrading 

air base facilities, he noted, would stretch out beyond the end of the year. He 

warned that such projections were independent of any contingency requirements that might arise.42

The director of construction went on to outline starts on new projects, 

progress on others, and some improvements in funding and management. 

During McNamara’s visit the previous November, MACV received authorization to start Project Newport and the new MACV headquarters. Washingt

also made funds available for advance procurement of long-lead-time items. 

Work was now under way at Newport. Long Binh was being transformed into 

a major logistical base. Clearing a site for the new MACV headquarters building at Tan Son Nhut Air Base had begun, and prefabricated building materials were on order. Enough DeLong pier units to provide sixteen deep-draft 

berths were due in April, and installation was expected by September. Dunn 

expressed some satisfaction in the relief granted by the Defense Department 

in financial accounting and funding flexibility. In addition, McNamara had 

gone to Congress with a request for a $200 million contingency fund to meet 

unforeseen construction requirements worldwide.43

As far as construction assets were concerned, Dunn could claim some 

progress in the first three months of 1966. The 18th Engineer Brigade increased 

from nine to eleven battalions. The 30th Naval Construction Regiment would 

expand from four to five battalions in March. Two Air Force Red Horse squadrons had arrived at Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay Air Bases. RMK-BRJ’s 

workforce now stood at 28,066, and the value of the consortium’s physical plant 

had grown from $32.9 to $53.5 million. The Officer in Charge of Construction 

had brought in two dredges with seven more on the way. In appraising the 

construction picture to Sharp after three weeks on the job, Dunn summarized: 

“A lot of progress made; a long way to go; a lot of problems to solve; and, a 

good solid foundation has been made.”44

The timely arrival of the right type and enough construction materials stood high among the construction chief’s concerns. He communicated 

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid. (quotation); CHECO Rpt, PACAF, 1 Sep 69, sub: Project Red Horse, pp. 5, 9, cop

in Historians files, CMH (hereafter cited as Project Red Horse
Engineers at War

98

directly with General Frank S. Besson Jr., commander of the Army Materiel 

Command, to work out a forecast of tonnages and a shipping plan. Even 

under ideal circumstances, Besson noted it would take between 120 to 

150 days lead time to ship materials from the United States. The Materiel 

Command was charged with getting more DeLong piers, and Dunn prodded 

Besson to include these units as early as possible. To cut down on production 

and shipping lead times, Besson pressed forth with negotiations to have the 

piers built in Japan. The two generals also exchanged ideas on a proposal to 

take World War II T–2 (Liberty ship) tankers out of storage, convert them 

into electrical power-generating ships, and move them to port and base complexes. The contractor operator would then tie the power ships into a land 

electrical distribution system, to be built and maintained by the contractor. Dunn suggested such systems for Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Nha 

Trang, and possibly Vung Tau and Long Binh.45

Another method to speed up procurement of construction equipment 

and material entailed creative financing. Earlier, in September 1965, Secretary 

McNamara had authorized some advanced procurement for the services in 

anticipation of additional funding, but even these expedient measures fell 

short. In January 1966, McNamara authorized the Bureau of Yards and 

Docks “advance obligation authority.” This temporary procedure authorized the bureau to use $200 million in the Navy Stock Fund for additional 

advanced procurement to support projects in Vietnam. The Navy engineering 

office could obligate money in contract arrangements, but no expenditures 

would be made until Congress appropriated the $700 million in supplemental 

funds requested for 1966. In late March, Dunn advised the chief of engineers 

that his office authorized the Officer in Charge of Construction to purchase 

over $40 million in equipment, over $33 million for generators, and $4 million 

for DeLong piers at Da Nang. He added that the advance purchase of one 

thousand prefabricated buildings and thirty highway bridges would follow, 

thus cutting down on the critical lead time to get these projects under way. 

When Congress appropriated the supplemental funds, the services reimbursed 

the Navy Stock Fund.46

Ironically, Dunn had to put up with some reduction in funding because of 

urgent requirements to expand training bases in the United States. The Army’s 

funding requirement to improve and build facilities at training centers and 

schools and for new units turned out to be greater than anticipated. In early June 

1966, with the Defense Department’s concurrence, the Army reprogrammed 

some construction funds destined for Southeast Asia. This amounted to a $37.1 

45 Msg, Gen Frank S. Besson, CG, U.S. Army Materiel Cmd, WDC 3441 to Dunn, 19 Mar 

66; Dunn SOG 0287 to Besson, 3 Apr 66; Dunn SOG 0297 to Besson, 5 Apr 66; Dunn SOG 

0316 to Besson, 12 Apr 66, all in Dunn Papers, CMH. 46 Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 6 Oct 65, p. 38, 3 Nov 65, p. 56, 2 Mar 66, p. 67, CMH; 

Memo, McNamara for Service Secretaries, 22 Sep 65, sub: Advance Procurement of 

Construction Materials and Construction Equipment for U.S. Military Construction in South 

Vietnam, Historians files, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 198–99; JLRB, Monograph 

6, Construction, p. 104; Msg, Dunn SOG 152 to Maj Gen Thomas J. Hayes, Dep Ch of Engrs, 

OCE, 22 Mar 66, Dunn Papers, CMH.
99

Organizing the Construction Effort

million cut and caused major readjustments to Army projects in Vietnam. To 

make matters worse, the Officer in Charge of Construction informed Dunn 

of escalating contract costs. Calling upon the tenant units to help build their 

own cantonments reduced contract labor costs and spared engineering troops 

for higher-priority projects. In responding to a congressional query passed on 

to him by Brig. Gen. Charles C. Noble, Sheridan’s chief for Southeast Asia 

construction, Dunn noted that many combat and support units had already 

made extensive use of self-help to improve their living conditions.47

Perhaps Dunn’s severest challenge as construction chief centered on the 

Air Force’s demand to build its own jet fighter base at Tuy Hoa. Not at all 

happy with Westmoreland’s construction priorities, Air Force officials in 

Washington pressed demands for the immediate construction of more airfields. In February, the air service proposed hiring its own contractor, thus 

bypassing the use of Army engineers and the Navy’s prime contractor. This 

so-called turnkey proposal invited the contractor to design and build the base 

in a single package and literally turn over the keys of the completed facility to 

the user. At first Dunn, Westmoreland, and Sharp did not agree, but the Air 

Force argued that its contractor would add to MACV’s construction assets. 

Both sides continued arguing who should build the base and whether or not 

to shift the location to Hue. In early May, McNamara decided to let the Air 

Force build the base at Tuy Hoa. Before the month was out, the Air Force had 

selected a contractor, who moved quickly to build an interim AM2 aluminum 

matting runway, and then a permanent runway and all of the facilities for a 

complete air base. Six months later, F–100 jet fighters touched down on the 

interim runway.48

Despite the Pentagon’s insistence on making Dunn the director of construction, he served in that job for only five months. By 1 July, Westmoreland 

had made his move to make the engineer general his J–4. Since airfields, ports, 

and bases remained high priorities, the MACV commander still preferred to 

have an engineer officer as head of his logistical staff. In early April, he discussed the matter with Secretary Vance during his visit to Vietnam. Vance, who 

earlier rejected Westmoreland’s proposal to appoint Dunn as J–4, now agreed. 

“This, I hope settles the matter,” Westmoreland wrote in his diary, “which was 

somewhat annoying to me several months ago when JCS proceeded to organize the staff and failed to support a position that I had very strongly taken.” 

He then advised Admiral Sharp, General Wheeler, and General Johnson 

that Dunn would take over the MACV logistical position on 1 July and that 

47 Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 22 Jun 66, p. 45, 22 Aug 66, p. 11, CMH; Richard P. Weinert, 

The Role of USCONARC in the Army Buildup, FY 1966 (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Continental 

Army Command, 1967), pp. 172–73; Msg, Dunn SOG 0579 to Maj Gen Charles C. Noble, 

Chief Southeast Asia Construction, Asst Sec Def (Installations and Logistics), DoD, 21 Jun 66, 

Dunn Papers, CMH. 48 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 219–22; Schlight, Years of the Offensive, pp. 87–88, 

120–22, 155; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 62–63; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC 06315 to 

CINCPAC, 27 Feb 66, sub: USAF Proposal for Additional Cost Plus Fixed Fee Construction 

Contractor in Vietnam, box 4, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; Msg, Dunn SOG 152 to Hayes, 22 

Mar 66, Dunn Papers, CMH.
Engineers at War

100

Raymond would become the new director of construction. When Dunn took 

on his new job, he would be a major general and Raymond would have his star. 

As J–4, Dunn exercised general guidance over the Construction Directorate 

until his departure in September 1967. By that time, Westmoreland’s top logistics priority had become supply and supply management, and he recruited a 

skilled manager in that field to replace Dunn.49

Operational Control

As more engineers arrived in Vietnam, operational control became increasingly a matter of debate and concern. Tactical commanders felt that the workload and the demands placed on them justified the need for additional combat 

49 Quote from Westmoreland Historical Notes, no. 5, 6 Apr 66; Msg, Westmoreland MAC 2751 

to Sharp, Wheeler, and Gen Johnson, 7 Apr 66, Westmoreland Message files, CMH; Westmoreland, 

A Soldier Reports, p. 509; Engineer Memoirs, Lieutenant General Carroll H. Dunn, p. 104.

General Dunn visits the 45th Engineer Group headquarters in Qui Nhon in late 

1967 as the MACV J–4. From left to right, seated: Brig. Gen. Charles M. Duke, 

commanding general of 18th Engineer Brigade; General Dunn; and Col. Kenneth 

T. Sawyer, commanding officer of the 45th Engineer Group. Group staff in the 

background includes the author (second from the left).
101

Organizing the Construction Effort

engineer units. Organic engineer units lacked the manpower and equipment to 

handle all the tasks involved in base development. Just to move the equipment 

of a division or a brigade by road to a bivouac area or base camp dictated 

extensive engineering effort. In such cases, nondivisional engineer units proved 

valuable with their greater capability to provide materials such as rock, sand, 

culverts, and earth fill.50

The operational control of units under General Ploger’s command became 

an issue from the moment the first engineer units came ashore. The initial 

emphasis on base development made engineer commanders and staff officers 

reluctant to transfer any of the few units available to the tactical commands. 

At the end of 1965, the 18th Engineer Brigade had five combat battalions 

in country, all committed to construction, with two more expected momentarily. Under more conventional circumstances, an Army corps would have 

commanded at least one engineer group or perhaps one group per division, 

with the groups receiving directions from the corps engineer. In Vietnam, however, General Westmoreland had established the Field Force, Vietnam, at Nha 

Trang. Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, who became the deputy commanding general, 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, in January 1966, agreed that 18th Engineer Brigade units 

would not be placed under field force command. He and Ploger felt that the 

demands of the construction program were such that the engineer brigade had 

to keep control of all its construction assets, including the combat battalions. 

Ploger also emphasized that engineers placed under the control of tactical 

commanders could be misused on pet or unessential projects.51

When Ploger had briefed General Westmoreland the previous November, 

he felt then that the 18th Engineer Brigade could ill afford to attach units to 

the tactical commands. Besides, most of the brigade’s equipment could not 

be easily transported aboard helicopters to support the fast-flowing combat 

operations. Attached units, Ploger said later, “would have spent more time 

traveling about the countryside than working as engineers.” The 18th Engineer 

Brigade commander believed “every hour and every day engineer troops spent 

away from the work site constituted a serious waste.”52

The command structure that Ploger and his subordinate commanders developed, both for construction and operational support, corresponded closely to 

the principle of general support used by artillery units. While the major construction projects influenced the location and distribution of 18th Engineer Brigade 

units, the centralized system allowed engineer commanders to dispatch the closest units to support tactical operations. In Vietnam, the field force commands 

(Field Force, Vietnam, in II Corps, later designated I Field Force, Vietnam, 

when II Field Force, Vietnam, was established in early 1966) had their own planning sections but no assigned troops, and had to request the use of the general 

support engineer units. Each supporting unit commander could disapprove the 

request in whole or in part. This rarely happened since Ploger made it clear to all 

50 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 140, 186–87. 51 Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 22–23.

52 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 140–41; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, p. 17 (quoted 

words).
Engineers at War

102

his commanders and officers that operational support missions had top priority. 

If they could not handle a request, they were to pass it up through the engineer 

chain. Although this system was designed to suit the situation in Vietnam, tactical commanders still preferred direct control over supporting engineers.53 

The 70th Engineer Combat Battalion’s general support mission at An 

Khe is a good example. Experience showed that it took at least one battalionmonth to prepare a site for use by one division. The 70th Engineer Battalion’s 

attempt to help set up the 1st Cavalry Division’s base camp in less time pointed 

out the need for more engineer troops, and the battalion remained at An Khe 

long after the arrival of the division, improving facilities and living conditions. 

In time, as more engineer battalions arrived in Vietnam, the divisions found 

at least one of the 18th Engineer Brigade’s battalions conveniently located at 

or near their base camps. When the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to northern 

Binh Dinh Province, backup support was provided by the nearby 19th and 35th 

Engineer Battalions. In the western highlands, the 20th and 299th Engineer 

Battalions at Pleiku were often summoned to help division engineers.54

Oddly enough, occasional circumstances caused the 18th Engineer 

Brigade to control divisional engineering units. An advance element of the 

25th Division—Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion—served under 18th 

Engineer Brigade and 35th Engineer Group control until the arrival of the 3d 

Brigade, 25th Division. The divisional engineer company did a variety of construction work that included joining forces with elements of light equipment 

and dump truck companies at Dong Ba Thin airfield complex. Company C 

also carried out the combat engineers’ secondary role as infantry by providing 

convoy security to the 62d Engineer Construction Battalion when it moved to 

Phan Rang.55

Ploger’s insistence on a centralized system of control not only had advantages from an engineering standpoint, but also benefitted nearby tactical units. 

Since engineer groups and battalions operated in assigned areas of responsibility, the need to move units from other areas over long distances was greatly 

reduced. This also gave the enemy fewer opportunities to ambush slow-moving 

convoys carrying construction equipment. The assignment of a given area to 

an engineer unit allowed it to become familiar with the local terrain and conditions. Over a period of time, this helped the divisions and brigades when they 

operated in these localities. An engineer battalion based near the new area 

of operations of redeployed divisions and brigades could be called upon for 

support and local intelligence and continue to apply its experience there to the 

nearby combat unit’s advantage.56

The peculiar requirements of cost accounting for construction projects 

also dictated the need for centralized control. The accounting procedures 

53 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 142, 186; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 17–18; 

Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 9, p. 10; Ltr, Ploger to All Officers, sub: Concept of 

Engineer Operations SVN, 16 Nov 66, box 31, 77/51, RG 319, NARA. 54 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 187. 55 Ibid., p. 55; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 96; The 25th’s 25th . . . in Combat, Tropic Lightning,

pp. 187–89. 56 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 188.
103

Organizing the Construction Effort

laid out by the Defense Department specified that an accurate record be kept 

showing the dollar value of material used in and the number of man-hours 

expended on any given project at any point in time. The task of keeping a 

running account of total costs and manpower used on a project evolved into a 

difficult procedure even when passed up through the various headquarters. If 

this function had been done by divisional battalions or brigade units assigned 

or attached to tactical headquarters, separate reporting chains would have 

been necessary. Along with this responsibility would have gone the administrative burden and problems of verification and enforcement that would have 

complicated the already rigorous demands placed on the tactical organizations 

in the field. As General Ploger later pointed out, even while doing base camp 

self-help projects, tactical units looked to an engineer unit to do all the cost 

accounting. If the engineers providing the supervision and guidance for the 

self-help projects did not handle the flow of construction materials as well as 

the bookkeeping, the magnitude of the paperwork would have overwhelmed 

the tactical units.57

Toward an Engineer Command

During the second half of 1966, the 18th Engineer Brigade gained more 

critically needed units and group headquarters to share command and control 

responsibilities. The 45th Engineer Group (Construction) under Col. George M. 

Bush traveled from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and arrived at Cam Ranh Bay 

in early June. Upon settling in at Dong Ba Thin across the bay, the 45th Group 

assumed control over the 20th and 39th Engineer Battalions, two light equipment 

companies, and a dump truck company from the 35th Group. On 31 July, Lt. 

Col. James L. Kelly’s 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction) from Fort Benning 

arrived and joined the 45th Group. Also that month, the 79th Engineer Group 

(Construction) from Fort Lewis, Washington, set up its headquarters at Long 

Binh. The 79th Group, commanded by Col. David C. Clymer, took over control 

of the 168th and 588th Engineer Battalions and two light equipment companies 

from the 159th Group. Two later arrivals, the 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

in September and the 86th Engineer Battalion (Combat) in October, expanded the 

group to four combat battalions and several smaller units. The 159th Group at 

Long Binh added the 169th Engineer Battalion (Construction) from Okinawa in 

May, which together with the 46th and 62d Construction Battalions comprised a 

construction group made up of three construction battalions. By mid-November, 

two more combat battalions, the 14th from Fort Bragg and the 35th from Fort 

Lewis, arrived, with the 14th going to the 35th Group and the 35th to the 45th 

Group. In addition, another divisional engineer unit served with the 18th Brigade. 

In October, the 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, preceded the division’s move from Fort Riley to III Corps and the Mekong Delta in December 1966 

and January 1967. For the time being, the 15th Engineer Battalion came under the 

operational control of the 159th Group. In a little over one year, Army engineer 

57 Ibid., pp. 188–89.
Engineers at War

104

units under the 18th Brigade had grown to 5 groups, 19 battalions, 21 companies, 

2 separate platoons, and 7 detachments.58

Since the Army had established three principal logistical support bases at 

Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and the Saigon–Long Binh area, General Ploger 

initially superimposed his three groups’ areas of responsibility in and around 

these base areas. The 937th Group at Qui Nhon provided engineering construction and combat support to U.S. forces in northern II Corps. The 35th 

Group at Cam Ranh Bay did the same in southern II Corps, and the 159th 

Group at Long Binh supported both III and IV Corps. Adjustments to these 

geographic areas of responsibility followed the arrival of the 45th and 79th 

Groups. Projects and engineer units at Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, Dong Ba Thin 

and the northern Cam Ranh peninsula were transferred from the 35th Group 

to the 45th Group. Most of III Corps and the units in the area were transferred 

to the 79th Group, which permitted the 159th Group to concentrate on base 

development projects in the Saigon–Long Binh area.59

A group’s designation as either construction or combat had only a small 

effect on the nature of its assigned mission or type of units assigned to it. 

Although four of the group headquarters were organized to oversee construction units and one to lead combat engineers, the assignment of geographic 

areas and work in these areas led to the attachment of a mix of combat 

and construction battalions to groups regardless of their designation. By 1 

November 1966, seven of the ten combat engineer battalions worked under 

two of the four construction groups while one of the seven construction battalions served under the direction of the brigade’s only combat group, the 

937th. With the arrival of the 35th Engineer Battalion in early November, 

another combat battalion was added to a construction group.60

Other measures were also taken to keep track of operations. Control of 

five groups put an added burden on the 18th Brigade headquarters at Tan Son 

Nhut. As a partial remedy, General Ploger directed that each group assign a 

liaison officer to the brigade’s operations section. The activation of a second 

U.S. corps-level command, II Field Force, Vietnam, under General Seaman 

at Long Binh, in March 1966, to coordinate the U.S. ground war in III Corps 

prompted the brigade to establish a Combat Support Section. For the sake of 

consistency, General Larsen’s Field Force, Vietnam, at Nha Trang, which filled 

the same function in II Corps, received a new name, becoming I Field Force, 

Vietnam. Serving as the link to the field forces, the Combat Support Branch 

coordinated operational support for the two field forces.61

58 45th Engr Gp Hist, 10 Sep 70, p. 1; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 18th Engr Bde, 26 Aug 66, 

pp. 4–5, 18, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Nov 66, p. 13, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 577th Engr 

Bn, 31 Oct 66, p. 3, all in Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 131–33; Galloway, 

“Essayons,” pp. 136, 138–39, 144, 148, 155. 59 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 132 and maps pp. 85, 132; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 18th Engr 

Bde, p. 4; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, I FFV, 25 Aug 66, p. 42 and incl. 46, Historians files, CMH. 60 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 102–03; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, I FFV, p. 42, and incl. 46.

61 Eckhardt, Command and Control, pp. 52–54; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 21 Jul 66, 18th 

Engr Bde, p. 1, Historians files, CMH, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 18th Engr Bde, p. 6; Ploger, Army 

Engineers, p. 133.
105

Organizing the Construction Effort

Although units in the brigade submitted progress reports and communicated via radio-teletype, Ploger and subordinate commanders and staffs also 

kept abreast of progress by frequent visits. Helicopters and other small aircraft 

parceled out between the brigade and group headquarters allowed commanders and staff officers to check on even the most remote projects. Ploger made it 

a point to check with the supported unit commanders. In this way, he reiterated 

priorities and made sure 18th Brigade units complied with his policies. One 

policy insisted that the engineers did not enjoy any better accommodations or 

facilities than the other units. During his first trip to Qui Nhon not long after 

his arrival, Ploger found out that the engineers had built a very fine service 

club with materials in critically short supply. After pointing the responsible 

officers “in the right direction,” he later reflected that the low-priority facility 

“could have come back to bite anybody associated with it if we hadn’t changed 

that fairly rapidly.”62

With five groups in country and a sixth due in, a change to the Army 

engineer command structure seemed imminent. Plans for a larger organization centered on an engineer command. Ploger visualized an Army command 

engineer assisted by a deputy overseeing two brigades. He felt that these two 

positions and the two brigades could be handled by four brigadier generals. 

Further, Ploger considered setting up an integrated staff, that is, one engineering office for both the engineer command and U.S. Army, Vietnam. General 

Engler, however, favored an engineer command headed by a major general 

with the command disassociated from the U.S. Army, Vietnam, staff as was 

done with the 1st Logistical Command. He preferred to have engineering 

matters processed through the U.S. Army, Vietnam, G–4, a common practice 

since most special staffs coordinated actions through one of the general staffs. 

Besides, Ploger on 1 November 1966 would become a major general and outrank all the general staff.63

Before the end of 1966, General Ploger took steps to establish the U.S. 

Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional). In anticipation of the 

reorganization and to ease coordinating with the groups in II Corps, Ploger 

on 18 November moved part of his staff to Dong Ba Thin under Col. Paul 

W. Ramee, the brigade’s deputy commander. Ramee then established a provisional northern headquarters to take control of the 35th, 45th, and 937th 

Groups. The 921st Engineer Group (Combat), which had arrived at Dong Ba 

Thin between late September and early October, had remained uncommitted, 

and its troops and equipment joined the new northern headquarters. With the 

activation of the provisional engineer command on 1 December, the northern 

headquarters became the 18th Brigade. Later that month, as part of General 

Westmoreland’s effort to move U.S. headquarters and troops out of Saigon, 

the new Engineer Command headquarters—the former 18th Brigade staff 

62 Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 8, pp. 18–19, 25 (quoted words, p. 19).

63 Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 7–11; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 9, 

p. 6; Ltr, Maj Roy Fowler, CO, 26th Mil Hist Det, to Charles B. MacDonald, Office, Ch of Mil 

Hist, 18 Aug 67, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

106

that remained in Saigon—moved into a partially completed cantonment at 

Bien Hoa.64

Shifting of responsibilities and personnel between Engineer Command 

and U.S. Army, Vietnam, followed. During a transition period in December, 

Engineer Command took over functions such as mapping and intelligence, 

base development planning, engineer design, construction management, 

and materials. In turn, Engineer Command transferred three officers to the 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, G–3 to carry out staff work dealing with engineering 

doctrine, force development, and organization and equipment. Engineer 

Command also transferred nineteen officers and nineteen enlisted men to 

the U.S. Army, Vietnam, G–4 to man the newly organized Installations 

Division primarily to handle the construction program, facilities engineering, and real estate. Although he no longer had a staff at U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, headquarters, Ploger still served as the Engineer, U.S. Army, 

Vietnam. Ploger later recalled that Engler “didn’t want anybody making 

decisions affecting engineering that didn’t have the concurrence of the 

engineer command so, in effect, I was a staff officer for him but my staff 

did not function inside USARV.”65

64 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 133–35; ORLLs 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 18th Engr Bde, p. 5, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, U.S. Army Engr Cmd, Vietnam, 31 Jan 67, pp. 1, 22–24, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 921st 

Engr Gp, 15 Nov 66, p. 7, all in Historians files, CMH; General Orders 6525 and 6526, USARV, 

27 Nov 66. 65 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 28 Feb 67, incl. 7, p. 1, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 6, 6 Mar 67, OCE Hist Ofc; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 13–14 

The 18th Engineer Brigade headquarters building at Dong Ba Thin
107

Organizing the Construction Effort

It did not take long to realize that this division of staff responsibilities 

would create problems. U.S. Army, Vietnam, began to refer construction matters to the Installations Division, not Engineer Command and the MACV 

Directorate of Construction as envisioned by Ploger. He took exception when 

the Installations Division, which he viewed primarily as a facilities engineering office, began to evaluate and modify construction programming and 

scheduling, items he previously approved. Ploger considered this a waste of 

scarce manpower, as evidenced by the Installations Division’s assignment to 

three officers the nearly impossible job of keeping track of the work done by 

his command. Ploger tried to persuade the G–4 that no one in U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, headquarters had the qualifications to review construction matters. His plea met without success, and he regretted his agreement to remove 

Engineer Command from U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters.66

With the establishment of the provisional engineer command, Ploger’s 

span of control improved from directly supervising five groups to supervising 

one brigade and two groups. The 18th Brigade retained control over the 35th, 

45th, and 937th Engineer Groups and served as the major operational support 

link with I Field Force. Since a second brigade headquarters would not arrive 

for some time, Engineer Command directly controlled the other two groups 

and dealt directly with II Field Force. The command further adjusted geographic areas of responsibility. The 937th Group moved inland to Pleiku and 

assumed responsibility for the Central Highlands. The 45th Group had moved 

from Dong Ba Thin to Tuy Hoa and then to Qui Nhon and took over the 

remaining area in northern II Corps. Remaining at Cam Ranh Bay, the 35th 

Group extended its area north to Tuy Hoa. Reporting directly to Engineer 

Command, the 159th Group concentrated its base construction efforts in the 

Saigon–Long Binh–Vung Tau area and the new base under construction for 

the 9th Division at Dong Tam in the Mekong Delta. Also reporting directly to 

Engineer Command was the 79th Group, whose area of responsibility comprised the remainder of III and IV Corps. This arrangement would remain 

until March 1967, when the 34th Engineer Group (Construction) arrived and 

assumed area responsibility for IV Corps and the Vung Tau enclave in III 

Corps. The arrival of the 20th Engineer Brigade in August 1967 allowed the 

Engineer Command to place the groups operating in III and IV Corps under 

the control of the second brigade, thereby reducing to two the number of 

headquarters reporting directly to the command. Despite these shifts, General 

Ploger took some satisfaction that “there hasn’t been a shade of difference in 

the way things get done in the field.”67

(quotation); Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 135; Interv, Maj Robert H. Van Horn, 3d Mil Hist Det, 

with Col Fred M. Walker, Exec Officer, USARV Engr Sec, 27 Dec 66, pp. [1–2], VNIT 31, CMH. 66 Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 14–16, 18–21; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Engr Cmd, 

Vietnam, p. 9; Interv, Van Horn with Walker, 27 Dec 66. Walker recalled that the Installations 

Division was to be responsible for the overall guidance of the Army construction program, base 

development, repairs and utilities, and real estate. Regardless, Ploger objected to two USARV 

engineer staff sections. 67 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 136–38; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 16–18 (quoted words, p. 18).
Engineers at War

108

As 1966 drew to a close, Ploger viewed the operations of Engineer 

Command with satisfaction. Nearly all the nondivisional engineer units in 

Vietnam came under his command. This command arrangement did not 

follow Army doctrine for a theater of operations, which typically had engineer 

combat groups assigned to corps and field armies and engineer commands 

with the construction units in the rear echelons. However, Ploger and senior 

engineer officers considered this the best approach under the circumstances. 

Engineer groups and most battalions in Vietnam were assigned geographic 

areas of responsibility, and they simultaneously carried out construction 

and operational support missions, with the latter getting priority. Engineer 

Command could draw upon the talents of over 16,000 soldiers in over fifty 

units, varying in size from detachments to battalions, to take on the full range 

of engineering tasks.68

Other Engineers

Other Army engineers and contractors also contributed to the construction effort. When not supporting operations in the field, division and brigade 

engineer units turned to base camp construction. The 1st Logistical Command 

utilities detachments, which were organized to carry out facilities engineering, 

had a limited construction capability. Pacific Architects and Engineers, which 

reported to the logistical command, continued to concentrate on construction. By the end of 1966, Pacific Architects and Engineers had increased its 

manpower to 16,000 people at thirty-five installations.69

Navy and Marine Corps engineers also expanded their construction capabilities. By the end of 1966, the 30th Naval Construction Regiment directed the 

efforts of eight Seabee battalions in I Corps. Four Seabee technical assistance 

teams, which had evenly divided their attention since late 1963 to build or 

improve Special Forces camps and carry out civic action projects for the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, which succeeded the U.S. Operations 

Mission, were now totally committed to support the aid mission during their 

six-month tours. The marines now had five engineer battalions—two supporting the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions and three heavier force battalions operating under the III Marine Amphibious Force. Like the Army engineers, the 

Seabees found it necessary to organize a larger command under a flag officer. 

On 1 June 1966, the newly established 3d Naval Construction Brigade set up 

shop in Saigon. R. Adm. Robert R. Wooding, who took over as the Officer in 

Charge of Construction in December, assumed a second hat as commanding 

officer of the 3d Brigade. By May 1966, RMK-BRJ’s workforce expanded to 

more than 40,000 and 3,700 pieces of equipment. During the summer, the 

consortium’s strength reached a peak of some 50,000 working at forty project 

sites. In October, the firm’s monthly work in place reached $44 million and 

68 Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, 29 Oct–17 Nov, incl. 7, tab A, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 5, 9 Dec 66, OCE Hist Ofc. 69 PA&E History, 1963–1966, p. 42.
109

Organizing the Construction Effort

continued to grow at a fast pace. To supervise the consortium’s efforts, the 

Saigon office increased its workforce in early 1967 to about one thousand.70

The Air Force demonstrated its air base maintenance and modest construction capabilities at the major air bases. Facility maintenance engineers at 

bases in the United States provided a good foundation to draw upon. When 

Air Force wings deployed to Vietnam, their base civil engineering maintenance 

forces went with them. By the end of 1966, thirty Prime Beef teams totaling nearly one thousand airmen completed projects costing nearly $5 million. 

In January 1966, the Air Force deployed its first Red Horse civil engineering 

squadron, the 555th, to Cam Ranh Bay, and before year’s end five of the Air 

Force engineering squadrons were working at major air bases in South Vietnam. 

Although the squadrons had only 400 men each, they usually employed large 

numbers of Vietnamese workers. As noted earlier, the Air Force also received 

the go-ahead to administer its own construction contract to build Tuy Hoa 

Air Base. The contractor, Walter Kidde Constructors, Inc., of New York, had 

authorization to employ almost 1,700 people in its multinational workforce.71

Two contractors involved with construction and maintenance of facilities were added in 1966. In March, the Army Materiel Command awarded 

a contract to Vinnell Corporation of Los Angeles, California, to provide 

electrical power at major bases. The Army withdrew eleven T–2 tankers from 

the Maritime Reserve Fleet, and Vinnell converted them to floating electric 

power-generating barges for use at bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Nha 

Trang, and Vung Tau. The following month, Vinnell got the go-ahead to begin 

work on land-based electrical generation and distribution systems at these 

bases as well as at Long Binh. While Pacific Architects and Engineers provided the Army with base maintenance and construction support under the 

1st Logistical Command in II, III, and IV Corps, the Navy in 1966 called 

upon Philco-Ford Corporation to provide skilled personnel to work under the 

Public Works Office, Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, in I Corps. The Public 

Works Office supervised a base maintenance force made up of Seabees, local 

nationals, and personnel furnished by the contractor.72

Engineer elements belonging to the allied forces were another construction resource. As early as March 1965, the Republic of Korea had dispatched 

a medical and engineer group known as the Dove Force to work on civic 

action projects near Saigon. The two South Korean divisions that deployed 

to II Corps in 1965 and 1966 had organic engineer battalions. In the summer 

of 1965, a company-size engineering element accompanied the Australian 

70 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 281, 287–88, 297, 300; “Helping Others Help Themselves,” 

p. 30; Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: 

History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982), p. 292; Army Buildup 

Progress Rpt, 18 May 66, p. 35, CMH; Summary Rpt of Activities of 3d Naval Const Bde, 1 

Jun–30 Nov 66, in U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, Monthly Historical Summary, Nov 66, app. III, 

box 9, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 71 USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 4–13, 39, 70, 119–20; Project Red

Horse, pp. 5, 9, 12, 16, 26, 30; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 158; Dunn, Base Development

pp. 90–91. 72 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 224; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 78–79.
Engineers at War

110

Task Force. New Zealand had contributed an engineer platoon as early as 

mid-1964 to do civic action work. That platoon was replaced the following 

year by an artillery unit to support the Australian Task Force in southern 

III Corps. Although the Philippines did not send a combat force, it did send 

a 2,000-man Civic Action Group to Vietnam in late July 1966. This force, 

which included nearly 500 engineers, embarked on a series of civic action 

projects in Tay Ninh Province and the Saigon region.73

By the end of 1966, the engineers were well organized to carry out the 

construction program and support the troops in the field. The establishment 

of the director of construction meant that General Westmoreland exercised 

direct control of the construction effort in Vietnam, including direction of the 

Navy’s Officer in Charge of Construction and its construction consortium, 

RMK-BRJ, in areas of project assignment, priorities of effort, and standards 

of construction. Through his construction chiefs, the MACV commander 

controlled the use and allocation of all construction resources in Vietnam. As 

for the Army engineers, General Ploger’s creation of an engineer command 

eased the coordination of the increasing numbers of engineer units entering the country. The dual-role concept as commander of nearly all engineer 

troops and chief engineer staff officer for U.S. Army, Vietnam, was retained. 

Even though the field force engineers lacked their own engineer units, Ploger’s 

principle of priority support to tactical commanders provided the engineers 

needed in any combat operation.

73 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 155–56; Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen and Brig. Gen. James L. 

Collins Jr., Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

the Army, 1975), pp. 60–64, 90, 105, 123.
5

Building the Bases, 1966

Like the previous year, most engineer support in 1966 concentrated on 

base development. In late 1965, the 18th Engineer Brigade devoted 85 

to 90 percent of its effort to construction and the balance to combat support, 

a ratio that remained constant until the autumn of 1966. Planning and construction focused on developing Saigon, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh 

Bay as the major receiving deep-draft ports—the so-called logistics islands or 

enclaves—and nearby roads and airfields to improve the delivery, storage, and 

distribution of materiel. Inland bases at An Khe, Pleiku, and the approaches 

to Saigon were also heavily developed. All the lodgments included supporting services: maintenance, supply, transportation, hospitalization, communications, and quarters to house troops. The development of major air bases, 

capable of handling large cargo and jet aircraft, in or near these complexes, 

served as a major link in the delivery of critically needed supplies. As the year 

wore on, the complexes took on an air of relative permanence as metal prefabricated and wooden buildings replaced tents and open spaces.1

The Cam Ranh Complex 

During 1966, the sandy Cam Ranh Bay peninsula and surrounding environs grew into a vast military complex. Plans called for the site to host port 

facilities, airfields, and depots for all classes of supplies, hospitals, cantonments, and other facilities. Civilian contractors played a major role in the 

area’s development. RMK-BRJ worked on the new airfield and logistical 

facilities, and DeLong Corporation installed portable deep-draft piers. Pacific 

Architects and Engineers set up facilities engineering shops. The Air Force 

dispatched civil engineering units to work on the air base, and the Navy sent 

Seabees to develop the naval facility. Cam Ranh Bay was a microcosm of the 

theater’s construction effort.2

In late April 1966, two of the DeLong barges for the third general cargo 

pier arrived. In preparation the 497th Port Construction Company completed 

a sheet-pile bulkhead between the two existing piers. A routine for installing the piers had been established: the 35th Engineer Group built connecting causeways, abutments, roads, and hardstands; the DeLong Corporation 

1

 Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, 10 Feb–3 Mar 66, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 1, 15 Mar 66, OCE Hist Ofc. 2

 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 April 66, 35th Engr Gp, 15 May 66, pp. 1–2, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 35th 

Engr Gp, 15 Aug 66, pp. 1–2, both in Historians files, CMH. For more on RMK-BRJ’s work at 

Cam Ranh Bay, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 226–33.
Engineers at War

112

installed the piers. When technical problems arose, the military and civilian 

engineers worked closely to resolve them. DeLong began installing the third 

pier in May and, despite some difficulty, positioned and readied the pier for 

caisson jacking by the end of June.3

Associated port work proceeded at high tempo. On the south beach, the 

497th Port Construction Company completed a timber pile U-shaped marginal wharf in April and two permanent LST ramps in June. The 220-foot 

wharf, the first of its kind designed and built for shallow-draft vessels in the 

bay, could unload two barges simultaneously. The wharf was supported by 

315 timber piles in seventeen feet of water and became the largest work of its 

type built by Army engineers since World War II. Unfortunately, it did not 

take long to realize that the untreated lumber used for bracing the fuel pipeline 

jetty and wharf had to be replaced because of the presence of marine wood 

borers in the bay. In late May, the 497th began to replace the bracing with 

treated lumber. The port construction engineers stabilized the area behind the 

wharf with crushed coral, which the 87th Engineer Battalion found offshore. 

Coral, made up of the skeletons of minute spherical animals, was chemically 

similar to limestone and frequently used by engineers in the Pacific during 

World War II. At Cam Ranh Bay, coral was used extensively for beach landing 

sites, roads, and hardstands. At the storage area next to the first DeLong pier, 

the 497th also designed and constructed a roll-on/roll-off ramp for unloading 

shallow-draft vessels. The company’s diving section removed obstacles, including a sunken vessel that blocked a second sheet-pile bulkhead. The divers also 

used underwater demolitions to loosen the coral for quarrying.4

The 497th Port Construction Company then concentrated on placing 

sheet-pile bulkheads between the RMK and DeLong piers, and the 87th 

Construction Battalion worked on the construction of causeways to connect 

the new DeLong piers to the shoreline. In July, the battalion built a 600-foot 

causeway to the second DeLong pier. To the north, the 87th with some help 

from RMK-BRJ began building a 3,600-foot causeway to a new ammunition 

pier. The causeway alone required 27,000 cubic yards of sand, 6,000 cubic 

yards of blast rock, and 15,000 cubic yards of laterite on top of 11,000 cubic 

yards of hydraulic dredged fill. In August, DeLong completed its second cargo 

pier and began to place Pier Number 3 just to the south of the existing RMK 

pier and DeLong Numbers 1 and 2. In October, more dredging in the entrance 

channel got under way, and by the end of the month, the 87th began construc3

 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 35th Engr Gp, p. 3, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 35th Engr Gp, p. 4; 

Yens and Clement, “Port Construction in Vietnam,” pp. 21–22; Dunn, Base Development, p. 55; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 76; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 52–53; Quarterly Hist Rpt 1 Apr–30 

Jun 66, MACV Directorate of Construction (MACDC), 11 Jul 66, pp. 14, 25–26, Historians 

files, CMH. 4

 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 3–4, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 35th Engr Gp, 

pp. 3–4; Yens and Clement, “Port Construction in Vietnam,” p. 22; Situation Rpt on the 

Construction of Port Facilities in South Vietnam, incl. 12, pp. 1–2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 3; Karl C. Dod, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, United States Army 

in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 

p. 385.
113

Building the Bases, 1966

tion of an 830-foot causeway to a fourth DeLong pier. North of the main port, 

DeLong finished installation of the 600-foot ammunition pier in mid-October, 

allowing safer and more direct delivery of ammunition to its storage facility. 

The firm completed its third cargo pier in early December.5

Impressive progress was also made elsewhere on the peninsula. In the 

lower half, Colonel McCulloch’s 87th Engineer Battalion completed storage 

tanks and connections for a 172,000-barrel fuel storage facility south of the air 

base, maintained over ten miles of road, built hardstands for ammunition and 

general storage areas, placed over 500 sand-cement and concrete slabs in the 

Army cantonment, and supervised troops building the cantonment under the 

self-help program. In April 1966, the 18th Brigade approved upgrading the old 

light aviation runway to handle C–130 transports. After a slow start, the 87th 

in September resumed work, and in two weeks completed the runway base and 

5

 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 35th Engr Gp, 31 Oct 66, pp. 3–6, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 35th 

Engr Gp, 15 Feb 67, pp. 3–4; Unit History, 35th Engr Gp (Const), n.d., pp. 12–13; Quarterly 

Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, 21 Oct 66, p. 38, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, 21 

Jan 67, pp. 26–27, Historians files, CMH; MACV Monthly Evaluation, Aug 66, p. F-5, all 

in Historians files, CMH; Yens and Clement, “Port Construction in Vietnam,” pp. 21–22; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 131.

The second DeLong cargo pier was completed at Cam Ranh Bay in August 

1966, and work on the third DeLong pier (to the right of the first DeLong pier) 

had begun.
Engineers at War

114

surfaced it with the newly introduced M8A1 solid steel plank matting. The 

airfield became operational on 11 October when the Air Force landed a C–130 

on the new 2,900-foot runway. Depot work by the 864th Engineer Battalion 

included roads, drainage, open storage areas, refrigerated storage facilities, and 

an automated data processing facility. By the end of June the battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert A. Seelye since January when he replaced Colonel 

Bunch, reported that the depot as 59 percent complete. To the north at Hon 

Tre Island just offshore from Nha Trang, Company C and heavy equipment 

from Company A carved a road to the top of a mountain and cleared the crest 

for an air defense missile unit. Meanwhile, the 102d Construction Support 

Company’s asphalt plant had made its first cold-mix pavement and produced 

its first hot mix. By summer, the roads in the depot and at the southern end of 

the peninsula had taken on a new look.6

In February 1966, Air Force Red Horse engineers arrived. The 555th 

Civil Engineering Squadron began to work on troop housing, roads, utilities, 

and other air base support facilities. Originally conceived to augment base 

engineers to handle heavy bomb damage or disasters, Red Horse squadrons 

quickly adapted to a construction role in Vietnam. In justifying an engineering force, Air Force officials emphasized that Red Horse squadrons provided 

an emergency capability only and did not minimize the need for Army engineer battalions to build the airfields. To General Dunn, the arrival of the Red 

Horse squadrons represented another construction asset, except they worked 

only on Air Force projects.7

Meanwhile, construction of the permanent runway and taxiway by 

RMK-BRJ lay almost dormant because of the diversion of the firm’s earthmoving equipment in January to the Army ammunition and logistic support 

area project. Although the Air Force deployed four F–4 Phantom squadrons 

onto the adjacent AM2 airfield, the temporary aluminum runway and taxiways built by the contractor soon had problems. A twenty-three-inch rainfall 

in December 1965 raised the water table to the level of the matting, forcing 

workers to improvise a drainage system. Rain made the metal runway slick, 

and the fighters had to land with drag chutes or land at other airfields. As 

the dry season approached in early 1966, a constant north wind pushed the 

taxiway three feet south over the dry sand, while the runway edged north 

under the weight of the planes landing from the south. Landing the planes 

to the south for three weeks moved the runway back. Daily stress measurements and periodic shifts in the direction of landings kept the shifting under 

control. The moving sand also created bumps and dips, and Air Force work 

6

 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 79–80; Col. William L. Starnes, “Cam Ranh Army Airfield,” 

Military Engineer 59 (September-October 1967): 358; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 275–77; 

Situation Rpt on the Construction of Depots and Supply Points in Vietnam, incl. 14, pp. 2–3, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 87th Engr Bn, 15 May 66, pp. 

1–3, 1 May–31 Jul, 66, 87th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 66, pp. 2–3, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 864th Engr Bn, 

15 Aug 66, pp. 1–2, all in Historians files, CMH. 7

 Project Red Horse, pp. 1–2, 9; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 112–1
115

Building the Bases, 1966

crews found themselves continually replacing sections of the aluminum matting and smoothing the sand.8

At the same time, there was an urgent need for an airfield capable of handling large transport aircraft. Although the AM2 matting had the strength to 

land and park large planes, the narrowness of the runway and taxiways and 

the limited amount of AM2 parking apron precluded the use of the Boeing 

707 commercial jets or the larger C–133 cargo transports. The construction 

of the Army’s replacement center in II Corps hinged on completing the new 

runway and other flight facilities. As a result, MACV decided to have the 

Officer in Charge of Construction redesign the permanent airfield for earlier 

use as an interim logistical air facility. When RMK-BRJ returned to its airfield 

project in June 1966, revised plans called for building the concrete runway in 

increments, 4,000 to 6,000 feet, with AM2 taxiways and aprons. This measure 

would at least allow C–130 cargo planes to use the airfield before the onset of 

the next monsoon season.9

In mid-October 1966, the firm turned over to the Air Force an 8,000-foot 

concrete runway. Work continued on the taxiways and high-speed turnoffs, 

and the hauling of fill for the remaining 2,000 feet of runway. To build up the 

south end of the field, three dredges excavated some 1.5 million cubic yards of 

hydraulic fill. By November, the parallel concrete taxiway and 90,000-squareyard AM2 parking apron were completed, permitting the Air Force’s Military 

Airlift Command to begin operations at Cam Ranh Bay. The adjacent AM2 

runway continued to be used and maintained by Air Force civil engineers. Its 

use, however, according to one squadron commander, continued to be “a sporty 

proposition.” Soft shoulders and the lack of an overrun and aircraft barriers 

often caused planes to sink into the soft sand when they veered off the runway.10

In 1966, the Cam Ranh peninsula became the first site in Vietnam to receive 

electrical power from the T–2 power-generating tankers, now on their way from 

American shipyards. The first tanker, the French Creek, arrived in June. Once 

positioned and hooked up by Vinnell Corporation to a completed section of 

the land line distribution system, the modified tanker began to generate power 

to the depot on 5 September. The second tanker, the Kennebago, arrived shortly 

after the French Creek. Eventually Cam Ranh Bay would get five of the eleven 

T–2 tankers, with Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau scheduled to get two 

each. When the ships arrived, the contractor temporarily moored them to withstand tide and weather. Vinnell was also charged with building the land-based 

electrical distribution systems at the four locations. By December, the firm had 

completed 80 percent of the forty-one miles of primary line and 5 percent of the 

eleven miles in the secondary line at Cam Ranh Bay.11

8

 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, p. 119; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, p. 10. 9

 MFR, J–4 Briefing 2 Feb 66, Base Development Cam Ranh Bay; Ltr, MACV MACJ44-

USBD to CG, USARV, sub: Cam Ranh Bay USAF Base, box 11, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 10 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, pp. 171–72 (quoted words, p. 172); Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 

Jul–30 Sep 66, p. 38, MACDC, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, pp. 27–28; Diary of a Contract, 

pp. 227–28; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, p. 113. 11 MACV Monthly Evaluation, Jun 66, p. A–30; “Floating and Land Based Power Plants,” 

Vinnell 11 (May 1969): 6–7; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 78–80; Miscellaneous Detailed 
Engineers at War

116

Although the 20th and 39th Engineer Combat Battalions encountered 

problems carrying out construction projects, both units quickly adapted to 

their new missions following their arrival on 1 January. The 20th Engineer 

Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Richard L. Harris, moved across the bay to 

Dong Ba Thin Army aviation base to continue the work started by Company 

C, 65th Engineer Battalion. The 20th had arrived in the middle of the northeast monsoon, and it concentrated on hauling fill to get the aviation units 

and equipment above the flood waters that inundated Dong Ba Thin from 

December through February. By May the battalion, with the trucks of the 

513th Dump Truck Company, brought the cantonment areas to grade, built 

seventy-five concrete pads for UH–1 helicopters, completed a pierced steel 

plank parking ramp for the C–7 Caribous, and began laying planking for a 

taxiway parallel to the runway. Following these jobs, work crews completed 

landing ramps for CH–47 helicopters, the airfield taxiway, and a cantonment 

area. In mid-July, elements of the battalion began moving to Ninh Hoa and 

Nha Trang. The other combat battalion, the 39th, under Lt. Gen. Earnest E. 

Lane, erected buildings in the depot area and a convalescent hospital on the 

seaside of the peninsula. By midyear, the battalion began shifting operations 

Discussion, incl. 11, pp. 4–5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4, 23 Sep 66, OCE Hist Ofc; 

Miscellaneous Detailed Discussion Vietnam, incl. 8. p. 5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5.

Cam Ranh Bay airfield from the northeast in October 1966 after the completion 

of the concrete runway on the right
117

Building the Bases, 1966

from Cam Ranh Bay to Nha Trang, Ninh Hoa, and Tuy Hoa. Both battalions 

were now under the control of Colonel Bush’s 45th Group.12

During the second half of 1966, Col. William R. Starnes’ 35th Group 

concentrated on base development projects at Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, 

and Phan Rang. The 3,000-man group now consisted of the 62d, 87th, and 

864th Construction Battalions and assorted smaller units. To keep pace with 

the troop buildup, the 35th accelerated work at the Cam Ranh Bay depot 

and other facilities at the southern end of the peninsula. Locally, the 864th 

Construction Battalion divided its efforts between building the depot at Cam 

Ranh Bay and an air-conditioned prefabricated communications center at 

Dong Ba Thin. Part of the battalion also worked on roads, bridges, and beach 

off-loading facilities at Nha Trang. The new beach facilities included four 

temporary LST ramps and four barge points that increased the unloading of 

cargo from about 9,700 short tons in January to over 21,000 short tons in 

December. Other work by the 87th Engineer Battalion was carried out at Phan 

Thiet, where a battalion task force supported an infantry battalion of the 1st 

Cavalry Division operating in the area. The engineer task force repaired and 

maintained an airfield, constructed landing craft anchorages, and improved 

base facilities.13

In July, another long-awaited construction battalion, Lt. Col. James L. 

Kelly’s 577th Engineer Battalion (Construction) from Fort Benning, Georgia, 

arrived and joined the 45th Group. Not surprisingly, ships carrying the battalion’s equipment did not arrive until later. The battalion assumed responsibility for projects at Dong Ba Thin. Company C, however, was detached while 

en route and assigned to work with the 46th Construction Battalion at Long 

Binh. At Dong Ba Thin Colonel Kelly initiated around-the-clock operations. 

Company B began building a regimental base camp for the South Korean 9th 

Division. In mid-August, Company D shifted to Nha Trang to build a 400-

man evacuation hospital for the Koreans. Returning to Cam Ranh Bay in early 

October, Company D started work on facilities for an inbound replacement 

battalion. Once set up, the replacement battalion would handle the influx of 

replacements and departure of soldiers completing their one-year tours.14

12 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 80–81, 83; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 20th Engr Bn, 15 May 

66, pp. 3–4, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 20th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 66, pp. 1–2, 8, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 39th Engr 

Bn, n.d., pp. 3–7, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 39th Engr Bn, 14 Aug 66, pp. 1–4, all in Historians 

files, CMH; Unit History, 15 Aug 1917–1 Sep 1971, 20th Engr Bn, n.d, pp. 7–8, Historians files, 

CMH; Situation Rpt on the Construction of Cantonments, Administrative and Community 

Facilities in South Vietnam, incl. 8, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3. 13 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 1–2, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 

1–3, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 864th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 66, p. 1–3, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 864th Engr Bn, 

15 Feb 67, pp. 1–4, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 87th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 66, pp. 1–4, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 

67, 87th Engr Bn, 11 Feb 67, pp. 1–5, all in Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 

130–31, 133–34; 35th Engr Gp History, pp. 12–13; Ltrs, MACV MACJ322 to CG, USARV, sub: 

Development of Hon Tre Air Defense Complex, 11 Apr 66, and Brig Gen Carroll H. Dunn 

MACDC to CG, USARV, sub: Hon Tre Island Facility, 17 Jun 66, both in Historians files, 

CMH. 14 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 577th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, pp. 1, 3–5, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 

577th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 67, p. 2; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 127–28.
Engineers at War

118

In late October, elements of the 14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) commanded by Lt. Col. William F. Brandes reached Cam Ranh Bay. Back in 

January, the battalion received alert orders to deploy from Fort Bragg by 

March, but shortages of personnel and equipment delayed its departure to 

September. Since the equipment did not arrive for several months, the soldiers 

could only use their hand tools. Companies A and C debarked at Cam Ranh 

Bay while the headquarters and Companies B and D continued on to Vung 

Ro Bay, eighteen miles south of Tuy Hoa near Highway 1. Company A helped 

the 577th Engineer Battalion build the replacement center, and Company C 

moved to Ninh Hoa to support the South Korean 9th Division. After disembarking at Vung Ro Bay, the remainder of the battalion moved to Tuy Hoa. 

Working with hand tools, Companies B and D maintained Highway 1 between 

Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro and the access road to the recently opened port at Vung 

Ro Bay. When the 577th Engineer Battalion received orders to move to Tuy 

Hoa, Colonel Brandes began to consolidate his units at Cam Ranh Bay.15

By the end of 1966, the combined efforts of troops and contractors had transformed Cam Ranh Bay into a major logistical base supporting over 36,000 troops. 

During the eighteen months, critical projects at the deep-water port, depot, and 

air base were completed or nearing completion. Whenever the builders finished a 

portion of a facility, such as new piers and warehouses, impatient operating agencies did not hesitate to put them to immediate use. By late 1966, the base boasted 

five deep-draft piers, four landing craft ramps, and wharves capable of handling 

nearly 6,000 short tons of cargo per day. More significantly, port capacity rose 

from approximately 73,000 short tons of cargo unloaded in January 1966 to nearly 

153,000 short tons in December. A jetty with two 6-inch fuel pipelines had a rated 

capacity to pump ashore 30,000 barrels of product daily. Actual figures varied. 

Logistic planners looked forward to completing the port complex by mid-1967. 

Also in operation were the Air Force base with its two long runways, an Army 

airfield on the peninsula, and another Army airfield at Dong Ba Thin.16 (Map 7)

Secondary Coastal Ports

In April 1966, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Eifler, who assumed command of the 

1st Logistical Command in January 1966, began to take measures to build an 

all-weather port in the Tuy Hoa area. He recognized the need to do something 

before the approaching winter monsoons struck the central coastal lowlands 

in October. Before the buildup in the Tuy Hoa area, the logistical command 

managed to support the small number of troops by bringing in supplies over 

the beach during the dry season and by air during the monsoon when heavy 

seas halted over-the-shore operations. Vung Ro Bay appeared to offer many 

advantages that Tuy Hoa did not have for the development of an all-weather 

15 ORLL, 1 Nov–31 Jan 67, 14th Engr Bn, 9 Feb 67, pp. 1–5, Historians files, CMH; Galloway, 

“Essayons,” pp. 128–29. 16 Dunn, Base Development, p. 68; MACV History, 1966, p. 298; Port Development Reference 

Study, MACJ44, 5 Dec 66, pp. 14–15, box 8, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 

sub: Port Development Plan, RVN, 10 Jun 67, p. 3, box 3, 84/051, RG 319, NARA.
119

Building the Bases, 1966

port, mainly a well protected, wide harbor. Only four bridges along the short 

distance of Highway 1 from Vung Ro to Tuy Hoa would require replacement 

or repair.17

17 Col. John J. Sawbridge, “They Built a Port to Beat the Weather,” Army Digest 22 (September 

1967): 44; Debriefing, Maj Gen Charles W. Eifler, 13 Jun 67, p. 4, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA, Historians files, CMH.

1

1

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

CAM RANH BAY

M4T6 Float Bridge Site

DeLong Pier 2

RMK Pier

Ammunition Pier

DeLong Pier 1

DeLong Pier 3

POL Storage

Ammunition

Storage Area

POL Jetty

Cantonments

Depot

to Nha Trang

Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base

Army Air­eld

10,000 Foot AM2 Runway and Taxiway

8,000 Foot Concrete Runway

Dong Ba Tinh

Army Air­eld

LST Ramps

South Beach

Barge Off-Loading

Cam Ranh

31 December 1966

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

CAM RANH BAY

Map 7
Engineers at War

120

On 27 April, a 39th Engineer Battalion reconnaissance party led by Colonel 

Lane began to survey Vung Ro Bay. While infantrymen of the 1st Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, cleared the immediate area, Lane and his men scoured the 

beaches, bay, road, and surrounding mountains. The engineers confirmed that 

the bay could fit deep-draft ships. They found ample space to build facilities, 

and a road could be cut through the thick jungle foliage and mountains of 

rock to connect the port to Highway 1. The survey completed, Colonel Lane 

became an enthusiastic supporter of the Vung Ro project, but he did not live 

to see the completed port. Several weeks later, enemy ground fire killed Lane 

during an aerial reconnaissance over the project area.18

General Larsen concurred in the need for a temporary port at Vung Ro 

to support combat forces around Tuy Hoa. The I Field Force commander 

expected the arrival of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and a South Korean 

regiment. From a logistics standpoint, Larsen did not consider it feasible to 

supply an equivalent two-brigade force by air during the monsoon season. 

He also ruled out opening Highway 1 from Qui Nhon to Tuy Hoa because he 

lacked troops to secure the route. As for opening Highway 1 from Tuy Hoa 

south to Cam Ranh Bay, Larsen believed that this would require more forces 

and engineering effort than the Vung Ro proposal. Estimates showed that it 

would take only thirty days to do the road work from Tuy Hoa and improve 

the bay for barge traffic. Aware of the ongoing debate between the Army and 

Air Force over whether to construct the deep-draft port facility at Vung Ro or 

Tuy Hoa, Larsen prodded MACV to get started on at least a temporary port 

at Vung Ro. Westmoreland concurred, and on 15 July the MACV Directorate 

of Construction directed the 18th Engineer Brigade to do the work.19

On 25 July, while I Field Force initiated Operation John Paul Jones to 

secure the area, the development of Vung Ro Bay began in earnest. As the 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and South Korean 2d Marine Brigade 

kept the Viet Cong at bay, the 39th Engineer Battalion swung into action. 

Elements of the battalion began repairing Highway 1 and erecting several new 

bridges between Tuy Hoa and Vung Ro. On the twenty-seventh, Task Force 

Schultz—consisting of Company A, elements of the Equipment Platoon

Headquarters Company, 572d Light Equipment Company, and 553d Float 

Bridge Company, under the command of Maj. John H. Schultz, the battalion executive officer—debarked from a landing craft and began building 

a port out of jungle, sand, and rock. Men and equipment cleared more than 

125 acres of thick, tangled underbrush, moved some 400,000 cubic yards 

of earth, and used large quantities of dynamite to blast away solid rock for 

an access road. Within two weeks, the task force blazed a passable pioneer 

road two miles from the beach to Highway 1. In the port area, work crews 

put down a six- to eight-inch layer of laterite and rock over some 10,000 

18 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 39th Engr Bn, p. 2; Sawbridge, “They Built a Port to Beat the 

Weather,” pp. 44–45; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 57, 223. 19 Msg, Lt Gen Stanley R. Larsen AVF-GD 5321 to Westmoreland, 7 Jul 66, sub: Vung 

Ro Bay; Msg, Westmoreland MAC 23595 to Larsen, 9 Jul 66, sub: Vung Ro Bay; Msg, 

COMUSMACV MACDC-BRD to CG, USARV, 15 Jul 66, sub: Vung Ro Bay. All in Historians 

files, CMH.
121

Building the Bases, 1966

square yards of sand. They also built two concrete ramps for landing craft 

and installed a fuel pipeline from mooring points in the bay to a temporary 

storage facility inland. Elements of the 497th Port Construction Company 

assembled a floating pier made out of Navy cube sections for barge discharge. The steel cubes, fastened with angle irons and cable, required very 

little on-site construction. Cubes were joined together in connected sections 

or as a complete pier in the water and towed into position. The port became 

operational in late September, and on 11 October it opened to unrestricted 

traffic. The dedication of Port Lane took place five days later, and the 1st 

Logistical Command officially took over operation of the facility. In the 

first two weeks of operation, more than 565 tons of vitally needed supplies 

arrived daily, just before the monsoon deadline.20

By then MACV wanted to make Vung Ro the permanent deep-draft port 

for the Tuy Hoa area. While the Army proceeded to build its interim port 

at Vung Ro, the Air Force went ahead with its own plans for Tuy Hoa Air 

Base. The Air Force developed its own shallow craft harbor near Tuy Hoa 

to discharge materiel for the turnkey project. Planning called for the Air 

Force contractor, Walter Kidde Constructors, to dredge an interim port at 

the mouth of the Da Rang River and convert the facility into a permanent 

port the following year. When Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff became aware of the development of two independent ports, they 

raised questions. Meetings between Army and Air Force representatives at 

MACV produced little more than an issue—Vung Ro versus Tuy Hoa. By 

mid-September, MACV predicted that the garrison strength of U.S. and 

South Korean troops in the area would exceed 18,000 and recommended 

to Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs that Vung Ro Bay should be the 

permanent port.21 (Map 8)

The Tuy Hoa port issue remained open until January 1967. A survey 

disclosed that the Tuy Hoa site involved time-consuming efforts to bring 

the harbor to the point of accommodating fully loaded T–1 tankers 

and pointed out the difficulty of tanker operations during the monsoon 

season, even after completion of a pier and breakwater. A tropical storm 

in December brought this point home. High tides and swells caused water 

to wash over the sandspit that separated the safe haven from the South 

China Sea. This water shifted the sand and silt and reduced the depth of 

the dredged entrance channel. MACV recommended that the port should 

be abandoned when the contractor no longer required it. On 13 January, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruled in favor of Vung Ro Bay. The Air Force did 

not dissent. The Tuy Hoa site served its purpose by offloading construction 

20 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 39th Engr Bn, p. 1, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 35th Engr Gp, p. 

4; AAR, Opn John Paul Jones, 39th Engr Bn, 17 Nov 66, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH; 

Sawbridge, “They Built a Port to Beat the Weather,” pp. 45–46; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 125; 

Rpt of Visit to 18th Engr Bde Units, incl. 7, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4; Army 

Construction in Vietnam, 7 Dec 66, incl. 9, p. 8, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5. 21 Msg, COMUSMACV MAC 41026 to CINCPAC, 11 Sep 66, sub: Vung Ro–Tuy Hoa Port, 

box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 75–79.
Engineers at War

122

supplies, and this enabled Walter Kidde to finish the airfield project fortyfive days before the 1 January 1967 deadline.22

22 USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 86–89; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 

Dec 66, MACDC, p. 29. 

SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

Cantonments

POL

Administration

Base Ops

Old Asphalt Runway

Proposed Relocation of

Vung Ro/Tuy Hoa Railroad

C O N C R E T E TA X I W AY

A M 2 R U N W AY

C O N C R E T E TA X I W AY

to Ammunition Storage

June 1967

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

TUY HOA AIR BASE

Map 8
123

Building the Bases, 1966

The 39th Engineer Battalion, now under the command of Lt. Col. Taylor 

R. Fulton, divided its attention to projects in the Tuy Hoa area and improvements at Vung Ro Bay. Work included base requirements for an army logistics 

subarea command and cantonments for the incoming 4th Infantry Division’s 

1st Brigade, a regiment of the South Korean 9th Division, and an army 

aviation battalion. The 39th continued to upgrade the facilities at Port Lane, 

worked on base development projects, repaired roads, and built a heliport 

for aviation units that supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Brigade. 

The sixty-four minipad heliport consisted of 24-by-24-foot pierced steel 

planking placed directly over sand treated with peneprime, a dust-control 

material with an asphalt base. These measures provided in minimum time 

maximum protection for the helicopters from sand and dust. Hardstands 

and the connecting road to Highway 1 were paved. By the end of 1966, a 

DeLong pier consisting of two “A” units was installed, adding Vung Ro to 

the growing number of ports that could discharge cargo from oceangoing 

ships. Most significantly, the sheltered bay could safely harbor up to a dozen 

large vessels.23

Meanwhile, a trade off of engineer units took place in two of the coastal 

bases. The reason for the moves stemmed from requirements for heavy construc23 Sawbridge, “They Built a Port to Beat the Weather,” p. 46; Army Construction in Vietnam, 

7 Dec 66, incl. 9, p. 8, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5; ORLL, 1 Nov–31 Jan 67, 39th Engr 

Bn, 31 Jan 67, pp. 1–7, Historians files, CMH; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, 

pp. 88–89; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 125, 127. For more on peneprime and dust control, see 

Col. Charles R. Roberts, “Trends in Engineer Support” (Student thesis, U.S. Army War College, 

1969), pp. 43–46.

Port under construction at Vung Ro Bay
Engineers at War

124

tion equipment at Tuy Hoa and the 35th Group’s need for a combat battalion. 

For several days in November, the 14th Combat and the 577th Construction 

Battalions shuttled men and equipment between Tuy Hoa and Dong Ba Thin. 

The 14th took over the 577th’s projects at Cam Ranh Bay, and the 577th took 

over the 14th’s projects at Tuy Hoa. At the South Korean cantonment south of 

town, the 577th centered efforts on a 400-bed evacuation hospital and a CH–47 

heliport. It also completed a 330-foot causeway leading to the DeLong pier at 

Port Lane along with other improvements. By the end of the year, the 577th 

and a platoon from the 643d Engineer Pipeline Company began installing an 

eight-inch fuel pipeline between the port and the air base with a spur leading 

to the allied camp. The 577th also took over rehabilitation and maintenance of 

Highway 1 between Tuy Hoa and Port Lane.24

Since Highway 1 was not opened for regular use until November, all construction supplies for the 45th Engineer Group had to be brought in by sea. 

Limited intercoastal shipping could only handle ammunition and rations, 

with construction materials put aboard on a space-available basis. This 

almost halted vertical construction (buildings), but the continual prodding by 

Colonel Bush and the opening of Port Lane brought deep-draft vessels carrying construction materials. By November, the grim logistics situation began 

to improve. The frequent moves of the group’s battalions continued to cause 

replacement parts problems until the headquarters arranged for direct support 

maintenance on an area basis. Still, units frequently left an area just about the 

time previously requisitioned parts arrived, and it took several weeks for the 

parts to reach the unit.25

Some twenty-eight miles to the south at Ninh Hoa, the 45th Group found 

a practical way to resolve transporting large tonnages of materials from Cam 

Ranh Bay. Truck convoys moving north placed a heavy burden on congested 

Highway 1, and there was constant need for security during the trip. The group 

turned to the Vietnamese Railway. With the arrangement of ample government security forces, the railway started service between the two areas. The 

opening of the railroad reduced congestion and wear on the key coastal road.26

About twenty-two miles south of Ninh Hoa at Nha Trang, military 

engineers and RMK-BRJ improved facilities to meet the influx of U.S. Air 

Force and Army aviation units and support organizations. Company C, 864th 

Engineer Construction Battalion, completed several warehouses and a depot 

hardstand and started building a fuel storage area. During a two-week period, 

Company B, 39th Engineer Battalion, transformed a trail around the city into 

a single-lane bypass road. The contractor’s workforce enlarged and modernized the 8th Field Hospital with twenty new buildings in a project started the 

previous October. In April, the firm also started to reshape the crown of the 

airfield’s main runway and completed the paving by mid-June. Prime Beef 

24 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 18th Engr Bde, 24 Feb 67, p. 5, Historians files, CMH, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, 577th Engr Bn, pp. 2–4, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 14th Engr Bn, p. 5. 25 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 130.

26 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–Jan 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 9–10, Historians files, CMH.
125

Building the Bases, 1966

construction teams built cantonment and other facilities for Air Force units at 

the base.27

Qui Nhon’s Development 

A corresponding surge of construction took place at the cluster of bases 

in and around the port city of Qui Nhon. In February 1966, the 1st Logistical 

Command declared that Qui Nhon would serve as one of its major Army 

logistics bases. The newly established Qui Nhon Support Command projected 

requirements for expanded storage capacity, which caused an even higher 

tempo of work for the 937th Engineer Group and its new commander, Col. 

William W. Watkin. Major improvements for the overtaxed port facilities and 

construction of a large maintenance facility were added to the depot construction projects. Three of the group’s four battalions—19th Combat under 

Colonel Mathews, 299th Combat under Lt. Col. Reuben L. Anderson, and 

84th Construction under Lt. Col. James D. Madison, who assumed command in January 1966—focused on Qui Nhon area projects. Operational support, for the most part, remained limited. The Navy’s Officer in Charge of 

Construction established a construction office in Qui Nhon to oversee work 

done by RMK-BRJ. In May, RMK-BRJ began to move workers up Highway 

1 to Phu Cat to begin preparations for constructing South Vietnam’s eighth 

jet air base. Simultaneously, the Air Force dispatched Prime Beef teams to the 

Qui Nhon airfield to build cantonment facilities.28

In Qui Nhon, Colonel Madison’s 84th Construction Battalion concentrated on depot, airfield, and port work. In the depot, the battalion built more 

prefabricated warehouses, sheds, and open storage areas. Many of the buildings, however, reached Vietnam without all their components, and the engineers had to improvise or locally fabricate the missing items. That expedient 

resolved the problem somewhat but added to the delays and costs. By April, the 

84th, which adopted the motto “Never Daunted,” began to construct approximately 175,000 cubic feet of refrigerated storage. At the Qui Nhon airfield, the 

battalion built a 1,197-foot extension to the runway and additional parking 

ramps. Also under way were many other projects, including the expansion of 

the 85th Evacuation Hospital to 480 beds.29

27 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 80; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 149, 288; Situation Rpt 

on the Construction of Depots and Supply Points in South Vietnam, incl. 12, p. 2, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 1; Situation Rpt on Lines of Communication Construction in 

South Vietnam, incl. 6, p. 2, and Situation Rpt on the Construction of POL Facilities in South 

Vietnam, incl. 13, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 

Jun 66, MACDC, p. 25; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 119–20, 123–24, 

126–27. For more on RMK-BRJ work at Nha Trang, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 234–35. 28 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 73; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 215; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 

66, 937th Engr Gp, 15 May 66, pp. 3–6; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 120, 

126. For more on RMK-BRJ work at Phu Cat Air Base and Qui Nhon, see Diary of a Contract, 

pp. 236–40, 266–70. 29 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 34–36, 70; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 April 66, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 3–4, 

6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 84th Engr Bn, 14 May 66, pp. 1–5, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 84th Engr Bn, 14 

Aug 66, pp. 2–5, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

126

Further improvements in the port area were carried out by the 84th and the 

1st Platoon, 497th Port Construction Company. In February, a 200-foot rock 

fill causeway was finished and connected to a Navy cube floating pier, 42 feet 

wide by 792 feet long. In another major project, the Qui Nhon peninsula was 

extended to receive more landing craft. When the pipeline dredge Ann arrived 

in April to work on a Navy Market Time coastal surveillance base, MAC

simultaneously gave its approval for the dredge to furnish fill for the extension. 

By the end of the month, the Ann completed this work and moved on to the 

Qui Nhon Market Time site. When the engineers finished the extension an

landing craft ramps, the in-transit storage area doubled in size. In early June, 

the port construction and construction engineers completed the installation 

of a four-inch submarine pipeline in the harbor. The new pipeline facilitated 

the transfer of fuel from tankers to a new 50,000-barrel capacity tank farm on 

the mainland. To stabilize the tankers while unloading, work crews installed a 

system of anchorages and moorings.30

The enlarged logistics base meant that even more work would be required 

to transform Qui Nhon into a major port complex. After the Ann completed 

its dredging at the Market Time facility in late May, it began work on a

extensive program to develop a deep-draft port. On 20 June, the hopper dredge 

USS Davison from the Corps of Engineers civil works fleet started work on 

the two-mile deep-draft approach channel and turning basin. Phase I planning 

for the expanded port included eight barge unloading points, two permanent 

LST ramps, and DeLong piers providing four deep-draft berths. In June, work 

began on a four-lane port access road one and a half miles across the bay to 

bypass the congested city. As part of this undertaking, RMK-BRJ began to 

drive sheet pile and place hydraulic fill for the bypass road’s subbase. While 

the contractor dredged fill for the causeway leading to the pier complex, the 

84th Engineer Battalion added landing craft ramps. The DeLong Corporation 

installed two prefabricated piers. Dredging the channel for deep-water shipping in the harbor continued. By December, the new pier complex with its 

four deep-draft berths boosted the cargo unloading performance from a little 

more than 59,000 short tons in January to over 113,000 short tons. The battalion improved the submarine fuel pipeline by more than doubling its length to 

5,500 feet and began placing two additional lines. In the depot, drainage facilities were improved before the winter monsoon. To satisfy the ever-increasing 

demand for rock, the 84th assumed responsibility for the operation of the 

quarry south of Qui Nhon. The battalion pooled its equipment with the 73d 

Construction Support Company, and the combined capacity of the rock crushers increased to two 75-ton-per-hour units and one 225-ton-per-hour unit.31

30 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, 8 Aug 66, pp. 24–25; Galloway, “Essayons,” 

p. 70; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 April 66, 937th Engr Gp, p. 6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 84th Engr Bn, p. 3, and 

1 May–31 Jul 66, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 3–4; Yens and Clement, “Port Construction in Vietnam,” 

pp. 22–23; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 107. 31 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 3–5, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 84th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 

66, pp. 2–6, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 84th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 67, pp. 3, 5, all in Historians files, 

CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 108–10; MACV History, 1966, p. 299.
127

Building the Bases, 1966

Outside Qui Nhon, the 19th Engineer Battalion carried on with an array 

of construction projects. Colonel Mathews departed in July and turned the 

reins of command over to Lt. Col. Nolan C. Rhodes. This transfer of command was literal, for it involved turning over the bit and reins of a bridle that, 

according to legend, came from a seahorse that rescued the drowning battalion 

commander during the World War II amphibious landing at Anzio, Italy. (The 

unit’s insignia was also emblazoned with a little seahorse.) One major project 

involved expanding the 50,000-barrel tank farm to 112,000-barrel capacity at 

a second site on the outskirts of town. The fuel-thirsty 1st Cavalry Division’s 

450 helicopters had placed heavy demands on the logistics base and had created an urgent need for more fuel storage, including the construction of a fiftyone-mile fuel pipeline from Qui Nhon to An Khe. In late August, Company C 

began work on the pipeline and pumping stations. Normally, engineer pipeline 

companies did this type of work, and MACV made arrangements for a platoon 

from the 697th Pipeline Construction Company based in Thailand to help. By 

mid-September, work crews had placed thirty-three miles of pipeline, but a 

shortage of clamps forced a temporary halt. Work shifted to building pump 

stations and welding pipeline sections. Bad welding rods caused more delays, 

and a plea went out to airlift acceptable welding rods from the United States. 

Meanwhile, at Lane Army Airfield outside Qui Nhon, the battalion continued 

to make improvements. Peneprime was used extensively to cut down on the 

dust, and twenty-five pads were added to the heliport. In mid-February, the 

19th began to build a large maintenance facility at Cha Rang near the intersection of Highways 1 and 19. The transfer of areas of responsibility between the 

DeLong pier under construction at Qui Nhon in November 1966. Arrow indicates the hydraulic fill for port hardstand.
Engineers at War

128

937th and the 45th Groups in November resulted in the transfer of the Cha 

Rang and the pipeline projects to the recently arrived 35th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat). The 19th also picked up the ammunition depot road maintenance 

project from the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion. Several operational missions were also assigned to the 19th later in the year.32

Much progress at the Qui Nhon ammunition depot had been made by the 

299th Engineer Battalion. The depot site, which was perched near the base of a 

steep slope next to Highway 1 southwest of the city, presented a tremendous challenge in design and drainage. Company B built roads, concrete ammunition pads, 

earthen berms around the pads, buildings, guard towers, and fencing. However, 

huge runoffs of water following heavy rains repeatedly damaged roads, berms, 

and other structures. Except when called out on operational missions, Company 

C kept busy patching assigned sections of Highways 1 and 19. In late July the battalion, now commanded by Lt. Col. Richard M. Connell who replaced Colonel 

Anderson in April, received word to move the headquarters, Company C, and part 

of the 630th Light Equipment Company to Pleiku to join Company A, which had 

been hard at work building facilities for the 3d Brigade, 25th Division. Company 

B remained at the ammunition depot until relieved by the 19th.33 (Map 9)

In November 1966, the 35th Engineer Battalion under the command of Lt. 

Col. Wesley E. Peel arrived at Qui Nhon from Fort Lewis, Washington. The 

battalion was unique in that it had four line companies compared to the three in 

the nondivisional combat battalions that arrived earlier. Newly arriving combat 

engineer battalions were organized under the later Table of Organization and 

Equipment (TOE) 5–35E series, while the battalions in country were still organized under the series 5–35D TOE. After settling in, the 35th assumed the Cha 

Rang depot and pipeline projects from the 19th. It also supported 1st Cavalry 

Division operations around Bong Son, some fifty miles north of Qui Nhon. 

This included keeping Highway 1 open to Bong Son during the winter monsoon 

already under way. Along Highway 19, the battalion and pipeline platoon completed five pump stations, two H-frame crossings, and four suspension crossings. Heavy rains and rising waters in December, however, caused the collapse of 

the fourth suspension bridge, and the project completion date of 31 December 

slipped back a week. By 20 January, with pipeline tests successfully completed, 

the 35th turned over the pipeline to the 1st Logistical Command. Soon fuel 

began to flow through the pipeline to An Khe. During this period, the battalion 

operated with only three lettered companies, for Company D had been ordered 

to Pleiku to work under the 20th Engineer Battalion’s control.34

Before the end of the year, the 45th Group’s area of responsibility and units 

under its control changed dramatically. By late 1966, the burgeoning Qui Nhon 

32 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 67, 70, 71; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 19th Engr Bn, 9 May 66, 

pp. 3–5, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 19th Engr Bn, 13 Aug 66, pp. 1–2, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 19th Engr 

Bn, 31 Jan 67, pp. 1–7, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, Engr Cmd, 31 Jan 67, pp. 16–18. ORLLs in 

Historians files, CMH. 33 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 299th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 66, pp. 3–4, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 299th 

Engr Bn, 31 Jul 66, pp. 2–4. All in Historians files, CMH. 34 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, Engr Cmd, pp. 17–18, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 45th Engr 

Gp, p. 4; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 163, 173.
129

Building the Bases, 1966

complex supported combat operations of over 62,000 combat and support troops. 

Because of the establishment of the engineer command and the shift of the 18th 

Engineer Brigade to Dong Ba Thin, other shifts of boundaries took place within 

the new brigade area. The 937th Engineer Group moved inland to Pleiku and 

assumed responsibility for the Central Highlands. On 10 November, Colonel 

Bush’s 45th Engineer Group shifted its area of responsibility north to the I/II 

Corps boundary and moved to a more central location in Qui Nhon. In turn, the 

35th Group extended its responsibility from Cam Ranh Bay to a point north of 

Nha Trang. The 45th Group lost the 14th Engineer Battalion to the 35th Group, 

and the 20th Engineer Battalion moved to the highlands to work under the 937th 

Group. Colonel Bush retained control of the 39th and 577th Engineer Battalions, 

and the 19th, 35th, and 84th Engineer Battalions in Qui Nhon along with all 

construction projects in the area were transferred to the 45th Group. As a result, 

Colonel Bush ended up commanding the largest engineer group in Vietnam—five 

battalions and several companies and smaller units totaling over 3,600 men.35

35 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 134, 136; Dunn, Base Development, p. 68; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 

Jan 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 3; Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, 29 Oct–17 Nov, incl. 7, tab A, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5.

1

1

19

441

441

440

6B

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

Lane Army

Aireld Complex

US Ammunition

Supply Point

POL Facility

Submarine POL Facility

Depot

POL Facility

DeLong Piers

Port Facility

Port Facility

LST, LCU, LCM Ramps

to Phu Cat 

to An Khe

to Tuy Hoa

Cha Rang

Maintenance

Complex

Hospital

Market Time

Pontoon Pier

Pipeline

An Khe Pipeline

Qui Nhon

Army Aireld

Engineer Rock Quarry

South Korean

Base Camp

31 December 1966

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

QUI NHON AREA

Map 9
Engineers at War

130

Highlands Camps

Work continued at a high pace at the 1st Cavalry Division’s An Khe base 

camp. Colonel Edelstein’s 70th Engineer Battalion improved access to the base 

by adding a one-and-a-half-mile road to Highway 19 east of An Khe City. To 

complete the road, the 70th spanned a river with a 260-foot double-double 

panel bridge. The Bailey bridge consisted of two tiers of double panels on 

each side of the roadway. Other projects completed were a perimeter security 

lighting system and a division tactical operations center. Extensive self-help 

construction under the supervision of the engineers continued in troop areas. 

In March 1966, Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, arrived from Qui Nhon 

and set up a new quarry and larger rock crusher plant. The construction unit 

also added many wood frame buildings, one of which included a reinforcedconcrete security room for use by the division’s communications section, a 

sixty-ton-capacity ice-making plant, and a central telephone dial exchange.36

Improving the An Khe airfield, however, turned into a major and troublesome 

endeavor. Through early spring, C–130s were continuing to suffer frequent 

tire cuts and blowouts. In late May, the rough condition of the new matting 

and the destructive effect of the pierced steel planking on the medium range 

aircraft’s tires again reached an unacceptable level, forcing the closure of the 

airfield for repairs.37

To improve the airfield situation, the engineers figured three projects 

would have to be undertaken. First, engineer units at An Khe would build an 

alternate T17 membrane assault strip at the Golf Course. Second, new matting 

would be placed on the old airfield. Third, the engineers would construct a 

completely new C–130 runway. In late May, the 8th Engineer Battalion completed about one-third of the alternate airstrip’s earthwork before turning that 

phase of construction over to Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion. On 10 

June, the 70th Engineer Battalion began to lay T17 membrane while Company 

B finished the earthwork. Designed to serve as a rapid means to protect the 

runway base from the effects of moisture, the recently developed T17 membrane consisted of a neoprene-coated nylon fabric packaged in sheets measuring 303 by 60 feet. As part of the process of laying and securing the membrane 

36 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 70, 72; ORLLs, 70th Engr Bn, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 7 May 66, pp. 

2–8, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 66, pp. 2–8, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 70th Engr Bn, 31 

Oct 66, pp. 1–2, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 70th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 67, pp. 2–6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 84th 

Engr Bn, 14 May 66, pp. 3–4, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 84th Engr Bn, 14 Aug 66, pp. 3, 21, 1 Aug–31 

Oct 66, 84th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 66, p. 1–2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 84th Engr Bn, p. 2. ORLLs 

in Historians files, CMH. 37 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 30; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 209, 230–31; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 66, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 6, 11, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 6; Quarterly 

Hist Rpt 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 23; Situation Rpt on the Construction of Airfields in 

South Vietnam, incl. 13, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 1; Situation Rpt on Airfield 

Construction in SEA, incl. 13, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 2, 6 May, OCE Hist Ofc; 

Situation Rpt on Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 3; Ltr, Lt Gen Joseph H. Moore, CG, Seventh AF, to Westmoreland, 13 May 66, sub: 

Hazardous Airfield Conditions at An Khe, and 1st indorsement, Brig Gen Carroll H. Dunn to 

Cmdr, Seventh AF, 22 May 66, Historians files, CMH.
131

Building the Bases, 1966

from moving during landings and takeoffs, work crews dug anchor ditches 

to hold the edges in place. Since the membrane provided no bearing capacity, the base required good compaction. As a finishing touch, a skid-proofing 

compound was applied to the membrane’s surface. In a little over one week, 

the 70th placed T17 membrane on a 3,200-by-60-foot runway, a 900-by-180-

foot parking area, and two 215-by-36-foot taxiways. The battalion also built 

a 100,000-square-foot compacted laterite hardstand and moved the control 

tower. The 70th Engineer Battalion officially completed the Golf Course project on 18 June.38

Air operations shifted to the T17 membrane Golf Course airstrip, and 

the main airfield was closed for rehabilitation. Soon the new airstrip had its 

own problems. A six-man maintenance crew was assigned to inspect and patch 

tears in the membrane after each C–130 landing. Although it did not rain very 

much, the impact and weight of the cargo planes repeatedly made ruts eight to 

twelve inches deep. This condition required frequent roller and vibratory compactor work that in itself proved damaging to the membrane. Nevertheless, the 

durability of the T17 membrane exceeded expectations, assuring its usefulness 

for forward operations, if given the proper maintenance. Unfortunately, the 

membrane runway at An Khe was considered less than satisfactory. On 11 

July, a few days before Colonel Edelstein transferred the command of the 70th 

Engineer Battalion to Lt. Col. John R. Redman, the unit received a construction directive to fortify the Golf Course airstrip with AM2 matting. Since the 

main runway was still closed, the directive mandated that one half the strip 

always be open to emergency traffic. Pacific Command controlled the scarce 

matting, and MACV had to request the diversion of matting from the Phu 

Cat Air Base project. Within a week, Company A began removing and replacing the membrane after filling and compacting bad spots. AM2 matting was 

then placed over the runway, taxiways, and parking apron. The onset of daily 

rains made the job that much more difficult. On 20 August, Colonel Redman 

received word from the division that the strip had to be ready for use on the 

twenty-fifth for a tactical operation. The battalion added more men to lay 

matting and completed the runway and two taxiways at 0600 25 August, four 

hours before the first aircraft touched down.39

A month later, the monsoon season was in full swing, and the Golf Course 

airstrip again began to show signs of failure. At one location, the weight of 

the taxiing aircraft started to force up mud through the joints in the matting. 

Since the matting did not appear damaged, the airstrip remained open with 

38 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 111–12; Memoirs of the First Team, p. 181; Situation Rpt 

on Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; 

ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 6, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2. 39 AAR, 70th Engr Bn, Golf Course Airstrip, 11 Sep 66, Incl in ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 

70th Engr Bn, pp. 12; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 70; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 231; Quarterly 

Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, pp. 23–24; Msg, CG I FFV to CG USARV, 27 May 66, 

sub: An Khe Airfield Requirements; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-CM to CINCPAC, 14 Jun 

66, sub: AM2 Matting Requirements for An Khe Airfield; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-CM 

20885 to Cmdrs Seventh AF, 1st Log Cmd, 1st Cav Div, USA Support Cmd, 18 Jun 66, sub: 

AM2 Matting Requirements for An Khe Airfield. Msgs in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

132

the suspected section closely monitored. By 30 September, the matting in this 

area had become deformed, but the strip remained open due to an ongoing 

operation. The 70th Engineer Battalion continued to monitor the airstrip, 

and on 7 October repair crews observed a hairline crack in the joint of the 

end panel of the depression. Landing and taxiing of C–130 transports caused 

AM2 panels in this section to become disengaged in two places. Further investigation revealed a subgrade failure that called for rehabilitation of some 300 

feet of the runway. Due to the high priority given to the military operation, the 

1st Cavalry Division authorized shutting down the airfield for only thirty-six 

hours. Taking turns in around-the-clock shifts, Companies A and C completed 

repairs at 0400 9 October. Another problem soon followed. Because of the lack 

of anchorage systems, the constant shifting of the aluminum matting continued to tear the membrane, thus allowing water to erode the subbase. The 70th 

again removed larger sections of matting and membrane. Work crews added 

and compacted crushed rock in the subgrade, applied peneprime in place of 

the membrane, and replaced the matting. The problems at An Khe simply 

reemphasized the importance of adequate drainage and the difficulties of 

doing earthwork during the monsoon. In December, another major change in 

specifications took place at the main airfield. The new asphalt runway would 

become the taxiway after completion of a concrete runway, the first of that 

type attempted by engineer troops in Vietnam.40

Over at the 12-million-square-foot Golf Course heliport, the 70th Engineer 

Battalion started building over four hundred ramps for the division’s helicopter 

fleet. Heavy vehicle traffic had torn off much of the grass cover, and in a short 

time the heliport became extremely dusty. General Wright even went to the 

extreme of having Vietnamese laborers cut sod and transplant it to the heliport. 

He recognized that every little bit helped to reduce dust and helicopter maintenance problems, but even under optimum conditions putting down sod by this 

method was a slow process, perhaps, according to one estimate, taking up to 

twenty years. The engineers turned to a better method. The ramps, which varied 

in size according to the size of the aircraft, were leveled and topped off with an 

asphalt surface treatment. Workers then covered the treatment with airfield matting. Together the two surfaces reduced dust and flying particles and provided a 

firm foundation even when it rained.41

At Pleiku, more engineers arrived to help build the forward base for the 3d 

Brigade, 25th Division. In early January, a reinforced platoon from Company 

A, 299th Engineer Battalion, moved from Qui Nhon to help build facilities 

for the infantry brigade. A second platoon followed a week later, and by early 

April the entire company had moved to Pleiku. Work began on an ammuni40 AAR, 70th Engr Bn, Golf Course Airstrip Repair, 9 Nov 66, Historians files, CMH; 

ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 70th Engr Bn, p. 3, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, 15 Feb 

67, p. 12, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, pp. 1–2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 84th Engr Bn, p. 2. 41 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 72; Interv, Fishback with Wright, 1 Mar 83, 2:399–400; Situation 

Rpt on the Construction of Airfields in South Vietnam, incl. 13, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 1; Situation Rpt on Airfield Construction in SEA, incl. 13, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 2; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 70th Engr Bn, p. 6, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 70th Engr 

Bn, p. 4.
133

Building the Bases, 1966

tion depot and roads in and around the base. By June, Company A started 

building an aircraft maintenance facility, a cantonment area, an eighty-bed 

hospital, and more depot facilities. The company also ran an experiment by 

laying T17 membrane along a 2,000-foot section of road as a dust-control measure. To keep the surface from being punctured and torn with sharp objects, 

work crews closed the test section to tracked vehicles and dump trucks hauling 

gravel. After two weeks of use, the membrane held up well and appeared to be 

a good expedient road surface. On 29 July, Colonel Connell moved his battalion headquarters and most of the attached 630th Light Equipment Company 

to Pleiku. Company B remained at Qui Nhon working on the ammunition 

depot until 21 August before rejoining the battalion. In August, the battalion 

began making preparations to help the arriving 4th Infantry Division set up a 

division-size base camp outside Pleiku.42

The forward presence of a full division at Pleiku called for more engineers to lend a hand in base development and operational support. On 10 

October, the 20th Engineer Battalion under Lt. Col. Robert L. Gilmore, who 

had replaced Colonel Harris in April, along with the attached 584th Light 

Equipment Company, moved from Ban Me Thuot to the 4th Division’s new 

Dragon Mountain base camp. Although Colonel Gilmore took over base 

development responsibilities from the 299th, only a limited amount of time 

could be devoted to base construction. Priority went to forward airfields and 

roads in support of the division’s operations. Whenever possible, Vietnamese 

laborers were hired and put to work manufacturing prefabricated buildings 

used in the self-help construction program. Company A initiated work on an 

interim water supply system by installing a pump station and pipeline from 

a nearby lake to a 1,000-barrel storage tank on the base. This undertaking 

included building a suspension bridge with a 300-foot clear span over a deep 

ravine and placing the pipeline underground inside the camp. Meanwhile, 

Company C constructed a loading ramp and crusher head wall for the 584th 

Light Equipment Company’s quarry. The light equipment company helped 

build several forward airfields and upgrade Highway 19. By early December, 

the 20th gained a fourth line company with the attachment of Company D, 

35th Engineer Battalion, to help the building effort at Pleiku. Since RMK-BRJ 

was already working at the air base and Camp Holloway, the firm received 

notice to proceed in June to build a cantonment, a hospital, and other support 

facilities for the Army.43

At nearby Pleiku Air Base, the Air Force expanded its presence from an 

outpost of 150 men to a complex of over 2,100 personnel. From this most 

inland of major air bases, the Air Force dispatched attack fighters, psychological warfare planes, gunships, forward air control observation planes, and 

rescue helicopters. Beginning in October 1965, a succession of Prime Beef 

42 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 4–5, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 

1–2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 299th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 67, pp. 1–7, Historians files, CMH; AAR, 

Test Road T17, Co A, 299th Engr Bn, 30 Mar 66, incl. 9, tab C, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt 

no. 3; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 117, 119, 165. 43 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 20th Engr Bn, 10 Nov 66, p. 3–4, 10, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 

20th Engr Bn, 12 Feb 67, p. 1–7, both in Historians files, CMH; Diary of a Contract, pp. 209–10.
Engineers at War

134

teams built cantonments, aircraft ramps, operations facilities, and helped 

assemble fuel storage bladders and their dispensing systems. The teams also 

built two-story wooden troop billets and a kennel for Air Police guard dogs. By 

13 September 1966, the teams had completed thirteen barracks housing over 

900 men. RMK-BRJ also worked on cantonment facilities, which included 

an additional 1,000 kilowatts of power and a utilities system (water, sewers, 

sewage plant, and power distribution), and completed a 30,000-square-yard 

parking apron in December.44 (Map 10)

On 10 November, the 937th Engineer Group, now under the command 

of Col. Ernest P. Braucher who replaced Colonel Watkin in August, assumed 

responsibility for the highlands and moved its headquarters to Pleiku. 

Although the group lost the 19th and 84th Engineer Battalions, it gained 

the 20th Engineer Battalion and Company D, 35th Engineer Battalion. The 

group retained the 70th and 299th Engineer Battalions and Company B, 84th 

Engineer Battalion. Colonel Braucher also had several smaller units to provide 

specialized support: the 509th and 511th Panel Bridge Companies (one platoon of the 509th remained attached to the 45th Group), the 584th and 630th 

Light Equipment Companies (the 630th also had a platoon attached to the 

45th Group), the 585th Dump Truck Company, and two platoons and a part 

of a support platoon from the 554th Float Bridge Company.45

On the negative side, the 937th Engineer Group lost a major portion of its 

construction capability while taking on a larger area of responsibility. Although 

the 937th had given up the eastern half of its territory to the 45th Group, its 

area increased by 30 percent after taking over the southern highlands from 

the 35th Group. The recent influx of U.S. troops into the Pleiku area created requirements for construction that more than matched the resources at 

Colonel Braucher’s disposal. This ensued despite transferring the Qui Nhon 

area projects and gaining the 20th Engineer Battalion. The loss of the skilled 

men and equipment of all but one company of the 84th, the only construction 

battalion in northern II Corps, could not be made up. The 84th had provided 

a reservoir of journeymen plumbers, fitters, electricians, and other key trades 

needed on the group’s projects.46

For the most part, the 937th Group had tackled large projects typically 

carried out by a construction group headquarters. The small operations (S–3) 

and supply (S–4) sections of the group headquarters and the combat battalions required augmentation to handle the additional engineering tasks. In the 

end, this meant that the group and combat battalion headquarters tasked their 

units to locate qualified officers to assume engineering tasks at the headquarters. In turn, this situation left several companies short of officers. To some 

degree, the attachment of light equipment and construction support companies did bring the combat battalion on a par with the construction battalions. 

The 937th Group managed to get by with its two light equipment companies, 

44 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, pp. 172, 176; USAF Airfield Construction in South 

Vietnam, pp. 120, 127–28; Diary of a Contract, pp. 208–09. 45 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, p. 2; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 163.

46 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 6, 12.
135

Building the Bases, 1966

but the transfer of one of the two companies to the 159th Group in April 

severely depleted the group’s construction equipment resources.47

In its first year in Vietnam (August 1965 to August 1966), the 937th 

Engineer Group had expended over 90 percent of its effort in construction. 

47 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 937th Engr Gp, p. 8, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 937th Engr Gp, 15 Aug 

66, p. 10, Historians files, CMH, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6; Galloway, 

“Essayons,” pp. 75–76.

14

14 19

Lake Bien Ho

Ammunition Storage Area

S Viet Ammunition Storage

POL Storage

Ammunition

Storage

Area

Ammunition Dump

Ammunition Dump

Arty Hill

MACV Compound

400 Bed Hospital

Log Cantonment

War Readiness Materiel

Special Forces Area

S Viet II Corps HQ USAF Cantonment

Montagnard Training Center

Construction Shops

US Parking Area

New Pleiku

Camp Holloway

Dragon Mountain 4th Inf Div 10 Kilometers

937th Engineer Group

Cantonment

Cantonment

Cantonment

Depot

Maintenance

Facility

Pleiku

31 December 1966

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

PLEIKU AREA

Existing Facility

Facility Under Construction

Planned Construction

Map 10
Engineers at War

136

With such a heavy construction responsibility, the group concentrated its 

efforts in and around Qui Nhon and at An Khe, improving and expanding 

logistic and support facilities, and to a lesser degree at Pleiku. As the pace of 

combat operations increased in the highlands, I Field Force tasked the nondivisional engineers of the 937th Group for more operational support. With the 

shift to the western highlands, the proportion of operational support missions 

dramatically increased. Much of this effort went to building and maintaining 

forward airfields and tactical supply routes supporting operations. By the end 

of 1966, the group’s construction and operational missions reached a balance. 

While the 70th Engineer Battalion concentrated almost entirely on construction at An Khe, the 20th Engineer Battalion devoted nearly all its effort to 

operational support. The 299th Engineer Battalion’s effort fluctuated but 

broke down almost evenly between construction and operational support.48

More Work at Phan Rang 

At Phan Rang, Colonel Triem’s 62d Engineer Construction Battalion continued work at the joint Army and Air Force facility where most of the effort 

went into the jet fighter base. First, military engineers built an AM2 aluminum 

matting airfield followed by the civilian contractor, RMK-BRJ, which built a 

permanent 10,000-foot concrete runway, taxiways, and parking aprons. The 

first rains of the monsoon fell in September and October 1965, but a period of 

fair weather followed. Earthwork progressed satisfactorily until mid-December 

when heavy rains again set in. Nearly nine inches of rain fell within a ten-day 

period, hindering the use of heavy construction equipment, and resulting in 

the loss of many productive days. The 62d also suffered a high rate of equipment breakdowns and a lack of repair parts. In January 1966, the battalion 

and the contractor tackled the problem by pooling equipment. Military operators used the contractor’s equipment at night, an arrangement that lasted until 

mid-February when RMK-BRJ began to work on the ammunition storage 

area.49

Although much earthwork remained to be done on the runway, the 62d 

began placing matting in areas as soon as the subgrade and base course were 

completed. All available electrical lighting was used to do earthwork at night. 

During the day, matting was laid even though temperatures reached 100 or 

more degrees. Through a trial and error method, the 62d found that small 

crews of soldiers proved more effective at laying the matting than Vietnamese 

laborers. On the other hand, the Vietnamese became proficient placing membrane sections on the subgrade and disassembling the bundles of AM2 matting. The first aircraft touched down on the interim runway on 20 February. By 

48 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, p. 6; 937th Engr Gp History, pp. 3–5; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 108–09, 160. 49 Quarterly Cmd Rpt 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 62d Engr Bn, 11 May 66, pp. 1, 5–6, and ORLL, 1 

May–31 Jul 66, 62d Engr Bn, 13 Aug 66, pp. 1–4, both in Historians files, CMH; Maj. Donald 

A. Haas, “Phan Rang Air Base,” Military Engineer 58 (November-December 1966): 431–32; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 45–46; Situation Rpt on the Construction of Cantonments, incl. 8, p. 

2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3.
137

Building the Bases, 1966

mid-March, the 10,000-by-102-foot runway and adjacent taxiways and parking aprons became operational when the first F–4 Phantoms landed, making 

Phan Rang the country’s sixth operational jet fighter base.50

Work continued on the airfield, but bad weather caused more problems. 

After the 62d Engineer Battalion laid more matting on the north taxiway, heavy 

rains in May caused base course and subgrade failures. This forced the Army 

engineers and Air Force civil engineers of the 554th Red Horse Squadron, 

which arrived in January, to stop construction and make repairs. Although the 

AM2 matting had held up well to wear, Red Horse engineers, who were building aircraft revetments at the time, noticed depressions on the parking ramp. 

As the rains continued (Phan Rang had the unenviable distinction from the 

builder’s point of view of having two rainy seasons, both winter and summer 

monsoons), the depressions deepened and quickly filled with water, often causing the fighter-bombers to drag their wing-hung ordnance. The ramp failures 

spread next to the taxiway, then the runway. With the help of RMK-BRJ, the 

Army engineers went to work trying to restore the taxiway and ramp. The 

554th Red Horse Squadron took over runway repairs.51

It was determined that rain alone had not caused the base course failure. 

Red Horse engineers opined that Army engineers in their attempt to meet 

deadlines deviated from the original plans and substituted another waterproofed membrane instead of the more rugged and superior T17 membrane. 

Air Force engineers also attributed the failures due to hasty workmanship. In 

fact, the prefabricated metal surfaces could not seal water out of the joints 

between panels. Even the T17 and various asphalt products turned out less 

than satisfactory. Since each takeoff and landing produced powerful thrusts 

against the surface, work crews tried anchoring the matting in attempts to prevent the runway from creeping. Unfortunately, the anchorages allowed surface 

water access to the subgrade. By June, the 62d Engineer Battalion completed 

the north taxiway and turned attention to the parking ramp. Also that month, 

Red Horse engineers, working at night to avoid the 125-degree heat reflecting 

from the AM2 matting, replaced nearly 90,000 square feet of runway matting. 

The runway remained open for operations, though at times it was reduced to 

only 6,000 feet of usable length. During this time, RMK-BRJ continued work 

on the concrete runway.52

By the end of the year, the 62d Engineer Battalion’s largest and most troublesome project at the air base neared completion. By then, Colonel Triem 

50 Haas, “Phan Rang Air Base,” pp. 432–33; Lyons, “Aluminum Matting Runways in 

Vietnam,” p. 246; Dunn, Base Development, p. 62; USAF Airfield Construction in South 

Vietnam, pp. 104–05. See also Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Jan–30 Apr 66, 62d Engr Bn, pp. 3–4, and 

ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 62d Engr Bn, p. 3. 51 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 62d Engr Bn, pp. 2–3, 6; USAF Airfield Construction in South 

Vietnam, pp. 105–06; Situation Rpt on Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, incl. 7, pp. 1, 

3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-CM 15141 to CG, 

USARV, and OICC (Officer in Charge of Construction) RVN, 13 May 66, sub: Expeditionary 

Airfield Phan Rang, Historians files, CMH. 52 USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 107–08; Situation Rpt on Airfield 

Construction in South Vietnam, incl. 7, pp. 3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; Ploger, 

Army Engineers, p. 114; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 62d Engr Bn, p. 6.
Engineers at War

138

had departed in late June and Lt. Col. Andrew J. Waldrop had assumed command ten days later. A notable achievement by the 62d Engineer Battalion as 

it entered its second year in Vietnam included the completion of the millionsquare-foot AM2 parking apron. Another project for the Air Force included 

completing a 46,000-barrel fuel storage area and connecting it to the six-inch 

pipeline leading to the beach. At the beach, the 62d installed two 8-inch submarine pipelines from the shore 1,200 feet out to a discharging and mooring 

facility. Work also began on two LST ramps and a new road to the air base. 

With the help of a fifty-man self-help contingent from the 1st Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, progress on the 4,700-man cantonment area began to 

raise the troop billets to Standard 4. The 62d also deployed forces inland to 

Bao Loc and to Da Lat to do airfield work.53

At the permanent airfield, RMK-BRJ completed the 10,000-foot concrete 

runway and four connecting taxiways on 12 October 1966. The new runway 

alleviated many operational adversities that had plagued the Army and Air 

Force engineers at the interim AM2 airfield. By year’s end, the new runway 

and its supporting taxiway system were in service. All the roads were graded 

and most were topped with an asphalt surface. The Air Force occupied more 

than one-half of the sixty-seven barracks and work continued on the remainder. Work also proceeded into the final stages of installing an electrical power 

plant, water and sewage system, dining hall, dispensary, and other structures. 

To compensate for some slippage and deletions from construction schedules 

forced by contract costs, MACV tasked the 554th Red Horse Squadron with 

a six-month work program. This would provide Air Force personnel in 1967 

those facilities that did not materialize in 1966.54

With a good share of its work completed, Colonel Waldrop received 

orders in late November to move the 62d Engineer Battalion to Long Binh. 

The second major move of the battalion while in Vietnam vividly brought out 

the hardships involved in relocating a 900-man heavy construction battalion. 

Companies continued to work on projects, phasing out construction approximately three to five days before loading on a LST for the voyage south. The 

move extended over a seven-week period, and as a result the battalion could 

barely keep up maintenance, medical, supply, engineering, and administrative 

support at two locations. Colonel Waldrop estimated the move had set back 

the battalion’s maintenance effort by two months and recommended against 

phased movement of engineer construction battalions.55

53 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 62d Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, pp. 1–4, and 1 Nov–31 Jan 67, 62d 

Engr Bn, 12 Feb 67, pp. 1–4 and incl. 1, AAR, Bao Loc Airfield, both in Historians files, CMH; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 134. 54 USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, p. 110; Quarterly Hist Rpts 1 Jul–30 Sep 

66, MACDC, p. 39, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, p. 29. For more on RMK-BRJ work at 

Phan Rang, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 250–54. 55 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 62d Engr Bn, pp. 1–4, 11. For an account of the procedures 

involved in such a move, see Sgt. Maj. Edward J. Malen, “Engineer Battalion Move by Landing 

Craft,” Military Engineer 60 (July-August 1968): 262–63.
139

Building the Bases, 1966

Long Binh and the III Corps Shield

Colonel Hottenroth’s 3,000-man 159th Engineer Group pressed ahead 

on the Saigon base complex and tactical base camps forming a protective arc 

around the capital. The group’s assignments included Long Binh, base camp 

facilities for the 1st and 25th Divisions, and the port at Vung Tau. Units carrying out this work were the 46th Construction and 168th and 588th Combat 

Battalions augmented by two light equipment companies and one construction 

support company. In addition, well-drilling detachments drilled for sources of 

fresh water. Besides its own troops and contractor personnel working in the 

area, the group also employed over 1,300 Vietnamese on a daily hire basis.56

At Long Binh, the 159th Group gradually transformed the former 

rubber plantation into a major Army base. The 46th Engineer Battalion, less 

Company D at Vung Tau, but reinforced with Company C, 168th Engineer 

Battalion, completed the 400-bed 93d Evacuation Hospital. Only shortages 

of electrical and plumbing supplies delayed the timely completion of the 

medical facility. In addition to the buildings, work at the hospital involved 

installation of an electrical distribution system by Pacific Architects and 

Engineers and construction of a minimum sewage system and access roads. 

56 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 83; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, 13 May 66, p. 1–7, 

Historians files, CMH; Rpt of Visit to the 159th Engr Gp, Long Binh, Vietnam, 15–18 Feb 66, 

incl. 6, tab C, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 1.

Phan Rang airfield at the end of 1966 showing concrete runway and taxiways on 

the left and AM2 runway on the right
Engineers at War

140

Work continued at the giant ammunition supply depot, the unit’s highest 

priority project. Seasonal rains hampered the construction of earthen berms 

and the extensive drainage and culvert work, but by early May approximately 

20 percent of the depot, which included more than three million square feet 

of storage space, was done. Work on sheds and bunkers progressed at an 

equal pace.57 (Map 11)

The 46th Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. George Mason 

who replaced Colonel Hagedon on 17 January, also worked on other projects 

in the Long Binh area. In late January, the battalion began to clear nearby 

land along Highway 1A for the II Field Force headquarters. After clearing 

the land for the new camp, which became known as Plantation, the 46th 

erected seventeen vertical wall Quonset buildings. Facilities for support units 

followed. Pacific Architects and Engineers installed power plants and security lighting. In April, work began on a new cantonment between Long Binh 

and Plantation for the 90th Replacement Battalion located at the intersection of Highways 1A and 15. By the end of May, the replacement battalion moved out of Saigon to its new camp, which was capable of housing 

3,000 individual replacements, soon to be expanded to a 6,000-man capacity. On the Dong Nai River, the 46th completed a barge off-loading facility 

known as the Cogido Dock. The new facility greatly increased the capacity 

for unloading barges used to transship ammunition from deep-draft ships 

docking downstream at Nha Be, thus avoiding hauling the dangerous cargo 

through populated areas to the Long Binh depot. After almost a year in 

country, the battalion finally took the time to complete its own maintenance 

shops, semipermanent headquarters buildings, and clubs.58 (Map 12)

The move of Army troops from Saigon to Long Binh showed the massive 

scope of work still to come. The camp continued to grow in importance as 

Operation Moose (Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiously) ordered by General

Westmoreland sent increasing numbers of U.S. troops to the former plantation. Long Binh had also become a major staging area for incoming men and 

units. From May to December, Long Binh grew from 6,000 to 20,000 men, 

with more troops to follow. By late 1966, the complex supported over 100,000 

soldiers operating in III and IV Corps.59

The 18th Engineer Brigade initially handled most of the work at Long 

Binh. After some delay, RMK-BRJ began to mobilize its workforce and gradually assumed the bulk of construction. In late October, base development 

plans noted that most of the cantonment and about half the logistical facilities 

would be built with the $91 million earmarked from Fiscal Year 1966 supple57 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 84; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 3–4, 1 May–31 

Jul 66, 159th Engr Gp, 12 Aug 66, p. 5, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 46th Engr Bn, 11 Aug 66, p. 1, 

both in Historians files, CMH; PA&E History, 1963–1966, p. 37; Situation Rpt on Hospital 

Construction in South Vietnam, incl. 15, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3. 58 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 84–86; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6, 

1 May–31 Jul 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 8–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 46th Engr Bn, p. 2; PA&E 

History, 1963–1966, p. 39. 59 Dunn, Base Development, p. 69; Army Construction in Vietnam, incl. 9, p. 1, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt, no. 5.
141

Building the Bases, 1966

mental funds. The rest of the facilities would be funded from the 1967 supplemental program at a cost of $77 million. Initial planning called for RMK-BRJ 

to complete the U.S. Army, Vietnam, and 1st Logistical Command permanent 

headquarters buildings by April 1967. Because of a scare brought on by a 

serious cash-flow problem that summer, the Officer in Charge of Construction 

slipped the projected completion date to August 1967.60

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1966, rains impeded progress in the Saigon area. Horizontal work (mainly earthwork) at Long Binh 

slowed down, but despite the mire, construction units maintained a moderately efficient rate on vertical projects. Experience gained a year earlier 

made the 159th Engineer Group headquarters attentive to drainage, and the 

commanders and staff admonished the constructing units to build drainage facilities before other work began. After almost a year commanding the 

group in Vietnam, Colonel Hottenroth passed the 159th Group to his successor, Col. Richard McConnell, in September.61

The 169th Engineer Battalion (Construction), which arrived from 

Okinawa in late May, became an integral part of the work under way at the 

logistical and headquarters complex. The battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. 

Marvin W. Rees, built a post headquarters and a stockade to detain U.S. 

soldiers charged or convicted of military offenses. The unit also cleared more 

storage areas, operated a prefabrication shop for the self-help construction 

program, began construction of the 24th Evacuation Hospital, built cantonments, and set up its asphalt plant. In August and September, the 169th 

built a staging area for the newly arrived 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

Elements of the battalion helped to build the barge off-loading facility at 

Cogido Dock.62

North of Saigon, Lt. Col. Manley E. Rogers’ 168th Engineer Battalion 

focused its efforts on the 1st Division’s base camps at Di An, Phu Loi, and 

Lai Khe. On 28 April 1966, Lt. Col. Edwin F. Pelosky assumed command 

of the battalion and would hold that position for the next year. At Di An, 

Headquarters Company and Company A completed thirty-seven tropical 

buildings for the division headquarters and began building warehouses and 

storage areas for the Division Support Command. In January, Company B 

began building a C–130 airstrip for the 3d Brigade at Lai Khe. Despite the 

necessity of hauling all material to the base by armed convoys, work crews 

finished the M8 pierced steel plank strip within two months. Coinciding with 

the airfield work, Company B improved the base camp and completed an 

adjacent heliport for twenty-five helicopters. In early May, Company A took 

over base construction from the 588th Engineer Battalion at Phu Loi and 

completed a control tower, an airfield operations building, and an M8 pierced 

steel plank parking ramp for the 196 helicopters supporting the division.

60 Army Construction in Vietnam, incl. 9, pp. 1–2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt, no. 5; 

Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, p. 27. For more on RMK-BRJ projects 

at Long Binh, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 278–82. 61 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 138–39; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8.

62 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 136–37; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, pp. 2–3, 31 Jul 66, and 1 

Aug–31 Oct 66, 169th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, pp. 4–7, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

142

Elements of the battalion also supported several operations and helped 

patrol areas around base camps.63

On 23 February, the 168th dispatched a platoon from Company C to 

Cu Chi northwest of Saigon to help build the 25th Infantry Division’s base 

camp. General Westmoreland counted on the division to fill part of the gap 

in combat power and guard the approaches to Saigon from this direction. By 

this time, the MACV commander was convinced that major tactical headquarters and support units needed a full-time home where the individual soldier 

could train, take care of his equipment, and get some rest and relaxation. The 

25th Division under the command of General Weyand made extensive studies 

before leaving Hawaii. Base development plans were put into final form following an advance party’s reconnaissance. The division’s 65th Engineer Battalion 

under Lt. Col. Carroll D. Strider assembled precut lumber kits for tents and 

latrines, which accompanied each unit. Upon arriving at Cu Chi, troops easily 

assembled the kits. Initial priority went to clearing fields of fire and constructing perimeter bunkers and wire barriers. Building semipermanent buildings 

followed. In early April, the 362d Light Equipment Company arrived to work 

on the camp’s road net and drainage ditches. Before the end of the month, the 

division headquarters and medical personnel occupied facilities consisting of 

shed-type prefabricated buildings.64

The 159th Group’s other combat engineer battalion, the 588th, commanded by Lt. Col. William T. Moore, also carried out construction work for 

the 1st Division. Company B worked at the Phuoc Vinh base camp northeast 

of Lai Khe, where it concentrated on building a cantonment, a heliport, and 

repairing airfield facilities. Heavy usage of the dirt airstrip (originally built by 

the Japanese during World War II) had caused considerable erosion, exposing large rocks that caused aircraft tire blowouts. The company remedied this 

problem by placing a six-inch topping of laterite on the field. Employing an 

expedient method to build parking ramps for helicopters, workers sprayed an 

asphalt cut-back treatment over the cleared area. They topped this off with 

pierced steel planking, thus completing a moderately dust-free heliport. On 1 

June, Company B became Company C, 168th Engineer Battalion, in a transfer of companies between the two battalions. Company C, 168th Engineer 

Battalion, at Long Binh suddenly found itself redesignated Company B, 588th 

Engineer Battalion. Meanwhile, the redesignated Company C moved to the 2d 

Brigade’s new base camp at Bearcat just off Highway 15 some five miles southeast of Long Binh. Besides the usual cantonment building tasks, the company 

built an eight-foot-high berm around the camp perimeter, providing a measure 

of security from enemy observation and direct fire.65

63 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 87; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 4–6, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 66, 168th Engr Bn, 13 May 66, pp. 1–3, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 168th Engr Bn, 14 Aug 66, 

pp. 1–3, both in Historians files, CMH. 64 Lt. Gen. John H. Hay Jr., Tactical and Materiel Innovations, Vietnam Studies (Washington, 

D.C.: Department of Army, 1974), pp. 149–51; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 87; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 2, 6, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 2–3. 65 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, p. 5, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 588th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 

66, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2.
1

1

15

15

1A

1A

Transportation

Cantonment

Engr Group

Cantonment

Engr Bn

Cantonment

Ord Cantonment & HQ

Repl Bn Cantonment

Maintenance and

Supply Area

Log Support Cantonment

Ammunition Storage

Strategic

Communications Facility II FFV HQ

S Viet Ammunition

Storage

PA&E Storage

Heliport

Ammunition

Depot

Stockade

Signal

24th Evac Hospital 

HQ BOQ

HQ BEQ

1st Log HQ

T

POL

ransportation USARV HQ

QM Supply

93d Evac Hospital

to Bien Hoa

to Saigon

to Vung Tau

31 October 1966

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

LONG BINH BASE

Existing FacilityFacility Under ConstructionPlanned Construction

Map 11
Engineers at War

144

As usual RMK-BRJ undertook the more complex construction projects. 

Following a terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy in March 1965, RMK-BRJ 

received a contract to build a new, more secure six-story building. In October, the 

consortium started work on an Army logistics depot in the eastern suburbs along 

the Saigon River bank. In December, workers began building a new ammunition 

depot, concrete parking aprons, and an Air Force cantonment at Tan Son Nhut 

Air Base. In April 1966, RMK-BRJ started planning for a 10,000-foot parallel 

runway at the air base. Lengthy negotiations with Vietnamese officials to remove 

graves in the path of the runway, however, delayed the start of the project to the 

end of the year. Also in late 1966, RMK-BRJ started building a new massive 

two-story prefabricated steel MACV headquarters building and complex costing $25 million adjacent to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Projects given to the contractor at Bien Hoa Air Base included a fuel storage area, cantonment and flight 

line facilities, an aircraft maintenance shop, a new hangar, taxiway resurfacing, 

and aircraft parking aprons. Planning had also begun to add a parallel concrete runway and more aprons and taxiways. The consortium’s new University 

Quarry—so named because of its proximity to a future Saigon University 

site—reached an impressive 250-ton-per-hour capacity in February 1966. (The 

quarry was also referred to as the SUMPCO Quarry [Saigon University Mineral 

Products Company] or SUMCO [Saigon University Materials Company].) In 

Saigon, the firm began work in April 1966 on an Armed Forces Radio and 

Television Service facility.66

Colonel Clymer’s newly arrived 79th Engineer Group became operational 

on 20 July. With the help of the 46th Engineer Battalion, the 79th constructed 

cantonment facilities at nearby Plantation, where it moved the following 

month. The move to Plantation eased coordinating engineering support with 

its major customer, II Field Force. While the 159th Engineer Group concentrated on base development projects in Saigon, Long Binh, and Vung Tau, 

the 79th Group served a dual role as a construction and combat group. In its 

construction role, the 79th built bases for the 1st and 25th Divisions, and the 

196th Light Infantry Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment following their arrival by the end of September. Simultaneously, the group provided operational support to these units. Early that month, the group lost its 

commander when Colonel Clymer injured his knee at a work site and had to 

be medically evacuated. Lt. Col. Walter C. Gelini assumed command. Gelini 

would become a colonel and remain in command for a full year.67

By the end of the year, Colonel Gelini commanded units usually found 

in a combat group. Starting with the two engineer combat battalions it inherited from the 159th, the 79th Group grew to four combat battalions, the 27th, 

86th, 168th, and 588th, and a host of smaller units. Initially, its smaller units 

included the two light equipment companies, the 362d and 557th, and the three 

66 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 148, 249–52, 261, 271; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 

Jun 66, MACDC, pp. 26–27; Ltr, Brig Gen Daniel A. Raymond, MACDC, to CG, Seventh AF, 

sub: Tan Son Nhut Parallel Runway, 14 Jun 66, Historians files, CMH. For more on RMK-BRJ 

work in the Saigon area, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 191–207. 67 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 139; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 79th Engr Gp, 14 Nov 66, pp. 3, 

5–9, Historians files, CMH.
145

Building the Bases, 1966

well-drilling detachments. In early September, the 66th Engineer Topographic 

Company, a corps support unit, joined the group. Although the topographic 

company belonged to the 79th Group, U.S. Army, Vietnam, controlled the 

specialized unit’s mapping efforts. In early October, the 18th Engineer Brigade 

transferred the 617th Panel Bridge Company from the 159th to the 79th 

Group. In mid-October, the 100th Engineer Company (Float Bridge) and in 

mid-December the 500th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) joined the group. 

The group also increased its area of responsibility in III and IV Corps, leaving 

the construction at Saigon and Long Binh and the new Dong Tam base in the 

delta to the 159th Group.68

Work at the 1st Division base camps continued to preoccupy Colonel 

Pelosky’s 168th Engineer Battalion. To keep pace with its heavy work load, 

the battalion operated on a seven-day, seventy-five-hour work week, easing up 

only Sunday mornings. Support for the battalion at Di An, Phuoc Vinh, Phu 

Loi, and Lai Khe included elements of two light equipment companies and 

three well-drilling detachments. In late October, the group transferred responsibility for Phu Loi and Lai Khe to the newly arrived 86th Engineer Battalion 

(Combat). The 168th shifted its main effort to Di An. This action allowed 

enough time for the battalion to build cantonment facilities on the northern 

side of the camp—known as the North Forty—to fit another move by the 

division’s 2d Brigade in March, this time from its short stay at Bearcat. Before 

moving to Di An, Company A at Phu Loi and Company B at Lai Khe had 

spent much time maintaining troublesome airfields at the two bases. During 

the rainy season, the two companies fought rutting and subgrade failures on 

the runways with rock. To keep the clouds of dust down during the dry periods, Company A applied peneprime near helipads.69

The 588th Combat Engineer Battalion consolidated its efforts in the 25th 

Division’s area of operations. In late June, Company B (formerly Company 

C of the 168th) at Long Binh joined the headquarters and Company A at Cu 

Chi. Company B then moved to Tay Ninh to begin construction of a new base 

camp for the 196th Infantry Brigade, then en route and expected to arrive in 

two weeks. On 22 August, Company C departed Bearcat and began to construct 

a 400-bed evacuation hospital for the 25th Division. With the hospital work 

moving along, the company sent a platoon to Tay Ninh in late October to build 

the first modern Army hospital consisting of inflatable, rubber-type buildings, 

formally known as MUST (medical unit, self-contained, transportable).70

During this period, the 588th, now under the command of Lt. Col. James 

F. Boylan, had grown into a considerable force. The battalion had under 

its operational control at Cu Chi a platoon-size force from the 100th Float 

Bridge Company, the 362d Light Equipment Company, and Company B, 86th 

68 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 139; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 5–9, and 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, 14 Feb 66, pp. 1–5, Historians files, CMH. 69 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 139, 141; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul, pp. 1–3, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 

168th Engr Bn, 12 Nov 66, pp. 1–8, Historians files, CMH. 70 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 141–42; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3, 1 

Aug–31 Oct 66, 588th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 66, pp. 1–3, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 588th Engr Bn, 13 

Feb 67, pp. 1–5, both in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

146

Engineer Battalion. Company B, which had arrived with the rest of the 86th at 

Vung Tau on 17 October, began building a post exchange consisting of several 

prefabricated metal buildings complete with electrical fixtures and concrete 

floors. In November, the 588th supervised a platoon from the 643d Engineer 

Pipeline Construction Company in the building of a 3,000-barrel fuel storage facility at Tay Ninh. After completing this project in early December, the 

platoon returned to Long Binh. By the end of the year, the battalion eagerly 

awaited the arrival of the valuable hauling assets of the incoming 67th Engineer 

Dump Truck Company.71

The 27th Engineer Battalion (Combat) commanded by Lt. Col. Charles 

R. Roberts supported the newly arrived 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 

the 3d Brigade, 4th Division. Arriving before the advance party and the rest of 

the battalion in mid-August, Company C moved to Xuan Loc, approximately 

twenty-five miles east of Long Binh, to build camps for the armored cavalry 

regiment. After completing a long sea voyage, which included a stop at Da 

Nang, the rest of the 800-man battalion, which had four lettered companies, 

arrived at Vung Tau on 30 September and moved to staging areas at Long 

Binh and Di An. While waiting for its equipment, the battalion headquarters 

worked on base development plans for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s 

6,000-man base camp near Xuan Loc. Meanwhile, the line companies took 

up their hand tools and went to work. Company B at Di An helped the 168th 

Engineer Battalion build the cantonment for the 2d Brigade, 1st Division. 

When the equipment arrived near the end of October, the headquarters and 

Company A moved to Xuan Loc, and joined the regiment’s 919th Engineer 

Company on base camp construction. After completing its tasks at Di An, 

Company B, on 1 November, moved east of Xuan Loc to Gia Ray to open a 

quarry and set up a rock crusher.72

On 17 October, Company D, 27th Engineer Battalion, was attached to the 

3d Brigade, 4th Division. When the brigade arrived that month, it did not join 

the rest of the division in II Corps. Instead, it was diverted to III Corps as a 

trade off for the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, at Pleiku. Since the 3d Brigade, 

4th Division, deployed to III Corps without its usual supporting company 

from the 4th Engineer Battalion, Company D assumed that role and began 

to improve the brigade’s base camp and airstrip at the vacated Bearcat camp. 

Within a month, the brigade joined the 25th Division northwest of Saigon at 

Dau Tieng. Company D continued to support the brigade by clearing South 

Vietnamese Army minefields around the base camp, building roads in the 

camp, and making improvements to the airfield. Outside the camp, Company 

D worked on roads, bridges, and culverts, and carried out combat engineering 

tasks typical for a divisional engineer company that included clearing firebases, 

mine clearing, and demolitions.73

71 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 588th Engr Bn, p. 2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 588th Engr Bn, 

pp. 2–5. 72 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 27th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, pp. 2, 8–9, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 

27th Engr Bn, 13 Feb 67, pp. 1–5, both in Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 144; 

Carland, Stemming the Tide, p. 166. 73 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, p. 18, Historians files, CMH.
147

Building the Bases, 1966

The other new arrival, the 86th Engineer Battalion (Combat), commanded by Lt. Col. Colin M. Carter, completed its long journey from Fort 

Dix, New Jersey, when it reached Vung Tau on 16 October aboard the USNS 

Weigle. After disembarking, the companies moved by air to their destinations. 

Headquarters and Company A deployed to Phu Loi, Company B to Cu Chi, 

Company C to Lai Khe, and Company D to Bien Hoa. At Phu Loi, Company 

A took over cantonment and airfield facility construction from Company A, 

168th Engineer Battalion. Plans were under way to build seven large prefabricated maintenance hangars at the airfield, but five of the hangar sets still 

had not arrived. Similarly, Company C took over projects from Company B, 

168th Engineer Battalion, at Lai Khe. Company B at Cu Chi worked on base 

development projects under the direction of the 588th Engineer Battalion. 

Company D at Bien Hoa completed a C–130 parking ramp at the airfield, and 

helipads, access roads, and cantonment projects on the Army side of the base. 

The battalion also received several combat support missions.74

At Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa Air Bases, RMK-BRJ made little progress 

on the parallel runways. By December, excavation work at Tan Son Nhut was 

only 3 percent complete. The fruitless negotiations to remove the two hundred 

or so graves came to a sudden end in early December when a Viet Cong force 

infiltrated the air base and had to be driven out of their hideaways, most of 

which were in the cemetery. Within a few days, the South Vietnamese Army 

appeared on the scene and without any explanation removed the tombstones. 

By the end of the year, excavation work had begun on the new runway. At Bien 

Hoa, only 50 percent of the plans were ready, and authorization for the work 

for the new runway, taxiways, and apron was held off until 1967.75

Air Force Prime Beef teams continued their work at both air bases, and 

advance elements of the 823d Civil Engineering Squadron had arrived at Bien 

Hoa Air Base in October. The 823d became the fifth Red Horse squadron 

deployed to Vietnam to support Air Force construction and repair requirements. By January 1967, the squadron deployed elements to Tan Son Nhut, 

Vung Tau, Da Nang, and Pleiku.76

By the autumn of 1966, Pacific Architects and Engineers began reducing its construction activities and turned attention to its facilities engineering mission. In October, Vinnell Corporation, which was also moving eleven 

T–2 power-generating tankers to four other locations, began construction of 

a central electrical power plant at Long Binh. The design called for a series of 

1,500-kilowatt generators to be connected and synchronized to work on one 

power system. Because of the threat of night attacks, the firm’s highest priority centered on installing security lighting around the ammunition depot. The 

contractor worked day and night to install over ten miles of security lighting 

around the perimeter. Power to other areas became available when workers 

completed portions of the pole line. Despite enemy activities and hazardous 

74 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 86th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 67, pp. 9–13, Historians files, CMH; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 144. 75 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 251–52; Diary of a Contract, pp. 199, 205. 76 USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 120, 126–29.
Engineers at War

148

conditions, construction of the plant continued satisfactorily during the winter 

of 1966–1967.77

New Berths for Saigon

The backlog of ships at the commercial port in Saigon had convinced 

MACV of the need for more extensive port facilities. At the beginning of 

1966, the port had ten deep-draft alongside berths, seven large and four small 

berths tied to buoys, two LST berths, and three T-shaped piers for coastal 

shipping. These facilities handled 90 percent of the cargo arriving in South 

Vietnam, but the daily average of 13,000 short tons was more than Saigon 

could handle. The current port, adequate by peacetime standards, just did 

not have enough berths, barges, landing craft ramp space, and storage space 

to support both the country’s commercial needs and the large quantities of 

economic assistance and military cargo now reaching Vietnam. Also exacerbating port operations were the lack of military control and the coordination 

problems with Vietnamese port officials. At best, three to four berths could 

be reserved for military cargo, another three to four for economic assistance 

cargo, while the rest remained for civilian use.78

To resolve these problems, MACV laid plans to build a new deep-draft port 

for military cargo along the Saigon River. The proposed site, named Newport, 

was in a sparsely populated area adjacent to Highway 1A about two miles 

northeast of the city. To get the port operational as soon as possible, planning 

proceeded for seven lighterage berths and four landing craft slips and ramps. 

Four deep-draft berths would be built later. MACV again turned to the Officer 

in Charge of Construction to design the facility and select a contractor.79

The Navy assigned the construction portion of the Newport project to 

RMK-BRJ. With such high interest in the project, the Officer in Charge of 

Construction assigned a full-time officer as a Resident Officer in Charge of 

Construction to oversee work, which soon became a twenty-four-hour-a day, 

seven-day-a-week maximum effort. By mid-May 1966, RMK-BRJ had dredged 

the LST slips and drove the first piles for the barge wharves. Unfortunately, the 

silty material from the river could not be used to fill the former rice paddy land 

and bayou. Instead, local contractors furnished much of the fill, and their little 

sampans accounted for about 3,900 of the 9,150 cubic yards of sand hauled in 

from other places each day. By midyear, the director of construction reported 

that RMK-BRJ drove 156 piles for the barge and LST wharves. The firm’s 

concrete precast yards also made eighteen concrete deck slabs for the deep77 PA&E History, 1963–1966, pp. 42; “Vinnell Makes History at Long Binh,” Vinnell 11 (May 

1969): 8–10, copy in Historians files, CMH. 78 MACV History, 1966, pp. 709–10.

79 Dunn, Base Development, p. 59; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1–31 Jan 66, MACDC, 19 Feb 66, 

Historians files, CMH; MACV History, 1966, p. 710; MACV Monthly Evaluation, May 66, p. 

G-5; Msg, Robert S. McNamara OSD 5096–65 to Westmoreland, 31 Dec 65, Westmoreland 

Message files, CMH; Msg, COMUSMACV MACJ44 to CG, USARV, 4 Jan 66, sub: Project 

Newport, Historians files, CMH.
149

Building the Bases, 1966

draft wharf. General Dunn informed Washington that the informal estimate to 

complete the demanding project now reached $30 million.80

Despite several problems, progress continued to be made on the docks and 

open-storage facilities. In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for a reevaluation of the entire project to refine the cost required to complete the port as 

originally designed. The new figure totaled more than $61 million, approximately double the earlier estimate. To save some money, the Army deferred some 

warehouses and other buildings. For a few days, a halt in the delivery of sand 

threatened progress. One of the Vietnamese contractors complained that “VC 

[Viet Cong] tax assessors” had charged the sampan operators a large fee. About 

ten days’ supply of sand was on hand, so the Officer in Charge of Construction 

ended that contract and negotiated a new one with other vendors. In October, 

the construction office turned over four barge wharves, one LCM/LCU (landing 

craft, mechanized, and landing craft, utility) ramp, one LST slip, and thirtyeight acres of filled land to the 1st Logistical Command. Work then commenced 

on four deep-draft berths, which included four deep-draft berths, more filled 

land, transit warehouses, a power-generating facility, and a perimeter road.81

80 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 27; Ltr, Dunn MACDC to CG, USARV, 

sub: Newport, Increment II, 18 May 66; DF, Raymond MACDC to CofS, MACV, sub: Status 

Report, 10 Jun 66, Historians files, CMH; Msg, Dunn SOG 0528 to Noble, 24 Jun 66, Dunn 

Papers, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 91. Report and letter in Historians files, CMH. 

See also Diary of a Contract, pp. 261–63. 81 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, pp. 40–41, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, 

p. 30; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 246.

Port and warehouses under construction in late 1966 at Newport
Engineers at War

150

Other efforts were also under way to relieve the pressure on the Saigon 

port. By April, dredging along the Soirap River between Vung Tau and Saigon 

opened a second deep-draft channel, which provided an alternate route for 

shipping along the Saigon River. The second channel lessened the impact in 

case the Viet Cong did succeed in sinking a ship. Additionally, three buoy 

berths were installed in the Dong Nai River at Cat Lai for mooring and offloading ammunition ships to barges.82

82 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 27.

1A 1

1

15

Dong Nai River

Saigon River

Saigon River

RMK-BRJ Depot

Newport

Game Warden Site

Cat Lai

Cogido

Port

Tan Son Nhut

Bien Hoa Air Base

Long Binh

Di An

Phu Loi

Bearcat

Saigon

Bien Hoa

Nha Be

October 1966

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

SAIGON BASE DEVELOPMENT

Existing Facility

Facility Under Construction

Planned Construction

Military Base

Civilian Built-Up Area

Map 12
151

Building the Bases, 1966

At Vung Tau, Company D, 46th Engineer Battalion, made headway on 

port facilities, the airfield, and projects for Australian units in the area. As 

the only company-size engineer unit at Vung Tau, Company D completed a 

variety of projects, including warehouses and fuel storage facilities for the 1st 

Logistical Command and helped the Australian task force to develop supply 

and troop staging areas. The fuel tank farm presented a challenge and involved 

removing three old storage tanks destroyed by the French when they evacuated 

the area. Work crews had to cut the damaged tanks with explosives, remove 

them from their protective shields, and replace them with new 10,000-gallon 

bolted steel tanks.83

By March, the 536th Engineer Detachment (Port Construction), the first 

of its kind to do this specialized work in III Corps, arrived at Vung Tau. The 

detachment initially concentrated on preparing designs and assembled its pile 

driving and diving barges before starting work on new piers and LST ramps. 

Plans called for the installation of a DeLong pier, but the extensive dredging 

requirements on the sheltered side of the peninsula prompted the Construction 

Directorate to change priorities. Of the seven DeLong piers intended for 

delivery to South Vietnam, Vung Tau dropped to the bottom of the list. The 

detachment also demonstrated the versatility of port construction units when 

it assembled and rehabilitated twenty-four barges belonging to the Army’s 4th 

Transportation Command.84

Projects in the Delta

Although few U.S. troops were in the delta region, military and civilian 

engineers carried out extensive construction there. In early April, RMK-BRJ 

completed a 4,000-foot runway and other base facilities on An Thoi, a small 

island off the coast of the larger Phu Quoc Island near the Cambodian coast. 

At the Army’s Vinh Long helicopter base, work that started in June 1965 continued. The contractor began further modernization at Binh Thuy Air Base. 

More work also awaited the firm at Can Tho, where the U.S. Navy launched 

patrol boat operations. In February, the Air Force began to dispatch Prime 

Beef teams to Binh Thuy to build billets and operational facilities for Air 

Force personnel.85

MACV had long considered the possibility of basing U.S. ground troops 

in the Mekong Delta. A survey team concluded that all land suitable for large 

tactical units was either heavily populated or occupied by the South Vietnamese 

armed forces. If American troops deployed to the delta, they would have to 

share already crowded areas or displace a portion of the population. Since the 

83 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 84–86; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6, 1 

May–31 Jul 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 8–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 46th Engr Bn, p. 2. 84 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 84–86; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 2, 5–6, 1 

May–Jul 66, 159th Engr Gp, p. 8, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 46th Engr Bn, p. 2; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 

1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 15. 85 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 294–95; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, 

p. 27; USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, pp. 119, 123, 125. For more on RMKBRJ work in the delta, see Diary of a Contract, pp. 123–26, 241–43.
Engineers at War

152

command considered both courses unacceptable, the planning staff searched 

for other means of basing troops. The MACV Engineer proposed dredging 

river sand as fill material and building up an area to fit a division. Yet, the 

number of dredges necessary to do the work would not be available until late 

1966. Although not entirely satisfied with this solution, the command believed 

the building of a base area by dredging operations a sound choice.86

Planning went forward to station a joint Army and Navy riverine force in 

the northern delta. Recalling that the French had dispatched small landing 

craft from land bases during the First Indochina War, planners envisioned 

river flotillas consisting of barracks ships and landing craft carrying ground 

troops on operations along the delta’s waterways. In early 1966, General 

Westmoreland approved plans to develop two land bases and one mobile 

floating base in the delta. One land base would house an infantry division 

headquarters and one brigade, and a second brigade would occupy a base in 

the northern part of the delta, probably in Long An Province in III Corps. 

The third brigade would be based on the water.87 (Map 13)

In May 1966, Westmoreland directed a survey to find a land base for 

the division headquarters and the one brigade. Tactical resupply and the 

transportation of materials dictated that the new delta base be accessible 

to a system of navigable waterways. Since the monsoon season drastically 

reduced the little available dry land, enough suitable fill had to be located 

near the site to raise an area of approximately 600 acres to a level higher 

than the watery countryside. The Directorate of Construction found four 

locations—designated Bases W, X, Y, and Z—suitable for dredging and 

building the land base and submitted these to Westmoreland for consideration. He picked Base W located about forty miles southwest of Saigon and 

about three miles west of My Tho. He believed that the site should be given 

a significant name in Vietnamese—something dealing with friendship and 

cooperation. He selected the Vietnamese term dong tam, which translated 

meant “united hearts and minds.”88

The plan called for three major operations to transform the marshy land 

into a riverine base. First, the builders had to excavate a rice paddy to make 

a turning basin for ships. The second task consisted of dredging an entrance 

channel into the turning basin from the My Tho River. Third, to make the onesquare-mile base, sand had to be dredged from the river and pumped into the 

rice paddies. For this last task alone, engineers estimated that approximately 

10.5 million cubic yards of fill would be required. This figure included not only 

86 Maj. Gen. William B. Fulton, Riverine Operations, 1966–1969, Vietnam Studies 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), pp. 26–27. For more background on the 

delta and planning, see George L. MacGarrigle, Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, 

October 1966 to October 1967, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 393–97. 87 Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 27–28. 88 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 13, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 

43; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 145; Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 33, 47–48.
153

Building the Bases, 1966

the landfill for the base but also a sufficient stockpile of sand for airfield and 

road projects and to make concrete.89

The first phase of the Dong Tam project began in July with the arrival of 

a clamshell dredge to prepare the work site for two larger dredges. The sixteeninch pipeline cutterhead Cho Gao arrived in late July but could not start pumping until 4 August because of a mine scare. The Viet Cong, aware that the base 

could cripple their efforts to control the heavily populated and rice-producing 

delta region, soon began to make their presence known. Sappers mined the 

Cho Gao, but the Americans found and removed the mines in time. The Viet 

89 Dunn, Base Development, p. 53; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 145; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 

Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 43.

4

4

4

4

4

4

1

X X

21 ARVN

X X

7 ARVN

X

92

X X

9 ARVN

XXX

ARVN I V

VINH LOI

SA DEC

CAN THO

DONG TAM

BINH DUC

MY THO

III CTZ

Song Hau Giang (Mekong)

Song Co Chien (Mekong)

Song My Tho (Mekong)

Song Vam Co Dong

Song Vam Co Tay

SOUTH CHINA SEA

GULF

O F

THAILAND

B AC LIEU

CHUONG THIEN

KIEN GIANG

AN GIANG

SA DEC 

KIEN PHONG 

KIEN TUONG

DINH TUONG

H AU NGHIA

LONG AN

KIEN HOA

GO CONG

GIA DINH

BIEN

H OA

CHAU DOC

BA XUYEN

VINH BINH

VINH LONG

PHONG DINH

AN XUYEN

CAMBODIA

Ca Mau

Bac Lieu

Soc Trang

Cao Lanh

Binh Thuy

Vinh Long

Ben Tre

SAIGON

Long Xuyen

Chau Doc

Rach Gia

1966–1967

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 Miles

0

30

30 Kilometers

Map 13
Engineers at War

154

Cong also mortared the dredge, causing some minor delays. Throughout July 

and August, the Cho Gao dredged the entrance channel and turning basin, 

pumping at an average rate of some 13,000 cubic yards of fill daily.90

The largest dredge in South Vietnam, the thirty-inch pipeline cutterhead 

Jamaica Bay, previously at work at Da Nang, arrived in September. Crews 

working among the fillpipes on shore came under sniper fire, and a plastic 

explosive charge damaged a dragline. Despite the harassment, the Jamaica 

Bay maintained its schedule with no breakdowns, pumping at a daily average 

rate of over 26,000 cubic yards. By 1 January 1967, the dredge had pumped 

some 2.3 million cubic yards of fill, creating 155 acres of dry land. The Cho 

Gao continued its work on the turning basin and completed 85 percent of the 

LST area. In October 1966, a Seabee detachment deployed from I Corps and 

built a concrete pontoon pier for Navy forces. Within a few weeks, the 159th 

Engineer Group deployed elements to start work on a 7,500-man camp and 

operational base for troops of the 9th Infantry Division.91

Logistical Troubles Continue 

During 1966, Army engineers continued to have trouble obtaining building supplies and keeping equipment running. As General Ploger pointed out 

to General Westmoreland during his November 1965 briefing, some $25 million in building materials ordered earlier had not arrived. To carry out the 

construction program through June 1966, Ploger had estimated that some 

325,000 tons of supplies would be needed. If the experience of previous wars 

continued, then about 15 percent of the total theater tonnage would consist 

of construction items. Translated into terms of shipping, this meant that one 

out of every seven ships would be loaded with lumber, airfield matting, bridge 

sets, generators, asphalt, cement, and prefabricated buildings. Ploger’s estimate 

turned out to be on the modest side. By the summer of 1966, about a third of 

the tonnage reaching Vietnam turned out to be construction items.92

Even when construction supplies started reaching the depots, distribution 

to engineer units fell short. During the summer of 1966, two shiploads of oneinch lumber were delivered to Cam Ranh Bay where there was a shortage of 

two-inch lumber, and five shiploads of two-inch lumber were shipped to Qui 

Nhon where there was no one-inch lumber. Meanwhile, shortages of two-byfours were exacerbated by the decision to put troops in wood frame barracks 

90 Dunn, Base Development, p. 53; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 292; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 

1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 43. 91 Dunn, Base Development, p. 53; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 292–93; Quarterly 

Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep, 66, MACDC, pp. 43–44, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, p. 33; Msg, 

COMUSMACV MACDC-CM to COMNAVFORV (Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam), 19 

Aug 66, sub: Dredging of Deep Draft Facility at Observation Point Da Nang, box 5, 69A/702, 

RG 334, NARA. 92 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 202; Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 26 Oct 66, pp. 56–57, CMH; 

USARV Engr, Summary of Total Tonnages of Troop Construction Material for Jan 66–Jun 

67, 8 Mar 66, incl. 20, tab B, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 2; Construction Logistics in 

Vietnam, incl. 9, p. 1, and 18th Engr Bde, Memo for Brigade S–4, sub: Construction Logistics, 

19 Aug 66, incl. 9, tab G, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4.
155

Building the Bases, 1966

instead of tents. Even when tents were used, two-by-fours were substituted for 

tent poles and used in wooden flooring. Although 1st Logistical Command 

increased the requisition objective for lumber from 50 to 75 million board feet 

as of 1 October, no one could say when the additional supplies would arrive. 

Another problem emerged from the reorganization of certain technical service 

supply units, including engineer supply units, into general depots, irrespective 

of the fact that a war was going on and a loss of some technical expertise 

was bound to result. No sooner were the new depots constituted in Vietnam 

than inexperienced depot troops had trouble identifying arriving inventory, 

especially electrical and plumbing supplies. By the summer of 1966, engineer 

units were regularly sending “scrounging” expeditions to the supply yards to 

search out items they required.93

The 159th Engineer Group at Long Binh continued to have the same problems from the previous year. In May, Colonel Hottenroth reported that the 

group continued to be plagued by shortages of construction materials and 

essential equipment parts and an inability to organize properly to meet the 

construction mission. For instance, workers had constructed troop showers 

up to the point of installing the shower heads only to discover that the part 

was not available. A 34E concrete paver remained inoperable for two months 

because it lacked major components, and well-drilling rigs had arrived without casings or screens. “The logistic system,” Hottenroth noted, “appears 

to have withered due to past efforts to eliminate military spaces in supply 

and maintenance operations and as a result in my judgment been unable to 

93 Construction Logistics in Vietnam, incl. 9, pp. 1, 4, and 18th Engr Bde, Memo for Brigade 

S–4, 19 Aug 66, sub: Construction Logistics, incl. 9, tab G, p. 3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt 

no. 4; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 9, 16.

The Dong Tam base camp surrounded by rice paddies began to take shape by the 

end of 1966.
Engineers at War

156

expand to meet the workload.” He noted that seven months had gone by after 

he had submitted a request to modify the battalions’ tables of organization 

and equipment. It appeared uncertain whether the Department of the Army 

would organize the units under the latest organizational tables. Travel to the 

dispersed project sites by the group’s commanders and staffs posed another 

problem; road travel was risky and not enough aircraft were available. Finally, 

he concluded, the myriad of administrative and reporting tasks had become 

burdensome. On the plus side, the weather during the period turned out to be 

favorable for construction.94

When equipment broke down or was not available, engineers found other 

ways to get the job done, by hand if necessary. While visiting the 159th Group 

in March, the Chief of Engineers’ liaison officer from Washington found that, 

although the group’s units had their authorized complement of seven 16S concrete mixers, they did not have enough mixers to handle the large number of 

projects at many different sites. The group had requested twelve additional 

mixers the previous November, but none had arrived. In the end, the engineer 

company responsible for the Lai Khe base camp project resorted to mixing 

concrete by hand while trying to fashion a homemade mixer. A query with 

Colonel Lien at the 1st Logistical Command revealed an awareness of the 

problem, but his staff could not provide the status of the request before the 

liaison officer’s departure.95

Colonel Gelini reported that logistics support for his 79th Engineer Group 

had been generally good, but there was a critical shortage of dump trucks. 

The inadequate hauling capability affected the group’s construction efforts, 

especially the transport of rock. To make matters worse, the 79th Group had 

to use its trucks to pick up cargo at supply points in the Saigon–Long Binh 

area and haul it to its outlying units. Fortunately, the assignment of a panel 

bridge company with 35 five-ton dump trucks and a float bridge company 

with 50 five-ton bridge trucks and 39 two-and-a-half-ton cargo trucks to the 

79th Group added capacity. Both bridge companies unloaded and stored their 

bridges at Long Binh and put their trucks on the road hauling supplies.96

Colonels Hart and Starnes, commanders of the 35th Group at Cam Ranh 

Bay, reported similar shortages. Hart complained that the regular supply 

system could not respond quickly enough for his units to complete their port, 

depot, and cantonment projects. He felt that certain special items, such as 

sheet piling, fuel pipeline supplies, and lumber, should be programmed in bulk 

instead of waiting for projects to be assigned to units, which then had to requisition the materials through normal supply channels. Hart also believed that 

responsibility for construction supplies should be returned to engineer commanders instead of the recent trend to general supply units. In another matter, 

Hart and Starnes believed that the current organization of the 497th Port 

94 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8 (quotation, p. 7); Galloway, “Essayons,” 

pp. 52, 89. 95 Rpt of Visit to the 159th Engr Gp, Long Binh, Vietnam, 15–18 Feb 66, incl. 6, tab C, and 

Situation Rpt on Engr Equipment in South Vietnam, incl. 17, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt 

no. 1. 96 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 1–7; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 147.
157

Building the Bases, 1966

Construction Company did not have the flexibility required to support construction work at more than one port at a time. Both men suggested changes 

in tables of authorization. Even so, a platoon had been detached and was hard 

at work on Qui Nhon port.97

While the 937th Engineer Group had some problems getting supplies, 

notably rock, electrical, and plumbing material, the main difficulty lay in 

transporting supplies inland to An Khe and Pleiku. Transportation units gave 

higher priority to ammunition, rations, and fuel, leaving little space for construction items. To support their projects, both the 299th Engineer Battalion at 

Pleiku and the 70th Engineer Battalion at An Khe put their trucks on Highway 

19 for the long-distance haul to Qui Nhon. The 70th reported it had to use its 

own vehicles to haul at least 75 percent of the construction items used by the 

unit. Supply technicians usually accompanied the convoys to Qui Nhon to help 

depot troops locate needed items. Gradually, the supply situation improved, 

and construction supplies reached the group in increasing quantities. Repair 

parts became more plentiful, but Colonel Braucher, the group commander, 

still complained of a lack of direct-support maintenance units.98

The equipment situation, however, brightened. By early April, seventyseven new HD16M bulldozers were shipped to Vietnam, forty-four to Cam 

Ranh Bay and thirty-three to Saigon, and more were on the way. About the 

same time, Caterpillar shipped 294 D7E bulldozers from Peoria, Illinois, to 

Army depots in the United States. Once complete packages of spare parts 

were available, which was expected in late April, D7Es would be shipped 

to Vietnam. Meanwhile, two of the bulldozers were airlifted to Saigon to 

acquaint operators and mechanics with the new standard bulldozer. Three 

technicians—one maintenance, one supply, and one factory representative—

started on-the-job training courses on 18 March. At the beginning of June, 

the parts support buildup was approaching 90 percent completion. Shipment 

of the new bulldozers, however, was held up by engine failures, which had 

to be evaluated. On 16 June, the Army Materiel Command authorized the 

release of 336 D7Es from the increasing depot stocks, 268 to Vietnam and the 

rest for issue to units deploying to Vietnam. The bulldozers began arriving 

in Vietnam on 25 August. By early 1967, 196 of the D7E bulldozers that had 

reached Vietnam were in the hands of Engineer Command units, replacing the 

HD16Ms, TD20s, and TD24s.99

More good news concerned earthmoving equipment. By early June, 250 

of the 840 Clark 290M tractors under contract had been delivered to Army 

depots. Some defects, however, still had to be fixed, and repair parts were not 

to reach the required 90 percent level before mid-July. Before being shipped 

to Vietnam, comparison-type testing of the new tractor with attached Euclid 

97 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 35 Engr Gp, pp. 6–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 66, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 

5, 8, 10. 98 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 119; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 937th Engr Gp, p. 8, 1 Nov 66–31 

Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 15–17, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2–3. 99 Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 6 Apr 66, p. 47, CMH; Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 250–52; Rpt 

of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, incl. 7, p. 5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4; ORLL, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, Engr Cmd, 31 Jan 67, p. 21, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

158

and LeTourneau eighteen-cubic-yard scrapers was carried out. Twenty-five of 

the scrapers had been delivered by LeTourneau against a contract for 330, and 

repair parts were expected to reach the required level by early July. By January 

1967, seventy-one Clark 290M wheeled tractors with LeTourneau scrapers 

had been received by Engineer Command units. They replaced 830Ms and 

other tractor-scraper combinations.100

Red Ball Express shipments of repair parts continued to remove equipment from deadlined status, but the rate was still high because of the variety 

of makes and models. Often a piece of equipment became deadlined for lack 

of a single part, but equipment requiring several parts usually had to wait for 

Red Ball items to come in piecemeal. During the period 5 December 1965 

to 3 May 1966, parts received through Red Ball removed from deadline 110 

of the 370 tracked and 28 of the 128 wheeled bulldozers. The 18th Engineer 

Brigade’s overall equipment deadline rate dropped from 28.5 percent in 

January to 16.2 percent in early June. A vigorous maintenance program also 

helped. Nevertheless, by the autumn of 1966 the 18th Brigade reported that 

equipment productivity averaged less than 60 percent due to lack of parts.101

Rock continued to be a scarce commodity. An especially acute shortage 

of rock existed in III and IV Corps. Just two U.S. quarries, the RMK-BRJ 

University Quarry outside Saigon and the 159th Engineer Group quarries 

nearly thirty-one miles to the south at Vung Tau, were in operation in early 

1966. Because of the lack of barges, only small quantities of rock could be 

shipped from Vung Tau to the Long Binh area. The 1st Logistical Command 

in late 1965 even resorted to buying rock from Singapore, which proved to be 

prohibitively expensive.102

When rock from quarries in Korea arrived in Saigon, a nightmarish situation involving customs, labor difficulties, and lighterage problems followed, 

producing lengthy delays and creeping costs. The engineers devised a scheme 

to tranship the rock on hundreds of sampans for delivery to a point near Long 

Binh for off-loading on trucks for the short haul to the base. At the off-loading 

site, it quickly became evident that the crane operator could not use the twocubic-yard clamshell, since the weight and size of the clamshell would have 

easily sunk the sampans. This left the slower method of hand labor and conveyors as the only means to bring the precious rock ashore. This was the first 

and last shipment from Korea, and the Army ended the contract.103

100 Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 6 Apr 66, p. 47, CMH; Arsenal for the Brave, pp. 250, 252; 

Rpt of Visit to the 1st Log Cmd, 12 and 15 Nov, incl. 10, p. 5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip, Rpt 

no. 5; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, Engr Cmd, 31 Jan 67, p. 21. 101 Rpt of Visit to the 35th Engr Gp, Cam Ranh, Vietnam, 22–25 Feb 66, incl. 6, tab B, p. 1, 

and Situation Rpt on Engr Equipment in South Vietnam, incl. 17, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 1; Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 4 May 66, p. 35, 11 May 66, p. 45, and 8 Jun 66, p. 47, 

CMH; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 18th Engr Bde, p. 8; Arsenal for the Brave, p. 251. 102 Dunn, Base Development, p. 102; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–1 Dec 65, 1st Log Cmd, 19 

Feb 66, p. 14, Historians files, CMH; Situation Rpt on Construction Materials, incl. 16, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 1; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 159th Engr Gp, 14 Feb 67, p. 11, 

Historians files, CMH. 103 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 102–03.
159

Building the Bases, 1966

Additional crushing plants and associated quarry sets consisting of wagon 

and tracked rock drills trickled into the country. By May 1966, larger 225-ton-perhour rock crushers reached Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon. In addition, larger 

numbers of the smaller but versatile 75-ton-per-hour units arrived: five in the 

Saigon area, two at Cam Ranh Bay, and two at Qui Nhon. This equipment only 

put a dent in the requirements for rock. General Ploger felt larger units in the 500- 

and 1,000-ton-per-hour categories and larger rock-hauling trucks were needed. 

This situation posed another problem, for the 18th Engineer Brigade could barely 

provide enough men to operate the equipment already on hand. A more pragmatic 

approach rested with the arrival of more light equipment companies and their 

75-ton-per-hour units and the purchase of rock from RMK-BRJ. By midyear 

things looked up for the 35th Engineer Group at Cam Ranh Bay when the 102d 

Construction Support Company prepared to open a new quarry site (two 10-hour 

shifts) consisting of a 225-ton-per-hour and three 75-ton-per-hour units.104

For the 79th Group, however, crushed rock needed for extensive concrete 

work at the base camps north of Saigon was still critically short. By way of 

solution, the group tried to develop quarries near construction sites. But at 

the Frenchman’s Quarry southwest of Bien Hoa blasting work in August 1966 

damaged a nearby Buddhist pagoda, and the province chief ordered a halt to 

operations. Blasting resumed a month later following negotiations with local 

officials. This time the engineers used new blasting techniques and operated 

only at specific times. They also repaired the pagoda.105

104 Equipment and Equipment Maintenance, incl. 21, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 2, 

6 May 66; Engr Equipment Situation, incl. 10, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3, 28 Jun 66. 105 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 147; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 79th Engr Gp, p. 10, and 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, 79th Engr Gp, 14 Feb 67, p. 9, Historians files, CMH.

Sampans were hired to haul rock from Vung Tau to the Long Binh area.
Engineers at War

160

Finance and Its Predicaments

In August 1966, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command requested 

a $200 million increase in construction funds to keep RMK-BRJ going in 

Vietnam. The deficit had developed, in part, because the contractor’s mobilization costs—supplies, materials, and equipment—had been underestimated a 

year earlier, as had everything else related to construction, including the size 

of the U.S. troop commitment. In response to the request, McNamara determined that $60 million should be enough to keep the contractor in business. 

But he also asked Sharp and Westmoreland to furnish him with a restatement 

of their construction program no later than 1 October.106

The $200 million that the Navy asked for in August shocked many in 

Washington. Soon the news media began to report charges of cost overruns, waste, 

and mismanagement on the part of the contractor. The nationwide HuntleyBrinkley evening television news of 7 September announced: “A major scandal 

involving $200 million has come to light in South Vietnam.” The Associated 

Press, in a national story, concluded that the Pentagon admitted it misled civilian 

contractors by overstating probable contract awards and underestimating costs. 

Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Preparedness Investigating

Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, wrote to McNamara about a 

WashingtonPost article that appeared on 8 September with the caption “Builders 

Running $200 Million in Hole in Vietnam.” McNamara tried to explain the rise 

in contracting costs. In response to the senator’s query he wrote: “We consider 

the cost growth as moderate and to be expected, considering the exigencies of 

wartime conditions under which the initial cost estimates were made and the 

work performed.”107

McNamara then went into detail. Several projects had changed, resulting 

in changes in design, methods, scope, and materials. For example, the initial 

design and construction directive issued in May 1966 for the headquarters 

complex at Long Binh provided for slightly more than 100,000 square feet of 

buildings. By late summer, several changes in scope increased the magnitude 

of work to 2.8 million square feet. Weather and site relocations increased costs 

at Phu Cat Air Base and the MACV headquarters building. Then too, recent 

strikes, civil unrest, wage increases, and lost time due to enemy activity had 

added to the higher costs. In July, 3,500 Vietnamese, 200 Koreans, and 600 

Filipinos had walked off their jobs at Cam Ranh Bay because of working 

106 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 70, 73; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, 

MACDC, pp. 25–28; Msg, Westmoreland 25637 to Sharp, 25 Jul 66, sub: Construction Programs 

and Funds; Memo, Robert S. McNamara, Sec Def, for Secretary of the Navy, 7 Sep 66, sub: 

Inadequacy of Contract Construction Funds, RVN, both in box 44, 71A/2351, RG 330, NARA; 

Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 9 Sep 66, sub: Construction Program in SVN, Historians files, CMH. 107 Transcript of Huntley-Brinkley Evening News (first quoted words), 7 Sep 66, box 36–14, 

OCE History files; Ltr, McNamara to Senator John Stennis (second quoted words), 12 Sep 

66, box 44, 71A/2351, RG 330, NARA; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 333; Statement by 

Edward J. Sheridan, Dep Sec Def (Properties and Installations) Before the Staff of the Senate 

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 13 Sep 66, pp. 7, 11, box 44, 71A/2351, RG 330, 

NARA.
161

Building the Bases, 1966

conditions and wages. The defense secretary added that the transfer of the $60 

million, and possibly more, would ensure continuation of the consortium’s 

work. A reduction in RMK-BRJ’s workforce from 51,000 to approximately 

43,000 by the beginning of 1967 would, according to McNamara, also increase 

efficiency and reduce costs.108

Meanwhile, General Raymond, who had returned to the United States in 

July on a thirty-day rest and recuperation leave, found himself spending most 

of his leave in Washington trying to clarify the $200 million requirement. The 

MACV construction chief spent hours going over the funding problem with the 

top officials of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the Pentagon. 

He discussed the funding predicament with Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Ignatius and his staff. Raymond also traveled to Capitol Hill almost daily to 

explain the funding situation before congressional subcommittee hearings.109

Exercising its oversight function, Congress sent teams to examine the construction program firsthand. A team from its auditing agent, the Government 

Accounting Office, arrived in Vietnam in July. In reviewing the performance 

of RMK-BRJ, the auditors noted that during the haste of the buildup the 

contractor dumped equipment and materials at port staging areas, depots, and 

project sites, and the flood of arriving materiel inspired thievery on a grand 

scale. RMK-BRJ could not account for the whereabouts of approximately 

$120 million worth of items shipped from the United States. In October, staff 

members of the Armed Services Committee toured bases and received detailed 

briefings. In one long question-and-answer session in which many cost figures 

were discussed, Capt. Paul E. Seufer, the Officer in Charge of Construction 

in Vietnam, perhaps best summed up his organization’s efforts. “If anything,” 

he told a subcommittee staff member, “I would like you to go away from here 

with a feeling that you have run into an organization that is on top of the 

management of a rather amorphous thing and we’re doing a good job.” The 

Government Accounting Office team’s report prepared in December concluded that “neither the Navy nor the contractor were adequately equipped 

to manage the mass buildup and neither devoted sufficient attention to maintaining a reasonable degree of management control over the fast escalating 

construction program.”110

While Congress and the Pentagon continued to spar over costs, Defense 

Department officials were having second thoughts about the authority they 

108 Ltr, McNamara to Stennis, 12 Sep 66; Msg, Brig Gen Daniel A. Raymond SOG 882 to Lt 

Gen Richard D. Meyer, Director for Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J–4, 8 Oct 66, Dunn Papers, 

CMH; Army Buildup Progress Rpt, 21 Jul 66, p. 43, CMH; Quarterly Hist Rpt 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, 

MACDC, pp. 27–28. 109 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 332–33; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, 

pp. 1, 25–26. 110 Draft, Report to the Congress of the United States, Survey of United States Construction 

Activities in the Republic of Vietnam, Government Accounting Office, Dec 66, pp. 2, 4, box 4, 

74/167, RG 334, NARA; RVN Supplemental Data Sheet, Officer in Charge of Construction, 

sub: Briefing of Mr. French’s Investigation for the Senate Sub-committee, p. 16 (quoted words), 

Incl to Ltr, OICC RVN to COMUSMACV, 1 Nov 66, sub: Senate Briefing of Preparedness 

Investigating Subcommittee Minority Counsel, Mr. Stuart P. French, box 16, 70/782, RG 334, 

NARA.
Engineers at War

162

had granted Westmoreland in January to control the construction program. In 

May, the Pentagon asked Westmoreland to send General Dunn to Washington 

to draft new procedures. Following Dunn’s return to Saigon, he and Raymond 

reviewed various drafts transmitted by message from Washington. In late 

June, General Noble, the Defense Department’s chief for Southeast Asia 

construction, informed Dunn of the possibility of returning to more-detailed 

line-item justifications. Almost in despair, Raymond responded such a move 

“would be a step backward and involve time consuming detail.” Dunn and 

Raymond managed to hold off any drastic changes for the time being. But 

by September, the unfavorable press coverage over contracting costs renewed 

Defense Department interest in tightening up construction procedures.111

McNamara now appeared determined to revalidate projects before approving any further work. During his visit to South Vietnam in October, he told 

General Raymond of his determination to reassert the authority granted to 

him earlier by Congress, and warned that he would require that new projects 

funded from the Fiscal Year 1967 Supplemental appropriation be submitted 

on a line-item basis instead of by categories. On 31 January 1967, McNamara 

made it official, forwarding a memorandum to the field rescinding the broad 

flexibility passed on to Westmoreland a year earlier. More changes would be 

forthcoming in 1967, and the Construction Directorate reluctantly began to 

adapt to the new details of construction management.112

Despite these problems and thanks to a growing U.S. military and civilian 

engineer workforce, the network of major and minor base complexes showed 

significant progress by the end of 1966. These achievements did not come about 

without difficulty. The engineers made mistakes. Often construction materials 

were not available in specified types or quantities. Equipment constantly broke 

down. Funding continued to plague construction managers. Meanwhile, the 

engineers also had to support ongoing tactical operations.

111 Msg, Dunn MAC 3876 to Noble, 14 May 66; Msg, Dunn WDC 6375 to Raymond, 31 

May 66; Msg, Noble 3557–66 to Dunn, 22 Jun 66; Msg, Dunn SOG 0538 to Noble, 28 Jun 66; 

Msg, Noble 3698–66 to Dunn, 29 Jun 66; Msg, Raymond SOG 0546 to Noble, 30 Jun 66; Msg, 

Noble WDC 13795 to Raymond, 22 Nov 66; Msg, Noble WDC 14521 to Raymond, 9 Dec 66. 

All in Dunn Papers, CMH. 112 Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, RVN, p. 52; Memo, McNamara 

for Secs of Svc Depts and Chairman JCS, 31 Jan 67, sub: Construction Approval Procedures 

for South Vietnam, in Booklet, Development of the Construction Directorate, incl. 5, tab I, 

Historians files, CMH; Msgs, Raymond SOG 0901 to Noble, 12 Oct 66, Raymond SOG 1085 to 

Noble, 25 Nov 66, Raymond SOG 1173 to Noble, 14 Dec 66, all in Dunn Papers, CMH.
Part 

Supporting the Offensive

6

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

During 1965 and 1966, military engineers carried out construction that 

encompassed almost every phase of engineering endeavor. American 

commanders at all levels had accepted the development of the fixed, somewhat 

permanent bases from which to operate. The increase in the number of tactical 

operations in 1966 began to draw the engineers, especially those in the divisions and brigades, more deeply into their combat and operational support 

missions. The nature of the war focused attention on several aspects of combat 

engineering. Before enough forces became available to open and maintain the 

road system, the combat forces depended almost wholly on aerial resupply, 

especially when they operated any distance from the coastal bases. Engineers 

were needed to increase the number of airfields in and around the interior 

bases, and to help detect, penetrate, and destroy the enemy’s well-concealed 

bunkers and tunnel complexes. When not occupied with high-priority base 

development projects, combat engineers of the 18th Engineer Brigade increasingly reinforced the division and brigade engineers.

III Corps Battles 

In January 1966, allied forces in III Corps began a series of spoiling attacks, 

radiating out from Saigon, to clear main roads, hinder enemy operations, and 

improve security. MACV deployed the 1st Division and the 173d Airborne 

Brigade into the corps’ northern and western areas. During the first week of 

the year, a battalion from the airborne brigade made an air assault in the delta 

country on the east and west sides of the Vam Co Dong River in Hau Nghia 

Province northwest of Saigon in Operation Marauder. After a brief encounter

the paratroopers pursued the Viet Cong force. Later a patrol uncovered a battalion-size base camp where the enemy left behind a sizable quantity of supplies, 

weapons, ammunition, and important documents. Once everything of value was 

removed, a demolitions team set about destroying the base.1

 (Map 14)

Marauder was followed on 7 January by Operation Crimp in the Ho 

Woods in southwestern Binh Duong and northeastern Hau Nghia Provinces. 

Both the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade participated 

in the war’s largest operation by U.S. forces thus far. Much of the terrain was 

open, except near the Saigon River, which was choked with thick jungle and 

overgrown rubber plantations. During the operation, General Seaman sent his 

3d Brigade through the southern part of the sector. Infantrymen and engineers found and destroyed bunkers, houses, sampans, supplies, and food, and 

1

 Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 168–69.
Engineers at War

166

in one tunnel complex captured a huge collection of maps, charts, and documents. The Viet Cong did not stand and fight, using instead hit-and-run and 

ambush tactics to inflict casualties. In the northern part of the sector, the 173d 

Airborne Brigade discovered a large tunnel complex, but the enemy managed 

to slip away from the brigade’s dragnet of one Australian and two American 

infantry battalions.2

A little over a month after Crimp ended, General Seaman launched another

spoiling attack north of Saigon—Operation Mastiff. In a series of helicopter

lifts, the 1st Division’s 2d and 3d Brigades joined by the division’s armored 

cavalry squadron deployed along three sides of a thirty-nine-square-mile area 

bordering the west bank of the Saigon River. Although the Americans uncov2

 Ibid., pp. 169–73; AAR, Opn Crimp, 173d Abn Bde, 23 Feb 66, p. 1; AAR, Opn Crimp, 3

Bde, 1st Inf Div, 15 Feb 66, p. 1, both in Historians files, CMH.

20

14

14

13

15

4

4

1

1

1

22

OPERATION CRIMP

OPERATION

MARAUDER

OPERATION

 BIRMINGHAM

OPERATION

EL PASO II

OPERATION ROLLING STONE

IV CTZ

II CTZ

 CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

SOUTH CHINA SEA

W AR ZONE C

W AR ZONE D

IRON TRIANGLE

NUI BA DEN

PHUOC TUY

BINH TUY

BINH

THUAN

LONG KHANH

PHUOC LONG

BINH DUONG

HAU NGHI A

LONG AN

GO CONG

KIEN HOA

KIEN TUONG

DINH TUONG

GIA DINH

TAY NINH

BIEN HOA

QUANG DUC

LAM DONG BINH LON G

An Loc

Loc Ninh

Tay Ninh

Lai Khe

Cu Chi

Bien Hoa

Bearcat

Xuan Loc

Long Binh

Tan An

SAIGON

My Tho

Ba Ria

Vung Tau

Ham Tan

Gia Nghia

Bao Loc

Phan

Thiet

Phuoc Vinh

Dong Xoai

Di An

Phu Cuong

Ben Cat

CAMBODIA

January–September 1966

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Corps Tactical Zone Boundary

Map 14
167

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

ered base camps, small hospitals stocked with medical supplies, training areas, 

rice storage caches, and small munitions factories, they met little organized 

resistance. Seaman terminated the operation on 25 February. Both Crimp and

Mastiff gave U.S. commanders a frustrating reminder of the enemy’s skills at

avoiding a fight with large formations.3

In March, the 1st Division launched a series of smaller or battalion-size 

operations north of Lai Khe and immediately west of Highway 13 near the 

hamlet of Bau Bang. By reducing the size of the U.S. units sent to the field, 

the Americans hoped that the Viet Cong would see them as tempting targets 

and go after them. The tactics worked, resulting in a battle at Lo Ke Rubber 

Plantation just west of Bau Bang. Within a few days, all three battalions of 

the 3d Brigade were sweeping the battle area. Though the enemy again slipped 

away, he suffered heavy casualties and loss of equipment.4

Throughout these operations, Colonel Sargent’s 1st Engineer Battalion 

and Captain Sowell’s 173d Engineer Company supported the infantry. Combat 

engineers augmented every infantry company and larger unit in the field with 

demolition teams. They also cleared and repaired roads, built landing zones, 

carried out the slow and deliberate clearance of bunkers and tunnels, and 

set up water points. During Crimp, Company C supported the 3d Brigade

and cleared and repaired roads into the area of operations. The battalion’s 

tankdozers and flamethrowers also supported the operation. Company B supported the 2d Brigade in Operation Mastiff. Similarly, the 173d Engineer

Company supported the 173d Airborne Brigade in Operations Maraud

and Crimp

5

To the north and east of Saigon, U.S. forces launched three major 

operations during the winter and early spring. In Operation Mallet, the 2d

Brigade swept the area around Long Thanh southeast of Long Binh. Rice 

caches and base camps were uncovered with little opposition. The major 

impact of this operation, which ended in mid-February, was the opening 

of Highway 15 and the reestablishment of a government presence in the 

area. Mallet had not quite wound down when the 1st Division launched

Operation Rolling Stone. The purpose of the operation was to provide

security for the 1st Engineer Battalion as it repaired and upgraded supply 

routes linking Highway 13 with Route 16 north of Saigon in Binh Duong 

Province, thereby improving ground traffic between the 1st Division’s bases 

at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh. The operation would also allow the South 

Vietnamese government to extend its control over the intervening territory 

and cut a major enemy supply and infiltration route linking War Zones C 

and D. Seaman assigned the security mission to the 1st Brigade, which in 

turn tasked one of its three battalions to guard the engineers on a rotation 

basis, while the other two probed nearby to keep the enemy off balance. Two 

weeks into the operation, strong Viet Cong forces attempted to attack 1st 

3

 Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 173–75. 4

 Ibid., pp. 175–78.

5

 HQ, 1st Engr Bn, 1st Engineer Battalion in Vietnam, n.d., 2 vols., vol. 1, pp. III-3 to III-4 

(hereafter cited as 1st Engr Bn Hist), copy in CMH.
Engineers at War

168

Brigade defensive positions outside the hamlet of Tan Binh just north of the 

roadwork and less than three miles west of Route 16. The attack was beat 

off with many enemy casualties. After the repulse at Tan Binh, the Viet Cong 

avoided battle, choosing instead to harass the work parties with occasional 

mortar and sniper fire. Although they killed three engineers and wounded 

twenty-nine, they were unable to stop the 1st Engineer Battalion, and by 2 

March the roadwork was complete.6

Operation Rolling Stone was the first major operation of the 1st Engineer

Battalion as a unit. Work began on 7 February when Capt. Joseph M. Cannon, 

commanding officer of Company D, dispatched a platoon with a bulldozer, 

grader, scoop loader, and four dump trucks to open two and one-half miles of 

Route 2A, or Route Orange, a supply road branching off Highway 13 north 

of Phu Cuong and leading to Phuoc Vinh. The Viet Cong blocked the road 

with about fifty berms and trenches, but in a single day the platoon swept the 

road for mines, pushed the berms aside, and filled the ditches. On the ninth, 

Capt. Charles R. Kesterson, the Company A commander, deployed five mineclearing teams to clear Highway 13 in leapfrog fashion north from Phu Loi 

to Ben Cat. Since the Viet Cong also ran buried wires to mines, which were 

command detonated from a distance, two bulldozers with rooters preceded 

the teams along the sides of the road to cut or expose the wires. Each team 

consisted of nine men: three mine detector operators with metallic detectors, 

and six probers. At times the mine-clearing teams were fired on, but accompanying tankdozers quickly suppressed enemy snipers with canister rounds 

and machine gun fire. Similarly, Company C under Capt. Robert F. Zielinski 

moved south from Lai Khe, clearing the road to Ben Cat. From Ben Cat attention turned to upgrading eleven miles along Routes 7B and 1A to Route 16. 

Engineer reconnaissance determined that a three-mile stretch of new road 

roughly following a cart track and ridgeline through jungle, plantations, and 

rice paddies just north of the existing road could be built east of Ben Cat 

without bridges or culvert. A bridge over the existing road had been partially 

destroyed, and shortly after the reconnaissance the Viet Cong, believing the 

bridge would be repaired, demolished it.7

On 10 February, the battalion less Company B moved from Di An and 

Lai Khe over the cleared Highway 13 to an area designated Base Camp 1 

about one and one-quarter miles east of Ben Cat. While the engineers set up 

the field camp, equipment operators immediately went to work on the road. 

Throughout the operation, the weather was warm and sunny. The lack of rain 

made it easier for vehicles to move about but hindered compaction during 

the roadwork. Three cargo trucks were rigged as expedient water trucks, and 

a water semitrailer and a 500-gallon-per-minute water pump were borrowed 

from the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Works for use in compacting the base 

course. During the first day, the first half mile of a new pioneer road was 

6

 Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 179–80; AAR, Opn Rolling Stone, 1st Engr Bn, 12 Mar

66, pp. 1, 8–9, Historians files, CMH. 7

 AAR, Opn Rolling Stone, 1st Engr Bn, pp. 2–5; 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, p. III-6; Garland,

ed., Infantry in Vietnam, pp. 222–24.
169

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

cleared and a laterite pit was opened within the camp’s perimeter, allowing bulldozers to clear the roadway and stockpile laterite until dusk at 1900. Pushing 

east, tankdozers, bulldozers, and graders cleared vegetation to a width of sixty 

feet. The fifty-five-ton tankdozer proved very effective in clearing hedgerows 

and stumps when compared to the twenty-seven-ton bulldozer. Next graders, 

water tankers, and pneumatic rollers went to work on a thirty-eight-foot-wide 

base course. The first six-inch layer of laterite was shaped by graders and compacted by dump trucks hauling laterite. This was followed by a twelve-inch 

layer of laterite compacted by steel rollers. Fortunately, the laterite used for the 

wearing surface of the entire road had good moisture content and compacted 

well without additional water. As the roadwork progressed, Colonel Sargent 

on 16 February moved the battalion to Base Camp 2, which also contained 

laterite, near the juncture of the new road and Route 7B. Similarly, on 23 

February Base Camp 3 was opened farther east on Route 2A. It was on the 

night of 23–24 February that the Viet Cong attacked the 1st Brigade’s field 

camp 1,100 yards to the northeast. On the morning of the twenty-sixth, engineer tankdozers and engineer security forces guarding minesweeping teams 

found three dead Viet Cong along the road. Apparently the bodies were a 

lure, and the engineers soon found themselves engaged in a heavy firefight that 

lasted about thirty minutes. Work resumed, and the 1st Engineer Battalion 

Engineers of the 1st Division encountered obstacles along roads such as the 

berm under construction by the Viet Cong.
Engineers at War

170

completed the thirty-foot-wide all-weather laterite road (Route Orange) from 

Ben Cat to Route 16 in three weeks, a half week ahead of schedule.8

As usual, the engineers checked for mines throughout Rolling Stone.

Thanks to the thorough sweep along Highway 13, the 1st Engineer Battalion 

was able to move to Base Camp 1 completely unhampered. This move contrasted sharply with previous ones in which several American soldiers had 

been killed in mining incidents along the same road. Venturing out from Base 

Camp 1 on the morning of the eleventh, mine-clearing teams discovered U.S. 

fragmentation bomblets emplaced by the enemy as antipersonnel mines in an 

area cleared just the day before. This was further evidence that the Viet Cong 

would take every opportunity to mine roads that were used by U.S. forces, 

and particularly those under construction where it was difficult to detect the 

presence of a concealed mine. Mine-clearing teams were dispatched every day 

from the field camps to clear both the area to be worked on that day and the 

completed portion of the road back to the starting point at Ben Cat. Despite 

the sweeps, some mines went undetected. On the first day out of Base Camp 

2, 17 February, S. Sgt. Clyde C. Foster, while improving a secondary road 

to a laterite pit with his bulldozer, detonated two mines in rapid succession. 

Fortunately, the bulldozer absorbed much of the blast and Sergeant Foster 

was unharmed. On the same day, the clearing teams working on the completed 

portion of the road found six antipersonnel and two pressure-activated antivehicular mines, which had obviously been put in the preceding night after 

roadwork ceased. When the battalion prepared to return to Di An via Ben 

Cat at the end of the operation, mine-clearing teams swept the road ahead 

of the leading units. Company C began moving out of Base Camp 3 at 1000, 

2 March, and traveled some distance without incident. Just east of old Base 

Camp 2, two pressure-activated mines were detonated and an armored personnel carrier and a tank were damaged. The road had been checked and cleared 

not more than a few hours earlier. No further incidents marred the return 

march, but the battalion learned that unless every inch of ground was under 

constant observation—a physical impossibility—the enemy would take a toll 

of friendly soldiers.9

In March, General Westmoreland launched more spoiling operations in 

III Corps. The 1st Division’s 1st Brigade joined the 173d Airborne Brigade 

in Operation Silver City, a sweep of the southwestern sector of War Zo

D. Again the two units found and destroyed rice caches, caused numerous 

casualties, interdicted the enemy’s lines of communications leading to Saigon, 

and disrupted one of the major Viet Cong sanctuaries in III Corps. Then, 

in anticipation of a fresh wave of enemy attacks, General Seaman, who 

assumed command of the newly activated II Field Force, Vietnam, sent the 

1st Division on a preemptive campaign. For sixteen days, beginning on 29 

8

 AAR, Opn Rolling Stone, 1st Engr Bn, pp. 3, 5–8; 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, p. III-6;

Garland, ed., Infantry in Vietnam, pp. 224–25. 9

 AAR, Opn Rolling Stone, 1st Engr Bn, incl. 2; Garland, ed., Infantry in Vietnam, pp.

224–25. See also Cir 350–3–1, 1st Engr Bn, 20 May 66, sub: Mine Clearing, incl. 11, tab B, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3.
171

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

March, the division, now under Maj. Gen. William E. DePuy, dispatched 

the 2d and 3d Brigades and the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 

on a sweep through a large area of Phuoc Tuy Province southeast of Saigon. 

The 1st Engineer Battalion provided demolition teams, water supply, clearing 

landing zones, roadwork, and bridge building. During the operation, called 

Abilene, a U.S. infantry company encountered a Viet Cong battalion on the

morning of 11 April, and the Americans beat off repeated attacks well into 

the night. Before reinforcements arrived the next day, thirty engineers from 

Company B descended through the jungle canopy on ladders hanging from 

the rear of hovering CH–47 helicopters. Armed with chain saws and hand 

tools, the combat engineers carved out a landing zone that allowed evacuation 

helicopters to lift out the casualties. This was the first time the 1st Engineer 

Battalion used this technique. Another first for the battalion took place when 

it used an armored vehicle launched bridge, borrowed from the 65th Engineer 

Battalion, 25th Division, to cross a forty-foot gap, enabling an ammunition 

resupply convoy to reach its destination. A culvert bypass was later built at the 

bridge site and the scissors bridge was withdrawn. Elsewhere, a pioneer road 

was blazed through dense jungle and the armored vehicle launched bridge was 

used for the second time, allowing artillery to move to a new location.10

10 Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 181–83, 306; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, II FFV, 1 Jun 66, 

p. 8, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 1st Inf Div, n.d., p. 6, both in Historians files, CMH; 1st Engr Bn 

Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-4, III-6 to III-7; Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 

Company B, 1st Engr Bn sections. For more on clearing landing zones, see Cir 350–3–1, 1st 

Engr Bn, 17 Apr 66, sub: Construction: Helicopter Landing Zone Construction, incl. 11, tab A, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3.

A 1st Engineer Battalion mine-clearing team along Highway 13
Engineers at War

172

On 24 April, the 1st Division and its engineers entered War Zone C near the 

Cambodian border in Operation Birmingham—the first major drive into the

enemy stronghold since 1962. During the operation, the 1st Engineer Battalion 

airlifted mine-detection teams to sites along Highways 1 and 22, while other elements preceded road bound convoys, replacing blown bridges and repairing roads 

along the way. Engineer teams also repaired Route 243 near Nui Ba Den (Black 

Virgin Mountain) and Route 26, bypassing Highway 22 from Tay Ninh to Go 

Dau Ha. Besides enemy harassment, mud and mines plagued the engineers. The 

monsoon season had begun in early May, and work crews had to tackle the sticky 

problem of rutted roads made soft by the constant pounding of tracked vehicles 

and heavy convoys. At this time, the 1st Engineer Battalion opened a road from 

Tay Ninh to the Michelin Plantation allowing supply vehicles and artillery to move 

by convoy. One major result of the operation was the discovery of a vast supply 

cache near the border. Birmingham took its toll of engineers. By the end of the

operation on 16 May, the 1st Engineer Battalion lost two men killed, including the 

death of Captain Kesterson, Company A commander, when he stepped on a mine 

while rushing to the aid of his minesweeping team struck down by a blast from a 

claymore mine. The battalion also suffered sixteen wounded.11

During June and July, the 1st Division and the South Vietnamese 5th 

Division mounted a series of operations along the eastern flank of War Zone 

C. In Operation El Paso II, the aim was to open Highway 13 from Saigon to 

rubber plantations in Binh Long Province and to seek out and destroy a Viet 

Cong division, then in the process of preparing to seize and hold the province capital of An Loc and several district capitals. By the end of the operation, highly effective counter-ambush tactics based on the armored cavalry’s 

firepower and the rapid reaction of helicopter-borne infantrymen uncovered 

supply caches and forced the Viet Cong to withdraw into sanctuaries along 

the border. Again the 1st Engineer Battalion supported the division by minesweeping and opening supply roads, clearing landing zones, and serving as 

infantry.12

Keeping the roads open for resupply convoys remained one of the 1st 

Engineer Battalion’s major responsibilities. In late August, the battalion supported the 1st Brigade to clear and secure Routes 16 and 1A for a resupply 

convoy from Di An to Phuoc Vinh. Code-named Amarillo, the operation

started out as a routine road-clearing job. The road was in poor condition and 

two culverts had been blown. While Company C worked north, Company A 

started at Phuoc Vinh and worked south. When the two infantry battalions 

guarding the road were committed to action against a reinforced Viet Cong 

battalion about five miles west of Route 16, the 1st Engineer Battalion was 

tasked to assume the security mission formerly assigned to the infantry battalions. By then, a north-bound convoy was about halfway to Phuoc Vinh. 

11 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 125; MACV History, 1966, pp. 383–84; ORLL, 1 Feb–

30 Apr 66, II FFV, pp. 8–9; 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-7 to III-8; AAR, Opn Birmingham,

1st Inf Div, n.d., pp. 23–24, Historians files, CMH; Always First, 1965–1967, “Mud and Mines.” 12 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 126; MACV History, 1966, pp. 385–86; Galloway, 

“Essayons,” p. 150.
173

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

Lt. Col. Joseph M. Kiernan, who had recently assumed command from 

Colonel Sargent, called out the remaining elements of the battalion from Di 

An. The road was secured, and the convoy passed without incident. At nightfall, Company A formed a defensive perimeter for the brigade command post 

and artillery base at Ap Bo La near the intersection of Routes 16 and 1A. A 

few miles to the south, the rest of the battalion set up a defensive perimeter. 

During the night, both perimeters were probed by Viet Cong, and Company 

A killed two of the enemy with small-arms fire. For three critical days, the 1st 

Engineer Battalion acted as infantry while the infantry battalions engaged the 

enemy in bitter fighting. On 26 August, the rest of the battalion moved north 

to protect the brigade command post. During the move, a 21⁄2-ton truck from 

Headquarters Company was destroyed by a command-detonated claymore 

mine. The blast was so strong that pellets penetrated the engine and cracked 

the block. Six of the eight engineers in the truck were wounded. On the night 

of the twenty-seventh, the Viet Cong again made probing attacks on the 1st 

Brigade’s perimeter. Company E, on the west side came under attack and 

before the night was over six Viet Cong were killed. There were no American 

casualties. On 28 August, the battalion resumed its mission as engineers. They 

destroyed tunnel complexes discovered by the infantry, cleared jungle and 

landing zones, and continued road and bridge work.13

In September, the battalion returned to Route 16 in Operation Longview.

Just south of Tan Uyen, work crews replaced a failing bridge, weakened by 

heavily laden convoys, with two 90-foot triple-single Bailey bridges supported 

at midpoint on a pier. Plans called for the Ministry of Public Works to build 

the pier, but work progressed too slowly and the piles were too short to carry 

the design load. The 1st Engineer Battalion took over and assembled a reinforced raft from its float bridge set for use as a pile-driving platform. After 

splicing additional piles to the Vietnamese piles, work crews, using a pile driver 

and operator from the 169th Engineer Battalion, drove the fourteen piles. The 

bridge opened to convoy traffic at 1230, 27 September. Meanwhile, Companies 

A and D cleared Route 16 of mines and obstacles. At one location, known as 

Ambush Corner, Company D bulldozed the jungle on both sides of the road 

to hamper future ambushes.14

The following month, the 1st Engineer Battalion directed its attention 

to Highway 13, by now dubbed Thunder Road, in Operation Tulsa. Again, 

obstacles had to be removed, and monsoon rains inundated the road in many 

places. Potholes and mine craters turned into bottomless pits. Working continuously to keep the road open to convoys and commercial traffic, the battalion turned to expedients such as placing timbers and perforated steel planks 

to surface the wet, sagging artery. Other improvisations included replacing a 

damaged bridge within two hours with a rock-filled french drain. When a mine 

ripped apart a bridge north of Phu Cuong, the battalion called on CH–47 

Chinook helicopters to lift sections of the dry span bridge to the site. To the 

13 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-8 to III-9; Always First, 1965–1967, “Committed as 

Infantry.” For more on Amarillo, see Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 325–33. 14 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-9 to III-10; Always First, 1965–1967, “Back to Route 16.
Engineers at War

174

dismay of the engineers, only one helicopter showed up, and the engineers had 

to place an armored vehicle launched bridge over the almost completed dry 

span bridge in time for a scheduled convoy.15 

Two other engineer mainstays in III Corps were the 168th and 588th 

Combat Battalions. Both concentrated on building the arc of forward bases 

protecting Saigon as well as carrying out operational support missions. 

Headquarters Company and Company A, 588th Engineer Battalion, worked 

on 1st Division projects at Phu Loi until late April when the 168th Engineer 

Battalion took over. In early May, the two companies of the 588th moved to 

the 25th Division’s Cu Chi base camp, relieved the 168th platoon there, and 

supported the 65th Engineer Battalion’s base development projects. A month 

later, Company B at Long Binh joined the battalion. In addition, the 588th 

Engineer Battalion maintained the airfield at Dau Tieng, improved the Loc 

Ninh Special Forces camp, and kept roads open and cleared jungle from a 

potential Viet Cong assembly area near Cu Chi. Company C at Bearcat joined 

the battalion in late August. When the 1st Division entered War Zone C near 

the Cambodian border in late April in Operation Birmingham, elements of

the 588th Engineer Battalion and the 617th Panel Bridge Company helped 

the 1st Engineer Battalion keep Highways 1 and 22 open between Cu Chi 

and Tay Ninh. In mid-May, the 588th sent men to Di An, where they joined 

troops of the 1st Engineer Battalion to train on tunnel destruction techniques. 

Following the training, the 588th became the 18th Engineer Brigade’s tunnel 

destruction force.16

At the beginning of 1966, the 168th Engineer Battalion had units at Di 

An, Lai Khe, and Long Binh carrying out construction and security tasks. 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company A were at Di An, 

the 1st Division’s main base, where Company A was busy building tropical 

wooden buildings, drainage ditches, roads, hardstands, latrines, and showers. First priority was for kitchens and dining halls, and a total of sixteen 

of the former and thirty-two of the latter were completed before the end 

of April. A carpenter shop was set up and began fabricating latrines and 

roof trusses. Most wood frame buildings included three-foot-high masonry 

walls. At Di An, Company A also ran combat patrols and night ambushes. 

In late April, most of Company A moved to Phu Loi to take over projects 

from the 588th. In addition to an array of tropical wooden buildings, metal 

prefabricated warehouses, sheds, and hangars, the company kept busy 

improving the Phu Loi airfield and the camp’s drainage system. Company 

B did work both on the cantonment and airfield at Lai Khe. In early June, 

when the 1st Division launched Operation El Paso II, Company B took 

over perimeter security. The battalion’s third lettered company, Company 

C, augmented the 46th Engineer Construction Battalion’s many projects 

at Long Binh. These included the 93d Evacuation Hospital and the head15 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-10 to III-11; AAR, Opn Tulsa, 1st Engr Bn, 22 Nov 66, 

OCE Hist Ofc; Always First, 1965–1967, “Miracle of Thunder Road.” 16 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 

1–3, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–5; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 141–42.
175

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

quarters complex for II Field Force at nearby Plantation. To help carry out 

these labor-intensive projects, Company C employed approximately 140 

Vietnamese workers as masons, carpenters, and general laborers.17

The II Corps War

In II Corps, U.S., South Korean, and South Vietnamese forces launched 

a series of operations in the highlands and the key coastal province, Binh 

Dinh. Until late January 1966, existing airfields adequately supported 

operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, and forward airfield work mainly 

consisted of repairs. Other than this, the division’s 8th Engineer Battalion 

limited its combat support to landing zones and road repairs. When airmobile operations shifted farther afield at the end of January, the division 

increased its dependence on cargo planes for logistical support, and airmobile engineers stepped up efforts to clear landing zones, build forward 

airfields, and open supply roads. Between 26 January and 5 June, Colonel 

Malley’s 8th Engineer Battalion carried through an extensive airfield building program resulting in seven new airfields, lengthening two fields to twice 

their previous size, and repairing and maintaining many others. Other airfields in II Corps were being improved by the 18th Engineer Brigade.18

(Map 15)

From 4 to 18 January, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3d Brigade, 25th 

Division, moved into the border area north of the Chu Pong Mountain to 

locate infiltration routes from Cambodia. Following a first phase, which 

involved clearing Highway 19 between An Khe and Pleiku, the infantry 

moved by helicopters into newly cleared landing zones in the heavily forested 

areas. During Operation Matador, the 8th Engineer Battalion descende

down troop ladders from hovering CH–47 helicopters for the first time in 

combat. Once on the ground, work crews used power saws to clear areas 

to fit one or two Huey helicopters. The next wave of helicopters delivered 

light engineer equipment to expand the landing zone to fit Chinook helicopters. In other cases, the Air Force dropped napalm and fragmentation 

bombs, ranging from 250 to 750 pounds, to cut holes in the forests. During 

the operation, troops uncovered several base camps and bunkers, and the 

enemy offered little resistance.19

In late January, the 1st Cavalry Division shifted operations from Pleiku and 

Kontum Provinces to the valleys along the coastal plains of northeastern Binh 

17 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3, 1 May–31 Jul, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3, 

and 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 3–5; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 141–42. 18 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 20; Lt. Col. Robert J. Malley, “Forward Airfield 

Construction in Vietnam,” Military Engineer 59 (September-October 1967): 318–22. See also 

Lt. Col. Robert J. Malley, “Engineer Support of Airmobile Operations” (Student essay, U.S. 

Army War College, 1967), pp. 11–15. 19 MACV History, 1966, p. 372; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, I FFV, 15 May 66, p. 7, Historians 

files, CMH; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 9 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and 

Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 57–60; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 92.
14

1

21

14

19

14

1

1

11

20

1

OPERATION

HAWTHORNE

OPERATION

MASHER/WHITE WING

OPERATION

THAYER

OPERATION

IRVING

OPERATION

PAUL REVERE I and II

OPERATION

HENRY CLAY

OPERATION

NATHAN HALE

OPERATIONS

SEWARD and GERONIMO

OPERATION

JOHN PAUL JONES

OPERATION BYRD

I CTZ

III CTZ

LZ ENGLISH

LZ HAMMOND

TUY HOA NORTH

CUNG SON

DONG TRE

CAT

OASIS

BUON BLECH

TUY HOA SOUTH

VUNG RO BAY

Chu Pong Mtn

SOUTH CHINA 

SEA

QUANG TIN

QUANG NGAI

KONTUM

BINH DINH

PLEIKU

PHU BON

PHU YEN

DARLAC

KHANH HOA

QUANG DUC

TUYEN DUC

BINH THUAN

PHUOC

LONG

LAM DONG

BINH TUY

LONG

KHANH

PHUOC TUY

NINH

THUAN

Dao Phu Qui

CAMBODIA LAOS

Da Lat

Kontum

Cheo Reo

Tuy Hoa

Song Cau

Gia Nghia

Tung Nghia

Bao Loc

Ninh Hoa

Phan Thiet

Pleiku

An Khe

Bong Son

Plei Djereng

Duc Co

Plei Me

Dak To

Tou Morong

An Lao

Qui Nhon

Ban Me Thuot

Phan Rang

Nha Trang

Cam Ranh

January–September 1966

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Corps Boundary

Map 15
177

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

Dinh Province. Reinforced by South Vietnamese and South Korean troops, the 

3d Brigade began Operation Masher. Washington had problems with such

a provocative name like Masher, and MACV renamed the operation W

Wing. When the remaining two brigades joined the hunt, the operation phased

into a massive search-and-destroy effort called White Wing. By the time the

operation ended on 6 March, the division’s troop carrying helicopters had completed a full circle of airmobile sweeps around the Bong Son Plain. The operation, also known as the Bong Son Campaign, temporarily cleared the plain of 

A CH–47 Chinook helicopter hovers while troops practice climbing down a ladder.
Engineers at War

178

strong enemy forces. Several enemy battalions were destroyed and the division 

captured a large number of arms, but Binh Dinh was not yet secure.20

During Masher/White Wing, the 8th Engineer Battalion teamed u

with South Vietnamese, South Korean, and 937th Group engineers to maintain air and ground lines of communication from Qui Nhon to the combat 

area. While most of the 8th Engineer Battalion supported the forces in the 

field, elements of the battalion built two forward airfields. Beginning on 28 

January and working around the clock for seventy hours, Company A and 

the 2d Equipment Platoon, Headquarters Company, opened the airstrip at 

Landing Zone Dog (later renamed English) to Caribou aircraft, a few miles 

north of the town of Bong Son. Continuing on their own for another day, they 

improved the dirt airstrip to C–123 standards. In early March, Headquarters 

Company completed a 3,200-foot airfield for C–130s at a landing zone four 

miles north of Phu Cat (later named Landing Zone Hammond).21

South of Hammond another hasty airstrip took shape. A small force led by

1st Lt. Thomas O. Boucher and S. Sgt. Sherman L. Kohlway from Company A, 

19th Engineer Battalion, completed a strip for the South Vietnamese 22d Infantry 

Division at An Nhon about eleven miles north of Qui Nhon just off Highway 1. 

Elements of the 84th Engineer Battalion and the 630th Engineer Light Equipment 

Company provided equipment support. The completed 1,800-foot-long, 80-footwide airstrip with 10-foot shoulders and a 35-foot cleared area on both sides was 

able to accommodate Caribou aircraft. The engineers hauled 40,000 cubic yards 

of fill during the round-the-clock operation. Although built primarily for use by 

the South Vietnamese division, the airstrip could also be used to relieve the traffic 

flow to the Qui Nhon airfield. The South Vietnamese division commander dedicated the airstrip to the memory of Maj. Stuart M. Andrews, U.S. Air Force, who 

was missing in action since being downed in March.22

In late March, the 1st Cavalry Division returned to the highlands to begin 

Operation Lincoln. Teaming up with the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, the airmobile division reentered the Ia Drang area in another search-and-destroy

mission, which resulted in moderate contact with the enemy. To support this 

and future operations, the 8th Engineer Battalion moved a platoon by CH–47 

helicopters to Landing Zone Oasis thirty-one miles southwest of Pleiku. 

Within four hours, the platoon cleared a new dirt airstrip for Caribou transports. Next, Company A arrived to build a separate runway for C–130s. Using 

the battalion’s lightweight bulldozers, graders, scrapers, and pneumatic rollers, 

the reinforced company carved out a new 3,500-by-60-foot runway. Instead 

of covering the runway with metal matting, work crews used T17 membrane 

for the first time in Vietnam. On 2 April, the first aircraft landed. During the 

20 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 61–67; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 202–15; 

Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 92–93. 21 Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Jun 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing 

Data (September 1965–March 1966), pp. 20–21; Malley, “Forward Airfield Construction in 

Vietnam,” p. 319; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 66. 22 “19th Engineers Extend Airstrip,” Castle Courier, 23 May 1966.
179

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

operation, the runway supported over five hundred landings and take-offs 

without significant damage.23

While the infantry swept over the western highlands, the 8th Engineer 

Battalion went to work on more airfields. Since vehicles could not get to all of the 

sites, helicopters had to move men and equipment. Some of the equipment could 

not be moved in one lift and had to be broken down into sections. In addition 

to its own CH–47 Chinooks, the division used CH–54 Tarhes or Flying Cranes, 

large cargo-carrying helicopters, to lift sections of D6B bulldozers, Caterpillar 

Model 112 graders, and MRS 100 tractor-scrapers. The bulldozer and grader 

required two lifts by the Flying Cranes, and sections of the tractor-scraper were 

delivered in four loads. Although the CH–47 could lift the bulldozer’s track and 

blade, CH–54s usually carried out the initial sorties. After the tracks were laid 

out, a CH–54 brought in the bulldozer’s body to be set on the tracks.24

On 3 April, two platoons and equipment arrived at the first site, Landing 

Zone Cat, in the trackless jungle some 43.5 miles southwest of Oasis, and

close to the Cambodian border. An advance work party cleared a landing zone 

using hand tools and chain saws. Next, helicopters brought the equipment: two 

D6B bulldozers, two motorized graders (one with a scraper), a self-propelled 

pneumatic roller, and vibratory compactor. More helicopters delivered a light 

dump truck, which also served as a makeshift water distributor carrying a 

500-gallon fuel bladder. By 5 April, the first Caribou landed on the hastily 

built strip, and the next day C–123 transports landed and took off from the 

completed 2,300-foot airstrip. This mix of equipment became the standard 

package when future airfield work required helicopters to transport all construction equipment.25

In twenty days, the 8th Engineer Battalion built four forward airfields and 

extended one more. Equipment moved by truck, helicopter, and fixed-wing aircraft. One D6B bulldozer, used in all but two of the projects, had moved 92 miles 

by truck, over 170 miles in four moves by helicopter, and 50 miles by C–130. 

During the twenty-day period, this bulldozer was in operation sixteen days.26

On 5 June, the 8th Engineer Battalion added another airfield, this one 

at Buon Blech Special Forces camp in northern Darlac Province. About four 

weeks earlier, Company B, augmented by two equipment platoons, moved to 

the camp under the protection of a 1st Cavalry Division task force. While an 

infantry company, artillery, and helicopter gunships of the task force secured 

the area, the engineer company fought the effects of heavy rains, cleared the 

site, and moved large quantities of earth. On 25 May, work crews began to 

23 MACV History, 1966, p. 374; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, I FFV, p. 8; AAR, Opn Lincoln,

8th Engr Bn, 13 Apr 66, p. 2, Historians files, CMH; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Jun 

67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (September 1965–March 1966), p. 21; Malley, 

“Forward Airfield Construction in Vietnam,” pp. 319–20; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 92; Memoirs 

of the First Team, p. 181. 24 Malley, “Forward Airfield Construction in Vietnam,” p. 320; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st 

Cav Div (Ambl), 7 Mar 67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (April–October 1966), 

pp. 48–51, Historians files, CMH; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 269, 274. 25 Malley, “Forward Airfield Construction in Vietnam,” p. 320; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 92.

26 Malley, “Forward Airfield Construction in Vietnam,” p. 320; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 95.
Engineers at War

180

place T17 membrane on the 3,200-foot runway and parking apron that could 

accommodate five C–130s.27

Other airfields supporting operations in the highlands were assigned to the 

18th Engineer Brigade. General Westmoreland expressed concern about the 

airstrip at Cheo Reo, about halfway between Pleiku and Tuy Hoa near Route 

7B. On 27 February, he directed that the airstrip be upgraded to C–130 standards. The Field Force, Vietnam, engineer tasked the 937th Group to carry out 

the improvements. In turn, the group passed the mission to Colonel Anderson’s 

299th Engineer Combat Battalion. On 26 March, Company C set out from 

Qui Nhon on a 160-mile road march along Highway 19 to Pleiku then south 

a few miles on Highway 14 and then southeast along Route 7B to Cheo Reo. 

Due to security concerns along Route 7B, the unit took all necessary supplies 

and materials and completed the grueling trip in one day. After reaching Cheo 

Reo, the company repaired soft spots on the runway, added 700 feet to the 

runway, and topped it off with M8 matting. A T17 membrane-covered parking ramp was added. Completing its work on 23 April, the company returned 

to Qui Nhon on the twenty-fourth, repeating the long trip in a single day.28

Although busy with various construction projects in the Qui Nhon and 

Pleiku areas, the 299th Engineer Battalion received a steady flow of operational missions elsewhere in II Corps. In mid-May, Company C ventured 

out again with the 630th Light Equipment Company for three weeks to Plei 

Kly, twenty-five miles south of Pleiku, to build an airfield to support the 3d 

Brigade, 25th Division, in Operation Paul Revere. During Paul Revere, U

troops reentered the Chu Pong–Ia Drang area for the first time since the late 

1965 campaign. The 299th task force built a 3,100-by-60-foot runway, a turnaround, and a parking apron, all covered with T17 membrane. On 8 June, two 

platoons from Company A left Pleiku to provide additional support to the 1st 

Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, in the Dak To area. The paratroopers, who 

had moved into the area following search-and-destroy operations in coastal 

Phu Yen Province, had just begun Hawthorne, an eighteen-day search-anddestroy operation in Kontum Province. One of the engineers’ major efforts wa

to keep the asphalt-surfaced Dak To airfield in operation.29

At midyear, U.S. forces continued spoiling attacks in II Corps. In June, 

the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, returned to Phu Yen Province to 

carry out Operation Nathan Hale, a twelve-day search-and-destroy mission. The 1st Cavalry Division returned to Binh Dinh Province in September

and launched Operations Thayer I, Irving, and Thayer II. These 

other combined operations with South Korean and South Vietnamese 

forces resulted in large North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong losses and 

the capture of large quantities of supplies. By October, elements of the 4th 

27 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 95; Situation Rpt on Airfield Construction, incl. 7, p. 3, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3. 28 Msg, CG, FFV to COMUSMACV, 2 Mar 66, sub: Repairs to Cheo Reo Airfield, Historians 

files, CMH; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, I FFV, p. 26, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 299th Engr Bn, 30 

Apr 66, p. 3, Historians files, CMH. 29 MACV History, 1966, pp. 372, 374, 377; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 299th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 

66, pp. 1–3, Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 73.
181

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

Infantry Division and the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, followed later by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, moved to the western highlands near the 

Cambodian border to continue Operation Paul Revere. Again, the sweep

disrupted enemy plans and raised havoc to his base areas. Operations in Phu 

Yen Province late in the year included Seward, which found the 1st Brigade,

101st Airborne Division, protecting the rice harvest, and Geronimo I, a

combined operation that included the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, and 1st 

Brigade, 101st Division. Long-running campaigns such as Operation Byr

in Binh Thuan Province demonstrated that an airmobile infantry battalion 

task force from the 1st Cavalry Division, supported by a platoon from the 

8th Engineer Battalion, could operate alone over an extended period of time 

against small enemy forces.30

In July, two brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division swept west through Phu 

Yen, Phu Bon, and Darlac Provinces to the Cambodian border in Operation 

Henry Clay. Engineering tasks for the 8th Engineer Battalion teams attached

to the assaulting infantry battalions included sweeping roads for mines and 

repairing forward airstrips. Repairing the airstrips posed some problems 

because much of the battalion’s equipment remained committed to higherpriority projects such as the An Khe airfield. As usual, ingenuity was brought 

into play. Lt. Col. Charles G. Olentine, who replaced Colonel Malley on 19 

June, noted that at Buon Blech one of his Company A platoons used a quartermaster laundry dryer as an expedient to dry the ground under the T17 

membrane, allowing the glue to hold satisfactorily.31

During the series of Paul Revere operations near the Cambodian border

the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, saw heavy combat. In August, the 1st Cavalry 

Division diverted forces from Binh Dinh Province to reinforce the 3d Brigade. 

Operation Paul Revere II brought forth the heaviest commitment by the 8t

Engineer Battalion in any single operation to date. Colonel Olentine moved his 

headquarters to Oasis, marking the first time that the headquarters operated 

outside Camp Radcliff since arriving in Vietnam. Monsoon rains had returned, 

and Olentine committed all of his resources during the month-long operation to keep the C–130 Oasis airstrip open and to carry out other missions to 

support the operation. Landing zones were cleared, enemy bunkers destroyed, 

and bridges and culverts built to cross the rising rivers and streams. Additional 

help came from 18th Engineer Brigade units of the 937th Engineer Group. 

The 299th Engineer Battalion, augmented with trucks and equipment from 

the 19th and 70th Engineer Battalions, the 630th Light Equipment Company, 

and the 509th Panel Bridge Company units hauled rock, put in culverts, and 

helped maintain roads. When the 1st Cavalry Division returned to Binh Dinh 

30 MACV History, 1966, pp. 378–79; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, I FFV, 25 Aug 66, pp. 12–13, 

1 Aug–31 Oct 66, I FFV, 30 Nov 66, pp. 10–12, 17–22, 23–28, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, I FFV, 6 

Mar 67, pp. 9–18, all in Historians files, CMH; Memoirs of the First Team, pp. 182–83. 31 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, I FFV, pp. 12–13; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Mar 67, 

sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (April–October 1966), pp. 100–103; AAR, Opn 

Henry Clay, 8th Engr Bn, 7 Aug 66, pp. 1–3, OCE Hist Ofc
Engineers at War

182

in mid-September, the 3d Brigade remained to carry out Operations Paul

Revere III and IV.

In southern Phu Yen Province, the 39th Engineer Battalion under Lt. Col. 

Taylor R. Fulton moved from Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa to 

concentrate on the Vung Ro Bay port complex and carry out operational support for nearby combat units. Between 10 and 25 July, the battalion headquarters, Companies A and B, and the 572d Light Equipment Company moved by 

sea aboard landing craft to Tuy Hoa where they joined Company C. During 

Operation John Paul Jones, a three-phase series of sweeps running from 

21 July to 5 September intended to secure the Vung Ro area and ensure that 

farmers around Tuy Hoa could harvest their rice crop without interference, 

elements of the battalion supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. 

Once the paratroopers secured Vung Ro Pass and Highway 1, Company C 

reopened and maintained Highway 1 from Tuy Hoa to the port project area. 

At Tuy Hoa South airfield, Company B built sixty-four 12-by-12-foot helicopter landing pads and two refueling pads, all on peneprime-treated sand 

and topped off with pierced steel planking, for aviation units supporting the 

airborne brigade. During Operation Seward, another sweep around Tuy Hoa

lasting from 5 September to 26 October, the battalion’s major tasks supporting 

the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, were building an airstrip capable of 

handling C–130s at Dong Tre Special Forces camp southwest of the town of 

Song Cau and repairing the gravel runway at Cung Son Special Forces camp 

airstrip twenty-two miles west of Tuy Hoa. Tasks also included minesweeping 

and maintaining Routes 6B and 7B to the two camps. Later, Company B began 

extending and placing T17 membrane surfacing at the Cung Son airstrip.33

Prior to Operation John Paul Jones, the valley area south of Tuy Hoa had 

been under Viet Cong control for several years, and Highway 1 was blocked 

by numerous ditches cut across the pavement and blown bridges and culverts. 

The key to the success of the Vung Ro Bay port project was the reopening of 

the road from Ban Nham on the Song Ban Thach, about ten miles south of 

Tuy Hoa, to Vung Ro. Four major bridges had been destroyed in this stretch 

of highway, and engineer reconnaissance teams accompanying the infantry in 

their advance relayed information back to the 39th Engineer Battalion concerning the bridges and the condition or existence of bypasses. Although a 

partly destroyed 850-foot concrete T-beam bridge was still standing at Ban 

Nham, the usable concrete spans, piers, and superstructure were old and damaged. The destroyed spans had been replaced by French Eiffel bridging; at 

best, the bridge might take ten-ton (Class 12) vehicles. No bypass was possible. 

32 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, I FFV, pp. 17–19; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Mar 

67, sub: Seven Month History and Briefing Data (April–October 1966), pp. 104–10; ORLL, 1 

Aug–31 Oct 66, 8th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, pp. 1–2; AAR, Opn Paul Revere II, 8th Engr Bn, 

Sep 66, pp. 1–5, both in OCE Hist Ofc; Memoirs of the First Team, p. 182. 33 AAR, Opn John Paul Jones, 39th Engr Bn, 17 Nov 66, pp. 1, 4; AAR Opn Seward, 39

Engr Bn, 17 Nov 66, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 39th Engr Bn, 

pp. 1–2.
183

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A decision was made, therefore, to construct a Class 60 float bridge just downstream from the existing bridge.34

Colonel Fulton assigned the job to Company C and the 553d Engineer 

Company (Float Bridge). The bridging was transported on one ship and on 

21 July was offloaded by transportation units on a beach just south of Tuy 

Hoa. When the bridge company arrived the following day, the bridging was 

loaded on bridge trucks in an around-the-clock operation for transport to 

Company C at the bridge site. Construction of the bridge began at dawn on 

the twenty-fourth. The bridge center line was located adjacent to and twenty 

feet downstream from the old bridge, but it was necessary to place the three 

work sites upstream because of shallow water and lack of space for work sites 

downstream. One work site was devoted to building the end sections. At this 

time it was discovered that sections of Class 60 steel treadway end ramps were 

missing, and plans were promptly made for expedient construction of the 

end ramps from M4T6 dry spans. The M4T6 bridge decking, known as balk 

(hollowed aluminum beams), was designed to be assembled by hand. At the 

other two work sites, work crews began assembling the successive bays. First, 

air compressors inflated two floats for each bridge section or bay. Only two 

cranes were available to lift and emplace the heavy Class 60 decking on the 

floats, so construction of each bay was slow. Upon completion, each bay was 

floated downstream under the damaged bridge and joined to the floating span. 

Anchor cables were secured to the existing bridge piers and bridle lines were 

run to each bay as it was joined. By early the next morning, the first 375-foot 

span was completed to a sandbar island at midstream and the makeshift end 

sections were placed. A hasty roadway was bulldozed across the island and 

topped off with pierced steel planking. New work sites were prepared on the 

island for construction of the span to the far shore. Since the channel on this 

side of the island was too shallow for a 27-foot power boat and construction 

of floats, a crane with a clamshell attachment was rushed to the site to dredge 

and deepen the river. As work continued into the second night, successive bays 

and the end sections were assembled and pulled into place by hand. By 1100, 

the bridge was open to traffic. 

Although the project took a day longer to complete than anticipated, the 

rest of Highway 1 to Vung Ro was opened on the morning of 27 July. Along 

the way, Company C repaired a damaged concrete-decked bridge and built five 

bypasses, which were improved by the construction of a 110-foot double-single 

Bailey bridge and four 23-foot M4T6 dry spans. Meanwhile, improvements were 

made at the float bridge site. Due to the approaching monsoon, the sandbar 

probably would be flooded with six to eight feet of water, making it unusable 

as a ford. This predicament was remedied by constructing a Class 60 treadway 

fixed span on Class 50 trestles across the island. M4T6 dry spans were again 

used as ramps to connect the fixed spans to the floating Class 60 bridges on both 

sides of the island. This remedy eliminated the need for the pierced steel plank 

roadway and made it possible to adjust the height of the overland fixed span 

34 Lt. Col. Taylor R. Fulton, “Conglomerate Tactical Bridging,” Military Engineer 59 

(September-October 1967): 323; AAR, Opn John Paul Jones, 39th Engr Bn, p. 1.
Engineers at War

184

to the changing flood depths. Since the 800-foot span was composed of seven 

parts—four M4T6 dry span end sections, two Class 60 float bridges, and a Class 

60 dry span trestle—it was called the conglomerate bridge.35

By midyear, more combat engineers arrived in the western highlands of II 

Corps. The 299th Combat Engineer Battalion in shifting operations to Pleiku 

helped build the 4th Division’s base camp, maintained roads in the area, and 

carried out various operational support missions. Heavy wheeled and tracked 

vehicle traffic combined with monsoon rains had turned a section Highway 

19 west of Pleiku into a slippery sea of mud. The battalion determined that 

only rock would save the road. Throughout August, the 299th supported by 

other 937th Engineer Group units hauled some 8,000 cubic yards of rock 

from quarries as far away as An Khe. Elements of the battalion also completed the improvement of defenses at the Duc Co Special Forces camp near 

the Cambodian border. During the period, another company of the battalion 

ventured into the highlands to improve and build C–130 airstrips south and 

southeast of Pleiku.36

35 Fulton, “Conglomerate Tactical Bridging,” pp. 323–25; AAR, Opn John Paul Jones, 39th 

Engr Bn, pp. 1, 4. 36 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 299th Engr Bn, 

14 Feb 67, pp. 1–7, Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 117, 119, 165.

During Operation John Paul Jones, men of the 39th Engineer Battalion built 

conglomerate bridge made up of several different tactical bridges.
185

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

The 20th Engineer Combat Battalion was also shifting operations to the 

western highlands. In mid-August, Company B moved by convoy to Ban Me 

Thuot to build a brigade-size bivouac area for the 4th Division. When this 

work neared completion, the company moved a month later to the remote Phu 

Tuc Special Forces camp southeast of Pleiku to extend an existing Caribou 

airstrip for C–130s. By 10 October 1966, the battalion and the attached 584th 

Light Equipment Company completed the move to the 4th Division’s Dragon 

Mountain Base Camp outside Pleiku. Within a short time, the battalion was 

carrying out a large share of the 937th Engineer Group’s operational support 

missions in the highlands, devoting most of its efforts to working on forward 

airfields and roads in support of tactical operations.37

Manpower

In April and May 1966, many Army engineers neared the end of their 

twelve-month tour of duty. Since nearly all had arrived with their units on 

the same ship, the rotation dates would be the same. The prospect of losing so 

many seasoned men at the same time threatened the operational expertise of 

many units. Seabee battalions faced a different circumstance. After completing 

a tour of approximately eight months, an entire battalion returned to a home 

base, and another battalion arrived in time to take over projects, equipment, 

and base camp.38

While the 18th Engineer Brigade worked on getting replacements, group 

commanders initiated programs to reduce the so-called rotational hump. The 

approach usually taken involved adjusting rotation dates and exchanging men 

between units with different deployment dates. For instance, Colonel Bush’s 45th 

Engineer Group had two battalions that departed the United States the same day 

in December 1965. Excluding earlier departures and extensions, approximately 

717 enlisted men and 33 officers were expected to depart in December 1966. To 

offset this excessive turnover, the group set a goal restricting battalion losses to 

no more than 25 percent of their soldiers in a one-month period. To achieve this 

goal, Bush promulgated a four-step program. First, battalions were authorized 

10 percent overstrength. Second, some individual tours were shortened by as 

much as one month, allowing the administrative load to be spread over at least 

two months. Third, the tours of 10 percent of the men eligible for rotation were 

extended by one month or longer if necessary, using a combination of voluntary or involuntary methods. Last, the group exchanged soldiers who had less 

Vietnam service with men from other battalions, including divisional engineer 

battalions, to lessen the impact of the loss on the unit.39

Other manpower factors affected productivity. In April 1966, one battalion 

commander reported that only 89.7 percent of the battalion’s authorized strength 

37 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 8, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 

1–4, 6–8, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 1–3. 38 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 185–86. 39 Ibid., p. 130; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 18th Engr Bde, 26 Aug 66, p. 4, Historians files, 

CMH, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 45th Engr Gp, p. 5; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 108.
Engineers at War

186

of 525 enlisted men was on hand, and only 40 percent worked on projects related 

to the construction program. To support the continuity of operations, Bush kept 

company and battalion mess, maintenance, supply and administrative troops, 

and equipment operations at or slightly above authorized levels. Guard duty took 

away more men. As a result, shortages turned up mostly in the line squads, about 

three men in each squad, leaving platoons with only about sixteen to eighteen men 

on the job each day. Hiring Vietnamese laborers helped somewhat, but the commander warned that the effects of the manpower shortages would be most severely 

felt when the battalion started on projects requiring technical skills and carried out 

operational support missions. To make matters worse, about 270 of the battalion’s 

enlisted men were scheduled to depart in July and August 1966.40

General Ploger attempted to bring relief to the manpower problem. In 

March 1966, he asked U.S. Army, Vietnam, for additional troops to augment 

18th Brigade units. He contended that the brigade needed an enlisted overstrength of between 10 to 15 percent to take full advantage of the dry season 

to complete as much work as possible before monsoon weather curtailed activity. The brigade had already fallen 700 men below authorized strength and 

1,160 by the end of the month. Since engineer fillers were beginning to arrive 

in the number required, Ploger indicated that he could get by with filling onehalf to two-thirds of this shortage with soldiers from other branches. Some of 

these men without engineering skills had relieved engineer soldiers previously 

tied down with security duties, which at Long Binh alone amounted to 2 officers and 77 enlisted men daily. Between late August and early September, the 

18th Engineer Brigade, with a strength now approaching 13,000 soldiers, had 

received 1,100 men from other branches to learn engineering skills or assume 

other duties. This measure helped ease the manpower problem.41

Hiring Vietnamese civilian laborers helped the 18th Engineer Brigade take 

up some of the manpower slack. By September 1966, the brigade supplemented 

its strength with approximately 5,400, mostly unskilled, workers. The contractors had exploited the skilled labor market to such a degree that those hired 

by the brigade worked on jobs requiring few or no technical skills. Engineer 

units began training programs to instruct Vietnamese workers in such skills 

as carpentry, masonry, mechanics, and vehicle operation. By late 1966, the 

159th Engineer Group at Long Binh began to graduate a class of heavy equipment operators every two weeks, thus alleviating a serious shortage of military 

operators.42

Efforts were also under way to ease a growing shortage of engineer officers. One way to relieve the problem at brigade headquarters was to designate 

40 Extract of a Letter from a Battalion Commander to a Group Commander, incl. 6, tab G, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt, no. 2. 41 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 130–31; Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde and Subordinate 

Units, 9–18 Apr 66, p. 1, incl. 6, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 2; Rpt of Visit to the 18th 

Engr Bde and Subordinate Units, 28 May–11 Jun 66, p. 1, incl. 5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt 

no. 3; Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, p. 1, incl. 7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4; Army 

Buildup Progress Rpt, 10 Aug 66, p. 63. 42 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 131; Rpt of Visit to the 18th Engr Bde, p. 5, incl. 7, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt, no. 4.
187

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

positions that could be filled by officers from other branches. Engineer group 

and battalion headquarters did the same. Signal Corps officers took over communications positions, and Adjutant General Corps officers replaced engineers in administrative jobs. Ploger also asked U.S. Army, Vietnam, to locate 

soldiers not assigned engineering duties but who had engineering backgrounds 

for reassignment to the brigade. In Washington, an Army study found that to 

fill officer positions in the new engineer units being raised, especially captains 

and lieutenants, an increasing number of engineer officers had to be diverted 

from other assignments. The solution pointed to temporarily assigning officers 

from other branches to the Corps of Engineers for eighteen months. Newly 

commissioned officers in other branches were also diverted to the Corps of 

Engineers. Officers with engineer and engineer-related degrees but assigned to 

other branches such as Armor or Field Artillery suddenly received orders to 

report to engineering jobs. This was the case in the 84th Engineer and the 589th 

Engineer Battalions (Construction) outside Qui Nhon. A field artillery officer 

with an engineering degree served as the 84th’s operations officer. Similarly, an 

armor officer was assigned as operations officer in the 589th when it arrived in 

early 1967. Reserve officers volunteering to come on active duty were eagerly 

accepted.43

The long-term solution to the shortfall in officers, however, lay in the 

United States, and programs were soon in train to raise Reserve Officers 

Training Corps enrollments at universities and colleges, increase the size of 

classes at the U.S. Military Academy, and turning to the time-honored expedient for quick expansion by increasing the output of the Officer Candidate 

Schools. With the demands of Vietnam, the Army also stepped up its efforts 

to develop promising enlisted men, particularly college graduates and those 

with some college training, as junior officers. The Engineer Officers Candidate 

School at Fort Belvoir was reactivated in the fall of 1965. By June 1966, 

1,132 junior engineer officer graduates had been commissioned. The number 

would climb steadily, reaching some 4,000 in 1968. When the school closed in 

January 1971, 5,859 new second lieutenants had been assigned to the Corps of 

Engineers. Altogether, the number of graduates reached 10,380, the balance 

being assigned to other branches.44

Forward Airfields

One task many engineer soldiers faced in South Vietnam was building 

forward airfields for cargo aircraft. Throughout South Vietnam, airfields 

gained importance as the final, vital link sustaining military operations. The 

land lines of communication—roads and rail—presented major security and 

43 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 66, 18th Engr Bde, p. 10; Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 6 Apr 66, p. 

3, and 4 May 66, p. 6, CMH. 44 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 183–86; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 22–23; 

Ronald H. Spector, “The Vietnam War and the Army’s Self-Image,” in Second Indochina War 

Symposium, ed. John Schlight (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986), 

pp. 176–77; Ronald H. Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 

1993), pp. 32–34.
Engineers at War

188

maintenance problems, and did not exist in many areas. The fluid nature of 

the war and the absence of battle lines prompted American forces to respond 

to tactical requirements in as mobile a fashion as possible. When compared 

to the massive effort required to build and maintain the land lines, it became 

apparent that an expanding network of airfields would better serve tactical 

mobility.45

Although General Westmoreland shifted some construction units to do 

port construction, he also pushed building and upgrading airfields for transport aircraft up to and including the C–130 Hercules. Existing and new major 

air bases under construction could easily accommodate the medium-range 

Hercules. While each of combat base camps occupied by U.S. divisions and 

brigades had an airstrip suitable for C–123 landings, the capabilities and locations of forward airstrips still fell far short of U.S. Air Force criteria for the 

more desirable, larger-capacity C–130. Coupled with the need to upgrade existing airstrips, Westmoreland pursued the goal of establishing a checkerboard 

pattern of forward airfields covering the entire country.46

The growing importance of forward airfields in tactical planning led 

Westmoreland to push for a coordinated upgrading effort. In May, a coordinating group representing MACV, U.S. Army, Vietnam, and Seventh Air 

Force (which succeeded the 2d Air Division) reviewed the airfield construction 

priority list and identified the urgent need for C–130 airfields. The airfields 

had to have an all-weather capability to handle sixty sorties a day to support 

division-size operations. In early June, Westmoreland approved a master plan 

and priority listing of forty airfields submitted by the group, now known as 

the Joint Airfield Evaluation Committee. Top priority for upgrading between 

July and September went to ten sites in Pleiku, Kontum, and Darlac Provinces 

in II Corps, and Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces in III Corps. Airfields 

in the coastal regions of I and II Corps had second priority, and airfields not 

covered in priority one in III Corps and all of IV Corps became third priority. 

Because of a shortage of airfield matting, the committee decided to limit the 

upgrade to the first priority fields at Kontum, Plei Me East, and Loc Ninh.47

The MACV Directorate of Construction designated Army funds for airfield construction. In late June, General Dunn informed U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

that the Military Construction Program covered funding requirements for 

airfields supporting logistical bases and division and brigade base camps. Top 

priority airfields by corps areas in this group included the division bases at 

45 MACV History, 1966, p. 300; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 185. 46 MACV History, 1966, pp. 300–301; Ltr, Westmoreland 001093 to CG, FFV, 10 Dec 65, sub: 

Tactical Employment of US Forces and Defensive Action; Interv, Rochester with Raymond, 11 

Jan 80, p. 86; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 224–25; Situation Rpt on Airfield Construction, incl. 

7, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 3; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 108. For a list of airfields 

and C–130 airfield criteria, see MACV Concept of Operations, 30 Aug 65. 47 MACV History, 1966, pp. 301–02; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, 

pp. 7–9, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 15; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 186, 230; Msg, 

COMUSMACV 18054 to CGs, III MAF, I FFV, and II FFV, 26 May 66, sub: Master Plan for 

Upgrading Airfields in RVN; Msg, COMUSMACV 20225 to CG, USARV, et al., 13 Jun 66, 

sub: Airfield Evaluation, both in box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA.
189

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

An Khe in II Corps and Cu Chi in III Corps and a brigade base in IV Corps. 

Materials used by troops to build the forward deployment airfields required 

for tactical operations fell within the other funding categories, Operations and 

Maintenance, Army (O&MA), and Procurement of Equipment and Missiles 

for the Army (PEMA). These included fields at Kontum and Cheo Reo in II 

Corps and Song Be and Loc Ninh in III Corps.48

By midyear, the upgrading program had achieved a degree of coordination, but more mundane troubles plagued the construction efforts. The weight 

of the C–130s, with high landing impact and maximum braking action, frequently caused runway surface problems. The M8A1 matting proved especially 

troublesome. The newly developed T17 membrane surfacing also presented 

high maintenance requirements on soils with low-bearing ratios. Under such 

conditions, AM2 and MX19 matting became the choice for surfacing runways, 

the M8A1 matting for taxiways and parking, and the T17 membrane principally for C–123 airfields.49

The need for continuing maintenance and shortages of matting presented 

difficulties for the engineers, who were still spread thin. There were more than 

two hundred airfields, including simple dirt strips, that were candidates for 

maintenance and upgrading. Airfield matting came under tight control, and in 

several cases MACV diverted matting from other projects—for example, shifting the AM2 originally programmed for Phu Cat Air Base to An Khe’s Golf 

Course airstrip. By September, airfields supporting Marine Corps operations 

in I Corps received special attention. The sharp burred edge of the mat adjacent to the connector hooks in newly installed M8A1 matting at several airstrips near the Demilitarized Zone caused blowouts to C–130 tires. More AM2 

matting was diverted to Dong Ha and an alternate airfield at Khe Sanh farther 

inland, and the Seabees completed both C–130 airfields in mid-October before 

the northeast monsoon came in full force, much to Westmoreland’s relief.50

By the end of 1966, the number of airfields and airstrips had grown to 282, 

which represented an increase from 243 listed airfields in July. In I Corps, the 

Seabees also improved An Hoi, Duc Pho, and Quang Ngai to C–130 capability, 

and fifteen other airfields throughout South Vietnam received similar priority 

listing. In November, MACV listed over sixty airfields requiring upgrading to 

C–130 capability, and the command expected to upgrade twenty-four of these 

by mid-1967.51

48 Ltr, Dunn to CG, USARV, 25 Jun 66, sub: C–130 Airfield Requirements, box 5, 69A/702, 

RG 334, NARA. 49 MACV History, 1966, pp. 302–03; Msg, CG, I FFV, to CG, USARV, 18 Aug 66, sub: 

Landing Mat, box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 50 MACV History, 1966, pp. 303–05; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, pp. 

20, 23–24, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, pp. 15–16, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, pp. 8–9, 24; 

Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 304–06. 51 MACV History, 1966, pp. 300, 305.
Engineers at War

190

Tunnels

During search-and-destroy operations, U.S. forces often came across enemy 

base areas containing vast networks of bunkers and tunnels. These networks 

had evolved over time as a natural response by the guerrillas to the advantages 

in aircraft and artillery held by the French, then the South Vietnamese, and 

finally the Americans. While U.S. units could move or destroy caches of supplies and munitions with relative ease, they had to develop individual and unit 

skills in the techniques of detecting, penetrating, and destroying the well-concealed bunker and tunnel complexes. Specially trained teams were established 

to search the tunnel complexes for prisoners, equipment, and documents. 

The soldiers in these teams, usually made up of men of small physical stature 

because the Vietnamese built entrances no larger than eighteen inches, proudly 

called themselves “tunnel rats.” Combat engineers contributed men, equipment, and the demolitions expertise to destroy the enemy tunnels.52

As allied operations increased during 1966, the troops discovered even 

more extensive tunnel complexes. The local Viet Cong used hastily built simple, 

shallow structures, while larger forces established well-constructed excellent 

camouflaged systems usually found in uninhabited areas. No two tunnel complexes were exactly alike, and lengths varied from about 6 to over 4,300 yards. 

Passageways leading from the small entrances from well-concealed, hidden 

trap doors expanded to about 2 feet wide and 21⁄2 to 3 feet high and extended in 

straight sections to about 50 feet long. The sections joined at various angles to 

one another, thus forming a zigzag pattern. This pattern served to protect the 

Viet Cong from observation. It also protected them from shock waves caused 

by explosives dropped into the tunnel, from shrapnel of detonating grenades, 

from direct-fire weapons, and made it easier to ambush tunnel rats during their 

search. The larger and more permanent tunnel complexes, especially those in 

the war zones, were elaborate, having as many as four distinct levels that held 

compartments usable as quarters, hospitals, and mess facilities. Rooms discovered during Operation Crimp measured approximately 4 feet by 6 feet by 3 feet

high and were found about every 100 yards. Shelves were provided along one 

side wall together with various types of seats. In some cases, air shafts were dug 

inside by rodents held against the tunnel roof in cages. Some tunnel complexes 

contained facilities for manufacturing and storing war materials. Booby traps 

were used extensively, both inside and outside the entrance and exit trap doors. 

Often, grenades placed in trees near the exit trap doors could be activated by 

pulling a wire from under the trap door or by the trap door itself.53

Moving from ad hoc methods practiced during Crimp, allied units developed

techniques and teams to deal with tunnels. Two-man teams usually explored the 

52 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 92; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 122; Maj. Glen H. 

Lehrer, “Viet Cong Tunnels,” Military Engineer 60 (July-August 1968): 244. 53 Rpt, MACV, 18 Apr 66, sub: Lessons Learned no. 56: Operations Against Tunnel 

Complexes, pp. 1–8, Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 94; Lehrer, “Viet Cong 

Tunnels,” pp. 244–45; Capt. Francis E. Trainor, “Tunnel Destruction in Vietnam,” Military 

Engineer 60 (September-October 1968): 341; Diary of an Infiltrator, Extracts from Captured 

Diaries, Dec 66, U.S. Mission in Vietnam, box 1, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA.
191

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

tunnels, one member staying at the entrance and the other descending into the 

tunnel. Equipped with a telephone, communications wire, compass, bayonet, 

flashlight, and pistol, the man in the tunnel explored the network, keeping in 

communication with his partner at the entrance. Riot-control chemicals and 

acetylene gas—along with explosives—appeared to be the best way to deny use 

of the tunnels to the enemy. In the 1st Division, tunnel destruction was assigned 

to the division’s chemical officer, but the division engineer soon assumed most of 

this responsibility. It also became obvious that such an unnatural and stressful 

task should be given to volunteers. In April 1966, MACV incorporated lessons 

learned during Crimp in a document that spelled out recommended techniques

to detect and destroy tunnel complexes, especially those found in the war zones 

and Viet Cong base areas.54

Combat engineers on the scene came forth with proposals to neutralize the 

tunnels. Colonel Sargent, commander of the 1st Engineer Battalion, believed 

the best approach lay in denying the enemy use of a tunnel instead of trying 

to collapse it with explosives. It took large quantities of explosives to destroy 

tunnels, and Sargent suggested using Mighty Mite smoke blowers to find the 

54 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 1st Inf Div, p. 20; Operations Against Tunnel Complexes, pp. 

9–13; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 94; Tom Mangold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi

(New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 101–03.

A 1st Division soldier enters a tunnel during Operation Crimp
Engineers at War

192

exits, then place CS gas sacks inside the tunnel and a small explosive charge 

at each exit. Detonating explosives and gas simultaneously, he believed, would 

seal the tunnel and trap the riot-control tear gas. This method worked well in 

collapsing tunnels with less than eight to ten feet of overburden.55

The acetylene gas tunnel demolition kit looked promising. The kit, which 

originated in a MACV request for help in November 1964 and was developed 

by the U.S. Army Munitions Command’s Picatinny Arsenal in Pennsylvania, 

worked on the principle of mixing calcium carbide and water to produce a 

highly explosive acetylene gas. Mighty Mite or other blowers pushed the gas 

into the tunnel. A small explosive charge detonated the combination of the gas 

and oxygen.56

A Department of the Army team, consisting of Maj. Jack E. Mowery 

from the Chief of Engineers and two civilians from Picatinny Arsenal, arrived 

in Vietnam in May 1966 to test the system and train combat engineers in its 

use. The team gave a three-day training course at Di An for selected troops 

from the 1st, 65th, 168th, and 588th Engineer Combat Battalions. A similar 

course at An Khe followed for members of the 8th and 70th Engineer Combat 

Battalions and Company A, 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion. In turn, these 

teams were expected to train other tunnel destruction teams.57

The Department of the Army team also tested the kit in the field. Near the 

village of Ba Ria, some thirty-one miles north of Vung Tau, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade found a tunnel complex, heavily fortified trenches, and a machine 

gun bunker. The 173d Engineer Company and tunnel demolition troops from 

the 588th Engineer Battalion spent two days exploring the tunnels, and after 

removing enemy material attempted to destroy the complex, with varying 

degrees of success. Destruction of an enemy-occupied tunnel complex found 

by the 25th Division in the Ho Bo Woods north of Cu Chi met with more success. While the assistant division commander and staff members assembled to 

observe the demonstration, Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion, sealed the 

entrances. The combination of three acetylene generators and a Mighty Mite 

blower pushed the gas through a hose into the tunnel. The explosion set off by 

electric blasting caps produced good results. About eight feet of overburden 

dropped into the tunnel, and loose earth sealed the entrances.58

Satisfied with the results, the U.S. Army, Vietnam, adopted the system 

for immediate use. The equipment brought by the Army team remained in 

Vietnam, with more sets to follow. Acetylene gas tunnel demolition kits were 

55 Ltr, Lt Col Howard L. Sargent to Lt Gen William F. Cassidy, OCE, 13 Jun 66; Ltr, Sargent 

to Cassidy, 16 Jul 66, both in OCE Hist Ofc. 56 Rpt, DA Tunnel Destruction Team, sub: The Employment of Acetylene in the Destruction 

of Viet Cong Tunnels, n.d., pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; Tech Info Rpt 33.8.7.5 HQ, Army 

Materiel Command, Oct 66, sub: Interim Report, Tunnel Destruction Demolition Set, XM69, 

pp. 1–8, box 8, 84/051, RG 319, NARA. 57 Rpt, DA Tunnel Destruction Team, pp. 3–5; Ltr, HQ USARV, AVEN-O, to USARV 

G–2, G–3, CGs, I FFV, II FFV, and 1st Div, and CO, 3d Bde, 25th Div, 2 Jul 66, sub: Tunnel 

Destruction, incl. 7, tab F, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4, 23 Sep 66. 58 Rpt, DA Tunnel Destruction Team, pp. 6–17; Rpt, 65th Engr Bn, n.d., sub: Destruction of 

Tunnels and Bunkers, p. 12, OCE Hist Ofc.
193

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

issued based on one tunnel destruction team for each division and four to the 

18th Engineer Brigade. The command also charged the engineer brigade to 

provide teams and equipment to support the separate brigades and to develop 

a light acetylene system.59

But demolition teams continued to experience mixed results in their 

attempts to destroy the complexes. Returning to the Ho Bo Woods in support 

of a 25th Division operation in late June, the team from the 65th Engineer 

Battalion encountered sniper fire. The battalion reported that the bulky acetylene kit should not be used in assault demolition work, but only in more 

deliberate denial operations. The 588th Engineer Battalion had more success 

in supporting the Australians and other units. In July, a team helped the 45th 

Engineer Group to destroy six bunkers near Tuy Hoa “with 100% effectiveness.” In November, the 588th trained more four-man teams from the 1st, 15th, 

27th, 86th, and 168th Engineer Battalions and the 919th Engineer Company, 

11th Armored Cavalry.60

Overall, results were frequently less than desired because of technical and 

tactical factors. General Ploger noted that operators had difficulty obtaining 

a complete mix of the explosive gases. Using oxygen when the acetylene was 

generated produced better results but added to logistical requirements. U.S. 

commanders preferred to carry regular explosives, which were no heavier than 

the generators and oxygen bottles and could stand rougher treatment. The 

65th Engineer Battalion had some success with bangalore torpedoes, fivefoot-length pipe-type explosives normally joined together to breach barbedwire obstacles, by placing them throughout the tunnels. Because tunnel rats 

usually searched the tunnels before destruction, some commanders felt this 

obviated the need for acetylene generators. Deliberate tunnel destruction with 

the generators also took time. This conflicted with the preference of most tactical commanders to move on rather than to keep their troops in a recently 

won area. As a result, the short duration of U.S. operations allowed the Viet 

Cong to reoccupy and rebuild their tunnels. The Viet Cong later boasted of 

the invincibility of their complexes. Meanwhile, the engineers, whether using 

different types of explosives or acetylene generators or attempts to flood the 

tunnels, continued to seek faster and better means of destruction.61

59 Rpt, DA Tunnel Destruction Team, p. 17; Ltr, HQ USARV, 22 Jul 66, sub: Tunnel 

Destruction. 60 Rpt, 65th Engr Bn, sub: Destruction of Tunnels and Bunkers, pp. 12–14; ORLLs, 1 May–

31 Jul 66, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 588th Engr Bn, p. 2, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 

67, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2; Combat Activities and Operational Support, incl. 11, pp. 3–4, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5. 61 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 94; Combat Activities and Operational Support, incl. 11, pp. 

3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 5; Rpt, 65th Engr Bn, sub: Destruction of Tunnels and 

Bunkers, pp. 7, 10; ORLL 8–66, DA, Engineer Notes no. 1, 13 Oct 66, p. 26; USARV Combat 

Lessons Bull, no. 5, 8 Feb 67, pp. 3–4; Sedgwick D. Tourison, Talking with Victor Charlie: An 

Interrogator’s Story (New York: Ivy Books, 1991), pp. 282, 287.
Engineers at War

194

The Land-Clearing Weapon

Since the heavily forested areas of Vietnam also concealed Viet Cong base 

areas, MACV planners agreed something had to be done to deny the sanctuaries, either by chemical defoliants, burning, or simply cutting and clearing the 

forest growth. The use of herbicides began with the early American buildup in 

1961. In considering various techniques to turn the tide against the insurgents, 

the Kennedy administration authorized the South Vietnamese to run tests of a 

chemical plant killer. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft sprayed the herbicide 

Dinoxol along a section of road north of Kontum and a section of Highway 13 

north of Saigon. Although the results disappointed the Americans, President 

Diem became a staunch supporter of the defoliation program. Despite concern 

that the United States could be charged with employing chemical or biological warfare, President Kennedy approved the use of defoliants selectively and 

under careful control. In January 1962, the Air Force deployed spray-equipped 

C–123s to South Vietnam under the code name Operation Ranch Hand.

Similarly, the South Vietnamese deployed helicopters on defoliation missions. 

The controversial program gained momentum in 1966, improving observation 

from both the air and ground and the defense of fixed bases. Agent Orange 

proved the most powerful of the herbicides, killing foliage and producing 

drying in four to six weeks. Agent Blue, a drying agent on contact, resulted 

in leaves drying up and dropping off, but the leaves could grow back. Still, 

most of Vietnam remained a verdant land, and even in the defoliated areas the 

enemy had some tree canopy and reoccupied his bases. Accordingly, MACV 

formulated plans to deny the Viet Cong his forest sanctuaries permanently by 

cutting and clearing with specially equipped bulldozers operated by engineer 

units.62

General Westmoreland’s interest in land clearing went back to 1965 

while attending one of the Hawaiian deployment conferences. By a chance 

encounter, he met a B. K. Johnson, who claimed to have cleared rain forests 

62 William A. Buckingham Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in

Southeast Asia, 1961–1971 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air 

Force, 1982), pp. 11–12, 16–17, 20–22, 30–31, 121–29, 185; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 89–90, 

392–93; Schlight, Years of the Offensive, pp. 42, 91–92; F. Clifton Berry Jr., Gadget Warfare, The 

Illustrated History of the Vietnam War (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 48–57; MACV 

History, 1966, pp. 774–75; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 280. Spraying the herbicides from 

aircraft reached its height in 1967 and 1968. Spraying continued at a reduced rate until April 

1970 when use of Agent Orange was halted. By May 1971 all spraying stopped. Meanwhile, in 

October 1970 Congress directed the Defense Department to commission the National Academy 

of Science to review the herbicide program. In addition, the Engineer Strategic Studies Group 

(later the Engineer Studies Center) was requested to study the military effects of herbicides. 

The Studies Group was picked because of the large background of information on hand of 

the geology, climatology, flora of the area, other surveys of the country, and the capability to 

do war-gaming. This completed study sparked more controversy when it concluded herbicides 

could be useful in future conflicts depending on a variety of factors. For more on Air Force and 

the Engineer Studies Center participation, see Bernard C. Nalty, Air War Over South Vietnam, 

1968–1975, United States Air Force in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History 

and Museums Program, United States Air Force, 2000), and Baldwin, Engineer Studies Center,

pp. 172–78. 
195

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

in Australia by shattering big trees with a crane mounting a 5,000-pound steel 

ball on a chain. This intrigued the MACV commander. Returning to Saigon 

he dispatched Capt. Robert L. Stuart, MACV Engineer Section, to observe 

the clearing operations on the King Ranch property in Australia and to assess 

its possible application to military operations. While visiting the ranch, Stuart 

observed large D8 and D9 bulldozers, two or four in a tandem hook-up dragging a chain, or a large hollow steel ball and ship anchor chain, or a chain and 

a wire rope. The nine-foot-diameter ball kept the middle of the chain up off the 

ground. Its weight also prevented the chain from sliding over the top of bent 

trees. The bulldozers were also modified with a reinforced canopy to protect 

the operator, reinforced push bars and undercarriages, and an extension on the 

blade. The simple extension on the blade, locally called a tree horn, allowed the 

operator more latitude in pushing down a tree. By positioning the blade high 

enough so that the bulldozer did not sit on the tree’s root system, the full force 

of the tractor could knock down a large tree in less than one minute. In late 

September 1965, Stuart returned and reported to Westmoreland that the procedures used in Australia could be effectively used in Vietnam. Westmoreland 

agreed and tasked U.S. Army, Vietnam, to obtain similar equipment from the 

United States for tests.63

In February 1966, the Department of the Army offered to obtain six sets 

of a special land-clearing blade, cab guard and screen, instead of the equipment requested by MACV. The Rome Plow Company of Cedartown, Georgia, 

had developed a special cutting blade for mounting on a standard military 

bulldozer. The sharp blade cut medium trees and brush at or near ground 

level, and a “stinger,” which protruded from one corner of the blade, split 

longer trees. MACV still preferred the King Ranch idea and heavier bulldozers 

because the equipment could clear seven acres an hour compared with two for 

the Rome plow. The Department of the Army, however, suggested testing the 

Rome Plow Company blades first.64

In late June, a company representative arrived to brief the engineers. On 1 

August, four Rome plow blades mounted on Allis Chalmers HD16M tractors 

reached the port of Saigon. The 169th Construction Battalion ran controlled 

tests in the Long Thanh area from 9 through 15 August and reported favorable results. The 588th Engineer Combat Battalion ran the second test from 

17 to 27 August at the abandoned Filhol Rubber Plantation near the 25th 

Division’s Cu Chi base camp. On the tenth day, three of the bulldozers struck 

mines, causing extensive damage but no casualties. The test ended the next day. 

Results revealed that the bulldozers equipped with Rome plows could clear 

63 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 18; Ltr and incls, MACV to CofS Army, 

no. 0172, 5 Feb 66, sub: Clearing of Rain Forests in Republic of Vietnam, CMH; Historical 

Notes, no. 1, 24 Oct 65, p. 11, Westmoreland Papers, CMH; Interv, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History with Gen William C. Westmoreland, 6 Dec 89, p. 102, CMH; Interv, Bower 

with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, p. 53; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 9, p. 7; Westmoreland, A 

Soldier Reports, p. 280; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 97–98. 64 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 98; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 19; Ltr, 

Raymond MACDC-AD to CG, USARV, sub: Clearing Rain Forest in RVN, 11 Jun 66, box 11, 

69A/702, RG 334, NARA.
Engineers at War

196

trees at approximately twice the rate of a standard bulldozer. Since the equipment worked best as a team, the 79th Engineer Group assigned all four plows 

and operators to the 557th Light Equipment Company. Soon the plows went 

to work clearing 500-yard-wide strips around base camps and 100-yard-wide 

strips on both sides of key roads. With their value now proven and capabilities 

made known, the team’s Rome plows could not keep up with the requests.65

In September 1966, all activities pertaining to the Rome plows took on 

the code name Paul Bunyon. Westmoreland appointed General Raymond 

to chair a task force to develop a land-clearing plan. Raymond decided that 

the best approach was the formation of special teams made up of approximately one hundred men and thirty D7E tractors and plows. Estimates based 

on experience projected that such a team could clear over 250 acres a day of 

heavy brush and scattered trees in the Viet Cong sanctuaries. In turn, the 18th 

Engineer Brigade recommended fifty-six additional Rome plow kits and disk 

harrows to keep areas free from regrowth. In early October, Westmoreland 

reluctantly agreed that the only way he could get the scarce bulldozers as soon 

as possible would be by holding up the deployment of three engineer battal65 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 19; Miscellaneous Detailed Discussion, 

incl. 11, pp. 3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 4; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 79th Engr Gp, 

14 Nov 66, p. 10, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 169th Engr Bn, 1 Nov 66, p. 4, both in Historians files, CMH; 

ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 588th Engr Bn, p. 6; Msg, Raymond SOG 0798 to Cassidy, 15 Sep 66, 

Dunn Papers, CMH.

Rome plows clear vegetation during Operation Paul Bunyon
197

Spoiling Attacks, January–September 1966

ions. The completed Paul Bunyon plan called for the 18th Engineer Brigade 

to undertake land-clearing operations in coordination with the field forces, 

with the initial phase taking place in III Corps. Control of the land-clearing 

teams and their priorities remained with the U.S. Army, Vietnam, commander. 

Since large-scale land-clearing operations could literally change the face of the 

country, Westmoreland vetted the plan with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge 

during a Mission Council meeting.66

Westmoreland, emphasizing the need to “think big,” still saw merit in the 

King Ranch ball-and-chain technique to level Viet Cong base areas. MACV 

requested the heavy chain from the Navy, but the Pacific Command could 

only provide a lighter one and one-half-inch commercial chain, which MACV 

claimed would not work. Although the towed ball worked well in the Australian 

jungle, difficulties in fabricating sets of balls and chains, the large size of the 

ball, troubles in transporting it, and inadequate equipment stood in the way 

of early success. The maintenance requirements of the heavier D9 bulldozer 

were also a concern. Instead, the 18th Engineer Brigade tested the Australian 

method of land clearing with the more common D7E bulldozers using smaller, 

locally fabricated steel balls, and a Navy chain.67

The tests of the Rome plows continued with good results. By November, 

three plows remained at Long Binh, clearing fields of fire and perimeter strips 

around the ammunition storage area. Three other Rome plows moved to Pleiku 

to help clear the 4th Division’s new base camp. In December, military airlift 

delivered six more kits, four going to Long Binh and two to Pleiku, bringing 

the total in country to twelve. Clearing requirements for the 9th Division camp 

at Bearcat resulted in the move of two Rome plows from Long Binh. By the 

end of the year, U.S. Army, Vietnam, had placed the order for the remaining 

fifty Rome plows.68

By the autumn of 1966, operational support tasks had picked up as the 

tempo of tactical operations increased. By then, five engineer battalions and 

four companies organic to a like number of divisions, separate infantry and 

airborne brigades, and an armored cavalry regiment, backed by eleven engineer combat battalions and an assortment of separate companies of the 18th 

Engineer Brigade, kept resupply roads open, built and reopened forward airfields, and explored and destroyed enemy tunnels and bunkers. The combat 

66 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, pp. 20–21, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, 

p. 6; Msg, Ploger MAC 7326 to Besson, 23 Aug 66, sub: Information on Rome Plow; Msg, 

Raymond SOG 0798 to Cassidy, 15 Sep 66, both in Dunn Papers, CMH; MFR, MACJ02, 

23 Aug 66, sub: Forest Clearing; DF, Asst CofS, J–4 to Dir of Cons, sub: MACV Task Force 

on Land Clearing Operations, 25 Aug 66, both box 12, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; MACV 

Planning Directive 10–66, Opn Paul Bunyon, 23 Sep 66, pp. 1–2; Memo, MACDC for Dep 

COMUSMACV, 3 Oct 66, sub: Paul Bunyon Program, both in 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; Msg, 

COMUSMACV 44465 to CGs, II FFV and USARV, 6 Oct 66, sub: Control and Use of Rome 

Plows, box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 67 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 98; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, p. 20, and 

1 Oct–31 Dec, 66, MACDC, pp. 6; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 21 Nov 78, sec. 9, pp. 7–9; Interv, 

Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 53–54. 68 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, pp. 6–7; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, 

p. 122.
Engineers at War

198

engineers also applied new developments in accomplishing their missions. 

These included the T17 membrane matting for forward airfields, various 

tunnel exploration kits, and specially designed Rome plow bulldozer kits to 

clear the land. The ensuing months would see an even greater role played by 

the engineers in combat operations.
7

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

The American ground offensive in Vietnam dates from the late weeks 

of summer 1966, when General Westmoreland finally received the 

troops he needed to challenge the in-country enemy sanctuaries and inflict 

heavy casualties. This influx of troops had come after a lengthy pause in 

deployments, when Westmoreland had been reduced to carefully husbanding 

his resources for about six months and fighting a transitional campaign with 

limited forces. Starting in July, however, the flow resumed of infantry, armor, 

artillery, and their supporting forces, adding importantly to the pressure that 

could be brought to bear in the Central Highlands, on the II Corps coast, and 

in the corridors leading out from Saigon. By January, the Army’s infantry, 

tank, and armored cavalry strength had nearly doubled from summer levels, 

and engineer strength had risen by almost a third to twenty-three battalions. 

With these reinforcements, the thrust of U.S. strategy shifted, becoming one of 

operating at a rapidly rising tempo and giving no respite to the Viet Cong and 

the North Vietnamese—in short, of expanding the war on a major scale with 

the expectation of significant results. The plan was to launch a heavy series of 

operations just after the start of the new year, but the offensive began sooner 

than Westmoreland expected.1

Attleboro

In October 1966, the discovery in Tay Ninh Province of a Viet Cong division and a North Vietnamese regiment led to the largest U.S. operation of 

the war to that point. The trigger was an American element new to Vietnam, 

the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, which, while searching for rice and other 

Communist supplies on the southern fringes of War Zone C, became dispersed in inhospitable terrain. Seeing a tantalizing opportunity to destroy an 

American unit, the enemy turned on the 196th. The battle that followed under 

the code name Operation Attleboro involved over 22,000 U.S. and all

troops, including the 1st Infantry Division, two brigades from the 4th and 25th 

Infantry Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the new 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, and the 196th. Control of the operation passed from the 196th to 

the 1st Division and finally to General Seaman’s II Field Force, making it the 

first Army operation in South Vietnam controlled by a corps-size headquarters. The series of engagements extended into late November. The enemy took 

serious casualties and lost huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies. In one battle, the 1st Division’s 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, repulsed an 

1

 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 13–15; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 131.
Engineers at War

200

assault by two North Vietnamese battalions, inflicting heavy casualties on the 

attackers and discovering a large cache of enemy ordnance nearby. The Viet 

Cong division was so badly mauled in the fighting that it would not reappear 

in combat until the following spring.2

Attleboro brought forth heavy demands for engineers to destroy en

tunnels and bunkers, clear jungle, repair roads and airfields, and build 

bridges. Directly involved were the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Division; the 

65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Division; the 173d Engineer Company, 173d 

Airborne Brigade; and the 175th Engineer Company, 196th Infantry Brigade. 

The 3d Brigade, 4th Division, which had just arrived in Vietnam and participated later in the operation, was supported by Company D, 27th Engineer 

Combat Battalion, 79th Engineer Group.3

Missions performed by Colonel Kiernan’s 1st Engineer Battalion during 

Attleboro reflected the support given by other engineer units. Initial assignments included upgrading nine miles of road between Tay Ninh and Suoi

and the construction of a ford and later a bridge over a stream north of Suoi 

Da. Since the Communists usually tried to destroy all bridges that they did 

not find useful, Company D built a combination timber trestle and M4T6 dry 

span bridge to cross the sixty-three-foot gap. The design allowed for the fortyfive-foot dry span to be removed and replaced on short notice. The engineers 

left enough lumber at the site so that villagers could build a light bridge to 

replace the dry span for use by bicycles and motor scooters. The 1st Engineer 

Battalion also removed a low-capacity Eiffel bridge and replaced it with a two 

hundred-foot panel bridge across the Saigon River at Dau Tieng and opened 

twelve and a half miles of road to the town, allowing movement of artillery 

and troops to the Michelin Plantation. While Company A concentrated on 

the bridge, Company C bulldozed a wide swath of rubber trees to reduce the 

possibility of ambushes. On 20 November, Company C moved by helicopters 

to the top of Nui Ong Mountain. There in a little over one day, the engineer 

troops cut vegetation and blasted and leveled the peak into a firing position 

for two artillery batteries.4

The bridge across the Saigon River presented a major engineering challenge. 

To make room for the higher-capacity panel bridge (a Military Class 60 bridge 

to support heavy division traffic), Company A had to remove the old bridge 

without damaging its two piers. By carefully using acetylene torches and steelcutting charges, welders successfully dropped all three spans. In the meantime, 

2 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 29; MACV History, 1966, pp. 386–87; ORLL, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, II FFV, 25 Apr 67, p. 19, Historians files, CMH; Lt. Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, 

Cedar Falls–Junction City: A Turning Point, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department 

of the Army, 1974), pp. 8–12; and especially MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 31–59. 3 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 27th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 66, p. 2, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 4th Inf Div, 22 

Dec 66, p. 46, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, 23 Feb 67, p. 18. All in Historians 

files, CMH. 4 This operation was code-named Battle Creek for the 1st Division. Unless otherwi

noted, this section is based on AAR, Opn Battle Creek, 1st Engr Bn, 23 Dec 66; Ltr, Lt C

Joseph M. Kiernan to All Men 1st Engineer Bn, Thanksgiving Day 1966, sub: 1st Engineer 

Actions in Operation Battle Creek, both in OCE Hist Ofc; Always First, 1965–1967, “Prepared 

for the Unexpected” and “The Bulldozer in the Attack.”
201

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

the troops rebuilt the abutments and 

used CH–47 Chinook helicopters to 

position I-beam caps on the piers. 

The 617th Panel Bridge Company 

readied the bridge for assembly, and 

work crews, now working around 

the clock, completed the bridge on 

21 November.

During Attleboro, elements

the 1st Engineer Battalion accompanied the combat forces and more 

than once served as infantry. When 

the 1st of the 28th Infantry uncovered the large enemy cache, a platoon from Company C descended 

seventy-foot ladders from Chinook 

helicopters and hacked out a clearing in the jungle. Helicopters shuttled in and out of the landing zone 

to remove the captured material. An 

engineer squad used satchel charges 

to destroy four enemy bunkers, a 

machine shop, and a hospital. When 

the 1st Division’s infantry battalions 

became heavily committed, Colonel 

Kiernan assigned company-size 

engineer task forces in the role as 

infantry to protect artillery firebases.

By Thanksgiving, Attleboro had drawn to a close, and the units retur

to their combat bases. Although frequently under fire, the 1st Engineer 

Battalion did not suffer casualties and claimed to have killed nineteen Viet 

Cong. As the year ended, the battalion busied itself with preparations to support a major clearing operation in the Iron Triangle. Attleboro proved 

time had come to use larger forces and the added firepower now available to 

shift the search-and-destroy operations to the corps level.5

The Western Highlands

In the western highlands, General Larsen’s I Field Force continued its series 

of border surveillance operations in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. In midOctober, elements of the 4th Infantry Division under the command of Maj. 

Gen. Arthur S. Collins and the attached 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 

launched Paul Revere IV in the hope of finding the enemy and his majo

enemy supply base in the Plei Trap Valley, a jungle-covered river basin some 

twelve and a half miles wide, marked on the west by the Nam Sathay River and 

5 Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction City, p. 12.

Colonel Kiernan led the 

1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry 

Division, from 16 August 1966 to 

3 June 1967 when he was killed in a 

helicopter accident.
Engineers at War

202

Cambodia, and on the east by the Se San River. The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, screened the attacking force’s southern flank in the Duc Co area. 

Heavy resistance was encountered, and in early December General Larsen 

airlifted the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, from Phu Yen Province into 

the northern Plei Trap. Assaults on well-fortified and dug-in enemy bases typified the action to the end of the year. Paul Revere IV disrupted a planne

North Vietnamese offensive, inflicting over 1,200 enemy killed and captured, 

but the sharp engagements and enemy sniping caused substantial American 

losses. The remote and rough terrain and restrictions placed on operating near 

the border made the operation that much more difficult. By the second week 

in December, the North Vietnamese had vanished into Cambodia.6

 (Map 16)

On New Year’s Day 1967, the 4th Division resumed the border campaign 

with Sam Houston, but the campaign did not get going until the division

crossed the Nam Sathay River in mid-February. By then, enemy activity 

in the area increased sharply, and several battalion-size engagements took 

place before the operation ended in early April. Maj. Gen. William R. Peers, 

who took over command of the 4th Division in early January, claimed the 

enemy was hurt severely, but because of the dense, rugged terrain, which 

limited the full use of American firepower, the area favored the enemy during 

the vicious close fighting. Paul Revere IV and Sam Houston feature

building of landing zones and firebases and the opening of a supply route to 

the Se San, bridging the river, and extending the road west to a newly opened 

firebase. Because the 4th Division did not enjoy the vast airmobile resources 

of the 1st Cavalry Division, it relied heavily on roads for resupply. During 

the second phase of Sam Houston, enemy mines made it increasingly difficult to keep the roads open west of Pleiku City. Although combat engineers

swept the roads daily, fifty-three vehicles suffered mine damage, with over 

90 percent of the incidents taking place between 14 February and 5 April. 

The 4th Division then moved into another frontier campaign in Operation 

Francis Marion, which would run until October 1967, with the aim 

destroying enemy forces and tracking down food and ammunition caches, 

rest areas, and infiltration routes.7

Directly supporting the attack into the Plei Trap Valley were Company B 

from Lt. Col. Norman G. Delbridge’s 4th Engineer Battalion; Company D, 

65th Engineer Battalion; and Company C, 20th Engineer Combat Battalion. 

Company B carried out close combat support missions, building and improving supply roads and clearing helicopter landing zones as the division’s 2d 

Brigade advanced into the Plei Trap. In early December, the company built a 

pioneer road known as Route 509B from Plei Djereng to the Se San River, a 

6 MACV History, 1966, pp. 378–79; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, I FFV, pp. 10–12, 17–22, 

23–28, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, I FFV, pp. 9–18. For more on operations in the highlands, see 

MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 61–76, 166–77. 7 MACV History, 1967, pp. 375–78; Interv, George L. MacGarrigle, CMH, with Lt Gen 

William R. Peers, CG, 4th Inf Div, 21 Oct 75, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; ORLLs, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, I FFV, pp. 9–18, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, I FFV, 30 May 67, pp. 19–20, Historians 

files, CMH; AAR, Opn Sam Houston, 4th Inf Div, 16 May 67, with Cover Ltr, Maj G

William R. Peers, 16 May 67, Historians files, CMH.
14

1

14

14

21

19

19

19

509

14B

511

OPERATION

PAUL REVERE IV

OPERATION

PICKETT

OPERATION

FRANCIS MARION

OPERATION

SAM HOUSTON

DAK TO 2

DAK PEK

DUC CO

AN KHE

OASIS

PLEIKU

KONTUM

PLEI ME

NEW PLEI DJERENG

BAN ME THUOT

la Drang

la Meur

Ya Lop

Se San

Q UANG NGAI

BINH DINH

K O N TUM

PLEIKU

PHU BON

KHANH HO A

D AR LA C

PHU YEN

C A

M B O D I A

S O U T H V I E T N A

M

L A O S

S O U T H V I E T N A M

C A M B O D I A

CHU PONG MASSIF

PLEI TRAP

PLATEAU GI

Mo Duc

Dak To

Ban Don

Cung Son

Cheo Reo

Phu Nhon

Hoai Nhon

October 1966–June 1967

WESTERN HIGHLANDS

0

0 40 Kilometers

Miles 40

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 300 600 1200 2000 and Above

Map 16
Engineers at War

204

distance of fourteen miles. When the 4th Division pushed across the Se San 

to the west, an armored vehicle launched bridge and an M4T6 dry span were 

used to span the river. From mid-November to early December, elements of 

Company C, 20th Engineer Battalion, cut a three-mile extension of the road 

through thick jungle west of the Se San. A firebase for 4th Division artillery 

was built and some clearing and surveying were done for a C–130 airfield. Two 

bulldozers equipped with Rome plow blades were used extensively for the first 

time in this area to level the dense vegetation. The Rome plows made the initial 

cut and a bulldozer followed doing the rough road construction. Demolitions 

were taken along to fell trees considered too big for the Rome plows, but it 

soon became apparent the plows could easily knock down any sized tree much 

Aerial view the Se San River bordering the rugged Plei Trap Valley, the area 

where the North Vietnamese Army had a major supply base
205

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

faster than the time required to do the demolition work. In early January, part 

of Company C returned to the Plei Trap to extend Route 509B another four 

miles to the northwest and built several firebases. This time there were two 

Rome plows and two bulldozers to do the clearing. The road was improved 

from pioneer status into a well-shaped, adequately drained one-way road. 

Altogether, the engineers placed six armored vehicle launched bridges and 

three M4T6 dry span bridges along Route 509B. Likewise, Company D, 65th 

Engineer Battalion, supported the advance of the 25th Division’s 3d Brigade 

as it advanced into the Plei Trap. Platoons were attached to each of the infantry battalions, and tasks included clearing landing zones, destroying enemy 

bunkers, and building defensive perimeters and helipads.8

Close support from the 4th Division’s engineers intensified during 

Operation Sam Houston. Engineer squads from Company A, 4th Engineer

Battalion, were attached to infantry battalions on a mission basis. The rest 

of the company, using demolitions and chain saws, cleared and improved 

firebases. This was a major effort, and D4B bulldozers were airlifted into the 

landing zones by 1st Cavalry Division CH–54 Flying Cranes. By 17 March, the 

company began widespread minesweep operations along major supply routes. 

On 4 April, elements of Company A accompanied by an infantry company 

and armor platoon providing security began improving Highway 19 from Duc 

Co to the Cambodian border. The job involved widening the existing gravel 

road, which was overgrown with vegetation and damaged from craters caused 

by artillery rounds. Two bulldozers and one Rome plow (the battalion had four 

Rome plows with protective cab assemblies considered sufficient to support 

most combat operations) cleared brush and widened and rough graded the 

road. Since there was some rock on the road, limited traffic during wet weather 

could be supported. Little contact was made with the enemy, but his presence 

in the area was evident when mines and trip flares were discovered. Undetected 

mines, however, damaged one truck and one bulldozer. Meanwhile, Company 

B provided one squad to each of the 2d Brigade’s three infantry battalions to 

help clear landing zones and firebases. At the brigade’s field command post, 

the 1st Platoon built defensive bunkers, an interior road net, and helicopter 

pads. Peneprime was generously applied to reduce dust at helicopter pads, 

refueling points, and roads. When the brigade moved west of the Se San, it 

became necessary to commit one engineer platoon to each infantry battalion 

to clear landing zones and firebases. From 14 to 22 March, the 1st Platoon 

replaced an armored vehicle launched bridge with a one-way timber pile bent 

bridge. Similarly, the 2d Platoon extracted two of the launched bridges and a 

dry span and then moved to Landing Zone Oasis to work on interior roads 

and helicopter pads. Company D, which was usually held in general support, on 6 February dispatched a squad to accompany the 2d Battalion, 35th 

8 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, 4th Inf Div, 22 Dec 66, p. 47, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 4th Inf Div. 20 

Mar 67, p. 30, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 14 Feb 67, pp. 29–30, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 

67, 20th Engr Bn, 12 Feb 67, pp. 3–4, 9, 17–18, all in Historians files, CMH, and 1 Nov 66–31 

Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, p. 9; Operational Support, USAECV [U.S. Army Engineer Command, 

Vietnam] (Prov), p. 1, incl. 7, tab R, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6.
Engineers at War

206

Infantry, 25th Division, when it was placed under the operational control of 

the 1st Brigade. Over the next seven weeks, the squad cleared thirteen landing 

zones. On 6 March, two D4Bs were airlifted into one landing zone to help. 

When the bulldozers were first placed in the landing zone there was room for 

only one helicopter, but after a day’s work there was enough cleared area to 

land six helicopters. The 4th Battalion’s bridge company, Company E, lent its 

bridging expertise in erecting, repairing, and removing M4T6 dry span and 

float bridges. During Sam Houston, the battalion did not go unscathed. T

engineers were killed and seven wounded. Equipment losses were six 5-ton 

dump trucks, one bulldozer, two water supply points, one tankdozer, a trailer, 

and a fuel pod.9

During Francis Marion, Companies A and B of the 4th Engin

Battalion continued sweeping for mines, clearing landing zones, firebases, 

and helipads, carrying out road maintenance and improvements, and working 

on base development at Dragon Mountain. Both companies built two new 

east–west roads running from Highway 14B to the west providing access to 

firebases. Company A with the 1st Brigade swept Highway 19 east to Duc 

Co, north on Highway 14B to Route 509, then west on Route 509 to New Plei 

Djereng Special Forces camp. The minesweeps, which included infantry and 

armored cavalry escorts, emanated from several locations to allow rapid and 

simultaneous movement by the mine-clearing teams. On 12 April, Company A 

augmented with two Rome plows blazed a ten-mile pioneer road (Route 4A) 

from the junction with Highway 14B west to a firebase. The company then 

helped further develop the firebase by working on the helipad and defenses 

and supporting infantry battalions in clearing vegetation at landing zones and 

other firebases. Company B supported the 2d Brigade at Oasis by improving

interior roads to all-weather use, built a 250-by-750-foot helicopter loading 

pad, and prepared protective berms in ammunition storage areas. On 9 April, 

the company, augmented by two Rome plows, cleared 800 acres for the resettlement of 10,000 Montagnard villagers. The Rome plows cleared an average 

of twenty-five acres per day in light to medium vegetation. Some delays were 

caused by small leaves from bamboo thickets clogging the bulldozers’ radiator 

grills, which resulted in overheating and frequent stops to cool the engines. 

Using air-compressor hoses to blow the leaves out of the radiators helped but 

did not solve this problem. Francis Marion would continue for another

months.10

Supporting the 1st Cavalry Division’s 2d Brigade during its screening 

operation in the Duc Co area was Company B, of Colonel Olentine’s 8th 

Engineer Battalion. The company moved with the brigade and set up operations at Oasis, where the cavalrymen encountered clouds of dust stirred by 

scores of helicopters landing and taking off every day. The dry season from 

9 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, 15 Jun 67, p. 29, Historians files, CMH; AARs, 

Opn Sam Houston, 4th Engr Bn, 23 Apr 67, pp. 1–9, 12, Historians files, CMH, and Opn

Houston, 4th Inf Div, p. 7. 10 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, pp. 29–30, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th Inf Div, pp. 37–38

Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 7.
207

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

September to April was now in effect. To overcome the discomfort, flight hazards, and increased wear on engines caused by the dust, Company B answered 

with peneprime, generously spraying the helipads. A modification to the sticky 

petroleum mixture not only significantly reduced the dust but also prevented 

vehicle traffic from ripping up the hardened peneprime adhering to the laterite 

soil. Company B also developed mobile minefield kits to hasten the placement 

and retrieval of antipersonnel mines. The enemy’s ability to move back and 

forth across the Cambodian border had given him a tactical advantage. As a 

countermeasure, U.S. troops looked more to using mines to block or canalize 

enemy movements, protect artillery firing positions, and strengthen ambush 

sites. Conventional methods, however, required large amounts of material and 

time, considerable drawbacks in quick-moving airmobile operations. With 

the mobile minefield kits—consisting of 150 small M14 antipersonnel blast 

mines, 6 claymore antipersonnel mines, 6 trip flares, a spool of communications wire, 18 ammunition box rods, 10 minefield markers, and 3 sledge hammers—designed for quick installation and removal, engineer squads were able 

to place a fifty-five-yard-wide minefield in forty-five minutes and pick it up in 

about the same time.11

Another novel weapon used by combat engineers in the western highlands were armored personnel carriers mounted with flamethrowers from the 

Flame Platoon, Headquarters Company, 4th Engineer Battalion. During Sa

Houston, three of the platoon’s four flamethrower tracks and a fuel carrie

were attached for nine days (24 February to 4 March) to Company A to clear 

ambush sites along Route 509B on both sides of the Se San. It took fifty-seven 

loads of napalm to burn off 55- to 110-yard strips of vegetation on each side 

of approximately ten miles of the road. Progress was limited to shooting only 

nine loads a day due to 11⁄2- to 2-hour curing times needed for the napalm to 

thicken, and the engineers looked into ways for a faster incendiary mix. On 

30 April, the flame platoon’s four flamethrower tracks were combined with 

the four tankdozers from the four line companies and a tank retriever into 

an engineer armored task force, which initially provided security for convoys 

hauling sand between Dragon Mountain and Kontum City. This naturally led 

to guarding work crews on the roads and at bridge sites and dump trucks hauling fill, reducing the dependence on infantry and armor for security.12

Though the 4th Engineer Battalion did a commendable job of carrying out 

assignments, some equipment shortages affected operations. At the beginning 

of 1967, the battalion did not have any of its authorized four launchers for the 

rapidly erected armored vehicle launched bridges. One launcher arrived for use 

in Sam Houston, but the shortage of three launchers seriously limited the reaction time in relocating the launched bridges. The battalion expected three n

M60A1 launchers by May. During Sam Houston, the shortage of 600-gallonper-hour water purification units meant that the 1,500-gallon-per-hour unit h

11 AARs, Opn Paul Revere IV, 8th Engr Bn, 26 Jan 67, p. 7, an. A, and Opn Thayer I

8th Engr Bn, 28 Feb 67, p. 26; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 8th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 67, pp. 4, 7–8. 

All in Historians files, CMH. 12 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 30, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 38.
Engineers at War

208

to be used on a part-time basis at the most critical location, which reduced potable water at other sites. Still, the battalion was able to supply more than 1.2 million gallons to using units during the operation. Two 600-gallon-per-hour units 

eventually arrived, but they were minus their components. By the end of April, 

the battalion was able to support the 1st and 2d Brigades with one water point 

each with two others at Dragon Mountain. There was still a shortage of four 

units. Fortunately, water points run by the 20th and 299th Engineer Battalions in 

the field, at project sites, and at the division base camp helped supply the needed 

water. On the plus side, the battalion received all of the replacement D7E bulldozers and all eight Clark 290M tractors with LeTourneau-Westinghouse scrapers authorized in the unit’s modified table of organization and equipment.13

General engineering support to the 4th Division and other forces in 

the western highlands fell to Colonel Braucher’s 937th Engineer Group. In 

November 1966, the group headquarters and elements of the 509th Engineer 

Company (Panel Bridge), 585th Engineer Company (Dump Truck), and 554th 

Engineer Company (Float Bridge) moved from Qui Nhon to Pleiku City. In a 

switch of areas of responsibility, the 45th Group moved to Qui Nhon and took 

over the eastern half of northern II Corps while the 937th Group assumed 

the western half of the 45th Group’s area and some of the 35th Group’s area, 

resulting in an increase of the 937th Group’s area of responsibility by approximately 30 percent. With this realignment of territory, the 937th Group lost 

two battalions (the 19th Combat and 84th Construction), gained one (the 20th 

now located at the 4th Division’s Dragon Mountain base camp), and retained 

two (the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion also near Pleiku City, and the 70th 

Engineer Combat Battalion at An Khe). Although down to three engineer 

combat battalions, the group’s engineer combat companies were expected to 

increase by three in 1967 when the three battalions were to expand to four 

letter companies under the E-series of organization and equipment. In addition, the group also had several company-size and smaller units, including 

Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, with the 70th Engineer Battalion at An 

Khe; Company D, 35th Engineer Battalion, with the 20th Engineer Battalion; 

and either all or parts of two light equipment companies, two panel bridge 

companies, one dump truck company, and one float bridge company. The 

attachment of the 102d Construction Support Company in March and the 

arrival of the 815th Engineer Construction Battalion in April increased the 

group’s strength by 24 percent and released the combat battalions in the Pleiku 

City area of most of their base camp construction duties, freeing them to concentrate on tactical operations and roadwork.14

As the tactical situation gradually improved and U.S. and allied forces 

moved from reaction missions to carefully planned operations, the 937th 

Group followed suit with more orchestrated planning to meet the requirements 

of the combat forces. One of these requirements took place in the latter part of 

13 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, pp. 32–33, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 39; 

AAR, Opn Sam Houston, 4th Engr Bn, pp. 9–10, 12. 14 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 2, 4–5, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 937th En

Gp, pp. 2–3.
209

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

Paul Revere IV in support of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, wh

it deployed into the northern Plei Trap. On 3 December 1966, group headquarters tasked the 299th Engineer Battalion under Lt. Col. Walter G. Wolfe 

to support the airborne brigade’s search-and-destroy Operation Pickett

Kontum Province. Company A, elements of the 554th Float Bridge Company, 

and Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion, were charged with building a float 

bridge across the Krong Poko River leading to Polei Kleng Special Forces 

camp west of Kontum City. Company C was to provide backup support on 

Route 511 west of Kontum City and Highway 14 between Pleiku and Kontum 

City. On the fourth, the 2d Platoon, Company A, left Pleiku and arrived at 

Kontum City, dropping off a grader and bulldozer at the airfield to ready it 

for the C–130 airlift of the airborne brigade. The next day, the platoon moved 

out on Route 511 to begin improving crossing sites for the trucks carrying the 

float bridging. The six-mile stretch was little more than a trail, which crossed 

many small streams and swamps. Four crossings were upgraded by using 240 

feet of 36-inch culvert. One of the crossings, however, washed out after the 

platoon made it across. When the platoon reached the Krong Poko River, it 

began laying out the bridge site. The rest of the Company A task force, which 

departed Pleiku on 5 December, installed culvert at the washed-out site to 

allow passage before it washed out again. Upon arrival at the Krong Poko, the 

task force began constructing the float bridge. But the poor near-shore landing and lack of space there to inflate the floats made it necessary to pull the 

operation about a mile back from the river. Inflated floats atop bridge trucks 

were shuttled to the bridge site where a crane lifted the floats into the water 

for assembly. On completion of the 420-foot bridge in the early morning of 7 

December, two platoons of Company A crossed over and began working on 

the short distance to the Special Forces camp while the 2d Platoon continued 

improving the road to the east.15

The 299th Battalion’s support of Operation Pickett continued a

high pitch until its termination on 21 January 1967. Company A continued 

to improve the Kontum airfield’s taxiways, ramps, bivouac areas, and roads. 

On 26 December, an engineer squad was committed to the airborne brigade 

to carry out minesweeps and hasty road repairs northwest of Kontum City. 

At Polei Kleng, the company applied peneprime to helicopter landing areas, 

improved the airstrip to handle C–123 transports, built a refueling point, and 

supported the 101st Airborne Division elements at the Special Forces camp. 

Since there was a forward supply element at Polei Kleng, the battalion S–4 section set up a water supply point, which provided approximately 2,000 gallons 

of potable water a day. On 6 January, T17 membrane was placed on the airstrip, and the job was finished by the eleventh. As traffic increased on Highway 

14, the wooden bridges rapidly deteriorated, and it became necessary to put 

Company C on repairing bridge damage as well as filling potholes on bridge 

approaches. As the operation began to wind down, Company C dispatched a 

15 AAR, Opn Pickett, 299th Engr Bn, 8 May 67, pp. 1–3, 5, incl. 3 to ORLL, 1 Feb

[sic] Apr 67, 299th Engr Bn, 8 May 67, Historians files, CMH; Operational Support, USAECV 

(Prov), p. 1, incl. 7, tab R, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6.
Engineers at War

210

platoon and a bulldozer to upgrade seven miles of road so that an artillery battery that had been airlifted to a firing position could depart overland. On 20 

January, Company A returned to Polei Kleng to remove the float bridge from 

the Krong Poko. The float bridge and the dry span were removed the next day, 

and the engineers returned to Pleiku.16

Keeping supply routes in the western highlands open and building new tactical roads were among the 937th Group’s major duties. Of note was Highway 

19, the eighty-one-mile supply route between Qui Nhon and Pleiku City, where 

heavy convoy traffic became routine. The key road, which had virtually disintegrated because of heavy traffic and weather, underwent upgrades, including 

new bridges, base course work, widening, and preparation for paving. Roads 

supporting operations west of Pleiku City to the Cambodian border were 

repaired to carry two-lane all-weather traffic. Increased emphasis was placed 

on Highway 19W from Dragon Mountain to Duc Co and Highway 14B and 

Route 509 between the intersection of Highway 19W to Plei Djereng, altogether forty-seven miles, the only roads leading to the western sector of the 4th 

Division’s area of responsibility. Route 509B extended twenty-eight miles from 

Plei Djereng Special Forces camp into the Plei Trap Valley, and a new six-mile 

stretch of Route 511, formerly a trail, extended to Polei Kleng Special Forces 

camp. Maintaining these mostly unpaved roads became a never-ending task, 

especially during the rainy season.17

Not all bridges were erected to stay in place. The Kon Bring Bridge is an 

example of the detailed planning arrangements and last-minute adjustments 

even for a supposedly simple bridge-building task. In early November 1966, 

the 299th Engineer Battalion was given the task to build and remove a M4T6 

dry span bridge at the hamlet of Kon Bring on Highway 14 about two miles 

northwest of the town of Dak To. The existing bridge, an Eiffel structure, had 

been destroyed in October, and the dry span would enable a team of the 539th 

Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment to withdraw its equipment from 

Dak Seang Special Forces camp, some fifteen and a half miles up the road. The 

engineer team had just completed building the camp and CV–2 Caribou airstrip 

and was ready to move to its next assignment. On 10 November, Colonel Wolfe 

dispatched his operations officer to coordinate the move and bridge site security 

with the Special Forces staff at Kontum City, where he learned that the engineer team also needed low-bed trailers to carry its equipment. Eventually three 

low-beds would be needed to carry a combination front loader and backhoe, a 

small bulldozer, a cement mixer, and a 21⁄2-ton truck that could not be towed. A 

grader could make it out on its own. The 2d Platoon, Company C, was tasked to 

build the bridge. On 9 November, the platoon picked up forty-five feet of M4T6 

dry span from the 554th Float Bridge Company, and practiced erecting the 

bridge on dry land at its camp outside Pleiku City. At 0630, 12 November, the 

2d Platoon departed Pleiku City with the bridge and two low-beds. On reaching 

16 AAR, Opn Pickett, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 3–5; Operational Support, USAECV (Prov), p.

incl. 7, tab R, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6. 17 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–11, 13–14, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 937th 

Engr Gp, pp. 7–12.
211

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

Tan Canh, a village just south of Dak To and east of the Dak To Special Forces 

camp, the platoon turned over the low-beds to Company A, which had been 

working at the airfield. In turn, the 2d Platoon was to borrow a bulldozer and 

front loader from Company A and continue on to the bridge site. Company A, 

however, needed the bulldozer to build a bypass around a bridge incapable of 

supporting heavy loads. This caused a delay of two and one-half hours for the 

Company B platoon, and it did not reach the bridge site until 1330. The bridge 

was installed by 1730, and the platoon dug in with the South Vietnamese escort 

for the night. The next morning, the low-beds loaded with supplies for Dak 

Seang and a Civilian Irregular Defense Group escort left Dak To, crossed the 

bridge, picked up the equipment at Dak Seang, and made the return trip to 

Dak To by noon. Company C then removed and reloaded the bridge and joined 

Company A at the Dak To airfield. The next day, Company C made the return 

trip to Pleiku City.18

Between October 1966 and June 1967, I Field Force had tasked the 

937th Engineer Group to build and upgrade several C–130 airstrips near the 

Cambodian border to all-weather capability to support combat operations. 

Nine airfields in the western highlands were upgraded to all-weather capability (eight to C–130 and one to C–123) to be used as jumping-off points for 

operations. Like the roads, these airfields routinely required maintenance and 

repairs. Typically, the airfield projects were company-size and spread over a 

wide geographic area. Taking advantage of the dry weather, the 20th Engineer 

Battalion built new airfields at New Plei Djereng and Duc Lap Special Forces 

camps and rehabilitated and extended the T17 covered fields at Landing Zone 

Oasis, Phu Nhon southeast of Oasis, Phu Tuc Special Forces camp farther 

to the southeast, and Buon Blech Special Forces camp southwest of Phu 

Tuc. At New Plei Djereng five miles south of the existing dirt airstrip at Plei 

Djereng, five work crews of Company D, 35th Engineer Battalion, surfaced 

the 3,500-by-60-foot runway with the new MX19 matting, four-foot square 

aluminum sheets encasing an aluminum honeycomb. This airstrip, built at a 

better site just south of the old strip, marked the first use of this new matting 

in Vietnam. After completing the work at New Plei Djereng in time to support Sam Houston, Company D moved to Oasis, where it removed the T

membrane and replaced it with an asphalt-treated vinylon cloth—a strong, 

burlap-type, synthetic fiber material—on the repaired subgrade. The runway 

was topped off with MX19 matting. The problem with all prefabricated metal 

surfacing in Vietnam was the inability to seal water out of the joints between 

panels. This technique offered the subgrade some protection.19

18 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 299th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 67, p. 2, and incl. 2, AAR, Kon Bring 

Bridge, 299th Engr Bn, 27 Nov 66; Unit History, 1966, 539th Engr Det, n.d., pp. 15–16, both in 

Historians files, CMH. 19 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, I FFV, pp. 58–60, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, I FFV, pp. 65–67, 69, 

1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 8–11, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8; 

Operational Support, USAECV (Prov), p. 1, incl. 7, tab R, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

6; AAR, Oasis Airfield, 20th Engr Bn, 10 Jun 67, pp. 1–7; Construction Performance Rpt [Plei 

Djereng], 20th Engr Bn, 5 Feb 67, pp. 1–7; Completion Rpt, Project 20–6 [Phu Tuc], 20th Engr 

Bn, 22 Mar 67, incls. 1–7. All 20th Battalion reports in box 4, 72A/2315, RG 319, NARA.
Engineers at War

212

The T17 airfield project at Duc Lap, code-named Operation Duches

typified some of the challenges—long distances, security, and logistics—

facing the engineers in the highlands. Upon completing work at Buon 

Blech airstrip, Company C, 20th Engineer Battalion, was ordered to move 

to Duc Lap Special Forces camp some 150 miles south of Pleiku City to 

build the new C–130 airstrip. A convoy carrying construction materials 

from the battalion at Dragon Mountain would make the fifty-three-mile 

trip down Highway 14, rendezvous with Company C at Buon Blech Special 

Forces camp, and proceed with Company C to Duc Lap. Meanwhile, a 

reconnaissance along the convoy route found the three-span Eiffel bridge 

over the Ea Krong River south of Ban Me Thuot could not support the 

convoy’s heavy loads. The bridge could not be bypassed, and reinforcing 

it was not considered feasible. Battalion headquarters determined the best 

way to cross the river in insecure territory was by raft. On 27 January, sections of a M4T6 raft were assembled and airlifted by six C–130s to Ban Me 

Thuot for pickup and installation by the South Vietnamese 23d Division’s 

engineers. The four-float raft was quickly assembled at the bridge site 

and secured. On 1 February, ninety-five trucks loaded with construction 

materials and a security force consisting of a South Vietnamese Special 

Forces company and their advisers from Buon Blech set out from Pleiku. 

The convoy reached Buon Blech in less than eight hours without difficulty. 

A soldier of the 20th Engineer Battalion places MX19 matting at New Plei 

Djereng Special Forces camp.
213

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

Company C and the convoy carrying construction materials—altogether 

110 vehicles—proceeded to Ban Me Thuot and remained overnight. The 

next morning, the engineer column left Ban Me Thuot, crossed over the 

Ea Krong River by raft, and reached Duc Lap in the early afternoon, completing the trip without a single breakdown or major incident. Clearing 

and grubbing of the area began on 3 February, and the following morning 

all equipment and troops were hard at work. Twelve days later, six C–7A 

Caribous (on 1 January 1967 all Army Caribous were transferred to the Air 

Force and their designation changed from CV–2 to C–7A in the process) 

landed on the partly completed airstrip. A C–123 airstrip was completed 

in eighteen days, and a hasty C–130 dirt airstrip was ready in twenty days. 

Special emphasis was placed on proper drainage, including the airstrip’s 

crown, ditches, and culverts. As the airstrip work neared completion, construction began on the parking apron and its two 40-by-80-foot access 

ramps and a two-mile access road to Highway 14. A six-inch layer of highquality laterite was spread and shaped, wetted down with a water distributor, and compacted with a steel-wheeled roller. Laying of T17 membrane 

on the airstrip, parking ramp, and access ramps began on 15 February and 

lasted for twenty-five days. This work was done at night to avoid excessive 

wrinkles caused by heat expansion during the day. As workers placed the 

membrane, another work party followed applying a nonskid compound. 

An M4T6 raft carries a 20th Engineer Battalion vehicle across the Ea Krong 

River on the way to build a new C–130 airstrip at Duc Lap Special Forces camp.
Engineers at War

214

By 7 April, the C–130 airstrip was complete, and Company C was ready 

to return home. On the first leg of the return, a mine caused some damage 

to a tractor-trailer, and the brakes failed on a grader causing it to overturn down an embankment and seriously injuring two men. On the way 

back, the raft at the Ea Krong was retrieved. The following afternoon, 8 

April, the convoy reached Dragon Mountain without any further incidents, 

bringing Operation Duchess to an end.

The 299th Engineer Battalion was also assigned several airfield projects of note. Besides the work at Kontum City and Polei Kleng, the Dak To 

airfield project was a major undertaking involving considerable planning, 

roadwork, and logistical support. The undertaking was generated by I Field 

Force’s requirement to support a brigade-size force out of the Dak To forward supply area, on this occasion the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 

during its foray into the northern Plei Trap. The existing 4,200-foot bituminous surface treatment airfield had sustained severe damage during Operation 

Hawthorne several months earlier from the combined effects of heavy u

and seasonal rains. To get to Dak To, however, required improving Highway 

14 from Kontum City to Dak To. Company A was given the job of improving 

the airfield and the initial opening of the road to Class 31 traffic and upgrading four of the northernmost water crossings while Company B was tasked to 

20 For detailed accounts of Duc Lap, see Maj. Darryle L. Kouns, “Combat Engineers in 

Operation Duchess,” Military Engineer 62 (May-June 1967): 173–76; and Completion Rpt,

Project 01–937/OS–66 [Duc Lap], 20th Engr Bn, 21 Apr 67, box 4, 72A/2315, RG 319, NARA. 

Surveying and site preparation at Duc Lap
215

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

improve the three southernmost crossings from Kontum City. Repairs to the 

Dak To airfield began on 30 October. As much as possible, work was done 

at night and during periods of slack air traffic, thereby keeping the airfield 

open throughout the repair period. Numerous soft spots and rutted areas were 

refilled with crushed rock, compacted with a steel-wheeled roller, and sealcoated. The patches and seal coat, despite some bleeding of asphalt, held out 

well, and C–130 aircraft regularly used the airfield with no detrimental effects. 

On 20 November, its work done, Company A departed Dak To. After all the 

heavy equipment passed over the dry span and M4T6 float bridge, work crews 

dismantled the bridges and loaded them on bridge trucks for the trip home.21

The Dak To project illustrated that administration, logistics, and communications were needed for engineer projects at remote locations. Some 210 

cubic yards of 3/4- and 3/8-inch aggregate were needed for the airfield patching, but neither the aggregate nor the transport was available to move that 

amount to Dak To. The 937th Group came to the rescue arranging for trucks 

from other units and enough aggregate from Qui Nhon, some 100 cubic yards, 

to get started. Another 40 cubic yards came later, and the 299th produced 

the remaining 70 cubic yards of 3/4-inch rock, which was carried in battalion 

dump trucks. Asphalt required for patch work and seal coat was moved by 

transportation units and the battalion’s vehicles. 

21 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 299th Engr Bn, p. 2, and incl. 3, AAR, Dak To Airfield and 

Route 14B (Kontum to Dak To Airfield), 299th Engr Bn, 18 Dec 66, pp. 1–6, 9; ORLL, 1 Nov 

66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8.

Work crews apply a nonskid compound to Duc Lap airstrip.
Engineers at War

216

One of the most critical resupply problems was getting repair parts and 

third-echelon mechanics. The group again helped by using its helicopters, but 

still this was not good enough to prevent lost time because of deadlined equipment. The repair problem was alleviated by the tenth day when an ordnance 

contact team and truck arrived at Dak To. As for food and potable water, the 

battalion attached a water supply team for the duration of the operation. The 

company also carried a fifteen-day supply of B-rations with fresh A-rations 

occasionally flown in by group helicopters or more frequently carried in resupply convoys.22

As a result of the engineers’ efforts, the new and improved roads and airfields made possible sustained operations in the highlands and on the border. 

These operations gave rise to some cautious optimism. For although the enemy 

controlled the tempo of fighting near the border, making it a costly undertaking to send U.S. troops there, those troops would nonetheless return whenever 

sizeable enemy forces sallied forth over the border from Cambodia.23

On the Coast

In Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces, U.S., South Korean, and South 

Vietnamese forces continued their attempts to weaken the enemy’s hold on the 

agriculturally rich coastal region. The 1st Cavalry Division’s return to Binh 

Dinh Province in September 1966 marked the beginning of a series of battles 

that kept the division in action for seventeen months. Operation Thayer I

began with a five-battalion air assault into the mountains of the Kim Son 

Valley, popularly known as the Eagle’s Claw or Crow’s Foot because of the 

shape of the tributary valleys. The cavalrymen did not meet much resistance, 

but they did uncover significant supply caches. Operation Irving unfolded o

2 October when elements of the 1st Cavalry Division moved east from the valleys and maneuvered into position around Landing Zone Hammond, the division’s main forward supply base at the entrance to the Suoi Ca Valley. There 

they joined South Korean and South Vietnamese troops in an effort to trap 

the enemy in a coastal pocket. In October 1966 and January 1967, Thayer II

and Pershing extended the preceding operations as part of an all-out effort

to pacify eastern Binh Dinh Province. The size of the forces in the operations 

ranged from a brigade with two battalions to all three brigades. Besides inflicting casualties on the enemy, the operations greatly reduced his dominance in 

the critical province.24 (Map 17)

22 AAR, Dak To Airfield and Route 14B (Kontum to Dak To Airfield), 299th Engr Bn, pp. 

6–8.23 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 76, 177; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr 

Gp, pp. 7–11, 13–14, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–12. 24 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, I FFV, pp. 21–27, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, I FFV, p. 15; Tolson, 

Airmobility, pp. 117–18, 124; Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, 7 Mar 67, sub: Seven Month 

History and Briefing Data (April–October 1966), pp. 111–32; Memoirs of the 1st Air Cavalry 

Division, p. 33–34. See also Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 256–74, and MacGarrigle, Taking 

the Offensive, pp. 85–89, 160–84.
1

1

1

19

19

X X

1 CAV

DUC PHO

LZ TWO BITS

LZ UPLIFT

LZ HAMMOND

PHU CAT

LZ ENGLISH

AN KHE

QUI NHON

Song An Lao

Nuoc Dinh

Song Kim

Son

Song Say

Song Ba

Song Lai Giang

SOUTH

 CHINA

 SEA

Duc Pho

Tam Quan

An Lao

Hoai Nhon Bong Son

Hoai An

Phu My

Phu Cat

An Nhon

Tuy Phuoc

Binh Khe

An Khe

AN LAO

VALLEY

BONG SON

PLAIN

SUOI CA

VALLEY

KIM SON

VALLEY

Cat Mit

Mountains

Nui Sang

KONTU M

QU ANG NG AI

BINH DINH

October 1966–June 1967

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION OPERATIONS

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 500 800 and Above

0 15

Kilometers

(Approximate)

Miles

0 15

Map 17
Engineers at War

218

Colonel Olentine, the commanding officer of the division’s 8th Engineer 

Battalion, directed engineering support from a forward command post at 

Landing Zone Hammond. Companies A, B, and C continued supporting 

the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades, respectively. In turn, the companies attached 

a platoon to each assaulting battalion. Typically, the engineers cleared and 

expanded landing zones and artillery positions and destroyed bunkers and 

tunnel systems. When the division found several caves in the coastal mountains 

in use by the enemy, the demolitions men used shaped charges instead of the 

usual C4 plastic explosives. The shaped charges, normally used to make large 

craters in roads, proved highly effective in breaking up the rock, thus making 

it easier to destroy the caverns.25

While the 1st Cavalry Division concentrated on clearing the enemy in 

eastern Binh Dinh Province, 937th Group engineers kept Highway 1 open. 

Beginning in September with Operation Thayer, Company B, 19th Engineer

Battalion, with the help of a platoon from Company C and elements of the 

South Vietnamese Army 6th Engineer Group, coped with mines and torrential 

rains. The highway and railroad bridges crossing the Lai Giang River at Bong 

Son still stood. The 1,600-foot Eiffel truss highway bridge, however, had suffered damage to several spans, reducing loads to twelve tons. Miraculously, the 

unused railroad bridge a few hundred yards to the east remained undamaged, 

and Company A laid a plank decking for vehicular use.26

Coinciding with the beginning of Thayer, the 1st Cavalry Division

expanded operations north of the Lai Giang to the An Lao Valley and the Bong 

Son Plain. Division plans during the autumn of 1966 included upgrading the 

airstrip at Landing Zone English to C–130 traffic. Because of the difficulty 

in moving heavy earthmoving and construction equipment up Highway 1 and 

across the Lai Giang, the 937th Engineer Group decided to transport men and 

equipment by sea to a beach site used earlier by the 1st Cavalry Division east 

of the village of Tam Quan. The engineers then were to proceed to Highway 1 

and head south to the airstrip.27

The 937th Group’s plan to rebuild the access route to Highway 1 and 

airfield work was called Operation Duke and was carried out by elements 

of the 19th and 84th Engineer Battalions in two phases. Colonel Rhodes’ 

19th Engineer Battalion kicked off the Phase I roadwork. On 13 September, 

Company A and the 509th Panel Bridge Company loaded aboard the Landing 

Ship Dock Gunston Hall at Qui Nhon and headed north. After some difficulty 

coming ashore in a high surf the following day, the task force rendezvoused 

25 AARs, Opn Thayer, 8th Engr Bn, 29 Oct 66, pp. 1–3, 7–8, Opn Irving, 8th Engr Bn,

Nov 66, pp. 1–3, 9, and Opn Thayer II, 8th Engr Bn, 28 Feb 67, pp. 1–2, 4–5; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31

Oct 66, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 2–6, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 8th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 67, pp. 1–4. All in 

Historians files, CMH. 26 AARs, Opn Thayer, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, Opn Irving, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, a

Opn Thayer II, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 5; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 7–9;

Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 113; Lt. Col. Nolan C. Rhodes, “Operation Duke,” Military Engineer 

61 (September-October 1969): 332–33. 27 Unless otherwise noted, the narrative covering Operation Duke is based on Rhodes,

“Operation Duke,” pp. 330–33, and Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 111, 113.
219

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

with South Vietnamese forces and set up a defensive perimeter. Work crews 

quickly repaired a causeway that had been partly washed out; built a 250-

foot Bailey bridge across the tidal inlet (an earlier bridge had been removed); 

replaced a damaged seventy-foot Bailey bridge leading to Highway 1; and 

proceeded inland to Highway 1 and turned south, clearing mines and making 

road repairs along the way. Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, which had 

landed on the sixteenth to do the airfield work, followed. When Company B 

reached the airstrip at English the following day, the 19th Engineer Battalion 

task force proceeded down Highway 1 to Qui Nhon, completing its portion of 

Phase I.

In early October, the 937th Engineer Group began Phase II of Operation 

Duke: the return of Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, from English to the 

beach site for the return trip to Qui Nhon. By then the company had extended 

the runway at English to over 3,300 feet and built an aircraft parking area.

On 4 October, elements of the 19th Battalion started back up Highway 1 from 

Qui Nhon to secure the beach site and remove the two Bailey bridges from 

the beach access road. Included in the convoy were two hundred tons of steel 

and lumber for use on the railroad bridge over the Lai Giang at Bong Son. 

After unloading the materials and leaving two float bridge platoons to help 

work on the railroad bridge, the task force crossed the highway bridge without 

difficulty. South Vietnamese security forces escorted the convoy past Englis

to the Tam Quan beach site where the engineers set up a defensive perimeter 

that evening. When Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, joined the task force 

on the beach, work crews removed the two Bailey bridges and replaced them 

with a steel stringer bridge and a suspension footbridge. An enemy probe on 

the night of 9 October and heavy mortar fire the next evening, which wounded 

eighteen men, coaxed the engineers to finish the job and get off the beach. 

When the LST that had delivered the stringers and taken aboard the bulldozers, graders, dump trucks, and other equipment could not free itself from the 

beach, the Navy brought in smaller LCUs. As a result, it took several more 

days to return the troops and equipment to Qui Nhon.

The airfield at Landing Zone English got more attention the following 

month when the 19th Engineer Battalion returned on 19 November to upgrade 

it to an all-weather capability. Company C took six days to place M8A1 matting on the runway, but heavy rains forced the engineers to switch from T17 

membrane to the metal matting on the taxiway and parking area. To keep on 

schedule, Colonel Rhodes sent two platoons from Company B to assist. Still, 

the heavy rainfall (over thirty inches fell in November and December) and a 

lack of matting caused delays. The two companies completed the surfacing, 

including a peneprime treatment of the runway’s shoulders, on 20 December. 

By this time, Landing Zone English had been transformed into a large logistical base and a key airfield to move 1st Cavalry Division troops long distances. 

The combination of heavy use and rains at English made maintenance an 

endless task for the engineers of several units.28

28 ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 7–8, 20–22.
Engineers at War

220

Meanwhile, efforts were under way with South Korean forces south of 

Qui Nhon to reopen gaps along Highway 1 in Phu Yen Province. In December 

and January, elements of the 19th Engineer Battalion, now under the command of Colonel Bush’s 45th Engineer Group, pushed south with roadwork 

while the 39th Engineer Battalion at Tuy Hoa pressed northward. As the 

South Korean Capital Division swept the area southward, Company A, 19th 

Engineer Battalion, reopened the road south of Qui Nhon from the Cu Mong 

Pass to Song Cau, filling sixty-five cuts in the road and building three panel 

bridges. As the South Korean 9th Division pushed northward from Tuy Hoa, 

Colonel Fulton pressed his 39th Engineer Battalion to work on the road and 

bridges. The reopening of the road for the first time in years was cause for 

some symbolic gesture. To emphasize the importance of this occasion, the 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, dispatched a thirty-four-vehicle convoy 

(dubbed Operation Roadrunner) from Kontum City by way of Highwa

19 to Qui Nhon, then down Highway 1 to the brigade’s home base at Phan 

Rang. To help speed up the crossing over the Song Cau at Ha Yen, the 39th 

Engineer Battalion dispatched two platoons from Company A and part of the 

553d Float Bridge Company to assemble a light tactical raft to supplement 

the South Vietnamese M4T6 raft at the ferry site. The restored road’s original 

asphalt surface was in fair condition and held up under local traffic. The 45th 

Engineer Group remained responsible for keeping the north-south highway 

open and assigned maintenance to the battalions in the area.29

By mid-1967, operations launched by allied forces in the coastal lowlands 

took away the previous dominance enjoyed by the Viet Cong and the North 

Vietnamese. The enemy was forced out of populated areas, and his large-scale 

operations became extremely risky. In Binh Dinh Province, the 1st Cavalry 

Division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but he still contested the province. 

The engineers contributed by reopening roads and making airfield improvements. Coastal Highway 1, albeit in poor condition and dangerous in many 

places, was passable during daylight traffic almost its entire length. Newly 

opened stretches included thirty-one miles from Landing Zone English north

to Duc Pho and another thirty-one miles from the Cu Mong Pass to Tuy Hoa. 

Interior roads were declared safe up to twelve and a half miles into the mountains. Meanwhile, completion of jet-capable runways at Phu Cat by RMKBRJ and Tuy Hoa by Walter Kidde and the addition of second permanent 

runways at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang by RMK-BRJ allowed for the 

stationing of more Air Force tactical fighter-bombers to provide support to 

the ground forces in II Corps. Work also progressed on the new permanent 

concrete runway at An Khe.30

29 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 19th Engr Bn, p. 9, and 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 39th Engr Bn, 

p. 3.30 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 83, 92, 322–24; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, I FFV, 

pp. 51, 66–69.
221

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

The Delta

By the spring of 1967, the Mobile Riverine Force, the joint U.S. Army–

Navy afloat element, was in place at Dong Tam and was beginning a long 

series of operations under the code name Coronado. The 9th Division’s 2d

Brigade provided the ground forces from three infantry battalions and other 

attached units. The Navy provided some one hundred boats and crews. From 

two barracks ships, the troops went on operations in armored troop carriers, preceded by minesweeping craft and escorted by armored boats called 

monitors. When the flotilla reached the objective, the men debarked under 

the protective fire of weapons mounted on the river craft, including 105-mm. 

howitzers on Ammi pontoon barges. When operations began, the Viet Cong 

countered with ambushes from the shore and in battalion strength. As time 

passed, the Mobile Riverine Force pressed forward into enemy-held areas, 

with results that lent encouragement that riverine operations might succeed.31

Army engineers organized for operations in this environment. The 1,015-

man 15th Engineer Battalion, the 9th Division’s organic engineer battalion, 

under Lt. Col. William E. Read continued to divide its efforts among the division’s three brigades. Battalion headquarters, Company A, and Company E, 

the bridge company, were located near the division’s and its 1st Brigade base 

camp at Bearcat east of Saigon. Company C was located at the 3d Brigade’s 

base camp at Tan An southwest of Saigon, and Companies B and D supported 

the 2d Brigade at Dong Tam also southwest of Saigon. The 15th Engineer 

Battalion used a broad array of equipment, including Rome plows, tankdozers, and bridging to support the division’s widely scattered operations in III 

and IV Corps. Meanwhile, general support for the 9th Division’s operations in 

the delta fell to the recently arrived 34th Engineer Group.32

Riverine operations by their nature reduced the requirements for combat 

engineer support and eliminated many demolitions and minesweeping tasks. 

Consequently, combat engineers attached to the riverine force frequently filled 

out infantry units that were short of riflemen. The usual allocation of engineers from the divisional engineer battalion was one engineer platoon to support each infantry battalion in the field. For example, Company D at Dong 

Tam typically supported the same two infantry battalions of the 2d Brigade on 

operations, providing a platoon to each battalion, while the remaining platoon 

and equipment worked at the Dong Tam camp. Lt. Col. Thomas C. Loper, 

who assumed command of the 15th Engineer Battalion in September 1967, 

reported that habitually fragmenting the two platoons into two- or three-man 

demolition teams to support infantry companies of the two battalions of the 

2d Brigade in the field did not seem economical. Consequently, the battalion began field tests by setting aside one of the platoons at a central location 

aboard a barracks ship to respond to calls while the other platoon dispatched 

31 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 209; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 402, 

411–30; Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 68, 73–74, 84–85. 32 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 15th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 68, pp. 1, 4, Historians files, CMH; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 244–45.
Engineers at War

222

demolition teams to the infantry companies. Loper also put two of his M113 

armored personnel carriers mounting flamethrowers aboard armored troop 

carriers for use against enemy positions along the waterways. The remaining 

two M113s with flamethrowers were used to clear heavily booby trapped areas. 

Until then, the battalion’s flamethrower platoon had been used for job site 

security and supporting the division’s three brigades and the Thai regiment.33

Among the 15th Engineer Battalion’s unusual elements were the 1st and 2d 

Airboat Platoons, activated and attached to the battalion in December 1967. 

These unique Army units were used to support the 3d Brigade in Long An 

Province and Thai forces in the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province. 

This coincided with the Navy dispatching three Patrol Air-Cushion Vehicles, 

or PACVs, to the Mobile Riverine Force. PACVs, also known as hovercraft that 

could skim right over river banks and dikes, had been demonstrated earlier in 

the Plain of Reeds, southwest of Saigon. The Army’s smaller and considerably 

less expensive airboats (each hovercraft cost close to $1 million) with mounted 

machine guns had been successfully used by the Special Forces. Because the 

15th Engineer Battalion had powered bridge erection boats, reconnaissance 

and pneumatic assault boats, responsibility for river reconnaissance, and some 

maintenance capability, assigning the twenty-eight airboats to the battalion 

was a logical choice. A short training program was conducted at Long Binh 

and concluded in a joint operation with the 720th Military Police Battalion. 

33 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 5–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 

1–3, 5–11, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 15th Engr Bn, pp. 4–6, 9–10; Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 

139, 141; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 244–45.

Men of the 15th Engineer Battalion use an airboat in the delta.
223

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

Within a few days, the airboats began supporting tactical operations. On 16 

December, the 1st Airboat Platoon departed Long Binh with sixteen boats 

and infantry machine gunners to support 3d Brigade operations in Long An 

Province. From the eighteenth through the twenty-ninth, the boats carried out 

screening and reconnaissance missions, moved troops into battle, and operated under day and nighttime conditions. On 5 January, five airboats began 

working with the Thai regiment. The boats were used almost daily, and by 

the eighteenth, eleven boats were working with the Thais. Some success was 

reported by the battalion with reconnaissance and screening missions, but 

there was less success in transporting troops. Although the airboats were rated 

to carry seven men, their speed and maneuverability decreased when exceeding the optimum load of three (operator, gunner, and one passenger). The 

dry season precluded the entry of airboats into the rice paddies, the primary 

intended use, thus confining them to rivers and streams. Their loud noise gave 

the enemy enough time to set up ambushes along the channelized waterways. 

Maintenance and supply problems included a lack of special tools and spare 

parts. Supplying the specified aviation fuel to remote areas was another problem for a while. Refueling took a long time because the size of the fuel intake 

hole was too small. A special nozzle was made, but it still took up to three 

hours to refuel one platoon. The battalion also reported the need for better 

communications, since only five radios were authorized for each platoon. The 

battalion felt that each boat needed a radio, while the command and control 

boat needed two, one for communicating within the platoon and the other for 

communicating with the supported unit and requesting artillery fire.34

III Corps Again

As the threat along the border in III Corps abated following Operation 

Attleboro, General Westmoreland in early 1967 launched the first of seve

large clearing operations north of Saigon. Operation Cedar Falls began

on 8 January 1967 with the objective of destroying the Viet Cong Military 

Region 4 headquarters harbored in the Iron Triangle. Under the direction of 

General Seaman’s II Field Force, the corps-size sweep involved the 1st and 

25th Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 196th Infantry Brigade, and 

the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. After maneuvering units into position, 

Seaman launched airmobile assaults to seal the enemy bastion, exploiting the 

natural barriers of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers that formed two of its 

boundaries. A series of sweeps followed to push the enemy toward the blocking 

forces. During the nineteen-day campaign, the enemy preferred to hide or infiltrate through allied lines than fight. Still, some seven hundred Viet Cong were 

killed, and approximately the same number were taken prisoner. When Ceda

Falls ended on 26 January, the combined American and South Vietnamese 

34 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 15th Engr Bn, pp. 12–14, 20–22; Berry, Gadget Warfare, 

pp. 35–38; Edward J. Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy 

and the War in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the 

Navy, 1994), pp. 167–68.
Engineers at War

224

force had found and destroyed major installations, including over 1,100 bunkers, 400 tunnels, and 500 other structures, including fortifications. They had 

also captured large quantities of food and supplies, confiscated many enemy 

documents, and cleared land for future operations.35 (Map 18)

Before and during Cedar Falls, the Engineer Command and the 1st

Division’s 1st Engineer Battalion formed a task force to support the combat 

forces gathering around the Iron Triangle. Colonel Kiernan, the division engineer and commander of the 1st Engineer Battalion, coordinated these efforts. 

Units in the task force included elements of his battalion; flame-throwing platoons from the division’s 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry; and tunnel rats from the 

35 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 249; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 133, 

137, 152; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, II FFV, pp. 7–8; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 

96–112.

240

14

2

13

13 X

173

X X

1

X

3 1

I I

41

III

11(-)

III

11(-)

1

XX

25

3

X

2

196

X

2

1

XX

25

3

X

173 Abn

Saigon River

Rach Thi Tinh

Saigon River

Dau Tieng Ap Bau Bang

Lai Khe

Ben Cat

Rach Bap

Cu Chi

Trang Bang

Ben Suc

Phu Cuong

Filhol Plantation

Ho Bo Woods

Boi Loi Woods

8–26 January 1967

OPERATION CEDAR FALLS

Air Assault

Ground Operations

Reconnaissance and Screening

Staging Area

Blocking Position

0 5 Miles

0 5

Kilometers

Map 18
225

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

242d Chemical Detachment. Most of the rest of the engineers came from the 

79th Engineer Group (elements of the 27th, 86th, 168th, and 588th Combat 

Engineer Battalions, and the 557th Light Equipment Company) and the 159th 

Engineer Group (elements of the 169th Engineer Construction Battalion). In 

addition, the 1st Logistical Command’s Saigon Support Command provided 

a detachment from the 188th Maintenance Battalion to render backup maintenance support to the bulldozer fleet being formed for large jungle-clearing 

operations. The bulldozers were consolidated under the headquarters of one 

engineer battalion, Colonel Pelosky’s 168th. Pelosky organized four teams, 

each consisting of six to twelve bulldozers. The engineer task force also set up 

a composite maintenance team that could fabricate parts.36

In a deception operation called Niagara Falls (5 to 7 January), the 1st

Division moved into attack positions. The 600-man engineer task force helped 

lead the way. The task force, supported by fifty-nine bulldozers, four Rome 

plows, and tunnel demolition teams from the 79th and 159th Engineer Groups 

in a short shakedown operation, cleared one-half square miles of jungle bordering the Thi Tinh River southeast of the Iron Triangle. On 5 January, a 1st 

Engineer Battalion bridge platoon with a pile-driving crane from the 169th 

Engineer Construction Battalion completed a 160-foot panel bridge across the 

Thi Tinh River west of Ben Cat. This route provided a rapid crossing for the 

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Shortly after the start of Cedar Falls, a

span of the new bridge collapsed under the combined load of a recovery vehicle towing a disabled M48 tank. Work crews from the 1st Engineer Battalion 

worked throughout the night removing the damaged section and installing an 

armored vehicle launched bridge to cross the gap. An engineer task force followed the 11th Armored Cavalry, clearing jungle and building landing zones, 

roads, and support areas. While the majority of engineers provided the customary support for a combat operation, they also took the opportunity to 

make Cedar Falls one of the most unique operations in the war up to that

point. For the first time, engineers deployed bulldozers and Rome plows on a 

massive scale to open large jungle areas during a combat operation. Until then, 

the Rome plows had worked in safe or partially secure areas. Now they became 

part of an assault team or dozer-infantry team to destroy enemy fortifications. 

The dozer part of the team included standard D7E bulldozers, tankdozers, 

36 Unless otherwise noted, engineer roles in Cedar Falls and Niagara Falls are base

on Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction City, pp. 29, 31–41, 60–79; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 139–

40; Always First, 1965–1967, “The Bulldozer in the Attack”; Combat Lessons Bulletin, HQ 

USARV, no. 5, 8 Feb 67, sub: Engineer Operations in the Iron Triangle; Lt. Col. Joseph M. 

Kiernan, “Combat Engineers in the Iron Triangle,” Army 17 (June 1967): 42–45; AAR, Opn 

Cedar Falls, 1st Engr Bn, 2 Mar 67, Historians files, CMH; Ltr, Kiernan to All Men 1st Engr

Bn and Dozer and Demolition Teams, 79th Gp, 29 Jan 67, sub: Engineer Actions on Operations 

Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls, both in OCE Hist Ofc; Interv, Capt George E. Creighto

Jr., 17th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Joseph M. Kiernan, CO, 1st Engr Bn, 20 Apr 67, Historians 

files, CMH; Self Interv, Maj John D. Simpson, S–3, 168th Engr Bn, 8 Jul 67, pp. 1–77, VNIT 

48, CMH; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 168th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 67, pp. 4, 8, 10–12, Historians 

files, CMH; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, incl. 7, tab R, p. 2, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 6.
Engineers at War

226

and Rome plows. The 1st Engineer Battalion also created an instant navy with 

its fleet of bridge erection boats to patrol the rivers.

Dozer-infantry teams moved into the jungle together, simultaneously 

clearing vegetation, searching for the enemy, and destroying his fortifications. 

One technique involved placing two tankdozers at the point to clear vegetation and detonating booby traps, followed by four bulldozers abreast, some 

equipped with Rome plow blades, with two more bulldozers to clean up the 

windrows of cut vegetation. Infantry worked alongside the dozers, at the same 

time carrying out search-and-destroy missions. A second technique employed 

a Rome plow in the lead followed by troops in armored vehicles. When the 

plow uncovered an enemy position, the vehicles provided fire support for the 

attacking infantry. Experience during Niagara Falls revealed the continuous need for on-the-spot servicing and small repairs by the bulldozer operators

and maintenance teams.

The duration of Cedar Falls did not allow for jungle clearing in the

entire Iron Triangle. Instead, as Kiernan recommended, the engineers cleared 

only strategic areas, 7 or 8 percent of the sixty-three square miles of jungle. By 

the end of clearing operations on 22 January, the 1st Division engineer task 

force had cleared a total of 2,711 acres or 4 square miles. This included 55- to 

110-yard strips of jungle on each side of major roads and thirty-four landing zones spaced throughout the bastion for helicopter resupply and medical 

evacuation. Engineers lifted into the jungle by helicopters cleared three of the 

landing zones, and the dozer-infantry teams cleared the remainder. At the 

northwest corner of the triangle, the village of Ben Suc, a suspected enemy 

fortified supply and political center, was sealed off and villagers evacuated. 

Bulldozers, tankdozers, and demolition teams then leveled buildings, collapsed tunnels, and obliterated bunkers and underground storage rooms. The 

teams also cut numerous swaths in the Iron Triangle, usually in widths of 33 

to 55 yards, to permit rapid movement of mechanized and airmobile units in 

future operations. The effect of this clearing lasted for a time, but vegetation 

always returned.

While the engineers cleared the jungle above ground, the tunnel rats and 

demolition teams explored and destroyed Viet Cong complexes found in villages and logistical base areas. The 1st and 168th Engineer Battalions discovered an effective method to destroy deeper tunnels by using conventional 

demolitions with acetylene gas. Demolition satchel charges, which were thirtypound charges of TNT, and forty-pound cratering charges placed at critical 

locations (rooms, tunnel junctions, exits, and entrances) or spaced at about 

27-yard intervals, provided a powerful boost for the acetylene. The combined 

effect helped to collapse tunnels as deep as 15 to 20 feet below the surface.

Basically, however, the 1st Engineer Battalion’s tunnel rats had the main job, 

going where a flashlight guided the way and a pistol was the primary weapon. 

“Charlie is in there. All we have to do is dig him out,” explained Pfc. Michael R. 

Tingley, who served in a team of seven tunnel rats working in conjunction with 

the division’s chemical detachment. Other team members carried gas masks, 

nauseating gas, grenades, smoke grenades, a telephone, and fifty-foot lengths 

of reinforced rope. One team member, Pfc. Roger L. Cornett, noted, “Handling 
227

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

explosives is real touchy at times. You can’t really worry about it but you often 

wonder.” Another tunnel rat with six months’ experience with explosives, Pfc. 

Stephen E. Sikorski, added, “I’m most concerned about booby traps,” and 

regarded his work as a “specialty that can either build or destroy.”37

37 “Engineers Turn Tunnel Rats,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 11 June 1967, extracted from 

Always First: 1st Engineer Battalion, 1967-1968 (1st Engr Bn, n.d.), copy in CMH.

Detonating cord used to initiate an explosive charge is lowered into a tunnel by 

troops of the 173d Engineer Company, 173d Airborne Brigade, during 

Operation Cedar Fall
Engineers at War

228

During Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls, 1st Division engineer

attempted to seal off enemy escape routes. General DePuy, the division commander, suggested mounting quad .50-caliber machine guns (four heavy 

machine guns mounted on a single pedestal and fired by one gunner) on platforms placed at the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. Kiernan 

turned the task over to his bridge company. Using components of a M4T6 

floating bridge, Company E assembled two rafts at the Vietnamese Engineer 

School at Phu Cuong, some seven and a half miles downstream. Each raft contained two bridge floats connected with aluminum decking, one quad .50- and 

six .30-caliber machine guns for additional firepower. Sandbags were placed 

on the floats and decking to protect the riflemen and grenadiers. A twentyseven-foot utility boat propelled each raft. The makeshift armed rafts were 

given the imposing name of monitors. In addition, the engineer navy included 

two armed utility boats, dubbed U-boats, and several pneumatic assault boats, 

each manned by two engineers and thirteen infantrymen for river patrols. 

Early on 5 January, the engineer flotilla left Phu Cuong and moved up the 

Saigon River. Nearing their destination, the lead elements came under sniper 

fire. The rafts and an armed helicopter overhead returned the fire, killing four 

of the enemy. By nightfall, the monitors took up position at the juncture of the 

two rivers, one raft tied to the east bank and the other anchored in midstream.

While the monitors remained in the same general area during Ceda

Falls, the engineer utility and assault boats of the 1st and 25th Divisions and 

173d Airborne Brigade patrolled the rivers. The patrols checked all Vietnamese 

boats and took several Viet Cong suspects to interrogation points. In addition, 

Men of the 1st Engineer Battalion use an M4T6 raft as a patrol boat.
229

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

the boats ferried supplies to outposts along the rivers, and returned with large 

quantities of rice and other enemy supplies extracted from nearby inlets.

Encouraged by the results of Cedar Falls, allied forces in February

intensified their pressure on the enemy in the largest operation of the war to 

that time, Junction City, an attack on War Zone C. While South Vietname

forces remained near the populated areas, elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th 

Divisions, the 196th Infantry Brigade—altogether six brigades—and the 

11th Armored Cavalry maneuvered into position to establish a horseshoeshaped cordon around the war zone. On 22 February, a battalion of the 173d 

Airborne Brigade, in the only combat paratroop jump of the war, dropped 

into a blocking position near the Cambodian border. Combined armored and 

mechanized elements of the 2d Brigade, 25th Division, and the 11th Armored 

Cavalry thrust northward through the open end of the horseshoe. Meeting 

little resistance at the outset, advancing troops found numerous enemy base 

camps, which they destroyed. Before the end of Phase I on 17 March, several 

sizable engagements took place, with two major battles occurring at or near 

Prek Klok, approximately halfway between Tay Ninh City and the Cambodian 

border, along Route 4.38 (Map 19)

As Junction City entered its second phase, American forces concentrat

their efforts in the eastern part of War Zone C, close to Highway 13. A brigade 

from the 9th Infantry Division replaced the 173d Airborne Brigade, and units 

began search-and-destroy operations in their assigned sectors. Enemy troops 

struck sharply against night defensive positions and firebases in attempts to 

isolate and defeat individual units. The combined firepower of the U.S. units, 

supporting artillery, and close air support, however, forced the attackers to 

break contact after suffering large losses.

By mid-April, the scale of Junction City had tapered off. The third pha

saw most Army units withdrawn, either to return to their bases or to take 

part in other operations. For the next month, a joint U.S.–South Vietnamese 

Army task force roamed throughout the war zone, but the temporarily shattered enemy had retreated into Cambodia. The operation officially came to an 

end at midnight on 14 May.

Engineer tasks in Junction City paralleled those in Cedar Fal

Although the region was too large to level with bulldozers, tankdozers, and 

Rome plows, the engineers managed to destroy some of the major hideouts. In the western sector of operations, the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th 

Division, supported by elements of the 27th, 86th, and 588th Engineer 

Combat Battalions; Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion, 4th Division; the 

175th Engineer Company, 196th Infantry Brigade; and the 500th Panel Bridge 

Company cleared land along the sides of roads and built landing zones and 

bridges along the way. The engineers also provided minesweeping and demolition teams and maintained forty-one miles of roadway. In the eastern half 

of War Zone C, the 1st Engineer Battalion—backed by the 168th Engineer 

38 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 113–43; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 249; 

Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 133–34, 137, 152–53; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, II FFV, 

15 May 67, pp. 21–23, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

230

Battalion during Phase I, the 27th Engineer Battalion during Phase II, and the 

173d Engineer Company—opened, cleared, improved, and maintained over 

forty-six miles of roads and opened and repaired several airstrips. At the start 

of the operation, Company D and Headquarters Company moved from the 

13

14

22

22

13

1

4

246

13

X X

25

X

1 25

X

2 25

X

3 4

OPERATION

JUNCTION CITY

OPERATION

CEDAR FALLS

PARROT'S

BEAK

ANGEL'S

WING

SUOI DA

TONG LE CHON

DAU TIENG

TAN SON NHUT

CU CHI

IV 

XXX 

III 

XX

25

X

199

XX

1

25

X

1

2

X

3

1

PREK KLOK

KATUM

Song Vam Co Dong

Saig on River

WAR ZONE C

An Loc

Ap Chon

Thanh

Lai Khe

Phu Hoa

Ben Cat

Go Dau Ha

Tay Ninh

Lo Go

Bao Trai

Duc Hoa

Trang

Bang

Duc Hue

Cu Chi

Moc Hoa

Svay

Rieng

SAIGON

Phu Cuong

CAMBODIA

October 1966–June 1967

III CORPS OPERATIONS

Unit Boundary

0 Miles

0

15

15 Kilometers

Map 19
231

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

just-completed C–130 airstrip at Suoi Da to begin work on an airstrip capable 

of handling C–123s at Katum, completing the laterite-topped airstrip in six 

days. The 168th Engineer Battalion built a new Special Forces camp and a 

3,100-foot M8A1 airstrip that was capable of handling C–130s at Prek Klok, 

helped complete the airstrip at Katum, and repaired the T17-covered airstrip 

at Suoi Da. Similarly, the 27th Engineer Battalion constructed a Special Forces 

camp at Tong Le Chon.39

The 168th Engineer Battalion played a major part in the second battle at 

Prek Klok. The battalion shared defense responsibilities inside the circular 

wagon train–type perimeter with 1st Division units—a mechanized infantry 

battalion and an artillery battalion. On the night of 10 March, the Viet Cong 

launched a heavy mortar barrage followed by the main attack on the perimeter’s eastern sector. During the attack, the engineers fought as infantry, filling 

in the gaps from their foxholes in the front lines. Air strikes and fire from 

other firebases helped drive away the attackers with heavy losses. U.S. losses 

were three killed and thirty-eight wounded, including two engineers killed 

(one from the 168th and one from attached elements of the 27th Engineer 

Battalion) and seven wounded.40

After Junction City, Colonel Kiernan reviewed the accomplishments 

his engineers. He told his troops that the battalion had built “more than onehalf of all Bailey Bridging employed to date in Vietnam . . . and constructed 

half of all C–130 airfields built by U.S. Engineers in the II Field Force area.” 

While Company D worked on the airfields during Junction City, the oth

companies worked on roads and bridges.41

The battalion completed two panel bridges: the first on Route 246 over the 

Saigon River and the second on Route 1A over the Song Be River. To meet 

a short deadline to allow passage of the 11th Armored Cavalry, Companies 

A and B helped by Company E’s bridge experts worked day and night to 

complete a two-span 220-foot bridge over the Saigon River at Tong Le Chon. 

Company A then deployed to the Song Be site south of Phuoc Vinh to rebuild 

a three-span bridge, claimed by Kiernan as one of the longest and most sophisticated Bailey bridges built by an engineering unit since World War II. Since 

the Vietnamese government would not allow removal of the concrete truss 

approach spans, the battalion had to modify panel bridge parts in order to fit 

the new center span between the old French trusses. Kiernan reported the new 

span was partially built on the existing center span, then jacked up from the 

old steel truss, and returned to a final position after the older truss dropped 

into the river one hundred feet below “with a beautifully executed demolition charge.” The battalion completed the 430-foot cantilever bridge just as 

39 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 140; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 193; Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction 

City, pp. 122–23, 152–53, 155, 159; AAR, Opn Junction City, 1st Engr Bn, 14 Apr 67, pp. 

4–5; Ltr, Kiernan to All Men 1st Engr Bn, 14 Apr 67, sub: 1st Engineer Actions on Operation 

Junction City, both in OCE Hist Ofc; Always First, 1965–1967, “The Big Push into War Zo

C”; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, pp. 5–6, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7, OCE Hist Ofc. 40 Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction City, pp. 117–21; Interv, Simpson, 8 Jul 67, pp. 79–115. 41 Ltr, Kiernan to 1st Engr Bn, 14 Apr 67.
Engineers at War

232

Junction City came to a close, and the previously rated Class 23 (thirty-t

capacity) bridge could now carry tanks and fully loaded supply vehicles in the 

next operation by the division.42

In the wake of Junction City, allied forces resumed clearing operations closer to Saigon and ventured into War Zone D. Just north of the Ir

Triangle, the 1st and 25th Divisions began Operation Manhattan. The 1s

and 65th Engineer Battalions continued extensive land-clearing projects and 

the destruction of hundreds of bunkers, tunnels, and installations. Monsoon 

rains began to fall, and keeping the unpaved routes open became a major challenge. In May, the 1st Division started Operation Dallas by entering the rolling, jungle-covered area of War Zone D to the east of Route 1A. The following month, the division moved north of Phuoc Vinh in Operation Billings. 

Notable 1st Engineer Battalion achievements during Billings, which ended 

on 26 June, included clearing landing zones, destroying bunkers, and reopening 

the twenty-mile stretch of Route 1A from Phuoc Vinh to Dong Xoai. Carving 

infantry landing zones in the heart of the jungle was dangerous. During one 

landing zone clearing mission, the 1st Platoon, Company C, had to stop work 

when the infantry security force tried to beat off an attack. During the three 

hours of fierce fighting against an estimated North Vietnamese battalion, the 

engineers doubled as infantrymen and self-appointed medics.43

Combat engineers suffered their share of casualties during these operations, 

and just as often became victims of accidents. The 1st Engineer Battalion suffered one man killed in action and seven wounded during Cedar Falls; one

killed and forty-two wounded during Junction City; and sixteen wounded 

Operations Manhattan, Dallas, and Billings. By its very nature, militar

engineering is dangerous. Working with construction equipment, handling 

explosives, and traveling by vehicles and aircraft, coupled with long hours and 

fatigue, meant that engineers in even so-called secure areas could be killed 

or injured. For instance, during Junction City, two tankdozers of the 1

Engineer Battalion with leading elements of the 3d Brigade moving north along 

the road between Suoi Da and Katum were lost to mines on the first morning of the operation. A party looking for laterite was attacked and suffered 

three casualties within six hundred feet of the battalion command post. At the 

Katum airstrip, surveying was often interrupted by sniper fire. Shortly after 

Operation Dallas, the 1st Engineer Battalion suffered a deadly blow when a 

helicopter carrying the battalion’s command group struck a high-tension wire 

while flying low under the flight pattern at Bien Hoa Air Base and crashed to 

the ground. Killed in the incident were Kiernan, who only had seven days to 

go before returning home; Lt. Col. Rodney H. Smith, executive officer and 

commander-designate; Maj. Millard L. Treadwell, operations officer; and Sgt. 

Maj. Terry M. Rimes, who was about to assume the post of battalion sergeant 

42 Ibid.

43 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, II FFV, 18 Sep 67, pp. 19–20, Historians files, CMH; 1st Engr 

Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-21 to III-22; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 

8, pp. 6–7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 7. See also MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 

145–55, 339–43.
233

The Campaign Widens, October 1966–June 1967

major. Maj. Edwin C. Keiser, assistant division engineer, assumed temporary 

command of the battalion.44

By mid-1967, Army engineers had proven their ability to support fastmoving combat operations in II and III Corps and more recently in IV Corps. 

In III Corps, they kept resupply roads open; built and reopened forward airfields; cleared the land for landing zones and mutually supporting firebases; 

cut swaths through dense vegetation that cloaked the enemy; and destroyed 

enemy base areas, tunnels, and bunkers. Similarly, in much larger II Corps, 

key roads were being opened and more airfields sprinkled the hinterlands. 

Most impressive was the gradual return of coastal Highway 1 to service with 

accompanying benefit to the local economy. Much work, however, remained 

in pushing the air and road supply lines into the inhospitable interior. As for 

the engineers’ prodigious efforts, local commanders expressed their appreciation, but some still wanted them under their direct control. Senior engineers 

continued to emphasize priority to support combat operations, but at the same 

time striving to complete base development projects and turning attention to 

the growing highway restoration program.

New techniques and equipment and reliance on technology did not always 

result in complete success. Although a great boon as an expedient runway 

surface, the T17 membrane, like the new metal mattings, required a good 

base, and frequent failures caused by heavy rains required extensive airfield 

repairs. The tunnel destruction teams in III Corps using the acetylene and 

explosives together achieved good results, but the Viet Cong had built too 

many burrows for the few trained tunnel rats and engineers to explore and 

map. Similarly, the impressive results of the bulldozers and Rome plows in 

land-clearing operations in III Corps were tempered by the large areas of 

dense vegetation and heavy maintenance requirements. In the course of a day’s 

operations, it was common for most of the Rome plows to sustain disabling 

damage of some sort. Troops in land-clearing units suffered higher casualty 

rates both from enemy action and natural hazards. Aside from falling trees, 

the operators often faced swarms of bees. In the end, elusive enemy troops 

still had abundant jungle cover to move about and build concealed supply 

caches. The jungle also quickly reclaimed the cleared areas. Although the engineers reopened many roads, the enemy came back at night to bury mines and 

destroy bridges. Sweeping for mines became a daily morning task. Heavy rains 

and traffic required continuous maintenance on the unsurfaced roads. Much 

work remained to improve the coastal road network and to extend road and 

air supply lines to the contested interior. Meanwhile, the military and civilian 

engineers remained heavily committed to base development, for the logistics 

bases and ports played a crucial role in supporting the combat forces.

The allied offensives had set the enemy back, but he remained a major 

threat in the countryside. A discouraging feature of the war was the fact that 

the allies could not muster enough troops to occupy the enemy strongholds and 

thereby prevent him from returning. As soon as American troops left areas they 

44 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-19 to III-22; Rogers, Cedar Falls–Junction City, p. 155; 

Always First, 1965–1967, “The Big Push into War Zone C.”
Engineers at War

234

had cleared such as the Iron Triangle, the enemy returned. Meanwhile, trouble 

was brewing in I Corps. In 1967, the threatening situation against the marines 

along the Demilitarized Zone intensified. General Westmoreland, concerned 

that the Marine forces there were insufficient, decided to send Army troops to 

the northern provinces.
8

To I Corps

I

n early 1967, a growing North Vietnamese threat below the Demilitarized 

Zone between the two Vietnams brought infantry units of the U.S. 

Army to I Corps for the very first time. General Westmoreland had planned 

to put the Army temporarily in southern I Corps in connection with his dryseason campaign beginning in the spring. But during the winter, a quickening 

of enemy activity in the A Shau Valley and Quang Ngai Province, and his conviction that the marines in I Corps were stretched to the limit, forced him to 

postpone his campaign indefinitely and to rush in reinforcements on a schedule not quite his own. On 28 February, he completed an initial planning action 

preparatory to the deployment of units northward, approving a new makeshift 

division to be created from brigades in II and III Corps, but deferred actually 

selecting the units until the division headquarters could be formally activated. 

Five weeks later, on 6 April, with eight North Vietnamese regiments counted in 

the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone, and enemy artillery hammering Marine 

bases along the border, Westmoreland ordered I Field Force to enter southern 

I Corps by the next evening so that the marines there could be sped at once to 

the threatened north. With this order, which implemented the provisional division called Task Force Oregon, the brigades fell into place. But because the

brigades were still scattered through the interior, with the nearest one too far 

south to meet the schedule, I Field Force called on its most agile unit to serve 

as the tip of the knife, and within hours elements of the 1st Cavalry Division 

were air-assaulting north into Duc Pho to relieve the marines.1

Duc Pho and Chu Lai

What the 1st Cavalry Division found in southern I Corps were facilities 

scarcely adequate for the marines, let alone the Army. For two years, the 

marines had treated southern I Corps as a backwater holding action while 

looking to the north. Da Nang had become the command and support hub of 

the corps-level III Marine Amphibious Force, nourishing satellite bases at Chu 

Lai and Phu Bai in consonance with the strategy, which was to hold the line 

as far north as possible and to pacify the rural population around the cities 

and towns. Well to the south lay Duc Pho, a district headquarters just above 

1

 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 203–10; Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War in 

the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1975), pp. 12–13; Maj. Gary L. Telfer, Lt. Col. Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming Jr., 

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: History and 

Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1984), pp. 75–78.
Engineers at War

236

the I/II Corps line, a town that had only become important to the Americans 

in January when the marines dispatched a battalion to cope with a rise in Viet 

Cong activity and to cut an enemy supply line to the coast. Despite two months 

of heavy fighting, the marines were barely dug in, still without beach and pier 

facilities or an airfield, or a secure lifeline down Highway 1 from the port at 

Chu Lai, and therefore dependent on helicopter resupply from ships offshore. 

Westmoreland’s orders to I Field Force were to the point: turn the town of 

Duc Pho into a robust support base—and do so quickly—and a staging area 

as large as necessary for the Army commitment.2

To spearhead that commitment, Maj. Gen. John J. Tolson, the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s commander, chose his reserve unit, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry. 

At first light on 7 April, the cavalrymen boarded Caribous and Chinooks at 

An Khe for the flight to Landing Zone English where they transferred to 

Huey helicopters for the journey to Duc Pho. By nightfall, the 2d Battalion 

relieved the marines outside the town. The 1st Cavalry Division’s 2d Brigade 

headquarters flew in the following morning and assumed control of all Army 

and Marine forces in the area, now designated Le Jeune. A second cavalry 

battalion followed the headquarters. Because the marines at the time had too 

few helicopters to effect their redeployment north, they remained under the 

control of the 2d Brigade until 21 April.3

 (Map 20)

With follow-on forces on their way to Duc Pho, one of the first priorities was construction of a rough but ready airfield. The assignment fell to 

the division’s 8th Engineer Battalion. Building on a reconnaissance of the site 

the previous month, advance elements of the battalion, including Company 

B, arrived on 7 April to start work east of the town in an open area called 

Landing Zone Montezuma. Over a period of forty-eight hours, helicopter

delivered thirty-one pieces of equipment weighing over two hundred tons—

making this the largest movement for the airmobile engineer battalion up to 

that point. The movement of the equipment, much of it partially disassembled, 

required twenty-four CH–54 Flying Crane sorties and fifteen CH–47 Chinook 

sorties. Work proceeded at a rapid pace around the clock, with operators running their equipment at night under the lights of vehicles and a floodlight set. 

This caused some concern to the marines who had endured nightly sniper and 

mortar fire over the past three months. The rumble of the bulldozers, graders, 

and other earthmoving equipment turned out to be the only activity to disturb 

their sleep that night. By dawn of the second day, the engineers completed 

one-half of the runway, and the work continued without interference.4

After twenty-four hours of continuous work, the 8th Engineer Battalion 

completed a 1,400-foot Caribou strip and proceeded into the next night to 

2

 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 205, 211; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, 

p. 15; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 131; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 

pp. 52–57, 63. 3

 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 210–11, 227–43; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 130–33; 

Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, pp. 78–79. 4

 Maj. Gene A. Schneebeck and Capt. Richard E. Wolfgram, “Airmobile Engineer Support 

for Combat,” Military Engineer 59 (November-December 1967): 397–98; AAR, Opn Le Jeune, 

8th Engr Bn, 4 May 67, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 132–33.
237

To I Corps

expand the runway for C–123 use. On 9 April, the first Caribous began delivering sections of culvert to be used to carry a drainage channel under the 

expanded runway. Air traffic was extremely heavy on that first day with over 

a thousand landings by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Work crews tried 

to reduce the immense dust clouds of the light sandy soil stirred by the heavy 

helicopter traffic by spreading peneprime on the helipads and refueling areas. 

On the evening of the tenth, work began on the installation of the culvert. 

Two scrapers cut a trench while a squad completed the culvert assembly for 

the drainage channel. Two bulldozers slowly moved the culvert into position 

and pushed it into the trench. The heavy equipment continued the cut, fill, and 

compaction work. By dawn the next day, the compacted earth C–123 runway, 

2,500 feet long and 50 feet wide, was done. A few days later, work began on a 

second Caribou airstrip placed 145 feet west of the C–123 runway’s centerline. 

14

1

1

1

9

SOUTH CHINA SEA

X X

2 ARVN

X

2 1 CAV

XXX

ARVN I

X X

1

XXX

III MAF

X X

3

X X

1 ARVN

X X

TF OREGON

II CTZ

HUE

DA NANG

QUANG NGAI

CHU LAI

DUC PHO

QUANG TRI

THUA THIEN

QUANG NAM

QUANG TIN

QUANG NGAI

KONTUM

BINH DINH

DEMARCATION LINE

CU LAO CHAM

CU LAO RE

Gio Linh

Quang Tri

Khe Sanh

A Shau

Hoi An

Tam Ky

Ba To

Con Thien Dong Ha

Que Son

NORTH VIETNAM

LAOS

CAMBODIA

1966–April 1967

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Map 20
Engineers at War

238

The second strip, completed on the evening of 15 April, became necessary to 

allow further expansion of the original airstrip to handle C–130s. Upon its 

completion, the Caribou runway then reverted to a taxiway.5

On 10 April, an advance party of the 39th Engineer Combat Battalion 

arrived from Tuy Hoa to coordinate support requirements with the 8th 

Engineer Battalion and to prepare for the 39th’s main mission—engineering 

support for Task Force Oregon. The main body of the battalion traveled

by ship. On 12 April, Company D came ashore two and a half miles east of 

Duc Pho at Landing Zone Guadalcanal, also called Razorback Be

A few days later, Company A and parts of the Headquarters Company and 

the 4th Platoon, 554th Float Bridge Company, came ashore. Two companies, 

Company B at Tuy Hoa and Company C at Vung Ro Bay, remained behind 

for the time being. Other elements of the 554th Float Bridge Company and 

a bridge platoon of the 509th Panel Bridge Company were also scheduled to 

join the 39th Engineer Battalion.6

Since the 1st Cavalry Division could not completely resupply the 2d 

Brigade by airlift and roads, the 39th Battalion’s first job was to build a road 

from the beach to Duc Pho as a ground link for supplies delivered by landing craft. Despite heavy rains and enemy mines, the 39th Battalion task force 

blazed a trail to Landing Zone Montezuma on the twenty-second. Within

three days, the trail was upgraded to a pioneer road. While Company D continued to improve the road, Company A moved men and equipment to Duc 

Pho to take over the C–130 airfield work. Company A, which endured some 

sniper fire, completed topping off the runway with MX19 aluminum matting 

on 15 May. The first C–130 landed on the new 3,500-by-60-foot strip with 

300-foot overruns that evening. The following morning, Company A joined 

the expanded all-weather C–130 runway to the temporary Caribou airstrip. 

The Duc Pho airfield, renamed Bronco, was officially completed on 31 May

The 39th Engineer Battalion also built helicopter pads and an ammunition 

supply point, and connected an access road from the airfield to Highway 1. 

On 30 June, the battalion began building revetments for all aircraft parked at 

Bronc

7

Direct support to the 2d Brigade’s two infantry battalions during operations in the Le Jeune area came from the 8th Engineer Battalion’s Company 

B, which carried out minesweeps, tunnel and bunker destruction, and general 

support. The latter chores included building helicopter revetments and pioneer 

roads, installing 6,000 yards of concertina barbed wire around the Landing 

Zone Montezuma perimeter, and spreading peneprime to reduce dust. One

5

 Schneebeck and Wolfgram, “Airmobile Engineer Support for Combat,” pp. 398–99; AAR, 

Opn Le Jeune, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 3, 6–7; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 133. 6 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, 15 Aug 67, pp. 2–3, 5; AAR, Opn Baker

Malheur I, 39th Engr Bn, 16 Sep 67, pp. 1–2, both in Historians files, CMH.

 AAR, Opn Baker/Malheur I, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 2–6; AAR, Opn Le Jeune, 8th Engr B

pp. 1–2, 5–6; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 5; Schneebeck and Wolfgram, 

“Airmobile Engineer Support for Combat,” pp. 398–99; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 

67, MACDC, 11 Jul 67, p. IV-8, Historians files, CMH; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force 

Oregon, 5 Nov 67, p. 35, Historians files, CMH
239

To I Corps

of the battalion’s water points was also airlifted from Landing Zone Englis

to Duc Pho on the eighth. Because the only source of water lay some 550 yards 

outside the perimeter, troops every morning had to sweep the road to the water 

point for mines.8

 (Map 21)

On 12 April, Task Force Oregon, under the command of Maj. Gen.

William B. Rosson, was officially activated and eight days later opened its 

headquarters at Chu Lai some thirty-seven miles north of Duc Pho. The task 

force relieved the 1st Marine Division on the twenty-sixth and formally took 

over responsibility for the Chu Lai and Duc Pho sectors. By then the 196th 

Light Infantry Brigade, which had been withdrawn a few days earlier from the 

final phase of Junction City, completed its move to Chu Lai. Reinforci

the brigade were a battalion from the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and 

a squadron from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. When, on 22 April, 

two battalions from the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, replaced the 2d Brigade, 

1st Cavalry Division, at Duc Pho, the Le Jeune operation ended. During the 

first week in May, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, put ashore at 

Razorback Beach and joined Task Force Oregon, making the task f

equivalent to a three-brigade division.9

8

 Schneebeck and Wolfgram, “Airmobile Engineer Support for Combat,” p. 399; AAR, Opn 

Le Jeune, 8th Engr Bn, 4 May 67, pp. 4–7. 9

 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 213–14, 229, 232, 236; Sharp and Westmoreland, 

Report, p. 153.

Men of the 39th Engineer Battalion lay MX19 matting at Duc Pho.
1

1

5B

5B

5B

5B

529

582

X X

TF OREGON

X

196

X

3 25

X

1 101

Song Tra Bong

Song Tra Khuc

Song Tra Cau

Song Ve

Song Re

SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

TAM KY

CHU LAI

QUANG NGAI

RAZORBACK

BRONCO

BATANGAN PENINSULA

KONT U M

QUANG NGAI

QUANG NGA I QUANG T IN

TAM KY

Ky Khuong

Tra Bong

Binh Son

Son Tinh

QUANG NGAI

Ha Thanh

Mo Duc

Ba To

Gia Vuc

Duc Pho

Nghia Hanh

Minh Long

April–May 1967

SOUTHERN I CORPS

Operational Boundary

0

0

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 500 800 and Above

10 Kilometers

Miles 10

Map 21
241

To I Corps

On 11 May, Task Force Oregon launched its first major operation,

Malheur, with the airborne brigade making a sweep inland from Duc Pho.

The heliborne search-and-destroy operation lasted until the end of May, followed by Malheur II, which ended on 2 August. Operations Hood R

and Benton followed. Although the operations resulted in large enemy losses

and the capture of food, weapons, and ammunition caches, they did not draw 

enemy forces into large-scale fighting.10

Army engineers allocated to Task Force Oregon, in addition to the 39th

Battalion, were drawn from units that supported the three brigades. Company 

A, 326th Engineer Battalion, deployed with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 

Division; the 175th Engineer Company with the 196th Infantry Brigade; and 

Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion, with the 3d Brigade, 25th Division. 

Technically the separate companies of these brigades were considered part of 

the 39th Engineer Battalion, but they remained attached to their respective 

brigades.11

As soon as the 39th Engineer Battalion completed the Duc Pho airfield, 

attention turned to reopening Highway 1 to traffic between Chu Lai and Duc 

Pho and south to the I/II Corps boundary. Logistics planners emphasized that 

this stretch would be the only dependable means of supply during the forthcoming monsoon. The road was secure between Chu Lai and Quang Ngai City, 

but between Quang Ngai and Duc Pho and south to the corps border it was 

controlled by the enemy and needed extensive repairs. General Westmoreland 

reemphasized the importance of the highway when he learned of plans to 

build a Caribou-capable airstrip at Mo Duc, about half-way between Duc Pho 

and Quang Ngai City. The airfield would support a nearby firebase and the 

district advisory team, but Westmoreland announced during a visit to Chu Lai 

that airfield work could be delayed until 1 September.12

With elements of Task Force Oregon providing security, the 39th Engineer

Battalion, and the 9th Marine Engineer Battalion, which had stayed behind 

in southern I Corps to support the Army, were ordered to bring the road to 

pioneer status, followed by more improvements. A new 75-ton-per-hour rock 

crusher was shipped to the 39th Engineer Battalion so it could set up a quarry 

approximately three miles south of Duc Pho. Limited rock production started 

on 10 September.13

Company A opened the road to traffic northward from Duc Pho, filling 

craters, grading, and building bypasses around destroyed bridges, followed 

10 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 229–43; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 154; 

Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, p. 119. 11 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7. 12 Msgs, COMUSMACV 18616 to COMNAFORV, 8 Jun 67, sub: Support of Project 

Oregon, and Task Force Oregon to III MAF, 31 May 67, sub: Visit of COMUSMACV, 

May 67; Memo, 1st Log Cmd, 18 Jun 67, sub: Trip Report, Visit to Chu Lai, 5 Jun 67, pp. 1, 

3; Memo, Lt Gen Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep CG, USARV, for COMUSMACV, 5 Nov 67, sub: 

Engineer Requirements in Americal Division TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility], p. 2. 

Messages and memos in Historians files, CMH. 13 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force Oregon, p. 23, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp

3, 9, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 4.
Engineers at War

242

by repairing or rebuilding the bridges. In many cases culverts were installed 

instead of bridges. Along the way, Company A provided its own security and 

deployed demolition teams and a bulldozer to destroy nearby tunnels and 

bunkers. When the Viet Cong retaliated by destroying a new forty-five-foot dry 

span on the evening of 1 June, work crews returned the next day and replaced 

the damaged span with two culverts. Company C, which had now rejoined the 

battalion, was given the job to improve the road southward from Quang Ngai 

City. On the fourteenth, the two companies met, and the fifty-mile stretch of 

Highway 1 between Chu Lai and Duc Pho was now open to convoy traffic. 

South of Duc Pho, Company D opened the road to the corps border on 8 July, 

linking up with the 8th Engineer Battalion working north from Bong Son. The 

next day the first convoy traversed this stretch.14

Although now open between Chu Lai and the border during daylight 

hours, Highway 1 still resembled a trail with many bypasses, culverts instead 

of bridges, and temporary bridges. Much work still needed to be done. The 

danger of mines and ambushes remained foremost in the minds of engineers 

working on the road. During the three-month period ending on 31 July, the 

39th Engineer Battalion suffered three killed and twenty-six wounded, mostly 

along Highway 1. In July, the southernmost one-third of the 39th Engineer 

14 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 2–5, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 

4; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 21 Oct 67, p. IV-8, Historians files, CMH; 

MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 242–43.

Once the airfield work at Duc Pho neared completion, the engineers turned their 

attention to reopening Highway 1 to Chu Lai.
243

To I Corps

Battalion’s Highway 1 responsibility was transferred to the 19th Engineer 

Battalion, which began to deploy north from Qui Nhon to work on the road 

from Bong Son to Duc Pho. Meanwhile, Seabees based in Chu Lai upgraded 

the highway from Quang Ngai City to Chu Lai, and Marine engineers worked 

northward from Chu Lai. Improvements to Highway 1 gradually advanced 

from a pioneer dry-weather roadbed and bypasses to a road with semipermanent bridges and a road surface which, if properly maintained, could bear 

divisional loads year-round.15

Yet for all of the good work along Highway 1 as well as at Duc Pho airfield, the 39th Engineer Battalion was not trouble-free. Logistical problems 

abounded. Sustaining U.S. forces around Duc Pho was the job of Task Force 

Gallagher, a special group of support units organized to manage supply fo

all Army units in the area. For the engineers, this included Class IV construction and barrier materials. Equipment and supplies not available from Task 

Force Gallagher came from the Qui Nhon Support Command with hel

from the 45th Group headquarters, which was conveniently located next door 

to the support command. Construction work, however, was slowed by Task 

Force Gallagher’s lack of forklifts to load heavy materials. Work was als

slowed because the MX19 airfield matting kits did not have turndown adapters, and the engineers had to improvise time-consuming anchorage systems 

to hold the Duc Pho runway in place. The 39th Engineer Battalion’s shortage of seven scoop loaders, one twenty-ton crane-shovel, a welding set, an air 

compressor, two 10-kilowatt generators, and several vehicles and trailers further affected the unit’s capability. Efforts were made through the 45th Group 

supply officer to speed the delivery of these items.16

Another problem facing the 39th Engineer Battalion was maintenance support. Initially, there were no direct or general support maintenance units in the 

area, and replacement parts for engineer equipment were almost nonexistent. 

An eleven-man contact team from a maintenance company based at Tuy Hoa 

provided some repair capability to the 39th Engineer Battalion but no repair 

parts. By mid-June, the lack of spare parts for engineer equipment had become 

critical. When the problem came to the attention of General Westmoreland 

during a visit to Chu Lai, Task Force Oregon, U.S. Army, Vietnam, and th

Qui Nhon Support Command reacted by checking all requisitions and initiating a crash program to improve supply flow. By 5 July, the engineer repair 

parts situation at Duc Pho had become “marginally adequate.”17

In stark contrast to Duc Pho, Army troops at Chu Lai found a well-developed complex supporting some 19,000 marines and sailors on a base still undergoing construction. Following the construction of an 8,000-foot AM2 airstrip 

there in mid-1965, the Seabees added a 4,000-foot AM2 crosswind runway 

and separate helicopter facilities the following year. In late 1966, RMK-BRJ 

15 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 6–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 3.

16 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 6–8; AAR, Opn Baker/Malheur I, 39

Engr Bn, p. 6. 17 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force Oregon, p. 36 (quoted words), 1 May–31 Jul 67,

39th Engr Bn, pp. 8–9; AAR, Opn Baker/Malheur I, 39th Engr Bn, p. 6; Msg, Task For

Oregon to III MAF, 31 May 67, sub: Visit of COMUSMACV, 30 May 67
Engineers at War

244

completed a 10,000-foot concrete runway. The shallow-draft port had several 

LST and LCU ramps, a barge discharge pier, and pipelines for offshore fuel 

discharging. LSTs, however, could enter the port area only at high tide, and 

monsoonal storms and typhoons threatened the facilities. The contractor was 

nearing completion of a fifth hangar and was working on a large power plant 

when it received word to phase down. On 1 May 1967, RMK-BRJ turned over 

uncompleted projects, concrete and asphalt plants, shops, and work camps 

to the Navy, which in turn divided the facilities and projects among Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps engineers on the scene. Total contract cost for work 

done during the twenty-two months RMK-BRJ had been at Chu Lai came to 

some $37 million. The Seabees, in addition to completing work for the 6,500 

Marine aviation, communications, and naval support troops staying behind, 

had already begun planning for Task Force Oregon. The former Marin

Corps commander in southern I Corps, a brigadier general, remained as the 

installation coordinator.18

Marine ground units began leaving Chu Lai in April, and they took with 

them their generators and water purification sets. As a result, water rationing 

became necessary for several weeks. Existing wells could not support the troops 

housed by Task Force Oregon, and Army engineers had to drill a new well.

After repeated efforts, they received enough pumps and filtration units, and on 

20 May water rationing was no longer required. Additional wells were dug in 

August. As for generators, the 1st Logistical Command temporarily assumed 

facilities engineering responsibility for the task force’s headquarters, and generators were furnished to the headquarters repair and utilities section. On the 

other hand, the marines left behind some refrigeration equipment and a limited 

ice-making capability, supplemented by small amounts of ice purchased on the 

economy. In order to provide more ice, the Seabees began building a fifteen-toncapacity ice-making plant in May and completed it in mid-July.19

In mid-June, General Westmoreland decided to leave Task Force Oreg

in southern I Corps throughout the autumn monsoon. As a result, base construction requirements at Chu Lai and Duc Pho took on a new perspective. 

Initially, the 39th Engineer Battalion, the 9th Marine Engineer Battalion, and 

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 71 and 8 (the latter replaced by Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 6 in early August), concentrated on completing the most urgently needed facilities to support operations. Between 1 and 

16 May, two large complexes for the Army’s 14th Aviation Battalion at Chu 

Lai were completed. The aviation facilities consisted of M8A1 landing mat 

aprons, helicopter pads, taxiways, and refueling pads, plus liberal applications 

of peneprime for dust control. With the approaching northeast monsoon in 

mind, attention turned to upgrading Highway 1 to an all-weather supply route, 

improving ammunition supply points, forward supply areas, and helipads, 

18 Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, pp. 320–23; MacGarrigle, 

Taking the Offensive, p. 299; MACV Complex Review, 1 Dec 66, pp. 40–47; Diary of a Contract, 

pp. 244–46; Memo, 1st Log Cmd, 18 Jun 67, sub: Trip Report, Visit to Chu Lai, 5 Jun 67, p. 1. 19 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force Oregon, pp. 34–35; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep

67, MACDC, p. IV-4; Msg, Maj Gen Charles W. Eifler, CG, 1st Log Cmd, to Gen Dwight E. 

Beach, CINCUSARPAC, 31 May 67, sub: Leventhal Report, Historians files, CMH.
245

To I Corps

upgrading living quarters to Standard 2 tentage with raised wooden floors 

and tent frames at Chu Lai and Duc Pho, and providing revetments for each 

aircraft at the two bases. Other work slated for the 39th Engineer Battalion 

was the new airfield at Mo Duc.20

20 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force Oregon, pp. 28, 35; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30

Jun 67, MACDC, p. IV-5.

While the base at Duc Pho had very little work done, the base at Chu Lai was 

consistently improved by the Seabees and RMK-BRJ.
Engineers at War

246

With the added workload, the 39th Engineer Battalion pressed to reclaim 

its remaining company left behind in II Corps. On 19 May, Company B had 

moved sixty-two miles north over Highway 1 to Qui Nhon where it stayed for 

one month with the 19th Engineer Battalion at Long My. During its stay at 

Long My, the company prepared to rejoin its parent unit and helped the 19th 

with its depot projects. On 21 June, Company B departed Qui Nhon aboard 

an LST and reached Chu Lai the same day. Soon the company was at work 

building roads in support of tactical operations, an ammunition supply point 

at Quang Ngai City, and taking on several base camp projects at Chu Lai.21

Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Joseph F. Castro, who replaced Colonel Fulton in 

July as commanding officer of the 39th Engineer Battalion, learned that 

Engineer Command did not have jurisdiction to issue construction directives 

for construction in I Corps, still a Navy and Marine Corps preserve. As a 

result, units could not draw materials to make tent frames and latrines for selfhelp base development. The problem was passed to the MACV Directorate of 

Construction. In turn, the directorate prepared a list of additional and unprogrammed projects, including $5.2 million for Task Force Oregon and passe

these requirements on to Washington for approval and funding. With this 

action and approval, steps were taken to obtain materials and get tentage construction under way to keep the troops out of the mud before the rains arrived 

in a few months. In addition, the 1st Logistical Command began preparations to have Pacific Architects and Engineers take over facilities engineering 

responsibilities at Chu Lai and Duc Pho.22 (Map 22)

Progress at Chu Lai continued at an impressive rate through the 

remainder of 1967. Improvements continued on the offshore fuel pipelines 

by extending them out another 1,500 feet. By July, the lines were ready 

for T–2 tanker operation. In June, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 

8 began expanding fuel storage tank capacity on the beach. Five 10,000-

barrel tanks were completed by Naval Mobile Construction 6 in August 

and September, but the tanks soon developed leaks. The Seabees applied 

an epoxy seal, and the tanks were in service by November. Additional 

ammunition storage pads for Marine Corps jet fighters based at Chu Lai 

were started in July and finished in October. An approach and centerline runway lighting system for the 10,000-foot runway was installed in 

September. Two of the hangars under construction for the marines were 

ready for use in late October. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 6 completed an engine maintenance shop in October and neared completion of 

an avionics repair facility in December. Quarry operations run by Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 71 picked up momentum in June with a 

two-shift operation. In May and June, the Seabees were even able to slip in 

the construction of a new chapel. As evidence of permanency, the Seabee 

21 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, Task Force Oregon, pp. 23, 35, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Eng

Bn, pp. 2–3; Msg, CG, USARV, AVDF-GC 623 to Engr Cmd, 30 May 67, sub: Request for 

Additional Engineer Company, Historians files, CMH. 22 Memo, 1st Log Cmd, 18 Jun 67, sub: Trip Report, Visit to Chu Lai, 5 Jun 67, p. 3; Msg, 

Brig Gen Mahlon E. Gates, MACV Dir of Const, SOG 1343, to Brig Gen Daniel A. Raymond, 

Ch of Southeast Asia Const, Dept of Def, 1 Jul 67, Historians files, CMH.
247

To I Corps

battalion began construction of a dairy plant in early June. The plant was 

completed in August, and Foremost Dairy, one of two firms contracted to 

produce milk and dairy products in Vietnam, began production in August. 

Also in August, MACV directed U.S. Army, Vietnam, to start shipping 

40-by-90-foot prefabricated buildings from Army stocks in Qui Nhon to 

Chu Lai. Four of the eighteen buildings in stock were to be erected by the 

1

1

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

Naval Depot Cantonment

Seabee Camp

Marine Helipads

Marine Support Group

Batch Plant

Crosswind Runway

Small Boat Facility

LST Ramp 

Barge Landing 

Marine Aviation Cantonment 

Communications

Quarry

Permanent Runway

RMK-BRJ Camp

& Crusher

Ammunition Storage

Ammunition Supply Point 

1st Marine Div HQ

Hospital 

Marine Aviation Cantonment

POL Unloading & Storage

Aireld Support Facility

7,000 Kilowatt Power

Bulk Fuel Chu Lai

March–August 1967

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

CHU LAI AREA

Existing Facility

Facility Under Construction

Planned Construction

Map 22
Engineers at War

248

Seabees for use as warehouses for Class II and IV storage, a post office, and 

a post-exchange addition.23

At Duc Pho, extensive development was also under way at the combat 

base. Plans were developed to provide an all-weather capability for the C–130 

airfield and additional crushed rock for roadwork. Procurement action on a 

runway lighting system was initiated in August. In late August, Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 71 was charged with providing technical help on selfhelp construction projects in the cantonment area to replace tents with wooden 

buildings. During October and November, the Seabee battalion completed a 

refueling facility that included a 16,000-barrel tank farm. By the end of the 

year, the brigade-size camp was well on its way to become a semipermanent 

installation, including facilities engineering support by Pacific Architects and 

Engineers.24

As 1967 drew to a close, Task Force Oregon transformed itself into a legitimate division. General Westmoreland resigned himself to the fact that Army

troops would have to remain in southern I Corps indefinitely. On 25 September, 

Task Force Oregon officially became the 23d Infantry Division (Americal).

23 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. IV-4 to IV-5, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, 

MACDC, pp. IV-3 to IV-4, V-3, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 21 Jan 68, pp. IV-3 to IV-4, 

last in Historians files, CMH. For more on dairy products, see U.S. Army Procurement Agency, 

Vietnam, Procurement Support in Vietnam, 1966–1968 (Japan: Toshio Printing Co., n.d.) pp. 

142–44. 24 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. IV-7, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 

p. IV-6.

Chu Lai base hosted a jet airfield and logistic facilities.
249

To I Corps

The Americal designation came about because of comparable circumstances in 

the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II. U.S. Army units on New 

Caledonia were transformed into the Americal Division to support the Marine 

Corps on Guadalcanal. In Vietnam, the title seemed appropriate as a means 

to promote good working relationships between the Marine Corps and the 

Army. Similarly, the Americal remained the only division to be formed outside 

the United States in the two wars. But rather than completely restructure the 

task force, the MACV commander allowed the three constituent brigades to 

retain their identities. The new division consisted of the 196th Light Infantry 

Brigade at Chu Lai; the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Duc Pho; and the 

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, now at Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin 

Province about eighteen and one-half miles northwest of Chu Lai.25 A fourth 

brigade, from the 1st Cavalry Division, was put under the operational control 

of the new division and relieved the marines in the Que Son Valley, a populated, 

fertile area extending inland from Highway 1 along the Quang Nam–Quang Tin 

provincial border some thirty-one miles northwest of Chu Lai. In October, the 

198th Light Infantry Brigade arrived at Hoi An in Quang Nam Province, replacing the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and in December the 11th Light 

Infantry Brigade reached Duc Pho and replaced the 3d Brigade, 4th Division. 

The two new brigades had their own engineer companies, the 55th with the 

198th Brigade and the 6th assigned to the 11th Brigade.26

For the most part, existing engineer units were merged into the division’s 

new 26th Engineer Battalion. Senior engineer officials, including General 

Cassidy, the chief of engineers; General Ploger at Engineer Command; and 

Brig. Gen. Andrew P. Rollins Jr., who assumed command of the 18th Engineer 

Brigade in September, had supported the idea to leave the infantry brigades’ 

organic engineer companies with the brigades and to activate a battalion at 

division level. This option, however, did not prevail, with the final decision by 

the Department of the Army in early November. Companies A, B, and C of the 

newly activated 26th Engineer Battalion were formed by assigning new designations to the three companies assigned to the 11th, 196th, and 198th Infantry 

Brigades. To flesh out the rest of the new battalion, Ploger and Rollins transferred men and equipment from the 18th Engineer Brigade, mostly from the 

39th Engineer Battalion, to form the headquarters and Company D. The command also gave the 554th Float Bridge Company a new designation: Company 

E, the 26th Battalion’s bridge company. Elements lost by the 39th Engineer 

25 On 1 August 1967, the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division was redesignated the 3d 

Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. The 4th Division’s original 3d Brigade, which had been 

operating under the 25th Division in III Corps since entering Vietnam, was simultaneously redesignated the 3d Brigade of the 25th Division. In addition, both engineer companies attached 

to the two brigades exchanged designations. This change of title resolved some administrative problems of two brigades located so far away from their divisions. It also brought the 3d 

Brigade, 4th Division, in southern I Corps a step closer to rejoining its parent division in the 

highlands. MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 245, 267. 26 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, Americal Div, 26 Nov 67, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; Memo, 

Palmer for COMUSMACV, 5 Nov 67, sub: Engineer Requirements in Americal Division 

TAOR, p. 1; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 138.
Engineers at War

250

Battalion were reconstituted from Engineer Command assets. Colonel Castro 

moved over to the 26th Engineer Battalion in mid-December as its first commander. On 20 January 1968, the 39th Engineer Battalion was released from 

its attachment to the Americal Division and returned to 45th Group control. 

The battalion, now under the command of Lt. Col. James M. Miller, continued to provide general support to the Americal Division.27

While the introduction of an Army division threw the enemy off balance in southern I Corps, the North Vietnamese kept relentless pressure on 

the marines all along the Demilitarized Zone. By September, the increased 

shelling endangered the construction of strongpoints and combat bases parallel to the Demilitarized Zone. The construction by Marine engineers, begun 

in April, was part of the long-debated electronic anti-infiltration barrier, the 

“McNamara Line,” ordered by Secretary McNamara to be built from the 

coast to the Laotian border. Mounting casualties prompted Westmoreland 

and the Marine commander, who both had doubts whether the system would 

work, temporarily to halt construction and concentrate on improving existing 

strongpoints and combat bases. As 1967 came to an end, Marine units constantly pounded by North Vietnamese artillery continued to be pinned down 

inside their fortified bases, hindering their operations.28

Meanwhile, the Americal Division continued the slow process in a seemingly never-ending search for elusive enemy units. In September, Westmoreland 

assigned all of Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces and part of Quang Nam 

Province to the Americal Division, allowing the marines to shift more forces 

north. Operation Wheeler, which ran from 11 September to 15 October, wa

an attempt to clear the area in the interior northwest of Chu Lai. In October, 

the deadly game of cat and mouse continued north of Wheeler in the Qu

Son Valley as Operation Wallowa. This time the 1st Cavalry Division’s 3rd

Brigade, operating under the control of the Americal Division, was brought 

north from Binh Dinh. After relieving elements of the 1st Marine Division, 

the cavalry brigade launched a series of air assaults in the valley. This operation, combined with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and later the 

196th Infantry Brigade, extended into the following year. To the south the 3d 

Brigade, 4th Division, in the Duc Pho and Mo Duc districts faced the same 

situation. While these operations took a toll against the enemy, the North 

Vietnamese in the area remained an effective threat. In the end, the dry-season 

27 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 22 Nov–13 Dec 67, incl. 7, p. 1, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 10, 19 Jan 68, OCE Hist Ofc; ORLLs, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, Engr 

Cmd, Jan 68, p. 15, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 39th Engr Bn, 9 Feb 68, pp. 2, 8, both in Historians 

files, CMH; Msg, Maj Gen Robert R. Ploger, CG, Engr Cmd, GVP 921 to Brig Gen Andrew P. 

Rollins Jr., CG, 18th Engr Bde, 3 Nov 67, sub: Engineer Battalion of 23d Inf Div (Americal); 

Msg, Rollins ARV 1978 to Ploger, 9 Nov 67, sub: Americal Engineer Battalion, both in 

Robert R. Ploger Papers, CMH; Memo, Palmer for COMUSMACV, 5 Nov 67, sub: Engineer 

Requirements in Americal Division TAOR, pp. 1–2. 28 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 255–63. For more on the Demilitarized Zone barrier, see Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 21–24; Shulimson, An Expanding War, pp. 

414–19; and Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the North Vietnamese, pp. 86–94.
251

To I Corps

operations in southern I Corps were not the ambitious sweeps into the interior 

that Westmoreland had anticipated.29

Highway 1 and Other Assignments

During most of 1967, the 1st Cavalry Division continued to put pressure on 

the enemy in neighboring Binh Dinh Province. Operation Pershing began o

11 February with the purpose of eliminating Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 

forces from that rice-rich coastal province. A continuation of the cavalry division’s campaigns in Binh Dinh Province since early 1966, Pershing continued

into early 1968.30

While operating on the coastal plains of Binh Dinh, the division combined the surprise of cavalry with the shock of armor to overwhelm North 

Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong defenses. Enemy fortifications were well 

organized and typically prepared in a series of hedgerows quickly thrown up 

in an elaborate perimeter that gave excellent cover and concealment around 

an entire village. During an attack, enemy troops remained ensconced in their 

bunkers, and 1st Cavalry Division forces could only kill or capture them by 

destroying the bunkers. This led to the attachment of a tank company from 

the 4th Division. Both the M48A3 tank’s 90-mm. gun and heavy armor proved 

the effectiveness of using armor to deal with the fortifications. The tank’s 

heavy weight alone, or in concert with the engineers’ bulldozers, was able to 

crush trench lines and bunkers. In September, the division received another 

armor capability with the attachment of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 

50th Infantry, a recent arrival in Vietnam. General Tolson did not confine 

this newest unit to mechanized infantry operations, directing the battalion to 

train for airmobile warfare. With the armored personnel carriers at a central 

position near Landing Zone Uplift, troops could be flown from any landing zone when a mission needed a mechanized unit. Engineer minesweeping

teams and bulldozers normally accompanied the armored columns. The onset 

of the monsoon limited the movement of armor cross-country, and engineering equipment, especially bulldozers and portable bridging, helped overcome 

obstacles and gaps along the way.31

The 1st Cavalry Division deployed troops to I Corps more than once. By 

the spring of 1967, the enemy had suffered severe troop and supply losses. 

Relentlessly pursued in every direction of Binh Dinh Province, the remaining elements of the North Vietnamese 3d People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 

Division sought refuge in adjacent Quang Ngai Province. These frequent 

retreats to the north, to rest and regroup, contributed to the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s participation in the Le Jeune operation in April. In May, elements 

29 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 264–83; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, Fighting the 

North Vietnamese, pp. 119–20. 30 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 129–30; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 180–85. 31 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 130, 139–41; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 186–89, 321; 

ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 1st Cav Div, 23 May 67, p. 29, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 8th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 

67, pp. 2–3, 12–13, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 8th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 67, p. 4; AAR, Opn Pershing, 1st Ca

Div, 29 Jun 68, pp. 13–15. ORLLs and AAR in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

252

of the 3d Brigade based in the An Lao Valley started a series of battalion-size 

air assaults in southern Quang Ngai Province. In August, the brigade made 

a major reconnaissance in force into Song Re Valley, for years a sacrosanct 

Viet Cong stronghold northwest of Duc Pho. By late September, the steady 

enemy buildup in I Corps generated another call for reinforcements. This time 

the 3d Brigade moved to Chu Lai and, operating under the control of the 

Americal Division, began Operation Wallowa. After relieving elements of 

the 1st Marine Division, the cavalry brigade launched a series of air assaults 

in the Que Son Valley. This operation, combined with the 1st Brigade, 101st 

Airborne Division, and later the 196th Infantry Brigade (Wheeler/Wallowa),

extended into the following year.32

In late 1967, the division also fought a major battle in northern Binh Dinh 

Province during Operation Pershing. The Battle of Tam Quan took place

late in the campaign between 6 and 20 December. By chance a scout team 

discovered an enemy radio antenna near the town of Tam Quan. The 1st 

Cavalry Division used “piling on” tactics that had proved successful in earlier 

operations. An infantry battalion and elements of the mechanized infantry 

battalion deployed first. The 1st Brigade added forces and teamed up with 

South Vietnamese troops in a battle characterized by massive use of artillery, 

tactical air support, and air assaults. The mechanized force, which included 

flame-throwing armored personnel carriers, closed in to destroy and crush 

enemy trenches. Combat engineer bulldozers from the 19th Engineer Battalion 

supported the attackers by building a causeway over the spongy ground, burying trench lines, and clearing areas for helicopter medical evacuation. Enemy 

forces, consisting primarily of a North Vietnamese Army regiment, lost 650 

men during this fierce engagement.33

During these operations, the 8th Engineer Battalion provided the full range 

of support in the field and at the combat bases. In northeastern Binh Dinh, 

the division dotted the area of operations with many landing zones of various 

types, which enabled air cavalry forces to move and fight anywhere quickly. 

The 8th Engineer Battalion helped build or improve existing landing zones at 

mountaintop firebases (Hump and Laramie), Caribou airstrips (Litts a

Mahoney), and forward operating bases (the division’s tactical command 

post at Two Bits near Bong Son, and Geronimo, English, Pony, Uplif

and Hammond). Landing Zone Two Bits also included a C–123 runway, and

Landing Zone English, thanks to continuous improvements made by 45th 

Engineer Group units, could handle C–130 transports. The engineers also 

helped pacification efforts to return territory to government control. This 

activity centered on reopening and improving Highway 1 and local roads.34

Within the framework of pacification, the 8th Engineer Battalion carried 

out contrasting missions of destruction and building. While supporting the 2d 

32 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 142–44, 147–49; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 186–92, 

263, 275–81, 315–19. 33 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 149–50; MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, p. 322; AAR, Opn 

Pershing, 1st Cav Div, p. 16. 34 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, pp. 2–3, OCE Liaison Office

Trip Rpt no. 7; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 1–7.
253

To I Corps

Brigade’s operations on the coast some twenty-five miles north of Qui Nhon, 

Company B destroyed several well-prepared bunkers in and around the villages. During the first week in June, Company A working with the 1st Brigade 

north of Landing Zone English reopened a five-mile section of Highway 1 to 

the I Corps boundary. After airlifting earthmoving equipment to the work site, 

the engineers opened a pioneer road in four days. When the 1st Brigade pushed 

into the An Lao Valley northwest of Bong Son, Company A reopened a section of Route 514, erecting several timber bridges along the way. Company A 

also answered the brigade’s call to destroy fortified villages in the valley.35

Repairing damage caused by enemy attacks on the forward bases and 

countering his increased use of mines and booby traps drew heavily on the 

1st Cavalry Division’s engineers. In one seventy-day period during Operation 

Pershing, the 8th Engineer Battalion reported 268 discoveries of mines or

booby traps. On 6 June, the ammunition dump at Landing Zone English was 

blown up, and the battalion straightaway committed troops and equipment to 

build a new seven-bay ammunition storage area.36

Meanwhile, the 45th Engineer Group began a northward shift in northern 

II Corps and southern I Corps to reopen and upgrade Highway 1. In May, the 

18th Engineer Brigade moved the group’s southern boundary northward from 

Ninh Hoa to Tuy Hoa. Concurrently, the 35th Group took control of the 577th 

Engineer Construction Battalion and responsibility for projects at Tuy Hoa 

and Port Lane. The arrival of the 589th Engineer Battalion (Construction) 

from Fort Hood, Texas, in late April restored the 45th Group’s construction 

capability, allowing Col. Kenneth T. Sawyer, who replaced Colonel Bush in 

May, some flexibility to refocus the efforts of his three combat battalions from 

base construction to tactical operations and roadwork. By this time, the 35th 

and 39th Engineer Battalions were supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and 

Task Force Oregon on a regular basis. Both battalions were also hard at work

reopening and upgrading Highway 1 in their areas of responsibility. In addition, Colonel Sawyer planned to move the 19th Engineer Battalion northward 

and position it between the 35th and 39th Engineer Battalions to work on the 

road between Bong Son and Duc Pho.37

The 35th Engineer Battalion had been providing the 45th Group’s principal 

backup engineering support to the 1st Cavalry Division since late 1966. At the 

height of the northeast monsoon, Colonel Peel had moved his Headquarters 

and Company A from Cha Rang Depot to Landing Zone Hammond to support Operation Thayer. This mission continued during Pershing, and by lat

April the battalion centered its efforts on supporting the division and improving Highway 1 between Qui Nhon and Landing Zone English. Company B

35 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 May–1 Jul 67, incl. 7, p. 29, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 8, 18 Aug 67, OCE Hist Ofc. 36 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, p. 3, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 May–31 Jul 67, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 1st Cav Div, p. 29, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 

8th Engr Bn, p. 2. 37 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 45th Engr Gp, 11 May 67, pp. 1–5, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th 

Engr Gp, 14 Aug 67, pp. 2–6, both in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

254

moved by air and road to English to maintain a section of Highway 1 and the 

airstrip. Despite the earlier work by the 19th Engineer Battalion, the runway 

at English started to fail. When the heavy rains slackened in mid-February, 

Company B removed the matting, repaired the subgrade, and laid new M8A1 

matting.38

Colonel Peel immediately assigned the attached Company D, 20th 

Engineer Battalion, the job of building all semipermanent bridges along 

Highway 1 between Phu Cat and Bong Son, a mission that soon extended 

to the battalion’s entire length of the road. By the end of July, Company D, 

which on 1 May had been redesignated Company D, 35th Engineer Battalion, 

averaging two to three new bridges each week, completed thirty timber trestle 

bridges. The new bridges consisted of timber pile abutments, bents, and piers, 

and wood and steel stringers depending on the lengths of spans. This arrangement lasted until the autumn, when the impending monsoon dictated a change 

in the battalion’s construction techniques, and each company took charge for 

all work along its assigned section of the road.39

When Lt. Col. David N. Hutchison took command of the 35th Battalion 

on 1 July, he inherited a battalion now committing most of its resources to 

improving Highway 1. The emphasis on the roadwork reflected the high priority that MACV and the South Vietnamese government gave to reopening 

major roads, especially Highway 1 running from the Demilitarized Zone to 

Saigon and on to the Cambodian border. Each morning mine detection teams 

checked the road between Landing Zones Hammond and English, later 

extending north to the I Corps border and south to the Phu Tai ammunition depot south of Qui Nhon. Work parties followed to work on sections of 

the road assigned to each company. Using specifications set by the MACV 

Construction Directorate, the troops widened and elevated the road, placed 

culverts, and repaired and replaced bridges.40 

Replacing some old narrow French-built concrete spans along Highway 1 

required their destruction. Tight working space in populated areas prevented 

the construction of the new spans parallel to the old bridge, which was done 

when possible. After improving a bypass around the bridge to carry traffic, 

the engineers sometimes had to destroy the old bridge with explosives. On the 

outskirts of one town north of Qui Nhon, however, the concussion of the blast 

dislodged some roof tiles of several nearby buildings. As the dust and smoke 

cleared, the onlookers could hear the sound of crashing tiles as they slid off 

the roofs of nearby buildings and struck the ground.41

Specialized engineer units augmented the 35th Engineer Battalion’s roadbuilding capability. Attachments from two separate companies that arrived 

38 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 35th Engr Bn, 9 May 67, pp. 1–5, Historians files, CMH.

39 Road Construction by Army Engineer Troops, incl. 9, tab F20, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 5, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 35th Engr Bn, 

10 Aug 67, pp. 2, 4–5, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, 8 Nov 67, p. 6, last two in Historians 

files, CMH. 40 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 2, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 2.

41 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 7; MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 

45th Engr Gp, p. 1, Historians files, CMH.
255

To I Corps

in June included the 2d Platoon, 137th Light Equipment Company, and the 

1st Platoon, 70th Dump Truck Company. The haul capability of the dump 

truck platoon’s 24 five-ton dump trucks greatly increased the amount of fill, 

subcourse, and base course materials used by the 35th Engineer Battalion. 

The arrival of the 517th Light Equipment Company in July further increased 

the battalion’s equipment capabilities. Once settled in, the 517th replaced the 

137th’s platoon and began operations on 1 August. The small rock crusher, 

earthmovers, bucket loaders, graders, cranes, and bulldozers of the light equipment company made possible the amount of work done by the battalion before 

the monsoon rains began that autumn. The cranes also increased pile-driving 

operations, thus allowing the simultaneous construction of several bridges. At 

Bong Son, the 553d and 554th Float Bridge Companies helped Company B 

span the Lai Giang with a 224-foot M4T6 floating bridge strung between two 

causeways. South Vietnamese Army engineers also did some bridge work on 

Highway 1 with materials provided by the 35th Engineer Battalion.42

The road improvement effort in Binh Dinh Province received extensive support from RMK-BRJ’s Phu Cat industrial site. Initially established to support 

the construction of Phu Cat Air Base, the quarry and asphalt plant set aside 

an increasing amount of production for Army projects. Sometimes this placed 

42 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, p. 3, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 2, 5, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr 

Bn, pp. 2, 5.

Mines were a constant hazard as the 35th Engineer Battalion worked along 

Highway 1 between Qui Nhon and Bong Son.
Engineers at War

256

the two services in competition for the same products, especially crushed rock. 

The 45th Group needed rock for the road, but the air base commander insisted 

on getting two-inch clean rock to fill aircraft revetments. Fortunately, the efficient plant served both needs. By mid-1967, the consortium’s asphalt plant was 

in full operation, as shown by newly paved streets in Qui Nhon and twenty-one 

miles of new pavement along Highway 1 from the port city to the air base. 

Large belly dump trucks delivered hot asphalt to the firm’s paving machine. 

Once the asphalt was spread by the paving machine, rollers compacted the 

two-inch surface. Operations then shifted to Highway 19. Following behind 

the 589th Engineer Battalion’s base course work, the contractor hauled and 

placed the asphalt surface to An Khe. The forty-one-mile stretch between the 

intersection with Highway 1 and the city of An Khe and the gate of Camp 

Radcliff was finished before the end of the year.43

Convoy traffic on both Highways 1 and 19 greatly increased but moved 

along briskly thanks to the newly surfaced roads. An asphalt surface provided 

a swifter all-weather supply route link and made it difficult for the enemy to 

mine. Since the trucks and semitrailer moving inland on Highway 19 had to 

negotiate sharp curves along the An Khe Pass, the contractor paved the shoulders. The Viet Cong could still place command-detonated mines by tunneling 

43 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 26 May 67, incl. 8, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 7; MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 45th Engr Gp, p. 1.

RMK-BRJ paves a portion of Highway 1 north of Qui Nhon.
257

To I Corps

a hole from the embankment, but at least the drivers could see any tampering 

with the road’s surface.44

To get a jump on paving Highway 1, Colonel Sawyer arranged with local 

RMK-BRJ officials to work on Sundays. The foremen agreed to operate the 

asphalt plant on their off day and to lend the paving equipment to the 35th 

Engineer Battalion. During the week, Company A prepared the road with 

a six-inch base course, which included a three-inch layer of crushed stones 

obtained from the Phu Cat quarry. Using its dump trucks to haul the asphalt, 

the battalion paved almost one mile each Sunday. By the end of October, the 

total reached six miles. Commenting on the team work between the group and 

the contractor, Colonel Sawyer explained that the RMK-BRJ industrial site at 

Phu Cat had given his group the capability of an additional engineer construction support company.45

In mid-July, the 19th Engineer Battalion started its move north. Colonel 

Rhodes and his staff coordinated the deployment with the two major tactical 

units on both sides of the corps boundary, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 

3d Brigade, 25th Division. The 19th Battalion reconnoitered several potential 

base camp sites. One hilltop site near Tam Quan had a commanding view of 

the highway and the South China Sea, but it had to be rejected. An access 

road would have to be built, and considerable earthwork would be required 

to build a base camp atop the hill. Also looking for a suitable site for the 

battalion’s main camp, Colonel Sawyer spotted from his helicopter a slight 

rise of land amid rice paddies just off Highway 1, some six miles north of 

Landing Zone English. The group commander selected this location, known 

by the 1st Cavalry Division as Sniper’s Island. Before the battalion’s move 

north, Rhodes departed Vietnam, leaving the executive officer, Maj. Richard 

W. Stevens, temporarily in charge. Following the dispatch of an advance party 

to Sniper’s Island, a task force from battalion headquarters, Companies A 

and B, and elements of the 137th Light Equipment Company departed the 

Long My base camp before dawn on Sunday, 16 July. The task force, led by 

the operations officer, Maj. Adrian G. Traas, rendezvoused with minesweep 

teams from the 35th Engineer Battalion north of Qui Nhon. Traveling some 

sixty-two miles up Highway 1, the convoy arrived at its destination without 

incident. That afternoon an infantry company from the 1st Cavalry Division 

arrived at Sniper’s Island to help guard the hastily drawn perimeter for the first 

night. A few days later, Lt. Col. Andrew C. Remson Jr. flew in by helicopter to 

take command of the battalion.46

At Sniper’s Island, the 19th Engineer Battalion set forth to build a defensible base camp and to start work on Highway 1. Scrapers and bulldozers 

moved earth to form a protective berm around the perimeter. Using lumber 

44 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 45th Engr Gp, p. 1.

45 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, 8 Nov 67, p. 3, Historians files, CMH, and 1 Aug–

31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 3; MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 45th Engr Gp, p. 1. 46 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2; Interv, Maj Paul D. 

Webber, CO, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Andrew C. Remson, CO, 19th Engr Bn, 22 Apr 68, 

incl. 2, p. 1, VNIT 80, CMH; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 67, p. 2. Both in 

Historians files, CMH. 
Engineers at War

258

hauled from Qui Nhon, troops built a tactical operations center and mortarproof live-in bunkers along the berm and inside the perimeter. An artillery 

forward observer stayed with the battalion for several days to register artillery fire around the perimeter. In addition, an artillery unit took up position 

next to the camp for a short time. Meanwhile, reconnaissance parties set out 

to examine the road and bridge sites between Bong Son and Duc Pho. Soon 

work was under way. Abutments on several destroyed bridges were removed 

in preparation for the construction of timber trestle bridges, and concrete was 

used to patch up holes along the road.47

By late September, the 19th Battalion had completed its deployment. 

Company D, which was newly formed in June, remained at Long My until late 

August when it moved to a new bivouac site called Landing Zone Thunde

approximately five miles south of Duc Pho. In late September, Company C 

moved six miles north of the battalion headquarters, now known as Landing 

Zone English North. Like the 35th Engineer Battalion, the 19th Enginee

Battalion with its attached units grew into a large reinforced battalion with 

over one thousand men. The 1st Cavalry Division considered a force this size 

straddling Highway 1 beneficial because the engineers’ presence helped block 

the free movement of the enemy in several places. The 137th Light Equipment 

Company opened quarries at Tam Quan and Duc Pho, and the 513th Dump 

Truck Company added a section of eight 5-ton dump trucks. In mid-December, 

the 73d Construction Support Company, which had provided the 45th Group 

with rock crushing and paving in and around Qui Nhon, moved from its Phu 

Tai complex to join Company C at Landing Zone Lowboy and set up operations at Tam Quan and Duc Pho. At the same time, the battalion’s responsibility was extended ten miles north of Duc Pho to Mo Duc, and Company 

moved to Landing Zone Max six miles north of Duc Pho.

At first the battalion’s roadwork centered on clearing and upgrading Highway 1 to the I/II Corps border and improving on the 8th Engineer 

Battalion’s pioneer work to upgrade the road to all-weather traffic. This 

involved filling all large holes and building hasty bypasses, covering the road 

with a sand-asphalt mix seal coat, using culverts where necessary, and spanning sixteen gaps where the enemy had destroyed the bridges. New spans 

included seven panel bridges (totaling 690 feet long), three decked railroad 

bridges used as substitute highway bridges, and six timber trestle bridges. 

Work was completed ahead of schedule on 8 September. The battalion moved 

to the next stage of work to upgrade the road, dubbed Seahorse Highway in 

tribute to the unit’s insignia depicting a seahorse, all the way to Duc Pho to 

MACV standards.49

47 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2; ORLL, 1 May–31 

Jul 67, 19th Engr Bn, p. 5. 48 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 19th Engr Bn, p. 2; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 

67, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 67, pp. 1–3, and 1 Nov–31 Jan 68, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 68, pp. 1, 3–4, 

both in Historians files, CMH. 49 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 2–4, and 1 Nov–31 Jan 68, 19th Engr Bn, 31 

Jan 68, p. 3.
259

To I Corps

By the end of the year, six U.S. engineer battalions of three services shared 

minesweeping and roadwork along Highway 1 in northern Binh Dinh and 

Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces. The 35th Engineer Battalion continued 

its work from Qui Nhon to Bong Son; the 19th Engineer filled the gap between 

Bong Son and Duc Pho and later to Mo Duc; and the 39th Engineer Battalion 

from Mo Duc to Chu Lai. The newly activated 26th Engineer Battalion of 

the Americal Division took on a portion of the minesweeping duties along 

this stretch of road. The 9th Marine Engineer Battalion and Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 6 carried out minesweeps and roadwork north of Chu 

Lai.50

The improved road helped the flow of combat troops and cargo and civilian traffic. In late December, Highway 1 served as the most practical means 

to move the arriving 11th Light Infantry Brigade from Qui Nhon to Duc 

Pho, where it joined the Americal Division. Pacification efforts in the area 

also made civilian travel less dangerous, at least during daylight. This measure 

of security and further improvements, as shown by the construction of new 

bridges and paving, prompted a resurgence of commercial traffic and a growing confidence on the part of the South Vietnamese government, which tried 

to reclaim control over the region. A determined enemy, however, struck back. 

With renewed vigor, the Viet Cong waged a relentless campaign of mining the 

roads, ambushing vehicles, and damaging or destroying recently built bridges. 

50 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 4–5, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 

4–5, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, Americal Div, 8 Feb 68, p. 30, last in Historians files, CMH.

After moving north of Bong Son, the 19th Engineer Battalion set up a main base 

camp on the rise of land overlooking the surrounding rice paddies.
Engineers at War

260

Even though enemy activity along the Americal Division’s section of Highway 

1 was extremely high, the road was never closed for an entire day. Destroyed 

or damaged bridges were usually discovered during early morning reconnaissance overflights or by minesweep teams. Normally, the road was open to traffic by noon or at least open to traffic before nightfall.51

As usual, the Viet Cong displayed ingenuity when using mines and explosives to disrupt traffic. The 35th Engineer Battalion reported that the enemy 

had taken advantage of the American soldier’s reluctance to get dirty if he 

did not have to, by burying mines deep under mud puddles or covering them 

with a layer of water buffalo dung. Scoop loader operators working in borrow 

and fill pits also had to be wary of mines buried deep in the sand and rock. 

In October 1966, Viet Cong sappers had expertly destroyed one of the central 

concrete piers of the 1,352-foot highway bridge over the Lai Giang at Bong 

Son. The explosion dropped two spans into the river and left a 194-foot gap. 

Fortunately, traffic could still cross over the railroad bridge. Later, the engineers responded with several projects that improved crossings over the river. 

Starting in late May 1967, Company B of the 35th Engineer Battalion built 

two new timber pile piers and raised and repaired the double Eiffel span, closing the gap on 29 July. Also, with the end of the monsoon several months 

earlier, the battalion returned the M4T6 floating bridge to service. In July, 

Company B replaced the timber decking on the railroad bridge. Three spans 

were now available to cross traffic over Lai Giang at Bong Son.52

At other crossings, the Viet Cong resorted to a simple method of damaging 

the new timber trestle bridges by setting the decks on fire. The engineers countered by placing sheet metal under the treadway and dirt, gravel, and asphalt 

on the decking. The battle of wits between the adversaries continued. The 

enemy next started to burn the creosoted piles and sun-dried timbers of the 

substructures and the undersides of the superstructures. One bridge near Tam 

Quan became a frequent target. During the initial attack, only the high level of 

the water under the bridge prevented the piles from being burned completely 

to the ground. The 35th Engineer Battalion rebuilt the center span of the 221-

foot bridge with steel I-beams and stringers on top of two hollow-steel pile 

bents, each made up of four piles filled with concrete. The Viet Cong’s success 

in destroying bridges this way also depended on the steadfastness of the security forces. North of Qui Nhon, soldiers of the South Korean Capital Division 

zealously defended their positions. Farther north, the Viet Cong usually 

brushed past the South Vietnamese bridge guards without much resistance.53

Although travel along Highway 1 between Qui Nhon and Bong Son became 

fairly secure during the day, the enemy still ambushed vehicles and work parties. One of these ambushes took place at twilight on 9 October when a small 

party from the 35th Engineer Battalion en route to its base camp at Landing 

51 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, Americal Div, pp. 23, 31, 33.

52 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 4, 1 May–31 Jul 67, pp. 4, 6–7. For more on 

the Bong Son Bridge repair, see Capt. Gerald W. Kamicka, “Rebuilding the Bong Son Highway 

Bridge,” Military Engineer 60 (March-April 1968): 112–13. 53 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 8–9, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 35th Engr Bn, p. 9.
261

To I Corps

Zone Hammond came under fire from both sides of the road. The barrage 

wounded the officer in charge, 2d Lt. Robert E. Knadle. He directed his men to 

defensive positions while remaining in the open near his disabled jeep to radio 

for reinforcements and medical evacuation. Knadle operated the radio until 

wounded again, this time by an enemy grenade. Although mortally wounded, 

the lieutenant remained in charge, leading his men against the attackers until 

reinforcements arrived. The U.S. Army posthumously awarded Lieutenant 

Knadle the nation’s second highest award, the Distinguished Service Cross.54

Farther north the 19th and 39th Engineer Battalions, working in the contested territory between Bong Son and Chu Lai, suffered even more casualties. 

Soon after arriving at Landing Zone English North, the 19th Battalion experienced its first casualty. During a minesweeping operation along Highway 

north of the base, a jeep detonated a mine, which killed one soldier. Another 

ambush on the same road struck vehicles of the 137th Light Equipment 

Company, resulting in several casualties. From November to the end of 

January, a period that included the battalion’s participation in the Battle of 

Tam Quan, the 19th Engineer Battalion and its attached units lost three killed 

and five wounded. Along the 39th Engineer Battalion’s section of the highway, 

Company C was frequently fired upon by snipers and lost men and vehicles to 

mine explosions. From May through July, Companies C and D suffered three 

killed and fifteen wounded along the road. Elements of Company B sweeping 

a local road for mines south of Chu Lai discovered two Viet Cong placing a 

mine. The team’s point man fired his grenade launcher and killed one enemy 

soldier. In late July, the enemy ambushed a platoon along the same road twice, 

resulting in two dead and three wounded Americans.55

Mines were especially insidious. From May through July, the 39th 

Battalion discovered sixty mines and thirty-one booby traps. Twelve mines and 

eight booby traps were detonated accidently. Most of the mines consisted of 

bamboo firing devices with an electric blasting cap and about twenty pounds 

of explosive. Seldom were the mines marked in any way. Most of the booby 

traps were hand grenades with trip wires connected to the pin. The 35th 

Engineer Battalion reported the enemy’s clever use of empty chambers so that 

minesweep teams could pass by. After the minesweep team and first convoy 

passed by, the Viet Cong returned, removed the board over the top of the 

chamber, quickly placed a mine, and topped off the chamber with fill to make 

the road appear undisturbed. Several vehicles returning as little as three hours 

later were destroyed.56 

October brought forth the annual northeast monsoon. In the 19th Engineer 

Battalion’s sector, the first heavy rains, twelve inches in one twenty-four-hour 

period, caused washouts along Highway 1. The battalion rallied by building 

54 General Order 6340, USARV, 10 Dec 67, copy in CMH; Robert G. McClintic, “Clearing 

the Way,” Engineer 1 (Fall 1971): 9–10; “35th Lt. Receives DSC Presented Posthumously,” Colt 

45 News 2 (2 April 1968): 1, Historians files, CMH. 55 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 19th Engr Bn, pp. 2–3; ORLLs, 1 May–31 

Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 3–5, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 19th Engr Bn, p. 2, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 19th 

Engr Bn, p. 3. 56 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 39th Engr Bn, pp. 9–10, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 35th Engr Bn, pp. 5–6.
Engineers at War

262

two panel bridges, one dry span, and one float bridge in less than seventy 

hours. The 35th Battalion faced similar problems in several areas where new 

bridges remained incomplete and the bypasses exposed to washouts. One evening, the rising waters threatened a washout of a bypass north of Qui Nhon 

despite the efforts of the 35th Engineer Battalion, which had used all the available crushed rock from the RMK-BRJ Phu Cat quarry. Although the quarry 

did have some rock destined for aircraft revetments at the air base, employees 

on the scene hesitated to release the more expensive two-inch washed rock 

normally used in concrete work. The 35th Engineer Battalion appealed to the 

group commander, Colonel Sawyer. Sawyer dispatched Major Traas, now the 

group contract liaison and installation master planning officer, to persuade 

local RMK-BRJ officials, who lived across the street from the headquarters 

in Qui Nhon, to issue the rock. By using the substitute rock as fill, the 35th 

Engineer Battalion managed to keep the crucial road to Bong Son open the 

next morning.57

In southern I Corps, a tropical storm dumped seventeen inches within 

twenty-four hours. Flooding washed out sections of Highway 1, and it took 

the 39th Engineer Battalion one week to repair the damage. The rains also 

closed Razorback Beach at Duc Pho, and supplies could only be delive

by air. Looking for an alternate over-the-beach site, the Americal Division 

ordered engineers to build a limited facility at the small port town of Sa Huynh 

located just north of the I/II Corps border. The 19th Engineer Battalion built 

a one-half-mile access road through a marshy area from Highway 1 and a 

165-by-250-foot off-loading area. With this work completed on 15 October, 

the odds to continue over-the-beach supply operations during the monsoon 

for units based at Duc Pho were improved. Meanwhile, the engineers continued roadwork, improved the Duc Pho airstrip, and expanded ammunition and 

fuel storage sites.58

Besides roadwork and daily minesweeps, the 45th Group’s three combat 

battalions carried out other tasks. The 35th Engineer Battalion continued 

to maintain the English airstrip, built artillery-firing platforms at Landing 

Zones Uplift and Pony, rehabilitated the Phu Cat Regional Forces Training

Center, and cleared fields of fire at Landing Zone Pony and Phu Cat Air 

Base. The 19th Engineer Battalion built bunkers and helicopter revetments 

at Landing Zone Two Bits for the 1st Cavalry Division. During the Battle of

Tam Quan, elements of Company A and the 137th Light Equipment Company 

helped destroy bunkers and tunnel complexes, killing ten enemy soldiers in the 

process. The 39th Engineer Battalion supported the Americal Division with 

jungle clearing, bunker construction, and destroying enemy tunnel and bunker 

complexes and captured munitions.59

57 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 19th Engr Bn, p. 4; MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 

45th Engr Gp, p. 1. 58 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, p. 269; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, Americal Div, p. 35, 

1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 4, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 19th Engr Bn, p. 3. 59 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 4–5, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 4.
263

To I Corps

By the end of 1967, it seemed certain that the U.S. Army’s role in I Corps 

would grow. Earlier that year, other than advisers and Special Forces troops, 

the Army only had several batteries of 175-mm. guns and 105-mm. self-propelled howitzers in northern I Corps—the 175-mm. guns delivering long-range 

fire support into and across the Demilitarized Zone and the howitzers giving 

direct support to the marines. By year’s end with the Americal Division and 

supporting troops on the scene, Army troops in I Corps numbered over twenty 

thousand with more to come. Together, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps engineers developed the combat bases at Chu Lai and Duc Pho and upgraded 

roads, especially Highway 1. With the anticipated arrival of even more troops 

in I Corps, additional Army engineers would be drawn northward.60

60 Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, p. 12; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 150.

9

Completing the Bases

The momentum of combat that carried over into 1967 did not diminish 

the construction effort. Military engineers and contractors continued 

an all-out effort that had started in 1965 to finish the theater’s bases, a task 

that had been given urgency with the resumption of the troop buildup in the 

summer of 1966. At the start of 1967, roughly half of the envisioned construction was done, but new requirements were still being added. Cost containment 

was also a growing issue, leading Engineer Command to pass on more work to 

engineer troops, to approve essential construction only, and to step up coordination between the contractor and troop efforts to save money and materiel. 

Meanwhile, the completion of projects did not end engineer responsibilities. 

There were increased demands on the facilities engineers to maintain, repair, 

and upgrade the expanding bases, which, in turn, meant budgeting more operations and maintenance funds and enlarging the utilities workforce.1

Southern and Central II Corps

In southern II Corps, the 35th Engineer Group, Air Force engineers, and 

the contractors continued to push ahead on base development. And because 

it constituted the crown jewel of the widening system of II Corps bases, Cam 

Ranh Bay received the lion’s share of engineer attention. As 1967 dawned, the 

peninsula continued to be dominated by scrub and sand. But all along the 

fringes, and into the interior as well, lay evidence of a maturing infrastructure 

of an expanding army. Off the north, near the neck, stood the Air Force base, 

and farther north still the Army replacement center and a hospital. To the west 

facing the bay clustered the piers, pipelines, and electrical power ships, while 

behind the port lay the Army depot, cantonments, and ammunition stores, 

with Army and Navy maintenance sheds clinging to the southern shore.2

The 35th Engineer Group committed the equivalent of two to three 

battalions to projects in the bay area. Most work went to the 1st Logistical 

Command’s Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, whose 15,000 troops were 

stationed on every part of the peninsula. In addition to paving roads and 

building barracks, warehouses, ammunition pads, and tank farms, the engineers constructed an air-conditioned automatic data processing facility for 

1

 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 71, 74–75; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, 

tab A, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 21 Jan 68, tab A, Historians files, CMH; Letter of Instruction, 

18th Engr Bde, 24 Nov 66, tab J, incl. 7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6, p. 4. 2

 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 68–69; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 59–60; Quarterly Hist 

Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, p. 27, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, p. IV-10; MACV History, 

1966, p. 298; ibid., 1967, vol. 2, pp. 831–32.
Engineers at War

266

the logistical command’s 14th Inventory Control Center, and also a strategic 

communications facility on the other side of the bay at Dong Ba Thin. For the 

inventory control center, Company D, 864th Battalion, had to lay a dust-proof 

floor and create an extensive power distribution system in the 2,000-squarefoot masonry building. At Dong Ba Thin, the 864th’s Company B cleared ten 

acres of heavily vegetated land, constructed access roads, protective berms, 

generator pads, and administrative buildings, and prepared concrete bases for 

eleven large antennas.3

For its part, RMK-BRJ worked on as many as twenty projects at once 

at Cam Ranh Bay. In April, the contractor completed a 2,000-foot concrete 

runway extension thereby giving the air base two 10,000-foot runways. The 

extended runway was now open to all aircraft, including the ever-increasing 

number of commercial jets transporting troops to and from Vietnam. The 

depot area neared completion with the addition of a 200,000-barrel fuel tank 

farm and more storage facilities. RMK-BRJ made many of the port improvements, which included dredging the ammunition pier’s turning basin. The 

dredged material was put to use as filling behind the bulkheads between the 

four DeLong piers. And not least of all, RMK-BRJ supplied a steady flow of 

3

 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 176, 178, 180–81, 217, 219–20; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 

864th Engr Bn, pp. 3–4, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 864th Engr Bn, 13 May 67, pp. 2–5, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 

864th Engr Bn, 8 Aug 67, pp. 2–4, all in Historians files, CMH.

During 1968, wooden tropical barracks and administrative buildings, designed 

and built by the 35th Engineer Group such as these buildings in the replacement 

center, had replaced tents at Cam Ranh Bay.
267

Completing the Bases

ready-mix concrete, crushed rock and asphalt, and building supplies from its 

depot to Army and Air Force engineers.4

Linking the peninsula to the mainland became a reality when RMK-BRJ 

began driving piles for a new bridge in late June. The combination railroad and 

highway bridge, located just south of the My Ca ferry and float bridge site, 

required eight pile bents, fourteen spans (seven each for the railroad and the 

highway), approaches, abutments, and decking. In September the bridge was 

well along, the east and west approaches being filled with dredged material, 

with an estimated date of completion the spring of 1968.5

Bringing electricity to the entire peninsula became possible when the 

Army and Air Force worked out a distribution arrangement. Part of the Army 

complex, including the convalescent and replacement centers, was located a 

long way from the planned T–2 tanker power plant and was separated from 

the main Army installation to the south by the concrete runway. Meanwhile, 

the Air Force had to plan for electrical power to serve its facilities on either 

side of the runway. To avoid building two power plants, the Air Force agreed 

to construct a power plant north of the runway and provide 5,000 kilowatts to 

the Army complex, while the Army reciprocated by supplying a like amount 

of power to Air Force units south of the runway. Early in the year, Vinnell 

connected two of the five T–2 tanker power plants to the electrical distribution 

system, with a third coming online in late February. The land-based diesel 

electrical power plant of eight 1,100-kilowatt units, a switching station to protect the primary line, and the last two tanker connections were completed in 

May. All told, the tankers, in conjunction with the land-based plant, generated 

34,200 kilowatts over 121 miles of pole lines (60 miles primary line, 27 miles 

secondary line, and 34 miles street lighting).6

The Nha Trang base complex also saw significant progress. In the late 

spring of 1967, the Officer in Charge of Construction, to avoid more cost 

overruns, began phasing down the RMK-BRJ contract at Nha Trang and 

some other locations and transferring remaining work to engineer troops. 

Altogether, the firm completed over $31 million in base construction in 

and around the former sleepy resort. Top effort went to paving the beach 

road, completing a warehouse and maintenance complex and 2,500-man 

cantonment for the 1st Logistical Command, and work along Highway 1. 

The logistical complex and cantonment project were challenging because of 

the technical work required. These projects featured hot and cold potable 

water systems and a waterborne sewage system. Meanwhile, Vinnell moved 

4

 Diary of a Contract, pp. 226–33; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 

34–35, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. IV-1 to IV-11, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, pp. IV-12 

to IV-13. 5

 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 34–35, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. 

IV-1 to IV-11, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, pp. IV-12 to IV-13. 6

 “Floating and Land Based Power Plants,” pp. 6–7; Development of Cam Ranh Bay, 30 Oct 

67, 1st Log Cmd, pp. 6–1 to 6–3, box 13, 68A/4975, RG 319, NARA; Dunn, Base Development, 

p. 80; Fact Sheet, 6 Feb 67, tab J, incl. 8, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6.
Engineers at War

268

two T–2 power tankers into place, and by July the electrical contractor was 

capable of distributing 15,000 kilowatts online.7

In the Tuy Hoa area, the 577th Construction Battalion split the workload 

with the 39th Engineer Combat Battalion. The 577th mostly carried out base 

development, and the 39th handled combat support missions with the exception of Company B, which continued to work at Port Lane, the subsidiary 

port at Vung Ro Bay. The 577th’s major projects included the expansion of 

the South Korean cantonment at Tuy Hoa and the upgrading of Highway 

1 between Vung Ro and the allied encampment just south of Tuy Hoa. 

Companies B and D maintained and patched the road with cold-mix asphalt, 

a forerunner to the envisioned widening to twenty-four feet, hot-mix asphalt 

surface, six-foot shoulders, and Class 35 two-way bridges.8

One of the projects undertaken by Company D, 577th Engineer Battalion, 

was a 400-bed hospital at Phu Hiep near Tuy Hoa, which officially opened on 

17 June. No comparable medical facility existed for a radius of eighty miles. 

From 7 December 1966 to 15 March 1967, the men worked, often in high winds 

and driving rain, to ready the facility for its first patients. In mid-March, a heli7

 Diary of a Contract, pp. 234–35; “Floating and Land Based Power Plants,” pp. 6–7; 

ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 864th Engr Bn, 7 Nov 67, pp. 2–5, Historians files, CMH; Dunn, 

Base Development, p. 80; Fact Sheet, 6 Feb 67, tab J, incl. 8, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

6; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, p. IV-11. 8

 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 174–75, 220; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 577th Engr Bn, n.d., pp. 

2–4, 1 May–31 Jul Oct 67, 577th Engr Bn, n.d., pp. 2–4, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 577th Engr Bn, 

11 Nov 67, pp. 2–4, ORLLs in Historians files, CMH.

By May 1967, five T–2 power tankers and a land-based power plant began producing electricity at Cam Ranh Bay.
269

Completing the Bases

copter arrived carrying several wounded infantrymen. Although not officially 

open, the hospital treated those soldiers and subsequently cared for several 

hundred allied casualties. Almost all of the hospital’s plumbing and fixtures 

and major parts of the generators, maintenance buildings, latrines, and water 

towers were improvised by the engineers. Many Vietnamese children were also 

treated there. Capt. Richard F. Hill, the Company D commander, said: “The 

men don’t say much about their work, but you can see the enthusiasm and 

pride in their eyes when an injured or sick child is treated and released from 

the hospital.”9

Air Force engineers complemented the construction program in southern 

II Corps. In the spring of 1967, the 554th Civil Engineering Squadron at Phan 

Rang became the first Air Force engineering unit to set up and operate a concrete batch plant. Most of this production was used for large aircraft dispersal 

hardstands. The employment of Vietnamese workers increased from 11 in 

April 1966 to 685 by September 1967. At first, most were hired as unskilled 

laborers or as painters, carpenters, and masons and had to be closely supervised. Eventually, a semiskilled labor pool was built up and included vehicle 

mechanics. At Tuy Hoa, Walter Kidde, working under the turnkey concept, 

finished the airfield lighting in February, and the entire $52 million permanent 

facility—a 9,000-foot interim AM2-surfaced runway, a 10,000-foot concrete 

primary runway and taxiway with parking aprons, and a logistic complex 

that included an extensive fuel storage facility and two maintenance hangars 

and cantonment—by the end of June 1967, one year after the initial contract 

award. Though the turnkey idea, where the contractor built the base in a 

single package, was a success at Tuy Hoa, no similar construction project was 

planned elsewhere because the Air Force did not need another jet-capable base 

in South Vietnam.10

During 1967, the equipment problems plaguing the Army engineers in 

the 35th Group subsided. In the spring, the status of earthmoving equipment improved considerably with the arrival of the Clark 290M tractors and 

scrapers, which replaced the worn-out 830M tractors and scrapers. Likewise, 

relief was brought to the 864th Battalion’s badly worn bulldozers, as HD16 

models were gradually replaced by the D7Es. At Cam Ranh Bay’s quarry, 

one of the largest troop-operated quarries in Vietnam set up by the 864th 

Engineer Battalion and currently operated by the 87th Engineer Battalion, 

equipment and manpower shortages eased when the 610th Engineer Company 

(Construction Support) arrived in August.11

9

 “Engineers Build Jungle Hospital,” Castle Courier, 30 June 1967. 10 Schlight, Years of the Offensive, pp. 224–25; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 223; 

USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, p. 95; Directorate of Construction, MACV, 

Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review), 15 Jan 68, p. 11–1, Historians files, 

CMH (hereafter cited as MACV Complex Review, date). 11 ORLLs, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 35th Engr Gp, p. 9; 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 864th Engr Bn, pp. 

1–2, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 87th Engr Bn, p. 3, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 864th Engr Bn, p. 3. For more on 

the Clark 290M tractor and scraper, see Pfc. Randy Hunter, “The 290M: Where There’s a Man 

. . . There’s a 290,” Kysu’ 1 (Summer 1969): 22–25.
Engineers at War

270

The Clark 290M tractor and scraper required skilled operators and 

mechanics. For example, Pfc. Gerald Schreiner of the 557th Engineer 

Company (Light Equipment) was one of the few men qualified to operate 

a 70,000-pound machine capable of moving 20 cubic yards of earth while 

leveling hills and filling low spots at the Phuoc Vinh base camp. On a typical 

day, he moved 400 to 600 yards of laterite to a new revetment area for an 

Army assault helicopter unit. By 0800, the thermometer already registered 

105°F. “I guess I make 20 or 30 trips a day between the job and laterite pit,” 

he yelled over the noise made by the 400-horsepower engine to a reporter 

from the Engineer Command’s public affairs office. “The trick is to roll with 

the ship,” he grinned, while shifting the heavy-duty transmission into second 

gear for a particularly steep hill. Schreiner controlled the 290’s main components by three levers to the right of the operator’s seat to fill the scraper 

with dirt and empty it at the job site. Seven hours later, his face resembled a 

topographical map with rivulets of sweat racing through reddish dust-caked 

plains. At night he tried to get six hours of sleep from the mosquitoes, muggy 

heat, and occasional rocket attacks.12

A great deal of maintenance had to be done to keep a machine like Schreiner’s 

290M working. “The heat really fouls up the turbochargers,” declared Sfc. Henry 

Flagg, the light equipment company’s maintenance chief. The turbochargers 

could double the engine’s horsepower, but the combination of too much heat and 

too little oil could cause the engine to freeze up and reduce its performance. The 

heat also took its toll on the four 24-volt batteries often cracking them. Flagg’s 

mechanics could replace two engines a day, but because engine exchange was 

considered third-echelon work, this practice had to cease. Still, there was enough 

maintenance work like checking the oil level in each of the five large sumps 

and tightening connections to keep the 290M running. “You know,” Flagg told 

the reporter, “we whip 90 percent of the problems we have with these babies 

by simply practicing a little preventive maintenance.” In closing, he remarked: 

“The men are pretty good about it too; they know that when you got a piece of 

machinery like this you got to take care of it.”13

By the end of the year, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Phan 

Rang were large operating installations with the full range of appurtenant 

facilities, including administrative buildings, hospitals, warehouses, barracks, 

repair shops, mess halls, and a deep-draft port at Cam Ranh Bay. The construction effort at Cam Ranh Bay, eventually costing over $145 million, had 

transformed the peninsula into a major logistical center. As of 31 December 

1967, the port offered deep- and shallow-draft berthing facilities with one permanent and four DeLong piers, six LST ramps, an ammunition pier, a fuel 

discharging jetty, 1,700 feet of sheet-pile wharf, and a barge wharf. The port 

handled an average of 6,800 short tons of dry cargo and 30,000 barrels of 

petroleum products daily. The peninsula abounded with depots and maintenance shops, which when completed would total over 1.4 million square feet 

of covered storage, 1.2 million square feet of open ammunition storage, and 

12 Hunter, “The 290M: Where There’s a Man,” pp. 22–25. 13 Ibid., p. 25.
271

Completing the Bases

bulk storage for over 775,000 barrels of fuel. Supplementing the storage facilities were standard military containers and trailer van containers transportable 

by specially designed ships put into use in 1967 by Sea-Land Services, Inc. 

Electrical power came from central systems relieving the insufficient tactical 

generators. Intensive well drilling improved the water production and quality. 

Some 25,000 troops from all the services worked and lived on the base, and 

they enjoyed access to many of the comforts offered on bases in the United 

States. On the negative side, central waterborne sewage systems were originally 

provided at few locations. Burn-out latrines, locally manufactured from fiftyfive-gallon drums cut in half and partially filled with diesel fuel, were widely 

used. This primitive system proved practical but distasteful because of the 

inevitable odors and the dense, foul, black smoke generated during burning. 

Troops were particularly unhappy when assigned this duty. On one side of the 

peninsula the Army had burn-out latrines, while on the other side the Navy 

and Air Force enjoyed a central sewage system. In any case, more construction was programmed to improve operations and living conditions, including 

a complete water and sewage system.14

As combat bases, Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, and Phan Rang hosted large 

jet-capable airfields, each with permanent 10,000-foot runways and necessary 

facilities supporting large numbers of fighter-bomber and cargo aircraft. With 

air base construction complete, the operations tempo increased dramatically. 

At Cam Ranh Bay, the average number of Air Force aircraft on hand increased 

from 87 to 128 assigned to four F–4 Phantom tactical fighter-bomber squadrons, two C–130 Hercules squadrons, and two C–7 Caribou squadrons. The 

number of sorties flown jumped from 8,349 during the last quarter of 1966 

to 33,342 during the last three months of 1967. In addition, the Navy and the 

Army housed another forty aircraft on the air base. Army airfields at Cam 

Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin housed over seventy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In terms of landings and takeoffs, Cam Ranh Bay topped 43,000 in 

October, ranking it just behind the monthly averages at the top three airports 

in the United States. Phan Rang increased from 86 to 111 Air Force planes 

assigned to three F–100 Super Sabre fighter-bomber squadrons, one B–57 

Canberra medium-bomber squadron, and three C–123 Provider transport 

squadrons. Sorties increased from 8,709 during the last three months of 1966 

to 23,950 during the same period in 1967. During the last quarter of 1966, the 

new Tuy Hoa Air Base bedded down an average of seventeen F–100s. A total 

of 778 sorties were flown during this period. By the end of 1967, the average 

number of aircraft increased to sixty-two (three F–100 squadrons), and the 

sorties flown in the last three months of the year leaped to 9,211.15

14 MACV Complex Review, 15 Jan 68, pp. 8-1 to 8-2; Dunn, Base Development, p. 84; MACV 

History, 1967, vol. 2, p. 833; Development of Cam Ranh Bay, pp. 2-3, 3-1; Heiser, Logistic 

Support, pp. 26–27, 171–73. 15 MACV Complex Review, 1 Apr 67, pp. 138, 192; ibid., 15 Jan 68, pp. 8-3, 8-5 to 8-6, app. 

V; Development of Cam Ranh Bay, pp. 2-1 to 2-3; Schlight, Years of the Offensive, app. 1; U.S. 

Air Force Statistical Digest, FY 1967, Headquarters, USAF, pp. 50, 58, 64, and U.S. Air Force 

Statistical Digest, FY 1968, Headquarters, USAF, pp. 52, 62, 68, both at Office of Air Force 

History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.
Engineers at War

272

Even though the main war effort did not take place along the envisioned 

Cam Ranh Bay–Ban Me Thuot–Pleiku axis, Cam Ranh Bay continued to play 

an important role in the logistics picture, serving as a sustaining base for the 

entire Army theater of war. It served as a major juncture for transshipping 

supplies from oceangoing vessels to coastal-type shipping. The ammunition 

storage areas allowed the Army to keep large stocks of ammunition in country 

relatively safe from enemy attack, and the cold-storage facilities allowed fresh 

vegetables to be brought down from Da Lat and stored prior to distribution.16

Farther North

Impressive progress was also made to bases at Qui Nhon, An Khe, and 

Pleiku. Expanding logistical facilities supporting the 1st Cavalry and 4th 

Divisions and South Korean forces in northern II Corps remained a high priority. Operations by the 1st Cavalry Division and the South Korean Capital 

Division coupled with a severe northeast monsoon in the coastal region 

placed a heavy dependence on Highway 1 from Bong Son south to Ninh Hoa. 

Responsibility for engineering support in the eastern half of northern II Corps 

now fell to the 45th Engineer Group following the departure of the 937th Group 

to Pleiku. To improve control of its five battalions and retain a major engineer 

headquarters in Qui Nhon, Colonel Bush moved the 45th Group headquarters 

from Tuy Hoa. After Bush’s departure in May, Colonel Sawyer concentrated 

much of the group’s efforts in the Qui Nhon area, employing three to four battalions. As work on the Qui Nhon depot complexes proceeded, enlargement 

of logistical facilities in the hinterlands gained momentum. This task fell to 

Colonel Braucher’s 937th Group which, following its move from Qui Nhon, 

could now concentrate on base construction and operational support in the 

western half of northern II Corps. Upgrading Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to 

Pleiku was shared by the two engineer groups.17

The two groups took different approaches in implementing an Engineer 

Command directive in November 1966 to establish Contract Liaison and 

Installation Master Planning offices to serve as go-betweens with civilian 

contractors and Army users. Duties assigned to the contract liaison offices 

included offering technical advice to installation commanders to help 

carry out their master planning responsibilities, monitoring troop self-help 

construction, providing a contracting officer’s representative on specified 

contracts, and participating in final inspections of completed projects. In 

the 45th Group, a separate office was established consisting of a captain 

(later a major), a clerk and jeep driver, and a Vietnamese Army sergeant 

who served as an interpreter. Coordination with the RMK-BRJ field office 

located at Phu Cat Air Base mainly concerned rock and asphalt production 

and paving. The office also maintained liaison with Vinnell and Pacific 

Architects and Engineers to check the status of their projects. In addition, 

the 45th Group’s contract liaison officer handled civil affairs matters and 

16 Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 27. 17 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 169.
273

Completing the Bases

served as point of contact with the Vietnamese Railroad and U.S. Agency 

for International Development office in Qui Nhon. The 937th Engineer 

Group also set up a separate office but assigned the duties to the S–3. He 

was assisted by one officer and one noncommissioned officer. Regional 

Contract Liaison and Installation Master Planning officers were assigned 

at installations in the group’s area of responsibility to keep watch over 

RMK-BRJ’s projects.18

A major development for the 45th and 937th Groups was the conversion 

of more combat battalions to the new TOE 5–35E series, which called for four 

lettered companies. In February, four companies were split from the new 31st 

Engineer Battalion (Combat) at Fort Hood and deployed to Vietnam. These 

companies became Company D of the 20th and 299th Battalions of the 937th 

Group and the 39th Battalion of the 45th Group (the fourth company was 

assigned to the 588th Engineer Battalion in III Corps), and gave the former 

D-series battalions a 25 percent increase in capability to carry out operational 

support and construction missions. Conversion of the other combat battalions—the 19th and 70th—came over the following months. The stripping of 

the four companies from the 31st Engineer Battalion, however, meant that the 

battalion would have to be rebuilt. Its deployment from Fort Hood to Vietnam 

would be delayed by more than a year.19

In Qui Nhon, Colonels Bush and Sawyer found functioning port, depot, 

hospital, and cantonment facilities well on their way to completion. Base development plans for the 45th Engineer Group’s chief customer, the Qui Nhon 

Support Command, called for more port and depot facilities, maintenance 

shops, and administrative buildings. For almost a year now, Qui Nhon was 

coequal with Cam Ranh Bay, and requirements for storage facilities greatly 

increased. The port served as the entry point for the material needs of the two 

U.S. and one South Korean divisions and Phu Cat Air Base. Envisioned was a 

logistical complex supporting over 100,000 troops in northern II Corps.20

During 1967, the 45th Group completed major projects for the Qui 

Nhon Support Command. Men of the 84th Engineer Battalion and the 643d 

Engineer Pipeline Company completed a refrigerated warehouse, a causeway 

in the port area, and more than four miles of eight-inch fuel line within the 

city and twenty miles of six-inch line from a tank farm outside Qui Nhon 

to Phu Cat Air Base. Dredging in the harbor was done by two dredges, the 

Ann operated by RMK-BRJ and the USS Davison manned by the Corps of 

Engineers. A new turning basin was completed in mid-March, and the dredged 

material was put to good use as fill for an access road to the docks and behind 

the bulkhead.21

18 ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, 

pp. 14–15. 19 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 158.

20 Dunn, Base Development, p. 71; MACV Complex Review, 15 Jan 68, p. 4-1. 21 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 170, 213; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 2–7, 1 

Feb–30 Apr 67, 84th Engr Bn, 14 May 67, pp. 2–5, Historians files, CMH, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th 

Engr Gp, p. 5, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, p. 5, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 5.
Engineers at War

274

RMK-BRJ retained a significant presence in Qui Nhon. Market Ti

facilities for the Navy’s coastal patrol operations, under construction at Qui 

Nhon since February 1966, were completed in May 1967. At the Qui Nhon 

airfield, the firm completed an airfield lighting system, a 3,400-foot taxiway 

extension, most of the work on an operations building, two maintenance hangars, and two large warehouses before turning the project over to Army engineers in May. Atop Vung Chua Mountain overlooking the city, the firm helped 

Page Communications Engineers, the Army Signal Corps contractor charged 

with building fixed communications systems, by laying foundations for buildings and antennas, and building fuel storage, water, and sewage systems, access 

roads, bunkers, security lighting, and security fencing.22

North of Qui Nhon, RMK-BRJ’s projects at Phu Cat Air Base neared 

completion. The concrete runway, 10,000 feet long by 125 feet wide, was completed on 14 March, and all work on the taxiways and warm-up apron was 

completed on 25 March. In May and June, two squadrons of F–100s were 

transferred from Bien Hoa and Phan Rang and began operations. During the 

last three months of 1967, the average number of aircraft stood at sixty-seven 

(mostly F–100s and C–7As). A total of 15,057 sorties were flown between 1 

October and 31 December. RMK-BRJ and Air Force engineers pressed on 

with more projects, adding a control tower, runway lighting, paved roads, aircraft revetments, and improvements in living and working conditions.23

In early 1967, Vinnell Corporation mobilized its workforce to carry out 

its electric power-generation project for bases in the Qui Nhon area. Two T–2 

tankers had arrived but not positioned because dredging was in progress. Upon 

completion of the dredging, the tankers were moved to mooring dolphins built 

by the 45th Group. Simultaneously, Vinnell erected pole lines to military bases 

in the city, and the first increment of power came online in April. By summer, 

the tankers were providing up to 15,000 kilowatts of electricity. In November, 

Vinnell’s contract was modified to add power plants and distribution systems 

to bases outside Qui Nhon. Altogether, plans called for the installation of six 

1,500-kilowatt generators in the Phu Tai Valley southwest of the city and three 

1,500-kilowatt generators for the South Korean encampments in ROK Valley 

just west of Qui Nhon. A power plant for Cha Rang depot and maintenance 

facility was also in the works.24

South of Qui Nhon, work progressed on depot facilities. The 19th 

Engineer Battalion continued improving the Phu Tai ammunition depot and 

began to build new depots for the Qui Nhon Support Command and the 34th 

Aviation Group at Long My, eight miles south of the city. To speed up the 

tempo of construction, Colonel Bush ordered the battalion to move to the 

22 Diary of a Contract, pp. 236–40; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 287. 23 Diary of a Contract, pp. 266–70; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 286–87; Schlight, Years 

of the Offensive, pp. 155, 158, 173, app. 1; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, p. 

36, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, p. IV-12, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. IV-10, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, 

MACDC, p. IV-8; U.S. Air Force Statistical Digest, FY 1968, p. 62. 24 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. IV-13; Fact Sheet, 6 Feb 67, tab J, incl. 

8, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 6; “Floating and Land Based Power Plants,” p. 10; MACV 

Complex Review, 15 Jan 68, p. 4–13.
275

Completing the Bases

work site. Extensive earthwork and vertical construction were required, and 

the group attached several 830M tractors and scrapers, and operators from 

the 84th Engineer Battalion to move fill down an adjacent mountain to the 

depot site. Operating heavy construction equipment did have its hazards, 

and on one occasion one of the scrapers tipped over coming down the slope. 

Fortunately, the operator was not seriously injured. By April, level plateaus 

had been shaped for the depots and the battalion’s base camp, later to become 

the depot’s cantonment. A concrete plant borrowed from a paving detachment 

at An Khe was pressed into service to make concrete floors for the 120-by-200-

foot Butler warehouse and 40-by-200-foot storage sheds. The Butler buildings 

were especially challenging because few of the combat engineers had experience erecting huge prefabricated metal buildings. In July, the 19th received 

long-awaited orders to move north of Bong Son to begin Highway 1 improvements, and the 84th Battalion took over the three depot projects.25

West of Qui Nhon, the newly arrived 589th Engineer Battalion 

(Construction) from Fort Hood took over the jobs at Cha Rang from the 35th 

Battalion in April. The battalion set up camp along Highway 19 near the intersection with Highway 1, putting it in a position to take on projects at the South 

25 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 170, 214; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 19th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 67, 

pp. 2–6, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 67, pp. 2, 4, both in Historians files, CMH.

In 1967, construction of depot facilities outside Qui Nhon were under way such 

as this Butler warehouse building being built by the 19th Engineer Battalion at 

Long My.
Engineers at War

276

Korean Capital Division’s base camp in ROK Valley, expanding on the work 

previously done by the 19th and 35th Engineer Battalions.26

At Camp Radcliff just outside An Khe, construction of the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s base camp also neared completion. The division’s base development planners predicated their requirements on supporting a troop strength 

expected to increase to 31,800 by the end of 1967. The 70th Engineer Battalion 

and Company B, 84th Engineer Battalion, completed a 65,000-barrel fuel tank 

farm, upgraded tactical roads east of An Khe, prepared Highway 19 from An 

Khe to the An Khe Pass for paving, supported self-help construction, and finished the 4,365-by-72-foot concrete runway. Heavy rains during the southwest 

monsoon, however, penetrated the AM2 matting at the Golf Course airstrip, 

and breaks in the T17 membrane resulted in saturation and breakdown of 

the subgrade. Repairs had to be repeated to what was believed to be an overly 

safe drainage system. With most of the base camp work completed, the 70th 

Engineer Battalion moved on to the Engineer Hill encampment outside Pleiku. 

By October, the battalion, in a period of twenty-six months, had played a 

major role in turning scrub land into a major camp.27

In October 1966, RMK-BRJ received notice to build an electrical power 

plant and distribution system at Camp Radcliff. Since the firm had no projects 

at An Khe, it first had to set up camp on the base. The setting of the poles 

began in January, and soon, thanks to help from Army Signal Corps units, 230 

poles were in place. Work on concrete slabs for the generators, transformers, 

and powerhouse was completed in April, and the site was ready for the six 

1,500-kilowatt Army-furnished generators still en route. By June, the locomotive-size generators, hauled by Army tractor-trailers from Qui Nhon, finally 

arrived. On 1 August, the electrical distribution line work was turned over to 

the 589th Engineer Battalion.28

At Pleiku, the pace of base development continued to grow following the 

arrival of the 4th Division at the Dragon Mountain Base Camp, six miles 

south of the city. But the added workload imposed a strain on the 937th 

Engineer Group, which also had commitments to support the division and 

other combat units in the western half of II Corps. The group had become 

the center of base development activity, particularly after 1 April 1967 when 

RMK-BRJ ended operations in Pleiku. By then the balanced distribution 

of effort between combat support and construction shifted to a 40:60 ratio. 

Heavy combat loads west and north of Pleiku kept a steady demand on engineer support in building and maintaining forward airstrips and supply roads. 

In mid-April, help arrived when the 815th Engineer Battalion (Construction) 

26 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 213–14; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 4–5, 1 

Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 5. 27 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 167–68, 209–10; MACV Complex Review, 15 Jan 68, pp. 5-1, 

5-8; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 4–5, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6, 

1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 5, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 2–5, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 67, 70th Engr Bn, 10 May 67, pp. 6–8, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 70th Engr Bn, 10 Aug 67, pp. 4–9, 

1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 70th Engr Bn, 14 Nov 67, pp. 1, 3–6, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 70th Engr Bn, 31 

Jan 68, pp. 6–7, last four in Historians files, CMH. 28 Diary of a Contract, pp. 275–76.
277

Completing the Bases

deployed from Fort Belvoir and soon became the group’s main construction 

force. The 815th took over running the contractor’s two 225-ton-per-hour rock 

crushers, construction materials storage area, and the bulk of equipment left 

behind by the contractor. RMK-BRJ did finish an asphalt parking apron and 

cantonment work at Pleiku Air Base, and Army cantonment construction was 

nearly completed. The remaining work was transferred to the 937th Engineer 

Group. Like An Khe, the string of camps around Pleiku was transformed into 

a livable semipermanent base complex for a division and supporting units. The 

move of the 70th Engineer Battalion from An Khe also helped balance the 

workload between combat support and construction in the area.29

During the course of the year, the 45th and 937th Engineer Groups noted a 

gradual reduction in equipment and supply deficiencies. In early 1967, getting 

supplies to the job sites in the 937th Engineer Group’s area of responsibility 

improved to the point that Colonel Braucher reported the increased availability 

of Class IV construction materials was the most noteworthy development in 

the three-month period since 1 November. In An Khe, requisitions for building supplies were submitted first through the group and routed to the 70th 

29 Ibid., pp. 208–10; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 163, 206; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 

67, MACDC, p. 36, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. IV-12 to IV-13, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 

pp. IV-11, IV-12, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, p. IV-8.

As a new transformer station went online, RMK-BRJ continued to work on an 

electrical power plant and distribution system at Camp Radcliff.
Engineers at War

278

Engineer Battalion S–4 for submission to the Qui Nhon Support Command. 

Since there was no Class IV yard in the An Khe logistical support activity, the 

70th Battalion was chosen to run the building materials storage facility. In 

Pleiku, requisitions were submitted through group headquarters to the Pleiku 

logistical support activity, which did operate a Class IV yard. Still, shortages 

of electrical and plumbing supplies and lumber and cement delayed several 

projects at An Khe and Pleiku, as did shortages of equipment. Of forty-eight 

authorized graders, the 937th Group was short ten. Only twenty-seven scoop 

loaders of sixty-one authorized and three motorized rollers of seven authorized were on hand. Repair parts were more plentiful. The chief maintenance 

concern was the lack of direct-support maintenance units. As for the 45th 

Group, Colonel Bush complained that the lack of compaction equipment 

needed in earthmoving work—thirty-five-ton compactors, sheepsfoot rollers, 

wobbly-wheel rollers, ten-ton steel-wheel rollers, asphalt finishing rollers, and 

water distributors—hampered road, airfield, and depot expansion projects.30

Some heavy construction equipment transferred from RMK-BRJ helped 

the equipment situation. Running the contractor’s former rock crushers, however, became a challenge for the 815th Battalion at Pleiku. One was in a state of 

disrepair and turned out to be a maintenance nightmare. The second crusher 

was new and had not been assembled. There were no maintenance catalogs or 

plans, but the battalion’s maintenance team persisted and brought the crusher, 

like the first crusher, a Pettibone, online in August.31

By the end of 1967, the 45th and 937th Engineer Groups and the contractors had accomplished most of their base construction projects. Qui Nhon, 

An Khe, and Pleiku became major staging areas for operations in northern II 

Corps. Qui Nhon developed into a major port and logistical complex supporting American and Korean troops in the region. Like other deep-draft ports 

under development, Qui Nhon’s added port capability reduced the pressure 

on LSTs, permitting their greater use for deliveries to shallow-draft ports 

instead of LCUs and LCMs. By the end of December, the daily port discharge 

capacities increased to 6,275 short tons of cargo, not much below Cam Ranh 

Bay, and 59,000 barrels of petroleum products, almost double the capacity 

at Cam Ranh Bay, up from 4,450 short tons and 14,000 barrels in January 

1967. Among the improvements in logistics was the new depot complex under 

construction at Long My. The demand for logistical facilities was so great that 

the Qui Nhon Support Command took over each building and storage area 

the moment they were ready for use and began relocating supplies stacked up 

on the beach. Qui Nhon also boasted three 400-bed hospitals, two American 

and one South Korean. Improved roads emanating from Qui Nhon, Highway 

1 north to Phu Cat and beyond and Highway 19 to An Khe, were surfaced 

with asphalt. A new jet-capable airfield at Phu Cat was in operation, and 

30 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 168, 175, 210; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 

15–17, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 13–14, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 937th Engr Gp, 31 Oct 

67, p. 13, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 45th Engr Gp, 11 May 67, pp. 5–6, last two in Historians files, CMH. 31 Unit History, 815th Engr Bn, n.d., p. 9, Historians files, CMH; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 

815th Engr Bn, 9 Aug 67, pp. 2, 4–8, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 815th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 68, pp. 2–7, 

both in Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 209.
279

Completing the Bases

improvements were under way to upgrade inland forward airstrips to C–130 

capability. Inland camps at An Khe and Pleiku were taking the form of World 

War II stateside camps. Work would continue at a slightly lower pace to complete ongoing projects, enhance existing facilities, and improve working and 

living conditions. To ensure that the bases received constant maintenance and 

utilities services and some new construction, Pacific Architects and Engineers 

routinely hired more workers and set up shops at many locations.32

III and IV Corps

Base construction in III and IV Corps made great strides in 1967 thanks to 

the arrival of a second engineer brigade headquarters, a sixth group headquarters, and six newly raised construction battalions from the United States. On 

3 August, the 20th Engineer Brigade headquarters, commanded by Brig. Gen. 

Curtis W. Chapman Jr., arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base from Fort Bragg. Two 

days later, Engineer Command placed the 34th, 79th, and 159th Groups under 

the 20th Brigade. The new brigade’s mission encompassed operational support, troop construction, and civic action in III and IV Corps. This command 

arrangement simplified Engineer Command’s span of control to two brigades 

with each brigade commanding three groups. Each brigade also supported the 

field force in its area of responsibility.33

Headquarters, 20th Engineer Brigade, was a new unit activated only 

three months before deploying to Vietnam. Despite several problems, the brigade headquarters company was able to meet the requirements for overseas 

deployment. Based on the experiences of the 18th Engineer Brigade, changes 

were made to the table of organization and equipment to fit the situation in 

Vietnam. An intelligence section was established, and the operations branch 

was expanded to four sections dealing with plans, construction operations, 

operational support, and liaison. General Chapman decided that most design 

work was to be done at group, battalion, and port construction company level. 

Standard drawings, such as barracks, mess halls, and showers, that had been 

developed by the three groups were catalogued for use by all the groups. A 

maintenance section was organized within the S–4. In so doing, the brigade 

put itself in a position to give technical help and speed up delivery of spare 

parts.34

Noteworthy among the many bases under development in III and IV Corps, 

Long Binh continued to grow into a major logistical and headquarters complex. By mid-1967, General Westmoreland’s campaign (Operation Moose) to

reduce the U.S. troop presence in Saigon resulted in relocating approximately 

half of the soldiers to Long Binh. On 15 July, U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters announced its move from Saigon to Long Binh even as construction 

32 Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 171; MACV Complex Review, 15 Jan 68, pp. 4-5, 4-6, 4-12; 

MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, p. 833; CINCPAC Port Development Plan, 12 Jan 67, p. 17, 

Historians files, CMH. 33 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 156–60, 221; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 20th Engr Bde, 31 Oct 

67, p. 2, Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 138. 34 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 2–6, 12–13.
Engineers at War

280

workers rushed to finish the new facilities. Other major headquarters, including U.S. Army Engineer Command and the 1st Logistical Command, had also 

taken up residence on the base. During 1967, more requirements for storage, 

airfield, maintenance, and community facilities were added to accommodate 

some 35,000 troops. This number would eventually increase to over 40,000. 

There was enough room, for the base covered over twenty-six square miles, 

nearly ten undeveloped. As a result, there was a large backlog of work facing 

the 5,000-man 159th Engineer Group.35

To carry out this work, Colonel McConnell, the group commander, relied 

on four construction battalions. By midyear, the 62d Engineer Battalion, 

which had completed its move from Phan Rang in January, finished expanding 

the II Field Force tactical operations center at Plantation and built the Long 

Binh central dial telephone facility. One of the challenging projects assigned 

to the 169th Battalion entailed shoring up the failing upper structure of one of 

the U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters buildings erected by RMK-BRJ. The 

46th Engineer Battalion devoted much of its effort to the Long Binh ammunition depot. Considered to be one of the largest ammunition storage areas in 

the world at the time, the depot contained 225 storage pads offering 250,000 

square yards of storage and thirty-nine miles of roads. Following a spring Viet 

Cong attack on the depot, the battalion’s Company B repaired damaged pads 

and improved the protective berms around the pads. Work assigned to the 92d 

Engineer Battalion included landscaping around the new U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

headquarters and building bunkers at the MACV headquarters at Tan Son 

Nhut.36

The timely flow of the right type of construction supplies to the 159th 

Group’s project sites still had hurdles to overcome. The combined efforts 

of engineer units and self-help programs exhausted stocks of electrical and 

plumbing supplies, water tanks for mess halls and showers, and two-inch 

lumber as soon as they arrived. This shortfall took place despite the large 

quantities of supplies reaching the depots. Asphalt and peneprime needed at 

Long Binh, Bien Hoa, and Bearcat for dust control on roads and helipads 

were in short supply. Getting rock and sand remained a problem because of 

the lack of convenient sources and transportation. A contract with a Korean 

company to deliver 100,000 cubic yards of rock from Korea was plagued with 

problems of gradation control, shipping schedules, port facilities, equipment 

availability, and Vietnamese bureaucracy. By April, only 23,000 cubic yards 

had been delivered, and the 159th Engineer Group cancelled the contract. 

Hiring a Vietnamese contractor to haul rock from the Vung Tau quarry by 

35 MACV Complex Review, 1 Dec 66, p. 197; ibid., 15 Jan 68, pp. 13-1 to 13-2; “Long Binh 

Post,” Army 23 (April 1968): 48; Dunn, Base Development, p. 145. 36 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 182–83, 224–25; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 159th Engr Gp, 

pp. 7–10, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 46th Engr Bn, pp. 1–5, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 62d Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 

1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 169th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 5–8, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 62d Engr Bn, 31 Jul 67, pp. 

1–6, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 62d Engr Bn, 31 Oct 67, pp. 4–6, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 62d Engr Bn, 31 

Jan 68, pp. 2, 5–8, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 169th Engr Bn, 11 Nov 67, pp. 2–9, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 46th 

Engr Bn, 15 May 67, pp. 1–5, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 46th Engr Bn, 14 Aug 67, pp. 1–6, 1 Aug–31 Oct 

67, 46th Engr Bn, 1 Nov 67, pp. 1–8, last seven in Historians files, CMH.
281

Completing the Bases

truck helped somewhat, but that contract expired without renewal on 30 June. 

Using barges to haul rock from Vung Tau to Dong Tam and Long Binh was 

only partially successful at first because tugs were not readily available to move 

loaded barges. Overcoming this problem and the Vietnamese bureaucracy 

resulted in gradually improved barge traffic. While a search continued for suitable quarry sites, the group was able to procure much of the rock for Long 

Binh from RMK-BRJ’s University Quarry outside Saigon. Then there was the 

constant challenge of keeping up with rising standards of living, especially at 

the large Long Binh base. Standards were elevated nearly to those used in the 

United States.37

The contractors working at Long Binh took much of the strain off the 

159th Group. During 1967, RMK-BRJ carried out approximately $25 million 

of work on the base. Most visible were the headquarters and support facilities 

for U.S. Army, Vietnam, and 1st Logistical Command. Building the headquarters complexes involved erecting six 2-story buildings forming an “H” for the 

Army headquarters and four 2-story buildings for the logistical command; 

adding asphalt roads and parking; and installing water, storm, and sewer lines. 

The buildings featured amenities such as air conditioning, indoor plumbing, 

and vinyl tiled floors, things that customers now expected and incorporated 

into designs. Such items were not readily available, and U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

and U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam, recognized this problem and 

focused on getting the materials rather than lowering standards. Construction 

on this priority project for the U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters complex 

started in December 1966. After working day and night, the contractor had 

two of the buildings ready for occupancy in early July 1967. All six buildings were ready by the end of the month. Three of the logistical command’s 

buildings were completed in late October and the fourth the following month. 

Since the windows of these buildings were designed not to open, occupancy 

was held up until air conditioning was installed in December. Other projects 

related to the arrival of the two headquarters were quarters for officers and 

enlisted men, dispensaries, chapels, support buildings, and utilities, including 

water and sewer distribution systems. Another high-priority project was constructing two buildings for the 14th Inventory Control Center, which managed 

the Army’s depot assets. The hope was that the third-generation computers 

expected in late 1967 would bring some order out of the tremendous influx 

of supplies coming over the beaches and arriving at the ports. One building 

housed the computers, and the other contained the administrative center. 

Using Army-furnished materials, RMK-BRJ met the beneficial occupancy 

date of 28 June.38

37 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 184, 225, 227; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 159th Engr Gp, p. 

11, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 159th Engr Gp, 14 May 67, pp. 18–19, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 159th Engr Gp, 

14 Aug 67, pp. 14–15, last two in Historians files, CMH. 38 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. IV-15, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 21 

Jan 68, p. IV-12, Historians files, CMH; Diary of a Contract, pp. 278–82; Army Construction in 

Vietnam, 11 Aug 67, incl. 8, p. 5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 

184; Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 23; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 114–15.
Engineers at War

282

The power plant at Long Binh begun the previous October by Vinnell 

started coming online in 1967. The firm’s responsibility in this project included 

not only the design, which Vinnell subcontracted, but also the construction, 

operation, and maintenance of the plant claimed to be the only one of its kind 

in the world. For the first time, twenty-one 1,500-kilowatt generators were connected and synchronized to work simultaneously on one power system, or in 

electrical terms on a single loop. As soon as pole lines were strung, power was 

made available to users. Because of the strong possibility of enemy attacks, 

extra measures and precautions were designed into the system. Ten-foot-high 

revetments were built around generator complexes. If enemy fire hit one complex, the damage would be confined to that one complex. Besides physical 

protection, the plans called for fail-safe devices to ensure that power would 

continue to flow to the major headquarters, the hospital, and the computer 

center. In case any one part of the plant or distribution system was damaged, 

a series of reclosers would lock that part out of the remaining system. Work 

continued, and by November 1968, 19,000 kilowatts of power were being 

delivered. Vinnell also built power plants and distribution systems at Long 

Thanh, Bearcat, Di An, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, and Cu Chi.39

Fifteen miles northeast of downtown Saigon, RMK-BRJ carried out projects at Bien Hoa Air Base for Army and Air Force tenants, and the 159th 

39 “Vinnell Makes History at Long Binh,” pp. 8–10. 

At Long Binh, RMK-BRJ built several headquarters complexes, including U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, which were ready for occupancy by the end of June 1967.
283

Completing the Bases

Engineer Group committed forces to improve the Army side of the base. A 

long-delayed authorization to begin a second 10,000-foot concrete runway 

(parallel to the one built by the contractor in 1962 and 1963) was finally made 

in early April 1967. This work was justified, for Bien Hoa had become the 

busiest air base in South Vietnam. Excavation soon began, and a night shift 

was added. Concrete work started in the second week of June, but by then 

annual rains held up progress. Work on the new runway, taxiway, warm-up 

aprons, and perimeter roads extended to April 1968.40 The contractor also ran 

into delays in the ammunition storage area originally authorized to be built 

in 1965. Work begun in April 1966 lasted to mid-1967. Other facilities built 

for the Air Force included an engine test stand; blast pads; a fire station; a 

10,000-foot-8-inch welded-steel fuel pipeline from the Dong Nai River to the 

air base; water; utilities systems; airmen’s dormitories; and runway shoulder 

rehabilitation and replacement airfield lighting cables. RMK-BRJ also built a 

telephone exchange building and drilled nine water wells on the Army side of 

the base. Projects carried out by the 159th Engineer Group included building 

a communications center with air conditioning, general officers quarters, and 

a road that would provide a direct link between Bien Hoa and Long Binh.41

Also greatly improved was the string of bases for the 1st and 25th Divisions 

defending Saigon from the north. The 79th Engineer Group at Plantation 

under Colonel Gelini, who was replaced by Col. Joseph A. Jansen in July, 

continued to carry out base camp construction simultaneously with its operational support missions and roadwork. Work at the divisions’ base camps 

progressed from minimum essential facilities to more sophisticated and more 

permanent support facilities. Making this possible was the arrival in April and 

May of the 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction) from Fort Knox and the 

34th Engineer Battalion (Construction) from Fort Stewart. The two construction battalions increased the group’s construction capability and allowed the 

group’s combat engineer battalions to boost operational support to the 1st and 

25th Divisions during a period of increased combat activity.42

East of Saigon, the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion took up the development of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Blackhorse base camp at Xuan 

Loc. Along with its attached units—the 591st Light Equipment Company 

at Blackhorse, the 94th Quarry Detachment at Gia Ray, and two sections of 

the 2d Platoon, 67th Dump Truck Company, at Blackhorse—the battalion’s 

strength was almost 1,100, with about 870 men in the battalion and over 200 in 

40 Bien Hoa was not only the busiest airport in Vietnam in terms of landings and takeoffs (over 70,000 in January and over 83,000 in September 1967), but Bien Hoa and Tan Son 

Nhut even exceeded Chicago’s O’Hare, the busiest airport in the United States, which averaged 

slightly over 47,000 landings and takeoffs per month in 1966. MACV Complex Review, 15 Jan 

68, app. V. 41 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 252; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 21 

Jan 68, p. IV-11, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, 24 Jul 68; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 1st Log Cmd, 

11 Nov 67, p. 114, Rpts and ORLL in Historians files, CMH; Diary of a Contract, pp. 203–07; 

Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 224; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 9, 11–12. 42 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 184–85, 187–89, 233, 235, 239; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 

79th Engr Gp, pp. 2–5, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 79th Engr Gp, 13 May 67, pp. 2–5, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 

79th Engr Gp, 8 Aug 67, p. 2, last two in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

284

the attached units. Company A concentrated on building a 1,500-foot airstrip 

and a sixty-bed surgical hospital, while Company C helped build cantonment 

areas. East of Xuan Loc at Gia Ray, Company B did cantonment construction 

and ran a quarry from the base of Nui Chua Chan.43

When the 34th Engineer Group (Construction) from Fort Lewis under 

Col. Joseph M. Palmer arrived at Vung Tau in late March, it assumed a wide 

area of responsibility for southern III Corps (less the Long Binh–Saigon area) 

and all IV Corps. During the late spring and the summer of 1967, the group 

expanded to five battalions with the May, June, and September arrivals of the 

69th, 93d, and 36th Construction Battalions. At this time, the group’s construction commitments increased with the assumption of responsibility from 

RMK-BRJ for work at Vung Tau and Can To on top of expanding the base 

camps at Dong Tam, Long Thanh, and Xuan Loc. Despite this and the addition of the construction units, the group’s ratio of operational support to base 

construction showed a significant increase, from 16 to 33 percent by the end 

of July.44

At Vung Tau, RMK-BRJ, Vinnell, and DeLong transformed the once 

small port into a key base. Several miles north of the city at Cat Lo, which 

served as a hub for Game Warden naval patrol activities, RMK-BRJ built

a base camp and storage and repair facilities for U.S. and South Vietnamese 

naval forces. At the port, the firm dredged a turning basin for deep-water 

ships and a 12,700-foot-long channel. Other jobs included facilities for Page 

Communications and the Signal Corps and included antenna and microwave 

antenna footings; slabs for communications trailers and buildings; water and 

sewage lines; and roads, drainage, and walkways. These jobs were finished in 

March 1967. DeLong completed the pier facility on 22 April. In late 1967, 

Vinnell finished installing both primary and secondary electrical distribution 

systems, and two power ships were online providing a generating capacity of 

11,000 kilowatts. Simultaneously, Pacific Architects and Engineers hooked up 

buildings to the system.45

Vung Tau was one of the places selected to phase down RMK-BRJ operations. The 69th Engineer Battalion from Fort Hood arrived at Vung Tau on 

1 May and took over the contractor’s projects at the ammunition depot and 

the fuel storage area, which involved building a 50,000-barrel addition to the 

existing tank farm. The battalion also built a barge-loading facility to support 

the movement of supplies to the Mekong Delta. On 20 September, the 36th 

Engineer Battalion from Fort Irwin, California, reached Vung Tau, marking 

the sixth and final construction battalion scheduled for Vietnam in 1967. On 

43 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 185, 187, 227, 229; ORLLs, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 27th Engr Bn, 

13 Feb 67, pp. 3–5, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 27th Engr Bn, 8 Nov 67, pp. 3–4, 10–14, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 

68, 27th Engr Bn, 8 Feb 68, pp. 1–2, 8–13. ORLLs in Historians files, CMH. 44 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 34th Engr Gp, 18 May 67, pp. 5–9, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 34th 

Engr Gp, 10 Aug 67, pp. 1–3, 5–11, both in Historians files, CMH; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 

227, 244–45. 45 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, p. 41, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. 

IV-17, IV-19, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, pp. IV-17, IV-23, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, p. IV-14; 

Diary of a Contract, pp. 222–24.
285

Completing the Bases

1 October, the battalion took over the projects at Vung Tau, and the 69th 

Battalion moved to Dong Tam and Can To. The 36th Battalion continued 

work on port facilities, a 5,000-man cantonment, rehabilitated the airstrip, and 

designed and built three 50,000-barrel fuel storage tanks and their concrete 

pads, a manifold system, and a jetty for off-loading T–2 tankers.46

Meanwhile, the 34th Group began moving more units into the delta region 

to take over projects started by RMK-BRJ and to build the bases for the 9th 

Division and support units. In May, company-size task forces from the 27th 

and 69th Engineer Battalions were on the job in Vinh Long and Can To doing 

airfield and cantonment construction. By midyear, one company from the 

Long Thanh–based 86th Engineer Combat Battalion moved to Dong Tam to 

help the building effort, and the rest of the battalion deployed to delta bases to 

work on base construction and support the 9th Division in the field. When the 

69th Engineer Battalion moved to Dong Tam in October, it assumed construction responsibility for the base.47

The Viet Cong made concerted efforts to hinder construction at Dong 

Tam. The insurgents knew the base held a commanding position in the 

delta and could hamper their control of the region. By the end of 1966, the 

dredges had made substantial progress in filling in the base area and clearing 

approach channels. On 9 January 1967, Viet Cong sappers succeeded in sinking the Jamaica Bay, the largest dredge in Vietnam. This attack prompted 

General Westmoreland to send elements of the arriving 9th Division to the 

partially filled Dong Tam site to take over security from the South Vietnamese 

and begin work on the base. Two companies of the division’s 15th Engineer 

Battalion accompanied the advance elements. Within a few weeks, Company 

C, 577th Engineer Battalion, moved from Long Binh to build facilities for the 

7,500-man camp and operational base. Company C also replaced a weak Eiffel 

bridge with two panel bridges connecting the camp with the city of My Tho 

to the east.48

Meanwhile, the Navy’s Officer in Charge of Construction diverted another 

dredge from Cam Ranh Bay, and in March the Jamaica Bay’s sister dredge, 

the New Jersey, arrived. On 7 May, the first LST entered the turning basin, 

relieving the smaller LCMs supplying the base for other use. By then the 

engineers had completed 20 percent of the planned construction, including 

a runway for light Army planes and helicopters, a sixty-bed MUST (medical 

unit, self-contained, transportable) hospital consisting of inflatable buildings, 

and numerous cantonment buildings.49 

46 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 230, 232–33; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 69th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 

67, pp. 2, 6–8, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 36th Engr Bn, 13 Feb 68, pp. 2, 5–7, both in Historians files, 

CMH. 47 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 185, 229–30, 232; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 69th Engr Bn, pp. 

2, 6–8. 48 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, p. 402; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 292–93; Dunn, 

Base Development, p. 53; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 145; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 183–84; 

Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, p. 41. 49 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 293; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 145–46; Quarterly Hist 

Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. IV-17, IV-18.
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286

The builders of Dong Tam faced challenges found nowhere else in Vietnam. 

At Dong Tam, the rain was severe enough that it almost halted construction 

for two months, and all efforts went into saving what had been built. The instability of the ground in the delta and the high water table caused special problems. Large buildings required supporting piles. When underground storage 

tanks popped out of the ground after removal of their contents, workers had 

to place concrete collars around the tanks. Holes dug for communications and 

power poles were shored up with fifty-five-gallon drums. Scarce rock moved 

by barge from the Vung Tau quarry, a five- to ten-day trip, and was used only 

on the most important concrete structures. Sand-cement sufficed for other 

work. By June 1967, the growing base occupied 4.6 square miles. In addition 

to the cantonment and storage facilities for the 9th Division’s 2d Brigade, the 

installation had a 1,640-foot airstrip and a 0.8-square-mile turning basin for 

shipping, with boat and barge landing sites. Summer saw the completion of 

more permanent buildings, water and electrical distribution systems, a waterborne sewage system, more ramps for landing craft, warehouses, hardstands, 

and maintenance shops. The Dong Tam project would extend to late 1968 

when it was officially declared complete.50

50 MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, p. 411; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 146–49; ORLL, 

1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 159th Engr Gp, p. 19. For more on Dong Tam, see Maj. Bryon G. Walker, 

“Construction of a Delta Base,” Military Engineer 60 (September-October 1968): 333–35. 

After overcoming the challenging soil conditions, engineers completed the Dong 

Tam base in late 1968.
287

Completing the Bases

Though the 34th Group had many of the same problems as the other engineer groups, it had to put up with the challenges of working in the delta. Rain, 

while not a major problem at the better-developed Vung Tau complex, played 

havoc in the delta, especially at Dong Tam and the newer sections of Long 

Thanh, areas that had been built since the 1966 monsoon. After assuming 

responsibility for transporting construction supplies and rock to the delta from 

the 20th Brigade, the group continued to work closely with Transportation 

Corps officials in scheduling the tows of 300- and 700-ton barges to off-loading sites. From May to the end of the year, twenty-four barges were hauling 

approximately 7,000 tons of bulk construction material each month to the 

delta. Rock requirements set up by MACV, however, were much larger, some 

38,000 tons per month from Vung Tau to the delta. During an eight-month 

period, the barges only moved 50,000 tons. Since the 1st Logistical Command 

controlled the majority of barges, the group recommended that the logistical 

command take over responsibility for moving the rock. On 15 January 1968, 

the 1st Logistical Command took over the operation while the group retained 

responsibility for the loading and unloading of rock, a task also under consideration for transfer to the logistical command.51

The Saigon Projects

In Saigon, RMK-BRJ completed several eye-catching projects. One of 

these was the new U.S. Embassy complex located about four blocks from 

Independence Palace, the Vietnamese White House. The old leased building 

downtown had been bombed several times and was susceptible to attack, and 

work began on the new site in September 1965. Delays in plans and funding, 

however, delayed occupancy until September 1967. Surrounded by a concrete 

wall and encased in a masonry rocket shield, the peculiar structure resembled a 

giant pillbox rising above the surrounding neighborhood. At first plans called 

for a four-story building, but this was changed in February 1967 to six floors 

topped off with a penthouse helicopter landing pad.52

Next in line was the $25 million MACV headquarters complex. The project had started on a site in the Chinese quarter of Cholon in west Saigon in 

February 1966, but strong protests by the inhabitants halted work in May. As 

a result, the project shifted to the northern edge of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. 

Surveying the new site began on 1 July, but stringent security requirements for 

construction workers resulted in slow hiring. It was not until September that 

construction got into high gear. At its peak, the project employed over 100 

Americans, 300 Koreans and Filipinos, and over 1,200 Vietnamese. By the end 

of June 1967, less than twelve months from the time excavation started for the 

security fence and less than eleven months from the time the first concrete slab 

51 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 229, 233; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 34th Engr Gp, p. 7, 1 

May–31 Jul 67, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 15–16, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 34th Engr Gp, 1 Feb 68, p. 14, 

last in Historians files, CMH. 52 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 250; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 21 Oct 

67, p. IV-22, Historians files, CMH; Diary of a Contract, p. 191.
Engineers at War

288

was poured, the project was 96 percent complete. In August, MACV headquarters began moving in. The two-story building contained a foundation of 

concrete caissons, 310,000 square feet of concrete floors with vinyl tile covering, an insulated metal roof, insulated double-wall metal siding, suspended 

acoustical ceilings, plastered fixed partitions, and plywood movable partitions. 

Also part of the new MACV complex were a three-story metal prefabricated 

barracks and mess hall, a one-story metal prefabricated building containing 

headquarters commandant offices and a warehouse, a power plant, a chiller 

plant, and a telephone exchange building. A chapel and automated data processing buildings were added and completed in the autumn. The complex had 

the largest air-conditioning plant in Southeast Asia, its own fresh water system 

with wells and treatment plant, and almost 11⁄4 mile of water and sewage lines. 

Surrounding the buildings were paved roads and four acres of parking lots, 

and 6,000 feet of 12-foot-high wire mesh security fence with lights every 90 

feet. It was no wonder that the MACV headquarters became known as the 

Pentagon East, or the Little Pentagon, for it was more than one-third (twelve 

acres of enclosed space) the size of the Pentagon in Washington (thirty-four 

acres). MACV headquarters now had enough space for 4,000 troops and civilian workers in one complex.53

Next door at Tan Son Nhut, RMK-BRJ worked on airfield expansion 

and base development. All official objections to building the parallel runway 

through an old Vietnamese cemetery vanished overnight on 4 December 1966 

when the Viet Cong infiltrated the base and had to be routed out of their hiding 

places, including the cemetery. Within a few days, the South Vietnamese Army 

appeared on the scene with bulldozers and leveled the obstructing tombstones. 

Progress was fast thereafter, and the new runway was in use on 15 April 1967 

and dedicated on 3 June. The entire parallel runway project consisted of a 

150-by-10,000-foot main runway of 10 inches of concrete (11 inches on the 

1,000-foot touchdown section of either end); runway lighting; 930,000 square 

feet of taxiway and apron of 12 inches and 11 inches of concrete, respectively; 

1 million square feet of compacted fill for the shoulders; and 400,000 square 

feet of soil-cement overruns, of which the 150 linear feet next to the runway on 

both ends was overlaid with 3 inches of asphalt. More 10-inch-thick concrete 

parking aprons were also built. Among the various air base facilities added by 

the contractor at Tan Son Nhut was a hardened concrete command post for 

the Air Force. During 1967, Tan Son Nhut bedded down an average of 142 Air 

Force aircraft. Over 126,000 sorties were flown in 1967.54

RMK-BRJ also wrapped up other projects in Saigon. The firm built the 

facilities for the country’s first television broadcasting stations for the Armed 

Forces Radio and Television Service and the Vietnamese government. About 

four blocks from Tan Son Nhut, RMK-BRJ undertook the rehabilitation of 

53 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 250–51; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 

p. IV-21; Diary of a Contract, pp. 194–96; Dunn, Base Development, p. 145. 54 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 251–52; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 

p. IV-21; Diary of a Contract, pp. 197–202; U.S. Air Force Statistical Digest, FY 1967, pp. 

60–61, and U.S. Air Force Statistical Digest, FY 1968, p. 66.
289

Completing the Bases

the 3d Field Hospital. The improved complex was completed in May 1967. 

On Saigon’s southern outskirts at the Phu Lam signal site, the contractor had 

been at work since July 1966. By May 1967, the project neared 50 percent 

completion, and the automatic switching center was activated in 1968. Some 

twenty other projects in Saigon were accomplished ranging from repairing of 

the fender system on a pier at the port, a penthouse addition to the MACV 

communications center, and a number of rehabilitation jobs on military offices 

and billets.55

East of Saigon, RMK-BRJ and Army engineers completed Newport. 

After finishing landing craft slips and ramps and barge off-loading wharfs 

in December 1966, the contractor began work on the deep-water berths 

and port buildings. When completed, the complex—consisting of a 2,400-

foot wharf, four deep-draft berths, and two transit sheds, each containing 

four interconnected buildings, 120 by 200 feet—totaled 290,000 square feet. 

The inner 140 feet of the pier structure involved building a wharf of freestanding pipe or H-pile with steel caps, stringers, and a concrete deck. Two 

piers made up the outer 140 feet supported by prefabricated steel jackets and 

concrete deck sections. The jackets and deck trusses were made at the firm’s 

fabrication yard at Poro Point in the Philippines. The piers were the idea of 

H. William Reeves, who adapted a design for oil platforms he built earlier 

55 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 251; Diary of a Contract, pp. 191–93; MACV History, 

1967, vol. 2, p. 793; Bergen, A Test for Technology, p. 302.

The MACV headquarters complex at Tan Son Nhut (the airfield is in the background) was completed by RMK-BRJ in the summer of 1967.
Engineers at War

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in the Gulf of Mexico, where piles were driven through steel tubes designed 

as part of the pier sections. Reeves, who had been sent to Vietnam earlier 

as a consulting engineer, returned to work for Brown and Root as part of 

the combine. Like the DeLong piers, the Reeves piers were prefabricated but 

with smaller sections and permanent. In late January 1967, the first berth was 

declared open and commemorated in a ribbon-cutting ceremony as the first 

ship came alongside. The second berth was completed in March, and all four 

were finished in July. Construction of a power plant and a maintenance shop 

proceeded concurrently with the pier work. At the peak of the port project, 

RMK-BRJ employed some 1,800 Vietnamese workers and 210 Americans and 

third-country nationals. The work schedule consisted of two 10-hour shifts per 

day, seven days a week. Meanwhile, fill operations for the port area continued. 

Fill material was hauled by the firm’s trucks from the University Quarry and 

subcontractors’ sampans. Newport could now accommodate simultaneously 

four oceangoing vessels, four shallow-draft landing craft, and seven barges. As 

with most projects, more improvements would be made. The cost up to that 

point was nearly $25 million.56

56 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. IV-21, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, 

pp. IV-2 to IV-21; Diary of a Contract, pp. 262–63; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 237, 246; 

Dunn, Base Development, p. 143.

A ribbon-cutting ceremony marked the opening of the Newport deep-draft port 

facility in Saigon when Brig. Gen. Shelton E. Lollis, commanding general of the 

1st Logistical Command, officiated by cutting the ribbon as (left to right) Generals 

Ploger, Dunn, and Raymond and Admirals Husband and Seufer observe.
291

Completing the Bases

Funding, Overbuilding, and Logistics 

During 1967, construction funding was on the downswing. By midyear, the 

total authorization since 1965 for military construction in Vietnam was $1.482 

billion, including the $397 million Fiscal Year 1967 supplemental. The funding 

for 1967 as compared to $850 million in 1966 indicated that the greatest part 

of the construction effort was financed and well on its way to completion. 

Nevertheless, Pacific Command and MACV believed the downward trend for 

Fiscal Year 1968 did not provide for all the required facilities and highway 

upgrading. But when Pacific Command requested additional supplemental 

funds, the Johnson administration demurred. By September and October 

1967, added construction requirements totaled $341 million, primarily to support the increased troop levels. In the end, MACV received $164.5 million 

supplemental funds for Fiscal Year 1968, which was much better than the $77 

million Fiscal Year 1968 regular appropriation. Only $69.1 million would be 

forthcoming for Fiscal Year 1969, bringing the total funds for Vietnam military construction to $1.71 billion.57

Meanwhile, General Raymond and his Construction Directorate faced a 

second funding overrun that came to light in January 1967. The Navy’s Officer 

in Charge of Construction in Saigon continued to underestimate the full degree 

of RMK-BRJ’s mobilization costs. Costs also swelled when the scope of projects expanded, and the Navy’s Officer in Charge of Construction in Saigon 

faced cash-flow problems. Up to this point, planning had been based on about 

$600 million equally divided between the contractor and troop effort. This 

figure did not include the $200 million to complete the contractor’s portion of 

the construction program, and now the Officer in Charge of Construction disclosed that the contractor required more than the $200 million estimated the 

previous July. In light of a reduced Fiscal Year 1967 supplemental program, 

Raymond could not expect relief in the planned Fiscal Year 1968 regular program submission, and he had to wait until about 1 November before these 

funds would become available. Raymond had no choice but to take steps to 

align future work within the new funding level. Since most of operational and 

logistical facilities were done, he looked to the increasing troop capability to 

take over a major share of the remaining work.58

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command also took steps to fix the 

overrun problem and dispatched its comptroller, Capt. Donald G. Iselin, to 

Saigon in February. One option that seemed to have the most merit allowed 

the consortium to complete current jobs along with some new work and the 

highway restoration program, turning the smaller and remote sites such as 

Pleiku over to the troop units. Besides easing the transition, Iselin believed 

that an infusion of cash for new work in the program would go a long way. 

57 CINCPAC History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 897–99; MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 843–44; 

MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 670; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 11–12; 

Quarterly Hist Sum, 1 Jan–31 Mar 69, MACDC, 19 Apr 69, app. 1, Historians files, CMH. 58 Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, pp. 35–36; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 

1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 11–16; Msg, Raymond SOG 0138 to Noble, 23 Jan 67, Dunn 

Papers, CMH.
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292

The Officer in Charge of Construction would only need part of that money 

to do the new jobs, enough to pay the labor since equipment and materials 

had already been purchased. The rest of the money could then be used to pay 

for the labor on current jobs. Iselin and Raymond traveled to Washington to 

recommend this approach to Defense Department officials. During the briefing, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ignatius went along with Iselin’s proposal, 

agreeing that the only way to handle the problem was to establish some level 

of effort. When Iselin drew up his plan he called it, for lack of anything better, 

the Level of Effort. Following this approach, the contractor was allocated a 

specific amount of funds at each of its remaining locations. Productive use of 

equipment, manpower, and materials was the major consideration at each site. 

The plan matched the firm’s given capability to a known workload, purposely 

established at such a level that work would always be ready, waiting for the 

capability rather than the consortium’s original posture of having more than 

enough capability and frequently waiting for work. Armed with Pentagon concurrence of the Level of Effort concept, Iselin returned to Saigon in March. 

Raymond agreed to put the Level of Effort plan into action. Iselin held a series 

of meetings to work out the details with the Construction Directorate, Officer 

in Charge of Construction, RMK-BRJ, and the three services. On the twentyfifth, Raymond directed the implementation of the system by 1 April 1967.59

By June, the Construction Directorate and the Officer in Charge of 

Construction had taken steps to absorb the overrun and phase down the contract with RMK-BRJ. The Navy’s Saigon office came up with a final estimate 

of $300 million to finish the contractor’s projects. Other measures included 

transferring some of the contractor’s projects, materials, and equipment to 

troop units; consolidating, closing out, or transferring the firm’s operating 

sites; and where possible, reducing the scope of projects. The Officer in Charge 

of Construction hastened plans to reduce the number of employees from 

48,800 to 17,000 by August and to phase out the contract by 1 July 1968. Since 

the reduction released workers with construction skills, the planning assumed 

that most of them would be able to find employment with other construction organizations. Losing all the firm’s construction capability, however, did 

not make much sense. In July 1967 MACV, after consulting with Honolulu 

and Washington, decided to retain the contractor and a workforce of at least 

15,000 to finish some projects and to carry out highway restoration.60

59 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 336–40, 342–45; Intervs, Richard Tregaskis with Capt 

Donald G. Iselin, Comptroller, Naval Facilities Engr Cmd, 29 Jan 71, pp. 6–21, and Brig Gen 

Daniel A. Raymond, Former Dir of Const, MACV, 20 Jul 70, pp. 19–21, both in Richard 

Tregaskis Papers, Naval Facilities Engr Cmd Hist Ofc, Port Hueneme, Calif.; Quarterly Hist 

Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 16–17, 19–20; MACDC Paper, n.d., sub: Level of Effort 

Concept, Dunn Papers, CMH. 60 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 840–42; Raymond, Observations on the Construction 

Program, pp. 36–37, 60–61; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 16–20, 1 Apr–

30 Jun 67, MACDC, 11 Jul 67, pp. III-4, IV-2, IV-3, 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 21 Oct 67, p. III3; Msg, COMUSMACV 09024 to CINCPAC, 17 Mar 67, sub: Reduction in RMK-BRJ Work 

Force; MACDC Fact Sheet, 5 Apr 67, sub: Construction Contractor Demobilization, RVN; 

Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 20 May 67, sub: Construction Contractor Capability; 

Msg, COMUSMACV 17260 to CINCPAC, 26 May 67, sub: Construction Contractor 
293

Completing the Bases

One way to cut down the number of projects and save money and engineering resources was to make sure facilities, especially troop billets, were not 

overbuilt. Since tents could be expected to survive little more than one year in 

such a climate, General Westmoreland had allowed construction of wooden 

tropical buildings. It was also recognized that roads, mess halls, latrines, showers, dispensaries, water towers, chapels, post offices, and other facilities would 

have to be built sooner or later. After reviewing the cantonment standards 

in 1966, U.S. Army, Vietnam, continued to use the field, intermediate, and 

temporary cantonment standards based on expected tenure of occupancy. In 

October 1966, MACV revised Directive 415–1 prescribing the three cantonment standards, which with minor modifications remained in effect for the 

remainder of the conflict. General Westmoreland concurred in using troops 

to build cantonments, but he considered it inappropriate to provide base 

camps beyond the mere necessities for units that operated and lived in the field 

most of the time. He was surprised, therefore, during a visit to Phan Rang in 

September 1967 to learn that new facilities were being built for the 1st Brigade, 

101st Airborne Division, particularly since the unit spent most of its time 

away from camp and did not make full use of the buildings already erected. On 

returning to Saigon he told General Palmer, the deputy commanding general 

of U.S. Army, Vietnam, to stop the work at Phan Rang and to look into the 

status of base camp construction.61

General Palmer, who in March 1967 had left the Army staff as chief of 

operations to command II Field Force, and on 1 July succeeded General 

Engler as deputy commander of U.S. Army, Vietnam, took immediate steps. 

No friend of the base camp concept, Palmer considered the policy “pernicious,” and the “manpower it soaked up was appalling, not to mention the 

waste of material resources and the handicap of having to defend and take 

care of these albatrosses.” It was also obvious to him that the camps were 

being overbuilt, and construction was too sophisticated. He himself became 

aware of a situation involving the 196th Infantry Brigade at Tay Ninh. And 

at Pleiku, Palmer found the 4th Engineer Battalion building concrete sidewalks for the 4th Division while the ammunition and fuel dumps remained 

impassable mud holes in the rainy season. His personal view was that all 

units should live in the field, with minimum facilities serving all the forces in 

a large area. He set up a base development study group under the chairmanship of the G–4, comprising staff officers of U.S. Army, Vietnam, and 1st 

Logistical Command, to evaluate all base camp construction requirements. 

The twelve-man study group reviewed base development plans for tactical 

and logistical bases and the reasons for their locations, degree of development, and their support to the tactical forces. Altogether, thirty-two Army 

bases and their satellites were visited and evaluated. At Qui Nhon, the study 

Demobilization; Msg, COMUSMACV 17572 to CINCPAC, 29 May 67, sub: Construction 

Contractor Demobilization. Two reports, messages, and fact sheet in Historians files, CMH. 61 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 45, 73–74; Ltr, Westmoreland to Dep CG, USARV, 23 Jan 

67, sub: Cantonment Construction Policy; Westmoreland Historical Notes, no. 21, 6 Sep 67, 

both in Westmoreland History files, CMH. MACV Directive, 415–1, 20 Oct 66, Construction: 

Cantonments, Standards of Construction To Be Used by US and FWMA Forces in RVN, an. A.
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294

group recommended that the port and logistical complex continue its base 

development program at the construction pace then under way, but that Tay 

Ninh, with the departure of the 196th Infantry Brigade to I Corps and a 

now-outdated base development plan, be considered for possible closing. At 

Bien Hoa, the study group found that the 173d Airborne Brigade only used 

22 percent of its base camp capacity at any given time and recommended 

any additional construction for the brigade should be deferred. With reference to Bien Hoa, the team also noted that the 20th Engineer Brigade 

and newly arrived 34th Engineer Battalion were living and working in tents 

considered below acceptable standards and recommended that the construction battalion be housed in a portion of the airborne brigade’s cantonment. 

At Phan Rang, the study group verified Westmoreland’s concern that the 

brigade of the 101st Airborne Division had not occupied its cantonment for 

more than a few days. The study group’s report suggested several reprogramming actions to assure the continuation of only essential base construction. 

General Palmer approved these recommendations and a proposed “hotel” 

concept. This meant that in any given base camp, the Army would not try to 

bed down every man since a large part of maneuver units would always be 

in the field.62

Despite MACV’s efforts to tighten the construction program, the Defense 

Department expanded upon the already constricting procedures of the construction authority. On 3 April, Secretary McNamara issued another procedural 

memorandum that did away with the concept that treated the entire country as 

one installation and instead divided the country into nineteen base complexes 

along with their satellite sites. Although the fifteen broad functional facility 

category groups had worked well for MACV program managers, they apparently did not provide the detail needed by the Defense Department. The Defense 

Department now preferred more detailed facility category groups, which nearly 

doubled the number of the superseded categories, but they did provide more 

detail and gave a better picture of what was being built. For example, the MACV 

list depicted hospitals as one category group, and dental clinics and dispensaries were lumped under cantonments. The Defense Department listed hospitals, dental clinics, and dispensaries as separate groups. MACV planners were 

now faced with managing over five hundred entities compared to the previous 

fifteen.63

The command again faced what amounted to a system that one could 

expect under normal peacetime procedures. Programming, reprogramming, 

reevaluation, rejustification, and resubmittals, with all of the attendant 

62 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 74–75; General Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s 

Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), pp. 69–71 (quoted 

words, p. 69); Report of HQ USARV Ad Hoc Group to Study Base Development, 18 Sep 67, 

pp. 2, 6, 8, 14–15, an. C, apps. II, XXII, XXIV, Historians files, CMH; Army Construction in 

Vietnam, incl. 8, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9, 24 Oct 67, OCE Hist Ofc. 63 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 74–76; Raymond, Observations on the Construction 

Program, pp. 51–52, 211–13 (tab V, Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 3 Apr 

67, sub: Construction Approval Procedures for SVN); Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, 

MACDC, pp. 20–21.
295

Completing the Bases

administrative burdens became a way of life for the construction managers. 

Since the Defense Department required copies of all construction directives, 

the Construction Directorate faced a possible increase of approximately 1,500 

entities to manage for each of the annual and supplemental appropriations. 

General Raymond later reported that even though the MACV commander 

retained some flexibility, “the new system has imposed a monumental paperwork task since, one there are so many separate projects and two copies of 

all amendments must be forwarded to DOD.” He noted that one reprogramming action alone could include five to ten amendments to the construction 

directives. As the Defense Department’s logistics study in 1969 pointed out, 

the modified system “provided maximum visibility and minimum flexibility.” 

The engineers had to abide by these restrictions and assigned more troops and 

civilians to do the bookkeeping.64

Bookkeeping also applied to construction supplies, especially those used 

by the contractors. In late 1966, RMK-BRJ had instructions to start construction on projects estimated to cost $823 million, some two-thirds of the entire 

construction program. Once the Seabees and the contractor had drawn large 

amounts of equipment and materials from Navy stockpiles, it became apparent that RMK-BRJ still needed equipment and materials in quantities far 

greater than could be replenished by Navy depots. This would bring the total 

equipment requirements to 5,000 items, an increase of 4,000, plus another 

1,000 pieces of rental equipment like barges, tugs, dredges, and pile drivers. 

The firm scoured the Far East for dredges and cement. When Westmoreland 

decided to house troops in tents with wood frames and wood frame buildings, 

RMK-BRJ added to its growing lists a huge demand for lumber. The firm’s 

Saigon office placed an order for 78.4 million board feet of lumber, and the 

home office at San Bruno, California, almost cornered West Coast lumber 

sources. This not only increased the price of lumber but also made it difficult 

for Defense procurement officials to satisfy the needs of the services within a 

specified time limit and at reasonable prices.65

Sorting and inventorying these vast stores of building materials and equipment during the hectic buildup posed major challenges. At first RMK-BRJ 

dumped equipment and materials at port staging areas, depots, and project 

sites. The flood of arriving materiel inspired thievery on a grand scale. Changes 

in project priorities and criteria also left the contractor with excesses of some 

materials. It became apparent that the consortium had to build its own depots 

and work camps in Vietnam to secure and house the growing stocks, which by 

May 1966 had grown in value to $162 million.66

It did not take long for Congress to become concerned. A team from its 

auditing agent, the General Accounting Office, arrived in Vietnam in July 1966 

64 Raymond, Observations on the Construction Program, p. 52 (quoted words); JLRB, 

Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 74–77, 80 (quoted words). 65 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 199–201, 225, 281; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, 

p. 174; Report to the Congress of the United States, Survey of United States Construction 

Activities in the Republic of Vietnam, General Accounting Office, Dec 66, pp. 1–2, 6, 31, box 4, 

74/167, RG 334, NARA (hereafter cited as GAO Rpt). 66 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 201, 212, 239–40; GAO Rpt, pp. 52–70, 77–81.
Engineers at War

296

to survey construction activities. In December, the team’s report concluded 

that problems it uncovered came about because of the speed in which RMKBRJ had to mobilize. In noting the contractor’s loss of control over materials 

and equipment, the team pointed out the magnitude of the problem. RMKBRJ could not account for the whereabouts of approximately $120 million 

worth of supplies shipped from the United States. The report prompted a 

lively exchange of views between the auditors and the commands. In response 

to the findings concerning inadequate depots, MACV and Pacific Command 

noted that the contractor’s facilities were at least equal to those provided to 

the military forces.67

The Navy and RMK-BRJ made a concerted effort to fix the problem. 

In July 1966, the Officer in Charge of Construction in Saigon established a 

Material Department to monitor the contractor’s procurement, shipping, 

inventory, property, and equipment programs. RMK-BRJ built major depot 

and repair complexes near Saigon, at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, with subsidiary storage areas at other locations. Near Saigon, RMK-BRJ began to 

capitalize on plans made earlier in the year to transform a marshy cigar-shaped 

island at Thu Duc into a vast storage and maintenance area. A large amount 

of fill was needed for the firm’s depot, but the Newport project had a higher 

priority and received the lion’s share of crushed rock from the firm’s University 

Quarry. This slowed progress somewhat. Nevertheless, some 1.2 million cubic 

yards of sand and 240,000 cubic yards of rock were used to stabilize an area of 

over 4 million square feet at Thu Duc. The firm completed most of the vertical 

construction (administration buildings, warehouses, and maintenance shops), 

utilities systems, surface stabilization, barge anchorages, and floating piers in 

early 1967. At the end of May, the inventory value of material (excluding spare 

parts) at Thu Duc totaled approximately $30 million. Altogether, the firm’s 

depot facilities in South Vietnam grew to twenty sites with ninety-seven warehouses providing 800,000 square feet of floor space. The firm also improved 

its security force by hiring Koreans and ethnic Chinese Nung mercenaries. 

While doing all this, the firm finally got the go-ahead to improve its camp sites 

for its American and third-country employees.68

Indicative of the development of the bases was the corresponding expansion of the facilities engineering contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers. 

During 1967, 5,000 more employees were hired, increasing the firm to over 

20,000 workers, including 1,500 Americans, 3,000 third-country nationals, and 

16,000 Vietnamese. At the start of the year, Pacific Architects and Engineers 

had responsibility for forty-nine permanent camps. These included major 

installations at Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Cu Chi, Long Binh, Vung Tau, Tuy Hoa, 

Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Phan Rang. By the end of the year, the firm 

had facilities engineering responsibility for 39 primary sites (classified as A 

installations), 57 smaller permanent offices (B and C installations), and 200 

67 GAO Rpt, pp. 2, 16–17, 52; Msg, CINCPAC to OSD, 6 Jan 67, sub: GAO Draft Report, 

Survey of U.S. Construction Activities in the Republic of Vietnam, 16 Dec 1966. Messages and 

correspondence concerning the report are in the same file with the report. 68 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 201, 248–49, 281–84; Diary of a Contract, pp. 262–63.
297

Completing the Bases

isolated Special Forces and adviser sites maintained by roving maintenance 

teams. The Long Binh complex alone required a facilities engineering staff of 

2,153 (80 U.S., 334 third-country nationals, and 1,739 Vietnamese). Taking 

care of the U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters complex required the dedicated 

services of 2 Americans, 6 third-country nationals, and 200 Vietnamese workers. The firm was still doing some $1 million in new construction each month, 

including jobs like building kennels for sentry dogs guarding a communications site at Long Binh. Though not in its facilities engineering charter, the 

firm pitched in to help hook up 2,200 telephones and run 200,000 feet of cable 

at MACV headquarters and 1,095 telephones and 25,000 feet of cable at Long 

Binh. The contractor also built engineer construction materiel yards for the 

logistical command in Saigon, Long Binh, and Vung Tau, stocking items from 

nails to prefabricated buildings.69

Because the Army supply system fell short of the contractual requirements 

with Pacific Architects and Engineers, the firm had unique supply problems 

of its own. Unlike the Navy’s contract with RMK-BRJ and the Air Force’s 

contract with Walter Kidde at Tuy Hoa Air Base, which allowed the two 

firms to procure the bulk of their equipment and supplies, the contract with 

Pacific Architects and Engineers called for the Army to provide these items. 

Despite the efforts of the 1st Logistical Command engineer and the U.S. Army 

Procurement Agency, Vietnam, Pacific Architects and Engineers received little 

of the equipment it was authorized. More than once the contractor resorted 

to purchasing materials and equipment from civilian sources. When the Army 

renewed the contract in mid-1966, the firm only possessed $3 million of the 

approximately $22 million of equipment and tools specified in the contract. 

The contractor’s difficulties varied from cancellations of requests for the missing equipment to critical shortage of space aboard ships and aircraft bound 

for Vietnam. In one instance, more than $1 million of equipment, vehicles, 

and prefabricated buildings purchased in Singapore reached Saigon almost 

six months later. The ever-expanding bases exacerbated the facilities engineering contractor’s materiel shortages, particularly refuse trucks, fire trucks, prefabricated buildings, and hand-operated insecticide foggers and rodenticide. 

Because of the lack of refuse trucks, Pacific Architects and Engineers had to 

hire local contractors, who demanded increasing prices to haul away the military’s trash. In late 1966, the contractor had on hand only 78 of the authorized 

626 pieces of “rolling stock,” but by mid-1967 the number on hand soared to 

674. By then, however, the shortfall in equipment was great because requirements had quadrupled over the authorized levels.70

Nevertheless, Pacific Architects and Engineers reported some improvement 

as equipment began to trickle in. Cement mixers, road graders, jeeps, assorted 

trucks, generators, and small shipments of water treatment plants, requested 

69 History, Pacific Architects and Engineers, Incorporated: Repairs and Utilities Operations for 

U.S. and Free World Military Forces, Republic of Vietnam, Calendar Year 1967 [Saigon, n.d.], pp. 

3, 6–7, 9, 14, 20, 23, copy in CMH. 70 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 173, 175; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 1st Log 

Cmd, n.d., p. 75, Historians files, CMH; PA&E History, 1963–1966, pp. 47–50.
Engineers at War

298

when the troop population began to rise, started arriving in September 1966. 

When thirty pickup trucks arrived in Saigon that month, Vietnamese customs 

red tape held up distribution for a month. Another contractor accidentally 

picked up and stored some transformers in Phan Rang, and it took the firm 

one month to locate them.71

The rapid growth of the facilities engineering contract made it evident that 

the Army needed better control. Although the 1st Logistical Command’s engineer monitored the contractor’s work, the command’s procurement agency 

managed the contract. To keep track of the firm’s performance, the procurement agency relied on contracting officer’s representatives, a title and responsibility typically given to staff officers as an additional duty. On 1 December 

1966, Col. Robert W. Fritz, who replaced Colonel Lien as the 1st Logistical 

Command engineer, established a Contract Management Branch at the firm’s 

Contract Management Office in Saigon. The branch, which later expanded to 

a division of three branches, supervised and controlled all technical aspects 

of the contractor’s operations. Fritz assigned duties as contracting officer’s 

representatives to the staff engineers of the Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh 

Bay support commands. In turn, the three commands appointed contracting 

officer’s representatives among the staff engineers of the installations within 

the support command areas. These assignments corresponded with Pacific 

Architects and Engineers’ three area and forty-five installation offices.72

Summing Up

By the end of 1967, the bases, all in full operation, were nearing completion. The builders had made tremendous headway to reduce the backlog, especially at the major complexes in and around Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Da 

Nang, and Qui Nhon. Since 1965, a vast base development program provided 

the operational, logistic, and support facilities that enabled the United States 

to deploy and operate a force now approaching 500,000. The construction of 

deep-draft ports with satellite shallow-draft ports, major air bases, depots and 

logistical complexes, and troop bases proceeded concurrently with the arrival 

of troops and their supplies. The anticipated long duration of operations 

made economical sense to upgrade troop housing from tents to tropical woodframed buildings and install better utilities beyond the designs called for in 

technical manuals. Statistics of completed Army facilities alone showed the 

immense effort put into the construction program. Over 4.4 million square 

yards of airfields were cleared, graded, and surfaced; 160 miles of pipeline 

and storage tanks capable of storing more than 37 million gallons of fuel were 

built; and 11.6 million square feet of covered and open storage for dry cargo 

were in place at the supply depots. Hospitals were capable of handling 2,800 

71 PA&E History, 1963–1966, pp. 48–49.

72 Dunn, Base Development, p. 92; Rpt of Visit to the 1st Log Cmd, 12 and 15 Nov 66, p. 

2, incl. 10, 7 Dec 66, OCE Liaison Office Trip Rpt, no. 5; ORLL, 1 Nov 66–1 Jan 67, 1st Log 

Cmd, pp. 73–74; U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, Procurement Support in Vietnam, 

1966–1968, n.d., pp. 30, 36, Historians files, CMH.
299

Completing the Bases

patients. Engineer troop strength increased as more construction battalions 

activated in 1966 crossed the Pacific, and command and control improved with 

the arrival of a second engineer brigade and the sixth engineer group. The 

long-awaited arrival of new equipment greatly helped, but getting construction supplies continued to be a challenge. With the construction program over 

the hump, planning was set in motion in 1967 to make sure there was no overbuilding and to cut back the expensive contract with RMK-BRJ. Washington 

also reduced funding and imposed more restrictions. Congress allocated over 

$1.5 billion in construction funds to the Defense Department for Fiscal Year 

1968 starting 1 July 1967, but only $300 million was slated for Southeast Asia, 

as compared to $1.1 billion the previous year. Still, the expansion of combat 

operations generated new requirements for roads, airfields, cantonments, and 

advanced logistical bases, an almost never-ending process as combat forces 

deployed to new areas. Priority now shifted to highway improvements. As 1968 

dawned, the engineers looked forward to finishing the bases, making headway 

on the road improvement program, and supporting tactical operations.73

73 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 133–34; Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army in 

Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1969), p. 218; Annual Report of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 

1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 90.

Among the major accomplishments in building the bases in South Vietnam were 

the deep-draft ports such as Newport shown here in October 1967.

10

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

During his visit to the United States in April 1967, General Westmoreland 

spoke of the importance of persevering on all fighting fronts simultaneously. He was now at the midpoint of his three-phase strategy that began 

with protecting his logistical bases with occasional forays. Currently, the allies 

were trying to gain the initiative and eliminate the enemy’s base areas and 

possibly his main forces. Westmoreland’s third phase envisioned moving into 

sustained ground combat to mop up the last of the main forces, or at least 

push them across the borders and try to contain them. “At one and the same 

time,” he told a gathering of the Associated Press managing editors in New 

York City, “we must fight the enemy, protect the people, and help them build 

a nation in the pattern of their choice.” A few days later in an address before 

a joint session of Congress, Westmoreland expanded on his war-winning 

strategy. He explained that the enemy, despite suffering large losses on the 

battlefield, still clung to the belief that he could defeat the allies through a 

clever combination of psychological and political warfare. “The only strategy which can defeat such an organization,” he stated, “is one of unrelenting 

but discriminating military, political, and psychological pressure on his whole 

structure—at all levels.”1

Strategy in Mid-Passage

This strategy in the mid-passage of the war was incorporated in the Joint 

Vietnamese-U.S. Combined Campaign Plan for 1967. With enlarged forces, 

added firepower, and improved mobility, Westmoreland carried the battle to 

the enemy regularly throughout the year. The plan provided for highly mobile 

American forces to carry the bulk of the offensive effort against Viet Cong 

and North Vietnamese Army main force units. South Vietnamese forces took 

on the primary role in pacification. Westmoreland viewed the U.S. effort as 

complementary—to drive the enemy main forces away from the priority pacification areas. He estimated that over half the U.S. combat forces would operate 

close to the heavily populated areas against guerrillas and local forces. These 

units would reinforce Vietnamese units in pacification, just as designated 

Vietnamese units would help carry the attack against the main forces.2

The Combined Campaign Plan also contained a blueprint for the security 

and restoration of the roads. As the priority construction of ports, airfields, and 

1

 Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 131–32; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 

pp. 224–29. 2

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 131–36; MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 317–22.
Engineers at War

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bases neared completion, more effort combining U.S. and South Vietnamese 

military and civilian resources could go to the highway restoration program. 

Planners viewed a good highway system as a high-priority requirement supporting military operations and nation-building. Early in 1967, MACV’s Directorate 

of Construction developed plans to upgrade about two thousand miles of roads. 

Dependable roads would also reduce dependency on the expensive air and slow 

water transportation systems. Sabotage, monsoon rains, and increasingly heavy 

use by allied military forces together had intensified the poor condition of the 

roads. Repairs were far beyond the capabilities of the South Vietnamese, and 

military engineers usually made minimum repairs and improvements to support military operations and the vital flow of commerce. The engineers would 

often repeat this process pending a fully funded restoration program. To carry 

out the program, the Directorate of Construction estimated an annual cost of 

about $130 million over the course of three years employing troop and contractor capability.3

While he prepared to upgrade the highways, additional troops and weaponry permitted Westmoreland to increase the scope and pace of offensive 

operations. In March, Westmoreland regarded the Army’s force ceiling under 

Program 4 of the buildup to be inadequate for the assigned missions, and 

he asked Washington for more troops. Washington reluctantly relented, and 

in October approved a force ceiling (Program 5) of 525,000 for 1968. U.S. 

strength increased significantly during 1967, from 385,000 to 486,000. By the 

end of the year, the number of maneuver battalions available to allied forces 

rose from 256 to 278. U.S. Air Force aircraft in South Vietnam increased 

from 834 to 1,085, and twenty-eight tactical fighter squadrons could be called 

upon to provide close air support and assist in the interdiction campaign. The 

number of B–52 sorties rose sharply. Army and Marine Corps helicopter units 

could muster over 3,000 helicopters of all types.4

By the autumn of 1967, Westmoreland had refined his earlier concept of 

a three-phase war to one of four phases. He saw 1968 as the year of the third 

phase, in which the Americans would continue to help strengthen the South 

Vietnamese military. The United States would also turn over more of the war 

effort to the South Vietnamese. In what he termed the fourth—and decisive—

phase, Westmoreland could see the “U.S. presence becoming superfluous as 

infiltration slowed, the Communist infrastructure was cut up, and a stable 

government and capable Vietnamese Armed Forces carried their own war to 

a successful conclusion.” He also expected that the enemy would try to do 

something to change this trend.5

Although events later in 1967 pointed to some kind of change in Hanoi’s 

plans, probably something big, General Westmoreland had no intention of sit3

 MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 326–30, vol. 2, pp. 762–63; MACDC-EBD Fact Sheet, sub: 

Highway Restoration Program in Vietnam, n.d., box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA; Quarterly 

Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, p. 1, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, p. II-1. 4

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 131; MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 135–36, 147–49; 

Schlight, Years of the Offensive, p. 159. For more on the troop ceiling requests, see MACV 

History, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 135–66 and Cosmas, Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, pp. 451–66. 5

 Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 136.
303

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

ting back to await the enemy’s next move. The promulgation of the Combined 

Campaign Plan for 1968 in November 1967 did not foresee any major changes 

in allied plans. U.S. ground forces would carry on with the destruction of the 

enemy’s main forces and base areas, contain the border areas and his use of 

infiltration and invasion routes, and help South Vietnamese forces to open and 

secure roads and the countryside. Westmoreland had concluded in mid-1967 

that the enemy was in a position of weakness. Hanoi had nothing tangible to 

show but increasing losses in personnel and materiel after a little more than a 

year of fighting the growing number of American troops. He regarded Hanoi’s 

choices as few, and intended to keep them that way. Indeed, as additional 

U.S. ground forces arrived, he saw an opportunity to employ the 1st Cavalry 

Division as a theater exploitation force in areas where good weather prevailed. 

In a series of operations code-named York, the division would deploy to

the III Corps border during the December to April dry season in the south. 

During the May to September dry season farther north, the cavalry division 

would then move to I Corps to sweep the four provinces along the Laotian 

border. Reestablishing control in the A Shau Valley could set the stage for an 

invasion of Laos, which, along with a possible amphibious assault around the 

Demilitarized Zone, could, Westmoreland believed, end the war.6

The Saigon Arc

Integral to these hopes for the future was progress in III Corps, and by 

mid-1967 II Field Force had completed a series of large-scale operations following Junction City. With the onset of the monsoon season, U.S. and alli

forces had settled in assigned areas meant to block the approaches to Saigon. 

The command’s maneuver forces included the 25th Infantry Division guarding 

the northwest approaches, the 1st Infantry Division to the north and northeast 

of the capital, the 9th Infantry Division east of Long Binh and to the southwest in the delta, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment farther to the east, and 

the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in Gia Dinh Province surrounding Saigon. 

II Field Force focused on strengthening security in the countryside, holding 

off enemy attempts to sabotage the national elections, and continuing to strike 

enemy base areas and defeat and destroy his forces. Other forces in the area 

included South Vietnamese regular and territorial units, the 1st Australian 

Task Force southeast of Saigon, and the Royal Thai Volunteer Regiment.7

By this time, the deployment of Rome plows and bulldozers had become 

a routine part of operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Their effectiveness 

during Cedar Falls had bolstered MACV’s earlier requests for land-clearing

teams. Although standard bulldozers had helped to prove the effectiveness of 

the land-clearing concept, their use in these operations had affected construction projects. MACV warned that similar use in the future would slow work 

at Long Binh and elsewhere until the land-clearing capability increased. As a 

6

 Ibid., p. 157. For details on the Combined Campaign Plan and the York series of operations, see MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 338–45, ibid., 1968, vol. 1, pp. 13–24. 

 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, 15 Nov 67, pp. 21–22, 57, 61, Historians files, CMH.
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result, II Field Force deferred large forest-clearing operations (Paul Bunyon) 

pending the arrival of land-clearing teams being formed at Fort Lewis, 

Washington.8

Rome plow kits reaching combat engineering units gradually increased. In 

December 1966, the Rome Plow Company rushed six kits to South Vietnam 

by air shipment. By early February, the Georgia-based company began weekly 

shipments of nine blades that continued over the next several weeks. As of late 

March, thirty medium and six light blades were in South Vietnam, but only 

twelve were mounted. The remainder still required attachment to the bulldozers. Totals in III Corps included four kits to the 1st Division, four to the 

25th Division, two to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, eight to the 79th 

Engineer Group, and four to the 159th Engineer Group. At midyear, plans 

called for a total of 174 blades, including 90 for three new land-clearing teams 

that began to arrive in May.9

The 27th, 86th, and 35th Land Clearing Teams reported for duty in May, 

June, and July, respectively. Originally proposed as self-contained teams, each 

consisting of 112 men and thirty Rome plows, the teams were reduced in scope 

by the Army to 64 men. The teams now depended on engineer battalions for 

maintenance, logistical, and administrative support. After undergoing several 

weeks of intensive training, the teams became operational approximately one 

month after their arrival. Two teams were attached to combat engineer battalions in III Corps, the 27th to the 168th Engineer Battalion at Di An and the 86th 

to the 86th Engineer Battalion at Bearcat. The third team, the 35th, deployed to 

II Corps, where it joined the 35th Engineer Battalion north of Qui Nhon.10

Battalion commanders used different approaches to assimilate the teams. 

Lt. Col. John R. Manning, who assumed command of the 168th Engineer 

Battalion in May, organized a land-clearing task force to support the 27th 

Land Clearing Team. Besides creating a small task force headquarters, the 

battalion formed a maintenance section consisting of a warrant officer, six 

mechanics, plus a contact team from a direct-support maintenance company. 

Another augmentation included a small communications section to provide a 

radio link between the task force and security forces. Lt. Col. James F. Miley 

of the 86th Engineer Battalion placed his land-clearing team in one of his line 

companies, which, in turn, designated two platoons to supervise and support 

the two sections. A mechanized infantry battalion usually provided security, 

8

 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 6–7; Msg, COMUSMACV 03824 to 

CINCPAC, 1 Feb 67, sub: Engineer Land Clearing Teams, box 18, 84/051, RG 319, NARA; 

Msg, COMUSMACV 09572 to CGs, USARV and II FFV, 22 Mar 67, sub: Forest Clearing 

Operations, box 5, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA. For more background on the land-clearing teams, 

see Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 23 Feb 67, p. 14, and 8 Mar 67, Supp, p. 1, CMH. 9

 Ltr, J. T. Soules, Vice President, Rome Plow Co, to Ploger, 9 Feb 67, Historians files, CMH; 

Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC p. 7, 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, p. 6, and 1 

Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, pp. II-6 to II-7. 10 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, p. II-7, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, 

pp. II-5 to II-6; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, Engr Cmd, p. 27, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 79th Engr Gp, p. 

8, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 34th Engr Gp, p. 2, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 2–3. For more 

on the deployment of the teams, see Army Buildup Progress Rpts, 19 Apr 67, p. 1, and 12 Jul 

67, Supp, p. 1, CMH.
305

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

and the armored personnel carriers also carried an engineer demolition squad, 

welder, and mechanics to support each land-clearing section. The extensive 

supervision and maintenance support required by the teams in the field forced 

engineer commanders to look for a more permanent solution. Col. Joseph A. 

Jansen, the commanding officer of the 79th Engineer Group, suggested organizing a separate land-clearing company. The U.S. Army, Vietnam, engineer 

staff agreed and began to prepare a table of organization for such a unit.11

The arrival of the land-clearing teams started a new phase of exposing enemy 

sanctuaries, base camps, and infiltration routes. During combat operations, the 

teams leveled large areas of jungle, forests, and rubber plantations. Bulldozers 

equipped with the plows cleared areas on both sides of supply routes and reduced 

the threat of ambushes and increased security, at least during the daylight hours. 

During August, search-and-destroy operations, which included extensive road and 

jungle clearing, penetrated known and suspected base camps and staging areas and 

prevented the Viet Cong’s infiltration into populated areas. By September, the land 

clearers opened large areas previously inaccessible to friendly forces. Operations in 

the Ong Dong jungle by the 1st Division, and the Filhol Plantation and the Ho 

Bo Woods by the 25th Division did much to deny the enemy previously secure 

base camps and forced him to abandon established lines of communications for 

less desirable routes. Simultaneously, the jungle-clearing effort improved allied 

base camp security by expanding fields of fire and clearing concealed avenues of 

11 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, pp. 1–2, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 9, 24 Oct 67, OCE Hist Ofc.

A modified D7E bulldozer equipped with a Rome plow and an armored cab
Engineers at War

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approach leading to the bases. Not only did cleared areas make it less difficult to 

detect enemy movements, but they also complemented efforts to improve base 

camp defenses from rocket and mortar attack. Land-clearing rates averaged 1.2 

acres per hour when cutting and piling vegetation up to six inches in diameter, 

more than double the standard D7E bulldozer’s 0.5 acres. The ratio for cutting 

dense vegetation, including larger trees, remained the same: 1.04 acres with the 

Rome plows and 0.4 acres with the standard bulldozer. By the end of the summer, 

the teams had leveled over 30,000 acres of vegetation.12

The 1st Infantry Division centered its efforts north and northeast of Saigon. 

Two operations specifically designed to deny the enemy his secure base areas, Lam

Son 67 and Paul Bunyon, epitomized the contribution made by the land-clearing 

teams. During Lam Son 67, a pacification operation that began in February, the 

27th Land Clearing Team cleared a jungle area often used by the Viet Cong for 

mortar attacks on Bien Hoa Air Base. Between 3 and 16 July, the team cleared 

2,610 acres, averaging 186 acres per day, and discovered and destroyed eight tunnels, nine base camps, and several mined booby traps. Three days later, the team 

joined Company A, 168th Engineer Battalion, and the 1st Engineer Battalion in 

the first phase of Operation Paul Bunyon in the Ong Dong Jungle, some ten 

miles north of Di An. Between 19 July and 13 August, they cleared 7,740 acres 

at the rate of 309 acres per day and destroyed five base camps and more booby 

traps. On 16 August, the effort shifted to Highway 13, dubbed Thunder Road. 

During Phase II of Paul Bunyon, the land clearers cut 5,200 acres along the road 

averaging 325 acres per day. In addition, the 1st Engineer Battalion’s Rome plow 

section, imitating an earlier experiment by the 9th Division, connected 180 feet 

of heavy anchor chain from a Navy cruiser between two bulldozers and cleared 

some 1,500 nearby rubber trees. The clearing operation, which continued into 

September, also resulted in finding and destroying thirteen base camps, fourteen 

tunnel complexes, and many mines and booby traps. By the end of the month, 

the 1st Engineer Battalion with help from the 79th Engineer Group had cleared 

selected sectors of jungle along Highway 13 and Route 1A toward An Loc and 

Phuoc Vinh, respectively. During Operation Bluefield II the same month, the 1st 

Engineer Battalion reopened Highway 13 and cleared vegetation a little over one 

hundred yards on each side of Route 301. This effort opened a second land route 

to Phuoc Vinh from the west.13

Similar operations took place to the east and southeast of Saigon. On 10 July, 

the allies initiated Operation Paddington to open a jungle area used by the Viet

12 ORLL, 1 Jul–31 Oct 67, II FFV, pp. 21, 28; Miscellaneous Detailed Discussion, incl. 9, p. 

3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8, 11 Aug 67; Ltr, HQ USARV, AVHEN-MO, to MACV, 

sub: Technical Report, Paul Bunyon Land Clearing Teams, n.d., incl. 9, tab B, p. 3, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 9; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 201. See also ORLL, 1 Jul–31 Oct 67, Engr 

Cmd, incls. 3 and 4, pp. 1–6; DA Pam 525–6, Military Operations, Lessons Learned: Land 

Clearing, 16 Jun 70. 13 ORLL, 1 Jul–31 Oct 67, II FFV, p. 28; 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-22 to III-26; 

Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, p. 3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 9; Interv, Maj Paul B. Webber, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col John R. Manning, CO, 

168th Engr Bn, 10 Apr 68, VNIT 106, pp. 1–2, CMH. For more on Paul Bunyon, see Technical 

Report, Paul Bunyon Land Clearing Teams, incl. 9, tab B, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9.
307

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

Cong as an operations and logistics base in Phuoc Tuy Province. The combined 

operation by the 1st Brigade, 9th Division; the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment; the 1st Australian Task Force; and South Vietnamese army 

and marine units cleared strips along Route 23 and other local roads. As part of 

an engineer task force deployed by the 9th Division, the 15th Engineer Battalion’s 

Company B used fourteen Rome plows and three bulldozers to clear the jungle 

back a little over two hundred yards. Also in July, the 9th Division attached 

elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to protect the 86th Engineer 

Battalion’s land-clearing task force in Operation Emporia, a continuation of

jungle-cutting along roads. Between 21 July and 15 August, Company B and the 

86th Land Clearing Team in its first operation cleared 1,586 acres on both sides 

of Highway 20, the key land route from the vegetable-producing area around Da 

Lat. The task force next cleared another 1,005 acres along Highway 1 between 

Xuan Loc and Gia Ray. In September, Rome plows moved south on Route 2 

cutting vegetation from the 11th Armored Cavalry’s camp at Blackhorse to Ba 

Ria. In another jungle-clearing operation under the 9th Division’s 1st Brigade 

(Akron III), the 86th team’s Rome plows, while cutting the thick underbrush

and towering trees near the borders of Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh 

Provinces, uncovered a fresh trail on 8 October. This led to the discovery of the 

largest weapons cache to date in III Corps.14

14 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, II FFV, pp. 23–24, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, p. 33, 1 May–31 

Jul 67, 34th Engr Gp, p. 8, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6; Engineer Support of 

Combat Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9; AAR, Opn 

Paddington, 15th Engr Bn, 23 Sep 67, p. 3, OCE Hist Ofc

An aerial view of an anti-ambush clearing on each side of a road by Rome plows
Engineers at War

308

Another land-clearing device, the so-called transphibian tactical tree 

crusher, made its appearance at this time. Like the towed ball and chain 

experiments, the massive ninty-seven-ton machine proved only marginally 

effective. General Ploger pointed out the difficulty in deploying such a massive piece of equipment. He noted that for the price of one tree crusher, 

approximately $300,000, he could buy seven of the proven Rome plows with 

the tractors. He did, however, accede to the 1st Logistical Command’s proposal to evaluate the machine. In March 1967, the logistical command contracted with LeTourneau Corporation of Longview, Texas, for a six-month 

rental of two tree crushers. The tree crushers arrived at Saigon’s Newport in 

mid-July, and by the end of the month the logistical command’s provisional 

detachment began to clear land around Long Binh Post. During the test 

period, which lasted to the middle of November, the two crushers used their 

pusher bars against large trees and used their cleated drums to chew up felled 

trees and vegetation. Approximately 2,000 acres in the depot and ammunition storage areas were cleared. The crushers did clear all kinds of vegetation 

averaging 2.1 acres per hour, but both machines spent about half the time in 

the repair shop.15

Following several modifications to alleviate the maintenance problems, the 

detachment and tree crushers were transferred to Ploger’s command to support tactical operations. The detachment, operating under the control of the 

93d Construction Battalion, leveled 1,300 acres supporting the 9th Division 

near the Binh Son Rubber Plantation, thirty-five miles southeast of Saigon. 

Again the equipment spent too much time in the shop. Fully satisfied that 

the machine’s limitations outweighed the benefits—its downtime, vulnerability 

to enemy action, and difficulty working in shallow water with mud bottoms 

of inadequate bearing and where insufficient water depth could not float the 

crusher free from the suction of the mud—Ploger had the equipment returned 

to the United States after the lease expired.16

Land clearing had proved to be an effective weapon against the enemy, 

and the planners made preparations for even larger operations in 1968. Open 

areas along the cleared roads lessened his capability to mount ambushes and 

reduced the effectiveness of those that did take place. During the month following the clearing operations along Highways 1 and 20 and Route 2, the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment reported no ambushes where previously many 

had occurred. Captured documents revealed that land clearing had a major 

15 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, p. II-6, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 67, MACDC, p. 

II-5; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 98–99; Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, p. 87; ORLLs, 

1 May–31 Jul 67, 1st Log Cmd, 15 Aug 67, p. 112, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 1st Log Cmd, 11 Nov 67, 

pp. 113–14, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 1st Log Cmd, 14 Feb 68, pp. 89–90, all in Historians files, 

CMH; Ltr, Ploger to CG, USARV, 15 Mar 67, sub: LeTourneau Transphibian Crusher, Ploger 

Papers, CMH; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 51–53; Interv, Sowell with Ploger, 16 

Nov 78, sec. 9, pp. 11–12. 16 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, pp. II-5 to II-6; Hay, Tactical and Materiel 

Innovations, p. 87; ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 93d Engr Bn, 14 Feb 68, p. 10, Historians files, 

CMH; “Tree Crusher Tested in Vietnam,” The Army Engineer in Vietnam, U.S. Army Engineer 

School Pamphlet (Fort Belvoir, Va.: n.d.), pp. 3–5; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, pp. 

52–53.
309

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

influence on the enemy, who regarded these operations as a threat to his plans. 

Newly cleared strips along roads reduced the need for convoy escorts and also 

became an effective barrier countering the enemy’s free movement of troops 

and supplies. In the wake of these successful operations, II Field Force headquarters shifted priority in III Corps to area clearing (some 400,000 acres), 

whereas I Field Force continued to use its land-clearing team in II Corps 

mainly for road clearing.17

In late September, General Westmoreland ordered III Marine 

Amphibious Force to prepare for large-scale land-clearing operations in I 

Corps. The Directorate of Construction helped the marines with planning 

details, and by the end of the year ten Rome plow blades for the marines’ 

bulldozers arrived in Da Nang. After considering operational requirements, 

III Marine Amphibious Force asked for two Army land-clearing teams to 

support future operations, but MACV suggested that the best source of 

land-clearing capability would be for that command to develop its own 

organic teams. The Construction Directorate also studied possible use of 

Rome plows by the South Vietnamese to support pacification in selected 

provinces. It soon became apparent, however, that Saigon’s military engineers had limited operating and maintenance capabilities and could not be 

expected to join the land-clearing effort.18

The arrival of the southwest monsoon in late spring placed heavy 

demands on the combat engineers to keep the deteriorating ground supply 

17 Technical Report, Paul Bunyon Land Clearing Teams, incl. 9, tab B, p. 4, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. 18 Ibid., pp. 4–5; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, MACDC, pp. II-6 to II-7.

The limitations of the transphibian tactical tree crusher outweighed its benefits, 

and the equipment was returned to the United States after the lease expired.
Engineers at War

310

routes open, while simultaneously clearing back the encroaching vegetation. 

As the 1st Division moved operations northward to the Cambodian border, 

the 1st Engineer Battalion used hand labor and unsophisticated expedients 

to rebuild and maintain Highway 13 and Rolling Stone Road between Ben 

Cat and Phuoc Vinh. Sometimes the troops had to blow stopped-up culverts and build short fixed span bridges over the water-filled gaps and timber 

roadways along muddy sections of the road. Several fixed spans were lifted 

intact to work sites by CH–47 helicopters, thus saving days of working time. 

During Bluefield II, Company A also built the superstructure of a twentyfoot timber trestle bridge airlifted to a prepared site by a CH–47. Northwest 

of Saigon, the 65th Engineer Battalion and the 79th Engineer Group’s 588th 

Engineer Combat Battalion supported the 25th Division by keeping supply 

routes open between Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng, Tri Bi, Prek Klok, and the 

Cu Chi area. The 9th Division’s 15th Engineer Battalion and other engineer 

units continued to work on the roads to the east, southeast, and southwest 

of Saigon. Work proceeded along Highways 1 and 20 as far as the II Corps 

boundary, Highway 15 and Route 2 toward the coast and the port of Vung 

Tau, and Highway 4 into the delta region. The roads were open, but no one 

could say for how long.19

The heavy rains also played havoc at the austere, hastily built forward 

airstrips, especially at Special Forces camps near the Cambodian border. In 

May, the 79th Group’s 168th Engineer Battalion airlifted troops to the Tong 

Le Chon airstrip west of An Loc to make repairs to the runway, turnaround, 

and parking apron. In June, the battalion deployed a task force to Chi Linh 

northeast of Saigon to repair the airstrip and enlarge the parking apron. By 

August, the 168th also extended the existing C–130 runway and added a turnaround and parking apron at Dong Xoai and began to upgrade the airfield 

at Loc Ninh to C–130 standards. Next, men and equipment boarded CH–54 

and CH–47 helicopters and flew to the Bu Dop Special Forces camp to begin 

upgrading the runway for C–123 aircraft.20

A variety of work continued in support of pacification in the arc of 

provinces around Saigon. Operation Enterprise, similar in scope to 

Son 67, began in February in Long An Province southwest of the city and 

lasted throughout the year. While the 9th Division’s 3d Brigade and South 

Vietnamese territorial units kept up the pressure on the Viet Cong, the 86th 

Engineer Battalion built several operating bases and artillery firing pads on 

rice paddies. What set this work apart was the need to import large quantities 

of rock from the Vung Tau quarry. The 34th Group arranged with transportation units for twenty-one barges, which carried the rock to the base camp 

sites in the delta. At Tan An, the engineers pushed up the rice paddy mud and 

19 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, p. 28; 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, pp. III-22 to III-26; 

ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 8–9; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 

Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 238, 

243–44. 20 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 May–1 Jul 67, incl. 7, pp. 5–6, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 8; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, pp. 4–5, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9; Interv, Webber with Manning, 18 Mar 68, p. 2.
311

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

topped it off with fill and rock to provide the necessary areas for cantonments 

and hardstands for a brigade base. This work also included the building of a 

C–123 airfield and heliport. Similar work took place at Ben Phuoc, a forward 

operating base for a mechanized infantry battalion, and Ben Luc, a forward 

support base for a composite artillery battalion. Near Saigon, the 199th Light 

Infantry Brigade and South Vietnamese units continued Operation Fairfax

a long-term pacification effort to keep the Viet Cong from reestablishing influence in the area. The 199th’s 87th Engineer Company split its efforts between 

supporting operations in the field and improving the brigade’s base camp at 

Long Binh.21

Operational Control Revisited

Increased emphasis on land clearing and road work illustrated the steady 

shift from base construction to combat support missions in 1967. Brig. Gen. 

Curtis W. Chapman’s 20th Engineer Brigade, which arrived in August to take 

control of the three engineer groups in III and IV Corps, reported a twofold 

increase in tactical missions from August through September. By 20 September, 

24 percent of the brigade’s total productive effort was being devoted to combat 

support. In II Corps, a shift of combat operations toward the border brought 

forth similar patterns of engineer support.22

With tactical missions on the rise, the old operational control question 

resurfaced with a vengeance in early 1967. It was raised by General Palmer, 

who had taken over as commander of II Field Force in March and who wasted 

no time in requesting a change in who would command the nondivisional engineers. General Engler turned him down, noting that the field force had never 

used more than one and a half battalions at any time in tactical operations. 

General Westmoreland agreed.23

In late spring, General Engler returned to the United States and General 

Palmer took over as U.S. Army, Vietnam, deputy commander. Palmer soon 

took steps to formalize a more precise means of identifying engineer support 

for the field forces. He asked that the field force commanders and the Engineer 

Command draw up agreements identifying certain engineer units to be on call 

for duty in tactical operations. On 17 May, Ploger signed a memorandum of 

understanding with Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, who moved up from the 

25th Division to command II Field Force. Brig. Gen. Charles M. Duke, the 

18th Brigade commander, prepared a similar agreement with General Larsen 

of I Field Force.24

21 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 May–1 Jul 67, incl. 7, p. 4, and Miscellaneous 

Detailed Discussion, incl. 9, p. 6, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 

67, 34th Engr Gp, p. 7, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 34th Engr Gp, p. 5; Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 245. 22 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 9; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 221, 243. 23 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 141; Msg, Westmoreland MAC 3653 to Palmer, 17 Apr 67, 

Westmoreland Message files, CMH. 24 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 141.
Engineers at War

312

Because Ploger foresaw few changes caused by the agreements to the 

operations of his command, he did not resist entering such arrangements. The 

agreement with Weyand put two battalions of Colonel Gelini’s 79th Engineer 

Group, the 168th and the 588th, under II Field Force’s operational control 

effective 6 June. The Engineer Command also earmarked three separate companies (the 100th Float Bridge, the 500th Panel Bridge, and the 362d Light 

Equipment) for the field force. Although II Field Force now had formal 

authority during combat operations, the 79th Group retained responsibility 

for all formal construction projects assigned these units. Ploger could not help 

but note that by August the units reported no significant change in their dayto-day operations.25

The memorandum of understanding drawn up between the 18th Engineer 

Brigade and I Field Force did not go into effect. The memorandum called 

for General Duke’s brigade to provide one engineer battalion or equivalent 

force from each group and such float and panel bridge and light equipment 

company forces as required. Larsen, however, expressed his satisfaction with 

the support given by the 18th Brigade and preferred to keep the same kind of 

relationship that existed before General Palmer’s request. He saw little advantage in the new arrangements because designating only certain engineer units 

could reduce the flexibility previously held by his commanders. Considering 

the larger geographic area of II Corps, it seemed unwise to have to move 

designated units a considerable distance, while bypassing units located in the 

area of an operation. Area support continued, with operational support missions retaining precedence over all other engineer support requirements. When 

General Larsen prepared to turn over his command in July, he wrote to General 

Duke commending the cooperation and support given by the 18th Engineer 

Brigade. He said the brigade’s efforts “surpassed all expectations, even to the 

point that operational control of engineer elements by I Field Force was never 

required.”26

Soon after succeeding General Ploger in August, General Duke, 

now with two stars, became aware that General Weyand still had some 

reservations concerning the responsiveness of support given by Engineer 

Command. On 16 September, he wrote to Weyand reaffirming that the 20th 

Engineer Brigade’s units would respond immediately to operational support requirements. In urgent cases, Duke recommended that the field force 

commander have his staff engineer bypass the brigade headquarters and 

“transmit the requirement directly to the engineer group—or even the battalion—headquarters immediately concerned.” He stressed that all routine 

25 Ibid.; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, p. 24; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in 

Vietnam, 9–23 Jul 67, incl. 6, pp. 4–5, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8. The memorandum 

of understanding is at tab L. 26 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 141; Interv, Bower with Ploger, 8 Aug 67, p. 24; Rpt of Visit to 

Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 9–23 Jul 67, incl. 6, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

8. The memorandum of understanding is at tab K. Also Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters 

in Vietnam, 15–30 Sep 67, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. General Larsen’s 

letter is at tab A.
313

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

or planned requirements would continue to be processed through the 20th 

Engineer Brigade.27

Ten days later, Duke met with Maj. Gen. George S. Eckhardt, the deputy 

commanding general of II Field Force, to discuss again the matter of operational control. According to Eckhardt, the operational support requirements 

had increased to such a degree, including responsibilities for rural development and the training of Vietnamese Army troops, that an entire group could 

be kept fully occupied. He then asked for operational control of a group 

headquarters plus all the combat battalions, light equipment companies, and 

bridge companies in the 20th Brigade. Since the field force had other units 

placed under its operational control to carry out its requirements, it seemed 

only natural to place the engineers in the same status. This new and enlarged 

request surprised Duke considering the evident success of past operations. He 

could not agree to such a request unless II Field Force accepted responsibility for the construction projects assigned to these units. Eckhardt stated that 

these conditions were unacceptable, suggesting that field force responsibility 

for combat operations would be incompatible with taking on construction 

projects outside the tactical realm.28

Since the two generals could not reach a new agreement, the procedure 

outlined in Duke’s letter to General Weyand remained in effect. General Ploger 

later wrote that engineer units carried out operational support missions “with 

the ease and timeliness that made any change in the tactical arrangements 

seem unnecessary.” He maintained that neither the support for tactical operations nor the progress on the base development program suffered appreciably. 

If more engineer units were available, he might have seen his way to place more 

units under the operational control of the field forces.29

The lack of further agreements did not deter engineer support of combat 

operations. In fact, this support increased. The Engineer Command reported 

that between 1 September and 15 November approximately 20 percent of its 

productive effort was devoted to operational support. The two brigades and all 

six groups reported increases. For example, the 45th Group in II Corps, with 

three combat and two construction battalions and several separate companies, 

calculated that 70 percent of its effort included land clearing, road and airfield 

maintenance and upgrading, minesweeping, firebase construction, and river 

crossings.30 (Chart 4)

On the III Corps Border

On 29 September, the 1st Infantry Division launched Operation 

Shenandoah II. The operation had a two-pronged purpose, combining 

27 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 142–43; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 

15–30 Sep 67, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. General Duke’s letter is at tab B. 28 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 143; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 15–30 

Sep 67, incl. 7, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. 29 Ibid.

30 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 22 Nov–13 Dec 67, incl. 9, p. 1, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 10, 19 Jan 68, p. 7, OCE Hist Ofc.
Engineers at War

314

search-and-destroy missions to inflict maximum casualties upon the newly 

arrived North Vietnamese forces in III Corps and roadwork, which included 

maintenance and upgrading and land clearing. The area of operation reached 

out from the division’s base camp at Lai Khe approximately nineteen miles to 

the north, and west to the edge of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. While a 

mechanized infantry battalion from the 1st Brigade swept an area north of Lai 

Khe, the 3d Brigade began securing Route 240 between Ben Cat to the edge of 

the rubber plantation. Next, Rome plows began to push back the jungle about 

a little over one hundred yards on each side of the road. Simultaneously, the 

Engr Cmd*

35th Engr Gp (Const) 45th Engr Gp (Const) 34th Engr Gp (Const) 79th Engr Gp (Const)

14th Engr Bn (Cbt) 19th Engr Bn (Cbt) 27th Engr Bn (Cbt) 34th Engr Bn (Const)

87th Engr Bn (Const) 35th Engr Bn (Cbt) 36th Engr Bn (Const) 168th Engr Bn (Cbt)***

577th Engr Bn (Const) 39th Engr Bn (Cbt)** 69th Engr Bn (Const) 554th Engr Bn (Const)

864th Engr Bn (Const) 84th Engr Bn (Const) 86th Engr Bn (Cbt) 588th Engr Bn (Cbt)***

589th Engr Bn (Const) 93d Engr Bn (Const)

18th Engr Bde 20th Engr Bde

937th Engr Gp (Cbt)

20th Engr Bn (Cbt)

70th Engr Bn (Cbt)

299th Engr Bn (Cbt)

815th Engr Bn (Const)

159th Engr Gp (Const)

46th Engr Bn (Const)

62d Engr Bn (Const)

92d Engr Bn (Const)

169th Engr Bn (Const)

* Engineer Command remained a provisional

organization, lacking the approval of DoD.

Const = Construction

Cbt = Combat

 Source: Ploger, Army Engineers, p.135

** Operational Control (OPCON), Americal Division

*** OPCON, II Field Force

Chart 4—Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Comma

November 
315

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

1st Engineer Battalion started to reopen the road, by then reduced to little 

more than a footpath because of enemy obstacles and jungle overgrowth.31

Most of the 1st Engineer Battalion moved to the area of operations. 

Companies B and C worked along Route 240, upgrading the road and cutting 

down 100-foot-tall trees with explosives, and encountering resistance along 

the way. On 13 October, North Vietnamese troops ambushed a Company 

C column by setting off a command-detonated mine and firing small arms. 

The engineers returned fire and continued on their way after the enemy faded 

away. Four days later, Company C gained some vengeance by uncovering and 

destroying a ten-ton rice cache. Meanwhile, Companies A and D airlifted 

precut timber trestle bridges and men to worksites, installing the twenty-foot 

spans across gaps in the road. Together, the 1st Engineer Battalion with the 

help of the 168th Engineer Battalion’s 27th Land Clearing Team cleared 

nearly 1,000 acres of dense jungle. They also cleared areas for five firebases, 

allowing 105-mm. howitzers to cover the division’s western tactical area of 

responsibility. Since the rainy season continued throughout the campaign, the 

1st Engineer Battalion again used timbers to build a corduroy base along the 

impassible muddy sections of the road. The battalion then topped off the road 

31 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, p. 29. For more on the Shenandoah operation, see 

AAR, Opn Shenandoah II, 1st Inf Div, 12 Apr 68, Historians files, CMH; MacGarrigle, 

Taking the Offensive, pp. 347–49.

During Operation Shenandoah, the 1st Engineer Battalion supported the

movement of the division’s armored personnel carriers by erecting tactical bridging such as this armored vehicle launched bridge.
Engineers at War

316

with over 700 five-ton dump truckloads of laterite and rock. All this work was 

accomplished in two weeks and enabled the 1st Division to penetrate one more 

enemy sanctuary. Although the division soon left the area, the message was 

clear. Allied forces could return at a moment’s notice.32

Enemy forces gave little resistance during the initial stage of Shenandoah, 

but in October they turned on their tormentors and launched a series of 

attacks on South Vietnamese bases near the Cambodian border. It became 

obvious to General Westmoreland that the North Vietnamese had shifted 

efforts to the border areas of II and III Corps and were caught while building 

staging areas and base camps. He claimed that the enemy hoped to achieve 

important psychological victories to divert allied attention from the urban 

areas and I Corps and to offset the inauguration of the newly elected Thieu 

and Ky government. On 4 October, the 1st Division’s mechanized infantry battalion came under attack six miles southwest of Chon Thanh. Two 

days later, an infantry battalion that moved into the area also came under 

attack. On the seventeenth, elements of another U.S. infantry battalion were 

ambushed eight and a half miles southwest of Chon Thanh. Friendly artillery and air strikes helped to beat off a Viet Cong regiment, but the enemy’s 

heavy use of small arms and automatic weapons took a heavy toll on the 

American battalion.33

The first border battle began early in the morning of 27 October 

near the village of Song Be. North Vietnamese forces assaulted a South 

Vietnamese infantry battalion, but the defenders repulsed every assault 

and inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. Much the same happened two 

days later at Loc Ninh, where a Viet Cong regiment struck the district town 

and a nearby rubber plantation eight miles south of the border. Phase II 

of Shenandoah started when U.S. air power and infantry units went to 

the aid of the South Vietnamese. Battalions of the 1st Division launched 

airmobile assaults, swept adjacent rubber plantations, and repelled attacks 

on night defensive positions. By the time the enemy broke off the battle on 

8 November, he had suffered nearly 1,000 killed. Operation Shenandoah

II ended on 19 November.34

The 1st Engineer Battalion’s major effort during the operation took place 

on supply routes north of Lai Khe. Following the national election, enemy 

forces had sabotaged Highway 13 to the point it could no longer support the 

division’s supply convoys to its Quan Loi base just to the east of An Loc. 

On 17 October, Company A moved by fixed-wing aircraft from Phuoc Vinh 

to Quan Loi where it began to build sections of culvert for the road work to 

start on 1 November. The day before the enemy, in a carefully planned act 

of sabotage, blew three large craters along a two-mile section of the road, 

32 1st Engr Bn Hist, vol. 1, p. III-26; Always First, 1967–1968, “Opn Shenandoah.” 33 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, pp. 29–30; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 288; 

CHECO Rpt, PACAF, 15 May 68, sub: VC Offensives in III Corps, Oct–Dec 67, p. 3, copy in 

Historians files, CMH. For more on these actions, see MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 

349–61. 34 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, II FFV, app. 30–33, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, II FFV, pp. 24–25; 

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 287–88; Interv, Webber with Manning, 10 Apr 68, p. 2.
317

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

approximately halfway between sources of rock needed for the repairs. On 1 

November, two platoons of Company B moved by CH–47 Chinooks from Di 

An to a site midway between Chon Thanh and An Loc to build a seventy-foot 

timber trestle bridge. The platoons, using the proven techniques of preparing abutments with demolitions and precutting and airlifting timber to the 

bridge site, completed the planned two-day project on the first day. With the 

early completion of the bridge, the battalion headquarters changed Company 

C’s mission to load rock at Lai Khe that night and to move at first light. On 

the second day, Company A continued to move south, filling craters and 

repairing damaged culverts. Company C collected additional dump trucks at 

Chon Thanh, crossed over the new bridge, and pushed north filling craters 

and potholes along the way. Upon linking, both units joined forces to fill the 

remaining crater by 1400. A half hour later, the main supply column moved 

north, one day ahead of schedule. Work along Highway 13—filling potholes, 

installing new culverts, grading, and clearing trees along the road—continued 

throughout the operation.35

Keeping the heavily worn and damaged roads open continued after 

Shenandoah II. The 1st Division carried out operations near Highway 13 

and built hasty night defensive positions and firebases along the road. Convoys 

moved more freely, and civilian traffic and economic activity increased. The 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, who once moved men and supplies along 

the road and crossed it at will, launched a series of night assaults against the 

American bases. During one attack on 10 December, elements of a North 

Vietnamese regiment struck a battalion-size task force five miles southwest 

of An Loc. U.S. ground fire and tactical air support drove the attackers back. 

Meanwhile, work along the key north–south road included a new bypass 

around the town of Ben Cat by Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion.36

In late November, the enemy again switched targets in a pattern of offand-on offensives and attacked two South Vietnamese outposts in Phuoc 

Long Province not far from the Cambodian border. Just after midnight on 29 

November, a reinforced Viet Cong battalion attacked the district headquarters 

compound at Bo Duc. Mortar rounds also struck the Bu Dop Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group–Special Forces camp a little more than a mile to the north. 

Friendly air and artillery strikes helped to oust the enemy from the district 

compound, and South Vietnamese and U.S. reinforcements moved by helicopters to the area. After setting up its night defensive position, a 1st Division 

infantry battalion soon came under heavy attack. Again firepower beat off 

the attackers. The 1st Division deployed more infantry battalions to probe the 

area. Several light encounters followed, and on the night of 8 December a battalion beat off another battalion-size attack. For the remainder of the month, 

one U.S. infantry battalion remained around Bu Dop while another moved to 

Song Be, where it carried out reconnaissance in force operations.37

35 AAR, Opn Shenandoah II, 1st Engr Bn, 10 Dec 67, pp. 2–7, Historians files, CMH. 36 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, II FFV, p. 37; Always First, 1967–1968, “Opn Shenandoah.” 37 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, II FFV, pp. 36–37.
Engineers at War

318

With Bu Dop under threat, the engineers found themselves again repairing 

bridges, this time along Highway 14A. The enemy had severed the only road 

link between the Bu Dop Special Forces camp and the MACV advisory compound in Bu Duc. Company E, 1st Engineer Battalion, received a mission to 

replace a damaged Eiffel bridge that cluttered the stream crossing. The bridge 

company’s engineers literally threaded the stiffeners of a helicopter-borne 

fifty-four-foot fixed span bridge, the longest bridge of this type installed by the 

unit, between the trusses of the older French bridge. Within a week, saboteurs 

destroyed the new bridge, but the determined engineers again replaced it.38

Summer Battles in the Highlands

In the western highlands of II Corps, General Westmoreland planned to 

continue screening the Cambodian border with light forces, introducing reinforcements only when large North Vietnamese units entered South Vietnam to 

mount offensive operations. Throughout the southwest or summer monsoon 

from April to October 1967, General Peers’ 4th Infantry Division carried out 

this mission in an operation called Francis Marion. Moving back to t

flat rolling hills of western Pleiku Province south of the Se San River, the 

1st and 2d Brigades tried to stifle large enemy movements through the area. 

This resulted in a series of border brushes and heavy contacts, and by late 

May MACV dispatched one of its strategic reserve forces, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade, to reinforce the hard-pressed division.39

Then in June, a growing threat developed farther north in Kontum Province. 

As a countermeasure, General Peers deployed two of the 173d’s battalions to 

the Dak To 2 airstrip and Special Forces camp, a few miles southwest of the 

town of Dak To. This operation, initially dubbed Greeley, which began on 17

June and lasted through 11 October, ranged over a rugged wilderness covered 

by thick double- and triple-canopy jungle. Thick bamboo fifteen to twenty feet 

high impeded movement in the only open areas of the mountainous rain forest. 

Within a few days, an airborne company clashed with a North Vietnamese 

Army infantry battalion and suffered heavy casualties in a violent battle. A 

week later, the rest of the 173d Airborne Brigade, a South Vietnamese airborne task force, and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, moved to Kontum 

City. The next few months involved grueling marches in western Kontum 

Province, where U.S. forces suffered mounting losses against firmly entrenched 

North Vietnamese units. Throughout July, the cavalry brigade systematically 

searched the area north of Kontum City. In August, a South Vietnamese 

infantry battalion moved to the area northwest of the province capital to stave 

off an impending attack at Dak Seang Special Forces camp north of Dak 

To. The battalion got hung up trying to assault a fortified hilltop, and two 

South Vietnamese airborne battalions moved to the field of battle. A few days 

later, a battalion threw back five mass attacks on its night defensive perimeter. 

38 Always First, 1967–1968, “Opn Shenandoah” and “Company E.” 39 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 133, 153; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, I FFV, pp. 9–11, 

and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, I FFV, p. 10.
319

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

When the enemy withdrew to the west after suffering heavy losses, the South 

Vietnamese found three hilltops forming a regimental-size base area, many 

bunkers, and an elaborate mockup of the Dak Seang camp.40

The fighting at Dak Seang and mortar attacks on Dak Pek Special Forces 

camp to the north gave credence to a possible attack on Dak Pek. A sweep of 

the area by the 173d Airborne Brigade and Civilian Irregular Defense Group 

elements located a few bunkers but not the enemy. This operation may have 

thwarted an attack on Dak Pek. On 20 and 21 August, the two airborne battalions were moved by helicopters to the Dak To area. Further sweeps by U.S. 

and South Vietnamese forces failed to find the enemy. Meanwhile, most of the 

reinforcements had deployed elsewhere: the 1st Cavalry Division’s brigade to 

the coast, the South Vietnamese airborne units to their home base near Saigon, 

and the bulk of the 173d Airborne Brigade to coastal Tuy Hoa. The remaining 

battalion of the 173d continued to sweep the area northeast of Dak To until 

11 October when Operation Greeley ended. The 4th Division’s border operations resumed the following day under the name of Operation MacA

41

During Operation Francis Marion, the 4th Division’s 4th Engine

Battalion sent Companies A and B to the field to support the 1st and 2d 

Brigades, respectively. In turn, the companies usually doled out platoons to the 

infantry battalions and squads to infantry companies. The engineers cleared 

landing zones, swept roads for mines, improved forward base camps, destroyed 

enemy bunkers, and built firebases and their access roads. Company A, augmented with two Rome plows, built over ten miles of fair-weather tactical road 

to firebases near the Cambodian border. The plows also cleared the jungle 

for fields of fire around the bases. CH–54 helicopters airlifted smaller D6B 

bulldozers to hilltop outposts for clearing tasks. Two of the bulldozers under 

the direction of Company B also cleared eight hundred acres for the resettlement of ten thousand Montagnards. The engineer battalion’s tankdozers and 

armored personnel carrier flamethrowers provided security.42

Other elements of the 4th Engineer Battalion moved forward to support the 

operation. Company D, which continued to do some base development work, 

built a road linking the Plei Me Special Forces camp to Highway 14. Company E 

stood by, ready to haul bridging and cargo. Headquarters Company augmented 

the companies in the field with equipment and security elements from the flamethrowing platoon. In addition, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Norman G. 

Delbridge, organized an armored task force. This ad hoc organization used 

the tankdozer from each of the four line companies and armored personnel 

carriers from the flame-throwing platoon to accompany work parties and convoys. Initially the task force protected convoys hauling sand between Dragon 

Mountain base camp and Kontum City. Delbridge envisioned deploying the 

40 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 67, I FFV, pp. 10–11, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, I FFV, p. 10–11. For 

more on Greeley, see AAR, Opn Greeley, 16 Dec 67, 4th Inf Div, Historians files, CMH; an

MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive, pp. 299–304, 309. 41 ORLL, 1 Aug-31 Oct 67, I FFV, p. 10–11; AAR, Opn Greeley, 4th Inf Div, pp. 10–11. 42 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, 15 Jun 67, pp. 29–30, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th

Inf Div, 20 Aug 67, pp. 37–38, both in Historians files, CMH; Engineer Support of Combat 

Operations, incl. 8, p. 4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 7, 2 Jun 67.
Engineers at War

320

armored force to guard engineers working on roads and bridge sites, such as the 

road to Plei Me.43

During Greeley, the 4th Engineer Battalion built an M4T6 floatin

bridge across the Dak Ta Tan River on Route 512 just west of the town of Tan 

Canh. Route 512 led to the two airstrips serving Dak To: Dak To 1 (or Old 

Dak To) and Dak To 2. Companies D and E worked together on the night of 

17 June to build a 120-foot span across the river. Pre-inflated floats were carried forward by Company E’s bridge trucks to a point near the bridge site. The 

floats were then lifted by CH–47 helicopters to the bridge site and placed in 

the river ready for assembly. Despite working at night and occasional mortar 

attacks, the engineers completed the bridge in twelve hours and it was ready 

for traffic by morning.44

Additional engineer support for the two operations came from the 937th 

Engineer Group. The 20th Engineer Battalion dedicated most of its efforts 

to operational support missions in the area west of Pleiku. Major tasks 

included upgrading forward airfields at Duc Co and Buon Blech and improving Highway 19 and other supply routes before the monsoon arrived. Then 

the battalion shifted the road work to Route 509 and a connecting road to 

Highway 19. In August, the 18th Engineer Brigade deployed the 35th Land 

Clearing Team to Pleiku. Under the direction of the 20th and 299th Engineer 

Battalions, detachments of Rome plows started clearing vegetation along the 

road between Highway 19 and Route 509 and Highway 19 between Mang Yang 

Pass and Pleiku. The 299th Engineer Battalion divided work between base 

facilities at Pleiku and Highway 14 from Pleiku to Dak To. The battalion also 

maintained nearby roads and made emergency repairs to the rain-damaged 

T17 airstrip at Polei Kleng. Companies B and D also supported Operation 

Greeley at Dak To and Kontum, respectively, building helicopter revetments

and temporary ammunition storage dumps.45

Ambushes remained a constant risk to the engineers while working and 

traveling these roads. The 299th Engineer Battalion was ambushed four times 

between November 1967 and January 1968. One of these ambushes that took 

place on 11 November 1967 along Highway 14 north of Kontum was especially brutal. A platoon from Company B, 299th Engineer Battalion, was en 

route to continue repairs to a previously damaged timber trestle bridge when it 

was ambushed by some fifty to eighty Viet Cong, who attacked with grenades, 

rockets, automatic weapons, and mortars. Sfc. John K. McDermott was in 

the lead vehicle when a recoilless rifle round exploded against his truck, but 

he managed to keep control of the vehicle and drove it off the road to allow 

the rest of the convoy to get by. McDermott then jumped from the truck and 

directed his men to safety. He killed two Viet Cong attackers before two more 

leaped at him bringing him to the ground. After struggling free, McDermott 

43 ORLLs, 1 Feb–31 Apr 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 30, and 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 38.

44 ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 67, 4th Inf Div, p. 38.

45 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 206, 208–09; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, 1 May–1 

Jul 67, incl. 7, pp. 2–3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 8; Engineer Support of Combat 

Operations, 1 Jul–1 Sep 67, incl. 9, p. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9; Engineer Support 

of Combat Operations, 1 Sep–15 Nov 67, incl. 9, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 10.
321

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

wounded two of the attackers and proceeded under heavy fire to drive several 

trucks out of the ambush site. Despite intensive enemy rifle fire and exploding 

grenades, he rallied his men in a counterattack. Meanwhile, S. Sgt. Frank J. 

Walker, a squad leader who was riding behind McDermott when the ambush 

occurred, leapt from his truck, which was also hit, and charged into enemy 

machine gun fire, knocking out several Viet Cong positions. These heroic 

actions allowed the convoy to move out of danger. Within a half hour, reinforcements arrived and drove off the enemy. Six engineers died and four were 

wounded in the encounter. Nine Viet Cong were confirmed dead. Extensive 

damage was made to one 5-ton dump truck, one 3/4-ton truck, and one jeep. 

General Westmoreland later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for valor 

to both sergeants in a ceremony at Pleiku.46

The 937th Group’s other two battalions, the 70th Combat and the 815th 

Construction, worked in and around the Pleiku bases. The 815th relieved the 

299th of many base development projects in the area. By midsummer, the 

construction battalion was hard at work on a heliport, a petroleum products 

storage area, the road network for the Pleiku evacuation hospital, and many 

smaller projects. In October, Col. Robert C. Marshall moved his fourth battalion, the 70th Engineer Battalion, from An Khe to Pleiku. Until then, the battalion had spent twenty-six months transforming the An Khe base camp into 

a major city and completing the only Army-built concrete runway in country. 

The 70th took over the 299th’s responsibility for Highway 14 from Pleiku to 

Kontum and a share of construction projects in the area.47

Marshall had to contend with several shortcomings. All three of his 

combat battalions were charged with at least some base development work. 

Some of these projects, which required more engineering and vertical construction talent not found in the tables of organization for a combat group, 

were highly sophisticated. Shortages of electrical and plumbing supplies held 

up projects, and shortages of repair parts for equipment inherited from RMKBRJ resulted in excessive downtime. Although the group took steps to cope 

with expected problems brought on by the monsoon, some projects had to be 

discontinued or delayed. The rains delayed paving at Camp Enari and completing site preparations at the Duc Co airfield. The improved roads stood up 

well during the monsoon season, but those that were not all weather turned 

into quagmires. The 937’s engineer battalions struggled to keep Route 512, 

an alternate six-mile fair-weather route to Dak To, open to convoys. Since 

the 299th Engineer Battalion lacked sufficient rock for the road, wheeled 

vehicles endured considerable wear and tear trying to move through the muck. 

Ground mobility in the area was lost. For approximately twenty-eight days 

from September through October, the only movement to Dak To was by air. 

The battalion went so far as to recommend that tactical commanders conduct 

46 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 299th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 68, pp. 7–8, 12, Historians files, CMH; 

“Two 299th Sergeants Awarded DSCs,” Castle Courier, 10 February 1968. 47 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 209–10; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 11–12.
Engineers at War

322

operations in the highlands during the monsoon season only when there were 

all-weather roads in the area.48

Dak To

In November, a few days after the battles at Loc Ninh and Song Be in 

III Corps, a third border battle erupted near Dak To. General Westmoreland 

later reported that the fierce fighting along the northwestern corner of II 

Corps was the pivotal battle of the last quarter of 1967. Here, too, North 

Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces took advantage of nearby sanctuaries 

in Cambodia and Laos and short supply lines. Just a few miles from the 

borders, Dak To stood astride a natural infiltration route into Kontum and 

Pleiku Provinces. Generally, Dak To consisted of the town and district headquarters on Highway 14, the short Dak To 1 airstrip a few miles to the southwest along Route 512, and the C–130 capable Dak To 2 airstrip and Special 

Forces camp farther west on Route 512. Dak To 2 lay on a valley floor close 

to a river, surrounded on all sides by peaks and ridges varying between 2,600 

to 4,300 feet high. Tall, thick trees, up to a hundred feet tall and topped with 

double and triple canopies, covered the steep slopes.49

When the 4th Division began Operation MacArthur in mid-October,

sweeps throughout the region produced only sporadic contact with the enemy, 

mostly in Pleiku Province. This soon changed. Near the end of the month, 

allied intelligence revealed that a North Vietnamese division controlling five 

regiments was moving northeastward into adjacent Kontum Province. The 4th 

Division deployed the 1st Brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion by 

air to Dak To. There they reinforced a battalion in the area guarding a work 

site at Ben Het, where construction had begun on an airstrip and preliminary 

clearing for a proposed Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp. Also at Ben 

Het, Westmoreland planned to place 175-mm. guns that could reach the enemy’s base camps inside Cambodia and southern Laos. In early November, a 

defecting enemy soldier divulged that the North Vietnamese division intended 

to capture the Dak To camp and Ben Het. Sharp contacts with enemy patrols 

confirmed the earlier intelligence. General Rosson, who had replaced General 

Larsen at I Field Force in August, began to airlift more U.S. and South 

Vietnamese units to the airstrip at the Dak To Special Forces camp. Before 

the enemy could launch his attack, the 4th Division had deployed a brigade of 

three battalions, including a battalion from the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 

division then set up firebases and began to assault the enemy’s forward bases.50

The twenty-two or so days of fighting around Dak To became one of 

the largest battles of the war to date and the largest in the highlands. Seldom 

48 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 211; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7, 13–14, 1 

Aug–31 Oct 67, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 299th Engr Bn, p. 12. 49 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 138–39; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 289; 

MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, p. 378. For more on enemy activity and terrain, see AAR, Battle 

for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, 3 Jan 68, pp. 2–5, Historians files, CMH. 50 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 139; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 288; AAR, 

Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, Peers cover ltr, pp. 1–2, main rpt, pp. 1–2, 6–8.
323

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

during the war did enemy units stand their ground, but here they stubbornly 

defended heavily fortified trenches along the ridges and peaks of the mountains surrounding Dak To. The enemy had carefully selected this region as the 

site for his campaign. Hill 875 stood as a dominating terrain feature in relative 

isolation and beyond the range of fixed artillery positions. It appeared the 

enemy intended to draw the guns to temporary positions and also lure allied 

troops deep into the battlefield, pinning and wearing them down, and eventually annihilating them in a major battle. Initially, the 4th Division’s 1st Brigade 

sent one infantry battalion to occupy the ridgeline running east to west south 

of the airstrip. A second battalion deployed southwest of Dak To, and the 

airborne battalion moved west to Ben Het to set up a firebase. During the first 

week of November, the brigade encountered enemy units moving to preselected and sometimes previously prepared positions. These fierce encounters 

prompted General Creighton W. Abrams—Westmoreland was in Washington 

at the time—to let General Rosson deploy the 173d Airborne Brigade with two 

more battalions to the Ben Het area. In a series of helicopter assault landings, 

the paratroopers and infantrymen moved from ridge to ridge, where they faced 

strong resistance from the entrenched enemy. Meanwhile, South Vietnamese 

troops took up blocking positions east of Dak To. They were joined by additional infantry and airborne troops to the north and northeast initially to block 

and then attack a North Vietnamese regiment moving down a valley from the 

northeast. To complete the ring around Dak To, the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, deployed south and southeast to block possible attacks and intercept 

any withdrawing enemy. To the west of Ben Het, a North Vietnamese regiment 

began to cover the withdrawal to the southeast of two hard-hit regiments. This 

resulted in a violent five-day struggle beginning on 17 November for Hill 875, 

which involved two battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade and a battalion 

from the 4th Division. When a battalion of the 173d found a large enemy 

force entrenched on the slopes and suffered moderately heavy casualties trying 

to reach the peak, the brigade commander quickly replaced it with another 

battalion. The hill was taken following the heaviest concentration of tactical 

air and artillery on any single terrain feature in the II Corps area. Northeast 

of Dak To, South Vietnamese forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in a 

fierce two-day battle.51

By the beginning of December, it became obvious that the U.S. and the 

South Vietnamese forces had the upper hand in the battle for the highlands. 

51 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, Peers cover ltr, pp. 1–2, main rpt, pp. 8–15. After 

action reports prepared by the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division; and the 173d Airborne Brigade are also in this report as inclosures 6, 7, and 8. 

Published accounts of the hill battles collectively known as Dak To are contained in Berry, Sky 

Soldiers, pp. 89–125; Edward F. Murphy, Dak To (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993); and 

Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 

1965–1973 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 168–78. For the opponent’s view of the 

battle, see Luc Luong Vu Trang Nhan Dan Tay Nguyen Trong Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc

[The People’s Armed Forces of the Western Highlands During the War of National Salvation 

Against the Americans] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People’s Army Publishing 

House]), 1980, pp. 56–69, copy in CMH (hereafter cited as Western Highlands).
During the fighting at Dak To, strong enemy defenses on Hill 875 

included trenches.
325

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

Before the battle ended, the allies had temporarily reinforced to a strength of 

three U.S. brigades that included nine battalions and six South Vietnamese 

battalions. Massive B–52 and tactical air strikes, using targets located by 

long-range reconnaissance patrols, supported the friendly forces. In the heavy 

fighting throughout November, four enemy regiments lost 1,600 men and 

were virtually destroyed. General Westmoreland described the Dak To fight 

as “an engagement exceeding in numbers, enemy losses, and ferocity even 

the Ia Drang Valley Campaign of 1965.” The allied attacks drove the enemy 

back into Laos and Cambodia and nullified his ability to stage major operations in the Central Highlands, at least for the time being. The fighting also 

caused heavy losses to the 4th Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 

Americans lost nearly 300 killed and over 1,000 wounded. South Vietnamese 

casualties included nearly 100 killed and over 200 wounded.52

Throughout Operation MacArthur and the fighting around Dak

engineer troops kept up a high pitch of supporting missions. Elements of the 

4th Engineer Battalion, mainly Company A, supported the 1st Brigade, 4th 

Division; most of Company A, 8th Engineer Battalion, accompanied the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s brigade; and the 173d Engineer Company supported the 

173d Airborne Brigade headquarters and three of its battalions in the area. 

(The brigade had increased to four airborne infantry battalions with the arrival 

of the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, in October.) The 937th Engineer Group 

supported the campaign by building bridges and maintaining roads and airfields while simultaneously carrying out other tasks in the western highlands. 

The group’s 299th Engineer Battalion bolstered tactical units in the Dak To 

and Kontum areas. Elements of the 20th and 70th Engineer Battalions, taking 

advantage of the approaching dry season, helped by working on roads leading 

into the area and nearby airfields.53

Again the organic engineers supporting the three combined arms brigades 

were parceled out to the infantry battalions and companies. Company A, 4th 

Engineer Battalion, provided a platoon to each of the three battalions of the 

1st Brigade, 4th Division. The platoon headquarters remained in the battalion 

firebases, with the squads often accompanying the infantry companies. Work 

varied from clearing landing zones and firebases to helping the infantry set up 

defensive positions and laying barbed wire. Small D6B bulldozers airlifted by 

CH–54s sped up the clearing of six firebases. Demolitions, including the preferred C4 plastic type, TNT, and the XM37 Demolition Kit, helped speed up 

the clearing of heavy timber, bamboo, and brush. When the infantry companies 

went on operations, the engineer squads did demolition tasks and used mine 

detectors to help locate buried weapons and ammunition. Enemy soldiers, however, took steps to bury their caches deeper than nine to twelve inches, too deep 

for effective use by the detectors. The 173d Engineer Company followed different procedures. Two-man demolition teams were attached to each infantry 

52 Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 139. See also Westmoreland, A Soldier 

Reports, pp. 289–90; AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, pp. 16, 20–21, 32–35. 53 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, pp. 25–30; ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 

937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8.
Engineers at War

326

company, with a noncommissioned officer remaining at the infantry battalion 

headquarters to control the teams and advise the staff. The rest of the company 

remained with the brigade, working in the base camp areas at Dak To 1 and Dak 

To 2 and dispatching troops on specific missions. Company A, 8th Engineer 

Battalion, deployed two platoons with the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Brigade, 

with each platoon directly supporting an infantry battalion.54

Lt. Col. Domingo I. Aguilar, who had taken command of the 299th 

Engineer Battalion in mid-October, moved his forward command post to the 

airfield at Dak To 1. There the bulk of the intelligence, operations, supply, 

and maintenance and equipment elements coordinated and carried out their 

own supporting missions. The S–4 section’s water purification teams provided 

the bulk of water for units in the Dak To area. These were supplemented by 

smaller water purification units of the 4th Engineer Battalion at Dak To 2 and 

the 173d Engineer Company at Ben Het. Aguilar’s S–4 also arranged for the 

transportation of the heavy volume of construction materials required for the 

battalion’s projects. Fleets of tractors and lowboy trailers from the battalion 

and from units of the 937th and 45th Engineer Groups hauled construction 

materials, particularly airfield matting. The maintenance section modified two 

D6B bulldozers allowing them to be broken down into two pieces, one with the 

tracks, chassis, and blade, the other with the engine and body. These were lifted 

by CH–54s to clear the jungle for artillery emplacements, ammunition storage 

areas, helicopter landing zones, and fields of fire.55

During the battle of Dak To, the 299th and its attached 15th Light 

Equipment Company provided general engineering support, and at various 

times took on direct-support missions for the three combat brigades. Company 

A continued to upgrade Route 512 between Dak To and the Highway 14 intersection in the town of Tan Canh. At the Dak To 1 airstrip, then only capable of 

handling C–7A Caribous on its 1,500-foot dirt runway, troops began to extend 

the runway to 2,300 feet. Support for the 173d Airborne Brigade at its Dak To 

forward bases included excavating holes for three tactical operations centers, 

building revetments for fuel bladders, and clearing fields of fire. Company B, 

located near the Kontum airfield, directed its efforts to maintaining Highway 

14 from Kontum to Dak To, improving Route 511 to the west, and improving 

the airfield. With two sections of the 35th Land Clearing Team under its operational control, the company cleared about one hundred yards of jungle back 

on both sides of the road. Company B also built helicopter revetments and 

expanded ammunition storage for elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and 

the 173d Airborne Brigade. Earlier, Company C had moved to Ben Het on 22 

October to build a C–7A airfield with provision for later expansion for C–130 

transports. The company also began preparations for a Special Forces camp 

and stood ready to support 4th Division and 173d Airborne Brigade units in 

the area. The 937th Group furnished a section of the Rome plow platoon to 

clear vegetation around the Dak To 2 airfield and Special Forces camp and 

54 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, pp. 29–30, and incl. 6, 7, and 8.

55 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, p. 25; AAR, Battle of Dak To/Opn 

MacArthur, 299th Engr Bn, 10 Dec 67, pp. 2–3, 10, Historians files,
327

Inland and to the Borders, June 1967–January 1968

east along Route 512 toward the intersection with Highway 14 at Tan Canh. 

While the Rome plows cleared both sides of the road back about one hundred 

yards, Company C graded the road and ditches and placed culvert. At Dak To 

2, Company D supported combat units, worked on its section of Route 512 to 

Ben Het, and maintained the C–130 airfield.56

Enemy attacks on the forward bases and supply routes also kept the 299th 

busy. On the morning of 15 November, a mortar attack at Dak To 2 destroyed 

two of the three C–130s on the parking apron. In the late afternoon, another 

mortar attack destroyed the ammunition storage area. Two days later, Company 

D started hauling fill to build an expedient taxiway that served as a bypass to 

the damaged aircraft. A team of engineers topped off the earthen ramp with a 

dust-proofing treatment and peneprime, completing the job on the nineteenth. 

Meanwhile, other troops from Companies A and D built a new five-cell ammunition storage area, finishing this task on 28 November. To keep the supply 

roads open, the 299th also installed culvert bypasses next to the new bridges. The 

enemy tried to disrupt traffic by repeatedly attacking the spans. For example, on 

the night of 7 November sappers blew a bridge and its bypass along Highway 

14. Company B immediately dispatched a platoon from Kontum and reopened 

the bypass by 1330 and within three days replaced the decking on the bridge.57

The 4th Engineer Battalion and the 937th Engineer Group weathered 

the demands of the operation with some diversions from regular tasks. Some 

confusion did arise concerning priority of work at the growing Dak To base 

camp. The 4th Division’s after action report noted that equipment time was 

lost because of inadequate or incorrect work. An appointment of a base commander and a board composed of representatives of major units, the report 

stated, could have resolved this problem. When the 4th Engineer Battalion 

needed help, Lt. Col. Emmett C. Lee Jr., who replaced Delbridge in July, could 

call on Colonel Marshall’s 937th Engineer Group. Marshall also reinforced his 

battalions. On 17 November, he placed one company from the 70th Engineer 

Battalion under the operational control of the 299th. Company C moved to 

Dak To and started to build a panel bridge over the Dak Poko River, replacing the 4th Engineer Battalion’s M4T6 float bridge. The new Bailey bridge 

(a 240-foot double-single) was opened to traffic on 15 December. During its 

stay at Dak To, Company C also furnished dump trucks and front loaders, 

repaired two aircraft revetments, and took on some combat support missions 

for infantry and artillery units in the area. Meanwhile, the 70th’s Company 

A continued to upgrade Route 509 west of Pleiku to a one-way fair-weather 

road. To the east, Company D kept open Highway 19 to the 937th Group’s 

eastern boundary at Mang Yang Pass. The 20th Engineer Battalion kept two 

companies, A and D, and elements of the 584th Light Equipment Company 

working along Highways 14 and 19 west of Pleiku. In late October, despite 

the many base development projects at Pleiku, the 20th also shifted a platoon 

56 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, pp. 25–29; AAR, Battle of Dak To/Opn 

MacArthur, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 2–8. 57 AAR, Battle for Dak To, 4th Inf Div, main rpt, pp. 26–28; AAR, Battle of Dak To

MacArthur, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 2,
Engineers at War

328

from Company C south to Buon Blech. The forty-man unit supported the 4th 

Division’s 2d Brigade by upgrading the T17 airstrip to M8A1 matting and 

improving the firebase. On 2 November, another platoon from Company C 

interrupted base development work to move south to Phu Nhon airstrip to 

repair its damaged T17 membrane surface and subgrade.58

Although battles raged along the border and intelligence showed massive 

enemy troop movements still taking place, General Westmoreland in December 

1967 believed the military situation in South Vietnam was turning in the allied 

favor. The South Vietnamese government succeeded in holding national elections. A new coordinated pacification program was under way. The protective 

arc around major cities expanded, and more U.S. troops arrived, allowing operations to shift to the remote border regions. When summoned to Washington 

by President Johnson in November, Westmoreland effused his most optimistic 

assessment of the war. “It is significant,” he told the National Press Club, “that 

the enemy has not won a major battle in more than a year. In general, he can 

fight his large forces only at the edges of his sanctuaries. . . . His guerrilla force 

is declining at a steady rate. Morale problems are developing within his ranks.”59

Though remaining heavily committed to completing the base infrastructure, the Army engineers’ support to the combat forces increased with military 

operations. To support the flow of troops and supplies to these more remote 

areas, combat engineers pushed ahead on road and airfield work and cleared 

landing zones. Planners now considered the Rome plows used in clearing 

areas and along supply routes as a tactical weapon. Although the demand for 

combat engineers had increased, Generals Ploger and Duke managed to keep 

control of the bulk of engineer troops, parceling out units as needs arose.

General Westmoreland and his intelligence chief, Brig. Gen. Phillip B. 

Davidson, concluded that the border battles were North Vietnamese failures. 

Davidson later wrote that General Vo Nguyen Giap paid a bloody price for 

the tactical lessons that he and his staff learned to avoid direct attacks on 

American positions. Giap apparently learned this lesson well. During the 

attacks of the Tet offensive in late January 1968, the North Vietnamese and 

their Viet Cong allies carefully avoided American combat units, concentrating 

instead on South Vietnamese forces and some U.S. military headquarters. If 

Giap had hoped to draw U.S. units and command attention to the peripheries 

of South Vietnam in a series of diversionary battles, he failed. The U.S. forces’ 

strategic mobility permitted them to move to the borders, smash Giap’s attacks, 

and redeploy back to the interior in a mobile reserve posture. The enemy must 

have realized the futility of these attacks. One Viet Cong colonel who defected 

in 1968 characterized the “border battles” as “useless and bloody.”60

58 ORLLs, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 70th Engr Bn, 

p. 4, and 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 1–4, 9–10; AAR, Battle for Dak To, main rpt, 

4th Inf Div, pp. 29, 55–56; AAR, Battle of Dak To/Opn MacArthur, 299th Engr Bn, p. 8. 59 Quoted in William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1

United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1988), p. 334. 60 Quoted in Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975 (Novato, Calif.: 

Presidio Press, 1988), p. 469.
Part Thre

Changing Course

11

Tet, January–March 1968

I

n early 1968, the war reached a critical stage when Hanoi launched its 

Tet offensive throughout South Vietnam. The allies had suspected that 

heavy attacks were in the offing, but they only began to realize the scope and 

schedule of the offensive when the assaults began just after midnight on 30 

January, coinciding with the start of the Vietnamese Tet celebrations ushering 

in the lunar New Year. By the next day, fighting erupted almost everywhere, 

as the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacked 36 of 44 provincial capitals 

and 64 of 242 district towns, as well as 5 of 6 of South Vietnam’s autonomous 

cities, among them Hue and Saigon. Local force units and sappers spearheaded the assaults and attempted to hold their designated objectives until 

reinforcements could arrive in strength from outside the cities. Political cadres 

accompanied the assault groups with the intent, in vain as it turned out, to 

coax the local population into civil rebellion. The fighting at Khe Sanh, Hue, 

and Saigon was especially vicious, but throughout the country heavy rocket 

and mortar fire and demolition charges caused damage to airfields, logistical 

facilities, and supply routes. And while the South Vietnamese government and 

its forces constituted the prime enemy target, American units were swept into 

the turmoil.1

Defending the Coast

The earliest attacks took place in the coastal cities of II Corps. At 0035 

on 30 January, only a half hour into the Vietnamese New Year, mortar rounds 

landed near the South Vietnamese Navy Training Center in Nha Trang. At 

0410, two Viet Cong battalions attacked Qui Nhon. Cam Ranh Bay experienced its first major threat when sappers swam into the bay and set off a 

demolition charge on a tanker, leaving it with a diamond-shaped hole above 

the water line. Within two days, the enemy attacked major population centers 

in nine of the corps’ twelve provinces. Highway 19 was cut just west of Qui 

Nhon, as were roads from Cam Ranh Bay to Da Lat and Ban Me Thuot. 

Heavy fighting at Da Lat, Ban Me Thuot, and Kontum shut down the airfields 

in all three towns.2

 (Map 23)

1

 For background on the Tet offensive, see Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 157–88; 

Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 310–49; Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 473–74; and, for 

the best general account, Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971). 2

 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 322; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 322; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 68, U.S. Army Support Cmd, Cam Ranh Bay, n.d., p. 6, Historians files, CMH. For more 

on the attacks in II Corps, see ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, I FFV, 15 May 68, pp. 11–14, Historians 

files, CMH; MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, p. 386, vol. 2, pp. 889–92; Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung, The 
4

4

4

4

4

1

20

11

21

15

13

14

14

14

19

1

1

1

1

1

9

SOUTH CHINA SEA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Gulf

of

Thailand

Mekong R

Mekong R

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

NORTH VIETNAM

DEMARCATION LINE

Cu Lao Cham

Cu Lao Re

Dao Phu Qui

Con Son

I CTZ

III CTZ

II CTZ

IV CTZ

Quang Tri

Khe Sanh

Da Nang

Tam Ky

Kontum

Dak To

Qui Nhon

An Khe

Hau Bon

Tuy Hoa

Ninh Hoa

Nha Trang

Ban Me Thuot

Pleiku

Da Lat

Phan Rang

Cam Ranh

Phan Thiet

Xuan Loc

Phuoc Le

Tay Ninh

Sa Dec My Tho Vinh

 Long

Phu Vinh

Can Tho

Ben Tre

Tan An

Go Cong

Phu Cuong

Bien

Hoa

Long Binh

Chau Phu Moc Hoa

Rach Gia

Ca Mau

Bac Lieu

Soc Trang

Hue

An Loc

Chu Lai

Quang Ngai

SAIGON

PHNOM PENH

Attopeu

Saravane

Stung Treng

Tchepone

Savannakhet

Kratie

Snuol

Svay Rieng

Paksé

TET OFFENSIVE

Engagement

1968

0

0

100

100

Miles

Kilometers

Map 23
333

Tet, January–March 1968

The fighting in the Qui Nhon area lasted from 30 January well into February 

and was typical of the allied experience in coastal II Corps. Before the attack on 

Qui Nhon, South Vietnamese forces had uncovered local Viet Cong hideouts and 

captured several cadre and prerecorded tapes to be used following the seizure of 

the radio station. Expecting an attack, the province chief announced a ban on 

fireworks, which was ignored by some people, and a curfew. Despite these precautions, a Viet Cong sapper battalion and a local force battalion slipped into the city, 

some of the insurgents disguised as South Vietnamese soldiers. They seized and 

briefly controlled the radio station, freed the Viet Cong captives, and occupied 

the railway station. The South Vietnamese regrouped and with the help of troops 

from the South Korean Capital Division ousted the attackers. The counterattack, 

however, destroyed the radio station and damaged the train station’s workshop, 

including a new General Electric locomotive, and other buildings in town.3

Since the Viet Cong’s main objectives in Qui Nhon were South Vietnamese 

facilities, the attackers initially bypassed the Americans unless they happened 

to be in the way. At daybreak on 30 January, three employees of Pacific 

Architects and Engineers traveling to work in a company jeep passed near the 

radio station. The Viet Cong opened fire killing all three. In addition, seven 

U.S. soldiers died and several were wounded in Qui Nhon, including three 

soldiers who also drove by the radio station during the fighting.4

Army engineer units in the Qui Nhon area immediately took up arms to 

help defend U.S. installations. Just before the offensive, the 45th Engineer 

Group deployed a provisional infantry platoon from the 35th Engineer 

Battalion to guard RMK-BRJ’s quarry and asphalt plant near Phu Cat. 

When the 35th received orders to head for I Corps, the security mission transferred to a platoon from the 523d Port Construction Company. The engineers 

assumed additional infantry duties when the U.S. Army Support Command, 

Qui Nhon, set in motion a rear area protection plan, which included mobile 

reaction forces drawn from the 45th Group. Within days of the Tet attacks, the 

group commander, Col. George W. Fink, ordered one company from the 84th 

Engineer Construction Battalion to hold the high ground west of the city and 

one from the 589th Engineer Construction Battalion to move into Qui Nhon 

proper and secure the airfield. Even so, the Viet Cong continued to attack. On 

3 and 13 February, rockets struck fuel storage tanks near the camp of the 84th 

Battalion west of town, leaving holes but no other damage. On 3 February, a 

squad of sappers infiltrated the camp itself, and the engineers lost two killed 

and two wounded. A second attack occurred on the twenty-sixth, along with 

an assault on a nearby South Vietnamese ammunition depot. This time the 

General Offensives of 1968–69, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1981), pp. 49–51; and Lt. Col. Phan Van Son and Maj. Le Van Duong, 

eds., The Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968, trans. J5/Joint General Staff Translation Board (Saigon: 

Printing and Publications Center, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces [RVNAF], 1969), pp. 

359–424, copy in CMH. 3

 Lung, General Offensives of 1968–69, pp. 50–51; Son and Duong, eds., Viet Cong Tet 

Offensive, 1968, pp. 381–92. 4

 PA&E History, Jan–Jun 1968, p. 30; Son and Duong, eds., Viet Cong Tet Offensive, 1968, 

p. 388.
Engineers at War

334

engineers killed two sappers without suffering any casualties. Meanwhile, at 

the 84th Battalion’s Phu Tai quarry, a mortar attack on 11 February resulted 

in the construction battalion’s third combat death.5

Viet Cong attacks on the roads leading out of Qui Nhon caused additional hazards for the engineers. Several convoys to Pleiku and Landing Zone 

English were ambushed. With the departure of the 35th Engineer Battalion

to I Corps, the 84th Engineer Battalion assumed responsibility for all of 

Highway 1 between Cu Mong Pass south of the city and Bong Son to the 

north. Five bridges required immediate repair, and sniper fire wounded sixteen 

engineers working along the way. Farther north along the dangerous stretch to 

Duc Pho, the 19th Engineer Battalion had to repair five bridges destroyed by 

fire, two destroyed by demolitions, and three more damaged by sapper attacks. 

The sappers also destroyed thirty-seven culverts using 100 to 200 pounds of 

explosives or artillery rounds. The battalion reported 255 contacts with enemy 

forces, who fired on the engineers in ninety-four separate incidents. Minesweep 

teams and work parties were caught in thirteen well-planned ambushes. In 

all, the 19th Engineer Battalion and attached units suffered seven killed and 

eighty-eight wounded. The 589th Engineer Battalion faced similar problems 

along Highway 19 to An Khe. When sappers destroyed two spans over the 

Phu Phong River, a little over four miles east of Binh Khe on the night of 27 

February, Company C built a 160-foot panel bridge over a wrecked span and 

reopened the road to traffic by 1600 the following day. The next night, the 

company reinforced the span to carry heavier traffic. Another panel bridge was 

built downstream to allow two-way traffic along the busy road. This second 

crossing later served as a bypass when the engineers began to reconstruct the 

permanent bridge. The repaired bridge, consisting of a new timber pile pier, 

steel beams, and timber decking, opened to traffic on 10 April. Company D 

cleared mines and improved the road from the base of Mang Yang Pass eastward to An Khe. When the company finished repairing a large hole blown in 

one of the bridge’s concrete decks, it began fixing three spans of another badly 

damaged bridge. Despite the enemy’s efforts, the engineers quickly reopened 

the main roads and kept them open.6

By mid-March, Col. John A. Hughes Jr. had moved his 35th Engineer 

Group from Cam Ranh Bay to the 45th Group’s small cantonment at Qui 

Nhon. This relocation was prompted by the impending move of the 45th 

Group to I Corps to take charge of engineer units slated to support Army 

troops deploying there. The move to Qui Nhon allowed Hughes and his 35th 

Group headquarters better control of operations in an area of responsibility 

that had more than doubled in size. Hughes also inherited three battalions 

5

 MFR, 21 Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 45th Engr Gp, p. 2; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 

68, 45th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 68, pp. 4, 8–9, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 84th Engr Bn, 14 May 68, pp. 3–4, 

and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 589th Engr Bn, 15 May 68, p. 5, all in Historians files, CMH; Interv, Maj 

Paul B. Webber, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col James F. Fraser, CO, 84th Engr Bn, 22 Feb 68, 

pp. 1, 8, VNIT 108, CMH. 6

 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 84th Engr Bn, p. 4, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 19th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 68, 

pp. 2–4, Historians files, CMH; 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 589th Engr Bn, pp. 7–8, 10; and 1 Feb–30 Apr 

68, 1st Log Cmd, p. 70.
335

Tet, January–March 1968

(the 19th, 84th, and 589th) and several separate companies, making his the 

largest engineer group in Vietnam. It now consisted of 6 battalions, 9 separate 

companies, and 7 detachments, nearly 7,000 troops. Since the 14th and 35th 

Engineer Battalions were slated to move north with the 45th Group, Hughes 

faced the task of dividing the vast area among the remaining battalions to 

carry out tasks formerly assigned to eight battalions.7

Fortunately, most of the vast logistical complex and highway improvements in the Qui Nhon area were nearing completion. The 35th Group could 

concentrate on extending road improvements and operational support during 

the coastal dry season. The 19th Engineer Battalion, using crushed rock from 

the Tam Quan quarry that began operations on 11 January, steadily added a 

base course along Highway 1 between Bong Son and Mo Duc in southern I 

Corps. Simultaneously, the battalion carried out operational support missions 

for the 1st Cavalry Division and its successors, the 3d Brigade, 4th Division, 

and, in turn, the 173d Airborne Brigade and the Americal Division. The 19th 

Engineer Battalion made airfield repairs at Landing Zone English, completed 

a small port at Sa Huynh, and built an access road to an artillery unit near Duc 

Pho. Minesweep teams carried out the repetitive but dangerous job of daily 

checks along Highway 1. Roadwork along Highway 1 by the 84th Engineer 

Battalion consisted of readying the base course to Bong Son for an asphalt 

7

 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 35th Engr Gp, 11 May 68, pp. 2–4, Historians files, CMH.

Before and during the Tet offensive, the Viet Cong consistently attacked bridges 

like this one burnt along Highway 1 north of Qui Nhon.
Engineers at War

336

surface and widening the Cu Mong Pass south of Qui Nhon. The attached 

523d Port Construction Company helped the 84th and other engineer units 

in several projects. Chief among the versatile company’s accomplishments in 

Qui Nhon were the completion of a third fuel storage tank farm (three 50,000-

barrel and four 10,000-barrel welded-steel tanks) and a second causeway 

bridge in the port. The 589th Engineer Battalion devoted most of its efforts to 

Highway 19 and An Khe’s logistical and airfield facilities. With the attached 

51st Asphalt Platoon’s asphalt plant at An Khe in full production shortly after 

15 March, the 589th Battalion began paving west of the city.8

Roads and Bases in the Highlands

The first attacks in the highlands took place around 0130 on 30 January 

at Ban Me Thuot, about an hour following the opening strike at Nha Trang. 

As celebrants set off a string of fireworks in the streets, a barrage of mortar 

and rocket rounds struck the town, followed by a ground assault by two Viet 

Cong battalions. Simultaneously, a battalion-size attack took place against the 

small district capital of Tan Canh near Dak To. Thirty minutes later, a North 

Vietnamese regiment and two separate battalions, almost 3,000 men, moved 

against Kontum City, and a half hour later the long-expected attack on Pleiku 

began.9

The 4th Infantry Division’s preparations before Tet included assigning 

an infantry role to its 4th Engineer Battalion. Two brigades (the 3d Brigade 

remained with the Americal Division until the end of March) continued to 

carry on Operation MacArthur, guarding the border regions and searching for the enemy in an immense area of operations. On the morning o

January, Colonel Lee, the 4th Engineer Battalion’s commander, received 

orders to organize two companies as infantry and prepare to deploy to one 

of three possible blocking positions outside Pleiku. Since Lee could not call 

back Companies A, B, and C from their commitment to the three brigades, 

he assembled the remaining units at Camp Enari, the battalion’s base camp 

just west of Pleiku, and organized the task force around Company D, most 

of Company E (bridge company), a platoon from Company A, and a makeshift armor platoon of tankdozers from the land-clearing team. The division 

also attached an armor company (Company A, 69th Armor) to the task force 

and provided an artillery liaison officer and a forward observer. The engineers 

gained additional fire power by borrowing twelve .50-caliber machine guns 

from other units and issuing two hand grenades per man. Material for overhead protection and bunkers was loaded on trucks and included concertina 

wire, heavy timbers, salvaged M8A1 airfield matting, and sandbags. The task 

force was declared ready for deployment by 1630 and spent the evening and 

the next day reviewing artillery adjustment and medical evacuation procedures 

8

 ORLLs, ibid., p. 2, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 7–9, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 19th Engr 

Bn, pp. 1–6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 84th Engr Bn, pp. 2–5, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 589th Engr Bn, pp. 

2–9.9

 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 322.
337

Tet, January–March 1968

and firing weapons. The infantry mission, however, was canceled, and division 

headquarters returned the engineers to normal duties at 1530, 26 January.10

At 0930 on 30 January, a Viet Cong local force battalion stormed into 

the provincial capital of Pleiku, and the division ordered the 4th Engineer 

Battalion to help retake the city. Luckily for the defenders, a North Vietnamese 

regiment failed to rendezvous with the local forces, which then carried out the 

attack alone. The Viet Cong penetrated Pleiku’s defenses only after crossing a 

large open field at great cost. At 1500, the engineers helicoptered to a landing 

zone outside town and set up a defensive perimeter. The armor company’s 

tanks joined the task force that afternoon, followed that evening by the 4th 

Engineer Battalion’s own armor force. The next morning, the task force and 

South Vietnamese troops advanced into town, took enemy fire, and continued 

the sweep until dusk. Company E took three prisoners, two of whom were 

members of sapper teams on suicide missions. The next morning, the engineers formed two skirmish lines and resumed the sweep, this time with the tank 

company. This drive resulted in the killing of twenty-one Viet Cong and the 

capture of several weapons. As the advance proceeded northward, resistance 

ceased. By nightfall, the engineer task force’s command post moved to a South 

Vietnamese artillery compound. One platoon reinforced the Artillery Hill 

Camp west of town, and another platoon with a platoon of tanks guarded the 

power plant. The engineers also manned a nearby observation post equipped 

with two starlight scopes (optical instruments that intensified low light allowing its users to see at night). By 1930, the observation post reported enemy 

troops moving toward town. Heavy concentrations of firepower delivered by 

artillery, helicopter gunships, and Air Force AC–47 Spooky gunships halted 

the advance. South Vietnamese troops moving through the area the next day 

found some blood-soaked clothing, bandages, and equipment but no bodies. 

Several sweeps of the area followed without any traces of the enemy. Its mission as infantry completed, the task force returned to Camp Enari at 1800, 1 

February, and its troops resumed normal chores as engineers.11

At Kontum City, elements of the 4th Engineer Battalion helped allied 

forces repel the enemy attack. Heavy fighting developed around government facilities and the airfield. By noon on 30 January, it became apparent that the South Vietnamese regular and territorial defenders needed 

help. The South Vietnamese rushed in a reinforced battalion, and the 4th 

Division deployed a task force centered on the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry. 

In a campaign that lasted through 12 February, the 4th Division’s task force 

(divided into teams and supported by two batteries of artillery; a company 

of armor; a troop of air cavalry; and two Dusters, or twin 40-mm. selfpropelled guns) set up blocking positions, helped retake the city in houseto-house fighting, and pursued the enemy through nearby hamlets and 

heavily defended hills to the north. Supporting the 4th Division task force, 

the 3d Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion, placed a squad with 

10 ORLL, 1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 4th Inf Div, 7 Mar 68, pp. 39–40, 50–51, Historians files, 

CMH. 11 Ibid., pp. 40–41, 50–51.
Engineers at War

338

each infantry company. Tasks included clearing mines, disposing of munitions, dispensing potable water at the task force’s firebase, and destroying bunker complexes. Additional help and equipment came from the rest 

of the division engineer battalion or nondivisional engineers nearby. An 

armored vehicle launched bridge supporting the armor team came from 

the battalion’s bridge company, and the 299th Engineer Battalion sent two 

D7 bulldozers to clear a patrol base for an infantry team. The engineers 

also made abundant use of their chain saws. One squad sent to support the 

armor team cleared a shroud of dense foliage that obstructed the tanks’ 

fields of fire. Another squad cleared a landing zone, permitting helicopters 

to extract an infantry company.12

The 937th Engineer Group’s construction program suffered because of the 

initial and follow-up attacks on roads and convoys. Mines and destroyed or 

damaged bridges blocked the main supply routes, and the nearly completed 

pipeline running parallel to Highway 19 was sabotaged. Rocket and mortar 

attacks caused some damage to buildings and airfield surfaces, which were 

quickly repaired. Quarries previously operating on a twenty-four-hour schedule were limited to daylight work. In March, Col. William J. Talbot assumed 

command of the group from Colonel Marshall. His main concern shifted 

to repairing the destruction caused by the enemy’s attacks and carrying on 

the mix of operational support and construction tasks. One chore included 

sending the 299th Engineer Battalion’s Company B to Kontum City, where 

it cleared some 1,500 cubic yards of debris. As for roadwork, the 20th, 70th, 

and 299th Engineer Combat Battalions, each backed by a light equipment 

company, labored to keep the critical supply routes open with daily mine 

sweeps and repairing road surfaces, culverts, and bridges. The 815th Engineer 

Construction Battalion, augmented by a construction support company and 

part of a pipeline company, continued base development tasks and paving 

Highway 19 east of Pleiku. Two dump truck companies and a land-clearing 

platoon also supported the group.13

Repairs and improvements at forward airstrips and helicopter facilities 

also resumed at full force. On 19 February, the 20th Engineer Battalion finished renovations at Buon Blech, and the runway and parking apron topped 

with new M8A1 matting could now handle C–130 aircraft. On the same day, 

the battalion started comparable upgrading at the Ban Don airstrip. The 20th 

Battalion also completed a C–7A airstrip (Operation Florida) and various

facilities at the Tieu Atar Special Forces camp and began to extract its lightweight airmobile equipment on 1 April. At Polei and Old Cheo Reo, the 70th 

Engineer Battalion labored to upgrade the airstrips to C–130 and C–123 

traffic, respectively. Both Dak To airfields had more work done by the 299th 

12 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, I FFV, p. 13; AAR, Battle of Kontum/Tet Counteroffensive, 1st 

Bn, 22d Inf, n.d., pp. 1, 3–6, and an. D, pp. 2–3, Historians files, CMH. 13 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

11, 6 May 68, OCE Hist Ofc; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 937th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 68, pp. 3–4, 6–8, 

1 Nov 67–31 Jan 68, 299th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 68, pp. 2–3, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 299th Engr Bn, 

30 Apr 68, p. 3, all in Historians files, CMH.
339

Tet, January–March 1968

Engineer Battalion, which prepared Dak To 1 for C–123 traffic and Dak To 2 

to withstand the effects of the southwest monsoon.14

After Tet, convoys carrying men and construction materials moved at 

great risk, and ambushes took an ever-increasing toll in casualties and damage 

to equipment. Dump trucks continued to haul sand on Highway 14 from 

Kontum, the only source of the material in the area, twice daily to the asphalt 

plant in Pleiku. The enemy, believing that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces 

would be dispersed while reacting to the attacks on the cities, made it a point 

to attack isolated vehicles and large convoys alike. Since Highway 14 served 

as the main supply road between the two province capitals, the engineers 

cleared a little over one hundred yards of vegetation from each side to reduce 

ambushes, but this did not discourage the attackers. On 6 March and again on 

13 March, the 937th Group took heavy losses. In the second attack, the engineer vehicles at the rear of a 150-vehicle convoy were struck from both sides of 

the road. The enemy, estimated to range from two reinforced companies to two 

battalions, had taken positions behind berms of foliage and earth formed by 

the land clearing. After the initial fusillade of automatic weapons and rocket 

fire, sappers rushed toward the vehicles, throwing satchel charges at the trucks. 

The South Vietnamese armored cavalry squadron providing security entered 

the battle, and air strikes broke the attack. A few vehicles managed to run the 

ambush and clear the killing zone, but one hit a truck and blocked the road. 

A relief convoy consisting of wreckers and a company from the 70th Engineer 

Battalion moved to the ambush site to remove the disabled vehicles. Casualties 

from the three engineer companies (the 70th and 586th Dump Truck and the 

509th Panel Bridge) totaled twelve dead and nineteen wounded. Equipment 

losses consisted of five trucks destroyed and another sixteen damaged.15

An investigation revealed the need for better coordination between the 

engineers and security forces and changes in convoy procedures. When the two 

officers in the serial containing the engineer vehicles were killed, communications with the convoy commander and the armored cavalry escort ceased. This 

left the engineers virtually helpless until the armored cavalry arrived. To counter 

future ambushes, the group assigned platoons from two combat engineer battalions as infantry to provide added security for engineer vehicles on Highway 

14. Modifications to vehicles included armored plating welded to the doors of 

trucks or sand and gravel filled in door cavities. Makeshift armored trucks, usually a five-ton dump truck with the bed and sides sandbagged, were intermingled 

with every six dump trucks. Each armored truck carried a noncommissioned 

14 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 937th Engr Gp, pp. 4–6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 20th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 

68, pp. 2–3, 9–10, Historians files, CMH, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 70th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 68, pp. 6, 8, 

Historians files, CMH, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 299th Engr Bn, pp. 1–8. For more on Operation 

Florida, see Intervs, Maj Paul B. Webber, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col James H. Phillips,

CO, 20th Engr Bn, 21 Mar 68, and Capt Leroy T. Cool, CO, Co B, 20th Engr Bn, 14 Mar 68, 

VNIT 175, CMH. 15 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

11; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 937th Engr Gp, p. 6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 1st Log Cmd, p. 70; 

Western Highlands, pp. 85–86. For a full account of the 13 March ambush, see AAR/Intervs, 

937th Engr Gp, 10 Jul 68, 26th Mil Hist Det, VNIT 176, CMH.
Engineers at War

340

officer with a radio and three to five well-armed troops. These measures must 

have helped, for on 30 April the 937th Group reported no more ambushes of 

engineer convoys along Highway 14.16

The engineers tried to reduce ambushes by doing a more thorough job of 

land clearing. Although trees and vegetation were cut back about one hundred yards along many stretches of roads, the windrows of fallen timber left 

behind provided good cover and concealment for enemy troops. Company A, 

70th Engineer Battalion, took care of this problem by using the “haystack” 

method. Since burning the fallen timber in the windrows was time consuming 

and inefficient, the battalion bulldozed the debris into piles, which were left to 

dry out for a few days, and then burned and the ashes scattered. The company, 

one of the engineer units assigned to protect convoys along Highway 14, also 

used two Rome plows and two bulldozers to clear an additional one hundred 

yards on each side of the road in areas most frequently used by the enemy. 

Rome plows of the 35th Land Clearing Team, attached to the 20th Engineer 

Battalion, were also busy at work on several supply routes. On 19 February, 

two sections of the team completed work along Route 7B west to the intersection of Highway 14. From there, the twenty Rome plows moved onto Highway 

14 and by 9 March cleared 1,180 acres south of Phu Nhon toward Ban Me 

Thuot. Operations then moved to Highway 19 to widen the cleared areas from 

about one hundred to about three hundred yards between An Khe Pass and 

Mang Yang Pass. The team’s third section of ten Rome plows, previously 

attached to the 35th Group at Phan Rang, moved to Ban Me Thuot and 70th 

Engineer Battalion control in late February and began clearing east along 

Highway 21. Hanoi’s account of the war in the highlands acknowledged these 

prodigious efforts to keep the land lines open.17

The Fight for Saigon and the Delta

Although the allies in III Corps had expected trouble at Tet, the number 

of Viet Cong who slipped through the defenses around Saigon and the extent 

and fury of the offensive came as a shock. South Vietnamese and U.S. troops 

reacted quickly and turned back the enemy within a week, save for some holdouts in Cholon, the Chinese quarter of Saigon. The attack in Saigon began with 

the raid on the American embassy, a rectangular six-story fortress completed 

by RMK-BRJ the previous September. The embassy was a dubious military 

objective but of significant psychological value. After breaching the wall and 

entering the grounds and chancery building, but not the embassy building, all 

the sappers were killed. Simultaneous assaults at Tan Son Nhut Air Base and 

the nearby Joint General Staff compound, the Presidential Palace, and other 

installations in Saigon also failed, although some enemy soldiers did briefly 

penetrate the back side of the air base and the South Vietnamese headquarters 

16 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 937th Engr Gp, p. 6, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 3, 

5–6; AAR/Intervs, 937th Engr Gp, 10 Jul 68, p. 6. 17 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 937th Engr Gp, p. 4, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 20th Engr Bn, pp. 2–4, 

and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 70th Engr Bn, pp. 3, 7, 14; Western Highlands, p. 85.
341

Tet, January–March 1968

complex. The assaults on Bien Hoa, Long Binh, the surrounding provinces, 

and in IV Corps were also short lived, although a second series of attacks in 

and around Saigon took place on 17 February, beginning with rockets striking 

Tan Son Nhut and MACV headquarters. Their intensity, however, was much 

less than the initial assaults. These attacks lasted intermittently until early 

March, highlighted by several fire fights inside Saigon and Cholon.18

The enemy interdicted all major roads from Saigon, delaying convoys on 

Highways 1 and 22 to Tay Ninh and Route 1A to Phuoc Vinh. Highway 13 

to Lai Khe was cut repeatedly by sabotage and roadblocks. Convoys caught in 

outlying areas often waited for days for the engineers to clear the way. Ground 

transportation in the delta was also at a standstill since the Vietnamese drivers, 

fearing reprisals, stayed away from work. Most highway improvements in III 

and IV Corps ceased, including RMK-BRJ’s project to upgrade the narrow and 

deteriorated Highway 4 in the delta. River barges that normally plied the waterways in the region were held up at Vung Tau. Rail movements stopped entirely. 

For several days, only priority airlifts could reach some of the inland bases.19

When Long Binh, Bien Hoa, and nearby posts came under fire on the 

morning of 31 January, Army engineers were already manning defensive 

positions. At the Long Binh post, parts of the perimeter were held by the 

159th Engineer Group. The 79th Group headquarters and the attached 66th 

Engineer Topographic Company based at II Field Force headquarters at 

Plantation put about one-half their troops in perimeter bunkers. Just up the 

road at the 199th Light Infantry Brigade’s Camp Frenzell-Jones, the 79th 

Group’s 100th Float Bridge Company helped man perimeter positions. At 

0300 on 31 January, the Viet Cong launched an intense rocket and mortar 

barrage at Plantation and Camp Frenzell-Jones. About the same time, rockets struck Bien Hoa Air Base and the adjacent III Corps headquarters compound, followed by ground assaults. When the barrage lifted at Plantation, 

the rest of the 79th Group’s soldiers—clerk typists, carpenters, draftsmen, 

surveyors, and mapmakers—joined the troops on the line. Viet Cong soldiers, 

in position in Ho Nai Village on the other side of Highway 1A, opened up 

with a torrent of rifle and machine-gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades 

against the camp, succeeded by a ground attack aimed at the II Field Force 

headquarters. The defenders responded with automatic weapons fire and 

grenades, which stopped the assault and pinned down the attackers. Military 

police and Army helicopter gunships joined the fighting. Soon elements 

of the 199th Infantry Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment swept the area, leaving sixty enemy dead in Ho Nai. Some 

Viet Cong were caught milling around in the village (nicknamed “Widows’ 

Village” because of the widows and orphans of South Vietnamese soldiers 

18 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 159; MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 390, 397; 

ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, II FFV, 20 May 68, pp. 38–42, Historians files, CMH. For more on the 

fighting in III and IV Corps, see MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 390, 397–99, vol. 2, pp. 894–

906; AAR, Tet Offensive, II FFV, 5 Aug 68, Historians files, CMH; Lung, General Offensives 

of 1968–69, pp. 51–75; General Donn A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1979), pp. 118–29. 19 Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 322; MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 653.
Engineers at War

342

living there). Determined to liberate a prisoner of war camp just west of the 

village, the attackers had gotten lost, and were quickly killed or captured.20

The intensity of the opening attacks immediately shifted the engineers in 

the Saigon area from base construction to improving base defenses and operational support. At Plantation, the 79th Group’s headquarters was heavily damaged, due largely to the concussion from an explosion set off by sappers who 

infiltrated through a thick bamboo grove between Plantation and the Long 

Binh ammunition dump. This gave Col. John H. Elder Jr., the group commander, good reason to rebuild an improved headquarters and a new tactical 

operations center protected in a reinforced-concrete block structure covered 

with sandbags. He also borrowed the 34th Group’s 86th Engineer Battalion 

Land Clearing Team to eliminate the bamboo grove. Some nine hundred acres 

were cleared in a week. At Long Binh, Col. Harvey C. Jones, the 159th Engineer 

Group commander, quickly committed his four construction battalions (46th, 

62d, 92d, and 169th) to improving the base perimeter, which involved adding 

more barbed wire fencing, reaction force bunkers, and access roads. Similar 

work went on at the U.S. Army camp at Bien Hoa and nearby firebases. Also 

under way at Long Binh was construction of a temporary tactical operations 

20 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 79th Engr Gp, 14 May 68, pp. 3, 9, 11, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 

159th Engr Gp, n.d., p. 5, both in Historians files, CMH; “Tet Truce Offensive, 1968,” and 

“In Defense of Plantation, 1968,” Hurricane, II FFV Magazine (April–June 1971): 2–4; Lung, 

General Offensives of 1968–69, p. 69; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 1, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11; Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and 

America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 707, 714.

Bunkers like this were the first line of defense during the enemy attack on Plantation, the headquarters of II Field Force.
343

Tet, January–March 1968

center for the 1st Logistical Command. This entailed excavating a 21-by-51-

by-15-foot-deep pit, erecting heavy timbers with a blast cover of a single layer 

of 12-by-12-foot timbers, and a 1-foot reinforced-concrete floor on top of two 

inches of compacted soil. All exposed areas were covered with roofing felt 

and sprayed with peneprime. Altogether, the bunker had 604 square feet of 

working area, plywood paneled walls, fluorescent lighting, and electrical outlets. With so much construction, and reconstruction, under way, the group’s 

lumber requirements between February and April rose sharply to more than 1 

million board feet, up from 700,000 board feet in the three months before Tet. 

By March, the Long Binh depot had run out of 80-foot timber piles. Although 

250 piles were found at the Qui Nhon depot, movement of the timber to Long 

Binh was delayed for a month, and construction there on the ammunition offloading pier came to a halt. Transportation of engineer construction materials 

again took a lower priority to ammunition, fuel, and rations.21

There were other examples of engineers under attack in III and IV Corps. At 

Can Tho Airfield, Headquarters Company of the 69th Engineer Construction 

Battalion lost five men killed and several wounded while stopping an attack of 

over one hundred Viet Cong. North of Saigon at Phu Cuong, a reinforced Viet 

Cong battalion on the morning of 1 February struck the district headquarters 

and the South Vietnamese Army Engineer School just west of town. Because 

of the Tet holidays, the school was defended by only eighty-seven Vietnamese 

Army soldiers and four American advisers. By 0700, the enemy had overrun 

the northern half of the school. If the school had fallen, the Viet Cong would 

have dominated the high ground, which also overlooked the bridge site where 

men of the 41st Port Construction Company and Company B, 92d Engineer 

Construction Battalion, were building the steel and concrete bypass bridge over 

the Saigon River. The school troops were outnumbered and low on ammunition, and casualties were mounting. A request for help from the American 

senior adviser went to the engineers at the bridge site, and twenty-five men in 

a makeshift platoon were sent to the school. Guided by the advisers and aided 

by an air strike, the engineers counterattacked and drove the enemy back. 

Soon afterward, a South Vietnamese tank-infantry force arrived, and the Viet 

Cong were evicted from the school grounds. The U.S. engineers lost two killed 

and several wounded. Less than forty-eight hours later, while fighting was still 

going on, the engineers were back at work on the bridge.22

In the meantime, engineers assigned to the divisions and brigades were heavily engaged. Ongoing operations such as the 25th Division’s Yellowstone and

Saratoga; the 9th Division’s Riley, Enterprise, and Coronado; and th

Division’s Lam Son 68, which succeeded Lam Son 67 on 1 February, continued. 

21 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 3, 11, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 159th Engr Gp, p. 

15, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 5–10, 19–21, 1 Feb–1 Apr 68, 46th Engr Bn, 14 May 

68, p. 7, Historians files, CMH, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 34th Engr Gp, 1 May 68, p. 6, Historians 

files, CMH; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 11. 22 Msg, Maj Gen Charles M. Duke, CG, Engr Cmd and USARV Engr, ARV 263 to Cassidy, 

5 Feb 68, Charles M. Duke Papers, CMH; Lt. Col. Walter R. Hylander Jr., “Port Construction 

Engineers in Combat,” Military Engineer 60 (November-December 1968): 420–21.
Engineers at War

344

The 1st Engineer Battalion’s support of 1st Division operations typified the role 

of a divisional engineer battalion during February. On 4 February, Company 

B entered the village of An My with the 2d Brigade. With the help of the battalion’s tunnel rats, the company found a large North Vietnamese Army staging 

base. Rome plows from the 27th Land Clearing Team moved in and razed the 

facility, deterring an expected attack on the Phu Loi base camp. During rocket 

and mortar attacks on the Lai Khe base camp, Company C put out fires that 

endangered the aviation refueling point and the base’s ammunition supply point. 

With Highway 13 cut by roadblocks, craters, and mines, Company C just south 

of Ben Cat filled the largest mine crater encountered by the battalion to date, 

requiring some thirty-six truckloads of laterite. On the eighteenth, while working toward Phu Loi, a Company C platoon-size task force and its mechanized 

infantry escort came under heavy antitank and automatic weapons fire. A fierce 

battle followed for several hours with the engineers covering the maneuvering 

infantry with fire until the attackers withdrew, leaving behind fifty-five dead. 

The engineers suffered four wounded and damage to several vehicles.23

Because of the extensive damage to the cities and towns, and the flow of 

refugees, the Saigon government, with American urging, launched a massive 

recovery program. When the immediate threat subsided and the most important tasks had been completed, engineer troops turned their attention to 

helping Vietnamese civilians. General Westmoreland made American engineers available and authorized the drawing of large stocks of roofing, concrete, and other building materials, and providing emergency food supplies, 

drinking water, and medical help. South Vietnamese and allied engineers 

joined the effort. At Hoc Mon north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the 159th 

Engineer Group provided materials and foodstuffs for the South Vietnamese 

5th Engineer Group’s damaged dependent housing area. Carpenter shops 

and block shops were set up there, and work began on homes for some 540 

people. Another effort, with commerce in mind, was Operation People’s

Road, aimed at reestablishing security and improving Highway 4 from the 

III Corps border to Can Tho before the onset of the rainy season. RMKBRJ had started the work in January, but because of the threat to unarmed 

work parties along the road, MACV decided to have the 20th Brigade work 

on the My Tho to My Thuan section. While the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, 

provided security, the 34th Group’s 86th Engineer Battalion started work 

on 2 March. By the end of the month, the battalion had completed the base 

course and grading and had paved two miles with a double bituminous surface treatment. The contractor did not do much between Saigon and My 

Tho in February but did resume work in early March. The South Vietnamese 

40th Engineer Group, helped by the 69th Engineer Battalion, worked along 

the remaining sections to Can Tho.24

23 Always First, 1967–1968, “Operation Lam Son” and “Company B and C”; Intervs, Maj 

William E. Daniel Jr., 17th Mil Hist Det, with 1st Lt William P. Francisco, Plt Ldr, 2d Plt, Co 

C, 2d Bn, 2d Inf, 1st Inf Div, pp. 1–8, and 1st Lt Terrence L. Hueser, Plt Ldr, 1st Plt, Co C, 1st 

Engr Bn, 1st Inf Div, 18 Jan 68, VNI 161, pp. 1–4, CMH. 24 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 404–05; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 166; 

MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, p. 536, vol. 2, p. 653; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, II FFV, p. 49, 
345

Tet, January–March 1968

Restoring Logistics in I Corps

In northern I Corps, North Vietnamese troops attacked Hue and Quang 

Tri City and cut off Tan My, one of the three ports above Da Nang. The other 

two, Dong Ha and Cua Viet, fell within artillery range from the Demilitarized 

Zone, making their use tenuous. The enemy also cut the Hai Van Pass along 

Highway 1 linking Da Nang to Hue. Supplies could be delivered by air, but the 

monsoon weather during February made flying and landing over-the-beach 

uncertain at best. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had increased their pressure on Khe Sanh. Earlier General Westmoreland had decided to hold the 

base, which he believed could tie down large North Vietnamese forces that 

otherwise could have moved unhindered around allied positions into the populated areas. On 5 February, heavy ground attacks followed by intense artillery 

fire the next day struck Khe Sanh and nearby Lang Vei Special Forces camp. 

Although the enemy took Lang Vei, the defenders at Khe Sanh and the surrounding hilltop outposts held out against heavy bombardments and ground 

assaults.25

On the eve of Tet, Brig. Gen. Willard Roper’s 18th Engineer Brigade and 

Colonel Fink’s 45th Engineer Group were preparing to send units to northern 

I Corps to support the 1st Cavalry Division, which had just deployed there 

to reinforce the marines. Fink and members of his staff made several trips 

to Phu Bai to coordinate the engineer deployment with the MACV Forward 

Command Post, an advanced headquarters that General Westmoreland established on 25 January to observe, direct, and, if necessary, control operations 

in the threatened northern provinces. On the twenty-ninth, General Roper, the 

commander of the 18th Engineer Brigade, and Fink traveled north to reconnoiter the group’s new area of responsibility. The following day—the same day 

the attacks began in the northern half of the country—the group dispatched a 

reconnaissance party to the Gia Le combat base, just south of Hue. One of the 

party’s helicopters was shot down with heavy casualties, including the death of 

the group’s operations officer.26

The first unit of the 45th Group to start north was the 35th Engineer 

Battalion from Landing Zone Hammond in northern II Corps. On 2 February, 

Lt. Col. John V. Parish Jr., who had assumed command of the battalion two 

1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 5, 24, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 9–10; 

Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 68, MACDC, 20 Apr 68, pp. IV-17 to IV-18, Historians files, 

CMH. 25 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 336–41, 345–47; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, 

pp. 162–64; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 165–68; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 73–78. 

For more on the Tet offensive in I Corps, see MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 376–79, vol. 2, 

pp. 883–89; Jack Shulimson, Lt. Col. Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and Capt. David 

A. Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: History and 

Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), pp. 113–223; Bowers, Tactical 

Airlift, pp. 295–316. 26 Col. George B. Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” Military Engineer 60 (SeptemberOctober 1968): 358; MFR, 21, Feb 92, sub: Author’s Recollections, 45th Engr Gp, p. 2; Engineer 

Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, pp. 1–2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11; ORLL, 

1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 7; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 150.
Engineers at War

346

weeks earlier, was alerted to get ready for the move. The battalion began its 

preparations. Initially, Parish hoped to make an amphibious landing off to the 

north of Hue, build an access road to Highway 1, and work south to Camp 

Evans, the 1st Cavalry Division’s forward base camp. This approach seemed 

quicker and preferable to disembarking at Da Nang, the scene of a hectic 

buildup of Army support units. Colonel Parish was also concerned that the 

battalion’s arrival in Da Nang could result in changing the unit’s mission to do 

local projects.27

The Parish plan never got off the ground. No sooner had he received his 

alert to move than the whole tactical situation turned dire along the coastal 

plain from Quang Tri south to the Hai Van Pass, making foolhardy any attempt 

to insert the engineers into the teeth of North Vietnamese resistance. Pending 

stabilization of the battle for Hue and improvement in allied fortunes in the 

countryside nearby, which did not seem likely for some time, the engineers 

would start from the safe haven of Da Nang, working overland with infantry 

to reopen Highway 1 as far as the Hai Van Pass. And there was no room for 

delay—the fighting north of the pass was consuming supplies at an alarming 

27 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, p. 8; AAR/Intervs, 35th Engr Bn, 29 Mar 68, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, p. 2, and incl. 8, Interv, Maj Paul B. Webber, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col John 

V. Parish Jr., CO, 35th Engr Bn, 29 Mar 68, VNI 10, p. 1, CMH. VNI 10 also contains maps, 

photographs, and other documents.

The Hai Van Pass was often obscured by clouds and fog.
347

Tet, January–March 1968

rate, threatening a deficit in logistical support that a land line alone had the 

earliest chance to avert.28

With time of the essence, the battalion made the trip to Da Nang in less 

than a week. Parish began by moving men and equipment down Highway 1 to 

the port at Qui Nhon, some thirty miles to the south. Initial plans had Navy 

LSTs transporting the unit over a two-week period. The sudden availability 

of a much larger capacity contract freighter, the Maryland of Seatrain Lines 

adapted to haul containers besides vehicles and general cargo, accelerated the 

deployment. The first two LSTs with Companies B and C less some equipment 

departed Qui Nhon on the tenth. Two more LSTs arrived the following day to 

load the two companies’ remaining equipment and part of the battalion’s largest unit, the attached 517th Light Equipment Company. When the Maryland 

showed up on the twelfth, a day ahead of schedule, the rest of the battalion, 

with some difficulty, loaded the freighter in two days. Seven 290M tractors 

and scrapers could not fit through the cargo hole, so three more LSTs carried these items, a second attached company (the 511th Panel Bridge), and the 

balance of the battalion. The brisk pace of loading resulted in the abandonment of tent frames and floors, items that the battalion had planned to take. 

28 Msg, Westmoreland MAC 01858 to Wheeler and Sharp, 9 Feb 68, Westmoreland Message 

files, CMH; Interv, Webber with Parish, 29 Mar 68, p. 1; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, 

pp. 58–59.

North of the Hai Van Pass, the enemy destroyed bridges like this French-type 

concrete bridge.
Engineers at War

348

Remaining elements reached the new camp, which was at the Nam O Beach 

site seven and a half miles north of Da Nang just off Highway 1, by midnight 

17–18 February.29

The enemy had done a thorough job in cutting Highway 1 between Da Nang 

and Hue. Sappers closed the narrow winding Hai Van Pass with three major 

breaks and many obstacles. Along a straight stretch farther north, dubbed the 

Bowling Alley, they destroyed every bridge and culvert and excavated large 

trenches along the way. During the first two weeks of February, attempts by 

the 7th Marine Engineer Battalion and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 

62 to clear the road resulted in heavy casualties and loss of equipment. When 

the 35th Engineer Battalion arrived, it too could not proceed due to the strong 

presence of enemy forces. On 14 February, the battalion’s first reconnaissance 

party, which included Colonel Parish, the operations officer, and battalion sergeant major, ran into a command-detonated mine and did not reach Hai Van 

Pass. Repeated efforts over the next few days resulted in enemy fire and several 

casualties. Only the arrival of the infantry, which swept the area west of the 

pass and similar efforts by the marines to the north, made it possible for the 

35th Battalion to reopen the road.30

Real progress began on the morning of 21 February. Minesweep teams 

reached the pass, and the following day work parties and equipment began 

filling cuts and replacing culverts along the roadway. Although Army and 

Marine infantry reduced direct attacks by the enemy, he still harassed the 

engineers. Mines also posed a threat. The minesweep teams could not find all 

the mines, particularly homemade nonmetallic types that did not show readings on the mine detectors. Many vehicles passed over deeply buried mines 

without setting them off, but heavier loads such as tractor-trailers would usually cause the pressure-type mines to detonate. This happened on the twentysecond, resulting in heavy damage to a tractor-trailer and seriously wounding 

the driver. By the twenty-fourth, Companies C and D worked their way to Hai 

Van Pass. On that day, a D7 bulldozer working on the road hit a mine, damaging the bulldozer and wounding several engineers. The next day, Companies 

A and B moved farther north to a bivouac on the sea. From there, the units 

began reopening the Bowling Alley to traffic. Work included the around-theclock building of a 105-foot, single-lane M4T6 trestle bridge. By 29 February, 

Company B met elements of the 32d Naval Construction Regiment working 

south. In the early morning hours of 1 March, a mine-clearing team swept the 

road and reported it clear. Engineers working on the road briefly took a break 

and watched a 100-vehicle convoy from Da Nang file past. This marked the 

first time since the start of the Tet attacks a month earlier that vehicles could 

make the trip to Hue. In all, the 35th Battalion in the period from 21 to 29 

29 AAR/Interv, 35th Engr Bn, 29 Mar 68, p. 2, and incl. 10, Interv, Maj Paul B. Webber, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, with Maj Wilbur C. Buckheit, XO [Executive Officer], 35th Engr Bn, 29 Mar 68, 

VNI 10, pp. 1–2, CMH. 30 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 35th Engr Bn, p. 3; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” p. 358; 

Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Feb 68, pp. 85–87, 

copy in Historians files, CMH; Interv, Webber with Parish, 29 Mar 68, pp. 1–2.
349

Tet, January–March 1968

February suffered damage to one 5-ton tractor trailer, two D7 bulldozers (one 

a total loss), and three 5-ton dump trucks. Ten men were wounded.31

The reopening of Highway 1 eased the logistical crisis around Hue, but 

officials still faced the task of supporting the action farther north and reconstituting the forward stockpiles, especially the fuel and ammunition, that would 

be needed for the relief of Khe Sanh. By one estimate, another 1,000 tons a 

day would be needed, nearly four times the rated capacity of Highway 1, if the 

counteroffensive was to kick off as planned on 1 April. With no other practical 

alternative but supply by sea, the surest way to move materiel in bulk, the U.S. 

command now gambled that the battle for the northern coast was about to be 

won. It immediately laid plans for a logistical-over-the-shore, or LOTS, site 

east of Quang Tri City, confident that the receipts would eliminate the deficit 

looming over future operations. The facility was to open in mid-March.32

With a LOTS site now on the drawing board, logistics figured heavily 

in Colonel Fink’s decision to locate the headquarters of his 45th Group in 

Da Nang. Initially he considered placing the headquarters farther north at 

Phu Bai near the MACV Forward Command Post and the 1st Cavalry and 

31 AAR/Interv, 35th Engr Bn, 29 Mar 68, pp. 3–5; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 35th Engr Bn, 

pp. 3–4; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” pp. 358–59; HQ, 35th Engr Bn, Summary of 

Operations in I Corps, incl. 6, tab F, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11. 32 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 477, 479, vol. 2, p. 619; Msgs, COMUSMACV to CO, 

3d Nav Const Bde, 16 Feb 68, sub: Hai Lang Beach Road Construction, and CG III MAF to 

COMUSMACV, 18 Feb 68, sub: LOTS Operation Northern I CTZ, both in box 1, 71A/354, 

RG 334, NARA.

At the top of Hai Van Pass, the 35th Engineer Battalion deployed equipment 

like this 290M scraper to widen the road and reduce sharp curves.
Engineers at War

350

101st Airborne Divisions. Setting up operations temporarily in Da Nang, 

however, made it easier to coordinate operational and logistical matters 

for the group’s projected four combat engineer battalions and attached 

units. These units initially included the 35th Engineer Battalion working on 

Highway 1, the 39th Engineer Battalion supporting the Americal Division, 

and the 14th Engineer Battalion, preparing to move to its new assignment, 

the over-the-shore site near Quang Tri. The group’s fourth battalion, the 

27th, was alerted in late March to move from its base sixty-two miles east 

of Saigon to support the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Eagle, south 

of Hue. An advance party from the group headquarters had arrived in Da 

Nang on 15 February. In mid-March, the group headquarters completed 

its relocation from Qui Nhon and moved into buildings provided by the 7th 

Marine Engineer Battalion next to the 1st Marine Division’s headquarters 

just west of Da Nang Air Base. There, the 45th Group had easy access to 

the III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters in Da Nang, the 3d Naval 

Construction Brigade across the road at Red Beach, and the logistical complexes throughout the metropolitan area.33

Some modifications to command and control and logistical support for 

the engineers in northern I Corps now became necessary. The 45th Group 

remained an assigned unit under the 18th Engineer Brigade at Dong Ba Thin, 

but III Marine Amphibious Force exercised operational control and the U.S. 

Navy provided most of the logistical support. On 25 February, the Marine 

command assigned the Army group the mission to minesweep, maintain, and 

upgrade Highway 1 between the bridge at Nam O and Phu Loc. The command 

also directed the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and Marine Corps engineer 

units in the area to help the Army engineers with supplies. Also made available 

were materials from the Seabee brigade’s pre-positioned and packaged war 

reserve stocks and heavy bridge timbers and large culverts programmed by 

the 3d Naval Construction Brigade for future major highway improvements. 

Save for the extreme southern part of I Corps, the 45th Group’s units relied on 

supplies provided by the Navy.34

Meanwhile, after considerable delay, the 14th Engineer Battalion began 

arriving at the over-the-shore site on 20 March. On 6 February, Lt. Col. 

33 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 1–10, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 27th Engr Bn, 

7 May 68, p. 9, Historians files, CMH; Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 2, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11; Msg, COMUSMACV to CG, USARV and CG, III MAF, 

2 Feb 68, sub: Engineer Support for Northern I CTZ, box 5, 71A/354, RG 334, NARA; Msg, 

CG, III MAF to COMUSMACV, 18 Feb 68, sub: LOTS Operation Northern I CTZ; Quarterly 

Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 68, MACDC, p. II-3; MFR, 21 Feb 92, Author’s Recollections, 45th 

Engr Gp, pp. 2–3. 34 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 1, 5–6, 11–12, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 1st 

Log Cmd, p. 4; Ltrs, CG, III MAF to CO, 45th Engr Gp, sub: Assignment of Responsibility 

for Land Lines of Communication, 25 Feb 68, tab D, and CG, III MAF to CO 45th Engr 

Gp, sub: Interim Guidance on Tactical Support Functional Components [TSFC], Program 

and Reporting Procedures for Lines of Communications, 26 Feb 68, tab E, both in incl. 6, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11. For more on the two services’ logistical support arrangements, see MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 616–18; Heiser, Logistic Support, pp. 216–17; and 

Merdinger, “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam,” pp. 244–46.
351

Tet, January–March 1968

Bennett L. Lewis received the warning order to prepare for immediate deployment from Cam Ranh Bay to I Corps. A Navy survey revealed, however, that 

LSTs could not beach but would require a 900-foot amphibious causeway 

to discharge cargo. The pontoon causeway, which had to be shipped from 

Japan and assembled by the Seabees, was not expected to be completed until 

15 March. Lewis had to postpone the deployment, and planning continued. 

When the 35th Engineer Battalion reopened Highway 1 north of Da Nang 

on 1 March, the 14th Engineer Battalion put the move in motion. The heavy 

equipment and cargo went directly by sea to the beach site, now called Utah 

Beach. On 14 March, the battalion, less Company C at Phan Thiet, departed 

for Da Nang aboard the SS Carolina. Following delays at Da Nang’s congested harbor, the troops and vehicles moved by land to Utah Beach. Two 

LSTs transported Company C and the remaining cargo at Cam Ranh Bay 

directly to Utah Beach.35

After arriving at the beach site, the 14th Engineer Battalion took over construction from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10. So far the Seabees 

had reopened an old narrow French road (Route 602) to Hai Lang where 

it connected to Highway 1, laid out sand roads, emplaced matting in open 

storage areas, and dug pits for fuel storage bladders. Company A started to 

improve the access road to two lanes topped with laterite and to construct two 

timber pile bridges, 120 and 140 feet long. It also built facilities and defense 

positions for the 159th Transportation Battalion task force, which ran the 

over-the-shore operation. Company B began building a sand-cement road 

system connecting sand-cement access ramps and storage pads built by the 

other two companies at the beach. The Earthmoving Platoon, Company C, 

589th Engineer Battalion, joined the 14th Battalion on the beach. The platoon’s 290M scrapers, bulldozers, graders, and water distributors increased the 

14th’s capabilities significantly. Company C of the 14th Battalion swept the 

access road for mines. Its greatest challenge was an antivehicular mine similar 

to the Soviet TMB2 mine with a pressure device that contained only a small 

amount of metal. The mine proved extremely difficult to detect.36

The over-the-shore facility was a major accomplishment. A joint effort 

by Army engineers, Navy Seabees, Army transportation units, Navy landing 

ships, and a Marine Corps fuel detachment transformed the beach into a key 

logistical facility. LSTs and other landing craft discharged cargo over the pontoon causeway while amphibious resupply cargo barges and lighters brought 

35 MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 619; Msgs, CG, III MAF to CG, 18th Engr Bde, 15 Feb 68, 

sub: Hai Lang Beach Road Construction, CG, III MAF to Commander in Chief Naval Forces, 

Vietnam, 15 Feb 68, sub: Pontoon Causeways at Hai Lang Beach, and CG, 18th Engr Bde to 

CG, III MAF, 16 Feb 68, sub: Unit Deployment, all in box 1, 71A/354, RG 334, NARA; Ploger, 

Army Engineers, p. 150; AAR, 14th Engr Bn, 7 May 68, sub: Relocation of 14th Engineer 

Battalion to I Corps Tactical Zone, pp. 16–23, incl. 1, ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 14th Engr Bn, 

30 Apr 68, Historians files, CMH; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 14th Engr Bn, pp. 2–6, and 1 

Feb–30 Apr 68, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 9–11. 36 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 14th Engr Bn, pp. 4–6; Interv, 1st Lt Raymond F. Bullock, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Bennett L. Lewis, CO, 14th Engr Bn, 20 Aug 68, VNIT 241, p. 2, 

CMH; Interv, Maj Alexander E. Charleston, 30th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Charles H. Sunder, 

CO, 159th Trans Bn, 7 Jul 68, VNI 63, pp. 1–2, CMH.
Engineers at War

352

supplies of all types ashore from deep-draft ships. Over time, Utah Beach 

contained extensive ammunition and fuel storage areas, a helicopter refueling 

point, a road net with a two-lane connection to Highway 1, and fuel pipelines 

laid offshore and from the beach to Highway 1 and then north to Dong Ha. 

Each day truck convoys moved cargo inland from the beach storage area to 

the forward support bases of the combat divisions. Although daily deliveries 

of under 350 tons were originally predicted, the beach facility usually averaged 

over 1,000 tons. (Because of its achievements, the facility shortly took on the 

name of Wunder Beach, a play on words by the personnel on the beach of 

the 159th Transportation Battalion’s commanding officer, Lt. Col. Charles H. 

Sunder.) As an additional benefit, the new inland road also crossed and effectively cut a main North Vietnamese supply route leading into Hue.37

The fighting to retake Hue lasted three weeks. Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese troops, moving under the concealment of low fog, infiltrated the 

old imperial capital with the help of accomplices inside the city. They quickly 

captured most of the city on the south bank of the Perfume River and later 

seized the bulk of the northern half, including the Imperial Citadel. U.S. 

Marines drove the enemy from most of the south bank in a few days. The 

fierce battle for the Citadel, in which U.S. and South Vietnamese units suffered 

heavy casualties, raged until the end of February.38

To the north and northeast, the 1st Cavalry Division began striking back 

at the enemy. The 1st Brigade helped South Vietnamese troops clear Quang 

Tri City. The 3d Brigade, which had been conducting operations between Chu 

Lai and Da Nang, was ordered to reinforce weakened local forces and block 

the enemy’s approaches to Hue. Eventually four battalions were involved at 

Hue in some of the heaviest fighting of the war. By the end of the operation, 

the brigade had killed over four hundred enemy, nearly all North Vietnamese.

Supporting the 1st Cavalry Division were Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 

engineers. A platoon from Company A of the division’s 8th Engineer Battalion 

accompanied the first cavalry battalion alighting at Landing Zone El Paso

near Hue on 17 January. Joined two days later by a second platoon, the divisional engineers, using their own and borrowed heavy engineer equipment, 

concentrated on opening Camp Evans. As the rest of the division arrived, the 

8th Engineer Battalion committed its resources to daily minesweeps along 

Highway 1 between Quang Tri and Hue, developing new landing zones and firebases, and supporting units closing into the area. Additional engineering support came from Seabee units—mainly Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 

5 and 10—before the arrival of the 14th and 35th Engineer Battalions. At 

Camp Evans, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 helped the 8th Engineer 

Battalion build a C–7 Caribou airstrip, which officially opened on 13 March. 

Work progressed to expand the airfield to C–130 capability. On 11 March, 

37 Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 59–62; Interv, Charleston with Sunder, 7 Jul 

68, pp. 1–3. 38 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 329–31; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 160; 

Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 39–48; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 158–64; Lung, 

General Offensives 1968–69, pp. 75–85. For more on the battle for Hue, see Keith William 

Nolan, Battle for Hue: Tet, 1968 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983).
353

Tet, January–March 1968

part of the battalion operations section moved to Ca Lu to survey the area 

and coordinate the construction of a new C–123 airstrip and base facilities 

(Landing Zone Stud) by Marine Corps engineers and Seabees. These and

other projects typified the Seabees’ responsiveness. When the division’s chief 

of staff had trouble with the III Marine Amphibious Force staff concerning 

the space requirements for the division headquarters, the Seabees’ commander 

simply asked what the division wanted done and in what order to have it done. 

General Tolson later wrote, “This was just the first example of the magnificent 

support we received from the Seabees.”39

The 1st Cavalry Division’s shift northward also brought home the 8th 

Engineer Battalion’s need for a fourth line company and additional equipment. Although the Seabees and Marine Corps engineers provided invaluable 

construction support, the 8th Engineer Battalion still lacked the general support capability found in the other divisions’ engineer battalions. This meant 

that Col. Edwin S. Townsley, the battalion commander, had to reduce the 

amount of direct support to the brigades in the field and take troops from 

the line companies to help the headquarters set up camp and do other tasks. 

The daily minesweeps along Highway 1 took up about 40 percent of the battalion’s effort, with most of the troops drawn from the line companies. Since 

the 3d Brigade was collocated with the division headquarters at Camp Evans, 

Company C, which provided direct support to the brigade, saw 50 percent of 

its capability drawn off to work on bunkers, tactical operations centers, and 

perimeter defenses. Townsley also pointed out the need for more backhoes and 

airmobile bulldozers, which were considered vital to firebase construction. 

Since the brigades usually opened at least two firebases during operations, he 

recommended increasing the number of authorized backhoes from three to six 

and boosting the number of bulldozers from the two on hand to the six currently authorized. This would enable each line company to build two firebases 

concurrently.40

Return to Normal 

Operational support missions continued at a high pitch through March, 

absorbing two-thirds of Engineer Command’s capacity, then began to subside 

as the Tet offensive petered out. By April, most of the roads had been reopened 

and the bridges repaired, allowing most engineer units, except those in I Corps, 

to return to a more typical allocation of effort between ordinary construction 

missions and providing for the divisions and brigades. One pacing factor in 

this return to normality was the extent to which the Vietnamese labor force felt 

safe to go back to work. 

III Corps returned to normal fairly quickly. By the end of March, the 79th 

Engineer Group, operating north of Saigon, had put the Tet cleanup behind 

39 Quoted words from Tolson, Airmobility, p. 160; ORLL, 1–31 Mar 68, 8th Engr Bn, 1 Apr 

68, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH; Memoirs of the First Team, p. 184. 40 ORLLs, 1–31 Mar 68, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 4–5, and 1–30 Apr 68, 8th Engr Bn, 4 May 68, pp. 

6–7, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

354

it and had started to stockpile construction material in preparation for the 

approaching rainy season when the weather would focus the expenditure of 

effort on base camp development projects. Three-fourths of its Vietnamese 

workers were back on the job. Closer to the capital, the 159th Engineer Group 

turned its attention to long-term defense, constructing combat-essential roads 

and hardening such facilities as airfields, generators, and fuel storage sites. 

Cantonments, laboratories, and storage yards were now also a construction 

priority. In II Corps, the picture was mixed. At An Khe and Cam Ranh Bay, 

little touched by the Tet offensive, base construction projects continued as 

before. Elsewhere, worker absenteeism and the closing of several quarries 

slowed the postattack cleanup, and as March ended the 35th Engineer Group 

had yet to complete its repairs to facilities at Phan Thiet, Nha Trang, and Tuy 

Hoa. Ordinary construction was picking up, but so far at reduced priority.41

The contractors faced some of the same problems as the troop units 

because of the absenteeism of their Vietnamese employees. The fighting near 

the bases forced many workers to stay home or seek safety elsewhere. Those 

who did report for work or were at work during the attacks faced the same risks 

as the military. Pacific Architects and Engineers, the Army’s facilities engineering contractor, had several facilities outside the base perimeters with security 

guards neither armed nor trained to defend against attacks. Civilians working 

side-by-side with soldiers often lacked the minimum protection of helmets and 

flak jackets. Sometimes the civilian engineers and technicians were barred from 

entering the bases. Fifteen employees of Pacific Architects and Engineers were 

killed and several others wounded during the Tet attacks. Eight Americans 

were missing, and seven were reported taken prisoner. Despite the intensity of 

the attacks countrywide, the firm evacuated only one site—at Vinh Long in the 

delta. The displaced Americans and third-country nationals returned to Vinh 

Long on 4 February and began repairs on electrical distribution lines, perimeter lighting, and power system for the water pumping station. By 12 February, 

120 of the 177 Vietnamese had reported to their jobs, with conditions returning to near normal. At many locations, the contractors continued to carry out 

critical operations using American supervisors, Filipino and Korean workers, 

and the Vietnamese who reported to work. Essential services as mundane as 

trash collection resumed with military escorts, often with American, Filipino, 

and Korean supervisors and technicians doing this necessary chore. By early 

March, the facilities engineering contractor reported it had returned to 80 

percent of its normal level of work. Construction work by RMK-BRJ slipped 

by one month, but by early March the firm reported that 82 percent of its 

workforce was on the job.42

41 Engineer Support of Combat Operations, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

11; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Apr 68, pp. 1–2, Historians files, CMH, 1 

Feb–30 Apr 68, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 2, 4, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 5–19, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 68, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 2, 5–8, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 35th Engr Gp, pp. 5–6, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 

937th Engr Gp, pp. 3–5. 42 PA&E History, Jan–Jun 1968, pp. 28, 33–34, 38–39, 44–45; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 

Mar 68, MACDC, pp. III-2 to III-4; MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 671.
355

Tet, January–March 1968

Army engineers were now carrying out tasks throughout South Vietnam. 

From the Mekong Delta to the northernmost provinces of I Corps, engineer 

troops were hard at work in support of combat operations, road and airfield 

improvements, and base construction. Much of this work was carried out under 

hazardous conditions. More severe tests would come following the enemy’s Tet 

offensive as the allies readied themselves for counteroffensive operations.

12

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

By the end of March, the storm of the Tet offensive had abated. Far 

from collapsing, the South Vietnamese government had rallied, and 

although fighting appeared touch-and-go in many places, no South Vietnamese 

units were destroyed, and their casualties were surprisingly low. More than 

simply rallying, however, the government also mobilized, approving a MACV 

plan to increase the armed forces to over 800,000 men in the next two years. 

To establish a self-sufficient logistical system, the expansion plan included 

four construction battalions. Senior U.S. Army engineers in Washington and 

Saigon also made preparations to organize and train South Vietnamese Army 

land-clearing companies.1

Americans at home saw a different picture, especially when word got 

out that even more U.S. troops would be needed in Vietnam. Dramatic 

images showing the sapper attack on the American embassy in the heart 

of Saigon, the besieged marines at Khe Sanh, and the bitter fight for Hue 

dimmed General Westmoreland’s contention of an allied victory. President 

Johnson’s claims of progress in the war, already doubted by many, lost 

more credibility, and he showed signs of frustration with the war. Defense 

Secretary McNamara, also disenchanted, left office on 1 March, replaced 

by Clark M. Clifford, an adviser and close friend of the president. Public 

skepticism over the war swelled after the media revealed Westmoreland’s 

request for an additional 206,000 troops. At the time he had about 500,000 

of the 525,000 American troops promised, and he needed all of them. 

Though most of the new troops were intended for the strategic reserves, 

the size of the request cast further doubts on the conduct of the war. 

Westmoreland did get some modest reinforcements in February. The 27th 

Marine Regimental Landing Team took up positions south of Da Nang 

and freed other Marine Corps units to move north. Meanwhile, the 3d 

Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, which included Company C from the division’s 307th Engineer Battalion, joined the 101st Airborne Division at Phu 

1

 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 26–27; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 161–62, 

164; Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973, United States Army in 

Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988), pp. 293–94, 313–14; 

Msgs, Maj Gen Robert R. Ploger, Dir of Topography and Mil Engineering, OCE, GVP 297 to 

Maj Gen Charles M. Duke, CG, Engr Cmd and USARV Engr, 4 Apr 68, sub: Land Clearing 

Companies; Duke ARV 989 to Ploger, 16 Apr 68, sub: Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN) Land Clearing Companies; Brig Gen Andrew P. Rollins, MACV Dir of Const, MAC 

05396 to Ploger, 23 Apr 68, sub: ARVN Land Clearing Companies, all in Duke Papers, CMH.
Engineers at War

358

Bai as its third brigade. This measure allowed the 101st Airborne Division’s 

3d Brigade to remain in the Saigon area.2

The small increases in U.S. force levels came after much debate in 

Washington. Without mobilization, the United States had become overcommitted. The strategic reserves had dwindled during a period of international 

tension. North Korea captured an American naval vessel, the USS Pueblo, 

a week before the Tet offensive. Chronic problems in the Middle East persisted. Civil unrest in the United States between 1965 and 1968 required the 

use of Army troops. After extensive deliberation, Johnson chose the modest 

force increase that would meet Westmoreland’s first troop request. A mechanized infantry brigade, including an attached engineer company, from the 5th 

Infantry Division would replace the 27th Marines in July. President Johnson 

also overcame his reluctance to mobilize the reserves. There were two reserve 

call-ups to meet and sustain these deployments, one in March and one in May. 

The call-ups totaled 62,000 men, nearly 54,000 of them Army, and included 

a National Guard engineer combat battalion and a light equipment company 

as part of the 13,500-man support package for Vietnam. This raised the manpower authorization to 549,500, the peak U.S. strength in Vietnam. For a disappointed Westmoreland, this meant that he would have to make the best possible use of American troops, and the South Vietnamese would have to take on 

a larger share of the war effort. As a signal to foster negotiations, Johnson also 

curtailed air strikes against North Vietnam. When the president outlined his 

decision in a nationwide address on 31 March, he surprised the nation and the 

world by announcing that he would not seek reelection and would devote his 

full attention to resolving the conflict. Though Hanoi had suffered a military 

defeat, Johnson’s actions implied that the Communists had achieved a political 

and diplomatic victory.3

To keep the number of mobilized support troops low, Washington authorized civilian substitutes. In addition to the 13,500 support troops, MACV 

received authority to hire 13,035 additional local civilians to augment logistic and construction units. MACV already had initiated a civilianization 

program in January, but the Tet offensive forced the command to defer the 

program for six months. Civilianization would have converted some military 

spaces, but using local nationals required a degree of stability in Vietnam, 

and fixed units and bases. During Tet, many Vietnamese failed to show up for 

work. If the U.S. Army, Vietnam, had completed the program, many logistical and engineering units would have lacked the flexibility to carry out their 

2

 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 350–59; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 

170, 184; MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 225, 244–45; Hammond, Military and the Media, 

1962–1968, pp. 344–45, 357–66, 371–73, 375–82. For more on the request for additional forces, 

see The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking 

on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed., 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 4:539–604; Davidson, 

Vietnam at War, pp. 492–520. 3

 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 227–28. For the text of Johnson’s 31 March speech, 

see Pentagon Papers (Gravel) 4:596–602. See also Herbert Y. Shandler, The Unmaking of a 

President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 194–

217, 229–36.
359

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

missions. For Engineer Command, the conversion would have amounted to 

almost two thousand spaces, about 20 percent of the total planned for U.S. 

Army, Vietnam. Each of the five construction battalions involved in the program would have lost ninety-nine military positions. Similar substitutions of 

Vietnamese workers would have occurred in smaller units such as construction 

support companies. MACV also considered transferring construction projects 

from engineer units to RMK-BRJ and raising the consortium’s manning level, 

enough to replace a construction battalion. Ironically, Saigon’s mobilization 

was expected to hinder MACV’s civilianization program and the contractor’s 

ability to hire more workers. Viet Cong reprisals against Vietnamese employees also provoked fear and reluctance on the part of potential workers. On the 

other hand, as the government inducted more men in the armed forces, women 

entered the workforce in larger numbers. That spring, Pacific Architects and 

Engineers hired about 200 women trainees. At the end of June, 161 women 

successfully completed training, and Pacific Architects and Engineers hired 

them as electricians, welders, drivers, mechanics, and plumbers.4

On 1 April, Westmoreland believed the allied forces were ready to counterattack. He told his senior commanders that forces in I Corps were “now in position to seek decisive battles in Quang Tri and Thua Thien.” Along the coastal 

regions and in the western highlands “our troops are orienting their operations 

on the enemy to keep him away from population centers and resources.” Moving 

south, he noted, “Allied campaigns throughout III and IV Corps are diligently 

securing and restoring lines of communications and installations (economic lifelines) that are vital to these rich and populated areas.” Westmoreland concluded: 

“We must go after the enemy throughout the country; we must hound him and 

hurt him. We can achieve a decisive victory and we must do so at once, to restore 

the perspective with which the world sees this war. We must demonstrate by our 

actions that we are, in fact, winning the war.”5

Westmoreland’s admonition to increase the tempo of pressure against the 

enemy came soon after the announcement that he would be leaving Vietnam. 

On 23 March, he was informed of his appointment as Army chief of staff. His 

deputy, General Abrams, would replace him that summer. In the few remaining months as MACV commander, Westmoreland directed counteroffensive 

operations, including the relief of Khe Sanh and a drive into the A Shau Valley. 

The war had reached a peak and, as usual, Army engineers, now spread from 

the Demilitarized Zone to the delta, were heavily involved in those operations.6

4

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 165; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 359; MACV 

History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 678; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 68, MACDC, pp. II-10 to II11; PA&E History, Jan–Jun 1968, p. 17. For more on the military force levels and civilianization program, see MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 225–33; Msg, Palmer ARV 1569 to Gen 

Creighton W. Abrams, Dep COMUSMACV, 9 Jun 68, sub: Program 6 Civilianization; Msg, 

Gen Johnson WDC 8527 to Palmer, 11 Jun 68, sub: Civilianization Program—Program 6; Msg, 

Palmer ARV 1622 to Gen Johnson, 14 Jun 68, sub: Civilianization Program, all in Creighton W. 

Abrams Papers, CMH. 5

 Quoted in MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 26–27.

6

 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 439.
Engineers at War

360

Relieving Khe Sanh

In mid-March, the North Vietnamese apparently had given up at Khe Sanh 

and began to pull back into Laos just as Westmoreland decided to reestablish a 

land link with the Marine base. He did not consider the base in great peril but 

became anxious to reestablish contact “if for no other reason than to silence 

dolorous critics and allay President Johnson’s concern.” MACV Forward 

Command Post under Westmoreland’s deputy, General Abrams, had developed a plan, code-named Operation Pegasus, before the end of February, but 

weather conditions and logistic preparations held up launching the campaign. 

Planning continued while allied forces retook Hue, more Army reinforcements 

reached the area, engineers reopened the lines of communication, and logisticians reconstituted stockpiles. When the logistics-over-the-shore supply facility at Wunder Beach began to discharge over one thousand tons a day, MACV 

set 1 April as the D-day for the relief of Khe Sanh.7

Meanwhile, five widely scattered U.S. divisions, three Army and two 

Marine, had taken up positions in I Corps, and Westmoreland considered the 

force too large to be controlled from a single headquarters. The recent arrivals 

included the 101st Airborne Division, which deployed from III Corps to Phu 

Bai on 19 February. When the 101st took over responsibility for the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s old operating area, the cavalrymen moved to a new base and airstrip 

called Landing Zone Stud at Ca Lu in central Quang Tri Province to prepare

for Pegasus. At that point, Westmoreland decided to upgrade the III Marine 

Amphibious Force to the level of a field army headquarters with a subordinate 

Army corps. On 10 March, accordingly, MACV Forward at Phu Bai officially 

became Provisional Corps, Vietnam, and General Abrams returned to Saigon. 

Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson, who had earlier commanded Task Force Orego

and then I Field Force, and was currently serving as Abrams’ deputy at MACV 

Forward, assumed command of the new Army corps and operational control of the two Army divisions, the 3d Marine Division, and other supporting 

forces in northern I Corps.8

Operation Pegasus began at 0700 on 1 April with American and Vietnamese 

forces moving out from Landing Zone Stud along Highway 9 toward the Khe

Sanh base. This followed an allied deception operation initiated a few days 

earlier northeast of Dong Ha. The Pegasus force, under the control of the 

1st Cavalry Division, included the division’s three brigades, a Marine Corps 

regiment, a South Vietnamese airborne task force, and the garrison at Khe 

Sanh, over 30,000 troops. The 1st Marines led the ground attack, securing and 

repairing the road as it advanced westward. Poor weather delayed the airmobile part of the operation to 1300, when the 1st Cavalry Division’s 3d Brigade 

began seizing high ground in a series of airmobile assaults. On 3 April, the 2d 

Brigade landed three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attacked to the 

northwest. During the fourth day, the marines continued their push while the 

7

 Quoted in ibid., p. 347; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, p. 68. 8

 Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 68–69; Shulimson, et al., U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam, 1968, p. 284.
361

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

cavalrymen applied pressure throughout the battle area. The following day, 

elements of the 26th Marines sallied forth from Khe Sanh and seized Hill 471 

southeast of the base. On 5 April, North Vietnamese troops tried in vain to 

retake the hill, but the marines, sustained by artillery and close air support, 

cut down the attackers in one of the major fights of the campaign. That same 

day, units of the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Brigade air-assaulted into positions 

overlooking Highway 9 south of the base. More air cavalry troops landed on 

Hill 471 to relieve the marines in the first relief of Khe Sanh’s defenders. The 

official linkup came the following afternoon when the 1st Cavalry Division 

airlifted South Vietnamese airborne troops to the base. On the morning of 

the eighth, the 3d Brigade cleared the remaining section of road and linked up 

with the 26th Marines. Two days later, the 1st Brigade seized the old Lang Vei 

Special Forces camp. Provisional Corps, Vietnam, officially ended Pegasus on 

15 April.9

 (Map 24)

Pegasus depended much on the logistical portion of the plan, which in 

turn depended on the engineers. Carrying out the logistic operation hinged 

on the construction at Landing Zone Stud. Before this work could start

the 3d Marine Division had to clear Highway 9 westward from the Marine 

artillery base at the Rockpile. Supplies, fuel, ammunition, and construction 

material were then stockpiled at Stud. On 14 March, a joint task force of

engineers under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division—consisting of elements of the 11th Marine Engineer Battalion, Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 5, and the 8th Engineer Battalion—reached St

and began work. Within twelve days, the tri-service engineers completed a 

C–7A Caribou airstrip 1,500 feet long by 150 feet wide. The Seabees, who 

were augmented with heavy equipment from the 32d Naval Construction 

Regiment, concentrated on the airfield. When Pegasus jumped off on 1 

April, Landing Zone Stud had reached about 83 percent completion. By

the time the operation ended, the base was in full operation and included 

an extended C–123 airstrip with parking ramps, ammunition storage areas, 

aircraft and refueling facilities, road nets, and strengthened defenses. Many 

vital supplies for the operation were brought up from Wunder Beach, where 

the 14th Engineer Battalion had arrived to join the Seabees working at the 

over-the-beach logistics facility.10

When the 1st Marines began its attack, two companies of Lt. Col. Victor 

A. Perry’s 11th Marine Engineer Battalion and an attached bridge platoon from 

the 7th Marine Engineer Battalion followed, repairing Highway 9 as the advance 

continued. On the first day, the 11th Engineer Battalion cleared one mile of 

9

 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 164, 186; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 169–78; Pearson, 

War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 81–89. See also Shulimson, et al., U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 

1968, pp. 283–90; Operation Pegasus, Historical Study 3–68, 31st Mil Hist Det, HQ Prov Corps 

Vietnam, May 1968 (hereafter cited as Operation Pegasus), copy in Historians files, CMH. 10 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 347; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 170–71; Capt. Moyers S. 

Shore II, USMC, The Battle for Khe Sanh (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, l969), pp. 133, 150; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 8th Engr Bn, 

p. 2; Operation Pegasus, pp. 6–7, 12; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” p. 359; Shulimson, et 

al., U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1968, p. 284.
Engineers at War

362

road and built four bypasses. The following day the engineers, protected on the 

flanks by Marine infantry, cleared almost two miles of road and built two more 

bridges and two bypasses. By the seventh, they had gone over five miles and 

replaced or rebuilt five of the nine bridges to Khe Sanh. On 8 April, helicopters 

lifted a third company to another bridge site. Meanwhile, back at Dong Ha, 

the 11th’s fourth line company and a bridge company assembled prefabricated 

bridge sections and bridge parts. The 1st Cavalry Division’s CH–54s lifted the 

finished bridge sections and M4T6 floating bridges to three sites. The last bridge 

went in on 11 April, and the Class 50 road, capable of supporting the standard 

divisional loads of approximately fifty tons, officially opened at 1600. In eleven 

days, the 11th Engineer Battalion and attached units reconstructed over eight 

miles of road, filled craters, cleared landslides, repaired or replaced bridges, and 

constructed bypasses. It seemed fitting that the first vehicle to make the trip from 

14

1

1

1

9

SOUTH CHINA SEA

II CTZ

KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp

KHE SANH

DONG HA

PHU BAI

OPERATIONS

DELAWARE–LAM SON 216

and SOMERSET PLAIN

OPERATION

PEGASUS

QUANG TRI

THUA THIEN

QUANG NAM

QUANG TIN

QUANG NGAI

KONTUM

BINH DINH

DEMARCATION LINE

CU LAO CHAM

CU LAO RE

Gio Linh

Quang Tri

Hue

A Shau

Hoi An

Da Nang

Tam Ky

Ba To

Duc Pho

Con Thien

Que Son

Chu Lai

Quang Ngai

NORTH VIETNAM

LAOS

CAMBODIA

April–December 1968

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

0 50 Miles

0 50 Kilometers

Map 24
363

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

Dong Ha to Khe Sanh since the summer of 1967 should be the jeep of the 11th 

Battalion’s command group.11

As the 11th Marine Engineer Battalion worked overland, elements of 

the Colonel Townsley’s 8th Engineer Battalion accompanied the leapfrogging 1st Cavalry Division units to the besieged base. Company C provided 

direct support to the 3d Brigade’s battalions air-assaulting into Landing 

Zones Cates, Mike, and Thor. This support included hasty engineering task

such as demolitions, field fortifications and wire, tactical operations center 

construction, and artillery positions. At Landing Zone Cates, the company

established and maintained the brigade’s water supply point. As the division 

approached Khe Sanh, Company C opened several landing zones, and furnished light bulldozers to speed up reopening the road link to the Marine base. 

Company B accompanied the 2d Brigade’s assaults into Landing Zones Tom

and Wharton. Company A already had a platoon at Landing Zone Stu

where it built the division’s tactical operations center and remained in general 

support. The remainder of the company opened Landing Zone Snapper for

the 1st Brigade, supported the South Vietnamese 3d Airborne Task Force on 

Landing Zone Snake, and sent out a demolition squad and minesweep team 

to support the assault on Lang Vei.12

Although Pegasus was a joint engineering effort, the need for more Army 

engineers in northern I Corps had become obvious. The commitment of the 

two Army divisions to the area had placed heavy demands on the available 

engineers to build combat and logistical bases and carry out road improvements. Both the 1st Cavalry Division’s 8th Engineer and the 101st Airborne 

Division’s 326th Engineer Battalions were small organizations consisting of 

only three instead of four letter companies. They not only lacked a bridge 

company authorized in infantry and armor divisions but also lacked the 

equipment to build new camps. For the time being Company D, 14th Engineer 

Battalion, at Camp Evans served as the 1st Cavalry Division’s fourth engineer company, a temporary measure at best. On 15 March, Provisional Corps, 

Vietnam, informed the III Marine Amphibious Force that it urgently needed 

additional Army engineering support for the two divisions and requested 

another engineer battalion.13

The assignment fell to the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion, located at the 

time about sixty-two miles east of Saigon. The 27th Engineer Battalion had 

been carrying out base development work and operational support for the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment at Blackhorse base camp and other bases nearby. 

During the Tet offensive, the battalion reopened roads cut by the Viet Cong 

and designated two line companies as a ready reaction force, freeing armored 

cavalry units for operations outside the base camp. On 24 March, a warning 

11 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 173, 178; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 83–84, 88; 

Shulimson, et al., U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1968, pp. 284, 589; Operation Pegasus, pp. 29, 40, 

46, 56. 12 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 2–3.

13 Operation Pegasus, pp. 8–9; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” p. 359; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 68, 14th Engr Bn, p. 6, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 14th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 68, p. 2, Historians files, 

CMH.
An Army CH–54 Flying Crane lowers a dry span bridge over a gap as the 

 Marine 11th Engineer Battalion worked to reopen Highway 9 to Khe Sanh 

 during Operation Pegasus
365

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

order dispatched through the 20th Engineer Brigade and 34th Engineer Group 

to Lt. Col. Kent C. Kelly, the battalion commander, ordered him to prepare 

the unit for the move north. The group quickly transferred projects to the 36th 

Engineer Construction Battalion. Colonel Kelly established a staging area at 

Bien Hoa, and on 4 April an advance party flew to Phu Bai and drove a short 

distance north to Gia Le to establish a base camp near Camp Eagle. In the next 

month, most of the 27th Battalion and the attached 591st Light Equipment 

Company moved by land, sea, and air, making this the longest of the engineer 

moves in Vietnam to date. Wheeled vehicles and cargo packed in Conex containers moved to Saigon for loading aboard a ship. A few days later, 325 troops 

flew aboard six C–130s to Da Nang to meet the ship and begin off-loading. 

After moving to a staging area at the 35th Engineer Battalion’s camp north of 

Da Nang, the vehicles convoyed over the Hai Van Pass to Gia Le. The rest of 

the troops flew directly to Phu Bai airfield. Engineer equipment that would 

have been difficult to move over the road was placed aboard LSTs at Newport 

for shipment beyond the Hai Van Pass to the port at Tan My. This movement 

required six LST loads spread over a twenty-day period, with the last LST 

reaching Tan My on 30 April. Two of the 27th Battalion’s units stayed behind. 

Company D remained at Phan Thiet and was placed under the 87th Engineer 

Construction Battalion’s control. The 27th Land Clearing Team continued its 

mission in III Corps under the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion.14

The A Shau

The 27th Engineer Battalion arrived just in time to support a major operation, an airmobile assault against the North Vietnamese redoubt in the A Shau 

Valley. Located less than seven miles from the Laotian border and running 

northwest to southeast, the valley extends between two high and steeply sloped 

mountain ranges that climb to over three thousand feet. Among the few manmade features were three abandoned airfields spread along the valley floor. 

North Vietnamese troops had controlled the A Shau since March 1966 when 

they overran the Special Forces camp in the southern end and established a 

major staging area to infiltrate troops and supplies through Laos into Thua 

Thien Province. After reviewing detailed intelligence of the North Vietnamese 

bastion, General Tolson exclaimed: “This was his [the enemy’s] Cam Ranh 

Bay, so to speak.” The valley’s peculiar location and topography expose it to 

both the northeast and southwest monsoons, and the brief interval between 

monsoons—mid-April to mid-May—prompted Westmoreland’s planners to 

propose a quick strike. During the last days of Operation Pegasus, Provisional 

Corps, Vietnam, completed final preparations for the assault, called Operation 

Delaware–Lam Son 216, committing elements of Tolson’s 1st Cavalry

Division and the 101st Airborne Division along with South Vietnamese forces. 

14 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 27th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 8–10, 14–16; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 

151; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” p. 359.
Engineers at War

366

A corps reserve was established by moving the 196th Light Infantry Brigade 

to Camp Evans.15

The operation began on the morning of 19 April with preplanned air and 

artillery strikes. But almost at once, heavy antiaircraft fire met the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s 3d Brigade, and poor weather played havoc with helicopter assaults 

and Air Force resupply missions. Just getting the desired firebases in place to 

support an assault on the old French airstrip at A Luoi took until the twentyfourth. Meanwhile, to the east, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, drove 

westward along Route 547, a narrow, winding, overgrown, unimproved road. 

On the second day, the cavalry division’s 3d Brigade expanded operations 

with one battalion pushing southeast and another blocking Route 548 that 

entered the valley from Laos. The following day, 21 April, fighting increased 

as the allied units moved deeper into the sanctuary. As the weather temporarily improved, the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, inserted a battalion into 

the central part of the A Shau, about a mile south of the A Luoi airstrip. 

Two more battalions followed, sweeping the surrounding area. During the rest 

of April, the buildup of forces and supplies continued around the airstrip, 

and by early May North Vietnamese resistance lessened. On 12 May, the 1st 

Cavalry Division and South Vietnamese airborne troops pushing westward 

along Routes 547 and 547A met some six miles east of A Luoi. As the operation progressed, American and South Vietnamese forces uncovered vast enemy 

caches. One find of interest to engineers was a large maintenance area and two 

Soviet-manufactured bulldozers used in building the logistical base and supply 

routes. By mid-May the rains of the southwest monsoon intensified, and the 

allies began to pull out. Operation Delaware–Lam Son 216 officially ended

on 17 May.16

During the A Shau operation, the engineers played a vital role. Company 

C, 8th Engineer Battalion, moved with the cavalry division’s 3d Brigade 

into landing zones and concentrated on setting up and improving firebases. 

Most of Company A accompanied the 1st Brigade’s assault battalions into 

Landing Zones Cecile and Stallion (A Luoi airfield). The unit also mad

minesweeps, constructed defensive positions and tactical operations centers, 

cleared fields of fire, and prepared artillery positions. While the 1st Brigade 

continued its buildup, CH–54 helicopters brought in construction equipment 

broken down into sections to work on the airstrip. On 1 May, a team from 

Headquarters Company, augmented with equipment from the 326th Engineer 

Battalion, opened the 2,900-foot runway to C–7A Caribous and four days later 

to C–130s. Company A of the 326th supported the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne 

15 Interv, Capt Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, 14th Mil Hist Det, with Maj Gen John J. Tolson, 

CG, 1st Cav Div, 27 May 68, p. 5 (quoted words), Historians files, CMH; Tolson, Airmobility, 

p. 182; Pearson, War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 3–4, 89; Spector, After Tet, p. 138. For more 

on the planning of the operation, see MFR, Brig Gen John R. Chaisson, Director, MACV 

Combat Operations Center, 17 Apr 68, sub: Report of Visit by COMUSMACV to HQ, PCV 

[Provisional Corps, Vietnam] 14 Apr 68, Westmoreland History files, CMH. 16 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 165, 187; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 184–92; Pearson, 

War in the Northern Provinces, pp. 89–92; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 333; Spector, After Tet, pp. 

139–40.
367

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

Division, and concentrated on clearing landing zones and constructing firebases. Prior to the operation elements from the 27th Engineer Battalion, still 

in the process of moving from III Corps, cleared and opened Route 547 from 

Hue to the valley. On 14 April, Company A, 27th Engineer Battalion, started 

roadwork to Firebase Birmingham, approximately twenty miles east of the

valley. Within a few days, a platoon from the 27th Battalion’s Company B 

reached Firebase Bastogne to work on the defenses and the road to Firebase

Birmingham. Another platoon moved farther west to the 101st Airborne

Division’s Firebase Veghel to support the South Vietnamese airborne task 

force. During the operation, the 591st Light Equipment Company organized 

an ad hoc land-clearing platoon of ten D7E bulldozers mounting Rome plows 

to clear vegetation out to three hundred yards along Route 547. Seabee units 

in I Corps provided additional equipment such as bulldozers and maintenance 

troops.17

During the operation, Army engineers noted some disturbing trends. In 

several cases, the 8th Engineer Battalion’s minesweep teams were blown up 

by command-detonated mines. Security elements were alerted to get at least 

one hundred yards to either side and forward of the minesweep team and to 

use grappling hooks along the ditches to uncover the connecting wires. To 

make detection more difficult and dangerous, the enemy was also burying 

mines deeper than normal while placing scrap metal just above the mine. The 

27th Engineer Battalion warned its mine-detector operators to keep checking 

suspected areas for signals that might reveal real mines.18

During Delaware–Lam Son 216, the abysmal weather affected air operations, especially the efforts to keep A Luoi airstrip open. The operation did not

call for major units to remain in the area after the operation, and the provisional corps overruled opening Route 547 all the way into the A Shau Valley. 

Instead, troops and supplies arrived by air. The 8th Engineer Battalion should 

have reached A Luoi on the second day to begin rebuilding the airstrip, but 

the poor weather and intense antiaircraft fire delayed its arrival ten days to 29 

April. Meanwhile, supplies were delivered by helicopters and C–130 airdrops 

until the engineers opened the airstrip to the first C–130 on 4 May. Heavy 

rainstorms turned the red dust of A Luoi into mud, and the airstrip remained 

closed from midday 7 May until the morning of the ninth. Withdrawal of 

troops began on 10 May, but heavy rains the following day again closed the 

strip to fixed-wing landings. Since the airstrip did not have ample time to dry 

out, helicopters had to be used to lift out the remaining supplies and troops as 

the operation ended.19

17 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 8th Engr Bn, 4 May 68, pp. 2–4, and 1 May–31 Jul 68, 8th Engr 

Bn, 1 Aug 68, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 340; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 68, 27th Engr Bn, pp. 11–12, and incl. 2, ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 591st Engr Light Equip 

Co, pp. 2, 7–9; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 151–52; Fink, “Engineers Move to I Corps,” p. 359; 

Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 187, 189–90. 18 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 8th Engr Bn, pp. 4–5.

19 Interv, Whitehorne with Tolson, 27 May 68, p. 6; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 332–33, 

339–41; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 190; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, pp. 262–63.
Engineers at War

368

Allied officers declared Pegasus and Delaware–Lam Son 216 tactical

and strategic successes, but it did not take long for North Vietnamese forces to 

return to Khe Sanh and the A Shau. Though no longer cut off or threatened 

with imminent attack, Khe Sanh remained under siege. North Vietnamese 

artillery, dug deep into the mountains in nearby Laos, continued to bombard 

the base. Badly mauled North Vietnamese units withdrew across the border 

to regroup and refit, and by early May enemy troops returned in large numbers. Operation Delaware–Lam Son 216 initially seemed worth the cost. The

operation resulted in an impressive list of captured ammunition, weapons, and 

equipment; disrupted future enemy operations; and effectively showed that he 

had no sanctuaries. Still, truck sightings in the valley less than a week after 

the allied withdrawal confirmed that the interdiction would not be long-lived. 

After Pegasus, senior U.S. Army and Marine Corps commanders in I Corps 

continued to declare the Khe Sanh base a liability. They recommended that the 

base be abandoned and destroyed and the area defended with airmobile troops 

from Landing Zone Stud. The marines had long advocated quitting Khe Sanh

and employing a mobile defense along the Demilitarized Zone. Westmoreland 

agreed in principle, but he disagreed with the recommended timing and 

deferred the decision to his successor, General Abrams. Preparations already 

under way to close the base were canceled, and the marines dug in again. On 

15 April, fresh Marine battalions and two battalions from the 1st Cavalry 

Division launched a new operation, Scotland II. In the ten weeks that followed Pegasus, American troops in or near Khe Sanh suffered more tha

twice the casualties reported during the siege. In June, Abrams became theater 

commander, and he quickly decided to close the combat base. With shells continuing to rain down on the base, the marines completed the evacuation on the 

evening of 5 July. The decision to leave Khe Sanh caused some bewilderment 

in the United States. Abrams justified this move by pointing out that not tying 

down troops to specific terrain would better the chances to counter future 

threats.20

Two More Enemy Highpoints

Hanoi’s actions suggested a renewed offensive, and it began on 5 May. 

Its timing coincided with the opening of the long-heralded Paris peace talks 

after President Johnson ordered a halt to bombing North Vietnam above 

the 20th Parallel. This offensive, known by American troops as the “MiniTet,” turned out to be a reduced version of the Tet offensive. At the same 

time, it showed the conferees in Paris that Hanoi would continue to fight. 

Except at Saigon and a few other places, the May offensive featured rocket 

and mortar attacks against towns, cities, and U.S. installations. Attacks on 

bridges and airfields were usually repulsed. In northern I Corps, the allied 

forces anticipated the attacks and blocked enemy advances toward Dong 

Ha. After a series of bloody engagements in the eastern Demilitarized Zone, 

20 Interv, Whitehorne with Tolson, 27 May 68, p. 5; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 341–42; 

Tolson, Airmobility, p. 192; Spector, After Tet, pp. 128–29, 140, 228–31.
369

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

the planned attack on Hue never got under way. Strong North Vietnamese 

forces did succeed in taking the Special Forces camp at Kham Duc, located 

about ninety miles southwest of Da Nang near the Laotian border. In the 

area around Pleiku and Kontum, preemptive attacks by the 4th Division, 

elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne 

Division, plus heavy B–52 strikes, forced the enemy to cancel attacks and 

withdraw into Cambodia. The main attack took place in Saigon. American 

and South Vietnamese troops on the approaches to the capital intercepted 

and destroyed many small guerrilla bands. Those that got into the city holed 

up in the Cholon district and fought stubbornly, often setting fires in the 

highly flammable shanty neighborhoods. This gave the impression of a city 

under siege and was designed to embarrass the government and influence 

the talks in Paris. Allied efforts to rout the enemy created more destruction. 

By mid-May, the allied forces had rooted the Communists out of most of 

their strongholds, ending the worst of the street fighting. Rocket and mortar 

attacks continued, however, and renewed attacks in Cholon and near the Phu 

Tho racetrack took place later that month.21

Army engineers witnessed the only real North Vietnamese battlefield success—Kham Duc. Kham Duc and its satellite camp at Ngoc Tavik, five miles to 

the south, served as the last remaining Special Forces camps along the Laotian 

border in I Corps after the fall of Lang Vei. The camp sat astride Highway 14, 

which also served as an avenue for the North Vietnamese coming down the 

roads and tracks of the Ho Chi Minh Trail just across the border. Although the 

two outposts could not completely block the infiltration into South Vietnam, 

they kept the enemy’s activities under observation and frequently hindered 

his movements. Placed in one of the most rugged border regions in Vietnam 

only ten miles from the Laotian border, the Kham Duc camp, village, and 

airfield sat in a milewide bowl surrounded by hills rising abruptly to heights 

of two thousand feet. Earlier in January when General Westmoreland canceled the first of his projected York operations, he had still wanted the airfield

upgraded to handle sustained C–130 traffic and pads built for a radio navigation system. These tasks were passed down through command and engineer 

channels to Company A, 70th Engineer Battalion, 937th Engineer Group, 

at Pleiku. To meet the 1 April completion date, the 70th Engineer Battalion 

made plans to move the company by air. Delivering the unit’s equipment and 

construction material, mostly M8A1 matting, would have required some forty 

C–130 sorties. Due to the scarcity of airlift at the time, the Air Force balked 

at handling the requirement until early April. Concerned that increasing rains 

during April would create construction problems, group headquarters tried to 

delay the project until the next dry season. The request was denied, and on 9 

April the first platoon flew to Kham Duc and moved to a nearby abandoned 

21 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 166–68; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 

359–61; MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 132–33, 393. For more on the fighting during this 

period, see ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 68, II FFV, pp. 22–35, and 1 May–31 Jul 68, I FFV, 15 Aug 

68, pp. 13–19; Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 129–31; Lung, General Offensives of 1968–69, pp. 

91–106; Spector, After Tet, pp. 142–83; Keith William Nolan, The Magnificent Bastards: The 

Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong Ha, 1968 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994).
Engineers at War

370

camp located on higher ground adjacent to the airfield. Work was well under 

way by the time the last element arrived on 15 April. Still, it would be several 

days before the company’s two D7E bulldozers, each too large for a C–130, 

arrived aboard C–124 Globemasters.22

Company A made good progress until 10 May, when the North Vietnamese 

launched their attack. First Lt. Daniel W. Waldo Jr., former executive officer and now company commander, assigned tasks to each of the three line 

platoons. The 2d Platoon developed a sand pit and access road, and the 1st 

Platoon started on the pads, which were leveled and waterproofed with a coating of RC–3, an asphaltic cutback material. This was covered by a one-inch 

layer of sand and topped off with M8A1 matting. With the arrival of the first 

bulldozer on 18 April, the 1st Platoon began clearing the new parking apron 

area. Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon worked on the runway and existing parking 

apron, patching and sealing the many holes and improving drainage. After the 

22 Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 343; Spector, After Tet, p. 166; AAR/Interv, Upgrading Kham 

Duc Airfield (Opn Santa Barbara), 26th Mil Hist Det, 24 Jul 68, pp. 1–4, and incl. 2, Inte

Maj Paul B. Webber, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Capt Daniel W. Waldo Jr., CO, Company A, 70th 

Engr Bn, 24 Jul 68, VNIT 214, pp. 1–2, 4, CMH.

An aerial view of the Kham Duc airfield with engineer camp to the left of the 

airfield
371

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

first mortar rounds struck the base at 0630, the engineers resumed work on the 

airfield. Another attack at 1000 brought all work to a halt.23

Within a few days, Kham Duc was hastily evacuated. Until then, Company 

A helped defend the base and tried to keep the runway open. During the 

second mortar attack, one soldier was wounded while repairing a telephone 

line between the engineer and the Special Forces camps. Following this attack, 

the 3d Platoon spotted North Vietnamese soldiers on the southeast side of the 

airfield and took them under fire. An intense firefight followed, and three more 

engineers were wounded. After one and one-half hours, the platoon withdrew 

to its camp. A major ground attack now appeared imminent, and later that 

morning an infantry battalion task force from the Americal Division began 

arriving by air and assumed command at Kham Duc. Company A spent the 

rest of the day clearing fields of fire and improving defensive positions. Earlier 

in the day, Ngoc Tavak also came under heavy attack, and the defenders were 

forced to abandon the camp and withdraw to Kham Duc before darkness. 

Scattered mortar fire rained down on Kham Duc on 11 May as the last of the 

reinforcements arrived. By then U.S. commanders had second thoughts about 

another protracted battle, and they recommended vacating the camp. After 

reviewing the situation that evening, General Westmoreland approved the 

withdrawal. Kham Duc, Westmoreland later wrote, “had none of the importance of or defensive potential of a Khe Sanh, and I ordered evacuation.” Just 

before midnight, the 70th Engineer Battalion ordered Lieutenant Waldo to 

get out with as much equipment as possible, but because of intense enemy fire 

early the next day this was easier said than done. Army and Marine helicopters 

managed a few pickups during the morning, but a downed CH–47 blocked the 

runway. Since the two bulldozers had been disassembled for evacuation, the 

engineers used a bucket loader to move the damaged Chinook. Fuel leaking 

from the burning helicopter, however, set the bucket loader ablaze, and the 

engineers had to abandon it. Frantically, they reassembled a bulldozer and 

finally moved the helicopter, permitting the landing of C–123s and C–130s. 

When one C–130 took off down the cratered and shrapnel-littered runway, 

mortars burst on all sides flattening a tire. The crew aborted the takeoff, offloaded the passengers, and with the help of engineer maintenance troops cut 

away the ruined tire. With fuel streaming from holes in the wings, the damaged 

and nearly empty aircraft managed to take off. At 1100, a C–123 took off with 

forty-six engineers, and CH–47s carried out the remaining sixty-four between 

1100 and 1500. That afternoon, two C–130s were shot down within minutes, 

but helicopters and transports, protected by close-in air strikes, completed 

the evacuation by 1600. Following the evacuation, air strikes demolished the 

remains of the camp, including Company A’s equipment and construction 

materials.24

23 AAR/Interv, Upgrading Kham Duc Airfield, pp. 4–6, and incl. 2, Interv, Webber with 

Waldo, 24 Jul 68, pp. 1–2, 6; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 343. 24 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 360 (quotation); Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 343–47; 

Spector, After Tet, pp. 166–75; AAR/Interv, Upgrading Kham Duc Airfield, pp. 4–11, and incl. 

2, Interv, Webber with Waldo, 24 Jul 68, pp. 5–10.
Engineers at War

372

The forced evacuation of the engineers at Kham Duc greatly affected 

Company A. Those men aboard the C–123 were flown to Da Nang, and 

those carried out by helicopters were dropped off at Landing Zone Ross

where other helicopters transported them to Landing Zone Baldy. Within a 

few days, the engineers were flown to their home base at Pleiku. Thirty-one 

men were wounded, almost a third of the engineers at Kham Duc. None 

died. Company A lost almost all its equipment and some weapons and communications gear, including both D7E bulldozers, eight 5-ton dump trucks, 

two bucket loaders, one grader, other assorted equipment, and all squad and 

platoon tool kits. Construction material left behind and assumed destroyed 

by the Air Force included 432 bundles of M8A1 airfield matting, 360 drums 

of asphalt, and 1,200 bags of cement. These were approved as combat losses, 

but by the end of June the unit still lacked its replacement bulldozers, dump 

trucks, and grader. As a result, the unit restricted its work to construction 

tasks in the Pleiku area.25

25 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, p. II-9, Historians files, CMH; AAR/

Interv, Upgrading Kham Duc Airfield, pp. 9–11, and incl. 2, Interv, Webber with Waldo, 24 Jul 

68, pp. 11–12.

Enemy mortar attack at Kham Duc as shown from the engineer camp
373

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

The May attacks in the Saigon area proved more destructive than Tet. 

Some 15,000 homes were destroyed creating nearly 104,000 new refugees. With 

the monsoon on the horizon, the South Vietnamese government began a crash 

reconstruction program. Fortunately, the government’s Central Recovery 

Committee established during the Tet offensive was still carrying out Project 

Recovery, and was able to move quickly to erect temporary housing. Med

claims that allied firepower had caused much of the damage prompted General 

Westmoreland to lend assistance. On 13 May, he ordered General Rollins, the 

director of construction, to organize a joint engineer task force of U.S. Army, 

Navy, and Air Force engineers to help build some 1,500 temporary family 

units. Westmoreland also endorsed naming the cooperative effort Operation 

Dong Tam, the same Vietnamese term used for the delta base, literally meaning “united hearts and minds.” Under Rollins’ direction, the participating 

organizations—the Directorate of Construction, the Navy’s Officer in Charge 

of Construction, and the three services’ engineer units—formed Task Force 

Dong Tam. The South Vietnamese chief of engineers, Col. Nguyen Chan, 

dispatched two liaison officers to the task force’s headquarters, and the Navy’s 

Officer in Charge of Construction provided a civilian draftsman and used an 

architectural engineering contractor to design the housing areas. The United 

States Agency for International Development provided cement and roofing 

from its stocks, and the U.S. Army furnished the rest of the materials, which 

the agency later replenished. All work came under the general control of the 

Central Recovery Committee.26

Within a few days Task Force Dong Tam began operations, which lasted 

through the summer. Since the 46th Engineer Construction Battalion at 

nearby Long Binh ran a prefabrication lumber yard, it became the U.S. Army’s 

most logical representative unit. On 19 May, Lt. Col. Pendleton A. Jordan, 

who just assumed command of the battalion, deployed Capt. Theodore B. 

McCulloch’s Company B and other elements to the Phu Tho racetrack in 

Saigon. McCulloch’s task force, which eventually numbered 217 officers and 

men plus Vietnamese laborers, quickly established a bivouac and set up a prefabrication yard. Simultaneously, the South Vietnamese Army’s 301st Engineer 

Combat Battalion based in the Saigon area and the Ministry of Public Works 

began clearing rubble and debris. Soon a team from the Air Force’s 823d Civil 

Engineering Squadron, Red Horse, from Tan Son Nhut Air Base arrived to 

help the 301st Engineer Battalion construct housing. On 23 May, elements 

of the 46th Engineer Battalion began site work in another part of the city. 

A week later, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 58 in Da Nang deployed 

a detachment of fifty-two Seabees to a third site in metropolitan Saigon. 

Enemy attacks in late May and coordination problems caused by the hasty 

bringing together of the diverse workforce initially hampered the operation. 

26 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 540, 542, vol. 2, pp. 675–76; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 

Jun 68, MACDC, p. V-1; MFR, Brig Gen Andrew P. Rollins, 17 May 68, sub: Saigon Emergency 

Housing, Westmoreland History files, CMH; AAR/Interv, Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det, 

12 Sep 68, with enclosed AAR, Task Force Helper under Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det,

10 Sep 68, p. 1, and incl. 1, Interv, 1st Lt Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Maj Gen 

Andrew P. Rollins, MACV Dir of Const, 31 Aug 68, VNIT 253, pp. 1–2, CMH.
Engineers at War

374

After two weeks on the job, the original completion date was moved back two 

weeks to the end of July. Plans called for 20-by-60-foot standard wooden barracks shells divided into five family units. Each unit consisted of 240 square 

feet of living space under corrugated metal roofing, lightly topped mortar 

or wooden floors, and one ceiling light fixture and outlet in areas provided 

with electrical power. Shared toilet facilities were built at most of the sites. 

By late June, the task force had completed over 300 housing units, with the 

46th Engineer Battalion completing 120. As work progressed, additional tasks 

included road networks, drainage systems, running water, and electricity for 

each dwelling, which extended the project another four weeks. In early August, 

the Construction Directorate decided to keep the 46th Engineer Battalion’s 

prefabrication yard open for another five weeks so that the Vietnamese could 

build 1,200 more family units. By early September, the project finally neared 

completion. The 46th Engineer Battalion alone had cleared 141,000 square 

feet of area; removed over 300 truckloads of rubble; and used more than 4 

million board feet of lumber, 10,000 bags of cement, and 3,500 truckloads of 

gravel, rock, sand, and laterite fill. A week later, the battalion began restoration work at the Phu Tho racetrack.27

Though it appeared Operation Dong Tam achieved its intended purpose, 

the engineers had some misgivings about how they had gotten the job done. 

General Rollins noted that projects of this type were “not a very efficient way 

of using engineer troops.” He believed that the operation would have been 

better organized under one service. Since Westmoreland considered Don

Tam a one-time venture, Rollins concluded the political goal was accomplished, and he hoped the South Vietnamese engineers would do more of this 

kind of work. Colonel Jordan agreed, noting that his battalion happened to 

be the most accessible Army unit in the area. He reckoned a single reinforced 

engineer battalion “would have done the job much more efficiently.” There 

were other problems. The high level interest in the success of the housing 

project prompted excessive supervision by higher headquarters. Company 

B’s junior officers, under pressure to get the job done, initially overlooked the 

importance of equipment maintenance. The company’s deadline rate soon far 

exceeded the rates in the rest of the battalion. To make matters worse, the 

arrival of the rainy season caused flooding in the lower bivouac area, and 

many trucks and even bulldozers got stuck in the mud. Jordan quickly ordered 

improvements to the maintenance area and more mechanics to fix the equipment. Still, construction deadlines were not met because of poor estimates, 

and unstable soil conditions were made worse by the rains. Army engineers 

also faced a hostile populace during the rubble cleanup. The people apparently 

27 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, p. 676; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, pp. 

V-1 to V-2; AAR/Interv, Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det, with enclosed AAR, Task Force 

Helper under Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det, pp. 2–4, and incl. 1, Interv, Bullock with

Rollins, 31 Aug 68, pp. 2–4, incl. 2, Interv, 1st Lt Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, with 

Lt Col Pendleton A. Jordan, CO, 46th Engr Bn, 27 Aug 68, pp. 1–2, and incl. 5, Briefing on Opn 

Dong Tam for VIPs, n.d., p. 1, all in VNIT 253, CMH; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC 22618 

to CG, USARV, 27 Aug 68, sub: Opn Dong Tam, box 1, 71A/0354, RG 334, NARA; MACDC

Fact Sheet, 6 Sep 68, sub: Opn Dong Tam, box 1, 71A/0354, RG 334, NARA.
375

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

did not expect any help and were initially suspicious. As work neared completion, the mood changed and many inhabitants welcomed the Americans with 

smiles, hand waving, and military salutes.28

In mid-August, Hanoi launched the last and weakest of its three offensives 

in 1968. Mortar and rocket attacks on populated areas and attacks on remote 

outposts were typical. In I Corps, the Americal Division’s armored cavalry 

squadron blocked North Vietnamese forces heading toward Tam Ky City. In II 

Corps, the enemy avoided contact with two exceptions. One attack took place 

against Duc Lap district headquarters near the Cambodian border. Another 

struck the Dak Seang Special Forces camp farther north along the Laotian 

border. In III Corps, the U.S. 25th Division fought off enemy attacks at Firebase 

Buell, two miles northeast of Tay Ninh City, and a night defensive position 

west of Dau Tieng. Other isolated attacks included an unsuccessful assault on 

28 AAR/Interv, Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det, with enclosed AAR, Task Force Helpe

under Opn Dong Tam, 26th Mil Hist Det, pp. 4–5, and incl. 1, Interv, Bullock with Rollins, 31 

Aug 68, pp. 2–4, incl. 2, Interv, Bullock with Jordan, 27 Aug 68, pp. 1–4, incl. 3, Interv 1st Lt 

Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Capt Theodore B. McCulloch, CO, Company B, 

46th Engr Bn, 25 Aug 68, VNIT 253, pp. 1–4, CMH. VNIT 253 also contains photographs, site 

drawings, and a map.

The Dong Tam project provided emergency housing for Vietnamese civilian

such as this unit under construction in Saigon.
Engineers at War

376

the Duc Lap Special Forces camp and a damaging ambush on a supply convoy 

traveling between Long Binh and Tay Ninh. During the attack on the convoy, 

an engineer squad from the 65th Engineer Battalion and escorting mechanized 

infantry returning from a minesweeping operation fought off the attackers until 

relieved by an armored cavalry troop. The battered convoy reached Tay Ninh, 

but some two dozen ruined vehicles littered the road.29

August also marked the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), the last major U.S. tactical unit sent to Vietnam. The mechanized brigade consisted of one tank battalion, which came with two armored 

vehicle launched bridges; two infantry battalions (one of them mounted on 

armored personnel carriers); a self-propelled artillery battalion; an armored 

cavalry troop; and an engineer company (Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion). 

In a short time, the brigade, which deployed along the Demilitarized Zone 

under 3d Marine Division control, surprised the North Vietnamese who had 

never battled true armor formations in this area.30

Finally, two U.S. Army reorganizations in midsummer created a new 

corps headquarters in I Corps and a second airmobile division. On 15 August, 

the Provisional Corps, Vietnam, became the XXIV Corps, a headquarters 

that previously saw combat service in the Pacific during World War II. Lt. 

Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, who had replaced General Rosson in July, assumed 

command of the corps and operational control over the 1st Cavalry, 101st 

Airborne, and 3d Marine Divisions and the 1st Brigade, 5th Division. Like 

its predecessor, XXIV Corps remained under the operational control of the 

III Marine Amphibious Force. The Department of the Army had considered 

converting the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobile configuration before 

the division deployed. Conversion began on 1 July. A year would pass before 

the full complement of helicopters was available and support facilities at 

Camp Eagle were expanded.31

Hanoi’s offensives did not deter the allies from trying to regain the initiative through a series of operations aimed at supply trails, caches, and way stations. Along the Demilitarized Zone, U.S. Marines, no longer tied down to fixed 

bases, expanded airmobile operations. They followed the Army’s lead in setting 

up mutually supporting firebases atop jungle peaks as the infantry fanned out 

below searching for trails and supplies. In early August, allied forces returned to 

the A Shau Valley. A brigade-size task force from the 101st Airborne Division 

and elements of the South Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division were airlifted into 

the valley in Operation Somerset Plain. Along with finding and destroyin

caches and base camps, the invading troops this time left the area littered with 

minefields. These obstacles hardly daunted the North Vietnamese, however, and 

they quickly moved back from neighboring Laos. After withdrawing from the A 

Shau, the 101st carried out an integrated airmobile, naval, and ground cordon 

29 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 131–36; Lung, General Offensives of 1968–69, pp. 109–12; 

Spector, After Tet, pp. 235–40; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, p. 276. 30 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 139–41. 31 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, p. 219, 239–42; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 195–97; Msg, CG, 

101st Abn Div, to CG, USARV, 12 Aug 68, sub: Construction Facilities at Camp Eagle, box 1, 

71A/0354, RG 334, NARA.
377

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

operation on the enemy sanctuary at Vinh Loc Island, east of Hue. II Corps 

saw a continuation of reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force operations. 

Around Saigon, a large-scale campaign, Operation Toan Thang (“Complete 

Victory”), started in April aimed at enemy units in the area. In the delta, the U.S. 

9th Division fought several battles, destroying a main force battalion southwest 

of Can Duoc near the III/IV Corps border. To support the effort in the delta, a 

study done by Army and Navy headquarters in Vietnam concluded that additional units of the 9th Division could be stationed at Dong Tam without further 

dredging. With a modest addition of naval craft to the river assault squadrons, 

an expanded force could support two brigades afloat and one at Dong Tam. 

By midyear, planning was under way to reorganize the 9th Division to a mobile 

river configuration and move it to IV Corps. On 25 July, the division headquarters moved from Bearcat to a new base camp at Dong Tam.32

During Operation Somerset Plain, which took place from 3 to 1

August, elements of the 101st Airborne Division’s 326th Engineer Battalion 

and the 45th Group’s 27th Engineer Battalion furnished engineering support. Expansion of Firebase Birmingham as a forward supply point included

helicopter rearming and refueling points and more pads for troop and cargo 

helicopters. Again, the 27th Engineer Battalion kept the main supply route, 

Route 547, to Birmingham open and supported the divisional engineers. Four

32 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 242–43, 392–94; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, XXIV Corps, 

15 Nov 68, p. 15, Historians files, CMH, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, I FFV, pp. 11–15; Spector, After 

Tet, pp. 231–35; Fulton, Riverine Operations, pp. 168–69.

Mountaintop firebase of the 101st Airborne Division in the A Shau Valley 

 during Operation Somerset 
Engineers at War

378

new firebases covering the five infantry battalions in their sweeps were built. 

While paratroopers provided security, work crews from Company A of the 

326th alighted from helicopters and cleared the landing zones with chain saws 

and demolitions. When there was enough room, CH–47 helicopters brought 

in small bulldozers to level the sites. Usually within two days, the engineers 

had enlarged the area enough to allow a CH–54 to deliver a larger D5A bulldozer. The altitude at Firebase Eagle’s Nest, however, was too great to airlift

that bulldozer, and the engineers borrowed a smaller T6 bulldozer from the 

Seabees. The new firebases included artillery positions, bunkers for command 

posts, fire direction centers, communications equipment, ammunition storage, 

and passenger and cargo helipads. Steep terrain in several instances required 

the fastening of handholds so that the engineers could pull themselves up the 

slopes, proof of their determination to support the operation. Before departing the A Shau, the 326th Engineer Battalion placed minefields at three defiles 

along Route 548. Chemical delay fuzes were adapted for use with the M16 antipersonnel and M18 antitank mines and set to self-destruct in forty-five days. 

Electronic sensors were also placed in the minefields to detect any attempts to 

remove the mines.33

The move of additional 9th Division units and headquarters to Dong Tam 

caused a major shift of the 34th Engineer Group’s units to the delta base. 

Previously the group had carried out operational support and construction 

tasks in all of IV Corps and southern III Corps, which included Long An 

Province, part of Gia Dinh Province, Phuoc Tuy Province, the Rung Sat 

Special Zone, and Vung Tau. The number of units attached to the Vung 

Tau–based headquarters usually stood at three construction battalions, one 

to two combat battalions, and an assortment of smaller units, altogether some 

3,900 to 4,200 men. Of these units, elements of the 69th and 93d Construction 

Battalions were completing a 7,500-man cantonment at Dong Tam for the division’s riverine brigade. In mid-June, the rest of the 93d Construction Battalion 

and the attached 67th Dump Truck Company and 702d Power Distribution 

Detachment moved from Long Thanh North. Companies B and D, 86th 

Combat Battalion, which had been working along Highway 4, reinforced the 

93d’s efforts to meet the added base camp requirements. In late August, more 

help arrived when the 36th Construction Battalion dispatched two construction platoons from Company B and one construction platoon from Company 

D. In September, the 113th Concrete and Paving Detachment arrived at Dong 

Tam to help the 93d Construction Battalion’s concrete production.34

33 Maj. Emmett Kelly, “Into the A Shau,” in A Distant Challenge: The US Infantryman in 

Vietnam, 1967–1972 (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1985), pp. 115–21; 45th Engr Gp (Const) 

Operational Support, 1 Jul–1 Nov 68, incl. 5, tab A–2, pp. 1–2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt 

no. 13; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, XXIV Corps, p. 15. 34 34th Engr Gp (Const) Status of Principal Construction Projects, 15 Nov 67–15 Feb 68, 

incl. 5, tab B–1, pp. 2–3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11, 6 May 68; 34th Engr Gp (Const) 

Troop Construction, 1 Feb–1 Jul 68, incl. 2, tab E–1, pp. 3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

12, 23 Sep 68, OCE Hist Ofc; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 68, 34th Engr Gp, 1 Aug 68, pp. 1–2, 6, 

13–14, 1 May–31 Jul 68, 93d Engr Bn, 14 Aug 68, pp. 2, 5, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 93d Engr Bn, 

15 Nov 68, pp. 1, 9, 11, all in Historians files, CMH.
379

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

Assessing Construction 

Hanoi’s offenses had caused some disruption to military construction, 

but the program steadily neared completion. American military and civilian 

engineers had in less than three years built an impressive array of operational, 

logistic, and support facilities needed during the buildup. Under the overall 

direction of MACV’s Directorate of Construction, a carefully managed program combined the needs of the three services and allied forces. Between 1 

January 1965 and 1 January 1968, the United States had provided $1.48 billion 

in Military Construction funds to build Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities in 

Vietnam. Comparing the funds available to the work done to this point showed 

the Military Construction Program to be 65 percent complete. Funding would 

reach $1.71 billion by year’s end.35

As a rule, the Construction Directorate ensured that only minimum essential construction using austere standards consistent with operational and tactical requirements was accomplished. This included the use of DeLong piers 

and prefabricated buildings that could be salvaged when U.S. forces left the 

area. The military now had four major ports along with additional smaller 

ports and over-the-shore beach facilities, relieving congestion and ending the 

temporary disruption to civilian ports. There were now depots with over 11 

million square feet of covered storage, over 5 million yards of open storage, 

2.5 million cubic feet of cold storage, and hospitals providing 8,250 beds. Five 

major jet air bases had been built since 1965, increasing the total to eight. Over 

one hundred smaller fields, many with newly developed aluminum and steel 

matting, allowed transport aircraft to airlift material to dispersed forces. Many 

key roads had been reopened and restored, with increased efforts devoted to 

expanding road networks and improving secondary roads. As the construction program progressed, the task of maintaining, repairing, and operating 

the facilities also grew. Facilities engineering contractors—the Army’s Pacific 

Architects and Engineers and the Navy’s Philco-Ford—took on most of the 

repairs and utilities operations at the expanding bases.36

Meanwhile, despite General Palmer’s admonition to tighten up the base 

construction program, overbuilding remained a concern. In May 1968, General 

Duke, shortly before turning over command of engineer troops in Vietnam, 

stated in his debriefing report that the number and size of base camps continued to be a problem and bore watching. Nevertheless, unauthorized self-help 

construction by troop units continued as commanders arrived and departed. 

Commanders and troops characteristically leaned toward improving living 

and working conditions, and they found ways such as bartering to obtain 

building materials.37

In May, Pacific Architects and Engineers marked its fifth anniversary as 

the U.S. Army’s facilities engineering contractor in the Republic of Vietnam. 

35 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, p. 843; ibid., 1968, vol. 2, p. 670.

36 Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, pp. 257–64. 37Debriefing, Maj Gen Charles M. Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 5–6, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

380

Manpower ceilings limited direct hiring, and the Army called upon Pacific 

Architects and Engineers to expand its organization as the buildup and pace 

of facilities construction increased. Approximately 24,750 employees (1,750 

Americans, 4,000 third-country nationals, and 19,000 Vietnamese) manned 

seventy-two major company installations and an assortment of supply and 

equipment maintenance facilities. When Army units moved into I Corps in 

1967, the firm expanded operations in areas not supported by the Navy. The 

sheer magnitude of its buildings and grounds gives an idea of the size of the 

facilities placed in its care. In mid-1968, the company maintained over 43 million square feet of building space and 11.5 million square yards of roads. It 

ran 1,128 generating plants ranging from small single units to a cluster of 

seven 1,000-kilowatt machines at MACV headquarters. Total monthly output 

neared 30 million kilowatt-hours and electrical distribution lines extended 650 

miles. That summer, Pacific Architects and Engineers took over responsibility 

for the new central power plant at An Khe consisting of six 1,500-kilowatt 

generators, the first of several large complexes to increase and stabilize electricity at major bases. The company operated 137 water treatment facilities 

purifying some 300 million gallons a month. Among its six sewage treatment 

plants, the Long Binh facility included a huge sewage lagoon that processed 

70,000 gallons a day. Other tasks included entomology services, refrigeration 

and air-conditioning maintenance, and trash collection. A fleet of 123 compactor trucks that arrived in late 1967 hauled away about 350,000 cubic yards 

of refuse every month and allowed the facilities engineering contractor to do 

away with most of its refuse collection subcontractors. With military units and 

subcontractors, the company disposed of 500,000 cubic yards of trash each 

month in sanitary fills. Forty-three ice-making plants produced 300 tons of 

potable ice each day such as the small but vital plant at Da Lat, which provided 

ice to preserve fresh vegetables delivered to troops throughout the country. By 

mid-1968, the company’s fire department had grown to forty-one stations with 

a roster of nearly one thousand people, over a hundred pumpers and tankers, 

and a newly opened school in Vung Tau.38

The Army’s power plant arrangements with Vinnell Corporation also 

expanded in the three years following the first contract. These contracts, 

awarded by Army Materiel Command, involved construction of power plants 

and distribution systems under the Military Construction, Army, program, 

plus operation and maintenance at seven locations. Cam Ranh Bay now 

had five T–2 power ships in operation, each with an output of 3,100 kilowatts. Power plants at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Tau contained two 

ships, each with an output of 4,300 kilowatts. Vinnell brought the last ship, 

which arrived March 1967, online on 6 September 1967. At Long Binh, work 

progressed on a large land-based power plant, which would include twenty 

1,500-kilowatt diesel-driven generators when completed in late 1968. Landbased plants were also at Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Loi, and Bien Hoa, with more 

38 PA&E History, Jan–Jun 1968, pp. 1–6; Dunn, Base Development, p. 93. For more on Pacific 

Architects and Engineers’ five years in Vietnam, see PA&E News Vietnam, 1 and 15 May 68, 

copy in Historians files, CMH.
381

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

programmed. In November 1967, Army Materiel Command modified the 

contract to build twelve more land-based plants and distribution systems. 

Planning for Fiscal Year 1969 envisioned land-based power plants replacing 

the power ships. Vinnell also had contracts to run a field maintenance shop, 

a Class IV Engineer Material Yard, and stevedoring operations for the 1st 

Logistical Command at Cam Ranh Bay.39

With cutbacks in construction funds already happening, planners in 

Washington and Saigon examined the roles of engineering troops and contractors. The contracts awarded to RMK-BRJ, Pacific Architects and Engineers, 

and Vinnell had resulted in tailor-made forces to do a job. Although the contractors required considerable time to mobilize, they were, because of their 

tailored makeup, more efficient than troop units. On the other hand, only the 

cost of construction materials was charged to the troop projects. Decreases 

in construction funds in 1967 reduced RMK-BRJ’s workforce to 18,000, and 

MACV planned to end the civilian construction effort in 1968. As the contractor phased out, troops would assume more of the construction workload. 

Fortunately, most of the major work that best suited the contractors’ talents, 

such as technical expertise, special equipment, and organizing for specific 

tasks would be completed.40

39 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 78–79; Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, pp. C-6 to C-7, Senior 

Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; “Floating and Land Based Power 

Plants,” “Vinnell Makes History in Long Binh,” “12 Additional Power Plants,” Vinnell 11 

(Spring 1969): 6–11; Procurement Support in Vietnam, 1966–1968, pp. 50–51. See also Thomas 

E. Spicknall, “Civilian Repairs and Utilities in the Combat Zone,” Military Engineer 61 (MarchApril 1969): 77–80. 40 JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 126; MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 841–42; ibid., 

1968, vol. 2, p. 678.

Pacific Architects and Engineers’ headquarters in Saigon
Engineers at War

382

These plans were modified in 1968, when MACV transferred projects 

assigned to military engineer units in the major enclaves to RMK-BRJ, freeing 

the troops to do projects in more remote areas. Troop to contractor transfers 

took place in areas where RMK-BRK had a mobilization capability. These 

included work sites in Saigon, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh Bay, and satellites 

in Chu Lai, Can Tho, Dong Tam, and Vung Tau. After further study that 

summer, MACV decided to obligate available funds before the end of the fiscal 

year and raise the contractor’s workforce to 25,000, decreasing the backlog of 

construction from eleven to eight months. As of 7 December, RMK-BRJ had 

23,804 people on its payroll (2,256 Americans, 1,766 third-country nationals, 

and 19,782 Vietnamese).41

During 1968, the buildup of engineer units reached its peak. Engineer 

troops comprised approximately 11 percent of all U.S. forces in Vietnam, and 

Army engineers exceeded all other branches except the infantry. Between July 

and December 1967, military engineer construction battalions had grown from 

fourteen to fifteen Army and from ten to eleven Seabee. This did not include a 

variety of smaller units and repairs and utilities specialists. Adding the eleven 

Army nondivisional combat battalions, three Fleet Marine Force battalions, 

and five Air Force Red Horse squadrons (but excluding the Army’s eight divisional battalions and the companies with the separate brigades and the Marine 

Corps’ two divisional battalions) the construction force had risen to forty-five 

battalions. Army engineers gained two more nondivisional combat battalions in 

41 MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 678–79; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 68, MACDC, 

p. V-18, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, p. V-19, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 68, MACDC, p. V-13, Historians 

files, CMH.

Vinnell Corporation’s central control room at the Long Binh power plant
383

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

1968. Naval engineering forces, which reached twelve Seabee construction battalions that summer, would level off to ten battalions by the end of the year.42

At the same time, in order for U.S. Army, Vietnam, to stay under the current troop ceiling, Engineer Command had to share in troop cutbacks. Plans 

at midyear called for the fifteen construction battalions and six separate companies (one float bridge and five construction support) to lose 4,561 spaces. 

Each construction battalion would lose 204 military spaces and convert to 

a modified Type B organization, which could be augmented by local civilian 

employees. Several units were further reduced, brought to zero strength, or 

scheduled for inactivation. The 62d Construction Battalion at Long Binh lost 

its three line companies and became the controlling headquarters for three 

land-clearing companies. At Cam Ranh Bay, the 87th Engineer Construction 

Battalion was scheduled for inactivation on 31 March 1969. Also reduced to 

zero strength were a float bridge company, a pipeline company, a panel bridge 

company, a dump truck company, and two detachments. Although assigning 

infantrymen as engineer replacements made up some of the shortages, there 

were soon critical deficiencies in construction foremen, equipment operators, 

mechanics, electricians, and plumbers.43

Streamlining the Effort

Since the early days of the buildup, U.S. Army Engineer Command, 

Vietnam, had directed troop construction, and 1st Logistical Command 

facilities engineering. In turn, logistical command had charged its engineering staff and U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, to carry out the 

facilities engineering mission and to administer the Pacific Architects and 

Engineers and Vinnell contracts. By early 1967, it had become evident that 

Pacific Architects and Engineers’ rapid growth demanded better control. As 

a result, 1st Logistical Command established a Contract Operations Branch 

under its engineer at the firm’s Contract Management Office in Saigon and 

increased the number of contracting officers’ representatives within the staff 

engineers at the Saigon, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay Support Commands 

and large installations. The Contract Management Office helped identify and 

resolve many problems while directing and analyzing Pacific Architects and 

Engineers’ activities and operations. By that time, however, the contract had 

risen to $100 million a year. Army planners, accordingly, sought ever-greater 

control over soaring costs and the potential for overbuilding.44

42 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 842–43; ibid., 1968, vol. 2, p. 679; Sharp and Westmoreland, 

Report, p. 263; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 300–301. 43 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in South Vietnam, 11–31 Jul 1968, incl. 1, pp. 2–4, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 12; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in South Vietnam, 

1–21 Nov 68, incl. 3, pp. 7–9, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–

31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. II-3, Historians files, CMH; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 18th Engr 

Bde, pp. 2–3, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 3–4, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 

2–3, and 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 35th Engr Gp, p. 5; FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and 

Operations, September 1965, pp. A-B-2, A-B-41. 44 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 92; Procurement Support in Vietnam, 1966–1968, pp. 36, 38.
Engineers at War

384

It seemed logical that one organization, such as Engineer Command, 

should combine those responsibilities, but the Army still had difficulty justifying an engineer command. After succeeding General Ploger in August 1967, 

General Duke continued to use the integrated staff that combined those of the 

command and the engineer section of headquarters U.S. Army, Vietnam. In 

practice, Duke found that he spent almost 80 percent of his time as USARV 

Engineer and 20 percent on Engineer Command matters.45

In September 1967, Duke took steps to develop a new organization. 

He seemed satisfied that the two engineer brigades had done an impressive job in accomplishing their combat support, road improvements, 

and construction missions in that order of priority. Still, he wanted to 

address Washington’s concerns about his ability to account for Military 

Construction, Army, funds, and he wanted to do so with an organization 

that would not downgrade combat and operational support, require an 

additional base structure, or add troop spaces. After an exchange of ideas 

with Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, the deputy chief of engineers, Duke 

gained General Palmer’s approval for what he believed to be the most workable solution. Thus, construction and facilities engineering functions were 

merged under a new organization, the U.S. Army Engineer Construction 

Agency, Vietnam (Provisional). U.S. Army, Vietnam, activated the new 

command on 15 March 1968, and on the twenty-ninth Brig. Gen. William 

T. Bradley took command. Basically, the new command served as a management organization to coordinate the construction and facilities engineering 

efforts carried out by engineer units and contractors. The Construction 

Agency assumed responsibilities for construction, base development planning, and the Army’s part of the highway, railroad, bridge restoration, and 

revolutionary development support programs. The new command also 

served as a link with MACV’s Directorate of Construction on matters dealing with the Army portion of the Military Construction Program. Troop 

projects were directed to the two brigades, and other construction projects 

were assigned to the Navy’s Officer in Charge of Construction for RMKBRJ. On 1 April, the 1st Logistical Command transferred its real estate 

functions to the Construction Agency. Three months later on 1 July, the 

agency took over the facilities engineering responsibilities, which included 

the management of the Pacific Architects and Engineers and Vinnell contracts and the supervision of the utilities detachments.46

45 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 15–30 Sep 67, incl. 7, p. 1, 4, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. 46 Ltr, Palmer to Gen Johnson, 14 Nov 67, Harold K. Johnson Papers, MHI; Ploger, Army 

Engineers, pp. 143–45; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 92–93; Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, p. 

5, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Maj Paul B. Webber, 

26th Mil Hist Det, with Maj Gen Charles M. Duke, CG, Engr Cmd and USARV Engr, 14 

May 68, VNIT 164, pp. 20–27, CMH; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, p. II4; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 22 Nov–13 Dec 67, incl. 7, p. 1, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 10; Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in Vietnam, 11–31 Mar 

68, incl. 4, pp. 4–5, tabs L–N, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11; Msg, Duke ARV 2130 to 

Maj Gen Frederick J. Clarke, Dep Ch Engr, 3 Dec 67, sub: Engineer Organization; Msg, Duke 

ARV 016 to Clarke, 3 Jan 68; Msg, Clarke GVP 015 to Duke, 9 Jan 68; Msg Duke ARV 061 to 
385

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

The Construction Agency’s organization closely paralleled Corps of 

Engineers districts and facilities engineering offices in the United States. 

Offices and divisions in the headquarters dealt with comptroller, administration, automatic data processing, engineering, real estate, supply, safety, 

public information, and real property functions. When the agency took over 

the facilities engineering function, it set up district engineer offices at Saigon 

(Southern), Cam Ranh Bay (Central), and Qui Nhon (Northern). In turn, 

the district engineers oversaw the installation engineers. For example, the 

Southern District Engineer’s area of responsibility included the Cu Chi, 

Long Binh, Tan Son Nhut, Lai Khe, Vung Tau, Dong Tam, Can Tho, and 

Saigon port installations. Large installations like Long Binh controlled the 

nearby Bien Hoa and Long Thanh Army bases. This structure provided a 

vertical command channel from the agency through the district engineers 

to the installation engineers, who could now operate free from the whims of 

local commanders. As more Army troops moved into northern I Corps, the 

Northern District added Phu Bai, Da Nang, Camp Evans, and Camp Eagle 

to its list of bases. Eventually each installation engineer managed all Armyfunded construction programs, facilities engineering contracts, and real 

estate matters in his area of responsibility. He also commanded the engineer 

detachments, mostly utilities, at a base or bases. Facilities engineering support for forty-five Integrated Wideband Communications Systems sites built 

and maintained by Page Communications Engineers would be added to the 

facilities engineering contract in Fiscal Year 1969. The Construction Agency 

also provided troops to operate and maintain large-capacity air conditioners and generators at each site. In its aim to control and improve technical 

performance, particularly Pacific Architects and Engineers’ operations, the 

agency nearly tripled the number of supervisors from 73 to 212.47

Despite these developments, 1st Logistical Command’s procurement 

agency retained administrative control of the facilities contracts. General 

Duke proposed giving the Construction Agency contracting officer authority for the contracts, but 1st Logistical Command insisted on keeping the old 

arrangement, and Department of the Army agreed. To make matters more 

complex, the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, not only came under 

the control of 1st Logistical Command, but its procurement chain went to 

U.S. Army, Japan. The construction and procurement agencies, accordingly, 

worked out a memorandum of understanding in which installation engineers 

Clarke, 10 Jan 68; Msg, Clarke GVP 031 to Duke, 11 Jan 68; Msg, Duke ARV 126 to Clarke, 

18 Jan 68, all messages in Duke Papers, CMH. 47 Dunn, Base Development, p. 92; Interv, Webber with Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 35–38; 

Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 6, C-7, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians 

files, CMH; JLRB, Monograph 1, Advanced Base Facilities Maintenance, pp. 27–30; Rpt of 

Visit to Various Headquarters in South Vietnam, 11–31 Jul 68, incl. 1, p. 6, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 12. Trip report no. 12 also contains U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, 

Vietnam (USAECAV), organization charts, a chart depicting the flow of base development 

plans and construction requests, and Letter of Instruction from CG, Engr Troops, Vietnam, to 

CG, USAECAV, 31 Jun 68. See also USAECAV Organization and Functions Manual, 27 May 

68, OCE Hist Ofc.
Engineers at War

386

served as the key link to the two organizations. While the installation engineers 

now reported through command channels to the Construction Agency, they 

continued as the Procurement Agency’s contracting officers’ representatives 

evaluating the performance of Pacific Architects and Engineers.48

General Duke and the Army Procurement Agency seemed satisfied with 

this arrangement. After only two months, Duke claimed the new command 

had already proved its worth. Construction programming became more effective within a single command. “You have one agency,” Duke stated in an interview, “that develops the requirements, that designs the facilities, that directs its 

construction and inspects it during the construction. . . . As far as I know, this 

has never been done before. And frankly, I think it’s superb.”49

The establishment of the Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, 

also resulted in a name change for Engineer Command and a broadening of 

its functions. Since Defense Department approval of an engineer command or 

an organization with command in its name seemed so doubtful, U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, inactivated the command and on 29 March activated Engineer 

Troops, Vietnam. Duke carried on as a commander and staff engineer. In 

the first role, he commanded three major subordinate organizations, the 18th 

and 20th Engineer Brigades and the Army Engineer Construction Agency, 

Vietnam. As the U.S. Army, Vietnam, engineer, he directed a staff charged 

with planning, developing policies, and setting construction priorities. His staff 

also continued to carry out mapping and engineer intelligence functions. The 

old Engineer Command had handled all personnel matters, including assigning all field grade officers by name. Through an agreement with the U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, G–1, Duke was still able to select his battalion and group commanders and play a role in the assignment of Corps of Engineers colonels.50

In May 1968, as General Duke prepared to leave Vietnam, he outlined 

major problems to be solved. Not only did Army engineers fail to gain contracting authority, but also they still had to contend with the existing costplus-fixed-fee contracts. He believed that control over the facilities engineering contract would have allowed the Army Engineer Construction Agency, 

Vietnam, to take over contracting authority for Military Construction, 

Army, construction when the large tri-service contract with RMK-BRJ no 

longer proved practical. Each service would then directly contract its own 

construction, but this did not happen. When comparing contractors, Duke 

rated Pacific Architects and Engineers’ performance below that of RMKBRJ and Vinnell. The facilities engineering contract, originally negotiated 

in 1963 and renewed annually, remained little changed, thus reducing incentives that would come from a cost-plus-award-fee contract. Although Pacific 

48 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 92–93; Interv, Webber with Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 17–20; 

Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, p. 6, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, 

CMH. 49 Interv, Webber with Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 37–46 (quotation, pp. 37–38); Debriefing, Duke, 

14 May 68, p. 5, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH. 50 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in South Vietnam, 11–31 Mar 68, incl. 4, p. 4, and 

HQ USARV, General Order 1381, Engr Troops, Vietnam (Prov), 28 Mar 68, incl. 4, tab L, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 11; Interv, Webber with Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 28–32.
387

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

Architects and Engineers had to 

compete for the Qui Nhon area 

contract in 1968, the cost-plusaward-fee contract would not 

go into effect until 1970. Pacific 

Architects and Engineers’ familiarity with operations in Vietnam gave 

the firm a distinct advantage, and 

it won the contract. Duke believed 

the competition resulted in better 

performance, especially in road 

maintenance.51

In a different area, although 

he viewed his relations with the 

Directorate of Construction and 

the Navy’s Officer in Charge of 

Construction as good, some of their 

practices bothered him. He preferred 

that the Construction Directorate 

confine its activities to programming and reprogramming projects 

and funds and setting construction 

standards. Duke became concerned, however, when Construction Directorate’s 

staff officers visiting projects and work sites returned to their offices and wrote 

disparaging inspection reports. The Navy construction office’s handling of 

funds also came in for criticism. He was disturbed by the Navy’s operation “in 

letting us see the behind the scenes manipulations of theirs insofar as cost is 

concerned.” The Army’s inspection system of cost-plus contracts, he claimed, 

was much more elaborate.52

General Duke’s departure in May preceded the changeover of all senior 

Army engineers in Vietnam. On 21 July, Maj. Gen. David S. Parker took over 

as U.S. Army, Vietnam, Engineer and Commanding General, Engineer Troops, 

Vietnam (Provisional), formerly known as Engineer Command, Vietnam. In 

October, General Bradley, who temporarily replaced Duke for three months, 

replaced General Rollins as the MACV director of construction. Col. John 

H. Elder Jr. replaced General Roper at 18th Engineer Brigade in September. 

Roper, who had commanded the brigade since November 1967, then assumed 

command of the U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, during 

his remaining months in Vietnam. Col. Harold R. Parfitt took command of 

the 20th Engineer Brigade from General Chapman in November. (Both Elder 

and Parfitt were on the brigadier generals promotion list.) Parker concurred 

in the integrated engineer headquarters and the two brigades but had doubts 

about a separate construction agency. He saw some duplication and overlap 

51 Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, p. 6, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians 

files, CMH; Dunn, Base Development, p. 93. 52 Interv, Webber with Duke, 14 May 68, pp. 38–48.

General Parker
Engineers at War

388

between the agency and his engineer staff sections and would have preferred 

to combine the two organizations. Since the construction agency had greatly 

improved the control and quality of the construction program and got better 

performance from the facilities engineering contractor, Parker decided that 

such a quick change would have generated too much turbulence. At some 

point in time, after American forces started to phase out, Parker visualized 

consolidating the two organizations.53

New Approaches

In the aftermath of Hanoi’s offensives, both sides changed approaches 

and consolidated forces. After heavy troop, equipment, and supply losses, the 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong retired to their sanctuaries. On the allied side, 

American troop strength continued to rise, and in-country moves took place. 

In September, the 101st Airborne Division’s 3d Brigade, which had stayed 

behind in III Corps, rejoined the division in exchange for the 3d Brigade, 82d 

Airborne Division. In late October, the 1st Cavalry Division moved by sea 

and air to III Corps to respond to a growing threat in the south. The move, 

code-named Operation Liberty Canyon, involved redeploying the divisi

nearly four hundred miles between the two fronts. By mid-November, the division had set up its headquarters at Phuoc Vinh and its support at Bien Hoa, 

and had begun operations along the Cambodian border. As for IV Corps, 

the 9th Division, which had moved its headquarters and a second brigade to 

Dong Tam, readied itself for the dry season. The campaign would be known 

as Speedy Expr

54

The latest deployments caused some changes in the allied order of battle. 

In I Corps, III Marine Amphibious Force continued to direct U.S. ground 

operations of one Army corps and two divisions. North of the Hai Van Pass, 

the XXIV Corps had operational control of the 101st Airborne Division, 3d 

Marine Division, and the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division. South of the pass 

to the I/II Corps border, III Marine Amphibious Force directed operations 

of the 1st Marine and Americal Divisions. Other forces in I Corps included 

two South Vietnamese infantry divisions and infantry regiment and a South 

Korean Marine brigade. I Field Force now had only two major tactical units, 

an infantry division and an airborne brigade, in II Corps. The 4th Infantry 

Division continued operations in the western highlands around the border 

regions. Most of the 173d Airborne Brigade remained in Binh Dinh Province 

with a battalion-size task force in the south. Two South Vietnamese and two 

South Korean Infantry divisions covered the rest of II Corps. In III Corps, II 

53 Debriefing, Maj Gen David S. Parker, USARV Engr and CG, Engr Troops, Vietnam, 

14 Oct 69, pp. 7–8, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; Parker’s 

Comments on OCE Manuscript, 14 Dec 77, pp. 1–6, Historians files, CMH; Debriefing, Brig 

Gen Willard Roper, CG, 18th Engr Bde, 7 Oct 68, p. 5, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, 

Historians files, CMH; Debriefing, Brig Gen Curtis W. Chapman, CG, 20th Engr Bde, 30 Oct 

68, p. 2, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH. 54 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 401; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 209–13; Memoirs of the First 

Team, p. 42.
389

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

Field Force controlled the U.S. 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions; 1st Cavalry 

Division; 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division; 

199 Light Infantry Brigade; and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Allied 

forces included most of a Thai infantry division and the Australian and New 

Zealand task force. Three South Vietnamese infantry divisions and airborne 

and Marine contingency forces also ringed the area around Saigon. In IV 

Corps, the U.S. corps advisory group had operational control over the rest of 

the 9th Infantry Division. South Vietnamese forces in IV Corps consisted of 

three infantry divisions.55

Amid these adjustments, engineer dispositions also changed. After the 45th 

Group and the 14th, 27th, and 35th Engineer Battalions moved to I Corps, the 

two engineer brigades shifted areas of responsibility several times to fit the 

tactical moves and engineering priorities. On 1 November, the 18th Brigade’s 

last adjustment of the year took place when the 937th Group at Pleiku took 

over responsibility for the northern half of II Corps and the 35th Group the 

southern half. As a result, the 937th Group gained the 19th and 84th Engineer 

Battalions, formerly 35th Group units in Binh Dinh Province. In turn, the 35th 

took control of the 70th Engineer Battalion at Ban Me Thuot. Since the 937th 

now had responsibility for the Qui Nhon area, the 35th Group’s headquarters 

returned to a more central location at Cam Ranh Bay. In III and IV Corps, 

the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division and emphasis given to the highway 

restoration program prompted realignments in the 20th Brigade as well. The 

79th Group at Plantation near Long Binh kept northern III Corps; the 159th 

Group at Long Binh took over more of the southern half, including Saigon, 

Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Xuan Loc, and Blackhorse; and 

the 34th Group, which moved to Dong Tam in December, held on to parts of 

southern III Corps and all of IV Corps. Units affected by boundary changes 

and moves included the transfer of the 34th Construction and 168th Combat 

Battalions from the 79th to the 159th Group. In return, the 159th transferred 

the 62d Engineer Battalion to the 79th.56 (Map 25)

Both Liberty Canyon and Speedy Express actively involved the engineers. During Liberty Canyon, which lasted until 30 December, 

the 8th Engineer Battalion cleared fields of fire by cutting down trees with 

chain saws and demolitions and helped fortify battalion bases. The three line 

companies focused efforts at forging firebases and landing zones out of the 

dense jungle near the Cambodian border. Within sixty days, Company C built 

ten firebases and more than thirty landing zones. Most of the 79th Engineer 

Group bolstered the 1st Cavalry Division’s engineers at Phuoc Vinh, Quan 

Loi, Song Be Tay Ninh, and other locations. One combat battalion devoted all 

55 MACV History 1968, vol. 1, pp. 218, 244, 372, 401, 646.

56 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam, 1–21 November 1968, 

incl. 3, p. 7 and tab O, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 

68, MACDC, p. II-3; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 20th Engr Bde, 10 Feb 69, pp. 2–3, 1 Aug–31 

Oct 68, 35th Engr Gp, 31 Oct 68, pp. 2–3, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 35th Engr Gp, 31 Jan 69, p. 4, 1 

Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 937th Engr Gp, 31 Jan 69, p. 2, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 79th Engr Gp, 14 Feb 69, 

p. 6, incl. 6, 1 May–31 Jul 68, 34th Engr Gp, pp. 1–2, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 34th Engr Gp, 1 Nov 68, 

pp. 1–2, and 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 159th Engr Gp, 14 Feb 69, p. 2, all in Historians files, CMH.
45

III

937

III

35

III

79

III

159

III

34

III

{

14th Bn

27th Bn

35th Bn

39th Bn

{

19th Bn

20th Bn

84th Bn

299th Bn

815th Bn

{

31st Bn

46th Bn

62d Bn

92d Bn

169th Bn

{

70th Bn

87th Bn

116th Bn

577th Bn

589th Bn

864th Bn

{

34th Bn

168th Bn

554th Bn

588th Bn

{

36th Bn

69th Bn

86th Bn

93d Bn

SOUTH CHINA SEA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Gulf

of

Thailand

Mekong R

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

NORTH VIETNAM

DEMARCATION LINE

Cu Lao Re

Dao Phu Qui

Con Son

Quang Tri

Da Nang

Kontum

Qui Nhon

Tuy Hoa

Ban Me Thuot

Pleiku

Cam Ranh

Phan Thiet

Phuoc Le

Tay Ninh

My Tho

Go Cong

Rach Gia

Bac Lieu

Hue

Quang Ngai

SAIGON

THE ENGINEER GROUPS December 1968

0

0

100

100

Miles

Kilometers

Map 25
391

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

its efforts to the airmobile divisions’ deployment while the group’s other two 

combat battalions and one construction battalion spent about 50 percent of 

their resources supporting the operation. Much work went into readying the 

base camps for the cavalry division’s fleet of aircraft. The group erected protective revetments around helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and expanded 

airfield facilities. Other tasks included upgrading base defenses, and logistical, 

medical, and communications facilities. This work caused a general slowdown 

of other construction projects and continued into 1969.57

Operation Speedy Express, due to begin on 1 December, diverted m

of the 34th Group’s highway improvement efforts for months. Col. Earnest 

Graves Jr., who assumed command of the group in September, recalled that 

Speedy Express curtailed plans to upgrade Highway 4, the major road so

of Saigon. The engineers hastily built forward bases to be used as jumpingoff points to seal the Cambodian border, but frequent changes in engineer 

priorities in the delta caused turmoil. After one month’s work, the engineers 

had to change plans to include the addition of a 1st Cavalry Division brigade, which called for a different distribution of troops and materials. The 

airmobile brigade, however, was not used in the operation. The operation 

slipped into the following year, and the initial number of forward bases 

was scaled back from eleven to four. Finding land in the densely populated 

delta became a major problem. Formal real estate arrangements involved a 

tedious process through U.S. and South Vietnamese channels. Some land 

was reclaimed by dredging or by drying out paddy mud.58

With the tactical emphasis shifting to III and IV Corps, the II Corps command worried that it would lose engineers. In November, the I Field Force 

commander, General Peers, met with Colonel Elder and discussed the effects 

of the 18th Brigade’s troop reductions and possible deployment of units to 

support Speedy Express. Elder reported the impending loss of nearly 

thousand military spaces, and he considered inactivation of whole units as 

less objectionable than civilianization. The brigade considered zeroing out two 

battalions and transferring a third battalion to III Corps, actions that Peers 

viewed as “totally unsatisfactory.” He informed General Abrams, citing road 

and airfield maintenance problems, which, added to other requirements in a 

vast area of operations, were “such that we will have difficult time maintaining 

the status quo to keep our head above water.” Peers concluded that replacing soldiers with the local national civilians was “infeasible, undesirable and 

in combat areas may be impossible.” Abrams told Peers that the civilianization program must be completed. He added, however, that a recent lifting of 

Department of the Army restrictions on the replacement pipeline had given 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, a chance to consider increasing engineer unit manning 

57 Hist Rpt, 14th Mil Hist Det, 1st Cav Div, Opn Liberty Canyon 1–69, p. 5; 8th Engr

Hist, 1968, pp. 14–15; ORLL, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 79th Engr Gp, incls. 4, 6; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 

1 Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. II-4. 58 Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 58, MACDC, p. II-4; Interv, Capt Raymond F. Bullock, 

26th Mil Hist Det, with Col Earnest Graves, CO, 34th Engr Gp, 11 Jul 69, VNIT 445, pp. 3–4, 

CMH; AAR, Opn Speedy Express, 16 Mil Hist Det, 14 Jun 69, pp. 29–30, Historians fil

CMH.
Engineers at War

392

levels. Abrams also noted that a U.S. Army, Vietnam, engineer study would 

review the future disposition of engineer units in II Corps. Generally, the 

number of U.S. Army engineer battalions in II Corps remained about the 

same: ten following the Tet deployments to I Corps, eleven between September 

1968 to March 1969, and ten again when the 87th Engineer Battalion was 

zeroed out.59

Facing the possible loss of the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigade units, U.S. 

commanders turned to greater use of allied engineers. While expressing his 

concerns about the civilianization program, General Peers proposed using 

Vietnamese soldiers just completing basic engineer training to flesh out the 

U.S. engineer units. He noted that General Parker already had initiated an 

affiliation program with nearby Vietnamese engineer units. The Vietnamese 

soldiers would not have to be assigned to the American units. Instead, Peers 

suggested the soldiers could remain assigned to the associated unit but work 

with the U.S. unit. Abrams responded that an on-the-job training program 

and increased participation by Vietnamese engineer units in the highway restoration program were under consideration. He also advised Peers to see if the 

South Korean engineers supporting their two divisions in II Corps could take 

59 Msg, Lt Gen William R. Peers, CG, I FFV, NHT 1900 to Abrams, 13 Nov 68; Msg, 

Abrams MAC 16033 to Peers, 20 Nov 68. Both in Abrams Papers, CMH.

Despite delays caused by Operation Speedy Express, the 34th Engineer Gr

continued to make progress along Highway 4.
393

The Aftermath, April–December 1968

over some road and airfield responsibilities. Peers also cited an urgent need to 

improve South Vietnamese engineer units in II Corps. To this Abrams replied 

that ultimately more Vietnamese Army engineer units would be activated and 

given the same equipment as U.S. units. Meanwhile, an affiliation program for 

logistical units called Project Buddy had been advocated by Maj. Gen. Joseph 

M. Heiser Jr., commanding general of the 1st Logistical Command. He felt 

that firsthand observation and experience on the job would be the best way 

to improve the skills of the South Vietnamese Army. Abrams approved the 

Buddy proposal in January 1969, and the engineers enthusiastically adapted 

General Heiser’s concept to their needs.60

As 1968 came to a close, the U.S. Army engineers reluctantly carried out 

the civilianization program. In late October and early November, the 18th and 

20th Engineer Brigades reported hiring 6,600 Vietnamese workers. By the end 

of the year, the 20th Brigade was authorized a local national workforce of 4,358 

employees. Authority for an additional 73,200 man-days for the quarter also 

allowed the brigade to hire daily laborers with Assistance-in-Kind funds. Senior 

engineer officers, including General Parker, still declared their doubts about 

the program. On 16 November, Parker and his staff briefed Lt. Gen. Frank T. 

Mildren, General Palmer’s successor as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. 

Army, Vietnam. During the briefing, the engineers pointed out several problems 

with the civilianization program. Fewer troops in the construction units meant 

fewer supervisors. Local nationals could neither be employed in hostile areas 

nor stand guard or defend base camps. Their holidays conflicted with American 

work schedules. The engineers considered some jobs too complex for the civilians’ limited experience, and cited their poor vehicle and equipment maintenance habits, and possible labor problems. Parker insisted that the construction 

battalions could not absorb any more local nationals. Engineer units at the time 

the program started, he noted, were already employing as many civilians as they 

could find, train, and supervise. Eventually, the two brigades had difficulty in 

recruiting skilled workers from the reduced manpower pool, which the contractors also depended on for workers. One group, the 35th, reported that moving 

its construction units to rural areas had caused further problems in recruiting 

skilled employees. Parker succinctly concluded, “We cannot operate on a mobile 

basis in a counterinsurgency environment at reduced TOE strength.” He bluntly 

declared the civilianization program a complete failure. Generals Roper and 

Chapman echoed these concerns in their debriefing reports near the end of 1968. 

Roper preferred to use the civilians above the authorized military strengths, as 

was true earlier. Chapman suggested restricting civilianization to one company 

so that the other companies in a battalion could retain their “complete integrity 

and usefulness.”61

60 Msg, Peers NHT 1999 to Abrams, 1 Dec 68, sub: Upgrading ARVN Engineer Capabilities; 

Msg, Abrams MAC 16667 to Peers, 5 Dec 68, sub: Upgrading ARVN Engineer Capabilities, 

both in Abrams Papers, CMH; Debriefing, Parker, 14 Oct 69, p. 4, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 169–70; Heiser, Logistic 

Support, pp. 240–41. 61 Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in South Vietnam, 1–21 Nov 68, incl. 3, pp. 7–9, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 20th Engr Bde, p. 4, and 
Engineers at War

394

Fortunately, several new units joined the two brigades that year, easing 

troop losses. During August and September, the 116th Engineer Combat 

Battalion, a National Guard unit from Utah called to active duty in May following Tet, deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Phan Rang Air Base 

to begin a ten-month tour of duty. The last element of the 800-man battalion, 

the largest single National Guard unit deployed to Vietnam, arrived at the air 

base in mid-September. After additional training and attachment to the 35th 

Engineer Group, the 116th deployed to three locations in southern II Corps: 

battalion headquarters and Company D inland to Bao Loc, Companies A 

and C inland to Di Linh, and Company B south to coastal Phan Thiet. At 

Bao Loc and Di Linh, the battalion’s efforts centered on maintaining and 

upgrading Highway 20. It offered general engineering support at Phan Thiet. 

A second National Guard engineering unit sent to Vietnam, the 131st Light 

Equipment Company from Vermont, joined the 35th Group in September. 

After a short stay with the 577th Engineer Battalion at Tuy Hoa, the company 

moved inland in mid-November, joining the 70th Engineer Battalion at Ban 

Me Thuot. There it undertook the rebuilding of Highway 21, airfield work, 

and civil affairs projects that included moving Montagnards to more secure 

locations. Also in 1968, the last Regular Army battalion arrived in Vietnam. 

On 24 April, the 31st Engineer Combat Battalion reached Vung Tau aboard 

the USNS Barrett. Back in November 1967, General Duke had asked the 

chief of engineers to deploy the battalion, then based at Fort Bliss, Texas, two 

months ahead of schedule. General Ploger, assigned to the Office of the Chief 

of Engineers after leaving Vietnam, had cited the unit’s shortage of almost 

four hundred enlisted men and experienced officers and noncommissioned 

officers. He pointed out that an early deployment required strong justification 

and an “acceptance of serious reduction in training.” When the battalion did 

arrive, it moved to Blackhorse and accomplished a mix of combat support and 

construction projects, initially under the control of the 34th Group, and from 

July to November, under the 159th Group. In November, the battalion moved 

to Phuoc Vinh where it was committed to Operation Liberty Canyon and 

1st Cavalry Division. In December, the 31st Battalion was transferred to the 

79th Group.62

1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 35th Engr Gp, p. 6; Ltr, 1st Lt Raymond F. Bullock, CO, 26th Mil Hist 

Det, to Cmd Historian, HQ USARV, 19 Nov 68, sub: Civilianization of Engineer Construction 

Battalions (Briefing of Lt Gen Frank T. Mildren, DCG, USARV), 16 Nov 68, Historians files, 

CMH; Debriefing, Parker, 14 Oct 69, pp. 8–9 (quoted words, p. 9), Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA; Debriefing, Roper, 7 Oct 68, pp. 5–6, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA; 

Debriefing, Chapman, 30 Oct 68, pp. 4–5 (quoted words, p. 5), Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA. Debriefings in Historians files, CMH. 62 Ltr, HQ 18th Engr Bde to CG, Engr Troops, Vietnam, 18 Sep 69, sub: Evaluation of 

National Guard Units, incl. 1, 116th Engr Bn (Cbt), p. 6, incl. 2, 131st Engr Co (Light Equip), 

p. 37; Msgs, Rollins ARV 1928 to Ploger, 1 Nov 67, sub: Acceleration of Engr Bn, and Ploger 

GVP 935 to Rollins, 9 Nov 67, sub: Acceleration of Engineer Battalion, both in Duke Papers, 

CMH; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 68, 34th Engr Gp, p. 2, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 159th Engr Gp, p. 2, 

and 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 79th Engr Gp, p. 6; Annual Hist Sum, Aug 69 to Sep 70, 31st Engr Bn, 

n.d., pp. 5–6, Historians files, CMH.
A crane belonging to the 116th Engineer Battalion from the Idaho National 

Guard, which carried out engineer support in the highlands, including highway 

work
Engineers at War

396

The disposition of Army engineer forces at the end of 1968 reflected the 

emergence of the highway improvement program, which came up during the 

meeting between Generals Parker and Mildren. The discussion turned to engineer support in the four corps. In I Corps, seventeen Army, Navy and Marine 

nondivisional engineer battalions, four of these Army combat battalions, supported the equivalent of four and one-third U.S. divisions. II Corps had eleven 

Army engineer battalions (five combat and six construction) backing one division and a separate brigade. III Corps had ten Army battalions (four combat 

and six construction) supporting the equivalent of four divisions. And IV Corps 

had three construction battalions supporting two-thirds of an American division. Mildren criticized this breakdown, noting that the seventeen battalions 

in I Corps accomplished the same work as ten battalions in II Corps. Most 

of the battalions in I Corps, however, were not Army but Navy and Marine 

engineers under III Marine Amphibious Force control. The deputy U.S. Army 

commander pointed out that the bulk of engineer work would be concentrated 

in III and IV Corps. This meant moving the 19th Engineer Battalion from II 

to III Corps and the 35th Engineer Battalion from I Corps to IV Corps. In 

the end, the 19th remained in II Corps and continued working on Highway 1 

between Phu Cat and Mo Duc. As the year ended, the 35th and its attached 

517th Light Equipment Company began its second major move in one year. 

This time the battalion moved almost the length of the country from Da Nang 

to Binh Thuy to bolster the 34th Groups’ work along Highway 4 in the delta. 

Army engineers were now working on major sections of the nation’s highways: 

35 miles in I Corps, 290 miles in II Corps, 253 miles in III Corps, and 45 miles 

in IV Corps. The coming year would see even more military engineers and 

civilian workers committed to renovating the nation’s highways.63

63 Ltr, Mildren Briefing, 16 Nov 68; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 45th Engr Gp, p. 41, and 1 

Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 69, p. 1, Historians files, CMH.
13

The Land Lines of Communication

Before the arrival of U.S. forces, South Vietnam’s land lines of communication consisted of the system of highways and railroads built by the 

French. Though the French administrators of Indochina had constructed an 

effective if modest transportation system over the years, the destructive effects 

of World War II, the First Indochina War, and Viet Cong interdiction later 

had left the network in ruins. By 1965, the severing of these transportation 

links had disrupted economic development, restricted the government’s military movements, and raised serious questions about the government’s claim 

that it still controlled a fair portion of the countryside. As U.S. planners began 

considering intervention with ground combat troops to stave off a Communist 

victory, it was plainly evident that the system of roads and railroads would 

not support a modern expeditionary force. Other lines of communication, 

the ports and airfields, would have to be relied on first. Once the situation 

improved, ground transportation would be reclaimed.1

Early Roads and Rails

The most direct and preferred link between major cities during the French 

colonial period was rail. Before World War II, Indochina possessed some 1,800 

miles of narrow one-meter gauge track built to high standards. It was a single 

track line with double track or sidings at stations holding trains of varying 

lengths. Roadbeds consisted of steel ties (treated wooden ties near the coast) 

and deep rock ballast. The stretch running from the Demilitarized Zone to 

Saigon had been built so that trains did not have to climb up grades steeper 

than 1 percent. Designs also included gradual curves with few having a radius 

of less than 1,300 feet. French and Vietnamese engineers made deep cuts and 

fills well above the waterways, built tunnels, and built bridges to cross the 

many rivers—shallow most of the year but susceptible to major floods during 

the monsoon—descending from the highlands. The main line running from 

Saigon to Hue to Hanoi was completed in 1936, or some forty years after it 

was begun. Considered one of the finest railroad systems in prewar Southeast 

Asia, service operated daily between Hanoi and Saigon at average speeds of 

1

 For more political and economic background of the Vietnamese ground transportation 

system during the colonial period, see Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 2 vols. 

(New York: Praeger, 1967), 1:7–8, 21–22, 26–29, 32–33, 2:970–71; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A 

History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), pp. 115–18.
Engineers at War

398

twenty-seven miles per hour. A trip between the two cities usually took about 

forty-two hours.2

The colonial administrations simultaneously developed the highway system. 

By the beginning of World War II, Indochina could claim one of the finer road 

systems in the Far East with a network of approximately 22,000 miles, approximately two-thirds in the Vietnamese colonies. The French improved the indigenous “Mandarin Road,” originally built by the Annamite emperors to connect Hue with both extremities of their domain. Redesignated Colonial Route 

1 (later Highway 1), the stretch between Saigon and Hanoi became a modern 

all-weather road. Although, in contrast to the rail lines, the main highways were 

marginally designed, narrow, partially surfaced asphalt or macadam roads; they 

were still considered quite an accomplishment and appropriate for the light and 

intermittent traffic of the period. Road widths varied from sixteen to twenty feet 

and narrowed in mountainous regions and at bridges, typically at one-half of the 

road widths allowing only one vehicle to cross at a time. Steep grades and rugged 

terrain in the highlands, rice paddies in the lowlands, and seasonal monsoons 

presented formidable obstacles to the road builders. The French improvised construction techniques and relied heavily on Vietnamese workers doing the manual 

labor and using local materials to place the base course. Workers usually topped 

off this “Telford base,” which consisted of large uniformly graded rock placed 

in a single layer over a compacted subgrade, with an asphalt or a light penetration macadam. Although adequate for prewar World War II traffic loads, the 

Telford base became unsuitable for heavier loads since wheel loads bearing down 

directly on to a single rock and the weaker soil beneath punched the rock into 

the subgrade. This defect was made worse during wet weather by the impact and 

vibration of fast, heavy moving loads. Maintenance became a process of annual 

reconstruction. The only way to resolve this built-in structural deficiency for 

heavier traffic was the complete removal of the Telford base.3

During the First Indochina War, fighting practically destroyed the highways and railroads of South Vietnam. More than 60 percent of the 11,800-

mile road system received damage in varying degrees, with most of the major 

bridges destroyed or damaged. The encroaching jungle reclaimed many sections of road, and only ruts and mud remained in sections still claimed to be 

open to traffic. Approximately two-thirds of Highway 1 between Saigon and 

Hue was impassable to motor traffic. Highway 19 from Qui Nhon to the western border had 310 permanent bridges; 240 of them had to be reconstructed. 

Only some 560 miles of the 1,400-mile railway system remained open, with 

enormous gaps separating the former link between Saigon and the new border 

at the Demilitarized Zone. The war left nearly all the stations, depots, and 

other rail facilities in a damaged state and little in the way of rolling stock and 

2

 Dunn, Base Development, p. 108; Indo-China, Geographical Handbook Series, Great 

Britain (Cambridge, England: Naval Intelligence Division, December 1943), pp. 424, 429–30; 

Jerry A. Pinkepank, “Rails Through Vietnam—1,” Trains 29 (March 1969): 27–28. 3

 Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 1:33; Indo-China, pp. 409–10; Vietnam 

Transportation Study, Based on Field Studies Conducted April 1965 through May 1966 for 

the Government of Vietnam and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

(Washington, D.C.: Transportation Consultants, Inc., June 1966), pp. 101–02.
399

The Land Lines of Communication

personnel to run the system. In 1955, the United States began to fund road 

and railway upgrading under the Foreign Aid Program.4

Much of the railroad was temporarily restored by the Vietnam Railway 

System, a semiautonomous railroad agency formed after the 1954 Geneva 

Agreement. Upgrading included modernization of shop facilities, mechanizing track maintenance, changing from steam to diesel-electric locomotive 

power, and replacing rolling stock with modern equipment. Bridge girders 

resting in the gaps suffered little damage and could be raised and reused. Since 

the bridges were of a standard design, damaged sections were easy to replace. 

By 1959 through service between Saigon and Dong Ha resumed, but the expedient nature of the repairs required much slower train speeds. Through service 

only lasted for a year and the government postponed further improvements. 

In September 1961, service between Saigon and Loc Ninh was suspended for 

security reasons. In the first six months of 1962, the Viet Cong blew up or 

derailed sixteen trains, machine-gunned thirteen others, and sabotaged the 

line at some thirty places. By April, all-night trains ceased operations. Viet 

Cong sabotage and the destructive typhoons of 1964 reduced the rail system 

to a little more than 180 miles. That year alone, the insurgents initiated 650 

incidents of sabotage. In total, 620 bridges and over 236,000 feet of track were 

destroyed. Locomotives were damaged nearly 400 times. Only short sections, 

4

 Vietnam Transportation Study, pp. 83, 129; Lt. Col. Nelson P. Conover, “The Lines of 

Communication Program in Vietnam, A Case Study,” Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, 

1973, p. 7 (hereafter cited as “LOC Program in Vietnam”), copy in Historians files, CMH.

The Mandarin Road (shown here in the early 1930s) ran adjacent to the South 

China Sea from the Chinese border to Saigon.
Engineers at War

400

such as Saigon to Bien Hoa and Da Nang to Hue, remained operational; 

the rest of the system remained too damaged to operate or unused. The rail 

authority also dropped attempts to restore the Saigon to My Tho line in the 

delta as impractical.5

Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese government considered the restoration of 

the battered railway system paramount for the nation’s development and steadfastly believed the railway a strategically important link. Government officials 

believed that a strong Republic of Vietnam had to have an operating railroad to 

serve as the backbone of the nation’s mass transportation system. Besides plans 

for restoring regular freight and passenger service, Vietnamese railroad officials 

planned for new lines to haul coal, fertilizer, and cement from existing and newly 

developed facilities. The railway service estimated that it would take six to eight 

months of minimal repairs to restore all of the disrupted traffic.6

 (Map 26)

5

 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 108–09; “The Trans-Viet-Nam Railroad: Its History and 

Significance,” News from Viet-Nam, Press and Information Office, Republic of Vietnam 

Embassy, 5, no. 14 (1 September 1959): 9–13; USOM, Annual Report for the 1958 FY (July 1, 

1957 to June 30, 1958) (Saigon, n.d.), pp. 9–10, USOM, Annual Report for FY 1961 (Saigon, 20 

November 1961), p. 31, both in Historians files, CMH; Pinkepank, “Rails Through Vietnam—2,” 

Trains 29 (April 1969): 38; The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and 

Programs, 2 vols. (Saigon and New York: Joint Development Group, Postwar Planning Group, 

Development and Resources Corporation, March 1969), 2:363, copy in CMH (hereafter cited 

as Postwar Development of Vietnam). 6

 “The Trans-Viet-Nam Railroad,” pp. 13–15; Vietnam Transportation Study, pp. 3, 132–

33; Mary E. Anderson, et al., Support Capabilities for Limited War Forces in Laos and South 

Vietnam (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1962), p. 75.

President Diem inaugurates railroad service from Saigon to Dong Ha on 

7 August 1959.
Tonle Sap

GULF

O F

T ONKIN

GULF

O F

THAILAND

SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

Red R

Black R

Mekong R

Mekong R

HAINAN

Con Son

Phu Quoc

DEMARCATION LINE

Inoperable

BURMA

NORTH

VIETNAM

CHINA

CHINA

THAILAND

LAOS

CAMBODIA SOUTH

VIETNAM

Lao Cai

Lang Son

HANOI

Haiphong

Dien Bien Phu

Luang Prabang

Vinh

Dong Hoi

VIENTIANE

Udon Thani

(Udorn)

Savannakhet

Quang Tri

Dong Ha

Hue

Da Nang

Paksé

Nakhon Ratchasima (Korat)

BANGKOK

Kratie

Pleiku

Kontum

Qui Nhon

Da Lat

Ban Me Thuot

Loc Ninh

Bien Hoa

Snuol

PHNOM PENH

Sihanoukville

Svay Rieng

Can Tho

SAIGON

Phan Thiet

Nha Trang

INDOCHINA

RAILROAD SYSTEM

1966

0 150

Miles

Map 26
Engineers at War

402

Meanwhile, of all the U.S. nonmilitary assistance provided to South 

Vietnam under the U.S. Operations Mission’s direction, most of the approximately 40 percent of the funds set aside for transportation was used on 

highway restoration. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group considered roadwork important and closely coordinated projects with Vietnamese 

engineers and the operations mission and its American contractors. Between 

1955 and 1962, the operations mission employed Capitol Engineering 

Corporation of Dillsburg, Pennsylvania, to do the engineering design and 

inspections, and Johnson, Drake, and Piper to do the construction. Starting 

in 1957, the construction firm built and improved over 180 miles of main 

highways. Highways 1A, 19, and 21 were designed and built to modern highway standards. The contractor also repaired other national and interprovincial routes and replaced damaged and demolished bridges with modern or 

temporary structures or ferries. A completely rebuilt four-lane Highway 1A 

and its eight bridges handled high-speed and heavy traffic over the twentyone miles between Saigon and Bien Hoa and provided an impressive showcase of American highway engineering. The new Bien Hoa Highway also 

boasted two large concrete four-lane bridges spanning the wide Dong Nai 

and Saigon Rivers (1,489 and 3,234 feet, respectively). Descending from 

Ban Me Thuot to Ninh Hoa over its ninety-three-mile course, Highway 21 

required forty-four bridges. The rebuilt Highway 19 between Qui Nhon and 

Pleiku also included forty new bridges within its 106-mile distance. Field 

surveys and construction plans proceeded for other major roads. After five 

years, however, the two firms left the country because of the worsening road 

security.7

The Vietnamese director general of highways, Ministry of Public Works, 

with U.S. financial and technical help, strived to maintain and rebuild the 

young nation’s roads. The director’s responsibility included managing the 

design, construction, and maintenance of the national and interprovincial 

highways, while local governments administered the provincial routes and city 

streets. To do this, the director relied on government workers, local contractors, and South Vietnamese Army engineer units. Because of President Diem’s 

interest in developing the Central Highlands, the highway agency concentrated 

efforts on improving Highway 14, considered by the government as the transportation backbone of the region. The 114-mile road project, the agency’s first 

major venture using mechanized equipment, included rebuilding the road and 

laying a double bituminous surface treatment, all to be done by the end of 1962. 

7 Vietnam Transportation Study, pp. 90–91; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 

8–9; Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 2:970–71; USOM, Activity Report, 30 June 

1954 to 30 June 1956, pp. 38–40, USOM, Annual Report (July 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958),

pp. 5–8, USOM, Annual Report for FY 1960 (Saigon, 1 October 1960), pp. 9–12, USOM, 

Annual Report for FY 1961 (Saigon, 20 November 1961), USOM, Annual Report for FY 

1962 (Saigon, n.d.), pp. 21–23, all in Historians files, CMH; Memo, Chief, Temporary 

Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) for Ch MAAG, 19 Jan 57, sub: Conference with 

USOM on Roads; Ltr, Dep Ch MAAG (Log) to Director, USOM, 10 Jun 57; DF, TERM 

Engineer to Ch MAAG, 11 Jun 57, sub: Road Priorities. Memo, Ltr, and DF in Samuel T. 

Williams Papers, MHI.
403

The Land Lines of Communication

Another program included major bridge reconstruction. Designed jointly by 

Capitol Engineering and the director general of highways and assigned to local 

contractors, work began in 1961 with intent to replace bridges on Highways 

1, 13, and 14. For replacement and repair of bridges destroyed or damaged 

by insurgent sabotage, the U.S. Operations Mission ordered large shipments 

of structural steel for fabrication into movable, military-type bridge sections.8

Meanwhile, South Vietnamese Army engineers focused their efforts on the 

“strategic roads” program in the highlands. Diem firmly believed that the new 

rural roads would open the remote area to settlement and support military 

operations. Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, the chief of the military advisory 

group, fully supported the rural project because it provided good training and 

meshed nicely with U.S. contingency plans. One project involved Route 5 from 

coastal Mo Duc inland to Kontum. Completion of this project would have 

resulted in another strategic link between the highlands and the coast and 

possibly led to future commercial and strategic links to Laos and Thailand. 

The routing of a section through Pakse in Laos became the topic of many 

high-level discussions between U.S. and Vietnamese officials. While the highway department worked along the eastern one-third of the road, troops of 

the 4th Engineer Combat Group advanced from Kontum over the remaining 

and more difficult stretch. Then in late 1959, the Viet Cong launched several 

hit-and-run attacks along the road. The insurgents succeeded in setting fire 

to the wooden bridge decks (a frequent practice throughout the war), damaged some construction equipment, and captured an engineering work party. 

As the insurgents increased the number of attacks, American advisers were 

evacuated.9

Despite these setbacks, Saigon in early 1962 renewed the road-building 

plan for the entire country. Plans included more than 180 miles of military 

roads of minimum standards reaching to outposts in previously inaccessible mountainous areas near the Cambodian and Laotian borders. South 

Vietnamese Army engineers gave this effort high priority, and U.S. Seabee 

teams added some military roads at Special Forces camps. Several U.S. advisers considered the plan too ambitious, however, and in the end Saigon did not 

accomplish its goals. In May 1963, MACV headquarters reported that out of 

8

 USOM, Annual Report for FY 1961, p. 26, and ibid., FY 1962, pp. 22–23; Dunn, Base 

Development, p. 99; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 8. 9

 Spector, Early Years, p. 307; “Communists Attack South Vietnamese Roadbuilders,” Daily 

Intelligence Bulletin for 19 Nov 59, Asst CofS for Intel, DA, p. 4, Historians files, CMH; Memo 

of Conversation Between Diem and Williams, 20 Dec 57, in Foreign Relations of the United 

States, 1955–1957, vol. 1, Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 

729, 889–93; Memo, Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams, Ch MAAG, for Amb Elbridge Durbrow, 14 

Jan 59, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 1, Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 131–33. Both volumes contain numerous references to 

President Diem’s interest in this program and highway restoration. On 9 May 1957, during 

his visit to the United States, the Vietnamese leader outlined his strategic highway program 

in the highlands to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The American president, half jokingly, 

said there was an old adage that roads sometimes were a “golden bridge for your enemies.” For 

more on the Eisenhower comment, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. 

1, Vietnam, pp. 797–98.
Engineers at War

404

nine hundred miles of roads programmed for improvement and construction, 

the government’s military and civilian engineers succeeded in accomplishing 

only 20 percent of the roadwork.10

By then the director general of highways lacked the capability to improve 

much less restore the nation’s road system. Much of the equipment left by the 

American contractors stood idle for lack of repair parts and adequate maintenance support, and the central repair facility filled rapidly with unusable 

and deteriorating machinery. Although the director issued a “Ten-Year Plan 

of Highway Improvement, 1965–l975” in 1964, in reality no capability existed 

to carry it out. The Vietnamese also persisted in using outdated and improper 

engineering practices learned under the colonial administration. Many officials recognized these defects, but supervisors and laborers fearing the possible 

loss of jobs strongly resisted modernization. To make matters worse, the U.S. 

Operations Mission’s advisory staff had dropped to just four people in the 

agency’s Roads Branch of its Public Works Division.11

Deteriorating road conditions persisted. Frequently, the Viet Cong sabotaged roads using the “piano keyboard” method. This old Viet Minh practice cut trenches several hundred yards along alternate sides of the roadway, 

thereby stopping vehicle traffic but leaving a small walkway for pedestrians 

and insurgents. Cutting roadways and destroying culverts and bridges reversed 

most of the earlier rebuilding efforts. Because the work crews lacked sufficient 

security on the job, nearly all work on the highway system stopped. The storms 

that swept over the country in late 1964 exacerbated the already deteriorating 

road system. During 1965, entire sections of key Highway 1 were closed to 

traffic in several provinces, and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular 

units threatened to sever Highway 19, effectively dividing the country.12

The U.S. Agency for International Development, the operations mission’s 

successor organization, urgently revived its transportation program for the 

hard-pressed Vietnamese nation. In April 1965, the Agency for International 

Development negotiated a contract study with a Washington firm to analyze 

South Vietnam’s entire transportation system, particularly roads and the 

means to their improvement. By then the United States had made a large 

investment in the road system, over $57 million between 1955 and 1964. Some 

of this work greatly helped the U.S. military buildup. The Saigon to Bien Hoa 

Highway carried an increased volume of military traffic and served as the link 

to large bases built along its route. Despite its poor condition and security, 

Highway 19 still served as a vital link in the movement and resupply of U.S. 

forces in the Central Highlands. Still, the study, which was completed in June 

10 MFR, MAAG J–3, 1 Mar 62, sub: Briefing for William P. Bundy, Dep Asst Sec Def for 

International Security Affairs; Memo, Robert H. Johnson, National Security Council Staff, for 

Walt W. Rostow, Dep Spec Asst to the President, 14 Oct 61, sub: Subjects for Exploration in 

Vietnam; MAAG-Vietnam Military Assistance Plan/Program, FY 1964–1969, 1 May 1963. All 

in Historians files, CMH. For more on the Seabee teams’ roadwork, see Marolda, From Military 

Assistance to Combat, pp. 192–200, 346–55; and Helping Others Help Themselves, pp. 29–43. 11 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 9; Vietnam Transportation Study, pp. 110, 113–14.

12 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 8; Vietnam Transportation Study, p. 91; MACV 

History, 1965, p. 122.
405

The Land Lines of Communication

1966, showed that damage had reduced the capacity of the country’s transportation network by at least 50 percent. The study declared the railway system 

almost entirely inoperative, the highways cut in many places with more than 

one thousand bridges and culverts damaged or destroyed, and the capacity 

of inland waterways blocked in many places. Even if the director general’s 

crews could repair some of the road damage, they could not have sustained 

the level of maintenance needed to overcome the deterioration caused by the 

increased weight and volume of heavy military vehicles. Between 1957 and 

1966, railway freight dropped nearly 50 percent. Only coastal shipping and 

civil air transport managed to expand service. As for solutions, the Agency 

for International Development study outlined logical tasks for postwar nation 

building, but these were insupportable because no one could foresee the extent 

or duration of the war.13

Initial Restoration Arrangements

Early in the U.S. buildup, land-line improvements had lagged behind logistical facilities and air and water lines of communication, but this changed as 

road usage increased. Initially, engineer troops used expedient methods such 

as filling craters, tactical bridging, and some road and bridge improvements 

to support tactical and logistic traffic. During 1966, road traffic increased at 

an accelerated rate. It was helped by General Westmoreland who urged commanders to use the roads instead of relying on helicopters. By recognizing 

that major improvements would have to be made to the ground transportation 

system, engineering staffs developed plans to restore the railway system and 

major portions of the road network leading to ports and major bases. A bypass 

to move convoys around congested Saigon was also considered essential. In 

April 1966, General Ploger proposed building a new direct road connecting 

Long Binh with the 25th Division’s base camp at Cu Chi. The proposed twolane paved road included fabricating a large bridge near Phu Cuong. Though 

the II Field Force commander was reluctant to provide road construction 

security, General Engler, the USARV commander, approved the highway and 

detailed planning began. Ploger also directed his group commanders to help 

South Vietnamese roadwork and to issue materials if bridges and roads were 

built to U.S. specifications. As far as committing U.S. engineers to the highways, which were deteriorating because of heavy traffic, he had to balance 

roadwork with all the priority tasks assigned to Engineer Command. In early 

December, Ploger set maximum and minimum guidelines for his commanders. 

A minimum of 10 percent of unit effort would be devoted to roadwork. In 

January 1967, Westmoreland reiterated to his field commanders that because 

of limited tactical airlift capability and the need to strengthen the nation’s 

13 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 9–10; Vietnam Transportation Study, p. 91; 

MACV History, 1965, p. 3; Dunn, Base Development, p. 99; Postwar Development of Vietnam, 

2:364.
Engineers at War

406

economic posture, the “overall strategy will include aggressive action to open 

secure, and use land and water lines of communication.”14

Military planners understood that programs funded by the Agency for 

International Development had strategic military value, and they began to 

take steps to merge the efforts between U.S. and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies. MACV J–4 and the Directorate of Construction coordinated 

roadwork with Saigon’s Joint General Staff through a Joint Roads and Bridges 

Committee. During a meeting held in April 1966, the committee discussed 

plans to reinforce bridges along Highway 15 to the port at Vung Tau. At the 

same meeting, the committee agreed to dispatch a joint team of military and 

civilian engineers to reconnoiter Highway 1 from Ninh Hoa to Phan Rang and 

from Qui Nhon to Bong Son. In May, the committee set priorities and classification standards for the selected routes. Class 50 roads with two-way Class 

35/one-way Class 50 bridging became the norm for divisional loads. Following 

the Highway 1 reconnaissance, the South Vietnamese Army chief of engineers 

used these standards to decide which bridges should be replaced. The MACV 

director of construction then arranged the transfer of steel beams from U.S. 

Agency for International Development stocks to U.S. and South Vietnamese 

engineers to get the bridge work under way.15

Similar arrangements took place to restore the railroad. In March 1966, 

a Joint MACV/Agency for International Development Study Group reviewed 

the reconstruction and security efforts and considered the South Vietnamese 

government’s proposal that the U.S. command rent the railroad system. 

MACV headquarters, which did not plan to operate a U.S. military rail service, declined the offer, preferring to have U.S. forces continue the customer 

relationship with the Vietnam National Railway Service. In April, Washington 

pledged additional commodity support provided the Vietnamese government carried out railway operations and reconstructed those sections damaged by floods and the war. Reconstruction efforts were coordinated through 

three standing committees composed of members of the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and 

the South Vietnamese government. Primary responsibility rested with the 

South Vietnamese/U.S. Railway Reconstruction Committee. A joint U.S. 

Railroad Coordinating Committee consisting of MACV staff and civilian aid 

officials met for the first time in August and held regular monthly meetings. 

The Directorate of Military Construction and the Agency for International 

Development prepared to reconstruct some 375 miles of a 713-mile system by 

the end of 1967. The plan encompassed four phases, and some slippage was 

anticipated. This objective was in line with one of the goals set forth during 

a recent U.S.-South Vietnamese conference in Honolulu: to increase the open 

14 Quoted in MACV History, 1967, vol. 1, p. 327; Dunn, Base Development, p. 99; Ploger, Army 

Engineers, p. 115–16; Ltr, Ploger to COs 18th Engr Bde, 79th Engr Gp, 159th Engr Gp, 4 Dec 

66, sub: Allocation of Engineer Effort, box 31, 77/051, RG 319, NARA; Msg, COMUSMACV 

MACCOC11 08709 to CINCPAC, 19 Mar 66, sub: Rail and Road Communications—I and II 

Corps, box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 15 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, pp. 6–7, and 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, 

p. 8.
407

The Land Lines of Communication

roads and railroads from about 30 to 50 percent. Progress depended on the 

phased securing of areas through which the railroad passed. Both governments agreed that the Vietnam National Railway Service would rebuild the 

main lines and U.S. forces would fund and build spurs, sidings, and marshaling yards. The Agency for International Development furnished construction 

materials such as rails, ties, structured steel, bridge trusses, and equipment. 

In addition, the U.S. military ordered two hundred rail cars and spare parts 

to supplement the fleet of Vietnamese rolling stock for the handling of military cargo. The 1st Logistical Command would control the cars and make 

arrangements with the Vietnam National Railway Service for maintenance 

on a reimbursable basis. Of the $25 million programmed for restoration from 

1966 through 1969, about two-thirds ($16.8 million) of the funding came from 

the U.S. Agency for International Development.16

The railway contributed to the allied war effort in several ways. For instance, 

the first shipment along the Qui Nhon to Phu Cat section, which reopened in 

July 1966, delivered nine hundred tons of construction materials to build Phu 

Cat Air Base. During the construction, the Vietnam National Railway Service 

also hauled rock from the RMK-BRJ quarry outside Qui Nhon. This undertaking alone kept many dump trucks from clogging Highway 1, by then the 

main supply route to Bong Son. When Phu Cat Air Base became operational, 

the railroad hauled supplies, ammunition, and fuel on a daily forty-three-mile 

round trip along a secure route patrolled by allied troops. Similar arrangements 

were made in October to haul rock for air base construction at Tuy Hoa. Since 

the new airfield would cross the rail line, the Air Force had to relocate the line. 

Even closed sections were put to use as temporary bypasses for allied vehicular 

traffic. During Operation Thayer in late 1966, the redecking of the Bong Son

railroad bridge provided a critical link over the Lai Giang River since the highway bridge could not support required loads. The conversion of the railroad 

bridge for truck traffic turned out to be extremely timely after the Viet Cong 

destroyed two sections of the highway bridge. In I Corps, the marines removed 

sections of track between Da Nang and Chu Lai for vehicular use. After getting Saigon’s approval, the marines were supposed to stockpile the tracks, but 

South Vietnamese troops appropriated some rail left next to the right of way. 

The marines did transport the remainder to the Da Nang rail yard.17

Highway and railway security and restoration goals incorporated in the 1967 

Combined Campaign Plan met with varying degrees of success. Allied military 

16 MACV History, 1966, pp. 294–96; Heiser, Logistic Support, pp. 165–66; Dunn, Base 

Development, p. 109; U.S. Agency for International Development/Vietnam, Project Status 

and Accomplishment Report, July–December 1970, Project: Railway Rehabilitation, p. 209, 

Historians files, CMH; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, pp. 6–7, and 1 Jul–

30 Sep 66, MACDC, pp. 8–10; Msg, Lt Gen Jean E. Engler, DCG USARV, MAC 5568 to 

Besson, 4 Jul 66, Dunn Papers, CMH; MFR, MACJ03, sub: Railroad Briefing, 10 March 1966, 

12 Mar 66, box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-PO 40427 to 

CG, USARV, COMNAFORV, and Cmdr, Seventh Air Force, 7 Sep 66, sub: Vietnam Line of 

Communications Requirements, box 5, 69A/702, RG 334, NARA. 17 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 109–10; MACV History, 1966, p. 296; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 

1 Apr–30 Jun 66, MACDC, p. 7, 1 Jul–30 Sep 66, MACDC, pp. 9–11, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, 

MACDC, pp. 1–4; Pinkepank, “Rails Through Vietnam—2,” p. 42.
Engineers at War

408

operations included eliminating enemy ambushes from vital roads and rail lines. 

Land clearing of a 100- to 300-yard-wide strip of vegetation along key roads 

reduced the enemy’s ability to mount ambushes and reduced the effectiveness of 

those that did occur. The cleared strips also provided cleared right-of-ways for 

later route restoration and upgrading. This surge in operations and restoration 

work in 1967 increased the percentage of military essential roads classified as 

“secure” (Green). During 1966, the roads defined as secure—those that could be 

traveled during daylight hours without an armored escort—varied from a low of 

698 miles (23 percent) to 742 miles (43 percent). The 1967 Combined Campaign 

Plan identified 1,296 miles of roads essential for military operations. During the 

year, roads classified Green rose from 609 miles in January (35 percent) to 1,063 

miles (61 percent) in December. The goal of 50 percent secure was exceeded by 

almost 11 percent. Military engineers and contractors in 1967 upgraded 170 

miles of highway and city streets to MACV standards. They also maintained 

4,432 miles of roads and streets, constructed 18,218 feet of new bridging, and 

rebuilt or replaced 39,845 feet of destroyed or damaged bridges with tactical 

bridging. Highway tonnages increased approximately 100 percent over that 

moved in 1966. Specific achievements included the reopening of Highway 1 in 

southern II Corps and northeastern III Corps and the opening or securing of 

remaining stretches in I Corps. In early 1968, engineers temporarily reopened 

the road from Saigon all the way to the Demilitarized Zone, but Highway 1 still 

required major upgrading and many sections remained vulnerable to sabotage 

and ambushes.18 (Map 27)

On the other hand, railroad restoration plans continued to lag in 1967. 

The number of sabotage incidents clearly showed the Viet Cong’s determination to disrupt restoration of the system. Attacks even took place on the 

outskirts of Saigon. In April, satchel charges caused light to heavy damage 

to ten locomotives and a crane parked in a rail yard. A month later, a mine 

caused a train’s derailment. Because of these attacks, the Vietnam National 

Railway Service restored less than sixty-two miles in the period December 

1966 to June 1967. To repair the recently damaged lines, the railway service diverted equipment and work crews from reconstruction projects. 

Some U.S. officials now seriously doubted the value of railroad restoration. 

In July, Robert W. Komer, who had recently assumed the new position as 

Westmoreland’s deputy for civil operations and revolutionary development 

support, or pacification, proposed eliminating or deferring railroad restoration. Komer asserted that available roads and coastal shipping voided the 

railroad’s economic significance. He believed railroad security troops could 

be put to better use in pacification. MACV J–4 reevaluated the plans and 

18 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 762, 764–66, 844–45; Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-PO 

32400 to CINCPAC, 2 Oct 67, sub: Highlights of Land Clearing RVN—Opn Paul Bunyon,

Westmoreland Message files, CMH; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 144. For more on 

the reopening of Highway 1, see Msgs, COMUSMACV MACJ322 19486 to DCG USARV, 

CG III MAF, CG I FFV, CG II FFV, 15 Jun 67, sub: Opening of Highway 1; CG II FFV 

AVFBC-P 70009 to COMUSMACV, 1 Jul 67, sub: Opening of Highway 1; CG III MAF to 

COMUSMACV, 4 Jul 67, sub: Opening of Highway 1; CG I FFV AVFA-GC-PL A1974 to 

COMUSMACV, 5 Jul 67, sub: Opening of Highway 1. All in box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA.
4

4

4

4

4

1

20

11

21

15

13

22

14

14

14

19

1

1

1

1

1

9

27

31

8A

9

10

7A

5A

SOUTH CHINA SEA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Gulf

of

Thailand

Mekong R

Mekong R

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

NORTH VIETNAM

DEMARCATION LINE

Cu Lao Cham

Cu Lao Re

Dao Phu Qui

Con Son

Quang Tri

Khe Sanh

Da Nang

Tam Ky

Kontum

Dak To

Qui Nhon

An Khe

Hau Bon

Tuy Hoa

Ninh Hoa

Nha Trang

Ban Me Thuot

Pleiku

Da Lat

Phan Rang

Cam Ranh

Phan Thiet

Xuan Loc

Phuoc Le

Tay Ninh

My Tho Sa Dec Vinh Long

Phu Vinh

Can Tho

Ben Tre

Tan An

Go Cong

Bien

Hoa

Chau Phu Moc Hoa

Rach Gia

Ca Mau

Bac Lieu

Soc Trang

Hue

An Loc

Chu Lai

Quang Ngai

SAIGON

PHNOM PENH

Attopeu

Saravane

Stung Treng

Tchepone

Savannakhet

Kratie

Snuol

Svay Rieng

Paksé

ROAD SYSTEM

National Highway

Interprovincial Route

1960s

0

0

100

100

Miles

Kilometers

7B

1

Map 27
Engineers at War

410

facilities needed for U.S. logistical bases and recommended continuing restoration. General Abrams, acting for Westmoreland, advised Komer that “a 

decision to write off the rail system prematurely would also be undesirable. 

From a long-range standpoint, a balanced transportation system in Vietnam 

may prove valuable.” By October, however, persistent sabotage and difficulties moving materials to work sites set back the railway service’s scheduling 

by six months. At the end of 1967, 296 miles (39 percent) of the rail lines were 

operational, 61 miles (8 percent) were undergoing repair, and 413 miles were 

not operational (53 percent). Although the security goal of 55 percent was 

not reached, statistics alone did not present the complete picture. Movement 

of military tonnage by rail increased nearly threefold over that moved in 

1966. The Vietnam National Railway Service also transported vegetables 

from Da Lat to coastal towns and started a daily passenger service between 

Saigon and Long Binh to ease the commute for the base’s Vietnamese civilian workforce.19

19 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 766–69; Dunn, Base Development, p. 109; Memo, Robert 

W. Komer, Dep Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, for Westmoreland, 

9 Jul 67, sub: Vietnamese National Railroad System (VNRS) Restoration; Memo, Abrams for 

Komer, 22 Jul 67, sub: VNRS Restoration. Both in box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA. For more 

on the restoration schedule, see Staff Study, MACJ45, 29 Jun 67, sub: Vietnamese National 

Railroad, box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA.

South Vietnamese railway workers repair tracks between Qui Nhon

and Phu Cat.
411

The Land Lines of Communication

Running the Programs

The mature Lines of Communication Program, robustly organized and 

decently funded, dates from the end of 1967. Progress had not been lacking 

the previous year as planners had begun turning their attention from ports 

and bases to land lines restoration and improvement. For one thing, the 

perennial tug-of-war over land transport financing had been resolved in the 

Agency for International Development/Department of Defense Realignment 

Program of November 1966, which recognized the Agency for International 

Development’s fiscal limitations. Under this program, the Defense Department 

would fund certain civilian aid projects, including railway sabotage replacement and highway maintenance and upgrading, provided they were clearly 

war related or incurred more than 50 percent of their cost because of enemy 

attacks. Retroactive to 1 July 1966, the program tasked Department of the 

Army with programming, budgeting, and funding the highway maintenance 

program. The Army, in turn, passed the requirement to MACV headquarters 

and, in January 1967, the Construction Directorate assumed responsibility for 

developing the highway maintenance and upgrading portion of the realignment program.20

Even so, highway funding remained under pressure through 1967. Major 

shortfalls, including $35 million in Agency of International Development/

Department of Defense funds and $50 million in military construction contingency money, affected the upgrading of Highway 1 north of Cam Ranh Bay 

and Highway 4 south of Vinh Long. The Construction Directorate feared that 

the holdup of contingency funds could cause work on several major bridges 

and bypasses to slip one year. As it is, Fiscal Year 1968 requirements had 

grown to $109.5 million, and the directorate estimated that about $130 million 

(including $50 million in military construction funds) would be needed each 

year through the close of Fiscal Year 1970.21

Into the breach stepped Robert Komer who, in November 1967, traveled 

to Washington to solicit support for the pacification and highway programs. 

There he presented a memorandum to Secretary McNamara, pointing out 

crucial funding needs. He contended that roads were not only militarily essential and saved airlift, but they were also vital for pacification. Only military 

engineers or U.S. contractors, he said, could do the job. And as the Agency for 

International Development did not have the money, the Defense Department 

20 MACV History, 1967, vol. 2, p. 763; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 10–11; 

Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Oct–31 Dec 66, MACDC, pp. 42–43, and 1 Jan–31 Mar 67, MACDC, pp. 

1, 53; MACDC-EBD Fact Sheet, [5 Dec 67], sub: Highway Restoration Program in Vietnam, 

box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA. See also Msg, COMUSMACV MACDC-PO 08067 to Sec 

State and Sec Def, 9 Mar 67, sub: Upgrading of Highway System RVN, box 3, 70A/782, RG 

334, NARA; and Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Army and 

the Agency for International Development, 25 May 67, box 4, 74/167, RG 334, NARA. 21 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 11; MACDC-EBD Fact Sheet, [5 Dec 67], sub: 

Highway Restoration Program in Vietnam. For more on funding problems during the period 17 

April–26 June 1967, see backchannel messages between MACV’s directors of construction and 

the Defense Department’s chiefs of Southeast Asia Construction, Dunn Papers, CMH.
Engineers at War

412

was his only recourse. McNamara scribbled a note in the margin of the memorandum directing his comptroller and installations and logistics chief to find 

the money required. Komer later noted that the money was requested and 

approved on military grounds for pacification purposes. “Here,” he declared, 

“was a case where the two went quite well together.”22

From this point on, Washington recognized highway improvement work 

as a distinct entity and always referred to it as the Lines of Communication 

Program, or, in military terms the LOC Program, under the administration 

of the Directorate of Construction. In December, the U.S. Mission Council 

in Saigon agreed, and the formal transfer of military and civilian highway 

programs to MACV headquarters took place on 1 February 1968. Early in 

1968, the directorate’s consolidated highway funding request for Fiscal Year 

1969 again exceeded $100 million. Approved funding levels varied from year 

to year, but by 1972, the funding level in all categories of restoration reached a 

cumulative total of nearly $500 million.23

With the accent on organization and concentrated effort, the South 

Vietnamese military also came on board. On 1 November 1967, recognizing the 

inadequate coordination, program overlap, and duplication of work among the 

two allies, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff and MACV headquarters 

agreed to consolidate all responsibilities for land lines of communication. A 

Combined Central Highway and Waterways Committee consisting of representatives from Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, and South Vietnamese military and civilian agencies, and chaired by the chief of staff of the Joint General Staff, first met on 

22 November to discuss and approve the committee’s charter. Planning then 

advanced to restore and upgrade approximately 2,532 miles of national and 

interprovincial highways to support military operations and pacification and to 

stimulate economic development. Highway construction standards applied to 

all construction agencies: U.S., South Vietnamese, and allied engineers.24

22 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 20–21; Msg, Sec Def DEF 4127 to 

COMUSMACV, 1 Dec 67, box 3, 70A/782, RG 334, NARA; Interv, Rand Corp. with Robert 

W. Komer, Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program, 1966–1969, 

7 May 1970, p. 122, Robert W. Komer Papers, CMH. 23 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 18–19, 21–23, 40; Memo, Lt Col James S. 

Sibley, Chief, LOC Div, Engr Cmd, for CG, Engr Cmd, VN, 5 Jun 70, sub: Authority for LOC 

Program, incl. 3, and Memo, Brig Gen William E. Bryan Jr., Acting CofS, MACV, for Rollins, 

27 Dec 67, sub: Mission Council Action, incl. 4, 26th Mil Hist Det, LOC Study, 10 Feb 71, 

VNIT 813, CMH. See also MACV Directive 415–6, 11 Mar 70, Construction: Surface Lines of 

Communication, Restoration and Maintenance of Highways and Bridges, an. A, p. 2, Historians 

files, CMH. 24 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 19–20; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 67, 

MACDC, pp. V-13 to V-15; Dunn, Base Development, p. 100; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 161; 

MACV Directive 415–6, 11 Mar 70, an. A, p. 1. See also Charter for the Combined Central 

Highway and Waterway Committee signed by Gen Westmoreland (COMUSMACV), Gen 

Cao Van Vien (Chief, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), Mr Donald 

G. MacDonald (Dir, USAID), and Mr Buu Don (Ministry of Public Works), incl. 6, 26th Mil 

Hist Det, LOC Study, 10 Feb 71, VNIT 813, CMH; and Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, RVNAF 

Logistics, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

1980), p. 380.
413

The Land Lines of Communication

Organizational changes took place at the Directorate of Construction on 

1 January 1968 with the establishment of a separate Lines of Communication 

Division. The Construction Management Division, formerly responsible for 

the highway program, was deactivated with its remaining functions transferred 

to other divisions. The new division, headed by Col. Charles R. Clark, directed 

the planning and execution of all national and interprovincial highway programs, plus waterways, railways, and dredging done by military engineers, 

contractors (mainly RMK-BRJ), and American and Vietnamese civilian 

agencies. The Agency for International Development retained responsibility 

for secondary road projects in the provinces. Finally, on 1 February, the Lines 

of Communication Division took over the advisory mission, which included 

advising the director general of highways and his five highway district engineers and their staffs and the provincial public works chiefs on all aspects of 

the country’s roads and ferries. A third branch, the Advisory Branch, which 

included several civilian aid technicians, was added.25

Sustaining Highway Improvement

Before long, highway improvement evolved into the single biggest construction program of the Vietnam War. The Combined Central Highway 

and Waterway Committee and the Directorate of Construction’s Lines of 

Communication Division envisioned a highway program lasting through 1974, 

but General Westmoreland, recognizing its tactical and economic importance, 

directed an accelerated plan to complete most restoration work by the end of 

1971. As a result, priorities were adjusted, with 2,199 miles earmarked for earlier 

completion, and the remaining 333 miles placed in deferred status. These figures, 

however, did not include upgrading and new road construction supporting tactical operations in areas not served by the major road networks or other local 

road programs sponsored by the Agency for International Development. In 

addition, the Philippine Civic Action Group worked on local roads and bridges 

in Tay Ninh Province. Railroad restoration along the main branch lines also got 

increased attention. The Lines of Communication Division mainly concerned 

itself with U.S. military rail spurs, and the division regularly participated in the 

meetings of the joint railroad coordinating committee.26

25 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 22–23; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 22–23, 

100; Msg, COMUSMACV 10964 to CG, USARV, Cmdr Seventh Air Force, COMNAVFORV, 

18 Apr 68, sub: Transfer of Highway Advisory Functions to MACV, box 6, 71A/354, RG 334, 

NARA; Memo of Understanding, MACDC-LOC, 1 Feb 68, sub: HQ MACV Assumption 

of the Highway Civil Advisory Responsibility, in Booklet, MACDC-PO, Development of 

the Construction Directorate, 15 Jun 70, box 11, 72A/870, RG 334, NARA. See also 26th Mil 

Hist Det, LOC Study, 10 Feb 71, 10 Apr 68, sub: Transfer of Highway Advisory Functions to 

MACV, incl. 5, and above cited 1 Feb 68 Memo of Understanding, incl. 9, VNIT 813, CMH. 26 Dunn, Base Development, p. 103; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 23; Tregaskis, 

Building the Bases, p. 391; Larsen and Collins, Allied Participation in Vietnam, p. 64; MACV 

History, 1968, vol. 2, p. 660; MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. IX-90, IX-92; Memo, HQ MACV, 

MACJ45, sub: Minutes of Meeting, Joint MACV/USAID Railroad Coordinating Committee, 

9 Feb 68, box 1, 71A/354, RG 334, NARA.
Engineers at War

414

The centralized management and increased planning capability showed in 

other areas as well. Improved cost estimates and cost accounting made funding, if not easier, at least more orderly. More explicit construction standards 

set forth as the result of a clearly defined highway program enabled the Navy’s 

Officer in Charge of Construction to hire specialized architect-engineer firms 

to solve design problems. Nearly all of the Navy’s design firms were now 

involved in highway projects. Their diverse and sophisticated skills ranged from 

developing computerized bridge designs using prestressed concrete beams to 

photogrammetric designs of highway layouts. By 1969, the architect-engineer 

effort expanded to $15 million in design contracts alone. The road builders 

also anticipated the large bridge-building requirement, and the design firms 

developed a series of standard designs for bridge decks, beams, prestressed 

concrete piles, pier protection, security lighting, and abutments. As a result, 

design costs averaged a low 1.5 percent of bridge construction, reducing design 

costs, simplifying construction, and saving time.27

Army engineers relied on civilian consulting firms to provide engineering 

expertise and methods to improve quality control. For instance, the U.S. Army 

Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, hired Quinton-Budlong Company 

to design bridges, to review road and bridge designs prepared by the units, 

and to give advice on equipment operation and maintenance, safety, and other 

engineering services. Included among the more than one hundred employees 

in Vietnam were experts in quarry and asphalt plant operations, well drilling, welding, mechanics, electrical designs, and licensing equipment operators. 

Formally referred to as “technical representatives,” several employees functioned at work sites and unit headquarters—including sixteen at 18th Engineer 

Brigade. Leo A. Daly Company concentrated on architectural engineering 

tasks, and Technical Services Corporation provided four asphalt equipment 

experts. The U.S. Army Construction Agency, Vietnam, trained quality assurance personnel who checked the quality of crushed rock, earth compaction, 

and asphalt production and gathered other quality control data. Since quarries and asphalt plants were the key to carrying out the highway program, 

commanders and staffs looked for ways to improve operations. In 1970, Brig. 

Gen. Henry C. Schrader, the 18th Brigade’s commander, started organizing 

engineer industrial control centers at group headquarters. The centers, consisting of at least one officer and several noncommissioned officers and enlisted 

men from each battalion running a quarry and asphalt plant, served as a centralized agency in the planning, installation and construction, and operation 

for all industrial complexes in each group. Modern soil-testing devices such as 

nuclear dosimeters were also used, and a central materials testing laboratory 

was established at Long Binh. General Schrader personally played a major 

role in obtaining and evaluating the nuclear dosimeters.28

27 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 24, 48; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 420; 

Interv, Richard Tregaskis with Frank S. McGarvey, Morrison-Knudsen International Company, 

Inc., Boise, ID, 19 Jun 70, p. 11, Richard Tregaskis Papers, Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command Hist Ofc, Port Hueneme, Calif. 28 Msg, CG, USAECAV to CINCUSARPAC, 11 Jul 68, sub: Engineering Contract Support, 

box 2, 74/167, RG 334, NARA; Maj. Henry A. Stearns, Maj. Rudolph E. Abbott, and Capt. 
415

The Land Lines of Communication

Highway construction standards followed U.S. practices as much as 

possible. These standards, based on criteria established by the American 

Association of State Highways Officials, ranged from a Class A highway (23 

feet wide and 8-foot shoulders) to a Class F road (23 feet wide and 2-foot 

shoulders). The Directorate of Construction incorporated the Class F road to 

make the most use of the French-constructed highway system’s alignments on 

existing embankments. This class called for laying a rock or asphalt stabilized 

base over the existing road and widening the traveled way, or actual road less 

shoulders, to 23 feet and paving it with an asphaltic concrete surface. Design 

life of the rehabilitated highway system ranged from twenty years for a Class 

A road to ten years for Classes C or D. Design life did not apply to the Class 

F roads.29

Bridges were essential links along the stretches of restored highways. One 

inventory showed approximately 750 bridges in the road net’s restoration and 

upgrading program. Over one-third of these bridges met satisfactory conditions or were under construction when the program began. Culverts would 

replace many bridges, and others would not have to be replaced for several 

years. Plans called for approximately 250 new bridges totaling 37,000 feet. 

Standard roadway widths for two-lane roads were set at 25 feet. Designs also 

provided for curbs and one-meter (3.3-foot) width sidewalks with guardrails. 

Short span bridges of 165 feet or less called for 40-foot roadway widths without 

sidewalks. Since bridges were the most vulnerable links of the highway system, 

engineers devised various methods of protection. Pier protection and security 

lighting systems were included in designs for major bridges. The chain-link 

fence stand-off pier protection system consisted of steel beams driven into the 

riverbed with fencing and concertina wire hung from the beams. In regions 

with extreme tidal variations, engineers built a flotation system known as a 

floating catwalk. This system could be fabricated easily, and the Styrofoam 

or steel balls were floated to the bridge for installation. Once emplaced and 

covered with wooden platforms, the catwalk was connected with chain-link 

fencing and the interior was filled with concertina. The floating catwalk also 

served as an observation post for guards, who could walk completely around 

the bridge pilings at water level. Antiswimmer devices and mine booms were 

developed to frustrate enemy demolition teams. Concertina wire was suspended from floating buoys and fastened on the river bottom. Changes in the 

tides, typical in most of Vietnam’s waterways, caused the concertina to shift 

James L. Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” Military Engineer 65 (March-April 

1973): 85; 1st Lt. Doug Noble, “Quinton-Budlong, The Consulting Engineer,” Kysu’ 2 (Spring 

1970): 9–10; Memo, Brig Gen Henry C. Schrader, CG, 18th Engr Bde, sub: Industrial Complex 

Control Center, 23 Jun 70, Henry C. Schrader Papers, MHI. See also Engr Cmd, Reg no. 415–

30, Construction: Quinton-Budlong Consultants, 8 Apr 71, box 2, 74/571, RG 334, NARA; 

Interv, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th Mil Hist Det, with 1st Lt Robert McKay, OIC [Officer 

in Charge], Central Materials Testing Lab, USAECAV, 2 Jan 71, VNIT 794, CMH; 1st Lt. 

Robert Hoyler, 18th Engr Bde, Report on the Evaluation of Nuclear Moisture-Density Gauges, 

18 Apr 71, Vietnam Collection, MHI. 29 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 102–03; History, LOC Program, incl. 3, tab X, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72, p. 183, OCE Hist Ofc. For more on highway standards, see 

MACV Directive 415–6, 11 Mar 70, an. A.
Floating balls being readied for installation at the Phu Cuong Bridge pier 

protection system
417

The Land Lines of Communication

and agitate unpredictably, hindering swimmers from trying to pass through it. 

Mine booms constructed of heavy timber attached to steel cables and across 

the river upstream of the bridge were employed to stop or detonate floating 

mines. Usually several feet of chain-link fence were hung from the timbers to 

catch submerged mines.30

The highway program required the procurement and transportation of 

vast quantities of construction materials and equipment to the work sites. As 

roadwork moved farther away from the logistics bases, a greater burden was 

placed on the entire supply system, and to reduce the number of times material 

was handled planners sought ways to ship directly from supply points to the 

users. Stocks of cement, asphalt, and culvert material dwindled rapidly, and 

engineers and logisticians improvised or borrowed materials from other services. For instance, the 45th Group borrowed construction materials from the 

Seabees when it moved to I Corps in early 1968 and began to reopen Highway 

1 through the Hai Van Pass. It also became clear that the standard equipment 

assigned to engineer units to do roadwork would not suffice.31

The short timetable for completing the roadwork prompted ideas for 

additional road-building equipment. Even if commanders shifted more engineer troops to the roads, the construction rate would not increase since road 

construction was limited by rock production and rock-hauling capability. In 

1968 at the suggestion of the Lines of Communication Division, the USARV 

Engineer, the Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, and the 18th 

and 20th Brigades analyzed rock requirements, production capabilities, and 

the advantages of furnishing Army engineer units with high-capacity civilian 

construction equipment. The engineers concluded that additional rock-production equipment (rock crushers, rock drills, and large-capacity rock-hauling 

trucks) and road-working equipment (heavy-duty and hand compactors, 

asphalt pavers and distributors, dump trucks, and cement mixers) would 

be required to complete the road program by the specified time. Evidence 

showed that “straight commercial” equipment used in the United States and 

not designed to meet military requirements (such as the twenty-ton rough 

terrain crane) or modified for military use (like the Caterpillar 830MB and 

Clark 290M wheeled tractors and the Euclid and LeTourneau 18-cubic-yard 

earthmoving scrapers) would increase the troops’ road-building ability to the 

rigorous standards required for a permanent highway system.32

30 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 120–21; MACV Directive 415–6, 11 Mar 70, an. B; Capt. 

Edward D. Florreich, “Lines of Communication Restoration Program,” Kysu’ 2 (Spring 1970): 

13. See also Bridge Protection in the Republic of Vietnam, Engr Adv Div, MACV, 1 Jan 68, 

MHI; and Capt. Robert J. Oldmixon, “Pier Protection,” Engineer 2 (Spring 1972): 26–29. The 

41st Port Construction Company worked on many pier protection systems in and around 

Saigon. For more on techniques and equipment, see Interv, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, with Capt Harold W. Wagner Jr., CO, 41st Engr Co (Port Const), 4 Dec 70, VNIT 

774, CMH. 31 Dunn, Base Development, p. 102. For more on engineering materials, see Interv, Christensen 

with Lt Col John L. Moffat, Dir of Materiel, USAECV, 7 Apr 71, VNIT 879, CMH. 32 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 103–06; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 24–25; 

Purchase of Construction Equipment with MCA [Military Construction, Army] Funds, p. 1, 

incl. 3, tab K, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13. 
Engineers at War

418

Purchase of commercial construction equipment totaling some $23 million 

from Military Construction, Army, funds began in December 1968. By July 1969, 

most of the more than seven hundred items of machinery in original factory colors 

arrived at the ports of Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Saigon. For easier identification, a purple roadrunner cartoon character running on a green circle with the 

letters MCA-LOC appeared as an emblem on all the new equipment. Among the 

most important items reaching the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades were eight 

250-ton-per-hour rock crushers and 226 twelve-cubic-yard dump trucks. The 

high-volume all-electric crushers, considered the key to the success of the highway 

program, replaced the lower-capacity 75-ton-per-hour plants. Just as portable as 

the smaller plants but easier to operate and maintain, the new crushers required 

fewer operators (one compared to three for the 75-ton-per-hour crushers), and 

produced at least three times as much rock. In addition, six 225-ton-per-hour 

crushers from depot stocks in the United States arrived before the 250-ton-perhour models, thus making possible the rapid rate of road improvement in 1969. 

When the new crushers were put into operation, many of the 75-ton-per-hour 

crushers judged uneconomically repairable were turned in. Feeding the fourteen 

large crushers required the addition of thirty-six track drills, ground-level rock 

feeders, and 600-cubic-foot-per-minute air compressors to the equipment purchase 

list. Quarry operations also improved with the addition of 29 six-cubic-yard scoop 

loaders to load the 100 fifteen-cubic-yard Euclid dump trucks purchased in 1967 

for quarry work. Far simpler to operate, faster, and easier to maintain, each of the 

new scoop loaders replaced two 40-ton crane shovels. The new twelve-cubic-yard 

dump trucks joined the fleet of standard five-ton Army dump trucks, by then 

hard-pressed to meet hauling needs. New earth compaction equipment included 

sixty heavy-duty compactors plus hand compactors to speed up culvert backfilling. Also twelve new backhoes for culvert placement and excavation in confined 

areas saved thousands of man-hours of digging and many hours of equipment 

time on crane-mounted shovels and clamshells. To speed up the paving effort, 

six asphalt pavers and fourteen distributors augmented the equipment on hand. 

Seven asphalt curb extruders were ordered. Their use in the Central Highlands 

helped redirect and channel monsoonal runoff and the manufacture of curb and 

gutter systems in villages and towns. Since bridges required about an average of 

165 cubic yards of concrete for abutments, deck slabs, and approach slabs, the 

engineers requested additional cement mixers. Central batch plants and transit 

mixers replaced the small 16S cement mixers and allowed work on more than one 

bridge at a time, thus significantly reducing production and maintenance manhours. Altogether, the new equipment increased the construction capability of the 

two brigades by as much as 50 percent.33

33 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 120, 124–25; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 103–07, 122; 

Army Activities Rpt, 9 Jul 69, p. 41, CMH; Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, p. 23, Historians files, 

CMH; Florreich, “Lines of Communication Restoration Program,” p. 12. See also Interv, 1st Lt 

Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Paul J. Kline, Chief of Supply Br, Supply 

and Maint Div, Engr Sec, USARV, 9 Mar 69, incl. 4, VNIT 445, CMH. For the Army’s justification to purchase commercial construction equipment, see Memo, Ploger, OCE, for Asst Sec 

Army (Installations and Logistics), sub: Requirement for Heavy Construction Equipment—

USARV, 19 Jul 68, Historians files, CMH. The merits of military and commercial construction 
419

The Land Lines of Communication

Manufacturers quickly provided the off-the-shelf construction equipment. In fact, this transaction was much faster than the normal procurement 

of standard military equipment. Since most of the commercial buy was new 

to the Army, the contract inserted provisions for factory representatives to 

prepare the equipment for use and to train the operators. Management of 

the equipment operators school came under the 169th Engineer Construction 

Battalion, which also picked up and processed all the equipment destined for 

20th Brigade units. By early 1970, the Long Binh–based battalion had distributed 103 pieces of equipment to the brigade’s units in III and IV Corps. The 

U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command also awarded a $5 million contract 

to Dynalectron Corporation of Fort Worth, Texas, to provide maintenance 

and repair parts support. In May 1969, the firm began setting up shop at 

twenty-six locations in Vietnam, and its employees, numbering between 125 

to 200 technicians, accomplished all unit-level maintenance and ran small 

repair parts distribution points at job sites for the 18th and 20th Brigade units. 

Vinnell Corporation provided backup engineer equipment and automotive 

maintenance support from its field maintenance shop at Cam Ranh Bay.34

In carrying out the highway restoration program, engineer units built base 

camps and industrial sites along the routes to be upgraded. This included 

building and maintaining quarries, asphalt plants, and access roads. During 

1969, the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades used more than 70,000 tons of rock 

every week, a rate that more than doubled the following year. The following 

year, the plants operated by engineer troops produced 340,000 cubic yards of 

rock and 60,000 tons of asphalt monthly to support the highway program. In 

addition, Army engineers relied on RMK-BRJ’s crushers for 38 percent of 

the rock required monthly to sustain an annual construction rate of 177 miles 

as set forth in 1968. By mid-1970, the two brigades ran eighteen rock-crusher 

sites. Most rock ended up as landfill, base courses, and asphaltic concrete on 

the roads. Of the eleven asphalt plants set up by 1970, all but two operated 

in conjunction with quarries. Both plants were located near paving sites, and 

trucks hauled rock to the plants from quarries and stockpiled.35

The near nonexistence of rock deposits in the Mekong Delta, where finding dry ground could sometimes be a problem, meant transporting large quantities of rock into the delta. At that time there were only two large sources for 

equipment are discussed in Maj. Gerald M. Tippins, “CCE—An Impossible Dream?” Engineer 

2 (Spring 1972): 12–15. 34 Dunn, Base Development, p. 122; ORLL, 1 Nov–31 Jan 70, 169th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 70, p. 

11, Historians files, CMH; 1st Lt. Eugene Roberts, “The Great Race, New Equipment,” Kysu’

1 (Summer 1969): 11; Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” 

p. 85; Visit to Various Headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam, 1–22 May 1969, incl. 5, p. 7, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14, 7 Jul 69, OCE Hist Ofc; Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, p. 16; 

“Other Logistical Support Services: Field Maintenance,” Vinnell 11 (May 1969): 12–14. 35 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 102, 111; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 124, 162; Briefing for 

the Undersecretary of the Army, incl. 14o, p. 7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16, 30 Apr 70, 

OCE Hist Ofc. For more on quarrying operations, see Spec. Mike Barry, “The Rhythm of Tam 

Quan Quarry,” Kysu’ 1 (Summer 1969): 3–5; Memo, Capt Kurt E. Schlotterbeck, 26th Mil Hist 

Det, for Mr Warner Stark, CMH, sub: 94th Quarry Detachment, 30 Nov 69, VNIT 547, CMH. 

VNIT 547 includes interviews, diagrams, photos, and a large-scale map of the Vung Tau area.
Engineers at War

420

crushed rock in the area—RMK-BRJ’s University Quarry outside Saigon and 

the 159th Engineer Group’s quarry at Vung Tau run by the 103d Construction 

Support Company’s quarry platoon. In November 1966, the consortium 

added a 400-ton-per-hour crusher to the 250-ton-per-hour plant and aggregate production jumped to an average of 6,500 tons per day. In late January 

1967, it reached a record production of more than 12,000 tons per day. Also 

that month, RMK-BRJ set up a hot-mix asphalt and concrete batch plant at 

its University Quarry site. Similarly, the Vung Tau quarry now operated by the 

94th Engineer Quarry Detachment evolved into the Army’s largest producer 

of crushed rock. This quarry produced most of the rock hauled to the 34th 

Engineer Group’s projects in the delta. By late 1969, Vung Tau’s production 

averaged 70,000 tons per month. Among the few outcroppings found in the 

northwest corner of IV Corps, two South Vietnamese quarries—an army 

quarry at Nui Sam and a Ministry of Public Works quarry at Nui Sap—produced rock for local highway and construction projects. By 1968, barges and 

sampans were transporting more than 150,000 tons of rock per month from 

these four quarries to off-loading sites in the delta. In January 1970, more than 

200,000 tons of rock were shipped, and in August 1971 production exceeded 

272,000 tons.36

36 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 102–03; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 124; Tregaskis, 

Building the Bases, pp. 249–50, 261; Diary of a Contract, pp. 255–56; Florreich, “Lines of 

Communication Restoration Program,” p. 12; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 66, 159th Engr Gp, p. 2, 13 

RMK-BRJ industrial sites such as the Phu Cat quarry and asphalt plant provided rock and asphalt for the highway program.
421

The Land Lines of Communication

Transporting rock to the delta greatly increased following the establishment of the MACV Delta Transportation Plan. The plan called for the 

construction of twelve barge off-loading points—seven by the U.S. Army 

(including the RMK-BRJ site at Can Tho) and five by the South Vietnamese. 

One key problem facing the planners was the gathering, repairing, and movement of off-loading equipment—clamshell cranes, bulldozers, and conveyor 

belts—and getting them to the sites. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development and U.S. Army, Vietnam, helped by obtaining some equipment for the South Vietnamese. Army Engineer Hydrographic Survey Team 

Number 1, a ten-man team based at Long Binh, the only one of its kind in 

the Army, charted water routes along the delta’s many canals.37

Expediting the distribution of crushed rock to where it was needed the 

most was charged to a small Delta Rock Agency formed within the Lines 

of Communication Division. This meant the three major customers in the 

delta—the U.S. Army, the South Vietnamese Army, and Vietnam’s Ministry 

of Public Works—would integrate construction operations and distribute rock 

on a quid pro quo basis. Their rock needs were forecasted for certain periods 

and forwarded to the Delta Rock coordinator, a Directorate of Construction 

staff officer, who decided what portion of each forecast would be filled at the 

discharge points. Crushed rock was loaded aboard barges linked together and 

ferried by Military Sea Transportation Service tugs to the unloading points. 

During 1971 over 7.1 million tons of crushed rock had been distributed, and 

almost 1.2 million tons were shipped in 1972. That year, two of the quarries 

ended operations: Vung Tau in February and University Quarry in June. To 

make up for the loss of the two quarries, South Vietnamese engineers increased 

production at Nui Sam, and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

extended its contract with Vinnell Corporation to run Nui Sap through 1973.38

May 66, Historians files, CMH; Memo, Schlotterbeck for Stark, 30 Nov 69, sub: 94th Quarry 

Detachment, p. 1; MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, p. IX-9; Ltr, CO, 34th Engr Gp to CG, 20th 

Engr Bde, 19 Oct 67, sub: Rock Requirements in the Delta, Historians files, CMH. 37 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 68, MACDC, p. IV-19, 1 Jul–30 Sep 68, MACDC, p. 

IV-7, 1 Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. IV-9, and 1 Jan–31 Mar 69, MACDC, 19 Apr 69, pp. IV-9 to 

IV-10, Historians files, CMH; Background Statement Leading to Formation of the Delta Rock 

Agency, incl. 3, tab E–1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; Spec. Mike Barry, “Down a Not 

So Lazy River,” Kysu’ 1 (Winter 1969): 25–26; MACV History, January 1972–March 1973, vol. 

1, p. E-32. For more on the U.S. Army Hydrographic Survey Team, see HQ, Engr Cmd, AVCCMO-I, U.S. Army Topographic Support of Military Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, 

25 Feb 71, pp. 58–82, Historians files, CMH; and Capt. Joseph Cascio, “The Water Mappers,” 

Kysu’ 1 (Spring 1969): 7–8. 38 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 68, MACDC, pp. IV-6 to IV-7, 1 Jul–30 Sep 68, 

MACDC, p. IV-8, 1 Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. IV-10, and 1 Jan–31 Mar 69, MACDC, p. 

IV-10; Concept of Organization, incl. 3, tab E–2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; Barry, 

“Down a Not So Lazy River,” pp. 25–26; MACV History, January 1972–March 1973, vol. 1, p. 

E-32. For more on the Delta Rock Agency, see AAR, Development of the Delta, Phase I, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, 18 Jul 69, which includes Interv, Capt Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, 

with Capt John H. Morgan, Coordinator, Delta Rock Agency, 10 Apr 69, incl. 7, and MACDCLOC, sub: Standard Operating Procedure Delta Rock Agency, n.d., incl. 9, VNIT 445, CMH; 

and, HQ, MACV Directive 55–15, 8 May 69, Transportation and Travel, Rock Movements, and 

Operations in the Delta, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

422

At times mud and the scarcity of rock, particularly in the delta, compelled the 

road builders to develop base course stabilization expedients. Engineers found 

that lime caused the clay to coagulate into sand-sized particles, which adhered 

together, forming a much more stable base than the clay alone. Henceforth, they 

used this stabilization method for all delta road construction. The clay-lime stabilization process was not new. It had been used by road builders in many parts 

of the world and tested on selected airstrips in Vietnam. Paddy clay could be 

used to build a strong and durable subgrade, making possible faster construction and allowing the rock barged in at great expense to be used only for the 

final base course and paving. As true of almost all other horizontal construction 

in Vietnam, this road-building technique could not be done in the monsoon 

season. When the rains stopped, roadside paddies were diked and pumped out. 

Bulldozers and earthmovers scraped out clay to form or expand a roadbed 

several feet above the surrounding paddies. As the clay dried out, controlled 

amounts of lime and moisture were added and mixed into the clay with a rotary 

tiller or disk harrow and compacted with a sheepsfoot roller or a segmented 

compactor and allowed to cure. Soil stabilization machines later were used to 

mix the lime with the clay fill. The engineers repeated this process with several 

(usually four) eight-inch layers of subbase. An eight-inch layer of crushed rock 

or cement was added to the last course, and a double layer of asphalt topped off 

the road. The 34th Engineer Group accomplished most of the thirty-seven miles 

along Highway 4 in the IV Corps area by using this method.39

39 Dunn, Base Development, p. 107; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 118–19; Conover, “LOC 

Program in Vietnam,” pp. 42–43; Florreich, “Lines of Communication Restoration Program,” 

Barges haul rock to the delta.
423

The Land Lines of Communication

Elsewhere in Vietnam engineers used similar stabilization methods. In June 

1969, the 554th Engineer Construction Battalion, 79th Group, started upgrading thirty-one miles of Highway 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc using Portland 

cement instead of lime. In this case, no suitable laterite for the subbase could 

be found in sufficient quantity along the route. The only source of rock for the 

base course available in the area was located near An Loc. Furthermore, the 

battalion would not have a rock crusher on site until late fall. Tests of the local 

silty sand, however, revealed an unusually low level of plasticity and twice the 

strength of lateritic material previously used for subbase construction. The 

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Elbert D. H. Berry, ordered further tests to see 

if cement would serve as a bonding agent between the silty sand particles, thus 

increasing the bearing capacity. After many tests, the battalion found that six 

inches of the soil-cement would provide Class A strength for the MACV Class 

F highway. This method eliminated the need for a rock quarry at An Loc, 

but it meant building a completely new parallel road since traffic could not 

travel on the base course during the seven-day curing process. Work started in 

late December when Vietnamese civilian workers laid out the bags of cement 

and dumped the contents on the new eight-inch subbase lift of silty sand. A 

grader in conjunction with a rotary tiller and a water distributor then spread 

and scarified the cement evenly over the surface. A segmented embankment 

compactor followed. The soil-cement, like concrete, required a moist cure. 

Since this method was almost impossible during the dry season, the 554th 

accomplished this with less effort by thoroughly dampening the completed 

base course and coating it with an asphalt cutback to seal in the moisture. 

After the curing period, the battalion paved the surface with two and one-half 

inches of asphaltic concrete.40

The Builders

To achieve the escalated rate of roadwork by 1971, the Lines of 

Communication Division and the Combined Central Highway and Waterway 

pp. 12–13; Interv, 1st Lt Raymond F. Bullock, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Richard E. 

Leonard, CO, 36th Engr Bn, 20 Mar 69, VNIT 445, pp. 5–8, CMH. VNIT 445 also includes 

other interviews, documents, and a large map covering highway and other construction in the 

delta. 40 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 119–20; Spec. Blanchard de Merchant, “Cement Stabilization 

of QL 13,” Kysu’ 2 (Spring 1970): 23–25. The 554th also faced a strange soil stabilization problem at a site of a just-completed dry span bridge on Route 8A near Phu Cuong, part of the 

main supply route from Cu Chi to Long Binh. Seven days after the bridge opened to traffic, the 

north lane of the east approach mysteriously dropped seven feet. More laterite and rock fill were 

added, but the approach continued to sink. A team of geologists and soils experts from the 20th 

Brigade discovered that this phenomenon was caused by the newly added fill that was slipping 

along a huge subsurface plane. The laterite and rock had displaced the silty, fluid paddy clay to 

the area of least resistance away from the “dam” created by the old roadbed along the south side 

of the new roadbed and the perpendicular bridge abutments. Having identified the problem, the 

engineers added blast rock and fill to the north side of each approach, thus creating sufficient 

force perpendicular to the subsurface plane and containing the clay. Capt. Gary D. McDonald, 

“The Terrible Temper of Rach Ba Bep,” Engineer 2 (Spring 1972): 10–11.
Engineers at War

424

Committee reordered priorities and switched responsibilities among the builders. Carrying out the highway program were the 20th Engineer Brigade in III 

and IV Corps, the 18th Engineer Brigade in II Corps and southern I Corps 

along Highway 1 to the Binh Son Bridge south of Quang Ngai, and the 3d 

Naval Construction Brigade in the rest of I Corps. RMK-BRJ supported the 

troops by providing rock and asphalt and upgrading assigned sections of road 

and building major bridges. South Vietnamese and allied military engineers 

participated to a smaller degree. In several areas, including Highways 19 and 1 

west and north of Qui Nhon, the consortium and troops worked jointly. The 

troops of the 45th Group prepared the roadbed and RMK-BRJ did most of 

the paving. The centralized management system introduced in late 1967 eased 

shifting of resources under changing conditions. For instance, engineer troops 

took over insecure road sections from RMK-BRJ. In addition, this planning 

took into consideration added repair and maintenance work caused by enemy 

action and monsoon weather. Often distances were too great to upgrade to 

MACV standards during one construction season, and road sections were 

simply patched up to survive the monsoon.41

Nevertheless, a considerable amount of work had already been done by 

1968. The 35th Engineer Group began paving operations at Cam Ranh and 

advanced both north and south along Highway 1. By early summer of 1967, 

the group also started fabricating twenty-foot reinforced-concrete spans. The 

159th Group paved Highway 15 between Long Binh and Vung Tau and built 

a causeway near the port city. Paving along Highway 19 between Qui Nhon 

and An Khe and Highway 1 north to Bong Son by the 45th Group and RMKBRJ was well under way. During 1968, the Combined Central Highway and 

Waterway Committee formally assigned 1,182 miles of the highway program 

to U.S. Army engineers, 218 miles to the Seabees, and 729 miles to RMK-BRJ. 

Early in the buildup, South Korean Army engineers of the Dove Unit, a task 

force devoted to local improvement programs based in Bien Hoa Province, 

began road and bridge work in the Saigon area. Later, South Korean engineers 

helped RMK-BRJ build a new North Capital Bypass around Saigon.42

As time passed, these figures changed because of funding, program reviews, 

and U.S. troop withdrawals. In 1969, South Vietnamese Army engineers formally entered the Lines of Communication Program and assumed responsibility for 103 miles of highways. By the end of 1969, the troops and contractor 

completed 997 miles. Work progressed slowly in 1970 adding another 464 

miles, for a total of 1,585 miles or 65 percent of the highway program. A 

cutback by the House Armed Services Committee in construction funds that 

41 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 23–25, 27; History, LOC Program, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, p. 184. For an example of road priorities shown on sketch maps 

corps by corps, see MACDC-LOC, Construction Bulletin No. 415–3–2, 15 Oct 69, sub: Lines 

of Communication Restoration Priorities, incl. 8, 26th Mil Hist Det, LOC Study, 10 Feb 71, 

VNIT 813, CMH. 42 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 117, 156; Larsen and Collins, Allied Participation in Vietnam, 

p. 123; Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” p. 86. For more 

on Highway 1, see Spec. Randy Hunter, “The Long Road: Asphalt Lifeline from the Delta to 

the DMZ,” Kysu’ 1 (Fall 1969): 17–22.
425

The Land Lines of Communication

year primarily involving highway restoration caused the Secretary of Defense 

to direct a thorough review of the highway program. In September, he reduced 

the fund ceiling by $49 million from $496.7 million to an interim $447 million. This resulted in the deferral of about 300 miles to be constructed by the 

South Vietnamese government later. U.S. Army troop responsibility dropped 

from 1,566 to 1,151 miles, the Navy from 267 to 248 miles, and the contractor from 614 to 560 miles. South Vietnamese Army engineer responsibility, 

however, increased from 103 to 322 miles. The priority assigned to the program 

remained high with 42 percent of the U.S. engineer troop effort, 25 percent of 

contractor effort, and 25 percent of South Vietnamese engineer troop effort 

devoted to the road program.43

The highway program had become the U.S. Army Engineer Command’s 

largest single project. As of early 1969, twenty-one of the 18th and 20th 

Engineer Brigades’ twenty-eight battalions and more than half of the 33,000 

troops had been directly involved in the road program at one time or another. 

That May sixteen battalions, nine in the 18th and seven in the 20th Brigade, 

were committed to highway upgrading, which in March absorbed 32.1 percent 

and 31 percent, respectively, of their total effort. By the spring of 1970, more 

than 11,000 men of the 26,000 in the two brigades were occupied in some 

aspect of the highway construction program. As U.S. combat forces withdrew 

from Vietnam, a larger proportionate share of engineer battalions stayed 

behind, with fourteen carrying out roadwork to the end of 1970. By then the 

19th Engineer Combat Battalion completed its portion of Highway 20 near 

the II/III Corps border and departed Vietnam. In 1971, the remaining battalions finished their road projects, with the last three departing near the end of 

the year. The Army road builders consisted largely of construction battalions 

and their attached units, including port construction companies and detachments. Nonetheless, an average of three combat battalions augmented with 

light equipment, construction support, and dump truck companies dedicated 

their efforts to the highway program. Actually, most of the combat battalions 

helped the effort by maintaining assigned sections of road and doing specific 

tasks such as base course work and building bridges.44

43 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 34–36; History, LOC Program, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, pp. 184–85; Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, 

Vietnam,” p. 86; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 111–12; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 117; MACV 

History, 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-63 to IX-67; Army Activities Rpts, 5 Aug 70, p. 21; 26 Aug 70, p. 23; 

16 Sep 70, p. 23, CMH. For more on roadwork between 1967–1970, see LOC sections: Quarterly 

Hist Rpts, 31 Mar 67 through 31 Dec 70, MACDC; OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpts, nos. 6–19; 

MACV History, 1968, vol. 2, pp. 651–53; MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. 91–97. 44 Dunn, Base Development, p. 102; Engr Cmd, AVHEN, Fact Sheet, sub: Vietnamization of 

the LOC Effort, 18 Jan 72, box 2, 74/571, RG 338, NARA; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” 

pp. 33–34; Army Activities Rpt, 9 Jul 69, incl. 5, p. 41, CMH; Visit to Various Headquarters in the 

Republic of Vietnam, 1–22 May 1969, p. 3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14; History, LOC 

Program, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, pp. 186, 189, 194. For more on road-building 

problems facing Army engineer troops, see Interv, Capt Wilbur T. Gregory, 26th Mil Hist Det, 

with Lt Col James S. Sibley, Chief, LOC Div, Const Dir, USAECV, 5 Oct 70, VNIT 740, CMH. 

See also History of the 18th Engr Bde LOC Program, 7 Apr 70, Schrader Papers, MHI; and S. 

Sgt. Matt Glasgow, “Roads to Peace: 20th Brigade Road Construction” Kysu’ 2 (Fall 1970): 2–5.
Engineers at War

426

It became apparent that the existing multipurpose nine-hundred-man 

U.S. Army construction battalion was not the best organization to do 

extensive roadwork. Normally construction battalions assigned projects to 

the three identical construction companies, which in turn assigned tasks to 

the single earthmoving and two vertical construction platoons. Additional 

specialized personnel and equipment were attached as necessary. Since 

roadwork is considered horizontal construction (earthmoving, paving, and 

drainage work involving much heavy equipment), battalions experimented 

by pooling personnel and equipment into functional-type companies, 

typically an earthmoving company with most of the heavy equipment, a 

dump truck company, and a vertical construction company consisting of 

tradesmen (carpenters, electricians, masons, plumbers, and steelworkers) 

to do structural or finish work above ground. In the delta, where there 

were a large number of bridges to be built, the 159th Engineer Group 

organized a bridge-building company and gave it equipment suited to that 

task. By centralizing personnel and equipment, including Vietnamese civilian workers and commercial construction equipment and attached troops 

and equipment from other units, local commanders believed these organizations allowed better use of equipment and resulted in improved road 

production.45

In I Corps, the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and Marine Corps engineers finished their share of the highway program in 1971. Earlier, in mid-1968, 

when the number of Seabee battalions increased to twelve, about 30 percent of 

the Navy’s engineer troop effort already had shifted to the highway program. 

One important project was the completion by Naval Mobile Construction 

Battalion 8 in September of the seven-and-a-half-mile road between Hue and 

the new permanent port facility at Tan My. In the spring of 1969, all five 

Marine Corps engineer battalions (including the two divisional battalions) 

and all ten Seabee battalions concentrated on Highways 1 and 9 in northern 

I Corps and Route 4 south of Da Nang. Starting at Lang Co, just north of 

the Hai Van Pass, the 3d Brigade rebuilt approximately eighty-seven miles of 

Highway 1 north to Dong Ha, then some twenty miles of Highway 9 west to the 

Vandegrift Combat Base at Ca Lu. Large supplies of crushed rock, estimated 

at 1.8 million tons, and asphalt were required. The 30th Naval Construction 

Regiment ran the quarries, crushers, and asphalt plants, and the five battalions 

of the 32d Naval Construction Regiment provided the road work crews. Road 

improvements undertaken during 1969 by the road builders in I Corps (including Army engineers of the 45th Engineer Group, South Vietnamese Army 

engineers, and RMK-BRJ) cut travel time between Da Nang and Hue from six 

hours to two, and between Da Nang and Dong Ha to four and one-half hours. 

Major bridge construction by the Seabees included the opening on 30 March 

of the new 825-foot, timber-piled-supported, concrete-decked Liberty Bridge 

at An Hoa, about nineteen miles southwest of Da Nang, which replaced the 

45 Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” p. 85; Interv, Capt 

William A. Kunzman, 16th Mil Hist Det, with Col John W. Brennan, CO, 159th Engr Gp, 24 

Feb 72, VNIT 1038, pp. 4, 8–9, CMH.
427

The Land Lines of Communication

original bridge washed away by monsoon floods in late 1967. The new bridge 

not only cut travel time between Da Nang and An Hoa by half, but it also 

increased the allied capability to support tactical and pacification operations 

and economic development into the An Hoa basin. During the same month, 

the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion completed upgrading Route 4 to western 

Quang Nam Province. Before departing Vietnam, Seabee units completed road 

and shoulder work along with permanent and timber bridges on Highway 1 

north and south of Da Nang. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 resurfaced the steep, winding, and heavily traveled section through the Hai Van 

Pass. South of Da Nang, persistent enemy harassment failed to halt Naval 

Mobile Construction Battalion 62’s improvement of Route 4. Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalions 62, 10, and 74 also completed three major concrete 

and steel highway bridges at Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Cau Do (just south of 

Da Nang), respectively.46

In mid-1969, RMK-BRJ was completing a work-in-place rate of more 

than $6 million a month. By January 1970, the consortium had completed 

375 miles with about 322 remaining. Overall, its share of the nearly $500 million highway program came to about $300 million. Normally, the assignment 

to construct the most difficult permanent bridges, including the manufacture 

of prestressed concrete bridge beams and pilings used in the highway program went to RMK-BRJ. For instance, from May through July 1971, the firm 

started building five major bridges near Saigon costing nearly $20 million. 

These included the 1,343-foot Tan An Bridge and the 1,738-foot Ben Luc 

Bridge along Highway 4 in the delta; the 2,654-foot Bien Hoa Bridge across 

the Dong Nai River leading to the Phu Cuong and North Capital Bypasses; 

the 1,819-foot Binh Loi Bridge over the Saigon River on Highway 13; and the 

1,571-foot Saigon River Bridge on the North Capital Bypass. The consortium 

operated quarries and asphalt plants throughout the country, including the 

Saigon University industrial site, a major supplier to the Delta Rock Agency, 

and the Phu Cat site, which supplied rock and asphalt in the Qui Nhon region. 

Although normally assigned the less dangerous routes, the firm’s crews still 

endured enemy harassment. Several incidents took place in early 1970 on 

Highway 1 between Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. In March, a project manager 

was killed by a mine north of Chi Thanh between Song Cau and Tuy Hoa. In 

that incident, a Vietnamese worker was killed and another badly injured. The 

same month, three South Korean soldiers were killed guarding the firm’s Chi 

Thanh installation. In the next three months, three more supervisors became 

46 Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969

(Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1988), 

pp. 267–68; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 298–99, 412–14, 417–18; Lt. (jg) J. A. Schroeder, 

“The Col Co Road to Hue,” Military Engineer 61 (May-June, 1969): 165–68. For more on Seabee 

road and bridge work, see Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 409–22; I Corps highway construction summaries in Quarterly Hist Rpts, MACDC, for years 1969–1971; MACV History, 1968, 

vol. 1, pp. 475–80; MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. IX-98 to IX-100; Lt. James M. Ramsey, 

USN, and Lt. (jg) John O’Blackwell, “The Cam Lo River Bridge,” Military Engineer 62 (JanuaryFebruary 1970): 29–31; Lt. Cmdr. Gordon W. Callendar Jr., “Seabee Bridging at Hue,” Military 

Engineer 62 (September-October 1970): 316–19.
Engineers at War

428

casualties—one by another mine, the second in an ambush south of Tuy Hoa, 

and the third during a mortar attack at Chi Thanh. As for the thousands of 

Vietnamese workers, RMK-BRJ’s prolonged stay in Vietnam afforded them 

the opportunity to learn new skills, which hopefully could be a vital source for 

future economic development after the war.47

U.S. military engineers also undertook several bridge projects of the scope 

usually assigned to the consortium. The 1,002-foot Phu Cuong Bridge spanning 

the Saigon River north of Saigon developed into one of the largest and most 

complex bridge projects undertaken by engineer troops in Vietnam. Begun in 

October 1967, and opened to traffic in late June 1968, the bridge completed a 

key link along the Phu Cuong Bypass. This main supply route bypassed Saigon 

and connected the depot complex at Long Binh with U.S. Army bases at Di 

An, Phu Loi, Cu Chi, and Lai Khe. Units of the 20th Brigade’s 159th Engineer 

Group tasked to do the bridge included Company B, 92d Engineer Construction 

Battalion, and the 41st Engineer Port Construction Company. Construction 

consisted of fourteen 60-foot spans and two 81-foot navigational spans with 

approximately 20 feet of clearance above mean high water. The two abutments 

and five land-based piers were constructed of built-up steel members. Depths of 

penetration for the piles through the riverbed’s organic silt averaged over 200 feet 

with a maximum depth of approximately 270 feet for several piles. Tidal fluctuation of eight feet in the river and the current caused tricky problems during 

the alignment of the steel jacket legs into which the piles were placed. Over six 

miles of steel piping alone were used in the piers. All circular piles and their 

prefabricated jackets were filled with concrete for additional rigidity. The two 

navigational spans consisted of eighteen 81-foot prestressed concrete beams, and 

the remaining fourteen spans held five steel stringers and precast concrete deck 

panels. Getting the 22-ton, 81-foot beams to the job site and in place turned into 

a major engineering operation. Trucks had to haul the beams some fifteen miles 

over the partially completed road directly onto the bridge. The 41st Engineer 

Company used Navy cube work barges mounting large cranes to lift the beams 

and move them from the point of pickup to the span being placed. This movement took place only during the slack tide because of the difficulty of controlling the barges maneuvered into place by a land craft, mechanized. Curbing was 

cast on the deck, which then was topped off with a four-inch asphaltic concrete 

wearing surface. An extensive lighting and pier protection system and other fixtures were completed in August.48

47 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 31; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 418, 420–21, 

429–30; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 71, MACDC, 8 Mar 72, pp. III-8 to III-9, Historians 

files, CMH. 48 Capt. Thomas C. Weaver, “The Phu Cuong Bridge, Construction and Features,” Military 

Engineer 61 (March-April 1969): 122–24; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 69, MACDC, 19 

Jul 69, p. IV-5, Historians files, CMH; Unit History, 41st Engr Co (Port Const), n.d., p. 1, 

Historians files, CMH. See also Capt. John E. Schaufelberger, “Precast Concrete Deck Panels,” 

Military Engineer 61 (March-April 1969): 124; 20th Engr Bde Press Release, Phu Cuong Bridge 

and Bypass, 11 Jun 68, Historians Files, CMH; and Interv, 1st Lt. Raymond F. Bullock, 26th 

Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Robert L. Crosby, CO, 92d Engineer Battalion, 29 Nov 68, VNIT 

336, CMH.
429

The Land Lines of Communication

The construction of the Phu Cuong Bridge did not go unnoticed by 

the Viet Cong, who saw both military and propaganda value in its destruction. Mortar rounds frequently struck the bridge site during construction. 

During the Tet offensive, enemy troops launched a major attack on the South 

Vietnamese Army Engineer School a few hundred yards from the engineers’ 

work camp. American engineers helped their South Vietnamese colleagues in 

a counterattack that succeeded in keeping the enemy from overrunning the 

The Phu Cuong Bridge under construction
Engineers at War

430

school and bridge. On 6 November 1968, Viet Cong sappers swam to the 

bridge and expertly fastened a demolition charge that destroyed two spans 

and caused other major damage. The 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Division, 

quickly installed an M4T6 floating bridge and reopened the critical bypass 

road to traffic within twenty hours. Soon afterward the 41st Port Construction 

Company returned to make permanent repairs. Capt. Thomas C. Weaver, the 

company commander, concluded that as little as fifty pounds of explosives 

had sufficed to do the damage because the original bridge design did not call 

for cross-bracing of the steel I-beams. An M48 tank sitting on the bridge at 

the time of explosion added its weight to the heavy weight of the bridge and 

multiplied the damage. The new design made it more difficult to unhinge the 

stringers if the concrete deck panels started breaking away. A major salvage 

operation followed. Divers, often working by feel alone and in changing tides, 

worked underwater clearing debris, checking piers, and locating damaged 

bridge components. Driving new piles became especially difficult because of 

the rubble, and the divers faced the extra hazard of placing charges on the 

bottom to break up the large pieces of concrete and steel blocking the way. 

Two piers were shifted several feet, which meant that ten 60-foot-length steel 

beams had to be extended to 65 feet. This splicing of five-foot extensions took 

two welders all day and about one hundred pounds of rod to complete the 

job. Time allowed for repair extended to four months. With additional support from the 159th Group, especially welders from other units and the 92d 

Engineer Battalion, the 41st beat its adjusted deadlines, completing the repairs 

on 14 February 1969.49

The Bong Son bridges crossing the Lai Giang River on Highway 1 

some fifty miles north of Qui Nhon epitomized spans that underwent several changes during the war. During the Bong Son Campaign in 1966, the 

existing single-lane bridges, a multispan Eiffel truss highway bridge and a 

railway bridge covered with planking to carry heavier loads, were used. A 

third crossing during the dry season consisted of a combination causeway 

and M4T6 floating bridge. When the Viet Cong damaged the Eiffel bridge 

in October 1966, the 35th Engineer Combat Battalion raised the Eiffel spans 

and completed the reconstruction in late July several months before the next 

monsoon season. By late 1969, traffic became so congested that the 84th 

Engineer Construction Battalion prepared plans to build a new permanent 

bridge. The 1,634-foot-long span, claimed as one of the longest bridges to 

be built by American troops in Vietnam, with a dual-lane roadway twentyfour feet wide, evolved into one of the largest and most demanding projects 

undertaken by the battalion. An engineer task force consisting of Company B 

and the 536th Port Construction Detachment departed Qui Nhon and set up 

camp in a grove of coconut trees on the river bank. Although plans called for 

the removal of several trees, which represented a major portion of the local 

economy and sentimental value, the engineers relented and carefully fitted 

49 AAR, Repair of Phu Cuong Bridge, 26th Mil Hist Det, 4 Apr 69, VNIT 376, CMH; 

ORLL, 1 Feb–3 Mar 69, 92d Engr Bn, n.d., p. 8, Historians files, CMH; Unit History, 41st Engr 

Co (Port Const), pp. 1–2. VNIT 376 includes interviews, photographs, and design sketches. 
431

The Land Lines of Communication

the twenty-four tropical wooden buildings between the trees. This resulted in 

some of the trees jutting through the overhangs of the tin roofs, and several 

young trees were transplanted. (During work breaks, villagers harvesting the 

crops showed their appreciation by treating the Americans to fresh coconuts.) 

Site preparations also included setting up an industrial plant consisting of 

a precast deck slab yard, a rebar processing yard, and a stringer yard. Five 

bulldozers fashioned an earthen dike diverting water to the far shore so that a 

construction causeway could be built. Concurrent training took place on the 

operation of forty-ton cranes, welding machines, transit mixers, and special 

items of equipment. Bridge construction began in early 1970 and lasted until 

September. The bridge consisted of twenty-six 60-foot and one 70-foot steel 

spans. Each of the twenty-six piers included a reinforced-concrete cap resting 

atop ten H-piles. Because the I-beams came in random 30- to 40-foot lengths, 

all 162 stringers had to be spliced. Welding operations continued day and 

night. Once the stringers were in place and welded together with steel braces, a 

crane lifted eight-inch reinforced-concrete deck slabs into place. Four hundred 

and eighty-nine slabs went into the completed structure and three inches of 

asphaltic concrete surfaced the roadway. Handrails, curbs, lighting, and a pier 

protection system followed.50

During the American troop withdrawals, South Vietnamese engineers gradually took over more of the highway program. Before they assumed their part in 

the highway program, South Vietnamese Army engineers doing road and bridge 

work received support from U.S. engineer units in the form of materials as long 

as they followed U.S. specifications. While the Americans concentrated on roads 

used for tactical or logistical operations, the South Vietnamese, through their 

advisers and on-the-job training programs sponsored by neighboring U.S. Army 

engineer and Seabee units, gained experience in the more pacified areas. Over 

time, South Vietnam’s engineering capability developed and expanded in size. 

Although South Vietnamese Army engineers were faced with many of their own 

increased combat support and construction missions, the South Vietnamese 

Army Chief of Engineers, Col. Nguyen Chan, agreed in late 1969 to participate 

fully in the highway restoration program. Initially, three construction battalions 

assumed responsibility for three sections totaling 103 miles along Highway 1 in 

II and III Corps and Highway 4 in IV Corps. This work included the building 

of fifty bridges totaling 9,445 feet long. In July 1970, U.S. troops transferred 

another 178 miles, including 65 miles of Highway 14 in II Corps; and sections 

of Route 7B (Cheo Reo to Highway 14 in central II Corps), Route 2 (Nui Dat to 

50 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 84th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 69, p. 3, 1 Feb–30 Apr 70, 84th Engr Bn, 

30 Apr 70, p. 2, 1 May–31 Jul 70, 84th Engr Bn, 31 Jul 70, p. 2, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 70, 84th Engr 

Bn, 31 Oct 70, p. 2, all in Historians files, CMH; Capt. Roger L. Baldwin, “Long Bridge at Bong 

Son,” Military Engineer 63 (September-October 1971): 334–35; 1st Lt. John Gamble and Spec. 

Newell Griffith, “Bridge Over Troubled Waters,” Kysu’ 2 (Fall 1970): 18–21. See also articles on 

the 577th Engineer Construction Battalion’s bridge project on Highway 1 south of Tuy Hoa by 

1st Lts. John P. Guthrie and Hubert C. Roche, “Cau Ban Thach Bridge,” Military Engineer 61 

(July-August 1969): 270–72; and the 46th Engineer Battalion’s Bailey Bridge modification to a 

key bridge in Saigon by Maj. Maxim I. Kovel and Capt. Richard M. Goldfarb, “New Life for 

the Fish Market Bridge, Saigon,” Military Engineer 60 (March-April 1968): 102–04.
Engineers at War

432

Highway 1 in southern III Corps), Route 8A (Rach Gia to Route 27 in western 

IV Corps), and Route 2B (Ham Tan to Highway 1 in southern III Corps). At 

the end of 1970, the South Vietnamese commitment stood at 300 miles, of which 

17.5 miles were completed.51

As the U.S. engineer presence decreased, South Vietnamese Army engineers took over quarries and asphalt plants and received more road-building equipment. In 1970, Vietnamese engineers took over operations at the 

Freedom Hill Quarry outside Da Nang. Later that year, they began on-thejob training at U.S. Army industrial sites, thus easing transfers at Phu Loc 

and Da Nang in I Corps, Weigt-Davis and Ban Me Thuot in II Corps, and 

51 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 116, 174–75; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 406–07; 

Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” p. 35; History, LOC Program, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 22, pp. 185, 187, 189. See also Spec. Peter Elliot, “Paving the Way to Vietnamization,” 

Kysu’ 2 (Fall 1970): 25–28.

Troops of the 84th Engineer Battalion build the new Bong Son Bridge.
433

The Land Lines of Communication

Nui Le in III Corps the following year. Also in 1971, construction units were 

authorized and equipped with 35 and later 75-ton-per-hour rock crushers, 

5-ton dump trucks, and 150-ton-per-hour asphalt plants. In March 1972, the 

6th Construction Group assumed responsibility for operations at the Dillard 

industrial work site south of Da Lat. By early 1973, the South Vietnamese 

had receipted for approximately 550 items of special heavy construction 

equipment. These transfers included much of the U.S. Army’s commercial 

equipment, thus passing on the enhanced capability for high-quality road 

building. Dynalectron continued to supply the parts and repaired the equipment at the work sites.52

Bridge building became one task in which the South Vietnamese Army 

engineers excelled. Before entering the highway program, they completed 

numerous projects, including the rock-unloading piers for the Delta Rock 

Agency. In 1967 as the 45th Engineer Group upgraded Highway 1 to Bong 

Son, the South Vietnamese Army 20th Engineer Combat Group, using U.S. 

materials, worked on several bridges outside Qui Nhon. In late 1970 when Lt. 

Col. Francis R. Geisel’s 554th Engineer Construction Battalion began upgrading thirty-two miles along Highway 20 near Bao Loc, the South Vietnamese 

203d Engineer Combat Battalion already had completed three bridges. Geisel 

noted that the 203d did a good job despite the poor decking, which was not 

52 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 35–36, 41, 44; MACV History, January 1972–

March 1973, vol. 2, p. E-30; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 381, 384.

South Vietnamese Army engineers became proficient in repairing and building 

bridges such as this panel bridge.
Engineers at War

434

properly creosoted and placed and began rotting, and the shortage of some 

equipment. The 203d was also building all the bridges using U.S. materials 

along the 815th Construction Battalion’s thirty-one miles of Highway 20 while 

the U.S. battalion concentrated on roadwork. Lt. Col. George K. Withers, the 

815th’s commanding officer, recalled in early 1971 that the 203d could get along 

just fine without his advice and was certain “that they can build bridges much 

better than we can.” In late 1970, the 20th Group’s 201st Engineer Combat 

Battalion finished one of the longest bridges in South Vietnam, the 3,281-foot 

Tuy Hoa Bridge on Highway 1.53

In late 1971, the U.S. troops’ roadwork came to a close, RMK-BRJ’s share 

neared completion, and the South Vietnamese took over the balance of the 

program. Earlier in the year, highway planners, facing the accelerating troop 

withdrawals, tried to resolve discrepancies and develop more realistic scheduling. By then the Seabees had completed nearly all of their assigned work in 

I Corps—188 miles, mostly sections of Highways 1 and 9, before departing 

Vietnam. U.S. Army Engineer Command’s share was set at 1,094 miles, of which 

751 miles had been completed. The planners deferred 279 miles of national 

and provincial highways, which would be completed by the Vietnamese. More 

adjustments followed as Washington hastened the departure of engineer troops 

and sought ways to close out the costly RMK-BRJ contract. Nevertheless, Maj. 

Gen. Robert P. Young, who replaced Brig. Gen. Robert M. Tarbox as the director of construction in December 1970, had to contend with transferring more 

highway and bridge construction to contractors. One approach included hiring 

Vietnamese contractors under so-called lump-sum contracts, which would have 

the added benefit of strengthening South Vietnam’s construction industry, one 

of the nation-building goals for the country. This concept became known as 

the Clarke Plan, named for Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, who became Chief of 

Engineers in August 1969, and under whose direction the plan was devised. The 

Clarke Plan, put in final form in June 1971, called for the transfer of fifty-seven 

miles of highway in the Mekong Delta. A pilot contract for just over $1.6 million 

was awarded by the Officer in Charge of Construction to a local Vietnamese 

firm, and in November the contractor began to upgrade six miles of a badly 

deteriorated Route 27 north of Binh Thuy. In July, RMK-BRJ took over an 

additional 17.5 miles as the 20th Engineer Battalion prepared to stand down. The 

consortium’s assigned work increased to 615 miles, with 595 miles completed at 

the end of the year. In addition, the contractor undertook major repairs, including repaving one hundred miles of Highways 13, 19, and 22 originally completed 

by the 18th and 20th Brigades. (Final reports still counted the one hundred miles 

as completed by the troops.) Base course and pavement failures along Highway 

19 required the rebuilding of seventy-three miles of road east and west of An 

Khe. Work started in January with the construction of a base camp and installation of rock crushers and an asphalt plant. Roadwork got under way in March. 

53 Intervs, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Francis R. Geisel, CO, 

554th Engr Bn, 17 Jan 71, pp. 2–3, 8–10, and Lt Col George K. Withers Jr., CO, 815th Engr Bn, 

15 Jan 71, pp. 2–3, 9, both in VNIT 813, CMH; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, p. 381; Quarterly 

Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 70, MACDC, 17 Jan 71, LOC Sec, para 2d(1)(b), Historians files, CMH.
435

The Land Lines of Communication

April saw a sharp increase in enemy action against the contractor. These attacks 

included direct rocket hits on the quarry, causing seven lost days of operation 

and damage to a generator shed, and an ambush in June that killed two Navy 

inspectors and wounded three employees. In December, U.S. Army engineers 

completed their commitment as the 35th Engineer Group’s Task Force Whiske

finished the final section of Highway 1 near Phan Thiet, bringing the total completed by Army troops to 905 miles. An Australian engineering squadron did 

subgrade repair and emplacement of base rock along Routes 2 and 23 in Phuoc 

Tuy Province, with paving carried out by RMK-BRJ and South Vietnamese 

Army engineers. The Directorate of Construction credited the Australians with 

completing 7.5 miles along Route 23. South Vietnamese Army engineers completed 127 of the 417 miles assigned to them.54

During 1972, RMK-BRJ completed its highway assignment, leaving the 

unfinished portion of the highway program to the South Vietnamese. In the 

Saigon region, the firm finished its assigned bridge and road projects. These 

included several bypass roads, most notably the North Capital Bypass in May, 

as well the realignment and rehabilitation of the eight miles of Highway 1 

between Bien Hoa and the bypass. Traffic now could bypass Saigon’s fast 

increasing congestion and converge with key roads outside the city. Also completed by midyear and transferred to the director general of highways were the 

bridges at Tan An and Ben Luc, the Binh Loi Bridge, the Saigon River Bridge 

on the North Capital Bypass, and the impressive concrete and steel Bien Hoa 

Bridge over the Dong Nai River. These immaculate, gleaming, off-white spans 

included precast concrete bridge beams and pilings manufactured by the firm. 

In the highlands, daylight attacks along Highway 19 forced RMK-BRJ to move 

its crews and equipment to Cam Ranh Bay, but they returned and finished the 

roadwork before the North Vietnamese launched their massive Nguyen Hue 

(Easter) offensive in April. The firm ended its Vietnam operations in May. Its 

construction accomplishments included 615 miles of road, many large bridges, 

and hundreds of small bridges.55

In 1972, South Vietnamese Army engineers’ growing participation in the 

highway program resulted in the activation of two new construction groups. 

Elements from five construction battalions and one combat battalion were 

now committed to roadwork, and elements of seven additional battalions were 

tasked with bridge construction. Altogether, the equivalent of nine battalions 

was committed to the highway program. During the year, Vietnamese Army 

54 History, LOC Program, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, pp. 189–95; Stearns, Abbott, 

and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” p. 86; Conover, “LOC Program in 

Vietnam,” pp. 31–32, 34, 35–38; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 421; Clarke Plan, incl. 2, tab 

X, LOC Program Summary, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22; Army Activities Rpts, 17 

Feb 71, p. 25; 19 May 71, p. 61; 9 Jun 71, p. 61; 20 Dec 72, p. 22, CMH; Msg, Maj Gen Robert 

P. Young, MACV Dir of Const, MAC 01763 to Brig Gen Richard McConnell, Asst Dir of 

Const Opns, Office of Asst Sec Def (Installations and Logistics), 8 Feb 71, sub: Switch of LOC 

Construction from Troop to Contractor; Msg, Young MAC 08609 to McConnell, 7 Sep 71, sub: 

VN Construction Industry Development. All messages in Robert P. Young Papers, MHI. 55 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 420, 430–31; Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC 

Highway Restoration, Vietnam,” p. 86; Army Activities Rpt, 20 Dec 72, p. 22, CMH; Quarterly 

Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–Dec 71, MACDC, pp. III-8 to III-9.
Engineers at War

436

engineers completed 58 miles of road and 3,400 feet of new bridging, bringing 

their totals to 181 of 417 miles of assigned roadwork and 24,842 of 37,650 

feet of assigned bridge construction. Hanoi’s offensive interrupted progress, 

but South Vietnamese Army engineers rallied to repair 150 bridges totaling 

12,264 feet. Of that number, they permanently or temporarily repaired 122 

with tactical bridges, bypasses, or rafts. The first Vietnamese lump-sum contractor completed three of the assigned six miles, and the Officer in Charge of 

Construction awarded two more contracts to Korean firms using Vietnamese 

subcontractors, one in March for thirty-five miles and another in June for 

twenty-seven miles. These contractors completed fifteen miles of road in 

1972.56

Although the extensive development of roads, airfields, and water transportation overshadowed the restoration of the railroad and reduced the 

urgency of an operational railway system, the slight increases in rail service 

sustained basic civilian and military operations, particularly on short hauls. 

Railroad restoration made little progress in early 1968 due to the Tet offensive. 

In March, General Westmoreland became concerned that the closure of the 

Hue/Tan My or the Dong Ha/Cua Viet port complexes could seriously hamper 

operations in northern I Corps. With the influx of reinforcements into the 

area, he urged greater emphasis on reopening secure land lines of communication, both highway and rail. Planners estimated that opening the Da Nang to 

Hue rail line, which had been closed since early 1965, would increase the daily 

military resupply capability by 800 to 1,000 tons. Westmoreland also felt that 

reopening the railroad would be a tangible symbol to the Vietnamese people of 

the Saigon government’s control of the area. As a demonstration of allied support, MACV assigned the 3d Naval Construction Brigade to do major bridge 

repairs along the line. In the spring of 1968, a Seabee detachment successfully 

raised and reconstructed a railway bridge just south of Phu Bai. In mid-July, 

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1 began rebuilding the three remaining 

demolished bridges on the southwest shores of Lap An Bay. Since the rail line 

and Highway 1 diverged southeast of the bay and no road ran parallel along 

this stretch, material and equipment were off-loaded from trucks and placed on 

rail cars for transport to the work camp and bridge sites. A Vietnam National 

Railway Service work train locomotive, however, would not be available for 

several months, and other attempts failed to push the loaded rail cars. The 

innovative Seabees then borrowed a small Marine Corps four-wheeled vehicle, 

called the Mule, which fitted exactly on the one-meter tracks and successfully 

moved the cars without difficulty. When possible, bridge sections were lifted 

back on to new piers. In November, enemy sappers dropped one side of the 

railroad bridge near Phu Loc, but the battalion raised and repaired the bridge 

56 MACV Construction Directorate, Lines of Communication Division Briefing, U.S. LOC 

Construction Progress, LOC Lump Sum Program, FY 1972 AID/DoD Program, Presented 

to the Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee Plenary Session, 28 Jun 72, pp. 

2, 5–7, Historians files, CMH; Stearns, Abbott, and Campbell, “LOC Highway Restoration, 

Vietnam,” p. 86; Engr Cmd, AVHEN, Fact Sheet, sub: Vietnamization of the LOC Program, 18 

Jan 72; MACV History, January 1972–March 1973, vol. 2, pp. E-30 to E-31; Khuyen, RVNAF 

Logistics, pp. 384, 386; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 36–37.
437

The Land Lines of Communication

before the end of the year. Rail service between Da Nang and Hue resumed on 

16 January 1969, and planning proceeded to expand service north from Hue 

to Dong Ha.57

As the intensity of the Tet offensive lessened, repair trains began reopening other lines. The rail line between Saigon and Xuan Loc was restored, and 

on 15 December 1968 passenger and cargo service started on the 200-mile 

line between Qui Nhon and Phan Rang. Security continued to plague railway 

progress. Yet, despite an average of fifteen interdictions per month, as compared to eight per month in 1967, operational trackage increased to 336 miles, 

or about 45 percent of the railway system.58

Railway restoration made slow but steady progress. Enemy sabotage persisted, and the Vietnam National Railway Service had to contend with manpower and equipment shortages and the inevitable heavy rains. During 1969, 

57 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 658–59; Lt. Theodore I. Harada, “Seabees on the 

Railroad,” Military Engineer 61 (July-August 1969): 262–66. 58 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 660–62.

Bien Hoa Bridge, completed in 1972 by RMK-BRJ, was part of a new bypass 

road north of Saigon.
Engineers at War

438

the Seabees continued to help the beleaguered rail service restore its bridges, 

which included raising one span and replacing another at the Song Bo Bridge 

nine miles north of Hue. At U.S. logistical facilities, the construction of rail 

spurs and sidings by RMK-BRJ and the Vietnam National Railway Service 

neared completion. These included spurs from the military docks at Newport, 

Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. By early 1971, the railroad operated in three separate areas with approximately 60 percent, or 441 miles, of the 770 miles of 

the programmed main line and branch line system. The longest run, some 

249 miles, ran from the Long Song River (south of Phan Rang) to Phu Cat. 

During 1970, cargo transported by rail climbed 15 percent over 1969 (from 

595,190 to 685,030 short tons), and the number of passengers transported by 

rail increased a dramatic 40 percent over the same period (from 1.75 million to 

2.4 million). In April 1970, President Thieu temporarily canceled restoration 

work, but he rescinded this order the following February. The railway service 

immediately resumed planning to close the remaining gap between Saigon and 

Phu Cat.59

A Legacy

With the return of all roadwork to the South Vietnamese government 

and the departure of the remaining U.S. troops, the Agency for International 

Development assumed the Directorate of Construction’s responsibility for 

managing the highway program. Planning began in the fall of 1970 when 

MACV and the Agency for International Development agreed to set up a 

joint committee to study the return of the highway advisory function to the 

civilian agency. A contract consulting team, Booz Allen, was hired to recommend institutional changes that the director general of highways could use 

to increase its capability. In May 1971, the joint ad hoc committee submitted its detailed report, which evaluated the condition of the highway system, 

estimated maintenance requirements, appraised the director general of highways’ capability, and proposed a timetable for the transfer of functions. One 

of the intermediate steps took place in July 1971 when the Directorate of 

Construction reestablished the Highways Engineering and Advisory Branch, 

as it existed before 1968. The advisory function was transferred on 1 July 1972. 

The Agency for International Development took over all MACV responsibility for managing the highway program on 1 January 1973, and the Delta Rock 

Agency in March. That month, the last American troops departed Vietnam in 

compliance with the Paris Peace Accords that were signed in late January. The 

only U.S. military connection during the ensuing armistice period continued 

through the small Engineer Branch, Defense Attaché Office, which provided 

59 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, pp. 97–98; ibid., 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-71 to IX-77; MACV 

History, January 1972–March 1973, vol. 2, p. E-22; Railroad Spur Construction, sec. III, 

Lines of Communication Division (MACDC-LOC), in Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–30 Apr 71, 

MACDC, p. III-15, Historians files, CMH; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 417; Dunn, Base 

Development, pp. 109–11.
439

The Land Lines of Communication

some technical assistance and maintenance support through the Dynalectron 

contract for the commercial construction equipment.60

The director general of highways faced many uncertainties as a highway 

organization. Although U.S. forces and RMK-BRJ did transfer many major 

items of equipment, which included five former RMK-BRJ industrial sites 

and two prestressed concrete plants, it was recognized that the equipment 

would require a larger and technically skilled workforce. The Directorate 

of Construction identified the Vietnamese agency’s problems earlier in a 

September 1968 study that emphasized the need for massive reforms in the 

Saigon government’s procedures and policies. The director general of highways 

did increase its workforce to 6,000 employees in 1972, but the Construction 

Directorate considered a further expansion to 10,000 by 1975 necessary to 

maintain and use the equipment and facilities in its charge. Considering 

Saigon’s requirements for military personnel and funding in other areas at the 

time, the Directorate of Construction doubted that the highway agency would 

get the needed expansion. Inevitably, the road network would require more 

major repairs. Problems facing the director general in 1972 included authority 

to hire an additional 4,000 workers, procuring over 1,500 pieces of equipment, 

rising costs, inadequate funding, the loss of over 300 engineers and trained 

60 MACV History, 1971, vol. 3, p. IX-18; ibid., January 1972–March 1973, vol. 2, p. E-30; 

USAID/Vietnam, Project Status and Accomplishment Report, July–December 1970, Project: 

Highways Improvements, p. 205; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, p. 381; Fact Sheet, Engineer 

Branch, Defense Attaché Office, 1 Apr 74, sub: The ARVN Lines of Communication Program, 

U.S. Army Engineer Programs, copy in OCE Hist Ofc. For more on the advisory transfer, see 

USAID/MACV Ad Hoc Committee Final Report, n.d., box 3, 72A/7061, RG 334, NARA.

Flatcars on front of a train south of Phu Cat were intended to detonate mines 

placed on the tracks by the Viet Cong.
Engineers at War

440

technicians to the military draft since 1968, and the unfavorable competition 

with contractors for trained technicians.61

At best, the director general attempted to preserve the upgraded highway 

system, using its own personnel to do maintenance and minor repairs and relying on South Vietnamese Army engineers and contractors to do most major 

repairs and new construction. Some progress was made in carrying out its 

maintenance mission. In 1971, the highway department had 105 teams backed 

up by 16 support teams that prepared cold-mix patches, seal-coated road surfaces, and repaired wooden bridge decks. It also began preparations to train 

some 600 Regional and Popular Forces troops to do work on the rural roads. 

Between 1968 and 1971, highway crews repaired 491 miles of road and 28,215 

feet of bridging. In 1971, the highway department seal-coated 149 miles of 

road and made plans to increase this effort to 435 miles. Also between 1968 

and 1971, the director general of highways built 8,202 feet of new bridging 

and could have done more but lacked funds to utilize fully local contractors. 

It faced many repairs in I Corps because U.S. engineers in the rush to finish 

work did not upgrade all the bridges and culverts along Highway 1. In some 

sections, the enemy destroyed newly emplaced culverts, and the troops filled 

the gaps to keep the road open. As a result, severe flooding followed heavy 

rains. In 1971, the highway agency replaced twelve bridges and nine culverts 

and planned to continue this work through 1975.62

Following the departure of RMK-BRJ in mid-1972, South Vietnamese 

Army engineers carried out most of the remaining bridge and highway modernization tasks until the country’s collapse in April 1975. Work progressed 

satisfactorily despite difficulties supplying spare parts and fuel and transporting long and heavy prestressed concrete beams to construction sites. There was 

also the continuing sabotage and fighting between 1973 and 1975. In 1974, the 

engineers began producing rock for all military and civilian highway projects 

in the delta. With help from Defense Attaché Office technicians, the quarry 

at Nui Sam was modernized with the addition of two 250-ton-per-hour rock 

crushers. By 31 July 1974, Vietnamese engineers reduced the remaining highway program to 146 miles of highway and 9,298 feet of bridging. In April 

1975, only 70 miles of new roadwork and 6,600 feet of bridging remained to 

be completed. During 1974 and 1975, however, Communist forces intensified 

their sabotage efforts along the highways. Several sections of Highway 4 were 

blown up at one time, increasing the demand for more rock and tactical bridging. South Vietnamese engineers reacted by stockpiling rock and dirt along 

the road west of My Tho. The troops and the highway department increased 

61 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. IX-19 to IX-20; Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” 

pp. 45–46; For more on the director general of highways’ projects, personnel, funding, equipment, and maintenance facilities, see USAID/MACV Ad Hoc Committee Final Report. 62 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. IX-19 to IX-20; Briefing by director general of highways at June 28th, 1972 Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee Meeting, box 

1, 74/0089, RG 334, NARA. For more on the director general of highways’ organization, its 

work along Highway 1 in I Corps, and status in late November 1971, see Briefing by MACV 

Construction Directorate Lines of Communication Division for General Frederick C. Weyand, 

Dep COMUSMACV, 29 Nov 71, box 4, 72A/7061, RG 334, NARA.
441

The Land Lines of Communication

the tactical bridge reserves by recovering panel bridges used by U.S. engineers 

along secondary roads in the pacification program and substituted Eiffel 

bridges and steel-timber permanent and semipermanent structures in their 

place. Nearly 2,296 feet of panel bridging were recovered and placed in reserve 

stocks. Efforts were also under way to round out incomplete panel bridge and 

M4T6 floating bridge sets when the collapse occurred.63

The nearly completed highway system encompassed modern, paved highways stretching almost the entire length of the country. Of the program’s 

2,532 miles, the road builders had by late 1972 completed 1,911 miles, with 

288 miles in progress or programmed, and 333 miles deferred. These figures 

did not include the many more local roads and bridges improved or built to 

support tactical operations and pacification or city streets funded under other 

programs. All the builders participated in one or more of these projects. In the 

case of local roads and bridges, the Combined Central Highway and Waterway 

Committee’s standards did not apply, but the unpaved and lower weight-bearing bridges connected hamlets and villages to secondary roads, which in turn 

joined major roads. Funding allocations, including civilian and military assistance, for the Lines of Communication Program alone totaled $460.3 million, 

or more than $236,000 per mile. Altogether, thirty industrial sites, including 

quarries, rock crushers, and asphalt plants, were set up to supply rock and 

asphaltic concrete. Between 1968 and 1972, these sites provided over 27 million tons of rock and 2.5 million tons of asphalt. The improved roads included 

Highway 1 connecting Saigon with the coastal cities and towns north to Dong 

Ha and west to Go Dau Ha, where it connected with Highway 22 to Tay Ninh; 

Highway 19 from outside Qui Nhon to Pleiku; Highway 21 from Nha Trang 

to Ban Me Thuot; Highway 13 from Saigon to An Loc; Highway 20 from Da 

Lat to Highway 1 west of Xuan Loc; Highway 4 from Saigon to the delta, 

and connecting to other improved roads in this important rice-growing region; 

Highway 15 connecting Saigon to Vung Tau; and parts of Highway 14 in the 

highlands between Dak To, Pleiku, and Buon Blech. The bypasses around 

Saigon diverted traffic and helped improve the area’s defenses. Besides the 

national highways, the highway program included lesser roads such as Routes 

9, 10, and 27 in the delta. The improved roads were opened to two-way traffic 

with bridges of thirty-five-ton capacity and above. Save for some unfinished 

sections in the delta, the road system provided reliable, rapid surface routes 

to all the major population centers. The loss of life and vehicles to enemy 

mines dropped dramatically, and military convoys covered distances in one 

day what previously required two to three days. The heavy fighting starting 

with the Easter offensive damaged some roads and bridges, mainly the northern sections of Highway 1 nearest the Demilitarized Zone and Highway 13 

near An Loc, but most of the road net survived intact. Since South Vietnam’s 

armed forces depended much more on road transportation than U.S. units, 

the improved highway system became an important factor as Saigon moved 

forces to oppose the North Vietnamese. The nation-building value was very 

63 Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 384, 386, 388–89.
Engineers at War

442

evident as the volume of civilian truck traffic increased between major cities, 

and people settled along the new highways.64

Compared to the roads, the railroad system did not live up to its potential 

for moving military freight because it was so easily interdicted. Only five short 

portions operated with relative security: Saigon to Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, and 

Long Binh; Nha Trang north to Tuy Hoa and south beyond Phan Rang; Qui 

Nhon to Phu Cat; and Da Nang to Hue. Nevertheless, the railroad was a valuable transportation asset for carrying newly landed cargo on short runs to 

the depots. One daily freight train from the Saigon port to Long Binh carried 

the equivalent of 6,800 truckloads a week, thus eliminating a large number 

of truck runs from Saigon’s congested streets and the Bien Hoa Highway. 

Military cargo could also move by rail from Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay to 

Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, and Phan Rang. The railroad also hauled large 

quantities of crushed rock from several quarries at low rates. Even though 

any value gained by rail transportation for U.S. forces diminished as the withdrawal gained momentum, the potential for commercial and military use by 

the South Vietnamese remained an important nation-building goal.65

64 Conover, “LOC Program in Vietnam,” pp. 40–41; Army Activities Rpts, 19 Jul 72, p. 24; 

20 Dec 72, p. 22, CMH; MACV History, January 1972–March 1973, vol. 2, p. E-30; Ploger, 

Army Engineers, p. 118; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 107–08, 112; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, 

p. 379. See also “LOC,” Engineer 1 (Spring 1971): 18–21; Florreich, “Lines of Communication 

Restoration Program,” pp. 11–16; and HQ, Engr Cmd, AVCC-CC, Fact Sheet, sub: Tactical and 

Rural Roads Programs as of 29 Feb 72, incl. 6, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22. 65 Dunn, Base Development, p. 111; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, p. 76; Peter Braestrup, 

“Saigon is Restoring Railroad: Controversial Project Proceeds with U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, 

8 December 1968.
14

Year of Transition, 1969

The new year, 1969, brought a change in the direction of American 

policy in Vietnam as the United States committed itself to gradual 

withdrawal of its forces and to turning over greater responsibility to the South 

Vietnamese. After Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird toured the theater in 

March, planning began in earnest in Saigon and Washington for the execution 

of the opening phase of the withdrawals commencing in the summer and for 

accelerated training of the Vietnamese under the “Vietnamization” concept. 

The year thus became a time of transition for U.S. forces, including the engineers, as several units departed and others moved to new areas and missions.1

The State of the Construction Program 

At the start of 1969, the $1.7 billion military construction program passed 

the 75 percent completion mark. Military engineers and contractors had built 

six deep-water ports at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro Bay, 

Vung Tau, and Saigon with twenty-seven deep-draft berths providing a capacity of 600,000 short tons per month. In addition, shallow-draft facilities at 

nine other ports handled 800,000 short tons per month. Mooring buoys and 

unloading facilities capable of discharging 1.25 million barrels of fuel daily 

had also been constructed. Over 270 miles of pipeline moved fuel to major 

bases. Some pipelines were laid in secure areas such as the six-mile line from 

the Saigon River to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Longer sections included the 

109-mile pipeline running through contested territory between Qui Nhon and 

Pleiku. Eight jet-capable air bases with fifteen 10,000-foot concrete runway/

taxiway systems and parking aprons were in service, supplemented by some 

eighty-three auxiliary airfields capable of handling C–123 or C–130 cargo 

planes. Together, these airfields supported over 5,750 aircraft of all types. The 

engineers had also built four major depot complexes at Long Binh, Da Nang, 

Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. Most of the so-called hard-core logistical 

requirements such as ports, airfields, and depots were completed.2

The construction program remained a shared undertaking between contractors and troops. Contracts absorbed most funds for ongoing and approved 

projects (64 percent or $260 million against $149 million allocated for troop 

1

 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, p. II-3. For more on Vietnamization, see Clarke, Final Years, 

pp. 341–60. 2

 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. IX-87 to IX-88; Dunn, Base Development, pp. 129–30; 

Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 78; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, pp. VI-4 to VI-5. 

See also HQ MACV, MACDC-BD, Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review), 

1 Mar 69, Historians files, CMH.
The busy port at Cam Ranh Bay showing a tanker at a petroleum pipeline pier 

and ships along side of the four cargo piers. 

(below) Ship-to-shore pipeline at Cam Ranh Bay transferred large quantities 

of fuel daily.
445

Year of Transition, 1969

construction). However, the troops carried out more projects because their 

labor was not charged to the program. Although the RMK-BRJ contract was 

originally programmed to close out in late 1967, the highway program and 

the impending cutback in troop strength convinced planners to retain a good 

share of the consortium’s construction capability. At the start of 1969, the 

firm’s workforce consisted of 25,000 personnel, staffed and equipped to carry 

out about $22 million of work per month. (Planners used a rough figure of $1 

million per month per one thousand employees.) To operate efficiently, RMKBRJ required about $100 million of backlog work. It appeared certain at the 

time that some contract capability would be required as long as U.S. forces were 

stationed in Vietnam. The contract effort would continue at approximately 

a 40-30-30 distribution to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively, until 

the latter two programs were completed. Then the consortium’s effort would 

entirely support the Army. By calculating the firm’s work-in-place rate and the 

backlogs, planners estimated that RMK-BRJ could finish its share of the Air 

Force and Navy projects by the beginning of August 1969 and January 1970, 

respectively. Ideally, the Army’s backlog would be done by April 1970. Other 

firms continued to augment the construction effort. The facilities engineering 

contractors, Pacific Architects and Engineers (the largest next to RMK-BRJ 

with more than 20,000 employees) and Philco-Ford, also worked on minor 

new construction projects at bases. Vinnell Corporation, which built and operated several Army central power plants, received word to build three more 

power plants at Can Tho, Vinh Long, and Cha Rang outside Qui Nhon, raising the total to fifteen. There were smaller firms such as dredging companies 

and local contractors, the latter with a combined $1.5 monthly construction 

capability.3

 (Table 1)

Much work still remained to be completed by engineer troops. Army 

engineers, who had the largest share of troop projects, had finished only 

about 53 percent of their construction jobs. The Seabees were further along, 

finishing more than 61 percent of their projects. Together, Army, Navy, and 

Air Force engineers completed almost 56 percent of assigned work. From 

a fiscal standpoint, Army engineers had more than $104 million of work 

remaining, the Seabees $36.5 million, and Air Force engineers $8 million. 

The approximate backlog was thirty-one months.4

The Army’s construction program came close to the total completion figure 

only because of the great amount of work done by contractors. By May 1969, the 

Army’s $887.4 million program, managed in Vietnam by the U.S. Army Engineer 

Construction Agency, reached 72 percent completion. Army engineers finished 

$127.6 million or 57 percent of $224.6 million set aside for troop construction 

compared to the contractors $513.6 million or 77 percent of an assigned $662.8 

million. More variation took place in highway construction. RMK-BRJ finished 

3

 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, p. IX-88; Army Troop Construction in the Republic of 

Vietnam, 1 Feb–1 Apr 69, incl. 6, pp. 1–3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14; PA&E History, 

FY 1969, pp. 1, 3; “12 Additional Power Plants,” Vinnell 11 (May 1969): 10, Historians files, 

CMH. 4

 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. IX-88 to IX-89.
Engineers at War

446

42 percent of its share of roadwork compared to only 8.1 percent by the troops. 

This latter percentage, however, did not reflect the nearly $24 million in Military 

Construction, Army, funds used to buy commercial construction equipment. 

The Army received nearly $35 million in construction funds for the highways, 

but the troops expended only $2.8 million as the approximate value of work in 

place. Also, the MACV Construction Directorate planned to transfer as much 

work as possible to RMK-BRJ to enable the troops to do more operational 

support missions.5

 (Chart 5)

In 1969, Army engineers numbered approximately 36,000 soldiers and 

comprised 10 percent of the total Army force in Vietnam. Of this number, over 

5

 Army Troop Construction in the Republic of Vietnam, 1 Feb–1 Apr 69, incl. 6, pp. 1–3, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14.

Percent by

Location Troops Contractor

Saigon 2 98

Tan Son Nhut 6 94

Bien Hoa 21 79

Tuy Hoa 22 78

Can Tho 22 78

Cam Ranh Bay 29 71

Phan Rang 33 67

Nha Trang 37 63

Phu Cat 40 60

Vung Tau 46 54

Da Nang 48 52

Chu Lai 57 43

Long Binh 59 41

Qui Nhon 67 33

Pleiku 71 29

Phu Bai 73 27

An Khe 75 25

Cu Chi 92 8

Total 40 60

 Sources: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Construction Status Report, South 

Vietnam, 28 Feb 69; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 125.

Table 1—Percent of Work in Place at Selected Locati
447

Year of Transition, 1969

28,000 served under General Parker. Most of the remaining engineers were 

assigned to the seven Army divisions, the four infantry and airborne brigades, 

and the armored cavalry regiment. Parker relied on the 18th and 20th Engineer 

Brigades, the U.S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, and a small planning 

staff at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, to carry out his command’s large construction and operational support responsibilities. Subordinate units comprised 

six groups, twenty-seven battalions, and many separate companies, teams, and 

detachments. The 18th Brigade under Brig. Gen. John H. Elder Jr., and after May 

1969 Col. John W. Morris, reported 13,310 personnel on its rolls (95.5 percent of 

authorized strength). Col. Harold R. Parfitt’s larger 20th Brigade stood near full 

Contractor

Harbor and Coastal

Facilities

Roads Sewage and Waste Airfield Pavements

Electricity

(Excluding Vinnell)

Waterfront Operating

Facilities

Water Supply Ammo Storage

Maintenance

Facilities

Liquid Fuel Storage Open Storage Admin Buildings

Hospital Buildings Covered Storage Troop Housing Cold Storage

Troops

99 94 76 68

57 52 49 45

42 42 39 35

32 30 27 23

1 6

24 32

43 48 51 55

58 58 61 65

68 70 73 77

Chart 5—Army Construction in Place by Cat

and Contractor, Januar

 Sources: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Construction Status Report, South 

Vietnam, 28 Feb 69; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, p. 124.
Engineers at War

448

strength (99.1 percent) with 13,798 troops. Brig. Gen. Elmer P. Yates’ Engineer 

Construction Agency, which included utilities detachments, reported 1,106 troops 

on hand, or 87.2 percent of 1,268 authorized personnel. Critically short military 

occupational specialties ranged from plumbers (231 of 591, or 39 percent of 

authorized personnel on hand) to auto repair parts specialists (86 of 127, or 67.7 

percent). On the other hand, there were almost double the number of carpenters 

authorized, and almost all the authorized number of quarrymen were present.6

A review of the 18th Brigade’s projects in the spring of 1969 illustrates 

the variety and scope of construction carried out by its three groups, thirteen 

construction and combat battalions, and smaller specialized units. In I Corps, 

the 45th Engineer Group’s four combat battalions took on several projects. 

The 14th Engineer Battalion expanded a surgical hospital at Camp Evans, and 

the 27th Engineer Battalion built an 11,520-square-foot UH–1 maintenance 

hangar, hardstand, and sixty-foot observation tower at Phu Bai. Major roadwork carried out by the 19th and 39th Engineer Battalions included upgrad6

 Visit to Various Headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam, 1–22 May 69, incl. 5, p. 3, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14. See also tabs H through J for station lists of all units down to 

company level, tab G listing critical personnel shortages, and tabs K through L for Letters of 

Instruction issued in January to commanding generals, Engineer Troops [Engineer Command], 

Engineer Construction Agency, and 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades. 

Aerial view of Cam Ranh Bay from the south and the port to the left and the 

peninsula filling in with depots and troop billets
449

Year of Transition, 1969

ing Highway 1 between Quang Ngai and Bong Son. In northern II Corps, 

the 937th Engineer Group’s 815th Engineer Construction Battalion at Pleiku 

completed air-conditioned communications buildings, a 33,450-square-foot 

aircraft maintenance hangar, maintenance shops, and troop housing. The 20th 

Engineer Combat Battalion worked on an 8,800-square-foot wood frame post 

exchange and a 12,800-square-foot wood frame theater for the 4th Division 

at nearby Dragon Mountain. At Qui Nhon, the 84th Engineer Construction 

Battalion finished two similar communications facilities, a prisoner of war 

hospital, two cold-storage warehouses, a prefabricated metal 120-by-200-foot 

warehouse, and seven 120-by-200-foot two-story wood frame buildings. In 

the port area, the 536th Port Construction Detachment built an ammunition 

off-loading facility, and the 84th Engineer Battalion and the 643d Engineer 

Company (Pipeline) extended two eight-inch petroleum pipelines eight miles 

to a tank farm. Extensive roadwork under way by the 84th and 815th Engineer 

Battalions, and the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion progressed along 

Highways 1, 14, 19, and Route 7B near Cheo Reo. In southern II Corps, the 

35th Engineer Group’s 864th Engineer Construction Battalion completed 

another communications facility and a seawall and hardstand at Nha Trang. 

The 577th Engineer Construction Battalion finished a 10,500-barrel tank farm 

and cantonment facilities at Tuy Hoa and worked on a 4,500-barrel tank farm 

at Da Lat. At Phan Thiet and Bao Loc, the 116th Engineer Combat Battalion 

built base camp facilities. Ongoing projects included the 589th Engineer 

Construction Battalion’s 24,000 square feet of warehouses at Dong Ba Thin 

and the 87th Engineer Construction Battalion’s 200,000-barrel tank farm for 

the Air Force at Cam Ranh Bay (with help from the 497th Port Construction 

Company and 643d Engineer Pipeline Company). All five battalions of the 

35th Group were improving twenty-five MACV advisory camps, which stood 

at 48 percent complete and included new billets, mess halls, wells, water storage 

and sewage systems, and latrines and shower facilities. Also, all of the group’s 

battalions were doing major roadwork along Highways 1, 11, 20, and 21.7

Likewise the 20th Brigade accomplished a variety of construction in 

III and IV Corps. Newly completed base construction at Long Binh by the 

159th Engineer Group’s 46th and 169th Engineer Construction Battalions 

included a stockade complete with prefabricated steel administrative buildings and wood frame barracks, mess hall, latrines, administrative buildings, 

and guard towers. Cantonment and water supply facilities were added for 

the 1st Division at Lai Khe by the 34th Engineer Construction and 168th 

Engineer Combat Battalions, and a new wood frame operations building for 

the Royal Thai Army Aviation Company was finished at Long Thanh North 

by the 92d Engineer Construction Battalion. Major work under way by the 

46th and 92d Engineer Battalions consisted of eight prefabricated steel, opensided Pascoe warehouse buildings for the rear echelons of the 1st Cavalry and 

101st Airborne Divisions at Bien Hoa. The 92d and 168th Engineer Battalions 

7

 Principal Construction Projects, 35th, 45th, and 937th Engr Gps, 1 Feb–15 Apr 69, incl. 6, 

tabs A through C, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 163. See also 

PA&E History, FY 1969 and FY 1970.
Engineers at War

450

were adding cantonment facilities at Long Thanh and Lai Khe. Also at Lai 

Khe, the 714th Power Distribution Detachment was building an electrical 

power distribution system, and at Cogido near Long Binh the 497th Port 

Construction Company was working on an ammunition off-loading wharf. 

Roadwork extended along Highway 13 (34th Engineer Battalion), the Phu 

Cuong Bypass (46th Engineer Battalion), and Highway 20 (169th Engineer 

Battalion). The 159th Group’s 41st Port Construction Company also began 

the Phu Cuong Bridge pier protection system. In western III Corps, the 79th 

Engineer Group’s 554th Engineer Construction Battalion completed a wood 

frame communications center, a maintenance hangar, and an aircraft fire station for the 25th Division at Cu Chi. The 588th Engineer Combat Battalion 

built dog kennels for the division at Tay Ninh, and the 554th Engineer Battalion 

finished MACV adviser facilities at Bao Trai. Ongoing projects included 

asphalt paving and an 11,520-square-foot hangar at Cu Chi airfield by the 

554th Engineer Battalion and upgrading MACV adviser facilities by the 31st 

and 588th Engineer Combat Battalions. Highway improvements by the 554th 

and 588th Engineer Battalions progressed along Highways 1 and 22. In the 

delta, the 34th Engineer Group finished wood frame cantonments and water 

and power distribution systems for the 9th Division at Dong Tam (69th and 

93d Engineer Construction Battalions), a 1,000-barrel petroleum tank farm at 

Vi Thanh (69th Engineer Battalion), and airfield paving at Vinh Long (36th 

Engineer Battalion). Roadwork by the group’s 34th, 36th, and 69th Engineer 

Battalions and the 35th Engineer Combat Battalion covered approximately 

seventy-three miles.8

The Seabees continued supporting U.S. forces in I Corps. At the start of 

1969, the 3d Naval Construction Brigade had ten naval mobile construction 

battalions, which included two battalions of reservists, divided among two 

construction regiments in I Corps. In addition, two construction battalion 

maintenance units, one in I Corps and the second at Cam Ranh Bay, detachments from an amphibious construction battalion, and fifteen Seabee teams 

carried out construction tasks. Battalions continued to rotate during the year, 

peaking at twelve at midyear and five at the end of the year when the 3d Marine 

Division departed. The drop in the number of Seabee battalions prompted the 

departure of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment in December. Highway 

upgrading made progress despite the added effort required to repair monsoondamaged roads. Improved stretches extended along Highways 1 and 9. The 

Liberty Bridge over the Ky Lam River connecting An Hoa and Go Noi Island 

to Da Nang was completed in March, and the Hue highway bridge opened to 

two-way traffic in September. Projects for the Navy and Marine Corps in the 

Da Nang area included 176,000 cubic feet of refrigerated storage, over 300,000 

square feet of covered storage, a data processing center, and concrete aircraft 

shelters at Da Nang Air Base and Marble Mountain Air Facility. Also completed or under way were five hangars and airfield facilities at Quang Tri, sixteen wood frame hangars for the U.S. Army at Camp Evans and Camp Eagle, 

8

 Principal Construction Projects, 34th, 79th, and 159th Engr Gps, 1 Feb–15 Apr 69, incl. 6, 

tabs D through F, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 163.
451

Year of Transition, 1969

a 200-bed hospital for the 1st Marine Medical Battalion in Da Nang, concrete aircraft shelters at Chu Lai, and improvements at Marine Corps combat 

bases. At the start of 1969, the naval construction forces faced backlogs of 

twenty-four months of vertical construction and thirty months of horizontal 

construction. When the troop withdrawals gained momentum in 1969, the 

backlogs dropped dramatically when the naval command canceled or deferred 

several projects. By the end of the year, the programmed backlog fell to under 

four weeks of horizontal construction and under five weeks of vertical work, 

sufficient for the planned employment of five battalions.9

Marine Corps engineers comprised the third cohort of U.S. military engineers in I Corps. The two divisional battalions, two heavy engineer battalions, two bridge companies, and one line company from another battalion 

swept roads for mines, built firebases, maintained and improved roads, and 

ran water supply points. They also did some construction. The fifth battalion, 

the 9th Engineers at Chu Lai (headquarters and three companies) and Tam 

Ky (part of a fourth line company) focused on maintaining and improving 

Highway 1 north of Chu Lai, including some operational support for the 

Army’s Americal Division. With the departure of the 3d Marine Division, the 

3d and 11th Engineer Battalions halted all construction projects. Before leaving Vietnam in late November, the 11th Engineer Battalion dismantled two 

combat bases and helped the 3d Battalion prepare the Cua Viet and Dong Ha 

Combat Bases for transfer to the South Vietnamese. The 1st and 7th Engineer 

Battalions stayed with the 1st Marine Division in the Da Nang area, and the 

9th Battalion and one bridge company remained at Chu Lai.10

In 1969, the five Air Force Red Horse squadrons of the 1st Civil Engineering 

Group concentrated on the aircraft shelter program, air base improvements, 

and emergency repairs. Between 10 August 1968 and 31 May 1969, the 554th 

Civil Engineering Squadron based at Phan Rang Air Base completed fortyone construction projects costing $1.2 million, and included an armament 

and electronics shop, a flight line fire station, a concrete access taxiway, six 

troop barracks, two 20-man officers quarters, a 49,000-square-yard asphalt 

hardstand, and a base theater. The unit also built more than the equivalent 

of one mile of reinforced-concrete revetment wall to protect Air Force barracks. During the same period, the 819th Civil Engineering Squadron at Phu 

Cat Air Base finished thirty-two projects totaling $1.8 million. Some of these 

projects included a 250,000-gallon water storage tank, a 5,000-foot chainlink security fence, new officers quarters, replacement aircraft ramps, and a 

communications facility. A sewer line and an officers dining hall were among 

the projects completed at Pleiku. The three other Red Horse squadrons—the 

555th at Cam Ranh Bay, the 820th at Da Nang, and the 823d at Bien Hoa—

carried out similar work. Red Horse units also built, improved, and manned 

perimeter defenses. At Phan Rang, teams deployed fourteen times in response 

9

 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, p. IV-13, vol. 2, pp. IX-98 to IX-100; Smith, U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam, 1969, pp. 267–69; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 69, MACDC, 19 Jan 70, p. II-3, 

Historians files, CMH. 10 Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp. 267–70, 377, 382.
Engineers at War

452

to mortar, rocket, and sapper attacks. (The 589th Construction Battalion and 

other Army tenant units also helped guard their part of the base’s perimeter.) 

At Da Nang, emergency repairs were severely tested on 27 April 1969 when a 

grass fire destroyed ammunition and bomb storage and fuel storage areas two 

miles southwest of the air base. Continuous concussions from the blasts also 

damaged many buildings. Red Horse work crews began repairing operations 

buildings and the passenger terminal, and within a month most of the damage 

was repaired. The Air Force also reduced some of its engineering force in 1969. 

In December, the 555th Civil Engineering Squadron at Cam Ranh Bay was 

inactivated, and the personnel and equipment were distributed among the four 

remaining squadrons.11

In 1969, aircraft shelters became a high-priority item, especially for the 

Air Force and Navy. The 1968 Tet attacks revealed the weakness of uncovered revetments when twenty-five Air Force aircraft alone valued at $94 

million were destroyed and another 251 were damaged by high-trajectory 

rockets and mortars. Now faced with an urgent requirement to protect its 

planes, the Air Force adopted an existing double-corrugated steel arch building design, the “Wonder Arch” named after the building’s manufacturer, the 

Wonder Trussless Building Company. Sections were bolted together and 

topped off with unreinforced concrete (fifteen inches thick on ridges and 

twenty-nine inches thick in valleys) which provided good protection. An 

added freestanding backwall gave equal protection and included an opening 

to let out jet exhaust. A few shelters could also be fitted with a front closure 

device. The Air Force program, called Project Concrete Sky, originally figured on 408 shelters costing $8.775 million at six air bases. However, sixte

shelters for Phu Cat Air Base were canceled, reducing the number of shelters to 392 and the price to $7.992 million. Production of materials began 

in mid-1968, and by October the 820th Civil Engineering Squadron began 

building the first Wonder Arches at Da Nang Air Base. Work got off to a 

slow start. Instructions were missing, many metal parts had been damaged 

during shipment, and the arches were larger than the spaces for them in the 

existing revetments. Despite these and other problems, Red Horse engineers 

cut the erection time for one shelter from one week to one day. All ninetyeight shelters at Da Nang were completed fifty-two days ahead of schedule. 

Elsewhere, Air Force engineers built 75 shelters at Bien Hoa, 62 at Tan Son 

Nhut, 40 at Phu Cat, 61 at Phan Rang, and 56 at Tuy Hoa. Since military 

engineers lacked enough concrete batch plants for the concrete covers, the 

MACV Construction Directorate committed RMK-BRJ’s large-capacity 

plants and its fleet of truck-mounted transit mixers. The firm completed 53 

concrete covers at Da Nang, 68 at Bien Hoa, and all 62 at Tan Son Nhut. Air 

Force engineers did the rest. All the shelters were completed by 13 January 

1970 at a final cost of $15.7 million, well worth the investment in deterring 

11 Project Red Horse, pp. 1–2, 7–9, 11, 13, 15–16, 19–25, 29–30; Roger P. Fox, Air Bas

Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 

United States Air Force, 1979), p. 115; Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp. 263–64; 

Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 69, MACDC, p. II-4.
453

Year of Transition, 1969

future damage to expensive aircraft. A comparable Navy program planned 

299 shelters at five bases, but this number was eventually reduced to 122 

at Da Nang, Marble Mountain, and Chu Lai. Elements of the 3d Naval 

Construction Brigade began building shelters in July 1969. By mid-1970, 

the brigade would complete 114 shelters and place concrete covers on all the 

shelters except 45 at Da Nang, which were poured by RMK-BRJ.12

Though the Wonder Arches proved cost-effective for expensive fighter aircraft, 

ensuring the same degree of protection for all aircraft did not appear warranted. 

The cost of a completed shelter, including the concrete, came to about $30,000, 

remarkably cheap when compared to saving a $2 million to $4 million aircraft. 

When the last shelter at Tuy Hoa Air Base was capped in early 1970, the Air Force 

had a combined total of nearly 1,400 protective structures, including approximately 1,000 revetments. Such cocoon-type shelters, however, seemed impractical 

for the large number of Army helicopters in Vietnam. Even flying skid-mounted 

12 Dunn, Base Development, p. 65; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 388–90; Fox, Air Base 

Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 70–71; MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. IX-100, IX-102; 

ibid., 1970, vol. 2, p. IX-53; Project Red Horse, pp. 6–7, 14, 18, 94–96; Nalty, Air War Ove

South Vietnam, pp. 35–36; Capt. Paul Y. Thompson, “Aircraft Shelters in Vietnam,” Military 

Engineer 61 (July-August 1969): 273–74.

Seabees pouring concrete for Wonder Arches at Da Nang Air Base
Engineers at War

454

helicopters in and out of uncovered revetments was considered hazardous. A 

September 1969 study by the Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Office of the 

Chief of Engineers, reported that to shelter all 4,210 Army aircraft in Vietnam 

would cost a prohibitive $300 million. Just covering some of the Army’s high-cost 

aircraft—the fixed-wing OV–1 Mohawk surveillance airplane, and CH–47 and 

CH–54 helicopters—would cost $54 million. Considering losses of Army aircraft 

in Vietnam, the study concluded it was not cost-effective to undertake a covered 

shelter program.13

Since some protection could be achieved with revetments alone, they were 

used and given high priority in 1969. The Army typically used the parallel and 

L-shaped revetments for helicopters and the U-shaped revetment for fixed-wing 

aircraft. Since aviation units moved frequently, each move required new revetment construction. Many helicopters had revetments in two or more locations. 

Designs ranged from revetment bins five feet high and four feet thick to portable 

revetments that could be easily assembled, disassembled, and moved. Precast 

concrete yards were already manufacturing bridge decking for the highway program, and conversion to movable concrete revetments was easily accomplished. 

The first concrete revetments were installed at Phu Loi in mid-1970. From late 

1970 on, the precast concrete revetment was adopted for wide use and offered 

the advantage of long life and portability. Also, in early 1970, Army engineers 

13 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, p. 389; Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 

pp. 70–71; Dunn, Base Development, p. 67; Engineer Strategic Studies Group, OCE, Sep 69, An 

Analysis of the Requirement for Army Aircraft Shelters, pp. ix, H-5.

Wonder Arches like these at Bien Hoa Air Base could not be used for all types 

of aircraft, and the Army used less expensive revetments.
455

Year of Transition, 1969

developed a practical revetment consisting of two walls of M8A1 runway matting with one foot of compacted earth between them. In March, four-sided 

revetments were specified for aircraft costing $1 million or more. A movable 

M8A1 revetment placed on a warehouse cart was developed as the fourth side 

to be connected and towed away from U-shaped revetments. Still, protection 

for most Army aircraft consisted of practical expedients such as earth- or rockfilled corrugated steel bins and fifty-five-gallon drums.14

Troop Withdrawals and Realignments

On 10 June 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced that 25,000 U.S. 

troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam starting within thirty days. 

Included in this number were 15,400 Army troops, 8,400 Marines, and 1,200 Navy 

personnel. Phase I redeployment involved most of the 9th Infantry Division from 

northern IV Corps and a regimental landing team in northern I Corps from the 

3d Marine Division. MACV led off the redeployment with first-rate combat units 

to make the reduction credible to Hanoi, the American public, and the South 

Vietnamese government. MACV’s other criteria were operational: it would 

14 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 67–68; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 162–63; Department 

of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 1973), p. 112; Capt. Glen E. Brisbine, “Combat Aircraft Revetments—A 

Review,” Military Engineer Field Notes, Military Engineer 64 (March-April 1972): 92–94.

L-shaped helicopter revetment
Engineers at War

456

reduce the U.S. presence in areas where strong South Vietnamese units, backed 

by U.S. tactical air, artillery, and helicopter support, could take up all or part of 

the ground fighting; where progress in pacification and military operations was 

being made; and where nearby U.S. forces could readily reinforce in emergencies. 

Since Saigon had to be protected at all costs, III Corps would be exempt from the 

early reductions. On 16 October, the president announced Phase II reductions of 

40,500 men, and a Phase III redeployment of 50,000 men on 15 December, to be 

completed by 15 April 1970. By then, U.S. military strength in the theater would 

drop to 434,000.15

The first withdrawals involved several engineer units. Most of the 9th 

Division, including its 15th Engineer Battalion left in September. Company C, 

however, remained with the 3d Brigade at Tan An in southern III Corps and 

became the 571st Engineer Combat Company. On 19 June, the 86th Combat 

Battalion at Camp Viking near My Tho received orders to depart in August. 

In the past, the 86th had supported the 9th Division and carried out road 

and bridge construction in III and IV Corps. Attached units (595th Light 

Equipment Company, 523d Port Construction Company, and 67th Dump 

Truck Company) were reassigned. Personnel with less than ten months’ service 

in Vietnam were transferred to other engineer units. Line companies in the 

86th were reduced to zero strength, and remaining troops were transferred to 

headquarters company, which departed with the battalion headquarters on 15 

August. Most of the battalion’s equipment was transferred to other engineer 

units, and the 93d Construction Battalion took over responsibility for the construction materials in the supply yard.16

By the end of the year, two more units had also departed Vietnam. In 

November, the 70th Combat Battalion, which had served in the highlands for 

more than four years, left. The 70th had moved from Pleiku to the Ban Me 

Thuot area in September 1968, where it built several firebases and helicopter 

revetments for an air cavalry unit moving into the area. About one-half of 

the engineers were reassigned to other units, equipment was either turned in 

or transferred to other units, and the main base camp (Camp Jerome) was 

torn down. On 19 November, the 70th transferred its remaining projects to 

the 864th Construction Battalion. Company B at the Hot Rocks Quarry east 

of Ban Me Thuot became Company C, 19th Engineer Combat Battalion. In 

December, Company C, 307th Engineer Battalion, returned to Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.17

15 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, pp. IV-10 to IV-13, IV-16, IV-18. See also Clarke, Final Years, 

pp. 346–59. 16 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, pp. IV-13, IV-15 to IV-19; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 

69, MACDC, p. II-8; Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 158; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 18th Engr 

Bde, 31 Jan 69, pp. 2–3, and 1 May–31 Jul 69, 86th Engr Bn, 9 Aug 69, pp. 1–2, 11, both in 

Historians files, CMH. For more on engineer units selected for redeployment, see Msg, Abrams 

MAC 7181 to Adm John S. McCain, CINCPAC, 6 Jun 69, sub: Force Planning, Abrams Papers, 

CMH. 17 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 68, 70th Engr Bn, 31 Oct 68, pp. 3, 5, and 1–29 Nov 69, 70th Engr 

Bn, 29 Nov 69, pp. 2, 5. Both in Historians files, CMH.
457

Year of Transition, 1969

The year 1969 also saw the scheduled departures of the two National 

Guard engineer units sent to Vietnam in 1968. In August, nearly one thousand 

men of the 116th Engineer Combat Battalion from Idaho and the 131st Light 

Equipment Company from Vermont reached the end of their tours in southern II Corps. Both moved to nearby transfer stations and to their home states 

for demobilization ceremonies. The 116th spent most of its tour in the Bao 

Loc area upgrading or maintaining Highways 1 and 20 and Route 8B. The battalion also provided operational support for Task Force South, an America

and South Vietnamese Army task force operating in southeast II Corps. Other 

duties involved maintaining Phan Thiet and Bao Loc airfields and improving MACV adviser camps. Civic action projects included providing water to 

the outlying Montagnard villages and improving drainage and village roads. 

To the north, the 131st Light Equipment Company, under the 70th Engineer 

Battalion’s control, ran Hot Rocks Quarry, helped rebuild fifty-seven miles of 

Highway 21 to the juncture with Highway 1 north of Nha Trang, and built 

several airfields. The 131st also did extensive civic action work. One major 

project involved relocating three thousand Montagnards from seventeen villages to a more secure central village. Work included clearing and leveling a 

one-square-mile area for the consolidated village, digging wells, improving 

roads, transporting people and animals, and even moving houses on low-bed 

trailers and reassembling them at the new site.18

The 19th Engineer Combat Battalion filled the void left by the departing 116th Battalion. This was a logical move since the 19th was nearly done 

upgrading eighteen and a half miles of Highway 1 from the I/II Corps border 

to Duc Pho. Control of the battalion passed from the 45th Group to the 35th 

Group for the second time in sixteen months. On 5 August, an advanced party 

moved to Bao Loc and began the process of taking over the 116th’s projects 

and equipment. Some of the 19th’s equipment and all tactical bridging and 

construction supplies were either transferred to nearby engineer units or 

turned in to the Qui Nhon depot. Base camps were transferred or dismantled, 

including the main camp at Landing Zone Lowboy. Several units, however,

remained behind for a short time to complete the roadwork.19

After the 19th Engineer Battalion moved to southern II Corps, it inherited 

two units formerly attached to the 116th, the 572d Light Equipment Company 

and the 547th Asphalt Platoon at Camp Smith. After settling in, the 19th 

proceeded to upgrade fifty miles of Highway 20. Other units also moved. 

18 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, pp. IV-16 to IV-17; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 35th Engr Gp, 

31 Oct 69, p. 7, Historians files, CMH; Lt. Col. Harvey L. Latham, “The Longest Weekend,” 

Kysu’ 1 (Summer 1969): 7–9; Ltr, CG, 18th Engr Bde, to CG, Engr Trps, VN, 18 Sep 69, sub: 

Evaluation of National Guard Units, pp. 6–7, 37–38, Historians files, CMH; AAR, Engineer 

National Guard Units, 26th Mil Hist Det, 17 Jul 69, pp. 2–3. The AAR also contains interviews 

from Capt. Raymond F. Bullock, CO, 26th Mil His Det, with Engineer National Guard Units 

to LOC Program, Vietnam, 35th Engr Gp, 70th Engr Bn, 116th Engr Bn, and 131st Engr Co, 

Jun–Jul 69, VNIT 446. The evaluation and report contain much information concerning the 

readiness of the two units, statistics comparing the units with Regular Army engineer units in 

Vietnam, commanders’ evaluations, and interviews. 19 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 35th Engr Gp, p. 7, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 19th Engr Bn, 13 Nov 

69, pp. 1, 5–6. Both in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

458

The 497th Port Construction Company, which had been attached to the 20th 

Brigade, returned to the 18th Brigade and resumed work at Cam Ranh Bay 

and Qui Nhon. The Earthmoving Platoon, Company C, 93d Construction 

Battalion, left the 35th Group and rejoined the battalion in the delta.20

Vietnamization 

If Vietnamization was not a new idea, what was new were the tempo, 

timing, intensity, and relationship with pacification and the U.S. troop withdrawals. By 1967, the number of Army engineer advisers had increased several 

times over from around 50 in the early 1960s to around 150. The previous 

year, the MACV Construction Directorate had taken on advisory responsibilities for South Vietnamese engineer construction units, engineer equipment 

and maintenance, and the Engineer School at Phu Cuong. The Directorate’s 

Engineer Advisory Division headed by a colonel was authorized nearly sixty 

officers and enlisted men. The rest of the engineer advisers were assigned to 

MACV corps and division advisory detachments with the advisers working 

with corps engineer staffs, combat engineer groups, and divisional and nondivisional engineer battalions.21

Training programs also expanded. The Engineer School tripled its student capacity to three thousand to handle the growing population of student 

officers, officer candidates, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers. 

In addition, a selected number of officers and enlisted men were sent to the 

U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir to attend engineering courses. The 

number steadily increased from 34 in 1965 to 105 in 1968 and 218 in 1969.22

When the Americans started to get pacification on its feet in mid-1967, 

General Abrams, as General Westmoreland’s deputy, was charged with 

upgrading South Vietnam’s armed forces. By this time, the South Vietnamese 

Army engineers were organized to support a national army of ten infantry 

divisions. Organized along American lines, each division had one engineer 

battalion of over 400 men. Backing the divisional engineers, each corps now 

had a combat engineer group consisting of several combat engineer battalions 

(540 men each) and separate dump truck, float bridge, panel bridge, and light 

equipment companies. From north to south, the 10th, 20th, 30th, and 40th 

20 Report of Visit to Various Headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam, 1–21 Nov 68, incl. 

3, p. 7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 13; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 35th Engr Gp, p. 7, 1 

Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 35th Engr Gp, 31 Jan 70, pp. 5–6, 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 

70, p. 1, and 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 864th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 70, pp. 2, 7, 9. ORLLs in Historians 

files, CMH. 21 Joint Table of Distribution, Construction Directorate, MACV, 1 May 1966; Talking Paper, 

sub: MACV Advisory Structure, 23 Jul 67, tab C, pp. 6, 10, and tab E, p. 5, Historians files, 

CMH. For more on the advisory effort, see Clarke, Final Years, pp. 49–78, and Cosmas, Years 

of Escalation, 1962–1967, pp. 288–90. 22 In late 1964, six South Vietnamese captains and the author attended the same officer career 

course at Fort Belvoir. Unpublished Monograph, “The Development and Training of the South 

Vietnamese Army,” CMH, 1973, pp. 16–17; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 167–71; Lt. Gen. Dong 

Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 1980), pp. 171, 206.
459

Year of Transition, 1969

Groups supported I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps, respectively, 

with twelve combat battalions and several separate companies and platoons. 

There were two construction groups, the 5th supporting the two southern 

corps and the 6th in the two northern corps. Combat service support engineers 

were found in depot, maintenance, post engineer, topographical, utilities, and 

sawmill units. Altogether, there were over 14,000 soldiers in engineer combat 

units and nearly 3,000 troops in the engineer construction units.23 (Table 2)

By 1969, the enlargement of the South Vietnamese Army engineer force had 

gained momentum. In MACV’s Phase I expansion plan, the 71st Construction 

Battalion, the first of the four new construction battalions envisioned in the 

plan, was organized at Can Tho in June 1968. By the end of September, U.S. 

advisers reported the new battalion had 85 percent of its authorized personnel and 10 percent of its authorized equipment. Pending the formation of 

the 7th Construction Group, the 71st trained under the tutelage of the South 

Vietnamese 40th Engineer Combat Group and operated independently in the 

Bac Lieu area of southern IV Corps.24

For Phase II, MACV planned to add one nondivisional combat battalion, 

five construction battalions, two construction group headquarters, and three 

land-clearing companies. By 1971, the Phase II program would result in an 

engineer force of ten divisional battalions, twelve combat battalions in four 

23 South Vietnamese Army divisional engineer battalions were numbered the same as the 

parent division, and nondivisional engineer combat units were numbered in a pattern matching respective corps and groups such as the 30th Group in III Corps with the 301st and 302d 

Engineer Battalions; separate engineer companies also had a similar three-digit unit designation; 

construction groups were numbered 5th through 8th and their battalions began with the same 

numbers such as 5th Group and its 51st and 52d Battalions. Force Structure Plan, Republic of 

Vietnam Armed Forces, FY 1967–1969, Military Assistance Program Directorate, 10 Jan 67, 

pp. 9, 12; Fact Sheet, MACDC-PP, 19 May 71, sub: ARVN Engineer Troop Strength, both in 

Historians files, CMH; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Apr–30 Jun 67, MACDC, p. II-11; Quarterly Hist 

Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. II-8. 24 MACV History, 1968, vol. 1, pp. 250–51; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jul–30 Sep 68, MACDC, 

p. II-4.

End of June

Major Engineer Elements 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

Combat Engineer Battalion (Division) 10 10 10 10 11 12

Combat Engineer Battalion (Separate) 13 13 12 12 12 12

Combat Engineer Group Headquarters 4 4 4 4 4 4

Engineer Battalion Construction 8 10 13 17 17 17

Engineer Construction Group Headquarters 2 2 3 4 4 4

 Source: Khuyen, RVNAF, p. 19

Table 2—Engineers in South Vietnamese A

Improvement and Expansion Program, 
Engineers at War

460

groups, and seventeen construction battalions in four groups. This organization, MACV believed, would be able to provide more than enough combat and 

general support and allow the South Vietnamese Army engineers to take on a 

meaningful share of the highway program. American planners also developed 

a smaller force structure, called Phase III, in case of a lesser North Vietnamese 

and Viet Cong threat. A force of six or eight divisions instead of ten would 

mean a matching reduction of divisional battalions, and the number of nondivisional battalions would be reduced to twelve. The number of construction battalions would remain the same because of the highway improvement 

program.25

Initially MACV planners envisioned unit-to-unit equipment transfers 

from departing U.S. units, but in 1969 the transfer process included newer 

equipment from depot stocks. This decision was prompted by General Abrams 

who, on 31 May, established criteria designed to ensure that all used U.S. 

Army equipment was safe to operate, serviceable, and operable to the extent 

required for its intended purpose. Replacements for any missing or defective 

parts had to be on order for delivery to the Vietnamese armed forces before 

a piece of equipment was considered transferable. Equipment not available 

from the depots came from U.S. units. An engineer unit slated for redeployment or inactivation continued its mission as long as possible, then turned 

over responsibilities, bases, and equipment to Vietnamese units. In June 1969, 

the 18th and 20th Brigades received instructions to begin transferring equipment to Vietnamese engineer units on a massive scale. These demands were 

not excessive since Vietnamese engineer units were authorized less equipment 

than their American counterparts. During August and September 1969, the 

18th Brigade transferred approximately 193 separate major items of equipment to the 40th Base Depot, the only engineer base depot in the Vietnamese 

Army. In late October, the brigade was tasked to transfer more equipment, this 

time to the new 805th Heavy Equipment Company at Da Nang and to the 63d 

Construction Battalion at Nha Trang. The 20th Brigade accomplished similar 

transfers, including equipment destined for the 63d Construction Battalion. 

A single U.S. battalion, the 92d Construction at Long Binh, received, stored, 

staged, and transferred some two hundred pieces of equipment for the 

brigade.26

Meanwhile, South Vietnamese Army engineer units gained valuable experience through training programs sponsored under Project Buddy by U.S. 

25 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. VI-16 to VI-17, VI-19 to VI-20; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 

Oct–31 Dec 68, MACDC, p. II-8, and 1 Jan–31 Mar 69, MACDC, p. II-11; Fact Sheet, U.S. Army 

Engr Cmd, AVHEN-MO, 29 Nov 69, sub: ARVN Engineer Improvement and Modernization, 

Historians files, CMH; Msg, Abrams MAC 7005 to Stanley R. Resor, Sec Army, 2 Jun 69, sub: 

Release of Information Pertaining to ARVN Force Levels, Abrams Papers, CMH. 26 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. VI-20 to VI-21; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 172–74; Ltr, 

Col Harry A. Griffith, CO, 35th Engr Gp, EGA-CO to Brig Gen John W. Morris, CG, 18th 

Engr Bde, 22 Nov 69; DF, MACJ462, sub: Condition Criteria for Transfer of US Equipment 

to RVNAF, 7 Nov 69, incl. 12b, and Chart: Construction Equipment Comparison for U.S. and 

RVNAF Units, incl. 12d, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16; ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 18th 

Engr Bde, 31 Oct 69, pp. 7–8, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 159th Engr Gp, 14 Nov 69, p. 26. Ltr, DF, 

and ORLLs in Historians files, CMH. 
461

Year of Transition, 1969

Army engineer units. Between August and December 1969, the 84th and 815th 

Construction Battalions trained 167 South Vietnamese soldiers from the 6th 

Construction and 20th Combat Groups to operate D7E bulldozers, 290M 

scrapers, twenty- and forty-ton cranes, scoop loaders, and asphalt plants. The 

35th Group arranged the training and equipment transfers for the newly activated 63d Construction Battalion. In December, the 20th Brigade reported its 

units had trained 426 South Vietnamese soldiers, with another 176 undergoing 

training. On-the-job training sessions included courses on soils analysis by 

the 36th Construction Battalion, asphalt plant assembly by the 36th Battalion 

and the 544th Construction Support Company, and quarry operations by the 

92d and 169th Construction Battalions and the 94th Quarry Detachment. 

Through such methods, the Vietnamese quickly learned to operate newer and 

complex machines. Besides these programs, the 100th Float Bridge Company 

between May and October provided on-the-job training to the 301st Combat 

Battalion, 30th Combat Group, on assembling the M4T6 floating bridge.27

27 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 170–71; Dunn, Base Development, p. 139; Fact Sheets, 937th 

Engr Gp, sub: Engineer Training of ARVN Forces, 9 Feb 70, and 35th Engr Gp, sub: Current 

ARVN Affiliation, 12 Feb 70, both in incl. 15c, and Fact Sheet, 20th Engr Bde, sub: RVNAF 

OJT Program, 16 Feb 70, incl. 16c, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. For more on the 

A South Vietnamese soldier operates a grader under the watchful eye of a U.S. soldier.
Engineers at War

462

Joint projects, especially highway upgrading, increased, encouraging South 

Vietnamese engineers to assume more responsibility. In I Corps, the South 

Vietnamese expanded minesweeping, bridge repair, and land-clearing operations, and began to take on more road maintenance responsibilities. In II Corps, 

the 18th Engineer Brigade’s efforts to help South Vietnamese engineer units 

develop a greater horizontal construction capability (quarry, road and airfield, 

and paving operations) began to bear fruit. After South Vietnamese Army engineers joined the highway improvement program in 1969, they began work on 

the long concrete and steel Highway 1 bridge at Tuy Hoa. The Vietnamese 20th 

Engineer Group built the bridge, and the U.S. 937th Group provided the materials and technical advisers. In the highlands, 20th Group units provided twenty 

dump trucks to support U.S. efforts along Highway 14. The 61st Construction 

Battalion, 6th Construction Group, assumed responsibility for upgrading thirtyfour miles of Highway 1 between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. In early 1970, the 

20th Brigade began making plans to transfer the Gia Ray industrial site located 

midway between Saigon and the II/III Corps border. Sometime after 1 May, 

South Vietnamese engineers were expected to take over the production of all 

crushed rock and asphalt concrete for Highway 1 roadwork between Gia Ray 

and the II/III Corps border. In IV Corps, South Vietnamese engineers assumed a 

larger share of airfield maintenance and began building major highway bridges. 

The Vietnamese 40th Engineer Combat Group also took over quarry operations 

at Nui Sam.28

Operation Switchblade teamed U.S. and South Vietnamese landclearing units under Project Buddy. Originally MACV called for the activation of three land-clearing companies beginning in July 1970 and six-mon

training cycles for each under the tutelage of the 62d Engineer Battalion 

(Land Clearing). Lt. Gen. Julian J. Ewell, the II Field Force commander, 

considered land clearing one of his most valuable assets, and he proposed 

accelerating the activations and training by six months. MACV concurred 

and the 318th Land Clearing Company, 30th Engineer Combat Group, was 

activated on 1 December 1969. Lt. Col. Paul C. Driscoll, the 62d’s commanding officer, named the training program Operation Plowshare. However,

he quickly changed the name to Switchblade after learning the same co

word was used in the program for the peaceful use of atomic energy to make 

excavations. On 15 December, the 62d welcomed the first group of seventyfive trainees to Long Binh and assigned them to the 501st Land Clearing 

Company and Company A, the battalion’s direct-support maintenance unit. 

The program consisted of classes followed by on-the-job training with the 

62d’s officers, tractor-trailer drivers, Rome plow operators, and mechanics 

acting as instructors on a one-to-one basis. Special seats were installed in the 

administrative arrangements of Project Buddy, see Memo, USARV Engr AVHEN-MO 

for Dep Engr, 22 Apr 69, sub: Utilization of US Facilities for OJT of ARVN Maintenance 

Personnel—“Project Buddy,” Historians files, CMH. 28 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. VI-147 to VI-148; Fact Sheet, EGC-CS, sub: Engineer 

Training of ARVN Forces, 9 Feb 70, and Fact Sheet, 35th Engr Gp, sub: Current ARVN Affiliation, 

12 Feb 70, both in incl. 15c; Ltr, 20th Engr Bde to CG, USA Engr Cmd, VN, sub: Review of the 

LOC Restoration Program, 19 Feb 70, incl. 16d, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. 
463

Year of Transition, 1969

cabs for the Vietnamese engineers to sit on and observe the American operators. Later in the training program, the Americans occupied the observers’ 

seats. From this vantage point, the trainees began to understand the intricacies of land clearing and the importance of daily operational maintenance. 

On 15 January 1970, thirty trainees accompanied the 501st to War Zone 

C for forty-five days to support a 1st Cavalry Division operation near the 

Cambodian border. Several large ten-ton tractors hauling trailers carrying 

the Rome plows and their American and Vietnamese operators in the cabs 

were driven by Vietnamese soldiers. In late January, a second cycle of thirty 

Vietnamese soldiers began training with the 984th Land Clearing Company. 

This group spent its forty-five days in the field supporting the 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment in War Zone C. They were followed by thirty more trainees 

who began training with the 60th Land Clearing Company. By the middle of 

March, the 318th had almost sixty qualified plow operators, and the training 

of support personnel was in high gear.29

The next stage of Operation Switchblade saw the emergence of t

318th as an operational land-clearing company. An earlier than expected inactivation of the 501st Land Clearing Company in April 1970 resulted in the 

transfer of ten Rome plows and the formation of the 318th’s first operational 

land-clearing platoon. A joint provisional land-clearing company consisting 

of American and Vietnamese personnel was formed and employed in a cutting 

operation in the jungle east of Tay Ninh. The former trainees enthusiastically 

manned the lead plows with the Americans following behind. Capt. Nguyen 

Van Tich, the 318th’s company commander, guided the cut from a low-flying 

OH–58 observation helicopter. Tich, who attended the U.S. Army Engineer 

School at Fort Belvoir, exuded confidence. When asked if he envisioned problems for the first operation, he replied, “My men are ready. I think we should 

be able to match the American engineer’s performance, at least on this first 

operation.” By early May, the operation was proclaimed a success, and the 

convoy of trucks and lowboys, which returned the provisional company to 

Long Binh, brought an end to direct U.S. supervision. Most of the remaining equipment, including twenty-five additional Rome plows, was transferred 

from the 62d Engineer Battalion and other U.S. units during the fifteen-day 

stand-down period. MACV’s Engineer Advisory Division also assigned one 

officer and two maintenance noncommissioned officers as advisers. On 25 

May, the 318th began its first forty-five-day cycle. Captain Tich controlled 

29 Lt. Gen. Julian J. Ewell and Maj. Gen. Ira A. Hunt Jr., Sharpening the Combat Edge: The 

Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department 

of the Army, 1974), p. 218; Ltr, HQ, 20th Engr Bde, AVRI-OS, to CG, USARV, 21 Jan 70, 

sub: ARVN Land Clearing; Memo, Dep Senior Adviser, III Corps, MACCZ-IIIEN, for Senior 

Adviser, III Corps, 7 Feb 70, sub: Training of ARVN Land Clearing Companies; Ltr, HQ, 62d 

Engr Bn, Lt Col Driscoll to CO, 79th Engr Gp, 6 Nov 69, sub: Proposed Plan for Activation 

of ARVN Land Clearing Companies, all in Historians files, CMH; ARVN Land Clearing 

Training (Operation Switchblade) Feb 70, incl. 16g, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

Interv, Capt Kurt E. Schlotterbeck, CO, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Paul C. Driscoll, CO, 

62d Engr Bn (Land Clearing), 22 Jun 70, VNIT 707, pp. 50–52, CMH. See also Spec. Bob Dart, 

“Vietnamization of Land Clearing—The Beginning,” Kysu’ 2 (Spring 1970): 5–8; and Spec. Neil 

Gaston, “Vietnamization of Land Clearing—The Final Phase,” Kysu’ 2 (Summer 1970): 12–16. 
Engineers at War

464

the company’s operations, and only a few advisers accompanied the unit. The 

318th operated like a U.S. land-clearing company, with the 30th Group’s S–3 

and S–4 sections working closely with their U.S. counterparts. Requisitions 

for repair parts were submitted to the Area Logistical Command to establish 

demands on the South Vietnamese supply system. The 62d continued to provide some parts and maintenance support, with the expectation that the South 

Vietnamese logistics system would take over this responsibility by 1 January 

1971. After completing the cutting cycle on 9 July, the 318th reverted to the 

control of the 30th Group, but the company remained at Long Binh until the 

group could find a permanent home. This proved beneficial. Neither the 62d 

nor the 318th by themselves had enough ten-ton tractors and twenty-five-ton 

trailers on hand to move a company’s thirty Rome plows to the field at once. 

As a simple solution, the two units pooled their tractors and trailers.30

Meanwhile, the 62d continued its training program. In late February 1970, 

soldiers from the 218th Land Clearing Company, 20th Engineer Combat 

Group in II Corps, started training. The 118th Land Clearing Company, 10th 

Engineer Combat Group in I Corps, began its training cycle the following 

month. The methods were the same. Almost every skill required of the U.S. unit 

was included during the on-the-job training program. Rome plow operators, 

heavy truck drivers, mechanics, and medical personnel trained and worked 

together. Vietnamese cooks, however, were not included. Colonel Driscoll 

recalled, “It wouldn’t be too helpful to train them to cook our stuff when 

they’re not going to be able to get it.” By midyear, he expressed satisfaction on 

the progress of the training program. Maintenance skills, however, required 

more effort than operating the bulldozers because some trainees expected to 

come in from a cut, park their equipment, and go to bed. They quickly learned 

that the American operators took pride in making sure the equipment was 

ready to go the following morning. Driscoll did not see language as a major 

barrier. “Just put a GI and an ARVN in a cab and in a couple of days,” he 

noted, “the ARVN’s got it. It’s rather amazing, really. But that was the key to 

the whole concept of the program, was the ability of the GI to be motivated 

to get the lesson across.” Driscoll noted interesting differences between the 

South Vietnamese companies. Most of the 318th’s soldiers had just completed 

basic training and were “cooperative and pliable,” but the 118th consisted of 

older, experienced soldiers who required more motivation. This attitude may 

also have stemmed from the fact that the 118th would not be working with the 

62d very long, and the Vietnamese may have considered the program as just 

another training exercise. However, in the field their attitude changed. The 

118th developed a competitive spirit, and its soldiers did not hesitate to help 

man the berm line defenses when the Americans came under attack. Driscoll 

30 Capt. Nguyen Van Tich quoted in Gaston, “Vietnamization of Land Clearing—The Final 

Phase,” pp. 12–16. Also, MFR, HQ II FFV, AVFB-EN, Col John Perkins III, II Field Force 

Engr, sub: Operation of 318th ARVN Engineer Land Clearing Company, 22 Apr 70, Historians 

files, CMH; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 22 Jun 70, pp. 52–54.
465

Year of Transition, 1969

did not have any qualms about the 118th’s future as a successful land-clearing 

company.31

Certain organizational differences allowed the South Vietnamese landclearing companies to operate more independently than their U.S. counterparts. The Vietnamese companies included a direct-support maintenance section with a third-echelon maintenance capability, unlike the U.S. companies 

that depended on battalion maintenance. Also, the South Vietnamese planned 

to assign more tractors and trailers to their land-clearing companies. Colonel 

Driscoll recalled just before his departure in July 1970 that the Vietnamese 

land-clearing companies would have twenty 10-ton tractors with low-bed trailers compared to only ten in the U.S. companies. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese 

companies were not 100 percent mobile. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese companies depended on other engineer units to move thirty Rome plows at one time. 

Still, Driscoll believed that the South Vietnamese had “a real good TO&E 

[table of organization and equipment].”32

A memorandum of understanding between MACV and the U.S. Army 

Engineer Command, Vietnam, formalized the training and affiliation programs. Signed on 26 March 1970 by Brig. Gen. John A. B. Dillard, who 

replaced General Parker in December 1969 as the commander of Engineer 

Troops, and Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Conroy, MACV’s J–4, the memorandum 

defined the procedures governing training assistance. The document also 

confirmed that the affiliation program supplemented the Vietnamese training 

system and MACV’s advisory role. General Dillard, who was promoted to 

major general on 1 April 1970, aggressively pushed his command to accelerate assistance. Most of the command’s groups and battalions worked closely 

with nearby Vietnamese Army engineer units. For instance, the 159th Engineer 

Group at Long Binh sponsored the 5th Construction Group at Hoc Mon. The 

31st Combat Battalion supported the 301st Combat Battalion. Several U.S. 

units were associated with more than one Vietnamese unit. In I Corps, the 45th 

Group worked with the 8th Construction and 10th Combat Groups. In the 

delta, the 35th Combat Battalion sponsored four Vietnamese engineer battalions, the 402d and 403d Combat, the 73d Construction, and the 21st Combat 

of the 21st Infantry Division. Dillard felt that the South Vietnamese chief of 

engineers’ decision to take on part of the highway restoration program and 

the Vietnamese engineers’ willingness to seek training were indicative of real 

progress.33

31 Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 22 Jun 70, pp. 55–61; Gaston, “Vietnamization of 

Land Clearing—The Final Phase,” p. 16. 32 Fact Sheet, HQ, USA Advisory Group, III CTZ, MACV, MACCZ-IIIEN, 5 Feb 70, 

Historians files, CMH; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 22 Jun 70, p. 61. 33 Ltr, Maj Gen John A. B. Dillard, CG Engr Cmd and USARV Engr, AVCC-CG to Ploger, 

OCE, sub: RVNAF Engineer Training, 14 Apr 70; Memorandum of Understanding Between 

MACV J–4 and CG, U.S. Army Engr Cmd, VN, sub: RVNAF Training, 26 Mar 70; 18th and 

20th Engr Bdes ARVN Affiliation Program, Associated Organizations, incl. 2 to Ltr, Dillard 

AVCC-CG to Ploger, 14 Apr 70. All in Historians files, CMH. See also Spec. Curt Nelson, “U.S.-

ARVN Training; Benefits on Both Sides,” Kysu’ 1 (Winter 1969): 21–24; and Elliot “Paving the 

Way to Vietnamization,” pp. 25–28.
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466

Turning Over Bases

As the U.S. withdrew more troops from Vietnam, many bases, ports, and 

other facilities became excess to American needs. Some departing U.S. units 

either tore down their camps or transferred them to other units. Prefabricated 

buildings were often disassembled and moved to other bases or returned to 

the United States. Sometimes new construction requirements arose when U.S. 

units not leaving Vietnam moved from a transferred base to another base. 

Although all remaining bases and facilities would eventually be given to the 

Vietnamese, MACV developed a priority system to allow other U.S. forces and 

agencies to have a last chance to use them.34

These transfers took place under broad guidelines established by MACV 

and the Joint General Staff. MACV wanted to turn over surplus bases as soon 

as possible, with priority given to the South Vietnamese armed forces. The command’s directive outlined assurances that the U.S. occupants would provide for a 

continuity of operations and maintenance responsibility. Also, South Vietnamese 

personnel were supposed to get adequate training in the operation and maintenance of the facility’s equipment and systems. Similar directives issued by the 

Joint General Staff and Central Logistics Command complemented the MACV 

directive. In November 1969, MACV and the Joint General Staff established a 

combined U.S.-Vietnamese committee for coordinating base and facility transfers along with similar committees in the four corps.35

When it came time to transfer a base to the Vietnamese, it was expected 

to be usable with a functional utilities system. If sophisticated equipment was 

essential to American operations at a base, but not for the incoming South 

Vietnamese, it would be removed. Usually this meant replacing high-voltage 

systems with low-voltage systems and removing air conditioners except in 

critical facilities such as hospital operating rooms. Generally, air conditioners 

were removed with the stipulation that windows would be provided. Still, Lt. 

Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, the commanding general of the Central Logistics 

Command, asserted that some U.S.-built bases were “too spacious and consisted of too many buildings and types of structures, all equipped with a complex array of utilities.” Frequently, the bases were too big for the Vietnamese 

units to fill all the barracks, to man all the guard and defense positions, and to 

maintain all the facilities. Too, departing U.S. units usually left the installations 

in increments, failing to guard all the unoccupied areas, which gave rise to theft 

and destruction. “Sometimes,” General Khuyen recalled, “entire mobs broke 

into a few bases and openly dismantled and took away everything in sight 

in complete defiance of the few PF [Popular Forces] guards.” This situation 

would worsen at several bases as the withdrawal of U.S. forces accelerated.36

34 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 171–72; Dunn, Base Development, p. 142. 35 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. VI-123 to VI-124; ibid., 1970, vol. 2, p. IX-36; Khuyen, 

RVNAF Logistics, pp. 179–80. For more on base transfer policies, see MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, 

pp. IX-102 to IX-105; MACV Directive 735–3, 3 Nov 69, Disposal of Excess US Armed Forces Real 

Property and Related Property in the Republic of Vietnam, Historians files, CMH. 36 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 172; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 181, 184–85 (first quote, 

p.184, second, p.185); MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. IX-36, IX-40.
467

Year of Transition, 1969

The departure of the 9th Division in mid-1969 set the pattern for the departure of tactical units. Redeploying from a combat zone required the division’s 

maneuver units to phase their stand-down and departures while keeping pressure on the enemy. For the 9th Division, this process started in July with the 

infantry battalions standing-down within their firebases while still conducting 

security operations before turning over the bases to the South Vietnamese. 

The units then moved to Dong Tam, where they were billeted aboard barracks 

ships. Tactical coordination with the South Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division, 

which operated in the same tactical area, took place without difficulty. As the 

9th Division’s operations drew to a close, engineering support also phased 

out. Projects in progress relating to pacification or civic action continued to 

completion. Not all of the 9th Division, however, departed. The 3d Brigade 

was reorganized as a separate brigade consisting of four infantry battalions 

and other elements totaling over 5,800 soldiers.37

Dong Tam marked the first major disposal of real property in Vietnam 

and foreshadowed problems with future base transfers. A joint Army–Pacific 

Architects and Engineers inventory of the base reported 1,001 buildings and 

facilities valued at $9.2 million. Some items—such as air conditioners, lighting 

fixtures, and ceiling fans—were removed and shipped out. Several buildings 

were also looted and damaged, probably by both departing Americans and 

arriving Vietnamese, despite the posted Off Limits signs. A Pacific Architects 

and Engineers real estate specialist complained about South Vietnamese Army 

transfer officials arriving late and delaying the signing of transfer forms that 

the facilities engineering contractor’s clerks had worked around the clock 

to prepare. Despite these difficulties, Dong Tam was transferred for South 

Vietnamese occupancy on 1 September, but the unfamiliar procedures and 

delays held up the complete transfer until late October. It became obvious 

that training programs for the South Vietnamese covering certain skills such 

as operating and maintaining large generators had to be set up. One solution 

included temporarily assigning personnel from the incoming unit for on-thejob training before the transfer. Another and better approach called for Pacific 

Architects and Engineers to teach these skills. The firm already had in place an 

excellent training program for its Vietnamese employees.38

In mid-September, Pacific Architects and Engineers began training South 

Vietnamese soldiers. The first course trained engineers to operate and maintain 

Dong Tam’s central power plant’s four 500-kilowatt generators and thirty-nine 

miles of high-voltage distribution lines. Three American and one Vietnamese 

instructor assisted by three interpreters taught mechanical and electrical facets 

of high-voltage generation and distribution. Each course lasted seventeen 

weeks and a second cycle followed. The firm’s electrical supervisor later commented that the Vietnamese soldiers were good students, learned fast, and were 

37 MACV History, 1969, vol. 3, pp. D-1 to D-2, D-5, D-13. For more on the redeployment of 

the 9th Division, see MACV History, 1969, vol. 3, an. D. 38 PA&E History, FY 1970, pp. 12–13, and app., PA&E Memo, Froilan V. Udtujan, Real 

Estate Mgmt Spec, for Acting Mgr, Engr Dept, sub: Trip Report to Dong Tam Installation, 9 

Sep 69; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 69, MACDC, p. V-6; MACV History, 1970, vol. 2, 

pp. IX-35 to IX-36, IX-40. 
Engineers at War

468

interested in the work. The engineers completed the second cycle at the end of 

May 1970, fully qualified as high-voltage technicians. Later, the contractor’s 

program moved to Nha Trang Air Base where the firm taught 150 Vietnamese 

airmen comprehensive facilities engineering courses that ranged from eight to 

twelve months.39

The departure of the 9th Division and the transfer of Dong Tam generated new construction requirements for the 34th Group at a time when there 

were fewer units to do the work. The 3d Brigade, 9th Division, headquarters 

complex at Tan An required expansion; a new battalion-size base camp at 

Can Giuoc had to be built; and aviation and support units had to be moved 

elsewhere, which required new facilities. Little time was allowed despite the 

imminent departure of the 9th Division’s 15th Engineer Battalion and the 

group’s 86th Engineer Combat Battalion. The 34th Group also faced a critical 

shortage of construction materials. This problem was reduced when engineers 

removed bunkers from closed firebases and collected all unused lumber at 

Dong Tam. Materials held as a contingency reserve to repair damaged bridges 

were also used. The group diverted units from other projects, and work began 

at the 3d Brigade’s headquarters and the base camp at Can Giuoc. Expanding 

the Tan An airfield and adding helicopter and fixed-wing parking aprons and 

revetments at Vinh Long and Can Tho also got under way. While the 93d 

Construction Battalion concentrated its efforts at Tan An, the 36th and 69th 

Construction Battalions worked on the other aviation projects.40

More base transfers followed. In October 1969, Blackhorse, forty miles 

east of Saigon and former base camp for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

was transferred to the South Vietnamese 18th Division. This time no significant damage took place at the 700-acre camp valued at $1.9 million. Camps in 

III Corps occupied by the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, which departed 

Vietnam in December, were either dismantled or turned over to the Vietnamese. 

At Vung Tau, several U.S. Army buildings, mostly barracks, worth $3 million 

were turned over to the Vietnamese national police in March 1970. In February 

1970, a portion of the 1st Division’s camp at Dau Tieng was transferred, but 

that part of the camp included Pacific Architects and Engineers facilities. The 

firm had to move operations to the other side of the camp. Dau Tieng’s new 

status also meant reduced manning. Consequently, the contractor moved the 

equipment and maintenance shop to a new parent installation at Cu Chi. In 

addition, 160 tons of supplies and 498 pieces of equipment no longer needed at 

Dau Tieng were redistributed to other installations in Vietnam. In I Corps, the 

South Vietnamese 1st Division accepted portions of the 3d Marine Division’s 

base at Dong Ha, and in III Corps the Vietnamese Air Force received former 

RMK-BRJ facilities at Bien Hoa Air Base. Also, U.S. Army units inherited 

several vacated camps by the end of the year. The 3d Marine Division’s base 

at Quang Tri became the home base for the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 

39 PA&E History, FY 1970, pp. 76–78. For more on the contractor’s training program, civilian and military, see PA&E History’s Appendix A, “Training Accomplishments.” 40 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 34th Engr Gp, 1 Nov 69, pp. 5–8, Historians files, CMH.
469

Year of Transition, 1969

(Mechanized). A portion of the departing Philippine Civic Action Group’s 

camp at Tay Ninh was transferred to elements of the 1st Cavalry Division.41

Supporting Combat 

As in 1968, a major share of the allied effort in 1969 remained committed to finding, fixing, and destroying North Vietnamese and Viet Cong formations and their base areas. In the northernmost provinces of I Corps, the 

3d Marine Division, the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, and the 101st Airborne 

Division guarded the Demilitarized Zone. In southern I Corps, the 1st Marine 

and Americal Divisions carried out small-unit patrolling and security operations. In II Corps, the 4th Division screened the Central Highlands along 

the Cambodian border and the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted most of 

its security operations in Binh Dinh Province. In III Corps, the 1st Cavalry 

and 25th Divisions defended the area along the Cambodian border. The 1st 

Division, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 199th Infantry Brigade, 

the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, and the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division 

shielded the Saigon approaches. The South Vietnamese armed forces, nearly 

one million strong, continued their security mission and participated in joint 

operations with U.S. forces. Allied forces also carried out security missions in 

their areas of responsibility: two South Korean army divisions protected the 

coastal lowlands in II Corps; the Korean marine brigade operated south of 

Da Nang; and the Australian and Thai forces secured the region southeast of 

Saigon and guarded the approaches from that direction.42

During the year, ground combat in South Vietnam lessened significantly, 

with occasional violent contacts between American and North Vietnamese 

units. In January, XXIV Corps began a series of offensive operations aimed 

at North Vietnamese base areas near the Laotian border. A reinforced U.S. 

Marine regiment struck an enemy stronghold north of the A Shau Valley in 

Operation Dewey Canyon and uncovered large caches. In March, the 101st 

Airborne Division launched a series of operations in the A Shau Valley itself 

in an effort to destroy the redoubt and to interdict supply routes built by North 

Vietnamese engineers. One heavy and violent contact between American and 

North Vietnamese units occurred when the division’s 3d Brigade and South 

Vietnamese Army elements launched a heliborne operation, Apache Snow,

into the valley. On 11 May, one of the brigade’s battalions collided with a 

sizable enemy force entrenched on Dong Ap Bia (Hill 937), resulting in a 

bloody battle better known as Hamburger Hill. Three more battalions were 

thrown into the fray before the crest finally fell. In the United States, the 

apparent waste of American lives in taking another enemy position and then 

41 MACV History, 1969, vol. 2, p. 105; ibid., 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-35, IX-37; Quarterly Hist 

Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 69, MACDC, pp. V-4 to V-5; PA&E History, FY 1970, pp. 13–14. 42 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, pp. II-13, V-3, vol. 2, p. VI-10; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an 

American Army, pp. 295, 303, 308, 319.
Engineers at War

470

leaving it sparked more criticism on the conduct of the war. Washington sent 

out word to hold casualties down.43

Organic engineer units carried out minesweeping and demolition support 

and general support in their parent organizations’ tactical areas. Divisional elements such as the 8th Engineer Battalion supported the 1st Cavalry Division’s 

border operations by building and improving tactical roads, firebases, landing zones, and forward airfields. In September, the 8th began resurfacing and 

expanding the vital Bu Dop airstrip, but monsoonal rains and mud hampered 

building the additional four hundred feet of runway. Frequent enemy mortaring left craters pockmarking the strip, adding more repair work to the project. 

Tragedy struck the airmobile engineer battalion when a helicopter carrying the 

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Andre G. Broumas, and members of his staff 

during a flight from Quan Loi and Bu Dop was shot down, killing all aboard.44

A major accomplishment of the 1st Division’s 1st Engineer Battalion in 

1969 was the opening of nearly fifty-six miles of a direct all-weather supply 

route between Phuoc Vinh and Song Be. Before 1969, this stretch of Route 

1A, actually a crude path, had been closed for five years and supplies had to 

be airlifted to bases at Dong Xoai, Bunard, and Song Be. The joint U.S.-South 

Vietnamese Army task force under the coordinating control of Lt. Col. Robert 

Segal’s 1st Engineers got under way in January. As the battalion committed 

equipment, bridging, minesweeps, and its land-clearing section to the operation, the South Vietnamese 301st Engineer Combat Battalion concentrated 

on the roadwork and bridge construction. Land-clearing companies of the 

62d Engineer Battalion cut 200-yard-plus-wide swaths along both sides of the 

road. The road was opened and secured in June, and civilian commercial traffic soon took advantage of the improved route.45

The 101st Airborne Division’s Operation Kentucky Jumper, a divisionwide operation that included Operation Apache Snow, illustrated the operational support role of the new airmobile engineer battalion. Between 1 Ma

and 31 July, the 326th Engineer Combat Battalion built nine new firebases. 

The 326th also opened over ninety landing zones, and on 13 June reopened the 

abandoned 1,500-foot C–7A Ta Bat airstrip on the floor of the A Shau Valley. 

At Camp Eagle, the division’s base camp, and brigade base camps improvements were made to tactical operation centers, fire direction centers, helipads, 

bunkers, billets, and interior roads. Helicopter airlift of the 326’s equipment 

43 Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 612–15. For more on Operation Apache Snow, see MA

History, 1969, vol. 2, pp. V-56 to V-57; ORLL, 1 May–31 July 69, 101st Abn Div, 20 Aug 69, 

pp. 4–6, Historians files, CMH; HQ, 22d Mil Hist Det, Narrative Operation Apache Sno

Historians files, CMH; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, pp. 299–302; and Samuel 

Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill, May 11–20, 1969 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988). 44 Memoirs of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, August 1965–December 1969, p. 185. See also 

Spec. Ken Hammond, “The Divisional Engineer,” Kysu’ 1 (Winter 1969): 6–8; and 14th Mil Hist 

Det, 1st Cav Div, Construction of a Fire Base, 10 Oct 69, Historians files, CMH. 45 The First Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1969 (n.p.: 1st Infantry Division, n.d.), “June 1969” 

and “1st Engineer Battalion” sections; AAR, Opn Toan Thang pp. 2–64, Phase I, 1st Engr Bn, 

20 Feb 69, 1st Engineer Battalion in Vietnam, vol. 2, pp. VIII-19 to VIII-32, CMH; ORLL, 1 

May–31 Jul 69, 1st Inf Div, 29 Aug 69, pp. 5–6, Historians files, CMH. See also 1st Engr Bn, 

Fundamentals of Engineer Support, [1969], Historians files, CMH.
471

Year of Transition, 1969

jumped 30 percent over the previous quarter. Together, the airlifts included 144 

CH–47 Chinook and 192 CH–54 Flying Crane sorties. Techniques developed 

to disassemble equipment into transportable sections paid off in early June 

when the battalion rebuilt the Ta Bat airstrip. Four D5A bulldozers, two M450 

bulldozers, two TD6 bulldozers borrowed from the Seabees, four graders, two 

backhoes, five 3/4-ton dump trucks, three sheepsfoot rollers, a thirteen-wheel 

roller, and other assorted equipment moved by air from Camp Eagle in several 

stages. Upon completion of the clay-surfaced airstrip and the first landing 

and takeoff by a Caribou, the equipment was dismantled for airlift back to 

Camp Eagle the next morning. Three miles south of Camp Eagle, the battalion 

reopened and improved an abandoned firebase (later renamed Arsenal) to

counter North Vietnamese rocket attacks. Roadwork to the firebase, which 

involved making side hill cuts and placing several culverts and the reconstruction of the firebase served as excellent training models for the battalion.46

During Apache Snow and the bitter fighting for Dong Ap Bia, the 326th

airlifted teams often under heavy enemy fire to clear landing zones. The teams, 

encumbered with chain saws and rucksacks loaded with plastic explosives, 

rappelled through holes in the dense forest canopy and cut down trees to make 

landing zones for helicopters to bring in more troops and supplies and evacuate casualties. Engineer teams also opened holes in the canopy so that the 

infantry’s 81-mm. mortars could fire.47

In terrain suitable for armored and mechanized infantry operations, 

attached engineers provided equally important support. In mid-March 1969, 

the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, formed Task Force Remagen around elements 

of an armored battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion and other supporting arms, including a reinforced engineer platoon. The task force advanced 

along Highway 9 from Ca Lu to the Khe Sanh plateau. It then turned south, 

screening the northern flank of the 3d Marine and 101st Airborne Divisions 

operating in the valleys to the southeast. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, 

led the task force down the dirt road, clearing mines, building bypasses, and 

spanning streams with armored vehicle launched bridges, which were immediately lifted back onto their carriers after the column crossed. Task Force 

Remagen roamed the area until the end of April, encountering only light 

resistance and some mortar fire directed from Laos.48

In III Corps, the 919th Engineer Company sent its platoons with each of 

the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s three squadrons on their wide-ranging 

sweeps. Additional support was also available with the activation of a fourth 

platoon in early 1969. In June, the 4th Platoon moved with the regimental 

headquarters to Quan Loi. There it made repairs to the headquarters area, 

improved base defenses, served as a ready reaction for perimeter defense, and 

escorted convoys along Highway 13. During one ambush along the road, the 

46 ORLL, 1 May–31 July 69, 101st Abn Div, pp. 1, 4, 39–42; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 493. 47 AAR, Opn Apache Snow, 3d Bn, 187th Inf, 20 Jun 69, p. 1, Historians files, CMH; Zaffir

Hamburger Hill, pp. 66–67, 104–06. 48 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 153–54; Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, pp. 64, 66; 

Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, pp. 297–98.
Engineers at War

472

engineers responded by firing their combat engineer vehicle’s demolition gun 

against enemy troops for the first time.49

In 1969, the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades committed nearly one-half 

of their total effort to operational support missions. Combat and construction engineers worked on airfield and bridge repairs, minesweeps, base camp 

defenses, aircraft revetments, tactical roads, and land clearing. In I Corps, 

the 45th Group assigned the 14th Combat Battalion to upgrade five miles of 

Route 8B to an all-weather two-lane compacted dirt road for the 3d Marine 

Division, the 39th Combat Battalion to restore an ammunition supply point 

for the Americal Division, and the 27th Combat Battalion to build a new helicopter hardstand for the 101st Airborne Division at Camp Eagle.

In II Corps, the 937th Group’s 20th Combat Battalion stabilized the subbase and base course and added four inches of new asphalt at the Cheo Reo 

Airfield. Also in the highlands, the 299th Combat Battalion upgraded Route 

512 between Dak To and Ben Het to one-lane all-weather capability. The 20th 

Combat and 84th and 815th Construction Battalions erected high chain-link 

stand-off fences around tank farms at An Khe, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku. In the 

Bong Son area, the 19th Combat Engineers repaired artillery gun pads and 

helipads for the 173d Airborne Brigade. In southern II Corps, the 35th Group 

directed the 70th Combat Battalion’s building of an underground medical 

bunker at Ban Me Thuot. The 116th Combat Battalion built nine L-shaped 

and twenty-one parallel aircraft revetments at Phan Thiet, and the 577th and 

589th Construction Battalions constructed gun pads, guard towers, and bunkers at firebases. At Nha Trang, the 864th Construction Battalion resurfaced 

an aircraft ramp.

In III Corps, the 159th Engineer Group (46th, 92d, and 169th 

Construction and 168th Combat Battalions) improved defenses at base 

camps, built bridge pier protection systems, and constructed aircraft parking aprons and revetments. A major undertaking by the 169th was the construction of a 3,800-square-foot reinforced-concrete underground tactical 

operations center for MACV and III Corps headquarters next to the Bien 

Hoa Air Base. Also in III Corps, the 79th Group’s 31st Combat Battalion 

completed bunkers and defenses for an advisory team at Song Be, and the 

554th and 588th Construction Battalions made airfield improvements for the 

1st Cavalry and 25th Divisions. 

In IV Corps, the 34th Group’s 86th Combat Battalion built gunpads for 

the 9th Division’s firebases, and the 36th Construction Battalion improved 

perimeter defenses at Vinh Long. At Vi Thanh Airfield, the 69th Construction 

Battalion upgraded the facility to C–130 status, and the 93d Construction 

Battalion added aircraft revetments at Dong Tam. Also, the 35th Combat 

Battalion built 96 bunkers, 9 guard towers, and 7 tactical operations centers 

49 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 154–55; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 11th Armd Cav Regt, 

10 Feb 69, p. 21, and 1 May–31 Jul 1969, 11th Armd Cav Regt, 18 Aug 69, p. 18. Both in 

Historians files, CMH.
473

Year of Transition, 1969

and laid over 15,750 feet of concertina barbed wire at Binh Thuy and Soc 

Trang base camps.50

Combat engineers often formed their own infantry units and ran reconnaissance patrols and small search and clear operations. Such organizations 

and operations became more prevalent as infantry units withdrew or were committed elsewhere. For instance, the 19th Engineer Battalion endured incessant 

harassment while working on Highway 1 between Bong Son and Duc Pho. The 

most serious incident occurred on 22 July 1968 when a convoy of the attached 

137th Light Equipment Company was ambushed near Tam Quan, resulting 

in the deaths of 12 engineers and major damage to vehicles and equipment. 

During the quarter ending 31 January 1969, the 19th Battalion recorded 202 

incidents, including small arms and grenade attacks and mine and booby trap 

explosions that caused 5 deaths and 31 wounded and damage to vehicles and 

equipment. Explosives also destroyed twelve culverts, and sappers frequently 

cut trenches and built barricades of bamboo, wire, and metal along the road. In 

reaction, the 19th began platoon-size reconnaissance and combat operations, 

often at night, near base camps. In one instance, the engineer-infantrymen, 

using night-vision devices, detected an enemy company-size force moving 

near the perimeter. A call for supporting artillery and fire from a dual 40-mm. 

“Duster” air defense cannon destroyed the column. In May, during one period 

of heightened enemy activity, Companies A and D reorganized as infantry 

to protect work parties and to carry out sweeps, night ambushes, and patrols. 

One platoon from each company returned to their engineering duties, but the 

bulk of the two companies continued their infantry role for several months. 

The battalion continued to carry out infantry missions after moving to the 

Bao Loc area, where there were no U.S. combat units nearby. Its previous 

experiences with the enemy on Highway 1 proved valuable for the men of the 

19th because they still had to deal with roadblocks, booby traps, ambushes, 

and sniper fire.51

Another notable combat engineer feat in 1969 was the 27th Engineer 

Battalion’s extension of a main supply route deep into the A Shau Valley. 

Previous expeditions into the valley had found both the enemy and adverse 

weather almost insurmountable barriers. To retain control permanently would 

50 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 163; Principal Construction Projects, 159th Engr Gp, 1 Feb–15 

Apr 69, incl. 6, tab F, Engineer Operational Support in the Republic of Vietnam, 1 Feb–15 Apr 

69, incl. 7, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 14. For more on the nondivisional combat engineers 

during this period from the perspective of their commanders, see Interv, Schlotterbeck with Lt 

Col James E. Hays, CO, 70th Engr Bn, 26 Oct 69, VNIT 492, CMH; Interv, Schlotterbeck with 

Lt Col George N. Andrews, CO, 31st Engr Bn, 11 Jan 70, VNIT 573, CMH; and Interv, Col 

Robert D. Arrington, with Lt Col James E. Caldwell, CO, Company B, 31st Engr Bn, 1985, 

MHI. 51 ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 69, pp. 3, 6, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 19th 

Engr Bn, 11 Aug 69, pp. 2, 14, and 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 19th Engr Bn, 31 Jan 69, p. 3. All in 

Historians files, CMH. For more on the 22 July 1968 ambush, see AAR, 13th Mil Hist Det, 

Ambush of the 137th Engineer Company’s Convoy in Binh Dinh Province, 12 Aug 68, VNI 

187, CMH. See also Interv, Schlotterbeck with S Sgt Phillip V. Hawkins, S–2 NCO, 19th Engr 

Bn, 30 Mar 70, VNIT 670, CMH; and Spec. Paul Grieco, “Engineer Groundpounders,” Kysu’

2 (Summer 1970): 26–28.
Engineers at War

474

require the movement of armor and heavy artillery and a large steady flow 

of supplies from the 101st Airborne Division’s base at Camp Eagle across the 

coastal plain, through the mountains, and into the valley. Beyond Firebase 

Bastogne, Route 547, which was nothing more than a six- to eight-foot cart

trail, proceeded westward thirty miles to the junction with Route 548 near the 

Ta Bat airstrip. When given the go-ahead, the 45th Engineer Group assigned 

the road project to the 27th Combat Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. 

Malcolm D. Johnson and after 26 June by Lt. Col. Stuart Wood. Additional 

units were attached to help. Besides his four line companies and headquarters 

company, Johnson controlled all or parts of eight other engineer companies. 

These included two light equipment companies, a panel bridge company, a 

land-clearing company, an earthmoving platoon from a construction battalion, and a company and platoon from another combat engineer battalion. A 

combat engineer company from the South Vietnamese 1st Division also joined 

the engineer task force. This conglomeration of engineer units, totaling some 

1,500 men, was designated Task Force Tiger. Work on the all-weather twelvefoot-wide supply link began in March.5

The project, code-named Operation Horace Greely, featured near

every facet of road construction. Daily minesweep teams headed out from 

the firebases and night defensive positions preceding the roadwork. While the 

teams were checking for mines, the battalion commander and his operations 

officer reconnoitered the road by air. Blasting and removal of hundreds of 

tons of rock were required to widen the roadway in areas that had steep drops 

of 200 to 300 feet with sheer bluffs rising directly above. Explosives were used 

to such an extent that Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, XXIV Corps commander, 

personally requested more when the engineers exceeded their allocation. The 

59th Land Clearing Company did much of the cutting and clearing of vegetation and earthwork. Since the vegetation had been defoliated by chemicals 

for some time, visibility and safety for the advancing plows was eased. The 

bulldozers’ protective cab covers also reduced the danger of large falling trees. 

Clearing areas bordering the roadway sometimes dropped off sharply to 60 

percent grades. The engineers solved this problem by developing an unusual 

method of tandem dozing called yo-yo dozing. This method used two bulldozers, one positioned on the roadway as an anchor and the other hooked to the 

first, rear end to rear end, then lowered over the edge of the slope with its plow 

pointed straight down to clear a swath through the trees and brush. When the 

dozer with the plow reached the bottom of the grade, the two dozers reversed 

their winches and the anchor dozer drew the second dozer back up the grade 

to begin a new cut. This technique was repeated until the 250-yard strip was 

cleared. Culverts were assembled in the base camps and transported, dangling 

by hook and line from CH–47s, to the construction sites. Farther down the 

52 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 152; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Lt Col Stuart Wood Jr., CO, 

27th Engr Bn, 15 Jun 70, VNIT 680, pp. 6–7, 17, CMH; ORLL, 1 May–31 July 69, 27th Engr 

Bn, 7 Aug, 69, pp. 3–4, Historians files, CMH; Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill, pp. 47–48.
475

Year of Transition, 1969

road, other elements of Task Force Tiger built a 160-foot panel bridge with

concrete abutments and piers over the Song Bo River.53

By mid-June, Task Force Tiger reached the juncture with Route 548.

By working out of the firebases and night defensive positions and the 101st 

Airborne Division providing security, the task force steadily pushed west. By 18 

June, a small trace had been cut opening the route to small tracked and wheeled 

vehicles. A month later, the engineers had widened the road to pass tanks. By 

the end of July, 12.5 of the 18.5 miles between Firebase Bastogne and Firebase

Cannon had been upgraded to a Class 50 two-lane all-weather road. Three 

new bridges (a 160-foot Class 60 panel bridge, an 80-foot Class 50 one-lane 

timber trestle bridge, and a comparable 63-foot timber trestle bridge), ninetyfive culverts, and four fording sites complemented the roadwork. Work on the 

route’s remaining section did not get beyond pioneer road status, sufficient for 

the passage of five-ton trucks. In mid-September, the 101st Airborne Division 

completed another operation (Montgomery Rendezvous) to deny the ene

access into the valley. Before long, however, the withdrawal of American forces 

precluded future efforts to keep the North Vietnamese Army out of the A Shau. 

The 101st Airborne Division pulled back toward the coast, and the engineers 

ceased further roadwork. Again the allies had to concede control of the valley. 

When Colonel Wood later checked the road, he found it cut by eighty-six rock 

53 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 152–53; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Wood, 15 Jun 70, pp. 7–12; 

ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 14th Engr Bn, pp. 5–6. See also 1st Lt. J. P. Donahue, “547, The A 

Shau Expressway,” Kysu’ 1 (Fall 1969): 6–9.

A CH–47 Chinook helicopter drops off preassembled culvert on Route 547.
Engineers at War

476

slides, three serious enough that it would have taken a bulldozer two days to 

clear.54

In 1969, land-clearing operations continued to prove their effectiveness in 

supporting tactical operations, and land-clearing units increased in size and 

number. Before December 1968, three land-clearing platoons (or teams at the 

time) operated in Vietnam, each equipped with thirty Rome plow blades and 

protective cabs mounted on D7E bulldozers. Two of the platoons were assigned 

to the 20th Brigade to carry out land-clearing missions for II Field Force, and 

the third was assigned to the 18th Brigade to support I Field Force. Other engineer units, particularly the divisional battalions, carried out land clearing on a 

smaller scale. The successful use of modified bulldozers as a tactical weapon 

spurred tactical commanders to request more units. Engineer leaders agreed that 

expansion was needed and began programming organizational changes. With 

only sixty-four men, existing land-clearing teams could do little more than oper54 Interv, Schlotterbeck with Wood, 15 Jun 70, pp. 26–28; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 27th Engr 

Bn, pp. 3–4; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 45th Engr Gp, 31 Jul 69, pp. 2–3, 1 May–31 Jul 69, XXIV 

Corps, 20 Aug 69, p. 19, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, XXIV Corps, 14 Nov 69, pp. 10, 24. ORLLs in 

Historians files, CMH.

Bridge under construction along Route 547
477

Year of Transition, 1969

ate the equipment, and their parent units experienced a severe drain on their 

maintenance capabilities.55

Expansion began in December 1968 when the three teams expanded to 

three companies with the same number of Rome plows and more administrative and maintenance capabilities. One month later, in January 1969, three 

additional land-clearing companies were activated, bringing the total to six. 

These were evenly divided between the two brigades, which took different 

approaches to their command arrangements and locations. The 18th Brigade’s 

area of responsibility encompassed the widespread and restrictive geography 

of I and II Corps and their road nets. Consequently, it assigned each of its 

three companies, the 59th, 538th, and 687th, to a group. On the other hand, 

the 20th Brigade’s area of operations included more level expanses in III Corps 

and road nets adequate for the large convoys of heavy tractor-trailers from a 

central base to the cutting areas. The assignment of its three companies to 

an existing battalion seemed the most practical choice. The 62d Construction 

Battalion based at Long Binh, one of the units programmed for inactivation 

or personnel cutbacks in 1968, was selected for this purpose. In January 1969, 

its three lettered construction companies (B, C, and D) were inactivated and 

replaced by the 60th, 501st, and 984th Land Clearing Companies. Company 

A, the equipment and maintenance company, was modified for the battalion’s 

new mission. The 62d’s authorized personnel strength dropped from 905 to 

647, but the actual number hovered around 700, which included many volunteers from the lettered construction companies. Also that month, the brigade 

reassigned the 62d from the 159th Group to the 79th Group, which directly 

supported II Field Force operations.56

The 62d became the first land-clearing battalion ever to be assembled. Its 

immediate concerns focused on assigning troops to the right jobs and ensuring 

an adequate stock of repair parts. Soldiers from the construction battalion were 

reassigned to suitable specialties or retrained to fill vacancies. Arrangements 

were made with the 1st Logistical Command to order repair parts to build up 

stockages. A new commander also arrived. On 13 January, Lt. Col. Valentine 

E. Carrasco, who guided the battalion’s transition from a construction to a 

land-clearing organization, transferred the colors to Lt. Col. Maximiano R. 

Janairo. In turn, Colonel Janairo led the new battalion for six months before 

transferring command to Colonel Driscoll. Driscoll commanded the battalion 

for a full year instead of the normal six months. When asked why during his 

end of tour interview, he replied: “I don’t know. Nobody told me why it was. 

When my six months was drawing to a close, I just kept my mouth shut. It 

could have been that my date was overlooked. It could have been that maybe 

I had so many skeletons buried in the closet that they didn’t feel like foisting 

them off on someone else.” He surmised that the real reason to leave him in 

55 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 99. 56 Ibid., pp. 99–100; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 68, 62d Engr Bn, 13 Aug 68, p. 2, 1 Feb–30 Apr 

69, 62d Engr Bn, 10 May 69, p. 2, and 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 159th Engr Gp, 14 Feb 69, p. 2, all 

in Historians files, CMH; Land Clearing Battalion Chronology, p. 1, incl. 10 to Rpt, 26th Mil 

Hist Det, 16 Jul 69, sub: Land Clearing, VNIT 522, CMH.
Engineers at War

478

command was to carry out the training at a critical time for the new South 

Vietnamese land-clearing companies.57

During 1969, the 62d incorporated new procedures and refined land-clearing 

doctrine. At company level, the key to successful operations was close coordination with its security element. Platoon leaders worked closely with their infantry 

or armored cavalry escorts. Maintenance, a constant problem because of the 

wear and tear caused by extended stays in the field and dangerous operating 

conditions, was improved thanks to a more responsive repair parts system. An 

authorized float of twenty-seven D7E tractors also compensated for any shortage of repair parts. Heavily cratered areas caused by B–52 strikes added to the 

many hazards involved in clearing operations, especially after vegetation around 

the crater grew back. It typically took several hours to retrieve a D7E that had 

crashed through the vegetation and fallen in. Pulling out the larger D9 bulldozer 

became a major effort. As for the danger from enemy fire, Colonel Driscoll 

recalled that a soldier assigned to his battalion had a one in three chance of 

being a casualty and a two in three chance if he was assigned to a land-clearing 

company.58

The transformation to a land-clearing battalion proceeded quickly and 

was soon followed by clearing operations. Reorganizing one of the existing 

teams into the 60th Land Clearing Company was not feasible until the team 

returned from the field. On 14 January, the 60th deployed for the first time. It 

cleared two hundred yards on each side of Route 1A between Phuoc Vinh and 

Dong Xoai as part of the 1st Engineer Battalion’s road project. Similarly, the 

501st Land Clearing Company deferred its reorganization from a team until 

it returned from the Trang Bang area where it cut hedgerows and destroyed 

bunker complexes in support of the 25th Division. In January the new 984th 

Land Clearing Company began organizing. The number of D7E Rome plows 

increased from nine to fifteen by the end of the month. By then one platoon 

was ready and was sent to help the 60th along Route 1A. Later operations bore 

out the effectiveness of company-size land clearing. The 60th cut nearly 5,000 

acres and destroyed forty-five bunkers and fighting positions for the 199th 

Infantry Brigade in the Gang Toi and Hat Dich areas east of Saigon. During 

this six-week operation, the 60th lost three D7Es and two men were wounded. 

In mid-January, the 501st moved to War Zone C in support of the 1st Cavalry 

Division and cleared over 3,700 acres in two weeks. The 984th cut over 3,000 

acres in the Trapezoid area for the 1st Division, but the company lost three 

D7Es, and thirty-five engineers were wounded.59

As 1969 progressed, II Field Force wore down the enemy and pushed him 

back toward his Cambodian base areas. General Ewell exploited these successes by pushing teams of armored cavalry and Rome plows to open roads 

57 Land Clearing Battalion Chronology, VNIT 522, p. 1; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 

22 Jun 70, pp. 4–5 (quoted words). 58 Land Clearing Battalion Chronology, VNIT 522, p. 8; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 

22 Jun 70, pp. 15, 66. 59 Land Clearing Battalion Chronology, VNIT 522, p. 1; Land Clearing Operations (1 Nov 

69–31 Jan 70), pp. 1–2, incl. 16f, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. Inclosure 16f also has 

seven overlays depicting the operations during this period.
479

Year of Transition, 1969

in War Zone C. Cuts on each side of the roads were reduced to about fifty 

yards, which automatically sped up operations fourfold. The 100-yard-plus 

swath allowed adequate aerial observation and did not unduly expose vehicle 

to ambushes. Also, instead of completely clearing large areas, the 62d adopted 

a lane-clearing technique, initially a 1,000-yard-plus lane, which would expose 

an enemy base area. Again much time was saved, and the lanes were further 

reduced to a little more than 500 to 600 yards, again increasing the savings. 

This technique was successfully used south of the Michelin Rubber Plantation 

and east of the Saigon River. By the end of 1969 and in early 1970, the 62d’s 

three companies had spread out in III Corps taking advantage of the first half 

of the dry season. They cut large areas for the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry 

Divisions, the 199th Infantry Brigade, and South Vietnamese and Thai forces.60

The 18th Engineer Brigade’s land-clearing operations met with equal success. 

Soon after its activation on 1 January 1969, the 59th Land Clearing Company 

moved north to the 45th Group. It began clearing operations for the 3d Marine 

Division in “Leatherneck Square” near Dong Ha, where it cleared nearly seven 

thousand acres in the first full-scale land-clearing operation in I Corps. After a 

one-week maintenance break, the company cleared another one thousand acres 

for the marines before joining the 27th Engineer Battalion in Operation Hora

Greely. Besides the work along Route 547, the 59th cleared sections along Route

548 and other areas near firebases and the A Shau airstrip. Later platoons joined 

the 14th, 27th, and 39th Engineer Battalions in clearing operations. In northern II 

Corps, the 937th Group’s 35th Land Clearing Team expanded into the 538th Land 

Clearing Company. It cleared sections along Highways 1 and 14 and Route 6B 

near Qui Nhon. The 18th Brigade’s third land-clearing company, the 687th, was 

formed from the inactivated 87th Engineer Construction Battalion and attached 

to the 35th Group. Upon completion of its training, the new company moved 

to southern II Corps and began clearing operations along Highways 11, 20, and 

21A. In April, the 2d Platoon was sent to Qui Nhon to clear the area around the 

petroleum tank farm. In June, the platoon deployed to I Corps to take part in a 

Marine Corps operation. Other elements of the 687th completed the clearing of 

almost seven thousand acres. After a maintenance break, the 687th on 30 October 

resumed clearing operations along Highway 1 and in the Cam Ranh Bay area. 

One month later, the company moved to Ban Me Thuot to clear both sides of 

local Route 1.61

Elsewhere, engineers supported clearing operations with ordinary bulldozers, some of which were equipped with Rome plow kits. Using Rome plows to 

destroy bunker complexes proved much more thorough when compared to the 

usual method of employing demolitions. Often demolitions only destroyed the 

beams. The holes remained, and the enemy could easily rebuild the bunker. 

If the engineers blasted the roof in, the enemy could burrow even deeper 

60 Ewell and Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge, p. 220; Land Clearing Operations (1 Nov 

69–31 Jan 70), pp. 1–2, incl. 16f, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. 61 Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, p. 24; ORLLs, 1 Nov 68–31 Jan 69, 18th Engr Bde, 

31 Jan 69, p. 2, 1 Feb–30 Apr 69, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Apr 69, p. 3, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 18th Engr 

Bde, 31 Jul 69, pp. 3–4, 1 Aug-31 Oct 69, 18th Engr Bde, 31 Oct 69, pp. 3–4, and 1 Nov 69–31 

Jan 70, 18th Engr Bde, 31 Jan 70, pp. 2–3. All in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

480

and continue to use the area. On 9 June 1969, the 4th Division dispatched 

an infantry battalion and two 26-man engineer teams from the division’s 4th 

Engineer Battalion to destroy a large bunker complex in the western highlands. Equipment consisted of two D7E bulldozers mounting Rome plow kits, 

two D7Es with standard bulldozer blades, one combat engineer vehicle with a 

bulldozer blade, one M48A3 tank, and a trailer-mounted air compressor. The 

D7Es, especially those with the Rome plow blades, could rip off the tops of 

bunkers, fill in the holes, and clear the area of vegetation. The combat engineer 

vehicle and tank provided additional security. During the clearing operation, 

the compressor blew out the bulldozers’ radiators three or four times a day to 

remove dirt and debris churned up while stripping the jungle. Working closely 

with the infantry companies, the teams destroyed 1,350 bunkers and cleared 

potential landing zones. Another method of land clearing was the continued 

use of anchor chains dragged by a team of two bulldozers. A third D7E followed the chain to help clear excessive debris collected in front of the chain. 

The 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Division, complemented the 62d Land 

Clearing Battalion’s work by using this method. Using six D7Es, the 65th daily 

knocked down an average of 125 acres of trees from four to eight or twelve 

inches in diameter.62

In the delta, with its inundated rice paddies and poor drainage, Rome 

plows had been considered impractical until, early in 1969, a joint U.S. and 

Vietnamese Army engineer operation changed that view. One Viet Congdominated area between Sa Dec, Vinh Long, and Can Tho, excluding segments 

next to Highway 4, became known as the Y base area because of its canal network. Rice paddies covered 80 percent of the Y, the rest being cultivated wood 

lines. Four main canals formed the Y with many others interspersed throughout the area. Thick vegetation around the canals provided the enemy cover 

and concealment. Removing this vegetation became the major objective in 

destroying this sanctuary. The area was considered too large for hand clearing, 

and it was decided to try the Rome plows. After the South Vietnamese infantry 

cleared out enemy main force units, an infantry security force and the South 

Vietnamese 9th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, moved in by land. 

Simultaneously, the U.S. 595th Light Equipment Company arrived by water in 

landing craft. Conventional blade D7E bulldozers built a dirt access road parallel to the main canal far enough to cover a day’s land clearing. Underbrush 

was also cleared some thirty to fifty yards from the canal. From this road, 

perpendicular branches were extended out to the paddy land to provide access 

for the Rome plows. This pattern was repeated, the bulldozers building the 

roads and the Rome plows cutting the trees. Not all the wood line could be 

cut, and chain and hand saws were used to cut the remaining trees. During the 

initial thirty-seven-day period, three Rome plows from the company’s landclearing detachment cut five miles along both sides of one canal. Over the 

62 MACV Combat Experiences 4–69, MACJ3-053, 3 Nov 69, sec. 1, pp. 1–11, Historians 

files, CMH; Capt. Robert A. Adams, “Anchor Chain Land Clearing,” Military Engineer 63 

(July-August 1971): 259. See also Capt. David R. Fabian, “Bunker-busting Operation,” Military 

Engineer Field Notes, Military Engineer 62 (March-April 1970): 102–03.
481

Year of Transition, 1969

next seventy-five days, another 1,833 acres were cleared, linking the northern 

secure areas with those in the south. The detachment also destroyed over two 

thousand bunkers along with living areas and a small hospital and captured 

large quantities of ammunition, equipment, and documents. It succeeded in 

removing all traces of enemy activity in a fifty-square-mile area. During the 

operation, the small U.S. contingent suffered nearly 50 percent casualties, and 

mines disabled one-half of the bulldozers.63

At times Army and Marine land clearers pooled their Rome plows into 

provisional organizations in support of operations. In June, the 2d Platoon 

of the 687th Land Clearing Company moved to I Corps to take part in the 

1st Marine Division’s Operation Pipestone Canyon, joining personnel and

equipment from the 7th and 9th Marine Engineer Battalions to form a provisional land-clearing company operating under the control of the III Marine 

Amphibious Force. Pipestone Canyon took place in two notorious areas,

Dodge City and Go Noi Island, approximately six to twelve miles south of Da 

Nang and four to twelve miles west of Hoi An. For several years, the Viet Cong 

and North Vietnamese had used both areas as havens and staging areas for 

attacks into the coastal lowlands and on Da Nang. During the 164-day operation, the combined force transformed Go Noi Island from a densely vegetated 

tract to a cleared area free of tree lines and other cover long used by the enemy 

to conceal his movement across the island. Nearly twelve thousand acres were 

cleared before the platoon rejoined the 687th at Phan Thiet on 1 September. In 

August, a provisional land-clearing platoon from the 39th Engineer Combat 

Battalion joined the 9th Marine Engineer Battalion to clear areas for the 1st 

Marine and Americal Divisions. One operation swept across an enemy staging 

area known as Barrier Island about twelve miles south of Da Nang. A joint 

operation, this effort included an amphibious landing on the seaward side of 

the island with security provided by South Korean Marines. Another operation cleared a coastal area just north of Duc Pho. In late November, the platoon returned to the battalion’s base at Chu Lai for maintenance, and fifteen 

days later made another amphibious landing along the coast just south of Da 

Nang. After clearing more than two thousand acres, the platoon returned to 

Chu Lai on 31 December.64

The cumulative effects of land-clearing operations in Vietnam had a decided 

impact on the enemy. He increasingly had to adjust to the disappearance of his 

base areas and the unveiling of his trails. Land clearing enabled friendly forces to 

observe, shoot, and move through hundreds of thousands of acres of territory 

he considered his domain. Land clearing also went hand in hand with pacification. Traffic flowed on hundreds of miles of roads made safer by pushing back 

the jungle growth that had provided excellent concealment. Newly cleared land 

63 Capt. Stephen E. Draper, “Land Clearing in the Delta,” Military Engineer 63 (July-August 

1971): 257–59. 64 MACV History, 1969, vol. 1, p. V-58; ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 18th Engr Bde, p. 3, 1 

Aug–31 Oct 69, 18th Engr Bde, p. 3, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 45th Engr Gp, p. 3, and 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 

70, 39th Engr Bn (Cbt), 31 Jan 70, pp. 1–3, 13, all in Historians files, CMH; Smith, U.S. Marines 

in Vietnam, 1969, pp. 174–87, 270; 1st Lt. J. P. Donahue, “The Clearing of Barrier Island,” Kysu’

2 (Spring 1970): 26–28.
Engineers at War

482

also had the potential for agriculture and settlement. The tactical effectiveness of 

the Rome plows continued in 1970 as preparations were being made to deprive 

the North Vietnamese Army from the immunity of retreat into sanctuaries long 

extant in Cambodia.65

65 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 103.
15

Year of Cambodia, 1970

During 1970, American policy stayed on course as U.S. forces hastened their withdrawal from Vietnam. For the most part, military 

operations were characterized by dispersed and highly mobile spoiling attacks, 

geared to exploiting progress in Vietnamization and pacification. But though 

the withdrawal proceeded rapidly, the war also took a dramatic upswing with 

a multidivision operation into Cambodia during the spring.

The redeployments in 1970 took place in three increments. At the beginning of the year, U.S. ground elements included some 330,000 soldiers and 

55,000 marines out of a total U.S. force of 475,000. By 15 April, however, the 

1st Division, the 3d Brigade of the 4th Division, a Marine Corps regimental 

landing team, and an Air Force fighter group had departed. As of 15 October, 

the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, another 

Marine Corps regimental landing team, and three Seabee battalions had gone. 

By the end of December, the rest of the 4th Division and two of the three 

brigades of the 25th Division returned to the United States. When 1970 ended, 

U.S. troop strength had dropped to 335,000, including 250,000 soldiers and 

25,000 marines.1

More U.S. Army engineers also left, but this hardly lessened their workload, and the engineers organized accordingly. The engineer command 

structure under U.S. Army, Vietnam, which had reached a peak strength of 

33,000 in 1969, dropped to about 22,000 by the end of 1970. By then the six 

engineer groups had dropped to five and the twenty-four battalions to twenty. 

Inevitably, the command reorganized, as the USARV Engineer and the U.S. 

Army Engineer Construction Agency consolidated.2

Engineer Consolidation

The policy of entrusting to one senior Army engineer the dual responsibilities of USARV staff engineer and command of all Army engineer units that 

were not organic to other commands had continued since the early days of the 

buildup. After April 1968, the engineer’s dual role titles were Commanding 

General, Engineer Troops, Vietnam (Provisional), and USARV Engineer. The 

Engineer Troops, Vietnam, consisted of three subordinate commands—the 

18th and 20th Engineer Brigades and the construction agency. Under this 

1

 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, pp. I-5, IV-7.

2

 Military Personnel Strength Summary, incl. 6A, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18, 2 

Nov 70, OCE Hist Ofc; ORLLs, 1 Nov 70–29 Apr 71, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Apr 71, p. 2, and 1 Nov 

70–15 Apr 71, 20th Engr Bde, 25 Apr 71, p. 3, both ORLLs in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

484

organization, the two brigades commanded all nondivisional engineer combat 

and construction units while the construction agency centralized control over 

the Army’s construction program and facilities engineering.3

In October 1969, USARV headquarters directed its major commands, including the engineers, to start consolidating or eliminating headquarters. The engineers considered several options before deciding to combine the headquarters of 

the Engineer Troops/USARV Engineer with the Engineer Construction Agency 

into a new consolidated engineer command and staff headquarters. The consolidation made sense. The Engineer Troops/USARV Engineer and the construction 

agency were located at Long Binh. There was already overlap and duplication 

of functions between the USARV Engineer’s Facilities Engineering Division and 

the construction agency’s Real Property Management and Real Estate Divisions. 

There was also uncertainty over responsibility for staff supervision and control 

and management of troop construction projects between the USARV Engineer’s 

Construction Division and the construction agency’s Engineering Division. The 

USARV Engineer did not have the technical engineering capability to review construction requests, contractor designs, and to do its own designs. This capability 

existed only in the construction agency’s Engineering Division. Finally, the loss of 

twenty-three spaces in the USARV Engineer required some internal reorganization, and the planners anticipated that more personnel savings would be possible 

if the headquarters of the Engineer Troops/USARV Engineer and the Engineer 

Construction Agency were consolidated.4

The organization of the new U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam 

(Provisional), received USARV approval on 7 January 1970 and was formalized as a command on 1 February. General Dillard, the commander, continued 

to serve concurrently as the USARV Engineer. The Engineer Command staff 

functioned as the USARV Engineer staff, and consisted of the Directorate 

of Construction, Directorate of Facilities Engineering, Military Operations 

Division, Materiel Division, and administrative and special staff offices. 

With the consolidation of the construction agency as part of the Engineer 

Command’s staff, two major subordinate commands remained, the 18th and 

20th Brigades. The authorized strength of the Engineer Command stood at 

over 26,000 men, making it the second largest subordinate element of USARV 

after the 1st Logistical Command. General Tarbox, formerly commanding 

general of the construction agency, became the deputy commander and the 

deputy USARV engineer.5

3

 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 179. 4

 Debriefing, Parker, 14 Oct 69, p. 7, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians 

files, CMH; Interv, OCE Hist Ofc with Maj Gen David S. Parker, 7 Jan 85, pp. 271–72, OCE 

Hist Ofc; Memo, Maj Gen David S. Parker for OCE Hist Ofc, Dec 1977, pp. 2–3, Historians 

files, CMH; Briefing, USARV Engineer Reorganization, n.d., incl. 14P, pp. 1, 4–8, 10–11, OCE 

Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. See also Briefing, USARV Engineer, 7 Jan 70, Historians files, 

CMH. 5

 Briefing, USARV Engineer Reorganization, incl. 14P, pp. 11–14, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 16; “Engineer Command Reorganized,” Castle Courier, 9 February 1970, p. 3. See also 

Ltr, Lt Gen Frank T. Mildren, AVHEN, to CG, USAECV(P), sub: Letter of Instruction (LOI), 

17 Feb 70, incl. 14J, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16.
485

Year of Cambodia, 1970

Two new positions, the Director 

of Construction and the Director of 

Facilities Engineering, were established. Colonels occupied both, and 

they directed two of the command’s 

most pressing missions, the highway 

program and facilities engineering services involving base transfers and closures. The Director of Construction 

oversaw several components carrying out the Army’s construction 

program. The Engineering Division 

planned, programmed, and designed 

the Army’s construction and highway 

improvement projects in Vietnam, 

and the Construction Division supervised and coordinated the accomplishment of these projects. Also, the 

Director of Construction’s Electrical 

Systems Office managed the Army’s 

high-voltage program in Vietnam. 

Both divisions maintained close 

ties and coordinated RMK-BRJ’s 

army construction projects with the Navy’s Officer in Charge of Construction. 

The Director of Facilities Engineering supervised the Real Estate Division, the 

Installations Division, and three District Engineer offices. Through its local area 

offices, the Real Estate Division managed over 1,100 land-use concurrences with 

the Vietnamese government and over 400 leases totaling about $19 million a year. 

In 1970, the only Women’s Army Corps officer authorized to wear the Corps 

of Engineers insignia, Lt. Col. Margaret M. Jebb, served as deputy chief of the 

Real Estate Division. Coordination and supervision of the Pacific Architects and 

Engineers’ facilities engineering contract, now amounting to about $100 million 

per year, came under the Installations Division. Similarly, the division supervised 

the high-voltage power operation contract with Vinnell Corporation. In addition, 

the Installations Division inherited the Base Development Branch, formerly in the 

construction agency’s Engineering Division. Though emphasis on base development had declined, the branch played a key role in base transfers and new requirements when U.S. forces moved from one base to another. The engineer districts 

remained much as they were under the construction agency except the Greater 

Saigon Engineer District, now incorporated into the Southern Engineer District. 

This district had its headquarters in Saigon and oversaw all U.S. Army installations in III and IV Corps. The Central Engineer District at Cam Ranh Bay carried 

out the same role in II Corps, as did the Northern District at Da Nang for I Corps.6

6

 Briefing, USARV Engineer Reorganization, incl. 14P, pp. 11–14, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Report no. 16; “Engineer Command Reorganized,” p. 3; Spec. Larry Crabtree, “Only WAC 

Wearing Engineer Brass Receives Ph.D. of Philosophy,” Castle Courier, 13 July 1970. 

General Dillard
Engineers at War

486

The Military Operations Division and Materiel Division, also headed by 

colonels, made up the third and fourth major staff elements. The Military 

Operations Division handled a wide range of operational functions, including coordinating engineer support for tactical operations and preparing plans 

for the disposition of engineer forces and contingency plans. It served as the 

central agency for all USARV mine and countermine activities and carried out 

mapping and intelligence missions. This division also had the responsibility for 

all USARV engineer activities related to Vietnamization and the training of 

South Vietnamese Army engineer units. Finally, the Materiel Division coordinated the movement and distribution of all engineer equipment and construction materials with other USARV staff agencies and engineer units.7

General Dillard believed in the reorganization. On 23 February, he wrote to 

General Clarke, Chief of Engineers, noting improved responsiveness and control 

over the command’s programs and improvement in morale. The reorganized engineer command and staff arrangement was even serving as a model for the consolidation of the 1st Logistical Command and the USARV logistical staff. His main 

concern about the proposed logistical reorganization was the possibility that his 

command would be placed under a deputy commanding general for logistics. This 

was an old worry of engineers because Army doctrine had in the past called for 

engineer construction commands to operate in rear areas under the theater army 

logistical commands. Although he and Clarke preferred to be entirely separate or 

included in the operational chain, both senior engineers did not foresee any problems 

or lack of responsiveness in operating this way. Anyhow, the engineer command 

and staff structure continued to operate as a major staff agency and major command within U.S. Army, Vietnam. Within six months, the provisional command 

received Department of the Army approval as a table of distribution organization.8

Toward the Sanctuaries

For years the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had taken advantage of 

sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia, where refitting, resupplying, and training 

could be carried out without interference. These staging areas and supply 

points continued to pose a danger to South Vietnam, especially the large base 

areas and support depots within short striking distance of Saigon. As the 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong increased their hold over the Cambodian 

border region, it became increasingly clear to American officials that, despite 

his currently reduced strategy of small-scale attacks, the enemy could stage 

from these bases to launch an invasion after the Americans withdrew.9

7

 Briefing, USARV Engineer Reorganization, incl. 14P, p. 13, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Report no. 16; “Engineer Command Reorganized,” p. 3. 8

 Ltr, Maj Gen John A. B. Dillard, CG, Engr Cmd and USARV Engr, to Maj Gen Frederick 

Clarke, Ch Engr, 23 Feb 70; Ltr, Clarke to Dillard, ENGME-P, 20 Mar 70, both in Historians 

files, CMH; FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations, September 1965, p. 1–2; 

Interv, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Maj Gen Charles C. Noble, CG, 

USAECV, 25 Jul 71, VNIT 919, p. 7, CMH. 9

 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, p. III-77; Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 623; Stanton, Rise and 

Fall of an American Army, p. 336.
487

Year of Cambodia, 1970

Allied operations after the Tet offensive of 1968 had destroyed many of 

the enemy bases in South Vietnam, making the sanctuaries even more critical 

to Hanoi. By early 1969, the enemy was sortieing regularly from the crossborder redoubts. These forays were typically preceded by logistical buildups 

inside Vietnam, which General Abrams called a logistical nose. The allied 

countertactic was to cut off this logistical nose and thus frustrate the attack 

that was intended to follow. A variety of forces were deployed to prevent these 

buildups and to seal the borders of South Vietnam. The 1st Cavalry Division 

and its engineers were at the forefront of this campaign.10

Beginning in the fall of 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division had positioned 

most of its combat units along the Cambodian border. The division assumed 

responsibility along an arc some ninety miles wide and thirty miles deep. The 

division’s area of responsibility comprised the provinces of Phuoc Long, Binh 

Long, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong and straddled the enemy’s lines of communication leading southward from the border to Saigon. As the 1st Division 

redeployed from Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry Division moved in, setting up operations, working with local Vietnamese forces, and learning about the enemy. 

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attempted to reestablish their logistical 

system, with the aim of repeating the attacks of Tet 1968. Throughout 1969, 

the 1st Cavalry Division fought a series of skirmishes along these supply lines, 

thwarting strong North Vietnamese forces attempting to position themselves 

closer to the capital. Although enemy attempts in the early months of 1970 

were weaker, he still tried to operate in force in these critical areas. In several instances, the cavalrymen uncovered base camps and fair-sized caches. 

Apparently, cutting the trails was causing a backlog of supplies in Cambodia. 

This was an ideal time to strike at the Cambodian supply base.11

The 1st Cavalry Division’s 8th Engineer Battalion continued to improve 

base camps and support tactical operations. Battalion headquarters and headquarters company joined the division headquarters at Phuoc Vinh; Company 

A at Tay Ninh supported the 1st Brigade; Company B helped the division settle 

in at Phuoc Vinh then moved to Lai Khe with the 2d Brigade; and Company 

C supported the 3d Brigade at Quan Loi. In the field, the battalion concentrated on building and upgrading landing zones and firebases, improving base 

defenses, and giving minesweep and demolition support to the infantry battalions. As the division uncovered enemy supply caches, the engineers stored 

and distributed captured rice to nearby villages.12

As in the past, the 20th Engineer Brigade’s 79th Engineer Group reinforced the divisional engineers in III Corps north and west of Saigon. Much 

of the priority work went to improving the forward airfields, main supply 

10 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 138–39. 11 Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 218–20; Memoirs of the First Team, p. 42. For more on the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s operations along the Cambodian border, see J. D. Coleman, Incursion

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) pp. 34–211; Keith William Nolan, Into Cambodia: Spring 

Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990), pp. 3–65; Shelby L. 

Stanton, Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987), 

pp. 158–77. 12 Memoirs of the First Team, pp. 184–85.
Engineers at War

488

routes, and base camps. The 31st Engineer Combat Battalion with the help of 

the 557th Light Equipment Company completed the resurfacing of the Phuoc 

Vinh airfield and built helicopter and fixed-wing revetments at Phuoc Vinh 

and Song Be. Work at the Phuoc Vinh airfield involved removing the M8A1 

matting, preparing the base course, putting down a twelve-inch layer of soilcement, and topping that off with a three-inch layer of asphaltic concrete. 

With the additional 400 feet of runway, the field was upgraded to a 4,100-foot 

Type II C–130 airfield. Upon completion of this work in February 1970, the 

battalion shifted to upgrading taxiways and parking ramps. Vertical construction involved building a new sixty-foot control tower, a helicopter refueling 

point, and other facilities for the 1st Cavalry Division. The 31st also upgraded 

several forward airstrips scattered across northern III Corps, including the 

strips at Tong Le Chon, Katum, Bu Dop, Dong Xoai, and Loc Ninh Special 

Forces camps. The 588th Engineer Battalion, which included the 362d Light 

Equipment and the 544th Construction Support Companies, covered some 

6,400 square miles and maintained 110 miles of roads. Other support for the 

1st Cavalry and 25th Divisions included building new or improving artillery 

gun pads, aircraft revetments, bunkers, air control and counter-mortar fire 

towers, and clearing fields of fire. In the Lai Khe area, the 168th Engineer 

Combat Battalion concentrated on operational support and base camp construction for the 1st Division. Elements of the battalion supported the 1st 

Cavalry Division at Quan Loi and Phuoc Vinh, where one platoon began work 

on the foundation and floor for a hangar being moved from Blackhorse. In 

September 1969, when enemy forces were detected approaching Lai Khe, the 

battalion served as a base defense force under the 1st Division. The 168th 

departed Vietnam about the same time as the 1st Division in April 1970.13

As the 79th Group’s only construction battalion, the 554th Engineer 

Battalion was committed to base construction and highway improvement 

work. Most of this effort took place at the 25th Division’s Cu Chi camp and 

along Highways 1 and 22. At Cu Chi, improvements included building bunkers and revetments for the 12th Evacuation Hospital. Working with Pacific 

Architects and Engineers, the 554th also reconstructed a concrete and asphalt 

helipad for the hospital’s medical evacuation helicopters. Another job involved 

paving interior roads at the base. In late 1969, the 554th began shifting operations to Lai Khe and Highway 13 upgrading.14

The overthrow of the Cambodian chief of state, Prince Norodom 

Sihanouk, in March 1970 hastened the events leading to the U.S. attack 

into Cambodia. Sihanouk’s successor, Prime Minister Lon Nol immediately demanded that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong leave Cambodia, 

13 Annual Hist Sum, Aug 69–Sep 70, 31st Engr Bn, pp. 6–7; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 70, 31st 

Engr Bn, 9 May 70, pp. 5–9; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 69, 588th Engr Bn, 14 May 69, pp. 1–2, 1 

May–31 Jul 69, 14 Aug 69, 588th Engr Bn, pp. 1–2, 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 588th Engr Bn, 15 Feb 

70, pp. 1–2, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 168th Engr Bn, 11 Aug 69, pp. 2, 4–8, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 7 Nov 

69, 168th Engr Bn, pp. 2, 4–11, all in Historians files, CMH. 14 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Jul 69, 554th Engr Bn, n.d., pp. 2, 4–9, 1 Aug–31 Oct 69, 554th Engr Bn, 

14 Nov 69, pp. 2, 4–7, 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 554th Engr Bn, 14 Feb 70, pp. 2, 3–5, and 1 Feb–30 

Apr 70, 554th Engr Bn, 14 May 70, pp. 2, 4–7, all in Historians files, CMH.
489

Year of Cambodia, 1970

and threatened to block the flow of supplies coming by sea through the 

port of Sihanoukville. Almost at once, the North Vietnamese Army and 

Khmer Rouge (the Communist insurgents in Cambodia) launched attacks 

in the Cambodian border areas to retain control over all routes leading to 

their bases. The small, inexperienced Cambodian Army was no match for 

the North Vietnamese, who drove west and threatened the capital, Phnom 

Penh. It became evident that without outside help, Lon Nol and his proWestern government would be overthrown, the port of Sihanoukville would 

be reopened to the Communists, and all of Cambodia could become a 

major base area outflanking allied forces in South Vietnam. The collapse of 

Cambodia would be a disastrous blow to South Vietnamese hopes for survival, imperil the time needed to complete Vietnamization, and jeopardize 

the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces.15

Lon Nol’s appeal for help prompted the South Vietnamese to mount largescale operations across the border. In mid-April, III Corps units launched 

Operation Toan Thang (Total Victory) 41, a three-day thrust into the Ange

Wing area of Cambodia, a key stronghold west of Saigon. Because U.S. forces 

were not allowed in Cambodia, American advisers stayed behind, although 

a brigade of the U.S. 25th Division supported the operation by screening the 

border. Before the end of the month, the South Vietnamese launched two short 

thrusts into Cambodia from IV Corps, basically confidence builders for the 

South Vietnamese Army. Although the allies declared the attacks a success, the 

North Vietnamese avoided contact and knew about the operations in advance. 

The short durations of the operations prevented a careful search of the base 

areas.16

Although U.S. engineers did not accompany the South Vietnamese across 

the border, they lent considerable help. In preparation for Toan Thang 41, III 

Corps engineer advisers arranged with the 20th Brigade to provide forty complete M4T6 floats, cranes, and bridge boats on 30 March to an assembly area 

near Go Dau Ha. Elements of the South Vietnamese 30th Group assembled 

the raft sections, which were then transported by CH–54s to the Ben Soi Bridge 

site west of Tay Ninh. Other 30th Group engineers launched the sections into 

the Vam Co Dong River and connected them into a floating bridge, which 

was completed the following day. A 600-foot access road and a 90-foot panel 

bridge leading to the floating bridge were also built by 30th Group engineers. 

In early April, the group’s 303d Combat Battalion built a M4T6 dry span and 

15 Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 624–25; Palmer, 25-Year War, pp. 98–99. See also, MACV 

History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-1 to C-13; Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian Incursion, 

Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), 

pp. 1–17, 29–32; Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 166–67; Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan, The Khmer 

Republic at War and the Final Collapse, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1980), pp. 32–83. 16 Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 625; Palmer, 25-Year War, p. 99; Starry, Mounted Combat, 

pp. 167–68. For more on the South Vietnamese reaction and April cross-border operations, 

see Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 32–50. See also MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-14 to 

C-35; Rpt, Opn Toan Thang 41, 14–17 Apr 70, U.S. Army Advisory Gp, III Corps, 7 Jun 70, 

Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

490

a panel bridge along the approaches to the Angel’s Wing. As the operation 

neared, the III Corps Engineer on 10 April asked the 20th Brigade to provide three 45-foot M4T6 dry spans. Four days later, another request asked for 

200 feet of 24-inch culvert. The 20th Brigade did not have this size culvert in 

stock, but supply personnel found the required size and amount in the 25th 

Division’s 65th Engineer Battalion and delivered it to Go Dau Ha that night. 

Early planning called for the dry spans to be assembled at Go Dau Ha and 

lifted by CH–54s, but weather and other problems prevented using the helicopters. Two of the bridges were loaded on trucks and the third was partially 

assembled so that it could be lifted by a Chinook on the morning of 14 April 

if required. During Toan Thang 41, the 30th Group attached a platoon from 

the 301st and 303d Combat Battalions to each of the three attacking South 

Vietnamese task forces and assigned one company from the 301st in general 

support. One task force also had an attached platoon of engineers from the 

South Vietnamese 25th Division’s 25th Engineer Battalion. Other work done 

by the 30th Group included opening and keeping open the main supply route 

between Bien Hoa and the Cambodian border and maintaining roads on the 

Vietnamese side of the border. On the Cambodian side, the South Vietnamese 

installed dry spans and one culvert and found the roads to be in good condition, although overgrown with grass in places. As for the Vietnamese engineer 

effort, the III Corps advisory group’s report of the operation succinctly noted: 

“Planning was timely and complete. Advance preparation prevented delays in 

execution. Provision was made to cope with any contingencies. Execution was 

aggressive and effective.”17

Main Attacks

Meanwhile, President Nixon and his advisers concluded that U.S. forces 

would have to intervene in Cambodia to ensure the success of the South 

Vietnamese raids. On 28 April, Nixon made the decision to send U.S. forces 

across the border in combined operations with the South Vietnamese. The 

objectives were to relieve pressure on the ragtag Cambodian Army, to destroy 

supplies and enemy troops in the base areas, and to seize the elusive enemy 

headquarters for southern Vietnam, COSVN. The main attack consisted of 

operations by South Vietnamese forces from III and IV Corps and by elements 

of II Field Force. Weather was a major concern, for the monsoon season 

would begin in late May. Good weather conditions were expected in early May, 

and the area chosen for the first attack was flat, with few natural obstacles to 

cross-country movement. For the Americans, timing and distance were critical factors. To allay the expected outcry in the United States, the Americans 

would be in and out of Cambodia by the end of June. Nixon also limited the 

U.S. invasion to no more than thirty kilometers (eighteen and a half miles) 

into Cambodia.18

17 Tho, Cambodian Incursion, p. 48; Rpt, Opn Toan Thang 41, pp. 7-1 to 7-2. 18 Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 625–26; Palmer, 25-Year War, p. 99–100; Starry, Mounted 

Combat, pp. 168, 178; MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, p. C-32. For an overview and operational 
491

Year of Cambodia, 1970

The major South Vietnamese part of the offensive, Operation Toan

Thang 42 (also called Rockcrusher), began on the morning of 29 Ap

when III Corps forces entered Cambodia’s Svay Rieng Province. The mission included opening and securing Highway 1 to allow the evacuation of 

Vietnamese refugees and to help the Cambodian Army regain control of 

its territory. Three South Vietnamese infantry-armor task forces moved 

south and west in the Angel’s Wing, meeting stubborn resistance as the Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese attempted to remove supplies and equipment. 

Nonetheless, the South Vietnamese quickly seized the first objectives and, 

on 1 May, swept past the provincial capital of Svay Rieng, opening Highway 

1 east to Vietnam. South Vietnamese helicopters quickly moved captured 

troops and materiel back across the border, while larger caches were guarded, 

pending removal, or destroyed. Toan Thang 42 evolved into several phases 

as forces attacked south into the Parrot’s Beak, and the advance continued 

westward along Highway 1 to clear the southern part of Svay Rieng. On 3 

May, III Corps forces linked up with IV Corps units advancing from the 

south. After seizing more weapon and supply caches, the South Vietnamese 

advanced west toward Phnom Penh, opening the road for Vietnamese residents who wanted to flee Cambodia. Other forces attacked north to the 

Chup Rubber Plantation near Kompong Cham, a provincial capital located 

on the Mekong River twenty-one miles northeast of Phnon Penh, and west 

from Vietnam along Highway 7. U.S. ground participation involved sending 

elements of the 3d Brigade, 9th Division, into the Parrot’s Beak not far from 

its area of operations in Long An Province.19

While the South Vietnamese were busy in the Angel’s Wing, the Toan Thang

43 attack started at dawn on 1 May into the Fishhook area of Cambodia. To 

spearhead the attack, Lt. Gen. Michael S. Davison, the II Field Force commander, put together a highly mobile force around the 1st Cavalry Division. All 

together, about 12,000 Americans and nearly 5,000 South Vietnamese formed 

the assault echelons, making the Cambodian incursion the biggest operation 

since Junction City in 1967. This force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert 

Shoemaker of the 1st Cavalry Division, included for its airmobile elements the 3d 

Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and the South Vietnamese 3d Airborne Brigade. 

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, of the 25th 

Division; the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry of the 9th Division; and 

the South Vietnamese 1st Cavalry Regiment provided ground reconnaissance 

and assault capabilities. Following intensive B–52 and tactical air and artillery 

strikes, the airborne brigade air-assaulted into an area north of the Fishhook to 

seal off escape routes. As air cavalry screened to the north, American armor and 

mechanized infantry, meeting some resistance, advanced across the border from 

summaries of the Cambodian Incursion in III and IV Corps, see MACV History, 1970, vol. 

3, pp. C-35 to C-86, C-93 to C-97; II FFV Commander’s Evaluation Report, Cambodian 

Operation, 31 Jul 70, Incl to ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 70, II FFV, 14 Aug 70, Historians files, CMH. 19 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 167–68, 176–77; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 51–70, 83–

90, 127. For more on the 3d Brigade, 9th Division’s participation, see AAR, Opn Toan Thang

500, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, 3 Jun 70, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

492

the south toward the suspected location of COSVN, hoping to envelope the 

enemy flank to the west. All first-day objectives were taken by dark.20 (Map 28)

Task Force Shoemaker advanced steadily over the next few days. On 2

May, the armored column cut the road east of Memot and linked up with 

the South Vietnamese airborne forces. The following day, elements of the 1st 

Cavalry Division’s 2d Brigade reinforced the task force. North Vietnamese 

forces avoided contact, sprinkling the roads with antitank mines. They left 

behind fully stocked depots as the allies probed their positions and uncovered 

caches. By early afternoon on the fourth, the 11th Armored Cavalry broke 

out of the jungle. The armored column proceeded north twenty-five miles 

through large rubber plantations using Highway 7 as the axis of advance 

toward Snuol and its important road junction. After taking Snuol on 5 May, 

the cavalrymen discovered an improved road, large enough for trucks and 

20 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 170–71; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 70–75; Palmer, 

Summons of the Trumpet, pp. 233–34; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 222–24. For more on the operation, including day-to-day events, see AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, 18 Jul 

70; AAR, Opn Dong Tien II and Toan Thang 43, 11th Armd Cav Regt, 9 Dec 70, both in

Historians files, CMH. See also Coleman, Incursion, pp. 234–48; Nolan, Into Cambodia, pp. 

85–183.

14

13

13

15

1

1

4

4

4

3

22

II CTZ

IV CTZ

Parrot's Beak

Fishhook

III CTZ

Gulf

o f

Thailand

Mekong R

Mekong R

CAMBODIA

Phan Thiet

Da Lat

Kratie

PHNOM PENH

Kompong

Cham Chup

Prey Veng

Tay Ninh

Svay Rieng

An Loc

SAIGON

Snuol

Memot

Kampot

Sihanoukville

Rach Gia

Can Tho

My Tho Vung Tau

Axis of Attack

Operational Area

May–June 1970

CAMBODIAN INCURSION

III and IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONES

Miles

Kilometers

0

0

75

75

Map 28
493

Year of Cambodia, 1970

carefully hidden under the jungle canopy. Advancing along this road they 

found and destroyed an abandoned truck convoy laden with supplies. Snuol 

turned out to be the hub of an extensive logistical operation. It included 

a fully equipped motor park, complete with grease racks and spare parts, 

and a large storage area containing tank gun ammunition. When President 

Nixon on 7 May proclaimed the cross-border operation a success and said 

that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia by 30 June, the search 

efforts intensified.21

On 5 May, the 1st Cavalry Division dissolved Task Force Shoemaker and

took direct control of Toan Thang 43. During the period 6 to 13 May, 1st 

Cavalry Division troopers found a huge complex dubbed the City. The City 

covered about one square mile consisting of a well-organized storage depot 

capable of receiving and issuing large quantities of supplies. Most of the storage bunkers contained large quantities of weapons and munitions. Storage 

bunkers held clothing, food stocks, and medical supplies. The large number 

of mess halls and training facilities showed that the complex was also used to 

21 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 172–74; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 74–76; Tolson, 

Airmobility, pp. 224–25.

An armored vehicle launched bridge being emplaced in the Fishhook 

area of Cambodia
Engineers at War

494

provide refresher military and political training to recent replacements from 

North Vietnam.22

Meanwhile, on 6 May other allied forces launched three simultaneous 

attacks against other bases straddling the border. The 1st Brigade, 25th 

Division, deployed two mechanized and two straight infantry battalions in 

the Dog’s Head area northwest of Tay Ninh City and attacked toward Krek 

in Operation Toan Thang 44 (also called Bold Lancer). On 11 May, th

brigade found a large cache fourteen miles west of the border, and the operation ended three days later. The next day, the 1st Brigade deployed to the 

Fishhook and relieved the 1st Cavalry Division. Elements of the 1st Cavalry 

Division’s 2d Brigade and the South Vietnamese 5th Division launched the 

second and third cross-border operations, Toan Thang 45 and Toan Thang

46, from Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. On the second day, the air 

cavalry troopers found an important weapons cache, nicknamed Rock Island 

East, which eventually yielded 329 tons of munitions. This cache was so large 

that it was decided to build a pioneer road linking the base area with Highway 

14 across the border. Meanwhile, the division moved the 1st Brigade from 

War Zone C to the area around the Cambodian town of O’Rang, east of the 

2d Brigade not far from the II/III Corps boundary in South Vietnam. A bat22 Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 76–78; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 226–29.

Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division uncovered the huge complex known as the City.
495

Year of Cambodia, 1970

talion of the 199th Infantry Brigade joined the foray, and this brought U.S. 

combat forces in the area to eight battalions. By the end of May, contacts 

with enemy forces increased along with the discovery of more weapons and 

supply caches. By early June, the entire division moved into the area. On 5 

June, a hospital complex with surgical facilities was discovered northwest of 

Bu Dop. During the second week of June, units of the 3d Brigade unearthed 

an underground shelter containing more communications equipment and a 

shop with parts and accessories. Sites located by the South Vietnamese in 

Base Area 350 included a hospital complex capable of providing medical 

treatment for five hundred men. The 1st Cavalry Division began withdrawing its forces from Cambodia on 20 June. It closed the last firebase on 27 

June, and by 29 June all U.S. units had returned to South Vietnam.23

During the eight-week incursion, around-the-clock support, much of it 

from Brig. Gen. Edwin T. O’Donnell’s 20th Brigade, came from the engineers. Besides the attacking units’ organic engineers, five nondivisional battalions, and several separate companies and detachments, provided direct 

and general support. The bulk of the units came from Col. Ernest J. Denz’s 

79th Group. Task Force East, composed of the 31st Combat and 554th

Construction Battalions and the 362d Light Equipment Company, supported 

the 1st Cavalry Division. Task Force West, composed of the 588th Combat

Battalion, attached elements of the 92d Construction Battalion, and the 

557th and 595th Light Equipment Companies supported the 25th Division. 

Units in general support included the 62d Land Clearing Battalion; the 79th 

Provisional Bridge Company; a mixture of separate companies, platoons, and 

detachments; and twenty-one tractors and trailers from the 34th Group and 

the 18th Engineer Brigade. Priority went to opening main supply routes over 

long-unused roads from Tay Ninh and An Loc. Deteriorating forward tactical airfields were also repaired and upgraded. Priority also went to building 

logistic facilities at the airfields and upgrading the surrounding roads to allweather. Organic engineers, the 1st Cavalry Division’s 8th Engineer Battalion, 

the 25th Division’s 65th Engineer Battalion, and the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment’s 919th Engineer Company, concentrated on opening, maintaining, and closing firebases and attack routes and helped with the removal 

and destruction of caches. Together, the equivalent of three nondivisional 

battalions supported the 1st Cavalry Division. This was a threefold increase 

compared to engineer effort for the division during normal operations. With 

only two days’ notice, supporting engineers during the three days from 29 

April through 1 May opened nine firebases for Task Force Shoemaker. Over

forty-five miles of laterite roads and two dirt airstrips had to be upgraded 

23 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 174–75; Tolson, Airmobility, p. 229; Tho, Cambodian 

Incursion, pp. 78–83. See also AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div; AAR, Cambodian 

Operations, 25th Inf Div, 19 Jul 70; AAR, Opn Bold Lancer I, 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div, 

Jul 70, all in Historians files, CMH; The U.S. 25th Infantry Division, October 1969–October 

1970, Yearbook (n.p.: Tropic Lightning Association, n.d.), pp. 80–81; Nolan, Into Cambodia, 

pp. 205–402.
Engineers at War

496

on the same two days’ notice to handle the division’s large resupply effort 

channeled through Tong Le Chon and Katum.24

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s rapid advance to Snuol along Highway 

7 relied on hasty bridging. After the lead tanks broke out of the jungle on the early 

afternoon of 4 May, they raced to the first of three bridges destroyed by the retreating North Vietnamese. The cavalry secured the site, placed an armored vehicle 

launched bridge, and went on. Resuming the advance the next day, the cavalry laid 

another armored vehicle launched bridge at a second crossing site. However, plans 

for the third crossing site called for a M4T6 dry span. Lt. Col. Scott B. Smith, 

the 1st Cavalry Division engineer and commander of the 8th Engineer Battalion, 

had reconnoitered the bridges with the cavalry regiment’s intelligence officer and 

found the third site too wide for the armored vehicle launched bridge. There were 

no other nearby launching sites. Smith requested the 79th Bridge Company at 

Quan Loi to preassemble the dry span for helicopter lift when the 11th Armored 

Cavalry secured the area. On the morning of 5 May, Smith airlifted a team of engineers—a platoon from Company C, 31st Engineer Battalion, the bridge sections, 

and a bulldozer dismantled in two sections—to the original site. Once assembled, 

the bulldozer began leveling the embankments. The engineers assembled the two 

30-foot ramp sections and a 15-foot center span delivered later in the morning by 

a CH–54 in three loads. Although the engineers worked hard, it became obvious 

that the bridge would not be ready until late afternoon. Anxious not to lose the 

momentum of the attack, Col. Donn A. Starry, the 11th’s commanding officer, set 

out on foot with an armored vehicle launched bridge. He found a place where the 

span could be used. After carefully testing several places, the vehicle’s operator let 

down the bridge with a few inches to spare across the gap and a cavalry troop tried 

it out. By 1300, the regiment’s column of M48 Patton tanks and M551 Sheridan 

armored cavalry assault vehicles resumed the advance. Working in waist-deep 

mud and fighting the Flying Crane’s hurricane-like winds most of the day, the 

engineers wrestled the last of the dry span sections into place and completed the 

75-foot bridge later that afternoon.25

More engineers soon crossed the border. On 14 May, the 31st Engineer 

Battalion, which had already assigned Company C to maintain Highway 

13 from An Loc to Snuol, ordered the company to Snuol to build bypasses 

around the heavily damaged town. This work consisted primarily of placing 

a laterite cap on existing light roads through the rubber plantation. Culvert, 

preassembled by Company D in Song Be, was airlifted to crossing sites. On 5 

June, Company C, 588th Engineer Battalion, joined 11th Armored Cavalry 

elements at the western edge of the Memot Plantation. The company began 

24 Ploger, Army Engineers, p. 176; AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, p. G-1; AAR, 

Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, n.d., pp. 1–3, 9; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th Engr 

Gp, 15 Aug 70, pp. 3–4, 7, all in Historians files, CMH. For more concerning 79th Group operations, see Intervs, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Col Ernest J. Denz, CO, 

79th Engr Gp, and staff officers, 26 Nov 70, VNIT 773, CMH. 25 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 172–73; AAR, Opn Dong Tien II and Toan Thang 43, 11th

Armd Cav Regt, pp. 10–11; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, p. 10; AAR, Opn Toan

Thang 43, 79th Engr Gp, p. 23; 31st Engr Bn, Annual Hist Sum, Aug 69–Sep 70, 31st Engr Bn, 

p. 7; Coleman, Incursion, p. 243; Nolan, Into Cambodia, pp. 135–36.
497

Year of Cambodia, 1970

to upgrade existing trails to help the regiment’s search for the enemy and his 

caches. The onset of the rains, which fortunately held off for three weeks in 

May, slowed progress, but this did not hamper the momentum of the armored 

cavalry. However, by mid-June, heavy rains and traffic caused steady deterioration of the two launched bridge crossings. Company C, 31st Engineer 

Battalion, moved to nearby Firebase Colorado to make repairs and complete

a 110-foot triple-single panel bridge. Although the rains caused problems for 

the engineers, a larger concern was a sudden increase in North Vietnamese 

activity in the area. Early one morning during heavy rains, the enemy struck 

the crowded base with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire, wounding thirteen engineers and damaging several vehicles. Thirty dump trucks from 

the 104th Dump Truck and 79th Bridge Companies that reached the base with 

their loads of rock the previous day had to park in partially exposed positions. 

On the morning of 17 June, work parties en route to the bridge sites were taken 

under fire and were forced to remain within the base for the remainder of the 

day. The next day, eight engineers were wounded on their way to a bridge site.26

At this time, the incursion reversed, and the U.S. troops began to withdraw from Cambodia. On the nineteenth, disassembly of the panel bridge and 

26 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 11, 18, 21, 26; AAR, Opn Toan Thang

43, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 9–10, 12; AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, pp. G-6 to G-7. For 

more about the 31st and 588th Engineer Battalions during the Cambodian operation, see Interv, 

Capt Kurt E. Schlotterbeck, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Gwynn A. Teague, CO, 31st Engr 

Bn, 6 Jul 70, VNIT 728; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Lt Col Thomas A. Stumm, CO, 588th Engr 

Bn, 24 May 70, VNIT 668, both in CMH.

A Sheridan of the 11th Armored Cavalry crosses an armored vehicle 

 launched bridge.
Engineers at War

498

75-foot dry span began. Two separate sections of the dry span were easily 

hauled away by helicopter. The third section, however, was so deeply mired 

in the mud that it could not be removed. It had to be destroyed in place. The 

110-foot panel bridge was dismantled and carried away in trucks. On 26 June, 

all U.S. units in the area returned to Vietnam through Katum.27

Throughout the operation, the engineers worked hard on the main supply 

routes. In the western sector, the 588th Engineer Battalion upgraded and maintained forty miles of Route 4 from Tay Ninh to Memot. The main effort involved 

building a new road from Katum. Work on the extension just south of the border 

began on 5 May. It took the 588th, with the help of the 595th Light Equipment 

Company’s earthmoving equipment and the 984th Land Clearing Company’s 

Rome plows in the lead, three days to gouge out a tactical road through the 

jungle. This allowed tracked vehicles to move to Firebase X-Ray just across the 

border. Augmented by five 290M scrapers and a roller from the 595th Light 

Equipment Company, the 588th Battalion’s Company A pushed on, completing the eleven-mile road on 16 May. Meanwhile, Company D, 92d Engineer 

Battalion, joined Company D, 588th Engineer Battalion, in a joint effort to 

maintain Highway 22 from Tay Ninh to Cambodian Route 78, and on to its 

27 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, p. 11; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th Engr 

Gp, pp. 12–13.

A CH–54 Flying Crane transports fixed-span bridging during the 

 Cambodian incursion.
499

Year of Cambodia, 1970

juncture with Highway 7 at Krek. One of two major spans built along the way 

involved erecting a 180-foot panel bridge consisting of a 140-foot triple-double 

span and a 40-foot double-single span supported by an intermediate pier.28

Also busy in the western sector were the 25th Division’s engineers. One 

of the first tasks facing the division’s 65th Engineer Battalion was to blaze a 

road to the Rach Cai Bac, a stream along the border some five miles west of 

Thien Nhon. While an infantry battalion made a helicopter assault to secure 

a bridgehead, a few miles on the Cambodian side, Companies B and E began 

installing a M4T6 floating bridge. Bulldozers cleared away brush on the river 

banks, and the bridge trucks loaded with bridge decking, each with an inflatable float set on top, pulled up at intervals. The men of the combat line and 

bridge companies worked past dark, completing the job forty-five minutes 

before midnight. At dawn on 7 May, armored vehicles began crossing the 225-

foot river into Cambodia. Meanwhile, Company A, which routinely supported 

the 1st Brigade, helped prepare the support base at Thien Nhon. Five Rome 

plows from the 984th Land Clearing Company began to widen and lengthen 

the airstrip and clear fields of fire around the base.29

In the eastern sector, the 31st Engineer Battalion opened routes to handle the 

heavy loads needed to supply the 1st Cavalry Division and return captured supplies. 

Besides its work along Highway 13, the 31st on 26 May began upgrading Highway 

14A, which was little more than a trail, from Loc Ninh to Bu Dop. By 1 June, 

Companies A and D reinforced with equipment from the 557th Light Equipment 

Company and 554th Construction Battalion, with protection provided by two 

cavalry troops, completed the upgrading. On 11 May, a platoon from Company B, 

a team of Rome plows from the 62d Land Clearing Battalion, and a panel bridge 

platoon from the 79th Bridge Company started working north along the heavily 

mined stretch from Bu Dop to Firebase Brown inside Cambodia. Encountering

an 80-foot gap along the way, the engineers used bulldozers to push out causeways 

from each bank. This narrowed the gap and allowed fitting the 38-foot M4T6 dry 

span airlifted from Quan Loi. Once across the gap, Rome plows opened the road 

to Firebase Brown. Without the plows, the road would have taken several additional days to open. Operating from Firebase Brown, and then Firebase Myro

the engineer task force added three panel bridges. These included an 80-foot span 

to replace the dry span, another standard dry span, and several culverts.30

In addition to the various supply routes, the engineers built access roads 

to the cache sites. Initially the 1st Cavalry Division planned to remove the 

captured stores at the City by helicopter. However, after finding more weapons 

and munitions, the division ordered the engineers to build an access road to 

evacuate the supplies by vehicle. Aerial reconnaissance revealed an unused trail 

leading east across the border to Company C, 31st Engineer Battalion’s, camp 

28 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 12, 17–18; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 

79th Engr Gp, pp. 9–11; AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, pp. G-6 to G-7; S. Sgt. Matt 

Glasgow, “Thrust into Cambodia,” Kysu’ 2 (Fall 1970): 13. 29 The U.S. 25th Infantry Division, October 1969–October 1970, Yearbook, pp. 80, 82; Tho, 

Cambodian Incursion, pp. 78–79; Nolan, Into Cambodia, pp. 220–21. 30 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 21, 26; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th 

Engr Gp, pp. 13–14; AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, p. G-6.
Engineers at War

500

near Highway 13. On 9 May, Company C and the 557th Light Equipment 

Company moved to the foot of the trail and began ripping a narrow channel through the thick jungle. With a D7E bulldozer in the lead, and a hovering helicopter keeping the work party on course, Rome plows widened the 

swath while road construction equipment shaped a new road. Late that day, 

the bulldozers broke through the trees at one side of the cache. Engineer and 

transportation vehicles quickly began hauling several thousand tons of supplies back to Vietnam over the 13.5-mile “Cache City Road.” Fortunately, 

rainfall had not yet become a factor in the operation, and the dry weather 

enabled the engineers to use hasty fords, thus eliminating the need for culverts 

and large amounts of fill. In late May, the 31st’s Company B helped the 1st 

Cavalry Division remove several hundred tons of supplies from Rock Island 

East. Rome plows widened a three-mile trail, formerly a North Vietnamese 

supply route, through the jungle. The improved route allowed engineer and 

transportation units to haul the captured material to Highway 14 and back to 

Vietnam.31

Engineers also made headway at the forward airfields, adding more offloading and logistical facilities. At the heavily used Bu Gia Map airstrip, the 8th 

Engineer Battalion added a new 250-foot square soil-cement parking ramp, a 

helicopter refueling facility, two gunship rearm points, and a 15,000-gallon-perday water supply point. Daily maintenance of the laterite runway surface and 

parking ramp kept the fair-weather airfield open despite heavy daily rains. The 

31st Engineer Battalion did similar work at Bu Dop and Loc Ninh. Planners 

looked to Loc Ninh as a dependable backup to Bu Dop. Similar improvements 

were made at Thien Nhon, Katum, and Tong Le Chon. Company D, 588th 

Engineer Battalion, and the 362d Light Equipment Company were already 

committed to upgrading the Thien Nhon airfield when the Cambodian operation began. The large number of aircraft sorties and the resultant failures in 

the M8A1 matting kept the 588th busy patching the runway and welding the 

matting’s joints. Reinforcing elements of the 92d Engineer Battalion from Long 

Binh arrived on the eleventh to begin work on a brigade-sized logistics base, 

which was completed within six days. Thien Nhon was unusual in that a section 

of Highway 22 served as the runway. At Katum, Company C, 588th Engineer 

Battalion, and elements of the 362d Light Equipment Company started extensive maintenance work on 2 May. The airfield could not be closed during daylight 

hours, so the engineers worked at night, using soil-cement stabilization covered 

with a MC70 asphalt coating. On 11 May, Company D moved to Katum from 

Cu Chi to place some 8,000 square yards of M8A1 matting on the 1,200-foot 

runway. Company A joined the effort and built a logistics complex, an airfield 

bypass road, a staging area, a road in the ammunition storage area, a berm to 

protect parked tractor-trailers, and an aerial resupply hook-out pad to sling load 

cargo. At Tong Le Chon, rain and heavy air traffic caused several soft spots on 

31 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 21, 26, 32; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 

79th Engr Gp, pp. 13–15; Glasgow, “Thrust into Cambodia,” pp. 13, 16. See also Spec. Harry 

Huntington, “The Cache Road,” 79th Pioneer 2 (30 May 1970): 3.
501

Year of Cambodia, 1970

the airfield. On 19 June, a platoon from the 557th Light Equipment Company 

moved to the base and completed repairs in ten days.32

Land-clearing units again displayed their ability to support combat operations. Teams probed suspected bunker and cache areas and cut pioneer roads 

for tracked and wheeled vehicles to haul away captured supplies. For the 

first time since the activation of the 62d as a land-clearing battalion, smaller 

task forces or platoons instead of complete companies moved to the cutting 

sites. For instance, between 10 May and 5 June, the 2d Platoon, 60th Land 

Clearing Company, supported the 31st Engineer Battalion by opening roads 

to cache sites. The platoon also helped the armored cavalry in reconnaissanceclearing missions. During the cuts, plows frequently unearthed more caches. 

Both sides of Highway 14A were also cleared back to about twenty-five yards 

for a distance of about six miles. On 18 May, another task force of Rome 

plows from the 984th Land Clearing Company joined the 588th Engineer 

Battalion at Thien Nhon to clear suspected ambush sites along Highway 22 

and Cambodian Route 78. The thirteen plows also cleared fields of fire around 

the base. The first plows entered Cambodia on 26 May, and soon one plow 

detonated a mine. No one was hurt and the plow withstood moderate damage. 

On 4 June, the task force moved west of the base along Route 20 and cleared 

both sides of the road to the border. It finished this job on 6 June. In mid-May, 

32 AAR, Cambodian Campaign, 1st Cav Div, p. G-5; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr 

Bde, pp. 40, 43, 46; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th Engr Gp, pp. 10–11. For more on earlier 

work at Thien Nhon by the 588th Engineer Battalion, see Capt. Francis L. Smith Jr., “Combat 

Engineers at Thien Nhon,” Military Engineer 62 (November-December 1970): 392–93.

The Thien Nhon airstrip used a section of Highway 22 as a runway.
Engineers at War

502

it became evident that if the armored cavalry was to maintain momentum 

around Snuol, routes of travel would have to be cleared through the jungle. A 

task force from the 60th Land Clearing Company, consisting of twenty-eight 

men and nine Rome plows, joined the cavalrymen. Although ambushed several times, in seven days the land clearers cut some 155 acres.33

Due to the small number of plows available and the extremely dense 

bamboo growth in the Snuol area, the land clearers developed several cutting techniques. The standard echelon formation was not workable. Instead, 

a lead plow pushed ahead some fifty to one hundred yards into the jungle 

with the remaining plows dividing and simultaneously pushing to the left 

and right. Once the direction of the cut was decided, the lead plow rejoined 

the others. When the plows neared the point of the deepest penetration, the 

process was repeated. This method allowed the plows to double and triple 

up in removing the bamboo and left a thirty-to-forty-yard-plus corridor free 

of downed trees. Although daily production dropped, this method had the 

advantage of giving the accompanying armored cavalry a much wider and 

faster reaction time to enemy attacks. The cavalry dropped the normal procedure of keeping the armored vehicles in cleared areas, and instead moved 

some of their forces ahead and on both flanks of the plows. This was a 

slow process. The armored vehicles had trouble forcing their way through the 

jungle, but this method did break up potential ambushes and gave the plows 

better protection. Firing at random intervals, “recon by fire,” apparently 

proved effective, for the enemy did not test the advance. Colonel Driscoll, 

the 62d’s commanding officer, however, was convinced that the recon by fire 

method was not really all that good. He recalled: “We’ve been hit within two 

or three seconds after gunships have worked the precise area in which we get 

hit.” In addition, Driscoll did not see much of a deterrence in using “shotguns” on the plows. “There is a drawback to putting a second man in the cab 

of the plow,” he noted, “because there’s no buddy seat in there . . . and he 

sits up high and he’s exposed an awful lot more than the operator. If they 

hit a mine, he’s almost a cinch to get some fragmentation from it.” Finally, 

the cavalry-engineer teams used “automatic ambushes” to protect the land 

clearers in the cutting areas and in their night defensive positions. At the end 

of the cutting day, security forces placed trip wires across trails connected 

to a series of five or six claymore mines. This helped reduce enemy activity, 

but it also required the delicate and time-consuming task of deactivating the 

weapons the next day.34

In early June, both land-clearing companies entered the Fishhook. There 

they worked with the 11th Armored Cavalry to find and destroy enemy fortifications, hiding places, and supplies and equipment. Until 1 June, the bulk 

of the 60th Land Clearing Company had been cutting near Minh Thanh 

northwest of Lai Khe. The 984th had been working in the Bearcat area south33 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 46–52; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th 

Engr Gp, pp. 15–16. 34 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 59–60; Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 

22 Jun 70, pp. 25–26.
503

Year of Cambodia, 1970

east of Long Binh. North Vietnamese resistance had been increasing in the 

Fishhook, and the land clearers encountered the heaviest enemy attacks of 

the Cambodian campaign. In its first day of cutting, the 60th’s security force 

discovered fifty bunkers, some weapons and munitions, and twenty tons of 

rice. Two days later, the cavalry-engineer force found another bunker complex 

about one square mile in area. On 7 June, they unearthed a large complex of 

seventy-five bunkers with two feet of overhead cover and fifty huts. During the 

search, more weapons and medical supplies were found. On the ninth, the land 

clearers and their cavalry escort came under fire several times, but they did find 

and destroy another 150 bunkers and huts. Such finds continued until the close 

of the operation on 24 June. Enemy attacks were frequent, from small arms, 

mortar rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades. On the sixteenth, the enemy 

made some seventy individual attacks against the cutting force. Three operators suffered wounds and two plows received light damage. One Rome plow 

struck a mine, wounding the operator and damaging the plow. The next day, 

the lead plow was struck by some one hundred rounds of automatic rifle fire 

and a rocket-propelled grenade. This attack killed one engineer and wounded 

another and left one plow moderately damaged. The 984th, which arrived in 

Cambodia in mid-June, also had its share of enemy contact. On the night 

of 19 June, rocket and mortar attacks against the company’s night defensive 

position killed three and wounded eighteen engineers. Harassing attacks on 

the twenty-second and twenty-third wounded another eleven engineers. Still, 

between 4 and 24 June, the two companies cleared about 1,700 acres of jungle 

and destroyed more than 1,100 enemy structures. Supplies uncovered included 

X-ray equipment, medical supplies, communications equipment, various 

weapons, 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, and 500 mortar rounds. 

Both units departed Cambodia via Katum and were among the last units to 

cross the border.35

The Cambodian operation illuminated the methods and hazards of 

land clearing. During the June cuttings, the mission of the company-size 

operations was to support the armored cavalry to locate enemy caches. The 

60th and 984th made their cuts as rays from night defensive positions. In the 

Fishhook, II Field Force usually assigned one land-clearing company to support one armored cavalry troop. The land clearers, however, found one platoon of ten plows sufficient to support a troop and recommended this ratio 

for future operations. If, during their probing cuts, the land clearers found 

they could not finish the cut that day, they could expect enemy contact the following day. To allay this problem, they bypassed all large trees and continued 

the cut as fast as possible within a seven- to nine-hour period. After returning to the night defensive position, operators still had daily maintenance to 

do. This meant sharpening blades, changing oil, and cleaning their machines. 

In addition, each plow required sixty to seventy gallons of gas and seventy 

35 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 52–59; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th 

Engr Gp, pp. 17–22; Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 175–76; Glasgow, “Thrust into Cambodia,” 

pp. 16–17; Spec. Dave Massey, “Land Clearing Team, Rome Plows on the Border,” Hurricane

(September 1970): 34–37.
Engineers at War

504

gallons of water daily. Of the two land-clearing companies in Cambodia, the 

984th suffered more casualties, mostly by indirect fire against night laagers. 

In the attack that caused three deaths and eighteen wounded, the engineers 

had inherited the position used the previous day by the armored cavalry. 

Typically, engineers tried to complete overhead cover before nightfall while 

bulldozers formed a berm around the position. If the land clearers could 

not finish the fortifications, they slept under their bulldozers or heavy equipment. The 60th made this a standard practice. Although not as comfortable 

or as protective as a bunker, the bulldozers gave ample protection.36

Maps and terrain intelligence played important roles in the Cambodian 

operation. Four years earlier, the Engineer Command had established two 

map depots in Vietnam. Due to the large troop withdrawals before Cambodia, 

only the 547th Map Depot Platoon at Long Binh remained in Vietnam. The 

Cambodian offensive severely tested the map supply system. The depot received 

no advance notice of the operation, and apparently II Field Force did not prepare map supply plans. At first, stocks of the border region seemed adequate 

for limited needs, but as the operation grew in scope restockage became necessary. On 1 May, II Field Force made the first emergency requisition for 58,000 

Cambodian large-scale sheets. The 66th Engineer Company (Topographic) 

(Corps), a unit under the control of II Field Force, sent the request directly to the 

29th Engineer Battalion (Base Topographic) in Hawaii. The maps reached the 

depot on the fourth. That day the 66th forwarded another request to the 29th, 

this time for 600,000 Cambodian and Laotian map sheets. The twenty-eight 

tons of maps reached Vietnam on 11 May. Between 1 and 10 May, the 66th’s 

Reproduction Platoon printed over 45,000 map sheets of Cambodia to meet 

initial demands. From 1 May to 2 June, the depot issued over 685,000 maps, 

almost three times the average issued over the same period. Cartographers 

also produced two uncontrolled mosaics of Cambodian airfields. Altogether, 

the 66th Topographic Engineer Company issued almost one million maps to 

support the Cambodian operation. The 517th Engineer Terrain Detachment 

in the Engineer Section at II Field Force headquarters furnished additional 

topographic information. There, expert terrain analysts looked at contours, 

vegetation, soil-bearing capacities to support armored vehicle movement, and 

information on likely enemy storage sites and supply routes. Given the poor 

secondary roads and the reliance on motor vehicles, especially in areas like 

the Dog’s Head and Fishhook, terrain and road knowledge before the attack 

became essential.37

South Vietnamese engineers continued to do a creditable job of supporting 

their combat forces. At the start of Toan Thang 42, the 30th Group placed 

one platoon in direct support and one company in general support of each 

36 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, p. 61; Massey, “Land Clearing Team, Rome 

Plows on the Border,” p. 37. For more on a commander’s views of the Cambodian operation, 

see Interv, Schlotterbeck with Driscoll, 22 Jun 70, pp. 23–39. 37 AAR, Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, p. 64; U.S. Army Topographic Support of Military 

Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, pp. 100–101, 117–18; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 70, II FFV, 

14 May 70, p. 42, Historians files, CMH. See also Spec. Larry Mayo, “Battle Maps,” Kysu’ 1 

(Summer 1969): 26–28.
505

Year of Cambodia, 1970

corps task force. Before the operation, the group again borrowed M4T6 floats 

and equipment from the 20th Brigade. These floats made possible the crossing 

by two task forces over the Vam Co Dong. Flying Crane helicopters picked 

up finished raft sections from the assembly site and dropped them off at the 

bridge site, where the South Vietnamese 301st and 303d Engineer Combat 

Battalions and the 317th Float Bridge Company tied the sections together 

into a bridge. By early evening of the twenty-fifth, the bridge was finished well 

before the armored task forces began their move into Cambodia. On 1 May, 

direct support grew to company-size operations. South Vietnamese combat 

engineers opened and repaired supply routes along the axis of advance, built 

passable roads out of trails, and erected M4T6 dry spans and panel bridges or 

bypasses for the armor and wheeled columns to follow. Other tasks included 

building supply points protected by solid earthen revetments and helipads to 

evacuate the wounded. Also, on 30 May the 303d Engineer Combat Battalion 

finished a forward airstrip with a laterite runway. To the south in IV Corps, the 

40th Combat Group built a C–7 Caribou airstrip at Neak Luong. In mid-June, 

an enemy mortar attack destroyed six floats at the critical Ben Soi Bridge, but 

the 301st Engineer Combat Battalion repaired the bridge in four hours. At 

Svay Rieng, the 303d Engineer Battalion took four days to replace a destroyed 

bridge with a 160-foot double-double panel bridge. Later in the operation, 

the 301st Engineer Battalion used four D7E bulldozers to clear vegetation on 

both sides of Highway 7 near the Chup Rubber Plantation. In June and July, 

as some forces withdrew, unguarded bridges were disassembled and stocked. 

Not to be outdone by enemy sappers, 30th Group engineers used demolitions 

Supplying enough maps for the Cambodian operation put a strain on the 

 remaining map depot in Vietnam.
Engineers at War

506

to destroy a 272-foot Eiffel bridge to deny its use to the enemy. The North 

Vietnamese Army had used the bridge spanning the Kompong Spean River at 

Kompong Trach for several years. Work shifted to improving defensive positions at bridges and bypasses as enemy forces increased their attacks. Engineer 

camps were also attacked. On 4 July, 120 rounds of 82-mm. mortar fire struck 

in and around the perimeter of Company A, 301st Engineer Battalion, at Krek. 

The attack killed five engineers and damaged several pieces of equipment. 

American advisers reported that the Vietnamese engineers gained tremendous 

confidence during the operation. This was the first time that battalion-size 

engineer units had to live and work in a combat environment, making sure that 

bridges and roads were completed on time.38

The Cambodian operation confirmed basic engineer principles in supporting a corps in the attack. Detailed planning at the 20th Brigade began only 

two to three days before the campaign and then continued for the next three 

weeks. General O’Donnell held nightly command and staff meetings, including representatives from groups and battalions, at brigade headquarters just 

outside Bien Hoa Air Base. At this time, orders were issued for the following 

day. O’Donnell stopped this practice after the units completed their moves, 

adequate bridge stocks and building materials reached the forward areas, and 

the scope of the operation became apparent. Task force organizations worked 

without difficulty since the brigade and groups routinely allocated resources 

based on the extent of the assignment. As in the past, engineer units quickly 

moved out of their base camps and firebases. They easily switched from regularly assigned construction jobs to the hasty, constantly changing main supply 

routes and combat support missions. Working relationships did not pose any 

problems since engineer units worked with the same supported combat unit. 

The brigade and group continued the practice of allowing the two battalion 

task force commanders the flexibility to accept combat and operational support missions directly from the divisions. This helped speed up reaction time. 

Tactical commanders assigned priorities, and the 20th Brigade and 79th Group 

allocated the needed resources.39

Despite the short lead times and some setbacks during the incursion, U.S. 

engineers could look back on an impressive list of accomplishments. They built 

35 miles of new roads and opened, repaired, or upgraded another 221 miles, 

and built or reinforced fifteen bridges. Roads were made passable by improving drainage, patching holes, and capping the surface with rock or laterite. 

Consequently, locating laterite borrow pits became critical. When placed on a 

dry base, laterite caps held up throughout the monsoon season. The engineers 

also built enough turnouts on the many single-lane roads to handle passing 

vehicles. Large amounts of tactical bridging were brought forward and used, 

over 345 feet of M4T6 dry span and 710 feet of panel bridging. Several delays 

in building the panel bridges occurred, however, because of missing parts and 

inexperience. Whenever possible, work crews used culverts or the large mul38 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 42, U.S. Army Advisory Gp, III Corps, pp. 4-3, 14-2 to 14-4; 

Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 193–94. 39 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, pp. 69–70.
507

Year of Cambodia, 1970

tiplate arch to conserve bridging and make the crossings less vulnerable to 

destruction.40

The key to opening and maintaining forward tactical airfields lay in the 

building of bypass roads where the main roads also served as runways. Early 

construction of the bypasses at Thien Nhon and Katum permitted their continued use. The engineers placed six hundred feet of M8A1 matting at each 

end of the two airfields in an attempt to ensure runway usage when the rains 

came. However, poor drainage under the matting made continuous maintenance necessary. When necessary, work took place at night to allow daylight 

landings. Patching potholes with soil-cement, laterite, and hot- and cold-mix 

asphalt continued throughout the operation. The cold mix proved to be the 

best material because it could be stockpiled at each end of the field. In case 

it became necessary, sufficient matting for one complete airfield in Cambodia 

was stockpiled at Quan Loi.41

As in the past, road mines posed major threats to armored columns and 

supply convoys. During the Cambodian operation, II Field Force used the 

only available vehicle-mounted mine detonator, the M48 Tank-Mounted 

Clearing Roller. This roller was obtained through the ENSURE (Expedit

Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) management system. 

Through this program, items were developed and procured either for evaluation purposes or for operational requirements. To speed up clearing operations 

for this operation, two tanks and one combat engineer vehicle mounted the 

rollers. The rollers cut clearing times by 50 percent when compared to using 

hand-held detectors. One precaution was necessary. If the roller only made 

one pass, all vehicles behind it had to follow in its exact path. Also, when the 

rollers set off mines, one or more of the replaceable wheels and sometimes 

the wheel arm assemblies had to be replaced. Mines over sixty pounds usually 

caused enough damage to require replacement of the entire arm assembly. 

Replacement typically took four men forty-five minutes. The 65th Engineer 

Battalion tried mounting the roller on one of its four combat engineer vehicles. Although designed for the M48A3 tank chassis it did, after removal of 

the bulldozer blade and some minor modifications, fit the combat engineer 

vehicle’s chassis. However, to replace the rollers and assembly arms, a wrecker 

was required because the engineer vehicle’s boom was too short for the job. 

After using the roller for several days and after setting off three mines, the 

engineers realized that enemy sappers were trying to figure the minimum size 

needed to destroy the mine roller. Combat engineers judged it best to use the 

roller infrequently along the same road, because daily usage encouraged the 

enemy to increase the number and size of mines. They argued it was better to 

use the roller with the tank since mounting the roller on the combat engineer 

vehicle took a specialized piece of equipment away from its primary mission. 

No matter how they were mounted, the rollers were considered better than the 

expedients of “running” or “busting” the road with tanks or dump trucks.42

40 Ibid., pp. 70–71.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 12; AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 79th Engr Gp, p. 33; AAR, Cambodian Operation, 
Engineers at War

508

The cross-border operation took its toll on engineers. Casualties in 20th 

Brigade units totaled 7 killed and 132 wounded. Mortar and rocket attacks 

accounted for most casualties, and most of these losses took place between 16 

and 19 June in the Fishhook. On 16 June, a work party en route from Firebase 

Colorado to a bridge site was ambushed and suffered eight wounded. It was

during this period that the 584th Land Clearing Company lost twenty-one 

soldiers. Other casualties were scattered in sporadic attacks or mines throughout the campaign. Tragedy also struck at the higher commands. On 12 May, 

General Dillard’s helicopter was shot down while he was reconnoitering Route 

509 about ten miles southwest of Pleiku. Others killed in the incident included 

Col. Carroll T. Adams, commanding officer, 937th Engineer Group; Lt. Col. 

Fred V. Cole, commanding officer, 20th Engineer Combat Battalion; Capt. 

William D. Booth, aide de camp; Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Griffith A. Jones of the 

Engineer Command; and five others. Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Robert W. Elkey of the 

937th Group was the sole survivor.43

25th Inf Div, pp. 11–12; Heiser, Logistic Support, p. 53. For more on the tank roller evaluations in armored operations, see Final Report, Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), sub: 

Optimum Mix of Armored Vehicles for Use in Stability Operations, ACTIV Proj. No. ACG 

69F, 27 Jan 71, pp. III-8, G-33, Historians files, CMH. 43 AAR, Opn Toan Thang 43, 20th Engr Bde, p. 68; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 176–77; “MG 

Dillard, 9 Others Die in Crash,” Castle Courier, 18 May 1970; Nolan, Into Cambodia, p. 201.

Rollers placed in front of M48 tanks and this combat engineer vehicle 

expedited clearing roads of mines.
509

Year of Cambodia, 1970

Secondary Assaults

The secondary attacks from II Corps were designed to draw North 

Vietnamese forces north and to cut their logistics lifeline north of the main 

battle. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces spearheaded the operations, known 

as Binh Tay I through IV, from Kontum in the north to Ban Me Thuot in the 

south. Headquarters I Field Force and II Corps received little warning of the 

attack. When orders were received on 2 May, units of the U.S. 4th Division 

and the South Vietnamese 22d Infantry Division were operating in enemy Base 

Area 226 in northwest Binh Dinh Province. The 173d Airborne Brigade in 

northern Binh Dinh Province was the only other American tactical unit of any 

size in II Corps. The 4th Division had already lost a brigade to redeployment.44

On 6 May, elements of the 4th Division reinforced by the South Vietnamese 

40th Regiment, 22d Division, commenced Operation Binh Tay I. The task 

force made air assaults into Base Area 702 west of Kontum and just south of 

the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. South Vietnamese 

forces began the Binh Tay II and III operations on 14 and 20 May into Base 

Areas 701 and 740 west of Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, respectively. Binh Tay

IV, carried out by the South Vietnamese in late June, was not directed toward 

destruction of enemy forces or bases but toward the evacuation of Cambodian 

and Vietnamese refugees.45

Although preceded by B–52 strikes, the 4th Division’s attacks ran into 

trouble, and the division’s foray across the border only lasted ten days. An 

infantry battalion on loan from the 101st Airborne Division failed to reach its 

intended landing zone because of heavy fire. Other units of the 4th Division 

also met resistance at their landing zones and were forced to withdraw. But 

after this initial opposition, the North Vietnamese avoided contact throughout the operation. By 7 May, the 1st Brigade’s three battalions reached the 

objective area, followed by the 2d Brigade’s three battalions. When the troops 

landed, helicopters dropped off 105-mm. howitzers to provide close fire support. Heavier artillery such as 8-inch howitzers and 175-mm. guns provided 

support from bases on the South Vietnamese side of the border. On 9 May, the 

airborne battalion uncovered a rice depot containing about 500 tons. Two days 

later, elements of other battalions discovered a North Vietnamese dispensary 

complete with surgical equipment and medicine and a twenty-bed hospital. On 

the thirteenth, most of the 2d Brigade returned by helicopter to Camp Radcliff. 

Once at their home base, they began standing down pending redeployment to 

the United States. The 1st Brigade began pulling out of Cambodia on 15 May, 

completing its withdrawal the following day. South Vietnamese units stayed 

behind, continuing the search in the base area. Binh Tay I ended on 25 May.46

The number of training areas, base camp complexes, and other facilities 

discovered during Binh Tay I revealed the scope and permanency of the North 

44 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, p. C-88; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, p. 90. 45 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-87 to C-91; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 90–100. 46 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-87 to C-88; Tho, Cambodian Incursion, pp. 90–95. For 

more on Binh Tay I, see AAR, Opn Binh Tay I, 4th Inf Div, 21 Jul 70, Historians files, CMH. 
Engineers at War

510

Vietnamese forces in this stronghold. By 13 May, the 4th Division had uncovered over 15 tons of munitions, 500 tons of food, large amounts of medical 

supplies, over 800 crew-served weapons and small arms, and a variety of other 

military equipment. The South Vietnamese found still more. Given the effort 

it would take to reestablish Base Area 702 during the rainy season, the North 

Vietnamese had suffered a blow.47

During Binh Tay I, the 4th Division’s 4th Engineer Battalion and elements 

of the 937th Engineer Group, 18th Engineer Brigade, rendered support. The I 

Field Force Engineer Section planned and coordinated the construction effort 

and operational support tasks. Divisional engineers carried out the usual missions: one line company in direct support of each brigade (Company B less 

one platoon to the 1st Brigade and Company C to the 2d Brigade) and one line 

company (Company D) in general support. (Company A had redeployed with 

the 3d Brigade.) Company A, 299th Engineer Combat Battalion, provided the 

third platoon to accompany the 1st Brigade’s attached airborne battalion. In 

turn, each line company doled out one platoon to each infantry battalion while 

the company headquarters remained with the brigade headquarters. On the 

morning of 4 May, the 4th Engineer Battalion’s forward headquarters moved 

from Camp Radcliff to Engineer Hill outside Pleiku. On 11 May, the battalion 

forward deployed with the division headquarters to New Plei Djereng. At the 

end of the operation on 16 May, the 4th Engineer Battalion returned to Camp 

Radcliff with the division headquarters. In the midst of Binh Tay I, the 4th

Engineer Battalion and 937th Group changed commanders. On 13 May, Lt. 

Col. Richard L. Curl replaced Lt. Col. John R. Brinkerhoff, who had commanded the 4th Battalion for one year. Curl would depart with the division 

in December. At the 937th, Col. James C. Donovan replaced Colonel Adams, 

who died when General Dillard’s helicopter was shot down. Adams had commanded the group for five months.48 (Map 29)

The engineers provided the normal close support for the infantry battalions assaulting the base area. Primary tasks included opening landing zones, 

clearing mines and booby traps, and building fortifications. Typically, rappelling teams, with their chain saws and explosives, dropped from hovering 

helicopters and cleared the landing zones. They usually were followed by a 

Case 450 airmobile bulldozer to help build battalion-size firebases. On the 

Vietnamese side of the border, Company D, reinforced with D7 bulldozers 

and graders from Company B, repaired Route 509 from the juncture with 

Highway 19 to New Plei Djereng. At New Plei Djereng, one platoon along 

with elements of Company E, the bridge company, built field fortifications for 

the 4th Division’s forward logistical base. Company E anticipated its bridging 

mission by moving two armored vehicle launchers with three bridges to New 

Plei Djereng. It also kept a bridge platoon on alert with two sets of M4T6 

floating bridge at Engineer Hill. When the bridge mission was discontinued 

on 14 May, the platoon returned the bridging to Camp Radcliff; the trucks 

47 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-87 to C-88.

48 AAR, Opn Binh Tay I, 4th Inf Div, pp. 17–18; ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 70, I FFV, 15 Aug 

70, p. 45, Historians files, CMH; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 221, 226.
511

Year of Cambodia, 1970

returned to New Plei Djereng and transported elements of an infantry battalion back to Camp Radcliff. At New Plei Djereng, the 4th Engineer Battalion 

built helicopter pads and refueling points. Two asphalt distributors also spread 

peneprime in an attempt to reduce the acute dust problem at the forward base. 

Reinforcing the 4th Engineer Battalion, Company B, 20th Engineer Combat 

Battalion, maintained Highway 19 from Highway 14 to Duc Co. At the Duc 

Co forward base, the company built berms around the fuel storage point, an 

ammunition supply point, and a rearm point. On 16 May, the company took 

over the Route 509 maintenance from Company D and continued this task 

until 29 May when it returned to Engineer Hill.49

Engineers supporting Binh Tay I experienced several annoying problems. 

Due to the shortage of ten-ton tractors and trailers, it took four days to shuttle 

all the bulldozers and graders to the Route 509 work sites. Heavy air and road 

traffic at New Plei Djereng forced the engineers to spread peneprime only at 

night. Also, the 4th Engineer Battalion’s limited equipment and supply of 

peneprime did not completely overcome the dust problem. On the other hand, 

heavy rains during the latter part of the operation hampered overland supply. 

Without nearby sources of good rock, engineers resorted to using the local 

basaltic soil, which when used as a surface course turned into a soupy mud 

under heavy rains and traffic. Had the operation continued longer with no 

change in the weather, resupply by road would have been drastically reduced. 

The 4th Engineer Battalion also had mixed results using the combat engineer 

vehicle with expendable rollers. During dry weather, the engineers could clear 

the main supply route within an hour, but the onset of heavy rains reduced the 

rollers’ effectiveness. Running at slower speed helped. Still, mud collected in 

the road wheels and caused excessive wear to the mine roller’s bearings.50

49 AAR, Opn Binh Tay I, 4th Inf Div, pp. 17–19. 50 Ibid., pp. 19–20.

14

14

13

19

II CTZ

Tonle

Sap

Mekong R

THAILAND LAOS

CAMBODIA

Stung Treng

Pleiku

Kontum

Ban Me

Thuot

Kratie

Axis of Attack

Operational Area

May–June 1970

CAMBODIAN INCURSION

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Miles

Kilometers

0

0

75

75

Map 29
Engineers at War

512

The cross-border incursions hurt the North Vietnamese Army. By the end 

of June, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces captured or destroyed almost 10,000 

tons of materiel and food. This amounted to enough rice to feed more than 

25,000 enemy troops a full ration for an entire year, individual weapons to equip 

fifty-five full-strength battalions, crew-served weapons to equip thirty-three full 

battalions, and recoilless rifle ammunition for more than 9,000 typical attacks 

against allied forces. In all, 11,362 enemy soldiers were killed and over 2,000 

captured. For the 1st Cavalry Division, the operation in Cambodia exceeded 

all expectations. Maj. Gen. George W. Casey, who took command of the 1st 

Cavalry Division on 12 May from Maj. Gen. Elvy B. Roberts, summed up 

the results as “impressive.” In a letter to his troops on 6 July, he wrote that the 

division “killed enough of the enemy to man three NVA [North Vietnamese] 

Regiments; captured or destroyed individual and crew-served weapons to equip 

two NVA Divisions; and denied the enemy an entire year’s supply of rice for all 

his maneuver battalions in our AO [area of operations].” For the next fourteen 

months, there were almost no North Vietnamese and Viet Cong operations in 

South Vietnam other than sporadic ambushes and attacks by fire.51

Operations After Cambodia

Besides the Cambodian incursion, allied military operations in 1970 

focused on enemy base areas inside South Vietnam, on protecting the population, and on exploiting progress in Vietnamization and pacification. In some 

areas, the Regional and Popular Forces assumed greater responsibilities for 

security. On 1 July, allied forces launched a countrywide Summer Campaign 

to intensify the pacification efforts, with the emphasis on eliminating the 

Viet Cong underground and guerrilla forces. The Fall Campaign began on 1 

October, and it concentrated allied forces against contested border areas. With 

these operations and the hundreds of small-unit actions, Saigon’s control over 

the countryside expanded.52

In I Corps, which faced the heaviest enemy threat, XXIV Corps took over 

command from the Marine Corps, and the South Vietnamese assumed greater 

responsibility. At the beginning of the year, U.S. ground forces consisted of 

some 50,000 Army troops and 55,000 marines, down from 79,000 marines a 

year earlier before the departure of the 3d Marine Division. In Quang Tri 

Province, the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, continued to guard the invasion routes 

across the Demilitarized Zone, and the 101st Airborne Division protected 

Hue. The III Marine Amphibious Force with its 1st Marine Division guarded 

Da Nang. During the summer, the marines made one last sweep through the 

Que Son Valley, keeping the area quiet until the division departed. In southern 

I Corps, the Americal Division continued security operations in Quang Tin 

51 Quoted words from Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 232–33; Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 179–81; 

MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, p. I-3; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, p. 342. For 

more on the results of the Cambodian operation, see MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. C-103 

to C-108. 52 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, pp. I-1, I-4, V-6; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, 

p. 343.
513

Year of Cambodia, 1970

and Quang Ngai Provinces. South Vietnamese forces assumed responsibility 

in western Quang Tri Province from the U.S. Marines and took control of 

several firebases south of the Demilitarized Zone. Meanwhile, U.S. and South 

Vietnamese forces carried out combined and separate operations to keep pressure on the enemy and deny him access to the population.53

In II Corps, the allies continued to pursue the main forces, attack the Viet 

Cong underground, and protect the population. Enemy activity was generally 

light. After the 4th Division redeployed in October and November, the South 

Vietnamese 22d Division assumed responsibility in the highlands. By then, 

the South Vietnamese controlled most of the corps area except parts of the 

coast. The 173d Airborne Brigade in northern Binh Dinh Province and the 

two Korean divisions to the south carried out pacification operations.54

An example of engineers supporting pacification was the completion of 

a bridge and causeway in the village of Tam Quan in northern Binh Dinh 

Province. The bridge and causeway stretched nearly 800 feet and provided fishermen from an off-shore island with a more rapid link to mainland markets, 

allowing them to make a quick sale of their daily catch. The project fell to the 

men of the 2d Platoon, Company B, 39th Engineer Battalion. Only two of 

the squad leaders and platoon sergeant were experienced in building timber 

bridges, and this one would be entirely over water. According to Sp4c. Richard 

Del Gaudio, “Before we moved down there, they told us we’d be working on 

an island paradise—ideal conditions, beautiful setting and plenty of beach.” 

They did find a quiet village on the mainland separated by a tidal river from 

the off-shore island. The men wanted to live there, but they had to settle for 

nearby Landing Zone English North and commute to the bridge sit

Each day’s early morning hours were spent sweeping for mines in the 

quarry area north of Tam Quan and the one-and-a-half-mile road from 

Highway 1 through the village to the job site. “We found eleven mines altogether,” 1st Lt. John W. Erdman noted, “Nine using the detectors and two 

the hard way.” One mine was pointed out by a child as the engineers were 

sweeping through the village. Dump trucks from Companies A and D at Chu 

Lai were sent south on loan to haul the large quantity of rock from the Tam 

Quan quarry to complete the first section of the causeway. A crane from the 

137th Light Equipment Company was then dispatched to drive bridge piling. 

While Sp4c. James Bradford operated the crane, the 39th Battalion’s surveyor, 

Sp4c. Ronald Rauch ensured that the bridge remained in line. “This proved 

to be quite a hassle, considering the rocky bottom conditions the piling had 

to be driven through,” recalled Rauch. Work progressed on the timber bridge, 

and the engineers figured they would be finished within a week. One morning 

during the minesweep, however, the men sensed something was wrong. No 

53 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, pp. I-5, V-7; Graham A. Cosmas and Lt. Col. Terrence 

P. Murray, USMC, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970–1971

(Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 

pp. 2, 17, 84. 54 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, pp. I-5, V-8. For more on some of the allied operations in II 

Corps, see ORLL, 1 May–31 Jul 70, I FFV, 15 Aug 70, pp. 10–15. 55 Spec. Willis Meeuwsen, “Bridge for the People,” Kysu’ 2 (Summer 1970): 6–7.
Engineers at War

514

mines were found, and as the mine team rounded the last curve they found 

the bridge was in flames. The bridge was too far gone to be saved. Lieutenant 

Erdman questioned the villagers through an interpreter and learned that after a 

brief firefight with the Popular Forces night security, the Viet Cong had set fire 

to the abutment and substructure of several pile bents. The fire spread quickly 

upward along the freshly creosoted piles to the superstructure. By noon all the 

spans had dropped into the water. Six weeks of work seemed lost.56

Col. William R. Wray, commanding officer of the 45th Engineer Group, 

and Lt. Col. Hugh G. Robinson, the commander of the 39th Battalion, flew to 

the job site. After viewing the damage, Colonel Wray suggested the bridge be 

rebuilt using the unburnt portions of the piles for support. That evening pencil 

sketches were made and discussed, and by morning the idea had taken shape. 

Brig. Gen. John W. Morris at 18th Engineer Brigade sent a message emphasizing the importance of the project. “Everyone was down in the dumps,” 

Erdman observed, “but it didn’t take much push after it was decided what had 

to be done.” With infantry from the 173d Airborne Brigade setting up a guard 

position and additional Popular Forces security now on the scene, the engineers responded by working late hours and sometimes through the night. “We 

had to work at night to cut off the burnt piles, because only then was the tide 

low enough,” said Specialist Del Gaudio. After cutting off the piles, a 10-by12-inch cap was bolted and scabbed onto them. This provided a substructure 

for the modified timber trestle bridge. The troops also developed a way to 

prefabricate the twenty-foot bents at Landing Zone English North and h

them to the bridge site. By using the sawed-off piles and prefabricated bents, 

the platoon rebuilt the bridge in only twenty-two days. To complete the second 

section of causeway, the 511th Engineer Company (Panel Bridge) contributed 

thirteen dump trucks and a platoon of men to help the 39th’s engineers. Four 

days later, the entire project was completed without further incident.57

In III and IV Corps, the allies consolidated their gains while enemy activity 

remained light to moderate. Later in the year, following the departure of 25th 

Division headquarters and two of its brigades, the 9th Division’s 3d Brigade, 

and the 199th Infantry Brigade, the South Vietnamese Army assumed more 

responsibility for the border and over 50 percent of the territory of III Corps. 

Allied plans included South Vietnamese forays into Cambodia and battalion 

and smaller size operations to strengthen government control over the countryside. The 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th Division’s 2d Brigade, and the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, the only U.S. ground combat units in III Corps, 

interdicted enemy supply routes, located and destroyed caches, and supported 

pacification. Australian and Thai forces continued to support pacification east 

and southeast of Saigon. The South Vietnamese had already assumed responsibility for ground operations in IV Corps when the 9th Division departed. A 

strong U.S. advisory effort, naval forces, helicopter units, and some combat 

support elements, including the 34th Engineer Group, remained in the delta.58

56 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 57 Ibid., p. 8.

58 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, pp. I-5, V-8 to V-10; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 70, II FFV, 14 Nov 
515

Year of Cambodia, 1970

Although Cambodia represented the year’s operational highlight, 1970 still 

saw the engineers active in other areas. They began or completed construction 

projects, continued operational and combat support missions that included 

land clearing, improved MACV advisory facilities, and made progress in the 

highway program. Some units prepared to stand down and others moved to 

new locations to replace departing units. In I and II Corps, the 18th Engineer 

Brigade commanded by General Morris and then by his successor, General 

Schrader, who assumed command in May, still controlled three groups consisting of eleven battalions, altogether almost 13,000 men. In I Corps, the three 

battalions of the 45th Group (14th, 27th, and 39th Combat) carried out operational support tasks for XXIV Corps and highway projects. Work included 

building bunkers, aircraft revetments, security towers, access roads to bases, 

and repairing the Mai Loc Special Forces airstrip in Quang Tri Province. 

Seabee units, which went from five battalions early in the year to two battalions by year’s end, worked on construction projects, including aircraft shelters. Three Marine Corps engineer battalions carried out similar tasks for the 

1st Marine and Americal Divisions. Another Marine engineer task included 

dismantling prefabricated buildings in the Force Logistics Command’s depot 

outside Da Nang for shipment to Okinawa. By the end of the year, only the 

1st Marine Engineer Battalion and one reinforced company of the 7th Marine 

Engineer Battalion remained.59

In northern II Corps, the 937th Group’s four battalions (20th and 299th 

Combat and 84th and 815th Construction) and in southern II Corps the 

35th Group’s four battalions (19th Combat and 577th, 589th, and 864th 

Construction) completed bunkers, aircraft revetments, and repairs to several 

airfields. Much effort went to the highway program along with some construction. The 864th Battalion was so spread out that it formed two large task 

forces, Task Force 21 outside Ban Me Thuot and, about 125 miles to the south, 

Task Force Whiskey not far from Phan Thiet. The battalion headquarters 

remained at Nha Trang, over 60 miles by air from Ban Me Thuot and almost 

125 miles from Phan Thiet. To prepare for the turnover of Camp Enari near 

Pleiku, the 937th disassembled two aircraft hangars and ten Pascoe buildings 

and reassembled them at Camp Radcliff.60

70, pp. 23–29, Historians files, CMH. 59 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 70, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Apr 70, pp. 2–4, 1 May–31 Jul 70, 18th Engr 

Bde, 31 Jul 70, pp. 3–4, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 70, 18th Engr Bde, 31 Oct 70, pp. 3–4, all in Historians 

files, CMH; Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–1971, pp. 324–27; CombatOperational Support, I/II CTZ (Corps Tactical Zone) (18th Engr Bde), incl. 15b, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. See also Significant Construction Projects and Operational Support 

Activities of 45th Engr Gp, incl. 10H, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 17, 30 Jul 70, OCE Hist 

Ofc, and incl. 7G, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18. 60 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 70, 18th Engr Bde, pp. 2–4, 1 May-31 Jul 70, 18th Engr Bde, pp. 

3–4, 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 35th Engr Gp, p. 5, and 1 Nov 69–31 Jan 70, 864th Engr Bn, pp. 2–13; 

Combat-Operational Support, I/II CTZ (18th Engr Bde), incl. 15b, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 16. See also Significant Construction Projects and Operational Support Activities of 

35th and 937th Engr Gps, incls. 10G and 10I, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 17, and incls. 

7F and 7H, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18.
Engineers at War

516

In III and IV Corps, the 20th Brigade headed by Brig. Gens. O’Donnell and 

Kenneth B. Cooper, who took command in November, also controlled three 

groups made up of twelve battalions, some 12,000 men. In northern and western III Corps, the 79th Group’s four battalions (31st and 588th Combat, 554th 

Construction, and 62d Land Clearing), besides supporting the Cambodian 

operation, worked on highways, some construction, airfield improvements, and 

a variety of operational support missions. The 159th Group and its four construction battalions (34th, 46th, 92d, and 169th) focused efforts in the Saigon–

Long Binh area and the highway program. In IV Corps, the 34th Group’s four 

battalions (35th Combat and the 36th, 69th, and 93d Construction) supported 

the remaining U.S. units in the delta and sought to complete its share of the 

highway program.61

The 326th Engineer Battalion’s work at Firebase Ripcord typified th

experience of engineers working where the only access was by helicopter. In 

April, the 101st Airborne Division established Firebase Ripcord atop a hil

twenty-four miles west of Hue to help prevent the North Vietnamese Army 

from moving into populated coastal regions of Quang Tri and Thua Thien 

Provinces. On 11 April, a small engineer party equipped with hand tools, 

power saws, and demolitions landed and fanned out and cut fields of fire and 

established fighting positions while the infantry searched the surrounding 

area. The engineers next cleared a rough landing zone. With enough space 

opened, a CH–54 lifted in a Case 450 tractor followed by a CH–47 carrying 

the blade and a drum of diesel fuel. Within minutes the engineers manhandled 

the blade to the tractor, which then cleared the hilltop of debris and excavated 

the first gun pit for the artillery. Another helicopter dropped off a Case 580 

combined scoop loader and backhoe. Ammunition berms were pushed up 

and more gun pits were carved into the hilltop. Although poor weather held 

off the arrival of the artillery pieces for several days, construction continued 

into July. By then, the North Vietnamese began to subject the base to daily 

attacks by mortars, recoilless rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades. Artillery 

fire, air strikes, and ground sweeps failed to drive off the determined North 

Vietnamese, who appeared to be preparing for a full-scale attack. Rather than 

face another siege like Khe Sanh, the division decided to close the firebase. 

The evacuation, which included the engineer equipment, took place on 23 July 

under heavy enemy fire, and several Chinook helicopters were heavily damaged. In August and September, this story was repeated at Firebase O’Reilly

some five miles north of Ripcord. O’Reilly was abandoned in early Octob

Clearly the North Vietnamese were determined to protect their most important base areas and supply routes, especially in northern I Corps, and their 

61 ORLLs, 1 Feb–31 Apr 70, 20th Engr Bde, 26 May 70, pp. 3–4, 7-8, 1 May–31 Jul 70, 20th 

Engr Bde, 13 Aug 70, pp. 2–3, 6, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 70, 20th Engr Bde, 15 Nov 70, pp. 3–4, 6–8, 

all in Historians files, CMH; Fact Sheet, 20th Engr Bde, Operational Support and Combat 

Support Missions, 1970, incl. 16b, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 16. See also Significant 

Construction Projects and Operational Support Activities of 34th Engr Gp, 79th Engr Gp, and 

159th Engr Gp, incls. 11E to 11G, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 17, and incls. 8C to 8E, 

OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18.
517

Year of Cambodia, 1970

pressure on Firebases Ripcord and O’Reilly indicated they still had enoug

strength to exploit allied weakness.62

The steady departure of engineer units continued in 1970. Two engineer 

combat battalions, the 1st and 168th, left in April when the 1st Division returned 

to Fort Riley, Kansas. The 168th returned to Fort Lewis, Washington, where 

it was inactivated. On 15 August, a color guard detachment representing the 

35th Engineer Combat Battalion, which had served in I, II, and IV Corps, 

headed to Fort Lewis for inactivation. A color guard detachment representing 

the 4th Engineer Battalion left on 6 December for the 4th Division’s new home 

base at Fort Carson, Colorado. Two days later, the 65th Engineer Battalion 

less one company returned with the 25th Division headquarters and two brigades to their home base in Hawaii. Company B remained behind in III Corps 

with the 2d Brigade. On 15 December, color guards from the 19th and 588th 

Engineer Battalions returned to Fort Lewis for inactivation ceremonies. Also 

by the end of the year, the first of the six engineer group headquarters, the 

79th at Long Binh, had left the country. Engineer units of the other services 

also returned to home bases in the Pacific or United States. In February, the 

Air Force’s 819th and 820th Red Horse Squadrons departed for the United 

States. The U.S. Navy’s Mobile Construction Battalions 1, 5, 7, 10, 62, 74, and 

121 completed their tours and returned to their home bases. Most were not 

replaced. At the end of the year, only Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 

3 and 74, the latter returning to Vietnam for its fourth and final tour, and 

Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 302 remained in Vietnam.63

Facilities Upgrades and Transfers

Though base construction had declined, it remained a major factor 

in engineering planning and execution. Strict controls still applied to new 

construction, and only emergency requirements such as the aircraft shelter 

program were considered. This was emphasized by General Abrams, who 

in early 1970 advised his commanders to use existing facilities, and for more 

temporary needs “make do or do without.” In April and October 1970, the 

Army’s funding allocation for Vietnam projects increased by only $20.2 and 

$15 million, respectively, for urgently required work. This brought the Army’s 

total construction program to $992 million. During the year, the Navy and 

Air Force programs reached $446.6 million and $405.3 million, respectively. 

In dollar figures, the three services’ military construction programs at the 

end of 1970 totaled $1.774 billion. Work in place proceeded at a steady rate, 

from $15 million per month in the second half of 1969 to $13 million per 

month through April 1970. The MACV Construction Directorate reviewed 

the remaining projects and assigned work to be carried out by troops and 

62 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. G-1 to G-6; Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam, 1970–1971, pp. 84–85; Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, pp. 344–46. 63 Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 70, MACDC, 18 Apr 70, p. II-2, 1 Apr–30 Jun 70, 

MACDC, 24 Jul 70, p. II-3, 1 Jul–30 Sep 70, MACDC, 23 Oct 70, p. II-7, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 70, 

MACDC, 17 Jan 71, p. II-9 to II-10. All in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

518

RMK-BRJ. Some savings were made when RMK-BRJ freed some $30 million 

after reducing overhead, amortization, and other cost efficiencies, releasing 

the funds to fulfill unfinanced requirements. Facilities engineers also began 

to face sizable cuts in operations and maintenance funds after the transfer of 

bases. Washington only provided $108 million for Fiscal Year 1971 instead of 

the projected $139.2 million. As a result, Pacific Architects and Engineers and 

Philco-Ford faced a reduction in services and personnel.64

During 1970, the emphasis on Vietnamization continued, with most funds 

released by the Department of Defense slated for improving and modernizing Vietnamese facilities and for the highway program. The total funded and 

unfunded dollar of work remaining came to $379 million for the Improvement 

and Modernization Program, U.S. forces, and the highways and railways program. Also, during the first half of the year, MACV and the service components carefully reviewed unfunded requirements for possible deletions. As a 

result, $214.5 million in unfunded requirements dropped to $81.8 million by 

the end of the year. Maximum use was to be made of vacated facilities to fill 

South Vietnamese requirements. South Vietnamese Army project groupings 

included building and upgrading hospitals, training centers and schools, communications facilities, depots, and company-size camps for the regular forces 

and regional forces. By the end of 1970, many of these facilities were completed or under way.65

Notwithstanding the reductions in funding, engineer troops and contractors made progress in upgrading bases, roads, and rail lines. The emphasis on 

roadwork shifted to quality control instead of miles paved, with more than 

half of the program completed. Security concerns temporarily halted main 

rail line restoration, but work proceeded on the spurs. The Air Force completed its aircraft shelter program, and the Navy’s program neared completion. 

Other new work consisted primarily in improving forward airfields, upgrading 

staging areas at ports and marshaling yards, and improving MACV adviser 

facilities.66

Rigid health standards imposed by the Department of Agriculture and the 

U.S. Public Health Service caused an upgrading of the staging areas for returning equipment and material. The facilities included wash racks, parking areas, 

grease racks, maintenance shops, and lighting systems for twenty-four-hour 

operation to clean, prepare, and stage vehicles and equipment for shipment to 

the United States. By the end of the year, all the required facilities at Newport, 

64 MACV History, 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-45, IX-49; Ltr, MACDC-PP to CINCPAC, sub: 

CPAF [Cost Plus Award Fee] Contractor, RVN, 22 Oct 70, Historians files, CMH; Ltr, Abrams, 

MACDC-PO to CG, USARV, 5 Feb 70, sub: Utilization of Facilities and Construction 

Resources, Historians files, CMH; Report of Liaison Visit to the Office of the USARV Engineer, 

incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18. 65 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. IX-49, IX-51.

66 Ibid., pp. IX-52 to IX-53, IX-66, IX-73; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Jan–31 Mar 70, MACDC, 

pp. VI-3 to VI-4, and 1 Jan–31 Mar 71, MACDC, p. II-1; Report of Liaison Visit to Office of 

the USARV Engineer, incl. 6, p. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 18. 
519

Year of Cambodia, 1970

Long Binh, and Da Nang were completed. The last retrograde facility at Qui 

Nhon was completed on 1 February 1971.67

The upgrading of MACV advisory facilities, which began in 1968, neared 

completion. Of 244 sites selected for vertical construction and water supply 

projects, troops and contractors completed work at 191. Ongoing work continued at 27 sites, while 26 awaited the start of construction. During the first 

quarter of 1971, 9 more sites would be added, with 228 completed by 31 

March, 12 in progress, and only 13 programmed to start construction.68

For the South Vietnamese, the construction of dependent shelters remained 

an important program that increasingly drew American backing. This program dated from 1961 when 64,000 family units were planned for servicemen 

below the grade of sergeant. An eight-year long-range program developed 

jointly by MACV and the Joint General Staff estimated a total requirement 

of 200,000 shelters. Over the years, several problems hampered construction. 

These included a lack of contractor interest, difficulty in obtaining land, 

shortages of transportation, and in 1964 the diversion of material caused by 

floods. Between 1961 and 1963 the government completed only 18,700 units; 

about 6,500 in 1965; under 10,000 for active military and a separate Regional 

Forces program in 1966; 2,408 units in 1967; and 4,951 units in 1969. In 1966, 

the Defense Department tried a pilot program for self-help dependent housing in III Corps by providing supplies and materials to build over 9,000 units. 

However, due to tactical operations, combat units could not find the time to do 

the work. In late 1968, Saigon decided to set aside some money for self-help, 

but only about 2,400 shelters were finished. Starting in 1969, U.S. and South 

Vietnamese funds were also allocated for the Popular Forces. In November 

1969, MACV and the Joint General Staff established the Dependent Shelter 

Program Group to manage the jointly funded program. By April 1970, the 

joint group determined the need for 240,000 shelters, taking into account 

that 40,000 families could be sheltered in vacated U.S. bases. After almost ten 

years, the requirement for new housing still stood at 200,000 units to be built 

in eight years.69

The plans for 1970 identified about 16,000 shelters for construction. U.S. 

funds, provided from the services’ accounts, totaled $4.3 million, with the 

Vietnamese government spending the equivalent of $5 million. Several designs 

were examined, and the approved standards were functional and austere, in 

deference to the living standards of the Vietnamese. Under these standards, 

the cost for each unit would be held to $600. The United States contributed 

cement, lumber, and corrugated metal, and the Vietnamese government provided the rest of the materials and military engineers, contractors, and troop 

units to do the work. American funding was expected to grow to $6 million 

67 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, p. IX-54; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 71, MACDC, 

p. II-1. 68 Ibid. See also 1st Lt. Daniel L. Campbell, “Builders for the Advisors,” Kysu’ 2 (Summer 

1970): 20–22. 69 MACV History, 1970, vol. 3, pp. IX-54 to IX-57; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 70, 

MACDC, p. II-3. For more on the dependent shelter program, see Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, 

pp. 389–95.
Engineers at War

520

for each of the following seven years. Costs were expected to increase, with 

additional funds required for community facilities such as schools and dispensaries. However, deliveries of U.S. materials for 1969 and 1970 fell behind 

schedule, and it took until mid-1970 before materials began to arrive in large 

amounts. In May, President Thieu wrote President Nixon asking for more 

help to complete the program in four years. Nixon responded by promising 

financial support to build 20,000 shelters per year for five years. By the end of 

the year, workers completed 7,909 shelters with 5,739 under construction. In 

addition, 1,121 military families lived in excess U.S. military facilities. Because 

of Thieu’s interest in getting more dependent housing as soon as possible, his 

military planners considered committing the equivalent of four engineer construction groups in 1971. Problems continued to trouble the housing program. 

One difficulty included Saigon’s timely release of funds. Another involved 

theft by corrupt officials and officers of the U.S.-furnished materials.70

Base transfers gained momentum in 1970. By the end of the year, seventyseven transfers ranging from firebases to large base camps were completed 

with thirty-eight still in process. In I Corps, several Marine Corps facilities, 

including the Da Nang Force Logistics Command compound and 7th and 

9th Engineer Battalion camps, were declared excess. They were transferred 

in January and May. In II Corps, the 4th Division transferred Camp Enari/

Dragon Mountain (over 1,400 buildings totaling over 2 million square feet of 

floor space) to the South Vietnamese 22d Division in April. Camp Radcliff 

would be transferred after the departure of the 4th Division. Major transfers 

in III Corps included the 1st Division’s Lai Khe base camp (over 500 buildings totaling 445,000 square feet of floor space) to the South Vietnamese 5th 

Division. The United States also turned over the 25th Division’s base camp 

at Cu Chi (over 3,200 buildings amounting to over 2.3 million square feet of 

floor space) to the South Vietnamese 25th Division in December.71

Transfers also extended to ports. In November 1969, a joint U.S.-Vietnamese 

committee announced schedules for complete or partial turnovers at Can Tho, 

Saigon, Vung Tau, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. In January 1970, 

the South Vietnamese began to move cargo through the shallow-draft ports 

of Hue, Dong Ha, and Chu Lai. The ports of Can Tho and Saigon (excluding 

Newport) were transferred in March and June. Not everything would be left 

behind. Planning was under way to disassemble some prefabricated buildings, 

airfield matting, and DeLong piers. Transfer problems persisted, with the lack 

of trained Vietnamese facilities engineers among the major obstacles. To make 

up for these deficiencies, U.S. forces continued on-the-job training programs 

70 MACV History, 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-59 to IX-63; Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 70, 

MACDC, pp. II-3 to II-IV, 1 Jul–30 Sep 70, MACDC, pp. II-5 to II-6, and 1 Oct–31 Dec 70, 

MACDC, pp. II-2. 71 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, p. I-5, vol. 2, pp. IX-36 to IX-39; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–

31 Mar 70, MACDC, pp. V-4 to V-5; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, p. 182; For more transfer lists, 

see Quarterly Hist Rpts, 1 Apr–30 Jun 70, MACDC, p. V-3, 1 Jul–30 Sep 70, MACDC, p. III-3, 

and 1 Oct–31 Dec 70, MACDC, pp. V-3 to V-5; PA&E History, FY 1970, app. Summary of 

Transfer and Abandonments of Real Property; PA&E History, FY 1971, pp. 82, 84, Historians 

files, CMH.
521

Year of Cambodia, 1970

and using contract instructors. The Army’s facilities engineering contractor, 

Pacific Architects and Engineers, continued to play a major role in training 

Vietnamese personnel as well as administering base transfers.72

By the end of 1970, the future of South Vietnam looked hopeful thanks 

to pacification and Vietnamization. While U.S. forces had cut their manpower 

by almost one quarter, the South Vietnamese military, including the Regional 

and Popular Forces, hovered around one million. Improved security made 

some of the fruits of the construction effort more meaningful to the people 

of Vietnam. The highway program, for example, had completed 1,461 miles 

or 65 percent of the 2,226 miles of main roads slated for improvement. At the 

start of 1970, 1,613 miles of road had reached the Green security status. By 

the end of the year, the allies claimed 71.4 percent Green and 97 percent in the 

less secure Amber status along 2,745 miles of road, which included the Green 

miles. The security status for the railway system at the end of the year only 

reached 44 percent Green, but the lower-priority rail system managed to support essential and military operations. Security goals along the vital waterways 

especially in the Mekong Delta reached 80 percent Green. MACV considered 

the Cambodian operation an important military success. Perhaps the clearest 

indication of success was the lowering of the U.S. profile as South Vietnamese 

units assumed more of the burden of fighting and supporting its forces. As the 

1970 MACV History declared: “If progress in Vietnamization and pacification was the keynote in 1970, the theme of 1971 would be testing the viability 

of our progress.” This would be seen with the forthcoming South Vietnamese 

foray in Laos in February.73

72 MACV History, 1970, vol. 2, pp. IX-36 to IX-43; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Mar 70, 

MACDC, p. V-4; DF, USARPAC, GPCO-ME, to CofS Army, sub: Management Study of 

DeLong Barges Used as Piers, 29 Jun 70, Historians files, CMH. For more on PA&E’s facilities 

engineering and training efforts, see PA&E History, FY 1970, pp. 35–54, 69–80; PA&E History, 

FY 1971, pp. 37–86. Both in Historians files, CMH. 73 MACV History, 1970, vol. 1, p. I-6, vol. 2, pp. VII-1 to VII-3, IX-65 to IX-66, IX-69 to 

IX-72, IX-78 to IX-79. Green status roads were physically open and traffic could move during 

daylight hours with relative freedom. Amber status roads were physically open but security 

measures, such as armed escorts, were required. MACV noted that for measurement purposes, 

total roads in Amber status included miles in Green status. Red was the unsafe status, and the 

roads were closed by enemy control or by explosive damage. The same security codes applied 

to railroads.

16

Last Battles and Departure

The years 1971 to 1973 saw American and other allied forces complete 

their withdrawal from Vietnam and the signing of the Paris Agreement, 

which was supposed to bring the war to a close. These years were highlighted by 

a South Vietnamese cross-border thrust into Laos, an operation which showed 

that Vietnamization still needed work, and the large-scale North Vietnamese 

Easter offensive one year later, which showed that Vietnamization might be 

succeeding after all. For the military engineers, it was a time of wrapping up 

the construction program, making headway on highway improvements, transferring facilities and responsibilities to the South Vietnamese, and providing 

combat operational support to the dwindling allied combat force.

Laos: The Plan

Although an attack plan had long been on the books, the trigger for the 

allied raid into Laos was evidence of a North Vietnamese buildup across the 

border for what was shaping up to be a major dry-season offensive in northern I Corps in early 1971. On 23 December 1970, President Nixon approved 

the campaign in principle, subject to final review. After further coordination 

between Washington and Saigon, the president approved the operation in 

detail on 18 January 1971. President Thieu concurred and named the operation Lam Son 719 after the birthplace of Le Loi, a national hero of antiquity. 

The 719 denoted the year (1971) and the objective (Highway 9). The attacking 

ground forces would be solely South Vietnamese because the U.S. Congress 

after Cambodia had prohibited the expenditure of funds for any American 

ground troops campaigning outside South Vietnam.1

Lam Son 719 was to be a spoiling attack, not to seize terrain but to upset 

North Vietnamese plans and deter future offensives. American and South 

Vietnamese commanders planned to cut supply and infiltration routes, 

destroy logistical complexes, and inflict losses on enemy forces. The incursion would take place within a narrow corridor some fifteen miles on either 

side of Highway 9 and go no farther in Laos than Tchepone, a logistical 

center on the Ho Chi Minh Trail about twenty-five miles west of the border. 

Allied commanders envisioned a four-phase operation that would last at 

least ninety days, or until the onset of the Laotian rainy season in early May. 

1

 MACV History, 1971, vol. 2, pp. E-15, E-17; Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 637, 639, 641; 

Palmer, 25-Year War, p. 109. For more background on Lam Son 719, see Maj. Gen. Nguyen 

Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 1979), pp. 32–35.
Engineers at War

524

In the first phase, Operation Dewey Canyon II, starting on 30 January, 

U.S. XXIV Corps would seize the approaches inside South Vietnam up to 

the border. Advancing on D-Day, a task force under the control of the 1st 

Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), would occupy the Khe Sanh 

area and clear Highway 9 for the advancing South Vietnamese. Farther to 

the south, the 101st Airborne Division would conduct diversionary operations in the A Shau Valley. In Phase II, South Vietnamese I Corps forces, 

mainly the Airborne Division reinforced by the 1st Armored Brigade, artillery, and engineers, would attack along Highway 9 in a series of leapfrogging 

air assaults and armored advances. In the third phase, the Airborne and 1st 

Infantry Divisions, after occupying Tchepone, would expand search operations to destroy enemy bases and stockpiles while rangers manned blocking positions to the north. Phase IV would involve withdrawing the South 

Vietnamese from Laos, ending the operation on or about 6 April. During all 

phases of Lam Son 719, U.S. forces would provide artillery fire, helicopter 

airlift, and tactical and strategic air support.2

For the engineers, the operation began on 12 January, eighteen days before 

D-Day, when Col. Kenneth E. McIntyre, commanding officer of the 45th 

Engineer Group, was summoned to meet with the XXIV Corps G–2 in Da 

Nang. Formerly at Phu Bai, the XXIV Corps in March 1970 had moved to the 

former III Marine Amphibious Force’s headquarters at Camp Horn, Da Nang; 

the 45th Group headquarters had also moved from Phu Bai on 1 December 

1970 and was comfortably quartered at the former Seabee Camp Haskins at 

Red Beach just west of Da Nang. The XXIV Corps engineer, Col. John H. 

Mason, was out-of-country, and Lt. Gen. James W. Sutherland, the XXIV 

Corps commander, wanted to have a senior engineer involved in the planning. 

McIntyre was asked to take charge of engineer planning until Mason’s return 

two days later. Critical information was needed as soon as possible. Could 

Highway 9 be opened for wheeled vehicles to Khe Sanh by D plus 1 and to the 

Laotian border by D plus 7? Could the Khe Sanh airstrip be opened to handle 

C–130 aircraft? McIntyre responded that he would immediately get his staff 

on the job and reconnoiter the road and airfield. The G–2 told him, however, 

that planning was restricted to a small circle of men, and there could be no 

ground reconnaissance or unusual activity in the area. Fortunately, Brig. Gen. 

John G. Hill, the commander of the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, had a readymade solution since the brigade constantly operated west along Highway 9. 

When the G–2 agreed that some reconnaissance was necessary, Hill arranged 

for McIntyre to accompany an aerial reconnaissance carried out under the 

guise of a helicopter raid.3

2

 MACV History, 1971, vol. 2, p. E-25; Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 642–43; Hinh, Lam 

Son 719, pp. 35–40; Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, pp. 239–40; Palmer, 25-Year War, p. 111. 

See also Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–1971, pp. 195–96. 3

 Brig. Gen. Kenneth E. McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” Army Engineer 2 (NovemberDecember 1994): 30; Col. Kenneth E. McIntyre, “Secret Planning,” Kysu’ 3 (Fall 1971): 15; 

Interv, Capt David D. Christensen, 26th Mil Hist Det, with Col Kenneth E. McIntyre, CO, 45th 

Engr Gp, 8 Mar 71, VNIT 891, pp. 3–4, CMH; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 

71, p. 1, Historians files, CMH.
525

Last Battles and Departure

A few hours later, the 45th 

Group commander, seated aboard 

a 101st Airborne Division AH–1 

Cobra gunship and accompanied 

by another Cobra and two UH–1 

Hueys, took off from Camp Eagle 

and headed west for Khe Sanh and 

the Laotian border. In between 

rocket firings, the pilot and Colonel 

McIntyre searched for a trace of 

Highway 9, which for long stretches 

was difficult to find, especially west 

of Khe Sanh, where the road was 

almost completely overgrown along 

the remaining fourteen miles to the 

border. In this stretch alone, all ten 

bridges had been destroyed, and the 

road had been cut in several places 

by bomb and shell craters. All but 

three of the thirty-three bridges 

along Highway 9 between the 

abandoned Firebase Vandegrift

twelve miles east of Khe Sanh, and 

a staging area for the operation, and 

the Laotian border were down. Flying over the former 3,700-foot Khe Sanh 

airstrip, McIntyre saw that the AM2 aluminum matting was riddled with hundreds of rocket and shell holes, and a huge crater overlapped the strip near its 

eastern end.4

Hoping he sounded more confident than he felt, Colonel McIntyre reported 

to the G–2 that the job could be done. To do this, the engineers would have to 

repair, replace, or bypass thirty bridges, clear about twenty-two miles of road, 

and virtually rebuild several sections of roadway. The only way to meet the 

deadlines would be to transport tactical bridging or culverts by helicopter to 

each stream crossing to join up with engineer teams and equipment that had 

moved overland to their work sites. As far as Khe Sanh airfield was concerned, 

McIntyre asked that the 101st Airborne Division’s 326th Engineer Battalion 

land there on D-Day to begin repairing the runway and apron and to prepare 

two nearby sites for tactical bridging. The G–2 approved this request, and 

McIntyre continued his solitary planning. Although the only engineer involved 

thus far in Dewey Canyon II, McIntyre later stated, “I’m sure what made it 

a success from a engineering viewpoint is that we were brought in on it early 

enough so that engineer aspects could influence the total plan.” This allowed 

him to mesh tactical planning with engineer planning and gave him enough 

4

 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 29–31; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 

71, pp. 4–6; Interv, Christensen with Col Kenneth E. McIntyre, CofS, Engr Cmd, 20 Jul 71, 

VNIT 923, pp. 19–20, CMH.

Colonel McIntyre
Engineers at War

526

lead time to identify long-range equipment requirements. What he considered 

most important was getting heavy-lift helicopter support that might not have 

been available if he had joined the planning team at a later date.5

 (Map 30)

McIntyre still needed more data on Khe Sanh airfield and the bridge 

sites. Some limited aerial photo coverage, including a low-level movie film of 

Highway 9, proved helpful. He also arranged with General Hill for additional 

reconnaissance. On 13 January, ranger and engineer reconnaissance teams 

from the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, were inserted at Khe Sanh and the Bridge 

36 site a few miles east of the airfield. After spending about ninety minutes on 

the ground, the team at the airstrip verified what McIntyre had seen from the 

air. At the bridge site, the team found that both embankments needed work 

before the gap could be bridged. Although the teams gathered the required 

information, they did not know of the impending operation.6

When Colonel Mason returned, he and McIntyre began preparing the 

engineer plan. Normally the 45th Group would receive missions from the 18th 

Engineer Brigade and Engineer Command, but General Sutherland thought 

there would be undue strain on security if all levels of the engineer command 

were made aware of the operation. As a result, the 45th Group was placed 

under the operational control of XXIV Corps effective 18 January. Then, 

about ten days before the operation, McIntyre received permission to bring 

the commanders of the 14th, 27th, and 326th Engineer Battalions into the 

planning group. Eventually the engineer planning team grew to eight officers 

from the 45th Group and two from the XXIV Corps Engineer Section. Still, 

the security restrictions on Dewey Canyon II and Lam Son 719 presented 

problems. Colonel McIntyre recalled that even the XXIV Corps G–4 was not 

involved in the planning until a few days before D-Day. As for the engineers’ 

major supplier, the U.S. Army Support Command at Da Nang, only the commanding general, his deputy, and another officer participated in the planning. 

The few planners did not have the experience and information they needed to 

get all the details right. Although group and battalion operations officers were 

included in the planning, company commanders and platoon leaders were not 

briefed until D minus 2. The troops were informed on D minus 1, 29 January, 

and then confined to their bases.7

During the preparations, cover stories and deceptions were devised. When, 

a few days before the operation, bridging was moved to Quang Tri Combat 

Base, the troops were told that Highway 1 was in danger of being cut north 

of the Hai Van Pass. When the 27th Engineer Battalion at Camp Eagle began 

5

 Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 20 Jul 71, pp. 22–23 (quotation, p. 22); McIntyre, “The 

Magnificent Sight,” p. 31; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, pp. 7–8, 20–21. 6

 McIntyre, “Secret Planning,” p. 15; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, p. 5; 

Intervs, Christensen with Maj Richard A. Miles, Bde Engr, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div, Capt George B. 

Schoener, CO, Co A, 7th Engr Bn, and 1st Lt Allen D. Ackerman, Asst Bde Engr, 1st Bde, 5th 

Inf Div, 10 May 71, VNIT 887, pp. 4–7, CMH. 7

 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 32; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, pp. 

7, 15, 20; Interv, Christensen with Col John H. Mason, XXIV Corps Engr, 8 May 71, VNIT 892, 

pp. 3, 9–11, 17–18; Interv, Christensen with Lt Col Russell L. Jornes, CO, 27th Engr Bn, 21 Mar 

71, VNIT 897, pp. 3–4. All VNITs in CMH.
1

1

9

9

DONG HA

CAM LO

QUANG TRI

CA LU

KHE SANH

VANDEGRIFT

Song Ben Hai

Cua Viet Houay Namxe

Xe Pon

Da Krong R

Song Thach Han

SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

DEMARCA TION ZONE

Quang Tri

Lao Bao

Lang Vei

Tchepone

NORTH

VIETNAM

LAOS

SOUTH

VIETNAM

January–April 1971

AREA OF OPERATIONS

LAM SON 719

SKETCH NOT TO SCALE

Map 30
Engineers at War

528

stockpiling culvert and practicing putting down and taking up of aluminum 

matting, the story was that the unit was about to enter the A Shau Valley.8

As for the Khe Sanh airstrip, several surprises arose during the planning. 

Since AM2 repair kits were unavailable, the replacement of damaged panels 

would have to be improvised, and restoring the runway would take longer 

than originally predicted. Fearing a serious delay, McIntyre recommended a 

parallel assault strip, 3,200 by 60 feet, be constructed and used until the old 

runway could be repaired. He considered this one of his better decisions, for 

the repair of the existing runway would take more than four weeks. Even this 

approach gave some concern, for the parallel dirt airstrip was sited based on 

a topographic map of the area: it could have been right on top of a minefield 

or old underground bunkers. In addition, McIntyre learned that the soil was 

almost entirely clay, which mandated topping the assault strip with matting. 

At first he considered requisitioning the light-duty M8A1 matting because it 

was readily available, but he realized it might not hold up on the clay. Since 

the AM2 matting was not available in the quantities required, he used MX19 

aluminum matting.9

When the 45th Group received its mission statement, it divided the engineering tasks into six parts. In the first, Lt. Col. Robert H. Carpenter’s 14th 

Engineer Combat Battalion based at Quang Tri would open Highway 9 to Khe 

Sanh. In the second, the battalion would work with Company A, 7th Engineer 

Battalion, in building an alternate parallel road north of Highway 9. The third 

task entailed building logistical support facilities at the reopened Vandegri

base. Lt. Col. Russell L. Jornes’ 27th Engineer Battalion, which would move 

overland on D plus 1 to Khe Sanh, was given the fourth and fifth tasks: open 

Highway 9 west of the base and repair the old Marine airstrip. For the sixth 

task, Task Force 326, comprised of six platoons totaling about 230 men from 

the 326th Engineer Battalion under the command of its executive officer, Maj. 

Gene A. Schneepeck, and under the operational control of the 45th Group, 

would be airlifted to Khe Sanh and begin constructing the assault airstrip. The 

task force would also prepare nearby bridge sites for tactical bridging. When 

the 27th Engineer Battalion reached Khe Sanh, it would assume operational 

control of the airborne engineers and provide heavier construction equipment 

as they continued working on the assault airstrip.10

One unknown was the weather. Ground transportation for the corps-size 

operation of about 35,000 troops depended on a single long, narrow, winding 

8

 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 32; Interv, Christensen with Jornes, 21 Mar 71, pp. 

9–12, 22–23; Interv, Christensen with Mason, 8 May 71, p. 11; Interv, Christensen with Maj 

Gene A. Schneepeck, XO, 326th Engr Bn, 18 Mar 71, VNIT 893, pp. 15–19, CMH. 9

 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 31–32, 35; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 

Mar 71, pp. 5–6, 10–12; Interv, Christensen with Mason, 8 May 71, p. 4–6; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 

Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 18. 10 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 32; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, pp. 

8–9; Interv, Christensen with Mason, 8 May 71, pp. 9–10; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr 

Gp, p. 22; Interv, Christensen with Schneepeck, 18 Mar 71, p. 2; Interv, Christensen with Jornes, 

21 Mar 71, pp. 28–29; Interv, Christensen with Lt Col Robert H. Carpenter, CO, 14th Engr Bn, 

7 Mar 71, VNIT 886, pp. 9–10, CMH.
529

Last Battles and Departure

road that hardly existed. Air transportation would have to rely on uncertain 

airstrips at Khe Sanh. Heavy rains could wash out most of the culvert bypasses 

and effectively close Highway 9 and possibly the airstrips. These concerns were 

expressed when Colonels McIntyre and Mason met with General Sutherland, 

seven days before the operation. Acknowledging these concerns, Sutherland 

replied, “I am confident that you engineers will do whatever is necessary to 

make this operation a success.”11

By D minus 1 the engineers were ready. Two panel bridge sets had been 

moved from Chu Lai to the Quang Tri Combat Base. All M4T6 bridging in 

depot contingency stocks at Da Nang to be used as dry spans also arrived 

at Quang Tri. Four armored vehicle launched bridges and three launchers 

from the 1st Brigade, 5th Division’s Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, 

and the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, were made available to cross gaps along 

Highway 9. In the last few days before the operation began, the 14th and 27th 

Battalions assembled 4,700 feet of 36-inch corrugated metal culvert and rigged 

them in bundles of four 20-foot sections for helicopter lift. The engineers also 

assembled ten 38-foot M4T6 dry gap spans for CH–54 Flying Cranes. One 

day before the start of Dewey Canyon II, the 45th Group Headquarters

(Forward), some thirty men, moved to the Quang Tri Combat Base. Over half 

of the forward consisted of aviators, crew chiefs, and maintenance troops. 

Altogether, the group would assemble nearly 1,100 troops for the operation, 

including the men from Task Force 326.12

The Operation

Dewey Canyon II began under the guise of an artillery raid. At 0400 

on 29 January, D minus 1, an armored task force accompanied by Company 

D, 14th Engineer Battalion, left Quang Tri City northward along Highway 1 

and turned west on Highway 9, reaching Firebase Vandegrift in midmorning. Other elements of the 14th Battalion moved to Ca Lu. After arriving a

Vandegrift, Company D began upgrading the approaches to the firebase

At day’s end, the company went through the motions of bedding down for 

the night. Shortly after midnight, two columns advanced west toward Khe 

Sanh, setting in motion Dewey Canyon II. The main effort, Troop A, 3d 

Squadron, 5th Cavalry, with elements of the 14th Engineer Battalion and the 

59th Land Clearing Company working together as an armored cavalry-engineer team, moved from Vandegrift along Highway 9. The secondary effort

the remainder of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of Company A, 

7th Engineer Battalion, moved from Firebase Elliott north of Vandeg

to build the alternate road to Khe Sanh.13

11 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 33 (quotation).

12 Ibid., p. 32; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, p. 31; Interv, Christensen with 

Carpenter, 7 Mar 71, pp. 10–11. 13 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 33; Robert P. Miller, “The Road to Laos,” Army 40 

(January 1990): 27–29; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, XXIV Corps, 30 Jan–6 Apr 71, 14 May 71, p. 

4, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Christensen with Carpenter, 7 Mar 71, pp. 13–16.
Engineers at War

530

The main column on Highway 9 set out at one minute after midnight, 30 

January. At the lead were a Rome plow, dismounted cavalry troops and engineer minesweeping teams, a Sheridan tank equipped with an infrared light, 

and an armored cavalry assault vehicle. Engineer bridge and culvert work 

crews, Rome plows, bulldozers, tanks, and armored cavalry assault vehicles 

down the line followed. The pace during the first hour in the darkness and 

no moonlight was much too slow to suit 1st Lt. Robert P. Miller, one of the 

platoon leaders from Company D, 14th Engineer Battalion, near the front of 

the column. Miller later recalled it was like driving down a black tunnel, and 

he asked and received quick approval from the troop commander to turn on 

the lead Rome plow’s headlights. The minesweep also slowed the advance, and 

it was discontinued because the operators could not get even a partial swing 

of their mine detectors in the high elephant grass in the road. After advancing 

about four hundred yards, the Sheridan became mired at the first stream crossing. The Rome plows passed the tank and pushed on, scraping the road clear 

of vegetation and widening it to some degree. On this stretch the road lay in 

the narrow Song Thach Han River valley, with the river on the left and hills on 

the right. Not able to stray far from the original roadbed, the column forded 

streams as it advanced. The Rome plows with their angled blades did a good 

job clearing vegetation, but a straight line D7 bulldozer had to be brought up 

to cut the steep banks to bypass the downed bridges. Although none of the 

first nine intermittent streams were flowing, a bulldozer did bog down in a 

wide muddy stream bed, and winching it out cost the column more precious 

minutes. In the darkness, the column had advanced only two and a half miles, 

but the advance increased speed as daylight spread over the valley.14

As the day dawned, the sky began to fill with helicopters ferrying troops, 

howitzers, small bulldozers, culvert sections, and supplies of all kinds to Khe 

Sanh. Joining Major Schneepeck’s Task Force 326 were three infantry battalions that would secure the base and begin operations in the area. Sling-loaded 

CH–47 and CH–54 helicopters carrying M4T6 dry span bridges and culvert 

met teams of engineers at bypassed bridge sites. The preassembled frame of 

each bridge was carried by a Flying Crane followed by a Chinook with a load 

of deck balk slung underneath. Chinook after Chinook brought four twentyfoot sections of preassembled culverts dangling at the end of a fifty-foot sling. 

An impressive 116 helicopter sorties flew in support of 45th Group missions 

that first day, 84 by Chinook and Flying Cranes. During the first two days, 

Army and Marine Corps helicopters also moved 425 tons of engineer supplies 

and equipment to Khe Sanh in one of the most ambitious airlifts in support of 

engineer operations in the war.15

14 Starry, Mounted Combat, p. 187; McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 33; Miller, “The 

Road to Laos,” pp. 27–29; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 19; AAR, Opn Lam Son

719, XXIV Corps, p. 4; Interv, Christensen with Carpenter, 7 Mar 71, pp. 13–16. See also Steven 

J. Rogge, “A Combat Engineer Squad Leader in Vietnam,” Army Engineer 2 (August-September 

1994): 32; Keith W. Nolan, Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719, V

1971 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), pp. 64–99.

15 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 33; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, XXIV Corps, p. 4; 

AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, 30 Jan–9 Apr 71, n.d., p. 12–2, Historians files, CMH.
531

Last Battles and Departure

As the cavalry-engineer column pushed westward along Highway 9, Task 

Force 326 engineers began preparing bridge sites near Khe Sanh for tactical 

bridging. At 0830, shortly after infantry units had landed on nearby hills, 

a platoon of Task Force 326 landed between Bridges 33 and 34 and teams 

moved the short distance to work on the abutments at both sites. At Bridge 33, 

an abutment was prepared for an armored vehicle launched bridge when the 

cavalry-engineer column reached the bridge site later that day. The airmobile 

engineers also placed a helicopter-delivered M4T6 dry span at Bridge 34 and 

built a culvert bypass at Bridge 35, clearing mines and booby traps along the 

way. Frequently their mine detectors could not be used because of the heavy 

vegetation, especially the very sharp-edged ten- to twelve-foot elephant grass, 

and they had to probe for mines with bayonets. From Bridge 34 to 35, the 

teams visually swept the road followed by two small M450 bulldozers that 

sheared off the top two to three inches of soil and rolled off antitank mines to 

the side. Near the end of the day, the bulldozers reached Bridge 36 and work 

crews began working on the bridge abutments. The cavalry-engineer column 

reached Bridge 36 by nightfall, only two bridges short of Khe Sanh. Before 

D-Day was over, the 14th Engineer Battalion had placed three armored vehicle 

launched bridges and seven M4T6 dry spans and constructed thirteen culvert 

bypasses, thereby meeting the D-Day objectives. Colonel McIntyre attributed 

this remarkable progress to the massive helicopter support and “the stellar 

A dump truck and Rome plow begin clearing and widening Highway 9 during 

the opening phase of Lam Son 7
Engineers at War

532

performance of platoon leaders and squad leaders whose aggressive leadership, flexibility and good engineering judgement carried the day. The baton 

had been successfully passed from the planners to the doers.”16

Some mix-ups did occur. While watching the progress of the Chinooks 

and Flying Cranes from his own helicopter, Colonel McIntyre noticed 

some returning with their loads of bridges and culvert. He followed them 

back to their pickup points and discovered some of the helicopter crews 

had not been able to communicate with the engineers on the ground. All 

radio frequencies had been changed on D minus 1, but some of the crews 

had not been given the new ones. McIntyre spent the next several hours 

passing out slips of paper with the correct frequencies. He also developed 

a simple arrangement by having large numbers painted on bed sheets and 

informing the helicopter pilots to deliver materials to the matching bridge 

site on the ground.17

The next day, 31 January, the road was open to Khe Sanh. That morning a M4T6 dry span was in place at Bridge 36, and the first armored units 

reached Khe Sanh at 1230. By the end of the day, tracked and wheeled vehicles 

were flowing into the combat base. Roadwork west of the base to the Laotian 

border was continued by Colonel Jornes’ 27th Engineer Battalion. Two Rome 

plows from the 1st Platoon, 59th Land Clearing Company, now attached to 

the 27th Battalion, blazed the way for the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, all the 

way to the border by the end of D plus 2. About two hundred yards short of 

the border, the engineers put up a road sign warning American troops not 

to go any farther. Highway 9 was opened to traffic on D plus 5, two days 

ahead of schedule. Together, the 14th and 27th Battalions and Task Force 

326 crossed a total of 39 streams with 12 M4T6 dry spans, 8 armored vehicle 

launched bridges, 2 eighty-foot panel bridges, and 84 forty-foot sections of 

culverts. All the bridges would be removed at the end of the operation.18

Work continued along Highway 9 throughout the operation. Except for 

brief maintenance periods and when wet weather caused very slick conditions, the road remained open twenty-four hours a day. On 2 February, a tank 

retriever towing an M48A3 Patton tank damaged an eighty-foot double-single 

panel bridge at Bridge 10 several miles north of Vandegrift. Traffic continued to move over the bypass during the construction of a new bridge, whic

opened four days later. With one exception two-way wheeled traffic could traverse all the way from Dong Ha to the Laotian border. The switchback crossing at Bridge 36 was a major bottleneck early in the operation. Heavy traffic 

had caused the M4T6 dry span bridge to settle fast, and it was replaced by 

an armored vehicle launched bridge. A sharp turning radius and steep slopes 

16 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 33–34 (quotation); Miller, “The Road to Laos,” p. 

29; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 19; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, p. 

12–1; Interv, Christensen with Schneepeck, 18 Mar 71, pp. 9, 31–32, 38–49. 17 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 34; Interv, Christensen with Carpenter, 7 Mar 71, 

pp. 18–19. 18 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 34–35; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, 

p. 19 and incl. 5; Interv, Christensen with McIntyre, 8 Mar 71, pp. 22–23; Interv, Christensen 

with Jornes, 21 Mar 71, pp. 21–22. See also AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, p. 12–1.
533

Last Battles and Departure

on both sides of the bridge caused some trucks and trailers and low-beds to 

miss the turn. A bypass could not be built, and the engineers resorted to blasting some thirty-five feet of rock from the northern approach, making entry 

easier. On 8 March, 45th Group engineers installed a second armored vehicle 

launched bridge with higher abutments and a better approach. The following 

day, rains in the mountains to the north caused a sudden rise in the water. 

Rushing water caused some damage to the abutments of the original bridge. 

This approach was further improved, and Bridge 36 suffered no other problems. On the peak day some 2,100 vehicles used the road. Security west of Khe 

Sanh improved with fifty-yard-wide strips on both sides of the road cleared by 

Rome plows.19

Along the alternate route to Khe Sanh, Company A, 7th Engineer 

Battalion, began clearing a tracked vehicle road, called Red Devil Road, in 

honor of the unofficial nickname for the 5th Division. Building this second 

route had been considered for several years, and past reconnaissances had 

shown this was possible. Moving in a southwesterly direction, bulldozers 

began cutting a tank trail along a rising ridge line, which ran about four and 

one-half miles and required fewer stream crossings and side hill cuts as well 

as better drainage and a minimum of work. This took two and one-half days. 

Then instead of following the ridge to the top of the mountain, the bulldozers 

proceeded down the hill with a steep side hill cut, making several switchbacks, 

19 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 34–35; Miller, “The Road to Laos,” pp. 30, 33; 

ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 19–20; Interv, Christensen with Carpenter, 7 Mar 

71, pp. 28–29.

An armored vehicle launched bridge at Bridge 33
Engineers at War

534

and pushed across a valley about 300 to 400 yards wide. Here the trail had 

to be gouged out of dense vegetation and one stream crossed on the fourth 

day. The steep banks of the stream made fording impossible, and a thirty-foot 

section of forty-eight-inch culvert was brought up, rolled into the stream, and 

topped off with dirt. On the other side of the valley, the bulldozers moved 

up a steep ridge with grades 30 to 40 percent in a number of spots. The next 

stretch extended across a flat region known as the Punchbowl, crisscrossed by 

several small streams and more than one mile of dense jungle on the eastern 

end. Bangalore torpedoes were used to help cut through the heavy vegetation, 

and the streams were either forded or temporary box culverts made out of logs 

were built. On 8 February, the column met a 14th Engineer Battalion column 

pushing out from Khe Sanh. Little contact was made with the enemy, and 

opening Red Devil Road was accomplished in much less time than anticipated. 

Improvements continued throughout the operation. These involved installing more culverts and upgrading the pioneer road to a fair-weather wheeled 

vehicle road.20

During Lam Son 719, the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, exploited the use of 

armored cavalry-engineer teams to build an additional fifty miles of pioneer 

trails and fair-weather roads in the Khe Sanh area. Such team efforts usually 

consisted of a mechanized engineer platoon with three armored personnel carriers and one or two bulldozers from Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, and 

an armored cavalry platoon. This type of organization afforded a highly armed 

road-building team that quickly bulldozed pioneer roads through rugged terrain and steep grades. Later the grades were reduced and the road surfaces 

improved for wheeled vehicles. Steep hills surrounded the Khe Sanh Plain, 

and the new roads provided added mobility for the armored and mechanized 

units and ground access to firebases. These measures kept most of the enemy’s 

mortar fire out of the Khe Sanh area and rocket fire to a minimum. After 

some ten days into the operation, a cavalry-engineer team built another route, 

called Red Devil Drive, some nine miles along a ridgeline from Khe Sanh to a 

ranger group headquarters near the border. Built in four days as a tank trail, 

this road was soon improved to handle truck traffic and allowed the movement 

of 175-mm. guns and ammunition to a firebase supporting South Vietnamese 

forces inside Laos. A tank trail was also blazed north of Red Devil Road to 

block possible North Vietnamese threats from that direction. Other trails followed, linking areas with Highway 9 and Red Devil Road.21

The most difficult stretch of road was built south of Red Devil Road during 

the latter stages of Lam Son 719. About three miles long, this road served two 

purposes. It was to link up with Firebase Cates overlooking Highway 9 and

also to confuse North Vietnamese forces in that area as to what the next allied 

course of action would be. Rugged triple-canopy jungle barred the way, and 

20 Interv, Christensen with Miles, et al., 10 May 71, pp. 10–11, 22–25, 32, 45–49; ORLL, 1 

Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 22. 21 AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, XXIV Corps, pp. 92–93; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 1st Bde, 5th 

Inf Div (Mech), 11 Jun 71, pp. 12, 21–22, Historians files, CMH; Interv, Christensen with Miles, 

et al., 10 May 71, pp. 29–31, 34–36.
535

Last Battles and Departure

the steep grades were just about the maximum for bulldozers to traverse. This 

was the only place that the bulldozers of Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, 

received rocket-propelled grenade fire. One bulldozer was hit twice, badly 

damaging the engine, and it had to be dragged out by another bulldozer.22

Meanwhile, at Khe Sanh work proceeded on the two airstrips. On D-Day, 

Major Schneepeck’s Task Force 326 started around-the-clock work on the assault 

airstrip, and the 1st Platoon, Company A, 27th Engineer Battalion, began to 

remove damaged matting from the existing airstrip. Once the engineers were on 

the ground, it became obvious that they could not complete the assault airstrip 

by the end of D plus 3. Mines laid by the marines and the lack of minefield 

records restricted movements in and around the base. The clayey soil coupled 

with a steady drizzle and heavy ground fog made it difficult for the soil to dry 

enough to get proper compaction. Even with the 27th Engineer Battalion’s D7E 

bulldozers and scrapers, the task force did not complete the dirt strip until D plus 

5. The first C–130 landed at 1600 the next day, 4 February, opening Khe Sanh 

to cargo aircraft for the first time in three years. However, the plane got mired in 

seven-inch ruts. Although a safe takeoff was narrowly managed, the Air Force 

determined that the packed earth airstrip was unsatisfactory for prolonged 

22 Interv, Christensen with Miles, et al., 10 May 71, pp. 35–36.

A bucket loader and bulldozer at work on Red Devil Road
Engineers at War

536

use during poor weather. Meanwhile, another C–130’s wheels bumped into a 

concrete slab about an inch under the runway’s surface, and the aircraft had 

difficulty maneuvering around this obstacle. The engineers quickly excavated 

the entire slab. On 7 February, a twenty-sortie C–130 effort hauled 250 tons 

of MX19 matting from Bien Hoa to Quang Tri. In turn, heavy-lift helicopters 

began delivering the matting to Khe Sanh. Despite intermittent rain, the engineers again compacted the assault strip using heavy rollers, and on 12 February 

they began laying the first of nearly 17,000 panels of the aluminum matting. 

The matted assault strip opened on the fifteenth, receiving its first C–130 that 

afternoon. On that day transports began regular flights into Khe Sanh. In addition, the battalion cleared, graded, compacted, and laid M8A1 matting for a 

new 350-by-850-foot parking apron near the west end of the assault strip. Other 

airfield work included repairs to an old parking apron between the two runways, 

turnarounds, and overruns. On 20 February, Major Schneepeck and his Task 

Force 326 were released from operational control of the 27th Engineer Battalion 

and returned to its home at Camp Eagle.23

23 “Lam Son 719,” Engineer 1 (Summer 1971): 27; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, 

pp. 12-2 to 12-4; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 20, 22, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th 

Engr Bn, 30 Apr 71, pp. 1, 4, 10, Historians files, CMH; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, pp. 513–14; 

Nalty, Air War Over South Vietnam, pp. 257–58; Interv, Christensen with Schneepeck, 18 Mar 

71, pp. 54–78; Interv, Christensen with Jornes, 21 Mar 71, pp. 18–21, 23–24, 26–28. See also 

Nolan, Into Laos, pp. 100–15.

At Khe Sanh Airfield, a CH–54 Flying Crane drops off sectionalized 

engineer equipment.
537

Last Battles and Departure

Repair of the old AM2 runway proved even more difficult. Removing and 

replacing the damaged panels was a very slow process, because the subgrade 

had failed in many places, and there were scores of dud rounds buried under 

the matting. The engineers used several thousand pounds of explosives to 

clear old minefields and the dud rounds. Furthermore, the expedient anchorage system of U-shaped pickets driven into the ground and bent over the matting was giving way, and the touchdown area at the eastern edge of the runway 

had failed. In one instance, the gust created by a helicopter’s blades lifted up 

a section of matting and flipped it over. Since the standard anchorage system 

was not on hand, the expedient method was effectively modified. Two eightfoot U-shaped pickets were welded to a three-foot angle iron. The pickets were 

driven into the ground with the angle irons holding the edge of the mats in 

place. It took a month for the 27th Engineer Battalion to restore the runway 

for C–130 use. It opened on 1 March. Nearly two thousand AM2 panels were 

used in the repair work. If AM2 repair kits had been available, repairs would 

have proceeded more quickly. “In retrospect,” Colonel McIntyre later wrote, 

“it would have been faster to have pulled the AM2 matting off to one side and 

to have started over from scratch.”24

The Air Force’s decision to enlarge the refuel and rearm area and add 

other improvements compounded the engineers’ workload. Task Force 326 

had to move its bivouac site to make room, and when the airborne engineers 

started clearing the new refuel and rearm area they uncovered huge amounts 

of buried debris, including fifty-five-gallon drums, timbers, old matting, and 

parts of bunkers. Bulldozer operators had to be especially careful in scraping 

away the dirt since the bulldozer blades could easily rip open barrels containing aviation fuel or diesel. More reinforced-concrete slabs were also found 

and had to be removed. Improvements made by the 27th Engineer Battalion’s 

attached 591st Light Equipment Company included a 538,200-square-foot 

helicopter staging area, improved roads within the base, and berms for the 

helicopter rearm pad. The company used over 90,000 gallons of peneprime to 

stabilize the helicopter area and interior roads. Another task assigned to the 

light equipment company required digging up and removing the remains of 

over one hundred bunkers built by the Marine Corps.25

Despite the many problems at Khe Sanh, the airfield readily handled 

the forty C–130 flights planned for each day. This figure was reached on 19 

February for the first time with the arrival of 350 tons of supplies, including 57,000 gallons of aviation fuel. Supply buildup was rapid, and a two-day 

stockage was attained in critical 105- and 155-mm. ammunition. On the peak 

day, 28 February, sixty-two C–130s flew into Khe Sanh. From 15 February 

until the end of the operation, one or both of the runways were available for 

service. On 9 March, however, a C–130 lost its right rear wheel while landing, 

24 Quote from McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” pp. 34–35; “Lam Son 719,” p. 27; Nalty, 

Air War Over South Vietnam, p. 258; ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 20–21, 1 

Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th Engr Bn, p. 9, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th Engr Bn, 30 Apr 71, pp. 1, 4, 9, 

Historians files, CMH; Interv, Christensen with Schneepeck, 18 Mar 71, pp. 56–57. 25 Interv, Christensen with Schneepeck, 18 Mar 71, pp. 78–79; Interv, Christensen with 

Jornes, 21 Mar 71, p. 17; ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th Engr Bn, p. 8.
Engineers at War

538

and the bare axle ripped the matting for some two thousand feet. Lacking 

enough replacement matting, repair crews quickly patched the damaged area 

with epoxy cement mixed with river run sand hauled in from the Ca Lu area. 

This method proved much better than soil-cement because of its quicker curing 

time. In fact, weather became more of a limiting factor than the condition of 

the runways.26

Besides the road and airfield work, Army engineers carried out routine 

operational support tasks during the cross-border operation. Company A, 

7th Engineer Battalion, made minesweeps along Highway 9 between Dong 

Ha and Cam Lo and minesweeps and assault bridging for the mechanized 

brigade’s artillery raids around Vandegrift. The company also provided 

1,500-gallon-per-hour water point and built fortifications at Khe Sanh. The 

326th Engineer Battalion built bunkers, fortifications, and tactical operations centers for the 101st Airborne Division and helped close down the Khe 

Sanh base. Units of the 45th Group built operational and logistical facilities at Vandegrift, Khe Sanh, and along the juncture of Highway 9 an

the Laotian border. During the operation, group units continued to provide 

engineering support to other U.S. units throughout I Corps. For example, the 

27th Engineer Battalion’s other three line companies and the attached 591st 

Light Equipment Company built dog kennels at Phu Bai for the battalion’s 

26 McIntyre, “The Magnificent Sight,” p. 35; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 514; ORLLs, 1 Feb–

30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 20, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th Engr Bn, p. 10; Interv, Christensen 

with Jornes, 21 Mar 71, pp. 34–36.

Aerial view of reopened Khe Sanh Airfield
539

Last Battles and Departure

mine detection dogs, constructed new fighting positions and bunkers at Camp 

Eagle, and reopened and maintained thirty miles of Route 547 into the A Shau 

Valley.27

Once the engineers reopened Highway 9 on the Vietnamese side of the 

border, South Vietnamese armored and airborne forces crossed into Laos at 

1000 on 8 February and advanced west five and a half miles toward Tchepone. 

Although intelligence reports had indicated that the terrain along the Laotian 

part of Highway 9 was favorable for armored vehicles, a road net did not 

exist. Highway 9 was a neglected forty-year-old single-lane dirt track, with 

high shoulders on both sides and no maneuver room. Huge bomb craters, 

undetected earlier because of the dense grass and bamboo, restricted the 

armored vehicles to the road. Helping to lead the way, the South Vietnamese 

101st Engineer Battalion used bulldozers to fill in craters and ditches. Some 

parts of the road had been destroyed beyond quick repair, and the engineers 

built bypasses. As the armored units moved along Highway 9, elements of the 

South Vietnamese Airborne Division, 1st Infantry Division, and rangers made 

assaults into landing zones north and south of the road. U.S. Marine Corps 

helicopters lifted small D4 bulldozers to open the firebases. Meanwhile, U.S. 

Army helicopters and artillery had moved to Khe Sanh to provide fire support, 

and air cavalry reconnaissance teams searched for North Vietnamese forces.28

Enemy reaction to the border crossing was swift and violent. Soon South 

Vietnamese units were bogged down by heavy North Vietnamese resistance 

and bad weather. Elements of some five North Vietnamese divisions plus 

tanks and large numbers of field and antiaircraft artillery faced the South 

Vietnamese, and the drive toward Tchepone stalled. After several days’ delay, 

the South Vietnamese air-assaulted into heavily damaged Tchepone, but by then 

the North Vietnamese counterattacked with Soviet-built T54 and T55 tanks, 

heavy artillery, and infantry. They struck the rear of the South Vietnamese 

forces strung out on Highway 9, blocking their main avenue of withdrawal, 

and overwhelmed several South Vietnamese firebases, depriving the troops on 

the road of critically needed flank protection. The result was a near disaster. 

U.S. Army helicopters trying to rescue South Vietnamese soldiers from their 

besieged hilltop firebases encountered intense antiaircraft fire. Panic soon 

ensued, and desperate troops even clung to helicopter skids to reach safety. In 

one instance, U.S. CH–54 helicopters airlifted two small bulldozers to help set 

up a crossing point for armored vehicles on the steep-banked Xepon River in 

order to reach Highway 9. The last elements of the 1st Division left Laos on 21 

March, and the remaining forces withdrew into South Vietnam over the next 

few days. Operation Lam Son 719 officially ended on 6 April.

27 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div, p. 12, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 

18, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 27th Engr Bn, pp. 4–8; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, pp. 

12-4 to 12-5. 28 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 190–92; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 240–41; Hinh, Lam Son 719, 

p. 65–68; Davidson, Vietnam at War, p. 656; Interv, Christensen with Mason, 8 May 71, p. 27. 

See also Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–1971, pp. 196–99. 29 Starry, Mounted Combat, pp. 192–96; Tolson, Airmobility, pp. 241–44; Hinh, Lam Son 719, 

pp. 117–18. 
Engineers at War

540

Although the South Vietnamese reached Tchepone, it was of little consequence. Their stay there was brief, and the supply caches discovered were 

disappointingly small. Operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail were hardly 

disrupted. Actually, the North’s infiltration reportedly increased during the 

operation as Hanoi shifted traffic to roads and trails farther to the west in 

Laos. In addition to heavy personnel losses, the South Vietnamese lost large 

amounts of equipment, and all of the combat engineer equipment, including thirty-one bulldozers, in their disorderly withdrawal. Over 100 U.S. Army 

helicopters were also destroyed and more than 600 damaged, the highest 

number in any one operation of the war. Lam Son 719 vividly illustrated that 

Vietnamization still had a long way to go and that the South Vietnamese were 

still heavily dependent on U.S. advisers. There were some successes. During 

the incursion, South Vietnamese forces inflicted heavy casualties on the North 

Vietnamese, forestalling a spring offensive in the northern provinces. Lam Son

719 also helped delay major operations by Hanoi for the remainder of 1971 

and early 1972. The operation, however, failed to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail 

for any appreciable time. The trail was in full operation within a week.30

By 25 March, U.S. forces had begun making preparations to pull back 

from their forward bases. Concern now centered on whether North Vietnamese 

forces would push across the border toward Khe Sanh. Already, sappers had 

penetrated the Vandegrift logistical base and succeeded in blowing up 10,00

gallons of aviation fuel. The enemy had also harassed Khe Sanh with mortar, 

artillery, and sapper attacks. As a result, General Sutherland ordered the 

removal of the airfield matting at Khe Sanh several days before the planned 

1 April date. Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion, began to clean up and 

recover salvaged construction materials. Two additional engineer platoons 

were airlifted to the base and, by 1 April, the day the airfield officially closed, 

524 bundles of MX19, 179 bundles of AM2, and 34 bundles of M8A1 matting were ready to be put aboard departing C–130s. All the MX19 and AM2 

matting emplaced at the Khe Sanh airfield was removed with the exception 

of the panels used to repair the old AM2 runway. On 5 April, a platoon from 

Company C, 326th Engineer Battalion, augmented with four M450 bulldozers 

arrived by air and began tearing down the base. Equipment that was not salvageable was buried, and bunkers and munitions left behind were destroyed. 

The engineers departed the next day, the same day the last South Vietnamese 

and U.S. forces boarded helicopters at the base.31

During the campaign, the 45th Group suffered personnel and equipment 

losses. Six engineers were killed and eleven wounded in action, seven seriously enough to be medically evacuated. Five of the deaths and three seri30 MACV History, 1971, vol. 2, pp. E-33 to E-34, E-45; Starry, Mounted Combat, p. 197; 

Tolson, Airmobility, p. 252; Hinh, Lam Son 719, pp. 127, 131, 139; Davidson, Vietnam at War, 

pp. 650–51. 31 William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973, United 

States Army in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996), p. 

483; Hinh, Lam Son 719, pp. 109, 117, 119, 125; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, p. 518; ORLL, 1 Feb–

30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 21–22; AAR, Opn Lam Son 719, 101st Abn Div, 30 Jan–9 Apr 

71, p. 12–5.
541

Last Battles and Departure

ously wounded were members of the 59th Land Clearing Company during 

an artillery attack late in the operation near the Laotian border. Several days 

later, a road grader operator from the 14th Engineer Battalion was killed in an 

attack along Highway 9. Two other engineers were wounded. The next day, a 

14th Engineer Battalion convoy heading toward Khe Sanh was ambushed: one 

engineer was wounded and two 10-ton tractors were damaged. Major equipment losses during the operation included six bulldozers.32

Attacks along Highway 9 were mostly harassing small arms, mortar, and 

rocket-propelled grenade fire on work parties and convoys. Minesweep teams 

easily detected the poorly buried mines. While rocket, mortar, and artillery fire 

did some damage to the Khe Sanh airfield, repairs were usually made within 

a few hours. During the sapper attack, some 230 rounds were directed at the 

base, but the air facility suffered no damage. No injuries were inflicted upon 

45th Group personnel and no equipment was damaged. Of the forty sappers 

who tried to enter the base, eighteen were killed or captured.33

Redeployments and Reorganizations

Lam Son was the last major engineer operation of the war, for the redeployments in 1971 and 1972 saw the departure of nearly all engineer troops 

and major organizational changes. In the engineer advisory effort, corps-level 

field force headquarters were consolidated with corps advisory elements. The 

forming of the Third Regional Assistance Command in III Corps and the 

Second Regional Assistance Command, later Second Regional Assistance 

Group, in II Corps joined together the former field force engineer sections 

and corps engineer advisory teams. In III Corps, for example, the II Field 

Force Engineer Section at Plantation became the Third Regional Assistance 

Command Engineer Section. Engineer advisers at III Corps headquarters at 

Bien Hoa and the 30th Engineer Combat Group at Hoc Mon now reported to 

the command engineer. Engineer advisers with South Vietnamese construction 

units, such as those with the 5th Engineer Construction Group at Hoc Mon, 

continued to report to the MACV Engineer Advisory Division in Saigon.34

After much study, Engineer Command, Vietnam, decided its share of the 

Increment VI drawdown in early 1971 would be the 18th and 20th Brigade 

headquarters, the 937th Group headquarters, and the 46th and 589th 

Construction Battalions. Maj. Gen. Charles C. Noble, the commanding general from June 1970 to August 1971, noted that the ability to get around by 

aircraft and modern communications allowed him to forego the intermediate 

brigade headquarters. “Intermediate headquarters,” he wrote in his debriefing 

report, “if not essential for command or control, only serve to slow down 

the action, to dilute the force of policies and directives, and to fritter away 

32 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, p. 21; Hinh, Lam Son 719, p. 130. 33 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 45th Engr Gp, pp. 21–22.

34 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. II-20 to II-21.
Engineers at War

542

precious high quality manpower resources.” As far as he was concerned, the 

restructuring of Engineer Command “has tightened up the ‘outfit.’ ”35

Col. William J. Schuder’s 937th Engineer Group at Phu Tai outside Qui 

Nhon underwent several unit changes before it departed in early April 1971. 

When the 19th Engineer Combat Battalion left the Ban Me Thuot area in 

December 1970, its area of responsibility was divided. The 20th Engineer 

Combat Battalion took over responsibility for the Ban Me Thuot area in 

Darlac Province. Task Force Sierra (610th Construction Support Company

Company D, 84th Engineer Construction Battalion; and one platoon of the 

299th Engineer Combat Battalion) was formed to continue the upgrading of 

Highway 21. Meanwhile, the group’s 84th Battalion prepared to move to Da 

Nang and 45th Group control, but serious flooding in Binh Dinh Province 

delayed the move until January 1971 because of the need to reopen washedout roads. In March, the 937th’s headquarters reduced its strength to zero, 

and its remaining units and area of responsibility in northern II Corps were 

transferred to the 35th Engineer Group.36

The 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades left soon afterward. Among the major 

functions transferred from the brigades to Engineer Command were deputy 

engineer, aviation officer, chaplain’s office, and communications section. Special 

advisers, some not previously assigned at Engineer Command level, included 

officers assigned to other organizations. The chief of the Plans Division, 

Military Operations Directorate, took on the additional duties as inspector general; the surgeon in the 92d Engineer Battalion became the medical adviser; and 

the headquarters commandant’s duties were taken over by the executive officer. 

Although the size of the headquarters slightly increased, the departure of the two 

brigades resulted in almost three hundred spaces. On 18 April, General Schrader 

saw his 18th Brigade furl its flag at Dong Ba Thin. At the ceremony, the brigade 

was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation, Second Oak Leaf Cluster, a 

culmination of its service since arriving in Vietnam on 3 September 1965. Two 

days later, a similar ceremony was held at Bien Hoa where Lt. Gen. William B. 

McCaffrey, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army, Vietnam, saluted the 

men of the 20th Brigade. The brigade’s commanding officer, General Cooper, 

assumed new duties as the deputy commanding general of Engineer Command. 

Upon the departure of the two brigade headquarters, Engineer Command 

assumed direct control of the four remaining engineer groups.37

35 Debriefing, Maj Gen Charles C. Noble, 6 Aug 71, p. 1 (quotation), p. 2 (quoted words), 

Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; Reorganization of HQ, 

USAECV, Briefing, Commanding Officers Conference, Engr Cmd, 18–19 May 71, p. 1, 

Historians files, CMH. 36 ORLLs, 1 Feb–24 Mar 71, 937th Engr Gp, 24 Mar 71, pp. 2–3, and 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 

35th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 71, pp. 3–4, both in Historians files, CMH. For more about the 937th 

Group commander’s experiences during this period, see Intervs, Christensen with Col William J. 

Schuder, CO, 937th Engr Gp, 10 Dec 70, VNIT 784, and 5 Apr 71, VNIT 878, CMH. 37 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, Engr Cmd, n.d., p. 1, 1 Feb–29 Apr 71, 18th Engr Bde, 30 Apr 

71, p. 7, and 1 Nov 7–15 Apr 71, 20th Engr Bde, 25 Apr 71, p. 3; AARs, Standdown After Action 

Rpt, 18th Engr Bde, 27 Apr 71, p. 1, and Standdown After Action Rpt, 20th Engr Bde, 1 May 

71, p. 1. All in Historians files, CMH. See also Spec. James Lohre and Spec. Albert Gore, “18th 

& 20th Drawdown,” Kysu’ 3 (Fall 1971): 20–27. 
543

Last Battles and Departure

Despite the large Increment VI withdrawals, Engineer Command was 

still a large organization. Assigned strength on 30 April 1971 stood at 17,500, 

some 2,500 below authorization strength and down from 23,000 the previous November. By 30 September, the command’s military strength dropped 

to 14,400, but Vietnamese workers increased 15 percent between October 

1970 and April 1971, from about 4,100 to over 4,700. In April, the command’s 

four groups commanded eighteen battalions (six combat, eleven construction, 

and one land clearing) and assorted companies and detachments. Engineer 

Command assigned each group engineering responsibility for a corps area: 

45th Group, I Corps; 35th Group, most of II Corps; 159th Group, III Corps 

and part of southern II Corps; and 34th Group, IV Corps. Training of South 

Vietnamese Army engineers gained momentum for programmed transfers of 

roadwork and industrial sites. At the time, the command’s productive effort 

averaged 46 percent highway work, 45 percent combat and operational support, and 9 percent construction. The Northern, Central, and Southern 

Engineering Districts, although reduced by 26 percent because of base closings and decreased projects, continued to supervise contract construction and 

the facilities engineering contracts.38 (Chart 6)

When Col. John S. Egbert’s 35th Group headquarters at Cam Ranh Bay 

took charge of the 937th Group’s missions and units, its area of responsibility expanded to all II Corps except Lam Dong Province bordering III 

Corps. Egbert now commanded six battalions and assorted smaller units. 

Highway restoration remained the group’s major effort (63 percent), with 

combat and operational support and some construction consuming the 

remaining capability (28 and 9 percent, respectively). In late April, the 589th 

Battalion completed thirty-four miles of Highway 1 and then stood down. 

Task Force Sierra continued roadwork along Highway 21 through June. I

August, another task force, Whiskey, was organized to complete Highway

1 between Phan Thiet and the II/III Corps border. Construction included 

refurbishing convalescent hospital buildings at Cam Ranh Bay for a religious retreat center, disassembling several prefabricated aircraft hangars at 

the An Khe and Tuy Hoa airfields and warehouses at the Long My depot 

outside Qui Nhon for return to U.S. stocks, and civic action projects. Enemy 

action against the engineers diminished. While an average of five incidents 

was reported between April and July, the number dropped to one over the 

next three months. Most attacks usually amounted to one or two mortar or 

rocket rounds causing little damage. Despite the heavy convoy traffic, road 

ambushes averaged just over one per month. Beginning in August, the group 

began cutting its strength, from a high of 5,200 down to just over 1,700 at 

the end of October. By then the 20th and 864th Engineer Battalions and 

Task Force Sierra had been redeployed or inactivated. The 815th Battalio

38 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, Engr Cmd, pp. 2–3, 12–13; U.S. Army Engineer Support 

Organizations, South Vietnam, 3–29 Apr 71, tab A, incl. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

19, 28 Jun 71; HQ, Engr Cmd, Periodic Report of Engineer Command Activities, 20 Nov 71, p. 

2; Org Chart, Engr Cmd, 1 Dec 71. Last two in Historians files, CMH. For a listing of engineer 

unit redeployments, see HQ, Engr Cmd, sub: Engineer Command History, 8 Jul 72, app. G-1, 

Historians files, CMH. 
Engineers at War

544

was transferred to the 159th Group. In early November, the 35th Group 

headquarters began closing down and departed on the twenty-first, almost 

six and one-half years after arriving at Cam Ranh Bay on 9 June 1965. The 

299th Battalion also departed that month, ending more than six years of 

service in Vietnam. As 1971 drew to a close, only two troop units, the 577th 

Engineer Battalion with a reduced strength of 252 personnel and Task 

Force Whiskey, remained in II Corps doing highway work under Engineer 

Command’s direction.39

The 34th Group at Binh Thuy in the delta also departed in November. Col. 

James A. Johnson and his successor Col. John F. McElhenny, who assumed 

command in May, commanded four construction battalions, the 34th, 36th, 

39 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 35th Engr Gp, 30 Apr 71, pp. 1, 3–4, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 71, 35th 

Engr Gp, 21 Nov 71, pp. 1–2, both in Historians files, CMH. See also Interv, Christensen with 

Col John S. Egbert, CO, 35th Engr Gp, 6 Jan 71, VNIT 813, CMH.

MACV

Command/Operational Control (OPCON)

Command Less OPCON 

Source: Tab A, Incl 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72

USA Eng Cmd, V

USARV

Staff

Director of Construction

HQ Co 35th Engr

Group

34th Engr

Group

159th Engr

Group

45th Engr

Group

Northern Engineering

District

Central Engineering

District

Southern Engineering

District

TRAC

3d Bde

1st Cav Div

501st Engr Co

XXIV Corps

196th Inf Bde

196th Engr Co

101st Abn Div

326th Engr Bn LEGEND

TRAC = Third Regional Assistance Command

Chart 6—U.S. Army Engineer Command Org

October
545

Last Battles and Departure

69th, and 93d and their attached units. The group’s main tasks included highway work and the training of South Vietnamese engineer units to take over 

the roadwork in IV Corps. Despite heavy road and bridge work, units began 

to depart that summer. Combat and operational support dropped to zero, and 

the engineers experienced only minor contact with the enemy. The most significant incident happened in July when an explosive charge was set off next 

to a work barge of the 523d Port Construction Company at a bridge site along 

Route 7A in Vinh Binh Province. Eight engineers were wounded, and the barge 

suffered minor damage. An ambush of a convoy along Highway 4 the following 

month took the life of a driver of a ten-ton tractor with low bed. Meanwhile, 

the 93d Battalion had dropped to zero strength on 31 July and was inactivated. 

By the end of September, only one full battalion, most of another, and part 

of a third remained, less than two thousand men. On 15 October, the 34th 

Battalion completed its drawdown to a color detachment, which flew to the 

United States a few days later. Also on 15 October, the 69th Battalion began 

its drawdown scheduled for completion by 15 November. Simultaneously, the 

group headquarters began to stand down, and the sole remaining battalion in 

the delta, the 36th Construction, was transferred to 159th Group control on 1 

October. Upon the departure of the 34th Group, Colonel McElhenney moved 

to the deputy engineer position at Engineer Command.40

The 45th Group in I Corps continued operations until early 1972. In 

April 1971, Col. Walter O. Bachus assumed command, replacing Colonel 

McIntyre, who moved up to Engineer Command to assume duties as chief 

of staff. At this time, the group consisted of the 14th, 27th, and 39th Combat 

and the 84th Construction Battalions and assorted smaller units, some 3,500 

troops. The 14th Battalion was the only engineer unit permanently located 

along the Demilitarized Zone, but the Quang Tri–based battalion departed 

in August. The other units were located in the Hue–Phu Bai, Da Nang, and 

Chu Lai areas, with the 39th Battalion supporting the Americal Division and 

the 27th Battalion supporting the 101st Airborne Division. Some of the work 

accomplished by the group included a 5,000-square-foot hardstand at Marble 

Mountain Airfield (84th Battalion); nine miles of fair-weather roads in the 

Quang Tri base area (14th Battalion); airfield improvements and repairs at 

Chu Lai (39th Battalion); 2,500 square feet of M8A1 matting for the Phu 

Bai airfield terminal (27th Battalion); and improvements at Firebases Veghel, 

Bastogne, Rakkasan, and Sally (27th Battalion). During the three-month

period ending in November, the group reported fifty-six projects or operations requiring one platoon week of effort. Serious setbacks in work, however, occurred in late 1971 as a result of Typhoon Hester. The storm and its 

fourteen inches of rain in a twenty-four-hour period on 24 October damaged 

buildings, knocked out several bridges, and washed out parts of Highway 1. 

40 ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 71, 34th Engr Gp, 13 Nov 71, pp. 1–4, Historians files, CMH; Engr 

Cmd Statistical Summary, 30 Sep 71, tab DD, incl. 2, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 21, 4 

Jan 72. See also Intervs, Christensen with Col John F. McElhenny, CO, 34th Engr Gp, 14 Sep 

71, VNIT 966; Lt Col Francis A. Sarnowski, CO, 34th Engr Bn, 13 Sep 71, VNIT 965. Both in 

CMH.
Engineers at War

546

A section of the Pohl Bridge built by the Seabees in 1968 and a major link to 

the firebases along Route 547 was carried away as thousands of tons of logs 

and debris accumulated against the concrete pillars. Work crews from the 26th 

and 27th Engineer Battalions and the South Vietnamese 127th Float Bridge 

Company rushed to the scene to clear debris and begin rafting operations. 

At Chu Lai, widespread damage to buildings took place at the time the 39th 

Engineer Battalion’s strength was about 50 percent due to redeployment. By 

8 November, the 39th Battalion at Chu Lai had dropped to company strength 

with the mission to support the 196th Infantry Brigade. By then tactical operations had diminished and so did the group’s casualties. From May through 

October, 9 engineers were killed in action, 8 died from nonbattle causes, and 

34 were wounded, with all the battle deaths and most of the wounded taking 

place between May and July. No casualties were suffered between November 

1971 and January 1972 when the combat battalions began to stand down. 

As the 101st Airborne Division began preparing for its departure, the 27th 

Battalion started redeploying to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 31 December. 

The group headquarters began to stand down on 15 January 1972. This left 

the 84th Construction Battalion at Da Nang with one company and a utilities 

detachment at Phu Bai and Company A, 39th Battalion, at Chu Lai as the 

only nondivisional engineer units in I Corps.41

The 159th Engineer Group at Long Binh, the last of the six group headquarters in Vietnam, stayed until April 1972. Col. John W. Brennan, who replaced 

Col. Levi A. Brown in late May 1971, assumed control of the 31st Combat; 

the 62d Land Clearing; the 92d, 169th, and 554th Construction Battalions and 

their attached units; and the 66th Topographic Company, altogether just under 

3,900 troops. The stand-downs, including the 46th Construction Battalion in 

April and the 62d Land Clearing Battalion’s headquarters in July, were offset 

in October when the 36th and 815th Construction Battalions, formerly 34th 

and 35th Group units, joined the 159th Group. The number of troops jumped 

to more than 6,700, but diminished with each unit stand-down. During 1971 

and early 1972, the 36th, 169th, 554th, and 815th Battalions concentrated on 

the highway program, the 92d Battalion on base development work, and the 

31st Battalion and the attached land-clearing companies on combat and operational support missions. The group’s area of responsibility included all of III 

and IV Corps and Lam Dong Province in southern II Corps, where the 554th 

Battalion tried to complete thirty-one miles of Highway 20. Several unusual 

but priority vertical construction projects, all at Long Binh, involved constructing a confinement facility (92d Battalion), a post exchange warehouse complex 

(169th Battalion and later 92d Battalion), a medical retention facility for drug 

testing (92d Battalion and Pacific Architects and Engineers), and a structure 

containing three handball courts at nearby Plantation (46th Battalion and 92d 

Battalion). These and several other projects of a more permanent nature at 

41 ORLLs, 1 Aug–30 Nov 71, 45th Engr Gp, 30 Nov 71, pp. 1, 3, 7–13, and 1 Dec 71–28 Jan 

72, 28 Jan 72, pp. 1–3, both in Historians files, CMH; “Hester Cuts Priorities” and “Debris 

Rams Bridge, Span Lost to Current,” Castle Courier, 15 November 1971.
547

Last Battles and Departure

Long Binh came about because of the possibility that the base might house a 

residual force for an indefinite period.42

As a result of these stand-downs, Engineer Command reduced manning 

and streamlined its organization. Because of the reduced requirement for 

engineering services, the Engineer Directorate, responsible for designs, design 

reviews, and cost estimates, was reduced to a division and placed under the 

Construction Directorate on 1 August 1971. Programming and review functions 

for Military Construction, Army, projects were transferred to the Operations 

Division, Facilities Engineering Directorate, and responsibility for monitoring Military Construction, Army, funds moved to the Program and Budget 

Office. Meanwhile, senior engineers in Washington and Saigon pondered the 

practicality of one general heading both Engineer Command and the MACV 

Construction Directorate. General Clarke, the chief of engineers, proposed 

the idea, and General Noble and General Young, who had been the director 

of construction since December 1970, fully agreed. In Washington, General 

Dunn and General Raymond, the first two directors, saw no difficulty in one 

general filling both positions with a deputy general at Engineer Command. 

The dual-hatted responsibility passed to General Young on 5 August upon the 

departure of General Noble. During the Increment X drawdown in January 

1972, the Engineer Command headquarters dropped from 334 to 213 personnel. In March, General Young departed Vietnam and General Johnson, the 

deputy commanding general, assumed the two positions.43

During the Increment XI drawdown that took effect in April 1972, the 

Engineer Command was replaced by a smaller U.S. Army Engineer Group, 

Vietnam. By the end of that month, U.S. troop strength dropped a further seventy thousand, and the engineer headquarters was reduced by an additional 

one hundred spaces. As a result, Engineer Command designed an engineer 

force consisting of 903 military, augmented with Vietnamese laborers and 

facilities engineering contractors, to provide limited operational support and 

minor construction and facilities engineering services. Earlier, on 1 January 

1972, subordinate provisional “engineer regions,” one in each corps area, or 

military region, were formed. The company-size engineer regions, commanded 

by lieutenant colonels, assumed all engineer support missions by 15 April. 

As the engineer regions became operational and assumed facilities engineering responsibilities, the district engineer offices were inactivated. In Military 

Region 1, personnel and equipment from the 84th Engineer Construction 

42 ORLLs, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, 159th Engr Gp, 20 May 71, pp. 1–2, 5, 35–7, and 1 Aug–31 Oct 

71, 159th Engr Gp, 20 Nov 71, pp. 1–3, 4–5, both in Historians files, CMH. See also Interv, Capt 

William Kunzman, 46th Mil Hist Det, with Col John W. Brennan, CO, 159th Engr Gp, 24 Feb 

72, VNIT 1038; Interv, Christensen with Lt Col Charles E. Eastburn, CO, 92d Engr Bn, 29 Jun 

71, VNIT 900. Both in Historians files, CMH. 43 Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, p. 1; Msg, Maj Gen Charles C. Noble, CG, Engr Cmd, ARV 

1574 to Maj Gen Frederick J. Clarke, 1 May 71; Msg, Brig Gen Curtis W. Chapman, Dir Mil 

Engineering, OCE, 232 to Maj Gen Robert P. Young, 4 May 71, sub: Engineer Organization, 

both in Young Papers, MHI; Memo, Col N. C. Manitsas, CofS, Engr Cmd, AVCC-C/S, for Dirs 

of Const, Materiel, and Mil Ops, sub: Reorganization of Headquarters, Engineer Command, 26 

Feb 71; Ltr, HQ, Engr Cmd, ACCC-E, sub: Limited Reorganization of Headquarters, Engineer 

Command, 28 Jul 71. Memo and letter in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

548

Battalion at Da Nang, the last engineer battalion to stand down in the region, 

were formed into Engineer Region, Military Region 1. The region engineers 

moved to the eastern side of the Da Nang River to Camp Horn, the headquarters for the First Regional Assistance Command. Also retained for a while 

were a port construction platoon and a well-drilling detachment. In II Corps, 

the 497th Port Construction Company, which completed its stand-down on 15 

April, manned and outfitted Engineer Region, Military Region 2, at Pleiku. 

At Long Binh, the 92d Engineer Construction Battalion served as the nucleus 

for Engineer Region, Military Region 3, before drawing down in April. A 

well-drilling detachment also remained. Engineer Region, Military Region 4, 

at Binh Thuy received personnel and equipment from the 36th Construction 

Battalion when it stood down in January. On 30 April, Col. Alfred L. Griebling, 

former chief of staff of Engineer Command, assumed command of Engineer 

Group, Vietnam. On the same day, the new headquarters became operational 

and took control over the engineer regions and assumed the engineer staff role 

in U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters. By then all battalion-size engineer units 

had redeployed, inactivated, or stood down, including the 159th Group on 

30 April. Key staff elements carried over from Engineer Command included 

Operations, Administrative, Facilities, and Materiels Directorates, which 

became divisions, and a Programs and Budget Office.44 (Chart 7)

There was, however, some concern whether this smaller engineer force 

had the capability to support the 69,000 U.S. troops still in country. In his 

March 1972 debriefing, General Young noted that the engineer group would 

be mostly facilities engineering oriented. There would be platoon-size troop 

organizations that could undertake minor construction and some combat 

support. However, Young pointed out, “This austere approach to engineers 

in the total force structure cannot provide the level of engineer support, particularly combat engineer support, dictated by experience and doctrine.” He 

also warned, “It is a reasonable, calculated risk which will succeed if no major 

combat action or natural disaster is experienced.” The facilities engineering 

contractors could provide some additional construction capability, but South 

Vietnamese engineers would have to be called to do additional combat and 

operational support.45

Nearly all the other services’ engineers had departed by this time. In I 

Corps, the marines transferred or demolished their bases. In September and 

October 1970, Marine Corps engineers leveled much of An Hoa Combat 

Base, dismantling or demolishing 340 buildings and flattening fortifications, 

leaving intact only the airfield, the industrial complex, and a small portion 

of the base for the South Vietnamese. Base demolition accelerated in early 

1971. Ironically, Firebase Ryder in the Que Son Valley had been rehabilitated

44 Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, pp. 1–2; Debriefing, Young, 5 Aug 71–15 Mar 72, 6 Nov 72, 

p. 16, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH. The term military region

emerged in July 1970 when the South Vietnamese government, in an administrative move that 

incorporated the territorial forces into the regular army, redesignated the corps tactical zones 

as military regions. I Corps Tactical Zone, for example, became Military Region 1, or MR 1. 45 Debriefing, Young, 6 Nov 72, p. 16, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians 

files, CMH.
549

Last Battles and Departure

only the previous September. During February and March, the 1st Engineer 

Battalion redeployed, leaving its Company A with Company A, 7th Engineer 

Battalion, as elements of the stay-behind 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade to 

guard the Da Nang area. During the final months of redeployment, Marine 

engineers provided combat support, operated water points, and leveled numerous camps and firebases near Da Nang. In May, the 3d Marine Amphibious 

Brigade ceased combat operations and turned over operations to the 196th 

Infantry Brigade. The last elements of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade 

and its engineers departed in late June.46

Meanwhile, the Seabees had consolidated headquarters and had withdrawn almost all units. In March 1970, the 32d Naval Construction Regiment 

assumed the functions of the 3d Naval Construction Brigade, and the Officer 

in Charge of Construction, Vietnam, took over the duties of brigade commander. The latter part of 1970 saw the 32d Regiment headquarters moving 

to Saigon and three construction battalions redeploying to their home ports 

and the arrival in Da Nang and Bien Hoa of two replacement battalions. 

Both battalions returned to their home bases in April 1971, and Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 5 arrived at Bien Hoa for its sixth and final tour in 

46 Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970–1971, pp. 243–44, 246, 325, 327.

MACV

Command/Operational Control (OPCON)

Command Less OPCON

Source: Tab A, Incl 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72

USA Engr Gp, V

USARV

Staff

Director of Construction

HQ Co Engr Region

MR1

Engr Region

MR3

Engr Region

MR4

Engr Region

MR2

TRAC

3d Bde

1st Cav Div

501st Engr Co

FRAC

196th Inf Bde

196th Engr Co

LEGEND

FRAC = First Regional Assistance Command

MR = Military Region

TRAC = Third Regional Assistance Command

Chart 7—U.S. Army Engineer Support Organiza
Engineers at War

550

Vietnam. In November, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 completed its 

assigned coastal radar sites and departed for Guam. The brigade headquarters stood down at the same time. Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 

302, which helped build dependent shelters in I Corps, left its Cam Ranh Bay 

base the following February and moved to Subic Bay, Philippines. By March 

1972, only four Seabee teams remained, three in the delta and one in III Corps, 

mostly doing civic action projects. This was quite a drop from eight teams in 

1967 and fifteen teams in 1968. The team at Go Cong on the coast southeast of 

Saigon finished its work in April and transferred its camp to Regional Forces 

engineers. By the end of the month, the teams and controlling detachment 

headquarters left Vietnam, thus ending over nine years of service in South 

Vietnam.47

The few remaining Air Force civil engineers continued to concentrate 

on improvements and repairs at the major air bases. Of note was support 

of Projects Enhance and Enhance Plus when, beginning in May 1972

Washington supplemented combat losses during the Easter offensive with 

additional equipment for new South Vietnamese armor, artillery, and air 

force units. The increased aircraft inventory of the rapidly expanding South 

Vietnamese Air Force resulted in new projects totaling over $3 million in 

Military Assistance funds for facilities improvements at eight air bases. Work 

included a depot overhaul at Bien Hoa Air Base, installation of additional 

petroleum storage tanks at several air bases, and reorganization of the civil 

engineering school. Construction of the petroleum storage tanks at five of 

the bases was to be awarded to contractors in April 1973 and completed in 

August. The Bien Hoa construction and the remainder of the base projects 

were scheduled to start in March 1973 and be completed in July. Several of 

the prefabricated airstrips and buildings, however, would be retrograded and 

returned to stock at overseas bases and stateside depots. In late 1972, civil 

engineers dismantled several prefabricated barracks buildings at Da Nang Air 

Base. The Seventh Air Force also recovered almost 8 million square feet of 

AM2 aluminum matting from Phan Rang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Tuy Hoa.48

The few U.S. Army engineer units in South Vietnam departed before 

the end of 1972. The 501st Engineer Company, formed from one of the line 

companies of the 1st Cavalry Division’s 8th Engineer Battalion, supported 

the stay-behind 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, at Bien Hoa. At Da Nang, 

one of the line companies of the 26th Engineer Battalion, Americal Division, 

became the 196th Engineer Company, 196th Infantry Brigade. Increment XII 

withdrawals, which saw the departure of 20,000 more troops by the end of 

June, left only 49,000 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. The two brigades 

were reduced to battalion-size task forces, and the engineer companies were 

reduced to platoons. In August, the two task forces departed, marking the end 

47 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 300–301, 417–18, 436; MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. 

V-39 to V-41. 48 Clarke, Final Years, pp. 452–53; MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, p. E-60; Fact Sheet, 8 

May 72, sub: Status of Retrograde of Aluminum Airfield Matting, incl. 1, p. 321, OCE Liaison 

Officer Trip Rpt no. 22.
551

Last Battles and Departure

of the Army’s ground combat role in the war. The next two increments ending 

in November further reduced U.S. forces to 27,000. By then Engineer Group, 

Vietnam, now down to some 221 soldiers, no longer had a troop capability, 

and only supervisory military personnel remained in the engineer regions.49

Operational Support After Laos

Following Lam Son 719, U.S. ground forces concentrated on defending 

critical bases while the South Vietnamese assumed primary responsibility for 

the ground war. The days of massive U.S. offensive operations were over. In 

III Corps, South Vietnamese Army units began replacing U.S. units along the 

border in early 1971 and carried out operations trying to block the return 

of enemy main force units and launched counterinfiltration operations into 

Cambodia. Although U.S. ground forces could not enter Cambodia, many 

continued to support South Vietnamese cross-border operations until their 

redeployment. Ground activity then centered on patrolling and sweeping 

the rocket belts, strips of land from which the enemy could fire barrages at 

bases and cities. This security role was dubbed dynamic defense, and by the 

end of the year all U.S. ground units had shifted into it. After Lam Son 719, 

the 101st Airborne Division gradually disengaged from direct contact with 

North Vietnamese Army units in the jungled western regions in I Corps and 

concentrated on dynamic defense in its assigned coastal region. The Americal 

Division fulfilled a similar role in southern I Corps. Occasionally the enemy 

lashed out at the defensive positions. The most severe attack occurred in March 

1971 when sappers overran Firebase Mary Ann southwest of Tam Ky killing

and wounding over one hundred American soldiers. In November, the newly 

organized South Vietnamese 3d Infantry Division took up positions along the 

Demilitarized Zone formerly manned by the 1st Brigade, 5th Division.50

As 1972 opened, only sixteen U.S. maneuver battalions remained in country, and most soon departed. In I Corps, only the 196th Infantry Brigade was 

left guarding Da Nang. Allied ground operations in II Corps revolved around 

the two South Korean divisions carrying out security missions and combat 

operations in their assigned areas. In III Corps, only the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, and the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, remained in positions 

along the rocket belt surrounding the Saigon–Bien Hoa–Long Binh complex. 

No U.S. ground combat force had operated in IV Corps since August 1969.51

Seven of the thirteen nondivisional combat engineer battalions had 

departed by early 1971. Only the 31st Engineer Battalion in III Corps, the 

20th and 299th Battalions in II Corps, and the 14th, 27th, and 39th Battalions 

in I Corps remained in South Vietnam. Over the next year, these units carried 

49 Chart, U.S. Army Engineer Support Organizations, South Vietnam, 1 May 72, tab A, 

incl. 1, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72; Redeployments of U.S. Forces from 

the RVN, Army Activities Rpt, 8 Nov 72, p. 3, CMH; Clarke, Final Years, app. C, U.S. Troop 

Redeployments, p. 524; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 72, Engr Gp, Vietnam, 31 Oct 72, p. 3, OCE Hist 

Ofc.50 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. I-5, IV-3, IV-21, IV-31, IV-35.

51 Ibid., 1972–1973, vol. 1, p. 9.
Engineers at War

552

out combat and operational support missions primarily geared to support the 

remaining combat forces as they shifted into their dynamic defense roles. All 

but the Long Binh–based 31st Battalion would be gone by early 1972, and it 

would depart in mid-March.52

The 31st Engineer Battalion and its attached light equipment company 

typified these operations. During the first half of 1971, the battalion centered 

its efforts on building firebases and on local road upgrades in III Corps. In 

February, a platoon-size force, while at work improving and maintaining the 

local road net and building gun pads for eight-inch howitzers at Firebase Blue

near the Cambodian border, helped defend the base when it was attacked in 

the early morning hours of the twenty-third. The engineers took up arms, put 

out fires, helped root out several sappers holed up in bunkers, and after the 

attack disposed of unexploded munitions. Miraculously, the platoon suffered 

only minor injuries and no fatalities. Over the next several months, the battalion worked on other firebases near the border. In June, Company B and the 

1st Platoon, 557th Light Equipment Company, completed Firebase Pace o

Highway 22. Work included building four heavy gun pads, an interior road net, 

hardstand and storage areas, a berm with four 40-mm. Duster positions, and 

an access road to the base. The following month, the company and light equipment company elements completed the rehabilitation of Firebase Elsenbe

just off Route 13 southwest of Tay Ninh. At the same time, the 557th Light 

Equipment Company upgraded Highway 22 between Firebase Pace and Tay

Ninh to an all-weather road, with a twelve-foot roadway and four-foot shoulders. To the east at Song Be, Company A improved Firebase Buttons, severa

local routes in the area, and airlifted elements to Bu Gia Map and Katum to 

carry out assorted tasks. Other Company A elements removed a M4T6 floating bridge and returned it to stock at Long Binh, repaired the runway at Loc 

Ninh, and improved the adjacent firebase. Meanwhile, Company C labored 

to upgrade two legs of the so-called Phu Hoa Triangle Road in Binh Duong 

Province southwest of Phu Cuong, giving access to rice paddies unused since 

the 1968 Tet offensive. However, the onset of the rainy season and other priorities halted this work for several months.53

At midyear, the 31st Battalion’s emphasis shifted to improving base 

defenses, installing aircraft revetments, participating in the highway improvement program, and other operational support tasks. In July, Company C 

began installing prefabricated bunkers, erecting towers, clearing fields of fire, 

and building 875 yards of berm and a berm road at Phu Loi. Late that month, 

the company started building a hardstand and erecting aircraft revetments. 

Heavy rains caused problems in compacting the hardstand over a saturated 

subgrade, but this work was completed in September and the perimeter work 

by the end of the year. Later in the year, Company B completed Bridge 4 

on Highway 20. This project involved two 60-foot spans, a center pier with 

52 ORLL, 1 Feb–30 Apr 71, Engr Cmd, incl. 1.

53 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Oct 71, 31st Engr Bn, 4 Nov 71, pp. 1–4, and 1 May–31 Oct 71, 159th 

Engr Gp, 20 Nov 71, pp. 5–6, both in Historians files, CMH; Spec. Albert Gore, “Threatened 

Overrun of FSB BLUE Thwarted by Quick Reactions,” Castle Courier, 5 April 1971, pp. 4–5.
553

Last Battles and Departure

a steel pile concrete cap, steel pile and concrete cap abutments, and concrete 

slab decks. The battalion employed its M48 mine-rolling tank on uncharted or 

suspected minefields. Between May and July, nearly five thousand antipersonnel mines were detonated on the perimeter at Di An. This was followed by the 

rolling of a suspected minefield on the southwest corner at Phu Loi Post to 

allow the clearing of fields of fire. Another task involved the construction of a 

large bunker sheltering four Signal Corps teletype vans.54

When the 62d Land Clearing Battalion headquarters stood down, its 

two land-clearing companies, maintenance company, and attached bridge 

company remained intact and were transferred to the 31st Combat Battalion. 

In more than four years, the Rome plows had cleared more than 215,000 

acres in III Corps, and the 62d Battalion cleared some 60,000 acres since the 

Cambodian incursion. The affiliated South Vietnamese 318th Land Clearing 

Company also cleared 22,000 acres in III Corps as well as considerable land in 

Cambodia. Other cuts included 3,300 acres cleared in January and February 

1971 by the 984th Land Clearing Company for the Royal Thai Army forces 

east of Bearcat base and 5,500 acres cut from mid-January to early March 

by the 60th Land Clearing Company around the village of Vo Dat in Binh 

Tuy Province. The 60th Land Clearing Company then moved to Hau Nghia 

Province to clear 18,000 acres. Several of the larger D9 bulldozers being evaluated for land-clearing operations were formed into a team for smaller landclearing projects. Although the D9 was found excellent for cutting first traces, 

it quickly outpaced the security force’s armored cavalry assault vehicles and 

D7 bulldozers. Land clearing continued to be dangerous work. During the 

period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971, there were 76 casualties, including 

6 killed in action, a rate of about 15 percent in a unit averaging 500 men. 

Security forces, especially infantry on foot, were also more prone to suffer 

casualties as the Rome plows crashed through the jungle. In June, Lt. Col. 

Robert P. Monfore, who had commanded the 62d Battalion for nearly one 

year, turned over command to Lt. Col. Walter P. Hayes. Following the closeout 

of land-clearing battalion headquarters, Colonel Hayes became the Engineer, 

Third Regional Assistance Command.55

In anticipation of the quickening redeployments, commanders kept up the 

high pitch of land-clearing operations during 1971. In July and August, the 

984th Land Clearing Company and the 318th Land Clearing Company cut 

over 9,000 acres in the Boi Loi Woods resulting in the virtual destruction of 

an enemy sanctuary in lower Tay Ninh Province. In August, the 60th Land 

Clearing Company began a cut in the Tan Uyen rocket belt north of Bien 

Hoa in an attempt to keep the enemy from launching rockets at the bases in 

the area. After clearing more than 1,400 acres, the company was pulled from 

this mission and moved by sea to I Corps in a high-priority mission with the 

54 ORLL, 1 May–31 Oct 71, 31st Engr Bn, 4 Nov 71, pp. 4–5.

55 ORLLs, 1 Nov 70–30 Apr 71, 62d Engr Bn, 14 May 71, pp. 1–8, 17, Historians files, CMH, 

and 31st Engr Bn, 1 May–31 Oct 71, p. 1; Spec. Ray Smietanka, “Rome Plows,” Hurricane

(April–June 1971): 42–44; Interv, Maj John L. Hitti, 17th Mil Hist Det, with Lt Col Walter P. 

Hayes, CO, 62d Engr Bn, and Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) Engr, 17 Oct 71, 

VNIT 983, pp. 2, 10–11, CMH.
Engineers at War

554

45th Group’s 59th Land Clearing Company to clear the Da Nang rocket belt. 

Meanwhile, the 984th and 318th Land Clearing Companies continued the Tan 

Uyen cut and cleared another 3,500 acres. In October, the 984th Company 

deployed north to clear strips along Highway 13 between An Loc and Loc 

Ninh.56

In II Corps, the 35th Group’s 538th Land Clearing Company completed 

clearing jungle around isolated villages in Tam Quan District near Bong Son. 

While clearing one area for a night defensive position, the land clearers discovered they had chosen a North Vietnamese bunker complex. The enemy 

soldiers apparently made a hasty retreat from the area, since fires were still 

burning, ice was found, and laundry was left to dry. During the next forty 

days, the land clearers found and destroyed hundreds of tunnels and bunkers. 

Returning to its base camp at Cha Rang Valley near Highways 1 and 19, the 

company relaxed, recuperated, and repaired bulldozers before moving out for 

another forty-five to sixty days in the field, this time clearing 200-yard strips 

of thick vegetation that had grown on both sides of Highway 19 in the An 

Khe Pass. December, however, saw the departure of the 59th, 538th, and 984th 

Land Clearing Companies. U.S. land-clearing operations came to an end on 

14 December when the 60th Land Clearing Company finished its cut in the 

Ham Tan region in the southeastern corner of III Corps and departed the following month. All land clearing now passed to the South Vietnamese.57

The building of firebases, which guarded the approaches to the U.S. 

bases and protected the Saigon and Da Nang military complexes, was 

among the last major operational support missions for U.S. Army engineers. 

In III Corps, this work involved building firebases for the 3d Brigade, 1st 

Cavalry Division; the 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and 

the 23d Artillery Group. Construction of these bases was the culmination 

of the experiences gained over the years. Extensive land clearing, earthwork, 

construction of berms, and excavation for fire direction centers, personnel 

shelters, and materials were required. In late February 1972, the 3d Brigade, 

recently reduced from four to three infantry battalions, began building six 

firebases northeast of Saigon to provide an artillery fan over the rocket 

belt and its approaches. Among the firebases were Bunker Hill, Gr

II, Ennis, and Crossed Sabers. Earlier, the 2d Squadron moved to its n

firebase, Fiddler’s Green, north of Saigon. From these more elaborate an

permanent firebases, the cavalrymen and airmobile infantry launched operations to keep enemy rocketeers off balance. The firebases also served as rest 

and recuperation centers for the company-size units rotating in and out of 

the field and boasted sound defenses, better living conditions, and even wells 

at three of the bases. Intended to serve as models for the South Vietnamese, 

56 ORLLs, 1 May–31 Oct 71, 159th Engr Gp, pp. 7–8, and 31st Engr Bn, 1 May–31 Oct 71, 

pp. 5–6; Spec. David L. Myers, “ ‘Rocket Pocket’ Gets Plowed,” Castle Courier, 4 October 1971. 57 Spec. David L. Myers, “538th LC Co. Strips Treacherous An Khe Pass,” Castle Courier, 

15 November 1971; Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, app. G-1; HQ, TRAC, Semiannual Written 

Review, 23 Jan 72, p. 64, Historians files, CMH.
555

Last Battles and Departure

the firebases would be transferred to the South Vietnamese when the U.S. 

units departed.58

Illustrative of the firebases was Bunker Hill located on a squat laterite

hill seventeen miles northeast of Saigon and nine miles north of Bien Hoa. 

Construction plans were developed by Maj. Peter J. Offringa, the air cavalry brigade’s engineer, who directed the 3d Brigade’s 501st Engineer Company operations and coordinated additional engineer support with the Third Regional 

Assistance Command Engineer and the 159th Group. Soon a task force under 

the direction of the 3d Platoon, 501st Engineer Company, and earthmoving 

equipment from the 557th Light Equipment Company began cutting the initial 

swath through the scrubby undergrowth covering the hill. Timing was critical, 

for the light equipment company only had fifteen days before standing down. 

A vertical construction platoon from the 92d Construction Battalion rounded 

out the task force. For the next two weeks, an average of four Caterpillar 830s 

hauled their 20-cubic-yard loads from 0730 to 1730, leveling the area and forming a perimeter berm. Once the scrub was removed, the familiar triangular 

shape of another 1st Cavalry Division firebase became evident. The scrapers 

also dug slots for fighting and living bunkers under the berm while bulldozers 

dug slots for the tactical operations center, mess hall, ammunition and supply 

58 HQ, TRAC, Engr Adviser, Fact Sheet for G–3, n.d., sub: Engineer After Action Rpt, 15 

Dec 1971 Thru 6 Aug 1972, p. 1, Historians files, CMH; Maj. Peter J. Offringa, “Bunker Hill: 

Anatomy of a Firebase,” Engineer 3 (Summer 1973): 19–20.

Excavating a tactical operations center at one of the new firebases north of 

Bien Hoa Air Base
Engineers at War

556

storage areas, medical bunker, base defense and fire direction center, and a 

post exchange bunker. Helicopter pads were positioned close to the entrance 

of the base and accessible to the aid station.59

As the earthwork progressed, other engineers began working on the 

structures. The vertical construction platoon built the framework for the tactical operations center and the mess hall and supervised Vietnamese laborers 

pouring concrete floors for both structures. Modular design was incorporated whenever possible. Conex containers were widely used. Dug eight feet 

into the ground, the sturdy tactical operations center was covered by M8A1 

matting and the equivalent of seven layers of sandbags. An underground 

tunnel connected the operations center to the base defense/fire direction 

center bunker. The 105-mm. howitzers were placed on a 200-foot equilateral 

triangular pad raised six feet to provide direct fire over the berm. Individual 

mortar pits were sandbagged to a height sufficient to protect the crews. The 

mess hall consisted of a 20-by-40-foot storage area and two 10-by-20-foot 

serving areas. Even though it was eight feet underground and covered with a 

roof, the mess hall was well ventilated through a series of vents consisting of 

M8A1 matting and 72-inch culverts. Troops were not exposed to enemy fire 

while being served, and the eating areas were dispersed. Wide flange beams 

were used to support the ammunition storage point’s roof, which was topped 

off with M8A1 matting, plastic sheeting for waterproofing, three feet of soil, 

and coated with peneprime. The basic design incorporated the majority of 

the living and fighting bunkers as part of the eight-foot-high triangular earth 

berm in order to take full advantage of its protection. Conex containers, 

with the doors removed, were used as two-man living bunkers and positioned into trenches before the berms were finished. Twelve-foot-wide rolls 

of plastic were used for waterproofing, and five feet of earth protected the 

top, front, and rear. The design of the fighting bunkers emphasized primary 

and supplemental bunkers. Corner bunkers were constructed as a three-unit 

module with the center Conex oriented with the apex, and the units to the 

left and right were positioned to provide coverage to the front and the flanks. 

Above each corner arose fifteen-foot observation towers with radar towers 

on the roofs. Extensive rows of barbed-wire obstacles reinforced by claymore 

mines, trip flares, and fougasse (a combination of napalm and C4 demolitions) surrounded the base.60

The thirty-five-day construction effort resulted in a comfortable and efficient battalion-size operating base. Water was pumped from a nearby river, 

treated, and pumped to a sixteen-foot-high tower. Gravity-feed distribution 

led to showers, drinking water tanks, mess hall, and mess hall wash rack area. 

Hauling water by truck was only needed to fill fifty-five-gallon washing barrels in the vicinity of the living and latrine areas. This home away from home 

also boasted three temporary volleyball courts, horseshoe pits, and an outdoor 

stage used for movies, USO shows, and a briefing area. Bunker Hill was the

59 Offringa, “Bunker Hill: Anatomy of a Firebase,” pp. 20, 25.

60 Ibid., pp. 21, 24–25.
557

Last Battles and Departure

last major firebase built by Army engineers, and it epitomized the evolution of 

firebase construction during the Vietnam War.61

Allied commanders anticipated a significant enemy offensive in 1972, 

most likely again during Tet, but no one expected the blitzkrieg-like invasion 

of the South that began on 30 March. This 1972 assault, known as the Easter 

offensive or Nguyen Hue offensive, broadly resembled the Tet offensive of 

1968, except the North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong, bore the brunt 

of combat. With nearly all U.S. combat troops gone and South Vietnamese 

military capacity still lacking, North Vietnam sensed an opportunity to 

demonstrate the failure of Vietnamization and hasten eventual victory. Total 

U.S. military strength in country was about 95,000, of which only 6,000 were 

combat troops. Countering the offensive fell almost exclusively to the South 

Vietnamese and their U.S. advisers, and allied air power. Attacking on three 

fronts North Vietnamese Army regulars poured out of the Demilitarized 

Zone and Laos and captured Quang Tri. The provincial capital was retaken in 

September after a bloody battle. In the Central Highlands, North Vietnamese 

units moved into Kontum Province, forcing the South Vietnamese to give up 

several border posts before being halted. In III Corps, the enemy took Loc 

Ninh on 2 April and surrounded An Loc, where a three-month-long battle 

ensued until the siege was broken. Often massive firepower provided by U.S. 

air and naval forces helped decide victory or defeat for the South Vietnamese. 

At An Loc, resupply airdrops for the besieged city by U.S. Air Force C–130 

61 Ibid., pp. 24–25.

Aerial view of Firebase Bunker Hi
Engineers at War

558

cargo planes became regular and efficient, and the defenders were kept well 

supplied.62 (Map 31)

During the Easter offensive, U.S. ground forces, including supporting 

engineers, stayed in their defensive roles near major installations. The largest 

incremental drawdown was entering its final month when the enemy offensive 

began. It continued unabated. Redeployments remained on schedule with eight 

U.S. maneuver battalions standing down by 30 June, leaving only the two battalion task forces at Bien Hoa and Da Nang. April and May saw over 30,000 

U.S. troops leave Vietnam. Another 20,000 would depart by 1 July, reducing 

the number in Vietnam to 49,000. Allied forces—Australians, Thais, and South 

Koreans—had departed or were in the process of leaving. While maintaining 

redeployment and installation transfer schedules, the United States reacted to 

the enemy attack by bringing in additional fighter-bomber, airlift, and gunship aircraft to help the beleaguered South Vietnamese. The enemy offensive 

also brought about an acceleration of the Improvement and Modernization 

Program, and more armor, aircraft, and ships were delivered. Occasionally, 

American installations at Da Nang and Bien Hoa, where U.S. Marine Corps 

fighter-bombers deployed to beef up tactical air support, received light rocket 

attacks but no ground assaults. As for the fighting, aviators bore the brunt of 

combat, flying bombing, aerial resupply, and gunship missions. Advisers with 

South Vietnamese combat units directed the air strikes, which helped decimate 

Hanoi’s forces.63

Although constantly dwindling in numbers during this period, the regional 

engineers carried out operational support missions, minor construction projects, and other tasks. In I Corps, a detachment of Military Region 1 engineers 

working on bunkers at Quang Tri was trapped for two days until rescued. 

The last rescue helicopter also carried out a Pacific Architects and Engineers 

generator operator. Later, the same soldiers built a bunkered forward tactical operations center (TOC) (dubbed Super TOC) for the First Regional 

Assistance Command at Hue and placed 4,500 mines around the communications facilities at Phu Bai. During the height of the enemy attacks near Pleiku, 

Military Region 2 engineers replaced missing matting at the Camp Holloway 

airfield to allow C–130s to land and deliver supplies and evacuate personnel. 

Military Region 3 engineers built revetments for medical evacuation helicopters and ready rooms for the crews at Tan Son Nhut and improved defenses at 

Long Binh and Third Regional Assistance Command at nearby Plantation. In 

the delta, engineers built live-in bunkers and replaced revetments and worked 

62 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, p. L-9; Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter 

Offensive of 1972, Indochina Monographs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1980), pp. 127, 134, 171–72. For more on the Easter offensive and South Vietnamese 

counterattacks, see MACV History, 1972–73, vol. 1, pp. 33–101, vol. 2, annexes J to L; Maj. 

Charles D. Melson and Lt. Col. Curtis G. Arnold, The U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That 

Would Not End, 1971–1973 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1991), pp. 2–184; Dale Andrade, Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, 

America’s Last Vietnam Battle (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995). 63 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 1, pp. 33, 35, 37, 46, 49; Clarke, Final Years, p. 482; 

Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1971–1973, pp. 157–58, 162, 164.
Tonle

Sap

GULF OF

THAILAND

SOUTH

CHINA SEA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Mekong R

Mekong R

MR 1

MR 2

MR 3

MR 4

Con Son

Phu Quoc

DEMARCATION LINE Sakon Nakhon

Savannakhet

Kammouane

Tchepone

Dong Ha

Hue

Da Nang

Muong Nông

Ubon Ratchathani

Paksé Quang Ngai

Tam Ky

Tam Quan

Hoai Nhon

Hoai An

Attopeu

Stung

 Treng

Dak To

Kontum

Qui Nhon

Ban Me Thuot

Kratie

Kompong Thom

Pursat

Kompong Cham

Chup Memot

Snuol

Loc Ninh

An Loc

Nha Trang

Tay Ninh

Svay Rieng

Kampot

Takeo

SAIGON

Rach Gia Can Tho

Quang Tri

Saravane

Pleiku

PHNOM PENH

Siem Reap

Neak Luong

Lomphat

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

SOUTH

VIETNAM

NORTH

 VIETNAM

 EASTER OFFENSIVE

North Vietnamese Axis of Attack

Military Region 

Note: On 1 July 1970, Corps Tactical Zones 

 were redesignated Military Regions.

MR 

March–May 1972

0 100

Miles

Map 31
Engineers at War

560

on perimeter defenses at Can To Airfield. Regional engineer troops also substituted for Vietnamese workers who stayed home during the attacks.64

A dramatic engineer-related mission during the Easter offensive involved 

the destruction of bridges spanning the 500-foot-wide Mieu Giang River at 

Dong Ha near the Demilitarized Zone. On 2 April, Easter Sunday, a North 

Vietnamese tank column approached from the north. The Seabee-built steel 

girder wooden decked highway bridge, capable of bearing sixty-ton loads, 

seemed to be the logical crossing for the drive down Highway 1 to Quang 

Tri and Hue. A South Vietnamese marine battalion and army tanks took 

up defensive positions on the southern bank, while gunfire from U.S. warships helped slow the enemy approaching the highway bridge and an old 

railroad bridge upstream. Although one of the railroad bridge’s spans had 

been destroyed, foot soldiers could still get across. South Vietnamese aircraft 

joined in and destroyed several tanks nearing the highway bridge. Meanwhile, 

confusion reigned among South Vietnamese commanders and U.S. senior 

advisers whether or not to blow the highway bridge. At the scene were two 

American advisers, Marine Corps Capt. John W. Ripley with the marines and 

Army Maj. James E. Smock with the armored unit. When it appeared that the 

North Vietnamese would make a crossing in overwhelming force, the advisers 

requested and received permission to destroy the bridge. Engineers from the 

3d Division had hauled five hundred pounds of TNT blocks and C4 plastic 

explosives to the base of the highway bridge. Ripley, who had received extensive demolitions training, realized that the explosives still had to be properly 

placed in the supports. A high chain-link fence topped by sharp steel concertina wire prevented easy access to the girders. Once Ripley cleared the fence, 

he had Smock push the boxes of explosives over the fence to him. He then 

crawled hand over hand dragging the boxes one by one along the underside 

of the southern span and placed them in the channels formed by the six supporting I-beams. All this took some two and one-half hours. At first the North 

Vietnamese watched but then started shooting at him. The tanks could roll 

across the bridge at any moment, but for some reason they did not. While 

Ripley completed preparations at the main highway bridge, Smock hastily 

placed demolitions on the railroad bridge. Meanwhile, Ripley had prepared 

both a time fuse and an electrical detonation. The electrical charge failed 

to set off the explosives, and the fuse seemed to take forever. At this time, a 

South Vietnamese colonel and his American adviser emerged, and they felt the 

bridge should not be destroyed. Suddenly there was an explosion. The span 

was neatly severed from the abutment, and it plunged into the river. It was not 

certain whether the fuse finally set off the charges. A previously requested air 

strike in the area may have set off a sympathetic detonation of the demolitions. 

In any case, the enemy armor advance toward Quang Tri was halted at Dong 

Ha, at least for the time being. The determined North Vietnamese tried get64 General comments, Gerald E. Galloway, Historians files, CMH; ORLL, 1 Aug–31 Oct 72, 

Engr Gp, Vietnam, pp. 5, 7.
561

Last Battles and Departure

ting tanks across at a bridge farther west at Cam Lo, but naval gunfire and air 

strikes halted this advance. Air strikes later destroyed this bridge.65

Fewer U.S. engineer advisers and smaller engineer staffs remained at the 

end of the April drawdown. In the Third Regional Assistance Command 

Engineer Section, all military personnel but the plans and operations officer 

had departed. Colonel Hayes, a captain, and two noncommissioned officers 

returned to the United States. All the advisers with the 30th Engineer Combat 

Group also departed. The remaining member of the section, Maj. Adrian G. 

Traas, was transferred to the G–3 to carry out engineering and other duties in 

the section. He continued as the sole link to the III Corps Engineer and 30th 

Group commander, Col. Le Van Nghia, often arranging helicopter transport 

and materials and accompanying Colonel Nghia on his visits to the field. The 

three division advisory teams in III Corps retained one engineer officer as 

engineer battalion advisers, several advisers remained with the 5th Engineer 

Construction Group, and a lieutenant colonel served as the III Corps Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development Support engineer adviser. The 

65 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, pp. L-8 to L-9; Starry, Mounted Combat, p. 208; 

Melson and Arnold, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1971–1973, pp. 50–58, 60–61, 64; Andrade, Trial 

by Fire, pp. 90–94. There are several versions on the destruction of the bridges at Dong Ha. See 

Col. Gerald H. Turley, The Easter Offensive (Novato, Calif.: Presideo Press, 1985), pp. 132–58, 

177–91; John G. Miller, The Bridge at Dong Ha (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989); Vicki 

Vanden Bout, “Ripley at the Bridge,” Leatherneck 69 (February 1986): 16–19.

Aerial view of the Third Regional Assistance Command headquarters at Plantation with the engineer buildings to the right of the entrance road
Engineers at War

562

Military Region 3 Engineer, Lt. Col. Ralph A. Luther, former commander of 

the 92d Construction Battalion, reported to Engineer Group, Vietnam. In the 

other corps, engineer positions were consolidated. In I Corps, the Military 

Region 1 Engineer, Lt. Col. Gerald E. Galloway, assumed additional duties 

as the First Regional Assistance Command staff engineer. In II Corps, the 

adviser to the 20th Engineer Combat Group assumed the duties as Second 

Regional Assistance Command Engineer, and a similar assignment was given 

to the 40th Combat Group adviser in IV Corps.66

By this time, South Vietnamese Army engineers had taken over almost all 

operational support missions. In III Corps, months before the Easter offensive, Colonel Nghia’s 30th Group concentrated on supporting cross-border 

operations in Cambodia and road and bridge work. The group reopened 

and upgraded Highway 22 from Tay Ninh to the border, placed a laterite cap 

on Route 13 from Chon Thanh to Minh Thanh, opened a rural road in the 

Angel’s Wing between Highway 1 west of Go Dau Ha and Ben Cau, upgraded 

Highway 1 from Xuan Loc to the II/III Corps border, and improved local 

roads in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces near the Cambodian border. 

In early 1972, the group assumed contingency responsibility from U.S. engi66 HQ, TRAC, Semiannual Written Review, 23 Jan 72, pp. 36–37; OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72, pp. 4–8.

Colonel Nghia inspects repaired bridge at Go Dau Ha, which was completed by 

the 302d Engineer Battalion on 18 July after being destroyed during the Easter 

offensive.
563

Last Battles and Departure

neers for thirty-two critical bridges in the corps area. Arrangements were 

made by the engineer adviser, Major Traas, to transfer contingency stocks of 

panel and M4T6 bridges along with excess bridge parts stored at Long Binh. 

Responsibility for all forward airfields within the corps was also assumed by 

the 30th Group. During and after the Easter offensive, the group reopened sections of main supply routes cut by the enemy. Examples of this work included 

replacing a blown culvert on Highway 1 near Trang Bang and rebuilding a 

blown bridge across the Vam Co Dong River at Go Dau Ha. Attempts to 

relieve surrounded An Loc involved moving the group’s 318th Land Clearing 

Company to Highway 13 where it cleared growth and enemy bunkers on each 

side of the road north of Lai Khe.67

The Easter offensive was a grave challenge for South Vietnam, and for 

the most part South Vietnamese troops resisted with determination. Wellplanned U.S. air strikes, particularly the massive B–52 raids, caused many 

of the 100,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong casualties and destroyed 

at least one-half of their tanks and large-caliber artillery. To some degree, 

it appeared that Vietnamization was working, provided that massive U.S. 

airpower, logistical support, and advisers were available. The halting of 

the North Vietnamese offensive allowed the United States the appropriate 

amount of time, a “decent interval,” to bow out of Vietnam. Nevertheless, 

North Vietnam still had gained considerable territory along the Laotian 

and Cambodian borders as well as the area just south of the Demilitarized 

Zone. These occupied areas would serve as the launch points for the final 

Communist assault in 1975.68

Winding Down the Construction Program

During 1971 and 1972, the massive military construction program neared 

the end. In 1972, for the first time since the 1965 buildup, a fiscal year Defense 

Department budget contained no request for authorizations or appropriations 

for military construction to support operations in Southeast Asia. Thus far, 

more than $1.8 billion for military construction had been appropriated. Still, 

much work needed to be done, particularly in the highway and modernization and improvement programs. Although the Department of the Army did 

approve $36 million for Fiscal Year 1970, this was disapproved by the Defense 

Department, and further funding by Congress became difficult. Command 

guidance stressed making do and doing without. Even more rigid construction limitations were established in September 1971. New project starts costing 

over $50,000 had to get Defense Department approval prior to the obligation 

of funds, and project overruns would have to be financed from funds already 

assigned. In terms of dollars spent and man-hours, 1971 was another busy 

year, but the downward trend was unmistakable and inevitable. As the year 

67 HQ, TRAC, Semiannual Written Review, 23 Jan 72, pp. 36–37.

68 Truong, Easter Offensive, pp. 158, 172, 176, 179–80.
Engineers at War

564

drew to a close, about $97 million in construction funding previously appropriated still remained to be completed.69

Rather than saying construction was coming to an end in Vietnam, the 

MACV Construction Directorate declared that the program was entering a 

new phase, and emphasized a new and higher standard of construction to complete outstanding projects. Buildings still needed to be erected or improved as 

units moved to other locations. A great majority of the camps were designed 

for a five-year life. The temporary standard two-story wooden buildings, 

some going back five or more years, showed signs of the ravages caused by 

monsoons and termites. Despite the drastic restrictions, new construction 

carried out by the U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam, continued at a 

surprisingly high rate. General Noble reported that 10 to 15 percent of the 

Engineer Command’s effort was still devoted to construction. In May 1971, 

the MACV Construction Directorate received $25 million in Fiscal Year 1971 

Military Construction, Army, funds, boosting the Army’s share of military 

construction in South Vietnam to $968.4 million. This figure changed little 

the following year, rising to $970.2 million and dropping to $954.1 million 

later in the year. For Fiscal Year 1973, the directorate forecasted the need for 

$58 million in Military Construction, Army, funds to support the facilities 

needed by residual forces and the modernization and improvement program 

for the South Vietnamese. Almost $41 million of this amount would be used 

to upgrade the facilities at Tan Son Nhut and Long Binh. More work was also 

programmed at Can Tho and Da Nang.70

Attention increasingly turned to improving living standards. A concerted 

effort had been under way for some time to improve the advisory camps. General 

Abrams deemed better housing and recreation facilities at base camps necessary 

to keep troops away from the less wholesome attractions of Vietnamese society, 

while at the same time lowering the American profile in Vietnam. As the war 

wound down, disciplinary problems, especially drug use, had become major 

command concerns. In May 1971, Abrams reiterated “the necessity for creative 

and imaginative programs to meet the diversified needs and interests of our personnel during the period of redeployment.” Emphasis was placed on intramural 

sports programs and building sports facilities on a self-help basis using operations and maintenance or nonappropriated funds. Troops also spent spare time 

improving barracks and game rooms. General Noble told his commanders that 

their troops “must do something about these needs, be it the repair of a movie 

projector or the construction of a basketball court.”71

69 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. IX-1, IX-13 to IX-14; Construction Directorate Briefing 

for Mr. Barry J. Shillito, Asst Sec Def (Installations and Logistics), 13 Dec 71, p. 2, Historians 

files, CMH. 70 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. IX-13 to IX-14; Construction Directorate Briefing for 

Mr. Shillito, 13 Dec 71, pp. 3–4; Quarterly Hist Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 71, MACDC, 8 Mar 72, p. 

II-8, Historians files, CMH; Army Activities Rpts, 21 Jan 72, p. 2, 16 Aug 72, p. 19, and 20 Dec 

72, p. 21; Debriefing, Noble, 6 Aug 71, p. 6, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians 

files, CMH; Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, p. 29. 71 Quotes from Ltr, MACJ12, Abrams to DCG, USARV, sub: Morale and Welfare Activities, 

7 May 71, with first Indorsement, Lt Gen William B. McCaffrey, DCG, USARV, 25 May 71, 
565

Last Battles and Departure

Indicative of these requirements, Engineer Command reported the completion of 103 major base construction and repair projects between February 

1970 and April 1972. This work, valued at $4 million in materials, included new 

recreation facilities at Long Binh, a confinement facility at Long Binh (better 

known as LBJ or Long Binh Jail), a religious retreat center at Cam Ranh Bay, 

an equipment retrograde facility at Da Nang, and a post exchange warehouse 

complex at Long Binh. Among the high-priority projects with short suspense 

dates were the retrograde facilities at ports such as the one at Da Nang. All 

were completed on time. Physical security projects—the construction of 

perimeter lighting, chain-link fencing, and concrete revetments—became a 

continuous operation. During the same period, contract work valued at $21 

million resulted in the completion of forty-seven major projects, including 

the Long Binh and Newport rail spurs, a petroleum pipeline at Qui Nhon, a 

cinder block cantonment for the 8th Radio Research Unit at Phu Bai, and an 

indoor theater and outdoor pool at Long Binh completed by the summer of 

1972. Another $1.4 million was used by troops and contractors to improve 

MACV adviser sites. Engineer troops worked on ten port construction and 

repair projects, expending some $600,000 in materials, at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, 

Cam Ranh Bay, and Newport. Also, in late 1971 damage caused by Typhoon 

Hester diverted much engineer activity in I Corps to repair work. The port of 

Da Nang required extensive repairs caused not only by the typhoon but also 

heavy usage by ships involved in retrograde operations. At Qui Nhon, port 

construction troops were called on to repair a failing wharf. On the operational side, the command directed over two thousand taskings, ranging from 

airfield repairs to firebase construction.72

During 1971, Seabee units with help from RMK-BRJ kept up a high 

pace of work. Major efforts centered on completing assigned sections of the 

highway program in I Corps, building logistical facilities at new and existing 

naval bases throughout the country, completing a network of sixteen coastal 

radar surveillance sites covering the entire South Vietnamese coast, and helping build dependent housing for South Vietnamese naval personnel. Work at 

naval bases and radar sites was part of the Navy’s Accelerated Turnover to the 

Vietnamese—a time-phased transfer of equipment, operational and logistical bases, and responsibilities to the South Vietnamese Navy. The first of the 

radar sites, which were designed to complement Market Time operations b

detecting Hanoi’s seaborne infiltration, commenced operations on 1 July at 

Vung Tau. One month later, a second site atop Monkey Mountain overlooking 

Da Nang harbor was turned over to the South Vietnamese. By December, the 

seventh site had been turned over and the remaining nine stations would follow 

by mid-1972. Seabee teams also drilled wells, repaired bridges, and helped the 

U.S. Agency for International Development on various civic action projects. 

From Soc Trang in the delta to Xuan Loc in III Corps, detachments worked on 

roads, schools, a maternity clinic, and other projects to raise living standards 

and second Indorsement, Noble, 2 Jun 71, to subordinate commanders and staffs, Historians 

files, CMH; Construction Directorate Briefing for Mr. Shillito, 13 Dec 71, p. 4. 72 Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, pp. 7–8.
Engineers at War

566

in outlying areas. In the delta, teams found time to install playground equipment at local hospitals and orphanages, grade local roads and install culverts, 

and repair water systems.73

Construction for South Vietnamese modernization and improvement 

began to show fruition. This work accomplished under the Military Assistance 

Service Funded (MASF) category of military construction included depot 

upgrades. The depot program was designed to provide the South Vietnamese 

armed forces with a rebuild capability for most engineer, signal, and ordnance 

equipment. The 40th Engineer Base Depot in Saigon was one of the beneficiaries. Initiated in 1969, the depot upgrade program was almost complete 

in 1972. Large equipment deliveries brought about by Projects Enhanc

and Enhance Plus, however, prompted an urgent need for a greater combat

vehicle rebuild capability. In December, almost $2 million was added by the 

Defense Department for new rebuild facilities. A part of this money was slated 

for more upgrades for the 40th Engineer Base Depot. During 1972, much 

work also went into building new wards for provincial hospitals. Work ranged 

from $231,000 for rehabilitation work in Qui Nhon to over $2.3 million for a 

450-bed hospital in Saigon.74

The South Vietnamese dependent housing effort still had its ups and downs. 

On the upward side, the U.S. made a commitment in 1970 to furnish $6 million 

to purchase building materials over a five-year period from 1971 to 1975 to 

build an additional 100,000 housing units. Also most South Vietnamese divisions were taking over the large bases left behind by U.S. forces and making 

sufficient land available for housing. Construction was enhanced when Pacific 

Architects and Engineers transferred a cement block–making machine to 

the 5th Engineer Construction Group, which from its rear base at Hoc Mon 

began making cement blocks for the program in III Corps. In addition, the 

South Vietnamese chief of engineers designed and built thirty-three manual 

and electric operated cement block–making machines for issue to engineer 

units in the other corps areas. Shortages in other building materials were made 

up by diverting materials from other projects. Construction carried out by 

Vietnamese troops and small local contractors progressed satisfactorily until 

1972 when the Easter offensive damaged a number of houses already built 

or under construction. The program was nearly stopped as contractors abandoned work sites, the supply of materials slowed down, and engineer units 

devoted more effort to support military operations. Work resumed in late 1972 

but was interrupted again when the U.S. Congress cut assistance funds. With 

only a limited amount of assistance funds forthcoming, Saigon had to suspend 

the program after 75 percent of the housing had been completed.75

During 1971, the time finally arrived to phase out the construction contract 

with the joint venture contractor, Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and 

73 Marolda, By Sea, Air, and Land, pp. 318–19; Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 417–18; 

MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, pp. V-6 to V-7, V-37 to V-41. 74 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, p. VIII-57; ibid., 1972–1973, vol. 2, pp. E-7 to E-8, E-23; 

Clarke, Final Years, pp. 452–53. See also Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 307–26. 75 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 1, pp. E-32, E-34; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 394–95.
567

Last Battles and Departure

Root, and J. A. Jones. In early 1970, the Naval Facilities Engineer Command 

in Washington decided the best way to end the cost-reimbursable contract was 

to do it in stages. During Phase I, RMK-BRJ and the Officer in Charge of 

Construction in Saigon reviewed all completed work totaling some $1.3 billion. This phase, which was completed in May 1971, proved so successful that 

a Phase II analysis covering another $227 million was completed in November. 

Completion of about $200 million still remained, and a final goal of nearly 

$1.9 billion was set for 1 July 1972. In order to meet this date, all projects had 

to reach the Officer in Charge of Construction not later than 1 May 1971 to 

allow time to forward notices to proceed to the contractor by 1 June. Planning 

also started for the orderly disposal of construction equipment, depots, and 

industrial sites. There were over 7,500 major items of equipment alone. With 

only eleven months to go, $38 million worth of materials, supplies, and spare 

parts had to be used and any residual inventory passed on to another agency.76

Despite the impact of the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter offensive, 

RMK-BRJ completed most of its tasks ahead of schedule in mid-May. As 

soon as the jobs were finished, the contractor reduced manning and closed 

out sites. The Officer in Charge of Construction worked closely with MACV 

for the transfer of the contractor’s camps, shops, and other facilities to U.S. 

and Vietnamese government agencies, with the U.S. Agency for International 

Development accepting many for final transfer to the Vietnamese. A system 

was developed to distribute a complete listing of usable equipment and materials worldwide. U.S. military organizations could request any item, paying only 

the cost of shipping. As part of the Vietnamization effort, about three thousand items of equipment were transferred to the U.S. Agency for International 

Development for use in a program to foster the growth of a construction 

industry in Vietnam. Equipment not claimed, about one-half, was transferred 

to the U.S. Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam, for sale. Nearly all the 

surplus construction materials were purchased from the contractor or transferred to other agencies in Vietnam. On 3 July 1972, the Officer in Charge of 

Construction held a ceremony in Saigon to note the end of the RMK-BRJ 

contract, which had run nearly eleven years. Accounting and administrative 

closeouts followed, and the Officer in Charge of Construction, Saigon, office 

closed its doors in early October. At that time, no disputes remained between 

the Navy and RMK-BRJ, a remarkable achievement for a contract relationship of this scope.77

RMK-BRJ’s part in the wartime building effort was striking. The firm 

accounted for more than 60 percent of the construction in Vietnam, with 

the rest by military engineers and other contractors. RMK-BRJ employed 

over 200,000 people from 1962 to 1972, with Vietnamese comprising at least 

80 percent of the workforce. To sustain the large construction load, equipment valued at $208 million was shipped across the Pacific and distributed to 

seventy-five construction camps and hundreds of smaller work sites. Along 

with the massive amount of airfield, port, depot, cantonment, and roadwork, 

76 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 423–29. 77 Ibid., pp. 423–29, 431–33, 436.
Engineers at War

568

some of RMK-BRJ’s significant building feats included MACV headquarters, 

much of Long Binh Post, the U.S. Embassy, the deep-draft Newport and its 

railroad spur connecting line to Long Binh, and five major bridges and a new 

Saigon bypass. Left behind to be operated by the Vietnamese government were 

several industrial facilities such as quarries, concrete prestress plants, dredging, and heavy construction equipment and maintenance repair shops. It was 

anticipated that South Vietnam’s future economic growth would greatly benefit through the marketable skills learned by more than 150,000 Vietnamese 

men and women. Women’s roles in construction, thanks to RMK-BRJ and 

other U.S. firms, had expanded to heavy equipment operators, welders, and 

electricians.78

The closeout of the RMK-BRJ contract did not end the Navy’s involvement in administering construction contracts. During the late stages of the 

RMK-BRJ program, the Officer in Charge of Construction awarded an 

increased number of contracts to Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese firms. In 

early 1972, the construction agency awarded a major road-building project 

in the delta to a Vietnamese firm and a $3.5 million contract to a Vietnamese 

joint venture for a combined arms school near Long Binh. As the RMK-BRJ 

contract was nearing an end, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

in Washington made plans for a new organization to replace the Officer in 

Charge of Construction. On 1 September, that part of the agency administering the remaining contracts in Vietnam was reconfigured as the Director of 

Construction, Republic of Vietnam. The new office reported to the Officer in 

Charge of Construction, Thailand, thus returning to the organizational structure that existed before 1 July 1965.79

Modifications were also made for facilities engineering services. At the 

beginning of Fiscal Year 1971 (1 July 1970), Pacific Architects and Engineers, 

Philco-Ford Corporation, and Vinnell Corporation employed over 25,100 

workers carrying out facilities engineering and high-voltage power production 

costing $108.6 million. Some 1,100 military personnel assigned to Engineer 

Command’s Facilities Engineering Directorate, the three district engineer 

offices, and engineer detachments supervised the contracts. In addition, a 

small organization, Facilities Engineer, Saigon, composed of direct-hire U.S. 

and Vietnamese civilians, provided facilities engineering services to leased 

facilities in Saigon. The Army determined it was in the best interest of the government to negotiate sole-source contracts for facilities engineering requirements. Cost-plus-award-fee contracts were again used and cost-incentive 

features were added as part of the award fees with the expectation that the 

two facilities engineering contractors would perform at a high level and at the 

same time reduce costs to increase earnings. In July 1970, Pacific Architects 

and Engineers began its eighth year in South Vietnam with an $82 million 

contract (down from $100 million in Fiscal Year 1970) and 21,000 employees. The contract renewal charged the firm to continue buildings and grounds 

78 “Summary of Vietnam Construction,” Military Engineer 64 (September-October 1972): 

56–58; Merdinger, “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam,” p. 235. 79 Tregaskis, Building the Bases, pp. 436–37.
569

Last Battles and Departure

maintenance, power production, potable water and ice supply, sanitation, air 

conditioning and refrigeration, and fire protection services at U.S. and allied 

installations in II, III, and IV Corps, and in I Corps north of the Hai Van 

Pass. During the year, however, the number of major bases dropped from 

twenty-nine to sixteen, the contract was reduced another $16 million, and the 

workforce dropped to 14,000. Following the turnover of logistic support in I 

Corps to the Army in the summer of 1970, Philco-Ford continued to carry out 

facilities engineering support at Da Nang and Chu Lai. By 30 June 1971, base 

transfers and budgetary constraints reduced the three contractors’ workforce 

by 7,200 and the contracts to $90.6 million.80

In July 1970, land-based high-voltage power requirements were separated 

from facilities engineering requirements and opened to competitive bidding. 

A contract was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers to operate and 

maintain generators and distribution systems at thirty-two sites. Vinnell 

Corporation still operated and maintained eleven T–2 tankers as power barges 

(four at Cam Ranh Bay, two at Nha Trang, three at Qui Nhon, and two at 

Vung Tau), an interrelated land site recently completed at Cam Ranh Bay, and 

land-based power plants at Da Nang, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai under cost-plusincentive terms. Plans were under way since 1969 to begin removing the tankers 

when the land-based plants came online. The estimated cost of returning the 

ships to the United States for disposal, including towing, came to $140,000 per 

ship. Since the ships were old and obsolete and the U.S. Navy no longer had 

requirements for their future use, the Maritime Commission agreed to sell the 

ships to competitive bidders as scrap at their present locations. On 20 August 

1970, the first two barges were removed from the system at Cam Ranh Bay, 

and in March and April 1971 all three barges at Qui Nhon were removed from 

power generation. Vinnell then took over operation of the newly completed 

land-based power system for the remainder of the fiscal year.81

During Fiscal Year 1972, the Army renewed the sole-source facilities engineering and power barge contracts and again put the land-based high-voltage 

contracts out to competitive bidding. While the facilities engineering contracts 

with Pacific Architects and Engineers and Philco-Ford remained a cost-plusaward-fee contract with an incentive feature, the power barge contract with 

Vinnell was changed to a fixed price. As for the land-based high-voltage 

requirement, Pacific Architects and Engineers competed with six other firms 

and again was awarded a contract to operate most of the plants, including Qui 

80 PA&E History, FY 1970, p. 2; ibid., FY 1971, pp. 1–3; Summary of Facilities Engineering 

Support for FY 71, tab T, pp. 1–3, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 20, 2 Sep 71; Engr Cmd 

History, 8 Jul 72, p. 10; AAR, Opn Countdown, HQ, USARV, 4 Jun 73, vol. 2, p. D-2-1,

Historians files, CMH; Col. Warren S. Everett, “Contractors in the Combat Zone,” Military 

Engineer 64 (January-February 1972): 37–38. For more on facilities engineering, see Intervs, 

Christensen with Col Marion M. Wood, Northern Dist Engr and later Dep Engr, Engr Cmd, 11 

Aug 71, VNIT 963; Lt Col Pierpont F. Bartow, Northern Dist Engr, 28 Jul 71, VNIT 962; and 

Lt Col Paul D. Matthews, Central Dist Engr, 19 Aug 71, VNIT 964. All in CMH. 81 Summary of Facilities Engineering Support for FY 71, pp. 3–4, OCE Liaison Officer Trip 

Rpt no. 20, 2 Sep 71; Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, pp. 11–12; MFR, USARPAC G–4, 1 Mar 

69, sub: Replacement of T–2 Ships RVN; Ltr, Dir Const, USARV Engr, to USARPAC, sub: 

Disposition of Power Barges in RVN, 12 Jun 70, both in Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

570

Nhon. Vinnell continued to operate high-voltage plants at Da Nang, Phu Bai, 

Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay. By July 1971, Pacific Architects and Engineers’ 

facilities engineering contract dropped to $51.68 million and its workforce to 

12,444 (788 U.S., 860 third-country national, and 10,796 Vietnamese). With 

the departure of U.S. Marines and the consolidation of remaining forces in I 

Corps, Philco-Ford’s contract expanded slightly to $14.46 million and its workforce to 3,206 (134 U.S., 447 third-country national, and 2,625 Vietnamese).82

By late 1972, nearly all facilities engineering and power generation were 

consolidated under one contractor, Pacific Architects and Engineers. PhilcoFord decided to close out its Vietnam operation at the end of September; 

Facilities Engineer, Saigon, phased out in February 1973 with most employees 

transferring to Pacific Architects and Engineers; and the firm was selected 

for a new consolidated contract awarded on 1 October for the remainder of 

Fiscal Year 1973. Pacific Architects and Engineers also became responsible 

for facilities engineering at Da Nang and Phu Bai, the remaining high-voltage 

barges at Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa, and increased management responsibilities in the Military Assistance Service Funded program. Major installations 

offices remained at Nha Trang, Camp Holloway outside Pleiku, ROK Valley 

outside Qui Nhon, Tan Son Nhut, Long Binh, and Can Tho. Clustered under 

these installations were other bases and MACV advisory team sites. For the 

Nha Trang and ROK Valley installations, South Korean forces became the 

facilities engineering firm’s major customer. In order to comply with the new 

contract terms, Pacific Architects and Engineers made organizational changes, 

including the creation of a Da Nang office and a Military Assistance Service 

Funded Program Office, and incorporated the power barges and land-based 

power plants under the installation offices. By helping the South Vietnamese to 

assume ever-increasing responsibilities for former U.S. installations, the firm’s 

Military Assistance Service Funded Program Office expanded on-the-job 

training and supplies for the many low-voltage generators at transferred installations and signal sites. To this end, the office dispatched six contact teams to 

carry out training and to help maintain and overhaul the power plants and 

distribution systems.83

82 Summary of Facilities Engineering Support for FY 72, pp. 1–2, and Facilities Engineer FY 

72 Proposals, pp. 1–2, both in tab T, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 20, 2 Sep 71; Status of 

Land Based High Voltage Power Plants, tab GG, incl. 1, p. 255, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 

22, 8 May 72. For more on facilities engineering from the contractor’s perspective, see Intervs, 

Christensen with Mr Charles N. Leightner, General Manager’s Representative, Military Region 

1 (MR 1), PA&E, 29 Jul 71, VNIT 959; Mr William F. Lane, General Manager’s Representative, 

MR 2, PA&E, 18 Aug 71, VNIT 960; and Mr Lawrence Farnum, Installation Engr, Philco-Ford, 

31 Jul 71, VNIT 961. All in CMH. 83 PA&E, General Manager’s Special Instructions, Contract DAJB11–73–0026, Revised 

Organizational Structure, September 1972, Historians files, CMH; AAR, Opn Countdown,

HQ, USARV, vol. 2, p. D-2-1.
571

Last Battles and Departure

Last Transfers 

The accelerated redeployments in 1971 and 1972 dramatically increased 

base transfers and reductions in leases. Compared to the transfer of 75 bases 

in 1970, the number in 1971 more than doubled to 173, including 105 former 

Army facilities. By the end of the year, a total of 278 bases, adviser sites, 

and industrial complexes, or 33 percent, had been turned over to the South 

Vietnamese since the transfers began in 1969. Military leases were reviewed to 

see if leaseholders could be moved to rent-free facilities as units and activities 

redeployed. As a result, the number of leases decreased steadily from 420 in 

July 1970 to 316 by 1 February 1971, reducing leasing costs from $11.8 million to $10.4 million. This savings, however, did not correspond to the drop 

in the number of leases since the costs of renewed leases increased. Savings 

in Military Assistance Program funds were achieved by substituting U.S. 

facilities slated to be closed instead of proceeding with planned improvement 

and modernization projects. The Construction Directorate, working closely 

with the MACV J–4, identified eighty-four projects valued at $11.4 million 

for cancellation. The directorate also closely worked with the U.S. Agency 

for International Development to determine what facilities not needed by the 

South Vietnamese armed forces could be used by civilian agencies such as the 

Ministry of Education, which expressed interest in using excess facilities for 

schools.84

By then several South Vietnamese military units and civilian agencies had 

moved into the former U.S. bases. Larger operational bases, composed chiefly of 

tin-roofed wooden barracks and prefabricated metal buildings used for offices 

and warehouses, along with surfaced roads, electrical-generating systems, and 

deep-well water supply systems, were usually turned over to South Vietnamese 

divisions. Despite their advantages, these bases caused certain problems. Some 

were too spacious even for an entire South Vietnamese division. Often units 

taking over the bases found themselves short of personnel to fill all the barracks and to man all the guard posts and defense positions and incapable of 

properly maintaining all the facilities. As a result, South Vietnamese units 

gradually shrank their living perimeter and cannibalized buildings no longer 

in use. New major South Vietnamese bases included Dong Tam (occupied 

since 1969 by the 7th Division); Vinh Long Airfield (9th Division); Blackhorse 

eight miles south of Xuan Loc (18th Division training center); Bearcat (Armor 

School and the site for a newly constructed Infantry School); Cu Chi (25th 

Division and several logistical units); Lai Khe (5th Division); Di An (Marine 

Division and the Railway Service); Camp Enari outside Pleiku (47th Infantry 

Regiment); Freedom Hill outside Da Nang (3d Division); and Camp Eagle 

(1st Division). The more permanent logistical bases usually accommodated 

logistical and field support units. Many expedient battalion and brigade bases, 

however, were usually destroyed or abandoned. Large or small, abandoned 

bases, including Camp Radcliff at An Khe, were often looted. Engineer units 

84 MACV History, 1971, vol. 1, p. VIII-61; Ltr, HQ, MACV, MACDC-RPM, to CINCPAC, 

sub: Planning for Disposal of Facilities, 13 Mar 71, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

572

were too preoccupied to participate in salvage operations and were usually 

used to recover prefabricated metal buildings only.85

The redeployment of two U.S. brigades characterized the stand-downs of 

separate infantry brigades and their camps. Before ending operations in late 

April 1971, the 2d Brigade, 25th Division, closed six firebases and transferred 

three others to the South Vietnamese and Thai forces in the area, transferred 

its main base camp (Camp Frenzell-Jones) near Long Binh to other U.S. units, 

and consigned two base camps at Xuan Loc to the South Vietnamese 18th 

Division. At the closed firebases, the brigade’s 54th Engineer Company leveled 

berms, swept the areas for mines, and hauled away usable materials. Along the 

Demilitarized Zone, the 1st Brigade, 5th Division, made arrangements with 

Pacific Architects and Engineers and the 101st Airborne Division to transfer 

the bases at Quang Tri and Dong Ha to the South Vietnamese 1st Division 

prior to its departure in August. The South Vietnamese were slow to move in, 

however, and the lack of security led to looting.86 

The Americal Division’s stand-down was centered at the large 18,000-man 

Chu Lai base camp. The base was served by a water system consisting of sixteen wells and five lakes capable of producing 1.3 million gallons of potable 

water per day. A 7,000-kilowatt high-voltage electrical system with one main 

plant and three substations served about 85 percent of the base, the remainder 

being served by a low-voltage system. The $50 million installation contained 

some four thousand buildings of temporary and preengineered construction, 

an airfield with three runways, a dock area with five ramps along the beach, 

and a thirty-three-mile perimeter lighting system. Planning began in early 

August 1971 to transfer the entire base to the South Vietnamese 2d Division. 

In this case, detailed instructions and close coordination with the installation 

engineer and well-controlled South Vietnamese quartering parties prevented 

excessive looting. Units were not cleared to depart until all trash had been 

moved to a sanitary fill. On 2 October, Typhoon Hester caused extensive 

damage and a virtual stop to the policing campaign. About one thousand 

buildings were repaired mostly through unit self-help, and South Vietnamese 

officials declared their requirements would be satisfied without further repairs. 

The 2d Division requested that storm debris be left in place and no attempt 

be made to clear collapsed buildings. Additionally, the quartering parties 

requested a halt to the trash removal because trash was very often of value to 

the South Vietnamese soldier. In the final days, the police emphasis was placed 

on recovering abandoned equipment and materials. Although the base was 

transferred on 27 November, some U.S. contractor personnel remained for 

85 Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 180–85. 86 AAR, Opn Keystone Robin (Charlie), 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 28 Apr 71, pp. 109–10, 11

AAR, Opn Keystone Oriole (Bravo), 1st Brigade, 5th Inf Div, 19 Aug 71, pp. 90–92. B

in Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kans. For more on other 

stand-downs in late 1970, see AAR, Opn Keystone Robin, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, 8 Oct 70; AAR

Opn Keystone Robin, 199th Inf Bde, 12 Oct 70; and AAR, Opn Keystone Robin, 25th 

Div, 15 Dec 70, all in CARL.
573

Last Battles and Departure

awhile to reconfigure the electrical system to South Vietnamese needs and to 

assist and train the new tenants to operate the system.87

During 1972, the remaining major bases were transferred or dismantled. 

Most of the real estate and facilities at Cam Ranh Bay were turned over by 1 

May. Only the Navy’s Market Time installation at the southern end of the peninsula, the Sea-Land transport facility, and the property disposal yard remaine

under U.S. control. At Qui Nhon, the port facilities and the Phu Tai complex 

had been turned over in November 1971, followed by the incremental transfer 

of the camps in and around the city. At Da Nang, the bulk of facilities were 

transferred in May and June, with Camp Horn, the 95th Evacuation Hospital, 

a covered storage area near Camp Horn, the air base, and China Beach still 

in U.S. hands. Other major transfers included Phu Cat Air Base in December 

1971, Phan Rang Army and Air Base during the period March to May 1972, 

Tuy Hoa Air Base on 22 February 1972, and Bien Hoa Air Base in June 1972. 

In late October, as the peace negotiations appeared to be nearing fruition, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MACV to title transfer all remaining bases and 

adviser sites. Procedures were streamlined, and by 10 November the title transfer was completed with the understanding that U.S. forces would continue to 

occupy facilities in use until no longer needed. This transfer also conveniently 

preempted the provisions in the cease-fire agreement concerning the mandatory 

dismantling of U.S. bases in South Vietnam. Joint physical inventories followed 

over the next sixty days. On 12 November, the South Vietnamese took formal 

possession of the Long Binh complex, estimated at $107 to $120 million in value. 

Extensive prior planning had taken place, and as the South Vietnamese units 

(the 3d Area Logistics Command and other logistical units, a 175-mm. artillery 

battalion, an armor squadron, an airborne battalion, and three ranger groups) 

moved in, U.S. units were consolidated and moved to another part of the post. 

By November, the recently reorganized U.S. Army, Vietnam/MACV Support 

Command headquarters, including Engineer Group, Vietnam, completed the 

move of its 2,900 member staff to Tan Son Nhut.88

Several bases or portions of bases were taken over by civilian agencies. At 

Long Binh, the Ministry of Economic Affairs took over a one-mile stretch 

bordering the Bien Hoa Highway to expand the Bien Hoa Industrial Zone. 

The ministry also took over several other camps, including RMK-BRJ’s 

facilities at Cam Ranh Bay for industrial development. At Phu Loi, a former 

1st Cavalry Division camp, the Ministry of War Veterans used the base as a 

vocational and handicraft training for veterans and disabled service men. The 

Ministry of National Education converted a former South Korean logistics 

base at Nha Trang into a community college.89

With the drawdowns and base transfers, large quantities of construction 

equipment and materials were retrograded to depots in the United States and 

87 AAR, Opn Keystone Oriole (Charlie), Americal Div, 15 Dec 71, pp. F-1 to F-3, CARL. 88 Turn Over Plans, p. 235, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72; MACV Histor

1972–1973, vol. 2, pp. E-28 to E-29, F-31; AAR, Opn Countdown, HQ USARV, vol. 1, pp.

A-3-I-3-1 to A-3-I-3-2, vol. 2, pp. D-1, D-10, D-3-1; Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 183–86. 89 Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics, pp. 183–84.
Engineers at War

574

overseas or transferred to the South Vietnamese. Many of the Army engineer units were inactivated in country and their equipment was turned in. 

The Engineer Command’s Materiel Directorate monitored the turn-ins and 

reviewed requests by MACV and USARV logisticians for lateral transfers to 

U.S. and South Vietnamese engineer units. As a result, about 90 percent of the 

equipment issued to South Vietnamese engineer units under the Improvement 

and Modernization Program came from Engineer Command’s assets rather 

than depot stock. Most of this equipment was used in the highway restoration 

program and included the commercial equipment and industrial plants. In 

February 1972, the MACV Engineer Advisory Division assumed responsibility from Engineer Command for administering the Dynalectron maintenance 

contract for the commercial equipment. Similarly, much of RMK-BRJ’s 

equipment and industrial complexes were transferred to the South Vietnamese. 

What could not be used or cared for by the South Vietnamese, such as prefabricated buildings and AM2 matting, was disassembled and shipped out. 

Equipment and materials not transferred to the South Vietnamese or considered too expensive or too much trouble to retrograde were turned in to 

property disposal channels to be sold to the highest bidders.90

Some of the high-dollar equipment returned to U.S. stocks included highvoltage generators and DeLong piers. These were major items in the retrograde 

program involving equipment valued at over $75 million. Shipment of the 

5,000-kilowatt generators offered no real problems, but the large 15,000-kilowatt generators, each almost the size of a locomotive, required heavy lift cranes 

and heavy transport vehicles to be moved along carefully reconnoitered roads 

and bridges capable of supporting the heavy loads to the ports. Returning 

these generators also depended on the hookup of replacement low-power generators or connection of existing loads to commercial power. By 1 November 

1972, only 38 of the 129 generators had been returned to the United States, 

but the potentially successful cease-fire talks spurred the shipment of 57 more 

valued at over $9.6 million by 28 March 1973. The rest were shipped out by 

MACV’s successor Defense Attaché Office.91

DeLong piers at five ports were steadily reduced. The two A-type barges 

comprising the DeLong pier at Da Nang were removed by RMK-BRJ in June 

and towed to Subic Bay. Between July and November, DeLong Corporation 

prepared the two A-type barges of the pier at Vung Ro Bay for shipment to 

the United States. In both instances, U.S. Navy tugboats towed the sections. 

In July, DeLong Corporation began preparing the two A-type barges of Pier 

Number 1 at Cam Ranh Bay for shipment the following June. By November 

1972, five DeLong piers, valued at some $60 million, were still in country: one 

at Qui Nhon consisting of four A-type barges, one at Vung Tau consisting of 

seven B-type barges, and three at Cam Ranh Bay consisting of four A-type and 

90 Engr Cmd History, 8 Jul 72, p. 14–15; Fact Sheets, MACJ46-AE, sub: Dynalectron 

Maintenance Contract, n.d., tab U, and RVNAF Engineer Participation in the Lines of 

Communications Program, 2 Mar 72, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72. 91 AAR, Opn Countdown, HQ USARV, vol. 1, p. 77, vol. 2, pp. D-3 to D-4, D-4-1 to

D-4-20.
575

Last Battles and Departure

six B-type barges. In December, the ammunition pier (six B-type barges) at Cam 

Ranh Bay was released for retrograde and by February 1973 was disassembled 

and en route to the United States. In June 1973, dismantling of another pier at 

Cam Ranh Bay and the remaining pier at Qui Nhon was nearing completion. 

Dismantling of the last DeLong pier at Cam Ranh Bay was programmed to 

begin in June 1974. All that remained of the five piers at Cam Ranh Bay was the 

permanent pier built by RMK in 1964.92

Bowing Out

In late October 1972, the prospect of the cease-fire negotiations appeared 

to be nearing a successful conclusion. General Weyand, who replaced General 

Abrams in June, began planning for successor agencies once a treaty was signed. 

Three new organizations would assume MACV’s responsibilities: a successor 

headquarters in Thailand, a U.S. element of a four-party joint military commission putting the cease-fire machinery in place once the cease-fire went into 

effect, and the Defense Attaché Office to monitor military activities and provide 

technical assistance to the South Vietnamese. The cease-fire began on 28 January 

92 Fact Sheet, AVCC-CC, sub: DeLong Piers, RVN, 17 Mar 72, incl 10, OCE Liaison Officer 

Trip Rpt no. 22, 8 May 72; Periodic Rpt of Engr Cmd Activities, 17 May 72, p. 7, OCE Hist Ofc.

One of the DeLong piers being towed to Cam Ranh Bay for return to the 

 United States
Engineers at War

576

1973, and the war ground to a halt, at least temporarily. In the sixty days that 

followed, over 58,000 foreign troops departed South Vietnam, including about 

23,000 Americans and 35,000 South Koreans. MACV headquarters dissolved 

on 29 March, and the three new agencies took over its remaining functions.93

The continuing drawdown of U.S. forces resulted in more changes for the 

few remaining U.S. military engineers. Major reorganizations of the U.S. Army 

Engineer Group, Vietnam, occurred in September and December 1972. The 

final organization resulted in a staffing of 100 military, 40 Department of Army 

civilians, and 674 Vietnamese employees. By this time, all the region engineers 

had ceased functioning as separate elements, and their personnel were assigned 

to the group’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company. On 28 December the 

group, the USARV Engineer Section, the MACV Directorate of Construction, 

and the Engineer Advisory Division were consolidated into one organization 

under Col. Russell J. Lamp, who became the MACV Command Engineer. The 

USARV Engineer Section and U.S. Army Engineer Group merged to direct 

projects and plans and administration. A Construction Division took care of 

construction and engineering and real estate. The combining of the MACV, 

USARV, and Engineer Group real estate offices significantly reduced processing time for leasing and base transfers. A newly established Engineer Branch, 

Defense Attaché Office, took over functions that would provide some support 

to the South Vietnamese after the last U.S. troops departed. These duties consisted of facilities maintenance, the highway improvement program to include 

technical assistance and maintenance support for the commercial equipment, 

the retrograde of equipment, support for large generators and air conditioners 

at certain communications sites, dependent shelters, the Military Assistance 

Service Funded program, and construction materials. Region engineers, who 

had stood their troop elements down, also reported to the Engineer Branch. 

By then the region engineers had been reduced to a few personnel. As the 

region engineers stood down, the Engineer Group formed a mobile engineer 

platoon at Tan Son Nhut and platoon-size forces of local nationals in each 

region. Pacific Architects and Engineers and Facilities Engineer, Saigon, provided the bulk of facilities engineering support.94

In late January 1973, following the signing of the armistice agreement, the 

MACV Command Engineer accomplished one final project. The engineers were 

tasked to help provide facilities for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission 

and the International Commission of Control and Supervision overseeing the 

cease-fire terms. Lacking any planning guidance, this final construction requirement came as a surprise. Within twenty-four hours, local national employees and 

Pacific Architects and Engineers began building or renovating offices, living quarters, and conference facilities. About two weeks later, all but two of the fourteen 

regional sites had been completed. By the time all U.S. and allied forces departed 

on 29 March, most of the fifty-two team sites and twelve control points were done. 

93 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, pp. G-1, H-2; Clarke, Final Years, pp. 495–96. 94 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, pp. E-30, G-12; AAR, Opn Countdown, HQ USARV,

vol. 1, pp. 30–31, 75–76, 78–79, vol. 2, pp. D-1 to D-2, D-8, D-1-1, D-7-1.
577

Last Battles and Departure

Pacific Architects and Engineers continued unfinished work under the direction 

of the Engineer Branch, Defense Attaché Office.95

By then all that remained of the engineer infrastructure was the small 

Engineer Branch, in the Army Division of the Defense Attaché Office. 

Altogether, this division consisted of three military and 277 U.S. civilian personnel. The Defense Attaché Office comprised five attachés representing the 

three services. Pacific Architects and Engineers continued to provide facilities 

engineering and limited construction services to the Defense Attaché Office 

until the final collapse of South Vietnam in 1975.96

95 AAR, Opn Countdown, HQ USARV, vol. 1, pp. 33–34, vol. 2, pp. D-4 to D-5, D-11 to

D-12. 96 MACV History, 1972–1973, vol. 2, p. G-12.

17

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the accomplishments of the military and civilian 

engineers in Vietnam were numerous, varied, and significant. Army 

engineers and their military and civilian partners opened new ports along the 

coast, constructed and improved airfields in the dense jungle, built and paved 

roads, erected logistical facilities and housing, and provided support for tactical 

operations to counter an attempted Communist takeover of South Vietnam. 

The number of Army engineer units grew from the 35th Group’s initial contingent of two construction battalions to an engineer command consisting of 

two brigades, six groups, twenty-eight battalions, forty-two separate companies, and various teams and detachments. Another seven engineer battalions 

were assigned to the divisions and eight companies to the separate brigades 

and regiment. During the war, over 200,000 soldiers served in engineer units, 

on engineer staffs assigned to major commands, in other staff and command 

positions, and as engineer advisers. In early 1969, when the Army reached its 

peak strength in Vietnam, there were over 40,000 troops serving with Army 

engineer units. During the course of the war, over 1,500 soldiers (engineers 

and non-engineers), including 143 officers, were killed or died of injuries while 

serving in engineer units and in other engineer assignments.1

The construction effort in South Vietnam allowed the United States to 

deploy and operate a modern 500,000-man force in a far-off underdeveloped 

land. Ground combat troops were able to fight the enemy from well-established 

bases, which gave U.S. and allied forces the opportunity to concentrate and 

operate when and where they wished. Although most of the construction was 

temporary, more durable facilities, including airfields, port and depot complexes, headquarters buildings, communications facilities, and an improved 

highway system, were intended to boost South Vietnam’s defensive capabilities 

and developing economy.

Control and Management

In Vietnam, the employment of the engineers required adjustments to 

Army doctrine to cope with the nature of the war. There were no front lines; the 

enemy was anywhere and everywhere, often intermingled with the population. 

1

 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 252, 298; Dunn, Base Development, p. 26; Computer Reports by 

Military Occupational Specialty, 26 Jan and 20 Apr 2005, Information Technical Management 

Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Department of Defense; Casualty Information 

Sheet, n.d., Historian, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. See also “U.S. 

Army Hostile Deaths by Combat Arms Branch,” VFW Magazine 90 (June-July 2003): 22.
Engineers at War

580

Consequently, construction units were not assigned to a communications zone 

to the rear, nor were combat engineer units to a combat zone to the front. Rather, 

engineers not assigned to divisions and separate brigades were placed under a 

single central command starting with the 18th Engineer Brigade and eventually 

U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam.2

Centralization violated the long-held doctrine of giving the corps commander control of engineer resources, but this was always more theoretical 

than real in Vietnam, since the commander had merely to pick up the phone, 

and any nearby units would be his as long as he needed them. In a letter to 

General Duke, General Larsen of I Field Force had nothing but praise for 

the cooperation his headquarters received from the 18th Engineer Brigade. 

As far as he was concerned, the response of the brigade’s units surpassed all 

expectations to the point that operational control was never an issue. General 

DePuy, a former commander of the 1st Infantry Division, later remarked that 

Engineer Command forces supported him so effectively that he was unaware 

for some time that they were not under the control of II Field Force. When 

asked of the desirability of assigning construction units to his 1st Logistical 

Command, General Eifler replied that the separate engineer disposition served 

many requirements and he was satisfied whenever he received his fair share of 

construction support.3

What did engineers themselves think of the centralized system? Engineer 

general officers supported it. Duke, Parker, Noble, and Young emphasized 

the high priority given to operational support and the flexibility in the use of 

engineer units. In late 1967, a survey conducted by Maj. Gerald A. Galloway, 

a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, of past and present engineer brigade, group, battalion, 

and separate company commanders, found a two-to-one margin of approval. 

The minority position came from seven of nine division engineers, who were 

concerned about being saddled with base development projects, and one of 

three field force engineers.4

Like the nondivisional engineers, construction resources were also centrally managed, in this case by the MACV director of construction. Until the 

advent of the directorate, control at the service level had led to competition 

among the services’ construction agencies for limited resources and a variety of construction programs responsible to different heads in Saigon and 

Washington. The first year of the buildup, when construction projects mush2

 Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 254–63. See also FM 100–10, Field Service Regulations, 

Administration, July 1963, para. 2-6 to 2-7; FM 100–15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, 

March 1966, para. 2-6 to 2-12; and FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations, 

September 1965, para. 1-1 to 1-10. 3

 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 140–41; Galloway, “Essayons,” pp. 276–78 (interviews with 

Generals DePuy and Eifler); Debriefing, Young, 15 Mar 72, p. 1, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA, Historians files, CMH; Ltr, Lt Gen Stanley R. Larsen, CG, I FFV, to Brig Gen 

Charles M. Duke, CG, 18th Engr Bde, n.d., copy in Rpt of Visit to Various Headquarters in 

Vietnam, 15–30 Sep 67, incl. 7, tab A, OCE Liaison Officer Trip Rpt no. 9. 4

 Galloway, “Essayons,” p. 278; Debriefings, Duke, 14 May 68, p. 1, Parker, 5 Dec 69, p. 7, 

Noble, 2 Jul 71, p. 2, and Young, 15 Mar 72, pp. 2–3, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA. 

All debriefings in Historians files, CMH.
581

Conclusion

roomed with no central planning or direction, proved especially difficult in this 

regard. Unification under MACV brought clarity to project assignments, priority of effort, and construction standards. Reporting directly to the MACV 

commander, the office worked well enough that a later Defense Department 

logistical review recommended that future contingency plans establish the 

composition and role of a construction directorate on the staff of every joint 

forces commander.5

Materiel and Maintenance

To ensure that projects were carried out efficiently, the engineers depended 

on having the right equipment and receiving their supplies on time. One of the 

innovations of the Vietnam War was the purchase of commercial equipment to 

speed up the highway program. Senior engineers were pleased with the results. 

General Roper, a former 18th Engineer Brigade commander, believed military 

construction equipment manufactured to Army specifications was many years 

behind that used in the construction industry. He became a strong advocate of 

procuring commercial equipment without the restriction of military specifications, noting that several ten-ton dump trucks could be bought for the price 

of one standard military five-ton dump truck. Commercial vehicles operated 

in almost every environment that the military vehicle faced and outproduced 

the military dump truck by a factor of two to one. In justifying the equipment, 

Roper had his staff review the highway program to see how long it would take 

to finish it with available equipment. The answer was eight years, but incorporating additional, mostly commercial construction equipment, cut the time 

to four years or less without an increase in manpower. This result led to the 

request in 1968 for commercial equipment using Military Construction, Army, 

funds. General Parker, who commanded all nondivisional engineer troops in 

1968 and 1969, conceded that the commercial equipment was not as rugged as 

the military, but it had performed well in the year since it was procured.6

Although engineers usually made do with the equipment on hand, modifications often resulted in better performance. A good example was the D7E 

bulldozer, equipped with a larger-than-normal Rome plow blade, sharpened 

each day, and its stinger projection used to split large trees before the blade 

sliced them off. Adding this powerful blade along with a protective cab, thereby 

creating the famous Rome plow, made the standard bulldozer an effective tactical weapon in clearing jungle growth.7

Lighter engineer equipment also arrived on the scene, initially with the 

1st Cavalry Division. Before the division deployed, the air assault tests at Fort 

Benning had been promising with respect to engineer organization, training, 

operational concepts, and light equipment. But the proof was in combat, and 

5

 Dunn, Base Development, pp. 18–19,137; JLRB, Monograph 6, Construction, pp. 87–89, 

91–92. 6

 Debriefings, Parker, 14 Oct 69, p. 11, and Roper, 7 Oct 68, p. 4, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA. Both in Historians files, CMH. 7

 Roberts, “Trends in Engineer Support,” pp. 34–35; Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. 96, 103.
Engineers at War

582

the division’s battle experience in the Central Highlands and along the coast 

exceeded the most optimistic forecasts. Again and again, light equipment of 

the 8th Engineer Battalion—small dump trucks, bulldozers, and scrapers—

moving with the heliborne assault elements, cleared landing zones and forward airstrips and helped to elevate the tempo of operations. Later in the war, 

Colonel Malley, the engineer who took the 8th Battalion to Vietnam, thought 

that all combat engineers, including the nondivisional, should be issued airmobile equipment. A start was made in 1968 when ten airmobile sets arrived 

in Vietnam, seven going to units, among them the 101st Airborne Division, 

which was being reorganized as an airmobile division, and three to equipment 

pools under the control of Field Force (Corps). When additional sets arrived 

a year later, along with an infusion of repair parts, there was finally enough 

light equipment on hand to meet the airmobile requirements of operations.8

Airfield matting, on the other hand, caused headaches throughout the 

war. T17 membrane airfields required constant monitoring and repairs before 

ruptures caused by landings and takeoffs allowed water to get through to the 

subgrade. Experience showed that if T17 matting was used, it always required 

repairs. M8A1 steel matting was not much better. Crews struggled to connect panels made by different manufacturers and keep the panels aligned. 

Manufacturers apparently did not follow the same specifications. Once this 

problem was reported, Army Materiel Command insisted that the manufacturers meet its criteria. Commanders were more favorably inclined to AM2 

and MX19 aluminum matting. The problem with the AM2 matting was the 

need for an expedient anchoring system. Later, accessory kits contained systems that correctly secured the matting. Better yet, the MX19 matting was 

initially provided with anchoring kits and was reported to be easy to place 

and remove. The trend was definitely toward using the MX19 as the standard 

airfield matting.9

The single greatest deficiency in engineer operations during the war, however, was poor equipment maintenance. General Parker believed that this 

defect needed to be corrected in the military school system. Added to the 

maintenance issue was the variety of makes and models of engineering equipment. To correct these problems, Parker pushed the idea of employing command maintenance inspection teams and established a school at Long Binh for 

repair parts clerks. These steps helped lower deadline rates, but equipment still 

on deadline was often the most needed on construction projects. Assigning 

more light equipment companies to every combat battalion helped, but the 

additional units outstripped the ability of the logistical system to provide 

backup maintenance. Parker suggested giving a third-echelon maintenance 

capability to light equipment companies similar to that of the construction 

battalions. Generals Morris and Chapman, in reviewing their experiences in 

8

 Malley, “Engineer Support of Airmobile Operations,” pp. 15–17; Logistics Review, USARV, 

vol. 7, Engineering Services System, pp. T-58 to T-60, U-34 to U-36, V-8, V-12 to V-14. 9

 Roberts, “Trends in Engineer Support,” pp. 40–43.
583

Conclusion

commanding the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades respectively, proposed the 

same capability for the combat battalions.10

Engineer Technique

In Vietnam, engineer reconnaissance teams played key roles in examining future work sites and determining if construction material was available 

nearby. Often, however, the teams had to travel over insecure roads. Security 

arrangements for the teams varied. When an engineer battalion carried out 

a reconnaissance operation in a division’s area of operations, the division 

provided security. For example, when the 19th Engineer Battalion began 

road work between Bong Son and Duc Pho in 1967, south of the I/II Corps 

boundary, the 1st Cavalry Division protected the work parties. North of the 

boundary, Task Force Oregon provided protection. But in many cases, the

engineers were on their own. Helicopters helped speed up reconnaissance, but 

there was always a question of availability and the danger of being shot down 

by enemy fire. When doing ground reconnaissance, many engineers preferred 

the armored personnel carrier (M113) to the 3/4-ton truck. With their mobility, protection, and firepower, M113s gave engineers entry into some of the 

most difficult and dangerous terrain in the country.11

To deny cover and concealment to the enemy, the engineers made important breakthroughs in counter-tunneling and land clearing. Through trial and 

error, engineers found that the acetylene method supplemented with satchel 

charges did a better job at collapsing tunnels than standard shaped charges. 

Rome plows came to be regarded as first-class tactical weapons and a trend of 

the future. Throughout the war, the Engineer School gave land-clearing classes 

to the officers in the advanced course under the reasonable assumption that 

future counterinsurgencies fought in jungles would require land-clearing units 

to spearhead advances and deny terrain to the enemy. But when U.S. forces 

withdrew from Vietnam and the Army turned its attention to conventional 

scenarios in Europe and elsewhere, the land-clearing classes vanished from the 

school curriculum. The land-clearing experience survived, if tenuously, in the 

few lessons-learned tracts that were published during the war.12

The enemy’s use of mines and booby traps was a significant problem in 

Vietnam and resulted in a large proportion of the battle casualties suffered by 

U.S. soldiers. Mines alone caused two-thirds of all combat losses of armored 

personnel carriers and tanks. All sorts of munitions, many of U.S. origin, were 

turned into lethal mines. In 1969, the Army established the Mine Warfare 

Center at U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquarters, and began to disseminate 

reports on enemy techniques and countermeasures. While the losses to mines 

10 Debriefings, Brig Gen John W. Morris, CG, 18th Engr Bde, 13 Jul 70, p. 13, Parker, 14 Oct 

69, pp. 10–11, Chapman, 30 Oct 69, pp. 8–9, and Brig Gen Harold R. Parfitt, CG, 20th Engr 

Bde, 1 Nov 69, pp. 6–7, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA. All in Historians files, CMH. 11 Roberts, “Trends in Engineer Support,” pp. 50–52; ORLLs, 1 Feb–31 Mar 67, 14th Engr 

Bn, p. 12, 1 Aug–31 Oct 67, 20th Engr Bn, p. 22, 1 Nov 66–31 Jan 67, 27th Engr Bn, p. 15. 12 Roberts, “Trends in Engineer Support,” pp. 35–36, 54–55; Debriefing, Parker, 14 Oct 69, p. 

2, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH.
Engineers at War

584

remained serious, General Parker believed that the center’s efforts helped to 

improve the ratio of mines detected to undetected. Using mine-detecting dog 

teams also showed promise, and improved models of metallic and nonmetallic 

mine detectors began to arrive in Vietnam. Despite this progress, mine warfare 

still favored the forces that placed the mines and put those forces that had to 

detect them or neutralize their effects at a continuing disadvantage.13

Another major innovation during the Vietnam War was the firebase in 

whose design and construction engineers played key roles. By late 1966, U.S. 

tactical units made it a common practice to build firebases within range of 

impending operations with artillery and infantry, headquarters elements, medical facilities, and other support. Typically, engineer bulldozers cleared fields 

of fire on slightly elevated land. Taking drainage into consideration, protective berms were pushed up from the outside, which would allow water to be 

drained and create a natural obstacle such as a moat. Drained artillery pads 

followed. Sixty-inch culvert or Conex containers topped off with pierced-steel 

planking and roofing paper and about two to three feet of earth or sandbags 

could be fitted in the berms as troop living and fighting positions. By piecing 

together the materials, tactical operations and fire-direction centers could be 

built. Fuel storage bladders could also be positioned in berms pushed up by 

the bulldozers. Firebases were constantly improved while the infantry maneuvered and the artillery provided fire support.14

Mapmaking provided another arena for engineer innovation in Vietnam. 

Up-to-date maps and topographic information were key ingredients to military operations in Vietnam, especially the placement of artillery fire. During 

the early stages of the war, artillery units normally supported ground units 

from fixed positions into which ground control had been extended. Surveys 

enabled the artillery to ensure the accuracy of fire, but as artillery units moved 

to more remote areas it became more difficult to support friendly units because 

surveys were lacking. In early 1967, Lt. Col. Arthur L. Benton, the former 

chief of the Mapping and Intelligence Division of the Engineer Section, U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, who had returned to Vietnam on temporary duty from the 

Army Map Service in Washington, D.C., developed a system known as photogrammetric positioning. By tying aerial photographs to base maps, artillery surveyors could readily obtain azimuth and location of firing positions. 

Working with the photograph and overprint of a map, aerial observers could 

give accurate references to targets. Tests proved favorable, and a system was in 

place after Operation Cedar Fall

15

13 Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, pp. 130–36; Debriefing, Parker, 14 Oct 69, pp. 3–4, 

Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH. For more on mine countermeasures, see Ewell and Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge, pp. 136–47. 14 Hay, Tactical and Materiel Innovations, pp. 97–106; Ltr, 20th Engr Bde to CG, USARV, 9 

Aug 69, sub: Fire Support Base Construction Experience, Historians files, CMH. See also Ltr, 

14th Mil Hist Det to Office Ch of Mil Hist, sub: The Construction of a Fire Base in the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 10 Oct 69, Historians files, CMH; Maj. Geoffrey A. Fosbook 

Jr., “Clearing Artillery Fire Support Bases,” Military Engineer 61 (March-April 1969): 87–89. 15 ORLLs, 1 Aug–31 Oct 66, II FFV Artillery, 14 Nov 66, pp. 12–13, 1 Feb–30 Apr 67, II 

FFV Artillery, n.d., pp. 8–9; Ltr, Col Arthur Benton to author, 25 Aug 98; Citation, Incl in 
585

Conclusion

Finally, the engineers fought as infantry when needed. All engineer soldiers were trained to fight as infantry, and engineer units were organized and 

equipped to defend themselves. From the earliest days of the buildup, engineers in units like the 173d Engineer Company, 173d Airborne Brigade, were 

assigned infantry duties to defend firebases and run patrols. The 1st Engineer 

Battalion had its M48 tankdozers acting as armor to protect infantrymen and 

engineers. It also organized a platoon made up of armored personnel carriers 

mounted with flamethrowers, tankdozers, scoop loaders, and air compressors 

to destroy tunnel complexes. In the highlands, the 4th Engineer Battalion combined its flame platoon’s four flamethrower tracks with the four tankdozers 

from the four line companies and a tank retriever to form an engineer armored 

task force to protect convoys hauling sand between Dragon Mountain and 

Kontum City, reducing the dependence on infantry and armor for security. In 

the delta, combat engineers attached to the riverine force frequently filled out 

infantry units that were short of riflemen. During the Tet offensive, the retaking of Pleiku City was helped by a task force from the 4th Engineer Battalion. 

Clerk typists, carpenters, draftsmen, surveyors, and mapmakers of the 79th 

Engineer Group headquarters joined the troops on the perimeter to help 

defend II Field Force headquarters at Plantation when it came under attack. 

Outside Qui Nhon, the 84th Engineer Construction Battalion defended the 

approaches to the city.16

The Soldiers

Despite the improvements in organization, equipment, and technique, it 

was still the engineer soldier who had to carry out the mission under trying 

conditions. Almost all senior officers looking back as the war wound down 

commented on the dedication and courage of their engineers. These same 

officers, however, were struck by the youth and inexperience of the men in 

the ranks. Because the bulk of the reserves were not called up, the Army had 

to create an entire new corps of junior officers and noncommissioned officers on a crash basis through candidate schools, faster promotions, and direct 

appointments. New, inexperienced junior noncommissioned officers were 

dubbed “shake and bake” to denote how quickly they got their new ranks. 

General Noble in particular believed that something was missing from their 

training. They seemed to lack initiative and confidence and, more pointedly, 

leadership training. He wrote that modern-day training seemed to be focused 

on the classroom, not on the practical art of handling men. He considered it 

regrettable that the Army had cut back on close-order drill and marching in 

formation. “In close order drill,” he wrote, “the chain of command, from the 

squad leaders on up, exercised positive, man to man and voice leadership.” 

Recommendation for Award, Lt. Col. Arthur L. Benton, 26 Jul 67, Engr Cmd. All in Historians 

files, CMH. 16 FM 5–135, Engineer Battalion: Armored, Infantry, and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions, 

November 1965, p. 2–1; FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations, September 

1965, pp. A-B-11, A-B-15, A-B-48, A-B-52, A-B-71; Debriefing, Duke, 14 May 68, p. A-12, 

Senior Officer Debriefing Program, DA, Historians files, CMH. 
Engineers at War

586

The Vietnam-era Army lost that time-honored means of nurturing effective 

leaders, and there were consequences for performance in the units.17

The vagaries of the one-year tour in Vietnam also seriously affected unit 

performance. The threat was particularly insidious on the one-year anniversary of a unit’s arrival in the theater, for on that date the unit, in theory, would 

undergo a 100 percent turnover in officers and men. To reduce this “rotation 

hump,” the Army tried various expedients, one of which, in the 45th Engineer 

Group, required that there be no manpower loss larger than 25 percent in any 

thirty days during a unit’s second year in Vietnam. Although the one-year tour 

was considered a morale booster, the constant rotation of troops caused turbulence as the replacements took time to become proficient. The long duration 

of the war also meant second and sometimes third tours for career soldiers. By 

1970, frequent family separations caused some captains and majors to leave 

the service.18

The engineer school system and on-the-job training were supposed to provide all the skills that the soldier needed, but both sometimes fell short. General 

Morris believed that mechanics and specialized equipment operators running 

asphalt pavers, rock crushers, and well drillers should have been trained in the 

United States and sent to Vietnam as teams. Noble remarked that commanders never seemed satisfied that incoming troops were adequately prepared. 

Even a few more weeks of practicing on equipment at the Fort Leonard Wood 

training center did not seem to produce the proficiency to operate graders, 

cranes, paving machines, and scrapers. Proficiency only came after months on 

the job, but most soldiers either left the service after completing their tours 

or were promoted. In either event, the operator was lost and new ones had 

to be trained. The highest rank for equipment operators then authorized was 

specialist fifth class. A possible solution, according to Noble, was to authorize 

the next higher rank (E–6) to operate the more complex construction equipment. This solution could have resulted in significant savings to the Army in 

the long run.19

Regardless of the concerns expressed by the senior leadership, the engineer 

soldier demonstrated the ability to adapt to the many challenges thrown in 

his path. Though plagued by acute deficiencies in engineering skills, the first 

engineers in Vietnam quickly responded to the missions placed upon them. 

In some cases, only one noncommissioned officer may have had the experience needed to get the job done, but within a short time the engineer soldiers 

learned from their sergeant to carry out the new tasks with confidence. Their 

efforts were evident in the struggle against a relentless enemy and adverse 

physical conditions. Accompanying the infantry, engineer soldiers ferreted out 

and destroyed enemy mines and tunnel complexes. Engineers manning Rome 

plows cleared paths through the jungle. Engineers cleared defensive perimeters 

17 Debriefings, Noble, 6 Aug 71, p. 10 (quoted words), and Chapman, 30 Oct 69, p. 9, Senior 

Officer Debriefing Program, DA. Both in Historians files, CMH. 18 Debriefings, Chapman, 30 Oct 69, p. 10, and Morris, 13 Jul 70, p. 9, Senior Officer 

Debriefing Program, DA. Both in Historians files, CMH. 19 Debriefings, Morris, 13 Jul 70, p. 9, and Noble, 6 Aug 71, p. 39, Senior Officer Debriefing 

Program, DA. Both in Historians files, CMH.
587

Conclusion

at base camps and firebases and built and often manned the bunkers and fighting positions. In their builder role, they completed or restored a multitude of 

airfields, roads, and bridges. The combat troops had base camps they could 

return to, not as comfortable as they may have liked, but constantly being 

improved. All these achievements were made possible through the endeavors 

of the engineer soldier and his officers.20

20 Ploger, Army Engineers, pp. vii, 183.

Bibliographical Note

This account of engineer operations in South Vietnam draws on a wide 

range of sources. These include published and unpublished accounts, 

command histories, unit reports and histories, messages, personal papers, interviews, memoirs, studies, and research papers. Of special value in preparing 

this volume were the monographs U.S. Army Engineers by Maj. Gen. Robert 

R. Ploger and Base Development by Lt. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn, both in the 

U.S. Army Vietnam Studies series; the Naval Facilities Engineer Command’s 

Southeast Asia: Building the Bases by Richard Tregaskis; and, “Essayons: 

The Corps of Engineers in Vietnam,” a thesis prepared by Brig. Gen. Gerald 

E. Galloway while a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College. These publications and thesis include many useful maps, charts, tables, 

glossaries, and appendixes. The companion combat volumes in the United 

States Army in Vietnam series fully depict the combat operations and provide 

more detailed maps of the operations. Altogether, these works provided the 

framework in this study’s account of construction and engineer combat support.

Other sources were valuable in fleshing out the engineer story. Most of 

the engineer-related interviews were gleaned from the Center of Military 

History Vietnam Interview Collection. Personal accounts, memoirs, and articles helped fill in gaps, and like the interviews added a human element missing in the official reports. Interviews of senior officers conducted later were 

also consulted. At higher levels, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(MACV) commanders’ and senior engineers’ collections provided backchannel messages, memorandums, and journals. Likewise, official debriefing 

reports, some with enclosures, gave frank assessments of the war and engineer 

efforts. Various reviews, trip reports, and studies on the construction program, 

engineer combat support, and engineer organizations were of great value in 

preparing this study. The trip reports prepared by the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers liaison officers provide not only narratives of engineer operations 

in South Vietnam but also informative annexes dealing with topics of interest 

and numerous color slides used by the liaison officer in his briefings.

Unpublished Sources

Among the unpublished sources were quarterly command reports and the 

operational reports – lessons learned (ORLLs) prepared by engineer units at the battalion level and higher. Periodic after-action reports (AARs) prepared by the units 

provided accounts of specific operations. These sources vary in quality from unit to 
Engineers at War

590

unit and are heavy in production figures that show the effectiveness of the support 

carried out by the engineers. A few units produced histories that also highlighted 

unit accomplishments and added some human interest. Similarly, interviews conducted in the field added a personal touch to engineer operations. Staff papers and 

reports put together by higher headquarters such as the Construction Directorate 

and the Office of the Chief of Engineers provide information on decisions affecting 

engineer operations, organization, logistics, and personnel matters. Special reports, 

studies, and investigations carried out at higher levels by the Defense Department, 

various headquarters, special study groups, and agencies depicted pros and cons of 

the construction effort. In all, the blending of these sources helped to achieve a balanced appreciation of the engineer endeavor in South Vietnam. 

The ORLLs that replaced the command reports in late 1965 recorded a 

unit’s activity over a three-month span (November–January, February–April, 

May–July, and August–October), arranged into sections on intelligence, operations, training, personnel, and logistics. Usually enclosures included an afteraction account of an operation, statistics, maps, and design sketches. Engineer 

activities were also included in ORLLs prepared at logistical and support 

command, corps, division, and separate brigade levels. The ORLL was most 

useful in describing what the unit did during the period, innovative techniques, 

and avoiding future mistakes. In general, ORLLs lacked sufficient detail of 

individual operations and specific accomplishments by engineer soldiers in 

successfully carrying out unit missions. For this, the researcher has to turn to 

the combat after-action report, or AAR, interviews, and public affairs articles.

Unfortunately, AARs were not prepared for the bulk of engineer operations. Usually only significant operations merited AARs. Like ORLLs, engineer 

contributions to operations were included in AARs prepared by division and 

separate brigades. The AARs prepared by engineer units described the support 

rendered to tactical operations and specific projects such as constructing forward airfields. The majority of engineer AARs were prepared at the battalion 

level, but a few covering major operations such as the Cambodian incursion 

were prepared by engineer group and brigade headquarters. In a division-size 

operation, the division engineer prepared accounts depicting operations by the 

organic engineer battalion and other supporting engineers. Typically, the same 

format was used with topical headings, including task organization, intelligence, 

mission, concept of operation, chronology, execution, logistics and administration, and conclusions and recommendations. Sometimes AARs included maps, 

photographs, and design sketches. In some cases, AARs included oral interviews 

conducted by Engineer Command’s military historians. The value of the AARs, 

besides the usual record-keeping account, was encompassed in the lessons on 

which the Army could base future doctrine, techniques, and possible corrective 

action.

National Archives and Records Administration

Many of the documents cited in this volume are in the custody of the National 

Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Records dealing with operations 

are housed in its facility at College Park, Maryland. Four record groups—Record 
591

Bibliographical Note

Group (RG) 319, Records of the Army Staff; RG 330, Records of the Department 

of Defense; RG 334, Records of Interservice Agencies; and RG 338, Records of 

the Army Commands—contain most of the ORLLs, AARs, correspondence and 

messages, and annual histories. Recently, NARA transferred the Vietnam War 

material in RGs 334 and 338 to a new record group—RG 472, Records of the U.S. 

Forces in Southeast Asia, 1950–1975. The documents consulted in RG 330 are the 

backup papers used in the Defense Department’s report by the Joint Logistical 

Review Board dealing with construction and advanced base facilities maintenance. 

Since RGs 334 and 338 citations are reflected in this volume, researchers need to 

rely on the archivists at NARA to locate the documents in RG 472.

U.S. Army Center of Military History

The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) located at Fort Lesley 

J. McNair in Washington, D.C., houses records that were critical in researching the engineer story. A photocopied set of the papers of General William 

C. Westmoreland assembled during his tour of duty as MACV commander, 

contains his backchannel messages and journal, as well as additional material 

that deals with engineer matters such as the messages between Westmoreland 

and Washington and Honolulu dealing with the establishment of a construction czar. Some engineer-related material can also be found in the photocopied 

collection of General Creighten W. Abrams. Critical, however, are the collection of papers of Lt. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn, the first MACV director of 

construction; the backchannel messages of Maj. Gen. Charles M. Duke, the 

commander of the 18th Engineer Brigade and later as the Engineer, U.S. Army, 

Vietnam; and copies of correspondence by Maj. Gen. Robert R. Ploger, the 

first commander of 18th Engineer Brigade and Engineer Command. 

The CMH Vietnam Interview Collection, altogether some two thousand 

interviews, included over two hundred interviews with engineer commanders, 

staff officers, and soldiers. Many of the engineer-related interviews have been 

transcribed. Summaries of the interviews and occasionally AARs are contained 

in the files. Most of the interviews were with departing battalion commanders covering the period of their command. There are also interviews with commanders and staff officers at command, brigade, and group levels. Only a few 

interviews were held with company commanders and enlisted soldiers and contractor representatives. The interviews with AARs that stand out are with the 

commander and staff of the 35th Engineer Battalion (Combat) after it reopened 

the Hai Van Pass; the commander and soldiers of Company A, 70th Engineer 

Battalion (Combat), following the evacuation of Kham Duc; the commanders 

and staff of the 34th and 35th Engineer Groups who discussed the highway 

improvement program in their areas of responsibility; and the commander of 

the 62d Engineer Battalion (Land Clearing) following the Cambodian incursion. Most valuable are the interviews that took place soon after an operation or 

event because details were still fresh in the minds of the participants. The endof-tour interviews were of limited value in this volume because the questions 

and answers mostly dealt with trends such as training, discipline, and morale but 

little on specific operations during the six-month or one-year tour.
Engineers at War

592

Other useful holdings are the copies of command histories prepared by 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV); the Commander in 

Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC); U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV); U.S. Army, Pacific 

(USARPAC); the histories of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the twelve-volume 

Defense Department Study on U.S.-Vietnam Relations commonly known as the 

Pentagon Papers. The Historians files collection, which are maintained in the 

working files of Histories Division or the research files of the Historical Resources 

Branch, include copies of AARs, ORLLs, interviews, letters, messages, memorandums, reports, briefings, studies, unit histories such as a two-volume unpublished history of the 1st Engineer Battalion in Vietnam, and other documents. 

Also available in the Historical Resources Branch are the published unit yearbooks of several divisions and separate brigades and the 1st Engineer Battalion in 

Vietnam; contemporary field manuals and tables of organization and equipment 

(TOEs); the papers of Thomas B. Thayer (with some references dealing with construction, base transfers, land mines, and booby traps) assembled by the former 

director of the Southeast Asia Office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Systems Analysis; the report by the Joint Logistics Review Board, 

which includes volumes on construction and facilities engineering; a volume 

dealing with engineering services in the multivolume Logistics Review, U.S. 

Army, Vietnam; and engineer-related items in the personal papers of Robert W. 

Komer, the MACV Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support (DEPCORDS). Copies of the weekly Army Buildup Progress Report (11 

August 1965 to 20 December 1972), prepared by the Office of the Chief of Staff 

of the Army (and which became the Army Activities Report: Southeast Asia on 

26 March 1969), include charts, graphs, and maps depicting base development 

progress and engineer unit dispositions as well as disclosing engineer problems. A 

collection of senior officer debriefing reports portray the views of several engineer 

generals before their departure from Vietnam. Some of the reports contain engineer subject annexes. Also in the files are copies of engineer-related documents, 

MACV complex reviews, Brig. Gen. Daniel A. Raymond’s Observations on the 

Construction Program, development of the MACV Construction Directorate, 

backup documents for the MACV command histories, and annual histories prepared by Pacific Architects and Engineers. 

U.S. Army Military History Institute

The U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, has large holdings of Vietnam War documents, varying from 

unit-level to high-level conduct of the war. In many instances, these documents 

duplicate holdings in the National Archives. MHI also holds the papers of many 

senior Army officers, including Corps of Engineers generals. These include the 

papers and messages of Generals Robert P. Young, Charles C. Noble, and Henry 

C. Schrader. The Senior Officers Oral History Program files at MHI include an 

extensive interview with Maj. Gen. Robert R. Ploger. (A copy of the Ploger interview is also available at CMH.) In addition, MHI’s Senior Officer Oral History 

Program contains interviews with Army War College students who served as 

engineer company commanders during the Vietnam War. MHI also houses the 
593

Bibliographical Note

Senior Officer Debriefing Reports, which include debriefings with senior Corps 

of Engineers officers. MHI is the main repository of newspapers and magazines 

published by commands in Vietnam. Engineer Command’s biweekly newspaper, 

Castle Courier, and a quarterly magazine, Kysu’, contain a variety of articles 

on engineer operations, construction, highway restoration, and many human 

interest stories. 

Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is located at the 

Humphreys Engineer Center in Alexandria, Virginia, near Fort Belvoir. The 

Office of History’s extensive Research Collection includes a wide variety of 

engineer-related material. Holdings contain many ORLLs and AARs prepared by engineer units in Vietnam, General Raymond’s Development of the 

Construction Directorate and observations on the construction program, documents, reports, personal papers, photographs, interviews, and field and technical 

manuals. The office also contains periodicals such as the Engineer Command’s 

biweekly newspaper, Castle Courier, and quarterly magazine, Kysu’, and 

bimonthly Military Engineer published by the Society of Military Engineers.

The Office of History received copies of all the Office, Chief of Engineers 

(OCE) Liaison Officer Trip Reports, which were prepared to brief the Chief 

of Engineers and Washington officials. Besides a narrative of his visit to Army 

headquarters in Honolulu and Saigon and engineer units in South Vietnam, 

the OCE Liaison Officer assembled a wealth of information on unit dispositions, operations, construction, and engineer logistics and personnel. The narratives typically included candid comments during his meetings with senior 

engineer officers. Altogether, twenty-two reports were heavily mined in the 

preparation of this volume.

The Office of History has conducted a series of oral history interviews with 

senior engineer officers that cover their careers and service in Vietnam. This 

series called Engineer Memoirs includes interviews with Lt. Gen. Frederick 

J. Clarke, Chief of Engineers during the Vietnam War; Lt. Gen. Carroll H. 

Dunn, MACV Director of Construction, MACV J–4, Director of Military 

Construction at the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and Deputy Chief of 

Engineers; and other senior officers. The full citation for the memoir used in 

this volume is as follows:

Engineer Memoirs, Lieutenant General Carroll H. Dunn. Alexandria, Va.: 

Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998.

The Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and engineer divisions have published histories of their organizations and activities. For this 

volume, the author consulted an overview of the Corps’ history and a history 

prepared by the Pacific Ocean Division. Full citations follow:

Thompson, Erwin N. Pacific Ocean Engineers: History of the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers in the Pacific, 1905–1980. Honolulu: Pacific Ocean Division, n.d.
Engineers at War

594

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History. 

Alexandria, Va.: Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2007. 

The Engineer Studies Group, later the Engineer Studies Center, a former 

field operating activity of the Corps of Engineers, did a broad spectrum of 

studies to assist OCE, the Army Staff, and the Defense Department and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in making decisions on base development and strategic 

forces planning. The Office of History prepared a history of the Engineer 

Studies Center. A bibliography of the Engineer Studies Center publications is 

in the historian’s files. The Engineer Studies Group and Center files are now in 

the National Archives. Complete citations used in this volume are as follows: 

An Analysis of the Requirement for Army Aircraft Shelters. Engineer Strategic 

Studies Group, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, 

September 1969.

Baldwin, William C. The Engineer Studies Center and Army Analysis: A History 

of the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 1943–1982. Fort Belvoir, Va.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1985. 

Bibliography of Publications, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Studies 

Center. N.p., n.d.

U.S. Navy Seabee Museum

The U.S. Navy Seabee Museum at Port Hueneme, California, houses 

the reports prepared by Seabee units following their tours in Vietnam and 

the Richard Tregaskis Papers. Tregaskis, noted for his book Guadalcanal 

Diary, had written Southeast Asia: Building the Bases for the Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command. Building the Bases was a chief source for sketching 

the work done by Seabee units and the joint-venture contractor, Raymond, 

Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones (RMK-BRJ). Backup 

materials, including interviews used in the preparation of Building the Bases,

are held in the Tregaskis Papers. Although Tregaskis concentrated on the 

Seabees and RMK-BRJ, he did include some work done by Army engineers. 

Most important were his interviews with senior Army and Navy engineers 

plus an interview with General Westmoreland in the Pentagon after he became 

the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Also available at the U.S. Navy Seabee 

Museum is Diary of a Contract, a history prepared by RMK-BRJ. The Seabee 

unit reports should be of interest to researchers who want to delve into the 

accomplishments of the naval construction battalions.

Other Holdings

Several other repositories were useful in the preparation of this volume. The Office 

of Air Force History at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., maintained files 

used in the preparation of John Schlight’s The War in South Vietnam: The Years of 

the Offensive, 1965–1968, which cites Air Force documents and histories on air base 

construction and Red Horse engineers. The holdings of the U.S. Naval History and 
595

Bibliographical Note

Heritage Command at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., and the Marine Corps 

History and Museums Division at Quantico, Virginia, were checked for materials 

on Navy and Marine Corps engineers. The library at the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has large holdings of ORLLs 

and AARs on the Vietnam War and copies of the MACV Complex Reviews. Copies 

of the MACV Complex Reviews were also found at the Army War College’s library at 

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, many of the ORLLs, AARs, and Senior 

Officer Debriefing Reports are in the holdings of the Defense Technical Information 

Center at Fort Belvoir. The command historian of the Engineer School at Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, has some holdings similar to the Corps of Engineers Historical 

Office. These include ORLLs, AARs, and OCE Liaison Officer Trip Reports.

Student theses and essays done by engineer officers attending the Command 

and General Staff College and Army War College provided additional background 

on engineer construction and combat support. Those consulted are as follows:

Conover, Lt. Col. Nelson P. “The Lines of Communication Program in 

Vietnam, A Case Study.” Research paper, U.S. Army War College, 1973. 

Galloway, Maj. Gerald E. “Essayons: The Corps of Engineers in Vietnam.” 

Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, 1968.

Malley, Lt. Col. Robert J. “Engineer Support of Airmobile Operations.” 

Student essay, U.S. Army War College, 1967.

Roberts, Col. Charles R. “Trends in Engineer Support.” Student thesis, U.S. 

Army War College, 1969.

Published Primary Sources

Among the published primary sources are the histories prepared by major 

commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sections of the histories cover engineering activities. Complete citations for the histories used in this volume are 

as follows:

Arsenal for the Brave: A History of the United States Army Materiel Command, 

1962–1968. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, U.S. Army Materiel 

Command, 1969.

Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Pacific. “CINCPAC Command History 

1961.” Honolulu: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics 

and Administration, 1962.

_______. “CINCPAC Command History, 1962.” Honolulu, 1963. 

_______. “CINCPAC Command History, 1963.” Honolulu, 1964.

_______. “CINCPAC Command History, 1964.” Honolulu, 1965.

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). History of U.S. Army Operations 

in Southeast Asia, 1 January–31 December 1964. Honolulu: Military History 

Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, 1965.

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968,” Part 2, 1965–1966. 

Washington, D.C., 1970.
Engineers at War

596

Military History Branch, Headquarters, United States Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. “Command History, 1964.” Saigon, 1965.

_______. “Command History, 1965.” Saigon, 1966.

_______. “Command History, 1966.” Saigon, 1967.

_______. “Command History, 1967.” Volumes 1–3. Saigon, 1968.

_______. “Command History, 1968.” Volumes 1–2. Saigon, 1969.

_______. “Command History, 1969.” Volumes 1–3. Saigon, 1970.

_______. “Command History, 1970.” Volumes 1–4. Saigon, 1971.

_______. “Command History, 1971.” Volumes 1–2. Saigon, 1972.

_______. “Command History, 1972–1973.” Volumes 1–2. Saigon, 1973.

Procurement Support in Vietnam, 1966–1968. U.S. Army Procurement Agency, 

Vietnam. Japan: Toshio Printing Co., n.d. 

Weinert, Richard P. The Role of USCONARC in the Army Buildup, FY 1966. 

Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Continental Army Command, 1967.

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp and General William C. Westmoreland directed 

the preparation of an overview of their commands covering the period from 

1964 to 1968. Sharp’s part of the report includes a section covering construction in Vietnam and Thailand, and Westmoreland’s part presents a command account of the war in South Vietnam, including several appendixes. 

One of the appendixes outlines base development and construction in South 

Vietnam. The complete citation is: Sharp, Admiral U. S. G., and General 

William C. Westmoreland. Report on the War in Vietnam (As of 30 June 1968). 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

Two sets of studies published under Department of the Army auspices 

were used in the preparation of this volume. The first series, the Vietnam 

Studies, consists of twenty-one monographs by senior officers who served in 

Vietnam. The monographs cited in this volume are:

Collins, Brig. Gen. James L. Jr. The Development and Training of the South 

Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972. Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1973.

Dunn, Lt. Gen. Carroll H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–1970. 

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1972.

Eckhardt, Maj. Gen. George S. Command and Control, 1950–1969. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974.

Ewell, Lt. Gen. Julian J., and Maj. Gen. Ira A. Hunt Jr. Sharpening the Combat 

Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974.

Fulton, Maj. Gen. William B. Riverine Operations, 1966–1969. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973.

Hay, Lt. Gen. John H. Jr. Tactical and Materiel Innovations. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974. 

Heiser, Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Jr. Logistic Support. Washington, D.C.: Department 

of the Army, 1974.

Kelly, Col. Francis J. The U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973.
597

Bibliographical Note

Larsen, Lt. Gen. Stanley R., and Brig. Gen. James L. Collins Jr. Allied 

Participation in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 

1975.

Pearson, Lt. Gen. Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968.

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1975.

Ploger, Maj. Gen. Robert R. U.S. Army Engineers, 1965–1970. Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974.

Rogers, Lt. Gen. Bernard W. Cedar Falls–Junction City: A Turning Point. 

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974.

Starry, General Donn A. Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: 

Department of the Army, 1978.

Tolson, Lt. Gen. John J. Airmobility, 1961–1971. Washington, D.C.: 

Department of the Army, 1973. 

A second set of studies published by the Center of Military History in 

limited quantities, the Indochina Monographs, was done by contract and 

authored by senior South Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian officers. The 

series consists of twenty monographs covering subjects of special interest to 

the authors who consulted available records. The series also provides personal 

commentary and experience, thereby giving them the character of primary 

sources. The following monographs were used:

Hinh, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Duy. Lam Son 719, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1979.

Khuyen, Lt. Gen. Dong Van. The RVNAF. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1980.

_______. RVNAF Logistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1980.

Lung, Col. Hoang Ngoc. The General Offensives of 1968–69. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981.

Sutsakhan, Lt. Gen. Sak. The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980.

Tho, Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh. The Cambodian Incursion. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1983.

Truong, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang. The Easter Offensive of 1972. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. 

Several published unit histories were consulted. Typically, divisions and 

brigades prepared histories in the form of yearbooks depicting operations. 

Unit histories usually have sections on the activities of organic engineer units. 

The 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, also published several histories. These published histories typically include photographs of commanders 

and troops, photographs of operations, and maps. The histories used in this 

publication and available at the Center of Military History are as follows: 

Always First: A Pictorial History of the 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry 

Division, October 1965–March 1967. 1st Engineer Battalion, n.d.
Engineers at War

598

Always First: 1st Engineer Battalion, 1967–1968. 1st Engineer Battalion, 

n.d.

Coleman, Maj. J. D., ed. 1st Air Cavalry Division: Memoirs of the First Team, 

Vietnam, August 1965–December 1969. Tokyo, Japan: Dai Nippon Printing 

Co., n.d.

The First Three Years: A Pictorial History of the 173d Airborne Brigade 

(Separate). Brigade Information Office, n.d.

The 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1969. N.p.: 1st Infantry Division, n.d.

The 25th’s 25th . . . in Combat, Tropic Lightning, 1 October 1941–1 October 1967. 

The 25th Infantry Division, 25th Division Public Affairs Office, n.d.

The U.S. 25th Infantry Division, October 1969–October 1970, Yearbook. N.p.: 

Tropic Lightning Association, n.d.

Vietnam, the First Year: Pictorial History of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry 

Division. Tokyo, Japan: Brigade Information Office, n.d. 

The MACV Directorate of Construction prepared periodic reports of the 

construction program known as Complex Reviews, which show a broad picture of facilities requirements as determined by the force structure in South 

Vietnam. Sketch maps of major base complexes are included. Related is the 

1964 base development plan for Southeast Asia published by U.S. Army, 

Pacific. Full citations are as follows: 

Base Development Plan No. 1–64, Vol. VI, Southeast Asia. Headquarters, 

U.S. Army, Pacific. Fort Shafter, Hawaii: U.S. Army, Pacific, n.d.

Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review). Saigon: Directorate 

of Construction, MACV, 1 December 1966. 

Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review). Saigon: Directorate 

of Construction, MACV, 1 April 1967. 

Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review). Saigon: Directorate 

of Construction, MACV, 15 January 1968.

Construction Program South Vietnam (Complex Review). Saigon: Directorate 

of Construction, MACV, 1 March 1969.

In 1969, the Department of Defense established the Joint Logistics Review 

Board and asked it to address the entire construction process. Two monographs 

cover base development planning, funding, standards for facilities, construction 

resources, and facilities engineering. The studies include numerous charts and 

tables. A similar study was prepared by U.S. Army, Vietnam. Full citations for 

studies used in this publication are as follows:

Joint Logistics Review Board. Logistics Support in the Vietnam Era. Monograph 

1, Advanced Base Facilities Maintenance. Washington, D.C.: Department 

of Defense, n.d. 

_______. Logistics Support in the Vietnam Era. Monograph 6, Construction. 

Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, n.d. 

_______. Logistics Support in the Vietnam Era. Monograph 12, Logistics 

Planning. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, n.d. 
599

Bibliographical Note

The Logistics Review, U.S. Army, Vietnam, 1965–1969, vol. 7, Engineering 

Services System. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, n.d. 

What became known as the Pentagon Papers were classified histories of 

Defense Department policy-making on Vietnam from 1945 through early 

1968, prepared at Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s direction. They 

were leaked to the press in 1971 and commercial editions were published. The 

narrative in these volumes is supplemented by extracts and reproductions of 

many high-level documents, including several dealing with a deployment of 

engineer troops. The two publications used in this volume are as follows:

United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department 

of Defense, 12 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971. 

The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States 

Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Senator Gravel Edition, 4 vols. Boston: 

Beacon Press, 1971.

The Department of Defense and Department of the Army have published annual histories, which include discussions of military construction in 

Vietnam. Those consulted and cited in this study are as follows:

Annual Report of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1965. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.

Annual Report of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1967. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

Annual Report of the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1968. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.

Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1969. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1973.

Reports published by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) in South 

Vietnam and studies sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) were useful in providing background to economic 

assistance, such as improvements to airports, ports, waterways, railroads, and 

roads. Complete citations for USOM reports and the USAID study used in 

this volume are as follows: 

The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and Programs. 2 

vols. Saigon and New York: Joint Development Group, Postwar Planning 

Group, Development and Resources Corporation, March 1969.

United States Operations Mission (USOM). Activity Report of the Operations 

Mission to Vietnam, 30 June 1954 to 30 June 1956. Saigon, n.d.

USOM. Annual Report for the 1958 Fiscal Year (July 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958). 

Saigon, n.d.

USOM. Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1960. Saigon, 1 October 1960.

USOM. Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961. Saigon, 20 November 1961.

USOM. Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962. Saigon, n.d.
Engineers at War

600

Vietnam Transportation Study, Based on Field Studies Conducted April 1965 

through May 1966 for the Government of Vietnam and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Consultants, 

Inc., June 1966.

Also used were contractor-prepared histories by RMK-BRJ and Pacific 

Architects and Engineers. These were published in limited quantities and include 

photographs. Copies are in Historians files at the Center of Military History. 

These are:

Diary of a Contract, NBy (Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks) 44105, January 1962–

June 1967. Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones 

(RMK-BRJ). Port Hueneme, Calif.: U.S. Navy Seabee Museum, July 1967.

Johns, Eric D. History PA&E, Pacific Architects and Engineers Incorporated: 

Repairs and Utilities Operations for U.S. and Free World Military Forces in 

the Republic of Vietnam, 1963 to 1966. [Saigon], n.d.

Johns, Eric D. and Frank A. Lerney. History PA&E, Calendar Year 1967. 

[Saigon], n.d.

_______. History PA&E, January–June 1968. [Saigon], n.d.

_______. History PA&E, Fiscal Year 1969. [Saigon], n.d.

_______. History PA&E, Fiscal Year 1970. [Saigon], n.d.

History PA&E, Fiscal Year 1971. [Saigon], n.d.

Frequently consulted were U.S. Army Field Manuals (FMs) for this period 

covering engineer missions, organizations, field data, and a reference for staff 

officers. For example, FM 5–34 is a pocket-size manual containing field data 

on explosives and demolitions, bridging, field fortifications, land mines, airfields and helipads, conversion tables, and other topics for noncommissioned 

officers and officers at the platoon level. Full citations are:

FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, May 1961.

FM 5–1, Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, September 1965.

FM 5–34, Engineer Field Data. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1 December 1969.

FM 5–135, Engineer Battalion: Armored, Infantry, and Infantry (Mechanized) 

Divisions. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1965.

FM 100–10, Field Service Regulations, Administration. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, July 1963.

FM 100–15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, March 1966.

FM 101–10–1, Staff Officers’ Field Manual. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, July 1972. 

Several official histories from the perspective of the enemy have been 

published in Hanoi by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Used primarily as 
601

Bibliographical Note

references in the combat operations volumes in this series, one has been used 

as a source for this work. The volume has been translated under the auspices 

of the Center of Military History. The histories and translations may be used 

by researchers who visit the Center. The citation for the publication used in 

this book is:

Luc Luong Vu Trang Nhan Dan Tay Nguyen Trong Khang Chien Chong My 

Cuu Nuoc [The People’s Armed Forces of the Western Highlands During the 

War of National Salvation Against the Americans]. Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban 

Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People’s Army Publishing House], 1980.

Other Primary Publications

Indo-China, Geographical Handbook Series, Great Britain. Cambridge, 

England: Naval Intelligence Division, December 1943.

Military Operations, Lessons Learned: Land Clearing. Department of the 

Army Pamphlet 525–6. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

16 June 1970.

Special Operational Report–Lessons Learned (ORLL), 1 January–31 October 

1965. Department of the Army, 23 August 1966.

Published Official Histories

U.S. Army

The Center of Military History’s U.S. Army in Vietnam series currently 

consists of eleven published works, including a pictorial volume, two volumes on MACV, two advice and support volumes, two public affairs volumes, two combat volumes, one volume on communications, and Engineers 

at War. Additional volumes in progress cover combat operations, logistics, 

and advice and support. Those used in this volume are:

Bergen, John D. Military Communications: A Test for Technology. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1986.

Carland, John M. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to 

October 1966. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

2000.

Clarke, Jeffery J. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.

Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 

1962–1967. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

2006.

Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–

1968. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.

_______. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973. Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996.
Engineers at War

602

MacGarrigle George L. Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 

1966 to October 1967. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1998.

Spector, Ronald H. Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960. 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.

In addition, the author consulted other published works of the Center of 

Military History. These are:

Cash, John A. “Fight at Ia Drang, 14–16 November 1965.” In Seven Firefights 

in Vietnam by John A. Cash, John Albright, and Allan W. Sandstrum, pp. 

3–40. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United 

States Army, 1970.

Dod, Karl C. The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, United States 

Army in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military 

History, United States Army, 1966.

U.S. Air Force

Several Air Force histories have been used in this study. The Office of Air 

Force History has published several volumes on air operations in Southeast 

Asia, and their full citations are:

Bowers, Ray L. Tactical Airlift, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 

United States Air Force, 1983.

Buckingham, William A. Jr. Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and

Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961–1971. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History, United States Air Force, 1982.

Fox, Roger P. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–1973. Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1979.

Futrell, Robert F. The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History, United States Air Force, 1981.

Nalty, Bernard C. Air War Over South Vietnam, 1968–1975. Washington, D.C.: 

Air Force History and Museums Program, United States Air Force, 2000. 

Schlight, John. The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive, 1965–

1968. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air 

Force, 1988.

In addition, the Seventh Air Force prepared a history on airfield construction in South Vietnam. A copy is in the historian’s files. The full citation is as 

follows: Martin, Jean, S. Sgt. Douglas W. Stephens, and S. Sgt. Robert F. Jakob. 

USAF Airfield Construction in South Vietnam, July 1965–March 1967. Historical 

Division, Directorate of Information, Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, n.d. 

U.S. Navy

Naval histories covering the accomplishments of the Seabees and RMKBRJ were extensively used. Those published by the Naval Historical Center are:
603

Bibliographical Note

Hooper, Edward B. Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational 

Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965–1968. Washington, D.C.: Naval 

Historical Division, Department of the Navy, 1972.

Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. 

Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical 

Center, Department of the Navy, 1994. 

Marolda, Edward J., and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. From Military Assistance to Combat, 

1959–1965. United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. Washington, D.C.: 

Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1986.

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command contracted with Richard Tregaskis 

(Guadalcanal Diary) to write a history of the Seabees and RMK-BRJ on the 

construction effort in Southeast Asia, which was frequently cited in this volume: 

Tregaskis, Richard. Southeast Asia: Building the Bases: The History of Construction 

in Southeast Asia. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.

In addition, the Seabee headquarters in Hawaii prepared a publication on 

the accomplishments of the Seabee Technical Assistance Teams sent to South 

Vietnam and Thailand. This publication covers the accomplishments of each 

team that supported the Army Special Forces Detachments early in the war and 

civic action projects for the U.S. Operations Mission: COMCBPAC Reports, 

Seabee Teams, October 1959–July 1968. Commander Naval Construction 

Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1969.

U.S. Marine Corps

The Marine Corps and Museum Division has completed publication of its 

chronological series on U.S. Marines in South Vietnam. The following publications were used in the preparation of this study:

Cosmas, Graham A., and Lt. Col. Terrence P. Murray. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 

Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970–1971. Washington, D.C.: History 

and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986.

Melson, Maj. Charles D., and Lt. Col. Curtis G. Arnold. The U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971–1973. Washington, D.C.: 

History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1991. 

Shore, Capt. Moyers S. II. The Battle for Khe Sanh. Washington, D.C.: History and 

Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1969, reprinted 1977.

Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966. 

Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. 

Marine Corps, 1982.

Shulimson, Jack, and Maj. Charles M. Johnson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The 

Landing and the Buildup, 1965. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums 

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978.

Shulimson, Jack, and Lt. Col. Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and 

Capt. David A. Dawson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 

1968. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1997.
Engineers at War

604

Smith, Charles R. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 

1969. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 1988.

Telfer, Maj. Gary L., Lt. Col. Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming Jr. U.S. 

Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967. Washington, 

D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps, 1984.

Secondary Works

Anderson, Mary E., et al. Support Capabilities for Limited War Forces in Laos 

and South Vietnam. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1962.

Andrade, Dale. Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America’s Last 

Vietnam Battle. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995.

Baldwin, Capt. Roger L. “Long Bridge to Bong Son.” Military Engineer 63 

(September-October 1971): 334–35.

Berry, F. Clifton Jr. Sky Soldiers. The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War. 

New York: Bantam Books, 1987.

_______. Gadget Warfare. The Illustrated History of the Vietnam War. New 

York: Bantam Books, 1988. 

Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 2 vols. New York: Praeger, 1967. 

Coleman, J. D. Incursion. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

Davidson, Lt. Gen. Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. 

Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988.

Fink, Col. George B. “Engineers Move to I Corps.” Military Engineer 60 

(September-October 1968): 358.

“Floating and Land Based Power Plants,” Vinnell 11 (Spring 1969): 6–11.

Fulton Lt. Col. Taylor R. “Conglomerate Tactical Bridging.” Military Engineer

59 (September-October 1967): 323.

Garland, Lt. Col. Albert N., ed. Infantry in Vietnam. New York: Jove Books, 

reprint of 1967 Infantry edition, 1985.

Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System 

Worked. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Kiernan, Lt. Col. Joseph M. “Combat Engineers in the Iron Triangle.” Army

17 (June 1967): 42–45.

Kouns, Maj. Darryle L. “Combat Engineers in Operation Duchess.” Military

Engineer 62 (May-June 1967): 173–76.

Malley, Lt. Col. Robert J. “Forward Airfield Construction in Vietnam.” 

Military Engineer 59 (September-October 1967): 318–22.

Mangold, Tom, and John Penycate. The Tunnels of Cu Chi. New York: Random 

House, 1985.

Mayo, Sp4c. Larry. “Battle Maps.” Kysu’ 1 (Summer 1969): 26–28.

McIntyre, Brig. Gen. Kenneth E. “The Magnificent Sight.” Army Engineer 2 

(November-December 1994): 29–35.

_______, Col. “Secret Planning.” Kysu’ 3 (Fall 1971): 15. 
605

Bibliographical Note

Merdinger, Capt. Charles J. “Civil Engineers, Seabees, and Bases in Vietnam.” 

In Vietnam: The Naval Story, edited by Frank Uhlig Jr., pp. 228–253. 

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Meyerson, Joel D. “War Plans and Politics: Origins of the American Base of 

Supply in Vietnam.” In Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare From the 

Middle Ages to the Present, edited by John A. Lynn, pp. 281–87. Boulder, 

Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. 

“MG Dillard, 9 Others Die in Crash,” Castle Courier, 18 May 70.

Miller, John G. The Bridge at Dong Ha. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 

Moore, Lt. Gen. Harold G., and Joseph L. Galloway. We Were Soldiers Once 

. . . and Young: Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam. 

New York: Random House, 1992.

Murphy, Edward F. Dak To. Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1993. 

Nolan, Keith William. Battle for Hue: Tet, 1968. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983.

_______. Into Laos: The Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Son 719, V

1971. Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1986.

_______. Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970. Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1990.

_______. The Magnificent Bastards: The Joint Army-Marine Defense of Dong 

Ha, 1968. Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1994. 

Oberdorfer, Don. Tet! Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971.

Offringa, Maj. Peter J. “Bunker Hill: Anatomy of a Firebase.” Engineer 3 

(Summer 1973): 19–20.

Palmer, General Bruce Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in 

Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Palmer, Col. Dave R. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. 

San Rafael, Calif: Presidio Press, 1978.

Rhodes, Lt. Col. Nolan C. “Operation Duke.” Military Engineer 61 

(September-October 1969): 332–33.

Schneebeck, Maj. Gene A., and Capt. Richard E. Wolfgram. “Airmobile 

Engineer Support for Combat,” Military Engineer 59 (November-December 

1967): 397–98.

Scigliano, Robert G. South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress. Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin Co., 1963.

Shandler, Herbert Y. The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and 

Vietnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. 

New York: Random House, 1988.

Son, Lt. Col. Phan Van, and Maj. Le Van Duong, eds., The Viet Cong Tet 

Offensive, 1968, trans. J5/Joint General Staff Translation Board. Saigon: 

Printing and Publications Center, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 1969. 

Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free 

Press, 1993.

Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: The 1st Cav in Vietnam. Novato, 

Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987. 

_______. The Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 

1956–1975. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985.
Engineers at War

606

_______. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in 

Vietnam, 1965–1973. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985.

“Summary of Vietnam Construction.” Military Engineer 64 (SeptemberOctober 1972): 56–58.

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972.

“Tet Truce Offensive, 1968,” and “In Defense of Plantation, 1968.” Hurricane, 

II Field Force, Vietnam, Magazine (April–June 1971): 2–4.

Thompson, Capt. Paul Y. “Aircraft Shelters in Vietnam.” Military Engineer 61 

(July-August 1969): 273–74.

Trainor, Capt. Francis E. “Tunnel Destruction in Vietnam.” Military Engineer

60 (September-October 1968): 341.

Turley, Col. Gerald H. The Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972. Novato, Calif.: 

Presidio Press, 1985. 

“Vinnell Makes History at Long Binh.” Vinnell 11 (May 1969): 8–10.

Walker, Maj. Bryon G. “Construction of a Delta Base.” Military Engineer 60 

(September-October 1968): 333–35.

Weaver, Capt. Thomas C. “The Phu Cuong Bridge, Construction and 

Features.” Military Engineer 61 (March-April 1969): 122–24.

Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 

and Co., 1976.

Yens, 1st Lt. David P., and Capt. John P. Clement III. “Port Construction in 

Vietnam.” Military Engineer 59 (January-February 1966): 20.

Zaffiri, Samuel. Hamburger Hill, May 11–20, 1969. Novato, Calif.: Presidio 

Press, 1988.
Glossary

Aggregate Crushed rock used with cement to 

form concrete.

AM2 Matting Rectangular aluminum matting used 

on jet fighter bases and selected Army 

airfields.

Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge A sixty-three-foot scissors-type bridge 

launched from an armored carrier for 

spans up to fifty-seven feet and capable of supporting Class 60 loads, that 

is, the approximate weight in tons of 

vehicles, equipment, and armor.

Bailey/Panel Bridge The Bailey bridge, also called a panel 

bridge, is a portable preengineered 

tactical truss bridge from World War 

II vintage named after its British 

designer. The bridge, which can be 

easily and quickly constructed, is supported by two main trusses formed 

from ten-foot steel panels that are coupled with steel pins.

Balk Decking Hollow aluminum decking used on 

M4T6 floating bridges and fixed spans. 

The deck balk pattern distributes the 

load over more than one pontoon or 

float. (See also M4T6 Bridge.)

Bent A structural frame similar to a tower 

used to support a bridge or railroad 

trestle.

Butler Warehouse A large prefabricated metal building.
Engineers at War

608

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific. Traditionally a naval commander heading the 

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); controls all service forces in the Pacific area, 

including Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and reports 

directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Class (30, 50, 60) Classification of bridges that indicate 

the safe weight-bearing capacity; small 

yellow classification signs are affixed 

to the front and sides of vehicles showing their safe loads.

Class 60 Floating Bridge Pneumatic floats covered with two decktread panels, curbs, and filler panels that 

can support division loads as a float 

bridge or raft; assembling the bridge 

requires cranes and air compressors.

Compacted Soil compressed by rolling to reduce 

surface volume in preparation for construction.

Conex A reusable metal container used for 

shipping military equipment.

COSVN Central Office for South Vietnam

Creosoted Timber Piles and timbers treated with woodtar distillate as a preservative.

D7E Bulldozer New standard military bulldozer 

introduced in 1966 in the D7 series 

of bulldozers dating back to World 

War II.

Decomposed Granite Granite deposits often marked by outcroppings of granite boulders.

DeLong Pier A prefabricated pier developed by the 

DeLong Corporation used for rapid 

building of port quays and ship berths.
609

Glossary

Dry Span A portable bridge for crossing short 

gaps under forty-five feet or longer 

spans using trestle bents; made up of 

M4T6 floating bridge superstructure 

components such as trestles and balk 

decking. (See also Balk Decking.)

Eiffel Bridge A French designed and manufactured 

bridge for carrying light traffic.

Fair-Weather Road Unpaved roads normally suitable for 

traffic during dry season but susceptible to damage during rainy season.

Float Bridge Tactical bridge designed to float on 

water on inflated rubber floats or 

metal pontoons. Types of float bridges 

included a foot bridge, light tactical 

raft, M4T6 bridge and raft, and Class 

60 bridge and raft.

Hardstand Hard-surfaced area for parking aircraft, equipment and vehicles, and 

supplies.

Hopper Dredge A self-propelled and seaworthy dredge 

using hydraulic suction pipes to excavate bottom material into internal 

hoppers as opposed to separate barges. 

The dredge can carry its waste to a 

dumping site.

Horizontal Construction Engineering term used to differentiate construction at or near ground 

level as compared to vertical construction, which is associated with 

structural work above ground; 

included is use of equipment for 

earthmoving, paving, and drainage 

work to build roads, canals, airfields, 

and open-storage areas. (See also 

Vertical Construction.)
Engineers at War

610

Laterite A red to brown, porous soil rich in secondary oxides of iron and aluminum. 

Laterite is unique in tropical regions 

such as Vietnam and is used widely as 

subgrade material for roads, airfields, 

and open-storage areas.

LCM Landing craft, mechanized

LCU Landing craft, utility

LOC Lines of communication

LST Landing ship, tank

M4T6 Bridge Portable bridge used to build rafts, 

float bridges, and short fixed spans 

with hollow-tubed decking (also 

known as balk decking).

M8 Matting Pierced steel landing matting distinguished by round holes in the matting 

developed in World War II.

M8A1 Matting Solid steel airfield matting widely used 

on forward airfields and parking areas.

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAP Military Assistance Program

MCA Military Construction, Army. Funds 

appropriated for Army construction.

MILCON Military Construction. Funds appropriated for major construction.

MUST Medical unit, self-contained, transportable

MR Military Region

MX19 Matting Square aluminum matting with honeycombed interior introduced in 1966 

and proved preferable for heavily used 

forward airfields.
611

Glossary

OICC Officer in Charge of Construction, 

Republic of Vietnam. Naval Facilities Engineer Command’s officer and 

office charged with supervising RMKBRJ (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones) in 

South Vietnam.

OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army. 

Funds appropriated for repair and 

maintenance of facilities.

Operation Moose Move Out Of Saigon Expeditiousl

OPLAN Operation Plan

PA&E Pacific Architects and Engineers. California engineering firm under contract 

by the Army to provide facilities engineering services and minor construction.

PACOM Pacific Command. Joint command 

under the CINCPAC who commands 

all service forces in the Pacific, including MACV.

Peneprime A rapidly placed, temporary dust-control material with an asphalt base that 

was sprayed on a leveled, graded, and 

compacted area, such as helipads, to 

bond sand particles. 

Philco-Ford Corporation Facilities engineering contractor working for the Navy and later the Army in 

I Corps.

Pioneer Road Hastily built roads supporting tactical 

operations; the roads may be subsequently improved or abandoned upon 

completion of an operation or the 

closing of a firebase.

Prime Beef Air Force engineering teams derived 

from nickname (Prime) and acronym 

(Base Engineering Emergency Force).
Engineers at War

612

Red Horse Air Force engineering squadrons 

derived from acronym Red (Rapid 

Engineering Deployable) and Horse 

(Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, 

Engineering). 

RMK-BRJ Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown 

and Root, and J. A. Jones. A joint venture of four American contractors under 

the direction of the OICC, Republic of 

Vietnam, hired to do large construction 

projects for the armed forces and U.S. 

agencies in South Vietnam.

ROK Republic of Korea

Rome Plow A D7E bulldozer equipped with a 

heavy-duty protective cab and a special tree-cutting blade manufactured 

by the Rome Plow Company of Cedartown, Georgia. Used to clear vegetation and deny cover and concealment 

to enemy forces.

RVN Republic of Vietnam, also known as 

South Vietnam.

Sheepsfoot Roller A towed roller with attached feet used 

to compact loose soil as contrasted to 

a motorized pneumatic-tired and steelwheeled roller.

T–2 Tanker A tanker used as an electrical power ship.

T17 Membrane Rubberized fabric used as an expedient 

airfield surfacing material on runways, 

taxiways, and parking areas.

TOE Table of organization and equipment

Transphibian Tactical 

 Tree Crusher

A land-clearing device that was only 

marginally effective in felling trees and 

vegetation.

Turnkey Air Force construction contract package used at Tuy Hoa without Army or 

Navy engineering resources.

USARPAC U.S. Army, Pacific
613

Glossary

USARV U.S. Army, Vietnam

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development. State Department agency 

reorganized and renamed in 1961 to 

carryout long-range economic assistance programs. (See also USOM.)

USOM U.S. Operations Mission. A field 

agency under USAID and its predecessor organization charged with carrying 

out economic and technical assistance 

in underdeveloped nations.

USNS U.S. Navy Ship

Vertical Construction In contrast to horizontal construction, vertical construction is more 

labor intensive and requires the use 

of hand tools; also includes efforts 

by carpenters, masons, steelworkers, plumbers, electricians, and other 

building tradesmen to build aboveground structures. (See also Horizontal Construction.)

Vinnell Corporation California firm awarded a contract 

with the Army to convert T–2 tankers to generate electricity and to build, 

operate, and maintain land-based 

power distribution systems.

Wonder Arches Steel aircraft shelters, reinforced with 

concrete that were designed to protect 

Air Force and Marine Corps fighter aircraft from bomb and rocket damage.

Map Symbols and Terms

Military Units

Function

Airborne Infantry

Airmobile Infantry

Armored Cavalry

Engineer

Infantry

Marine Corps

Size Symbols 

Battalion or Armored Cavalry Squadron

Regiment or Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brigade

Division

Corps

Examples

70th Engineer Battalion (Combat)

35th Engineer Group (Construction)

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

Boundary between the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions

3 25

X

35

III

XX

1

25

1 CAV

X X

III

I I

X X

X

XXX

70

III
Engineers at War

616

Geographic Terms

Nui Mountain

Song River

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Arty Artillery

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Aust Australian

BEQ Bachelor Enlisted Quarters

BOQ Bachelor Officers’ Quarters

Bn Battalion

CAV Cavalry

CTZ Corps Tactical Zone

Evac Evacuation

FFV Field Force, Vietnam

HQ Headquarters

Inf Div Infantry Division

LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized

LCU Landing Craft, Utility

Log Logistics

LST Landing Ship, Tank

LZ Landing Zone

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAF Marine Amphibious Force

MR Military Region

Ops Operation

Ord Ordnance

PA&E Pacific Architects and Engineers

POL Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants

Repl Replacement

Rgt Regiment

RMK-BRJ Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and 

 Root, and J. A. Jones

ROK Republic of Korea

TF Task Force

USAF U.S. Air Force

USARV U.S. Army, Vietnam
A Luoi, 366, 367

A Shau Valley, 235, 359, 365–68, 376, 378, 

475, 524

landing zones in, 470

and Operation Dewey Canyon, 46

and Operation York, 303, 3

supply route for, 473

Abrams, General Creighton W., 323, 359, 

392, 410, 487, 564, 575

and civilianization, 391–92, 393

equipment and facilities transfers, 460, 517

on Khe Sanh, 368

and Operation Pegasus, 36

and pacification, 458

Accelerated Turnover (Navy), 565

Adams, Col. Carroll T., 508, 510

Adjutant General Corps, 187

Advisers, 1–3, 263, 431, 458, 459, 489, 561, 579

at Kontum, 403

sites for, 297, 450, 457, 518, 565, 571, 573

to South Vietnamese forces, 212, 462, 

464, 506, 540, 557, 558, 562

and Tet offensive, 343

Agent Blue, 194

Agent Orange, 194n62

Aguilar, Lt. Col. Domingo I., 326

Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 518

Air Force, U.S., 2, 39–40

2d Division Civil Engineer, 79

554th Civil Engineering Squadron, 269

555th Civil Engineering Squadron, 109, 

114, 451, 452

819th Civil Engineering Squadron, 451

820th Civil Engineering Squadron, 452–55

823d Civil Engineering Squadron, 79, 95, 

109, 111, 147, 373, 451–52

Directorate of Civil Engineering, 91

engineers, 48, 265, 269, 274

Logistics Command, 40

Military Airlift Command, 115

Seventh, 188, 550

See also Bien Hoa; Projects, Enhance

Enhance Pl

Airboats, 222

Airborne Division

101st, 350, 509, 538, 545, 546, 572, 582

in I Corps, 469, 472, 551

in A Shau Valley, 365, 367, 475–

76, 524

at Bien Hoa, 449

at Camp Eagle, 376, 470, 473, 525

Firebase Ripcord, 5

Hue protected by, 512

at Phu Bai, 357–58, 360

at Polei Kleng, 209

Airborne Brigades

1st, 101st Airborne Division, 48, 58, 61–

62, 123, 249–50, 509

in A Shau Valley, 366–67, 376–77

at Cam Ranh Bay, 56

at Dak To, 180

Phan Rang Air Base, 59, 220, 293, 

294

in Phu Yen Province, 180, 181, 182

at Plei Trap, 202, 209, 214

in Que Son Valley, 252

See also Task Forces, Orego

2d, 101st Airborne Division, 509

3d, 82d Airborne Division, 357, 388, 389, 

456, 468, 469

3d, 101st Airborne Division, 358, 369, 

388

173d, 16, 51, 56, 58, 67, 229, 322, 335

in II Corps, 56, 469

in III Corps, 165

at Ben Het, 26, 323

and Bien Hoa, 294

in Binh Dinh Province, 388, 509, 

513

casualties, 325

at Dak To, 326

engineers assigned to, 48

in Iron Triangle, 59

mine clearing, 58

operations of, 68, 70, 71

in Phuoc Tuy Province, 54–55

in Pleiku Province, 318, 319, 369

and Tam Quan bridge, 514

Index
Engineers at War

618

Airborne Brigades—Continued

and tunnel complexes, 166, 192

in War Zone D, 59, 68–69

See also Operations, Attleb

Cedar Falls, Crim

Marauder, Silver

Airborne Battalions

1st, 503d Infantry, 53

2d, 503d Infantry, 53, 71

Aircraft. See particular types; Helicopters.

Aircraft, bombers

B–52 Stratofortress, 59, 73, 302, 325, 369, 

478, 491, 509, 563

B–57 Canberra, 271

Aircraft, cargo

C–7 Caribou, 116, 213, 271, 274, 326, 

338, 352, 361, 366, 505

C–123 Provider, 76, 178–79, 188, 194, 

209–13, 231, 271, 310–11, 338, 361, 

371, 443

C–124 Globemaster, 370

C–130 Hercules, 66, 113–15, 130–32, 141, 

147, 178, 180–82, 184–85, 188–89, 211–

15, 238, 252, 310, 322, 338, 352–53, 365–

67, 371, 443, 472, 524, 535–37, 557–58

Aircraft, fighter-bombers

F–4 Phantom, 114, 137, 271

F–100 Super Sabre, 99, 271, 274

Aircraft, miscellaneous

AC–47 Spooky gunship, 337

OV–1 Mohawk surveillance, 454

Allis Chalmers, 195

American Association of State Highway 

Officials, 415

Ammi pontoon bridges, 220

An Hoa, 426–27, 450, 548

An Khe, 111, 192, 275, 279, 321, 354, 472

1st Cavalry Division based at, 34, 58, 59–

66, 72, 130, 189

airfield at, 60, 130–32, 181, 189, 220, 256, 

276, 336, 543

and Highway 19, 130, 175, 276, 334

mine clearing, 58

Pass, 58, 256–57, 276, 340

pipeline, 127–28

power generation at, 380

quarry at, 61, 184

supplying, 157, 277–78

See also Engineer Battalions, 70th; Camp 

Radcliff.

An Lao Valley, 218, 252, 253

An Loc, 172, 306, 310, 316, 317, 557–58

Anderson, Lt. Col. Reuben L., 125, 128, 180

Andrews, Maj. Stuart M., USAF, 178

Ann (dredge), 126, 273

Antitank gun, M56 self-propelled, 54

Ap Bac, 11

Ap Nha Mat, 69

Armed Forces Radio Service, 64

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, 

144, 288

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 11th, 141, 231, 

249, 259, 514

in III Corps, 304, 469

base camp, 144, 146, 283, 363, 468

at Chu Lai, 239

departs, 451

in Fishhook area, 502

and land clearing, 307, 308–09

at Snuol, 496

and Tet offensive, 341

See also Operations, Attleb

Junction City, Niagra F

Speedy Express, Toan Thang 

Armored personnel carriers, 170, 251, 305, 

376, 535, 583

with flamethrowers, 72, 170, 207, 222, 

252, 319, 585

M113, 54, 67, 583

Army, Eighth, 86, 90n26

Army Engineer Hydrographic Survey Team 

Number 1, 421

Army Map Service, 584

Army Materiel Command, U.S., 29, 30, 98, 

109, 380, 582

and supply shortages, 41, 42, 157

and Vinnell contract, 381

Army Military Assistance Program 

Logistics, 81, 82

Army Reserve troops, 15, 31

Army Signal Corps, 274

Army Waterways Experiment Station, 

Vicksburg, Mississippi, 90n26

Army, U.S. Department of the, 33, 49, 156, 

376, 385, 391, 563

Artillery Group, 23d, 554

Artillery support, 54, 56, 64, 67, 70, 73–74, 

110, 171–73, 179, 200–201, 204, 210, 

218, 229, 252, 258, 262, 310, 323, 335, 

366, 376, 378, 488, 516, 524, 537–38, 

584. See also Firebases.

Artillery weapons

8-inch howitzer, 509

105-mm. howitzer, 73, 263, 315, 509, 

556

175-mm. gun 263, 322, 509, 534, 573

Assistance-in-Kind funds, 393

Atomic Energy Commission, 44n53

Austin, Maj. Harold P., 51, 52

Australia, 26, 70, 193, 195, 469, 514, 558

1st Australian Task Force, 54, 110, 151, 

303, 307, 389
619

Index

1st Battalion, Royal Australian 

Regiment, 171

engineer units of, 70, 435

and tunnel complexes, 166

Aviation Battalion, 14th, 244

Aviation Group, 34th, 274

Ba Ria, 192, 307

Bachus, Col. Walter O., 545

Bailey bridge, 130, 173, 183, 219, 231, 327

Ball-and-chain technique, 197

Ban Don airstrip, 338

Ban Me Thuot, 133, 213, 272, 389, 394, 

509, 515

construction at, 185, 472

and land-clearing operations, 340

Tet offensive, 331, 336

transfer of, 432

Bao Loc, 138, 457

Bao Trai, 450

Barges, 428, 574–75

Barrett, USNS, 22, 394

Barrier Island, 481

Base areas (enemy), 226, 495, 509, 510

Base demolition, 548–49

Base Engineer Emergency Force (Air Force), 

48, 109, 124–25, 133–34, 147, 151

Bau Bang, 69, 167

Bearcat, 145, 174, 304, 377, 502–03, 553

Armor School at, 571

camp at, 142, 146, 197, 221

power plant at, 282

supply shortages at, 280

Ben Cat, 168, 170, 310, 314, 317, 344

Ben Het, 322, 323, 326, 327

Ben Luc, 311, 427, 435

Ben Phuoc, 311

Ben Suc, 226

Benton, Lt. Col. Arthur L., 584

Berry, Lt. Col. Elbert D. H., 423

Besson, General Frank S., Jr., 98

Bien Hoa, 16, 47, 54, 55, 67, 294, 365, 

541

Air Base, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 31, 51, 53, 144, 

147, 232, 279–80, 283, 452, 468, 472, 

506, 550

Army base at, 385

attacks on, 306, 341

base transfer, 573

bridge, 427, 435

cantonment at, 106

Industrial Zone, 573

land-clearing operations, 306, 307

power generation, 281, 380

Red Horse units at, 451

supplying, 280

and railroad, 442

roads to, 402

See also Airborne Brigades, 173d.

Bien Hoa Highway, 403, 442

Binh Dinh Province, 59, 102, 259, 388, 

389, 542

operations in, 175–85, 216, 250, 251, 469

RMK-BRJ projects in, 255–56

See also Cavalry Division, 1st 

(Airmobile).

Binh Duong Province, 165, 167, 552

Binh Gia, 54

Binh Khe, 334

Binh Loi Bridge, 427, 435

Binh Long Province, 172, 188, 494

Binh Son Rubber Plantation, 308

Binh Thuan Province, 181

Binh Thuy Air Base, 151, 473

Binh Tuy Province, 70, 553

Black Virgin Mountain. See Nui Ba Den.

Blackhorse. See Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, 11th.

Bo Duc, 317

Boi Loi Woods, 553

Bong Son, 178, 242, 243, 472

bridges, 218, 219, 255, 258, 260, 407, 430

Campaign, 177–78, 430

and highways, 128, 254, 259, 260, 272, 

275, 335, 406, 424, 430, 433, 449, 473

Plain, 177, 218

Booth, Capt. William D., 508

Booz Allen, 438

Boucher, 1st Lt. Thomas O., 178

Boylan, Lt. Col. James F., 145

Bradford, Sp4c. James, 513

Bradley, Brig. Gen. William T., 384, 387

Brandes, Lt. Col. William F., 118

Brandt, Col. Roland A., 34, 65

Braucher, Col. Ernest P., 134, 157, 208, 

272, 277

Brennan, Col. John W., 546

Bridging equipment, M4T6, 27, 48, 67, 183–

84, 205, 228, 320

and Bong Son Bridge, 430

at Dak Poko River, 327

at Dak To, 215

and Khe Sanh, 362, 530–31, 532

Kon Bring Bridge, 210

at Lai Giang River, 260

and Operation Attleboro

at Phu Cuong Bridge, 430

at Quang Tri combat base, 529

rafts, 212, 214, 220, 228

and Se San River, 204, 206

South Vietnamese Army uses, 505, 563

Brinkerhoff, Lt. Col. John R., 510
Engineers at War

620

Broumas, Lt. Col. Andre G., 470

Brown and Root, 48, 290. See also RMKBRJ (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones).

Brown, Col. Levi A., 546

Bu Dop Special Forces camp, 310, 317, 318, 

470, 495, 500

Bu Gia Map airfield, 500

Bulldozers, 41, 225, 233, 251, 270, 306, 378

Allis Chalmers HD16M, 42, 157, 195, 269

Case 450 airmobile, 510, 516

Case 580 combined scoop loader, 516

Caterpillar 830M, 269, 275

Clark 290M, 157, 158, 208, 269, 270, 347, 

351, 417, 461, 481, 498

D4B, 205, 206

D5A, 378, 471

D6B, 63, 179, 319, 325–26

D7, 42, 338, 348, 349, 510, 530, 553

D7E, 157, 196, 197, 208, 225, 269, 306, 

367, 370, 372, 417, 461, 476, 478, 480, 

500, 535, 581

D8, 195

D9, 195, 197, 478, 553

M450, 471, 531, 540

TD20, 40, 157

TD24, 157

tree horn blade, 195

yo-yo dozing, 474

See also Rome plow.

Bunch, Lt. Col. James E., 19, 20, 21, 24–25, 114

Buon Blech Special Forces camp, 179, 181, 

211, 212

Bush, Col. George M., 103, 185–86, 253, 

273, 274–75, 278. See also Engineer 

Groups, 45th.

Ca Lu, 353, 360, 529

Cache City Road, 500

Cam Lo, 538

Cam Ranh Bay, 56, 58, 103, 104, 120, 265, 

267, 270, 298

airfield at, 28, 31, 95, 97, 118, 220, 271, 

550

construction at, 23–31, 112, 114–15

DeLong piers at, 27, 28, 29–30, 111, 112–

13, 266

development of, 80, 111–18, 266

electrical power generation at, 109, 115, 

267, 271, 380, 569–70

facilities at, 84, 112, 271, 296, 419, 449, 

543, 565

labor strikes at, 160

port at, 6, 12, 20, 21–22, 96, 278, 443

quarry, 38, 269

and railroad, 442

Sea-Land Services at, 271, 573

shortages at, 41, 154–55, 157, 159

and Tet offensive, 331, 354

transfer of, 573, 575

Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Area, 42–43, 80, 104

Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, 265, 383 

Cambodia, 74, 488–89, 504

Angel’s Wing, 489, 490, 491, 562

border operations, 172, 174, 181, 299, 

310, 318, 388, 463, 487, 493

Dog’s Head area, 494, 504

Fishhook area, 491–92, 494, 502–04, 508

North Vietnamese haven, 73–74, 175, 

202, 207, 216, 322, 369, 482, 486

withdrawal from 493, 495, 497–98, 509

See also Operations, Toan Thang 41 

through 46.

Cambodian Army, 489, 490, 491

Camp Eagle, 365, 385, 450, 471. See also

Airborne Divisions, 101st.

Camp Enari, 321, 336, 337, 515, 520, 571

Camp Evans, 346, 352, 353, 363, 366, 385, 450–

51. See also Engineer Battalions, 14th.

Camp Frenzell-Jones, 341, 572

Camp Haskins, 524

Camp Holloway, 10, 133, 558, 570

Camp Horn, 524, 573

Camp Jerome, 456

Camp Radcliff, 181, 509, 510, 511, 515

construction of, 62, 64, 276, 515

transfer of, 520, 571

Camp Smith, 457

Camp Swift, Texas, 90n26

Camp Viking, 456

Can Giuoc, 468

Can Tho, 8, 151, 344, 385, 421, 564, 570

airfield, 6, 285, 468, 560

base transfers, 520

power plant at, 445

Tet offensive, 343

See also Engineer Battalions, 69th.

Cannon, Col. C. Craig, 43, 45

Cannon, Capt. Joseph M., 168

Capitol Engineering Corporation, 402, 403

Carolina, SS, 351

Carpenter, Lt. Col. Robert H., 528

Carrasco, Lt. Col. Valentine E., 477

Carter, Lt. Col. Colin M., 147

Casey, Maj. Gen. George W., 512

Cassidy, Lt. Gen. William F., 43–44, 82, 249

Castro, Lt. Col. Joseph F., 246, 250

Cat Lai, 150

Cat Lo, 284

Caterpillar Corporation, 42, 157, 179, 417, 555

Cavalry Division, 1st (Airmobile), 58, 257, 

262, 326, 335, 353, 360, 514, 581
621

Index

in III Corps, 472

in A Shau Valley, 365–66

and Army reorganization, 376

in Binh Dinh Province, 77, 102, 180, 216, 

218, 220, 251–52

in Cambodia, 512

in Central Highlands, 51

departs Vietnam, 488

deployed, 26

and Duc Pho, 235, 236, 238

facilities for, 64–65, 248, 272, 346, 449, 

488

helicopters of, 127

and Khe Sanh relief, 361–62, 363, 368

operations of, 128, 175–76, 181, 252, 272, 

352, 463, 470, 487, 495, 499

at Phuoc Vinh, 388

and Pleiku, 73, 77

and Tet offensive, 345, 346, 352

in Trapezoid Area, 478

See also An Khe; Operations, Lib

Canyon, Lincoln, Malhe

Malheur II, Pegasus,

Bayonet, York, Toan Thang 

Cavalry Brigades

1st, 1st Cavalry Division, 252, 253, 323, 

325, 326, 352

A Shau Valley, 366

in Binh Dinh Province, 218

land clearing for, 479

Pleiku Campaign, 73, 74

and relief of Khe Sanh, 361

2d, 1st Cavalry Division, 74, 202, 206, 

236, 252–53

in Binh Dinh Province, 218

and relief of Khe Sanh, 360–61, 

363

takes Vinh Thanh Valley, 72

See also Operations, Abilen

3d, 1st Cavalry Division, 72, 250, 318, 

352, 491, 550, 554

in A Shau Valley, 366

in Binh Dinh Province, 218

Pleiku Campaign, 73, 74, 77

in Quang Ngai Province, 252

and relief of Khe Sanh, 360, 361, 

363

See also Operations, Abilene

Masher, Toan Thang 4

Cavalry Battalions

1st, 7th Cavalry, 73, 76, 77

1st, 8th Cavalry, 77

2d, 5th Cavalry, 236

2d, 7th Cavalry, 74, 77

Central Engineer District, 485

Central Highlands, 2, 14, 56, 325, 418, 557, 582

engineers in, 107, 129

highways in, 402, 404

troops deployed to, 51, 199, 469

Central Logistics Command, 466

Central Recovery Committee, 373

CH–54 Tarhe. See Helicopters.

Cha Rang, 127, 128, 253, 274, 275, 445, 554

Chan, Col. Nguyen, 431

Chapman, Brig. Gen. Curtis W., 279, 311, 

387, 393, 582

Charleston Army Depot, South Carolina, 29

Chemical defoliants, 194

Chemical Detachment, 242d, 225

Cheo Reo airstrip, 180, 189, 338, 472

Chi Linh, 310

Chi Thanh, 316, 317, 427–28

Cho Gao (dredge), 153, 154

Chu Lai, 235–51, 261, 263, 407, 520, 529

airfield at, 16, 21, 31, 96, 245, 246, 250, 

352, 451, 453, 545

contractors at, 244, 246, 382

facilities engineering at, 569

and Highway 1, 241, 242

typhoon damages, 546

Chu Pong Massif, 73, 175

Chup Rubber Plantation, 491, 505

Civic action projects, 109, 457, 467, 550, 

565

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 

53, 211, 317, 319, 322

Civilianization, 358–59, 391, 392, 393

Clark, Col. Charles R., 413

Clarke, Lt. Gen. Frederick J., 434, 486, 547

Clifford, Clark M., 357

Clymer, Col. David C., 103, 144

Coastal projects, 216–21

Cochard, Lt. Col. Edmond J., 81

Cogido Dock (Dong Nai), 140, 141, 450

Cole, Lt. Col. Fred V., 508

Collins, Maj. Gen. Arthur S., 201

Combined Central Highway and Waterways 

Committee, 412, 413, 423–24, 441

Connell, Lt. Col. Richard M., 128, 132

Contract Liaison offices, 272, 273

Contractors, 2, 5–6, 12, 39, 79, 108–10, 

443

backlog and, 445

and bridge construction, 434

at Cam Ranh complex, 111, 118, 266

and costs, 160, 292, 443

labor force of, 186

and road projects, 28, 31, 92, 404

and Tet offensive, 354

training programs, 91

turnkey, 99, 121, 269

Vietnamese, 149, 281, 440
Engineers at War

622

Contractors—Continued

See also Booz Allen; Dynalectron 

Corporation; Pacific Architects 

and Engineers, Inc.; Page 

Communications Engineers; PhilcoFord Corporation; RMK-BRJ 

(Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones); 

Quinton-Budlong Company; 

Vinnell Corporation; Walter Kidde 

Constructors, Inc.

Contracts, 6, 381

cost-plus-award-fee, 568, 569

cost-plus-fixed-fee, 5, 10, 386, 387

cost-plus-incentive, 569

cost-reimbursable, 567

fixed-price, 5

and Level of Effort concept, 292

lump-sum, 434, 436

See also RMK-BRJ (Raymond, 

Morrison-Knudsen, Brown and 

Root, and J. A. Jones); Vinnell 

Corporation.

Cooper, Brig. Gen. Kenneth B., 516, 542

Copeland, Capt. Richard L., 27

Cornett, Pfc. Roger L., 226–27

Corps

I, 246, 248, 250–51, 262, 333, 334–35, 515

airfields in, 6, 188

and Army reorganization, 376

base transfers in, 520–21

Dong Ha operations, 368

and drawdowns, 543

enemy actions, 250, 252, 316, 375, 

516–17

engineers in, 363, 396

First Regional Assistance 

Command, 548, 562

joint projects in, 363, 462

land-clearing operations in, 309, 

479, 553–54

logistics in, 345–53

marines in, 83, 94, 108, 189, 234, 

235, 360, 469

railroad in, 407

Typhoon Hester, 565

See also Infantry Divisions, 23d; 

Laos; Northern Engineer 

District; Operations, Yor

Task Forces, Orego

II, 175–85, 220, 236, 265–72, 377, 469, 509 

actions in, 318–22, 375, 509

airfields in, 6, 83, 188, 233, 472

and An Khe, 72

base maintenance and construction, 109

and base transfers, 520–21, 543

engineers in, 34, 391–92, 396

joint projects in, 462

Korean divisions in, 109

minesweeping in, 58

northern, 47, 104, 107, 253, 272–79, 

479

and reorganization, 105

replacement center, 115

roadwork, 258, 309, 310, 479

Second Regional Assistance 

Command, 541, 562

Second Regional Assistance 

Group, 541

Tet offensive in, 331–36

and Viet Cong underground, 513

See also Central Engineer 

District; Task Forces, Sout

III, 223–34, 279–87, 313–18, 396, 459n23, 

557

airfields in, 6, 83, 188–89

Australian Task Force in, 110

and base transfers, 520–21

battles in, 70, 71, 165–75, 322, 375

Civil Operations and 

Revolutionary Development 

Support adviser, 561

counter-infiltration operations in, 

551

and drawdowns, 543, 550

land clearing in, 197, 309, 479, 

553

maintenance and construction, 

109, 158, 391, 472, 552

Rome plows used in, 303, 304

and Tet offensive, 340–44

See also Southern Engineer District.

IV, 104, 140, 279–87, 378, 516, 546

airfields in, 6, 83

base maintenance and construction, 109, 472–73

and drawdowns, 543

engineers in, 396

joint projects, 462

operations in, 233, 311, 514

roadwork, 545

rock shortage, 158

See also Operations, Speed

Express; Southern Engine

District.

XXIV, 388, 474, 526

activated, 376

operations, 469, 512, 524

Corradi, R. Adm. Peter, 13

COSVN (Central Office for South Vietna

490, 492
623

Index

Counterinsurgency, 3, 5, 66, 67, 77

Crowley, Brig. Gen. John D., 88, 89

Cu Chi, 142, 147, 195, 282, 385, 468, 571

airfield at, 189, 450, 500

supply of, 310, 428

Cu Mong Pass, 220, 334, 336

Cua Viet, 345, 451

Cung Son Special Forces camp, 182

Curl, Lt. Col. Richard L., 510

Da Lat, 138, 307, 331, 380, 433

Da Nang, 346–47, 348, 352, 432, 481, 564

airfield, 4, 5, 6, 16, 31, 51, 96, 147, 350, 

450, 452–53

and base transfers, 520, 550, 573

China Beach, 573

DeLong piers at, 98

facilities at, 39, 84, 407

facilities engineering at, 569, 570

Force Logistics Command, 520

and Kham Duc evacuation, 372

land clearing at, 309, 554

port of, 12, 96, 443

project completion, 519, 565

Red Horse crews at, 452

Support Command, 526

Da Rang River, 121

Dak Pek Special Forces camp, 319

Dak Poko River bridge, 327

Dak Seang, 210, 211, 318–19, 375

Dak Ta Tan River, 320

Dak To, 180, 210, 216, 319, 322–28, 336

airfield at, 214, 215, 338

Dak To 1, 320, 326, 339

Dak To 2, 318, 320, 326, 327, 339

Special Forces camp at, 211, 318

See also Engineer Battalions, 299th; 

Operations, Horace Gr

Darlac Province, 179, 181; airfield in, 188

Dau Tieng, 146, 174, 200, 310, 375–76, 468

Davidson, Brig. Gen. Phillip B., 328

Davis, R. Adm. James R., 13

Davison, Lt. Gen. Michael S., 491

Davison, USS (dredge), 126, 273

Defense Attaché Office, 438–39, 440, 574, 

575–76, 577

Defense, U.S. Department of, 3–4, 49, 161–62, 

412, 518, 566

and construction boss, 85–87, 89, 90

and construction programs, 85, 95–96

financing construction, 97, 103, 294, 295, 

299, 563–64

theater-planning conferences, 4

Defoliation, 194

Del Gaudio, Sp4c. Richard, 513, 514

Delbridge, Lt. Col. Norman G., 319–20, 327

DeLong Corporation, 30–31, 111–12, 126, 574

DeLong pier, 27, 28, 29–30, 97, 112–13, 

123–24, 151, 270, 290, 379, 574–75. 

See also Cam Ranh Bay; Da Nang; 

Qui Nhon; Vung Tau.

Delta Rock Agency, 421, 427, 433, 438

Demilitarized Zone, 234, 303, 345, 359, 563, 

572

airstrips near, 181

engagements in, 368–69, 376–77

and Highway 1, 254, 408, 441

and railroad, 397, 398

routes through, 512, 557

units near, 235, 250, 263, 469, 513, 545, 551

Denz, Col. Ernest J., 495

Dependent Shelter Program, 519–20, 566

Deputy Officer in Charge of Construction, 

Republic of Vietnam, 5–6, 80–81, 83

DePuy, Maj. Gen. William E., 171, 228, 580

Di An, 59, 67, 145, 168, 282, 317, 571

facilities at, 36, 47, 68, 70, 141, 146

land clearing, 304, 306

and minesweeping, 170, 553

resupply of, 172–73

tunnel demolition training at, 174, 192

Diem, Ngo Dinh, 3, 11, 194, 402–03

Dillard, Maj. Gen. John A. B., 433, 465, 

484, 486, 508

Dinoxol, 194

Director of Construction, Republic of 

Vietnam, 568

Director of Facilities Engineering, 485

Directorate of Facilities Engineering 

(Engineer Command), 484, 485, 

547, 568

Dog’s Head area. See Cambodia.

Dong Ap Bia (Hill 937), 469, 471

Dong Ba Thin, 58, 103, 104, 105, 107, 116, 

124, 129

airfield at, 48, 102, 118, 271

facilities at, 117, 266

Dong Ha, 345, 352, 360, 362–63, 368, 426, 

532, 538

airfield, 189

base transfer, 451, 468, 520

bridge at, 427, 560

port, 432

rail service to, 399, 437

Dong Nai River, 54, 68, 69, 140, 150, 283, 

427, 435

Dong Tam, 107, 152–55, 221, 281, 284–87, 

373–78, 385, 388, 450, 467, 468, 472, 

571

Dong Tre Special Forces camp, 182

Dong Xoai, 53, 232, 310

Donovan, Col. James C., 510
Engineers at War

624

Dragon Mountain, 207, 210, 212, 214, 319–20

and base transfers, 520

camp at, 133, 185, 206, 208, 276, 449

See also Infantry Divisions, 4th.

Drawdown, increments, 547, 558

Dredging, 15, 112, 126, 150–52, 154, 266, 

273–74, 377, 391, 413, 445, 568

Driscoll, Lt. Col. Paul C., 462, 464–65, 477–

78, 502

Duc Co, 183, 202, 205, 206, 210, 320, 321, 511

Duc Lap Special Forces camp, 211, 212, 

375–76

Duc Pho, 189, 235–51, 258, 259, 262, 263, 

334

Duke, Brig. Gen. Charles M., 379, 384, 386, 

387, 394, 580

on contracts, 385, 387

and operational control agreement, 311, 

312, 313, 328

Duke, Col. Robert W., 20, 41

Dunn, Brig. Gen. Carroll H., 87, 88, 89–94, 

114, 149, 162, 547

construction priorities, 95–96

and funding issues, 96–97, 188

as J–4, 99–100

and procurement, 98, 99

Dynalectron Corporation, 419, 433, 439, 574

Ea Krong River, 212, 213, 214

Eagle’s Claw, 216

Easter offensive. See Nguyen Hue offensive.

Eckhardt, Maj. Gen. George S., 313

Edelstein, Lt. Col. Leonard, 33, 60, 61, 130, 

131

Egbert, Col. John S., 543

Eiffel bridging, 182, 200, 212, 218, 260, 285

Bong Son bridge, 430

on Highway 14, 210

Kompong Spean River, 506

Eifler, Maj. Gen. Charles W., 118

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 403n9

Elder, Brig. Gen. John H., Jr., 342, 387, 391, 

447

Electrical power, 109, 115, 138, 147, 265, 

267, 271, 276–77, 374, 380–81, 450. 

See also Vinnell Corporation.

Elkey, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Robert W., 508

Eltinge, USNS, 22

Engineer Advisory Branch, Military Assistance 

Advisory Group (MAAG), 79

Engineer Brigades

18th, 44, 86, 249, 253, 386, 387, 514

and civilianization, 392, 393

Combat Support Section, 104

at Dong Ba Thin, 129, 350

drawdowns, 541, 542

equipment issues and, 158, 419, 

460, 581

Headquarters Company, 43, 104

and highway program, 414, 424, 

425, 434

joint projects, 462

land-clearing operations, 196, 197, 

221, 476, 477, 479

Long Binh, 140

operations of, 47, 83, 111, 180, 

447, 472

organization, 483, 484

Ploger and, 84, 105

projects of, 448–49

and rock requirements, 159, 417, 418

strength and organization of, 48, 

97, 101, 103–04, 105–06, 107, 

145, 185, 320, 389, 458, 580 

and Tet offensive, 345

tunnel-destruction systems, 193

and Vung Ro port, 120

20th, 107, 279, 344, 365, 386, 387, 583 

at Bien Hoa, 294

and civilianization, 393

drawdowns, 541, 542

equipment of, 419, 460

and highway program, 424, 425, 434

land-clearing operations of, 476

organization and strength of, 311, 

320, 389, 392, 447–48, 483, 484 

rock requirements of, 287, 417, 418

Engineer Groups

34th, 20th Engineer Brigade, 221, 279, 

344, 391, 394, 450, 495

construction material shortage, 468

and drawdowns, 544, 546

in Mekong Delta, 285, 287, 378, 

396, 420, 450, 514

and soil stabilization, 422

and Vung Tau, 107, 284, 310

35th, 18th Engineer Brigade, 102, 103, 

105, 134, 208, 253, 394, 458 

in Binh Dinh Province, 389, 542

at Cam Ranh Bay, 24–25, 26, 27, 

28, 31, 34, 41, 48, 104, 107, 111, 

117, 156, 389, 544

and civilianization, 393

deploys, 19, 20, 22, 579

and drawdowns, 546

and highway program, 424, 435

and materiel, 36–37

medical bunker construction, 472

at Nha Trang, 117

at Phan Rang, 117, 340

and rock requirements, 159

at Tuy Hoa, 124, 354
625

Index

45th, 18th Engineer Brigade, 103, 104, 

185, 457, 528, 529, 542

and airfield construction, 252

casualties, 540–41

contract liaison office, 272–73

control of, 105, 107

and highway program, 220, 253, 

262, 417, 424, 426, 433, 474

Khe Sanh construction, 538

and III Marine Amphibious Force, 

350

minesweeping by, 262, 313

at Qui Nhon, 107, 128–29, 208, 243

rock requirements of, 256, 258

shortages, 124, 277, 278

Tet offensive and, 333, 345–46, 349

and training assistance, 465

79th, 20th Engineer Brigade, 104, 279, 

312, 389, 394, 495, 506

and II Corps, 487–88

in III Corps, 353–54, 516

and II Field Force, 477, 585

land clearing, 196, 304, 305, 306

logistic support, 156

at Long Binh, 144, 283, 341, 342, 

389

projects of, 144

redeployed, 517

rock requirements of, 159

tunnel demolition teams, 225

159th, 20th Engineer Brigade, 43, 103, 

135, 142, 144, 279, 354

at Bien Hoa, 282–83

at Dong Tam, 145, 154

and drawdowns, 544, 546, 548

at Long Binh, 47, 104, 107, 139, 

141, 145, 155, 280, 341, 342, 

389, 546

quarry, 158, 420

road and bridge construction, 304, 

424, 426, 428, 430

at Saigon, 144, 145

supplies for, 280–81

training program of, 186, 465

and tunnel destruction, 225

at Vung Tau, 144

921st, 18th Engineer Brigade, 105

937th, 18th Engineer Brigade, 34, 42, 65, 

128, 185, 320, 510

airfields, 180, 211

at An Khe, 157

at Cam Ranh Bay, 47

casualties, 339, 508

and Dak To, 215, 325, 326–27

drawdowns, 541, 543

joint projects, 462

at Pleiku, 107, 129, 134–35, 136, 

183, 272, 276, 277, 321, 515

at Qui Nhon, 104, 125, 136, 389

roadwork, 210, 272, 338, 340

shortages, 134–35, 278

and TOE 5–35E, 273

Engineer Battalions

1st, 1st Infantry Division, 67, 68, 71, 

229–30, 315–16, 451, 585

bridge erection boats of, 226

casualties, 168, 232

intelligence section, 68

land clearing, 201, 232

mine clearing, 72, 169, 172

operations, 167, 169–70

redeployed, 517, 549

and roads, 167, 172–74, 310, 315, 

316, 470, 478

Rome plow section, 306

Tet offensive and, 344

tunnel destruction, 72, 191–92, 

193, 226

See also Operations, Attleb

Cedar Falls, Billings

Birmingham, Paul Bunyon

Rolling Stone, Tuls

4th, 4th Infantry Division, 293, 319, 325, 

326, 327, 336, 510

bridge construction, 320

bunker destruction, 480

departs, 517

Flame Platoon, 407

at New Plei Djereng, 511

and Pleiku, 337, 585

7th, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

See Engineer Companies, A, 7th 

Engineer Battalion.

8th, 1st Cavalry Division, 62–63, 175–

185, 352–53, 495, 496, 500, 582

at An Khe, 130

in Binh Dinh Province, 252

along Cambodian border, 487

at Camp Radcliff, 65

casualties, 76, 470

Duc Pho operations, 236–37

and Highway 1, 242

in Ia Drang Valley, 72

Intelligence Section, 78

and Khe Sanh relief, 361, 363

at Landing Zone Hammond, 21

minesweeping, 367, 470

and pacification program, 252–53

and Pleiku Campaign, 74, 76

and tunnel destruction, 192

14th, 45th Engineer Group, 103, 124, 

129, 335, 526, 529, 545
Engineers at War

626

Engineer Battalions—Continued

bridge construction, 530–31

at Cam Ranh Bay, 118

Camp Evans hospital, 448

casualties, 541

and Khe Sanh, 361, 528

land-clearing operations, 479

and Red Devil Road, 472, 534

Utah Beach construction, 351

15th, 9th Infantry Division, 103, 193, 

221–22, 285, 310, 456, 468

19th, 937th Engineer Group, 34–35, 37, 

134, 181, 208, 254, 335, 389, 396

at Ban Me Thuot, 542

at Bong Son, 472

bulldozers of, 252

depot construction, 274

at Long My, 246

minesweeping by, 261

and Qui Nhon construction, 125, 

128, 129

redeploys, 517

road projects of, 218–19, 220, 243, 

257–58, 259, 261–62, 334, 425, 

448–49, 473, 583

in ROK Valley, 276

supply shortages, 37, 41

20th, 937th Engineer Group, 48, 49, 129, 

185, 208, 340, 515

airfield construction, 211, 472

at An Khe, 136

at Ban Me Thuot, 542

at Cam Ranh Bay, 116

casualties, 508

construction projects, 449, 472

at Pleiku, 102, 128, 133, 134, 320

redeployed, 543

roadwork, 325, 327–28, 338, 434

26th, 23d Infantry Division, 249, 250, 

259, 546, 550

27th, 79th Engineer Group, 103, 144, 

146, 225, 229–30

in A Shau Valley, 365, 367, 377, 

473–74

at Camp Eagle, 350, 365, 526, 536

construction projects of, 231, 283, 285

Khe Sanh, 528, 537

land-clearing operations, 479

mine detection, 367

Phu Bai projects, 448

and Pohl Bridge, 546

See also Operations, Dewe

Canyon II

29th Engineer Battalion (Base 

Topographic), 504

31st, 79th Engineer Group, 450, 465, 472, 

488, 496, 499, 500, 516, 546

deployed, 273, 394

and land clearing, 501, 553

at Long Binh, 552

See also Task Forces, Eas

34th, 79th Engineer Group, 283, 294, 

389, 449–50, 516, 544, 545

35th, 45th Engineer Group, 129, 260, 333, 

334, 335, 517

arrival, 102, 103, 104

augmented, 254–55

Bong Son bridge repair, 430

and Camp Evans, 352

and mines, 257, 260, 261

pipeline work of, 128

at Pleiku, 133

roadwork of, 253, 257, 259, 260–

61, 262, 275, 350–51, 450

in ROK Valley, 276 

and Tet offensive, 333, 334, 345, 

348–49

and training assistance, 465

36th, 34th Engineer Group, 365, 468, 

472, 544–45, 546, 548

arrival, 284–85

and roadwork, 450

training by, 461

39th, 35th Engineer Group, 103, 129, 

245–46, 249–50, 273, 545

arrival, 47–48, 49

at Cam Ranh Bay, 116

casualties, 242, 261

at Chu Lai, 546

land-clearing operations, 479, 481

minesweeping by, 182, 261

road projects of, 242–43, 259, 261, 

448–49, 513, 514

shortages of, 243

and Task Force Oregon, 238, 241

244, 253

at Tuy Hoa, 123, 183, 220

at Vung Ro Bay, 120, 123

See also Infantry Divisions, 23d.

46th, 159th Engineer Group, 26, 35, 37, 

449–50, 516, 541

at Long Binh, 47, 68, 103, 117, 

139, 140, 144, 174–75, 280, 

342, 449

and Task Force Dong Tam, 373–7

62d, 35th Engineer Group, 28, 37, 43, 

103, 389, 478

at Long Binh, 138, 383, 477

at Phan Rang Air Base, 59, 136, 

220, 271, 274, 280, 394, 451
627

Index

65th, 25th Infantry Division, 171, 174, 

229, 310, 490, 495, 499

at Cu Chi, 142

at Dong Ba Thin, 116

and land clearing, 480

Long Binh, 280, 342

minesweeping, 376, 507

at Phu Cuong Bridge, 430

redeployed, 517

and tunnel destruction, 192, 193

See also Operations, Attle

69th, 20th Engineer Brigade, 344, 378, 

450, 468, 472, 516

arrival, 284–85

casualties, 342

drawdown of, 545

70th, 937th Engineer Group, 33, 34–35, 

134, 181, 273, 339, 340, 472

and An Khe, 60, 65, 66, 102, 130–

32, 136, 157, 208, 277–78

at Ban Me Thuot, 389, 394

at Camp Radcliff, 64–65, 276

Dak To, 325, 327

at Kham Duc, 369, 371, 372

Pleiku, 321

at Qui Nhon, 40

redeployment, 456

roadwork of, 338–39

security issues, 61–62

and tunnel destruction, 192

84th, 937th Engineer Group, 19, 22, 134, 

178, 208, 335, 389, 545

and Bong Son bridge, 430

at Da Nang, 546

as Engineer Region, Military 

Region 1, 547–48

fence construction, 472

at Phu Tai, 542

quarry used by, 38

at Qui Nhon, 25, 34, 61, 66, 125, 

126, 129, 187, 273, 275, 449, 585

supply shortages, 37

and Tet offensive, 334

training South Vietnamese engineers, 460

See also Operations, Duke.

86th, 79th Engineer Group, 103, 144, 

145–46, 147, 225, 229, 285, 472

redeployed, 456, 468

and tunnel-destruction training, 

193

at Vung Tau, 147

87th, 35th Engineer Group, 26–27, 37, 

43, 117, 392, 479

at Cam Ranh Bay, 27, 112–14, 269, 

383

at Phan Thiet, 117, 365

92d, 159th Engineer Group, 280, 430, 

461, 516, 542, 555, 562

at Bien Hoa Air Base, 472

as Engineer Region, Military 

Region 3, 548, 562

at Long Binh, 342, 460, 500, 546

at Long Thanh, 449–50

93d, 34th Engineer Group, 284, 308, 378, 

450, 456, 468, 516, 545

105th, 30th Infantry Division, 90n26

116th Engineer Combat (Utah National 

Guard), 394, 449, 457, 472

129th, 29th Infantry Division, 44n53

168th, 79th Engineer Group, 68, 103, 

144–45, 310, 312, 449–50

at Di An, 146, 174

and land clearing, 304, 315, 344, 365

at Long Binh, 139, 141, 142, 174

at Prek Klok, 231

and tunnel destruction, 192, 193, 

225, 229–30

169th, 159th Engineer Group, 141, 173, 

225, 280, 450, 461, 546

equipment operators school, 419

and land clearing, 195

at Long Binh, 103, 342, 449, 516

196th, 196th Infantry Brigade, 550

299th, 937th Engineer Group, 47, 133, 

136, 544, 515, 551

airfield projects, 180, 214–15

Dak To, 215, 325, 326, 327

Kon Bring Bridge, 210

at Kontum City, 338

at Pleiku, 102, 134, 157, 183, 208, 

320, 321

and Qui Nhon construction, 125, 128

and roadwork, 181, 338–39, 449, 472

water points, 208, 209

See also Operations, Picke

326th, 101st Airborne Division, 363, 525, 

526, 528

in A Shau Valley, 366–67, 377, 378

equipment of, 470–71

firebase construction by, 470, 516

544th, 79th Engineer Group, 283, 423, 

433, 461, 472, 516, 546

554th, 79th Engineer Group, 488, 495, 

499, 546

577th, 45th Engineer Group, 124, 129, 

253, 472, 515, 544

aircraft revetments, 472, 515

arrival, 103, 117

at Tuy Hoa, 124, 268, 394, 449

588th, 159th Engineer Group, 47, 68, 

103, 141, 273, 310, 312, 488, 516
Engineers at War

628

Engineer Battalions—Continued

and land clearing, 195, 501

at Long Binh, 139, 146

redeployed, 518

at Tay Ninh, 145, 146, 310, 450, 

498

and tunnel destruction, 192, 193, 225

See also Operations, Juncti

City; Task Forces, We

589th, 45th Engineer Group, 253, 276, 335, 

449, 452, 541 

aircraft revetment construction 

by, 472, 515, 543

at Qui Nhon, 187, 333

roadwork of, 256, 275, 334,

336

815th, 937th Engineer Group, 208, 321, 

338, 434, 449, 472, 515

and drawdown, 543–44, 546

rock crushers, 276–77, 278

South Vietnamese engineer training, 460

864th, 35th Engineer Group, 19, 20, 43, 

114, 117, 269, 472

and drawdown, 543

group headquarters of, 22

Nha Trang construction, 449

quarry used by, 38

transport of, 22

See also Task Forces, 21, Whiskey.

Engineer Companies

6th, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, 249

15th Light Equipment, 326

41st Port Construction, 343, 428, 430, 

450

55th, 198th Brigade, 249

59th Land Clearing, 474, 477, 479, 529, 

531, 541, 554

60th Land Clearing, 463, 477, 478, 501, 

502–03, 504, 554

66th Topographic 145, 341, 504, 546

67th Dump Truck, 146, 283, 378, 456

70th Dump Truck, 255

73d Construction Support, 126, 258

79th Provisional Bridge, 495, 496, 497, 

499

87th, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, 311, 

449

100th Float Bridge 145, 312, 341, 461

102d Construction Support, 27, 114, 

159, 208

104th Dump Truck, 497

131st Light Equipment (Vermont 

National Guard), 394, 457

137th Light Equipment, 255, 257, 258, 

261, 262, 473, 513

173d, 173d Airborne Brigade, 51, 52, 53, 

54, 230, 325–26, 585

collaborates with Australian 

engineers, 70

and Operation Attleboro

operations, 167

175th, 196th Infantry Brigade, 200, 229, 

241, 546

178th Field Maintenance, 22

362d Light Equipment, 144, 145, 312, 

488, 495, 500

497th Port Construction, 25, 29, 121, 

126, 450, 458

at Cam Ranh Bay, 27, 111–12, 449

as Engineer Region, Military 

Region 2, 548, 558

organization of, 156–57

500th Panel Bridge, 145, 229, 312

501st, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 

550, 555

501st Land Clearing, 462–63, 477, 478

509th Panel Bridge, 35, 134, 181, 208, 

218–19, 238, 339

510th Direct Support Maintenance, 40

511th Panel Bridge, 134, 347, 514

513th Dump Truck, 22, 61, 116, 258

517th Light Equipment, 255, 347, 396

523d Port Construction, 333, 336, 456, 

545

538th Land Clearing, 477, 479, 554

544th Construction Support, 488

553d Float Bridge, 27, 120, 183, 220, 255

554th Float Bridge, 134, 208, 209, 210–

11, 238, 249, 255

557th, 144, 270, 495, 501, 552

land clearing by, 196, 225, 500, 555

roadwork, 488, 499

571st Engineer Combat, 456

572d Light Equipment, 47–48, 120, 182, 

457–58

584th Light Equipment, 22, 133, 134, 

185, 327, 508

585th Dump Truck, 134, 208

586th Dump Truck, 339

591st Light Equipment, 283, 365, 367, 

537, 538

595th Light Equipment, 456, 480, 495, 498

610th Construction Support, 269, 542

617th Panel Bridge, 145, 174, 201

630th Light Equipment, 47, 65–66, 128, 

132, 134, 178, 180–81

632d Light Equipment, 61, 65

643d Pipeline Construction, 124, 146, 

273, 449

687th, 477, 479, 481

697th Pipeline Construction, 127
629

Index

919th, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

146, 193, 471, 495

984th Land Clearing, 477, 478, 502–03, 

504, 553, 554

and Rome plows, 498, 499, 501

training by, 463

A, 1st Engineer Battalion, 68, 168, 172–

73, 310, 315, 316, 317, 549

A, 4th Engineer Battalion, 205, 206, 319, 

336

A, 7th Engineer Battalion, 376, 471, 528, 

529, 533, 534–35, 538, 549

A, 8th Engineer Battalion, 76, 178–79, 

181, 218, 253, 325, 326, 352

A, 14th Engineer Battalion, 118

A, 15th Engineer Battalion, 221

A, 19th Engineer Battalion, 178, 218–19, 

220, 473

A, 20th Engineer Battalion, 327

A, 27th Engineer Battalion, 200, 231, 

284, 367, 377, 534

A, 31st Engineer Battalion, 499, 552

A, 35th Engineer Battalion, 253, 257, 

262, 348

A, 39th Engineer Battalion, 182, 220, 

238, 241–42, 513, 546

A, 65th Engineer Battalion, 499

A, 70th Engineer Battalion, 131, 132, 

327, 340, 369–70, 371, 372

A, 86th Engineer Battalion, 147

A, 116th Engineer Battalion, 394, 449

A, 168th Engineer Battalion, 141–42, 

145, 146, 174, 306

A, 299th Engineer Battalion, 132–33, 

180, 209, 210, 211, 510

at Dak To, 214, 215

and Highway 19, 327

A, 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 

58, 59, 192, 241, 377, 540

A, 588th Engineer Battalion, 174–75, 

498, 500

A, 864th Engineer Battalion, 114

B, 1st Engineer Battalion, 55–56, 70, 168, 

315, 317, 344

B, 4th Engineer Battalion, 202, 205, 206, 

319, 336, 337–38

B, 8th Engineer Battalion, 72, 206–07, 

218, 236, 238, 253–54, 487

at Buon Blech, 179–80

Pleiku Campaign, 74, 76

B, 14th Engineer Battalion, 118

B, 15th Engineer Battalion, 307

B, 19th Engineer Battalion, 218, 219

B, 20th Engineer Battalion, 184, 511

B, 27th Engineer Battalion, 231, 284, 367

B, 31st Engineer Battalion, 499, 552–53

B, 35th Engineer Battalion, 260, 347, 348

B, 39th Engineer Battalion, 124, 182, 

242, 246, 513

B, 46th Engineer Battalion, 117, 280, 

373, 374

B, 62d Engineer Battalion, 477

B, 65th Engineer Battalion, 499

B, 84th Engineer Battalion, 130, 134, 

208, 219, 276, 430

B, 86th Engineer Battalion, 78, 145–46, 

147

B, 92d Engineer Battalion, 343, 428

B, 116th Engineer Battalion, 394

B, 168th Engineer Battalion, 141, 142, 

145, 147, 174

B, 299th Engineer Battalion, 128, 133, 

214–15, 320, 326, 338

B, 577th Engineer Battalion, 268

B, 588th Engineer Battalion, 142, 174

B, 864th Engineer Battalion, 266, 456

C, 1st Engineer Battalion, 68, 69–70, 168, 

170, 172, 315, 317

C, 4th Engineer Battalion, 146, 336

C, 8th Engineer Battalion, 59, 72, 75–77, 

218, 366, 389, 487

C, 14th Engineer Battalion, 118, 351

C, 15th Engineer Battalion, 221, 456

C, 19th Engineer Battalion, 127, 218, 

219, 258, 334, 456

C, 20th Engineer Battalion, 202, 204, 

205, 212–14, 328

C, 27th Engineer Battalion, 146, 200, 284

C, 31st Engineer Battalion, 496, 499–

500, 552

C, 35th Engineer Battalion, 347, 348

C, 39th Engineer Battalion, 182, 183, 261

C, 62d Engineer Battalion, 477

C, 65th Engineer Battalion, 102, 116, 

192, 241, 517

C, 70th Engineer Battalion, 66, 132

C, 86th Engineer Battalion, 147

C, 93d Engineer Battalion, 458

C, 168th Engineer Battalion, 139, 142, 

152, 174

C, 299th Engineer Battalion, 133, 180, 

209–10, 326, 327

C, 307th Engineering Battalion, 357, 456

C, 577th Engineer Battalion, 117, 285

C, 588th Engineer Battalion, 174, 496–97,

500

C, 589th Engineer Battalion, 351

C, 864th Engineer Battalion, 114, 124

D, 1st Engineer Battalion, 68, 168, 173, 315

D, 4th Engineer Battalion, 319, 320, 336

D, 14th Engineer Battalion, 118, 363, 

529, 530
Engineers at War

630

Engineer Companies—Continued

D, 15th Engineer Battalion, 221

D, 19th Engineer Battalion, 258, 334, 473

D, 20th Engineer Battalion, 254, 273, 

327, 511

D, 26th Engineer Battalion, 249

D, 27th Engineer Battalion, 146, 200, 

231, 365

D, 31st Engineer Battalion, 496, 499, 500

D, 35th Engineer Battalion, 133, 134, 

208, 211, 254, 348

D, 39th Engineer Battalion, 238, 242, 

261, 513

D, 46th Engineer Battalion, 36, 117, 

139, 151

D, 62d Engineer Battalion, 477 

D, 65th Engineer Battalion, 77, 202, 205

D, 84th Engineer Battalion, 22, 25–26, 

36, 542

D, 86th Engineer Battalion, 147, 378

D, 92d Engineer Battalion, 498

D, 116th Engineer Battalion, 394

D, 299th Engineer Battalion, 273, 320, 327

D, 577th Engineer Battalion, 268–69

D, 588th Engineer Battalion, 500

D, 864th Engineer Battalion, 266

E, 1st Engineer Battalion, 68, 173, 317

E, 4th Engineer Battalion, 206, 209, 319, 

320, 337

E, 15th Engineer Battalion, 221

E, 26th Engineer Battalion, 249

E, 27th Engineer Battalion, 231

E, 65th Engineer Battalion, 77, 499

Engineer Detachments

64th Terrain, 82

517th Terrain, 504

536th Port Construction, 430, 449

539th Control and Advisory, 41, 210

Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional), 

U.S. Army, 250, 272, 279–80, 311–12, 

358, 526, 580

and civilianization, 359

cutbacks and drawdown, 383, 541, 543, 

544, 547

equipment and supply issues and, 157, 

158, 281

headquarters, 105–06

highway construction and repair, 353, 

425, 434

map depots, 504

Materiel Directorate, 574

rate of construction, 564, 565

reorganization, 484, 542

staffing, 384, 484

training assistance, 465

See also U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV).

Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam 

(Provisional), U.S. Army, 414, 445–

46, 447, 448, 547

activation and organization of, 384–86

District Engineer offices, 485

Installation Division, 485

Real Estate Division, 484, 485

Real Property Management Division, 484

reorganization, 483, 484

utilities detachments, 448

Engineer Group, Vietnam, U.S. Army, 547, 

548, 551, 562, 573, 576

Engineer Section, General Headquarters, 

Far East Command, 90n26

Engineer Strategic Studies Group, 194n62, 454

Engineer Studies Center, 194n62

Engineer Functional Components System, 

38–39

Engler, Lt. Gen. Jean E., 101, 105, 106, 293, 

311, 405

ENSURE (Expediting Non-Standard 

Urgent Requirements for Equipment), 

507

Erdman, 1st Lt. John W., 513–14

Ewell, Lt. Gen. Julian J., 462, 478–79

Facilities Engineer, Saigon, 568, 570

Farrington, 1st Lt. Reed M., 25

Field Forces, Vietnam, 46, 101, 180

I, 101, 104, 201, 235, 311, 509

airstrips, 211, 214

and Duc Pho, 236

engineers in, 136, 510

land clearing in, 309, 476

II, 101, 104, 170, 311, 312, 313, 478–79

in Cambodia, 503

Engineer Section, 541

land-clearing operations, 304, 309, 

462, 476

map use, 504

mine detonator, 507

and Plantation, 140, 144, 175, 280, 

341

Third Regional Assistance 

Command Engineer Section, 

541, 553, 555

Filhol Rubber Plantation, 195, 305

Fink, Col. George W., 333, 345, 349

Firebases

Arsenal, 4

Bastogne, 367, 474, 475, 54

Birmingham, 367, 37

Blue, 552

Brown, 49

Buell, 375

Bunker Hill, 554, 555, 556–
631

Index

Buttons, 5

Cannon, 475

Cates, 53

Colorado, 497, 50

Crossed Sabers,

Eagle’s Nest, 

Elliott, 

Elsenberg, 

Ennis, 55

Fiddler’s Green,

Grunt II

Hump, 25

Laramie, 2

Mary Ann, 

Myron, 4

O’Reilly, 516, 51

Pace, 5

Rakkasan, 545

Ripcord, 516, 5

Ryder, 54

Sally, 54

Vandegrift, 525, 528, 529, 532, 538, 5

Veghel, 367, 545 

X-Ray, 498

First Indochina War, 1, 3, 398

First Regional Assistance Command, 548, 558

Fishhook area. See Cambodia.

Flagg, Sfc. Henry, 270

Force Logistics Command, 515

Foremost Dairy, 247

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 26, 27, 277

Engineer Officers Candidate School, 187

Engineer School, 90n26, 187, 459, 463, 583

Fort Benning, Georgia, 103, 117, 581

Fort Bliss, Texas, 47, 394

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 43, 47, 103, 

118, 279, 456, 546

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 33, 47–48

Fort Carson, Colorado, 517

Fort Devens, Massachusetts, 47

Fort Dix, New Jersey, 147

Fort Gordon, Georgia, 47

Fort Hood, Texas, 253, 273, 275, 284

Fort Irwin, California, 284

Fort Knox, Kentucky, 283

Fort Lee, Virginia, 47

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 28, 35, 586

Fort Lewis, Washington, 44n53, 90n26, 103, 

128, 284, 304, 394, 517

Fort Meade, Maryland, 34

Fort Ord, California, 19

Fort Polk, Louisiana, 19

Fort Riley, Kansas, 35, 55, 103, 517

Fort Stewart, Georgia, 283

Fort Wolters, Texas, 19

Foster, S. Sgt. Clyde C., 170

Four-Party Joint Military Commission, 576

Fritz, Col. Robert W., 298

Fulton, Lt. Col. Taylor R., 123, 182, 182, 

220, 246

Galloway, Lt. Col. Gerald E., 562, 580

Gaydos, Lt. Col. Andrew, 45

Geisel, Col. Francis R., 433

Gelini, Lt. Col. Walter, 144, 156, 283, 312

Geneva Agreements of 1954, 1, 2, 399

Gia Dinh Province, 303, 378

Gia Le, 345, 365

Gia Ray, 146, 283, 284, 307

Giap, General Vo Nguyen, 328

Gilmore, Lt. Col. Robert L., 133

Go Noi Island, 450, 481

Goddard, Brig. Gen. Guy H., 91

Graves, Col. Ernest, Jr., 391

Greater Saigon Engineering District, 485

Griebling, Col. Alfred L., 548

Gulf of Tonkin, 12

Gunston Hall (landing ship dock), 218

Hagedon, Lt. Col. George G., 35–36, 37, 

140

Hai Van Pass, 345, 346–47, 348, 365, 388, 

417, 426

Hamburger Hill, 469–70

Harris, Lt. Col. Richard L., 116, 133

Hart, Col. William F., 19, 20, 42, 156

Haskins, Lt. Col. Thomas C., 19, 20, 22

Hau Nghia Province, 165, 553

Hayes, Lt. Col. Walter P., 553, 561

Heaman, R. Adm. William F., 84, 85, 86

Heiser, Maj. Gen. Joseph M., Jr., 393

Helicopters, 53, 60, 63, 69, 71, 75–77, 

101, 105, 123, 127, 133, 141–42, 

175, 194, 216, 226, 271, 302, 317–

20, 345, 362, 371–72, 391, 405, 453–

54, 471, 488, 491, 509–10, 539–40, 

583

CH–47 Chinook, 76, 116, 124, 171, 173, 

165, 177–79, 201, 236, 310, 317, 320, 

371, 378, 454, 471, 474, 490, 516, 

530

CH–54 Tarhe or Flying Crane, 179, 205, 

236, 310, 319, 366, 378, 454, 471, 496, 

498, 516, 529–30, 539

H–21 Shawnee, 10

OH–58 Sioux, 463

UH–1 Iroquois or Huey, 10, 35, 73, 77, 

116, 175, 236, 448, 525

Herbicides, 194

Highway 1, 25, 124, 218, 251–63, 352, 398, 

441, 462, 491, 543

enemy assaults on, 260–61, 427, 563
Engineers at War

632

Highway 1—Continued

bridges, 119, 218–19, 258, 403, 434

at Chu Lai, 242, 244–45, 249

convoy traffic on, 256

to Duc Pho, 236, 241, 242, 245

flooding, 262, 545

improvements and clearing, 175, 256, 

257–58, 335, 411, 435, 440, 449, 451, 

488, 543, 562

land clearing along, 308, 479

maintenance and repair of, 118, 220, 310, 

349, 350, 396, 417, 424, 426, 457

and Qui Nhon, 25, 77, 178, 125

and Tet offensive, 334, 341, 345, 346

Highway 1A, 35, 140, 402, 470, 478

Highway 4, 378, 396, 411, 440, 441, 480, 545

Ben Luc Bridge, 427

upgrades, 341, 344, 391, 422, 431

Highway 7, 491, 492, 496, 499, 505

Highway 9, 426, 434, 450, 524, 525, 539

attacks on, 541

and Khe Sanh, 360, 361, 528, 529

minesweeping, 538

Operation Dewey Canyon, 530, 531,

532, 534–35

See also Operations, Lam Son 719; Tas

Forces, Remagen.

Highway 11, 47

Highway 13, 68, 69, 168, 229, 423, 441, 

499–500

bridges, 403, 427

convoys on, 471

land clearing along, 194, 306, 554, 563

minesweeping/securing, 71, 170, 172

and Tet offensive, 341, 344, 348

upgrading and repair of, 173–74, 450, 

496, 488

Vietnamese contractors work on, 434

Highway 14, 180, 209, 319, 320, 322, 326, 

441, 494

ambushes on, 321, 339

bridge on, 327, 403

convoys, 340

improvement of, 214, 402

joint projects, 462

Kon Bring Bridge, 210

land clearing, 339, 479

South Vietnamese participate in reconstruction of, 431–32

Highway 14A, 318, 499, 501

Highway 14B, 206, 210

Highway 15, 54, 71, 140, 167, 406, 424, 441

Highway 19, 61, 75, 130, 175, 256, 398, 435, 441

and An Khe, 59, 60, 130, 175, 334

clearing, 58, 72, 175

defense of, 51, 210

improvements and repairs to, 15, 128, 

133, 205, 256, 320, 402, 406, 424, 511

land clearing along, 554

security of, 404–05

and Tet offensive, 331

Vietnamese contractors work on, 434

Highway 19W, 210

Highway 20, 441, 546, 552

land clearing, 307

upgrading, 394, 425, 433–34, 450, 457

Highway 21, 340, 394, 402, 441, 542, 543

Highway 21A, 479

Highway 22, 172, 441, 498, 500, 501, 562

Hill, Brig. Gen. John G., 524, 526

Hill, Capt. Richard F., 269

Ho Bo Woods, 165, 192, 193, 305

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 369, 523, 540

Ho Nai Village, 341–42

Hoc Mon, 344, 365, 541

Hoi An, 249, 481

Holcomb, Maj. Merritt R., 52

Holloway, CWO2 Charles E., 10

Hon Cong Mountain, 61, 63

Hospitals

3d Field, 289

8th Field, 10, 124

12th Evacuation, 488

24th Evacuation, 141

85th Evacuation, 125

93d Evacuation, 36, 139, 174

95th Evacuation, 573

Hot Rocks Quarry, 456, 457

Hottenroth, Col. James H., 47, 139, 141, 155

Hovercraft. See Patrol Air-Cushion Vehicles 

(PACV).

Hue, 99, 331, 351, 369, 442, 450, 512, 520

and base transfers, 520

Buddhist uprising in, 11

and Tet offensive, 345–46, 348–49, 352, 

357, 360

and railroad, 442

Hughes, Col. John A., Jr., 334

Husband, R. Adm. A. C., 91

Hutchison, Lt. Col. David N., 254

Ia Drang, 72–78, 178, 325

Ignatius, Paul R., 90, 92, 161, 292

Improvement and Modernization Program, 

518, 558, 574

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

90n26

Infantry Divisions

1st, 26, 33, 51, 66–72, 170–71, 231, 449, 571 

assault boats, 228–29

base camps construction, 36, 47, 

142, 144, 145
633

Index

and base transfers, 468, 520, 571

engineers, 226

and Highway 13, 317

in Iron Triangle, 59

Lam Son 67, 30

land clearing in, 59, 304, 479

at Long Binh, 139, 141

in Ong Dong jungle, 305

operations, 167, 310

and Tet offensive, 344

tunnel destruction, 191

Saigon defense, 283

in War Zone C, 174

4th, 133, 180–81, 183, 184, 251, 319, 325

bunker destruction, 480

Dragon Mountain base, 208, 210, 

276, 449

facilities, 272

at Kontum City, 337

at Pleiku, 197, 369

redeployed, 513

and Tet offensive, 336

9th, 107, 221, 307, 308

at Bearcat, 197

in Cambodia, 484, 491

in Mekong Delta, 285, 306, 344, 

377, 378, 388

redeployment, 456, 467–69

23d (Americal), 248–49, 262, 336, 350, 

388, 515, 545

in I Corps, 263, 374, 469, 551

and Highway 1, 260, 335, 451, 472

and Kham Duc, 371

in Quang Ngai Province, 250, 512

in Quang Tin Province, 512–13

redeployment, 572

See also Task Forces, Oregon

25th, 77, 102, 311, 343, 478, 488, 495, 

499, 514

airfields, 472

base camps, 142, 144, 174, 192, 

195, 450, 488, 520, 571

departs, 483

at Filhol Plantation, 305

at Ho Bo Woods, 305

at Long Binh, 139

Saigon defense, 283, 304

tunnel destruction, 193

Infantry Brigades 

1st, 1st Infantry Division, 67, 73, 120, 

170, 376

1st, 4th Infantry Division, 123, 181, 208, 

318, 323, 325

1st, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

388, 468–69, 471, 524, 572

1st, 9th Infantry Division, 307, 344

1st, 25th Infantry Division, 494

1st, 101st Airborne Division, 16, 19, 34, 

51, 120, 123, 138, 181

2d, 1st Infantry Division, 16, 67, 166–67, 

318, 514

arrives, 55, 56

at Bearcat, 142

cantonment for, 146

intelligence section, 71

land clearing, 70, 205

2d, 4th Infantry Division, 202, 208, 328

2d, 9th Infantry Division, 221, 286

2d, 25th Infantry Division, 572

3d, 1st Infantry Division, 67, 69, 141, 

165, 166, 314, 483

3d, 4th Infantry Division, 200, 249, 

250, 335, 336

3d, 9th Infantry Division, 389, 469, 483, 

491, 514

3d, 25th Infantry Division, 48, 77, 128, 

180, 181, 241, 249n25, 257

at Chu Lai, 239

Operations Paul Revee II

IV, 182, 20

at Plei Trap, 205

at Pleiku, 132

11th Light, 249

196th Light, 120, 144, 223, 241, 249–50, 

252, 293, 294, 366, 546, 549, 551

at Chu Lai, 239, 249

at Da Nang, 549

and Operation Attleb

199–201

and Operation Cedar Falls, 2

at Tay Ninh, 145, 293–94

198th Light, 249

199th Light, 303, 389, 469, 478, 479, 495, 514

pacification operations, 311

redeployed, 483

and Tet offensive, 341

Infantry Battalions 

1st, 18th Infantry, 56

1st, 28th Infantry, 199–200

2d, 16th Infantry, 56

2d, 18th Infantry, 56

2d, 34th, Infantry, 491

2d, 35th Infantry, 205–06

Installation Master Planning Offices, 272, 273

Integrated Wideband Communications 

Systems, 385

International Commission of Control and 

Supervision, 576

Inventory Control Center, 14th, 266, 281

Iron Triangle, 59, 201, 223, 224, 225, 226, 

232, 234

Iselin, Capt. Donald G., 291–92
Engineers at War

634

J. A. Jones Corporation, 48

Jamaica Bay (dredge), 154, 285

Janairo, Lt. Col. Maximiano R., 477

Jansen, Col. Joseph A., 283, 305

Jebb, Lt. Col. Margaret M., 485

Johnson, B. K., 194–95

Johnson, General Harold K., 43, 66, 81, 99, 

547

Johnson, Col. James A., 544

Johnson, Lyndon B., 11, 12, 19, 31, 74, 328, 

357

bombing of North, 14, 360, 368

deployments ordered by, 26

reserve call-ups, 358

Johnson, Lt. Col. Malcolm D., 474

Johnson, Drake, and Piper, 402

Joint Airfield Evaluation Committee, 188

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13, 14–15, 21, 86, 121, 

149, 573

and construction boss, 88, 92

on prepositioning materiel, 36–37

and troop levels, 33, 48

Joint General Staff, 20, 406, 412, 466, 519

Joint MACV/Agency for International 

Development Study Group, 406, 438

Joint Roads and Bridges Committee, 406

Joint Vietnamese-U.S. Combined Campaign 

Plan for 1967, 301–02, 303, 407–08

Jones, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Griffith A., 508

Jones, Col. Harvey C., 342

Jordan, Lt. Col. Pendleton A., 373, 374–75

Jornes, Lt. Col. Russell L., 528, 532

Katum, 231, 232, 496, 498, 500, 507

Keiser, Maj. Edwin C. 233

Kelly, Lt. Col. James L., 103, 117

Kelly, Lt. Col. Kent C., 365

Kennedy, John F., 3, 7, 11

Kennedy, Col. Kenneth W., 80, 81, 82, 83, 

84, 94

Kesterson, Capt. Charles R., 168, 172

Kham Duc Special Forces camp, 369–71, 372

Khe Sanh, 189, 331, 345, 534, 538–39

airfield repair, 537–38

bridges 33 and 34, 35, 36, 530, 531

and Lam Son 719, 524, 5

Operation Dewey Canyon II, 528, 529,

531

relief of, 349, 359, 360–65, 520

siege of, 357, 368

Khmer Rouge, 489

Khuyen, Lt. Gen. Dong Van, 466

Kiernan, Lt. Col. Joseph M., 173, 200, 201, 

224, 226, 228, 231

Kim Son Valley. See Eagle’s Claw.

King Ranch, Australia, 195, 197

Kinnard, Maj. Gen. Harry W. O., 62, 72, 73, 74

Knadle, 2d Lt. Robert E., 261

Kohlway, S. Sgt. Sherman L., 178

Komer, Robert W., 408, 410, 411, 412

Kompong Cham, 491

Kompong Spean River, 506

Kon Bring Bridge, 210

Kontum City, 318, 319–20, 331, 337

Kontum Province, 9, 175, 194, 207, 322, 325

airfield in, 188, 189, 214

and Nguyen Hue offensive, 557

operations in, 180, 209, 318, 509

Krong Poko River, 209, 210

Ky, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao, 26, 316

Ky Lam River, 450

La Nga River, 70

Labor strikes, 160–61

Lai Giang River, 218, 219, 255, 260, 407

Lai Khe, 67, 68, 142, 145, 147, 317, 385

airfield at, 174

attacks on, 344

base transfers, 520

camps at, 141, 156, 167, 428

power distribution at, 450

Laird, Melvin R., 443

Lam Dong Province, 543, 546

Lamp, Col. Russell J., 576

Land clearing, 194–98, 232, 303, 305–

06, 308–09, 478, 583. See also

Ball-and-chain technique; Land 

Clearing Teams; Rome plow; South 

Vietnamese Army.

Land Clearing Teams

27th, 304, 306, 315, 344, 365

35th, 276, 304, 320, 326, 340, 472–73, 479

62d, 462, 464, 470, 479, 480, 495, 499, 

501, 502, 516, 546, 553

86th, 304, 307, 342

Landing Zones

Albany, 

Baldy, 372

Cat, 17

Cates, 36

Cecile, 36

Dog, 17

El Paso, 3

English, 178, 218, 219, 220, 236, 239,

252, 253, 254, 257, 262, 334, 335

English North, 258, 261, 513,

Falcon, 

Geronimo, 2

Guadalcanal. See Razorback 

Hammond, 178, 216, 218, 252, 253, 254,

260–61, 345

Lowboy, 258, 4
635

Index

Max, 2

Mike, 36

Montezuma, 236–

Oasis, 178, 179, 181, 205, 206–07, 21

Pony, 252, 26

Razorback Beach, 238, 239,

Snake, 36

Snapper, 3

Stallion, 3

Stud, 353, 360, 361, 363, 3

Thor, 36

Thunder, 25

Tom, 363

Two Bits, 252, 26

Uplift, 251, 2

Wharton, 

X-Ray, 73, 75, 76

Lane, Lt. Gen. Earnest E., 116, 120

Lane Army Airfield, 35, 127

Lang Vei Special Forces camp, 345, 361

Laos, 2, 14, 15, 26, 523–41. See also

Operations, Lam Son 71

Larsen, Maj. Gen. Stanley R., 46, 48, 104, 

120, 201, 202, 311, 312, 580

Lee Lt. Col. Emmett C., Jr., 327, 336

Leo A. Daly Company, 414

LeTourneau Company, 308

Lewis, Lt. Col. Bennett L., 351

Liberty Bridge, 426–27, 450

Liberty ships, 98

Lien, Lt. Col. Floyd L., 42, 156, 298

Lincoln, Lt. Gen. Lawrence J., 80

Lines of Communication Program (LOC), 

411, 412, 413, 423, 441. See also Delta 

Rock Agency; Rock.

Lo Ke Rubber Plantation, 167

Loc Ninh, 188, 189, 316, 322, 500, 552, 557

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 197

Logistical Command, 1st, U.S. Army, 42–

44, 118, 121, 128, 141, 149–51, 265, 

308, 393, 484, 486, 580

activated, 20

barges controlled by, 287

camp construction evaluated by, 293–94

cantonment for, 267

Contract Management Office, 383

Contract Operations Branch, 383

Dillard on, 486

equipment and materiel of, 26–27, 36, 

155, 156, 158, 477

facilities engineering and, 108, 244, 246, 383

at Long Binh, 280, 281, 342

nondivisional engineers under, 42

oversight responsibilities of, 4, 83, 297, 

298

procurement agency of, 385

Project Buddy, 393

on Qui Nhon, 125

and railroad reconstruction, 407

and Vinnell Corporation, 381

See also An Khe; Inventory Control 

Center, 14th; Pacific Architects and 

Engineers, Inc.; Port Lane; RMKBRJ (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones); 

Transphibian Tactical Tree Crusher.

Logistical-over-the-shore (LOTS), 349, 350

Long, Charles D., 91

Long An Province, 222, 223, 310, 378, 491

Long Binh, 139–50, 167, 186, 222, 376, 385, 

414, 503

bases at, 36, 47, 96, 97, 104, 279, 280, 

298, 342, 428, 443

costs of construction at, 160

Eiffel Bridge at, 285

improvements at, 380, 558, 560, 564

land clearing at, 197, 303–04, 308

Plantation, 35

power generation at, 109, 147, 282, 380

and railroad, 442

rock requirements, 158, 281

supply shortages at, 37, 280

Tet offensive in 341, 342–43

Long Khanh Province, 307

Long My, 258, 274, 543

Long Song River, 438

Long Thanh, 167, 195, 282, 284, 285, 378, 

385, 449

Loper, Lt. Col. Thomas C., 221, 222

Luther, Lt. Col. Ralph A., 562

MACV Directorate of Construction, 94–99, 

107, 120, 152, 295, 580

concrete production, 452

Construction Management Division, 412

drawdowns and consolidation, 517–18, 

547, 571, 576

Duke on, 387

and Dunn, 100

Engineer Advisory Division, 92, 93, 459, 

463, 574, 576

Engineering and Base Development, 92, 93

and funding, 188, 246

Highways Engineering and Advisory 

Branch, 438

and land-clearing operations, 309

and Military Construction Program, 188, 

384, 547

Program and Budget Office, 547

program management, 92, 379

and railroad reconstruction, 406–07

reductions in construction, 564
Engineers at War

636

MACV Directorate of 

Construction—Continued

and RMK-BRJ, 446

roads, 254, 302, 406, 411, 415, 435

and South Vietnamese engineer construction units, 458

training program, 459

and Vietnamese director general of highways, 439–40

See also Delta Rock Agency; Lines of 

Communication (LOC) Program; 

Military Construction Program; 

Engineer Command, Vietnam 

(Provisional), U.S. Army.

MACV Forward Command Post, 345, 349–

50, 359, 360. See also Provisional 

Corps, Vietnam.

MACV. See Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam, U.S.

Madison, Lt. Col. James D., 125

Mai Loc Special Forces airstrip, 515

Maintenance Battalion, 188th, 225

Malley, Lt. Col. Robert J., 62, 75, 175, 181, 582

Mang Yang Pass, 320, 327, 334, 340

Mann, USNS, 34

Manning, Lt. Col. John R., 304

Marble Mountain Air Facility, 450, 453, 545

Marine Corps, 2, 16, 235, 351, 436

III Marine Amphibious Force, 83, 108, 

350, 353, 396, 524

and Army reorganization, 376

at Da Nang, 512, 549

and land-clearing operations, 309

and Operation Pegasus, 360, 36

See also Da Nang. 

1st Marine Division, 108, 239, 250, 252, 

388, 515

in I Corps, 469, 481

at Da Nang, 350, 451, 512

3d Marine Division, 108, 360, 376, 388, 479

in I Corps, 469, 472

equipment transfers, 468

redeployed, 450, 451, 455, 512

See also Highway 9

1st Marines, 360, 361–62

26th Marines, 361

27th Marines, 358

1st Marine Engineer Battalion, 427, 515

1st Marine Medical Battalion, 451

7th Marine Engineer Battalion, 348, 350, 

361, 481, 515

9th Marine Engineer Battalion, 241, 244, 

259, 451, 481

11th Marine Engineer Battalion, 361–62, 363

Regimental Landing Team, 483

See also McNamara Line.

Maritime Commission, 569

Maritime Reserve Fleet, 109

Market Time, 126, 273, 565, 

Marshall, Col. Robert C., 321, 327, 338

Maryland, SS, 347–48

Mason, Lt. Col. George, 140

Mason, Col. John H., 524, 526, 529

Mathews, Lt. Col. Amos C., 34, 37, 125, 

127

McCaffrey, Lt. Gen. William B., 542

McConnell, Col. Richard, 141, 280

McCulloch, Lt. Col. John J., 26, 37, 113

McCulloch, Capt. Theodore B., 373

McDermott, Sfc. John K., 320–21

McElhenny, Col. John F., 544

McIntyre, Col. Kenneth E., 524, 526, 528, 

529, 530–31, 537, 545

McNamara, Robert S., 4–5, 14, 30, 41, 94, 

98–99, 250, 411

on construction oversight, 85–86, 89, 90, 

92, 93

funding and, 160, 161, 162, 294, 425

McNamara Line, 250

Mekong Delta, 7, 107, 151–54, 221–23, 284, 

355, 434

Mekong Delta Transportation Plan, 421

Memot Plantation, 492, 496

Michelin Rubber Plantation, 69, 172, 200, 

314, 479

Midway Island, 22

Mildren, Lt. Gen. Frank T., 393, 396

Miles, Capt. Paul L., 27

Miley, Lt. Col. James F., 304

Military Airlift Command. See Air Force, 

U.S.

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

(MAAG), U.S., 2, 79, 82, 402

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

(MACV), U.S., 3–4, 20–21, 297, 404, 

406, 412

and airfield construction, 188

Base Development Branch, 79–80, 81, 485

base transfers, 466–69

civilianization program of, 358–59, 381

Command Engineer, 576

on construction costs and program management, 291, 294, 296

Engineer, 152

Engineer Advisory Division, 541

Engineer Branch, 79, 82–83

Engineer Branch, Directorate of 

Army Military Assistance Program 

Logistics, 79, 80

Operations and Studies, 82

OPLAN 32–64, 12, 14

program managers of, 294
637

Index

Real Estate Branch, 82

redeployments, 455–56

and roads, 404, 412

and Saigon commercial port, 148

and training assistance, 465

troop strengths, 33, 87

See also MACV Directorate of 

Construction; MACV Forward 

Command Post.

Military Assistance Program, 12, 571

Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF), 

566, 570, 576

Military Construction, Army, 418, 446, 

564, 581

Military Construction Program, 188–89, 

379, 380, 384

Military Police Battalion, 720th, 222

Military Regions 1 through 4, 547–62

Military Sea Transportation Service, 421

Miller, Lt. Col. James M., 250

Miller, 1st Lt. Robert P., 530

Mine Warfare Center, 583

Mines, 170, 348, 351, 417, 502, 553

Minesweep teams, 170, 229, 251, 259, 348, 

470, 539, 584. See also under individual units.

Mission Council Meetings, 197

Mo Duc, 335

Mobile Riverine Force, 221, 222

Monfore, Lt. Col. Robert P., 553

Monkey Mountain, 565

Montagnards, 206, 319, 394, 457

Moore, Lt. Col. Harold G., 73, 76

Moore, Lt. Gen. Joseph H., 84

Moore, Lt. Col. William T., 142

Morley, Capt. Thomas L., 51, 52

Morris, Brig. Gen. John W., 447, 514, 515, 

582, 586

Morrison-Knudsen of Asia, Inc. See RMK 

(Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen).

Mowery, Maj. Jack E., 191

MUST (medical unit, self-contained, 

transportable), 145, 285

My Tho, 152, 344, 456

My Thuan, 344

Nam O Beach, 348, 350

Nam Sathay River, 201, 202

Nation-building, 302, 434, 441–42

National Academy of Science, 194n62

National Guard, 15, 31, 457

See also under Engineer Battalions; 

Engineer Companies.

National Security Council, 16

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

160, 161, 291, 567, 568

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions, 517

No. 1, 436

No. 5, 352, 361, 549–50

No. 6, 244, 246, 259

No. 8, 244, 426

No. 10, 351, 352

No. 58, 373

No. 62, 348

No. 71, 244, 246, 248. See also Seabees.

Navy, U.S.

3d Naval Construction Brigade, 108, 350, 

424, 426, 436, 453, 450, 549

30th Naval Construction Regiment, 38, 

48, 83, 86, 97, 108, 426, 450

32d Naval Construction Regiment, 348, 

361, 426, 549

See also Military Sea Transportation 

Service, 421

Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, U.S., 2, 

5, 13, 83, 91, 98

Navy Officer in Charge of Construction, 

Southeast Asia, 5, 52, 83, 84, 110, 485, 

549

and 3d Naval Construction Brigade, 108, 

350

aircraft facilities built by, 115, 453

and construction boss, 92

contracts and procurement, 98, 436

on costs, 99, 141, 161, 291, 292

designs MACV headquarters, 95

dredges, 285

Duke on, 387

Materiel Department, 296

and Nha Trang, 267

and Operation Dong Tam, 37

and port facilities, 94

and RMK-BRJ, 384, 567

and road rehabilitation, 414

and Qui Nhon construction, 125

Vietnamese contractors and, 568

See also Director of Construction, 

Republic of Vietnam; U.S. 

Construction Staff Committee.

Navy Public Works, U.S., 79

Navy Seabees Technical Assistance Teams, 

U.S., 8

Navy Stock Fund, 98

New Jersey (dredge), 285

New Life Program, 8–9

New Plei Djereng Special Forces camp, 206, 

210, 211, 510, 511

New Zealand, 110, 389

Nghia, Col. Le Van, 561, 562

Ngoc Tavak, 371

Nguyen Hue offensive, 435, 441, 550, 557–

58, 560, 562–63, 566
Engineers at War

638

Nha Trang, 10, 58, 114, 116, 270, 442, 520

construction and repairs at, 267–68, 354

power generation at, 109, 115, 380, 570

and Tet offensive, 336

training at, 331, 468

Nhon Trach District (Bien Hoa Province), 222

Ninh Hoa, 116–17, 118, 124, 272

Nixon, Richard M., 455, 490, 493, 520, 

523

Noble, Maj. Gen. Charles C., 99, 162, 541, 

547, 564, 580, 585

Nol, Lon, 488, 489

Nondivisional engineer units, 101

North Korea, 358

North Vietnam, 12

North Vietnamese 3d People’s Army of 

Vietnam (PAVN) Division, 251

North Vietnamese Army, 51, 180, 489, 506, 

512, 516, 557

Northern Engineer District, 485

Norton, Brig. Gen. John, 22, 43, 44, 45

Nui Ba Den, 172

Nui Le, 433

Nui Ong Montain, 200

Nui Sam (quarry), 420, 421, 440

Nung mercenaries, 296

Nye, Sgt. George, 76

O’Donnell, Brig. Gen. Edwin T., 495, 506

Office of the Chief of Engineers, 454

Officer Candidate Schools, 187

Officer in Charge of Construction, Thailand, 

568

Offringa, Maj. Peter J., 555

Olentine, Lt. Col. Charles G., 181, 218

Ong Dong jungle, 305, 306

Operations

Abilene, 1

Amarillo, 172–

Apache Snow, 469, 470, 

Attleboro, 199–201

Battle Creek, 20

Benton, 24

Billings, 232

Binh Tay through IV, 509–

Birmingham, 172, 174, 367, 377–7

Bluefield II, 306, 3

Bold Lancer. See Toan Thang 

Bushmaste I and I

Byrd, 18

Cedar Falls, 223–26, 228, 229, 232

303, 584

Clean House, 7

Coronado, 221, 34

Crimp, 165–66, 167, 190–9

Dallas, 23

Delaware–Lam Son 216, 365, 366, 3

368

Dewey Canyon, 46

Dewey Canyon II, 524, 525–4

Dong Tam, 373, 37

Duchess, 212, 2

Duke, 21

El Paso II, 172,

Emporia, 3

Enterprise, 310,

Fairfax, 

Florida, 3

Francis Marion, 202, 206, 318

Geronimo I, 

Happy Valley, 7

Hawthorne, 180, 

Henry Clay, 1

Highland, 5

Horace Greely, 318, 319, 320, 474

Hump, 68–6

Irving, 180, 

John Paul Jones, 120, 18

Junction City, 229, 231, 232, 239, 

Kentucky Jumper,

Lam Son 67, 306, 310, 3

Lam Son 68, 343–

Lam Son 719, 523–41, 5

Le Jeune, 236, 239, 251–5

Liberty Canyon, 388, 389,

Lincoln, 1

Longview, 1

MacArthur, 319, 322, 32

Malheur, 2

Malheur II,

Mallet, 1

Manhattan, 

Marauder, 165, 

Masher, 1

Mastiff, 166–

Matador, 

Montgomery Rendezvous,

Moose (Move Out Of Saigon

Expeditiously), 140, 279

Nathan Hale, 180

New Life, 70, 

Niagara Falls, 225–26, 

Paddington, 306–

Paul Bunyon, 196, 197, 304, 30

Paul Revee I through IV, 180, 

182, 201–02, 209

Pegasus, 360, 363, 365, 36

People’s Road, 34

Pershing, 216, 251, 252, 253–

Pickett,

Pipestone Canyon, 4

Plowshare, 4
639

Index

Ranch Hand, 1

Riley, 343

Roadrunner, 2

Rockcrusher. See Toan Thang

Rolling Stone, 167, 168, 1

Sam Houston, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, 

Saratoga, 

Scotland II

Seward, 181, 1

Shenandoah, 313–14, 31

Shenandoah II, 

Shiny Bayonet, 

Silver City,

Smash, 7

Somerset Plain, 376,

Speedy Express, 38

Switchblade, 462,

Thayer I, 180, 216, 218, 253, 4

Thayer II, 180, 

Toan Thang, 377

Toan Thang 41, 489–95

Toan Thang 42, 491, 504–05

Toan Thang 43, 491, 492, 493, 494

Toan Thang 44, 494

Toan Thang 45, 494

Toan Thang 46, 494

Tulsa, 173–74

Wallowa, 250, 25

Wheeler, 250–

White Wing. See Ma

Yellowstone, 3

York, 303, 3

Operations and Maintenance, Army 

(O&MA), 189

O’Rang, Cambodia, 494

Osmanski, Brig. Gen. Frank A., 13–14

Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc., 12, 

155, 272, 296–98, 333, 354, 488

1st Logistical Command and, 44, 108, 

109, 118, 128, 156

construction projects of, 83, 149, 566

contracts, 5, 381, 383, 384, 386–87, 485, 518

and Defense Attaché Office, 577

facilities engineering by, 10, 66, 111, 147–

48, 246, 248, 296–97, 379–80, 385, 

445, 568–70

at Long Binh, 139–40, 296, 297, 343, 546–47

power generation, 139–40, 284, 380

and real estate transfers, 467, 468, 572

Saigon Support Command, 225

and Special Forces, 297

storage facilities for, 151

training programs of, 467, 521

at Vung Tau, 284, 296, 297

women trainees, 359

workforce of, 48, 279, 558

See also U.S. Army Procurement 

Agency, Vietnam.

Pacific Command, U.S., 4, 11, 12, 13, 33, 79, 

81, 82–85, 97, 131, 296 

on construction costs, 291 

and land clearing, 197

on materiel shortages, 36

Vung Ro Bay port, 121

Pacification program, 3, 259, 306, 310, 328, 

472, 512, 514, 521

and base transfers, 467

and civilian operations, 408, 467

engineers support, 513

and redeployments, 456, 458

and roads, 252–53, 408–09, 411–12, 441, 

481–82

and South Vietnamese forces, 301, 309, 

311, 456, 521

Page Communications Engineers, 274, 284, 

385

Palmer, Lt. Gen. Bruce, Jr., 81, 293, 294, 

311, 379, 384

Palmer, Col. Joseph M., 284 

Parfitt, Col. Harold R., 387, 447–48

Paris Peace Accords, 438, 523

Paris Peace Talks, 368

Parish, Lt. Col. John V., Jr., 345–46, 348

Parker, Maj. Gen. David S., 387–88, 392, 

396, 447, 465, 580, 581, 582

Parrot’s Beak, 491

Patrol Air-Cushion Vehicles (PACV), 222

Peel, Lt. Col. Wesley E., 128, 253, 254

Peers, Maj. Gen. William R., 202, 318, 391, 393

Pelosky, Lt. Col. Edwin F., 141, 145, 225

Pena, M. Sgt. Earnest F., 53

Pentalateral Agreement of 1950, 20–21

Perfume River, 352

Perry, Lt. Col. Victor A., 361

Phan Rang, 28, 58, 97, 136–38, 220, 269, 

270, 340

airfield at, 31, 59, 96, 136, 271, 394, 451–52

and railroad, 442

supply shortages at, 37

transfer of, 573

Westmoreland concerns, 293, 294

Phan Thiet, 351, 354, 365, 394, 457, 515

Philco-Ford Corporation, 109, 379, 445, 

518, 568, 569–70

Philippine Civic Action Group, 110, 413, 469

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 489, 491

Phu Bai, 357–58, 385, 570

airfield terminal, 545

kennels at, 538–39

Marine base at, 235, 345, 349, 365

Phu Bon Province, 181
Engineers at War

640

Phu Cat, 125, 160, 178, 254, 438, 442, 573

air base, 96, 131, 189, 220, 255, 262, 273, 

278–79, 406, 452

quarry, 257, 262, 333

Phu Cuong, 168, 173, 228, 343, 428, 429, 450

Phu Cuong Bypass, 428

Phu Hoa Triangle, 552

Phu Lam, 10, 289

Phu Loc, 350, 432

Phu Loi, 145, 147, 168, 344, 389, 428

1st Infantry Division at, 47, 49, 67–68, 

70, 141, 174

power plant at, 282, 380

recast concrete revetments, 454–55

Phu Nhon, 211, 340

Phu Phong River, 334

Phu Tai, 254, 274, 334, 573

Phu Tuc Special Forces camp, 185, 211

Phu Yen Province, 10, 180, 181, 202, 216

Phuoc Long Province, 53, 188, 317, 494

Phuoc Tuy Province, 54, 171, 307, 378, 435

Phuoc Vinh, 67–68, 145, 231, 232, 316–17

construction at, 142, 270

routes to, 167, 168, 172, 300, 310

and Tet offensive, 341

Plain of Reeds, 222

Plei Djereng, 202, 210

Plei Me, 73, 76, 188, 319, 320

Plei Trap Valley, 201, 202, 210

Pleiku Campaign, 73–75

Pleiku City, 10, 14, 73, 102, 107, 129, 146–47, 

372

airfield, 4, 6, 15, 77, 133, 188, 277

asphalt plant at, 339

border activities and, 202, 318

construction at, 34, 47, 111, 128, 132, 

134, 136, 184, 197, 208, 210, 272, 276, 

279, 293

forward support base for, 75, 76

and highway, 51, 175, 180, 202, 209, 210, 

320, 327–28, 338

pipelines to, 443

supplies for, 157, 278

and Tet offensive, 336–37

Pleiku Province, 318, 322

Ploger, Maj. Gen. Robert R., 44–46, 49, 84, 

85, 249, 311–12, 384, 394

centralized system preferred by, 102–03, 

104, 105

Engineer, U.S. Army, Vietnam, 106

on Engineer Command operations, 108, 110

on land-clearing issues, 308

logistical and supply issues and, 154, 159

on manpower issues, 186, 187, 328

and nondivisional engineer units, 101–02, 

108, 382

road construction recommendations, 405

standards of construction, 46

tunnel-destruction systems, 193

and Engineer Command, Vietnam 

(Provisional), U.S. Army, 105

Pohl Bridge, 546

Polei Kleng Special Forces camp, 209, 

210, 214, 320, 338. See also Engineer 

Battalions, 70th.

Popular Forces, 466, 514

Poro Point, 289

Port Lane, 123, 124, 253, 268

Ports, 12–13, 15, 20, 94, 520–21. See also Cam 

Ranh Bay; Can Tho; Da Nang; Nha 

Trang; Qui Nhon; Saigon; Vung Ro 

Bay; Vung Tau.

Power Distribution Detachments

702d, 378

714th, 450

Prek Klok Special Forces camp, 229, 231, 310

Prime Beef. See Base Engineer Emergency 

Force (Air Force).

Procurement of Equipment and Missiles for 

the Army (PEMA), 189

Projects

Buddy, 393, 460–61, 462

Concrete Sky,

Enhance, 550, 5

Enhance Plus, 550, 

Newport, 95, 96, 97, 565. See a

Saigon. 

Recovery, 

Provisional Corps, Vietnam, 360, 361, 363, 

365, 376. See also Corps, XXIV.

Public Works Office, Naval Support 

Activity (Da Nang), 109

Pueblo, USS, 358

Quan Loi, 316, 470, 471

Quang Nam Province, 249, 250

Quang Ngai City, 189, 241, 242, 246

Quang Ngai Province, 235, 250, 251–52, 259

Quang Tin Province, 249, 250, 259, 515, 545

Quang Tri City, 345, 346, 349, 350, 352, 360, 

450, 468

Quang Tri Province, 512, 516, 526, 528, 529, 

557, 560

Quarries, 126, 159, 246, 258, 354

Duc Pho, 241

Freedom Hill, 432, 571

Korean, 158–59

at Phu Cat, 255–57

near Qui Nhon, 407

University, 95, 144, 158, 281, 421

Vung Tau, 281, 421

Quarry Detachment, 94th, 283, 461
641

Index

Quartermaster Depot, 504th, 43

Que Son Valley, 251, 512

Qui Nhon, 14, 22, 25, 34, 47, 51, 58, 257

and base transfers, 520, 573

Construction Agency offices at, 385

DeLong pier at, 30, 126

development of, 125–29, 294, 335

electric power generation at, 274, 276, 380

facilities at, 4, 34, 95, 128, 278, 443

highways, 120, 219, 256, 259, 278

Korean troops at, 220

logistical support base, 104

and Pacific Architects and Engineers, 

10, 387

pipeline, 127, 443

port of, 15, 20, 96, 126, 157, 443

power generation at, 109, 115, 445

project completion, 519, 565

and railroad, 442

rock crushers at, 159

Tet offensive in, 331, 33–34, 487

See also Engineer Battalions, 84th; 

Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones 

(RMK-BRJ); U.S. Agency for 

International Development.

Qui Nhon Support Command, 125, 243, 

273, 274, 278, 298, 333–34, 383

Quinton-Budlong Company, 414

Rach Cai Bac, 499

Radcliff, Maj. Donald G., 62

Radio Research Unit, 8th, 565

Ramee, Col. Paul W., 105

Rapid Engineering Deployment and Heavy 

Operational Repair Squadron. See

Red Horse Squadrons.

Rauch, Sp4c. Ronald, 513

Raymond, Brig. Gen. Daniel A., 84, 86, 94, 

100, 161, 162, 196, 291, 292, 295

Raymond International. See RMK 

(Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen).

Read, Lt. Col. William E., 221

Red Ball Express, 41, 42, 158

Red Beach (Da Nang), 524

Red Devil Drive, 533

Red Devil Road, 534

Red Horse Squadrons, 39–40, 48, 91, 97, 109, 

114, 382

554th, 137, 138

819th, 517

820d, 517

See also Air Force, U.S.

Redeployment, 455, 456, 571–75

Redman, Lt. Col. John R., 131

Rees, Lt. Col. Marvin W., 141

Reeves, H. William, 289–90

Reeves piers, 289–90

Refugees, 60, 70, 344, 373, 491, 509

Regional and Popular Forces, 440, 512, 519, 

521, 550

Remson, Lt. Col. Andrew C., Jr., 257

Replacement Battalion, 90th, 140

Republic of Korea, 20, 26, 120, 175, 180, 

220, 558

9th Infantry Division, 117, 118, 123, 220

Capital Division, 34–35, 58, 220, 260, 

272, 276, 333

Dove Force, 109, 424

2d Marine Brigade, 58, 120, 469

engineers, 392–93

Marines, 481

withdrawal of, 558

Reserve Officer Training Corps, 187

Resident Officer in Charge of Construction, 

Republic of Vietnam. See Deputy 

Officer in Charge of Construction, 

Republic of Vietnam.

Revetments, 454

Rhodes, Lt. Col. Nolan C., 127, 218, 219, 257

Rimes, Sgt. Maj. Terry M., 232–33

Ripley, Capt. John W., 560

Riverine force, 152, 221. See also Infantry 

Divisions, 9th.

RMK (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen), 5, 6, 

10, 12, 38

at Cam Ranh Bay, 27, 28, 31, 112

scope of work, 13, 14

RMK-BRJ (Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen, 

Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones), 94, 

110, 124, 141, 276, 382, 485

1st Logistical Command headquarters, 141

Armed Forces Radio and Television 

Service construction, 144

asphalt and concrete plants of, 95, 144, 

158–59, 262, 281, 290, 333, 420, 427, 

452–53

and base transfers, 468

Bien Hoa Air Base construction, 144, 

147, 281

bridge construction by, 427, 434

at Cam Ranh complex, 111, 112, 114, 

266–67, 296, 382, 573

Can Tho facilities, 151, 284, 382

Chu Lai airfield, 243–44, 382

and civilianization program, 359

completion rate of, 445–46, 567–68

contracts, 267, 273, 297, 299, 381, 386, 

566–67, 568

departure of, 440

embassy construction, 144, 340, 568

at Da Nang, 296, 382
Engineers at War

642

RMK-BRJ—Continued

Dong Tam, 284, 382

equipment of, 278, 296, 439

funding issues, 160, 291, 295, 296

highways, 257, 344, 424, 426–27, 435, 445

MACV headquarters construction, 144, 

280, 568

Newport project and, 148–49, 289, 290, 296

at Phan Rang, 136, 138

Phu Cat Air Base, 220, 272, 274

Pleiku, 133, 134, 276, 277

and Qui Nhon construction, 125, 126, 

274

Saigon projects, 287–89, 382

and Seabees, 565

Tan Son Nhut Air Base construction, 

142, 147

and Tet offensive, 333, 341, 355

at Vung Tau, 284, 382

women participate in construction, 568

workforce of, 48, 97, 108–09, 140, 161, 

290, 296, 381, 428

Xuan Loc, 284

See also Camp Holloway; Long Thanh.

Roberts, Lt. Col. Charles R., 146

Roberts, Maj. Gen. Elvy B., 512

Robinson, Lt. Col. Hugh G., 514

Rochefort, Lt. Col. Joseph J., 25

Rock, 126, 256, 258, 417, 422, 426

crushers, 38, 159, 241, 255, 277, 278, 417, 

418, 419, 433, 440

Korean contract, 280

in Mekong Delta, 419–20

transport of, 406, 421, 442

scarcity of, 158, 286, 287

Rock Island East, 494, 500

Rogers, Lt. Col. Manley, E., 141

ROK Valley, 34, 274, 276, 570

Rollins, Brig. Gen. Andrew P., Jr., 249, 

373, 374

Rome plow, 477, 478–79, 480–81, 498, 500, 581

cutting techniques, 195, 502

kits, 198, 304, 479–80

and road clearing, 204, 205, 206, 340, 

367, 489, 500, 530

as tactical weapon, 328, 581

used in land-clearing operations, 197, 

233, 305, 307, 463

See also Bulldozers; Land clearing; South 

Vietnamese Army.

Rome Plow Company, 195, 304

Roper, Brig. Gen. Willard, 345, 387, 393, 581

Rosson, Lt. Gen. William B., 239, 322, 360, 376

Routes

1A, 168, 172, 173, 231, 232, 306, 341

2, 71, 307, 308, 421, 435

2A, 168

2B, 432

3A, 72

4, 426, 427, 498

5, 403

6B, 182, 479

7A, 545

7B, 168, 180, 182, 431, 449

8A, 432

8B, 457

9, 441

13, 562

16, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173

23, 307, 435

26, 172

27, 434, 441

78 (Cambodia), 498–99, 501

240, 314

246, 231

301, 306

440, 25

509, 320, 327, 508, 510, 511

509B, 202, 205, 206, 207, 210

511, 209, 326 

512, 320, 321, 322, 326, 327, 472

547, 366, 367, 377–78, 479, 546

547A, 366

548, 366, 378, 474

Orange. See Route 2A.

Royal Thai Army, 303, 449, 554, 558

Rung Sat Special Zone, 378

Runway matting, 66, 507, 537, 550, 582

AM2, 115, 131–32, 136–37, 138, 189, 276, 

537, 540

anchorage issues, 537, 582

M8 pierced steel, 66, 116, 141, 180

M8A1, 114, 189, 219, 244, 254, 370–71, 

372, 455, 488, 528, 536, 540, 556, 582

MX19, 189, 211, 238, 528, 536, 540

shortages of, 188, 189

T17, 130–31, 132, 137, 178, 180, 181, 189, 

198, 209, 233, 276, 320, 328, 582

Sa Huynh, 262, 335

Saigon, 11, 41, 67, 104, 369, 520

Cholon, 340, 341, 369

Construction Agency offices at, 385

defensive arc for, 51, 67, 303–11

Newport, 148, 289–90, 296, 308, 365, 

438, 518–19, 520, 565, 568

North Capital Bypass, 405, 424, 427, 435, 441

Phu Tho racetrack attacked, 369

port of, 12, 20, 67, 68, 84, 94, 95, 148–51, 

442, 443

projects at, 287–90

Tet offensive in, 340–44
643

Index

Saigon River, 200–201, 223, 228, 231, 435, 443

Saigon Support Command, 383

Sargent, Lt. Col. Howard L., 67, 72, 167, 

169, 173, 191, 192

Sawyer, Col. Kenneth T., 253, 257, 272, 273

Schneepeck, Maj. Gene A., 528, 530, 535, 536

Schrader, Brig. Gen. Henry C., 414, 515, 542

Schreiner, Pfc. Gerald, 270

Schuder, Col. William J., 542

Schultz, Maj. John H., 120

Se San River, 202, 205, 207, 318

Seabees, 38, 39, 48, 81, 353, 378, 445, 565

activities of, 189, 261, 351, 403, 436

An Hoi construction, 189

at Cam Ranh complex, 111

at Chu Lai, 243–44, 246–47, 252, 259, 263

and drawdowns, 549

Dong Ha, 189

and Dong Tam project, 154

Khe Sanh, 189, 361

Quang Ngai construction, 189, 243

Team 1104, 53

units, 14, 185, 350, 426

warehouse facilities for, 248

See also Naval Mobile Construction 

Battalions; Public Works Office, 

Naval Support Activity (Da Nang).

Sea-Land Services, Inc., 271

Seaman, Maj. Gen. Jonathan O., 46, 71, 72, 

165, 167, 223

on 1st Infantry Division, 66, 68

commands II Field Force, 104, 170, 199, 223

Seatrain Lines, 346

Seelye, Lt. Col. Robert A., 114

Segal, Lt. Col. Robert, 470

Self-help projects, 96, 130, 133, 246, 272, 

280, 519

Dunn on, 99

locations of, 34, 65, 113, 141, 248, 276

Ploger on, 103

unauthorized, 379

Seufer, Capt. Paul E., 161

Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. G., 11, 96, 97, 99, 160

on construction boss, 85–86, 87–88, 89

on troop deployments, 26, 95

Sheridan, Edward J., 85, 90, 91, 92, 99

Shields, Marvin G., 53

Shoemaker, Brig. Gen. Robert L., 491

Signal Battalion, 39th, 10

Signal Corps, 187, 276, 284

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 488

Sihanoukville, Cambodia, 489

Sikes, Robert L. F., 91

Sikorski, Pfc. Stephen E., 227

Smith, Lt. Col. Rodney H., 232–33, 413

Smith, Lt. Col. Scott B., 495

Smock, Maj. James E., 560

Sniper’s Island, 257

Snuol, Cambodia, 492–93, 496, 502

Soc Trang, 10, 473

Soirap River, 150

Song Ba, 58, 61, 69

Song Ban Thach River, 182

Song Be, 53, 189, 316, 317, 322, 389, 470, 

472, 488, 496, 552

Song Be River, 69, 231

Song Bo Bridge, 438

Song Cau, 182, 220, 427

Song Re Valley, 252

Song Thach Han River, 530

South Korea. See Republic of Korea.

South Vietnam, Ministry of Economic 

Affairs, 573

South Vietnam, Ministry of National 

Education, 573

South Vietnam, Ministry of Public Works, 

168–69, 173, 373, 402, 420

South Vietnam, Ministry of War Veterans, 573

South Vietnamese Air Force, 468, 550

South Vietnamese Army, 3, 26, 54, 84, 147, 

307, 480, 539

I Corps, 6, 459

II Corps, 6, 459

III Corps, 6, 459

IV Corps, 6, 459

1st Infantry Division, 468, 474, 572

2d Infantry Division, 572

3d Infantry Division, 551

7th Infantry Division, 467, 571

9th Infantry Division, 571

18th Infantry Division, 468, 572

22d Infantry Division, 178, 509, 513, 520

23d Infantry Division, 212

3d Airborne Brigade, 491

1st Armored Brigade, 524

1st Cavalry Regiment, 491

40th Regiment, 22d Infantry Division, 509

47th Regiment, 571

4th Engineer Group, 403

5th Engineer Group, 459, 561, 566

6th Engineer Group, 218, 433, 459, 461

8th Engineer Group, 465

10th Engineer Group, 458–59, 465

20th Engineer Group, 433, 458–59, 461, 

462, 464, 489, 490, 506, 562

30th Engineer Group, 458–59, 461, 464, 

470, 489, 505–06, 561, 562, 563

40th Engineer Group, 344, 458–59, 462, 562

21st Engineer Battalion, 21st Infantry 

Division, 465

61st Engineer Battalion, 6th Engineer 

Group, 462
Engineers at War

644

South Vietnamese Army—Continued

63d Engineer Battalion, 460

71st Engineer Battalion, 459

203d Engineer Battalion, 433–34

301st Engineer Battalion, 373, 465, 490, 

505, 506

303d Engineer Battalion, 489, 505

403d Engineer Battalion, 465

318th Land Clearing Company, 462, 463, 

464, 554, 563

805th Heavy Equipment Company, 460

3d Area Logistics Command, 573

3d Airborne Task Force, 363

40th Base Depot, 460

base and equipment transfers, 468, 571

in Cambodia, 504–06

land clearing, 357, 465, 554

and Nguyen Hue offensive, 557

Special Forces, 212

on strategic roads, 403–04

training, 478, 543, 545

upgrading of, 458–59

South Vietnamese Army engineers, 48, 84, 

374, 392–93, 402, 406, 436

advisers for, 92

bridge construction by, 255, 433, 440, 

441

construction groups activated, 393, 435–36

Engineering School, 9, 228, 343, 429, 458

and highway program, 425, 431–32, 440–

41, 460

maintenance, 66

quarries and asphalt plants run by, 432

See also under South Vietnamese Army.

South Vietnamese Navy, 21

South Vietnamese Navy Training Center, 331

South Vietnamese/U.S. Railroad 

Reconstruction Committee, 406

Southeast Asia Construction Group, 90

Southern Engineer District, 485

Sowell, Capt. Mark S., Jr., 53, 54, 167

Special Forces. See under individual 

locations.

Starnes, Col. William R., 117, 156

Starry, Col. Donn A., 496

State, U.S. Department of, 3, 21

Stennis, John, 160

Stevens, Maj. Richard W., 257–58

Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Richard G., 376, 474

Strategic hamlet program, 8–9

Strider, Lt. Col. Carroll D., 142

Stuart, Capt. Robert L., 195

Subic Bay, Philippines, 22

Sunder, Lt. Col. Charles H., 352

Suoi Ca Valley, 72, 77, 216

Suoi Da, 200, 231

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. James W., 524, 526, 

529, 540

Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia, 491, 505

T–2 tankers (power generation) 98, 109, 115, 

147, 246, 267–68, 274, 285, 380, 569. 

See also Cam Ranh Bay; Nha Trang; 

Qui Nhon; Vung Tau.

Talbot, Col. William J., 338

Tam Ky City, 375, 451

Tam Quan, 218, 219, 257, 513, 554

battle of, 252, 261, 262, 473

quarry at, 258, 335, 513

Tan An, 221, 310–11, 427, 435, 468

Tan Binh, 168

Tan Canh, 211, 320, 326, 327, 336

Tan My, 345, 365, 426

Tan Son Nhut International Airport, 10, 

204, 385, 570

attack during Tet offensive, 340–41

expansion and improvements of, 2, 4, 5, 

12, 36, 144, 147, 288, 452, 558, 564

MACV headquarters at, 97, 160, 280, 

287–88

personnel at, 573, 576

pipelines to, 443

U.S. Operations Mission at, 43

Tank-Mounted Clearing Roller, 507, 553

Tankdozer, M48, 67

Tanks

M48A3 Patton, 67, 170, 199, 225, 251, 

430, 480, 496, 532

M551 Sheridan, 496, 530

Tan Uyen District, 56, 68, 173, 553

Tarbox, Brig. Gen. Robert M., 434, 484

Task Forces

21, 515

326, 528, 530–31, 535, 536, 537

Dong Tam, 37

East, 4

Gallagher, 2

Oregon, 235, 238–39, 241, 243–44, 246

248, 253, 360, 583. See also Infantry 

Divisons, 23d.

Remagen, 471

Schultz, 

Shoemaker, 492, 493, 495–

Sierra, 542, 

South, 4

Tiger, 474, 47

West, 4

Whiskey, 435, 515, 543, 54

Tay Ninh City, 53, 68, 172, 174, 494, 552

battles in and around, 229, 375

roads to, 200, 310, 341, 376, 441, 495, 

498
645

Index

Tay Ninh Province, 110, 293–94, 389, 413, 463, 

487, 553

base transfer, 469

facilities in, 145, 146, 450

Viet Cong in, 199

See also Operations, Attleb

Taylor, General Maxwell D., 7, 81–82

Tchepone, Laos, 523, 524, 539, 540. See also

Operations, Lam Son 71

Technical Services Corporation, 414

Ten-Year Plan of Highway Improvement, 

1965–1975, 404

Tet offensive, 328–53, 363, 365, 373, 428, 557

Thailand, 1, 222, 223, 389, 514

Thi Tinh River, 223, 225, 228 

Thien Nhon, 499, 500, 501, 507

Thieu, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van, 26, 316, 438, 

520, 523

Thomas B. Bourne Associates, 5

Thu Duc, 296

Thua Thien Province, 365, 516

Thunder Road. See Highway 13.

Tich, Capt. Nguyen Van, 463–64

Tieu Atar Special Forces camp, 338

Tingley, Pfc. Michael R., 226

Tolson, Maj. Gen. John J., 236, 251, 353, 365

Tong Le Chon Special Forces camp, 231, 

310, 488, 496, 500–501

Townsley, Col. Edwin S., 353, 363

Traas, Maj. Adrian G., 257, 561, 563

Tractors. See Bulldozers and Rome plow.

Transphibian Tactical Tree Crusher, 308

Transportation Battalion, 159th, 351, 352

Transportation Command, 4th, 151

Treadwell, Maj. Millard L., 232–33

Triem, Lt. Col. Paul D., 28, 136, 137–38

Trung Loi, 69

Tudor Engineering Company, 5

Tunnel Killer Teams, 72, 190–93, 224–25, 226, 344

Tunnel rats. See Tunnel Killer Teams.

Tunnel systems, 54, 56, 70, 166, 190–93

acetylene gas, 192, 193, 583

demolition, 224, 225, 226, 232, 583

Mighty Mite smoke blowers, 192

Tuy Hoa, 104, 120, 180, 182, 270, 272, 354, 

428

air base, 99, 109, 118–19, 121, 271, 297, 

407, 452, 453

bridge construction at, 183, 434

expansion of, 268, 269

port at, 95, 121–22

power generation, 570

and railroad, 442

transfer of, 573

Typhoon Hester, 545, 565, 573

Tyson, Capt. Jesse M., Jr., 27

U.S. Agency for International Development, 

273, 405, 406–07, 421, 567, 571

and civic action programs, 108, 565

Defense Realignment Program, 411

and Operation Dong Tam, 37

and road projects, 406, 411, 412, 413, 438

U.S. Army, Japan, 37, 385

U.S. Army, Pacific, 36, 83

U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), 41, 43, 105, 

247, 293, 421, 548

on airfield construction, 188

and civilianization program, 358–59

Engineer Office, 45

and engineer reorganization, 483–84

Engineer Section, 576

Facilities Engineering Division, 484

headquarters, 141, 279–80

Installations Division, 106, 107

intelligence operations, 486

and land clearing, 195, 197, 305

logistical staff, 486

and manpower issues, 186, 383, 391–92

Mapping and Intelligence Division, 584

mapping missions, 486

mine and countermine activities of, 486

responsibilities, 106

training programs, 486

tunnel-destruction system, 193

See also Engler, Lt. Gen. Jean E.; 

McCaffrey, Lt. Gen. William B.;

Mine Warfare Center; Ploger, Maj. 

Gen. Robert R. 

U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Command, 

419

U.S. Army Munitions Command, 191

U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam, 

297, 383, 385, 386

U.S. Army Property Disposal Agency, 567

U.S. Army Support Command, 22, 43, 

79, 80, 81, 83. See also U.S. Army, 

Vietnam (USARV).

U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, 7, 10

U.S. Construction Staff Committee, 80, 82

U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 3, 96, 144, 287, 340, 

357, 568

U.S. General Accounting Office, 161, 295–96

U.S. Operations Mission, 2–3, 8, 43, 84, 

402, 403, 404. See also U.S. Agency 

for International Development; U.S. 

Construction Staff Committee.

U.S. Public Health Service, 518

Utah Beach, 351, 352

Vam Co Dong River, 165

Vance, Cyrus R., 14, 88, 89–90, 99

Vi Thanh, 450, 472
Engineers at War

646

Viet Cong, 3, 26, 70, 84, 144, 153, 199, 480, 

563

at Cam Ranh Bay, 25, 56

in Cambodia, 322, 486, 487

at Dong Tam, 285

engagements, 53, 54–55, 69, 71, 147, 165–

66, 167–68, 169, 231, 280, 316, 320–21

in Iron Triangle, 59

losses of, 180, 200–201, 223, 226

Military Region 4, 223

and railroads, 399, 408

and roads, 120, 170, 172–73, 182, 242, 

256, 259, 260–61, 317, 363, 403, 404, 

407, 429–30, 514

and Tet offensive, 331, 333–34, 336–37, 

340, 341, 343, 352

Vietnam National Railway Service, 341, 

397–405, 406, 407, 408, 410, 436, 438

and First Indochina War, 398

sabotage, 399–400, 407, 437–38,

security of, 521

service restored, 400–401, 436, 437, 441

and Tet offensive, 437

Vietnamese Director General of Highways, 

439–40

Vietnamese facilities engineers, 520–21

Vietnamization, 458–65, 483, 512, 518, 521, 

540, 557, 563

and Cambodia and Laos, 489, 523

equipment and base transfers, 567

training under, 443, 486

Vinh Binh Province, 545

Vinh Loc Island, 377

Vinh Long, 10, 151, 285, 354, 445, 450, 468, 

472, 480, 571

Vinh Thanh Special Forces camp, 72

Vinh Thanh Valley, 72

Vinnell Corporation, 267–68, 284, 380, 445, 

570

contracts, 109, 274, 282, 381, 383, 384, 

386, 421, 485

equipment provided by, 419

workforce of, 274, 568

See also Cam Ranh Bay; Long Binh, T–2 

tankers (power generation).

Vo Dat, 70, 553

Volpe, Capt. Michael, 56

Vung Chua Mountain, 274

Vung Ro Bay, 118, 119, 123, 268, 281

connected with Highway 1, 120, 183

port, 182–83, 443

Vung Tau, 16, 47, 68, 287, 296, 378, 385, 394

airfields, 10, 20, 51, 151

and base transfers, 468, 520

DeLong pier at, 30, 151, 284, 574

infiltration at, 565

port of, 20, 51, 94, 96, 139, 151, 284, 

406, 443

power generation by, 98, 109, 115, 310, 

380, 569

projects of, 139, 144, 146, 285

RMK-BRJ at, 284

rock production, 158, 281, 286, 310, 

420, 421

and Tet offensive, 341

Waldo, 1st Lt. Daniel W., Jr., 370, 371

Waldrop, Lt. Col. Andrew J., 138

Walker, S. Sgt. Frank J., 321

Walter Kidde Constructors, Inc., 109, 121, 

122, 220, 269, 297

War Zone C, 67, 71, 172, 174, 229, 463, 

478–79, 494. See also Operations, 

Attleboro, Birmingham

Falls, Junction City, Rol

Ston

War Zone D, 54, 59, 68, 71, 167, 170, 232

water purification/supply, 207–08, 244, 326, 

363, 519

Watkin, Col. William W., 45, 125, 134

Weaver, Capt. Thomas C., 430

Weigle, USNS, 147

Westmoreland, General William C., 11–12, 

16–17, 68, 251, 303, 316, 321, 322

and Americal Division, 250

on construction oversight and control, 

86, 87–88, 89–90, 93–95, 110, 162

construction priorities of, 13, 14, 20, 46, 

84, 94, 95, 99, 120, 188, 293

on Dak To, 325

on Engineer Branch, 81

Field Force, Vietnam, established by, 101

and funding issues, 160

on highways, 241, 405–06, 413

Kham Duc evacuation, 371

Khe Sanh relief, 360, 368

land-clearing programs and, 194, 195, 

196–97

on logistics, 100, 243

and marines, 234, 309

personnel issues, 43, 295

plans of, 59, 170, 235, 236, 301, 302, 318, 

320, 359, 

railway restoration, 436

and refugees, 373, 374, 509

and Tet offensive, 344, 345, 357

troop deployments, 77, 78, 142, 152, 285

on troop strengths, 26, 32–33, 51, 54, 95

See also Pleiku Campaign; Task Forces, 

Orego

Weyand, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., 77, 142, 

311, 312, 313
647

Index

Wheeler, General Earle G., 86, 87, 89–90, 

99

Williams, 2d Lt. Charles Q., 53

Williams, Lt. Gen. Samuel T., 403

Williamson, Brig. Gen. Ellis W., 51, 59

Wilson, Lt. Gen. Walter K., 80

Withers, Lt. Col. George K., 434

Wolfe, Lt. Col. Walter G., 209

Women’s Army Corps, 485

Wonder Arches, 452, 453–61

Wonder Trussless Building Company, 452

Wood, Lt. Col. Stuart, 474, 475–76

Wooding, R. Adm. Robert R., 108

Wray, Col. William R., 514

Wright, Brig. Gen. John M., Jr., 59–60, 132

Wunder Beach, 352, 360–61

Xepon River, 539

Xuan Loc, 71, 146, 282, 283, 284, 307, 389, 

437, 441–42, 562, 565, 571–72

Yates, Brig. Gen. Elmer P., 448

Young, Maj. Gen. Robert P., 434, 547, 548, 580

Zielinski, Capt. Robert F., 168