Separate and Unequal

Race Relations in the AAF

During World War II

Alan M. Osur
Above: Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Commanding Officer, 99th Fighter Squadron posed with the first pilots to be assigned to the unit. First African American pilots to be assigned to a fighter squadron. USAF Photo.

On cover: P-51 Mustangs of the 332d Fighter Group. USAF Photo

Separate and Unequal

Race Relations in the AAF

During World War II

Alan M. Osur

2000

Introduction

Race relations between white and black Americans in the Army Air

Forces (AAF) during World War II ran the gamut from harmonious to

hostile, depending upon the unique circumstances existing within each

unit, command, and theater. In analyzing racial policy as it was implemented throughout the chain of command, are a number of themes relevant for an understanding of the utilization of African Americans during

the war. First, the AAF never willingly accepted black soldiers. This service had totally excluded them for over two decades before they were permitted to enter, and then used them only reluctantly. The fact that the

AAF even opened its doors to African Americans and proceeded to make

additional opportunities available to them was due to pressures aimed at

the War Department and the AAF. Individuals and organizations within

the black community and white liberals in and out of Congress were quite

vocal and were able to exert sufficient pressure to force the War

Department and AAF to examine and modify their policies and practices

throughout the war.

Another recurring theme was that leadership within the War

Department and AAF assumed that segregation was the most efficient

system of race relations and accepted the “separate-but-equal” doctrine.

Even if we accept “separate-but-equal” as the law of the land, the AAF

did not, in fact, maintain equal facilities for black soldiers, and they were

not afforded equal treatment. Thus, the policy of segregation was unsatisfactory for African Americans, and the duplicated facilities that were

necessary to maintain the system were far too expensive in terms of the

results obtained. And because of deeply ingrained racist beliefs, the

American public and the military were willing to accept the additional

financial burden, social unrest, and inefficiency of segregation in an

attempt to keep African Americans “in their place.”

During the war, the U.S. military inherited from American society

and from its own traditions a difficult problem in attempting to absorb

large numbers of African Americans into a war apparatus, and racial

issues plagued the AAF. Although the AAF fervently defended segregation, its leaders failed to understand that this implied second-class citizenship for blacks. Additionally, blacks were no longer willing to accept

the demeaning status to which they had been relegated, and using the military as a vehicle for their protests, voiced their objection to discriminatory treatment and segregation. Their protests were for military leaders a

constant source of frustration and annoyance.

However, one can discern a decided shift in the approach of the War

Department in 1943. Until then, officials in the War Department and the

AAF reflected society’s traditional racist attitude toward the utilization of

African Americans. The military did not consider black soldiers as part of

3
the American military tradition and used them only when absolutely necessary for the defense of the country or when political pressure forced

their use. With mounting pressure upon War Department officials, there

was change in outlook from 1943 through the end of the war to recognize

and alleviate the race problem. The U.S. government sought to utilize

black soldiers fairly rather than to view them merely as embarrassments

and problems. Unfortunately, this change in attitude did not filter down

through the AAF chain of command. Throughout the war, many AAF

commanders demonstrated a reluctance to treat blacks with full equality

and to show a sincere commitment to abide by positive War Department

racial directives.

4
The War Department and

the Black Community

In spite of an exclusion policy maintained by the U.S. government

and military, African Americans have participated in America’s wars,

although they have not always received due recognition for their efforts.

With the approach of World War II, two contrasting attitudes affected War

Department policy concerning the utilization of African Americans. On

one side was the black community which pressured the President, as

Commander in Chief, as well as the War Department. Because African

Americans were determined to persevere in achieving the promise of

American life, their impact during World War II differed from previous

wars. They were aided by organizations within the black community and

by the propaganda war which emphasized the racist and undemocratic

character of the Axis powers. Their ability to organize and the political

self-consciousness and awareness that had developed in the black community gave them the capability to exert pressure. What they worked for

was recognition of their rights commensurate with their sacrifice to the

national effort, and they expected that the federal government would protect them as all soldiers in uniform.

While African Americans at the outset of World War II became

vocal about their rights within the military structure, others continued to

defend the needs of that structure, such as the right of whites to be segregated from blacks and the military requirement for military efficiency.

War Department leaders weighed these views as they attempted to formulate troop policy for blacks. They also weighed studies at, for example, the Army War College, that evaluated the performance of African

Americans in World War I. One study from 1925 clearly reflected the

racist views of American society and military personnel. It established the

impact of racism upon the minds of field grade officers of the 1920s who,

generally speaking, would become the commanders in World War II.

Another study from mid-1937 noted that during mobilization, black soldiers would comprise nine percent of the total mobilized strength. But it

recommended segregated units and did not list the Air Corps as an organization in which blacks could serve.

There were other factors that influenced World War II War

Department officials and racial policy. The War Department viewed the

racial situation as a product of American society and believed that the

military should avoid becoming entangled in the country’s social problems. The military should uphold the status quo without offering African

Americans any concessions beyond those they had in civilian life. As

General George C. Marshall noted in 1940, it was society that had created the conditions which made it necessary for the War Department to fol5
low a policy of segregation, and he felt that it was important not to ignore

those conditions. An extensive campaign to force a change could have a

destructive effect on military efficiency, and the military was not the

proper vehicle for critical social experiments. He continued this reasoning in 1941 in a letter in which he argued against ending segregation

which he saw as “tantamount to solving a social problem which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of the nation.” He

maintained that “experiments within the Army in the solution of social

problems are fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, or morale.”

An officer of the War Department Adjutant General’s office gave a

speech in late 1941 in which he noted that “the Army is not a sociological laboratory.... Experiments to meet the wishes and demands of the

champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are

a danger to efficiency, discipline and morale.” This speech characterizes

the views of many within the department, including the leadership of the

AAF.

The military plans and studies of the interwar period, the attitude of

the white Americans, and the attitude of military leaders all accepted segregation as the most efficient approach for the utilization of African

Americans. Since segregation was legal (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896), the

military could fall back on the position that segregation was not discriminatory and was indeed the most efficient way to run the War Department.

An AAF memorandum states that the AAF “can do a better job with less

trouble by segregation than they can by intermingling the races with the

problems which such intermingling are bound to cause.”

In sum, the War Department saw itself as a product of American

society; therefore, Army racial policy should reflect civilian practice and

black soldiers should receive no more than they had received in civilian

life. The Army and AAF saw themselves as servants of the state, not as

instruments of social change. They should operate in terms of military

needs and efficiency, and their leaders firmly believed that military effectiveness and morale dictated segregation.

The black community viewed the military differently and by the end

of the 1930s began to devote greater attention to the lack of opportunity

in the military service. The military was a source of employment for

many who continued to feel the effects of the great depression. The pay,

food, and clothing provided by the military offered them an exceptional

opportunity. To be denied the right to serve was interpreted by African

Americans as an example of economic discrimination. Others became

skeptical over the issue of having to “prove themselves” by fighting for

the right to serve. They believed that they had clearly demonstrated their

ability in other American wars. Also, the African American community

fully understood that segregation implied inequality – second-class citizenship. Equally frustrating was the hypocrisy of the military segregation

policy maintained during a war fought for the preservation of democracy,

6
as African Americans viewed segregation as the very antithesis of the

American democratic system. African Americans were unrelenting in

pointing out that the Four Freedoms and Jim Crow ideology were contradictory and that black Americans were fighting abroad for a democratic

ideal that did not exist at home.

Disrespect for blacks in uniform became another source of difficulty for black servicemen. When large numbers entered the military, many

soon encountered racial problems in and around their camps, obvious

cases of discrimination and prejudice. But a further issue was herein

implied – disrespect for the uniform of the United States military. All military men and women were regularly required to wear their uniforms and

in American society the uniform normally commanded respect. However,

numerous discriminatory acts were perpetrated against black soldiers,

and these were serious injustices because the military institution was for

them one of the few symbols of what America represented.

An important theme which grew out of the early war period was the

slogan Double V. This rallying symbol, popularized in early 1942 by the

Pittsburgh Courier, stood for victory against fascism abroad and racism

at home. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People (NAACP) also supported the concept. Throughout the war,

African Americans, applying the concept of the Double V, struggled to

remove the contradiction between the claims of American democratic

ideology and the racial inequalities evident in American life. As

Americans, they were patriotic and loyal, and expressed their support for

the military buildup and war effort; but, at the same time, they were

embittered over their treatment by the military and their inferior social

status within American society.

In analyzing the racial issues affecting the black community, it is

obvious that by 1942 a black consciousness had evolved and was an

important factor in pressuring for social change. Black organizations had

been pressuring the government for a greater role in the national defense,

directing their efforts primarily at restrictions in the Army and Navy and

the exclusion policy of the Air Corps. The Pittsburgh Courier was joined

by the NAACP, and the National Urban League. The Courier made the

Air Corps its special target. As the War Department announced that new

openings would be made available to African Americans, the Courier, in

particular, interpreted each victory as a direct result of its long fight. In

May 1940, the Courier launched the Committee on Participation of

Negroes in the National Defense Program. However, the Courier did not

always receive the support of the NAACP, because the Courier was willing to accept the “practicality of separate divisions” while the NAACP

was not.

In the fall of 1940, the black community and the War Department

confronted each other, bringing about significant results. A meeting

between Walter White of the NAACP and President Franklin Roosevelt

7
led to an administration policy statement that for the first time stated that

African Americans would be utilized on a “fair and equitable basis” in

each major branch of the service, including in the Air Corps. However,

segregation also would be the policy. As the November election

approached, blacks would make more gains, such as the appointment of

Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., to the rank of Brigadier General; Judge

William Hastie as Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War to handle racial

matters; and Major Campbell Johnson as Executive Assistant to the

Director of Selective Service.

Pressure from the black community continued, and the NAACP

conducted a letter-writing campaign to get the Air Corps to accept blacks.

However, in January 1941 when the War Department announced the formation of an all-black Pursuit Squadron and the training of black pilots at

Tuskegee, the NAACP and other black organizations were in a dilemma

concerning the program. Although they were adamant about any kind of

segregation, especially in the Army, they had to admit that Tuskegee was,

nonetheless, an opportunity to fly in the Air Corps.

It is clear that the pervasiveness of traditional racial ideas held by

the majority of the white American public and solidified by time and

practice made the black struggle for equal rights arduous and lengthy.

Blacks expressed in different ways the idea that they would not simply

accept things as they were and were willing to fight for their right to participate in the military establishment. The War Department gradually

altered its policies, accepting black soldiers and improving their treatment. The black community organized to meet this challenge and to fight

for its rights — and when participation was achieved, it continued to fight

for fair treatment.

8
The Army Air Forces: Early Policies and Practices

During the period of the military buildup leading to World War II,

leaders of the Army Air Forces hesitated to utilize African Americans.

Air Corps officers believed that they were incapable of performing well

in flying roles, and since military efficiency overshadowed all other considerations, the utilization of black men was deemed impractical.

Primarily because the War Department received constant pressure from

black organizations and individual and in turn the department pressed the

Air Corps, were AAF units opened up to blacks. Thus, the black community and the War Department eroded the AAF exclusionist policy. Once

the AAF accepted blacks into its ranks, local communities and military

leaders protested having black soldiers stationed in their areas. But as a

result of War Department pressure, the AAF was forced to deploy them

to all of its stateside bases and to many overseas sites. Institutional and

personal discrimination, however, persisted, and African Americans did

not obtain fair and equitable treatment in the AAF. On the other hand, the

AAF did establish an integrated AAF Officer Candidate School in Miami

Beach, Florida.

During the First World War, official Air Service policy toward

African Americans maintained that since “at present time no colored aero

[sic] squadrons are being formed,” and it was impossible to mix blacks

with whites, no black recruits could be accepted into the Air Service.

Applicants were told that they could apply later if the Air Service decided to form black flying squadrons. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s such

reasoning prevailed. In 1922, the Chief of the Training and War Plans

Division noted that although “there is no restriction placed by law or regulation on the race of applicants for appointment as flying cadet,” it was

impossible to form black or integrated units. There was, therefore, “no

justification in training negro cadets.” The Air Service Reserve Corps

also excluded African Americans, since that service would only accept

those officers with previous Air Service training.

In the 1930s, the Air Corps’ rejection of blacks remained an institutionalized practice as black applicants time after time received the standard reply that “there are no organizations in the Army A.C. made up of

colored men and none are contemplated.” Therefore, there are “no colored soldiers in the Army Air Corps.” One qualified young black applicant who was rejected during this period was Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., who

had graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1936.

Until 1939, the Air Corps had succeeded in excluding African

Americans. However, black and while leaders and organizations were no

longer willing to accept such racist practices and challenged this exclusion policy. Intensive political pressure was applied upon Congress, the

9
President, Secretary of War, and War Department, and through them,

upon the Air Corps. Gradually the Air Corps altered its policies, backed

down, and admitted blacks.

In 1939 and 1940, Congress enacted three laws which were to have

a significant impact upon blacks and the AAF. The Civilian Pilot Training

Act established the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) with the purpose of creating a reserve of civilian pilots to be called in the event of a

war emergency. African Americans participated in this program at a number of sites, including Tuskegee Institute. Public Law 18 provided for the

large-scale expansion of the Air Corps, and one section stipulated that

one of the civilian contract schools had to be designated for the training

of blacks. Since the contract schools were to provide pilots for the military, blacks assumed that they would enter the AAF, although the law did

not explicitly state this. Yet, the AAF continued to exclude them for the

next two years, and military leaders resisted and even refused to acknowledge the full implications of the law. The AAF Plans Division tried to circumvent the law by noting that while one school must be designated for

blacks, no one actually had to be trained.

Finally in 1940, responding from pressures from black and civil

rights groups, Congress inserted in the Selective Training and Service Act

that there would be no discrimination because of “race and color.” The act

effectively required the War Department to accept blacks in numerical

proportion to whites.

However, the Air Corps continued to resist the pressure placed upon

it to accept blacks. African Americans applying for admission to the

Glenview, Illinois school established by Public Law 18 were told “that no

separate units had been set up to accommodate Negroes for training, and

therefore, it would be impossible to accept people of that race.” General

Henry “Hap” Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps defended his service’s position and reiterated the standard argument that since there were no black

units in the Air Corps, there was no way to utilize them. He added that

“negro pilots cannot be used in our present Air Corps units since this

would result in having negro officers serving over white enlisted men,”

creating “an impossible social problem.” These and other similar comments were sent to the War Department in mid-1940 to resist the utilization of African Americans. The War Department Operations Division as

well as Personnel and Intelligence, and the Secretary of War, all concurred with the position of the Air Corps.

But, by the end of 1940, continued pressure and Army officials

forced the Air Corps to develop suitable plans for the utilization of blacks

and to accept its share of the Selective Service quota. The Army Ground

Forces and Services of Supply insisted that the only fair method of distribution was to spread blacks equitably throughout the Army; otherwise

the nonflying units would carry an unfair burden.

10
Therefore, the AAF planned for the establishment of a black flying

unit. Since there would be a limited number of enlisted blacks needing

training, the Air Corps did not want to create a special school that would

draw from its short supply of qualified instructors and supervisors. So,

the Corps adopted the expedient to organize technical training at an established facility, and Chanute Field, Illinois was chosen. Tuskegee was

selected as the site for pilot training, and the Air Corps notified Training

Command in early November, 1940 to prepare for its formation and organization. Tuskegee would be “fully equivalent, with respect to the character of living conditions, facilities, equipment, and training, to that provided for white personnel under similar conditions.” 

Brig. Gen. W. R. Weaver, Commanding General of the Southeastern

Air Corps Training Center at Maxwell Field, Alabama, to which

Tuskegee was attached, proceeded with the AAF plan. Black pilots were

to be trained under the supervision of 11 white officers and 15 white noncommissioned officers until such time that a sufficient number of black

airmen could be trained to replace them. However, in accordance with

Army Regulation 95-60, the Commanding Officer at Tuskegee had to be

white. The AAF plan provided for the training of only 45 black officers

during the first year of operation. General Weaver advised Mr. G. L.

Washington, Director of Aviation Training at Tuskegee, that “the negro

population deserved a successful experiment in flying training; the success of negro youth in the Air Corps hinged upon the fate of the Tuskegee

project.”

On 16 January 1941, the War Department announced the formation

of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and of the Tuskegee training program. Why

did the Air Corps decide on a pursuit flying mission for African

11

General Weaver
Americans? The decision appears to have been based on racial factors. A

pilot sitting in a single-seat fighter aircraft necessitated a limited training

program for blacks. Had bombers been selected, there would have been

the additional training need for bombardiers, navigators, and gunners,

placing a greater strain on the segregated facilities.

In spite of the admission of blacks into flying training, Air Corps

leaders were reluctant throughout the war to expand their training program

and combat role. Because of this resistance, the entire flying program for

black pilots suffered, the result of which was a sluggish program that progressed slowly through each phase until pressure forced the AAF to take

some action. This hesitation is evident from correspondence and memoranda. In a mid-1942 discussion with the Directorate of Individual

Training, the Air Staff concluded that African Americans did not do well

in World War I under their own officers “due to the emotional characteristics of the race.” And so it was up to the 99th and 100th Pursuit Squadrons

to prove the black’s ability in the Air Corps. “A test by fire,” those responsible for training contended, “is the only one of recordable worth.”

Although publicity surrounding the formation of Tuskegee and the

pursuit squadron occupied much space in the press and the attention of

many both in and out of the AAF, the vast majority of African Americans

were in support rather than in flying units. Most served in units such as

Aviation Squadrons, Air Base Defense Units, Quartermaster Battalions,

Ordnance Companies, Transportation Companies, and others.

Throughout 1941, as the War Department prepared to accept blacks,

the AAF made plans to receive its full quota and by mid-1941 it includ12

Technical Training
ed 2,250 men. To facilitate the task of absorbing these new recruits, the

AAF organized them into nine segregated Aviation Squadrons of 250

men each to be stationed at various bases throughout the South. These

squadrons would perform routine duties at the fields, including labor

tasks requiring maintenance, truck driving, interior guard duty, assistance

around hanger areas, airdrome maintenance, and other housekeeping and

labor chores.

Ironically, the small numbers the AAF had difficulty assigning in

1941 would give way to thousands as a result of the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harbor. In January 1942, the War Department notified the AAF that

its quota would be 53,299 by the end of the year. In addition, the AAF

was assigned 24,293 black men from the Arms and Services (ASWAAF),

a rather random official designation for a variety of units which operated

with AAF units, but were on loan from other arms and services. The AAF

attempted to restrict the use and numbers of African Americans, but the

War Department was resolute in its decision that the AAF utilize its full

share. The majority of them were assigned into units assigned to jobs

which did not require high skill levels. In fact, many of these units were

really labor battalions and had been so designated in World War I. The

majority were assigned to Aviation Squadrons, and these units attracted

great attention because of the sheer numbers of men involved in undefined tasks. Judge William Hastie, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of

War, was quick to investigate and complain. He objected to the segregation, the fact that they seemed to have no mission except to absorb black

recruits, and on many bases they were assigned to “pick and shovel” jobs

which were considered common and menial.

Nonetheless, the AAF, supported by the War Department, did not

alter its policy that lower intelligence, educational background, and leadership levels dictated the utilization of blacks. As a result, morale and performance were definitely affected in those units where they functioned

without any real purpose or were interrupted in their training to do housekeeping chores. Blacks in these units objected to their assignment to labor

tasks, and “unit after unit” disclosed that they resented the fact that they

were exclusively black. Also, some complained that the “high-fallutin”

name of Aviation Squadron was offensive, for it was simply windowdressing to deceive the public. The situation inevitably resulted in poor

morale which led to Absence Without Leave (AWOL), drunk and disorderly conduct, failure to obey orders, insulting language, and breaches of

discipline.

Later in the war, the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) reported similar

problems. Many of the unskilled black women who entered the service

were still unassignable by the middle of the war. A large number were

sent to bases as unskilled personnel, and local commanders were hard

pressed to assign them tasks.

In addition to morale problems caused by the haphazard assignment

13
procedures, black pilots and those in technical positions also experienced

numerous frustrations. The restricted facilities at Tuskegee coupled with

short-sighted AAF plans created numerous problems, including a sizeable backlog of qualified applicants waiting to enlist. Since the War

Department and AAF upheld segregated training, African Americans

were not permitted to attend a number of other AAF technical training

and flying centers because of a lack of segregated facilities. White candidates entering flying training had at times to wait a few weeks before

beginning training, while a much longer wait was usually in store for

black candidates. Some qualified black men were drafted before the AAF

could accept them for segregated training.

Progress in expanding AAF assignments for blacks remained sluggish and delays were commonplace. The AAF vigorously maintained that

the number of men called coincided with existing vacancies, and any

other policy would be wasteful and serve no useful purpose. In some

instances strict adherence to policies affecting black pilots became detrimental to their morale. Many qualified pilots were thwarted in their

attempts to advance because the AAF unconditionally had refused to permit them to engage in anything but pursuit flying. Because of this restriction, when a black pilot candidate washed out of pursuit flying, he had no

alternative training program to enter, while there were numerous alternatives open to whites.

There were additional problems for African Americans attempting to

enter technical training. An example of the illogic that plagued black

14

Women’s Army Corps (WAC)
progress throughout the war was a report by Air Staff Personnel that “the

race of an individual is immaterial to eligibility for admission to aviation

cadet courses of training.” But, Personnel continued, “the number of

Negro candidates assigned to any particular course of aviation cadet training will not exceed the number of graduates that can be utilized in Negro

units of the AAF.” It is apparent that the second statement contradicts the

first, yet the AAF and War Department continued to maintain that segregation did not restrict opportunities for blacks in the military.

The areas of flying and technical training became most vulnerable

issues for the AAF, and that service was constantly under attack by

African Americans leaders. Judge Hastie, his successor Truman Gibson,

and leaders of the NAACP were most persistent in exploiting the weaknesses in the AAF’s argument over segregation. For example, the AAF

needed 10,000 meteorologists, and since there were only seven vacancies

for blacks, many with the proper qualifications were refused entry into

the program. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate with special advanced study in

biology and biochemistry was assigned as a laborer to a Signal

Construction Battalion.

Once blacks had been accepted into the AAF, other problems continued to hamper their advancement. After the plans for expansion were

developed, there was the persistent obstacle of where to station them. As

early as 1941, reacting to announcements that blacks were scheduled for

assignment to specific bases, commanders and spokesmen for local communities registered a barrage of complaints with the War Department. In

early 1942, the AAF issued a memorandum to its stations and surveyed

possible locations for the stationing of blacks. The replies must have been

disheartening. Most bases reported that either the military commanders or

the local communities did not desire them at their locations. Some would

accept only a limited number, and others would only accept southerners.

Base leaders protested to no avail as the AAF sent blacks to all locations,

including Eglin Field, Florida, Ellington Field near Houston, Texas, and

Bakersfield, California.

Local citizens were also vocal in their opposition to bringing black

soldiers into their communities. During the early part of the war and most

noticeably in the south, civilians wrote or had their Congressmen write to

the War Department and the AAF. Generally, their letters reflected racial

fears about the disproportionate number of blacks in the area. Local citizens expressed concern that since there was a shortage of recreational

opportunities for them, the latter might use white facilities as a result. The

volume of correspondence was considerable, but the AAF response was

standard, stressing that it was aware of the concerns of local citizens, that

the AAF had its quota and must assign blacks to all bases, that the Army

was doing everything possible to provide adequate recreational facilities,

that the AAF hoped civilians would cooperate, and that blacks were

members of the Armed Forces and deserved to be treated as such.

15
These difficulties in the assignment of blacks concerned the War

Department and Secretary of War Stimson. The War Department, under

the prodding of Secretary Stimson, was resolute in notifying local and

overseas commanders that they would have to accept their quota of

blacks, and it is significant that he played a leading role in those decisions.

With the acceptance of hundreds of thousands of men into the AAF

during the early part of the war, there was a noticeable deficiency in the

expansion program – no provision for the training of nonflying black officer personnel. Prior to World War II, pilots had performed all administrative duties, but with the increased sophistication of flying this was no

longer practical. The AAF finally realized the need for a ground school to

train 12,000 officers, including African Americans. Late in 1941, the

AAF pressed the War Department for its own administrative schools, and

in early 1942 the AAF designated Miami Beach, Florida as its Officer

Candidate School (OCS). Soon, the first class entered and utilized existing civilian facilities. The Adjutant General directed in April that a proportionate share of each OCS quota be allotted to blacks. As a result, most

OCS classes included blacks, and the official histories report that “few

difficulties were encountered.” With the exception of sleeping quarters,

black candidates were completely integrated into the program, but outside

the school area they had to abide by local customs.

The relative ease with which the program accepted blacks contrasts

sharply with the opposition which resulted when the AAF first announced

that they would go to Miami Beach. The local commander, Congressman,

and civilians all protested since blacks already were not permitted to live

in Miami Beach. Congressional pressure forced the Air Staff to reexamine its decision to include blacks in the Miami Beach program and to

reconsider the prospect of a separate school for blacks, but military efficiency was an overriding factor. A separate school would be costly in

terms of the small numbers of blacks trained and could lead as well to

protests and difficulties in locating a suitable site. Also, the War College

studies of the post-World War I period were hostile to any future use of

black officers, but at the same time took the position that, if they must be

used, they should be trained along with white officer candidates.

African Americans attended OCS throughout the war, but in small

numbers. A black candidate who graduated in January 1944 maintained

that personnel treated him fairly, although the school generally did not

promote blacks as regularly as whites. All recreational facilities at the

OCS were available, including the night clubs. Everyone wore uniforms

so club managers knew that those entering their clubs attended the school

and, therefore, were welcome. But the main problem was the absence of

black women on the Beach. When there was free time, blacks went to

Miami for recreation. At the school there were only two restrictions –

rooms were segregated and they had to go to Miami for haircuts. As for

16
the attitude of whites toward this almost total integration, they really had

no choice; if they behaved in a discriminatory fashion, they could be

reported and washed out. And the instructors were fair because they were

well screened and very capable. Later, when the school moved to San

Antonio and Maxwell Field, it was reported that blacks were well treated

and received a minimum of discriminatory treatment.

The treatment of blacks at Miami Beach demonstrates a trend that

the AAF might have applied to its entire training program. Instructors and

white students were briefed on how to treat blacks and were encouraged

to deal with them fairly. Granted, there were small numbers, but because

the AAF took a positive stand, the Miami Beach program was a success.

Had military leaders demonstrated a similar strength of purpose at other

locations, perhaps there might have been fewer racial problems. Yet, the

AAF was unwilling to make that commitment and viewed the integrated

OCS as an exception.

Throughout the Second World War, large numbers of African

Americans entered the Army Air Forces. At the end of 1942, there were

thousands of blacks in the AAF, whereas there were none the previous

year. By June 1944, the AAF had 145,242 blacks in its total force of over

2 million men. Though there were noticeable breakthroughs for blacks

entering the Army Air Forces, the AAF remained reluctant to accept them

and had made repeated attempts to restrict their progress. By April 1945

only one of 90 was an officer while 1/6th of the white force was commissioned. The AAF organized a vast majority into segregated service

units performing more or less routine tasks about the bases, while more

black officers were flying personnel or worked in related positions. Any

progress that was made resulted from political pressure directed against

the War Department, which then exhorted the AAF to revise its policies.

Despite the fact that War Department officials often agreed with AAF

attitudes, the War Department did appear on occasion to be impatient

with AAF intransigence. In spite of the success of the OCS program to

integrate blacks, almost all blacks in the AAF served in segregated units

and lived in segregated facilities. The general reluctance of the AAF to

utilize them created tensions that erupted throughout the war. These conflicts will be described in the following sections.

17
18
The Army Air Forces: Black Officers and Flying Units

A large percentage of African American manpower in the AAF was

utilized in service units, yet most of the publicity, credit, and glory went

to the pursuit pilots. Though much money and effort were expended on

the flying program, the history of black flying units reveals only partial

success. The 99th Squadron and the 332d Group, made up of the 100th,

301st, and 302nd Squadron, performed in a creditable manner in the

Mediterranean Theater. On the other hand, the 477th Group never completed its training for overseas deployment and by the end of the war in

Europe, had practically collapsed as a unit. Although each unit was segregated, its success or failure depended mainly on the attitude of those in

the command structures. The 99th and 332d were unique in the history of

black units in the military in that all of their officers were black. Inspired

by an opportunity to “prove themselves” and led by a strict military disciplinarian, they performed as well as any comparable white unit.

However, the 477th represented segregation at its worst. The key officers

in this unit were white and frequently used their positions as a steppingstone for promotion and reassignment to more important positions. In

addition, they were often indifferent to the needs of the unit and were condescending toward the blacks under their command. Thus, the 477th

never performed its mission.

The AAF conducted all basic training for black pilots at Tuskegee

Field, Alabama. At first, the 99th Pursuit Squadron, flying single-engine

fighter planes, absorbed all graduates. Later, the AAF organized the 332d

Fighter Group, which incorporated three other squadrons. The 99th completed its training and arrived in the Mediterranean Theater in 1943. In

the same year, the 332d moved to Selfridge Field, Michigan where it

completed its preparation for overseas deployment, arriving in the

Mediterranean in early 1944. Meanwhile, the AAF initiated plans in late

1943 to form the 477th Bombardment Group to fly twin-engine bombers.

Tuskegee lacked the facilities for conducting this new training, and it

became necessary to send blacks to other fields. Hondo Field, Texas

received Navigation cadets; Midland, Texas trained Bombardiers; and

Mather Field, California accomplished some twin-engine transition training. The 477th began its training at Selfridge, but in mid-1944 moved to

Godman Field, Kentucky where it stayed until March 1945. The unit then

moved to Freeman Field, Indiana, where it remained a month before

returning to Godman. Units of the 477th now joined with returning personnel from the 332d to form the 477th Composite Group under the command of Colonel B. O. Davis, Jr. At the same time, replacement pilots for

the 332d trained first at a satellite field of Selfridge — Oscoda — and

then at Walterboro, South Carolina.

19
Black flying units were confronted with a veritable maze of racial

problems, most of which were created by the AAF. The AAF dogmatically pursued a system of segregation that was almost impossible to

maintain. It even went so far as to violate War Department regulations to

prevent the mixing of whites and blacks in officers’ clubs.

Understandably, many problems developed as a result of this uncompromising position. Primary was the psychological degradation implicit in

the workings of segregation. Then there was the problem caused by the

absence of black cadres to supplement black units. While a mixture of

new and experienced personnel comprised white units going into combat,

when the 99th began flying the Mediterranean in 1943, it consisted entirely of personnel new to combat operations. Third was the friction caused

when commanders did not want black flying units in their operational

areas. For example, in June 1945 there were discussions concerning the

possibility of sending a black flying unit to the Pacific; Generals George

Marshall and Douglas MacArthur approved, but the AAF commander

there opposed the idea. General Henry Arnold wrote that “it is O. K. from

the W. D. viewpoint to send them but when [General] Kenney uses them

down in Mindanao or Borneo don’t be surprised of the criticisms that are

received.” Finally, there were restrictions on the types of training open to

blacks. Since the AAF considered their use in flying as an “experiment,”

it first employed them in single-engine planes exclusively and only gradually permitted black pilots to train in more sophisticated aircraft.

Officials rejected some flying programs solely because of the fear that

racial problems would arise. This was true of the Transport Command,

since providing adequate food and lodging facilities created too great a

problem for pilots flying around the country, especially in the South.

Tuskegee Army Air Field was located near the town of Tuskegee

and Tuskegee Institute in southeastern Alabama. The AAF did everything

possible to build the complex into a first-rate training center and to keep

racial problems at a minimum. To a large extent, it was successful in both

objectives. The training African Americans received was comparable to

that received by whites, and Judge Hastie noted that “the best of facilities

and thoroughly competent instructors were provided for.” It is probable

that political factors were responsible for the high caliber of training and

equipment at Tuskegee. One official history notes “that the Tuskegee

undertaking was considered by the War Department as No. 1 priority”

because of the “political pressure that had been brought to bear upon the

White House and the War Department to provide pilot training for

negroes.” Any delay could “seriously embarrass the War Department.”

The AAF attempted to establish a “separate but equal” facility at

Tuskegee. But living and other conditions aggravated racial problems,

and the segregated system compounded its own deficiencies. For one,

there was serious overcrowding. Overused facilities hindered flying

training and generally obstructed operations. An explanation for this

20
poor planning was the AAF’s attempt to solve the black training program

by placing all of its basic flight training at Tuskegee, but, unfortunately,

the facilities were not adequate to meet this demand. Once the pilots

were trained, the AAF did not immediately transfer them into operational units. Overcrowding at Tuskegee became more acute in 1942 and

1943, as the 99th remained on the station until April 1943. Two other

organizations also strained the facilities. The 96th Service Group, organized to support black flying units, received a minimal amount of tactical training during 1942 because no training facilities had been arranged.

Only a year later did it finally receive training and then move to

Selfridge. The 332d Group with its three squadrons and support organizations also created problems until it made its move to Selfridge in

March 1943. While at Tuskegee, the Training Command history reports

that the 332d “had difficulties with its training in that no adequate facilities existed on the station for its training and during the time it was at

Tuskegee practically no tactical training was accomplished.” Then in

July 1943, the War Department further overtaxed the base and assigned

50 liaison pilots to train for the Army Ground Forces. Fifty aircraft of

three different types and speeds already used the main field, so liaison

training was conducted at an auxiliary field.

21

Maj. Gen. Walter R. Weaver delivers the inaugural address opening the new

Air Corps school for training black aviators at Tuskegee.
Another factor which contributed to the cramped facilities at

Tuskegee was, as the unit history designates them, the “unwieldy surplus,” mainly nonflying personnel. Early in 1942, the AAF stopped the

practice of discharging those eliminated from the flying school, made

them privates, and retained them at Tuskegee. Unlike eliminated white

candidates who could be reassigned to other flying programs, there simply was no other place for blacks. Consequently, by September 1943, the

majority of the 286 eliminated cadets who were still at Tuskegee had low

morale. Besides having no real function, they were embittered over racial

conditions which they believed worked against them, and the black press

further fanned their discontent. By late 1943, some did enter navigator

and bombardier schools, but their departure had no great impact upon the

excessive numbers which continued to increase.

In July 1943, Tuskegee received 25 Signal Corps officers from

Selfridge. The Eastern Flying Training Command (EFTC) was well aware

22

Cadets reporting to Capt. B.O. Davis, Jr., Commandant of Cadets; Cadet

Marion A.B. Carter presenting his orders. Capt. B.O. Davis, Jr. also will take

pilot instruction. Atlanta, Georgia. August, 1941.

Technical Training
that although these officers were not being assigned commensurate with

their training and background, retraining them was detrimental to morale

and not in the best interest of the service. Again, there simply was no other

place to send them. By the end of October 1943, Tuskegee reported that

there was an excess of 90 officers on the field and that most of them were

second lieutenants who were well trained and anxious for proper duty. Then

in December 1943, the Air Service Command unexpectedly transferred to

Tuskegee 30 Quartermaster Officers from Daniel Field, Georgia. By this

23

Technical Training

Technical Training
time blacks were attending the Miami Beach OCS regularly and an average

of seven of its graduates per month arrived for nonflying assignments. At an

August 1944 conference between key officers from Tuskegee and the EFTC,

officers revealed that there was then a wasted manpower surplus of 105 nonrated black officers, including 75 AAF and 30 ASWAAF. In addition, the

OCS at San Antonio began sending eight more graduates each month.

The situation at Tuskegee was most frustrating for blacks, but it also

presented a serious problem to dedicated white officers who attempted to

bring order out of chaos. The histories of the EFTC for 1943 and 1944

were quite frank and critical in assessing this predicament and noted that

there was little that could be done. Colonel Noel Parrish, the Tuskegee

commander, made a concerted effort to function under the circumstances;

and his frustration is evident in a handwritten note appended to a heavy

file which discussed overcrowding. The note asked plaintively: “Why do

they all come to Tuskegee.”

In addition to the problem of overcrowding, the Tuskegee commander faced others that were “difficult and voluminous.” Because of the

structure of the black flying program, one of the greatest difficulties

encountered was that there were several commands with overlapping

operational control over black units. There was a continuous stream of

phone calls and exchanges with the Training Command, Eastern Training

Command, First Air Force, AAF Headquarters, and others, and little or

no coordination among them since most communications were made outside the normal chain of command. This lack of coordination particularly affected Tuskegee’s immediate headquarters at Maxwell.

24

301st Armorers at work. (L to R) T/Sgt Roland L. Poindexter, Washington,

D.C.; S/Sgt. Samuel Mumford, Valdosta, Georgia; Cpl. Albert C. Knight,

Mobile, Alabama.
Colonel Parrish had to make numerous trips to the Pentagon to

secure decisions on matters so involved that normal channels of command had failed to produce results. “Every promotion, every assignment,

nearly every decision,” he later stated, “had a black and white side to it

that we had to consider, as well as the purely military side and the side of

efficiency.”

There were also difficulties with the local community. Tuskegee

was a typical southern town with its white control and Jim Crow system

of treating African Americans. Black soldiers from the station reported

harassment from whites and tended to avoid the town and instead used the

social facilities either on base or at Tuskegee Institute.

Relations on base and with the local community often depended on

the attitude of the commander. Colonels Frederick Kimble and Noel

Parrish were the two commanders at Tuskegee during the period it was a

full training facility, and there was a marked contrast between them.

Kimble was paternalistic and somewhat skeptical of the black’s ability to

fly an aircraft. He appeared to be blind to the racial problems inherent in

the training of blacks in the south.

The job of commander at Tuskegee required close coordination with

both whites and blacks, and while Colonel Kimble was successful with

the former, he never was able to gain the respect and confidence of the

latter. His attempts to maintain a strict segregated system undermined

morale and this was played up by the black press. However, Colonel

Parrish’s long tenure as commander, from December 1942 until 1946,

25

Pilot Training
made him especially cognizant of Tuskegee’s particular problems, and he

was able to work well with blacks and whites and to improve relations

with the town. He was a student of practical psychology and, to avoid

misunderstandings, would occasionally address local groups to explain a

particular policy or incident. He maintained that his upbringing in

Kentucky had been of great advantage in dealing with white southerners.

Colonel Parrish was successful as the commander of Tuskegee.

Morale, which had been low during the latter part of 1942 and early 1943,

improved considerably, helped no doubt by the reduced overcrowded

conditions when tactical units were moved to Selfridge and overseas in

the spring. Under Parrish, segregation was reduced and he enforced War

Department directives about equality of treatment. He earned the respect

of blacks, for as one black pilot remarked: “The only thing that struck me

was why have a white in charge of the base when there were qualified

blacks. But if there had to be a white, he was the best one.”

The 99th Squadron and 332d Group were the only black flying units

to enter combat, and they flew missions solely in the Mediterranean

Theater. The 99th went to North Africa in April 1943, and flew its first

combat mission against the island of Pantelleria on 2 June. Later, the

squadron participated in the air battle against Sicily, operating from its

base in North Africa, and supported the invasion of Italy. It moved to an

advanced base in Sicily after the island’s occupation and in September

1943 moved to a base on mainland Italy. Although the 99th was successful in its primary mission of strafing, the pilots did not gain the glory of

shooting down more than a handful of enemy aircraft until early 1944.

From then until the end of the war, the squadron regularly engaged

German pilots in aerial combat. It received its share of successes, and

26

Col. Kimble Col. Parrish
gained recognition from high-ranking AAF officials that it was an experienced combat unit.

In the meantime, three squadrons of the 332d Group completed their

training at Selfridge Field, and in January 1944 deployed to Italy under

the command by Colonel Davis. The Group at once entered combat and

successfully accomplished dive-bombing and strafing missions. In July,

the 99th was added to the 332d, and the Group participated in campaigns

in Italy, Rumania, France, Germany, and the Balkans, and earned the

27

Tuskegee Army Air Field, Tuskegee Alabama. Cadets at mess, June 1942.

Staff officers of an all black Air Corps squadron, near Fez, French Morocco.

(L to R) Lt. Col. Benjamin O. Davis, C.O.; Capt. Hayden C. Johnson; Capt.

E. Jones; Lt. Wm. R. Thompson; Lt. Herbert E. Carter; Lt. Erwin B.

Lawrence; Lt. George R. Currie.
Distinguished Unit Citation. After the war, the senior AAF commander in

the Mediterranean, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, commented that the 332d “did

a very good job.”

More important than the record of their combat performance is to

study the way in which black units were treated overseas and the impact

their performance had on decisions concerning the future utilization of black

pilots. In general, it can be said that within the framework of segregation,

they were treated well in terms of facilities, recreational provisions, combat

responsibilities, and general attitude. General Eaker was complementary,

and white crew members appreciated the work the pilots of the 332d did to

protect the bombers. But the segregated system was “a slap in the face.”

There was some early criticism by the AAF leadership in the

Mediterranean theater focusing on the inexperience of the pilots, the lack

of air discipline, and a lack of aggressive spirit. This issue of the combat

effectiveness of the 99th was submitted to the McCloy Committee, a special committee established in the War Department for handling policies

concerning black troops. Colonel Davis had returned to the United States

to assume command of the 332d and gave his impressions to the committee. Davis pointed to the issues of combat replacements that did not

arrive as with white units and the lack of any experience cadre as existed

in other combat units. For example, because of segregation, it was not

possible for the 99th to profit from the experience of white flight leaders. 

The analysis of the 99th by high-ranking AAF officers is typical of

the approach used in evaluating black performance during both World

Wars. The officers who evaluated black units failed to take into consideration the impact racial factors had upon the personnel of the unit before and

during the period it was in combat. The men of the 99th were capable,

trained, and qualified, and they could have become members of any

squadron and functioned well in combat. They gradually acquired experi28

Black pilots in the Mediterranean
ence and confidence, and achieved an expertise comparable to other

squadron members. The only official statistical analysis conducted on the

99th during the war concluded that there was “no significant general difference between this squadron and the balance of the P–40 squadrons in the

MTO.”

In 1943, the War Department and AAF devoted considerable attention to the 99th, because there were discussions to expand the flying role

29

Black pilots in the Mediterranean
of African Americans. Judge Hastie’s sudden resignation as the Civilian

Aide to the Secretary of War in January brought some changes, but the

AAF was still reluctant to plan for more black pilots. Yet, by the end of

the year, final plans had been made for the formation of a black medium

bombardment group – the 477th – and personnel for that unit would begin

training at Tuskegee, Mather, Hondo, Roswell, and Midland Fields.

Political pressure played a major role in the creation of the 477th.

General Barney Giles, an Air Staff officer, referred to the problem of the

use of blacks as “political dynamite” and believed that War Department

leaders would “be forced by public opinion into the decision which thus

far they have been unwilling to make.” The Operations Division of the Air

Staff noted that there was “political pressure to use Negro troops in more

than one type of aviation,” and the 477th would satisfy such a demand.

Just because more blacks would be training in flying positions did

not mean that race relations would improve. During the last two years of

the war, race relations affecting black flying units at many stateside bases

deteriorated. A key issue within the 477th Group and other units that frequently precipitated racial conflict was the base officers’ club. The treatment of black officers on the club issue reveals the attitude of their white

superiors and other AAF leaders. Put another way, the club issue was one

place where black officers could challenge the AAF on racial matters.

Army Regulation (AR) 210-10 stated that Officers’ clubs had to

extend “to all officers on duty at the post the right to full membership.”

In practice, however, African Americans were not afforded the right to

membership. Base commanders often found it difficult to accept them

within the same social surroundings as whites at an officers’ club. The

concept of the “officers’ home” and the racial attitudes of many military

personnel ran counter to AF 210-10 and the desire of black officers to be

30

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and group commander Lt. Col. B.O. Davis, Jr. inspect

an all black fighter group of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force.
members of an integrated social organization. Where blacks were few in

number or concentrated at all-black bases such as Tuskegee, little could

be done to correct the abuse. But at Selfridge and Freeman Fields, a large

group of black officers encountered segregation at the officers’ club and

the outcome was quite different.

Actually, not all bases presented problems for black officers and

cadets. The OCS at Miami Beach was integrated. At Randolph Field,

Texas, all officers attending the School of Aviation Medicine were

encouraged to use the officers’ club. At other bases, such as Hondo and

Midland Texas, there were separate and equal clubs, and both races

seemed to accept the situation. On the other hand, conditions at those

bases isolated from public scrutiny were not so amiable. One report from

Kessler Field, Mississippi notes that the base excluded black officers

from the main officers’ club, although for a short time it billed them for

membership without permitting its use. At the Orlando, Florida

Intelligence School, blacks were not permitted to use the white officers’

club, and their club consisted of a converted barracks.

At Selfridge Field, the operational training base for the 332d and

477th, race relations gradually deteriorated. The most significant racial

incident in 1943 occurred when the white base commander shot and

wounded a black soldier. The commander had been drunk and supposedly had stated: “I repeatedly gave instructions that I did not want a colored

chauffeur.” The AAF court-martialed the colonel.

The Air Surgeon asked a consultant, Dr. Lawrence A. Kubie, who

had been conducting a psychiatric study of black pilots at Selfridge and

Oscoda, to examine the colonel. Dr. Kubie went beyond his charter and

made some interesting observations about racial conditions at the two

fields. He noted that morale suffered most when race relations deteriorated, and segregation beyond basic training generated poor race relations,

31

Gen. Giles
thus hampering military efficiency. More crucial was the fact that the existence of separate black units fostered an emotional build-up that grew

deeper and more charged as the war progressed. It followed that minor

incidents appeared to provoke major racial disturbances. Kubie found rapport to be better at Oscoda than Selfridge because at Selfridge the whites

tended “to wear the airs of white superiority,” while the small number at

Oscoda felt “pride in the Negroes they were training.” The AAF and Air

Surgeon ignored Dr. Kubie’s observations and recommendations.

During the first six months of 1944, race relations at Selfridge rapidly worsened, and the AAF was forced to remove all black flying personnel from the field. The precipitating factor was a dispute over the use of

the officers’ club. Added to this was the continued anxiety by the War

Department and AAF arising from the summer 1943 race riot in Detroit.

The initial confrontation took place on 1 January 1944 when three

black officers visited the club and were told by the base commander that

they were not welcome. According to the War Department Inspector’s

report, the commander “forbade Negro officers to use the Officers’ Club

and employed insulting language in conveying his views on this subject to

a Negro officer.” The commanding officers of the 553d told the black officers in his command “that he would court-martial for inciting a riot, the first

man who stepped into the Officers’ Club.” The AAF supported the base

and 553d commanders’ positions and blamed the black press and racial agitators in Detroit for causing the difficulties. The AAF recommended moving the black units to another location. The service looked at using Antigua

or Saint Lucia in the Caribbean, but rejected those locations as being

impractical. The base resolved its club problem by closing the club.

Meanwhile on the base, conditions did not improve, even though the

War Department relieved and reprimanded the base commander.

Transcripts of recorded phone conversations indicate that the entire AAF

chain of command up through General Arnold supported the base commander and encouraged him in his efforts. The black units fell under

Major General Frank Hunter, First Air Force Commander, and in referring to segregation, he said to higher headquarters that “I didn’t condone

it, I ordered it.” General Hunter visited Selfridge in the spring of 1944 and

told a black newspaperman that “Negroes can’t expect to obtain equality

in 200 years and probably won’t, except in some distinct future.” Hunter

and other AAF officers complained about the unrelenting pressure that

fell on that service from the War Department.

In May, the 477th was transferred from Selfridge to Godman Field,

Kentucky, and the 553d to Walterboro, South Carolina. Official unit histories make no suggestion that racial factors were largely responsible for

the move. The First Air Force history furnishes as reasons “hazards and

interruptions,” such as smoke from the industrial areas and winter weather. The history of the 477th states that the “transfer was made to make use

32
of better atmospheric conditions for flying.” However, behind the scenes

in the War Department and AAF, among the black fliers, and within the

black community, the real reason for the move was no secret. One black

officer reported on General Hunter’s visit in March during which Hunter

told the black officers that there “will be no race problem here for he will

not tolerate any mixing of the races and anyone who protests will be

classed as an agitator, sought out and dealt with accordingly.”

Race relations were at a standoff while the 553d was at Walterboro.

General Hunter wanted some form of segregation maintained, because he

believed “that’s the way they run things down in South Carolina.” When

during the summer of 1944 the War Department ordered that facilities

would be utilized by both whites and blacks, white officers refused to

attend the club and rented facilities in the town.

Because the Army Air Forces seldom exhibited strong positive

direction in the area of race relations, basic issues affecting black flying

units in the United States remained unresolved at the end of 1944. The

ambiguity of segregation policy and dominance by the white command

structure, coupled with increased pressure by blacks, fostered a breakdown in communication that led the following year to a conflict at

Freeman Field, Indiana. Overseas, the story was quite different as the

332d became an integral part of the Allied fighting machine. Other AAF

officers there respected and accepted the blacks. Within the AAF, the

treatment of small groups of black officers at various bases ranged from

good to discriminatory. The degree of acceptance was relative to the

amount of public attention focused on the base. But the treatment of the

477th exemplified the most harmful attitudes of many officers.

33

Gen. Hunter
1943: Era of Change

During the course of the war, the War Department and AAF spent

much time, money, and effort to assure employment of black troops with

a minimum of racial difficulty. They conducted surveys and staff studies,

wrote pamphlets and manuals, produced films and radio broadcasts, and

passed down the chain of command a constant stream of letters, memoranda, and instructions. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this

activity, but it is clear that racial tensions did not subside as the war progressed, and the AAF’s most explosive racial disturbance took place in

April 1945. An obvious explanation for persistent racial unrest with the

military was that society continued to compound the racial problems.

Furthermore, the fact that many military leaders were not convinced of

the usefulness of blacks in the war effort did not contribute to better racial

harmony. It is apparent, however, that as the war progressed, attitudes at

the highest levels with the War Department underwent a major and significant change. From 1940 through early 1943, officials generally

believed in the inferiority of African Americans, were afraid to incorporate them into the armed forces, and were certain that conspirators,

inspired by Communists, Japanese spies, or other un-American groups,

were responsible for racial strife. This theory rested on the assumption

that the country had solved its racial problem through a separate-butequal doctrine that blacks found acceptable and that any challenge to the

status quo had to be explained on the basis of alien forces stimulating the

dissatisfaction of racially inferior blacks. However, beginning in 1943,

the War Department began to reflect a changed attitude. There was an

increasing acceptance of the notion that African Americans were not

racially inferior, but were victims of the environment, racism, prejudice,

and segregation.

Unfortunately, because of a decided lack of commitment on the part

of some AAF leaders, this attitudinal change did not filter down to lower

command levels. Racial difficulties might have been minimized had

AAF leaders rigidly enforced equality of treatment for all personnel and

exhibited the moral leadership sought by War Department officials.

Rather, throughout the chain of command, commanders found ways to

circumvent War Department and AAF directives.

During the period of the pre-World War II military buildup, African

Americans became increasingly vocal, pressuring the War Department

and the President to be more responsive to their problems and to be more

assertive in assuring their fair employment in the military services. A

result of this action was the formation of the all-black Office of the

Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, organized to “facilitate the equitable and orderly integration of Negroes into the Army.” Its responsibilities, at first vague, were later expanded, and the office was given an

34
important role when the War Department announced that all policy matters pertaining to blacks were to be referred to the Civilian Aide “for comment or concurrence before final action.”

Judge William H. Hastie was appointed as the first Civilian Aide.

He brought a broad legal background, an outstanding reputation, and a

dedication to crusade actively against discrimination. Hastie remained in

this position until January 1943, when Truman Gibson assumed the post.

During the war years, each man stamped his own personality upon the

office, although Hastie generally received much of the publicity.

Hastie was ineffective in working within the War Department, and

evidence demonstrates that the War Department itself has to accept most

of the responsibility. High-ranking officials displayed a steadfast reluctance to utilize blacks in the war effort and did not take Hastie seriously.

They rarely consulted him on policy questions affecting blacks and misconstrued his suggestions as threats rather than as constructive criticism.

During these early years, it is unlikely that anyone could have effectively

functioned in the office, given the inflexible attitude of many military officers. Hastie had to confront those who perpetuated racial stereotypes and

accepted Jim Crow practices, and he experienced constant frustration.

In addition, Judge Hastie’s identification with the NAACP, a “colored uplift” society, created a cleavage between his office and the military. His influence was not evident in fundamental policy decisions within the War Department, but rather in tackling discrimination “point by

point.” Hastie funneled his energies into processing individual complaints

of discriminatory treatment, channeling them to the proper agency within the War Department. One of his primary goals was the elimination of

discrimination of any form within the military, and Hastie and his assistants pursued that goal through countless cases.

The aides flooded every level of the War Department with letters,

including the offices of the Secretary of War (Stimson), his Under

Secretary (Patterson), Assistant Secretary (McCloy), and Assistant

Secretary for Air (Lovett). Further down the chain of command, they sent

memoranda to the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the AAF, the Inspector

General, the Adjutant General, and others. During the course of 1941 and

1942 Assistant Secretary Robert A. Lovett had the responsibility to

resolve questions concerning African Americans in the AAF, but in the

later stages of the war, John J. McCloy assumed the task as head of the

Committee on Negro Troop Policies. Hastie’s and Gibson’s correspondence to Lovett and McCloy was voluminous and challenging on many

issues, as the aides were realistic about the basic conservatism inherent

within the War Department concerning racial matters. For example,

Lovett was concerned about the pressure Hastie used to affect change in

the AAF and was afraid that some people might expect a change in the

policy of segregation. Therefore, Lovett informed the AAF that “there

must be and will be segregation.”

35
Aside from the Office of the Civilian Aide, numerous civilian organizations were successful in channeling their efforts toward accomplishing

change within the War Department. The two most vocal and active black

groups were the black press and the NAACP. The black press reached the

pinnacle of its influence during World War II, and touched most blacks in

one fashion or another. The black press had conducted for over a decade a

relentless crusade to ensure equal participation by blacks in the armed services, and it zealously exposed and publicized any discrimination toward

them. The NAACP was also active in fighting discrimination in the military. Because the NAACP took a stand on key issues and gained favorable

publicity, it enjoyed a tremendous increase in branches and membership.

The result was that many in the War Department and AAF viewed the

black press and NAACP as militants and radicals stirring up the black soldier. However, they did not relent in their attempt to elicit change and to

end discrimination and segregation. Win or lose, they were pressure

groups with which the War Department had to deal.

A turn of events within the War Department came with Judge Hastie’s

resignation on 5 January 1943. Although Hastie was enthusiastic during the

early part of his appointment, dissatisfaction soon overcame him. He was

not necessarily disenchanted with War Department officials, but the attitudes

and policies of the AAF. He characterized the force’s sentiments toward him

and his office as “hostile” and attributed this largely to General Arnold “who

was entirely out of sympathy with my efforts.” Also Assistant Secretary of

War for Air, Lovett “always seemed politely disinterested in my efforts.”

36

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (left), Assistant Secretary of War John J.

McCloy, and Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett.
In his letter of resignation to the Secretary of War, Hastie directed

much of his resentment toward the AAF, because some of its recent

actions were “so objectionable and inexcusable that I have no alternative but to resign in protest and to give public expression to my views.”

He characterized the AAF’s efforts in the race relations field as reactionary and unsatisfactory, and its recent performance as a “further retrogression.” This referred to an AAF study into establishing a segregated OCS at Jefferson Barracks. Hastie included five pages of specific

objections.

Hastie’s resignation had a notable impact upon the AAF and the

black community. The AAF girded itself for his resignation memorandum, preparing for the brunt of his criticism. Perhaps the AAF’s reaction

to the resignation exhibited the first real sign of a constructive outlook

toward the employment of African Americans. Since the AAF was well

aware of its vulnerability, it began to move with a speed and determination never previously observed in the area of race relations. The Chief of

the Air Staff, Major General George Stratemeyer, assumed personal control and acted with dispatch and decisiveness. 

General Stratemeyer issued directives to the various commands and

directorates in the AAF to correct any problem that Hastie had identified

and reiterated the relevant regulations about discrimination and the treatment of blacks. Once again, the AAF was caught in its own bind of not

providing equal treatment within its segregated system. For example,

white medical doctors attended the Flight Surgeon School at Randolph

Field, Texas, while blacks received their training through a correspondence course. The general ensured that there would be no segregated

OCS; and he directed that at Tuskegee there would be no separation of the

races in official assemblies, in toilet facilities, and messing facilities, and

that hereafter black officers would be placed in administrative posts.

37

Col. B.O. Davis, Jr., Frank Stanley, President of the National Negro

Publishing Association, and Truman K. Gibson, Jr., Civilian Aide to the

Secretary of War, during a visit to Godman Field.
General Stratemeyer knew that Tuskegee was the racial showplace of the

AAF, and the service must prevent “misunderstandings, difficulties, and

demoralizing incidents.”

From 1943 until the end of the war, there appeared to be a decided

attitudinal shift among War Department leadership. Policy makers

became aware of the full scope of racial problems and attempted viable

solutions. To a certain extent, the AAF reaction to Judge Hastie’s resignation exemplifies a fresh new approach. Unfortunately the impetus created by that event was short-lived, although increased demands from the

black community and persistent pressure from the War Department

caused the AAF to modify its position. Under the chairmanship of

Assistant Secretary McCloy, the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop

Policies, commonly referred to as the McCloy Committee, was instrumental in bringing about change. The committee’s purpose was to function as a central agency at the highest levels to coordinate policy for the

utilization of black troops.

The McCloy Committee did make a major contribution in influencing War Department policy. As racial tensions escalated in 1943, the committee recommended the dispatch of a letter from General George C.

Marshall to his major commanders spelling out their responsibilities.

Other discussions concerned the use of black troops in combat, the performance of the 99th Squadron, and equitable recreational facilities. The

committee issued a pamphlet, Command of Negro Troops, took action on

the Freeman Field mutiny, and directly or indirectly introduced numerous

other changes.

This shift in War Department outlook was expressed, too, in its general acceptance of Truman Gibson, in marked contrast to its reluctance to

recognize Judge Hastie. Gibson was able to take advantage of the uproar

precipitated by Hastie’s resignation. His first letter to Assistant Secretary

Lovett sought to ease the tension created by the resignation and to lay the

groundwork for future cooperation. The communication was well-balanced with constructive criticism tempered by praise and conciliation.

For example, he praised Colonel Parrish and the AAF for their efforts to

conduct fair and impartial training at Tuskegee, and he offered his office

“for any assistance that can be afforded the Army Air Forces in the development of necessary overall plans for Negroes.”

Gibson appeared to maintain good rapport with the War

Department, particularly with McCloy and his committee. He returned

their confidence through his loyalty, constructive criticism, and objectivity. He publicly praised certain Army actions on policies if they were

worthy of praise and criticized segments of the black community if they

were deserving of criticism. However, it was inevitable that the closer he

worked with the War Department, the more his motives would be questioned by some black leaders. He was labeled as the War Department

“mouthpiece” and “as the rubber stamp Uncle Tom who was used by the

38
War Department.” Still, with the support of most of the black press and

the War Department, Gibson was very productive and was a key figure in

1944 and 1945 in the development of policies benefiting African

Americans in military service.

In addition to the efforts of the McCloy Committee and the work of

Truman Gibson, the War Department took other steps with regard to the

employment of blacks. By mid-1943, it was clear to many high-ranking

War Department officials that mounting racial problems were detrimental

to military efficiency. In an attempt to ease these tensions, the War

Department issued several important directives. These dealt with issues

such as discrimination against blacks and the on-base use of recreational

facilities. The recreational facilities directive provided that although facilities could be designated for particular units, they could not be denied to

any group or individual because of race. The military was attempting to

reduce friction in the civilian community by encouraging black soldiers

to use facilities on the base. Civilian complaints were answered with a

standard response that all soldiers regardless of race should “be afforded

equal opportunity to enjoy the recreational facilities which are provided

at posts, camps and stations.”

Another device employed by the War Department in an attempt to

alleviate racial problems was to produce various items for public release

directed at both white and black audiences. The pamphlet, The Negroes

and the War, was clearly a propaganda attempt directed at African

Americans, and was not one of the government’s more successful efforts.

Blacks were critical because it lacked any admission that discrimination

did exist in the United States and in the military, while southern whites

concluded that it advocated social equality and was a political move to

influence black voters. Representative Rankin of Mississippi called it a

“Communist pamphlet,” and Representative Hamilton Fish of New York

considered it to be “both tripe and baloney.”

“The Negro Soldier,” a film directed by Frank Capra and produced

in 1943, was a more successful effort, and Capra designed it for both

black and white audiences. In emphasizing the accomplishments and participation of blacks in American history, the film’s purpose was to educate whites and to build pride among blacks. The movie was shown in

more than 3,500 commercial theaters, and the Chief of Staff required all

soldiers to see it.

With similar purpose the War Department published guidelines to

instruct those associated with black troops. The publications are significant because they represent a progressive and sensitive approach for the

Army. Command of Negro Troops was issued as a guide for white officers

commanding black troops. It pointed out that black facilities were rarely

equal to whites, and noted that it was the commander’s responsibility to

make them more equitable. Leadership and the Negro Soldier discussed

the black role in America and the particular problems black soldiers

39
encountered in the Army. Army Talk Number 70 was an effort to educate

whites on the danger of prejudice.

At the same time, the War Department made a significant attempt to

be more constructive in its relationship with the black press by providing

more news coverage of black units. The War Department corrected shortcomings by making more news available to black reporters, encouraging

black papers to send war correspondents overseas, and holding frequent

informal talks with editors. Thirteen black newspapers reached an agreement to pool the news gathered in two major theaters of operations.

Gibson noted that this illustrated one of the few occasions where the

“highly individualistic and exceedingly competitive Negro press has

cooperated in a single venture.”

Regardless of the good intentions of the War Department and its

directives, memoranda, publications, and other materials, a change in attitude toward the utilization of African Americans could not be effective if

AAF commanders lacked the moral leadership to enforce them. The AAF

had hesitated in the employment of blacks, and there is little evidence that

the AAF took the initiative to ensure equal treatment for them. Instead, it

remained on the defensive in responding to pressure from the War

Department. For example, in one case the War Department in May 1944

sent a memorandum to the AAF concerning the investigation of an aviation squadron, and noted that if the allegations were true, the service was

“making themselves needlessly vulnerable by not placing more emphasis

on the handling and training of Negro AAF units.”

Subordinate generals frequently acted independently of War

Department and AAF directives and orders. It is not wholly clear why

many commanders refused to cooperate fully and why they willingly

resisted these directives. One explanation generally given is the military’s

intrinsic conservatism that solidifies attitudes, discourages criticism, and

restricts change. Often, ideas become molded into customs and traditions

which are defended as sacred and vital to the efficient operation of a military unit. The traditional manner in which the military treated black soldiers was an established custom dating from before World War I and perpetuated during the Second World War. The AAF was therefore not innovative in its policy and did not acknowledge any contradiction between

its treatment of blacks and the need to pursue a war. It is true that AAF

policies reflected societal norms, but this service tended to represent the

conservative branch of American society whose views it found were

compatible with its own established thoughts. Further, a large proportion

of generals and other officers were from the South, and they generally

upheld this traditional attitude in race relations.

Directives, statements, and orders issued by the War Department

were only as effective as the determination of local commanders to

enforce them. Where local commanders were not positively committed,

discrimination resulted. The Army attempted to regulate the assignment

40
of black military police and to encourage stationing northern African

Americans in the North. It directed improvements in the caliber of white

and black officers assigned to black units and issued instructions for leaders to avoid the use of racial epithets. It instructed local commanders

about the necessity for proper recreational facilities for all black soldiers

and appealed to southern state law enforcement officials and governors to

respect them. Despite these efforts to contain racial problems, it was obvious that attitudes forged for centuries could not be changed overnight.

Perhaps commanders did realize that some men accountable for decision-making in the higher echelons of the War Department and AAF were

not themselves totally committed to their racial policies. For example,

General Barney Giles of the Air Staff had responded to the War

Department that the AAF was properly handling and training black units.

He probably based this remark on a letter that General Arnold had just

issued to his commanders. General Arnold related that there was a feeling

among some agencies in the War Department that the AAF was not complying with War Department policy concerning the handling of black

troops. Arnold resolutely stated that War Department policy is AAF policy.

On the surface at least, this letter clearly demonstrated to the War

Department that the AAF supported current policy. Yet, one week later a

telephone conversation recorded between Giles and Major General Frank

Hunter, First Air Force Commander, more clearly indicates the lack of

commitment of high ranking officers:

Hunter: Well, Gen. Arnold wrote a letter down here the other day and

said that we didn’t carry out the War Dept. stuff and that we would.

Did you read that?

Giles: Yes, we were forced to do that.

Hunter: I know, I didn’t pay much attention to it.

Giles: That’s right.

Such nonchalance might well have been prevalent throughout the chain

of command.

At lower command levels, there were noticeable contrasts in the

instructions regarding the treatment of black enlisted men which some

AAF commanders sent to their officers. A communication from the

Commander of the Air Engineers emphasized building the “men’s pride

in themselves, their work, their officers, their organization.” He made

points that were basic principles of leadership, valuable for the command

of all military personnel, and the Air Engineers did well to reemphasize

them.

On the other hand, the Air Service Command in 1943 issued instructions on the same subject which, instead of emphasizing basic leadership

principles, suggested taking advantage of what today would be called the

“Sambo” personality of blacks. It noted that blacks are generally immature in every respect except their physical being, have a simple nature,

41
and if scared or frightened could react as a child. Instructions of this

nature contributed to perpetuating stereotypes and were detrimental to

positive race relations. There may have been other similar instructions,

for Truman Gibson complained to Assistant Secretary McCloy that some

directions proceeded on the premise that white officers should be “Bible

spouting, fatherly masters who recognized the primitive and child-like

qualities of their Negro soldiers.” Gibson continued that this attitude was

demeaning to black soldiers, assuming that if they were given “pretty uniforms, medals and pats on the back,” they would perform to white expectations.

The War Department may have thought that solutions to racial problems were as easily dispensed as the directives and supportive measures

it generated within the chain of command. However, much to the dismay

of the department, the AAF, and the black community, racial problems

persisted and even escalated throughout the last years of the war. In spite

of efforts to deal with officer selection, discrimination, recreational facilities, and the black press, and the distribution of movies, manuals, and

pamphlets, attitudes of commanders and white soldiers did not change

overnight. Realistically, a War Department directive was only as effective

as its enforcement within a chain of command, and in spite of noticeable

changes in attitude within the War Department, there was a question as to

the commitment of some AAF commanders to improve race relations.

By the end of the war, African Americans in the AAF were still not

being treated in the same manner as whites, yet some progress had been

made. Much of the credit for these successes must go to those blacks both

within and outside of the military who were unwilling to accept discrimination of any kind and made a concerted effort to be conspicuous in combating unequal treatment. The Office of the Civilian Aide, the black

press, and organizations such as the NAACP did support black soldiers.

At times these groups were effective, at other times they were an annoyance to the War Department, but always, because of their influence

among black soldiers and politicians, they were forces with which the

War Department had to reckon.

42
Problems, Protests, and Leadership

Racial protest intensified as the war progressed, and an increasingly larger number of people became involved in the fight for broader

rights. In 1943, major race riots took place in the Army and in American

cities. Critical disorders occurred at Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi, Lake

Charles, Louisiana, Camp San Luis Obispo, California, and Fort Bliss

Texas; and civil disturbances took place in Los Angeles, Detroit, New

York, and Beaumont, Texas.

Because African Americans in the AAF were not as numerous nor

as concentrated as in the Army, smaller numbers partook in the AAF

riots. Protests in the Army Air Forces covered the full spectrum from

individual confrontations to small groups desegregating recreational

facilities to spontaneous larger protests. In May and June of 1943, two

significant AAF riots involved black soldiers: one at Bamber Bridge,

England, and another at MacDill Field, Florida. These disturbances are

important because they were a microcosm of the spontaneous 20th century race riot which confronted American cities in the postwar decades.

An analysis of the Bamber Bridge riot shows how AAF leaders used the

lessons learned from this confrontation to modify existing policies.

However, later in the war another type of racial protest took place at

Freeman Field, Indiana; well-planned and executed, it drew attention to

the general failure of the AAF segregation policy toward black flying

units and revealed the lack of commitment of some AAF leaders to implement War Department directives on racial matters.

Unfortunately, from a military point of view the employment of

black soldiers was not a success. Black units reported low morale and

were unable to perform satisfactorily. Black soldiers were often insulted

and humiliated by those who expressed the traditional American, and particularly southern, practice of keeping them “in their place.” Not only

were discriminatory acts frequent, but they were defended as the custom

in the South and in the military. More frustrating to blacks was the failure of whites to comprehend the magnitude of the racial problems in

American civil and military society. From a military perspective, racial

problems distracted soldiers’ energies from the all-important war effort,

and efficiency suffered as a result.

Black soldiers experienced many difficulties as victims of military

and civil segregation. Four general problem areas are notable: trouble

with the surrounding communities, mistreatment by military police, poor

command leadership, and lack of adequate base and town recreational

facilities.

In the local communities, the fact that African Americans wore the

uniform as members of the Armed Forces did not alter the traditional

racial attitude of whites. And to a large extent, the War Department and

AAF did little to protect blacks. The vast majority of incidents that took

43
place in local communities ranging from harassment to violence and

killings occurred in the South. Many of the incidents involved the southern transportation system, especially bus and rail facilities. Mistreatment

by local police and authorities further caused major problems, and

throughout the war, there are recorded numerous instances of police brutality. Police in Montgomery beat an Army nurse from Tuskegee Field

when she refused to get off a bus as ordered by the driver, and a local

sheriff in Ripley, Mississippi shot in cold blood a black soldier from

Dyerburg Field.

African Americans experienced similar mistreatment in their

encounters with the Military Police (MP). There were numerous reports

of friction between them and black troops, notably during the early war

years before the War Department established quality control over MP

selection and training. Black soldiers feared and did not respect MPs, and

provocation often led to violence.

A most exasperating problem confronting black units during the war

was questionable leadership. Though blacks were segregated into their

own units, the vast majority of their officers were white. The AAF did not

utilize black officers on a large scale, and usually assigned most of them

to flying bases. The War Department believed that they did not make

good officers, that white officers did a better job of commanding black

units, and that black soldiers actually preferred white officers over black

ones. A corollary to this was the belief that black soldiers preferred southern white because they understood blacks and their problems.

Generally, white officers who were in command of blacks failed to

understand or appreciate the particular problems they faced, and many of

these officers were paternalistic, claiming that they liked and understood

blacks and knew what was best for them. There were even reports of southern white officers attempting to enforce a type of Jim Crow system among

units stationed in the North. Black soldiers were aware that at some bases

the Army punished its white officers by assigning them to black units. The

AAF and War Department were aware of the problem of leadership in

black units and circulated a series of letters and corrective instructions.

Another grievance was the shortage of adequate recreational facilities, both on and off base. Bases were often located in areas where there

were insufficient civilian facilities for black soldiers. Off-base facilities

were limited and often there was only a small black support structure. Onbase facilities posed another problem. In insisting on segregation, the

AAF created a burden for its units. Not only were existing recreational

facilities inadequate for all soldiers, but AAF commanders had to provide

for two sets of each type of social activity. This practice became both burdensome and expensive, and strained the limited facilities to the detriment of both black and white morale. But even when AAF stations constructed facilities for blacks, they often did not meet the requirements of

the “separate-but-equal” doctrine.

44
Generally, the experiences African Americans encountered in

everyday service life strained their patience. During the war, the country

asked them to risk their lives, while at the same time it imposed segregation as a constant reminder of their second-class citizenship. Black anger

and frustration then were the inevitable consequence of this situation.

For whites in the AAF, black assertiveness was totally out of character and difficult to comprehend. Besides the confusion wrought by their

rupture with their traditional role, blacks were clearly undermining the

established social order. So whites sought easy explanations, usually blaming outside factors unrelated to the segregation issue itself. For example,

southerners and those stationed in the South blamed northern blacks

because the latter had more liberties in the North. In the North, southern

blacks were held accountable for taking advantage of the increased freedoms available there. In both the North and South, whites regarded the

Japanese, Communists, and the black press as the chief agitators.

Black AAF personnel focused their protests. They rebelled through

their disinterest in the war and assigned mission; they engaged in acts of

violence against individual whites; they insisted upon entering segregated facilities on and off base; they inundated everyone from the President

to the Pittsburgh Courier with letters of protest; they undertook full-scale

demonstrations; they spoke out against their officers and NCOs; and they

exhibited an uncooperative and generally sullen attitude. For example,

General B. O. Davis, Sr. and Truman Gibson, during a 1943 tour of Army

camps, observed in most black soldiers a growing “implacable hatred for

the Army.” Much of that was due to the fact that blacks believed that they

had nothing to fight for. Since most were in service units rather than in

combat, the war for them seemed all the more remote.

Thus, the history of the African Americans in the AAF is a history

of attacks on discrimination and segregation. Many outbursts were not

premeditated, but rather were spontaneous, sparked by an isolated event

that aroused black resentment. The image of blissful and dull blacks content with their status and of happy-go-lucky indifference find little support in the evidence. At March Field, California, four black soldiers damaged a restaurant where they had been refused service; on a bus from

Daniel Field to Augusta, Georgia, soldiers threatened a bus driver who

tried to get them to move; in Fairfax, South Carolina outside of

Walterboro Field, 16 black officers shouted “Heil Hitler” when they were

refused service at a “for-whites-only” cafe.

Frequently on AAF stations, recreational facilities became targets

for integration. Incidents took place at Cochran and Robbins Fields,

Georgia; Tuskegee Field; Gunter and Maxwell Fields, Alabama; George

Field, Illinois; Laurinburg-Maxton Field, North Carolina; Hill Field,

Utah; Langley Field, Virginia; and Gulfport, Mississippi.

There were a number of major race riots during the war, and the

most notable in terms of its impact upon command policy occurred at

45
Bamber Bridge, England. The official report terms the riot an “alleged

mutiny.” It was a reaction by a number of black soldiers to two white

Military Policemen who accosted them for not wearing the proper uniform in a Bamber Bridge pub. Many of the black participants were tried

and convicted for their involvement. What is significant about the incident is the manner in which high AAF leaders in Britain reacted to the riot

and other racial incidents in 1943.

Racial problems in Great Britain were similar to those in the United

States. Generally, friction developed over the use of recreational facilities, interracial dating, and the resistant attitude of some leaders which

affected military justice and training. However, in Britain racial conditions were different. The absence of traditional restrictions and legal barriers for nonwhites meant that the local population afforded African

46

General Dwight D. Eisenhower chats with a black airman during a troop

inspection.
Americans relatively fair treatment. This civil situation forced the

American military to take a more progressive approach in handling the

race question so as not to offend the British. In addition, there were a

number of American generals who believed that all soldiers should be

treated equally and translated that conviction into command policy. These

included Generals Dwight Eisenhower, John Lee, Ira Eaker, and Carl

Spaatz. They believed that blacks were an integral part of the war effort

and that peaceful relations between the races were essential.

As African Americans started arriving in Britain, problems did

develop and many of these can be attributed to misjudgment by the military. Training and organizational difficulties were compounded by a

shortage of qualified officers to work with black units. By mid-1943 it

appeared that the problem of race relations constituted a dilemma far out

of proportion to the actual number of blacks stationed in Britain. But

Bamber Bridge clearly brought the issue to the attention of all levels of

command and forced a reevaluation of the role of the black in the Eighth

Air Force. The official report enumerated the conditions responsible for

the unhealthy racial climate and resultant friction. The report presented an

accurate assessment of racial conditions and made recommendations that

would affect every black AAF unit in Britain. Coming on top of Bamber

Bridge was an incident at Ipswich where a number of white enlisted men

displayed “a pugnacious attitude toward all colored soldiers, especially

those seen in the company of white girls.” Official documents blamed

whites for being responsible in large part for the racial problems in the

command as some of them were “trouble-makers.”

The primary effort to solve racial problems originated at Eighth Air

Force level with General Eaker who took the initiative to rectify the

unhealthy situation. At a staff meeting, Eaker told his staff to “stop arguing as to the reasons why they [blacks] were sent here and do our best to

cooperate with the War Department in making their employment here satisfactory to all concerned.” Furthermore, he realized that “90 percent of

the trouble with Negro troops was the fault of the whites” and directed his

staff officers “to give serious thought to handling this important problem.” This statement was almost without equal among AAF generals. In

it there was no hedging, no avoidance, no complaining, but simply the

commitment to stop wavering and get the job done.

As a result of his action, black units were reorganized into a Combat

Support Wing and a group of seventy-five predominantly white officers

were removed. The reorganization of African Americans into a combat

support wing noticeably improved discipline, morale, and performance.

Other measures also were taken: close liaison with district provost marshals, joint white and black MP patrols, the airing of justifiable grievances, careful selection of officers, and a well-rounded special services

program. Importantly, the command learned that continuous preventive

effort was needed to keep the lid on the racial situation.

47
What then can be concluded about the employment of African

Americans in Great Britain during the war? They performed exclusively

in a service capacity, and in addition to the normal strains of wartime, they

had to endure a number of racial difficulties which affected their performance and morale. However, because of two factors problems caused by

race were not as pronounced as in the United States. First, the British civilian population was more tolerant of blacks and did not object to socializing with them. Second, the military took a strong stand to keep discrimination at a minimum. The AAF made a determined effort and faced issues

squarely, helping to minimize racial tension. For the most part, the main

impetus was the desire of AAF leaders to create the most efficient fighting

machine possible. In Great Britain, blacks performed efficiently because

military leaders took their human needs into consideration.

Since black units in the United States were not under a single command as in Great Britain, there were wide differences in their treatment.

Generally, the degree of racial harmony achieved was proportionate to

leadership’s sensitivity to racial problems, and to the way in which it followed War Department racial policies. As with Bamber Bridge, the

MacDill race riot, also labeled a mutiny, took place because of leadership’s

failure to react decisively to escalating racial tensions. Several underlying

factors were responsible for the unrest at MacDill. A large percentage of

blacks were from the North, and they were mentally unprepared for southern racial discrimination; the transportation system to Tampa was inadequate; and officers assigned to black units were of low quality and ability.

These problems were present at most bases where blacks were stationed,

but at MacDill little attempt had been made to restrain the growing tension, and it only took a small incident to spark a major outbreak.

It should not be inferred that race relations were uniformly unpleasant throughout the AAF. Such an assumption would ignore those air bases

where a responsive command attitude to racial problems did ease tensions

considerably. At many bases race relations were at least good, and here

black units performed in a satisfactory manner. Perhaps the single most

important overriding factor was the attitude of the local commander and

his staff. If he were positive toward black units and did everything within his power to prevent discrimination, the results were rewarding. Had

this occurred more frequently, race relations within the entire AAF could

have been much smoother, and black units could have been employed

with better results. Inspection reports, unit histories, command histories,

and other official documents attest to the presence of this positive racial

climate at various bases.

The Second Air Forces appears to have had fewer racial problems

than other commands; this may be attributed to the attitude of its commanding general., General St. Clair Streett. The command completed

staff studies to determine how best to utilize blacks and recommended

their utilization within their military occupational specialties. As a result

48
of this action, approximately 90 percent of the blacks were properly

assigned. This assignment problem was a major source of irritation within other commands.

Within other commands, individual unit commanders could establish the pattern for improved communication between the races. Both

Judge Hastie and Truman Gibson singled out the commanding officer at

Patterson Field, Ohio for his determination to deal fairly with all personnel and prevent any kind of discrimination. Sheppard Field, Texas took

special care to utilize each black soldier in accordance with his qualification. The handling of aviation squadrons at Eagle Pass Field, Texas and

Barksdale Field, Louisiana received special comments from Gibson. The

Barksdale unit history reported that the officers were always concerned

for their men and were perceptive in dealing with their discipline, work,

training, and recreation.

Douglas Field, Arizona made a special effort to ensure that black

Women’s Army Corps (WACs) personnel would be well accepted with a

minimum of difficulty. Bases throughout the Eastern Technical Training

Command introduced a number of measures that favorably affected

morale, such as purchasing musical instruments, ensuring appropriate

assignment of jobs commensurate with training, eliminating bed checks,

and providing adequate recreational facilities.

The pattern of race relations adopted in a particular unit or within a

command often related to the quality of leadership and command attitude.

The War Department and Army Air Forces exerted considerable effort in

seeking a solution to racial problems, and the most expedient course

repeatedly proved to be the application of basic principles of constructive

military leadership and a commitment to their departmental policies.

Successful commanders were able to maintain discipline, while looking

out for the welfare of their men and women. Unsuccessful leaders often

49

Gen. Streett
saw blacks as problems rather than as soldiers who could perform their

mission given the proper training and support. But where African

Americans were not treated fairly, they often resorted to some kind of

protest. Thus, the degree to which officers at all levels of command were

committed to the successful employment of blacks marked the difference

between the success or failure of a black unit.

50
Confrontation at Freeman Field

The history of the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium) is a story

of failure, and it practically collapsed as a unit in the spring of 1945. This

failure can be attributed to haphazard leadership that had a cursory regard

for problems and often ignored War Department policies.

The 477th began its calamitous training at Selfridge Field,

Michigan,but the unhealthy racial atmosphere created by the officers’

club incident and the general friction that existed there soon stymied its

training. The unit moved to Godman Field, Kentucky and then to

Freeman Field, Indiana in an AAF attempt to isolate the racial problems

rather than to seek solutions to them. The unit’s performance was thus

poor, and the training it received to qualify for combat duty was not commensurate with the expenditure in personnel, money, and material.

The 477th Group encountered a number of major difficulties which

contributed to its ineffectiveness. First, although it was activated as a unit

in January 1944, its manning was not completed until 1 March 1945.

Second, the training was inefficiently scheduled, deadeningly repetitious,

and frequently postponed. Third, because blacks were relatively new to

flying, there was no established cadre to break in new pilots. Fourth,

because of racial antagonisms, the white leadership of the group did not

have the respect of the blacks in the unit. Fifth, the segregation issue tore

the unit apart, the most conspicuous cause of racial tension being the segregation of officers’ clubs.

As a result, hostility intensified between blacks and whites, deepening the cleavage between the black units and their command. The vertical relationship that exists between officers and enlisted men broke down

into a horizontal relationship among all blacks. In addition, according to

the First Air Force history, there was “the determination of negro officers

to achieve social equality, the determination of the AAF to deny it, and

the need of the War Department to tell both they were right.”

The AAF failed to profit from its previous experiences with black

flying units, and consequently manning and training problems plagued

the 477th. Surpluses and shortages were common. Enlisted men arrived

with little formal or on-the-job training. The group commander, Colonel

Selway, tried to make the best of the situation by initiating an intensive

training program, but the system became so complicated that simply

maintaining records was an impossible task. When the AAF activated the

477th, the group was confronted with the immediate handicap of 60 pilots

and copilots with no bombardier-navigators. A year later, and three

months after their projected deployment date, the group was short 26

pilots, 43 copilots, 2 bombardier-navigators, and all 288 gunners.

However, once the 477th was fully manned, the supply of men was endless and Godman became crowded. Because of these difficulties, the

training of the unit took 15 months, five times the normally allotted time,

51
and there was still disorganization. Rather than focusing on combat readiness, the primary mission of the group deteriorated to satisfying training

requirements. African Americans in the 477th knew that the AAF and

First Air Force would sacrifice training to maintain segregation, and this

knowledge undermined morale.

Another difficulty was that the AAF was overly cautious, since it

conducted a training program not with combat in mind, but with an overwhelming preoccupation with public reaction. There had been charges at

the beginning of the war that the AAF had been reckless with black lives.

To counter this charge, First Air Force came up with an accident rate that

was a matter for commendation and congratulations. However, the command accomplished this with a caution so excessive as “to amount to

babying,” since the 477th conducted its training only under optimum conditions. The Air Inspector noted that although pilots held instrument

cards, they could not fly under instrument conditions. An indication of

the command’s attention to political pressure was a jocular comment

found on a buckslip from the First Air Force Operations and Training

Division. When the question arose of replacing white officers with black

ones in early 1945, one officer noted that “maybe we should coordinate

this with Eleanor [Roosevelt].”

Between May 1944 and June 1945, the 477th endured 38 squadron

or base unit moves, 23 of them called Permanent Change of Station

(PCS). It is true that other groups in the AAF endured similar inconveniences, but for the 477th the AAF precipitated each move not for military advantage, but racial reasons.

To illustrate, the 477th originally went to Selfridge because

Tuskegee was overcrowded and nearby Detroit could provide suitable

recreational facilities for blacks. But when urban tensions began to intensify and the AAF saw Detroit as a liability because of its “outside influence” and “racial agitators,” the group was relocated. However, official

military reports record that the reasons for the move were adverse weather conditions and the hazards of industrial smoke. The transfer to the isolation of Godman may have resolved the racial problem, or at least postponed it, but from a military standpoint it was a poor place to train the

group. The unit historian conducted a survey of the facilities at Selfridge,

Godman, and Freeman Fields, and in terms of weather, terrain, housing,

hanger space, runways, ramps, and training aids, Godman was the most

unfavorable. Using Godman meant that a subbase was needed for night

flying, and Sturgis was selected. But as the Group Commander Colonel

Selway notes, this precipitated questions about eating and sleeping

accommodations since “it always goes back to the same old racial thing.

How can you do night flying without housing people, and if they are colored, commissioned and enlisted, what happens – they’ve got to eat and

sleep.” By early 1945, the training schedule had become so bogged down,

it was obvious that the 477th needed one base that could provide all of its

52
training needs to salvage the program – in March the group moved to

Freeman Field, Indiana.

At Freeman Field, racial problems arose that were not factors at

Godman. At Godman, African Americans had full use of the installation,

including the officers’ club and recreational facilities, while whites used

the segregated facilities at nearby Fort Knox. Black officers endured this

situation because they could not legally protest the segregated club at Fort

Knox. AR 210-10 stated that everyone assigned to a base could use the

facilities, but they were not assigned to Fort Knox and the regulation did

not apply to them. The enlisted men from Godman, however, did challenge segregation at the Fort Knox theater. After the war when Colonel

B. O. Davis, Jr. was the group commander and First Air Force inquired

about the colonel living at Fort Knox, a post colonel replied that “We

have four General Officers living here on the post, and by God, they just

don’t want a bunch of [racist epithet deleted] moving in next door to

them.”

At Godman and at Freeman, the AAF and First Air Force maintained a white power structure that permitted blacks to advance in rank

only to a certain grade. The higher grades were reserved for white officers. Even blacks who had experienced overseas combat duty with the

332d were assigned as trainees under white supervisors. One black pilot

in the 477th believed that this was the real issue underlying all racial

problems and that the officers’ club dispute was simply a means to bring

the question into focus. This structure also applied to the enlisted men.

Colonel Selway stated that the unit could not have black crew chiefs on

airplanes; blacks could be mechanics, but all the crew chiefs had to be

white.

As the white command structure of the 477th became more rigid in

enforcing segregation, it became increasingly difficult to maintain standards of discipline. The climate became explosive, ready to be ignited,

and the fuse was lit at Freeman Field following a series of incidents at the

officers’ club. The War Department intervened, assumed direct control of

the situation, and forced First Air Force and the AAF to back down on the

segregation issue.

After the 477th moved to Freeman Field, black officers were no

longer allowed free reign of the base as they had enjoyed at Godman.

There were two separate officers’ clubs, and to skirt the August 1944 War

Department directive prohibiting segregation in recreation facilities, the

base designated one club for key supervisory officers and the other for

trainees. This distinction took advantage of the loophole in the directive

– facilities could be designated by unit or organization. This resulted in

de facto segregation. On the other hand, Freeman Field completely disregarded AF 210-10 which held that all officers at a post had the right to

membership in all clubs. From recordings of telephone conversations, it

is clear that Colonel Selway, in separating the races, acted with the full

53
support and often with the encouragement of General Hunter who had the

indorsement of the Air Staff.

Soon after arriving at Freeman, some skirmishes took place in

Seymour and on base, and small groups of black officers time and again

entered the white club. Selway wanted to close the white club, but Hunter

advised Selway to remain firm; he would be “delighted for them to commit enough actions that that way [sic] so I can court-martial some of

them.” In early April, groups of black officers entered the white club and

were arrested. All but three were released because the legal officer said

that the order prohibiting their entry into the club was “inexact and

ambiguous as to its meaning or purpose.” The three were held because

they had pushed an officer as they entered the club. Meanwhile, a new

regulation was issued and all the officers had to sign a statement indicating that they did “read and fully understand the above order.” One hundred and one black officers refused to sign; they were arrested and flown

to Godman. The African Americans had remained abreast of all events,

and played their hand carefully. Rather than congregate in large groups,

they discussed their plans inconspicuously among themselves, and made

certain that their protest was orderly and effective without violence.

Hunter continued to circumvent the race issue and mentioned to

Selway that “as far as I’m concerned I don’t recognize any race problem, I

recognize a conspiracy to revolt, not to comply to military orders.” In another conversation, to Selway’s comment that, “If we run on this, we might as

well quit,” Hunter replied, “I know that. I don’t run on anything. I have no

idea of running.” The Air Staff also supported General Hunter (“none of us

can suggest any better procedure than that which you are following.”).

However, several days later the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff,

Brigadier General Ray Owens, had the unpleasant task of informing

Hunter that the 477th would be returned to Godman and that Selway

would be replaced. This upset Hunter. He informed Selway of the move,

but not of his impending dismissal. Selway reported to Hunter that “there

would be no assimilation except over my dead body.” Later, Owens

reported to Hunter that “he [Arnold] said to tell General Hunter that we

are perfectly pleased and happy and satisfied with the actions he

took....The Chief [Arnold] here feels that his [Hunter’s] action in the past

was perfectly alright, legitimate, satisfied with it.”

Meanwhile, First Air Force prepared charges against the arrested

officers. General Hunter tried to get an indorsement in writing from the

AAF, supporting him on his interpretation of the club issue. He received

verbal confirmation, but nothing in writing. Hunter plaintively noted to

the Air Judge Advocate that “it leaves me out on the limb. I carry out

instructions from the AAF, then I try to get it in writing, and I can’t.”

Other conversations show the attitudes of some on the senior staffs. One

Air Staff officer commented to another officer at First Air Force that “I

have maintained all along that it’s the whites that are being discriminated

54
against in the Army and not the colored.” He added that “maybe we can

eliminate the program gradually and accomplish our end.”

Finally, on 20 April, the Air Staff notified Hunter that General

Marshall had approved the release of the 101 officers and that charges

against them will be dropped; they would only receive an administrative

reprimand. This action effectively removed Hunter’s authority from the

matter, since he had jurisdiction over the 477th, and he complained

accordingly; he had “court-martial jurisdiction, and they cannot tell me

whom I can try and whom I can’t.” Of course, Hunter had to back down,

although he did get Selway to remain in command of the 477th to avoid

giving the blacks the idea that they had “got another one.” The official

War Department position was that “there is reasonable doubt that these

officers fully understood the implications of their actions.” Of course they

did, and they were willing to accept the consequences of their actions.

We know from the documentation that the McCloy Committee had

followed the events at Freeman Field and has assumed almost complete

control of the matter. The committee was aware of the widespread publicity given to this issue and of the political pressures on the War

Department. Many Senators and Representatives wrote indicating their

concern for the situation. The committee concluded that although the

arrests were proper, the order separating the races was not, and the committee opposed the official AAF position which was to modify the regulation. Secretary of War Stimson supported the committee and asserted

that there could be separation in the use of facilities, but that separation

should not be based on race.

55

Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker addresses the 332d Fighter Group at Godman Field. Brig.

Gen. B.O. Davis, Sr. and Civilian Aide Truman Gibson look on.
Of the three who remained under arrest, the court martial only found

one guilty and he was fined $150. In essence, while the AAF charged 104

black officers with a capital offense in time of war, it succeeded in convicting only one. The African Americans tested the segregation system

and disobeyed orders, but because their demonstration was well planned

and executed, and because outside pressure had mounted in their favor,

they were able to force the AAF to abide by War Department directives.

On the other hand, some might argue that the AAF had won the battle because it transferred the 477th to an inferior base – Godman – where

segregation could be enforced. Colonel Davis and his black officers and

enlisted men replaced the entire white command structure on the base.

The AAF thus created an all-black base. But blacks did achieve certain

gains – an opportunity to advance up the command ladder and perform

tasks for which they were qualified. They started their training for the

Pacific war, but the war ended before they were given that opportunity.

This detailed study of the 477th Bombardment Group illustrates

how command attitudes and leadership influenced or undermined racial

harmony. Some commanders did take an active role in assuring the acceptance of African Americans; others simply paid lip-service to War

Department directives and principles of leadership. In the case of the

477th, blacks were seen as problems, and AAF leadership utilized the

unit to satisfy political pressure rather than to focus on its potential with

regard to the war.

56
Conclusion

There is no question that during World War II, the Army Air Forces

made some headway toward improved race relations and the proper utilization of black units. However, that partial success does not alter the

fact that the AAF failed to develop a comprehensive policy for dealing

with all the problems that arose following the introduction of large numbers of black soldiers. By 1942, the AAF was required to accept and utilize African Americans at a rate of 10.6 percent of its total force, and

unfortunately, it did not anticipate many of the resultant problems. The

War Department and AAF operated under the official policy of segregation in terms of housing, messing, and recreation; since they considered

these facilities “separate-but-equal,” they did not find their policy discriminatory. Unfortunately, the system reflected the racist tradition of

American society, and despite sincere and whole-hearted efforts by some

commanders, in actual practice the military did not grant blacks equal

treatment. As a result, from the perspective of the black soldier, segregation was unacceptable, and from the perspective of the AAF, it was inefficient.

Significantly, as the war progressed, blacks saw the value of protest

to effect change. Had the black community not been as alert, organized,

and vigorous in its demands, they would not have participated in the AAF

to the extent they did. They persistently objected to their status, beginning

with a campaign to reverse the exclusion policy of the Air Corps.

Throughout the war, the black community actively fought segregation

and discrimination and demanded maximum participation within the military. This constant pressure forced the War Department to expand opportunities for blacks and, in turn, to influence the AAF to reevaluate and

modify its policies to accommodate black demands. This process of

demand, pressure, and protest leading to reevaluation and change dominated the war years. To illustrate, from the early days of Tuskegee, pressure from the black community resulted in the AAF making available to

blacks new technical areas, permitting them to fly twin-engine aircraft,

sending them overseas in increasing numbers, and providing better base

facilities. Furthermore, persistent political pressure provided an opportunity to participate in combat operations even though many AAF leaders

questioned this policy.

Since many AAF commanders were not totally committed to the

utilization of black personnel, they may have become indifferent toward

carrying out War Department directives. It follows that the degree of

racial harmony attained was relative to the quality of leadership which

fluctuated from command to command. For example, progressive leadership in Great Britain used the lessons it learned from the Bamber Bridge

riot in effecting a more equitable policy, while the lethargy of other leaders was responsible for the near collapse of the 477th as a unit. The dis57
aster at Freeman Field demonstrated the failure of the AAF and its policies, and its insensitivity to the grievances that precipitated the incident.

AAF commanders continued to resist the full implementation of War

Department racial policies even after 1943 when they evolved into a more

positive approach.

Finally, out of the war the AAF emerged with ambiguous ideas on

the future employment of blacks, reflecting the confused policies and

practices that had existed during the war. Some leaders attempted to

retreat to a policy of total segregation, while others realized that some

aspects of segregation were no longer applicable. Ultimately, to be successful in achieving racial harmony, the AAF had to develop a policy that

would provide for the equal treatment of all personnel within the service

and had actively to enforce that policy.

Perhaps the best summary to come out of the war on the impact of

race relations on unit efficiency came from Colonel Noel Parrish, the

Tuskegee commander. He commented on the black flying units, but his

observations could apply to all black units:

The fact that they could operate with the background they had, the conditions they were under, the suspicions as well as the real fears that they

would not be given equal opportunity or recognition or treatment, and

the question of precisely what they were fighting for, which was bound

to arise – considering all these things I thought they did better than anyone had a right to expect. But I don’t want to pretend that this was the

greatest and most effective unit ever produced. It was amazing that it

performed at all.

In summary, the struggle to improve race relations in the AAF during

World War II challenged the military establishment to face its own ineffectiveness. Through confrontation with black and white liberal groups, the

AAF learned that active commitment, vital leadership, and equal opportunity produced a more viable military organization than did segregation and

unequal treatment. A lesson to be learned is that it is necessary to change

behavioral patterns, because attitudes entrenched for 300 years cannot be

easily recast. If the United States Air Force and the Department of Defense

continually apply the notions of efficiency and social justice implicit in the

World War II experience, the military will be able to move ahead of society in solving America’s race relations problems.

58
Suggested Readings

Dalfiume, Richard M. Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces:

Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953. Columbia: University of

Missouri Press, 1969.

Davis, Benjamin O. Jr. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American. Washington,

D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.

Dryden, Charles W. A-Train: Memoirs of a Tuskegee Airman.

Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997.

Fletcher, Marvin E. America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis,

Sr., 1880-1970. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989.

Francis, Charles E. [Revised by Adolph Caso]. The Tuskegee Airmen:

The Men Who Changed a Nation. Boston, Mass.: Branden

Publishing Co., 1997 (originally published 1955).

Gropman, Alan L. The Air Force Integrates: 1945-1964. Washington,

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978.

Jakeman, Robert J. The Divided Skies. Tuscaloosa: University of

Alabama Press, 1992.

Lee, Ulysses. The Employment of Negro Troops [United States Army in

World War II]. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966.

MacGregor, Morris J. Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965.

Washington, D.C.: United States Army History, 1981.

McGovern, James R. Black Eagle: General Daniel ‘Chappie’ James, Jr.

Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985.

McGuire, Phillip. He, Too, Spoke for Democracy: Judge Hastie, World

War II, and the Black Soldier. Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press,

1988.

Nalty, Bernard C. Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans

in the Military. New York: The Free Press, 1986.

________ and MacGregor, Morris J., eds. Blacks in the Military:

Essential Documents. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc.,

1981.

59
Osur, Alan M. Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The

Problem of Race Relations. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1977.

Phelps, J. Alfred. Chappie: America’s First Black Four-Star General,

The Life and Times of Daniel James, Jr. Novato, Calif.: Presidio

Press, 1991.

Rose, Robert A. Lonely Eagles: The Story of America’s Black Air Force

in World War II. Los Angeles, Calif.: Tuskegee Airmen, Los

Angeles Chapter, 1976.

Sandler, Stanley. Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons of

WWII. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992.

60