UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LUIS ENRIQUE SALAZAR 

BENITEZ, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 17-8094 

(D.C. No. 2:16-CR-00020-ABJ-1) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Mr. Luis Salazar Benitez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The 

district court sentenced him to 135 months’ imprisonment, and Mr. Benitez 

did not appeal. Nine months later, Mr. Benitez filed a motion to compel his 

former attorney to furnish his criminal case file. The district court denied 

the motion because Mr. Benitez had not cited any authority showing that 

 

*

 We have determined that oral argument would not materially help us 

to decide the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. 

This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But this order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 24, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

the court had the power to order such relief. Mr. Benitez filed two more 

motions to compel over the following months. The district court denied 

these motions, again relying on the lack of any cited authority showing the 

power to order such relief. 

Mr. Benitez appeals the district court’s denial of his second and third 

motions to compel, arguing that the rulings violated the First, Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 1001. Because 

Mr. Benitez had failed to assert a valid basis for jurisdiction, the district 

court denied the motions. Technically, however, the motions should have 

been “dismissed” rather than “denied.” 

Before addressing the merits of Mr. Benitez’s motion, we must 

ensure not only our own jurisdiction but also the district court’s. See Steel 

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998). Federal district 

courts have limited jurisdiction, which is established by the Constitution 

and federal statutes and may not be expanded by judicial decree. Kokkonen 

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of 

establishing jurisdiction falls on Mr. Benitez. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. 

v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 & n.3 (2006); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor 

Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that pro 

se litigants must follow the same procedural rules that govern other 

litigants). 
3 

The district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Benitez’s criminal case 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. But § 3231’s grant of jurisdiction ended upon 

entry of the final judgment. See United States v. Asakevich, 810 F.3d 418, 

421 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding that § 3231 does not provide jurisdiction 

for a district court to consider a post-conviction motion); accord United 

States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110, 1116–17 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an 

argument that § 3231 created jurisdiction to set aside a guilty plea after 

entry of a final judgment). Mr. Benitez filed his motions to compel months 

after the district court had entered a final judgment. Therefore, § 3231 did 

not create jurisdiction to consider the second and third motions to compel, 

and Mr. Benitez must establish jurisdiction under some other source. 

Mr. Benitez does not identify any other source to support the district 

court’s jurisdiction. He generally points to the Constitution as the 

authority underlying his claim, but nothing in the Constitution would 

empower the district court to order a third-party to produce documents in a 

closed criminal case. 

As the movant, Mr. Benitez bore the burden to establish the district 

court’s jurisdiction over his second and third motions to compel. See p. 2, 

above. He failed to carry his burden, preventing the district court from 

exercising jurisdiction over the motions. See United States v. James, No. 

17-1217, 2018 WL 1560251, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2018) (unpublished) 

(concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
4 

defendant’s post-judgment motion to compel his former attorney to turn 

over records in his criminal case); United States v. Woods, No. 15-3304, 

2016 WL 3457754, at *2–3 (10th Cir. June 23, 2016) (unpublished) (same). 

 When the district court lacks jurisdiction over a motion, the proper 

disposition is “dismissal” rather than “denial.” City of Boulder v. Snyder, 

396 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1968); accord Pagants v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 

1067, 1073 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, we have directed district courts to 

“dismiss” motions seeking orders for records from their prior attorneys. 

James, 2018 WL 1560251, at *4; Woods, 2016 WL 3457754, at *3. 

 Here, the district court recognized that it lacked jurisdiction, but 

ordered “denial” rather than “dismissal.” Technically, the motions should 

have been “dismissed” rather than “denied.” We therefore vacate the 

district court’s rulings and remand with instructions to dismiss the second 

and third motions based on a lack of jurisdiction. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge