NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEOBARDO JIMENEZ-DOMINGUEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-70207 

Agency No. A205-274-719 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 10, 2020

Seattle, Washington

Before: BERZON, MILLER, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Leobardo Jimenez-Dominguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review 

of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s 

denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), 

and we deny the petition.

1. Jimenez-Dominguez seeks review of the Board’s denial of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 18 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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withholding of removal based on his membership in two proposed social groups: 

(1) his biological family and (2) “property owners in Santo Domingo Yosonama,” 

Mexico. Jimenez-Dominguez contends “that he will be extorted, kidnapped, and 

killed just like his three cousins . . . because he is a member of their extended 

family and because he co-owns property in Santo Domingo Yosonama.” JimenezDominguez does not claim that he suffered past persecution, so he must 

demonstrate “a clear probability of future persecution.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 

F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). He must also show that the feared persecution has 

a nexus to a protected ground. Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3, 

1136 (9th Cir. 2016).

Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s finding, adopted by 

the Board, that Jimenez-Dominguez did not establish a nexus between the feared 

persecution and membership in his biological family. Jimenez-Dominguez does 

not know who killed his cousins, and he testified that he believed his cousins were 

attacked because they owned land—not because they belonged to his biological 

family. In addition, members of Jimenez-Dominguez’s immediate family currently 

live in Mexico and have not been threatened or subjected to mistreatment. Cf.

Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1094; Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 

2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 

(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The record does not contain “direct or circumstantial” 
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evidence sufficient to compel the conclusion that Jimenez-Dominguez will more 

likely than not be targeted for persecution on account of his biological family. INS 

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992). Because Jimenez-Dominguez did 

not demonstrate a nexus between any threat of harm and his membership in his 

biological family, we need not consider the Board’s alternative holding that his

family is not cognizable as a particular social group.

Substantial evidence also supports the immigration judge’s finding, adopted 

by the Board, that Jimenez-Dominguez did not establish a nexus between the 

feared persecution and his status as a property owner. Jimenez-Dominguez coowns a house in Santo Domingo Yosonama and claims that his home ownership 

will enmesh him in a violent dispute in the area over adjoining agricultural lands.

Jimenez-Dominguez does not own agricultural land, however, and did not

demonstrate that his home ownership puts him at risk of future persecution. 

Although Jimenez-Dominguez claims that his cousins were threatened and killed 

because they were landowners, he does not share that characteristic. See Flores 

Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2015) (petitioner, unlike his 

father, “did not engage in proselytizing efforts,” so was unlikely to be persecuted 

on account of his religion). Nor does the record compel the conclusion that 

Jimenez-Dominguez will more likely than not be forced to fight against the rival 

town due to his home ownership. See Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097 
4 

(9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the Board’s characterization of the proposed social group 

as “landowners” rather than “property owners” is immaterial, as the Board 

correctly recognized that Jimenez-Dominguez “fears returning to Mexico due to 

his ownership of a home,” which lacks a nexus to “the local dispute about 

agricultural land.” 

2. Jimenez-Dominguez seeks protection under the Convention Against 

Torture based on his fear of “cartels and criminal groups” and his fear that “he will 

be killed like his cousins once he takes up residence in the house he co-owns with 

his long-term partner.” To qualify for relief, “an alien must establish that ‘it is 

more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed 

country of removal.’” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 

2014) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). And “the torture must be ‘inflicted by or 

at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 

person acting in an official capacity.’” Id. (quoting Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 

1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Jimenez-Dominguez 

“is not likely to face torture by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 

acquiescence of a public official . . . upon repatriation to Mexico.” JimenezDominguez’s generalized country-conditions evidence is insufficient to 

demonstrate that he will more likely than not be tortured with the acquiescence of 
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government officials. Garcia-Milian, 755 F.3d at 1034–35; Delgado-Ortiz v. 

Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). And Jimenez-Dominguez’s further 

claim that local police failed to properly investigate the death of his cousins is 

likewise insufficient to demonstrate government acquiescence. Garcia-Milian, 755 

F.3d at 1034.

3. Jimenez-Dominguez’s challenge to the agency’s jurisdiction based on 

defects in his original notice to appear is foreclosed by our decisions in 

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2019), and Aguilar 

Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2020).

PETITION DENIED.