Filed 12/20/16

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

RAFAEL MADRIGAL,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

VICTIM COMPENSATION AND 

GOVERNMENT CLAIMS BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B265105

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS148486)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. James C. Chalfant, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Justin Brooks, Alexander Simpson and Raquel Cohen for 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant 

Attorney General, Larenda R. Delaini and Kenneth N. Sokoler, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
2

Rafael Madrigal appeals from the judgment upholding the 

decision of the state’s Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board (Board) to deny Madrigal compensation for 

wrongful imprisonment after the Board found that Madrigal had 

not proven he was factually innocent of attempted murder. We 

hold that the Board erred when it refused to be bound by the 

findings in a federal district court’s order granting Madrigal’s 

habeas corpus petition due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Because it was reasonably probable that consideration of those 

findings would have caused the Board to award compensation, we

reverse and remand for a new hearing before the Board.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rafael Madrigal was convicted in 2003 of attempted 

murder after eyewitnesses identified him as the passenger in a 

car who, after approaching rival gang members, fired a gunshot 

that struck and wounded Ricardo Aguilera. As is usual with such 

cases, there were conflicts, inconsistencies, and weaknesses in 

the witnesses’ testimony.

Madrigal contended he had been at work when the incident 

occurred. Steve Finley, who was the floor supervisor where 

Madrigal worked, testified that Madrigal had been at work that 

day until 3:30 p.m., while the shooting took place about 45 

minutes away between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. However, Finley 

admitted that the laminating machine Madrigal operated shut 

down at 1:50 p.m. that day, that Madrigal could have left up to 

an hour early without his knowledge, and that instead of 

Madrigal punching out his time card at 3:30 p.m. on the day of 

the shooting, Finley recorded that time the next day after talking 

to Madrigal’s brother Victor, who also worked at the plant.1

In September 2009, a judge of the United States District 

Court accepted the findings of a magistrate judge and granted 

Madrigal’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that 

 

1 This portion of our statement of facts is derived from the 

decision affirming Madrigal’s conviction. (People v. Madrigal

(Oct. 17, 2005, B170431) [nonpub. opn.].)
3

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his 2003 trial. The 

deficiencies fell into four categories.

First, defense counsel’s failure to introduce a secretly 

recorded jailhouse conversation of Madrigal’s co-defendant 

Olivares, who drove the car involved in the shooting. In that 

conversation, Olivares tells his girlfriend that he cautioned 

Madrigal about having his brother, Victor, ask around about who 

the real shooter might have been, and suggests that Madrigal 

knew nothing about who committed the shooting.

Second, defense counsel’s failure to call Madrigal as a 

witness after telling the jury during opening statement that 

Madrigal would testify. Madrigal would have told the jury about 

his alibi defense and his belief that someone named Mendoza had 

been the shooter.

Third, defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present 

alibi testimony from Robert Howard, who was Madrigal’s 

ultimate supervisor, and who claimed that Madrigal had been at 

work until 3:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting because only 

Madrigal could operate a certain machine and Howard would 

have known if the machine had been shut down early.

Fourth, defense counsel’s failure to call Madrigal’s brother, 

Victor, as a witness, because Victor would have testified that he 

was at work with Madrigal when the shooting occurred, and 

otherwise would have corroborated Madrigal’s alibi. 

The magistrate found that Madrigal had been prejudiced by 

counsel’s omissions because, had the missing evidence and 

omitted witnesses been presented, a different result was 

reasonably probable. In the context of these ultimate findings, 

the magistrate made several characterizations about the 

evidence. The Olivares jailhouse audiotape was “highly reliable 

and exculpatory evidence in support of [an alibi] defense.” The 

tapes were “compelling evidence to bolster” Madrigal’s claim that 

Mendoza had been the shooter. The prosecution’s case was weak. 

Supervisor Howard’s testimony would have provided “a complete 

alibi and undermined the eyewitness” identifications. Howard’s 

testimony was “certain and unequivocal” and he would have 
4

“made a very strong witness” because “his testimony was clear, 

straightforward, and credible,” and would have provided strong 

support for Madrigal’s alibi defense. Victor’s testimony would 

have been corroborative of, and was consistent with, that of floor 

supervisor Finley. The eyewitness testimony about the shooting 

was questionable.

One month later, the magistrate issued an order granting 

Madrigal release on bail pending the prosecutor’s decision 

whether to retry Madrigal. Among the factors the magistrate 

considered was the possibility of irreparable harm to Madrigal 

should bail be denied. In finding that such harm was likely, the 

magistrate noted that there was “compelling evidence in this case 

that [Madrigal] is actually innocent of the crime for which he was 

convicted. Based upon the alibi evidence that was presented at 

the evidentiary hearing, it would have been impossible for 

[Madrigal] to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was 

committed. The secretly recorded jailhouse tape of the 

conversation between [codefendant] Olivares [and his girlfriend] 

demonstrates that [Madrigal] was not involved in and did not 

know who committed the offense for which he was charged and 

convicted. The eyewitness identifications were conflicting and 

unreliable. Finally, there is evidence of a favorable polygraph

examination in 2006, conducted by a 23-year veteran of the 

F.B.I.”

In July 2011, the superior court dismissed the still-pending 

criminal case against Madrigal after the prosecution announced 

it was not ready to retry him. In September 2011, Madrigal filed 

a complaint with the Board seeking compensation for the time he 

was jailed because he was innocent of the charges. (Pen. Code, 

§ 4900, et seq.)

Following a contested evidentiary hearing, a hearing officer 

issued a proposed decision in November 2013 denying Madrigal’s 

claim after finding that Madrigal had not proven his innocence by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Before the Board could act on 

the proposed decision, new legislation took effect in January 2014 

that made binding certain factual findings from habeas corpus 
5

and other rulings that went to the issue of a claimant’s actual 

innocence.2 The hearing officer then issued a new proposed 

decision, ostensibly in light of the changes to the law, concluding 

that: (1) the habeas corpus findings were not the type that 

became binding under the new provisions; and (2) Madrigal still 

failed to prove his actual innocence. The Board adopted those 

findings by a 2-1 decision in March 2014 and denied Madrigal’s 

claim.

Madrigal then brought an administrative mandate action 

against the Board. The trial court found that the Board’s 

decision was legally and factually correct and entered judgment 

for the Board.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties agree that, because Madrigal did not have a 

fundamental vested right to compensation from the Board, we 

review the Board’s decision to determine whether it is supported 

by substantial evidence. (Tennison v. California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board (2007) 

152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1182.) However, to the extent we construe 

statutory provisions, an issue of law is presented that we review 

by applying the rules of statutory interpretation. (Harbor 

Regional Center v. Office of Administrative Hearings (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 293, 304.)

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to 

ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to give effect to the 

purpose of the law. (Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction 

Authority v. Pacific Madrigal Telephone Co. (2006) 

140 Cal.App.4th 658, 663-664 (Pasadena Metro Blue Line).) We 

first examine the words of the statute and try to give effect to the 

usual, ordinary import of the language while not rendering any 

language surplusage. The words must be construed in context 

 

2 We will discuss the relevant statutes in detail, post.

3 We discuss the trial court’s findings in more detail in 

section 2. of our Discussion.
6

and in light of the statute’s obvious nature and purpose. The 

terms of the statute must be given a reasonable and 

commonsense interpretation that is consistent with the 

Legislature’s apparent purpose and intention. (Id. at p. 664.) 

Our interpretation should be practical, not technical, and should 

also result in wise policy, not mischief or absurdity. (Ibid.) We 

do not interpret statutes in isolation. Instead, we read every 

statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a 

part in order to harmonize the whole. (20th Century Ins. Co. v. 

Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1275.)

If the statutory language is clear, we should not change it 

to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the 

statute or from its legislative history. (Pasadena Metro Blue 

Line, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.) If there is more than one 

reasonable interpretation of a statute, then it is ambiguous. 

(Joannou v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 

746, 752 (Joannou).) If so, we turn to secondary rules of 

construction, including maxims of construction, the legislative 

history, and the wider historical circumstances of a statute’s 

enactment. (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

1. The Law Applicable to Compensation Claims for the 

Wrongly Convicted

Effective January 1, 2014, statutes governing compensation 

for wrongly convicted persons were either enacted or amended to 

provide that under some circumstances, findings made as part of 

habeas corpus and other proceedings had binding effect on the 

Board when considering compensation claims. We set forth those 

statutes in relevant part.

First, section 1485.5 was added to the Penal Code.4 (Stats. 

2013, c. 800 (S.B. 618), § 2.) It bore the subject heading, 

“Stipulation to or no contest of allegations underlying grounds for 

granting writ of habeas corpus or motion to vacate judgment; 

facts binding on Attorney General, factfinder, and California 

 

4 All further section references are to the Penal Code.
7

Victim Compensation Board; notice of stipulation of facts; express 

factual findings, including credibility determinations, to be 

binding.” 

The statute itself provides: “(a) If the district attorney or 

Attorney General stipulates to or does not contest the factual 

allegations underlying one or more of the grounds for granting a 

writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, the facts 

underlying the basis for the court’s ruling or order shall be 

binding on the Attorney General, the fact finder, and the 

California Victim Compensation Board. . . .

“(c) The express factual findings made by the court, 

including credibility determinations, in considering a petition for 

habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Section 

1473.6,5 or an application for a certificate of factual innocence, 

shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the 

California Victim Compensation Board.”

6

 

5 Section 1473.6 allows someone who is no longer 

incarcerated, and therefore not entitled to habeas relief, to bring 

a motion to vacate the criminal judgment that led to his earlier 

imprisonment on the ground of newly discovered evidence of 

government fraud that points unerringly to innocence, or of 

government perjury or fabrication of evidence that was 

substantially probative on the issue of guilt.

6 Subdivision (b) provides that the district attorney shall 

notify the Attorney General before stipulating to facts that will 

be the basis of granting a writ of habeas corpus or a motion to 

vacate a judgment. Subdivision (d) provides that “express factual 

findings” are “findings established as the basis for the court’s 

ruling or order.”

Soon after its passage, section 1485.5 was amended by 

adding subdivision (e), which states: “For the purposes of this 

section ‘court’ is defined as a state or federal court.” (Stats. 2014, 

c. 28, eff. June 20, 2014.) The legislative history of this 

amendment states that it clarified “those provisions” governing 
8

Section 1485.55 was enacted at the same time. (Stats. 

2013, c. 800 (S.B. 618), § 3.) Its subject heading states, 

“Contested proceedings; granting writ of habeas corpus, judgment 

vacated, and finding that new evidence points to innocence; 

finding binding on California Victim Compensation Board; 

payment of claim; petition for finding of innocence by 

preponderance of evidence; presumptions.” It provides:

“(a) In a contested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of 

habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully imprisoned 

or restrained, or when, pursuant to Section 1473.6, the court 

vacates a judgment on the basis of new evidence concerning a 

person who is no longer unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, and 

if the court finds that new evidence on the petition points 

unerringly to innocence, that finding shall be binding on the 

California Victim Compensation Board for a claim presented to 

the board, and upon application by the person, the board shall, 

without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature that an 

appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 

4904.” New evidence is “evidence that was not available or 

known at the time of trial that completely undermines the 

prosecution case and points unerringly to innocence.” (§ 1485.55, 

subd. (g).)

 

the binding effect of factual findings in wrongful imprisonment 

compensation claims. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 

Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 854 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended June 12, 2014, p. 4, par. 20.)

Because this amendment was intended to clarify the law as 

it originally existed, its application to this case does not violate 

the general prohibition against the retroactive application of new 

legislation. (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 

15 Cal.4th 232, 243.) As a result, when sections 1485.5 and 

1485.55 were first enacted, they included applicable federal court 

habeas rulings, and our analysis will treat these provisions 

accordingly. 
9

Under subdivision (f), the Board must recommend payment 

of a compensation award without a hearing if a federal court 

grants a habeas corpus petition after finding a defendant 

innocent by no less than a preponderance of the evidence.” 

(§ 1485.55, subd. (f).)

However, in cases where a writ of habeas corpus or a 

motion to vacate a judgment was granted on grounds other than 

new evidence that points unerringly to innocence, the defendant 

may move the Board for a finding of innocence by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1485.55, subds. (b), (c).)

The procedures for claim filing and hearing are found in 

sections 4900 through 4904. Relevant here is an amendment to 

section 4903 that was enacted as a companion measure to 

sections 1485.5 and 1485.55 and that was designed to take into 

account the new provisions concerning the binding effect of 

certain court rulings.

Subdivision (a) of section 4903 states that the parties may 

introduce evidence to support their positions at a claim hearing, 

with the claimant required to prove his or her innocence. 

Subdivision (b) was added to that section. (Stats. 2013, c. 800 

(S.B. 618, § 7.) It provides: “(b) In a hearing before the board, 

the factual findings and credibility determinations establishing 

the court’s basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus, a motion for 

new trial pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a 

certificate of factual innocence as described in Section 1485.5 

shall be binding on the Attorney General, the factfinder, and the 

board.”

2. The Habeas Factual Findings Were Binding on the Board

The trial court found that the habeas petition findings were 

not binding under sections 1485.5 or 1485.55/4903 because the 

former applied to only uncontested habeas proceedings while the 

latter was inapplicable because the findings were made solely in 

the context of determining whether Madrigal had been prejudiced 

by his lawyer’s ineffective representation.

Madrigal contends the Board (and by extension the trial 

court) erred by not treating as binding under either section 
10

1485.5 subdivision (c) or section 4903, subdivision (b) the findings 

made by the federal district court in granting him both habeas 

corpus relief and bail.

Respondent contends, as the trial court found, that the 

obligation to treat habeas petition findings as binding applies 

only when the habeas petition was uncontested under section 

1485.5. Respondent acknowledges that section 4903, subdivision 

(b) makes binding certain factual findings from contested habeas 

proceedings, rendering Madrigal’s section 1485.5 contention 

moot. However, respondent contends that the type of findings 

made by the district court in granting Madrigal’s habeas petition 

are not binding under section 4903 because they did not form the 

factual basis of that court’s order, which determined only that 

Madrigal had been prejudiced by his trial lawyer’s ineffective 

representation.7

We agree with respondent that the section headings define 

the parameters of sections 1485.5 and 1485.55, and that they 

therefore apply, respectively, to uncontested (§ 1485.5) and 

contested (§ 1485.55) proceedings. (Kurtin v. Elieff (2013) 

215 Cal.App.4th 455, 484 [section headings may be considered 

when interpreting a statute, and are entitled to considerable 

weight].) We conclude that section 4903, subdivision (b) applies 

to the findings from contested habeas (and other post-conviction 

relief proceedings) that did not result in findings of actual 

innocence. We disagree with respondent that the district court’s 

findings in this case have no binding effect.

As part of our analysis of these statutes, we turn to the 

legislative history to resolve this issue. The Legislative Counsel’s 

Digest is the official summary of the legal effect of a bill and is 

relied upon by the Legislature throughout the legislative process. 

(Joannou, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) Although it is not 

binding, the Digest is entitled to great weight. (Ibid.)

 

7 We understand respondent’s “factual basis” argument as a 

different way of saying the district court’s findings were not 

binding because they did not unerringly point to innocence.
11

The Digest for the statutes we are called on to interpret 

states that the bill makes binding, without the need for a 

hearing, findings that point unerringly to innocence. (Legis. 

Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 618, (2012-2013 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 22, 

2013, p. 1.) The Digest next states that when a writ of habeas 

corpus is granted for a prisoner who is unlawfully detained, the 

Board, “in making its determination as to any claim submitted by 

that person, would be required to incorporate and be consistent 

with the factual findings, including credibility determinations, of 

the court granting the writ or reversing the conviction, and . . . 

those factual findings, including credibility determinations, [are] 

binding upon the [B]oard.” (Ibid.)

Notably, the Digest does not limit the latter statement to 

uncontested habeas proceedings. Instead, it draws a distinction 

between two types of findings: Those stating that the evidence 

points unerringly to innocence are binding and require no Board 

hearing, while other types of findings from earlier habeas or 

other proceedings are binding when there is a compensation 

hearing in order to provide consistency between both sets of 

proceedings. The Digest does not indicate that this latter group 

of findings is dispositive of the availability of a compensation 

award.

Another bill analysis notes that the California District 

Attorneys Association was opposed to the bill because “a person 

could have a conviction reversed for legal error – not insufficiency 

of the evidence – and face retrial of the charges that were 

reversed. The person could still file a claim for compensation and 

rely on factual findings in his or her favor from the habeas 

proceeding, despite the pending or completed retrial. CDAA 

objects to the possibility that a person could obtain a grant of 

compensation and still be convicted in the second trial.” (Sen. 

Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 618 (2012-2013 

Reg. Sess.) as amended April 15, 2013, p. P.) The analysis stated 

in reply that “[w]hile this scenario is theoretically possible, it 

appears to be extremely unlikely. All material factual findings 

from the habeas proceeding would be binding on the board, not 
12

just those favorable to the claimant. Further, the Attorney 

General would have full access to the prosecution’s evidence 

countering any claim of innocence and would present that 

evidence to the board.” (Ibid.)

The situation described in that scenario is much like ours. 

Madrigal’s conviction was reversed for legal error not directly 

related to the sufficiency of the evidence, and he temporarily 

faced the prospect of a retrial. As the legislative history shows, 

although such a scenario was deemed rare, it was accounted for 

by the Legislature and rejected as a concern because both 

negative and favorable findings would be binding and because 

respondent would have access to all of the prosecution’s trial 

evidence.

In short, the legislative history shows that the Legislature 

wanted to streamline the compensation process and ensure 

consistency between the Board’s compensation determinations 

and earlier court proceedings related to the validity of a 

prisoner’s conviction. To accomplish this, the Legislature 

provided for three scenarios: (1) at uncontested habeas and other 

such proceedings, the factual findings underlying the court’s 

findings are binding (§ 1485.5, subd. (a)); (2) the findings from 

contested proceedings are binding and compensation is awarded 

without a hearing if the findings are based on new evidence that 

points unerringly to innocence (§ 1485.55, subd. (a)); and (3) in all 

other scenarios that result in a hearing before the Board, 

previous trial court findings and credibility determinations that 

do not point unerringly to actual innocence are binding, with the 

Board bound by those findings when evaluating the evidence as 

part of its determination whether to award compensation. (§ 

4903, subd. (b).)

As we have already observed, respondent contends that the 

type of findings made by the district court when granting 

Madrigal’s habeas petition are not binding under section 4903 

because the court did not find that Madrigal’s alibi evidence was 

true or that Madrigal was actually innocent. Instead, the trial 

court was merely characterizing the relative strength of the 
13

defense and prosecution evidence when evaluating whether 

Madrigal had been prejudiced by his trial lawyer’s ineffective 

representation. We disagree that the section 4903 findings are so 

limited. Nothing in section 4903 or its legislative history shows 

that subdivision (b) does not apply to findings of the type made by 

the district court here. Instead, as the legislative history 

indicates, the Legislature was motivated in part by the desire to 

ensure consistency between the Board’s determinations and the 

factual findings made in post-conviction relief proceedings, 

including those not based on actual innocence.

Moreover, section 4903 expressly applies to both factual 

findings and credibility determinations, and the district court 

found witness Howard’s testimony was credible. That finding is 

binding on the Board. Whether other findings are binding on the 

Board and the precise effect of those findings in light of other 

evidence is a matter best left for the Board as it applies the 

standard we have set out today.

Madrigal contends that the district court’s findings were 

tantamount to finding him actually innocent, mandating an 

award of compensation by the Board. We disagree. On this 

point, we side with respondent that the nature of those findings 

fell short of that standard. Madrigal’s writ of habeas corpus was 

granted on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Although the district court made findings concerning the 

weakness of the prosecution’s case and the strength of Madrigal’s 

alibi evidence, it did so in the context of determining whether 

Madrigal had been prejudiced by his trial lawyer’s omissions.

This ruling required a finding that a different result was 

reasonably probable absent counsel’s errors. (In re Welch (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 489, 517.) Therefore, what the district court found 

when granting Madrigal’s habeas petition was that a different 

result was reasonably probable if there had been effective 

assistance of counsel. The court did not find that new evidence 

pointed unerringly to his innocence. Nevertheless, the Board was 

not free to ignore the district court’s findings even if they did not 

establish actual innocence.
14

We cannot say that had the Board given binding effect to 

the district court’s findings concerning the prosecution and 

defense evidence that it would have reached the same result, 

especially in light of the Board’s split decision. We therefore 

leave it to the Board to make that determination for itself.

We also reject Madrigal’s assertion that the findings made 

when he was granted bail are also binding. Under section 4903, 

subdivision (b), the only findings that qualify for binding effect 

are those made when a defendant obtains post-conviction relief 

by way of a petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate the 

judgment under section 1473.6, or a certificate of factual of 

innocence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to 

the superior court to enter a new judgment for Madrigal that: 

(1) reverses the Board’s order denying his compensation claim; 

and (2) directs the Board to hold a new compensation hearing 

that gives binding effect to the district court’s habeas corpus 

findings in a manner consistent with this decision. Appellant 

shall recover his appellate costs.

RUBIN, J.

I CONCUR:

FLIER, J.
Madrigal v. Victim Compensation & Government Claims 

Board

B265105

Bigelow, P. J., Dissenting

I respectfully dissent. The majority misinterprets the 

application of the pertinent statutes, resulting in a decision that 

will bind the California Victim Compensation and Government 

Claims Board (the Board) in many of its future hearings in a 

misguided manner. Contrary to the majority’s view, Penal Code1

sections 1485.5, 1485.55, and 4903 do not conflict with one 

another. Instead, they set out a consistent statutory framework 

which directs that the Board is bound by credibility 

determinations and findings forming the basis for orders made by 

a state or federal court in habeas corpus proceedings only where 

the district attorney or the Attorney General does not contest the 

predicate factual allegations. When properly construed in this 

manner, it is apparent the trial court was correct in finding the

Board was not bound by the contested factual findings made by 

the federal district court when it granted Madrigal’s habeas 

petition on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Further, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that 

Madrigal failed to demonstrate his innocence. Therefore, I would 

affirm the trial court’s ruling. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

I. The Statutory Framework 

California has long had a system for compensating individuals who 

have been erroneously convicted and incarcerated. (People v. Etheridge 

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 800, 806.) Sections 4900 through 4905 set forth

the procedure by which an exonerated convict may present a claim to the 

Board for “‘the pecuniary injury sustained by him or her through the 

erroneous conviction and imprisonment . . . .’” (Id. at p. 807.) In 2013, the 

Legislature enacted a bill to amend the procedures governing section 4900 

claims. (See Stats. 2013, ch. 800.) In addition to amending portions of 

sections 4901-4904, the Legislature added sections 851.865, 1485.5 and 

1485.55 to the Penal Code. (See Stats. 2013, ch. 800.) As noted, the 

relevant provisions are found in sections 1485.5, 1485.55 and 4903. 

Sections 1485.5 and 1485.55 can be found in Title 12, 

Chapter 1 of the Penal Code, which deals with writs of habeas 

corpus. 

Section 1485.5 governs uncontested facts and court findings 

stemming from them in writs of habeas corpus, motions to vacate 

judgments, and certificates of factual innocence. It provides, in 

pertinent part:

“(a) If the district attorney or Attorney General stipulates 

to or does not contest the factual allegations underlying one 

or more of the grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus 

or a motion to vacate judgment, the facts underlying the 

basis for the court’s ruling or order shall be binding on the 

Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board. 

[¶] . . . [¶]

(c) The express factual findings made by the court, 

including credibility determinations, in considering a 

petition for habeas corpus, a motion to vacate judgment 

pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application for a 

certificate of factual innocence, shall be binding on the 
3

Attorney General, the factfinder, and the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board.

(d) For the purposes of this section, ‘express factual 

findings’ are findings established as the basis for the court’s 

ruling or order. 

(e) For purposes of this section, ‘court’ is defined as a state 

or federal court.” (§ 1485.5.)

Thus, section 1485.5(a)2 directs specific tribunals how to 

consider stipulations and facts not contested by the district 

attorney or the Attorney General that are made in state and 

federal habeas proceedings. It further indicates that when the 

district attorney or the Attorney General stipulates to or does not 

contest facts in a habeas corpus proceeding, in all future 

hearings, the Attorney General, any other factfinder, and the 

Board are bound by the facts underlying the basis for the court’s 

rulings, including its credibility determinations. (§ 1485.5(c).) 

Finally, it defines the term “express factual findings” and 

clarifies that “court” includes state and federal courts. 

(§ 1485.5(d)-(e).)3

Section 1485.55, on the other hand, directs specific 

tribunals how to consider findings in habeas corpus proceedings 

and motions to vacate judgment where the facts were contested. 

It states: 

 

2 For ease of reference, a short-cite form omitting 

“subdivision” or “subd.” for each citation to sections 1485.5, 

1485.55 and 4903 will be used.

3 Sections 1485.5 and 1485.55 were amended in 2014 to add 

subdivision (e) to section 1485.5.
4

“(a) In a contested proceeding, if the court grants a writ of 

habeas corpus concerning a person who is unlawfully 

imprisoned or restrained, or when, pursuant to Section 

1473.6, the court vacates a judgment on the basis of new 

evidence concerning a person who is no longer unlawfully 

imprisoned or restrained, and if the court finds that new 

evidence on the petition points unerringly to innocence, that 

finding shall be binding on the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board for a claim 

presented to the board, and upon application by the person, 

the board shall, without a hearing recommend to the 

Legislature that an appropriation be made and the claim 

paid pursuant to Section 4904.

(b) If the court grants a writ of habeas corpus concerning a 

person who is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained on any 

ground other than new evidence that points unerringly to 

innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner may move for a 

finding of innocence by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the crime with which he or she was charged was either not 

committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by him 

or her.

(c) If the court vacates a judgment pursuant to Section 

1473.6, on any ground other than new evidence that points 

unerringly to innocence or actual innocence, the petitioner 

may move for a finding of innocence by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the crime with which he or she was 

charged was either not committed at all or, if committed, 

was not committed by him or her.

(d) If the court makes a finding that the petitioner has 

proven his or her innocence by a preponderance of the 

evidence pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c), the board shall, 

without a hearing, recommend to the Legislature than an 

appropriation be made and the claim paid pursuant to 

Section 4904. 
5

(e) No presumption shall exist in any other proceeding for 

failure to make a motion or obtain a favorable ruling 

pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c).

(f) If a federal court, after granting a writ of habeas corpus, 

pursuant to a nonstatutory motion or request, finds a 

petitioner innocent by no less than a preponderance of the 

evidence that the crime with which he or she was charged 

was either not committed at all or, if committed, was not 

committed by him or her, the board shall, without a hearing, 

recommend to the Legislature that an appropriation be 

made and the claim paid pursuant to Section 4904.” 

(§ 1485.55.)

Here, the statute indicates that in contested writ 

proceedings (and vacations of judgment under section 1473.6), 

where there are no stipulations or uncontested facts, and a state 

or federal court finds the petitioner innocent based on new 

evidence, that finding is binding on the Board, which must 

compensate the petitioner without a hearing. (§ 1485.55(a).) 

Further, the statute provides that if the writ (or vacation of 

judgment) is granted on any other ground, the petitioner can still 

seek a finding that he or she is innocent by a preponderance of 

the evidence. (§ 1485.55(b)-(c).) If the petitioner is found 

innocent during that subsequent hearing, he or she must likewise 

be compensated by the Board without a hearing. (§ 1485.55(d).) 

Finally, section 1485.55(e) indicates that in contested 

proceedings, no presumption is to be made in favor of innocence 

or guilt, by any subsequent tribunal, if the petitioner fails to 

make a motion or secure a finding of innocence. 
6

I turn now to section 4903. That section is found in Title 6, 

Chapter 5 of the Penal Code, which applies to indemnity for 

persons erroneously convicted and pardoned. All of Chapter 5, 

comprising sections 4900 through 4906, directs the Board how to 

handle and report claims for compensation for the wrongly 

convicted. As applicable here, section 4903 sets out the 

procedures for a hearing on such a claim:

“(a) At the hearing the claimant shall introduce 

evidence in support of the claim, and the Attorney 

General may introduce evidence in opposition thereto. 

The claimant shall prove the facts set forth in the 

statement constituting the claim, including the fact that 

the crime with which he or she was charged was either 

not committed at all, or, if committed, was not 

committed by him or her, and the pecuniary injury 

sustained by him or her through his or her erroneous 

conviction and imprisonment.

(b) In a hearing before the board, the factual findings 

and credibility determinations establishing the court’s 

basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus, a motion for 

new trial pursuant to Section 1473.6, or an application 

for a certificate of factual innocence as described in 

Section 1485.5 shall be binding on the Attorney General, 

the factfinder, and the board. 

(c) The board shall deny payment of any claim if the 

board finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

claimant pled guilty with the specific intent to protect 

another from prosecution for the underlying conviction 

for which the claimant is seeking compensation.” 

(§ 4903, italics added.)

So, section 4903(a) indicates who may present evidence and 

what must be proved at a hearing before the Board. Additionally, 

section 4903(b) provides that at the hearing, the factual findings 
7

and credibility determinations as described in section 1485.5, 

applicable only to uncontested facts in habeas corpus 

proceedings, are to be considered binding on the Board. 

II. The Board Was Not Bound By The Habeas Court’s 

Findings

With this statutory predicate in mind, I focus now on its 

application in the present case. Madrigal filed his claim with the

Board in September 2011, seeking compensation under section 

4900. I agree with the majority that since Madrigal’s federal 

habeas corpus petition was contested, his claim for compensation 

before the Board was governed by section 4903(a), and it required 

him to prove the requisite facts demonstrating his innocence. 

However, I part company with the majority in concluding that 

section 4903(b) binds the Board to the federal court’s findings and 

credibility determinations in a contested hearing. 

The majority correctly acknowledges that section 1485.5 

applies only to uncontested proceedings. It reaches that 

conclusion by finding the subject headings to be dispositive. 

(Kurtin v. Elieff (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 455, 484 [subject 

headings entitled to considerable weight].) I agree the subject 

headings are persuasive and that the sections complement one 

another in that section 1485.5 applies to uncontested proceedings 

and section 1485.55 applies to contested proceedings. It is logical 

for the Legislature to have drafted one provision, section 1485.5, 

to apply solely to uncontested proceedings while another 

provision, section 1485.55, to apply to contested ones. The 

majority thus correctly repudiates Madrigal’s argument that 

section 1485.5(c), which provides that express factual findings are 

to be considered binding in uncontested proceedings, somehow 
8

jumps into section 1485.55 and applies in a contested proceeding 

as well. I agree that section 1485.5(c), indicating the Board is

bound by state and federal court credibility determinations, 

must be read in light of section 1485.5(a), which refers only to the 

uncontested allegations or stipulations made by the state. 

This is the extent to which I agree with the majority, 

because it next accepts Madrigal’s argument that section 4903(b), 

describing the factual findings and credibility determinations 

which are to be binding on the Board, includes findings and 

determinations from contested and uncontested proceedings. 

There is a very obvious flaw in this analysis: it entirely overlooks

section 4903(b)’s explicit language providing that only the factual 

findings and credibility determinations “as described in Section 

1485.5” are binding on the Board. By its reference to the section 

governing uncontested hearings, the statute explicitly provides 

that the only factual findings and credibility determinations 

binding on the Board are those applicable to uncontested 

proceedings. 

It is apparent that the phrase “as described in Section 

1485.5” modifies the entirety of “the factual findings and 

credibility determinations” made in habeas, new trial, and 

factual innocence proceedings, rather than just the last 

proceeding listed—“an application for a certificate of factual 

innocence.” To read section 4903(b) otherwise – as disjunctively 

describing three “motions,” the resolution of which results in 

binding factual findings and credibility determinations, and 

identifying the last as “a certificate of factual innocence as 

described in section 1485.5. . .” – does not withstand analysis. 

First, while section 1485.5 includes applications for a certificate 

of factual innocence in the list of motions to which it refers, it 
9

does not “describe” certificates of factual innocence. Instead, 

sections 851.8 and 851.86 describe them. Sections 851.8 and 

851.86 explain, in detail, a certificate of factual innocence, the 

procedures for obtaining one, and the consequences to an accused 

who receives one. 

Moreover, section 1485.5(d) defines the term “express 

factual findings” and section 1485.5(e) defines the term “court.” 

Neither of these terms is defined in section 4903(b) and their 

definitions are indispensible for the proper interpretation of the 

applicability of section 4903(b). Without a reference to section 

1485.5 that applies to all three types of motions there is no 

indication that “court” in 4903(b) means both state and federal 

court’s or that “factual findings” in section 4903(b) means 

findings established as the basis for the court’s ruling or order. 

Accordingly, section 4903(b) can only be read to bind the Board to 

factual findings and determinations of credibility stemming from 

habeas, new trial and factual innocence proceedings where the 

facts are uncontested by the Attorney General or the district 

attorney: the proceedings as described in section 1485.5. 

Instead of considering this qualifying language in its 

analysis, the majority finds section 4903(b) conflicts with section 

1485.55(a), and turns to the legislative history to resolve what it 

terms an “interpretive inconsistency.” I would not look to the 

legislative history, because there is no conflict in the statutes. 

As I have noted, the language of section 4903(b) specifically 

states that the only facts that are binding in subsequent 

proceedings are those from uncontested hearings. There is no 

conflict between section 4903(b) and section 1485.55(a), which 

indicates that, in a contested proceeding, the Board is only bound 

by a federal or state court finding of innocence. The entire 
10

statutory framework at issue here repeatedly points to the fact 

that the only binding credibility and factual findings are those 

which are not contested by the Attorney General or the district 

attorney. That is what is stated in section 1485.5, governing 

uncontested hearings, and what is omitted in section 1485.55, 

governing contested hearings. That is the limitation set forth in 

section 4903(b). (McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 

75 Cal.App.4th 196, 211 [“‘[We] read every statute “with 

reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that 

the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” 

[Citation.]’”].) I find no conflict among the relevant statutory 

provisions. Instead, they are consistent and straightforward. 

Having reached this conclusion, it necessarily follows that 

the Board is bound by a previous habeas court’s factual findings 

and credibility determinations under section 4903(b) only when 

those findings are predicated on uncontested proceedings. That 

is not the case here, as the Board properly found. 

III. Substantial Evidence Supports The Board’s Finding

Accordingly, I now address whether substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s ruling that Madrigal failed to prove his 

innocence under section 4903(a). (Tennison v. California Victim 

Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 

1182.) 

In rejecting Madrigal’s claim, the hearing officer relied on 

the eyewitness’ identification of Madrigal as well as the 

weaknesses and inconsistencies in the alibi evidence offered by 

Finley and Howard. Both the victim and eyewitnesses Moreno 

and Huezo identified Madrigal as the shooter, and testified that 

Madrigal asked where the victim was from before shooting. 
11

The victim also identified Madrigal from a photo lineup nearly 

three weeks after the shooting. The victim stopped cooperating 

before trial because he did not want to be considered a snitch.

A sheriff and a district attorney interviewed Production 

Manager Howard, who was Madrigal’s supervisor, in July 2009. 

After showing Howard Madrigal’s time card and other workrelated documents from the date of the shooting, Howard said 

that Madrigal stopped using his laminating machine at 1:50 p.m. 

to begin another job, but acknowledged that the work order 

documenting that fact had been written by Madrigal. Howard 

had no independent recollection of Madrigal being at work after 

1:50 p.m. that day, and said floor supervisor Finley would have a 

better recollection. The time card evidence was also questionable 

because employees were not allowed to clock out for one another, 

Madrigal rarely failed to clock out, and Finley wrote in the 3:30 

clock out time by hand at the request of Madrigal’s brother 

Victor. 

In a 2011 interview with prosecutors, codefendant Olivares 

said that Madrigal was the shooter, that the recorded jailhouse 

conversation concerned another shooting, and that Madrigal 

claimed “his boss” had “covered” the timecard issue. 

This evidence is sufficient to support the Board’s

determination that Madrigal failed to prove his innocence.

4 

 

4 In reaching this conclusion, I note that the magistrate’s 

statements at the bail release hearing do not qualify for binding 

effect because the relevant statutes specify only three types of 

hearings from which findings may bind the Board: motions to 

vacate the judgment under section 1473.6, petitions for writs of 

habeas corpus, or an application for a certificate of factual 

innocence. (§§ 1485.5, 1485.55 and 4903.) A bail release hearing, 
12

I would affirm the denial of Madrigal’s petition for writ of 

mandate.

BIGELOW, P.J.

 

even one occurring after a writ of habeas corpus has been 

granted, is not a part of the habeas proceedings.