U.S. Marines in Battle

10 JUNE – 9 AUGUST 1898

GUANTÁNAMO BAY
Cover: Cuzco Well, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 1898, by Charles H. Waterhouse. The first Marines to campaign in and around Guantánamo Bay, 

Cuba, landed during the Spanish-American War, and the area now known as GITMO has been a Marine base ever since. In the decisive engagement of the battle, Marines of the First Marine Battalion assaulted and captured the blockhouse overlooking the Spanish base of Cuzco 

Well. Skirmishers, under covering fire of the new tenants, cleared the fields of any Spanish defenders around the windmill and water supply.

Source: Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
Marine Corps History Division

an imprint of MCU Press

Quantico, Virginia

2020

by Jerry A. Roberts

U.S. Marines in Battle

GUANTÁNAMO BAY

10 JUNE – 9 AUGUST 1898
MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION

Director

Dr. Edward T. Nevgloski

MCU Press Director

Angela J. Anderson

Editor

Stephani L. Miller

Visual Information Specialist

Jose J. Esquilin

This pamphlet battle study, one in a series dedicated to U.S. Marines in battle, is published as 

a History Division imprint by MCU Press. The production of this work and other MCU Press 

products is graciousy supported by the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.
1

Squadron.” This squadron comprised four ships: one steam 

frigate (USS Chicago [cruiser]), two corvettes (USS Atlanta and 

Boston [protected cruisers]), and one dispatch boat (USS Dolphin

[PG 24]). In the late 1880s, Navy ship design and construction 

then transitioned to battleships such as the USS Maine (ACR 1) 

and Texas (1892) and in the early 1890s to the pre–dreadnaught 

battleship era with ships such as the USS Indiana (BB 1), 

Massachusetts (BB 2), and Oregon (BB 3).2

The modernization of the Navy in the last two decades of 

the nineteenth century began the Navy’s transition from its traditional mission of defending the American coastline to a modern 

power projection and sea control force. By 1890, the theories 

of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan on the importance and influence of seapower to national interests had gained wide support 

in both the naval Service and government circles. This change 

in strategic mindset was illustrated by the passage of the Naval 

Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1891 (Battleship Act of 1890) 

to build modern battleships. Upon passage of the bill, Secretary 

of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy gave clear and unambiguous instruction to the head of the Navy Construction Bureau: “Now, 

sir, what you’ve [got] to do is to design a ship that can lick anything afloat.”3

2 Battleships such as the Maine and Texas were more commonly known as secondclass battleships or armored cruisers, as advances in ship design and technology 

made them obsolete before they were officially commissioned.

3 John R. Spears, Our Navy in the War with Spain (New York: Charles Scribner’s 

Sons, 1898), 54.

On 21 April 1898, the United States declared war on Spain 

and for the first time since the American Civil War the 

U.S. military found itself at war on a national scale. The 

Spanish-American War was the first open conflict between the 

United States and a foreign power since the Mexican-American 

War of 1846–48. In four decades of peace, the United States 

had allowed its military to atrophy to near pre–Civil War levels. 

For example, the Army had seen its active-duty strength reduced 

from more than 2.6 million troops under arms to fewer than 

40,000. By 1879, the total number of ships on the Navy rolls 

had dropped from the peak Civil War strength of more than 600 

fighting vessels to 142. At any given time, the Navy could only 

muster an average of 48 ships capable of service. The secretary 

of the Navy publicly lamented that “in the entire Navy there was 

not a single, high-power, long-range, rifled gun!”1

The Spanish-American War proved to be a watershed event 

for the entire United States military. The outcome of this conflict altered the nineteenth-century American military focus on 

defense of the homeland to a military with global missions and 

responsibilities. The need to defend newly acquired territories in 

both oceans required a military with the means to rapidly project 

power across the seas. The actions of a small Marine force at 

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, in the summer of 1898 proved to be 

particularly impactful on the future of the Marine Corps. This 

small and short-lived battle served as a major catalyst that spurred 

the evolution of the Marine Corps from a naval guard force to 

the naval expeditionary force of the twentieth century that we 

recognize today.

The Late Nineteenth-Century Environment

The Navy, although greatly reduced in size from 1865 levels, had 

fared somewhat better than the Army in the peacetime budget 

battles. In the 1880s and 1890s, the Navy embarked on an extensive shipbuilding and modernization program. In less than 15 

years, the Navy would be transformed, moving out of the age 

of wood, iron, and sail into the modern era of technologically 

advanced steel ships. 

The Navy began its aggressive shipbuilding program in 

1883 with the construction of what was known as the “White 

1 John D. Long, The New American Navy, vol. 1 (New York: Outlook Company, 

1903), 14.

The White Squadron in 1890. The commissioning of these four ships marked 

the beginning of a shipbuilding program that by 1898 had transformed the U.S. 

Navy from an antiquated coastal defense force to a modern sea control and power 

projection force.

Naval History and Heritage Command

GUANTÁNAMO BAY

10 JUNE–9 AUGUST 1898
2

In 1898, with the outbreak of war with Spain, the U.S. Navy 

fielded a capable surface fleet built around a nucleus of modern 

battleships, supported by armored cruisers and auxiliary ships. 

Although certainly not comparable in size to the great navies of 

the world, the Navy possessed individual ships that stacked up 

well against some of the most capable ships in the world at that 

time.

By comparison, the Marine Corps in 1898 was a very modest 

force of 3,100 officers and enlisted men scattered around the 

globe in Marine barracks, other shore installations, and more than 

50 detachments at sea on Navy ships. The ninth Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, Colonel Charles Heywood, championed two 

principal missions for the Marine Corps, as did his predecessor 

Colonel Charles G. McCawley: guarding naval shore installations 

and providing detachments for Navy ships.4 The guard forces assigned to the major barracks were a manpower resource to be 

drawn on in response to crisis, while the ships detachments’ main 

duties were to man secondary batteries on ships and provide personnel for ad hoc landing forces. 

In the spring of 1885, world events provided an operational 

venue that highlighted the issues the Marine Corps faced between 

the missions it could or should perform and the disparities in 

manpower that limited the ability to pursue those missions. The 

Isthmus of Panama had erupted in civil unrest and revolt against 

Colombia, causing great concern in the United States. Although 

President Grover Cleveland was not interested in foreign intervention, he was concerned about protecting U.S. citizens and 

property in the region. 

On 1 April 1885, President Cleveland authorized a naval 

expedition to Panama to protect U.S. interests. Maintaining the 

ability to transit the isthmus and prevent the disruption of the 

free movement of people, goods, and communications from 

the Atlantic to the Pacific was deemed to be of high importance 

to the nation. The protection of American companies was 

given high priority. To ensure their assets were protected, the 

Pacific Mail Steamship Company provided the Navy the use 

of two steamships (City of Para and Acapulco) to transport the 

expeditionary force. 

On 2 April 1885, the eighth Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, Colonel Charles Grymes McCawley, received orders to organize a battalion of Marines and to embark them for Aspinwall, 

Panama. A battalion of 234 Marines was quickly organized under 

the command of then-major Charles Heywood by drawing available personnel from the Marine Barracks at Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire, as well as Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Washington, 

4 At the time, the commandancy was filled by a colonel; the rank was raised to 

brigadier general in 1899 and to major general in 1902. Col Heywood served as 

Commandant from 1891 to 1903.

DC. The battalion also included company commander Captain 

Robert W. Huntington and First Lieutenant George F. Elliott (future 10th Commandant), who both would play critical roles in 

the Guantánamo Bay landings 13 years later. Navy Commander Bowman H. McCalla (also a future key player at Guantánamo Bay) was selected to be the naval force commander for the 

Panama expedition under the overall command of Rear Admiral 

James E. Jouett.

On 3 April 1885, the Navy Department telegraphed the 

commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, Rear Admiral Jouett, assigning him overall command of the mission. Admiral Jouett’s instructions were very straightforward. He was authorized to 

use a naval expeditionary force for the sole purpose of protecting 

American lives and property and to ensure free and uninterrupted transit across the isthmus. He was cautioned to use great discretion in his actions and in no way to interfere with the sovereign 

acts of the government of Colombia or to take part in any of the 

political or social events.

The expeditionary force, with Heywood’s battalion as the 

main landing force, sailed from New York on 3 April 1885, 

landing Heywood’s Marines in Aspinwall, on 12 April. Ultimately, 

three Marine battalions would be formed and deployed to 

Panama. They would be nominally consolidated into a brigade 

under the command of Major Heywood and operate ashore for 

the better part of a month, restoring and maintaining order until 

sufficient Colombian troops arrived between 30 April and 5 May 

to take control. This was the first time a United States Marine 

brigade had ever been organized.5 Commander McCalla would 

arrive on 15 April and make the decision to come ashore to take 

personal control of the operation, which would ultimately lead 

to conflict between the Navy and the Marine Corps in the postoperation environment.

The formation of this provisional Marine brigade caused 

the Corps to reduce its Atlantic coast shore installations by more 

than half. To make matters worse, at this time there was no Marine battalion or regimental organizational structure. The efforts 

to form larger tactical organizations such as this where none 

currently existed were naturally very ad hoc evolutions, leading 

to an environment characterized by improvisation and discovery 

learning. One of the more interesting outcomes of this successful employment of naval forces in response to a crisis was not so 

much its impacts on world events as was its impact internally on 

Service and individual professional opinions and theories being 

discussed in the naval Service. A hot topic at the time was the 

5

 Robert Debs Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962

(Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1991), 93.
3

role of the Marine Corps and its future utility as a naval landing 

force in expeditionary operations versus the use of Marines in 

ships detachments.

Commander McCalla issued a detailed after action report 

on the isthmus operations to the secretary of the Navy. In this 

report McCalla praised the Marines for their efficiency and discipline but was very critical of their tactics and proficiency with 

artillery and machine guns. He even went so far as to critique the 

current rifle manual and manual of arms and to make recommended changes to the existing manuals.6

 Needless to say, detailed criticisms of Marine ground operations by a naval officer 

did not sit well with Marine Corps leadership.

Most significantly, McCalla took direct aim at the primary 

Marine mission of guarding naval installations when he concluded that too much time on barracks duty came at the expense 

of professional education of Marine officers and meaningful 

training of Marine units to prepare them for expeditionary operations. Commander McCalla recommended annual summer 

maneuvers with Marines in conjunction with the fleet and U.S. 

Army to develop the tactics and techniques and organizational 

structure needed for major landing operations. He also advocated 

the Navy purchase transports specifically designed to carry Marine brigades.7

 Although McCalla’s report actually advocated the 

development of the Marine Corps as a true expeditionary arm of 

the fleet, that salient point was lost in what was viewed by Marine 

leadership as a direct refutation on the currently accepted core 

missions of the Marine Corps.

6

 “Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval Expedition to the Isthmus of 

Panama, April 1885,” Annual Report of the Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation, 1885, Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA, 61.

7

 “Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval Expedition to the Isthmus of 

Panama, April 1885,” 67.

RAdm Jouett’s flagship, the USS Tennessee (1865). Originally USS Madawaska, the ship’s 

name was changed to Tennessee on 15 May 1869. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH46920

Lead elements of the Marine battalion landing at Aspinwall, Panama, 1885. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

An armed railroad car used by Marines to provide security for rail traffic across 

the Isthmus of Panama in 1885. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

RAdm James E. Jouett, commander of the North Atlantic Squadron. Selected as 

the overall commander for the Panama intervention, Jouett assigned oversight of 

operations ashore to Cdr B. H. McCalla.

Naval History and Heritage Command
4

McCalla’s recommendations struck directly at the dilemma 

the Marine Corps faced throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Marine Corps was a force with very limited 

resources that allowed them to perform their current mission, 

but with little hope of adding new structure and resources to 

take on new missions. Colonel Commandant McCawley strongly 

rebutted Commander McCalla’s conclusions and recommendations and defended the status quo, describing the missions of 

the Marine Corps in the traditional terms of ships detachments 

and guard duty at the Navy yards. He made no reference to the 

possibility of future expeditionary roles for the Corps.8

In retrospect, the 1885 Panama operation provided a telling 

preview of the employment of Marines at Guantánamo Bay in 

the Spanish-American War 13 years later, with McCalla as the naval force commander, Heywood as Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, Huntington as commander of the Marine landing force, 

and Elliott as a company commander in the operation’s decisive 

engagement.

The issues raised in Commander McCalla’s report were illustrative of the professional and institutional split between the 

leadership of the Marine Corps and an influential Navy reform 

element led by Captain Alfred Mahan and Lieutenant William F. 

Fullam. The transformation of the Navy from a predominantly 

coastal defense force to an instrument of power projection and 

sea control in the 1880s and 1890s brought forth significant implications for the current and potential future missions of the 

Corps. This period was characterized by intense professional 

debate on the future structure and missions of both elements 

of the naval Service. The Navy reformers had become a dominant driving force in determining the future of the Navy and the 

Corps.

In 1889, a crisis point was reached for the leadership of the 

Corps when the Navy board led by Commodore James A. Greer 

(formed to address future Navy and Marine Corps organization) 

released its recommendations. It was clear in the Greer report 

that a significant number of naval officers were bent on severe reductions or outright elimination of Marine detachments aboard 

combatant ships, with others openly advocating elimination of 

the Corps entirely. The following year, an article by Fullam was 

published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings in which he contended the presence of Marines on board ship was not needed and 

was in fact a hindrance to developing sailors and petty officers. 

The Greer report contended that the reduction of the number of 

Marines on board ship would allow larger Marine organizations to 

be trained as separate expeditionary landing forces. From the per8

 Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898 (Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 1993), 62. 

spective of the Corps’ leadership, the Greer report and Fullam’s 

article were direct attacks on the future existence of their Service.9

McCawley and his successor, Heywood, would steadfastly 

defend the status quo. They both viewed the strategy of organizing the Marine Corps around the dual missions of the barracks 

guard forces and ships detachments as keeping the Corps closest 

to integral Navy missions. In hindsight, one might fault them for 

failing to embrace the expeditionary mission that would ultimately define the twentieth-century Marine Corps. But that decision 

must be looked at within the context of the times. The Corps at 

this point was very small, with little prospect for growth in numbers and budgets required to form regiments or brigades to take 

on the expeditionary landing force mission. To many in the Corps, 

a move away from what were perceived as core Navy missions was 

taking on the inherent risk of failure and potentially having the 

mission and the Marine Corps ultimately absorbed by the Army. 

For the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, this period 

was a constant struggle for the institutional existence of their 

Service. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the Commandants of 

the Marine Corps steadfastly supported the barracks and ships 

detachments missions as the key to institutional survival. In their 

view, these missions made the Marine Corps a more integral part 

of the Navy structure and as such were the best approaches to 

ensure the Corps’ existence in the future. However, it was clear 

that many influential U.S. naval officers of the day, including Captain Mahan, did not see things in the same way.

The Road to War and Initial Operations

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the island of Cuba 

was in near-continuous turmoil due to a series of revolts against 

9

 Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898, 94–99.

The camp of the naval expeditionary force located at Aspinwall, Panama, 1885. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
5

Spanish colonial rule. Diplomatic relations between Spain and the 

United States were strained by these events since Spain suspected 

the U.S. government was providing material support to Cuban 

rebels. Additionally, American public sentiment was decidedly 

against the Spanish for their perceived harsh treatment of the 

Cuban people, which included placing the territory under martial 

law in 1896 and moving the population to concentrate it centrally 

as a way to deprive Cuban guerrillas fighting for independence 

of the ability to hide in plain sight among civilians. The relocated 

Cubans, though guarded by Spanish troops, suffered from poor 

conditions, nutrition, and medical care; 30 percent of relocated 

people died.10 Finally, the fact that Spanish control of the island 

represented a vestige of European colonialism in America’s backyard and a direct violation of America’s long-standing Monroe 

Doctrine was more than enough to tilt public sentiment against 

Spain.

For many years, numerous American entrepreneurs, commonly known as “filibusters,” contracted with Cuban insurgents 

to smuggle arms and other banned material onto the island. One 

of the more famous incidents occurred in 1873, which became 

known as the Virginius affair. The Virginius, a ship that carried 

fraudulent U.S. registration papers and flew the U.S. flag, was used 

illegally to clandestinely ship arms to Cuba. The illicit use of the 

ship to support insurgents in Cuba was widely suspected, if not 

well known, by U.S. diplomatic agencies. The ship was captured 

by the Spanish gunboat Tornado and taken to Santiago, Cuba, 

where the mixed American and English crew and other passengers were imprisoned. Within a week, nearly 50 of the crew were 

10 “The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War—Reconcentration Policy,” 

Hispanic Reading Room of the Library of Congress Hispanic Division, accessed 

27 February 2019. 

summarily executed by the Spanish military. Legally justified or 

not, such events contributed to the strong anti-Spanish sentiment 

of the American public for several decades.

American and Spanish relations took a turn for the worse 

during the Cuban insurrection that began in 1895. In February 

1896, Spain sent General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau to suppress 

the revolt. Weyler was determined to end the rebellion at any 

cost, instituting a policy of harsh and brutal suppression of the 

insurgents or even of those who were not actively assisting their 

Spanish overlords. 

Weyler’s approach was to cut off aid to rebels by forcing 

much of the Cuban rural peasantry into armed concentration 

camps, called reconcentrados. The end result was abject misery and 

the rise of starvation. Concurrently, American citizens in Cuba 

often found themselves under house arrest or in jail without what 

they believed to be just cause. The result was a backlash of humanitarian outrage in the United States, accompanied by official 

protests from the U.S. government. The culminating event in 

this period of strained relations came when the United States 

minister to Spain, Stewart L. Woodford, delivered the American 

government’s position in unambiguous language: “You must take 

Weyler out of Cuba or we will do it for you.”11 General Weyler was recalled by Spain in October 1897, but not before grave 

damage had been done to the relationship between Spain and the 

United States, particularly in the court of public opinion and in 

the American press. 

The removal of Weyler did not resolve the Cuban situation 

and anti-Spanish riots again erupted in Havana in January 1898. 

Former Confederate general and governor of Virginia Fitzhugh 

Lee, the American counselor general in Havana, described conditions in Cuba as explosive and suggested to President William 

McKinley that the presence of a U.S. warship in Havana might 

calm the situation. The North Atlantic Squadron had previously 

been dispatched to Key West to conduct winter maneuvers as 

well as to be in position to respond to a crisis in Cuba if required. 

On 24 January 1898, McKinley directed the commander of the 

North Atlantic Squadron, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, to 

send the USS Maine to Havana in support of Lee’s request in an 

attempt to calm the situation.

The Maine departed Key West the evening of 24 January to 

time its arrival at Havana after daylight the next morning. The 

Maine was received with the appropriate courtesy by the Spanish 

and anchored at buoy number four. Due to the volatile situation 

in Havana, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, commander of the Maine, 

took extra precautions by establishing a greater than normal 

number of armed sentries as well as keeping enough steam up 

11 Spears, Our Navy in the War with Spain, 62.

Col Charles G. McCawley, eighth Commandant of the Marine Corps. During his 

tenure as Commandant, he fought for the institutional survival of the Marine 

Corps against the more strident elements of the Navy reform movement. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
6

in the boilers so as to be able to quickly employ the ship’s main 

battery of 10-inch guns if needed.12

Considering the political volatility at that time in Havana, the 

next several days were remarkably calm. There were no public 

demonstrations or confrontations between the Spanish authorities and the Cuban populace who supported independence. The 

Maine’s presence in Havana took on the semblance of any other 

port visit for a U.S. warship. Visits by friendly Cubans supportive 

of the United States as well as less congenial visits by Spanish 

representatives on official business were the daily routine. The 

tense political atmosphere between the United States and Spain 

did not improve when on 9 February the New York Journal, owned 

by William Randolph Hearst (whose name will forever be tied to 

the term yellow journalism), published what came to be called the 

de Lôme letter. Cuban revolutionaries had gained possession of a 

letter from the Spanish ambassador to the United States, Don 

Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, addressed to the minister of Spain. 

The letter was forwarded to Hearst, who was always eager to 

publish anything that would sell newspapers. In this letter, the 

Spanish ambassador expressed some very pointed and uncomplimentary opinions about the character of President McKinley. 

On the evening of 15 February, approximately 30 minutes after “Taps” was sounded on the Maine, the ship was wracked by two 

tremendous explosions that lifted the bow of the vessel out of the 

water. As Sigsbee struggled down the dark passageway from his 

cabin to get out on deck, he met Marine Private William Anthony, 

who saluted and reported the ship had blown up and was sinking. 

In the end, 260 sailors and Marines were killed in the explosion 

or later died of injuries in the hospital. That evening, Captain 

Sigsbee sent the following message to the secretary of the Navy:

Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at 9.40 tonight [sic], and destroyed. Many wounded and 

doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded 

and others on board Spanish man-of-war and 

Ward Line steamer. Send light-house tenders 

from Key West for crew and the few pieces of 

equipment above. No one has clothing other 

than that upon him. Public opinion should be 

suspended until further report. All officials believed to be saved. [Lieutenant Friend W.] Jenkins and [Assistant Engineer Darwin R.] Merritt 

not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, 

including representatives of General [Ramon] 

Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.13 

12 A. B. Feuer, The Spanish-American War at Sea: Naval Action in the Atlantic (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 6.

13 “Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898, part 2,” Naval History and Heritage 

Command, 22 April 2015.

President McKinley immediately ordered the Navy to 

conduct a formal court of inquiry into the cause of the explosion. The Spanish government offered to participate in a 

joint inquiry but was rejected by the Americans. Thus, two investigations, one American and one Spanish, were conducted 

concurrently and independently. The American inquiry convened on 21 February, headed by Captain William T. Sampson 

(soon to be the naval force commander of operations against 

Cuba). The court reported out one month later and concluded:

In the opinion of the court the Maine was 

destroyed by the explosion of a submarine 

mine, which caused the partial explosion of 

two or more of the forward magazines. The 

court has been unable to obtain evidence 

fixing responsibility for the destruction of 

the Maine upon any person or persons.14

14 [Naval Operations of the War with Spain] Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the 

Bureau of Navigation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898), 17, 

hereafter Naval Operations of the War with Spain.

Anti-Spanish sentiment was often portrayed in political cartoons of the time. 

These two 1898 examples were published in Puck magazine, one of the most 

widely read and popular periodicals of the era. 

Library of Congress
7

The Spanish investigation asserted that the Maine was destroyed 

by an internal explosion, but their arguments fell on deaf ears. 

War now seemed to be an inescapable inevitability. In the 100-plus 

years since the destruction of the Maine, there have been numerous 

studies and analyses of the incident. The consensus of these 

efforts is that the sinking of the Maine was caused by an internal 

fire and explosion. The Maine was loaded with bituminous coal, 

which was known for its potential for spontaneous combustion. 

Between 1895 and 1898, there were numerous documented 

incidents of U.S. Navy ships experiencing coal bunker fires. 

Yellow Journalism

The Oxford English Dictionary defines yellow journalism as a term applied to reckless or unscrupulous newspapers or writers 

of newspaper articles.1 The Spanish-American War coincided with the height of yellow journalism in America. The term 

was coined in the mid-1890s to characterize the sensationalistic style used by Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William 

Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal. Both newspapers were accused by critics of sensationalizing the news to drive up circulation. Embellishment and telling a compelling story often overrode serious investigative reporting. Pulitzer and Hearst 

are often portrayed as influential figures in shaping American opinion in support of war against Spain. Both newspapers 

heavily covered the revolt in Cuba and were known for sensational and often exaggerated accounts of the conditions in 

Cuba. An English magazine in 1897 noted, “All American journalism is not ‘yellow,’ though all strictly ‘up-to-date’ yellow 

journalism is American!”2

1

 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., vol. 20, eds. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), s.vv. “yellow journalism.” 2 Elizabeth L. Banks, “American ‘Yellow Journalism’,” Nineteenth Century, a Monthly Review 44 (July–December 1898): 328, as quoted in The Oxford English 

Dictionary, s.vv. “yellow journalism.”

Coupled with a design flaw in the Maine (and other ships) that 

placed coal bunkers adjacent to ammunition magazines, a bunker 

fire could have created enough heat transfer through the bulkheads 

to cause a detonation of ammunition. However, in the volatile 

diplomatic and political climate of 1898, dispassionate scientific 

analysis had most likely fallen victim to preconceived conclusions. 

On 26 March 1898, within a week of the conclusion of the 

USS Maine court of inquiry, Captain Sampson found himself in 

temporary command of the North Atlantic Squadron due to the 

poor health of Rear Admiral Sicard. All prewar planning for naval 

Puck magazine political cartoon depicting Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst in competition to shape war coverage and public opinion. 

Library of Congress
8

operations against Spain in the Atlantic fell to Sampson. With the 

outbreak of war, he was given command of the fleet and promoted 

to the rank of rear admiral.

On 6 April, Sampson received his orders for war preparations from Secretary of the Navy John Long. At the outbreak 

of hostilities, Sampson was to capture or destroy Spanish vessels 

in West Indian waters and to establish a blockade of Cuba. The 

northern coast ports of Havana and Matanzas were of primary 

concern. If resources allowed, the blockade was to expand to 

the southern Cuban ports of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and 

Cienfuegos. In addition, the secretary cautioned Sampson against 

engaging Spanish shore batteries, as readily available repair facilities were lacking and he might not expect ground forces to be 

available for the seizure or occupation of key points until as late 

as October.15

As Captain Sampson wrestled with the dilemma of how to 

turn Secretary Long’s instructions into an executable plan of action, he formulated a concept for the immediate employment of 

the Marine Corps to support his maritime blockade of Cuba. In 

a message to the secretary on 13 April, Sampson put forth the 

argument that to establish a blockade it “will be a necessity to 

hold certain small places, both as a refuge for our smaller ships 

and as the most convenient method of closing these places for 

trade.”16 To accomplish this task, Sampson recommended a battalion of 400 Marines be formed and readied to deploy as early 

as 20 April, with a second battalion ready by the 25th. Sampson 

was convinced that with the protection provided from the guns 

of the naval squadron a small landing force could take and hold 

key points along the Cuban coast.

The United States and Spain were moving rapidly toward a 

state of war. The U.S. consul-general to Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, departed for Key West on 9 April. On 11 April, President McKinley 

presented a resolution to Congress requesting authorization to 

use force in Cuba, which was approved on 20 April. The publishing of the signed joint resolution of Congress demanded that 

Spain remove all forces from Cuba and relinquish all authority 

and government of the island. The resolution also authorized 

the president to initiate a blockade of Cuba, a clear act of war 

on the part of the United States. The resolution was delivered to 

Spain on 20 April, resulting in the Spanish government expelling 

the U.S. ambassador and declaring war on the United States the 

next day. 

15 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 171. 16 Capt William Sampson, commander in chief U.S. Naval Force on North Atlantic 

Station, letter to the secretary of the Navy, 13 April 1898, Spanish-American 

War papers, folder 1 of 5, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA, hereafter Sampson 13 April 1898 letter to secretary of 

the Navy. 

An artist’s contemporary rendition of the explosion of the USS Maine, published 

by Muller, Luchsinger & Co. 

Library of Congress

Pvt William Anthony of the Marine detachment of the USS Maine. He found 

Capt Charles D. Sigsbee in the passageway, calmly saluted, and reported that the 

Maine had blown up and was sinking. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

The USS Maine (ACR 1) entering Havana harbor on the morning of 25 January 

1898, in an attempt to calm the volatile atmosphere in Cuba. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
9

With the declaration of war, the North Atlantic Fleet was 

immediately put into action. On 21 April, Captain Sampson received notification of his official assignment to command of the 

naval forces on the North Atlantic Station and promotion to rear 

admiral.17 In a separate correspondence sent that same day from 

Secretary Long, Sampson was ordered to initiate the blockade of 

the northern coast of Cuba. The following morning, Sampson’s 

force sailed from his base at Key West for Cuba, a mere 90 miles 

to the south.

As the North Atlantic Fleet put to sea early on 22 April, Admiral Sampson faced major resource shortfalls that greatly limited his flexibility to conduct operations during the next 30 days. 

As Secretary Long alluded in his directives to Admiral Sampson 

on 6 and 21 April, the initial strength of the North Atlantic Fleet 

was insufficient to completely blockade the island of Cuba, much 

less to have additional resources to concurrently meet the highly 

probable threat of a Spanish naval force coming to relieve the 

blockade. 

A major contributor to Sampson’s resource issue was the 

fleet organization that he inherited when he assumed command. 

The North Atlantic Fleet was initially divided into two major 

components, the Blockading Squadron under Commodore John 

C. Watson and the Flying Squadron under Commodore Winfield 

S. Schley. The Blockading Squadron was directly under Sampson’s control, whereas the Flying Squadron was an independent 

force initially positioned in Hampton Roads, Virginia, and answering directly to the secretary of the Navy. By positioning the 

Flying Squadron in Virginia, the secretary of the Navy hoped to 

calm the fears of the American public on the East Coast about 

a possible attack by Spanish naval forces. This perceived need 

effectively withheld some of the Navy’s most capable ships from 

Sampson’s initial operations against Cuba. 

The United States was fully aware that a Spanish flotilla under 

the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete had assembled in the Cape Verde Islands off the west coast of Africa on 20 

April for possible deployment to the West Indies. On 29 April, a 

news report that the flotilla had departed with an assumed destination of either Puerto Rico or Cuba interjected a great element 

of uncertainty into Admiral Sampson’s calculations. The North 

Atlantic Fleet commander not only had to execute the blockade 

of Cuba but simultaneously needed to keep a significant force at 

sea to find and counter this mobile threat.

A major impediment to Sampson’s operations was the 

logistical problem of keeping his ships resupplied with coal. 

The U.S. Navy had a great shortage of colliers (ships designed 

to carry coal and resupply other ships). Recoaling a ship was a 

17 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 174.

time-consuming process that often took several hours. This 

was a task best accomplished in a port or protected anchorage. 

Recoaling at sea was possible but the process was vulnerable 

to weather conditions, and it was not a capability that could be 

relied on to sustain fleet operations over an extended period 

of time. As a result, ships of the Blockading Squadron had to 

routinely redeploy back to Key West to be resupplied with coal. 

This process could take an individual ship out of action anywhere 

from 24 to 48 hours, depending on weather and the ship’s speed 

in transit. 

The recoaling problems came to a head with the search for 

Admiral Cervera’s flotilla during the last half of May 1898. Admiral Sampson had formed an eight-ship squadron that sailed for 

San Juan, Puerto Rico, in an attempt to intercept Cervera’s force, 

but the Spanish were not anywhere near this location. After bombarding the defenses of San Juan on 12 May, Sampson retired 

back to Key West to refuel his ships. 

While Sampson was conducting this somewhat fruitless 

search operation around Puerto Rico, Cervera’s flotilla was spotted off Martinique on 12 May and at Curaçao on 14 May attempting to recoal. Cervera finally limped undetected into the harbor 

of Santiago de Cuba on the morning of 19 May, low on fuel and 

with ships badly in need of repair. 

Commodore Schley’s Flying Squadron was ordered from 

Hampton Roads to Key West on 13 May, where his squadron 

would eventually come under the operational command of Sampson. After recoaling his ships, Schley was dispatched on 19 May 

around the western side of Cuba to search for the Spanish flotilla suspected to be in the southern Cuban port of Cienfuegos. 

Schley arrived on 21 May, but was unable to determine whether the Spanish flotilla was in the port. On 23 May, Schley was 

informed by Sampson that unconfirmed reports put Cervera’s 

force at Santiago de Cuba. It took Schley almost a week to finally 

confirm the Spanish naval force was in fact at Santiago de Cuba, 

not Cienfuegos. After receiving several messages from Secretary 

Long on the absolute necessity of keeping the Spanish blockaded 

in Santiago, Schley sent the following message on 28 May:

Secretary of the Navy, Washington:

The receipt of telegram of May 26* is acknowledged. . . . [collier] Merrimac [(steamer)] engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to 

have towed to Key West. Have been unable 

absolutely to coal the Texas [second-class 

battleship], Marblehead [C 11], Vixen [yacht], 

Brooklyn [CA 3] from collier, all owing to very 

rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key 

West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; cannot 
10

the imminent employment of the Army expeditionary force, the 

continued need to blockade Santiago and the rest of Cuba, and 

the coming of anticipated bad weather with the Cuban rainy season, Sampson was convinced that the North Atlantic Fleet was 

in dire need of a forward protected anchorage for recoaling and 

repairs. 

On 30 May 1898, in an exchange of messages, Sampson 

and Secretary Long came to an agreement that Guantánamo Bay, 

approximately 40 miles east of Santiago, was the best location 

for Sampson’s advanced naval base. On the evening of 4 June, 

Sampson assigned the mission of securing Guantánamo Bay 

“as a base for his colliers, repair ships and other auxiliaries” 

to Commander McCalla, who was captain of the cruiser USS

remain off Santiago present state squadron 

coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape 

Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. . . . Much to be regretted, can not 

obey orders of Department. Have striven 

earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key 

West by way of Yucatan Passage. Can not [sic] 

ascertain anything respecting enemy positive.18

Schley’s message set off a flurry of activity at the highest 

levels of the Navy Department. Sampson, who had just recently 

been given operational command of Schley’s Flying Squadron, 

immediately sent preemptive orders to the commodore that he 

was to “blockade the Spanish squadron at all hazards.”19 More 

ships, including colliers, were dispatched to Santiago to alleviate Schley’s supply problems. On 30 May, Sampson arrived in 

the Santiago area with additional warships, ensuring that he had 

more than an adequate force to maintain a continuous blockade 

of the Spanish flotilla.

With the bottling up of the Spanish squadron in Santiago 

harbor and the extensive blockade operations off the northern 

coast of Cuba, the United States shifted its operational focus 

from Havana to Santiago. It was decided that the Army’s 10,000-

man expeditionary force preparing to depart from Tampa, Florida, would be sent to Santiago, where a joint Navy and Army 

operation would destroy the Spanish flotilla and secure a major 

Cuban port in a single blow. The American command felt it was 

imperative to move before the onset of the rainy season. With 

18 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 397. 19 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 398.

An 1897 map of Cuba, its provinces, railroads, cities, towns, harbors, bays, etc., published by Mast, Crowell & Kirkpatrick. 

New York Public Library, Maps of North America Collection

The wreck of the USS Maine. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
11

Marblehead (C 11).20 A message was sent out immediately to 

the commandant of Key West Naval Station, directing the 

embarkation of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington’s 

battalion of Marines for service in Cuba. Sampson’s concept for 

the utilization of a Marine battalion to secure key points ashore 

in support of larger naval operations, first proposed to Secretary 

Long on 13 April, was now to be put into execution.21

Formation and Deployment 

of the First Marine Battalion 

As the United States and Spain moved inexorably toward war 

in April 1895, Commandant Colonel Charles Heywood was not 

waiting for events to dictate his actions. His experience in the 

1885 Panama expedition served as a useful template for efficiently organizing an expeditionary battalion in a very short space of 

time.

In March 1898, Congress approved the addition of 473 

new enlistments for the Marine Corps and ultimately authorized 

the temporary expansion of the Marine Corps (officially enacted 

on 4 May) by 1,640 enlisted billets to meet “exigencies that may 

exist” during the following 12 months.22 With the authorization 

to recruit replacements, Heywood was now in a position to start 

stripping personnel from their current stateside organizations to 

provide immediate manpower for war service. In his annual report to the secretary of the Navy, Colonel Heywood asserted that 

without the additional manpower authorization the Marine Corps 

would have been unable to meet the requirements for both war 

support and guarding naval installations in the United States.23

On 5 April, eight days before Captain Sampson’s proposal to Secretary Long for the formation of a Marine battalion, 

Heywood put out a call to his commanders of installations and 

ships detachments on the East Coast to identify troops for consolidation into an expeditionary unit at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 

The experience of Marines like Private John H. Clifford, assigned 

to Marine Barracks Portsmouth in New Hampshire, typified the 

sense of urgency permeating the Marine Corps: “On the 6th of 

April the 1st Sergeant called assembly and 60 men were identified 

to report to the quartermaster for war equipment.”24 The following day, these Marines, under the command of Captain William F. 

20 Paolo E. Coletta, Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor (Washington, DC: 

University Press of America, 1979), 91.

21 Sampson 13 April 1898 letter to secretary of the Navy.

22 An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service for the Fiscal Year Ending June Thirtieth, Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-Nine, and for Other Purposes 

(1898).

23 Jack Shulimson et al., comp./ed., Marines in the Spanish-American War, 1895–

1899: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington, DC: History and Museums 

Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1998), 108. 

24 John H. Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines (Foster, 

RI: Brass Hat, 1930), 8.

Spicer, boarded a ferry to town, from which they took a train to 

Boston and then traveled by ship to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. The 

Portsmouth Barracks detachment would become the nucleus for 

the formation of Company D, First Marine Battalion, with Captain Spicer as the commanding officer and First Lieutenant Wendell C. Neville (future 14th Commandant of the Marine Corps) 

as one of its two platoon leaders. 

As was to be expected, the sudden influx of several hundred 

Marines into the Brooklyn Navy Yard strained the capacity of its 

limited facilities. Again, Private Clifford recorded, “My company 

slept in the loft of an old stable with woolen blanket for a bed, 

knapsack for a pillow and blue military coat for covering.”25

On 16 April, Colonel Heywood received verbal authorization 

from the Department of the Navy to officially organize a 400-

man battalion for service in Cuba. Lieutenant Colonel Robert 

Huntington, the current commander of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 

was selected to command the battalion. On 18 April, Huntington 

reported that the battalion of four companies was formed and 

ready for embarkation. 

On 21 April, Huntington was directed to increase the battalion to six companies, and in 24 hours he reported that the 

battalion—now five infantry companies and one artillery company, with a total of 24 officers and 623 enlisted Marines—was 

ready for embarkation. The battalion was a collection of men 

from Marine Barracks Washington, DC; Brooklyn, New York; 

Boston, Massachusetts; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Newport, 

Rhode Island; Norfolk, Virginia; and the U.S. Naval Academy 

in Annapolis. Additionally, Marines were also drawn from U.S. 

receiving ships Vermont (1848), Wabash (1855, screw frigate), 

Richmond (1860, steam sloop), and Franklin (1864, screw frigate). 

The truly ad hoc nature of the effort to form a large tactical organization from disparate Marine stations cannot be overstated. 

In 1898, the Marine Corps still had no officially recognized organizational structure for tactical units. The Corps was organized 

along the specific requirements of the various barracks and ships 

detachments. When the First Marine Battalion was formed, the 

standard template for infantry formations at the time was the 

current U.S. Army structure, which was a holdover from the Civil 

War. Just as during the Civil War, in 1898 the base tactical infantry 

formation was the regiment. On paper, a regiment consisted of 

ten 100-man companies. Each company was divided equally into 

two platoons. A battalion was not a permanent standing organization, but a term used to describe a subset or detachment of a regiment that consisted of two or more companies. In other words, 

a battalion was a label applied to an organization that was larger 

than a company but not large enough to be called a regiment. 

25 Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines, 9.
12

In his September 1898 annual report to the secretary of the 

Navy, Heywood lauded the efforts of the Marine Corps quartermaster, Major F. L. Denney, and the battalion quartermaster, 

Captain C. L. McCawley, in preparing the Marines for operations 

in Cuba. In anticipation of the deployment of a Marine expeditionary force for war, Major Denny had been aggressively purchasing and consolidating supplies and equipment, as Heywood 

noted: 

The battalion was thoroughly fitted out with 

all the equipments [sic] and necessities for field 

service under the conditions prevailing in Cuba 

which experience and careful consideration 

could suggest, including mosquito netting, woolen and linen clothing, heavy and light weight 

underwear, three months’ supply of provisions, 

wheelbarrows, push carts, pickaxes, shovels, 

barbed-wire cutters, wall and shelter tents, and 

a full supply of medical stores. Campaign suits 

of brown linen and campaign hats were ordered, 

but . . . it was impossible to send them with the 

battalion. They were shipped later, however, and 

proved a great comfort to the men.26

For all the herculean efforts of the quartermasters, there 

were the inevitable mismatches of equipment with capabilities. 

When loading the battalion’s equipment onto the ship, a member 

of Company D noted, “We had several sets of double harness, 

two double wagons, one single wagon and a plow, but no mules. 

Whether it was forgotten to have the mules or the intention was 

for the Marines to be the mules I do not know.”27

Considering the rapidity with which the Marine battalion 

was thrown together, it was remarkably well equipped (as attested 

by Commandant Heywood) and was also very well armed. Huntington’s Marines were equipped with the recently acquired Lee 

Navy M1895 rifle. The Lee rifle was a straight-pull, bolt-action 

weapon with an internal five-round magazine. It could be quickly 

reloaded with a charging clip, making it the first American military rifle of its kind. It fired a high-velocity, 6mm smokeless powder round, which was a great technological improvement from its 

black powder predecessor, the .45-70-caliber Springfield M1873. 

The major drawback to the newly issued Lee rifle was the level 

of training the individual Marines had with the weapon in April 

1898. The weapons had been issued to the Marine Corps the 

previous year and ammunition stocks were initially in very short 

supply. In his September 1897 report of the Marine Corps, the 

26 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish-American War, 1895–1899, 105. 27 Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines, 10.

Commandant noted that “no target practice with the new rifle 

can be conducted at present, and the men are entirely unfamiliar 

with the use of this arm, except for drill purposes. Target practice is at present conducted with the old Springfield rifle which is 

obsolete.”28 Increasing his Marines’ proficiency with the Lee rifle 

would be a top training priority for Lieutenant Colonel Huntington in the initial weeks of the battalion’s existence. 

Company F was designated as the battalion artillery company 

and as such was equipped with four Hotchkiss 3-inch mountain 

guns. The Hotchkiss mountain gun was a breech-loading direct 

fire weapon designed to provide close supporting fires to infantry 

units. It was an effective antipersonnel weapon, firing 12-pound 

projectiles of three types: shell, shrapnel, and canister. It had an 

effective range of 4,000 yards, but was limited by terrain, as the 

crew had to visually acquire the target, estimate the range, and 

aim the weapon similar to aiming a rifle. Unfortunately, the only 

ammunition issued for the Marine artillery was shrapnel. The 

shrapnel round was an air burst projectile that needed to detonate in front of enemy formations to be effective. As noted by 

Lieutenant Colonel Huntington, “It was very difficult to explode 

this projectile, with any certainty, at short ranges.”29 With a total 

weight of 570 pounds, the lack of mules or horses to provide 

mobility for the guns would limit their use to fixed defensive positions at Guantánamo. As the men in the artillery company were 

principally trained as infantrymen, proficiency with the weapon 

was, of course, lacking. 

The First Marine Battalion was also the first American unit 

to employ a gas-operated machine gun in land combat. The battalion deployed with two Colt-Browning M1895 machine guns. 

The total number of guns in the battalion would grow to four 

when the Marine detachment from the USS Texas brought two 

guns ashore to reinforce the battalion after the initial landing at 

Guantánamo. The Colt machine gun fired the same 6mm ammunition as the Lee Navy rifle. 

The task of transporting the Marines to war fell to the USS

Panther (AD 6), commanded by Commander George C. Reiter. 

The Panther was a commercial steamship the Navy had recently 

purchased from Venezuela with the intention of using it as an 

auxiliary cruiser. The Panther was hastily converted to a transport 

to carry the anticipated 400-man battalion. Due to the short notice increase of the Marine battalion to six companies with more 

than 600 men, Colonel Heywood reported the deficiency in capacity of the Panther to the commander of the Brooklyn Naval 

28 Annual Report of the Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the 

Secretary of the Navy (1897) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1897), 

18. 

29 Annual Report of the Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the 

Secretary of the Navy (1898) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898), 

25.
13

Station, who informed him that he had been directed to fit out 

a larger ship, the USS Resolute (1894, previously the SS Yorktown), 

as permanent transport for the Marine battalion. However, the 

commander wrote, “After the Resolute was fitted out and ready to 

sail and provisions placed on board for the battalion, the exigencies of the service required she be taken for other purposes.”30

The Panther now had to be reconfigured and reprovisioned to 

accommodate the additional personnel, all of which would be 

accomplished in fewer than 24 hours. 

The Panther proved to be far less than ideal for the assigned 

mission. The Marines’ living quarters were extremely overcrowded. The ship’s mess deck could only accommodate feeding 200 

men at one time, necessitating three separate mess calls for every 

meal. Lieutenant Colonel Huntington viewed these shortcomings 

as hurdles to be overcome and endured; eventually, however, he 

came to see them as great inconveniences that nevertheless were 

to be expected during time of war. Huntington wrote to his wife, 

“I think going in steerage is luxury compared to being a private 

on a transport. However unless the ship is as crowded as this 

I suppose no special evil would come from this.”31 In the end, 

Lieutenant Colonel Huntington proved to be adept at making the 

best of a bad situation for his embarked Marines. 

On the afternoon of 22 April, the Marines marched in parade formation to the Brooklyn Navy Yard docks to the sound 

of cheering crowds with “intense enthusiasm in the navy-yard, 

docks, harbor front, and shipping of New York and Brooklyn.”32

By 1815, the battalion was on board, and at 1930, as “the naval 

band on dock played The Girl I Left Behind Me,” the Panther pulled 

away from the pier bound for Fort Monroe, Virginia.33

At 2000 on 23 April 1898, 24 hours after departing the 

Brooklyn Navy Yard, the Panther dropped anchor off Fort Monroe. Commander Reiter and Lieutenant Colonel Huntington reported to Captain Schley, commander of the Flying Squadron, 

stationed in Hampton Rhodes, to receive follow-on orders. The 

Panther with its embarked Marines was directed to set sail for Naval Station Key West. The departure from Fort Monroe would not 

occur until the arrival of an escort ship, the USS Montgomery (C 9). 

Huntington utilized the short stop at Fort Monroe to move his 

Marines ashore for live fire training with both the Lee rifles and the 

Hotchkiss guns. The Panther and Montgomery finally weighed anchor 

and pulled away from Fort Monroe with the Marine battalion on 

board at 0800 on the morning of 26 April bound for Key West.

30 Annual Report of the Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the 

Secretary of the Navy (1898), 8. 31 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers, box 1, Archives Branch, Marine 

Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

32 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 112. 33 Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines, 10.

Key West

With the Marines now in transit to Key West, there was still no 

defined mission for how, when, or where the battalion was to be 

employed. Regardless, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington was determined to make the most of the limited space on the Panther 

to ready his Marines for combat. Weapons training was of the 

utmost importance to increase the individual Marine’s familiarity 

and proficiency with the Lee rifle. From 1400 to 1600 daily, all 

of the infantry companies (A, B, C, D, and E) “were exercised 

in volley and mass firing, each man using ten rounds.”34 The gun 

crews of the artillery (Company F) each fired one round from 

their 3-inch guns and then replicated the 10 rounds of small arms 

training of the infantry companies. Most of the remainder of the 

daily routine involved lectures and instruction on various subjects, such as first aid and tactical maneuvers. The Marines also 

detailed six signalmen to the Panther to maintain proficiency in 

receiving and sending messages using both lanterns and flags, as 

well as supplying half of the ship’s designated life boat crews.35

The Panther arrived in Key West at midday on 29 April, and 

Huntington reported to Rear Admiral Sampson aboard the USS

New York (ACR 2) the following day. Sampson had no defined 

mission, and as expected, no orders for the Marines. The Navy 

was completely focused on attempting to locate the Spanish flotilla under Admiral Cervera, which was last reported having left 

the Cape Verde islands headed for the West Indies. Sampson 

was about to depart with his squadron for Puerto Rico in what 

proved to be a futile attempt to intercept the Spanish force. Until 

the Spanish naval threat could be located and dealt with, there 

would be no movement of ground forces to Cuba. Huntington 

recorded, “If we expect to go to Cuba, I suppose we shall, but I 

have heard that the plans of the authorities in Washington have 

changed . . . and I suppose it is not desirable to land a small force 

in Cuba without having practical control of the sea.”36 Huntington’s Marines would have to wait in Key West until the location 

of Cervera’s ships was resolved. 

The next month was a trying time for the Marines as they 

attempted to use the overcrowded Panther as a floating base of 

operations. On 5 May, Huntington began landing his companies 

to conduct training ashore. For the better part of three weeks, 

5–23 May, Huntington cycled his companies ashore, up to four 

at a time, for what was described in the First Marine Battalion record as “Company Drill.”37 As Private Wilford Langley recorded 

34 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, Cuba, 1898, Spanish-American 

War papers, folder 1 of 5, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA. 

35 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 1.

36 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers.

37 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 3–6.
14

in his diary, “We lay at anchor for a month, going ashore once a 

week for drill. We went through many hardships suffering from 

intense heat and bad food.”38

As Lieutenant Colonel Huntington cycled his companies on 

and off the Panther for training in preparation for a still undefined 

mission, the first engagement with the enemy in Cuba involving 

U.S. Marines was already taking place. Boat crews made up of a 

mix of Marines and sailors were sent close in to shore outside the 

port of Cienfuegos to cut undersea telegraph cables. The Marines 

taking part in the action were assigned to the ships’ detachments 

aboard the USS Marblehead and USS Nashville (PG 7). 

As the North Atlantic Fleet continued to improve its blockade 

of the coast of Cuba, it was important to not only prevent physical 

access to Cuban ports but also to sever external communication 

with Spain. Despite the blockade, Spanish forces in Cuba were 

in constant communication with Madrid via undersea telegraph 

cables that ran from Guantánamo Bay to Haiti and from Santiago 

de Cuba to Jamaica. The telegraph cable extended from Santiago 

de Cuba west to the port of Cienfeugos, then west to the port 

of Batabano, then overland to Havana. It was deemed of utmost 

importance to cut off Havana from direct communication with 

Madrid. The decision was made to cut the cables at Cienfuegos to 

isolate Havana from direct overseas communication.

The cable cutting mission fell to Commander McCalla of 

the Marblehead with the Nashville in support. McCalla organized 

the expedition consisting of one steam cutter and two launches 

from each ship. The steam cutters would tow the launches close 

to shore and provide fire support against any Spanish ground 

forces that might try to interfere with the operation. The cutter 

from the Nashville was armed with two Colt machine guns while 

the cutter from the Marblehead had a Hotchkiss 1-pounder quick 

fire gun.39 The launches each had 12 men, comprising a mix of 

oarsmen, blacksmiths, and carpenters to handle the grappling and 

cutting tools for the cables, as well as Marines armed with Lee 

rifles as marksmen (five from the Marblehead and seven from the 

Nashville). The operation was set for 11 May. 

The undersea cables were located close to the shore off of 

Colorados Point on the east side of the harbor entrance. The 

point had a lighthouse and cable house, and the surrounding area 

was defended by Spanish infantry in rifle pits. The Marblehead and 

Nashville provided initial naval gunfire support, which scattered 

the defenders and allowed the steam cutters to get the launches 

close to shore without further hindrance. The men in the launches 

38 Margret Farrow Sacks, transc., “Diary of Private Wilford Langley of the 

U.S.M.C.’s First Marine Battalion (Reinforced),” 29 April 1898 entry, Spanish 

American War Centennial Website, accessed 1 August 2016.

39 Quick fire was a term used to describe small caliber revolving multibarrel cannons.

worked for more than two and a half hours within 50 yards of 

shore under sporadic small arms fire and successfully located and 

cut two large undersea cables. 

As the crews in the launches began working on a third smaller cable, Spanish reinforcements reoccupied some of their former positions and brought accurate and intense small arms fire 

against the boat crews. Private Herman W. Kuchneister, a member of the Marine detachment from the Marblehead, described 

the scene:

The lifting of the cable was a very perilous and 

laborious task but the cutting crew went about 

their job coolly. Bullets were piercing the boat 

and the water was coming in. But coolly as ever 

we put a bullet in the hole and it helped keep the 

water out. Large shells dropped around us nearly 

Adm Cervera’s flotilla anchored in the Cape Verde Islands shortly before their 

departure for the West Indies in late April 1898.

New York Public Library, Maps of North America Collection

The USS New York (ACR 2), an armored cruiser that served as RAdm Sampson’s 

flagship throughout the war. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
15

Major General Charles Heywood

lifting us out of the water. Shells from our own 

ship and the Spanish batteries passed over head.40

During this operation, Private Kuchneister received a severe 

wound in the jaw that plagued him the remainder of his life. 

The Nashville and Marblehead reengaged the Spanish with 

their 5- and 6-inch guns. The ships were able to completely suppress the enemy fire by destroying the cable house and lighthouse 

that some Spanish were using for cover, as well as scattering other troops that had attempted to reoccupy rifle pits near the shore. 

40 William D. Furey, transc., “Private Hermann D. Kuchmeister’s [sic] Account of 

the Cienfuegos Cable Cutting Expedition,” Spanish American War Centennial 

Website, accessed 8 September 2016. While this secondary source spells the private’s name with an “m,” original documents give his last name spelled with an 

“n” (Kuchneister).

Under cover of this heavy fire, the launches and steam cutters 

were able to safely withdraw, but were unable to complete the 

cutting of the third cable. In all, the launch crews suffered two 

killed and seven wounded (one Marine killed, Private Patrick Regan, and one wounded, Private Kuchneister).41All members of 

the launches (including all 12 Marines) were awarded the Medal 

of Honor for their actions. From the beginning of the embarkation of the First Marine Battalion on board the Panther, the 

relationship between the Navy and Marine commanders was, at 

best, a strained one. At this time, there was no clearly defined 

naval doctrinal command relationship between the two commanders. Huntington considered the Panther’s sole mission as 

that of providing transport for his Marines, while Commander 

41 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 191.

Major General Charles Heywood, ninth Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, was born in Waterville, Maine, on 3 October 

1839. He was appointed a second lieutenant in the Marine 

Corps from New York on 5 April 1858. During that year, 

he was stationed at the Marine Barracks Washington, DC, 

and at Marine Barracks New York in Brooklyn, New York.

During the American Civil War, he landed with the Marines at Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina, where he was present 

at the capture of Forts Clark and Hatteras, participated in a 

number of boat expeditions on the James River, was on the USS 

Cumberland (1842) in the battle with the CSSVirginia, and was 

aboard the USS Hartford (1858) in the Battle of Mobile Bay. His 

service during the Civil War thus secured for him two brevet 

ranks for distinguished gallantry in the presence of the enemy.

During the serious labor riots during the summer of 

1877, Heywood commanded a battalion of Marines at Baltimore; Philadelphia; and Reading, Pennsylvania. He was honorably mentioned by General Winfield Hancock of the U.S. Army, who was in general command, and received thanks from 

the Navy Department for his service. His next years of duty carried him to widely separated posts: Mare Island, California, 

and Brooklyn, New York.

In April 1885, he commanded a battalion of Marines for duty on the Isthmus of Panama to protect American citizens and 

property during a revolt against Colombia. His command eventually grew to 800 Marines and sailors. Heywood was promoted 

to lieutenant colonel on 9 March 1888 and on 30 January 1891 was appointed colonel Commandant of the Marine Corps. By 

special acts of Congress, he was promoted to brigadier general in March 1899 and to major general in July 1902. He was the 

first Marine to hold the rank of major general. 

He was an advocate of professional education and standardized training. He was the first to establish a regular system 

of examinations for officer promotions and set up the system of officers’ schools. Major General Heywood had completed 

more than 45 years as a commissioned officer in the Marine Corps when on 3 October 1903, he was placed on the retired list.

MajGen Charles Heywood, ninth Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Source: MajGen Charles Heywood biographical file, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division.
16

Reiter looked on the Marines as cargo, and like any other cargo, 

once on board his ship, it was his prerogative to make decisions 

on their disposition and utilization as he saw fit. With the arrival 

of the Panther at Key West, Commander Reiter sought to unload 

his cargo at the first opportunity. On 10 May, Reiter ordered the 

battalion ashore. Huntington was able to get this order revoked 

by appealing directly to Commodore George C. Remey, commandant of Naval Station Key West.42

This issue came to the forefront again when the Panther was 

42 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 113.

selected to tow the monitor USS Amphitrite (1883, screw monitor) from Key West to the blockading squadron in Cuba. On the 

afternoon of 23 May, the Marines were ordered ashore and the 

order was executed at 0400 the following morning. The departure 

of the Marines did not go smoothly. Commander Reiter ordered 

Huntington to leave half of the Marines’ 6mm and 3-inch artillery ammunition on board the Panther as ballast. Huntington 

again had to appeal to Commodore Remey, who modified the 

order to allow the Marines to offload all of their 6mm ammunition, but half of the artillery ammunition remained on the Panther. Huntington clearly noted his frustrations with the Navy in 

When the First Marine Battalion went ashore in Guantánamo Bay, they were armed with the Lee Navy Model 1895 rifle. This 

weapon was a newly adopted straight-pull magazine rifle, manufactured by the Winchester Repeating Arms Company. It was the 

first American military rifle to be loaded by a charging clip of five rounds into an internal magazine. It fired a 6mm smokeless 

powder cartridge with a 135-grain bullet. The 6mm Lee cartridge also was interchangeable for use in the Navy version of the 

Colt-Browning Model 1895 machine gun. 

The Lee had a reputation for adequate reliability in the field in the hands of well-trained troops. Marine reports after the 

Guantánamo Bay expedition criticized the design of the extractor as being somewhat fragile and prone to break or malfunction. 

This was particularly true in the hands of an individual who was not thoroughly familiar with the weapon. Several were issued 

to Cuban insurgents supporting the Marines at Guantánamo. The untrained Cubans experienced a much higher failure rate than 

with the Army (Krag) Model 1892/98 rifle.

Depiction of the Lee Navy M1895 rifle internal five-round magazine system. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

Source: “Model 1895 Lee Navy,” Winchester Arms Collectors Association website; and Jim Hanson, “The 6mm U.S.N.—Ahead of Its Time,” Rifle Magazine, 

January/February 1977, 38–41.

Lee Navy Rifle Model 1895 specifications

Weight – 8.32 pounds

Length – 47.75 inches

Caliber – 6mm

Action – Straight-pull bolt

Muzzle velocity – 2,560 feet/per second

Effective range

Point targets – 549 m/600 yards

Massed targets – 900 m/1,000 yards

Maximum range – 1,829 m/2,000 yards

Lee Navy Model 1895 Rifle
17

LtCol Huntington, newly designated commander of the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced), in camp at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, 1898.

Naval History and Heritage Command

Robert W. Huntington was born on 2 December 1840 in Hartford, Connecticut. He entered Trinity College in the autumn 

of 1860, but left the college at the outset of the Civil War to enlist in the 1st Regiment Connecticut Volunteers. While a 

member of the 1st Connecticut, he applied for a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps and was commissioned as a second 

lieutenant of Marines on 5 June 1861. 

He fought in the Battle of First Manassas as a member of the Marine battalion under the command of Major John 

G. Reynolds. He subsequently served in the North Atlantic Blockading Fleet and participated in operations that resulted in 

the capture of Port Royal, South Carolina, as well as the capture of Fort Clinch, Fernandina, Florida. 

As a captain of Marines, Huntington commanded the guard at the U.S. legation in Edo (then called Yeddo), Japan. 

From 1866 to 1898, he served on numerous sea tours and at various naval stations and posts in the United States and was 

a company commander in the Marine battalion during the expedition to the Isthmus of Panama in 1885. 

On 20 February 1897, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to command the Marine Barracks New 

York Navy Yard, Brooklyn. On 22 April 1898, he was assigned to command the First Marine Battalion (Reinforced) and 

led that command during operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Huntington was promoted to colonel on 10 August 1898 for conspicuous conduct in battle at Guantánamo Bay. After 

disbanding the First Marine Battalion, Colonel Huntington returned to command the Marine Barracks New York Navy 

Yard. On 10 January 1900, Colonel Huntington was placed on the retired list, having completed 38 years of active and 

distinguished service as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Robert W. Huntington

Source: Robert Pendleton, contr., “The Biography of Colonel Robert Watkinson Huntington, United States Marine Corps, Commanding 1st Marine 

Battalion (Reinforced),” Spanish American War Centennial Website.
18

RAdm William T. Sampson, commander of all U.S. naval forces in the West 

Indies. He was an advocate of utilizing Marine landing forces to hold key points 

ashore in support of his naval operations. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

Adm Pascual Cervera y Topete, commander of the ill-fated Spanish flotilla sent 

by Spain to relieve the United States blockade of Cuba. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

LtCol Robert W. Huntington, commanding officer of the First Marine Battalion. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
19

a report to Commandant Heywood on 25 May, stating, “Owing 

to the short time allowed for the removal of the stores, and notwithstanding the fact that the men worked hard and worked fast, 

considerable quantities of our property and part of the ten days’ 

rations I requested were left on board.”43

Huntington believed that the order to summarily push the 

Marines ashore was due to the “earnest solicitation and representations of Commander Reiter.”44 Although the overcrowded 

conditions on the Panther were far from ideal, the Marines viewed 

the Panther as their link to the war. An issue of great concern 

to many of the officers was that once put ashore they might be 

abandoned and in effect marooned in Key West for the duration 

of the conflict. 

A camp was established along the beach approximately two 

miles from the dock. On 25 May, colors were raised for the first 

time over newly christened Camp Sampson. Impressions of the 

Marines concerning their new camp were universally bleak. A 

festering swamp, swarms of mosquitoes, and intolerably hot 

were common descriptors. In such an environment, sickness was 

a major concern. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington 

was determined to keep his Marines healthy. He ensured that 

wood flooring was procured for tents, issued the new brown 

lightweight linen campaign uniforms to replace the standard 

heavy blue woolen uniforms, and most importantly, ensured 

a good supply of clean drinking water. Daily, Huntington had 

43 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 113. 44 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 113.

casks of distilled water brought ashore from ships in the harbor 

for drinking and gave strict orders that no water was to be used 

for drinking or cooking that had not been thoroughly boiled. 

Huntington would ensure strict adherence to this policy throughout the campaign. As a result, the daily sick list for the Marines 

averaged about 2 percent with no disease-related deaths. This was 

a remarkably low number for military units of that period operating in a subtropical climate.

Although training, with a heavy emphasis on marksmanship, 

was the first order of the day for the battalion, other assigned 

duties lent an air of routine to the encampment. With the influx 

of large numbers of people into Key West due to the war, the 

town had taken on a wild and lawless aspect. As Private Langley 

of Company F noted, “at daylight a murdered man was found 

outside of Leon’s Salon, better known as the Last Chance.”45 On 

25 May, the commandant of Key West Naval Base directed the 

First Marine Battalion to provide a guard to protect public property and maintain order. One officer and 33 enlisted were detailed 

daily to guard duty in Key West. In addition, the battalion detailed 

six enlisted men as orderlies in support of the station commandant, and it was frequently called upon to provide escorts for 

military funerals for naval personnel killed in action in Cuba.

Contrary to the fears of many in the battalion that the Marines might be left to languish in the swamps of Florida, the First 

Marine Battalion’s life at Camp Sampson would last less than two 

weeks. On 4 June, with Admiral Cervera’s fleet finally bottled 

up in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, Rear Admiral Sampson 

called for the deployment of the Marines to Cuba. Camp Sampson was quickly broken down, and on 6 June, the Marines were 

reembarked aboard the Panther. Four companies disembarked on 

7 June to provide one final funeral escort before the battalion departed. The Panther finally sailed from Key West at 1930 on 7 June 

with orders to report to the commander of the North Atlantic 

Fleet off the south coast of Cuba.

Guantánamo Bay 

On the evening of 6 June, Commander McCalla put Admiral 

Sampson’s orders to secure Guantánamo Bay as an anchorage 

for repair and recoaling into execution. For the initial phase 

of the operation, McCalla was assigned tactical command of 

the USS Yankee (1892, screw steamer) and SS St. Louis (1894, 

steamer) along with his own ship, the Marblehead. The first step in 

accomplishing the mission was to cut external communications 

to the Guantánamo area. The departure of the Marblehead and 

Yankee from the blockading force at Santiago de Cuba was timed 

45 Sacks, “Diary of Private Wilford Langley of the U.S.M.C.’s First Marine 

Battalion (Reinforced),” 26 May 1898 entry.

USS Panther (AD 6), a commercial freighter converted to an auxiliary cruiser, then 

converted to a transport for the Marine battalion. The ship was too small to 

adequately accommodate the 650-man battalion that it would carry to Cuba. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
20

Hotchkiss 3-inch mountain gun specifications

Range – 4,000 yards 

Projectile weight – 12 pounds

Muzzle velocity – 870 feet/per second 

Total weight – 570 pounds

Hotchkiss 3-inch Mountain Gun

Source: Annual Report of the Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to 

the Secretary of the Navy (1898), 25; and A. B. Dyer, Handbook for Light Artillery (New 

York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1896), 23–27.

While awaiting orders to deploy to Cuba, the companies of the First Marine Battalion rotated ashore from the Panther to train (referred to in the battalion records as 

“company drill”) at Key West, FL.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

The Hotchkiss 3-inch mountain gun was a breech-loading weapon 

officially classified as a light field gun. It was designed to be transported by breaking the gun down and packing it on mules or towed 

behind a standard horse-drawn artillery limber. 

As with all late-nineteenth-century light artillery, this was a 

line-of-sight, direct-fire weapon. It was utilized in close support 

of infantry formations in both the offense and defense. The lack 

of mules or horses with the Marine battalion at Guantánamo Bay 

would limit the gun’s use to defensive operations. 

The Hotchkiss mountain gun fired three types of projectiles: 

shell, shrapnel, and canister. Shell was a metal casing filled with a 

bursting charge designed to detonate on impact, breaking the shell 

into fragments. It was used against personnel or light fortifications. 

Shrapnel was a time-fused air-burst antipersonnel round that was 

effective against troops in open ground at mid to long range. Canister was a close-range antipersonnel round that was in essence a 

3-inch-diameter shotgun shell.

The Marines at Guantánamo Bay were only issued shrapnel 

rounds for the Hotchkiss guns. The shrapnel round required an 

accurate estimation of range by the gunner, and an appropriately 

set time fuse so that the round would detonate on the downward 

arc slightly above and in front of the target. As noted by Lieutenant 

Colonel Huntington in a 26 August report to the Commandant, the 

short ranges of engagement made it difficult to effectively employ 

the guns with this single type of ammunition.

Capt Francis Harrington, commander of Company F (artillery company), with one of his four Hotchkiss 3-inch guns in a defensive 

position at Camp McCalla, Guantánamo Bay, 1898. Due to the lack 

of mules or horses for transport, these guns had to be placed in 

fixed positions. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
21

so as to arrive at Guantánamo at first light on 7 June. Upon his 

arrival, McCalla found the St. Louis already on site outside the 

bay, dragging for the telegraph cable that ran from Guantánamo 

Bay to Haiti. As the St. Louis continued its efforts to cut the 

telegraph cable, the Marblehead and the Yankee proceeded into the 

bay to begin operations to secure the anchorage that was so badly 

need to sustain the fleet off Santiago. 

Guantánamo is a deep-water bay leading to the small port 

of Caimanera, located five miles north of the bay entrance. Just 

south of Caimanera, there are several small islands that divide 

the upper area of Guantánamo Bay into three narrow channels 

leading to a large upper bay. The Spanish had constructed 

their main defenses to guard the channels on the upper end of 

Guantánamo Bay. The narrow channels were protected by mines 

with forts to cover the minefields. The main defense was a large 

sand fort on Cayo del Toro on the east side of the upper bay 

opposite Caimanera. This fort had mounted three antiquated 

6.4-inch muzzle-loading guns and was intended to cover the 

One of Company F’s Hotchkiss 3-inch mountain guns in a fixed emplacement at 

Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Source: “Panther I (Iron-hulled Steamer),” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed 24 April 

2019.

The USS Panther was built by William Cramp and Sons of Philadelphia in 1889. First commissioned as the merchant steamship Venezuela, it saw service for several years as a cargo freighter transporting goods between the United States and Central 

and South America. The Venezuela was purchased by the Navy from the Red D Line Steamship Company on 12 April 1898, 

and recommissioned as the auxiliary cruiser USS Panther, Commander George Cook Reiter in command. 

At the outbreak of war with Spain, the Panther was hastily converted into a troop transport. On 22 April 1898, the First 

Marine Battalion was embarked on board for transportation to Key West, Florida, and ultimately to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 

The Panther proved to be less than optimal for the task of transporting 650 embarked Marines, as it was originally configured 

to transport approximately 400.

The USS Panther, an auxiliary cruiser hastily converted to a transport to convey the First Marine Battalion to Cuba. Originally configured to hold 400 embarked Marines, it had to be hastily reconfigured to hold 650 and proved to be inadequate for the assigned mission. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

USS Panther
22

entrance to the channels. Smaller sand fortifications on the 

west side of the bay around Caimanera boasted a modern 3.5-

inch Krupp rifle and several old muzzle-loading guns and field 

pieces intended to cover the upper minefields in the channels, 

supported by a lone Spanish gunboat, the Sandoval, armed with 

two guns (6- and 1-pounder).46 The armament of these forts and 

the Sandoval would quickly prove to be no match for the modern 

U.S. warships and their large-caliber weapons. 

The dominant terrain feature around Guantánamo Bay 

proper is on the southeastern shore, where a peninsula comprising the Cuzco Hills juts out into the bay entrance. The northern 

tip of this neck of land was known as Fisherman’s Point (also 

referred to as Playa de Este), so named because of a small fishing 

village along the shoreline. On a prominent hill directly overlooking the point was a telegraph station protected by a small force of 

Spanish troops manning a blockhouse with supporting trenches 

and two light muzzle-loading field pieces.

46 Capt Bowman H. McCalla, USN, “Lessons of the Late War,” extracts of lectures at Naval War College, Newport, RI, session of 1899, Naval History and 

Heritage Command, accessed 10 September 2016. Some sources refer to the 

Krupp weapon as a 3-inch mountain gun, however, McCalla described them as 

3.5-inch rifles. The author has been unable to account for the discrepancy in McCalla’s description of the enemy forces’ weaponry.

The entire combined Spanish and Cuban loyalist force in 

the area was estimated to be about 7,000 under the command 

of General Félix Pareja. Prior to the arrival of the U.S. Navy 

on 7 June, the main threat to Spanish forces was a large force 

of Cuban insurgents who controlled much of the area between 

Caimanera and Santiago to the west. Consequently, the bulk of 

Spanish ground forces were deployed west of Caimanera in an 

attempt to protect the railroad and telegraph lines to Santiago. 

Approximately 800 Spanish and Cuban loyalists were deployed 

east of Guantánamo Bay. The majority of the western shore of 

the bay entrance was under the control of Cuban insurgent forces, some of whom would play a key supporting role to the Marines in the upcoming operation.

As the St. Louis worked on cutting the undersea cables, the 

Marblehead and Yankee entered the bay and immediately took the 

Spanish positions on Fisherman’s Point under fire. With little 

protection from the ships’ guns and no ability to respond, the 

Spanish garrison quickly withdrew into the surrounding hills. The 

Yankee destroyed the telegraph station and the blockhouse as the 

Marblehead moved farther up the bay and took the Spanish fort on 

Cayo del Toro under fire. Return fire from the fort was ineffective due to the very limited range of its obsolete muzzle-loading 

guns. The Spanish gunboat Sandoval steamed down the channel, 

Length – 41 inches

Weight – 22.49 pounds (40 pounds with carriage)

Cartridge – 6mm 

Feed system – belt 

Rate of fire – 500 rpm

Maximum effective range – 2,000 yards

Source: “M1895 Colt-Browning Machine Gun,” Infogalactic.com, accessed 18 February 2019; “M1895 Colt-Browning Machine Gun,” World Heritage Encyclopedia, accessed 18 February 2019; “Colt Browning M1895 (Potato Digger),” MilitaryFactory.com, accessed 18 February 2019; Al Sumrall, “The Colt 

Model 1895 Automatic Machine Gun,” Spanish American War Centennial Website, accessed 18 February 2019; and “Colts Patents Arms Manufacturing 

Company Colt-Browning Model 1895 Machine Gun 0.30 – 06 Dewat,” GunAuction.com, accessed 18 February 2019.

A Colt-Browning M1895 machine gun on a wheeled carriage at 

Guantánamo Bay, 1898. Three M1895s were taken with the Marines to 

Cuzco Well, where they were employed with great effect.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Colt-Browning M1895 Machine Gun specifications

The Colt-Browning M1895, nicknamed “potato digger” because of its unusual operating mechanism, was an air-cooled, beltfed, gas-operated machine gun with a rate of fire of 500 rounds per minute (rpm). Designed by John Browning in 1889, it was 

the first successful gas-operated machine gun employed by the U.S. military in land combat. The weapon fired the same 6mm 

ammunition as the 1895 Lee Navy rifle, and it could be configured to be fired from a tripod or a wheeled carriage. 

The M1895 machine gun proved to be accurate and reliable for many years. It saw service with the Marine Corps in multiple conflicts, such as the Philippine-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, and operations in Veracruz, Mexico.
23

and after firing several rounds in a somewhat symbolic gesture of 

resistance, withdrew back to Caimanera. Commander McCalla’s 

two ships now controlled the bay and demonstrated it could be 

used as a safe anchorage without the necessity of reducing the 

Spanish forts on the northern end of the bay.

As the Yankee was completing the destruction of the Spanish positions on Fisherman’s Point, Commander McCalla was 

conferring with Cuban insurgents aboard the Marblehead. The insurgents had been dispatched by Major General Calixto Ramón 

Garcia Iñiguez to update the Americans on the status of Cuban 

forces in the area and to cooperate in any planned operations. 

McCalla departed at 1400 with the Yankee and his Cuban guests 

to report to Admiral Sampson at Santiago. After briefing Sampson on the situation at Guantánamo, McCalla was directed to 

return to Guantánamo and await the arrival of Huntington’s Marine battalion, now en route from Key West. On the morning of 

9 June, McCalla’s force was reinforced by the USS Vixen, Dolphin

(PG 24), and the battleship Oregon.

With the Marine battalion on its way, McCalla’s most pressing 

order of business was to select a suitable landing site from where 

the Marines could protect ships in the harbor against harassment 

by Spanish ground forces. Captain Mancil C. Goodrell, the Fleet 

Marine officer aboard the New York, was tasked with finding a 

suitable landing site that was “a strong defensive one, covering the 

cable station and the lower harbor from attack from the hills to 

the south and west.”47 On 9 June, after a combination of studying 

charts and maps and a physical reconnaissance of the eastern 

shore of the bay, Captain Goodrell recommended Fisherman’s 

Point as the landing site and the hill overlooking the beach (the 

location of the Spanish blockhouse and telegraph station) as the 

best defensive position along the lower bay. The proposal was 

discussed with Commander McCalla and the Cuban insurgents. 

All agreed with Goodrell’s recommendation, and Commander 

McCalla officially approved Fisherman’s Point as the landing site 

for the First Marine Battalion.

The Panther arrived off Santiago at 0700 on 10 June. After a brief meeting with Admiral Sampson, Lieutenant Colonel 

Huntington and the Marine battalion finally had their assigned 

mission. No details were immediately available; Huntington only 

knew that his battalion would be going ashore somewhere at 

Guantánamo Bay. By 0900, the Panther was sailing for Guantánamo with orders to report to Commander McCalla. 

As the Panther steamed toward Guantánamo Bay, the landing 

site was already being secured. At 0800, Captain Goodrell led a 

60-man landing force (40 from the Oregon and 20 from the Marblehead) ashore at Fisherman’s Point. The Marblehead stood close 

off shore ready to provide fire support if needed, but the landing party met no opposition. Goodrell described the scene in his 

report:

There were evidences [sic] on every hand of 

the hasty flight of the Spanish troops. They left 

behind them two brass twelve-pounder field 

pieces, the caissons filled with ammunition: 

a regimental flag, the third Principe [Prince’s 

Infantry Regiment No. 3], between three and 

four hundred cartridge boxes filled with Mauser 

ammunition, also a number of Mauser [rifle] 

cartridges boxes that had never been opened, a 

considerable quantity of provisions, a complete 

signal outfit, several hundred knapsacks and 

haversacks, clothing of officers and men hanging 

in every house and shed, a dozen car-boys of 

rum . . . a watch, shot-gun, musical instruments 

and many toilet articles.48

Captain Goodrell’s initial landing force swept inland several 

hundred yards and established a skirmish line to secure the area. 

The captain then went on board the newly arrived Panther to report the results of the landing to Lieutenant Colonel Huntington. 

47 Capt M. C. Goodrell, Report of 6 October 1898, Spanish-American War papers, folder 1 of 5, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA. 

48 Goodrell, Report of 6 October 1898, 3.

Map depicting the location of undersea cables at Cienfuegos.

Naval History and Heritage Command
24

Marines and sailors of the USS Nashville (PG 7) who were all awarded the Medal 

of Honor for gallantry in action during the cable-cutting operation at Cienfuegos. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

The Medal of Honor in the Nineteenth Century

Front and back of a Medal of Honor awarded to BM Thomas 

Gehegan for personal valor while serving as captain of USS 

Pinola’s (1861) 11-inch gun during the Battle of New Orleans, 

24–25 April 1862. The medal was forfeited because of misconduct and remained in Navy Department custody. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

The Medal of Honor was established during the American Civil War 

to recognize enlisted men for gallantry. The U.S. Navy established the 

Medal of Valor in 1861 and the U.S. Army created the Medal of Honor 

in 1862. In 1863, the Army authorized issuing the medal to officers. 

The Navy continued to restrict the issue of the medal to enlisted personnel until 1915. The Medal of Honor was the only authorized medal 

to recognize the valor of soldiers and sailors in battle during the nineteenth century. That would change in 1918 with the establishment of 

lesser medals, such as the Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished 

Service Medal, and the Silver Star. The early criteria for the Medal of 

Honor was not as well defined as it is today, and as a result it was not 

stringently and consistently applied. In 1863, for example, 300 members of the 27th Infantry Regiment, Maine Volunteers, received the 

Medal of Honor for reenlisting to protect the Capitol for the duration 

of the war (all were later rescinded by an Army review board in 1917). 

It was not until 1918 that Congress established clearer guidelines for 

awarding future medals that brought the criteria much more in line 

with what we know today.

As one looks at the recipients of the Medal of Honor during 

the Spanish-American War, it is important to view the justification of 

these awards within the context of their time. For example, all 52 men 

(including 12 Marines) who participated in the cable cutting operations 

at Cienfuegos were awarded the Medal of Honor. The actions of most 

of these men would not meet the modern threshold for the Medal of 

Honor, but they were consistent with existing precedent for issuing 

the medal in the 1890s.

Source: “History,” Congressional Medal of Honor Society website, accessed September 

2016.

Artist’s rendition of one of the cable-cutting launches at Cienfuegos.

Naval History and Heritage Command
25

Goodrell described the position as “an exceptionally strong one, 

and, if properly fortified, could be held by the Marine battalion 

against any force that could be brought against it.”49 Goodrell’s 

discussion with Huntington was very brief as he found him leaving the ship to report to McCalla on the Marblehead a short time 

before the battalion was to move ashore.

At 1300, the battalion was ordered to land. The Marines 

were loaded in boats and rapidly towed to the beach by steam 

launches. Within an hour, four companies had landed, with two 

companies remaining on board the Panther to offload supplies 

and equipment (Companies A and F would move ashore on 11 

June). Company C, under Captain George F. Elliott, was the first 

to land and quickly moved inland beyond the hill to relieve Captain Goodrell’s skirmish line, allowing the initial landing party 

to return to the Oregon and the Marblehead. Right behind Elliott’s 

lead elements came several war correspondents. The most famous of them was well-known journalist and author Stephen 

Crane. Crane stayed with the Marines during the heaviest fighting 

and was a key figure in documenting and reporting their exploits 

at Guantánamo Bay.

Commander McCalla was adamant that one of the first orders of business for the Marines ashore was to burn anything 

that had been utilized or left behind by the Spanish. This included all huts and houses on Fisherman’s Point. In the nineteenth 

century, disease was still the predominant killer on the battlefield. 

This action was taken as a precaution against the chances of con49 Goodrell, Report of 6 October 1898, 3.

tracting yellow fever. As medical science in 1898 had yet to establish the connection between the deadly disease and the mosquito, 

it was believed that this scourge of the tropics was predominantly 

passed by human contact. Fire was considered an effective way to 

eradicate potential sources of contagion. 

The focus of the battalion for the remainder of the day was 

the ship-to-shore movement of all the logistical material required 

to sustain them for the foreseeable future. The work was laborious and exhausting. Coupled with a blistering Caribbean summer 

sun, it was extremely arduous. By nightfall, Huntington had established a camp on the crest of the hill overlooking Fisherman’s 

Point. Tents were erected and supplies and equipment brought 

up from the beach. The position was christened Camp McCalla, 

and on this spot, the American flag would be officially raised over 

Cuban soil for the first time on the morning of 11 June. 

In his report to the Commandant on 17 June, Huntington 

expressed his dissatisfaction with the position Captain Goodrell 

had selected for the battalion: 

The hill occupied by us is a faulty position, but 

the best to be had at this point. The ridge slopes 

downward and to the rear from the bay; the space 

at the top is very small, and all the surrounding 

country is covered with thick and almost impenetrable brush. The position is commanded by 

a mountain, the ridge of which is about 1,200 

yards to the rear.50

If this was indeed Huntington’s initial assessment of his assigned position, his actions and decisions in the first 24 hours 

ashore are puzzling. Captain Goodrell had asserted that the position “if properly fortified could be held against any force.”51 Fortifying and improving his position against potential enemy attacks 

was not Huntington’s initial priority of effort for the battalion. 

In establishing camp McCalla, the term camp was the operative 

word. Tents were erected at or near the top of the hill, clearly 

in sight of potential enemy forces and silhouetted against the 

sky and bay. First priority was given to offloading supplies and 

equipment rather than focusing on establishing and improving a 

strong defensive position. Huntington’s position had more the air 

of an armed camp in a low-threat environment than the defensive position of an outnumbered force that had just projected itself onto a hostile shore where the enemy force in the immediate 

area was believed to number several hundred, with the ability to 

be reinforced fairly quickly from Caimanera. After the war, when 

reflecting on the initial hours ashore, Private Frank Keeler of 

50 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 115. 51 Goodrell, Report of 6 October 1898, 3.

Typical tent quarters for Marines at Camp Sampson, Key West. A piece of the 

wooden flooring that LtCol Huntington demanded for all tents can be seen in the 

lower right of the picture. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
26

Company D noted in his memoirs, “While we were stacking arms 

and unloading ship the Spanish had every chance in the world to 

close in on us. . . . To think of the risk we went through makes me 

angry with our Commanding Officers every time I think of it.”52

As the sun set on 10 June, the First Marine Battalion was firmly established on Fisherman’s Point in terms of men and materiel. Camp McCalla was established, adequate supplies of food and 

ammunition had been offloaded, and four rifle companies were 

ashore. Three main outposts of approximately 15 –25 Marines 

each were established to provide early warning if the Spanish approached that night. Between 2000 and 2100, pickets reported 

enemy activity to the front. The battalion was quickly formed 

up and moved forward. A sweep of the area to the immediate 

front found no enemy, and the rest of the night passed without 

incident. This night would prove to be the last restful one for the 

Marines for the next three days.

On 11 June, Companies A and F were brought ashore, 

completing the landing of the entire battalion. Unfortunately, 

Huntington had more problems to deal with than just the tactical 

deployment of his battalion. His acrimonious relationship with 

Commander Reiter of the Panther came to the fore again as the 

Marines were struggling to offload supplies and equipment. As 

the Marines labored in the Cuban heat, the crew of the Panther

stood by and watched. Huntington’s complaints on this issue to 

Reiter were met with indifference. When the issue was raised to 

McCalla asthe overall commander of the Guantánamo operation, 

his reaction was swift and pointed. He issued the following 

directive to Commander Reiter: “Sir, break out immediately and 

land with the crew of the Panther 50,000 rounds of 6-millimeter 

ammunition. In future do not require Colonel Huntington to 

break out or land his stores or ammunition with members of 

his command. Use your own officers and crew for this purpose 

and supply the commanding officer of Marines promptly with 

anything he may require.”53 McCalla was so incensed with Reiter’s 

actions, he enclosed a copy of this directive to Admiral Sampson.

By the afternoon of 11 June, the initial tactical disposition of

the battalion was set. Four rifle companies were arrayed in front 

of Camp McCalla. The right flank on the southwest side of the 

landing area along the eastern edge of the bay was manned by 

Captain Spicer’s Company D. To their left in the center of the line 

facing south was Company B under Captain Benjamin R. Russell. 

The left flank was held by Company C under Captain Elliott and 

Company E under First Lieutenant James E. Mahoney. Company 

F (artillery) under Captain Francis H. Harrington occupied the 

52 Frank Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898: The Journal of Frank Keeler, Marine 

Corps Papers Series no. 1, ed. Carolyn A. Tyson (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 

Museum, 1967), 7. 

53 Naval Operations of the War with Spain, 491.

hilltop of Camp McCalla proper, and Company A under Captain 

Allan C. Kelton was at the foot of the ridge along the beach 

protecting the battalion logistics stores. Three major outposts 

were continuously manned forward of the main line. Even after 

24 hours ashore, there had been no concerted effort to clear away 

heavy brush to create fields of fire or any significant effort made 

to dig in or fortify defensive positions. Huntington was focused 

on offloading supplies and equipment, which consumed most of 

the battalion’s manpower.

The routine nature of the battalion’s activities abruptly 

changed at about 1700 on 11 June, when a flurry of rifle fire 

was heard forward of the outpost near the crossroads held by 

Lieutenant Wendall Neville of Company D. This was a Spanish 

ambush of a forward picket post manned by Privates William 

Dumphy and James McColgan. A brisk exchange of rifle 

fire ensued between the Spanish and Neville’s outpost of 25 

Marines. After approximately 30 minutes, the Spanish withdrew. 

Investigating the fate of the picket post, Neville’s Marines found 

the bullet-riddled bodies of their two comrades, the first Marine 

casualties of the battle. 

Shortly after nightfall, the Spanish were back in force. At 

about 1900, the Spanish brought rifle fire to bear against the 

Marine positions from multiple directions. Camp McCalla itself 

proved to be an easy target. A New York Journal correspondent 

reported:

The attack caught the Marines by surprise, most 

of them busy with their tents and baggage and a 

number bathing in the bay about a quarter of a 

Cdr B. H. McCalla, naval force commander for the 1885 Panama expedition and 

naval force commander for the seizure of Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He was a 

strong advocate of Marines being trained and equipped for a primary mission as 

expeditionary landing forces rather than guarding naval installations and providing ships detachments afloat. His strong opinions on the subject led to conflicts 

with Marine Corps leadership in the prewar years. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
27

mile from the camp. . . . Up from the sea came running a line of naked men, grabbing their carbines 

and falling into place as Lieutenant Colonel R. W. 

Huntington issue [sic] his orders, getting a formation below the brow of the hill, and waiting to see 

how much forces would develop against him. . . . 

After a while a charge was ordered down the hill. 

There was no fun in this for naked men but they 

held their places and charged with the others.54

The First Marine Battalion journal records five separate 

small attacks on the camp between nightfall and midnight, and 

54 Larry Daley, contr., “The Taking of Guantanamo,” Spanish American War Centennial Website, accessed 1 August 2016. 

a larger attack with heavy supporting fire coming from the south 

and southwest at 0100.55 The tentage area of the camp received 

heavy fire from multiple directions during this period. When the 

early morning attack commenced, Stephen Crane was on his way 

to see the battalion surgeon, Dr. John Blair Gibbs, with whom he 

had established a friendship. He wrote,

I went in search of Gibbs, but I soon gave over 

in active search for the more congenial occupation of lying flat and feeling the hot hiss of the 

bullets trying to cut my hair. For the moment I 

was no longer a cynic. I was a child who, in a fit 

of ignorance, had jumped into the vat of war.56 

As Crane lay prone to escape the bullets passing through the 

tents in large numbers, Crane’s friend Dr. Gibbs was breathing 

his last. Several eyewitnesses reported that “Dr. Gibbs had just 

risen from his camp chair, and walking to the door of his tent and 

stretching his arms, said: ‘Well, I don’t want to die in this place.’ ” 

These were the last words he spoke as a bullet struck him in the 

temple.57

The fighting during the night of 11–12 June can best be described as a series of probing and harassing attacks. The Spanish 

kept consistent pressure on the Marine outposts, while bypassing 

them with small groups to bring the main Marine defensive positions under fire. In a post-battle letter to his parents, Second 

Lieutenant Melville J. Shaw describes the all-night action on the 

eleventh as he led a 25-man detachment from Company D on 

outpost duty far in front of the battalion’s right flank:

I was attacked toward evening and driven back 

several hundred yards by a demoralizing fire from 

the hills and bush, but I rallied my men and we 

deployed through the bush, and soon worked our 

way back to our original position. We held this for 

an hour or more and were masters of the situation. 

. . . At about seven o’clock, Lieut. [Lewis C.] Lucas 

of Co. C came out from camp with two squads, 

sixteen men, deployed on each side of the road. It 

is to his excellent scouting and judgment that we 

owe our escape. For his men found that we would 

soon be surrounded completely by three times our 

number, and it was at the critical moment he gave 

the order for us to cut our way back to camp.58 

55 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 8.

56 Daley, “The Taking of Guantanamo.”

57 Daley, “The Taking of Guantanamo.”

58 2dLt Melville Shaw, letter to his father, 29 June 1898, Spanish-American War 

papers, folder 1 of 5, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Hand-drawn map of Guantánamo Bay. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

The cruiser USS Marblehead (C 11), commanded by Cdr B. H. McCalla.

Naval History and Heritage Command
28

In this all-night sequence of back-and-forth maneuvering and 

exchanging fire with Spanish forces, Lieutenant Shaw’s detachment 

would suffer no casualties, which was illustrative of the true nature 

and lack of intensity of the fighting on the night of 11–12 June.

The main response of the Marines to Spanish pressure 

was a high volume of return fire at ill-defined or unconfirmed 

targets. In his 1899 post-war lectures at the Naval War College, 

McCalla would point out what he considered a lack of fire discipline by the Marines, contending that the battalion expended 

45,000 rounds in the first night’s fighting.59 According to Lieutenant Colonel Huntington’s post-operations reports, it appeared 

[as] if ammunition was being wasted for it was 

impossible to see anyone to fire at, so great 

was the darkness. But we all became satisfied 

afterwards that the cartridges were well expended 

for it convinced the enemy that we were well 

provided with ammunition and prevented him 

from attempting to get anywhere near us or in 

fact to show himself in the small open space to 

our front.60

Sporadic attacks continued on the Marine positions until 

near daybreak. For Huntington, the early morning of 12 June 

proved to be a period of reflection and doubt regarding the viability of his position and his ability to maintain it. Huntington 

and Major Henry C. Cochrane (battalion executive officer) discussed the situation, and Cochrane recommended repositioning 

the battalion closer to the shore using the hilltop as a fortified 

outpost.61 Huntington conferred separately with some of the 

company commanders who were in the immediate area and then 

informed Cochrane he was going to the Marblehead to confer with 

Commander McCalla. Cochrane was later shocked to discover 

that Captains Russell and Spicer had already relayed to Huntington that it was their belief that the position was untenable and 

the battalion should be withdrawn. Cochrane would later learn 

that his commander’s purpose in meeting with McCalla was to 

recommend the battalion be withdrawn.62

Huntington found McCalla aboard the Texas, where the two 

had what could only be described as a far-less-than-congenial 

professional exchange of ideas. McCalla flatly and vociferously 

rejected Huntington’s proposal to consider withdrawing the Marines: “Leave this camp? No sir, that camp is named for me. Never, my family would suffer. You were put there to hold the hill and 

you’ll stay there. If you are killed, I’ll come out and get your dead 

59 McCalla, “Lessons of the Late War.”

60 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 73–74. 61 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 71. 62 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 71.

The USS Yankee (1892) supported the initial operations to secure Guantánamo 

Bay by driving the Spanish off their positions on Fisherman’s Point. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

The USS Oregon (BB 3), the most modern battleship in the U.S. Navy at the outbreak of the war. The Oregon’s Marine detachment under Capt Mancil C. Goodrell 

of the USS New York made the initial landing on Fisherman’s Point on 10 June. 

The Oregon is most famous for its transit from California around South America 

to Florida to reinforce Adm Sampson’s forces blockading Cuba in the opening 

days of the war. The voyage of the Oregon became a driving argument for the 

eventual construction of the Panama Canal.

Naval History and Heritage Command
29

body.”63 One can easily make the case that McCalla’s concern for 

his family’s reputation had no relevance in this discussion, but 

his position was clear and unambiguous. The Marines were there 

to stay. A thoroughly rebuked Huntington returned to shore.

What caused a man of Lieutenant Colonel Huntington’s 

years of experience to seemingly lose heart in the ability to accomplish his mission after what, in his own personal combat experience, would be described as a series of brisk skirmishes is 

a mystery. There were no instances during the night when the 

Spanish mustered anything resembling a concerted effort to 

bring any of the Marine elements into a decisive engagement. 

The total Marine casualties of four dead and two wounded attests to that. Huntington certainly was no coward. There were 

numerous eyewitness accounts of his presence during the night 

at multiple points of danger in which he exhibited a cool, calm 

demeanor under fire.

Huntington later recorded, “I do not know why I did not 

expect a night attack for we had a flurry in the P.M. and two 

63 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 71.

men were really assassinated.”64 Huntington’s failure to seriously 

consider the possibility of the Spanish conducting night attacks 

on 11 June seems to have left him in a state of surprise by the unanticipated actions of his adversary. As commanders often have 

done in that situation, Huntington second-guessed his decisions 

and exhibited a lack of confidence in the plan of operations. 

His recommendation to extract the battalion in reaction to the 

Spanish attacks brings to mind the well-known quote of General 

Alexander A. Vandegrift, 18th Commandant: “Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably 

because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position 

cannot be held.”65

Immediately upon his return to shore, Huntington proceeded to rectify some of the tactical shortcomings inherent in his 

position. Tents were taken down and relocated toward the base 

of the hill. Those that were too bullet riddled to save were piled 

up in front of trenches now being dug on the top of the hill to 

fortify the position. Up until that point, only one of the 3-inch 

64 Coletta, Bowman Hendry McCalla, 9. 65 Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1 (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997), 1. 

Stephen Crane

Stephen Crane (1 November 1871–5 June 1900) was an 

American novelist recognized by modern critics as one of 

the most innovative writers of his generation. He is best 

known for his groundbreaking Civil War novel The Red Badge 

of Courage: An Episode of the American Civil War (1895).

On 10 June 1898, Crane went ashore with the Marines 

in Guantánamo Bay as a war correspondent for Joseph 

Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s 

New York Journal. He accompanied the Marines during the 

action at Cuzco Well on 14 June, volunteering his services as 

a messenger and aide. He was recognized by the Marines for 

his “material aid in the fighting.”1 His eyewitness accounts 

of the First Marine Battalion in action at Guantánamo Bay 

were captured in several published accounts that covered 

events such as the death of battalion surgeon Gibbs, the 

fighting at Cuzco Well, and two separate articles describing 

the bravery of Marine signalmen under fire. 

1 W.A.M. Goode, With Sampson Through the War: Being an Account of the Naval 

Operations of the North Atlantic Squadron during the Spanish American War of 

1898 (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899), 296.

Journalist and novelist Stephen Crane. 

Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Libraries 
30

Hotchkiss guns had been unloaded, and it had seen little action 

for fear of hitting their own outposts. The other three guns were 

brought ashore that morning. Several newspaper correspondents 

did more than just cover the battle—they assisted with the camp 

fortifications. The Chicago Tribune’s H. J. Whigham observed, “We 

found the Marines so weary that we all turned in to help carry 

supplies to the camp. . . . We also helped to get two three-inch 

field guns to the top of the hill.”66 The lack of mules to move the 

guns was now having an impact.

As actions on Fisherman’s Point began to take on a more serious tone for the Marines, there was no shortage of willing volunteers to help. Lieutenant Cyrus S. Radford, a member of the 

Marine Corps detachment on board the Texas, requested permission to take the ship’s 41 Marines ashore to render assistance to 

Huntington’s battalion. Permission was granted, and the Marines 

were ordered to board boats for Camp McCalla. They would 

bring with them two Colt machine guns, doubling the number of 

those weapons at Huntington’s disposal. Additionally, the ship’s 

chaplain, Harry W. Jones, volunteered to go ashore to assist with 

the dead and wounded.

Upon arrival, Chaplin Jones found himself standing next to 

Lieutenant Colonel Huntington and presiding over the burial service for Dr. Gibbs and Privates Dumphy and McColgan. As the 

burial detail under the direct eye of Huntington stood at parade 

rest, Chaplain Jones recalled, 

I took out my Bible, and was about to commence 

the service when I heard a whistle. Turning to the 

Colonel, I said: “Sir, what is it?” thinking he had 

whistled. He said: “Nothing.” I said: “I thought 

I heard a whistle, sir.” He said: “No, Chaplain, I 

did not whistle; that was a Mauser [rifle] bullet; 

we are [being] attacked.”67

66 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers.

67 Rev Harry Jones (USN), A Chaplain’s Experience Ashore and Afloat: The Texas under 

Fire (New York: A. G. Sherwood, 1901), 202.

Fisherman’s Point and the initial landing site of the Marine battalion. The top of 

this prominent hill was the location of Camp McCalla. 

Library of Congress

A rare action photo showing the smoke from the Marines burning the huts and 

other structures on Fisherman’s Point on 10 June 1898.

Library of Congress

LtCol Huntington and SgtMaj Henry Good at Camp McCalla. SgtMaj Good was 

killed in action on the night of 12 June 1898. 

Library of Congress
31

Jones quickly found cover by joining several Marines who 

were in the act of returning fire against the Spanish from a nearby shallow trench. In a very short space of time, the chaplain 

noticed that Huntington and the burial detail were still standing 

at parade rest by the grave site. The somewhat chagrined Jones 

dusted himself off and returned to Huntington’s side, where the 

Marine commander asked, 

“Chaplain, do you feel like continuing the service?” I said: “Yes, sir, with your permission.” 

Then he said: “Go ahead.” So, taking my place 

where I had stood a few moments before, I commenced the service, and was just uttering the 

words: “Man that is born of woman—” when 

up rushed three Marines with one of our Colt’s 

automatic guns, and some others with a threeinch field piece, planting them on either side of 

me, and all through the service those two guns 

seemed to chant the prayers with me.68

The conclusion of the burial service was not the end of 

Chaplain Jones’s adventures that day. As he was walking to the 

beach to return to the Texas, he was accompanied by two news 

correspondents whose names he recorded only as Coffin and 

Duaide. As bullets whistled by their heads, Coffin suggested they 

make a run for the boats as “my name is altogether too appropriate for this business.”69

Additional reinforcements arrived as a detachment of Marines and bluejackets (sailors) from the Marblehead came ashore 

and were placed in support of Company D on the right flank. 

Approximately 60 Cuban insurgents under the command of 

Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Thomas landed to assist the Marines. 

The insurgents brought much more to the battalion than many 

had supposed. Their knowledge of the area and extensive experience in fighting the Spanish made them invaluable as scouts and 

advisors to the Marines.

During the afternoon, many Marines were allowed to go 

down to the beach to wash. Shortly after a large number of naked 

Marines were in the water, the Spanish opened long-range rifle 

fire on the beach area. The fire proved intense enough to quickly 

end any desire for swimming and washing. Naked men scrambled 

out of the water to grab clothing and weapons, seeking cover 

wherever they could find it.

Sporadic firing continued through the day with groups of 

Spanish bringing Marine positions under fire and the Marines responding with heavy return fire. The 3-inch guns were employed 

68 Jones, A Chaplain’s Experience Ashore and Afloat, 202. 69 Jones, A Chaplain’s Experience Ashore and Afloat, 202.

frequently in the afternoon with good effect in dispersing groups 

of enemy soldiers. The battle was still predominantly an outpost 

fight between small groups without any sustained engagements. 

The battalion journal recorded the fighting on the night of 12 

June as “many persistent and trifling attacks . . . in reply to which 

we used a good deal of ammunition.”70

The most significant action that day occurred after dark on 

the battalion’s far right flank. First Lieutenant Neville of Company D was in charge of an outpost of approximately 50 men. To 

his front, the Spaniards had occupied what was described as the 

ruins of an old Spanish stone fort on the east shoreline of the 

bay, west of Neville’s position. From this area, the Spanish were 

able to bring fire on the battalion logistics area along the beach 

and the main Marine position on the hilltop. Neville maneuvered 

his men forward and assaulted the fort. The Spanish were forced 

out of the position, leaving 15 dead behind.71 The Marines of 

Company D who held that position throughout the night under 

what they described as “almost constant fire” certainly did not 

see their action as trifling.72

That night, a major shortcoming in Huntington’s defensive 

scheme was revealed. As Navy ships moved up and down the 

shore attempting to acquire targets with searchlights and bring 

fire to bear in support of the Marines, it became clear that the 

Navy did not know where the Marine positions were actually 

located. Around midnight, in an attempt to engage the Spanish 

forces taking Neville’s outpost under fire (Lieutenant Neville 

already occupied the old stone fort), the Marblehead put half a 

dozen 6-inch shells on the Marine position. As Private Keeler 

recorded, “a shell passed so near that the wind from it took off 

my hat. . . . The exploding shell sent scrapnel [sic] in amongst us. 

One of our men was struck.”73

The Marine signalmen on the hill at Camp McCalla ordered 

the ships to cease fire. Commander McCalla sent men ashore 

from the Marblehead to determine the exact location of the Marine positions, but there would be no more close fire support 

from naval gunfire that night. McCalla came ashore himself in 

the morning to apologize for the close call, explaining that he had 

no idea the Marine outposts were so far forward of the camp.74

Signalmen atop the hill of Camp McCalla kept continuous 

communications flowing between the Marines and the ships off 

shore. This was particularly dangerous work at night when the 

Spanish were able to work close enough to the Marine position to 

70 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 9.

71 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1899, 72. 72 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 9.

73 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 15. 74 J. F. Holden-Rhodes, Smart and Faithful Force: Henry Clay Cochrane and the United 

States Marines Corps, 1861–1905 (Tucson, AZ: Fireship Press, 2012), 24.
32

bring the hilltop under accurate fire. The signalmen used lanterns 

to signal the ships at sea, making them prime targets for Spanish 

snipers. Stephen Crane was impressed with the cool heroism of 

these Marines and stayed close to their station at night as they 

performed their vital mission. He wrote,

How, in the name of wonders, those four men 

at Camp McCalla were not riddled from head 

to foot and sent home more as repositories of 

Spanish ammunition than as marines is beyond 

all comprehension. To make a confession—when 

one of these men stood to wave his lantern, 

I lying in the trench, invariably rolled a little 

to the right or left, in order that, when he was 

shot, he would not fall on me. . . . Whenever the 

adjutant, Lieutenant [Herbert L.] Draper, came 

plunging along throughout the darkness with an 

order such as: “Ask the Marblehead to please 

shell the woods to the left”—my heart would 

come in to my mouth for I knew then that one 

of my pals was going to stand up behind the 

lanterns and have all of Spain shoot at him. The 

answer was always upon the instant: Yes, sir.75

In the major action of the night around the stone fort, the 

Marine casualties included one killed and four wounded. The single Marine who was killed was Private Goode Taurman. He was 

reported as missing at role call the next morning. It was soon discovered that he had been shot during the night and fell from the 

cliff into the sea, where his body was recovered that morning by a 

Navy launch. The other significant casualty for the battalion that 

night was the death of Sergeant Major Henry Good, killed while 

directing the return fire of Marines in Company C. 

The Spanish again opened an attack on Marine positions on 

13 June at 0800. It was “subdued without loss or difficulty.”76 The 

remainder of the day would prove to be quite uneventful as compared to the previous two days. This gave Huntington a respite to 

confer with his officers and address what needed to be done. The 

major concern weighing on Huntington was that constant harassment by the Spanish was taking a toll on the physical stamina of 

his men. Although casualties had been relatively light, most of his 

battalion had been without any significant rest for more than 48 

hours. In a letter to his wife on 19 June, Huntington wrote, “This 

kind of thing had gone on for three days and had it not been for 

the Cubans might be going on now.”77

The Cuban insurgents who had joined the battalion on 

75 Daley, “The Taking of Guantanamo.”

76 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 9.

77 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers.

11 June now showed their real value. They possessed in-depth 

knowledge of the local area and solid intelligence on how the 

Spanish were operating. This information was a critically important element in the future course of the battle. Lieutenant Colonel 

Thomas, the leader of the insurgents attached to the battalion, 

informed Huntington that the Spanish forces operating in the 

area were approximately 500 strong and utilizing a point known 

as Cuzco Well as a base from which to launch attacks against the 

Marines. The Spanish base was less than five miles southeast of 

Camp McCalla across a chain of hills. The Cubans contended 

that the water supply at Cuzco was essential to sustaining enemy 

operations in the area, as this was the only source of drinking 

water for Spanish forces south of Caimanera. The Cubans recommended an offensive strike at Cuzco to destroy the well, the 

loss of which would force the Spanish to withdraw to Caimanera, 

thus relieving the pressure on the Marine position. Huntington 

accepted the recommendation and made the decision that evening to go on the offensive to destroy the Spanish base. 

Huntington developed his plan to strike at Cuzco the following morning. The Spanish did not harass the Marines that night, 

giving them a much-needed rest and allowing Huntington time 

to focus on finalizing his plan of attack. The Marine advance on 

Cuzco on 14 June proved to be the decisive engagement in the 

Guantánamo Bay operation. 

Cuzco Well

Huntington’s decision to go on the offensive on the morning of 

14 June is in marked contrast to his state of mind just 48 hours 

earlier when he proposed evacuating the Marines from Fisherman’s Point. The arrival of the Cubans under Lieutenant Colonel 

Thomas most certainly helped to lift some of the fog of war 

regarding the enemy. With the Cubans’ firsthand knowledge of 

the area and up-to-date intelligence on the dispositions and capabilities of the Spanish forces to his immediate front, Huntington 

now had a much clearer picture of his situation. 

Logically, Huntington only had two courses of action to 

consider. On one hand, he could choose to remain on the defensive. To stay on the defensive would surrender initiative to the 

Spanish, who had so far used that initiative to effectively keep 

the Marines pinned down in a nearly continuous firefight. In the 

72-plus hours that had passed since the Marines landed, the battalion’s total casualties had been relatively light, with five killed 

and six wounded. But this period had also been physically taxing 

on Huntington’s men with continuous alerts and little or no rest. 

Huntington knew he could not continue to operate this way indefinitely. The Spanish also had the luxury of employing what 

force they needed to harass the Marines and resting others, while 

Huntington’s Marines, in their constricted battlespace, could 
33

not do the same. Staying on the defensive would also allow the 

Spanish to pick and choose the time to possibly bring significant 

reinforcements south from Caimanera in an attempt to destroy 

the landing force. On the other hand, the Marines had an ample 

amount of naval gunfire support available to offset disparities 

in numbers, but this advantage was negated during the hours of 

darkness.

Huntington’s second alternative was to attack. Taking the offensive had its risks, but also the potential for significant rewards 

as well. If the single source of water for the Spanish forces in 

the area could be destroyed, this would eliminate the immediate 

Spanish threat to the Marines and their landing area. The major 

problem Huntington faced in launching an offensive was his need 

to provide an adequate force to protect the landing area, which 

in turn limited the amount of combat power he could employ in 

any attack. If the Cuban intelligence on the size of the Spanish 

forces operating in the Cuzco area was accurate, Huntington’s assault force would be facing a numerically superior Spanish force 

defending their base. Huntington’s major asymmetric advantage 

over his adversary was naval gunfire. As long as the Marines were 

operating close to shore, they possessed the potential to employ 

a powerful fire support asset that the Spanish had no ability to 

counter. 

Huntington chose to go immediately on the offensive to destroy the Spanish base at Cuzco Well and eliminate the enemy’s 

ability to sustain themselves in the area. He quickly finalized his 

plans with execution scheduled for the morning of 14 June. The 

main assault force consisted of Companies C and D under the 

overall command of Captain Elliott, the Company C commander. The two companies would total 160 Marines augmented with 

three Colt machine gun crews and 50 Cubans. Colonel Alfredo 

Laborde of the Cuban Army was also present but had no command.78 Laborde had served as a pilot for the Marblehead during 

the initial operations in Guantánamo Bay, and had come ashore 

with the Marines on 11 June to act as an advisor.

The USS Dolphin was assigned to provide fire support for the 

assault force. With all the firepower available from the fleet at this 

time, the extent of naval gunfire support assigned for this critical 

Marine operation was an aged dispatch boat, one of the original 

four White Squadron ships of 1884, which had marked the start 

of the Navy’s modern ship building program. Still, the Dolphin

mounted a main armament of two 4-inch main guns as well as 

four smaller Hotchkiss rapid fire guns of 2- and 3-inch caliber 

which was still a significant amount of firepower.

Stephen Crane was given permission to accompany Elliott’s 

assault force. Elliott had originally declined to take an additional 

78 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 294–96. 

officer along as adjutant, but upon learning that Crane would be 

with them he requested Crane act as an aide if necessary. Crane 

accepted, and in Elliott’s report of the battle he mentioned that 

the correspondent was “of material aid during the action, carrying messages to fire volleys, etc., to the different company commanders.”79

The plan called for Elliott’s route to Cuzco to utilize a coastal 

path through the old Spanish stone fort that had been the scene 

of Lieutenant Neville’s all-night action on 12 June. His column 

would then proceed along the coast to what is now known as 

Windward Point, where the column would have to cross over 

steep ridges directly toward Cuzco Well, which was situated in a 

narrow valley near the shore. The Dolphin would keep pace on the 

flank in case its naval gunfire support was needed. 

In addition to the main assault force, Huntington established 

three platoon-size outposts of approximately 50 men each to 

screen the Marine position at Fisherman’s Point and to be prepared to reinforce Elliott if required. On the right flank was a platoon from Company B under First Lieutenant Clarence L. Ingate. 

Ingate’s platoon was to screen along the coast and link up with 

Elliott’s force when it passed, taking orders from Elliott from 

that point forward. First Lieutenant James Mahoney was assigned 

to hold the trail crossing (referred to as the crossroads) south of 

Camp McCalla with a platoon of his own Company E. Second 

Lieutenant Louis J. Magill’s platoon of Company A established an 

outpost northeast of Mahoney’s position. 

The assault force assembled at 0730 on 14 June in the logistics area along the beach, where final equipment inspections 

were held before moving out. At 0800, the Spanish made another 

attack on the battalion that was easily beaten back and that had 

no effect on the preparations of Elliott’s force. At 0900, Elliott’s 

column commenced its movement. Thomas’s 50 Cubans were in 

the lead, followed by Company C and then D. The three Colt machine guns were with Company C near the head of the column. 

The first thing to go awry in Huntington’s plan was the failure of Lieutenant Ingate to make contact with Elliott’s force. Ingate was on his first mission outside the battalion’s main defenses 

and he seemed to be lacking navigation skills. He failed to get to 

his assigned position on time and consequently missed the linkup 

with Elliott’s marching column. Ingate would eventually make his 

way back to the main defensive area and report his failure to meet 

Elliott about the time the fighting at Cuzco commenced. 

At a point approximately halfway to his objective, Captain 

Elliott detached First Lieutenant Lewis C. Lucas with a platoon 

of Marines and half the Cubans in a swing through the mountains to the left of the column, in an attempt to cut off the ene79 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 296. 
34

my pickets and prevent the Spanish from being warned of their 

approach. Elliott noted in his battle report, “In this we failed, 

and our force was discovered by the Spanish outposts, which retreated immediately and gave the alarm to the main body.”80 As 

the Spanish pickets rapidly retreated toward Cuzco Well, Elliott’s 

main force was right on their heels.

At this point, Elliott’s force and the Spanish main body were 

separated by an unoccupied high hill. Elliott rapidly pushed his 

force up the hill, looking to gain a positional advantage. The physical exertion of the march in the intense heat was taking a toll on 

the Marines. Men were succumbing to the heat, including Captain 

Spicer, commander of Company D. As a member of Company 

D looked up at the hill looming before him, he exclaimed, “We 

never will get up there.” His platoon leader, First Lieutenant Neville responded, “No you won’t if you stand there and look at it.”81

The opening minutes of the battle had come down to a 

race to seize the key terrain, with the Marines climbing the west 

side of the hill and the Spanish the eastern slope. The Marines 

of Company C and their Cuban allies won the race to the top 

by the slimmest of margins. They immediately began pouring 

deadly fire at the Spanish, forcing them back down into the 

valley. Elliott’s decision to place the Colt machine guns forward in the column now paid huge dividends. Private Keeler 

of Company D would attest, “It was the machine guns that 

held back the enemy until all the Americans were up and in the 

80 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 294. 81 Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines, 16.

fight.”82 Elliott’s force had not only gained the key terrain but 

had immediately established fire superiority over his adversary.

The hill that Elliott’s Marines now controlled was described 

as a horseshoe-shaped ridge encircling two-thirds of a small valley, with Cuzco Well at the open end of the shoe on the valley 

floor. Within minutes of seizing the ridge, Lieutenant Lucas arrived from his cross-mountain march, having already lost nine 

men as heat casualties. Lucas deployed his 32 Marines and 25 Cubans into position and extended the left flank of the line to the 

north. Shortly after Elliott’s force was fully arrayed on the ridge, 

Lieutenant Magill of Company A arrived from the north and 

occupied the far left of the ridgeline beyond Lieutenant Lucas’s 

left flank. Magill had established his 50-man outpost that morn82 Clifford, History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines, 16.

The bodies of Pvts James McColgan and William Dumphy and the battalion surgeon, Dr. John Blair Gibbs, lying under tarps and awaiting burial on the morning 

of 12 June 1898 at Camp McCalla.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

The temporary graves of Gibbs, Dumphy, and McColgen. This was the site where 

Chaplain Harry W. Jones and LtCol Huntington presided over the burial service 

under fire on the morning of 12 June 1898. 

Library of Congress

The First Marine Battalion scheme of maneuver against the Spanish at Cuzco 

Well, 14 June 1898.

Courtesy of the author
35

ing not far to the northwest of Cuzco Well. When the battle was 

joined, Lieutenant Magill marched on his own initiative toward 

the sounds of the guns (capturing an intact Spanish heliograph 

station on the way) and arrived in an ideal position to put the 

Spanish forces around the well in a cross fire. 

The fight had settled into a long-range exchange of fire at 

600–800 yards. The Marines’ positional advantage forced the 

Spanish into cover around the well and a wooden blockhouse. As 

the Marine fire took a toll, the return fire from the Spanish grew 

more sporadic and ineffective. Elliott noted in his battle report: 

By the use of glasses and careful search by the 

men, individuals were discovered and fire being 

opened upon them, they would break from 

cover to cover and we were thus enabled to gain 

targets at which to fire. . . . Many of the men 

fired as coolly as at target practice, consulting 

with each other and their officers as to range.83

Having clearly established fire superiority over the Spanish forces, 

Elliott decided it was time to conclude the fight by bringing naval 

gunfire to bear on the enemy position.

Captain Elliott called for a signalman, and Private John 

Fitzgerald twisted around from where he lay in a prone firing 

position and saluted, acknowledging that he was a signalman. 

Fitzgerald acquired some cloth that would suffice as a makeshift 

signal flag and attached it to the end of his rifle. He positioned 

himself slightly below the crest of the hill away from the enemy 

and wig-wagged the message to the Dolphin. It soon became clear 

that with the ridge as a backdrop, Fitzgerald and his flag could 

83 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 295.

not be seen by the Dolphin. The signalman now repositioned himself on the crest of the hill where he was clearly visible to both 

the Dolphin and the Spanish.84 As Stephen Crane later recorded:

As soon as the Spaniards caught sight of this 

silhouette, they let go like mad at it . . . the 

situation demanded that he face the sea and 

turn his back to the Spanish bullets. This was a 

hard game, mark you—to stand with the small 

of your back to volley firing. . . . We all cleared 

out of his neighbourhood [sic]. If he wanted sole 

possession of any particular spot on that hill, he 

could have it.85

Private Fitzgerald stoically stood to his post until his message was sent and an acknowledgment was received from the Dolphin. He then dropped to the ground and returned fire with the 

makeshift flag still affixed to the end of his rifle. 

The message Private Fitzgerald had delivered requested 

that the Dolphin open fire on the blockhouse and the immediate area surrounding it, where the Spanish were taking cover. The Dolphin opened fire and “the first shell went wide of 

its mark, but the second struck the block-house and it flew a 

part like a fire-cracker [sic].”86 As the 4-inch shells from the Dolphin landed on their positions, the Spanish were clearly faced 

with two distinct but undesirable choices. First, try to hold 

onto their position, which was rapidly becoming untenable; or 

second, run a gauntlet of fire in an attempt to escape the valley. Whether by command or spontaneous reaction, many 

of the Spanish chose the latter. Crane described the scene:

Then the quality of the battle suddenly changed 

with the shout of: There they go! See ’em! See 

’em! Unable to withstand the pelting bullets 

longer, the Spaniards broke from the cover of 

the manigua (bush) and began running . . . the 

battle became a “most extraordinary game—of 

trapshooting—and coveys of guerrillas got up in 

bunches of five or six and flew frantically up the 

opposite hillside.”87

It was now approximately 1400 as the Spanish began a 

“straggling retreat” to get out of the valley.88 The Marines kept up 

a controlled deliberate fire on the retreating Spanish. Officers were 

84 Stephen Crane, Wounds in the Rain: A Collection of Stories Relating to the SpanishAmerican War of 1898 (London: Methuen, 1900), 185–86. 85 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 186. 86 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 18. 87 Daley, “The Taking of Guantanamo.”

88 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 295.

One of the Marine signalmen at Camp McCalla. Several Marines of the battalion 

were trained as signalmen and kept communication flowing between Camp McCalla and ships in the bay. The signalmen used flags by day and lanterns after dark. 

Library of Congress
36

directing volley fire at target areas beyond the ranges at which the 

average rifleman could hit a point target but “where large bodies 

of the enemy could be seen.”89 The Marines delivered controlled 

volleys, saturating the target area with bullets. According to 

Private Keeler, “We set our sights on the rifles at 1,200 yards 

and fired volley after volley.”90 By all eyewitness accounts, the 

Marines’ long-range fire was very effective. The technique of 

controlled volley fire at extended ranges had been a key part 

of Lieutenant Colonel Huntington’s battalion training regimen 

aboard the Panther and at Key West. This training now paid off.

The Dolphin’s fire had an immediate significant effect on the 

enemy, but it also produced some unintended consequences. Due 

to the limitations of communication, closely coordinating actions 

on the ground with the ship offshore was tremendously difficult. The Dolphin had moved father up the coast to the east than 

was desirable. Now, instead of firing across the front of the Marine positions, the Dolphin’s gun target line was pointed straight 

at Lieutenant Magill’s position on the far left flank. As some of 

the ship’s rounds impacted on the ridge to his front, Magill was 

forced to disengage and withdraw his platoon to the back side of 

the ridge for protection. 

Captain Elliott now recognized that the critical moment of 

the battle was at hand. He sent orders to Magill to launch an 

attack down the valley to his front and drive the Spanish toward 

the coast. Elliott was no longer just looking to drive the Spanish 

out of their position; he now thought he might bag the entire lot 

of them. Before he could put Magill in motion, Elliott needed to 

get the Dolphin to cease fire. Once again, the call went down the 

line for a signalman, and Sergeant John Quick stood up. Stephen 

Crane again described the scene: 

He produced from somewhere a blue polka-dot 

neckerchief as large as a quilt. He tied it on a 

long, crooked stick. Then he went to the top of 

the ridge, and turning his back to the Spanish 

fire, began to signal to the Dolphin. Again we 

gave a man sole possession of a particular part 

of the ridge. We didn’t want it. He could have it 

and welcome. If the young sergeant had had the 

smallpox, the cholera, and the yellow fever, we 

could not have slid out with more celerity.91

The Dolphin received the message and ceased its bombardment. Lieutenant Magill was ordered forward, but for some reason the Dolphin opened fire again, once more forcing Magill to 

retreat to the lee of the ridge. In the time it took to resend the 

89 Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 295. 90 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 18. 91 Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 188.

signal and for the Dolphin to finally cease fire for good, the opportunity to capture the Spanish was lost. By the time Magill’s 

platoon swept down the valley from the north, the majority of 

the Spanish force had already fled over the hills to the northeast 

and out of the valley. 

While Elliott’s fight was in full swing, the sound of the battle was clearly audible to Huntington at Camp McCalla. WithMajGen Wendell C. Neville, future 14th Commandant of the Marine Corps, was 

a platoon commander in Company D. He had to take command of the company 

during the fight at Cuzco Well after Capt William F. Spicer succumbed to the heat 

on the march to the battlefield.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Some of LtCol Enrique Thomas’s Cuban insurgents who reinforced the First 

Marine Battalion at Camp McCalla. The Cubans’ knowledge of the area and their 

extensive experience fighting the Spanish made them invaluable as scouts and as 

a source of intelligence. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
37

out any knowledge of how the fight at Cuzco was progressing, 

Huntington decided to send Elliott reinforcements. Lieutenant 

Ingate, who had reported from his failure to link up with Elliott 

as planned that morning, was ordered to take his 50 Marines and 

join with Lieutenant Mahoney’s 50-man outpost at the crossroads 

and then for the combined force to move to Elliott’s aid. Even 

though Mahoney’s location was only about a mile forward of the 

main defensive line, Lieutenant Ingate again failed to get to his 

assigned position on time. Mahoney eventually moved to join Elliott without Ingate, but the delay caused him to arrive at Cuzco 

at 1600, too late to take part in the fighting.

By 1515, the fight was essentially over. Lieutenant Lucas was 

ordered to take his platoon down into the valley to the abandoned 

Spanish camp to destroy the well and anything else that might be 

of use to the Spanish. This was quickly accomplished. Unfortunately, most Marines had emptied their canteens, and the lack of 

water was now a major issue for Elliott’s force. Elliott ensured 

that the officers stuck to Huntington’s policy on clean water and 

protecting the health of the men. Private Keeler recalled, “We 

destroyed their well of fresh water. Although nearly dying for a 

drink, our officers would not allow us to touch a drop of it. We 

had to wait until they could send some from the U.S.S. Dolphin.”92

 The Cubans under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas were 

pushed beyond the valley to provide security for Lucas’s Marines 

while they were engaged in the destruction of the Spanish camp. 

The final action of the battle was a short engagement between 

Thomas’s Cubans and guerrillas (Cubans loyal to Spain) in which 

Thomas’s men suffered two killed and two wounded while killing 

five guerrillas. 

The end results of the fight at Cuzco could not have been 

more lopsided. The total casualties for Elliott’s force in the main 

battle was only three wounded (one Marine and two Cubans). 

One of the wounded Cubans was actually shot by Colonel Laborde, who multiple witnesses attested was wildly firing his pistol 

during the entire engagement. The greatest number of casualties 

for Elliott’s force occurred in the short follow-on fight between 

the Cubans and guerrillas in which the Cubans lost two killed and 

two wounded. Ultimately, the largest cause of casualties for the 

Marines on this day was the oppressive temperature. Approximately a dozen Marines were heat casualties, including Captain 

Spicer, the Company D commander. The Marines took 18 Spanish prisoners, including a lieutenant. The total Spanish casualties 

92 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 18.

George Frank Elliott

George Frank Elliott was born in Eutaw, Alabama, on 30 November 

1846. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point 

in 1870 and was appointed as a second lieutenant of Marines. As a 

junior officer, he served in duty assignments at seven different Marine 

barracks and on five ships detachments. He was the fleet Marine 

officer on the USS Baltimore (C 3) when the ship was sent to China 

to guard American interests during the war between Japan and China.

During a strike of railway employees of the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad, Elliott was detached with a Marine guard to protect and 

defend the property of the railroad. In 1885, he was with the Marine 

battalion sent to the Isthmus of Panama.

In April 1898, Elliott was assigned to the First Marine Battalion 

and landed at Guantánamo Bay as commander of Company C, where 

he distinguished himself in the battle of Cuzco Well. In 1899, he 

commanded the Second Marine Battalion in the Philippines, eventually 

commanding the 1st Marine Brigade (comprising the First and Second 

Battalion of Marines). 

In October 1903, he became the first Marine officer promoted to 

the permanent rank of brigadier general and assigned as 10th Commandant of the Marine Corps, relieving Colonel Charles Heywood. George F. Elliott, future 10th Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, commanded Company C of the First Marine Battalion at 

Guantánamo Bay. He led the offensive strike against the Spanish 

at Cuzco Well, which proved to be the decisive engagement of 

the Guantánamo Bay operation. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Source: BGen George Frank Elliott biographical file, 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division.
38

were 60 killed and an estimated 150 wounded. The Spanish base 

and its associated water supply was completely destroyed. 

By 1730, Elliott had moved all of his casualties (heat related 

and wounded) to the Dolphin, had resupplied his men with fresh 

water from the ship, and had his prisoners ready to move. The 

return march to Camp McCalla was completed by 2000 without 

incident. That evening, for the first time since the landing on 10 

June, the Marines enjoyed a hot meal and an uninterrupted night’s 

rest. On 17 June, in his report on the Guantánamo Bay operations to Colonel Heywood, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

Huntington gave the Cubans credit for planning the operation, 

but also noted that it was “the coolness, skill, and bravery of our 

officers and men, by which alone its success was achieved.”93

Final Operations

The morning of 15 June offered the first quiet and peaceful dawn 

since the Marines landed on Fisherman’s Point five days before. 

The First Marine Battalion journal entries for that day were in 

stark contrast to those preceding: “The usual pickets and patrols 

were posted. This day was devoted to obtaining a much needed 

rest. No alarms were given.”94

On 15 June, the Marines had a stadium-like view of ongoing 

naval actions in Guantánamo Bay. At this point, Commander 

McCalla decided it was time to move his ships up the bay to 

destroy the fortifications on Cayo del Toro that protected the 

channels leading to Caimanera. Assuming that the channels and 

waters of the upper bay were heavily mined, on the night of 14 

June, McCalla sent a launch into the channel to sweep for mines. 

This was dangerous work, as the men in the launch had to bring 

up the mines by grappling with the mooring cables. The sweeping 

operations were less than successful. The launch penetrated the 

channel to the edge of Caimanera but was only able to locate and 

remove two mines. Undeterred, McCalla ordered the Marblehead

and the battleship Texas to move up the channel to firing positions, 

while launches, supported by the Suwannee (1897), continued to 

sweep for mines.95 

The Marines crowded the hilltop above Fisherman’s Point 

and watched the grand display of firepower as the Texas and Marblehead laid waste to the Spanish fortifications, the major damage being inflicted by the 12-inch guns of the Texas. As the two 

ships opened fire, silhouetted against a dark sky and the smoke of 

their own guns, “cheers went up from the ships as well as from 

93 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1898, 116. 94 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 10.

95 Suwannee was an old lighthouse tender that was turned over to the U.S. Navy for 

use as an auxiliary cruiser in 1897–98.

the Marines.”96 Once again the Spanish defenses were no match 

for the firepower of modern warships. The Spanish guns were 

quickly silenced and their fortifications and surrounding structures received severe damage. The only meaningful response the 

Spanish could muster came in the form of small arms fire from 

the northwest shore of the bay directed against the Navy launches that continued their mine sweeping operations. This fire was 

quickly suppressed by the guns of the Suwannee. McCalla narrowly escaped disaster when both the Texas and the Marblehead had 

their propeller shafts fouled by mine mooring cables; the mines 

failed to detonate and were quickly cleared away by the supporting launches. 

For the next 10 days, the activities of the Marines on Fisherman’s Point took on the semblance of a daily camp routine 

as the specter of combat with the Spanish and Cuban loyalists 

dissipated. Pickets and patrols were sent out during the day and 

larger outposts were established at night. During daylight, an average of 15 Marines plus Cuban scouts provided security, and 

the night outpost duty consisted of multiple outposts with up to 

75 Marines each. The recurring entry in the battalion journal for 

night security operations was “all quiet.” However, there was a 

single exception to the dull routine. When Private Robert J. Burns 

of Company C was assigned to picket duty on a dark, moonless 

night, he heard movement to his front and issued a challenge. 

When the challenge went unanswered and the movement continued, he executed his standing orders and fired in the direction 

of the noise. Daylight revealed that Private Burns had effectively 

dispatched a wild hog. 

Occasionally the Cuban scouts would report the sighting of 

or find indications of the presence of Spanish scouts near the 

outposts, but none were engaged or captured. On 18 June, the 

battalion journal noted, “The fight on the 14th inst. [14 June] 

seems to have made them (the enemy) vacate this portion of the 

country as no signs of them can be found.”97 The only exception to this was a periodic lone Spanish deserter surrendering to 

the Marines at Camp McCalla. The prisoners all came over with 

stories of not being paid for months and not having anything to 

eat for days. 

The threat of imminent combat was replaced with a more 

mundane routine of security patrols, improvement of camp defenses, and the establishment of daily drill and parade formations. Huntington expressed it in a letter home: “Things have 

gotten very structured since Elliott’s fight and all we do is to lie in 

the dirt and cut a few bushes to see a little farther from our breast 

96 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 10.

97 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo. The term inst. is an abbreviation 

for instant or instante mense (in the current month), which was commonly used to 

mean a day in the current month.
39

works.”98 The major threat to the Marines transitioned from enemy bullets to self-inflicted injury. “There has been an epidemic 

of accidents in camp,” the battalion records note, culminating 

in two Marines (Private Albert E. Halvoas of Company D and 

Private John J. Reardon of Company C) being injured by the accidental discharge of their own rifles.99

The daily routine of the camp was broken on 19 June when 

a detail of 50 Marines and 30 Cubans was formed under Lieutenant Lucas to revisit the Cuzco battlefield. This expedition was 

formed at the request of the battalion surgeon, Doctor John Edgar, for the purpose of examining Spanish dead and to document 

the casualty-producing effects of the Lee rifle. At the time, there 

were doubts expressed among certain Navy and Marine leaders 

98 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers.

99 Journal of Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 10.

as to the effectiveness and killing power of the Lee 6mm bullet 

at extended ranges. Edgar saw this as an opportunity to gather 

empirical data through firsthand examination of the enemy dead 

still on the field. Edgar was accompanied by three hospitalmen 

to assist him in his examinations of the Spanish corpses. Acton 

Davies, a correspondent for the New York Sun, also accompanied 

the group and later published a detailed account of the rather 

grisly mission.

The detail left Camp McCalla at 0900, following the same 

route that Captain Elliott’s force had taken on 14 June. The march 

was a laborious effort in the intense heat. As one would expect, 

as the column approached the area of the well and the destroyed 

blockhouse, they noted “the rocky brush covered hillsides all 

about us with the vultures circling and circling about and then 

settling out of sight. They told the story, and the scent that the 

varying winds blew down upon us from all sides only served to 

intensify the most disgusting of all of warfare’s many phases.”100

As the battalion surgeon performed his examinations, the 

Marines went souvenir hunting. The Cuban scouts had previously done a thorough job of collecting abandoned weapons and 

machetes immediately after the fight on 14 June, so the pickings 

were lean. An account of the expedition related, “One find was 

a Spanish officer’s field cot. It was much nicer than any in use 

in our army, having steel legs and steel head and foot boards. 

The marine who found it was the envy of all his comrades. They 

threw the yellow fever scare into him, but he wouldn’t drop it and 

sweated all the way back to camp with it.” 101

After examining several corpses in the area of the well and 

blockhouse, where the effect of the bullets could be seen in the 

bones and skulls of the dead, the surgeon was fully satisfied that 

the power of the Lee rifle at ranges of 700 to 800 yards was fully 

proven. Doctor Edgar’s analysis and observations would eventually be widely printed in American newspapers. The mission was 

completed in short order and there proved to be no desire by 

the group to examine bodies in the area where the main fighting 

had taken place as “the intolerable stench from the dead made it 

impossible to continue to search.”102 With the doctor’s scientific 

curiosity satisfied, Lieutenant Lucas moved his force out of this 

rather undesirable environment and back to camp McCalla, arriving shortly after 1600. 

Late in the afternoon of 20 June, the USS Resolute (1894) arrived off Fisherman’s Point and began unloading supplies for the 

100 Patrick McSherry, contr., “The First Marine Battalion Revisits the Scene of 

the Fight at Cuzco Well,” transc. by Robert Pendleton, Spanish American War 

Centennial Website, accessed 5 August 2016.

101 McSherry, “The First Marine Battalion Revisits the Scene of the Fight at Cuzco 

Well.”

102 Journal of the Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 11.

The USS Dolphin (PG 24), one of the four ships of the White Squadron built in 

1883 that started the Navy’s modernization program. A dispatch boat that was 

designed for speed to carry messages for the fleet, its 4-inch guns were used to 

good effect in supporting the Marines at Cuzco Well.

Naval History and Heritage Command

The USS Resolute (1894) was originally designated as the transport ship to carry 

the First Marine Battalion to war. It was loaded and ready for embarkation of the 

Marines when it was reassigned to other missions and replaced by the Panther. In 

the rush to transfer supplies and equipment from the Resolute to the much smaller 

Panther, some of the cargo had to be left on board the Resolute. 

Naval History and Heritage Command
40

Marines. The following day, the captain of the Panther was directed to transfer all of the battalion’s supplies, equipment, and ammunition to the Resolute. The often acrimonious and certainly less 

than satisfactory relationship between the First Marine Battalion 

and the Panther finally came to an end. The Marines were now 

supported by the larger transport that was originally designated 

to carry them to war before it had been reassigned to other missions. The Marines also were at last reunited with their campaign 

hats, which had been left on board the Resolute during the rushed 

transfer of supplies to the Panther back in April. 

After the reduction of the Spanish defenses on Cayo del 

Toro on 15 June, the Navy continued sweeping for mines in the 

channel in preparation for an eventual move up the bay to Caimanera. The only resistance the Spanish were able, or at least 

willing, to muster against the naval force was to harass the minesweeping operations and any other ships close by with small arms 

fire from the northwest shore of the bay. Although this fire was 

at most an irritant to the naval forces, it was something that Commander McCalla decided must be eliminated, and he once again 

called on Huntington and his Marines to do the job. 

Contrary to the very ad hoc activities that typified the Marine landing at Fisherman’s Point on 10 June, this operation was 

a model of detailed planning. Commander McCalla’s operation 

order for this action was precise and complete in laying out the 

timeline and sequencing of events, command relationships, the 

forces to be employed (naval and land), formations for movement by water, ship’s supporting relationship to the landing force, 

and the objectives to be achieved. Lieutenant Colonel Huntington personally commanded the landing force, which consisted 

of Company C under Captain Elliott, Company E under First 

Lieutenant Mahoney, and a supporting detachment of 60 Cubans 

under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas. Huntington’s force totaled 

approximately 240 men. 

The operation was scheduled to commence at 0300 on 24 

June. Huntington’s landing force launched on time in three parallel columns of five boats each. The right column was made up 

of Cubans and the center and left columns of Marines. Each 

column of boats was towed across the bay by an armed steam 

launch. The cruiser Marblehead and the gunboat USS Helena (gunboat no. 9) were close in shore on the west flank of the landing 

force to interdict possible interference from an enemy force suspected to be about a mile west of the landing area. The predawn 

landing on the far side of the bay went off without incident. 

Huntington’s force swept through the area and encountered no 

resistance. The battalion records show that, on 25 June, “Signs, 

which showed that about a hundred men had left the point about 

Signalmen at Cuzco Well

Sgt John Quick was awarded the Medal of Honor at the battle of 

Cuzco Well for his bravery in signaling for naval gunfire support while 

fully exposed to Spanish rifle fire. Quick would go on to a long and 

illustrious career in the Marine Corps, retiring as a sergeant major.

Source: Crane, Wounds in the Rain, 185–86, 188. Naval History and Heritage Command 

During the battle at Cuzco Well, Sergeant John Quick and Private John 

Fitzgerald, both of Company C, demonstrated great courage under fire. 

Both would stand atop a ridge, silhouetted against the sky, the object 

of intense Spanish rifle fire, and stoically wig-wag messages to the USS 

Dolphin. The incident was immortalized in the writings of Stephen Crane, 

who accompanied the Marines to the battlefield as a war correspondent.

Quick was awarded the Medal of Honor in December 1898. Crane’s 

writings were instrumental in making Sergeant Quick a Marine legend. 

Quick would serve a long and illustrious career in the Marine Corps, ultimately achieving the rank of sergeant major.

Private Fitzgerald, even though he had been the first of the two to 

volunteer to stand in the open under fire and signal the ship, remained 

anonymous for many years. Part of the reason may well have been that 

Crane never knew his name and referred to him in his writing as “a 

red-headed ‘m[——]’—I think his name was Clancy [he was actually Private John Fitzgerald of Company C]—at any rate, it will do to call him 

Clancy.” 

Private Fitzgerald’s heroism went officially unacknowledged for 

more than 10 years until the record was finally corrected and he was 

awarded the Medal of Honor in December 1910, five years after his discharge from the Marine Corps.
41

a day previous were found, but no Spaniards.”103 This would be 

the last tactical operation executed by the battalion during the war. 

As the operational climate in the Guantánamo Bay area 

evolved fully into the category of dull routine, the exact opposite was occurring about 20 miles to the west. On 20 June 1898, 

the naval force carrying the U.S. Army V Corps, commanded 

by Major General William R. Shafter, had finally arrived off the 

southern coast of Cuba. Shafter and Admiral Sampson met that 

night to coordinate plans for upcoming operations. It was the 

beginning of a stormy relationship fraught with conflicting Service perspectives and priorities. The one thing not in dispute was 

that the port of Santiago was now the focal point of U.S. military 

operations in Cuba. Admiral Cervera’s flotilla was still perceived 

as the top military threat to U.S. operations in the West Indies. 

As long as Cervera’s ships were holed up in harbor, Santiago received the undivided attention of both the U.S. Army and Navy 

in Cuba. 

With the landing of V Corps at Daiquiri and Aguadores east 

of Santiago on 22 June, the war in Cuba entered a new phase. 

Within 10 days, Shafter’s V Corps was able to move on Santiago, 

103 Journal of the Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 12.

capturing key terrain on the outskirts of the town in the battles 

of San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill. By 1 July, Santiago was effectively under siege. 

With the likely prospect that Santiago would fall to the 

Americans, Admiral Cervera faced a dilemma. He could either 

attempt to run out of the harbor and engage the technologically 

and numerically superior enemy fleet in battle, or he could scuttle 

his ships in the harbor to prevent their capture. Cervera’s preference was to scuttle his ships and not needlessly sacrifice the lives 

of his sailors in a futile gesture. His ships were short on fuel and 

ammunition and badly in need of repair. Unfortunately for Cervera, since his arrival in Cuba, he was under the direct authority 

of Ramón Blanco y Erenas, the Spanish governor general in Havana, who was adamant that Spanish honor demanded he push 

out to sea and engage the enemy fleet in battle. 

Cervera decided to attempt his escape from Santiago at 

0900 on 3 July. He chose that time on the off chance that he 

could catch the U.S. ships by surprise during their routine Sunday 

morning inspections and church services. It was a forlorn hope at 

best. At the appointed hour, the Spanish flotilla moved out in column and the first ship, the Infanta Maria Teresa, cleared the harbor 

entrance about 0930. The U.S. ships were not caught off guard 

and moved quickly in pursuit. A running gun battle moving westward down the coast ensued, and in short order, the four Spanish 

armored cruisers and two fast torpedo boats were all sunk or run 

aground, too badly damaged to stay afloat. 

As luck would have it, while Cervera prepared to make his 

dash out of the harbor, Admiral Sampson departed southeast 

with the New York for a planned meeting with General Shafter 

to iron out conflicting opinions and priorities on the final steps 

to ensure the fall of Santiago. In his absence, Sampson had left 

Commodore Schley in command of the blockading ships. When 

the alert went out that the Spanish were coming out, Sampson 

turned the New York around and raced full-speed back to the battle, arriving as the last Spanish ships were being run aground. 

This chain of events initiated a multiyear feud between Sampson 

and Schley about who should get the lion’s share of the credit 

for the destruction of Cervera’s flotilla. In effect, the two mighty 

hunters stood over the emaciated, half-starved deer carcass, both 

loudly claiming credit for having brought the mighty and dangerous beast down.

As the Marines of the First Marine Battalion celebrated the 

news of the naval victory off Santiago, they got a firsthand look 

at Spanish prisoners when the Resolute returned to Guantánamo 

on 4 July with 500 crewmen of the Cristóbal Colón on board. The 

remainder of July was characterized by the battalion suffering a 

series of transfers and detachments of Marines to other ships detachments or to guard prisoners being transported to the United 

This image shows Marines at Camp McCalla in full tropical uniform. The campaign hats the Marines are wearing were part of the equipment that was left on 

the Resolute in April. The Marines did not get this uniform item until the arrival of 

the Resolute at Guantánamo on 20 June 1898. 

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
42

States, dropping the effective strength of the battalion to around 

550 men. 

On 23 July, the Spanish garrison in Caimanera surrendered, 

ending all organized resistance in the Guantánamo area. On 26 

and 27 July, the entire contingent of Cuban insurgents who had 

been with the battalion since 12 June left Camp McCalla for 

other missions. On 31 July, the battalion ended the daily security outposts and patrols. Camp McCalla had become just that: 

a camp in which the battalion sat and awaited its next assignment. Huntington had concerns about his own age and physical 

stamina and that of his senior officers and their ability to execute 

follow-on combat missions. After the fighting had subsided in 

June, Huntington had expressed his concern in a letter to his 

wife: “Six months of active campaigning would clear Huntington, Harrington, Spicer and Elliott from the rolls of the battalion. I am not so sure of Cochrane because he takes such selfish 

care of himself that he might last unless somebody killed him.”104

On 3 August, the battalion was directed to commence 

loading supplies and equipment aboard the Resolute. Lieutenant 

Colonel Huntington was informed that the battalion was to be 

104 LtCol Robert Huntington personal papers.

transported to the Isle of Pines, a large island off the southwest 

coast of Cuba. Their mission was to secure the island and its 

harbor as a safe anchorage for ships blockading the west coast 

of Cuba during the upcoming hurricane season. The mission was 

nebulous at best. After requesting any available military information on the island, Huntington was informed that a paper would 

be forwarded to him. Huntington later recorded, “This paper 

proved to contain general information relative to the island and 

the approaches to it. I had no information as to whether there 

was a hostile force in any part of the island.”105 By early evening 

the battalion was completely embarked on board the Resolute and 

ready to sail. The orders to move finally came late in the afternoon of 9 August when the Resolute left Guantánamo under the 

escort of the USS Newark (C 1).

As the Resolute cruised down the coast, they were afforded a 

close look at the wrecks of Cervera’s ships west of Santiago. The 

Resolute and Newark soon linked up with a detachment of ships 

comprising the Suwannee, Hist (screw steamer), Osceola (AT 47), 

and the captured gunboat USS Alvarado (1895) under the overall 

command of Captain Caspar F. Goodrich. En route to the Isle of 

105 Shulimson et al., Marines in the Spanish American War, 1895–1898, 119.

Contemporary map depicting the approximate positions of Cervera’s destroyed ships in the battle of Santiago on 3 July 1898.

Library of Congress
43

As the First Marine Battalion sailed west along the Cuban coast en route to the Isle of Pines off New Caledonia, they got a close-up look at the destroyed ships 

of Adm Cervera’s flotilla. Shown here are two Spanish armored cruisers—Cristóbal Colón (bottom) and Vizcaya (top)—which were beached to avoid being sunk.

Naval History and Heritage Command
44

Final photograph of the officers of the battalion (minus Maj Henry C. Cochrane). Seated left to right: 1stLt James E. Mahoney, Capt Herbert L. Draper, Col Robert 

W. Huntington, Maj Charles L. McCawley, LtCol Francis H. Harrington, Maj William F. Spicer, and Capt Wendell C. Neville. Standing left to right: 1stLt George C. 

Reid; Capt Charles G. Long; 1stLt Edwin A. Jonas; Lt John M. Edgar, MC, USN; 2dLt Newt H. Hall; Capt Clarence L. Ingate; Capt William N. McKelvy; Maj George 

F. Elliott; 1stLt Smedley D. Butler; Capt Philip M. Bannon; and Capt Melville J. Shaw. 

Naval History and Heritage Command

Officers of the First Marine Battalion pose at Camp Heywood, Seavey Island, in 1898. From left to right: 1stLt Lewis C. Lucas, Company C; 1stLt Clarence L. Ingate, 

Company B; 2dLt Melville J. Shaw, Company D; 2dLt Newt H. Hall, Company B; and 2dLt George C. Reid, Company E.

Naval History and Heritage Command
Pines, Captain Goodrich decided to alter the mission and demand 

the surrender of the port of Manzanillo about 80 miles west of 

Santiago. 

On 12 August at 1530, the squadron opened fire on the 

shore defenses of the town. The Resolute participated in the 

bombardment with its 6-pounder guns, while three machine 

gun teams from the battalion manned stations along the rails to 

suppress enemy small arms fire from the shore if needed. The 

bombardment lasted a little more than an hour, and the ships 

broke off the engagement and withdrew after the Spanish 

declined to surrender.

On the morning of 13 August, Captain Goodrich was prepared to resume the battle, to include landing the Marine battalion with reinforcements from ships detachments to seize the 

town’s shore defenses. After two initial shots from the Newark, 

white flags appeared on the shore defenses. A boat approached 

from the shore also displaying a white flag. The boat was carrying the French consul, who informed Captain Goodrich that an 

armistice had been signed between the United States and Spain. 

The war was over. All hostilities had ceased, and the Marine battalion would soon be homeward bound.

Home Again

Early on 14 August, the Resolute was steaming east returning to 

Guantánamo Bay, where she arrived at midmorning the next day. 

The First Marine Battalion now received the official notification 

that they had been ordered home. Their return voyage was 

delayed until the arrival of four U.S. Army artillery batteries that 

would share space on the Resolute for the return trip to the United 

States. On the morning of 18 August, with all Army units now 

embarked, the Resolute set sail for Montauk Point, New York.

The Resolute arrived off Montauk on the morning of 23 

August. After a medical inspection of all personnel on board, 

the Army units were cleared to go ashore and were offloaded 

the next day. The Resolute continued its journey north to Seavey 

Island near the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, 

where the Marines were disembarked on 26 August. The battalion established Camp Heywood (named for Colonel Charles 

Heywood) on a site personally selected by the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps as the ideal place for the Marines to recuperate 

from their operations in Cuba. 

The normal medical practice of the time was to quarantine 

units returning from the tropics. This requirement was waived 

by the Commandant due to the excellent overall health of the 

returning Marines. During the entire deployment to Key West 

and Cuba, the battalion’s sick list had averaged less than 2 percent, 

without a single disease-related death during the operation. This 

was truly phenomenal for a nineteenth-century military operation, 

as deaths due to sickness often rivaled or exceeded those actually 

killed in battle. 

The success in maintaining the health of the Marines was 

directly attributable to Lieutenant Colonel Huntington’s stringent 

practices and policies on hygiene and sanitation and the strict adherence to those policies by the leadership of the battalion. Most 

important was Huntington’s insistence on a supply of clean water 

for drinking and cooking. Throughout the operation, Huntington 

ensured that his Marines were continuously supplied with distilled water from the ships. The battalion quartermaster, Captain 

McCawley, had the foresight to acquire a large number of wooden casks in Florida prior to the battalion’s departure for Cuba to 

ensure ample storage capacity for clean water would be available 

when the battalion was ashore. There is no better example of this 

insistence on clean water than at the fight at Cuzco Well. When 

the battle was over and most of the Marines’ canteens had been 

emptied, Captain Elliott did not allow his men to drink from the 

captured well. He was adamant that the desperately needed resupply of water be brought ashore from the Dolphin.

Along with stringent sanitation policies the Marines were 

also the beneficiaries of a bit of luck regarding the maintenance of their health. The Marine area of operations on the 

southeast tip of Cuba is a semiarid region and therefore did 

not have the mosquito problems that plagued the Army units 

operating in the wetter jungle areas around Santiago just 50 

miles to the northwest. As a result, the Marines avoided any 

cases of yellow fever, a disease that ravaged their Army counterparts. As medical science of the time had yet to make the 

45

Company training was a daily routine at Camp Sampson, Key West.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division
46

connection between yellow fever and the mosquito, the Marines and Navy attributed the lack of yellow fever cases to good 

sanitation and quarantine practices rather than the fortuitous 

medical environment in which the Marines were operating. 

On 30 August, Commandant Heywood issued a congratulatory letter to the battalion extolling their accomplishments in 

battle and their invaluable service to the national war effort. Lieutenant Colonel Huntington and five other officers (Elliott, Lucas, 

Neville, Magill, and Second Lieutenant Philip M. Bannon) were 

promoted for gallantry. Lucas, Neville, Magill, and Bannon received brevet or temporary promotions, and Elliott was advanced 

three numbers on the lineal list for seniority in his current rank.106

The battalion participated in a celebratory parade through 

the streets of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, across the harbor, 

on 16 September, advertised as “Portsmouths welcome to the 

heros of 98 [sic].”107 The Marines were the focal point of a parade 

that included all of the city’s major government organizations 

and was viewed by a crowd estimated to exceed 20,000. The parade concluded with the battalion marching across the footbridge 

to Pierce Island where they stacked arms and enjoyed a celebratory dinner. The sumptuous bill of fare was documented in Private Frank Keeler’s memoirs as follows:

• Forty-eight bushels of clams

• Twenty five hundred good large lobsters

• One thousand ears of corn

• Six barrels of sweet potatoes

• Eleven hundred rolls of bread

• About one hundred and ten loaves of brown 

bread

• Half a barrel of pickles

• Twenty five boxes of crackers

• Fifty watermelons

• One hundred gallons of very fine coffee

• Fifty cases of beer

• Fifteen boxes of cigars108

The official order to disband the battalion was issued on 19 

September 1898, and on the 20th, Camp Heywood was completely broken down and disestablished. The men of the First Marine Battalion were immediately transferred back to the various 

barracks and ships detachments from which they had come five 

months previous. Subsequent to the disbanding of the battalion, 

President McKinley requested an additional parade of the battalion in Washington, DC. In typical ad hoc fashion, the remnants of 

the battalion that were now assigned to national capital area were 

106 Journal of the Marine Battalion at Guantánamo, 21.

107 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 26. 108 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 26.

mustered one last time, and with the support of the Marine band 

executed the parade on a rainy day on 22 September. With the conclusion of the parade, the history of the First Marine Battalion was 

finally closed out, and in the words of Frank Keeler, “This ended 

the ‘Heros of Guantanamo’ [sic] and gave them needed rest.”109

When viewed against the totality of the battle history of the 

Marine Corps, the fight at Guantánamo Bay was in essence a fourday skirmish that will never be listed as one of the epic battles 

of the Corps. At the tactical level, this operation marked some 

significant firsts for the Corps. The Navy’s Lee rifle, employed 

by the battalion, was the first modern magazine-fed smokeless 

powder rifle used in combat by the U.S. military. Although it had 

a relatively short lifecycle as the Marine standard infantry rifle, 

the Lee rifle proved to be effective and reliable in the hands of 

well-trained Marines. 

The battalion also was the first U.S. ground force to employ modern air-cooled, gas-operated machine guns in combat. 

The Colt-Browning machine gun proved to be somewhat temperamental, requiring frequent repair. Nevertheless, the machine 

guns were highly effective in battle and were a key element in 

the Marine victory at Cuzco Well. Most important, the landing at 

Guantánamo was the first employment in the history of the Marine Corps of a Marine unit specifically organized and equipped 

as a stand-alone, mission-specific landing force to perform that 

mission in a combat environment in support of a naval campaign.

The Marine landing at Guantánamo Bay was in effect the 

first practical application of the concepts and theories on the use 

of Marines in modern naval operations that were central to the 

reform movements of the 1880s and early 1890s. The theory of 

a Marine Corps organized as a larger stand-alone naval landing 

force was first put into application in 1885 in Panama. Although 

a peacekeeping and stability operation, it generated a great deal 

of debate on the future role of the Corps. In retrospect, the 1885 

Panama intervention provided a workable template for organizing and employing a mission-based Marine landing force that was 

repeated in 1898 when the First Marine Battalion was formed. 

The irony of this professional discourse on the possibilities 

of a potential new mission for the Corps was that it was 

predominantly Navy officers advocating for the reformation 

of the Marine Corps into an expeditionary arm of the Navy. 

In his after action report of the 1885 Panama expedition, 

Commander McCalla recommended that the Marines spend less 

time in barracks and more time in summer maneuvers drilling 

with machine guns and field pieces in order to become more 

proficient in landing operations. He also advocated the formation 

of naval expeditionary brigades with their own transport ships as 

109 Keeler, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, 1898, 25.
an essential element of naval operations. Prior to the outbreak of 

the war, it was Admiral Sampson, in an April 13 letter to Secretary 

of the Navy Long, who called for the formation of up to two 

Marine battalions specifically for the purpose of holding key 

points ashore to support his naval campaign. 

Conversely, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps 

steadfastly stuck to the status quo of a Marine Corps built 

around ships detachments and the barracks structure. The larger 

issues raised by McCalla in 1885 were predominantly ignored 

by Marine leadership. However, it should be noted that, due to 

prewar budgetary restraints, the possibility of resourcing a larger 

expeditionary-focused Marine Corps was extremely remote. 

Many in the Corps feared that an underfunded expeditionary 

focus was the first step to absorption of the Corps by the Army. 

Even after the success of the Guantánamo operation, the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps continued to focus on the 

organization of the Corps around ships detachments and the 

barracks as the future mission of the Service. Marine manning 

of secondary batteries on ships was a point of emphasis in Colonel Heywood’s annual report on the state of the Marine Corps 

to the secretary of the Navy in September 1898. In an effort to 

add empirical data to his argument for maintaining Marine gun 

crews on Navy ships, Colonel Heywood made an unsuccessful 

attempt to gather quantitative data on the effectiveness of Marine 

gun crews on ships versus their Navy counterparts during the 

naval engagements of the Spanish-American War. Heywood was 

convinced that the status quo was the best way to keep the Corps 

closely aligned with the Navy’s core missions and thus ensure its 

future existence. 

The most unanticipated factor raising the status of the 

Marine Corps in the eyes of the nation was the laudatory press 

coverage given the Guantánamo operation. The Marine battalion 

had no shortage of war correspondents ashore, the most notable 

being journalist and author Stephen Crane. From 10 to 22 June, 

the Marines were the only U.S. forces on enemy soil. The picture 

painted by the correspondents of a small Marine contingent 

fighting against long odds captured the full attention and 

admiration of the nation. If the Guantánamo operation and the 

Army’s much larger Santiago campaign had occurred concurrently, 

the exploits of Huntington’s Marines most assuredly would have 

been overshadowed and gone largely unnoticed. The eyewitness 

accounts of Crane and his contemporaries made instant heroes 

of the Marines with the American public.

In the end, the Guantánamo operation greatly enhanced 

the public and professional stature of the Marine Corps. This 

enhanced standing was successfully leveraged by the Commandant 

to expand future Marine Corps budgets and end strength. In his 

1898 annual report to the president, even the secretary of the 

Navy supported an increase of the Marine Corps strength to 5,000 

men. This included a recommendation to establish the position 

of the Commandant as a permanent general officer for the first 

time in Marine Corps history. George Elliott would be the first 

Commandant to hold permanent general officer rank when he 

succeeded Colonel Charles Heywood as the 10th Commandant. 

When viewed against the larger issues of roles and missions 

within the Navy, Guantánamo was truly a transformational event 

for the Marine Corps. The battle of Guantánamo was a significant institutional transition point between the traditional missions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of providing 

detachments afloat and guarding naval shore installations, and 

the twentieth-century missions of a self-contained naval landing 

force employed in support of naval operations and campaigns.

47

49

Annual Report of the Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine 

Corps to the Secretary of the Navy (1897). Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1897.

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Corps to the Secretary of the Navy (1898). Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1898.

Casey, BGen Silas (USA), ed. Infantry Tactics, for the Instruction, Exercise, 

and Manoeuvres of the Soldier, a Company, Line of Skirmishers, 

Battalion, Brigade or Corps d’Armée. Vol. 2. New York: D. 

Van Nostrand, 1865.

Chadwick, French Ensor. The Relations of the United States and Spain: 

The Spanish-American War. Vol. 1. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911. 

Clifford, John. History of the First Marine Battalion of the U.S. Marines. 

Foster, RI: Brass Hat, 1930. 

Coletta, Paolo E. Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979.

Crane, Stephen. Wounds in the Rain: A Collection of Stories Relating to 

the Spanish-American War of 1898. London: Methuen, 1900.

Daley, Larry, contr. “The Taking of Guantanamo.” Spanish American 

War Centennial Website. 

Dyer, A. B. Handbook for Light Artillery. New York: John Wiley and 

Sons, 1896.

Feuer, A. B. The Spanish-American War at Sea: Naval Action in the Atlantic. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995. 

Furey, William D., contr. “Private Hermann D. Kuchmeister’s [sic] 

Account of the Cienfuegos Cable Cutting Expedition.” 

Spanish American War Centennial Website. 

Goode, W. A. M. With Sampson Through the War: Being an Account of 

the Naval Operations of the North Atlantic Squadron during the 

Spanish American War of 1898. New York: Doubleday and 

McClure, 1899.

Goodrell, Capt M. C. Report of 6 October 1898. Spanish-American 

War papers, folder 1 of 5. Historical Reference Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Heinl, Robert Debs. Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 

1775–1962. Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1991.

Holden-Rhodes, J. F. Smart and Faithful Force: Henry Clay Cochrane and 

the United States Marines Corps, 1861–1905. Tucson, AZ: 

Fireship Press, 2012.

Huntington, LtCol Robert. Personal papers. Box 1. Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

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Marine Corps Paper Series no. 1. Edited by Carolyn A. 

Tyson. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Museum, 1967. 

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Company, 1903.

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on First-Person Accounts. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009.

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Naval History and Heritage Command.

McSherry, Patrick, contr. “The First Marine Battalion Revisits the 

Scene of the Fight at Cuzco Well.” Transcribed by Robert 

Pendleton. Spanish American War Centennial Website. 

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Corps. New York: Macmillan, 1980.

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Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898.

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North Atlantic Station letter to the secretary of the Navy. 

13 April 1898. Spanish-American War papers, folder 1 of 

5. Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Selected Bibliography and Additional Reading
50

Shaw, 2dLt Melville. Letter to his father. 29 June 1898. SpanishAmerican War papers, folder 1 of 5. Historical Reference 

Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Shulimson, Jack. The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898. 

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

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and Evelyn A. Englander, comp./ed. Marines in the 

Spanish-American War, 1895–1899: Anthology and Annotated 

Bibliography. Washington, DC: History and Museums 

Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1998. 

Spears, John R. Our Navy in the War with Spain. New York: Charles 

Scribner’s Sons, 1898. 

The Oxford English Dictionary. 2d ed. Vol. 20. J. A. Simpson and E. S. 

C. Weiner, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1997. 

White, Trumbull. Our War with Spain for Cuba’s Freedom. Chicago: 

Monarch Book Company, 1898.
Acknowledgments

The completion of this work benefited greatly from the generous guidance and assistance of Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, former director of the 

Marine Corps History Division, who reviewed the content for factual accuracy; Paul W. Westermeyer of the Marine Corps History Division 

for technical assistance in editing, critiques of draft material, and overall publication plan; and also the Marine Corps History Division staff 

for assistance in providing research materials and recommending external points of contact that were essential in completing this work. 

About the Author 

Jerry A. Roberts is a graduate of Georgia Southern University in Statesboro. He retired after 38 years of U.S. government service that included 23 years with the Marine Corps, from which he retired as a lieutenant colonel, and 15 years of civilian service with the Joint Warfare 

Analysis Center in Dahlgren, Virginia.