alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles Rosenthal, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Concur—- Rabin, J. P., Valente, McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 20, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-50433 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus SAUL PEREZ-DE HOYOS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 2:03-CR-744-ALL

-------------------- Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Saul Perez-De Hoyos raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
#### § 921.955 Certification of blasters.

Parts 955 of this chapter, *Certification of Blasters in Federal Program States and on Indian Lands,* shall apply to the training, examination and certification of blasters for surface coal mining and reclamation operations.

[51 FR 19462, May 29, 1986]
#### United Services Automobile Association, Respondent, v. Louis Graham, Defendant, and Helen Pardalis et al., Respondents. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, Intervenor-Appellant.

Order, entered on December 5, 1963, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, with $20 costs and disbursements to appellant, and motion by appellant for leave to intervene in this action granted, with $10 costs. The pending action was brought by the respondent insurance company to declare the validity of its disclaimer as the insurer of a certain vehicle alleged to have been involved in a collision with another automobile, resulting in damage and injury to an occupant thereof. The declaratory judgment action is brought against the plaintiff’s insured and the owner and occupant of the other automobile. The occupant and her husband, as persons insured under an MVAIC endorsement, may be entitled to proceed and have recovery against MVAIC because of plaintiff’s disclaimer without regard to the validity thereof. Thus, it is true that MVAIC may be held liable to these persons under its endorsement irrespective of the outcome of the declaratory judgment action. (See Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2-a; *Matter of MVAIC [Malone],*19 A D 2d 542; *Matter of Scire [MVAIC],*19 A D 2d 788; *Matter of Danza [MVAIC],*40 Misc 2d 776; *Matter of MVAIC [Holley],*33 Misc 2d 567.) Nevertheless, if MVAIC is required to and does pay the claims asserted under its endorsement, it would be subrogated to the claimants’ rights, if any, against the plaintiff’s insured. Therefore, MVAIC does have a real and substantial interest in the matter of the determination of the validity of plaintiff’s disclaimer. It is settled that *“*an action for a declaratory judgment is brought to forever settle the rights of all parties interested, and, generally speaking, all persons who may be affected thereby must be joined as parties. As in other actions, the court must have before it the parties to the controversy and the cause, so that the adjudication, when made, will bind the interests and the parties, and so will constitute a judicial determination of the controversy.” (22 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, § 26, p. 739.) Therefore, MVAIC, at least where it consents, may properly be made a party to the action for the purpose of facilitating the disposal in one action of all claims involving the valadity of the plaintiff’s disclaimer. The claims of MVAIC with respect thereto involve common questions of law and fact, and, in view of the broad language of the statute (CPLR 1013) and the mandate for liberal construction (CPLR 104), the application of MVAIC to intervene should have been granted. (See *Matter of Eberlin*v. *Herman,*18 A D 2d 1068, 1069; *Reed*v. *Village of*
      *658
      *Larchmont,*19 A D 2d 624; *Central Westchester Humane Soc.*v. *Hilleboe,*202 Misc. 873, 875; *Matter of MVAIC [State-Wide Ins.*Co.], 36 Misc 2d 981.) Concur—Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
### §5405. Regulations

The Office shall issue such regulations as it determines to be necessary for the administration of this chapter, including the administration of the Fund. The Office's regulations shall include criteria governing—

(1) an agency plan under section 5406;

(2) the allocation of monies from the Fund to agencies;

(3) the nature, extent, duration, and adjustment of, and approval processes for, payments to individual employees under this chapter;

(4) the relationship to this chapter of agency performance management systems;

(5) training of supervisors, managers, and other individuals involved in the process of making performance distinctions; and

(6) the circumstances under which funds may be allocated by the Office to an agency in amounts below or in excess of the agency's pro rata share.

(Added Pub. L. 108–136, div. A, title XI, §1129(a), Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1643.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 5405, added Pub. L. 95–454, title V, §501, Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1183; amended Pub. L. 98–615, title II, §201(a), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3211; Pub. L. 101–509, title V, §529 [title I, §101(b)(3)(C)], Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1427, 1439, related to pay administration, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103–89, §3(a)(1), (c), Sept. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 981, 983, eff. Nov. 1, 1993.
Exhibit 32


Certifications of Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of
Earth Sciences, Inc. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


I, Mark H. McKinnies, certify that:

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended
September 30, 2003 of Earth Sciences, Inc. (the "Company) as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark
H. McKinnies, President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

1)	the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2)	the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Date:  November 11, 2003                 /s/ Mark H. McKinnies
                                         ----------------------
                                            Mark H. McKinnies
                                   President and Chief Financial Officer
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Stephen J. Markman Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 28, 2014

h0325 

# Order

Clerk March 28, 2014

147434

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 147434 COA: 313207 Kalamazoo CC: 2012

- 000303

- FC RODERIQUE LAREESE ROLARK, Defendant

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 23, 2013 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARKMAN

, J . ( dissenting ).

I respectfully dissent and would grant leave to appeal to consider (a) whether the trial court clearly erred by determining that a document discovered in defendant’s prison cell, appearing to police to contain a detailed and first

- hand confession by defend ant of his involvement in a homicide for which he was then under investigation, was “intended for counsel” and therefore properly suppressed and (b) whether the Court of Appeals in its characterization of the scope of the attorney

- client privilege in Michi gan erroneously or inadvertently expanded the traditional understanding of the privilege to encompass communications intended for yet

- unidentified attorneys. See Watson v Detroit Free

Press , 248 Mich 237, 240 (1929) (stating that for the privilege to appl y, “the relation of attorney and client must exist”); Devich v Dick , 177 Mich 173, 178 (1913) (stating that the defendant need not have formally retained an attorney for this privilege to exist, but he must have “‘consult[ed] with an attorney in his profes sional capacity, with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and [if] the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established’”) (citation omitted).
### **CHAPTER 1027—LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE**

#### SUBCHAPTER I—LAW ENFORCEMENT

Sec.
102701.
Law enforcement personnel within System.
102702.
Crime prevention assistance.

#### SUBCHAPTER II—EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

102711.
Authority of Secretary to use applicable appropriations for the System to render assistance to nearby law enforcement and fire prevention agencies and for related activities outside the System.
102712.
Aid to visitors, grantees, permittees, or licensees in emergencies.
#### HESS et al. v. LIEBMANN.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 22, 1903.)

1. Evidence—Written Contract—Parol Evidence.

In an action for the price of a bill of goods in which plaintiff introduced a written contract signed for defendant by her husband as agent, and in her presence, providing that the goods should be shipped at the seller’s earliest convenience, and containing a provision that no agreement other than that therein contained should be binding upon either purchaser or seller, parol evidence that the order was conditional upon the goods being delivered at a certain time, was inadmissible.

¶ 1. See Evidence, vol. 20, Cent. Dig. § 1941.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Tenth District.

Action by Henry B. Hess and others against Ada Liebmann. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. ■ Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J„ and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

John T. Booth, for appellants.

Wm. A. Sweetser, for respondent.

MacLEAN, J.

This action was brought to recover the purchase price of certain goods sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendant. The answer, verified by the defendant herself, put in issue all the allegations of the complaint, except the copartnership of the plaintiffs, and also alleged an agreement to deliver the goods in question by a certain stipulated time, besides setting up a counterclaim for profits guarantied in connection with the contract of sale. Upon the trial the defendant was confronted with a written agreement signed in her behalf by her husband and agent in her presence, as she later admitted. The agreement began with an order to ship the goods at seller’s earliest convenience, contained a provision that goods were to be delivered to the purchaser by delivering them to the transportation company, upon which the responsibility of the seller was to cease, and “no agreement other than above set forth shall be binding either upon purchaser or seller.” Against the objections and over the exceptions of the plaintiffs’ counsel, the defendant "w.as al*179lowed to give evidence of an oral agreement that the goods were to be delivered for the Christmas trade, and that at the time of signing the writing put in evidence, the husband said he signed it on that condition. This was error. No authority was shown in the salesman to make such an agreement. Inspection of the writing showed it to be complete, embracing all the particulars necessary to a perfect agreement, and designed to express the arrangement between the parties; and so it presumably embraced the entire arrangement. Moreover, the parol evidence was inconsistent with and contradictory of the written instrument. The judgment should be reversed. Doolittle v. Fitchett, 35 Misc. Rep. 529, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1124; Globe Soap Co. v. Liss, 36 Misc. Rep. 199, 73 N. Y. Supp. 153.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event. All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> OPUR1
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                       608021
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                     113611
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          132487
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        573292
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                   53618
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1481029
<COMMON>                                        102180
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       216348
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                              39479
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                  358007
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            28268
<PREFERRED>                                       6900
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                            127318
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                                   0
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                       117468
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                    62530
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                          0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                     0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                  780538
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  1481029
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                       414043
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             13757
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      358505
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      372262
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                          41781
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               (6952)
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                   34829
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         24370
<NET-INCOME>                                     10459
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                       1729
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                     8730
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                         25443
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                        17783
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                           57931
<EPS-BASIC>                                      .43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .43


</TABLE>
-82 -80 -78 -76 -74 -72

 38

 40

 42

★

▲

▲

▲

▲

★ ▲

▲

▲ ▲ 500

 1000

 1500

 100

18 12 06 00

07/17

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 17 Jul 07

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.90 N 76.65 W Meters AGL

★

■

■

■

■

★

■

■

■

■

★

●

●

●

●

★

●

●

●

●
### §1205. Funding

#### (a) In general

In addition to any amounts provided by appropriation Acts, funding for this chapter shall be provided from the Digital Transition and Public Safety Fund in accordance with section 3010 of the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 (47 U.S.C. 309 note).

#### (b) Compensation

The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information shall compensate any such broadcast station licensee or permittee for reasonable costs incurred in complying with the requirements imposed pursuant to section 1201(c) of this title from funds made available under this section. The Assistant Secretary shall ensure that sufficient funds are made available to effectuate geographically targeted alerts.

#### (c) Credit

The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology and the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, may borrow from the Treasury beginning on October 1, 2006, such sums as may be necessary, but not to exceed $106,000,000, to implement this chapter. The Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information shall ensure that the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology and the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere are provided adequate funds to carry out their responsibilities under sections 1203 and 1204 of this title. The Treasury shall be reimbursed, without interest, from amounts in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund as funds are deposited into the Fund.

(Pub. L. 109–347, title VI, §606, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1941.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (c), was in the original "this title", meaning title VI of Pub. L. 109–347, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1936, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of title VI to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1201 of this title and Tables.

Section 3010 of the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, referred to in subsec. (a), is section 3010 of Pub. L. 109–171, which is set out in a note under section 309 of this title.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 962 

To amend title 11 of the United States Code to include firearms in the 

types of property allowable under the alternative provision for exempting 

property from the estate. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 9, 2023 

Ms. TENNEY (for herself, Mr. GOSAR, Mr. WEBER of Texas, and Mr. LAMBORN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 11 of the United States Code to include 

firearms in the types of property allowable under the 

alternative provision for exempting property from the 

estate. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Gun Own5 ers in Bankruptcy Act of 2023’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXEMPTIONS. 

7 Section 522 of title 11, United States Code, is 

8 amended— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 962 IH

1 (1) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the 

2 following: 

3 ‘‘(13) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to 

4 exceed $3,000 in value, in a single firearm or fire5 arms.’’; and 

6 (2) in subsection (f)(4)(A)— 

7 (A) in clause (xiv) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

8 end; 

9 (B) in clause (xv) by striking the period at 

10 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

11 (C) by adding at the end the following: 

12 ‘‘(xvi) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to 

13 exceed $3,000 in value, in a single firearm or fire14 arms.’’. 

15 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS. 

16 (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as provided in sub17 section (b), this Act and the amendments made by this 

18 Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 

19 Act. 

20 (b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.—The amend21 ments made by this Act shall apply only with respect to 

22 cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code 

23 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
§ 846.18 Payment of penalty. ( a ) *No abatement or appeal.* If a notice of proposed individual civil penalty assessment becomes a final order in the absence of a petition for review or abatement agreement, the penalty shall be due upon issuance of the final order.
( b ) *Appeal.* If an individual named in a notice of proposed individual civil penalty assessment files a petition for review in accordance with 43 CFR 4.1300 *et seq.,* the penalty shall be due upon issuance of a final administrative order affirming, increasing or decreasing the proposed penalty.
( c ) *Abatement agreement.* Where the Office and the corporate permittee or individual have agreed in writing on a plan for the abatement of or compliance with the unabated order, an individual named in a notice of proposed individual civil penalty assessment may postpone payment until receiving either a final order from the Office stating that the penalty is due on the date of such final order, or written notice that abatement or compliance is satisfactory and the penalty has been withdrawn.
( d ) *Delinquent payment.* Following the expiration of 30 days after the issuance of a final order assessing an individual civil penalty, any delinquent penalty shall be subject to interest at the rate established by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for late charges on late payments to the Federal Government. The Treasury current value of funds rate is published by the Fiscal Service in the notices section of the Federal Register and on Treasury's Web site. Interest on unpaid penalties will run from the date payment first was due until the date of payment. Failure to pay overdue penalties may result in one or more of the actions specified in § 870.23(a) through (f) of this chapter. Delinquent penalties are subject to late payment penalties specified in § 870.21(c) of this chapter and processing and handling charges specified in § 870.21(d) of this chapter.
[53 FR 3675, Feb. 8, 1988, as amended at 73 FR 67631, Nov. 14, 2008]
```

[House Report 112-92]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

112th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     112-92

======================================================================

 
   PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO THE HOUSE 
 AMENDMENT TO THE BILL (S. 990) TO PROVIDE FOR AN ADDITIONAL TEMPORARY 
   EXTENSION OF PROGRAMS UNDER THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT AND THE SMALL 
        BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT OF 1958, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                _______
                                

May 26, 2011.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

               Mr. Dreier, from the Committee on Rules, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                       [To accompany H. Res. 281]

    The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration 
House Resolution 281, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to 
the House with the recommendation that the resolution be 
adopted.

                SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION

    The resolution provides for the consideration of the Senate 
Amendment to the House Amendment to S. 990, the Small Business 
Additional Temporary Extension Act of 2011. The resolution 
makes in order a motion offered by the chair of the Committee 
on the Judiciary that the House concur in the Senate Amendment 
to the House Amendment to S. 990. The resolution provides for 
one hour of debate on the motion with 40 minutes equally 
divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member 
of the Committee on the Judiciary and 20 minutes equally 
divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The 
resolution waives all points of order against consideration of 
the motion. Finally, the resolution provides that the Senate 
amendment shall be considered as read.

                         EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS

    Although the rule waives all points of order against 
consideration of the motion, the Committee is not aware of any 
points of order against consideration of the motion. The waiver 
of all points of order against consideration of the motion is 
prophylactic.

                                  

```