COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

XIX Tactical Air Command

and ULTRA

Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944

Campaign in France

BRADFORD J. “BJ” SHWEDO

Major, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 10

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

May 2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public

release: distribution unlimited.

ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shwedo, Bradford J., 1963–

XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA : Patton’s force enhancers in the 1944

campaign in France / Bradford J. Shwedo.

p. cm. –– (CADRE paper ; 10)

At head of title: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air

University.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-089-2

1. World War, 1939–1945––Campaigns––France. 2. Patton, George S. (George

Smith), 1885–1945. 3. ULTRA (Intelligence system) 4. World War, 1939–1945––

Military intelligence––United States. 5. World War, 1939–1945–– Cryptography. 6.

United States. Army Air Forces. Tactical Air Command, 19th–– History. 7. World War,

1939–1945––Regimental histories––United States. 8. Close air support. I. Title: 19

Tactical Air Command and Ultra. II. Title: Nineteen Tactical Air Command and Ultra.

III. Title. IV. Series.

D761 .S49 2001

940.54'214––dc21 2001022416

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iii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 KEY PLAYERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Evolution of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Understanding ULTRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

New Kid on the Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3 BREAKOUT IN BRITTANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Patton’s Playground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Combat Operations Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Lure from the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4 MORTAIN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

AND THE FALAISE GAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

“To the Sea”—Targeting the Third Army

Lifeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

ULTRA Improvements at Third Army . . . . . . . 54

German Neck in a Noose That the Allies

Fail to Pull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5 TALE OF TWO RIVERS—SEINE AND LOIRE . . . 71

Patton’s Original Plan Pursued . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Patton’s Pursuit in the South . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Support Roles Switch—XIX TAC

Bags 20,000 Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

v
Chapter Page 

6 ALLIES BACK THE WRONG HORSE––

PATTON’S CAVALRY STOPPED . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Allies Choose the Road Worst Traveled . . . . . 110

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . 125

Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Ground Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Implications for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Maps

1 Choke Point at Avranches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2 Third Army Operations in Brittany . . . . . . . . . . 31

3 Angers and the Breakout Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4 Mortain and Falaise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5 Drive to the Seine River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

6 Four Seine Bridgeheads and Beyond . . . . . . . . . 86

7 XIX Tactical Air Command’s Interdiction

Plans for the Loire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

8 Attacks to the West Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

9 Operation Market Garden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Photographs

Generals George S. Patton Jr. 

and O. P. Weyland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

vi
Page 

Lt Col (then major) Melvin C. Helfers’s

ULTRA Briefing to Patton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Col Oscar W. Koch, Third Army’s G-2 . . . . . . . . 17

Surrender Ceremonies at Beaugency Bridge . . . 95

Port of Brest after the German Surrender . . . . . 109

vii
Foreword

Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton’s spectacularly successful drive

across France in August–September 1944 as commander of the

US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign.

Many biographers have attributed Patton’s achievements

almost exclusively to his masterful employment of armor and

to an innate sixth sense that enabled him to anticipate the

moves of his opponents. Drawing heavily on declassified

ULTRA intelligence reports, the records of XIX Tactical Air

Command, and postwar interrogations of German commanders, Maj Bradford J. Shwedo’s XIX Tactical Air Command and

ULTRA: Patton’s Force Enhancers in the 1944 Campaign in

France sheds new light on Patton’s generalship and suggests

that Patton’s penchant for risk and audacity may have been

less the product of a sixth sense than of his confidence in

ULTRA and tactical airpower. Timely and highly accurate

ULTRA intelligence afforded Patton knowledge of German

capabilities and enabled him to shape his operations to exploit

mounting German weakness. Airpower provided top cover,

punched through German concentrations, guarded Patton’s

right flank, and furnished crucial airlift support while disrupting enemy lines of communication. 

Whatever Patton’s personal intuitive gifts, he deserves full

marks for skillfully integrating the ground scheme of maneuver, airpower, and intelligence into the overall strategy of the

Third Army. Major Shwedo shows in some detail how Patton

used both ULTRA and conventional operational intelligence to

identify German vulnerabilities and then coordinated ground

maneuver forces and airpower to exploit those vulnerabilities

and create new ones. The synergy between courageous leadership and airpower, highly mobile ground forces, and superb

intelligence—each creating opportunities for the other—took

the Third Army and XIX TAC from Normandy to within 50

miles of the German border in less than 45 days.

General Patton’s masterful employment of armor, airpower,

and intelligence in a campaign fought more than 50 years ago

is a textbook example of the sophisticated fusion of airpower,

ix
ground power, and information in the planning and execution

of a fast-moving military operation. It is also a case study in

flexibility, innovation, and boldness at the operational level of

war. For all those reasons, Patton’s campaign in France merits the attention of latter-day air and ground warriors who

must meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century. 

Originally written as a master’s thesis for Air University’s

School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), XIX Tactical Air

Command and ULTRA was selected by the Air Force Historical

Foundation as the best SAAS thesis for academic year

1999–2000. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and

Education is pleased to make this excellent study available to

the US Air Force and beyond.

x

JAMES R. W. TITUS

Dean of Research

Air University
About the Author

Maj Bradford J. “BJ” Shwedo is an intelligence officer who

has served in various assignments within the intelligence community. Currently, he is assigned to the Joint Staff at the

Pentagon as an operations officer in the Directorate of

Operations, Information Operations (J-39). His unit level

experience was with the 53d Fighter Squadron during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and he commanded a signals intelligence site in Korea. Staff positions

include assignments as intelligence support officer to new

weapons acquisitions and as chief of Offensive Information

Warfare on the Air Staff. Major Shwedo is a graduate of the US

Air Force Academy, Defense Intelligence College, Air

Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced

Airpower Studies. He and his wife Alison have one son, Mac.

xi
Acknowledgments

Much of this study is based on extensive primary source

research. Some reside in archives; and to the novice, archives

usually necessitate enormous amounts of support from

experts. This study was no exception to that rule. Specifically,

I thank The Citadel archives employees for providing Lt Col

Melvin C. Helfers’s personal papers and three videotaped

interviews; these greatly aided this project. I also recognize Joe

Caver and his associates at the Air Force Historical Research

Agency for providing unlimited access to Gen O. P. Weyland’s

collection and the unit reports from XIX Tactical Air Command

(TAC). The Auburn University Library afforded me unlimited

access to the ULTRA messages used in this work, which

allowed the prolonged activity of associating specific ULTRA

messages with orders, authors’ accounts, and troop movements. Invaluable background information was provided

through two outstanding Americans, Andy Anderson and

Frederick Vosburg, both of whom were intelligence experts at

the XIX TAC. I express my respect and gratitude to my thesis

advisor, Dr. Harold R. Winton. He offered encouragement,

direction, and advice on all aspects of this paper. Dr. Winton’s

sense of humor and tenacity pushed this document through

numerous revisions. My reader, Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, had

similar attributes; and his inputs significantly aided my paper.

I thank my wife Alison and our son Mac for their support and

all the fun times along the way. While I owe so much to many

others, any errors in interpretation or expression of the facts

are mine alone. Therefore, any errors lie solely with the author.

xiii
Chapter 1

Introduction

The superior efficiency and cooperation afforded to this

Army by the forces under your command is the best example of the combined use of air and ground troops I have ever

witnessed.

—George S. Patton Jr.

—(letter to the commander,

—XIX TAC, August 1944)

General Patton’s use of ULTRA in his historic drive across

France is a fitting thesis for a tactical epic . . . One message,

as at Avranches, may turn the spear points of a German

Army and save an entire campaign from disaster. Each day

brings some item of value and interest and in many cases,

the item is the motive force behind whole divisions. The

service is so incredibly valuable that it requires time for an

intelligent person to believe that it is really reliable. The first

impression by other than the gullible is that it is too good to

be true.

—Maj Warrack Wallace, 18 September 1944

—Bletchley Park Observer to US Third Army

In the course of military history, few generals have risen to

the achievements of Gen George S. Patton Jr. and his Third US

Army (USA). One of General Patton’s most significant accomplishments was his historic drive across France in 1944. Attacking in three different directions (westward—Brittany,

south—Loire River, east—Paris to the Moselle River), the Third

Army moved farther and faster than any other army in the history of warfare.1 At one point during this campaign, Third

Army advanced along a 90-mile front that ran along the Loire

River, which gave Patton a combined flank and front of 450

miles.2 During this month-and-a-half offensive, the Third

1
Army liberated 41,000 square miles of enemy territory in its

drive from Normandy to within 50 miles of the German border.3 Patton’s exploitation of the situation in the August and

September 1944 scenario became “the beginning of the end”

for Germany. Most importantly, his rapid drives permitted astonishing gains at relatively low losses (approximate totals of

German losses were 32,000 killed; 96,500 wounded; and

94,199 taken as prisoners of war [POW]; United States [US]

losses were 4,575 killed; 23,794 wounded; and 6,156 missing).4 The extraordinary results of this campaign have led

many historians to wonder what was the secret behind Patton’s

success.

Most of the studies associated with Patton focus on the glorious deeds, bravery, and tenacity of the Third Army. This narrow perspective may not thoroughly explain the details behind

Patton’s success. His unorthodox schemes remain the focus of

debate concerning the genius of Patton. Unfortunately, due to

Patton’s premature death in 1945 and the limited information

available to researchers immediately after the war, many post–

World War II histories fostered a myriad of myths that persist to this day. These histories run the gamut. Some credit

Patton’s success to mythical qualities and claim he had “a

sixth sense—which enabled him to foresee situations that

were developing and make dispositions to meet them.”5 Others

attack his strategies in France for his perceived blatant disregard for flank protection. One author said the way that Patton

fixed his logistic problems “does not bear examination, in

terms of how a responsible senior commander should behave.”6 Another author characterized Patton’s drive across

France as a “reckless exploitation” of the situation.7 Contrary

to these accounts, Patton was not guided by a sixth sense or

reckless action; and contemporary commanders, through

careful examination, can extract many lessons from the campaign fought in France a half century ago.

During this drive Patton rapidly exploited a fluid front as his

area of responsibility (AOR) grew exponentially. The manner in

which Patton exploited the battlefields in France has often

provoked controversy. However, he provided some clues to his

success when in late August he stated, “to attack with the

2

CADRE PAPER
limited forces I have now available—since I occupy a 300 mile

front [and had lost the XV Corps to Hodges]—I am taking

chances, but I am convinced that the situation in the German

Army warrants the taking of such risks.”8 In this case Patton

knew he had to capitalize on the window of opportunity that

was present in the summer of 1944. But as his AOR increased

and his manpower strengths remained constant, he also realized he had to devise economy-of-force measures. He accomplished this task through various force-enhancing schemes

that entailed some unorthodox employment of his units. Although these unorthodox schemes remain the focus of debate

concerning the genius of Patton, recently declassified sources

afford insight into some of Patton’s actions and the calculations and estimates upon which these actions were based. 

Immediately after declassification of ULTRA intelligence

records,* Gen Ira C. Eaker, commander of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, stated that “virtually all of the historical accounts of the great battles of World War II must now be reexamined in the light of ULTRA’s extraordinary disclosures.”9

Unfortunately, most of the senior leadership of World War II

did not live long enough to cite the benefits of ULTRA, but one

who did provide an idea of the advantages it could afford a

commander. In 1975 when Gen Elwood R. Quesada, commander of XI Tactical Air Command (TAC), was asked the

value of ULTRA messages, he said,

They were particularly valuable. They would tell us where certain units

were. They would tell us where they might be going. They would tell us

in one way or the other what the state of their alert was. They would

often tell us what the effect of certain actions of ours was on them. It

would often do that. That was a common source of information, which

of course, would often make us grin. Sometimes be embarrassed too, I

might add. And so, this information was not only to inform us what

was happening at the time, but would confirm the effect of our action

on prior days and prior weeks. It wasn’t uncommon for us to get a verbatim copy of a message through the ULTRA system that was sent to

3

SHWEDO

*Coined by the British, ULTRA was the code name for high-grade signals intelligence derived from

German secret radio communications. Such enemy messages were known as Enigma communications, after the sophisticated German cipher machine used to encrypt them. By 1940 the British were

routinely intercepting, deciphering, translating, and analyzing a large portion of German Enigma traffic. The resulting ULTRA intelligence gave the British, and later the Americans, extraordinarily accurate information on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of their German opponents.

ULTRA remained a secret for almost 30 years after the war. Its existence was first revealed in 1974

when retired RAF Group Capt Frederick W. Winterbotham published The Ultra Secret.
the German field commanders, Army group commanders as an example, and from Hitler and his entourage, and we would often get the

message before the field commander got it. And you could tell that by

the field commander’s response “I got your message yesterday afternoon,” but we would have had it yesterday morning. That happened

time and time again. It was a very helpful thing.10

Because of the beneficial possibilities cited by Generals Quesada and Eaker’s assertion which insists that the great battles

must be reexamined in the light of ULTRA, it may now be possible to fathom the role of this special intelligence in General

Patton’s success.

Another area often neglected by historians during discussions concerning Patton is his use of airpower. Patton made

every effort to emphasize the contributions of airpower during

this campaign; and he often started press conferences by stating, “Now I would appreciate it if you all could integrate in your

stories the Third Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command, because the XIX TAC has done a great job with us.”11 Gen Carl

A. Spaatz confirmed the great job done by the XIX TAC with

the Third Army. After the drive across France, General Spaatz

noted, “What you’ve seen is the greatest example of air-ground

cooperation that has ever been or will ever be.”12 Like accounts

of ULTRA, many of the airpower stories that motivated Patton

and Spaatz’s praise are untold—still buried in the archives. Although Patton’s ground scheme of maneuver has been well

documented, its relationship to the force enhancers represented by ULTRA and airpower has yet to be examined in detail.

This study examines the relationship among ULTRA, Patton’s ground scheme of maneuver, and the operations of XIX

TAC. Patton did not live long enough to reveal the impact of

ULTRA intelligence on his battle plans, but declassification efforts have shed a new light on this topic. Archival material

provides a useful basis for assessment of airpower’s contributions and an expanded view of history. 

To better understand the relationship among Patton’s force

enhancers, this study examines ULTRA reports and compares

them to the standard accounts of the various battles. Afteraction reports by the ULTRA officers at Third Army and XIX

TAC headquarters serve as a foundation. Recollections are

evaluated against secondary historical accounts to better ensure

4

CADRE PAPER
accuracy and become the starting point for associating and

tracing individual messages to operational decisions. These

ULTRA reports are compared to memoirs and diaries to identify suggestive but understandably guarded references by senior decision makers. All of this information discloses how Patton took advantage of the fluid environment of 1944. Patton’s

effective and sometimes unorthodox employment of airpower

and ULTRA allowed him to take risks and dictate situations

that made him and his troops the most successful and feared

forces in the European theater. 

This study traces Patton’s higher tactical and operational

decisions from the hedgerows of Normandy in early August

1944 to the banks of the Moselle River, just 50 miles from the

German border. During this campaign Patton devised unique

systems to exploit the reciprocal and force-enhancing capabilities of ULTRA, airpower, and ground scheme of maneuver.

The examination of the relationships among these three tools

in the operational artist’s kit bag serves several functions.

First, it allows us to understand more fully the reasons behind

Third US Army’s rapid and successful drive across France.

Second, it provides insight into the process by which a practitioner of the operational art makes the fine judgments between

opportunity and risk and employs all the principal tools at his

disposal to exploit the former and mitigate the latter. Third, it

suggests how these same tools could be usefully combined in

the technologically enhanced era of the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. George Forty, Patton’s Third Army at War (London: Arms and Armour

Press, 1990), 10.

2. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2: Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing, 1971), 66.

3. Brenton G. Wallace, Patton and His Third Army (Washington, D.C.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946), 88.

4. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 144.

5. Fred Ayer Jr., Before the Colors Fade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964),

iii.

6. Ronald Lewin, Montgomery as Military Commander (Conshohocken,

Pa.: Combined Publishing, 1998), 232.

7. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 528.

8. Ibid.

5

SHWEDO
9. Ira C. Eaker, Microfilm 23342—Personal Collection of I. C. Eaker—

“ULTRA Goes to War” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Eaker Collection, 29 December 1974), 1.

10. Ralph Stephenson, Report K239.0512-838—“Interview with Lt Gen

Elwood R. Quesada—ULTRA Section” (Air Force Historical Research Center:

Quesada Collection, 13 May 1975), 7.

11. Blumenson, 539.

12. Frederick Vosburg, XIX TAC senior intelligence officer, telephone interview with the author, 24 March 2000.

6

CADRE PAPER
Chapter 2

Key Players

I would like to learn from you something. I don’t understand

how you could more or less be everywhere at once. It

seemed that if something was hit in the rear areas, interdictions and so on, supply establishments, reserve German

troops moving somewhere, you would show up and clobber

them. But then when your army was going to attack or defend—either one, but usually attacking—you had all kinds

of airplanes helping them. How could you be everywhere all

the time?

—Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

—(Question asked of the XIX TAC

—commander during an interrogation)

During and after the war, Germans on the western front, at

all levels of command, consistently pointed to Allied airpower

as one of the main factors contributing to their defeat. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt provided numerous examples of how Allied air operations ruined many of his battle

plans throughout the European campaign. By mid-1944 the

balance for air superiority began to tip in the favor of the Allies. When von Rundstedt was asked during interrogations

after World War II what would have been different if the air

force elements had been at parity prior to D day, he flatly

stated “The invasion would have never succeeded.”1 Von

Rundstedt further highlighted the force-enhancing effects of

airpower when he said, “These attacks were painful for moving our troops, our supplies and our gas. The tactical attacks

in France on railroad communications were devastating, all

the more so as they were repeated like clockwork again and

again immediately after we repaired the damage. On the roads

our convoys or a single M/T [motor transport] could not move

during the day. We could never count on when a certain division would arrive at its destination.”2 Von Rundstedt’s respect

7
for Allied airpower was no different before he became a POW.

He stated in a message sent to higher headquarters during the

war that “Allied air attacks to block railway transports to battle areas were very large in scale and had corresponding effect

. . . Allies exactly informed on German bringing up of forces by

recce and considerable activity by agents.”3 Von Rundstedt did

not live long enough to find out that agents and reconnaissance were not the only things that were informing the Allies.

More important was the Allies’ ability to rapidly apply airpower

against these targets. This, along with their new advantage in

air superiority, was the product of years of experience in North

Africa and Italy.

Evolution of Airpower

One of the lessons from North Africa and Italy was the need

for improved air-ground cooperation. Therefore, it was agreed

prior to the Normandy invasion that air and ground commanders would live in the same quarters, use the same operations center, and—most importantly—would “coordinate and

not subordinate” operations as “coequals.”4 These decisions

eventually were spelled out in Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power. While some air commanders used FM 100-20 to convince their ground compatriots that they were on coequal status, XIX TAC took it as a

starting point to evolve doctrine to fit the situation that existed

in 1944 France. General Patton described this evolution which

became the basis for the Third Army’s XIX TAC’s air-ground

team:

We have seen the attempts of air and ground to work together for years

but it was only on the 1st of August [1944] that it really worked. First,

air was subservient to the ground forces. That was wrong. Then air and

ground were set as things apart and that was wrong for it was quite

evident that we were not getting along. When, in those days, we would

ask for support from air the request might be made at 8:30 in the

morning and planes in inadequate numbers would arrive at perhaps

1:30 in the afternoon. I do not say this in criticism but I wish to point

out the lack of understanding of the system of getting them there.5

Patton’s people knew the system was broken and made

changes that may have appeared to be unorthodox, but these

8

CADRE PAPER
schemes significantly exploited the opportunities that existed

in August 1944. FM 100-20 directed a list of prioritized tactical airpower missions and proposed the highest priority missions for tactical air forces were air superiority, interdiction,

and, last, close air support (CAS) because it was “the most difficult to control, most expensive, and are in general, least effective.”6 XIX TAC took a different approach. They emphasized

CAS and interdiction (42 percent and 40 percent of sorties, respectively) while their sister, IX TAC, had more conventional

employment methods (27 percent CAS and 46 percent interdiction).7

The situation in Europe dictated that CAS should become a

higher priority, but this concept strayed from the teachings of

that time. The Army Air Force School of Applied Tactics

claimed before the D-day invasion: “It is almost impossible to

employ third phase operations [CAS] where bomb lines cannot

be maintained. This phase depends for success upon teamwork and cooperation. It is best employed on a stable front,

where preplanned attacks can soften up the enemy for a

breakthrough by ground forces.”8 Again, General Patton’s

forces took a different approach. To ensure the best possible

CAS and interdiction sorties for his rapidly moving forces, Patton recommended that bomb lines be abolished and that

fighter-bombers be allowed to attack freely against any clearly

recognizable targets of opportunity.9 The Army Air Force

School of Applied Tactics was correct in determining that CAS

was dependent upon teamwork and cooperation, which became another area where Patton employed unique solutions to

ensure success.

XIX TAC found the Army Air Corps manning for air liaison

officers (ALO) to be inadequate to support air-ground operations. They improvised manning and equipment that expanded their ALO organization by a factor of three over the

amount allowed by Air Corps tables of organization.10 The coordination among all elements was focused on shortening the

decision cycle for air attacks. XIX TAC found existing warning

and intelligence functions disjointed and unsatisfactory, and

they described their solution with the following comment: “To

overcome this, all aircraft warning units, fighter control

9

SHWEDO
squadrons, and radio intercept ‘Y’ service [intelligence] have

been organized into a provisional Tactical Control Group and

placed directly under the control of the Advanced Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command.”11 The evolution of this improvised system led Patton to say “formerly, . . . we could

never talk to each other but now we can curse the living daylights out of each other!”12 While Patton points out one of the

added benefits of this organization, the results on the battlefield truly displayed the merits of his system.

General Patton and his forces believed the summer of 1944

offered a window of opportunity to end the war quickly, but

this plan rested on the assumption that Third Army could exploit the fluid situation by rapid drives through the Wehrmacht.

All actions sought to increase the pace of the advance. Gen O.

P. Weyland, the XIX TAC’s commander, best described the

sometimes unconventional nature of the drives across France

with the following account:

Well, the Germans were fairly discombobulated. We, of course, endeavored to keep him in that shape and that was part of the interdiction program. To see that they couldn’t move their reserves. Or if they

did, to get them mixed up and whatnot. So they’d run these armored

columns into the Germans, and I’d violate what used to be an old principle of tactical air power “Don’t use air power against something that

the artillery can hit.” Well, time was of the essence. So I said to he--

with that. Here, they were moving, so by the time they’d stop a column

and deploy their artillery and whatnot . . . He--, it might take them an

hour or two. I’d have fighter-bombers out in front and we’d try to take

care of anything out there. But sometimes there’d be concealed stuff.

So then they’d yell. I’d have an Air Force liaison officer in the lead tank

who communicated with the fighter group that was working up front

somewhere . . . Whistle them back, and they’d be there in three minutes. Wham! Wham! Wham! They’d keep rolling.13

Patton had created a truly integrated air-ground team, and

this feeling permeated the lowest echelons of command. Gen

Paul Harkins (Patton’s deputy chief of staff) fondly recalled

this unique teamwork when he said, “The 19th TAC would fly

in weather that was absolutely forbidden for anybody else to

fly in. If a tank cut-out or got damaged out in front of the lines

and the others couldn’t move, the [19th] TAC would come in

under cloud cover and go in and strafe around until somebody

could go out and pull the tank out.”14 This support worked

both ways. The 4th Armored Division diverted resources to

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secure a downed airman through a call from his squadron

mates, and the XIX TAC repeatedly used Third Army artillery

fire for flak suppression.15 Patton fostered this relationship,

which was significantly better than the air-ground cooperation

in North Africa; and he took great pride in describing this new

kinship. “Now the situation has cleared up wonderfully because the soldiers got to know each other and about the other

fellow’s organization. There is a steady stream of pilots going

for visits to my units at the front to see how my ground soldiers live. And I also know that many of my own men are making it a practice of calling on the pilots to help drain bottles of

captured enemy merchandise. And this spirit of comradeship

is helping out in many ways.”16 This comradeship may have

flourished at the bottom, but it clearly had its roots at the top.

General Patton’s planning for the European campaign

began in England, and he wasted no time finding a commander for his air arm. General Weyland recalled harboring

some anxiety about his new command. But early in the job,

the spirit of 1943 Casablanca agreements overcame many of

his concerns as related in the following story.

Initially, this was not looked upon as a highly desirable assignment.

General Patton had a reputation as being hard to work with, and he

had a rather low regard for air power. However, this was to change rapidly . . . Whereas many ground commanders still believed that tactical

air power should be subordinated to the ground force commander,

General Patton agreed with me that he would command the ground

and that I would run the associated tactical air forces. At the same

time we both laid our cards on the table. We planned and executed our

respective responsibilities in the closest of coordination . . . From an

early attitude of skepticism, General Patton went to the other extreme.

He thought the XIX Tactical Air Command could do no wrong.17

Considering General Weyland’s background, it is not surprising that the two generals got along so well. Weyland had spent

most of his Air Corps career in tactical aircraft and had served

several tours directly attached to ground units. This provided

him added credibility because as he pointed out, to the average

Air Corps officer, “ground organization tactics were pretty much

of a mystery to them—it was not to me.”18 Patton demanded

competence and results, and it did not take long for Weyland

to display both. Early in the campaign, Patton was impressed

with roadways filled with dead Germans and destroyed

11

SHWEDO
equipment all credited to the XIX TAC; and this time it was

Patton asking Weyland to drain a bottle of bourbon for his efforts. Weyland later admitted, “Well, we killed that bottle of

bourbon, I think. And from a degree of mutual respect, this

brightened up into a very close and lasting friendship.”19

12

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Generals George S. Patton Jr. and O. P. Weyland

Understanding ULTRA

ULTRA was another area where Patton used his experience

in North Africa and Italy to improve both relationships and

performance. Although Patton disliked many of the British

representatives associated with the ULTRA system, he knew

this source of intelligence was far too important to waste due
to his prejudices. Patton knew that with every dutiful message

the Germans sent, they were compromising another aspect of

their operations. This was true because early in the war, the

Allies had broken the Germans’ highest level of communications; and Patton, as Group Capt F. W. Winterbotham––senior

RAF representative at Bletchley Park––later noted, “never

failed to use every opportunity that ULTRA gave him to bust

open the enemy.”20

These opportunities were afforded because much of the German message traffic was transmitted via wireless sets employing a cryptological machine called Enigma. The breaking of

this machine’s codes began in the interwar years through a

multinational effort. The Poles initiated the process in 1929;

and the French aided in this effort in 1932 by presenting to

the British German army Enigma intercepts, a commercial

Enigma machine (originally designed in 1919 to protect business secrets), and two Enigma manuals.21 The German military made numerous improvements on the original, which

made the number of possible cipher combinations (or keys)

“500 million million million . . . million [the word million being

written a total of 15 times].”22 In 1939, with World War II on

the horizon, the Poles shared all of their knowledge with the

French and the British; but within one year, the British were

fighting the Enigma battle alone. 

Although the Germans on occasion questioned the security

of their wireless communications, they placed their confidence

in the above calculations; and that misplaced confidence became a significant factor in their defeat in World War II. The

British launched an all-out attack on the Enigma machine

and its codes. This effort had top priority for all resources, and

it rapidly expanded to an organization of 10,000 people who

had an almost limitless budget. It was a complex program. The

system required a large signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept

infrastructure, which would relay raw intercepts to the code

breakers located 50 miles north of London at Bletchley Park.23

At Bletchley Park, the code breakers used early computers

called Bombas to help break the codes; and then the messages

were translated, analyzed, and prioritized.24 The British

quickly discovered the tactical applicability of this information

13

SHWEDO
and built up an infrastructure to facilitate this process. They

established special liaison units (SLU) that were colocated

with operational forces to push this information down to army

command level. This secret information was held at the highest levels and was classified Top Secret ULTRA. The ULTRA recipient list was kept to the bare minimum; but when the

United States entered the war, the circle expanded. 

Patton’s first introduction to ULTRA was in 1942 during Operation Torch in North Africa. During this period it was the

British SLU’s responsibility to provide ULTRA information to

the commands. However, in late 1943 it was agreed that each

country “would disseminate ULTRA to its own commands.”25

This decision was one of the significant factors that made

ULTRA so effective in France. Prior to this agreement, the

British SLUs were Bletchley Park’s only representatives to the

field commands; and they were not good salesmen at Patton’s

headquarters. They had no intention of becoming team players and constantly reminded people through their actions that

they did not fall under Patton’s command. 

The first step towards changing Patton’s mind about ULTRA

involved finding a new salesman. The success of the 1943

ULTRA agreement became apparent when Patton met his first

American ULTRA officer. He enthusiastically asked his G-2,

“Why haven’t I been informed about this Major at Third Army

Headquarters?”26 His G-2 replied, “Since we had such a bad

experience with British intelligence and signal troops (SLU) attached in Africa and Sicily, I felt it best not to mention their

presence and mission to you.”27 The employment of a competent team player transformed ULTRA from a daily one-page

synopsis in North Africa and Sicily to an extravagant daily

briefing and a 24-hour access to the commanders of Third

Army and XIX TAC in France.

The above access was unique to the American commands,

and that may be due to the extraordinary ULTRA personnel

under General Patton’s command. Outside of Patton’s Third

Army, the US ULTRA program was largely an incestuous organization whose senior leader was a civilian lawyer named Alfred McCormack. McCormack largely focused on barristers to

fill the ULTRA ranks because he believed “that lawyers as a

14

CADRE PAPER
class are better fitted for intelligence work.”28 Author Thomas

Parrish noted that this practice left the program with numerous inexperienced personnel, of which “a surprising proportion [consisted] of Alfred McCormack’s fellow Princeton

Tigers.”29 Parrish made an additional observation about this

ULTRA corps. “These ULTRA officers would be young men of

low rank, almost all of them civilians at heart, and relatively

new to the army. But generals must not, for such reasons,

brush them off. What these men would have that was possessed by no one else in any of the commands, was training

. . . in the handling of items of signal intelligence.”30 The Third

Army ULTRA officer called this training a British joke where

“the main item of equipment used was a mug for drinking tea,

the dirtier the better”; and he claimed, “I don’t remember

learning anything important.”31 This may have been true because the Third Army ULTRA officer was not new to the Army,

which is probably why generals did not brush him off.

Civilians at heart—relatively new to the army—were recipes

for disaster at Third Army headquarters; and someone had the

foresight to send a unique ULTRA officer to Patton’s staff, Lt

Col Melvin C. Helfers. In direct contrast to lawyer McCormack’s philosophy, a firm credo in Third Army’s G-2 organization was that “intelligence officers are made, not born.”32

While the other commands were struggling with their on-thejob trainees, Colonel Helfers was ready to perform his duties.

Helfers was a 1937 Citadel graduate, and he was the only Regular Army officer selected for ULTRA duties.33 He knew what

was important; and, unlike his contemporaries, he had the immediate confidence of his commanders, which helped him fuse

his information into Third Army operations. Helfers held little

regard for his higher headquarters counterparts, and he described the Twelfth US Army Group G-2 section as “overrun

with a bunch of civilian lawyer flunkies.”34 Unlike his higher

headquarters, Helfers had an excellent working relationship

with his Army Air Forces ULTRA compatriot. 

Maj Harry M. Grove was the ULTRA officer assigned to the

XIX TAC, and he too broke the stereotype of the typical American ULTRA officer. Major Grove also had an operational background and called himself an “Air Force retread.”35 Grove had

15

SHWEDO
been a pilot in World War I; and when he was recalled to duty

during World War II, he had instant credibility. He and Helfers

also carried on the air-ground cooperation within ULTRA

channels. Early in the campaign, Grove received “a request

from Gen Patton’s Chief of Staff through Lt Col Melvin Helfers

. . . that a verbal presentation of ULTRA information on the

GAF [German Air Force] be

given to Gen Patton and his

staff at the regular ULTRA

briefing.”36 This briefing was

the main conduit for incorporation of ULTRA into Third Army

operations. Patton had two

staff meetings each morning—a

large formalized briefing that

was preceded by the much

smaller ULTRA briefing. Major

Grove recalled these meetings

as follows,

It was the custom of Gen Weyland and Col Browne to attend the regular morning ULTRA briefing of Gen Patton and his Staff . . . It should

be stated here both generals and staffs were extremely attentive listeners, and gave the most serious consideration to ULTRA information.

This interest was indicated by the concentration of attention during

the briefing, as it was the rule to ask no questions during the verbal

presentation, but afterward, many intelligent questions were asked

and opinions requested based on the material at hand. It afforded the

writer the greatest satisfaction to observe the influence of source information on the conduct of operations.37

Helfers reflected upon these little meetings by stating, “General Patton must have considered this small group his privy

counsel, and he did not hesitate to let his thoughts wander

with them and to discuss future operations with them.”38 Col

Oscar W. Koch, Patton’s G-2, had similar memories of these

sessions. In his guarded 1970 account, he observed that the

“presentation would be followed by a period of thinking out

loud by all present . . . If the enemy does so and so, General

Patton would ask, what do you think of our doing this?”39

ULTRA started the day for the Third Army and XIX TAC, but

that was not this information’s only outlet. Both commanders

also gave their ULTRA officers clearance to provide updates

16

CADRE PAPER

Lt Col (then major) Melvin C.

Helfers’s ULTRA Briefing to Patton
any time during the day that they deemed appropriate. General Weyland made this clear to Grove by stating that “he

wanted to be awakened at once for any information that he

could do something about, and it was left to the writer’s

(Grove) judgment and experience.”40 Within Patton’s organization the ULTRA staff’s judgment and experience were never in

question.

The last aspects that helped to ensure success for Patton

were his appreciation for intelligence and for his G-2. As a senior officer, Patton’s understanding and enthusiasm for intelligence was even more unique than his serious support for coequal status for airpower or for well-prepared ULTRA officers.

He appreciated the opportunities ULTRA provided because unlike most field commanders, he had two tours as an intelligence officer (1925–28 and 1935–37).41 Gen Omar Bradley

best encapsulated the American view of an intelligence assignment when he reflected, “Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in some stations G-2

became a dumping ground for officers ill-suited for command.

I recall how scrupulously I avoided the branding that came

with an intelligence assignment in my own career.”42 This

practice led many senior commanders during the interwar

years to grow indifferent when filling the various “2” positions

on their staffs. This policy may be fine in peace, but it is disastrous in war. So while Patton was employing outstanding officers that were of the same caliber as General Weyland, other

generals were filling their intelligence staffs apathetically with

misfits and “officers ill-suited for command.”

17

SHWEDO

Col Oscar W. Koch, Third Army’s G-2

On top of Patton’s intelligence apparatus as Third

Army G-2 was Colonel Koch.

He was an old friend of General Patton’s from the Army

Cavalry School, and he had

followed Patton through his

previous campaigns. Patton

respected Koch; and he often

praised Koch’s efforts, once

stating “I ought to know

Photo courtesy of US Army
what I’m doing, I’ve got the best da--ed intelligence officer in

any United States command.”43 When it came to ULTRA, Koch

showed a maturity that other G-2s did not always possess. Appreciation for ULTRA ran the gamut among the various 2s.

Some intelligence directors failed to see the value of this information, and the frustration of their subordinate staff was

sometimes apparent: “It was difficult to properly present the

‘source’ [ULTRA] to the Commanding General and his

deputies. This difficulty arose primarily because of the complete failure of the then A-2 to appreciate the value of the

‘source’ and the possibilities of its operational use. Fortunately, this A-2’s services came to a speedy termination

through the excellent marksmanship of a Wehrmacht submachine gunner.”44 On the opposite end of the scale, some G-2s

totally embraced ULTRA. These officers were so infatuated by

this source that they disregarded their duties as G-2s and became full-time ULTRA officers. As one ULTRA officer noted,

that left him without a job and their associated armies without a G-2:

Initially, the G-2 presented the signals, unsorted, unedited, and without comment, to the CG [commanding general] and C/S [chief of staff]

twice daily. Later I was permitted to see them after everyone else. By

keeping records and by plotting a map, I was able to show the G-2 that

a good deal of valuable information was being overlooked. Gradually I

was allowed first to sort and then to edit and by the beginning of the

Ardennes offensive, the material was assembled and written up twice

daily . . . then read to the CG by the G-2 . . . No briefing was ever done

directly by the ULTRA representative.45

ULTRA was very enticing. Messages often provided everything a G-2 would want. German unit reports gave the exact

order of battle strengths, locations, and conditions of morale.

Logistic messages supplied the Allies with an interdiction

playbook. Attack and movement orders gave the G-2 the everelusive intentions of the enemy, and damage or repair reports

provided accurate bomb damage assessments and precise

dates for follow-on strikes of repaired facilities. Some G-2s saw

this as the answer to their dreams, but Koch took a different

approach. 

Accounts of ULTRA’s contributions often ignore the potential pitfalls associated with its use. Some of these hazards were

18

CADRE PAPER
revealed in a May 1945 report: “The raw intercepted messages

themselves never give a complete or sequential chronicle; the

gaps must be filled by the knowledge of the inner administrative and operational procedures of the German armed forces

and by deduction based on his knowledge. Often, ULTRA itself

has been dangerously misleading. The ULTRA technique may

decipher the message ordering an intended operation, but fail

often to intercept the message that cancels or alters it.”46

In contrast to many G-2s, Patton’s director of intelligence

took a balanced approach to exploiting ULTRA intelligence.

Koch knew tracking the problems associated with ULTRA was

a full-time job, which is why Helfers was the only ULTRA officer “in all the US armies who daily briefed the Army commander directly.”47 Koch knew his job was to provide the

larger intelligence picture. ULTRA was just one facet of that

greater picture, and Koch refused to let his other intelligence

sections atrophy due to excessive reliance on this single

source. Koch ensured all sections continued their work in

spite of this intelligence windfall; and as one observer noted,

this practice sometimes appeared to have redundant results:

The regular G-2 sections, by dint of painstaking and intelligent piecing

together of scraps gleaned from PW’s (prisoners of war), captured documents and other sources, identified one morning at the regular meeting five enemy divisions in the line opposing the Third Army. This was

good G-2 work. Yet, after the special briefing followed the regular briefing, Colonel Koch called to General Patton’s attention that these five divisions had been identified by the recipients and placed on the ULTRA

map as follows: two divisions a week before, two divisions three days

before and one the preceding day. It was a common occurrence at the

regular meeting for a G-2 man to identify a German division which had

been spotted days before by ULTRA and had been announced at the

special briefing. On two occasions the regular G-2 staff placed German

divisions in the line which were actually in Italy, according to the last

ULTRA report. At the special briefings following these occasions, it was

stated that there had been no ULTRA message showing a movement

from Italy. In each case, the divisions remained in Italy and the G-2

section, a week or so thereafter, corrected the mistakes which were due

to PW’s who strayed to France from their former units in Italy.48

Koch received numerous suggestions to indoctrinate (grant access to ULTRA intelligence) his order-of-battle team in order to

eliminate the perceived redundancy of tasks and avoid any

possible confusion due to the conflicting information pre19

SHWEDO
sented by conventional sources of intelligence. Koch believed

that this was inadvisable, and he stressed the need to create

orders of battle “compiled exclusively from open sources.”49

This directive would pay handsome dividends in the prelude to

the Battle of the Bulge and would also provide exceptional

cover stories for the operational employment of ULTRA.

New Kid on the Block

Although Patton and Koch were veterans of North Africa and

Sicily, before 1 January 1944 Third Army had been a training

unit and would require some time to get ready for combat. The

main body of Third Army arrived in England in March 1944,

and preparations for tasks on the continent began immediately. Patton created an organization that was built for speed.

Helfers’s first impression “of Third Army Headquarters was

that of an old-fashioned cavalry troop with General Patton as

the troop commander and his four G’s as his platoon commanders.”50 In order to ensure cavalry speed, Third Army was

one of the first commands to use the war-room concept, not

only in headquarters planning but also in the field of combat.51 One of the first directives received by this war room was

indicative of the coming campaign: “Third US Army Plan is indefinite since its deployment depends upon the situation at

that time.”52 The vagueness was due to the fact that for the

Normandy invasion, Third Army was considered a follow-on

force not scheduled to be committed until D+28–D+30. The

original Overlord plans had Third Army largely focused on

Brittany; but soon after the commencement of operations, its

aims would greatly expand.53

Third Army officially initiated operations on 1 August 1944

and found a situation that was perfect for Patton’s style of

warfare. The enemy troops opposing Third Army were not

ready for Patton’s rapid exploitation of the battlefield. The Seventh German Army opposite Patton’s forces was battered by

the previous months’ operations. These German forces had

become accustomed to the set-piece battles of the hedgerows,

and as one quote attributed to Gen George C. Marshall attests,

the Germans were about to meet a new adversary: “Bradley

20

CADRE PAPER
will lead the invasion, but he is a limited objective general.

When we get moving, Patton is the man with the drive and

imagination to do dangerous things fast.”54 Bradley’s limited

objectives in June and July significantly wore down the German army; and when Operation Cobra blasted a hole in the

brittle lines, Patton’s mobile forces were matchless to exploit

this breakthrough. 

By 31 May 1944, Third Army had 253,000 men; but it took

time to channel these forces through the narrow bridgehead in

Normandy in the months of July and August. During the initial phase of this operation, Patton had five armored and six

infantry divisions. To increase the tempo of the attack, Patton

used these armored divisions as Third Army’s lead elements,

with the infantry being employed to reduce any bypassed

strong points. In order to maneuver these forces quickly, Patton employed informal techniques to reduce the time associated with Third Army’s decision cycle.

As reflected in the earlier ULTRA section, Patton’s planning

for Third Army’s operations often occurred in an informal atmosphere. Contrary to his popular image, during these planning sessions Patton jettisoned his legendary gruff personality. According to Helfers, “my experience with him was like a

college professor conducting a seminar, easy going and he had

a sense of humor.”55 Operational planning started with intelligence; and as one author noted, this practice had obvious

benefits. “Patton never made a move without first consulting

G-2. In planning, G-2 always had the first say. The usual procedure at other Headquarters was to decide what to do and

then, perhaps, ask G-2 what was out front. Patton always got

his information first and then acted on the basis of it. That explains why Third Army was never surprised and why it always

smashed through vulnerable sectors in the enemy’s lines.”56 In

order to facilitate the rapid application of this information,

Patton created various organizations to quickly move data

within his front. This meant that his war room was constantly

busy; and as Third Army’s after-action reports indicate, many

of their inputs were taken through informal telephone calls

(more formal confirmation orders came via hard copy later).57

21

SHWEDO
Every component within Patton’s organization was built to

focus on the rapid and efficient application of military force.

While Patton was building this organization, he had the advantage of monitoring the ongoing operations in France, which

allowed him to prepare his troops intelligently for their upcoming tasks. Patton impatiently watched the Battle for Normandy and confined his critiques to his diary and his inner

circle of friends, but his comments offered an excellent preview of plans for the upcoming operations: “Sometimes I get

desperate over the future. Brad and Hodges are such nothings. Their virtue is that they get along by doing nothing. I

could break through in three days if I commanded. They try to

push all along the front and have power nowhere. All that is

necessary now is to take more chances by leading them with

armored divisions and covering their advances with air bursts.

Such an attack would have to be made on a narrow sector,

whereas at present we are trying to attack all along the line.”58

Third Army arrived on the European continent at a time tailormade for a commander who could exploit the fluid conditions

that existed in August 1944. Patton was such a commander,

and a foreshadowing of upcoming events is evident in the

comments of a Navy lieutenant who witnessed Third Army’s

debarkation. “And when you see General Patton . . . you get

the same feeling as when you saw Babe Ruth striding up to

the plate. Here’s a big guy who’s going to kick the he-- out of

something.”59

Notes

1. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-95—“Weyland’s Interrogation of von

Rundstedt at Bad Kissingen” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Weyland Collection, 2 July 1945), 6.

2. Ibid., 4–5.

3. James D. Fellers, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives: Record

Group 457, 7 June 1945), 35.

4. Laurence S. Kuter, “God---mit Georgie,” Air Force Magazine, February

1973, 55.

5. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101—“Talks by General Patton and

General Weyland at Press Conference” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 16 December 1944), 3.

6. Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 12.

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7. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army: The XIX Tactical Air

Command in the Second World War,” draft paper, June 1994, Boulder, Colo.,

266.

8. Wasson J. Wilson and Henry F. Fitzmaurice, Report 248.401-19—lecture, “Command and Employment of Airpower” (Air Force Historical Research Center, 10 January 1945), 5.

9. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France

and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1981),

242.

10. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 30 September 1944), 1.

11. Ibid.

12. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101, 4.

13. Ralph Stephenson, Report K239.0512-813—“Interview with General

O. P. Weyland” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 19

November 1974), 77–78.

14. James Hasdorff, Report K239.0512-522—“Interview with Gen Paul

D. Harkins” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Corona Harvest Collection, 23 February 1972), 8.

15. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101—“Talks by General Patton and

General Weyland at Press Conference” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 9 December 1944), 4–5.

16. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101—Press Conference, 16 December 1944,

4.

17. Charles M. Province, Patton’s Third Army: A Daily Combat Diary (New

York: Hippocrene Books, 1992), 290–91.

18. Stephenson, Report K239.0512-813, 22–23.

19. Ibid., 75–76.

20. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row,

1974), 98.

21. F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1979), 947–48.

22. Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was

Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two (Frederick, Md.:

University Publications of America, 1984), 24.

23. Edward Hitchcock, “The Hut Six Story,” Foreign Intelligence Literary

Scene, June 1982, 77.

24. Ibid.

25. Alfred McCormack, SRH-185—“War Experiences of Alfred McCormack” (National Archives: Record Group 457, 31 July 1947), 10–11.

26. Melvin C. Helfers, Personal Papers—“My Personal Experience with

High Level Intelligence” (Charleston, S.C.: The Citadel Archives, November

1974), 8.

27. Ibid.

28. McCormack, 4.

29. Thomas Parrish, The American Codebreakers: The US Role in ULTRA

(Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough Press, 1991), 187.

30. Ibid., 189.

31. Helfers, 3.

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SHWEDO
32. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2 Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971), xvi.

33. Helfers, 1.

34. Ibid., 10.

35. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 16 October 1984).

36. Harry M. Grove, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives: Record

Group 457, 30 May 1945), 2–3.

37. Ibid., 3.

38. Helfers, Personal Papers, 8.

39. Koch and Hays, 147.

40. Grove, 4.

41. Roger H. Nye, The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an

Extraordinary Leader (Garden City Park, N.Y.: Avery Publishing, 1993), 67

and 102.

42. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1951), 33.

43. Fred Ayer Jr., Before the Colors Fade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1964), 175.

44. John C. Griggs, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives: Record

Group 457, 17 May 1945), 1.

45. Adolph G. Rosengarten Jr., SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA

Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 21 May 1945), 7.

46. SRH-113—“ULTRA History of the US Strategic Air Force Europe versus German Air Forces” (National Archives: Record Group 457, May 1945),

4–5.

47. Helfers, Personal Papers, 10.

48. Warrack Wallace, SRH-108—“Report on Assignment with the Third

United States Army 15 August–18 September 1944” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 21 May 1945), 3–4.

49. George C. Church, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 28 May 1945), 4.

50. Helfers, Personal Papers, 2.

51. Province, 12.

52. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Annex 4: Third US Army Outline Plan, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, 1. Copy

located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

53. Ibid., 1–2.

54. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 622.

55. Helfers, video tape interview.

56. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947),

68.

57. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1, Annex

N, Third US Army Directives, Regensburg, Germany, 1945 , I–VII. Copy located

in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

58. D’Este, 617.

59. Ibid., 614.

24

CADRE PAPER
Chapter 3

Breakout in Brittany

Patton studied every ULTRA signal and, knowing where

every enemy soldier was in his path, would thread his way

round or through them and find the undefended spot. He

had done it in Sicily and then all the way from Brittany to

the Rhine.

—Group Capt F. W. Winterbotham

—Senior ULTRA officer

The conditions that existed in August 1944 could not have

been more conducive to Patton’s style of warfare. The French

countryside was littered with thinly manned German units

who were trying to guess where the Allies would strike next.

Throughout June and July, the Allies employed Patton as a

decoy. This ruse helped convince the Germans that Patton’s

nonexistent First US Army Group (FUSAG) would lead the

grossen invasion at Calais, an area 200 miles northeast of the

Allied beachheads. As the Fifteenth German Army idly

watched the D-day invasions awaiting the main attack from

FUSAG at Calais, the Third US Army was busy planning its

maneuvers to exploit the sparse German force allocations on

the Brittany Peninsula. 

Patton’s Playground

The original D-day plans called for the entire Third Army to

be committed to Brittany. Its first mission was the reduction of

the peninsula, and then its four corps would be “concentrated

in preparation for operations to the east.”1 Insight into the dire

German circumstances would dictate modifications to the initial

D-day plans and greatly reduce the Third Army’s commitment

to the Brittany Peninsula. Increased insight into German operations by August also greatly aided Patton’s design for maneuver warfare. On 20 July 1944, Adolf Hitler narrowly escaped an

25
assassination attempt that significantly shook his confidence in

the German military. With the trust of the German military undermined, Hitler decided to direct the war increasingly from his

headquarters. His orders would not escape the attention of the

Allied ULTRA analysts who would often take action on these directives as quickly as their intended recipients—hence further

centralization of German command-aided Allied understanding

of dispositions and intentions. 

Patton’s version of blitzkrieg warfare greatly aided the

ULTRA effort. His rapid pursuits, encirclements, and deep

thrusts rarely allowed the Germans to employ hardwire communications. Therefore, the increasingly mobile German

troops became more reliant on the wireless Enigma machine

for the majority of their communication needs. This fact became clear to the Bletchley Park officials who saw the sharp

increase in ULTRA traffic soon after Patton’s forces broke out

of Normandy. Ralph Bennett, a senior intelligence officer at

Bletchley Park, described this phenomenon of the summer of

1944: “The volume of traffic dropped when the front became

temporarily stabilized soon after the fall of Cherbourg [end of

June] and was slow to pick up again until Cobra brought

about a resumption of mobile warfare a month later and

raised the traffic-levels to unprecedented heights . . .

Mercifully, the famine began to abate as Cobra got under way

and August was once more a time of plenty.”2 The vast

amounts of information dictated that any future Third Army

campaign must exploit the advantages associated with an enfeebled enemy. Many of these ULTRA messages made it very

apparent that the Germans were extremely vulnerable to a

rapid air-ground attack. 

The XIX TAC also saw August 1944 as a time of opportunity.

The battle for air superiority clearly had been won by the

Allies, and the summer days were conducive to exploiting this

newly gained leverage in the air. Although the Third Army and

the XIX TAC would not become officially operational until 1

August 1944, XIX TAC had been flying sorties with IX Fighter

Command since February 1944 and found the summer

months propitious for an air campaign. One after-action report included this statement: “taking full advantage of the long

26

CADRE PAPER
summer days, some groups flew as many as five separate missions in one day, and many pilots put in a ‘working day’ of

more than 12 hours of almost continuous fighter-bombing.”3

When the XIX TAC moved to forward airfields, weather problems such as morning fog on the peninsula were negated,

which also increased sortie generation rates. The Third Army’s

advance captured airfields so rapidly that XIX TAC moved its

combat headquarters five times in August.4 Like ULTRA,

ground action aided the air campaign. Although moving to

new air bases tested the command and control of XIX TAC operations, these bases afforded decreased fuel consumption

and time-to-target rates while increasing target loiter times

and sortie generation. Overall, Patton’s forces soon found out

in early August that the ground scheme of maneuver, ULTRA,

and airpower were mutually beneficial. 

The XIX TAC was not the only unit operating before the formal 1 August 1944 start date. Patton had unofficially been directing Gen Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps since 28 July, and

some of his orders were causing some consternation among the

veteran hedgerow fighters. The official US Army history of

World War II captures some of the problems Middleton encountered when General Bradley transferred his corps from

First to Third Army: “Middleton, methodical and meticulous,

found himself in a whirlwind that threatened to upset his ideas

of an orderly and controlled progress. The transfer of VIII Corps

from First to Third Army brought changes in staff procedures,

communications, and supply, but these were minor problems

compared to exigencies that emerged in rapid succession as a

result of positional warfare in Cotentin to wide-open exploitation in Brittany.”5 First Army tended to emphasize formal staff

work, often committing its plans to paper and requiring precise

reports from subordinate units. Patton favored the opposite

end of the spectrum. He advocated a “good plan violently executed now rather than a perfect plan next week”; and for

Patton, staff planning and orders were frequently conducted

through informal briefings and conversations.6

Middleton, an infantryman, was not the only one who perceived some of the new cavalry-minded orders as perplexing.

Weyland’s staff reported “General Patton’s first request to

27

SHWEDO
Nineteenth TAC was a strange one: do not blow up any

bridges.”7 In the past, this technique was effective for slowing

German movements; but Patton looked at interdiction another

way. He wanted the bridges so his forces could move without

delay. Patton’s plans were built on high-speed movement. His

plan was to prevent movements “from, not to” the battle area,

in order to keep the lines of communication (LOC) ahead of his

troops as smooth and as fluid as possible.8

The XIX TAC also had some transition problems associated

with the transfer from First to Third Army, as noted by XIX

TAC pilots:

Before Cobra, the second priority assignment for air as the First Army

fought stubbornly from hill to hill and patiently stormed strong points,

was to attack German defensive positions which had held out for days

and might hold out for weeks. Thunderbolts would plan, twenty-four

to forty-eight hours in advance, to dive bomb a tough machine gun

concentration or fort impregnable from ground. In Third Army–

Nineteenth TAC tactics, the second job too was reversed. There were no

such things as German “strong points” in Brittany short of the great

island and port fortresses. Over the open country of the peninsula, the

Germans rarely paused long enough to make a stand at Hill X or Ridge

Y. It became impossible to plan tactical support missions a day in advance, when Third Army tanks rolled ahead twenty miles a day and

when aircraft had to make sure, before an attack, that the objective

had not already been taken out by our ground forces. All these considerations added up to the same thing. In support of Gen. Patton,

Nineteenth TAC would find its targets in the field, and would plan as

it flew.9

The XIX TAC found one of the best ways to support the above

operations was through dedicated armor cover, which at the

time was considered by the Air Corps to be an inefficient use

of airpower. The standard procedure for this operation was to

fly 35 miles ahead of the column to seek out and destroy

strong points or pockets of resistance that might hamper forward movement.10 The XIX TAC also found itself performing a

myriad of unconventional tasks ranging from flank support for

the entire Third Army to covering and defending bridges for

ground troops or simply reporting the present location of

Patton spearheads.

Patton’s preparations for his upcoming operations in Brittany

appeared unorthodox to many members of his command. The

majority of these changes concerned air-ground cooperation,

28

CADRE PAPER
and it was clear throughout Patton’s organization that any procedure that did not emphasize speed or the rapid advance of the

Third Army would not survive the general’s scrutiny. 

Combat Operations Begin

The front that Patton inherited on 1 August afforded a tenuous gateway into Brittany. One of the greatest limiting factors for Patton during this time was getting his forces through

a bottleneck at Avranches. Avranches is a small town between

the See and Selune Rivers, and movement along the few roads

that went through the town had to be managed with great precision (map 1). One task force with 3,500 men was instructed

to arrive “in Avranches precisely at 0200 . . . not before and

was to clear Pontaubault exactly by 0500.” (See map 2, example 1.)11 This task was so challenging that it led Patton to comment in his diary on 1 August: “Visited the VIII Corps to coordinate the movement of the 90th Division through the rear

areas. This is an operation which, at Leavenworth, would certainly give you an unsatisfactory mark, as we are cutting the

90th Division through the same town and on the same street

being used by two armored and two other infantry divisions.

However, there is no other way of doing it at this time.”12 The

criticality of Avranches was noted by both sides, and many orders during the month of August focused on the destruction or

protection of this vital choke point. 

On 1 August Patton’s G-2, Colonel Koch, also provided possible enemy reactions to the oncoming Third Army attacks.

The assessment stated that the Germans could “launch a

major armored counterattack against the Army’s east flank

designed to drive a wedge to the sea and sever the north-south

supply line.”13 It also estimated that the enemy could evacuate to the south and west while delaying by using favorable

terrain for sporadic defense, or “he could withdraw into and

defend the heavily fortified Brittany ports.”14 The first week of

fighting in Brittany would see the Germans attempt to execute

each option listed in Koch’s report. Patton wasted no time in

preparing Third Army units to counter these anticipated

enemy countermoves.

29

SHWEDO
One of the first requests from Patton for the XIX TAC noted

in General Weyland’s diary called for “air cover over bridges

and dams, as they are vulnerable and their destruction would

cause debacle.”15 On 3 August Third Army specifically asked

30

CADRE PAPER

Map 1. Choke Point at Avranches
for fighter cover over the Pontorson bridge.16 Due to vulnerabilities associated with Third Army’s initial precarious posi31

SHWEDO

Map 2. Third Army Operations in Brittany
tion, Weyland took these rear-area missions over Avranches

and Pontorson seriously. As soon as XIX TAC received its first

P-51 Mustangs, they were assigned to keep a constant fighter

umbrella over the Third Army rear areas.17

Through ULTRA, Patton and the XIX TAC knew the

Germans wanted to target vulnerable areas such as bridges

and LOCs with any asset available. On 1 August at 2230

hours, the Germans transmitted an attack order to 116

Panzer Division instructing them to “hold their position and

counter thrust towards Avranches.”18 The areas along the

Allies’ narrow LOCs were also a favorite for the German artillery, and Luftwaffe air tasking orders (ATO) continuously

highlighted a focus on these LOCs. During this period the

Allies consistently had access to German ATOs, which may

help to answer von Rundstedt’s initial question to Weyland

during the former’s subsequent interrogation: “How could you

be everywhere all the time?”19 During this period Jagdkorps

Two continually called for “road strafing in Avranches” and

“Schwerpunkt roads [are at] Avranches . . . Pontorson.”20 XIX

TAC actively employed assets to counter both the German air

and ground threats in this area. By midmorning 1 August, the

Germans were introduced to the new air-ground team in-theater when the German commanders received reports stating:

“that the Americans were at Pontorson and Dol-de-Bretagne

and that two batteries of a German assault gun brigade committed against the armored spearheads had been destroyed

principally by fighter-bombers.”21

Although the first day’s activities had many successes, there

were some initial problems associated with the transition from

static to mobile warfare. Late in the first day, General Patton

received a report that a German armor column was headed for

Third Army spearheads. Patton quickly tasked Weyland to intercept it, and the XIX TAC “put three groups of F/B

(fighter/bombers) on the German column.”22 Patton later recalled this episode as very amusing as he related the following

story: “I asked General Weyland . . . to send some fighter

bombers to stop it. The bombers were unable to find the column, because it actually was the 4th Armored Division moving in from the northeast. However, the planes did do some

32

CADRE PAPER
effective work knocking out enemy resistance ahead of the 4th

Armored Division and this was a precursor of many other

such jobs. It was love at first sight between the XIX Tactical

Air Command and the Third Army.”23

Patton’s rapid advances often put timely information about

the current situation at a premium. This is why capabilities

like ULTRA could be especially valuable in a high-speed campaign. During this drive, Patton committed the 6th and 4th

Armored Divisions and divided each division into three combatant commands: CC A, CC B, and CC R reserve. Due to a

change in priorities, a reduced effort was committed to

Brittany, leaving the task that was once for the entire Third

Army to VIII Corps.24 Although this force did not have the originally planned firepower, Patton was interested in speed; and

these lighter commands could efficiently exploit the confusion

that existed within the German units. On 2 August ULTRA

found one unit in Dinan that correctly estimated the strength

of 6th Armor’s CC B when it reported the Allies were “attacking Dinan but without strong forces,” and the message then

referred to a “German attack from east to west on Dinan.”25

Dinan was quickly identified as a German strong point and

was bypassed (map 2, example 2). It is not surprising that at

noon on the 4th, Patton issued the order “Dinan will not, repeat, not be attacked.”26 It is also not surprising that at 2130

hours that same day, a German commander submitted a message complaining “Dinan sector no repeat no contact with

Allies.”27

Another unit that bypassed Dinan was the even lighter Task

Force A. Patton specifically created this force of 3,500 men to

support the attack on Brest through the rapid capture of

bridges from the north. Although the force was initially diverted to St. Malo by the VIII Corps commander, Patton interceded because he wanted “Task Force A to sweep the north

coast of Brittany.”28 ULTRA information from 4 August suggested the north roads of Brittany were primed for Task Force

A. At 1115 on 4 August, the German naval harbor master at

St. Brieuc reported that the “[Kriegsmarine] had blown up and

abandoned its bases.”29 Further confirmation came on 5

August when a report on St. Brieuc claimed “the infantry had

33

SHWEDO
moved off, base blown up.”30 Task Force A quickly secured

that town on the 6th, and ULTRA messages received early that

same day gave Task Force A little reason to deviate from the

road leading out of St. Brieuc. On 5 August the German 266th

Division reported forces “between St. Brieuc and Morlaix with

few divisional troops and three Ost Battalions of little fighting

value and limited mobility.”31 The message proved accurate.

On 9 August Task Force A reported they had completed their

mission with few losses and had encountered very few enemy

soldiers (map 2, example 3).32

ULTRA was not the only source of information during this

campaign. Sixth Armored Division’s CC B was traveling on the

main road that paralleled the north highway that Task Force

A used, when suddenly the French Forces of the Interior

warned that 2,000 paratroopers were to make a defense at

Carhaix.33 Early in the morning of the 5th, CC B was directed

to bypass Carhaix. During that same morning, an ULTRA

message arrived confirming the location of the paratroopers

and their frustration because at Carhaix there was “no repeat

no contact with the Allies, [Germans sent] Reece in easterly direction.” 34 (See map 2, example 4.)

The key to operations in Brittany was the concept of avoiding strong points and exploiting the weak areas of the German

defenses. Unfortunately, Brittany was also the home of numerous fortresses that overlooked many of the key ports that

the Allies wanted to use in the coming winter months. Prior to

the D-day invasion, there were numerous reports on these

fortresses, most of which revealed that they would not be easy

to conquer. Strangely, the Japanese were a great source of information on this topic. The Japanese ambassador in Berlin,

Gen Oshima Hiroshi, dutifully reported back to Tokyo often

enough to become one section of Grove’s standard briefing

headings under the category of “Special Information.”35 Carl

Boyd, in Hitler’s Japanese Confidant, captures the information

that Hitler shared with this general which was transmitted

back to Tokyo and intercepted by the Allies. General Oshima

described the improvements to these forts (caliber of guns,

rates of fire, disposition of forces, etc.) that began in 1942 and

which made clear that these forts would not fall quickly to

34

CADRE PAPER
Allied pressure.36 His information was considered so important that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was provided a copy

of the intercepted messages.37

ULTRA reports early in the campaign also confirmed

German attachment to these fortresses. ULTRA intercepted

orders to the commander of St. Milo directing “that suitable

vessels [are] to be employed to support artillery fire in order to

use everything to hold St. Milo.”38 On 4 and 5 August, XIX TAC

“braved solid flak” and destroyed and damaged some of these

ships; but the fort’s defensive walls were beyond the capabilities of the fighter-bomber of 1944.39 Hitler invested much in

these fortresses, hoping that the Allies would tie up troops attacking garrisons as opposed to fighting their way into

Germany. Hitler selected dependable commanders for these

fortifications, required them to take an oath to defend to the

death, and specifically ordered them to hold these forts “to the

last man, to the last cartridge.”40 The Allies knew these

fortresses would not be easy to take, but their biggest question

was how long the Germans would delay in Brittany before they

retreated back to their strongholds east of the Rhine.

Attacks on these forts would have given the Germans time

to build up defensive positions on other areas of the peninsula. Twelfth Army Group understood this quickly and directed on 2 August that “St. Malo may be bypassed and contained if reduction takes too large a force and too much

time.”41 Time and large forces were not items the Allies had,

and Patton was content to let the Germans bottle themselves

in these fortresses. Early morning on the 6th, ULTRA provided

another confirmation on what fortresses were of the greatest

concern to the Germans when they directed their forces “available in Brittany to be concentrated in the fortresses of St.

Malo, Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire.”42 That same day, 12th

Army Group provided the assessment “Enemy resistance in

Brittany now consists of scattered pockets and port garrisons

apparently to defend St. Nazaire, Lorient, Brest, and the

Peninsula North of Guingamp.”43 A captured German general

best describes the Allies’ strategy during this phase when he

accuses Hitler of having fortress mania: “The enemy was content simply to keep these fortresses under observation, since

35

SHWEDO
they could do no harm to his conduct of the campaign as a

whole. But they cost us between 160,000 and 200,000 men,

together with costly weapons and equipment.”44

The above facts rapidly made Brittany a backwater operation, and Patton’s attention quickly turned to the east. Patton

knew he had a small window of opportunity to exploit the confusion that existed within the German lines, and the attacks

on St. Malo and Brest would have to wait as the 4th Armored

Division sealed off the Brittany Peninsula. 

Initially, the drive to Brittany was focused on securing additional ports for logistical support and reducing the strain on

the Normandy beaches. The rapid withdrawal of the German

forces to their fortresses and the void of German forces eastward changed the Allies’ priorities. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower

reflected the Allies’ attitude towards Brittany’s ports when he

said: “any attempt to capture the place [main port of Brest] in

a single assault would be extremely costly to us. Fortunately,

our prospects for securing better ports than Brest began to

grow much brighter just before the middle of August.”45 The

ports Eisenhower referred to were farther east, and he noted

“the distance from Brest to the Metz region was greater than

the distance from Marseille (southern France) to Metz.”46 The

rapid gains of the Allied armies quickly made Brittany’s ports

a secondary priority. 

Overall, as soon as the German forces were bottled up in

their fortresses, the Allies’ rear areas were relatively secure.

Further efforts against these German troops would become a

waste of resources at a critical time period. Patton understood

this as he turned his attention towards Paris and the exploitable French countryside. 

The Lure from the East

The Allied attacks farther inland did not have to tackle

fortresses; and the topography east of Brittany was devoid of

many natural barriers, which made this region conducive to

rapid armor thrusts. ULTRA also pointed out through numerous messages that the positions in this sector were weakly

manned, which enticed the Allies to drive east before the

36

CADRE PAPER
Germans could rectify the situation. Although it appeared

from initial indications that Rennes would be a German strong

point, on 2 August ULTRA showed a different picture. Early in

the morning of 2 August, the Allies received an intercepted

message that instructed Germans on 1 August in Rennes to

“begin at once” the destruction of Rennes.47 It appeared the

Germans did not have long-term plans for this city, and on 3

August, “elements of the 8th Infantry Division captured

Rennes over light enemy resistance.”48

Farther to the east and south, even more revealing messages were received that provided insight into the desperate

situation in the German rear areas. On 1 and 2 August, reports from Laval requested “supply columns to be sent at once

to Laval . . . Supply of fighting troops no longer possible” and

they also needed “M/T [motor transport] . . . for evacuation.”49

On the 2d, LeMans (farther to the east) cried for “35 medium

lorries immediately, otherwise [there is a] danger that irreplaceable equipment might have to be blown up.”50 There were

numerous indicators that German defenses were ill prepared

for an Allied drive to the east, and Patton did not want to give

his adversaries any time to correct their situation. On the 4th,

he gave orders for XV Corps “to seize the bridgehead at Laval

. . . [then] to LeMans and prepare for further action to the

north or east or northeast.”51 (See map 1.)

During these drives Third Army continued to receive confirmation through ULTRA of thinly manned German positions.

Patton quickly determined that this situation needed to be exploited. On the morning of 5 August, an ULTRA message revealed that the Germans had scheduled “withdrawal operations Gruppe from Laval . . . envisioned for night 5th/6th.”52

On the 6th, patrols discovered that the German garrison was

thoroughly destroyed; and the following morning they found

Laval had been evacuated and met no opposition securing the

town (see map 1).53 Similar situations occurred with other

small towns, but Patton was only interested in driving as far

south as the Loire River, with the next southern target being

Angers.

As Patton’s forces were driving towards Angers on the 7th,

ULTRA reported that the previous day the following order went

37

SHWEDO
to German units: “Angers . . . to be destroyed as soon as no

more units on them. Transfers to be made rapidly.”54 Later

that day Patton “verbally ordered the XX Corps to move one

regimental combat team from 5th Infantry Division to Angers”

and on 10 August “Angers was captured without resistance.”55

(See map 3.) The preparatory air attacks on LeMans and

Angers represented some of the complexities of striking targets

based purely on ULTRA information. Because only a few officers were indoctrinated into ULTRA, sometimes line pilots

were very frustrated with what they viewed as worthless missions. One ULTRA officer recounted this problem with the following story:

Through this recipient’s ULTRA-inspired recommendations, repeated

attacks were made against the clutches of fields at Alencon, LeMans,

Angers, etc. Invariably, pilots would return from these missions reporting “no aircraft seen” and somewhat “browned off” at dumping

their eggs on apparently inactive fields and dispersal areas. Regular as

clockwork, however, SOURCE [ULTRA] would produce a reaction such

as, “Ten a/c [aircraft] lost from low level attack,” “No serviceable a/c

left,” “All technical flying equipment heavily shot up,” “impossible to

occupy airfield any longer,” etc. Even Operations, non-indoctrinated at

the time, was skeptical, but the Air Commander continued to back the

program because he knew they were there and were being affected by

the effort. Eventually, a IX pilot was shot down over one of the Angers

strips and lay for days in the woods where he watched the German

fighters take-off and land throughout the daylight hours and he observed their careful camouflage and dispersal systems. On his return

to Allied lines he told of having been mentally gripped at the time of his

attack because he could see no aircraft and thought he was performing a wasteful and useless mission. His eyewitness account did much

to boost morale and obtain confidence in the advocated program.56

The initial phase of this campaign saw a dramatic transition

from the tough fighting in the hedgerows under the First Army

to Patton’s rapid advances throughout Brittany and his first

strides towards Paris. Patton’s program, however, took time to

gain the confidence of all participants; and it also experienced

growing pains. From the XIX TAC being tasked to intercept a

friendly armored column or the initial request to “not bomb

bridges” to the realization that air liaison officers were needed

below division and corps level, all these details needed to be

worked out to ensure Patton’s operational methods could be

employed.

38

CADRE PAPER
39

SHWEDO

Map 3. Angers and the Breakout Area
Middleton also found his new commander’s methods unorthodox; and Patton sometimes had to overturn some of his

subordinate’s more cautious orders, one time muttering to

himself “and he was a good doughboy, too.”57 There was no

doubt that Patton’s operational approach was controversial,

and some authors still criticize his methods claiming “principally, he occupied ground rather than destroying armies.”58

Unfortunately, what Middleton and these critics did not understand was that if Third Army slowed down to destroy the

enemy, it would provide other areas time to prepare defenses—a fact later realized in the fall of 1944. Patton understood that rapid drives to rear areas could force the enemy

back into fortresses where they could be rendered useless.

When his thrusts eventually did put him in a position to destroy an entire army, he was stopped repeatedly by higher

headquarters. 

During this phase of the operation, Patton employed many

nonstandard schemes to exploit the conditions in Brittany.

This phase successfully tested many of the force enhancers

that would carry Patton across the French countryside.

ULTRA, airpower, and the ground scheme of maneuver were

mutually complementary. ULTRA revealed the German strong

points; and Patton crafted a ground scheme of maneuver that

avoided these areas in order to capture territory, which forced

many Germans either to surrender or retreat back to their

fortresses. ULTRA also informed Patton on the capabilities of

those fortresses; and Patton merely chose not to attack them,

preferring to leave these German troops as prisoners behind

their own walls. In the cases of Avranches and Pontaubault,

ULTRA reconfirmed the threats to these areas. In these instances Patton knew he had to defend these areas, while the

Germans often provided their attack plans to him through

ULTRA. 

Patton’s ground scheme of maneuver facilitated ULTRA by

forcing the retreating Germans away from wire communications and into reliance on the wireless Enigma machine. Once

these German forces arrived at their fortresses, the communication lines were cut by the Allies’ siege troops. This act ensured accurate ULTRA information on the blockaded

40

CADRE PAPER
fortresses for the remainder of the war. The ground scheme of

maneuver also aided the air campaign by capturing German

airfields. These new fields allowed airpower to be rapidly applied on the battlefield, and it also secured areas away from

the unfavorable weather conditions associated with peninsulas. 

Similarly, airpower assisted the ground scheme through

CAS and interdiction that ensured the rapid advances of Third

Army. Airpower was also used to release troops that may have

been dedicated to secure rear areas and allowed them to exploit the fluid situation in Brittany. These fluid conditions

were fertile grounds for ULTRA, which fed information back

into this system; and Patton’s force-enhancing program soon

had a momentum of its own. Patton would need all of these

advantages for the upcoming battle because the Allies were

soon to experience their first major counterattack on the

European continent.

Notes

1. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Annex 4, Third US Army Outline Plan, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, 1. Copy

located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

2. Ralph F. Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,

1944–45 (New York: Scribner, 1980), 101.

3. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-101—“Fly, Seek, and Destroy” (Albert

F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 13 December

1944), 2.

4. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-81—“Planes over Patton” (Albert F.

Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 30 October 1944),

1.

5. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 350.

6. Ibid., 344–45.

7. XIX TAC Staff, “Planes over Patton,” 8.

8. Ibid.

9. XIX TAC Staff, “Planes over Patton,” 8–9.

10. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 30 September 1944), 3.

11. Blumenson, 356.

12. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 495.

13. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Third US Army August Operations, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, 16. Copy

located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

41

SHWEDO
14. Ibid.

15. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-1—“Weyland Diary—XIX TAC”

(Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 18 May

1945), diary, 1 August 1944, entry 2030 hours.

16. Ibid., 3 August 1944, entry 1900 hours.

17. XIX TAC Staff, “Planes over Patton,” 16.

18. Great Britain Public Record Office, “ULTRA: Main Series of Signals

Conveying Intelligence,” Bletchley Park, 1944, reel 33, XL 4499. Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

19. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-95—“Weyland’s Interrogation of von

Rundstedt at Bad Kissingen” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Weyland Collection, 2 July 1945), 6.

20. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4626 and XL 4759. 

21. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 341.

22. “Weyland Diary—XIX TAC,” 1 August, entry 2030 hours.

23. George S. Patton Jr., Paul D. Harkins, and Beatrice A. Patton, War as

I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), 99.

24. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), 274.

25. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4482.

26. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 378.

27. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4787.

28. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 389–91.

29. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4681.

30. Ibid., XL 4860.

31. Ibid., XL 4912.

32. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 392.

33. Ibid., 379.

34. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4798.

35. Harry M. Grove, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives: Record

Group 457, 30 May 1945), 2.

36. Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and

Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas,

1993), 189–90.

37. National Security Agency, Report 170.601-5—“Magic Reports for the

Attention of the President” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Special Collections, 1943–44), 1–17.

38. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4444.

39. XIX TAC Staff, “Planes over Patton,” 14.

40. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 340.

41. Third US Army, 12th Army Group Directives, 2.

42. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4900.

43. Third US Army, 12th Army Group Directives, 2.

44. Seymour Freidin, Werner Kreipe, and William Richardson, eds., The

Fatal Decisions (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1956), 236.

45. Eisenhower, 280.

46. Ibid.

47. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4375.

48. Third US Army, Third US Army August Operations, 18.

49. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4325 and 4446.

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50. Ibid., XL 4448.

51. Third US Army, Third US Army August Operations, 19.

52. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4800.

53. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 434–44.

54. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 5046.

55. Third US Army, Third US Army August Operations, 22 and 26.

56. James D. Fellers, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA

Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 7 June 1945), 33.

57. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of

France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University

Press, 1981), 184.

58. Ibid., 245.

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Chapter 4

Mortain Counteroffensive

and the Falaise Gap

We must strike like lightning. When we reach the sea the

American spearheads will be cut off. Obviously, they are

trying all out for a major decision here because otherwise

they would not have sent their best general, Patton. That’s

the most dangerous man they have. But the more troops

they squeeze through the gap, and the better they are, the

better for us when we reach the sea and cut them off!

—Adolf Hitler

The American victory in this battle appears as fine an example of improvisation, flexibility and courage. ULTRA had

given the Allies . . . ample time to prepare exactly the right

killing ground. Instead of stunned opponents scurrying to

the rear, the Germans found a cool, poised and fully briefed

reception committee.

—Ronald Lewin

Near the end of the first week of Third Army operations,

Major Helfers saw his ULTRA AOR grow exponentially. As

Helfers was supporting contingency planning for attacks driving east, west, and south, the most ominous clouds were rising over rear areas behind Third Army’s forward command

headquarters. During the first week of fighting, ULTRA messages clearly displayed the Germans’ keen interest in the bottleneck at Avranches; and on 6 August, all indications predicted that this lifeline was soon to be threatened. One of the

first messages Helfers received that morning made it apparent

that the upcoming German action would be no small operation. The message highlighted Jagdkorps Two’s response to

the army that the “fighter operations as requested at the lowest strength requires employment of 1000 aircraft in one day

in a limited area.”1 Although Jagdkorps Two declared “support

45
in the manner requested is impossible,” they provided the location of where their limited support would occur by stating

the focus was “intended in [the] southern part of [the] area in

question.”2 Five Z messages (the highest on the ULTRA priority scale) continued throughout the day, which later provided

Helfers the exact details of the impending German attack in

the “southern” area in question.

“To the Sea”—Targeting the

Third Army Lifeline

At 1912 hours, ULTRA provided another Luftwaffe associated

message from 2d Schutzstaffeln (SS) Panzer Division requesting

“night fighter operations for protection of own [2 SS Panzer’s] attack over area St. Clement–St. Hilaire and day fighters on the 7th

for the same area.”3 (See map 4.) Twenty minutes later, another

message was transmitted to the 47th Panzer Corps discussing

an attack to the west with an attack formation “from right to

left—116 Panzer Division, 2d Panzer Division, 1st SS Panzer

Division and 2d SS Division.”4 By 2030 hours, ULTRA indications of impending enemy action became so ominous that

Helfers believed they required Patton’s immediate attention.

The 2d SS Panzer Division provided Helfers the location for

the assault. It ordered an “attack on Mortain and [then a]

thrust to St. Hilaire,” and the message also made it easy for

Allied aircraft interdicting these forces because it tasked the

following identification procedure: “Ground troops [German]

shooting green, designation of German aircraft by recognition

signals.”5 However, an additional message that arrived later

that evening made the biggest impression on Helfers: “At

about eight that evening Captain Hutchinson (British liaison—

Officer-in-charge of the ULTRA message center) came to my

tent with a single long message. Hitler had ordered all armor

units in the Caen area to assemble in a designated area and,

as a mass, attack Mortain. Mortain was to be seized, the one

American supply route from Normandy to northern France

cut, and Americans south of Mortain killed or captured. That

was getting too close to home, as the Third Army

Headquarters was at that time south of Mortain.”6

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Forty years later, Helfers still recalled this individual report

and claimed “this is a good example of the high level important

messages that came out of ULTRA intelligence”; and he further

related his feelings on the night of 6 August:

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SHWEDO

Map 4. Mortain and Falaise
I remember this wording very well, these were the words of Hitler that

came across ULTRA. [Helfers read the message.] “The outcome of the

Battle of France depends on the success of the attack on the southern

wing of the Seventh Army. Commander-in-Chief West will have a

unique and unrepeatable opportunity of thrusting into the region

largely devoid of the enemy, and to change the whole situation

thereby.” When I saw this message, I immediately felt that if General

Patton doesn’t get this message immediately—I’d be court-martialed.7

Helfers’s actions began a chain of events that were corroborated by all senior officers involved; but because these officers

died before the ULTRA secret was declassified, their guarded

recollections of this event attribute the information to an unnamed source. As soon as Helfers finished transferring the

contents of Hitler’s message onto his map, he hurried with his

charts, notes, and flashlight to find Colonel Koch. Helfers recalled, “Colonel Koch was in his tent dozing”; but after Helfers

woke him up and went over the messages, “he [Koch] agreed

that the Army Commander should receive the same intelligence at once.”8 Koch’s 1971 book, G-2: Intelligence for Patton,

used a similar but guarded account:

Awakened by the intelligence section duty officer, I got answers. Word

had just been received from higher headquarters, I was informed, that

a “usually reliable source” had reported that a German counterattack

of major proportions against First Army was imminent . . . noted that

the XX Corps [of Third Army] was now moving south through the gap

and that one of its divisions, the 35th was opposite the critical point.

If the 35th were halted and turned toward the east . . . it would be in

a position to backstop the First Army at the most threatened and most

critical points. We’ll go see the commander, Gay (Third Army Deputy

Chief of Staff) decided.9

Helfers then had his first meeting with Patton. He was introduced as a major who had some special intelligence that required his immediate attention. Helfers spread his map on the

floor, and the three officers informally squatted over the chart.

Helfers showed how the one Five-Z message fit in with the rest

of the other ULTRA messages displayed on the map. Patton did

not immediately act on this information. Instead, he turned to

Koch and asked what he thought of the data. Koch replied, “I

think the source is genuine and fits the rest of the German situation.”10 Patton’s previous intelligence experience taught him

not to jump on single source intelligence, which is why he asked

for Koch’s opinion. Koch confirmed that his big picture (other

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sources of intelligence) corroborated the ULTRA depiction of the

situation. Armed with this knowledge, Patton took immediate

action. He phoned Maj Gen Walton Walker (commander, XX

Corps), who was just passing through the Mortain bottleneck,

and directed him to halt the corps’s movement to the south and

take up defensive positions facing east.11 Patton’s diary entry for

the same period displayed his initial skepticism towards ULTRA

when he wrote, “We got a rumor last night from a secret source

that several panzer divisions will attack west from Mortain on

Avranches. Personally, I think it is a German bluff to cover a

withdrawal, but I stopped the 80th, French 2d Armor, and the

35th [Divisions] in the vicinity of St. Hilaire just in case something might happen.”12

Patton’s suspicions about this secret source are not surprising because this was his first real briefing from an ULTRA

officer. Before this event, Third Army’s standard ULTRA dissemination procedure was in the form of typewritten reports

that were provided to Koch and then incorporated into the

greater intelligence picture. This situation provided an opportunity for ULTRA information to attain greater significance at

Third Army headquarters. Patton had placed some credence in

Helfers’s information, and the fate of an improved ULTRA program was dependent upon success at Mortain. Helfers did not

have to wait long to find out that this was no “German bluff to

cover a withdrawal”; and after this episode, Helfers became the

only ULTRA officer to personally brief his commanding general

on a daily basis.13

Soon after this initial ULTRA meeting, Helfers received additional confirmation of the impending German attack.

Midnight brought a message ordering the Germans to attack

“with strong forces of five panzer divisions from Sourdeval to

Mortain towards the west, first objective road Brecey to

Montigny” and Jagdkorps Two “to support [the] attack with all

force except JIG Two.”14 Another message specifically mentioned Avranches and stated the “objective is to cut off Allies

who have broken through to [the] south from supply base and

to effect junction with the coast.”15 This information did not

only affect planning at Third Army, these messages also had a

corresponding ripple effect on XIX TAC. In his diary that same

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night, General Weyland wrote “Conference with Gen Gaffey

(Third Army Chief of Staff) and Third Army staff reference possible German counterattack east to west between Selune and

See.”16 Like Patton, Weyland took this information and started

planning and coordinating with other units to create his version of a reception committee for the attacking Germans.

At 2300 hours Weyland made his final entry for 6 August,

which stated “Missions laid on for 7 August, called Gen Q

[Quesada, 9th TAC Commander] reference possible German

counterattack. XIX TAC can divert F/B [fighter/bombers] to

threaten area anytime—will coordinate between two TACs.”17

The coordination between these two TACs was facilitated by

the fact that before Third Army became operational, XIX TAC’s

main focus was supporting First Army operations. Later that

morning, additional plans were made to mass the effects of

airpower to counter the German threat. These actions were

also reflected in the following diary entry: “Gen Quesada requested use of 406 Group [P-47s] with rockets for easing

pocket in the vicinity of Mortain and east to assist in the break

up of hostile tank attacks, concurred . . . also agreed to put P51 fighter cover over threatened area.”18 All of this planning resulted in a battle that clearly displayed the synergy that comes

from efficient incorporation of ULTRA intelligence in a lethal

air-ground campaign. 

Early on the morning of 7 August, the attack came as expected. The Germans failed to find the “region largely devoid of

the enemy” as Hitler had promised. Instead, they engaged

dug-in divisions and a sky filled with tactical aircraft.

Although the German forces made some initial gains, Allied

forces quickly denied the enemy their objectives. Third Army

ground preparations were handsomely rewarded. Koch recalled the decision to use Third Army as backstop forces was

well founded when he stated, “The German counterattack

came as expected. The 35th Division, later attached to the VII

Corps of First Army for that action, became heavily engaged.

Third Army troops continued to pour through the gap. The allout German counterattack was not only repulsed, but the

stage was set for the encirclement of the entire German

Seventh Army in the Falaise area.”19 In this battle the

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CADRE PAPER
Germans got their first taste of concentrated Allied tactical airpower. They temporarily recaptured Mortain; but when the fog

lifted, a murderous Allied air assault ensued. More than a

thousand Allied fighter-bombers roamed the battlefield

unchecked. Although Jagdkorps Two claimed it needed 1,000

planes for this battle, it could only muster 300; and by 8

August only 110 were still in action.20

XIX TAC found this battle fertile ground for increasing kill

counts in every category. In the first week of operations, the

XIX TAC did not log any enemy aircraft kills; but on 7 August

they made up for lost time, chalking up 33 in one day.

Preceding ULTRA messages had tracked retreating Luftwaffe

aircraft to various bases in the rear, and the collateral secret

account provided the following explanation for the day’s high

kill count: “part of the bag of enemy aircraft was obtained

when information was received that Chartres airfield was ripe

for attack.”21 XIX TAC’s support to the battle did not stop with

negating the German air threat; many of their more successful missions were ground attack sorties. One example comes

from the unit that Weyland had transferred to Quesada the

night before: “Tank battles were seen in the Vire–Mortain sector, and our planes took a hand in them. In one attack, seven

P-47s of the 405th Group claimed destruction of 12 tanks, five

staff cars, four half-tracks (three of them carrying flak guns)

and four light flak positions, plus damage to four other

tanks.”22 Soon after the war, the Office of the Assistant Chief

of Air Staff for Intelligence put out a report on this battle, sensationally stating that the Allies were “in danger of being cut

off by a determined German counterattack at Avranches but

the air ended this threat, pulverizing concentrations of enemy

troops and armor as fast as they were formed.”23 Although this

comment may exaggerate airpower’s role in this engagement,

it pales in comparison to the comments that came from the

Germans.

In 1956 German Lt Gen Bodo Zimmerman (former chief operations officer, commander in chief [CINC] west, and Army

Group D) recalled the battle stating, “After a certain initial

success it was brought to a standstill at first light by the intervention of the Allied Air Force. This was the first time in

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history that an attacking force had been stopped solely by

bombing.”24 XIX TAC and Third Army did not have to wait

until 1956 to get the Germans’ impression of the Allied air effort—by that afternoon, ULTRA reports immediately gave evidence of their success. The German Seventh Army reported

“the actual attack had been at a standstill since 1300 hours,

owing to the employment by the enemy of a great number of

fighter-bombers and the absence of own aircraft.”25 Lowerechelon forces provided similar accounts. The 47th Panzer

Corps claimed “the activity of fighter-bombers is said to be

have been well-nigh unendurable” and 1st SS Panzer Division

observed that they had “no previous experience of fighterbomber attacks on this scale.”26 Although the Germans rightfully attributed much of the Allied success in this battle to airpower, it would be several years before they would learn that

one of the greatest factors was ULTRA—a fact that was not

missed by the Allied commanders involved. 

Maj Warrack Wallace (Helfers’s assistant) remembered the

appreciation felt at Third Army for ULTRA by stating, “General

Gaffey at a later date mentioned the Avranches incident to the

writer [Wallace] as one of the cases in which the service [Ultra]

had been invaluable.”27 This event also made a large impression on Bradley and Quesada. In 1977, when discussing the

value of ULTRA, Quesada specifically brought up the

Avranches: “You know, Brad and I never used to talk together

about our ULTRA signals. We just took it for granted that each

of us knew what was in them. But I can still see the moment

when we stood with those signals in our hands, and grinned,

and said we’ve got them.”28 Although the Allied commanders

knew the secret to their success, the Germans never suspected a compromise of the Enigma message system.

Therefore, they attributed their defeat to other factors.

Considering that the Mortain counteroffensive was Hitler’s

plan, he had to find a scapegoat. The victim was CINC West

Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge. When the news of

the fiasco reached Hitler, he ominously condemned Kluge with

one sentence: “The attack failed because Kluge wanted it to

fail.”29 Although Hitler permitted Kluge to command for another 11 days, the effects of this defeat ruined Kluge, which is

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reflected in his chief of staff’s (Gen Günther Blumentritt) final

memories of his commander:

Kluge had been shocked by the failure of his counterattack on

Avranches on August 7 and upset by Hitler’s reproaches; he had sent

his son into the Falaise pocket with the words “Let nobody accuse me

of sparing my son and heir.” . . . [Blumentritt] last saw him on the eighteenth, tapping a map chart and moaning, “Avranches, Avranches!

This town has cost me my reputation as a soldier. I’ll go down in history as the Benedeck (Austrian General crushed by Von Moltke in the

Austro–Prussian War, 1866) of the western front. D’you know Count

Moltke’s book on Benedeck? I did my best but that’s fate for you.”30

Kluge never found out that his demise was less fate and more

ULTRA. Soon after he left Blumentritt, he committed suicide

by taking potassium cyanide on a roadside headed toward

Metz.

Kluge was the first high-ranking victim of a truly integrated

ULTRA, air, and ground operation. Lessons from North Africa

and Sicily were coming to fruition in France, but Hitler

thought he could correct the problem by changing commanders. The problem with this philosophy was that his solution

would be a commander from the east who did not understand

the capabilities of Allied airpower. Unfortunately for Hitler, the

Allies in France were fully apprised of German strengths,

weaknesses, and intentions. The Allies used airpower to attack all areas of the battlefield with a significant economy of

force, which further exacerbated the German logistics and

personnel problems that plagued the Western Front. The frustration with Hitler’s simplistic solution for solving the problems on the western front (replacing Kluge with Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model) was best encapsulated by General

Zimmerman: “Field Marshal Model, who had hitherto seen action only on the Eastern front, did not immediately grasp the

full gravity of the situation in France and hoped that he might

yet restore it. But he was soon to realize the unimaginable effects of the enemy’s air supremacy, the massive destruction in

the rear areas, the impossibility of traveling along any major

road in daylight without great peril, in fact the full significance

of the invasion.”31 Patton saw the opportunities ULTRA and

airpower could provide, and he devised a new program to

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capitalize on the benefits that were afforded him during this

campaign.

ULTRA Improvements at Third Army

Although Group Capt Winterbotham (a senior ULTRA officer) lauded the ULTRA influences at Patton’s headquarters in

Sicily, the ULTRA system before 6 August was greatly hindered by the representatives that were sent by Bletchley

Park.32 In Sicily the ULTRA representatives were British troops

that did not fall under Patton’s command, and their actions

did little to improve Patton’s apparent prejudice against his

Anglo allies. In March 1944 the British and Americans agreed

that US commands should brief their own commanders, but

that the SLUs (message centers) would still be manned by

British officers.33 These troops were the responsibility of the

G-2; and at Patton’s headquarters, it was best to hide the

British as best as possible. Helfers provided “a few thoughts

about the British signal section” which would show why Koch

concealed them.

They were a pain in the neck to General Patton, I am sure, and they

were a pain in the back to me. They were attached to Third Army headquarters, just as I was, and their records were administered somewhere else. Hence, nobody could tell them “nutt’in.” They wore their

uniforms as they pleased. They came and went as they pleased. They

kept their quarters as they pleased and they cooked and ate as they

pleased . . . The British captain’s name by the way was Hutchinson,

and he was a horse’s a-- . . . I tried to win him over and even gave him

a first-class dinner for him and the other three officers at the Bells of

Peavor the night before Third Army headquarters left for Normandy,

but no soap . . . So much for our gallant allies. Their intelligence was

good but their attitude towards Americans was lousy as a rule.34

Helfers’s military education from The Citadel taught him

that sharp uniforms, spotless quarters, and being a member

of the greater team were factors that were essential to success

at Patton’s headquarters. Unfortunately, his association with

the British and the old procedures for ULTRA at Third Army

still relegated Helfers’s ULTRA inputs to typewritten pages

that would be incorporated by Koch. But that all changed after

Patton got off the phone directing General Walker to prepare

for the counterattack on Avranches. Helfers’s next story shows

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the necessity of having a competent and credible ULTRA salesman at Patton’s headquarters, which eventually transitioned

the ULTRA input from one page of text into a comprehensive

daily briefing:

After telephoning, General Patton turned to me and asked me how long

I had been with Third Army Headquarters and how valuable I thought

the intelligence was that I was receiving from my source. I told him

that since the Third Army had been operational, I had usually known

twenty-four hours in advance what the Germans in front of Third Army

units attempted to do. Thereupon, General Patton turned to Colonel

Koch and asked him why hadn’t he been informed about what this

major was doing at Third Army Headquarters. Colonel Koch told

General Patton that since they had had such a bad experience with the

British intelligence and signal troops attached to them in Africa and

Sicily, he felt it best not to mention their presence and mission to him.

General Patton took that as a reasonable and satisfactory explanation.

General Patton then told me that beginning the next morning at seven

I was to come to his trailer and present a short briefing on ULTRA intelligence and on what had come in over the past twenty-four hours. I

was to be prepared to do that until further notice. Also, that if any single important intelligence came in, I was to get it to him or the Chief of

Staff at once.35

These daily briefings continued until the end of the war. In

the past, as Winterbotham pointed out, ULTRA was very effective; but now the impediment based on Patton’s prejudices

was removed, and ULTRA became much more tactically responsive. Third Army’s staff quickly discarded the old Allied

attitudes towards ULTRA as it discovered through Patton’s

new program that: 

The idea that ULTRA is useful tactically only in a static situation became ridiculous as an Army has never moved as fast and as far as the

Third Army in its drive across France and ULTRA was invaluable every

mile of the way . . . The operational value of the service was so impressive that General Patton never passed a special briefing. If he was

unable to attend the regular meeting, he always saw to it during the

day that the recipients (ULTRA officers) came over to his caravan to

make their showing.36 

One of the keys that made this information so valuable to

Third Army was that Patton pushed this information down to

the lowest levels. His methods sometimes went well beyond

what was approved by Bletchley Park. 

A letter from General Marshall that provided the governing

regulations for ULTRA made some items very clear. Two of the

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SHWEDO
biggest restrictions were that only “authorized recipients of

ULTRA” could receive this information and “when operational

action is taken on the basis of ULTRA intelligence, the utmost

care must be taken, by means of proper cover, to insure that

the action does not reveal or in any way suggest that this

source of intelligence is at our disposal.”37 Patton and his staff

pushed these two stipulations to the limit. Essentially,

Marshall’s instructions restricted ULTRA information from

going below Army level. But from Patton’s perspective, that information was needed at lower levels of command; and he

used different methods that sometimes pushed or broke the

rules contained in the Marshall letter. Helfers recalled one

method that Patton used five or six times, which was focused

on pushing information to the corps level:

He [Patton] would come up to my map and he would ask me about a

specific area. He would then ask, “Would you make me a copy on a little map of that specific area with that information on it [ULTRA]? I’m

going to see General Eddy or one of the other Corps commanders because I want to discuss this with them.” [With some apprehension

Helfers prepared the map.] I handed it to him when he was getting into

his car. I said “General Patton my instructions are that this intelligence

is not to go below Army level.” General Patton said “who told you that?”

I said “Colonel Telford Taylor at the Embassy” [Highest Ranking

American ULTRA officer in theater]. Patton said “Gimme the map.

Don’t worry about it, I’ll assume all responsibility. I’ll see that you get

your map back tomorrow morning.” And that’s the way it worked.38

There is no record of how Patton presented these regulationbending encounters, but it has become clear that many tactical actions had ULTRA influences. Even Winterbotham suspected it, as is evident in his comment: “Patton had been

bound to inform General Haislip [XV Corps commander] of the

source of the information.”39 But in the same story he also acknowledged that “on the whole, security was quite marvelous,

considering the moves which had to be made in such a

hurry.”40 Patton did not let ULTRA’s influence stop at corps or

even division level. Helfers also contended the general pushed

this information down to one lowest tactical level of command.

A small task force was responsible for the vital role of flank

guard in one operation: “Colonel Harkins had a Task Force

with an infantry company, artillery battery, and a tank company and they were sent out as flank guard. Well something

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came out of the briefing which Patton thought was something

that Harkins could use. Without anything to do after the briefing, Patton said ‘all right now Major . . . hot foot it over to

Harkins and tell him what you just told me about that area

over there.’”41

Patton understood the force-enhancing possibilities of

ULTRA, and they had great influence on his ground scheme of

maneuver. At the highest levels, ULTRA allowed the Allies to

make preparations for the German counterattack at Mortain.

This allowed Patton’s forces to continue pouring through

Avranches, which facilitated Third Army’s attacks heading

east, west, and south. At the lowest levels, ULTRA allowed

Patton to employ economy-of-force measures effectively by giving him the exact locations, strengths, and intentions of

German troops. Patton’s new ULTRA system was lauded in

every after-action report. The only member of Third Army

headquarters who did not appreciate ULTRA’s capabilities was

“Willie,” Patton’s pit bull, who “showed his contempt for intelligence by raising his leg on one of the recipient’s best maps,”

which caused Patton to exclaim, “you see Major what Willie

thinks of your map.”42

German Neck in a Noose

That the Allies Fail to Pull

The last 11 days of Kluge’s life were spent arguing with

Hitler concerning strategies associated with the Mortain area,

and many of these conversations were captured by the ULTRA

audience. This information proved invaluable as Patton’s team

planned its next move. By 1200 hours on 7 August, the

German forces were brought to a standstill. At this same hour,

Weyland recorded in his diary “conference with General

Bradley, General Patton and General Wheeler, reference

ground plans on killing German counterattack and further

movements for Third Army.”43 The Patton Papers, which was

written before ULTRA was declassified, provides some insight

into this meeting. Although the book credited Patton’s fine

intuitive feeling for foreseeing the events of the 7th, it more

importantly pointed out that “because Patton halted three

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divisions near the attack area . . . Bradley let him continue his

sweep around the Allied right flank.”44 By this time ULTRA

was also alleviating some of their fears because the Allied

commanders knew that they would have ample warning that

would allow them to react to any serious threats. ULTRA relieved Patton of many of his defensive duties; and after this

meeting, Patton’s forces were attacking the sparse German defenses to the east. These eastern drives had the potential to

encircle an entire German army, but such action was dependent upon the Germans remaining infatuated with Hitler’s original target—the sea at Avranches. 

Indications from ULTRA remained encouraging for Patton’s

envelopment. It became apparent that the Germans did not to

want give up on their initial plans. One Bletchley Park employee fondly reflected on this period by stating: “I can still

vividly recall the exhilaration . . . in recollection they (the intercepts) surpass even D-Day for volume and importance of

the information ULTRA produced. The size of the net which

was being drawn round Army Group B, and the number of divisions which would be caught in it clearly depended on

whether Hitler persisted with his foolhardy attack.”45

Messages after the initial German repulse showed the

enemy was willing to continue this foolhardy attack for quite

some time. Unfettered by German setbacks, ULTRA revealed

that the “intentions [of] 2d SS Panzer Division [were] unchanged, St. Hilaire [was] to be captured.”46 Further encouragement came on 8 August when the Seventh German Army

directed an “attack by 47th Panzer Corps . . . [which was] to

be continued with all forces, and the breakthrough to

Avranches, decisive for the general situation, was to be

achieved.”47 As the Germans remained focused on their original plan, it appeared Hitler was unaware of Army Group B’s

tenuous position. Every order Hitler made demanding an attack to the sea pushed the German troops’ necks farther into

the Allies’ noose. Patton’s deep drive to LeMans and the potential left turn towards Allied forces in the north presented a

situation that caused General Bradley to comment, “This is an

opportunity that comes to a commander not more than once

in a century. We’re about to destroy an entire hostile army.”48

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During this period Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s

forces were facing close scrutiny due to their modest gains as

compared to Patton’s successes in Brittany. Although

Montgomery had promised to take Caen on D day (6 June

1944), he did not finish mopping up resistance until 18 July.49

His next offensive would move at a similar sluggish pace and

would hinder attempts at a greater envelopment. Most of

Hitler’s plans to strike Avranches were dependent upon transferring tanks from the Falaise area in order to mass his forces.

During this time frame, Montgomery launched a succession of

attacks focused on taking Falaise. Many ULTRA readers

watched with disgust as Montgomery’s forces engaged the

same German troops who had movement orders to go farther

into the pocket that the Allies were hoping to envelop. One

such reader, Group Capt Winterbotham, made this point by

stating, “Montgomery might have done better to let Eberbach’s

panzers go west before the Canadian attack.”50

The manner in which the Allies were going to destroy this

enveloped army remains a controversial subject. ULTRA messages showed that defenses around and south of Paris looked

particularly vulnerable. Patton preferred drives farther to the

east towards Chartres or Dreux before turning north for a

deeper envelopment to ensure all the Germans in Normandy

would be cut off, but in Patton’s words “Bradley won’t let

me.”51 Weyland was more vocal in his objections when he was

asked if he supported the early attempt to envelop the

Germans at Falaise:

It just made me mad as he--. . . We were on our way. He-- we would

have hit the Seine River. Then we were going to go down—my concept

and then Georgie’s too—hit the Seine River, cross it, of course, and

then go down there and cut off that German Army which was confronting the British. But no, we got orders. As a matter of fact, General

Omar Bradley came down to our headquarters and we were really

rolling. We were making 30 miles a day, or something like that, and

rolling along. Some opposition, nothing serious . . . So Bradley came

down and said, “Well, George, starting tomorrow, I want you to do a 90-

degree crossover turn and head due north instead of Paris.” Well

Georgie was amazed. I was amazed . . . Well, I threw my tin hat on the

ground. I said “My God, this is a piecemeal meddle.” I said “We’re ruined. We’ll be at the Seine River. The Redball Express can still support

them there.” I hadn’t even started using the troop carriers to support

us . . . “We’re on the go” I said. “Boy, General Bradley, why don’t you

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just let us keep going? There’s nothing of any consequence to stop us.

Well, the Germans troops are massed to our north, and we’re south of

them, and moving. We’ll get in behind them. What’s wrong with that?”

He kind of smiled and said, “Well you’ve got a point, and it’s probably

a good one, but this is the way it’s going to be done.”52

Patton and Weyland complied with these orders, and on 8

August Third Army gave the directive to “advance on the

[northward] axis [of] LeMans–Alencon–Sees to prepare for further action against [the] enemy flank and rear.”53 The following day an ULTRA message revealed that the Germans did not

anticipate this northward advance, and they acknowledged

Patton’s exceptional employment of intelligence in the following message: “Allied movements and behavior lead to [the]

conclusion that [the] Allies very thoroughly informed on [the]

German situation and state of forces. Jagdkorps [is] not repeat

not expecting [the] Allies to wheel northwards but rather continue [their] main thrust to [the] east and southeast.”54 This

was encouraging, for Patton’s forces were now driving north;

but the best confirmation that Germans were susceptible to

an envelopment came on 10 August.

Once again Hitler’s prose came through ULTRA, and he left

very little to Kluge’s imagination for this attack. Hitler had apparently not lost his preference for Avranches and the sea:

Attack on southern wing of Seventh Army will be conducted by Panzer

Gruppe Eberbach after regrouping and bringing up of decisive offensive arms. On its success depends the fate of the battle of France. “I

order” command of attack, General Eberbach to whom a newly formed

Fuehrungsstab is being brought up with Oberstleutnant Von Kluge

[Field Marshal’s son] as Chief of staff . . . Objective of the attack, the

sea at Avranches to which a bold and unhesitating thrust through is

to be made. Rear attacking waves swinging north as opportunity occurs . . . Time of attack, probably on eleventh. Be prepared for a postponement at short notice of 12 to 24 hours.55

Hitler’s message assured Patton that the Germans’ attention

was diverted away from his forces thrusting north. 

ULTRA provided more encouraging news from the tactical

levels. Reports among the various units displayed the disorganization that existed within the German lines. One message

stated, “Lack of clear knowledge on the location of his own

troops and [the] undisciplined withdrawal even before slight

Allied pressure make it appear possible that [the] commander

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CADRE PAPER
of the regiment on the left operating on the Corps boundary is

not in control of his troops.”56 That same day, ULTRA provided

a rest and refit message that reduced the number of German

fighter groups from 17 to 13.57 This reduction helped create an

environment in which Patton’s air-ground team could thrive,

and it wasted no time heading north towards its next objective

at Alencon. 

During the operations around Alencon, Third Army and XIX

TAC demonstrated the complementary nature of air-ground

operations. Some efforts involved tactical expedients, as illustrated by the following example: “enemy tanks were holding up

an American column, fifteen 500-pounders were dropped and

. . . the US column was seen to move forward.”58 Other air efforts required more detailed planning and coordination. Patton

wanted the ground forces to advance on their objectives as

quickly as possible in order to exploit the German’s attention

to the west at Avranches. Airpower facilitated these attacks.

The speed of Patton’s maneuver to Alencon surprised

Montgomery, whose action in contrast to Patton’s, according

to Russell F. Weigley “appears to have bogged itself in timidity

and succumbed to the legendary vice of over caution.”59 Third

Army’s next target was Argentan. This city and those beyond

it would be greatly affected by Montgomery’s cautious nature

because Argentan was eight miles beyond Bradley’s army

group boundary.

While Patton was moving north, Kluge and Hitler continued

to debate the future of France. Hitler was still focused on

Avranches, but Kluge was able to promote a secondary strike

against Patton’s forces to the south. This information did not

escape Third Army headquarters, and Martin Blumenson

summed up Patton’s thoughts in the following observation:

With ULTRA intercepts warning Allied commanders of a German strike

against Haislip’s (Patton’s XV Corps Commander) flanks, was it wise to

let Haislip go ahead? Or was it better to hold him where he was and let

him assume a defensive posture? As always, Patton opted for audacity, letting Haislip close the pocket. If that course increased the risks,

so be it. On the other hand, perhaps the Germans would never be able

to attack Haislip’s flank. Even if they did, they lacked the strength,

Patton surmised, to create more than a fleeting crisis. Either way, the

Allies seemed about to eliminate the two German armies west of the

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Seine River. That goal, firmly, in Patton’s mind, warranted accepting

danger.60

ULTRA probably contributed to Patton’s audacity.

Numerous ULTRA messages reported that units inside the

Falaise pocket informed higher headquarters that they were

short of gasoline, ammunition, and transportation, and that

heavy losses meant that some units existed in name only. Gen

Wade H. Haislip’s ground activity proved many of these reports

to be true. His troops initially found Argentan defended by a

German bakery company.61 Patton knew the Germans would

not stay in the western portion of the Falaise pocket forever.

Whether the German forces were withdrawing from the pocket

or attempting to counter the Third Army drive from the south,

Patton knew he was in a foot race with the Germans to secure

the rear areas. Any delays would ensure that the Germans

would replace bakery companies with panzer divisions.

Therefore, Patton stretched his authority when he ordered XV

Corps “upon capture of Argentan push on slowly in the direction of Falaise . . . [then] continue to push on slowly until you

contact our Allies.”62

This movement went well beyond Twelfth Army Group’s

boundary, and Patton was obliged immediately to inform

Bradley of this action. Bradley told Patton to stop offensive operations. His decision has been the source of controversy ever

since. Unfortunately for Patton, Eisenhower would not take

control of ground operations until 1 September 1944; this left

Montgomery as the de facto European theater of operations

ground force commander, even though Bradley was commanding the army group. Bradley’s response was probably influenced by events that occurred earlier that day at

Montgomery’s headquarters. When the news reached

Montgomery of Haislip’s progress beyond Argentan, he turned

to his chief of staff, Francis De Guingand, and ordered him to

“tell Bradley they ought to get back.”63 This order clearly agitated

De Guingand, which led him to comment to Montgomery’s G-2

that “Monty is too tidy.”64

Patton spent most of 13 August calling headquarters trying to

overturn the order. ULTRA assured Third Army that Hitler’s

interest was still focused on Avranches; and the German

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counterattack on his flank, as expected, was not materializing

in great strength. Early that morning, Leven Allen (Bradley’s

chief of staff), confirmed Bradley’s stop order. Patton pleaded

with Allen to convince Bradley to talk to Montgomery for him.

Bradley’s G-3 eventually made the call to Montgomery’s headquarters, requesting permission to drive north of Argentan.

Unfortunately, De Guingand’s answer was “I am sorry.” De

Guingand revealed in his memoirs his belief “in the ability of the

Americans to have gone beyond Argentan and to have closed the

pocket. The blame for the failure to do so fell on Montgomery.

The Americans regarded the army group boundary as a firm restriction against further movement. They needed Montgomery’s

invitation to cross, and Montgomery should have erased the line

on the map and let them proceed.”65

Montgomery’s halt order remained in effect until the British

and Canadians captured Falaise, which did not occur until 16

August. In the interim XIX TAC attempted to make up for the

stationary Third Army ground forces that were awaiting the

British successes in the north. On 13 August, 37 P-47 pilots

found 800–1,000 motor vehicles of all descriptions west of

Argentan. The flight pounced on the column destroying

400–500 vehicles, with one pilot in the attack employing his

belly tank on 12 trucks—which resulted in an explosion that

left all of them on fire.66 The following day’s events further confirmed Patton’s suspicions that the enemy was extremely vulnerable. At 1100 hours XIX TAC’s 511th Squadron reported

northeast of Argentan “the phenomenon of ground troops surrendering to air,” and fighter command provided the location

of the 300–400 white flag waving troops to the closest “unemployed” units still held up by Montgomery’s stop order.67

Patton was livid as Haislip’s forces idly waited for the British

to close the gap. By the 14th, the Germans clearly understood

their dire circumstances. At midday, the German Seventh

Army “requested to withdraw [the] front [of] Seventh Army and

[the] left wing [of] Panzer Army Five under the protection of

Panzer Gruppe Eberbach to the line Falaise–Argentan.”68

Patton knew his opportunity to close the Falaise Gap was becoming increasingly fleeting because the longer Third Army

waited, the more its northern route would be populated with

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escaping German forces from the west. ULTRA provided an excellent summary of the German withdrawal. Patton monitored

the Germans’ exploitation of Montgomery’s mistake, and his

frustration erupted at Helfers during a briefing when he declared, “If Montgomery does not get a move on I’m going to

drive those Germans right up his a--!”69 A calmer Patton reflected in his diary, “I believe that order . . . emanated from

21st Army Group, and was either due to [British] jealousy of

the Americans or to utter ignorance of the situation or a combination of the two.”70

When the Canadians finally took Falaise on the 16th,

Montgomery found a situation significantly different from the

night of the 12th. Haislip’s 90th Division was heavily engaged

with German troops desperately trying to keep the gap open.

On the 17th Patton created a provisional corps (2d French

Armor Division, 90th Infantry Division, and 80th Infantry

Division) under his chief of staff, Gen Hugh J. Gaffey, to implement the order to close the gap.71 By this time the Falaise

Gap was a lost opportunity. A desperate, cornered enemy now

inhabited an area that was once devoid of German forces. XV

Corps was denied the previous advantages of Mortain. As opposed to rapidly capturing rear-area towns and setting up defensive positions that were easily supported by air, Gaffey’s

southern corps and Montgomery’s forces from the north had

to endure hard fighting, which finally closed the gap on 20

August. The Allied ground scheme of maneuver was denied

the crushing victory once promised to it, but it did complement the air attacks that significantly helped with the defeat

of German forces caught in the pocket. 

Airpower’s systematic reduction of enemy forces left a

strong impression on the Germans caught within the pocket.

Gen Fritz Bayerlein, commander, Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr,

provided some insight into what it was like to be on the receiving end of the Falaise air attack when he said,

Traffic was in a terrific snarl in the village, moving north and east to

get out of the Falaise–Argentan trap . . . Punctually at 0900 in the

morning of the 13th came the fighter-bombers. They swept in very low

over at least 250 motor transport, trucks, cannon, and nebelwerfer on

the roads in and around the village and nearby fields and orchards.

They hit a truck train of rocket ammunition right off the bat, and this

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started exploding and throwing rockets in all directions. The streets of

the town were so littered with the burning remains of trucks and

equipment as to be impassable, yet the fighters kept on until it was

practically dark, after which two-motor bombers came in and bombed

intermittently at night.72

By 17 August the German escape attempts were in full swing.

Targets were so numerous that the Allies had very little trouble finding use for their ordnance, and XIX TAC rapidly

massed its forces to capitalize on the opportunities the

Germans afforded them. Not even weather protected the

enemy: “The Germans tried another mass movement out of the

pocket. They figured that low clouds were a reasonably good

safeguard against our aircraft, and they began to take to the

roads two and three abreast in anything that had wheels. A

short squadron of American fighter-bombers dived dangerously low through the clouds and saw the traffic jam. They

sent word back to headquarters, and soon the sky was so full

of British and American fighter-bombers that they had to form

queues to make their bomb runs. The gigantic offensive kept

up until after nightfall.”73 The Germans continually acknowledged the effects of Allied airpower. Many were impressed with

road attacks and claimed fighters would “pounce down even

on a single vehicle or motor cyclist,” while another officer summarized the frustrations of many POWs when he said, “you

have bombed and strafed all the roads causing complete congestion and heavy traffic jams. You have destroyed most of our

petrol and oil dumps, so there is no future in continuing to

fight.”74

Although XIX TAC’s operations may have been very successful in Falaise, they too were not above British interference

denying them more effective results on the battlefield. The

morning of the 18th found a sight that had become routine

during the Falaise Gap operations. P-47s found 1,000–1,500

vehicles parked bumper to bumper in the Argentan–Trun

area. Further reconnaissance revealed 1,000 more, and the

standard call back to higher headquarters was made to share

the wealth. To the disappointment of the XIX TAC pilots, they

received an order similar to their ground counterparts, which

was “do not attack because they were outside of their responsibility.”75 The majority of the targets were in the British

65

SHWEDO
sector; and as opposed to queuing as they did before, the

British wanted sole propriety of this 7,000-vehicle target.

Although the British would damage or destroy almost 3,000

vehicles, the XIX TAC was upset that this “stop order” would

deny them “a chance at the big jackpot.”76

Stop orders—whether directed at ground or air forces—can

be debated long after a conflict has ended, but they represent

some of the difficulties that are inherent in coalition warfare.

Montgomery’s delays allowed the Germans to recover personnel, panzers, and field guns that became the cadre of divisions

that helped carry on the European campaign. But coalition

warfare by its nature breeds different solutions for different

problems. Although the Normandy campaign cost the

Germans 250,000 casualties and overwhelming amounts of

equipment, Patton’s forces saw the Falaise Gap as an opportunity lost because for the majority of the campaign, they

could only hit the fleeing Germans with their air arm.77 This

would not be the last time Patton had a difference of opinion

with Montgomery’s tactics, but in this case Patton employed

other Third Army assets and focused them on Patton’s original goal—the Seine River.

During the Mortain and the Falaise Gap battles, ULTRA and

airpower afforded Patton many force-enhancing capabilities

that allowed him to prosecute his campaign effectively. During

the Mortain counterattack, Patton used his employment of

three divisions as a backstop for First Army as justification to

convince Bradley to allow him to press his attacks to the east.

Mortain also became the genesis for an upgraded ULTRA program that helped tighten his decision cycle and push vital information to lower echelons of command. Airpower during this

campaign continued to refine its transition from attacking

static targets with First Army into a cavalry-type organization

that could break free a stalled tank column with a single pass

of fifteen 500-pound bombs. While Third Army was halted,

ground units became supporting elements to the XIX TAC.

Third Army rounded up prisoners and held defensive positions

as Weyland hit the Falaise Gap with the only weapons that

were permitted by higher headquarters. ULTRA also benefited

from Patton’s rapid advances. Desperate, retreating Germans

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CADRE PAPER
generated increased radio traffic that provided Patton clear insight into all facets of the Germans’ capabilities and intentions.

This phase clearly displayed the potential synergy of ULTRA,

airpower, and ground scheme of maneuver; but it also demonstrated the adverse effects on this synergy when one of the elements was denied. During the Mortain counteroffensive, all

elements (ULTRA, airpower, and ground scheme of maneuver)

contributed to produce overwhelming results that destroyed

the German attack. In contrast, the Falaise Gap failed to yield

the same conclusive results. Higher headquarters denied

Patton his ground scheme of maneuver, and he attempted to

strike the enemy with his remaining two force enhancers.

ULTRA-informed airpower destroyed enemy troops and equipment; but towards the end of the campaign, British air efforts

also denied the XIX TAC the ability to fully apply its destructive power. Eventually, higher headquarters lifted their restrictions on Patton’s force-enhancing trinity; but by this time

the window of opportunity had closed. The vulnerable German

troops that were pushing their necks farther into the Allies’

noose became aware of their precarious position and were no

longer in danger of a Falaise envelopment. This fact did not

deter Patton as he employed his force-enhancing troika towards his original target area for an envelopment—the Seine

River. 

Notes

1. Great Britain Public Record Office, “ULTRA: Main Series of Signals

Conveying Intelligence,” Bletchley Park, 1944, reel 34, XL 4917. Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., XL 4991.

4. Ibid., XL 4997.

5. Ibid., XL 4999.

6. Melvin C. Helfers, Personal Papers—“My Personal Experience with

High Level Intelligence” (Charleston, S.C.: The Citadel Archives, November

1974), 7.

7. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 2 October 1984).

8. Helfers, Personal Papers, 9.

9. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2: Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing, 1971), 64.

10. Helfers, Personal Papers, 8.

11. Ibid.

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12. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 503.

13. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 9 October 1984).

14. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 5027.

15. Ibid., XL 5053.

16. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-1—“Weyland Diary—XIX TAC”

(Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 18 May

1945), diary for 6 August 1944, entry 1930.

17. Ibid., 6 August 1944, entry 2300.

18. “Weyland Diary—XIX TAC,” 7 August 1944, entry 0830.

19. Koch and Hays, 65.

20. David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 684–85.

21. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 30 September 1944), 8.

22. Ibid., 9.

23. Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, Report

168.7104-92—“IMPACT—US Tactical Air Power in Europe” (Albert F.

Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, May 1945), 28.

24. Seymour Freidin, Werner Kreipe, and William Richardson, eds., The

Fatal Decisions (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1956), 224.

25. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s

Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (London: Hutchinson Co.,

1978), 339.

26. Ibid.

27. Warrack Wallace, SRH-108—“Report on Assignment with the Third

United States Army, 15 August–18 September 1944” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 21 May 1945), 3.

28. Lewin, 339.

29. Irving, 684.

30. Ibid., 689.

31. Freidin, Kreipe, and Richardson, 227.

32. F. W. Winterbotham, The ULTRA Secret (New York: Harper & Row,

1974), 160.

33. George C. Marshall, SRH-026—“Marshall Letter to Eisenhower on

the Use of ULTRA Intelligence” (National Archives: Record Group 457, 15

March 1944), 2.

34. Helfers, Personal Papers, 3–4

35. Ibid., 8.

36. Wallace, 4–5.

37. Marshall.

38. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 16 October 1984).

39. Winterbotham, 219.

40. Ibid.

41. Helfers, video tape interview, 16 October 1984.

42. Ibid.; and Wallace, 5.

43. “Weyland Diary—XIX TAC,” 7 August 1944, entry 1200.

44. Blumenson, 503.

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45. Ralph Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,

1944–45 (New York: Scribner, 1980), 118.

46. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 35, XL 5119.

47. Ibid., reel 34, XL 5248.

48. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt Co., 1951),

375.

49. Thomas Parrish, The American Codebreakers—The US Role in ULTRA

(Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough Press, 1991), 213–14.

50. Winterbotham, 154.

51. Blumenson, 504.

52. Ralph Stephenson, Report K239.0512-813—“Interview with General

O. P. Weyland” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 19

November 1974), 89–91.

53. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Annex N, Third US Army Directives, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, IV. Copy

located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

54. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 35, XL 5356.

55. Ibid., XL 5461.

56. Ibid., XL 5476.

57. Ibid., XL 5521.

58. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties,” 16.

59. Martin Blumenson, The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the

Falaise Pocket (New York: W. Morrow, 1993), 205–6.

60. Ibid., 207.

61. Ibid., 205.

62. Third US Army, “After Action Report,” Annex N, Third US Army

Directives, V.

63. Blumenson, The Battle of the Generals, 208.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 209–10.

66. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties,” 17.

67. Ibid., 18.

68. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 36, XL 6312. 

69. Helfers, video tape interview, 16 October 1984.

70. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 508–9.

71. Third US Army, “After Action Report,” Annex N, Third US Army

Directives, VII.

72. Willis Thornton, Report 168.7104-95—“Interrogation of General Fritz

Bayerlein” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 29 May 1945), 9.

73. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-81—“Planes over Patton” (Albert F.

Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 30 October 1944), 27.

74. Gerry B. Jepson, Report 533.4501-9—“Assessments of Air Attacks as

Determined from Prisoners of War” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research

Center: Aerospace Studies Institute, 18 August 1944), 1–2.

75. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties,” 24.

76. Ibid.

77. Lewin, 345.

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Chapter 5

Tale of Two Rivers—Seine and Loire

To attack with limited forces I have now left available—

since I occupy a 300 mile front—I’m taking chances, but I

am convinced that the situation in the German Army warrants the taking of such risks.

—George S. Patton Jr.

He [Patton] got enough information from ULTRA to know

there was no danger from his southern flank across Loire

River, it was unheard of that an army would drive through

enemy territory without flank guard. That was where the

19th TAC came in and the Air Force was his flank guard.

—Melvin C. Helfers

Based on his experiences in World War I and his various

European tours, Patton had very specific ideas for his upcoming assault on northern Europe. This was to be Patton’s third

trip across France, and he made his desired route very clear

to his staff. Colonel Koch arrived at Knutsford, England, on 23

March 1944; and in his first meeting with Patton since Sicily,

Koch found his old boss in a customary position—bent over a

map table. Patton declared “Koch, I want all your G-2 planning

directed here [Metz, France],” Patton then swept his finger

starting at Nantes on the Atlantic Coast, along the Loire River

eastward, and noted “I do not intend to go south of the Loire

unless it is necessary to avoid a right angle turn.”1 Koch immediately realized the importance of this meeting, and he later

reflected “In the broadest terms, Patton had just stated his

EEI’s [essential elements of information] for the planned Third

Army offensive on the European continent . . . The task facing

my intelligence staff was now clear. Anything which might affect the Third Army mission, from that coast of France all the

way to Metz by way of a circuitous route through Brittany, was

71
now of critical concern.”2 Patton’s original concept was sound.

It appeared from all indications resonating from the enemy

that an eastward drive along the Loire by way of Metz could

deliver Patton’s forces to the German border in relatively little

time. Unfortunately, the German dispositions and intentions

that Koch was tracking were not the biggest hazards to the

Third Army’s mission. Patton correctly identified the real

threat when he wrote, “My only worries are my relations, not

my enemies.”3

Patton’s Original Plan Pursued

Patton’s swift drive to LeMans showed that there was great

disorganization within the German ranks and that the only

way to nurture this confusion was to grant them no reprieve

from attack. General Bradley’s order to drive northwards towards Alencon upset Patton and Weyland because they felt

this pocket was too shallow and their bigger prize was at the

Seine River. Contrary to legend, Patton always followed orders;

but he also had the habit of suggesting alternative strategies

while implementing orders with which he may not have

agreed. This clearly was the case when Bradley’s northern

drive to Falaise turned into Montgomery’s halt at Argentan. 

Third Army’s breakout and exploitation in early August

shocked the Germans, and ULTRA captured their panic as the

Germans struggled to prepare defensive lines. A message of 10

August 1944 displayed the situation within the German lines

that may explain Patton and Weyland’s objections to the shallow attempt at an envelopment or the more ill-planned stop

order. The ULTRA intercept was a directive from

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) to the military commander of France that stated,

OKW orders rearward positions along the Marne [River]. The military

control of the development of a special ops [operations] staff to be set

up with Military Commander France. Personnel to be employed—

Fortress Construction Battalions. In addition, French population [is] to

be employed on a large scale, severest measures [are to be used] to put

sufficient numbers rapidly to work. Three blocking preparations to be

pushed forward with [the] greatest of emphasis . . . Preparations to enroll civilians on [the] largest scale to be based on commune lists of

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inhabitants from 16 to 60 years old . . . Inhabitants [are] to supply entrenching tools.4

These positions were behind the Seine River, and the next day

the ULTRA audience received further confirmation that the

Germans had little current capability to defend west of the

Seine. A message from 11 August ordered a commission to ensure “arrangements [are] made for [the] evacuation in [the]

areas of Melun, Paris, Chartres and [the] north[ern] part of

Orleans.”5 The situation was clear to Weyland, as he indicated

in his diary on 13 August: “G-2-3 Meeting––[showed] All reports, ground and air, indicate withdrawal of Germans to [the]

east.”6 The following day, numerous ULTRA messages would

provide Patton’s road map to further exploit the German gaps

in the east. 

At 0218 hours on the 14th, ULTRA provided Patton encouraging news for future operations when it reported the Germans’

appreciation of his southern forces near LeMans. This situation

report stated, “To be assumed that Allies, [are] bringing up further forces to [the] area [of] LeMans, [they] will continue [to]

thrust northward in [the] general direction [of] Rouen (a city on

the Seine). Covering lines envisaged were for the time being no

longer effective.”7 Later in the day, an additional message provided the specific weak points in the German lines. The following message indicates how German higher headquarters frantically tried to plug holes in their defenses. 

[Request] Up to one Army into [the] area south of Paris by quickest

possible means . . . 64th Infantry not to be brought up to 19th Army,

but [instead] to [an] area southeast [of] Paris. Luftflotte 3 [is] to subordinate 1000 men to [the] army for ground fighting in area south [of]

Paris–Dreux–Chateaudun–Orleans–Montaris . . . 15th Army, without

awaiting arrival of static divisions, [is instructed] to pull out [the] 1st

and then 2nd Infantry Divisions and [are to] send them by quickest

possible means to [the] area south of Paris. Some of the above measures are being carried out in that [the] 6th Parachute Division is to

move into [an] area around Chartres.8

Patton knew he was in a footrace with the German forces

and could not stand still when undefended territory beckoned

to the east. Patton also knew that in this scenario, time was

against him; and within 24 hours of Montgomery’s stop order,

Patton had managed to get his forces moving again. On this

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same day, Patton devised a plan that divided XV Corps into

two entities. The first half would comply with the Argentan

stop order and assume defensive positions, while the other

half would complement a larger force that was tasked to exploit the German situation in the east. After consulting

General Haislip on the plan, Patton—the politician—went to

higher headquarters to win approval for his latest concept. A

secret to his success lay in the following diary entry: “I then

flew back to see Bradley and sell him the plan. He consented,

and even permitted me to change it so as to move XX Corps on

Chartres, the XV Corps on Dreux, and XII Corps on Orleans .

. . It is really a great plan, wholly my own, and I made Bradley

think he thought of it. Oh, what a tangled web we weave when

we first practice to deceive. I am very happy and elated. I got

all the Corps moving by 2030, so that if Monty tries to be careful it will be too late.”9 ULTRA provided a road map to the

Seine, and Patton knew he had a small window of opportunity.

In order to beat the Germans to the punch, Patton would require every advantage that ULTRA and airpower could provide.

One of the first units that Patton got moving at 2030 hours

on the 14th was XII Corps. It was concentrated southeast of

LeMans awaiting orders, and Patton directed it to proceed directly to Orleans. Patton noted XII Corps’s initial drive from

LeMans as a model of air-ground cooperation, and he provided

insight into his combinations with the following passage: 

Just east of Le Mans was one of the best examples of armor and air cooperation I have ever seen. For about two miles the road was full of

enemy motor transport and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable calling card of a P-47 fighter-bomber—namely a group of .50-caliber holes. Whenever armor and air can work together in this way, the

results are sure to be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the roads, and so long as he

stays on the roads the fighter-bomber is one of the most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork two things are necessary:

first, intimate confidence and friendship between air and ground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of the

ground commander.10

Patton’s air-ground team made excellent time; and by the

night of the 15th, XII Corps confirmed the German evacuation

order that was identified in ULTRA. Patton’s forces found the

large airport in Orleans, which had been strongly fortified with

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antiaircraft and antitank guns, virtually undefended. After

capturing the airport, XII Corps finished the job the following

morning with a two-pronged attack that crushed the slight opposition that still existed within the city.11

On 14 August Patton’s two other initial targets (Chartres

and Dreux) also showed encouraging signs for Third Army’s

selected routes of advance. Air reconnaissance summaries

from XIX TAC stated that the “pilots reported fires at Chartres

airfield, which appear[ed] unserviceable, and a violent explosion

at the Dreux airdrome . . . [that made it appear that] the

Luftwaffe was pulling out.”12 ULTRA information was further

confirmed when XV Corps met “only a few lightly defended

road blocks”; and when they surrounded Dreux, XV Corps

only had to “fire at some German troops fleeing eastward” in

order to capture the town.13 During this drive time was critical; and XIX TAC also ensured that piecemeal German units

would not slow Patton’s forces as the following report indicated. “North of Dreux, eight P-47s flying armored column

cover were vectored by the 5th Armored Division to a road

junction where anti-tank guns and infantry were holding up

the advance . . . Our Thunderbolts attacked it with six 500-

pound bombs, four frag clusters, and strafing. Results were

not observed, but the ground forces indicated that the guns

were destroyed, and they congratulated the squadron

leader.”14

Complementing the obvious contributions from the air,

ULTRA appears to have also greatly influenced this campaign.

Bennett recalled “unprecedented amounts of Enigma traffic

were being intercepted, and most of it was decoded with such

rapidity that signal after signal could be prepared so close to

the German time of origin, that each seemed more urgent than

the last.”15 During this period Helfers remembered the importance and Patton’s rapid assimilation of this information: “I remember one time he [Patton] called me in one afternoon, [he]

asked me a few questions and looked at my map.” After it was

all over with, he said “Thank you very much Major, you have

saved me the service of two divisions.”16 In this scenario

Patton could neither waste time in needless battles nor

waste troops on unnecessary flank missions. Patton knew the

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locations of the enemy defenses, and he maneuvered his

forces around the impediments to ensure that he beat the

Germans to the undefended positions in the rear.

Unfortunately for the commanders not indoctrinated to

ULTRA commanders, some of these movements may have appeared haphazard with no great purpose. One example of

lower-level frustration with higher headquarters’ taskings

came from the official US Army History of World War II:

General Irwin [Commander of 5th Division, XV Corps] who was less

than fully informed on the big picture, [claimed that] “sudden and unexpected changes cause[d] considerable confusion in arrangements,

transportation and plans,” particularly since there was “no indication

of reasons for orders.” His bewilderment increased during the next few

days when “orders made no sense at all” and prompted “great confusion.” Between 12 and 16 August, Irwin received conflicting orders that

indicated not much more than changing directions of march. Strained

communications, sketchy information, and a surprising absence of

German opposition characterized his division’s movements. (Emphasis

added)17

Although the Third Army forces that attacked Chartres encountered the most resistance, they still cited the “excellent

road net and sparseness of the enemy” as the reasons for the

successful drive to their objective.18 Patton’s troops were successfully employing his style of warfare, and the Third Army’s

initial objectives had been captured in their entirety by 16

August 1944 (map 5). 

Contrary to the wishes of many Parisians, Patton’s next objective was the Seine River to facilitate a second envelopment

north of the French capital. Although XV Corps’s eastward

drive placed it only 37 miles from Paris, Patton knew a Seine

River crossing there would destroy his race to the German undefended rear. Patton found much more advantageous crossing points north of the city that involved less fanfare and resistance. This northward drive would also resemble Patton

and Weyland’s original plan. This thrust could provide an opportunity to catch the Germans who escaped the Falaise Gap

and also push the German river-crossing points farther down

the Seine where the river was wider and more difficult to

cross.19

The Germans’ appreciation for the ongoing race to the Seine

was not lost in ULTRA messages. One situation report stated “a

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new factor is that the 7th American Armored Division is attacking through Nogent. Situation at [the] bottleneck [is] still such

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SHWEDO

Map 5. Drive to the Seine River
that a certain degree of orderly evacuation is possible. If there is

any hesitation, development of [the] situation [for the] Army

Group cannot be foreseen.20 Although the Germans understood

the importance of beating Patton to the rear, their intentions exceeded their capabilities. Numerous ULTRA reports showed why

there would be hesitations. “Situation [on] both sides [of] Falaise

[is] apparently extremely serious. Resistance of the troops,

weakened to utmost as regards [to] both personnel and material, not far from collapse. Consequences incalculable. Despite

redoubled Allied air effort, which was intolerable for the troops,

five heavy flak batteries have been made available exclusively for

A/T [anti-tank] defense on north front . . . Request that bringing up ammunition be increased maximum possible.”21

Ammunition was not the only shortage the Germans were enduring, as another ULTRA intercept stated “fuel situation [is] so

strained that supply journeys and removal of wounded in part

stopped.”22 Patton refused to let the Germans rectify their situation as his attention focused on the most expeditious route

across the Seine.

In order to conserve Allied gas and supplies, Patton gave priority to XV Corps and directed it to “move early 18 August to secure a position in the vicinity of Mantes–Gassicourt to interdict

[the] Seine River.”23 Earlier that morning (0044 hours), ULTRA

showed that this route of advance would be an excellent crossing point. In this message the German 352d Division was instructed that they were “under orders to withdraw in [the] face

of Allied pressure to Seine crossing at Mantes and Melun.”24

Unfortunately, XX Corps was not ordered to attack Melun until

20 August; and it found defensive forces waiting. But XV Corps

had a relatively easy drive to Mantes. It quickly crushed the assortment of German stragglers that were placed at roadblocks,

and the following day XV Corps found Mantes–Gassicourt abandoned.25

The easy capture of Mantes also revealed that there was

nothing preventing a Seine crossing at this location; therefore,

XV Corps crossed the river and awaited further orders. This

action across the Seine did not win Patton the praise one

might expect as his aide-de-camp’s notes indicate.

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We had just finished pushing up to and against the Seine River at

Mantes–Gassicourt; returned to our headquarters and on our arrival

were informed by the Chief of Staff that Gen. B[radley] was on his way

and was “fit to be tied.” He wanted to see Gen. P[atton] . . . General B.

arrived and he immediately launched into the fact that they had had a

big conference and decided that Third Army shouldn’t go beyond

Druex and Chartres . . . [and towards] the Seine [so as to] leave an escape route for the Germans in the Falaise pocket. After Gen. B. had informed Gen. P. [he] was not to advance any farther and that was that.

Gen. P. told Gen. B. that since he was already to the Seine River, in fact

had pi--ed in the river that morning and had just come back from

there, what would he want him to do—pull back? After much discussion Gen. B. told him how strong the people [Germans] were in the

Falaise pocket and he didn’t think Gen. P. would be able to contain

them, and it was his orders to leave an escape route to the east [for

them]. General P. asked him if he ever knew him to give up a piece of

ground he had taken. Gen. B. said, “No, but this is different.” Gen. P.

said that he could and would hold it, if Gen. B. would agree. So it was

agreed that he would hold what he had, which we did, thereby closing

the escape that they had been wanting to hold open. Gen. B. left Gen.

P.’s headquarters quite cheerfully, after saying to Gen. P., “It certainly

is a pleasure to talk to someone who is sure and confident. The picture

looks much different from here. But for my sake stay put there now—

don’t advance any farther across the river. I’ll try to sell them this but

. . .,” etc.26

The notes from this encounter ended with Patton’s aide commenting “without this crossing of the Seine . . . Montgomery

might well still be sitting on his Caen.”27 This statement expressed the frustrations that Patton and his staff had with the

overly cautious nature of the British and their influence on

Bradley and, later, Eisenhower. Daily ULTRA intercepts

showed that the German army was no longer composed of the

unbeatable “supermen” that had shocked the European continent earlier in the war. Mortain proved that ULTRA and airpower could identify and destroy large attack formations, but

some could not transition to this new phase of the war.

Unfortunately, cautious advances allowed the Germans to set

up defenses in any threatened area. By the time the lethargic

forces capitalized on these attacks, another determined battle

would ensue, causing numerous additional casualties and

slower progression. Patton realized this and implemented a

campaign focused on speed. He did this to avoid the slowgoing hedgerow fighting of June and July. In August 1944

Patton’s rapid, low-cost drives proved that cautious attacks

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were actually more dangerous, and he made this very clear in

the following comment that summarized his strategy in

France: “Whenever you slow anything down, you waste human

lives. Up to the present, we traded about between 10 to 12

[Germans] for 1 [American] . . . The last war was a slow one,

one with a narrow front, very great depth. In this war, there is

no front. There is very little depth . . . [In this war] we cut

through and wipe them out. If we hit opposition, we try not to

boot it out. We try to hold and go around and then have the

infantry clean it out.”28 Patton eventually talked Bradley into

letting the XV Corps push the attack north along the banks of

the Seine for a second envelopment. It took two days for XV

Corps to start moving because once again, Montgomery had

reservations about the Americans crossing army boundary

group lines into the British sector.29 The delay gave the

Germans time to construct defensive positions and take advantage of the terrain. During the two-day wait, SS Captain

Wahl—on his own initiative—gathered tanks from all sources

(remnants of 2d SS, 9th SS, and 2d Panzer Divisions) and later

joined with the 1st SS Panzer Division, which later became

known as Kampfgruppe Mohnke.30 This unit caused XV Corps

five hard days fighting to reach its objective, which was 20

miles up the Seine. 

As in the first envelopment attempt at Falaise, the XIX TAC

once again played a role in the reduction of forces attempting

to escape the noose at the Seine. Like Patton, XIX TAC was not

in awe of the retreating Germans: “West of Paris, too, the

Germans were retreating, many crossing the virtually bridgeless Seine during the night by pontoon, by ferry, and even by

swimming. At the ferry slips our planes dropped delay-fused

bombs set for detonation during the night, at the probable

peak of the hurried, nocturnal exodus of supermen.”31 At

Third Army the veil of the fearsome Germans was gone. XIX

TAC attempted to increase the costs of the German retreat. It

destroyed units that were denied XV Corps due to army

boundary problems. Eventually, the delayed ground forces

were involved in an unnecessary battle with well-prepared and

dug-in German forces. Although the envelopment on the Seine

failed to secure the lofty goals it once promised, airpower’s

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achievements left a great impression on the enemy, as one

German general recalled, “Field Marshal Model had ordered

the withdrawal of Fifth Panzer Army across the lower Seine . . .

With a tremendous effort, and with the sacrifice of vast quantities of equipment as a result of ceaseless air attacks, the

crossing too was completed much against expectations. The

last armored formation across was 116th Panzer Division, in

the Rouen area. The scene along the banks of the Seine was

appalling. Hundreds of smashed vehicles and burned out

tanks marked the route which the last German troops had

taken.”32 XV Corps eventually closed the gap, but during this

drive these troops were turned over to the temporary control

of the First US Army. This changed Patton’s focus to the

south. This transfer also absolved Patton from the time-consuming responsibilities of liberating Paris, which allowed him

to continue his dash towards the makeshift defenses in the

Paris–Orleans Gap.

During this drive ULTRA greatly aided the speed and effectiveness of the ground scheme of maneuver by highlighting the

weak points along the Seine River. The higher headquarters’

delays clearly proved Patton’s theories correct about slowing

down Allied forces. To make up for these delays, XIX TAC was

able to hit the German forces crossing the Seine north of the

forward advance of the XV Corps. Although the Germans were

able to extricate some of their forces, this crossing was extremely costly. When Model’s last rear guard crossed the

Seine, it had rescued few more than 100 panzers and assault

guns.33 Higher headquarters interfered with some of Patton’s

plans; but in the south he would have a much freer hand,

which made this operation one of his most successful operations of the war.

Patton’s Pursuit in the South

The area below Paris became of significant concern to the

Germans because so many of their troops to this point had

been caught in either the first or second Allied envelopment.

Hitler’s infatuation with the sea at Avranches––and his mistaken belief that the grossen invasion would come at Calais––

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caused him to concentrate his forces in the north. Hitler also

believed that the Allies would immediately attempt to liberate

Paris. When this did not occur, it made maneuvering units to

stop Patton’s southern drive even more challenging. ULTRA

captured the Germans’ concerns as they attempted to remedy

the situation in the following 17 August movement order:

“OKW orders, all troops and authorities of all branches of the

Armed Forces in the area of Army Gruppe G, West of the line

Orleans–Clermont Ferrand–Montpellier—are, in so far as not

projected for defense of fortresses and fortress areas and except for fighting troops of 19th Army, to transfer beginning at

once behind the line Seine–Yonne–Bourgogne.”34 On 20

August XII Corps was tasked to beat these German reinforcements, with the initial objective being the Yonne River at Sens.

These attacks were predicated on speed, but XII Corps’s new

commander spent the majority of this operation nervously

questioning his commander’s tactics. 

Patton was very depressed about having to relieve XII Corps

commander, Maj Gen Gilbert Cook, but he had blood circulation problems that made even walking difficult. Cook’s replacement was Maj Gen Manton Eddy. Eddy was the former

commander of the 9th Division and a veteran of the hedgerow

fighting. He was not accustomed to Patton’s style of warfare,

as Patton disclosed in a letter to his wife: “Manton Eddy who

took over Doc’s [Cook’s] corps asked me when I told him his

job: ‘How much shall I have to worry about my flank?’ I told

him that depended on how nervous he was. He has been

thinking [that] a mile a day [was] good going. I told him to go

fifty and he turned pale.”35

Eddy’s concern for his flanks was not ill founded. His corps

was on the southernmost flank of Patton’s army, and this position was also the southern flank of the Allied front in northern France. Therefore, Eddy was essentially responsible for

the flank guard for the Allied effort in Western Europe. This

fact caused numerous discussions on the subject that many

members of the Third Army staff recalled vividly. Colonel Koch

remembered one phone call in which Eddy complained that

Patton’s plans left his flanks insecure. Patton did not agree

and reminded him “in the academic days at Fort Leavenworth,

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the approved measure was to protect the army’s flank by a

squadron of horse cavalry, less Troop A. And you’ve got a da--ed

sight more than that.”36 Unfortunately, Eddy did not understand the force-enhancing measures that Patton was using to

secure his flanks.

General Harkins (Patton’s deputy chief of staff) provided insight into Patton’s force-enhancing measures when he related

the following story.

Then we were going across France, General Eddy who had the XII

Corps [which] only had four divisions. He was stretched out 80 miles.

He had just come from 9th Division up in the hedgerows, and he was

really frightened to death because his flanks were wide open. He called

General Patton, and said, “Listen, your G-2 tells me there are 90,000

Germans on my right and 80,000 on my left and I’ve only got four divisions.” And General Patton says, “Ignore the ba--ards, go ahead.”

Then he called O. P. Weyland and told him to watch the flanks, and if

anything was coming up the roads to let him know, and then we’d see

what we could do.37

Patton also confirmed Harkins’s words and his reliance on airpower in the book War As I Knew It. In relating a similar conversation, Patton provided much of the rationale behind his

decisions.

When this move started, Eddy of the XII Corps asked me how much he

should worry about his right flank. I said that depended on how nervous he was by nature. Of course, there was nothing to cover his right

flank, but by advancing in depth—that is, one division following the

other—this lack of defense was immaterial. If I had worried about

flanks, I could have never fought the war. Also, I was convinced that

our Air Service could locate any groups of enemy large enough to be a

serious threat, and then I could always pull something out of the hat

to drive them back while the Air Force in the meantime delayed their

further advance.38

The forces that Eddy was most concerned with were the

German troops who were receiving transfer orders to fill the

Paris–Orleans gap. These movement directives were well monitored by ULTRA, as one Bletchley Park employee recalls. “Our

output was so great that the movements of most of the major

German army and air force units at this time can still be reconstructed with considerable detail from the immense numbers of location reports received, up to a hundred in a single

day . . . it [the messages] enabled large staffs which were now

working on ULTRA at home and abroad to weave an even

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tighter intelligence net round the Wehrmacht than before.”39

In 1984 Helfers confirmed Patton’s reliance on the vast number of ULTRA messages. Helfers recalled, “He [Patton] got

enough information from ULTRA to know there was no danger

to his southern flank across the Loire River, it was unheard of

that an army would drive through enemy territory without

flank guard.”40 Airpower and ULTRA in this scenario turned

potential flank guard troops into Patton’s spearheads that

would lead some of Patton’s most successful drives.

Patton’s faith in ULTRA and airpower was immense because

as Eddy often pointed out, he was gambling the entire flank of

the Allied effort in France with this concept. Unfortunately for

Eddy, he was not privy to ULTRA information. Patton knew his

risks were lowered with the help of ULTRA intelligence. Due to

the dutiful German reporting system, Patton knew where the

enemy was, where he would be, and in what numbers. These

facts were confirmed by conventional sources of intelligence

that allowed Patton to apply the correct force allotments to the

German weak and strong points. Any unforeseen German

countermoves could be rapidly dealt with by airpower that

would provide Patton additional time to reorient forces. The

air-ground team then could deal efficiently with whatever

flank threat that materialized.

Although Eddy had some apprehensions, his XII Corps

prosecuted Patton’s plan to the letter, which caused Patton to

call this operation “the fastest and biggest pursuit in history.”41 XII Corps drove to Montargis, found some opposition,

immediately bypassed it, crossed the Loing River at Souppes,

and rapidly raced to Sens. This thrust was so quick and unexpected—and the spearheads of XII Corps took the German

garrison by such surprise—that some officers were strolling

the streets in dress uniform. These unfortunate sightseers

missed the last truck home that day, and they witnessed Third

Army’s capture of their bridgehead on the Yonne.42 Eddy then

telephoned to proclaim: “General, I had a lovely drive. I’m in

Sens. What’s next?” Patton replied: “Hang up and keep

going.”43

As the infantry routed the bypassed forces in Montargis,

Eddy did “keep going”; and his 4th Armored Division drove 40

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miles to the outskirts of Troyes, defeating the German forces

there in a day. By the time the Allies celebrated the liberation

of Paris (25 August), Patton already had four bridgeheads

across the Seine; and his forces were almost 80 miles beyond

the French capital (map 6). This rapid drive was significantly

abetted by the synergistic employment of Patton’s force enhancers, which were used in both traditional and unconventional roles. 

When the Luftwaffe attempted to deny Patton’s army the

bridgeheads on the Seine, XIX TAC countered these actions

with various air superiority missions. While covering XX

Corps, XIX TAC broke up an attack by “seventy plus Fw-190s,

many carrying bombs” that were “dispersed” before they could

hit their targets.44 On 25 August the Allies launched an attack

specifically focused on the German air force in France. This

was a joint operation among the various TACs and numbered

air forces that used ULTRA to find and destroy enemy aircraft:

“The melding of Y intercept [lower grade communications intercepts] with German Air Force operational order and intentions produced excellent results particularly in the Normandy

campaign and after the breakthrough where by virtue of

‘source’ information. The Ninth Air Force was able to carefully

follow the retreating Luftwaffe and deal a successful series of

blows at the overcrowded German airfields of Eastern

France.”45 XIX TAC’s target, Beauvais Airfield, was particularly

active and highlighted itself in ULTRA traffic with messages

such as the following from Field Luftgau stating, “Urgently

need M/T [motor transport] fuel in area of Laon and Beauvais.

Allotment urgently requested for stepped up operations, increased transfers and urgent transport of ammunition and

aircraft fuel . . . [could] jeopardize further operations.”46 XIX

TAC destroyed 13 aircraft on the ground at Beauvais. They

also engaged 45 more Focke–Wulf (Fw) 190s in the air which

increased their kills by an additional 13 and also damaged

three others. Overall, Ninth and Eighth Air Force fighters destroyed or damaged 254 planes, with XIX TAC’s portion being

67 aircraft in one day. This day led many after-action report

writers to call it “the day that broke the back of the German

fighter force in France.”47

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The Allied Air Forces were becoming so dominant that both

sides were recognizing the large impact they were having on the

battlefield. The demoralizing effects it was having on the German

troops forced the military governor of France to circulate the

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Map 6. Four Seine Bridgeheads and Beyond
following piece of propaganda that was captured during this

campaign: “The ground soldier in action on the invasion front

feels depressed most of all by enemy air superiority. In spite of

the numerical inferiority of our air force, there have been successes accomplished, however, which the single soldier, tied

down to his narrow section of the front, cannot appreciate. The

following air force information should be known to the troops so

that they may know what great support the fighting forces are

receiving from their own air force.”48 Unfortunately for the

Germans, Patton found one more way for Allied airpower to “depress” the German ground soldiers. In order to keep his eastward drive south of Paris going, Patton became IX Troop Carrier

Command’s major effort. These C-47s were being held in reserve for possible airborne operations at Chartres and Orleans.

Patton’s capture of these cities freed them to support other

Third Army activities. Patton’s LOCs were stretched, and his

tanks needed gas and oil. The Red Ball Express (the theater

truck-borne delivery system) was having trouble keeping up

with Third Army’s advances; therefore, Patton again turned to

airpower to solve some of his ground-based problems. IX Troop

Carrier Command alleviated some of the supply problems associated with Third Army’s rapid drives. This support peaked on

26 August with the IX Troop Carriers employing 606 C-47s and

three C-53s that transported 2.15 million pounds of fuel and rations.49 Patton had found another way for airpower to support

his ground scheme of maneuver, but the air arm’s crowning accomplishment would soon be realized south of the Loire River.

The drive to the Seine was a classic example of Patton using

every available asset to exploit the disorganization that was

prevalent throughout the retreating German forces. During

this American blitzkrieg, Patton employed the tactic of bypassing strong points and attacking weak points deep in the

enemy’s rear areas. The XIX TAC ULTRA team identified

threats and essentially provided a map for the ground scheme

of maneuver to guide the ground troops efficiently to the undefended rear. Weyland’s airmen provided flank support and

cover for the Third Army’s spearheads and struck the retreating Germans attempting to cross the Seine. Before Patton’s

forces initiated their drive to the Seine, Patton wrote his wife:

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“Unless I get a stop order in the next two hours, we are jumping again. On paper it looks very risky but I don’t think it is.”50

The force-enhancing capabilities of ULTRA and the excellent

working relationship with XIX TAC do not appear on paper,

while history shows that this drive was not risky; and clearly

Patton’s strategy was sound because in this campaign “no

army had ever moved with such speed and dash.”51

Support Roles Switch—XIX TAC Bags

20,000 Germans

After the fall of Paris on 25 August 1944, Third Army advanced along a 90-mile front that ran along the Loire River—

giving Patton a combined flank and front of 450 miles.52

Patton did not have sufficient forces to cover this vast area adequately, thus he became increasingly dependent on XIX TAC

and ULTRA. During the early planning in England, Patton told

Koch that he had no intention of pushing south of the Loire.

This position did not change during the August operations. On

3 August, 12th Army Group specifically directed the Third

Army to drive as far south as “the Loire River and protect the

right flank with minimum forces as necessary.”53

This situation initially appeared amenable to both sides.

ULTRA and the XIX TAC monitored the German forces south

of Loire who reported the “successful demolition of [the] Maine

and Loire Bridge near Angers” or “Loire Bridge at

LaRoche–Bernard demolished.”54 Considering these were

flank-protecting actions, the Germans were merely reducing

the target list for the XIX TAC. These German forces were incorporating some of the same economy-of-force measures that

Third Army was employing, as one unit south of the Loire reported, “North bank of Loire from Saumar to Nantes being

given up to economize forces.”55 For the first two and one-half

weeks of August, the forces south of the Loire were clearly focused on defense and holding ground. Patton knew this and

could confidently disregard them. The continuous German references to defensive taskings to “block Loire crossing[s] as far

as Tours” showed that they had their attention focused elsewhere.56 On 15 August the situation in southern France

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CADRE PAPER
changed, and these defensive forces rapidly attempted to fill

empty gaps in their northern lines in order to avoid another

envelopment.

Seventh US Army’s invasion of southern France quickly put

the German troops south of Loire in a vise. Third Army’s rapid

drive east along the banks of the Loire, complemented with

Seventh Army’s drive north up the Rhone valley, put the

Germans in the position of being cut off. This led Hitler to send

the following message to the commander-in-chief west: “As the

development of the situation with Army Group Baker makes

the cutting off of [the] 19th Army within a foreseeable period

seem possible, [I] order that firstly, Army Group G, with the

exception of the forces remaining in Toulon and Marseilles,

will disengage from the Allies and will gain contact with the

south wing of Army Group B. Construction of an intermediate

line Sens–Dijon–Swiss Frontier to be initiated immediately.”57

Additional ULTRA messages provided the routes of these retreating forces. The order that “railways [were] to be fully

used” further aided XIX TAC’s interdiction campaign.58 These

railways would become the targets in an operation against the

forces south of the Loire.

The following public affairs release of December 1944 clearly

displayed Patton’s reliance on the XIX TAC. “Never in military

history had a ground commander entrusted the defense of an

army flank to tactical aircraft, but when Third Army turned

east and headed for Paris they left only light holding forces

along the Loire River. South of the Loire, General Erich Elster

had an estimated 36,000 German troops who could have

stabbed viciously into the exposed Third Army flank.”59

Although these forces could have attacked the Third Army

flank, the ULTRA audience knew that they had an alternate

destination. Numerous intercepted messages directed these

forces to the Swiss frontier, and some specifically called the

units “to be brought back to [the] area [of] Belfort.”60 With this

knowledge, Patton’s attitude towards flank guards does not

seem particularly brash. At the beginning of this campaign,

Patton told Weyland, “I am going to forget completely about my

flank if you can guarantee to protect me from the air”; and

Weyland agreed saying “I can do that if I have the weather.”61

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SHWEDO
As added insurance, Patton knew ULTRA could see through

any weather; and the battle south of the Loire became a XIX

TAC and ULTRA affair.

Weyland’s planners wasted no time. On 23 August they submitted plans to destroy any hopes for the 36,000 Germans to

reenter the fight (map 7). Unlike the public affairs release, the

XIX TAC planners had a better idea of the desired route for the

German forces. The plan was a classic interdiction effort with

several phases, which are described in the following passage.

The success of the American Seventh Army’s landing on the

Mediterranean coast of France will, or already has, forced a general

abandonment by the enemy of his position in Southern France. He

must withdraw or be cut off. In withdrawal he has two alternatives.

One is to bring his forces north and attack the Third Army’s right

flank, and the other is to race the Third Army to the German–Swiss

corner near Belfort, and if he wins [they will] help set up a defensive

line for the protection of the Reich with these forces. It is thought that

the latter is the more probable course but whatever the choice, he

must use railroads and roads to the utmost. The plan presented herein

seeks to deny to him the use of the former and force him to the roads

where he will be required to use his badly diminished stocks of oil. The

roads and the columns on them in turn should be attacked at points

to be chosen as his movements are found.62

Due to the meticulous German reporting system, XIX TAC had

no trouble finding acceptable targets. Grove specifically highlighted ULTRA’s contribution to this campaign by stating,

“When Patton’s open flank was along the Loire River and XIX

TAC was assigned the job of protecting that extended open

flank, ULTRA’s knowledge of enemy locations and movement

was of great value.”63

The following day the XIX TAC initiated the plan. The 371st

Fighter Group reported that it did “a little working on the railroad” along Loire.64 The initial phase of the scheme made a series of 18 rail cuts and 16 bridge cuts that isolated the forces

from the Third Army right flank and severed the northwest

route to the German–Swiss border (see map 7).65 Early in the

movement, the German forces employed march tactics and reporting procedures that greatly aided the targeting process as

the following message shows, “Danger from [the] Allies and [the]

composition of march groups, consider [it] necessary to march

main body as one formation. Employment of blocking formations on a line La Charite–Bourges and towards north intended

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CADRE PAPER
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SHWEDO

[the German–Swiss Border] . . . completion of movement by 15

September presuming all runs smoothly.”66 Unfortunately for

the Germans, all did not go smoothly. ULTRA indicated the effects of the XIX TAC’s denial of rail transport in the following

message: “railways cannot be used to [an] advantage because of

increasing demolitions. Great strain on persons unaccustomed

to marching, in present oppressive heat.”67 With rail movements

significantly degraded, the XIX TAC was then ready to transition

to targeting individual German units.

Although the area below the Loire River is vast, ULTRA significantly narrowed the search patterns. ULTRA messages tracked

FRANCE 

BELGIUM 

LUXEMBOURG

GERMANY 

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

Sambre

Meuse

Marne

Seine

Saône

Moselle

Loire

Cher

Rhône

Seine

Loir

Saône

Rhône

Dordogne

Rhine

Durance

Po

Isère

Isère

Drac

Doubs

Lot

Lot

Loire

Koblenz 

Wiesbaden 

Luxembourg

Paris 

Trier

Metz 

Strasbourg

Bern 

Geneva 

Turin

Aosta 

Bastogne 

Saarbrücken

Mainz 

Cherbourg 

Montreux 

Dijon 

Poitiers Moulins 

Nevers Bourges 

Bellac

Beaugency

Issoudon

Desired Route

Surrender Route

Rail Cut

Rail Bridges

La Chatre 

Belfort 

Cosne

Map 7. XIX Tactical Air Command’s Interdiction Plans for the Loire
the proposed withdrawal routes, which in turn provided the P47’s flight paths for armed reconnaissance missions. One example of the detail provided in these messages comes from the 64th

Corps in a message from 26 August: “Routes ‘ABLE’ Poitiers, La

Châtre, Moulins. ‘BAKER’ Châtellerault, Châteauroux, Bourges,

Loire crossing at Nevers, La Chârite, and Cosne. Assembling area

[at Châteauroux–Angoulême–Poitiers with last elements of

southern group in Angoulême on 1 September. Loire crossing

with first elements [of] main body probably not before 12

September.”68 The movement of the German troops started to demand action on the last days of August. The following message

provided the area of operations for XIX TAC’s armed reconnaissance missions: “Covering forces on [the] Loire until last elements of 159 Reserve Division pass[es] through Angoulême–

Poitiers area. South of Châteauroux–Poitiers line, thrust to east

reveal strong guerrilla crossings and destruction of bridges,

which with difficult terrain are delaying progress. Thus Poitiers

turning point for all elements streaming back.”69

On 1 September XIX TAC specifically targeted the above

area of interest, and the air strikes scored immediate results

as the XIX TAC’s daily intelligence summary reports: “36th

Group flew 4 armed recce missions south of the Loire River in

the Poitiers–Châteauroux–Bourges area. One of these, a group

mission, with 35 aircraft participating, provided the highlight

of the day with the destruction of 311 MT [motor transports] and

94 armored vehicles. The 53d Squadron of this Group attacked

an ammunition dump near Poitiers and reported explosions from

it that continued for 15 minutes after the attack.”70 XIX TAC

continued these attacks below the Loire for the next 10 days.

The targets often corresponded to the specific locations cited

in the ULTRA messages. The Germans continued to report

their progress, and the XIX TAC made sure they would not

make their proposed schedule. The 64th Corps, who were

heading for the Swiss border, stated that they “intended to

cross the Loire on the ninth [September]”; and their Army

Group instructed them “to expedite this if possible.”71

Following this message, XIX TAC had one of its best days, reporting on 7 September:

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CADRE PAPER
406th Group, in two armed recces in the Chateauroux–Issoudun–

Bourges area provided the high spot of the day. Upon receipt of a

Tac/R report that an enemy column was moving in that area, 406th

Group was sent out on the target, found the column, and bombed and

strafed it until their ammunition was exhausted. Returning to base for

more ammunition they hurried back to the target and completed the

destruction of the entire column. Pilots reported that French civilians

were taking the few remaining vehicles in the column as our aircraft

left. Total claims: 132 motor transport and 310 horse-drawn vehicles

destroyed or damaged.72

After three additional days of air attacks, the Germans south

of the Loire were ready to quit. German General Elster sent a

note through messengers to the closest ground units that his

forces were done. General Elster stated his terms for surrender as: “Keep the ‘Jabo’ (German slang for fighter-bomber—

Jagdbomber) off my men and they will march north to

Beaugency bridge and surrender.”73

Since these German troops were more than 250 miles behind Patton’s forward line of troops, the Ninth US Army (the

closest ground units to the Germans) sent representatives to

discuss the formal terms of surrender. Information from this

meeting rapidly demonstrated the effects of airpower because

the Germans “insisted that Weyland, whose planes had

caused him so much anguish, be at the ceremony.”74 Because

these troops were so far from any ground units, the 20,000

Germans were instructed to change their northeast route and

march under a white flag directly north to the Beaugency

bridge. Weyland then sent the Germans a note saying, “Okay,

we’ll keep you under surveillance, and if you make a false

move, you’ll get hit again.”75

Gen William H. Simpson, Ninth US Army commander, was

confused by the German ground troops’ request involving

Weyland; therefore, he drove to XIX TAC headquarters to get

some answers. Although the only US forces that engaged the

Germans were the XIX TAC, General Simpson was still perplexed by a note given to him by one of his subordinate generals. Weyland fondly remembered Simpson’s education in the

abilities of airpower in the following story:

So Baldy Simpson said that he got that message from a German general through his division commander, who said that they wanted to

turn in their suits if they would quit hitting them from the air. Well, it

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SHWEDO
just happened the day before, or the morning of that same day. He was

down there one afternoon and said, “What’s the meaning of all this?” I

said, “Well, I just got some wet prints of these German troops south

about 100 miles, or something like that. They’re getting a little desperate, and they’re trying to move. They’ve formed up in columns and [are]

trying to head back toward Germany. It just so happened we caught

about two columns, each about ten miles long . . . We just got through

beating the he-- out of them this morning, and here happens to be the

pictures.” Well, on these roads there were burning trucks and vehicles

and whatnot. Smoke [was] moving up. Some vehicles were trying to get

off the roads into the fields to get away. And he looked at that, and

said, “My God, now I understand. That’s why the old boy wants to quit.

I don’t blame him.”76

After this educational session, General Simpson decided not to

attend the formal surrender ceremony. This became a wise decision because the major general that Simpson sent took a

backseat to Weyland.

The 83d Infantry Division was responsible for all facets of

the ceremony. The 83d ensured that the formal protocol for

the ceremony would dictate that General Elster would surrender to Maj Gen Robert C. Macon (the 83d Division commander). To guarantee there was no confusion, the 83d protocol representatives provided the following scripts in German

and English to make sure all items ran smoothly:

General Elster: “Forced by the war situation, it was decided by the

High Command to withdraw the combat troops from my March Group.

Therefore I am unable to make a breakthrough to the German Frontier

by force of arms, I herewith surrender the ground and supply troops

remaining with me to the Ninth US Army, in accordance with mutually

agreed terms.” General hands over a weapon as a symbol. Major

General [Macon]: “On behalf of the Army of United States, I accept your

surrender. You and your command will receive fair treatment as prisoners of war.”77

Unfortunately, the Germans did not agree with the script and

did not let their concerns be known until during the ceremony.

Breaking ranks with protocol, General Elster disregarded

General Macon and walked over to the XIX TAC commander

and in Weyland’s words: “He turned over his pistol to me, not

the Army General.”78 The assistant Third Army G-2 shares a

similar story related to the snub of the Ninth US Army.

Although Third Army’s ground troops never engaged the

German forces south of the Loire, the air-ground teamwork

under Patton was highlighted by General Elster’s unrehearsed

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CADRE PAPER
speech, which is reflected in Col Robert Allen’s recollections of

the event:

Two hundred and fifty miles in the rear of Lucky’s [Third Army’s] line

of contact, 64th German Corps had decided to call it quits. Several

days before the formal capitulation, this portion of Third Army’s farflung zone was suddenly transferred to Ninth Army. Without having

raised a finger to force surrender, Ninth Army collected some 20,000

Krauts and their Lugers. To Third Army men the loss of the latter was

even more painful than the juicy PW bag. But there was one hilarious

compensation. The surrender formalities took place in an ancient little

town of Beaugency, on the Loire 30 miles southwest of Orleans . . .

Major General Robert C. Macon, CG 83d Infantry Division, Brigadier

General O. P. Weyland, CG XIX TAC, and other senior officers were

present. As part of the ceremony, Elster made a speech. When he concluded, an interpreter was asked what the Kraut said. The interpreter

fidgeted, hemmed and hawed. “Well, what did he say?” was demanded.

“Couldn’t you understand him?” “Yes, sir,” replied the interpreter. “I

understood him all right. He said he wanted it clearly understood that

he was surrendering to the Third US Army.”79

The surrender at Beaugency represented an example of the

ground scheme of maneuver supporting an interdiction campaign that delayed, disrupted, and then destroyed forces that

capitulated under the threat of further air strikes. In turn, the

force-enhancing effects of airpower and ULTRA provided

Patton assurances that his flank was not at risk, which provided more troops that could be used as spearheads. 

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Surrender Ceremonies at Beaugency Bridge
Some historians see the Seine and Loire campaigns through

the nervous eyes of General Eddy. They highlight Patton’s

hard-driving campaign, but they also fault him for his apparent risky maneuvers. Patton’s biographer, Martin Blumenson,

characterized this campaign as “reckless exploitation”; but

with the declassification of ULTRA and the knowledge of

Patton’s reliance on airpower, his actions seem much less

brazen.80 Patton’s AOR was growing exponentially, and he had

to find force enhancers to ensure his drive eastward could

continue. Patton knew any delays in his drive towards the

Rhine would allow his enemies time to prepare defenses and

would close the window of opportunity that existed during this

period. The combination of operational necessity; detailed,

timely, and very accurate knowledge of enemy capabilities and

intentions; and a cooperative air element whose commander

was fully attuned to Patton’s maneuver philosophy and style

of war produced a situation that allowed Patton to exploit fully

the potential synergies of air-ground operations.

These synergies enabled Patton’s forces to drive within 60

miles of the German border. But in the next phase of operations, the Allies were finally able to accomplish something the

Germans were never able to do—they stopped the air-ground

team of the Third Army.

Notes

1. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2: Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing, 1971), 53.

2. Ibid., 53–54.

3. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 503.

4. Great Britain Public Record Office, “ULTRA: Main Series of Signals

Conveying Intelligence,” Bletchley Park, 1944, reel 35, XL 5533. Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

5. Ibid., XL 5619.

6. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-1—“Weyland Diary—XIX TAC” (Albert

F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 18 May 1945),

diary for 13 August 1944, entry 0900.

7. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 36, XL 6121.

8. Ibid., XL 6188.

9. Blumenson, 510.

10. George S. Patton Jr., “General Patton’s Own Story,” Saturday Evening

Post, 1 November 1947, 16.

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11. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 566.

12. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-64—“Twelve Thousand FighterBomber Sorties” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 30 September 1944), 20.

13. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 571.

14. XIX TAC Staff, “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” 23.

15. Ralph Francis Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,

1944–45 (New York: Scribner Co., 1980), 119.

16. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 9 October 1984).

17. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 563.

18. Ibid., 569.

19. Ibid., 573–74.

20. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 36, XL 6648.

21. Ibid., XL 6495.

22. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 35, XL 5834.

23. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Annex N, Third US Army Directives, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, VII. Copy

located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala. 

24. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 37, XL 6814.

25. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 573.

26. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 521–22.

27. Ibid., 522.

28. Ibid., 542–43.

29. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 578.

30. Ibid.

31. XIX TAC Staff, “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” 26.

32. Seymour Freidin, Werner Kreipe, and William Richardson, eds., The

Fatal Decisions (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1956) 230–31.

33. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s

Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (London: Hutchinson Co.,

1978), 345.

34. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 37, XL 6753.

35. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 522.

36. Koch and Hays, 162.

37. James Hasdorff, Report K239.0512-522—“Interview with General

Paul D. Harkins” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Corona Harvest

Collection, 23 February 1972), 7.

38. George S. Patton Jr., Paul D. Harkins, and Beatrice A. Patton, War as

I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), 113.

39. Bennett, 136.

40. Helfers interview, 9 October 1984.

41. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend,1885–1945

(New York: Morrow, 1985), 233.

42. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 584.

43. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins

Publishers, 1995), 637.

44. XIX TAC Staff, “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” 21.

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45. John C. Griggs, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA

Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 17 May 1945), 2.

46. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 37, XL 7348.

47. XIX TAC Staff, “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” 29.

48. Ibid., 22.

49. IX Troop Carrier Command Staff, Report K110.7006-2—“Special

Project File” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Research

Studies Institute, 30 November 1944), 2.

50. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 522.

51. Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 233.

52. Koch and Hays, 66.

53. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Annex 1, Twelfth US Army Group Directives, Regensburg, Germany, 1945,

2. Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala. 

54. Great Britain Public Record Office, reels 35 and 36, XL 5794 and XL

6636.

55. Ibid., reel 36, XL 5704.

56. Ibid., XL 6188.

57. Ibid., XL 6919.

58. Ibid., reel 37, XL 7171.

59. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101—“Fly, Seek and Destroy” (Albert

F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 13 December

1944), 3.

60. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 37, XL 7246, XL 7296, and

XL 7471.

61. Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, Report

168.7104-92—“IMPACT—US Tactical Air Power in Europe” (Albert F.

Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, May 1945), 28.

62. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-85—“Operation Plan: Air Support of

Third Army’s Drive to the East” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research

Center: Weyland Collection, 23 August 1944), 1.

63. Harry M. Grove, SRH-023—“Reports by US Army ULTRA

Representatives in the European Theater of Operations” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 30 May 1945), 5.

64. XIX TAC Staff, “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” 28.

65. XIX TAC Staff, “Operation Plan: Air Support of Third Army’s Drive to

the East,” 1–2.

66. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 38, XL 7518.

67. Ibid., XL 8240.

68. Ibid., XL 7955.

69. Ibid., reel 39, XL 8390.

70. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-82—“XIX Tactical Air Command

Daily Intelligence Summary” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Weyland Collection, 2 September 1944), 2.

71. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 40, XL 9089. 

72. XIX TAC Staff, “XIX Tactical Air Command Daily Intelligence

Summary,” 8 September 1944, 2.

73. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-90—“XIX TAC—Tactical Air

Operations in Europe” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Weyland Collection, May 1945), 48.

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74. Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, Report

168.7104-92, 30.

75. Ralph Stephenson, Report K239.0512-813—“Interview with General

O. P. Weyland” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 19

November 1974), 78–79.

76. Ibid., 80.

77. Jules K. French, Report 168.7104-38—“Report of Activities of Liaison

Officer with German Marsch Gruppe Sud” (Air Force Historical Research

Center: Weyland Collection, 20 September 1944), appendix 1.

78. Stephenson. 

79. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947),

144–45.

80. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 528.

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Chapter 6

Allies Back the Wrong Horse—Patton’s

Cavalry Stopped

We have, at this time, the greatest chance to win the war

ever presented. If they will let me move on with three Corps,

two up, one back, on the line of Metz–Nancy–Epinal, we can

be in Germany in 10 days. There are plenty of roads and

railroads to support the operation. It can be done with three

armored and six infantry divisions. It is such a sure thing

that I fear these blind moles don’t see it. 

—Gen George S. Patton Jr.

The quick capitulation of Paris on 25 August 1944 denied

the Germans the time they needed to build secondary defenses beyond the Seine. One week earlier, the CINC west and

the German military governor of France were directing the

“most rapid provision of manpower to develop the

Somme–Marne–Saône–Jura [defensive] positions”; but all of

these positions were rapidly overrun.1 General Patton’s forces

south of Paris sent the German forces reeling towards their

border, and many felt the Nazis were on the verge of collapse.

After the Normandy campaign, the Germans assessed that

they had “the equivalent of 27 divisions,” with their “tank establishment particularly low,” facing 53 full-strength Allied divisions with five additional divisions dedicated to the

fortresses in Brittany.2 Many of the Allies felt that the

Germans were kaput and believed that any single push would

cause Germany’s downfall. This cockiness led to questionable

courses of action that confounded Patton. He saw what appeared to be an obvious opportunity to shorten the war turn

into an ill-advised airborne operation that destroyed his entrée

to the German heartland.

Once the Allies were beyond the Seine, the next main objective became the Rhine River. Allied planners saw that there

were four basic routes into Germany. These four routes were

101
analyzed geographically with the choices varying between (1)

the easily flooded flatlands of Flanders; (2) another route via

Amiens, Maubeuge, and Liège along the northern edge of the

Ardennes; (3) a path through the hilly woodland of the

Ardennes; or (4) the road south of the Ardennes through Metz,

the Saar, and Frankfurt. Choices one and three were discarded on the basis of terrain, which led to competing strategies between Patton’s route of advance in the south and

Montgomery’s in the north. General Montgomery presented a

myriad of reasons why his route of advance should be the

Allied main effort (shortest route to the industrial Ruhr Valley

and Berlin, additional seaports, elimination of V-weapon sites,

etc.). But General Patton saw many pitfalls in Montgomery’s

route, and the available evidence confirmed many of Patton’s

concerns.3

The Allies’ successive August envelopments to the north

channeled the majority of the retreating Germans into

Montgomery’s northern sector. This action ensured that any

drive within Montgomery’s section would face the brunt of the

surviving German forces. This area also afforded the enemy

excellent terrain that was conducive for defensive warfare.

Montgomery’s initial plans would have affected Patton’s

ground scheme of maneuver because Montgomery wanted to

shift the Allies’ emphasis to the northern sector where Patton

thought the terrain would not be propitious for his form of

tank warfare, as he noted in his diary: “I cannot understand

why Monty keeps asking for all four Armies to be in the Calais

area and then move through Belgium, where his tanks are

practically useless now because of the numerous canals and

will be wholly useless this winter. Unfortunately, he has some

way of talking Ike [Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme allied

commander] into his own way of thinking.”4 Montgomery’s initial August request to concentrate the Allied forces in his sector was denied by General Eisenhower, who at this time favored a simultaneous broad-front approach. This denial

allowed Patton to continue his ground scheme of maneuver to

the east.

The last week of August saw the Third Army continue its

string of rapid successes. With the Germans consolidated in

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either Montgomery’s northern sector or retreating from southern France, there was a large gap in the German lines opposite the Third Army’s positions. The Germans’ situation during this time frame was tenuous. As one German general

pointed out, the idea of defensive positions was contrary to

any of Hitler’s initiatives.

The reader will frequently have wondered why there were no prepared

defensive positions into which the army might have been withdrawn . . .

The answer is that in Hitler’s eyes such foresight was a cardinal sin.

Nobody was even allowed so much as to contemplate the possibility of

a withdrawal, and the provision of a defensive line to the rear of the

battle zone might, he felt, encourage such thoughts . . . It is true that,

as a top secret matter, the possibility of forming a line running from

the Somme along the line of the Marne and the Saone . . . had been investigated in theory. But no such line had been constructed and now

there were no forces available either to build or to man it. In any event,

it was too late, for this theoretical defensive line had been overrun by

the enemy in the Marne sector.5

The Third Army’s rapid movements quickly confirmed the

above information as they encountered few enemy troops and

even fewer defensive positions. Patton’s XX Corps turned over

their bridgeheads across the Seine to the First US Army and

then proceeded to Reims. Farther to the south, XII Corps traveled from Troyes to Vitry-le-François with little difficulty and

then crossed the Marne and took Chalons without encountering any trench lines or notable German resistance. The next

target was the Meuse River, and once again the countryside

was relatively void of Germans. A light company surprised

enemy outposts at Commercy and neutralized their artillery

positions by shooting the crews before they could remove their

breechblock covers. This action allowed this company to seize

the Meuse bridge intact. Third Army continued to destroy disorganized opposition, and by 1 September they had bridgeheads along the Meuse River at Commercy, St. Mihiel, and

Verdun (map 8).6

The next defensive line in Patton’s way was the Siegfried

Line (known to the Germans as the West Wall). During the previous four years, this defensive line received less attention

than the imaginary Somme–Marne–Saône line. The Germans

stripped these fortifications for the sake of the Atlantic Wall,

and its condition in August 1944 was pathetic. Von

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SHWEDO
104

CADRE PAPER

Map 8. Attacks to the West Wall
Rundstedt’s conviction was “that at this time the Allies could

have broken through the West Wall whenever they wished.”7

This fact discomfited the Germans as they made every effort to

fall back and reenergize their defensive capabilities. ULTRA

messages reporting redeployments like: “Early second [of

September] Commander-in-Chief West reported intentions . . .

[to] transfer Panzer base from Metz to Kaiserslautern” only

further encouraged Patton’s forces toward their intermediate

target—the Moselle River.8

During this drive Patton experienced the effects of differing

priorities from higher headquarters. Montgomery convinced

Eisenhower that portions of Third Army’s gas supply should go

north to support his drive. Therefore, starting on 23 August,

Patton’s gas rations began to decrease. Patton was able to make

up some of these shortfalls through the capture of German fuel,

but Montgomery’s increased demands stifled even these efforts.

Unfortunately, this misallocation of resources eventually eroded

the various force-enhancing capabilities that Patton had depended upon in previous campaigns.

As August drew to a close, Montgomery became more successful at swaying Eisenhower. The broad-front initiative

started to become unrealistic, and the Allies’ solution was to

make drastic cuts in Third Army supplies. On 28 August

Bradley told Patton the majority of supplies would go to First

Army. The latter was now in support of Montgomery’s forces,

who were heading towards more important objectives; and

higher authorities also directed that an additional 3,000 tons

of daily supplies would go to the civilians of Paris.9 This redirection of effort, complemented by Montgomery’s upcoming

plans, would also eliminate a function of airpower that Third

Army had become dependent upon, as Patton complained in

the following comment: “In addition to this (the loss of supplies), the airlift, on which we had previously counted for a

good proportion of our supplies, was being diverted to feed

Parisians; while other transport planes were being assembled

. . . for an air drop in front of the Twenty-First Army Group.

Finally, as a last straw, Com Z (Communications Zone) used

several truck companies to move their headquarters from

Cherbourg to Paris at this very date.”10 Patton soon found out

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SHWEDO
that he could expect no additional supplies until 3 September.

This information came at the same time the CINC west admitted to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl that the Allies had attained

absolute tactical superiority and judged them able to avoid

lines of defense and capable of “destroying the German military forces in the west.”11 These facts, together with the Third

Army’s withering logistical support, eventually led Patton to exclaim:

The twenty-ninth of August was, in my opinion, one of the critical days

in this war, and hereafter many pages will be written on it—or, rather,

on the events which produced it. It was evident at this time that there

was no real threat against us . . . Everything seemed rosy, when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gas we were to

get that day had not arrived. At first I thought it was a backhanded way

of slowing the Third Army. I later found out that this was not the case,

but that the delay was due to a change of plan by the High Command,

implemented, in my opinion, by General Montgomery . . . I presented

my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the

Siegfried Line before it could be manned. Bradley was very sympathetic, but Bull (Major General H. R. Bull, Eisenhower’s G-3) and, I

gather, the rest of SHAEF’s (Supreme Headquarters Allied

Expeditionary Force) Staff did not concur. It was my opinion then that

this was the momentous error of the war.12

Patton’s accusations were serious; and after investigating the

facts on both sides of the battle lines, it appears that his appraisal may well have been correct.

Patton’s frustrations with this situation were similar to

every other battle Third Army fought in France. He knew any

delay would give the Germans time to fill their gaps and close

the window of opportunity. The Germans’ attempt to fill the

holes in their lines involved the rapid redeployment of their

troops from southern France. But Montgomery’s meddling was

not the only factor that hampered Patton’s ability to deal with

enemy troops moving up from southern France.

In late August von Rundstedt returned to France and spent

much of his time trying to close the hole between the Third

Army and the Rhine River. ULTRA intercepted numerous messages encouraging the 19th Army to expedite the movements

up the Rhone Valley.13 These elements were farther to the east

from the units that XIX TAC engaged south of Loire. Although

the XIX TAC bagged 20,000 prisoners, many more escaped

farther to the east because of the numerous delays in supplies

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CADRE PAPER
and the diversion of the XIX TAC to other areas of interest.

Bradley diffused Patton’s efforts when he shifted a significant

portion of XIX TAC’s focus nearly 500 miles to the rear in order

to finish the attacks on the port of Brest. Patton recalled this

request in the following diary entry: “He [Bradley] said to me,

with reference to the Brest operation, ‘I would not say this to

anyone but you, and have given different excuses to my staff

and higher echelons, but we must take Brest in order to maintain the illusion of the fact that the US Army cannot be

beaten.’ More emotion than I thought he had.”14 Patton fully

supported his boss on this emotional issue, but it cost him the

force-enhancing capabilities of the XIX TAC at a time when all

of Patton’s assets were spread extremely thin.

On 2 September Bradley’s emphasis on the Brest target also

came down through Air Force channels, and General Weyland

recorded this fact in a diary entry stating, “call from Gen[eral]

Vandenberg—Brest to get highest priority.”15 Unfortunately,

this move also could be categorized as another momentous

error of the campaign. The biggest fault with this requirement

was that it was a tremendous waste of sorties at a critical time.

The XIX TAC after-action report clearly demonstrates this sentiment in the following observation:

The experience of this command has demonstrated clearly that the employment of fighter-bombers against strong fixed fortifications such as

Brest is relatively ineffective. Far greater destruction and loss can be

inflicted upon the enemy by employing these aircraft against proper

fighter-bomber targets such as troops, transport, materiel on the

move, supply depots and lines of communications. An example was the

series of fighter-bomber attacks on the enemy forces south of the Loire

in early September. These attacks culminated in the surrender of a

major general and 20,000 troops which had been cut off from escape

into Germany . . . The fruits of this program of interdiction and harassment would have been considerably larger had it not been interrupted by the concentration of the fighter-bomber effort at Brest.16

The XIX TAC could have been more effectively employed by

keeping the gaps in the German lines open by expanding the

destruction south of Loire to the units retreating up Rhone

Valley. This effort could have aided the sluggish ground

scheme of maneuver that was suffering from a lack of supplies. These targets (ground units in travel mode) were the

most conducive for fighter-bombers’ attacks, and the eradication

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of these German troops would have made the greatest contribution to the Third Army’s efforts. XIX TAC further complained that General Middleton called “for more and more air,

. . . in spite of the presence of 31 battalions of artillery.”17 More

importantly, the ineffectiveness of fighter-bombers against

these targets and the outstanding capabilities of artillery

against fixed fortifications were well known before the time

Brest was given priority for air assets. 

ULTRA provided excellent bomb damage assessment reports

through Brest’s daily situation reports. Early in the campaign,

Brest reported “all phone and teleprinter lines [were] cut,” and

they had to depend on the wireless Enigma machine to stay in

contact with higher headquarters.18 Numerous ULTRA messages from Brest stated “roofs of pens not pierced” or “no damage or casualties caused by fighter-bomber attack.”19 ULTRA

was not the only available intelligence to confirm the shortcomings of fighter-bombers against fortifications. On 21

August the forts at St. Malo fell, and the German POWs “were

almost unanimous in stating that it was artillery fire, gradually reducing their defensive guns to a state of helplessness,

that brought [their] surrender, and that the air attacks including those in the final phase had no decisive effect.”20

Although all of this evidence was available to Allied senior

leadership, it did not stop them from dedicating 400 aircraft,

which led to “street fighting with P-47s” where “little progress

was made.”21

Throughout these aerial attacks, German ULTRA messages

continued to confirm the object of this operation (the ports of

Brest) would be worthless. Situation reports from Brest frequently provided discouraging updates, as in the following report from 4 September: “By late third [of September], demolition completed of all installations at Brest vital to war—railway

station, electricity works, etc. and commercial harbor.

Demolition of Naval Harbor continuing.”22 The Brest commander reconfirmed on 9 September that the “fortress would

be defended by Ramcke (Generalleutant Herman B. Ramcke,

Brest commander) to the end and [would] only [be] given up to

the Allies as a heap of ruins.”23 Generalleutant Herman B.

Ramcke delivered on his promise and when he surrendered on

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CADRE PAPER
19 September, the port of Brest was worthless. Consequently,

the Allies decided simply to contain the ports of Lorient, St.

Nazaire, and the pocket north of Bordeaux with holding forces

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SHWEDO

until the end of the war. This solution may have been a better

course of action regarding Brest during a period when the

bulk of XIX TAC was needed elsewhere.

The diversion of airpower had its costs. One reporter specifically asked Patton: “Is the lack of air cover hampering operations now?” Patton confirmed that they were involved in more

important operations over Brest.24 The fact was that the most

important operation at that time was the gap 500 miles to the

east which was being filled by retreating forces from the Rhone

Valley. Bradley’s emphasis on Brest further hindered Patton’s

advances as he attempted to carry on his attack with limited

supplies and air cover. XIX TAC knew these retreating forces

would be employed in combat again, and with the limited extra

resources available they tried to destroy the Germans outside

of their AOR, as the following report confirms.

Port of Brest after the German Surrender
Many troops from this area did manage to escape into Germany before

junction was effected between the Third and Seventh US Armies, some

of them crossing the Loire in the vicinity of Nevers. Our fighterbombers covered that area, although it was far south of the Army

boundary, in an effort to discourage this withdrawal. Unfortunately,

the crucial period in the program of interdiction and harassment coincided with the period of all-out attack on Brest, and because of the priority accorded the latter project, this program was unable to achieve

complete success.25

The delay of the coupling of Third Army and Seventh Army

may have been the most serious breach associated with the diversion of supplies to the north. The only thing that stopped

General Patton from sealing off these forces from Germany

was a lack of gas and supplies. In late August Patton made

this point clear when he wrote to his son: “my chief difficulty

is not the Germans but gasoline. If they would give me enough

gas, I could go anywhere I want.” By mid-September the Third

Army and Seventh Army finally met, crushing the German

16th Division between them.26 But as the XIX TAC had already

pointed out, this was only after numerous Germans had escaped the potential losses associated with the bombing exploits of XIX TAC or the envelopment caused by the ground

scheme of maneuver of the Third Army.

The choices made during this time frame cost the Allies

many opportunities, and no one was more upset than Patton.

But these setbacks would pale in comparison to Montgomery’s

next scheme, which was supported by the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) staff.

Unfortunately, ULTRA would signal a clear pathway into the

Third Reich; but Montgomery’s newfound audacity would lead

him to disregard all warnings that clearly showed the hazards

associated with his ill-planned drive in the north. Once again,

decisions made beyond Patton’s control would force him to

make adjustments in his plans to continue his drive toward

Germany. 

Allies Choose the Road Worst Traveled

Encouraged by Patton’s southern drives and Montgomery’s

rapid gains through Brussels and Antwerp, the Allies began to

believe that the Germans were so feeble that they would be

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CADRE PAPER
incapable of stopping a major Allied thrust. Given this premise,

Montgomery offered his leadership and forces to become that

major Allied thrust. On 4 September he proposed a plan that

called for his forces to receive all of the available resources for

a single strong drive to Berlin via the Ruhr. This plan was

predicated on stopping the Third Army to support his drive.

Eisenhower declined this plan, once again favoring a broadfront strategy; and he also believed that this proposal’s strong

thrust was pencil-like. Eisenhower then offered ways to

strengthen the attack; and Montgomery was granted the use

of SHAEF’s strategic reserve, the Allied Airborne Army.27

On 10 September the Allies backed Montgomery’s next plan,

which ensured that Patton would not see airlift support for

quite awhile. This plan rested on the assumption that Allied

airborne troops would seize a series of bridges, while armor

forces would advance across 64 miles of enemy territory on a

one-tank front—along elevated, unprotected highways—

flanked by a soft and sodden tank-proof landscape.28

Unfortunately, the only Allied personnel who crossed into the

Ruhr via this attack were POWs. The accepted theory for the

failure of this operation portrays Montgomery as the victim of

a huge intelligence catastrophe. An example of this view is

Albert A. Nofi’s book, The War against Hitler, which faulted intelligence in the following manner.

The Fifteenth (Army) made a bold attempt to evacuate across the

Scheldt and the British made no serious effort to cut off their withdrawal. Once they got out, they withdrew north and west of Eindhoven

to rest and refit. In addition at about the same time, the German II SS

Panzer Corps was pulled out of the Eifel and sent to Arnhem to refit.

This put the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem. Both operations, conducted in the early days of September, were carried out

rather openly. Yet neither was accounted for in the intelligence summaries upon which the planned operation was based (map 9).29

This theory on the failure of intelligence has huge ramifications for the analysis of Patton’s actions during this period. If

Allied intelligence could not track Panzer corps and divisions,

these German units that were unaccounted for could have

been opposite Third Army’s positions—which would really call

into question the genius of Patton’s force-enhancing maneuvering with ULTRA. Unfortunately for Montgomery and Nofi,

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SHWEDO
112

CADRE PAPER

Meuse-Escaut Canal

The Hague

Hook of Holland

Utrecht

Driel

Rotterdam

HOLLAND

BELGIUM

Dordrecht

Roosendaal

Esschen

Ghent

Zaltbommel

Grave

Vught Uden

s’Hertogenbosch Moerdijk

Breda

Tilburg

Terneuzen

Woensdrecht Woensdrecht

Antwerp

Gheel

Albert Canal Albert Canal

Turnhout Valkenswaard

St Oedenrod

Best Zone

Eindhoven

Neerpelt

Oosterbeek Arnhem

Venlo

Roermond

Lower Rhine

R. Rhine

Valburg

Nijmegen

R. Waal

R. Maas

Turnhout Canal

Wilhelmina Canal

Breskens

South Beveland

Scheldt

Allied Advance Axis

15 Army's Escape Route

Belgian-Dutch Frontier

The Scheldt Estuary

and Surrounding Area

R. Escaut

Map 9. Operation Market Garden
the declassification of ULTRA destroys this theory and—more

importantly—suggests that the best route into the German

heartland was opposite Third Army’s positions. In order to

support Montgomery’s offensive, once again Patton’s forces

were stalled and his supplies were diverted north. Considering

the ULTRA information and the numerous disruptions in

Third Army’s advances, it is not surprising that Patton wrote

on the same day that Montgomery’s plan was approved,

“Books will some day be written on that ‘Pause which did not

refresh’ anyone but the Germans.”30

Nofi specifically cites the failure of intelligence to locate

German units within the area of interest before Operation

Market Garden as one of the great mistakes of the operation,

and he judges British intelligence’s errors as inexcusable. 31

Contrary to the above historical account of intelligence’s performance in the planning for Operation Market Garden,

ULTRA analysts knew about the above German force deployments almost two weeks before the plans were initiated. This

was the type of information that allowed Patton to move confidently, without concern for large, undiscovered units suddenly appearing in his sector. On 5 September ULTRA intercepted the German Army Group B’s direction to the “Nine SS

Panzer and Ten SS Panzer Division, elements not operating, to

be transferred for rest and refit in [the] area of Venloo–

Arnhem.”32 The following day, ULTRA messages reiterated the

above directive and further ordered, “HQ [Headquarters] Two

SS Panzer Corps subordinated [to] Army Group B, to transfer

to Eindhoven to rest and refit in cooperation with General of

Panzer Troops West and direct rest and refit of 2nd and 116th

Panzer Divisions, 9th SS Panzer Division and Heavy Assault

Gun Abteilung 217 . . . and 10 SS Panzer Division not operating [is] order[ed] [on the] fourth [of September] to area of

Venloo–Arnhem . . . for refit.”33

Another 5 September ULTRA message from Army Group B

to the armed forces commander of the Netherlands specifically

made “mention of further withdrawal of 15th Army” and ordered them “to prepare flank protection in the west–east direction on [the] general line [of the] Albert Canal.”34 ULTRA

displayed no confusion over the location of these forces.

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SHWEDO
Patton’s conscience was clear; he knew these forces were operating in the north. Third Army could proceed against an

enemy that had concentrated its forces outside Patton’s AOR.

What was even more appalling in retrospect was the further

disregard of ULTRA information by higher headquarters—information that was emanating from Patton’s sector. 

Within Patton’s zone ULTRA continued to intercept most of

the Germans’ attempts to rectify their defensive problems.

These messages captured the dire nature of the German situation as troops from the south were instructed to construct a

“line of defense in [the] sector Chaumont–Chatillon–Sur–Seine

as other troops [are] not available and it is a matter of life and

death for [the] Army Group to secure the northern flank.”35

The Germans were specifically concerned about the West Wall

approaches just beyond Patton’s tanks. One ULTRA message

received on 5 September highlighted the exact areas of weakness and the ramifications of an Allied attack in this area:

“Chief of Staff, Commander-in-Chief West on third [of

September]: [The] following are of decisive importance 1) [They

need] Exact knowledge of [the] course of the West Wall. 2) Its

blocking on the German–Luxembourg and German–French

frontier between south of Trier and Merzig. An Allied thrust towards Trier would tear open the existing West Wall before it is

made fit for defense . . . All HQ’s and units must know it, because it must in all circumstances be defended as a last barrier.”36 The Germans made every effort to fill these gaps in

their lines, but there were few resources available. They did

not know that Patton’s supplies were headed elsewhere, and

the Nazis’ desperate pleas for support came in the form of the

following request: “situation requires [the] speediest employment of engineering blocking forces to prevent surprise [by]

forward thrusts by Allied Tanks. Army Group requests employment of Engineer forces, as it has none available.”37

Engineering troops were not the only units needed on the West

Wall. Numerous parties requested combat troops, as the following message reveals, “Blumentritt to Jodl . . . [The] gap between Luneville and Belfort cannot be closed at present with

own forces until elements of Army Group G have arrived there

. . . Commander-in-Chief West again applies for bringing of

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CADRE PAPER
three infantry divisions in order to close this gap. As Allies

consist of armor and motorized infantry divisions, plentifully

supplied with tanks. Divisions to be brought up must be adequately supplied with anti-tank weapons. Allocations of

panzer brigades specifically desired.”38

ULTRA, through the CINC west, identified the weak points

and also let Patton know how long his window of opportunity

would be open, as this 4 September message reveals,

“Subordinates concerning [the] protection of the West positions as quoted by Commander-in-Chief West . . . 36th

Grenadier Division security garrison line Trier–Saarbrücken,

559th Grenadier Division security garrison line Thionville–

Metz, . . . 36th Division not expected to be ready for employment until 15 September but efforts being made to begin

transport of first elements by [the] 10th.”39 Even more frustrating for Patton, he not only watched his supplies being sent

north but ULTRA also told him the Germans were redirecting

additional forces from Third Army’s area to Montgomery’s sector—reported in the following message: “Hitler order[ed] third

[September] 19th Parachute Army subordinated to Army

Group B for the defense of [the] Albert Canal from Antwerp to

Maastricht. Formation at its disposal to include 3d, 5th, and

6th Parachute Divisions and those elements temporarily engaged in [the] Nancy area.”40 As the evidence continued to

build about the hazards associated with an Allied attack in

Holland, Patton continued to receive encouraging reports concerning his sector that stated, “[a] second reported gap in [the]

front, between Longway and Thionville [and is] only covered by

the weak forces of Flak Corps Three, [they are] ready to join in

ground fighting. Destruction of [the] remainder of [the] Flak

Corps thereby to be expected, so new setting up [of secondary

lines is] impossible.”41 Considering the dichotomy between the

two axes of attack, it is not surprising Patton considered this

episode to be a momentous error in the war.

As with the rest of the drive across France, General Patton

knew that the Germans would eventually rectify their problems

within their lines if the Allies did not capitalize on the present situation. In order for the Third Army to continue their exploitation,

General Eddy implemented one of Patton’s unconventional

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SHWEDO
schemes. This time Patton was dealing with hindrances created

by his Allies. To overcome these setbacks, he resorted to more

desperate measures, as he noted in his diary.

[SHAEF’s Staff] are letting Montgomery overpersuade Ike to go north.

It’s a terrible mistake, and when it comes out in the after years, it will

cause much argument. The British have put it over again. We got no

gas because, to suit Monty, the First Army got most of it, and we are

also feeding Parisians. When I got back [to headquarters] I found that

Eddy had told Gaffey (Third Army Chief of Staff) during my absence

that if he pushed on to Commercy, he would arrive with no gas, so

Gaffey told him to halt near St. Dizier. I told Gaffey to run till the engines stop and then go on foot . . . In the last war I drained 3/4 of my

tanks to keep the other 1/4 going, Eddy can do the same. It is terrible

to halt, even at the Meuse. We should cross the Rhine at Worms, and

the faster we do it, the less lives and munitions it will take. No one realizes the terrible value of the “unforgiving minute” except me. Some

way I will get on yet.42

Patton managed to continue to get on, but it was at a much

slower pace and required more reliance on ULTRA. 

As the above ULTRA intercepts indicated, there was very little threat ahead of Third Army. But due to the fuel situation

and XIX TAC being tied up with the Brest operations, Patton

was forced to employ weak thrusts to gain bridgeheads. After

the Third Army secured the Meuse River crossings, the next

target was the Moselle. During this drive the force-enhancing

capabilities of ULTRA were again apparent. One example is a

high-priority ULTRA message that warned, “intentions [to attack] night of six–seventh according to 82 Corps . . . Support

of attack [will be] of 15th PG [Panzer Grenadier] Division in the

area of Montmedy–Verdun–Briey–Audun by thrust of a battlegroup of 17th SS Panzer Division from Metz bridgehead in direction Conflans.”43 This message made a big impression on

Helfers’s assistant as he recalled, “a 5 Z message arrived at

0100 o’clock, containing an Army order for an attack at 0300

o’clock by the 15th Pz Gr and 17th SS Pz.” The message was

taken at once to Colonel Koch who went with the recipient to

General Gaffey. Means were devised to warn the division concerned without jeopardizing security. The German attack was

planned upon an exposed flank and at a time when the Army

was “spread out as thin as the skin on an egg,” in General

Patton’s language. No other form of intelligence could possibly

give such advanced warnings.”44 Through these drives Third

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CADRE PAPER
Army was able to secure three bridgeheads across the Moselle

River near Metz, Nancy, and Toul. But without supplies and

with numerous delays, they soon stalled and eventually allowed the Germans the time they needed to build up defensive

positions.

As the Operation Market Garden start date of 17 September

approached, additional information continued to indicate the

dichotomy between the two fronts. Patton’s forces idly watched

the CINC west initiate desperate measures to rectify the problems with the West Wall, even ordering “all supply troops . . .

billeted near the West Wall and all troops of Army, Luftlotte

Three, Naval Gruppe West . . . [and] all forces in any way available to be put together in emergency units and to be put in at

once for defense of the West Wall.”45 Across from Montgomery

was a different story. On 13 September it became apparent

that Operation Market Garden might not achieve the surprise

it needed. ULTRA intercepted requests for “Air Recce (reconnaissance) for the tenth [September] . . . “to establish whether

[the] Allies [were] preparing formations for a thrust to Aachen

or against First Para[chute] Army for a thrust towards

Arnhem.”46 The next day ULTRA reported “according [to an]

unspecified authority [there are] strong indications landing[s]

in Netherlands [are] imminent, with [the] employment of large

forces.”47 On 15 September (two days before attack), ULTRA

produced a long, seven-part message that provided specific

details of the upcoming operations that stated “Thirty British

Corps [of the] Two British Army between Antwerp and

Hasskelt. Bring up further Corps is possible . . . Photo recce

tasks indicate probable intention is thrust mainly on

Wilhelmina Canal on both sides of Eindhoven into Arnhem.

[Bletchley Park provides additional] (Comment: further specification of area incomplete but includes ‘west of Nijmegen’) To

cut off and surround German forces [in] western Netherlands.”48 This information was available to Allied leadership,

and they still chose Operation Market Garden as their best

route into Germany. Patton’s drive in the south was sacrificed

to support this attack. Although Patton effectively employed

intelligence, it was not enough to have one Army commander

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SHWEDO
using this vital information while others were apparently

oblivious.

ULTRA was not the only source providing information about

the threatening German forces in the landing zones of

Montgomery’s forces. The Dutch underground provided secondary confirmation that led officers to confront Montgomery.

At the lower levels, Maj Brian Urquhart, intelligence officer at

the First Allied Airborne Army, used reports from the Dutch

resistance and aerial photos to find the German panzers in a

prospective drop zone. Brushed aside, Major Urquhart was

judged “hysterical and shortly afterwards was ordered to take

a rest and go on leave.”49 At the most senior levels, Gen

Kenneth Strong (Eisenhower’s chief intelligence officer) and

Gen Walter Beddell Smith (SHAEF chief of staff)—both of

whom were cleared for ULTRA—were concerned with the evidence of German tanks in the vicinity of Arnhem. General

Strong later related in a guarded account (his story was told

before the declassification of ULTRA) of this event: “Not long

before the air drop on Arnhem, I told Beddell Smith that I had

doubts about its success as there were some evidence of

German armor, probably new tanks, were within striking distance of Arnhem. General Eisenhower instructed me to go

with Beddell Smith to Twenty-first Army Group headquarters

in order to explain our fears.”50 These two officers proceeded

to Montgomery’s headquarters in Brussels; and like Major

Urquhart, they had their information dismissed. General

Smith recalled of the meeting “I got nowhere, Montgomery

simply waved my objection airily aside.”51 The last person to

confront Montgomery was Wing Commander Asher Lee, air intelligence officer at the Airborne Army. Lee made a point to

read ULTRA, and he “found evidence of armor at Arnhem so

conclusive that he used every effort, without success, to bring

its significance home to the authorities in England. Lee therefore made his way to Belgium and found that there, too, his

warning fell on deaf ears.”52 Montgomery’s stubborn refusal to

acknowledge ULTRA-based warnings that conflicted with his

plans stands in marked contrast to Patton’s use of this highly

sensitive source.

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Operation Market Garden ended with Montgomery categorizing the debacle as “a bridge too far.” But this failure reflected much more than that. The bridge to which he referred

was the object of the entire operation. The Allies took this

route because Montgomery sold senior leadership on the

premise that this was the most effective route into the Reich,

to the neglect of the southern option. Patton vehemently disagreed with this course of action, and senior ULTRA officer

Ralph Bennett’s following observation displays Patton’s understanding of the situation and the dichotomy between the

two schemes of maneuver. “On the basis of ULTRA intelligence

alone, then, there was little to choose between the opportunities presented on the lower Rhine and the upper Moselle and

Saar, and much to be said in favor of a quick and shattering

blow in the latter region (Patton’s area of responsibility). Ample

information about each was provided with equal accuracy.”53

Unfortunately, intelligence is not the only factor taken into

consideration when making operational decisions within an

Allied campaign. Eisenhower had suspicions about the

chances for Market Garden, which is probably why he sent

General Smith to confront Montgomery; but as Strong notes,

Many fail to understand the great pressures, both national and international, both hidden and apparent, to which the Supreme

Commander was subjected . . . Eisenhower had not only to consider

the wider strategy of the campaign, but also to give due weight to the

views of those immediately subordinate to him. Montgomery, now a

Field-Marshal, was the chief British commander in the field and in

close touch with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff.

Montgomery’s views were generally those of the British Government

and it was therefore extremely important not to turn down his proposals out of hand.54

Eisenhower recalled how Montgomery presented his proposal

in this case and stated “he vehemently declared that all he

needed was adequate supply in order to go directly into

Berlin.”55 Montgomery’s insistence on the operation, coupled

with strong support from British prime minister Winston S.

Churchill and chief of the British Imperial Staff Field Marshal

Alan Brooke, may have created a political rationale for the operation. In his memoirs, however, Eisenhower chose to articulate a rationale for the plan that was primarily military: “I instructed him (Montgomery) that what I did in the north was

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Antwerp working, and I also wanted a line covering that port.

Beyond this I believed it possible that we might, with airborne

assistance, seize a bridgehead over the Rhine in the Arnhem

region, flanking defenses of the Siegfried Line.”56 Eisenhower

may not have believed wholeheartedly Montgomery’s plan, but

he did approve it. This decision had its consequences, and

Eisenhower admitted in 1948: “I am certain that Field Marshal

Montgomery, in light of the later events, would agree that this

view was a mistaken one.”57

The Germans also confirmed this mistake. David C.

Eisenhower, in Eisenhower: At War 1943–1945, highlights the

Germans’ 1 September 1944 point of view.

Veterans of the German high command would later agree that bold

Allied moves that week might have penetrated the German frontier defenses and ended the war. To his postwar interrogators, Jodl described

the difficulties facing the German high command. Under Hitler’s ongoing edict to counterattack in Normandy, the military had been severely

restricted in preparing for the defense of the Seine, the Somme and the

German frontier. “The action of the supreme command upon events in

the west was extremely limited,” Jodl recalled. “It scarcely had any reserves available and only with reserves can strong influence be exercised . . . for days there was just a general directive, to fight as stubbornly or hold or gain as much ground as possible in order to seal the

gaps in the fronts and to gain the necessary time for the West Wall to

receive armaments for its defense.” Jodl also suggested that determined movement on the Paris–Reims Luxembourg axis towards

Frankfurt (Patton’s axis), where a single reconnaissance battalion of

the Sixth Panzer Army patrolled the Saar Frontier, would have penetrated the toughest sectors of the West Wall.58

Von Rundstedt echoed the above comments, noting “that at

this time the Allies could have broken through the West Wall

whenever they wished . . . But to our great surprise the operations of the Allies came to a full stop in front of the West Wall:

supply difficulties were presumably at the root of this.”59

Supplies were the problem, and on 25 September (the last day

of Operation Market Garden), Third Army received the following order: “The acute supply situation confronting us has

caused the Supreme Commander to direct until further orders, the Third Army with its supporting troops, and those elements of the Ninth Army placed in the line, will assume the

defensive . . . This change in attitude on our part must be

completely concealed from the enemy.”60 This order may have

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been kept secret from the Germans, but its ramifications became very clear to the enemy because it was the first week of

November before Third Army was to make another major offensive. Patton’s letter to his wife on 25 September best encapsulated the situation when he wrote “it was not the

Germans who have stopped us, but higher strategy.”61

During this campaign, Patton had to overcome many hindrances that were beyond his control. One by one, his force

enhancers disappeared via competing interests. Airpower was

diffused by two different tasks. The XIX TAC was sent 500

miles to the rear to deal with the strong defenses at Brest, and

his airlift capabilities were denied due to humanitarian efforts

in Paris and Montgomery’s efforts in the north. His rapid

drives were not focused on land or headlines but on time.

Patton knew if the enemy was granted any respite, Third Army

would pay for these delays in lives and time. The denial of supplies left Patton with very few force-enhancing capabilities,

and ULTRA could only carry the Third Army so far. Patton was

an avid consumer of ULTRA, and the higher headquarters’ disregard for this information must have been particularly frustrating. But as he found out, it was not enough for him to understand the battle space, his superiors must be equally

informed or they might be tempted to initiate any offensive

against an enemy that was apparently kaput. 

The Allies obviously chose a poor path as their main effort

into the Third Reich; and the extreme delays caused by

Operation Market Garden continued to prove Patton’s theory

about delays correct, as General Harkins reflected. “We had to

hold up for a while, while they put up the effort north on

Montgomery . . . By the time we started again, they filled in the

Siegfried Line in and around Metz, and we had a he---of-atime getting through there.”62 As Patton predicted, the decisions made during this phase of World War II caused much argument. In May 1945 the assistant chief of staff for air

intelligence contributed to the debate. His report was very critical on the diversion of XIX TAC to hit fortresses in the extreme

west; and he called Brest, St. Malo, and Isle de Cezembre (island of St. Malo) “three battered monuments to the uneconomical use of air power.”63 This same report forwarded the

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counterfactual proposition that stated, “It is tempting to speculate on what would have happened if the entire lift of our

strategic bomber force had been temporarily committed to the

hauling of freight for Third Army.”64 Eventually, the Third

Army did prevail after a long delay. But more important for future commanders are Patton’s two observations associated

with this campaign and the costs of failing to apply the right

resources against the correct targets.

He [Eisenhower] kept talking about the future great battle of Germany,

while we assured him that the Germans have nothing left to fight with

if we push on right now. If we wait, there will be a future great battle

of Germany.65

Montsec has a huge monument to our dead (World War I). I could not

help but think that our delay in pushing forward would probably result, after due course of time, in the erection of many other such monuments for men who, had we gone faster, would not have died.66

All decisions have their consequences. Some would argue the

consequences associated with the diversion of supplies and

airpower and the disregard of intelligence in this campaign resulted in all of the losses associated with not ending the war

earlier.

Notes

1. Great Britain Public Record Office, “ULTRA: Main Series of Signals

Conveying Intelligence,” Bletchley Park, 1944, reels 36 and 37, XL 6450 and

6881. Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

2. Seymour Freidin, Werner Kreipe, and William Richardson, eds., The

Fatal Decisions (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1956), 235.

3. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 657–58.

4. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 527.

5. Freidin, Kreipe, and Richardson, 232.

6. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 667–68.

7. Freidin, Kreipe, and Richardson, 235.

8. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 39, XL 8994.

9. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 530.

10. George S. Patton Jr., Paul D. Harkins, and Beatrice A. Patton, War as

I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), 120.

11. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 663–64.

12. Patton, Harkins, and Patton, 119–20.

13. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 38, XL 7872 and 7979.

14. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 532.

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15. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-1—“Weyland Diary—XIX TAC”

(Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, 18 May

1945), diary for 2 September 1944, no time given.

16. XIX TAC Staff, Report 168.7104-90—“XIX TAC—Tactical Air

Operations in Europe” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Weyland Collection, May 1945), 1.

17. XIX TAC Staff, XIX TAC—“Tactical Air Operations in Europe,” 48.

18. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 34, XL 4931. 

19. Ibid., reel 35, XL 5655.

20. Willis Thornton, Report 533.4501-9—“Effects of Air Attacks on the

Fortress of St. Malo” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center:

Aerospace Studies Institute, 22 August 1944), 1.

21. XIX TAC Staff, “XIX TAC—Tactical Air Operations in Europe,” 48–49.

22. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 40, XL 9138.

23. Ibid., XL 9598.

24. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 543.

25. XIX TAC Staff, “XIX TAC—Tactical Air Operations in Europe,” 50.

26. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2: Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing, 1971), 66.

27. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 687.

28. Thomas Parrish, The American Codebreakers: The US Role in ULTRA

(Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough Press, 1991), 254.

29. Albert A. Nofi, The War against Hitler: Military Strategy in the West

(New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), 157–58.

30. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 546.

31. Nofi, 172–73.

32. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 40, XL 9188.

33. Ibid., XL 9245.

34. Ibid., XL 9162.

35. Ibid., reel 39, XL 8815.

36. Ibid., reel 40, XL 9174.

37. Ibid., reel 39, XL 8987.

38. Ibid., reel 40, XL 9104.

39. Ibid., XL 9100.

40. Ibid., XL 9247.

41. Ibid., XL 9143.

42. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 531.

43. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 40, XL 9310.

44. Warrack Wallace, SRH-108—“Report on Assignment with the Third

United States Army 15 August–18 September 1944” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 21 May 1945), 4.

45. Great Britain Public Record Office, reel 40, XL 9597.

46. Ibid., reel 41, HP 9.

47. Ibid., HP 175.

48. Ibid., HP 242.

49. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s

Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (London: Hutchinson Co.,

1978), 349–50.

50. Kenneth Strong, Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an

Intelligence Officer (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 202.

51. Lewin, 350.

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52. Ibid., 351.

53. Ralph Francis Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,

1944–45 (New York: Scribner, 1980), 135–36.

54. Strong, 203.

55. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1948), 305.

56. Ibid., 307.

57. Ibid., 305.

58. David C. Eisenhower, Eisenhower: At War 1943–1945 (New York:

Random House, 1986), 436.

59. Freidin, Kreipe, and Richardson, 235.

60. Third US Army, “After Action Report, 1 Aug 44–9 May 45,” vol. 1,

Third US Army September Operations, Regensburg, Germany, 1945, 84.

Copy located in Auburn University Library, Auburn, Ala.

61. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 556.

62. James Hasdorff, Report K239.0512-522—“Interview with General

Paul D. Harkins” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Corona Harvest

Collection, 23 February 1972), 10–11.

63. Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, Report

168.7104-92—“IMPACT—US Tactical Air Power in Europe” (Albert F.

Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland Collection, May 1945), 30.

64. Ibid., 31.

65. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 537.

66. Patton, Harkins, and Patton, 124.

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Chapter 7

Conclusions and Implications

Does ULTRA, of World War II, have significant lessons for us

today? I think it does. Cracking enemy secret codes and

other signal devices and improvisations do help, but the

only sure path to victory is to have a united, determined people with able and decisive leadership, predominant resources and military power. 

—Gen Ira C. Eaker

In December 1974 General Eaker analyzed the Allies’ employment of ULTRA in World War II. Eaker’s survey commended generals such as Patton for their quality of generalship and, in contrast, said: “Montgomery and Mark Clark

stand out as brave but often timid souls whose failure to exploit ULTRA in a timely and decisive fashion cost the Allies

dearly.”1 But as the above epigraph indicates, ULTRA was only

one factor on the path to victory; and if all the other factors are

neglected in war, they cost a nation dearly. All the major commanders within the European theater had access to ULTRA,

and their units were largely outfitted with similar equipment.

But General Patton often produced results that far exceeded

those of the other commanders during this campaign. During

his operations Patton understood the fluid conditions that existed in France in 1944. He crafted a plan that exploited this

situation with a unique and complementary employment of

ULTRA, airpower, and ground maneuver. These force elements

allowed him to continue his drives east as his AOR grew exponentially. Third Army and XIX TAC’s drive across France

demonstrated that Patton’s trinity had a complementary momentum of its own. More importantly, it also exhibited the adverse effects associated with denying any one of these aspects

to a commander. General Patton was one of the most successful and feared commanders of the European theater, and his

drive across France had numerous lessons for the future. As

125
General Eaker pointed out, the failure of other commanders to

employ these force enhancers correctly cost the Allies dearly.2

Therefore, it is imperative that we learn the significant lessons

from Patton’s 1944 campaign. These insights will be developed

from historical conclusions on the areas of intelligence,

ground maneuver, airpower, and leadership. 

Intelligence

General Patton’s drive across France clearly demonstrated

that accurate, timely information concerning enemy dispositions and intentions can be invaluable to campaign planning

and—more significantly—to the adjustment of the campaign

as it moves toward its objective. The Mortain counteroffensive

illustrated that ULTRA could shape the planning of battle.

Through preconceived ULTRA plans, air and ground power became a cool, poised, and fully briefed reception committee that

rapidly destroyed the German forces in a set-piece battle

under conditions that were changed to favor the Allies.3 Patton

also applied ULTRA to make rapid adjustments to exploit the

sparse defenses between the Seine River and the German border. Due to competing Allied efforts, Patton was forced to employ weak thrusts to capture bridgeheads; and ULTRA ensured that the applicable assets would be employed to counter

any German threats as Third Army was “spread out as thin as

the skin on an egg.”4

Overall, ULTRA clearly influenced Patton’s operations and allowed him to adopt economy-of-force measures to contend with

his expanding AOR. Patton’s statement that ULTRA saved him

“the service of two divisions” illustrated in objective terms

ULTRA’s force-enhancing capacity.5 For XIX TAC, ULTRA reduced the search area south of the Loire; identified vulnerable

airfields; aided in the interdiction of supplies, troops, and equipment; and provided accurate bomb damage assessments and

flak warnings. But perfect intelligence such as ULTRA will not

guarantee overwhelming success, as demonstrated by the striking contrast between the operational achievements of Patton’s

Third Army and other Allied commands.

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ULTRA employment in France in 1944 demonstrated the significant influence of the human element on the use of operational intelligence. General Patton handpicked Colonel Koch to

be his G-2, and Koch cited his close relationship with his commander as one of the key elements of a successful intelligence

operation.

Command support—the support of his commander, evidenced primarily by mutual confidence engendered by and nurtured through respect. He must be confident that the results of his efforts will be respected by his commander, both in terms of interest and attitude and

in the degree of utilization of the end product so painstakingly produced. The commander on the other hand must be confident that his

intelligence chief’s work merits such respect. If either confidence fails,

command support is nonexistent. With command support, G-2 will

tackle any job. Without it, he performs a useless task, merely going

through a series of staff exercises. In that case, both he and the commander are losers.6

Colonel Koch had command support, and the issue of confidence in G-2 personnel had significant implications for the

Allies’ ULTRA program. Before the Normandy campaign

began, a civilian lawyer decided “that lawyers as a class are

better fitted for intelligence work.”7 Although these men were

extremely intelligent (one later becoming a Supreme Court justice), in the eyes of some Regular Army officers they were a

“bunch of civilian lawyer flunkies.”8 Such an appearance could

undermine a commander’s confidence in his intelligence team.

This was not an issue within Patton’s headquarters because

Major Helfers (the only Regular Army ULTRA officer) and

Major Grove (a World War I pilot) had instant credibility and

therefore had command support almost immediately. Helfers

and Grove did not perform worthless staff exercises. Patton

utilized the end product, and one of Third Army’s ULTRA assistants lamented, “It’s a pity that the thousands who contribute in one mechanical way or another to the finished product cannot share in the drama attending its final use in the

field.”9 Unlike Montgomery’s staff at Market Garden, Koch,

Helfers, and Grove had Patton’s support and confidence,

which was one of the key elements of Patton’s employment of

intelligence during this campaign.

Effective intelligence also demands effective distribution.

Perhaps the greatest strength of Patton’s ULTRA program was

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his ability to push relevant information down to subordinate

commands. Patton’s employment of ULTRA destroyed many of

the previous assumptions associated with this high-level

source of information. As one ULTRA officer noted, “The service (ULTRA) often is said to be primarily of strategic value and

only useful tactically in a static situation. Perhaps its prime

value is strategic, but Patton’s use of ULTRA in his historic

drive across France is a fitting thesis for a tactical epic.”10 This

tactical epic demonstrated the rapid and flexible employment

of information that influenced all levels of Patton’s operations.

The campaign was also marked by numerous instances of

Patton testing the ULTRA guidelines that governed the employment of this source. Although Helfers had some nervous

experiences during this campaign, Koch’s big picture often

produced acceptable cover stories for ULTRA’s employment.

And it was obviously successful because the Germans did not

discover the compromise of the Enigma machine until 1974

when Group Capt Winterbotham published The Ultra Secret.

Ground Maneuver

Throughout this campaign Patton’s forces demonstrated that

when an attacker grants a reprieve to a retreating force, the

pause will eventually cost more in lives and equipment than the

more ambitious alternative. During this drive Patton argued, “It

is terrible to halt . . . We should cross the Rhine in the vicinity

of Worms, and the faster we do it, the less lives and munitions

it will take. No one realizes the terrible value of the unforgiving

minute except me.”11 The validity of this proposition is clearly

demonstrated when one compares the rate of advance and

losses after the Third Army’s halt at Falaise and on the banks

of the Seine. The Germans used the time granted by the Allies’

halt orders to prepare and consolidate the remnants of their

once defeated forces to construct defenses that significantly hindered Patton’s operations. The greatest example of this concept

is the delay associated with the diversion of resources to support Montgomery’s Market Garden. This pause allowed the

Germans to prepare the West Wall, which would postpone

Patton’s entry into Germany by almost six months at a signifi128

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cant cost of lives and equipment. The failure to exploit the conditions opposite Patton’s front has often been cited by former

German leadership as one of the most significant Allied errors

of the war as reflected in the following statement:

Veterans of the German high command would later agree that bold

Allied moves that week might have penetrated the German frontier defenses and ended the war . . . [Generaloberst Alfred] Jodl also suggested that determined movement on the Paris–Reims Luxembourg

axis towards Frankfurt (Patton’s axis), where a single reconnaissance

battalion of the Sixth Panzer Army patrolled the Saar Frontier, would

have penetrated the toughest sectors of the West Wall [Patton’s sector

of operations].12

General Zimmerman echoed these veterans of the high command with the following passage: “It was Rundstedt’s conviction that at this time [early September 1944] the Allies could

have broken through the West Wall whenever they wished . . .

But to our great surprise the operations of the Allies came to

a full stop in front of the West Wall: supply difficulties were

presumably at the root of this.”13

This campaign also demonstrated how ground maneuver

could aid Patton’s other force enhancers. Patton’s ground

scheme of maneuver facilitated ULTRA because it forced the

Germans to depend on the wireless Enigma machine. Whether

the Germans were retreating to Germany or back to their

fortresses, these actions generated volumes of ULTRA traffic

that led Bletchley Park representatives to recall the increase in

intercepts to “unprecedented levels.”14 The ground scheme of

maneuver also assisted the air campaign by capturing

German airfields. These new fields allowed airpower to be rapidly applied on the battlefield with increased loiter times and

better sortie generation rates. Patton’s rapid advance also secured areas away from the unfavorable weather conditions of

the Cherbourg Peninsula. 

Airpower

One of the most impressive accomplishments of this campaign was the destructive firepower generated by the airground team of XIX TAC and Third Army. Patton highlighted

their complementary nature when he noted, “Armor can move

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fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the

roads, and so long as he stays on the roads, the fighterbomber is one of the most deadly opponents.”15 John C.

Slessor argued that airpower should be “concentrated where

its influence was most likely to be decisive at the time,” a criterion that perfectly described the cooperation between Third

Army and XIX TAC.16 With air superiority in favor of the Allies,

Weyland employed aircraft as the point for armor columns and

provided constant, on-call CAS. These activities, complemented by XIX TAC’s interdiction operations, caused Patton to

write Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, chief of the Army Air Corps,

stating that “for about 250 miles I have seen the calling cards

of the fighter-bombers.”17

XIX TAC performed several functions that aided Patton’s advance. XIX TAC served as flank guard for almost 500 miles of

territory, and it also secured several rear areas. These actions

allowed Patton to redirect troops ordinarily dedicated to the

above roles to become spearheads for Third Army’s advancing

columns. XIX TAC’s bombing ensured that enemy ground

forces were denied respite on any area of the battlefield.

Therefore, they were not able to “hardwire” communications,

which once again induced German dependence on the wireless Enigma machine, thus generating exploitable information. Air reconnaissance missions also provided quick cover

stories for the operational employment of ULTRA. Finally, although limited in overall tonnage, airpower was employed to

keep Patton’s rapid drives pushing forward through the use of

IX Troop Carrier Command. This organization moved supplies

more rapidly than could the ground-based Red Ball Express.

Eventually, this service and some of XIX TAC’s efforts were diverted to other, less profitable objectives, which leads to a final

observation.

Commanders must know the limitations of their systems,

learn from the previous battles, and employ the lessons

learned to future scenarios. The diversion of the XIX TAC to

Brest was a mistake. The POWs from St. Malo provided ample

evidence that the fighter-bomber was ineffective against the

Brittany forts, and ULTRA reports reconfirmed this fact. XIX

TAC would add little to the 31 artillery battalions employed

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against this objective, which should have been merely contained. In contrast, the XIX TAC had exhibited outstanding results against troops in travel mode; and during this period the

Rhone Valley and Loire River areas provided fertile conditions

for effective fighter-bomber sorties. This denial of a force enhancer provided an additional example of the recurring frustration that occurred when Patton was denied these assets

during his campaign.

Leadership

This study sheds a new light on Patton’s leadership during

the campaign in France, particularly regarding his calculation

of risk and the steps he took to minimize it. Patton’s generalship was a key to Third Army’s successful integration of intelligence, the ground scheme of maneuver, and airpower. When

Patton was afforded all of the elements of his force-enhancing

trinity, Third Army produced unprecedented gains and overwhelming victories—such as the battle of Mortain. His employment of these elements allowed him to choose which battles he would fight and which he would avoid. Those he chose

to fight allowed him to make rapid gains with relatively few

losses. In contrast, when either air or ground operations were

hindered by higher headquarters’ orders, the other two elements attempted to offset the deficiencies; but the results

never rose to the same high level of accomplishments. These

mutually supporting enhancers eventually had a momentum

of their own that rolled the Germans back to within 50 miles

of their borders. But as this study has demonstrated, when

leaders fail to exploit the conditions associated with a weakened enemy or neglect to employ their assets effectively, the

cost in war is paid in precious lives and materiel. Considering

this great price, it is imperative that we learn the lessons from

the past that this campaign has for the future. 

Implications for the Future

This campaign provides counsel to future leaders who incorrectly believe that information dominance or perfect information

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will solve all of the problems on the battlefield. ULTRA may

have been a very reliable source of information; but without

credibility on the part of the data analysts, it was not always

well integrated into the commanders’ operational concepts. It

is not surprising that after World War II one report suggested

that “if Special Security Officers [ULTRA officers] are recruited

from the ranks of those who have had intelligence experience,

then they will need less training, and then they will be better

Special Security Officers.”18 This study calls into question the

practice of placing cross-trainees into critical intelligence positions because such officers could be as ineffective as bad

British troops or civilian lawyer flunkies, which would negate

the efforts of the numerous individuals who painstakingly

produced the intelligence product. But as Colonel Koch

pointed out in regard to General Patton, this is only half the

equation. Commanders themselves must have a useful appreciation for intelligence in order to apply this information effectively in battle. Patton had two tours as an intelligence officer.

Assigning future air commanders to intelligence billets may

not be practical in today’s US Air Force; but absent such a policy, the present state of intelligence instruction at our professional military education schools must be improved. A greater

understanding of intelligence sources and methods may be the

first step towards Koch’s command support, which in his

words will ensure that in future battles, the “G-2 will tackle

any job.”19

Effective dissemination is also vital. One of the factors that

made Patton so successful was his employment of high-level intelligence in low-level situations. Future intelligence leaders

must remember that people at the lowest levels do not care if the

information comes from an Enigma machine or a POW report.

When General Bayerlein was asked to “judge American intelligence,” he stated “[the] intelligence service must have worked

well, for generally tactical targets were recognized swiftly and

correctly.”20 He and the rest of the Germans did not even suspect

that the Allies’ intelligence successes were due to a compromise

of the Enigma machine. This lack of perception suggests that future “intelligence gain/loss studies” should not focus on the

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worst-case scenario because within a robust intelligence program, there are always cover stories available. 

The Third Army–XIX TAC cooperation also demonstrates the

importance of air-ground operations, notwithstanding the airpower successes in Kosovo and Bosnia. Some analysts are extrapolating from the events in the Balkans a vision of singleservice operations as the future of warfare. This is a mistake.

These air-only extrapolations could destroy the air-ground

synergy that was so prominent in Patton’s campaigns and that

could well be required in future campaigns. Furthermore, the

use of “kill boxes” during Desert Storm to strike targets well

beyond friendly lines was very successful; but the

Patton–Weyland form of air-ground cooperation will require

much more intimate teamwork. And Patton’s version of the

World War II evolution of air-ground cooperation may have lessons for today: “We have seen the attempts of air and ground

to work together for years but it was only on the 1st of August

[1944] that it really worked. First, air was subservient to the

ground forces. That was wrong. Then air and ground were set

as things apart and that was wrong, for it was quite evident

that we were not getting along.”21 Whether the Army and the

Air Force are getting along is not the point. In World War II

Patton had the luxury of improving his use of airpower

through an evolutionary process. In future battles we may not

be afforded the luxury of time in which to develop the most effective form of air-ground cooperation. Sensor-to-shooter initiatives have the possibility of paying handsome returns in a

rapid integrated air-ground campaign, but the techniques to

perfect these initiatives will require extensive joint practice in

peacetime. The Air Force and Army must ensure that all information systems are compatible and—more importantly—

that these two services practice on a large scale with these new

information dominance initiatives. There are numerous possibilities to increase this training—from joint Red Flags and

National Training Center ventures to remote simulations incorporated into one large exercise. These exercises should resolve some of the problems that took Patton years in World

War II to correct. They should also ensure the most effective

133

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application of information, airpower, and ground forces in future operations.

At the end of Patton’s campaign across France, General

Spaatz traveled to Nancy, France, to congratulate the XIX TAC

and Third Army for their outstanding August and September

campaign. Spaatz gave a speech saying “I’d like to congratulate you for your work in France. What you’ve seen is the

greatest example of air-ground cooperation that has ever been

or ever will be.” Patton responded, “General Spaatz you are a

liar. What we are going to do will make the crossing of France

look like chicken sh--,” and then he immediately sat down.22

Unfortunately, due to a diversion in resources, Patton was

only able to replicate his 1944 movements for brief periods beyond the borders of France.

The crossing of France was quite remarkable. Harkins and

Weyland both went on to become full generals; and they both

agreed with Spaatz’s opinion, claiming that they had not seen

an air-ground effort as successful as the XIX TAC and Third

Army’s. Therefore, the first portion of Spaatz’s comments are

clearly true; but it is up to us and our leaders to ensure that

Spaatz is proven a liar in future conflicts that require extensive intelligence and air-ground coordination. If the Air Force

and the Army both learn the proper lessons from this campaign concerning how best to integrate intelligence, ground

maneuver, and airpower, the best will, indeed, be yet to come.

Notes

1. Ira C. Eaker, Microfilm 23342—Personal Collection of I. C. Eaker—

“ULTRA Goes to War” (Air Force Historical Research Center: Eaker

Collection, 29 December 1974), 2.

2. Ibid.

3. Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II’s

Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (London: Hutchinson Co.,

1978), 338.

4. Warrack Wallace, SRH-108—“Report on Assignment with the Third

United States Army 15 August–18 September 1944” (National Archives:

Record Group 457, 21 May 1945), 4.

5. Melvin C. Helfers, video tape interview at The Citadel (Charleston,

S.C.: The Citadel Archives, 9 October 1984).

6. Oscar W. Koch and Robert G. Hays, G-2: Intelligence for Patton

(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971), 165.

134

CADRE PAPER
7. Alfred McCormack, SRH-185—“War Experiences of Alfred

McCormack” (National Archives: Record Group 457, 31 July 1947), 4.

8. Melvin C. Helfers, Personal Papers—“My Personal Experience with

High Level Intelligence” (Charleston, S.C.: The Citadel Archives: November

1974), 10.

9. Wallace, 4.

10. Ibid., 3–4.

11. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 531.

12. David C. Eisenhower, Eisenhower: At War 1943–1945 (New York:

Random House, 1986), 436.

13. Seymour Freidin, Werner Kreipe, and William Richardson, eds., The

Fatal Decisions (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1956), 235.

14. Ralph Francis Bennett, ULTRA in the West: The Normandy Campaign,

1944–45 (New York: Scribner, 1980), 119–20.

15. George S. Patton Jr., “General Patton’s Own Story,” Saturday Evening

Post, 1 November 1947, 16.

16. John C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University

Press, 1936), 79.

17. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins

Publishers, 1995), 637.

18. SRH-107, “Problems of the SSO System in World War II” (National

Archives: Record Group 457, 17 September 1945), 35.

19. Koch and Hays, 165.

20. Willis Thornton, Report 168.7104-95—“Interrogation of General Fritz

Bayerlein” (Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center: Weyland

Collection, 29 May 1945), appendix 1-7.

21. O. P. Weyland, Report 168.7104-101—“Talks by General Patton and

General Weyland at Press Conference” (Albert F. Simpson Historical

Research Center: Weyland Collection, 16 December 1944), 3.

22. Frederick Vosburg, XIX TAC senior intelligence officer, telephone interview with the author, 24 March 2000.

135

SHWEDO
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XIX Tactical Air Command and ULTRA

Patton’s Force Enhancers in

the 1944 Campaign in France

Air University (AU) Library/AU Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

Rita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson