RAIL TRANSIT

Federal Transit 

Administration Can 

Strengthen Safety 

Oversight by 

Improving Guidance 

to States

Report to Congressional Requesters

March 2018

GAO-18-310

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-18-310, a report to 

congressional requesters

March 2018

RAIL TRANSIT

Federal Transit Administration Can Strengthen Safety 

Oversight by Improving Guidance to States

What GAO Found

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to 

rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for 

railroads, while FTA’s program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on 

state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in 

federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety 

regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement 

mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure).

Key Characteristics of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) and Federal 

Transit Administration’s (FTA) Rail Safety Oversight Programs

There are strengths and limitations to FRA’s and FTA’s approaches to their 

safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety 

regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National 

Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with 

generally agreed, that strengths of FRA’s rail safety oversight program include its 

safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement 

authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, 

such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms.

FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety 

program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and 

support to states’ safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and 

effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not 

provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based 

inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it 

does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to 

develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not 

allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go 

undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to 

evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are 

effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies’ enforcement is 

effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to 

remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, 

potentially contributing to safety incidents. View GAO-18-310. For more information, 

contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or 

goldsteinm@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided 

with additional authority to oversee the 

safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA 

is now implementing this authority. The 

DOT’s Office of Inspector General has 

reported, though, that FTA faces

challenges in carrying out its enhanced 

safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, 

has long carried out safety oversight of 

freight, intercity passenger, and 

commuter railroads.

GAO was asked to review various rail 

safety and oversight issues, including 

the differences between FRA’s and 

FTA’s rail safety oversight programs. 

This report examines (1) key 

characteristics of FRA’s and FTA’s rail 

safety oversight programs and (2) 

strengths and limitations of FRA’s and

FTA’s rail safety oversight programs.

GAO assessed FRA’s and FTA’s

information about rail safety oversight 

activities against guidance from the 

Office of Management and Budget, 

leading practices developed by the 

transit industry, and federal standards 

for internal control. GAO also 

interviewed stakeholders, including rail 

operators chosen based on mode, 

size, and location.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FTA (1) create 

a plan, with timeline, for developing 

risk-based inspection guidance for 

state safety agencies, and (2) develop 

and communicate a method for how 

FTA will monitor whether state safety 

agencies’ enforcement practices are 

effective. DOT agreed with our 

recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and 

WMATA provided technical comments 

that we incorporated as appropriate.
Page i GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Letter 1

Background 6

FRA Has a Centralized Safety Oversight Framework While FTA Is 

Implementing a State-Based Approach 12

FRA’s and FTA’s Approaches to Rail Safety Oversight Have 

Strengths and Limitations, and FTA Can Improve 

Implementation of Its New Authorities 21

Conclusions 33

Recommendations 33

Agency Comments 33

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Transportation 35

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36

Figures

Figure 1: Rail Transit Systems Overseen by State Safety 

Agencies 7

Figure 2: United States General Railroad System 10

Figure 3: Key Characteristics of the Federal Railroad 

Administration’s (FRA) and Federal Transit 

Administration’s (FTA) Rail Safety Oversight Programs 13

Contents
Page ii GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Abbreviations

DOT Department of Transportation

FAST Act Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FTA Federal Transit Administration

MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program

WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

March 20, 2018

The Honorable Trey Gowdy

Chairman

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark Meadows

Chairman

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Government Operations

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Tammy Duckworth

United States Senate

Until recent years, safety oversight of public transportation systems has 

been largely the responsibility of state entities. In 2012, the Moving Ahead 

for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) provided the United States 

Department of Transportation (DOT) with additional authority and 

responsibilities to oversee the safety of the nation’s rail public 

transportation systems.1 Within DOT, the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA) is now implementing this authority.2 In 2015, the Fixing America’s 

Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) further enhanced federal safety 

oversight authority by, among other things, explicitly allowing FTA to 

assume direct safety oversight of a state’s rail transit systems. While 

 1 The term “public transportation” is defined as regular, continuing shared-ride surface 

transportation services that are open to the general public or open to a segment of the 

general public defined by age, disability, or low income. 49 U.S.C. § 5302(14). This report 

is specifically concerned with rail fixed guideway public transportation systems, which is 

defined as any fixed guideway system that uses rail, is operated for public transportation, 

is within the jurisdiction of a state, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 

Railroad Administration, or any such system in engineering or construction. Throughout 

this report, we refer to these rail fixed guideway systems as “rail transit.”

2 The additional authority and responsibilities were granted to the Secretary of 

Transportation, who has delegated them to FTA. Throughout the rest of this report we 

refer to those authorities as FTA’s.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

federal oversight authority of rail transit safety has recently been 

expanded, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also in DOT, has 

long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and 

commuter railroads in the U.S. that operate on what is known as the 

general railroad system of transportation (general system).3

Following high-profile accidents on the Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority (WMATA) Metrorail system in June 2009 and January 

2015, FTA assumed temporary direct oversight of WMATA’s rail system 

in October 2015. As a result of its review of a January 2015 WMATA 

Metrorail accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

recommended in that same year that DOT seek legal authority for FRA to 

assume safety oversight over WMATA’s rail system.4 According to NTSB, 

which is an independent federal agency that seeks to advance 

transportation safety primarily through accident investigations, FRA is 

better suited to providing safety oversight for WMATA’s rail system 

because FRA has uniform safety regulations, an experienced inspection 

staff, and the ability to assess civil penalties for safety violations. DOT 

disagreed with NTSB that the most urgent and effective solution was to 

transfer safety oversight of WMATA’s rail system to FRA. The DOT Office 

of Inspector General (OIG) also issued a report in 2016 about FTA’s 

challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight, including 

challenges addressing its safety oversight personnel and resource needs 

and establishing robust safety performance criteria and enforceable 

standards.5 We have also reported that FRA has faced its own challenges 

in recent years, such as ensuring that it has enough inspectors for its 

safety oversight workload.6

In light of these issues and NTSB’s recommendation, you asked us to 

review various safety and oversight issues at WMATA Metrorail and FTA, 

 3 Throughout this report, we refer to freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads 

under the jurisdiction of FRA as “railroads.”

4 NTSB, Safety Recommendation, R-15-31 and -32 (Urgent), September 30, 2015. NTSB 

officials told us that this recommendation could possibly apply to other rail transit systems 

given their overall concerns about rail transit safety.

5 DOT OIG, Improvements in FTA’s Safety Oversight Policies and Procedures Could 

Strength Program Implementation and Address Persistent Challenges, ST-2017-004 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2, 2016).

6 GAO, Rail Safety: Improved Human Capital Planning Could Address Emerging Safety 

Oversight Challenges, GAO-14-85 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 2013).
Page 3 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

as well as differences between FRA’s and FTA’s rail safety oversight 

programs. In consultation with your office and to assist efforts to ensure 

effective rail transit safety oversight of WMATA and other rail transit 

providers, we focused this review on examining (1) key characteristics of 

FRA’s and FTA’s rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and 

limitations of FRA’s and FTA’s rail safety oversight programs.

In addressing the research objectives, we focused on three 

characteristics of DOT’s rail safety oversight, as implemented by FRA and 

FTA: (1) developing safety regulations, (2) conducting inspections and 

oversight, and (3) using enforcement mechanisms. We focused on these 

aspects of rail safety oversight because they are the areas highlighted by 

NTSB as strengths of FRA’s safety oversight program.

To address our research objectives, we gathered information about FRA’s 

and FTA’s rail safety oversight activities and assessed it against guidance 

and leading practices. We reviewed recent statutes that establish DOT’s 

rail safety oversight authority as well as applicable implementing 

regulations. We also reviewed FRA’s and FTA’s documentation regarding 

safety oversight policies and practices. We also interviewed officials from 

FRA and FTA about their rail safety oversight activities. We assessed the 

information on safety regulations gathered from agency documents and 

interviews against official federal government guidance, issued by the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), about the development of 

federal regulations.7 We also assessed the information gathered from 

agency documents and interviews about inspections against leading 

practices developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

Development (OECD) 8 and the Transportation Research Board’s Transit 

Cooperative Research Program (TCRP).9 For the OECD, which has 

played a leading role in the international community to promote regulatory 

reform and the implementation of sound regulatory practices, we 

 7 OMB, Circular A-119: Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary 

Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

27, 2016). OMB, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2003).

We also examined the guidance provided about using performance-based regulations in 

Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993.

8 OECD, Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Enforcement and 

Inspections (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014).

9 TCRP, Report 149: Improving Safety-Related Rules Compliance in the Public 

Transportation Industry (Washington, D.C.: 2011). TCRP, Report 174: Improving Safety 

Culture in Public Transportation (Washington, D.C.: 2015).
Page 4 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

identified reports specifically about regulatory enforcement and 

inspections. For the TCRP, which serves as one of the principal means 

by which the transit industry can develop innovative near-term solutions, 

we identified the reports specifically about rail safety and rail oversight.

We also assessed the information gathered from agency documents and 

interviews about inspections and enforcement against federal internal 

control standards about risk assessments as well as agency information 

and communication.10

To further examine FRA and FTA rail safety oversight activities, we 

identified and summarized the strengths and limitations of FRA’s and 

FTA’s current safety oversight programs as identified in past studies.

Specifically, we assessed the findings from our past work11 as well as 

from DOT OIG12 and NTSB reports.13

To further examine FRA’s safety oversight activities specifically, we 

assessed the statistical model used as part of FRA’s National Inspection 

Plan. The National Inspection Plan uses safety risk information, including 

as part of a quantitative model, to help target FRA inspection resources to 

areas of higher risk. We assessed the model based on FRA 

 10 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014).

11 GAO, Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State Safety 

Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006); GAO, Rail Safety: 

The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to Better Target Its Oversight, but 

Assessment of Results Is Needed to Determine Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 26, 2007); and GAO-14-85.

12 DOT OIG, Challenges to Improving Oversight of Rail Transit Safety and Implementing 

an Enhanced Federal Role, MH-2012-048 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012). DOT OIG, 

FRA is Nearing Completion of Rules required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act, but 

Needs to Improve Oversight , CR-2013-070 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2013). DOT OIG, 

ST-2017-004.

13 NTSB, Organizational Factors in Metro-North Railroad Accidents, Special Investigation 

Report NTSB/SIR-14/04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2014). NTSB, Derailment of Amtrak 

Passenger Train 188, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 12, 2015, Accident Report 

NTSB/RAR-16/02 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2016). NTSB, Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority L’Enfant Plaza Station Electrical Arcing and Smoke Accident, 

Washington, D.C., January 12, 2015, Accident Report NTSB/RAR-16/01 (Washington, 

D.C.: May 3, 2016). NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Rail Transit Vehicle Safe 

Braking, Recommendation No.: R-17-04 (Washington, D.C., May 1, 2017).
Page 5 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

documentation and interviews with FRA officials as well as findings from 

our previous work.14

Finally, we interviewed a variety of stakeholders, including rail operators 

and organizations, about the strengths and limitations of FRA’s and FTA’s 

rail safety oversight activities.15 Specifically, we interviewed railroad 

officials from Amtrak, BNSF Railway, Long Island Rail Road, Metro-North 

Commuter Railroad, New Jersey Transit, Port Authority Trans Hudson, 

and Union Pacific Railroad. We also interviewed rail transit officials from 

Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Los Angeles County Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority, New York City Transit, San Francisco Municipal 

Railway, and WMATA. We selected these railroads and rail transit 

operators based on their modes of operation,16 systems’ size and age, 

and geographic location. Though we believe these railroads and rail 

transit operators provided relevant and diverse perspectives on rail safety 

oversight, the information gathered from these entities is not 

generalizable to all rail operators. To further understand and assess rail 

transit safety oversight specifically, we also interviewed officials from 

state safety agencies that oversee the rail transit operators interviewed.

Finally, we interviewed officials from stakeholder organizations, including 

the Association of American Railroads, American Association of State 

Highway and Transportation Officials, American Federation of Labor and 

Congress of Industrial Organizations, American Public Transportation 

Association, and National Association of Railroad Passengers.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2017 to March 2018 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

 14 See in particular the discussion of statistical modeling in GAO, Motor Carriers: Better 

Information Needed to Assess Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safety Interventions, 

GAO-17-49 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2016); GAO, Drinking Water: Additional Data and 

Statistical Analysis May Enhance EPA’s Oversight of the Lead and Copper Rule, 

GAO-17-424 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2017); and GAO, Agricultural Conservation: 

USDA Should Improve Its Process for Allocating Funds to States for the Environmental 

Quality Incentives Program, GAO-06-969 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).

15 Throughout this report, we refer to both rail transit entities and railroads collectively as 

“rail operators.”

16 Among railroads, we selected entities operating freight or passenger service. Among 

rail transit, we selected entities operating heavy rail, light rail, and cable cars.
Page 6 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In the United States, both FRA and FTA regulate rail transportation 

safety. FRA oversees safety of railroads operating on what is known as 

the general system, a network of standard gage track over which goods 

may be transported and passengers may travel. This system includes 

freight railroads, which typically own their own tracks and locomotives, 

transporting products among states and regions. FRA also oversees 

safety of intercity passenger and commuter railroads that operate over 

tracks owned by freight railroads and other entities. FTA oversees safety 

of rail transit systems that typically serve individual metropolitan areas, 

using track not shared with freight and other passenger trains. Rail transit 

includes a variety of modes, such as heavy and light rail,17 streetcars,18

automated guideways,19 cable cars,20 and others.

Rail transit is an important component of the nation’s transportation 

network, particularly in large metropolitan areas. Rail transit systems 

provided over 4.4 billion passenger trips in 2016. “Heavy rail” systems in 

large cities account for much of the total rail transit activity, including 88 

percent of passenger trips in 2016. According to FTA, 61 rail transit 

systems within 28 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico are 

 17 “Heavy rail” is a transit mode that uses an electric railway with the capacity for a heavy 

volume of traffic. It is characterized by high speed and rapid acceleration passenger rail 

cars operating singly or in multi-car trains, on fixed rails, and usually a separate rights-ofway from which all other vehicular and foot traffic are excluded. “Light rail” is a transit 

mode that typically uses an electric railway with a light volume traffic capacity compared to 

heavy rail. It is characterized by rail cars operating singly (or in short trains) on fixed rails 

in shared or exclusive right-of-way.

18 Streetcars are a transit mode operating entire routes predominantly on streets in mixedtraffic. This service typically operates with single-car trains powered by overhead wires or 

cables providing electrical power.

19 Automated guideways are an electrically-powered mode of transit operating in an 

exclusive guideway or over relatively short distances. The service is characterized by 

either monorail systems with human-operated vehicles straddling a single guideway or by 

people-mover systems with automated operation.

20 Cable cars are a transit mode that is an electric railway with individually controlled 

transit vehicles attached to a moving cable located below the street surface and powered 

by engines or motors not onboard the vehicle.

Background

Rail Transit
Page 7 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

subject to safety oversight by one of the 31 agencies in FTA’s state safety 

oversight program (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Rail Transit Systems Overseen by State Safety Agencies

The states have long played a central role in conducting safety oversight 

of rail transit systems.21 The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 

Act of 1991 required, among other things, that states with rail transit 

operators designate an agency to oversee the safety of those systems, 

 21 According to FTA, from the inception of the U.S. DOT’s federal financial assistance 

program for state and local agencies until the enactment of MAP-21, FTA and its 

predecessor agency, the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, were prohibited from 

regulating any aspect of the day-to-day operations of grant recipients, including 

establishing national mandatory standards for transit safety.
Page 8 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

known as a state safety oversight agency.22 In overseeing state safety 

agencies, FTA designed the program as one in which FTA, states, and 

rail transit operators collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail 

transit systems.

However, limitations have been identified in the state safety oversight 

program. In 2006, we reported on some state safety agency challenges in 

overseeing rail transit safety.23 Specifically, we found many of the state 

safety agencies lacked enough qualified staff and adequate levels of 

training to meet their responsibilities. In a 2009 hearing before the 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, then Secretary Ray LaHood of the 

Department of Transportation discussed some of the weaknesses under 

the current state safety oversight program and introduced a public 

transportation safety legislative proposal. In 2010, various bills were 

introduced in both houses of Congress that would have provided FTA 

with various enforcement mechanisms and with the authority to issue 

safety regulations. Additionally, the bills would have required the 

Secretary to establish a federal certification program for employees and 

contractors who carry out a state public transportation safety program. In 

the 112th Congress, the Senate amended a House bill to include a public 

transportation safety provision, which eventually became section 20021 of 

MAP-21, the federal public transportation safety program.

MAP-21 enhanced FTA’s authority to oversee the safety of rail transit, 

potentially addressing some of the weaknesses identified by various 

stakeholders. Specifically, MAP-21 established a comprehensive Public 

Transportation Safety Program,24 which continues to rely on state safety 

agencies to monitor rail transit systems’ safety operations. MAP-21 

required that, within 3 years of the effective date of a final state safety 

 22 Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 3029, 105 Stat. 1914, 2116 (Dec. 18, 1991) (codified as 

amended at 49 U.S.C. § 5330). Throughout this report we refer to state safety oversight 

agencies as “state safety agencies.”

23 GAO-06-821.

24 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 20021, 126 Stat. 405, 709 (July 6, 2012). The Public 

Transportation Safety Program is comprised of five main elements—(1) a national public 

transportation safety plan; (2) a safety certification training program for federal, state, and 

local transportation agency employees with safety oversight responsibilities; (3) public 

transportation agency safety plans; (4) a strengthened state safety oversight program for 

rail transit; and (5) a new framework for federal oversight and enforcement. See 49 U.S.C. 

§ 5329.
Page 9 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

oversight program rule,25 each eligible state have in place a state safety 

oversight program certified by FTA.26 An eligible state must, among other 

things, establish a state safety agency and determine, in consultation with 

FTA, an appropriate staffing level for this state agency that is 

commensurate with the number, size, and complexity of the rail transit 

systems within the state. Additionally, a state safety agency must be 

financially and legally independent from any rail transit system it oversees 

and have investigative and enforcement authority with respect to the 

safety for its rail transit systems, among other things. Each eligible state 

has until April 15, 2019, to receive FTA approval of its state safety 

oversight program, or else FTA will be prohibited from obligating certain 

federal financial assistance to any entity in the state that is otherwise 

eligible to receive that federal financial assistance.27 After that approval, 

state safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA 

regulations a minimum of once every 3 years through a triennial review 

process. According to FTA, these requirements represent a dramatic 

increase in federal expectations for state safety oversight and for the rail 

transit industry. MAP-21 also established a state safety oversight grant 

program, offering federal funding to states for their state safety activities.

FTA’s Office of Transit Safety and Oversight administers the state safety 

oversight program.

Freight and passenger railroads have played a transformational role in 

the development of America and continue to be an important part of the 

economy. The general railroad system consists of a vast network of 

operations (see fig. 2). The $60 billion freight rail industry is operated by 

seven Class I, and hundreds of smaller, railroads.28 In addition, about 40 

railroads move passengers, which carry greater than 670 million 

passengers per year.

 25 FTA issued the final state safety oversight rule on March 16, 2016, with an effective 

date of April 15, 2016. 81 Fed. Reg. 14,230 (Mar. 16, 2016) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 674).

26 An eligible state is one that has a rail transit system within the jurisdiction of the state 

that is not subject to regulation by the FRA, or a rail transit system in the engineering or 

construction phase of development within the jurisdiction of the state that will not be 

subject to regulation by FRA.

27 Four of the 31 state safety oversight programs have been certified as of February 22, 

2018.

28 Railroads are classified based on their annual carrier operating revenues. According to 

the Surface Transportation Board, Class I railroads are the largest, with annual carrier 

operating revenue of about $447 million or more.

Railroads
Page 10 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Figure 2: United States General Railroad System

The federal government has long provided regulatory oversight of railroad 

safety, both passenger and freight, that operate on the general system.

The Interstate Commerce Commission, the first federal regulatory 

commission in U.S. history, was established in 1887 to regulate interstate 

commerce by rail.29 The Commission’s safety functions were transferred 

to FRA, which was created by the Department of Transportation Act in 

1966. In its role as federal regulator and overseer of railroad safety, FRA 

prescribes and enforces railroad safety regulations and conducts 

research and development in support of improved railroad safety and rail 

transportation policy. FRA utilizes safety inspectors and specialists, 

 29 U.S. Senate Historical Office.
Page 11 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

primarily covering five safety disciplines, to review and enforce 

compliance with these regulations. FRA’s safety disciplines are track, 

signal, and train control; motive power and equipment; operating 

practices; and hazardous materials. Following several fatal rail accidents 

between 2002 and 2008, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 was 

enacted, the first authorization of FRA’s safety programs since 1994. This 

act directed FRA to, among other things, issue new safety regulations for 

different aspects of railroad safety, such as hours of service requirements 

for passenger railroad workers, positive train control implementation,30

track inspection rules, and safety at highway-rail grade crossings. FRA’s 

Office of Railroad Safety administers the agency’s safety program.

Rail transportation is a relatively safe way to transport people and 

products though serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail 

transit. According to an analysis of DOT’s Bureau of Transportation 

Statistics data by the American Public Transportation Association, travel 

by rail transit is far safer than automobile travel.31 From 2000-2014, for 

instance, there were 6.53 and 0.33 fatalities per billion passenger-miles 

traveled in cars or light trucks and rail transit, respectively. Within rail 

travel, the fatality rates on both railroads and rail transit operators have 

remained similar in recent years. Further, the rate of accidents and 

incidents—including collisions and derailments—also do not appear to 

differ substantially between railroads and rail transit in recent years.32

Nevertheless, serious incidents continue to occur on railroads and rail 

transit, posing safety risks to passengers, railroad employees, and the 

 30 Positive train control is a communications-based system designed to prevent certain 

types of rail accidents caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions, trains 

entering established work zones—which could cause roadway worker casualties or 

equipment damage—and derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. For example, 

positive train control can automatically slow or stop a train that is not being operated 

safely due to operator errors.

31 American Public Transportation Association, The Hidden Traffic Safety Solution: Public 

Transportation, September 2016.

32 See FRA, Ten Year Accident / Incident Oversight safety data, and FTA, National Transit 

Database, Safety and Security Time Series Data. Railroad accidents here include train 

accidents and highway-rail crossing incidents, as well as other accidents or incidents that 

cause physical harm to persons. Train accidents include railroad track, equipment and/or 

structures that have sustained damage in excess of FRA’s accident reporting threshold. A 

highway-rail grade crossing incident typically involves on-track railroad equipment striking 

a highway user or a highway user striking on-track equipment at a highway-rail crossing. 

Rail transit accidents here include collisions (with motor vehicles, people, fixed objects, rail 

vehicles, bus vehicles, and other items), train derailments, and fires.

Rail Accidents and 

Incidents
Page 12 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

public. For example, in June 2009, two WMATA trains collided, resulting 

in 52 injuries and 9 deaths. A smoke incident on WMATA’s Metrorail 

system in January 2015 also resulted in the death of 1 person and injured 

over 90. In a 10-month period from May 2013 to March 2014, the MetroNorth commuter railroad, which serves New York and Connecticut, was 

involved in five accidents that resulted in the death of 6 people and 126 

injured. In June 2016, two BNSF Railway freight trains collided near 

Panhandle, Texas, resulting in the death of three crew members.

Incidents such as these have prompted investigations into both the 

causes and contributing factors of the specific accidents as well as 

broader rail safety oversight.

FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while 

FTA is implementing changes to the rail transit oversight program, 

established in federal statute, which relies on states to monitor and 

enforce safety. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) the 

establishment of safety regulations,33 (2) inspections and other oversight 

activities, such as audits and investigations, based on those regulations, 

and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are 

addressed (see fig. 3).

 33 We define “regulations” in this report as agencies’ statements of general applicability 

and future effect, which establish legally binding requirements for regulated entities and 

are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In the context of FRA and FTA rail 

safety oversight, we refer to “safety regulations” as mandatory minimum safety 

performance requirements for regulated entities. We define “standard” in this report as 

conditions, guidelines, or characteristics of industry policies and practices that do not have 

the force and effect of law.

FRA Has a 

Centralized Safety 

Oversight Framework 

While FTA Is 

Implementing a StateBased Approach
Page 13 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Figure 3: Key Characteristics of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Rail 

Safety Oversight Programs

FRA has developed extensive railroad safety regulations over decades.

FRA’s railroad safety regulations include requirements governing track 

design and inspection, grade crossings, signal and train control, 

mechanical equipment including locomotives, and railroad-operating 

practices including worker protection rules. For example, FRA’s 

regulations for track and equipment include detailed, prescriptive 

minimum requirements, such as formulas that determine the maximum 

allowable speeds on curved track. Many of FRA’s rail safety regulations 

establish minimum safety requirements, though railroads can apply for 

waivers.34

As FRA updates its safety regulations, it has proposed more 

performance-based regulations in recent years. Many of FRA’s current 

safety regulations specify the behavior or manner of compliance that 

railroads must adopt, such as inspecting each locomotive at least every 

92 days. Performance-based regulations, however, specify a desired 

outcome rather than a behavior or manner of compliance. For example, 

FRA’s recent rulemaking to amend its passenger equipment safety 

regulations proposes performance-based crashworthiness and occupant 

 34 Waiver petitions generally seek an exception from compliance with an FRA regulation 

that the petitioner believes is unnecessary or excessively burdensome under the specific 

circumstances (sometimes because the petitioners’ practices exceed the regulatory 

requirements, according to FRA officials). Although certain statutorily mandated 

requirements cannot be waived, FRA may generally issue a waiver when it is in the public 

interest and consistent with railroad safety.

Safety Regulations
Page 14 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

protection requirements, rather than explicit targets or tolerances.35

According to FRA, establishing performance requirements in these areas 

would allow a more open rail market that incorporates recent 

technologies.

FTA is currently assessing the need for rail transit safety regulations, 

having been provided the authority to issue safety regulations in 2012.36

Since MAP-21 was enacted, FTA has finalized regulations implementing 

the public transportation safety program authorized by statute. These 

include regulations that establish rules for FTA’s administration of a 

comprehensive safety program to improve rail transit safety as well as 

updated regulations governing state safety oversight of rail transit.37 In 

addition to its public transportation safety program regulations, FTA also 

has regulations governing its drug and alcohol testing program.38 MAP-21 

also authorized FTA, for the first time, to issue rail transit safety 

regulations, which would establish minimum safety performance 

requirements for rail transit operators, as part of its requirement to 

develop a National Public Transportation Safety Plan.39 FTA initiated a 

regulatory development effort after the passage of MAP-21, which 

included a compilation and evaluation of existing transit safety standards, 

guidance, and best practices from the federal government, states, 

 35 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and 

High-Speed Trainsets, 81 Fed. Reg. 88006 (Dec. 6, 2016).

36 According to FTA, the agency and its predecessor agency, the Urban Mass 

Transportation Administration, were previously prohibited from regulating any aspect of 

the day-to-day operations of grant recipients, including establishing national mandatory 

standards for transit safety. However, according to FTA, it has been responsible for 

monitoring the many state agencies that exercised direct safety oversight of rail transit 

operations, and providing technical assistance to those state agencies.

37 See 49 C.F.R. pts. 670 and 674.

38 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 655. The purpose of this part is to establish programs to be 

implemented by employers that receive financial assistance from FTA, and by contractors 

of those employers, that are designed to help prevent accidents, injuries, and fatalities 

resulting from the misuse of alcohol and use of prohibited drugs by employees who 

perform safety-sensitive functions.

39 FTA issued the final National Public Transportation Safety Plan in January 2017. 82 

Fed. Reg. 5628 (Jan. 18, 2017). According to FTA, it will periodically issue a National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan to improve the safety of all public transportation 

systems that receive funding under Chapter 53 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code. The National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan includes, among other things, safety performance 

criteria, voluntary minimum safety performance standards for vehicles in revenue 

operations, safety advisories, and best practices.
Page 15 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

industry, and other sources. After the evaluation, FTA issued a report that 

concluded there was limited documentation or evidence of the 

effectiveness of these existing rail transit safety standards.40 The report 

included recommendations that are intended to enable FTA to undertake 

further data-driven, risk-based analysis of rail transit safety performance 

and the applicability and effectiveness of the identified safety standards.

FTA is also currently analyzing specific focus areas to determine any 

areas that should be addressed by federal safety regulations. For 

example, FTA is studying the need for regulations related to rail transit 

vehicle crashworthiness.

Since no federal rail transit safety regulations that establish minimum 

safety performance requirements for rail transit operators currently exist, 

rail transit operators are subject to different safety standards,41 depending 

largely on what voluntary standards they have chosen to adopt, according 

to American Public Transportation Association officials we spoke with.42

The American Public Transportation Association, for instance, has issued 

a variety of rail transit safety standards, addressing various aspects of the 

industry including operations, training, and inspections. In addition, states 

vary in the extent to which they have regulations for rail transit operators.

For example, officials from the California Public Utilities Commission 

noted that it has issued a variety of safety regulations applicable to rail 

transit operators within the state of California to improve safety of rail 

operations.

Both FRA and FTA have mechanisms to gather the input of 

stakeholders—including rail operators, labor unions, industry 

associations, and others—when considering development of safety 

regulations. In developing most of its safety regulations, FRA seeks input 

from stakeholders through its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. In 

1996, FRA established this committee to develop new regulations through 

a collaborative process, with the rail community working together to 

create mutually satisfactory solutions to safety issues. FTA is 

 40 FTA, Review and Evaluation of Public Transportation Safety Standards, FTA Report 

No. 0103, Prepared by Center for Urban Transportation Research, January 2017.

41 According to FTA, its regulations on the prevention of alcohol misuse and prohibited 

drug use in transit operations can be considered “safety regulations. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 

655

42 Industry standards also exist for railroads, developed by such organizations as the 

Association of American Railroads.
Page 16 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

collaborating with stakeholders as it assesses the need for rail transit 

safety regulations. More specifically, FTA’s research partner, the Center 

for Urban Transportation Research, established a working group to 

collaborate with industry stakeholders to inform the safety regulations 

development process. FTA also solicited comments from industry 

stakeholders on its compilation of existing rail transit safety standards.

More broadly, FTA also has a Transit Advisory Committee for Safety, 

which provides information, advice, and recommendations to FTA on 

safety matters.

FRA fulfills its mission, in part, through safety compliance audits and 

inspections, and investigations. FRA ensures compliance with its safety 

regulations through inspections, using a staff of railroad safety experts, 

inspectors, and other professionals assigned to eight regional offices 

across the nation. For example, to determine a railroad’s compliance with 

FRA safety regulations, inspectors examine track, equipment, signal 

devices, employee actions, and procedures and review maintenance and 

accident records. Additionally, 31 states have rail safety programs that 

partner with FRA.43 Under this approach, FRA enters into agreements 

with states to allow state inspectors to participate in investigative and 

surveillance activities concerning federal railroad safety laws. State 

inspectors who participate in this program submit inspection reports to 

FRA. More broadly, FRA’s inspections are guided by a risk-based 

model.44 Under this approach, FRA focuses its inspections on locations 

that, according to the data-driven model, are likely to have safety 

problems. Like other operating administrations within DOT, FRA has 

relatively few resources for overseeing railroads, compared with the size 

of the general system. The risk-based model is designed to help FRA 

target the greatest safety risks. FRA has begun utilizing automated 

inspections as well. In particular, according to FRA, new imaging 

technologies have the potential to better inspect track for cracks in the rail 

that could lead to breakage as well as measure the track’s geometry to 

 43 See 49 U.S.C. § 20105; 49 C.F.R. pt. 212.

44 FRA’s risk-based model is a risk assessment tool, which we have defined as a process 

of qualitatively or quantitatively determining the probability of an adverse event and the 

severity of its impact on an asset. It is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

A risk assessment provides the basis for the rank ordering of risks (in FRA’s situation, 

railroad accidents) and for establishing priorities for applying countermeasures (in FRA’s 

situation, safety inspections). See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed 

to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 

Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

Oversight Activities
Page 17 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

ensure that rails are positioned to meet standards. To further promote 

safety in railroad operations, FRA conducts accident investigations.

Separate from investigations conducted by NTSB, FRA investigates 

select railroad accidents to determine root causation, and any contributing 

factors, so that railroad properties can implement corrective actions to 

prevent similar incidents in the future.

Resources for railroad safety oversight activities have increased in recent 

years. FRA was appropriated about $218 million in fiscal year 2017, an 

increase over the approximately $187 million it received in fiscal year 

2015, for safety and operations, which funds FRA’s personnel, including 

inspectors, and safety programs. According to FRA, Congress provided 

FRA with increased funding in recent years for the purpose of increasing 

staffing related to specific safety issues, such as trespasser prevention 

and passenger rail safety.45 As part of this effort, FRA has hired additional 

inspectors, going from 347 inspectors in fiscal year 2013 to over 360 

currently, out of the nearly 930 total full-time equivalent staff. FRA officials 

told us, as we have reported in the past,46 that it can be difficult to recruit, 

train, and certify qualified inspectors in a timely manner, especially in 

certain areas of expertise. Further, according to FRA, its inspectors have 

the ability to inspect less than 1 percent of the general system annually.

Though FTA now has more robust inspection authorities, states will 

continue to conduct front-line rail transit safety oversight activities. MAP21 provided FTA with new authorities to inspect, audit, and investigate 

practices at rail transit agencies, including safety practices, while also 

preserving the role of state safety agencies to monitor rail transit systems’

safety operations. According to FTA officials, any federal inspections of 

rail transit operators are intended to supplement a state safety agency’s 

oversight activities, except where FTA assumes temporary, direct 

oversight of a rail transit system from an inadequate state safety agency.

FTA officials told us that establishing a nationwide safety inspection 

program at the federal level is inconsistent with the statutory framework of 

the state safety oversight program and with congressional intent, which 

contemplates preserving the primary role of state safety agencies in 

providing direct safety oversight of rail transit systems. The officials also 

noted that the state-based approach to rail transit safety oversight is 

valuable because states are generally closer to, and more familiar with, 

 45 FRA, Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 2018.

46 GAO-14-85.
Page 18 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

rail transit operators. To date, FTA has utilized its new inspection 

authorities only on WMATA’s rail system.47 As part of oversight activities, 

some state safety agencies have conducted inspections of the rail transit 

systems they oversee, though they were not required to do so, according 

to FTA officials we spoke with. To strengthen states’ abilities to conduct 

oversight activities, FTA has recommended that state safety agencies 

develop risk-based inspection programs. Further, to ensure the 

independence of state safety agencies, these agencies cannot receive 

funding from the rail transit entities they oversee.48

Resources for FTA’s rail transit safety oversight administrative expenses 

have remained relatively stable in recent years, though more are needed, 

according to FTA. Since fiscal year 2012, FTA’s appropriations for 

administrative expenses, which funds FTA personnel and support 

activities including the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight, has 

increased $14 million, to about $113 million in fiscal year 2017, according 

to FTA. However, for several years, FTA has averaged about 508 total 

full-time equivalent staff agency-wide, and a little over 30 safety staff in 

the Office of Transit Safety and Oversight. According to FTA, the Office of 

Transit Safety and Oversight has been under-resourced since it was 

established in response to new safety authority provided in MAP-21.49 For 

fiscal year 2018, FTA requested in their submission for the President’s 

Budget proposal funding to hire up to an additional 20 positions for 

various lines of safety work.

FRA’s and FTA’s oversight activities also include regular audits of, and 

communication with, the rail operators under their oversight.50 Given finite 

 47 FTA has conducted many inspections of the WMATA rail system’s track infrastructure 

and internal inspection program to inform their direct oversight of the rail system.

48 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(4)(A)(i). As noted above, FTA has also implemented a grant 

program, established in MAP-21, which provides funding for state safety oversight 

programs. Lack of resources, and independence from the entities they oversee, have 

historically been weaknesses of state safety oversight, according to stakeholders we 

spoke with. Two state safety agencies we spoke with said that they are using the new 

grant funds to hire inspectors, though similar to FRA, they noted that it can be difficult to 

recruit and retain qualified inspectors given the demand for these employees and the pay 

they are able to offer.

49 FTA, Budget Estimates, Fiscal Year 2018.

50 FTA officials emphasized to us that while FRA directly audits and communicates with 

the railroads it oversees, under FTA’s program, FTA will generally oversee the state safety 

agencies and the state safety agencies will directly oversee the rail transit operators.
Page 19 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

resources and large rail networks, FRA and FTA audit rail operators’ own 

inspections rather than conducting comprehensive federal inspections.

More specifically, FRA inspectors, and state safety agencies in FTA’s 

oversight program, regularly examine records of rail operators’ internal 

inspections to identify safety deficiencies.51 Officials from FRA, FTA, and 

five rail stakeholders we spoke with told us that FRA and FTA rail safety 

oversight programs also rely on collaboration and communication 

between rail operators and regulators to ensure safety. For example, 

regular meetings between FRA and railroad staff to discuss safety trends 

and industry developments are important to ensuring safety, according to 

officials we spoke with from FRA and the railroads. FRA specialists and 

inspectors participate, with representatives of railroad labor and 

management, in the implementation of voluntary safety programs. For 

example, FRA sponsors the Confidential Close Call Reporting System, a 

voluntary, confidential program allowing railroads and their employees to 

report accident and incident “close calls.” According to FRA officials, 

voluntary programs such as this increase industry awareness of railroad 

safety and engagement with it. FTA also collaborates with state safety 

agencies as rail transit safety issues arise, according to FTA officials, 

using federal oversight and enforcement authorities as a “back-stop”

against the oversight of state safety agencies. Additionally, according to 

officials we spoke with from FTA and two rail transit operators, state 

safety agency staff meet with rail transit operators regularly, using 

knowledge of local operating conditions to help ensure safety.

FRA uses a variety of tools, including civil penalties, to resolve safety 

issues. While some safety issues are resolved informally through 

discussion and collaboration between FRA and railroads, as noted above, 

some defects identified during inspections are classified as violations and 

subject to financial penalties. More specifically, when railroads do not 

resolve issues in a timely manner or identified defects are serious, FRA 

has the authority to cite violations and assess civil penalties, against 

either railroads or individuals. Further, as authorized by law, FRA 

negotiates settlements with railroads and other entities subject to its 

safety jurisdiction to resolve claims for civil penalties.52 In fiscal year 

2016, FRA assessed over $11.8 million in civil penalties against railroads.

 51 According to FRA, it also routinely conducts focused, comprehensive inspections on 

particular safety issues involving individual railroads.

52 49 U.S.C. §§ 20111(a)(1), 21301(a)(3), 21302(a)(3), 21303(a)(3).

Enforcement Mechanisms
Page 20 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

According to FRA, fiscal year 2016 was the second year in a row that it 

took steps to increase penalty amounts paid by railroads, as part of a 

continued effort to increase consequences for violations that negatively 

affect safety.53

To ensure the safety of rail transit systems, states will continue to be the 

primary enforcers of safety requirements, according to FTA officials, 

though FTA now has more enforcement tools. MAP-21 preserved the role 

of state safety agencies as the primary enforcement body for rail transit.

FTA has now required that state safety agencies have enforcement 

authorities sufficient to compel action from rail transit entities to address 

safety deficiencies. Though no specific authorities are required, FTA has 

suggested that a variety of mechanisms could be appropriate, such as the 

ability to remove deficient equipment from service or assess fines.

According to FTA, this requirement is designed to overcome a longstanding vulnerability in state safety oversight, which allowed safety 

deficiencies to remain for long periods of time. MAP-21 and the FAST Act 

also provided FTA with more options for enforcement when rail transit 

operators are found to be out of compliance with safety requirements. In 

particular, FTA can withhold federal funding for rail transit operators or 

direct a rail transit operator to use federal funding for a specific purpose.54

Additionally, after FTA assumes temporary direct oversight of an 

inadequate state safety agency, FTA can withhold federal funds from the 

state until the state safety oversight program has been certified.55 To 

date, FTA has utilized this authority only with the states responsible for

safety oversight of WMATA’s rail system. In February 2017, FTA 

announced that it would withhold 5 percent of fiscal year 2017 urbanized 

area formula funds from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia 

until a new state safety oversight program is certified for WMATA’s rail 

system.56 This action built upon FTA’s determination that WMATA’s state 

safety agency was ineffective at “providing adequate oversight consistent 

with prevention of substantial risk of death or personal injury.”57

 53 FRA, Fiscal Year 2016 Enforcement Report.

54 49 U.S.C. § 5329(g)(1)(D), (E).

55 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(8)(C)(ii).

56 Letter from FTA Governor Hogan, Governor McAuliffe, and Mayor Bowser (Feb. 10, 

2017).

57 Letter from FTA Governor Hogan, Governor McAuliffe, and Mayor Bowser (Feb. 10, 

2017).
Page 21 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

FRA and FTA also have the authority to directly intervene in rail 

operations. In particular, both FRA and FTA can suspend the service of 

rail operators in response to certain safety concerns.58 Additionally, FTA 

can assume direct safety oversight of a rail transit operator if FTA 

determines the state safety oversight program is not adequate, among 

other things.59 In response to safety incidents on WMATA’s rail system, 

FTA assumed temporary and direct safety oversight of WMATA in 

October 2015, as previously noted.60

FRA and FTA’s approaches to their rail safety oversight missions each 

have strengths and limitations, including how the agencies develop safety 

regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. Compared 

to FRA’s long-standing role in providing safety oversight over railroads, 

FTA is in the process of implementing significant changes to its program 

for rail transit safety oversight after being granted new authorities in MAP21 and the FAST Act. With respect to regulations, FRA’s extensive and 

well-established safety regulations are a strength. FTA has made some 

progress toward developing appropriate safety regulations, such as 

identifying subjects for potential regulatory action. With respect to 

inspections, FRA’s use of a risk-based approach to distributing inspection 

resources is a strength. FTA has sought to address previously identified 

deficiencies in state safety oversight by recommending that state safety 

agencies develop risk-based inspection programs. FTA, though, has not 

 58 FRA’s emergency order authority allows it, upon finding the existence of an unsafe 

condition or practice (or combination thereof) causing an emergency situation involving a 

hazard of death, personal injury, or significant harm to the environment, to order railroads 

to take immediate action to abate the emergency situation. Similarly, FTA’s authority 

permits it to issue restrictions and prohibitions upon finding the existence of an unsafe 

condition or practice (or combination thereof) such that there is a substantial risk of death 

or personal injury.

59 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(8). The FAST Act amended the public transportation safety 

program to allow the Secretary of Transportation to administer the state safety oversight 

program for a rail transit agency if the Secretary determines that the state safety oversight 

program is not being carried out in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 5329, has become 

inadequate to ensure enforcement of federal safety regulation, or is incapable of providing 

adequate safety oversight consistent with the prevention of substantial risk of death or 

personal injury. Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 3013, 129 Stat. 1312, 1476 (Dec. 4, 2015) (codified 

at 49 U.S.C. § 5329(e)(8)). 

60 In 2016, DOT OIG recommended that FTA finalize and issue policies and procedures 

for assuming and relinquishing, direct safety oversight authority. FTA officials told us that 

they planned to issue such policies and procedures by the end of 2017 but have not done 

so as of March 1, 2018.

FRA’s and FTA’s 

Approaches to Rail 

Safety Oversight 

Have Strengths and 

Limitations, and FTA 

Can Improve 

Implementation of Its 

New Authorities
Page 22 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

provided states guidance for these efforts. With respect to enforcement, 

FRA’s use of its enforcement authorities is a strength. FTA is also 

implementing new statutory requirements that state safety agencies have 

enforcement authorities but does not have a process or methodology to 

evaluate the effectiveness of these enforcement practices.

Extensive and well-established safety regulations are a strength of FRA’s 

safety oversight program based on studies we reviewed and discussions 

with rail operators and stakeholder organizations. According to NTSB, 

FRA’s railroad safety regulations are an important and effective part of its 

oversight program. Our previous work reported that according to 

stakeholders, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee provides a 

collaborative environment where stakeholders in the rail community work 

with FRA to identify issues and proposals for safety standards and 

regulations that improved the quality of railroads’ safety initiatives and 

fostered a greater level of compliance with safety regulations.61 This is 

consistent with views of stakeholders we spoke with, who characterized 

FRA’s safety regulations as a strength. An industry association told us 

that FRA’s regulations promote safety by helping to ensure that no 

operator falls below a minimum threshold for safe operations, while a rail 

operator told us that federal regulations help to standardize the operating 

environment and prevent a patchwork of various state regulations. Four 

stakeholders also characterized the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, 

which plays a large role in crafting FRA’s railroad safety regulations, as 

effective and inclusive.

However, based on studies we reviewed and discussions with rail 

operators’ and stakeholders’ organizations, FRA faces limitations in its 

efforts to regulate safety across railroad systems that differ from one 

another and sometimes change more quickly than the federal regulatory 

process. Five railroad operators and an industry association told us that 

some of FRA’s safety regulations do not account for differences in 

railroads or innovation in safety practices, with three railroad operators 

stating that this approach requires the extensive use of waivers for 

particular regulations. Further, two railroad operators and a rail transit 

operator we spoke with stated that additional federal regulations are 

needed to provide minimum baseline requirements in specific areas of 

railroad safety such as medical fitness for duty. In 2014, NTSB also found 

 61 GAO-14-85. 

Regulations: FRA and FTA 

Are Working to Improve 

Rail Safety Oversight by 

Considering Performancebased Regulations
Page 23 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

that FRA needs to do more to regulate particular safety issues including 

medical fitness for duty and signal protection.62

FRA officials acknowledged that time and resources are two of the 

primary challenges that the agency faces when developing safety 

regulations but also noted additional ways in which the agency can 

require railroads to adopt safety practices. FRA officials described the 

process of creating or significantly amending a regulation as involving 

years of work, even before the agency commences with the process of 

drafting a rule. The officials also noted that the agency has additional 

tools to compel railroads to adopt safety practices. For example, FRA 

officials discussed the use of compliance agreements, in which railroads 

can have fines reduced in exchange for adopting safety measures that go 

beyond what FRA regulations require.

FRA officials are considering the use of performance-based regulations 

as they update their safety regulations.63 As noted above, FRA’s 

proposed regulations regarding passenger equipment safety incorporates 

performance -based safety requirements, rather than explicit safety 

targets or tolerances. FRA has promulgated performance-based 

regulations about the implementation of positive train control, a 

communications-based system designed to prevent certain types of train 

accidents, as well as system safety programs that set general safety 

parameters and thresholds by which successful performance is 

governed.64

FRA’s consideration of performance-based regulations is in line with 

federal guidance. OMB’s Circular A-4 states that performance standards 

“are generally superior to engineering or design standards because 

performance standards give the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve 

regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way.”65 Additionally, under 

Executive Order 12866, agencies should (to the extent permitted by law 

and where applicable) identify and assess alternative forms of regulation 

 62 NTSB, Special Investigation Report, SIR-14/04. 

63 Performance-based regulations specify a desired outcome rather than behavior or 

manner of compliance.

64 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 236, subpart I; 49 C.F.R. pt. 270. The system safety program 

regulations have been suspended through December 4, 2018. 

65 Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 2003).
Page 24 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

and specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior 

or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt.66

However, as the language of OMB’s Circular A-4 and Executive Order 

12866 suggest that performance-based regulations are not always 

feasible, studies of performance-based regulations find that as with any 

other form of regulation, performance-based standards have trade-offs.67

FRA officials told us that under certain circumstances, performancebased regulations are appropriate for issues regarding design, 

maintenance, operation, and technology-driven safety requirements. FRA 

officials we spoke with did not think performance-based standards are 

appropriate for areas that require standardization. One example is track 

safety standards, where the need for different operators to use the same 

equipment precludes a performance-based approach that allows railroads 

to meet requirements through different means. FRA officials added that a 

key aspect of the success of performance-based regulations concerns 

how railroads demonstrate compliance. This concern is consistent with 

other studies of performance-based regulations, which find that these 

regulations are most appropriate when regulators have capacity to 

measure and monitor performance.68

Though FTA has made progress assessing the state of rail transit safety 

standards, a limitation of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight program is the 

lack of federal rail transit safety regulations, which may contribute to 

inconsistent safety practices across the rail transit industry, according to 

studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder 

organizations. NTSB reported that the structure of FTA’s oversight 

process leads to inconsistent practices, inadequate standards, and 

marginal effectiveness.69 In addition, a 2016 DOT OIG report found that 

 66 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). A subsequent executive 

order reaffirmed this principle.

67 See, for example, Coglianese, Cary, Jennifer Nash, and Todd Olmstead, “PerformanceBased Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental 

Protection,” Regulatory Policy Program, Report No. RPP-03 (2002); May, Peter, 

“Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky Buildings,”

Law and Policy, vol. 25, No. 4 (2003); and Coglianese, Cary, “The Limits of PerformanceBased Regulation,” 50 U. Mich, J. L. Reform 525 (2017). 

68 See Coglianese (2017), 547. 

69 NTSB, Collision of Two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail Trains 

Near Fort Totten Station, Accident Report, NTSB/RAR-10/02 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 

2010).
Page 25 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

because FTA’s safety standards are voluntary, they are unenforceable. In 

2012, FTA gained the authority to issue safety regulations, though it has 

not done so yet, and NTSB and other stakeholders we spoke with 

indicated that the lack of such federal safety regulations is a weakness in 

federal rail transit safety oversight. Despite differences across rail transit 

systems, there is value in establishing federal rail transit safety 

regulations, according to stakeholders from all categories of those we 

interviewed, including a state safety agency, three rail transit operators, a 

railroad operator, and two industry associations. Some stakeholders 

identified specific areas that would benefit from federal rail transit 

regulations. For example, two rail transit agencies called for federal 

regulations to address operator fatigue. Some of these officials stated that 

federal rail transit safety regulations could help ensure safety by 

establishing clear and consistent minimum standards. Officials from a rail 

transit entity and an industry association stated that voluntary standards 

are not enough to ensure that transit entities will adopt appropriate safety 

measures.

According to our analysis, a past study, and stakeholders we spoke with, 

FTA’s ability to develop and implement performance-based regulations is 

limited by its lack of capacity to collect and analyze rail safety 

performance data. In 2017, DOT OIG found that data limitations of FTA’s 

National Transit Database results in limited safety performance criteria in 

FTA’s National Public Transportation Safety Plan. Further, two rail transit 

entities as well as a state safety agency we spoke with stated that they 

face challenges in analyzing data due to either the size of their systems 

or their capacity.70 FTA officials told us that they need more data to inform 

their decisions regarding whether to establish rail transit safety 

regulations, and also added that a limitation to their ongoing assessment 

of potential areas for rail transit safety regulation is the concern about 

public disclosure of safety data provided to FTA and its potential use in 

 70 According to FTA, state safety agencies generally receive data from the rail transit 

operators they oversee. This, in some cases, is the same data rail transit operators 

provide to FTA’s National Transit Database.
Page 26 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

private litigation.71 According to FTA officials, they need more information 

to do a comprehensive evaluation of efficacy of current safety standards 

and practices. As required by the FAST Act, FTA has entered into an 

agreement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 

Medicine, to conduct a study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest 

to withhold from federal or state court proceedings any information 

collected by DOT through its public transportation safety program 

oversight activities. The National Academies of Sciences is expected to 

complete this study in 2018.

FTA is taking positive steps toward developing safety regulations that 

may address inconsistent safety practices across rail transit operators.

FTA officials stated that the agency is considering issuing rail transit 

safety regulations and also employs additional tools to compel rail transit 

entities to adopt safety measures. As noted above, FTA is currently 

studying whether federal regulations are appropriate for specific areas of 

rail transit safety. Executive Order 12866 and OMB’s Circular A-4 direct 

federal agencies to consider performance-based regulations when 

developing regulations. Further, as the Transportation Research Board 

recently reported, any decision to use performance-based regulations 

“must take into account the regulator’s own ability to enforce and motivate 

compliance (through methods such as auditing and field inspections) as 

well as the capacity of regulated entities to meet their obligations.”72 FTA 

officials noted that they are actively engaged with members of the 

Transportation Research Board in reviewing and discussing these recent 

findings related to safety regulations for high-hazards industries.73 In 

January 2017, FTA issued its National Public Transportation Safety Plan, 

which FTA officials noted is one component of their transit safety 

standard development program. According to FTA officials, the plan 

 71 According to the DOT OIG, FTA has twice sought data protection legislation that was 

not enacted. According to FTA officials, certain types of transit safety information that is 

obtained by FTA might be protected from public disclosure under a Freedom of 

Information Act exemption. For example, FTA may withhold from public disclosure 

Sensitive Security Information that was developed in the conduct of security activities, the 

disclosure of which the Secretary has determined would (1) be an unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy; (2) reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or 

financial information; or (3) be detrimental to transportation safety. See 49 U.S.C. § 

40119; 49 C.F.R. pt. 15.

72 Transportation Research Board, Special Report 324: Designing Safety Regulations for 

High-Hazard Industries (Washington, D.C.: 2018).

73 High-hazard industries include those in which safety failures can be catastrophic and 

lead to deaths and injuries, environmental damage, and property loss. 
Page 27 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

identifies a list of issue areas that the agency is currently studying to 

determine whether national regulations are needed. FTA officials also 

stated that the plan includes “voluntary standards,” which are intended to 

put the industry “on notice” that federal safety regulations may be 

proposed in those areas. FTA officials stated that they view the National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan as iterative and more easily updated 

compared with official regulations. Additional tools that FTA officials 

stated the agency employs in its approach to safety oversight include 

general directives as well as the requirements associated with FTA 

grants.

Based on our assessment and studies we reviewed, a strength of FRA’s 

safety oversight program is its risk-based approach to distributing 

inspection resources, which may serve as an example for FTA and state 

safety agencies. According to NTSB, FRA’s qualified inspectors are a 

strength of its oversight program. To help target these inspectors to the 

areas of highest risk, FRA developed the National Inspection Plan, which 

includes a quantitative model for allocating inspection resources in a way 

that tries to minimize railroad accidents. This model utilizes data 

including: (1) accident and incident data that railroads are required to 

report, (2) data from FRA inspection activity, and (3) information on 

railroad activities such as train miles and other data. Based on our 

assessment of FRA’s model, we believe that it can be an appropriate and 

useful tool for directing its inspection resources based on risk because it 

relies on statistical methods commonly used to predict the risk of a 

violation for regulated entities. While we did not review FRA’s entire 

modeling process, nor did we validate the results it generates, we do 

believe that FRA’s approach to using these statistical models as a key 

part of its inspection program is appropriate.

However, a potential limitation of FRA’s inspection program is the 

flexibility granted to individual inspectors and whether the manner and 

extent to which inspectors implement this discretion may be inconsistent 

with the risk-based National Inspection Plan. FRA’s National Inspection 

Plan provides guidance for inspectors about how much time they should 

spend inspecting individual railroads. According to FRA officials, FRA 

inspectors have considerable flexibility to deviate from the National 

Inspection Plan based on their judgment regarding where to more 

effectively use their resources. FRA officials stated that situations arise 

that call for deviations in planned inspections. For example, a particular 

railroad may experience a serious accident and therefore require more 

oversight from FRA. According to FRA officials, regional offices make 

Inspections: FRA Utilizes a 

Risk-Based Model, While 

FTA Oversees the 

Development of State 

Safety Agencies’ New 

Programs
Page 28 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

these decisions based on their understanding of emerging issues.

Inspectors are expected to know their region and decide which locations 

to go to, and are in part evaluated based on these decisions. When a 

region’s record of total inspection time spent on a particular railroad 

differs from the National Inspection Plan by more than 5 percent, the 

region’s leadership submits an explanation to FRA’s Office of Railroad 

Safety. This practice, if not monitored, could allow inspectors to deviate 

from the data-driven model results in ways that undermine the goal of the 

National Inspection Plan to deploy FRA’s limited resources efficiently and 

based on risk. However, FRA officials told us that flexibility for individual 

inspectors is important, and that FRA is continuously monitoring the 

model’s performance and making changes as appropriate. Further, 

OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy note that it is 

important to ensure “that sufficient flexibility is left to enforcement and 

inspection officials to adapt their response in proportion to the facts on the 

ground.”74

A strength of FTA’s approach to rail transit safety oversight is that it is 

working to overcome weaknesses in state oversight of rail transit 

identified in our prior work and stakeholders we spoke with. For example, 

FTA has noted that in the past some state safety agencies lacked 

sufficient oversight authorities. To now be certified by FTA, state safety 

agencies must demonstrate that they have authority to review, approve 

and oversee the implementation of rail transit operator’s safety plans.

Additionally, we have found, and FTA has also noted, that some state 

safety agencies would benefit from more training and additional staff.75 To 

now be certified by FTA, state safety agencies must be capable of directly 

hiring and developing staff and contract support, as well as have a 

training plan for certain staff.

 74 OECD, 2014.

75 GAO-06-821. We made two recommendations to FTA in this report. First, we 

recommended that FTA develop performance goals for the state safety oversight program. 

Second, we recommended that FTA develop and encourage completion of a training 

curriculum for state safety agency staff. FTA took action in response to both of these 

recommendations, establishing performance goals and a training curriculum. Additionally, 

MAP-21 addressed some of these concerns. Through the ongoing certification process, 

states determine in consultation with FTA the appropriate staffing level for their state 

safety agency. Further, to be certified by FTA, states must demonstrate that the 

employees and other personnel of the state safety agency who are responsible for the 

oversight of rail transit safety are qualified to perform their functions, based on appropriate 

training, including completion of the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 

Program. 
Page 29 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Though FTA is seeking to implement stronger safety oversight activities, 

a limitation of its program is that state safety agencies have not received 

the guidance and support necessary to develop effective inspection 

programs. FTA does not currently plan to conduct widespread inspections 

itself and recommends that state safety agencies develop risk-based 

inspection programs. According to FTA, states have discretion to 

establish their inspection programs in accordance with their program 

standards, and are not required to actually conduct inspections as the 

method of verifying rail transit operators’ compliance with safety rules.76

However, direct observation, audits, and performance indicator tracking

are useful methods for an oversight agency in assessing a regulated 

entity’s safety culture.77 Officials we spoke with from selected state safety 

agencies say that they have received little guidance from FTA on what 

their risk-based inspection programs should look like. In the materials 

FTA provided to states, it said that it intends to provide guidance to states 

on risk-based inspections but did not provide us with a plan or timeline for 

doing so.

Without guidance from FTA, state safety agencies may not develop 

effective risk-based inspection programs and thus not use their resources 

efficiently. Effective risk-based inspection programs are particularly 

important given state safety agencies’ limited resources. We have 

reported in the past that some state safety agencies lack sufficient 

resources, including training and staff.78 Officials from two rail transit 

operators and all four industry associations we spoke with stated that 

state safety agencies continue to have limited resources and capacity.

Several state safety agencies we spoke with rely on contractors or 

employees with other responsibilities besides oversight of rail transit to 

meet their increased oversight responsibilities and achieve certification 

from FTA.

Federal standards for internal control as well as leading practices for 

regulatory inspections state that agency objectives, including those 

related to inspections and enforcement, should be clearly communicated.

 76 A state safety oversight program standard must identify the processes and procedures 

that govern the activities of the state safety agency. Also, the program standard must 

identify the processes and procedures rail transit operators must have in place to comply 

with the standard.

77 TCRP, 2015.

78 GAO-06-821.
Page 30 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Specifically, federal standards for internal control require that 

management communicate the necessary quality information to achieve 

the agency’s objectives.79 Additionally, the OECD’s Best Practice 

Principles for Regulatory Policy recommends that governments ensure 

clarity of rules and processes for enforcement and inspections and clearly 

articulate rights and obligations of officials.80 According to OECD, the 

frequency of inspections and the resources employed should be 

proportional to the level of risk.

A strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is that the agency has and 

utilizes clear enforcement authority, according to NTSB and stakeholders 

we spoke with. As previously discussed, FRA has several enforcement 

tools available when inspectors find that railroads are noncompliant with 

applicable regulations, including civil penalties, individual liability, 

compliance orders, and emergency orders. According to NTSB, this array 

of specific enforcement tools helps ensure safety deficiencies are 

addressed by railroads. FRA officials also told us that the process of 

adjudicating civil penalties provides a forum for FRA and railroad officials 

to meet to discuss safety issues. Four rail operators also told us that 

FRA’s authority to issue civil penalties is necessary to ensure railroads’

compliance with regulations.

However, a potential limitation of FRA’s approach to enforcement is that it 

is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of FRA’s civil penalties. FRA has 

reported that it cannot determine whether observable safety 

improvements are directly attributable to discrete civil penalties or 

whether the amount of civil penalties has any effect on safety.81 We have 

reported in the past about the challenges of determining the effect of 

penalties on compliance in tax policy, though we also noted that, despite 

these challenges, some analyses likely would be useful for better 

understanding the effect of penalties on compliance.82 FRA also reported, 

though, that according to the judgments of its inspectors, issuing civil 

penalties yields observable improvements in safety practices and 

 79 GAO-14-704G.

80 OECD, 2014.

81 FRA, Fiscal Year 2016 Enforcement Report. 

82 GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Should Evaluate Penalties and Develop a Plan to Focus 

Its Efforts, GAO-09-567 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2009).

Enforcement: FRA Utilizes 

Various Mechanisms; FTA 

Has No Process or 

Methodology to Assess 

the Effectiveness of State 

Safety Agency 

Enforcement
Page 31 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

compliance with the law. Further, according to FRA, though it does not 

quantify the impact of civil penalties, FRA monitors railroad responses to 

its enforcement activity and adjusts its oversight as necessary. More 

broadly, civil penalties are not meant, by themselves, to ensure railroad 

safety. Instead, FRA reported that it uses its entire regulatory regime as a 

whole to try and ensure safety. FRA officials also noted that the agency 

has additional tools, apart from civil penalties, to compel railroads to 

adopt safety practices.

A strength of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight is that it seeks to improve 

historically weak state safety agency enforcement authorities, as 

described in our previous report as well stakeholders we spoke with. FTA 

requires state safety agencies to adopt enforcement authorities that are 

sufficient to enable states to compel action from rail transit agencies to 

address identified deficiencies. FTA has also communicated to states that 

it is focusing its evaluation of each state’s enforcement authorities in two 

major areas: ensuring that the state can carry out its primary 

responsibility for rail transit safety in response to (1) an imminent threat to 

public safety on the rail transit system and (2) a lack of action or noncompliance from the rail transit operator in carrying out certain safety 

plans. FTA has provided states with examples of the enforcement 

authorities and policies state safety agencies could establish to address 

these specific concerns. Authorities to address imminent safety threats 

may include the authority to suspend rail transit agencies’ operations, 

inspect and remove deficient equipment or system infrastructure from 

service, or issue an order requiring the rail transit agency to correct an 

unsafe condition prior to placing equipment or infrastructure back into 

passenger service. FTA has also provided state safety agencies with 

examples of authorities to address a lack of action or cooperation by the 

rail transit operator, including the authority to withhold or redirect funds, 

levy civil or criminal fines or penalties, and a formal citation or ticketing 

program.

Though federal law requires that state safety agencies have enforcement 

authorities over the safety of the rail transit entities they oversee, a 

limitation of FTA’s approach is that FTA has not developed a method to 

evaluate the effectiveness of states’ enforcement practices. Certified state 

safety agencies will be evaluated for continued compliance with FTA 

regulations every 3 years. This triennial review process (for rail transit 

safety) seeks to ensure that states are effectively carrying out their 

responsibilities. While FTA officials told us that they will evaluate state 

safety agencies’ enforcement during the triennial reviews, FTA has not 

developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state 
Page 32 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

enforcement authorities and practices as a whole are effective. Without a 

method for determining the effectiveness of state safety agencies’

enforcement, FTA may not have the information needed to identify 

ineffective safety enforcement. As a result, deficiencies may remain for 

long periods of time, potentially contributing to safety incidents.

Federal standards for internal control maintain that agency managers 

should perform a range of practices that would facilitate the establishment 

of a system to monitor the effectiveness of agency activities, which in the 

context of FTA’s mission includes the effectiveness of its rail transit safety 

oversight. Agency managers should define objectives clearly to enable 

the identification of risks, establish activities to monitor performance 

measures and indicators, and externally communicate the necessary 

quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Internal control 

standards further stipulate that agency managers should perform 

monitoring activities regarding their internal control system and evaluate 

the results. To do so, federal standards for internal control state that 

agency managers should monitor ongoing operations and effectiveness, 

evaluate the results of this monitoring, and identify any changes that need 

to be made to achieve improvement in agency operations.

The effectiveness of state safety agency enforcement is especially 

important because questions have been raised about the efficacy of 

FTA’s own enforcement mechanisms, including its ability to withhold 

funds from and assume direct control over safety oversight for a rail 

transit entity. Rail transit operators and industry association 

representatives we spoke with stated that FTA’s authority to withhold 

funding from states is overly punitive, and two stakeholders said the FTA 

needs more precise tools. Officials from an industry association added 

that withholding funds can be counterproductive, as most state safety 

agencies are already underfunded and understaffed. FTA officials pointed 

to examples in which the agency successfully supported state safety 

agencies in compelling action from rail transit agencies as evidence that 

the state safety oversight model, in which FTA backs up state safety 

agencies, is effective. Additionally, officials from numerous state safety 

agencies and others questioned whether FTA has the capacity to 

effectively assume direct safety oversight of rail transit operators. FTA 

has not assumed direct safety oversight of any rail transit operators 

outside of WMATA, and FTA officials noted that they intend to continue 

supporting state safety agencies in their oversight wherever possible.
Page 33 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

The approaches to rail safety oversight utilized by FRA and FTA each 

have strengths and limitations. However, FTA’s program is currently in 

transition as the agency implements new authorities and responsibilities 

provided in federal law. Though FTA has made progress by evaluating 

existing rail transit safety standards and providing some guidance to 

states as part of the certification process, limitations in FTA’s approach 

may still hinder the success of the state-based rail transit safety oversight 

program. Given the looming 2019 deadline for state safety oversight 

programs to achieve FTA certification, FTA can improve its efforts to 

implement its new rail transit safety oversight program. In particular, 

without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based 

inspection programs, state safety agencies may not use limited resources 

efficiently, risking that important safety issues will go undetected. Further, 

without a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of states safety 

agencies’ enforcement, FTA will lack the information needed to identify 

ineffective state enforcement, which risks allowing safety deficiencies to 

remain for long periods of time. By providing this additional guidance and 

direction to the state safety agencies, FTA would help ensure that states 

are able to effectively identify and resolve rail transit safety issues.

We are making the following two recommendations to FTA:

• The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should create a plan, with 

a timeline, for developing guidance for state safety agencies about 

how to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program. 

(Recommendation 1)

• The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should develop and 

communicate a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of the 

enforcement authorities and practices of state safety agencies. 

(Recommendation 2)

We provided a draft copy of this report to DOT, NTSB, and WMATA for 

review and comment. 

In written comments, reproduced in appendix I, DOT agreed with both our 

recommendations. DOT also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

In e-mails, NTSB and WMATA provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. NTSB noted that we do not discuss the role 

of system safety initiatives, such as safety management systems, in the 

Conclusions

Recommendations

Agency Comments
Page 34 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

FRA and FTA rail safety oversight programs. We agree with NTSB that 

system safety concepts are increasingly influencing the FRA and FTA 

approaches to rail safety oversight but, as NTSB also noted, both FRA 

and FTA lack finalized regulations codifying their approaches to system 

safety initiatives. Because the extent of rail entities’ implementation of 

these initiatives varies and is not complete we did not include an 

assessment of the strengths and limitations of those initiatives in our 

scope.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Transportation, Chairman of NTSB, General Manager of WMATA, and 

the appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Individuals who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix II.

Mark Goldstein

Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Transportation

Page 35 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Transportation
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 36 GAO-18-310 Federal Rail Safety Oversight

Mark Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Steve Cohen (Assistant Director); 

Kyle Browning (Analyst in Charge); Melissa Bodeau; Lacey Coppage; 

Serena Lo; Sean Miskell; and Josh Ormond made key contributions to 

this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(101961)
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