alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 21, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50189

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE MARIA REIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-1576-ALL-DB

--------------------

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Jose Maria Reis appeals the sentence imposed following his

guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States after

deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Reis

contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define

separate offenses. He argues that the prior conviction that

resulted in his increased sentence is an element of a separate

offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have been alleged in

his indictment. Reis maintains that he pleaded guilty to an
No. 03-50189

-2-

indictment which charged only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year

maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for that

offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Reis acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 21     


                         LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES


     The Partnership was a general partner in JMB/San Jose Associates, an
Illinois general partnership which held title to Park Center Financial
Plaza prior to its sale in February 1998.  The Partnership was a general
partner in Topanga Plaza Partnership, a California general partnership
which held title to Topanga Plaza prior to the Partnership's sale of its
interest in Topanga Plaza in November 1998.  The Partnership was a general
partner in JMB-40 Broad Street Associates, an Illinois general partnership
which held title to the 40 Broad Street Building prior to its sale in
December 1997.  The Partnership's interest in the foregoing joint venture
partnerships, and the results of their operations are included in the
consolidated financial statements of the Partnership filed with this annual
report.
§ 1806.3 Procedures governing acceptance of service of process. ( a ) *Service of Process Upon the NACIC or a NACIC Employee in an Official Capacity* — ( 1 ) *Personal Service.* Unless otherwise expressly authorized by NACIC Counsel, or designee, personal service of process may be accepted only by NACIC Counsel, Director, NACIC, or Deputy Director, NACIC, located at Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters, Langley, Virginia.
( 2 ) *Mail Service.* Where service of process by registered or certified mail is authorized by law, unless expressly directed otherwise by the NACIC Counsel or designee, personal service of process may be accepted only by NACIC Counsel, Director, NACIC, or Deputy Director, NACIC. Process by mail should be addressed as follows: NACIC Counsel, National Counterintelligence Center, Washington, DC 20505.
( b ) *Service of Process Upon a NACIC Employee Solely in An Individual Capacity* — ( 1 ) *General.* NACIC will not provide the name or address of any current or former NACIC employee to individuals or entities seeking to serve process upon such employee solely in his or her individual capacity, even when the matter is related to NACIC activities.
( 2 ) *Personal Service.* Subject to the sole discretion of appropriate officials of the CIA, where NACIC is physically located, process servers generally will not be allowed to enter CIA Headquarters for the purpose of serving process upon any NACIC employee solely in his or her individual capacity. Subject to the sole discretion of the Director, NACIC, process servers will generally not be permitted to enter NACIC office space for the purpose of serving process upon a NACIC employee solely in his or her individual capacity. The NACIC Counsel, the Director, NACIC, and the Deputy Director, NACIC are not permitted to accept service of process on behalf of a NACIC employee in his or her individual capacity.
( 3 ) *Mail Service.* Unless otherwise expressly authorized by the NACIC Counsel, or designee, NACIC personnel are not authorized to accept or forward mailed service of process directed to any NACIC employee in his or her individual capacity. Any such process will be returned to the sender via appropriate postal channels.
( c ) *Service of Process Upon a NACIC Employee in a Combined Official and Individual Capacity* —Unless expressly directed otherwise by the NACIC Counsel, or designee, any process to be served upon a NACIC employee in his or her combined official and individual capacity, in person or by mail, can be accepted only by NACIC Counsel, Director, NACIC, or Deputy Director, NACIC, National Counterintelligence Center, Langley, Virginia.
( d ) *Service of Process Upon a NACIC Counsel.* The documents for which service is accepted in official capacity only shall be stamped “Service Accepted in Official Capacity Only.” Acceptance of Service of Process shall not constitute an admission or waiver with respect to jurisdiction, propriety of service, improper venue, or any other defense in law or equity available under the laws or rules applicable to the service of process.
Internet Address (URL) http://epa.gov

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

 OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION

MEMORANDUM

TO: Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472

FROM: Jason Samenow

Climate Change Division, Office of Atmospheric Programs

SUBJECT: Impact of Light Duty Vehicle Emissions Reductions on Global Climate

Enclosed is the technical report prepared by the Joint Global Change Research Institute, 

which is part of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This document describes the 

methodology used to analyze the impacts of EPA’s Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 

Emission Standards on sea level rise and global mean temperature. Also enclosed is an excel 

spreadsheet containing the more detailed model results supporting the technical report.

Enclosures
### §103304. Recovery of land withheld

(a) Civil Action.—The United States may bring a civil action in the courts of the United States against a person to whom land lying within a national military park has been leased that refuses to give up possession of the land to the United States after the termination of the lease, and after possession has been demanded for the United States by the park superintendent, or against a person retaining possession of land lying within the boundary of a national military park that the person has sold to the United States for park purposes and received payment therefor, after possession of the land has been demanded for the United States by the park superintendent, to recover possession of the land withheld. The civil action shall be brought according to the statutes of the State in which the national military park is situated.

(b) Trespass.—A person described in subsection (a) shall be guilty of trespass.

(Pub. L. 113–287, §3, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3166.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 103304 | 16 U.S.C. 416. | Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 372, §§4, 5, 29 Stat. 622. |

Section

In subsection (a) the words "any park commissioner" are omitted as obsolete. See section 103303 of the new title. The words "or code of practice" are omitted as obsolete because of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C. App.).
# C_2012118EN.01002101.xml

| 21.4.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 118/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.4.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 118/21

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2012 — British Aggregates v Commission

(Case T-210/02 RENV) (1)

1

(State aid - Environmental tax on aggregates in the United Kingdom - Commission decision not to raise objections - Advantage - Selective nature)

2012/C 118/33

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: British Aggregates Association (Lanark, United Kingdom) (represented by: C. Pouncey, J. Coombes, Solicitors, and L. Van den Hende, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Afonso, J. Flett and B. Martenczuk, Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (represented initially by: T. Harris, and subsequently by S. Ossowski, acting as Agents, and by M. Hall and G. Facenna, Barristers)

Intervener in support of the defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for partial annulment of Commission Decision C(2002) 1478 final of 24 April 2002 on State aid file N 863/01 — United Kingdom/Aggregates Levy.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Commission Decision C(2002) 1478 final of 24 April 2002 on State aid file N 863/01 — United Kingdom/Aggregates Levy, save as regards the exemption for Northern Ireland; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Commission Decision C(2002) 1478 final of 24 April 2002 on State aid file N 863/01 — United Kingdom/Aggregates Levy, save as regards the exemption for Northern Ireland;

| 2. | Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the British Aggregates Association before the Court of Justice and the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the British Aggregates Association before the Court of Justice and the General Court;

| 3. | Orders the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear its own costs incurred before the Court of Justice and the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear its own costs incurred before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

---

(1)  OJ C 219, 14.9.2002.

1

---
Exhibit 32.02

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
annual report of Sbarro, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 27, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Carolyn M. Spatafora, Principal
Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 26, 2010



|                                                                                         
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Carolyn M. Spatafora                                                                 
|Carolyn M. Spatafora Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting
Officer)

NOTE: A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In the Matter of Esther Franck, Respondent, v. Board of Education of the City of New York et al., Appellants.

An a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act by a school secretary in the New York City public school system to annul the resolution of the Board of Education of the City of New York requesting the medical board of the Teachers’ Retirement System of *742the city to conduct a medical examination of the petitioner, and for other relief, the Board of Education and the Teachers’ Retirement Board appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings .County, dated April 26, 1962, which granted the petition and, *inter*alia: (a) annulled the said resolution of the Board of Education; (b) directed it to withdraw its said request for the petitioner’s medical examination; and (c) directed that, in the event of further proceedings against the petitioner, the Board of Education either furnish her “ with copies of all findings and all official reports and all medical reports pertaining to her ”, or permit “the petitioner and her duly appointed representative to examine her personnel file.” [.See Special Term opinion, 33 Mise 2d 754, 756.] Order reversed on the law and the facts, without costs, and proceeding dismissed. Findings of fact which may Ibe inconsistent herewith (see 33 Mise 2d 754) are reversed, and new findings are made as indicated herein. In our opinion, under all the circumstances, the actions of the Board of Education were neither arbitrary nor capricious. We find that there was a substantial basis for the exercise of its administrative discretion; hence, the courts may not interfere. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld and Hill, JJ., dissent and vote to modify the order by striking out the fourth ordering paragraph with respect to the reports to be made available to petitioner by the Board of Education; and, as so modified, to affirm, with the following memorandum: In our opinion, in this case the actions .of the Board of Education were arbitrary and capricious. However, petitioner does not have the right to examine, or be furnished with copies of, *all*reports and findings relating to her *(Matter of Kropf*v. *Board of Educ.,*18 A D 2d 919). She is entitled to be furnished with copies of all official reports which pertain to her and which emanate from her principal (By-laws of the Board of Education, § 89, subd. 7 [b]). She has received such copies in the past, and there is no showing of any likelihood that she will be denied them in the future. It was error, therefore, to include in the order any provision with respect to such reports.
### §425. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 425, comprising section 604 of the National Security Act of 1947, act July 26, 1947, ch. 343, was editorially reclassified as section 3125 of this title.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                             111
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,864
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                         42
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 2,126
<PP&E>                                           5,363
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,324
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,221
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,342
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            23
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,789
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,221
<SALES>                                         10,472
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,472
<CGS>                                            9,159
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       18
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,002
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 105
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    187
<INCOME-TAX>                                        38
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                149
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       149
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-50793

_______________

ALEX ALVARADO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

EL PASO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(4:95-CR-66)

_________________________

March 28, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant school

district, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to challenge his

termination. Having examined the briefs, pertinent portions of the

record, and the applicable law, we affirm, essentially on the basis

of the Order Regarding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

entered by the district court on September 12, 1996.

AFFIRMED.
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 22 January 2008 – Efkon v Parliament and Council**

**(Case T-298/04)**

Annulment – Directive 2004/52/EC – Interoperability of electronic road toll systems – No individual concern – Inadmissibility

1.                     *Actions for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them (Art. 230, fourth para.,
EC; European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/52) (see paras 53-56, 61, 64-65, 68-70)*

2.                     *European Communities – Judicial review of the legality of the acts of the institutions – Measures of general scope (Arts 10
EC, 230, fourth para., EC, 234 EC and 241 EC) (see para. 72)*

3.                     *Actions for annulment – Jurisdiction of the Community judicature (Art. 230 EC) (see para. 73)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION for annulment in its entirety or, in the alternative, in part, of Directive 2004/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the interoperability of electronic road toll systems in the Community (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 124, corrigendum OJ 2004 L 200, p. 50). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action as inadmissible; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Efkon AG to bear its own costs and pay those of the Council; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | | Orders the Parliament and the Commission to bear their own costs. |
#### § 881.9 Reports.

At such times and in such detail as the Secretary shall require, the State shall furnish to the Secretary a statement with respect to each project showing the work done, the status of the project, expenditures, and amounts obligated, and such other information as may be required.
#### § 903.824 Special performance standards—Mountaintop removal.

Part 824 of this chapter, *Special Permanent Program Performance Standards—Mountaintop Removal,* applies to any person who conducts surface coal mining and reclamation operations constituting mountaintop removal mining.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0143 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BENJAMIN EUGENE COLE JR.,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including April 9, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

February 2 2024

02/02/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0143
#### Gilbert Martinez, Respondent, v Fifty Two West Seventy Seventh Street Corp., Defendant, and St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital et al., Appellants.

[833 NYS2d 209]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital and West Care Medical Associates appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Douglass, J.), dated January 12, 2006, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendants St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital and West Care Medical Associates for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured on February 11, 2001 when he fell off a ladder while painting a room at the facility of the defendant West Care Medical Associates (hereinafter West Care), a department of the defendant St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital (hereinafter St. Luke’s). SLR Management Services, Inc. (hereinafter SLR), provided payroll services to West Care’s support staff. SLR was the plaintiff’s general employer, issued his paychecks from funds supplied by St. Luke’s, and provided him with workers’ compensation insurance, through a policy issued in SLR’s name and paid for by St. Luke’s.

The plaintiff was hired and supervised by Anthony Nasser, an *504employee of St. Luke’s. Nasser also had the authority to discipline and fire the plaintiff. The painting equipment used by the plaintiff was also supplied by St. Luke’s.

Based on the foregoing facts, West Care and St. Luke’s moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff was their special employee, and that his action was therefore barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law *(see Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp.,*78 NY2d 553, 557 [1991]). The Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

The movants tendered competent evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was their special employee, thus establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law *(see Gherghinoiu v ATCO Props. & Mgt., Inc.,*32 AD3d 314 [2006]; *Ribeiro v Dynamic Painting Corp.,*23 AD3d 795 [2005]; *Hill v Warner Bros.,*277 AD2d 10 [2000]; *Abuso v Mack Trucks,*174 AD2d 590 [1991]; *cf. Karczewicz v 473 Owners Corp.,*272 AD2d 137 [2000]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

In light of our determination, we do not reach the appellants’ remaining contentions. Prudenti, P.J., Fisher, Garni and McCarthy, JJ., concur.