## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

State Farm Mutu al Au tom obile Insu rance Co. v. Rodriguez , 2013 IL App (1st) 121388

Appellate Court Caption STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOB I L E I NSURANCE COMPANY, P l ai n t i ff -A p p el l ee, v. HERI BERTO RODRI GUEZ
, Def en d an t

Appellant.–STATE FARM MU TUAL AUTOMOB I L E I NSURANCE C O M P A N Y
, P l a i n t i f

f

- A p p e l l ee , v

. R AU L DIAZ, R A M IR O VI CTORI ANO, J OSEFI NA AL VAREZ
, and L EONEL AL VAREZ
, Def endants-A

ppellants.

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division
Docke t No. 1-12-1388, 1- 12-1390 cons.

Filed Marc h 28, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Although defe ndants wer e g ood-fa ith purcha sers of the automobiles they insured with plaintiff and they had ins urable interests i n those vehicles, they did not suffe r a “loss” when the car s wer e seized by law enfor ceme nt authorities as stolen vehicles, since the seizures did not constitu te “dama g e to” the vehicles that amo u n t ed to a “loss” under the
compre hensive cover ag e provisions of the polic i es , and the fac t that
renta l cover ag e was provided and extended to one insured while his claim

was being investigated did not waive the insurer’ s rig ht to deny cover ag e.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, Nos. 11-CH-20209, 10- CH-30718; the Hon. Mary L

. Mikva and the Hon. P et er Fly nn, J udg es, presiding

.

J udg ment No. 1-12-1388, A ffirme d. No. 1-12-1390, A ffirme d.Counsel on

Appea l J oseph A. Bosc o and Andre w D. Be ll, both of L aRose & Bosc o, L td., of Chicag o, for a

ppellants.

Kristin L

. W ar d and Fr ank C. Stevens, both of Taylor Miller, L L C, of Chicag o, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE EPS TEI N deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustice F itz g era ld Smi th concur red in the judgment and opinion.
J ustice Pucinski specially concur red, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 S t at e Fa rm Mutual Automobile Insuranc e Company (State Fa rm) issued automobil e insurance policies to the defe ndants. During the term of the insurance poli ci es , the defe ndants’ automobiles wer e seized by law enfor ceme nt authorities as stolen vehicles. The trial courts in two separ ate decla ratory judgme nt actions g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of State Fa

rm, ruling that its polic y provides no compre hensive cover ag e for the seized vehicles. ¶ 2 I n this consolidated appea l, the defe ndants contend that the trial courts err ed in granting
summary judgme nt to St ate F arm. F or the re asons stated he rein, we aff irm.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 State Fa

rm issued automobile insuranc e p o l i ci es t o eac h of the defe ndants: Heribe rto Rodrigue z; Raul Diaz; Ramiro Victoriano; and L eonel and J osefina Alvare z. Althoug h the fa cts pertinent to eac h defe ndant differ slightly
, cer tain fac ts are common to all of the defe ndants. First, ther e is no dispute that the defe ndants’ State F arm policies we re in for ce at the time of the events in question. Second, eac h defe ndant purcha sed an automobile from

a private individual. Third, following such purcha ses, all of the automobiles wer e seized by law enfor ceme nt on the g rounds that they previously had been stolen. Four th, the defe ndants d i d n o t steal the automobiles and wer e not awa re that the vehicles wer e stolen at t h e t i m e they wer e purc hased. ¶ 5 Fo l l o wi ng the seizure of their automobiles, eac h of the defe ndants m ad e cl ai m s fo r compre hensive cover ag e on their State Fa rm policies. Wit h respe ct to Diaz only
, State Fa rm provided renta l car cover ag e, which was extended twice, while his claim was being i n v es t i gated. St ate Far

m ultimately denied Diaz’s claim, as well as the claims of t he ot h er defe ndants. After the denials, State Fa rm filed two decla

ratory judgme nt actions in the circ uit
court of Cook County
, seeking decla ration t h at there was no compre hensive cover ag e

-2-available to the defe ndants. 1

¶ 6 The parties filed cross-motions for summa ry j u d gm en t

. J udg e Peter Fly nn hear d the motions conce rning defe ndants Diaz, Victoriano, and J o s e f in a a n d L e o n a l A lv a

rez. The court grante d State Fa

rm’s summary judgme nt motion and denied the defe ndants’ summ ar y judgme nt motion. I n its order ruling on the summary judgme nt motions, the court “dec lare [d] that the seizure of the insured vehicles by law enfor ceme nt authorities on the g round that they

wer e stolen is not a ‘loss’ as define d in the compre hensive cover ag e” of the defe ndants’ policies. J udg e Mary Mikva g rante d State Fa rm’s summary judgme nt m o t i o n and denied defe ndant Rodrig uez’s summary judgme nt motion. ¶ 7 The de fenda

nts appea led their re spective or ders; the a ppeals a re c onsolidated here in.

¶ 8 ANALYSI S ¶ 9 The policy provides in per tinent part as f

ollows: 2

“ P HYSICAL DAMAG E COVERAGES

* * *
Insu ring Agree m ents 1. Com prehensive Cover age We will pay :

a. for loss
, except loss caused by collision
, to a cove red vehicle [.] ” (Emphasis in orig inal.) The policy

define s “loss,” in rele vant par t, as follows:

“ Loss means: 1. direc t, sudden, and a ccide ntal damag e to; or 2. total or partial thef

t of

a cove red vehicle .” (Empha sis in original.) ¶ 10 De fe n d an ts raise a number of arguments on appea l. The defe ndants contend that they have an insurable interest in the vehicles, g iven that they were g ood-fa ith purcha sers. The defe ndants then ar g ue that beca use the term “dama g e” is unde fined in the policy , the cour t must look to its dictionary definition. The defe ndants urg ed the trial courts to use the Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary definitions of “dama g e”–“ loss or injury to person or proper ty”–and “loss”: “the disappea

ranc e or diminuti o n of value, usually in an unexpected or relatively unpredic table way .” Noting that State Fa rm prese n ted no “counte r-de finition” at the trial

Anot her def

end ant , Val er ie J imenez, was dis m is sed fr om th e c om pla int bec aus e J imenez 1 wit hdr ew he r i nsu ra nce cl ai m again st Sta te Far m

.

Alt hough oth er asp ect s of the poli cy– i.e

. , the decl ar at ion s page–di ff er for the def

end ant s, 2 the “St at e Far m Car Pol ic y Booklet ” (Po li cy Form 9813 B) inc lud ed in eac h pol ic y is the same. For
purpos es of our ana lysis , we wil l som et imes refe r to a si ngle “ pol ic y,” m ean ing the poli cy bookle t

comm on t o al l o f t he d ef

end ant s’ pol ic ie s.

-3-court level, the defe ndants contend that State Fa rm’s primary argument–that only damag e to the vehicle, rathe r than damag e to the defe ndants, may be con s idere d “dama g e” under the policy –is, at best, a second “re asonable interpre tation[ ]” of the policy languag e. Given that “all ambig uities in an insurance contra ct will be construed ag ainst the insurance company ,”
t h e d efe ndants argue that the t rial court err ed in finding in State Fa rm’s favor. Finally
, th e defe ndants contend that State Fa rm’s extension of renta l c overa g e to one of the defe ndants is “furthe r evide nce that the policy languag e is ambig uous.” ¶ 11 State F a

r m a n d th e d e fenda

nts ag ree reg arding the applicable standard of revie w. B eca use the parties filed cross-motions for summary j udg ment, they conce ded the absenc e of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t and invited the court to decide the ques t i on prese nted as a matter of law. Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Care ma rk Rx, Inc.
, 359 I ll. App. 3d 749, 755 (2005). I n appea ls from summary judgme nt ruling s, we conduct a de novo revie w. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual InsuranceCo. , 154 I ll. 2d 90, 102 (1992).

¶ 12 Insurable I ntere st ¶ 13 The defe ndants contend that, based on the holding in Reznick v. Home Insurance Co.
, 45 I ll. App. 3d 1058, 1060 (1977), the g ood-fa ith purcha ser o f an autom obile that later was deter mined to be a stolen vehicle has an insurable interest in the vehicle. The court in Reznick stated that “ ‘ [g]enera lly speaking
, a person has an insura ble intere st in property

whene ver he would profit by or g ain some advanta g e by its continued exi stence and suff er some loss

or disadvantag e by its destruction.’ ” Reznick
, 45 I ll. App. 3d at 1061 (quoting 3 Ronald A. Ander son, Couch Cy clopedia of Insuranc e L aw § 24:13 (2d ed. 1960)). B eca use they eac h

wer e “fi n an cially and practica lly disadvantag ed by the l oss of t he vehicle,” the defe ndants

asser t that they satisfy the Reznick definition of insurable interest, as long as they wer e “g ood faith purc haser s.” See Reznick , 45 I ll. App. 3d at 1061. ¶ 14 State Fa

rm conce des that the defe ndants wer e g ood-fa ith purcha sers of their vehicles a nd have insurable interests. Howeve r, State Fa rm argues–and we agree –that this conce ssion is irrele vant to the issue of whether its policy provided cover ag e for the seizure of the vehicles. The Reznick court held that it first neede d to deter mine whether a g ood-fa ith purcha ser of a stolen vehicle had an insurable interest in the vehicle beca use it could decide “whe ther this ty pe of loss”– i.e.
, seizure by law enfor ceme nt–“was cover ed by the compre hensive cover ag e provisions of the insurance ag ree ment.” Id. at 1062. There fore
, we turn our focus to the issue of whe ther de fenda

nts sustained a “loss” a ccor ding to the te rms of State F arm’s policy

.

¶ 15 “L oss” Under the Policy ¶ 16 The policy provides phy sical damag e cover ag e for “loss *** to a cover ed vehicle.” The policy define s “loss” as “dire ct, sudden, and acc idental damag e to” or “total or partial theft of” a “cove red vehicle.” The p ar t i es agre e that seizure of the vehicles by law enforce ment authorities does not constitute “total or partial theft of” the vehicles. The critica l question is whether the seizure constitutes “di rec t, sudden, and acc idental damag e to *** a cover ed vehicle.” ¶ 17 “An insurance policy is a contra ct, and the g ener al rules g overning the interpre tation of

-4-other ty pes o f contra cts also g overn the interpre tation of insurance policies.” Hobbs v. Hartford I

nsurance Co. of the Midwest
, 214 I ll. 2d 11, 17 (2005). Our primary objective is
to “asc erta in and give effe ct t o the i ntention of t he parties as ex p ressed in the agr eeme nt.” Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Servic es Ltd.
, 223 I ll. 2d 407, 416 (2006). ¶ 18 I f t he ins uranc e poli cy langu age i s unambig uous, the pol icy will be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy

. Hobbs
, 214 I l l

. 2d at 17. Whether an ambig uity exis ts “turns on whether the policy languag e is subject to more than one rea sonable interpre tation.” Id

. “That a term is not define d by the policy does not rende r it ambig uous, no r i s a p o l i cy term considere d ambig uous mere ly beca use the parties can sug g est cre ative possibili ties for its meaning .” Nicor , 223 I ll. 2d at 417. ¶ 19 W h er e a t er m i n an i n s u rance policy is not define d, “we aff ord that term its plain, ordinary and popular meaning
, i.e.
, we look to its dictionary definition.” Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz
, 237 I ll. 2d 424, 436 (2010). See also Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc.
, 223 I ll. 2d 352, 366 (2006 ) (n o t i n g t hat courts have looked to their dictionary definitions to aff ord terms their “plain, ordinary
, and popular meaning s”); Gillen

v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
, 215 I ll. 2d 381, 393 (2 0 0 5 ) (s t at ing that undefine d terms will be g iven their “plain, ordinary and popular meaning
, i.e.
, they will be construed with refe renc e to the ave rag e, ordina ry , normal, reasonable person” ); Czapski v. Maher
, 2011 I L App (1st) 100948, ¶ 29 (“I llinois courts have g ener ally utiliz ed dictionaries to determine the meaningof undef ined terms in many

contexts.”). ¶ 20 The defe ndants note that the policy does not include a definition of “dama g e.” They look
to the Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary definition of “dama g e”: “[l] oss or injury to person or p ro p er ty .” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 445 (9th ed. 2009). “L oss” being undefine d within t h e Bla ck’s definition of “dama g e,” the defe ndants use the dictionary ’s definition of “loss”: “the disappea ranc e or diminuti on of va lu e , u s u

. in a n u nexpected or relatively unpredic table way ,”

or i n j u ry t o person or proper

ty

. Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 1029 (9th ed. 2009). Def endants
argue that beca

use the vehicle s “disappe are d without war ning and in an unexpected or relatively unpredic table way ,” the seizure of eac h vehicle qualifies as “dama g e” u n d er t he policy

. Fur

thermore
, acc ording to the defe ndants, the reduc tion of the value of the vehicles
to zero–as defe ndants no longe r may use, sell o r d er i v e an y other value from the vehicles–c onstitut es “da

mag e” unde r the policy

. ¶ 21 We ag ree with State Fa rm that a policy term is not ambig uous simply “bec ause the term is not defined within the policy or bec ause the parties c an sug g est cre ative possibiliti es for its meaning .” L a

p h a m- Hi ck

ey Steel C

orp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co.
, 166 I ll. 2d 520, 529 (1995). The policy provides that there is a “loss” if ther e wa s “direc t, sudden and

acc idental damag e to *** a cover ed vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) Acc ording to the defe ndants, inserting the Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary definition of “d am age” into the policy ’s definition of loss results in the following de finition of “loss”:

“ Loss means: 1. direc t, sudden, and acc idental disappearance or diminution ofvalue, usually in an unexpe cted or relative ly unpredictable way [(emphasis added) ] t o; or 2. total or partial thef

t of

-5-a cove red vehicle .” (Empha sis in original.)

We do not vi ew t he fore g oing languag e as a rea sonable interpre tation of the policy terms. First, we note that the defe ndants ’ p ro p osed definition is essentially the insertion of the Bla ck’s definition of “loss” into the Bla ck’s definition of “dama g e” into the policy definition of “loss.” Even if the definition sug g ested b y t h e defe ndants was not unduly strained, we believe that the “disappe ara nce or diminuti on in value *** t o ” a v eh i cle–a s opposed to “disappe ara

nce or diminuti on in value *** of ” a vehicle–is an “absur d result” we are compelled to avoid. See Bond County Community School District No. 2 v. Indiana Insurance Co.
, 269 I ll. App. 3d 488, 499 (1995). We share the view of the trial courts that althoug h the seizure of the vehicles does constitute d am age t o the defe ndants, it does not constitute damag e “to” the cover ed vehicles. The defe ndants have not claimed that the seizure resulted in phy sical d am age t o the vehicles. The defe ndants have failed to sug g est any rea sonable interpre tation of the term “dama g e” under which their vehicles, as opposed to the defe ndants themselves, have been da mag ed. ¶ 22 The defenda

nts dismi ss State Fa

rm’s reliance on the word “to” in the pol icy definition of “loss” as a “hy

per- technica l g rammatica l argument” that repr esents a “ridiculous attempt to e levate f

orm over substanc e.” We disagree

. An insurance policy must not be interpre ted in a manner that rende rs contra ct provisions meaning less. Continental Casualty Co. v. Donald T. Bertucc i, Ltd.
, 399 I ll. App. 3d 775, 789 (2010). A lthough we acknow ledg e the harsh result o f the s eizures on the i nnocent purchase r defendants herein, we cannot ignore

or m o d i fy the preposition “to” in the “loss” definition and transfer their burdens to parties that did not contra ct t o i n s u re t h i s ri sk. As noted by J udg e Mi kva below,” i t is completely unfair and completely unfortunate that the differ ence in preposition should make *** a multi thousand dollar differ ence to y our client.” J udg e Fly nn simil arly observe d that “[t] his entire

case turns *** on the lack of a pre position.” ¶ 23 Th e t ri al co u rts eac h discussed two case s addre ssing situations simil ar to these c ases: Reznick v. Home Insurance Co.
, 45 I ll. App. 3d 1058 (1977), and Cueto v. Allstate Insurance Co.
, 544 A.2d 906 (N.J. Super. Ct. L aw Div. 1987). In Reznick
, this court addre ssed whether the compre hensive cover ag e provision of the plaintiff’s a uto mobile insurance policy cover ed loss of a vehicle cause d by confiscation due to the fac t that the vehicle had been stolen when the insured was a g ood-fa ith purcha ser. Reznick
, 45 I ll. App. 3d at 1059. After deter mining that there was an “ins u ra b l e i n tere st” in the vehicle, the court considere d the definition of “loss” in the policy : “ ‘direc t and acc id en t al loss of or damag e to *** the automobile.’ ” (Emphasis added. ) Id

. at 1062. The court conclude d that this languag e cover ed the police confiscation of the vehicle. Id. at 1062-63. In Cueto
, a New J erse y court found that the police confiscation of a stolen vehicle was not a “risk” wit hin the expectation of the vehicle purcha ser and there fore the purc haser was not entitled to rec over under his c omprehe nsive

cover ag e policy for loss of the vehicle. Cueto
, 544 A.2d at 909. The court also analy zed the following a

u to mo b ile insurance policy languag e: “ ‘We will pay for direc t and acc idental loss
to your cover ed auto ***.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Cueto
, 544 A.2d at 908. Distinguishing the Reznick policy lang uag e about loss of or damag e to a vehicle, the Cueto court conclude d that there was no “ loss to” the cover ed vehic le. Id. at 909. ¶ 24 At the hear ing on the summary judgme nt motions, J udg e Mikva stated that I llinois law

-6-“cle arly rec og nizes” that defe ndant Rodrigue z had an insurable interest and that she was “not

that persua ded” by Cueto in light of “we ll-settled” I llinois law that “a di ff er en t l y worde d
compre hensive cover ag e would cover this kind of *** seizure of a car by law enfor ceme nt.” The court then noted that “I just do not believe that there is any way to view t h e p olicy lang uag e as ambig uous on this point.” J udg e Fly nn simil arly noted that “[i] f the policy had ref err ed to loss ‘of’ the vehicle, like the Resnick policy
, then we have Resnick as authority *** for policy

cover ag e *** [b] ut the ‘of’ isn’t in there.” ¶ 25 For the first time in their reply brief, the defe ndants arg ue that Cueto is “not the only out of circ uit case on point,” citing a Texas court of appea ls decision, S t ate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kelly
, 945 S.W .2d 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), abro g ated on other grounds by Don’s Building Supply, Inc. v. OneBe acon Insurance Co.
, 267 S.W .3d 20 (Tex. 2008). The de fenda nts a rgue that Kelly “supports a finding that the applicable policy l an gu age is ambig uous.” “I t is axiom atic that arguments raised for the first time in a rep l y brief are waived.” Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Technology, Inc.
, 402 I ll. App. 3d 490, 502 (2010). Howeve r, even if we wer e to consider the defe ndants’ argument, we do not share their view reg arding the signific ance of Kelly

. The Kelly court addre ssed wh et h er the confiscation of a stolen vehicle by state authorities constituted an “ ‘ac cidental loss’ ” under the applica

ble insuranc e policy

. Kelly , 945 S.W .2d at 906. Afte r concluding that there was

an insurable loss, the court considere d the policy l an gu age

. Acc ording to the court, State Fa rm had agr eed to “ ‘pay for direct and acc idental l oss’ to the i nsured’ s ‘cove red auto

. ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 907. Analy zing whether the confiscation was an “ac cidental loss,” the court conclude d that “conf iscation is not the natura l and probable result of the g ood faith purcha se of an automobile” and, “[o] n this rec ord,” the confiscation constitute d an acc idental loss under the ter

ms of the policy

. Id. at 909-10. ¶ 26 We disag ree with the def endants’ c ontention that the Kellydecision supports a finding that the applicable pol icy languag e is ambig uous. First, the fac t that a S tate F arm policy is
at issue both in Kelly and the instant case s is not rele vant. Even if issued by the same insurer, they are differ ent policies issued in differ ent jurisdictions more than 15 y ear s apar t. Second, the lang uag e at issue in Kelly is distinguishable from the challeng ed languag e in these case s. The Kelly court stated that “[u] nder Mr. Kelly ’s insurance policy
, State Fa rm agree s to ‘pay for dire ct and a ccide ntal loss’ to the insured’s ‘ cove red auto .’ ” ( Emphasis in origina l). Id.
at 907. Even assuming arguendo that the policy actua lly used the word “to,” the Kelly court 3 d i d n o t an al yze whether there was “dama g e to” a vehicle. As discussed above, we do not believe that the seizure of the defe ndants’ vehicles can constitute “dama g e” to the vehicles. Third, we note that the Kelly court focuse d primarily on the meaning of “cove red auto” and “ac cidental loss” under the policy ; there is no substantive discussion addre s s i n g t h e signific ance of the wor d “to.” ¶ 27 T h e d efe ndants further contend that if we “g ive merit to State Fa rm’s uns u p p o rt ed

asser tion that damag e to the o w n er o f a vehicle does not constitute damag e to the vehicle, then this court has b ee n p resented with two rea sonable interpre tations of the applicable

T he word “t o” is not inc lud ed wit h the pol ic y la nguage dir ect ly quot ed by the Kel ly cou rt

. 3

-7-policy lang uag e.” (Emphase s in orig inal.) We agai n disag ree beca use we do not view the defe ndants’ interpre tation as rea sonable. We do not se e any ambig uity in the policy mere ly beca u se there is a disag ree ment betwee n State Fa rm and the defe ndants reg arding its meaning

. See Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co.
, 213 I ll. 2d 141, 153 (2004) (noting that a contra ct is not rende red ambig uous mere ly beca use the parties disag ree about its meaning ). ¶ 28 I f there is an ambig uity in an insurance policy
, we will construe it in favor of the insured. Hobbs
, 2 1 4 I l l

. 2 d at 30-31. Be cause we conclude that the challeng ed languag e is not ambig uous, we need not consider the defe ndants’ argument that the term should be construed in their favor

and ag ainst State Fa

rm, the insurer

that draf ted the policy

. ¶ 29 Finally
, the defe ndants raise a p u b l i c p o l i cy argument for the first time in their re ply brief, c ontending that “deny ing the se families the insurance cover ag e they paid for, f

or the vehicles they possessed and utiliz ed for y ear s would be an inequitable result” and is ag ainst the principles of the “cour t of equity in which the instant matters wer e initially decide d.” We
ag ain note that ar g uments raised f or the fir st tim e in a r eply brief a re waived. Salerno , 402 I ll. App. 3d at 502. Howeve r, even if we consider the defe ndants’ publi c poli cy argument,

we cannot ag ree with their position. Whil e we acknow ledg e that the result in the trial courts is unfortunate for the defe ndants, we do not deem it inequitable. Indeed, if, as we have found, State Fa rm did not contra ct to c over this ty pe of claim it would be inequitable to pla ce loss

on it beca

us e o f s y mpathy for the victimiz ed innocent purcha sers of stolen vehicles. “I f insurance policy terms are clea r and unambig uous, they must be enfor ced as written unless doing so would violate public policy .” Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.
, 237 I ll. 2d 391, 400 (2010). The public policy of I llinois is “re flec t ed in its constitution, statutes, and judicial d ec i s i o n s.” Id. The defe ndants have not cited–and we are not awa re of–any constitut ional, statutory or judicial basis under I llinois law for not enfor cing this policy in

acc ordanc e with its clear

and unambiguous terms. ¶ 30 I n summary , we conclude that under the unambig uous languag e of the policy
, the seizure of eac h defe ndant’s vehicle did not constitute damag e to the vehicle and thus the defe ndants did not sustain an insurable “loss” under t h e p o l i cy

. Although we are sy mpathetic to the defe ndants’ position, we will not “ ‘torture ordinary words until they confe ss to ambig uity .’ ” Hobbs
, 214 I ll. 2d at 31 (quoting W estern States Insurance Co. v. W isconsin W

holesale Tire, Inc. , 184 F.3d 699, 702 ( 7th Cir. 1999).

¶ 31 Rental Car Cover ag e for Diaz ¶ 32 The Du Pag e County Au t o T h ef t Task For ce seized defe ndant Raul Diaz’s vehicle on May 17, 2010. After the seizure, Diaz made a claim under his State Fa rm policy

. Whil e the claim was being investigated, State Fa rm provided renta l cover ag e to Diaz on May 26, 2010 and extended it on J une 4, 2010 and J une 11, 2010. State Fa rm issued a renta l cover ag e letter

on May 26, 2010, which, acc ording to the defe ndants, “may only be offe red when a cover ed

-8-vehicle is unavailable as the result of a ‘loss’ under the policy .” State Fa rm ultimately denied 4 Diaz’s claim and f

iled the dec laratory

judgme nt action beingappea led her ein. ¶ 33 Acc ording to the defe ndants, the State Fa rm’s ag ent’s treatment of Diaz’s claim afte r the seizure of his ve hicle “supports a f inding that the policies are ambig uous.” The defe ndants contend that State Fa

rm’s filing of its decla

ratory judgme nt action afte r the provision and extension of renta l car cover ag e–“a benef it on Mr. Diaz that could only be had if the seizure should be deeme d a loss under the policy”–evide nces a “cle ar incons istency .” Given that ambig uities in an insurance policy are construed ag ainst the insurer, the defe ndants argue that the “policy lang uag e is ambig uous and should be interpre ted in favor of the defe ndants being
compensated under

the policy

for their loss.” ¶ 34 S t at e Fa rm re s p o n d s t h at beca use the policy is a fully integ rate d document– i.e. , it constitutes the entire ag r e e me nt betwee n the parties–the “four corne rs” or parol evidenc e rule “g ener ally prohibits the use of extrinsi c evidenc e to contra dict or vary the terms of a written
contra ct.” The insurer contends that “[b] eca use extrinsi c evidenc e cannot be used to interpre t the policy , it cannot be used to manufa cture an ambiguity .” Conce ding tha t the State Fa

rm claims repr esentative “simply made a mistake when deciding to pay car re n t al b enef its to Diaz,” S tate Farm argues t hat t he “mist ake sheds no light on the m eaning of t he poli cy , or whether it is ambiguous.” ¶ 35 Our supre me cour t in Air Safety, Inc . v. Teache rs Realty Corp. , 185 I ll. 2d 457 (1999),

a d d resse d the question of whether extrinsi c evidenc e may be “provisionally admitted to s h o w that an expli citly integ rate d, fac ially clea r, and complete writt en co n t ra ct is actua lly ambi gu o u s.” Id. at 459. The court first observe d that if the contra ct languag e is fac ially unambig uous, then the contra ct is interpre ted by the trial court as a matter of law without the

use of parol evidenc e. Id. at 462. Howeve r, under the “provisional admission approa ch,”
ap p l i ed by the I llinois Appellate Court in a varie ty of case s, “althoug h the languag e o f a contra ct i s fac ially unambig uous, a party may still proff er p ar ol evidenc e to the t rial j udg e for t h e p u rp o s e of showing that an ambig uity exis ts which can be found only by looking beyond the clea

r languag e of the contra ct.” Id. at 463. The supreme court declined to adopt the provisional admission approa ch becaus e the contra ct at issue contained an express integ ration clause

. Id. at 464. The court n o t ed that “whe re parties formally include an integ ration clause in their contra ct, they are expli citly manifesting their intention to protec t themselves ag ainst misint erpr etations which mig ht arise f rom extrinsi c evide nce.” Id. ¶ 36 The State F arm policy at issue provides, in par

t: “2. This po l i cy contains all of t he agr eeme nts betwee n all named insureds who are shown on the De clar ations Pag e and a ll applicants and:

a. us ; and b. any of our ag ents.” (E mphasis in origina l.)

We not e tha t the fi nal li ne of the le tt er is unde rl ine d and st at es as fo l l o w s : “T his le tt er 4
pro vides you wit h onl y a genera l exp la nat ion of avail abl e ben ef it s and doe s not grant any ins ura nce

covera ge. Ple ase re fe r t o your S ta te Far m CarPol ic y for t he t er m s a nd c ondi ti ons of cover age.”

-9-We have deter mined that the policy t er m s ar e fac ially unambig uous, and we choose not eff ectively nullify the foreg oing integr at i o n clause in an attempt to find a latent ambig uity in the policy terms. “[E] x trinsic evidenc e is admissibl e to explain the me aning of words in

a contra ct only wh en t h er e i s an ambig uity or the words are suspectible of differ ent interpre tations.” Lee v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.
, 361 I ll. App

. 3d 970, 979 (2005). See also Lease Managem ent Equip me n t Co r p. v. DFO Partnership
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 678, 686 (2009) (conc luding that “trial courts err ed in allowi n g the prese ntation of parol evidenc e prior to finding that the contra ct languag e wa s ambiguous”). ¶ 37 State Fa

rm also contends that partial pay ment under a policy does not waive an insurer’ s rig ht to lat er d eny a claim. Specifica lly
, the State Fa rm claims repr esentative explained to Diaz, throug h his Eng lish- s p eaking daug hter, that althoug h renta l cover ag e was being extended, it was done so provisionally
, as State Fa rm’s investigation of the claim was pending

. State Fa

rm argues that, as evidenc ed by this conver sation, the insurer “expressly did
not relinquish its rig ht to ref use the claim, but instead expressly invoked its rig ht of denial.” The defe ndants counter that the renta l car cover ag e was not offe red as evidenc e of waiver but “rather as evidenc e that a rea sonable interpre tation of the insurance policy languag e supports defe ndants’ claim; even State Fa rm’s own employ ee rea d the State Fa rm policy as providing Mr. Diaz with relief.” ¶ 38 J udg e Fly

nn specific ally addre ssed this argument during the hea ri n g o n the summary judgme nt motions : “I don’t particula

rly car e whether the claims ag ent say s this is cover ed or not cover ed, so long as we’ re not talking about a bad-f aith claim, beca

use the claims ag ent can’ t tell me what the law is. That’s my job. And if the claims ag ent came into court and said, I rea lly think this claim is cover ed, my response would be, So what?
You can’ t use the claims ag ent then to cre ate an ambig uity in s o m et h i n g which otherwise is not ambig uous any more than the fac t that a particula r contra cting party has

a rea lly quirky rea ding of the contra ct term that would war rant a Court in concluding that the contra ct term is ambig uous, even though ever y body except that particula r contra cting party would rea d it one way .”
We ag ree that the claims ag ent’s extension of rent al ca r cover ag e to Diaz–reg ardle ss of whether s u ch covera g e was prese nted as “provisional”–doe s not evidenc e an ambig uity in the policy
, and we will not interpre t the claims ag ent’s actions to cre ate an ambig uity wher e it does not otherwise e x ist.

¶ 39 CONCL USI ON ¶ 40 The trial courts corr ectly conclude d that the seizure of the defe ndants’ stolen vehicles did
not constit u t e “d am age to” the vehicles and there fore was not a “loss” for purposes of
compre hensive cover ag e under th e ir St a te F a r m a uto mo b il e in s u

r a n c e p o li c ie s. The extension of renta l car cover ag e to defe ndant Diaz does not aff ect such conclusion. The trial courts did
not err in g ranting State Fa rm’s motions for summary judgme nt in its decla ratory judgme nt actions and de nying the summary judgme nt motions of the de fenda nts.

-10-¶ 41 No. 1-12-1388, A ffirme d.

¶ 42 No. 1-12-1390, A ffirme d.

¶ 43 J USTI CE PUCI NSKI , specia lly

concur ring

. ¶ 44 I ag ree with m y co lleagues in their decision to aff irm the judgme nt of the trial court, howeve r, I would point to one additional clause in the “Diaz” insuranc e p o l i cy , under “Phy sical Damag e Coverag e” (pag es 27 to 33 of the policy ) and further under “Exclusions” (pag e 31 of the policy

) the policy

specific ally

states:

“ Exclusion s THERE I S NO COVERAGE F OR:
* * *
9. LOSS TO ANY COV

ERE D V EHIC LE THAT RESUL TS FROM THE TAKI NG OF OR SEI Z URE OF THAT COV ERE D V EHIC LE BY ANY GO VE R

NM ENTAL AUTHO RI TY.”
I n the ca se of Dia z, the policy is clear . The vehicle was a cove red ve hicle, it was seized by
a g overnme ntal authority , and cove rag e is excluded.

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