The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

Civil War 

Trans-Mississippi 

Theater

1861–1865

The

in the
CMH Pub 75–3

Cover: Detail from Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, c. 1889, by Kurz & Allison
by

Jeffery S. Prushankin

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

Civil War 

Trans-Mississippi 

Theater

1861–1865

The

In The

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART, PH.D.

 Chief of Military History
THE CIVIL WAR IN THE

TRANS-MISSISSIPPI THEATER

1861–1865

Strategic Setting

Often neglected in history books, the Trans-Mississippi West 

played an important role in the Civil War. Although the battles 

fought in this region were relatively small compared with those 

fought elsewhere, the struggle to control the Trans-Mississippi had 

far-reaching consequences for both sides (Map 1).

For the Union, the theater presented several major objectives. 

At the outset of the war, President Abraham Lincoln’s first concern 

in the region west of the Mississippi River was securing the state of 

Missouri and its principal city, St. Louis. Until the military accomplished this objective, it would be difficult to achieve the broader 

strategic goal of severing the Confederacy in two by gaining 

control of the Mississippi. Second, the United States hoped to 

pacify western Louisiana and establish a presence in Texas. While 

all of the Trans-Mississippi states had the potential to provide 

the Confederacy with resources, Texas gave the Confederacy its 

only common border with a foreign country. Since France had 

invaded Mexico in December 1861 over issues related to unpaid 

debts, U.S. officials feared that the Confederacy might be able 

to acquire European goods in exchange for cotton via Mexico, 

7
8 

thereby defeating the government’s planned blockade of Southern 

ports. If France recognized the Confederacy as an independent 

nation, its presence on the Texas border could prove even more 

dangerous. Finally, the Lincoln administration wanted to ensure 

that the Federal government maintained control of the Far West, 

to include the gold deposits in Colorado and California. 

For the Confederacy, the Trans-Mississippi was an important source of agricultural commodities, including cotton, 

sugar, and rice. The southwestern part of the region contained 

Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Rio Grande

Gulf of Mexico

Fort Leavenworth

Fort Brown

El Paso

Galveston

Brownsville

Matamoras

Laredo

Shreveport

Sante Fe

San Antonio

New

 Orleans

St. Louis

LITTLE ROCK

INDIA N

TERRI T O R Y

NEBRASKA

TERRIT O R Y

NEW MEXIC O

T ERRI T O R Y

C O L O R ADO

TERRIT O R Y

UNORGANIZE D

T ERRIT O R Y

TEXA S

L O

U I S I A N A

M I S S I S S I P P I

I O W A

WISCONSIN

ILLINOIS

MISSOURI

ARKANSAS

KANSAS

MEXIC O

1861–1865

TRANS-MISSISSIPPI THEATER

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

Map 1
9

nearly one million horses, 800,000 oxen, over 300,000 mules, 

and millions of cattle. The area was likewise a source of 

manpower. During the course of the war Texas furnished 58,000 

men for Confederate armies, Louisiana provided 53,000, and 

Arkansas sent 45,000. Missouri and Indian Territory did not 

secede from the Union, but nonetheless sent 40,000 and 5,000 

men, respectively, into rebel service. Although most of these 

Trans-Mississippians served in eastern armies, enough soldiers 

remained west of the river to protect the Confederate political 

and economic infrastructure in the theater. 

The region’s vast distances and primitive transportation and 

communication networks posed challenges for both sides during 

the war. Early in 1862, the Confederate War Department created 

a Trans-Mississippi District and later that year elevated the TransMississippi to department status. The U.S. Army never created 

a single entity to command its forces west of the Mississippi. 

Rather, it organized several geographically based military departments. During the conflict the War Department continually 

adjusted existing designations and often combined two or more 

departments to create military divisions. Individual field armies 

functioned within each department. In the Trans-Mississippi the 

principle Federal armies included the Army of the Southwest, the 

Army of the Frontier, and the Army of the Gulf. State and local 

authorities often complicated command relationships, particularly 

for the South, so that military forces did not always act in concert 

with one another. During the course of the war, some 200,000 

Union soldiers would serve in the Trans-Mississippi Theater. 

Operations

War in the Desert

The most remote area of operations during the American 

Civil War was that in the far western territories of New Mexico and 

Arizona. The American Southwest was a sparsely inhabited land 

of divided loyalties. In New Mexico, the population around Santa 

Fe was predominately neutral, while settlers farther south called 

themselves Arizonians and harbored pro-Confederate sentiments. 

In 1861, Confederate sympathizers decreed Arizona a territory. 

To secure that claim, and with hopes of conquering New Mexico, 

Colorado, Utah, and perhaps even California, rebel Brig. Gen. 

Henry H. Sibley organized a force of 3,700 men that he called the 
10 

Army of New Mexico. In February 1862 he marched north along 

the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas, toward Fort Craig, south of 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. At this post there were 1,250 U.S. Army 

regulars and over 1,000 recently raised New Mexico volunteers 

and militia. After having failed to draw the Federal commander, 

Col. Edward R. S. Canby, out of his works, Sibley decided to bypass 

the fort through the high bluffs to the east. Canby responded by 

intercepting the rebels at 

Valverde Ford on the Rio 

Grande on 20 February. The 

next day, the Federals met 

Sibley’s advance, but suffered 

a defeat after a Confederate 

charge captured their artillery (Map 2).

Canby fell back into 

the fort and refused to 

surrender, compelling Sibley 

to leave behind a detachment to watch the post while 

he proceeded northward 

to Santa Fe through inhospitable country. As Sibley’s 

force grew weaker because 

of the harsh conditions, the 

Federals to his front grew 

stronger. Unionists from 

Colorado rushed to support 

Federal forces in New Mexico, and on 26 March, a portion of the 

Confederate advance clashed with the Colorado volunteers at 

Apache Canyon near Glorieta Pass, about twenty-five miles east of 

Santa Fe. Both sides concentrated their forces, and on 28 March, 

skirmishing near Pigeon’s Ranch, just east of Glorieta Pass, erupted 

into a pitched battle. Although Sibley’s forces drove the Federals 

from the field, Maj. John M. Chivington, from Colorado, attacked 

the Confederate rear and destroyed the rebels’ supply wagons. 

Chivington’s feat rendered Sibley’s tactical victory meaningless and 

forced the Confederates to abandon the campaign. Canby pursued 

Sibley’s defeated army for several days but did not attempt to bring 

it to battle. Still, the Confederates, lacking supplies, endured a 

punishing retreat, first to El Paso, and then on to San Antonio, Texas. 

Colonel Canby, pictured as a general (Library of Congress)
11

The Confederate repulse brought an end to significant fighting in 

the far western territories.

The Battle for Missouri and Arkan

The only Trans-Mississippi slave state remaining in the 

Union, Missouri, was the linchpin for the U.S. government’s 

ability to use military force on the Mississippi River and the 

lands beyond. Control of St. Louis would allow the U.S. military 

to establish lines of communications along the Mississippi River 

VALVERDE FORD 21 Feb

PIGEON RIDGE 28 Mar

GLORIETA PASS 26–28 Mar

C H I V I N G T O N

S I B L E Y

S I B L E Y

Rio Grande

Rio Grande

Pecos R

Fort Garland

Fort

Union

Fort Craig

Fort Stanton

Fort Fillmore

Fort Deance

Fort Webster

Fort Thorn

Peralta

Socorro

Albuquerque

El Paso

Galisteo

Taos

Sante Fe

S A N TA FE TR A IL

CI M A RR O N C U T– O FF TR A IL

INDIAN

TERRITO R Y

U T A H

TERRIT O R Y

NEW MEXI C O

TERRIT O R Y

C O L O R ADO

TERRIT O R Y

MEXIC O TEXA S

Confederate Movement

Union Movement

Engagement

February–March 1862

NEW MEXIC O CAMPAIGN

0 50 100 150

Miles

Map 2
12 

and along the road network that connected the city to points 

to the north, west, and south. Missouri was a divided state, 

however, and many citizens held strong pro-Confederate sympathies. The United States strengthened its military presence in St. 

Louis by reinforcing Capt. Nathaniel Lyon and his 2d United 

States Infantry stationed there. The pro-Confederate state militia 

camped just outside of town, and Lyon feared it would attempt 

to seize the St. Louis arsenal. On 10 May, in a preemptive strike, 

he arrested 600 militia members. As he marched the prisoners 

through town, rioting broke out, and Lyon’s troops killed over 

two dozen civilians. Tensions continued to rise as the War 

Department promoted Lyon to brigadier general and authorized 

some 10,000 troops to serve under him in Missouri. Lyon’s next 

move was against pro-Confederate politicians at the state capital 

in Jefferson City. In June, his force drove the nascent Confederates 

to the southwest corner of the state. 

In the summer of 1861, the United States could not risk 

leaving the situation in Missouri unresolved. A Confederate resurgence would threaten not only St. Louis, but also possibly Kansas 

and Illinois. Fearing that Confederates in northwest Arkansas 

would join Brig. Gen. Sterling Price’s secessionist Missouri State 

Guard in the southwest portion of Missouri in late July, General 

Lyon gathered 5,400 troops into what he called the Army of the 

West and marched into southwestern Missouri. (See Map 

3.) Soon after he arrived at 

Springfield, Missouri, Lyon 

discovered that Brig. Gen. Ben 

McCulloch’s Western Army, a 

Confederate force that included 

Price’s Missouri State Guard 

among its 11,000 effectives, 

was fifty miles to the southeast 

at Cassville. The Confederates 

advanced toward Springfield 

and Lyon planned to attack 

isolated elements of the rebel 

column. After a skirmish on 2 

August at Dug Spring, he reconsidered and fell back ahead of 

McCulloch’s superior force. 

General Lyon, shown as captain

(Library of Congress)
13

McCulloch hoped to drive Lyon from southwest Missouri 

as a means of protecting northwest Arkansas and the Indian 

Territory, while Price saw the capture of Springfield as the first step 

in regaining control of his home state. On 9 August, bad weather 

delayed the Confederate advance, and when McCulloch paused 

along Wilson’s Creek, twelve miles south of Springfield, Lyon 

seized the initiative. 

Lyon accepted a plan offered by Col. Franz Sigel to divide 

his army and launch simultaneous surprise attacks against 

the enemy flanks. At dawn on 10 August, the Federals hit the 

unsuspecting Confederates. Striking from the north, Lyon and 

his 4,200 men caught the rebels off guard. From the south, Sigel 

and his column of 1,200 men likewise enjoyed initial success, but 

McCulloch rallied the Confederates and Sigel soon withdrew in 

disorder, leaving behind most of his artillery. This allowed the 

Confederates to take the offensive. Unaware of Sigel’s retreat, 

Lyon put up a ferocious defensive fight along a ridge known 

later as Bloody Hill. Price’s Missourians also fought tenaciously, 

and the battle turned in favor of the Confederates. During the 

fighting, Lyon was killed, the first general on either side to die in 

combat during the Civil War. Union command devolved to Maj. 

Samuel D. Sturgis, who continued to hold the position at Bloody 

Hill until he learned of Sigel’s retreat. With ammunition running 

General Price

(Library of Congress)

General McCulloch

(Library of Congress)
14

low, Sturgis ordered a withdrawal to Springfield and by 1200, the 

Federals were gone. 

The Battle of Wilson’s Creek left the Federals with 1,317 casualties, including 258 killed and 873 wounded. The Confederates, 

who called the battle Oak Hill, suffered similar losses, with 1,222 

casualties, including 277 dead and 945 wounded. As the first major 

battle in the Trans-Mississippi, Wilson’s Creek set into motion 

events that shaped the prosecution of the war in the West.

The Confederate victory at Wilson’s Creek rendered the 

Federal hold on Springfield untenable. Sigel assumed command 

of the Army of the West and ordered a retreat to Rolla in central 

Missouri. During the retreat, Union officers and enlisted men 

alike criticized Sigel’s performance at Wilson’s Creek, and he relinquished command to Major Sturgis. From Rolla, a rail line took the 

troops to St. Louis where Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, commander 

of the United States Western Department, reassigned the units and 

officers to other commands.

Frémont was an antebellum adventurer, abolitionist, and the 

Republican Party presidential nominee in 1856. In 1861, it was 

political influence, rather than military prowess, that earned him 

a generalship in the Union Army. Frémont had taken command 

of the department in July, and since his arrival in Missouri, he had 

Colonel Sigel, shown as 

major general

(Library of Congress)

Major Sturgis, shown as 

brigadier general

(Library of Congress)
PEA RIDGE

7–8 Mar 1862 

LITTLE SUGAR CREEK 17 Feb 1862 

PRAIRE GROVE CANE HILL 7 Dec 1862 28 Nov 1862 

WILSON’S CREEK 10 Aug 1861 

SPRINGFIELD

12 Feb 1862

DUG SPRING

2 Aug 1861 

LEXINGTON 12–20 Sep 1861 

FORT HINDMAN 9–11 Jan 1863 

HELENA

12 July 1862

LITTLE ROCK

10 Sep 1863 

PINE BLUFF 17 Sep 1863 

Mississippi R

Mississippi R Missouri R

Ouachita R

Arkansas R

Red R

Red R

Sabine R

Yazoo R

White R

Illinois R

White R

Osage R

Fort Pillow

Fort Smith

Fort Scott

Fort Leavenworth

Fort Davidson

Batesville Van Buren Clarksville

Maysville Bentonville

Cassville

Lebanon Pilot Knob

Rolla

Sedalia

Fayetteville

Monroe

Yazoo City

Shreveport

Camden

Hot Springs

Arkadelphia

Washington

Lawrence

Kansas City

Carthage

Memphis

Vicksburg

St. Louis

Alton

JACKSON

JEFFERSON CITY

INDIAN

 TERRIT O R Y

MISSOURI

ILLINOIS

TEXAS

TENNESSEE

L O U ISIAN A

MISSISSIPPI

ARKANSAS

KANSAS

Engagement

August 1861–September 1863

MISSOURI-ARKANSAS THEATER

0 50 100

Miles

Map 3
16 

busied himself with organizing 

his forces. He did not have time to 

focus on internal dissent, particularly on the heels of Wilson’s 

Creek. Moreover, Price was on 

the move, and the Confederates 

had retaken Springfield. 

Like the Federals, Confederate 

commanders bickered among 

themselves. General Price, who 

held his commission from the state 

of Missouri, insisted on advancing 

north to Lexington, a city on 

the Missouri River, to recruit 

volunteers for the State Guard. 

General McCulloch, who held a 

commission from the Confederate 

government, refused to sanction 

the mission and insisted that he 

did not have authorization to conduct offensive operations in 

Missouri. He considered the earlier movement toward Springfield 

a defensive measure, designed to help him achieve his primary 

mission of securing Arkansas and the Indian Territory. Price’s plan 

was more offensive in nature. Moreover, McCulloch insisted that 

the Confederates lacked the means and manpower to hold positions around Lexington. The disagreement left Price embittered, 

and as he marched his Missourians to Lexington, McCulloch 

marched the Western Army to Arkansas. 

On 12 September, Price reached Lexington, and as recruits 

flocked to his command, the State Guard increased to nearly 

18,000 men. For nine days, Price’s force besieged the town 

and pinned down the small Union garrison of 3,800 Federals 

under Col. James A. Mulligan. The town fell on 20 September 

when a majority of Colonel Mulligan’s subordinate officers 

voted to surrender. 

General Frémont’s failure to reinforce the garrison at 

Lexington left him open to criticism. He responded quickly 

and pushed 30,000 troops west from St. Louis to confront the 

Missouri State Guard. Price realized that his position was untenable and fell back toward the Arkansas line ahead of Frémont’s 

advance. In late October, the Federals marched into Springfield. 

General Frémont

(Library of Congress)
17

Frémont provoked controversy with a declaration of martial 

law, alienating many civilians and politicians. His decision to 

confiscate the property of Confederate sympathizers, including 

slaves, exceeded his authority as department commander. On 2 

November, President Lincoln relieved him and appointed Maj. 

Gen. David Hunter to command. Hunter withdrew the army to 

the Sedalia-Rolla line and scattered his forces across the central 

and eastern portions of the state. Meanwhile, Price’s State Guard 

secured positions around Springfield.

On 19 November, the War Department transferred General 

Hunter to command the Department of Kansas and appointed 

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in his place. Nicknamed “Old 

Brains,” Halleck often took a theoretical approach to war and 

applied his considerable intellectual prowess to solving military 

problems. In Missouri, he recognized the need to secure St. 

Louis as the base of operations for a spring campaign to control 

the Mississippi River. Accordingly, he designed a campaign to 

“drive Price from the state,” thereby ridding Missouri of the 

Confederate threat and releasing Union troops for operations 

to secure the Mississippi.

On 25 December, Halleck appointed Brig. Gen. Samuel R. 

Curtis to command the Military District of Southwest Missouri 

and instructed him to lead the 12,000-man Army of the Southwest 

against Price. In mid-January 1862, Curtis organized his forces at 

Lebanon, some fifty miles southwest of his supply base at Rolla 

and sixty miles northeast of Springfield, his immediate objective. 

Curtis appointed General Sigel second-in-command and gave 

him control of a corps of two small divisions: the 1st Division 

under Col. Peter J. Osterhaus, a Prussian, and the 2d Division 

under Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Asboth, a Hungarian. A large 

number of German immigrants from St. Louis made up these 

divisions, and Curtis took Sigel’s German ethnicity into consideration. Nevertheless, relations between Curtis and Sigel remained 

strained for the duration of the campaign. The rest of the army 

consisted of the 3d Division under Col. Jefferson C. Davis, a 

regular Army veteran from Indiana, and the 4th Division, led by 

Col. Eugene A. Carr.

Curtis’ advance units approached Springfield on 12 February 

and took the Confederates by surprise. Price had not anticipated a 

winter offensive by the Federals and had failed to prepare adequate 

fortifications. He had 8,000 men at Springfield, but with General 
18 

McCulloch’s command in 

Northwest Arkansas, the 

Confederates could not effect 

a concentration in time. 

Price ordered an expeditious 

retreat down the Telegraph 

Road toward the state line. 

Curtis paused in Springfield 

long enough to secure the 

town and then pursued Price. 

For Curtis and Halleck, 

possession of Springfield itself 

meant little without putting 

an end to the Confederate 

presence in Missouri, and 

that meant the destruction of 

Price’s army.

With Price in flight, 

Curtis had to take decisive action to catch the Confederates 

before they escaped Missouri. He disregarded Halleck’s admonition to keep his forces together and, at Sigel’s behest, divided 

the army. Curtis pushed the 3d and 4th Divisions down the 

Telegraph Road while Sigel’s command moved along a parallel 

series of roads to the west in an attempt to get in front of Price. 

Snow, ice, and freezing conditions slowed the movement of both 

columns. A Missouri Confederate noted that “snow was all over 

us, and our clothes frozen to our bodies.” Curtis failed to prevent 

Price’s escape, and on 16 February, the Confederates crossed 

into Arkansas. Rather than stop at the state line, however, Curtis 

continued the pursuit. 

Just inside Arkansas, the Federals encountered stiff resistance near Little Sugar Creek. Unbeknownst to Curtis, elements of 

McCulloch’s command under Col. Louis Hebert had come up to 

support Price. Curtis halted pursuit and took stock of his situation. 

Already 250 miles from the supply depot at Rolla he did not want 

to extend his lines of communications deeper into enemy territory, 

particularly if, as he suspected, the Confederates were in strong 

force. Halleck instructed Curtis to secure his position and await 

support. Meanwhile, the Confederates evacuated Fayetteville, 

Arkansas, and concentrated their forces twenty-five miles to the 

south in the Boston Mountains.

General Curtis

(Library of Congress)
19

The Confederates had a new commander, Maj. Gen. Earl 

Van Dorn, an impetuous U.S. Military Academy graduate 

from Mississippi. Recent squabbles between generals Price and 

McCulloch concerning troop dispositions and command responsibilities had prompted Confederate President Jefferson Davis to 

designate the Trans-Mississippi 

as a separate military district 

and to appoint an overall 

commander. Van Dorn arrived 

in late January and consolidated the forces of McCulloch, 

Price, some Texas cavalry units, 

and a brigade of American 

Indians under Brig. Gen. Albert 

Pike, to create a new army, the 

16,000-man Army of the West. 

Van Dorn planned a spring 

campaign to capture St. Louis. 

The Federals, however, had 

seized the initiative and by the 

end of February, Curtis held 

the road network in northwest 

Arkansas as well as good defensive ground behind Little Sugar 

Creek along a broad plateau 

known as Pea Ridge.

Van Dorn devised a plan 

to regain the strategic initiative by destroying the Union Army of 

the Southwest. He would first strike Sigel’s force at Bentonville, 

Arkansas, then turn east to fall on Curtis. Once Van Dorn disposed 

of the Federals in northwest Arkansas, he would have a clear 

road to Springfield and St. Louis. Van Dorn’s plan to concentrate 

superior force against divided elements of the enemy was sound. 

In addition, the Confederates had the element of surprise working 

in their favor. However, bad weather, a lack of supplies, and poor 

staff work undermined Confederate efforts. 

Van Dorn’s army advanced from the Boston Mountains on 4 

March, but the next day Unionists in northwest Arkansas alerted 

Curtis to the rebel movements. On 6 March Curtis concentrated 

his troops at a fortified position astride the Telegraph Road, north 

of Little Sugar Creek. When General Van Dorn neared Bentonville, 

General Van Dorn

(Library of Congress)
20 

he realized that Sigel had fled and that Curtis had concentrated his 

army in a defensive position to the east. That night at a council-ofwar, General McCulloch identified a road called the Bentonville 

Detour that ran around Curtis’ right and led to the Telegraph Road 

near Cross Timber Hollow, five miles to the rear of the Union 

position. McCulloch suggested a flanking movement with part 

of the rebel army to force Curtis out of his entrenchments and 

compel his retreat to Missouri. Van Dorn, however, envisioned 

a grand flanking maneuver with his entire command to envelop 

the enemy position completely and force Curtis to surrender. 

Van Dorn ordered the Confederates to begin the operation at 

once, although McCulloch and Price protested that the men were 

exhausted and hungry. Nevertheless, by 2400, the Confederates 

were on the march. 

Meanwhile, the Federals did not stand by idly and await 

attack. On the afternoon of 6 March, Curtis created defensive 

positions that commanded clear fields of fire to his front and 

flanks. He also secured avenues of approach on all sides. At the 

suggestion of Col. Grenville M. Dodge, he ordered trees felled 

across the Bentonville Detour to slow any Confederate attempt 

at a flanking maneuver.

By dawn, only General Price’s command had reached the 

Telegraph Road in the rear of Curtis’ line, while McCulloch’s men 

remained strung out along the Bentonville Detour. Realizing that 

McCulloch could not reach the staging ground at Cross Timber 

Hollow until midafternoon, Van Dorn divided the army. He 

ordered Price to move south along the Telegraph Road to the 

Elkhorn Tavern. Meanwhile, McCulloch would march two and 

a half miles along the Ford Road, a farm lane that ran east below 

the southern face of a sprawling hill known as Big Mountain. The 

path would carry McCulloch to the Telegraph Road just below 

Elkhorn Tavern and two miles above Curtis at Little Sugar Creek. 

At that point, McCulloch and Price would reunite to confront 

the Federals. 

On the morning of 7 March, Curtis expected the main 

Confederate attack to come from the south against his front. He 

realized, however, that a contingent of Confederates had indeed 

turned his right. Therefore, he ordered Colonel Osterhaus, whose 

division held the Union right, to conduct a reconnaissance in 

force, advancing north from Little Sugar Creek toward Leetown 

and the Bentonville Detour. (See Map 4.)
21

Moving north along the Leetown Road, Osterhaus spotted 

several thousand Confederates marching directly across his 

front headed east on the Ford Road toward the Telegraph Road. 

He realized that this was not a diversionary force but General 

McCulloch’s entire command, over 8,000 strong. “I could not 

hesitate in my course of action” Osterhaus reported, “the safety 

of our position was dependent upon the securing of our right 

flank and the keeping back of the enemy until I was re-enforced.” 

He deployed several companies of his cavalry under Col. Cyrus 

Bussey into line of battle and, with his artillery, opened on 

the Confederates. The attack took the latter by surprise, but 

McCulloch deployed 3,000 cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. James 

M. McIntosh, whose charge routed the outmanned Federals. 

Osterhaus brought up reinforcements, formed a line at Oberson’s 

Field, and directed his artillery to fire over the trees at the 

Confederates occupying Foster’s farm. 

Despite his initial repulse, Osterhaus had accomplished 

his immediate objective of delaying the Confederate attempt 

to concentrate at Elkhorn Tavern. Rather than risk leaving a 

Federal force in his rear, McCulloch decided to stay and fight. 

Before ordering his attack to commence, however, he was killed 

reconnoitering the Federal lines. Command devolved to General 

 Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark.

(Library of Congress)
22

McIntosh, who sent orders to launch the attack. McIntosh chose to 

lead from the front, and in the course of the attack he too fell. The 

loss of two commanding officers in fewer than two hours stunned 

the division. Leaderless, and without a clear understanding of the 

objectives, Confederate field officers pulled their troops back. 

Confederate command fell on Colonel Hebert, whose 

Arkansas brigade held the flank east of the Leetown Road. Hebert 

did not know what had happened to the rebels across the road, 

and poor communications left him unaware of his new status as 

division commander. Upon hearing the fire to the west, Hebert 

sent his brigade forward. The thick woods disrupted the brigade’s 

alignment and they soon came under fire from Union artillery. The 

Federals held back the Confederates for nearly forty-five minutes 

until Hebert’s superior numbers began to turn the fight in his favor. 

When the Confederates broke through the battery, Indiana troops 

under Col. Thomas Patterson arrived and the Federals pitched 

into the rebel’s left flank as other regiments opened on the enemy 

right. Under fire from three sides, the unsupported Confederates 

fell back in disorder as the Federals took numerous prisoners, 

including Colonel Hebert. Colonel Osterhaus thus had achieved 

 East front of the Elkhorn Tavern, Pea Ridge, c.1886 (Library of Congress)
O S T E R H A U S

VAN D E V E R

D O D GE

C A R R

CURTIS

P

R I C E

L I T T L E

M c C U L L O

C

H

M c I N T O S H H E B E R T

V

A

N

D

O

R

N

Little Sugar Creek

Fos te r’s Farm

Cross Timber

Hollow

Ruddick’s Fie ld

Oberson’s Fie ld

BIG MOUNT AIN 

Elkhorn Tavern

Ford

Pratt’s Store Winston

F O R D R O A D

T E L E G R A P H R O A D

H U N T S V I L L E R O A D

E B T N O N V LI LE D ET O U R

Leetown

DAY 1

7 March 1862

B AT TLE OF PEA RIDGE

Confederate PositionConfederate AttackConfederate RetreatUnion PositionUnion MovementUnion Retreat

0 1 2

Miles

Map 4
24 

two objectives—he had secured the right flank of the Union army 

by uncovering the Confederate turning movement and he had 

prevented the rebels from concentrating both wings of General 

Van Dorn’s army in Curtis’ rear.

As the fighting unfolded at Leetown, General Curtis 

received word of a Southern force massing several miles to his 

rear along the Telegraph Road in Cross Timber Hollow. Curtis 

discerned the Confederate strategy and took steps to address 

the threat to his rear. He ordered Colonel Carr, commander 

of the 4th Division, to send Colonel Dodge’s brigade north 

on the Telegraph Road to the Elkhorn Tavern, a way station 

that stood at the southern edge of Cross Timber Hollow on 

the Pea Ridge plateau. Dodge posted his men along the high 

ground overlooking the approach to Pea Ridge. His left rested 

between the tavern and a rise known as Big Mountain while 

his right extended east along the Huntsville Road. Carr had 

the bulk of the Union army to his rear with an unknown 

Confederate force to his front. Despite the favorable ground, 

Carr recognized the need for more men to secure the position, 

and Curtis instructed him to bring up the rest of his division, 

a brigade under Col. William Vandever. Around 1200, as 

Vandever deployed his infantry, Carr ordered a battery to fire 

on suspected Confederate positions about one-half mile away. 

Rebel guns promptly returned the fire. 

The sudden firing took both the Federals and Confederates 

by surprise. Carr did not expect to discover half of the Confederate 

army deployed into line of battle north of his front, while Price 

and Van Dorn did not anticipate meeting the Federals until they 

neared Little Sugar Creek. For over two hours firing filled the 

hollows with dense smoke. Price was shot in the arm but remained 

in command of his division. Although the Confederates outnumbered Carr’s force by over two-to-one, the Federals held the high 

ground, and Van Dorn did not press the advantage. Unaware of 

the troubles along Ford Road, he undoubtedly hoped McCulloch 

would arrive to unhinge the Federal left at Elkhorn Tavern. Only 

after learning of the battle at Leetown did Van Dorn shift to the 

tactical offensive. He instructed Price to ascend Pea Ridge and roll 

up the Union right flank on the Huntsville Road while Col. Lewis 

Henry Little’s Missouri brigade attacked the Federal left at Elkhorn 

Tavern. If successful, the Confederates would crush the Federals 

in a vise.
25

The assault got underway late in the afternoon. On the Union 

right, Colonel Dodge anticipated the Confederates and ordered 

his brigade to refuse its thin line. Dodge’s infantry held a strong 

position along a belt of woods bordering the Clemons Field, but 

with only two guns, he could do little to answer Price’s artillery. 

After enduring nearly twenty minutes of shot and shell, Dodge’s 

men braced for Confederate infantry. General Price committed 

his troops piecemeal, and the Federals repelled the attack. Price 

repeated the pattern of artillery followed by infantry but again 

failed to utilize his numerical strength, and the Confederates fell 

back a second time. Finally, Price used the woods to conceal the 

movement of a portion of his command while another contingent 

struck Dodge’s brigade head on. The Federals gave ground grudgingly and retreated toward the Telegraph Road. 

Things were no better for Colonel Vandever’s brigade on the 

Union left as the Confederates seized Elkhorn Tavern. Colonel 

Carr ordered a retreat and his division withdrew down the 

Telegraph Road for nearly one-half mile before officers directed 

them to re-form along the woods south of Ruddick’s cornfield. 

Vandever’s brigade held a position with their left on the Telegraph 

Road and Dodge’s brigade to their right.

The Confederate pursuit was ragged, and at dusk elements of 

Price’s division finally emerged from the woods north of Ruddick’s 

field. They found the Federals in line of battle supported by thirteen 

guns. Flush from the rout at Elkhorn Tavern and undeterred by the 

strong Union position, the rebels advanced across the field. Many 

of Price’s Missourians wore newly issued, undyed, wool uniforms 

that stood out as bright white against the darkness, and Union 

musketry cut them down by the score. Again, the Confederates 

failed to take advantage of superior numbers and fell back into 

the woods. During the fighting General Curtis arrived on the field 

and, sensing a chance to regain ground around Elkhorn Tavern, 

personally led some 500 reinforcements up the Telegraph Road. 

He ordered Dodge to take the 4th Iowa Infantry and join the sortie 

but as the troops pushed forward, Confederate artillery opened on 

them, and the Federals fell back.

In the day’s fighting around Elkhorn Tavern, the Confederates 

had squandered numerous opportunities. Van Dorn’s failure to immediately seize the tactical initiative in Cross Timber Hollow gave Curtis 

time to shift Carr from Little Sugar Creek to Elkhorn Tavern and 

delay the Confederate advance. Once the Confederates launched an 
26

all out attack, Carr made good use of the terrain and, rather than yield 

the ground to superior numbers, forced Van Dorn to claw his way up 

from Cross Timber Hollow to Pea Ridge. By the time the fighting on 

the Huntsville Road and at Elkhorn Tavern became general, Curtis 

knew that he had been turned and took steps to reorient his front 

180 degrees from Little Sugar Creek to face the Confederate threat 

from the north. Nevertheless, the Confederates could have pushed 

the Federals at Ruddick’s Field, but they again failed to bring superior 

numbers to bear. Personal gallantry notwithstanding, Curtis displayed 

strong, if not deliberate leadership and, despite the bold vision of his 

Southern counterpart, out-generaled Van Dorn.

Throughout the night of 7 March, the Federals completed their 

redeployment of the face of their front from south to north and 

sent the army’s supply trains to safety south of Little Sugar Creek. 

General Curtis also recalled Colonel Davis’ division from Leetown 

to extend Carr’s left across the Telegraph Road south of Ruddick’s 

Field. General Van Dorn attempted to consolidate his forces along 

the Telegraph Road below Elkhorn Tavern, but by dawn, nearly 

half of the troops from Leetown had not arrived. He positioned 

McCulloch’s men, now under General Pike, astride the Telegraph 

Road but divided General Price’s division, placing the Missouri State 

Guard on the eastern flank and the 1st and 2d Missouri brigades 

to the west. Moreover, the wooded heights known as Big Mountain 

hemmed in the Confederate right and constrained infantry movements. Although Big Mountain was a poor place for infantry, it 

provided a strong artillery platform. Yet, Van Dorn either failed to 

recognize this or simply did not foresee the need to turn this terrain 

to his advantage. Further complicating the situation for Van Dorn, 

Confederate trains made a wrong turn on the Bentonville Detour 

and had moved away from the Telegraph Road. Consequently, at 

dawn on 8 March, the Confederate ranks were thin and poorly 

aligned, as well as short of food, medicine, and munitions.

The Federals expected Van Dorn to initiate battle at dawn, 

but when a Confederate advance failed to materialize, Colonel 

Davis unleashed his artillery to probe the enemy position north 

of Ruddick’s Field (Map 5). The Confederates returned a concentrated artillery barrage toward Davis’ position, and the Federal left 

or western flank began to bend back. The artillery duel had uncovered the Confederate position, and Curtis sensed an opportunity 

to take the tactical initiative. He directed General Sigel to hurry 

his divisions from Little Sugar Creek and form on the left of Davis’ 
OSTERHAUS

ASBOTH

D AV I S C A R R

C

U

R

T I S

P

R I C E

V

A

N

D

O

R

N

Little Sugar Creek

Cross Timber

Hollow

Ruddick’s Fie ld

BIG MOUNT AIN 

Elkhorn Tavern

Clemens

Pratt’s Store

Winston

F O R D R O A D

T E L E G R A P H R O A D

H U N T S V I L L E R O A D

B E N T O N V ILLE D ET O U R

Leetown

Confederate Position

Confederate Retreat

Union Position

0 1 2

Miles

DAY 2

8 March 1862

B AT TLE OF PEA RIDGE

Map 5
28 

division. Sigel moved quickly and placed Osterhaus’ division 

between Davis’ left and a rise of ground, later called Welfey’s Knoll, 

while General Asboth aligned his command at a slight angle left 

of Osterhaus’ men. The Union line soon stretched nearly one mile 

and extended past the Confederate flanks. Moreover, the Union 

had more guns and a strong artillery platform. Around 0800, with 

deployments completed, Curtis ordered the artillery to open ahead 

of the infantry advance.

After a two-hour artillery battle Van Dorn realized the situation 

was hopeless and ordered a retreat eastward on the Huntsville Road 

before directing his army to march south to Van Buren, some one 

hundred miles distant. Troops already in line of battle would fight a 

rear guard action to protect the withdrawal and then join the retreat. 

About 1030, 10,000 Federal troops advanced against rebels at the 

Elkhorn Tavern. In the face of the onslaught, the Confederate line 

collapsed, precipitating a confused and disorderly rebel retreat. The 

confusion actually worked to the rebels’ advantage. The Federals did 

not know in which direction Van Dorn’s main force had fled, and so 

Curtis did not launch a full-scale pursuit.

The battle was costly to both sides. Of the 10,250 engaged, the 

Federals suffered 1,384 casualties, a rate of 14 percent. Casualties 

were worse for the Confederates as Van Dorn lost 2,000 of the 

12,500 men engaged, a 16 percent casualty rate. Two weeks later, 

when most of the Confederates reached Van Buren, the Army of 

the West was a shell of its former self with limited combat capabilities and little esprit de corps. For the Confederates, the campaign 

to regain Missouri had been a disaster. For the Federals, however, 

the Pea Ridge Campaign had accomplished its dual objectives of 

destroying Price’s army and saving Missouri for the Union, at least 

for the time being.

The Union Army of the Southwest moved east to secure the 

Missouri border while Van Dorn’s army crossed the Mississippi, 

intending to join Confederate forces at Corinth for operations 

against Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in Tennessee. Van Dorn’s 

removal left the Confederates in the Trans-Mississippi without an 

organized military force to contest Union troop movements. With 

the Confederate Army of the West gone, Halleck believed Curtis 

could capture Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, with relative ease 

but this was not the case. One of the unintended consequences of 

Van Dorn’s withdrawal was the emergence of guerrilla warfare in 

Arkansas. Confederate partisans, many of whom had deserted 
29

the Army of the West, waged a bloody campaign to protect 

their homeland from invasion, occupation, and subjugation. 

Confederate irregulars ambushed supply trains, harassed foraging 

parties, and executed captured Union soldiers. Despite a lack of 

centralized control, Arkansas guerrillas brought Curtis’ advance to 

a standstill at Batesville, ninety miles north of Little Rock.

In May, the Confederate War Department gave the 

command of the Trans-Mississippi District to Maj. Gen. Thomas 

C. Hindman. A skilled administrator, Hindman had built a new 

Confederate force of some 12,000 troops, dubbed the Army of 

the Trans-Mississippi. Empowered by the Partisan Ranger Act, 

passed by the Confederate congress six weeks earlier, he immediately assembled various partisan units and  small companies 

of volunteers to operate with little guidance and oversight. The 

added pressure from Hindman’s rangers was more than Curtis’ 

Northern army could endure. With Union lines of communications from Rolla in ruin, Curtis abandoned plans to reach Little 

Rock and instead turned his attention to Helena. Forced to live 

off the land, he implemented a policy of total war as he thundered down the White River, destroying everything in his path 

including civilian property. 

As for Confederate partisans, Curtis characterized 

them as villainous assassins and authorized Union 

commanders to show no 

quarter. On 12 July, Curtis’ 

Army of the Southwest took 

Helena and re-established 

supply lines with Federal 

forces on the Mississippi. 

By June 1862, the 

Confederate War Department 

expanded General Hindman’s 

authority to include the 

Department of the TransMississippi, encompassing all 

Confederate territory west of 

the Mississippi River. Having 

foiled the Union offensive, 

he turned his attention to 

General Hindman

(Library of Congress)
30 

rebuilding a conventional force. His draconian approach, however, 

angered many in the Department, and in August, Richmond 

demoted Hindman to command of the Arkansas District and 

appointed Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes, a veteran of the 

regular Army, as commander of the Department of the TransMississippi. Hindman persuaded Holmes to renew the offensive against Springfield by going on the offensive in Northwest 

Arkansas.

Reports of Confederate cavalry activity drew General Curtis’ 

attention to southwest Missouri. He instructed Brig. Gen. John M. 

Schofield to secure the Missouri-Arkansas border and eliminate 

any Confederate force in the area. Schofield took the newly formed 

Army of the Frontier into the region and scattered the small force 

of Confederates there. He posted two divisions at Springfield and a 

third seventy-five miles south at Maysville, Arkansas. Complaining 

of illness, he returned to St. Louis, leaving Brig. Gen. James G. 

Blunt in command. Upon learning of Blunt’s exposed position in 

Arkansas, Curtis advised him to fall back toward Springfield, but 

the counsel went unheeded.

In November, with the Army of the Trans-Mississippi concentrated at Fort Smith, Arkansas, Hindman seized what he saw as an 

opportunity to destroy the Union Army of the Frontier, starting 

with Blunt. He sent 2,000 cavalrymen under Brig. Gen. John S. 

Marmaduke to screen the Confederate advance. At the same time, 

Blunt pushed his 5,000-man division south to probe Confederate 

dispositions. The forces clashed on 28 November at Cane Hill. 

The Federals won a tactical victory, but Blunt’s advanced position 

left him even more vulnerable and over one hundred miles from 

support. Still, after the fighting, he remained at Cane Hill. Blunt’s 

decision was imprudent and needlessly put the security of his 

command and of southwest Missouri at risk.

On 3 December, Hindman moved to take advantage of Blunt’s 

exposed position. His plan called for infantry to strike the force 

at Cane Hill, while cavalry rode east to gain the Federal rear and 

compel Blunt to surrender. Although Hindman’s plan was technically sound, his army was ill prepared for the operation. Most of 

his men were green recruits or conscripts, and many shouldered 

inferior smoothbore muskets. Moreover, munitions and other 

supplies were insufficient to conduct the campaign effectively. 

Meanwhile, Blunt sent word for Brig. Gen. Francis J. Herron, 

in command of two Union divisions in Springfield, to move his 
31

force south to Cane Hill at once. Herron led his 7,000 men on a 

forced march from Springfield, and arrived in Fayetteville before 

dawn on 7 December, having covered some 115 miles at a pace of 

over 35 miles per day. Hindman learned of Herron’s advance on the 

night of 6 December but was not sure of his numerical strength. 

Nevertheless, he could not strike Blunt as planned with a Federal 

force in position to fall on his rear. He therefore decided to move 

east and attack Herron’s command before it reached Cane Hill. 

General Hindman moved his army to Prairie Grove, ten 

miles southwest of Fayetteville, and took up a defensive position 

on the hills overlooking the Illinois River and commanding the 

road to Cane Hill. When Herron’s divisions arrived, the column 

came under fire from Confederate batteries on the ridge. Herron 

deployed his rifled guns along the Illinois River beyond reach 

of Confederate smoothbore cannon and destroyed Hindman’s 

batteries. Federal infantry attacked the Confederate position, 

and throughout the morning, the armies struggled for control 

of the high ground. Meanwhile, at Cane Hill, Blunt remained 

unaware of Herron’s predicament until the sounds of battle drew 

him toward Fayetteville. His Federals arrived at Prairie Grove 

after 1200, and attacked the Confederate left, just as Herron 

began to falter. Hindman repulsed Blunt’s attack but could not 

exploit his advantage. As dusk approached, the battle came to an 

inconclusive end. 

Hindman asked for a cease-fire to retrieve his casualties, 

and Blunt agreed. The truce was a ruse, however, and in the early 

hours of 8 December, Hindman withdrew his army to Fort Smith. 

During the retreat, many Confederates deserted, disillusioned with 

Hindman and the Confederacy. Blunt was furious and accused 

Hindman of unchivalrous conduct. He declared victory and, in 

late December, moved to take Van Buren and Fort Smith, both 

in northwest Arkansas. Hindman retreated south of the Arkansas 

River and then turned east toward Little Rock.

Although Prairie Grove ended as a tactical draw, it was another 

strategic Union victory. The battle decimated Hindman’s army and 

thereby crippled the Confederacy’s ability to wage an effective 

campaign for Missouri. Missouri and much of Arkansas would 

remain in Union hands for the rest of the war. The Federals held 

a firm grip on the area north of the Arkansas River from Indian 

Territory to the Mississippi River. In January 1863, they captured 

Fort Hindman, 117 miles southeast of Little Rock at Arkansas Post. 
32 

In September, Little Rock and 

Pine Bluff fell, and Union forces 

secured control of the Arkansas 

River Valley. These Union victories confined Southern forces to 

the southwest corner of the state. 

For the Confederates, failure 

at Prairie Grove led to Hindman’s 

transfer east and a shake-up in 

command for the Department of 

the Trans-Mississippi. Richmond 

reduced General Holmes to the 

Arkansas district command and 

appointed Lt. Gen. Edmund 

Kirby Smith to head the department. Kirby Smith was a West 

Point graduate and regular Army 

veteran, known across the South 

for his timely arrival at First Manassas, his organizational skills as a 

department commander in East Tennessee, and his role in the 1862 

Kentucky Campaign. 

The Red River Campaign: The S

for Louisiana and Te

Along with St. Louis, New Orleans was a key component 

in the Union strategy to control the Mississippi River. Without 

control of the lower Mississippi and the Gulf Coast region, the 

United States could not project its military power in that sector 

of the Trans-Mississippi. The capture of New Orleans in April 

1862 opened the door for the Union to push north from the 

mouth of the Mississippi while other Federal forces drove south 

along the river from Missouri, Arkansas, and Tennessee. At that 

time, the U. S. War Department began discussions regarding a 

campaign into Texas. Establishing a military presence in Texas 

would compel the Confederates to divert manpower from other 

theaters to meet the threat. Beyond that, the occupation of Texas 

would deprive Southern forces east of the Mississippi of an 

important source of food, animals, and raw materials. 

Other voices also called for a Texas campaign. Many Northern 

politicians argued that the large German immigrant population in 

Texas would support the Union as volunteers for military service 

General Kirby Smith

(Library of Congress)
33

and as voters to re-establish a 

pro-Union state government. 

Economic and business interests also exerted pressure on the 

Lincoln administration to invade 

Texas. The Northern textile 

industry suffered from a cotton 

shortage that shuttered nearly 

three-quarters of the nation’s 

mills and fueled both unemployment and inflation. To many 

Eastern industrialists, control 

of the Texas cotton fields held 

the solution to their economic 

woes. For all of these reasons, in 

October 1862, Secretary of War 

Edwin M. Stanton instructed 

Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks to 

prepare for an invasion of the 

Lone Star state.

On 14 December 1862, Banks arrived in New Orleans as 

commander of the Department of the Gulf. A former governor 

of Massachusetts and United States Congressman, Banks received 

the appointment for his political aptitude and not his military 

achievements. His orders were to secure the western side of the 

Mississippi River Valley, cooperate with General Grant in gaining 

control of the Mississippi River, and then turn toward Texas. To 

achieve these ends, General Banks commanded the XIX Corps 

with four divisions made up primarily of recent volunteers from 

New England and New York. Nearly half of the 42,000 troops under 

his command had enlisted for nine months, and few possessed any 

prior military experience. Banks deployed 40,000 troops in New 

Orleans for operations along the Mississippi, while the remainder 

garrisoned in Pensacola. 

Banks directed most of his attention to developing a campaign 

along the Mississippi but felt beholden to the “on-to-Texas” contingent of politicians and cotton speculators that had accompanied 

him to New Orleans. Accordingly, he dispatched 300 men from the 

42d Massachusetts Infantry to support a small Federal force that 

held a tenuous foothold in Galveston, Texas. The Confederates’ 

Texas district commander, Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, devised a 

General Banks

(Library of Congress)
34 

two-pronged attack on the port city that called for approximately 

1,000 dismounted cavalry troops to strike the Federal garrison by 

land while two cotton-clad gunboats, manned by 300 sharpshooters, 

slipped into Galveston Bay and engaged the six Union ships 

protecting the fortifications. 

At dawn on New Year’s Day 1863, Magruder’s joint force 

struck the Union outpost. Although the overland attack failed, 

Confederate ships inflicted significant damage to their Union 

counterparts. With two Union gunboats crippled, the remainder 

of the warships steamed to safety in the Gulf. The outnumbered 

42d Massachusetts surrendered, and the Confederates regained 

control of Galveston and the Texas coastline. For the moment, 

Union occupation of Texas would have to wait as Banks turned his 

focus to the reduction of Port Hudson, the Confederate fortress on 

the Mississippi between Baton Rouge and Vicksburg. 

As Banks probed the avenues of advance from New Orleans to 

Port Hudson, a small Confederate force in south central Louisiana 

menaced his lines of communications. In the District of Western 

Louisiana, Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor commanded two Confederate 

divisions of Texans and Louisianans, many of whom were fighting 

in defense of their hometowns. The son of former United States 

President Zachary Taylor and 

brother-in-law of Confederate 

President Davis, Taylor had 

served as a brigadier general 

under “Stonewall” Jackson 

in the Shenandoah Valley. 

Recently transferred to 

district command in his home 

state, he engineered sorties 

that forced Banks to divert his 

attention from Port Hudson. 

Banks detached 16,000 men 

in two divisions and one 

brigade to clean the Bayou 

Teche region of Confederates 

in a campaign conducted 

from early April through late 

May 1863. The region was 

some sixty miles west of the 

Mississippi River in the south 

General Taylor

(Library of Congress)
35

central portion of Louisiana, and the Bayou Teche flowed for 120 

miles south from Opelousas to join the Atchafalaya River below 

Grand Lake, west of New Orleans. 

By 9 April, the Federals reached Fort Bisland, the Confederate 

works west of Grand Lake on the Bayou Teche. Banks divided his 

force and, using naval transports on Grand Lake, forced Taylor’s 

withdrawal from Fort Bisland. The Confederates moved up the 

bayou, deep into the Louisiana interior. The Federals pushed 

north all the way to Alexandria, just above the confluence of the 

Mississippi and the Red River. 

In early May, as General Grant stepped up his campaign to 

take Vicksburg, Banks installed his army as an occupation force 

and began to probe the area beyond Alexandria for pathways into 

Texas. His foray deep into Louisiana concerned the Union high 

command. His army had already cleared Taylor’s troops from the 

Teche region and, in doing so, had cut Port Hudson’s supply line 

from the Louisiana interior. Banks’ current operations, however, 

had little to do with his primary mission to clear the lower 

Mississippi, and from Washington, D.C., General in Chief of the 

U.S. Army Halleck called the activities at Alexandria “too eccentric to be pursued.” He demanded that Banks move against Port 

Hudson immediately. On 14 May, Banks marched his command 

toward the Mississippi. By the time he arrived, one week later, he 

had concentrated 30,000 Federal troops against 7,500 Confederates 

at Port Hudson. 

Despite the numerical discrepancy, the Confederate position 

was strong. The fortifications stretched across high ground, while 

the terrain surrounding the position was swampy and choked 

with thick underbrush that provided poor fields of fire and few 

avenues of advance for an attacking force. Moreover, interior lines 

allowed the talented Confederate commander, Maj. Gen. Franklin 

K. Gardner, to shift his troops and mass his firepower as needed. 

Banks devised a plan to offset Gardner’s interior lines by ordering 

a simultaneous assault along the entire Confederate position. He 

assigned Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman to lead the left wing and 

Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel the right wing. Maj. Gen. Christopher 

C. Augur and Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover would direct the attack 

against the Confederate center. Although Banks’ subordinates 

disagreed on the wisdom of the plan, arguing instead for a siege, 

the commanding general insisted, “The people of the North want 

blood,” and he ordered the attack to proceed. 
36 

On 27 May at 0530, Federal batteries and gunboats began 

shelling Port Hudson, but the infantry assault failed to unfold as 

planned. Weitzel’s right wing moved against the northern flank 

of the Confederate line at 0600 but the terrain disrupted unit 

cohesion. Moreover, Union forces in the center and on the left failed 

to move in concert with the right wing, thus allowing Gardner to 

shift troops to meet each threat in turn. The Union left wing did 

not get under way until after 1200, and by then the Confederates 

had repulsed Weitzel’s attack and secured the northern sector. The 

Union left wing thus faced a reinforced Confederate line, which 

the Federals were unable to break. Sherman fell wounded and was 

carried from the field. Similarly, at the center, Augur waited for 

direct orders to advance and did not move until after Sherman’s 

repulse, while Grover’s men did not advance until 1500. By then, 

the defenders had blunted the uncoordinated Union assault, and 

Banks broke off the fighting. 

The Confederates counted fewer than 500 casualties, while 

Federal losses numbered over 2,000 and included some African 

American troops from the 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guard 

organized in the fall of 1862. These regiments were in Col. John A. 

Nelson’s brigade of Brig. Gen. William Dwight’s division and saw 

action as part of the Union right wing. 

Following the assaults of 27 May, General Banks settled in 

for a siege. On 14 June, he ordered an attack against a portion of 

the Confederate center at Fort Desperate but could not break the 

Southern lines. The Confederates held on at Port Hudson until 

receiving word that Vicksburg had fallen on 4 July. On 9 July, Port 

Hudson surrendered. With the Mississippi River in Union hands, 

Banks returned his attention to Texas.

By the summer of 1863, a new development added to the urgency 

of the Texas mission. French Emperor Napoleon III had invaded 

Mexico in 1861, and in June 1863, his troops captured Mexico City. 

Rumblings of a possible Franco-Confederate alliance worried the 

Lincoln administration. Union control of Texas would do much to 

dissuade the French from aiding the Confederates, and the conquest 

of Texas was therefore of increasing importance to President Lincoln. 

General Banks examined a variety of invasion routes and 

favored an amphibious landing on the Gulf Coast over a campaign 

through the Louisiana interior. In August, he devised a plan to 

move elements of the XIX Corps on naval transports to Sabine 

Pass, a lightly defended position on the Gulf at the border of 
37

Texas and Louisiana. Once the 

Federals gained control of the 

pass, they would use the area as 

a staging ground for a full-scale 

invasion of Texas, while the 

Navy protected supply lines on 

the Gulf and up the Sabine River. 

Banks gave Maj. Gen. 

William B. Franklin command 

of the expedition. Franklin 

was a West Point graduate 

whose lackluster performance 

at Fredericksburg in 1862 had 

earned him a transfer to the 

Trans-Mississippi. Nonetheless, 

with elements of the XIII 

Corps arriving in New Orleans, 

ostensibly to replace troops 

whose enlistments had recently 

expired, Banks reorganized the XIX Corps and gave Franklin the 

command. On 4 September, an invasion force of 5,000 bluecoats 

boarded transports and, accompanied by several gunboats, set 

out for the Sabine Pass. 

On 7 September, the flotilla reached the pass without incident, 

but the following day brought disaster. Confederate Lt. Richard 

W. “Dick” Dowling, a young Irish immigrant, held the position 

with just forty-two men, mostly Irish-born Texans, and twelve 

guns. Dowling’s artillery controlled the channel, and it decimated 

the Union force, disabling 2 ships and inflicting 375 casualties, 

while the Confederates did not lose a single man. Franklin abandoned the mission and returned to New Orleans. Texas district 

commander General Magruder called Dowling’s performance “the 

most extraordinary feat of the war.”

After the fiasco at Sabine Pass, Banks designed overlapping operations for Texas and Louisiana. In October 1863, he 

ordered General Franklin into the Teche region with instructions 

to advance to Opelousas, the temporary Confederate capital of 

Louisiana. Once Franklin reached that point, the Federals could 

continue to move northwest and reach Texas by way of the Red 

River, or turn west and strike for the Sabine River. Franklin’s 

column moved cautiously as enemy cavalry slashed at its flanks 

General Franklin

(Library of Congress)
38 

and rear. When the outnumbered Confederates offered battle near 

Opelousas, Franklin ordered a retreat. 

At the same time, Banks sent another amphibious expedition 

to Brownsville, Texas. Across the Rio Grande from Matamoras, 

Brownsville was a trade center for cotton, munitions, and 

medicine. The 2d Division of the XIII Corps took Brownsville 

on 6 November and installed Andrew Jackson Hamilton, a Texas 

Unionist, as provisional governor. The Federals now controlled the 

lower Rio Grande valley from Brownsville up to Laredo but failed 

to shut down illicit trade or win over civilians to the Union occupation. In the spring of 1864, General Magruder sent Col. John 

Salmon “Rip” Ford to retake the lower Rio Grande Valley. Ford was 

a former Texas Ranger and politician, who forged a colorful collection of state troops, conscripts, home guard, deserters, partisans, 

outlaws, and civilians, ranging from teenagers to old men, into his 

self-styled Cavalry of the West. Urging his men to defend their 

homes against the “mongrel force” of Union invaders, Ford inched 

his 1,800-man force south from San Antonio toward Laredo and 

then east toward Brownsville. In late June, a 400-man Confederate 

reconnaissance force clashed 

with Union troops outside 

of Brownsville. Ford learned 

that fewer than half of the 

6,000 Union troops remained 

at Fort Brown. For three 

weeks, he prepared to attack 

the fort, but in late July, he 

learned that the Federals had 

evacuated Brownsville.

Meanwhile, General 

Halleck started to pressure 

Banks to invade Texas 

through Louisiana along 

the Red River. Halleck 

promised to provide Banks 

with support from Maj. Gen. 

Frederick Steele’s Army of 

Arkansas and from Maj. Gen. 

William T. Sherman’s Army 

of the Tennessee. In addition, 

President Lincoln endorsed 

General Steele

(National Archives)
39

a Red River campaign, in part because Banks could use Louisiana 

as a laboratory for the administration’s reconstruction policy. Banks 

consented and, with Halleck’s direction, began to draw up plans for 

the campaign. 

The Army of the Gulf would provide most of the manpower 

for the expedition with over 18,000 men under Banks’ command. 

General Franklin would lead the XIX Corps with Brig. Gen. William 

H. Emory’s 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Albert L. Lee’s Cavalry 

Division. Brig. Gen. Thomas E. G. Ransom would command a 

detachment from the XIII Corps that included the 3d Division 

under Brig. Gen. Robert A. Cameron and the 4th Division under 

Col. William J. Landram. The expedition would draw on an additional 11,000 men from the XVI and XVII Corps of the Army of 

the Tennessee. Brig. Gen. Andrew Jackson Smith, a Pennsylvanian, 

West Point graduate, and regular Army veteran, led this contingent that included two divisions from the XVI Corps, the 1st and 

3d under the command of Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower, along with 

a provisional division from the XVII Corps, designated as the 2d 

Division under Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby Smith. Joining A. J. Smith’s 

command was Brig. Gen. Alfred W. 

Ellet’s Mississippi Marine Brigade. 

Banks planned a massive 

pincer movement directed at 

Shreveport, Louisiana, the new 

capital of the Confederate TransMississippi and the department’s 

industrial center. The XIX and 

XIII Corps would march from 

Baton Rouge to Alexandria; there 

they would unite with General A. 

J. Smith’s forces. Admiral David 

D. Porter’s fleet of warships 

would accompany these troops 

to Alexandria. Porter’s fleet, the 

largest ever assembled on North 

American waters, totaled 104 

vessels and included an array 

of ironclads, tinclads, river 

monitors, and transports. Once 

united at Alexandria, Banks, A. J. 

Smith, and Porter would advance 

General A. J. Smith

(National Archives)
40 

northwest along the Red River to Shreveport with the navy 

providing logistical support as well as firepower. At Shreveport, 

the Louisiana arm of the campaign would rendezvous with 

11,000 troops from Arkansas under General Steele. This force 

consisted of the 3d Division of Steele’s VII Corps, a total of 7,000 

men, and another 4,000 soldiers from the Army of the Frontier 

under Brig. Gen. John M. Thayer. Steele and Thayer would unite 

their forces in the southwest corner of the state at Arkadelphia, 

the former marching southwest from Little Rock and the latter 

marching south from Fort Smith. From Arkadelphia, they would 

continue on to Shreveport and a junction with Banks’ army. 

Once in Shreveport, a portion of Banks’ force would march west 

into Texas, while the remainder occupied the city.

The plan suffered from poor design with too many elements 

left to chance. While Banks stipulated Shreveport as the objective, he never clearly defined or prioritized the military, political, 

and economic goals for the campaign. He certainly hoped to 

take the offensive against enemy forces that totaled less than 

one-third of his numbers, but he did not specify the destruction of the Confederate army in Louisiana as the primary objective. Moreover, Banks would not achieve concentration until he 

reached Shreveport. The multifaceted operation called for precise 

coordination and communication between columns separated 

by hundreds of miles. Worse yet for Banks, the Northern press 

published the particulars of the invasion plans, and Confederate 

operatives in New Orleans provided detailed information of the 

operation to General Taylor. The lack of security eliminated the 

element of surprise. This gave the Confederates an opportunity 

to utilize interior lines to gain a tactical advantage at a time and 

place of their choosing.

Internal divisions further jeopardized the Union plans. While 

the campaign included units from four different armies and from 

the navy, General Halleck failed to appoint a single individual 

to direct the action. General William T. Sherman had offered 

to oversee operations, but Banks outranked him, and Sherman 

refused to serve under an officer of dubious military talent. As a 

result, Sherman sent General A. J. Smith to lead the contingent 

from the Army of the Tennessee. In Arkansas, General Steele 

was unenthusiastic about the campaign. He sought to exert his 

authority by continually making unilateral decisions regarding the 

disposition of his command and the prosecution of the campaign. 
41

The navy added to the internal 

dissention as Admiral Porter 

considered himself exempt 

from orders, instructions, 

or suggestions issued by any 

army officer, particularly from 

a nonprofessional like Banks. 

General Grant specified that 

A. J. Smith’s troops were on 

loan and that Banks must 

return them to the Army of 

the Tennessee by 15 April, thus 

creating an arbitrary deadline 

for the capture of Shreveport. 

Beset by a host of problems, 

the campaign got underway 

on 7 March 1864, one week 

behind schedule, when Lee’s 

5,000 Union cavalry troopers 

rode out from Baton Rouge, headed for Alexandria. A. J. Smith’s 

Federals left Vicksburg on 10 March and, along with Porter’s fleet, 

entered the Red River two days later. The lead column of Banks’ 

infantry, commanded by General Franklin, set off on 15 March. 

The Federals in Arkansas did not begin until 21 March, nearly 

three weeks behind schedule. 

Admiral Porter

(Library of Congress)

The Red River Expedition, Louisiana and Texas, 1864

(Library of Congress)
MANSURA 16 May 1864 

FORT DERUSSEY 14 Mar 1864 

YELLOW BAYOU 18 May 1864 PORT HUDSON 27 May–9 Jul 1863 

NEW ORLEANS 29 Apr 1862 

FORT BISLAND 9 Apr 1863 

VICKSBURG 18 May–4 Jul 1863 

SABINE PASS 8 Sep 1863 

PLEASANT HILL 9 Apr 1864 

MANSFIELD

8 Apr 1864

JENKINS FERRY 30 Apr 1864 

Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Ouachita R

Arkansas R

Saline R

Red R

Red R

Sabine R

Yazoo R

Pearl R

Atchafalaya R

Bayou Teche

Grand Lake

Gulf of Mexico

Springeld Landing

Fort Adams

Helena

Pine Blu

Monroe

Yazoo City

Shreveport

Alexandria

Opelousas

Natchitoches

Grand Ecore

Camden

Hot Springs

Arkadelphia

Natchez

Baton Rouge

JACKSON

LITTLE ROCK

TEXAS

L O U ISIAN A

ARKANSAS

MISSISSIPPI

Engagement

April 1862–May 1864

LOUISIANA-ARKANSAS BAT TLEFIELD

0 50 100

Miles

Map 6
43

Confederate agents apprised General Kirby Smith of the 

Union campaign in January, and he ordered Trans-Mississippi 

district commanders to prepare. Troops in Indian Territory 

gathered along the Arkansas border, while those in Texas moved 

toward the Louisiana line. In Arkansas, Price, recently elevated to 

district command and the rank of major general, had 14,000 troops. 

He deployed his cavalry above Camden, while Brig. Gen. Thomas 

Churchill held the town with his own division of Arkansas infantry 

and Brig. Gen. Mosby Parson’s division of Missourians. Kirby 

Smith ordered General Taylor to dam the Red River upstream by 

sinking the 300-foot steamer New Falls City, and wedging bow and 

stern into opposite riverbanks. Downstream, Taylor’s men refurbished a series of forts and water batteries, the most prominent of 

which, Fort DeRussy, stood between the mouth of the Red River 

and Alexandria (Map 6). 

General Kirby Smith ordered Taylor and Price to retard the 

Federal advance but to avoid a general engagement and fall back 

toward Shreveport. By using interior lines, Kirby Smith hoped to 

mass his forces at a central position for a strike against whichever 

arm of the Federal pincer presented the more immediate threat to 

the capital. Then, he would turn and concentrate against the other 

Federal column. While this plan was sound, given the numerical 

discrepancy that Kirby Smith faced, it required Taylor and Price to 

retreat in the face of the enemy, and neither district commander 

endorsed the strategy.

On 13 March, the Federal vanguard ascended the Red River. 

The next day the joint Federal force advanced fifteen miles up river 

to the Confederate works at Fort DeRussy. Porter’s gunships began 

to shell the fort while A. J. Smith deployed the 1st and 2d Brigades 

of the 1st Division, XVI Corps, into line of battle to take the rebel 

defenses from the rear. Confederate Maj. Gen. John G. Walker 

prepared to contest the Federal advance along the Marksville Road, 

but citing the discrepancy in strength and firepower, fell back 

without a fight, and Fort DeRussy surrendered before the Union 

assault began. The battle was little more than a skirmish, with the 

Federals suffering 38 casualties while capturing 310 Confederates, 

10 guns, and a supply of ordnance. With the lower Red River in 

Federal hands, the path to Alexandria lay open. Taylor abandoned 

the town and moved upriver toward Natchitoches. 

General Banks did not reach Alexandria until 25 March, 

ten days after the first Federal troops had entered the town. He 
44 

and Admiral Porter faced significant challenges. The anticipated 

seasonal rise in the water level of the Red River above Alexandria 

had failed to materialize. This meant that most vessels in Porter’s 

fleet could not continue upriver, leaving Banks without logistical 

support. Under pressure from Grant to take Shreveport by 15 

April, Porter managed to get thirteen gunboats and thirty transports above the falls at Alexandria on the Red River. On 26 March, 

advance elements of Banks’ column moved toward Natchitoches, 

where they arrived on 30 March. 

At Natchitoches, General Banks’ staff failed to locate the road 

that ran alongside the Red River to Shreveport. Rather than spend 

additional time reconnoitering, Banks chose to have his men take 

the stagecoach road that ran inland, away from the river and from 

the protection of the Union fleet. Porter would continue upriver 

while Banks marched across country through Mansfield. Once 

past Mansfield, the army and navy would reunite at Springfield 

Landing, just below Shreveport, and reach their objective ahead of 

General Grant’s 15 April deadline. Banks’ troops began the march 

on 6 April, while Porter began to steam for Springfield Landing 

the following day. Banks based his decision in part on misleading 

intelligence from locals, as well as the lack of resistance from 

Confederate forces. Certainly pressure from Grant to return A. J. 

Smith’s troops to the Army of the Tennessee also influenced Banks. 

Nevertheless, the decision proved a costly mistake that changed 

the course of the campaign. 

The stagecoach road was narrow, at some points no more 

than a ditch that snaked its way through pine forests that pressed 

in from both sides. The march progressed slowly with Lee’s Union 

cavalry in the lead. Franklin’s troops followed, strung out for 

twenty miles, with A. J. Smith’s command slogging through the 

mud left in Franklin’s wake. 

Lee ran into Brig. Gen. Thomas Green’s veteran Texas cavalry 

at Wilson’s farm, twenty miles south of Mansfield. Recognizing 

that he faced more than token enemy resistance, Lee brought up 

his artillery to drive off the Confederates and sent word to Franklin 

for support. He eventually received the 1st Brigade, some 1,200 

men, of Landram’s division of the XIII Corps.

On the evening of 7 April, after a council of war, General 

Taylor determined that the Federal order of march combined with 

the wooded terrain and the narrow road reduced Banks’ ability 

to rapidly concentrate his superior firepower. On the other hand, 
45

once past Mansfield, the road divided into three parallel avenues 

of advance, with one road running to the river at Springfield 

Landing. This would allow Banks to move his army along separate 

roads, each within supporting distance of one another, and enable 

his infantry to re-establish contact with the fleet. Taylor concluded 

that if the Federals passed Mansfield, Shreveport would certainly 

fall. Consequently, he decided to disregard General Kirby Smith’s 

orders to fall back toward a concentration of forces at Shreveport 

and to take the offensive south of Mansfield. 

Taylor selected the Moss plantation three miles below the 

town to confront the Federal advance. There, the road emerged 

from the woods on Honeycutt Hill and ran northwest across an 

open field that measured 1,200 yards in length and 800 yards in 

width. Taylor planned to deploy infantry across the road and use 

the woods north of the field to conceal his cavalry on the flanks. He 

hoped to draw Banks down from Honeycutt Hill and into the open 

where the Confederate infantry would drive the Federals back on 

their trains while Confederate cavalry enveloped the flanks. 

Col. Frank Emerson’s Federal brigade, accompanied by 

Colonel Landram, reached General Lee’s cavalry camp at Carroll’s 

Mill early on the morning of 8 April and the cavalry promptly 

renewed the advance. The Federals drove Confederate skirmishers 

through woods for six miles until they reached the clearing below 

the northwest slope of Honeycutt Hill. There, across the field, Lee 

saw Taylor’s force deployed into line of battle. Lee positioned his 

troopers in a defensive alignment along the crest of Honeycutt Hill 

and sent word to General Franklin for infantry support. Franklin 

instructed Ransom to bring up the 2d Brigade of the 4th Division, 

and General Banks rode to the front to assess the situation. Banks 

arrived around 1300 and sent word for Franklin to bring up the 

remainder of his force at once. The commanding general instructed 

Lee to hold his position until support arrived.

Lee skirmished with the Confederates throughout the afternoon as Union support came to the front, slowed by the narrow 

road and the wooded terrain. By 1530, Landram’s 4th Division 

was in position with Col. Joseph W. Vance’s brigade to the right 

of the road and Emerson’s brigade astride the road. Capt. Ormand 

F. Nims’ 2d Massachusetts battery took a position in the center of 

the road while the Chicago Mercantile battery, under Lt. Pinkney 

S. Cone, unlimbered its guns northeast of the road on the slope of 

Honeycutt Hill. The Federals positioned cavalry on the flanks with 
46 

Col. Thomas J. Lucas’ brigade securing the right and Col. Nathan 

A. M. Dudley’s brigade anchoring the left. Altogether, the Federals 

had 5,000 men. 

Nearly 1,000 yards across the field, Taylor had deployed Brig. 

Gen. J. Alfred Mouton’s division to the left of the Mansfield Road 

and posted Walker’s Texans to the right with elements of Green’s 

cavalry holding each flank and artillery manning the center. 

Taylor had 8,800 effectives and outnumbered the Federals, but the 

Federals remained atop Honeycutt Hill in a defensive posture, and 

with each passing hour they grew in strength as reinforcements 

arrived at the front. Taylor had to take the initiative or risk losing 

the battle and the campaign. At 1600, he ordered Mouton to attack.

On the Confederate left, Mouton’s division charged across 

the field and up the slope of Honeycutt Hill northeast of the 

Mansfield Road. To their front, General Ransom’s five Union regiments commanded the field from a strong position behind a split 

rail fence. Two hundred yards from the Federal line, advancing 

Confederates reached a swale and paused to re-form. General 

Mouton rode among his men to rally the troops, and they soon 

renewed the assault. As Mouton’s division closed on the Federal 

right, Taylor sent Walker’s division against the left. Walker’s Texans 

struck the line and battled for control of the Union guns on the 

Mansfield Road. General Ransom pulled the 83d Ohio Infantry 

from the right flank and sent them to rescue the battery but by the 

time the regiment arrived, the Texans had broken the Union left, 

seized the battery, and turned the guns on the Federals. 

Confederates swarmed across the crest of Honeycutt Hill 

and the Union line collapsed. Ransom was wounded, and brigade 

commanders Emerson and Vance were wounded and taken 

prisoner. Without leaders to steady the men and direct the retreat, 

Federal discipline disintegrated. Confederates cut off the 48th Ohio 

Infantry and 130th Illinois Infantry and nearly annihilated these 

regiments. Meanwhile, the remaining Union soldiers fell back 

through the woods until they met General Cameron and the 3d 

Division of the XIII Corps, accompanied by General Franklin. The 

Federals re-formed with the remnants of some cavalry, as Franklin 

sent an order to General Emory to bring up the XIX Corps and 

form a defensive line to the rear of the XIII Corps, lest the enemy 

force another retreat. In less than an hour, the Union line began to 

break again. General Banks arrived as the line gave way and could 

not rally the panicked troops. Soldiers became entangled with the 
47

trains, and Confederate cavalry enveloped the flanks, gobbling up 

prisoners and shooting men as they fled. General Franklin suffered 

a leg wound and barely escaped capture. 

Around 1800, the retreating Federals reached Emory’s 

deployed XIX Corps at Pleasant Grove, two miles below the Moss 

Plantation. The Confederates approached, but the day’s fighting 

left them too disorganized for another coordinated assault. 

The Battle of Mansfield, also called Sabine Crossroads, cost 

Banks 2,200 casualties out of 12,000 engaged while Taylor lost 1,000 

men of his 8,800. Among Taylor’s losses was General Mouton, who 

was killed on Honeycutt Hill after the Federals had begun their 

retreat. Mouton had spotted a group of isolated Federal soldiers 

from the 19th Kentucky Infantry who had thrown down their arms 

and surrendered. As he rode forward to investigate, several of the 

men picked up their weapons and shot him. Nearby Confederates 

who witnessed the event rushed the Federals and killed them. 

At Pleasant Grove, General Banks held a council of war and, 

at the urging of his generals, ordered a withdrawal to Pleasant Hill, 

a village on a slight plateau nearly fourteen miles to the southeast. 

There, the army would regroup and, with the support of A. J. Smith’s 

XVI Corps bluecoats, take a defensive position and await Taylor’s 

next move. A. J. Smith posted his command south of the town along 

a low ridge. The XIII Corps had suffered the brunt of the attack at 

The Battle of Pleasant Hill

(Library of Congress)
48 

Mansfield, and Banks sent them to the rear while he posted Emory’s 

1st Division from the XIX Corps on the north side of Pleasant Hill. 

Emory sent Col. William T. Shaw’s brigade, detached from the XVI 

Corps, to hold the Mansfield Road north of town with General 

Dwight’s brigade east of the road and Col. Lewis Benedict’s brigade 

farther west along the Sabine River Road. Brig. Gen. James W. 

McMillan’s brigade was in reserve behind Dwight.

The position was poor and the deployments questionable. 

Shaw was far ahead of Dwight and Benedict, and thus his flanks 

were exposed. Dwight’s left ran at an angle from the Mansfield 

Road behind Shaw, while his right bent back toward McMillan’s 

reserves. Benedict was over 300 yards to Shaw’s rear and 

concealed by woods. Meanwhile, Smith’s corps held the Jessup 

Road from Natchitoches at least 300 yards behind Benedict’s 

left. General Banks did not anticipate the coming battle. In fact, 

he planned to resume the advance on Shreveport that evening, 

which may account for the carelessness with which he positioned his army. 

At 0900, Confederate cavalry found the Federals in line of 

battle at Pleasant Hill. Reconnaissance reported Emory’s position 

in front of the town but failed to uncover the presence of the XVI 

Corps posted to the rear. Thus, Taylor based his plan of attack on 

incomplete intelligence. He planned to envelop Banks’ left flank 

first. Once he did so, other Confederate units would strike the 

Union center while his cavalry enveloped the Federal right and cut 

off avenues of retreat to the river. 

At 1630, twelve Confederate guns posted astride the Mansfield 

Road opened on Shaw’s brigade, 800 yards away, initiating an artillery duel that shattered the afternoon calm. Thirty minutes later, 

as Shaw’s guns fell silent, General Churchill’s Confederate division 

roared into action on the Federal left. The Confederates then struck 

the Union center, and Taylor’s cavalrymen, seeing the Union line 

begin to give way, charged the right. The attack, however, was 

poorly executed. Although the Southerners gained some success 

against Banks’ center, A. J. Smith’s XVI Corps hit the Confederates 

hard and unhinged the enemy attack. The Confederates fell back 

in disorder as darkness encroached. 

The Battle of Pleasant Hill ended with Banks’ army sustaining 

1,400 casualties and Taylor’s force losing 1,700, with each side 

having some 12,000 engaged. Taylor faulted himself for failing 

to oversee the details in his troops’ dispositions. Banks credited 
49

A. J. Smith with the victory and personally rode to congratulate him 

after the battle: “God bless you general, you have saved the army.”

That night, Banks called a council of war. Generals Franklin, 

Emory, and Dwight all urged him to pull back to the river, where 

the army could resupply and reorganize under the protection of the 

fleet. Then, after a few days, the army would resume the march to 

Shreveport. Banks concurred and ordered a retreat to Grand Ecore. 

General A. J. Smith was not at the meeting but upon learning of 

the decision, protested and insisted Banks give him time to collect 

his wounded and bury his dead. When Banks declined, A. J. Smith 

petitioned Franklin to arrest the commanding general. Franklin 

refused, and the Army of the Gulf began its retreat. While Pleasant 

Hill was a tactical victory for the Federals, Banks’ decision to 

retreat turned the battle into a strategic win for the Confederates.

Immediately following Pleasant Hill, General Taylor met with 

the department commander. With Banks in retreat, Kirby Smith 

wanted Taylor to march to Arkansas to secure the northern front. 

Taylor maintained that once the Federals in Arkansas learned of 

Banks’ retreat, General Steele would abandon his operations and 

return to Little Rock. He beseeched Kirby Smith to allow him to 

destroy the Federals in Louisiana, but the commanding general 

refused. Without confirmation that Steele was in retreat, Kirby 

Smith could not risk leaving Shreveport vulnerable to the column 

advancing from the north. On 12 April, he sent two-thirds of 

Taylor’s army on a forced march to join General Price in Arkansas 

and stop Steele. Kirby Smith planned to ride to Arkansas to join 

the Confederate force and personally lead them in battle. Before 

leaving for Arkansas, he told Taylor that if Steele retreated, he 

would indeed return the troops to Louisiana. Until then, only 

Green’s cavalry and Brig. Gen. Camille Polignac’s infantry division 

remained with Taylor for operations against Banks and Porter.

The Federals at Grand Ecore did not realize that Taylor was 

left with just a skeleton force of barely 5,000 men. Indeed, Banks 

believed that Taylor had him pinned down with 25,000 troops. 

For six days, Banks contemplated the situation and weighed his 

options. During that time he reorganized the army. He replaced 

his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, with General Dwight, 

and relieved his cavalry commander, Lee, replacing him with Brig. 

Gen. Richard Arnold, formerly the chief of artillery. These moves 

indicated that Banks sought to shift blame for the failure to reach 

Shreveport to subordinates. Although Banks considered resuming 
50 

the march on Shreveport, Admiral Porter insisted that, with the 

water level continuing to fall, the navy could not move upriver. 

In addition, Banks was under increasing pressure from Grant 

to return the XVI Corps to General Sherman’s army. With these 

factors in mind, Banks ordered a retreat, and the army arrived at 

Alexandria on 23 April.

On 27 April, Porter’s fleet finally arrived at Alexandria after a 

harrowing journey downriver. By the time the flotilla arrived, the 

river had fallen to four feet in places, far less than the seven feet 

needed to pass the town and enter the river below. The Confederates 

encircled the city as Porter struggled to find a solution to his predicament. General Banks could not remain at Alexandria indefinitely, 

and yet, without infantry protection, the navy risked losing the 

fleet. The solution came from Lt. Col. Joseph Bailey, an engineer on 

General Franklin’s staff. Bailey suggested construction of a series of 

wing dams to span the river and raise the water level enough for 

the ships to move into the lower Red. Banks and Porter approved 

the project, and on 8 May, elements of the flotilla began to cross 

over the falls. By 13 May, the last of the ships steamed into the lower 

Red River. For his engineering feat, Bailey received a promotion to 

brigadier general and won the Medal of Honor.

With Porter gone, Banks ordered Alexandria abandoned, and 

A. J. Smith’s troops proceeded to fire the town. By then, Banks had 

lost control over A. J. Smith and was powerless to stop the destruction. General Taylor pursued the retiring Federals, battling them 

on 16 May at Mansura and again on 18 May at Yellow Bayou, before 

the Union army escaped across the Mississippi River, ending the 

Red River campaign. 

The campaign was a strategic defeat for the Federals, who 

failed to accomplish any of their objectives. While General Banks 

won several tactical victories, his resounding defeat at Mansfield 

ultimately proved the decisive contest of the campaign. Banks’ 

personal courage and determination could not compensate for 

his weak leadership and lack of sound judgment. In all, Banks 

lost 5,400 men along with 20 guns, 200 wagons, and 1,000 horses, 

while Porter lost 9 ships and suffered 300 casualties. Confederate 

losses totaled 4,000. 

Taylor’s superior generalship was the deciding factor. Not 

only did he inspire his subordinates and his troops, but his use 

and selection of terrain enabled the ragged Confederate army to 

win a campaign against a force three times its size. In doing so, the 
51

Confederates saved the political and industrial center at Shreveport, 

defended the fertile Red River valley, and secured Texas. 

Taylor insisted that he could have annihilated Banks’ army 

and captured Porter’s fleet if not for Kirby Smith’s decision to take 

two-thirds of the infantry to Arkansas. As Taylor had predicted, 

General Steele retreated upon learning of Banks’ defeat. This 

meant that Shreveport was safe, but rather than sending 

Confederate infantry back to Taylor, Kirby Smith had pursued 

Steele’s Federals. On 30 April, while Banks and Porter languished 

at Alexandria, Kirby Smith caught Steele at Jenkins Ferry, along 

the Saline River. The inconclusive battle at Jenkins Ferry left the 

Confederates with one thousand casualties, while the Federals 

suffered half that number. Strategically, the battle accomplished 

nothing for the Confederates as the Federals continued their 

retreat to Little Rock.

Throughout the campaign, Taylor had protested Kirby Smith’s 

Fabian policy of strategic retreat. Once the campaign ended, Taylor 

stepped up his criticism to the point of insubordination. Kirby 

Smith relieved him from command and appointed General Walker 

to district command. Within weeks, the Confederate government 

promoted Taylor to lieutenant general and gave him command 

of the Department of Mississippi, Alabama, and East Louisiana. 

Banks, too, was relieved of command and replaced by Maj. Gen. 

Edward R. S. Canby, who commanded the newly formed Division 

of West Mississippi that absorbed the Department of the Gulf and 

the Department of Arkansas. Banks remained in New Orleans to 

implement the Unionist state government that he helped install 

during the preceding months.

Price’s Missouri 

Although Banks’ campaign failed, a positive but unintended 

consequence of operations along the Red River for the Union was 

the disruption of Confederate designs for the Trans-Mississippi. 

General Kirby Smith had planned to lead the South’s Army of 

the Trans-Mississippi into Missouri. Indeed, before the Federals 

launched the Red River Campaign, Kirby Smith had believed 

that Taylor could hold western Louisiana with a small force while 

the bulk of the army reclaimed Arkansas, liberated Missouri, 

and captured St. Louis. The Federal invasion through the Red 

River Valley had forced Kirby Smith to shift to the defensive in 

Louisiana and by the time the campaign ended, the Army of the 
52 

Trans-Mississippi was too weak to initiate offensive operations 

into Arkansas and Missouri. 

During the summer, Kirby Smith met with General Price and 

Thomas C. Reynolds, the Confederate governor of Missouri, to 

discuss options for the state. In lieu of a full-scale invasion, Kirby 

Smith sent Price on a cavalry raid into Missouri with St. Louis as 

the objective. Once Price seized the city, the Confederates believed 

that as many as 20,000 volunteers would flock to the colors. This 

would force the Federals to divert troops from other theaters to 

battle the Confederates for control of Missouri. 

On 19 September, Price led 12,000 men across the Arkansas 

line and into Missouri. His newly formed Army of Missouri 

consisted of three divisions, led by General Marmaduke, Maj. 

Gen. James F. Fagan, and the flamboyant Brig. Gen. Joseph O. 

Shelby. The army contained men from Missouri and Arkansas 

and included several veteran units, but nearly one-third of 

Price’s force consisted of untrained, inexperienced, and illequipped conscripts. (See Map 7.)

On 25 September, the Confederates approached Fort 

Davidson, sixty-five miles south of St. Louis. The fort was a hexagonal series of earthworks and rifle pits ringed by a dry moat, ten 

feet in width with a depth of 

six feet. The commander of the 

District of St. Louis, Brig. Gen. 

Thomas Ewing Jr., had 1,500 

men at the fort, although only 

900 were fit for duty. 

Fort Davidson stood in 

the Acadian Valley, blocking 

the Confederate route to St. 

Louis and creating a dilemma 

for Price. Shelby urged him 

to bypass the fort and push 

on to St. Louis, but Fagan and 

Marmaduke argued in favor of 

reducing the garrison before 

going ahead. Despite instructions from Kirby Smith to 

move rapidly to St. Louis, Price 

chose to attack the outpost. 

Marmaduke and Fagan would 

General Ewing

(National Archives)
53

assault the fort while Shelby cut Federal lines of communications. 

The decision marked the turning point of the campaign.

Price planned to put his guns along Pilot Knob and 

Shepherd’s Mountain, two ridges that ringed the Federal 

position. From there, the batteries could direct fire into the 

fort and compel the Federals to surrender. Before hostilities 

commenced, however, Price received word that General Ewing 

held a group of Confederate sympathizers as prisoners inside the 

post. If the guns opened fire, the civilians would suffer the consequences. Fagan and Marmaduke proposed a change in tactics 

with artillery supporting a frontal attack. Although this would 

expose Confederate troops to Federal fire as they advanced 900 

yards across the open valley floor, Price’s lieutenants insisted that 

superior numbers would enable them to carry the works with 

minimal casualties. Price approved the plan but cautioned that 

his divisions must move in concert. 

On 27 September, the Confederates opened the attack. 

Federal artillery held superior fields of fire, and Ewing’s twelve 

guns extracted a heavy toll. Moreover, Price and his commanders 

failed to anticipate the effect that the terrain would have on the 

troops. The broken ground disrupted unit cohesion, and the 

charge degenerated into a series of piecemeal assaults. Many 

of the green Confederates broke and ran, while veteran units 

took heavy casualties. Numerous Confederates who reached 

the fort were hit by Ketchum grenades, concussion devices that 

the Federals lobbed over the walls and down onto the attackers. 

When the Confederates fell back, Price counted 1,000 casualties 

while Ewing lost 200 men.

The following day, Price considered renewing the attack, and 

the Confederates constructed ladders to scale the walls of the fort, 

but Ewing had withdrawn before dawn. Even so, Price could not 

declare victory. The battle had been a disaster for his army and for 

his mission. He had underestimated Ewing and approved a battle 

plan that failed to exploit the relative strengths and weaknesses of 

the opposing positions. To add to the sting of defeat, Shelby failed 

to secure a position across the Federal line of retreat, and Ewing 

escaped to St. Louis. Initially, Price planned a pursuit, but Shelby 

reported that A. J. Smith’s Union XVI Corps was advancing toward 

the Confederates. This intelligence, combined with the defeat at 

Pilot Knob, prompted Price to abandon plans for St. Louis and 

turn the columns west toward Jefferson City.
WESTPORT 23 Oct

PILOT KNOB

27 Sep

19 Sep

2 Dec

28 Aug Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Arkansas R

Missouri R

Arkansas R

Red R

Red R

Sabine R

Pearl R

White R

Fort Smith

Fort Gibson

Fort Scott

Fort Leavenworth Kansas City

Carthage

Herman

Franklin

Doniphan

Batesville

Rolla

Sedalia

Maysville

Fayetteville

Perryville

Doaksville

Laynesport Camden

Washington

Arkadelphia

Sherman

Van Buren Clarksville

Hot Springs

Pine Blu

Arkansas Post

Helena

Monroe

Alexandria

Shreveport

Memphis

St. Louis

Alton

Vicksburg

Natchez

JACKSON

JEFFERSON CITY

TOPEKA

LITTLE ROCK

INDIAN

 TERRIT O R Y

MISSOURI

KANSAS

ILLINOIS

TEXAS L OUISIANA

MISSISSIPPI

ARKANSAS

TEXA S

TENNESSE E

Price’s Movement

Engagement

28 August–2 December 1864

PRICE’S RAID

0 50 100 150

Miles

Map 7
55

Price picked up 7,000 recruits along the way, but discipline problems plagued his efforts to sway Missourians to the 

Confederate cause. In fact, rampant looting of towns and villages 

by the Confederates had the opposite effect. Straggling also beset 

the march as Price moved through the state at a laggardly pace. This 

gave the Union commander of the Department of Missouri, Maj. 

Gen. William S. Rosecrans, and his cavalry chief, Maj. Gen. Alfred 

Pleasanton, time to coordinate pursuit of the southern column. As 

Pleasanton’s cavalry and A. J. Smith’s infantry chased Price from 

the east, General Curtis gathered his troops from the Department 

of Kansas to intercept the Confederate column from the west. 

Price skirmished his way across Missouri until 22 October, when 

he reached Westport, just south of Kansas City. 

At a council of war that night, Price considered moving 

toward Kansas City or Leavenworth, Kansas. However, intelligence 

reports revealed Curtis’ Army of the Border massed to the west 

with 10,000 soldiers. In addition, Pleasanton’s cavalry, also with 

10,000 men, was closing in from the east. Although outnumbered 

three-to-one, Price realized that U.S. forces were divided, and he 

hoped to destroy each in detail. Price planned to take two divisions 

and strike Curtis’ force along the Brush Creek south of Westport, 

while a third rebel division delayed Pleasanton’s advance at the Big 

Blue River to the east. Upon defeating Curtis, Price would turn and 

concentrate his force against Pleasanton. If successful, this would 

allow the Confederates unencumbered entrance into Kansas. 

In the predawn hours of 23 October, Union General Blunt 

seized the initiative and sent two brigades across the Brush 

Creek to engage Price’s divisions. The fighting swayed back and 

forth along the ridges and through open fields until Confederate 

General Shelby’s Iron Brigade drove the Federals back across 

the Brush Creek. A lack of ammunition and concern over a 

threat from Pleasanton, who was now engaged, prevented the 

Confederates from pressing their advantage and they remained 

south of the creek. This gave the Federals time to regroup 

and resume the offensive, but a second assault also failed to 

dislodge the rebels. Curtis sought to avoid another frontal attack 

and enlisted the aid of a local farmer in locating an avenue of 

approach to the Confederate left. Leading his own escort and the 

9th Wisconsin Battery through a ravine along the Swan Creek, 

Curtis took position directly on Shelby’s left flank. As Curtis’ 

artillery tore through the Confederate flank, Blunt resumed the 
56 

attack against the rebel center. With fresh troops at his disposal, 

including Kansas militia in support, Blunt began to unravel the 

rebel defenses. Moreover, to the east, Pleasanton’s command had 

fought its way across the Big Blue River. Marmaduke’s division 

grudgingly gave way and fell back toward the main Confederate 

position below Westport.

Once elements of Pleasanton’s command reached Westport, 

Price came under fire on three sides. Fearing encirclement, he 

had little choice but to withdraw and, in doing so, to abandon the 

campaign. The Battle of Westport cost each side 1,500 soldiers. 

The Federals gave chase, but fierce rear guard actions secured 

the Confederate retreat that carried Price southwest through 

Indian Territory, before the army finally crossed the Red River 

and entered Texas. From there Price turned east and reached 

Laynesport, Arkansas, on 2 December. By then, the Army of 

Missouri could muster just 6,000 troops. During the raid, Price’s 

troopers had covered 1,424 miles, fought 43 engagements, and 

suffered 50 percent casualties. Although he had succeeded in 

diverting Federal resources from operations east of the Mississippi, 

Price’s raid failed as a recruitment drive, and St. Louis remained 

fixed under Federal control.

Price’s raid ended major combat operations in the TransMississippi. The final fighting in the theater took place on 13 May 

1865, at Palmito Ranch, near Brownsville, but by then General 

Robert E. Lee had surrendered his Army of Northern Virginia at 

Appomattox. After four years of fighting, the Civil War was over.

Analysis

Ever since the start of the war, weak leadership undermined 

the Confederacy’s operations in the Trans-Mississippi. In 1861, 

disputes between Generals McCulloch and Price prevented coordination of military efforts, robbing the Confederates of an opportunity to seize Missouri and to compel the Federals to invest greater 

resources in securing the Trans-Mississippi. In 1862, Generals Van 

Dorn and Hindman had overestimated the capabilities of their men 

while proving themselves unequal to the contingencies of warfare. 

General Kirby Smith added a significant degree of professionalism 

to the department, but he lacked strategic judgment, hampering 

General Taylor, his most-skilled subordinate, and giving too much 

latitude to General Price, his least-skilled subordinate. 
57

Although friction and poor generalship also bedeviled the 

Union, the overall organization and command structure in the 

Federal forces had given the United States a tremendous advantage 

in securing strategic objectives in the Trans-Mississippi. Since the 

outbreak of war, the United States had regarded the Mississippi 

River as the key terrain feature in the theater and had devoted 

the resources and personnel necessary to control it. The Union 

command structure facilitated cooperation between commanders 

on either side of the Mississippi and allowed the Federals to shift 

troops according to need. 

From the outset, the Federals had identified Missouri as a vital 

strategic center in the Trans-Mississippi and had moved accordingly to secure it. General Curtis was the right man for the task; 

his victory at Pea Ridge in 1862 was arguably the most important 

event in the Trans-Mississippi. Had the Confederates succeeded 

at Pea Ridge, the doorway to St. Louis would have been open. A 

Confederate campaign to take the city, particularly at that stage of 

the war, would have required a substantial shift in Union resources 

away from theaters east of the river. Instead, Pea Ridge left the 

Confederates crippled and allowed Curtis to begin campaigning 

for control of Arkansas. While Prairie Grove was neither as large 

nor as dramatic as Pea Ridge, its strategic importance lay in sealing 

the doorway to Missouri. Harassment by Confederate guerrillas 

and Price’s horsemen notwithstanding, Missouri and St. Louis 

would remain in Union hands.

Union performance in Louisiana was less spectacular. Banks 

lacked the military training and skills necessary to manage either 

a department or an army in the field. His missteps along the Bayou 

Teche and the Sabine River in 1863, and his blunders on the Red 

River in 1864, meant that the Federals failed to capture western 

Louisiana and Texas. Fortunately for the North, Kirby Smith 

passed up the opportunity to capture Banks’ army and Porter’s 

fleet at Alexandria. As Taylor reflected, “such opportunities never 

occur twice.” Indeed, the capacity to take advantage of opportunities ultimately was the difference between success and failure in 

the Trans-Mississippi.
58 

The Author

Jeffery S. Prushankin received his Ph.D. in United States history 

from the University of Arkansas in 2000 and was awarded a West 

Point summer fellowship in 2002. He taught American military 

history at Penn State Abington and currently is the professor of Civil 

War Era studies at Millersville University in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. 

His area of specialization is the war in the Trans-Mississippi South 

and he is the author of numerous articles and books on that subject, 

most notably, A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby 

Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi. He is 

currently writing a military biography of General Edmund Kirby 

Smith.
59

Further Readings

Johnson, Ludwell H. Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the 

Civil War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958; 

reprint, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993.

Kerby, Robert L. Kirby Smith’s Confederacy: The Trans-Mississippi 

South, 1863–1865. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 

Piston, William Garrett and Richard W. Hatcher III. Wilson’s Creek: 

The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It. 

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Prushankin, Jeffery S. A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund 

Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the TransMississippi. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005.

Shea, William L. Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign. Chapel 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

Shea, William L. and Earl J. Hess. Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in 

the West. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).
PIN : 105428–000

The

Civil

War Sesquicentennial