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Freezing the Fighting: Military 

Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

Samina Ahmed 

Varun Sahni 

a 

OPERATIVE MONITORING CENTER 
I 

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March 1998 

Freezing The Fighting: 

Military Disengagement On The Siachen 

Glacier 

Samina Ahmed 

Consultant, The Asia Foundation, 

Islamabad, Pakistan 

Varun Sahni 

Professor, Jawaharlal Neb University, 

New Delhi, India 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/ 1 

(rtr) Sandia National laboratories 

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Freezing the Fighting: 

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4 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

Freezing The Fighting: 

Military Disengagement On The Siachen Glacier 

Abstract 

Since 1984. India and Pakistan have confronted each other militarily for control over the 

Siachen Glacier and its approaches in the eastern Karakoram mountain range, adjacent to 

the borders of India, Pakistan, and China. The longest-running armed conflict between 

two regular armies in the twentieth century, the conflict in Siachen has resulted in 

hundreds of' casualties, mainly because of adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain. 

The econoniic cost of sustaining a conflict in that geographically remote and climatically 

inhospitable region has also been extremely high for both countries. 

Past efforts h> India and Pakistan to find a mutually acceptable solution have failed, 

mainly bccausc of mutual distrust and suspicion. This paper examines Indian and 

Pakistani perceptions, preference, and policies, and identifies options for resolving the 

conflict. This paper also identifies the most appropriate verification and monitoring 

technologies to assist policy-makers in ensuring agreement stability and compliance. 

While a future agreement on resolving the dispute will depend, above all, on the political 

will of the 1 ndian and Pakistani leaderships, adequate, appropriate verification and 

monitoring nicchanisms will enhance their ability to reach a sustainable and durable 

accord of' thc Siachen conflict. 

5 
Freezing the Fighting: 

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6 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 9 

2. SIACHEN’S GEOSTRATEGIC SETTING ........................................................................................... 9 

3. THE HISTORY OF THE SIACHEN DISPUTE .................................................................................. 10 

4. MAPPING THE POLICY TERRAIN ................................................................................................... 11 

4.1 INDIAN PERCEPTIONS, POLICY, AND PREFERENCES ............................................................................. 1 1 

4.2 PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS, POLICY, AND PREFERENCES ....................................................................... 16 

4.1.1 Unraveling Indian Policy ............................................................................................... 13 

4.2. I The Pakistani Policy Debate ..... ................................................................. 19 

5. TAXONOMY OF AGREEMENTS ....................................................................................................... 21 

5.1 A POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SIACHEN DISPUTE ....................................................................... 22 

.......................................... 23 

23 

.............................................. 24 

6. VERIFICATION OPTIONS .................................................................................................................. 24 

5.1.1 De-Escalation Of Hostilities ............................ 

5.1.3 Demilitarization Of The Area ... 

5.1.2 Disengagement Of Military Forces.. ............................................................ 

6.1 VERIFICATION LEVELS ........................................................................................................................ 25 

................................... 26 

6.2 VERIFICATION MEASURES ................................................................................................................... 27 

6.3 VERIFICATION AND AGREEMENT STABILITY ....................................................................................... 30 

7. FREEZING THE FIGHTING: THE LOGIC FOR CHANGE ........................................................... 32 

6. I. 1 Intrusiveness and Compliance Assurance.. .................... 

8. ABOUT THE AUTHORS ....................................................................................................................... 34 

Figure 1. Composite Satellite Image of the Siachen Glacier Region ............................... .12 

7 
Freezing the Fighting: 

Acronyms 

CFL Cease-Fire Line 

CMC Cooperative Monitoring Center 

LOC Line of Control 

POK Pakistan-occupied Kashmir 

8 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

Freezing The Fighting: 

Military Disengagement On The Siachen Glacier 

I. Introduction 

For over 13 years, Indian and Pakistani troops have confronted each other, eyeball to 

eyeball, for control of the Siachen Glacier and its approaches in the eastern Karakoram 

mountain range, adjacent to the borders of India, Pakistan, and China. The conflict has 

resulted in hundreds of casualties caused by adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain 

rather than the occasional military skirmish. In addition, sustaining a conflict in that 

geographically remote and climatically inhospitable region has a high economic cost. 

Indian and Pakistani leaderships acknowledge the human and economic costs of the 

Siachen conflict. Earlier attempts to reach a mutually agreeable solution have, however, 

proved unsuccessful. Negotiations on Siachen are again underway as part of an overall 

peace dialogue between the two states. 

Despite the willingness of all involved parties to find a solution to the Siachen dispute, a 

history of distrust and mutual suspicion derailed earlier efforts. Such hurdles and 

constraints could, however, be overcome through a variety of measures, including the use 

of suitable technological mechanisms to verify and monitor a settlement. 

By placing the Siachen conflict within its geostrategic and historical setting, this paper 

examines Indian and Pakistani perceptions, preferences, and policies and identifies 

options for resolving the dispute. This paper also describes verification and monitoring 

technologies that can support a future India-Pakistan peace accord on the Siachen Glacier 

dispute. 

2. Siachen’s Geostrategic Setting 

Siachen has witnessed sporadic armed clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces since 

April 13, 1984. It is by far the longest-running armed conflict between two regular 

armies in the twentieth century. However, this is not a declared war. India and Pakistan, 

the two contesting states, continue to maintain full diplomatic relations with each other, 

and have many other ties, including economic and academic. Neither is this a 

conventional conflict: although both armies are conventionally armed, weather, altitude, 

and terrain make this uninhabitable region an unlikely zone of armed strife. 

The Siachen Glacier is one of the most inhospitable and glaciated regions in the world. 

Sliding down a valley in the Karakoram range, the glacier is 76 kilometers long and 

varies in width between 2 to 8 kilometers. It receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 

10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds up to 150 knots (nearly 

300 kilometers per hour). The temperature drops routinely to 40 degrees C below zero, 

9 
Freezing the Fighting: 

and even lower with the wind chill factor. For these reasons, the Siachen Glacier has 

been called the “Third Pole.” 

This misleading epithet focuses solely on the adverse weather conditions and completely 

ignores the deleterious impact of altitude and terrain. In reality, the high altitude severely 

compounds the bitter climatic conditions. Base Camp for Indian forces is 12,000 feet 

above sea level. The altitude of some Indian forward bases on the Saltoro Ridge ranges 

from Kumar (1 6,000 feet) and Bila Top (1 8,600 feet) to Pahalwan (20,000 feet) and 

Indira Col(22,OOO feet). Because of the steep gradient of the Saltoro Range, the area is 

also prone to avalanches. These adverse conditions have direct consequences: since the 

war began, only 3 per cent of the Indian casualties were caused by hostile firing. The 

remaining 97 per cent have fallen prey to the altitude, weather, and terrain. 

Pakistani combat casualties are equally low because troops are dug in, artillery fire over 

mountain peaks is generally inaccurate, and infantry assaults are seldom made in the 

harsh climate and difficult terrain. Most Pakistani casualties occur because of the 

climate, terrain, and altitude. Pakistani positions are, for the most part, at a lower altitude 

in the glacier area, ranging between 9,000 to 15,000 feet (some are at a much higher 

altitude such as Conway Saddle, at 17,200 feet, which controls ingress to the glacier). 

Glaciers at the Pakistani frontlines begin at 9,440 feet. Pakistani troops are stationed on 

steep slopes, exposed to harsh weather. As a result, the main causes of Pakistani 

casualties are treacherous crevasses and ravines, avalanches, high altitude pulmonary and 

cerebral edema, and hypothermia.’ 

3. The History Of The Siachen Dispute 

The fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not 

controlled by either until the mid-1980s. The origins of this armed conflict lie in the 

India-Pakistan dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1948, following an 

inconclusive war, the areas of the disputed state that fell under Pakistan were comprised 

of the Northern Areas (Baltistan and Gilgit Agency), Azad Jammu, and Kashmir. India 

controlled two-thirds of the territory including Jammu state, Ladakh, and the valley of 

Kashmir. 

A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of the 1949 India-Pakistan 

agreement that concluded the war in Kashmir. The CFL ran along the international IndiaPakistan border and then north and northeast until map grid-point NJ 9842, located near 

the Shyok river at the base of the Saltoro mountain range. Because no Indian or Pakistani 

troops were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ 

9842, the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. Both sides agreed, in the 

’ According to a Pakistani officer stationed in Siachen, “We have lost many more men to avalanches, 

crevasses and cold than we have to shells and bullets.” Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal, “Siachen,” The News, 

April 12, 1995. 

10 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

vague language that lies at the root of the Siachen dispute, that the CFL extends to the 

terminal point, NJ 9842, and “thence north to the glaciers.”2 

After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Tashkent agreement resulted in troop withdrawals 

to positions along the 1949 CFL. No attempt was made to extend the CFL further. 

Following Pakistan’s defeat in the 197 1 war, the Simla Agreement of 1972 established a 

new Line of Control (LOC) as a result of the cease-fire of December 1971. The Siachen 

Glacier region. where no fighting had taken place, was left undelineated, and no attempt 

was made to clarify the position of the LOC beyond NJ 9842. The LOC was merely 

described as moving from Nerlin (inclusive to India), Brilman (inclusive to Pakistan), up 

to Chorbat La in the Turtok sector. “From there the line of control runs northeastwards to 

Thang (inc1usik.e to India) thence eastwards joining the glacier^."^ 

Since the Siachen Glacier region falls within the undelineated territory beyond the last 

defined section of the LOC, map grid-point NJ 9842, India and Pakistani territorial claims 

are based on their interpretations of the vague language contained in the 1949 and 1972 

agreements. I’ahistan draws a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 up 

to the Karahorani Pass on its boundary with China.4 India instead draws a northnorthwest line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro Range, a southern 

offshoot of thc liarakoram Range.’ Figure 1 shows the disputed area and each country‘s 

claim lines. 

4. Mapping the Policy Terrain 

Any attenipt to anal\rze the Siachen dispute and identify potential opportunities and 

mechanisms tor its resolution involves not only mapping the geographical dimension but 

also mapping thc policy terrain of the two disputant states. An analysis of Indian and 

Pakistani pcrccptions is equally essential since such perceptions shape policies and 

preferences in hoth countries. 

4.7 Indian Perceptions, Policy, and Preferences 

From an Indiiin pcrspcctive, the Siachen Glacier is the wedge of territory that separates 

Pakistan-occupicd Kashmir (POK) from Aksai Chin, the part of Kashmir claimed and 

Robert G b irwig. “The Siachen Glacier Dispute-I: The Territorial Dimension,” Strategic Studies (VO~. 

Details of the Line of Control provided to the Indian parliament by Indian Foreign Minister, Sardar 

X, No. 1. Autumn 1986), p. 51. 

Swaran Singh in December 1972. Cited in A.G. Noorani, “Fire on the Mountain,” Illustrated Weekly of 

India, June 30. 1985. p. 40. 

Ikram Sehgal, “The Siachen Battleground: Withering Heights,” Globe (Nos. 10 and 11, 1996), p. 67. See 

also Robert Wining, op.cit., pp. 60-61. 

’ Jasjit Singh, “Siachen Glaciers: Facts and Fiction,” Strategic Analysis (Vol. XII, No.8, October 1989), pp 

700-701; W.P.S. Sidhu, “They Shall Not Pass,” India Toduy, May 31, 1992, p. 90. 

11 
Freezing the Fighting: 

Figure 1. Composite Satellite Image of the Siachen Glacier Region6 

occupied by China.’ In Indian perceptions, Siachen’ s geostrategic importance lies in the 

fact that its control would support Indian defense of Ladakh, Jammu, and Kashmir 

against Pakistani and/or Chinese threats.* It would prevent the outflanking of Indian 

forces in Leh and Kargil sectors and connecting the Aksai Chin highway with the 

Karakoram pass. Control over Siachen would enable India to keep watch over the 

Karakoram highway and the Khunjarab pass, while fortifying India’s position in border 

negotiations with China.’ 

Image processing by Earth Data Analysis Center, University of New Mexico. 

’ Indian commentators emphasize that Siachen is, in the words of General Chibber, “the wedge that keeps 

our two adversaries apart.” Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber, “Siachen-The Untold Story (A Personal Account),” 

Indian Defence Review, January 1990, p. 146. See also P.M. Pasricha, “The Siachen Glacier-An 

Orographic Offensive by Pakistan,” Strategic Analysis, December 1985, p. 855 and Rita Manchanda, 

“Indo-Pak ‘Mountain Diplomacy’,” The Telegraph, June 9, 1985. 

Yusuf Jameel, “India Ready Even for Sino-Pak Offensive,” The Telegraph, 23 June 1985; Lt. Col. Daljit 

Singh, “The Long War,” The Illustrated Weekly oflndia, April 9, 1989 and Yusuf Jameel, “On the World’s 

Highest Battleground,” The Telegraph, May 12, 1989. 

Rita Manchanda, op.cit. 

12 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

For India, controlling the commanding heights is a crucial aspect of the Siachen conflict. 

This issue flows out of basic infantry tactics: height confers a tactical advantage.” 

Except at Gyong La, Indian forces occupy and control the commanding heights. Thus, 

Pakistani military efforts since 1984 have been aimed at dislodging Indian forces from 

their positions. This strategy puts Pakistan at a distinct disadvantage for two reasons: 

(1) Pakistani forces have to carry the assault to the Indians, who have a much easier 

military task of sitting tight and defending their positions; and (2) that assault requires 

Pakistani forces to climb steep terrain.’’ 

On the other hand, as long as Pakistan does not commit its forces to an offensive against 

the Indian positions, it is the Indians who have the disadvantage of being deployed at 

much higher altitudes. In order to block Pakistan’s access to the Siachen Glacier, India 

has no option but to maintain its hazardous posts on the Saltoro Ridge, thereby exposing 

its forces to the dangerous altitude, weather, and terrain. India’s strategy is also 

extremely expensive in financial terms: most of the Indian pickets and posts on the 

Saltoro Ridge are air-maintained. Personnel, weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food are 

usually flown in by helicopter, and occasionally paradropped.I2 

4.1 .I Unraveling Indian Policy 

India’s declared policy on the Siachen dispute is to interpret “thence northwards to the 

glaciers” to mean that the LOC proceeds from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the 

Saltoro range.13 However, India’s declared policy is not a sufficient indicator of the 

According to General Chibber, the notion that “reasonably well-prepared defensive positions could not 

be dislodged” was basic to the Indian concept of operations. He argues that “at these formidable altitudes it 

is difficult, almost impossible, to dislodge a force that occupies a height.” Lt. Gen. Chibber, op.cit, pp. 150- 

151. 

Over the years, many Indian analysts have emphasized the importance of Indian control of the Siachen 

10 

11 

heights. See, for example, Srijoy Chowdhury, “Glacier of Discontent,” Sunday, October 20-26, 1985; 

Preeti Singh, “Pakistani Eyes on Siachen Glacier,” Patriot, August 3 1, 1985; O.P. Sabhenval, “Siachen: 

Snow-bound Frontier,” Mainstream, June 22, 1985; Raj Chengappa, “Siachen Glacier: Battle of the 

Heights,” India Today, December 3 1, 1987; Manoj Joshi, “Siachen: Face to Face,” Frontline, October 1, 

1988 and Man Mohan, “India Frustrates Pakistani Pressure on Siachen Glacier,” The Hindustan Times, 

August 23, 1992. 

’* As M.J. Akbar remarks, “India’s problems are greater than Pakistan’s because the latter’s supply lines 

need mules; ours need helicopters.” M.J. Akbar, “Fresh Bid for End to Siachen War,” The Telegraph, 

August 20, 1992. See also Joydeep Sircar, “India is on High Ground at Siachen,” The Telegraph, October 

25, 1985 and M.K. Dhar, “More Incursions in Siachen Likely,” The Hindustan Times, October 4, 1987. 

l3 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh points out that “in mountainous terrain, the high crest line marking the 

watershed is the internationally accepted norm for working out boundary settlements, much as the thalweg 

(or the mid-channel) riverine principle is used to delineate boundaries along rivers.” Air Commodore Jasjit 

Singh, “The Siachen Imperatives,” The Hindu, July 13, 1989. In another article, Singh argues that the 

watershed principle is extremely important in Siachen because “any deviation by India from this principle 

would have a major implication for the settlement of the Sino-Indian border where India’s position is 

premised on this principle.” Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “Siachen: The Himalayan Battlefield,” The 

Hindustan Times, October 18, 1987. 

13 
Freezing the Fighting: 

different perspectives, concerns, and objectives in the Indian policy community on the 

Siachen dispute. Three alternatives are readily discernible in India: (1) maintaining the 

deployment on Siachen at all costs, (2) negotiating a military disengagement with 

Pakistan, and (3) withdrawing Indian forces from the glacier, unilaterally if necessary. 

The advocates of a negotiated or unilateral Indian withdrawal base their position on 

several arguments. They argue that the disputed region is uninhabitable, and therefore 

has no strategic value. Some believe that a Siachen settlement could be the first step in 

the resolution of the Kashmir di~pute.’~ Others argue that the Kashmir and Siachen 

disputes can be unlinked, and that Siachen can be resolved without compromising on 

Kashmir. They hold that the Saltoro range is a killing field, and the much higher altitude 

of the Indian posts exacerbates India’s problems. They argue that the financial costs of 

India’s Siachen operations represent a huge waste of much-needed resources.’’ Most 

important of all, they feel that the Siachen conflict is a cruel, costly, and unnecessary war 

that must be brought to an end.I6 

While many of the above views are valid, they do not represent the predominant Indian 

perspective on Siachen. Indeed, the very fact that the advocates of withdrawal are already 

convinced that a resolution of the conflict is desirable and possible makes them less 

important than the sector of opinion that opposes withdrawal but would consider a 

compromise provided certain conditions are met. 

The opponents of an Indian withdrawal from Siachen argue that the glacier has strategic 

value to India because it physically separates Pakistan and China, the country’s primary 

adversaries. Furthermore, a Siachen withdrawal would weaken India’s position on 

Kashmir.I7 Control of the commanding heights gives India the tactical advantage and 

denies Pakistan access to the glacier. India should therefore not relinquish its battlefield 

gains on the negotiating table, because Pakistan would occupy the heights as soon as 

l4 See in particular A. G. Noorani, “Easing the Indo-Pakistani Dialogue on Kashmir: Confidence-Building 

Measures for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and the Wular Barrage Disputes,” Occasional Paper 16 (The 

Henry L. Stimpson Center, Washington DC, April 1994). 

l5 The actual amount spent by India on the Siachen operation is almost impossible to ascertain since it is 

buried under more than a dozen budget heads. Figures in journal articles and newspaper reports vary 

enormously and are deemed unreliable. 

W.P.S. Sidhu, for instance, calls it a “war of prestige” and a “crime against humanity.” W.P.S. Sidhu, 16 

“Siachen: The Forgotten War,” India Today, May 31, 1992, p. 88. 

l7 Lt. Gen. Chibber expresses the view that “the whole of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to India; so where is 

the need for compromise?’ In a similar vein, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh argues that “the issues related to 

the Siachen glacier constitute only a subset of a larger dispute. . . concerning the state of Jammu and 

Kashmir. . . The fundamental issue here is not a border/territorial dispute. . . in the sense it would have 

been if the area held by Pakistan across the Indian defense line on the Saltoro range was Pakistani 

territory.” Lt. Gen. Chibber, op.cit., p. 151; Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “Far From a Thaw: What Blocks 

a Full Settlement,” Frontline, December 4, 1992. 

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Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

India withdrew from them.18 As for the human cost, because Indian military personnel 

are volunteers, casualties are not a sufficient reason to withdraw. In any case, only a 

small part of the Indian amy is deployed on the Saltoro Range, and over the years the 

Indian forces have learned how to engage in glacial warfare.” Although the financial cost 

is significant, India has already borne this financial burden for 13 years and could 

continue to do so indefinitely. 

Subtle distinctions are important among Indian analysts and policy makers who oppose a 

withdrawal of Indian forces from their current deployment on the Saltoro Range. Some 

are convinced that India must hold on to Siachen at all costs. They argue that Pakistan is 

conducting a highly successful low-cost proxy war in Kashmir, at considerable cost to 

India. The only theater in which India is able to pay Pakistan back in its own coin is on 

the Siachen Glacier itself, where India has a distinct tactical advantage. No matter what 

the cost, India must therefore stand firm. Any compromise on Siachen would relieve the 

pressure on Pakistan in the one place where it really hurts and would thus be tantamount 

to falling into a Pakistani trap. 

Another hardline position is that India must not withdraw from Siachen because it 

represents a major military victory for India. India won the race for the glacier, and now 

controls the commanding heights on the Saltoro range. Over the last 13 years, Pakistan 

has tried innumerable times to displace the Indian forces, and has always had to withdraw 

with severe casualties. India has to do nothing but sit tight and periodically repel a 

Pakistani assault. Any Indian withdrawal will leave Pakistan with an open door to the 

commanding heights. Pakistan would gain in a negotiation what it has been unable to 

obtain on the battlefield. Whatever the cost, India must therefore stand firm and maintain 

its current deployments. 

The viewpoints articulated above may appear equally hawkish, with neither willing to 

countenance an Indian withdrawal from the Saltoro heights. However, a closer look 

reveals significant differences between them. No agreement with Pakistan that involves 

an Indian withdrawal would ever satisfy the policy makers and analysts for whom the real 

value of Siachen is that it is a bleeding ground for Pakistan. In contrast, a resolution can 

be devised to meet the principal concerns of Indian policy makers and analysts opposed 

to a Pakistani occupation of the Saltoro heights and Siachen following an Indian 

withdrawal. This group would back a negotiated Indian withdrawal provided they were 

convinced that India could, with adequate warning, forestall any Pakistani attempt to 

move into positions India vacated. 

According to Mahendra Ved, for example, “Positions gained and maintained after fierce fighting cannot 

be given away through talks, since there is no guarantee who will violate the pact and regain more than 

what was in their possession earlier.” Mahendra Ved, “Siachen Talks Aim is Status Quo,” The Hindustun 

Times, May 30, 1989. 

See, for example, IDR Research Team, “Glacial Warfare: The Indian Army Experiences a New 19 

Dimension in High-Altitude Warfare,” Indian Defence Review, July 1989, p. 96. 

15 
Freezing the Fighting: 

The key to an agreement on the Indian side would lie in convincing as many hardliners as 

possible within the Indian policy-making community that an Indian withdrawal would 

not be tantamount to handing Siachen over to Pakistan. This implies that the Indian 

army, the only government agency with the professional competence to assess military 

strategy, would have a major say, virtually amounting to a veto, on any Siachen 

agreement. In terms of Indian policy making, the Siachen issue is thus extremely 

unusual, because ordinarily the military institutions in India are firmly subordinated to 

civilian authority. However, the memory of defeat at the hands of China in 1962 is very 

much alive in India, and no politician or bureaucrat is likely to interfere in matters of 

professional military judgment. Thus, the army’s assessment of the military implications 

of a Siachen agreement would be critical to whether or not India accepted the agreement. 

4.2 Pakistani Perceptions, Policy, and Preferences 

In Pakistani perceptions, the Siachen dispute has a relevance to the dispute with India 

over Kashmir, albeit an indirect one. Because of the hostile nature of the terrain, 

negotiators responsible for delineating the 1949 India-Pakistan cease-fire line in the 

disputed territory of Kashmir left an undefined area which encompassed the Siachen 

Glacier and its approaches. After the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, neither state 

attempted to delineate a cease-fire line or line of control in the Siachen region because of 

the nature of the terrain and the absence of any physical military presence.20 

Pakistan interprets the vague language contained in the 1972 Simla agreement to mean 

that the LOC should extend in a straight line in a northeasterly direction from NJ 9842 

toward the Karakoram Pass. At the same time, Pakistan recognizes the disputed nature of 

the Siachen region. In the 1963 Sino-Pakistan agreement, for example, in which the 

Karakoram Pass was defined as the terminal point for the delineation of the Sino-Pakistan 

international boundary, the areas south of the border were described as “the contiguous 

areas the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan,” and not as Pakistani 

territory. 

Pakistan also claims that the Siachen Glacier and its approaches fall within the Pakistanicontrolled and administered territory of Jammu and Kashmir, more specifically in the 

Baltistan district in the Northern Areas.22 The claim that Siachen is a part of Pakistan’s 

Northern Areas is significant because Pakistan has, since independence, gradually 

2o Ibnul Hasan, “Siachin: No Breaking of the Ice Yet,” The Pakistan Times, June 23, 1986; Ikram Ullah, 

“The Truth About Siachen Glacier-11: Why Should Pakistan Bite the Bait?’ ibid., October 20, 1987. The 

Pakistan Times, a daily newspaper, has served as the unofficial organ of the Pakistan government. 

XII, No. 1, Autumn 1988), pp. 45-46. 

22 Pakistani analysts claim that the Siachen Glacier has been a “de facto and dejure part of Pakistan’s 

Northern Areas ever since the creation of the ceasefire line.” See Shabbir Hussain, “Siachen Glacier-Facts 

and Fiction,” The Pakistan Times, September 6, 1985, and A. Sayeed Khan Qamar, “Siachen Glacier-A 

Test of Indian Political Sagacity,” The Muslim, June 9, 1986. 

Robert G. Wirsing, “The Siachen Glacier Dispute-11: The Strategic Dimension,” Strategic Studies (Vol. 

16 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

incorporated the Northern Areas within the state.23 Pakistani officials have also taken the 

stand that the Northern Areas were never under the direct jurisdiction of the state of 

Jammu and Kashmir in undivided India.24 While no steps have been taken, so far, to 

integrate the Northern Areas formally within Pakistan, such a move is possible in the 

future.25 The anomalous status of the Northern Areas provides Pakistan the justification, 

when the need arises, to separate the Siachen conflict from the larger dispute over 

Kashmir. Siachen is thus portrayed as a regional issue by Pakistani officials as opposed 

to Kashmir, which, it is stressed, is an international issue.26 

Although the dispute over the Siachen region is recognized as a by-product of partition, 

because the area was left undelineated, all Pakistani governments have claimed 

permanent administrative control over this “subdistrict” of Baltistan. They also claim 

that Pakistani administrative control has international recognition. For example, 

international mountaineering expeditions to the vicinity of the Siachen Glacier have 

obtained permission from Pakistani authorities since the 1 950d7 Cartographic 

international recognition for Pakistani territorial claims is also cited, including several 

international atlases that show the Siachen Glacier as lying well within the Pakistanicontrolled portions of the LOC.28 

Pakistan admits, however, that its claims to administrative control did not translate into 

actual physical presence. No permanent posts were established due to the inhospitable 

23 Unlike Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which has, at least in official terms, a separate state structure, the 

Northern Areas are under the direct administrative control of the Pakistan federal government. 

24 Challenging India’s claim that the Siachen area was a part of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani Foreign 

Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, claimed that the Glacier was an integral part of Pakistan’s Northern 

Areas, which had historically fallen outside the boundaries or administrative control of Jammu and 

Kashmir state. Brig (retd.) A.R. Siddiqi, “Siachen: The Glacier Won’t Move,” Dawn, June 30, 1986. 

25 On August 28, 1997, the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northem Areas, Lt. Gen. Majeed 

Malik declared that the federal government intends to decide the future of Gilgit and Baltistan, keeping in 

mind the claim of the people of the Northern Areas that their region was not a part of Jammu and Kashmir 

and that “they liberated the areas by themselves and struck a willed accession with Pakistan.” Dawn, 

August 29, 1997. 

26 Pakistan Foreign Office sources cited in Aroosa Alam, “Siachen Likely to be Demilitarized,’’ The 

Muslim, December 7, 1993. Announcing Pakistan’s willingness, in March 1997, to resume talks on 

demilitarizing Siachen, Foreign Office spokesman Khalid Saleem stated that: “The Siachen situation is not 

directly linked to Kashmir.” Umer Farooq, “Pakistan Ready to Discuss Withdrawal from Siachen,” The 

Nation, March 2, 1997. 

’’ According to Pakistani sources, as early as 1957, a British expedition sought Pakistani permission to visit 

the glacier zone. Since the 1972 Simla agreement, over 20 international mountaineering expeditions had 

sought similar permission from Pakistani authorities. Dr. Muhammad Aslam Sheattles, “From Cochin to 

Siachen,” The Pakistan Times, December 15, 1992; I.A. Ifiikhar, “Siachen: India’s Achilles Heel,’’ The 

Muslim, April 18, 1995. 

’* These include the National Geographic Society’s Atlas of the World, the University of Chicago’s A 

Historical Atlas of South Asia, The Times Atlas of the World and the 198 1 and 1982 issues of the American 

Alpine Journal. 

17 
Freezing the Fighting: 

terrain and harsh climatic condition~.~~ Pakistan was willing to accept the territory as noman’s land until India deployed its forces in the Siachen area in 1984. By Pakistani 

perceptions, this violated the spirit of the Simla Agreement according to which neither 

side would resort to the use of force to resolve bilateral disp~tes.~’ 

The Indian military made substantive gains, acquiring control over two of the three key 

mountain passes in the Saltoro Range. The initial Pakistani response was to 

simultaneously contain the Indian advance and to dislodge Indian troops from their 

positions on the higher ground in the passes providing access to the glacier. By 

controlling the heights, the Indians were in a militarily advantageous position. The 

Pakistani offensives failed and there were high casualty rates.31 Since then, Pakistani 

strategies, tactics, and goals have been reassessed. 

While artillery, rockets, and gunfire put pressure on Indian troops, large-scale offensives 

are no longer mounted against Indian positions on the more easily defensible high 

mountain passes. Instead, Pakistan’s military planners have used and consolidated their 

advantages over their Indian adversaries in terms of terrain, altitude, and logistics. While 

Pakistani troops are stationed outside the glacier, in less forbidding terrain than their 

Indian adversaries, the Pakistani military presence forces India to retain its troops on the 

more elevated and hazardous mountain passes, resulting in higher attrition rates because 

of the dangerous altitude, weather, and terrain.32 

Logistically, Pakistan controls Gyong La, which sits astride India’s access route from Leh 

to the glacier and its approaches. Pakistani troops are only twenty kilometers away from 

Addressing Parliament in November 1985, Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zain Noorani 29 

declared that “the glacier up to the Karakorum Pass” was “under Pakistan’s administrative control.” He 

added, “No troops had, however, been posted there (prior to 1984) because of climatic conditions.” 

Maleeha Lodhi, “Siachen: What Really Happened?’ The Muslim, October 22, 1987. 

In an interview with an Indian news agency, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto pointed out that the Siachen 

conflict was “the first and only instance of violation of the Simla Agreement,” adding that Pakistan sought 

to resolve it peacefully “in accordance with the Simla Agreement, in which both sides are committed to not 

alter the situation unilaterally.” The Hindustan Times, June 20, 1989. See also M.H. Askari, “Unfreeze 

Siachen?’ Dawn, November 18, 1987. 

31 Pakistani sources claim that 100 to 160 Pakistanis were killed in the September 1987 abortive bid by a 

full battalion to capture Indian positions on the higher ground near Bilafond La. Indian sources claim that 

more than 250 Pakistanis were killed in the offensive. The Nation, 7 October 1987; 10 October 1987; M.J. 

Akbar, “Top Secret Pak File on Siachen Leaked to India on Eve of Critical Battle,” The Telegraph, 

January 1.1988. 

j2 In Pakistani estimates, Indian expenditure on the Siachen operations is five times higher, while the 

casualty ratio is 10 to one. Lt. Gen. Imranullah Khan, who served as Corps Commander, responsible for 

Siachen, claims: “Our aim has been to make it expensive for them, and that has worked.” E.A. Bokhari, 

“The Queen of Glaciers,” Globe (Nos. 2 and 3, 1997), p. 70. See also Aroosa Alam, op.cit. 

30 

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Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

a main Indian supply route at Dzingr~lma.~~ The Pakistani military, on the other hand, has 

easier land access to its posts through Pakistani-controlled territory. Since the mid-1 980s 

continuous improvements of Pakistani logistical/administrative support and ground 

communications have been made as roads and tracks have been brought up to the 

Pakistani lower base camps.34 As a result, Pakistan’s casualty rates and financial costs 

have decreased, in sharp contrast to India, which is forced to provide all logistical support 

by air to its forces. 

4.2.1 The Pakistani Policy Debate 

Strategically, Pakistan continues to focus on its primary objective of driving the costs of 

the Siachen dispute high enough to force India to make concessions in any future 

settlement. Declared policy in Pakistan is equally consistent. The Siachen Glacier and 

its approaches are located within Baltistan in the Pakistani-administered Northern 

Territories. Pakistan will not accept the status quo on Siachen because India’s military 

presence on the glacier and its environs is 

Pakistani policy makers have, however, demonstrated a certain flexibility on the Siachen 

issue, which is missing in the India-Pakistani dialogue on the larger dispute of Jammu 

and Kashmir. Pakistan’s refusal to negotiate its basic demand for a plebiscite on Kashmir 

contrasts sharply with its willingness to consider measures ranging from redeployment to 

demilitarization regarding the Siachen dispute. Officials and opinion-makers recognize 

that the Siachen dispute focuses on territory of little strategic value, while draining funds, 

manpower, and military hardware.36 

33 A.G. Noorani, “CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek, and Wular Barrage,” Michael Krepon and 

Amit Sevak (eds), Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia (Manohar, 

New Delhi, 1996), p. 88. 

j4 The 150-kilometer track between Baltistan’s district headquarters Skardu and Dansam, the first of a 

series of Pakistani military base headquarters for the Siachen Glacier region, has been developed into a 

wide road, capable of handling heavy vehicles. A field mess and hospital have been established at a further 

base, Goma. Roads and bridges have also been constructed between Goma and Gyari, where the glaciated 

region begins. See Lt. Col. Syed Ishfaq Ali, “Scaling the Heights of Siachen,” The Nation, July 2, 1991. 

See also Ikram Sehgal, op.cit., p. 69; Zahid Hussain, “Fighting on the Roof of the World,” The Muslim, 

June 22, 199 1, and Shahjehan, “Closer to Heaven,” The News, April 25, 1996. 

for Foreign Affairs Siddique Khan Kanju, told the Senate on February 22, 1993, that India had illegally 

occupied the Siachen Glacier in 1984, in contravention of the Simla Agreement; adding that Pakistan’s 

willingness to negotiate the issue did not imply a recognition of Indian ground claims. The Frontier Post, 

February 23, 1993. 

36 Questioning the rationale behind the fighting in the Siachen, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan 

stated, “Why should we be facing each other on the roof of the world? It’s stupid-two nations locked in 

totally futile combat.” Molly Moore, “Siachen Glacier Winning War,” Dawn, May 4, 1993. See also The 

Nation, October 3, 1992. 

Discussing the outcome of the sixth round of defense secretaries’ talks on Siachen, Pakistan’s Minister 35 

19 
Freezing the Fighting: 

Tracing the course of the conflict and the negotiating behavior of Pakistani policy 

makers, it is clear that a unilateral Pakistani withdrawal can be ruled out because Indian 

forces control most of the glacier’s territory, including the high ground on two of its three 

major passes. There are three policy options before Pakistani decision-makers: (1) to 

continue the armed conflict, (2) to sign an agreement limited to conflict containments, or 

(3) to reach a comprehensive and permanent settlement with India. The adoption of any 

of these options depends on the perceptions, preferences, and bargaining power of various 

sections of Pakistan’s policy-making community. 

Hardline elements, including influential segments within Pakistan’s military 

establishment and civil bureaucracy, favor a continuation of the conflict because India is 

perceived as the aggre~sor.~’ For this segment of Pakistani opinion, a negotiated 

settlement is regarded as an unnecessary concession. The military stalemate is seen as 

favoring Pakistan because neither side can claim to have ousted the other from the 

disputed territory. A more important motive for continuing the conflict is the desire to 

avenge the initial Pakistani military reverses by seeing India bleed because India’s human 

and financial costs are far higher.38 

More moderate elements within the political leadership as well as in the civil-military 

bureaucracies favor a negotiated ~ettlement.~~ Moderate elements believe that Pakistani 

casualties and the economic burden do not justify sustaining a conflict over an 

inhospitable territory with no population or resources and little geostrategic value.40 Even 

among Pakistani supporters of a negotiated settlement, however, there are concerns, 

based on a history of mistrust, that India would attempt to use a settlement to legitimize 

its claim over the disputed area.4’ 

“Every square inch is sovereign territory,” declared the head of the Pakistan armed forces’ Inter-Services 

According to some senior Pakistani army officers, “They (the Indians) asked for it, and let them pay for 

31 

Public Relations, Major General Jehangir Nasrullah. “You can’t throw it away.” Molly Moore, op.cit. 

it.” Air Marshal (retd.) Ayaz Ahmed Khan, “Siachen: The Graveyard of Indian Army,” Defence Journal 

38 

(Vol. XXI, NOS. 5-6), p. 37. 

Announcing the resolve of the Nawaz Sharif government to maintain “normal good neighborly relations 

with India,” Foreign Office spokesman Khalid Saleem declared that: “We are always willing to discuss the 

question of withdrawing troops from Siachen provided it is based on agreements and agreed principles.” 

Tariq Butt, “Pakistan ready to discuss withdrawal from Siachen,” The News, March 2, 1997. 

soldiers in Siachen costs more than Rs 450 (approximately US $10). The Nation, December 29, 1987; The 

News, August 23, 1992. 

4’ Pakistan has rejected any Indian claim over the disputed territory on the basis of its physical presence in 

the area. According to the Minister of State for Defense, Rana Naeem Mahmood, in the first rounds of 

negotiations in 1986 and 1987, Pakistan had rejected Indian demands for a ceasefiie on existing positions, 

insisting that a mutual force withdrawal to pre- 1984 positions must precede any agreement on a ceasefire. 

In subsequent negotiations, a changed Pakistan stand called for the withdrawal of troops to positions held 

at the time of the 1972 Simla Agreement, when the Line of Control was demarcated. Dawn, November 3, 

39 

Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan disclosed that each ‘roti’ (piece of bread) for Pakistani 40 

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Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

Any agreement that alters the territorial status of the Siachen region to Pakistan’s 

disadvantage would thus be opposed. This explains Pakistan’s rejection of Indian 

proposals for authentication of actual ground positions prior to a withdrawal or the 

delineation of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842 along existing ground positions in the 

Siachen region.42 There would, moreover, be considerable internal opposition to any 

settlement without adequate safeguards-political and technological-to ensure that the 

disputed region does not become vulnerable to Indian encroachments in the future. 

5. Taxonomy of Agreements 

Continuous negotiations have been held to contain and resolve the conflict ever since the 

outbreak of hostilities. As early as 1984 and 1985, flag meetings were held, with little 

success, between Indian and Pakistani sector commanders. Since January 1986, several 

high-level talks have been held between Indian and Pakistani defense and foreign 

secretaries as well as senior military personnel, reflecting their desire to reach a peaceful 

and negotiated ~ettlement.~~ In 1989 and once again in 1992, the two countries came close 

to a resolution of the dispute. 

At the fifth round of talks between Defense Secretaries in June 1989, an understanding 

was initially reached to resolve the dispute. According to the joint statement issued at the 

conclusion of talks, “There was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict, 

avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so 

as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen 

area.” The joint statement stated that, “The army authorities of both sides will determine 

these position^."^^ 

At the sixth round of the Defense Secretary talks in November 1992, with the assistance 

of military experts, an India-Pakistan agreement was reportedly reached that envisaged 

(1) the mutual withdrawal of troops from key passes to new positions, and (2) the creation 

of a “zone of complete disengagement” as a result of troop disengagement and 

redeployment. The delineation of this area of “peace and tranquillity” would be “without 

1987; The News, August 23, 1992. See also Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, “India flunks the Siachen test,” The News, 

November 30, 1992. 

42 Pakistan is equally concerned that India will use the pretext of redeployment to station its troops in 

positions which would be more easily defensible in terms of logistics, altitude and terrain. Abdul Waheed 

Husaini, “Confusion mars Indo-Pak talks on Siachen,” The News, November 5, 1992. 

‘’ In the joint statement issued at the conclusion of Defense Secretary-level talks in June 1986, the two 

sides expressed their resolve to “find a negotiated settlement of the Siachen issue in accordance with the 

Simla Agreement.” The Pakistan Times, June 15, 1986. Similar statements have been issued at subsequent 

meetings. 

44 Dawn, August 24, 1992; The Hindustan Times, June 18, 1989. 

21 
Freezing the Fighting: 

prejudice” to the known position of either side. The agreement also reportedly included 

pledges by both states to refrain from reoccupying vacated positions.45 

No new positions would be occupied in the designated zone nor would any “activity’- 

civilian or military-be allowed within the designated zone. Time schedules for 

disengagement and redeployment were to be worked out to the “mutual satisfaction” of 

both sides, followed by the formation of a joint commission that would be responsible for 

“delineation of the Line of Control beyond NJ 9842.” Until the area was formally 

delineated, monitoring mechanisms would be devised to prevent the occurrence of 

violations. Reportedly, either side could resort to “any means,” including the use of 

force, in the event of a violation of these commitment^.^^ 

The two countries, however, not only failed to implement these tentative agreements, but 

one or the other side denied that any tangible agreement had been reached on either 

occa~ion.~’ The difficulty in reaching or implementing any mutually agreeable proposal 

was due to a number of factors, ranging from domestic political constraints to differences 

over the determination of redeployment positions, the demarcation of the proposed 

demilitarized zone, and ensuring the inviolability of such a zone.4s The significance of 

the understandings reached in 1989 and 1992 cannot, however, be understated since they 

identify potential areas of agreement and discord in any future agreement of the Siachen 

dispute. 

5.7 A Potential Settlement of the Siachen Dispute 

With the resumption of the India-Pakistani dialogue in 1997, as a result of renewed 

efforts by the Indian and Pakistani governments to improve bilateral relations, the 

Siachen dispute is once again on the formal agenda of ongoing talks at the foreign 

secretarial level. While the outcome of these negotiations depends on complex, 

intertwined, external and internal determinants, a future understanding of the dispute 

could take any of the following shapes: (1) an accord to de-escalate hostilities; (2) an 

understanding to disengage military forces, or (3) an agreement to demilitarize the area. 

This taxonomy does not imply that the three types of potential agreements would 

necessarily be reached in sequence or even in isolation from one another. An accord on a 

limited military disengagement would include an understanding on the avoidance or deescalation of hostilities. Should the political will exist, such an agreement could also 

include, among its objectives, future negotiations on a more comprehensive solution that 

45 Atul Aneja, “Siachen Accord Envisages a Thaw,” The Hindu, March 28, 1997; The Nation, June 22, 

1996. 

46 Atul Aneja, op.cit. 

Pakistan refused to accept India’s version of the November 1992 accord, spelled out in India’s January 

1994 Non-Paper on Siachen. 

48 Zafar Abbas, “In From the Cold?’ The Herald, April 1997, p. 47. 

While the Indian government repudiated Pakistani claims of a mutually agreed upon formula in 1989, 47 

22 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

would involve the demilitarization of the disputed area. Similarly, an agreement to 

demilitarize the Siachen Glacier would inevitably include the de-escalation of hostilities 

and the disengagement of troops. It is not necessary that separate accords for either a 

cessation of active hostilities or the disengagement of military forces would precede an 

agreement to demilitarize the region. 

Each type of agreement and its conflict management or conflict resolution features will 

depend, moreover, on several broad principles or pre-conditions. Thus levels of mutual 

trust and confidence and/or mutuality of interests will determine both the nature and the 

parameters of any potential agreement. Another important precondition is the degree of 

political will on the part of authoritative decision-makers to reach a peaceful, negotiated 

settlement of’ the dispute, including their demonstrated ability or desire to avoid 

intractable i ssues. 

5.1 .I De-Escalation Of Hostilities 

The primav ob-iective of such an accord would be to reduce the chances of conflict, 

ending the acti\ e hostilities in the Siachen Glacier region. Such an agreement would 

include sc\ crrd conflict-management mechanisms. The features of the accord could 

specificall) include restrictions on any quantitative increases in weaponry, and an 

agreement to refrain from aggressive behavior such as offensives to occupy new territory 

or to dislodge ri\ a1 troops, The agreement could also prohibit either side from fortifying 

its presence in the disputed region through the induction of new military units. 

Such an agrcemcnt would require confidence building measures such as: 

0 prior notification of troop rotation 

0 prior noti tication of flights or convoys providing logistical support 

0 a hotlinc and regular meetings between sector commanders to prevent an increase in 

tensions or to end an outbreak of fighting 

0 obser\ atiibti posts for monitoring the cease-fire accord. 

5.1.2 Disengagement Of Military Forces 

An agreement on military disengagement could incorporate many of the clauses of an 

agreement spccitically aimed at de-escalating hostilities, including confidence building 

measures such as prior notification of overflights and flag meetings between Indian and 

Pakistani sector commanders. Such an accord would, however, move from conflict 

management to conflict resolution since it would demonstrate the willingness of both 

parties to find a more comprehensive solution to the dispute. It could also serve as a 

continuum from cease-fire to demilitarization should the political will exist. 

23 
Freezing the Fighting: 

Relocating troops to minimize the chance of conflict implies (1) gradual reductions of 

forces in forward positions and (2) an incremental dismantlement of forward pickets and 

observation posts. Forces would then be redeployed and repositioned in agreed areas. 

Other measures could include a limitation on overflights. While artillery batteries at the 

various posts and positions could remain in place, an agreement for military 

disengagement could envisage gradually downgrading weapons systems, including 

removing sophisticated military systems such as surface-to-air missiles.49 

A decision could also be made to refrain from airborne or directed attacks, accompanied 

by the withdrawal of anti-aircraft batteries. Military observers, joint patrols and other 

appropriate mechanisms could be used to monitor the accord and to verify agreed levels 

of military disengagement, including redeploying troops to designated positions and 

downgrading military equipment. 

5.1.3 Demilitarization Of The Area 

The demilitarization option is the most comprehensive solution for the Siachen dispute. 

It would require, as essential preconditions, an immediate cessation of hostilities and the 

prevention of any potential reoccurrence of armed conflict. The creation of a demilitarized zone would cause the complete withdrawal of all military presence on and in the 

environs of the glacier. Such a withdrawal would be accompanied by the destruction of 

bases, pickets, and observation posts, the removal of all military hardware from the 

disputed area, and a prohibition on aerial patrolling and reconnaissance by either side.50 

The agreement would also include a commitment on both sides to refrain from reoccupying vacated positions. Another confidence building measure could be the use of hotlines 

between force commanders as well as senior personnel at military headquarters, including 

Directors-General of Military Operations. Above all, an appropriate regime of 

monitoring technologies and verification procedures would be identified and instituted to 

ensure the viability of the accord. 

6. Verification Options 

The phrase “Trust but verify‘‘ has been implicit to all arms control agreements since it 

entered the international security lexicon during the Reagan-Gorbachev years. The 

theory and practice of verification since the mid-1980s suggests that the stability of a 

bilateral, regional, or international security agreement depends on how it is ~erified.~’ 

Both sides have deployed surface-to-air missiles in the area. 49 

50 While its access through several routes to the GLACIER area will enable Pakistan to remove its heavy 

weaponry by land, India might be forced to destroy artillery guns and ammunition that had been paradropped to its positions. Pravin Sawhney, “Siachen Is a Myth.” India’s Defense: Ten Myths That Have 

Shaped The Image (Royal United Services Institute, London, forthcoming), p. 10. 

See, for example, Gloria Duffy, “Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: What to Look For,” Shai 51 

Feldman, ed., ConJidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East (Westview Press, 

24 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

This section examines available verification options for ensuring the stability of a future 

India-Pakistan agreement on Siachen. Three conceptual dimensions of verification are 

discussed. First, alternative levels at which verification can be accomplished are 

classified and their associated attributes discussed. Then, alternative measures by which 

verification might be sought at the various levels are identified. Finally, implications of 

alternative verification options for agreement stability are analyzed. 

6.1 Verification Levels 

At least four levels of verification can be conceptualized in the context of Siachen. These 

include the use of national means as well as three levels of bilateral cooperation: minimal, 

moderate, and extensive. If verification is done by national means, data would be 

unilaterally obtained by India and Pakistan and kept confidential. Because data would be 

gathered without the other side’s consent, permissive intrusiveness would be minimal. 

Similarly, cooperation in the collection and sharing of data would also be minimal due to 

concerns about compromising national intelligence sources. This would complicate 

mutual compliance assurance, because each side’s national means would be shrouded in 

secrecy. Thus the potential of national means of verification for building mutual IndiaPakistan confidence would be extremely low. However, verification by national means 

would not require building domestic support in either country. 

At a bilateral minimal level of verification, data unilaterally obtained by India or Pakistan 

might be occasionally shared with the other, either to substantiate an allegation of 

noncompliance, or to reassure the adversary about one’s own compliance. This level of 

verification may also involve limited cooperation in the collection of data without 

extensive sharing of information. Refraining from camouflaging military equipment 

would be an example of this type of limited cooperation. However, neither India nor 

Pakistan would have much reason to trust the data provided by the other, and verification 

would depend primarily on national means. Thus, bilateral minimal verification would 

involve low levels of permitted intrusiveness, cooperation, and data sharing, and would 

result in relatively low mutual compliance assurance. The confidence building potential 

of this level of verification also would be relatively low, but because of its virtually 

nonintrusive nature, it would require minimal domestic support in either India or 

Pakistan. 

A bilateral moderate level of verification would involve moderate cooperation between 

India and Pakistan in sharing data obtained through the use of similar if not identical 

verification measures. This type of verification would require higher levels of permitted 

intrusiveness, cooperation, data sharing and compliance assurance, and would offer 

higher confidence building potential in return. However, the intrusive nature of bilateral 

~~ 

Boulder, Colorado, 1994), pp. 103-1 14. See also Patricia Bliss McFate, “Three Interfaces: Regional and 

International Stability; Confidence-Building and International Verification; and the United Nations and 

Regional Organizations,” J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, VeviJication, Compliance and Confidence 

Building: The Global and Regional Interface (Centre for lnternational and Security Studies, York 

University, Toronto, 1996), pp. 75-85. 

25 
Freezing the Fighting: 

moderate verification may cause public opposition. Thus, the success of the respective 

governments in building up the required domestic support would be an important factor 

in considering this level of verification. 

Finally, comprehensive cooperation in obtaining and sharing data is the hallmark of the 

bilateral extensive level of verification. This level would involve employing similar 

verification measures by both India and Pakistan, and it would also require extremely 

high levels of permitted intrusiveness, cooperation, and data sharing. Indeed, both states 

would expect to receive the same kinds of data provided on an equal basis from virtually 

identical sensors. Thus, bilateral extensive verification would be characterized by high 

mutual compliance assurance and would have high potential for building confidence. 

However. domestic support would become more important in the decision of both 

governments to agree to this highly intrusive level of verification. Public support for 

bilateral extensi\,e verification would likely occur only if the agreement were perceived to 

be in the national interests of both India and Pakistan. 

Agreeing about the appropriate level of verification is just as important as reaching an 

agreement on the dispute itself. In addition, cooperative verification, no matter how 

extensive. docs not replace the need for information from national means. 

6.1 .I Intrusiveness and Compliance Assurance 

Multiple critication measures can operate at each of the verification levels previously 

discussed. ISach erification measure has inherent degrees of intrusiveness and 

compliancc assumnce. Intrusiveness has two different dimensions: 

sovercignt: . or the degree to which some verification measure requires permissive 

cooperrttion trom the parties to the agreement. 

sensitii it: ot' the information being gained from the monitoring applications. 

Aerial o\ erllights illustrate both dimensions. There is the aspect of permitting 

obseriational flights into the sovereign airspace of participating states, but there is also 

the aspect of' thc resolution of the technologies employed and the degree of sensitive 

information the: can collect. 

A rather di tfkrcnt example is remote sensing by satellite that requires no permission from 

any count? to be operated from space, but has the capability of detecting sensitive 

activities such as weapons development or radio communications. Remote sensing by 

satellite ma). not infringe on the legal sovereignty of the observed state, but might be 

considered quite intrusive if it causes that state to modify operations (such as limiting 

hours of operation or requiring underground facilities) to prevent observation. Thus, 

intrusiveness is not always a function of cooperation or permission. 

The second conceptual point concerns the relationship between intrusiveness and 

compliance assurance. While they are usually directly related, they do not necessarily 

26 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

have a cause-and effect-relationship. Intrusiveness does not always result in compliance 

assurance. Thus, it is important not to assume that a verification measure must be 

intrusive to be effective, or conversely that a verification method that is intrusive is 

necessarily effective. 

Verification measures should be associated with verification levels at which they can be 

most appropriately utilized. In the context of the Siachen conflict, India and Pakistan 

would have to weigh the costs of intrusiveness of each type of verification measure 

against its benefits of compliance assurance in order to identify and select an appropriate 

package of verification measures to be applied at the agreed verification level. 

6.2 Verification Measures 

The first type of verification measures are declarations and notifications, which are 

usually made through documents, meetings, and hot lines. In the Siachen context, these 

measures would involve communication between India and Pakistan to inform each other 

of intended actions such as troop movements, military exercises, and flights that could 

appear to be threatening. These unilateral transparency measures could build mutual 

confidence. Intrusiveness would be very low because of their unilateral nature, and they 

would provide very little compliance assurance. Over time, they could contribute to 

confidence building. 

At the next level, verification by technical means involves employing various types of 

devices, such as sensors and associated technologies, and interpreting the data they 

generate. The following lists available verification technologies: 

1. Aerial sensing - Aerial sensing methods could employ photographic and video 

cameras, both visual and infrared, and radar. The level of intrusiveness of sensors placed 

on aircraft would depend on several factors, including which country owns and operates 

the aircraft, whether the flight is in foreign airspace or not, the exact flight path of the 

aircraft, the altitude of the aircraft, the capability of the sensors on board, who is 

receiving the data from the sensors, and how data is transmitted. Depending on the 

combination of these factors, aerial sensors could be moderately to highly intrusive and 

provide moderate to high compliance assurance. 

2. Satellites - Satellites can also carry visual and infrared photographic cameras and 

radar. However, unlike aircraft, orbiting satellites are outside the sovereign jurisdiction 

of all states, which reduces the intrusiveness of satellite sensing as a verification measure. 

Nevertheless, remote sensing from satellites can provide high compliance assurance. 

Remote sensing data from commercial satellites, such as the French SPOT, the Russian 

KVR-1000, the Indian IRS-C and the Canadian RADARSAT, could be purchased by 

either India or Pakistan at relatively low prices. However, this application has 

limitations, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. 

27 
Freezing the Fighting: 

3. Ground Sensors - Ground sensors include seismic, acoustic, magnetic, infrared, 

thermal, and radar devices. They can (1) monitor the movement of troops or equipment 

along access routes to deployment areas; (2) detect the provision of aerial supplies to 

forward positions; or (3) monitor base camps away from the glacier. Ground sensors 

would be more intrusive than aerial or satellite sensors, but they would provide high 

compliance assurance. The degree of intrusiveness of ground sensors would depend on 

several factors, including which country had placed the sensor, where the sensor had been 

placed, who was receiving data from the sensor, and how the data was being transmitted. 

4. Video and Optical Sensors - Cameras can be much more intrusive than other ground 

sensors. While all data generated by ground sensors, whether optical or non-optical, 

would be subject to interpretation by both countries, photographs tend to be less 

ambiguous than data from some other types of ground sensors. In the Siachen context, 

video and optical sensors could supplement other sensors by providing a visual 

assessment of activity. Though ground-based video and optical sensors can be highly 

intrusive, the compliance assurance they may provide can be just as high. 

5. Tags and Seals - Artillery pieces could, for example, be tagged and their removal 

verified by joint Indian and Pakistani inspection teams at specified inspection sites in the 

vicinity of the glacier. The intrusiveness is very high, because India and Pakistan would 

give each other access to their hardware. However, tags and seals would also provide 

very high compliance assurance. 

6. Inspections - Potentially one of the most intrusive verification measures for India and 

Pakistan would be ground and aerial inspections of their forces, equipment, and force 

dispositions by the other side. Baseline inspections could verify the situation on the 

ground prior to the signing of an India-Pakistan agreement on Siachen. Routine 

inspections would be more intrusive and would involve periodic inspections of specified 

facilities and camps on either side. Elimination inspections could verify the disabling and 

destruction of hardware prohibited by an India-Pakistan agreement. These three types of 

inspections represent increasing levels of intrusiveness, but could provide high levels of 

compliance assurance. 

Two other types of inspections also might be possible in the context of a Siachen 

agreement. If challenge inspections were authorized, both countries could mount 

inspections on demand with minimum notice. Continuous inspections would involve the 

permanent presence of Indian and Pakistani inspectors in each other’s facilities. Both 

inspection regimes have extremely high levels of intrusiveness and compliance assurance. 

Clearly, India and Pakistan would have a wide array of verification measures with 

different degrees of intrusiveness available to them to verify a Siachen agreement. 

However, not all the verification measures discussed above would be suitable to Siachen. 

Altitude, weather, and terrain on the Saltoro Range and the Siachen Glacier will put any 

technology to a rigorous test. For instance, the degree to which acoustic, seismic, and 

other ground sensors would be able to function when buried under several meters of snow 

28 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

would need to be evaluated. Many parts of the glacier and the Saltoro Ridge are 

avalanche-prone because of the steep gradient. Thus, ground-based sensors could be lost 

and damaged frequently and would require regular replacement. Since blizzards reach 

speeds of 300 kilometers per hour on the Saltoro Range, it is uncertain whether sensors 

‘ mounted on towers and masts would be able to withstand such tremendous wind speeds. 

Some existing sensors may not be able to withstand temperatures as low as -40 degrees 

Celsius.52 Radars with domes may present a viable alternative for short-range air-space 

monitoring. The ability of sensors to function in the glacier environment can be 

determined only through rigorous on-site or environmental testing, and it could be 

necessary to specially design suitable verification equipment. 

Since the disputed area is perennially snow-covered, tests would be needed to determine 

if commercial satellite imagery would be effective, given the large expanses of white 

background in the images. RADARSAT images of the disputed area show the terrain 

well but the current resolution of the images is not good enough for the application of 

monitoring low-level military a~tivity.’~ Finally, given the uninhabitable nature of the 

disputed area, it is not just technical measures that would be subject to all manner of 

limitations. The deleterious impact of extreme altitude, weather, and terrain on the 

human body would make a continuous inspection regime highly improbable. Thus, the 

harsh conditions on the glacier will pose special challenges to any verification regime. 

Geophone sensor SM-6, manufactured by Sensor Nederland bv has an operating temperature range -40 52 

to 100 degrees Celsius. 

” Thomas Budge, Earth Data Analysis Center, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

29 
Freezing the Fighting: 

VERIFICATION APPLICATIONS 

Verification 

Measures 

Declarations 

& Notifications 

Technical 

Monitoring 

Inspections 

De-escalation 

Documents 

Meetings 

Hot lines 

Commercial Satellite 

photography 

- visual 

- infrared 

radar 

*Baseline 

~~ 

Disengagement 

Documents 

Meetings 

Hot lines 

*Aerial Sensors 

photography 

- visual 

- infrared 

0 video 

0 radar 

Commercial Satellite 

0 photography 

- visual 

- infrared 

0 radar 

Ground Sensors 

0 seismic 

0 acoustic 

magnetic 

0 infrared 

thermal 

0 radar 

*Video and Optical 

Sensors 

Baseline 

Routine 

Elimination 

Demilitarization 

Documents 

Meetings 

Hot lines 

Aerial Sensors 

0 photography 

- visual 

- infrared 

0 video 

0 radar 

Commercial Satellite 

0 photography 

- visual 

- infrared 

0 radar 

Ground Sensors 

0 seismic 

0 acoustic 

0 magnetic 

0 infrared 

0 thermal 

0 radar 

Video and Optical 

Sensors 

Tags and Seals 

Baseline 

Routine 

Elimination 

Challenge 

Continuous 

*Verification measures dependent on terms of agreement 

6.3 Verification and Agreement Stability 

The purpose of verification is to assure compliance, which is necessary for agreement 

stability. The stability of an India-Pakistan agreement on Siachen would depend on how 

comprehensive the agreement is and how extensively it is verified. According to the 

taxonomy devised in the previous section, the least extensive agreement on Siachen 

would be a de-escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan. A de-escalation 

agreement that the two countries verified solely by national means is likely to be 

30 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

unstable, because verification methodologies that depend entirely on national means can 

increase mutual distrust, although national means probably would be extensively utilized 

by both countries to veri@ a de-escalation agreement. 

Likewise, a de-escalation agreement that relies on an occasional sharing of information 

might also be slightly unstable due to lack of trust. However, a de-escalation agreement 

between India and Pakistan, supported by a moderately intrusive verification arrangement, would be much more likely to endure and build confidence. Lastly, it would be 

inappropriate to verify an India-Pakistan de-escalation agreement at the bilateral 

extensive level, because extremely intrusive verification in a situation of minimal mutual 

agreement would likely contribute to tension. 

Thus, in the context of a de-escalation agreement, if prior notification of troop rotation 

and flights or convoys providing logistical support is agreed upon, verification could be 

ensured through data exchanges via flag meetings and hotlines. Compliance of a deescalation agreement could also be ensured through baseline inspections, satellite 

imagery, and radar. 

An agreement between the two countries that was aimed at disengagement of military 

forces would be far more extensive than a de-escalation agreement, and would therefore 

require a much more extensive level of verification. Verification of military 

disengagement solely by national means would be highly unstable, and could lead to a 

lack of confidence in the agreement. Nevertheless, national means would be used by 

India and Pakistan to supplement a bilateral arrangement to verify military 

disengagement. 

A military disengagement agreement that could only be verified at the bilateral minimal 

level, with the occasional sharing of unilaterally-obtained information, also would be 

unstable. However, a military disengagement agreement between India and Pakistan that 

depended on verification at the bilateral moderate level would be much more stable. 

Bilateral extensive verification of a military disengagement agreement between India and 

Pakistan would be inappropriate. As long as Indian and Pakistani forces remain in the 

area, an extremely intrusive verification arrangement would lead to tension and could 

easily threaten agreement stability. 

Thus, as in the case of de-escalation, commercial satellite imagery could be used to assure 

compliance. In addition, because of the higher levels of intrusiveness associated with this 

kind of agreement, aerial sensing could be used, for example, to verify a gradual 

reduction of forces and equipment in forward posts as well as ground resupply. A 

limitation on unauthorized flights could be most effectively verified by radar and acoustic 

and seismic sensors. A slightly more intrusive agreement might permit the use of video 

and optical sensors to supplement other ground-based sensor systems. Finally, baseline, 

routine, and elimination inspections could be used to verify the incremental dismantling 

of forward posts and the gradual downgrading of weapons systems. 

31 
Freezing the Fighting: 

The most extensive India-Pakistan agreement on Siachen would involve demilitarization 

of the area. A Siachen demilitarization agreement based solely on verification by 

national means would be extremely unstable and could easily collapse. Thus, it would 

appear unlikely that national means verification, based on technical and human 

intelligence, could by itself induce agreement stability at any level. Nevertheless, 

national means would be used to supplement more intrusive and cooperative levels of 

verification. 

A demilitarization agreement based solely on bilateral minimal verification, with hot 

lines, flag meetings and the occasional sharing of information obtained from nationally 

owned and operated sensors, would also be unlikely to bolster confidence and mutual 

trust between India and Pakistan and would be highly unstable. A moderately intrusive 

verification arrangement between the two countries could significantly strengthen a 

demilitarization arrangement and lead to agreement stability. Nevertheless, bilateral 

moderate verification, incorporating cooperative monitoring through ground sensors and 

baseline, routine, and elimination inspections, would not be sufficiently extensive for a 

Siachen demilitarization agreement. 

For such an arrangement to be extremely stable and successful, cooperative monitoring at 

the bilateral (extensive) level may be necessary to assuage concerns that the vacuum 

created by the complete withdrawal of troops and equipment could not be exploited by 

the other side. This package of verification measures, in addition to the minimal and 

moderate measures identified above, might include cooperative monitoring through 

aerial, video, and optical sensors as well as tags and seals. It could also require challenge 

and continuous inspections. 

Aerial sensing and commercial satellite imagery could, for example, be used to verify the 

withdrawal of all troops, the destruction of all military bases and the removal of all 

military hardware. Optical, video, thermal, and motion sensors could be deployed to 

observe activity in the abandoned camps and posts. Acoustic and seismic sensors and 

radar could be used to monitor prohibition on unauthorized overflights. 

Any stable agreement of the Siachen dispute, whether it involves the de-escalation of 

hostilities, the disengagement of military forces, or demilitarization, requires an 

appropriate fit between agreement provisions and verification requirements. Thus 

verification knowledge and expertise would play a vital role in ensuring the stability of 

any future agreement of the Siachen dispute. 

7. Freezing the Fighting: The Logic for Change 

After years of hostilities, neither India nor Pakistan are any closer to achieving their 

stated objective of acquiring control over the disputed territory through the use of force. 

Policy makers in both states have begun to examine the possibilities of a negotiated 

agreement, partly as a result of the military stalemate and partly because of the mounting 

costs of the conflict in terms of lives and money. The Siachen dispute covers a territory 

32 
Military Disengagement on the Siachen Glacier 

of little strategic importance for either state, while it serves as yet another irritant in the 

uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan. 

A peacefully negotiated settlement of the Siachen conflict appears especially logical since 

the glacier’s inhospitable terrain will continue to deter Indian and Pakistani attempts at 

acquiring military predominance. At the same time, an agreement on Siachen will not 

impinge, either militarily or politically, on the position of either side in the resolution of 

their other, more major differences. A settlement of the dispute would, however, reduce 

bilateral tensions, thereby improving the climate for future steps towards peace. 

Specifically in the context of the Siachen dispute, even a policy option that merely 

reduces hostilities would serve as a first step towards the conclusion of a more 

comprehensive agreement. 

Should India and Pakistan succeed in reaching an agreement on Siachen, their ability to 

implement such an accord will depend, above all, on the political will of their respective 

leaderships. At the same time, the application of pertinent verification measures would 

assist policy-makers in their task of ensuring agreement stability and compliance. If the 

appropriate verification mix is not identified, provisions could be incorporated into a 

future agreement that could not be adequately verified, reducing the prospects of 

agreement stability. Thus, the ability of India and Pakistan to reach a durable accord of 

the Siachen conflict will be greatly enhanced by an understanding of the complex interrelationship between potential negotiated terms and adequate knowledge of verification 

methodologies. 

33 
Freezing the Fighting: 

8. About the Authors 

Dr. Samina Ahmed is a specialist on South Asian security and a fiee-lance journalist. 

She has a master’s degree in International Relations and a Ph.D. in Political Science from 

the Australian National University. Dr. Ahmed has considerable research experience and 

has published extensively on South Asian security issues. Her publications include the 

co-edited book, Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options, as well as 

several book chapters and articles in academic journals and the print media. 

Dr. Varun Sahni is Associate Professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Neh 

University, New Delhi, and Professor Investigador en Estudious Internacionales, Centro 

de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, Mexico City. Dr. Sahni received both his 

master’s degree in Latin American Studies and D. Phil. in politics from the University of 

Oxford. 

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