PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KATHY M. GEORGE, on behalf of the Estate of Troy Bradshaw, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. BEAVER COUNTY, by and through the Beaver County Board of Commissioners; CAMERON M. NOEL; RANDALL ROSE; DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants - Appellees. No. 21-4006

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Utah (D.C. No. 2:16-CV-01076-TS)

________________ _________________ Eric Boyd Vogeler, Vogeler, PL LC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Andrew R. Hopkins, Mylar Law, P.C. (Frank D. Mylar with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees.

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , McHUGH , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ CARSON , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Order requires respecting policy. A nd volatile prison e nvironments demand consistent training on institutional policies. But failin g to follow prison policy is not FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 3, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 12 a constitutional violation in and of itself. Successful 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipaland supervisory-liability cl aims involve a constitutional violation or pattern of constitutional violations. Viola ting policy alone supports neither. We treat jail-suicide claims, like Plain tiff’s, as failures to provide medical care. Such claims require proof that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious me dical needs, violating the Eighth, or Fourteenth, Amendment. Although Plainti ff proved that certain officers failed to follow Beaver County’s suicid e-prevention policy, the dist rict court granted summary judgment (1) to the County because Plai ntiff failed to show it employed an unconstitutional policy and (2) to Sheriff No el and Corporal Rose because the law entitles them to qualified immu nity. We exercise jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Beaver County Correctional Facility’s (“BCCF”) suicide-prevention policy requires officers to screen all prisoners for suicide risk . When screening suggests such a risk, officers must keep that prisoner in an obs ervation cell in the booking area, check on him every fifteen minutes, and remove all property or implements that could be used for suicide. BCCF’s prac tice was to give inmates on suicide watch only a suicide smock to wear and only a su icide-proof blanket for bedding. Once an officer places a prisoner on suicide watch, only a medical or me ntal-health provider may remove him. BCCF Officers may vi ew BCCF’s policy handbook, containing the suicide-prevention policy, on every computer in the facility. And officers must also Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 23 complete a twelve-week training program at the Utah Peace Of ficer Standards and Training (“POST”) Academy followed by fo rty hours of annual training, which includes a four-hour suicide pr evention training. All deputie s involved in this lawsuit are POST-certified officers in good standing. And before the events that occurred in this case, no inmate had ever committed suicide at the BCCF. On June 13, Beaver County officers re sponded to reports of a truck running into parked cars. The decedent, Troy Br adshaw, drove the truc k. When officers encountered him at the scene, he smelled of alcohol, sp oke incoherently, and could barely stand and walk. The officers ar rested Bradshaw for driving under the influence and placed him in Deputy Nathan Bastian’s vehicle. Once in the patrol vehicle, Bradshaw complained of pain, so Deputy Bastian transported him to Beaver Valley Hospital. At the hospital, Bradshaw complained that his handcuffs hurt his left hand. When Deputy Bastian and Se rgeant Laura Davis chec ked the cuffs, they discovered he was missing a finge r from a previous injury. To avoid that injury from causing him discomfort, they instead uncuffe d his wrists and cuffed his arms to the hospital bed. At the hospital, Bradshaw twice asked Sergean t Davis to kill him. The hospital cleared Bradshaw, and Deputy Ba stian transported him to the BCCF. At the BCCF, Deputy Cody Allen had Brad shaw take a breath test. Deputy Allen then completed the Initial Arrestee Assessment (IAA), which reflects that Bradshaw previously considered suicide; was not thinking about it currently; had a brother who committed or attempted suicide; and was intoxicated. Bradshaw stated that he would kill himself if placed in a cell. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 34 After the IAA, the office rs placed Bradshaw on suicide watch. Three corrections officers and De puty Allen walked Bradshaw to a holding cell in the booking area. Deputy Allen told Bradshaw that he would be in cell two—a “dry” cell without a toilet. Bradshaw moved away fro m Deputy Allen and said he would not go into the cell. Deputy Bastian grabbed Brad shaw’s arm, and Brad shaw resisted. The officers then forced Bradshaw down to the ground, wh ere Sergeant Davis secured his legs. Sergeant Davis ordered Bradshaw to stop resisting. He complied, and the officers rolled him on his side and placed hi m in cell two. Bradshaw beat on the cell door for two to three hours. Officers did not place him in a safety smock or create a suicide watch log, in violation of BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, but Corporal Sarah Kinross monitored Bradshaw by sitti ng in the booking area all night. Corporal Kinross’s June 14, 2014 shift-change report reflected that Bradshaw was suicidal and in cell two. Corporal Kinro ss stated that, as a matter of practice, she would have orally passed this informa tion on to Corporal Randall (“Randie”) Rose, the oncoming corporal, but could not recall if that happened. 1 By June 14, 2014, Bradshaw was no longer acting violently, and Officer Shawn Higgins transferred Bradshaw from cell two to cell three. While cell three is in the booking area, it has a toilet, sink, a nd bed. Some officers were unaware that Bradshaw was on suicide watch. Corporal Rose was on duty when Bradshaw moved

1 Defendant Rose testified that BCCF officers conveyed shift-change information to the oncoming shift orally, via handwritten notes in the control room, or by written reports. At least with oral shift-change reports, in 2014, BCCF had no specific written policy for how that should be done. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 45 to cell three. While in cell three, Bradshaw received be dding, but the record does not reveal who gave it to him. Some officers may have thought that moving Bradshaw to cell three meant he was no longer on suicide watch b ecause cell two ordinarily housed suicidal inmates (and without bedding), though BCCF sometimes kept suicidal inmates in ce lls one and three. That same day, officers completed a s econd assessment of Bradshaw as part of the booking process. Corporal Rose, pr esent for the assessme nt, heard Bradshaw respond “yes,” when asked if he was thinking about committing suicide. The assessment conveyed Bradshaw was suicidal and should be on suicide watch. During the booking process, before officers placed him in a cell, a nurse saw Bradshaw, still wearing his street clothes. Concerned that Bradshaw w ould go into shock, the nurse directed officers to provide him a blanket. Bradshaw received his bedroll, which included a blanket, sheet, and pillowcase, while in cell three. Later that evening, officers took Bradshaw to the hospital to have his leg ex amined, and they returned him to cell three once back at the jail. The shift-cha nge reports prepared on the evening of June 14, 2014, and on June 15, 2014, do not suggest that Bradshaw was suicidal. BCCF officers comm unicated a prisoner’s suicidal status via shift-change reports and word of mouth. Several office rs said they did not know that Bradshaw was on suicide watch. By the time Corporal Rose arrived for his shift on June 15, 2014, Bradshaw had bedding and clothing. Bradshaw, seemi ng in good spirits, received breakfast and Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 56 lunch. Officers last saw him alive at 11:45 a.m. Just after noon, they found him dead in his cell after he hanged himsel f with a pillowcas e or sheet. Plaintiff Kathy George, Bradshaw’s mother , sued on behalf of her son’s estate, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants Corporal Randie Rose, Beaver County, and Beaver County Sherif f Cameron Noel violated Bradshaw’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and “Utah C ode Article I, Section 7.” Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her st ate-law claim against Defenda nts. The district court granted summary judgment to all parties on her remaining claims because the law entitled Rose and Noel to qualified immuni ty and no Beaver County policy violated Bradshaw’s constitutional rights.
II. We review a grant of summary judgme nt based on qualified immunity de novo, applying the same standard as the dist rict court. Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Ci r. 2013) (citation omitted). Su mmary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no ge nuine dispute as to a ny material fact and the movant is entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[O]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to th e party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp

. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 ( 1986) (citation and alterations omitted). But wh en a defendant asserts qualif ied immunity on summary judgment, the burden shifts, and the plaint iff must show that (1) the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutiona l right and (2) that the c onstitutional right was clearly Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 67 established at the time of the incident. Becker, 709 F.3d at 1022 (citation omitted). Courts may address either prong first. Id. (citation omitted).
III. Plaintiff argues the district court wr ongfully granted Beaver County summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find the County’s failure to implement sufficient safeguards or train its corrections officers on suicide prevention constituted deliberate indifference. Plaintiff also app eals the district court’ s determination that the law entitled Noel and Rose to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. She argues that a reasonable jury could find No el liable as a supervisor and that Rose acted with deliberate indifference to Bradshaw’s su icide risk.
A. We conclude the district court properly granted summary judgment to Beaver County. Plaintiff cannot establish that the County was deliberately indifferent by failing to train its corrections officers on preventing suicide, failing to train on preparing shift-change reports, or faili ng to install CCTV mo nitoring cameras in certain cells. In enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to subject municipalities to liability unless an official policy caused a constitutional tort . Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 691 (1978)). Thus, municipalities are responsible only for their own illegal acts and “are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions.” Connick v. Thomps on, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citations Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 78 omitted). Rather, to hold a municipality lia ble, a plaintiff must prove that (1) an official policy or custom (2) caused the plai ntiff’s constitutional injury and (3) that the municipality enacted or maintained that policy with deliberate indifference to the risk of that injury occurring. See Schneider, 717 F.3d at 769

− 71. Municipal liability is “most tenuous where a claim turns on a fa ilure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citation omitted). But a municipality’s deci sion not to train its officers rises to the level of an official govern ment policy under § 1983 only when the failure to train “amount[s] to ‘deliberate i ndifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact .’” Id. (second alte ration in original) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference requires proof th at a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious cons equence of his action. Id. (c itation omitted). For example, when policymakers have actual or constr uctive notice that a training deficiency caused city employees to commit constitu tional violations, the city may be deliberately indifferent if it chooses to maintain its defi cient training program. Id. (citation omitted). Ordinarily, a plain tiff must prove a pattern of untrained employees’ constitutional violations to s how deliberate indiffe rence. Id. at 62 (citation omitted). “Evidence of a pre- existing pattern of violations is only unnecessary in a narrow range of circum stances . . . in which the unconstitutional consequences of a failure to train are highly predictable and patently obvious.” Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F. 3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quo ting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63

− 64). Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 89 Plaintiff contends Beaver County wa s deliberately i ndifferent to the “predictable consequences” of failing to train its offi cers on its suicide-prevention policy and shift-change reports and failing to install CCTV monitoring cameras in the cells housing suicidal inmates. First, concerning Plainti ff’s suicide-prevention-policy argument, Plaintiff argues Beaver County ne ither provided its officers a copy of its suicide-prevention policy nor trained them on it. But BCCF’s suicide-prevention policy, along with the rest of the policy handb ook, was available to officers “on every computer in the facility.” And all Beaver County corrections officers complete a twelve-week training program at the Utah POST Academy. POST training includes a four-hour suicide-prevention training, a nd BCCF sponsors an annual mental-health training, which sometimes includes suic ide-prevention training. After POST certification, BCCF officers also receive on- the-job training, called FTO training, to learn how more experienced officers impl ement BCCF policies. All deputies on duty
June 13

− 15, 2014, were POST-certified officers in good standing. Although some officers testified that they were unfamiliar with BCCF’s specific suicide-prevention policy, BCCF officers received some suicid e-prevention training and could view the policy. While BCCF could have offered mo re or better suicide-prevention training, “showing merely that additi onal training would have been helpful in making difficult decisions does not establish municipal liability.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 68. Plaintiff contends a pattern of misconduc t exists showing Beaver County was deliberately indifferent “to the predictable c onsequences of failing to train its officers on suicide prevention.” She re lies on the following: (1) the ar resting officer failed to Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 910 notify a mental-health provider when Bradshaw asked her to kill him twice; (2) the intake officer placed Brad shaw on suicide watch but di d not put him in a suicide smock, log fifteen-minute safety-checks, or notify a mental-health provider that he was suicidal; (3) a booking officer failed to notify a mental-health provider that Bradshaw was suicida l; (4) Corporal Rose transferred Bradshaw to cell three, which lacked CCTV monitoring, without authori zation from a mental-health provider; and (5) Rose failed to ensure other officers kne w Bradshaw was suicidal, placed him in a suicide smock, or performed fifteen-minute checks. But Plaintiff’s examples do not show a pattern of constituti onal violations by untrained officers over time. They instead demonstrate that o fficers failed to comply with the County’s suicideprevention policy during this incident—a s howing insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to suicide-prevention training. And Plaintiff does not argue that proving a pattern of constitutional violations is unnecessary here. See Waller, 932 F.3d at 1285 (“Evidence of a pre-existing pattern of violations is only unnecessary in a narrow range of circumstances . . . in which the unconstit utional consequences of a failure to train are highly predictable a nd patently obvious.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, on the facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot establish that BCCF has a policy of failing to train its officers on suicide prevention. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (stating a municipality’s failure to train its officers rises to the level of an official governme nt policy when that failure “amount[s] to ‘deliberate i ndifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact ’” (second alteration in original)). Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1011 Second, Plaintiff argues Beaver County failed to train its officers on shiftchange reports. As support, Plaintiff asserts that no re port after the initial intake officer’s suggested Bradshaw was suicidal, even though Rose knew Bradshaw was. Rose also did not recall whet her he orally communicated th at information to the next shift. But, like Plaintiff’s suicide-prevention-policy argum ent, a failure to comply with BCCF’s shift-change-report policy does not evidence a pattern of constitutional violations amounting to a po licy of failing to train on shift-change reports. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 Part II at 326 (BCCF officers conveyed shift-change information to the oncoming shift orally, via handwritten notes in the control room, or by written reports.). Failing to comply with jail policy does not amount to a constitutional violation on its own. See Da vis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 194 (1984). Municipal-liability claims require proof that the m unicipal entity acted with deliberate indifference. Schneider, 717 F. 3d at 770 (citations omitted). And proving deliberate indifference ordinarily requires showing a pattern of similar instances because “continued adherence to an appro ach that [policymakers] know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (citation omitted). Plaintiff offers no evid ence showing that Beaver County failed to comply with its shift-change -report policy on any occasion ot her than this incident. Thus, Plaintiff cannot prove Beaver Count y acted with deliberate indifference in failing to train its officer s on shift-change reports. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1112 Last, Plaintiff argues that Beaver Count y’s failure to install CCTV monitoring cameras in the cells used fo r suicidal inmates in violat ion of its suicide-prevention policy amounted to deliberate indifference. But again, Plaintiff complains only that the County violated its policy here a nd offers no evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations showing the Coun ty’s deliberate indifference to the consequences of failing to install CCTV mon itoring cameras in thos e cells. After all, no inmate had ever committed suicide at BCCF before this incident. And Plaintiff does not argue that proving a pattern of constitutional violati ons is unnecessary. Because Plaintiff cannot show that the Count y was deliberately indi fferent in failing to train its corrections o fficers on preventing suicide and preparing shift-change reports or in failing to install CCTV mon itoring cameras in certain cells, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Beaver County.
B. The district court granted Sheriff Noel summary judgment on qualified immunity because “[t]here is no evidence that Sheriff Noel knew that . . . Bradshaw presented a substantial risk of suicide.” George v. Beaver County, No. 2:16-CV1076 TS, 2019 WL 3892940, at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 19, 2019). Plaintiff claims the district court erred because a reasonable jury could find Noel liable as a supervisor as a result of his “lax enfor cement and utter lack of tr aining on the BCCF Suicide Prevention Policy.” We disagree. Supervisory liability under § 1983 may attach to a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, or implements a policy that injures that plaintiff’s constitutional Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1213 rights. Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 –64 (10th Cir. 2011)). But supe rvisors are not vicariously liable for their employees’ acts. See id. So a plaintiff must “show an ‘affirmative link’ between the supervisor and the constitutiona l violation” to hold the supervisor liable. Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 435 (10th Cir. 2 014) (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d at 767). To show an “affirmativ e link” between a supervisor and the alleged constitutional injury, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the defendant pr omulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm , and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutiona l deprivation.” Dodd s v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199–200 ( 10th Cir. 2010) (citing Summum v. C ity of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2002)). Courts treat jail-suicide claims as a fa ilure to provide medical care, Barrie v. Grand County, 119 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1997), whic h implicates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s “ser ious medical needs” violates the Eighth Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process clause provides pretrial detainees the same protection for medical at tention as convicted inmates receive under the Eighth Amendment. Barri e, 119 F.3d at 867 (citation omitted). And we apply the same deliberate-indifference standard no matter which amendment provides the constitutional basis for the claim. Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989 (1 0th Cir. 2020) (citing Est. of Hocker v. Wals h, 22 F.3d 995, 99 8 (10th Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, 142 S. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1314 Ct. 312 (2021). Plaintiff’s supervis ory-liability claim in this case requires
“a particularized state of mind: actual knowledge by a prison official of an individual inmate’s substantial risk of suic ide.” Cox, 800 F.3d at 1249. “[P]rison officials are deliberately indiffere nt if they fail to take reasonable steps to protect a pre-trial detainee or an inma te from suicide when they have subjective knowledge that person is a substantial suicid e risk.” Crane v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4th 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Thus, to hold Noel liable as a supervisor, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he had “actual knowledge . . . of [Bradshaw’s] substantial risk of suicide.” Cox, 800 F.3d at 1249. That knowledge could have come from his subordinates even if he “had no personal interaction wi th [the prisoner] or direct and contemporaneous knowledge of his treatment.” Id. at 1254. Plaintiff puts forth no evidence show ing Noel had actual knowledge of Bradshaw’s substantial risk of suicide. See, e.g., Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 Part I at 93 (stating that Noel “was unaware Mr. Bradsh aw was incarcerated at the Jail on June 15, 2014”). Instead, she conte nds Supreme Court precedent only requires Noel to have known of the “generalized risks presented by conditions at his jail,” rather than “the risk to a specific detainee,” to ha ve the culpable state of mind. And she argues that she presented evidence to the distri ct court from which a jury co uld reasonably conclude that Noel endorsed a widespread custom or policy at BCCF of failing to report suicide risks and that he failed to train officers on suicide prevention. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he very existence of the Suicid e Prevention Policy and accompanying procedures . . . should have put Sheriff Noel on notice of the substan tial risk presented by suicidal detainees” Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1415 because “those policies . . . required updating and implementation,” and Noel failed to act “in the face of a substantial risk of suicide to BCCF inmates.” Plaintiff is correct that Farmer v. Brenna n, 511 U.S. 825 (199 4), “opened the door to a showing that a supervisory jail official co uld have the requisite mens rea if he knew of the generalized risks presented by conditions at his jail, not merely the risk to a specific detainee.” Indeed, Farmer states, “it does not matter whet her the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, a ny more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk . . . for reasons pers onal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” 511 U.S. at 843. But Farmer concerned deliberate indifference to an inmate’s safety who “w ould be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack,” id. at 831, and we have applied its deliberate-indifference-to-a-generalized-risk requirement in cases involving the risk of se xual assault. See, e.g., Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 915–16 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating “[t]he official’s knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particularinmate” in a prison-sexualassault case). But in Cox, we determined that supervisory- liability in the inmate-suicide context requires the prison official to ha ve had actual knowledge of an individual inmate’s substantial risk of suicide. 800 F. 3d at 1249. We acknowledged that “we have taken a different stance on the knowledge of ri sk that must be alleged” in the prisonsexual-assault context. Id. at 1251 n.11. But we found those cases distinguishable because one can assess the risk of se xual assault from the sexual victimizer’s characteristics and other external factors, wh ile “a substantial risk of suicide may be Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1516 impossible to discern unless the particular inma te reveals indicia of that risk to prison officials.” Id. (citations omitted). Still, Plaintiff urges us to reject readin g Cox to mean “that no supervisory liability can attach to a jail official unl ess that official subjectively kno ws of the suicide risk to a particular inmate.” Under that reading, Pl aintiff contends, jail officials could implement unconstitutional policies leading directly to inmate suicide and “escape liability by simply maintaining ignorance of the day-to-day, inmate-specific operations of their jail.” But Cox is clear: § 1983 jail-suicide supervisor y-liability claims require the supervisor to have known that the specific inma te at issue presented a substan tial risk of suicide. Id. at 1250; see also Crane, 15 F.4th at 1307 (“[A ]s we explained in Cox v. Glanz, prison officials are deliberately indifferent if they fail to take reasonable steps to protect a pretrial detainee or an inmate from suicide when they have subjective knowledge that person is a substantial suicide risk.” ). “[W]e are bound to follow our . . . precedent, absent en banc reconsideration or a super[s]eding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 12 66, 1278 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Thus, to defeat Noel’s summary-judgment motion, Pl aintiff must offer ev idence showing Noel had actual knowledge of Bradshaw’s substantial risk of suicide, rath er than a generalized risk. Plaintiff has pointed to no eviden ce showing Noel had actual knowledge of Bradshaw’s substantial risk of suicide. 2

2 Plaintiff also argues that Cox is fact ually dissimilar to this case because “none of the jail officials in Cox knew or could have known that the detainee presented a suicide risk,” and therefore none of Sheriff Glanz’ s subordinates could have communicated that knowledge to him. Appellant’s Br. at 38. In Plaintiff’s Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1617 Even if § 1983 jail-suicide supervisory-lia bility claims only required the actor to have known of a generalized risk of suicide at the prison, the record does not show Noel knew of any generalized risk. That officers ignored porti ons of the County’s suicideprevention policy is not enough to raise a fact issue that Noel knew about a generalized risk to suicidal detainees, contrary to Pl aintiff’s argument, because no inmate had ever successfully committed suicide at the BCCF before this incide nt. Appellant’s App. Vol. 1 Part I at 93 (declaring that Noel “had no re ason to believe that there was any defect of [sic] problem with the way the policy was enfo rced or implemented at the Jail prior to Troy Bradshaw’s unfortunate death”). And, to the extent Plaintiff contends that Noel endorsed a custom or policy of failing to report suicide risks and train officers on suicideprevention, thus creating a generalized risk to suicidal detainees, Plaintiff failed to show such a custom or policy existed. As discussed above, Plaintiff demonstrated no pattern of untrained employees’ constitutional violations showing deliberate indifference to suicideprevention or shift-change-report training to ri se to the level of County policy or custom. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. 3 Rather, Plaintiff only showed a failure to co mply with the

case, the evidence shows that Corporal Ro se was present during Bradshaw’s booking assessment and learned that Bradshaw was suicidal. But though at least some of Sheriff Noel’s subordinates knew that Br adshaw was suicidal , no evidence shows they communicated that to Noel.

3 “Deliberate indifference . . . is defined differently for Eighth Amendment and municipal liability purposes.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998). “In the prison conditions contex t, deliberate indifference is a subjective standard requiring actual knowledge of a risk by the official” while, “[i]n the municipal liability context, deliberate indifference is an objective standard which is satisfied if the risk is so obvious that the official s hould have known of it.” Id. (citation omitted). We do not equate the two deliberate-i ndifference standards here. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1718 County’s policies in Bradsh aw’s case. And any argument that Noel affirmatively endorsed not reporting suicide ri sks in shift-change reports, ra ther than failing to train on reporting them, also falls short because Plai ntiff does not attempt to prove a pattern evidencing that custom. B ecause there is no evidence th at Noel knew Bradshaw presented a substantial risk of suicide, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Sheriff Noel.
C. Last, we affirm the district court’s gr ant of summary judg ment to Corporal Rose. Whether Rose violat ed Bradshaw’s constitutiona l rights by placing Bradshaw in a regular cell and failing to inform other officers of his suicide risk was not clearly established in June 2014. In the qualified-immunity context, “[a] clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable offici al would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitte d) (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). “Ordinarily, a plaintiff may satisfy this clearly-established-law standard by identifying an on-point Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision that

We note only that Plaintiff cannot show the County was deliberately indifferent (under the municipal-liability standard) in failing to train its corrections officers on preventing suicide and preparing shift-change reports. Plaintiff is therefore unable to show the County had a wide spread custom or policy of failing to train on suicide prevention and shift-change reports. As a result, Plaintiff canno t rely on that policy or custom to raise a fact issue concerni ng whether Noel was deliberately indifferent (under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment st andard) to a substan tial risk of suicide to prison inmates. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1819 establishes the unlawfulness of the defendant ’s conduct,” or “the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). 4 “[T]he precedent must have clearly established the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1014 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). While we do not require a case directly on point, existing preceden t “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (citation omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of citing to us wh at he thinks constitutes clearly established law.” Crane, 15 F.4th at 1303 (quoting Thom as v. Durastanti, 60 7 F.3d 655, 669 (10th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff contends she presented sufficien t evidence from which a fact finder could determine that Rose knew Brad shaw presented a suicide risk and acted with deliberate indifference to that risk by placing him in a regular cell and failing to inform other officers of that suicide risk “forma lly or otherwise.” But, on June 13

− 15, 2014, when the incident occurred, no Tenth Ci rcuit or Supreme Court decision put Rose on notice that his conduct violated Bradshaw’s constitutional right s. As of June 1, 2015, no Supreme Court

4 The Supreme Court has left open wh ether only its precedent may clearly establish law. See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 n.8 (2018) (“We have not yet decided what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”); Rivas- Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam) (“Even assuming that Circuit precedent can clearly establish law for purposes of § 1983, LaLonde is materi ally distinguishable and thus does not govern the facts of this ca se.”). Yet “we do not thin k only Supreme Court precedents are relevant in deciding whether a right is clearly established.” Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir. 2020). Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 1920 decision established a right to the “proper im plementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols” or “even discusse[d] suicide scr eening or prevention prot ocols.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 82 6 (2015) (per curiam). In Cox, we determined that “an inmate’s right to proper prison suicide screening pr ocedures during booking . . . was not clearly established in July 2009.” 800 F.3d at 1247. But even Cox did not establish in 2015 that Sheriff Glanz’s conduct violated a constitutiona l right. “There, we assumed the existence of a constitutional violation and held that the right at issue—‘an inmate’s right to proper prison suicide screening procedures during bo oking’—wasn’t clearly established.” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cox, 800 F.3d at 1247). But Plaintiff argues Barrie, 119 F.3d at 866

− 67, clearly established a suicidal pretrial detainee’s right to reasonable safegua rds against harming himself in 1997, long before Bradshaw’s death in 2014. Barrie c oncerned a pretrial de tainee’s post-booking suicide in the county jail’s “drunk tank.” Id. at 863

− 64. Grand County officers arrested Alan Ricks around 6:00 p.m. on October 26, 1991; at 7:30 p.m., they placed him in the drunk tank after booking a nd permitted him to keep his street clothes; and by 2:00 a.m., Ricks had hanged himself with his sweatpants dr aw cord. Id. Ricks’ s estate and family members filed suit against the county and seve ral county officials. Id. at 863. We clarified that prisoners—pretrial detainee s or postconviction inmates—have claims against their custodians for fa ilure to provide adequate me dical attention, including jailsuicide claims, only when the custodian knows of the risk involved and is deliberately indifferent to it. Id. at 868–69. We dete rmined that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of suicide, id. at 869, and did not hol d that the defendants’ Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 2021 conduct violated Ricks’s constitutional rights . Thus, Barrie did not clearly establish a right to proper implementation of prison-suic ide-prevention protocols in this circuit. Plaintiff failed to carry her bur den to point us to law clearly establishing that right, and, based on our review of the caselaw, circuit pre cedent did not clearly establish that right in June 2014. Thus, Rose’s c onduct did not violate clearly established law, and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The district court properly granted summ ary judgment to the County, Noel, and
Rose.

AFFIRMED. Appellate Case: 21-4006 Document: 010110678979 Date Filed: 05/03/2022 Page: 21