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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Security and Peace

in the Middle East

Experiments with Democracy

in an Islamic World

DAVID G. CURDY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 4

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1996
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

In this excellent essay Lt Col David G. Curdy examines 

prospects for democratic transitions in the Middle East. 

notes that with the conclusion of the cold war, the basis 

US Middle East policy, which had centered around oil, Isra

and the Soviet Union, should be reexamined and, perha

redesigned. Moreover, major political events stemming fr

the 1990--91 Gulf War have reenergized efforts to implem

democratic processes within the region.

Colonel Curdy argues that the West has generally held 

view that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive a

incompatible. However, he notes that the Islam-based tra

tions of consultation, consensus, and independent judgm

are being used today to legitimize the rise of democracy i

number of Arab states. In opposition to this democratiz

trend is the rise of Islamic radicalism which rejects evoluti

ary political change and liberal political formulas. The cla

of these two approaches will severely test US policy in 

Middle East. Contemporaneous with these political curre

is a new phase in resolving the decades-old Palestinia

Israeli conflict. The Palestinians’ struggle to create a dem

cratic identity will be key in establishing their economic vi

ity and in reassuring Israelis that a Palestinian state will 

be a security threat.

Colonel Curdy concludes that the future challenge for 

US will be to foster the view among Arab states that the 

favors democratization based on Islamic traditions, rat

than the imposition of Western democratic institutions 

our Muslim friends. When democratic Arab nations can co

ist with Israel, the US will have contributed to a basis 

regional peace and stability that it has long sought, both 

an ideal in itself and as instrumental to America’s continu

access to Middle East oil and markets.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iii

About the Author

Lt Col David G. Curdy has been interested in the Mid

East since his undergraduate days while studying politi

science at Washington State University during the ea

1970s. During his military career, Colonel Curdy has tr

eled to the Middle East on several different occasions vi

ing with both military commanders and political officials 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. He h

served with various fighter units in USAFE, PACAF, a

CONUS and was a squadron commander at RAF Lak

heath, United Kingdom, in 1993--94. Colonel Curdy i

graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfo

Virginia, and he is a graduate of the Air War College, cla

of 1995.

v
Security and Peace

in the Middle East

Experiments with Democracy

in an Islamic World

Since the end of World War II, the United States’ (U

national interests in the Middle East have been diverse a

at times in conflict. US interests in the Middle East have be

described as vital by every US president since Truman

various times the US has supported nondemocratic 

gimes in the Middle East, usually based on one of th

reasons: (1) ensuring Israel’s national survival, (2) block

the Soviet Union from establishing hegemony within 

region, or (3) guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of oi

American and Western industry and consumers. ‘‘Th

three concerns----oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union----were 

driving forces behind American Middle East pol

throughout most of the period from the 1950s through 

1980s. Democratization was viewed, at best, as a secon

ary objective.’’

1

US national interests will continue to be intertwin

amongst competing intraregional conflicts that arise wit

the Middle East. But, as a new world order emerges fr

the cold war, the old rubric for US Middle East policy h

to be reexamined and, perhaps, redesigned.

Two major developments have evolved in the afterm

of the very short, but strategically important, 1990--91 G

War. They are (1) agitation for, and development of, dem

cratic political processes in a region historically govern

by Islamic tribal monarchies and military despots a

(2) a concerted international and regional effort to solve 

Palestinian-Israeli problem. With the threat of the Sov

Union gone and the major military threats to Israel larg

mitigated, the number one priority for the US is in sec

ing long-term access to Middle East oil. US ability to p

mote peace and stability in the region will determ

whether we are successful in the long run.

In my opinion, the recent upsurge of democratizat

within Muslim nations will offer opportunities for the US 

align itself politically with presently and formerly autocr

1
Arab states. However, the short-term implications for 

policy-making could be painful and will definitely be ch

lenging. A definition of a democratic nation, for our p

poses, is one that has a legitimate and accepted consti

tion (written or unwritten) and an elected, or otherw

representative, government in which individuals in pow

can be dismissed and replaced without violence or an

chy. Samuel Huntington has noted that such transitio

must occur at least twice before a democratic nation c

truly be regarded as ‘‘consolidated.’’

2

After considering the question of whether Islam and 

mocracy are compatible, this paper will examine the beg

nings of democratic processes within Saudi Arabia, Kuw

Jordan, and Israel/Palestine. I will show that the relig

of Islam does not necessarily eliminate the possibility 

government based on democratic processes. I will highli

some Islamic interpretations of the Qur’an and how 

mocracy relates to Islamic life vis-à-vis politics. As an 

ample, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are attempting 

facilitate a consultative process, based on Islam’s sha

or religious law, to allow their citizenry a form of partici

tion in the governing process. In concluding the brief loo

at respective cases, I will address some viewpoints on h

the continuing attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Isr

conflict may hinge on whether a Palestinian governm

can be established based on democratic principles, a g

ernment whose very existence would not pose a threat 

Israel. Finally, the essay will conclude with observations 

the future for US policy and insights which seem to ap

across the individual country cases.

Islam’s Perspective on Democracy

How does Islam view democracy and what does Isl

say in regard to governing its people? Three concepts p

a central role in Islam’s outlook towards democracy: c

sultation (shura), consensus (ijima) and, independent ju

ment (ijtihad). These terms have not always been as

ciated with democratic institutions; but they are, accord

to advocates today, critical concepts in discussing 

prospects of Islamic democracy.3

2 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Consultation has been broadly redefined today upon 

principle of the ruler consulting with citizens. Traditi

ally, consultation has been a one-way relationship 

which the ruler asks subordinates for advice. Advoca

today argue that the Qur’an calls for ‘‘mutual adv

through mutual discussions on an equal basis. Toda

modern authors also relate consultation to the rights of 

people. ‘‘The people, being the vicegerents (deputies) of All

have a general right to dispose of their affairs on the ba

of the principle of consultation,’’ and this right should 

clude ‘‘the formation of an assembly whose members 

representatives of the people.’’

4

 Today, these ideas exis

some form and are practiced in Kuwait, with its Natio

Assembly, and in Saudi Arabia, with its Consultat

Councils.

Consensus in traditional Islam has for centuries be

the ultimate validation of decisions, especially in the Su

sect which encompasses 85 to 90 percent of Musli

worldwide.* Final religious authority rested with the ula

(the scholars) who used consensus to determine Islam

law. The general public had no say in this process, a

when the scholars reached a consensus, debate genera

ended. Consensus is an evolutionary concept which ma

of today’s writers see as an expanding political idea. Th

believe that consensus can be a method for accepting m

jority rule in the Islamic world. One author notes that ‘

legitimacy of the state . . . depends on the extent to wh

state organization and power reflect the will of the umm

(the Muslim community).’’ Some authors also point 

that the legitimacy of state institutions is not derived fr

written sources, but is based on the principle of ijima

sum, they argue that consensus can both legitimize Islam

democracy and offer a procedure to carry it out. 5

* This paper has not attempted to deal with the case of revolution

Iran, a non-Arab, Shiite state. While the Iranian revolution was, in its e

days, an inspiration to Islamic activists throughout the Middle East, Ir

luster has dimmed in recent years as its economy has collapsed and 

mullahs have increasingly repressed internal dissent. It remains to be s

whether Iran continues to be viewed as an alternative form of Isla

democracy or whether the mostly Sunnite world of Islam ultimately 

judge it both as a failure and as an irrelevant Shiite experiment.

CURDY 
Some Muslim scholars believe that by exercising 

formed, ‘‘independent judgment,’’ they will be execut

God’s will. Muhammad Iqbal (1875--1938), one of the ma

leaders in modern Islam in the 1930s, called for ‘‘the tra

fer of power of Ijtihad from individual representatives 

schools (elites) to a Muslim legislative assembly (citizens

Muhammad Iqbal believed that democracy was the m

important political ideal within Islam. Although critica

European colonialism, he highly respected English dem

racy and praised England for embracing this ‘‘Mus

quality.’’

7

Even in this short exploration of some of Islam’s ba

concepts, it appears that many modern Islamic writers 

developing Islam’s traditional concepts of consultati

consensus, and independent judgment into a framew

capable of acting as a foundation for Islamic democra

These writers see Muslims actively engaged in redefin

democracy as complementary to a resurgence of Islam. D

mocracy and Islam are contradictory only if democracy 

defined by certain Western standards. As the US had 

Jefferson and Hamilton to help define the New Worl

brand of democracy, perhaps the Islamic world will p

duce its own founding fathers of democracy.

Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom

Attempts to Reform

The Arab approach to government has never taken 

road of pluralism. Rather, Arabs and the Islamic religio

culture have taken paths such that politics is a ‘‘win

take all’’ process.8

 The tribe and family are more import

in Islamic culture than the rights and privileges of 

individual. The trend within the Arab community has 

cused on gaining and keeping power under the singu

rule of a family or tribe. An obvious example is the al-Sa

family ruling the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The curr

period of family rule began when Abd al-Aziz, a member 

the deposed al-Saud family, expelled the Rashidi fam

and recaptured the city of Riyadh in 1902. King Abd 

Aziz, also known as ibn Saud, further consolidated 

family power, albeit with internal and external help, 

4 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
establish the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The ki

dom has been under Al-Saud rule ever since. 9

The 1990--91 Gulf War focused US political debate 

whether American lives were sacrificed merely to sust

the uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil and whether o

democratic values of liberty, justice, and civil rights w

replaced by a more pragmatic view of the world in th

case. The US realization that we had prevented one dic

tor from absorbing Kuwait, and then restored an undem

cratic regime in its place, created pressure on Washing

to push for democratic change in Kuwait. The challenge 

US policymakers was, as they increased emphasis on f

ther democratization within Arab states, that they might 

creating further instability in the region, thus allow

radical Muslims ‘‘waiting in the wings’’ to finally gain 

reins of power.10 The nightmare scenario for the West 

once the radicals are democratically elected, that they w

dispense with the democratic process and its ideals a

install a radical Islamic theocracy like the one we see 

Iran today.

The Gulf War has energized both a Westernized element 

a conservative religious element within the Saudi Arab

citizenry, causing the al-Saud family to create a Consu

tive Council system, both at the national and provinc

levels. This system is intended to broaden popular part

pation within Saudi national decision making. In 19

King Abd al-Aziz expanded his unelected Consultat

Council, Majlis ash-Shura, which he had established e

lier in the Hijaz (western Saudi Arabia) while he was c

solidating his kingdom. This council system continued i

the 1950s; however, it slowly lapsed and disappeared as 

original members died. Discussions to revive the coun

began in the 1960s. They began again in 1980 when K

Khalid charged a commission of eight prominent Saudis 

address this issue. The commission recommended that 

Consultative Council be reinstated, but opposition wit

the royal family shelved the recommendation until 1992

Probably sensing US and domestic pressure after 

Gulf War, King Fahd reestablished the Consultative Cou

cil on 1 March 1992. During his announcement, King Fa

issued a set of royal decrees that guaranteed some fi

CURDY 
ever individual rights. These rights included protect

against unwarranted searches and protection of priv

property. On 20 August 1993, King Fahd named the 

members of the national Consultative Council, and it w

inaugurated on 29 December 1993.11 He also formed 

mid-level system of Consultative Councils for the ki

dom’s 13 provinces. These provincial councils are prima

concerned with such economic issues as local infrastr

ture projects and services. Many Saudis feel the provinc

councils will have a more immediate impact than the n

tional council. They believe that direct citizen input 

local domestic projects will have a more tangible effect 

the daily lives of the citizenry.

The national Consultative Council exists to advise 

government on foreign policy, economic development, int

national agreements, and rules and regulations. It is e

powered to summon ministers for questioning, review 

annual reports of ministries, and comment on governm

proposals. The national Consultative Council does not s

nificantly diminish the king’s authority, much less give 

people an ability to change the government peacefully. 12

So what effect will an unelected group of advisors have 

the king’s decisions? King Fahd has stated that he will 

responsive to the council’s advice and requests for change

is anticipated that both the national and provincial coun

will work cordially with the royal family initially to establ

an organizational precedent and legitimacy.13

Consultative Council members are not likely to ch

lenge either the king’s or the royal family’s authority 

fear of being disbanded. It is believed that the councils

time, may become emboldened and challenge the ro

family on issues of national importance. Today, curr

councils fall significantly short of being a congress o

parliament in the Western sense, and the average Sa

citizen has no chance of turning to the opposition a

changing his government through a peaceful democra

process. However, it appears that the Saudi populat

believes that the reinstated Consultative Council system 

a first step in the gradual democratization of the count

Consultative Council members want the council to estab

6 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
its legitimacy and to evolve into a more powerful rep

sentative institution.14

US and Saudi officials are generally pleased that no Islam

radicals are presently seated within the council. The Sa

government believes the overall benefits of excluding 

radical Islamists exceed the potential hazards stemm

from their exclusion. The radicals are incensed by th

exclusion, and assert that their lack of representation w

lead only to further confrontation with the governmen

Political exclusion from the democratic process surely 

not what one thinks of when a nation is pursuing a dem

cratic system of government. Excluding the radical Islam

from participating may not turn out to be the most prod

tive course of action for dealing with this problem in 

long term. But the al-Sauds have been remarkably resili

and agile in walking the line between tradition and refor

Perhaps their Consultative Councils will buy time for ad

tional political development.

Kuwait: A Progressive Approach

Kuwait differs from Saudi Arabia markedly in that it i

cosmopolitan city-state that has been comparatively rec

tive to Westerners and their culture. After World Wa

Kuwait came under British protection and continued 

until June 1961. In comparison, no foreign country e

controlled the Saudi Arabian interior. The al-Saud fam

gained and maintained control of the peninsula throu

tribal alliances and religious zeal. The al-Sabah fam

which rules Kuwait today, came to power centuries a

through a commercial community decision-making proc

among the state’s large trading families. 16

Today the main pillar of Kuwait’s democratic institutio

is the National Assembly. This partly elected assembly 

acted a constitution that came into being on 16 Novem

1962. The National Assembly and the amir share a balan

of powers within the framework of the Kuwaiti constituti

Both can initiate laws and any assembly member can 

troduce a bill. The amir has veto power, but the assem

can overturn a veto by a two-thirds majority. However, 

amir can dissolve the assembly, although new electio

CURDY 
must be held within two months. Also, a provision (uniq

among all six Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states) exi

which allows any 10 assembly members to initiate a mot

to withdraw confidence in a cabinet member. A confiden

vote is then taken that requires a majority vote in the asse

bly to pass. This proviso allowing the assembly to remov

cabinet official is truly a remarkable benchmark in the 

gion’s democratic growth. Kuwait’s National Assembly 

greater legislative power than that vested in any other G

Cooperation Council representative institution.

One serious limitation within this democratic process 

the disenfranchisement of a large portion of the electora

Only 6 percent of Kuwait’s citizenry, 82,000 out of 620,0

citizens and about 800,000 noncitizens, are able to vo

Strictly speaking, only adult males of families who resid

in Kuwait before 1920 and who have maintained residen

through 1959 can vote. Women, like their counterpa

elsewhere in the region, cannot vote. The likelihood of 

panding the electorate by enfranchising women is slight 

the foreseeable future. Despite that state of affairs, wom

are currently part of the political process and were activ

engaged in 1992 assembly campaigns as advisors, spee

writers, and organizers.17

The Gulf War severely weakened the al-Sabah fam

politically, and Washington subsequently had leverage 

seeking to expand the democratic process in Kuwait. T

US gained concessions and elections took place on 5 Octo

1992. Formation of official political parties was forbidd

However, the government unofficially approved the form

tion of opposition groups which acted as de facto politi

parties. These groups represented the full spectrum of 

litical ideology to include the fundamentalist Mus

Brethren, the harder-line Islamic Salafi group, and the libe

nationalist Kuwaiti Democratic Forum.18

In an effort to bury the ‘‘winner take all’’ attitude char

teristic of past Kuwaiti and Arab politics, opposing libe

and Islamic groups acted more maturely and were 

warded for their efforts. The October 1992 election was 

to the government’s liking as 31 of the 50 seats on 

ballot were won by the opposition. Rather than declare 

election invalid, the prime minister selected six elec

8 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
members to represent the various viewpoints of this new

elected assembly. The prime minister selected across 

political spectrum, including liberals, fundamentalis

and Shiites, to form a coalition cabinet. 19 Contrary to 

situation in Saudi Arabia, 19 of the 31 newly elected op

sition assembly members were considered to be fundam

talist Muslims. Interestingly, these fundamentalists are 

considered to be radically antigovernment.

The assembly quickly took action to address critical issu

within Kuwait during its 1992--93 session. It tackled iss

over the government’s objections, including reviewing a

approving both the civil and military budgets. It also inv

tigated government fiscal irregularities, particularly the 

billion in losses that occurred in the Kuwaiti investm

office in Spain. Consequently, the assembly stiffened p

alties for abuse of public funds. It also investigated 

dismal military response to the Iraqi invasion, hum

rights policies within the state, and the amir’s decr

since the last dissolution of the assembly in 1986. 20

The assembly pursued a course that is intended to ma

the al-Sabah family accountable for its actions. As a resu

assembly criticism of the Kuwaiti military and its lack 

reform led to the resignation of the armed forces chief 

staff in February 1993. The assembly voted down a p

posal in January 1994 to exempt ministers from be

brought to trial. It is evident that the National Assembly 

Kuwait is taking a more aggressive approach in its affa

than the Saudi Consultative Councils due to its consti

tional basis and its relatively longer established preced

for sharing the country’s power. However, both the Sa

and Kuwaiti rulers have made it clear they are not forf

ing power, only enlisting these bodies to help them gover

Jordan: ‘‘Top Down’’ Democratization

Jordan’s King Hussein has thus far been successful 

co-opting Islamic activists into participation in gove

ment, much as they have been co-opted in Kuwait, th

isolating the radical Islamist fringe. In the case of Jord

however, most of the impetus and leadership have co

from the king in the form of ‘‘top down guidance’’ rat

CURDY 
than from outside pressures or from the bottom up as 

Kuwait.

King Hussein rules a population that is 60 percent Pal

tinian.21 As a result, the external and domestic security 

King Hussein’s monarchy is intimately intertwined with 

position vis-à-vis the Palestinians on the West Bank and 

Jordan. Prior to the Gulf War, in June of 1988, Yasir Ara

attempted to convince the Arab League that he, as leader 

the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), should h

full financial control over the Palestinians in the occup

territories. In a far more politically threatening maneuv

Arafat also attempted to gain Arab support as the sole le

representative of all Palestinians in the region. He was s

cessful in the former but did not gain Arab support for 

latter. However, the Palestine National Council did gr

him recognition in the latter case. 22

To counter this move by the PLO leader, King Huss

formally ended his relations with, and responsibilities 

the West Bank on 31 July 1988. As part of this action, 

king dissolved the Jordanian parliament, whose memb

ship included 50 percent representation for the West Ba

His actions caused pressure on the PLO to act as a sta

in-exile and to act accordingly in the international dip

matic arena. The PLO met this challenge by proclaim

the independence of Palestine, which King Hussein f

mally recognized.

The king’s severing of claims to the West Bank allow

him to withdraw from regional issues and focus on 

domestic problems confronting Jordan. He announced 

the spring of 1989 that a new National Assembly would 

chosen democratically from citizens residing on the E

Bank of the Jordan. These elections were held in Novem

and were the first held since the 1967 war with Israel. T

membership of this new National Assembly contained 

proximately 40 percent Islamic fundamentalists. Their ca

paign slogan of ‘‘Islam is the solution’’ was designed to 

vive Islamic law in Jordan. Interestingly, this Islamic b

within the National Assembly most often acted pragm

cally rather than ideologically and usually supported 

king’s policies. The Islamists’ restraint, when they disagr

with the king’s policies, as in the case of his disengagem

10 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
from the West Bank, was a significant factor supportin

revival of democratic processes within Jordan.

Further commitment by the king was evident when 

announced in November 1989 his intention to appoin

royal commission to draft a national charter to regul

Jordan’s political process. This new charter would lega

political parties, which had been banned since 1957. T

charter was ratified and implemented in June 1991.

Historically, political opposition in Jordan usually ma

fested itself by questioning the legitimacy of the monarc

The new national charter, which allowed for the full sp

trum of political views, also required these political parties 

state their allegiance to the monarchy. The result was dif

sion of the opposition towards the monarchy and expans

of political participation by the Jordanian citizenry. 23

Then came the Gulf War and very quickly Jordan 

came an international outcast. The Saudi governme

which had been a strong friend and ally of King Husse

took a hard line against Amman during the war. Riya

suspended its oil supply to Jordan and expelled 20 Jor

nian diplomats as a result of the king’s pro-Iraq positi

However, domestically, the king’s status with his peo

had never been higher. The Jordanian populace stron

supported his policy toward Iraq, and the king’s program 

democratization within Jordan enhanced his overall leg

macy as the country’s monarch.

After the war, Jordan’s image improved rapidly with 

US and the West. By the time Madrid peace talks began 

October 1991, the US had released $57 million in e

nomic and military aid to Jordan. 24 At the Madrid con

ence, Jordan’s leadership allowed PLO-approved rep

sentatives of the Jordanian delegation to negotiate direc

for the first time with Israeli representatives. The conf

ence eventually led to the historic signing of a declarat

of principles between Israel and the PLO in Washingt

D.C., on 13 September 1993.

This Israeli-PLO rapprochement allowed Jordan to p

sue its own bilateral agenda with Israel. Since the 19

Six-Day War, Jordan’s relations with Israel had been m

estly favorable compared to other Arab states and the PL

King Hussein’s continued support for democratizat

CURDY 
within Jordan was validated once more when new parliam

tary elections were held in November 1993. Almost a y

later, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed 

26 October. King Hussein has committed Jordan’s econom

future to links with Israel and the West, and this new co

mitment on Jordan’s part must deliver tangible econom

returns in the short term. If the economic benefits are slow 

materializing, King Hussein most likely will find the oppo

tion becoming more active. However, opposition part

mainly the Islamists, are giving the government some time 

show economic results from the Israeli peace process.

The government does not see a direct threat from 

opponents; however, it is taking precautions. These p

cautions range from prohibiting Islamic activists fr

preaching in mosques to denying them access to priv

and state funds. These government actions have resul

in cries of ‘‘anti-democratic practices,’’ but the regime h

been careful not to carry its crackdown to extremes. 25 T

opposition confronting King Hussein has been vigorous b

not violent. The government has been heavy handed 

times but not totally undemocratic. The king’s response 

President Assad of Syria, who described leasing back J

danian territory to Israel as blasphemy, was: ‘‘With all d

respect, the terms of the treaty are not your business. ’

Yasir Arafat and his street demonstrators who had pu

cally insulted the king for signing the treaty, which th

viewed as adverse to Palestinians’ rights in Jerusalem, 

king sent the following message: ‘‘You cannot go it al

and try to upstage me; ingratitude towards Jordan’s lo

partnership with the hapless Palestinians and denial of 

Hashemites’ role in the guardianship of the holy sites 

Jerusalem will not help your cause either with the Isra

or the international community; coordinate with Jord

and recognise at least a symbolic role for the Hashemi

in Jerusalem, or else do not count on my help for whate

you try to achieve.’’

26

King Hussein, unlike other Arab leaders in the regi

has never felt comfortable resorting to repressive metho

of governing. His commitment to liberalizing the dem

cratic processes within Jordan and co-opting the Islam

opposition has been a counterbalance to his signing of 

12 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
peace treaty with Israel. He is betting that the long-te

economic benefits will far exceed and offset any politi

and/or religious backlash from aligning Jordan with 

traditional Arab enemy, Israel. King Hussein has craf

orchestrated a system of rights and responsibilities for 

opposition to adhere to. He demands loyalty to the mon

chy and rational behavior. In return he offers political 

cess and the means to change Jordanian society.

The Palestinians and Israel:

Palestinian Democracy

It appears that a new Palestinian state is evolving ou

the seemingly endless confrontation between the Ara

and Israelis. The form of its government is only just eme

ing. Yasir Arafat is still at the helm of the PLO and is the 

facto head of the Palestinian homeland in the territories 

Gaza and Israeli-evacuated areas of the West Bank. N

much thought has been given to how these new territor

will be governed, much less to a larger Palestinian sta

Will the Palestinians adopt a democratic form of gove

ment? So far the Israelis have shown little interest in t

question. Understandably, Israel focuses on its own se

rity requirements, and the Israeli predisposition that 

mocracy within the Arab world is an oxymoron has larg

preempted their addressing this critical topic.

William Quandt, a professor at the University of Virgi

and a former Carter administration National Secur

Council advisor on the Middle East, believes the Isra

have found some distinct advantages in being able to d

with Arab dictators. As an example, President Anwar Sa

of Egypt most likely would not have been able to make 

historic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 if he had fi

been obliged to consult the Egyptian public. Negotiatio

with Syria’s Hafez al-Assad would surely prove to be m

cumbersome if Assad had to answer to a democratic g

ernment. In reality, very few Israelis feel that more dem

racy for the Palestinians or in any Arab state will enhan

their overall security.27

However, Palestinian interest in democracy is curren

high. Polls show that three-quarters of the Palestinia

CURDY 
living in Gaza and the West Bank support an election 

form a governmental authority for the new territories. O

10 percent of the Palestinians support the idea that 

PLO should appoint a governing body for them. 28

Why should the Palestinians support a democratic g

ernment any more than the other Arab regimes in the 

gion? The stark truth is that the Palestinians have be

treated very badly over the years by numerous authorit

ian Arab regimes. Their memories of mistreatment by N

ser in Egypt, Assad in Syria and Lebanon, and Saddam 

Iraq have convinced many that their new life should not 

entrusted to a nondemocratic, one-man rule governmen

In spite of the fact that they loath the Israeli occupat

policies they have been subjected to over the years, 

Palestinians have seen what a pluralistic system such 

Israel’s can accomplish. They have seen the effects that 

opposing political voice has had in a parliamentary syste

Palestinians have seen first hand the reins of Israeli g

ernmental power change hands when the policies of 

incumbent party have not delivered.

Within the Kingdom of Jordan, the Palestinians h

seen in recent years the light-handed governing of K

Hussein over an energetic parliamentary system. Electio

in Jordan have been relatively free; political debate is giv

large areas for its conduct. Many Palestinians, rather th

criticize the Hashemites, now articulate Jordanian dem

cratic processes as the norm to be followed as opposed 

the authoritarianism of the PLO.29

The Palestinians’ experiment with self-government d

ing this transitional phase will have little chance for s

cess unless they adopt a democratic form of governme

This assertion is based on the requirement for econom

progress for the Palestinian people. Palestinian society h

many characteristics that correspond well with democra

The Christian minority lives within the world of a Mus

majority with relative ease. Also, the Palestinian peo

exhibit a large degree of social cohesion when compared 

other Arabs. Many Palestinians have been forced to 

abroad and many are well educated. A major dispar

though, is the division of wealth among most Palestinia

Many live in abject poverty, while others are living a

14 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
much higher standard. Success for the future will depe

on sustained economic development that will allow m

Palestinians to enjoy economic prosperity commensur

with their educational level.30

In the past, the PLO and Arafat have never been 

democratic about control over finances. The Palestinia

now require substantial monetary assistance from the 

ternational community to support their efforts in the te

tories. These foreign donations will have to have some v

bility within the government or the donations will sim

stop. The Palestinian governmental organizations cont

ling the use of this money will also have to be accounta

for the system to succeed. There are many other ro

blocks to Palestinian success. The reluctance of the P

leadership to let go of its current power, Israeli indifferen

to a Palestinian agenda, and a US policy that ignores 

importance of supporting the process of democratizat

could undercut the whole Palestinian effort. 31

Democracy will not be a miracle drug for the Palestinia

Democracy will not guarantee that good leaders are alw

elected, but it does ensure the opportunity to address 

problems of ineffective, long-term government, which tod

is a large problem in the Middle East. A basic assumpt

embodied within democracy is that the public will rec

nize when it is being ill served by its government and v

it out of power. This is why free elections are so importa

as an integral step to institutionalize democracy within 

Middle East.

Highest on the Palestinians’ priority list are independe

and democracy. A Palestinian democracy that borders b

Jordan and Israel most certainly would be a better nei

bor from a security standpoint for both nations. As a 

sult, a Palestinian democracy would lessen defense 

quirements for Israel and Jordan. Additionally, Palestin

democracy could be more easily incorporated into a fut

regional economic system than could an antagonistic d

tatorship. The choice the Palestinians ultimately purs

will largely determine the overall peace and security 

region will enjoy in the next century. 32

The future Palestinian system of government will 

likely be formed around total dominance by the PLO. N

CURDY 
proactive elements of the loyal opposition from inside 

occupied territories will spearhead the new Palestin

agenda for self-government. Faisal al-Husseini, a Palest

ian representative to the peace negotiations, summed 

this new agenda when he said, ‘‘We are fighting to free 

people, not to enslave any other people. We are fighting 

build our state, not to destroy any other state. ’’

33

US Policy: A New Beginning

‘‘Ironically, the most significant impact of the Pers

Gulf War may have been . . . that the ‘wall of fear’ separ

ing citizens from autocratic rulers has been brok

through, [and] while the great powers applaud partici

tion and exalt democracy, they loathe instability; . . . 

achievement of greater participation and democratizat

without accompanying instability is difficult to imagine

The Bush administration was successful in having 

Kuwaiti National Assembly restored quickly after the G

War. It set an example for others to follow.

Since then, the Clinton administration has articula

its National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargeme

which incorporates advancing democratic processes a

expanding free markets. However, the administration 

taking a more cautious approach in the Middle East, so 

not to jeopardize US interests by creating unnecessary 

uncontrollable instability. US officials believe that their 

tions to pressure Arab governments, particularly Sa

Arabia, will be seized upon by radical Islamists as pr

that the democratization process is yet another example 

royal families acquiescing to US desires. It appears that 

now US foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia will focus 

human rights issues rather than on the more contentio

issue of major democratic governmental reform. 35

It is no surprise that radical Islamic fundamentalism 

the new force to be reckoned with in the Middle Ea

Radical Islamic fundamentalists will attempt to under

any Arab government that tries to balance Islamic religio

beliefs with democratic practices. Specifically, they will 

tempt, and to some extent already have, to derail the on

ing Palestinian-Israeli peace process through the use 

16 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
terrorism. The Clinton administration’s National Secu

Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, with its emp

ses on promoting individual liberty and free markets, w

face full resistance from radical Islamic regimes (Iran, Ir

Sudan, Libya) and religious threats (Hamas, Islamic Jih

Hezbollah) bent on destroying peace and security wit

the region.

Today, the political playing field for major democra

reform in Kuwait is more fertile. US attempts to conn

democracy with the promotion of internal stability c

tinue. As an example, US Embassy officials have design

programs for Kuwaiti judges, police, military office

prosecutors, and investigators to receive instruction fr

US counterparts. Because radical Islamic fundamentali

have the opportunity to be heard within the Kuwaiti g

ernmental process, Kuwait may ultimately prove to be 

model for regimes in the area in establishing Islamic 

mocracy. Radical Islamic fundamentalists have a large 

centive to work their agenda within the democratic syste

In Jordan, King Hussein has co-opted opposition Islam

by obtaining their loyalty to the monarchy as a precon

tion to each party’s right to participate in the democra

process. By contrast, the Saudi model leaves the radi

Islamists little choice but direct confrontation with 

country’s rulers. The possible results of this alternat

recall memories of angry Islamists taking power throu

violent means in Tehran in 1979. Saudi Arabia, however

a very different country from Shiite Iran.

Finally, we must remember that Americans have be

experimenting with democracy for more than 200 years 

our own country, and some would argue that there is s

much room for improvement. The US, in the role 

teacher, needs to be very patient and encourage stude

along their chosen roads to democracy.

Conclusion

The US and Israel are not formal allies; however, the 

has a moral and a political commitment to Israel that m

go beyond any of our current, formal, treaty obligatio

Our commitment to Israel’s security is measured by the f

CURDY 
that the US has provided more than $40 billion in e

nomic and military aid for nearly a half century. T

amount more than doubles what the US spent to rebuil

devastated Europe after World War II. As President Nix

bluntly told a bipartisan group of congressional lead

before the Yom Kippur War in 1973, ‘‘No American Pr

dent will ever let Israel go down the tube. ’’ It is the o

Western-style democracy in the Middle East, and it h

been continually fighting for its existence for more than 

years.36

However, much has changed in the Middle East. T

threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared. Regio

threats posed by Iraq and Iran have grown and are now 

largest impediments to security in the region. And wh

Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat shook hands in Washingt

D.C., on 13 September 1993, that event, we hope, ushe

in the final chapters of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since 1980, more than 1.4 million people in the Pers

Gulf region have lost their lives in wars and terror

attacks. Israel has fought five wars with surround

Arab nations. This massive loss of lives has not be

solely attributable to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many c

flicts have been instigated by Muslims against Musli

and radical Shia terrorism has been exported to num

ous moderate Sunni Arab countries, to include those 

the Maghreb.

As a product of the Gulf War and the demise of 

Soviet Union’s influence in the region, many moder

Arab countries are now making small, incremental st

towards institutionalizing democratic processes and 

panding civil liberties. It continues to be a very slow proce

A sudden surge towards democracy by any Arab nation 

likely to give radical Islamic movements quick leverage a

could well lead to backlashes and a resurgence in gove

ment repression of human rights.

As Anthony Cordesman points out in After the Sto

Arab nations can protect basic human rights and enforc

meaningful legal system without copying the West

model. Cordesman notes that practically all Middle Ea

ern states have formally committed themselves to adher

to the rule of law, though they may ignore this comm

18 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
ment in practice at times. There is no inherent reason th

Islamic law should be lacking in its approach to hum

rights and mercy for its citizens. 37

From the previous discussion, we can appreciate t

democracy and Islam are actually compatible both in the

and practice within the Arab world. Democratic practi

seem to be what the majority of the Arab people desire. T

US strategy of promoting democracy within the Middle E

to thwart the radical Islamists and to complement the f

market system will take on new importance as the n

century looms. In today’s world, where Arab monarchs a

despots can no longer court the monolithic Soviet Union 

political and economic leverage, democratic processes o

the Arab people an opportunity to participate more fully 

the next century’s new world order.

To reverse Paul Kennedy’s argument that Islam’s 

treat into itself [is] due to a long held fear of being ‘sw

lowed up by the West,’ ’’ the US and the West must ta

steps to dispel the perception that we are intent on 

stroying the traditional world of Islam by insisting on 

mocracy based on Western style and culture. 38 Willi

Quandt believes that ‘‘the US should avoid overreacting 

the specter of a monolithic Islamic threat in the Mid

East.’’ He feels the US should treat Islamic movemen

both liberal democratic and fundamentalist, as compl

multifaceted phenomena, and the US should take its sta

on a case-by-case basis depending on our interests at 

time and place.39

In the twenty-first century, it will be in the Uni

States’ vital interest to provide the leadership to assist M

dle East democracies in all their various shapes and form

Democracy and some of its associated institutions 

among the solutions which the US can offer its friends 

the Middle East. There are, of course, other approach

that Muslim states may prefer to explore to fulfill deman

for political participation, as this essay has addressed. Ab

all, the US and the West must avoid fostering the impr

sion that we are trying to force Western democratic insti

tions on Muslim friends, especially when Islam itself h

its own authentically democratic traditions.

CURDY 
Notes

1. William B. Quandt, ‘‘American Policy toward Democratic Poli

Movements in the Middle East,’’ in Ellis Golberg et al., eds., Rules 

Rights in the Middle East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 19

165.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the 

Twentieth Century, (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 19

266.

3. John O. Voll and John Esposito, ‘‘Islam’s Democratic Essen

Middle East Quarterly, September 1994, 7.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 8.

6. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, ‘‘The Reconstruction of Relig

Thought in Islam,’’ in Voll and Esposito, ‘‘Islam’s Democratic Essen

Middle East Quarterly, September 1994, 173--74.

7. Voll and Esposito, 9.

8. Mohammed Al Rumaihi, ‘‘Kuwait: Oasis of Liberalism?’’ Middle 

Quarterly, September 1994, 31.

9. Daniel C. Diller and John L. Moore, eds., The Middle East, 8th 

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 332.

10. Kenneth Katzman, ‘‘Arabia and Kuwait?’’ Middle East Quart

September 1994, 21.

11. Ibid., 22.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 23.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 24.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 26.

19. Al Rumaihi, 34.

20. Katzman, 26.

21. Diller and Moore, 265.

22. Ibid., 264.

23. Ibid., 266.

24. Ibid., 267.

25. George Hawatmeh, ‘‘Jordan: Strains Begin to Show,’’ Middle 

International, 16 December 1994, 8.

26. George Hawatmeh, ‘‘Jordan-Israel Treaty: Selling the Peace,’’ M

East International, 4 November 1994, 7.

27. William B. Quandt, ‘‘The Urge for Democracy,’’ Foreign Aff

July/August 1994, 2.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 3.

30. Ibid., 5.

31. Ibid., 4.

32. Ibid., 7.

33. Muhammad Muslih, ‘‘The Shift in Palestinian Thinking,’’ Cu

History, January 1992, 28.

20 SECURITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
34. Augustus R. Norton, ‘‘Breaking through the Wall of Fear in 

Arab World,’’ Current History, January 1992, 37.

35. Katzman, 28.

36. Richard M. Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 

1994), 143.

37. Anthony H. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Mil

Balance in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 752

38. Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New Y

Random House, Inc., 1993), 211.

39. Quandt, ‘‘American Policy toward Democratic Political Movem

in the Middle East,’’ 171.

CURDY