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UNITED STATES POLICY AND STRATEGY 

IN EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 21, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 21, 2017 

Page 

UNITED STATES POLICY AND STRATEGY IN EUROPE ............................................... 1 

Breedlove, General Philip M., USAF (Ret.), Distinguished Professor, Sam 

Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology .......... 5 

Burns, Ambassador William J., President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ...................................................................................................... 10 

Vershbow, Ambassador Alexander R., Distinguished Fellow, Brent Scowcroft 

Center on International Security, Atlantic Council .......................................... 21 

(III)

(1) 

UNITED STATES POLICY AND STRATEGY 

IN EUROPE 

TUESDAY, MARCH 21, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34.m. in Room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Wicker, Fischer, 

Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cruz, Strange, Reed, Nelson, 

McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Warren, 

and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services 

Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on United 

States policy and strategy in Europe. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses this morning: General Philip Breedlove, who was relieved of his obligation to 

appear before this committee when he retired last year, yet has 

graciously agreed to submit himself before us once again. I have no 

doubt he will soon regret that decision and will wish for a speedy 

return to Georgia Tech where he is Distinguished Professor at the 

Sam Nunn School of International Affairs. 

We are also pleased to be joined by Ambassador William Burns, 

an old friend of this committee and of America, who is the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, who is a Distinguished Fellow at 

the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. 

All three of these gentlemen combined have many, many decades 

of service to this country and we are grateful they would come and 

join us this morning. 

Since the end of the Cold War, American policy and strategy in 

Europe have been guided by the idea that Russia was, or at least 

might become, a reliable security partner. To varying degrees, each 

of our last three Presidents pursued a partnership with Russia on 

these terms, and each time, high hopes ended in disappointment, 

not for lack of good faith or effort on the American side, but because of the simple fact that Vladimir Putin has no interest in such 

a partnership. He believes achieving his goal of restoring Russia as 

a great power means diminishing American power, as well as the 

values and institutions it sustains and defends. 

2 

Unfortunately, we as a country were slow to recognize that fact. 

Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine, annexed Crimea, repeatedly 

threatened our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, 

violated the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty] Treaty, rapidly modernized its military, executed a major military 

buildup along its western border, and interfered in American elections, all before policymakers on both sides of the aisle truly began 

to come to terms not only with the reality of Vladimir Putin’s neoimperial ambitions, but also with the heavy price we have paid for 

a policy General Breedlove once described as, quote, hugging the 

bear. 

Until the end of the Cold War, there were a quarter of a million 

United States forces stationed permanently in West Germany 

alone. Today we have just a quarter of that number on the entire 

European continent. This drastic reduction was not merely the 

product of a post-Cold War peace dividend. Indeed, as recently as 

the two years before Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States 

withdrew two brigade combat teams from Europe. As a result, 

while Russian tanks rolled into Crimea in 2014, the United States 

had zero tanks permanently stationed in Europe. 

Likewise, we let American intelligence on Russia’s tactical and 

operational capabilities languish, weakening our ability to quickly 

detect Russia’s large military movements and effectively attribute 

its, quote, hybrid warfare tactics. We unilaterally disengaged from 

the information fight, allowing Putin’s propaganda machine and 

army of trolls and hackers to wage a war on truth with alarming 

success. 

The bottom line is that three years after the invasion of Ukraine 

and annexation of Crimea, the United States has yet to heed the 

wakeup call. We still have not adjusted to the scope, scale, and severity of the new strategic reality we face in Europe. We continue 

to lack coherent policy and strategy to deter conflict and prevent 

aggression in Europe while confronting a revisionist Russia that is 

hostile to our interests and our values. 

The good news is we have begun to fix the damage done by years 

of false assumptions and misguided policy with the European Deterrence Initiative. But that is just a first step. The new administration has an opportunity to turn the page and design a new policy and strategy in Europe backed by all elements of American 

power and decisive political will. Each of our witnesses has deep 

experience in the formulation and execution of national security 

strategy, and I hope they can begin to describe the basic pillars and 

underlying principles of such a policy and strategy. 

Some of the features of a new approach in Europe are already 

clear: enhancing forward presence of United States military forces; 

increasing investments in capabilities necessary to counter Russia’s 

advanced anti-access, area denial threat; following through on modernization of our nuclear triad; devising gray zone strategies for 

competition below the threshold of major conflict in domains such 

as cyber and unconventional warfare; providing defensive lethal assistance to Ukraine; and working together with allies and partners 

to arm ourselves to resist Russia’s war on truth, counter Russian 

disinformation, and strengthen the resiliency of our societies and 

institutions. 

3 

What is also clear is that no United States policy or strategy in 

Europe can be successful without our NATO allies. 

As Chancellor Merkel reminded us years ago, the Freedom Bell 

hangs in Berlin. It was a gift from the American people, modeled 

after our own Liberty Bell. It rang on the day of German reunification. But it also rang after the September 11th attacks. Sixteen 

German citizens died when the towers fell that day. When our 

NATO allies invoked article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the 

first time in history in response to those attacks, German troops 

went to fight side by side with American troops in Afghanistan. 

Fifty-four of them have given their lives, and nearly 1,000 are still 

serving there today. We must never forget or diminish the price 

our allies have paid in blood fighting alongside America. 

I thank our witnesses for their testimony this morning. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this important hearing on the security environment in Europe. 

I also want to thank our distinguished panel for appearing before 

us this morning, and thank them for their extraordinary service to 

the Nation in many different capacities over many, many years. So 

we look forward to your testimony, gentlemen. 

This morning’s hearing provides an opportunity for the committee to begin to examine in more detail the threat posed by Russia’s malign activities aimed at undermining the United States-led 

international order, one where countries are sovereign and free to 

make their own choices about integrating economically and politically with the rest of Europe, rather than being coerced into a 

sphere of influence. Hopefully this morning we can also discuss 

what we need to do to respond to and defend against that Russian 

threat. 

This threat was brought especially close to home last year with 

Russia’s interference in our own presidential elections. Countering 

Russia’s malign activities is a matter of national security, and we 

have a responsibility to ensure that any examination of such activities by Congress, the intelligence community, or the executive 

branch is not politicized. Russia’s attack on American democracy is 

just one part of a broader Kremlin-directed assault on the cohesion 

of the NATO alliance, the European Union, and other Western institutions and a rejection of the post-Cold War vision of an integrated and stable Europe. Our national security depends on our 

better understanding Putin’s world view and Russia’s strategic 

aims in its aggression toward the West. I am interested hearing 

our witnesses’ views on these matters. 

President Putin has proven willing to use a broad range of military and non-military tools to advance what he sees as Russia’s 

strategic interests. Militarily, Putin has used force and coercion to 

violate the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors and undermine their 

further integration into Europe. In the Republic of Georgia, the 

Russian military has occupied two separatist regions since 2008 

and Moscow has recognized the regions’ independence from GeorVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:40 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29655.TXT WILDA
4 

gia, contrary to the international community’s determination that 

these regions are sovereign Georgian territory. 

In Ukraine, Russia uses hybrid warfare operations by combining 

influence operations with clandestine military and financial support to separatists to seize Crimea, changing the boundary of a European nation by force for the first time since the end of the Cold 

War. Since then, Russia has sought to consolidate its control by 

providing direction and equipment, including heavy weapons, to 

separatist forces in eastern Ukraine, while failing to fulfill its commitments under the Minsk ceasefire agreements. 

We have also seen Putin draw upon similar tools to prop up the 

Assad regime in Syria, while seeking to mislead the international 

community by stating the purpose of its military involvement there 

is to counter ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. 

Putin has even gone so far as to engage in nuclear saber rattling, 

conducting nuclear exercises during the 2014 Crimea invasion. According to recent news reports, Russia is fielding a missile system 

that violates the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty and threatens all of NATO. I would be interested in hearing 

from General Breedlove and our other witnesses about their 

thoughts on whether United States and NATO military forces are 

appropriately postured and trained to deter Russian aggression 

across Europe and to respond in the event of a crisis. 

At the same time, the Kremlin’s playbook also includes a wide 

range of non-military tools at Putin’s disposal to influence the 

West. Russia employs an array of covert and overt asymmetric 

weapons short of military conflict, including cyber hacking, 

disinformation, propaganda, economic leverage, corruption, and 

even political assassination. General Breedlove, I would be interested in your recommendations from your time as EUCOM Commander and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] on 

how to detect and respond to the appearance of ‘‘little green men’’ 

in Ukraine and Russian disinformation operations intended to conceal Russian aggression on the ground. 

In addition, we need to better understand how the Kremlin is 

conducting influence activities as part of a concerted effort to harm 

Western cohesion and opposition to Russia. There needs to be a 

recognition that Russian state-controlled media, such as RT [Russia Today] and Sputnik, disseminates fake news, amplified through 

social media, to undermine people’s faith in democratic institutions 

in Europe and in the United States. Just last week, we heard 

warnings in the Banking Committee about how divisions within 

the EU could weaken sanctions imposed against Russia following 

its seizure of the Crimea peninsula in Ukraine. 

Moreover, Russia appears to be growing bolder in its use of influence operations to coerce its neighbors and undermine Western opposition. The January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment of 

Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent United States Elections 

found that Russia’s influence efforts in the 2016 United States 

presidential election reflects a significant escalation compared to 

Russia’s previous information operations. The report also warned 

that these cyber-enabled multifaceted influence operations that the 

Kremlin used to target the United States democratic process likely 

represent a new normal in Russian conduct toward the United 

5 

States and our European allies and partners. This pattern of Russian interference will only continue and intensify over time if it 

goes unchallenged. 

Countering this national security threat will require a whole-ofgovernment approach that brings together the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and others. I would be interested 

in our witnesses’ thoughts on how the United States Government 

needs to be organized to counter the Russian influence threat and 

how Congress might resource such an effort. I will ask our witnesses whether they agree that significant cuts at the State Department and other civilian agencies would significantly hamper 

our ability to use diplomacy, strategic communications, and other 

foreign policy tools to counter these Russian malign activities. 

Finally, what is clear is that we need a comprehensive strategy 

for countering the anti-Western aggression from the Kremlin. Such 

a strategy will need to be based on a clear-eyed understanding of 

Russia’s strategic aims and how it is using the full range of influence operations to achieve these goals. I intend to work with Chairman McCain to undertake the necessary effort within this committee to examine this question in depth. I believe we can work in 

a bipartisan fashion to address this national security threat. I look 

forward to this morning’s hearing to begin to shed light on this 

critical issue for our country and for European security. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I welcome the witnesses. General Breedlove? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF 

(RET.), DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR, SAM NUNN SCHOOL OF 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, 

thank you for this invitation to testify before you again. It is an 

honor to be here to talk about United States strategy and policy 

in Europe, and in particular, I applaud your inquiry into United 

States-Russia issues. 

United States-Russian relations are very much in the news these 

days. I believe it is appropriate given their importance, and I believe it is essential to look at these relations in a thorough, dispassionate way. That is what I hope we do today. There is much 

to talk about a new start with the Kremlin, and given the right 

framework and circumstances, I believe that has merit. 

Our current vector in United States-Russian relations is not a 

good one, and I believe if we do not find the right framework for 

engagement, it will not improve. The key is that framework and 

how we proceed. 

Russia is a great power with a proud history, and they have the 

world’s largest country in terms of territory, and they are a player 

on the world stage. Russia possesses the world’s second most powerful military: a nuclear arsenal comparable to ours and conventional forces that are easily the most powerful in Europe. While its 

economy is stagnant and it has been hit hard by the low prices of 

oil and natural gas, it is still the 12th largest in terms of dollars. 

We cannot simply dismiss Russia as a declining and regional 

power. 

6 

Again, given the right framework, it makes great sense for our 

Government to have meaningful discussions with Russia at a number of levels. We have much to discuss with the Kremlin. First, we 

would like to make sure our relationship does not deteriorate further. While we have more strategic matters to discuss, we need to 

address shared concerns about Moscow’s current practice of flying 

warplanes dangerously close to us, at times without their transponders on, and causing problems with American and other NATO 

planes and ships. Such incidents risk fatal accidents and even a 

clash between the United States and Russia. We need to reestablish substantive communication between our militaries in order to 

avoid such incidents and, when they occur, to move toward 

deconfliction. 

If Moscow really wants to improve relations, progress on these 

questions should not be hard to achieve. With an incremental approach and incremental successes, we can start to look for more 

substantial meetings to take on more difficult questions. Once we 

make progress in deconfliction, we can address more global issues 

of mutual interest. Holding a summit possibly in the future to 

launch that dialogue would signal a commitment by Washington 

and Moscow and would provide an important opportunity to address an issue important for over half a century, that of nuclear 

disarmament. This area has been dormant for some time now. Of 

course, before we can move to new agreements on nuclear issues, 

it is important that Moscow moves quickly to cease its violation of 

the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement. 

Iran is another important area for discussion. Moscow and Iran 

have worked together closely in Syria, and Iran has even provided 

Russian warplanes a base for a brief period of time. Yet, at the 

same time, Moscow worked with us and others in persuading 

Tehran to sign the agreement on its nuclear program. Our administration has indicated that it wants to take a second look and improve the terms of that agreement. Is Moscow really willing to 

partner on this, or does it prefer good relations with Tehran at the 

expense of stability in the Persian Gulf? 

A third area to discuss is working with the Russians to counter 

Daesh or the Islamic State of Iraq and in the Levant and other violent extremist organizations. If Moscow were a reliable partner 

against Daesh, the advantages are obvious. The complication, 

though, is that Moscow’s military operation in Syria has devoted 

little attention to these extremists. It has instead been directed 

against our moderate allies and lately as it works with Ankara 

against the Kurds. 

In addition, Moscow’s saturation bombing against towns and cities has fueled refugee flows, exacerbating the refugee crisis in Europe. In fact, there has been very little overlap in our strategic objectives in Syria, and Moscow’s principal objective in Syria is to 

shore up the weak, yet savage Assad regime. If we back off active 

opposition to Assad, which I think would be a serious concession 

to Mr. Putin, can we depend on Moscow to be a real partner in 

Syria and beyond against Islamic extremism? 

We can add other issues to this possible dialogue. Cooperation in 

dealing with drug trafficking and space exploration should be on 

the table. There is ample opportunity that the Kremlin and the 

7 

White House can achieve a great deal when our interests are similar and we work together. 

But we must, however, be realistic and not turn our eyes from 

places where Moscow is challenging our interests. President Putin 

has made clear that he wants to upend the post-Cold War order established in Europe. He and senior Russian officials have justified 

aggression in Ukraine by claiming a right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers there. They have said that this principle applies elsewhere. Their goal is to weaken NATO, the European Union, and the transatlantic relationship. 

Clearly there are two sides to every story. However, over the past 

nine years, as both of you have mentioned, the Kremlin has committed multiple acts of aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea 

in 2014, and since then, an ongoing, not-so-covert war in Ukraine’s 

east. It has agreed to two ceasefires and violated each repeatedly. 

Moscow has indicated by actions and statements that if it succeeds in Ukraine, there could be future targets. All three of our 

NATO allies in the Baltics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are 

worried. Two of them, Estonia and Latvia, with their large ethnic 

Russian populations are concerned that Russia might try to use 

them as an excuse. Moscow sent this message when it kidnapped 

an Estonian intelligence official from Estonia on the same day that 

the Wales NATO summit ended in September of 2014. 

We have a vital interest in stopping Moscow’s revanchist policies 

before they move to other countries, especially our NATO allies in 

the Baltics. Yes, we can conduct negotiations with Moscow on global issues, but we also need to continue to strengthen NATO’s presence along its eastern flank. The Warsaw NATO summit last summer took decisions to do that. The administration should endorse 

those decisions and reaffirm our article 5 commitment to defend 

each NATO member under threat, and it should take the lead in 

enhancing NATO capacities to deal with hybrid war, as you both 

mentioned, the appearance of disguised Russian agents or ‘‘little 

green men’’ in allied countries as an example. To underscore our 

commitment to the Alliance, I agree with the President’s plan to 

meet first with his NATO colleagues before seeing Mr. Putin. 

Mr. Putin understands the value of negotiating from strength. 

We can demonstrate our strength by developing a more forward defensive force and a more forward defensive force posture to deal 

with the Kremlin’s challenges to Europe. Additionally, we should 

more fully support Ukraine against the Kremlin’s aggression. In 

our past, we have been reluctant to provide Ukraine with defensive 

weapons so as to better defend itself. Our team should review that 

decision. 

Part of this is maintaining the economic pressure on Moscow. 

Our and Europe’s economic sanctions, which cost the Russian economy 1 to 1.5 percent of its GDP [Gross Domestic Product] in 2015, 

were imposed as an incentive for Moscow to meet its Minsk commitments and withdraw from Ukraine’s east and as a deterrence 

against any additional aggression. It would be a sign of weakness 

to ease those sanctions for anything less than Moscow’s full compliance with Minsk, which means a full restoration of the internationally recognized border between Russia and Ukraine. The more 

8 

trouble the Kremlin has in conducting its war in Ukraine, the less 

likely it is to cause trouble for us with our eastern NATO partners. 

The last six months have demonstrated that we must greatly improve our cyber defense to block and deter operations that the 

Kremlin has been conducting against us and others. The latest 

dump of documents via Wiki is another reminder of the need to 

raise our cyber defense. We also need to consider how we can respond to future cyber attacks in ways—perhaps not public—that 

would deter future cyber aggression. This is another subject for discussion with Moscow once we strengthen our position. 

Finally, sir, the world and the United States have enjoyed extraordinary peace, stability, and prosperity since the end of World 

War II and the Cold War. As just one measure, in 1970 over two 

billion of the world’s three billion people lived in extreme poverty. 

In 2015, less than 1 billion of the globe’s nearly seven billion people 

are in extreme poverty. An important reason for this is the peace 

and stability created by the great institutions that the United 

States, with its European partners, put together at the end of 

World War II, and that, sir, includes NATO. 

We have a vital interest in maintaining a strong NATO and a 

vibrant Europe. 

A dialogue with Moscow is possible. So too is cooperation. If the 

Kremlin is ready to work with us against Daesh or to improve the 

Iranian nuclear deal, we should be ready. But we should not be shy 

or hesitant about defending our interests when we are under challenge from the Kremlin. A policy of strength requires nothing less. 

[The prepared statement of General BREEDLOVE. follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF (RET) 

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for this invitation to testify 

before you again. It is an honor to be here to talk about United States Strategy and 

policy in Europe, and in particular I applaud your inquiry into United States-Russian relations. 

United States–Russian relations are very much in the news these days. I believe 

it is appropriate given their importance; and I believe it is essential to look at these 

relations in a thorough, dispassionate way. That is what I hope we do today. There 

is much talk about a new start with the Kremlin, and given the right framework 

and circumstances I believe that has merit. 

Our current vector in United States–Russian relations is not a good one, and I 

believe if we do not find the right framework for engagement it will not improve. 

The key is that framework and how we proceed. 

Russia is a great power with a proud history, the world’s largest country in terms 

of territory, and a player on the world stage. Russia possesses the world’s second 

most powerful military: a nuclear arsenal comparable to ours and conventional 

forces that are easily the most powerful in Europe. While its economy is stagnant 

and has been hit hard by the low prices of oil and natural gas, it is still the 12th 

largest in dollar terms. We cannot simply dismiss Russia as a declining and regional 

power. 

Again, given the right framework it makes great sense for our Government to 

have meaningful discussions with Russia at a number of different levels. We have 

much to discuss with the Kremlin. First, we would like to make sure our relationship does not deteriorate further. While we have more strategic matters to discuss, 

we need to address shared concerns about Moscow’s current practice of flying warplanes dangerously close, and at times without their transponders on, to American 

and other NATO planes and ships. Such incidents risk fatal accidents and even a 

clash between the United States and Russia. We need to re-establish substantive 

communication between our militaries in order to avoid such incidents, and when 

they occur, to move toward de-confliction. 

If Moscow really wants to improve relations, progress on these questions should 

not be too hard to achieve. With an incremental approach and incremental sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:40 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29655.TXT WILDA
9 

cesses, we can start to look for more substantial meetings to take on more difficult 

questions. Once we make progress in deconfliction we can address more global 

issues of mutual interest. Holding a summit to launch that dialog would signal a 

commitment by Washington and Moscow, and would provide an important opportunity to address an issue important for over half a century: nuclear disarmament. 

This area has been dormant for some time now. Of course, before we can move to 

new agreements on nuclear issues, it is important that Moscow moves quickly to 

cease its violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement. 

Iran is another important area for discussion. Moscow and Iran have worked together closely in Syria. Iran even provided Russian warplanes a base for a brief period of time; yet at the same time Moscow worked with us and others in persuading 

Tehran to sign the agreement on its nuclear program. Our administration has indicated that it wants to take a second look and improve the terms of that agreement. 

Is Moscow willing to partner on this? Or does it prefer good relations with Tehran 

at the expense of stability in the Persian Gulf? 

A third area to discuss is working with the Russians to counter Daesch, or the 

Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant (ISIL), and other violent extremist organizations. If Moscow were a reliable partner against Daesch, the advantages are obvious. The complication, though, is that Moscow’s military operation in Syria has devoted little attention to these extremists. It has instead been directed against our 

moderate allies and lately, as it works with Ankara, against the Kurds. 

In addition, Moscow’s saturation bombing against towns and cities has fueled refugee flows, exacerbating the refugee crisis in Europe. In fact, there has been very 

little overlap in our strategic objectives in Syria, and Moscow’s principal objective 

in Syria is to shore up the weak, yet savage, Assad regime. If we back off active 

opposition to Assad—a serious concession to Mr. Putin—can we depend on Moscow 

to be a real partner in Syria and beyond against Islamic extremists? 

We can add other issues to this possible dialog. Cooperation in dealing with drug 

trafficking and space exploration should also be on the table. There is ample opportunity that the Kremlin and the White House can achieve a great deal when our 

interests are similar and we work together. 

We must however be realistic and not turn our eyes from places where Moscow 

is challenging our interests. President Putin has made clear that he wants to upend 

the post-Cold War order established in Europe. He and senior Russian officials have 

justified aggression in Ukraine by claiming a right to protect ethnic Russians and 

Russian speakers there; and they have said that this principle applies elsewhere. 

Their goal is to weaken NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic relationship. 

Clearly there are two sides to every story, however, and over the past nine years, 

the Kremlin has committed multiple acts of aggression: in Georgia in 2008; in Crimea in early 2014; and since then an ongoing not-so-covert war in Ukraine’s East. 

It has agreed to two ceasefires—Minsk I and II—and violated each repeatedly. 

Moscow has indicated, by actions and statements that if it succeeds in Ukraine, 

there could be future targets. All three of our NATO Allies in the Baltics—Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania—are worried. Two of them, Estonia and Latvia, with their 

large ethnic Russian populations, are concerned that Russia might try to use them 

as an excuse. Moscow sent this message when it kidnapped an Estonian intelligence 

official from Estonia on the same day that the Wales NATO summit ended in September of 2014. 

We have a vital interest in stopping Moscow’s revanchist policies before they move 

to other countries, especially our NATO allies in the Baltics. Yes, we can conduct 

negotiations with Moscow on global issues; but we also need to continue to strengthen NATO’s presence along its eastern flank. The Warsaw NATO summit last summer took decisions to do that. The new Administration should endorse those decisions and reaffirm our article 5 commitment to defend each NATO member under 

threat; and it should take the lead in enhancing NATO capacities to deal with hybrid war—the appearance of disguised Russian agents or little green men—in Allied 

countries. To underscore our commitment to the Alliance, I agree with the President’s plan to meet first with his NATO colleagues before seeing President Putin. 

Mr. Putin understands the value of negotiating from strength. We can demonstrate our strength by developing a more forward defensive force posture to deal 

with the Kremlin’s challenges to Europe. Additionally, we should more fully support 

Ukraine against the Kremlin’s aggression. In our past, we have been reluctant to 

provide Ukraine with defensive weapons so as to better defend itself, our team 

should review that decision. 

Part of this is maintaining the economic pressure on Moscow. Our, and Europe’s, 

economic sanctions—which cost the Russian economy 1–1.5 of GDP in 2015—were 

imposed as an incentive for Moscow to meet its Minsk commitments and withdraw 

10 

from Ukraine’s East, and as a deterrence against additional aggression. It would be 

a sign of weakness to ease those sanctions for anything less than Moscow’s full compliance with Minsk, which means a full restoration of the internationally recognized 

border between Russia and Ukraine. The more trouble the Kremlin has conducting 

its war in Ukraine, the less likely it is to cause trouble for us with our eastern 

NATO partners. 

The last six months have demonstrated that we must greatly improve our cyber 

defenses to block and deter the operations that the Kremlin has been conducting 

against us and others. The latest dump of documents via Wiki Leaks is another reminder of the need to raise our cyber defense. We also need to consider how we can 

respond to future cyber-attacks in ways—perhaps not public—that would deter future cyber aggression. This is another subject for discussion with Moscow—once we 

strengthen our position. 

The world and the United States have enjoyed extraordinary peace, stability and 

prosperity since the end of World War II and the Cold War. To take just one measure, in 1970 over two billion of the world’s three billion people lived in extreme poverty. In 2015 less than one billion of the globe’s nearly 7 billion people are in extreme poverty. An important reason for this is the peace and stability created by 

the great institutions that the United States created with its European partners at 

the end of World War II to include NATO and the European Union. 

We have a vital interest in maintaining a strong NATO and vibrant Europe. 

A dialogue with Moscow is possible. So too is cooperation. If the Kremlin is ready 

to work with us against Daesch or to improve the Iranian nuclear deal, we should 

be ready. But we should not be shy or hesitant about defending our interests when 

we are under challenge from the Kremlin. A policy of strength requires nothing less. 

The Atlantic Council takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no 

affiliation with the United States Government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained herein are the sole responsibility of the author. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ambassador Burns, welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Ambassador BURNS. Thank you very much. Chairman McCain, 

Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, I am honored 

to be with you again, and I am honored to join General Breedlove 

and Ambassador Vershbow. I am glad to offer a few very brief 

thoughts on the challenges posed by Putin’s Russia and what to do 

about it. 

In the quarter century since the end of the Cold War, profound 

grievances, misperceptions, and disappointments have often defined the relationship between the United States and Russia. I 

lived through this turbulence during my years as a diplomat in 

Moscow, navigating the curious mix of hope and humiliation that 

I remember so vividly, and the Russia Boris Yeltsin and the pugnacity and raw ambition of Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. I lived 

through it in Washington, serving both Republican and Democratic 

administrations. 

There have been more than enough illusions on both sides. The 

United States has oscillated between visions of an enduring partnership with Moscow and dismissing it as a sulking regional power 

in terminal decline. Russia has moved between notions of a strategic partnership with the United States and a later deeper desire 

to upend the current international order where a dominant United 

States consigns Russia to a subordinate role. 

The reality in my view is that our relationship with Russia will 

remain competitive and often adversarial for the foreseeable future. 

At its core is a fundamental disconnect in outlook and about each 

other’s role in the world. 

11 

President Putin’s deeply troubling interference in our elections, 

like his broader foreign policy, has at least two motivating factors. 

The first is his conviction that the surest path to restoring Russia as a great power comes at the expense of an American-led 

order. Resentful of what he and many in the Russian political elite 

perceive as a pattern of the West taking advantage of Russia’s moment of historic weakness, Putin wants Russia unconstrained by 

Western values and institutions, free to pursue a sphere of influence. 

The second motivating factor is closely connected to the first. The 

legitimacy of Putin’s system of repressive domestic control depends 

on the existence of external threats. Surfing on high oil prices, he 

used to be able to bolster his social contract with the Russian people through rising standards of living. But Putin has lost that card 

in a world of lower energy prices and Western sanctions and with 

a one-dimensional economy in which real reform is trumped by the 

imperative of political control and the corruption that lubricates it. 

The ultimate realist, Putin is not blind to Russia’s relative weakness but regularly demonstrates that declining powers can be at 

least as disruptive as rising powers. He tends to see a target-rich 

environment around him. If he cannot easily build Russia up, he 

can take the United States down a few pegs with his characteristic 

tactical agility and willingness to play rough and take risks. If he 

cannot have a deferential government in Kyiv, he can grab Crimea 

and try to engineer the next best thing, a dysfunctional Ukraine. 

If he cannot abide the risk of regime upheaval in Syria, he can flex 

Russia’s military muscle, emasculate the West, and preserve 

Bashar al Assad atop the rubble of Aleppo. If he cannot directly intimidate the European Union, he can accelerate its unraveling by 

supporting anti-union nationalists and exploiting the wave of migration spawned in part by his own brutality. If we cannot directly 

confront NATO, he can probe for fissures within it and make mischief in the Balkans. 

So what do we do about all of this? Russia is still too big, proud, 

and influential to ignore and still the only nuclear power comparable to the United States. It remains a major player on problems from the Arctic to Iran and North Korea. The challenge before 

us, it seems to me, is to manage without illusions a difficult and 

combative relationship. I would highlight five key elements of a realistic strategy. 

First, we need to sustain and, if necessary, amplify the steps we 

have taken in response to Russian hacking. It would be foolish to 

think that Russia’s serious assault on our election can or should be 

played down however inconvenient. Russia challenged the integrity 

of our democratic system, and it sees Europe’s 2017 electoral landscape as the next battlefield. 

Second, we have to reassure our European allies of our absolute 

commitment to NATO, as General Breedlove stressed. In diplomacy, remembering your base is just as important as it is in politics, and it is what should guide our policy toward Russia. Our network of allies is not a millstone around America’s neck, but a powerful asset that sets us apart from relatively lonely major powers 

like Russia and China. 

12 

Third, we have to stay sharply focused on Ukraine, a country’s 

whose fate will be critical to the future of Europe and the future 

of Russia over the next generation. This is not about the distant 

aspirations of NATO or European Union membership. It is about 

helping Ukrainian leaders build the successful political and economic system that Russia seeks to subvert. This is just one dramatic example of why the administration’s proposed foreign assistance cuts are so terribly shortsighted. 

Fourth, we should be wary of superficially appealing notions like 

a common war on Islamic extremism or a common effort to contain 

China. Russia’s bloody role in Syria and its continued attachment 

to Assad make the terrorist threat worse, not better. Its long-term 

concerns about a rising China to its east are real, but for now, 

Putin has little inclination to sacrifice the relationship with Beijing, critical to the more immediate objective of eroding an American-led order. 

Fifth and finally, we need to focus on critical and practical priorities like rebuilding habits of communication between the United 

States and Russian militaries, again as General Breedlove stressed, 

to help forestall inadvertent collisions in Europe or in the Middle 

East. As former Senator Sam Nunn has argued, we should engage 

in our own cold-blooded self-interest, as well as Russia’s, on issues 

where we can both benefit, particularly reducing the risks of nuclear confrontation and of nuclear or radiological materials falling 

into the wrong hands. For all our profound differences, Russia and 

the United States share a unique capability and a unique responsibility to reduce nuclear risks. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no illusions about the challenge before us. 

It really pays to neglect or underestimate Russia or display gratuitous disrespect, but I am also convinced that firmness and vigilance and a healthy grasp of the limits of the possible are the best 

way to deal with the combustible combination of grievance and insecurity that Vladimir Putin embodies. We have a better hand to 

play than he does. We should play it methodically, confident in our 

enduring strengths, and unapologetic about our values. 

Thank you very much. 

[In lieu of a written statement, Ambassador Burns submitted the 

following articles:] 

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Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Ambassador Vershbow? 


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STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW, 

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Thank you. Chairman McCain, Ranking 

Member Reed, other members of the committee, it is an honor for 

me to be able to speak before you today on United States security 

strategy and policy in Europe and, in particular, how to meet the 

challenge posed by an aggressive revisionist Russia. 

I submitted a longer prepared statement in which I describe the 

many dimensions of the Russian challenge. Of course, the watershed event occurred exactly three years ago with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the launching of the ongoing campaign to destabilize other parts of Ukraine. President Putin tore up the international rulebook, and he ended a period, as you said, Mr. Chairman, of more than 20 years when we looked to Russia as a potential partner. 

Three years later, the Russian challenge has become even more 

serious. Not only have they continued the aggression against 

Ukraine, they have engaged in political aggression against our societies using cyber attacks, disinformation, and influence operations 

to affect the outcome of elections and undermine confidence in our 

democratic institutions. 

In essence, Russia is trying to undo decades of progress toward 

a more stable and integrated Euro-Atlantic community and to go 

back to the days when Russia dominated its neighbors through 

force and coercion. It aims to weaken and divide NATO and the 

European Union and to reduce their attractiveness to other European nations. It even sponsored an armed coup d?etat in Montenegro last year to derail that country’s accession to NATO. It wants 

to reduce U.S. influence in the world. But I think the main driver 

of what is going on is a determination to preserve the Putin regime’s grip on power by discrediting any Western-oriented alternative and distracting the Russian people from the country’s economic decline. So as Bill Burns said, that requires an external 

enemy. 

Of course, now the challenge to the international order extends 

to the Middle East with devastating consequences for the people of 

Syria while contributing little to international efforts to defeat 

ISIS. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of a massive upgrading of Russian military forces in every domain while Russia 

flouts its obligations under arms control agreements, including violating the INF Treaty. 

So while we should always seek constructive relations with Russia, we must approach that relationship without any illusions. 

Since it is Russia’s actions which have fundamentally changed our 

relationship, any change for the better depends on changes in Russian behavior. To get there, we need a comprehensive strategy that 

builds upon the combined material and moral strength of our close 

allies and partners in Europe and around the world. As in the Cold 

War, we must engage with Russia but from a position of strength. 

Now, what would be the elements of a comprehensive strategy? 

As you know, I spent the last five years as Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, and I am pleased to say that the Alliance is in a 

much stronger position than it was three years ago militarily and 

22 

politically to meet the Russian challenge. General Breedlove deserves a lot of the credit for that. 

Since 2014, NATO has carried out the most significant increase 

in its collective defense posture for a generation. Allies have begun 

to reverse the decline in defense spending. They have increased 

NATO’s ability to reinforce allies at short notice, increased the 

scale and frequency of exercises, boosted cyber and missile defense, 

strengthened intelligence sharing, and tried to speed up decisionmaking in a crisis. 

At Warsaw last July, allies decided that credible deterrence also 

required additional forces on the ground. So they agreed to deploy 

multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, 

and also to increase NATO’s presence in Southeastern Europe as 

well. So now if Russian troops or ‘‘little green men’’ cross the borders, they will immediately face troops from across the Alliance 

from both sides of the Atlantic rather than just national forces. 

I am pleased to say that the United States is playing a very key 

role in implementing these decisions, leading the battalion in Poland and contributing additional combat capabilities under the European Deterrence Initiative. This initiative is critical to the credibility of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, and I hope it will 

continue to receive full support from the new administration and 

the Congress as a demonstration of our unequivocal commitment to 

the Alliance. 

But the United States is not shouldering this burden alone. I am 

pleased to say that the UK, Canada, and Germany are leading 

NATO’s battalions in the three Baltic States, and 12 other allies 

have stepped up to provide units. 

Nevertheless, there is a lot more that our allies need to do in the 

coming years, which I spell out in my written statement. They have 

to contribute more follow-on forces, more investments in air and 

missile defense, precision strike, anti-submarine warfare capabilities to counter Russian A2/AD capabilities. That all requires resources, and I hope that by the time of the mini-summit in late 

May, that all allies will have concrete plans to accelerate the increasing of their defense spending to meet the two percent of GDP 

goal. 

Now, we cannot just circle the wagons and strengthen NATO’s 

28 members alone. There is also a need to do more to bolster the 

capabilities of Russia’s neighbors who are directly threatened by 

Moscow and strengthen our partnerships with countries like Sweden and Finland who can help the Alliance, especially in the Baltic 

Sea region. Our packages of support for Ukraine and Georgia 

through NATO have helped with the defense reforms, but they 

would benefit from a lot more resources. 

Bilaterally, the United States nonlethal defensive weapons assistance and training has helped Ukraine’s armed forces prevent 

further Russian incursions in the Donbas, but we should consider 

expanding the support quantitatively and qualitatively to include 

lethal systems such as anti-tank weapons, UAVs [Unmanned Ariel 

Vehicles], and air defenses if Russia continues its aggression in 

eastern Ukraine. 

Of course, while it is not our focus today, NATO needs to look 

south as well as east when it comes to strengthening its neighbors. 

23 

A bigger effort in defense capacity building for partners in the Middle East and North Africa could address the root causes of terrorism and migration. 

Now, Russian interference in our presidential election and its 

similar efforts in Europe call for a strong response both at the national level and through NATO and the EU [European Union]. We 

need to do more to ensure the integrity of our election processes 

and institutions against cyber attacks and foreign manipulation. 

We should devote additional resources to detecting and analyzing 

Russian propaganda and influence operations, work with the social 

media companies to label or take down false stories before they go 

viral, and expand radio, TV, and Internet broadcasting, especially 

in the Russian language, to debunk disinformation and fake news. 

We should not fight propaganda with propaganda, however, but 

project a positive narrative about what the West stands for. 

I think NATO could take a bigger role in the countering influence operations and Russian active measures. These may not be 

traditionally in NATO’s mandate, but defending societies is just as 

important as defending borders. Here we should join forces with 

the European Union to forge and integrate a strategy for countering the whole spectrum of hybrid warfare methods since NATO 

does not have all the necessary tools. 

Now, just a few words on how to engage with Russia. First of all, 

I would agree that we need a unified approach with our democratic 

allies, one consistent with our shared values and principles. This 

means, first of all, that engagement should address head on the 

fundamental reason why relations have deteriorated in the first 

place: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its violation of the 

rules that have kept the peace in Europe since the end of World 

War II. 

Time is of the essence. In recent days, Russia has increased its 

military and political pressure on Ukraine. The Minsk process led 

by Germany and France may have prevented further deterioration 

up until now, but it does not provide sufficient leverage to induce 

Russia to reverse course and withdraw its forces and its proxies 

from the occupied territories. So I would argue that stronger, highlevel United States diplomatic engagement working with Kyiv, Berlin, and Paris may be necessary to achieve real progress and avoid 

another intractable frozen conflict. 

So I would urge the Trump administration to make solving of the 

conflict in eastern Ukraine the litmus test and the essential first 

step in any reengagement effort with Moscow, and as a first step, 

we should consult with our allies to develop a common strategy. 

There may be things to talk about with Russia on Iran, ISIS, North 

Korea, but the core issue that we need to tackle head on is the aggression in Ukraine. Any bargain with Moscow and any easing of 

sanctions should be contingent on fully implementing the Minsk 

agreements and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas, 

including control over its international borders. Anything less 

would reward Russian aggression and only embolden Mr. Putin 

further. 

Last but not least, successful pursuit of the kind of strategy I 

have outlined depends on Western unity and resolve. That unity 

and resolve is being tested not just by external challengers like 

24 

Putin and ISIS, it is also threatened from within: Brexit, public 

dissatisfaction with illegal migration, and slow economic growth, a 

Turkey that seems to be drifting away from Western values, to 

name just a few. As in the past, United States leadership will be 

essential in holding NATO together and in ensuring that decisionmaking by consensus continues to be effective. At the same time, 

the United States needs to demonstrate in word and deed that it 

supports a strong, united Europe as an indispensable partner in 

dealing with Russia and other challenges even as we work to overcome differences on trade or refugee policy. 

The perception that the Trump administration is skeptical about 

the European Project could exacerbate internal divisions within 

Europe and provide openings for Russian mischief making. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Vershbow follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE

Three years ago this month, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and laid the groundwork for its campaign to destabilize Ukraine. That moment marked the end of a 

period of more than twenty years when the countries of the West looked to Russia 

as a partner. Of course, even before 2014, Russia had demonstrated a pattern of destabilizing countries in its neighborhood, particularly Moldova and Georgia. But 

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—including the first changing of borders by 

force in Europe since World War II—represented a new strategic reality, and a 

wake-up call for the United States and its NATO Allies. 

That new strategic reality is even starker today: Russia has not only continued 

to undermine the post-WWII and post-Cold War international order—an order based 

on respect for the sovereignty of nations, and the rule of law—through its illegal 

occupation of Crimea and its ongoing war of aggression in Eastern Ukraine; Russia 

has also engaged in political aggression against our societies, using cyber-attacks, 

disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations (what the Soviets called ‘‘active measures’’) to affect the outcome of elections and to undermine confidence in 

our democratic institutions. 

In essence, Russia is trying to undo decades of progress toward a more stable and 

integrated Euro-Atlantic community. It wants to turn back the clock to a time when 

Russia dominated neighboring countries through force and coercion. Using military 

intimidation, economic warfare and ‘‘active measures,’’ it aims to weaken and divide 

NATO and the European Union, which it sees as the main obstacles to its expanded 

power in Europe, and to reduce their attractiveness to other European nations. It 

openly works to destabilize countries that seek closer ties to the Euro-Atlantic community, as we are seeing in the Western Balkans, even sponsoring an armed coup 

d’e ́tat in Montenegro last year to derail its accession to NATO. All of this is driven 

by a determination to preserve the Putin regime’s grip on power by discrediting any 

Western-oriented alternative and distracting the public from Russia’s economic decline. 

Moscow’s challenge to the international rules-based order now extends beyond Europe to Syria and the broader Middle East. As Russia has provided greater levels 

of military support for President Assad—including bombing moderate opposition 

groups and critical infrastructure, and driving tens of thousands of civilians from 

Aleppo and other cities—it has made it even more difficult to find a long-term end 

to the war in Syria, while contributing little to international efforts to defeat ISIS. 

Now, Russia may be seeking a foothold in Libya, putting at risk international efforts 

to support the government of national accord and end the civil war. 

All of this has occurred against the backdrop of a massive upgrading of Russian 

military forces, both conventional and nuclear. After their forces’ poor performance 

against Georgia in 2008, Russian military spending has increased by one-third and 

its modernization programs have transformed Russian capabilities in every domain. 

At the same time, Russia continues to flout many of its obligations under arms control and transparency regimes, as we have seen with the recent news about the deployment of a long-range ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the INF 

Treaty. 

25 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

While we should always seek constructive relations with Russia, we must approach the relationship without illusions. We need to recognize that it is Russia’s 

actions which have fundamentally changed our relationship, and that any change 

for the better depends on changes in Russian behavior. Meeting the Russian challenge in the years ahead calls for a comprehensive strategy, building on the combined material and moral strength of our close Allies and partners in Europe and 

around the world. 

To achieve a more stable and constructive relationship with Moscow that is sustainable for the long term, we must speak with Russia from a position of strength. 

During the Cold War, a strong deterrence paved the way for de ́tente, for arms control agreements, and for our relatively predictable and stable relationship with the 

Soviet Union. Our situation today is different, but it requires a similar approach. 

A combination of strength and engagement is the best way to bring Russia back to 

compliance with international law and with Helsinki principles. 

ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY

A comprehensive strategy for meeting the Russian challenge should have many 

elements, including: bolstering our defense and deterrence against potential Russian 

threats; supporting Russia’s neighbors in their efforts to build strong, resilient societies and defend their sovereignty; countering the Russians’ revisionist, anti-Western propaganda and other forms of ‘‘hybrid’’ warfare aimed at undermining our democracies; and continuing to support the aspirations of the Russian people for freedom and democracy over the longer term. In all of these lines of effort, we have a 

greater chance of success by working closely with our European allies and partners. 

Bolstering Defense and Deterrence 

When it comes to bolstering defense and deterrence, the NATO Alliance today is 

in a much stronger position than it was three years ago to meet the Russian challenge. Since the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO has carried out the most significant 

increase in its collective defense posture for a generation. Allies have begun to reverse the decline in defense spending, with total spending up by 3 percent last year. 

Through the Readiness Action Plan, Allies have increased their ability to reinforce 

any Ally at short notice with a much larger NATO Response Force of 40,000 troops 

and a quick-reaction Spearhead Force, ready to move within days to wherever it 

might be needed. They also increased the scale and frequency of military exercises, 

developed a strategy for countering ‘‘hybrid’’ warfare, boosted NATO’s cyber and ballistic missile defenses, strengthened intelligence sharing within the Alliance, and introduced measures to speed up decision-making in a crisis. 

At the Warsaw Summit last July, Allies took even more far-reaching decisions to 

strengthen deterrence for the long term. Allied leaders decided that, with Russia’s 

continuing military build-up and its growing anti-access/area denial capability, it is 

not enough to rely on reinforcements alone. Credible deterrence also requires additional forces on the ground. So at Warsaw, NATO leaders agreed to enhance 

NATO’s forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance with the deployment 

of multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and to increase its presence in southeastern Europe as well. So, should any country act aggressively against a NATO Ally, they would immediately face troops from across the 

Alliance, from both sides of the Atlantic, rather than just the national forces of one 

country. 

The United States is playing a key role in implementing these decisions, serving 

as lead nation for the multinational battalion in Poland, and contributing additional 

combat capabilities as part of the billion-dollar European Deterrence Initiative. The 

EDI (and its predecessor, the European Reassurance Initiative) have ensured an almost continuous presence of United States combat forces across NATO’s eastern 

flank—reassuring our Allies, enhancing interoperability and readiness, and leaving 

the Russians in no doubt that they would pay a heavy price for testing Alliance resolve. EDI is critical to the credibility of NATO’s defense and deterrence posture, 

and I hope it will continue to receive full support from the new Administration and 

the Congress. 

When it comes to the eastern flank, the United States is not bearing an outsized 

share of the burden. American contributions are being matched by increased efforts 

on the part of the European Allies and Canada. The UK, Canada and Germany have 

taken the leading role in NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the three Baltic 

States, reinforced by units from 12 other Allies, and seven European Allies are serving in succession as lead nation for NATO’s rapidly deployable ‘‘spearhead’’ force. 

This is a good example of transatlantic teamwork. 

26 

Nevertheless, there’s more that needs to be done in the coming years. For example, while our Allies have stepped up by providing forces for the eastern flank, they 

will also need to do their share in fielding the follow-on forces—ground, air and 

naval—and the critical enablers needed to back up these ‘‘first responders.’’ Right 

now, the U.S. provides the majority of these forces, and allies should commit to 

shouldering at least 50 percent of the burden within the next few years. 

Allies will also need to do their part in countering the Russians’ growing anti-access and area denial capabilities in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, which could 

seriously impede NATO’s ability to bring in reinforcements. This means investing 

more in air and missile defense, precision strike, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Allies will also need to commit more assets to the standing NATO maritime 

groups to ensure that the Alliance is able to maintain freedom of navigation in the 

North Atlantic. Despite the renewed emphasis on territorial defense, Allies need to 

maintain and strengthen their expeditionary capabilities so that NATO is fully 

equipped to fight terrorism and manage crises beyond NATO’s borders. 

All of this requires additional resources. Allies must not only adopt concrete plans 

to fulfill the pledge to raise defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2024, as Secretary of Defense Mattis called for in February; they should accelerate these efforts 

if possible. They should also speed up efforts to meet the even more important target of devoting 20 percent of their defense budgets to new equipment and R&D— 

a benchmark now met by only ten of the 28 allies. 

Enhancing the Resilience of Allies and Partners 

Spending more on defense is vital, but it is not enough. Russia exploits the weakness and vulnerabilities of our societies and uses cyber-attacks and propaganda to 

turn a country’s citizens against their own government and toward Russia. Allies 

must therefore strengthen their resilience in key practical areas. Governments must 

ensure that their cyber defenses are strong, that they have a high degree of civil 

preparedness, and that their critical national infrastructure is protected. Resilience 

is the essential first rung of the deterrence ladder. 

Moreover, we can’t just circle the wagons and strengthen the resilience of NATO’s 

28 members alone. Allies also need to bolster the capabilities of Russia’s neighbors 

who are threatened by Moscow, and strengthen NATO’s partnerships with other European partners, such as Sweden and Finland, who can help the Alliance in key regions like the Baltic Sea. 

NATO has been engaged for many years in assisting Georgia and Ukraine to 

carry out defense reforms, to raise the proficiency of their armed forces, and to bring 

them closer to NATO standards. Since 2014, NATO has expanded these efforts 

through the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package and Comprehensive Assistance 

Package for Ukraine, and it has deployed a team of resident defense advisors to 

each country. But both these efforts are relatively under-resourced in comparison 

to European Union efforts in the police and judicial sectors, and I recommend that 

the Trump Administration push for their expansion. 

Bilaterally, the United States has provided non-lethal defensive weapons assistance to Ukraine, and together with Canada, offered valuable training to Ukrainian 

armed forces. This has helped them prevent further Russian incursions in the 

Donbas. We should consider expanding this support both quantitatively and qualitatively, to include lethal defensive weapons such as anti-tank weapons and air defenses, if Russia continues its aggression in Eastern Ukraine. 

When it comes to strengthening its neighbors, NATO needs to look South as well 

as East, by doing more to project stability to its partners in the Middle East and 

North Africa. Helping Middle Eastern neighbors build reliable defense institutions, 

secure their borders, and fight terrorism in their own regions is the best way to prevent them from becoming failed states and safe havens for ISIS. It would be a tangible way for NATO to address the root causes of the migration crisis and homegrown terrorism in Allied countries. It would also reduce opportunities for Russian 

meddling. In many areas, such as North Africa, defense capacity building could be 

done in partnership with the European Union. It makes no sense to compete with 

one another, when there is more than enough work to go around for both organizations. 

Defending our Societies and Countering Russian Disinformation 

Russian interference in the United States presidential election last year and its 

similar efforts to influence the outcome of European elections call for a strong response at the national level, but there is also a role for NATO and the EU as well. 

Nationally, we need to ensure the integrity of our election processes and institutions against cyber-attacks and foreign manipulation; we should devote additional 

resources to detecting and analyzing Russian propaganda and influence operations; 

27 

we should work with social media platforms to label or take down false stories before the go viral; and we should expand radio, television and internet broadcasting 

aimed at debunking disinformation and ‘‘fake news.’’ We shouldn’t fight propaganda 

with propaganda, however, but project a positive narrative, one that conveys what 

the West stands for, to our own publics and to Russian-speaking audiences. 

Multilaterally, we should urge our NATO allies to support a bigger Alliance role 

in countering influence operations, disinformation and ‘‘active measures’’ by Russia. 

These are not traditionally problems within NATO’s mandate, but defending our societies is just as important as defending our borders. Here too, closer collaboration 

between NATO and the EU would make sense—in countering propaganda and 

disinformation, in sharing intelligence about cyber and other asymmetric threats, 

and in conducting joint exercises to ensure that ‘‘little green men’’ are not able to 

do to our countries what they did to Ukraine. I hope the Trump Administration will 

give its full support to the development of an integrated NATO–EU strategy for 

countering hybrid warfare, building on the Joint Declaration by NATO and EU leaders issued in Warsaw. 

Principled Engagement with Russia . . . starting with the Ukraine crisis 

The last, and most challenging, piece of a new political strategy for the United 

States and its Allies is how to engage with Russia, even as we seek to deter and 

counter the multiple threats it poses. Relations with Moscow are at their lowest 

point in decades, and President Trump is certainly right in wanting to explore possibilities to reduce the risk of conflict, lower tensions and find areas for mutually beneficial cooperation. But it is essential that any engagement with Russia be based 

on a unified approach with our democratic allies, one that is consistent with our 

shared values and principles. Most importantly, engagement should address headon the fundamental reason why relations have deteriorated in the first place—Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its violation of the rules that have kept the 

peace in Europe in the decades since the end of World War II. 

Recently, Russia has increased its military and political pressure on the ground 

in Eastern Ukraine while using multiple levers to undermine and discredit the 

Ukrainian Government and its policies of reform. The Minsk process, led by Germany and France, has been useful in preventing a further deterioration of the situation, but does not provide sufficient leverage to induce Russia to reconsider its approach and withdraw its forces and its proxies from the occupied territories. Stronger, high-level United States diplomatic engagement, working in close coordination 

with Kyiv, Berlin and Paris, may be necessary to achieve real progress and avoid 

another intractable frozen conflict. Time is of the essence. 

If the Trump Administration wants to pursue improved relations with Russia, 

solving the conflict in Eastern Ukraine should be the litmus test and the essential 

first step. Any ‘‘bargain’’ with Moscow should be contingent on full implementation 

of the Minsk agreements and restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas, 

including control of its international borders. Anything less would reward Russian 

aggression and only embolden Putin to further destabilize his neighbors. Trading 

away Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence in return for greater cooperation 

against ISIS would be a devil’s bargain, and it would ultimately fail: the 45 million 

people of Ukraine will not quietly accept being consigned to a Russian ‘‘sphere of 

influence.’’ Indeed, if Putin remains intransigent, we and our Allies should be prepared to increase the pressure on Russia even further by tightening sanctions and 

stepping up military and economic assistance to Ukraine. 

CHALLENGES TO TRANSATLANTIC UNITY

Pursuing a strategy along the lines suggested above would provide the foundation 

for engaging Russia in a dialogue that upholds our values and restores the credibility of the international rules-based order. But as noted previously, success depends on Western unity and resolve. That unity is being tested not just by external 

challenges like Russia and ISIS; it is also threatened from within. 

NATO has not been seriously affected by Brexit or the refugee crisis, but Alliance 

cohesion and solidarity could be challenged in several ways: by a failure of Allies 

to follow-through on rectifying the imbalance in defense spending; or by an inability 

to maintain the balance in addressing threats from the East and the South that is 

essential to Allied cohesion. The latest, and perhaps the most serious, challenge 

comes from a Turkey that seems to be drifting away from Western values and developing closer links with Moscow. As in the past, U.S. leadership will be essential in 

holding NATO together and ensuring that decision-making by consensus is not paralyzed. 

For its part, the European Union will be increasingly preoccupied by negotiations 

over the terms of Brexit, while struggling to manage popular dissatisfaction over ilVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:40 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29655.TXT WILDA
28 

legal migration and feeble economic growth. The perception that the Trump Administration is skeptical about the whole European project could exacerbate internal divisions within Europe and provide openings for Russian mischief-making. The 

United States needs to demonstrate, in word and deed, that it supports a strong, 

united Europe as an indispensable partner in dealing with Russia and other challenges, even as we work to overcome differences over trade and refugee policy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

General Breedlove and Ambassador Burns, Ambassador 

Vershbow just mentioned the need to provide lethal defensive 

weapons to Ukraine. Do you agree with that, Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. If Russia continues its aggression in eastern 

Ukraine or stimulates another significant escalation of fighting, I 

do. 

I think that what is important, though, is—all of us I think emphasized the significance of alliance unity and to make sure that 

we are working these issues with our key NATO partners as well, 

as well as with the EU, because we want to just keep our eye on 

the importance of sustaining sanctions as well, the economic sanctions that exist, until there is full implementation of Minsk. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you not agree that from a morale purposes alone, much less capability, that it would be helpful to give 

lethal defensive weapons to Ukrainians? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think it would, again especially in the face 

of an escalation of Russian-inspired fighting in eastern Ukraine. 

Again, the only thing I would emphasize is the importance of 

very close consultation with our allies so that this does not become 

a contentious source of debate and an opportunity for Putin to 

drive wedges between us and our NATO and EU allies. That is all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Good point. 

General Breedlove? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I believe that every nation has a right 

to defend itself, and my recommendation on this has not changed 

since when I was in my previous capacity and I do support that. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ambassador Vershbow, there is a little country called Montenegro. There are only 650,000 people there. As of 

February, 23 of the 28 member states approved the accession of 

Montenegro into NATO. Why is the accession of Montenegro so important, and why does Russia oppose the accession of such a small 

country? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the number 

is now up to 25, and I hope the U.S. will join the ranks of those 

who have ratified. 

I think Montenegro’s accession is important, in part, as a matter 

of principle that since the end of the Cold War, we have taken the 

position, together with our allies, that countries should be able to 

seek membership in NATO if they can meet the criteria and contribute to stability in their region and in Europe at large. We put 

them through a lot of rigorous reforms and defense improvements 

to meet those criteria. Montenegro did what we expected of them. 

I think it also is a contribution to stability in the western Balkans, which is still unfinished business. We still see internal divisions in Bosnia. We still see problems now in Macedonia. So I 

think setting an example that countries that do do their homework, 

meet the criteria, contribute to stability in their neighborhood can 

29 

become members of NATO, even if they do not bring a huge 

amount of defense capability to the Alliance. 

Russia opposes this because they I think are trying to draw a red 

line in the face of any further NATO enlargement. They are most 

concerned about Ukraine and Georgia, but I think they see the Balkans as an area of traditional influence for Russia, and they are 

using all kinds of means, including the coup that I mentioned, to 

detail Montenegro’s accession even at this late stage of the process. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Even to the point where they tried to orchestrate a coup to overthrow the democratically elected government. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Indeed, and even Serbia, which is ambivalent about NATO, I think was quite alarmed that their territory was used to hatch a plot against a neighboring state that they 

consider a friend and not an enemy. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. No. I agree absolutely. I think it is important for the United States to follow through and join our other 

NATO allies in approving Montenegro’s accession. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Some of us believe, General Breedlove, that 

Vladimir Putin may test us more by further misbehavior in 

Ukraine. If that happens, which there are some indications of that 

already, what should be our response? 

General BREEDLOVE. Chairman, thank you. 

An axiom remains from my childhood behavior with my father, 

and that is we should not reward bad behavior. I believe that we 

should better equip Ukraine to meet those challenges. 

I think Ambassador Burns made a very important point too. We 

need to work with our allies to bring them along with us to the 

same conclusion and set its support. I have offered thoughts in the 

past about defensive weaponry and ways that we can help Ukraine 

to have more resiliency in the face of this tough pressure, and I 

think those are all still very valid. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your outstanding testimony. Very insightful and extremely timely. 

One issue I think we all agree upon is that a military response 

is necessary, strengthening NATO—and I joined the chairman with 

his leadership in advocating for providing defensive weapons to 

Ukraine several years ago. That is necessary but not sufficient. 

What we also require is an economic and geopolitical strategy. 

I go to some of the points that were raised by all of the panelists. 

It seems to me that as Ambassador Vershbow pointed out, the 

Ukraine is a key test of our resolve. There it is not just defensive 

weapons, it is significant aid for political capacity building, anticorruption efforts, diversifying the energy from Russian supply exclusively to non-Russian supply. That calls for an all-of-government 

approach and significant resources. Perhaps the analogy is after 

World War II, it just was not lots and lots of U.S. soldiers and airmen, but it was the Marshall Plan that helped. Although that 

might be out of our scope at the moment, we have to make significant commitments beyond just military support. 

The point again that the Ambassador made about the weaknesses or the perception in Europe of disarray, EU under pressure, 

30 

Brexit. It is alarming when we have American voices sort of cheering on Brexit, cheering on sort of some elements that would encourage the dismemberment of the EU rather than its strengthening. 

So I would ask all of you just to comment in general about this 

notion of necessary military support, but we have to go the extra 

step across our entire government. General Breedlove? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, I fully agree, and what we talk about 

occasionally is using all the elements of our Nation’s power. We use 

a simple model in the military. We are taught DIME, diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic. Certainly Russia uses all of 

those tools in putting pressure on Ukraine, and our not only the 

United States, but the Western response should contain all of 

those. 

As you mentioned, considering how we can help nations like 

Ukraine who are under pressure in that more broad front, I completely agree that the answer does not only lie in the military. 

Senator REED. Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. No. I absolutely agree. I think that kind of 

a comprehensive strategy is essential, and I would just add two 

points, I think one kind of strategic and more specific to some parts 

of Europe. 

The strategic point is that I think now more than ever, it is important for the United States to invest in our transatlantic relationships at a moment when our partners and our allies in Europe 

are under pressure almost any place you look on the geographic 

compass from the west, the issue of Brexit; from the south, whether it is terrorism or migration flows; and from the east, a resurgent 

Russia. It is very important for us to invest in that relationship 

and recognize its significance to almost anything the United States 

wants to achieve in the world. 

The second and more specific comment has to do with what you 

said about Ukraine and our earlier conversation about the Balkans. 

I think what is at stake in Ukraine is enormously important for the 

United States and for our European allies. It is partly about security and defense, but it is also partly, just as you said, Senator 

Reed, about the economic and political health of Ukraine. It is true 

the Ukrainian leadership has to do its own part and has to climb 

out of a hole, which in part is self-inflected in terms of corruption 

over the years. But you now have a leadership that is beginning 

to do that, and we need the kind of sustained focus and resources 

from the United States, from Europe that is going to help Ukrainians to help themselves at this critical moment. I think the same 

is true in the Balkans where we have to keep our eye on the ball 

as well. 

Senator REED. Ambassador Vershbow? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Thank you. 

I would agree with my colleagues that supporting Ukraine and 

all of Russia’s neighbors that are targeted by Putin for his sphere 

of influence deserve our support, and that is a comprehensive effort, military, political, economic, helping them fight corruption. 

And, of course, Ukraine in the last three years, despite having to 

fight an undeclared war in its eastern provinces, has made more 

progress on reform than in the previous 20-plus years since independence in 1991. A lot of the support they are getting for that efVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:40 Apr 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\29655.TXT WILDA
31 

fort is coming from our European partners. So it is not just the 

U.S. that is trying to help them shore up their security, their resilience, their economy and to fight corruption, which is the real big 

challenge that they face. 

So the cuts in State Department resources for these sorts of programs are misguided. This is not charity, but it is investing in 

greater stability and security in Europe because a more resilient 

and secure Ukraine is really the best response to Putin’s aggression. The more that Ukraine succeeds in establishing a democratic 

society with a robust economy, the more it will send a signal to the 

people of Russia that the kind of system that they are stuck with 

under President Putin is less desirable than going back to the path 

of openness, reform, and better relations with the West at the same 

time. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker? 

Senator WICKER. Well, I appreciate the excellent testimony, and 

I agree that the more Ukraine succeeds, the better off it is for us 

in the United States and the West, and I think it is one of the most 

profoundly important issues that we face in the next year or two. 

Let me see if I have discovered a little bit of a distance between 

our witnesses today. Ambassador Burns, you took most of your testimony from an article that you previously wrote in the New York 

Times. You have four steps, and then you went beyond that in your 

oral testimony today to mention that, nevertheless, in spite of everything Russia has done and all of our problems, there are still 

areas of cooperation that we could reach. 

So would you restate that and be more specific? Then I will ask 

General Breedlove and the Ambassador to respond to this idea that 

you have. 

Ambassador BURNS. Sure, I would be glad to, Senator. My only 

point is that I think cold-bloodedly from the point of view of not 

only American interests but Russian interests as well and wider 

international interests, it is important for us to continue to engage 

with Russia on issues like the safety and security of nuclear materials, the danger of nuclear terrorism, the danger of nuclear and 

radiological materials getting in the wrong hands. Those are issues 

where I think the United States and Russia, precisely because of 

our history and our nuclear arsenals and our capability, really do 

have unique responsibilities. 

I think as General Breedlove said, I think it is also important for 

us, even as we did at the worst moments of tension in the Cold 

War, to sustain a habit of military-to-military communication. So 

we are avoiding inadvertent collisions whether it is over the Baltic 

States or in the Middle East or elsewhere. I think there is practical 

in that for us, whatever ever our profound differences with Russia 

on many other issues. 

Senator WICKER. General Breedlove, are you on the same page 

there? 

General BREEDLOVE. Yes, Senator. There is no air between us 

and those conversations. I would add things like transparency and 

exercises. Just yesterday, another major SNAP exercise in Crimea 

aimed at destabilizing Kyiv. Loose nuclear materials. Senator 

32 

Nunn is working on that hard. It is a place where we can absolutely find, I think, some common ground, and believe in CT 

[counter-terrorism] in many ways. They are as worried about what 

is coming out of Afghanistan and the Balkans as we are. So I do 

believe, again, reestablishing trust in an incremental way, we need 

to sit down and work on these things. 

Senator WICKER. Ambassador Vershbow, you are on the same 

page there? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Yes, Senator. I would agree that even 

with these fundamental differences, we have to try to manage the 

relationship, as Ambassador Burns said. I think, in the short term, 

maybe the most we can do, which is try to reduce the risks of some 

accidental incident escalating out of control, trying to persuade the 

Russians not to give their pilots the freedom to provoke our ships 

and surveillance planes, more transparency, bringing more observers to exercise it so we do not miscalculate in a crisis. 

There may be geopolitical issues where we could try to cooperate 

with Russia although, even as we have heard, fighting ISIS is not 

as clear as it might seam, but the Russians really have the same 

objectives in Syria or other parts of the Middle East as we do. But 

we should test Putin on whether he is actually able to contribute 

something real, and we do not have to trade the sovereignty of 

Ukraine in order to get him to cooperate on ISIS. If he wants to 

do that, he should do it on its merits. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Will one of you comment or all of you comment on the value of 

OSCE [Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe] in all of 

this? OSCE is a 57-nation group. The United States and Canada 

are members. It is consensus-based, and it has been challenged in 

recent years by a far more aggressive Russia. The organization’s 

highest profile engagement remains the fielding of an 1,100-person 

special monitoring mission to Ukraine, an unarmed civilian mission 

that serves as the international community’s eyes and ears in the 

conflict zone. Of course, there are many other duties of OSCE. But 

what value should we place on OSCE’s continuing role in the European security architecture? Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. Yes, I am glad to start, Senator. 

I guess I would say for all the limitations of the OSCE as a big, 

sprawling institution, as you described, I think it has continuing 

value, first because it embodies some of the core values that we 

share with our European allies and partners in terms of sovereignty of states, you know, the inviolability of borders so that—— 

Senator WICKER. Those Helsinki principles. 

Ambassador BURNS. Right, so that big states do not just get to 

grab parts of smaller states just because they can, and so for all 

the limitations of the institution, I think its core value is because 

it really does embody the Helsinki principles, and it is important 

for us to continue to invest in that. It also does good work in terms 

of the monitoring function that you described in Ukraine and elsewhere. 

Senator WICKER. General? 

General BREEDLOVE. Senator, if I could just add a much more 

tactical—and I am sorry for that—observation. There are limits 

and I could not agree with that more. But occasionally with some 

33 

of the fake news that was created in the Donbas and other places 

as Russia invaded, even though OSCE was challenged in it, often 

it was the source of the real news of what was actually going on 

on the ground. Again, it has challenges but it also provides some 

pretty good input for us occasionally. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I would agree that OSCE still has value, 

particularly because of the norms and values that it upholds, even 

though the Russians are violating a lot of those right now. But it 

gives us a basis on which to challenge their misbehavior. 

Its practical value may have declined because the Russians have 

sort of turned against OSCE. They do not really like its efforts to 

promote free elections and transparency in the political processes 

since that is the antithesis of what their system now represents. 

The special monitoring mission in Ukraine I think has been very 

courageous in trying to make the disengagement work even half 

well. But even as the Russians authorize missions like that, they 

shoot down the UAVs that have been purchased by that mission. 

They threaten some of the monitors. They have denied them access 

to sensitive areas when they are bringing lots of weaponry. So 

OSCE is challenged, but I do not see any alternative right now in 

trying to manage a conflict like in eastern Ukraine. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here this morning. 

Ambassador Vershbow, you talked about the importance of shoring up the European unity, and NATO is clearly one of our ways 

to do that, our support for NATO. Do we think that Europeans or 

NATO members will be concerned when they hear the report that 

came out this morning that Secretary of State Tillerson is going to 

skip the next NATO meeting to head to Russia? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Well, Senator, I think there is some concern about that. I think hopefully there will be other ways for him 

to engage at an early opportunity with his counterparts from the 

NATO countries. Many of them are coming to Washington in a few 

weeks for a counter-ISIS ministerial meeting. But still, I would say 

yes—I am a NATO veteran and NATO junky—that the presence of 

the U.S. Secretary of State, particularly his first opportunity to join 

his counterparts at a ministerial, is something that should not be 

passed up, especially when we face so many challenges. But I think 

the more basic question is consulting first with your allies before 

you engage with the Russians. So hopefully there will be other 

ways that he can do that. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

General Breedlove, actually I think all of you referenced the concern about our nuclear arsenals, both ours and Russia’s, and the 

potential for reducing those arsenals. I thought your idea of a summit was particularly interesting, General Breedlove. 

What kind of message does it send as we are trying to think 

about how we reduce the nuclear threat when we have the President of the United States talking about an arms race and saying, 

‘‘Let it be an arms race,’’ so committing to an arms race against 

Russia? 

34 

General BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, if I could just talk to the basics a 

little bit. Clearly we have a Russia that has built the discussion of 

use of nuclear weapons into its escalate to deescalate doctrine. It 

speaks that often and writes often that nuclear weapons are a logical extension of conventional warfare, things that we would not 

want to be on the table. 

I think the appropriate response from us and our NATO allies 

is to remain creditable and ready and to have the policy in order 

to present a clear affront to those thoughts from Russia. What I 

thought we should do and what we have done I think well in the 

past in NATO is to try to completely convince that we are ready 

to respond if required, and I think that is the policy into the future. 

Senator SHAHEEN. What should we be thinking about in terms 

of Russia’s violations of the INF Treaty? 

General BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, my message on this has not 

changed. We cannot let that go unchallenged. I tell you I have 

great confidence in our new Secretary of Defense and in Joe 

Dunford, who I have worked with before. My guess is that they will 

modify or come out with a new approach. 

But in the past, I think our former Secretary Ash Carter testified 

in front of this committee and laid out a framework, which I completely agreed with. I think that we have not really started down 

that framework, and we either should or allow our new leaders to 

modify and put theirs out. 

But the bottom line is, again, we cannot let bad behavior go unchallenged. This was not done by accident and we need to respond. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I share that view. 

Last December, we had folks testifying in response to what we 

then learned was an emerging story about the Russian cyber attack 

on our elections. One of the points that was made was that Russia 

is looking at not just a military buildup, not just pushing the envelope in eastern Europe in terms of its invasion of Ukraine, but it 

is also looking at a huge propaganda buildup in terms of support 

for RT and its other channels of communication. It is also looking 

at disrupting Western elections as part of a deliberate strategy to 

undermine the West. 

Ambassador Burns, can you comment on that—you were clear 

that you think we ought to respond to Russia’s actions—on what 

else we should be thinking about as we look at the French and German elections upcoming? I am out of time, so maybe you could 

quickly respond. 

Ambassador BURNS. I will be very brief. 

I mean, I absolutely agree with you on the seriousness of not 

only of the Russian hacking of our recent elections, but also what 

is at stake across the European elections this year as well. I think 

this is part of a deliberate strategy on the part of Russia. I think 

we are in the process not only of taking steps ourselves which were 

announced by the last administration, which are important to sustain the investigations to get to the bottom of this remain extremely important. Then I think working with our allies to shore 

up their own capacity to resist this kind of disruption is also very 

important this year. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst. 

35 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being with us today and 

your continued service to our country, as well as your enduring 

commitment to forwarding or advancing our shared interests with 

the people of Europe. I do think that that is very, very important, 

and in the face of the resurgent Russian threat, I think we can all 

agree that America needs your leadership as well and expertise in 

these areas. So thank you for being here. 

I am going to go back just to comment about Ukraine. Congress 

gave the President authority to give lethal assistance to Ukraine, 

and just last month, I joined a number of my Senate colleagues in 

a letter to President Trump asking him to expedite the use of that 

authority. I do think that that is very important. We should honor 

our commitment to Ukraine and utilize lethal assistance to them. 

Now, General Breedlove, we have had a discussion about our initiatives in Europe before. I believe that physical presence is oftentimes the best reassurance, and as part of the European Deterrence Initiative and Operation Atlantic Resolve, Congress authorized $3.4 billion to enhance American presence in the region. If you 

could, just describe to us what types of presence that we might 

need, what certain troop levels, what types of forces. Does that include the National Guard or Reserve, naval forces, et cetera? And 

then also maybe, General, if you could just let me know whether 

you think rotational forces are appropriate or whether we need to 

have a more permanent presence. 

General BREEDLOVE. Thank you, Senator. I could talk a long 

time. I will try to be as brief as I can but get to your questions. The $3.4 billion—and first of all, may I thank this committee and 

others who have worked on these ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] initiatives across the last two years. They are vital. Twenty 

years as the chairman called of hugging the bear. We changed our 

orientation in Europe, and I believe it is now absolutely vital that 

we reevaluate since we do not have that strategic partner that we 

looked to have in the past. 

The $3.4 billion does, as did the previous years, a broad set of 

things from improving infrastructure, financing rotational exercises 

and forces, and actually moving some force to Europe. It is a broad 

approach, and I think that is right and proper because we do need 

to relook at how we can reinforce Europe. We are not in the practice anymore of arriving with ships, transloading rail cars, et 

cetera, and we need to get back to that. 

Ma’am, I have testified in front of this committee before that I 

believe our presence in Europe is not yet appropriate. I used to say 

it is the road through Warsaw not to Warsaw, meaning the agreements that we made in the Warsaw Summit were the next logical 

step but probably not the last step. 

I have also not changed my mind that I believe actual presence, 

permanent presence—— 

Senator ERNST. Permanent presence. 

General BREEDLOVE.—is the best answer. But I believe we are 

realistic in that that may not be a future that we can see. We need 

to have the appropriate balance of permanent forward forces, rotational forces, and prepositioned materials so that we can rapidly reinforce, prepositioned materials that our great Guard and Reserve 

36 

forces can rotate on, et cetera. So I believe it is a balance as the 

way to get to best solution that we can afford and move forward 

with in the future. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. I appreciate that. 

Ambassador Burns, you have stated that we must reassure our 

European allies of our absolute commitment to NATO. I agree with 

that. I also think we need to reassure our non-NATO countries that 

are also good friends to the United States, and that is why I am 

proud of the Iowa State Partnership Program. We are engaged 

with Kosovo. That is why I co-chair the Senate Albanian Issues 

Caucus. 

How else can we reassure countries in the Balkans and 

Caucasus, those who aspire to join NATO, that they have our support? 

Ambassador BURNS. I am sure Ambassador Vershbow can add to 

this as well. But as you well know, there are a number of NATO 

programs already that we work with partner countries, and I think 

it is important to sustain those. 

A lot of this is also just diplomatic attention as well in the 

Caucasus, even as far afield as Central Asia, as well as in the Balkans, the day in/day out effort to pay attention, to be able to sustain assistance programs, not just in the security area but in other 

areas as well, that are a tangible demonstration of our commitment 

to the health of those societies at a moment when, just as you said, 

Senator, I think the Russians are busily trying to undermine prospects for the future of many of those societies. 

Senator ERNST. Ambassador, did you have any further comment? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I agree with that. I think much more 

vigorous diplomatic engagement by the United States is needed because things are unraveling internally in some of the countries, 

Macedonia, Bosnia in particular. The situation between Kosovo and 

Serbia is also deteriorating, and all of this is because the Russians 

are throwing a lot of salt in the wounds and trying to exploit historic tensions and grievances. 

The European Union spends a lot, and they are actively engaged 

diplomatically, but I think the countries in the region still look to 

the U.S. because of our role in ending the wars in the 1990s. I 

think strong United States leadership, working with the Europeans, is essential to hold off the Russian meddling and help countries like Macedonia finally get back on the path of European integration, NATO membership, which they have been struggling with 

for more than a decade and a half. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Warren? 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you for being here today. 

Right now, everybody knows that the American intelligence community has concluded that the Russians conducted successful cyber 

attacks against the United States last year in order to influence 

our election. But people may not know that we are not Russia’s 

only target. A decade ago, some of NATO’s Baltic States also endured cyber attacks, which were believed to have originated in 

Russia. 

37 

Now, in 2014, NATO updated its cyber defense policy to clarify 

that cyber attacks are covered by article 5, NATO’s collective defense clause, meaning an attack on one is viewed as an attack on 

all. But the Alliance has not publicly clarified the threshold at 

which a cyber attack would trigger article 5 or describe any of the 

types of responses that it might employ. 

So, General Breedlove, I want to thank you for your work 

strengthening the NATO alliance. But I want to focus in this particular area. Do you think the Russians are taking advantage of 

NATO’s apparent reluctance to determine when a cyber intrusion 

is an armed attack and to make it clear when we will respond? 

General BREEDLOVE. Senator, thank you for the question, and 

the thrust of your question I think is spot on in that we need to 

better understand and better articulate to the world possibly where 

this all stands. 

I think this is good new/bad news, and I will try to be short. The 

good news is that three days before I started my—or three days 

after I started my term as the SACEUR was the first doctrine 

signed by NATO. So literally in the last three and a half years, we 

have come a long way. Now NATO does have some policy and doctrine and a wonderful center at Talinn, Estonia, if you have not 

been there, to fight this, one of the real capabilities of NATO. That 

is the good news. We have come a long way. 

Senator WARREN. Right, and the bad news? 

General BREEDLOVE. The bad news is there still is, as you have 

correctly pointed out, some definitive things that need to be laid 

out and we are slow getting to those. 

Senator WARREN. Do you want to say a word about what those 

are? 

General BREEDLOVE. Well, ma’am, I have been critical that we do 

not have an offensive policy in NATO. It is completely defensive. 

As a fighter pilot, I think the best offense is a missile in the air 

headed in the other direction. 

Senator WARREN. All right. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

it. 

Russia will undoubtedly continue to use cyber tools to try to 

interfere with and destabilize our NATO allies. If we are ever going 

to deter that behavior, then we need to strengthen the Alliance’s 

capabilities and make clear what our response will be both within 

the NATO alliance and make that clear to the Russians. 

I have one other question I want to ask about, and that is the 

Syrian civil war started six years ago this month, and the humanitarian crisis there has pushed massive numbers of refugees to Europe. I saw some of this up close a couple of years ago when I visited a refugee intake center in Greece and a refugee resettlement 

center in Germany. I met with refugees who had risked their lives 

on long and dangerous journeys from many different countries. 

European countries have struggled to deal with this surge. Thousands of refugees remain stuck in camps and detention centers. 

This is totally unsustainable. 

Ambassador Burns, setting aside the obvious need to try to get 

to the root causes of the crisis, what steps beyond providing for humanitarian aid and supporting maritime search and rescue efforts 

38 

should the United States take to enhance Europe’s efforts to absorb 

refugees and migrants? 

Ambassador BURNS. That is a really difficult question, as you 

know, Senator. I mean, I think just the sheer magnitude of the humanitarian problem is going to require continued expenditure of resources and the resources of our European partners for some time 

to come, and that is where some of the foreign assistance cuts that 

appear in the administration’s budget I think are really, really 

troublesome. 

You are right. The core challenge is to move towards some kind 

of political transition in Syria because of the simple reality that unless the 70 percent of the population of Syria that is Sunni Arab 

feel a stake in their future, Sunni extremist groups, whether it is 

ISIS or some other acronym, are going to have fertile soil in which 

to destabilize Syria and create more human suffering. 

Senator WARREN. So let me ask about that. Is it helpful or harmful if the United States dramatically reduces its admission of refugees and migrants? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think it is undoubtedly harmful, and I am 

entirely aware of the importance of ensuring the security of American citizens in our own society. I am very familiar with the processes that are employed to deal with Syrian refugees. They are as 

strict and comprehensive as any that I have seen. But a lot of this 

has to do with the leadership we demonstrate in the world, and 

when we are moving in a different direction than a lot of our European allies and partners are, it does send a very complicated signal. 

Senator WARREN. I appreciate your point on this because it 

seems to me that for our security, for Europe’s security, and because we are a decent and compassionate people, that we need to 

help Europe manage the huge flow of refugees. But as you say, we 

also need to lead by example here. The United States has always 

been a beacon of hope for people around the world, refugees and 

other troubled groups, and the last thing we should be doing is continuing to push for illegal Muslim bans that betray our values and 

our Constitution and do nothing to keep us safe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Cotton? 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing today and 

for your many years of long service to our country. You have all 

been around the block once or twice in Europe and Russia. 

I know someone else who has been around the block once or 

twice with them is Bob Gates. In his first memoir of his time at 

the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], he writes of the many specific policy questions that, in particular, President Carter and 

President Reagan faced in places like Central America and sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and pushing back against Soviet 

aggression. But he puts as much or more weight on what he refers 

to as the correlation of forces, long-term trends that set the relative 

power of the United States against then the Soviet Union and 

today Russia. 

So he talks, for instance, about Jimmy Carter championing 

human rights within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact which 

undermined the legitimacy of their regimes, his down payment on 

39 

a defense buildup after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and 

in particular, Ronald Reagan’s efforts to rebuild our military to expand our nuclear forces to deploy INF forces to Europe to counteract the Soviet Union’s deployment, then ultimately the strategic defense initiative, which he said kind of culminated all of the trends 

the Soviet leaders had feared for so long, you know, a growing 

Western economy, technological advantages, military strength. 

That, while not the cause of the ultimate downfall of the Soviet 

Union, it was kind of the ultimate symbol of what the Soviet Union 

had feared for so long. 

I would just like to get your thoughts just going down the row 

on how important, on the one hand, those specific bilateral or policy questions are today—you might say Ukraine or Georgia or what 

have you—versus the broader correlation of forces between the 

United States and Russia. General Breedlove? 

General BREEDLOVE. Senator, I will probably disappoint because 

I do not think you can discount either. I think they are both incredibly important. As we talked a little bit about earlier, I think that 

our Nation’s power is not just its military. It is broader than that. 

It is our values, our diplomatic position in the world, the fact that 

we try to get the right message out in our information campaigns. 

We need a strong military, and of course, our economy is incredibly 

important. 

On the strictly military side, I obviously wore the cloth of our 

Nation for 39 years, and I believe that we need to remain strong 

and credible and be seen as strong and credible in the world. I see 

that as a specific line of endeavor in our future. 

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Burns? 

Ambassador BURNS. No. I absolutely agree. I mean, I think leverage is essential in diplomacy especially in dealing with adversarial 

relationships like the United States-Russia relationship. I think 

that is why it is especially important to invest in our alliance system as well because that is what sets us apart from Russia and 

China and other major powers. I think that continued focus on especially our transatlantic alliance is extremely important in that 

correlation of forces. 

Senator COTTON. Ambassador Vershbow? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Just to echo my colleagues, I agree we 

need to look at American power in the broadest sense of the word, 

military, political, economic, and our moral power, the values that 

we represent. 

As Bill Burns just said, having democratic allies who share those 

values and are prepared to share risks with us is a real asset for 

us in countering the Russian threat and other threats around the 

world. So we have to strictly think of the correlation of forces in 

a broad sense and try to use our allies as force multipliers in dealing with threats that we see, particularly the challenge from Russia with all its different dimensions. 

So in that sense, lots of lessons can be drawn from the experience of the late Cold War that you described. Peace through 

strength may be a cliche but it still is valid in today’s world. 

Senator COTTON. To our two Ambassadors, Bob Gates described 

George Shultz and his role in the 1980s, someone who often came 

in for criticism from some of his fellow cabinet members of perhaps 

40 

being too soft or conciliatory towards Russia, even though he supported many of these issues that we have described as the correlation of forces like the deployment of INF forces to Europe but also 

encouraging Reagan and ultimately prevailing upon Reagan to proceed with various sets of talks or negotiations with Russia to maintain open lines of communications. Maybe most notably a few 

weeks after the KAL [Korean Air Lines] 007 shoot-down outside of 

Korea, George Shultz convinced the President that he should go 

forward with consultations in Europe with his Russian counterparts. 

How important is it that we maintain such an open line of communication even while we resist and confront Russia and its aggression throughout Europe and the Middle East? 

Ambassador BURNS. I think it is an essential part of a successful 

strategy. I mean, we need to be tough-minded on issues, just as you 

said, Senator. We need to be mindful of the importance of building 

our leverage, especially through our alliances. But we also ought 

not to be shy about engaging as well and being equally direct in 

those kinds of channels of communication as well so that we are 

managing a relationship that is inevitably going to be complicated. 

We are looking for those areas where we might be able coldbloodedly to cooperate, but we are able to push back in a lot of 

other areas as well. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Absolutely. As difficult as the Russians 

may be and as hostile as they may be in a lot of areas, we have 

to talk to them. We have to try to find ways to persuade them to 

change their policies or offer ways out of some of the impasses that 

we face. 

I think that is why George Shultz was one of the most successful 

Secretaries of State—I had the honor of working with him for a few 

years—because he was very tough when we still needed to be tough 

with the Russians in the early 1980s, but when the changes began 

under Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Shultz recognized there was an opportunity to begin to change the relationship to move away from Cold War confrontation, reduce nuclear 

weapons, and helped President Reagan seize those opportunities. 

So we have to be alert to possible cracks in the facade that Putin 

projects. I personally am skeptical that there are that many opportunities out there, but if we can get past this current Ukraine crisis 

and use United States diplomatic leadership backed by real leverage, including the possibility of lethal assistance to Ukraine, if 

Putin does not play ball, we might be able to kind of get to a better 

place and then begin to rebuild step by step the kind of partnership 

that George Shultz was seeking in the late 1980s under President 

Reagan. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you all. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Peters? 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to each of our panelists for your leadership in this 

area over many years and for the discussion here today. 

In my first question, I want to return back to an issue that has 

been discussed previously related to the cruise missile deployments 

in violation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement, which 

I find very troubling, and from listening to the testimony of all 

41 

three of you, I think all of you agree with that. I think it is interesting and would like to have your comment that while the Russians are moving forward in violation of that treaty, on the one 

hand; on the other hand, when it comes to the START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty, they seem to be in compliance 

there. There is a disconnect between compliance with one treaty 

and another. I am wondering what is behind that. What do you 

think may account for that? 

Actually, General Breedlove, you mentioned the Russian strategy 

to escalate to deescalate, which is a very troubling strategy. Is it 

perhaps related to that as to why they are deploying these cruise 

missiles? 

General BREEDLOVE. I am going to defer, Senator, on the piece 

about the START to my more learned colleagues. 

What I would like to do is maybe address your latter question 

and leave the other for them. 

Senator PETERS. Right. Thank you. 

General BREEDLOVE. I think there are multiple reasons why the 

Russians are fairly blatantly violating the INF. I think they have 

expressed for a long time displeasure with our deployment of missile defense into Europe. There are two sides to every story. While 

I do not agree with their position, I can understand that they believe they have told us and told us and told us, and now they are 

bringing some tougher tools to the table to try to address some of 

those issues. 

Secondarily, I think that they know that this is a very divisive 

discussion inside of NATO, and I agree with my colleagues, who 

have both, I think, said that one of Mr. Putin’s greatest desires is 

to bust up these Western organizations so that he can deal with 

Western nations individually vice with large organizations. So I do 

believe that they have several reasons that they are proceeding on 

the INF, and again, maybe I do not agree with those reasons, but 

we have to understand what they are thinking along those lines. 

Senator PETERS. Ambassadors? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I think it is partly about missile defense 

that the Russians are violating the INF Treaty, but I think it more 

reflects a longstanding grievance that they have had that other 

countries in the world such as China, Pakistan have intermediaterange missiles which could reach Russia, and they have no missile 

of the same capability to deter and respond. It is sort of not a very 

convincing argument because they have their intercontinental systems which can be used in nuclear scenarios against those countries. 

But I think they may also believe they can get away with this 

violation because of the ambiguity of some of the technologies involved and assessing what is the maximum range of a cruise missile compared to its overall weight and payload. So they may think 

that they can get away with cheating, and we cannot let that happen. So I think in terms of responding, we need to kind of first look 

at what is the enhanced threat that we face and find ways to neutralize that threat. It does not mean it is tit for tat. We may not 

need to violate the INF Treaty ourselves. There may be alternative 

systems, both defensive and offensive such as air-launched cruise 

42 

missiles deployed forward in Europe that could neutralize any military gains that the Russians could perceive from this violation. 

But it does not bode well for long-term stability if they are prepared to cheat. The New START agreement is still being complied 

with. Let us hope that they do not violate that one too. 

Ambassador BURNS. Senator, the only thing I would add is on 

your second question about escalate to deescalate, I agree with you 

on the seriousness with which we ought to view that issue because 

if Russian doctrine changes to the point we are faced with a conventional inferiority, you know, they are willing to resort to early 

use of battlefield nuclear weapons, that creates a whole new area 

of potential tension and instability. It is another of the reasons why 

we ought to be engaging with them in what used to be called strategic stability talks, first to try to get to the bottom of what it is 

that they have in mind and then, second, working with our allies 

to be very, very clear and blunt about our concerns about that and 

about the dangers of it. 

Senator PETERS. Given that response, is it reasonable to think 

this weapon actually is more effective in that strategy, which is 

certainly very frightening, to escalate/deescalate? You are more 

likely to use a weapon, this cruise missile, than you would a strategic missile. Is that another reason why they would want to deploy it? 

General BREEDLOVE. Senator, I think that is what they write 

about. It is another step and rung in the ladder of tools that they 

can use. Where we think more in terms of a nuclear threshold, they 

see it as another logical step. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Senator REED [presiding]. On behalf of Chairman McCain, let me 

recognize Senator Sullivan. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you, gentlemen, for not only your testimony 

today but your decades of public service, which I have had the opportunity to witness for a number of years. So it really has been 

exceptional. So I just want to commend you for that and your families, by the way. 

Would you agree that one of the most strategically important advantages we have right now as the United States and have had 

really for generations is that we are an ally-rich nation and our adversaries or potential adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, North 

Korea, are ally-poor? Would you agree that that is a key strategic 

advantage the United States has? 

Ambassador BURNS. Absolutely. I think it is among our greatest 

advantages and has been for decades. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So you look at, like I mentioned, the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans, Iranians. Nobody wants to 

be on their team. Nobody is clamoring to be part of the—as matter 

of fact, they all look to be alliances with themselves just because 

they have so few other countries that are interested in actually 

teaming up with them. 

So is it also true that Russia—I know is the focus of this hearing—but also China see as one of their goals to undermine these 

alliances, split us apart from our key long-term allies? 

Ambassador BURNS. Absolutely. 

43 

Senator SULLIVAN. So I know it is early days in the Trump administration. I think we have a lot of cabinet members who understand this, but what do you think the Trump administration is 

doing right to strengthen alliances and push back on Russian attempts to undermine them, and where can they improve? I will 

open it up for all three of you gentlemen. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Well, Senator, first I would agree that 

we are very much advantaged by having networks of alliances in 

Europe and other parts of the world. The Russians, in particular, 

seem to alienate their neighbors. The only way they feel they can 

keep their neighbors under control is by keeping them weak and 

unstable. So that means in the long term that is a very 

unsustainable way to build relationships. So I think we have a natural advantage and we should not psych ourselves out. 

But it is a little early to make—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. No. It is very early. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW.—broad judgments about the new administration, but after some question marks that were raised about 

whether NATO is obsolete in the mind of President Trump, they 

have, I think, reassured allies that they still value NATO, value 

the transatlantic relationship, recognize that allies are contributing 

in Afghanistan and other operations. 

But I think the jury is still out as to what kind of agenda will 

the Trump administration lay out for NATO. Where does it want 

NATO to evolve and take on new missions, new roles? I think there 

is more we could ask our allies to do through NATO, not just 

spending more money but doing more things to deal with the root 

causes of terrorism, of migration. So I look forward to what that 

agenda is. 

I think sending messages to our east Asian allies. The Mattis 

trip, now the Tillerson trip I think have been very clear that those 

alliances with Korea and Japan will remain high priorities. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Any other? General Breedlove, Ambassador Burns, what they 

can be doing better, what they are doing well now? It is a really 

important issue. Right? It is the key strategic issue. We have this 

great advantage. We need to double down on it not undermine it 

ourselves. 

Ambassador BURNS. We do, and I think the honest answer is 

there is a lot of uncertainty right now on the part of our allies, notwithstanding the efforts of a number of the new cabinet principals 

to emphasize the commitment, but there is uncertainty, given 

things that were said during the campaign by President Trump 

and some of the signals coming out of the White House since then. 

It is really important I think to reassure our allies and partners. 

There are some good opportunities in the next few months with 

meetings in Europe. 

Senator SULLIVAN. We can do that as well here. Right? At the 

U.S. Senate. 

Ambassador BURNS. Absolutely, and I think the more that can be 

done like at the Munich security conference and other places, the 

better. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask another question, just switching 

gears here, on the Arctic. You know, General Breedlove, you were 

44 

very aware and watched as the Russians engage in this massive 

military buildup in the Arctic. Many of us I think in a bipartisan 

way on this committee certainly were concerned that we did not 

have a strategy. We put in a provision in the NDAA two years ago 

to actually have a strategy. It is a little better than the lack of one 

that we previously had. We really did not have one. 

General Mattis, in his confirmation hearing, has talked about the 

Arctic being key, strategic terrain, sea lanes, resources, and that 

Russia is aggressively taking action. In the new strategy, it talks 

about the importance of protecting sea lanes, resources through 

freedom of navigation operations, kind of like we have done in the 

South China Sea although not nearly enough. 

General Breedlove, can you comment on this? More specifically, 

if Russia decided to deny access to vital United States resources in 

the region or international sea lanes, shipping lanes in the Arctic, 

do we have any capability whatsoever to conduct a surface FONOP 

[Freedom of Navigation Exercises] to challenge that? What should 

we be doing about that? 

General BREEDLOVE. Senator, thank you. I understand the question. Let me just reframe a minute. 

We ought to try to make the Arctic an opportunity. We are early 

in this conversation. We ought to make it an opportunity and not 

a place of competition. But we need to, with a very wary eye, look 

at the actions that you have mentioned that Russia is taking in the 

north. Our abilities as are other nations’ and, frankly, Russia’s 

abilities to operate in the north are still challenging. This is a 

tough place to be. But what we do see as a Russia moving out to 

establish capability there—that could be used appropriately or nefariously. I believe this and I have spoken before that we need to 

look at our capabilities. Are they deep? Do we have the right ones? 

I think there is work to be done there. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Can we conduct a FONOP there? Is the answer not no? It is not even close. 

General BREEDLOVE. If I understand, I think we can but realizing that we would have to be there at the right time of the year 

and the right time of conditions. We do not have some of the capabilities we need to operate up there when the ice is challenging. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator King? 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Breedlove, in your testimony, you touched upon a question that I think is of surpassing importance in the situation that 

we are in now. This discussion today has been about high-level 

strategy and deployment and those kinds of things. You mentioned 

the danger of confusion, misunderstanding, and accidental war. I 

think one of the most profound books about foreign policy, which 

I recently reread, is ‘‘The Guns of August.’’ We stumbled into World 

War I. I think every policymaker should read that book. It is eerily 

prescient of the situation we are in now. 

Number one—and Senator Cotton mentioned this—it seems to 

me that given the danger of a Russian pilot inadvertently hitting 

a ship instead of buzzing it or a Chinese pilot in the South China 

Sea doing the same and the escalation from there, to me that cries 

out for better communication and open lines. My understanding is 

45 

that that has somewhat diminished both on the military-to-military 

level and at the highest level. Your thoughts? Any of you? General 

Breedlove? 

General BREEDLOVE. May I modify the scenario and tell you 

what worries me? I really believe the pilots are good enough not 

to hit one of our aircraft. I am often asked about this scenario. 

What worries me and what worries others are in one of these flybys, if the Russian aircraft just simply has a mechanical malfunction and hits the water, what is going to happen? Are we going to 

be blamed? Will be used as a simple tool to create a catastrophe, 

et cetera, et cetera? Frankly, our Aegis cruisers and destroyers are 

very capable of defending themselves against Russian aircraft. I do 

not worry about that piece. But I worry about the accident that 

then escalates into something wholly unintended. 

Senator KING. Exactly. Is it not critical in that piece to have open 

lines of communications? 

General BREEDLOVE. Sir, we do have some but they are not adequate. We still have what we call INCSEA, incidents at sea, which 

actually have expanded to incidents at sea, land, and air in some 

of those conversations. We have mechanisms, but I believe we need 

to be more aggressive about those conversations so we do not stumble. 

Senator KING. Let me turn it just slightly. One of the problems 

is that what we view as defensive, the other side can view as provocative, and how you hit the right point—in other words, stationing troops in Poland, moving equipment into preposition in 

Eastern Europe. We view that as defensive. Is it possible that that 

could lead to an escalation if the Russians view that as an aggressive act? I am trying to think through the scenarios here that could 

lead to a dangerous result. 

Ambassador Burns, your thoughts. 

Ambassador BURNS. I think your question is a very important 

one, Senator. I think there is a real risk in letting channels of communication atrophy. They are not a favor to the Russians to be able 

to communicate at all sorts of different levels, whether it is military-to-military, as General Breedlove described, or at diplomatic 

levels or at higher levels as well. I think there is a cold-blooded 

self-interest in trying to ensure that we understand one another 

clearly. It does not mean that we are going to overcome Russian 

concerns about what they might see to be the aggressive intent of 

some of our deployments. But at least I think we will have a little 

bit clearer understanding and we will be able to avoid some of 

what could be inadvertent collisions, whether physical or political. 

Senator KING. Let me talk a bit about what I call the cheap war, 

the war that has been waged over the last several years, the last 

election here, now in France, now in Germany. I did a quick calculation. For the price of one F–35, the Russians can deploy 4,000 

hackers and trolls, and they have been remarkably successful at a 

very low price. 

Ambassador Vershbow, your thoughts about what I consider really a new form of warfare that is unfolding in front of our eyes. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I absolutely agree. I call it political aggression rather than military aggression against our societies, and 

it is a lot cheaper than waging war. They probably could buy more 

46 

than 4,000 hackers with the price of an F–35. So we cannot sort 

of count on the Russians depleting their resources through their 

aggressive behavior the way they did in the Cold War. 

Senator KING. The arms race economics does not work in this situation. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. No. We need, first of all, to make sure 

that we can deny them the ability to do it as effectively as they did 

during our election in terms of hardening our systems, being more 

vigilant about fake news, taking down the false stories quickly before they go viral. 

Senator KING. But all of those are defensive. I am running out 

of time, but we need a cyber doctrine in connection with our Western allies that involves an offensive capability as well, do we not? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. Well, we may not want to do an exact 

tit for tat in this field, but it would be more aggressive than pushing our values, pushing our narrative because Putin is worried 

about a democratic alternative gaining ground again in Russia. I 

do not think we should give up on our support for civil society, for 

independent media, supporting emigre media sites that try to push 

objective information into Russia, this new current time channel 

that the Broadcasting Board of Governors is launching to affect the 

opinions of Russian speakers both in Russia and on the borderlands. All these things are very important to show that we are not 

going to fail to compete in this political battle. 

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine? 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to all the witnesses for your testimony. 

Beginning in 2015, General Dunford, as the head of the Joint 

Chiefs, in appearances before this committee started to say and he 

said on multiple occasions now that among nation-states in the 

world, Russia is our biggest—he has used the phrase ‘‘adversary,’’ 

‘‘headache,’’ ‘‘what keeps him up at night,’’ ‘‘threat’’ in terms of its 

military, both capacity and intent to use its power. 

Did any of you disagree with that conclusion? 

General BREEDLOVE. I certainly do not, and it has been my testimony in front of this committee before. 

Ambassador BURNS. No. I think Russia has demonstrated since 

2015 it is a pretty big headache. I mean, we have got no shortage 

of other headaches in the world, but it has lived up to that form. 

Senator KAINE. Ambassador? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I agree as well. Its ability to kind of 

overturn the whole international order puts it in a class by itself 

in terms of the nature of the threat. 

Senator KAINE. Are any of you aware in the world right now of 

a nation-state that is doing more to destabilize and interfere with 

other nations’ internal political affairs than Russia? No? 

Given Russian physical presence in Georgia and the Ukraine, are 

you aware of any other nation in the world right now that has been 

more willing to incur into the physical sovereignty of another nation? Is there a bigger violator of incursions into physical sovereignty in the world right now than Russia? No. 

47 

With respect to the election issue, I was in Europe recently and 

was asked a series of kind of challenging questions along this line, 

and I would like your thoughts on it. If the U.S. will not act to defend itself from an election cyber attack, we know you will not act 

to defend us. There was a great deal of skepticism about what the 

U.S. would do to help any other nation under a similar threat because of a perception that we did not act in real time to stop a 

cyber attack of our election. As of yet, there has been no particular 

consequence of it. Do you think that would be a reasonable concern 

that others would have if they do not see us acting to protect ourselves, that they would be deeply skeptical that we would act to 

protect them? 

Ambassador BURNS. I do, Senator. I mean, in the face of what 

has been a truly serious assault on our democratic system, I think 

it is absolutely essential that we not only recognize the severity of 

the problem but respond to it with the fullest possible investigation 

and then work with our allies, having demonstrated our own realization of the concern, to help them strengthen their defenses as 

well. 

Senator KAINE. Finally, here is a question that I want to ask you 

that is really about sort of the psychology of dealing with Russia 

because I have a much higher confidence in my own opinions about 

our actions in other parts of the world, the Middle East and Arab 

North Africa, Latin America, and not so much about Russia. 

There are currently some discussions about possibly engaging in 

greater oil diplomacy with Russia. So the sanctions after Ukraine, 

for example, have limited joint ventures between American companies and Russia on oil issues. But there are some questions about 

whether we should potentially do that in the Arctic or elsewhere, 

should we not allow joint ventures and cooperation with Russia 

that we are not currently doing. 

If we were to do that, tell me what your opinion would be. Would 

that make Russia like the United States better, or would they simply use any additional assets that they get from that to continue 

on the path they are on, including the common path of companies 

that are resource-rich? Those resources often deepen corruption, 

deepen oligarchy rather than really help domestic economic satisfaction. 

Ambassador BURNS. I will start, Senator. No. I think in my experience, the Russians unsentimental about issues like this. So it is 

not necessarily going to make the current Russia regime like the 

United States more. I think it is really important, as Ambassador 

Vershbow said before, to sustain the sanctions which restrict a lot 

of those activities until we see full implementation of the Minsk 

Agreement because I do think movement on Ukraine is really crucial here. 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I agree with that. The Russians will still 

pursue their interests very aggressively and using energy as a leverage. But those are among the most important sanctions imposed 

after the aggression against Ukraine. So they should be kept in 

place until we see real change on the ground. But then when conditions are met, we should lift them, but there is a long way to go 

before the Russians convince me that they are going to restore sovereignty in Ukraine. 

48 

Senator KAINE. General Breedlove? 

General BREEDLOVE. Real change needs to be evident. Reestablishing trust—we have none now. I think those are key. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, 

Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses for their testimony 

today. 

Oh, Senator Shaheen, I apologize. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one 

more question, and this is probably for all of you or whoever would 

like to answer. 

Everyone I think has alluded to Russia’s propaganda efforts, the 

amount of money they are spending on RT [Russia Today], on 

Sputnik, on other media outlets. It is something that I have been 

concerned about and actually filed legislation that would change 

the way FARA [Foreign Agents Registration Act] operates to look 

at whether they are trying to circumvent our legislation and not 

registering. I think probably I hit a nerve because there has been 

an interesting response in Russia to that legislation. 

But can you talk about how much we should be concerned about 

this propaganda arm? I was interested, Ambassador Vershbow, in 

your suggestion that NATO ought to be looking at responding to 

some of the Russian propaganda in a different way. So how much 

of a piece of what Russia is trying to do is this, and what should 

we be doing in response to it? 

General BREEDLOVE. I will start with just a short remark. I 

think it was surprising to me how little the Western world talked 

about what quietly happened here about ten days ago where Russia established an information warfare division of their military 

and beginning to funnel an even more military approach to how 

they do this. While it is a cheap war—we used those words earlier—they are putting a lot of money into this. Senator, I think this 

is something we need to be very attentive to. 

I agree with something that was said earlier. We cannot go tit 

for tat. Right after the MH–17 shoot-down, they put four stories 

out on the street within two news cycle that it took us two years 

to debunk. We cannot respond tit for tat. What we need to do is 

get our troops, our values, and our lines out there in an aggressive 

way so that the world can see the other side of the story. 

I am sorry for taking your time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. No. Thank you. 

Ambassador Burns, do you have anything to add to that? 

Ambassador BURNS. No. I absolutely agree, and I think working 

with our NATO and EU partners is absolutely essential. We have 

a much stronger voice when we are part of a chorus on these issues 

than when we are doing it solo. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ambassador Vershbow? 

Ambassador VERSHBOW. I agree with my colleagues. I think we 

should not overestimate the audience that RT really has, but I am 

more worried about the ability to manipulate social media with 

trolls, with bots, and getting these fake stories into millions of people’s inboxes before we even know what is going on. At the same 

time, we have to stay consistent with our own values about free 

speech and diversity of opinion in the media, but call them out on 

49 

shoddy journalistic standards, manipulation of truth into fake 

news. If there are legal issues, I am not competent to evaluate 

whether they are skirting the Foreign Agent Registration Act, but 

we should look closely at that because it is, as we all know, an arm 

of the Russian Government de facto if not de jure. 

But the allies and our European Union partners are in some 

ways more vulnerable to all this with Russian minorities in many 

countries, traditional sympathies towards Russia, inclining people 

to look to Russian media rather than to the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] or other sources. So it is a collective challenge, 

and I think working with our allies and partners, we can better 

meet that challenge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree. It is something I have heard 

everywhere I have been in Eastern Europe, concern about that 

kind of propaganda. So thank you all very much. 

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses for their testimony 

today and for their years of outstanding service to our Nation. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Just a brief comment. We have talked about the 

doctrine of escalate to deescalate. It seems to me to be not only irrational but insane. You typically escalate in response to your opponent to defeat them, though escalate not to deescalate but escalate to defeat might be the real reality. I just wanted to make that 

point. I see heads nodding. I do not need a response, but I think 

there is agreement. 

Chairman MCCAIN. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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