1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STANLEY A. SANSONE ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1: 23

- cv
- 02470 ( UNA ) ) UNITED STATES PATENT ) AND TRADEMARK OFFICE , et al ., ) ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the C ourt on its initial review of P laintiff’s pro se complaint , ECF No. 1, amended complaint, ECF No. 3, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis , ECF No. 2. The C ourt will grant the in forma pauperis application an d dismiss the case for the reasons explained below. Plaintiff, a resident of Houston, Texas, has filed a complaint against the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the USPTO’s Director. He seeks reexamination of

a final decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) that affirm ed the USPTO’s denial
of Pl aintiff’s petition seeking patentability on his invention

. He also seeks damages arising from
that denial

. First, this C ourt lacks jurisdiction over P laintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has two available

avenues to challenge a PTAB decision ; he may either appeal the decision directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. § 141, or he may file a civil action to obtain a patent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , under 35 U.S.C. § 145. P laintiff has no recourse in this C ourt.2

Second, t o the extent that P laintiff seeks damages, he has failed t o state a claim. Plaintiff fundamentally predicates his claim for damages on criminal statutes, namely, 18 U.S.C. § § 241

– 242, 2387

. H owever , bare federal criminal statutes , such as those, “have no corresponding private right of action.” Wiggins v. Philip M orris, Inc ., 853 F. Supp. 458, 466 (D.D.C. 1994) (collecting cases) ; see Crosby v. Catret , 308 Fed. Appx. 453, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (no private right of action under §§ 241

– 242); Johnson v. D.C. Crim. Just. Act , 305 Fed. Appx. 662 , 662 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (same); Brooks v. Army 1 st Operations Comm ., No. 23

- cv
- 00189 , 2023
WL 1963891 , at 1 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2023) (same) (collecting cases); Mirarchi v. Exec. Branch of
Gov’t , 2023 WL 5598454 , at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023) (no private right of action under § 2387) (collecting cases including Barrett v. Biden , No. 22

- 2823, 2022 WL 16528195, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2022) ; Prunte v. Univ

. Music Gr p. , 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) ). Even if those

statutes provided a cause of action, they bear no relevance to the facts giving rise to this case. Finally, P laintiff broadly alleges that the USP TO violated his due process rights under the
14 th Amendment by repeatedly rejecting his appli cation, which he contends contravenes the

“ special status ” originally afforded his application by the agency. Put simply, P laintiff fails to articulate adequately the dep rivation of a protected right. “ Events may not have unfolded as
Plaintiff wished, but his dissatis faction . . . [does] not form a basis for a due process violation. ” Melton v. District of Columbia , 85 F. Supp. 3d 183 , 193 (D.D.C. 2015). “[F]ederal court jurisdiction must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly. The mere sug gestion of a federal question is not sufficient to establish the j urisdiction of federal courts.” Johnson v. Robinson , 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan , 904 F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam) ). Moreover, the Fourteenth Amen d ment does n ot apply to federal government, its agencies, or i ts officials. See Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).3

For all of these reasons , this case will be dismissed without prejudice

. A separate order accompanies this memorandum o pinion.

Date: O c tober 25 , 2023

__________ _________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge