Aerospace Power in the

Twenty-First Century

A Basic Primer

Clayton K. S. Chun

United States Air Force Academy

in cooperation with

Air University Press

Colorado Springs, Colorado

and

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

July 2001
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chun, Clayton K. S.

 Aerospace power in the twenty-first century : a basic primer / Clayton K.S. Chun

 p. cm.

 Includes index.

 ISBN 1-58566-091-4

 1. Air power. 2. Space warfare. 3. Air power—History—20th century. 4. Astronautics,

 Military. 5. United States. Air Force. 6. Military doctrine—United States. I. Title.

UG630 .C52 2001

358.4’00973—dc21

200103410

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of th

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force Academy, th

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleare

for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Contents

Chapter Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

1 Aerospace Concepts and Definitions . . . . . . 

Aerospace Power Defined . . . . . . . . . . . 

Characteristics of Aerospace Power . . . . . 

Aerospace Power in War . . . . . . . . . . . 1

What Aerospace Forces Can Accomplish . . . 2

The Aerospace Environment . . . . . . . . . 2

Aerospace Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 Aerospace Power Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What Is Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

What Should Aerospace Power Theory Do? . . 3

Giulio Douhet: The First Airpower Theorist . . 3

Billy Mitchell: America’s First Airpower

 Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Sir Hugh Trenchard: An Independent

 Air Force for Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Jack Slessor: Support for Ground Forces . . . 5

Claire Chennault:

 Pursuit-Aviation Enthusiast . . . . . . . . 5

William A. Moffett: Father of Naval Aviation . . 5

Alexander P. de Seversky:

 Airpower Advocate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

John Warden: The Five-Ring Model . . . . . 6

Space Power Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

iii
Chapter Pag

3 Functions and Capabilities of Aerospace Power:

Air and Space Superiority/Strategic Attack . . . 7

Air and Space Superiority: The First

Order of Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 The Battle of Britain: The Luftwaffe’s 

 Failure to Control the Skies . . . . . . 7

 Total Air Domination: The Six-Day War . . . 8

 Air Superiority and Operation Overlord . . 9

Defeating the Enemy through

Strategic Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 Japan ’s Hawaii Operation . . . . . . . . . 10

 Slamming Saddam: Operation

 Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 The Eighth Air Force in the Combined

 Bomber Offensive, 1943–45 . . . . . . 11

4 Functions and Capabilities of Aerospace Power: 

Interdiction/Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . 13

Interdiction: Striking the Enemy

Before He Can Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 Operation Strangle: Korea, 1951 . . . . . 13

 The Easter Offensive: Airpower 

 Halts the North Vietnamese . . . . . . 13

 Interdiction at Sea: The Battle

 of the Bismarck Sea . . . . . . . . . . 14

Supporting the Troops with

Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Airpower Fails at Kasserine Pass . . . . . . 15

 Gunships for Close Air

 Support in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 Close Air Support in the Korean War:

 A Navy and Marine Corps View . . . . . 16

5 Functions and Capabilities of Aerospace Power:

Rapid Mobility/Space and Information . . . . . 17

Mobility Operations: Moving Manpower,

Munitions, and Machines . . . . . . . . . . 17

 Failure at Stalingrad: Air Supply Falls Flat . . 17

iv
Chapter Pag

 Transporting an Army:

 Operation Desert Shield . . . . . . . . . 18

 Airlift Saves Berlin: Operation Vittles . . . 19

Space and Information:

The Enabler of Operations . . . . . . . . . . 19

 Finding a Needle in a Haystack:

 The Great Scud Hunt . . . . . . . . . . 19

 Corona: The First

 Space-Reconnaissance System . . . . . 20

 Information Averts a

 Nuclear Showdown: Cuba, 1962 . . . . 21

6 Functions and Capabilities of Aerospace Power: 

Airpower Unleashed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

At the End of Empire: The 1982

 Falklands War in the Air . . . . . . . . . . 22

Eighty-Five to Zero: Israel’s

 Bekaa Valley Campaign . . . . . . . . . . 24

Stopping the Luftwaffe Cold: The Soviet

 Tactical Air Effort in World War II . . . . . 25

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

7 Planning for Aerospace Operations . . . . . . 26

Air Campaign Planning Concepts . . . . . . 26

A Framework for Air Campaign Planning . . . 27

Researching the Combat Environment . . . . 27

Determining Air and Space Objectives . . . . 27

Determining Centers of Gravity . . . . . . . 27

Determining Air and Space Strategy . . . . . 27

Putting the Campaign Together . . . . . . . 27

Air Campaign Planning Concerns . . . . . . 27

Air Campaign Planning:

 National Implications . . . . . . . . . . . 28

8 Taking Off into the Wild Blue Yonder . . . . . . 28

Strategic or Ground-Operations Support? . . 29

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and

 the Future of Aerial Warfare . . . . . . . . 29

v
Chapter Pag

The Advancement of Space Forces:

 An Independent Force? . . . . . . . . . . 29

Building a Mobile Force . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Information: The Key to Victory . . . . . . . 30

Technological Solutions for an

 Unknown World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Fighting Jointly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Illustrations

Figure

1 Warden’s Basic Five-Ring

Model Used in Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3 Overlord Theater of Operations . . . . . . . . . 9

4 Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

5 Desert Storm Theater of Operations . . . . . . 10

6 Korean Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

7 New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

8 Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

9 Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

10 The Eastern Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

11 Berlin Airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

12 Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

vi
Figure Pag

13 Argentina and the Falkland Islands

 (Islas Malvinas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

14 West Falkland and East Falkland . . . . . . . 22

15 Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley . . . . . . . . . 24

Photo

C-5 cargo aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Global Positioning System satellite . . . . . . . . . . 

C-17 enhances global mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Peacekeeper ICBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tomahawk cruise missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Titan III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B-17 destroyed at Hickam Field . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B-17 bombing a ball-bearing plant . . . . . . . . . . 1

P-47s in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Aircraft provide a wide variety of capabilities . . . . . . 1

Air Force B-66 Destroyer leads

F-105 Thunderchiefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Destroyed MiG-25 during Operation 

Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

F-15 air superiority fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Minuteman III ICBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Precision-guided attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Navy F-18s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Logistics is one of the keys to airpower . . . . . . . . . 3

vii
Photo Pag

World War I German aviator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Trench warfare in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Destroyed German city in World War II . . . . . . . . 4

Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Carrier aviation supports operations

in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Eddie Rickenbacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bombing of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

MiG-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

American troops invade Normandy . . . . . . . . . . 9

Air raid Pearl Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

USS Arizona burning at Pearl Harbor . . . . . . . . . 10

Army Apache attack helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Cruise missile launched from a B-52 . . . . . . . . . 11

F-111 strike aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

F-117 aircraft over Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Destroyed Scud missile storage facilities . . . . . . . . 11

Destroyed Iraqi aircraft shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

B-17 bomber attacks Focke-Wulf plant . . . . . . . . 12

Adolph Hitler inspects bomb damage . . . . . . . . . 12

US Navy fighter in the Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . 13

B-29 bombers over Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

F-4E fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

viii
Photo Pag

A-10s providing CAS in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

AC-47 gunship in the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . 16

CAS from Navy Corsairs in the Korean War . . . . . . 16

Air mobility in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

German forces in the Soviet Union

in World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Civilian airliners support deployment

of troops in Operation Desert Shield . . . . . . . . . . 18

C-47s provide invaluable service during Berlin airlift . . . 19

Scud missile that failed to reach its target . . . . . . . 19

Defense Support Program satellite . . . . . . . . . . 20

Patriot missile battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

F-15E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Minuteman ICBM force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Nuclear warhead bunker at

San Cristóbal, Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

HMS Broadsword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

F-16s providing air superiority . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

B-29 bombers destroy Chosen oil refinery . . . . . . . 26

AWACS aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Damage from air interdiction mission . . . . . . . . . 28

B-2 refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Predator UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

ix
Photo Pag

Communications satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

C-17s transport combat equipment

and personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Space power in the field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

B-2 Spirit bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

x
Foreword

Developing future aerospace leaders is the key to ensurin

the national security of the country. Such development i

based on a firm understanding of the theory, principles

and applications of aerospace power. Without thi

foundation, aerospace and military leaders would have 

difficult time deploying and using air and space forces in

today’s dynamic world. With the end of the Cold War, th

United States military has been challenged by a series o

world events that have forced aerospace leaders to apply ai

and space power in many innovative ways. They have ha

to focus on and question many previously held belief

about air and space power. Future leaders will need to b

well grounded in the capabilities and limitations o

aerospace power to envision how to plan, operate, an

build aerospace capabilities.

Dr. Chun’s Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century

A Basic Primer is a great start towards understanding th

importance of aerospace power and its ability to conduc

modern warfare. Aerospace power is continually changin

because of new technology, threats, and air and spac

theories. However, many basic principles about aerospac

power have stood the test of time and warfare. This boo

provides the reader with many of these time-tested idea

for consideration and reflection. Although Aerospace Powe

in the Twenty-First Century was written for future officers

individuals desiring a broad overview of aerospace powe

are invited to read, share, and discuss many of the idea

and thoughts presented here. Officers from other service

will find that this introduction to air and space forces wil

give them a good grasp of aerospace power. More experience

aerospace leaders can use this book to revisit many of the issue

that have affected air and space forces in the past and tha

might affect them in the future. Air Force officers wil

discover that Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century

xi
is a very timely and reflective resource for their professiona

libraries.

JOHN R. DALLAGER, Lieutenant Genera

Superintendent

United States Air Force Academy

xii
About the Author

Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun, a 1978

graduate of the University of California,

Berkeley, holds an MA in economics from

the University of California, Santa

Barbara; an MS in systems management

from the University of Southern

California; and a PhD in public policy

analysis from the RAND Graduate

School. He is professor of economics at

the United States Army War College,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where

he is an instructor for the Department of

National Security and Strategy, teaching

“War, National Policy, and Strategy” and courses on nationa

security economics. He successfully completed a career as a

Air Force officer, having held several staff and comman

positions with the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, th

Air Staff, Air University’s School of Advanced Airpowe

Studies, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, as well as space an

missile assignments. In his last assignment, Dr. Chun held

positions as deputy group commander of the 34th Education

Group and commander of the 34th Education Squadron at th

United States Air Force Academy.

Clayton K. S. Chun

xiii
Preface

Addressed either to the novice or any individual who want

to understand the rudimentary aspects of aerospace power

this book exposes readers to relevant aerospace capabilities

theories, applications, operational planning, and key issues

Theories and applications of aerospace power are not limited

to the United States Air Force but apply to aerospace forces in

general. Although the Air Force has forces and capabilitie

that include a very wide range of activities, other air and spac

forces reflect several of these same capabilities and many uniqu

ones. Understanding how these forces operate can help both

students who are new to aerospace power and individuals familia

with ground and maritime forces appreciate the strengths an

weaknesses of air and space forces.

The book introduces the reader to definitions and concept

of aerospace power. Material in chapter 1 provides a set o

definitions, characteristics, and concepts for readers. Aerospac

power is defined in terms of how it contributes to the successfu

conduct of war through an evaluation of its ability to operat

under a set of principles of war. A discussion of the environmen

and elements of aerospace power concludes the chapter.

Chapter 2 gives the reader a survey of major air and spac

theories. A study of any academic subject calls for a good

theoretical foundation to explain and predict actions. Divers

theories address the application of aerospace power. Some o

them view airpower as a force that can replace other militar

capabilities. Some stress the integration of airpower into existin

forces, while others maintain that air and space assets should

provide greater support to other forces. Several theories wer

written just after the introduction of the airplane. Others ar

more contemporary views that look at airpower and spac

power through the prism of experience gained from conflict

and advancements in capabilities that illustrate the value o

air and space systems. Theory provides a forum to debat

many issues. How one defines the use, organization, an

structure of military forces frequently depends upon leadership’

xv
beliefs and theories. A solid grounding in aerospace theor

provides a good start for understanding the use of aircraft an

space systems.

With a grounding in theory, a student can then consider th

application of aerospace power. Chapters 3–6 concentrate on

aerospace power’s functions and capabilities, which have bee

tested in war and peace. These chapters explain each function

and then provide three short case studies for illustration

discussion, and further study. Instead of looking only a

successes, the chapters also include failed efforts. Instructor

using this text may wish to compare a failure to a success

Studying failures often allows students to evaluate why action

were not successful and to ponder what they could have don

to correct the situation. These case studies allow for a discussion

of the issues and problems that each commander faces in

achieving certain goals or confronting particular situations.

Instructors can use the case studies to stimulate discussion

or to allow students to make their own evaluations. Further, 

do not mean to imply that these studies represent the onl

examples of aerospace functions. To give the reader a mor

encompassing view of aerospace power, they include experience

from sister services and foreign military services. Instructor

may wish to use contemporary case studies or issues t

supplement or replace the ones provided to illustrate issue

facing current aerospace forces. In the future, I hope to revis

the studies to include more humanitarian missions and othe

deployments throughout the world.

Learning about the capabilities of aerospace forces i

important, but students should also have some acquaintanc

with a frequently ignored aspect of aerospace power—ai

campaign planning. Chapter 7 concentrates on the process o

planning for the appropriate use of aerospace power—one o

the most important responsibilities of a military commander

Readers may not require exposure to such planning in grea

detail, but acquiring a general knowledge of the deployment o

air and space forces can help shape their thoughts on objective

conditions, and alternative solutions. Instructors and student

might use this rudimentary focus on planning to evaluate th

previous chapters’ case studies in terms of how they may hav

xvi
avoided failure or improved the application and operation o

air or space forces.

Chapter 8 discusses some key issues that aerospace leader

face today and will face in the future. Many of them involv

new technology and innovation. Aerospace power was buil

and thrives upon advanced technology, which, together wit

the process of innovation, allows air and space forces to creat

new options and opportunities to enhance capabilities or solv

problems. New war-fighting capabilities, organizations

relationships with other military forces, and additional issue

depend upon advanced technology and the way aerospac

leaders handle its application.

Gaining a good understanding of aerospace power theory

doctrine, and strategy requires a continual review of curren

events. Unfortunately, many books and articles on aerospac

power assume the reader already has knowledge about thes

issues and concepts. If the development of aerospace and join

leaders is to improve, candidates in precommissioning agencies

as well as new and junior officers, need a firm foundation in th

principles and theories of aerospace power. My goal in preparin

this text is to provide this basic knowledge. These few chapter

should give readers a general understanding of the primar

missions and capabilities of aerospace power.

Preparing this text has been a career-long objective. To

many times I have seen Air Force officers view themselves onl

as technicians or specialists, not as Air Force officers. I strongly

believe that the service and nation deserve more; however, Ai

Force officers need to be airpower and space powe

advocates—not zealots. Becoming proficient in one’s chose

career field or specialty is admirable and necessary. Indeed, t

become true military professionals and to become the mos

effective aerospace and joint team members and future leaders

officers must understand the strengths and weaknesses o

applying air and space forces. This knowledge can only improv

their ability to lead and make decisions in their specialties. Thi

concern is exacerbated by the present trend towards reduced

resources and increased deployments.

I wish to thank several individuals and organizations fo

supporting me in this effort. Fellow members of the 34th

Education Group and 34th Education Squadron at the United

xvii
States Air Force Academy helped motivate me in preparin

and writing this book. In particular I want to express m

thanks to Col Thomas A. Drohan, Dr. Charles Krupnick, Ms

Delores Karolick, Lt Col John R. Higgs, Maj Larry Walker, an

many others. Additionally, Dr. Dan Mortensen of Air University’

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education inspired

and encouraged me to complete this work over the years

Special thanks go to the staff of the Department of Defens

Media Center at March Air Reserve Base, California, for th

photographs that richly illustrate the subjects discussed. Finally

I would like to thank Dr. Marvin Bassett and the fine staff a

Air University Press for making this book a reality. The research

grant that I received—the McDermott Award for Researc

Excellence at the United States Air Force Academy—provide

financial support. My family, however, is the real inspiration

for completing this primer. My wife Cheryl and sons Dougla

and Raymond patiently endured many missed weekends an

evenings as I researched and wrote on airpower and spac

power. I could not have completed this project without thei

support.

CLAYTON K. S. CHUN

US Army War College

Carlisle, Pennsylvania

xviii
Chapter 1

Aerospace Concepts and Definitions

Aerospace power means several things to many people. Som

military members might identify aircraft with aerospace power

Others might see aerospace power as the integration of air

craft and space systems. Aerospace power is a relative new

comer to warfare compared to land or naval power. However

nations have used aircraft for military and commercial pur

poses over the past 100 years. This is only a small slice in th

history of warfare compared to land and naval warfare. Aero

space power has dramatically changed over the years and ha

produced several distinct capabilities that have changed th

face of warfare. Future aerospace leaders require a solid foun

dation or understanding of the purpose, characteristics, the

ory, and functions of air and space power to effectively emplo

aerospace power in war. Before one can study this dynami

subject, one needs to understand some basic definitions, con

cepts, and beliefs regarding aerospace power.

Aerospace Power Defined

Over the past century, aircraft have been used in modern

military operations ranging from global war to peacekeeping

This wide capability has led to much discussion among advo

cates and critics of aerospace power. Defining aerospace powe

over the last few years has been a challenge for large land

based air forces as well as smaller forces. The rapid growth in

air and space technology has added more capabilities to ai

and space forces over the years. Supersonic speeds, stealth

capability, and rapid mobility are a few of the many capabili

ties incorporated into airpower in the past. Space system

have also shown their worth with their ability to enhanc

terrestrial events involving communications, weather, naviga 

tion, early warning, and intelligence, as well as their ability t

provide other key information for a war fighter. The concept o

“information warfare” and its ties to space systems and mod 

1
ern information technology is also changing the face of aero

space power.

Modern aerospace power includes many functions and ca

pabilities. A definition of aerospace power will help frame th

discussion of this elusive subject and give the reader a foun

dation to address many of the timely and timeless issue

facing students of air and space power theory, doctrine, strat

egy, and operations. Aerospace power includes air, space, an

the integration of air and space power. Operations in air an

space have led to many discussions about the resources, value

strategies, and ideas about the newest form of warfare. Peopl

who have attempted to write a definition of airpower through

the years have wrestled with making it an all-inclusive ye

succinct expression for this continually evolving concept. In

1925 William “Billy” Mitchell, an early advocate of aerial bom

bardment, gave one of the earliest definitions of airpower: “th

ability to do something in or through the air, and as the ai

covers the whole world, aircraft are able to go anywhere on th

planet.”1 The “ability to do something” brings to mind a strengt

or power to influence events. Mitchell’s definition makes n

distinction between military and civilian exploitation of th

air. Other definitions are more focused on military operation

and the distinction of the type of object that travels or ma

C-5 cargo aircraft can provide combat or humanitarian missions on short notice.

2
nipulates air operations. For example, the Royal Air Forc

(RAF) defines airpower as “the use, or denial of the use, of th

air or space for military purposes, by or to vehicles capable o

sustained and controlled flight beyond the area and the rang

of the immediate surface conflict.”2 This view provides a mor

distinct definition of airpower’s limits and capabilities. Th

RAF’s airpower view specifies the level, instruments, and pri

orities for airpower. This definition adds the dimension of de

nying air and space access to a foe and restricts the discussion o

airpower to vehicles that can operate beyond the immediate bat

tlefield, excluding bullets in flight or artillery shells. If Mitchell’

definition is broad, then the RAF view may be too limited

However, they share a common theme of exploiting the environ 

ment above Earth’s surface through the operation of a vehicle

This debate about airpower has plagued students for years.

Advances in commercial air transportation, satellite com

munications, and information applications have added new

dimensions to Mitchell’s definition of airpower. These capabili

ties are key to military aerospace power’s future and need t

be addressed in a definition. Aerospace power, as opposed t

airpower only, might be better defined as “the exploitation o

the environment above Earth’s surface by aerospace vehicle

or devices to conduct operations in support of national objec

tives.” This definition adds the air and space environment t

the debate and reflects the growing importance of space, a

does the RAF definition. Additionally, like Mitchell’s definition

it includes military and civilian use of air and space. Commer

cial air and space operations are areas of growing technologi

cal and financial strength for many corporations. Aerospac

power is a unique form of military and commercial power tha

can help a country achieve numerous national objectives. Un

fortunately, this definition of aerospace power is fleeting sinc

technology alters the face of aerospace power. However, this i

the challenge of studying, developing, and applying aerospac

power. The nature and use of aerospace power are limite

only by the imagination of its leaders and, more importantly

the men and women who support its operation. This study o

aerospace power concentrates on its military application. Al

though commercial aerospace power is vital to the interna

tional and domestic economy, the use or threatened use o

3
military forces has a more immediate and crucial role amon

national security concerns. The definition of aerospace powe

is only a start in one’s study of the value of air and spac

systems. One also needs to understand characteristics tha

underlie the use of this expanding military power.

Characteristics of Aerospace Power

Aircraft and space systems have many advantages that can

support military operations in many unique ways. One of thei

greatest advantages is the flexibility to operate in many type

of operations, purposes, theaters, and environments. Aero

space power’s inherent flexibility allows it to plan an attack on

a foe in one area, quickly respond to another threat in anothe

area, or return to a base different than the one from which i

took off. In the 1960s, during the Vietnam War, US Air Forc

(USAF) North American F-100 Super Saber and US Nav

McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft might plan a mis

sion against enemy bridges for a particular day. During th

course of the day and while the planes were en route to thei

targets, a friendly ground unit might come under fire from 

superior-sized enemy guerilla force. The F-100 and A-4 air

craft could swiftly change their mission to support the friendly

ground unit by dropping their munitions on the guerillas. Th

aircraft could then return to their respective bases or aircraf

carriers, rearm, attack the original target, or again support th

ground forces. These air forces could also have simply diverte

a portion of their aircraft to attack the guerilla force and si

multaneously attack the bridges. The flexibility of aircraft pro

vided the commander a number of options to use this force in

innovative ways.

An aerospace force gives the commander many alternative

and options that aircraft and space systems can support in

most situations that involve military forces. This force applica

tion may range from lethal use of weapons, to reconnaissance

to sending aircraft to drop food supplies. While these air an

space forces can be used in many situations, they can also b

used in unison to accomplish a single mission.

4
In many military situations, a commander may not hav

sufficient resources to meet all requirements. The commande

must prioritize missions among limited assets. Aerospace force

can swiftly concentrate their efforts against a single target o

series of targets. The speed, range, and flexibility of aerospac

forces give a commander the unique ability to provide an over

whelming force against a foe in one instance and move swiftly

against another enemy position within minutes. During Op 

eration Desert Storm , coalition air forces struck diverse tar

gets, including ground forces, air defenses , industrial sites

nuclear/biological weapons, oil, and leadership. Target coordi

nation among aircraft units concerning when an attack should

start or who should strike the target requires precise timin

and planning. For example, coalition air forces conducted ove

23,430 missions against ground forces during Operations De

sert Shield /Desert Storm . Limited aircraft and munitions, at

tack on enemy air defenses, reconnaissance, timing of attacks

Global Positioning System satellite providing navigation support—an illustration o

space power

5
and damage assessments are all issues requiring resolution

by a centralized command to ensure that the proper mission

are conducted, without duplication, and that an adequate re

sponse is made. However, since aerospace operations must b

flexible, lower-echelon commanders must have the ability t

quickly change a planned course of action or react to unfore

seen situations. These subordinate commanders must hav

the flexibility to conduct operations. They should have th

ability to modify their plans to use their forces in an appropri

ate manner.

The introduction of aircraft and space systems has added 

critical element to modern military activities—specifically, speed

Mountains, rivers, and difficult terrain can significantly slow

down a ground force. Ground-force movements might be meas

ured in tens of miles per day. Naval forces may travel faster

Open ocean travel might be measured in hundreds of mile

per day. Aircraft and space systems can reach speeds severa

magnitudes above those of ground and naval forces. Spee

allows aircraft and space systems to conduct several mission

The C-17 enhances global mobility for the United States.

6
during the same period it takes ground and possibly nava

forces to accomplish a single mission. A corollary of the spee

characteristic is aerospace power’s responsiveness to situ ations

Aerospace forces can also react faster to rapidly changin

situations than can many other military forces. A timely re

sponse to a dangerous situation may save an army or provid

humanitarian relief.

Aircraft and spacecraft not only can travel faster than a ship

or a truck, but also they can cover greater distances an

operate over longer ranges. Before the introduction of aircraft

military operations were normally localized to a limited area

Railroads increased the options of fighting over continenta

distances during the American Civil War. Aircraft revolution

ized global conflict. During World War II, US Army Air Force

(AAF) and RAF bomber units were able to fly hundreds o

miles to strike targets in Germany on a daily basis. The AAF

was also able to bomb Japan from Pacific bases hundreds o

miles away during day and night operations. Later, the inven

tion of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and jet bomb

ers (with refueling support) allowed nations to attack target

continents away—literally exhibiting a global capability. Ad 

vances in space systems may push ranges farther into Earth

orbits to actions in deep space or even to other planets.

Increased speed and range provide more alternatives an

opportunities, which allow a commander better freedom o

action to conduct operations. This freedom of action allows an

air force to select a mission over a range of operations. 

commander’s operations are greatly expanded among a multi

tude of targets that may be attacked. Conversely, land force

generally need to attack enemy forces one at a time on a front

This limitation may significantly slow down ground operation

and, ultimately, an entire campaign. Although great advance

in technology and maneuver strategies have tempered thi

observation over time, aerospace forces have a broader selec

tion of targets that they may attack. Similarly, naval vessel

can travel the seven seas to attack many targets, but they ar

limited to coastal targets and ships in range of their gunfir

and antiship missiles. Longer-range shipboard and submarin

missiles are improving naval force projections. 3

7
Another characteristic of aerospace power is its ability t

provide a global perspective. Ground forces normally have 

perspective based on the opposing front lines. Naval forces ar

also limited to operating mostly along the horizon. Although

modern technology has allowed ground and naval forces t

extend their vision beyond the horizon, it cannot compare t

 Peacekeeper ICBM

8
the perspective of aerospace assets. Satellites can provide coun

trywide imagery in a matter of minutes and global coverage o

a foe’s military actions. This coverage could include not only

air and space operations, but also several ground theaters an

areas where naval forces sail in geographically separate

thea ters.

Aerospace power can also affect the tempo and timing o

situations. A commander can use aerospace forces to strik

enemy positions and invoke a reaction from the foe or shap

his reaction. If a commander wants to shape a foe’s reaction

Tomahawk cruise missile from the USS Missouri

conducts an attack during Operation Desert Storm.

9
he will need split-second coordination of actions and decision

to counteract the actions taken by the opposing forces. Th

fast tempo of aerospace operations also requires rapid deci

sion making. Quick timing, freedom of action, and flexibility o

forces to take action require accurate information. A futur

aerospace leader must be able to gather, analyze, and synthe

size information into effective life-and-death decisions. Aircraf

commanders may face situations in which they choose be

tween conducting their planned missions or supporting an

other action. They must make their decision by weighing thei

assigned mission’s objectives against what they might gain

from pursuing an alternative requirement.

Aerospace power also puts fewer friendly forces at risk o

casualties, except for incidents of friendly fire. Casualties ar

a natural outcome of conflict, and modern technology ha

increased the lethality of weapons, resulting in the possibilit

of massive casualties. The casualty reduction of friendly death

and wounds is a paramount consideration in the plannin

 The Titan III can carry satellites into orbit.

10
and coordination of combat operations. In combat, aircraf

and spacecraft, whether manned or unmanned, expose fewe

human lives to danger than do comparable land and nava

force applications for the same mission. Casualty reduction

and increased lethality from modern aerospace weapons give 

commander a powerful combination to strike an enemy when

timely attacks are vital and when other military forces are no

available.

Although aerospace forces have many strengths, they als

have some limitations. A student of aerospace power should

consider these strengths and weaknesses in the application o

air and space forces. Similarly, a military planner should d

the same with land and naval forces. Aerospace, land, an

naval forces are like tools used by a commander. Each tool i

designed and used for a specific task. Selecting only one too

for all jobs may get the job done, but it may not be as effectiv

or efficient as using the tools in combination. Whenever 

commander uses these “tools,” he or she should consider al

strengths and weaknesses of military power and select th

right combination of forces. The study of the limitations o

aerospace power is a start to understanding how to maximiz

the use of aircraft or space systems over many situations tha

aerospace leaders will face in the future.

Aircraft and space systems were developed from and rely

primarily on high technology that requires significant resources

New materials, propulsion systems, guidance systems, satellites

and other complex devices rely on significant research an

development in many areas for their existence. These effort

require funding, scientific resources, industrial production, an

other assets that have alternative uses. A nation needs t

make a conscious decision to expend these limited, valuabl

resources to expand or maintain aerospace capabilities. If th

nation cannot or is not willing to do so, it risks having 

technologically obsolete force—a situation that may endange

its military forces and, ultimately, the nation. The resourc

requirement puts aerospace forces at odds with land and na

val forces for competition with limited funding or personnel.

Each pound of equipment or weapon that an aerospac

vehicle must carry requires an appropriate amount of propu

sion and support. The capacity of an aircraft or rocket carry

11
ing a payload is limited because of size or weight. Aircraft can

transport only a limited number of passengers, supplies, o

armored vehicles. A booster rocket can carry a limited numbe

of pounds with a limited size into low earth orbit. Relative t

ships, railroads, or a truck convoy, aerospace systems hav

limited payloads. Once aircraft drop their munitions on a tar

get, they must return to base and fight another day. Normally

these aircraft do not conduct other activities after accomplish

ing their primary mission. Ships can carry several tanks from on

continent to another, albeit at a slower speed, compared to 

jet transport, which can carry two armored vehicles at most.

Aircraft and space systems can patrol areas around th

world. However, unlike ground forces, they cannot occupy ter

ritory . Peacekeeping operations that rely on a local police o

constabulary force require a ground presence to arrest crim

nals or conduct many types of law-enforcement duties. Air

craft can observe some activities and can take some action

but are not a pure substitute for the presence of soldier

enforcing a treaty on the ground. New technology that in 

cludes pilotless, long-duration vehicles and space systems can

allow surveillance of surface activities, but weather, enem

deception and camouflage, and other actions can limit thes

capabilities. Currently, aircraft usually stay in one geographi

area for a limited time. Even with aerial refueling, aircraf

must eventually return to their bases for repairs, replenish

ment of supplies, or crew rest. Satellites may have geosyn 

chronous orbits that provide a relatively stationary orbit t

provide “coverage” over a particular region, but it is usually

limited to equatorial regions around the globe and still doe

not put forces on the ground.

Aerospace forces operate above Earth’s surface, but they ar

still reliant on ground support. Aircraft cannot stay in the ai

indefinitely. Crews need to be replaced, maintenance must b

conducted at bases, munitions and fuel must be supplied t

planes, and services from other support systems must be pro

vided to aircraft. Aircraft are tied to Earth’s surface, and thei

bases or aircraft carriers make these systems vulnerable t

attack. Space systems also rely on ground launch, support

and control. A foe does not have to attack a satellite directly

he can disable or destroy the satellite’s ground-control station

12
or interfere with its communications link to effectively neutra

ize its capabilities.

Space assets have limited mobility and may have less flexi

bility than aircraft, soldiers, or naval vessels. Satellites oper

ate under the laws of orbital mechanics and travel along pre

dictable paths. Once they are in orbit, changes in position ar

made with limited onboard fuel to power their propulsion sys

tems. Refueling these satellites is neither easy nor inexpen sive

Unless one absolutely needs these satellites to move, thei

orbital paths are usually not changed. Essentially, they have 

limited capability to change orbits. Additionally, a nation ma

have reduced imagery coverage because of an intelligence sat

ellite’s peculiar orbit and may require another satellite or othe

asset to support the same mission. Surface forces might mov

out of a satellite’s path or camouflage themselves before the

are detected and then conduct their assigned mission.

Aircraft and spacecraft are very fragile . Speed, range, an

weight considerations require airframe or satellite body con

B-17 destroyed at Hickam Field during the Pearl Harbor attack. The Hawaiia

Air Force was severely damaged during the attack.

13
struction that uses lightweight materials, which may affec

survivability. Unlike a tank or ship, an aircraft’s fuselage migh

be manufactured with aluminum or other materials that pro

vide sufficient structural strength for flight but do little t

protect it against a missile or shell. Damage from enemy at

tacks or even a bird hitting the Plexiglas canopy might forc

the aircraft to abandon its mission or even destroy the vehicle

Aircraft and spacecraft might not be able to sustain operation

under significant air or space defenses.

These strengths and limitations should allow one to assess

in a general manner, where the use of aerospace forces i

appropriate. Depending on the environment, condition of th

force, and the political objective desired, aerospace power migh

or might not contribute significantly to a conflict. Applyin

inappropriate resources to a situation is not only wasteful, bu

also subjects aircrews or other personnel to needless risks

Aircraft and spacecraft give a commander many alternatives t

exercise against an adversary. The appropriate application o

aerospace power depends upon a decision maker’s pitting th

strengths of his or her aircraft and space systems against th

weaknesses of the enemy. Additionally, the commander need

to limit the exposure of aerospace forces’ limitations whil

minimizing the strengths of the enemy.

Aerospace Power in War

Aerospace power’s strengths and weaknesses are importan

in combat planning. How one employs these forces is also an

important issue. The elements that make aerospace powe

work together allow a nation to use a combination of letha

capabilities in war. Throughout the history of warfare, severa

individuals have identified ideas and concepts about war an

the means by which leaders apply their military forces. Thes

“principles” help one to understand the application of militar

forces and the ways one can think about fighting a war an

using aerospace power. Although there is no universal agree

ment upon a list of these principles of war, the study an

time-tested use of these ideas can help one address man

issues facing a decision maker in times of war. One should

14
neither substitute these principles for critical thinking no

ignore them as just an irrelevant “history lesson.” Successfu

generals do not follow these principles as a simple checklis

but apply them as appropriate, considering the situation. Us

ing them is more an art than a science, and a particula

situation may call for using all or some of the principles—o

just one. Solving aerospace power problems requires imagina

tion and initiative rather than a slavish devotion to following 

list of principles.

Col J. F. C. Fuller developed a set of principles of war in

1925. Fuller, a Royal Army officer, compiled many of thes

military thoughts in The Foundations of the Science of War

Although he was an expert in armored warfare, his list o

principles of war gives us a point of departure to discuss wa

in general and the way these principles might apply to aero

space power. Many of the lessons from successes in war un

derscore Fuller ’s principles of war, and one can learn abou

the potential application of aerospace power by reviewing thes

situations. These principles include objective, offensive, mass

economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, sur

prise, and simplicity. 4

The most important principle of war is objective, which pro

vides a focus or goal that all aerospace forces are trying t

achieve for a situation. A concise and coherent objective a

lows a commander to concentrate his or her efforts on solvin

a particular problem or series of problems. If a commande

can adequately identify an objective, his or her subordinate

can better define and clarify their role and effort in any opera

tion. An objective allows individuals to better prepare them

selves to accomplish the commander’s aims. For example, in

World War II the AAF and RAF in Europe conducted a sus

tained bombing campaign against Nazi Germany’s industria

and military targets. The Combined Bomber Offensive’s objec

tive was to reduce the war-making capability of the Third

Reich. Bombing missions were planned to systematically crip 

ple the ability of Germany to make armaments and thereb

reduce its ability to support military operations. A commander’

objective should also satisfy any higher-level political or mili

tary objective. Defining “what you have to do” (objective) wi

15
help the commander solve the problem of how to accomplish

the mission.

Winning a war also takes initiative and action. Military force

often need to be more proactive than reactive in many situ 

ations. Nations take offensive actions to defeat an enemy o

eject him from their borders. Maintaining a defensive stanc

just limits the country to maintain its status quo, and the bes

it can do is “not lose.” Offensive operations allow a nation t

shape an environment and strike a foe before he has a chanc

to attack. Aerospace forces are well suited to take offensiv

actions due to their speed, range, ability to concentrate, an

perspective. The Israeli Defense Forces/Air Force (IDF/AF) wa

able to clearly demonstrate the value of offensive air opera

tions during its Six-Day War against Egypt, Syria , and Jordan

in June 1967. Israeli jets conducted a surprise, massive groun

attack against the Egyptian air force that rendered it incapa

ble of further military capability. The Israelis then eliminate

Destruction from above. During the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943, a B-1

bombs a ball-bearing plant and aircraft-engine repair depot near Paris, France.

16
the Syrian and Jordanian air forces. Without air support, Ara

ground forces were left open to attack by IDF/AF planes an

armored units. The IDF/AF shaped the battlefield so that Israel

surface forces could conduct offensive ground action to overcom

a larger Arab ground force.

If a nation takes the offensive in a conflict, it may have th

option of attacking with fewer forces along a broad front o

assaulting the enemy on a narrower front with all its forces

The probability of a successful breakthrough on the front i

increased if the nation can mass its forces against a decisive

point along the front. Forces using mass can concentrate thei

capability against an enemy’s weaknesses. Mass allows a na

tion to deliver a devastating blow to an enemy, both physically

and psychologically. On 24 December 1944, bombers and fight

ers of the AAF and RAF conducted a coordinated attack agains

supply lines, bridges, troop concentrations, rail lines, and air

fields, and supported Allied ground operations along the Ar 

dennes front (also known as the Battle of the Bulge ). Ove

2,300 aircraft missions helped push German forces out of th

Bulge and inflicted great damage on enemy ground forces

Allied aircraft were able to concentrate and attack German

forces that had a significant impact on the battlefield.

In World War II, P-47s performed a number of

missions, such as air superiority, interdiction, and

close air support.

17
Although a commander needs to use mass and conduct an

attack with decisive force, military forces are usually resource

constrained. Air forces do not have an inexhaustible supply o

aircraft, pilots, munitions, or other support. Commanders need t

provide a sufficient number of resources for a military force s

that it can accomplish its mission. The selection of a min

mum of resources to satisfy mission requirements—econom

of force—is a challenge for a planning staff, especially if it i

faced with several important military operations. If too man

resources are devoted to a mission, the excess resources can

not be employed to accomplish some other mission.

For example, during the Vietnam War, the USAF was as

signed to destroy the Than Hoa Bridge on 3 April 1965. 

large “strike” package of 79 Republic F-105 Thunderchief

dropped 638 750-pound bombs and fired 298 rockets bu

failed to destroy the bridge. Five aircraft were lost in the at

tack. The bridge was a target of many missions throughou

the war. In 1972 the USAF was finally able to destroy the span

by using 16 F-4 Phantoms equipped with advanced Pavewa

laser-guided bombs, thus eliminating the need for large num

bers of aircraft. Technology allowed the USAF to reduce th

Aircraft provide a wide variety of capabilities that allow commanders to effective

select resources for combat and noncombat missions.

18
number of munitions and aircraft used to destroy the bridg

and effectively accomplish the mission. The F-4s used 24 guide

munitions and 48 unguided bombs to destroy the bridge. Th

USAF estimated that the damage from the mission was equiva 

lent to using 2,400 unguided bombs.5

Military forces can cause a foe to move or position himsel

in a less effective manner to conduct his operations. A na

tion’s military force can use maneuver to create favorable con

ditions on the battlefield for exploitation—including the capa

bility to attack, retreat, or further shape the battlefield. Aerospac

forces can use their speed and range to position themselves t

influence the movement of enemy forces or support the move

ment of soldiers to a critical area on a battlefield. Such move

ment could block an enemy’s advance or put friendly forces in

an optimal position to attack. An example of stopping an en

An Air Force B-66 Destroyer leads F-105 Thunderchiefs in an attack over North Vietnam in 1966. The

F-105 bore the brunt of many attacks in the

Vietnam War.

19
emy

s advance occurred during Desert Shield /Desert Storm

when the United States moved more than 526,277 tons o

cargo and over 499,627 passengers by aircraft. The rapid trans

port of troops, supplies, and weapons helped stop the possibl

invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq. The rapid movement of combat

ready forces into Saudi Arabia allowed the nation to tak

several alternative courses of action, while limiting those of Iraq

The conduct of military operations is a very complex situ 

ation that requires timely planning and intense coordination

of effort. If the operation involves joint aerospace, land, an

naval forces, there is a distinct possibility of miscommunica

tion, contradictory plans, and actions that are mistakenly dis

regarded. An effective method to avoid many of these short

comings is to appoint a single commander who is in charge o

all operations to ensure unity of command . Commanders with

singular authority and appropriate decision-making capabilit

provide better coordination and planning. Failure to achiev

unity of command can result in counterproductive efforts. Ai

operations in the Vietnam War were divided among severa

commanders. The control of air operations was divided amon

the USAF, Navy, Army (helicopters), and Marine Corps, as wel

as various major commands within the four services. Thi

organization produced a fragmented command and control (C2) o

air resources.

Aerospace systems are extremely fragile devices. Enem

ground forces can attack aircraft on the ground, where the

are vulnerable to small-arms fire. Carefully planned air at

tacks may be displaced if a foe is tipped off about any impend

ing actions. Military forces require security to protect thei

assets and avoid giving the enemy any unintended advan

tages. Airfield protection has been an important prerequisit

to make airpower available for action and to give a commande

maximum support to conduct operations. During the Vietnam

War, Vietcong guerillas were able to conduct harassing at

tacks to disrupt aircraft ground-support activities and destro

aircraft. Although these raids did not affect the outcome of th

war, future incidents involving nuclear, biological, and chem

cal (NBC) weapons may significantly affect the availability an

operation of aircraft. Surface-to-surface ballistic missile at

20
tacks using conventional munitions may leave a runway un

usable or may severely damage parked aircraft.

Enemy forces that are prepared and can benefit from defen

sive weapons are more difficult to defeat than unprepare

forces that are attacked in open terrain. The chance of suc

cess for an offensive action against the enemy is increase

greatly if a military force can attain surprise—the mirror imag

of security. A military force conducting a surprise operation

takes advantage of selecting the time, location, and type o

action it can take against an adversary. The enemy has n

ability to react immediately to an action taken against him. Ai

raids are classic examples of surprise. If the military force can

avoid detection from surveillance before its attack, then it ma

significantly improve the probability of conducting a success

ful surprise attack. Such an attack may catch aircraft on th

airfield or outside of hangars, air defenses unprepared fo

action, or protective revetments vulnerable to immediate de

struction. In May 1981, the IDF/AF attacked an Iraqi nuclea

reactor at Osirak. Operation Babylon ’s objective was to de

Destroyed MiG-25 during Operation Desert Storm. Achieving air superiori

can also come from defeating aircraft on the ground.

21
stroy Iraq’s growing nuclear weapons program. Severa

McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle and General Dynamics F-1

Fighting Falcon aircraft avoided radar detection and enem

fighters before conducting their operation. The attack was 

complete surprise, and the reactor was destroyed, pushin

back Iraq’s nuclear capability several years.

The final principle of war is simplicity . Complicated plan

and actions may unintentionally create additional problem

for a military force. An overly complex plan may cause mis

takes or prevent actions and thus endanger the entire plan’

success. Keeping a plan or operation simple allows a com

mander to use his or her forces in a flexible manner so as t

effectively counter an adversary’s reactions to the plan. Clear

concise, and understandable plans promote better coordina

tion and understanding of the operation. For example, con

ducting an aerial photoreconnaissance mission of a particula

battle-damaged target is easier to plan and execute than con

ducting total surveillance of an area and then looking fo

battle-damaged targets. In the former case, intelligence ana

lysts need only focus on a single target. In the latter, the sam

F-15 air superiority fighter

22
intelligence analysts need to find the target and then deter

mine its battle damage.

The principles of war provide many issues to consider dur

ing the application of military forces. Aerospace power high 

lights many of these principles. Although following them give

commanders a better understanding of how they might in 

crease their chances of achieving success on the battlefield

these principles will never guarantee victory. There is no for

mula for their correct application. Their application depend

on many variables that can significantly affect the actions o

friendly and enemy forces. Understanding the ideas and im 

portance of these principles of war provides fledgling com

manders a first step towards using aerospace forces.

What Aerospace Forces Can Accomplish

Aerospace forces, like land and naval assets, accomplish

several purposes in conflict and in peace. The introduction o

the aircraft and space systems has provided revolutionar

changes to a nation’s ability to fight. The versatility of aero

space forces allows a national leader to pursue many alterna

tives to solve a country’s problems in war. One needs to un

derstand specific missions that aircraft and spacecraft can

accomplish or support before he or she employs them. Aero

space forces can conduct deterrence, compellence, denial, co

ercion, decapitation, and humanitarian missions.

The most important objective accomplished by aerospac

forces is their deterrent mission. Deterrence , whether in a nuclea

or conventional conflict, discourages a nation or party from

taking certain actions. During the Cold War, the United State

created a force of nuclear-armed bombers and missiles capa

ble of surviving a nuclear attack and subsequently inflictin

significant damage on the attacking nation. Aerospace forces pro

vided bombers, ICBMs , early warning satellites, defensive ca

pabilities, communications, and reconnaissance forces tha

gave the nation 24-hour, combat-ready forces to retaliate agains

an enemy or to react quickly to a situation. These forces mad

a potential enemy think twice before launching a preemptiv

nuclear or conventional strike against the United States. Th

23
speed, range, and flexibility of aerospace forces also give them

a decided advantage in achieving conventional deterrent value

Aircraft that are ready to bomb targets at a moment’s notic

also help stop another nation from taking certain actions be

cause of the fear of a swift, decisive reaction. Aircraft can

demonstrate deterrent value by providing a visible display o

combat power if they fly near an enemy’s border or conduc

training exercises in plain sight of an adversary.

America’s nuclear deterrent power rests partly on the

Minuteman III ICBM.

24
Similarly, a nation could use the threat of destruction to com

pel another nation, organization, or group of people to take an

action. Compellence is not about retaliation or compensation

A nation can take actions to threaten another country. Thes

actions may be offensive or provocative in nature. For exam

ple, a nation might threaten to begin military operations un

less it receives territorial concessions from a neighbor within 

specified time frame. If the nation does not comply, nationa

leaders could initiate a bombing or invasion attempt.

Unfortunately, nations sometimes are not deterred from con 

ducting combat operations or taking some other undesirabl

course of action. If combat should occur, then aerospace force

can deny an armed force or nation the ability to conduct thos

actions. Deterrence actions involve changing the mind-set of 

potential adversary. Denial actions include physical attack

upon the adversary’s military or other appropriate targets t

stop or reverse an action. For example, during Desert Storm

coalition air forces attacked Iraqi transportation, supply, in 

dustrial, and other targets that supported enemy forces t

reduce their military capabilities. Successful missions agains

Precision-guided attacks can stop the flow of supplies and reduce the enemy

combat power.

25
ground-transportation targets such as roads, bridges, and rail

roads helped slow down Iraqi ground-force movements an

reduced the enemy’s ability to fight because the flow of sup

plies and troop reinforcements was reduced to a trickle.

Once combat operations start, aerospace forces can coerc

an offending nation or party to take a certain course of action

Coercion involves the use of force to punish the transgres

sions of a foe in hopes of altering a nation’s will. Although

coercion may use attacks on physical targets, its main goal i

to change the behavior of a nation, organization, or group o

people through psychological means. However, a significan

issue regarding coercion is the problem of escalation. What i

the target organization or enemy does not cooperate? Does th

coercive power increase the level of attack? Is there a ceiling t

the escalation of force? In 1999 the North Atlantic Treat

Organization (NATO) conducted an air campaign, Operation

Allied Force, against Serbian forces in Kosovo and Yugoslavia 

These NATO air forces attacked several key leadership an

command centers in the hopes of forcing Serbian nationa

leaders to accept conditions to end the conflict and stop op 

erations. NATO air forces also attacked a number of othe

targets that affected the living conditions of the Serbian popu 

lace. This action may have added internal pressure on th

Serbian leaders to accede to NATO’s demands by creating publi

dissension among the Serbian populace and reducing the coun

try’s war-making capacity.

Another mission that aerospace forces can readily accom

plish is decapitation . Aerospace forces deliver lethal, precision

weapons at great speeds and range that make them weapon

of choice to isolate top enemy leadership from its sources o

power (i.e., its military and population). A single jet bombe

might destroy a telecommunications center, thus preventin

the enemy leader from transmitting vital commands to hi

forces and his nation’s citizens. The objective of decapitation

is to separate the “brain” (national leader) from the “body

(nation) so that the body is paralyzed and cannot take effectiv

action. Because the body might not be able to function suffi

ciently to exist, it may no longer remain a threat.

Finally, aerospace power is not always involved in conflic

but may take humanitarian actions. Aerospace power can rap

26
idly deliver aid to nations that suffer natural disasters such a

earthquakes, fires, or floods. Aircraft can swiftly deliver critica

food and shelter when hours literally count in life-threatenin

situations. Commanders can use aircraft to fly over conteste

areas and provide quick, precision delivery of supplies an

material. On 24 June 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded al

road, rail, and waterways into Berlin to make allied force

abandon the city. No food or supplies were allowed into th

city. A tense standoff between Soviet and allied military force

threatened to escalate into another world war. Instead, allie

air forces conducted Operation Vittles (the Berlin airlift ), which

used aircraft to carry 2.3 million tons of food, coal, and sup

plies to keep the citizens of Berlin alive. The Soviet Union saw

that Berlin would not fold and ended the blockade on 1

May 1949.

Aerospace forces can accomplish a wide variety of opera

tions, including taking actions to prevent war by deterring 

potential enemy from conducting military operations. The flexibil

ity attributed to the inherent nature of aerospace power allow

a nation to use a single aircraft to produce effects that onc

were achieved only by millions of soldiers. One plane migh

destroy a nuclear-weapons production plant and thereby en

a nation’s ability to threaten a wide region of the world, or tha

plane itself might use a nuclear weapon. Conversely, man

aircraft might staunch the flow of an enemy invasion forc

attacking a helpless neighbor or conduct operations to ensur

that friendly ground forces invade an enemy. Aerospace powe

also gives the nation a very effective tool to provide human

tarian aid around the world. This capability is being calle

upon more often than in the past because of the result o

ethnic conflicts, enhanced ability to conduct such operations

greater awareness of deadly situations, and frequent growth o

humanitarian missions around the world.

The Aerospace Environment

Aerospace assets conduct their missions in a unique envi

ronment. Air and space forces operate in the third dimen

sion—the area above Earth’s surface. The air and space envi

27
ronments are quite different. Aircraft fly due to aerodynami

lift. Spacecraft manipulate orbital mechanics to operate in th

vacuum of space. Although these environments significantly

differ, both can affect land and naval operations. Land an

naval forces generally influence operations on their own envi

ronments. Land forces confront and occupy opposing lan

forces but usually have limited effects on naval and aerospac

forces. Similarly, naval forces primarily conduct actions agains

foes on the ocean’s surface and subsurface areas. The Navy

does have a strike capability against land targets. Aerospac

forces can directly act against both land and naval forces

More importantly, aerospace forces can move quickly within

the atmosphere or space, concentrate, and then operate agains

either land or naval forces—or both.

Advancing technology increases the future promise of veh

cles that may one day routinely operate in air and space environ

ments. Altitude, range, and speed limitations hampered early

propeller aircraft. Later, jet aircraft extended the operatin

characteristics to high altitudes and supersonic speeds. Dur

Navy F-18s

28
ing the 1950s and 1960s, rockets and spacecraft extende

aerospace’s reach into the cosmos. Today, the space shuttl

launches into space like a rocket, deploys satellites in space

and then returns to Earth like an airplane. Tomorrow, aero

space planes may operate at hypersonic speeds in space whil

taking off and landing on Earth like airplanes. The gap be

tween air and space vehicles may greatly narrow with thes

developments.

Aerospace Elements

Aerospace power relies on both vehicles and other element

to accomplish its missions. The elements that create aero

space power include an aerospace industry, people, suppor

systems, equipment, and rational direction. The strength of 

nation’s economy and its political will are key to the develop 

ment and maintenance of aerospace power, but this is true o

any military force as well. A country must have sufficien

economic strength to provide adequate financial, technologi

cal, and productive capacity to enable the government to ex

pertly operate aerospace forces. The economic strength of 

nation sets the pace for developing military forces and directly

affects its national security. Aerospace power also depends on

the willingness of the nation’s populace to permit use of thei

resources for building, maintaining, and applying aerospac

power. Without the backing of a nation’s population, aero

space power may be limited in scope and use.

Aerospace power owes many of its capabilities to technologi

cal advances, which often require complex electronics, infor

mation systems, propulsion, life support, munitions, and othe

devices. Engineers, scientists, computer experts, technicians

and extensive capital investment in facilities and equipmen

make these innovations possible. The aerospace industry no

only provides equipment repair, but also gives the nation th

ability to produce new aircraft or spacecraft. Individual na

tions may create their own aerospace industry, or they ma

use the services of another nation’s industrial capacity b

importing many of these products. Today, many nations d

not depend upon domestic aerospace industrial strength t

29
produce aircraft or space systems. For example, the Unite

States arguably must depend on foreign industry to provid

computer chips, raw materials, and other imported product

to ensure the manufacture of many military aerospace compo

nents. In the future, growth in economic globalization wil

increase foreign interdependence for industrial products.

Piloting an aircraft is a complex task. Maintaining an aero

space force also requires the existence of a technology base

People must fly, maintain, and operate the support system

that keep a nation’s aerospace power working around the clock

These people must have the sufficient motivation, education

and training to keep aircraft and space systems in operabl

condition. A nation’s military must keep the people who ar

involved in maintaining aerospace power motivated to con

tinue working in the aerospace industry or as a part of th

military aerospace force. If there is little or no motivation fo

people to support the aerospace force, a nation may becom

trapped in an expensive and ultimately ineffective force due t

low experience levels. The nation must also maintain a soun

educational system to instill the proper levels of knowledge t

produce engineers, technicians, and people capable of operat

ing and maintaining advanced technology or exploiting it. Fi

nally, the aerospace force must have facilities and programs t

train people in specific methods of operating and maintainin

the equipment and systems of the aerospace force. These trainin

programs must be able to expand and adapt to changes in situ 

ations or threats.

Aircraft and satellites cannot operate by themselves. Although

a crew can fly an aircraft, it relies on a number of diverse

complex support systems while in the air and on the ground

A crew may require assistance from satellite navigation sys

tems to get data on locations. The crew also needs a commu 

nications network to relay critical information about landin

instructions, weather, and other key data necessary to operat

the plane. Ground-support operations also include air traffi

control, maintenance, supply, and facilities that include main 

tenance hangars and runways. Similarly, space systems als

require much ground support that includes communications

data processing, satellite -control facilities, and launchpads

Aerospace power is not just about platforms. Typically, man

30
individuals still concentrate on the end result of aerospac

power—aircraft and spacecraft —when they think about thi

form of military activity. Technologically advanced aerospac

systems require extensive support from specialists with a wid

range of expertise. Flight surgeons provide medical support fo

crews; aircraft-maintenance personnel ensure that vital re

pairs are made to aircraft; and satellite-control personnel mak

sure that proper orbital adjustments are made to maintain

peak efficiency and effectiveness for the system.

A nation may have all the physical elements necessary t

organize and function as an aerospace force, but it is useles

unless it is given direction. A nation could use its aerospac

force for independent military actions, such as nuclear deter

rence . Conversely, the country could use this aerospace forc

as a supporting resource for its ground forces or as an equa

partner to all of its sister services. Before the nation decides t

Logistics is one of the keys to airpower.

31
use its aerospace force in a particular manner, it needs t

provide direction and guidance on how it will use this capabil

ity to better prepare and employ its forces. Without solid di

rection to shape and provide a common set of beliefs abou

aerospace power, these forces might not provide optimal serv

ice to the nation. The country might acquire unnecessary air

craft and space systems that might not give it the appropriat

forces to win a war of national survival. Guidance issued t

aerospace forces might come from national objectives , strat

egy, beliefs, experience, theory, and other sources. Developin

the guidance and plans to build, shape, and operate an aero

space force is one of the most challenging issues facing lead

ers. Unknown threats, resource constraints, and other dy

namic factors create much uncertainty about future guidanc

to build the aerospace force of the future.

Aerospace industry, people, support systems, and guidanc

all help aircraft and space systems stay in operation. However

one of the most important factors in aerospace power revolve

around the equipment available for use. Aircraft are compose

of several systems, including propulsion, communications, guid 

ance, airframe, electronic devices, radar, and munitions. Thes

systems are further composed of subsystems and components

which must work together to allow the aircraft to operate

Space systems—which operate without the benefit of bein

easily repaired, unless retrieved by another space system o

recovered upon reentry for reuse—must rely on existing on

board components. At a minimum, the equipment must hav

advanced capabilities and be reliable, maintainable, and cost

effective.

Aerospace power is not just about aircraft or orbiting satel

lites. The key components of an aerospace industry—people

support systems, guidance, and equipment—all contribute t

a nation’s ability to conduct operations above Earth’s surface

Although a nation may be able to operate an aerospace forc

without one or more of these elements in the short run, th

ability of that country to exploit air or space in the future wil

be limited. The complexity of flying or launching a vehicle int

low earth orbit requires considerable energy, time, and re

sources. The coordination and integration of these efforts ar

32
one of the challenges a nation faces if it wishes to use aero

space power.

Summary

Aerospace power, like other forms of military power, ha

unique characteristics, definitions, strengths, and weaknesses

Understanding these characteristics in relation to other militar

forces and the principles of war should help the reader appre

ciate how aircraft and space systems can support militar

operations today and in the future. The concepts of aerospac

power provide a foundation that allows one to evaluate how

aerospace power should be used in military and humanitarian

situations. This function gives one the tools to solve problem

that involve these forces. The planning and operation of thes

complex military capabilities require a common understandin

about aerospace power.

Students of aerospace power face a continual challenge

Technological change, shifting threats, the application of ai

and space forces, and other dynamic events have modifie

people’s thoughts about aerospace power through the years

Early airpower advocates struggled to define what role aircraf

should play in future wars through a vision limited by existin

technology and theories of the day. Some military officers charge

that aircraft played a pivotal role that would end a conflic

through long-range bombardment. Others thought aircraft would

better serve a ground commander as flying artillery. The emer

gence of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and space sys

tems has added to the aerospace power debate through th

years. In the future, newly discovered technologies and capa

bilities will undoubtedly change viewpoints on the role of aero

space power. However, the basic concepts discussed in thi

chapter should help guide the discussion of these issues. Aero

space power theories, doctrines, and strategies will be revise

over time, but the basic concepts and ideas should enhanc

one’s ability to apply new capabilities to the future of aero

space power.

33
Notes

1. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilitie

of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: Dover, 1988), 3–4.

2. Philip Towle, “The Distinctive Characteristics of Air Power,” in Th

Dynamics of Air Power, ed. Group Capt Andrew Lambert and Arthur C

Williamson (Bracknell: RAF Staff College, 1996), 3.

3. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles have provided an intercont

nental nuclear-attack capability since the 1960s.

4. The United States Air Force developed a set of principles of war, base

on Fuller’s set, and applied it to aerospace power. This list is incorporate

into Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 

September 1997, 11–21.

5. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle i

Three American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994)

387.

34
Chapter 2

Aerospace Power Theory

Aerospace power can support a nation and military com

mander in different ways. It can perform bombardment mis

sions against an enemy’s industrial base, support ground force

by attacking supply lines, or rapidly move armored forces aroun

the globe. The optimal use of aerospace power depends on

many factors: available forces, objectives, enemy military ca

pabilities, established plans, principles and concepts of opera

tions, and an appropriate theory. Several individuals have ad

vocated that nations use their aircraft and space systems t

support or win wars in particular ways. These theories hav

shaped the face of airpower in the past and continue to do s

in the present. Perhaps they will also guide future aerospac

power in several important organizational, force-structure, plan

ning, and operational areas. This chapter identifies the funda

mental theories that have had the greatest impact upon aero

space power today.

This chapter first defines what a theory is and why it i

important. This definition should help one compare theorie

as well as decide whether the theory seems reasonable and i

applicable today and for the future. The chapter then dis

cusses the work of several key theorists. Ideas and concept

dealing with aerospace power are based on individual experi

ence, beliefs, prediction, and contemporary technology. A reade

should note that these theories evolved as events changed ove

time. The study of theory helps frame and make relevant how

aerospace power can be employed, developed, and built. Mor

importantly, these theories may provide insight into solving 

nation’s future military problems.

What Is Theory?

For decades, airpower thinkers have developed, written, an

debated their ideas on the role and impact of aircraft on war

These enterprising visionaries developed theories on the appli

35
cation of early aircraft that have had a great impact on devel

oping a force. Military space theory is still in its infancy. How

ever, military commanders are beginning to view military spac

forces as a vital element of present and future combat opera

tions. Before one can study these theories, one needs to un

derstand what a theory is and how it can be used in the stud

of aerospace power.

Theory provides a foundation for a field of study. A theor

can help an individual explain a state of nature, define o

establish a set of beliefs about a subject, provide knowledg

about the principles of a subject, and predict a future condi

tion. A person can use theory to explain how a particula

function works. This explanation may provide basic facts or 

model that provides one an interpretation of the events an

actions taken throughout a process. 1 Theory guides individu 

als towards a common understanding of a subject because i

should define and relay a set of beliefs that people can agre

upon, discuss, and debate. A theory can also set forth obser

vations about the nature of the subject. The principles of war

as earlier discussed, were not proven “facts” or laws; the

were merely a series of ideas expressed by individuals abou

lessons from combat experience and beliefs. Finally, a theor

should predict or explain how a future condition, situation, o

outcome might change, given the application of certain belief

or ideas about a subject. This aspect of a theory allows th

individual to say, “If one uses this idea, then this will happen.

If this is a definition of theory one can use, then where doe

theory come from? A person may create a theory through

several diverse avenues. Observations from actual events a

low one to draw some correlation to the cause and effect o

events. This gives an individual a rudimentary basis to mak

some conclusions about the nature of an event if one uses 

particular function in a certain way. For example, in econom

ics one might observe the conditions of supply and demand. I

demand for a product is greater than the supply, the price fo

the item would rise, and shortages of the good or servic

might result. Additionally, the increased price might induc

firms to produce more of the good or service.

A series of events provides a better foundation for drawin

conclusions than does a single observation. Over time, situ 

36
ations with different conditions may help individuals refin

their theory and make it more resilient and universal in scope

Individuals may also form theories through experimentation

A controlled experiment using observed tests might allow on

to vary the use of actions on similar situations and then

measure the differences in their final results. This measure

ment requires a careful experimental design. The difference in

effects might help one develop a theory based on these results

A theory may also come from a person’s set of beliefs. A

potential theory might develop from an individual’s thoughts

perceived logic, beliefs, or reflections about a subject. For ex

ample, a theory’s development can also come from a combina

tion of these sources. Observation may lead to a series o

experiments that results in a belief about a subject. Theor

becomes the foundation for the discussion and development o

aerospace forces. Individuals and organizations have sough

to develop air forces based on theory. The adoption of theor

by military leaders as a framework to develop forces demon

strates its relevance for present and future use. Theory i

always changing and evolving due to dynamic conditions an

will require the attention of future leaders for its application.

What Should Aerospace Power Theory Do?

Aerospace power theories should add to the field of study

as is the case in any other discipline, such as economics

political science, mathematics, or engineering. Aerospace powe

theory is another resource for military leaders to develop a se

of plans for combat, build a fleet of aircraft and spacecraft 

train people, and think about how their aerospace forces wil

fight in the future. Aerospace theories may include a complet

theory on all aspects of aerospace operations or a single seg

ment, like strategic-bombardment theory. Regardless of th

level of theory, a discussion of how the element of aerospac

power is defined in terms of its role in military operations, it

basic propositions, and its effects on the battlefield is para

mount.

A complete aerospace power theory should address wha

aircraft and space systems can contribute to military opera

37
tions and how a commander should employ those forces in

combat. The theory, at a minimum, should address the issu

by predicting “if one employs airpower or space power unde

these conditions, then the result will be . . . ,” given the prope

use of force. More importantly, the theory should discuss how

aerospace power will get certain results and explain why th

results were achieved. The theory’s author can also demon

strate the difference in capabilities between different militar

forces such as naval or land forces. This discussion allows 

reader to assess the relationship between aerospace powe

and other military forces’ abilities to conduct the same opera

tion and its impact on the future battlefield. The propose

theory becomes an integral part of a commander’s assessmen

to compare, contrast, and select the best forces to accomplish

a mission.

“Traditional” aerospace theory has been based on aircraft

There are few recognized theories on space power. Perhaps th

need to produce a theory has not kept pace with the techno

logical and operational growth in space power. Conversely

after World War I, several airpower theorists created and openly

discussed their theories. Several highly public debates took

place on the implications of these theories. Those debate

ranged from the accepted role of airpower in relation to groun

and naval forces to the moral value of using bombers agains

civilian targets. Airpower theory also was used to justify an

independent role and organization for air forces from othe

forces. These theories also helped national and military lead

ers plan future campaigns against anticipated antagonists in

the looming global conflict of World War II. The acquisition

training of forces, and deployment of military aircraft wer

predicated on these campaign plans, which mirrored the lead

ing airpower theories of the day. The United States built it

land-based air forces around the long-range strategic bomber

Other nations, like Germany, followed a different path by develop

ing an air force designed to support ground forces. After th

war, the United States geared much of its air force to suppor

nuclear operations. Airpower theory had an influential grip on

the development and capabilities of fighting forces. In the fu 

ture, revolutionary ideas and theories about space power ma

result in new organizations, methods of fighting, and relation

38
among services, as well as determine the number of resource

available to apply in the next war.

Giulio Douhet: The First Airpower Theorist

Gen Giulio Douhet developed one of the first and most influ 

ential airpower theories. Douhet, an Italian army officer, wa

highly influenced by Italy’s airpower experience during its co

lonial era and World War I. Although not a pilot, Douhet took

command of an airplane battalion in the Italian army in 1912

His airpower theory was explained in The Command of the Air

written in 1921 and revised in 1927. Douhet’s ideas greatly

affected the thoughts of leaders of the United States Army Ai

Corps. Ultimately, his thoughts were extensively studied an

modified by the Air Corps’s prestigious Air Corps Tactical Schoo

(ACTS), whose graduates became the leaders of the futur

United States Air Force. Their experience in the school signifi

cantly affected many key decisions during and after World

War II. ACTS was the intellectual center for the fledgling Ai

Corps and significantly influenced the Air Corps and AAF fo

many years.

Douhet ’s main thesis was that airpower, through carefully

planned long-range bombardment, could devastate a nation

and render the use of a ground war moot. An important pre

requisite of Douhet’s theory was the command of the air, o

what is known today as air superiority. A nation’s aircraft ha

to be able to attack at will and deny an enemy’s air force th

capability to conduct similar attacks. The air force had t

either destroy or disable its enemy’s ability to fly in order t

secure access to bombing targets. Similarly, the enemy could

not bomb a friendly nation if it did not control access to th

air. A nation’s aircraft could attack enemy planes in the air

on the ground, or in “production centers.” However, attackin

aircraft on the ground was Douhet’s preferred method of con

trolling the air. Land and naval forces were still a necessar

part of war since conquered nations needed to be occupied o

sea-lanes of communications patrolled. The primacy of lan

and naval forces was challenged while airpower ascended int

a dominant role. Douhet believed that only an “adequate ae

39
rial force,

 without need of land or naval weapons, could de

stroy an enemy’s air force. 3 Before aircraft could conduct op 

erations, a nation needed to gain command of the air ; this wa

so important that Douhet equated its attainment as a firs

step towards maintaining the national defense.

After achieving command of the air , an air force could bom

an enemy’s vital centers of government, industry, and popula 

tion. Hindering a nation’s ability to wage war is important

Douhet made no distinction between combatants and non

combatants. The total mobilization of whole nations’ popula 

tions, economies, industries, and societies to fight in World

War I illustrated the difficulty of discriminating among a sol

dier on the front, a production worker manufacturing smal

arms, or a banker financing the war effort. A weak link in th

total mobilization effort was civilian morale. The linkage be

tween civilian morale and ending a conflict was the key t

Douhet ’s theory of airpower.

Unlike the soldier on the front, steeled by combat, civilian

morale was fragile and very unstable. If a nation could bom

production centers, cities, homes, and other areas where civil

ians congregated, then their morale would soon ebb. The dis

enchanted civilians would demonstrate against the war an

force their government to capitulate. In order to hasten th

destruction of civilian morale, Douhet advocated that an ai

force use any means to inflict damage upon the enemy. Thi

included the possible use of explosive, incendiary, and poison

gas weapons. Douhet thought that a combination of thos

weapons would create a synergistic effect that would deepen

the drop in civilian morale. Germany’s first attempts to us

primitive strategic bombers and zeppelins against London in 

spired Douhet concerning the possibilities of winning a war b

breaking a populace’s will. The German raids against Britain

produced no conclusive evidence about shattering the enemy’

will. Additionally, Douhet’s advocacy of a massive first strik

against the enemy underscored his support for the offensiv

use of airpower. The newly developed aircraft’s speed and rang

would allow the nation’s air force to conduct massive bom

bardment campaigns and render ground and naval forces use

less. The aircraft’s speed and the height at which it flew als

made defense against an offensive aerial attack difficult.

40
Douhet ’s ideas were developed in the context of the horror

suffered in World War I. On 1 July 1916, the British arm

suffered 20,000 deaths and 40,000 wounded during the Battl

of the Somme. German losses were over 6,000 killed an

wounded. The 10-month Battle of Verdun ended with ove

377,000 French and 337,000 German deaths. Aerial bom

bardment of cities with relatively fewer, albeit civilian, death

would be more humane than the slaughter in the trenches

Douhet reasoned that aerial warfare, under the command o

an airman, was less destructive than previous modes of com

bat. Aircraft put under the command of ground or naval force

World War I German aviator drops a bomb over the western

front. Bombing would later become a contentious issue

among theorists.

41
would merely act in secondary roles, like reconnaissance , an

not take full advantage of their capabilities. The full potentia

of aerial warfare would not be realized; only the horrors o

trench warfare would remain. Airpower had to have an inde

pendent role in future wars and not be subordinated to eithe

the army or navy. An independent air force organized to con

duct long-range bombardment at a moment’s notice was th

only answer.

The air force needed only two types of aircraft: “battleplanes

and reconnaissance aircraft. Douhet believed that an air forc

should be composed mostly of battleplanes, which would have

sufficient self-defense armaments to protect themselves from

enemy aircraft attack. These aircraft could act as defensiv

fighters and bombers but were designed primarily for bombin

missions. There was no need for a specialized interceptor o

attack aircraft with the deployment of the battleplane, which

could attack from any direction against an enemy. The expan

siveness of the air made ground and aerial defense agains

bombing missions nearly impossible for a defender to detect

plan, or execute. Seeking air-to-air combat was pointless fo

Trench warfare in World War I 

42
the stronger or weaker air force. Reconnaissance aircraft wer

used to gather information to “keep from being surprised b

the enemy.”4 Speed was the best weapon of these aircraft

which could detect enemy preparations for war and provid

information that would later be transformed into targets fo

the battleplanes . However, the main type of aircraft that an

independent air force should adopt was clearly the battle

plane; all others were merely ancillary aircraft that detracte

from the main purpose of the air force—strategic bombard 

ment.

Douhet ’s theory on airpower can be summed up by hi

statement “To conquer the command of the air means victory

to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of what

ever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose.”5 Although

much has been written about Douhet ’s thoughts on breakin

the will and morale of civilian populations via bombardment

command of the air was the key to the destruction of cities. In

Douhet ’s eyes, the command of the air allowed the air force t

accomplish total victory against the enemy relatively quickly

compared to the ponderous land campaigns of the time. To 

day, the prospect of bombing innocent civilians is repulsive

but we have adopted the idea that an independent air forc

should attack targets of national significance, not just civil

ians. Douhet speculated that a hypothetical aerial attack con

ducted in a single day on “governing bodies, banks, [and

other public services” might plunge Rome’s population into 

state of terror. 6 This is the effect Douhet believed might en

the war. The air force could create more problems for a city i

it also destroyed or disabled rails, as well as telegraph, tele

phone, and radio communications. Douhet ’s list of possibl

targets was the first recognition of what an air force bombard 

ment campaign should attack to affect the well-being of 

nation.

These ideas—an independent air force’s winning a war through

the exclusive use of airpower and establishing command o

the air—would soon attract many adherents and advocates o

airpower. Early aviation technology allowed Douhet to pee

into the future and develop his ideas about aerial warfare

Airpower was in its infancy, and as technology advanced, air

power advocates promoted many of Douhet’s themes. Some o

43
his ideas would be proven in combat during World War II

others resulted in tragic consequences for opposing forces an

enemy populations during the war.

Douhet ’s theory on airpower had several limitations. Asid

from the use of poison gas and incendiary weapons, Douhe

advocated a war against civilians to break the will of a popula 

tion. He also made several assumptions that may not be rea

Destruction of a German city in World War II breaks the will of the people. Douhet

hypothesis is tested.

44
sonable today. Douhet saw the public

s morale as fragile an

susceptible to being swiftly broken by aerial bombardment. A

a result, he reasoned that the demoralized population would

pressure the government to end the war—assuming that th

government listens to the population. But totalitarian or auto

cratic regimes might not listen. Additionally, populations ar

quite resilient to military attacks. Many cases in military his

tory record that when some cities were put under siege, a

occurred in the American Civil War, the population’s will did

not crumble. Another potential problem is the assumption

that the airplane or battleplane will break through enem

defenses unscathed and defeat the nation. Douhet did no

anticipate high technology’s refinement of defensive weapons

such as high-speed aircraft interceptors, radar, or antiaircraf

missiles. Arguably, Douhet’s theory works on nations that hav

large cities or industrial targets. Would his ideas be appropri

ate for a war against an insurgency with guerilla forces or an

agrarian society? There was almost universal agreement tha

a nation could be defeated by airpower. Little provision existe

for a nation’s size or type of conflict since war, in Douhet’

eyes, was total.

Despite these limitations, Giulio Douhet did write the firs

comprehensive airpower theory that helped give others th

inspiration to develop their own theories. His theory was 

starting place for many airmen to attempt to build an inde

pendent air force, carved out of their land and naval services

General Douhet provided the push to define and legitimiz

national air forces—a movement that carried into the post–World

War II era.

Billy Mitchell:

America’s First Airpower Theorist

William “Billy” Mitchell was a combat-experienced aviator in

the US Army who wrote about the use of airpower and it

future application in war. He was the son of a US senator an

joined the Army during the Spanish-American War. Mitchel

was an ardent airpower zealot who commanded American com 

bat aviation on the western front during World War I. He late

45
became assistant director of the Army

s Air Service after th

war. Mitchell’s name made many newspapers’ headlines when

he used Air Service bombers to demonstrate that these air

craft could sink captured German battleships. These experi

ments showed that the battleship was not invulnerable to ai

attacks and that aircraft could adequately defend the coast

as effectively as Army coastal-defense artillery units or th

Navy. He continued to press his case within the Army an

with the public. Mitchell was later court-martialed and re

signed as a result of his vehement advocacy of an independen

role for airpower and charges he made that naval officers wer

criminally responsible for an airship disaster.

Mitchell was not an originator of new ideas. Instead, h

borrowed heavily from existing concepts (e.g., those of Douhe

and others) and his experiences from World War I. He wa

adamant about the independence of an air force and the cen

tral command of air assets by an airman. Mitchell believe

that an autonomous air force, coequal in status to the Arm

and Navy, could conduct long-range bombardment against vita

centers of an enemy without attacking its land or naval forces

Additionally, he thought that an airman must command th

independent air force, that only “air-minded” countries could

fully support an air force, and that all aviation resources

including naval aircraft, should be controlled by this inde

pendent air force. The country should organize the three sepa

rate services into a unified department of defense. Mitchel

believed that airpower would dominate both land and nava

forces. Although Mitchell’s ideas sound similar to Douhet’s, h

differed greatly from the Italian general in several areas.

Mitchell believed in using aerial, long-range bombardmen

against an opposing nation’s industry and infrastructure. Un

like Douhet , Mitchell abhorred direct attacks against civilian

in any form. US Army aviators eschewed the concept of at

tacking defenseless women and children as politically unpa

atable and did not fully support Douhet ’s ideas. 7 Instead

Mitchell thought attacks against the war-making capability o

a nation were more effective. These targets included industry

agriculture, and infrastructure (e.g., roads, rails, bridges, wa

terways, and other vital centers). Attacking these targets re

quired precision bombardment in order to destroy factorie

46
Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, an early airpower advocate in

the US Army Air Corps

47
and avoid civilian casualties. Mitchell thought the bombing o

a nation’s “nerve centers” early in the conflict would signifi

cantly disrupt the country. 8 Instead of applying Douhet’s the

sis that war was won by breaking the will of the people , Mitche

tried to hinder the enemy’s war-making capability by attack 

ing vital centers of command and industry. The destruction o

a nation’s direct war-making capability would stop the en

emy’s ability to conduct operations. Although Mitchell believe

that air forces could attack an enemy’s homeland, he stil

supported the idea that land and naval forces would als

contribute to an enemy’s defeat. Armies and navies were stil

targets to be destroyed, and the airplane would enable a na

tion to do this at a lower cost and faster speed.

Mitchell did, however, champion the idea of gaining contro

of the air, like Douhet. Mitchell agreed with Douhet’s theor

that gaining control of the air was the first objective for any ai

force. An air force attempting to gain superiority over an en

emy’s air forces would do so primarily by conducting air bat

tles against enemy air forces. Mitchell believed that “the only

effective defense against aerial attack is to whip the enemy’

air forces in air battles.”9 This differed greatly from Douhet’

concept that control of the air be achieved primarily by attack 

ing enemy aircraft on the ground. Additionally, the ability t

gain control of the air would require specialized fighter aircraf

instead of battleplanes. Mitchell also advocated that an ai

force build a mixture of aircraft that included bomber, pursui

(fighter), attack (to support ground troops), and observation

(reconnaissance ) planes. In 1921, Mitchell estimated that thi

“balanced” force would be composed of about 60 percent pur

suit, 20 percent bomber, and 20 percent attack aircraft—hardly 

force dominated by strategic bombers. Mitchell’s perception o

force structure appears more balanced and capable of a multi

tude of missions for a nation. The long-range bomber was stil

the primary aircraft type, despite the acknowledgement of at

tack, pursuit, and observation planes. Bombers would delive

a knockout punch to an enemy’s war-making capability. Pur

suit aircraft could help defend the nation against bombin

attacks. For the United States, the bomber had to travers

oceans to strike naval vessels at sea or attack European tar

gets. Douhet’s Italian battleplanes would conduct their bom

48
bardment missions over shorter ranges than would American

aircraft.

After gaining control of the air, Mitchell’s air force could

attack a nation’s vital centers or other targets such as troop

formations and supplies. Any remaining enemy aircraft would

be occupied with defending their country from bombardmen

missions. Since two oceans protected the United States, long

range bombers could easily attack enemy battle fleets. In July

1921, Mitchell successfully demonstrated the ability of aircraf

to sink battleships when his planes sank the German battle

ship Ostfriesland and other vessels with 2,000-pound bombs

The sinking of this heavily armored dreadnought signaled 

new age for naval and aerial warfare. This dramatic show o

airpower dominance over a naval vessel once thought invu

nerable provided a national demonstration of airpower an

started a debate about the value of aircraft.

Mitchell’s ideas were instrumental in orienting future American

airpower towards bombardment and creating an independen

force from the Army and Navy. However, like Douhet , Mitchel

also made several assumptions about airpower that would

later be challenged under combat and practical experience

while others would be validated. Offensive combat air opera

tions were the keys to success. The bomber would get through

to the enemy’s vital centers, contingent upon a friendly force’

ability to win the critical air battles that would determin

control of the air. Mitchell thought that air defenses were no

as far evolved as bombers, which allowed offensive comba

operations to dominate aerial warfare. Antiaircraft artillery (AAA

and pursuit aircraft were not as technologically advanced, in hi

opinion, and the bomber appeared to rule the skies. If bomb

ers could get through, then enemy forces could also do th

same to friendly cities and industry. Additionally, advances in

technology that made the bomber supreme were not seriously

considered for the single-engined fighter.

Mitchell did bring many defense issues to the public fo

debate. Aircraft were pitted against naval battleships for th

mission of defending the United States. Mitchell sought a pub

lic forum on airpower issues rather than restricting himself t

a military audience, as did Douhet . Defense budgets wer

shrinking during the interwar years in the United States, an

49
services were competing for every defense dollar. Mitchell

bombing experiments exposed the vulnerabilities and poten

tial obsolescence of naval vessels to aircraft attack. Thes

experiments inspired Mitchell to embrace the idea that air

power would dominate both land and naval warfare in th

future. The creation of an independent air force from the Arm

also ruffled many feathers in that service. Many US Arm

leaders envisioned aircraft protecting ground units from en

emy bomber forces and supporting ground operations—no

conducting an independent bombing role. All of these idea

would be tested in World War II. Mitchell did not live lon

enough to see bombers’ domination of the AAF during World

War II or to see the creation of his cherished independent ai

force in 1947.

Sir Hugh Trenchard:

An Independent Air Force for Britain

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard was 

driving force within the RAF . Although he was not initially an

advocate of an independent air force or long-range bombard 

ment, he later defended the RAF as a separate service from

the army and navy. Trenchard was the head of the RAF , an

his ideas about what the service should be would ultimately

influence the RAF ’s performance during World War II. Whil

Douhet and Mitchell wrote about their theories in books an

articles, Trenchard used his position to advocate his theorie

in staff papers and lectures. Head of the Royal Flying Corps in

France during World War I, he later commanded the Inde

pendent Air Force (later the RAF ) in 1918. This separate ai

force was created to protect the homeland from the threat o

German aerial attacks.

Trenchard believed wholeheartedly in the concept that air

power’s strength lay in its ability to conduct offensive opera

tions. Additionally, he thought that an enemy nation migh

capitulate if a bomber force could destroy the will of its popu 

lation through attacks on vital industrial and communication

targets. Trenchard embraced the idea that the demoralize

population would rise up against its government and force i

50
to surrender. Trenchard 

s theme about crushing an adver

sary’s will through bombing sounds like Douhet’s beliefs—in

deed, evidence exists to indicate that Douhet did influenc

Trenchard ’s ideas. 1 0 Also, the chief of the RAF firmly advo

cated that control of the air was a prerequisite to all air opera

tions. Finally, he believed that such air-controlling air force

could be “substituted” for more expensive army units. Tren

chard ’s idea of substitution met with success in its application

in colonial Britain .

The notion that an offensive air force was paramount als

supported his idea of strategic bombardment. The strategi

effect of causing the enemy’s population to lose its will an

causing industrial capacity to suffer was justification for main 

taining a coequal service, separate from the Royal Army an

Royal Navy. Trenchard did not advocate the targeting of civil

ians per se; rather, he intended to attack industrial target

and infrastructure while limiting collateral damage.

1 1 He be

lieved that the “moral effect of bombing stands to the materia

in a proportion of 20 to 1” in terms of the effectiveness of an

aerial-bombardment campaign. 1 2 That is, the effect of bombin

on a population’s will was more substantial than the physica

damage it caused. Breaking the will of the people would com

from indirect attacks against a nation’s production centers—no

against their homes. Trenchard’s approach could break th

will of the people via factory workers who suffered from at

tacks on industrial targets. Curiously, Trenchard thought tha

the air raids against England by Germany actually raised Brit

ish morale .

1 3 He also advocated the use of night bombing t

deny the enemy any relief. Continuous bombing would com

plement daytime attacks and ultimately reduce losses from ai

defenses.

Like Douhet or Mitchell, Trenchard also thought that gain 

ing control of the air had to occur before any other air opera

tion could take place. Trenchard ’s combat experience concern

ing the lack of success in destroying enemy airfields led him

to the idea of air battles. The Independent Air Force devote

over 40 percent of its air strikes to attacks on German air

fields in World War I.

1 4 Once control of the air was achieved

the RAF could accomplish several missions. An independen

RAF could conduct strategic bombing missions to break th

51
will of the people ; it could support ground units against en

emy troop formations; or it might attack enemy supply an

transportation resources. Trenchard did not advocate that th

sole purpose of independent air operations was strategic bom

bardment. He never lost sight of cooperation with ground forces

Before its independence, the Royal Flying Corps heavily sup

ported ground operations, and Trenchard did not abandon

this concept.

During the 1920s and 1930s, British military budgets wer

slashed for economic reasons during the global depression

Great Britain ’s military still had to defend a vast empire stretch

ing from Africa to the Americas. Maintaining troops and nava

forces in those colonies was expensive, especially to a militar

stretched thin to cover global commitments. Trenchard intro

duced the concept of substitution or air control to remedy th

situation. Essentially, aircraft in combination with mobile arm

units could attack rebel base camps or forces threatenin

colonial status. The RAF could bombard villages, crops, enem

base camps, or any other targets, usually after a warning wa

given to the population. Air forces were to act as police at 

lower cost than an occupying army would incur. However

mountainous geography or guerilla forces, able to blend int

the local populace, proved difficult for air control to handle

But air control could and did work in several locations. In

1921, five RAF squadrons replaced 33 Royal Army and colo 

nial battalions. The cost of keeping an equivalent militar

capability fell from an annual outlay of £20 million to only £

million. 1 5 Not only was the expense reduced, but also casua

ties were lowered—and the RAF squadrons proved more mo

bile than ground forces. The RAF also pacified Somaliland a

an expenditure of £77,000, compared to an estimated expens

of £6 million—the equivalent of two army divisions. Thes

concepts were the beginning of using air forces as expedition

ary forces that could independently conduct operations fa

from home to satisfy national political objectives.

Whereas Douhet only wrote about his theories and Mitchel

brought public attention to the airpower debate, Sir Hugh

Trenchard actually applied airpower theory. Trenchard wa

able to develop doctrine, plan force structure, and groom fu 

ture RAF leaders schooled in the beliefs of strategic bombing

52
One of Trenchard

s greatest achievements was keeping th

RAF intact as an independent service. Defense budget cut

forced all services to defend themselves against reductions in

roles and missions. Trenchard succeeded in keeping the RAF

intact, albeit at a reduced size. Not only did Trenchard believ

in many of the ideas advocated by Douhet and Mitchell , h

made them more practical. He added the ideas of night bomb

ing, air control, and destruction of the enemy’s will through

attacks on industry and infrastructure to the growing debat

about airpower.

Jack Slessor: Support for Ground Forces

John “Jack” Slessor was a subordinate of Sir Hugh Tren

chard . He would later become chief of the Air Staff for the RAF

from 1950 to 1953. Slessor entered the Royal Flying Corps a

a pilot and later prepared the RAF for World War II. Slesso

shared many ideas that Trenchard believed, and he advance

several new thoughts regarding air support to ground forces

He was able to see several of his ideas put into action durin

his tenure as commander in chief of the Mediterranean Allie

Air Forces in 1944, during some of the most bitter groun

combat in Italy . Slessor’s contribution to airpower theory in

regard to attacking enemy forces behind the immediate battle

field was a revelation to many airmen. His assignment as an

instructor at the Army Staff College at Camberley from 193

to 1934 affected his views. He later published a book based on

his lectures at the Army Staff College entitled Airpower an

Armies and advocated a role for airpower to support groun

operations.

Slessor believed in many of the popular airpower theories o

the day, especially Trenchard ’s, including the notion that stra

tegic bombardment was the primary role of an air force an

that control of the air was a prerequisite for all air operations

However, his Camberley experience made him ponder how

airpower might support land operations. Unlike his contempo

raries who saw the horrors of trench warfare, Slessor wa

exposed to many technological marvels being discussed at th

Army Staff College—specifically, the tank. Perhaps the old con

53
cept of trench warfare would be relegated to the dustbin o

history. If armored and mobile ground forces could swee

through a nation, could they alter the face of warfare—a

airpower was about to do?

While Trenchard supported the concept of damaging the wil

of a population through attacks on industry, Slessor held 

view much like Mitchell’s. Slessor’s strategic-bombardment cam 

paign would concentrate on attacking important distribution

points, industries, communications, and other targets to shu

down industrial and war-making capabilities. Not all of th

industrial capabilities need be destroyed—only key industrie

that would force the collapse of certain production. Timin

and proper targeting (Slessor was vague about which targets

against a nation’s industry were just as effective as and mor

efficient than a war of annihilation.

What marks Slessor from Douhet, Trenchard , and Mitchel

is his concern about support to ground operations. His Air

power and Armies addresses issues about how airpower could

support British land forces in an expeditionary ground cam

paign. Slessor was not advocating the use of close air suppor

(CAS)—direct attacks against enemy forces engaged in comba

with friendly forces. Instead, he preferred interdiction—the de

struction of enemy supply and troop reinforcement to the bat

tlefront. Slessor thought of attacks on supply lines that would

curtail the reinforcement of equipment, ammunition, and con

sumable goods as a means of choking off the fighting capabil

ity of a foe’s ground forces. These actions would reduce th

fighting capability of the enemy and increase the chance of hi

defeat by ground forces. Control of the air would allow ai

forces to strike rail, canal, road, and other forms of transpor

tation during daylight. Cooperation between air and groun

forces would allow the nation to better succeed against th

enemy—the first seeds of joint planning and execution of 

campaign.

Jack Slessor did foresee occasions in which air forces neede

to conduct CAS missions. He provided three conditions tha

air forces and armies needed to achieve to maximize thei

chances of success for these tactical missions. First, the ai

force had to attain control of the air . This control was, at 

minimum, local or over the battlefield area. Preferably, the ai

54
force would control the air over the whole theater of opera

tions. Second, joint coordination between air and ground force

was essential in order to plan missions, ensure that timing o

attacks was carefully coordinated, and reduce careless execu 

tion that might result in friendly casualties from these ai

attacks. CAS missions required more coordination and inter

s ervice cooperation than interdiction strikes against enemy sup

ply lines.1 6 Third, a commander might use CAS missions in

three ways: to support a breakthrough against the enemy’

front lines, help pursue retreating enemy forces, or counter

attack an enemy’s attempt to conduct his own breakthrough

against positions held by friendly forces.1 7 Airpower’s role in

support of ground operations was better served in interdiction

than in CAS . The latter was more reactive, and one could

avoid attacks on friendly forces if the ability of enemy forces t

conduct such attacks was eliminated through interdiction .

Slessor’s experience in the Italian campaign during World

War II provided him firsthand observations of the effects o

airpower on a disciplined, entrenched German ground force

He made several interesting observations in “The Effect o

Airpower in a Land Offensive,” his report of 18 June 1944. Th

Italian campaign was fought over mountainous terrain tha

allowed German forces to build defenses and let them hav

access to several rail and road systems capable of resupplyin

frontline forces. He observed that airpower could not inde

pendently defeat a “highly organized and disciplined army

even when the army is virtually without air support of it

own.” Further, air missions cannot “entirely prevent the move

ment of strategic reserves to the battlefront” and isolate th

enemy. However, airpower can “make it impossible” for a de

termined ground force to mount a prolonged defense against 

ground offensive. Airpower could also turn a retreat by thes

organized forces into a rout, and this would “eliminate an

entire army as an effective fighting force.”1 8 Slessor’s view wa

that airpower, not land forces, significantly reduced the fight

ing capability of the German forces in Italy . This allowed th

Allied forces to grind down German forces and expel them

from the battlefield. His thoughts on interdiction , first deve

oped at Camberley, proved their worth.

55
Jack Slessor was an airpower visionary. He advanced th

ideas of using airpower to support ground and joint operation

between army and air forces but also saw the value of strate

gic bombardment against a nation’s war-fighting capability

Slessor also was the first airpower theorist to recognize tha

joint cooperation and coordination were necessary among ai

and ground forces in order to succeed with CAS and interdic

tion . Slessor provided a more practical and balanced view o

airpower than did Douhet, Mitchell, or Trenchard , Slessor’

mentor.

Claire Chennault: Pursuit-Aviation Enthusiast

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the ideas of Douhe

Mitchell, Trenchard , and Slessor were discussed by many mili

tary-aviation advocates. Strategic bombardment was a keyston

to all of their airpower theories. Bombers would get through

air defenses to deliver their deadly cargoes and destroy a na

tion almost single-handedly with impunity. Nowhere was thi

theory adopted more vigorously than in the United States. Th

Army Air Corps established the Tactical School in 1920 a

Langley Field, Virginia , to evaluate all aspects of air tactics

strategy, and doctrine . The school would later move in 1931 t

Maxwell Field, Alabama , and change its name to the Air Corp

Tactical School, where the faculty and students concentrate

on developing a strategic-bombardment strategy—the indus

trial-web theory. The ACTS industrial-web theory revolved aroun

the use of daylight high-altitude precision attack on a selecte

number of targets that, if successfully conducted, would col

lapse a nation’s industry. These selected industries would shu

down the “web.” Daylight precision bombing was required be

cause of the limited number of bombers available. Air Corp

bombers needed to attack these targets more efficiently an

effectively instead of using the mass bomber force envisione

by Douhet. Mitchell’s influence upon the Air Corps was insti

tutionalized within ACTS. But one man, Claire Chennault 

criticized these ideas.

Chennault was an unabashed supporter of pursuit aircraft

As an ACTS instructor, Captain Chennault questioned th

56
invulnerability of strategic bombers from modern air defenses

Bomber advocates assumed that an air defense force had little

chance of detecting attacking bombers as well as bomber

capable of defending themselves against interceptors. Chen

nault challenged these assumptions. His main thesis was tha

an air defense system needed to have a sufficient communica

tions and detection system created in depth with high-spee

fighters. This system could then successfully intercept an

thwart a bomber attack. Bomber enthusiasts believed tha

long-range attacks were limited only by an aircraft’s rang

since air defenses were ineffective. Chennault approached th

problem from a different angle: bomber effectiveness was lim

ited to its ability to avoid destruction by pursuit aircraft. Chen

nault was influenced by a series of antiaircraft exercises con

ducted in 1933 at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Chennault helped organize and plan the Fort Knox exer

cises, which involved the use of an early warning system com

posed of civilian observers, communications, and centralize

fighter-control centers to detect incoming enemy bombers an

direct pursuit aircraft to disrupt them. Chennault accused th

Air Corps’s bomber advocates or “bomber boys” of rigging th

exercise to understate the pursuit aircraft ’s capabilities. H

alleged that the defenders were forced to use obsolete pursui

planes against the Air Corps’s latest, fastest bombers. Chen

nault also accused Air Corps officials of denying the estab

lishment of air-warning sites near the targets. 1 9 He stresse

that the Air Corps needed to develop a high-speed interceptor

improve fighter training, and develop an early warning system

The Fort Knox exercises supported Chennault’s ideas. If pur

suit aircraft had sufficient warning, timely detection, and ter

ritory, then the bomber could be intercepted. Pursuit aircraf

required timely preparations to take off, as well as guidanc

and information about their targets. This requirement mad

long-distance detection imperative, with continual updates on

target location, speed, and direction. Only a well-designed

and-operated early warning system could deliver such infor

mation. Chennault also advanced the concept of using a mo

bile early warning system. Unlike the situation in smalle

countries such as England and Italy, the size of the Unite

States might make total continental air defense coverage to

57
expensive. Army operators could activate the warning system

in locations that faced an immediate threat and provide addi

tional support to those areas. Curiously, Chennault did no

strongly advocate the use of pursuit escorts to defend agains

interceptors. Perhaps his lack of support for an escort rol

was based on his emphasis on offensive actions for pursui

aircraft.

Chennault began to formulate a contrary view to the bombe

school of thought at ACTS , posing questions in five areas:

1. Should an air force be wholly of the bombardment type?

2. Should fighter types predominate?

3. Should an air force be “balanced” as to types?

4. Of what value are ground defenses against air attack?

5. Can fighters intercept and defeat raiders with any degre

of certainty? 2 0

These questions were a serious attempt to debate the merits o

developing a force fielded heavily with bombers. Most of th

previous airpower theories were written without experience o

experimentation—only speculation. Chennault’s Fort Kno

exercises did lend a voice to argue for aerial interception an

the potential vulnerabilities of bombers against modern fighters

Although in 1930, ACTS advocated using pursuit escort aircraft t

ward off enemy fighters from attacking bombers, this changed t

a doctrine of bombers not requiring any pursuit support. Th

advanced technology of high-speed, multiengine bombers allowe

these aircraft to outperform any fighters. Unfortunately, th

bomber advocates did not realize that technology might enable

the construction of equal or superior high-speed interceptor

and accurate detection systems.

Claire Chennault opened a debate about the control of th

air or air superiority. Douhet believed that his battleplane

could win the command of the air by bombing airplanes on

the ground at airfields. Mitchell advocated winning the skie

through air battles. Chennault’s defensive pursuit aircraft migh

place both ideas under more scrutiny. Pursuit aircraft migh

deny control of the air without actually winning air superiorit

and threatening bomber operations. Pursuit aircraft’s primar

role was to control the air by shooting down enemy airplanes

This early air superiority theory challenged Douhet and man

58
theorists at ACTS . Chennault also believed that pursuit air

craft were capable of missions other than interception.

Pursuit aircraft could also attack enemy airfields. They wer

flexible enough to operate under many conditions and could

be used in several areas to meet military requirements, 2 1 thu

allowing a commander to use airpower as a weapon of oppor

tunity. Chennault stressed that pursuit aircraft could be use

in either defensive or offensive roles. Mass pursuit aircraf

could provide a potent force to deliver devastating attack

against enemy bombers, which would not reach their target

intact, regardless of what Douhet thought.

Claire Chennault’s ideas would eventually be proven correc

in combat in World War II. An early warning system with 

well-trained and armed fighter force defeated a modern Ger

man bomber force during the Battle of Britain . Similarly, un

escorted bomber attacks on Germany resulted in massive casua

ties for Allied bomber aircrews trying to fly against German

interceptors. Only after the AAF started to use escort fighter

did bomber operations become more effective, reducing losse

significantly. Chennault ’s own experience in China with th

world-renowned American Volunteer Group—the Flying Ti

gers—from 1941 to 1942 underscored the value of effectively

using pursuit aircraft against enemy bomber forces and th

flexibility of pursuit aircraft to conduct a variety of missions

The debate about aircraft types that dominated debates in th

1930s is still the subject of headline news today.

William A. Moffett:

Father of Naval Aviation

Rear Adm William A. Moffett, US Navy, was a contemporar

airpower supporter and innovator during the highly publi

debates between William Mitchell and the Air Corps. Moffett’

concern was to apply the newly developed airpower to nava

operations. Douhet, Mitchell, and other airpower theorists con 

centrated on land-based airpower. In contrast, Admiral Moffe

applied the airplane to warfare at sea; this involved airships

land-based search airplanes, seaplanes, and the newly emerg

ing aircraft carriers. Moffett’s advocacy of aircraft carriers an

59
carrier aviation was most influential on airpower, resulting in

a debate rivaling the infighting within the US Army on th

future of aircraft. The Navy was divided between aviation ad

vocates like Moffett and supporters of the battleship. Although

Moffett did not create a theory of aerial warfare, as did Douhe

or Mitchell, he did have a vision of extending the strikin

power of the Navy through the use of aircraft to change nava

warfare forever. During World War II, Moffett’s persistence paid

off handsomely for the United States and its Allies with carrie

aviation . Mobile airpower, from the invasions of North Afric

to the island-hopping campaigns in the Pacific, proved th

power of the airplane at sea. Moffett also demonstrated th

value of the airplane over the battleship, when aircraft attack 

ing ships consistently demonstrated their superiority durin

Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea , Midway, the Mariana Islands, an

other battles.

Use of the battleship and capital ship dominated naval though

in the 1920s. The battleship supporters or “gun club” viewe

command of the sea as the main objective and believed th

In a demonstration of airpower at sea, carrier aviation supports operations i

Kosovo in 1999. Admiral Moffett’s dream is attained.

60
battleship would win the day by sweeping the sea of enem

ships in large naval battles. Aircraft were most useful but only

for spotting the enemy fleet and directing naval gunfire agains

targets. These aircraft were critical to ensuring that the flee

could sink enemies before being fired upon. Control of the ai

was important to keeping friendly spotting planes airborn

and keeping enemy fleet aircraft out of the air.

Moffett, a onetime battleship captain himself, was a gradu 

ate of the naval aviation observer courses—he was not a pilot

However, Moffett did embrace aviation as the future for th

Navy. In 1921 he became the head of a new naval bureau, th

Bureau of Aeronautics , which was responsible for all procure

ment, training, technical, and other issues regarding nava

aviation . The bureau even established a naval air factory t

build its own aircraft. Like Trenchard , he was in a position t

apply his ideas to an organization, but this time it involve

naval aviation to the fleet. Unlike Mitchell and Trenchard 

Moffett did not try to gain an independent role for aviation

Instead, naval aviation would better serve the fleet by integrat

ing its power into the Navy. Naval aviation would only strengthen

the fleet’s ability to seize command of the sea. 2 2

Moffett’s view of carrier-based aircraft significantly differe

from that of his battleship-supporting contemporaries. Gun

club supporters saw aircraft as a source of limited reconnais

sance, spotting for naval gunfire, protection of the battleship

fleet from enemy aircraft, and antisubmarine operations. Thes

battleship supporters believed that carrier aircraft could help

win a major naval engagement by attacking an adversary’

ships and slowing them down until friendly battleships could

engage them in battle. Moffett thought that a large naval-avia 

tion force launched from an aircraft carrier could successfully

conduct an offensive to defeat an enemy fleet, independent o

the battleship. 2 3 He had witnessed Mitchell’s successful bomb

ing experiments on the Ostfriesland. Moffett thought that th

Navy should not rely on a fleet composed mostly of battle

ships, should at least consider protection of the fleet by air

craft, and should use these aircraft for long-range strike op 

erations. More importantly, aircraft could sink heavy ships

and the Navy could exploit this new technology. Moffett be

lieved that aircraft carriers would be the cornerstone of th

61
future for naval aviation .

 Aircraft carriers were needed t

allow naval aviation to concentrate a mass of aerial assets t

strike at the heart of the enemy fleet—the battleship.2 5 Moffe

supported the idea that the Navy was the first line of defens

and that aircraft carriers would extend this line, bearing th

brunt of the nation’s defense.

He developed his ideas on a carrier task force in conjunc

tion with surface-force advocates. Using his position at th

Bureau of Aeronautics, he was able to develop long-range patro

aircraft for coastal defense (as opposed to Mitchell’s position o

using Air Corps bombers) and to push through the purchas

of aircraft carriers and their introduction in fleet exercises in

1925. As a result, Adm William Sims, a proponent of battle

ship superiority and an influential gun-club member, was con

vinced by Moffett of the carrier’s value. By 1929 Moffett saw

the fruits of his labor blossom when the USS Lexington an

USS Saratoga , the US Navy’s first modern carriers, were de

ployed with the fleet. The introduction of these carriers wa

aided by Moffett’s insistence that the speed and size of thes

ships would allow aerial operations to continue if land base

were denied to the United States. The naval-limitation agree

ments among Great Britain , the United States, Japan , an

others during the 1920s were geared towards battleships dur

ing this discussion. Moffett was able to convince Congress t

convert the Lexington and Saratoga to carriers and avoid vio 

lating the 1922 Washington Naval Limitation Treaty ceiling

on battleship strength by using this conversion. Japan’s con

struction of land bases on islands it received after World War 

would see American aircraft carriers take the war to thes

islands and the Japanese homeland later in World War II.

William Moffett was able to integrate airpower into a forc

structure that capitalized on the airplane’s superior range

speed, flexibility, and lethality. Naval-aviation advocates lik

Moffett avoided many of the acrimonious debates within thei

organization that dogged Mitchell, his supporters, and the Ai

Corps leaders. Aircraft operations were seen by Moffett as 

way to take a battle to the enemy. He stated that “the air flee

of an enemy will never get within striking distance of ou

coasts as long as our aircraft carriers are able to carry th

preponderance of airpower to sea.”2 6 Instead of Mitchell’

62
views that Air Corps bombers could take the war to an en

emy’s industry and interior infrastructure, Moffett advocate

the power of aircraft carriers to deny this ability to an enem

by striking at his borders and his fleet.

Alexander P. de Seversky: Airpower Advocate

Alexander de Seversky was an unabashed airpower propo

nent who helped shaped the USAF during and after World

War II. He was a Russian fighter ace in World War I, enginee

and founder of the Seversky Aircraft Corporation , Air Corp

reserve officer, and airpower theorist. Although de Seversk

did not have many original ideas, he refined a number o

Mitchell’s ideas and brought them to the American public’

attention. De Seversky’s ideas were popularized during World

War II in a Walt Disney animated movie Victory through Air

power (named after his first book) that educated the publi

and AAF personnel about airpower’s value to the Allied wa

effort.2 7 Unfortunately, many of his views were openly biase

against the Navy and were more propaganda than fact. H

also held a personal grudge against Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold 

commander of the AAF, because of a perceived slight from Arnold

over direction of the Seversky Aircraft Company. These view

limited his influence among many naval and several AAF offi

cers during the war. However, de Seversky’s drive to educat

the American public about the great value airpower offered t

defend the United States was invaluable in creating the USAF

De Seversky insisted that airpower was quickly becomin

the decisive weapon for modern warfare. Airpower alone could

not win a war. But aircraft would provide devastating blow

against an enemy’s industrial capacity and “blockade” or paralyz

his government. The reduction or curtailment of supply lines

communications, and transportation by aerial blockade could

severely hamper a nation due to airpower’s ability to strike a

any point—at sea or against that nation, as well as its colonie

or allies. Armies and navies would provide forces for occupa

tion and “possession” of the enemy’s territory. 28 Both Douhet’

claims that airpower could win a war through destroying th

will of the people and Mitchell’s contention about defeating th

63
enemy

s ability to conduct war were keys for de Seversky. H

believed that the proper application of airpower could halt th

effective and efficient running of an enemy’s government (i.e.

induce paralysis). But World War II events did not prove Douhet’

or Mitchell’s theories to be fully correct. The Luftwaffe ’s strate

gic bombing campaign against Britain in 1940, albeit limite

due to the RAF fighter defenders, did not destroy the will o

the people or stop the British war capability—neither did i

paralyze the government. De Seversky believed that the Luft

waffe failed to paralyze the British because strategic bombard 

ment first requires control of the air—something the Luftwaff

clearly failed to achieve. Additionally, strategic bombing re

quires the “correct” choice of targets, sufficient bombing ca

pacity, and continuity of effort. 2 9 The Luftwaffe failed to mee

these conditions; if Germany had accomplished these goals

the British government would have been paralyzed, leavin

the island ripe for invasion. United States airpower would d

better by avoiding the mistakes of the Luftwaffe through im 

proved weapons and planning.

The effectiveness of strategic bombardment depended on

the objective of the air campaign. Bombardment could accom

plish several objectives: strike a population, hit industry, o

attack enemy forces. Each nation had a unique set of “vita

centers” that could contribute to meeting these objectives. 

commander needed to have a clear objective for airpower t

strike. The commander then needed to assess the targets tha

were essential in a bombing campaign. De Seversky did no

attempt to define what these targets were; he merely parrote

much of the prevailing AAF thought: destroy all industria

infrastructure and crush the enemy’s ability to conduct war.3 

However, he believed that any war was really a total war

Destruction of the nation was the goal of airpower, and he pro

posed a strategy of “extermination.”3 1

De Seversky thought that airpower’s primary value lay in it

strategic offensive power. Long-range bombers could strike tar

gets within an enemy’s country or attack enemy forces fa

from American-held bases. Unlike surface forces that had t

attack enemy forces from the adversary’s outermost defensiv

perimeter, aircraft could bypass these forces and strike inde

pendently of surface forces. Any diversion from this use o

64
strategic offensive bombardment was a waste of valuable re

sources. Tactical support of ground or naval operations fell in

this category.

Control of the air was not only necessary for success in 

strategic-bombing campaign, but also was the key to the suc

cess of surface combat. Without air superiority, surface force

were at the mercy of enemy air forces. De Seversky stated tha

“no land or sea operations are possible without first assumin

control of the air above.”3 2 Pursuit aircraft were necessary t

accomplish this goal. The only effective means of destroyin

airpower was airpower. In de Seversky’s opinion, AAA an

other ground defenses were not effective against aircraft. Withou

adequate aircraft able to attack incoming bombers, the latte

could strike targets far out at sea or inland. Armies and navie

were vulnerable to air attack and needed protection. A corol

lary to de Seversky’s observation was that the Navy’s inabilit

to conduct a strategic offensive would lead to its replacemen

by airpower because of surface vulnerability to air attack.3 

Airpower made nations once thought invulnerable to attac

subject to massive aerial bombardment. America needed t

develop a large air force rather than devote resources to an

outmoded navy and army.

De Seversky had a profound effect on the postwar air force

Airpower advocates looked at the destruction, both physica

and psychological, wrought on Germany, Italy, and Japan

Certainly, airpower had contributed to much of the disintegra

tion of the Axis powers, but it did not obviate the need for 

ground invasion of Europe or occupation of Japan . Even th

atomic bombing of Japan did not lessen the impact that 

Russian ground invasion of occupied Manchuria and the threat

ened invasion of the Japanese home island by Allied force

had on the final Japanese surrender. Airpower alone did no

win the war, but it was a decisive element of the war. Bomber

and missiles armed with atomic bombs could provide an inter

continental strike capability against the Soviet Union durin

the Cold War. These weapons were capable of rendering 

near-fatal blow to a massive Soviet war machine. The Arm

and Navy would be reduced to the secondary role of mopping

up operations after airpower had delivered a staggering punch.

65
In the Cold War, the rise of American strategic airpower wa

a reflection of many of de Seversky’s views. Strategic bom

bardment—from both aircraft and missiles—replaced the tra

ditional emphasis on ground and naval forces as defenders o

the nation. Airpower’s transition to a premiere fighting forc

equal to its surface siblings finally occurred after decades o

debate and action.

John Warden: The Five-Ring Model

Col John Warden , USAF, retired, developed a theory of stra

tegic attack on a nation based on inflicting paralysis through

the use of airpower. Warden planned an initial air campaign

“Instant Thunder,” to attack Iraq during Operation Desert Storm

The plan was later modified for use in the conflict. Colone

Warden had written a National War College thesis on air cam

paign planning that served as a basis for his thoughts on

attacking an enemy. His views have been modified over th

years to define particular sets of targets that can be attacke

to create a paralyzing effect throughout a nation.

Warden believes that an enemy nation has certain center

of gravity (COG) that can create vulnerabilities to its security

One can classify these national COGs within a series of sys

tems. In Warden ’s opinion, successful attack on a hierarchy o

these systems can significantly contribute to the nation’s down

fall. Airpower can speed the destruction of the nation by at

tacking targets in a parallel manner (simultaneously) instea

of employing traditional surface combat that attacks target

one at a time or serially. Technology allows the precision at

tack of one aircraft against targets that once required fleets o

aircraft. These advances allow commanders to attack severa

targets at once instead of using all of their forces to attack on

system at a time. Parallel attacks prevent an enemy from

conducting military operations that may affect friendly forces

Additionally, after a nation’s air forces gain air superiority

they can conduct strategic-bombardment campaigns or sup

port surface forces. This gives air forces the freedom to attac

a number of targets among these systems.

66
Warden

s objective was to affect the mind of the enemy

leadership or the system of the enemy as a whole. While Douhe

thought that attacks on a population would break the nation’

will to resist, Warden disagreed, maintaining that one could

not successfully target human behavior and that the accurac

of changes was not sufficiently predictable to ensure victory

However, physical attacks on military and industrial target

that were properly linked to political objectives would provid

a better opportunity to defeat a nation.

An enemy’s “system of systems” is composed of five areas o

“rings.” This five-ring model was used against Iraq (fig. 1)

Warden later admitted that each nation has unique COGs tha

may cause a commander to view other countries with differen

rings. 3 4 These COGs provide air campaign planners a priorit

for basing their actions. The most important system or ring i

leadership, which occupies the center position within a serie

of five concentric rings. Leadership or command is critical as 

first target because important decisions, direction, and coordi

nation come from leadership. Disabling or destroying this rin

would separate the “brain” from the enemy’s “body.” This ac

tion is intended to leave the enemy nation without guidance

For example, the leadership ring might include an enemy’s top

national decision-making bodies, key C2 organizations, an

communications systems.

Other rings include organic essentials, infrastructure, popu 

lation, and fielded forces. Organic essentials are facilities o

processes that a nation requires for its existence. In the cas

of Iraq, these would include oil and petroleum processing

electricity, weapons of mass destruction , and nuclear process

ing plants. Infrastructure includes a nation’s transportation

capability. Hindering the efficient flow of goods and service

limits the country’s ability to conduct business and militar

operations. Targets include roads, rails, harbors, and airports

Warden did not advocate direct, indiscriminate attacks agains

the civilian population and felt it morally reprehensible to d

so. However, if pressure were applied through the population

to affect an adversary’s government, then this pressure migh

support the successful conclusion of the conflict. Enemy mo

rale might be lowered by continuous, around-the-clock attac

on a number of targets that would disrupt the normal, day-to

67
day lives of ordinary people. Fielded forces, the last ring, ar

the traditional military forces that armies and navies attack

The fielded forces of an enemy have been viewed in the past a

the most vital ring. But Warden thought that these forces wer

merely tools for the enemy to reach a particular end. If the

were incapable of conducting operations because of air at

tacks on the other rings, then they would become less capabl

of achieving an enemy’s political objectives. Warden propose

Figure 1. Warden’s Basic Five-Ring Model Used in Desert Storm

(Adapted from Col John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpowe

Journal 9, no. 1 [Spring 1995]: 47)

68
that one should attack from the innermost ring out. That is

the first ring to be struck is leadership, and the last is fielde

forces. Airpower allows a commander to hit all or selecte

rings in a parallel attack . The flexibility of air forces give

them the particular advantage of striking enemy systems in

many ways.

Warden’s theory concentrated on strategic effects on th

enemy force’s systems as a whole. These attacks might not b

directed solely against a foe’s fielded forces but might oppos

the political objectives of the nation. Technology has allowe

airpower to realize many of the capabilities that early theorist

(e.g., Douhet and Mitchell) could only dream or speculate abou

for the future. Warden ’s assumption about attacking an en

emy based on his systems or organizations may work for clearl

defined adversaries or operations. One wonders how Colonel War

den’s theory might translate against guerilla forces or terror

ists with unidentified COGs or rings.

Space Power Theory

Early airpower theorists found a readily available readership

among veteran World War I aviators and others who flew mis

sions or observed the actions of aerial combat. Unfortunately

military space activities, since their inception in the 1950s

have been shrouded in a cloak of secrecy. Although the Unite

States had a highly visible manned and unmanned civilian

space program, the classified nature of space surveillance

imagery, and other capabilities precluded a wide discussion o

military space theory. Additionally, international desire an

national policy to deweaponize space have also constraine

the discussion of military space theory. Finally, the influenc

of commercial space activities has seriously complicated th

military space picture. Nations that did not previously have

access to space communications, imagery, and navigation now

have the instantaneous benefit of using these assets withou

making the massive investment of resources or time require

for a space program.

Recently, there has been more discussion about militar

space activities due to the rapid application of space technolo 

69
gies to aerial weapons and surface activities, as well as th

explosion of commercial space usage. Unlike the theories o

early airpower advocates, few military space theories provide 

comprehensive treatment of manned and unmanned systems

Several authors have developed proposed space doctrines an

policies. Doctrine is guidance, based on experience or beliefs

provided to commanders for the conduct of military opera

tions. Doctrine is not theory; it does not provide a prediction

or explanation of an action or state of nature. A space theor

should address the issues of how and why military spac

resources accomplish national objectives.

3 5 However, there hav

been some attempts to develop a space power theory.

One theory about space power assumes that space is 

natural extension of the air environment. Barring the physica

differences between vehicles operating in the air compared t

those operating in space, advocates of this idea believe tha

the same actions capable of being conducted in the air can b

done in space. The only difference between air and space i

that space vehicles will fly faster, further, and higher than

aerial vehicles but will require more support. Strategic bom

bardment, space control, and other actions can be conducte

at a higher altitude than existing aerial vehicles can attain.

Another theory views space like the ocean. Space vehicle

provide a valuable resource that the nation needs to protect

Naval theorists, notably Alfred Thayer Mahan, maintained that 

seafaring nation needs to control the sea-lanes of communica

tions in peace—at least over sovereign territory—and durin

war. Sea control was necessary to ensure that nations could

conduct free trade. Control also allows a nation to deny th

same sea-lanes to a foe in war. Control of space is similar t

control of the sea. One may view the United States as an

emerging spacefaring nation, just as it was a seafaring nation

in the early twentieth century. The change in environment i

irrelevant since the concept is not dependent on geography

Military capabilities in space must be used to control spac

operations. A nation needs to control information produced b

space assets, protect support facilities and space vehicles agains

attacks, and maintain a capability to deny or disable an ad

versary’s space systems.

3 6 Increasingly, space is being used fo

lucrative commercial purposes such as telecommunications

70
Control of this medium would be similar to control of sea

lanes of communications to enable nations to conduct trade o

commerce.

A different approach stresses space systems’ innate abilit

to provide continuous situational awareness of terrestrial ac

tivities and their value to a nation. Satellites can detect activi

ties on Earth’s surface and relay that information to air, land

and naval forces for action. Additionally, space is vital to al

terrestrial activities—political, economic, and military. Thes

observations indicate that space power is a precondition fo

control of the sea, land, or air.3 7 This theory includes fou

conjectures. First, space assets become a necessary condition

to enhance the war-fighting capabilities of air, land, and se

forces. Second, space forces can attack terrestrial forces di

rectly and can also extend the damage inflicted by aerial an

surface forces. Attacks from space on surface forces by space

to-ground missiles , reentry vehicles, or other weapons are ex

tensions of high-altitude bombardment. Increased accurac

from space navigation and communications systems can als

enhance the ability to conduct precision attacks against tar

gets or identify previously unknown targets. Third, the nation

must deprive enemies from attaining any advantage in spac

that they might use against it. Fourth, fragile, valuable, an

scarce space assets must be protected. Space systems hav

become a decisive element to future warfare and are not in 

trinsically linked to airpower but are independently control

led. 3 8 Advocates of this theory foresee an independent spac

force, much like early airpower theorists predicted an inde

pendent air force in the 1920s.

Development of space theory is a fertile field. Today ther

are no weapons in space. However, this might change as th

value of space becomes more apparent to nations that want t

exploit space or deny its use to others. Space is still importan

because of its global access and ability to support terrestria

operations. Space-based communications, navigation, weather

early warning, surveillance, and other combat-support mis

sions are critical for aerial, ground, and maritime militar

operations. The relationship among space, air, land, and nava

power is vital to ensure that a nation uses its limited re

sources for the proper application of military force. Like th

71
airpower theories of the 1920s and 1930s, space power theor

is confined to a prediction of the future because of the limita

tions of available technology. Future aerospace leaders wil

grapple with many new issues and concerns, one of which wil

be to develop a space and, potentially, aerospace theory. Man

of the issues discussed and debated by Douhet, Mitchell, Mo

fett, and others may provide a basis for developing a spac

theory that explains the purposes and means of projectin

power to achieve objectives. Conversely, space forces operat

in a unique environment that may require new technologie

and specific methods to conduct operations. The challenge o

defining the value, use, and future of air and space operation

will require all the creativity and foresight of our future leaders.

Summary

Aerospace theory has changed through the years. The firs

theories addressed by Giulio Douhet were more akin to specu 

lation based on beliefs than theory based on extensive comba

experience. Later, ideas were tested in combat, or experiment

were conducted to gather appropriate information on which t

base a theory. Other airpower theorists revised their theorie

after a period of reflection. Ultimately, the theories of Douhet

Mitchell, Trenchard , and others provided a guiding hand t

define how aerospace power should be used, and this affecte

the development and employment of air forces around th

world. Theory clearly affected the development of the AAF be

fore, during, and after World War II, culminating with th

creation of an independent air force. The ideas of Mitchell an

ACTS significantly influenced the decision to adopt strategi

bombardment as a primary mission of air forces. After th

war, the United States used these ideas to assemble a nuclea

force of bombers and ICBMs to defend the nation.

Notes

1. A model is a representation of reality that explains an aspect of th

real world, item, system, or process.

2. Strategic refers to activities directly affecting the national survival o

the effective conduct of the overall war.

72
3. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942

reprint, Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1983), 29.

4. Ibid., 119.

5. Ibid., 28.

6. Ibid., 51.

7. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in th

United States Air Force, 1907–1960, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Universi

Press, 1989), 39.

8. Johnny R. Jones, William “Billy” Mitchell’s Air Power (Maxwell AFB

Ala.: Airpower Research Institute; College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researc

and Education, 1997), 9.

9. William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilitie

of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: Dover, 1988), 199.

10. R. A. Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’

1994), 44.

11. David R. Mets, The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classica

Airpower Theorists (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1999), 23.

12. John Terraine, The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in th

European War, 1939–1945 (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 9.

13. John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from

1909 to 1921 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 322

14. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Forc

Doctrine before World War II,” in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution o

Airpower Theory, ed. Col Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univer

sity Press, 1997), 52.

15. Alan Stephens, “The True Believers: Airpower between the Wars,” i

The War in the Air, 1914–1994: The Proceedings of a Conference Held by th

Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, March 1994, ed. Alan Stephen

(Fairburn Base, Australia: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, 1994), 51.

16. Interdiction operations include missions whose purpose is to de

stroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it affects th

operations of friendly forces.

17. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor,” 65.

18. Terraine, 598.

19. James Tate, The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward Avia

tion, 1919–1941 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 161.

20. Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Ai

Arm, 1917–1941 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 56.

21. Ibid., 62.

22. Dr. David R. Mets, “The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution o

American Naval Thought,” in The Paths of Heaven, 125.

23. Ibid., 127.

24. William F. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Nav

Aviation (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 90.

25. William F. Trimble, Wings for the Navy: A History of the Naval Air

craft Factory, 1917–1956 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 162.

73
26. Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United State

Naval Aviation (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 215.

27. David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Airpower Theo

rists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 631.

28. Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory through Airpower (New York: S

mon and Schuster, 1942), 346.

29. Ibid., 72.

30. Phillip Meilinger, “Proselytizer and Prophet: Alexander de Seversk

and American Airpower,” in Airpower: Theory and Practice, ed. John Gooc

(London: Frank Cass, 1995), 19.

31. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation o

Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 128.

32. De Seversky, 123.

33. Ibid., 125.

34. John Warden, “Planning to Win,” in Testing the Limits: The Proceed

ings of a Conference Held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, ed

Shaun Clarke (Fairburn Base, Australia: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre

1998), 87.

35. James E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Colorado Springs, Colo.: U

Air Force Academy, 1999), 11.

36. Ibid., 138.

37. Maj Robert D. Newberry, Space Doctrine for the Twenty-first Centur

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 22.

38. Ibid.

74
Chapter 3

Functions and Capabilities

of Aerospace Power: Air and Space

Superiority/ Strategic Attack

Air and space power theorists, combat experience, beliefs

organizational structure, threats, and other factors have shape

the composition and application of aerospace forces aroun

the world. These forces conduct several functions that can

support other military forces or can be used to conduct inde

pendent operations. Many of these air and space capabilitie

and functions were discussed and debated extensively b

Douhet , Mitchell, and others. Conversely, some aerospace ca

pabilities were developed as a result of technology or comba

needs. Regardless of their origin, air forces around the world

can conduct different levels of these functions and capabili

ties, given the appropriate resources, motivation, and opportu 

nity. Particular circumstances and situations may dictate th

relative importance of these functions. Each military situation

objective, or environment can influence a commander’s em

phasis on particular selections and focus for his or her forces.

Several functions characterize aerospace power, as dis cusse

in this chapter and in chapters 4–6. The first and foremost i

aerospace superiority. Giulio Douhet identified command o

the air as the first objective that an air force needs before i

can accomplish any other action. An aerospace force can con

duct both air and space superiority missions. Strategic attack

operations allow a nation to use its aerospace forces to directl

affect another nation’s ability to conduct war or exist as 

sovereign nation. This chapter addresses those two functions

Aerospace forces can also conduct operations to stem the flow

of supplies and forces before they arrive at a battlefield (inte

diction) or directly support combat forces in the field agains

the enemy (close air support )—both of which are discussed in

chapter 4. Surface and aerospace forces also need extensiv

logistical support to conduct operations and may require rapid

mobility of materiel, manpower, and other resources. Aero

75
space forces can rapidly transport resources from one conti

nent to the next within hours and use mobility to shape th

face of war. Space and information operations support th

gathering and processing of information through systems such a

satellites. Those two functions are the topics of chapter 5

Aerial reconnaissance also provides information for crucial com

bat and national-level decisions. These platforms and their sup

port systems give a commander a unique perspective to asses

enemy abilities, battlefield awareness, and combat results. A com

mander might exploit the flexibility of airpower by blending thes

functions and capabilities to support particular operations o

campaigns so that the enemy feels the full force of airpowe

unleashed, addressed in chapter 6. An air force might no

need to conduct an extensive air superiority campaign becaus

its adversary has few aircraft or ground-based air defenses . Bu

the air force may need much CAS to ensure that an amphibi

ous landing succeeds against a massive surface force.

Discussion of these areas includes three case studies fo

each function. Air and space superiority, strategic attack , in 

terdiction , CAS, mobility, and space and information provide 

visible reminder of aerospace power. The case studies are in 

tended to illustrate the particular function or show aerospac

power’s capabilities and their importance in combat or in achiev

ing an assigned national objective . In each instance, the firs

case study represents a failed application of the particula

function, followed by case studies of two successful applica

tions. Each of these studies showcases aerospace power in

different situations and conditions, some in ways never befor

imagined possible.

Many times, students are urged to closely follow successfu

applications of a principle or an idea. Future aerospace lead

ers must recognize that understanding the misapplication o

air and space assets is equally important if they wish to avoid

such mistakes and increase their chances of victory. A ver

valuable method for understanding the nature of aerospac

power is to learn from mistakes and problems. The case stud

ies that highlight the failure to achieve or conduct a particula

function should serve as a good starting point for discussion

of the successful application of aerospace power. Readers wil

76
find that evaluating and avoiding failure is just as useful a

emulating success.

Air and Space Superiority:

The First Order of Business

Air and space superiority is a prerequisite to all other aero

space functions and capabilities. This function allows a coun

try’s aerospace force to attack an enemy from air and spac

without fear of being attacked from forces above Earth’s sur

face. Air and space superiority also allows a nation the free

dom to attack a foe with aerial weapons. Air superiority can b

achieved through offensive counterair (OCA), defensive coun

terair (DCA) , and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD

OCA operations include attacks on enemy aircraft and air

fields, normally on or over enemy territory. Air forces use DCA

to defend their air assets against an enemy aerial assault nea

or over friendly territory. DCA missions can be used to den

an enemy force air superiority over a specific geographic area

An air force is proactive and uses its initiative to conduct OCA

missions, while it reacts to enemy initiatives by conductin

DCA missions. SEAD destroys, disables, or degrades a foe’s

surface air-defense systems. This mission normally include

attacks or the disabling of ground or airborne radar system

to avoid both detection and subsequent attack on friendly

forces; destruction of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and AAA

and the neutralization of command, control, and communica

tions activities that direct weapons against friendly air forces

Space superiority includes offensive counterspace (OCS) an

defensive counterspace (DCS) activities. OCS operations at

tempt to destroy or disable enemy space systems or the dat

produced by those systems through attacks on the space sys

tem itself, the information data link from the system to 

ground station, or terrestrial support facilities. Space force

can also conduct DCS operations to protect friendly spac

assets or their support systems from attack. This includes th

use of decoys, hardening systems against electronic or radia 

tion damage, camouflage, maneuvering, and other defensiv

measures.

77
Air and space superiority results in dominance over a foe in

the respective medium that allows the force the ability to con

duct operations. Command of the air, like command of th

sea, is a vital requirement to conduct operations with reduce

losses and increased probability of success. But how can an

aerospace power achieve air and space superiority? Why i

attainment of air and space superiority vital to a campaign

What can an aerospace power accomplish with air and spac

superiority? Reading these case studies should allow one t

understand the importance commanders place on aerospac

forces’ getting and maintaining superiority in air and space

Additionally, the claims of air and space superiority as th

prime objective for aerospace power can also be tested. Douhe

and Mitchell claimed that the first task of airpower was t

attain command of the air. How did the Luftwaffe fare in it

campaign against Britain without air superiority? Does thi

case study support the claims of Douhet and Mitchell ?

Eddie Rickenbacker, first American air ace, demonstrated early attempts t

gain air superiority in World War I.

78
The Battle of Britain:

The Luftwaffe’s Failure to Control the Skies

The Battle of Britain was a critical air campaign fought from

July to November 1940. The RAF and German Luftwaffe force

conducted the first major all-aircraft battle in history through

this campaign. The Battle of Britain demonstrated the value o

achieving air superiority to allow an air force to conduct 

strategic-bombardment campaign. This battle also revealed th

need for defensive operations to deny air superiority to an

enemy and their effectiveness in stopping a bomber campaign

Later, when Eighth Air Force flew unescorted B-17 and B-2

raids over Western Europe, we would relearn the lessons o

the Battle of Britain by paying a heavy price in destroye

planes and lost aircrews.

The Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, had accomplishe

a miracle of planning and operational execution to defeat Po

land, France , and other Western nations with a combination

of armored blitzkrieg attacks supported by the Luftwaffe . Grea

Britain ’s expeditionary force on the European continent ha

been dealt a stunning defeat at the hands of Germany an

had retreated across the English Channel from Dunkirk. Brit

ain was the only nation at war with Germany that threatene

Adolf Hitler’s attempt to conquer Europe. The Wehrmacht high

command speculated that it could attack England directly o

wage a war of attrition along “peripheral areas” in the Mediter

ranean. If the Germans decided to confront England directly

their options were to attack shipping and industry with nava

power and airpower, bomb civilian populations by terror raids

or invade England.

1

 On 16 July 1940, Hitler authorized Op

eration Seelöwe (Sea Lion), the invasion of England. German

was poised to deliver a knockout blow to England by conduct

ing a massive bombing campaign to eliminate the RAF as an

effective force to oppose an invasion of Britain . A major as

sumption of this plan was that the Luftwaffe would attain ai

superiority.

2

Hitler issued top-secret directive no. 17 on 1 August 1940

defining the objectives of the Luftwaffe’s air campaign

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Hitler’s second in comman

and commander of the Luftwaffe , was directed to

79
1. Defeat the RAF by first attacking flying formations, groun

organization, and supply lines. Secondary targets include

aircraft and antiaircraft-equipment production facilities

2. Attack harbors (after gaining air superiority) that engaged in

food supplies and food-supply production in England.

3. Destroy enemy warships and merchant shipping. The ai

war was to take precedence over war at sea.

4. Support naval operations and Operation Sea Lion .

5. Conduct terror raids only with Hitler’s express approval.

Göring prepared his forces to conduct operations on 10 Augus

1940 or Eagle Day. The Luftwaffe ’s high command interprete

Hitler’s directive as meaning first, achieve air superiority; second

support Operation Sea Lion by eliminating the Royal Navy an

RAF bombers that threatened the invasion; third, destroy British

harbors, imports, and supplies; and fourth, launch authorize

retaliatory terror raids on the British. 4 These attacks did no

specifically target fighter forces but the entire RAF. They would

include strikes against the RAF’s bomber and coastal commands

The Luftwaffe would eliminate the RAF as an effective fightin

force, thus reducing the possibility of an attack on German

and reducing British capability to oppose the German invasion.

The German invasion of England would require a coordi

nated Luftwaffe attack on RAF fighter planes, airfields, C2, an

aircraft factories. However, the Luftwaffe had been strained b

supporting a continuous European campaign since 1 Septem

ber 1939. Although the Luftwaffe stood victorious, it had los

thousands of aircraft and combat-experienced aircrews. Th

Battle for France, from May 1940 through June 1940, cost th

Luftwaffe 1,428 aircraft destroyed and 488 damaged.5 The Luft

waffe was designed to support ground operations, not conduc

a sustained strategic-bombardment campaign against indus

try or enemy airfields. Future victories were contingent upon 

rapid ground offensive and defeat of enemy armies. Luftwaff

aircraft were not designed to attack at long ranges or conduc

operations independently from ground forces. German lan

forces would capture any airfields that the Luftwaffe needed in

order to sustain combat operations and extend its range ove

the enemy. After smashing through Poland, the Netherlands

and France , the Luftwaffe ’s air-support force required majo

80
rest, rearmament, and reorganization. The Luftwaffe was als

involved in the invasion of Norway.

The Luftwaffe’s aircraft reflected its doctrine of supportin

ground forces. Their largest bomber, the Heinkel He-111, wa

a twin-engined aircraft designed as a commercial transport

The He-111 was underpowered and lacked speed. Other Ger

man bombers were faster, such as the Junkers Ju-88 or Dornie

Do-17, but they could carry only half the bomb load and ha

less defensive armament than the He-111. The Germans als

used the Junkers Ju-87 dive-bomber, a relatively slow, short

ranged, small-bomb-capacity, and lightly armored aircraft tha

worked well in close support of the army but had little valu

in a strategic-bombardment campaign.

In 1940 the Luftwaffe had two main fighter aircraft—th

Messerschmitt Bf-109 and Bf-110. The Bf-109 was a single

engined modern fighter that was a worthy adversary of RAF

fighters. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe , it did not have a lon

range, either to escort bombers or attack RAF aircraft deep in

England. The Luftwaffe did build the twin-engined Bf-110 es

cort fighter, which had sufficient range to support long-range

bomber missions. The Bf-110 suffered from low acceleration

and a wide turning radius, which made it vulnerable to RAF

fighters. Bf-110 pilots did have the advantage of heavy arma

ment, and the aircraft could dive against RAF fighters an

deliver a devastating punch. Often, Bf-110s would escort bomb

ers, while Bf-109s defended the Bf-110 escorts. German fighte

escorts for bombers were limited to southern England due t

the Bf-109’s internal fuel supply. Unfortunately for the Luft

waffe , the enemy’s industrial strength (i.e., aircraft, antiair

craft defenses, and other military production facilities) wa

concentrated in central England—out of effective Bf-109 range

The RAF could deploy its forces out of range of the Bf-109 a

any time, whenever fighter or aircraft losses became too costly

and could resume operations over southern England if Opera

tion Sea Lion were launched.6

In World War I, the RAF had learned its lesson to defend th

country from bomber and zeppelin attacks. The British devel

oped a radio detection (radar) system and integrated it into 

C

2

 system that directed fighter aircraft to intercept incomin

enemy aircraft. The Chain Home radar system could detec

81
aircraft at 120 miles and could determine an enemy aircraft

altitude, while its shorter-range brother, the Chain Home Low

system , could detect the presence of aircraft at only 50 miles

The combination of radar, C2, a series of observers, and mod 

ern interceptor aircraft would have to defend England agains

the onslaught of the Luftwaffe. Claire Chennault ’s theory o

how to employ pursuit aircraft would be tested in combat.

The RAF’s two main fighter interceptors were the Superma

rine Spitfire Mark I and the Hawker Hurricane Mark I. Th

Spitfire was equal to the Bf-109 in performance except for th

fact that the Bf-109 was faster at most altitudes and could

outclimb the Spitfire at altitudes up to 20,000 feet. The Spit

fire was more maneuverable than any Luftwaffe aircraft at al

altitudes—a key factor in fighter combat—and usually attacke

escorting fighters like the Bf-109. The Hurricane was out

classed by the Bf-109 except in terms of low-altitude maneu 

verability, and the British fighter could outturn the Bf-109 a

all altitudes. If the Hurricane had had a height advantage, i

could have defeated the Bf-109 . Hurricanes usually intercepte

the bombers. Also, the Hurricane’s very sturdy design allowe

it to take massive damage and still fly. The Spitfire and Hurri

cane were more than a match for the Bf-109, Germany’s bes

fighter, and were significantly better armed than the Luftwaff

bombers. The Bf-109s that escorted Luftwaffe bombers took

about half an hour to reach London . RAF radar and groun

controllers would take some time to identify the targets an

scramble aircraft. Spitfires and Hurricanes needed about 1

minutes to reach altitude and additional time to maneuve

into an attack position.7 This meant that the RAF had ver

little time to intercept invading forces. RAF Fighter Comman

had 347 serviceable Hurricanes and 160 Spitfires available t

fight 656 Bf-109s and 200 Bf-110s.

8

 By 10 August 1940, th

Luftwaffe had 2,550 serviceable planes, which included bomber

ground-attack, fighter, long-range reconnaissance, and othe

types of aircraft to use against the RAF and knock the British

defenses out of commission to ensure a successful Operation

Sea Lion .

The Luftwaffe’s air campaign was conducted in several phases

The Germans launched Kanalkampf, an attempt to attack British

shipping, harbors, and coastal targets. This phase lasted abou

82
six weeks, from 10 July to 7 August. Bf-109s dominated th

Spitfires and Hurricanes . German bombers struck convoy

and ports at will. The second phase was fought from 8 Augus

to 23 August. This phase included Adlerangriff (Eagle Day)

which the Luftwaffe launched on 13 August. Eagle Day’s ob 

jective was to gain air superiority over the RAF. The Luft

waffe ’s goal was to crush Fighter Command’s radar, opera

tions centers, and communications, as well as dominate th

Spitfires and Hurricanes . Fighter Command’s only reasonable

response was to hang on and not be destroyed. This phas

quickly became a battle of attrition. Although the Luftwaff

had a numeric advantage over the RAF , its force structure wa

not designed to conduct an extended air campaign. British

aircraft-production capability could replace destroyed Spitfire

and Hurricanes; however, it could not produce enough pilot

to fill empty cockpits due to combat losses. The third phas

concentrated on Luftwaffe attacks on RAF airfields and ke

industrial facilities, which would force Fighter Command t

commit to a massive air battle that would determine which

country would rule the skies over England. The destruction o

aircraft-production factories and airfields would eliminate no

only RAF Fighter Command as an effective military force, bu

also the entire RAF . The last phase, 7 September to the end o

October, concentrated on day-and-night bombing mission

against London . The London bombing campaign was Hitler’

response to the RAF ’s bombing of Berlin . This phase switche

the military objective from gaining command of the air to terro

bombing. This change of strategic direction ultimately cost th

Luftwaffe the Battle of Britain and forced the cancellation o

the invasion of England.

There are several reasons why the Luftwaffe was not able t

achieve air superiority over the smaller RAF Fighter Com

mand. The limited range of Bf-109 fighters forced Luftwaff

bomber forces to fly limited missions with the questionable

Bf-110 escorts. As a result, the Luftwaffe became subject t

massive bomber losses. Luftwaffe bomber attacks from Nor

way fared worse since they were sent into battle without Bf

110 escorts, which did not have the range to accompany th

bombers. As bomber losses mounted, Göring ordered the Bf

109s to provide close escort for the bombers and not attac

83
Spitfires or Hurricanes unless in defense of the bombers. Thi

change in policy limited the Luftwaffe ’s capability to contro

the skies. Bf-109s escorting bombers to London had only 1

minutes of combat time over the bombers’ targets. Accordin

to German fighter ace Adolf Galland, the limited range of th

fighters was the decisive factor in the battle.9 This change in

tactics allowed the RAF to take the initiative in most comba

situations. The Luftwaffe did not have enough Bf-109s to con

duct both escort and attack missions against RAF fighters an

airfields. Eventually, the RAF ’s Spitfires and Hurricanes de

nied air superiority to the Luftwaffe and were able to attac

vulnerable bombers repeatedly. The Luftwaffe lost a total o

1,636 aircraft during the Battle of Britain , but, more impor

tantly, it could never replace experienced aircrews.1 0 The RAF

lost about 915 aircraft.

The British radar, communications, and C2 system were no

disabled by Luftwaffe attacks. The value and necessity of gain 

Bombing of Britain

84
ing information about an aerial adversary was amply demon

strated in the Battle of Britain . RAF personnel were able t

detect and counter Luftwaffe attacks by directing fighter air

craft to intercept aircraft. This capability provided a distinc

advantage to RAF defensive forces.

The Luftwaffe also suffered from poor intelligence. German

military intelligence consistently overstated RAF losses an

understated German aircraft destroyed. Luftwaffe target infor

mation was too old, incomplete, or incorrect. German pilot

often took off from their airfields to conduct missions withou

knowing about RAF battle losses or conditions of their targets

The British not only had radar, but also had captured a Ger

man encryption device that allowed them to decipher Luft

waffe battle plans. The system, Ultra , gave British leader

advanced warning on daily German objectives.

German aircraft and the organization of the Luftwaffe als

affected the battle. Luftwaffe aircraft that successfully defeate

the ground forces and obsolete air forces over Western Europ

were not capable of a sustained, long-range battle of attrition

against the RAF . The Luftwaffe’s CAS air force was incapabl

of absorbing massive losses. Additionally, the bomber forc

was not trained, organized, or armed to conduct sustaine

industrial and airfield attacks.

One of the major mistakes in World War II was the Luft

waffe ’s switch from its strikes on RAF Fighter Command to 

terror campaign against London. Fighter Command was nea

collapse due to fighter, pilot, and airfield losses. If the Luft

waffe had continued its campaign, Fighter Command would

have folded and ceded both air superiority and victory to Ger

many. The shift away from efforts to gain air superiority was 

fatal flaw of the Luftwaffe campaign. Also, the switch to 

terror campaign provided the “miracle” to Britain and allowe

it to recover and defeat the Luftwaffe.

The final factor, certainly not an insignificant one, was Fighte

Command’s outstanding performance. Spitfire and Hurrican

aircraft proved an even match for the Bf-109 and the German

air force. Pilot and ground crews maintained fighter opera

tions during the four critical months of the battle. The RAF

hung on to defend the nation and successfully denied com

mand of the air to the Luftwaffe . This led to German cancella 

85
tion of Operation Sea Lion and to Hitler

s critical error o

invading the Soviet Union . The fate of the war was altered ove

a question of air superiority.

Total Air Domination: The Six-Day War

The Israeli Six-Day War in June 1967 is a classic example

of an air force gaining air superiority. The Israeli Defens

Forces/Air Force used surprise, offensive tactics, mass, an

other principles of war to conduct a preemptive strike agains

the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) and then a lightning air assaul

on the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF). Both attacks allowed th

IDF/ AF to reduce a larger air force to a pile of twisted meta

amid burning airfields. This one-day strike was a knockou

punch that let the IDF/AF achieve total air domination t

bomb and strafe Arab ground forces unmercifully before Is

raeli armored forces mauled the survivors. Air superiority gav

the IDF/AF freedom from attack since it destroyed EAF an

SAAF fighters on the ground. Israel was also able to conduc

bombing runs and achieve overall freedom to attack facilities

troops, roads, and other targets.

During the early 1960s, several Arab nations took actions t

antagonize and harass Israel. In 1964 a meeting among offi

cials from the governments of Egypt, Syria , Jordan , and Leba

non ended in agreement to divert water from the Jordan Rive

and significantly reduce water for Israeli use. Israeli force

were able to destroy the water project after responding to 

series of Syrian artillery shellings of Israeli military positions

There were also several cross-border raids by guerilla force

against Israeli settlements that resulted in retaliatory air an

ground operations. In April 1967, Israeli air and ground force

also attacked the Golan Heights after Syrian artillery unit

shelled surrounding Israeli homes and farms. Israeli militar

forces began to mobilize for a possible attack on their nation

because of the increased frequency of raids and confronta

tions. The Egyptian and Syrian governments also believed tha

Israel was poised to conduct a preemptive attack on thei

nations. The Egyptian government demanded that United Na 

tions (UN) peacekeepers leave the Sinai desert, a buffer zon

created between Israel and Egypt after the 1956 Suez War t

86
avoid detection of Egyptian military preparations. With Englan

and France, Israel had participated in a surprise attack on

Egypt in 1956. At the end of the war, Egypt lost control of th

Sinai peninsula. The Sinai was put under UN protection t

preclude any aggressive moves by Egypt against Israel (fig. 2).

Egypt, Syria , and other Arab nations started to mobiliz

their military forces. Egyptian army units occupied position

in the Sinai and across the Israeli border. By 20 May, ove

10,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks were on Israel’s bor

der. 1 1 Egypt also closed Israel’s access to the Red Sea through

the Strait of Tiran on 22 May. Arab countries started to sen

Figure 2. Egypt

87
ground units to ring Israel with a force of no fewer than 250,00

troops; 2,000 tanks; and over 700 aircraft. War seemed inevi

table, and Arab military forces were prepared to cut Israel in

two. Israel also prepared for action.

The Arab air forces were much larger than the IDF/AF on

the eve of the Six-Day War. The EAF had a force of over 20,00

personnel and 450 combat aircraft. Soviet aircraft dominated th

EAF arsenal, which included frontline MiG-21 Fishbed fight

ers, one of the most deadly interceptor aircraft in the world

The EAF also possessed Tu-16 Badger strategic bombers arme

with air-to-surface missiles that threatened Israeli cities, in 

dustrial centers, and other targets. The Tu-16s could carry 

payload of over 20,000 pounds. These bombers were the greates

threat to Israel since they could hit their targets within thre

minutes of entering Israeli early warning radar coverage an

did not need to enter Israeli airspace to launch their mis

siles.

1 2 The Egyptian military also had Il-28 Beagle bomber

that also had the range to strike Israeli targets. The EAF did

suffer from poor reliability, a severe lack of trained pilots with

combat experience, and doctrine based on that of the Sovie

air force , which limited the EAF pilots’ flexibility and initiative

SAAF, a smaller-scaled EAF without the Tu-16, had about 15

aircraft. The even smaller Jordanian and Iraqi air forces mad

up the bulk of the other forces.

IDF/ AF forces had a much smaller force structure. Israel

air forces fielded about 245 combat aircraft. The Israelis ha

72 Dassault Mirage IIICJ fighter-bombers, 18 Super Myster

B.2 fighter-bombers, 50 Mystere IV-A fighter-bombers, an

several obsolete fighter-bombers and trainers pressed into servic

for combat use. The IDF/AF used multipurpose aircraft be

cause of financial and manpower constraints. These aircraf

needed to perform several functions adequately to defend th

nation. The IDF/AF had to rely on superior strategy, training

and planning to make up for its lack of force structure. IDF/ A

pilot training produced some of the world’s finest air-to-ai

and air-to-ground attack pilots. Unfortunately, the numeri

advantage of the Arab air forces required IDF/AF planners t

look for new ways to neutralize the Arab advantage.

The IDF/AF planned to defeat the Arab air forces individu 

ally by a massive OCA operation. An air-to-air battle was no

88
feasible because of the Arabs’ large force structure. Instead

IDF/ AF planners would conduct a low-level, high-speed attac

on EAF airfields first and then strike the SAAF . An initia

attack on the EAF would eliminate the threat of the Tu-16

and defeat the larger of the two Arab main air forces . Th

IDF/ AF would need a massive strike that would destroy a

most all EAF aircraft on the ground and their runways with ou

a requirement to repeat or sustain further operations agains

those targets. The IDF/AF commander, Maj Gen Mordecha

Hod , decided not to attack the EAF and SAAF simultaneously

since he was not assured of a decisive strike on both forces

due to his limited forces.1 3 Hod ordered 12 aircraft held bac

to defend Israel. All remaining combat aircraft would strafe

and bomb EAF airfields in a surprise attack.

This proposed attack had three main goals: achieve air su 

periority, destroy the Arab air forces as an effective offensiv

fighting force, and allow the IDF/AF to support ground opera

tions after the destruction of the EAF and SAAF. The IDF/AF

conducted routine training missions that it would later mimi

on the day selected to conduct the surprise attack. Thes

missions were designed to lull the EAF into a feeling that the

were not the start of combat operations. Israeli fighter-bomber

The MiG-21 jet fighter was the nemesis of the US Air Force in the Vietnam Wa

and of the IDF/AF in the Six-Day War of 1967.

89
would carry air-to-ground munitions only—no air-to-air mis

siles —to maximize the destruction of enemy aircraft and air

fields. These aircraft would fly at low levels to avoid Egyptian

radar and air defense systems. After the attack on EAF forces

the IDF/AF would switch its efforts to the SAAF . Hod assume

that the SAAF would need at least two-and-a-half hours afte

the notification of the EAF strike to prepare and respond t

the IDF/AF .

Planning called for the initial wave of IDF/AF fighter-bomb

ers to reach their targets in the early morning during a period

when EAF morning patrols were returning to base and ther

were few fighters in the air to oppose the IDF/AF . During thi

time, most EAF senior officers were commuting from thei

homes and bases and were not available to direct operations

Israeli forces had to make the most efficient use of forces—econ

omy of force—and persist in their operations. This operation

required rapid logistical support in terms of rearming an

refueling combat planes. Instead of relying on a large numbe

of aircraft, the IDF/AF would have to increase the tempo an

number of missions per aircraft to conduct the campaign. Th

entire operation depended on surprise. Israel would have t

conduct the air campaign under strict secrecy. A preemptiv

attack was key to trade force size for surprise. The IDF/AF 

with approval of the Israeli prime minister and Cabinet, planne

to begin the war at 0745 (0845 Cairo time) on 5 June 1967. 14

Another clear, blue-sky morning greeted IDF/AF pilots a

they took off from airfields throughout Israel. By 0700, 12

IDF/ AF warplanes were winging their way to attack EAF air

fields throughout Egypt. The aircraft flew out in three waves o

40 aircraft. One wave, composed of Mirage and Super Mys

teres, flew west, out to the Mediterranean Sea, and then turne

south to strike EAF airfields along the Sinai Canal. Othe

aircraft struck directly south from the Israeli border agains

airfields and targets in the Sinai. The last wave hit airfield

along the Red Sea and interior of Egypt. The first wave wa

unopposed—a great strategic surprise that caught the EAF of

guard and vulnerable to heavy damage.

Four aircraft from each wave were assigned to strafe an

bomb each airfield. The four aircraft were scheduled to com

plete their airfield assault in 10 minutes. A follow-on attack b

90
the next wave of jets was scheduled to strike other airfields 1

minutes after the initial wave. The third wave followed. IDF/ A

aircraft returned to base, and ground crews refueled, rearmed

and repaired aircraft hit by AAA, all within 15 minutes o

landing. 1 5 The Israelis were able to throw eight more waves o

aircraft against the EAF for an additional 80 minutes of bomb

ing. 1 6 There was a 10-minute pause after this blitz, followed b

another eight waves of aircraft attacks. The EAF was devas

tated within three hours, with over 300 EAF aircraft destroye

or damaged. There were only a handful of EAF attempts to pu

aircraft into the sky to oppose the IDF/AF . One unsuccessfu

attempt was flown out of the Abu Sueir airfield. The EAF

launched 20 MiG-21 interceptors that met 16 IDF/AF Mirag

jets over the airfield. The EAF lost four MiG-21s to the IDF/AF

in this engagement.

The successful strike against the EAF allowed the IDF/AF t

turn its attention to the SAAF and the Royal Jordanian Ai

Force (RJAF). EAF aircraft and forces were unable to launch 

counterattack against Israel. The SAAF and RJAF did manag

to get aircraft into the air to strike Israeli targets, includin

airfields and an oil refinery. These Arab air attacks resulted in

little significant damage, however. The IDF/AF responded with

a heavier aerial attack against airfields in Syria and Jordan

Four SAAF airfields were hit, resulting in the destruction o

about two-thirds of the SAAF aircraft. The RJAF was virtually

demolished on the ground and ceased to be an effective fight

ing force for the rest of the war. All but one of its comba

aircraft were destroyed in the attacks. The IDF/AF also struc

Iraqi airfields.

At the end of the day, the RJAF was completely eliminated

the EAF was heavily damaged, and the SAAF would have t

struggle to conduct a minimum of operations. The IDF/AF ’

preemptive attack had hit 25 airfields and destroyed hundred

of Arab aircraft . The IDF/AF claimed 240 EAF , 45 SAAF , 1

RJAF , and seven Iraqi aircraft destroyed on the ground and in

the air. 1 7 The IDF/AF admitted to 19 aircraft lost. After thes

actions, the EAF and other Arab air forces were never a seri

ous threat to Israel or its military forces throughout the Six

Day War. The EAF, SAAF, and Iraqi air force managed som

limited missions against Israeli military forces, but these wer

91
conducted by exception. The IDF/AF was free to concentrat

on supporting the army’s ground operations and striking th

enemy’s ground forces.

Israel’s bold use of preemptive bombing and strafing of air

fields and aircraft on the first day of the war allowed th

IDF/ AF to achieve air superiority. The Arab air forces were no

able to respond or take any actions against the IDF/AF . Thi

allowed the IDF/AF the flexibility to continue attacks on air

fields; support the eventual capture of much Arab territory b

the Israeli army; and pummel retreating Arab ground forces

The IDF/AF gambled on the attack by using surprise and it

highly trained fighter-pilot force to overcome the numeri

strength of the Arab air forces. The attacks not only reduce

the opposition forces facing the IDF/AF, but also severel

shocked the Arab governments. The Arab military forces tha

were readying for a possible offensive were put on the defen

sive with a demoralized force. The character of the war for th

Arabs swiftly changed to a conflict unplanned by the Cairo o

Damascus governments. Instead of a swift victory for the Egyp

tians and Syrians, a one-day campaign, through air supe

riority, turned into a humiliating defeat. Israel’s superior training

force employment, planning, initiative, and logistical suppor

ruled the day for the IDF/AF .

The importance of air superiority was amply demonstrate

in the Six-Day War. The attainment of air superiority gav

Israel the opportunity to use a smaller air force to destro

forces much larger than its own. The value of air forces in 

modern war was proven with a carefully planned campaign

Additionally, the IDF/AF revealed the value of airpower agains

ground forces without air superiority. If the IDF/AF had no

gained command of the air, the Arab air forces might have

inflicted more losses on the IDF/AF and created a war o

attrition that would have lengthened the conflict and threat

ened the existence of Israel.

Air Superiority and Operation Overlord

The turning point of combat in the European theater of opera

tions in World War II was the invasion of continental Europe

Operation Overlord , by Allied forces in Normandy, France, on

92
6 June 1944. The successful landing of American, British, an

other Allied forces was the beginning of the end of the German

Wehrmacht’s domination of Western Europe. The long-awaite

invasion required sufficient forces, logistics , and freedom from

Luftwaffe attacks on the beaches, as well as the initial Allie

footholds in France. The AAF’s Eighth and Ninth Air Force

were to prepare the battlefield for Allied ground forces. Th

Eighth Air Force commander, Maj Gen James Doolittle , or

dered his command to continue using its Boeing B-17 an

Consolidated B-24 bombers to disrupt German industry an

to use Republic P-47 and North American P-51 escort fighter

to strangle Luftwaffe fighter resources.

1 8 AAF bomber and fighte

units were to first focus on the Wehrmacht’s overall comba

capability and then concentrate on supporting ground com

manders for Overlord and subsequent operations. Ninth Ai

Force was a “tactical” organization devoted to ground-suppor

missions. The Ninth had one purpose: support operations fo

Overlord. Fighters from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces—2,00

airplanes—and the Ninth ’s medium-bomber force were to con

duct Operation Pointblank.

Operation Pointblank’s goal was to make Overlord possible

by destroying German military, industrial, and economic power

as well as the Germans’ morale.

1 9 A combined offensive tha

involved AAF and RAF forces, starting in the spring of 1943

was used to destroy the Luftwaffe. These attacks would drain

the Luftwaffe ’s resources from other fronts to protect the Reich

and allow the Allies to pursue their plans to invade France.

2 

Allied planners for Overlord envisioned airpower’s playing 

key role for the invasion’s success. Luftwaffe fighter strength

was rising fast, and if the Allies wanted to achieve air supe

riority, the Luftwaffe ’s fighter strength had to be sharply re

duced. Continued attacks on the heart of Germany would

cause munitions production to concentrate on more AAA an

defensive fighters, not bombers or other ground offensive weap

ons. This would reduce Germany’s ability to threaten Ameri

can, British, and Soviet forces. Additionally, large bombin

raids would force the Luftwaffe fighters to rise to defend Ger

man industries and allow the Allied fighters to engage th

German air force in combat. RAF and AAF bombers were als

used to hit airfields and aircraft-production facilities. The initia

93
efforts of Pointblank were disappointing. German fighters sho

down many AAF bombers as they attempted bombing run

over industrial targets over Europe in daylight.

The AAF upgraded its primary fighter escorts for the bomb

ers by replacing its less capable Lockheed P-38 twin-engine

fighters with the superior P-51 Mustang longer-range aircraft

The AAF also introduced long-range drop tanks that extende

the range of all its fighters—P-38, P-47, and P-51. These modi

fications allowed the Eighth to oppose Luftwaffe air defense

on a more than equal footing, which helped reduce bombe

losses. The bombers were also aided by a new H2X rada

guidance system that would assist bombers in finding thei

targets—even in bad weather that would have forced a mis

sion cancellation. On 20 February 1944, the Allies launche

“Big Week,” an attempt to destroy 12 key Luftwaffe aircraft

production facilities. AAF and RAF forces also smashed air

fields, petroleum-storage facilities, key aircraft-component pro

duction sites (e.g., ball-bearing plants), and other targets. Th

Germans were forced to disperse their vulnerable industry

and that placed an immediate strain on Germany’s overloade

transportation system. The German aircraft industry was abl

to produce at least twice as many fighter aircraft than in

previous months because of dispersing, maximizing efficien

cies, and significantly reducing production of other weapons

Fighter-aircraft production was only 1,300 aircraft per month

in January; this increased to 1,600 planes by April and mush

roomed to 3,000 by September. 2 1 The results of Big Week wer

still costly to Germany. The AAF and RAF dropped close t

19,000 tons of bombs and lost about 400 planes. The Luft

waffe lost 600 aircraft but, more importantly, sacrificed irre

placeable, experienced fighter pilots. Over 150 Luftwaffe fight

ers were lost in five days. 2 2 From January to June 1944, th

Luftwaffe lost over 2,262 fighter pilots. 2 3 In May 1944, German

fighter-pilot losses represented 25 percent of the entire force

By March 1944, the Luftwaffe had lost over 56 percent of it

fighter force to air attacks. The Allied bombing campaign achieve

its objective: crush the Luftwaffe, especially the fighter forces

Germany did not have the capacity to effectively challenge th

RAF and AAF over Berlin , let alone the invasion area in far

away Normandy.

94
The Eighth 

s bombers switched targets from mostly strate

gic industrial targets to additional support for the Overlord

campaign. AAF bombers started to attack German airfield

and the transportation systems throughout France . Bomber

continued to hammer oil- and aircraft-production facilities

The Luftwaffe was stretched very thin. Experienced pilot re

placements were dwindling, fuel to operate and train force

was running low, airfields were pushed further east to avoid

AAF attacks, and Allied air strength was growing. The effective

fighting force for the Luftwaffe was slowly changing to an

ill-trained fighter defense force, which limited its ability t

conduct operations. The RAF and AAF began to face Luftwaffe

opposition that was only a shadow of what it had been a few

months earlier. The Allies were winning the war of air supe

riority through a combination of attacking industry, disruptin

airfields, and dominating the air through air-to-air victories

The RAF and AAF were using all means to gain air superiority.

Allied air forces began to concentrate their attacks on 

number of targets as the proposed invasion date neared. Th

RAF and AAF struck transportation, materiel, troop concen

trations, fortifications, and other targets that would directly

hinder the invasion. AAF and RAF planners concentrated thei

efforts against Luftwaffe airfields within 150 miles of Caen , th

major city closest to the Normandy beaches.2 4 On 10 May, th

Luftwaffe ’s radio and radar systems also came under an aeria

onslaught to reduce the C2 of enemy forces before the invasion.

Operation Overlord required complete mastery of the skie

to allow the initial amphibious invasion forces to consolidat

their positions on Normandy (fig. 3). The Allied Expeditionar

Air Force was formed to support the invasion. It consisted o

173 fighter or fighter-bomber squadrons, 59 light or medium

bomber squadrons, and 50 support-aircraft squadrons. Fif

teen squadrons supported coverage over the invasion fleet, 5

squadrons provided support over the beaches, 33 squadron

escorted bombers or conducted strafing missions in fighte

sweeps, another 33 squadrons hit targets inland of the imme

diate invasion area, and 36 provided direct CAS to groun

units. 2 5 Additionally, RAF Bomber Command and other AAF

units would lend support. These forces totaled close to 12,00

aircraft.2 6 American and British air forces were ready to dom

95
nate the skies over France by hunting for Luftwaffe fighters in

Normandy. The Luftwaffe had only about 170 serviceable air

craft to oppose over 5,600 fighters.2 7 Allied forces were able t

fly a total of 14,674 sorties, or aircraft missions, over Nor

mandy, with a loss of 113 aircraft, mostly due to ground fire. 2 

The invasion was a success, due in great part to the lack o

opposition air forces. The Luftwaffe was forced to stay on th

ground, and very few Luftwaffe missions were flown agains

the invasion forces. By 10 June, RAF and AAF aircraft wer

operating from airfields in France, and that strengthened th

Allied death grip on the Luftwaffe in France .

The Luftwaffe was ineffective in stopping the RAF and AAF

from dominating the air over Normandy. Generalfeldmarschal

Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of German forces in the west

including Normandy and the rest of France, believed Allie

airpower was so dominating that his forces could do little t

oppose the initial landings. On 20 June, Rundstedt wrote in

his report “Experiences from the Invasion Battles of Normandy

that “within 21⁄2 days, at a depth from the enemy bridgehead o

Figure 3. Overlord Theater of Operations

96
about 65 miles, 29,000 enemy sorties were counted; of these

about 2,300 aircraft a day divebomb and strafe every move

ment on the ground, even a single soldier.”2 9 Generalfeldma

schall Erwin Rommel, commander of German forces in th

Normandy area, was more direct in his assessment of Allie

command of the air when he wrote, “The enemy’s air supe

riority has a very grave effect on our movements. There’s sim

ply no answer to it.”3 0 German reinforcements and supplie

were not able to provide effective replacements or move quickly t

counter Allied actions. Allied air forces froze German forces in

place and operated with minuscule Luftwaffe opposition.

The RAF and AAF would not be able to conduct this type o

CAS to Army units and have the luxury of strafing “a single

soldier” if it were not for air superiority over the Normand

beachhead and beyond. Although the Allies dominated the air

the ground forces still had to slug their way through a serie

of beach defenses and the formidable German Seventh an

Fifteenth Armies. The American, British, and Canadian groun

forces, involved in the initial invasion, needed every advantag

possible to successfully conduct an amphibious invasion, con

solidate, and break through German defenses to liberate Franc

and drive on Germany. Allied air forces, free from enemy fighte

opposition, attacked enemy rail lines and bridges two month

before the invasion and all airfields 21 days before invading. I

the Germans had had the ability to transport more troops an

supplies into the Normandy area immediately after the inva 

sion, then Allied forces would have faced much fiercer opposi

tion. The Germans even may have been able to hold the inva 

sion area to the thin strips of beaches and not allow a breakou

to the interior of France . German forces were able to conduc

significant counterattacks against British forces at Normandy

British and American forces were able to break out of th

Normandy area only after a massive buildup of forces and an

aerial bombardment campaign about a month and a half afte

the initial invasion. An effective Luftwaffe fighter force could

have also stymied the invasion by interfering with Allied air

support missions and creating havoc among a series of critica

preinvasion parachute landings at night.

The Allies’ successful quest to obtain air superiority starte

well before the first American GI set foot on a French beach

97
Air superiority started with the Big Week campaign, moved t

a massive campaign to destroy Luftwaffe airfields in France

and finally challenged any air opposition left over. Although

the Luftwaffe still had several serviceable fighters in the Nor

mandy area, the Allies were able to shoot down these plane

and their reinforcements within 10 hours of the invasion.3 

The RAF and AAF had three possible strategies to achieve ai

superiority: dominate the local skies over the battlefield, at

tack aircraft production , or conduct operations to achieve con

trol over a larger area by destroying airfields, support, and th

supply system. The last strategy was attacking aircraft-pro

duction facilities that would reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability t

conduct air operations and destroy German fighter strength.3 2

The Allies conducted elements of all three strategies. The

also introduced better fighter aircraft , such as the P-51, tha

American troops invade Normandy, France, during Operation Overlord on D day

6 June 1944.

98
had superior air-to-air capabilities compared to its predeces

sors, the P-38 and P-47. The P-51 was able to outfly an

outfight its main opposition, the Focke-Wulf Fw-190 an

Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters. This concentrated aerial effort

which had the express purpose of knocking out the German

air force, succeeded. These efforts mirrored many of the effort

of early airpower theorists. Douhet believed in striking air

fields as a means of gaining command of the air . Mitche

thought that an air battle might allow the air force to gain ai

superiority. ACTS instructors thought that striking the indus

trial capability of a nation would slow a foe’s war-makin

capability, which included air operations. This combination o

actions denied the Luftwaffe the opportunity to challenge Allie

airpower. Fortunately, the RAF and AAF were able to gain ai

superiority—a decisive measure in Normandy that put the Al

lies on the road to victory.

Defeating the Enemy through Strategic Attack

Douhet , Mitchell, and other early airpower theorists envi

sioned the defeat of an enemy through the destruction o

targets that directly affected the conduct of the war. In th

past, many military leaders identified strategic bombardmen

with attacks upon a nation’s capital, industrial capacity, mili

tary headquarters, and similar targets. Although these target

are usually considered strategic, the objective and nature o

strategic warfare have evolved to understanding the effect o

the destruction or disruption of a target on the nation’s abilit

to fight the war—not the target itself. The ACTS faculty an

students identified particular targets that would cause a na

tion’s industry to fail. The industrial-web theory was an early

attempt to select particular key industries that would shutte

a country’s manufacturing capacity and its military capability

Similarly, aerospace leaders need to understand that the bomb

ing of a single key target may eliminate the need to strike 

whole structure of enemy targets.

Nuclear long-range bombers launched against the interior o

a country characterized the notion of strategic attack by air

power during the Cold War. First, strategic attack is not lim

99
ited to nuclear weapons only; precision conventional weapon

can destroy targets and eliminate the nation’s capability t

function or reduce its military capability. Airpower does no

necessarily need to destroy a target via nuclear warfare bu

perhaps merely disable or disrupt operations. Second, all types o

aircraft can conduct a strategic attack . The key determination

of whether a target is strategic or not is its impact on an

enemy’s war-making capability. Army helicopters that attack 

critical communications or leadership target may have a large

strategic effect than a jet bomber that attacks an enemy groun

unit. This distinction allows the smallest aircraft to have th

potential to conduct a strategic attack and increases the flexi

bility that a commander can use to conduct a campaign. Third

strategic attack is not limited to attacks within the enem

nation. Air operations may be conducted against targets alon

the enemy’s periphery. Also, a strategic attack may be directe

against a nation’s deployed space assets that may not be unde

direct control of the country. These conditions have altere

the vision of strategic attack, and they provide a challenge t

future aerospace leaders. Planning for strategic attack wi

require more information and analysis to determine the strate

gic effect of the attack—not just a determination of the vehicl

or platform that will conduct it. Strategic attack may weaken

an opponent so much that his surface forces may not offe

strong resistance to friendly forces.

Japan’s Hawaii Operation

Japan ’s Hawaii Operation was a bold surprise attack on US

naval, air, and ground forces in 1941. The Japanese govern

ment had designs to expand its influence and territorial con

trol throughout most of Southeast Asia . On 6 September 1941

the Japanese government made a decision to go to war agains

the United States. The Japanese army and navy general staff

began operational planning to conquer Malaya , Java , Borneo

the Bismarck Archipelago, the Netherlands East Indies , an

the Philippines .

3 3 Capture of these areas would ensure read

access to raw materials. The United States had cut off export

of oil and other essential raw materials to Japan in respons

to Japanese actions in China. Japan ’s economy would disinte

100
grate unless it could obtain access to resources. An obstacl

in the way of the Japanese plans was the British, Dutch, an

American military forces stationed in the Pacific. Although

American forces in Hawaii were not located near Japan ’s tar

gets in Southeast Asia , US Army and Navy forces could be

come formidable reinforcements if American forces in the Phil

ippines were seized—or they might become the basis of a strik

force against Japan.

The US Pacific Fleet represented a distinct threat to Japan’

war plans. There was little chance of keeping the fleet from

involvement if the Imperial Japanese military forces capture

the Southeast Asian region. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN

main goal in the Hawaii Operation was the destruction of th

US Pacific Fleet—other targets would be considered second

ary. 3 4 American naval power stationed at Pearl Harbor re

volved around the battleship fleet and three aircraft carriers. I

the Japanese could destroy the American Pacific Fleet an

bases in the Philippines, Wake Island, and Guam , then th

ability of the United States to respond to the Japanese seizur

of Southeast Asia would be limited to attacks originating from

the American west coast, thousands of miles away (fig. 4). 

crippled US Navy would be forced to go on the defensive an

allow the Japanese to consolidate and strengthen a Pacifi

perimeter if the Americans mounted a counterattack. The Ameri

cans would be forced to strip military forces from the Atlanti

to reinforce the Pacific—an unpalatable option for the US Navy

and Army, especially for the embattled British.

The Japanese Naval General Staff and Combined Fleet head 

quarters planned a carrier-based aircraft raid that would de

stroy the American naval forces in Pearl Harbor. After th

elimination of this threat, the IJN and army could launch

their plan to capture Southeast Asia . IJN planning was con 

strained by a larger political concern—ongoing negotiations be

tween the Japanese and American governments to conclude 

peaceful settlement to events in China and the economic

sanctions placed on Japan . If these negotiations were suc

cessful, then the IJN would cancel the attack. If not, a decla 

ration of war needed to be transmitted to the American gov

ernment before the Pearl Harbor strike.

101
The IJN would use 33 ships, including four heavy and tw

light aircraft carriers with approximately 360 combat plane

for the Hawaii Operation . The attack fleet also contained 2

submarines to encircle the island of Oahu, the main Hawaiian

island that was home to the bulk of American naval an

military forces. IJN planners estimated that the attack had 

50 percent chance of success. 3 5 The submarines would in 

crease the chance of sinking American naval vessels. Midge

submarines would attempt to enter Pearl Harbor and attac

ships. The attack was scheduled for 7 December (Hawaiian

time)—a Sunday. A weekend attack would hopefully catch th

Pacific Fleet by surprise. The IJN was receiving information on

US fleet movements in and around Pearl Harbor from a spy in

the Japanese Embassy in Honolulu . Two aircraft carriers, th

Figure 4. Pacific Area

102
Enterprise and Lexington , were known to operate in the area

but the third carrier—the Saratoga—was in dry-dock repair a

San Diego. The aircraft carriers were the main targets of th

IJN fleet.

Naval aviation had shown its value to Combined Fleet Adm

Isoroku Yamamoto, the IJN commander in chief. Yamamot

had conceived of and advocated approval of the Hawaii Opera

tion . Naval aviation had shown that, under combat conditions

it could sink ships. In May 1941, a Royal Navy carrier aircraf

had significantly contributed to the sinking of the German

navy’s Bismarck with antiquated Swordfish torpedo biplanes

Earlier, on 11 November 1940, the Royal Navy had used 2

Swordfish aircraft to sink or disable three battleships of th

Italian Fleet in the Gulf of Taranto. The Taranto attack knocke

out much of the Italian naval effort in the Mediterranean dur

ing a crucial phase of the North Africa campaign. With th

Italian Fleet disabled, the British were able to continue resup

ply of their forces in North Africa, support liberation efforts in

the Balkans, and keep the Suez Canal open. The IJN would

try to reproduce the same strategic effect against the Unite

States with the attack on Pearl Harbor. The IJN would rely on

small carrier aircraft to knock out the Pacific Fleet. Conversely

the prevailing Air Corps belief was that long-range bomber

could conduct a strategic attack and sink a large ship, much

like Mitchell had demonstrated with the Ostfriesland.

The IJN carrier-aircraft fleet was composed of three aircraf

types. The Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighter plane, proven in com

bat over China, was faster and more maneuverable than an

American fighter plane operating in Hawaii. Although it wa

faster than its rivals, it did not have self-sealing fuel tank

and was largely unarmored. These conditions would prov

fatal to Japanese pilots later in the war. The IJN also used th

Nakajima B5N2 Kate horizontal bomber and Aichi D3A1 Va

dive-bomber . The Kate and Val aircraft were the main strik

force used against the Pacific Fleet and in bombing runs agains

US Army airfields. The Zero aircraft were to provide bombe

escort and strafe targets of opportunity.

American air defenses in the Pearl Harbor area include

Army AAA, pursuit aircraft , and a radar system. Additionally

most naval vessels had AAA on board and aircraft based at US

103
Marine Corps and naval air stations on Oahu. In 1913 th

War Department had established a large US Army pres ence—th

Hawaiian Division , whose primary mission from 1920 to 194

was to defend Pearl Harbor against “damage from naval o

aerial bombardment.”

3 6 Later, the chief of staff of the US Army

Gen George C. Marshall, directed the Hawaiian Division t

protect the fleet as well as the Pearl Harbor facilities.

The US Army had two major and two minor airfields on

Oahu. The two major air bases were Hickam Field and Wheele

Field . Hickam , located adjacent to Pearl Harbor, was a bombe

base and headquarters of the Hawaiian Air Force. Wheele

Field , in the center of the island and next to a major Arm

base, Schofield Barracks, was home to the Hawaiian Air Force’

fighter force. The mainstay of the Army Air Corps fighter forc

was the Curtiss P-40 B/C Tomahawk fighters. The P-40 would

later shine in China as the primary fighter flying for Clair

Chennault ’s Flying Tigers. However, the P-40 was obsolete b

1941. Air Corps pilots also flew a more antiquated fighter, th

Curtiss P-36A. There were 55 P-40 B/C and 20 P-36A aircraf

serviceable on 7 December 1941.3 7 The two minor fields, Be

lows and Haleiwa , contained a few fighter and observation

aircraft. The Hawaiian Air Force also had 12 B-17D Flyin

Fortress bombers that were supposed to seek out and destro

an enemy fleet if Hawaii were attacked.3 8

The Hawaiian Division did operate an air warning system

but it was incomplete. The system was composed of five mo

bile SCR-270 long-range radar sets located in temporary loca

tions and one set stationed on the northern tip of Oahu. Th

Army had received three fixed SCR-271 radar sets, but the

were not installed at the time of the attack. The radar sys

tems, land observers, and reconnaissance aircraft were linke

to a centralized information center that was supposed to iden

tify an air threat to Hawaii and send P-40 aircraft to intercep

a foe within six minutes of detection. 3 9 The air warning system

was also responsible for warning AAA units as well as Navy

and Marine Corps aircraft. The system was still under devel

opment and was not ready to fully operate during the Pear

Harbor attack.

The IJN’s success depended on complete surprise by th

carrier aircraft . Avoiding the Hawaiian Air Force ’s fighters an

104
the Hawaiian Division

s radar systems was paramount. Fortu 

nately for the Japanese, the US Army’s air warning system

was incomplete and did not provide its intended warning. IJN

aircraft were to hit US Navy and Army targets in two waves

The first wave, composed of 183 aircraft, would strike Pear

Harbor, Hickam, Wheeler , and other airfields around Oahu. A

midget submarine force was to enter Pearl Harbor and attack

ships in conjunction with the air assault, but it accomplishe

little. A second wave would follow the first wave.

The attack on Pearl Harbor concentrated on “Battleship Row.

The American carriers had left Pearl Harbor. The Enterpris

was 200 miles from Pearl Harbor conducting training. 4 0 Th

Lexington was delivering Marine Corps aircraft to Wake Island

So the key objectives of the strategic attack were missing. Th

IJN did not have adequate intelligence that notified it of th

missing carriers. The only forces left were battleships an

other supporting naval vessels. Pearl Harbor did contain vita

oil reserves, maintenance facilities, and a submarine base tha

Air raid Pearl Harbor. Japan’s use of carrier aircraft succeeded in sinkin

several battleships but did not cripple the US Pacific Fleet.

105
supported US Navy operations throughout the Pacific. If th

IJN forces could destroy the oil and maintenance facilities, th

US Pacific Fleet would have to withdraw many of its opera

tions to the west coast. The submarine base was anothe

lucrative strategic target. The Navy’s submarine force receive

much credit for blockading the Japanese home islands an

sinking many merchant and naval vessels after the Pearl Har

bor attack, when the US Navy and Army could not strike th

enemy.

At 0755, the first wave struck multiple targets in and aroun

Pearl Harbor. An Army radar crew had detected the IJN carrie

aircraft earlier, but the warning was not transmitted to th

fighters at Wheeler Field . The first attack wave struck battle

ships and airfields with little opposition. The second wave hi

Oahu with another 169 aircraft. The Japanese were able t

sink four battleships, heavily damage five other battleships

and bomb or torpedo nine others. About 2,400 American

were killed and 1,700 wounded in the attack. One hundre

sixty-nine US aircraft were destroyed, and 150 were heavily

damaged. The IJN carrier pilots successfully hit their target

with minimal losses—185 killed and one captured. Only 2

IJN planes failed to return to their aircraft carriers.

The Japanese strategic strike was a great success in em 

ployment. The Pacific Fleet’s battleship forces were severely

damaged, and all were put out of commission to various de

grees. The IJN carrier air attacks knocked out US Army air

fields and destroyed many aircraft. The Army’s major losse

were mainly in personnel, aircraft, and the shock of the at

tack. If the Japanese designed the attack to demoralize th

American public so it would sue for peace, it actually had th

reverse effect: the American public was now more inclined t

fight a bitter conflict to assure Japan’s defeat. The damag

inflicted on American forces was lighter than first imagined

Although the battleship fleet was severely damaged, the all

important carrier fleet escaped unscathed in the attack. Thes

carriers would later form the vanguard for the Pacific cam

paigns at Coral Sea and Midway. The Japanese also did no

disable the Pearl Harbor shipyard maintenance and logistic

capabilities. The loss of these facilities would have denie

advance support for the eventual American campaign to re

106
capture lost territory. The IJN also did not hit the oil-storage

facilities near Pearl Harbor whose destruction would have se

riously hindered all naval operations—more so than the loss o

the battleships.4 1 The combined Zero, Kate, and Val air as

sault also missed the submarine base. Submarine forces wer

the first naval vessels to strike back at Japan . The war record

illustrated the importance of the US Navy’s submarine fleet

Submarines would sink 1,113 merchant ships, with 65 prob 

able kills, over the course of the war. 4 2 These actions greatly

aided the strangling of Japan ’s industry, reduced food sup

plies, and crippled its war capability.

The Japanese strategic attack used only two waves of air

craft strikes. The Pacific Fleet was crippled, and the land

based bomber airfield at Hickam was smoldering. Several crit

ics of the IJN did not understand why another wave of aircraf

was not sent to demolish the remaining targets at Pearl Har

bor. If the Japanese had launched more attacks, the destruc

tion of the shipyard, oil facilities, and submarine base could

have been accomplished. The Japanese did not ensure th

USS Arizona burning at Pearl Harbor

107
destruction of all key strategic targets. Adm Chuichi Nagumo

commander of the IJN Pearl Harbor task force, thought tha

another wave was unnecessary for several reasons. First, h

believed that no additional significant damage could be in 

flicted on the Americans from the first two waves. Second

Nagumo thought the second wave had encountered stronge

AAA fire, placing his aircraft in greater danger. Third, he als

did not know what American naval and air forces were avail

able for a counterattack against his carriers. Fourth, the Japa 

nese task force was in range of American land-based bomber

and in potential danger of attack.4 3 The failure to take advan

tage of the American shock and losses doomed the chance of 

dominant strategic attack by the Japanese. The IJN had achieve

air superiority over Oahu by the destruction of the Hawaiian

Air Force and the absence of the Enterprise and Lexington 

Instead of devastating the Pacific Fleet, however, the IJN focuse

the attention of the American public on defeating the Axi

powers.

Slamming Saddam: Operation Desert Storm

On 17 January 1991, coalition forces of the United States

Britain , France , and several other nations conducted a strate

gic attack against Iraqi targets. The targets included air de

fense systems, C2 centers, leadership, suspected NBC weap

ons facilities, and military bases. The strategic campaign wa

designed to paralyze not only the Iraqi government of Saddam

Hussein , but also his military forces that were occupying Ku 

wait . Hopefully, the American-led air campaign would signifi

cantly reduce the military capabilities and options that Sad

dam could employ against the coalition or hinder the eventua

ground offensive to recapture Kuwait . Col John Warden origi

nally proposed the concept of the strategic air campaign agains

Iraq. His proposal closely followed his theory on air campaigns.

A simmering dispute between Iraq and Kuwait over the owner

ship of oil resources exploded into open conflict. On 2 Augus

1990, the Iraqi Republican Guard crossed the Kuwaiti borde

and seized the country. The government of Kuwait, its citi

zens, and elements of the Kuwaiti military fled south to Saud

Arabia (fig. 5). The UN condemned the invasion and demande

108
an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. The UN would late

authorize the use of force to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait .

The United States responded quickly to a request by Kin

Fahd of Saudi Arabia for aid to forestall a potential invasion o

his country by Saddam Hussein. The loss of the oil fields o

Kuwait was significant, but the additional loss of Saudi Ara

bian oil would be a disaster for the world’s economies. Presi

dent George Bush ordered the Army’s 82d Airborne Division t

deploy to Saudi Arabia . He also sent 48 Air Force McDonnell

Douglas F-15C/D Eagles from the 1st Fighter Wing to Saud

Arabia to defend Saudi airspace and deter further Iraqi ag

Figure 5. Desert Storm Theater of Operations

109
gression. The aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower and its battl

group were rushed to the Persian Gulf. This was the start o

Operation Desert Shield , the initial defense of Saudi Arabi

and buildup of military forces to recapture Kuwait.

Bush ’s initial political objectives included the following:

• [Obtain the] immediate, complete, and unconditional with

drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

• Restore Kuwait ’s legitimate government.

• Maintain security and stability of Saudi Arabia and th

Persian Gulf.

• Ensure the safety and protection of the lives of American

citizens abroad. 4 4

The American military needed to define these political objective

in terms of military ones. Lt Gen Charles Horner, senior USAF

officer on the staff of Central Command (responsible for American

military operations in the Persian Gulf), received a more well

defined set of military objectives from Bush :

• Force Iraq out of Kuwait .

• Destroy NBC capability (five-to-10-year setback).

• Minimize loss of life.

• Minimize civilian casualties.

4 5

Horner was responsible for planning, organizing, and con

ducting the air campaign to accomplish these military objec

tives. Colonel Warden , head of Checkmate, an air-plannin

organization at the Pentagon, immediately started to develop

an air plan to defeat Iraq and accomplish Bush ’s nationa

objectives. Checkmate ’s plan, Instant Thunder, was designe

to exploit Iraqi vulnerabilities and attack high-valued targets

Warden thought airpower alone could win the war and forc

the Iraqis out of Kuwait with minimal casualties.4 6 Horne

rejected War den ’s plan, persuading the overall commander o

Central Command, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, to accept 

four-phased offensive campaign:

• Phase 1: Strategic air campaign against Iraq.

• Phase 2: Air campaign against Iraqi air defenses in Ku 

wait .

110
• Phase 3: Attrition of Iraqi ground-combat power to neu 

tralize Iraq’s deployed ground forces and isolate the Ku 

wait battlefield.

• Phase 4: Ground attack to eject Iraqi forces from Ku 

wait .

4 7

Air forces could conduct the first two phases and suppor

the last two. Warden ’s modified Instant Thunder campaign

would be conducted in Phase 1. The strategic air campaign

would concentrate on political-military leadership that would

target command, control, and communications capabilities

The goal of the strategic air campaign was to isolate and handi

cap the ability of the Iraqi government to operate its militar

force. Additionally, the air campaign would destroy NBC war

fare capability. Coalition air forces were also charged with

eliminating the Iraqis’ ability to conduct offensive military op 

erations, as well as destroying support facilities and ballisti

missile launchers. The strategic attack would also aim fo

electric power, oil refineries, key bridges, and rail lines.

4 8 Ther

were over 350 strategic targets identified for the campaign. Ai

planners estimated that the strategic air campaign would las

about a week. However, before the air campaign could becom

effective, air superiority would be needed in order to accom

plish the initial attacks and subsequent air operations. Ai

operations against targets that controlled or operated Iraqi ai

defense radar, SAM sites, AAA, and fighter-interceptors would

also be conducted on the first day of the campaign.

The Iraqi air force had just finished a 10-year war of attri

tion against Iran . The Iraqis had a mixed force of 750 to 80

fixed-wing, mostly Soviet and French, aircraft that was orga

nized, trained, and operated under Soviet doctrine and guid 

ance.

4 9 This force included 405 fighter-interceptors, includin

the top-of-the-line MiG-29. The Iraqi air force was the sixth

largest in the world; however, most of its aircraft were obso

lete, and its personnel were ill prepared for combat and ori

ented towards the defense of particular locations—not the overa

country. The Iraqi Air Defense Command did have airborn

radar, ground-based surveillance radar, and a number of French

and Soviet SAM systems. These systems, like the air-breath in

portion of the Iraqi air force, did not possess state-of-the-ar

111
equipment, and many personnel lacked training. Saddam

Hussein ’s air defense forces included 7,000 AAA pieces, lo 

cated at 970 sites, and over 16,000 SAMs, most of them de

fending Baghdad.

5 0 These forces also relied heavily on centra

ized command centers that would become lucrative targets t

the coalition air forces, which had significant intelligence abou

the French-supplied aircraft and air defenses. Since Franc

was a part of the UN effort to oust Iraq, it supplied valuable

data about the Iraqi air defense capabilities. Although th

Iraqi air force posed little danger to the coalition forces , i

could hinder Desert Storm , the military campaign against Iraq.

The coalition air forces were composed of 11 national forces

United States air forces dominated the coalition effort. USAF

Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft made up 76 percent of al

airframes,5 1 including reconnaissance aircraft, fighters, bomb

ers, transports, and other warplanes. The United States als

provided space surveillance, early warning, communications

navigation, and early warning satellites that contributed greatly

throughout all military operations during Desert Shield /Storm

The Phase 1 strategic air campaign would use all types o

aircraft, including fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, tanker

electronic warfare, surveillance , special operations, and other

to conduct the attack. All services contributed to the attack on

Iraqi radar systems, as did US Army helicopters.

Phase 1 began a day earlier than the scheduled attack on

Iraqi soil. The main attack was scheduled to begin on 1

January. On 16 January 1991, seven USAF Boeing B-52G

bombers from Barksdale Air Force Base (AFB), Louisiana, wer

launched on a 14,000-mile round-trip mission to deliver 3

conventionally armed air launched cruise missiles. The US

Navy also launched 52 Tomahawk cruise missiles from th

battleships Wisconsin and Missouri and the cruiser San Ja

cinto.

5 2 Horner also coordinated an initial attack on air defens

radar systems by USAF MH-53J Pave Low and Army AH-6

Apache attack helicopters. The helicopter assault would allow

coalition aircraft to strike targets within Iraq without bein

detected; this would reduce the SAM and AAA directed agains

the strike force. Other aircraft, like the F-4G, EA-6B, an

EF-111A, also supported SEAD missions. A coordinated at

tack required detailed planning to include combat air patrol

112
(CAP), tanker support, timing of the cruise missile launching

sequence of attacks on targets, recovery efforts, and search

and rescue capabilities.

After the air defense radar systems were destroyed, waves o

aircraft entered Iraqi airspace to deliver a massive strike. Lock

heed F-117A stealth strike aircraft, F-15E Strike Eagle fighter

bombers, B-52 bombers, RAF and Royal Saudi Air Force Tor

nado GR-1 ground-attack aircraft, General Dynamics F-11

Aardvark fighter-bombers, carrier-based A-6 Intruder bomb

ers, and several types of support aircraft launched multipl

raids along the southern border of Iraq and Kuwait . Coalition

aircraft also launched attacks from Turkey. These aircraft struc

the Iraqis’ Kari air defense C2 network, Scud tactical ballisti

missile sites, storage and production facilities, communica

tions lines, electricity, presidential office complex, Baath Part

headquarters, airfields, weapons-of-mass-destruction produc

tion facilities, and other targets. Long-range, eight-engined B

52 bombers flew alongside shorter-range, single-engin

fighter-bombers to strike targets throughout Iraq. The com 

Airpower in Desert Storm. Army Apache attack helicopters provided CAS fo

ground forces.

113
bined effort was designed to isolate Saddam Hussein from hi

military forces, severely disrupt the air defense systems, an

attempt to create a psychological effect on the Iraqi people

Despite the presence of a large enemy air force and air defens

system, coalition aircraft got through and destroyed many ke

targets. A visible example to the Iraqi populace of the coali

tion ’s bombing campaign was the disruption of a key aspect o

modern life: electricity. Coalition air planners took great pain

not to permanently destroy electrical-production facilities—only

disable them. Nevertheless, the campaign shut down mos

electrical power throughout Iraq and created a hardship for it

people.

The strategic air campaign ended on 25 January. Durin

the first two days of the campaign, 169 out of 298 strategi

targets were struck. The coalition aircraft shut down the Iraq

Precision-guided munitions give aerospace power the ability to strike global

and quickly, much like this cruise missile launched from a B-52.

114
air force , disrupted air defenses , and affected the ability of th

Iraqi military to communicate with its deployed forces. Thes

actions allowed coalition forces to expand their assault to dif

ferent areas. Air superiority was achieved after most of th

Iraqi air force was trapped in hangars because their runway

were cratered. The first two days of bombardment had de

stroyed Iraqi aircraft, disrupted ground-controlled intercept (GCI

facilities, and stopped Iraqi air operations. American aircraf

and their allies continued to pound airfields, supply lines

command authority, Scud missiles, military support, weapon

of mass destruction , and the Republican Guard . Over 18,27

sorties were flown in Phase 1. The coalition lost few aircraft t

Iraqi forces in the operation.

The strategic campaign accomplished several goals. How

ever, there were limitations to the strategic-bombardment cam

paign. Fighter-bombers had a difficult time finding, targeting

and destroying Scud missiles, which continued to hit target

in Israel and Saudi Arabia throughout Desert Storm , raisin

the possibility of the Iraqis using an NBC warhead agains

neighboring countries and friendly forces. The failure to stop

the Scuds forced the USAF to divert valuable air resources t

hunt these missiles. These aircraft could have been used t

destroy other targets, like Iraqi ground forces. The Defens

Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that strategic air mission

The versatile F-111 strike aircraft

115
against Scud targets were only 25 percent fully successful.5 

Scud mobile launchers were able to hide, quickly set up, launch

their missiles, and move. These characteristics contributed t

the difficulty experienced by coalition aircraft in destroying th

Scuds.

Coalition aircraft also had problems eliminating NBC weap

ons, as well as production and storage facilities. These weap

ons posed some of the greatest threats to coalition forces dur

ing Desert Storm and were potential threats in future conflict

in the Persian Gulf. Although the DIA estimated that the Phase 

effort fully destroyed 76 percent of the targets associated with

weapons of mass destruction , the failure to identify all target

was evident after the war. 5 4 Immediately after the war, UN

arms inspectors found that production facilities had moved

targets had not been detected, or weapons had been con

cealed. Iraq had maintained an NBC weapons program despit

the best efforts of the coalition air attacks. This failure illus

trated the need for accurate intelligence . Without proper tar

geting, strategic airpower is seriously hampered. Proper tar

geting requires timely and appropriate intelligence .

Coalition air forces were able to conduct a massive strategic

attack on Iraq. These air forces used surprise, mass, an

objective to conduct a sustained campaign during early Janu 

ary 1991. The strategic air campaign allowed the coalition t

paralyze many Iraqi military functions. Iraqi air defenses , ai

F-117 aircraft performed strategic attack missions over Iraq during Operatio

Desert Storm.

116
forces, and military C

2

 capabilities were seriously disrupte

throughout the war. This allowed the coalition to conduct th

other phases of the war with less resistance from the Iraqis

The effects of the strategic air attack did not totally isolat

Iraqi military forces from Saddam Hussein, but the commun

cations links with Kuwait and the outside world were cut

Also, Saddam’s air force ultimately fled destruction by seekin

asylum in Iran . Additionally, the strategic campaign resulte

in a 55 percent shutdown of electricity production by 17 January

(88 percent by 9 February). Additionally, 93 percent of Iraq’

oil-refining capability was destroyed. Finally, Saddam’s elit

Republican Guard was immobilized, and many units were re

duced to 50 percent combat efficiency. 5 5 Coalition forces wer

able to use new advances in precision-guided munitions (PGM

stealth , space, cruise missile, and other technological advance

ments to achieve these results. Strategic attack created man

Precision-guided munitions allowed airpower to destroy Scud missile storag

facilities with little collateral damage.

117
of the effects desired by Horner. Although it did not end th

war, strategic attack was a vital element in preparing to liber

ate Kuwait .

Precision attack during Desert Storm. Destruction of these aircraft shelter

effectively killed Iraqi aircraft before they could fly.

118
The Eighth Air Force in the Combined

Bomber Offensive, 1943–45

In World War II, the Army Air Corps was confronted with 

challenge to find ways to defeat Germany. Many AAF officer

in leadership positions who were responsible for planning

building, and employing forces were ACTS graduates and ha

lived through the public debates during Billy Mitchell’s tenure

Several officers and ACTS faculty, such as Laurence S. Kuter

Haywood S. Hansell, Harold L. George , and Kenneth N. Walker

advocated using strategic bombers alone to defeat Germany

Before the entry of the United States into World War II, Presi

dent Franklin D. Roosevelt had authorized secret high-leve

military discussions with the British military. From Januar

to March 1941, these discussions resulted in an agreemen

that Germany had to be defeated first, and a sustained bombe

offensive would prepare for an invasion.5 6

On 9 July 1941, Roosevelt asked Secretary of War Henr

Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox for their esti

mates of materiel and manpower to defeat Germany, Italy, an

Japan .

5 7 Harold George , who was assigned to the Army’s Wa

Plans Division, was authorized to produce the requirement

for Army aircraft . He enlisted the aid of Hansell, Kuter, an

Walker. Their document, Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1

became a blueprint to defeat Germany by strategic bombard 

ment. The AWPD-1 team assumed that it would take years fo

the US Army to procure, train, and deploy sufficient aircraf

and aircrews to wear down Germany before an invasion could

be mounted. To defeat Germany, George estimated the AAF

needed 6,860 heavy bombers. The total Air Corps requiremen

was 63,500 aircraft with 2,160,000 personnel to fight the war

The Air Corps’s objectives were to defend the United States

conduct a strategic bombing offensive against Germany to a

low an invasion, provide CAS to ground forces after an inva 

sion, conduct a strategic defense against Japan, and—onc

Germany was defeated—conduct a strategic bomber offensiv

against Japan.

The AWPD-1 planners believed that a massive strategic at

tack on Germany would defeat Hitler. In case they were wrong

George and the other planners included other targets to sup

119
port the invasion of Europe. The plan called for a massiv

bombing campaign 21 months after America entered the war

this campaign would require at least 4,000 bombers conduct

ing operations for at least six months. 5 8 The AWPD-1 docu 

ment was focused on the German economy—no surprise sinc

the ACTS graduates had been educated in the industrial-we

theory. This theory was translated into a strategy and forc

structure. The initial target plans included electrical power

transportation, and petroleum. AWPD-1 contents went wel

beyond the materiel and manpower estimates requested b

Roosevelt. The Air Corps document would become the basi

for a strategic air campaign against Germany called the Com 

bined Bomber Offensive (CBO). AWPD-1 contained 154 Ger

man targets classified into five major areas: the Luftwaffe an

aircraft production (including airfields, aluminum, and magne

sium), electrical power, transportation centers, petroleum, an

morale .

59 A revision to AWPD-1, AWPD-42, deleted the moral

target and substituted submarine bases and synthetic rubber

The German Kriegsmarine U-boat submarine fleet was a majo

threat to Allied convoys that supplied Britain and the Sovie

Union with munitions, food, and raw materials.

During World War II, the AAF—the expanded Army Ai

Corps—was wedded to the idea of employing strategic bomb

ers using high-altitude daylight precision-bombing technique

to destroy specific targets. Using heavily armed and armore

bombers, the AAF could deliver bombs at long ranges withou

fighter escort. Additionally, AAF bombers flying at high alti

tudes would also help pilots avoid fighter interceptions. Thes

ideas were straight out of both ACTS and the theories of Billy

Mitchell. The AAF ’s Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses and Con

solidated B-24 Liberator bombers were organized into th

Eighth Air Force, stationed in England. These bombers wer

designed and developed to support the idea of high-altitud

daylight precision bombing. By early 1942, Eighth Air Forc

started limited bombing operations against targets in France.

The RAF had serious reservations about the American ap

proach to the CBO. British pilots were unconvinced about th

ability to drop bombs with precision from high altitude. Th

RAF had moved towards area bombing in hopes of crushin

the morale and will of the German populace. The British fel

120
that industrial targets were not feasible since precision target

ing was not a well-developed application. These ideas reflecte

Trenchard ’s proposals, discussed earlier. Additionally, flyin

during daylight, according to the RAF , invited Luftwaffe fight

ers to harass bombers. British Fighter Command had alread

demonstrated the folly of sending bombers without escort

against targets, when it defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle o

Britain . Because the RAF did not have adequate fighter es

corts that could support the bomber offensive,6 0 it switched t

night-bombing missions to avoid detection.

The Luftwaffe still possessed a formidable air defense forc

despite being stretched with commitments from the deserts o

North Africa to the steppes of Russia. German air defense

included the Freya early warning radar system, AAA, the new

Würzburg fire-control radar, and two fighter aircraft—th

As part of the Combined Bomber Offensive, a B-17 bomber of the Eighth A

Force attacks the Focke-Wulf plant in 1943.

121
Messerschmitt Bf-109 and the Focke-Wulf Fw-190 (and, later

jet aircraft). The Luftwaffe did not initially use a centralize

control system for its air defense system. However, as the CBO

continued, the Luftwaffe started to concentrate its force

around seven aerial defensive zones under a single control

ler.6 1 This change increased the efficiency and effectiveness o

the Luftwaffe’s air defenses .

On 17 August 1942, Eighth Air Force made its debut agains

German strategic targets when it bombed the Rouen-Sottevill

rail marshalling yard in France . Bomber strength started t

rise, but so did Luftwaffe opposition. The Eighth conducte

missions in France, close to England, to ensure that som

fighter escorts were in range of Supermarine Spitfires . Eighth

Air Force began to receive longer-range P-47 Thunderbolt an

P-38 Lightning fighter escorts. Bomber losses continued a

the Luftwaffe Bf-109 and Fw-190 found a vulnerable are

against the B-17 and B-24 aircraft—attacking head-on, wher

the bomber had reduced defensive armament. Luftwaffe ai

defenses were able to conduct mass attacks against bombe

forces and exploit the bombers’ lack of defensive armament

after German radar detected the raid. For example, on 1

April 1943, a force of 65 B-17s struck the Focke-Wulf aircraft

production plant in Bremen, Germany. The AAF lost 16 bomb

ers on the raid. The commander of VIII Fighter Command

responsible for fighter escorts, demanded a 20-fighter grou

reinforcement to avoid the problems faced in Bremen . By Ma

the AAF had received a sufficient number of P-47s and up

graded B-17Fs that had heavier nose armament. On 4 May, 

force of 65 B-17Fs and B-24s, Spitfires, and P-47s attacke

the former Ford and General Motors plant at Antwerp in th

Netherlands. About 70 Luftwaffe fighters attacked, but no bomb

ers were lost. The tactic of sending bombers into combat with

out escort fighters was ended. Eighth Air Force also had t

delay the start of larger missions due to the transfer of bomb

ers and fighters to support combat operations in North Afric

and throughout the Mediterranean.

Eighth Air Force got stronger with each passing day through

experience and reinforcements, allowing the AAF to strike fur

ther into Germany. The long-range escort problem was par

tially solved by pilots improving their flying experience with

122
the P-47. Emboldened by this new capability, Eighth Air Forc

planners began to plan a raid on the ball-bearing plants in

Schweinfurt and on the Messerschmitt plant at Regensburg

The P-47 escorts would fly near the German border. The fighte

pilots would then refuel at their bases and meet the returnin

bombers. The Schweinfurt and Regensburg raid was sched 

uled for 17 August 1943. Bad weather and timing problem

made it difficult for the fighter escorts to meet the bomber

going to and from their targets. Both targets received heavy

damage, but 60 of the 315 bombers sent into combat wer

lost. A follow-up attack on Schweinfurt on 14 October als

resulted in heavy losses—60 aircraft from a 230-bomber force

Eighth Air Force could not sustain these numbers of aircraf

and aircrew losses. However, replacements were found.

America’s relentless economic growth and strength allowe

it to manufacture aircraft in large numbers. The AAF starte

to expand and train more aircrews. Fighter strength started t

grow and challenge the Luftwaffe, but the raids into German

continued. Eighth Air Force planned another major offensiv

to decimate the Luftwaffe . Operation Argument was designe

to disable Luftwaffe fighter-production facilities. These attack

started on 20 February 1944 and would directly curtail th

Luftwaffe ’s fighter operations and force its fighters to mee

AAF fighters escorting the bombers. The AAF now flew th

P-51 Mustang, a plane superior to either the Bf-109 or Fw-190

These attacks would later be known as Big Week , discusse

earlier. The operation was a smashing success. Over 1,00

B-17 and B-24 aircraft participated in the first day of raids

Airfields, aircraft-production facilities, marshalling yards, stor

age areas, and other targets of opportunity were blasted dur

ing Big Week. More importantly, the Luftwaffe ’s back was bro

ken. It lost airframes and incurred large losses to it

ever-decreasing pool of combat-ready pilots. Aircraft production

was disrupted, and the Luftwaffe had to build more defensive

fighters to defend the Reich instead of building other types o

planes. The German military also suffered because the in 

creased emphasis on building fighters reduced the capacity t

build ground and naval weapons.

After Big Week, the AAF concentrated on hitting oil an

petroleum targets and supporting the Normandy invasion in

123
France. The AAF also struck rail and road transportation t

slow down production efforts. Eighth Air Force continued 

war of attrition against the Luftwaffe. Bomber losses were stil

high. In the first week of March 1944, a single raid agains

Berlin lost 69 bombers. This was an example of AAF leader

ship forcing the Eighth to conduct combat operations dee

into Germany.

6 2 Attacks against oil targets would reduce Luft

waffe and German military operations and force the Luftwaff

fighters to engage American bombers and their fighter escort

in combat. Fuel production started to fall. On 5 June 1944

the Luftwaffe Operations Staff was so concerned that it wrote

“The most essential requirements for training and carrying ou

production plans can scarcely be covered with the quantitie

of a/ c [aircraft] fuel available.”6 3

The AAF’s participation in the CBO definitely supported th

winning of the war against Germany. Eighth Air Force an

other AAF units flew 501,536 bomber sorties that droppe

1,005,091 tons of bombs.6 4 The campaign did not come with

out a heavy price—67,646 crewmen were killed, and AAF ’

bomber losses totaled 8,325 aircraft. The strategic attack dis

rupted military production, transportation, oil production, an

the Luftwaffe; it also prepared the battlefield for an invasion o

France. The buildup, training, planning, and employment o

B-17 and B-24 bombers reflected ACTS and AAF doctrine an

concepts. The AAF was able to force the German military t

devote valuable resources towards defending the Reich an

allowing American, British, and Soviet ground forces to ad

vance on Germany and ultimately win the war. Instead o

contesting these advances, the Luftwaffe was confined to de

fending Germany against air attacks. The German military

designed for blitzkrieg, was now put on the defensive. Thi

consumed resources, time, opportunities, and training; it als

forced a change in strategy. Over 82 percent of the Luftwaffe’

strength was assigned to the Reich’s defense by 1944. 6 5

The strategic air campaign did not win the war single

handedly, as the ACTS faculty might have thought and hoped

The AAF’s CBO efforts focused on defeating the Luftwaffe and th

German military’s capability by destroying particular indus

trial targets. Instead, forcing the German fighters to engag

Eighth Air Force’s superior escort fighters also directly de

124
feated the Luftwaffe . Additionally, having to confront a larg

German fighter force made the concept of unescorted bombe

missions infeasible. The bombing campaign did inflict grea

damage on fighter production and did succeed in dispersin

military production. Professor Wilhelm “Willy” Messerschmitt

designer of the Bf-109 and other aircraft, estimated that thi

industrial dispersion reduced German aircraft-production ca

Adolph Hitler inspects bomb damage in a German city in 1944.

The Combined Bomber Offensive affected German morale.

125
pacity by 50 percent. 6 6 The German economy also suffere

through attacks on oil, transportation, and industry.

AAF bombers could have improved their performance in sev

eral ways. Besides the inclusion of fighter escorts, better tar

geting would have increased the effectiveness of the CBO . Fo

example, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, con

ducted after the war, believed that the destruction of propelle

and aircraft-engine industries would have been more effectiv

than attacking aircraft-assembly plants. Additionally, the at

tack on ball-bearing plants was found to be not as detrimenta

to German production as once thought. The Germans could

easily import ball bearings, disperse the industry, or creat

substitutes for this product. Despite the CBO ’s best efforts

German aircraft engineers and production staffs were able t

build a number of jet aircraft and rocket systems that would

become operational before the war’s end.

The slow buildup of forces also delayed the bombing cam

paign . Notwithstanding American industrial capacity, bomb

ing the Reich was slowed due to diversions of resources an

efforts to other theaters, such as North Africa and the Pacific

Most of the munitions were dropped on Germany in the las

months of the war, when Eighth Air Force had a full comple

ment of bombers. Targeting many diverse areas also dilute

the bombing effort. German industry was also a resilient tar

get. German production used only a fraction of its full capacit

and was able to compensate for AAF bomber damage. Hansell

one of the AWPD-1 authors, admitted that the assumption o

Germany’s being under full mobilization was an issue. 6 7 Th

ACTS assumed that a nation at war would be at full mobiliza 

tion and that the entire industrial capacity would be targeted

This was critical for the strategic air campaign to work. CBO

efforts by themselves did not close down the German econ

omy, but in combination with a Soviet and British-American

ground invasion, those efforts caused the German war ma

chine to fold.

Notes

1. Wlliamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–194

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), 45.

126
2. R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939–1945 (Chelsea, Mich.: Scarboroug

House, 1991), 31.

3. Derek Wood with Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin: The Battle o

Britain and the Rise of Air Power, 1930–1940 (Washington, D.C.: Smith 

sonian Institution Press, 1990), 163.

4. Murray, 48.

5. Ibid., 40, table 3.

6. Ibid., 46.

7. Robin Higham, “The Royal Air Force and the Battle of Britain,” i

Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Frankli

Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994), 131.

8. Len Deighton, Battle of Britain (London: George Rainbird Limited

1980), 101.

9. Richard Hough and Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain (New York

Norton, 1989), 310.

10. Murray, 53, table 9.

11. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middl

East (New York: Random House, 1982), 149.

12. Brereton Greenhaus, “The Israeli Experience,” in Case Studies in th

Achievement of Air Superiority, 576.

13. Ibid., 577.

14. Herzog, 151.

15. Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, D.C

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 117.

16. Daniel J. March et al., The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare

vol. 2, 1945 to the Present (London: Aerospace Publishing Limited, 1997)

159.

17. Ibid., 162.

18. Edward Jablonski, America in the Air War (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Lif

Books, 1982), 121.

19. David A. Anderton, The History of the U.S. Air Force (New York

Crescent Books, 1981), 85.

20. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: Norton, 1995), 129.

21. Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of th

United States Air Force, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History an

Museums Program, 1997), 301.

22. March et al., 160.

23. Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Ai

Attack, 1911–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press

1989), 189.

24. Thomas B. Buell et al., The Second World War: Europe and th

Mediterranean, West Point Military History Series (Wayne, N.J.: Avery

1989), 274.

25. Hallion, 196.

26. March et al., 164.

27. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 162.

127
28. March et al., 166.

29. Buell et al., 310.

30. Hallion, 205.

31. Overy, The Air War, 77.

32. W. A. Jacobs, “Operation OVERLORD,” in Case Studies in th

Achievement of Air Superiority, 271.

33. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Wash 

ington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), 105.

34. Shigeru Fukudome, “Hawaii Operation,” in The Japanese Navy i

World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers, ed. Raymon

O’Connor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 5.

35. Ibid., 11.

36. Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding th

United States and Its Outposts (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief o

Military History, 1964), 151.

37. Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn, 7 December 1941: The Ai

Force Story (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Office of History, 1991), 11.

38. James P. Tate, The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward

Aviation, 1919–1941 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 178.

39. Arakaki and Kuborn, 14.

40. Carl Smith, Pearl Harbor, 1941 (Botley, Oxford: Osprey, 1999), 37.

41. E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History (Annapolis: Naval Inst

tute Press, 1981), 289.

42. Ibid., 338.

43. Mitsuo Fuchida, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor,” in The Japanes

Navy in World War II, 27.

44. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, 

League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 1994), 63.

45. Ibid., 64.

46. Nalty, 456.

47. Ibid.

48. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Ai

Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 55.

49. Richard G. Davis, “Strategic Bombardment in the Gulf War,” in Cas

Studies in Strategic Bombardment, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, D.C.: A

Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 558.

50. Ibid.

51. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf Wa

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 158, table 5.3.

52. Stan Morse, Gulf Air War Debrief (London: Aerospace Publishing

Limited, 1991), 49.

53. United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Operation Deser

Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134 (Washington

D.C.: GAO, 1997), 148.

54. Ibid., 148–49.

128
55. Keaney and Cohen, 102–3.

56. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation o

Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 98–99.

57. Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War I

(New York: Random House, 1993), 49.

58. Sherry, 99.

59. Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley P. Newton, “The American Strate

gic Air Offensive against Germany in World War II,” in Case Studies i

Strategic Bombardment, 189.

60. Christopher Shores, Duel for the Sky (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

1985), 173.

61. McFarland and Newton, 197.

62. Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Wash 

ington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 393.

63. Ibid., 399.

64. McFarland and Newton, 232.

65. Ibid., 237.

66. Ibid., 238.

67. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlant

Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972), 198.

129
Chapter 4

Functions and Capabilities of Aerospace

Power: Interdiction/ Close Air Support

Interdiction: Striking the Enemy

Before He Can Attack

Surface forces face many challenges, including enemy groun

forces threatening their positions. Surface and air commander

face a dilemma. Should air forces directly attack a groun

threat, or should they eliminate the threat by reducing it

capability to attack? The former case is time sensitive an

requires air forces to be ready for action and be responsive t

the actions taken by an enemy force. Conversely, the latte

case does not result in immediate action. Instead, air force

attack enemy units and supplies before they reach the battle

front. These actions may take time to produce an appropriat

effect on the battlefield and are usually conducted in area

away from the immediate front and away from direct suppor

for surface forces.

Air forces are well suited to support interdiction missions

which focus on air operations to destroy, disrupt, or disabl

enemy military forces before they reach the battlefield. Inter

diction missions attempt to reduce the military capability of 

ground force to effectively fight a war before friendly force

have to respond by maneuver or fire. For example, if air

interdic tion missions are successful, a friendly ground forc

will not have to engage a fully equipped and manned enem

ground force. These conditions would reduce friendly casua

ties and increase the probability of success against a foe. Ai

interdiction can help shape the forces and conditions of 

battlefield in favor of friendly ground forces.

There are three methods of conducting air-interdiction mis

sions. First, air operations might try to destroy or reduce th

number of enemy soldiers and supplies through attrition. Th

attack against enemy military forces before they reach a bat

tlefield directly reduces their ability to fight. Second, air force

131
can create a blockage that delays or denies the enemy th

ability to send personnel and material to the battlefront. Thi

type of action creates a barrier of destruction that prevent

the enemy from receiving reinforcements or supplies. Th

third method is to create systematic inefficiencies to dela

logistical support. Air forces might destroy railroads, bridges

or roads to disrupt transportation networks, thus forcing th

enemy to take long delivery routes that create distribution

problems.1

Interdiction targets can take many forms. For example, na

val airpower could strike ports and harbors, lines of commun

cations, storage facilities, or submarine bases, albeit with usually

lesser payloads than land-based aircraft . Interdiction is no

restricted solely to ground operations. Naval forces can also b

affected by interdiction missions. Most naval vessels requir

logistical support or, in the case of battle, reinforcements t

continue a conflict. Aviation and ground forces can also con

duct interdiction missions by using their helicopters, long

US Navy fighter from the USS Bon Homme Richard conducting an interdictio

mission against a bridge during the Korean War.

132
range tactical missiles , and artillery in direct missions agains

an enemy force. Interdiction missions by air forces provide 

flexible capability for a commander to eliminate the require

ment to fight a battle or, at the least, reduce the size of th

conflict.

Air forces can conduct effective interdiction missions, bu

they need a concentrated effort in order to work. Ground o

naval forces may legitimately require direct aerial support t

defeat enemy forces. A commander needs to weigh the issues

costs, and benefits of conducting interdiction or CAS mis

sions. This challenge can pit an air force commander agains

a surface commander over the use of limited aerospace powe

resources.

Operation Strangle: Korea, 1951

UN forces in Korea had managed to survive a North Korean

invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) during 1950. Revers

ing a humiliating retreat down the Korean peninsula, UN force

conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon and pushed th

Soviet Union and North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), which

was backed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to th

brink of destruction near the North Korean border with th

PRC. The PRC responded with an attack across the Yalu Rive

that forced UN and American forces to retreat once more, an

the war stalemated in a conflict along a stable line south o

Seoul, the ROK capital (fig. 6). The UN faced a PRC groun

force of 300,000 men from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA

and an NKPA with a combat strength of 553,000 men in Novem

ber 1950. 2

A war of attrition ensued throughout the Korean peninsula

The USAF proposed an aerial interdiction campaign to stem

the flow of reinforcements and supplies to PRC and NKPA

forces. The USAF’s Fifth Air Force (5AF), the Navy’s Task Forc

77 (TF77) carrier force, and the Marine Corps’s 1st Marine Ai

Wing were to conduct the interdiction campaign—Operation

Strangle —beginning in the spring of 1951. Gen Matthew Ridg

way, commander of UN forces, wanted to recapture Seoul an

push the PLA and NKPA north. Operation Strangle would seve

133
the supply lines of these forces, which stretched 150 mile

from the Yalu River south.3

Fifth Air Force had attempted an earlier interdiction pro

gram, Interdiction Plan no. 4 (15 December 1950 to 30 Ma

1951), to choke off the PRC’s use of railroads to resupply it

forces. American aircraft, including World War II–era Boein

B-29 Superfortresses and Douglas B-26 Invaders, attacked 

myriad of rail lines and connections throughout North Korea

 Figure 6. Korean Conflict

134
American intelligence analysts believed that if the rail line

were cut, the PRC would need 10,000 trucks to provide logisti

cal support for its troops. The Chinese and Koreans had only

4,000 trucks between them.4 The railroad system in North

Korea had many parallel and transverse connections that mad

the network difficult to attack. The air forces could not attac

all the connections simultaneously, and repairs were made t

cuts in the line with a large labor pool available for construc

tion. So enemy rail traffic continued, albeit using circuitou

routes. Limited B-29 bombing sorties and MiG-15 fighters con

tributed to the reduced Interdiction Plan no. 4’s ability t

destroy key rail bridges. B-26 bombers tried to intercept moto

transports, but the PRC and North Korean drivers switched t

night convoys and used camouflage to hide their vehicles from

attack during daylight. Fifth Air Force ’s F-51s, Lockheed P-8

Shooting Stars, and Republic F-84 Thunderjets, acting as arme

reconnaissance forces—hunting for trucks and destroying tar

gets of opportunity—soon faced deadly AAA fire. Losses jumpe

from three in January 1951 to 28 in April 1951. The interdic

tion program was not working. The PLA still had 18 division

on the battlefield ready for combat. The railroad system wa

too tough to destroy.

Operation Strangle was implemented to improve the inter

diction effort. North Korea was divided into sections to b

attacked by USAF, Navy, or Marine Corps aircraft , which would

concentrate on attacking the road network from a rail line t

the front.5 Strangle ’s targets centered on seven main enem

supply lines running from the PRC to the front. However, a

UN air forces destroyed or damaged the roadways, the Ch

nese and Koreans took measures to counteract the attacks

Instead of using main roads, traffic was diverted to secondar

ones. American aircrews did their best to destroy bridges an

roads by using time-delay bombs to discourage repairs, bu

Chinese and Korean labor gangs used rifle fire to explode th

bombs or accepted any casualties to repair the damage.6 UN

air forces also dropped tetrahedral tacks to puncture tires

used aerial mines, and cratered roads. North Korean enginee

units were stationed at key points along major supply lines t

repair any damage. These units rapidly repaired the roads. UN

intelligence analysts estimated that road traffic had increased

135
and the PLA and NKPA were able to stockpile 800 tons o

supplies a day. They would soon have a large strategic reserv

to conduct a major ground offensive. 7

B-26 bombers continued interdiction operations by flying a

night. Attacking convoys required precision; bombing at nigh

compounded the problem since pilots needed to use flares fo

illumination. Unfortunately, the only combat aircraft usin

flares, the B-29, had a dismal 50 percent failure rate for it

flares. 8 C-47 transports were better, but they were vulnerabl

to AAA fire; furthermore, defense operations limited their avail

ability for interdiction missions. Weather, terrain, and the dif

ficulty of finding targets at night made these measures ques

tionable. The attack on roads and convoys started to fizzle

Fifth Air Force looked for another alternative to interdict th

enemy.

Operation Strangle’s focus shifted to attacking the railroa

networks. The PRC and North Korea had always used railways

to transport the vast majority of their supplies to the front

Intelligence experts from 5AF estimated that only 120 boxcar

per day were needed to supply the entire enemy war effort a

the front. The rail line interdiction program had three attac

B-29 bombers over Korea could not stem the flow of materiel and manpowe

from North Korean and Communist Chinese forces.

136
options: bomb rail bridges, destroy rolling stock, or sever rai

track and roadbeds. Aircraft from TF77 had conducted an

extensive bridge-busting program on Korea ’s eastern coast

Bridges were repeatedly struck, but they were soon repaire

or bypassed. Rear Adm R. A. Ofstie , commander of TF77

admitted that the Navy fliers created major gaps in the rai

network, but supplies still got through by truck. 1 0 Addition

ally, if the communists could repair the bridge, they could

anticipate another attack by air forces. They could station AAA

units to shoot down the planes. Analysts with 5AF also con

cluded that since the PLA and North Koreans needed relatively

few boxcars to resupply their forces, they could not destro

enough of them to stop their effort.11 The only remaining op 

tion was to bomb railway tracks and roadbeds. Aircraft could

attack anyplace along a rail line without fear of AAA. Camou 

flaging track was difficult, and replacing track would requir

heavy equipment that the Chinese and Koreans did not pos

sess. Railway track and roadbeds became the main target

along with a few rail bridges.

Aircraft from TF77 and 5AF as well as strategic bomber

started to bomb their targets. The majority of air operations in

Korea concentrated on this interdiction effort. Gen James A

Van Fleet, commander of Eighth Army, reduced ground re

quirements for CAS to a total of eight sorties per day pe

division—a total of a mere 96 sorties.1 2 Cutting a rail line in

several places also compounded the enemy’s repair problems

Fifth Air Force estimated that Operation Strangle , now re

named Saturate , would last 90 days.

Operation Saturate ’s purpose was to cut the rail lines faste

than the enemy could repair them. Rail lines were abandone

or kept open only after a major repair effort was launched

Aircraft from TF77 closed major railway tracks along the east

ern coast. However, problems soon started to appear.

Enemy countermeasures were enacted to thwart the inter

diction campaign. Use of AAA and automatic weapons directe

at aircraft skyrocketed from about 200 weapons in Januar

1951 to about 1,200 in November 1951.1 3 UN losses mounte

for all types of aircraft. Because aircrews had to expend mor

efforts to avoid AAA, bombing accuracy plummeted by half

Additionally, MiG-15s, aided by drop tanks to increase thei

137
range south, started to attack aircraft on interdiction mis

sions. This confined the area of operations for most 5AF air

craft. If they were “bounced” by the MiG-15s, then they droppe

their bombs before hitting their targets and flew home. MiG

15s also forced B-29 bombers to switch to night attacks t

avoid being shot down. Night operations reduced the numbe

of bomber sorties and bombing accuracy, which affected th

interdiction effort. North Korean labor units also became mor

adept at repairing railway track and bridges. South Korean

agents of the USAF’s Office of Special Investigations observe

North Korean labor units fixing railway track within six t

eight hours after the attack and replacing large bridges in n

more than two to four days.1 4 Fifth Air Force would need even

more aircraft to keep pace with the North Korean repairs. N

additional aircraft were forthcoming to support the effort. US

Air Force and Navy resources were also being used in Europ

and other contingencies. The technology available to conduc

night and precision attacks was not in use. If the interdiction

aircraft had obtained such devices, perhaps the assault on

roads and railways would have seen better results. Finally, th

consumption of supplies by the PLA and NKPA was much

smaller than Western intelligence analysts had estimated. Ameri

can Army divisions required 500 tons per day of supplies. PLA

divisions, although 50 percent the size of a comparable Ameri

can unit, used fewer than 40 tons. Interdiction of such smal

amounts of supplies would require an extensive effort. B

December 1951, 5AF conceded that Operation Saturate ha

failed.

The interdiction efforts throughout Korea were massive. Air

crews from 5AF flew 87,522 sorties, made over 19,000 railway

track cuts, claimed to have destroyed 34,211 vehicles, wrecke

276 locomotives, and knocked out 3,820 railway cars.1 5 Despit

these efforts, the PLA and NKPA were still supplied and wage

war with the UN. Many ground commanders were convince

that aerial interdiction had achieved little and that the bes

use of airpower was CAS . The PLA and NKPA were able t

stockpile supplies. However, aerial interdiction did disrupt en

emy operations, and, more importantly, there was no majo

offensive conducted by the enemy during or after the interdic

tion campaign started. Rail lines were cut, and resources wer

138
diverted to repair them. Indeed, the aerial interdiction effor

did not prove itself to ground-force commanders as airpowe

advocates had hoped it would. UN forces had to overcom

such problems as covering a large area against an enemy wh

did not rely heavily on logistics and using aircraft no

equipped to conduct an interdiction campaign.

The Easter Offensive:

Airpower Halts the North Vietnamese

The American ground involvement in Vietnam had reache

a climax in the Tet offensive in 1968. After the combine

Vietcong and North Vietnamese offensive had surprised South

Vietnamese and US forces, the withdrawal of American groun

forces proceeded, greatly aided by intense international an

domestic political pressure for a negotiated settlement. The US

policy of direct involvement became one of aiding the South

Vietnamese government to shoulder more of the defensive re

quirements while American forces were withdrawn. Unde

President Richard M. Nixon , the process of Vietnamization

proceeded, and only a handful of American ground adviser

and few USAF units were stationed in Vietnam. The Pari

Peace Accords were dragging on, and the end of hostilities in

Vietnam seemed far away, but the American military presenc

was shrinking fast. The North Vietnamese government gaine

strength and waited until American forces were at their lowes

to begin operations to invade South Vietnam. There were only

95,000 US forces in South Vietnam—down from a high o

500,000 in 1969. 1 6

On 30 March 1972, North Vietnamese armor and infantr

units rolled across the northern border of South Vietnam through

the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Three North Vietnamese Arm

(NVA) divisions—over 40,000 troops—pushed south, supporte

by artillery, rockets, and SAMs.

1 7 The North Vietnamese ha

been infiltrating regular NVA soldiers into the south in antici

pation of the invasion. The NVA also launched an attack from

Cambodia in hopes of capturing Saigon , the capital of South

Vietnam.

Units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), de

fending the northern provinces of South Vietnam , were over

139
run and forced to retreat. The three-pronged attack on ARVN

and the South Vietnamese government threatened to divid

the nation quickly. Nixon ordered American airpower to tak

the field to stem the invasion since he did not want to threaten

the withdrawal of further ground troops and thus halt Viet

namization .

1 8 Nixon ordered the remaining 6,000 American

ground forces not to engage the NVA. Airpower could swiftly

enter the conflict and leave the area without threatening t

create a new, sustained presence in South Vietnam. The USAF’

only combat unit stationed in South Vietnam was a McDon

nell-Douglas F-4 Phantom wing at Da Nang, but the Air Forc

also had three wings of F-4s in Thailand. Fortunately, th

USAF had several B-52 bomber units stationed at Andersen

AFB, Guam . The USAF and Navy were ordered to send mor

airpower to South Vietnam to stem the rising invasion tide.

Operation Constant Guard was initiated to replenish air

power’s strength in South Vietnam and stop the invasion. F-4

strength was boosted from 185 to 374; 124 B-52s were de

The F-4E fighter, similar to the one shown here, helped stem the tide in th

Easter offensive of 1972.

140
ployed to Guam ; and C-130s, F-111As , and KC-135 tanker

came from USAF units around the world to South Vietnam

Units were sending aircraft to South Vietnam within 72 hour

of the request.19 The Navy sent two additional aircraft carriers

followed by two more, to the existing two carriers off the coas

of South Vietnam . The Marine Corps ordered two squadrons o

F-4s, one squadron of A-6 bombers, and two squadrons o

McDonnell-Douglas A-4E light-attack aircraft. The US Air Forc

had removed many of its air resources before the invasion an

had to replace much of its capability to fight an air war.

The earlier war in South Vietnam was characterized by 

guerilla action. The Vietcong and NVA stayed in the jungle o

melted into the local populace to attack and harass the ARVN

and American military units. American airpower operated un

der many restrictions: off-limit targets, artificial zones of re

sponsibility (route packages), piecemeal attacks, centralize

command and execution of missions, and other problems. B

1972 the NVA was using T-54, T-55, and amphibious PT-7

tanks. The North Vietnamese had switched to a conventiona

war to seize territory and defeat the ARVN in the field. Th

NVA was succeeding. The American military would respon

with Operation Freedom Train .

Nixon decided to unleash an extensive bombing and inter

diction campaign to stop the North Vietnamese in thei

tracks—thus, Operation Freedom Train was born. Its objec

tives were to restrict the flow of supplies to North Vietnam

from its allies, destroy enemy military suppliers and stores

and stop the flow of supplies from North to South Vietnam.

2 

Eventually, Nixon authorized the mining of North Vietnam’

major port, Haiphong. Earlier administrations were afraid t

mine or bomb the port due to potential damage to Soviet

Chinese, or other nations’ ships, which could have led to ex

tensive political damage to the war effort. Given this self

im posed restriction, the Soviets and Chinese were able to kee

the supply lines open to North Vietnam with impunity.

On 3 April, American air forces were authorized to strik

SAM, AAA, artillery, and logistical targets as far north as 5

miles above the border of South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs o

Staff (JCS) later authorized the attack of targets throughou

North Vietnam ’s panhandle (the area that connected North

141
and South Vietnam). American air forces were given the green

light to inflict maximum damage against the enemy’s air de

fense, artillery, and logistical support. The US Air Force’s Sev

enth Air Force (7AF), the Navy’s TF77, and Strategic Air Com

mand ’s (SAC) B-52s were given certain geographic areas o

responsibility. The Seventh had the responsibility of strikin

targets from the DMZ north to about 100 miles near the 18th

parallel, and TF77 would strike north of the Air Force’s are

for about 25 miles. The task force’s interdiction effort would

include transshipment points, storage areas, highways, roads

waterways, and any target that supported the NVA’s war effor

in the south.2 1

Aircraft of 7AF, TF77, SAC , and the South Vietnamese Ai

Force (VNAF) attacked North Vietnamese supply lines in South

Vietnam and throughout the North Vietnamese panhandle. In

March 1972, there were 4,237 sorties; the number of mission

in April jumped to 17,171 and increased to 18,444 by the en

of May.2 2 Airpower was heavily involved in the fight. The VNAF

contributed about one-third of the total effort. Vietnamization

had delivered a trained air force, and it was being used t

defend South Vietnam. By 16 April, Nixon expanded the wa

by allowing B-52s to bomb Haiphong harbor and its surround

ing facilities.

Airpower was striking NVA logistics in South Vietnam , th

transportation network in the North Vietnamese panhandle

and targets in North Vietnam. Nixon’s goal was to halt th

North Vietnamese ground offensive and rescue the South Viet

namese—not recapture lost territory. 2 3 The interdiction effor

and an extended bombing campaign in North Vietnam becam

an effort to coerce the NVA to leave South Vietnam and stop

the Easter offensive . Nixon authorized further bombing mis

sions in North Vietnam to begin on 8 May. These raids, Opera

tion Linebacker I, allowed a resumption of bombing. Abou

1,800 sorties were conducted over North Vietnam in the firs

three days of Linebacker while other aircraft attacked NVA

troops and supply lines in South Vietnam . A total interdiction

campaign was initiated to halt all NVA supplies and reinforce

ments going into South Vietnam.

President Nixon listed three main objectives for the com

bined air and naval campaign against North Vietnam. Durin

142
a three-day air campaign, Linebacker would use B-52s an

other tactical aircraft to hit targets in the north that would

create supply and troop shortages in the south and limit th

war-fighting capability of NVA forces in South Vietnam . Line

backer’s objectives were to

• reduce the flow of supplies into North Vietnam,

• destroy existing stockpiles of supplies in North Vietnam

and

• reduce the flow south from North Vietnam.

2 4

These objectives mirrored the earlier goals to stop supplie

and reinforcements into South Vietnam. Now, the entire countr

of North Vietnam might be affected by restricting the import o

resources into Haiphong. The interdiction campaign took on

an expanded meaning. B-52 raids threatened to widen the wa

and escalate the conflict into a new American war unless th

NVA withdrew. Linebacker had another goal—to get the stalle

peace talks back on track.

North Vietnamese air defenses were not easily defeated, an

they were active throughout Linebacker . SAM, AAA, and MiG

fighter interceptors were ready to oppose the air assault. Th

North Vietnamese started to shoot SAMs at record levels dur

ing Freedom Train and Linebacker. American air losses fo

April, May, and June hit 52 aircraft. American air forces con

tinued the attack and racked up 27,745 sorties over the north.2 

Seventh Air Force, TF77, and SAC B-52s started to target rai

lines, roads, bridges, and marshalling yards, as well as equip 

ment repair, oil and petroleum storage/refinery, and electrica

power facilities as Linebacker geared up. The Navy started t

mine Haiphong harbor under Operation Pocket Money. If tha

operation succeeded, then supplies would have to be reroute

through China—a time-consuming effort—and American ai

forces could pinch off their transport by attacking the surface

transportation network. The USAF recognized that Hanoi, th

capital of North Vietnam, was a key logistics center—key t

the country’s limited production capability, storage area, an

C

2

center. The Hanoi area became a target too. If Hanoi an

Haiphong were isolated, the air forces could concentrate on

shutting the flow of supplies and reinforcements south.

143
The Linebacker raids had four phases. The first would strik

rail lines in and around Hanoi plus railways leading to China

The second phase concentrated on targeting storage facilitie

and marshalling yards. Air Force and Navy crews would then

hit secondary storage and transshipment points used by th

North Vietnamese in response to the first two phases. Th

fourth phase would strike enemy air defenses: C2, SAM, AAA

airfields, and other targets. This last phase would start when

air commanders believed that air defenses needed to be de

stroyed to accomplish the first three phases.

Air commanders were faced with a dilemma. Should the

concentrate their efforts on striking targets in North Vietnam

or stem the immediate flow of supplies in the south? Although

the United States had sent many reinforcements to South

Vietnam, the air resources to conduct Freedom Train and Line

backer were limited. The targets in North Vietnam were mor

lucrative, but the number of attack sorties in South Vietnam

outnumbered those in Hanoi-Haiphong by a ratio of four t

one.

2 6 However, the raids in the north were aided by the intro

duction of PGMs . Missions that would have required man

aircraft using gravity bombs, unchanged since World War 

were replaced by television- or laser-guided munitions tha

needed only one aircraft to execute. The number of mission

over North Vietnam was also limited due to the lack of night

bombing capability. Air assets in the south did not have t

fight radar-guided SAMs, AAA, or MiGs that could attack air

craft under conditions of reduced visibility. This constrain

was lessened when 7AF received the all-weather and night

capable F-111A fighter-bomber. The Linebacker raids, a

though freer from restrictions than previous campaigns, ha

some limitations. Certain areas in Hanoi were off limits to attack.

Despite these restrictions, Linebacker succeeded in pound

ing the logistical capabilities of North Vietnam and put pres

sure on the enemy government to withdraw the NVA from

South Vietnam . Once Haiphong harbor was mined and th

American air forces could use PGMs to destroy key bridge

and rail lines, reinforcements and the resupply effort to sup

port the NVA started to slow down. However, the effort t

significantly reduce petroleum supplies to North Vietnam wa

largely unsuccessful because of North Vietnamese efforts t

144
disperse their oil-distribution system and a well-camouflage

oil pipeline from China that escaped destruction.2 7 Interdiction

efforts in the south benefited from the lack of an extensiv

SAM system, the absence of MiGs, better intelligence, an

shorter flight times to respond to commanders and increas

the sortie rate.

The Easter offensive ultimately faltered by June 1972, when

the ARVN, with extensive air support, recaptured much of it

lost territory. The North Vietnamese had stockpiled supplies t

last through the summer; oil pipelines were not seriously dis

rupted; and supplies, albeit reduced, were moved from Chin

via truck instead of rail. The interdiction effort did reduc

supplies, and the efforts to capture South Vietnam wer

thwarted. If airpower had not been used, the invasion of South

Vietnam would have been unopposed, and the NVA could have

controlled the south.

The enemy’s use of conventional forces to invade South

Vietnam had increased its reliance on logistics, which compro

mised the NVA’s operations because of the vulnerability of it

supply lines. Additionally, the heavy demand for supplies mad

the NVA sensitive to shortages created by the Linebacker bomb

ing campaigns and Freedom Train strikes. The destruction o

logistical transportation capability also strained the limite

mobility resources available to the NVA. These limited resource

could either haul supplies or be used in the south to suppor

combat operations. Lines of communications were disrupted

and the NVA was left with finding ways to overcome thes

problems. Although the NVA was not ultimately defeated, i

was forced to admit defeat at this point, stop its offensiv

operations, and return to the Paris peace talks. According t

Gen William A. Momyer, former 7AF commander, the use o

airpower in South Vietnam and Linebacker during the Easte

offensive was the most significant factor in turning around th

peace negotiations. 2 8

Interdiction at Sea: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea

In March 1943, the Allies were slowly pushing the Japanes

forces out of New Guinea and the rest of the Southwest Pacific

Area (SWPA). Gen Douglas MacArthur, commander of Allie

145
forces in SWPA, was successful in pushing Japanese arm

units out of Guadalcanal by using his naval, air, and groun

forces. The Japanese were being attacked throughout SWPA

and required reinforcements throughout the region. American

and Australian forces were on the offensive, and the Imperia

Japanese army and navy were suddenly on the defensive. Th

Japanese transferred two divisions from Korea and northern

China to shore up their defensive line in New Guinea .

2 9 Con

trol of New Guinea was still in doubt. If New Guinea remaine

in Japanese hands, an invasion of Australia was possible. L

Gen Adachi Hatazo, commander of the newly created Eight

eenth Army, decided to relocate his headquarters from Ra

baul, New Britain , to Lae, New Guinea, to increase the Japa

nese army’s pressure on the Allied forces. He planned to transi

the Bismarck Sea with the 51st Division in a convoy and lan

in New Guinea (fig. 7).

MacArthur had received intelligence from the US Navy tha

indicated the Japanese would send the 51st Division via con

voy to Lae, with up to 12 transports protected by destroyers.3 

If MacArthur could eliminate the 51st before it reached Lae

then control of the area might fall into Allied hands. Airpowe

could be used to sink the convoy before the ground forces hi

the beaches in New Guinea. The challenge fell on MacArthur’

air commander, Maj Gen George Kenney, a recent addition t

the Allied SWPA staff. MacArthur had gone through several ai

commanders because of the lack of progress using airpower

Kenney came armed with some unconventional ideas. High

a ltitude precision daylight bombing did not work in the Pacific

as well as it did in Europe. European targets were industria

ones while Pacific targets frequently were moving ships o

ground forces. Pacific bombing operations were hardly a suc

cess. B-17 bombers failed to sink any ships in the Battle o

Midway in 1942 and were a disappointment throughout th

Pacific theater . There was much doubt on MacArthur’s staf

about the value of airpower.

Kenney believed that the chance of hitting a moving ship

would increase if he could change how his Air Force unit

would operate against the enemy. Kenney did not have an

carrier-based aircraft that were designed to sink naval ships

Instead, SWPA air forces needed to modify Kenney’s aircraft t

146
do the job. Kenney had a relatively small force of 207 bomber

and 129 fighters. Unfortunately for Kenney and MacArthur

the United States and Britain had agreed that the first goa

was for the Allies to defeat Germany first. This meant that th

best aircraft were sent to Europe rather than the Pacific. Second

rate aircraft were allocated to Kenney. But this secondar

status did not stop him. He ordered his engineers to modify

aircraft to meet his needs. For example, SWPA’s AAF engi

neers added forward-firing .50-caliber machine guns to 3

North American B-25C Mitchell medium bombers. The engi

neers also added four more guns to blisters on the aircraft’

side. This modification allowed the B-25 to strafe a ship an

knock out any AAA threat on ships’ decks. The B-25’s bom

payload was also changed to carry 60 small fragmentation

bombs and six 100-pound demolition bombs with delayed

fuses. 3 1 Kenney also used parachute-fitted bombs to improv

accuracy.

Figure 7. New Guinea

147
SWPA aircrews also practiced bombing targets at an alti

tude of 150 feet. Kenney soon realized that his aircraft would

increase their chances of hitting a ship if they attacked at 

lower altitude. B-25 and Douglas A-20 Havoc light bomber

experimented with skip bombing or “masthead” attack tech

niques. This bombing technique was similar in practice t

skipping stones; instead of hitting a target from the top, how

ever, a bomb would strike the target—a ship—in its side.

Armed with a warning that the Japanese planned their mov

towards Lae, Kenney was ready for action with his new ai

force. B-24 bombers kept Rabaul under observation for an

Japanese convoy activity. Hatazo moved out of Rabaul with

6,912 soldiers and crews of the 51st Division and convoy crew

members at midnight on 28 February 1943, into the Bis

marck Sea towards Lae.

3 2 The convoy was composed of eigh

transports and eight destroyers. The Japanese hoped for ba

weather to limit visibility and reduce the chances of bein

attacked by Kenney. They assigned about 80 fighters to pro

vide air coverage over the convoy. 3 3 Kenney had around 15

aircraft, half of them P-38 fighters. On 1 March, SWPA recon

naissance aircraft spotted the convoy 150 miles west of Ra

baul.

3 4 Land-based aircraft were now poised to defeat a fleet

Mitchell’s ideas about airpower sinking ships would be put t

the test. If the SWPA aircraft could sink the Japanese, th

enemy on New Guinea would be dealt a serious blow.

The Japanese convoy was struck by three waves of long

range B-17 bombers from the 43d Bomb Group, guided b

B-24 reconnaissance reports. The B-17s dropped 1,000-poun

bombs from an altitude of 6,500 feet. Half of the transport

were sunk or sinking. Kenney had intended to sink the enem

ships in deep water to reduce the chance of rescuing enem

survivors.3 5 Two destroyers picked up some survivors from th

transports and made a dash for Lae to drop rescued soldier

off on New Guinea. The rest of the convoy continued on it

fateful way, closer to the bombs of the modified B-25s an

fighter aircraft.

SWPA medium bombers and fighters were ready to finish of

the convoy. On 2 March, 30 modified B-25Cs, A-20s, an

Australian Beaufighter aircraft were ready to strike. Flying in

low, the aircraft avoided Japanese Zero fighter coverage tha

148
was ready to pounce on any B-17s. The Japanese fighter cov

erage was flying at 7,000 feet above the convoy and was caugh

off guard by Kenney’s low-level bombing strikes.3 6 From 100

hours to nightfall, Allied airpower repeatedly struck the Japa

nese convoy. Aircraft attacked at wave height, low, and me

dium altitudes. Skip bombing and strafing worked magnifi

cently. The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet added to the fray b

sending patrol torpedo boats to attack the convoy. At the en

of the day, all of the remaining transports were sunk, four o

the eight destroyers sunk, and many Japanese aircraft sho

out of the skies. The Japanese convoy lay broken and burnin

in the Bismarck Sea .

The next day, 3 March, aircraft continued to strafe the rem

nants of the convoy. American and Australian aircraft wer

victorious, sinking 12 ships in three days. Out of 6,912 Japa

nese troops and crews on the convoy, 3,664 were killed. Fewe

than 700 soldiers reached Lae. The Allies lost only four plane

shot down, with 13 killed and 12 wounded.3 7 This interdiction

mission also influenced the Japanese strategy of directly

sending reinforcements to their forces in New Guinea. Th

Japanese would not send supplies or troop replacements di

rectly to Lae. Instead, they would send them up to 200 mile

away from Lae and either transport them on smaller high

speed boats and submarines or overland through the jungle

The introduction of small barges and high-speed ships mad

their supply and reinforcements vulnerable to US Navy patro

torpedo boats and SWPA aircraft. 3 8 The Japanese lost an esti

mated 20,000 personnel transiting the sea from Rabaul t

New Guinea after the Battle of the Bismarck Sea .

39 In both

cases, the transfer of reinforcements and supplies was slowe

and consumed more resources by forcing Japanese engineer

to build a road across northern New Guinea and use smalle

vessels.

Land-based airpower was able to defeat a naval force almos

single-handedly. Despite the lack of dive-bombers and torped

attack planes designed to sink ships, Kenney’s skip bombin

and modified aircraft completed the job. The typical interdic

tion mission of attacking and disrupting men and materiel on

the land took on another face: destruction of enemy resource

at sea. Airpower could deliver a valuable tool of maneuver t

149
force the Japanese to take excessive actions to avoid destruc

tion by the SWPA forces. The Japanese were vulnerable, espe

cially to interdiction of their naval assets that provided rein 

forcements and logistics support to island outposts. The US

Navy also aided these efforts by using its submarine forces t

sink any ships that escaped detection by air. The aerial inter

diction efforts also grew as the Japanese started to lose thei

ability to contest the skies over the Pacific. The American

aircraft industry also got into high gear and produced modern

fighters and bombers in quantity; these were shared in th

European and Pacific theaters. This had the effect of tighten

ing the noose around Japan’s neck. Japanese living condi

tions on New Guinea were getting abysmal. Approximately 4

percent of the Japanese force fighting in the steaming jungle

of New Guinea were suffering from disease or starvation.4 0

MacArthur could now start a campaign of island hopping

These actions centered on avoiding pitched battles on enemy

held islands and letting the Japanese “starve on the vine” b

cutting off their supplies. Since airpower was a deadly threa

to the Japanese navy, this strategy was an effective method o

defeating the enemy and avoiding American and Australian

casualties. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea forced the Japa

nese largely to abandon any major efforts to take the offensiv

against the Americans and Australians on New Guinea. Afte

isolating the Japanese, Kenney believed his air forces could

then concentrate on supporting ground operations.

4 1 The Japa 

nese dug into their island empire to await the oncoming Allie

offensives—this spelled doom for the Japanese.

SWPA forces were also fortunate that they had intelligenc

indicating the Japanese were going to move their forces from

Rabaul to Lae. The interception of Japanese naval codes gave

Kenney advanced notification of the size of the convoy, depar

ture and destination locations, and an approximate timing o

the move. SWPA air forces were able to marshal sufficien

reconnaissance aircraft to seek out the Japanese convoy.

Allied success at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea illustrate

the importance of airpower to many skeptical ground com

manders in the SWPA. MacArthur finally recognized the valu

of airpower. His opinion on airpower left no doubt when h

advised a subordinate of Sir Louis Mountbatten, commande

150
of the Southeast Asian theater, in fall 1943 to 

tell him he wil

need more air and when you have told him, tell him again

from me that he will need more air! And when you have told

him that for a second time, tell him from me for the third tim

that he will still need more air!” 4 2 This transformation wa

due, in no small part, to the efforts of Kenney and the Battl

of the Bismarck Sea.

Supporting the Troops with Close Air Support

One of a ground commander’s worst nightmares is to b

attacked and surrounded by an overwhelming number of en

emy troops. Ground commanders normally have at their dis

posal artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, armor, and othe

weapons to help repel such attacks. Starting in World War 

and reaching maturity in World War II, airpower provided 

much-needed function of close air support . CAS provides di

rect assistance, through bombing or strafing, to troops directly

engaged with enemy forces or in proximity to friendly forces

This is especially true for light infantry, airborne forces, o

ground units getting ashore from a seaborne invasion. Fo

example, if friendly forces are surrounded and being attacked

aircraft could bomb enemy forces that have encircled the friendl

forces.

CAS has been the subject of many debates since its intro

duction on the battlefield. Airmen argued that interdiction wa

a more valuable use of limited aerial weapons. Conversely

ground commanders saw the immediate need of CAS to pro

tect and support their soldiers in battle. Airmen could contro

and plan interdiction missions, but they would be “on-call” t

respond to a CAS request. Interdiction allowed commanders t

be more proactive and seek out the enemy, whereas CAS wa

a reactive function that tied up resources waiting for a mis

sion. However, CAS was and still is a very valuable tool for al

commanders.

No military function or capability is infallible. Strategic at

tack and interdiction missions may not completely stop an

enemy force from conducting operations against friendly groun

forces. An example is a surprise combined air and groun

151
attack, such as the 1973 Yom Kippur War , in which Egyptian

forces stymied and pushed Israeli armored and infantry unit

out of their defensive positions. This forced the IDF/AF t

concentrate on CAS to stop the advance. Throughout modern

war, cooperative efforts in the air and on the ground hav

proven to be an effective team for defeating enemy groun

forces. The US Marine Corps almost exclusively devotes it

own “organic” fixed-wing air forces to the support of groun

operations.

Air and space forces need to balance the requirements an

priorities for all of their functions: air and space superiority

strategic attack, interdiction , and CAS . If interdiction works

friendly ground forces will not even see a significant portion o

an enemy’s force. If not, airmen may need to apportion man

of their resources to CAS . In either case, an aerospace leade

needs to decide upon the appropriate number of interdiction

and CAS missions, given the current situation. Conducting an

A-10s providing CAS in Kosovo in 1999

152
exclusive interdiction campaign without regard to CAS ma

lead to a defeated friendly ground force and make the success

ful interdiction campaign a moot point. Conversely, using al

air and space resources for CAS might not be an effectiv

application of limited aerial weaponry. Aircraft might stay idle

and enemy forces might entrench their rear-area logistica

support structure and defenses. Such a situation might lea

to having to use even greater numbers of ground and ai

forces to defeat the enemy later on.

The debate over whether to use interdiction or CAS is 

continuing one. Understanding the issues and the function

of CAS and interdiction will help one become aware of thes

concerns. Future military commanders need to use all thei

forces as effectively and efficiently as possible to maximiz

their firepower, maneuver, and exploitation of the battlefield

In certain situations, priorities may change, and either inter

diction or CAS may become the more critical mission for th

day. The availability of resources or political objectives ma

dictate switching from one type of mission to the other. This i

one of the most valuable aspects of air and space power—th

ability to conduct many types of missions, with limited re

sources, and in a short time frame.

Airpower Fails at Kasserine Pass

By early 1943, the US Army had landed and begun opera

tions against German and Italian forces in North Africa. Th

Allies were slowly pushing the German Afrika Korps (DAK) ou

of Africa and forcing its retreat to Sicily and the Italian main 

land. Although relatively new to the war, American groun

commanders were itching to get into combat and prove thei

worth. The DAK’s leaders, including Generalfeldmarschall Er

win Rommel, realized they were being put into a vise between

the growing American strength in the west and the oncomin

British Eighth Army in the east. Rommel planned to scrap

together enough German and Italian forces to launch an offen

sive against the green American Army and then concentrat

on the British. American and German forces would eventually

meet at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia . In this battle, American

ground forces would be defeated. Airpower—specifically, th

153
lack of both CAS and air superiority—would be partly blamed

Based on this experience, the Allies would adopt a new doc

trine that changed the face of airpower.

In the early days of World War II, Army Air Corps assets did

not operate as an independent force. Instead, aircraft squad

rons were divided among ground units. The ground commande

was responsible for assigning missions to his aircraft. Th

only exception to control of air resources by ground officer

was long-range strategic-bombardment units. They were con

trolled by a centralized source to conduct independent action

in direct support of a war effort. Small aviation forces wer

assigned to ground commanders to ensure rapid and exclu 

sive CAS in operations.4 3 There were still questions about wh

would control airpower and what was the most effective use o

these resources.

Adding more confusion to this situation was a new Arm

doctrine incorporated into Field Manual (FM) 31-35, Aviatio

in Support of Ground Forces. CAS and other support mission

were put under the control of the highest ground commande

in-theater, but subordinate ground commanders could not di

rect the use of air units to conduct missions. They had t

request missions through an air-support commander via 

Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, was a cunning foe to Allied forces in Nort

Africa.

154
theater commander. Ground commanders objected since thei

ability to use all available forces and ensure their unity o

command was now disrupted. The control of airpower, espe

cially CAS , was in doubt in 1942 and would seriously affec

operations in North Africa, as well as later actions.

The Germans launched their strategy of conducting an of

fensive against the Americans and holding off British attack

in the west. German and Italian units conducted a massiv

offensive, and Allied forces were overrun. Tanks, half-tracks

artillery, munitions, supplies, and airfields were abandoned t

the onrushing Germans. The Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tun

sia , initiated on 18 February, began when Rommel ordere

two DAK armor divisions to strike and push American force

out of the area (fig. 8). The Americans had built up a defensiv

line to contain further German advances in the area. German

forces smashed American units and forced several units t

retreat by the next day.

Allied air and ground units were thrown into the battle t

stem the DAK’s offensive. Airpower was rushed into the battle

Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, from the Western

Desert Air Force, which supported the British Eighth Army

was put in command of the Allied Air Support Command. Thi

command had responsibility for all tactical air-support mis

sions, including CAS .

44 Coningham quickly saw many prob 

lems. Almost all of the Allied air missions were defensive in

nature. Although the air forces conducted CAS missions, ai

units were hesitant to go on the offensive. Additionally, target

were numerous, but bombers and fighters tended to protec

their assigned ground units. Coningham insisted that the ex

isting tactic of creating “air umbrellas” to provide a protectiv

bubble for ground units had to stop. Coningham demande

that air missions attack troop concentrations and vulnerabl

trucks. By going on the offensive, Allied aircraft should caus

enemy attacks on ground forces to subside.

This change of policy would turn the fortune of war aroun

for the Allies. One aspect that Coningham could not control

however, was the weather. Torrential rains turned airfield

into seas of mud. Sortie rates dropped. Additionally, the los

of airfields close to the battlefront caused aircraft to fly at thei

maximum range to fight a battle. Payloads were reduced fo

155
bombers, and fighters had less time contesting the skies agains

the Luftwaffe or strafing targets.

Allied ground forces eventually pushed the DAK out of th

area, and Kasserine Pass was cleared on 21 February. By 2

February, the Germans were in retreat. Weather condition

continued to hamper air operations. As the weather improved

Coningham was able to enact a priority system of air mission

throughout the area. Air units were no longer under the direc

control of ground commanders. Coningham convinced Gen

Dwight D. Eisenhower , commander of Allied forces for all o

North Africa and the Mediterranean , that CAS needed to b

allocated by priority due to the scarcity of aircraft.4 5 Groun

 Figure 8. Tunisia

156
commanders would expect less CAS . However, ground com

manders whose limited air resources did not give them

enough CAS support in previous situations now received, in

an emergency, more resources from a pool of centrally control

led aircraft.

Recriminations about the failure of airpower to support groun

commanders started in earnest after the DAK was pushe

back. Air-ground cooperation was lacking. There were insuffi

cient aircraft to conduct important missions; aerial reconnais

sance proved to be of little value to commanders; and bombin

missions were too slow in execution to be effective. Experi

enced ground forces were afraid of firing on aircraft, unles

they were fired upon, for fear of being attacked.4 6 In othe

cases, ground forces shot at any aircraft—including friendly

ones. Changes to air doctrine and policy were badly needed.

Coningham identified several areas to improve the suppor

of ground forces. First, instead of creating a defensive um

brella that concentrated on air defense over a limited area

airpower should strive to gain air superiority over the entir

region. Air units, theoretically, could have local air superiorit

over their area but could lose it if the Luftwaffe attacked each

air umbrella one at a time. The Luftwaffe could use mass an

the offensive to separately defeat the Allied air forces. Overal

air superiority was a primary objective above all other require

ments. Second, Coningham ordered a halt to the application

of airpower on an on-call basis controlled by separate groun

commanders. Another commander might view one ground com

mander’s priority as a mere nuisance. Due to scarce air as

sets, requirements and requests for airpower could best serv

the overall theater commander by centralizing the assignmen

of air missions. Third, Coningham pressed for control of ai

resources by an airman, not a ground commander. An airman

better understood and had a broader theater perspective fo

the application of air superiority, strategic attack, interdiction 

and CAS than did a ground commander. Ground command

ers, in Coningham ’s eyes, fought the land campaign; air com 

manders fought two: the battle for air superiority and th

battle in support of the ground commander to win the lan

campaign.4 7 These observations would become codified into 

new Army doctrine that would eventually affect the future of CAS 

157
The experience at Kasserine Pass and the overall perform

ance of airpower in North Africa indicated a need to revis

Army doctrine. Army Chief of Staff Marshall authorized Eisen

hower to form a team of air and ground officers to revise th

existing doctrine. The new doctrine, FM 100-20, Comman

and Employment of Air Power, reflected many of Coningham’

ideas. FM 100-20, which differed greatly from FM 1-5, took

effect on 21 July 1943—a swift change for a policy that in 

cluded such radical changes. FM 100-20 codified the concep

that air and land are “co-equal and interdependent; neither i

an auxiliary of the other.”4 8 Although this segment of the doc

trine did not give the AAF total independence, it was a grea

step towards equity between air and ground commanders. Ai

commanders still worked through a theater commander, bu

lower-level ground commanders could not treat air units as i

they were subordinates.

The manual went further by defining the priority of employ

ing airpower. Air superiority was first as a prerequisite fo

“any major land operation,” followed by interdiction and CAS 

The lesson of first achieving air superiority provided an open

ing for the growing AAF to push for a wider theater perspectiv

for airpower. Interdiction also reflected the thought of usin

offensive actions to create situations in which ground force

did not have to fight larger surface conflicts. CAS received th

third priority.

FM 100-20 also identified the idea that one of airpower’

greatest strengths was its inherent flexibility. Airpower could

provide an air or ground commander many capabilities. Air

craft could attack other aircraft, bomb strategic targets, straf

railways, or support operations near ground forces. The author

of FM 100-20 stressed that centralized control of these re

sources would enhance this flexibility to react in dynami

situations. Aircraft could mass and focus on different target

and defeat the enemy better than if they were acting in 

piecemeal fashion. Additionally, an airman would control thes

air resources better than would a ground commander. An

airman—knowledgeable about air missions, aircraft, and em

ployment tactics, and aware of the air environment—could

better serve the requirements of the ground commander.

158
Out of the ashes of Kasserine Pass arose the foundations o

new doctrine and policy that affected not only CAS , but als

airpower’s future in the AAF and the forthcoming US Air Force

The failure of CAS became a rallying point for discussin

broad ideas of airpower. Not every reader agreed with FM

100-20. Some thought that it was an “AAF Declaration o

Independence.”49 Others believed that the document was to

“British” because of Coningham’s influence in North Africa 

Regardless of opinion, the doctrine of tactical air support wa

forged in North Africa and became a defining moment for CAS 

Gunships for Close Air Support in Vietnam

In 1965 a new weapon that carried miniguns in a transpor

airframe—the gunship —supported American Army units in

South Vietnam. This marriage of modern gunnery weapon

and relatively slow, propeller-driven transport airplanes flew

in face of the USAF’s push to employ jet aircraft. After thi

development, Army units were able to get large volumes o

accurate CAS . Although the gunships were slow, they pro

vided a stable platform to deliver their deadly firepower, an

they could loiter over an area for long periods of time. The

were designed to support the soldier on the ground for CAS

missions. The use of the first gunships in Vietnam is a goo

illustration of how airpower’s flexibility greatly supported 

ground commander’s requirements.

Top American military leaders were concerned about severa

aspects of the United States’s increasing involvement in South

Vietnam. Rising Vietcong insurgency efforts threatened much

of South Vietnam’s army. The Vietcong and NVA were increas

ingly targeting South Vietnamese villages and citizens. Guer

illa raiders harassed American airfields with rocket attacks

American military ground operations began to move from ai

base defense to active operations against the Vietcong a

ground strength grew. The Vietcong usually launched attack

at night to take advantage of the dark and increase thei

chance of success in a surprise attack. At the same time, th

USAF was testing a specially fitted Douglas C-47 with thre

6,000-round 7.62 mm SUU-11A miniguns and flare dispens

ers fitted on the left side of the plane. These aircraft wer

159
designed for nighttime CAS missions. On 2 November 1964

Gen Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force chief of staff, ordered that 

prototype gunship test the concept in Vietnam.

5 0

The gunship tests started in December and showed grea

promise under combat conditions. Gunship attacks agains

boats, trails, and buildings demonstrated accurate fire. On th

first nighttime mission during 23–24 December, the gunship

attacked a Vietcong force that had surrounded an outpost

The test gunship dropped 17 flares and fired 4,500 rounds

The attack was broken off, and the outpost saved. The gun

ship was then sent to another surrounded outpost that wa

also saved by gunship fire. 5 1 A more dramatic example of th

gunship ’s prowess was a combat mission flown on the night o

25 February 1965. The prototype gunship fired upon a Viet

cong force that was on the offensive in the Vietnamese high 

lands. The gunship poured 20,500 rounds into the enem

assault and killed about 300 Vietcong guerillas. 5 2

The gunship tests were a resounding success. On 13 July

1965, the Air Staff authorized the formation of a squadron o

AC-47 gunships and their deployment to Southeast Asia by 

November. 5 3 But there were critics of the AC-47 program wh

feared that the slow-moving, low-altitude AC-47s were vulner

able to ground fire. Furthermore, the 7.62 mm miniguns wer

ineffective at ranges up to 1,500 feet. If the AC-47s operated a

a lower altitude, they were within the range of enemy 23 mm

and 37 mm AAA.

5 4 However, the AC-47 became a versatil

weapon, demonstrating its ability to conduct CAS by operatin

at night and producing a high volume of fire that could als

destroy vehicles. These characteristics would make the AC-4

quite valuable to an interdiction effort. The AC-47 would pro

vide interdiction capabilities against enemy troop and truc

movements in Laos .

The AC-47 “Spooky” gunships were organized under the 4th

Air Commando Squadron (4ACS). Seventh Air Force ’s Opera

tions Order 411-65 identified the 4ACS ’s missions as defend

ing hamlets against night attack with flares and firepower

supplementing strike aircraft in the defense of friendly forces

and providing long-endurance escorts for convoys.5 5 The 4ACS

also provided interdiction by hitting targets in Laos and alon

the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail , a main north-south rout

160
network of roads, where supplies and manpower supplied th

Vietcong and NVA in South Vietnam (fig. 9).

The AC-47 provided a significant boost for CAS . From July

to September 1965, it was responsible for defending over 50

villages and hamlets and breaking up 166 enemy attacks.5 

The US Army and other forces were given an aerial tool fo

quickly delivering a huge amount of firepower that could

break the attack of an enemy force. For example, in Februar

1967, AC-47 gunships were providing CAS to Marine Corps

ROK, and South Vietnamese military forces in the northern

part of South Vietnam in Operation Lien Ket I, 16 miles south

west of Chu Lai. NVA forces were threatening the area in early

1967 and had to be stopped.5 7 Six AC-47 aircraft were as

signed to support marines and other forces. The Spooky air

craft provided 12 hours of support, firing over 123,00

rounds. This effort accounted for over 200 confirmed enem

dead and another 520 probably killed in the area.5 8 This ex

ample illustrates the value that AC-47s had for ground forces

These aircraft acted as airborne artillery to provide direct

accurate, timely, and sustained CAS for troops engaged in

battle.

The AC-47 was still hampered by some operational limita

tions. It had a speed of only 200 knots, was vulnerable t

The AC-47 gunship provided invaluable CAS in the Vietnam War.

161
ground fire, and was not as maneuverable as other aircraft

Also, the AC-47 had limited cargo space that put constraint

on the types and placement of its weapons and restricted th

amount of ammunition and flares it could carry. Also, th

AC-47’s low wings restricted the vision of gunners and blocke

certain firing angles. Still, the AC-47 was cited as “the bes

deterrent we have to attack by mortar, recoilless rifle, or rocket

on airfields and bases.5 9 Field commanders in Vietnam wante

more AC-47s. By 1967 two more squadrons were formed an

 Figure 9. Southeast Asia

162
began actively supporting ground forces. The USAF

s AC-4

aircraft operated until 1969.

A new replacement aircraft, the AC-119G Shadow, was adde

in 1968. The AC-119 was designed to carry armament simila

to the AC-47’s. The aircraft carried 7.62 mm miniguns, a new

illumination system, fire-control equipment, and other detec

tion systems. The interim AC-119G was introduced, but 

more advanced gunship was on the horizon—the Lockhee

AC-130A Spectre.

The AC-47 met with so much success that engineers from

Air Force Systems Command had already started plans t

develop a more capable gunship by February 1965. The four

engined, propeller-driven C-130A Hercules transport plane wa

chosen as a test prototype. This gunship would carry night

detection sensors in addition to flares to improve its ability t

strike at night. Engineers also wanted to experiment with ra

dar and infrared systems that improved its ability to find en

emy targets at night, under jungle foliage, and in difficul

terrain. The forward-looking infrared system would help detec

heat from vehicle engines and lights, even after they wer

turned off. The aircraft also had a night-illumination system

with 1.5-million-candlepower capability and 24 flares. Addi

tionally, the proposed AC-130A tested a combination of 7.6

mm miniguns and 20 mm M-61 Vulcan cannons. The longer

range 20 mm guns put the aircraft out of reach of the Viet

cong’s AAA. The AC-130A was also much faster than the AC

47. Its enhanced-detection system was linked to a fire-contro

system that could provide better aiming and preparation fo

firing. The AC-130A would provide a significant increase in

weaponry over the AC-47’s .

The AC-130A prototype, like the test AC-47, conducted comba

trials over Southeast Asia from February to November 1968

The gunship proved its worth by conducting CAS missions

but it was called upon for more interdiction missions. Durin

the combat-trial period, it spotted 1,000 trucks, attacked 481

and destroyed or damaged 361 vehicles.6 0 The gunships als

sank boats, struck roads and waterways, and directly sup

ported troops. After the test period, Secretary of the Air Forc

Harold Brown approved a mixed gunship force of AC-47, AC

119, and AC-130A aircraft. Brown was concerned that a hug

163
force of AC-130s might cut into the tactical-airlift transpor

capability in the area. He proposed that AC-119 aircraft re

place the AC-47s for CAS and base defense and release th

AC-130As to concentrate on night interdiction first and CAS

in a secondary role.6 1 The AC-47s would phase out with AC

119s, which themselves would be phased out in favor of AC

130As .

The success of the AC-130A against trucks in its comba

tests led to a major change in the aircraft’s priorities. AC-130

were tasked to conduct night interdiction and armed recon

naissance missions to destroy wheeled and tracked vehicles.6 

CAS became a tertiary priority of the aircraft after it con

ducted night-interdiction missions involving bombing an

then hitting the target with fire suppression. The technology o

the gunship ’s weapons and detection systems, as well as th

aircraft’s capabilities, allowed the commander to expand it

mission beyond CAS .

Although the gunship was originally designed to suppor

ground forces with CAS , new technology and innovation a

lowed engineers and combat personnel to devise new method

to support ground forces. These actions increased the option

that a commander could take to blunt Vietcong and NVA ef

forts in South Vietnam. The gunships were capable of CAS 

interdiction , and armed reconnaissance missions. These air

craft reflected the flexibility that airpower provides to a com

mander under many diverse conditions. The gunship ’s design 

ers and users were able to use existing transport aircraft an

weapons to develop a unique weapon system in record time

months compared to the years normally required for a

aircraft-acquisition effort. Engineers and combat personne

worked together to refine requirements and build and test th

aircraft under actual fighting conditions. Users of the aircraf

also had the foresight to test and expand the weapon’s us

from CAS to interdiction . Designers of the gunship also im

proved the aircraft in response to enemy defenses.

CAS missions were aided by the introduction of the AC-47

AC-119, and AC-130 aircraft. Instead of fast-flying jets, groun

units had aircraft that could loiter slowly over a target an

deliver a withering amount of fire. Additionally, these gun

ships could provide several levels of support, including CAS 

164
interdiction , and armed reconnaissance. These capabilities a

lowed a commander to provide many different types of sup

port. The US Air Force has used gunships, which were proven

in Vietnam, for CAS and special-operations missions sinc

their inception.

Close Air Support in the Korean War:

A Navy and Marine Corps View

CAS missions were highly valued by ground commanders a

much in the Korean War as they are today. The issue o

getting enough CAS missions has always been a sore poin

among the services. During the opening months of the Korean

War, UN forces were pushed from the border between North

and South Korea to a perimeter around the port city of Pusan

Retreating UN ground forces were forced into this corner an

were desperate to hang on and not be swept into the Sea o

Japan . Ground units made CAS requests for immediate sup

port. Artillery and ammunition were in short supply to sup

port these ground units. The Air Force was asked to shoulde

more responsibility for CAS but was also shorthanded in avail

able aircraft.6 3 B-29 bombers were pressed into CAS service

General MacArthur, commander of UN forces in Korea, wante

the UN’s Eighth Army to route all CAS requirements through

the Air Force’s 5AF . This centralized control of CAS mission

reflected the doctrine established by FM 100-20. However, th

Pusan defense was critical, and many demands for CAS wer

sent directly to the US Navy’s TF77, some with the concur

rence of 5AF.

Fifth Air Force was responsible not only for CAS , but als

for air superiority throughout the theater and for interdiction

missions. Air superiority was needed to allow it to unleash th

tactical airpower to conduct CAS and interdiction . USAF, Navy

and Marine Corps aircraft were fighting the air war inde

pendently and threatening the coordination of action. Lt Gen

George E. Stratemeyer, commander of 5AF , wanted all opera

tional control of air resources under his purview. He requeste

that MacArthur agree to this proposal. Stratemeyer ’s reques

was approved with modifications—he could control only land

based aircraft (which included Marine Corps assets) and ha

165
operational coordination (veto power over proposed missions

with naval airpower. The Navy could still control airpower t

support several missions, including amphibious assaults. Thi

arrangement would create problems for the use of airpower in

the future.

The use of CAS was one of the problems that would remain

unanswered in this debate. The Air Force and Army had on

system established by FM 100-20 and the World War II expe

rience. The Navy and Marine Corps had another method

shaped by the Latin American and World War II (Pacific thea

ter ) experiences. Both systems were designed under specific

assumptions, needs, and forces. Each service believed that it

CAS approach was appropriate for its operations in Korea

Both systems would create problems for Stratemeyer .

After World War II, the US Army revised its doctrine con

cerning air-ground operations, conceding that tactical air

power was under the control of a theater air commander wh

could assign air missions. The theater air commander wa

still under the command of a theater commander, but air

power was centrally controlled. These missions were control

led out of an Army and Air Force joint operations center (JOC

located at Army headquarters. The JOC allowed Army an

USAF officers to coordinate actions, but the decisions to con

duct a mission remained firmly in the hands of a USAF com

mander. 6 4 On 3 July 1950, the first JOC was established in

Itazuke Air Base in Japan and later moved to Korea as UN

forces pushed north from Pusan.

6 5 Radar, air traffic control

communications, and other systems were shipped and in stalle

to support JOC operations in Korea . After the first month o

the war, over 4,300 CAS sorties were flown in support of th

ground forces, stopping enemy tank, truck, and vehicle move

ment during daylight.6 6

Under the JOC system, the USAF established subordinat

organizations to improve air-ground operations that affecte

CAS. Air Force personnel manned a tactical air control cente

(TACC) that was colocated with the JOC. The TACC receive

air mission requests, coordinated the action with the JOC

and ordered execution of the mission. The TACC allowe

USAF forces to get prioritized missions from the JOC an

control the number of missions conducted in-theater. The Ai

166
Force also formed air liaison officers (ALO) who coordinate

missions under the tactical air control party (TACP) system

The ALO served on the ground with Army units, under th

TACPs, and was equipped with appropriate communication

equipment to stay in contact with CAS aircraft and a forward

air controller (FAC)—an airborne USAF pilot directing air op 

erations from a plane. If the TACP identified a likely CAS

target (from ground-unit requests), the pilot would contact th

Army division it worked for and request a mission. The divi

sion would then pass the request up through the division

corps, and then to the JOC for action. As soon as the JOC

approved the mission, the TACC would direct an aircraft fo

action. This aircraft would then contact the FAC for direction

and guidance to the target. The process could take 40 minutes

Air Force and Army officers in the JOC also decided whethe

Army artillery could provide support rather than CAS ; USAF

officers were reluctant to approve CAS missions within 1,00

yards in front of troops. 6 7 Army commanders preferred to rely

on their own artillery within this range, but if the situation

were critical or demanded additional firepower, they would

call on airpower to conduct the mission.6 8 Army ground com

manders started to request more CAS as the war lengthene

and enemy activity increased. In August 1952, Gen Mark W

Clark , the US Army Far East commander, observed that groun

commanders frequently asked for CAS missions that their or

ganic artillery could provide faster and more efficiently than

could limited air forces. 6 9 Clark believed that the Army could

not replicate the same system as a rival, dedicated air-groun

Marine Corps system because organization, training, and ar

tillery allocations differed greatly. The Air Force/Army system

was highly structured and tightly controlled by the Air Force

Initially, the JOC system did not include Navy or Marine Corp

requirements or links to their airpower resources. Later, Navy

and Marine Corps officers were included in JOC operations

which improved coordination among TF77, Marine Corps, an

5AF operations. Incredibly, before the consolidation of JOC

operations, the services used different map systems, which le

to great confusion over target locations.70

Navy and Marine Corps airpower focused on CAS in a differ

ent light. The Navy/Marine concept of air-ground operation

167
was tested in the 1920s and throughout the Pacific campaign

in World War II. During Marine amphibious assaults aroun

the Pacific, air liaison teams operated with ground forces

much like the ALO system. Navy and Marine Corps air force

in Korea were focused on the CAS mission. Although their ai

resources conducted interdiction missions later in the war

the early phases of the conflict were dedicated towards sup

port of ground forces. Conversely, the US Air Force was con

ducting strategic attack , interdiction , and CAS during th

same phase. Coordinating CAS missions became a problem o

priorities.

Navy and Marine Corps support of onshore operations wa

based on the assumption that lightly armed Marine Corp

forces did not have sufficient artillery support.7 1 While th

Army had its own heavy-artillery units, similarly sized Marin

Corps units relied on naval fire support from ships offshor

and on air support. The lack of artillery forced the Marin

Corps to devote its limited aircraft resources to focus on CAS 

It could commit few resources to other missions. Navy an

Marine Corps air resources were trained specifically for th

CAS mission and were considered an aerial-artillery asset t

be used in lieu of ground fire support. Attacks on enem

positions close to Marine ground forces were the rule rathe

than the exception.

Navy pilots did share a common objective with their Ai

Force contemporaries: the value of air superiority. The USAF

valued air superiority because of the freedom to attack an

the freedom from being attacked. The Navy believed in th

same principles but had an added concern—defending th

carrier fleet and protecting an amphibious landing force from

attack. The Navy also had to contend with antiship aeria

attack, reconnaissance , antisubmarine actions, and othe

missions. Interdiction and CAS were viewed as equal priori

ties. 7 2 Conversely, the Air Force and Army had agreed tha

interdiction preceded CAS in priority as early as FM 100-20

The Marines had an added incentive to keep CAS a high prior

ity. If they could not keep their independent CAS capability

the Navy might subsume their air resources, and they would

lose their air capability.

168
Navy and Marine Corps CAS requests were normally starte

by a Marine Corps TACP assigned to a ground unit. Thes

TACPs were similar to the Air Force/Army TACP units. Re

quests were sent to a Marine brigade’s tactical air direction

center (TADC), which was at a lower level than the TACC tha

provided more decentralized decision making and potentially

faster response time. Separate TADCs traded timeliness fo

coordination of theater operations. Marine Corps TADC

worked well to support Marine units only, but the USAF TACC

had to coordinate support for Army and other ground units

Later, radio links and improved coordination among TADCs

Air Force TACCs, and Navy/Marine TACCs helped alleviat

this problem. The onshore Marine Corps TACC or Navy TACC

at sea did prioritize air missions but assumed that a TACP

request was valid and immediately ordered CAS strikes agains

the target.7 3 Still, the TACC was able to get CAS to troop

CAS from Navy Corsairs in the Korean War

169
faster. The Marines also used a ground FAC to control strikes

unlike the airborne Air Force FAC . The Air Force and Arm

tried ground-based FACs but found radio communications dif

ficult in the mountainous Korean terrain.7 4 Radio interferenc

created communications breakdowns, so the USAF turned t

light observation aircraft for the task. The degree of control o

the air strikes reflected the focus of air support.

Both the Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force/Army had dif

ferences, but once they recognized these differences, they could

meet requests for CAS more efficiently. Air Force officer

needed to realize the importance of Navy and Marine CAS

efforts to secure and defend an amphibious landing and t

provide fire support to Marine units without major artiller

support. The proximity of carriers to amphibious and Marin

operations made it possible for aircraft to stay airborne an

ready to provide on-call CAS missions. Marine Corps air unit

could ensure a CAS strike mission within five to 10 minutes. 7 

Most USAF units were well behind the battlefront and wer

better prepared to launch their missions from a ground on

call status rather than an aerial one. The Air Force also recog

nized that, like the Army, Marine ground commanders did no

command air resources but had to coordinate their request

among other commanders through a TACC priority system

While Navy/ Marine Corps CAS advocates railed against th

confining, centralized control advocated by the Air Force, th

Air Force rejected the “go it alone” attitude of the Navy/ Marines

Centralized control resulted in slower response time for a Ma

rine ground commander. Conversely, the USAF was concerne

about Navy/Marine Corps CAS missions being conducted t

the exclusion of other theater priorities. Although the two sys

tems differed, there was room for cooperation. The Air Forc

believed that the Navy/Marine Corps system was better suite

for the early stages of an amphibious assault—not a battlefron

where airpower would become a substitute for artillery. 7 6

CAS was a vital element to the success of ground operation

in Korea. After improving communications and coordination

among the services, the JOC concept did work. Understandin

each service’s views on CAS helped improve the relationship

among them. Additionally, better aircraft, equipment, maps

targeting, and battle-damage assessment significantly im 

170
proved operations. However, differences in perspectives amon

services plagued the use of CAS . The Air Force still considere

CAS secondary to air superiority, strategic attack , and inter

diction . Increasing its commitment to CAS would have re

duced its capability to conduct these other missions.

After the Korean War, an Air-Ground Operations Conferenc

was held to evaluate CAS . The findings concluded that th

JOC system was effective and improved throughout the war

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps representatives wanted a com

mitment to an allocation of air missions devoted to CAS an

wanted it assigned to a ground commander after all othe

missions were assigned. The Army considered Air Force CAS

restrictive, compared to that of the Marines. For example

response and support time were slower; USAF aircraft loitere

over a target area for 30 minutes, whereas Marine aircraf

stayed for 73 minutes; and, more importantly, each Marin

Corps division received 37 CAS sorties a day, while Arm

units got only 13. 7 7 These missions would be preplanned bu

could be allocated to other missions in an emergency. Thi

would avoid questions of a ground commander’s misusin

assigned missions for less important missions. The three serv

ices also wanted more ground TACP units and the airborn

FAC as a spotter—not the director of CAS missions. Predict

ably, the USAF representative disagreed since the set alloca

tion might endanger airpower’s flexibility to support the thea

ter campaign. This issue was not resolved and remains a poin

of contention to this day.

Issues among the services surrounding CAS are as conten

tious today as they were in the Korean War. Control of ai

missions, requests for support, and the priority of CAS , com 

pared to other missions, are still a topic of hot debate. Groun

commanders still want dedicated CAS . Aerospace leaders wil

continue to wrestle with the challenge of choosing the priorit

of air missions among competing demands. Services will con

tinue to debate who is in charge—the supported or supportin

command for CAS. This challenge will become greater as emerg

ing threats create situations that conventional artillery and 

reduced military cannot handle. Greater cooperation, commu 

nication, understanding, and joint doctrine may solve some o

these problems. However, the competing demand for limite

171
resources may drive ground forces to elect the developmen

and employment of substitute capabilities for CAS .

Notes

1. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle i

Three American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History

1994), 1.

2. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951 (Wash 

ington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), 23 and 55.

3. Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of th

United States Air Force, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History an

Museums Program, 1997), 40.

4. Mark, 294.

5. Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–195

(Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 82.

6. Ibid., 83.

7. Mark, 307.

8. Ibid., 305.

9. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953

rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 437.

10. Wilbur H. Morrison, Pilots, Man Your Planes! The History of Nav

Aviation (Central Point, Oreg.: Hellgate Press, 1999), 282.

11. Futrell, 439.

12. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C

Center of Military History, 1992), 106.

13. Mark, 302.

14. Ibid., 315.

15. Futrell, 471.

16. A. J. C. Lavalle, ed., Airpower and the 1972 Spring Invasion (Wash 

ington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 1.

17. Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Ai

Combat, 1945 to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 273.

18. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing o

North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 153.

19. Ibid.

20. Mark, 375.

21. Ibid., 376.

22. Lavalle, 106, table 6.

23. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in Wa

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 197.

24. Lavalle, 106.

25. Mark, 378.

26. Ibid., 383.

27. Ibid., 391.

172
28. William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (New York: Arno Pres

1980), 333.

29. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War wit

Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 226.

30. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthu

(New York: Random House, 1996), 333.

31. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Force

in World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 t

July 1944 (1950; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History

1983), 141.

32. John Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, D.C

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), 40.

33. Eric M. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacifi

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), 590.

34. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of th

Pacific War (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 202.

35. Perret, 333.

36. Edward J. Drea, “Into the Jungle: New Guinea,” in Pearl Harbor an

the War in the Pacific, ed. Bernard C. Nalty (New York: Smithmark Publish 

ers, 1991), 103.

37. Miller, 41.

38. E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History (Annapolis: Naval Inst

tute Press, 1981), 315.

39. Bergerud, 592.

40. Spector, 228.

41. Joe Gray Taylor, “American Experience in the Southwest Pacific,” i

Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Frankli

Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 311.

42. Perret, 342.

43. Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War I

Close Air Support, North Africa (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force Histor

and US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 12.

44. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Force

in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to Decembe

1943 (1949; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History

1983), 157.

45. Mortensen, 72.

46. George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the We

(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991), 480.

47. Mortensen, 76.

48. War Department, Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employ 

ment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, 1.

49. David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–1943,” in Case Studie

in the Development of Close Air Support, 185.

173
50. Jack S. Ballard, The Development and Employment of Fixed-Win

Gunships, 1962–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1982)

11.

51. Ibid., 20.

52. Ibid., 21.

53. Ibid., 26.

54. Earl H. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Wh

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), 176.

55. Ballard, 35.

56. John J. Sbrega, “Southeast Asia,” in Case Studies in the Develop 

ment of Close Air Support, 444.

57. George L. MacGarrigle, Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive

October 1966 to October 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History

1998), 203.

58. Ballard, 52.

59. Ibid., 53.

60. Ibid., 90.

61. John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive

1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 241.

62. Ballard, 107.

63. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington

D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), 109.

64. Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950–1953,” in Case Studies in the Develop 

ment of Close Air Support, 348.

65. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: (June

November 1950) (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), 95.

66. Ibid., 256–57.

67. Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore: Nautica

& Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1986), 43.

68. Futrell, 705.

69. Hermes, 326.

70. Morrison, 274.

71. Hallion, 43.

72. Millett, 351.

73. Ibid.

74. Hallion, 44.

75. Futrell, 120.

76. Millett, 352.

77. Crane, 62.

174
Chapter 5

Functions and Capabilities

of Aerospace Power: Rapid

Mobility/Space and Information

Mobility Operations: Moving Manpower,

Munitions, and Machines

Aerial combat operations do not always involve fighter plane

shooting enemy planes or bombers attacking targets deep within

an adversary’s homeland. Airpower can conduct operation

that significantly aid land forces. CAS directly aids the effort o

a ground-force commander. An operation that greatly aid

land forces is airpower’s ability to move those forces quickly

around the globe. Mobility operations can also transport cargo

from a single soldier to heavy tanks, thousands of miles in 

day. Additionally, transport aircraft can provide supplies to 

land force in terrain difficult to reach by land or sea routes

This capability also lends itself to not having to station groun

forces around the world. Instead, if an emergency arises, air

power can transport forces to the theater and replacements t

fight any battle. The ability to move these forces quickly an

in significant numbers can also provide a deterrent effect on

an adversary who may not be willing to face a swift, decisiv

action by a mobile ground force. These same capabilities ar

also applicable to humanitarian missions. Medical aid an

food can be sent to many inhospitable regions by air trans

port. Conditions that require the timely delivery of medicine

food, clothing, shelter, and technical assistance can be met b

global air mobility. Airlift can also deliver supplies and person

nel to combat zones using tactical air mobility.

The movement of personnel and equipment is a key capabil

ity of airpower. The versatility of large transports allows 

commander to conduct many different types of operations

Transports can deliver soldiers from their home country to 

destination, move them within a region, or fly them from on

region to another. This reduces the number of soldiers o

175
forces that may be required for worldwide commitments du

to the ability to move and better share resources at an appro

priate location. Merchant or cargo shipping can transport mor

people and material than can air mobility. However, if timin

is critical, air transportation can provide a more effective an

efficient solution to the problem. Additionally, air transporta

tion is better able to deliver these resources if the location i

landlocked, does not have infrastructure capable of handlin

merchant shipping, or does not have the road or rail system t

carry cargo to its destination inland. Air mobility is not 

substitute for oceanic shipping. It is just another tool avail

able for a commander to consider. Moving equipment is an

other capability of air mobility. A transport can literally carr

a heavily armored tank thousands of miles. Additionally, an

air transport can move aircraft by putting them on board 

plane, as with tanks, or through another method.

Air mobility in World War II

176
Most modern military aircraft also have the capability o

aerial refueling. This allows an air force to rapidly move combat

capable aircraft from one theater to the next without stoppin

to prepare them for shipping, putting them in transit, an

making them operational for combat after they make the trip

This capability reduces the need for a series of bases for air

craft to land, refuel, take off, and go to another airfield befor

arriving at their final destination. Rapid reinforcement of ai

resources might mean the difference between winning or losing 

war. More importantly, it could prevent a conflict by deterrin

or frightening a potential adversary from attacking, much lik

transporting a large land force into an area in conflict. Aeria

refueling allows air forces to mass their aircraft at crucia

points and times. Aircraft can also stay on station longer t

fight or extend their range of operations to meet unknown o

difficult situations. Aerial refueling provides more options t

the commander—it becomes a force multiplier.

Air transport has always been an important part of air

power. The dream of rapid transport of men, material, an

machines has become a reality. Jet aircraft with large carryin

capacities have greatly supported many operations in the past

Global coverage to move material from one continent to an

other gives a national decision maker many options for fight

ing, deterring, or meeting requirements for providing relie

during natural disasters. Like their weapons-capable breth

ren, air-transport aircraft must be responsive and capable o

operations at a moment’s notice.

Failure at Stalingrad: Air Supply Falls Flat

In late 1942, the German and Soviet armies were locked in

mortal combat over control of the city of Stalingrad, located in

the southern USSR on the Volga River. The Volga was a “vita

artery” to keep supply lines open from the Black Sea .

1

 Stalin 

grad was the site of several munitions, tank, tractor, chemical

oil-processing, and other production facilities. Named afte

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin , it was a symbol of the War in th

East. The German Sixth Army attempted to push Soviet groun

forces out of the city. The Soviets planned on a house-to

house fight that would ensnare the German forces. Sixth Arm

177
was eventually encircled and defeated at Stalingrad; this be

came one of the major turning points of the war because th

Germans had to shift from an offensive to a defensive focus in

the USSR. The Battle of Stalingrad saw some of the bitteres

fighting in World War II, with the Germans suffering ove

800,000 and the Soviets 1.1 million casualties in the cam

paign.2 In the immediate area of Stalingrad, the Germans su

fered 147,200 casualties and over 91,000 captured.

3

 Only 5,00

German prisoners returned home in 1955.

The house-to-house fighting allowed the Soviets to grind th

Germans in a slow attrition. The German Sixth Army’s majo

advantage—armored forces and mobility—was useless in th

rubble of this type of street fighting. The Soviets were able t

defend buildings and trade space for time. Initially, the Ger

mans prevailed by pushing most of the Soviets from the cit

by October 1942. Soviet forces had another idea. Two Sovie

armies began to encircle the German forces around Stalin 

grad. The commander of the German forces asked that he b

allowed to retreat to avoid encirclement and save his forces

Hitler refused since the taking of Stalingrad had become 

symbol of the fortunes of the Soviet campaign. The Soviet

had never succeeded in defeating a German army, and it wa

inconceivable they would do so now. Hitler ordered his troop

in Stalingrad to consolidate their positions and hold on unti

reinforcements could break through. Temperatures started t

fall as Soviet pressure on the besieged Germans increased

Hitler and Göring promised that the Luftwaffe would provid

German forces with as much as 600 tons of supplies a day. 

Sixth Army staff officers originally calculated that their men

needed 750 tons but later reduced this to 500 tons. 5 Görin

would later agree to airlift this amount. The Luftwaffe would

have a big chore since it had only 30 Junkers Ju-52s in th

area for the operation. Several Luftwaffe commanders in th

area were concerned. Generalleutnant Martin Fiebig , responsi

ble for the airlift, wrote that “supplying Sixth Army by air wa

not feasible.” Even Göring doubted the Luftwaffe’s ability t

conduct the airlift. He could “do nothing but agree” with Hitler, o

else he would be “left with the blame.”6 Further, the weathe

and enemy situation were unpredictable factors.7 Winter flyin

178
conditions were miserable, and the Soviets started to threaten

Luftwaffe airfields.

The Ju-52 was the Luftwaffe’s main transport aircraft . I

had served well in the early phases of World War II but wa

beginning to suffer losses greater than its production. Still

the Ju-52 had proven itself by supplying six German division

encircled at Demyansk in the winter of 1941–42. Ju-52s wer

scheduled to transport 300 tons of supplies per day to th

Germans in Demyansk.

8

 This was the world’s first major airlif

operation to supply a ground force entirely by air. The Luft

waffe collected Ju-52 aircraft, pilots, and training units from

throughout the eastern front to conduct the operation. Sovie

bombers had damaged airfields, which limited the airlift ef

forts. By the end of February 1942, the Luftwaffe was capabl

of providing only half of the ground forces’ requirements. Luft

waffe Ju-52s were keeping 100,000 troops supplied, if barely

and in three months delivered 24,300 tons of cargo, airlifte

15,446 men into Demyansk, and removed 20,093 casualties

Luftwaffe transport capabilities were severely weakened with

this effort. Losses included 385 flying personnel and 262 air

In 1941, German forces in the Soviet Union faced severe supply shortages a

Stalingrad.

179
craft. The Luftwaffe demonstrated its ability to airlift supplie

and reinforcements. The Demyansk experience was costly an

illusionary insofar as the Luftwaffe believed it exemplified wha

its airlift fleet could accomplish. A similar situation at Stalin 

grad provided an opportunity for the Luftwaffe to demonstrat

its ability to perform another mobility operation (fig. 10).

But Stalingrad was not Demyansk. The requirements to kee

Stalingrad were greater. The number of soldiers in Stalingra

Figure 10. The Eastern Front (Adapted from Case Studies in the

Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling

[Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990], 116)

180
was three times the number in Demyansk. Also, the Soviet

had a strong air force near Stalingrad, where the Luftwaff

contested air superiority. Additionally, the Luftwaffe did no

have the number of transport aircraft to support the airlift 

The idea that this would be another Demyansk would prov

faulty. Additionally, planning and decision making for the air

lift took place in Berlin . Air commanders from the area aroun

Stalingrad were not consulted.

If the Germans in Stalingrad could survive in the pocket, 

planned breakthrough by German armored forces might sav

the city. Hitler assumed that the Luftwaffe would be capable o

completely resupplying Sixth Army by air and that the Sixth

could defend itself in the face of massive Soviet forces. Th

entire German military was under a strain since it was fight

ing on simultaneous fronts in the USSR, North Africa, and th

Balkans. Luftwaffe assets were drained away from the USS

to support North Africa. The Luftwaffe was forced to pres

Heinkel He-111 bombers into service as transports. The deci

sion to use these aircraft came at the cost of reducing th

attack capability of the German air force. The Luftwaffe als

had to contend with the weather, limited ground support, an

enemy air opposition while operating a small transport fleet

At least the Demyansk operation had had sufficient trans

ports. On 29 November, the first day of the resupply effort, th

Luftwaffe put 38 Ju-52s and 21 He-111s into the air. Only 1

Ju-52s and 13 He-111s delivered their cargoes to Stalingrad

Each Ju-52 could carry about a ton of cargo while an He-11

could fly in about 1,000 pounds. The Luftwaffe needed 80

Ju-52s to supply the 500 tons per day to the Sixth Army. Th

Luftwaffe had only 750 aircraft in the entire fleet.1 0 Some esti

mates were as high as 1,052 Ju-52s, assuming an abysmal 3

to 35 percent for operational readiness of the aircraft.1 1

This first-day effort was far less than the 500 tons per da

promised by Göring. Generaloberst Wolfram von Richtofen

commander of the Luftwaffe’s Fourth Air Force, which ha

responsibility for the airlift , estimated that he would be able t

field 298 Ju-52s on 25 November.1 2 This was far short of th

required 800 Ju-52s to supply the effort. The Luftwaffe ’s abil

ity to keep Göring’s promise seemed slim. The lack of Ju-52

would have to be made up with the less-capable He-111s an

181
other aircraft. Richtofen had recommended that the Sixth Arm

break out of Stalingrad, but Hitler rejected the proposal. Th

Luftwaffe was caught in a no-win situation.

The Stalingrad defensive continued in the cold, wintry weather

From 1 to 23 December, the Luftwaffe airlifted supplies aver

aging 90 tons per day. 1 3 This allowed the German forces t

survive but do nothing else. They could not counterattack o

force a breakthrough from their encircled positions. The majo

airlift of the period came on 7 December, when 300 tons wer

delivered to Stalingrad. Airlift capabilities rose marginally in

January, when Sixth Army received an average of 120 ton

per day. This was still only 20 percent of the required an

promised amounts. If the supplies were not met, surrende

and defeat would soon come to the Germans.

The Luftwaffe stripped units of any aircraft that could fly

Ju-52s, obsolete Junkers Ju-86 trainers, Focke-Wulf Fw-20

Condor naval bombers, Messerschmitt Me-323 transports, Goth

242 transports, and He-111s supported the effort. Trainin

crews and aircraft were also sent east, which further reduce

the ability of the Luftwaffe to increase its airlift capability. Th

Soviet air force was not oblivious to this effort, concentratin

its fighter strength to intercept the transports and stop th

flow of supplies. The Luftwaffe’s failure to master offensiv

counterair superiority was in doubt because of losses, ba

weather, and the need to escort the transports safely int

Stalingrad. Soviet air defenses concentrated their efforts nea

the front. Moreover, cold weather limited maintenance, grou

support, and cold-start procedures—temperatures of -30° 

were not uncommon. By mid-January 1943, only 15 of 14

Ju-52s, 41 of 140 He-111s, and one of 20 Fw-200s wer

capable of flying the airlift.

1 4

Luftwaffe efforts could hardly deliver any tonnage at all, le

alone the estimated required amounts to Sixth Army. The 600

ton requirement seemed like an underestimate. Ammunition

requirements for a corps, about one-third smaller than Sixth

Army, were 400 tons per day. In heavy fighting, this could

increase to 598 tons (or 295 Ju-52 sorties) per day or 99

tons for heavy fighting. 1 5 Sixth Army would need much mor

than the 600 tons to survive. Luftwaffe officers had tried t

persuade the German Wehrmacht headquarters that the Luft 

182
waffe could not support the effort. Instead, it might be able t

supply a portion of the requirement, but either a breakout b

Sixth Army or a breakthrough by a relief column would sav

the ground forces. Actual supplies airlifted into Stalingrad wer

estimated to be 50 to 80 tons per day. 1 6 The airlift effort migh

only allow the besieged defenders to hold their positions.

There are several reasons for the failure to provide adequat

mobility and support at Stalingrad. First, the Germans faile

to adequately plan and analyze the situation. The relianc

only on airlift operations was questionable. Only an immediat

breakout or breakthrough could have ensured proper rein 

forcements and supplies to the defenders. The inflexibility o

Hitler’s decision to defend the salient at all costs ensure

Sixth Army’s destruction. Second, the inadequate transpor

force significantly lessened the Germans’ ability to muster enough

mobility forces to deliver supplies into Stalingrad. Hitler ’s dec

sion to send airlift forces into North Africa also hurt his effort

in the USSR. Between November 1942 and January 1943, th

Luftwaffe lost 250 Ju-52s in Tunisia —aircraft it could hardly

afford do without.1 7 Third, the Luftwaffe had only one ade

quate airfield to supply Stalingrad. Soviet ground forces even

tually closed it and forced Luftwaffe transports to fly longe

distances, which reduced daily sorties and made them mor

vulnerable to interception by Soviet aircraft . Soviet artiller

and ground operations threatened airfield operations through 

out the area. Fourth, unpredictable weather caused flight an

ground-support problems. Weather delays and cancellation

were common. Maintenance operations and the process o

getting aircraft to work in freezing conditions exhausted th

ground crews. Fifth, the Luftwaffe did not have air superiority

Transports were easy targets, even with fighter escorts. Th

Soviets claimed to have shot down 676 Ju-52s, but the Luft

waffe admitted only 266 planes lost. 1 8 Soviet aircraft also con

tinued to attack Luftwaffe airfields, and the Luftwaffe could d

little to stop it. For example, on 2 January 1943, Soviet ground

attack aircraft claimed to have destroyed 72 German aircraf

on the ground. 1 9 Overly optimistic predictions and inadequat

airlift resources ultimately led to the failure of the resupply

effort. Soviet army forces eventually forced the surrender o

the German Sixth Army on 30 January 1943.

183
Transporting an Army: Operation Desert Shield

The airlift of men, material, and machines from the Unite

States to Saudi Arabia and the subsequent effort to supply

forces and maintain those forces comprised the largest airlif

in history. The US Air Force and its Civil Reserve Air Flee

(CRAF) provided rapid-response capability to all services tha

supported the coalition efforts of Operations Desert Shield an

Desert Storm . Although sea lift carried more material an

munitions than did airlift , the latter was able to deploy combat

ready soldiers within hours of a presidential decision to deplo

ground and air forces to the Persian Gulf. Similarly, critica

units or spare parts were delivered in-theater and distribute

through an intratheater air-express service to move vital car

goes to their destination.

Civilian airliners supported the massive deployment of troops

during Operation Desert Shield.

184
The American effort to defend Saudi Arabia and deter fur

ther Iraqi aggression in August 1990 relied upon swift move

ment of military forces from the continental United States t

locations thousands of miles away in the Persian Gulf. Fortu 

nately, the USAF had two dedicated major commands tha

could support this Herculean effort: Military Airlift Comman

(MAC) and Strategic Air Command. MAC had the responsibil

ity to transport personnel and cargo worldwide with its fleet o

Lockheed C-5 Galaxy and C-141 Starlifter jet aircraft. Add

tionally, MAC was responsible for intratheater airlift with

Lockheed C-130 Hercules propeller-driven aircraft, which sup

ported tactical missions. SAC was the Air Force’s and nation’s

primary nuclear-deterrent force, but it also maintained an

operated aerial-refueling Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers an

McDonnell-Douglas KC-10 Extender aircraft.

The USAF’s mobility forces had to move cargoes up to 7,00

miles one way. These distances and the amount of suppor

required would take upwards of 80 percent of the C-141 flee

and 90 percent of all C-5 aircraft.2 0 The 110 C-5 and 23

C-141 aircraft carried personnel, tanks, palletized cargo, heli

copters, and other equipment to fight the war. These two air

craft types served as the bulwarks of the strategic, long-rang

airlift effort, moving close to 64 percent of the cargo and abou

27 percent of the personnel transported by strategic airlift .

2 

The USAF also operated 32 percent of its C-130 fleet in Deser

Shield / Desert Storm. This fleet delivered up to 300,000 ton

of cargo, using over 47,000 sorties throughout Saudi Arabi

and the Persian Gulf area. These efforts were significant, bu

airlift resources were not sufficient. On 17 August 1990, Presi

dent Bush authorized MAC to order CRAF to support the air

lift. This fleet included commercial airliners that had accepte

subsidies and preferential contracts in return for making them

selves available for emergency activation to support airlift op

erations. This marked the first time CRAF had been activate

in its 38-year history. Four days later, the president issue

Executive Order 12727 to mobilize 200,000 reservists, man

of them involved in mobility operations, for a period not t

exceed 180 days. 2 2

The airlift effort lasted about 206 days, moving approxi

mately 17 million tons per mile per day (the product of aircraf

185
cargo weight in tons and the distance flown). 

3 C-5 and C-14

aircraft carried the cargo, while CRAF carried mostly passen

gers since its aircraft were configured for passenger servic

but not readily capable of transporting outsized cargo (e.g.

tanks). The strategic airlift of dry cargo material accounted fo

only 15 percent of the total war effort, but it carried about 9

percent of all passengers deployed to and from the Persian

Gulf.

2 4 At the peak of operations, from December 1990 t

January 1991, strategic-airlift aircraft were landing every 1

minutes, 24 hours a day. This equated to 127 aircraft tha

conducted a sortie per day. Airlift operations rose to suppor

the initial deployment of forces into Saudi Arabia and to sup

port combat operations after the start of Desert Storm in

January 1991.

On 7 August 1990, President Bush authorized the deploy

ment of military forces into Saudi Arabia to defend the king

dom. MAC had to start moving forces almost immediately

initiating thousands of sorties. MAC quickly deployed an air

lift-support team to the Persian Gulf to set up a coordination

and control office. On 8 August, the first elements of th

Army’s 2d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division from Fort Bragg

North Carolina, were sent to Saudi Arabia to send a clea

signal of America’s commitment and to deter further Iraq

aggression.25 The JCS also sent two squadrons of F-15C fight

ers, Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons 2 and 3 (which con 

tained heavy equipment and supplies) from Diego Garcia an

Guam , two aircraft-carrier battle groups, and an airborn

warning and control system (AWACS) unit to the Persian Gulf

along with the ready brigade from the 82d Airborne. MAC

supported the move of the F-15s, AWACS aircraft, and Arm

brigade.

Requests to move major units and cargo started to over

whelm MAC. Its airlift fleet was limited, and it relied on Ai

Force Reserve personnel to man half of its crews.2 6 The airlif

effort needed aircrews and aircraft. On 17 August, Gen Hansfor

T. Johnson , commander in chief of MAC , ordered a limite

activation of CRAF , which added 17 passenger and 21 carg

planes to MAC’s fleet. The president would later issue a call

up of reserves. Within a month of MAC ’s beginning the airlift

it had moved 50,000 tons of cargo and 70,000 passengers

186
There were 100 combat aircraft on the ground in Saudi Ara

bia , as well as a brigade from the 82d Airborne, personne

from a Marine air-ground task force , and elements from an

air-assault division. These forces allowed the UN to provide an

immediate but limited defensive force against the Iraqis. Th

next deployments would concentrate on building up a force t

expel the Iraqis from Kuwait .

On 9 November, President Bush ordered more military force

into the theater. Passenger movement expanded. Heavily ar

mored Marine Corps and other combat divisions were rushe

into the theater. This movement also created a demand fo

additional cargo to support more personnel. MAC used al

available CRAF aircraft and started to reduce its cargo mis

sions by modifying C-141 aircraft to carry passengers. Logis

tics distribution and transportation systems were inundate

in the United States and in Saudi Arabia with the deluge o

requests and deliveries. This emphasis on airlift did not change

until the start of Desert Storm —the attack on Iraqi forces.

The start of offensive operations against Iraq, beginning on

17 January, brought several challenges to MAC . The Iraqi

began to launch Scud surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, which

threatened airfields in Saudi Arabia . Several CRAF aircrew

refused to enter a war zone, and there was great fear that th

Scuds might carry chemical or biological weapons. Most CRAF

airlines indicated that they would fly into the area only durin

daylight hours since Scud attacks occurred at night.2 7 Thi

affected the timing and scheduling of flights, which could lea

to the possible cancellation of 24-hour operations. MAC offi

cials moved airfields out of the range of Scuds, provided CRAF

aircrews with chemical defense gear and better intelligence

and made a concerted effort to convince airline executives t

accept their request to return to the previous working rela tion

ship. CRAF operations resumed their 24-hour-per-day schedule

On 17 January, another 76 CRAF aircraft were activated; only

nine cargo planes were used since MAC had contracted th

others to fly earlier.2 8 Another challenge was the Scud attack

on Israel. President Bush ordered the deployment of US Arm

Patriot SAM units to defend Israel. The Patriot was originally

developed as an antiaircraft missile, but modifications to it

187
software allowed it to intercept tactical ballistic missiles lik

Scuds.

MAC needed to use almost all of its C-5 fleet to move th

Patriot missile batteries because of their size and extensiv

support equipment. Within 24 hours of notification, two Pa 

triot batteries were landing in Tel Aviv ’s Ben-Gurion Airport on

19 January. 2 9 The batteries were made minimally operationa

that day. Coincidentally, the Iraqis started a Scud attack on

Israel that same day. Within three days of being airlifted, th

Patriots began operations to intercept Scud missiles. The air

lift forces were able to respond rapidly to an emerging threa

and move priority cargo and personnel to different regions t

support a national directive.

MAC still needed to support air and ground operations. Th

United States had deployed almost 500,000 personnel to th

theater. They needed food, water, medicine, munitions, and al

types of equipment. MAC also had to prepare for personne

movements back to the United States and other locations world 

wide after the war.

Intratheater airlift was also a significant effort. C-130 sor

ties actually outnumbered those of all other aircraft types in

Desert Shield /Desert Storm.

3 0 The C-130s acted as “feeder

airlines to the strategic-airlift C-5 , C-141, and CRAF aircraf

that made the intercontinental flights. These routes were sched 

uled to provide routine distribution of cargo and personnel

Helicopters could extend the feeder airlines to locations inac

cessible to C-130s. The aircraft supported operations through 

out the Persian Gulf and delivered reinforcements and sup

plies to frontline troops. F-16 units were moved overnight b

C-130s to get closer to the battlefield.3 1 The C-130 fleet wa

critical to intratheater logistics and included the first units t

be deployed to serve in that capacity. These aircraft delivere

air tasking orders (ATO) (daily aircraft-operations orders) tha

shaped the conduct of the war, delivered reconnaissance film

and provided advanced logistics support to units on the move

among other missions.

C-130s transported the entire XVIII Airborne Corps durin

the ground-combat phase of Desert Storm . The corps move

from its base in Saudi Arabia to a position 400 miles west

Airlift aircrews beat the estimated requirement of averaging 

188
landing every 10 minutes during a 24-hour period for 14 day

by averaging a landing every seven minutes!

3 2 This airlif

opera tion moved 9,000 tons of equipment and over 14,00

airborne troops.

Aerial refueling allowed the UN’s coalition air forces to con

duct training, patrol capabilities, and a major air campaign

Aerial refueling also allowed the strategic airlift and transit o

combat aircraft. US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and for

eign air forces provided several different types of tankers tha

kept fighters and AWACS aircraft on station to defend Saud

Arabia . These aircraft also allowed attack aircraft to strik

deep into Iraq or loiter over the battlefield to conduct CAS an

interdiction missions. SAC tankers flew over 360 sorties a da

and averaged 1,433 refuelings a day. 3 3 Refueling capabilit

supported 60 percent of all attack sorties.

Aerial refueling allowed the initial F-15 force to arrive in

Saudi Arabia within one day; with their armaments, the F-15

were able to fly operational missions a day after their arrival

Over 1,000 aircraft were able to carry their armaments an

arrive on station, ready for combat. A tanker bridge that in 

volved more than 100 tankers was constructed between th

United States and Saudi Arabia . Aircraft such as the F-1

used five refuelings to make the trip nonstop. 3 4 Refueling op 

erations were the largest and most extensive in history.

MAC and SAC were able to successfully conduct a massiv

airlift operation that directly aided the victory in Desert Storm

They moved personnel and critical cargo quickly. However

ground commanders wanted three times the airlift capabilit

that MAC and SAC possessed. Additionally, increased usage o

C-5 and C-141 aircraft caused operational readiness rates t

fall because of maintenance requirements. The rush to airlif

materials also caused priority difficulties, payload inefficien

cies, and planning problems. These problems highlighted con

cerns about realistic training, planning factors, retention o

sufficient numbers of aircrews, and integration of CRAF air

craft into MAC operations.

The airlift operation did, however, work well. Using C-14

aircraft near the end of their operational lives and undergoin

a massive downsizing of forces after the Cold War, MAC pro

vided the largest airlift operation in history. The value of mo

189
bility resources was underscored when air forces were rapidly

moved to fight in Desert Storm , Army units were sent directly

into the theater within hours, and combat-ready equipmen

was deployed in a minimum of time.

Airlift Saves Berlin: Operation Vittles

Airpower has increasingly been called upon as a tool o

choice to provide humanitarian aid worldwide. Air transport

can deliver food, medicine, equipment, supplies, and person

nel within hours of an emergency. This capability has been

available for several years. One of the first instances of air

power’s being called upon to support people in need occurre

in 1948, when the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin and tried t

sever it from the Western powers. By agreement, Britain , France

the United States, and the Soviet Union administered a di

vided Berlin . The city itself was located within the Soviet

con trolled zone of occupation that would later become th

People’s Democratic Republic of Germany or East Germany

The Soviets attempted to squeeze the allies out of Berlin an

reduce their influence in Eastern Europe.

Stalin , leader of the Soviet Union , wanted to further consoli

date the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Th

American, British, and French presence in Berlin was a re

minder of Western influence. West Germany was being rebuil

under the Marshall Plan and might become a self-sustainin

country, which would make the East German regime’s eco

nomic efforts pale in comparison. The allies also introduced 

new currency in Berlin over which the Soviets had no control

Stalin wanted the allies out of the city. 3 5

On 15 June 1948, the Soviets placed restrictions on traffi

between Berlin and the western zones of occupation held b

the American, British, and French powers. The Soviets wante

Western currency usage ended in Berlin since the Soviet zon

of occupation surrounded it and they believed Berlin was par

of the Soviet-controlled economy. The Soviets issued a new

currency, the ostmark, for use throughout Berlin . Gen Luciu

D. Clay, American military governor of the military zone in

Berlin , refused to compromise. The Soviets could withdraw

their demand, go to war, or intensify their blockade. At 060

190
on 24 June, the Soviets cut off all road, rail, and water traffi

from Berlin to West Germany. Electricity from the Soviet zon

of occupation to Berlin was shut off due to “coal shortages.”3 

The Western powers could either agree with the Soviets or ge

out of Berlin .

President Harry Truman ordered US forces to stay in Berlin 

which became a symbol of America’s fight against spreadin

communism. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recalle

Truman’s bluntly stating, “We [are] going to stay, period.”3 

Without food, supplies, and power, the Western powers ha

only an estimated 36 days of food and 45 days of coal in stoc

to supply 2.3 million civilians and military personnel. 3 8 Th

city needed 3,800 tons of supplies daily in summer and 4,50

tons in winter; the winter requirement was later raised t

5,600 tons.3 9 Without surface transportation, the only possibl

solution was an immediate airlift . Clay was unconvinced tha

the USAF could conduct such an operation. He wanted t

send a relief column supported with armored vehicles through

the Soviet zone of occupation to resupply Berlin . Truman dis

agreed with Clay and ordered an airlift . The USAF and RAF

began an effort to airlift food, supplies, and coal into Berlin 

These actions became known as Operation Vittles or the Ber

lin airlift.

United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) would bear th

brunt of the airlift missions. USAFE had two troop-carryin

groups of Douglas C-47 Dakota transports. Lt Gen Curtis E

LeMay, commander of USAFE, estimated that his force could

airlift about 225 tons per day—less than half of the 500-ton

per-day requirement for the military-occupation force alone.4 

LeMay requested that Headquarters US Air Force send addi

tional heavier-lift Douglas C-54 Skymaster aircraft, which wer

sent to LeMay along with an order to provide airlift for th

civilian population as well. LeMay and Clay agreed on a 24

hour-a-day airlift with 54 C-54 and 195 C-47 aircraft tha

could lift 1,500 tons per day. 4 1 LeMay was forced to rely on th

less-capable C-47s until sufficient numbers of C-54s were as

signed to Europe. The British could provide about 750 ton

per day. When Clay asked LeMay if he could lift coal and othe

supplies, LeMay responded, “The Air Force can deliver any

thing.”4 2 However, LeMay needed even more capability to mee

191
these demands. The Air Force stripped units in the Unite

States, Guam, Hawaii, and other locations to muster enough

C-54s to support the airlift . The US Navy sent 24 C-54s. USAF

had 225 C-54s ready to support the airlift . Earlier, USAF

estimated it needed 162 C-54s, without C-47 support, to mee

Berlin ’s requirements. USAFE now had sufficient air resource

to begin the operation.

The USAFE and RAF efforts were merged into the Combine

Airlift Task Force (CALTF). The Soviets allowed CALTF to oper

ate three air corridors, each 20 miles wide, under previou

agreements (fig. 11). The Soviets patrolled the corridors with

fighters and monitored activity with radar and communica

tions equipment. The first airlift missions started on 26 Jun

with an 80-ton delivery. LeMay had started to airlift som

supplies to Berlin earlier in anticipation of the blockade. Thes

initial trials started on 21 June with a six-ton load that grew

to 156 tons the next day. 4 3 By 28 June, the RAF started airlif

missions. As transports became available to CALTF , the ton

nage increased. The Soviets started to harass the transports

C-47s, like the one shown here, provided invaluable service during the Berli

airlift.

192
The US Air Force reacted by sending two squadrons of B-2

bombers and Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star fighters to Europ

in case hostilities ensued. The B-29s were not capable of car

rying nuclear weapons, but they were highly publicized a

“atomic bombers.”4 4 The atomic-bomb-capable B-29s remaine

in the United States.

Figure 11. Berlin Airlift (Adapted from To Save a City: The Berlin Airlif

1948–1949 by Robert G. Miller [Washington, D.C.: Air Force History an

Museums Program, 1998], iv)

193
Maj Gen William H. Tunner , commander of CALTF, create

a production-line effort to get aircraft on schedule for depar

ture, spaced within the corridor, landed, cargo extracted, an

returned to West Germany for another sortie. Tunner built hi

airlift upon the heavier-airlift C-54 aircraft, which had tripl

the carrying capacity of the C-47.

4 5 The larger-capacity aircraf

would reduce the number of sorties and ease coordination

USAFE and RAF aircraft were guided by radar and wer

spaced three minutes apart. Radar- and ground-controlled ap

proach (GCA) systems kept strict discipline for the aircraft

Winter storms, night operations, and the GCA handled othe

problems. Each plane had only one opportunity to approach

and land; if it could not, the plane was ordered back to Wes

Germany.

C-54s on the ground were quickly unloaded and refueled

Tunner reduced time on the ground to 30 minutes.4 6 Aircrew

would call 10 minutes ahead of landing to coordinate with

ground operations to ensure that a specialized crew was avail

able to off-load a particular cargo, such as coal, and arrang

for a parking spot for each aircraft. Aircrews stayed on th

plane while it was unloaded and refueled. Similarly, the load

ing of coal and food became a science. A loading team could

put a bagged, 10-ton cargo of coal into an aircraft in about 1

minutes, and a portable conveyor belt could load 20 tons o

coal in 35 minutes, compared to a ground crew’s 45 to 6

minutes.4 7 Tunner believed that his aircrews could achieve

maximum efficiency by using standardized procedures. Crew

were given standard training courses, flight information, pro

cedures, and controls. C-54 airlift operations operated like 

machine with little variance. Tunner ’s efforts paid off, as C

54s carried more than their civilian versions by about 8,50

pounds.4 8

The nonstop operations did take a toll on aircraft. Engine

needed overhaul and spare-parts replacements. Landing on

rough, steel-planked runways required above-normal tire re

pairs. USAFE and augmented maintenance crews could no

perform all of the maintenance. These crews had to replac

over 90 engines per month and repair 23 tires a day, alon

with repairs and routine checks on hydraulics, electrical sys

tems, airframes, and other problems. C-54s also required 200

194
and 1,000-hour routine maintenance checks. After 200 fligh

hours, a C-54 was sent to a depot in England for a series o

inspections. After passing the inspections, the plane wa

loaded with engines ready for overhaul and sent back to th

United States for the 1,000-hour maintenance work. Thi

r emoved the aircraft from operations for up to 44 days. Afte

the airplane underwent the maintenance work, it was loade

with cargo and repaired engines to return to Germany. Tunne

used a complex scheduling system to ensure that he had 

minimum of 319 C-54s available from a peak force of 40

aircraft to conduct operations. 4 9 About 75 were in mainte

nance at any one time. Still, scheduling was not enough.

Tunner started to employ German nationals to conduct lim 

ited, routine maintenance work in Berlin . These replacement

would allow American maintenance crews to concentrate on

other vital repair work. USAFE hired former World War I

Luftwaffe personnel. Maintenance manuals were translated int

German to aid the effort. The program worked so well tha

ex-Luftwaffe personnel outnumbered American maintenanc

crews at the end of the Berlin airlift .

Operation Vittles was meeting all expectations and require

ments. Berlin ’s citizens were fed, clothed, and heated through

airpower. The 24-hour-a-day operation lasted for 462 days

with the exception of a 15-hour period in November 1948 tha

closed airlift operations due to poor weather. On 15 Apri

1949, CALTF established a delivery record of 12,940 tons in

1,398 sorties.5 0 Airlift capability grew from 2,000 tons per da

on 31 July to an average of 5,583 tons by 18 September 1948

It continued even higher despite the winter weather. The Sovi

ets’ blockade had failed. The West had won. On 9 May 1949

the Soviets announced that the blockade would be lifted on

12 May. Operation Vittles continued to deliver supplie

through the air in case the Soviets reinitiated the blockade.

Airlift operations performed magnificently. Through 30 Sep 

tember 1949—the end of the Berlin airlift—CALTF delivere

2,325,000 tons of cargo. Berlin did not fall. The city continue

to conduct business and factory production under “normal

conditions. The US Air Force carried about 1,783,000 tons o

cargo. During the period, approximately two-thirds of this carg

was coal. 5 1 American and British aircrews flew 567,537 flyin

195
hours with a takeoff or landing occurring every minute. Unfor

tunately, CALTF lost 12 aircraft in crashes that killed 30 Ameri

can military members and one civilian.

The Berlin airlift demonstrated the feasibility and effective

ness of mobility operations. Combined and joint operation

were showcased in this effort. American and British airlif

joined forces to supply Berlin with almost every requiremen

imaginable. The C-54s demonstrated the advantages that larg

cargo planes had over the smaller C-47s. These aircraft showe

that large aircraft were more efficient than the nimbler carg

aircraft. Additionally, Operation Vittles was a visible showcas

for global-mobility operations in peace and, potentially, in war

The Berlin airlift was the largest one of its kind up to thi

point in history. It was conducted solely for humanitarian

reasons, yet it had serious political implications for the futur

of Western Europe. Planning and coordination allowed a mas

sive airlift operation to be sprung in weeks, altering Stalin ’

position on Berlin . He could continue the fruitless effort; at

tack the combined American, British, and French forces; o

end the blockade. He chose a humiliating defeat and pulle

back the blockade. The newly created US Air Force had sur

vived its first challenge and won.

Space and Information:

The Enabler of Operations

Aerospace power is a combination of air and space func

tions and capabilities that have enhanced combat operation

on the battlefield and have aided national-security decisions

Space operations have significantly increased the quality an

amount of information that has directly affected the ability o

commanders to observe enemy operations, communicate with

forces, plan actions, prepare forces for combat, and suppor

war-fighting capabilities. Additionally, space systems provid

deterrent value for the nation’s security. Satellites provide 

constant stream of information about possible ICBM

launches. Space-based imagery also allows the nation to iden

tify potential threats from new weapons. These opportunitie

provide more alternatives to decision makers. Some of th

196
uncertainty that military commanders face is reduced, an

the chance of success on the battlefield is increased with thi

information.

Computer and information technology has significantly in 

creased since the days of the first computer—ENIAC—in 1946

The acquisition, manipulation, transmission, and storage o

vast amounts of information have revolutionized warfare. In 

telligence information about enemy capabilities that formerly

took days or weeks to gather, format, and distribute now take

minutes. The transmission of battle plans might involve 

single distribution through a network of computers instead o

printing and physically delivering the orders to their recipi

ents. While the United States utilizes this information fo

many defense issues, it must also defend against powers tha

may try to disable or destroy the ability to use such informa

tion. The nation also conducts information warfare, which

seeks to defend the country’s use of information and to den

the same capability to a foe. This capability is similar to ai

superiority in that it allows the nation to act without fear o

attack on its information.

Space and information operations are tightly connected. In 

formation in warfare and information warfare rely on the gath

ering and rapid transmission of large quantities of data. Satel

lites can provide a means to observe an area of the glob

unhindered by the limitations of manned aircraft and nationa

borders. These systems can operate on a 24-hour schedul

that may provide near-constant coverage over a specific re

gion. Global communications with satellites also provide near

simultaneous connections without regard to terrain. This ca

pability has also aided aircrews in the receiving of navigation

information. These opportunities have not only helped militar

but also commercial organizations. The rapid and accurat

use of information has transformed the world economy. Thi

has been a boon to industry, but it has also become a poten

tial target for an adversary.

There have been several space and information operation

that have had national impact. Space operations are still rela 

tively new compared to air operations, but space systems hav

gained much influence relative to aerial systems over recen

years. Information technology is growing at an exponentia

197
rate and provides many new avenues to exploit and defen

against exploitation. These opportunities will provide the fu 

ture aerospace leader with an additional arsenal to meet to

morrow’s challenges.

Finding a Needle in a Haystack: The Great Scud Hunt

During Desert Storm , a major problem that plagued coali

tion forces was the inability to destroy Iraqi surface-to-surfac

ballistic missiles launched against targets in Israel and Saud

Arabia . The Iraqis were able to launch a number of Scu

missiles that killed several people and could have create

more damage had they been armed with NBC warheads. Par

of the problem of finding these missiles involved determinin

the location of launchers, mobile or fixed. The US Air Force’

Defense Support Program (DSP) was a key component of th

Scud hunt.

The Scud was not a precision weapon. The Iraqi governmen

used it as a terror weapon rather than a military one. Saddam

ordered that Scuds be used in his war with Iran from March

to June 1985, when the Iraqis attacked factories, a nuclea

plant, and civilian targets. Saddam attempted to use Scu

strikes against Israel to fracture a tenuous alliance between

Western and Arab nations during the Gulf War .

5 2 The Iraqi

hoped that their Scud attacks might provoke an Israeli mili

tary response that would put the coalition Arab nations in 

tough position of siding with Israel against another Arab country

The Iraqis launched the first Scud attack on 17 January 199

and followed with seven missiles that struck near Tel Aviv an

one missile against Dhahran, Saudi Arabia . The coalition ha

to stop Scud launchings in order to keep Israel from takin

unilateral action that might affect the operation of the war

After hearing about the Scud launches, Secretary of Defens

Dick Cheney stated that “the number one priority is to kee

Israel out of the war.”5 3

The Scud was a relatively primitive ballistic missile base

on the World War II–era German V-2 . The Iraqis purchase

several missiles from the Soviet Union and developed severa

indigenous missiles. Saddam’s missile force was composed o

the Scud 1-C, Scud-B, and the Iraqi-made Al-Hussein an

198
Al-Abbas/ Al-Hijarah Scud derivatives. The Soviet-built Scud

had a limited range of 175–85 miles, with a circular erro

probable of 2,900 feet; they could carry a payload of 2,20

pounds.5 4 The Al-Hussein had a longer range but a reduce

payload of 1,000 pounds; though less accurate, it could reach

a speed of Mach 5. Iraq’s Al-Abbas and Al-Hijarah had th

longest range—465 miles—with only a 650-pound payload

they were less accurate than the Al-Hussein .

Iraqi missile crews could launch the Scuds in two ways

from fixed sites and through mobile transporter erector launcher

(TEL). Scuds deployed from fixed sites offered more accurac

since their guidance systems were better aligned against tar

get coordinates. However, these sites were also vulnerable t

air attack. TELs offered a more difficult target since a launch

crew could fire its missile from many locations against an

enemy. Such launches were less accurate than launchin

from a fixed site, but mobile sites could remain hidden from

detection until firing. After a launch, the TEL was driven awa

and hidden.

A Scud missile that failed to reach its target

199
The United States had two options to reduce the chance o

Scuds hitting Israel. American forces could deploy a missile

defense system or conduct an air campaign against the mis

siles and their launchers. The US Army deployed and operate

the Patriot missile in an anti-ballistic-missile role to shoo

down Scuds. Additionally, the coalition air forces use

ground-attack aircraft to locate and destroy Scud launchin

sites. Both systems required detailed information about th

timing and location of the missile launch. The usual flight tim

from launch to impact was only seven minutes. 5 5 Patriot mis

sile units required warnings, and strike aircraft used location

data to find the launch site. Scud missiles were not militarily

important. They had a small warhead and were inaccurate

Their true value was their political impact.

The United States had three DSP satellites in the Persian

Gulf theater. DSP satellites were originally developed to detec

Soviet ICBM launches and submarine-launched ballistic mis

siles through infrared signatures, thus providing strategic warn

ing to national leaders. In 1990 the JCS realized that DS

could also identify launches of less-capable tactical ballisti

missiles, including Scuds, and authorized United States Spac

Command to release this data for regional combat command

ers.

5 6 This entailed a move from a strategic, national role t

one that provided detailed launch time, location, missile class

direction, and an assessment of the launch to a war-fightin

commander for immediate, day-to-day operations to defeat tacti

cal ballistic missiles. This change would require alterations in

operating conditions to provide tactical missile warning alon

with the satellites ’ primary mission of providing early warnin

against an ICBM attack on the United States. 5 7

DSP satellites, along with ground-based radar systems in

Turkey, could detect ballistic missile launches from Iraq. Onl

these systems could provide warning and targeting informa

tion concerning the Scud attacks. The United States operate

three DSP satellites in the area for such purposes. The DS

used an infrared telescope to monitor Earth every 10 seconds

A sensor within the telescope would detect the infrared energ

from a Scud and send an electronic signal to a ground station

for processing. Cloud cover could mask detection of the mis

200
sile’s “launch plume.” The Scud could be detected only after i

broke through the clouds.

Once the missile was detected, satellite data was sent t

ground stations for relay to a processing center in the Unite

States. Initial data was sent to an Air Force Space Comman

station in Woomera, Australia , and then sent via a Defens

Satellite Communications System (DSCS) link to another groun

station at Buckley AFB, Colorado. The data was then trans

mitted to US Space Command’s Missile Warning Center at th

North American Air Defense Command in Cheyenne Mountain

near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The data was then analyzed

and launch information transmitted back to the Persian Gul

through DSCS to US Central Command in Saudi Arabia . Th

data was transmitted by a telephone call or through the auto

mated Tactical Event Reporting System . Central Comman

would send the warning to a Patriot missile battery com

mander or air commander via the Air Force Satellite Commu 

Defense Support Program satellite

201
nications System . These commanders relayed the information

via radio link to their subordinates to take air defense action

or to hunt for the Scud TEL or fixed site. This process took

about five minutes.5 8 Given the fact that the missile’s fligh

usually lasted seven minutes and that Patriot missile crew

needed time to align their missiles and detect the incomin

missile with their own radar systems, there was little margin

for error.

The Air Force Space Command, US Central Command, US

Space Command, and others tried to reduce the warning time

From 17 to 20 January, the warning time averaged 5.4 min 

utes but was significantly reduced to 3.3 minutes after Ai

Force Space Command analysts became experienced with th

detection of Scud launches. This added crucial time to allow

Patriot and aircraft crews to prepare for operations. Air Forc

Space Command officials suggested that a direct connection

between DSP and Central Command be established that would

reduce warning time to 90 seconds.5 9 Unfortunately, this pro

posal required training, secure communications, procedures

and equipment that would take too long to make the system

operational.

At first, the Patriot missile defense system was touted as 

great success. Scuds were fired upon and allegedly brough

down. Unfortunately, the Patriot’s performance was challenge

when an analysis by the General Accounting Office of Patrio

warhead kills indicated a 9 percent success rate against Scuds.

6 

Patriot missile batteries in Israel were also criticized in a 199

Israeli Defense Ministry report that claimed there was no evi

dence that the Patriots hit Scuds. However, DSP information

identified each Scud launch and was relayed to the appropri

ate individuals. One can only speculate as to whether th

delay in receiving information or the performance of the Pa 

triot missile caused the drop in interception rate. However

DSP information did provide at least a limited warning tim

and guidance information for the Patriots.

The Great Scud Hunt over Iraq by coalition aircraft was als

a disappointment. McDonnell-Douglas F-15E Strike Eagles at

tacked fixed sites on the first day of Desert Storm in order t

eliminate the threat to Israel. Initial battle-damage assess

ment indicated that the effort destroyed 36 fixed and 10 mo

202
bile TELs,

6 1 the latter representing the real problem. The Iraqi

used preselected launch sites to improve accuracy and hid

their TELs. Bombing missions were conducted against Scu

production facilities, fixed sites, potential hiding places, an

mobile launchers.

The hunt for the mobile TELs was limited because of th

time required to calculate the location of the launch and sen

aircraft to attack. Only 215 sorties were made agains

TELs—approximately 15 percent of all air attacks agains

Scuds.

6 2 This slim number indicated the difficulty of coordi

nating near-real-time detection, targeting, and attacks on thes

types of systems. Although the coalition air forces had infor

mation, this limited effort underscored the difficulty of strikin

TELs. F-15Es and other aircraft, such as F-16s, were equippe

with targeting and infrared detection systems to attack TEL

at night and with limited visibility. Even if the Scud was sighted

 A Patriot missile battery, ready for action

203
targeting and delivering weapons against the TEL proved diffi

cult. On 42 occasions in which pilots identified TELs, onl

eight were attacked due to sensor limitations.6 3

The Great Scud Hunt had limited success insofar as in 

creased patrolling by F-15E, F-16, and other aircraft may hav

reduced the number of launches. The first week of the cam

paign saw 34 missiles fired against targets. During the las

week, the rate dropped to 17. 64 But the Great Scud Hunt use

2,493 sorties that involved F-15E, F-16, A-6E, A-10, B-52G

F-117A, and RAF Tornadoes.

6 5 This effort took away valuabl

aircraft missions that Central Command could have diverte

to other areas, such as CAS or interdiction .

DSP’s ability to find, track, and warn coalition forces worke

very well. Air Force Space Command personnel were able t

adjust DSP from a strategic missile warning system to on

that detected tactical ballistic missiles. Warning times wer

reduced. Accurate information was given to commanders. Un

fortunately, even this advanced warning time was not enough

to halt the deaths of 42 individuals in the war. The relatively

rapid warning time required better coordination and informa

tion distribution. A five-minute warning time may have been

adequate for a response, given a 30-minute missile flight. Tac

tical commanders had, at best, only a 3.3-minute warnin

time for a Scud flight time of seven minutes. The warnin

The F-15E provides long-range strategic strike and interdiction.

204
times were even shorter when Scuds were launched unde

heavy cloud cover. Additionally, tactical commanders had t

launch air strikes or conduct antiballistic-missile operation

that took more time and exact coordination. The Scud experi

ence caused the United States to initiate a series of Patrio

system improvements and speed up efforts to develop a tacti

cal ballistic missile defense system . In the future, aerospac

leaders need to concentrate not on detection capabilities, bu

on command, control, and battle management of information

and its rapid distribution to users.

Corona: The First Space-Reconnaissance System

After the end of World War II, the United States and th

Soviet Union entered another war—the Cold War. Each nation

developed nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. 

devastating strategic attack against cities and military force

could occur within hours from a bomber or minutes from 

land-based or submarine-launched ballistic missile. The Unite

States needed accurate information to assess the Soviet Un

ion’s capability to launch a nuclear attack. If the Soviets wer

building a new weapon, then the United States might need t

develop a counterweight to this threat or increase its deter

rence against such a weapon. This would affect the nation’

chances for survival.

The United States developed and deployed a series of pro

grams designed to gather information about the USSR’s mili

tary capabilities. Several aircraft systems were used to gathe

electronic, communications, and photographic information

These schemes ranged from the use of high-altitude balloon

carrying cameras to aircraft that would enter the Soviet Un

ion’s airspace to gather strategic information. Soviet air de

fenses started to improve their capabilities to shoot down thes

balloons and aircraft with advanced SAMs guided by rada

systems and interceptors. Additionally, the Soviets increase

the number of jet interceptors capable of reaching reconnais

sance aircraft. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US

Air Force combined to develop a high-altitude photographi

aircraft—the Lockheed U-2. CIA officials believed its high

altitude operation could escape SAMs and jet interceptors

205
U-2 operations overflew the USSR, gathering photographic in 

formation about Soviet strategic bomber and missile develop 

ments. These missions ended when the Soviets shot down 

U-2 on 1 May 1960, captured its pilot, and exposed America’s

aerial spy missions to the world. This shootdown denied th

US government its premier strategic-reconnaissance system.

The CIA and the Air Force had commissioned several stud

ies to explore the use of Earth-orbiting satellites to take photo

graphs over the Soviet Union . Satellites seemed to be a rea

sonable, albeit untried, substitute for aircraft. The Soviets ha

already sent a satellite into orbit when they launched Sputnik

I on 4 October 1957. Satellites were seen as a less vulnerabl

alternative than another aerial system. There were no known

Soviet antisatellite weapons, and an unmanned reconnais

sance satellite did not have a pilot to support or lose if th

satellite were shot down. Additionally, the satellite could tak

photographs over several regions in the Soviet Union faste

than an airplane could. While the U-2 was readied for it

missions to get information about Soviet systems, the Air Forc

was charged in 1955 with developing a highly classified spac

system —Weapon System (WS)-117L—that would provide con

tinuous surveillance of preselected areas of the world relate

to an adversary’s war-making capability. 6 6

The Lockheed Corporation received a contract on 29 Octo

ber 1956 to build WS-117L. The project would provide the CIA

with an operational system in 1960. President Eisenhowe

wanted a satellite system in place earlier. CIA and USAF offi

cials decided to initiate an interim reconnaissance satellit

that might be deployed faster. This system—Corona—was de

signed to use a camera that photographed its targets while th

satellite made several orbits over a designated area. The film

would be returned to Earth via a recoverable reentry capsul

that an Air Force plane would capture in midair over th

Pacific.

The Corona program helped answer many questions abou

the Soviet Union ’s military programs. Airfields, factories, mis

sile silos, research and development centers, military bases

and other targets were photographed. However, Eisenhowe

wanted the existence of Corona kept secret. A cover story wa

concocted, and the project was called Discoverer in public—an

206
attempt to mask the reconnaissance program

s purpose as 

scientific satellite program.

The Corona program was originally designed for a mission

of limited duration. A Thor launch vehicle would put Coron

into a polar orbit from Vandenberg AFB, California . Each Co

rona vehicle had a 70-degree panoramic Itek camera with 

resolution of 35 to 40 feet.6 7 Later missions included two cam

eras and improved resolution to six feet. The first Coron

vehicles carried enough film for a 24-hour mission that a

lowed the satellite to make 17 orbits. 6 8 The vehicle would star

photographing a wide area of the Soviet Union because i

could not distinguish particular targets, unlike the U-2 , whos

pilot controlled the camera. A radio signal from the groun

would initiate the reentry phase of the flight. The film wa

recovered in a parachute-equipped reentry vehicle caught in

midair by a C-119 recovery aircraft stationed at Hickam AFB

Hawaii. Later, modified JC-130s improved the recovery process.

Discoverer I was launched on 28 February 1959. This tes

case was designed to evaluate the Thor booster rocket’s abilit

to put a dummy payload into orbit. Air Force engineers track 

ing Discoverer I’s progress lost contact with the vehicle 95

miles from Vandenberg. Failures plagued the early Discovere

program. Problems involving the Thor booster rocket, camera

reentry system, and other shortfalls caused much concern

about Corona’s future. Finally, on 10 August 1960, Discovere

XIII put an instrument payload into orbit that was recovere

by ship after it reentered the atmosphere, despite the fact tha

a C-119 recovery aircraft had failed to catch it. Presiden

Eis enhower displayed an American flag that had gone int

orbit in the reentry vehicle. This public act helped cemen

Discoverer’s cover story but, more importantly, proved tha

Corona could work.

The prime targets for photographic missions were the Sovie

Union ’s ICBMs. The United States did not know how man

missiles the Soviets possessed or their capabilities. During th

presidential campaign debates, President Eisenhower ’s ad

ministration was blamed for creating a “missile gap” between

the United States and the USSR. The Soviets were credite

with a growing ballistic missile advantage, and the Unite

States needed to build up its strategic force. Although the U-2

207
had provided valuable photographs over several targeted ar

eas, much of the Soviet Union was uncharted by the CIA

Approximately 65 percent of the Soviet Union ’s landmas

could hold ICBMs .

6 9 The CIA estimated that the Soviet Union

could have 150 to 400 ICBMs by mid-1961. Corona could help

confirm or deny this estimate.

Discoverer XIV was launched on 18 August 1960. The cam 

era used 20 pounds of film to photograph 1,650,000 squar

miles of the Soviet Union , more than the total U-2 program o

24 flights. 7 0 The film allowed photointerpreters to identify 6

new airfields and 26 SAM bases. However, clouds obscure

the film, and the camera’s resolution did not allow the pho

tointerpreters to count aircraft. Later advancements in camer

technology would improve this capability. The vehicles starte

to carry more film, stereo cameras, two film-recovery capsules

more fuel to keep Corona in orbit longer, and other additions.

Corona proved to be a great success for the nation. Th

program was able to photograph 23 of 25 Soviet ICBM com

plexes by March 1964. Three months later, all ICBM com

plexes were photographed.7 1 The missile gap was debunke

when the Soviets were shown to have about 10–25 ICBMs in

1961. 7 2 Believing the missile gap, some people in the admin

stration of President John F. Kennedy wanted to build 10,00

Minuteman ICBMs ; instead, Kennedy reduced the number o

missiles to 1,000, which saved valuable resources and re

duced the chance of a massive arms race. The Kennedy ad

ministration observed no appreciable buildup of Soviet o

Warsaw Pact military activities (including ballistic missiles

during the Cuban missile crisis. This allowed Presiden

Ken nedy to strengthen his fortitude to maintain a nava

blockade around Cuba . Another example of Corona’s valu

was its ability to determine the amount of destruction tha

Israel inflicted on Arab forces in the Six-Day War in 1967. Th

United States knew the extent of the Israeli victory and th

amount of damage suffered by the Arabs. During the Vietnam

War, Corona photographed SAM sites and gave commander

the status of individual missile complexes. More importantly

the United States gained invaluable information about Sovie

and Communist Chinese strategic weapons, nuclear energy

and space programs. The Corona program gave the Unite

208
States a reliable, continuing system that provided a glimps

into the Soviet and Chinese national defense programs.

The Corona program became the backbone of US intelli

gence capability during its long lifetime. 7 3 Corona mission

flew from 1961 through 25 May 1972. This period covered 14

missions and 165 film-capsule recoveries. Corona camera

took 866,000 images covering 99,722,000 square miles.7 4 Thi

accomplishment created a wealth of timely information fo

The Minuteman ICBM force was built to counter a perceived Soviet missile threat

209
national decision makers. Corona allowed American leaders t

gather information about Soviet successes and failures in

weapons and space developments, force-structure sizes, an

deployments. This gave presidents a significant advantage in

dealing with arms negotiations, weapons development, an

diplomatic actions.

The information from Corona was a valuable light in a se

of intelligence darkness in the early 1960s. The program pro

vided certainty to intelligence and gave national leaders confi

dence to make critical decisions. The United States and th

Soviet Union were on the brink of building massive number

of nuclear-armed weapons. The Soviets were threatenin

American interests in Western Europe over Berlin and off th

coast of Florida in Cuba. Instead of overreacting and creatin

an artificial confrontation, national leaders were able to us

up-to-date information to dispel false estimates or misinfor

mation. Not only did Corona identify all major ballistic -missil

launch complexes, but also it identified space centers, con

struction facilities for ballistic-missile submarines, weapon

plants, SAMs, antiballistic-missile sites, and other high-valu

targets. 7 5 This information allowed America’s national leader

and military forces to target these locations and create detaile

maps. Additionally, the Corona information allowed Presiden

Nixon to begin serious arms-limitation negotiations with th

Soviet Union .

The United States continues to use imagery satellite sys

tems for military and arms control purposes. These system

provide critical, time-sensitive information that gives a com

mander near-instantaneous information about an enemy’

force dispositions, battle damage, movements, and terrain

conditions. Instead of film, these systems use electronic stor

age and transmission of photographs to ground stations tha

can send them in digital form around the world. These ad

vances have given today’s imagery satellites a significant ad

vantage over the Corona system.

Information Averts a Nuclear Showdown: Cuba, 1962

In October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union

were at the brink of nuclear war over the Soviet Union ’s place

210
ment of intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic mis

siles (IRBM and MRBM) in Cuba , just 90 miles away from

Florida (fig. 12). The Soviets’ placement of both these missile

and Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle light jet bombers gave the Sovie

Union a potent nuclear-strike capability. The Soviet Union

was hoping to deploy these missiles without the Unite

States’s knowledge. President Kennedy was already aware o

the missiles’ presence and was prepared to demand their re

moval. On 22 October 1962, Kennedy called this action “delib 

erately provocative and unjustified . . . that cannot be ac

cepted by this country.”7 6 The American discovery of Sovie

chairman Nikita Khrushchev’s placement of the missiles wa

greatly aided by aerial-reconnaissance aircraft that provide

up-to-date photographic evidence of SAM , aircraft, IRBM, an

MRBM deployments around Cuba . Photographic analysts from

all services and the CIA gave the White House evidence o

these actions with which to confront Khrushchev and eventu 

ally force him to dismantle the missiles and pledge never t

put them in Cuba again.

Cuba had recently been through a turbulent period of revo

lution. Fidel Castro had risen to power and aligned himself a

a Cuban nationalist revolutionary with Marxist leanings. Castr

overthrew the Cuban government on 1 January 1959. He did

not want to align himself with American businesses or govern

ment due to their support of the Cuban government that h

had just overthrown. The Soviet Union moved swiftly to fi

this void and provided military and economic aid to Castro’

new communist government. Cuban-American relations wer

strained when anti-Castro forces, supported by the CIA, at

tempted an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1962

The Kennedy administration was highly embarrassed by thi

failure.

Khrushchev was encouraged by these events. He though

that he could influence and pressure Kennedy into makin

several concessions, more so than his predecessor, Dwigh

Eisenhower.

7 7 Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna, Aus

tria , to discuss several important mutual issues: arms control

relations between the two nations, and other points of conten

tion. Kennedy supported the status quo while Khrushche

wanted more—the communist revolution was in full swing

211
212
and the Soviets wanted recognition as a superpower on pa

with the United States. The Soviets also were interested in

gaining control of Berlin .

Khrushchev became bolder. He decided to pressure the Unite

States into removing IRBMs and MRBMs based in Turkey

Italy, and Britain . Khrushchev considered the placement o

nuclear-armed missiles a personal affront and demanded thei

withdrawal. 7 8 Although the Soviet Union had a few ballistic

missiles and strategic bombers capable of reaching North Amer

ica, the Soviets did not have as many capable nuclear force

as did the United States. If the Soviets could deploy opera

tional IRBMs and MRBMs , the two countries might becom

more strategically balanced. Additionally, the attempted Ba

of Pigs invasion was thought to be a signal of American inten

tion to eventually wrest control of communist Cuba . Khrush

chev could protect Cuba by providing a nuclear retaliator

force. In May 1962, the Soviet premier decided to build severa

missile bases in Cuba, thinking, “Why not throw a hedgeho

at Uncle Sam’s pants?”7 9

The Soviet Union would move MiG-21 interceptors, Il-28s

MRBMs, IRBMs, SAMs, AAA, construction equipment, an

42,000 construction and military personnel to Cuba. The So

viets secretly launched Operation Anadyr to ensure a missil

deployment in Cuba by October 1962. 8 0 Soviet dockworker

unloaded the missiles, and Russian construction crews buil

missile complexes to avoid Cuban involvement and potentia

leaks. Castro was concerned about the secrecy and believe

that public disclosure would be a better course for Cuba an

the Soviet Union . Khrushchev disagreed. The deployment’s

secrecy would surprise Kennedy, especially with a Novembe

congressional election approaching, and force him to accede t

several Soviet demands. Also, if the Americans found ou

about the deployment, they could attack Cuba or blockade th

island. The deployment proceeded without notice until a CIA

U-2 flight over Cuba provided photographic evidence of newly

constructed SAM sites.

The CIA had reason to believe that the Soviets were sendin

massive numbers of military weapons to Cuba. On 22 August

Kennedy was advised of the large arms shipments, and h

ordered increased aerial surveillance of the island. The vulner

213
ability of the CIA

s U-2 program became evident when one o

its planes was shot down over the Soviet Union in May. Th

Cubans did not, as the CIA first believed, possess the same ai

defense systems or capabilities as the Soviets. US Air Forc

and Navy reconnaissance, patrol, and surveillance mission

were stepped up.

On 29 August, a CIA U-2 mission took off from McCoy AFB

Florida. It photographed two SAM sites and six more unde

construction. 8 1 By themselves, the sites were of little threat t

the United States. However, the patterning of the sites sug

gested that their mission was to defend a ballistic missil

complex. The SAMs were operational, and ballistic missile de

ployment might occur soon. On 4 September, Kenned

warned Khrushchev not to introduce offensive missiles int

Cuba . Khrushchev denied any knowledge of ballistic -missil

development in Cuba . The CIA ordered more U-2 flights for 5

17, 26, and 29 September and for 5 and 7 October.8 2 Th

United States sped up the race for more information. Thre

more SAM sites were identified, but no IRBM or MRBM weap

ons were found. On 8 September, a US Navy Lockheed P-2

Neptune antisubmarine aircraft photographed the Sovie

freighter Omsk carrying several suspicious oblong container

that might contain ballistic missiles. IRBM and MRBM cargoe

were being shipped to Cuba .

Further construction work on Cuba was noted by recon

naissance flights. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamar

ordered the US Air Force’s SAC to take control of all U-

flights. The Soviets had operational SA-2 SAMs . If a U-2 wer

shot down, the aircraft would be by piloted an Air Force mili

tary officer—not a CIA civilian employee. On 14 October, a U-2

from SAC ’s 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flying ou

of Patrick AFB, Florida , took 928 photographs during a six

m inute flight over Cuba . The photographs showed MRBMs read

for deployment at two sites—San Cristóbal and Sagua la Grande

The MRBMs were on transporters outside of shelters. Propellant

loading equipment was present. President Kennedy was shown

the photographs on 16 October.

The aerial reconnaissance effort shifted from high-altitude

wide-area views to more detailed, low-level missions. The Ai

Force’s McDonnell RF-101C Voodoo aircraft from the 29th

214
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron out of Shaw AFB, South

Carolina , were ordered into action. The U-2 photographs ha

already identified several areas for tactical-level reconnais

sance to gather more information. On 17 October, the RF

101Cs photographed what appeared to be two IRBM sites a

Guanajay and Remedios.

The United States added other information-gathering re

sources. The National Security Agency used Boeing RB-47

USAF electronic-intelligence aircraft, flying three missions pe

day, to gather data on Cuban surveillance radar and SAM

radar systems. Navy RC-121C Super Constellation aircraft wer

used to listen to radio and other communications throughou

Cuba . Naval ships were also used to eavesdrop on Cuban an

Soviet communications. 8 3 The United States used all possibl

Nuclear warhead bunker at San Cristóbal, Cuba

215
means to gather information about suspected ballistic missile

activity.

The combination of U-2 and RF-101C flights provided al

the evidence that Kennedy needed. Nine missile sites wer

identified at four locations. There were six MRBM sites—fou

at San Cristóbal and two at Sagua la Grande. Each site ha

four missile launchers with the capability of two launches

The Soviets could deploy up to 48 SS-4 Sandel missiles with 

range of 2,000 kilometers. 8 4 The Sandel could strike targets a

far north as Washington, D.C., and cover 40 percent of Amer

ica’s SAC bases.8 5 The other three sites were IRBM complexe

at Guanajay and Remedios . Like the MRBM sites, these als

had four launch sites with a two-missile system. This indi

cated that the Soviets could launch 24 SS-5 Skean IRBMs

each with a maximum reach of 4,100 kilometers. 8 6 All majo

American cities except Seattle were in range of the SS-5 

These MRBMs and IRBMs could carry about a one-megaton

nuclear yield.

In private discussions and in the UN, President Kenned

was able to confront the Soviets with photographic evidenc

that they had placed offensive missiles in Cuba. Kennedy pu

American military forces on alert. US Air Force aircraft wer

sent to the southeast. Kennedy ordered a quarantine—in rea

ity, a naval blockade—around Cuba to stop all shipping

SAC’s 156 operational ICBMs were ready to launch, and it

nuclear-armed bomber fleet dispersed. Reconnaissance flight

continued over the island with a flight every hour. RF-101C

and US Navy LTV RF-8 Crusaders crisscrossed the island t

update information about missile-deployment status. AAA fir

was noticed, but no SAMs were fired. Unfortunately, on 2

October a SAM shot down a U-2 over Cuba, killing Ma

Rudolph Anderson . Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev vi

the Soviet Embassy in Washington , telling him that if he did

not withdraw the missiles , further action would take place.

American air, naval, and land forces were readied for 

possible invasion and strike against the missiles. American

reservists and guardsmen were activated for service. The Unite

States was ready to repeat another Bay of Pigs invasion; thi

time, however, American servicemen would assault Cuba with

the full backing of the nation. On 28 October, Radio Moscow

216
reported that the missiles would be withdrawn—the Unite

States had successfully forced Khrushchev to back down withou

firing a shot. The Soviet Union was humiliated. The Unite

States accomplished this with the use of photographic evi

dence and the deterrent power of its military. America als

started to dismantle its tactical ballistic missiles in Britain 

Italy, and Turkey. The US government also promised not t

invade Cuba. To ensure Soviet compliance with the agree

ment, reconnaissance planes continued to fly over Cuba, thi

time to inspect departing freighters with their missile cargoes

Aircraft also observed the removal of missiles and missile

sup port equipment. Rapid, accurate information had affecte

the fortunes of the two superpowers. A nuclear confrontation

was averted, and the lives of millions of people had been

saved.

Notes

1. Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision i

the East (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1987), 365.

2. Charles Winchester, Ostfront: Hitler’s War on Russia, 1941–1945 (Bo

ley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, Limited, 2000), 62.

3. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the Ea

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), 79.

4. Ibid., 59.

5. Joel S. A. Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’

Defeat in the East, 1942–1943 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas

1998), 236.

6. Ibid., 246.

7. Ibid., 236.

8. Ziemke and Bauer, 188.

9. David Donald, ed., Warplanes of the Luftwaffe (London: Aerospac

Publishing, 1994), 152.

10. Hayward, 248.

11. Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941–194

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 107.

12. Ziemke, 61.

13. Ibid., 75.

14. Winchester, 7.

15. Ibid., 73.

16. Hardesty, 110.

17. Hayward, 245.

18. Hardesty, 110.

19. Hayward, 284.

217
20. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf Wa

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 137.

21. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, S

Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment fo

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Research Center

United States Transportation Command, and Joint History Office, Office o

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 37.

22. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Ai

Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 4.

23. Ibid., 154.

24. Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of th

United States Air Force, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History an

Museums Program, 1997), 448.

25. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, The Whirlwind War: Th

United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washing

ton, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995), 51.

26. James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, 

League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 1994), 29.

27. Ronald N. Priddy, A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in Opera 

tions Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie (Cambridge, Mass

Volpe National Transportation Center, 1994), 148.

28. Keaney and Cohen, 158.

29. Schubert and Kraus, 248.

30. Keaney and Cohen, 156–57, table 5.

31. Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 230.

32. Nalty, 452.

33. Keaney and Cohen, 160.

34. Ibid.

35. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War Histor

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 47.

36. Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, Cold War: An Illustrated History

1945–1991 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1998), 69.

37. Daniel L. Haulman, Wings of Hope: The U.S. Air Force and Human

tarian Airlift Operations (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museum

Program, 1997), 3.

38. Isaacs and Downing, 70.

39. David A. Anderton, The History of the U.S. Air Force (New York

Crescent Books, 1981), 137.

40. Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Universi

Press, 1988), 177.

41. Ibid.

42. Anderton, 137.

43. Roger G. Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (Wash 

ington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 22.

44. Isaacs and Downing, 75.

218
45. Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of th

United States Air Force, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History an

Museums Program, 1997), 428.

46. Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United State

Air Force, 1947–1997 (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1997), 42.

47. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, 180.

48. Anderton, 140.

49. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, 181.

50. Boyne, 42.

51. Miller, Airlift Doctrine, 181.

52. Hallion, 180.

53. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: Th

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1995)

234.

54. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites an

National Security (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 158

Circular error probable measures the radius of a circle where 50 percent o

a warhead or weapon falls near a target.

55. David N. Spires, Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Spac

Leadership (Peterson AFB, Colo.: Air Force Space Command, 1997), 255.

56. Richelson, 161.

57. Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, 193.

58. Spires, 254.

59. Ibid., 255.

60. Richelson, 168.

61. Ibid., 171.

62. Keaney and Cohen, 73.

63. Ibid., 76.

64. Gordon and Trainor, 240.

65. Richelson, 171.

66. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona” (document is now declassified), in CO

RONA: America’s First Satellite Program, ed. Kevin C. Ruffner (Washington

D.C.: CIA History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1995), 4.

67. Cris Kruschke, “CORONA: A Program Profile,” Quest 7, no. 1 (Sprin

1999): 25.

68. Curtis Peebles, The Corona Project: America’s First Spy Satellite

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 55.

69. Ibid., 88.

70. Dwayne A. Day, “The Development and Improvement of the CORON

Satellite,” in Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, ed

Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (Washington, D.C

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 61.

71. Greer, 37. Document is now declassified.

72. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate, 11-8/1

61, “Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missil

219
Forces,

 21 September 1961 (document is now declassified), in CORONA

America’s First Satellite Program, 141.

73. Albert D. Wheelon, “CORONA: A Triumph of American Technology

in Eye in the Sky, 47.

74. Peebles, 259.

75. CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program, xiv.

76. Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peac

(New York: Doubleday, 1995), 437.

77. Ibid., 467.

78. Gaddis, 264.

79. Isaacs and Downing, 190.

80. Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in th

Cold War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 275.

81. Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Ai

Combat, 1945 to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 349.

82. Anderton, 152.

83. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentiet

Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 315–16.

84. David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (New York: Sain

Martin’s Press, 1999), appendix 8, 407.

85. Isaacs and Downing, 191.

86. Miller, The Cold War, appendix 8, 407.

220
Chapter 6

Functions and Capabilities of

Aerospace Power: Airpower Unleashed

Aerospace power advocates can point to several cases in

which airpower and space power were used in many uniqu

ways. Innovative, flexible applications provided a variety o

options for a commander. Creative applications of airpowe

and space power confounded a foe and allowed a military forc

to adapt to environments that a country never before faced

Doctrine, weapons, and experience were used to overcome th

shortcomings of airpower in order to sweep aside opposition

Flexibility was the key to unlocking many problems facing 

commander. Long-distance combat, numeric superiority, an

other limitations were overcome through bold, ingenious plan

ning.

A future aerospace leader needs to extend his or her think

ing to solve complex military problems. The British recaptur

of the Falkland Islands demonstrates multiple uses of limite

airpower and the innovative approach to reducing Argentina’

military advantages. The Israeli military also used advance

technology and superior military forces to overcome numeri

advantages. The Bekaa Valley campaign was a demonstration

of joint air and ground operations that pushed Syrian force

out of a highly threatening position against Israel. Finally, th

Soviet Union ’s campaign to defeat the Luftwaffe in World Wa

II was an example of skillful planning and attacking German

weaknesses with Soviet strengths. The Soviet air force was on

the brink of collapse but resisted the might of a German

onslaught and won. American aerospace leaders might face 

similar challenge in the future.

These case studies do not involve American military forces

Foreign air forces do not handle military situations in th

same way that the United States does. Readers can bette

prepare for operating with allies or fighting future air forces i

they understand the motivations and gain an appreciation o

how foreign forces fight. Although American air forces hav

great capability, there is always the potential for a foe to iden

221
tify and exploit any weakness in our forces. Studying th

results of how different actors might react to situations wil

only strengthen the reader’s ability to make strategic deci

sions.

At the End of Empire:

The 1982 Falklands War in the Air

In future military operations, the United States may have t

fight and win further from home with far fewer forces than in

the past. One factor will remain constant in the future—Amer

ica’s reliance upon airpower for victory. How might airpowe

contribute to a successful, extended “bare base” operation fa

from home? A student of airpower should examine how th

British overcame both numerically superior Argentinean mili

tary forces and difficult geographic challenges during th

Falklands War of 1982. Airpower significantly contributed t

success in the British campaign. Conversely, the Argentinean

air force’s and navy’s misuse of airpower played a significan

role in their defeat. This case discusses the background of th

war, ways in which the British and Argentinean forces use

airpower, and the significant airpower lessons to be learne

from the war.

The conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentin

was not new. The British had gained the Falkland Islands as 

possession in 1833 through eviction of Argentinean colonist

(fig. 13). Since that time, Argentinean governments have re

peatedly tried to reestablish their claims to the Falkland

(known to the Argentineans as Islas Malvinas). The Ar

gentineans repeatedly attempted to regain possession of th

islands and worked through the UN to settle their claims

These legal efforts did not succeed. In the past, the Falkland

served the British as a naval base near strategic Cape Horn

as a whaling station, and as a justification for a presence in

Antarctica. Possession of the islands has also served as 

visible outpost to an ever-shrinking British Empire. The Falk 

lands are literally at the end of the Empire—7,100 mile

southwest of the British Isles.

222
The territory is composed of a series of islands approxi

mately 400 miles east of the southern coast of Argentina. Mos

activities on the Falklands took place on two main islands—Wes

Falkland and East Falkland (fig. 14). The capital and main cit

was Port Stanley, with a population of 1,000 people (tota

population of the Falklands was about 2,000). In 1982 Por

 Figure 13. Argentina and the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)

223
Stanley also contained the island’s major airport, which con

tained a 4,100-foot airstrip that could not support large jet

aircraft operations.

Argentinean attempts to unseat British rule of the Isla

Malvinas were precipitated by several events. Under their mili

tary junta, Argentinean civil and military forces attempted t

take possession of South Georgia , a British island east of th

Falklands, on 19 March 1982. About 60 Argentinean civilian

Figure 14. West Falkland and East Falkland

224
scrap workers were sent to the island to dismantle an aban

doned whaling station. These workers raised their nation’

flag on South Georgia and claimed it for Argentina . With littl

overt British reaction to this “invasion,” the Argentinean mili

tary government decided to take the Falklands. However, th

British had sent military observation teams from the Falk 

lands-based HMS Endurance and Royal Marines on 25 and 3

March. British Royal Navy (RN) nuclear submarines were als

dispatched to the area on 25 March. Apparently, the Ar 

gentineans were unaware of this response. Ironically, a British

firm had hired the Argentinean scrap workers to dismantl

and salvage the abandoned whaling station.

Another key event that influenced the Argentinean invasion

decision was British domestic politics. John Nott , British min 

ister of defense, had proposed several defense cuts, which

included the retirement—without replacement—of the HMS

Endurance , the only permanently stationed British naval pres

ence on the Falklands. Nott also recommended that the RN’

only two aircraft carriers—HMS Hermes and Invincible —be re

moved from the active inventory and sold to Australia due t

budget reductions. He made plans to reduce air and groun

forces as well. In light of the scant reaction concerning th

invasion of South Georgia , a shrinking British military force

and the long distances from British military bases, and seek 

ing a way to bolster the unpopular military government, on 2

March the Argentinean junta decided to recapture nationa

prestige by invading the Falklands. The Argentinean invasion

force left port on 25 March and successfully landed on th

Falklands on 2 April. After token resistance, the British gover

nor of the Falklands surrendered to the Argentineans. Th

latter’s military forces quickly installed an AN/TPS-43F radar

air traffic control center, and air defense systems at the Por

Stanley airport. Argentinean ground forces deployed mor

than 10,000 troops around the Falklands.

Both nations had aviation forces equipped to fight a majo

conflict; however, conditions dictated by the Falklands se

verely affected aircraft operations. Argentinean forces had on

of the largest airpower forces in Latin America. Conversely

the British forces had a wide range of aircraft types capable o

conducting missions, from long-range operations to tactica

225
support. The United Kingdom did, however, lack the number

of aircraft available for long-range and extended deployments

The British military needed to develop other counters to th

numerically superior Argentinean air forces .

The Argentinean air force, Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA)

and naval aviation force, Commando Aviacion Naval Argentin

(CANA), had a mix of single-purpose aircraft. FAA forces ha

225 combat aircraft, several of them capable of striking th

Falklands from Argentina.

1

 These aircraft included approxi

mately 21 Dassault Mirage IIIEA fighter-bombers, 26 Israe

Aircraft Industry Dagger fighter-bombers (based on the Mirag

design), nine English Electric Canberra B.Mk.2 bombers, 6

IA-58 Pucara twin turboprop ground-attack planes, and abou

68 McDonnell-Douglas A-4B/C/P Skyhawk light-attack air

craft. The FAA also possessed seven Lockheed C-130 trans

ports, Boeing 707 jets, helicopters, and other aircraft. Many o

these aircraft would have to operate at their maximum range

since Argentina did not possess many air-to-air-refuelin

tanker aircraft , nor could many of its combat-loaded jets oper

ate from the Port Stanley airport. The FAA did operate tw

KC-130 tankers. The Mirages and Daggers did not, however

have air-to-air-refueling capability. The major CANA force

during the conflict included 10 A-4Q Skyhawks, 10 Aeromac

chi MB-339 light strike forces, and five Dassault Super Eten

dard attack aircraft. The Super Etendards were especially

dangerous to British naval forces since they were equippe

with French-built AM-39 Exocet antiship missiles, but CANA

had an inventory of only five missiles. Additionally, CANA

could use A-4Qs deployed on the Argentinean carrier Vien

ticinco de Mayo to attack the British fleet. FAA and CANA

deployed 24 Pucaras, six MB.339A jets, four Beech T-34C

Mentor trainers, and several helicopters to Port Stanley and 

smaller airfield at Goose Green . A combination of 20 mm an

35 mm AAA and Roland and Tigercat SAMs defended thes

two airfields. The FAA also used two companies of officer ca

dets to operate the air defenses at the airfields.2

With the above forces, the FAA and CANA pursued severa

combat objectives: to attack any possible British invasion

force, to oppose any invasion, to provide CAS to Argentinean

ground forces, and to defend Argentinean soil from any British

226
attack. Although Argentinean air forces could operate thei

high-performance jets, they had to fly from locations over 40

miles away. This range limitation reduced aircraft payload

and loiter time to target and attack British forces, as well a

response time and sortie generation since the Argentinean

could not station the majority of their aircraft at Port Stanley

Conspicuously absent was any airborne early warning (AEW

or major use of air-to-air-refueling capability for FAA or CANA

The RAF and RN had better aircraft than the FAA or CANA

but the limited number of aircraft and the long distance

affected their ability to deploy forces and conduct operations

Past budget cuts had forced the RAF to transition to a smalle

force. For several decades, the RAF had maintained a force o

“V” long-range strategic bombers. Its lone five Avro Vulcan

aircraft force—No. 44 Squadron—was saved from deactivation

and placed on alert after the Argentineans invaded the Falk 

lands. The Vulcan had the range to strike targets at 4,60

miles. The RAF was in the process of replacing the Vulcan

with shorter-range Panavia Tornado strike aircraft. The RAF

also maintained several Handley Page Victor K.2 air-to-air

r efueling tankers (modified bombers), McDonnell-Douglas F-4

Phantoms, British Aerospace Buccaneer strike jets, C-130 an

VC-10 transports, Sepecat Jaguars, Hawker-Siddley Nimrod

maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft, and an assort

ment of helicopters. The F-4s, like the Vulcans, were slated fo

replacement by Tornados. The RAF and RN had a force o

multipurpose British Aerospace Harrier and Sea Harrier close

support vertical/short takeoff and landing jets.

The RAF and RN air forces’ immediate objectives were t

establish an air bridge between the United Kingdom and As 

cension Island, to protect a British invasion task force, and t

support and defend British ground-invasion forces. The Brit

ish did not have long-range aircraft capable of striking th

Falklands or Argentina from bases in Great Britain . The RAF

needed an assembly point for long-range strike, reconnais

sance, mobility, and tanker operations. The nearest British

controlled airfield, Ascension Island, was about 3,900 mile

away from the Falklands. The RAF could not operate anythin

other than its Vulcans, Victors, Nimrods, C-130s, and VC-10

from Ascension Island’s Wideawake airport. Ascension Islan

227
would serve as a base for airborne strike and reconnaissanc

missions and logistics support, as well as a natural spring

board to coordinate and consolidate forces for an attempt t

retake the Falklands. The RAF expanded operations a

Wideawake from a three-flight-per-week runway to one han

dling over 400 flights per day.

Another objective of British airpower was to provide protec

tion for moving an invasion fleet from the United Kingdom o

for moving one assembled at Ascension Island. Fortunately

the RN did not immediately scrap the carriers HMS Herme

and Invincible after Nott released his policy. Those carrier

would serve as the basis for the initial task force. They wer

normally operated with five Sea Harriers and about 10 Se

King helicopters each. The Sea Harrier was the aircraft o

choice by default since it could take off and land from ship

that could move close to the Falklands. The carrier task forc

could increase the Sea Harrier payload by reducing the effec

tive operating range and make these aircraft a more viabl

military force. The RN’s Sea Harrier aircraft were armed with

US-supplied AIM-9L Sidewinder all-aspect air-to-air missile

(AAM) for combat air patrol missions over the fleet. Addition

ally, aircraft were also required for ground-attack sorties t

support and defend any British ground operations once an

invasion force landed on the Falklands. British task force

subsequently carried RAF Harrier GR.Mk.3s to replace Se

Harriers lost to attrition and to supplement ground-attac

missions.

An initial British task force left Great Britain on 5 April fo

Ascension Island en route to the Falklands. The task forc

consisted of the HMS Hermes and Invincible , support ships

20 Sea Harriers, and dozens of helicopters. Additional ships

including troop transports, would follow.

Although the Argentinean air forces ’ jet aircraft were no

able to use the Port Stanley airport, the FAA had significan

airpower resources based on the Falklands. If the British

could neutralize FAA operations on the Falklands, then a seri

ous threat to the British invasion and ground operation

would be removed. The Argentineans would then have to rely

on major air support from the mainland. Without major air-to

air-refueling capability, Argentinean aircraft could strike Brit

228
ish forces only at extreme ranges. This allowed any British

task force to more effectively employ Sea Harrier CAP and ai

defense weapons to increase the chance of fending off Argen

tinean air attacks and successfully projecting combat power

The British could also strike the FAA and CANA bases on th

mainland using their Vulcan fleet. However, British attacks on

the mainland might result in a widening of the war. As 

result, the British limited Argentinean airpower in tw

ways—by stationing a force in Chile and by attacking th

Falklands from Ascension Island.

The British government deployed several aircraft to Chile

Argentina and Chile had a long history of territorial dispute

over several southern islands. A successful occupation of South

Georgia and the Falklands by Argentina could pave the wa

for future Argentinean military “island taking” adventures. Th

Chilean government, therefore, had a stake in the British mili

tary attempt to retake the Falklands and head off Argentinean

expansion. Allegedly, the RAF stationed several aircraft in Punt

Arenas in Chile, close to the Argentinean border. Sometim

after 10 April, the RAF was allowed to station RAF Canberr

PR.Mk.9 and RN Nimrod R.Mk.1 aircraft, ready to perform

reconnaissance and electronic intelligence missions. 3 Addi

tionally, the British press reported that a squadron of RAF F-4

Phantoms was deployed to Chile .

4

 The F-4s were in range t

attack several FAA and CANA airfields. This threat drew of

Argentinean FAA fighter forces to ensure they could moun

DCA missions against the F-4s. This action reduced potentia

FAA airpower against a British invasion force.

Additionally, the RAF used its Vulcan and Victor forces t

attack the Port Stanley airport. The RAF conducted seven

Vulcan missions (code-named “Black Buck ”) during the cam

paign in an attempt to render the airfield inoperable to th

FAA. On 1 May, a Vulcan B.2 from Wideawake conducte

Black Buck 1. This Vulcan mission required 18 air-refuelin

operations and 15 Victor K.2 tanker sorties, with the bombe

in flight for 14 hours and 50 minutes.5 The Vulcan dropped 2

1,000-pound bombs, but only one bomb struck the airfield

The single bomb did crater the center of the airfield, but th

damage was quickly repaired. A later Black Buck mission

included a successful antiradar mission using AGM-45 Shrik

229
missiles against the AN TPS-43F radar at the Port Stanle

airport. Although the damage caused by the Black Buck mis

sions was minor, the psychological impact on the Argentinean

government was great. The British proved their ability to strik

long distance from Wideawake. This action takes on mor

significance when one realizes that Buenos Aires is much

closer to Wideawake than the Falklands. After Black Buck 1

the FAA pulled out fighters from support of the Islas Malvina

to bases further north to protect Argentinean cities.6 Blac

Buck 1 was only the warm-up act. The British task force

equipped with Sea Harriers, was now in range for ground

a ttack operations.

The initial British task force had finally arrived within 9

nautical miles of East Falkland. Immediately following th

Black Buck 1 mission, 12 Sea Harriers from HMS Herme

headed towards Argentinean positions to complement the Vu

can raid. Nine Sea Harriers attacked Port Stanley using 1,000

pound general-purpose bombs and BL.755 cluster-bom

units. This attack temporarily made the airfield unusable. Th

attack on Goose Green was more successful since it resulte

in the destruction of three FAA Pucara aircraft. The Sea Harri

ers returned to the task force without loss. The RN’s HMS

Glamorgan, Alacrity , and Arrow followed up the air attacks b

conducting shore-bombardment operations within 12 miles o

Port Stanley.

7

 Three FAA Daggers attacked and caused mino

damage to all three ships. The task force’s Sea Harriers tha

were used in the airfield attack were rearmed with AIM-9

Sidewinders in anticipation of further Argentinean attacks on

the fleet.

The sudden attacks by Vulcans and Sea Harriers on Argen

tinean military forces on the Falklands were a shock to th

Argentineans. They knew of the existence of the British tas

forces and had spotted them on 21 April with an FAA Boein

707; the thought of an imminent invasion caused immediat

reaction by the FAA and CANA. The FAA launched sortie

from mainland airfields in San Julian and Rio Gallego

against the British task force. The Argentineans launched A-4

and Canberra aircraft supported by Mirage III and Dagge

fighters against the RN’s ships. The A-4s were unsuccessful in

finding any targets. The Canberras did spot the task force an

230
attempted to attack. Sea Harriers intercepted them, and on

Canberra was shot down by an AIM-9L. Additionally, the only

air-to-air engagement of the war took place as a result of th

FAA’s first attack on the RN fleet. Mirage IIIs from the FAA’

only dedicated interceptor unit clashed with Sea Harriers con

ducting CAP missions over the task force and lost two aircraf

to AIM-9 missiles. The FAA also lost a Dagger. British air

power ruled the skies after the first day of conflict. However

Argentinean airpower was poised to strike a more deadly blow

to the British forces in the coming weeks.

On 2 May, the British nuclear attack submarine HMS Con

queror found and sank Argentina’s second-largest naval ves

sel, the cruiser General Belgrano. The sinking of the Belgran

resulted in the Argentinean navy’s retreat to coastal waters fo

the remainder of the war and caused the Vienticinco de May

to withdraw to port. British naval forces were not under threa

from Argentinean surface naval forces for the remainder of th

war. More importantly, the CANA A-4 forces on the Vienticinc

de Mayo were denied the opportunity to operate closer t

British invasion forces and complicate British defensive effort

by immobilizing the carrier. British forces could now concen

trate on air defense efforts to protect their fleet. The Argentin 

ean government’s hope of defeating the British invasion force

rested on its FAA and CANA land-based aircraft and groun

forces deployed on the Falklands.

Two CANA Super Etendards based at the Rio Grande airfiel

found the British task force, which had earlier been shadowed b

a CANA surveillance SP-2H Tracker aircraft. CANA was awar

of the fleet’s composition and general location. The Etendard

were armed with one AM-39 Exocet antiship missile. The air

craft were operating at close to their maximum operatin

range, in poor weather, and with no air cover. Both aircraf

launched their missiles. One missile failed to find its target

However, the second one struck the HMS Sheffield , a type 4

destroyer performing radar picket duty for the task force. Th

Exocet’s warhead failed to detonate, but the fire caused b

unused missile fuel and the ship’s aluminum construction

resulted in massive destruction. 8 There were 26 RN fatalities

and the ship sank under tow six days later. The loss of th

Sheffield was a shock to the British government. The FAA an

231
CANA displayed their ability to deliver a tremendous new threa

to British naval forces. Additionally, the attack demonstrate

the poor judgment of the British in not using an AEW system

to detect an enemy air attack. The British eventually deploye

Sea King helicopters in an AEW role, but these aircraft wer

neither designed nor properly equipped for the mission.

British fortunes also turned sour in another manner. Se

Harriers struck the Goose Green airfield on the same day a

the attack on the Sheffield . One aircraft was lost to AAA fire

The next day, two Sea Harriers from the Invincible collided in

poor weather when they were conducting search and rescu

operations for the Sheffield . These actions seriously reduce

the number of operating Sea Harriers, amounting to 15 per

cent of the original Sea Harrier force. The task force neede

aircraft-attrition replacements since these losses occurred be

fore the main effort of the force—the amphibious invasion

RAF Harrier GR.Mk.3s were modified for air-to-air refueling

flown from Great Britain to Ascension Island, and then trans

ferred to the commercial-container cargo ship MV Atlanti

Conveyor for transport to the Falkland Islands area. The At

lantic Conveyor ultimately reequipped the Hermes and Invinc

ble with six Harrier GR.Mk.3s, eight Sea Harriers, and 1

helicopters.

The British military also stepped up attacks on Argentinean

forces on the Falklands, relying on other unique forces t

leverage its limited airpower. Units from the British Special Ai

HMS Broadsword, a veteran of the Falklands War of 1982, was attacked b

Argentinean sea- and land-based air forces.

232
Services commando forces operated as forward air observer

and helped neutralize FAA bases on the Falklands. On 1

May, Special Air Services forces attacked an FAA airfield a

Pebble Island near West Falkland. The raid destroyed six Pu 

caras, four T-34Cs, and a transport aircraft, not only reducin

Argentinean ground-support aircraft available to thwart th

invasion, but also demoralizing the Argentinean groun

forces. They realized that British forces, with more to come

were slowly isolating them.

Argentinean aviation forces, however, continued to attac

British naval forces throughout May. Typically, FAA A-4 Sky

hawks, escorted by Mirage IIIs , would deliver 1,000-poun

bombs against naval targets of opportunity. For example, on

12 May, 12 Skyhawks attacked the HMS Glasgow and HMS

Brilliant. A 1,000-pound bomb was dropped on the Glasgow

but passed through the hull without exploding. The FAA ha

serious problems involving faulty bomb fuses throughout th

war. The attacks on Glasgow and Brilliant cost the FAA thre

A-4s (two to Sea Wolf SAMs and one to pilot error). The Ar 

gentineans failed to stem the rising tide of British forces build 

ing up around the Falklands. Additionally, British naval force

carrying more aircraft, helicopters, supplies, and ground force

streamed south from Ascension Island. The war entered it

final phase—a British amphibious invasion to wrest control o

the Falklands from the Argentineans.

The British were not deterred by the Argentinean air at

tacks. British airpower transitioned from a force primarily de

voted to fleet defense and attacks upon Falklands airfields t

one ready for invasion of the Falklands. RAF and RN re

sources focused their efforts on protecting the ground force

that had landed and on supporting the ground offensive. How

ever, the FAA and CANA still possessed the ability to strik

and destroy portions of the task force. By 21 May, the British

forces had landed at San Carlos Bay with a main objective o

retaking Port Stanley. Approximately 2,000 British troops com

posed of commando units and paratroops hit the beach.

In the next few days, the FAA and CANA put up a vigorou

effort to disrupt the invasion force by attacking naval vessel

and the beachhead. The Argentineans launched several strike

composed of A-4 , Mirage III, and Dagger aircraft against th

233
British task force and sank the frigates HMS Ardent, Antelope

and the destroyer Conventry . Another three RN frigates su

fered heavy damage. While the loss of these naval vessels wa

serious, the British were to suffer a heavier blow.

On 25 May, two CANA Super Etendards, armed with on

AM-39 Exocet each and displaying exceptional flying skill

found the MV Atlantic Conveyor after flying over 800 mile

from their mainland bases. The pilots fired their missiles. On

Exocet hit the Atlantic Conveyor and started an onboard fir

that eventually caused the ship to sink; the other missil

failed to find its mark. The Super Etendards were refueled b

KC-130s.

9

 Fortunately for the British task force, all Harrie

aircraft had earlier been transferred, but the task force lost six

Wessex helicopters, one Lynx helicopter, three heavy-lift CH

47D Chinook helicopters, 12 seamen, and several tons of criti

cal supplies. British ground forces lost invaluable helicopte

lift to support their operations against Port Stanley. Instead o

the rapid mobility offered by helicopters, the British groun

forces had to move on foot up mountainous terrain unde

winter conditions.

Argentinean air strikes were not exclusive to the task force

On 27 May, a force of A-4 and Mirage III aircraft struck British

ground forces near the British beachhead. These aircraft at

tacked the British main logistics center on the Falklands an

destroyed significant numbers of guns, mortars, ammunition

and antitank missiles and launchers. Additionally, a majo

medical dressing station was rendered unserviceable for th

rest of the war. 1 0

The Argentinean attacks were also very costly to the FAA

and CANA. Argentinean pilots flew not only long distance

from their bases, but also faced a gauntlet of Sea Harriers

sea-based SAMs , AAA, land-based air defense systems, an

electronic countermeasures (ECM) as well. The Argentinean

lost over 40 aircraft, mostly to Sea Harriers, during this pe

riod. Argentinean air strikes would never again approach th

intensity or scope of previous efforts.

RAF Harriers and RN Sea Harriers continued to support th

advance of British ground forces towards Port Stanley. By 

June, Harrier operations were enlarged by the addition of an

850-foot steel-mat airfield on the San Carlos beachhead. Thi

234
provided British aircraft with a refueling point and reduce

the vulnerability of aircraft from attacks by the FAA and CANA

on the HMS Hermes and Invincible . These land-based aircraf

were able to generate additional sorties and reduce respons

time to support the ground commander’s requirements.

The Argentineans put up some last-ditch efforts to suppor

their besieged ground forces on East Falkland. British groun

forces attempted an amphibious assault seven miles south o

Port Stanley in Buff Cove on 8 June. The FAA attacked th

logistics landing ships HMS Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad with

five A-4 and six Dagger jets. Mirage IIIs conducted a diversion

ary raid on San Carlos to draw away the Sea Harrier CAP. Si

Tristram and Sir Galahad suffered major damage, the latte

losing 50 men. On the return flight home, the Daggers at

tacked the HMS Plymouth , a frigate, and disabled her when

four 1,000-pound bombs struck the ship (none exploded). 

second wave of Argentinean aircraft also sank the assault ship

HMS Fearless.

These attacks failed to halt the British encirclement of Por

Stanley. The FAA and CANA supported Argentinean force

around Port Stanley, but they were ineffective due to the in 

ability of their air forces to stop British resupply efforts. Th

Argentinean ground forces were unable to halt the British

advance through the island. Conversely, Sea Harrier and Har

rier GR.Mk.3 aircraft continued to attack Argentinean groun

positions. By 14 June, Argentinean forces around Port Stanle

surrendered, and the war was over.

The Argentinean and British air forces conducted two differ

ent air campaigns. The Argentineans were reduced to a defen

sive mission close to home, while the British mounted an

expeditionary force to retake the Falkland Islands without nearb

land bases. Both forces recognized the value of airpower. Th

Argentineans relied on land-based airpower , and the British

concentrated on sea-based airpower. The British also use

several innovative applications of airpower throughout th

campaign.

One can trace the failure of FAA and CANA forces to severa

factors. These include less-capable aircraft, failure to achiev

air superiority, lack of modern force multipliers, failure t

mass during attack, and limited air refueling.

235
Although the Argentineans were numerically superior, man

of the aircraft and equipment used were not top of the line

The FAA’s main strike aircraft, the A-4 Skyhawk and Can

berra bombers, were 1950s design and production. Argentin 

ean aircraft also carried few electronic aids and defensive ar

maments; most did not have air-refueling capability, which

severely limited their range. The equipment used by the Ar 

gentineans was also faulty. Bomb fuses failed to operate, du

in part to Argentinean aircraft dropping their ordnance at low

altitudes to avoid the RN CAP and air defenses . This left insu

ficient time for bombs to fuse. CANA Super Etendards did

score impressive strikes against ships with their Exocet mis

siles. However, the Argentinean government failed to stoc

enough of these weapons or break an embargo by the French

government on the missiles. The FAA and CANA also did no

use laser-guided munitions, unlike the RAF in its ground at

tacks against Argentinean ground positions.1 1

The FAA and CANA did not achieve air superiority over th

Falklands. Argentinean military forces did not attempt to ex

pand the runways at Port Stanley’s airport to operate thei

Mirage III or Dagger aircraft. If the FAA had deployed thei

interceptors on the island, British military operations would

have been more hotly contested. The Sea Harriers might no

have had the ability to control the skies, and A-4 and Supe

Etendard aircraft operating from a closer land base could hav

generated more sorties to attack the British task force, inva 

sion, and ground operations.

Argentinean air forces did not employ many of the modern

force multipliers that we see today. The FAA and CANA gener

ated up to 300 strike sorties from 1 May to the surrender a

Port Stanley on 14 June, but many sorties operated withou

sufficient reconnaissance or intelligence. The Argentinean

carried out several reconnaissance sorties, but the aircraf

used for these missions (e.g., Boeing 707, C-130, P-2 Nep 

tunes, and others) were neither designed nor equipped for thi

task. Additionally, many attacks against the task force wer

made against naval targets of opportunity. As a result, th

FAA and CANA hit picket ships (e.g., frigates and destroyers)

The FAA and CANA did not know where the British carriers o

major troop transports (e.g., the requisitioned luxury liners SS

236
Canberra and Queen Elizabeth II) were located. Sinking thes

ships would have dealt a major blow to the invasion becaus

of the loss of military ground forces and the political effect o

high casualties.

Another Argentinean failure involved the use of the principl

of mass. Although the FAA and CANA had numerical supe

riority, they never generated a full-scale attack against th

British task force or invasion force. Argentinean air strike

were limited to fewer than a dozen aircraft at a single time

Imagine what might have happened if the Argentineans ha

used a 75-aircraft attack wave against the British task force

The Sea Harrier CAP and ship air defenses caused majo

losses among Argentinean aircraft, but some did get through

to their targets; a large-scale attack could have overwhelme

the defenses and proved disastrous for the invasion force

Poor planning resulted in a failure to mount large-scale at

tacks.

Another shortfall in FAA and CANA operations was low sor

tie generation. Argentinean sortie generation was considerably

less than that of RN or RAF forces. Although the British ha

few aircraft, they were able to project more combat power than

the numerically superior Argentineans. The FAA planned ove

505 combat sorties—445 were launched, but only 28

reached their targets.1 2 The CANA launched only six Supe

Etendard and 34 A-4Q sorties. In contrast, for example, th

British launched the following numbers of sorties from 1 Ma

through 14 June: 1,335 Sea Harrier (1,135 CAP missions)

600 Victor K.2 , 111 Nimrod , 126 Harrier GR.Mk.3, and 2,25

Sea King helicopter.

1 3

Lastly, the Argentineans’ lack of major air-refueling capabil

ity significantly affected their operations. This limitation di

minished aircraft range, loiter time, and the ability to search

for targets. FAA and CANA aircraft could attack only ships o

surface targets within their range, thus limiting their availabl

targets. Mirage III and Dagger aircraft had to operate at th

extreme boundaries of their ranges. This significantly contrib 

uted to their inability to contest the skies for air superiorit

with the Sea Harriers, much like the failure of the Luftwaffe’

Me-109Es to control the air against RAF Spitfires and Hurri

canes 40 years earlier in the Battle of Britain . They could no

237
loiter and protect A-4 or other aircraft. Also, FAA and CANA

aircraft had to attack at the first target of opportunity an

could not search for more lucrative targets due to fuel con

straints.

Although FAA and CANA failed to stop the British recaptur

of the Falklands, their pilots served with distinction. Unde

extremely difficult conditions (e.g., better armed Sea Harriers

long distances, extensive air defenses, and other factors)

these pilots were able to sink several major RN surface com

batants and support ships. The prospect of facing AIM-9

armed Sea Harriers providing CAP would alarm the bravest o

pilots. The effectiveness of CAP is illustrated by the RN pilot

results. They launched 27 AIM-9Ls and scored 24 hits, which

destroyed 19 aircraft (11 Mirage III and eight Dagger intercep 

tors). Despite these dangers, FAA and CANA pilots and crew

rose to the challenge to defend the Islas Malvinas.

British airpower took a distinctly different approach by plan

ning the campaign in distinct phases and coordinating join

forces successfully to invade and eject Argentinean forces. Th

British were able to effectively use their smaller forces an

maximize their performance. The Argentinean strategy boile

down to a phased defensive operation that seemed more reac

tive than British actions. In a nutshell, the British relied on an

overall offensive campaign against a defensive one waged b

FAA and CANA airpower. British airpower objectives, after cre

ating the air bridge to Ascension Island, were to protect th

task force and ensure that air support was available for th

ground invasion.

The first task for the RAF and RN was to neutralize th

Argentineans’ airpower and deny them control of the air. Th

RN initially deployed only 20 Sea Harriers. The British neede

to draw on these limited resources and other forces to reduc

Argentinean airpower. These operations included conductin

CAP over the task force with Sea Harriers armed with AIM

9Ls, launching the Black Buck missions, keeping CANA’s only

carrier in port, attacking airfields with Special Air Service

forces and Harriers, and deploying seaborne and land-base

air defense systems. Although the British forces were not able

to achieve air supremacy throughout the theater, their limite

forces did thwart many FAA and CANA attempts to bomb th

238
task and invasion forces. More importantly, the combination

of local air superiority using CAP, superior training and arma

ment, and favorable attrition rates significantly reduced th

Argentinean numerical advantage. The high Argentinean attri

tion rate affected FAA and CANA efforts to stop the British

invasion efforts.

The reduction in the number of threats from Argentinean

air forces also led to the RAF ’s and RN’s ability to suppor

ground operations for the British invasion. Argentinean groun

forces had air defense weapons, but efforts by RAF and RN

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft still managed to ensure tha

ground units could retake many major military objectives aroun

the Falklands. The use of multipurpose aircraft like the Se

Harrier enabled the British to switch roles from CAP to groun

attack. Additionally, the coordination between ground element

and CAS immeasurably aided the effort to evict Argentinean

ground forces from defensive positions.

Whereas the FAA and CANA did not use force multipliers

the British relied on several to compensate for the operationa

difficulties they faced. Air refueling significantly improved th

RAF’s ability to strike long distance from Wideawake. The RN

was able to use aerial refueling to extend Nimrod reconnais

sance and intelligence -gathering missions. The British als

employed strategic airlift . The use of Ascension Island as 

long-distance logistics base forced the RAF to rely on strategi

airlift from its C-130 and VC-10 forces to ensure that the tas

force received vital personnel, spare parts, and supplies.

Unlike the Argentineans, the British were able to restore th

Port Stanley airport quickly after the war. RAF F-4s conducte

full operations from the airport on 17 October by using AM-2

matting. The RAF also extended the airfield by 2,000 feet

Argentinean forces had AM-2 matting before the conflict an

could have started extension of the airfield before it was at

tacked. If the conflict had continued, the airfield’s ability t

support RAF operations would have provided new opportun

ties to strike Argentina directly.

Although the British maintained a multilayer defense for th

task force, Argentinean forces still scored some impressiv

hits. Sea Harriers and SAMs shot down many Argentinean

aircraft, but the RN was hampered by inadequate AEW cover

239
age and defenses against such weapons as the Exocet missile

Additionally, bomb damage from Skyhawk, Mirage III, an

Dagger aircraft sank four ships and could have done seriou

damage to six more if the bombs had exploded. This illus

trated the vulnerability of naval forces to aircraft despite all o

the RN’s defensive precautions. More importantly, antimissil

defenses against the Exocet were lacking. Air-to-surface mis

siles showed their deadly effect in the absence of adequat

defenses.

Despite this problem, the RAF and RN defeated a force much

larger than their own. Argentina lost an estimated 103 aircraf

and helicopters to all causes in the conflict.1 4 The British gov

ernment made claims of another 14 aircraft probably destroye

and 15 destroyed on the ground. The RAF and RN lost 3

airframes in the war due to AAA, SAMs, accidents, or losse

from ship attacks by the FAA and CANA. British airpowe

played a significant role in defeating a foe by participating in 

joint undertaking that occurred far from home under difficul

circumstances. Proper planning, employment, and use of forc

multipliers all played major roles in the retaking of the Falk 

lands. However, the innovative use of force by British airpowe

may offer more fertile ground to explore for future force em

ployment. The Falklands War demonstrated the ability to pro

ject military forces in innovative ways. The British task forc

operated far from logistics sources and won a major victory in

the process. Because the United States may face similar situ 

ations in the future, the Air Force must learn from the experi

ence of British forces in the Falklands.

Eighty-Five to Zero:

Israel’s Bekaa Valley Campaign

Aerial warfare has progressed from “knights of the sky” meet

ing in aerial duels over the western front in World War I to 

sophisticated electronic battle waged above the battlefield. 

key element of modern airpower involves the defeat of ground

based air defense systems in order to wage aerial combat

During World War I, biplanes on both sides of the conflic

avoided or countered other biplanes, small-arms fire, barrag

240
balloons, and first-generation antiaircraft weapons. By the 1980s

many nations’ militaries had sophisticated air defense sys

tems with radar, airborne warning, radar-guided AAA, defen

sive ECM, and SAMs . The Israeli Defense Forces/Air Forc

encountered these types of systems during the 1973 Yom Kip 

pur War. Unfortunately for the IDF/AF , the early stages of th

engagement over the Suez Canal almost proved catastrophi

for an air force unprepared to meet those defenses. The IDF/ A

quickly adapted to the situation, with the aid of the Unite

States, to defeat Egyptian and Syrian air and ground forces

In June 1982, Israel was to face another conflict—this time in

Lebanon . It had learned its lessons about defeating integrate

air defense systems (IADS) and would apply those lessons in

the Bekaa Valley.

In 1974 a civil war between Christian and Islamic militi

groups erupted in Lebanon . Islamic groups such as the Pales

tine Liberation Organization (PLO) sought and received aid

from some Arab countries. Syria was one of those supporter

and a willing participant in the conflict. On 31 May 1976, i

intervened in the civil war to halt the conflict. 1 5 The Syrian

government made no effort to disguise its support for th

Islamic groups, especially the PLO. Syrian forces included th

3d Armored Division and a variety of aircraft such as th

MiG-21, Su-7 , and helicopters. These forces and others tran

sited from Damascus to Beirut through the Bekaa Valley, which

ran north to south (fig. 15).

Syrian and PLO involvement in the Lebanese civil war cre

ated several problems for Israel. An Islamic-controlled Leba

non would allow terrorist groups like the PLO easy access t

conduct guerilla or artillery raids on northern Israeli settle

ments. Although Israel had signed the Camp David peace ac

cords with Egypt, Syria still posed a threat to Israel. Syrian

forces in Lebanon added another question mark to Israel’

strategic position in case of war. Israel also felt a moral re

sponsibility not to see a “holocaust” among the Christian fac

tions perpetrated by Islamic groups if Syria succeeded in tip 

ping the military balance in favor of such groups as the PLO .

1 

Thus, Israel was slowly dragged into Lebanon.

As the Lebanese civil war continued, the PLO began a cam

paign to strike Israeli settlements from encampments in southern

241
Lebanon . The frequency of guerilla raids escalated through th

early 1980s. By spring of 1982, Israeli defense minister Arie

Sharon had publicly warned the PLO and Syria that it was hi

government’s intention to cross the Lebanese border in forc

and destroy the PLO infrastructure unless the attacks stopped. 1 

With the Israelis pulling out of the Sinai peninsula in obser

vance of the Camp David accords and achieving peace with

 Figure 15. Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley

242
Egypt, Syria became Israel

s main enemy. The Israeli govern

ment could release military forces from the Egyptian frontie

for future operations in Lebanon against the PLO and Syria . A

justification for launching the Lebanese invasion came afte

another PLO attack. This time a terrorist group linked to th

PLO attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli am

bassador to the United Kingdom , on 3 June 1982 in London

On the next day, the IDF/AF conducted 60 air strikes on PLO

outposts in southern Lebanon ; the PLO responded with stepped

up artillery and Katyusha rocket attacks on Israeli settle

ments. 1 8 The Israeli Cabinet met and authorized an invasion o

Lebanon .

An Israeli armored force composed of 500 tanks spear

headed a force of 60,000 troops over the Lebanese border a

1100 on 6 June 1982. Israel launched Operation Peace fo

Galilee , ostensibly to eliminate the threat from the PLO an

other terrorist groups located in southern Lebanon , to demili

tarize the Lebanese border, and to remove Syrian forces from

the country. Israeli military forces would need to establish 

demilitarized zone from the border up to a distance of 4

kilometers (about 25 miles) to remove the threat of futur

artillery or rocket attacks. The PLO and Syrian military con

trolled a series of mountainous areas surrounding the Beka

Valley. The Syrians had deployed several radar, AAA, and SAM

systems to protect their forces from the Israelis. In order t

eject PLO and Syrian forces from the Bekaa Valley, th

IDF/ AF needed to contend with these defenses. The IDF/AF

faced a situation similar to that encountered with Egypt in

1973—a heavily defended air defense umbrella but with 

more deadly combination of modern air defense weapons an

emplacements hidden among rugged mountains instead of ex

posed on the flat desert terrain of the Sinai. The Syrians als

possessed many advanced MiG-23 and MiG-25 fighters tha

compounded the IDF/AF ’s problems.

The IDF/AF and the Syrian Arab air force had clashed inter

mittently over the skies of Lebanon from 1978 through 1982

The Israeli government authorized air strikes into Lebanon

starting in 1979. On 27 June 1979, the IDF/AF struck PLO

targets in Tyre and Sidon with a force of A-4 Skyhawks an

F-4E Phantoms supported by CAP from F-15A and Kfir fight

243
ers (an Israeli-modified Dassault Mirage jet). American-sup plie

AEW E-2C aircraft supported these attacks by detecting en em

aircraft and directing their interception by fighter air craft. Twelv

SAAF MiG-21s responded to the Israeli assaults—only seven

returned. This was the first of many encounters between th

IDF/ AF and SAAF. From 1978 through 1982, SAAF lost ove

two dozen aircraft to the IDF/AF .

1 9

IDF/AF aircraft conducted reconnaissance missions ove

southern Lebanon , including the Bekaa Valley, with RF-4E

aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), which include

the Ryan Teledyne 1241 (AQM-34L) Firebee and the Israe

Aircraft Industry Scout. The Firebees were fitted with elec

tronic and optical sensors to track the locations of Soviet-buil

mobile SA-6 SAM units and gather information about rada

frequencies.2 0 The Scout RPVs were equipped with television

and wide-angle film cameras for postattack analysis.

The Israelis’ ground forces advanced on two fronts, up th

Lebanese coast and through the Bekaa Valley. These initia

drives into southern Lebanon , supported by attack helicopter

and air strikes, pushed back some 15,000 PLO guerillas an

100 tanks.21 PLO encampments were destroyed or captured

The Israelis attempted an amphibious invasion of Sidon bu

were repulsed. The IDF then tried a ground attack a secon

time to invade Sidon but was met with SAAF attacks. IDF/AF

fighters easily dominated the SAAF intruders and shot down

at least two MiG-21s and six ground-attack aircraft. 2 2 Th

Israelis were pushing the PLO and Syrians out of Lebanon 

The PLO forces were in danger of being crushed. The Syrian

government had no alternative other than moving against th

IDF task force to save the PLO and stop any further Israel

advance into Lebanon .

The Israeli advance up the Bekaa Valley started to slow a

the PLO and Syrian ground forces put up continued opposi

tion from their deployments in the surrounding mountains

The Bekaa Valley was an important route for Syrian force

and military supplies, but it also housed several PLO encamp

ments. Israeli forces would need to push both the PLO an

Syrian army out of this area. However, the IDF ground force

could not do the job alone and relied on the IDF/AF for CAS

and protection from SAAF attack. Israeli air support for Beka

244
Valley operations faced a challenge similar to that of the 197

Yom Kippur War. Unlike its actions in earlier encounters, th

Syrian military had heavily defended its positions with 1

SA-6 , two SA-3 , and two SA-2 SAM batteries.

2 3 Once employed

however, the Syrian military did not reposition any SAM bat

teries, build dummy sites, entrench, or properly site the mis

sile batteries during its stay in the Bekaa Valley. These ac

tions would haunt the Syrians later in the campaign. Th

defenses also included radar and AAA emplacements. This ai

defense system stretched the length of the Bekaa Valley to th

Syrian border.

In light of its experience in the Yom Kippur War, the IDF/AF

had modified its tactics and strategies to handle attacks on

IADS. If the IDF/ AF could not neutralize these systems, i

could not achieve air superiority over the SAAF. Failure t

gain and maintain air superiority would lead to a disaster akin

to what occurred in the early stages of the 1973 war. This time

the IDF/AF was well prepared. RF-4E and RPV reconnais

sance missions had located many of the Syrian SAM , AAA

and radar sites. Prior to any air strikes, a coordinated attac

by IDF special forces, artillery, and rockets would soften th

Syrian air defenses . IDF ground forces used American-mad

Lance surface-to-surface missiles in these attacks. Addition

ally, they used a newly deployed surface-to-surface antiradia 

tion missile of Israeli design, the Ze’ev (Wolf), to strike rada

systems.2 4 Additionally, the IDF/ AF employed a specially modi

fied Boeing 707 to jam Syrian radar signals, fighter-contro

networks, and navigation aids. The Boeing 707 also had side

looking radar that allowed pilots to detect locations of SAM

batteries and other systems, as well as enemy radar frequen

cies used to tune IDF/AF aircraft ECM pods. The RPVs gath

ered the appropriate frequencies for this jamming, and th

IDF/ AF also used them in the initial attack to get up-to-dat

information .

2 5 The Israelis also used CH-53 helicopters for stand

off jamming missions. The Israelis armed their strike aircraf

with a variety of PGMs to attack radar and SAM sites. Th

IDF/ AF had acquired US-made long-range AGM-78 Standard

and AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles to destroy rada

sites. Fortunately for the IDF/AF , the Syrians did not us

dummy radar sites emitting signals to confuse antiradiation

245
missiles fired against operating radar systems. Finally, th

IDF/ AF operated an AEW system composed of two orbitin

E-2C Hawkeye aircraft. These aircraft allowed Israeli command

ers to gather real-time information about SAAF movements fo

IDF/AF fighter pilots and provided an invaluable tool for main 

taining C2 over the battlefield. The Israelis also used a system

of Westinghouse low-altitude AN/TPS-63 radar units deploye

under tethered balloons to maintain continual surveillanc

over the SAAF .

2 6

The first attack against the Bekaa Valley air defenses wa

launched on 9 June at 1414. An attack force composed of 4

F-4E Phantoms, A-4 Skyhawks, and Kfirs, supported by F-1

and F-16 fighters, struck Syrian air defenses. The IDF/AF

launched several RPVs to confuse Syrian radar operations an

to gather current frequency data when these radar operator

detected and locked SAMs on the RPVs . The attack-force air

craft were well equipped with ECM pods and chaff to counte

radar detection (the Firebees may have used chaff as well). 2 

The main targets were Syrian ground-controlled intercept fa

cilities, SAM radar sites, and SAM batteries. The destruction

of GCI facilities would leave the SAAF incapable of directin

any DCA missions against the IDF/AF or attacks on the ID

ground forces. The elimination of SAM radar sites would ren

der any SAM battery sightless. Lastly, air strikes against th

SAM batteries would eliminate SAAF ’s ability to threaten an

Israeli airborne systems conducting either OCA or CAS opera

tions.

The IDF/AF sent 26 F-4Es armed with AGM-65 television

guided Mavericks and the Standard and Shrike antiradiation

missiles to make the initial strikes. The F-4Es launched thei

antiradiation missiles from a range of about 22 miles to avoid

any SAMs after the Syrians turned on their radar system

when they detected the RPVs .

2 8 The A-4s and Kfirs followed u

the F-4E strikes with GBU-15 cluster-bomb attacks on th

SAM sites. These aircraft destroyed several GCI facilities, ra

dar installations, and 10 of the 19 SAM batteries within 1

minutes. Eventually, the IDF/AF would destroy 23 SAM bat

teries in the Bekaa Valley over the entire campaign. Thes

batteries included replacements for ones previously attacke

and destroyed by the IDF/AF . A second wave of IDF/AF air

246
craft struck additional radar and SAM locations. A thir

IDF/ AF series of attacks mopped up any remaining targets

Syria responded by sending aircraft to stop the IDF/AF . Th

SAAF, without a clear picture of the air situation due to it

loss of radar and GCI capability, sent out a large force o

approximately 60 to 100 aircraft. Their mission was to push

the IDF/AF out of the Bekaa Valley and to protect any retreat

ing Syrian ground units.2 9

The SAAF sent a force of MiG-21, -23, -25, and Su-22 air

craft out to attack an IDF/AF force of unknown strength an

location. The second wave of IDF/AF aircraft was in the mids

of mopping-up operations against the Syrian air defenses . Is

raeli F-15 and F-16 escort aircraft engaged the Syrian inter

ceptors in one of the largest dogfights since World War II

Israeli aircraft had AIM-7F Sparrow, AIM-9L Sidewinder , an

Israeli-made Shafrir 2 and Python 3 AAMs, along with interna

guns. The Sparrow allowed IDF/AF pilots to strike SAAF air

craft at beyond visual ranges and beyond the range of any o

the Soviet-made AAMs used by the Syrians. Additionally, th

AIM-9L all-aspect mission allowed Israeli fighter pilots to at

tack SAAF jets head-on. Israeli AAMs eventually accounted fo

93 percent of all IDF/AF kills. The Soviet infrared-guided AA-

Atoll and AA-8 Aphid AAMs were usable only if the SAAF pilo

managed to maneuver and attack an IDF/AF plane from th

rear. This put the Syrian pilots at a severe disadvantage in 

dogfight.

Syrian air losses over the Bekaa Valley were heavy. Afte

dogfights, the SAAF claimed to have shot down 26 IDF/AF jet

while losing 16 aircraft. The Syrians later readjusted this tota

to 19 enemy aircraft destroyed at a loss of 16 MiGs. Th

IDF/ AF boasted that it had shot down 29 SAAF planes with

out loss. The Israelis reduced their claim to 22 Syrian jets

again without any losses. Most of the SAAF losses were due t

“modified” AIM-9L AAMs. These missiles were specifically

modified from IDF/AF experience in Lebanon since 1976. 3 0

In a single day, the Syrians’ air defenses in the Bekaa Valle

were virtually destroyed, and a significant number of thei

aircraft shot down. The Soviet Union was so concerned abou

the IDF/AF ’s ability to defeat its designed and manufacture

SAM and radar systems that it sent Col Gen Yevseny S. Yuva 

247
sov, deputy commander of the Soviet Air Defense Force, t

investigate the actions in the Bekaa Valley.

3 1 If the Israelis

armed with American equipment, could easily sweep away th

Soviets’ air defense systems, then what could they expect from

the United States Air Force? The poor performance of th

Syrian air defense system underscored the lessons learne

from the earlier air campaigns in 1973 and World War II

Although ground forces may have a superior air defense um

brella, airpower can often defeat the most heavily armed ai

defense systems.

Air combat continued between the IDF/AF and SAAF fo

two days. On 10 June, the IDF/AF destroyed the last tw

original SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley. Israeli ground forces

supported by Bell AH-1S Cobra and Hughes 500MD Defende

helicopters (the 500MD was armed with TOW antitank mis

siles), started a drive into the Bekaa Valley to dislodge PLO

and Syrian forces. The IDF/AF provided top cover against an

SAAF attack to the ground forces. The SAAF attempted to stop

the IDF ground forces and suffered the loss of 26 MiGs an

three helicopters. The Syrians admitted to the loss of only fiv

MiG-21s, three MiG-23s, and six helicopters.

3 2

SAAF could not sustain this loss rate. The IDF/AF an

SAAF continued their air operations on 11 June over the Beka

Valley. An Israeli armored column attempted to cut a roa

from the Bekaa Valley to Beirut. SAAF was not successful in

stopping the Israeli ground forces; nor did it halt the hemor

rhage of aircraft losses. The attack cost the Syrians 18 mor

planes. At 1200 on 11 June, Israel and Syria reached a tenta 

tive cease-fire. Because the PLO was not included, the IDF/AF

continued to support air operations in southern Lebanon agains

the PLO .

The IDF/AF claimed an exceptional victory in the air an

against the Syrian IADS. Israel claimed it shot down 85 SAAF

aircraft in air-to-air combat with no losses in the Bekaa Valle

campaign. The IDF/AF ’s force of 37 F-15A aircraft accounte

for 40 SAAF jets (equally divided between MiG-21 and MiG-2

aircraft), while the 72 F-16As killed 44 more Syrian jets. On

Syrian plane was shot down by an F4-E. The Syrians claime

they lost 60 aircraft while shooting down 19 IDF/AF aircraft

Even if Israeli claims are discounted, this campaign stil

248
achieved outstanding results in air-to-air combat against th

SAAF. US estimates of IDF/AF losses include two A-4s, on

F-4E, one F-16A, and seven aircraft damaged. 3 3

The IDF/AF ’s successful air campaign in the Bekaa Valle

is a textbook example of how to achieve air superiority. Th

campaign was conducted in two phases. First, the IDF/AF

attacked and defeated SAM , AAA, radar, and GCI systems

This action significantly reduced the ground threat to IDF/AF

aircraft and blinded the SAAF . SAAF aircraft were handi

capped by their inability to receive up-to-date information

about their IDF/AF foe. Second, Israeli fighter aircraft de

feated the SAAF in the skies over the Bekaa in major dogfight

during the three-day air campaign. Not only did the IDF/AF

plan and execute its mission well, but also the SAAF an

Syrian military contributed to their own demise by their poo

operational performance. Syrian fighter pilots could not achiev

air superiority or deny it to the IDF/AF . The SAAF could no

stop any IDF/AF effort to destroy air defenses in the Beka

Valley.

The IDF/AF planned the defeat of the Syrian air defens

system, based on its experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War

The IDF/AF maintained reconnaissance and intelligence gath

ering by RF-4E and RPVs prior to and after the commence

ment of hostilities. Israeli attack plans reflected information

gathered by electronic and optical means on the location of ai

defense weapon systems and radar frequencies before the 

June air strikes. This information allowed the Israelis to con

centrate on destroying Syrian air defense and C2 systems with

out making extensive and time-sensitive search efforts. Th

Israelis made extensive use of RPVs as decoys and as a mean

of gathering intelligence throughout the campaign. Although

these IDF/AF systems were not armed in the Bekaa Valley

future US Air Force unmanned aerial vehicles could carr

weapons (e.g., antiradiation missiles or other PGMs ) capabl

of carrying out missions akin to the Israeli F-4Es’ defeat o

SAMs or radar systems. The Israelis also deployed airborn

jamming assets on specially equipped aircraft and aircraft

carried pods. In contrast to its initial efforts to dislodge Egyp 

tian air defenses in 1973, the IDF/AF used many electronic

249
aids to defeat Syrian forces and deny them many of thei

defensive capabilities.

The IDF/AF ’s aircraft, weapons, and other force multiplier

also contributed to its success. The Israelis obtained advance

weaponry, superior C2, and better coordination between groun

and air forces. F-15 and F-16 aircraft demonstrated their su 

periority over Soviet-supplied MiG planes. American AIM-7

and AIM-9s (and Israeli derivatives) provided an additiona

edge for the better trained and motivated Israeli pilots ove

their Soviet-armed and -trained foes. Advanced technology gav

the IDF/AF the ability to locate and kill SAAF aircraft befor

those planes could get off a single missile shot. Attacks on

radar and SAM systems by antiradiation missiles also allowe

the Israelis to defeat those systems beyond the effective rang

of SAAF weapons. Once blinded, the Syrian air defenses could

not stop the IDF/AF from attacks on SAM and AAA sites with

their less sophisticated weapons. Finally, the use of AEW as

sets allowed the Israelis to detect SAAF aircraft taking off from

their bases, hence eliminating any chance of surprise attacks

This information also allowed the IDF/AF to provide better C

of its limited assets to meet an airborne threat or divert air

craft to hit ground targets. This real-time information greatly

contributed to the IDF/AF ’s intercepting and defeating SAAF

forces over the campaign.

The IDF/AF and ground forces also integrated their opera

tions within the Bekaa Valley. The IDF/AF first defeated th

air defense systems, achieved air superiority, and supporte

ground forces in their occupation of southern Lebanon . Th

key to success in the Bekaa Valley was knocking out the ai

defense systems and then turning airpower loose to suppor

the IDF ground forces. The Syrian military’s reliance on an ai

defense umbrella to protect itself from an air attack prove

deficient, much like early American doctrine during the North

African campaign in World War II.

Syrian forces, in contrast, were poorly deployed and did no

perform well in the field. SAM and radar systems were place

in locations that were not optimal for defeating the IDF/AF 

For example, SAM sites were not dug in or placed in prope

fields of fire. Several SAM sites were located on the tops o

mountain peaks, which precluded them from depressing thei

250
launchers to attack low-flying Israeli jets. The Syrians did no

operate CAP over the SAM, GCI, AAA, and radar systems be

fore the IDF/AF conducted its attacks; they suffered massiv

losses attempting to do so later. Radar and other air defens

systems did not attempt to relocate throughout the campaign

making them sitting ducks for the Israeli warplanes. The SAAF

was merely reactive to the IDF/AF strike and went on th

defensive. Conversely, Israel maintained the offensive throughou

the campaign and accomplished its goal of pushing the PLO

and Syrians out of the Bekaa Valley.

Stopping the Luftwaffe Cold:

The Soviet Tactical Air Effort in World War II

On 22 June 1941, the largest military campaign in World

War II started on the German-Soviet border. This was Fal

Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union . Th

campaign would engulf the major portion of the German mili

tary effort in World War II until the final defeat and destruc

tion of Berlin in 1945. The struggle would result in more than

30 million deaths and many more wounded—casualties on 

scale never before seen in human history. This military fron

was the scene of large ground armies slugging it out over vas

plains, mountains, frozen steppes, and countless scenes o

urban street fighting. Thousands of tanks shot it out at th

Battle of Kursk, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers fough

untold personal engagements in the rubble of Stalingrad. Th

battle was fought not only on the ground, but also in th

skies. What role did airpower play in this gigantic struggle?

The German Luftwaffe was still smarting from its humiliat

ing defeat at the hands of the RAF during the Battle of Britain 

Part of its problem was its doctrine, force structure, and strat

egy. The Luftwaffe continued to cling to a doctrine that sup

ported Germany’s earlier blitzkrieg strategy of rapidly knock 

ing out enemy ground forces and supporting continued lan

operations. This meant that Luftwaffe doctrine did not have t

address the need for a significant strategic-bombing force; in 

stead, it chose to concentrate on a CAS force. As a result, th

Luftwaffe was primed for a quick campaign without any aeria

251
counterattacks. The Luftwaffe 

s force structure worked wel

against countries in the relatively close quarters of western

and central Europe, like France or Poland. However, fightin

against the Soviets on a much larger continental front, th

Luftwaffe failed to achieve the same blitzkrieg success it en

joyed in 1939 and 1940.

Curiously, the Soviet air force (Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily o

VVS) was designed and built to support the operation of th

Soviet army, just as the Luftwaffe was designed to support th

German army. Although not built to support a blitzkrieg strat

egy, the VVS was designed and organized as an auxiliary o

the Soviet army. The Luftwaffe’s rise to power before World

War II occurred because of rapid, sustained buildup, but th

VVS’s prewar development was severely hampered by Stalin ’

purges of top VVS and aircraft-industry leadership. From 1936 t

1939, approximately 75 percent of the VVS ’s top leaders wer

removed from office. Since the VVS lacked the aircraft, lead

ers, doctrine, or infrastructure to fight the Luftwaffe on an

equal footing, it found itself unprepared for war in 1941.

How did the VVS ultimately force the Luftwaffe to a stand

still and help lead the Soviet Union to victory over Germany

These actions are particularly interesting, given the fact tha

the VVS was virtually destroyed in the air and on the groun

during the first day of Fall Barbarossa. What did it do to win

the war against the superior Luftwaffe and gain mastery of th

skies on the eastern front? The VVS ’s approach towards fightin

Germany is a lesson in how a defeated air force can use it

strengths and ability to change its operations to achieve vic

tory under very trying conditions.

The VVS lost over 1,200 aircraft in combat to the Luftwaffe

on the first day of Fall Barbarossa . The Germans attacke

simultaneously along the Soviet border from the Baltics to th

Black Sea on 22 June. Although the Soviets had disperse

their airfields, most of their aircraft losses were due to Luft

waffe strafing and bombing attacks—not air-to-air combat.3 

The VVS had over 10,000 aircraft assigned to Europe at th

time, but most of the planes were obsolete and deployed fa

forward, towards the enemy. The Russians’ forward aircraf

deployments were a result of the recent acquisition of Polish

territories under their nonaggression pact with Germany. Thi

252
land grab allowed the VVS to station aircraft in the new terri

tory but placed them within easy reach of the Luftwaffe. On

the first day of Fall Barbarossa , VVS aircraft were parke

wingtip to wingtip on rough airfields. Within a week, the Luft

waffe had crushed the VVS in Europe. About 2,000 VVS air

craft were destroyed within 72 hours, and the German High

Command claimed VVS losses at 4,017 planes within the firs

seven days of the campaign. 3 5 Only 150 German aircraft wer

claimed to be lost in the operation after the first week.

The Luftwaffe reigned supreme over the VVS as a result o

these early operations. But the VVS soon fought back with 

vengeance. The Soviet armies withdrew and started to fight 

defensive war. The VVS began a war of attrition and started t

chip away at the Luftwaffe . By 27 September 1941, the Luft

waffe had lost 1,603 aircraft, almost as many as the 1,73

planes it lost in the Battle of Britain .

3 6 By the end of 1941

however, the VVS’s losses approached over 8,500 aircraft, which

forced it to change its focus. The Soviets put more emphasi

on gaining air superiority and defeating Luftwaffe fighter forces

The VVS also concentrated on its role as flying artillery for th

Soviet army to counteract German panzer forces. Although th

VVS had many obsolete aircraft, it tried to sweep the skies o

Luftwaffe planes at all costs.

How then did the VVS accomplish this mission? A key strat

egy was to use mass to crush German military forces. Fearin

for their aircraft industry, the Soviets moved entire production

lines across the Ural Mountains, away from possible captur

or destruction. This Herculean effort required the Soviets t

move 10,000,000 workers; 1,360 production plants; an

1,500,000 tons of equipment to start production.3 7 Before th

war, in 1939 and 1940, Soviet industry had produced abou

10,000 aircraft per year. 3 8 By June 1944, the Soviet aircraf

industry was able to boost production from 2,000 aircraft pe

month in 1942 to well over 3,355 planes per month. Thes

aircraft included improved versions of existing aircraft an

several new types that proved rugged, simple to maintain, an

effective in combat. By contrast, the Luftwaffe’s reliance on 

blitzkrieg force structure resulted in the production of th

wrong types of aircraft and very few new aircraft types unti

late in the war.

253
The VVS 

s ability to produce aircraft rivaling and eventually

surpassing the Luftwaffe ’s was as much an illustration of So

viet determination and dedication to win the war as the failur

of the Luftwaffe ’s strategic attack. The Luftwaffe did not learn

its lesson from the Battle of Britain of developing a viable

long-range strategic-attack capability. The German air forc

was still oriented towards the support of the ground war. As 

consequence, it could not stop the flow of VVS aircraft o

other war materiel to the Soviet front. The Luftwaffe also did

not have the doctrine or experience to conduct an extensive

interdiction campaign. Although Luftwaffe pilots had tried in 

terdiction efforts in Poland and France, they were not equipped t

conduct operations over the broad expanse of the USSR. Th

Luftwaffe failed to destroy rail lines, materiel in transport, an

transportation centers.

The Luftwaffe’s reliance on blitzkrieg strategy did not pre

pare it for the long, continuous combat operations on th

Russian steppes. German force structure and tactics relied on

a lightning war fought with fencing-foil precision. What th

Germans faced, however, was a meat-cleaver war that contin 

ued unabated until Berlin ’s final surrender. Fighting near ma

jor salients, such as Stalingrad, and maintaining a presenc

along the entire front highlighted the war. The Luftwaffe could

not support the front everywhere with the same effort. Th

Germans frequently stripped areas not under immediate at

tack to concentrate their forces to gain air superiority. Thi

strategy succeeded at the cost of other fronts and furthe

attacks.

Continued attrition of German aircraft was a significant fac

tor in the destruction of the Luftwaffe in the Soviet Union 

Unlike the Soviets, the Germans delayed introduction of new

aircraft types and did not mobilize their economy to a full wa

footing until well into the war. Germany produced 27,18

aircraft from 1941 to 1942 for all fronts, compared to Sovie

production of 41,171 for the same period. 3 9 The 1942 produc

tion rate would not allow the Luftwaffe to sustain simultane

ous offensive operations in the Soviet Union and on all othe

fronts. The Germans had to send aircraft to support thei

operations in the Balkans and the Mediterranean , as well a

to defend the Reich. By 1943 the Soviet front became a secon

254
dary priority for the Luftwaffe as the defense of the Reich

against American and British long-range strategic bomber

consumed valuable fighter resources. This action further re

duced the possibility of knocking out the VVS. In fact, in 194

the Luftwaffe fielded only 375 single-engine fighters devoted t

air-superiority missions on the Soviet front against thousand

of VVS aircraft. 4 0

Russian devotion to duty and fierce courage were also ke

ingredients in the victory over the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaff

maintained control of the air from 1941 to 1942 due to it

superior planes, pilots, and experience. During the early stages o

Fall Barbarossa, the VVS , desperate to stem the onslaught o

the Luftwaffe , began ramming Luftwaffe aircraft using a tacti

called taran, an extreme measure taken by Soviet fighter pilot

after they had run out of ammunition.4 1 Pilots would ram thei

aircraft against Luftwaffe bombers and attempt to disable th

aircraft. VVS pilots aimed their fighters at the German air

craft’s control surfaces or attempted to cut the German bomb

er in half. The pilots would then either land their fighters o

attempt to parachute away from the damaged plane. This tac

tic remained part of VVS pilots’ options against the German

until they achieved air superiority on all fronts in 1943.

Conversely, the Luftwaffe was shortsighted in its application

of seasoned pilots and limited aircraft. Starting in the 193

buildup, the Luftwaffe stripped training units of their bes

pilots and assigned them as frontline combat crews. This pol

icy hastened the demise of the Luftwaffe by reducing th

quantity and valuable quality of replacement pilots. This self

defeating process forced less-qualified instructor pilots to pro

vide an ever-decreasing capability to produce combat crews

As the Luftwaffe raided its own meager training bases for mor

combat crews, training quality diminished even further. Fo

example, during the Soviet encirclement of 100,000 German

ground troops in February 1942 at Demyansk, the Luftwaff

attempted to resupply those forces via airlift . Luftwaffe trans

port resources were ordered to send 300 tons per day to th

encircled forces. German transport instructor pilots and train 

ing aircraft were sent to the Soviet Union to allow the Luft

waffe to conduct the airlift . Although the airlift was success

ful, it came at a steep price: 265 aircraft lost. The Luftwaff

255
High Command came away from the experience believing i

could break a Soviet ground encirclement through aerial re

supply alone. This illusion proved disastrous at Stalingrad

Additionally, the poor performance of VVS fighter operation

at Demyansk forced the Soviets to build better fighters an

improve their tactics. These actions would ultimately lead t

the VVS ’s achievement of air superiority.

The experience at Demyansk spurred the VVS to make neede

reforms. Better air and ground coordination would ensure tha

encircled German forces would not escape again. The Sovie

Stavka, or high military command, replaced the VVS com

mander with Alexander Novikov, who provided the drive, en

ergy, and ability to modernize the VVS. Just as the RAF change

its fighter tactics in the Battle of Britain , so did Novikov mod 

ify VVS operations to counter the Luftwaffe ’s tactics and be

gan building more capable aircraft. He also formed air armies

Instead of keeping the current, segmented VVS operations (e.g

separate bomber, fighter, and other commands), the air arm

put elements of each type of command under a single organ

zation, controlled by a Soviet ground commander. The sepa

rate VVS commands had previously worked inde

pendently—most of the time in an uncoordinated manner.4 

The new air armies were able to provide improved support an

quickly strike at German positions throughout the front. Thi

gave the VVS and the Soviet army the needed flexibility of 

fluid, continental front against the Germans. Novikov als

formed huge air armies as reserves to plug gaps along th

front. The increased production of aircraft allowed the VVS t

keep 43 percent of its strength in these reserve air armies b

the end of the war. The air armies also grew in number from

1,000 in 1942 to well over 2,500 by 1945. These forces wer

able to batter not only German ground forces, but also th

Luftwaffe .

The Luftwaffe ’s reliance on a blitzkrieg force structure an

doctrine contributed to its inability to meet the VVS challeng

of a long-term attrition campaign. One of the key elements o

the Luftwaffe ’s blitzkrieg doctrine was the use of surprise t

win air superiority.

4 3 Germany’s early World War II campaign

were aimed at rapid capture of enemy airfields and destruc

tion of opposing air forces through a combination of armore

256
advances and CAS . German fighters would pick off the re

maining air opposition in air-to-air combat. The Russian cam

paign significantly altered the Luftwaffe ’s plans. The VVS wa

not totally destroyed in the early days of Fall Barbarossa , an

German air forces could not remain supreme throughout th

campaign over the Russian skies, as they did in France o

Poland. During the campaign, Germany did not significantly

alter its doctrine or strategy to compensate for the changin

tides of war. Instead, the Luftwaffe was locked into a sluggin

match with the VVS that it could not win. Ultimately, th

numbers of VVS aircraft that faced Germany overwhelmed th

Luftwaffe ’s limited resources.

The best known example of the Luftwaffe ’s failure in th

Soviet Union is the encirclement of Stalingrad from 19 Novem 

ber 1942 to 3 February 1943 (see chap. 5). The Soviet arm

had surrounded 230,000 Axis troops of the German Sixth

Army in the city of Stalingrad. The Luftwaffe attempted t

provide aerial resupply to the trapped forces, as it had done in

Demyansk. Unfortunately, the loss of irreplaceable pilots an

transports at Demyansk played a major role in the Luftwaffe’

failure at Stalingrad. The Luftwaffe had been in continuou

combat from 1939 and was at the end of a long logistical tai

in the Soviet Union. It was also fighting against an improve

VVS. German air force officials were forced to use their meage

resources in unconventional ways to halt the Soviets at Stalin 

grad. Transport units used bombers to carry supplies to mak

up a fleet of 800 aircraft, but improved Soviet fighter opera

tions and dwindling Luftwaffe fighter capability resulted in

major German losses. German transport losses skyrocketed t

481 aircraft and, on average, achieved a resupply rate of les

than 31 percent of the daily objective. 4 4 The Soviets were suc

cessful in capturing Stalingrad, and the German Sixth Arm

was lost. This ensured the collapse of the main German offen

sive on the central Soviet front.

The Luftwaffe never recovered after Stalingrad. Conversely

the VVS gained in strength and momentum after this majo

victory. VVS aircraft were able to stem all further German

ground opportunities from then on. The last major German

offensive on the front, Operation Zitadel, on 5 July 1943, wa

Hitler’s last attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviet ar

257
mies in the center and southern fronts at Kursk. The Ger

mans attempted to stop a potential Soviet drive into the mid 

dle of the German line by encircling two Soviet armies, much

like Stalingrad, but this time with the Soviets entrapped. Kurs

was the key. If it fell, the Germans would have a new life in

the Soviet Union . Kursk would eventually become the larges

tank battle in history. The Luftwaffe committed 70 percent o

its forces on the Soviet front to the battle—over 2,050 aircraf

against 2,900 VVS planes.4 5 The Soviets lost hundreds o

tanks in the initial attacks. However, VVS fighter and ground

attack aircraft counterattacked against the Germans. VVS

quantity and quality stopped the German advance and a

lowed the Soviet tank forces to regroup and attack. The VVS

lost well over 1,000 aircraft, but so did the Luftwaffe . Thi

titanic armored and air battle caused massive losses to th

Germans. German failure at Kursk, Italy’s fall, plus stepped

up American and British strategic bombing over Germany force

the Luftwaffe to withdraw fighter units to strengthen defense

closer to home. This allowed the VVS to take the offensive

against the Germans and dominate the skies until the end o

the war.

The battle at Kursk brought to an end Germany’s final at

tempt to conquer the Soviet Union . The Luftwaffe did not stop

the VVS, even after stripping aircraft throughout the front t

gain air superiority over Kursk. The VVS was still able t

pound German ground forces. Ironically, the VVS was able t

use a Luftwaffe air doctrine based on support of ground force

to push out the German invaders. However, the VVS approache

the doctrine differently and modified its strategies in light o

conditions on the front. The Luftwaffe ’s weaknesses were ex

posed in the frozen wastes—not only its inability to conduc

winter fighting, but also its failed logistics and ill-planne

force structure.

Once the Luftwaffe was deposed, the VVS maintained th

offensive from Kursk to Berlin . It was able to retain the initia 

tive because of its ability to produce massive numbers of air

craft. The failure of the Luftwaffe to destroy Soviet production

facilities allowed the Soviets to build thousands of modern

aircraft and continue a long war of attrition. Additionally, th

Allies were able to supply the Soviets with thousands of othe

258
aircraft and supporting war materials throughout the war un

til the Soviets could increase their own aircraft production

This uninterrupted supply of domestic and imported aircraf

allowed the Soviets to achieve a minimum 10-to-one supe

riority in terms of operational aircraft towards the end of th

war.

Massive production, attrition, Luftwaffe mistakes, and soun

doctrine allowed the Soviets slowly to gain air superiority. Th

lessons learned in blood from early failures in 1941 and 194

eventually forced the VVS to concentrate on gaining air supe

riority. This allowed the Soviets to defend against Luftwaff

attacks and gave the VVS the freedom to strike against Ger

man ground units with relative impunity. The VVS then con

centrated its forces against vulnerable German sectors durin

the offensives of 1944 and 1945.

Even without a strategic bombardment force like America’

or Britain’s, the VVS was still able to beat the vaunted Ger

man military machine with only a tactical air force. The Sovi

ets used tactical aircraft because of limited resources, experi

ence, wartime emergencies, and doctrine. Soviet aircraft wer

further refined to operate under rugged conditions (such a

unimproved airfields, winter conditions, long logistical lines

and limited maintenance). The Soviets were able to adapt t

conditions that the Luftwaffe faced in 1941 and 1942 and t

prevail, while the Germans became bogged down. This exam

ple illustrates the possibility of winning a major war withou

strategic airpower. Some may argue that the Combined Bomb

er Offensive supported the Soviets by reducing German mili

tary production and drawing away the opposition’s fighte

strength. Conversely, the Luftwaffe’s failure to destroy VVS

airfields and aircraft-production facilities was due to a lack o

strategic airpower. However, the VVS ’s emphasis on tactica

support kept the Soviet army in the field and allowed it t

grind down the German war machine. The VVS eventually wa

able to meet German quality with Soviet quantity and attri

the once mighty Luftwaffe to a shell of its former self.

The VVS’s force structure clearly reflected its doctrine. Abou

35 percent of Soviet airpower was devoted to air superiorit

and 46.5 percent to CAS . The remainder was predominantly

reconnaissance—not strategic bombardment.

4 6 The Soviets ha

259
no intention of using a blitzkrieg-style offensive, given the siz

and breadth of the front they faced. Throughout the cam

paign, the main focus for the VVS was ground support. In th

early part of the war, the Soviet air force was able to trad

space for time. This exchange allowed the Soviet Union t

regroup and rebuild. The Luftwaffe did not expect a counterat

tack but believed it would have a quick victory in 1941. Th

Soviet Union planned an attrition strategy that eventually pu

even more pressure on the overwhelmed Luftwaffe . The Sovi

ets’ ability to remain flexible and to adapt doctrine, strategy

and force structure became an important element of thei

victory. Airpower strategists in the future need to be aware o

changing conditions and realize that some situations may no

require such time-honored or dogma-inspired uses of airpowe

as strategic bombardment.

Summary

Aerospace functions and capabilities are not meaningles

definitions and terms. Wars and conflicts have been won o

lost because a side could not accomplish a certain mission o

failed to include the function or capability in its plans. Air an

space superiority, strategic attack, interdiction , CAS , mobility

space and information, and flexibility in operations were ke

components in many conflicts. No one method exists for suc

cessfully using these functions. Creative and innovative use

of these air and space activities can provide a commande

many alternatives and options to settle a conflict.

Future technology, threats, and limited resources will gree

aerospace leaders. They will need to apply many of the lesson

learned from previous conflicts and many concepts about aero

space power to successfully harness air and space resources

Future weapons will become more precise and deadly. En gage

ments with adversaries are becoming more complex. Aerospac

power will also become more involved in these challenges a

the nation seeks new methods to reduce casualties and quickly

settle conflicts. Applying a single aerospace function or a com

bination of functions to support this goal has become an ar

that tests our best minds. It will remain a continuing issue in

260
the twenty-first century. Flexibility in planning and execution

is the key to aerospace power.

Notes

1. Earl H. Tilford, “Air Power Lessons,” in Military Lessons of the Falk 

land Islands War: Views from the United States, ed. Bruce W. Watson an

Peter M. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 37.

2. Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Com

bat, 1945 to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 372.

3. Ibid., 370.

4. Bryan Perrett, Weapons of the Falklands Conflict (New York: Blandfor

Press, 1982), 90.

5. Flintham, 372.

6. David C. Isby, Jane’s Air War 1, Fighter Combat in the Jet Age (Lon 

don: HarperCollins, 1997), 148.

7. R. G. Funnell, “‘It Was a Bit of a Close Call’: Some Thoughts on th

South Atlantic War,” in The War in the Air, 1914–1994: The Proceedings of 

Conference Held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, March 1994

ed. Alan Stephens (Fairbairn Base, Australia: RAAF Air Power Studies Cen 

tre, 1994), 214.

8. Perrett, 47.

9. Lon O. Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, D.C

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 199.

10. Funnell, 219.

11. Nordeen, 205.

12. Flintham, 379.

13. Ibid., 378.

14. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic (New York

Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983), 247.

15. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middl

East (New York: Random House, 1982), 68.

16. Ibid., 339.

17. Ibid., 341.

18. Nordeen, 182.

19. Charles Stafrace, Arab Air Forces (Carrollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signa

Publications, 1994), 59.

20. Flintham, 69.

21. Nordeen, 182.

22. Flintham, 69.

23. Nordeen, 182.

24. Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operation

History of Ground-Based Air Defense (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Universi

Press, 1988), 147.

25. Flintham, 69.

261
26. The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare, vol. 2, 1945 to the Pre

sent, ed. Chris Bishop and Sophearith Moeng (Westport, Conn.: AIRtim

Publishing, 1997), 180.

27. Werrell, 147.

28. Bishop and Moeng, 180.

29. Isby, 111.

30. Brereton Greenhous, “The Israeli Experience,” in Case Studies in th

Achievement of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1994), 600.

31. Nordeen, 182.

32. Flintham, 70.

33. Nordeen, 184.

34. The Aerospace Encyclopedia of Air Warfare, vol. 1, 1911–1945, ed

Daniel J. March and John Heathcott (Westport, Conn.: AIRtime Publishing

1997), 90.

35. Samuel W. Micham Jr., Eagles of the Third Reich (Novato, Calif

Presidio Press, 1997), 138.

36. David C. Isby, “The Air and Sea War in the East,” in War in the Eas

The Russo-German Conflict, 1941–45 (New York: Simulations Publication

1977), 174.

37. Kenneth R. Whiting, “The Soviet Air Force against Germany an

Japan,” in Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, 190.

38. R. J. Overy, The Air War, 1939–1945 (Chelsea, Mich.: Scarboroug

House, 1991), 49.

39. Whiting, 203.

40. Isby, “The Air and Sea War in the East,” 175.

41. Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air Power, 1941–194

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 27.

42. Ibid., 86.

43. J. E. Kaufmann and H. W. Kaufmann, Hitler’s Blitzkrieg Campaigns

The Invasion and Defense of Western Europe, 1939–1940 (Conshohocken

Pa.: Combined Books, 1993), 26.

44. Isby, “The Air and Sea War in the East,” 175.

45. Chistopher Shores, Duel for the Sky (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

1985), 141.

46. Overy, 54.

262
Chapter 7

Planning for Aerospace Operations

Aerospace forces provide many capabilities and alternative

that a commander can use independently or in unison with

land and maritime forces. The proper balance between air

power and land power was clearly an issue during World Wa

II at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. This debate caused the Arm

to create FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power

which served as a concept for airpower in World War II an

future conflicts. It stressed that the Army Air Forces should

attain air superiority and then conduct interdiction and clos

air support , in that order. This doctrine provided guidance fo

simple to complex tactical operations. At the same time, th

AAF was conducting strategic bombardment operations agains

Germany and, later, Japan . Billy Mitchell and the philoso

phies of the Air Corps Tactical School encouraged the AAF

leadership to focus on strategic bombardment. Many AAF leader

wanted to concentrate on independent operations that could

win the war through the Combined Bomber Offensive alone

Ground commanders wanted more airpower devoted to groun

operations to support an eventual invasion of Europe. How

ever, the Combined Bomber Offensive did not win the wa

single-handedly although it significantly helped reduce Ger

many’s industrial and military strength, enabling the Allies t

land in France. Although these issues were debated over 

half century ago, they still have validity within the aerospac

power community and other military communities. Plannin

for aerospace-power applications involves many such con cern

that must be settled before an air campaign is conducted. Ai

Force officers need to be knowledgeable of the possibilities an

limitations of aerospace assets and should advocate condi

tions that optimize the effectiveness of aerospace power.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the prope

application and operation of aerospace power was debated

These issues were very similar to the ones raised in World Wa

II. A group within the Air Force advocated that the best method t

defeat the Iraqis was a massive strategic bombardment cam

263
paign that, in their opinion, would provide a knockout punch

to Iraqi leadership and the Iraqis’ war-making capability. Thi

would pave the way for an easy coalition victory. Other Ai

Force leaders believed that the Iraqi forces on the Saudi Ara

bian border dictated a more tactical approach to airpower t

support defensive operations. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein

did not attack across the Saudi border. However, the coalition

used a four-phased air campaign approach that combined th

strategic bombardment campaign with a tactical ground

support operation. The planning for this campaign involve

national priorities, military objectives , service doctrines , forc

capabilities, political environments, the threat, and other fac

tors. Planning for an air campaign is one of the most crucia

aspects of conducting a war and will continue to increase in

complexity.

This chapter introduces some of the most basic concept

and rudimentary aspects of conducting air campaign plannin

(including planning for space forces) to conduct operations

These tools and concepts are not meant to be a simple list o

procedures that one blindly follows. Flexibility is the key t

aerospace power. Innovation and a changing threat will forc

aerospace planners to adapt to change and exploit situation

to gain an advantage over a foe. Rigid planning and the con

duct of operations might give a foe the opportunity to antici

pate a friendly force’s plan and prepare a countermove o

avoid an attack. Conversely, failure to provide a flexible plan

may lock aerospace forces into a course of action that neithe

supports friendly forces nor effectively hampers the enemy. Ai

campaign planning is an art that all aerospace leaders mus

understand and practice.

Air Campaign Planning Concepts

An aerospace leader needs to understand how to organize

plan, and operate forces to meet a set of goals or objective

under difficult environmental conditions. Aerospace operation

are the result of many decisions and linkages. Military action

must support national political objectives . If military action i

appropriate, military objectives are developed that are subset

264
of national political objectives . Aerospace operations are a par

of these military objectives . Without this direction, aerospac

operations would be ambiguous at best and damaging to na

tional objectives at worst. Depending on the level of opera

tions, the planning to support these actions may be very ex

tensive. These plans can range from a theater-level air campaign

that deals with a massive strategic attack to a series of air

ground operations. Theater-level campaign plans are designe

to include all aspects of a military operation or campaign ove

a geographic area. These plans include air, land, space, an

maritime operations. They also affect national and allied forces. A

theater commander may have four different campaign-plannin

activities conducted simultaneously. The theater commande

might have air and space, land, maritime, and special opera

tions plans being developed and integrated into an overal

theater campaign plan . Air campaign plans must suppor

higher-level theater campaign plans, and lower-level aerospac

tasks must support the air campaign plan. These plans mus

provide a framework to satisfy objectives, force availability

logistics, timing, contingencies, alternative actions after th

conflict, and measures of effectiveness to compare progres

towards meeting the objective. Aerospace power involves such

diverse elements as air and space superiority, mobility, strate

gic attack , interdiction , CAS , and other support. How should

a staff of professionals organize and plan for these types o

operations?

Air campaign planning should help a commander satisfy

several requirements. Although an overall air campaign plan

provides the basis for further air and space planning, thi

process serves as a vehicle to force commanders and staffs t

think about a situation or problem facing the nation. There i

no set methodology for solving aerospace problems. Doctrin

provides guidance but may not illustrate enough detail to mak

specific aircraft assignments. Conversely, regulations or othe

similar documents might force strict compliance as a primar

goal, but these actions are normally on a smaller scale than

an air campaign plan. However, air campaign planning an

other levels of similar details should at least provide a com

mon focus that satisfies a commander’s goals and objective

and makes clear to subordinates the purpose of the operation

265
Air campaign planning provides a vehicle for organizing sev

eral military operations to attain a particular set of objective

with certain forces, at specified times, and with a desire

number of effects. The process of selecting a single plan o

series of plans can involve the evaluation of several alterna

tives and options that may vary the force level and direction o

operations and possibly influence the level of casualties for an

action. Alternatives may also be dictated by different environ

ments, adversarial characteristics, friendly strengths and weak

nesses, and timing of missions. A commander may also nee

to evaluate these alternatives by comparing the potential ris

of failure to the probability of a positive outcome. Additionally

not only does the commander need to consider air and spac

forces, but also the interaction between these forces and th

effect that land and maritime forces will have on the opera tion

Acting independently, these forces may require more forces than

would a joint effort.

Completing an aerospace planning effort may require a com

plex schedule of operations. In Operation Desert Storm , th

coalition air forces’ overall air campaign plan involved fou

phases that required extensive coordination among all militar

forces. These actions provided commanders a time-sequence

chain of events that subordinates would need to prepare fo

future detailed actions. Additionally, the phasing of operation

allowed commanders to prioritize actions, objectives, and tar

gets. Commanders must decide how to determine the phase

from objectives, such as Desert Storm’s achievement of ai

superiority in phase one; the geographic goals of destroying al

Luftwaffe airfields in France; or meeting a condition (e.g., con

ducting a CAS campaign if ground opposition increases o

conducting interdiction if no such increase occurs). Once 

phasing schedule is developed, a further evaluation of targets

priorities, and a lower level of objectives can be defined.

Phasing the air campaign plan allows the commander t

determine the priority of operations. If phasing is complete

sequentially, there is a distinct order for the completion o

target attack against the enemy. Perhaps the reason for 

sequential attack is due to requirements to complete destruc

tion or disruption of targets in a particular order. For example

before an air force can destroy a factory, it needs to disable an

266
air defense system to increase the probability of the factory’s

destruction with reduced risk of aircrew casualties. Con versely

an air force could also attack targets in parallel, which would

confuse an enemy and complicate his air defense efforts. Phase

might overlap or be accomplished at the same time. This ca

pability allows the air force to strike many different types o

targets at the same time and increase a commander’s options

Aircraft could strike mechanized infantry units and supply

dumps, and engage in an aerial battle with the enemy—all a

once. This might greatly confuse a foe or help complete 

phase in the air campaign plan .

The specific targets for the air campaign usually concen

trate on centers of gravity—key components that affect th

running of the military or the nation. Successfully attackin

these COGs can help disable the enemy’s war-making capabil

ity, morale, political decision making, and so forth, thus inter

fering with the running of the government, economy, military

F-16s providing air superiority

267
and society. For example, COGs discussed by John Warden

include leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, popula 

tion, and fielded forces—critical in achieving both the theater’

and commander’s overall objectives and goals. COGs may shift a

the theater campaign proceeds and the enemy reacts to the ai

campaign ’s operations. For example, the destruction of fue

sources may shift the COG from destruction of the enemy’s

armored forces to chemical weapons. Depending upon politica

constraints or an aerospace force’s ability to destroy a targe

without causing collateral damage (i.e., unintended civilian

damage), the force might not be able to attack some COGs .

Air campaign planning must also organize the appropriat

forces to conduct the operation. Air and space forces involve

in the operation must be notified and ready to perform 

series of potentially complex actions. Commanders must coor

dinate actions for logistics, timing, aerial refueling, reconnais

Strategic attack. B-29 bombers destroy the Chosen oil refinery at Wonsan

North Korea.

268
sance, and many other tasks. The sequence of attacks from

divergent forces must ensure the proper number and types o

munitions, fighter escort, and other support. Available force

might not have particular capabilities to strike the enemy

which may affect the use of weapon systems or the sequenc

and choice of attacking certain targets. Organizing availabl

forces to achieve a desired effect is the most important aspec

of assigning these forces.

One of the most important considerations involved in ai

campaign planning is the enemy’s strength and condition. Ai

campaign planners might consider the enemy’s strategies, forces

objectives, weaknesses, and strengths. The enemy might hav

certain objectives that one should deny before a friendly com

mander can start an air campaign . The enemy might be will

ing to sacrifice a certain number of forces to accomplish thi

objective or deny it to a friendly force. Understanding thes

constraints will improve the chances of achieving friendly ai

campaign goals and objectives. This understanding of how an

enemy operates can help a commander predict or estimat

how he might react to selected actions. These projections migh

allow a commander to anticipate countermoves and challenge th

enemy in a more informed manner. These projections might als

open up some vulnerability to attack. Additionally, if one a

lows the enemy to take the initiative and go on the offensive

one loses the ability to control events. Staying on the offensiv

might be easier if one can anticipate and counter the adver

sary’s moves.

These considerations provide some of the information nec

essary to put together an air campaign plan . Situations wil

differ over time and may force an aerospace commander t

review and modify his or her plan between campaigns or day

to-day actions. Concentration on one area during a successfu

air campaign might not work with other campaigns. The cam 

paign in Desert Storm might not have worked in Vietnam

However, some common areas provide a framework for organ

izing activities to conduct an air campaign . These events pro

vide a way to think about and debate the merits of alternative

for committing forces and fighting the enemy.

269
A Framework for Air Campaign Planning

The information necessary to conduct air campaign plan

ning is extensive and varies with time. Organizing the infor

mation into a coherent plan requires a logical method to en

sure consistent, thorough consideration. One may use 

five-step approach towards planning: researching the comba

environment, determining the air and space objectives, ana

lyzing COGs, determining the air and space strategy, and put

ting the campaign together.1 These steps provide a way t

think about an air campaign . This process also gives the plan

ner a road map to gather information about the campaign.

This five-step method directly links the objectives and ef

fects desired by an aerospace commander. The process allow

the planner to build a campaign from a theater commander’

general directions to specific guidance on targets. Normally

the five-step method is not sequential. Some planning step

continue throughout the process and are revised with time

Gathering information about the enemy’s military capabilitie

should happen continuously to give planners and aircrew

up-to-date information about such activities as the opposi

tion’s fighter capabilities or ground movements, which can

affect the timing of missions or specific targets. The proces

involves specialists from many different areas of expertise. Fo

example, intelligence officers can provide valuable information

and insights into the enemy’s capabilities. Additionally, the

can give advice about specific targets in the COGs. Othe

individuals with expertise in logistics, munitions, weather, space

aircraft operations, and information systems come together t

create the plan. This process then serves as a communica

tions device to ensure that relevant units required to conduc

the air campaign are aware of the plan’s details and can pro

vide maximum support for operations. The five-step method

allows aerospace teams to best satisfy a commander’s objec

tives and goals for a theater campaign .

Researching the Combat Environment

This stage involves “doing your homework.” Before plannin

an air campaign , the planner needs to understand the envi

270
ronment in which forces will be engaged. Such information

includes political, military, economic, leadership, geographic

and other significant data. This stage involves not only enem

capabilities, but also friendly forces and the physical environ

ment. Planners need to understand the strengths and weak

nesses of the enemy. This knowledge may provide insights fo

designing a plan to exploit a defect in an adversary’s suit o

armor. Such information can significantly change the alternativ

courses of action presented to a commander. Additionally, an

enemy force’s dispositions, capabilities, and locations can in 

fluence the types of friendly forces needed, target identifica

tion, and deployment locations for friendly forces. Information

about an enemy’s political, social, and economic structur

might give planners insight into the foe’s motivations, objec

tives, and strategies.

Air campaign planners should also evaluate friendly force

capabilities. Information might include available forces, trea

ties, rules of engagement, command relationships, and othe

relevant considerations. This evaluation not only includes force

under the direct control of a national air force commander

but also any alliance or coalition member’s forces as well. D

forces have the proper munitions, training, and personnel t

conduct proposed operations? Planners may need to reques

additional reinforcements or release forces to other theater

with this information. Suppose the planners are given the tas

of evaluating how to attack an enemy based on an island

Friendly forces in the theater may include several fighter an

bomber squadrons. Perhaps the planners might need mor

aerial-refueling aircraft and transports to ensure that ade

quate support is present to conduct strike operations. Plan

ners might also ask for additional aircraft carriers. If the en

emy’s air strength is modest, then planners might not need a

many fighters. These forces might be released to fight in an

other theater that has a greater need for them. Current force

may also dictate alternatives and options available to planner

to present as courses of action to a commander. Possession o

only a few forces might indicate a defensive strategy unti

more forces are available to attack an enemy. This situation

would resemble the one in the early days of World War II in

the Pacific theater. Forces were first sent to Europe to defea

271
Germany. After sufficient forces were assigned to the Euro

pean theater, American commanders in the Pacific started t

receive more and better equipment and manpower. Before re

ceiving Pacific-bound reinforcements, American forces were on

the defensive and had to react to Japanese advances through 

out the area in the early years of World War II.

Finally, researching the combat environment also include

evaluating its physical condition. The area’s geography ma

dictate certain requirements and considerations for friendly

forces. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm forced plan

ners to maximize the use of global transportation to ship every

thing from personnel to heavy vehicles. This large-scale move

ment of manpower and materiel required a combined aerial-

maritime-, and surface-transportation effort. The shipment o

large items, such as armored fighting vehicles, forced coalition

air planners to consider actions that relied on jet transports t

move other cargo. Additionally, these requirements also force

other planners to use slower maritime resources. Logistics i

one of the most critical support issues affecting present an

future military capabilities. Current supply stocks, host-nation

support agreements, airfield capabilities, and existing and fu tur

supply infrastructure all require immediate attention. Thes

factors significantly controlled the timing of operations in Deser

Storm . The desert environment also influenced planning

Great distances between airfields and targets made aerial

r efueling capabilities critical to conducting an air attack

Often, planners for friendly forces tend to cast the enemy in

their own image. They tend to believe the enemy would fight in

the same way and have the same objectives as friendly forces

This is usually not the case. Planners need to put themselve

in the enemy’s shoes to understand what his motivations ar

and how he might fight.

Determining Air and Space Objectives

This step is the most important aspect of air campaign

planning—defining what air forces are to achieve in a cam

paign. Objectives help focus thoughts and actions. They should

be developed from higher-level national objectives and the theate

272
commander

s objectives. Without direction, air and space force

might aimlessly conduct disorganized and contradictory ac

tions, some of which might prove harmful to friendly forces

Well-defined objectives should help planners avoid these prob 

lems and better coordinate proposed actions. A force can “dem

onstrate resolve” to show that a nation is ready to act, but i

must have a clear objective. For example, a nation might pro

test another country’s action and show resolve by deployin

forces near the offending country. However, unless the nation

clearly illustrates its purpose, it could be a meaningless ges

ture. If the nation provides a condition, such as threatenin

air strikes unless forces are withdrawn from a disputed terri

tory within 24 hours, this sends a clear picture to the offend

ing country.

Objectives should have four characteristics: clarity, concise

ness, attainability, and support for higher-level objectives. 2 A

planner might not provide the most effective or efficient plan

to higher-echelon commands without these characteristics

Either the planners can ask for more guidance from highe

commands, or they can continue planning, assuming a com 

mander’s intent. Air campaign planners might need to esti

mate what a commander intends to accomplish.

Objectives must be clear. They should provide distinct guid 

ance for all parties involved in the planning process. Objec

tives must convey a common understanding of what is to b

accomplished in the plan. This condition should greatly im 

prove the planners’ ability to translate the national and thea

ter commander’s objectives into detailed airpower and space

power objectives. For example, a theater commander’s objective

might include destruction of all weapons of mass destruction

held by the enemy. An air campaign plan may focus on an

objective to destroy nuclear-material processing plants. Plan

ners might assign strategic bombers to attack these targets

However, before they can successfully meet this objective

friendly forces might first need to achieve air superiority as 

theater air objective . These air and space objectives must sup

port higher-level command objectives, or else one needs t

question the relevance and wisdom of those airpower an

space-power theater objectives.

273
These objectives should not be designed as 

open ended.

Commanders and planners require some measure to help de

termine when they have accomplished the objectives. This pro

cess may include defined factors about which intelligence spe

cialists might gather information to ensure the objectives ar

met. This quantitative measure may help in many respects. I

one of the theater air objectives was to achieve air superiority

then one way to measure attainment of the objective might b

the destruction of 90 percent of the enemy’s fighter forces

Intelligence sources might have an accurate estimate of th

number of enemy fighters before the start of the conflict. As 

suming that friendly forces have a reliable method of deter

mining enemy air losses, this measure of effectiveness migh

work. Conversely, an “end state” that requires a break in th

will or morale of the civilian populace is more difficult to measure

Intelligence officers might see mass civilian migrations from

enemy cities to rural relocation centers. This might be indica

tive of the civilian populace’s fear of attack. However, in th

Battle of Britain in 1940, many civilian families left citie

bombed by the Luftwaffe, but British morale never broke dur

ing the war.

Objectives must also be tempered by political, legal, moral

and social constraints. Bombing cities, even with PGMs, migh

involve civilian deaths due to human error. The taking o

innocent lives is unacceptable to most nations. Restriction

involving attacks near shrines, religious structures, borders

embassies, hospitals, and other targets might limit the abilit

of planners to consider several objectives. Perhaps an objec

tive is to disable a nation’s industrial capacity to support it

war-making capability. The industry might be located near th

heart of the nation’s medical and cultural centers. Although

the air force has the ability to bomb targets with great accu 

racy, mistakes do happen. The accidental bombing of a chil

dren’s hospital would have major international and domesti

political ramifications that could alter the course of the war

This is especially true with worldwide television and medi

coverage that can heighten awareness of a single bombin

mistake. International and domestic political opposition to th

conflict could sprout and end further aerial bombardment

274
These constraints might limit the courses of action availabl

to the commander.

Determining Centers of Gravity

Once air objectives are agreed upon, planners need to deter

mine the critical characteristics, capabilities, and strength

that allow the nation to survive and conduct military opera

tions. The planners need to look at COGs that affect how th

enemy functions. Additionally, planners also may want to evalu 

ate the friendly forces’ COGs . This analysis will provide infor

mation that may help friendly forces take steps to preven

destruction by enemy forces. Once these COGs are identified

planners should determine the strategic effect of their destruc

tion or disruption on an enemy’s capabilities.

The evaluation of COGs is affected not only by the air objec

tives, but also by the capabilities and doctrines of the attack 

ing air forces. An air force with only a few fighters would hav

a difficult time conducting a heavy-bombardment campaign

against a widespread industrial complex. Additionally, an ai

force with a doctrine that focuses on high-altitude, precision

daylight bombing—like the AAF in World War II—might con

centrate on an enemy’s COGs supporting the industrial-we

theory—factories, for example. Again, one is cautioned abou

casting an adversary in one’s own image. The industrial-we

theory may work for highly centralized industrial nations tha

do not import military equipment. Small, agrarian nations o

guerilla movements might not have the same COGs . Similarly

John Warden ’s five-ring model took a different spin regardin

an enemy’s COGs , the most important of which was leader

ship. Ideas from Warden and other theorists can alter plan

ners’ ways of determining these important COGs.

There is no magic formula or set method for determinin

COGs . After identifying the “true” COGs , planners may even

determine that their air force cannot significantly destroy, dis

able, or disrupt the enemy’s operations within a particula

COG. This realization may force planners to consider concen

trating on other COGs or asking for reinforcements to disabl

a particular target. These COGs will later become the basis fo

275
developing a set of targets for air forces to attack. Planner

must also assign priorities to the COGs , which can help them

determine when to attack them and the number of sortie

necessary to ensure they are destroyed or disabled. If th

planners can calculate the number of forces for each COG , th

aerospace commander can build a force sufficient to suppor

and conduct the campaign.

COGs may also change during the campaign. Political force

within the enemy nation could alter leadership. Destruction o

the enemy’s natural resources might force him to shift from 

resource-based economy to an industrial one, assuming h

has the capacity and time to do so. Purely conventional mili

tary forces could switch to a guerilla or terrorist orientation

Planners and analysts will need to determine how these COG

change as time and actions alter the enemy’s behavior an

interests.

An analysis of friendly COGs is also important. If a fo

counterattacks or conducts a surprise attack, friendly force

could be dealt a devastating blow. One cannot assume tha

the enemy will remain on the defensive. He might launch an

offensive against weaknesses in the friendly forces. This analysi

helps planners calculate the necessary defensive effort to as

sure that offensive operations can run smoothly throughou

the campaign.

Determining Air and Space Strategy

Strategy is the art of defining how to meet an objective

Once air objectives are determined, an aerospace commande

must develop a strategy to meet his or her theater air objec

tives. Strategy is a balancing act that pits forces, the risk o

failure or success, and a commander’s imagination to meet an

objective. The commander needs to weigh courses of action

to best satisfy his or her specific requirements to accomplish 

mission. This stage should clearly define how an aerospac

leader would use all airpower and space-power forces to ac

complish theater-level objectives and all air and space objectives.

Planners must consider many aspects of creating an overal

air campaign plan . Air and space strategy should also fit int

276
other campaign strategies that involve land or maritime force

and their joint usage. Conversely, the air and space strateg

for a particular campaign may be just a small part of a serie

of air and space actions that support a major conflict. In th

air and space strategy, planners might discuss the use o

parallel or serial attacks. They should also consider the phas

ing of operations. Air and space forces could first achieve ai

and space superiority and then conduct different types of at

tack. Likewise, these forces could attempt to gain control o

the air and at the same time begin all manner of militar

operations, including strategic attack, interdiction , reconnais

sance, mobility, and CAS . The phasing of operations is nor

mally identified by a major event or attainment of a specifi

objective. The plan might also devise a strategy that center

on independent action, such as a strategic bombardment cam 

paign designed to halt the enemy. Conversely, the air an

space campaign plan may focus on supporting land or mari

time campaign plans only.

A strategist might not have the luxury of maintaining 

static strategy. As events occur in the campaign, the enemy’s

and friendly force’s objectives and situations could change

dictating the use of different strategies. If the purpose of strat

egy is to describe how to achieve an objective, then changing 

friendly or an enemy objective can force planners to modify

strategies. This means that planners must continually monito

current situations and adjust their plans accordingly throughou

the air campaign .

Unfortunately, air and space resources are limited. Nationa

leaders need to prioritize their resource allocations for defens

expenditures or force-structure decisions. If we had unlimite

resources, air forces might have equal capabilities for air su 

periority, strategic attack, and other actions. Depending on

the air force’s situation, leaders could develop force structur

to emphasize certain abilities to satisfy particular requirements

The proposed strategy should concentrate on using the strength

of friendly forces against the weaknesses of the enemy. Thi

focus on an asymmetric approach to warfare allows the com

mander to pit his or her best force capabilities against th

least-capable forces of the enemy. Indeed, if one conducts thi

type of strategy, he or she must be wary of a foe who conduct

277
a similar strategy . Understanding a friendly force

s weaknesse

and COGs will help alleviate some of these limitations by plan

ning for their adequate defense.

Putting the Campaign Together

The first four stages of air campaign planning help the aero

space commander and planners gather information and con

cepts and then coordinate actions. The next step is to put th

information together into a coherent, clear plan of action s

that air and space forces located throughout the theater can

conduct operations. The commander must consider all alter

natives and courses of action to select the best possible plan

to achieve the theater commander’s objectives. The plan mus

strike a balance between being too optimistic and overly pessi

mistic. Some planners could assume that a smaller enem

military capability poses little danger to friendly forces an

that these forces will soundly defeat the enemy. Although a fo

might have a smaller air force, he could attack a much large

military force, much like the Israelis did against Egypt an

Syria in the Six-Day War. The plan should also avoid overly

pessimistic options. Defending against every possible enem

attack against a friendly COG is futile and wasteful. Air cam

paign plans should have a reserve capability to handle unex

pected situations, but the reserve amount must be tempere

by resource availability and the amount of risk a commande

is willing to assume.

The air campaign plan must provide information about ob 

jectives, specific targets, timing, force assignments, level o

damage desired, and roles and responsibilities among forces

The specific form of the air campaign plan may change ove

time, but the basic ideas and concepts concerning plannin

for combat are not likely to change soon. Identifying enem

and friendly capabilities, forming objectives, noting key as

pects of different sides, developing strategy, and organizing 

plan are concepts that should endure into the future.

278
Air Campaign Planning Concerns

Developing an air campaign plan involves several people

and organizations. The process allows many different organ

zations with divergent ideas to work together to develop 

coordinated plan. Each air campaign plan may vary, depend

ing upon the air and space objective, threat, and availabl

forces. These dynamic concerns may affect the proposed or

ganizations, schedules, information, decision points, and dis

semination of the air campaign plan . Such concerns motivat

planners to add more effort and coordination as the cha

lenges of creating an air campaign plan increase with th

complexity of the circumstances.

The overall theater campaign plan can help determine th

organizational level and objectives in the air campaign plan

ning phase. If the theater campaign plan specifies that only 

particular type of operation is desired, then a limited numbe

of organizations may be involved with the planning effort. 

limited campaign will obviously reduce the number and scop

of organizations for the operation. A campaign involving only

airpower and space power—such as Allied Force, the 1999 ai

campaign in Kosovo—may not require a large organization

like the one that supported Desert Storm , which coordinate

air, ground, and maritime operations. Conversely, a true coali

tion air campaign plan that includes land and maritime force

can involve several organizations and foreign nations. Deser

Storm ’s air campaign planning effort involved many nations

services, and national organizations (e.g., intelligence agen

cies), which forced planners to consider complex issues an

increase the time required to coordinate actions and conduc

operations.

Air campaign planning may not always be completed in on

location. Small, forward-based planning organizations migh

deploy to a location near the battlefield. If this forward echelon

can create sufficient planning activities to support the war

then it could use resources available through support service

back home or away from the immediate front. Modern tech

nology allows for instantaneous global communications tha

may enable this option. Home-based intelligence, weathe

forecasting, and other support might not have to deploy to th

279
field. Required information could be transmitted to the forwar

echelon for inclusion in the air campaign plan. The availability o

timely and accurate information reduces the planning cell’

requirements to support a large staff and diminishes its vu

nerability to attack. Conversely, the lack of support personne

may increase the coordination time or requirement definition

because their absence might create a misunderstanding o

lack of perspective necessary for a true aerospace operation

(as would be the case in the absence of space-operations per

sonnel). If all planning is conducted away from the battlefield

planners might not understand the concerns, interests, an

requirements of the air campaign in the same way a set o

deployed, dedicated planners would.

Due to the nature of modern warfare and aerial combat, th

coordination among air, space, land, and maritime forces i

key for mission success. Liaison efforts among ground force

for CAS , air defense efforts, special forces , land forces fo

mobility, and naval fleet activities can affect operations. Fo

example, even though the air forces might want to conduct 

series of strategic attacks on the enemy’s homeland, they should

coordinate with land-component commanders and forces. Sol

diers might be deployed in the area or ready to attack th

same target. Additionally, if the air campaign planners need t

use transport aircraft, the land-component commander should

be told that tactical airlift for resupply, transport, or para

chute deployments might be curtailed.

After an air campaign plan is completed, units do not us

the plan as the sole basis for initiating aircraft sorties; the

will receive more detailed plans for executing operations. Con

ducting air and space operations requires much preparation

Targets need to be identified, munitions prepared, aircraft re

paired, pilots briefed on the operation, and other operationa

considerations satisfied. The timing of operations can also chang

hourly. Although operational units should have a basic con

cept of the campaign, they might need only a few days o

detailed plans because of the focus and potential for change

The air campaign plan might represent the overall campaign

with general guidance for aerospace leaders. Operational unit

require more directed plans to prepare missions within th

next few days and then conduct an attack.

280
In Desert Storm, commanders received a master attack plan

(MAP) that provided more detail than did the air campaign

plan (e.g., times on target for missions, target names, aircraf

types, and number of aircraft to conduct the operation for th

next 72 hours). 3 This information provided a more comprehen

sive view of air and space operations in-theater, thus prepar

ing operational units for combat. Although the MAP did no

specify individual aircraft, it gave affected units an overview o

operations. Current information and intelligence data help de

velop the MAP. If an attack does not produce the desire

outcome, the commander might want the target struck again

Additionally, the MAP identified the availability of munition

and aircraft so that operational units could prepare for thei

missions. The plan also listed a prioritized set of targets

Planners and operational units would use the MAP to mak

decisions about specific targets. The plan also helped planner

identify specific weapons to be used against targets.

Although the MAP identified targets and weapons, more de

tailed information was required to conduct operations. Plan

ners issued units an air tasking order (ATO) that provided 

detailed operational plan for the next 24 hours. ATOs wer

normally in production up to 48 hours before they were imple

mented. This forced air campaign planners to work on on

ATO 24 hours in advance of the operation, while operationa

units were executing the missions. Often, ATOs were delayed

and changes were frequent. The ATO provided detailed infor

mation about communications, radio call signs, airspace con

trol, aerial refueling, munitions loads, aircraft performanc

data, and specific unit actions that affected theater operation

(e.g., AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance systems, etc.). If thi

information is not available, then aircraft from different unit

might try to attack the same target at the same time.

During Desert Storm , 116,818 sorties covered by ATOs wer

planned in 43 days.5 Published the day before their execution

ATOs were immediately flown to the operational units to en

sure they had sufficient time to prepare for operations. Change

were common—about 500 a day for a total of 22,942. Opera

tional units needed to monitor and adjust to changes to en

sure that they hit the right target, at the correct time, with th

proper weapons. Aerial-refueling locations and timing wer

281
other key aspects of the ATOs . If units attempted to refuel a

the wrong times, they would have to wait because other unit

were scheduled ahead of them or because refueling suppor

was insufficient.

Critics of the ATO process complained about the unrespon

siveness and slow processing time for the plans. Although i

took 48 hours to prepare the ATO, air units had to satisfy

immediate requirements to follow it. This pushed operationa

units to create a surge of action in a short period of time an

repeat the process the next day, placing a great deal of strain

on aircrews and support personnel. Producing the ATO faste

would allow operational units to better prepare for operations

Additionally, operational units wanted fewer changes. Unfor

tunately, campaign planners had no control over dynamic situ 

ations, aircrews being ordered to reattack targets, and ba

weather. Operational units also wanted to do away with th

process and “do their own coordination,”6 which likely would

have led to much confusion and disorganization among mili

tary forces.

This series of plans provides different levels of information

for specific purposes. An overall air campaign plan gives gen

eral guidance to meet theater campaign objectives. This infor

Command and control—key to success. This AWACS aircraft can direct airpowe

in combat.

282
mation identifies air and space objectives that support an

overall theater campaign . The MAP provides further deline

ation of specific targeting and detailed information for plan

ning sorties. Finally, the ATO assigns individual pilots an

aircraft to attack or conduct other operations. These plannin

documents allow a commander to coordinate actions and as

sure that sufficient resources are assigned to the appropriat

target.

Air Campaign Planning: National Implications

Air campaign planning is not limited to theater considera

tions—it also has national implications. Today, a single aeria

attack can alter the shape of an entire war. Planning for war

fighting contingencies provides security options for the na

tional leadership. Conducting general air campaign plannin

for different scenarios gives political and military leadership 

basis for conducting more detailed efforts. Air campaign plan

ning also allows military commanders to acquire, prepare, an

test plans before they are executed in combat. If targets ar

not carefully identified or if heavy collateral damage is inflicte

After an air interdiction mission, vehicles are unable to transport troops o

supplies.

283
on civilians, national policy or objectives might change. Th

quintessential set of national security and military plans in 

volves nuclear operations, since approval of the release o

nuclear weapons would affect the country’s survival.

Planning for an air campaign takes much concentrated ef

fort. ATO development depends upon very specific situationa

planning. Although one might not be able to conduct detaile

preconflict planning, aerospace leaders could prepare regiona

or likely conflict scenarios for planning contingencies. Befor

Desert Storm, several possible air campaign plans were modi

fied for particular conditions in-theater. Such preconflict plan

ning efforts create opportunities to evaluate potential require

ments, approaches, targets, and training exercises that late

become the basis for detailed, specific campaign plans. Ques

tions about the free world’s access to Persian Gulf oil force

military planners to consider many scenarios involving differ

ent countries, all designed to thwart an invasion by an adver

sary. These contingency plans are the basis for further plan

ning, including one for an air campaign . The latter should no

begin with the outbreak of hostilities. An understanding o

potential conflicts and ways to use air and space resource

can help define the forces required to fight a future conflict

The AAF used a request from President Franklin Roosevelt t

develop aircraft requirements before America entered World

War II as a blueprint for an air campaign plan against Ger

many. The Allied effort to conduct strategic air operation

against Germany would have been considerably slowed with

out the early planning and mobilization to build an aircraf

force structure. Such contingency plans might also becom

the foundation for planning exercise deployments to allow op 

erational forces to train in the same way they will fight.

Air campaign planning also provides tangible evidence tha

the nation is committed to defend or support allies in a con

flict. If the nation provides adequate forces and trains them

appropriately to execute the plan, then this effort might hav

value as both a show of strength to allies and a deterrent t

potential enemies. Preparing for future conflict by using po

tential air campaign plans also allows planners to determin

whether the proposed concepts are feasible. Testing a concep

or an idea for the first time in combat is probably not the bes

284
way to evaluate the capabilities of an aerospace power force

The only exception might occur as the result of a new discov

ery or the desire of military leaders to achieve strategic sur

prise by introducing a new method of conflict. Air campaign

plans, if not immediately implemented, might be modified vi

a war game that is used as an exercise or a test of comba

capability.

The specific conditions and objectives found in the air cam

paign plans for Desert Storm and subsequent deployment

such as Deliberate Force (Bosnia ) and Allied Force (Kosovo

reflected national and international political objectives. Th

linkage between national political objectives and ATOs is im

portant. Theater campaign plans need to reflect national po

litical objectives. Additionally, air campaign plans must sup

port the theater campaign plans. ATOs, at the lowest level o

air campaign planning, represent a detailed, one-day view o

operations in the air campaign plan and must support th

efforts of the national leadership. This is especially true toda

because of the lethality, precision, and global reach of air an

space forces. A single aircraft can certainly affect the outcom

of a war. Conventional cruise missiles, laser-guided weapons

weapons using satellite navigation, and other munitions can

accidentally inflict massive casualties upon military forces o

civilians, which may affect operations in the conflict. For ex

ample, on 13 February 1991, USAF aircraft bombed th

Ameriyya air-raid shelter in Baghdad, thought to be a com

mand post, resulting in several hundred civilian deaths. Th

attack raised international protests and forced a review o

individual target lists on the daily ATO by the US secretary o

defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7

Similarly, during Allied Force

a B-2 bomber accidentally destroyed part of the Chinese Em

bassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia . This unfortunate accident force

changes in strategic bombing by reducing the number of eligi

ble targets in subsequent attacks on Belgrade. In both cases

instant media attention highlighted the damage and increase

the pressure on national leaders to alter actions that migh

affect political objectives.

The clearest connection between national political objective

and air campaign planning is the possible employment of nu 

clear weapons. Stringent control by national leadership is para

285
mount. In the United States, the Single Integrated Operation

Plan (SIOP) outlines attack options involving the aerial deliv

ery of nuclear weapons. Depending on dynamic conditions

the conflict, forces, timing, targets, and desired effects wil

change daily. The president of the United States can select th

options and, effectively, the ATO to accomplish the operation

Nuclear forces in the Cold War were on instant alert with

aircraft ready to take off and conduct nuclear operations. ICBM

launch crews were ready to send missiles to their target

within minutes. The SIOP was continually tested, evaluated

reviewed, and exercised as a deterrent and visible sign o

America’s aerospace power. The US Navy also had a signifi

cant role in the SIOP with its submarine-launched ballistic

missile forces. The control of nuclear weapons is vested in

national leadership, and that leadership has significantly tie

aerospace power planning to the country’s survival.

Aerial refueling allowed B-2s based in the United States to strike targets i

Kosovo.

286
The flexibility, global ranges, lethality, and rapid speed o

aerospace weapons significantly affect air campaign plannin

efforts for air forces. These characteristics can also have a sa

in the outcome of a conflict in terms of developing a force

training for contingencies, or influencing national policies. Ai

campaign planning is not static. An aerospace leader face

continual, dynamic changes in threats, capabilities of friendly

forces, objectives, and availability of resources. Proper prepa

ration for contingencies and actual conditions can help tha

leader win a battle and, eventually, a major conflict. Air cam

paign planning is a first step towards applying the aerospac

functions of air and space superiority, strategic attack, inter

diction , CAS, mobility, and space and information operation

in a larger role involving other nations and services.

Notes

1. Lt Col Maris McCrabb, “Air Campaign Planning,” Airpower Journal 8

no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11.

2. Air Campaign Planning Handbook (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Joint Doctrin

Air Campaign Course, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Educa 

tion, 1998), 14.

3. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Ai

Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 128.

4. Daniel R. Gonzales, Evolution of the Air Campaign and the Contingenc

Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), MR-618-AF (Santa Monic

Calif.: RAND, 1996), 12.

5. Ibid., 21, table 3.1.

6. Ibid., 25.

7. Jeffrey Record, Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf Wa

(McLean, Va.: Brassey’s, 1993), 124.

287
Chapter 8

Taking Off into the Wild Blue Yonder

Air and space forces are relative newcomers to warfare. Th

desire to fight an enemy by taking the high ground has been

an objective of surface commanders. The first military applica

tion of aerial devices involved balloons, used in 1794 durin

the French Revolution. Other inventors and military thinker

sought different devices for flying through the air. One of th

earliest inventors was Leonardo da Vinci, who proposed th

use of gliders, helicopters, and other fantastic flying machine

in the fifteenth century. Inventors and visionaries created new

weapons and concepts for commanders to gain the high groun

through the use of the air. Rockets, used by the Chinese, wer

introduced to European armies. The first flying machine othe

than a lighter-than-air balloon—the Wright Flyer—graced th

skies in 1903. By 1907 the US Army was using this aircraft a

a reconnaissance vehicle. Italy started to use the airplane as 

weapon as early as 1911, and other nations incorporated i

into their war plans in World War I. After World War II, spac

systems added another step to conquering the high ground

The first man-made object orbited Earth in 1957. Since tha

time, man has set foot on the Moon, and space vehicles hav

explored the solar system and beyond. Military space system

have developed along with these civilian efforts and have sig 

nificantly increased the global reach of aerospace power.

Aerospace power depends, in large part, on technology an

the ability of a trained labor force to sustain and supply it

The use of airplanes was made possible only by technolog

and innovation. The development of machines capable of es

caping gravity has enabled nations to use the air and spac

environments to conduct many existing and new military mis

sions. These capabilities have opened a number of new op 

tions for a nation to exploit the aerospace realm by increasin

the reach, lethality, and speed of air and space vehicles. How

ever, proposed alternatives to fighting created by aerospac

vehicles through existing conventions have raised many is

sues. Some of these concern new technologies and their ef

289
fects on warfare, while others are 

classical debates within

the military services.

Although aerospace forces face numerous current issues

some debates will affect aerospace power into the twenty-firs

century and beyond. Air forces will continue to debate whethe

their primary focus should concern the conduct of strategi

operations, ground support , or a combination of both. Th

advancement of microelectronics, computer systems, and min

aturization has allowed scientists and engineers to develop

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which may eliminate the nee

for manned aircraft in some areas. The advancement of spac

systems has increased the potential for hypersonic travel, which

may allow true aerospace vehicles to deliver munitions or sup

plies worldwide very quickly. This capability may lead to ques

tions about the integration of these innovations into curren

force structures. Political, military, social, and economic change

in the world have altered the threats and conflicts involvin

many nations. With the end of the Cold War, several nation

have reduced their military forces, yet diverse and deadly threat

still confront the world. Air and space forces may need greate

mobility and the capability of fighting a number of differen

conflicts while committing fewer forces. Information warfar

will also become an issue for future conflicts, possibly expand

ing the scope of conflict and operations that affect aerospac

forces. The advancement of technology and innovation ha

also challenged national, military, and aerospace leaders. How

aerospace commanders handle these new capabilities will be 

contentious issue in the future. National leadership is increas

ingly called upon to use military forces in many unique situ 

ations. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are becom

ing the norm—more so than in the past. Military leaders hav

focused on incorporating many different types of forces into 

joint capability to support these missions. Doctrine, organiza 

tions, training, strategy, and operations have been signifi cantly

affected by this new emphasis. These challenges can affect th

employment of forces and alter the face of war.

These are only a few of the concerns that present and futur

aerospace leaders will face in a turbulent world. However

aerospace power challenges today will certainly change an

influence events with which tomorrow’s leaders must contend

290
Thinking about and solving future problems will require keen

decision making and planning. Understanding such broad is

sues will help individuals evaluate solutions to many futur

problems.

Strategic or Ground-Operations Support?

Some advocates of an independent air force argued that th

primary mission of the service was to conduct independent, stra

tegic bombardment. Veterans from the Com bined Bomber Offen

sive, former ACTS faculty and students, and believers in stra

tegic bombardment were in AAF leadership positions after World

War II. The invention and use of the atomic bomb also pro

vided a glimpse into the future face of war worldwide. Hope

that the terror of nuclear weapons would deter an opponen

were tantalizing for many AAF officers. Nuclear weapons could

stop aggressive moves around the globe. Additionally, relianc

on these devices and the need for fewer bomber aircraft would

allow a nation to reduce the size and importance of othe

services. As an independent service, the Air Force could win 

war or at least severely damage an enemy so that the othe

services would have a better chance of prevailing on the bat

tlefield. This issue created a national debate concerning th

use of airpower.

Critics both inside and outside the Air Force questione

many aspects of this view. If nuclear weapons were used

could war be waged in such an environment? 1 Nuclear deter

rence might work against other nuclear powers, but would th

United States use these weapons against a nonnuclear power

If not, what value would nuclear-capable bombers have against 

guerilla movement or small-scale conventional conflict? To ge

resources, the Air Force might have to reduce its conventiona

forces. The sacrifice of fighters, tactical fighter-bombers, an

other aerial weapons designed to provide CAS and interdiction

would reduce war-fighting capability against conventional forces

Unfortunately, this concern became a deadly problem for Ai

Force units flying many World War II–era aircraft in the Ko 

rean War.

291
Concepts involving strategic air attack changed dramatically

after the end of the Cold War. The Air Force started to empha

size conventional PGMs instead of nuclear weapons. The serv

ice had conducted strategic attacks using conventional weap

ons earlier, but new threats, weapons, and national objective

forced a modification of ideas about strategic air warfare. Th

Air Force also used aerial platforms that differed greatly from

nuclear-armed bombers. During the Vietnam War, the Air Forc

and Navy used fighter and attack aircraft to bomb key target

throughout North Vietnam. In 1986 those two services com 

bined forces to jointly attack Libya with “tactical” aircraft—no

the traditional large, multiengined bombers. The goal was t

create a strategic effect by striking particular targets. By th

early 1990s, national and military leaders had de-emphasize

nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons, because of lethalit

and precision guidance, could hit an adversary more potently

than could older, nonnuclear weapons. Technology gave aero

space leaders alternatives to nuclear weapons for conductin

strategic attacks.

The idea of emphasizing independent strategic warfare ver

sus a ground-support strategy is still an open issue. Durin

Operation Desert Shield , a plan to use airpower alone to forc

the Iraqi government to withdraw its forces from Kuwait wa

proposed for adoption. This plan, known as Instant Thunder 

was designed by Col John Warden as “a focused, intense ai

campaign designed to incapacitate Iraqi leadership and de

stroy key Iraqi military capability in a short period of time.”

The Instant Thunder campaign sought to isolate Saddam

Hussein from control of the nation, destroy Iraqi offensive an

defensive capability, disable national leadership, eliminate Iraq a

a threat to other foreign nations, and minimize infrastructur

damage so as to reduce reconstruction efforts at the conclu 

sion of the war. Air forces would concentrate on COGs tha

included leadership, C2, key production and distribution cen

ters, weapons of mass destruction , and threats from offensiv

ballistic missiles and aircraft. The air forces conducting thi

campaign would use PGMs, two squadrons of B-52s , one squad

ron of F-111s, one squadron of F-15Es, 32 squadrons o

fighter/attack aircraft, and one squadron of F-117s . Additionally

292
the attack would use conventional Tomahawk land-attac

missiles from naval forces.

Warden believed that his plan would cripple the enemy within

six days if attacks were conducted around-the-clock. On th

first day, the USAF and other forces would conduct 1,20

sorties against a strategic target list that included telecommu 

nications, electricity, oil, nuclear weapons, and other targets

Up to 900 sorties per day by coalition aircraft would follow t

reattack strategic targets; they would then turn their attention

to the Iraqi chemical and military-support infrastructure. War

den ’s goal was to destroy the national leadership’s ability to com 

mand and control activities; eliminate Iraq’s ability to conduc

strategic offensive and defensive operations; disrupt the econ

omy; reduce oil exports; and prepare the battlefield for comba

operations. Warden’s emphasis on a strategic air campaign

was absolute. He dismissed any suggestions by Gen Colin

Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding th

diversion of air resources to support ground operations unti

Instant Thunder had attained its objectives.3

Others within the USAF disagreed. Ground-support opera

tions in the form of CAS seemed more of a priority to groun

commanders. The potential threat of Iraqi ground forces in 

vading Saudi Arabian territory seemed a more imminent an

diverse threat. If the strategic air campaign did not stop th

Iraqi military capability, what would air forces do to halt 

possible invasion? There were many questions about the tar

get selection and short time frame, as well as concerns abou

the complexity of the plan and a focus on tactical versu

strategic effects. The presence of Iraqi armored forces only 

few hundred miles away from Riyadh also caused concern

The closest American armored units were in Germany. At th

time, airpower was the only tool that could halt these forces.

The question of employing strategic versus ground-suppor

operations should not be considered an “either or” proposi

tion. Numerous factors can affect the decision to emphasiz

either strategic or tactical warfare. If a country does not hav

many strategic targets that can affect the conduct of a war

emphasizing an extensive strategic air campaign might be in 

appropriate. For example, if the purpose of the strategic ai

campaign was to defeat the means of military production

293
then a country that imports military equipment may not offe

sufficient targets for such a campaign. Instead, an interdiction

program might be more appropriate. In the Korean War, in

which the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union

supplied the North Korean military forces, the allied strategi

air campaign was limited due to the paucity of North Korean

factories or oil refineries. 5

Ground forces also require air support. However, on-cal

CAS could leave aerial assets idle; they might also be use

against less important targets than strategic ones if control i

left to ground commanders. Using air resources for groun

support is a contentious issue among aerospace and groun

commanders. Strategic attack affects the adversary’s entir

war effort, but the CAS campaign takes time for successfu

implementation. Conversely, ground commanders could requir

immediate CAS to ensure they are not encircled and defeate

by a superior enemy ground force. However, assigning all aer

ial forces to conduct CAS operations might bleed away force

that could affect the naval, air, and ground war by attackin

targets that would eventually halt enemy actions at either th

theater or national level.

During Operation Desert Storm , coalition air forces con

ducted a strategic air campaign and then implemented a groun

campaign. After commanders were satisfied that the Iraqi mili

tary was sufficiently battered, they launched a combined ai

and ground campaign. However, this classic campaign wa

conducted against a conventional army. What would happen i

the coalition fought a guerilla force in the jungle, on moun

tains, or in a heavily urban area with many civilians? Condi

tions can dictate that airpower and space power might not b

able to use strategic or CAS missions as they were conducte

against Iraq. Future aerospace commanders must consider 

number of factors to advise, consult, coordinate, and decid

on the appropriate application of aerospace power in variou

scenarios. Mixing a strategic air campaign with ground opera

tions will continue to be a highly debated issue. The value o

aerospace power is its flexibility to conduct a variety of opera

tions. Aerospace leaders will need to organize and apply thes

flexible forces to satisfy many commanders’ needs and re

294
quirements, especially as the United States faces many un

known threats in widely divergent environments.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and

the Future of Aerial Warfare

Future aerial vehicles will face a number of advancement

in air defenses that can limit their capabilities. SAMs and AAA

could be supplemented by directed-energy weapons and 

number of other systems. Aircrews facing these dangers ma

encounter a deadly reception that could result in high casua

ties. Avoidance of aircrew casualties or capture is an impor

tant factor in planning air attacks. Some methods for avoidin

such situations include using longer-range, precision offensiv

weapons and increasing aircraft survivability by improving avion

ics or other defensive countermeasures . Another method in 

volves using pilotless aircraft.

UAVs will not replace piloted aircraft entirely. However, th

use of these types of vehicles may alter the structure an

application of aerospace forces in the future. UAVs can b

used for reconnaissance , SEAD, and bombing missions. Ad 

vancements in electronics, information networks, sensors, proces

sors, and miniaturization of aircraft components in crease th

effectiveness and efficiency of aerial operations. Transferrin

information at high speed through satellite connections an

processing through advanced computer systems might allow 

“pilot” to operate the vehicle safely from locations thousand

of miles away. This reduces the potential for casualties, re

duces the cost of the vehicle (no life-support systems for air

crews), increases options for a commander to attack heavily

defended targets with a centralized command center, and in 

creases the number of vehicles available for a commande

because of their smaller size, mobility requirements, and sup

port needs. Crews, maintenance personnel, and other equip 

ment may not need to deploy to a theater, freeing mobilit

assets to send other critical materiel or personnel to fight 

conflict. Commanders might be willing to “sacrifice” these ve

hicles to attack targets in exchange for a certain result. 

pilotless aerial vehicle also might perform better since accel

295
eration and G-force limits are extended without a pilot, thu

increasing the UAV’s ability to avoid missiles and other de

fenses.6 Aircraft designers might have more options for build 

ing a low-observable version of the UAV if it is smaller than 

typical piloted aircraft.

UAVs have certain limitations. They depend heavily on sen

sors and data links to operate. If those devices are disabled o

destroyed, the UAV either will not operate or will operate with

limited capabilities. Heavily jammed areas could significantly

affect UAV operations. Human pilots can generally operate th

aircraft without these types of sensors and data links. UAV

that do not rely on periodic updates but use preprogramme

instructions are feasible. However, a preprogrammed UAV ma

lose its ability to react to changing environments and situ 

ations. A centralized control center for UAVs may also becom

a potential target for terrorists or become a vulnerability if 

natural disaster or other event affects its operation.

Air forces have used UAVs in the past, mostly for bombin

missions that used a preprogrammed, one-way mission pro

file. Today, the fact that UAVs can take off and land make

them reusable in a variety of missions. Most current-day pro

posals focus on a man-machine interface that allows a vehicl

to maneuver to avoid defenses, attack targets of opportunity

and initiate other actions that require immediate changes to 

flight profile. Technology has greatly advanced capabilities

The shape of future airpower? A Predator UAV on a reconnaissance mission

296
enabling true UAVs to conduct many of the same mission

that piloted vehicles can accomplish today.

The US Army and Navy were interested in an unmanne

guided flying vehicle as early as 1916. 7 This proposed World

War I–era “Bug” was a pilotless aircraft that could carry 

payload to attack enemy positions. Actually a flying bomb o

torpedo, it performed well in a series of tests. Col Henry “Hap

Arnold (future AAF commander) wanted to order 100 of them

for use in proposed tactical missile units on the western fron

in World War I. Unfortunately, Arnold never received permis

sion to implement his plan. The Germans experimented with

the V-1 winged cruise missile, launching over 1,200 of thes

aerial bombs against London in World War II.

8

 The Unite

States and other nations have used cruise missiles for severa

years now. Similar in principle to the Bug and V-1 , thes

weapons boast improved inertial guidance and performance

During the Vietnam War, the USAF successfully used remotely

piloted vehicles for reconnaissance missions.

In the future, aerospace leaders may decide to use a pre

dominant force of UAVs in particular situations or phases o

an air campaign . UAVs will alter the face of combat. Perhap

due to the absence of a pilot and any potential casualties t

aircrews, national leaders will be more willing to use this form

of airpower rather than surface forces. Additionally, the avail

ability of UAVs might prompt more aggressive action rathe

than diplomacy.

The Advancement of Space Forces:

An Independent Force?

In the 1960s, the Air Force attempted to create a true aero

space force. The future of space forces looked bright. Spac

satellite systems, boosters, and other developments were fore

casted for acquisition, development, and use. One program—th

Dyna-Soar, a forerunner of the space shuttle—was a propose

manned reconnaissance and bomber vehicle. Unfortunately

the Vietnam War and a national focus on civilian space activi

ties forced a reduction in many of the Air Force’s space pro

grams. Satellite reconnaissance, communications, navigation

297
early warning, weather, and other support programs have il

lustrated the value and necessity of incorporating space-base

capabilities for aerial operations as well as ground and mari

time actions.

Technological advances in propulsion, materials, electron

ics, computers, communications, and other discoveries hav

helped ignite interest in space systems. Reliance upon th

Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation for naviga 

tion and weapons delivery by all services has increased th

need to continually operate and improve the system. One lim

tation of space power, however, is the time-sensitive and costl

process of sending a space system into orbit. Many of today’

satellites are very fragile, slow to build, and expensive. If 

problem occurs in the orbiting system, either a ground crew

can try to send instructions to the vehicle in an attempt to fix

it or use an expensive space shuttle mission to retrieve it

Deploying a satellite into orbit usually requires the use of an

expendable rocket or the space shuttle; both options requir

much effort and many resources. These impediments hav

curtailed attempts to make space systems more responsive t

the requirements of war fighters.

The Air Force and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad 

ministration are experimenting with a series of hypersoni

and transatmospheric vehicles , which promise routine, inex

pensive access to space. These vehicles may become the bridg

between true aerial vehicles and orbiting space systems. The

can lift off from Earth’s surface, operate at high altitudes or in

space, and then return. Depending on their payload, thes

vehicles can perform a number of missions that space an

aerial platforms can conduct today—and they can fly faster

further, and higher than contemporary vehicles. The USAF

and other air forces might face issues related to the integra

tion of these new vehicles in their organizations and ways t

operate them in the future.

Some individuals might advocate making space forces inde

pendent from the Air Force. Their arguments could highligh

differences in the environments in which air and space force

operate. Aerial vehicles rely on lift. Space vehicles, becaus

they operate in a vacuum, rely on thrust. This simple differ

ence illustrates the gulf between the two environments an

298
puts a different focus on their forces. Although they are stil

Earth-based, like aircraft, space systems are usually unmanne

and operate from the farthest reaches of human interaction

Advocates of an independent space force insist that such 

force can better serve the nation by concentrating on spac

issues. Their argument resembles that of the early proponent

of an independent air force, who supported the idea of a sepa

rate service capable of increasing the capabilities of airpowe

rather than being shackled by an organization focused on

land operations.

Space power is evolving and can provide even greater flexi

bility and strategic reach than airpower. However, question

still arise concerning the use of weapons in space; cost; tech

nical, legal, and doctrinal matters; and theoretical aspects o

the use of space power. Technology and specific equipmen

provide opportunities, but space-power advocates have to de

fine the use of space not only in terms of operations there, bu

also in terms of terrestrial actions. Today, space power ap

pears limited to a supporting role for aerial and surface opera

tions. 9 Until economic, political, and military issues are re

solved, allowing space power to conduct a broader range o

military operations (e.g., bombardment and other force appli

cations), the question of an independent space force will con

tinue to be debated.

Technological advancements in the 1920s and 1930s tha

involved guidance, propulsion, and payload improvement

pointed many visionaries towards an independent air force

Similar advances in hypersonic and transatmospheric vehicle

may do the same for space forces. Instead of an independen

space force , the operation of a combined aerospace force migh

allow for a better joint use of forces. Adm William A. Moffe

gained lasting naval fame when he combined the divergen

maritime surface operation with naval aviation . Aircraft wer

able to support naval surface operations and amphibious land

ings. Space forces that operate at high altitudes and low earth

orbit can support aerial forces. As technology advances, hy

personic and transatmospheric vehicles will gradually conduc

more missions that were once the sole responsibility of aeria

operations. Moffett’s model will be more applicable in thi

case. Aerospace power may evolve into a broader, space-heavy

299
force. Naval aviation is now a premier force at sea with aircraft

carrier battle groups. Battleships have gone by the boards, an

the once proud “gun club” is no more. Can the same situation

apply to the Air Force of the future? Space forces might becom

the primary source of operations, supported by aerial forces

These actions will occur only if the technology, commitment

and vision to match these new and expanding capabilities can

be translated into a military force that promotes nationa

objectives.

Exploiting space itself, compared to affecting terrestrial events

may become more of a key COG in the future. Today, acces

to space holds political, economic, and military application

that significantly affect operations on Earth’s surface. Spac

offers much opportunity for political cooperation—witness th

International Space Station , which has led to many nation

working together for a single purpose. Also, the growing com

mercial value of communications satellites and the use of infor

mation networks in opening international trade have in crease

Communications satellites, a vital part of space power, multiply a militar

force’s combat power.

300
the value of space access immensely over the last few years

Finally, military power can greatly expand into truly globa

access, even if weaponry is not introduced into space. Hyper

sonic and transatmospheric vehicles can expand rapid mobil

ity, reconnaissance , situational awareness, satellite deployment

and other activities. Space has become an increasingly signifi

cant portion of the nation’s military capability. Questions abou

an independent force versus an integrated force will be de

bated for years. Future aerospace leaders must be aware o

the issues involving space as the field becomes a dominan

factor in future force employment.

Building a Mobile Force

A nation can deter and fight aggression in many ways. Dur

ing the Cold War, the United States and its allies maintained 

large military on many bases throughout the world, ready t

contain and possibly fight the Soviet Union . These forces wer

geared towards conducting either a conventional or nuclea

war. After the Cold War, the United States made drastic cut

in personnel, weapons, and bases. The demise of the Sovie

Union forced national leadership to rethink many of its mili

tary concepts that had guided the country for decades. Eth

nic, religious, territorial, and other conflicts started to becom

issues after the controlling influence of the Soviet Union ended

Also, traditional regional disputes have become more common

and deadly for a variety of reasons, such as the proliferation o

different weapon systems. Overseeing national, alliance, an

UN commitments to enforce security arrangements and sanc

tions has also forced the extended deployment of air forces

These concerns, which have challenged the American militar

to identify future threats and prepare its forces to fight in

many different situations, are magnified in light of the de

crease in military force structure and the reduction in re

sources available to modernize military forces.

Instead of manning the same number of Cold War installa 

tions with fewer personnel, one method entails making force

more mobile and capable of deploying and fighting in differen

environments and situations. This philosophy is not new. Th

301
United States Marine Corps has embraced this concept through 

out its history. The Marines developed expeditionary forces t

support deployments from the most northern regions to jungl

warfare throughout the world. Naval vessels were able to mov

the Marines and their equipment to sites worldwide. Air force

can also conduct these types of operations. Although the Ai

Force did not create an explicit expeditionary force until today

throughout its history it has been able to craft and deplo

aircraft and personnel to fight a war in many emergency situ 

ations. For example, the Air Force was able to fight majo

conflicts in Korea , Vietnam, and Iraq by planning and shapin

an appropriate force and quickly moving it into the theater

Today, this emphasis on expeditionary forces has taken ove

much of the service’s planning.

Temporary, extended, and unforeseen deployments of ai

forces worldwide have created several constraints on force de

ployments. Many of them are conducted from foreign base

and have relied upon ad hoc organizations to fill require

ments. This has created concerns about personnel deploy

ments, training, and readiness. Since these types of deploy

ments are the norm today and for the foreseeable future, an

organizational and doctrinal change has become necessary

The emphasis on a more mobile, contingent force is quit

different than the Cold War –era stationing of forces ready t

fight a set-piece war. The change to an expeditionary force wi

alter the types of personnel and forces, as well as the way th

nation will fight in the future.

Mobile forces will require different types of capabilities t

enable an expeditionary nature. Although the Air Force can

move many forces and personnel quickly, it is limited in th

size and amount of cargo it can move at any one time. Thi

constraint will force leaders to prioritize the cargo it will choose t

move. Additionally, large numbers of aircraft, equipment, an

personnel may also create a more lucrative target to an adver

sary. Further, these forces will require additional support. In 

deed, a smaller force can be deployed faster and is less vulner

able as a target; it is also more likely to receive basing approva

from the host nation.

These smaller forces will need to operate on their own with

out as much support as required by previous ones. Thus

302
equipment and munitions must be more reliable. This mean

that aircraft and equipment must be easily maintained an

operated with fewer personnel and less material support. Mu 

nitions and equipment must be more capable of accomplish

ing their missions the first time, without having to repeatedly

reattack the target. Improving a weapon’s lethality can in 

crease the probability of a successful attack on first try. Con

versely, if current target information or deployment of th

weapon is incorrect, potential collateral damage or civilia

casualties might be great, thus creating new political concern

that can affect the conduct of the operation.

Information becomes very important to this new capability

Pilots must have accurate targeting data and mission-plannin

data delivered to them quickly. Missions may change, or tar

gets may be modified. American forces need to maximize thei

combat effectiveness and efficiency by solving problems wit

fewer forces. Shared knowledge will help accomplish these objec

tives. Similarly, other personnel and support functions can

support operations better with accurate and near-real-tim

C-17s can transport combat equipment and personnel worldwide.

303
information. Maintenance, civil engineer, medical, and securit

personnel, as well as others, can accommodate changes an

emergencies faster by relying on distributed information.

Fast, accurate information requires vast computing an

communications networks. Much of this equipment is no

easily transportable. However, one may not need to send mos

of the personnel and equipment to the theater. Much of th

information-management support can stay in the continenta

United States or a regional center. Advanced technology ha

allowed the United States to transfer information through

communications satellites and other devices. Additionally, in 

formation might be directly available from information source

in directly usable form. For example, GPS satellites can giv

military forces in the field accurate navigation locations with 

satellite receiver. Likewise, small satellite receivers may pro

vide a commander with data on imagery, weather, and s

forth. Other systems, such as airborne C2, could provide mo

bile support that would have otherwise been restricted to 

large, permanent command center. Technology has allowe

machines to replace many traditional functions, reducing th

need for additional personnel.

The new emphasis on expeditionary capability also require

increased mobility resources. Larger-capacity transports tha

can deliver cargo and personnel are required for the initia

movement and subsequent operations. Other expeditionar

forces will also require rapid support. These requirements wil

demand a capability to move many forces to different location

under varying conditions.

Personnel will also have to perform under more demandin

conditions. Instead of focusing on one foe or region, futur

aerospace leaders must be able not only to become deployabl

worldwide, but also work with more allies under extremely

sensitive political conditions. Military officers must be able t

solve difficult problems at several levels. Junior officers wi

interact with foreign allies, train to operate under arctic t

desert conditions, maximize the use of existing equipment

operate with fewer resources, and be ready to deploy at 

moment’s notice. These future leaders must be decision mak

ers who can operate under tactical conditions but with a stra

tegic view towards winning a conflict. The ability to solve ser

304
ous problems with an appreciation for applying aerospace force

at critical times is paramount for future aerospace leaders.

Expeditionary aerospace forces will require a new disciplin

and way of thinking among personnel. Rotational duties wil

become more the norm than the exception. These forces wil

become more attuned to schedules and training requirement

to solve problems. Additionally, if whole units deploy to sup

port operations, everyone in an organization will become combat

focused for the deployment. No longer will selected personne

move to a forward location. Personnel—from combat crews t

financial managers to services specialists—will travel togethe

and train, live, work, and operate as one team. This situation

is similar to the Navy’s ship deployments. Aircraft carriers ar

moving cities that have every capability, from police to cook

to firemen, and everyone operates as a team. Land-based air

power will perform in a similar manner by taking all of it

technical capability to the field.

Information: The Key to Victory

Aerospace power relies not only on technology, but also on

information. The control and exploitation of information can

channel an adversary into certain behaviors and actions. Con

versely, if friendly forces do not have the correct information

about a target, they can misidentify it, use an inappropriat

weapon against it, or be unable to tell whether or not an

attack against it was successful. Reliance on commercial com

puter and information networks has forced military organiza 

tions to think about conducting attacks against an enemy’

information resources and defending against similar informa

tion attacks by an adversary. Increased emphasis on informa

tion will have profound implications for future aerospace forces

Personnel, equipment, decision-making processes, and othe

influences will alter the ways air and space forces operate.

Why is information so important in today’s military? It ha

always been critical to success in warfare. Finding an enem

or determining industrial targets is crucial for planners tryin

to disable an adversary’s economy by scheduling sorties o

attacks. Additionally, coordinating activities with other serv

305
ices depends on timely information. Conversely, enemy intelli

gence services would like to know the location, intent, an

plans of friendly forces to avoid an attack or launch a counter

move against those forces. In the past, military forces hav

used a variety of sources to gain information from spies, li

brary research, aerial photography, satellites , and so forth

Although today’s forces use many of these same sources, th

information is more rapidly disseminated and more easily ob 

tained.

Smaller forces must rely on striking targets the first tim

with great confidence of destroying or disabling them. Aero

space power is much affected by these changes. Air and spac

forces must be able to deploy forces for combat, treaty en force

ment, deterrence, and support of operations. A commander’s de

cision to conduct particular operations must rely on data fo

deploying rapidly and defending forces; providing necessar

targeting information to conduct selective attacks might allow

expeditionary forces to react to short-notice emergencies faste

than previous force structures. 1 0 Information will help aero

space forces to deploy rapidly and employ forces; improv

military capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction 

increase options available for a commander to operate; provid

better situational awareness of enemy actions in the battle

field; and provide sufficient firepower to appropriate targe

sets. These abilities may allow present and future aerospac

forces to combat a variety of operations with fewer forces and

hopefully, improve the planning and evaluation of enemy ca

pabilities. The availability of appropriate information durin

timely situations can provide leverage to forces and improv

their efficiency and effectiveness against much larger forces

This may require aerospace forces to invest in a variety o

information-gathering, processing, and analysis systems. Aero

space leaders must contend with a variety of issues to under

stand expanded information threats. Information imbues al

aspects of modern life: political, social, economic, and mili

tary. Access to and exploitation of information can signifi

cantly affect doctrine, policy, strategy, and alternatives for con

fronting and handling these situations.

Several aspects of modern-day life have heightened the value o

information to military operations: low costs, the blurring o

306
traditional boundaries, perceptions, warnings, coalitions, an

the increased vulnerability of the United States.11 Modern techno

logical innovations in the civilian-information sector have fa

outstripped the military’s development of similar systems. Militar

information-processing applications were once the driving forc

to develop computers, networks, and communications devices

Today, the military must rely on many civilian inventions an

commercial products to stay current. Once-classified militar

systems now have less capability and growth potential than

commercial ones. The low cost of procurement has allowe

less-developed countries to access much information to exploi

or attack other systems. Individuals or terrorist groups can

gain the same information available to many nations. For ex

ample, the United States developed a number of imagery sat

ellite systems worth billions of dollars. Today, better imagin

systems can provide the same or superior products almos

instantaneously to individuals for a lower cost. Persons famil

iar with a computer, modem, and the Internet can gain sub

stantial information to conduct operations.

Space power in the field. Ground forces can now benefit from satellit

communications.

307
Information does not have borders and may not be limite

solely to governments. Military-related information was onc

limited to certain government organizations. Today, weather

imagery, navigation, and other information is accessible to th

private sector, other governments, and the general public. Man

of these systems have also been transferred to civilian govern

ment and private organizations. Computer networks and thei

control are in the hands of numerous commercial organiza 

tions worldwide. If one were to inquire about the source o

information required by the military, he or she would find 

patchwork of public and private organizations and individuals

For example, a French satellite taking imagery of American

ports may use a commercial data-processing center in Ger

many that uses a multinational data-communications system

for a terrorist user. If the United States government wanted t

deny access to certain types of information, it would have t

work with numerous organizations to cut off an adversary.

Low-cost access to information also creates several opportu 

nities to allow many state and nonstate actors to voice thei

opinions worldwide and affect the perception of participants in

a conflict. Different points of view expressed around the world

can be used for legitimately voicing concerns, or they can be use

to confuse or misinform parties. Confusion about the “facts” o

the case can affect national relationships, domestic debates

and one’s understanding of the nature of the conflict. A smal

group of dedicated information specialists can create an effec

tive propaganda machine to combat much larger opponents.

Information is available at the speed of an electron. It can

be reproduced instantaneously and sent around the world

with a simple keystroke. The complexity of information sys

tems also makes detection of and reaction to information

based attacks or concerns difficult to assess. Damage to data

bases, communications systems, and processing systems ma

take time to detect and to make relevant parties aware o

problems in their information systems. Hidden computer vi

ruses or other damaging programs might lay dormant until 

foe needs to initiate an attack. Information attacks might b

subtle, incremental actions, or they could be a series of mas

sive attacks. A defender against such attacks may not hav

adequate time to prepare or fix complex problems. Addition

308
ally, using the Internet may allow a foe to conduct information

warfare anonymously. A nation or an individual could strike 

country undetected. This aspect of information operations in

hibits long-range forecasts about threats; it also increases th

difficulty of planning for and defending against activities or o

ensuring that national leadership is aware of potential threats

Since many industries and services use information, the en

emy has numerous potential targets to consider. Utilities, finan

cial institutions, health-care organizations, postal services, an

other modern-day conveniences use information systems. How

can the nation plan for such attacks and successfully defen

diverse institutions under both private and public control?

Parties using an information attack might choose a selectiv

strike against particular nations. Some countries might b

more vulnerable to interruptions of work in financial institu 

tions; others might be affected greatly by the disruption o

mass transportation, such as railways or roadways. If severa

nations try to band together to fight this threat, they may no

be able to coordinate activities because of confusion about th

nature of the threat. The unknown nature of the information

attack might not allow nations to understand either the scop

of the attack or the participants involved. Additionally, coali

tions or alliances that share information might be vulnerabl

through their “weakest” member. Hacking into a sovereign

nation’s information systems might allow an adversary to gain

access to an ATO or other information, with or without th

knowledge of the intended victim.

The unprecedented access to and availability of information

systems have increased the vulnerability of many nations. Na

tional security threats to a country’s existence were once though

to be limited to nuclear weapons or conventionally armed bomb

ers. Today, the reliance on information-intensive activities ha

improved the standard of living for the populace. However

this improvement in lifestyles has also increased the potentia

to affect more people’s lives by eliminating selected informa

tion. For example, most American citizens and businesses us

checking accounts to pay for domestic and international transac

tions. Suppose an unfriendly nation decides to disrupt th

Federal Reserve System’s ability to clear bank checks in th

United States. Everyday commerce would be gravely affected

309
Individuals and companies making or receiving payments an

planning expenditures may have to think about methods t

circumvent this problem, if possible. American and interna

tional economies would be slowed without this key componen

of commerce.

Aerospace forces also rely heavily on information. Aware

ness of the potential use and vulnerabilities of information i

an important first step towards understanding how to operat

in this new environment. Aerospace forces can elect to follow

several routes. Control of information is important. Access t

selected information might be designed to secure the availabil

ity of data to selected users. Information and security expert

could increase efforts to protect information. Conversely, air

power and space-power forces, such as satellites and aircraf

devoted to gaining data about a foe or denying access to an

adversary, already conduct many of these types of operations

Integration of these efforts into current air and space opera

tions will take time. Denying information to a foe may be mor

of a challenge than conducting weapons-dropping missions on

an enemy. Problems associated with creating special organiza 

tions, training personnel, and equipping units to handle th

explosion of potential information-related problems will in creas

exponentially in the future. This will compound the problem

that aerospace leaders will face, along with the “conventional

aspects of air superiority, CAS, interdiction, and other functions.

Technological Solutions for an

Unknown World

Aerospace forces are based on devices that rely on applyin

scientific and engineering principles and an educated work 

force to support practical applications. Advancing technolog

has enabled aerospace leaders to substitute machinery fo

manpower. Giulio Douhet was convinced that battleplanes migh

revolutionize warfare and make the outcome more humane

Other airpower theorists tried to apply technology to reduc

friendly casualties or end conflicts faster than contemporar

methods would. Advancements in air and space weaponr

have increased commanders’ alternatives. For example, spac

310
exploration allowed the fledgling USAF to experiment with 

number of capabilities that allowed it to replace or supple

ment manned aerial vehicles with unmanned machines. To 

morrow, advancements in information, materials, and the min

aturization of components might provide newer methods t

fight a war.

The ways in which aerospace leaders plan and exploit new

technology will be an important factor in shaping future capa

bilities. There are several ways to think about using technol

ogy. Individuals or organizations can create new technologie

based on a desire or requirement. Aerospace forces might evalu 

ate what they need for future capabilities and spend resource

to get special applications of technology for specific missions

This emphasis on technology is a more directed approach

towards advancing weapon-systems development. Conversely

military forces might adapt available technology or recently

discovered applications for military use. Aerospace leaders migh

need to become more innovative in using the technology. Th

challenge to aerospace leaders is to adapt to change. Unfortu 

nately, organizational resistance to change might affect how

leaders use new inventions, or the discovery might lay idl

until the service faces an emergency—or, in many cases, unti

an adversary adopts the technology. In case an enemy make

strides in technology, the emphasis will quickly shift to findin

a countermeasure or defense. Unfortunately, the aerospac

force may have lost a prime opportunity to exploit the new

technology—hence, air and space forces become reactive, no

proactive, to the technology. A principle of war calls for stay

ing on the offensive, but reactive behavior gives an adversar

the advantage of taking the initiative and potentially takin

offensive action against friendly forces. Indirectly, the avoid 

ance of initiative may give an adversary valuable time to ex

ploit the technology.

Aerospace forces in the United States had relied primarily

on directed research and development to produce weapon sys

tems, many of which were started as solutions to problem

facing the nation. Doctrines and strategies were initially cre

ated, and then an aerospace force was created to suppor

them. This approach provided a “top-down” view of high-leve

objectives. This philosophy provides a logical, planned direc

311
tion for technology. After the Vietnam War, the USAF evalu 

ated combat losses due to SAMs, AAA, and interceptor air

craft . The Yom Kippur War of 1973 between Israel and Egyp

highlighted the value of air-defense weapons against aircraft

Development of advanced air-defense systems would make fu 

ture aircraft losses even greater.

One approach to reducing potential losses and increasin

combat effectiveness involved developing a radar-evading air

craft that would reduce aircraft vulnerability. The USAF starte

an advanced-technology program that would reduce the rada

cross section (RCS) that enemy air defenses could detect t

guide missiles , guns, or aircraft. By 1974 the Defense Ad 

vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) approved contract

to develop RCS reduction technology—known as Project Harvey.

1 

Eventually, the USAF would use this technology to produc

and deploy the F-117A stealth combat aircraft. The new tech

nology, which allowed the United States to strike enemy tar

gets in heavily defended areas using a single radar-evadin

airplane, was a breakthrough in aerospace engineering an

has been applied to other aircraft, missiles, and aerial vehicles.

The focused approach to top-down innovation works unde

many conditions involving whether or not sufficient resource

are available, whether or not objectives have been identified

and whether or not activities happen during war or peace

These factors can affect time, motivation, experience, and de

velopment of the proposed applications of new technology. Th

application of advanced technology can help a nation prepar

to shape future conflicts and world events. Stealth aircraf

allowed the United States to conduct an extensive strategic

bombardment campaign in Operation Desert Storm, withou

loss, against one of the most heavily defended areas in th

history of aerial combat. This capability shaped the conduct o

the conflict and allowed coalition air-campaign planners t

attack different targets with many combinations of aircraft.

New aircraft, space, and basic research efforts are expen

sive. For example, the USAF research, development, test, an

evaluation budget request for fiscal year 2001 is $9.7 billion

and the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and other system

includes an additional $14.1 billion. 1 3 These amounts repre

sent a total of 33.4 percent of the USAF budget. The Air Forc

312
has assigned approximately 97,000 people to conduct research

development, test, acquisition, and support for aerospace weap

ons and support systems. 1 4 These resources represent a com

mitment to advance, apply, and maintain advanced technolog

in many systems. Aeronautical, space and missile, electronic

and munitions systems are supported by a variety of tes

centers, laboratories, and other scientific and engineering cen

ters. These efforts frequently take much time to design, build

test, and deploy weapon systems. The F-117A used many exist

ing systems, such as the engine and landing gear, to reduc

development time. The initial operational capability of the firs

F-117A unit was granted in 1983, nine years after DARPA

initiated Project Harvey.

1 5 Conversely, the Rockwell B-1B concept

to-deployment of an operational aircraft took decades of focus

ing on new technology.

Justification for long development and production times fo

weapon systems assumes that threats and foes do not chang

readily during this period. In the Cold War, many weapon

could afford a slow, deliberate development phase. Technolog

was created and tested extensively to ensure that weapon

worked with great reliability. Unfortunately, threats have change

dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Some weapons

such as the Northrop-Grumman B-2 stealth bomber, wer

designed to find, attack, and destroy nuclear-armed system

within the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, national leader

decided that they did not need the number of B-2 bomber

initially estimated to defend the nation. However, modifica

tions to America’s long-range bombers allowed aircraft de

signed in the Cold War era to maintain their combat edge b

equipping them with conventional cruise missiles and PGMs

Engineers and scientists were able to update munitions, ena

bling these aircraft to fight another way. Unfortunately, not al

weapon systems could claim this distinction. Reduced budg

ets and mission requirements forced the retirement of a serie

of Cold War–era aircraft and other systems.

During peacetime, engineers and scientists have the luxur

of time to correct mistakes or test alternatives. But technolog

and innovation during an active conflict is a different situation

altogether. Aerospace leaders faced with an emergency condi

tion might need to modify existing weapon systems or rush

313
the development of the weapon without adequate experimen

tation or extensive development. Motivation among design en

gineers and scientists may be higher for this type of effor

since the nation may be faced with destruction unless a solu 

tion is found. Additionally, the military may not face the sam

level of scrutiny or questioning about the development of weap

ons as it would during peacetime.1 6 The approval of wartim

efforts may require a compressed schedule to implement 

proposed program. This shortened timing may result in highe

costs and potentially more mistakes or errors in the develop 

ment program than would be the case for peacetime projects

But wartime designs and technology applications allow aero

space forces to immediately test, under combat conditions

whether the effort is worthy of increased production. Immedi

ate feedback to weapons designers can speed the modification

of systems to satisfy a commander’s requirements.

 B-2 Spirit bomber

314
Aerospace systems are very susceptible to problems in tech

nological advancement. Innovation allows for experimentin

with new and untested ideas or concepts for a force structure

In the rush towards developing a new weapon, many resource

and valuable time can be squandered without clear direction

During World War II, the Luftwaffe designed and produce

several jet aircraft. Top Luftwaffe leadership concentrated it

efforts on building a jet fighter to defend Germany agains

American and British bombing efforts and regain air supe

riority along all fronts. The Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe

designed as an interceptor, was ready for service by May 1944

Hitler’s desire for revenge against the Allied bombing of Ger

many motivated him to order the program reoriented to a fas

bomber. 1 7 Many of the aircraft were diverted from their main

purpose of attacking bombers and their escorts. If devoted t

an air defense role, the aircraft could have changed the char

acter and success of the Combined Bomber Offensive and

ultimately, the conduct of the war. Questionable national di

rection and goals blocked the revolutionary path to the intro

duction of jet aircraft.

Conversely, wartime necessity under clear direction can als

produce many successful results. Several nuclear scientist

and physicists, including Albert Einstein , heavily influence

the United States government to conduct atomic-energy re

search for the purpose of developing an atomic bomb.

1 8 B

1941 the Army was the lead development agency for such 

project. The rush to develop this weapon required much dupli

cation and parallel effort to ensure creation of a workabl

device. After tremendous amounts of money, manpower, an

materials were expended, the AAF exploded nuclear weapon

over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. In four years, 

weapon of great power was created. During Desert Storm

coalition forces were not able to attack targets that were heav

ily entrenched or buried deep in the earth. Air Force engineer

were able to develop the GBU-28 penetrating bomb in les

than 17 days. The 25-foot-long and 4,700-pound weapon wa

designed, built, and tested before its transport to the Persian

Gulf. Within five hours of its delivery to coalition forces, tw

GBU-28s were loaded onto F-111 aircraft for an operationa

mission.1 9

315
Today, military forces must rely increasingly on civilian in 

novation. Information and computer systems are only two ex

amples of this change. Reduced defense budgets, a rapidly

changing strategic and international environment, and deman

for a more responsive process to acquire weapons have force

engineers and scientists to use many commercial sources fo

innovation. Aerospace forces must alter their expectations t

incorporate commercial technology and adapt existing inven

tions for weapon systems. The reliance on civilian technolog

and standards has become the focus for development efforts.

Such reliance has many advantages. Competitive free mar

kets can separate and identify the best and most cost-effectiv

technology for an application. Military forces can literally rea

the benefits of obtaining tested, superior, and cost-effectiv

solutions to difficult problems. Using a military-controlled de

velopment program might result in a narrow development o

technology for specific uses. But civilian technology can b

used in a number of applications instead of staying locke

behind a classified wall of military silence. Rather than limit

ing the number of persons working for a technical solution

innovation—assuming the commercial world is looking at th

problem—can be expanded to an entire world of engineers an

scientists who are working on the project. This may lead t

different approaches for handling or solving the problem tha

were never imagined by military or government decision mak

ers. These are but a few of the advantages of applying civilian

technology and adapting this approach to weapons develop 

ment. However, aerospace leaders must balance several short

comings to this approach with military technological-developmen

efforts.

First, the ability to design custom weapons or systems i

limited to available civilian innovation. Unless, by coincidence

civilian technology is applicable to military needs, develop 

ment of aerospace weaponry will be delayed or may not hav

the same desired characteristics or capabilities that aerospac

leaders require for the future. Another limitation of civilian

innovation is control over dual-use technology for military ap

plications. If the military uses the same civilian technology a

is used for commercial products, adversaries may be able t

develop countermeasures to the system after examining it

316
operating capabilities and faults in the technology. An adver

sary can also exploit commercial technology. Countries with

out large budgets for research and development may be abl

to build their own weapons with this inexpensive technology

Civilian dual technology may even lead to the proliferation o

weapons and create an arms race. The United States ha

relied on its ability to use advanced technology to overcome 

number of operational limitations, such as geographic dis

tances, disparities in force sizes, and so forth. If nations hav

access to the same technology, many of them will benefit from

this situation, while others, like the United States, may see 

once-held advantage disappear.

New technology and developments have allowed countries t

avoid always “fighting the last war.”2 0 Innovations such a

nuclear weapons, tanks, aircraft, and so forth have change

the face of warfare. Future aerospace leaders must adapt t

advances in military innovation. Information warfare, spac

systems, stealth aircraft, and other advances have challenge

air and space forces in the recent past. These systems hav

altered doctrines , strategies , and force structures. Technolog

advancement is not limited to aerospace forces. Other militar

systems will also add new and better capabilities. Aerospac

leaders should be aware of how ground and maritime force

have applied technology. This awareness helps friendly force

plan and fight together by integrating the strengths and ad

dressing the weaknesses of all forces. Similarly, understandin

technology will also help future planners think about a per

ceived adversary’s capabilities and threats.

Fighting Jointly

Today’s American military forces are trained, organized, an

structured to fight with their sister services as a joint team

Improved operations, decreased resources, and rising com

plexity in warfare have forced increased joint operations amon

services. This emphasis is apparent in joint doctrine, organ

zations, purchases of weapons, and training of forces. Each

component has unique capabilities that can add to the suc

cessful execution of an air campaign . For example, Army force

317
can provide massive fire support against air-defense system

by using tactical missiles and artillery. Army and Marine Corp

forces can also use helicopter and aviation forces to disabl

and destroy many different targets along a front. Naval force

contribute aviation forces and cruise missiles to strike dee

into enemy territory. If the Air Force does not take advantag

of these capabilities, it will have to divert its limited resource

to accomplish these missions, perhaps delaying the attain 

ment of other objectives. Additionally, having several divergen

forces take action against an enemy can cause confusion an

complicate his defensive effort.

If a nation fights with only a single force, an enemy can

more easily plan for the assault. If an enemy knows he will b

threatened by a land-based air force , he can prepare SAMs

AAA, radar, and interceptor forces to defend the homeland

However, if the force is joint, the planning for attacks from th

sea or from tactical missiles may require additional defensiv

forces, which may weaken the overall capability of the adver

sary to defeat other friendly forces. Also, by massing a large

force, the joint effort might stun the enemy with the speed an

size of the attack, a situation that other friendly or allie

forces could exploit.

Joint operations have been significantly affected by the rapid

impact of world events. Disruption of access to a raw materia

in a small country might have a detrimental effect on th

world economy or political relationships. This reaction can, in

turn, compel a nation to send military forces to stabilize an

area or take other active measures to restore a situation. Coun

tries might need to send selected units to support these action

in an expeditious manner. Different services have unique ca

pabilities and forces that can create and shape situations to 

nation’s advantage. Selecting the right combination depend

upon forces able to successfully integrate force capabilities in

a joint manner.

Dealing with unknown or ill-defined requirements, usin

smaller forces, and making rapid decisions will shape futur

military organizations. Operations ranging from nuclear to hu 

manitarian missions cannot rely on a single military service o

capability. Concentrating on a single capability will provid

narrow operational options and alternatives to national lead

318
ers. Force capabilities should not be so thinly stressed tha

they can do all missions but cannot reduce a persistent threa

to a nation. National leaders need to make careful choice

about force capabilities. One method for overcoming this issu

entails creating forces that can substitute capabilities for par

ticular forces. For example, Jack Slessor suggested that air

power could patrol and restore order in the British colonie

just as well as Royal ground forces in the 1930s. Space sys

tems have substituted for ground-based communications sys

tems in many areas, reducing costs and increasing capabilities.

Future military commanders must be experts in conductin

their own specialties and in knowing how other military force

operate. Knowledge of ground and maritime operations is 

prime ingredient in the development of aerospace leaders. Th

ability to work in a joint or multinational force structure ha

become a prerequisite for operating large theater-level forces

Although the United States has fought in World War I, World

War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, an

other conflicts involving joint and multinational operations

the increased political and military influence of foreign coun

tries has grown exponentially. Understanding how ground an

maritime forces fight may also increase the ability of a studen

of aerospace power to compare and contrast its strengths an

weaknesses. Such a study can only improve the student’

knowledge of aerospace power and its future applications.

Summary

Aerospace commanders must not only consider how to ap

ply aerospace forces, but also know how to approach man

future issues and concerns. Changing world events, technol

ogy, national goals, and other events are factors that chang

the way nations can use air and space forces. However, advo 

cates of airpower and space power may have to deal with

several enduring issues. What is the best role for airpower an

space power? Can air and space forces win a war inde pendently

of other forces? How can the nation incorporate new technolo 

gies, weapons, and missions?

319
A strong foundation in knowing the capabilities of aerospac

forces can only strengthen an individual’s ability to use them

in war or humanitarian missions. This knowledge helps in

developing new weapons, deploying forces, and working with

different military services and nations. The dynamic nature o

aerospace operations will force future leaders to evaluate thei

actions and other services in a more critical manner to enabl

them to solve increasingly complex problems. Undertaking 

career-long study of aerospace power is one way of assurin

that this foundation remains strong, relevant, and viable. Th

long-term appreciation of these subjects not only will improv

our ability to control aerospace power, but also will solve un

known issues that await us in the future.

Notes

1. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapo

lis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), 269.

2. Briefing, “Iraqi Air Campaign Instant Thunder,” Persian Gulf Wa

Records, n.d., US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

3. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Ai

Campaign against Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 72.

4. Ibid., 127.

5. John R. Bruning, Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea (Dulles, Va

Brassey’s, 1999), 209.

6. Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, The Aerospace Revolution: Role Revisio

and Technology: An Overview (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), 145.

7. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Mod

ern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 237.

8. Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell AFB

Ala.: Air University Press, 1985), 58.

9. Gregory Billman, “The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact o

Fiction?” in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Powe

Thought: A Comprehensive Anthology of Space-Related Master’s Research

ed. Bruce M. DeBlois (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1999), 548.

10. David A. Ochmanek et al., To Find, and Not To Yield: How Advance

in Information and Firepower Can Transform Theater Warfare, MR-958-AF

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998), 67–68.

11. Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategi

Information Warfare: A New Face of War, MR-661-OSD (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 1996), 16.

12. Curtis Peebles, Dark Eagles: A History of Top Secret U.S. Aircraf

Programs (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995), 141.

13. United States Air Force, Air Force FY00/01 President’s Budget High

lights (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1999), 2.

320
14. 

Organization,Airman: Magazine of Americas Air Force, Januar

2000, 16.

15. Peebles, 170.

16. Rosen, 23.

17. James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of Air Power (New York: Wi

liam Morrow and Co., 1986), 236.

18. Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to th

Present (New York: Free Press, 1991), 252.

19. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf Wa

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 243.

20. Rosen, 1.

321
Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AAF Army Air Forces

AAM air-to-air missile

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School

AEW airborne early warning

AFB Air Force base

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

ALO air liaison officer

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ATO air tasking order

AWACS airborne warning and control system

AWPD-1 Air War Plans Division-1

C2 command and control

CALTF Combined Airlift Task Force

CANA Commando Aviacion Naval Argentina

(Argentinean naval aviation force)

CAP combat air patrol

CAS close air support

CBO Combined Bomber Offensive

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COG center of gravity

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DAK German Afrika Korps

DARPA Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

DCA defensive counterair

DCS defensive counterspace

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMZ demilitarized zone

DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System

323
DSP Defense Support Program

EAF Egyptian Air Force

ECM electronic countermeasures

FAA Fuerza Aerea Argentina

(Argentinean air force)

FAC forward air controller

F M Field Manual

GCA ground-controlled approach

GCI ground-controlled intercept

IADS integrated air defense system

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IDF/ AF Israeli Defense Forces/Air Force

IJN Imperial Japanese Navy

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOC joint operations center

MAC Military Airlift Command

MAP master attack plan

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NKPA North Korean People’s Army

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OCA offensive counterair

OCS offensive counterspace

PGM precision-guided munitions

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PRC People’s Republic of China

RAF Royal Air Force

RCS radar cross section

RJAF Royal Jordanian Air Force

RN Royal Navy

ROK Republic of Korea

324
RPV remotely piloted vehicle

SAAF Syrian Arab Air Force

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAM surface-to-air missile

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SIOP Single Integrated Operation Plan

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

TACC tactical air control center

TACP tactical air control party

TADC tactical air direction center

TEL transporter erector launcher

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

VNAF South Vietnamese Air Force

VVS Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily (Soviet air force

325
Index

Adlerangriff (Eagle Day), 83

aerial

artillery, 168

bombardment, 104

interdiction, 133, 138–39, 150

reconnaissance, 157

refueling, 12, 90, 177, 185, 189,

226–29, 232, 235–37, 239, 268,

271–72, 281

aerospace industry, 29–30, 32

aerospace vehicles, 29, 289–90

airborne artillery, 161

airborne early warning (AEW), 227, 232,

239, 244, 246, 250

air campaign, 110–11, 200, 264–65,

267–70, 277, 280, 284, 292, 297, 317

air campaign plan/planners, 67,

264–73, 276, 278–85, 287

air control, 52–53

Air Corps, 39, 56–57, 59, 62–63, 103–4,

119–20

Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), 39, 56,

58–59, 72, 99, 119–20, 124, 126,

263, 291

aircraft

A-6 Intruder, 113, 141

A-6E, 204

A-10, 204

AC-47 “Spooky” gunship, 160–64

AC-119, 163–64

AC-119G Shadow, 163

Aeromacchi MB-339, 226

AH-64 Apache helicopter, 112

Aichi D3A1 Val, 103, 107

airborne warning and control system

(AWACS), 186, 189, 281

Avro Vulcan, 227, 229–30

battleplane, 42–43, 45, 48, 58, 310

Beaufighter, 148

Beech T-34C Mentor, 226, 233

Bell AH-1S Cobra helicopter, 248

Boeing 707, 226, 230, 236, 245

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, 79, 93,

104, 120, 122–24, 146, 148–49

Boeing B-29 Superfortress, 134–36,

138, 165, 193

Boeing B-52, 112–13, 140, 142–43,

204, 292

Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker, 141, 185

Boeing RB-47E, 215

bomber, 49–50, 56–59, 62–63, 65,

72, 80–85, 88, 93–95, 108, 112,

120, 122–24, 126, 135–37, 147,

150, 155–56, 175, 205, 211, 229,

255, 257, 271, 291–92, 297, 309,

315

British Aerospace Buccaneer, 227

British Aerospace Harrier, 227–32,

234–39

Bug (pilotless aircraft), 297

C-119, 207

Canberra PR.Mk.9, 229–31, 236

carrier, 60–61, 101, 103–4, 106, 113,

146

CH-47D Chinook helicopter, 234

CH-53 helicopter, 245

close-support vertical/short takeoff

and landing, 227

Consolidated B-24 Liberator, 79, 93,

120, 122–24, 148

Curtiss P-36A, 104

Curtiss P-40 B/C Tomahawk, 104

Dassault Mirage, 90–91, 226, 244

Dassault Mirage III, 230–31, 233–38,

240

Dassault Mirage IIICJ, 88

Dassault Mirage IIIEA, 226

Dassault Super Etendard, 226, 231,

234, 236–37

dive-bomber, 103, 149

Dornier Do-17, 81

Douglas A-20 Havoc, 148

Douglas B-26 Invader, 134–36

Douglas C-47 Dakota, 136, 159,

191–92, 194, 196

Douglas C-54 Skymaster, 191–92,

194–96

E-2C Hawkeye, 244, 246

EA-6B, 112

EF-111A, 112

Electric Canberra B.Mk.2 bomber,

226

electronic warfare, 112

escort fighter, 81, 93, 124

F-16 Fighting Falcon, 22, 188, 203–4

246–50

F-51, 135

F-100 Super Saber, 4

327
F-105 Thunderchief, 18

fighter, 57–59, 80–81, 85, 94–95,

97–98, 103, 112, 121–22, 124,

135, 148, 150, 155–56, 175, 182,

189, 192, 249, 255–59, 269–71,

274–75, 291–92

fighter-bomber, 88–90, 113, 115, 144

fighter-interceptor, 111

Focke-Wulf Fw-190, 99, 122–23

Focke-Wulf Fw-200 Condor, 182

General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark,

113, 141, 144, 292, 315

Gotha 242, 182

gunship, 159–61, 163–65

Handley Page Victor K.2, 227, 229,

237

Hawker Hurricane Mark I, 82–85, 237

Hawker-Siddley Nimrod, 227, 229,

237, 239

Heinkel He-111, 81, 181–82

helicopter, 100, 112, 132, 185, 188,

226–28, 232–34, 240–41, 244,

248, 289, 318

Hughes 500MD Defender helicopter,

248

IA-58 Pucara, 226, 230, 233

Ilyushin Il-28 Beagle, 88, 211, 213

interceptor, 57–59, 82, 205, 236,

247, 312

Iraqi, 91, 115

Israel Aircraft Industry Dagger

fighter-bomber, 226, 230–31, 233,

235–38, 240

Israel Aircraft Industry Scout, 244

JC-130, 207

Junkers Ju-52, 178–79, 181–83

Junkers Ju-86, 182

Junkers Ju-87, 81

Junkers Ju-88, 81

KC-130, 226, 234

Kfir, 243, 246

Lockheed AC-130A Spectre, 163–64

Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, 185–86, 188–89

Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 141, 163,

185, 188, 226–27, 236, 239

Lockheed C-141 Starlifter, 185–89

Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star, 193

Lockheed F-117, 113, 204, 292,

312–13

Lockheed P-2 Neptune, 214, 236

Lockheed P-38 Lightning, 94, 99,

122, 148

Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star, 135

Lockheed U-2, 205–8, 213–16

long-range bomber, 48–49, 64, 99,

103, 227, 255, 313

LTV RF-8 Crusader, 216

Lynx helicopter, 234

Marine Corps, 112, 135, 152, 165,

168

MB.339A, 226

McDonnell RF-101C Voodoo, 214–16

McDonnell-Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, 4,

141, 226, 230–31, 233–38, 240,

243, 246, 249

McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom,

18–19, 112, 140–41, 227, 229,

239, 243, 246, 248–49

McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle, 22,

109, 113, 186, 189, 202–4, 243,

246–48, 250, 292

McDonnell-Douglas KC-10 Extender,

185

Messerschmitt Bf-109, 81–85, 99,

122–23, 125

Messerschmitt Bf-110, 81–83

Messerschmitt Me-109E, 237

Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe, 31

Messerschmitt Me-323, 182

MH-53J Pave Low helicopter, 112

MiG, 143–45, 247–48, 250

MiG-15, 135, 137–38

MiG-21 Fishbed, 88, 91, 213, 241,

244, 247–48

MiG-23, 243, 247–48

MiG-25, 243, 247

MiG-29, 111

Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, 103, 107, 148

Mystere IV-A, 88

Nakajima B5N2 Kate, 103, 107

Navy, 135, 165

North American B-25C Mitchell,

147–48

North American P-51 Mustang,

93–94, 98–99, 123

Northrop-Grumman B-2 stealth

bomber, 285, 313

nuclear bomber, 216, 291–92

Panavia Tornado, 113, 204, 227

pursuit, 48, 56–59, 65, 82, 103

RC-121C Super Constellation, 215

reconnaissance, 104, 112, 148, 150,

205, 211, 217, 227

Republic F-84 Thunderjet, 135

Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, 93–94,

99, 122–23

328
RF-4E, 244–45, 249

Rockwell B-1B, 313

Ryan Teledyne 1241 (AQM-34L)

Firebee, 244, 246

Sea King helicopter, 228, 232, 237

Sepecat Jaguar, 227

SP-2H Tracker, 231

special operations, 112

stealth, 117, 312, 317

strategic bomber, 38, 40, 48, 57,

119–20, 213, 273

Su-7, 241

Su-22, 247

Supermarine Spitfire, 82–85, 122, 237

Super Mystere B.2, 88, 90

surveillance, 112, 231

Swordfish, 103

tactical fighter-bomber, 291

tanker, 189, 226–27

transport, 112, 164, 175–77, 179,

181, 183, 190, 192, 233, 257,

271–72, 280, 304

Tu-16 Badger, 88–89

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 249,

290, 295–97, 311

VC-10, 227, 239

Wessex helicopter, 234

zeppelin, 40, 81

aircraft carrier, 59, 61–63, 101–3,

105–6, 141, 168, 170, 186, 225, 228,

236, 238, 271, 300, 305

aircraft industry, 94, 98, 120, 122–23,

125, 150, 252–53

air defense, 5, 51, 56–57, 76–77, 90, 94,

108, 110–16, 121–22, 142–44, 157,

182, 202, 205, 214, 225–26, 229,

231, 234, 236–41, 243, 245–51, 267,

280, 295, 312, 315, 318

air doctrine, 258

Air Force Reserve, 186

Air Force Satellite Communications

System, 202

Air Force Space Command, 201–2, 204

Air Force Systems Command, 163

Air-Ground Operations Conference, 171

air liaison officer (ALO), 167–68

airlift, 178–86, 188–89, 191–92, 194–96,

239, 255, 280

Air Service, 46

Air Staff, 160

air superiority, 39, 58, 65–66, 75–80,

83–86, 89, 92–93, 95, 97–99, 108,

111, 115, 152, 154, 157–58, 165,

168, 171, 181, 183, 197, 235–37,

239, 245, 249–50, 253–56, 258–60,

263, 265–66, 273–74, 277, 287, 310,

315

air supremacy, 238

air tasking order (ATO), 188, 281–86, 30

Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1),

119–20, 126

Air War Plans Division-42 (AWPD-42),

120

Allied Air Support Command, 155

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 95

American Volunteer Group (Flying

Tigers), 59

Ameriyya air-raid shelter, 285

Andersen AFB, Guam, 140

Anderson, Rudolph, 216

antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 49, 65, 77,

91, 93, 103–4, 108, 111–12, 121,

135–37, 141, 143–44, 147, 160, 163,

213, 216, 226, 232, 234, 240–41,

243, 245, 249–51, 295, 312, 318

Arab air forces, 88–89, 91–92

Argentina, 221–23, 225–27, 229, 231,

239–40

Argentinean air forces, 222, 226–27,

228, 236, 239

Argov, Shlomo, 243

arms control, 210–11

Army Air Corps, 39, 56, 104, 119–20,

154

Army Air Forces (AAF), 7, 15, 17, 39, 50

59, 63–64, 72, 93–99, 119–20,

122–24, 126, 147, 158–59, 263, 275,

284, 291, 297, 315

Army Air Service, 46

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

139–41, 145

Army Staff College, 53

Arnold, Henry “Hap,” 63, 297

Ascension Island, 227–29, 232–33,

238–39

asymmetric warfare, 277

atomic bomb, 65, 291, 315

Australia, 146, 225

Baath Party, 113

Baghdad, Iraq, 112, 285

Balkans, 103, 181, 254

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, 112

battle-damage assessment, 170, 202

battles

Bismarck Sea, 149–51

329
Britain, 59, 79, 83–85, 121, 237, 251,

253–54, 256, 274

Bulge, 17

France, 80

Kasserine Pass, 155

Kursk, 251

Midway, 146

Somme, 41

Stalingrad, 178

Verdun, 41

Bay of Pigs, 211, 213, 216

Beirut, Lebanon, 241, 248

Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, 221, 241, 243–51

Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 285

Bellows Field, Hawaii, 104

Ben-Gurion Airport, 188

Berlin, 83, 94, 124, 181, 190–92,

195–96, 210, 213, 251, 254, 258

Berlin airlift, 27, 191, 195–96

Big Week, 94, 98, 123

Bismarck Archipelago, 100

Bismarck Sea, 146, 148–49

Black Buck missions, 229–30, 238

Black Sea, 177

blitzkrieg, 79, 124, 251–54, 256, 260

bombing, 15, 79, 94, 99, 114, 120,

125–26, 136–37, 141–42, 145–46,

151, 157, 164, 203, 274, 295–96, 315

Borneo, 100

Bosnia, 285

Bremen, Germany, 122

Britain, 40, 51, 64, 78–79, 85, 108, 120,

147, 190, 213, 217

British Fighter Command, 121

British Special Air Services, 233, 238

Brown, Harold, 163

Buckley AFB, Colorado, 201

budget cuts, 53, 225, 227, 313, 316

Buenos Aires, Argentina, 230

Buff Cove, Falkland Islands, 235

Bureau of Aeronautics, 61–62

Bush, George, 109–10, 185–87

Caen, France, 95

Cairo, Egypt, 92

Cambodia, 139

Camp David peace accords, 241–42

Castro, Fidel, 211, 213

center of gravity (COG), 66–67, 267–68,

270, 275–76, 278, 292, 300

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 205–6,

208, 211, 213–14

centralized control, 170

Chain Home radar system, 81–82

Checkmate, 110

Cheney, Dick, 198

Chennault, Claire L., 56–59, 82, 104

Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, 201

Chile, 229

China, 59, 100–101, 103–4, 143–46

Chinese Embassy, bombing of, 285

Chu Lai, South Vietnam, 161

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 184–89

civilian casualties, 110, 303

civilian morale, 274

Clark, Mark W., 167

Clay, Lucius D., 190–91

close air support (CAS), 54–56, 75–76,

85, 95, 97, 119, 133, 137–38,

151–61, 163–72, 175, 189, 204, 226,

239, 244, 246, 251, 257, 259–60,

263, 265–66, 277, 280, 287, 291,

293–94, 310

coalition, 5, 25, 108, 111–17, 184, 189,

198, 200, 202–4, 264, 266, 271–72,

279, 293–94, 307, 309, 312, 315

coercion, 26

Cold War, 23, 65–66, 99, 189, 205, 286,

290, 292, 301–2, 313

collateral damage, 51, 268, 283, 303

combat air patrol (CAP), 113, 228–29,

231, 235–39, 243, 251

combined aerospace force, 299

Combined Airlift Task Force (CALTF),

192, 194–96

Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO), 15,

120, 122, 124, 126, 259, 263, 291,

315

Combined Fleet (Japanese), 103

command of the air, 39–40, 43, 58, 75,

78, 92, 99

command and control (C2), 20, 67,

80–82, 84, 95, 108, 113, 117,

143–44, 246, 249–50, 292–93, 304

Commando Aviacion Naval Argentina

(CANA) (Argentinean naval aviation),

226–27, 229–40

compellence, 25

Coningham, Arthur, 155–59

control of the air, 51, 53–54, 58, 61,

64–65

conventional weapons, 100, 292

Coral Sea, 60, 106

Corona (satellite system), 206–10

Cuba, 208, 210–11, 213–17

Cuban missile crisis, 208

Damascus, Syria, 92, 241

330
Da Nang, South Vietnam, 140

Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA), 312–13

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

115–16

Defense Satellite Communications

System (DSCS), 201

Defense Support Program (DSP), 198,

200, 202, 204

defensive counterair (DCA), 77, 229, 246

defensive countermeasures, 295

defensive counterspace (DCS), 77

demilitarized zone (DMZ), 139, 142

Demyansk, Soviet Union, 179–81,

255–57

de Seversky, Alexander, 63–66

deterrence, 23, 25, 31

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 198

Diego Garcia, 186

directed-energy weapons, 295

Discoverer satellites, 207–8

doctrine, 52, 56, 70, 88, 124, 154,

157–58, 165–66, 221, 250–52, 254,

256–60, 263–65, 275, 290, 302, 306,

311, 317

Doolittle, James, 93

Douhet, Giulio, 39–46, 48–54, 56,

58–60, 63–64, 67, 69, 72, 75, 78, 99,

310

downsizing, 189

dual technology, 316–17

Dyna-Soar, 297

early warning system, 57, 59, 112

Easter offensive, 142, 145

East Falkland, 230, 235

East Germany, 190

Egypt, 16, 86–87, 90, 241, 243, 278, 312

Egyptian Air Force (EAF), 16, 86, 88–91

Eighteenth Army (Japanese), 146

XVIII Airborne Corps, 188

Eighth Air Force, 79, 93–95, 120,

122–24, 126

Eighth Army (British), 153, 155

Eighth Army (UN), 165

VIII Fighter Command, 122

82d Airborne, 109, 186–87

Einstein, Albert, 315

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 156, 158,

206–7, 211

electronic countermeasures (ECM), 234,

241, 245–46

electronic intelligence, 229

European theater, 150, 272

expeditionary forces, 52, 235, 302, 304–

Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),

221–34, 232, 235–36, 238–40

Fiebig, Martin, 178

Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command

and Employment of Air Power,

158–59, 165–66, 168, 263

Fifteenth Army (German), 97

Fifth Air Force, 133–38, 165, 167

51st Division (Japanese), 146, 148

Fighter Command, 83, 85

fighter-control centers, 57

1st Fighter Wing, 109

1st Marine Air Wing, 133

five-ring model, 67, 275

five-step planning, 270

Flying Tigers (see also American

Volunteer Group), 104

Forrestal, James, 191

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 186

Fort Knox, Kentucky, 57

43d Bomb Group, 148

forward air controller (FAC), 167, 170–7

forward air observers, 233

4th Air Commando Squadron (4ACS),

160

Fourth Air Force (German), 181

4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing,

214

France, 50, 79–80, 87, 93, 95–98, 108,

112, 120, 122, 124, 190, 252, 254,

257, 266

Freya early warning radar, 121

Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA)

(Argentinean air force), 226–31,

233–40

Fuller, J. F. C., 15

Galland, Adolph, 84

GBU-28 penetrating bomb, 315

George, Harold L., 119

German Afrika Korps (DAK), 153, 155–5

German air force, 85, 93

German High Command, 253

Germany, 7, 15, 38, 40, 51, 59, 64–65,

79–80, 82, 85, 93–94, 97, 119–20,

122–24, 126, 147, 195, 251–52, 254,

257–58, 263, 272, 284, 293, 315

Global Positioning System (GPS), 298,

304

Golan Heights, Israel, 86

Goose Green, Falkland Islands, 226,

230, 232

331
Göring, Hermann, 79–80, 83, 178, 181

gravity bombs, 144

Great Britain, 51–52, 57, 62, 79–83, 87,

120, 122, 195, 227–28, 232

Great Scud Hunt, 202, 204

ground-controlled approach (GCA), 194

ground-controlled intercept (GCI), 115,

246–47, 249, 251

ground support, 50, 52–56, 65, 80–81,

89, 92–93, 150, 152, 157–59, 164,

166, 168, 233, 250, 254, 258, 260,

264, 290, 292–94

Guadalcanal, 146

Guam, 101, 141, 186, 192

Guanajay, Cuba, 215–16

Gulf of Taranto, 103

Gulf War, 198

gun club, 60–62, 300

Haiphong, North Vietnam, 141–44

Haleiwa Field, Hawaii, 104

Hanoi, North Vietnam, 143–44

Hansell, Haywood S., 119, 126

Hatazo, Adachi, 146, 148

Hawaii, 101, 103–4, 192

Hawaiian Air Force, 104, 108

Hawaiian Division, 104–5

Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 104–5, 107, 207

high-altitude daylight precision

bombing, 56, 120, 146, 275

Hiroshima, Japan, 315

Hitler, Adolph, 79–80, 83, 86, 119, 178,

181–83, 257, 315

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 160

Hod, Mordechai, 89–90

Honolulu, Hawaii, 102

Horner, Charles, 110, 112, 118

humanitarian missions, 26–27, 175,

190, 196, 290, 318, 320

Hussein, Saddam, 108–9, 112, 114, 117,

198, 264, 292

hypersonic vehicles, 298–99, 301

Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), 101–8

Inchon, South Korea, 133

independent air force, 42–43, 45–46,

49–50, 71–72, 291, 299

independent space force, 71, 299, 301

industrial targets, 51

industrial-web theory, 56, 99, 120, 275

information

attack, 305, 308–9

operations, 197, 287, 309

resources, 305

systems, 305, 308–9

threats, 306

warfare, 197, 290, 309, 317

integrated air defense systems (IADS),

241, 245, 248

intelligence, 85, 105, 112, 116, 135–36,

138, 145–46, 150, 187, 197, 209–10,

215, 236, 239, 249, 270, 274, 279,

281, 306

interdiction, 54–56, 75–76, 131–39,

141–43, 145, 149–53, 157–58, 160,

163–65, 168, 171, 189, 204, 254,

260, 263, 265–66, 277, 287, 291,

294, 310

Interdiction Plan no. 4, 134–35

International Space Station, 300

Iran, 111, 117, 198

Iraq, 20, 22, 66–67, 108, 110–14,

116–17, 187, 189, 199–200, 202,

292–94, 302

Iraqi Air Defense Command, 111

Iraqi air force, 88, 91, 111–12, 115, 117

Israel, 86–92, 115, 187–88, 198, 200,

202, 208, 221, 241, 243, 248, 251,

312

Israeli Defense Forces/Air Force

(IDF/AF), 16–17, 21, 86, 88–92, 152,

241, 243–51

Israeli Defense Ministry, 202

Italian Fleet, 103

Italy, 53, 55, 57, 65, 119, 213, 217, 258

289

Itazuke Air Base, Japan, 166

Japan, 7, 62, 65, 100–101, 106–7, 119,

150, 263

Java, 100

Johnson, Hansford T., 186

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 141, 186,

200, 285, 293

joint

doctrine, 171, 317

forces, 238

operations, 317–18

operations center (JOC), 166–67,

170–71

planning, 54

Jordan, 16, 86, 91

Jordanian air force, 17, 88

Kari air defense, 113

Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, 153, 156,

158–59, 263

Kennedy, John F., 208, 211, 213–14, 21

Kenney, George, 146–51

332
Khrushchev, Nikita, 211, 213–14,

216–17

King Fahd, 109

Knox, Frank, 119

Korea, 133, 137–38, 146, 165–66, 168,

170, 302

Korean War, 165, 171, 291, 294, 319

Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 26, 279, 285

Kursk, Soviet Union, 258

Kuter, Laurence S., 119

Kuwait, 108–11, 113, 117–18, 187, 292

Lae, New Guinea, 146, 148–50

land-based airpower, 132, 148–49, 165,

235, 305, 318

Langley Field, Virginia, 56

Laos, 160

laser-guided weapons, 18, 144, 236, 285

Lebanon, 86, 241–44, 247–48, 250

LeMay, Curtis E., 160, 191–92

Libya, 292

Lockheed Corporation, 206

logistics, 93, 106, 139, 142–43, 145,

150, 153, 187–88, 228, 234–35,

239–40, 258, 265, 268, 270, 272

London, 82–85, 297

long-range bombardment, 39, 42, 46, 50

Luftwaffe, 64, 78–85, 93–99, 120–25,

156–57, 178–83, 195, 221, 237,

251–60, 266, 274, 315

MacArthur, Douglas, 145–47, 150, 165

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 70

Malaya, 100

Mariana Islands, 60

Marine air-ground task force, 187

Marshall, George C., 104, 158

Marshall Plan, 190

master attack plan (MAP), 281, 283

Maxwell Field, Alabama, 56

McCoy AFB, Florida, 214

McNamara, Robert S., 214

Mediterranean, 103, 122, 156, 254

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, 53

Messerschmitt, Wilhelm “Willy,” 125

Midway, 60, 106

Military Airlift Command (MAC), 185–89

military objectives, 110, 264–65

missile defense system, 205

missiles, 65–66, 88, 214, 216–17, 296,

312

AA-2 Atoll, 247

AA-8 Aphid, 247

AGM-45 Shrike, 229, 245–46

AGM-65 Maverick, 246

AGM-78 Standard, 245–46

AIM-7F Sparrow, 247, 250

AIM-9, 231, 250

AIM-9L Sidewinder, 228, 230–31,

238, 247

air-to-air (AAM), 90, 228, 247

air launched cruise, 112

air-to-surface, 88, 240

Al-Abbas, 199

Al-Hijarah, 199

Al-Hussein, 198–99

AM-39 Exocet, 226, 231, 234, 236,

240

antiaircraft, 45

antiradiation, 249–50

antitank, 234

ballistic, 33, 111, 207–8, 210,

213–14, 216, 292

cruise, 113, 117, 285, 297, 313, 318

intercontinental ballistic (ICBM), 7,

23, 72, 196, 200, 207–8, 216, 286

intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM),

211, 213–16

Lance, 245

medium-range ballistic (MRBM), 211

213–14, 216

Patriot, 187–88, 200–202, 205

Python 3, 247

Roland, 226

SA-2, 214, 245

SA-3, 245

SA-6, 244–45

Scud, 113, 115–16, 187–88, 198–205

Sea Wolf, 233

Shafrir 2, 247

space-to-ground, 71

SS-4 Sandel, 216

SS-5 Skean, 216

submarine-launched ballistic, 200,

205, 286

surface-to-air (SAM), 77, 111–12,

139, 141, 143–45, 205, 208,

210–11, 213–16, 226, 234,

239–41, 243, 245–51, 295, 312,

318

surface-to-surface, 151, 198

tactical ballistic, 133, 200, 204–5,

217, 297, 318

Thor, 207

Tigercat, 226

Tomahawk, 112, 293

TOW antitank, 248

333
V-1, 297

V-2, 198

Ze’ev surface-to-surface, 245

Missile Warning Center, 201

Mitchell, William “Billy,” 2–3, 45–46,

48–54, 56, 58–64, 69, 72, 75, 78, 99,

103, 119–20, 148, 263

mobility, 175–76, 260, 265, 277, 287,

290, 295, 301, 304

Moffett, William A., 59–63, 72, 299

Momyer, William A., 145

morale, 43, 45, 51, 67, 93, 120, 274

Mountbatten, Louis, 150

Nagasaki, Japan, 315

Nagumo, Chuichi, 108

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 298

national objectives, 32, 52, 70, 76, 110,

264–65, 272, 284–85, 292, 300

National Security Agency, 215

National War College, 66

naval aviation, 61–62, 103, 132, 299–300

naval blockade, 216

Netherlands, 80

Netherlands East Indies, 100

New Guinea, 145–46, 148–50

night bombing, 51, 53, 121, 144

Ninth Air Force, 93

Nixon, Richard M., 139–42, 210

No. 44 Squadron (British), 227

Normandy, France, 92, 94–99, 123

North Africa, 60, 103, 121–22, 126, 153,

155–56, 158–59, 181, 183

North American Air Defense Command, 201

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 26

North Korea, 134–35, 165, 294

North Korean People’s Army (NKPA),

133, 136, 138

North Vietnam, 141–44, 292

North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 139–45,

159, 161, 164

Norway, 81, 83

Nott, John, 225, 228

Novikov, Alexander, 256

nuclear

deterrence, 291

forces, 213, 286

war, 100, 301

weapons, 22, 27, 33, 100, 193, 205,

210, 284–86, 291–93, 309, 315,

317

biological and chemical (NBC), 20,

108, 110–11, 115–16, 198

Oahu, Hawaii, 102, 104–6, 108

offensive counterair (OCA), 77, 88, 246

offensive counterspace (OCS), 77

Office of Special Investigations, 138

Ofstie, R. A., 137

operations

Allied Force, 26, 279, 285

Anadyr, 213

Argument, 123

Babylon, 21

Constant Guard, 140

Deliberate Force, 285

Desert Shield, 5, 20, 110, 112,

184–85, 188, 263, 272, 292

Desert Storm, 5, 20, 25, 66, 112,

115–16, 184–90, 198, 202, 263,

266, 269, 272, 279, 281, 284–85,

294, 312, 315, 319

Fall Barbarossa, 251–53, 255, 257

Freedom Train, 141, 143–45

Hawaii, 100–103

Instant Thunder, 66, 110–11, 292–93

Kanalkampf, 82

Lien Ket I, 161

Linebacker I, 142–45

Overlord, 92–93, 95

Peace for Galilee, 243

Pocket Money, 143

Pointblank, 93–94

Saturate, 137–38

Seelöwe (Sea Lion), 79–82, 86

Strangle, 133, 135–37

Vittles, 27, 191, 195–96

Zitadel, 257

Ostfriesland, 49, 61, 103

Pacific Fleet, 101–3, 106–8

Pacific theater, 146, 150, 166, 271

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),

241–44, 248, 251

parallel attack, 66, 69, 267, 277

paralysis, 64, 66

Paris Peace Accords, 139, 145

Patrick AFB, Florida, 214

peacekeeping, 290

Pearl Harbor, 60, 101–8

Pebble Island, 233

People’s Democratic Republic of

Germany, 190

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 133,

135–38

334
People

s Republic of China (PRC),

133–36, 294

Persian Gulf, 110, 116, 184–86, 188,

200–201, 284, 315

phasing of operations, 266, 277

Philippines, 100–101

planners/planning, 88–89, 92, 95,

100–102, 110–12, 114, 119, 123–24,

181, 189, 196, 221, 237–38, 240,

261, 263–66, 269–85, 291, 302,

305–6, 309, 312, 317–18

Poland, 79–80, 252, 254, 257

political objectives, 67–69, 110, 153

Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, 223–30,

233–36, 239

Powell, Colin, 293

precision attack, 26, 46, 71, 138, 292,

295

precision-guided munitions (PGM), 117,

144, 245, 249, 274, 292, 313

principles of war, 14–15, 23, 33, 36, 86

Project Harvey, 312–13

Punta Arenas, Chile, 229

Pusan, South Korea, 165–66

Rabaul, New Britain, 146, 148–50

radar cross section (RCS), 312

RAF Bomber Command, 95

RAF Fighter Command, 82–83, 85

reconnaissance, 5, 42–43, 48, 61, 76,

135, 164–65, 168, 188, 206–7,

214–16, 227–29, 236, 239, 244–45,

249, 259, 269, 277, 281, 289, 295,

297, 301

Regensburg, Germany, 123

Remedios, Cuba, 215–16

remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), 244–46,

249, 297

Republican Guard, 108, 115, 117

Republic of Korea (ROK), 133, 161

Richtofen, Wolfram von, 181–82

Ridgway, Matthew, 133

Rio Gallegos, Argentina, 230

Rio Grande, Argentina, 231

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 293

Rommel, Erwin, 97, 153, 155

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 119–20, 284

Royal Air Force (RAF), 3, 7, 15, 17,

50–53, 64, 79–85, 93–99, 113,

120–21, 191–92, 194, 204, 227–29,

232–34, 236–40, 251, 256

Royal Flying Corps, 50, 52–53

Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF), 91

Royal Saudi Air Force, 113

rules of engagement, 271

Rundstedt, Gerd von, 96

Sagua la Grande, Cuba, 214, 216

Saigon, South Vietnam, 139

San Carlos Bay, Falkland Islands, 233

San Carlos, Falkland Islands, 234–35

San Cristóbal, Cuba, 214, 216

San Julian, Argentina, 230

satellites, 3, 9, 11–13, 23, 29–32, 71, 76

196–97, 200–201, 206–7, 210, 285,

295, 297–98, 300–301, 304, 306–8,

310

Saudi Arabia, 20, 108–10, 115, 184–89,

201, 293

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 104

Schwarzkopf, Norman, 110

Schweinfurt, Germany, 123

sea-based airpower, 235

Sea of Japan, 165

sea lift, 184

search and rescue, 232

Seoul, South Korea, 133

sequential attack, 266

Seventh Air Force (7AF), 142–45, 160

Seventh Army (German), 97

Seventh Fleet, 149

Seversky Aircraft Company, 63

Sharon, Ariel, 242

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, 215

ships, Argentinean

General Belgrano, 231

Vienticinco de Mayo, 226, 231

ships, British

HMS Alacrity, 230

HMS Antelope, 234

HMS Ardent, 234

HMS Arrow, 230

HMS Atlantic Conveyor, 232, 234

HMS Brilliant, 233

HMS Conqueror, 231

HMS Conventry, 234

HMS Endurance, 225

HMS Fearless, 235

HMS Glamorgan, 230

HMS Glasgow, 233

HMS Hermes, 225, 228, 230, 232, 23

HMS Invincible, 225, 228, 232, 235

HMS Plymouth, 235

HMS Sheffield, 231–32

HMS Sir Galahad, 235

HMS Sir Tristram, 235

SS Canberra, 237

SS Queen Elizabeth II, 237

335
ships, German

Bismarck, 103

ships, US

USS Eisenhower, 110

USS Enterprise, 103, 105, 108

USS Lexington, 62, 103, 105, 108

USS Missouri, 112

USS San Jacinto, 112

USS Saratoga, 62, 103

USS Wisconsin, 112

Sicily, 153

Sidon, Lebanon, 243–44

Sims, William, 62

Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP),

286

Six-Day War, 16, 86, 88, 91–92, 208, 278

Sixth Army (German), 177–78, 181–83,

257

skip bombing, 148–49

Slessor, John “Jack,” 53–56, 319

Somaliland, 52

Southeast Asia, 100–101, 160, 163

Southeast Asian theater, 151

South Georgia, 224–25, 229

South Korea, 165

South Vietnam, 139–45, 159, 161, 164

South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), 142

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 145–50

Soviet Air Defense Force, 248

Soviet air force, 88, 182–83, 221, 252,

260

Soviet doctrine, 111

Soviet Union, 27, 65, 86, 120, 133, 181,

183, 190, 198, 205–8, 210–11,

213–14, 217, 221, 247, 251–52,

254–55, 257–58, 260, 294, 301, 313

space

access, 301

assets, 100

control, 70

doctrine, 70

forces, 36, 71–72, 77, 297–300

operations, 196–97, 287

planning, 264

programs, 208, 297

shuttle, 29, 297–98

superiority, 75–78, 152, 260, 265,

277, 287

surveillance, 112

systems, 70–71, 77, 196–97, 206,

289–90, 298–99, 317, 319

theory, 36, 69–72

vehicles, 31, 37, 70, 289, 298

weapons, 71, 299, 301

special forces, 245, 280

special operations, 165, 265

Sputnik I, 206

Stalingrad, Soviet Union, 177–78,

180–83, 251, 254, 256–58

Stalin, Joseph, 177, 190, 196, 252

Stavka (Soviet high command), 256

Stimson, Henry, 119

strategic air campaign, 108, 110–12,

114, 116–17, 120, 124, 126, 292–94

Strategic Air Command (SAC), 142–43,

185, 189, 214, 216

strategic attack, 43, 51–54, 56, 64–66,

70, 72, 75–76, 79–81, 99–100, 103,

105–8, 111, 115–19, 124, 151–52,

154, 157, 168, 171, 205, 258–60,

263–65, 277, 280, 285, 287, 290–92,

294, 312

strategy, 56, 88, 98, 124, 251–54, 257,

260, 269–71, 276–78, 290, 306, 311,

317

Stratemeyer, George E., 165–66

Suez Canal, 103, 241

Suez War, 86

suppression of enemy air defenses

(SEAD), 77, 112, 295

surprise attack, 100, 116, 256, 276, 285

surveillance, 246

Syria, 16, 86–87, 91, 241–43, 247–48,

278

Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF), 17, 86,

88–91, 243–51

system of systems, 67

tactical air control center (TACC),

166–67, 169–70

tactical air control party (TACP), 167,

169, 171

tactical air direction center (TADC), 169

Tactical Event Reporting System, 201

Tactical School, 56

taran (Soviet ramming tactic), 255

Task Force 77 (TF77), 133, 137, 142–43

165, 167

Tel Aviv, Israel, 188, 198

television-guided munitions, 144

terror campaign, 83, 85

Tet offensive, 139

Thailand, 140

theater campaign, 268, 270, 283

theater objectives, 273, 276, 282

3d Armored Division (Syrian), 241

transatmospheric vehicles, 298–99, 301

336
transporter erector launchers (TEL),

199, 202–4

Trenchard, Hugh, 50–54, 56, 61, 72, 121

Truman, Harry, 191

Tunisia, 155, 183

Tunner, William H., 194–95

Turkey, 113, 200, 213, 217

29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron,

215

Tyre, Lebanon, 243

Ultra, 85

United Kingdom, 222, 226–28, 243

United Nations (UN), 86–87, 108–9, 112,

116, 133, 135, 137–39, 165–66, 187,

189, 216, 222, 301

United States Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE), 191–92, 194–95

United States Central Command, 110,

201–2, 204

United States Space Command, 200–202

United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

126

Vandenberg AFB, California, 207

Van Fleet, James A., 137

Vienna, Austria, 211

Vietcong, 139, 141, 159–61, 163–64

Vietnam, 139, 159–60, 162, 165, 269,

302

Vietnamization, 139–40, 142

Vietnam War, 4, 18, 20, 208, 292, 297,

312, 319

vital centers, 40, 46, 48–49, 64

Volga River, 177

Voyenno-vozdushnyye sily (VVS) (Soviet

air force), 252–60

Wake Island, 101, 105

Walker, Kenneth N., 119

Warden, John, 66–69, 108, 110–11, 268

275, 292–93

War Department, 104

War in the East, 177

war game, 285

Warsaw Pact, 208

Washington, D.C., 216

Washington Naval Limitation Treaty, 62

weapons of mass destruction, 67, 113,

115–16, 273, 292, 306

Wehrmacht, 79, 93, 182

Western Desert Air Force, 155

West Falkland, 233

West Germany, 190–91, 194

Wheeler Field, Hawaii, 104–6

Wideawake airport, Ascension Island,

227–30, 239

will of the people, 48, 50–54, 63–64, 67

Woomera, Australia, 201

World War I, 38–41, 45–46, 50–51,

62–63, 69, 81, 144, 151, 240, 289,

297, 319

World War II, 7, 15, 38–39, 44–45, 50,

53, 55, 59–60, 62–64, 72, 85, 92,

119–20, 134, 151, 154, 166, 168,

178–79, 195, 198, 205, 221, 247–48,

250–52, 256, 263, 271–72, 275, 284,

289, 291, 297, 315, 319

Wright Flyer, 289

Würzburg fire-control radar, 121

Yalu River, 133–34

Yamamoto, Isoroku, 103

Yom Kippur War, 152, 241, 245, 249,

312

Yugoslavia, 26

Yuvasov, Yevseny S., 248

337
AEROSPACE POWER IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A Basic Primer

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Marvin Bassett

Copy Editor

Sherry Terrell

Book Design and Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and Prepress Production

Vivian O’Neal