THE KOREAN WAR

THE CHINESE

INTERVENTION

3 November 1950–24 January 1951
Introduction

The Korean War was the first major armed clash between Free

World and Communist forces, as the so-called Cold War turned hot. The

half-century that now separates us from that conflict, however, has

dimmed our collective memory. Many Korean War veterans have considered themselves forgotten, their place in history sandwiched between the

sheer size of World War II and the fierce controversies of the Vietnam

War. The recently built Korean War Veterans Memorial on the National

Mall and the upcoming fiftieth anniversary commemorative events

should now provide well-deserved recognition. I hope that this series of

brochures on the campaigns of the Korean War will have a similar effect.

The Korean War still has much to teach us: about military preparedness, about global strategy, about combined operations in a military

alliance facing blatant aggression, and about the courage and perseverance of the individual soldier. The modern world still lives with the consequences of a divided Korea and with a militarily strong, economically

weak, and unpredictable North Korea. The Korean War was waged on

land, on sea, and in the air over and near the Korean peninsula. It lasted

three years, the first of which was a seesaw struggle for control of the

peninsula, followed by two years of positional warfare as a backdrop to

extended cease-fire negotiations. The following essay is one of five

accessible and readable studies designed to enhance understanding of

the U.S. Army’s role and achievements in the Korean conflict. 

During the next several years the Army will be involved in many

fiftieth anniversary activities, from public ceremonies and staff rides to

professional development discussions and formal classroom training.

The commemoration will be supported by the publication of various

materials to help educate Americans about the war. These works will

provide great opportunities to learn about this important period in the

Army’s heritage of service to the nation.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military

History by Richard W. Stewart. I hope this absorbing account, with its

list of further readings, will stimulate further study and reflection. A

complete listing of the Center of Military History’s available works

on the Korean War is included in the Center’s online catalog:

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/brochure.htm.

JOHN S. BROWN

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History
The Chinese Intervention

3 November 1950–24 January 1951

They came out of the hills near Unsan, North Korea, blowing bugles

in the dying light of day on 1 November 1950, throwing grenades and

firing their “burp” guns at the surprised American soldiers of the 8th

Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Those who survived the initial

assaults reported how shaken the spectacle of massed Chinese infantry

had left them. Thousands of Chinese had attacked from the north, northwest, and west against scattered U.S. and South Korean (Republic of

Korea or ROK) units moving deep into North Korea. The Chinese

seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and

over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN)

troops. Within hours the ROK 15th Regiment on the 8th Cavalry’s right

flank collapsed, while the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 8th Cavalry fell

back in disarray into the city of Unsan. By morning, with their positions

being overrun and their guns falling silent, the men of the 8th Cavalry

tried to withdraw, but a Chinese roadblock to their rear forced them to

abandon their artillery, and the men took to the hills in small groups.

Only a few scattered survivors made it back to tell their story. The

remaining battalion of the 8th Cavalry, the 3d, was hit early in the morning of 2 November with the same “human wave” assaults of bugle-blowing Chinese. In the confusion, one company-size Chinese element was

mistaken for South Koreans and allowed to pass a critical bridge near

the battalion command post (CP). Once over the bridge, the enemy commander blew his bugle, and the Chinese, throwing satchel charges and

grenades, overran the CP. 

Elements of the two other regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division,

the 5th and 7th Cavalries, tried unsuccessfully to reach the isolated

battalion. The 5th Cavalry, commanded by then Lt. Col. Harold K.

Johnson, later to be Chief of Staff of the Army, led a two-battalion

counterattack on the dug-in Chinese positions encircling the 8th

Cavalry. However, with insufficient artillery support and a determined

enemy, he and his men were unable to break the Chinese line. With

daylight fading, the relief effort was broken off and the men of the 8th

Cavalry were ordered to get out of the trap any way they could.

Breaking into small elements, the soldiers moved out overland under

cover of darkness. Most did not make it. In all, over eight hundred men

of the 8th Cavalry were lost—almost one-third of the regiment’s

strength—in the initial attacks by massive Chinese forces, forces that

only recently had been considered as existing only in rumor. 
Unsan

38° 38°

T a e b a e k M t s

MANCHURIA

Hyesanjin

Ch’osan

Hagaru-ri

Hungnam

Iwon

Wonsan

Sinuiju

Chongju Sinanju

P’YONGYANG

Kaesong

Ch’orwon

Munsan-ni

Uijongbu

Ch’unch’on

Hongch’on

Suwon

Osan

Ch’ungju

Wonju

Chech’on

Samch’ok

Ulchin

Andong

Yangyang

Kansong

Kosong

Kumhwa

P’yonggang

P’ohang-dong

Taegu

PUSAN

Miryang

Masan

Mokp’o

Kunsan

Taejon

SEOUL

Inch'on

an gjin

Ch R

CHANGJIN

(CHOSIN) RES

Ch’ongch’on

R

Taedong

Taeryong

Kur

R

R

yong

R Yalu R

Yesong

R

Imjin

R

Han R Naktong

R

Kum

R

YELLOW

SEA

K O R E A

S T R A I T

SEA

O F

JAPAN

KOREA

High Ground

Above 200 Meters

0 50 MILES
Other elements of the Eighth Army were also attacked in the ensuing days, and it fell back by 6 November to defensive positions along

the Ch’ongch’on River. However, as quickly as they had appeared, the

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) disappeared. No additional attacks

came. The Chinese units seemed to vanish back into the hills and valleys of the North Korean wastelands as if they had never been. By 6

November 1950, all was quiet again in Korea.

Strategic Setting

The large-scale Chinese attacks came as a shock to the allied

forces. After the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the Inch’on

landings, the war seemed to have been won. The desperate defensive

fighting of June was a distant memory, as were the bloody struggles to

hold the Naktong River line in defense of Pusan in August and early

September. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Far Eastern

Command Theater Commander, had triumphed against all the odds by

landing the X Corps, consisting of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th

Infantry Division, and elements of ROK Marines at the port of Inch’on

5

U.S. soldiers with tank make their way through the rubble-strewn 

streets of Hyesanjin in November 1950. (DA photograph)
near Seoul on 15 September. Breaking out from the Pusan Perimeter

four days later, Eighth Army defeated and then pursued the remnants

of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) up the peninsula by many

of the same roads over which they had retreated a mere two months

before. On 29 September Seoul was declared liberated.

As the victorious UN forces pursued the fleeing NKPA, MacArthur

was authorized by President Harry S. Truman to go north of the preJune boundary, the 38th Parallel, while enjoined to watch for any indications that the Soviets or Chinese might enter the war. Korea was seen by

most at the time as just part of the overall struggle with world communism and perhaps as the first skirmish in what was to be World War III.

MacArthur, convinced that he could reunify all of Korea, moved his

forces north. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army advanced up the

west coast of Korea to the Yalu River, while Maj. Gen. Edward M.

“Ned” Almond’s independent X Corps conducted amphibious landings

at Wonsan and Iwon on the east coast. Almond’s units moved up the

coast and to the northeast and center of Korea to the border with China.

Until the attacks by the CCF at Unsan, the war thus seemed on the verge

of ending with the UN forces merely having to mop up NKPA remnants.

In retrospect the events on the battlefield in late October and early

November 1950 were harbingers of disaster ahead. They had been foreshadowed by ominous “signals” from China, signals relayed to the

United States through Indian diplomatic channels. The Chinese, it was

reported, would not tolerate a U.S. presence so close to their borders and

would send troops to Korea if any UN forces other than ROK elements

crossed the 38th Parallel. With the United States seeking to isolate

Communist China diplomatically, there were very few ways to verify

these warnings. While aware of some of the dangers, U.S. diplomats and

intelligence personnel, especially General MacArthur, discounted the

risks. The best time for intervention was past, they said, and even if the

Chinese decided to intervene, allied air power and firepower would cripple their ability to move or resupply their forces. The opinion of many

military observers, some of whom had helped train the Chinese to fight

against the Japanese in World War II, was that the huge infantry forces

that could be put in the field would be poorly equipped, poorly led, and

abysmally supplied. These “experts” failed to give full due to the revolutionary zeal and military experience of many of the Chinese soldiers that

had been redeployed to the Korean border area. Many of the soldiers

were confident veterans of the successful civil war against the Nationalist

Chinese forces. Although these forces were indeed poorly supplied, they

were highly motivated, battle hardened, and led by officers who were

veterans, in some cases, of twenty years of nearly constant war.

6
Perhaps the most critical element in weighing the risks of Chinese

intervention was the deference paid to the opinions of General

MacArthur. America’s “proconsul” in the Far East, MacArthur was the

American public’s “hero” of the gallant attempt to defend Bataan and

Corregidor in the early days of World War II, the conqueror of the

Japanese in the Southwestern Pacific, and the foreign “Shogun” of

Japan during the occupation of that country. He was also the architect

of the lightning stroke at Inch’on that almost overnight turned the tide

of battle in Korea. When he stated categorically that the Chinese

would not intervene in any large numbers, all other evidence of growing Chinese involvement tended to be discounted. MacArthur and his

Far Eastern Command (FEC) intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A.

Willoughby, continued to insist, despite the CCF attacks at Unsan and

similar attacks against X Corps in northeastern Korea, that the

Chinese would not intervene in force. On 6 November the FEC continued to list the total of Chinese troops in theater as only 34,500, whereas in reality over 300,000 CCF soldiers organized into thirty divisions

had already moved into Korea. The mysterious disappearance of

Chinese forces at that time seemed only to confirm the judgment that

their forces were only token “volunteers.”

The overall situation in early November 1951 was unsettled, but

UN forces were still optimistic. The North Korean Army had been

thoroughly defeated, with only remnants fleeing into the mountains to

conduct guerrilla warfare or retreating north toward sanctuary in

China. Eighth Army positions along the Ch’ongch’on River, halfway

between the 38th Parallel and the Yalu, were strong. The 1st Cavalry

Division had admittedly taken a beating, but two regiments were still

in good condition, while the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions had generally recovered from their earlier trials. On the Eighth Army’s right

flank, the 2d Infantry Division was in a position to backstop the vulnerable ROK 6th and 8th Divisions. In northeastern Korea, the units

under X Corps were fresh and, in the case of the 1st Marine Division,

at full strength. By the first week of November, despite the surprise

attacks by what were still classed as small Chinese volunteer units, the

United Nations forces as a whole were well positioned and looking

forward to attacking north to the Yalu to end the war and being “home

by Christmas.”

Operations

The U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) had extensive

forces at its disposal in Korea in November 1950. The major UNC

7
ground combat strength consisted of Eighth Army headquarters, a

ROK army headquarters, 6 corps headquarters (3 U.S., 3 ROK), 18

infantry division equivalents (10 ROK, 7 U.S. Army, and 1 U.S.

Marine), 3 allied brigades, and a separate airborne regiment. The total

combat ground forces were around 425,000 soldiers, including some

178,000 Americans. In addition, of course, the UNC had major air and

naval components in support. 

Forces opposing the UN in early November were organized under

a combined headquarters staffed by North Korean and Chinese officers. Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, was also commander of

the North Korean Armed Forces based at Kanggye, deep in the mountains of north central Korea. On paper, the North Korean forces consisted of 8 corps, 30 divisions, and several brigades, but in fact only 2

corps totaling some 5 weak divisions and 2 depleted brigades were in

active operations against UN forces. The IV Corps with one division

and two brigades opposed the ROK I Corps in northeastern Korea,

while the II Corps with 4 scattered and weakened divisions was

engaged in guerrilla operations in the Taebaek Mountains both above

and below the 38th Parallel. The remainder of the surviving North

Korean Army elements were resting and refitting in the sanctuary of

Manchuria or along the border in north central Korea, away from the

main lines of UN advance along the east and west coasts of the peninsula. Most of the enemy striking power was contained in the 300,000-

strong Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They had entered

Korea during the last half of October, undetected by FEC intelligence

assets. The stage was set for the near-destruction of Eighth Army and

the abandonment of the military attempt to reunify Korea.

Convincing himself and his Far Eastern Command staff that the

Chinese would not intervene in force, General MacArthur was determined to reunify Korea and change the balance of power in Asia. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff, impressed by MacArthur’s stunning triumph at

Inch’on and the collapse of the NKPA during the following month,

were in no position to argue. Despite some misgivings, they allowed

MacArthur a generous, although not unrestrained, latitude to pursue

his vision of winning the war before the year was out. Even President

Truman, not a man to defer easily to anyone, apparently felt that

MacArthur should be allowed to carry on the war and finish off the

North Koreans. 

To implement MacArthur’s objectives, General Walker drafted

plans for his Eighth Army to advance quickly against the crumbling

opposition all the way to the Yalu River on the Chinese frontier.

Meanwhile, General Almond and his X Corps, separated from Eighth

8
XXXX

XXXX

EIGHTH

XX

1 Mar 

XX

3

XX

7

XXX

X

38° 38°

T a e b a e k M t s

MANCHURIA

Hyesanjin

Ch’osan

Hagaru-ri

Hungnam

Iwon

Wonsan

Sinuiju

Chongju Sinanju

P’YONGYANG

Kaesong

Ch’orwon

Munsan-ni

Uijongbu

Ch’unch’on

Hongch’on

Suwon

Osan

Ch’ungju

Wonju

Chech’on

Samch’ok

Ulchin

Andong

Yangyang

Kansong

Kosong

Kumhwa

P’yonggang

P’ohang-dong

Taegu

PUSAN

Miryang

Masan

Mokp’o

Kunsan

Taejon

SEOUL

Inch'on

To CHONGJIN 

an gjin

Ch R

CHANGJIN

(CHOSIN) RES

Ch’ongch’on R

Taeryong

Kur

R

yong

R Yalu R

Yesong

R

Imjin

R

Han R Naktong

R

Kum

R

YELLOW

SEA

K O R E A

S T R A I T

SEA

O F

JAPAN

Taedong R

High Ground

Above 200 Meters

0 50 MILES

RACE TO THE YALU
Army by the virtually impassable Taebaek Mountains, planned a similar series of widely scattered offensive spearheads on the eastern side

of the peninsula in order to beat Eighth Army to the Yalu. Beginning

in mid-October, each major force sought to take as much terrain as

possible. Eighth Army units occupied P’yongyang, the North Korean

capital, about seventy-five miles north of the 38th Parallel, on 19

October. Almond’s X Corps came ashore at Wonsan on the other side

of the peninsula on 25 October and moved quickly inland. Only the

unforeseen incidents at Unsan, about sixty miles north of P’yongyang,

at the end of October caused both forces to pause and reconsider the

wisdom of such an all-out offensive.

With the cessation of Chinese attacks on 6 November, Walker and

Almond began planning to resume the offensive. Elements of X Corps

units even reached the Yalu River at Hyesanjin on 21 November and

Singalp’ajin on the twenty-eighth. Although these were only minor

“reconnaissance-in-force” elements, both Walker and Almond planned

to follow through with major offensives of all their forces beginning

on 24 and 27 November, respectively. 

In the west, Eighth Army began its offensive north from its positions along the Ch’ongch’on River, some fifty miles north of

P’yongyang, on 24 November. Its initial objective was to reestablish

contact with any remnant North Korean forces or Chinese volunteer

units. The I Corps (24th Infantry Division, ROK 1st Infantry Division,

and British 27th Commonwealth Brigade) was on Eighth Army’s left,

IX Corps (25th Infantry Division, 2d Infantry Division, and the

Turkish Brigade) was in the center, while the ROK II Corps, with its

6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions, was on the eastern flank. The 1st

Cavalry Division and the British 29th Infantry Brigade were in

reserve, along with the U.S. 187th Regimental Combat Team

(Airborne). 

The I Corps attacked west and northwest toward Chongju and

T’aech’on, while IX Corps headed north toward Unsan, Onjong, and

Huich’on. The ROK II Corps began moving toward the northeast and

into the Taebaek Mountains on the Eighth Army’s right flank that separated Eighth Army from X Corps. All advancing units generally

received only scattered small-arms fire, and in most instances they

moved unopposed toward their objectives. A few miles from Unsan,

elements of the 25th Division discovered thirty U.S. soldiers missing

since the 8th Cavalry’s battle with the Chinese weeks before. They had

been captured and then released by the Chinese and suffered from

wounds and frostbite, but they were alive. By 25 November all units

were reporting that they had reached their objectives, although they

10
also reported increasing enemy resistance and even some local counterattacks. However, optimism still prevailed. Eighth Army thus

planned to resume its offensive in conjunction with the planned attack

of X Corps in the east beginning on 27 November.

The Battles Along the Ch’ongch’on

On the night of 25 November the Chinese struck Eighth Army

again. The first CCF attacks hit the 9th and 38th Infantries of the U.S.

2d Infantry Division about eighteen miles northeast of Kunu-ri along

the Ch’ongch’on River. Charging to the sounds of bugles, the Chinese

40th Army found gaps between the units and struck their flanks. They

hit units on both sides of the river just south of a low mountain called,

ironically, Chinaman’s Hat. Infiltrators also attacked elements of the

23d Infantry just behind the 9th Infantry. The Chinese took heavy

casualties and were forced to suspend their attack in the early morning

hours, only to resume just before dawn. Vigorous U.S. counterattacks

restored most of the main line positions. Attacks also were pressed

against the U.S. 25th Infantry Division to the 2d Division’s left,

prompting a now-alerted U.S. command to cancel the advance planned

for 26 November. Suddenly on the defensive, U.S. soldiers dug in and

consolidated their positions while waiting for new Chinese attacks.

Eighth Army’s situation was complicated by the fact that the

Chinese broke through elements of the ROK II Corps on the army’s

right wing. They penetrated the ROK front in several places, establishing roadblocks to the rear of ROK units, cutting them off and creating

panic. By noon on the twenty-sixth the ROK II Corps front had folded,

exposing Eighth Army’s entire flank.

Reacting quickly, Walker sent the 1st Cavalry Division, at that

time guarding supply installations and routes in Eighth Army’s rear,

and the Turkish Brigade, in IX Corps reserve, forward to protect possible Army lines of retreat. Farther west, Walker halted the 24th

Division and prepared to conduct an active defense all along his lines.

Although his intelligence officer (G–2) raised the estimate of Chinese

troops in the area from 54,000 to 101,000, Walker still did not realize

the size of the Chinese offensive. No one did. FEC headquarters merely reported to Washington that “a slowing down of the UN offensive

may result” from these new attacks.

Late on the twenty-sixth Chinese forces struck again on the Eighth

Army’s right flank, with the goal of exploiting the collapse of the ROK

II Corps while attempting to flank the entire Eighth Army from the

east. Attacking heavily in the east and center sections of the UN line,

the Chinese threw five field armies into the fight while sending another

11
against the 24th Division to the west on a holding mission. Attacks

against the ROK 1st Division drove that unit back and soon exposed the

flanks of both the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions. Only a rapid readjustment of forces plugged this gap and stabilized the situation by early

evening on 27 November. However, the situation was growing grim. By

mid-afternoon on the twenty-eighth all U.S. and ROK units were in

retreat. Attempts by the 2d Division to hold the line and by the 1st

Cavalry Division and Turkish Brigade to restore Eighth Army’s right

flank were in vain. Two Chinese Armies, the 42d and 38th, were pouring through the broken ROK lines to Eighth Army’s east and threatening to envelop the entire force. Walker’s only hope was to bring off a

fighting withdrawal of his army deep behind the Ch’ongch’on River

line, below the gathering Chinese thrust from the east.

The withdrawal of Eighth Army units was made more difficult by

the thousands of fleeing Korean refugees who blocked the roads. In

addition, the hordes of refugees gave excellent cover to Chinese and

North Korean infiltrators, who often dressed in Korean clothing, went

through U.S. checkpoints, and then turned and opened fire on the startled Americans. The tactics repeated those used by the North Koreans

during the initial invasion of the South and were often equally effective.

One 7th Cavalry company commander was killed and eight of his men

wounded by enemy infiltrators throwing hand grenades. As in the summer, Eighth Army orders directed that refugees be diverted from main

12

Chinese Communist infantry “volunteers” advance in

northern Korea in 1950. (China Today [Beijing: 

China Social Studies Publishing Co., 1990])
roads, escorted by South Korean police, and routed around allied

defensive lines, although the strictures were often difficult to enforce.

The brunt of the renewed enemy attacks fell on the exposed U.S.

2d Infantry Division. With his division almost cut off from the rest of

the Army, Maj. Gen. Laurence B. “Dutch” Keiser relied upon the

Turkish Brigade to protect his right flank as he prepared to withdraw

from Kunu-ri. The Chinese, however, bypassed the Turks, who

remained concentrated at Kaech’on, ten miles to the west of Kunu-ri,

and established roadblocks on the 2d Division’s withdrawal route to

the south. These roadblocks, combined with attacks against U.S. and

ROK troops north and northeast of Kunu-ri, proved a lethal combination. As the 2d Division began its withdrawal under pressure on the

morning of the thirtieth, it found itself literally “running the gauntlet”

as its trucks and vehicles were trapped on a congested valley road

under fire from Chinese positions on the high ground to the east and

west. Air strikes helped but could not dislodge the Chinese troops as

they poured rifle and machine-gun fire into the slow-moving American

vehicles. Soldiers were often forced to crouch in the ditches as their

vehicles were raked with enemy fire; while hundreds were killed or

wounded, others were forced to proceed on foot down the long road to

Sunch’on, almost twenty miles to the south of Kunu-ri. Chinese roadblocks halted the columns repeatedly as the casualties mounted. Some

artillery units were even forced to abandon their guns. The 37th Field

Artillery Battalion, for example, lost 35 men killed, wounded, or missing and abandoned 10 howitzers, 53 vehicles, and 39 trailers. As the

road became clogged with abandoned vehicles, men were forced to

leave the column and make their way south as best they could. Unit

integrity in some places broke down under the murderous fire. Finally,

late on 30 November, the last units closed on Sunch’on and the shattered Eighth Army established a hasty defensive line from Sukch’on to

the west to Sinch’ang-ni in the east, some twenty-five miles south of

their initial positions on the Ch’ongch’on River line.

The battles along the Ch’ongch’on River were a major defeat for

the Eighth Army and a mortal blow to the hopes of MacArthur and others for the reunification of Korea by force of arms. The 2d Division

alone took almost 4,500 battle casualties from 15 to 30 November,

most occurring after the twenty-fifth. It lost almost a third of its

strength, along with sixty-four artillery pieces, hundreds of trucks, and

nearly all its engineer equipment. While the rest of Eighth Army had

not been hit as hard, with the possible exception of the ROK units

whose total losses will probably never be known, there was no doubt

about the magnitude of the reverse. The U.S. 1st Cavalry, 24th and 25th

13
Infantry Divisions, and the ROK 1st Infantry Division were still relatively intact, but the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, the Turkish Brigade, and

the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions were shattered units that

would need extensive rest and refitting to recover combat effectiveness.

Although not closely pursued by the Chinese, Walker decided that his

army was in no shape to hold the Sukch’on–Sinch’ang-ni line and

14

XXXX

PLA 50

XXXX

PLA 40

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX

PLA 66

Ch'ongch'on R

Ch'ongch'on R

Taedong R

12

12

Turkish

 Bde

ROK 6 Div

9

19

24

24

38 11 3

27

21

21

35

35

7 Cav

8 Cav

2

1 Cav

XX

ROK 1 25 XX

25 XX2

24

ROK 1

XX

I

XXXIX

I

XXXIX

IX

XXX

ROK II

Chongju

T'aech'on

Pakch'on

Kaech'on

Kunu-ri

Pugwon

Ipsok

To

Somin-dong

Huic

Sunch'on

Songch'on

Sinanju Anju

Sukch'on

Yongyu

Samso-ri

To P'YONGYANG

0 20

Miles

BATTLE OF THE CH'ONGCH'ON

25–28 November 1950

Eighth Army Front, Evening, 25 Nov

(Arabic Numerals Identify Regiments)

Chinese Attacks, Night, 25 Nov 

Chinese Attacks, Night, 26–28 Nov 

Eighth Army Front, 28 Nov

High Ground Above 500 Feet
ordered a retreat farther south

before his forces could be

enveloped by fresh Chinese attacks. 

X Corps

The Chinese offensive of late

November destroyed Eighth Army

plans to push all the way to the

Yalu. They also stymied the other

arm of the offensive: the attack of

X Corps and the ROK I Corps up

the eastern coast and center of the

peninsula. General Almond, following the intent of General

MacArthur to push vigorously

against the retreating foe, had

planned a multipronged operation

using these two corps. The ROK I

Corps, consisting of the ROK 3d

and Capital Divisions, was to proceed up the coastal roads over 200

miles northeast to Ch’ongjin and

then on to the Yalu, there to guard

the X Corps right flank. The X

Corps was to attack north and west

of the Changjin Reservoir. Its 7th

Infantry Division was to occupy

the center of the X Corps front and

push to the Yalu at Hyesanjin,

about 160 miles north of Wonsan.

On the left of the corps, the 1st

Marine Division was to proceed up

both sides of the Changjin

(Chosin) Reservoir, about halfway

to the border, tie in with the ROK

II Corps of the Eighth Army to the

west, and then push sixty more miles north towards the Yalu at

Huch’angganggu and Singalp’ajin. However, despite the urgings of the

X Corps commander for more speed, 1st Marine Division Commander

Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith was leery about dispersing his division over

too broad a front. He ordered his units to attack cautiously, maintaining unit integrity, and within generally supporting distances of each

15

XXXX

PLA 42

XXXX

PLA 38

Taedong R

(-)

5

8

10 21

ROK 7 XXROK 8

Yongdong-ni

okch'on

h'on

Pukch'ang-ni
other. The terrain in this part of Korea—narrow roads often cut by gullies and valleys with imposing ridgelines and mountains surrounding

them—made it critical for units to stay together. 

Rounding out X Corps was the newly arrived 3d Infantry Division,

which landed at Wonsan between 7 and 15 November and was augmented by a ROK marine regiment. These units were to guard the

corps rear, relieve the marines of any port protection duties, and prepare to conduct offensive operations in support of corps operations as

needed. The 3d Division faced some challenges with making a fighting

team out of its subordinate units. The 65th Infantry Regiment, filled out

with hundreds of mobilized Puerto Rican National Guardsmen, had

only recently been assigned to the division and had not worked with the

division staff officers before. In addition, while training in Japan, the 3d

Division’s 7th and 15th Regiments had been assigned thousands of

minimally trained Korean augmentees, called KATUSAs (Korean

Augmentees to the U.S. Army). Nonetheless, the division was fresh and

constituted the major reserve available to X Corps. 

In a seemingly minor change in plans, Almond ordered the 31st

Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 7th Division to relieve the 5th

Marine Regiment on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir so the

marines could concentrate their forces on the west, reorienting their

drive to the north and west of the frozen reservoir. The 31st RCT, like

most of the rest of the 7th Infantry Division, was widely scattered and

arrived in its new area in bits and pieces. The roads were treacherous,

trucks were in short supply, and the different battalions and artillery

assets only slowly began to assemble east of the reservoir. Although

the unit was called the 31st RCT, the 31st regimental commander, Col.

Allan D. “Mac” MacLean, was to command the 1st Battalion of the

32d Infantry along with his 2d and 3d Battalions of the 31st Infantry.

The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Donald C.

Faith, Jr., was first to reach the new positions, relieving the marines on

25 November. Faith’s battalion was alone on the east side of the reservoir for a full day before other elements of Task Force (TF)

MacLean—the 3d of the 31st Infantry and two artillery batteries—

arrived on the twenty-seventh. The 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, the

other artillery battery, and the 31st Tank Company were still missing.

The tanks were on the road just outside the Marine perimeter at

Hagaru-ri at the southern end of the reservoir, and the 2d of the 31st

was still en route. Nevertheless, MacLean confidently prepared to

launch his attack the next day. 

Almond’s offensive was not to be. Late on 27 November the

Chinese struck the U.S. forces on both sides of the Chosin Reservoir

16
nearly simultaneously. Two CCF Divisions, the 79th and 89th,

attacked the marines west of the reservoir in the Yudam-ni area. The

marines killed the Chinese by the hundreds but were in danger of

being cut off from the division headquarters at Hagaru-ri, at the southern end of the reservoir. In a similar maneuver, the CCF 80th Division

struck the spread-out positions of Task Force MacLean while simultaneously moving around its flank to cut it off from the marines at

Hagaru-ri. Initially successful, the Chinese were finally stopped just

before dawn.

During the day on 28 November, General Almond and his aide, 1st

Lt. Alexander Haig, helicoptered into the perimeter of TF MacLean.

Despite all the evidence of massive Chinese intervention, Almond

exhorted the soldiers to begin the offensive. “We’re still attacking,” he

told the soldiers, “and we’re going all the way to the Yalu.” The corps

17

To 

P L A 2 7 T H

A R M Y

PLA

20TH

ARMY

5 Mar

7 Mar(-)

C/7 Mar(-)

F/7 Mar

3/1 Mar(-)

3/31 Inf

57 FA Bn(-)

1/32 Inf

Toktong

Pass

Hell

Fire

Valley

1221

Yudam-ni

Sinhung-ni Hagaru-ri

Hudong-ni

Kot’o-ri

P’ungnyuri R

Changjin R

CHANGJIN

(CHOSIN)

RES

BATTLE OF THE

CHANGJIN RESERVOIR

27–29 November 1950

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

0 100 1000 1500 AND ABOVE

0 10 MILES

U.S. Positions, Night, 27 Nov

Axis of Chinese Attacks,

Night, 27 Nov–Morning, 29 Nov

Route of Withdrawal to Hagaru-ri

XX

PLA 60

XX

PLA 58

XX

PLA 59

XX

PLA 89

XX

PLA 79

XX

PLA 80
18

commander then flew back to Hagaru-ri, convinced that TF MacLean

was strong enough to begin its attack and deal with whatever “remnants” of CCF forces were in their way.

That evening the Chinese remnants struck again. The CCF 80th

Division hit the dispersed U.S. units with waves of infantry. Despite

the reassuring presence of tracked antiaircraft weapons (40-mm.

killing machines), the sub-zero cold and the constant Chinese attacks

began to take their toll. The fighting was often hand to hand.

Convinced now that launching any kind of attack on the twenty-ninth

was futile, Colonel MacLean abruptly ordered a pullback to form a

more consolidated defense. That accomplished, he proposed waiting

for the arrival of his missing third battalion before resuming any offensive operations. However, during the withdrawal operations his troops

came under renewed enemy attack, and in the confusion MacLean was

captured by the Chinese. With no hope of rescuing his commander,

Colonel Faith took command of the task force. Colonel MacLean in

fact died of wounds four days after his capture.

The epic struggle of Task Force MacLean—now called Task Force

Faith—was drawing to a close. Its separated tank company, augmented

by a pickup force of headquarters company soldiers and clerks,

attempted twice to relieve the beleaguered force. However, the tanks

foundered on the icy roads, and the attacks were further hindered by

misdirected air strikes. The tanks withdrew into the safety of Hagaru-ri.

Faith, unaware of this attempted rescue because of faulty communications, was running short of ammunition and had over four hundred

wounded on his hands. General Smith, commander of the 1st Marine

Division, was given operational control of the cut-off Army unit, but

apparently had his hands full withdrawing his marines in an orderly

fashion into Hagaru-ri. The 7th Division commander, Maj. Gen. David

G. Barr, flew into the perimeter of TF Faith on the thirtieth, but had

only bad news for Colonel Faith. The Marines could provide little more

than air support. Continued Chinese attacks during the night of the thirtieth and into the morning of 1 December left TF Faith in a dangerous

situation with no help in sight. Chinese assaults had almost destroyed

the perimeter that night, and the number of wounded went up to nearly

six hundred, virtually one-fourth of the entire formation. Believing that

one more Chinese attack would destroy his force, Faith decided to withdraw and run the Chinese gauntlet down the frozen road along the east

side of the reservoir in hopes of reaching the marines at Hagaru-ri.

On the morning of 1 December the exhausted men of TF Faith

formed into a column with the wounded piled into about thirty overcrowded trucks. Taking a while to get organized, the column began to
pull out in the early afternoon just as their Marine air cover arrived.

Tragically, the lead plane dropped its napalm short, and the thick, jellied gasoline exploded near the head of the column, badly burning

over a dozen soldiers. Many of the men ran for cover, destroying what

little order the column had left. Colonel Faith rallied the men and got

them moving again, but near-panic had set in and the men began to

gather in leaderless groups. The CCF, noting the withdrawal, began to

pour in fire from the high ground to the east of the column. As it

advanced, the column encountered a destroyed bridge on the road.

Bypassing the bridge was possible, but only one vehicle at a time

could be winched up the steep slope on the other side. The CCF clustered along the column, directing fire into the exposed trucks.

Farther south, the column was stopped by a Chinese roadblock near

Hill 1221. Some brave soldiers under the command of a few officers

stormed up the slopes and, despite severe casualties, managed to take

most of the hill, gaining valuable time for the column. It was getting

dark, and the lights of Hagaru-ri could be seen in the distance over the

ice-covered reservoir. However, the Chinese roadblock stood between

the column and safety. Desperately, Colonel Faith gathered a few men

and charged the Chinese defenses. Seizing the position, the American

soldiers managed to disperse the enemy, but Faith was mortally wounded. Although his men managed to prop him up on the hood of his jeep

and the convoy began moving again, the retreating force began to give

up hope. Despite the desperate attempts of the few remaining leaders,

the convoy began to come apart. Just miles from safety, the column hit

another blown bridge. The few unwounded men began moving out over

the ice, thick enough for foot travel but not for vehicles, leaving the

stranded convoy behind. By dark Task Force Faith thus ceased to exist.

As the CCF fire intensified with heavy machine guns and grenades, the

remaining able soldiers abandoned their trucks and fled to Hagaru-ri

over the ice. Colonel Faith, later awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously, remained behind with his men to die in the cold.

All during the night of 1–2 December, shattered remnant of Task

Force Faith trickled into the Marine positions at Hagaru-ri. A few were

rescued by Marine jeeps racing out over the ice to pick up dazed, frostbitten survivors. Some 319 Americans were rescued in this manner by

individual marines. Many of the worst wounded were airlifted to safety. Of the 2,500 men of Task Force Faith, 1,000 were killed, wounded,

captured, or left to die of wounds. After the air evacuation, about 500

7th Infantry Division soldiers were left to accompany the 1st Marine

Division as it began its withdrawal from Hagaru-ri to the port of

Hungnam, fifty miles southeast, and evacuation by sea. 

19
The men of Task Force Faith did not die in vain. They had virtually destroyed an entire Chinese division and prevented any possible

attack south by the Chinese for four critical days. If they had not been

able to hold out as long as they had, the 80th Division might have hit

the 1st Marine Division perimeter at Hagaru-ri in force before the 5th

and 7th Marines could have withdrawn. Those units might then have

faced dug-in Chinese roadblocks in their rear instead of a safe perimeter and a reasonably open road to the south. The entire fate of X Corps

may well have been different, if not for the bravery and stubborn

defense of the area east of the Chosin Reservoir by the men of Task

Force Faith. 

Faced with the renewed Chinese attacks on X Corps and Eighth

Army, General MacArthur finally admitted that the Chinese intervention had changed everything, announcing, “We face an entirely new

war.” Summoning both Walker and Almond to Japan even as their

units were fighting off the massive Chinese attacks, MacArthur grappled with ideas to save his units. He considered establishing a defensive line, or perhaps two enclaves along the coast, to prevent the

destruction of Eighth Army and X Corps and the loss of all that had

been gained since September. Another plan had the 3d Infantry

Division attacking directly east from Wonsan into the Chinese flank,

but the units involved considered it far too risky and besides, the terrain made it nearly impossible. MacArthur next asked Washington for

augmentation by troops of Chiang Kai-shek, the defeated ruler of

China now in exile with some of his army on the island of Taiwan.

Viewing this scheme as a dangerous escalation of the war, Washington

would have nothing to do with it. Sensing disaster, MacArthur began

imagining the total destruction of his forces in Korea or an evacuation

of the mainland. 

Retreat from North Korea

After the defeat at the Ch’ongch’on River, General Walker realized that it was necessary to withdraw his Eighth Army from its positions before the Chinese could move around its still-open right flank.

He ordered an immediate retreat to create an enclave around

P’yongyang. However, even as troops occupied their new positions, he

realized that he lacked the forces to maintain a cohesive defensive line.

Three of his ROK divisions (6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions) had

disintegrated; the U.S. 2d Infantry Division was in shambles; and all

the other units had taken heavy loses in men, materiel, and morale.

Faced with these problems, Walker decided to abandon P’yongyang.

He needed time to regroup and refit his units. He ordered the with20
drawal of the army to a line along the Imjin River, about ninety-five

miles to the south near the prewar border. He further ordered that all

supplies that could not be moved or any installations that could be of

use to the enemy be destroyed. 

Moving slowly down the few good roads in Korea, Eighth Army

units began pulling back from their positions near P’yongyang on 2

December and retreated over the course of three weeks to a line along

the Imjin River, from Munsan-ni on the western coast to just south of

the Hwach’on Reservoir across the peninsula. Caught wrong-footed by

21

U.S. combat engineers place satchel charges on a railroad bridge

near P’yongyang, preparing to destroy it to slow the Communist 

advance. (DA photograph)
this quick withdrawal, and needing time of their own to refit and

resupply their troops, the Chinese did not immediately pursue. By 23

December the U.S. I and IX Corps and the ROK III and II Corps, west

to east, were in place along the line. The ROK I Corps began to arrive

after its evacuation from northeast Korea, to be placed on the far right

of the line, anchoring the line to the eastern coast. It was not a strong

defensive position, but it had the advantage of leaving no flanks in the

air. It also maintained UN control of Seoul. 

In northeast Korea, with the consolidation of the 1st Marine

Division at Hagaru-ri along with the remnants of TF Faith, the situation in the X Corps area was improved, but hardly reassuring. There

was only one narrow road leading from Hagaru-ri to the port of

Hungnam, over fifty tough miles to the southeast. At Hungnam,

Almond planned to establish a perimeter and begin the slow process of

withdrawal. Early in the process he had ruled out a “Dunkirk” situation, where the men would be extracted while leaving their equipment

and supplies behind. Such a blow to allied pride and troop morale was

22

U.S. soldiers retreat from P’yongyang in December 1950, carrying

their equipment on traditional Korean “A” frames. (DA photograph)
23

too grievous to contemplate. The challenge was first to safely withdraw the Marine and Army units from the Chosin Reservoir area down

to Hungnam, then to establish a strong defensive perimeter, and finally

to begin shrinking that perimeter under enemy pressure while loading

up all the supplies and equipment possible. It would be a race between

the Chinese forces and U.S. tactical and logistical skills. 

The first challenge—withdrawing the Marine and Army units from

Hagaru-ri to Hungnam intact—was potentially the most dangerous. If

To HUNGNAM

P L A

2 7 T

H

A R M Y

PLA

20TH

ARMY

1 Mar Div (-)

Elm, 7th Inf Div

Toktong

Pass

Hell

Fire

Valley

Funchilin

Pass

Treadway

Bridge

Funchilin

Pass

1081

1221

TF DOG, 3d Inf Div

Yudam-ni

Sinhung-ni Hagaru-ri

Hudong-ni

Kot’o-ri

Chinhung-ni

Sudong

Majon-dong

Sinhung

Oro-ri

XX

PLA 77

CHANGJIN

(CHOSIN)

RES

P’ungnyuri R

RETREAT FROM CHANGJIN 

RESERVOIR

6–11 December 1950

Route of Withdrawal 

0 100 1000

0 10 

ELEVATIONS IN METERS

1500 AND ABOVE

MILES

XX

PLA 60

XX

PLA 58

XX

PLA 79

XX

PLA 80

XX

PLA 76

XX

PLA 89
the Chinese in the area could cut the road between Hagaru-ri and

Hungnam with a strong enough force, the entire 1st Marine Division

could be lost. Such a disaster would seriously undercut the entire UN

position in Korea. The effect on the American public would be

tremendous. Their failure to rescue TF MacLean/Faith, fresh in their

minds, the Marine and X Corps staffs began working together to coordinate their movements and fires to prevent any chance of a reoccurrence of such a tragedy. Their planning, coupled with massive

American firepower and airpower and the sheer persistence and

courage of the marines and soldiers at hand, would turn the tide and

snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

The 1st Marine Division plan was relatively clear and straightforward, although still difficult to execute. The division with its attached

Army units would move all its men and equipment down the road to

Hungnam, while combat units would systematically take and clear the

ridgelines dominating the road. There was to be no repetition of the

Kunu-ri gauntlet of the 2d Infantry Division. Combat power would

clear the ridges, while air support and artillery would destroy any

roadblocks or major concentrations of Chinese forces. Meanwhile, X

Corps would send a special task force from the relatively fresh 3d

Infantry Division—code-named Task Force DOG—about thirty miles

north up the road from Hungnam through Hamhung to just south of

the Funchilin Pass near Kot’o-ri. Task Force DOG, with its powerful

attached artillery units, would keep the road south of the pass open all

the way to the port.

Leading the way south some eight miles to Kot’o-ri on 6

December were the 7th Marines and the ad hoc Army battalion formed

from the remnants of Task Force Faith/MacLean. With artillery support carefully planned and around-the-clock air cover, the force quickly met and overcame enemy resistance at various strong points. The

rest followed, and a Marine rear guard was out of Hagaru-ri by midmorning of the following day. During the fight south to Kot’o-ri, some

103 marines lost their lives, with almost 500 wounded. 

Once at Kot’o-ri, the Marine and Army force faced a major obstacle: a sixteen-foot gap in the road near the Funchilin Pass. A steep

chasm prevented any hope of bypassing the gap. The staff of X Corps

coordinated an airdrop on 7 December of eight 2 1/4-ton treadway

bridge sections to cross the gap. In a series of air operations, all eight

sections were dropped by parachute near the pass, with one falling

inside Chinese lines and another damaged in the drop. However, the

remaining sections bridged the gap and, despite some tense moments

when trucks almost slid off the narrow bridge, the way was clear. 

24
Followed by hundreds of fleeing Korean refugees, the Marine and

Army forces made their way south against continuing Chinese flank

attacks. Finally, early in the morning of 10 December, the first linkup

occurred between the lead elements of the northern force and Task

Force DOG. Over the next two days the rest of the Marine and Army

elements withdrew through the covering elements of TF DOG to safety

in Hungnam. Again, the withdrawal came at a price. The Chinese

managed to cut the road near Sudong, about ten miles south of Kot’ori, late on 10 December, but a composite Marine force led by two

Army officers beat back the enemy. In the process one of the leaders of

the force, Army Lt. Col. John U. D. Page, was killed in action and later

received the Medal of Honor posthumously. Despite the attacks of two

Chinese armies, the withdrawal from the Chosin area of over eleven

thousand Marines and one thousand soldiers was successful.

On 8 December MacArthur ordered X Corps to evacuate through

the port of Hungnam and redeploy to South Korea as part of Eighth

Army. Given the size of the force and the near presence of the

Chinese, the withdrawal had to be a carefully orchestrated event.

Setting up a special Evacuation Control Group, Almond directed the

25

A U.S. infantryman with a 75-mm. recoilless rifle (rocket launcher) 

guards a pass south of the Chosin Reservoir. (DA photograph)
battle-weary 1st Marine Division to be evacuated first, from 9–15

December. It was followed by the ROK I Corps from 15–17

December, the 7th Infantry Division from 18–21 December, and the

3d Infantry Division from 21–24 December. All this occurred while

coordinating shipping with the Navy’s Task Force 90, uploading thousands of tons of supplies, and maintaining a secure perimeter. 

The withdrawal from Hungnam was accomplished successfully,

despite all the potential dangers. The X Corps arranged for the withdrawal of over 105,000 troops; 18,422 vehicles; 350,000 tons of bulk

cargo; and as a bonus some 98,100 refugees. Naval gunfire support

assisted in pulling off the maneuver with minimal enemy interference.

The Navy and Army worked together as well to coordinate a massive

demolitions plan to destroy any cargo too bulky or dangerous (like

frozen dynamite) to move, along with the docks and port facilities.

The X Corps outloaded all its elements on a strict timetable and

moved them by sea to Ulsan, just north of Pusan in South Korea, for

refitting and redeployment to the front to help Eighth Army hold the

line. The last soldiers from the 3d Infantry Division embarked on their

landing craft to the waiting ships on Christmas Eve 1950. As they left,

26

The USS Begor lies off the port of Hungnam as demolition charges destroy

the dock facilities on 24 December 1950. (U.S. Navy photograph)
the docks erupted behind them in a series of huge explosions. The

attempt to reunify Korea by force was over.

Ridgway Takes Command

General Walker was an indirect casualty of the Chinese attacks.

On the morning of 23 December, with the redeployment of Eighth

Army to new lines in the south complete and the first elements of the

evacuated X Corps on the way, the Eighth Army commander left

Seoul by jeep on an inspection trip. Ten miles north of the capital, his

vehicle zoomed north past several U.S. trucks halted on the opposite

side of the road. Suddenly, a Korean truck driver pulled out of his

lane, heading south, and tried to bypass the trucks. In doing so, he

pulled into the northbound lane and collided with Walker’s jeep. The

commander was knocked unconscious and later pronounced dead

from multiple head injuries.

The man selected to replace General Walker as Eighth Army commander was Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. At the time Ridgway was

serving on the Army staff in the Pentagon as deputy chief of staff for

operations and administration. A famed airborne commander from

World War II, Ridgway was knowledgeable about conditions in Korea

and the Far East and had a strong and dynamic personality. He would

need both for the task ahead. His success in turning Eighth Army’s

morale around, using little more than a magnetic personality and bold

leadership, is still a model for the Army, showing how the power of

leadership can dramatically change a situation. 

Ridgway landed in Tokyo on Christmas Day 1950 to discuss the

situation with MacArthur. The latter assured the new commander of his

full support to direct Eighth Army operations as he saw fit. Ridgway

was encouraged to retire to successive defensive positions, as currently

under way, and hold Seoul as long as he could, but not if it meant that

Eighth Army would be isolated in an enclave around the city. In a foreshadowing of his aggressive nature, Ridgway asked specifically that if

he found the combat situation “to my liking” whether MacArthur

would have any objection to “my attacking”? MacArthur answered,

“Eighth Army is yours, Matt. Do what you think best.”

General Ridgway knew that one of his first jobs was to restore

the Eighth Army soldiers’ confidence in themselves. To accomplish

this he had to be aggressive, despite the hard knocks of November

and December, and find other leaders in Eighth Army who were not

defeatist or defensive oriented. In practice he proved quick to reward

commanders who shared his sentiments and just as quick to relieve

those officers at any level who did not. During one of his first brief27
ings in Korea at I Corps, Ridgway sat through an extensive discussion of various defensive plans and contingencies. At the end he

asked the startled staff where their attack plans were. The corps G–3

(operations officer) responded that he had no such plans. Within

days I Corps had a new operations officer. The message went out:

Ridgway was interested in taking the offensive. To aid in this perception he also established a plan to rotate out those division commanders who had been in action for six difficult months and replace

them with fresh leaders who would be more interested in attack and

less in retreat. In addition, he sent out guidance to commanders at all

levels to spend more time at the front lines and less in their command posts in the rear. The men had to see their commanders if they

were to have confidence that they had not been forgotten. All these

positive leadership steps would have a dramatic effect almost from

the first. Eighth Army was in Korea to stay.

Ridgway, despite his aggressive intent, was also enough of a realist to know that the Chinese were still capable of launching major

attacks. He also knew that his Eighth Army still needed time to refit

and reorganize. Thus, he immediately began planning to strengthen the

defensive lines around Seoul while bringing up X Corps as quickly as

possible to strengthen the Wonju sector in the center of the line.

Almond’s X Corps was no longer independent, but would be just

another corps of the Eighth Army, tied into a new defensive line that

stretched unbroken from one side of the peninsula to the other.

Before Ridgway’s changes could be instituted, however, the

Chinese attacked again. Beginning on 26 December, the CCF struck

hard at UN units on the western approaches to Seoul. Supporting

attacks occurred as well in the central and eastern parts of the line.

The Chinese hit the ROK units hard, and again several units broke.

Two out of three regiments of the ROK 2d Division fled the battlefield,

leaving their valiant 17th Regiment to fight alone and hold its position

for hours despite heavy losses. Ridgway reluctantly ordered a general,

but orderly, withdrawal, with units instructed to maintain contact with

the enemy during their retreat, rather than simply giving up real estate

without inflicting losses on the enemy.

Initially, Eighth Army pulled back thirty miles to a defensive line

along the Han River to protect Seoul. By 2 January both I and IX

Corps had successfully concluded the new withdrawal and, with extensive firepower at their command, their chances of holding the city were

good. However, there was a distinct danger that the two corps could be

outflanked to the east and forced to defend Seoul with their backs to

the sea. Ridgway, unwilling to risk the loss or isolation of so much of

28
his combat power, reluctantly ordered the retreat of both corps to

“Line C,” just south of the Han. For the third time in the war so far,

Seoul was to change hands. 

Followed by hordes of refugees hauling their loved ones or a few

personal treasures on their backs or on oxcarts, I and IX Corps began

withdrawing from Seoul on 3 January. The loss of the capital was

again a bitter pill for everyone to swallow. The cold froze refugee and

soldier alike as the long UN columns snaked southward again. As the

Han River began to freeze solid, refugees braved the treacherous ice to

reach the temporary safety of UN lines. However, the freezing of the

river threatened the entire UN position, since the same ice that held

refugees could hold Chinese infantry intent on heading off the

American withdrawal. Before such attacks could occur, however, the

movement south was completed.

On the whole, the allies accomplished the evacuation of Seoul

with minimal casualties. However, one of the units, the attached 27th

Commonwealth Brigade, had been forced into hand-to-hand combat to

rescue one of its cut-off battalions and had suffered heavy casualties.

Finally, on the morning of 4 January, despite the continuing stream of

desperate refugees, Eighth Army engineers blew the three ponton

bridges and the main railway bridge over the Han to prevent their use

by the pursuing Chinese. The withdrawal to Line C was complete.

However, even as units were moving into position on this defensive

line, plans were being executed to withdraw some thirty-five miles farther south to Line D, running from P’yongt’aek in the west, northwestward through Wonju to Wonpo-ri.

The freezing of the Han River limited the defensive capabilities of

UN troops scattered along Line C. In addition, the ROK III Corps in

central Korea had virtually collapsed. Only the ROK 7th Division was

in a position to help stabilize the line. The ROK 2d Division was down

to less than a regiment. The ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were in complete retreat toward Wonju. To the east the ROK II Corps’ 3d Division

was also withdrawing to the south. As a result Ridgway ordered the

U.S. X Corps, still recovering from its near-disaster in northeast

Korea, to move up and take responsibility for some thirty-five miles in

the center of Line C. Almond was to have control of the U.S. 2d and

7th Infantry Divisions and whatever remnants that he could gather of

the ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions. To the right of X Corps, the ROK

III and I Corps would extend Line C to the eastern coast. However, the

staying power of this new defensive line was problematic.

Ridgway assessed the situation and, after the withdrawal from

Seoul was completed, ordered the entire Eighth Army to withdraw

29
again to Line D, which was somewhat redrawn to run straight east

from Wonju to Samch’ok instead of northeastward to Wonpo-ri.

Beginning on 5 January all five corps of Eighth Army pulled back to

this line. Despite its losses, the Eighth Army situation was thus much

improved from the last days of November, with better coordination

between units and fewer open flanks.

30

XXX

XXX

XXX

LINE C

LINE D

BRIDGEHEAD LINE

IX ROK III

I IX

ROK III R

17

17

17

29

2

24

29

20

13

17

20

55

1

1

1

5Y

33

3

1

33 3

3A

Hon

SEOUL

Inch’on

Uijongbu

Munsan-ni

Kaesong

P’yongt’aekAnsong

Suwon

Kimp’o 

Afld

Yangp’yong

Yoju

Ich’on

Wonju

Hwach’on

To P'YONGYANG 

Yonch’on

Osan

Umsong

HWACH’ON

RES

Han R

Yesong

R

Imjin R

R Pukhan

Imjin

R

Han R

X

TURK

XX

25

XX ROK

 8

XX XX

ROK 2

XX

24

XX

ROK 6

XX

ROK

5

XXX

NK I

XXXX

PLA 50

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX

PLA 38

XXXX

PLA 40

XXX

NK V

XXXX

PLA 42

XXXX

PLA 66

XX

ROK 1
The enemy attacks, however,

were not over. The rejuvenated

NKPA opened a two-corps assault

on X Corps positions near Wonju in

the center of Line D on 7 January.

The NKPA V Corps hit the 2d

Division at Wonju with two divisions in a frontal attack, while a

third division attacked from the

northwest against the adjacent ROK

8th Division. They were assisted by

one of the divisions of the NKPA II

Corps, which also launched attacks

against the neighboring ROK III

Corps to the east. The North

Koreans managed to force the 2d

Division out of Wonju by the

evening of 7 January, and all counterattacks failed to retake the city. 

The North Korean success at

Wonju and the dangerous penetration of the ROK III Corps by the

NKPA II Corps threatened to

unhinge the entire UN line.

However, the harsh winter weather

and logistical challenges, coupled

with newly aggressive patrolling by

UN soldiers, began to take their toll

on the attackers’ momentum. The

defensive line was reestablished

just south of Wonju, cutting off the

weakened NKPA divisions that had

penetrated the line. The 1st Marine

Division was sent up from reserve

to conduct a systematic antiguerrilla campaign against the scattered

forces and in three weeks managed to destroy virtually one entire NKPA

division. By the end of January a new defensive line had been established from the Han River, running just south of Wonju to Samch’ok on

the eastern coast. 

While X Corps was dealing with the potentially disastrous penetration in the center, I and IX Corps were busy stabilizing their positions

31

ROK II

XXX

ROK II ROK I

29

24

60

24

20

2

Yangyang

ngch’on

Inje

Wonpo-ri

R

Soyang R

CCF ATTACKS

26 December 1950–1 January 1951

MILES

0 30 10 20

Eighth Army Frontline, 26 Dec

Planned Delaying Lines

High Ground Above 1000 Feet

U.S. and ROK Attacks, 30–31 Dec

Chinese Attacks, 31 Dec–1 Jan

North Korean Attacks, 26–30 Dec

XX

ROK CAP

XX

ROK 9

XX

ROK 3

K

2 (+)

XXX

NK II
and instituting a series of aggressive reconnaissance-in-force patrols to

their front. General Ridgway, dismayed by the continuing poor showing

of his battle-weary units, demanded that unit commanders lead the way

in restoring an aggressive spirit. To help rebuild the still shaky morale of

Eighth Army, he ordered I Corps to plan a major reconnaissance-inforce in its sector to test the measure of Chinese resistance. Operation

WOLFHOUND used troops from the U.S. 25th Infantry Division (especially the 27th Infantry Regiment, the “Wolfhounds,” from which the operation drew its name), the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, and the ROK 1st

Division. Maj. Gen. Frank W. “Shrimp” Milburn, commander of I

Corps, directed it along the Osan-Suwon axis, twelve to twenty miles to

the north, supported by artillery and tanks. 

The reconnaissance began on 15 January. The 3d Infantry

Division units involved were quickly immobilized by enemy defensive

positions, but the rest of the forces met little opposition until near

Suwon. There, Chinese troops forced the WOLFHOUND units to turn

back just south of their objective, but they were able to establish an

advance corps outpost line along the Chinwi River, south of Osan, by

32

U.S. military leaders in Korea visit the front lines north of Suwon on 

28 January 1951. General MacArthur is at the right front. General 

Ridgway is in the center, third from the left. (DA photograph)
late on 16 January, while inflicting some 1,380 enemy casualties at the

cost of 3 killed and 7 wounded of their own. More important, they had

showed both the Chinese and themselves that the Eighth Army continued to have an offensive spirit. 

Almost immediately, two other reconnaissances-in-force sallied

out from UN lines: another from I Corps and a one-day action in the

IX Corps sector, both on 22 January. The reconnaissance in the IX

Corps sector consisted of a tank-heavy formation called Task Force

Johnson after its commander, Colonel Johnson. The immediate results

of both operations were small, but the ground was being laid for a

return to the offensive by the entire Eighth Army in the near future.

Analysis

The period from early November 1950 to late January 1951 was in

many ways the most heartbreaking of the Korean War. During the previous summer the North Korean attack had been a total surprise, and

the disastrous retreat to the Pusan Perimeter was painful in the

extreme. However, the series of defeats could be explained by the necessarily haphazard and slow reinforcement of the outnumbered U.S.

and South Korean forces. Moreover, these defeats were followed by

elation as the Inch’on landings reversed the situation and the UN

forces seemed on the verge not just of victory in South Korea but of

total victory, including the liberation of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula. All these dreams were swept away by the massive intervention of the Chinese Army in late November 1950. There

would be no homecoming victory parade by Christmas.

The initial warning attacks and diplomatic hints by the Chinese

were ignored by the overconfident Far Eastern Command under

General MacArthur. MacArthur’s failure to comprehend the reality of

the situation led the entire United Nations army to near disaster at the

Ch’ongch’on River and the Chosin Reservoir. Only the grit and determination of the individual American soldiers and marines as they

fought the three major enemies of cold, fear, and isolation held the UN

line together during the retreats from North Korea. Once tied together

into a coherent defensive line, under new and dynamic leadership,

these same soldiers and marines showed their determination to continue the fight. Hard battles lay ahead, but the period of headlong retreats

from an attacking, unsuspected foe, was finally over. 

33

Further Readings

Appleman, Roy E. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in

Korea, 1950. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.

———. Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army X Corps in Northeast

Korea, 1950. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1990.

———. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November

1950). U.S. Army in Korea. Washington, U.S. Army Center of

Military History, 1961.

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950–53. New York:

Doubleday, 1987.

Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the Gauntlet: November 1950, the

Defeat of Eighth Army. Nashville, Tenn.: Battery Press, 1987.

Mossman, Billy C. Ebb and Flow: November 1950–July 1951. U.S.

Army in Korea. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1990.

Stanton, Shelby. America’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950.

Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989.

35
CMH Pub 19–8

Cover: U.S. 7th Infantry Division soldiers pass through the outskirts of

Hyesanjin in November 1950. (DA photograph)

PIN : 077985–000