Planning Airpower Strategies 

Enhancing the Capability of Air Component Command Planning Staff 

CHARLES K. SHUGG, Major, USAF

School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR 

COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, 

ACADEMIC YEAR 1994–95. 

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


March 1996 
Disclaimer 

The author produced this paper in a Department of Defense school environment in the interest of 

academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views 

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 

of the Department of Defense or the United States government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for 

public release. 

ii 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii


ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v


ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix


INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi


1
 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S

PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2
 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING

THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE

AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3
 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND

PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S

CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

4
 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING

STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5
 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT

COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . . . . . 29

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

iii 
Illustrations 

Figure 

1 Colonel Warden’s Five-Ring Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3
 USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization,

Pre-Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4 USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization, Fall 1993 . . . . . . . 21

5 USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization, Spring 1995 . . . . . . 22

Table 

1
 Checkmate Assessment of Current

USCENTAF Planning Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

iv 
Abstract 

This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable 

of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air 

Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a 

sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background 

by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. 

The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not 

think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and 

therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author 

justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective 

operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a 

notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes 

the individual branch’s responsibilities and products. The largest implication of this 

notional organization is the requirement to possess a strategy cell with immediate, 

direct, and continual access to the JFACC, to develop an overall framework for the 

rest of the combat planning organization. Using this notional planning organization 

as a template, this study also examines CENTAF’s current combat planning staff. 

The conclusion is that although CENTAF has made inroads into improving the 

efficiency or “doing things right” of campaign planning, they still need to improve the 

effectiveness or “doing the right things” of their efforts. The final section of this study 

examines several solutions to this shortfall and concludes that the mission of 

developing operational-level airpower strategies should remain at the air component 

commands. To improve the situation at the air component commands, support 

should be given to a centralized training institution which stresses the importance of 

beginning the process with an effective and holistic operational airpower strategy. 

v 

About the Author 

Maj Charles K. Shugg was commissioned in 1980 upon graduation from the 

United States Air Force Academy (USAFA). Graduating from undergraduate pilot 

training in 1981, he went on to fly OV-10s as an instructor pilot and standards and 

evaluation pilot at Sembach Air Base (AB), Germany. He was subsequently selected 

to fly the F-15C as an instructor pilot and standards and evaluation pilot at 

Soesterberg AB, the Netherlands. He then was assigned to the F-15 Replacement 

Training Unit at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, as an instructor pilot. While 

there he graduated from the USAF Fighter Weapons School and was subsequently 

assigned to the Checkmate Division of the Air Staff in 1992. He has a bachelor’s 

degree in economics and management from USAFA and a master’s degree in 

management sciences from Troy State University. In July 1995, Major Shugg was 

assigned to the 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia. 

vii 

Acknowledgments 

I acknowledge several people without whose support and assistance this study 

would not have been possible. I thank Lt Gen John P. Jumper, commander, Central 

Command Air Forces, for granting me an interview and allowing me unrestricted 

access to his organization. 

I especially Colonel Feldman for his logic and cognitive framework for describing a 

“process.” This proved to be invaluable in developing the responsibilities and 

products of an air component commander’s campaign planning organization. Two 

graduates of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Lt Col Jack Egginton and 

Maj Michael R. Moeller, graciously provided their experience and knowledge of 

airpower strategy development to this study. Their assistance and keen insight kept 

me on track. 

Most important, I express my appreciation to my family for their patience and 

understanding during this process. 

ix 

Introduction 

In an attempt to determine whether US war-fighting commander’s subordinate air 

component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy, we 

use an “a fortiori” or best approach. This study uses US Central Command Air Force 

(CENTAF) as our example of an air component command because it is the air 

component command with the most recent experience in creating and executing a 

sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. 

To set the background, we examine CENTAF’s role in Central Command’s 

(CENTCOM) Persian Gulf campaign strategy. At the start of the hostilities in the 

Persian Gulf, CENTAF did not have or initially produce an airpower strategy that 

was acceptable to the commander in chief (CINC). Their CINC, Gen H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf, found what he and our senior military and political leaders thought 

was the correct theater airpower strategy in the Instant Thunder plan. This plan 

was developed by the Checkmate Division of the Air Staff in Washington, D.C. 

To determine if CENTAF’s current combat planning organization has the 

capability to produce an acceptable airpower strategy for future conflicts, this study 

examines certain credible sources to establish some of the attributes that make up 

an effective airpower strategy. Using these sources as a guide, I create a notional 

campaign planning organization which possesses those successful attributes. This 

notional organization is compared to the current CENTAF planning organization by 

using staff assistance reports, interviews, and observations from CENTAF’s most 

recent Blue Flag exercise. It determines which attributes are lacking and whether or 

not they are critical to the development of a successful theater airpower strategy. 

Finally, this study examines a number of proposed solutions to improving the 

war-fighting commander’s ability to receive an acceptable theater airpower strategy. 

xi 
Chapter 1 

USCENTAF’s Role in CENTCOM’s 

Persian Gulf Campaign Strategy 

A “plan” is the simple expression, written or otherwise, used to guide the 

implementation of a strategy and resources to achieve desired objectives. 

Implicit in a plan are measurements of success which are used to determine if 

the plan is succeeding or been overtaken by events.1 Unfortunately this 

definition does not coincide with most US war plans. 

Central Command’s (CENTCOM) preparation for conflict in the Persian 

Gulf area of responsibility (AOR) adhered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

standardized planning procedures. These procedures, called the Joint 

Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES), called for an operations 

plan (OPLAN) which was created during the deliberate planning phase of 

JOPES. “An OPLAN is a complete description of the CINC’s [commander in 

chief] concept of operations. It identifies the forces and supplies required to 

execute the plan and includes a movement schedule of resources into the 

theater of operations.”2 OPLANs are periodically revised to reflect the 

dynamic state of foreign affairs. At the time of the Persian Gulf crisis, 

CENTCOM’s OPLAN concerning the Iraqi area was in revision to reflect the 

changes brought on by the end of the cold war. 

However, there is a misperception that all CINC OPLANs allocate forces 

and schedule force deployments based on a proposed employment strategy. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. Like most, USCENTCOM’s OPLAN 

was “primarily a deployment document that outlined only a vague notion for 

the use of air power along with a general concept for ground operations.”3 

Similar to other theater contingency plans, planners devoted their effort to 

defining forces, establishing command relationships, and developing a scheme 

to move forces to the theater to support CINC missions—deterrence and 

defense—with the possibility of some limited counteroffensive action. This 

was accomplished without an employment strategy to base these decisions. 

The OPLAN made no mention of an offensive US operation or an independent 

offensive air campaign.4 In an effort to remedy this situation in the future, 

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has ordered a formal change 

to the focus of operational plans to the “employment of forces to the maximum 

extent possible.”5 

Without an overall theater employment strategy in the AOR, Central 

Command (CENTAF) did not prepare an air component employment plan. 

Although the CINC and the CENTAF/CC discussed possible options on how to 

1 
refocus the emphasis of the CINC’s OPLAN for upcoming revision, the plan 

still resembled a deployment document. It still did not refer to the employment of forces. To the Air Staff’s directorate of plans, where all of the CINC’s 

plans are reviewed by Headquarters USAF, this deficiency was very evident. 

After reviewing the spring 1990 draft of CENTCOM’s OPLAN, Col John A. 

Warden III, Air Force deputy director for war-fighting concepts, dispatched 

a team of officers from the Checkmate Division to visit CENTAF and 

CENTCOM headquarters to argue for the incorporation of an “air option” into 

the OPLAN. At the time, their efforts were not welcomed.6 

Combat planning exercises, designed to practice the execution portion of a 

campaign plan, never used a proactive airpower strategy. Soon after taking 

command of USCENTCOM, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf began shifting 

CENTCOM’s emphasis toward a more regional vision. Thus, CENTAF began 

focusing away from the traditional cold war Soviet threat and more toward an 

Iraqi threat.7 However, Internal Look, a USCENTCOM joint exercise, and the 

two previous USCENTAF Blue Flag exercises, remained defensively oriented 

and continued to use airpower in a reactive mode as a support asset for 

ground forces. These exercises always assumed the traditional airland battle 

scenario of ground forces already in contact and airpower’s role being 

relegated to air support of those ground operations. According to Col Samuel 

J. Baptiste, the chief of Combat Operations Planning Staff in Headquarters 

USCENTAF Combat Plans, these exercises prepared his staff in developing 

air tasking orders (ATO) and familiarizing them with potential Iraqi targets.8 

Airpower was never exercised as a proactive offensive option, just a reactive 

support component for the ground operations. He noted that, “the size and 

tempo of air operations in Desert Shield and Storm exceeded anything 

USCENTAF had either planned for or exercised.”9 Thus, prior to the start of 

the Persian Gulf War, USCENTAF had not planned or exercised a proactive 

airpower option which explored other aspects of airpower’s potential 

contributions to a theater campaign plan. 

On the morning of 8 August 1990, CINCCENT made a unique phone call to 

the Pentagon. Eight days prior to that phone call, General Schwarzkopf had 

given his assessment of the Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border to the JCS 

and the secretary of defense. Five days prior to that phone call, Iraqi forces 

had invaded Kuwait and General Schwarzkopf had personally ordered his air 

component commander, Lt Gen Charles A. Horner to meet with him at 

CENTCOM headquarters to discuss airpower options. The phone call to the 

Pentagon on 8 August was to the chief of staff of the Air Force (CSAF), Gen 

Michael Dugan. Since the CSAF was on temporary duty out of town, the 

vice-chief of staff of the Air Force (VCSAF), Gen John M. Loh, took the call. 

General Schwarzkopf told the VCSAF, “we have a decent plan for air/ground 

operations, but I’m thinking of an air campaign, and I don’t have any 

expertise—anybody here who can think in those kinds of terms and look at a 

broader set of targets or a strategic campaign.”10 General Schwarzkopf had 

earlier asked the CJCS, Gen Colin Powell, for permission to make this 

request. The VCSAF passed this tasking to Maj Gen Robert M. Alexander, 

2 
director of Plans (AF/XOX), and a small planning group headed up by Colonel 

Warden who had been looking at just such an issue since 5 August.11 

The small planning group’s (Checkmate) efforts can be credited with 

creating the framework for CENTCOM’s innovative airpower strategy in 

support of the theater campaign. Although there remains a bit of controversy 

on whether or not Checkmate’s Instant Thunder plan was the foundation of 

the executed plan, there are still some undeniable facts. 

Due to the lack of preplanning, USCENTAF Combat Plans spent a tremendous amount of effort during the first week of August on the deployment of 

forces into the AOR. According to Colonel Baptiste, “normally, details concerning selected units, deployments, and beddown are worked out well in advance 

by planners and logistics experts. The resulting Timed Phased Force Deployment Data List (TPFDDL) thus becomes an integral part of an operational 

plan. But, since USCENTCOM’s theater emphasis had only recently shifted 

to a regional threat, the new Operational Plan 1002-90 was not complete. One 

part missing was detailed force deployment data. In addition, host-nation 

agreements for beddown of units had not been worked out with Saudi Arabia 

or other Persian Gulf states. These problems combined to make deployment of 

forces more an ‘ad hoc’ effort than a well thought-out plan. Obviously, an 

incomplete OPLAN caused Desert Shield to get off to a rough start.”12 

Military planners, such as Colonel Baptiste, make a tremendous assumption when it comes to the preplanned TFPDDL included in most OPLANs. 

That assumption is that the deployment plan is based on the requirements of 

an employment plan. As mentioned earlier, most OPLANs do not include an 

expected employment plan so deployment plans cannot coincide with the yet 

to be determined employment strategy. Thus, the addition of a TFPDDL to 

the newly revised OPLAN 1002-90 would only have given the planners a false 

sense of security. 

The second undeniable fact is that General Schwarzkopf went in search of 

a proactive and holistic operational-level air strategy plan. He found such a 

plan in Checkmate’s Instant Thunder. Logically developed and organized, the 

plan used political objectives to shape theater military objectives. It described 

an airpower strategy and showed linkages to military objectives and 

particular target sets. Although some senior military leaders did not agree 

with the strategy, it was a comprehensive and well-organized plan that its 

creators and supporters were able to successfully communicate. Above all, it 

was accepted as the approved campaign strategy by the president of the 

United States and his CINC. According to Colonel Baptiste, “USCENTAF 

Combat Plans could have developed a similar plan [Instant Thunder]. 

However, General Horner was extremely busy as the senior CENTCOM 

commander forward and had turned over USCENTAF to his vice-commander. 

Also, Combat Plans and the rest of the USCENTAF staff had their hands full 

bedding down forces and building the daily and D-Day ATOs.”13 He also went 

on to conclude that “in retrospect, General Schwarzkopf’s choice of the Air 

Staff was a good one. I believe General Horner received the genesis of a well 

3 
thought-out plan quicker than [USCENTAF] Combat Plans could have 

produced it in Riyadh.”14 

Thus, at the start of hostilities in August 1990, CENTCOM’s airpower 

portion of the campaign strategy was unsatisfactory in the eyes of its 

commander, General Schwarzkopf. His own Air Force component, USCENTAF, 

was not prepared for numerous reasons. First, they did not preplan a holistic 

airpower strategy. Second, their regional OPLAN was in revision and its 

format was not conducive to allowing an airpower employment strategy. 

Third, their exercises continued to practice the cold war reactive style of 

airpower employment even though their commander had revised their focus 

toward a more regional and non-Soviet threat. Fourth, their exercises did not 

prepare them for the potential size and tempo of airpower operations. This 

unexpected magnitude of tasking, and lack of preplanned airpower options, 

lead to their inability to satisfy their commander’s demand. 

Because of these circumstances, General Schwarzkopf looked to the Air 

Staff. The Air Staff’s Checkmate Division prepared an airpower strategy to 

his satisfaction, and this strategy went on to become the framework for his 

overall theater campaign plan. In an attempt to determine how this situation 

could have been handled by CENTCOM’s air component command, I examine 

how an air component planning staff can effectively create airpower 

strategies. The first step in this next task is to determine resources that are 

successful in teaching or producing innovative theater-level airpower 

strategies. 

Notes 

1. United States Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 1, Planning and Command and 

Control (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), xviii. 

2. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) Pub 1, Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1993, 6–21. 

3. GWAPS, 21. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Message, CJCSI 3110.01, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Top Secret) Information 

extracted is unclassified, par. 7, December 1994. 

6. GWAPS, 115. 

7. Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero (New York: 

Bantam Books, 1992), 286. 

8. Col Samuel J. Baptiste, “HQ CENTAF in the Gulf: Reflections on Combat Planning and 

the Air Tasking Order Process” (Unpublished paper, Air War College, 1994), 5. 

9. Ibid., 3. 

10. Gen John M. Loh, vice-chief of staff of the Air Force, Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Va., 

transcript of interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, 19 September 1991, 4–5, Desert Story 

Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency, hereafter cited as AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala. 

11. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against 

Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 23–26. 

12. Baptiste, 7. 

13. Ibid., 13. 

14. Ibid., 14. 

4 
Chapter 2 

Credible Sources for Determining the

Attributes of an Effective Airpower Strategy 

The need for knowledgeable operational-level airpower campaign planners 

is reflected by the revision and creation of new Air Force institutions. By 

examining these institutions, and other credible sources, we can establish 

some of the attributes that make up an effective airpower strategy. To keep 

the number of institutions and sources to a manageable number, only institutions that concentrate on the operational level of airpower strategy or campaign planning are examined. These are the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign 

Course (JDACC), Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Joint Forces Air 

Component Commanders (JFACC) Course, Checkmate Division of the Air 

Staff, and the latest successful airpower strategy to be accepted and 

implemented by a CINC: Instant Thunder. 

JDACC is a school created and tasked by the Air Force director of Plans 

and Operations (AF/XO) to be a training forum for operational airpower 

planners. Established in 1991, this two-week course teaches officers to plan 

and execute an air campaign as part of an overall theater- campaign plan. 

Taught by Air Force officers at Air University, its mission is to educate 

airmen from unified, combined, and supporting air component commands in 

the fundamental process of theater-level, joint combined air campaign 

planning through the application of established aerospace concepts, principles, and doctrine. The academics focus on Air Force, Navy, Army, Marine 

Corps, and joint aerospace doctrinal concepts. In addition, they also analyze 

previous air campaigns from a historical perspective.1 JDACC emphasizes the 

need to become knowledgeable of potential crisis areas and to be well 

prepared. Preplanning airpower employment strategies for an AOR or 

OPLAN directive gives an operational logic to the CINC’s airpower 

deployment plans and schedules.2 

ACSC, since 1993, has become the largest educational institution to 

instruct and advocate innovative approaches to airpower strategy. Due 

largely to the vision of its new commandant, Colonel Warden, who was the 

former leader of the Checkmate group responsible for the creation of the 

Instant Thunder airpower strategy, the school primarily focuses on how 

airpower can be employed at the operational level of warfare. Concepts such 

as the role of higher-level objectives, the strategic structures of a nation-state, 

the operational structures of a military force, joint operations planning, air 

5 
campaign planning, war gaming, and campaign termination are introduced to 

more than 500 students a year. 

The JFACC course is a senior-level professional military education course 

offered by the US Air Force to prepare potential JFACCs. The one-week 

course is held semiannually. The first course, held in April 1995, was 

attended by 12 senior joint service officers: 7-Air Force, 3-Navy, 1-Marine 

Corps, and 1-Army. The attendees are selected by their respective senior 

officer management programs based on their potential for assignments as a 

JFACC. The senior officers study war fighting, military doctrine, and the 

employment of unified, joint, and combined forces. Particular emphasis is 

placed on theater-wide airpower employment. 

The Checkmate Division of the Air Staff plays a major role in assisting air 

component commanders’ staffs to develop their airpower strategies. 

Established by Gen David C. Jones, CSAF, in November 1976, it was 

originally used to “express and explain the complexities of combined arms 

warfighting capabilities and shortfalls.”3 The division “uses all available 

intelligence sources to identify and compare the strengths and weaknesses of 

the United States and its Allies.”4 The planners then use that information to 

“identify ways to fight the most pressing contingency with existing 

capabilities and ensure a decisive outcome.”5 The original focus of this group 

was to study and understand the Soviets and determine their vulnerabilities 

for US/NATO exploitation. However, after the cold war ended, Colonel 

Warden was able to convince General Dugan, then AF/XO, to keep the 

organization intact and use it as a “kind of Air Force think tank.”6 

The AF/XO keeps the Checkmate Division busy by tasking it to find ways 

to enhance air component commanders’ planning staffs’ ability to create 

effective and innovative airpower strategies. In the summer of 1992, the 

Checkmate Division developed the JFACC training course for flag officers and 

taught the validation course prior to it being transferred to Maxwell AFB in 

1994. That same year they were also tasked by the AF/XO, in cooperation 

with the Advanced Research Projects Agency, to develop a computerized 

operational-level airpower planning tool to assist air component commanders’ 

planning staffs in creating and documenting airpower strategies. This task 

was successfully completed and the product was called the Air Campaign 

Planning Tool (ACPT) or the JFACC Planning Tool (JPT).7 

Briefly, this tool’s contribution to theater airpower strategy is two-fold. In 

peacetime, its automation capability allows planners to perform in-depth 

analysis and identify enemy vulnerabilities. This analysis allows operations 

and intelligence planners to focus on the most lucrative targets for airpower 

and thus reduce the intelligence collection requirements to a feasible number. 

This focused effort facilitates contingency planning by enhancing existing 

databases, improving assessments, and allowing construction of more 

effective theater airpower strategies. Ideally, airpower planners could then 

assess and present numerous alternative strategies and force commitment 

levels to their commanders.8 

6 
During times of crisis, the tool is designed to allow the JFACC’s planning 

staff to significantly accelerate their decision process. It provides pilotage 

charts, imagery, country studies, and analysis of the crisis situation at a 

single workstation. It graphically displays critical information to allow the 

JFACC’s planners to visualize large quantities of data and quickly appreciate 

the impact of information updates. In short, it allows the JFACC’s staff to 

better construct the airpower portion of a theater campaign plan and then 

quickly adapt it to counter enemy reactions or the fog and friction of war. This 

tool is currently being deployed to air component planning staffs around the 

world.9 

In addition, numerous air component commanders and their planning 

organizations have requested Checkmate expertise and assistance in 

planning for numerous exercises and real-world conflicts. Checkmate personnel deploy with these planning staffs to observe, analyze, and assist their 

theater airpower campaign planning process and products. Some of the 

planning staffs that have asked for Checkmate assistance since 1993 includes 

the Seventh Air Force in Korea, 32d Air Operations Group in Europe, 

USCENTAF, and the Twelfth Air Force at Davis-Monthan AFB.10 

Another source of attributes for an effective airpower strategy is the 

Instant Thunder plan. By understanding the attributes of this strategy, we 

can possibly gain an insight into an effective airpower strategy. During the 

examination of this plan, care was taken to look for general attributes 

because although it was successful during the Persian Gulf War, it was 

developed for a specific situation and time. It should not be used as an 

“approved” or “institutionalized” airpower strategy. The general attributes of 

Instant Thunder that were examined included characteristics of its creators, 

how the plan was organized, and the nature of its presentation. 

The personnel who constructed the Instant Thunder plan shared many 

common characteristics. Most of them considered our current war plans to be 

focused almost exclusively on the deployment rather than the employment of 

forces.11 One reason Colonel Warden used the members of the Checkmate 

Division as his core cadre was that he had strong ties to the organization. As 

mentioned earlier, he had lobbied to maintain the organization in the Air 

Staff after their initial charter for examining a potential NATO/Soviet conflict 

diminished after the end of the cold war. He did this because he believed in 

their independent thinking and analysis on important combat-employment 

issues. Primarily made up of fighter pilots, they had a variety of other 

specialties to include tanker, airlift, reconnaissance, analysts, and support 

personnel.12 All members had the highest levels of security clearances which 

allowed them access to intelligence agencies and information for their 

research. Members of this organization strived to examine potential 

adversaries’ force capabilities and intentions while avoiding the tendency to 

use a “mirror-imaging” mentality. Their job was to examine a wide range of 

plans and contingencies and come up with alternative solutions. Prior to the 

Persian Gulf War, these individuals were tasked to provide “fresh insights 

with free thinking in an unencumbered environment into the future roles, 

7 
strategies, and tactics for the United States Air Force.”13 General Schwarzkopf 

recognized their free thinking by his comment made at the conclusion of the 

Instant Thunder briefing at Headquarters CENTCOM on 10 August 1990. He 

enthusiastically stated, “You are the first guys that have been leaning 

forward. I’m glad to see it. This is exactly what I want!”14 

In short, the Checkmate Division looked at the big picture of airpower and 

did not constrain their ideas on the employment of airpower even though 

CENTAF and Tactical Air Command (TAC) seemed to have narrowed their 

vision of airpower employment to primarily a “reactive” mode of airpower. 

CENTAF and TAC limited their use of airpower to primarily force-on-force. 

They assumed an established land battle and thus airpower became relegated 

to a more defensive approach. They virtually ignored other potentials for 

airpower employment.15 

This narrow “corps-level” view of a reactive mode of airpower employment 

appears to have manifested itself out of the Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine. 

According to the then-current version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, while airpower is to be an integrated element of the AirLand Battle 

concept, it only plays a subordinate role. Even though some argue that the Air 

Force was not truly committed to this concept, other indications tell a 

different story. At a USCENTAF briefing, presented by General Horner to 

General Schwarzkopf in April 1990 on air operations for OPLAN 1002, 

General Horner’s philosophy became very clear. At the bottom of the briefing 

slide titled “Mission Flow,” a common term used in flight briefings, General 

Horner wrote the phrase, “Build a hose and point it where the ground 

commander sees that it’s needed.” The briefing went on to reference airpower 

in terms of force-on-force only and assumed that the land battle had begun. 

The only airpower missions mentioned in the briefing were close air support 

(CAS) and interdiction.16 

Instant Thunder was an operational-level plan. Its viewpoint was theaterwide. Its airpower strategy concentrated on how airpower forces were to be 

employed from the start until the conclusion of hostilities. In short it encompassed the whole picture or campaign. Airpower actions or tasks were based 

on satisfying well-defined theater-military objectives that were based on our 

nation’s political objectives. These political objectives were not given to the 

planning group prior to determining the airpower strategy. They had to be 

derived by consolidating portions of recent policy statements and speeches 

from the president and other members of the executive branch. Lt Col David 

Deptula, a member of the secretary of the Air Force’s Staff Group and later a 

prominent member of the Checkmate and Black Hole planning groups, commented that the “intent and objectives of [the] air campaign [were] well 

understood by key planners,” in great part due to the framework of the plan 

and its briefings.17 

Instant Thunder’s concept of operations was organized in a unique framework developed by Colonel Warden. Known as the “five-ring” model, he and 

his group used this model to help describe the logic behind attacking a 

modern nation-state (fig. 1). 

8 
Figure 1. Colonel Warden’s Five-Ring Model 

By describing the modern nation-state as a system made up of numerous 

subsystems, they were able to illustrate how they determined the enemy’s 

potential centers of gravity. The staff also used this analytical technique to 

determine critical target categories. Only after they were confident of their 

logic and analysis to achieve the appropriate effect, did they attempt to select 

specific targets.18 

Although the plan eventually contained certain specific targets, Instant 

Thunder was not simply a prioritized target list. A prioritized target list had 

become the Air Force’s informal doctrine or idea of an airpower strategy. A 

classic example of this misunderstanding was a conversation General 

Alexander, Air Force deputy director of Plans and Colonel Warden’s boss had 

with Maj Gen James R. Clapper, Jr., head of Air Force Intelligence (AF/IN), 

on 8 August 1990. In that phone conversation, General Clapper argued adamantly that the Ninth Air Force (USCENTAF) had a strategic air campaign 

plan prior to deploying to Saudi Arabia. When questioned on what the plan 

consisted of, General Clapper explained, “They have about 44 targets.” 

General Clapper did not understand the concept of a complete and comprehensive operational-level airpower strategy. “In the intelligence general’s 

mind, targets and target folders equated to an air campaign.”19 In short, the 

Instant Thunder plan was constructed from the “top” down versus the 

historical pattern of a target list first or a bottom-up approach. 

Another attribute of Instant Thunder lay in its well-thought-out and constructed presentation. It was organized so that its creators and supporters 

were able to effectively communicate its attributes. Although some may argue 

with the validity of Colonel Warden’s five-ring model, it served a valuable 

purpose in creating an effective airpower strategy. As evidenced by his later 

writings, presentations, and speeches to the faculty and students of ACSC, 

Colonel Warden was open to alternative methods and models to describe 

nation-state systems. The brilliance in this particular methodology was that 

it was a simple and comprehensive cognitive framework. The plan’s concept of 

operations was easily understood by CINCCENT, CJCS, secretary of defense, 

9

and other senior political and military leaders, to include our nation’s commander in chief. The benefit of presenting a comprehensive yet simple 

airpower strategy at the campaign level was that senior political and military 

leaders could easily grasp the linkages to their strategic-level policy. This 

ensured that certain issues and concerns were understood by all the senior 

leaders of the country and thus they felt comfortable giving their support to 

the military by allowing them to execute the campaign. This attribute of the 

plan may have been a major contributing factor to a comment made by 

General Schwarzkopf. In front of his CENTCOM audience that received the 

first briefing of Instant Thunder on 10 August 1990, he commented, with 

reference to Colonel Warden and his group of planners, that “You have restored my confidence in the United States Air Force. CENTAF can’t do 

planning.”20 

Thus, in order to determine the attributes of an effective airpower strategy, 

we combined the knowledge of credible organizations and the attributes of a 

recently successful airpower strategy. By using these sources as inputs, we 

structured a notional air component planning staff. 

Notes 

1. JDACC flyer, 1992. 

2. Lt Col Maris McCrabb, former director of JDACC, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interview with 

author on the merits of preplanning airpower strategies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 5 June 1995. 

3. Mission Statement Checkmate Division (Washington, D.C.: Air Staff, October 1991). 

4. Ibid. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against 

Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 16. 

7. Joe Roberts, former chief of the strategy branch of the Checkmate Division, Washington 

D.C., interview with author on Checkmate taskings and accomplishments, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 

7 February 1995. 

8. Headquarters USAF/XOOC, “The Air Campaign Planning Tool—An Introduction” 

(Unpublished paper, Checkmate Division, Washington, D.C., July 1993) 2. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Maj Michael R. Moeller, Checkmate planner, Washington, D.C., interview with author 

on current status of ACPT, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 7 February 1995. 

11. Reynolds, 15. 

12. Ibid., 16. 

13. Mission Statement Checkmate Division, October 1991. 

14. Lt Gen Robert M. Alexander, Washington, D.C., transcript of interview with Lt Col 

Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col Edward C. Mann, and Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, 30 May 1991, 28, 

Desert Story Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

15. Dennis M. Drew, “Joint Operations: The World Looks Different from 10,000 Feet,” 

Airpower Journal 2, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 4–16. 

16. Briefing, subject: OPLAN 1002 Air Operations, April 1990, file 19, Gulf War Air Power 

Survey Collection, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

17. Lt Col David Deptula, member of the Checkmate and Black Hole planning groups, notes 

immediately following the conclusion of Desert Storm. 

18. Reynolds, 35–36. 

19. Ibid., 31–32. 

20. Ibid., 53–56. 

10 
Chapter 3 

Recommended Responsibilities and

Products of an Air Component Commander’s

Campaign Planning Organization 

The responsibilities of an air component commander are extremely 

demanding. Their campaign planning organization must, therefore, assume 

numerous critical responsibilities to ensure the effective use of airpower 

assets. Using some of the general attributes of Instant Thunder, the concepts 

taught and used at various campaign planning courses and the Checkmate 

Division, this study presents recommendations. These recommendations address the structure of the planning organization along with their assigned 

responsibilities. It describes the individual element’s expected product(s), its 

relationship to other elements, and provides insight into the qualifications 

required of its personnel. 

The “strategy” cell should be the air component commander’s personal 

think tank. This type of group is similar in nature to the “log (logistics) cell” 

which Army Lt Gen William G. Pagonis, primary Persian Gulf logistician, 

established during the Persian Gulf War. Described as a “distinctive innovation,” his log cell started out as a small, ad hoc think tank. It collected and 

analyzed operational information and used it to construct plans against 

General Pagonis’s potential contingencies.1 

In peacetime the air component commander’s strategy cell should create 

preplanned holistic airpower strategy options for their commander to 

stimulate innovative thinking on the potential employment of airpower in the 

overall theater strategy. The best of these options or ideas should then be 

presented to the CINC by the air component commander. This allows the 

CINC to be on top of potential airpower options and solutions if queried by 

senior political leaders and reassures him that his air component command is 

a forward-thinking organization. If implemented, this strategy will set the 

framework for which the rest of the organization will base their efforts. 

In wartime, the air component commander’s strategy cell has various 

critical responsibilities. It must synchronize air operations with the CINC’s 

guidance prior to and during the conflict. It should also be the primary liaison 

with the joint force commander’s (JFC) planners. This is because it has the 

primary responsibility to maintain and monitor the continuity of the entire 

campaign’s airpower strategy. Since this group, under the direction of the air 

component commander, creates the airpower strategy for the overall theater 

campaign, it must also determine its phasing requirements (phases represent 

11 
a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or 

mutually supporting activities)2 and measures of merit (MOM). It is, 

therefore, logical that they should also be responsible for determining the 

analysis requirements of these MOMs to ensure airpower is achieving its 

desired objectives. After determining phase requirements and MOMs, they 

need to provide the air component commander with phase priorities and 

assist in the creation of JFACC guidance. This cell must continuously monitor 

and assess progress within a phase and notify and prepare the JFACC of 

anticipated phase completion. In addition to all these responsibilities, the cell 

should also be the primary interface with special technologies and 

unconventional operations because of their vision and understanding of the 

entire campaign.3 

The strategy cell provides the foundation for accomplishment of numerous 

JFACC or air component commander responsibilities. It, therefore, requires a 

close relationship with the commander. The personnel of General Pagonis’s 

log cell, or strategy group, reported directly to him and had nearly complete 

access to him at any time. He demanded total impartiality from them and 

assured them that their plans would also receive the same candor and vigor 

from him. In return he assured them that careers would not be jeopardized by 

exposing possible faults in his planning or by questioning his logic.4 

The strategy cell’s formal products lay the foundation for the rest of the air 

component commander’s combat planning staff. Its formal products consist of 

an air operations plan, long-term JFACC guidance (i.e., outside the ATO 

cycle), and a progress assessment for the JFACC to analyze the status of 

airpower’s contribution to the overall campaign. 

The air operations plan is the framework in which the overall campaign’s 

airpower strategy is organized and documented. This plan provides an overview 

of airpower’s concept of operations and lists any assumptions used in the 

determination of its strategy. It documents the strategic-political, 

theater-military, and theater JFACC air objectives. In addition it clarifies the 

conditions necessary for the termination of operations. Phase guidance and 

priorities are recommended for each phase. Supporting air objectives (e.g., 

conduct air defense and surveillance operations) and the associated airpower 

tasks (e.g., deploy theater missile defense forces and infrastructure and initiate 

air defense operations) are then used to describe each particular phase. 

Within each of the phases, every supporting objective is assigned suggested 

MOM criteria. This criteria is used to determine successful effects (not 

necessarily the accomplishment of the task) of airpower operations. Each 

phase has suggested criteria for phase completion so that other operations 

can commence as soon as possible. An effective air operations plan involves a 

great deal of thought and study. To better understand how to construct an air 

operations plan, we must examine what is involved in the creation of an 

airpower strategy.5 

An airpower strategy must enhance the effectiveness of the overall theater 

campaign. Strategy has been defined in various ways. One such definition is 

“the art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, 

12 
and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable 

consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.” A more concise 

definition is “a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve objectives.” 

These definitions not only “address the art of distributing and applying 

military means,” as the role of strategy is often defined, but they also link 

actions to an effect: the fulfillment of objectives which are the ends of policy.6 

Thus, the development of strategy must be based on objectives, geopolitical 

information (scenario dependent), resources available, and a knowledge of 

military—especially airpower—doctrines and theories. 

Airpower strategy development incorporates many levels of objectives from 

the national level through current political, theater-military, and airpower 

objectives. An essence of strategy from the renowned 20th-century military 

strategist, B. H. Liddell Hart, was to always keep your objectives in mind 

while attempting to create your plan based on circumstances. He used the 

phrase, “To wander down a side-track is bad, but to reach a dead end is 

worse,” to remind planners of this important aspect.7 

The national-level objectives of the United States can be found in numerous 

documents. The two most prevalent are the National Security Strategy of the 

United States, published by the White House, and the National Military 

Strategy of the United States, published by the CJCS. From these objectives 

and various policy statements, political objectives will be formulated to reflect 

the country’s desires concerning the particular geopolitical situation. 

However, at the start of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the political 

objectives were not presented to the military planners. They were constructed 

by military planners and then given to the administration for approval.8 Just 

as political objectives must support national-level objectives, so must military 

objectives support political objectives. 

Although political and military objectives are different, they should not 

become separated. For modern nation-states do not go to war just for war’s 

sake but in pursuance of their policy or political objectives. As described by 

Liddell Hart, “The military objective is only the means to a political end. 

Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective.”9 

The same correlation should be made for creating airpower objectives for 

the JFACC’s airpower strategy. They must be linked to the theater CINC’s 

military objectives, which in turn should be linked to political- and 

national-level policy objectives. Thus, the aim of an airpower strategy is to 

enhance the overall theater strategy. When all the objectives or ends have 

been linked together, it is essential to quickly determine if your means are 

capable of achieving your ends.10 To accomplish this task, geopolitical 

information, resources, theory, and doctrine must be studied. 

Geopolitical information is essential to airpower strategy development. 

Every scenario contains vital factors which make that particular situation or 

circumstance unique. Thus, the means to accomplish or achieve the desired 

effect should always be distinctive from other strategies. A comprehensive 

understanding of the nature and reasons for the crisis is critical. To “know 

13 
the enemy,” as the renowned Chinese strategist Sun Tzu noted, has become a 

cardinal tenet of strategy.11 Areas of investigation should include, but not be 

limited to, an in-depth knowledge of the environment, support structure, and 

threat. 

Knowledge of the environment should address physical and social issues of 

the area. Physical issues, such as topography and weather, are important considerations for the employment of any military but particularly airpower forces. 

Social issues, as a minimum, include the cultural, political, and international/ 

intranational environment. Historical background of the culture, the psychology of the leadership, the history of the decision-making apparatus/ 

leadership, economic conditions, and religious influences must be investigated. 

The enemy’s support structure may reveal linkages and provide insight 

into how the enemy operates. The country’s economy and infrastructure will 

illustrate potential strengths and weaknesses in the theater’s communications, transportation (including air base availability and operability), 

manufacturing infrastructure and the availability of critical items such as 

food, fuel, and water. Examination should also shed light on the area’s 

international relations and the particular type economy (commodities, 

industrial, or knowledge-based). This knowledge will affect potential economic 

warfare courses of action. The enemy’s military support infrastructure may 

also reveal potential coalitions and reveal possible strengths or weaknesses in 

the enemy’s ability to wage war. 

Friendly and hostile military capabilities must be examined in- depth prior 

to creating an airpower strategy. Although the factors used to identify these 

capabilities are identical for friendly and hostile forces, identifying friendly 

force capabilities is often more challenging. While there is a tremendous 

amount of data available on US forces, the same cannot be said about our 

allies’ capabilities. This may be because our military does not have a 

dedicated organization which tracks such information compared to our own 

forces (e.g., logistics) and those that study the threat (e.g., intelligence). In 

addition, accurately assessing our own capabilities requires an objectivity 

that may become masked by some of our other interests (e.g., service or 

branch parochialism). 

Besides the traditional way of quantifying fielded military forces and 

analyzing hostile intentions, other areas of the threat’s military must be 

examined. We need to determine the ways in which capabilities and 

intentions are perceived and misperceived. These images or signals provide a 

valuable insight to the threat’s political-military behavior. 

The last aspect in evaluating geopolitical issues for the formulation of airpower 

strategy development is to avoid ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is the tendency to 

assess aspects of other cultures in terms of one’s own culture’s standards and 

values. Ethnocentrism is one of the factors which can seriously interfere with 

rational strategy development. It is usually not the sole cause of mistakes in 

strategy but only a contributory one. Unfortunately, strategists may not be able to 

know enough about an individual or group psychology to determine the reason 

behind a particular decision or action. Thus, the best that one may be able to 

14 
hope for is to be prepared and aware of any tendencies to mirror image a 

potential adversary. Along with geopolitical issues, the amount of resources 

available plays a critical role in an airpower strategy. 

Available resources is a critical factor in determining potential strategies. 

The key to determining the most effective and efficient amount and type of 

resources required for a particular strategy involves extensive knowledge and 

flexibility. An effective and efficient strategy must be constructed with respect 

to time (e.g., arrival time for deploying forces), and various force levels (e.g., 

from in-place forces to potential coalitions). Included in the resource 

allocation process are numerous limiting factors that may prohibit the 

feasibility of cer- tain resource combinations. These limiting factors could 

include transporta- tion capability, sustainability, time requirements, and 

other outside available resources (e.g., coalitions). 

An effective and innovative strategy should not be constrained by our 

current doctrine. However it must not be created without an understanding of 

various doctrines and theories. An airpower strategist should not only be able 

to give sound advice on airpower but also provide advice on how surface forces 

could be employed to complement airpower operations. This advice should 

lead to synergistic effects that contribute to the achievement of the campaign’s objectives. Understanding the past may keep one from reliving the 

errors and mistakes of others and prevent one from reinventing the wheel. It 

is tempting to always refight the last war because of the experience gained 

from it (especially if it was successful). A historical example of this situation 

is the strategic bombing template from World War II being used against the 

nonindustrial nations of Korea and North Vietnam. 

Airpower strategists must possess and demonstrate vision. Each situation 

or scenario is unique and therefore requires flexibility in current doctrine and 

the search for an innovative solution to the problem. The planning staff for 

Instant Thunder was not ignorant of the current AirLand Battle doctrine nor 

of the airpower theories from the past. The planning staff recognized the 

potential contribution airpower could make to the campaign by attacking 

Saddam Hussein’s ability to control his forces. 

With such importance placed on creating a sound airpower strategy, the 

personnel assigned to the strategy cell should be hand selected for their 

attributes. Personnel assigned to the JFACC or air component commander’s 

staff group must have an in-depth knowledge of a variety of fields. First, and 

most important, is that the individuals understand operational strategy. In 

short, they must understand “the art and science of planning, orchestrating, 

and directing military campaigns within a theater of operations to achieve 

national security objectives.”12 These individuals must be capable of producing “a strategy based on existing military capabilities; a strategy that is used 

as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the 

short-range time period.”13 

The second trait they require is a combination of an in-depth knowledge in a 

particular tactical field (e.g., fighter operations, space operations, intelligence, 

etc.), plus a demonstrated capability in joint operations and/or combined 

15 
operations. To keep the size of the strategy cell to a manageable number for a 

brainstorming working group, the particular tactical expertise should be 

broad in nature. Examples would include special operations, fighter 

operations, bomber operations, airlift operations, space operations, intelligence, and logistics. The combined and joint operations problem can be solved 

by incorporating other service component representatives into the cell during 

times of crisis and by continuous interaction with the other components 

during peacetime preparation. The next element involved in the campaign 

planning process is the day guidance, apportionment, tasking, and targeting 

(GATT) cell. 

The day GATT cell uses the strategy cell’s air operations plan as a 

framework. The day GATT cell’s overall responsibility is to translate the air 

operations plan into a more detailed version for daily operations. It prioritizes 

tasks for the next ATO cycle and recommends the weight of effort for 

airpower assets. The cell provides inputs to the JFACC for his attendance at 

the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). This board is usually chaired 

by the deputy CINC and attended by all the component commanders. The day 

GATT cell is also the daytime interface with the ATO execution cell since the 

former has the working knowledge of why certain decisions were made to that 

particular day’s plan.14 

The day GATT cell is primarily responsible for two products which assist in 

transitioning the overall air operations plan into a daily ATO. First, this cell 

produces a daily prioritized task list which, once approved by the JTCB, can 

be used to select individual targets. The concept of using a daily prioritized 

task list versus a prioritized target list is a very important aspect of creating 

an effective and efficient daily ATO. This is contrary to the suggested 

methodology described in Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. As 

evidenced by our experience during Vietnam, even some of our US political 

and military senior leaders equate lists of targets to the ends and not just as a 

means to the end. Except under unusual circumstances, our senior leaders, 

such as the JFC and component commanders, need to remain focused on 

prioritizing the ends and not get involved in the micromanagement of the 

individual means. The idea of prioritizing tasks versus individual targets was 

used in the second half of Blue Flag 95-2 with outstanding success. Members 

of the exercise JTCB reported it was the most effective and efficient board 

meeting they had experienced. In their opinion it was the first time that the 

true issue of priorities was addressed and that every member was in 

agreement.15 The second product that the day GATT cell is responsible for is 

determining the daily MOMs. Once the daily prioritized tasks are 

determined, the day GATT cell must inform the appropriate analysts and 

intelligence systems of the need to monitor the respective MOMs. This will 

greatly assist the battle damage assessment (BDA) feedback loop into the 

daily air operations plan and make the overall plan more effective and 

efficient.16 

The night GATT cell continues to add more detail into the daily plan so 

that it can eventually be turned into an ATO. The night GATT cell’s responsi16 
bilities include building the next ATO’s master attack plan (MAP) and to be 

the nighttime interface with the ATO execution cell. Its formal product is the 

MAP which is the framework for creating a daily ATO. A MAP provides 

theater-level sequencing and resource suggestions for producing an ATO.17 

Considerations for developing a MAP include, as a minimum, specific targettiming requirements, synergistic effects to minimize attrition while achieving 

decisive results, effects of other service operations, and the availability of 

friendly air assets. Specific target-timing requirements refers to the fact that 

some particular targets are time-critical. This may be due to the target’s potential to inflict unacceptable losses on friendly forces (e.g., weapons of mass 

destruction) or the fact that they are fleeting in nature and it is anticipated 

that this may be the only time they can be targeted (e.g., Scud mobile launchers). Other specific target-timing factors may include the desire to limit 

collateral damage (e.g., the downtown district during nonbusiness hours), or 

intelligence information that makes the target more valuable or vulnerable at 

a specific time (e.g., known meeting or conference time).18 

MAP builders should strive to achieve synergistic effects and attempt to 

minimize attrition while achieving decisive results. Even though attrition risk 

may heavily influence the sequencing of airpower assets, critical ground 

operations may take precedence over the order of attack. MAP builders 

should attempt to mass airpower assets to achieve the greatest impact from a 

limited amount of suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) assets. They 

should also attempt to exploit transitory weaknesses in an enemy’s defenses. 

For these reasons, targets that are in close proximity of each other may be 

attacked simultaneously even though the targets might support different 

tasks with dissimilar priorities.19 

The effect of the other operations in-theater should also have a significant 

impact on building a MAP. As mentioned earlier, the need to support 

unanticipated land or sea forces may force a modification to the synchronization of airpower assets. The MAP builders must coordinate and integrate 

surface maneuver and special forces units to maximize firepower to support 

and complement airpower objectives.20 

The availability of certain friendly airpower assets is an important factor in 

determining sequencing in the MAP. The availability of aircraft (e.g., stealth 

fighters), weapons (e.g., precision munitions), skilled personnel (e.g., aircrew), 

and support assets (e.g., tanker aircraft) will affect the number of attacks 

that can take place over any given period of time. These factors will affect the 

number of similar type targets (requiring a limited asset) that may be 

attacked simultaneously. However, these factors should never be the 

foundation for a MAP. Friendly airpower asset availability should only be a 

sanity check on the MAP so that the ATO production cell can easily transform 

the MAP into an ATO. The next two elements involved in the campaign 

planning process is the ATO production cell and the ATO execution cell.21 

The responsibilities of the ATO production and execution cells are fairly 

self-explanatory. The ATO production cell produces and transmits the next ATO 

to all the appropriate airpower wings or units. The formal product of this cell is 

17 
therefore an ATO. An ATO contains very detailed information on how 

airpower assets will be employed on that particular day. It contains such 

information as take off times, call signs, weapon loads, mission numbers, 

identification friend or foe codes, and other special instructions or coordination information. The efficiency of the ATO production process has been 

greatly enhanced by the computerization of the production and transmission 

of the ATO. The ATO execution cell executes the current ATO and provides 

feedback of its effects and results to the strategy cell. The strategy cell is thus 

able to continuously monitor and update the status of the overall airpower 

strategy. 

This notional campaign planning organization takes a top-down approach in 

determining the responsibilities and products of the organization. The process 

began with a holistic operational-level airpower strategy which was communicated through the air operations plan document. That document became the 

framework for the other branches to the campaign planning division to develop 

and execute a daily ATO. Using this process, this study next examines 

CENTAF’s early 1995 combat planning staff and attempts to determine if they 

could develop a holistic and operational-level airpower strategy. 

Notes 

1. Lt Gen William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School 

Press, 1992), 103–4. 

2. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 6 September 1993, 3-4. 

3. Checkmate briefing slides, “The State of the JFACC: An Assessment of Current JFACC 

Organizations and Planning Processes,” February 1995. 

4. Pagonis, 103–4. 

5. Maj Michael R. Moeller and Lt Col Jack Egginton, Checkmate planners assigned to the 

strategy branch and major contributors to the upcoming USAF Joint Force Air Component 

Commander (JFACC) Primer, interview with author on air operations plan and airpower 

strategy development process, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 6 February 1995. 

6. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954; reprint, New York: Meridian, 1991), 321. 

7. Ibid., 334-37. 

8. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against 

Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 53. 

9. Liddell Hart, 334–37. 

10. JDACC, Air Campaign Planning Handbook, 2d ed., 31 January 1994, 20–27. 

11. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 122. 

12. Air Force Manual (AFM)1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 

vol. 2, March 1992, 297. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Checkmate briefing slides. 

15. Moeller and Egginton interview. 

16. Checkmate briefing slides. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. JFACC Primer, 2d ed., 1994, 43–45. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Ibid. 

18

Chapter 4 

Report on USCENTAF Planning

Staff’s Status—Early 1995 

As mentioned earlier, USCENTAF did not possess any preplanned holistic 

airpower strategy options for their AOR prior to Desert Storm. Recognizing 

the fact that producing and executing an ATO is a major responsibility of 

USCENTAF, it must not be forgotten that if the ATO is to be effective, its 

production must be based on a holistic theater airpower strategy. To 

determine if today’s USCENTAF combat planning organization is any better 

prepared to recommend and execute a campaign-level airpower strategy, we 

examine three basic areas. First, we examine the current combat planning 

organization and compare it with its pre-Desert Storm organization. Next, we 

use CENTAF’s experience at Blue Flag 95-2 to determine how effectively and 

efficiently the organization functions. Finally, we use personal observations 

and interviews with various members of CENTAF’s planning staff to gain 

insight of their perceived focus and possible shortfalls. 

USCENTAF’s combat planning organization has gone through numerous 

changes and adjustments since 1990. These changes reveal the changing 

philosophy toward the primary focus of their combat planning staff. According 

to USCENTAFR 55-45, dated 27 June 1990, the USCENTAF Combat Plans 

organization consisted of a director and assistant director of combat plans 

who had four divisions under them: Fighter/Bomber, Support, Tactical (now 

theater) Air Control System (TACS), and Combat Plans. Combat Plans was 

then divided into three branches: employment, long-range, and targeting. The 

targeting branch is further divided into the night targeting cell and the 

battlefield coordination element (BCE). ATO planning and production is not 

directly shown on the organizational chart (fig. 2).1 

The change in the organizational structure prior to Desert Shield/Storm 

may shed more light on the emphasis of the combat planning staff. The 

pre-Desert Shield organization had the USCENTAF directorate of Combat 

Plans subdivided into two divisions: Combat Operations Planning Staff 

(COPS) and the ATO Division. The COPS Division was responsible for areas 

concerning the commander’s guidance letter, the targeting process, the daily 

ATO concept of operations, and force packaging. All the duties of the COPS 

seem to have had a short-term focus of only a few days. The ATO Division 

was responsible for the final coordination, production, and distribution of the 

ATO. ATO execution responsibility fell under the director of Combat 

19 
Source: USCENTAFR 55-45, 27 June 1990. 

Figure 2. USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization 

Operations and was accomplished in the Air Operations Center (AOC). No 

organization had the responsibility for the holistic airpower vision (fig. 3).2 

Comments by General Horner during the preparation for Desert Storm in 

August lend credibility to the premise that CENTAF’s emphasis was on 

producing an ATO and not on creating an overall airpower strategy. While 

receiving the Instant Thunder briefing from Colonel Warden, who had been 

brought over to Saudi Arabia by General Schwarzkopf, he disapprovingly 

stated to Colonel Warden that “Our (CENTAF) goal [is to] build an A—T—O!” 

and not to worry about an overall airpower strategy.3 

CENTAF combat plans went through another reorganization during the 

Persian Gulf hostilities; however, it was not until the fall of 1993 that it 

showed a formal focus on producing a preplanned holistic airpower strategy. 

The new combat plans was subdivided into four divisions. The divisions were 

Campaign Plans, ATO Development, TACS, and ATO Production. The 

Source: According to Col Samuel J. Baptiste, chief of Combat Operations Planning Staff, Headquarters 

USCENTAF. 

Figure 3. USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization, Pre-Desert Storm 

20

Campaign Plans Division consisted of two branches: Strategy and GAT. The 

GAT branch also contained a night target cell (fig. 4).4 

Source: USCENTAFR 55-45, sec. 2, 11 January 1994. 

Figure 4. USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization, Fall 1993 

This reorganization appeared to reflect USCENTAF’s desire to correct the 

discrepancies of the past and ensure that there could be no mistake on which 

branch had the responsibility for the creation of an overall airpower strategy. 

According to USCENTAFR 55-45, dated 11 January 1994, the strategy 

planning cell responsibilities include but are not limited to: 

1) developing strategies for force beddown, force posturing, and force projection in 

support of near- and long-term theater campaign objectives; 

2) coordinating with the CINC and CENTAF commander, identifying logistic support requirements for planned or projected beddowns, restructuring or operations; 

3) coordinating with supporting commands for the implementation of operational 

plans and requirements; 

4) coordinating with other components as to planned campaign strategies and 

forthcoming operations that require air support or may affect the air component’s 

and/or joint force air component’s long-range employment plans; and 

5) undertaking special projects which are not normally part of the deliberate planning process.5 

This guidance is further evidence that USCENTAF is aware of some of its 

shortfalls and made an attempt to remedy the situation. It implies that nearand long-term campaign objectives have to be either known or developed in 

order to create strategies. It also states that the air component’s and/or 

JFACC’s long-range employment plans must be coordinated with the other 

components and the CINC. This is further evidence that USCENTAF is concerned with the creation of a holistic airpower employment plan. Unfortunately this essential element of the combat plans organization has been 

eliminated in the current USCENTAF combat planning organization. 

As of spring 1995, USCENTAF’s newly named Combat Plans squadron, has 

an entirely new look. The organizational chart currently divides the Combat 

Plans squadron (A5-DOX), into Command and Control (A5-DOXC), Exercises 

(A5-DOXE), Campaign Plans (A5-DOXP), and ATO Automation (A5-DOXA). 

21

However, at the same time, the organization chart of the Campaign Plans 

Flight, previously called a division, shows their flight consisting of four 

subflights or elements. These elements consisted of Contingency Plans, 

Deliberate Plans, Long-Range Plans, and Special Programs (fig. 5).6 

Source: USCENTAF Organization Chart, 609 Air Operations Group, A5-DOX. 

Figure 5. USCENTAF Combat Planning Organization, Spring 1995 

Although the elements in the Campaign Plans Flight gives the impression 

that USCENTAF is concerned about the continued development of airpower 

strategies, assistance visits from the Checkmate Division of the Air Staff and 

USCENTAF’s performance at Blue Flag 95-2 tells a different story. 

When a potential conflict erupted in Iraq in the fall of 1994, USCENTAF’s 

new commander, Lt Gen John P. Jumper, requested Checkmate to augment 

his planning staff. As a result, Checkmate suggested that USCENTAF’s combat planning organization expand its vision of combat planning to include an 

overall operational airpower strategy.7 To clarify this statement a definition 

of operational strategy is appropriate: 

A strategy based on existing military capabilities; a strategy that is used as a 

foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time 

period.8 

Areas examined by the Checkmate Division included 

strategy development (overall campaign); 

JFC/JFACC staff interaction; 

integration of special technology and unconventional operations; 

monitoring the progress and assessing the effectiveness of the airpower effort; 

air operations planning (outside the next ATO cycle); 

other component/JFACC staff interaction; 

ATO development; and 

ATO execution. 

The only areas that were deemed to have a formal process were the ATO 

development and execution areas. It should be noted that these areas had 

22

been the focus of the organization prior to Desert Storm. JFACC staff interaction with the JFC and other component staffs was deemed to be in the realm 

of an informal process. The rest of the areas that were examined did not exist 

in the formal process of USCENTAF’s planning considerations.9 

According to Checkmate’s analysis, USCENTAF’s long-range planning cell 

had the responsibility to provide the longest and widest vision of the entire 

campaign. However, its responsibility required it to provide only two to four 

days worth of priorities (e.g., two to four days from the current ATO) to the 

JFACC. In addition, they recommended JFACC priorities for the next ATO to 

the day GATT cell. In short, no group was responsible for airpower’s overall 

campaign strategy. Since there wasn’t any such group, it only follows that 

there was no process or procedure to monitor the progress of airpower’s 

objectives or assess its overall effectiveness.10 Table 1 is a summary of 

Checkmate’s assessment of the current USCENTAF planning organization. 

USCENTAF combat planning organization’s experience at Blue Flag 95-2 

highlighted similar conclusions. Previous Blue Flags had been a test bed for 

Table 1 

Checkmate Assessment of Current USCENTAF Planning Organization 

N A M E RESPONSIBILITIES P R O D U C T 

LONG-RANGE 

PLANNING CELL 

– PROVIDE JFACC 2–4 DAY PRIORITIES 

– RECOMMENDS NEXT DAY ATO JFACC 

PRIORITIES TO DAY GATT 

– JFACC GUIDANCE DAYS 2–4 

– DAILY PRIORITIES 

– APPORTIONMENT 

RECOMMENDATION 

JTCB – PROVIDE NEXT DAY ATO AND 

APPORTIONMENT GUIDANCE 

– APPORTIONMENT 

GUIDANCE 

DAY GATT – PROVIDE NEXT ATO TARGET PRIORITIES 

– FOCAL POINT FOR COMPONENT LIAISON 

– JFACC PRIORITIZED TASKS 

TARGETING 

CELL 

– BUILDS NEXT ATO TARGET LIST 

– PROVIDES COMBAT ASSESSMENT 

–PRIORITIZED TARGET LIST 

NIGHT GATT – BUILDS NEXT ATO MASTER ATTACK PLAN – MASTER ATTACK PLAN 

ATO PRODUCTION – BUILDS AND TRANSMITS NEXT ATO – ATO TRANSMITTED 

ATO EXECUTION – MONITORS/EXECUTES CURRENT ATO – ATO EXECUTED 

the development of computerized ATO development and execution hardware 

and software and did not allow the organization to adequately practice their 

AOC operations. Fortunately this situation has changed so that USCENTAF 

was able to exercise its planning organization for the first time.11 Thus, since 

an organization has to learn to walk before it runs, USCENTAF’s combat 

planning during Blue Flag 95-2 emphasized the production of the ATO 

without any reference to an overall airpower strategy. CENTAF’s combat 

planning process was described in briefings and point papers as simply a 

series of meetings. 

23 
CENTAF’s campaign planning process was structured by a series of 

meetings which occurred throughout the day starting with the first meeting 

at 0800 and the last one at 1800. Their emphasis was on the ATO process and 

it focused almost exclusively on improving the efficiency (e.g., doing things 

right) of producing a daily ATO. There was little to no effort to determine if 

the process or the product (i.e., the daily ATO) was in fact effective (e.g., doing 

the right things). The ATO development process did not attempt to reference 

an overall campaign plan, objectives, nor any MOM until the Checkmate 

augmentees suggested and produced briefing slides for the JFACC 

briefings.12 

To the benefit of USCENTAF, it has attempted to improve the efficiency of 

the ATO cycle. This cycle began with a joint guidance, apportionment, and 

targeting (JGAT) meeting at 0930. The JGAT meeting was chaired by the 

JFACC (only for this Blue Flag) and attended by senior component 

representatives. Its primary purpose was to review two days’ worth of 

potential future ATO targets (days B and C) and approve the targeting 

strategy for the next ATO (day A). (This targeting strategy was a result of the 

previous day’s JTCB meeting.)13 

The next meeting of the JTCB was at 1100. The JTCB was chaired by the 

deputy CINC and was attended by the component commanders or their 

representatives. Its focus was on reviewing JFC’s objectives/guidance and 

discussing long-range targeting strategy (day B) which was used 221

/2 hours 

later at the next JGAT meeting.14 CENTAF now plans to have this group look 

outside the ATO cycle (days D through F).15 

The JGAT working group meeting was held at 1200. It was chaired by the 

deputy director of Combat Plans and was initally intended to have only field 

grade component representatives. However, during this Blue Flag the Navy 

sent an air wing commander (O-6) to be its naval component representative.16 

Its purpose was to publish the joint targeting list (JTL) for the next day (day 

A) using the guidance from the JGAT meeting at 0930.17 

The next meeting was at 1700 and was attended by senior AOC component 

representatives. It attempted to determine JFACC guidance for two days 

ahead (day B). This guidance was used in the next day’s JGAT meeting at 

0930.18 

The GAT began building the ATO at 1800 using the JTL published at that 

day’s 1200 JGAT meeting. A MAP was produced during the night and 

inputted into the Advanced Planning System (APS) by 0400 the next day. The 

MAP was then transformed into an ATO by incorporating detailed 

instructions and coordination information. It was reviewed and approved 

throughout the process (at 0830 by the JFACC) until 1800 when it was 

transmitted to simulated airpower wings or units.19 

The Blue Flag 95-2 debriefing revealed the USCENTAF commander’s 

desire to improve its combat planning capability. The debrief also revealed a 

possible hidden agenda or subordinate objective. It appeared that 

USCENTAF was attempting to build the other service components’ confidence 

that the AOC operation and process was under control. Fortunately the 

24 
USCENTAF staff was very critical of their performance. USCENTAF’s A3/5 

stated that the ACPT should have played a greater role and been involved 

earlier in their initial planning efforts during Quick Flag (training program 

devoted to creating a holistic airpower strategy to use in the Blue Flag 

exercise). He also pointed out that within his own staff the operations and 

plans interface needed improvement and that increased feedback between the 

two would help to increase each other’s awareness. Surprisingly enough, the 

greatest insight into the exercise came from the person who had been with 

USCENTAF the least amount of time, its commander. First, he recognized 

that he needed to be the single point of contact for airpower targeting 

priorities when he met with the other service components.20 

The commander also commented that the AOC briefings were 

unsatisfactory because they focused entirely too much on measuring 

insignificant events, such as sorties flown, or the number of certain mission 

types, and not on the impact or effect they had toward the overall campaign. 

This remark was made soon after US Marine Forces, Central Command’s 

(MARCENT) representative demonstrated his service parochialism by 

complaining that neither the ATO or the briefings to the JFC reflected the 

Marine Corps’ contribution to the CAS effort (bean counting of mission-type 

sorties). This comment was made even though those assets were not released 

to the JFACC for tasking. To his credit, the MARCENT representative later 

made a very insightful comment to this group of senior leaders. He stated 

that “Where you sit determines what you see.” His challenge to the group was 

not to assume that just because the JFACC had the “big picture” that 

everyone else did too. Other components and/or allies, along with the worker 

bees in the AOC, might easily be left in the dark and have no idea of how they 

were contributing to the big picture. General Jumper concluded the debrief by 

proclaiming that USCENTAF could “now start dealing more with the product 

quality versus the process and evaluate the level of its thinking up to the 

strategic level.” The USCENTAF commander’s remarks indicate a concerted 

effort toward correcting the organization’s shortfalls from the Persian Gulf 

War.21 

However, the debrief also revealed some serious misperceptions on the part 

of the other service components. First, US Army Forces, Central Command 

(ARCENT) asked if it would be possible to “put an ATO on the shelf and give 

it a formal review in order to institutionalize it.” He then used Pacific Air 

Forces (PACAF) and Korea as an example of this type of process. There are 

inherently two basic flaws in having USCENTAF take this approach. One is 

that their AOR is more dynamic and could involve numerous geographically 

different scenarios, unlike the static situation in Korea. The other flaw is that 

the concern should not be in the micromanagement of a daily ATO but on the 

overall campaign and its supporting strategies that affect the campaign. In 

short the preplanning vision needs to at least encompass the entire 

campaign.22 

Another disturbing critique from ARCENT was that there was no formal 

means to “validate the ATO targets from those requested.” This critique 

25 
reveals that there is still more work to be done on educating the other 

components. Other components should only present prioritized task requests 

to the JFACC and not simply “a list of targets to be serviced.” The idea of 

continuing to present specific targets to the JFACC may give the impression 

that the Army is attempting to use airpower as a means to conserve its own 

organic artillery assets.23 

US Navy, Central Command’s (NAVCENT) contribution to the debrief was 

to slip in a briefing on how one of their Persian Gulf War planners (Comdr 

[“Duck”] McSwain from the 7th Carrier Group) viewed airpower campaign 

planning. Even though this briefing was not appropriate or relevant to a 

senior leader exercise debrief, everyone politely listened as he described how 

to ensure a notional airpower campaign plan placed the appropriate weight of 

effort on attacking a particular type of target. Unfortunately his process was 

not concerned with the most important aspect or purpose of the campaign: 

the effect the attacks were having toward achieving an objective, desired 

outcome or goal. Although the true purpose of this particular briefing is not 

clear, its unexpected occurrence in the presence of this group of senior leaders 

may reveal another service challenge over establishing airpower planning 

procedures.24 

Interviews and a fact-finding visit to USCENTAF headquarters at Shaw 

AFB, South Carolina, revealed a glimmer of hope along with some demons 

from the past. The brightest star at the field grade level was the Campaign 

Plans flight commander, Lt Col Bob Schloss. His understanding of 

operational strategy and his willingness to seek new ideas and methods to 

improve his flight’s effectiveness was commendable. Unfortunately his office 

appears to be overwhelmed with noncampaign planning tasks from his 

superiors and temporary duty assignments to fill Joint Task Force Southwest 

Asia. Thus, his effort to move his flight toward a more operational or holistic 

campaign level of thinking is moving slower than desired. To this end, there 

is still not a group or person responsible in his flight for the creation of a 

complete airpower strategy for the duration of the entire campaign.25 

There are two demons still lingering in the USCENTAF combat planning 

staff. One is the “tactical-level” mind-set maintained by some of the planning 

veterans. During a discussion on the merits of Blue Flag exercises to the 

combat planning process, the issue of how the reduced frequency of the 

exercises affected their combat planning staff. Out of that discussion a 

question arose on whether the combat planning staff ever attempted to 

determine the effectiveness of the daily ATOs. A veteran of over 20 

USCENTAF exercises and a former Persian Gulf War combat planner 

responded by stating they used to do that by sending a copy of an exercise 

ATO to one of the flying wings in their command to have them check to see if 

they had made any clerical errors in tasking the individual flights.26 This 

type of response illustrates the lack of operational-level focus or thought in 

the production of CENTAF’s daily ATOs which remains today. 

It also became apparent that although most planners could agree on the 

words that described their planning process, the commonality of the concept 

26 
was lacking. It was very similar to the comment made by General Horner to 

Col Steve (“Foose”) Wilson (director of the “Fighter Mafia” division of the Air 

Staff and confidant of Lt Gen Jimmie Adams, the Air Force XO) when he 

received the Instant Thunder briefing for the first time in Saudi Arabia. In 

that discussion, he told Colonel Wilson that, “I’m not worried about strategic 

targets.” Although Colonel Wilson was attempting to convey that those 

particular targets were called “strategic” targets for their potential strategic 

or war-winning effect, General Horner had thought that strategic targeting 

was synonymous with “nuclear” targeting. Thus, he firmly let Colonel Wilson 

know that he was not intending to use nuclear weapons.27 This type of 

misunderstanding was also evident with the USCENTAF planning staff when 

it came to the words campaign planning, operational, and strategy. Although 

a few felt airpower campaign planning meant creating an overall game plan, 

most felt that it simply meant producing daily ATOs. Instead of operational 

referring to the operational level of warfare, most felt that it meant anything 

other than a support function. Lastly, although the term airpower strategy 

had a fairly common definition, the duration of its vision varied from the next 

day to the entire campaign duration. 

These observations revealed the need for a standardized educational 

process for all Air Force officers, and especially combat planners. It also 

illustrates the point that simply creating a “strategy cell” in name may not 

automatically achieve the desired outcome of having an assigned group take 

responsibility for the creation and monitoring of an airpower strategy that 

encompasses the entire campaign.28 

Notes 

1. USCENTAFR 55-45, 27 June 1990, 3-18. 

2. Col Samuel J. Baptiste, “HQ CENTAF in the Gulf: Reflections on Combat Planning and 

the Air Tasking Order Process” (Unpublished paper, Air War College, 1994), 28. 

3. Col Richard T. Reynolds, Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against 

Iraq (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 126. 

4. USCENTAFR 55-45, sect. 2, 11 January 1994. 

5. Ibid. 

6. CENTAF Organization Chart, 609 Air Operations Group, A5-DOX. 

7. Lt Col Jack Egginton and Maj Michael R. Moeller, Checkmate Division planners, 

strategy cell, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., interview with author on Checkmate/CENTAF staff 

assistance visit, Hurlburt Field, Fla., 6 February 1995. 

8. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 

297. 

9. Checkmate briefing slides, “The State of the JFACC: An Assessment of Current JFACC 

Organizations and Planning Processes,” February 1995. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Lt Gen John P. Jumper, CENTAF commander, interview with author, Shaw AFB, S.C., 

14 June 1995. 

12. Background paper and briefing slides on CENTAF planning for Blue Flag 95-2 and 

notes, 6–8 February 1995. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

27

15. Col Bill Hoge, CENTAF A3/5, interview with author, Shaw AFB, S.C., 14 June 1995. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Notes, Blue Flag 95-2 Senior Officer debrief, 8 February 1995. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Ibid. 

25. CENTAF personnel, notes and interviews with author, CENTAF headquarters, Shaw 

AFB, S.C., 16–17 March 1995. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Reynolds, 92. 

28. CENTAF’s notes and interviews with author. 

28

Chapter 5 

Implications/Solutions to Air Component

Commands’ Combat Planning Shortfalls 

Since the completion of Desert Storm, many ideas have come to the 

forefront on how to remedy the shortfalls of air component commanders’ 

combat planning staffs. Solutions range from improved training for these 

staffs to the complete elimination of its planning responsibility. This study 

briefly examines a few of these options and comments on their attributes and 

shortfalls. 

One proposal is to have one centralized combat planning staff for all air 

component commands. Some advocate that an established group of 

knowledgeable campaign planners, such as the Checkmate Division of the Air 

Staff, should be that staff. They argue that Checkmate already has the 

correct mixture and quality of personnel. They claim that the Checkmate 

organization has been, and continues to be, the informal experts in campaign 

planning in the Air Force (as evidenced by the demand for their assistance). 

Its location in Washington, D.C., offers a direct “eyeball-to-eyeball” access to 

intelligence-gathering sources and organizations (e.g., Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, etc.) that 

facilitate the formulation of an effective airpower strategy. 

Problems with this proposal are both concrete and perceptual. The concrete 

problems include the lack of manpower and reduced interaction with the 

respective air component commanders and their other organizations. 

Assuming various air component commanders would still require preplanned 

studies and contingency plans, a large quantity of personnel would be needed 

to continuously track and update all of the information. In addition, not 

having the combat planning staff collocated with their respective commander 

and the other organizations (e.g., logistics) within the command could lead to 

a disconnect with the commander’s intent. Since the commander and his 

strategy cell must have a personal relationship and trust concerning their 

airpower strategy, this situation would not be optimal. 

It would be unrealistic to assume that unfavorable perceptions from the 

Vietnam era no longer exist. Many of our senior Air Force leaders are very 

hesitant to support planning organizations to be staffed by military or civilian 

personnel in Washington, D.C. During the Persian Gulf War, Gen Robert D. 

Russ, commander of TAC; General Adams, the AF/XO; and General Horner, 

the CENTAF commander, were very adamant about having combat planning 

done only in-theater. By moving the centralized organization out of the 

29 
Washington, D.C., area, the organization no longer has day-to-day personal 

contact with the national intelligence agencies. 

A second proposal is to increase the number of combat planning exercises 

for the air component commands. On the surface this proposal seems to be the 

easiest to accomplish even though funding could be a limiting factor. 

However, the problems with this proposal are twofold. Even though exercises, 

such as Blue Flag, examine and exercise a portion of the air component 

combat planning staff and provide interaction with sister component planning 

staffs, they do not adequately address the effectiveness of overall airpower 

strategies. They primarily exercise the ATO development and execution cells 

and then only for a few days. 

Granted the air components need to be able to produce and execute an ATO 

for the successful employment of airpower, but an ATO is only effective if it is 

based on a solid airpower strategy. Currently, air component combat planning 

exercises fail to assess the components’ overall airpower strategy or allow 

their strategy cells to assess the progress of their overall strategy and make 

appropriate modifications to it. 

The final option is to establish a centralized training center for all air 

component commanders’ combat planning staffs in an attempt to teach effective airpower strategy planning. During the course of conducting research 

and composing this study, such an organization was formed under the Air 

Warfare Center. The Center for Integrated Air, Space, and Information 

Operations is situated at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Along with the other 

schools located there (Air Ground Operations School, Battle Staff Training 

School, etc.), it will supposedly create a “JFACC Tech” and become “a center 

of excellence for training at the operational level of warfare.” The 

organization’s proposed mission is to “train, exercise, and support 

JFACCs/JFACC staffs/AOCs in campaign planning (includes Military 

Operations Other Than War).”1 

The Center for Integrated Air, Space, and Information Operations anticipated concept of operations is to work with air component command staffs 

during pre-exercise planning to create campaign plan(s) for execution during 

exercises (Blue and Green Flags, Cope Thunders, JFACC Trailblazer [United 

States Air Forces Europe exercise], Ulchi Focus Lens [Korea], etc.). More 

specifically it anticipates assessing the effectiveness of campaign plan(s) during exercises and to publish lessons learned. It also plans to test and assess 

air, space, and information operations doctrine using live and computerassisted exercises. Finally it anticipates assisting air component staffs in 

creating campaign plans for contingencies and to augment those planning 

staffs as needed. 

Although this is the best of all the proposals, there are still some potential 

shortcomings to this option. First and foremost is that it may be hard to break 

some perceptions of this new organization. Hurlburt Field has not been 

known, as a location, for having demanding training programs in the past, 

having a large number of future Air Force leaders stationed there, or for 

being a recognized overall career enhancing permanent change of station 

30 
experi- ence. In addition, it may be difficult for a new organization to obtain 

instant credibility with the air component staffs. Finally, some supporting 

com- ponents may also feel threatened by yet another organization impinging 

on their perceived territory (e.g., USSPACECOM’s resistance to placing 

opera- tional space assets at ACSC for familiarization and training). 

The recommended solution to correcting the shortfalls of an air 

components’ combat planning organization is twofold. First, the mission of 

operational- level airpower strategy development should be maintained at the 

air component command. As suggested by General Jumper, this can be 

accom- plished by using the Checkmate Division expertise. During peacetime 

certain members of Checkmate would visit his organization to stimulate 

innovative and creative thought toward airpower. In times of conflict certain 

members of Checkmate could then be used to augment his planning staff. The 

bottom line is to provide the air component commander with the planning 

assets that he requires and avoid other organization’s needs to create 

alternative or com- peting plans.2 Second, the air component command’s 

combat planning staff needs to increase their operational-level training. This 

training should be done at a centralized location so that standardization can 

be obtained within all the air component commands and the specialty of 

operational-level airpower campaign planning. It must teach the staffs to 

begin with a holistic and operational-level airpower strategy and to use that 

strategy to develop and produce a daily ATO. Through this type of training 

we can hope that the next time an air component command is called upon to 

enter into a conflict, it will be well prepared due to their staff’s preplanning 

efforts and under- standing of how airpower can contribute to the overall 

theater campaign. 

Notes 

1. Briefing slides, Headquarters USAF/XOX, Center for Integrated Air, Space, and 

Information Operations, Winter 1994. 

2. Lt Gen John P. Jumper, CENTAF commander, interview with author, Shaw AFB, S.C., 

14 June 1995. 

31

Chapter 6 

Conclusion 

This study’s goal is to provide insight into an air component command’s 

ability to create an effective airpower strategy. By determining some of the 

most important attributes of an effective airpower strategy, this study 

presented a critical analysis of a combat planning organization. It concludes 

that CENTAF combat plans are capable of efficiently developing and 

producing daily ATOs but does not yet base those ATOs on an effective 

airpower strategy. 

The deficiency of the CENTAF combat planning organization primarily lies 

in its lack of a strategy development cell within its staff. This strategy cell 

provides an operational vision to develop a holistic airpower strategy to 

complement the CINC’s overall theater strategy. This strategy then provides 

a framework for planners to build an effective ATO. 

An analogy to this situation is the development of a housing subdivision. A 

commercial real estate investor establishes a community by getting advice 

from housing development and community development experts. This is 

similar to a CINC getting expert advice from his component commanders 

prior to developing his theater campaign strategy. Once a decision is made to 

establish the community and with a general set of guidelines, such as 

location, size, and type of community, the expert developers determine how to 

effectively and efficiently follow those guidelines. With regard to war fighters, 

once the general guidance for a theater campaign plan is provided by the 

CINC, the air component commander must decide how to effectively and 

efficiently employ airpower to support the CINC’s theater campaign plan. A 

housing developer must create a subdivision plan, such as where to put the 

houses to maximize the effectiveness (e.g., quality of homes and lots) and 

efficiency (e.g., minimize costs) of the project. This plan is used by the housing 

architects to assist in their housing blueprint decisions. Those blueprints are 

then used by the construction workers to build the houses. An air component 

planning staff has a similar responsibility to a housing developer. The staff 

must develop an effective and efficient airpower strategy which is translated 

into an air operations plan. The air operations plan is the framework by 

which the GATT cell develops and passes on their MAP. The MAP is then 

used by the ATO developers to build the daily ATO. 

Largely, air component commanders and their planning staffs concentrate 

on the development and production of the ATO. Unfortunately this is to the 

detriment of the creation of a sound overall airpower strategy. This situation 

is similar to a housing subdivision being established with emphasis on 

33 
individual homes rather than how all the homes fit together to form a quality 

subdivision. The result could be disastrous for the commercial real estate 

investor: CINC. 

Thus, the air component planning staffs must refocus their concentration 

toward two of its responsibilities. First, they must ensure that the air 

component commander is as knowledgeable as possible concerning airpower 

employment. The commander can, therefore, be effective in the role of expert 

advisor to the CINC. Second, once the CINC provides guidance for the theater 

campaign strategy, the planning staff must develop an overall airpower 

strategy. This strategy is used as a solid framework for the rest of the 

campaign planning process. 

Thus, the goal of the air component’s planning staff is twofold. First, it 

must provide the air component commander with the best possible inputs so 

that the commander can properly advise the CINC. Second, it must improve 

its ability to effectively plan an airpower strategy to complement the CINC’s 

overall theater strategy. To accomplish this task, a strategy development cell 

must be incorporated into the combat planning staff and the entire combat 

staff must receive recurring standardized training on how to effectively 

employ airpower assets at the operational versus tactical level of warfare. 

34

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Loh, Gen John M. Vice-chief of staff of the Air Force. Langley AFB, Va. Transcript of 

interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, 19 September 1991, 4–5. Desert Story 

Collection, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. Former director of JDACC, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Interview 

with author on the merits of preplanning airpower strategies, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., 5 June 1995. 

Moeller, Maj Michael R. Checkmate planner, Washington D.C. Interview with 

author on current status of ACPT. Hurlburt Field, Fla., 7 February 1995. 

Moeller, Maj Michael R., and Lt Col Jack Egginton. Checkmate planners assigned to 

the strategy branch and major contributors to the upcoming JFACC Primer. 

Interview with author on air operations plan and airpower strategy development process. Hurlburt Field, Fla., 6 February 1995. 

Roberts, Joe. Former chief of the strategy branch of the Checkmate Division, Washington, D.C. Interview with author on Checkmate taskings and accomplishments. Hurlburt Field, Fla., 7 February 1995. 

Briefings and Notes 

Blue Flag 95-2 Senior Officer debrief notes, 8 February 1995. 

Briefing. Subject: OPLAN 1002 Air Operations, April 1990, file 19, Gulf War Air 

Power Survey Collection. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. 

Briefing slides. Headquarters USAF/XOX. Center for Integrated Air, Space, and 

Information Operations, Winter 1994. 

Briefing slides and background paper. Subject: CENTAF planning for Blue Flag 95-2 

and notes, 6–8 February 1995. 

CENTAF Headquarters. Notes and interviews with various CENTAF personnel. 

Shaw AFB, S.C., 16–17 March 1995. 

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Checkmate briefing slides. Subject: The State of the JFACC: An Assessment of 

Current JFACC Organizations and Planning Processes. Checkmate Division, 

February 1995. 

Deptula, Lt Col David. Member of the Checkmate and Black Hole planning groups. 

Notes immediately following the conclusion of Desert Storm. 

Other 

CENTAF Organization Chart. 609 Air Operations Group, A5-DOX.


JDACC flyer, 1992.


Mission Statement Checkmate Division. Washington, D.C.: Air Staff, October 1991.


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