William T. Bowers

William M. Hammond

George L. MacGarrigle

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 1996

BLACK SOLDIER

WHITE ARMY

The 24TH Infantry 

Regiment in Korea
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bowers, William T., 1946–

Black soldier, white army : The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea / by

William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, George L. MacGarrigle.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Korean War, 1950–1953—Regimental Histories—United States. 

2. United States. Army. Infantry Regiment, 24th—History.

3. Korean War, 1950–1953—Afro-American participation. 4. United

States. Army—Afro-American troops—History. I. Hammond, William

M. II. MacGarrigle, George L., 1930– . III. Title.

DS919.B68 1996

951.904’2—dc20 93–14052

CIP

CMH Pub 70–65
T

he story of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea

is a difficult one, both for the veterans of the

unit and for the Army. In the early weeks of the

Korean War, most American military units experienced problems as the U.S. Army attempted to

transform understrength, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained forces into an effective combat team

while at the same time holding back the fierce

attacks of an aggressive and well-prepared opponent. In addition to the problems other regiments

faced in Korea, the 24th Infantry also had to overcome the effects of racial prejudice. Ultimately the

soldiers of the regiment, despite steadfast courage

on the part of many, paid the price on the battlefield for the attitudes and misguided policies of the

Army and their nation.

Several previously published histories have discussed what happened to the 24th Infantry. This

book tells why it happened. In doing so, it offers

important lessons for today’s Army. The Army and

the nation must be aware of the corrosive effects of

segregation and the racial prejudices that accompanied it. The consequences of that system crippled

the trust and mutual confidence so necessary

among the soldiers and leaders of combat units and

weakened the bonds that held the 24th together,

producing profound effects on the battlefield. I

urge the reader to study and reflect on the insights

provided in the chapters that follow. We must

ensure that the injustices and misfortunes that

befell the 24th never occur again.

Six people deserve special acknowledgment for

the roles they played in the production of this study.

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh first recognized

the need for this work and monitored its early stages.

A concerned veteran, Mr. David Carlisle, pushed

continually for its completion. General Roscoe

Robinson, before he passed away, read initial drafts

of the early chapters and made valuable comments.

Col. John Cash collected many of the documents,

conducted nearly three hundred oral history interviews, walked the battlegrounds in Korea, and drafted an early account of the regiment’s history. The

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and

Reserve Affairs, Hon. Sara E. Lister, supported our

work during the past two years. The Secretary of the

Army, Hon. Togo D. West, Jr., approved its publication. Special thanks is extended to each, as well as to

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Roy Flint, a combat veteran and

scholar who prepared an introduction placing this

study in its larger historical context. We are also gratified to report that the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, is

once again serving proudly as part of the 1st Brigade,

25th Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Foreword

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

Washington, D.C.

21 August 1996
WILLIAM T. BOWERS received his B.A. and M.A.

degrees in history from Texas Christian University.

Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1969, he

served in Vietnam in the 1st Cavalry Division and

later as an adviser. He has commanded field

artillery units in the United States and Germany

and has served as a staff officer in the office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in

Washington, D.C., as well as in the Joint

Headquarters of the Central Army Group and the

Fourth Allied Tactical Airforce (NATO) in

Heidelberg, Germany. He has taught history at the

U.S. Naval Academy and has been a guest lecturer

at the Army War College and at the NATO School

in Oberammergau, Germany. In 1992 he joined the

Center of Military History as chief of the Histories

Division. Having retired from the Army in 1995, he

resides in Burke, Virginia, where he remains active

in the field of military history.

WILLIAM M. HAMMOND graduated from the

Catholic University of America, where he earned

the S.T.B., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees. He currently

serves as a historian with the Center of Military

History, where he has authored a two-volume history of official relations with the news media during the Vietnam War, Public Affairs: The Military and

the Media. He has also authored the Army’s history

of the selection and interment of the Vietnam

Unknown Soldier, The Unknown Serviceman of the

Vietnam Era; a monograph entitled Normandy,

released in 1994 by the Army to mark the 50th

anniversary of the invasion; as well as numerous

shorter articles and publications. He is currently

preparing a volume in the Army’s Cold War series

entitled “The Army and National Security: The

Emergence of the Cold War, 1945–1953.” Dr.

Hammond has taught at Trinity College in

Washington, D.C., and at the University of

Maryland, Baltimore County. He currently doubles

as a Lecturer in University Honors at the University

of Maryland, College Park, where he teaches courses on the Vietnam War and the military and the

news media in American history. 

GEORGE L. MACGARRIGLE is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy and has received

an M.A. in history from Pennsylvania State

University. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in

1952, he served with the 1st Cavalry Division in

Korea as a rifle company commander and again

with the 1st Cavalry Division during the Vietnam

War as an infantry battalion commander. He directed the military history program while assigned to

the ROTC at Pennsylvania State University. He currently serves as a civilian historian with the Center

of Military History, where he has authored “The

Year of the Offensive” and is working on a second

volume, “The Tet Offensive,” both of which tell the

Army’s story of combat in Vietnam.

The Authors
I

n late September 1950, two months after the

beginning of the Korean War, the commander of

the 25th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. William B.

Kean, requested that the Eighth Army disband the

all-black 24th Infantry Regiment because it had

shown itself “untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an infantry regiment.” Thus began a controversy that has continued to this day. Critics of the racially segregated

regiment have charged that the 24th was a dismal

failure in combat. The African-American veterans

of the organization and others have responded that

the unit did far better than its antagonists would

concede and that its main problem was the racial

prejudice endemic to the Army of that day. Military

historians have tended to cite the lack of training

and preparation afflicting all of the U.S. Army units

entering combat during the early weeks of the

Korean War and the inability of senior commanders to remedy deficiencies of leadership in the

24th within a reasonable period of time.

For a while, with the integration of the armed

forces, the talk on all sides subsided, but when the

U.S. Army’s official history of the Korean War, South

to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, authored by Roy E.

Appleman, appeared in 1961, it reignited the controversy by publicizing the background of Kean’s

charges. During the late 1970s, as a result, a number

of individuals began an effort to persuade the Army

to revise its history to reflect a more balanced view of

the regiment. In 1987 Secretary of the Army John O.

Marsh, Jr., directed that the U.S. Army Center of

Military History undertake a definitive evaluation of

the 24th’s role in the Korean War. If the regiment’s

performance was commendable, the record could be

amended. But if its service was less than successful,

the reasons behind its shortcomings ought to be

examined for the lessons they might convey to the

soldier of today.

Col. John A. Cash began the effort in 1988.

Over the next several years he and several assistants

conducted nearly three hundred oral history interviews, visited the battlefields in Korea, researched

official records in the National Archives, and completed part of an initial draft outline for a final manuscript. Cash retired in 1992. Shortly thereafter the

Center formed a team of three historians to conduct additional research and interviews and to

compose a final study.

This history is the result. It analyzes the operations of the 24th Infantry during the Korean War to

determine how well the unit and its associated

engineers and artillery performed. In the process it

asks whether deficiencies occurred, seeks their military causes, and looks at how those influences and

events intersected with the racial prejudices prevalent in that day.

Starting with a brief rendition of the background

of the African-American soldier in the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, the study shows that

Preface
segregated regiments and divisions performed well

when called upon during the American Civil War

and throughout the nineteenth century. In the same

way, the men of the all-black 93d Division fought

effectively under French command during World

War I, as did the experienced black tank and tank

destroyer battalions that often spearheaded the final

Allied drive into Nazi Germany during World War

II. In that light, if the 24th Infantry faltered during

its first two months in Korea, the color of the majority that constituted its companies and battalions was

not the reason. More obvious answers lay in the deficiencies of leadership, training, supply, and support

that burdened the entire United Nations force,

whether white or black, during the first months of

the war in Korea. Those causes nonetheless seemed

only a beginning because they exist in every war and

have time and again given way to the solutions that

good leadership inevitably supplies. If the 24th’s

problems lasted longer than a brief period, deeper

reasons would thus have to be found, and they

would inevitably have to reside in considerations

that distinguished the 24th from all-white units, particularly the racial bias and discrimination, both

open and covert, that the regiment and its people

experienced throughout the unit’s existence.

As authors, we faced major challenges in determining what happened. Few historical problems are

more demanding than those that accompany an

attempt to reconstruct the performance of a military

unit in combat. Every platoon, company, battalion,

regiment, and division has its own character, and

each one consists of subunits that are in turn unique.

All are composed of thinking human beings who act

as individuals. Even so, the people who compose

those units or any group will not always behave as

they might on their own. A dynamic can come into

play among them when unusual circumstances

intrude, and the effects it produces, whether acts of

extreme bravery or of mass confusion, may at times

seem hardly rational. Much depends upon the bonding that exists among the group’s members and the

trust they place in one another and in their leaders.

In addition, a group’s identity can take new forms

over time as circumstances and personalities change.

Given those uncertainties and the many variables

involved, the attributes that produce success in combat are not always discernable. Well-experienced

units with unsurpassed achievements may sometimes fail while worn units with less than perfect

records may pull together at a moment of supreme

terror to succeed.

Indeed, the nature of combat is such that it is

difficult even for participants coherently and completely to describe the events that occurred. Danger,

chaos, confusion, and stress distract attention from

the main course of the fighting. Meanwhile, perspectives vary widely, depending on an individual’s

responsibilities and his location on the battlefield.

The view and understanding of a private will hardly

resemble those of a unit commander. Each will

reflect the truth of what happened in his own way.

On top of that, the emotional intensity of combat

may deepen the natural tendency of a soldier to forget embarrassing and unpleasant events and to focus

his attention on aspects of the fighting that appeal to

his sense of self-worth.

As combat historian S. L. A. Marshall discovered, if time, patience, and special skills are necessary to reconstruct what happened even immediately after a battle, it is still more difficult to explain why

it occurred. Marshall brought together all the survivors of an action and questioned them as a group.

Each participant contributed his own view of the

battle, starting at the beginning and moving step-bystep through events as they developed. At first, no

one would have a complete understanding of what

had occurred or why events had transpired the way

they did. But after three or four days of effort, a fairly coherent picture would begin to emerge.

Nothing of the sort was possible in the case of

this study. No time or opportunity existed during the

early days of the Korean War for extensive combat

interviews. Events were moving too fast. As a result,

we had to rely upon contemporary descriptions of

combat compiled by the units involved.

Those materials were often extensive. Officers at

command posts in the field would keep daily journals, collect folders of operations orders and messages, and, from time to time, compose memorandums for the record. Once a month, those at battalion would draft a war diary, later called a command

vi THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
report, for their unit and submit it to the regimental

headquarters. Using those diaries along with its own

journals and reports, the regiment would then compile a report of its own for submission to the division

command. The division would do the same, and so

on up the line. Each report was accompanied by

annexes describing particular problems that developed, lessons learned, and the personnel and supply

status of the command. There were also maps,

graphs, and overlays.

Despite the wealth of information that those

materials presented, as the study proceeded it

became clear that all of those sources, particularly

the war diaries, were deficient. Unit records and

human memories were sometimes incomplete or

inaccurate, and those flaws might be carried over

into a narrative. Compounding the problem, war

diaries, although due within a few days after the end

of each month, were sometimes actually written

weeks after the events they described had occurred

because the demands of combat had intervened. By

then, daily journals and other unit records might

have been destroyed or lost, some participants in the

action would have fallen in battle, and the chronicle

of what had happened would have had to be reconstructed from fragmentary records and scraps of

memory. On occasion as well, the narratives were

self-serving, presenting a more favorable view of

events than the facts warranted or covering up the

role that poor leadership and decision making

played in some military failures. Overall, if some war

diaries were thus beautifully detailed and even brutally honest while others were incomplete and less

than candid, few written records of any consequence

speculated on why events had occurred in the manner that they did.

Those difficulties forced the authors to make

heavy use of oral history to bridge gaps and correct

errors in the official records. Yet that approach had

its own problems. The participants in a past action,

recounting their experiences in interviews, had to

struggle against their own imperfect memories. They

had little access to official records, maps, and overlays and, except in rare instances, few opportunities

to revisit the terrain they were attempting to

describe. If they had kept a personal diary, it was

often incomplete. And even where a veteran had a

good recall of events, details of one combat action

sometimes merged with those of others until none

bore much resemblance to what had actually happened. Complicating matters, perspectives and perceptions had changed over time where race and

other issues were concerned. The influence of the

civil rights movement and the spread of the ideal of

racial equality had worked their way so thoroughly

through American society that it was often difficult

to perceive where a man had stood on the issue during the war. If some of those interviewed had

changed very little, others had clearly matured. Men

who had earned reputations as racists among their

subordinates and colleagues during the war had

become remarkably more tolerant and objective over

the forty years between then and now.

Some of the sources that proved most valuable

to the study were the transcripts of interviews conducted by inspector general teams during the course

of three official investigations into the 24th’s performance in battle. Those materials must be used with

great care because they are, at times, racially biased

and self-serving. Nevertheless, they contain a great

wealth of information about the fighting, some of it

gathered within days of the events described from

witnesses who would soon be killed in combat. To

be sure, many whites in those interviews blamed

their black subordinates or enlisted soldiers for every

problem, and the blacks, on occasion, held their

tongues or played blatantly to the prejudices of their

interviewers to preserve or further their careers. But

statements of that sort were easily balanced against

one another and against those of individuals who

were willing to speak their minds, whatever the consequences. In addition, some of them are virtual

duplicates of stories told by other veterans long

afterwards and of events detailed in radio logs and

daily journals.

We employed caution in dealing with all those

materials. In the case of documentary evidence, we

sought to verify controversial occurrences by seeking

out multiple sources for the same information. If

only one source existed, we checked the reliability of

previous assertions from that source and, if any

doubt remained, attempted to verify the account by

PREFACE vii
getting the comments of veterans who had already

proved themselves forthright and knowledgeable.

After that, if doubts still persisted, we did not use the

information. 

The same sort of approach applied to oral history interviews. We attempted in every case to corroborate stories from one source with material from others or from written records. Where that proved

impossible, the credibility of the source became a

concern. Was that person in a position to know? Did

he have something to gain from the statement? Was

the rest of the information he provided reliable and

accurate as far as it was possible to tell? Had he been

willing at times, to paint himself in a bad light to

depict the truth? If the responses to those questions

were adequate, in important cases we used the material but always with an explanation in a footnote. In

the same way, we tried to label hearsay and rumor as

such throughout the study, but whether or not a

comment was well founded, the mere fact that a

number of soldiers said substantially the same thing

gave it weight as an indicator of the morale and

cohesion of the regiment. In some circumstances,

assertions were made in interviews that could have

been proved only by an official investigation at the

time. Once again, after the proper labeling, we used

these comments if they seemed an adequate reflection of the thoughts of the men at the time. The race

of an individual can of course play a role in how he

perceives an event. Because of that, we made it a

point whenever possible to label the race of officers

mentioned in the body of the text. Enlisted men and

noncommissioned officers are all black unless otherwise identified.

When a historian examines the history of a military unit in detail, problem areas tend to eclipse

matters that went well. To achieve balance, the successes of a unit must be told along with its failures,

and what went poorly must be seen in the perspective of what other military units were doing at the

same time and in the same place.

We sought to do that in this study but encountered problems in making the attempt. Since the war

diaries we consulted often tended to be bland or

lacking in fine detail, we frequently found it difficult

to identify and reconstruct episodes in which all but

the most singular achievements had occurred. In the

case of Medal of Honor winner Pfc. William

Thompson, for example, unit histories were completely silent until 4 January 1951, five months after

the day on which the soldier earned his award by

giving his life for his fellow soldiers.

As in the case of Thompson, we attempted to

underscore the special deeds of units and individuals by making the best use wherever we could of our

interviews and the records and depositions accompanying award citations. In that way, we were able to

single out some members of the 24th who overcame

the burdens not only of unpreparedness and weak

leadership but also of racial prejudice by performing

exemplary acts of achievement during the war. 

Over the first two months of the fighting, however, the exploits of those men tended to pale in the

context of what was going wrong elsewhere in the

regiment. The situation changed following the

breakout from Pusan, after the troops and their leaders had time to train and mend. From then on, the

regiment performed more or less on a par with the

rest of the Eighth Army.

Overall, we found that comparisons between the

24th and the other regiments fighting in Korea were

difficult to make, not only because no two military

units are precisely the same, but also because none

of the other regiments experienced the particular

social and psychological burdens segregation

imposed. A lack of resources was also an impediment. Interviews with almost four hundred individuals, two-thirds of them African-Americans, went

into the research behind the study of the 24th. An

effort to do the same for other regiments serving in

Korea at the time was impossible.

Within those limitations, we did attempt to provide a context for the 24th by pairing it with several

similar units, the 5th, 27th, and 35th Infantry

Regiments, all of which served in the same vicinity

and experienced the same sort of combat. In doing

so, we drew upon the official records of those units

and conducted a number of interviews with their

veterans to determine the quality of their leadership,

the conditions their men experienced, and how well

they fared in combat. Although the work was hardly

as exhaustive as what was done for the 24th, we are

viii THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
confident that it was adequate to show how well the

24th performed by comparison.

Many people contributed to the successful completion of this book. Although we cannot mention

all of them here, a number deserve special thanks.

Several Chiefs of Military History, Brig. Gens.

William A. Stofft, Harold W. Nelson, and John W.

Mountcastle, provided continual moral and material

support. The Chief Historian, Jeffrey Clarke, likewise

rendered important advice and assistance. Col. John

Cash, Bernard Muehlbauer, Maj. Timothy Rainey,

and Young Gil Chang, who has since died, conducted the initial interviews and completed essential preliminary surveys of relevant documentation. Mary

Haynes, Edward Drea, Terrence Gough, and Maj.

Constance Moore, all of the Center’s Research and

Analysis Division, assisted with further research and

interviews when the need arose. The Center’s librarian, James Knight, and archivists Hannah Zeidlik

and Donald Carter responded cheerfully to every

request for books and documents, even the most

arcane. John Wilson of the Center’s Organizational

History Branch was similarly helpful when confronted with urgent requests for information on obscure

military organizations. Robert J. T. Joy, a professor of

military medicine at the Uniformed Services

University of the Health Sciences, was a constant

resource for medical aspects of the study. The Eighth

Army’s historian, Thomas Ryan; Richard Boylan of

the National Archives; David Keough of the U.S.

Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania; and the staff of the Army Reference

Branch at the National Personnel Records Center in

St. Louis also contributed heavily in locating relevant

documentation on file with their respective agencies.

Col. Clyde Jonas, John Elsberg, Albert Cowdrey,

Graham Cosmas, Mary Gillett, and Joel Meyerson of

the Center, along with the late General Roscoe

Robinson, Morris MacGregor, Bernard Nalty, and

Richard Ruth, read initial drafts of various portions

of the book and made many valuable suggestions.

The authors are also grateful to Mr. David Carlisle,

who pushed for the manuscript’s completion.

Meanwhile, Lt. Gens. Julius Becton and Sidney

Berry, Maj. Gen. Oliver Dillard, Brig. Gen. Roy Flint,

Cols. John Komp and Gustav Gillert, Sgt. Maj.

Richard Sanders, Stephen Ambrose, Clay Blair, Peter

Braestrup, John Butler, Richard Dalfiume, Robert

Goldich, Joseph Glatthaar, Phillip McGuire, David

Segal, and Frank Schubert evaluated the final draft.

Gaye Patrick deserves special thanks for handling correspondence and arranging the interview

summaries in a useful database form. Thanks should

go as well to John Birmingham, who designed the

layout for the book; Beth MacKenzie, who located

many of the photographs; and Sherry Dowdy, who

prepared the maps. We are also grateful to our editors, Diane Arms and Diane Donovan, who shepherded the manuscript through to final publication,

as well as Susan Carroll, who compiled the index.

The members of our families merit particular

mention for their patience and the constant encouragement they provided. They contributed much

more than they will ever know.

Finally, the historian who finds imperfections in

the written records he uses and in the memories of

those he interviews must recognize that he has the

same flaws in himself. Having done that, he must

make a special effort to cast off his intellectual preconditioning, to step out of himself and into the

moment he is trying to re-create, and to feel as his

subjects felt. Only then can he begin to understand

why they acted as they did. The reader of this study

will have to decide whether this work succeeds in

doing that. For the rest, since the historian must be

true to his own instincts about his material, we, the

authors, are alone responsible for all interpretations

and conclusions that appear and any errors that have

occurred. Our views do not reflect the official policy

or position of the Departments of the Army and

Defense or the U.S. government.

PREFACE ix

WILLIAM T. BOWERS

WILLIAM M. HAMMOND

GEORGE L. MACGARRIGLE

Washington, D.C.

21 August 1996

B

lack Soldier, White Army is a “shocking” book. So

said Clay Blair after reading it. Blair was shocked

by the violence of combat in Korea and by the

unreadiness of the 24th Infantry Regiment and the

rest of the Army to deal with that violence early in

the war. Most of all he was outraged by the decision

of political leaders to send an unready Army to war.

This response by the author of The Forgotten War:

America in Korea, 1950–1953, one who has thought

long and hard about Korea, suggests that others who

read this book will more clearly understand the

Korean record of the 24th Infantry in the broader

context of the post–World War II history of the

armed forces and the Army in particular. 

There has never been a decade quite as turbulent as that which followed World War II. Atomic

power, military demobilization and industrial

reconversion, leadership in the United Nations

(UN), hostility between the Western allies and the

Soviet Union, the Berlin blockade, creation of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and

Communist Chinese ascendancy in Asia defined

the American response to the Cold War. For the

first five years there was little confrontation by military forces. Then the Korean conflict surprised

Western policy makers and their constituents,

causing the old Western alliance of World Wars I

and II to form again, this time against the Soviet

Union and its allies, North Korea and the People’s

Republic of China.

Looking back from the eve of the Korean War,

it is clear that the United States had undertaken

international responsibilities that became military

requirements in the years that followed. To help

guard against the revival of fascism and to begin the

political reconstruction of its former enemies, the

United States agreed to station occupation troops in

Germany, Austria, Trieste, Korea, and Japan.

Military leaders believed that the nation’s commitment to occupy and govern the defeated territories

demanded conventional military forces both in the

United States and overseas. But even before the war

ended, the United States began to reduce its armed

strength from about twelve million to a postwar

goal of about a million and a half men.

Demobilization was a political imperative in

1945. Meeting demands to bring the troops home,

the Army discharged 4 million men in the first six

Introduction

by

Roy K. Flint

Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, United States Army (Retired), served as company commander and battalion operations officer

in the 23d Infantry during the period immediately following the Korean War and as battalion commander in the 22d Infantry

during the Vietnam War. He holds a doctorate in military history from Duke University. Prior to retirement in 1990, he was

professor and head of the Department of History and dean of the Academic Board at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

General Flint has been the president of the Society for Military History since 1993.
months and would release most of the remainder

by the middle of 1946. The Air Force cut its

strength in half, from 218 groups to 109, and the

Navy reduced the fleet strength by deactivating

ships, aircraft, and their crews and halting construction on those ships in the yards at the end of

the war. Still, the demand for demobilization continued through 1946 and into 1947.

Dismantling the armed forces at the same time

the nation increased its international obligations

alarmed the military professionals. The forces in

the United States were cut to a nucleus of the needed reserve, while overseas troops were thinly

stretched. Moreover, as the breach between the

Soviet Union and the Western European allies

widened, Soviet military forces quickly replaced

resurgent fascism as the main military threat to the

interests of the United States. If the Soviets resorted to war, they would be able to employ overwhelming land forces almost immediately against

the nations of Western Europe and the occupation

forces of the United States. Moreover, the Soviets

could support ground operations with powerful

tactical air forces. At sea the Soviet surface navy was

a negligible threat, but the Soviet submarine force

was growing. The Soviet Union had abundant

resources and could develop an industrial capacity

far exceeding its achievement in World War II.

Soviet potential, in the long term, was seen to be

virtually unlimited; the essential question was:

when could the Soviets effectively employ the new

air-atomic weapons system?

Not surprisingly, on the eve of the Korean War

the solution to the American strategic problem was

to deter war by threatening air-atomic retaliation.

The purpose of this deterrence was to defend

Europe and the continental United States against

the Soviet Union. To implement a single enemy

strategy, the United States built an air force capable

of air-atomic delivery that was adequate as long as

the American monopoly on atomic weapons and

their means of delivery existed. But by concentrating on the purchase of long-range bombing aircraft,

the United States acquired atomic delivery at the

expense of conventional air, land, and sea capability, a more costly and politically less attractive alternative. As a consequence, the Air Force was short

of aircraft for the close support of ground forces;

the Army was ill equipped and understrength; and

the Navy, although able to employ powerful carrier

task forces almost immediately, lacked the long-distance troop-lift capability upon which the Army

depended. Under these circumstances, until

Western European nations were rearmed and able

to assume the burden of their own protection, there

could be little or no conventional defense of

Western Europe. Everything depended upon deterring Soviet expansion by threatening atomic retaliation. Up to the outbreak of the Korean War in

June 1950, deterrence was understood to be working because, for whatever reasons, it had not yet

been tested by the Soviets. In concentrating on preventing a big war, however, the nation’s leaders had

failed to conceive of a more conventional conflict.

Ironically, the United States was actually better

prepared to fight in Korea than anywhere else in

the world. Although the administration and

Congress wanted to adopt air-atomic deterrence to

the exclusion of more expensive conventional

forces, the bureaucratic bargaining between the

Joint Chiefs—who were also chiefs of the four services—and the secretary of defense prevented that

solution and forced a roughly equal division of

funds that ensured that a ground force was available to fight in Korea. Specifically, in or near Japan

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur commanded 4 reduced-strength Army divisions of the

Eighth Army; 18 fighter squadrons and a light

bomber squadron of the Air Force; and 1 cruiser, 4

destroyers, and a number of amphibious vessels of

the Navy. In addition, the Seventh Fleet, a powerful carrier strike force, was available if needed.

Although it may have been difficult for

American leaders to understand that summer night

in June 1950, the North Korean attack was to point

with unmistakable clarity at the deficiencies in the

combat readiness of the United States. Called upon

to meet the North Korean ground attack, the Army

revealed the inadequacies of a minimalist conventional military policy. For as events turned out, the

North Koreans were simply undeterred by the

atomic power of the United States because they had

xii THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
no vulnerable industrial targets upon which they

relied. Moreover, they were strong in mobilized

military manpower, the principal weakness of the

United States, South Korea, and those countries’

UN allies. In time this weakness would be remedied, but until the winter of 1950–1951 American

and South Korean soldiers suffered terrible casualties holding the line against a well-trained, wellarmed, and tactically effective enemy army.

So the weakness of the initial military response

in Korea was a result of prewar diversions from

conventional forces of men, money, and materiel to

build air-atomic deterrence of the Soviet Union. As

a result, MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker,

the Eighth Army commander, committed forces to

Korea that were flawed. When Walker arrived in

Japan in 1949, he had made individual training

first priority in Eighth Army. After receiving reinforcements, he filled battalions sufficiently to

enable realistic training. But he was still limited in

his ability to maneuver offensively and defensively

by regiments that had only two battalions instead

of three; he could never fill his manpower or equipment shortages; and he could not create training

areas adequate for Infantry-Armor-Artillery combined arms training. While individual soldiers

might develop skills, combat readiness suffered

from a lack of unit and combined arms preparation. In this regard, the 24th Infantry Regiment was

no worse than any other unit and better off organizationally because it was the only regiment in

Eighth Army with three battalions.

When MacArthur moved combat troops to

Korea early in July 1950, the consequences of

committing a flawed Army to battle became

apparent. The first American troops to meet the

enemy were virtually isolated on the battlefield

and stretched by extended frontages. They were

without allies, combat support, and sources of

resupply. Moreover, the North Koreans attacked

with a well-rehearsed and effective scheme of

maneuver: they fixed the American front with a

tank-infantry-artillery attack, enveloped both

flanks, attacked command posts and mortars in

the rear, and then formed roadblocks to cut off

reinforcements and prevent escape. Once in the

rear, North Korean units disrupted the defense

physically and psychologically because the

defenders were ill prepared to fight surrounded.

Often the primary concern of the defenders was to

escape. MacArthur tried to remedy the problem

by rushing troops to Korea, not only to build

resistance to the North Koreans in their southward drive, but also to create a viable theater of

war capable of sustaining combat forces on the

battlefield. Belatedly, the tasks were accomplished, but the folly of unreadiness was made

indelible by the mounting casualties.

While all units struggled to overcome organizational obstacles, the 24th Infantry Regiment experienced the especially difficult circumstances

described in Black Soldier, White Army that led to its

inactivation in October 1951. The decision to inactivate the 24th was certainly a result of dissatisfaction with its performance, but it was also the culmination of a gradual change in Army policy

toward segregated units that had been under way

since early 1950. In January Army regulations

directed efficient employment of manpower without regard to race, and in March the Army did away

with quotas that restricted the recruiting of black

soldiers. As a result, enlistment of black men

increased well beyond the requirements of the segregated units. Commanders therefore began assigning black soldiers wherever they were needed and

expressed satisfaction with the results. Fears of hostility and tension between blacks and whites

proved unfounded, and performance improved in

the integrated combat units.

A segregated Army was always a bad idea, rooted in the social standards of white Americans in the

twentieth century every bit as deeply as it was in

the nineteenth century. Given the tensions of the

Cold War and the need for economical use of manpower in the modern armed forces, it was a foolish

waste. Regardless of the sentimental attachment of

black veterans of the 24th Infantry and the black

battalions in the 9th and 15th Infantry Regiments,

segregated units had to go. Unfortunately, before

Korea no one in responsible positions had the will

to overcome personal prejudice or to confront

political opposition to integration. Among the

INTRODUCTION xiii
senior Army officers who recognized this fact and

had the courage to act was General Matthew B.

Ridgway, Eighth Army commander following

Walker’s death in December 1950 and the architect

of the UN drive north of the 38th Parallel in the

spring of 1951.

After replacing MacArthur as Far Eastern commander in April 1951, Ridgway proved to be the

catalyst that resolved the dilemma over segregated

units. His purpose was to improve combat effectiveness in all units within the Far Eastern

Command, so in May, only a month after taking

command, he recommended assigning black troops

to all of his units in Japan and Korea. He also recommended inactivating the 24th and assigning its

troops to other all-white units in the theater. The

Department of the Army approved his recommendations in July and directed integration of combat

units over a six-month period; service units were to

integrate after the combat battalions. While inactivation of the 24th may be seen by some as an act

unrelated to efficiency, it was in fact a highly visible

symbol of Ridgway’s dedication to a ready Army:

manned, organized, trained, equipped, and supplied to go to war at a moment’s notice. There

would be no more Koreas.

Understandably, winding down the war in

Korea sidetracked the measures needed to achieve

Ridgway’s goal. Nevertheless, even before the

Supreme Court ruled against “separate but equal”

in 1954, near the end of the decade following

World War II, the Army was well on its way to creating a merit-based system that served as a model

of desegregation for the civilian community. Once

undertaken it was so successful that a black soldier,

General Colin Powell, eventually served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff some thirty-five

years later.

Black Soldier, White Army is first and foremost

an important social history of black soldiers in the

United States Army. It explains in vivid detail the

climate of racial prejudice surrounding the regiment in Japan and Korea and then in equally

harsh terms, it uncovers the legacy of that prejudice in combat. Therefore, the unfolding story is

also a military history of the 24th Infantry

Regiment in the first fifteen months of the Korean

War. Black veterans of the 24th may be unhappy

with this book as a regimental history because it

has so much to say about the events leading to the

inactivation of the regiment in October 1951. So

too will white officers who served in the regiment

and who must come to grips with the authors’

carefully supported portrayal of bigotry and

downright bad leadership that had so much to do

with the troubles of the 24th and that make the

book such an important social history. Similarly,

all officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers who served prior to Korea must feel uneasy

about the policies and practices that maintained a

racially segregated Army. The attitudes about race

that so damaged the morale and sense of selfworth of the men in the 24th emanated from

every level of command from the battlefield to

Tokyo and Washington. This is what Black Soldier,

White Army is all about.

xiv THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Contents

Chapter Page

1. Prologue: Two Centuries of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Turbulence and Reappraisal, 1945–1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3. Gifu: “Our Own Little World” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 

Okinawa and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Life at Gifu, 1946–1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

A Time of Change, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4. Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

The 24th Infantry Prepares for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The Journey to Korea and First Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Yech’on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

5. Sangju . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

The 24th Moves South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Incidents Near Idang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Combat, 26–31 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

6. The Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

The Eighth Army Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Combat, 5–15 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

7. The Great Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

The 25th Division at the End of August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

The North Koreans Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Colonel Corley Takes Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Chapter Page

8. To Kunu-ri and Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Breakout and Move North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

The Push Toward the Yalu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

The Chinese Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

The 3d Battalion’s Ordeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

9. Across the Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

The Eighth Army Withdraws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Time To Mend, January–March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

The Han River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

Crossing the Hant’an . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

The Chinese Spring Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

10. Last Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

11. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

Appendixes

A. Infantry Regiment Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

B. Black Units Serving in the Korean War, September 1950–September 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

Bibliographical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

Tables

No.

1. 24th Infantry Strength, 1946–1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2. Percentage Distribution of AGCT Scores of Men in Army, 1949–1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3. Eighth Army VD Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4. GCT Breakdown—25th Division Units (As of 19 September 1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

5. Racial Distribution of Officers When the 24th Infantry Deployed to Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

6. 25th Division Losses by 31 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

7. 24th Infantry General Courts-Martial, July–October 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Maps

1. Korea and Japan, 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

2. The U.S.–ROK Front, 13 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
No. Page

3. Battle for Yech’on, 20–21 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

4. 24th Infantry Regiment, Sangju Area, 22 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

5. 24th Infantry Regiment, Sangju Area, 26–31 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

6. The Front Moves South, 14 July–4 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

7. Task Force Kean, 7–12 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

8. 24th Infantry Regiment, Haman Area, 16–26 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

9. The North Korean Naktong Offensive, U.S. 25th Division Sector, 

31 August–1 September 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

10. The Pursuit, 23–30 September 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

11. Battle of the Ch’ongch’on, 25–28 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

12. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kunu-ri Area, 23–25 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

13. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kunu-ri Area, 26–30 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

14. Battle of the Ch’ongch’on, 28 November–1 December 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

15. Eighth Army Withdrawal, 1 December 1950–24 January 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

16. Operation RIPPER, Western Front, 6–31 March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

17. Han River Crossing, 7–15 March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

18. Operations on the Western Front, 1–22 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

19. 24th Infantry Regiment Advance North of Hant’an River, 7–22 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

20. The Chinese Spring Offensive: The Main Effort, 22–30 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

21. Eighth Army Advance, 20 May–1 July 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

22. 24th Infantry Regiment, Kumhwa Area, 31 August 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Illustrations

Civil War Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Bvt. Brig. Gen. Ranald S. MacKenzie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The 24th Infantry Marching in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The 24th Infantry Attends Sick Call in Siboney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

American Negro Troops in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

A Kitchen and a Dining Room in a Trench in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The 24th Infantry Before Going Out To Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Truman Gibson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Aerial View of the 24th Infantry Area, Gifu, Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Enlisted Men of the 24th Infantry Ride Through a River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Camp Majestic, Near Gifu, Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

White Stucco Building at Camp Majestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Members of the 24th Infantry Band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Colonel Halloran With a 24th Infantry Boxing Team Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Troops of the 25th Infantry Division Unload Trucks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Col. Horton V. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Maj. Gen. William B. Kean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Page

Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

The 24th Infantry Waiting To Move Out From Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Soldiers on a Flatcar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Troops of Company G, 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Yech’on Burns After Being Shelled by American Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Yech’on From Top of a Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

A Patrol Moves Up a Hill To Observe North Koreans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

North Korean–Held Territory West of Sangju . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Members of Company M, 24th Infantry, in the Sangju Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Pfc. William Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Col. Arthur J. Champeny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Men of 159th Field Artillery Battalion Fire a Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Gold Mine in Which Communist-Led North Koreans Hid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Sunday Morning Services Along the Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

The Enemy Side of Rocky Crags on Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

General Douglas MacArthur With Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

Mountain Mass West of Haman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Members of the 24th Infantry March Behind Battle Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Lt. Col. John T. Corley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Members of a Communications Element Checking Radios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Bivouac Site of a Headquarters Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Preparing To Leave an Assembly Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Men From a 24th Infantry Company Await Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

A Soldier Relays a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

General MacArthur Salutes the Men of the 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

General MacArthur With Sgt. Curtis Pugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

General Omar N. Bradley Meets Troops of the 24th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Men of the 24th Regimental Combat Team Shield Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Col. Henry C. Britt After Receiving the Silver Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Men of the 24th Infantry With Korean Porters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

Capt. Oliver W. Dillard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Men of the 24th Infantry Fight With Chinese Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Companies B and C, 24th Infantry, Battle Communist Counterattacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

The 24th Infantry Fighting South of Ch’orwon, Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

Battling a Chinese Counterattack South of Ch’orwon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Men of the 3d Battalion Withdraw After Heavy Counterattacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Ready and Waiting in a Bunker for the Chinese Advance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

Sgt. Cornelius H. Charlton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Men From Company D After Thirty-Eight Days on the Front Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Members of Company M Prior to Inactivation of the Regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 21, 32, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 61, 63, 80, 84, 85, 86,

93, 94, 97 (left/right), 111, 132, 136, 138, 152, 161, 166, 170, 180, 181, 184, 198, 210, 211, 225, 226

(left/right), 227, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 257, 262, National Archives; and pp.

4, 9, 11, Library of Congress. All other illustrations from the files of the Department of Defense.
BLACK SOLDIER

WHITE ARMY

The 24TH Infantry 

Regiment in Korea

T

he soldiers of the 24th Infantry regiment who

fought in Korea were heirs to a long tradition of

service by blacks in America’s wars. Their forebears had fought alongside the colonial militias

during the nation’s early years, at Lexington and

Concord, and all through the American Revolution.

Black seamen sailed with Commodore Oliver

Hazard Perry’s victorious fleet on Lake Erie and

stood with General Andrew Jackson at the Battle of

New Orleans in the War of 1812. Confronted by

racial prejudice at a time when the North and

South were beginning to drift apart over the issue

of slavery, only a few African-Americans served

with American ground forces during the Mexican

War, but more than two hundred thousand rallied

to the Union cause during the American Civil War.1

During the years prior to the Civil War, many

northern states adopted legislation emancipating

slaves, but blacks in general remained inferior to

whites before the law. The ranks of the militia and

the Regular Army opened to them intermittently,

when a need for manpower arose in times of emergency, but they closed again as soon as peace

returned. Only the Navy remained accessible. Life

at sea was so harsh during those days that shipmasters, whether civilian or military, took anyone

who would sign on, whatever his color.2

The pattern repeated itself in 1861, when the

South seceded from the United States and the

Civil War began. Although the Navy recruited

blacks from the beginning and commanders in the

field employed escaped slaves as laborers, the

Army once more excluded them. President

Abraham Lincoln and his advisers hoped to gain

the support of such slave-holding border states as

Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky, while leaving

the door open for some sort of reconciliation with

the seceding states. Because the presence of armed

CHAPTER 1

Prologue: Two Centuries of Service

1 A number of works detail the role of blacks in these wars.

One of the most comprehensive is Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for

the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York:

Free Press, 1986). See also John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to

Freedom: A History of Negro Americans (New York: Vintage Books,

1969); Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Lorenzo

Johnston Green, “The Negro in the War of 1812 and the Civil

War,” Negro History Bulletin (March 1951); Roland MacConnell,

Negro Troops in Antebellum Louisiana: A History of the Battalion of

Free Men of Color (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press,

1968).The Army dropped the regimental designation in 1917. At

that time, the 24th Infantry Regiment became simply the 24th

Infantry. For clarity, this book retains the old title, but it acknowledges the change by using the word regiment in lowercase.

2 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 21; Green, “The Negro in

the War of 1812 and the Civil War,” pp. 131f. In the Dred

Scott decision, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney cited the exclusion of blacks from state militias as part of his argument that

they were not citizens of the United States. See Richard M.

Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on

Two Fronts, 1939–1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri

Press, 1969), p. 1.
blacks among Union forces might aggravate slave

holders in both areas, signifying a complete break

with the South, it seemed best to all concerned for

whites to do the fighting.3

As the war lengthened, pressure for change nevertheless began to rise. Free blacks petitioned

Lincoln for the right to bear arms. Antislavery

activists and politicians backed them on the grounds

that the military needed men. Congress yielded in

July 1862, when it authorized Lincoln to recruit

blacks into the Army. In September the president

issued a preliminary emancipation proclamation and

set 1 January 1863 as the date for it to take effect.

Although the act was designed to affect only those

states that had seceded and had no bearing on those

that remained loyal to the Union, it opened military

service to southern blacks who were able to elude

their masters and make their way north to Union

lines. From then on, field commanders took increasing advantage of escaped slaves as soldiers. Forming

all-black units, they enlisted proven white officers

with strong abolitionist sympathies to command

runaways. By the end of the war, at least 186,000

African-Americans had served in the Army and thousands more had participated unofficially as laborers,

teamsters, and cooks. Some 30,000 blacks served in

the Navy.4 Estimates vary on how many became

casualties. By some accounts the mortality rate for

black troops was up to 40 percent higher than for

4 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

3 James MacPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 490–501. For details on

the use of blacks as laborers, see General Benjamin Butler’s GO

34, 1 Nov 1861, in War Department, The War of the Rebellion,

A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate

Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1880–1902), ser. II, vol. 1, pp. 774–75.

4 Strength figures are in Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp.

33–46. The number given for the Navy is an estimate because

surviving records for the period are scarce. See Ltr, Secretary of

the Navy John D. Long to Congressman C. E. Littlefield, 2 Apr

02, in Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., and Bernard C. Nalty, Blacks in

the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, 13 vols.

(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1977), vol. 2, item 61.

For more on blacks in the Civil War, see Dudley T. Cornish,

The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865

(New York: Longmans, Green, 1956); and Joseph T. Glatthaar,

Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and

White Officers (New York: Free Press, 1990).

Civil War soldiers
whites. Whether that was so or not, at least 68,000

appear to have been either killed or wounded.5

Black units fought well in combat, distinguishing themselves at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend,

Fort Wagner, and the Siege of Petersburg, to name

just a few engagements. Many Union generals nevertheless so mistrusted blacks and their abilities

that they refrained from committing them to the

fighting. As a result, although African-Americans

sometimes held the point in attacks because their

officers believed they were the descendants of savages and therefore fierce fighters, black units on the

whole tended to receive static assignments guarding bridges and securing rear areas. With little

chance to move from one locale to another the way

combat forces did, they stayed for long periods in

one place, where many of their members fell not to

the enemy but to the poor sanitary practices prevalent in armies of the day.6

If blacks received the right to fight, resistance

to their presence in the Army remained substantial. The U.S. government considered AfricanAmericans auxiliaries and for most of the war paid

them three dollars less per month than their white

counterparts, even though they shared the danger

and sometimes fought in the same battles.

Meanwhile, the few blacks who won commissions

as officers were never allowed to command even

the lowest ranking white.7 The black soldier, for

his part, was hardly insensitive to how he was

treated. He could do little about the way commanders used him, but several black units protested

the inequities in pay. The 54th Massachusetts even

declined to accept its wages for a year. It went into

battle in Florida in 1864 singing “Three cheers for

Massachusetts and seven dollars a month.”8

Despite continuing inequities, the black soldier

gained from his service in the war. Former abolitionists argued vehemently that blacks had earned a

place in the nation’s armed forces and succeeded

over heavy opposition in pushing a bill through

Congress in 1866 that gave blacks the right to serve.

Under the reorganization of the military that followed, the Regular Army thus consisted of 5 artillery,

10 cavalry, and 45 infantry regiments, of which 4

regiments of infantry and 2 of cavalry were to be all

black. A further reorganization in 1869 consolidated

the 4 black infantry regiments into 2, the 24th and

25th Infantries, and reconfirmed the 2 regiments of

black cavalry, the 9th and 10th. Racial prejudice was

so prevalent that even enlightened whites gave no

thought to integrating blacks into white units, but

the establishment of the four black regiments was

still a definite step forward.9

The predecessors of the 24th Infantry, the 38th

and 41st Infantry regiments, formed in 1866. Some

of their members were veterans of the Civil War,

but others were untrained recruits. A number

enlisted from the northern states, where they had

lived free before the war, but many were southerners and former slaves. Life in the Army with its regular pay and free food, clothing, and shelter

appealed to men who had little economic security

or social acceptance on their own.10

The 38th and 41st were consolidated and reorganized as the 24th Infantry during September and

October 1869.11 Most of the new regiment’s 35 offiPROLOGUE 5

5 Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 293f. Cornish

puts the number of blacks killed and wounded at 68,178. See

Cornish, The Sable Arm, p. 288.

6 The bearing of white preconceptions on the employment of black troops is mentioned by Glatthaar in Forged in

Battle, p. 148. See also pp. 121–68 for more on the accomplishments of African-Americans in battle. Mary C. Gillett, The

Army Medical Department, 1818–1865, Army Historical Series

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 277, speaks of sanitary

conditions at the time. For more on African-Americans in the

Civil War, see Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War

(New York: Da Capo Press, 1989).

7 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 33–46.

8 Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 291.

9 Monroe Lee Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers,

1866–1900 (Niwot: University of Colorado Press, 1991), p. 201.

See also William G. Muller, The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and

Present (Fort Collins, Colo.: 1972; reprint, n.d.), pp. 2–3.

10 Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, pp. 4–5.

11 Theophilus F. Rodenbough and William L. Haskin, The

Army of the United States: Historical Sketches of Staff and Line

With Portraits of Generals in Chief (New York: Maynard, Merrill

& Co., 1896), p. 695; GO 17, 15 Mar 1869, in L. Albert Scipio

II, Last of the Black Regulars: A History of the 24th Infantry

Regiment (1869–1951) (Silver Spring, Md.: Roman

Publications, 1983), p. 123.
cers and 655 enlisted men took up station in the

largely unpopulated Southwest, at Fort McKavett,

Texas, 180 miles west of San Antonio. McKavett

housed the main body of the 24th, the unit’s headquarters and four companies, but portions of the

regiment also deployed to Forts Davis, Concho,

and Stockton, forming a 220-mile-long line across

Texas that defined the southern edge of the Great

Plains. The unit’s first commander, Bvt. Brig. Gen.

Ranald S. MacKenzie, was considered “the most

promising young officer in the Army” by General

Ulysses S. Grant, who noted that the officer had

graduated from West Point during the second year

of the war but had won his way to high responsibilities before its close “upon his own merit and

without influence.”12

During the next decade, units of the 24th

defended frontier posts, participated with black

and white cavalry units in skirmishes with bands of

Indian raiders, escorted supply trains, provided

security for railroad and wagon road construction

teams, and often dispatched guard detachments to

subposts and stagecoach stations. Although the

unit participated in almost all U.S. expeditions into

Mexico to pursue Indians during the period, its role

was usually less than glamorous. Cavalry performed most of the combat missions while the

infantry did the routine work of guarding supply

lines and securing key passes and water holes.13

Some of the work the regiment did was still

exceedingly important. Between April and

December 1875, for example, Companies D and F

assisted elements of the 10th Cavalry and the 25th

Infantry in a survey of the Great Plains. The maps

that resulted from the expedition proved indispensable for commanders planning later operations

in the region. In the same way, during 1879 and

1880 soldiers from the 24th maneuvered with the

10th Cavalry during a long campaign that prevented the famous Apache warrior Victorio and his

band from entering Texas from Mexico.14

After eleven years of duty that saw the gradual

pacification of the Texas frontier, the 24th deployed

to the Indian Territory in present-day Oklahoma.

Its troops took up station at Forts Sill and Reno and

in cantonments on the North Fork, Canadian Run,

and North Canadian Rivers. Charged with performing tasks similar to those it had previously

accomplished on the Texas frontier, the unit also

took responsibility for thousands of Kiowa,

Comanche, Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians on

reservations in the area.15 Transferring to the Far

West in 1888, the regiment once again found itself

6 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

12 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York:

Charles L. Webster & Co., 1886), 2:541.

13 Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, p. 5. See also

Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 7. For classic studies of the

African-American soldier on the western frontier, see William H.

Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers (Norman: University of Oklahoma

Press, 1967); Arlen Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West,

1869–1891 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971).

14 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 7–9.

15 Muller, The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, pp.

10–11.

General MacKenzie
serving at isolated posts—Fort Bayard in New

Mexico and Forts Grant, Thomas, Bowie, and

Huachuca in Arizona, among others. The unit’s

duties remained the same, but it also kept watch on

several tribes of Apache Indians housed in such

encampments as the San Carlos Indian

Reservation.16 Its commander during much of the

period was Col. Zenas R. Bliss, an outstanding officer who had been cited for gallantry during the

Battles of Fredericksburg and the Wilderness and

had won the Medal of Honor.17

During this period, two soldiers from the 24th

joined the twenty-three blacks who received the

Medal of Honor in the post–Civil War nineteenth

century. While escorting an Army paymaster traveling between Forts Grant and Thomas on 11 May

1889, Sgt. Benjamin Brown and Cpl. Isaiah Mays

displayed great heroism during the course of a violent robbery. Although wounded, Mays walked and

crawled two miles to a neighboring ranch to bring

assistance. The paymaster, Maj. Joseph W. Wham,

later reported, “I served in the infantry during the

entire Civil War . . . in sixteen major battles, but I

never witnessed better fighting than shown by these

colored soldiers.”18

Despite the performance of the 24th and other

black units on the frontier, blacks as a group,

whether inside or outside the armed services,

endured increasingly difficult circumstances during

the late 1870s, the 1880s, and the 1890s. Racism

was growing in the United States and in many other

parts of the western world. By 1900 a multitude of

statutes popularly known as Jim Crow laws had been

enacted in the southern United States. The Supreme

Court ratified the laws in such landmark decisions as

Plessy v. Ferguson, which became the basis for most

kinds of segregation by endorsing the doctrine of

“separate but equal” in travel accommodations. Jim

Crow laws consigned black children to schools for

blacks only, curtailed the right of African-Americans

to vote in local and national elections, and imposed

rigid limits on the ability of blacks to associate with

whites in most public places. A favored practice in

the South, segregation was less formal in the northern states but often just as real.19 Whites on the

western frontier appear to have been the most broad

minded, at least toward black soldiers, who

remained an important part of the U.S. Army’s deterrent to Indian attack.20

An effort was made during those years to disband

the 24th Infantry and other black military units. “The

negroes are not self-sustaining,” one commentator of

the day argued in testimony before Congress. “They

have no mechanics, no clerks, very few of them know

how to read and write; . . . they lose many more

equipments [sic] than the whites do.”21

With blacks comprising close to 10 percent of

the Army, the effort failed. Indeed, the lack of

opportunity for blacks in civilian life drove some of

the nation’s brightest African-Americans into military ranks, where they tended to stay. Desertion

rates for the Army during the post–Civil War years

tell the story. They were considerably lower for

blacks than for whites. Between 1880 and 1889,

only 59 men deserted the 24th Infantry and only

104 the 25th. By contrast, the lowest number for

an all-white regiment came to 281 men for the 2d

Infantry. The highest came from the 15th Infantry,

which saw 676 defections over the same period.22

PROLOGUE 7

16 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 3–11.

17 Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, p. 135; Muller,

The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, pp. 16–18.

18 The number 23 includes three Seminole-Negro scouts

assigned to the 24th. See U.S. Congress, Committee on

Veterans Affairs, Medal of Honor Recipients (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 273, 299. Wham’s

report is in U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secretary

of War, 1889 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1889), p. 185. See also Preston Amos, Above and Beyond in the

West: Negro Medal of Honor Winners, 1870–1890 (Washington,

D.C.: Potomac Corral of the Westerners, 1974).

19 For more information, see Franklin, From Slavery to

Freedom, pp. 324–43. See also C. Vann Woodward, The

Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1966). Plessy v. Ferguson followed a precedent for institutionalized segregation established in the Army

Reorganization Act of 1866 which established separate black

regiments.

20 Frank N. Schubert, “Black Soldiers on the White

Frontier: Some Factors Influencing Race Relations,” Phylon 32

(Winter 1971): 410–15.

21 The testimony is quoted in Scipio, Last of the Black

Regulars, p. 12.

22 Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, pp. 171–73.
Although often stationed at isolated posts in

the deserts of the Far West, black soldiers were

hardly unconscious of the world they had left

behind. Letters from home kept them informed,

and some among them subscribed to the black

civilian press. When a weekly published in

Virginia, the Richmond Planet, for example, solicited

funds in 1895 for the defense of two black women

accused of murdering a white, men of the 24th at

far away Fort Huachuca, Arizona, responded with

small donations and letters to the editor on the

women’s behalf. In the field, the men also formed

debating societies and literary clubs where they discussed issues that were important to blacks of the

day—for example, the competing ideologies of

Booker T. Washington, who preached a low profile

for blacks attempting to survive in a white world,

and William E. B. DuBois, who founded the more

militant National Association for the Advancement

of Colored People (NAACP).23

Blacks who wanted to get ahead in the Army

tended to go with the system. Chaplain Allen

Allensworth, for one, accepted the racial status quo

in the Army. Applying for a chaplain’s appointment

in 1886, the well-educated former slave made it a

point to note in his letter to the adjutant general that

he would give no offense because of his race. “I know

where the official ends and where the social line

begins,” he wrote, “and have guarded against social

intrusion.” Allensworth became a chaplain at Fort

Supply in Indian Territory, where he operated a post

school. Later, he established a school with a graded

curriculum and a study outline at Fort Bayard in

New Mexico. His reputation grew as an educator. In

1891 he was invited to Toronto, Canada, to deliver a

paper at a professional conference.24

If some black soldiers tended to go along, however, others reacted to the growing racism around

them with anger. Members of the 9th Cavalry shot

up the town of Suggs, Wyoming, in 1892 to avenge

a racial insult. One year later, they fired into a

saloon near Fort Concho, Texas, after a group of

Texas Rangers pistol-whipped black soldiers drinking there. Shortly afterward, troopers from the 9th

rescued a black veteran from a lynch mob in

Crawford, Nebraska, and issued a broadside warning to residents of the town that their patience was

at an end. “You shall not outrage us and our people

right here under the shadow of ‘Old Glory,’” the

sheet’s anonymous author declared, “while we have

shot and shell, and if you persist we will repeat the

horrors of San[to] Domingo—we will reduce your

homes and firesides to ashes and send your guilty

souls to hell.”25

Although some of the men of the 9th Cavalry

registered their outrage at racial prejudice by force

of arms, those of the 24th took the opposite

approach. In 1896, when the regiment deployed to

Fort Douglas, on the outskirts of Salt Lake City,

Utah, the white citizens of the area were so disturbed they sent a delegation to Washington to

protest. Notwithstanding, the men of the 24th performed their duties so professionally and with such

concern for the community that within a year the

city’s leading newspaper published an apology.26

On 19 April 1898, when the unit departed for

Tampa, Florida, to participate in the SpanishAmerican War, its 540 men received a heartwarming send-off. The people of Salt Lake City turned

out en masse to wish them an early return.27

Good feelings lasted until the regiment reached

Florida, where its members experienced extreme

racial hostility for the first time. At Tampa, drunken whites from an Ohio volunteer regiment amused

themselves by firing their weapons at a two-yearold black child. When word reached men of the

24th and 25th encamped nearby, enraged members

8 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

23 Frank N. Schubert, “The Fort Robinson Y.M.C.A.,

1902–1907,” Nebraska History 55 (Summer 1974): 166.

24 Billington, New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, p. 161.

25 Quote from ibid., p. 166. See also Frank N. Schubert,

“The Suggs Affray: The Black Cavalry in the Johnson County

War,” Western Historical Quarterly 4 (January 1973): 57–68.

26 Conditions within the 9th Cavalry are described by

Frank N. Schubert in “The Violent World of Emanuel Stance,

Fort Robinson, 1887,” Nebraska History 55 (Summer 1974):

203–21. See also Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 11;

Michael J. T. Clark, “A History of the Twenty-Fourth United

States Infantry Regiment in Utah, 1896–1900” (Ph.D. diss.,

University of Utah, 1979).

27 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 11.
of those units attacked both white soldiers and segregated businesses in the town. The militants withdrew only when a regiment of white volunteers

from Georgia restored order, having put some thirty of them into the hospital.28

Shortly after the incident, the 24th and 25th

sailed for Cuba. On 25 June they disembarked at

Siboney, where they joined other units of regulars

and volunteers to begin an attack on the eastern

approaches to the city of Santiago.29 Barely a week

later, on 1 July, the American commander, Maj.

Gen. William R. Shafter, moved against Spanish

defensive lines located to the east of the city on the

San Juan Heights. During the battle that followed,

the only full-scale infantry engagement of the war

in Cuba, black soldiers from the 24th and the other

black regiments distinguished themselves.

For most of the day, nothing went as the

Americans had planned. A tenacious Spanish guard

of about five hundred men at El Caney, northeast of

San Juan, tied down a force of over six thousand

Americans that was supposed to turn the northern

flank of the main Spanish position. Meanwhile, to

the east confusion reigned at the San Juan Heights,

where only 900 Spanish troops were present. In the

absence of clear orders, regimental and company

PROLOGUE 9

28Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., “Negro Troops in Florida,

1898,” Florida Historical Quarterly 49 (July 1970): 4–5, 7–9.

See also Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 67f.

29Muller, The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, p.

12; Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 18–22.

The 24th Infantry marching in Cuba, 1898
officers hesitated, questioning whether to swing to

the attack in the absence of the units at El Caney or

to hold in place. When they decided to go ahead,

their forces began to experience extreme difficulty

maneuvering in the thick brush. Junior officers

repeatedly had to expose themselves to enemy fire to

sort through the confusion, and many lost their lives.

Poor coordination and intermingling of units on the

battlefield resulted. In the end, valor, numbers, and

a battery of Gatling guns made the difference. Under

increasing pressure, the Spaniards withdrew to a second line of defense and the 24th, mixed with portions of several other regiments, rushed forward to

take a blockhouse at the top of the hill.30

In all, the American force suffered more than

one thousand casualties during the day, losses that

were hardly as grave as those suffered during

some battles in the Civil War, but still heavy. Of

those, nearly 9 percent—twelve killed and seventy-five wounded—were members of the 24th.31

“The gallantry and bearing shown by the officers

and soldiers of the regiment under this trying

ordeal,” the commander of the 2d Battalion, Capt.

Henry Wygant, later noted, “was such that it [the

unit] has every reason to be proud of its record.

The losses of the regiment . . . show the fire they

were subjected to.”32 Indeed, the 24th later incorporated the blockhouse on San Juan Hill into its

regimental crest and adopted the term Semper

Paratus, “always prepared,” as its motto.33

Outbreaks of tropical diseases such as malaria

and yellow fever followed the American victory in

Cuba. According to a medical theory of the day,

blacks, who were descended from natives of the

tropics, were naturally more immune to those diseases than whites. As the epidemic spread and

deaths occurred, commanders decided that the men

of the 24th would be well suited to serve the sick

and ordered the unit to assist at the hospital in

Siboney. The task involved little extra risk to the soldiers who worked in the hospitals, all of whom were

volunteers, because both malaria and yellow fever

come as the result of mosquito bites rather than from

contact with the infected. It nevertheless threw the

theory of black immunity into question. Fifty percent of the 471 men who reported for duty at

Siboney contracted one or the other disease.34

Following the war, blacks received considerable

praise for their conduct in the fighting. “Being of a

race which only thirty-five years ago emerged

through a long and bloody war, from a condition of

servitude,” one commander wrote, “they . . . gave all

they had . . . that the oppressed might be free, and

enjoy the blessings of liberty guaranteed by a stable

government.”35 Even so, when the soldiers returned

home they saw little improvement in their way of

life. Exposed increasingly to the effects of Jim Crow

and aware that they had sacrificed much in the

recent war, they became less inclined than ever to

accept racial insults. As a result, armed clashes

occurred between recently returned black soldiers

and whites at a number of different sites. “We did

our duty in Cuba,” Pvt. George Washington, a member of the 24th, declared at the trial of a white who

had slashed him with a razor, “and we don’t think we

should be insulted because we are black.”36

10 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

30 Reports of the 24th’s role in the fighting are contained

in U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the War Department

for 1898 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1898), pp. 434–38. See also Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for

Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War,

2d ed. (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing Co.,

1994), pp. 209f; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 68–70.

31 Ltr, Capt A. C. Markley, Actg Cdr, 24th Inf Rgt, to

Adjutant General (AG), 5 Jul 1898, in Annual Report of the War

Department for 1898, p. 434. See also Francis E. Lewis, “Negro

Army Regulars in the Spanish-American War: Smoked Yankees

at Santiago De Cuba” (M.A. diss., University of Texas at Austin,

1969), p. 48.

32 Rpt, Capt Henry Wygant, Cdr, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 5

Jul 1898, in Annual Report of the War Department for 1898, vol.

1, pt. 2, pp. 434–35.

33 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 11–28.

34 Ltr, Maj A. C. Markley to AG, 18 Sep 1898, in Muller,

The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, pp. 26–32. See also

Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 72.

35 HQ, 25th Inf Div, GO 19, 11 Aug 1898, reprinted in

John H. Nankivell, ed., The History of the Twenty-Fifty Regiment,

United States Infantry, 1869–1926 (Fort Collins, Colo.: Old

Army Press, 1972), p. 83.

36 Quote from Michael C. Robinson and Frank N.

Schubert, “David Fagen: An Afro-American Rebel in the

Philippines, 1899–1901,” Pacific Historical Review 44

(February 1975): 68.
The 24th itself returned to the West. Six companies moved back to Fort Douglas in Utah while three

others went to Fort D. A. Russell in Wyoming. Over

the next few months, portions of the regiment served

in Washington, Montana, and Alaska. In July 1899,

after the United States went to war in the Philippines

to take control of Spain’s former colony, the unit

deployed to the islands to assist in defeating the dissident forces of guerrilla leader Emilio Aguinaldo.

The assignment was difficult for some of the

men because influential segments of the black community in the United States had begun to question

the justice of the war. Concerned that issues important to blacks, such as education and enfranchisement, had been shoved aside for the sake of a foreign adventure, the senior bishop of the African

Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States,

Henry M. Turner, for one, declared that the conflict

was nothing more than “an unholy war of conquest.”37 Well aware of the questions circulating in

their community, the men of the 24th in the

Philippines were quite capable of making their own

opinions known. When they arrived in Manila, for

example, they surprised many of the white soldiers

already present. When one white called out to a

debarking black, “Hello, nig. . . . What do you

think you’re going to do over here!” the soldier

replied, with just a touch of irony, “Well, I doan

know, but I ruther reckon we’re . . . to take up de

White Man’s Burden!”38

Over the three years that followed, the men of

the 24th fought in a number of difficult engagements against Philippine guerrillas. At San

Nicolas, Company K accepted the surrender of 17

officers and 150 insurgents and recovered 101

PROLOGUE 11

37Turner is quoted by Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 74f.

38Quote from Robinson and Schubert, “David Fagen,” p.

70. For more on blacks in the imperial age, see Willard B.

Gatewood, Jr., Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden,

1898–1903 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), and

idem, Smoked Yankees and the Struggle for Empire: Letters From

Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas

Press, 1987).

The 24th Infantry attends sick call in Siboney.
rifles. The men of the 24th also aided in the organization of civil government in many towns,

supervised elections, and provided security for

the civilian population.39

Yet racial prejudice took its toll. Whites

looked down on all people of color, referring to

the Filipinos as “gugus,” “niggers,” and “black

devils,” but one white general deemed the natives

of the islands “naturally more intelligent than our

[American] colored people.”40 The Filipinos

themselves attempted to capitalize on the situation by offering officer commissions to blacks who

deserted to their side. Almost all refused.

Desertion not only involved a betrayal of country

and unit, it also meant the loss of friends and cultural ties and risked execution or imprisonment

upon capture. In the end, fewer than five blacks

accepted the offer. Of those, Pvt. David Fagen of

the 24th rose to the rank of captain in the enemy’s

army before apparently being killed. Doubtful

from the beginning that blacks would fight their

“Filipino cousins,” the Army took Fagen’s defection seriously and attempted without success to

hunt him down. It also made an example of two

captured black defectors from the 9th Cavalry,

who were executed. The point made, President

Theodore Roosevelt then commuted the death

sentences of all remaining deserters, whether

white or black.41

The 24th served in Montana after the defeat of

the insurrection but returned to the Philippines in

1906 to assist in suppressing outbreaks of violence

that continued to occur. It remained until 1908,

when it redeployed to Fort Ontario and Madison

Barracks in New York. It sailed once more for the

Philippines in 1911, remained on garrison duty

until 1915, then redeployed again to the United

States. Stationed temporarily at the Presidio of San

Francisco, it took up residence at Fort Russell in

February 1916.42

The Army moved the regiment to the

Southwest later in the year, after the Mexican bandit-revolutionary Francisco “Pancho” Villa raided

Columbus, New Mexico. At first the unit guarded

lines of communication between Columbus and

other border towns. Later, it deployed across the

border to Colonia Dublan in Mexico, where it operated under the command of Brig. Gen. John J.

Pershing as part of an 18,000-man force that had

deployed into northern Mexico in a vain attempt to

capture the rebel chieftain.43

Although the 24th spent considerable time

outside the United States during the period

between the Spanish-American War and World

War I, it was hardly unaffected by the racism that

seemed an increasingly important feature of

American society at the time. With ships becoming more technologically complex, the Navy, for

the first time in its history, actively began to seek

a more skilled and educated all-white enlisted

force. In the process it excluded blacks from seamen’s billets, relegating them to stewards’ positions. Meanwhile, the National Guard in the

southern states excluded blacks from membership, and the Army resisted inclusion of black

units in organizations such as the coast and field

artillery. Blacks, according to racial theories of the

day, were inferior to whites in mechanical skills

and learning abilities and served much better as

servants and menial laborers.44

The leaders of the nation themselves subscribed to the idea. Although Theodore Roosevelt,

for example, had at first endorsed the contributions

of black soldiers to the victory in Cuba, in later

years he attributed those accomplishments almost

completely to the leadership of whites. In the same

way, when members of the all-black 25th Infantry

allegedly raided the city of Brownsville, Texas, dur12 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

42 Muller, The Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, p.

13.

43 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 42–46.

44 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 77–88.

39 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, pp. 32–42; Muller, The

Twenty-Fourth Infantry Past and Present, pp. 30–43. For a firsthand account of the conflict from the viewpoint of a black

noncommissioned officer in Company H, see Sanford M.

Thomas, War in the Philippines (Privately published, 1903),

MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Va.

40 Army and Navy Journal 38 (2 February 1901): 539,

quoted in Robinson and Schubert, “David Fagen,” p. 72.

41 Robinson and Schubert, “David Fagen,” p. 78.
ing 1906, causing the death of one white, Roosevelt

ignored major flaws in the evidence implicating

men of the unit. Presuming guilt, he used his powers as president to dismiss every soldier and noncommissioned officer on duty the night of the incident. One hundred and sixty men were driven

from the Army as a result, without trial, due

process, or legal procedure of any sort.45

Yet, when the United States declared war on

Germany in 1917, blacks closed ranks with their

white countrymen. If some questioned whether

their participation would aid the advance of their

race, many others viewed the conflict as an

opportunity. Blacks had gained much through

their loyalty to the nation in time of war, editor

William E. B. DuBois observed in the Crisis, the

official organ of the NAACP. Many had fought in

the American Revolution, more in the War of

1812, and tens of thousands in the Civil War. In

part because of their sacrifices, the slave trade

had been abolished, the slaves had been freed,

and the black man had won the vote. “Some ten

thousand Negroes fought in the SpanishAmerican War,” DuBois continued, “and in the

twenty years ensuing since that war, despite

many setbacks, we have doubled or quadrupled

our accumulated wealth.”46

If the black community tended to agree with

DuBois and embraced the war enthusiastically, however, the Army had doubts. The assistant chief of

staff, Maj. Gen. Tasker Bliss, believed that blacks did

well in military service and that he would have little

difficulty recruiting them, but he understood that

any attempt to use them might involve political

problems. Southern members of Congress might

raise objections if they learned that armed blacks

were to be stationed in their districts or trained near

their homes. In the end, rather than assume any risk,

the Army enlisted some 650,000 volunteers but

accepted only 4,000 blacks.47 Meanwhile, reasoning

that an oppressed minority might be tempted to disloyalty by the enemy, officers within the Military

Intelligence Division of the Army War College began

to investigate possible black subversives and to compile dossiers on their activities.48

Voluntary enlistments of whites nevertheless

proved inadequate to the needs of modern war.

With the black community clamoring for recognition and the Selective Service system drafting

increasing numbers of black men, the Army

decided to establish a training school at Fort Des

Moines in Iowa to prepare black junior officers

for service in the all-black units it would shortly

have to organize. One thousand of the men

selected for the new school were to come from

enlistments or mobilized National Guard units.

The rest would be drawn from the corps of noncommissioned officers already serving in the

Army’s black regiments. Most if not all senior

commanders were firmly convinced that blacks

performed best under white leadership, but the

need to placate the black community prevailed.

They took comfort from the thought that very

PROLOGUE 13

45 Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 422f, 441–43;

Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., “Black Americans and the Quest for

Empire,” Journal of Southern History 37 (1971): 582; Nalty,

Strength for the Fight, pp. 90–95. An early, highly critical examination of the Brownsville affair was conducted by the

Constitution League of the United States under the auspices of

Republican gadfly Senator Joseph “Fire Alarm” Foraker of Ohio.

The league’s preliminary report, along with basic documents

relating to the episode, is in U.S. Congress, Senate, Preliminary

Report of the Commission of the Constitution League of the United

States on Affray at Brownsville, Texas, August 13 and 14, 1906, 59th

Cong., 2d sess., 10 December 1906, doc. 107 (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906). For more modern

treatments, see John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid (New York:

W. W. Norton, 1970); Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair (Port

Washington, N.Y.: National University, 1971).

46 William E. B. DuBois, “The Reward,” the Crisis, 41

(September 1918): 217, quoted in Ulysses Lee, The

Employment of Negro Troops, United States Army in World War

II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 4f.

47 Ltr, Maj Gen Tasker Bliss to General Robert K. Evans,

4 Apr 17, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States

Armed Forces, vol. 4, item 1; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p.

108.

48 Records and correspondence relating to the program

have been reproduced on microfilm by the National

Archives. See M1440, Correspondence of the Military

Intelligence Division Relating to “Negro Subversion,”

1917–1941, National Archives and Records Administration

(NARA), Washington, D.C.
few of the new officers would ever advance

beyond the rank of captain.49

The decision to train seasoned sergeants as officers had a profound impact upon the 24th Infantry.

The unit’s 3d Battalion alone sent off twenty-five

noncommissioned officers to participate in the program. The effects of that loss became apparent during July 1917, when the battalion transferred to

Camp Logan near Houston, Texas, where it was to

guard the construction of a training facility. The men

of the unit became increasingly resentful of the city’s

Jim Crow laws, the brutality of the local police, and

racial insults. An Army inspector general later summarized the attitude among local whites: “A nigger is

a nigger, and . . . his status is not effected [sic] by the

uniform he wears.”50

Lacking the stabilizing influence of veteran

sergeants and commanded by white officers who

were few in number and either inexperienced in

command or insensitive to black complaints,

more than a hundred troops finally responded by

taking arms and marching into the city. During a

two-hour rampage, they killed sixteen whites,

some in cold blood, and wounded twelve more.

Four of their own number were killed by townspeople or the random firing of their comrades. A

fifth—one of the ringleaders—took his own life. It

was the only race riot in U.S. history in which

more whites than blacks died.51

A similar episode involving men of the regiment’s 1st Battalion took place at about the same

time in Waco, Texas. In that case, however, prompt

action by the unit’s commanders and self-restraint

on the part of the town’s white civilian population

kept a major confrontation from developing.

Despite a brief interlude of indiscriminate firing, no

casualties occurred.52

Over the next fourteen months, 6 soldiers

from the 1st Battalion and 149 from the 3d were

court-martialed in a series of four separate trials.

The men involved in the incident at Waco were

convicted of assault with intent to murder but

received relatively light sentences, imprisonment

at hard labor for five years.53 In contrast, those

charged at Houston received harsh, almost summary punishments. Of 64 charged in the first of

three trials, 5 went free, 4 received lesser sentences, 42 went to prison for life, and 13 were

condemned to death. The executions were carried

out on 22 December, before the accused had a

chance to appeal their sentences through the

usual military channels and before any public

announcement of the verdicts had been made.

The Army took the step to minimize reactions to

the executions by either angry blacks or jubilant

whites. The white press in general agreed with the

decision. Black newspapers were outraged: “Strict

justice has been done,” the New York Age declared,

“but full justice has not been done.”54

In two later trials, sixteen more soldiers were

sentenced to hang, but by then the black community was in full cry. In response, President

Woodrow Wilson announced a new policy committing the president himself to examine death

penalty verdicts in all cases involving military law.

In the end, rather than alienate blacks further or

risk losing black support for the war, the War

Department commuted all remaining death sentences except those for six soldiers convicted of

killing specific individuals. Over the years that followed, black organizations campaigned for the

14 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

52 Garna L. Christian, “The Ordeal and the Prize: The

24th Infantry and Camp MacArthur,” Military Affairs 50 (April

1986): 65–70.

53 Ibid., p. 69.

54 Quote from Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p. 460.

The statistics are in Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 104.

49 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 109f.

50 The inspector general is quoted in Scipio, Last of the

Black Regulars, p. 135. See also HQ, Southern Dept, Office of

the Department Inspector, Rpt on the Houston Riot, 13 Sep

17, file 370.61 (Riots), 11 Oct 17, Record Group (RG) 393,

NARA. For more on the Army’s change of attitude toward the

black soldier during this period, see Marvin Fletcher, The Black

Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1891–1917

(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).

51 Rosalind Alexander, “Houston’s Hidden History,” Texas

Observer, 7 Apr 89, pp. 18–20; Pamphlet, The Houston Riot

and Courts-Martial of 1917, n.d., copy in U.S. Army Center of

Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C., files. The best

treatment of the riot and its aftermath is in Robert V. Haynes,

A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1976).
release of the imprisoned rioters. The Army resisted but commuted the sentences one by one. The

last of the men left prison in 1938.55

The Waco affair and the Houston riot had farreaching effects on the 24th Infantry and other

black units. Prior to the two events, the Army had

considered raising a total of sixteen regiments to

accommodate the black recruits the draft was providing. After those incidents, it rejected the idea

on the grounds that blacks and whites would have

to train in the same encampments and that a

“national calamity” might occur if either group got

out of hand.56 As a result, most of the more than

400,000 blacks who entered the Army never saw

combat at all. They served in all-black utility

units—as stevedores, construction crews, truck

drivers, and the like. As for the 24th and 25th

Infantry regiments, neither made it to France.

Composed of well-trained regular soldiers who

could have contributed to the fighting, the units

spent the war mounting guard patrols, the 25th in

the Philippines and Hawaii, the 24th at isolated

outposts along the Mexican border. Both had

become objects of mistrust. As the inspector general put it in his final report on the Houston affair:

“The tendency of the negro soldier, with fire arms

in his possession, unless he is properly handled

by officers who know his racial characteristics, is

to become arrogant, overbearing, and abusive,

and a menace to the community in which he happens to be stationed.”57

With the African-American community clamoring for justice and investing heavily in war

bonds, the Army was unable to keep blacks completely out of combat. In the end, it established

the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions for them and

sent the units to France. As with many all-white

divisions, the two went into combat with incomplete training, and many of the individual replacements who joined them later in the war possessed

only rudimentary fighting skills. Compounding

those problems, however, was the lack of enthusiasm that the Army displayed for black units in

general. According to the commander of the 92d

Division, Brig. Gen. Charles C. Ballou, the Army

assigned white officers so prejudiced against the

troops that the unit lacked the organizational

cohesion and trust among men that it needed to

succeed. As a result, despite many individual acts

of bravery, the division’s men showed little initiaPROLOGUE 15

55 Ltr, Secretary of War Newton Baker to President

Wilson, 22 Aug 18, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the

United States Armed Forces, vol. 3, item 88.

56 Memo, Maj Gen Tasker Bliss for Secretary of War, 24 Aug

17, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed

Forces, vol. 4, item 5. The recommendation was the product of

a study begun before the riot but approved afterward. 57 The report is reproduced in Scipio, Last of the Black

Regulars, p. 135.

American Negro troops in France (note the French helmet)
tive in combat and sometimes straggled to the rear

when surprised.58

If racial intolerance harmed the 92d, however, it

also tended to hide the fact that there were causes for

the division’s lapses on the battlefield that had nothing to do with race. In its first significant combat

action, for example, the division’s 368th Infantry

regiment, advancing across difficult, unreconnoitered terrain and lacking both effective artillery support and the tools it needed to cut through extensive

wire entanglements, came up against unexpected

machine guns and artillery fire directed by spotters

in aircraft. Under the circumstances, close coordination was essential, yet orders were vague and liaison

between companies and battalions was virtually

nonexistent. Meanwhile, the front assigned to one

battalion was so broad that the unit became scattered

and disorganized. In the end, 58 soldiers were killed

and 222 wounded. Despite those difficulties, none of

which had any connection with race, and a lack of

resourcefulness on the part of some white commanders, the men of the regiment and their black officers

bore the brunt of the blame. In all, some thirty black

lieutenants and captains were immediately relieved

of their duties for general inefficiency and cowardice,

and several were court-martialed for retreating in the

face of the enemy.59

That beginning notwithstanding, the division,

composed mainly of draftees, gained experience

over the next several weeks. Within little more than

a month, it was attacking so well that its commanding general could only commend it for a “decided

improvement in offensive spirit and aggressive

action.” Indeed, some twenty-one members of the

division earned the Distinguished Service Cross for

bravery, a decoration second only to the Medal of

Honor. Even so, the unit’s achievements went largely unnoticed. Its failures were what officers and policymakers tended to see after the war had ended.60

Although faced with many of the same impediments as the 92d, the 93d did better, probably

because Pershing assigned its regiments to the

French, who trained, supplied, and fielded them as

if they were their own, without racial prejudice. In

addition, the division comprised mainly former

National Guard units that had worked together for

years during peacetime and possessed both cohesion

and organization. Recalling a singular attack with

bared bayonets in which the men of the 1st Battalion

of the division’s 371st Infantry regiment broke into

an enemy fortification on the Hindenburg Line, the

battalion’s white commander, Maj. Joseph B. Pate,

spoke movingly of the deep respect he held for the

African-American troops who had accomplished the

deed: “To have been permitted to command such a

splendid body of men, from its organization to its

demobilization and to share in the honor of this signal achievement, accomplished through such united

courage and the supreme sacrifice of so many of our

comrades, fills my heart with the greatest pride and

the keenest sadness.” In the end, three of the 93d’s

four regiments won the Croix de Guerre for valor,

France’s highest award for a military unit. Even so, as

with the 92d, white officers tended to see only the

race of the men involved. The 93d had succeeded,

16 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

58 The preparation of all U.S. units in the war was questionable. For more information, see Timothy K. Nenninger,

“American Military Effectiveness in the First World War,” in

Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military

Effectiveness: The First World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman,

1990), p. 153; Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle, The American

Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign (Newark:

University of Delaware Press, 1987). The performance of the

92d and many of the problems the unit faced are described in

Ltr, Col C. C. Ballou to Asst Commandant, General Staff

College, 14 Mar 20, in MS, Historical Section, Army War

College, The Colored Soldier in the U.S. Army [May 1942], pp.

99–106, CMH files. Since Ballou was the wartime commander

of the unit, his remarks might be seen as mere self-justification.

They are seconded, however, by William E. B. DuBois, in “The

Negro and the War Department,” the Crisis 16 (May 1918):

7–8, quoted by Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, p. 9.

59 The story of the 92d Infantry Division is told in MS,

Historical Section, Army War College, The Ninety-Second

Division, 1917–1918 [1923], CMH files. See especially pp.

18–19, 33–34. See also American Battle Monuments

Commission, 92d Division, Summary of Operations in the World

War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), p.

25. For more on the handicaps under which the 92d labored,

see Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown

Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I (Philadelphia:

Temple University Press, 1974), pp. 137–63. The 368th’s

attack is described on pp. 150–52.

60 Ibid.
they suggested in reports following the war, mainly

because the French had never used the unit as a

whole but had parceled its regiments out individually to separate divisions. “Colored troops will do

much better,” they said, “when they are associated as

component parts of white organizations.”61

With the end of World War I, the Army went

through a drastic drawdown. Reduced in size to

828 men in 1922, the 24th took up residence at

Fort Benning, Georgia, the home of the Infantry

School, where it participated in the transformation of the post from a temporary to a permanent

facility.62 Segregated into its own special, “colored” area, the unit performed mainly housekeeping and construction chores. “After I joined the

regiment in 1923,” one sergeant recalled, 

members of the 24th performed various labor duties

for the building of several parts of the post. For example, during the day, some of us were used for road

building and at night we hauled concrete by wheelbarrows, for the construction of Doughboy Stadium (the

football field). Once concrete pouring began we could

not stop until the sections that were being built were

completed. We worked in three shifts because the

work continued all night. If not otherwise needed, our

band was detailed to play during our working to keep

up our morale.63

PROLOGUE 17

62 See L. Albert Scipio II, The 24th Infantry at Fort Benning

(Silver Spring, Md.: Roman Publications, 1986).

63 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 58. Quote from

Interv, John A. Cash with Randall Reuben, 10 Sep 88, CMH

files. All interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O.

Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files.

61 The 93d was never formally organized as a division. For

a detailed if somewhat biased treatment of the unit’s performance, see Chester D. Heywood, Negro Combat Troops in the

World War: The Story of the 371st Infantry (Worcester, Mass.:

Commonwealth Press, 1928). Pate tells his story in The

Capture of COTE 188, attachment to Ltr, Maj J. B. Pate to

Secretary, American Battle Monuments Commission, 6 Jun 27,

file 719.3, no. 7, 371st Infantry Regiment, box 259,

Correspondence with Former Division Officers, RG 117,

Records of American Battle Monuments Commission,

Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.

The second quote is from Memo, Col V. A. Caldwell for Asst

Commandant, General Staff College, 14 Mar 20, sub: Use To

Be Made of Negroes in the U.S. Military Service, in MacGregor

and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces,vol. 4, item

120. For brief histories of the 93d in World War I, see MS, Jehu

C. Hunter and Major Clark, The Buffalo Division in World War

II [copyright Jehu C. Hunter, 1985], CMH files; Barbeau and

Henri, The Unknown Soldiers, pp. 111–36.

A kitchen and a dining room in a trench in France
Other soldiers from the 24th worked at a logging

camp on post, maintained the base’s stables (a prestige assignment because of the high level of skill

involved in training horses), delivered coal to officers’ quarters during the winter, policed the post

for cleanliness, gardened, and performed general

maintenance on the physical plant.64

The soldiers were carried on the Army’s books as

riflemen, machine gunners, and so forth, but, in fact,

for years most continued to be little more than heavy

laborers, gardeners, or cooks. Very little combat

training occurred, especially during the first decade

of the unit’s stay at Benning, except for exercises in

marksmanship, close-order drill, and military courtesy. The men made a snappy appearance, were

noted for their saluting, and were well disciplined,

rarely getting into trouble with the police of

Columbus, Georgia. As M. Sgt. Joe Black explained,

although Benning and the town of Columbus were

segregated, “we didn’t mind it; we soldiered through

it and went by the rules and tried to stay out of trouble.” As for the regiment’s officers, most were

detailed to special duty at the base’s signal office,

post exchange, and the various academic departments of the Infantry School.65

Some attempts were made in 1934 to improve

the unit’s ability to perform military missions, but

for a time the old role still appears to have prevailed. During large-scale maneuvers conducted

in May 1935, under the direction of the headquarters of the IV Corps Area, for example, the

unit was assigned to participate but could provide

no more than 11 officers and 227 enlisted men

out of an authorized strength of 717. The rest

were already committed to “special duties” and

could not be spared.66

The maneuvers in 1936 went better. The 24th

took to the field as a two-battalion regiment and

was commended by the commanding general for

the role it played in the exercise. Even so, that

same year, when Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., reported

for duty as a new second lieutenant fresh from

West Point, he learned that the white 29th

Infantry performed all of the “high visibility” tasks

on post and that the 24th served mainly as a labor

pool. Assigned as a platoon leader in Company F,

Davis recalled that he went into the field for

uncomplicated maneuvers only twice during the

entire year he held the job.67

Although treated for the most part as manual

laborers, many of the men in the 24th entered the

Army and remained because garrison life, even if

segregated, held many more attractions for them

than the lack of opportunity on the outside. The

Army paid great attention to physical fitness and

sports, and the men of the 24th excelled in those

areas. They won recognition and championships in

competitions against whites, especially in boxing

and swimming. In addition, the Army provided a

boost for men who would otherwise have lived

seriously disadvantaged lives.

The experience of M. Sgt. Harry Woods of the

24th was typical. Woods entered the service in

1936, during the final years of the Great

Depression. He possessed at best a grade-school

education and no vocation. The Army changed

that. He finished high school, rose to the rank of

master sergeant, obtained the respect that came

from the exercise of authority, and earned a good

enough living to send two children through college. In an interview fifty years later, he said, “The

Army did a lot for me.”68

As World War II loomed and the Army prepared for the possibility that it might shortly face

combat, blacks became concerned that the conflict

18 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

64 Intervs, Cash with Harry Woods, 8 Aug 88; Eugene

Pleas, 22 Oct 88; Eddie H. Lucky, 20 Oct 88; Tommie J. Baugh,

9 Sep 88; Willie Fortson, 25 Feb 89; Bennie Livingston, 25 Feb

89; Hiram Davis, 10 Sep 88; Isham W. Alexander, 7 Sep 88;

Lewis Portis, 21 Oct 88; Reuben, 10 Sep 88; Bernard L.

Muehlbauer with Sam Malone, 4 Dec 89. The emphasis on

fatigue details instead of training continued into 1940.

65 Scipio, The 24th Infantry at Fort Benning, p. 121. Quote

from Interv, Cash with Joe Black, 10 Sep 88. See also Interv,

Cash with John E. Cole, 8 Oct 88.

66 Scipio, The 24th Infantry at Fort Benning, pp. 121–23.

67 Interv, Cash with Lt Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.,

United States Air Force (USAF) (Ret.), 13 Jun 90. See also

Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., An Autobiography, Benjamin O. Davis,

Jr., American (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution

Press, 1991), pp. 58f; Intervs, Cash with Alexander, 7 Sep

88; Fortson, 25 Feb 89.

68 Interv, Cash with Woods, 8 Aug 88.
would only provide their domestic critics with

another excuse to try to prove the inferiority of

their race. Following World War I, DuBois had

charged that, rather than allow a black regiment

officered by blacks to succeed, “Negro haters

entrenched in the Army” had conducted “a concerted campaign [of slander].” Something of the

sort might happen in the war to come. Increasingly

powerful as a voting bloc during the 1930s, blacks

began to agitate for their rightful place in American

society and for concessions by the military.69

In particular, black leaders voiced their determination to resist any attempt on the part of the

Army to restrict their people to labor battalions in

the coming war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s

political opponents seized on the issue as the election of 1940 approached, pointing out in full-page

advertisements in black newspapers the disparities

African-Americans suffered in the armed forces in

comparison with whites. An advertisement in the

influential Baltimore Afro-American, for example,

made the point that 100 white colonels had been

promoted over Col. Benjamin O. Davis, the highest

ranking black in the U.S. Army.70

On 25 October 1940, shortly before the

November election, President Roosevelt responded by appointing Davis as the Army’s first black

general. On the same day, he announced that the

first black federal judge, William H. Hastie,

would become civilian aide on Negro affairs to

the secretary of war. If those appointments gained

wide approval in the black community, however,

they were offset by the prejudices of white military planners who continued to view blacks as

inferiors.71 Unwilling to experiment and convinced that African-Americans could perform in

combat only after intense training and under the

leadership of superior white commanders, those

officers concluded that wartime conditions would

preclude the sort of effort required and that

blacks would once more have to spend the war in

labor units.72

White planners set a limit of 10.6 percent on

African-American enlistments and inductions into

the Army. In that way, the service would be able to

organize itself efficiently for segregation by budgeting only the units and accommodations it needed

to maintain racial separation. As World War II

unfolded, however, the Army failed to fill that

quota. At the beginning of the war it held back on

inducting black draftees, failing to request even one

black from the Selective Service draft call that followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Later, it

reduced enlistment quotas for blacks and postponed the induction of those already notified, citing the need to build segregated facilities and to

transfer veterans from existing black units to train

the new recruits. The poor health and illiteracy of

many blacks also figured in. Selective Service rejection rates for blacks on those grounds ran at over

50 percent between 1943 and 1945, as compared

with 30 percent for whites. Nevertheless, a proportionally larger number of blacks than whites volunteered for military service. Since many more whites

than blacks held skilled jobs in civilian life and

were often deferred, proportionally more blacks

were also drafted.73

The Army’s reluctance to bend sometimes

approached the absurd. When the all-black National

Medical Association, for example, began to press the

government to employ black doctors and nurses in

military hospitals, the service complied by establishing an all-black hospital at Fort Huachuca, an isolated, largely black post located deep in the Arizona

desert. The new facility was near an all-white hospital that, while staffed largely by whites, had always

served both races. The base commander at Fort

Huachuca attempted to reduce the resulting tensions

by importing black entertainers and establishing a

PROLOGUE 19

69 “Opinion of W. E. B. DuBois: Bullard,” the Crisis 30

(September 1925): 218–29, quoted by Lee, The Employment of

Negro Troops, p. 15.

70 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp.

26–41. The advertisement is noted on p. 40.

71 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 78–80. Judge

Hastie’s role in World War II is described in Phillip McGuire,

He, Too, Spoke for Democracy: Judge Hastie, World War II, and the

Black Soldier (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

72 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 17–19.

73 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp.

50–51, 91.
variety of off-duty educational programs. Blacks

assigned to the post, however, had little choice but

to conclude that they were nothing more than inferiors in the eyes of the Army.74

Black officers also suffered indignities.

Although the service went to great lengths to keep

them separate as well, it soon found it had little

choice but to integrate at least their training. The

education of blacks was so inferior in the United

States that only an elite few qualified for officer

candidate school, too few to justify a separate

program. Even then, more blacks obtained commissions than the Army could comfortably

accommodate because the War Department persisted in assigning whites to officer black units. In

the end, many young black lieutenants found

themselves occupying undesirable billets in service elements while sometimes less qualified

whites went to combat organizations. Serving in

designated units and grades and unable to command even the lowest ranking white officer, black

officers were never allowed to think that they

were anything but unwanted.75

The system bred racial tension, especially in

the South, where violent outbreaks sometimes

occurred. In Fayetteville, North Carolina, for

example, white military policemen boarded a bus

of unruly blacks returning from leave and with little apparent provocation attempted to discipline

the men with nightsticks. In the melee that followed, a black stole a policeman’s pistol. Within

moments, one black and one white lay dead and

three more blacks and two whites were wounded.76 At Fort Benning, a black soldier was found

hanging from a tree with his hands tied securely

behind his back. Although the facts of the case

were never determined, blacks had little doubt

that the dead man had been lynched. There were

black military police on base, black Sgt. John

McClary recalled, but they could do little to curb

the activities of white civilians, who on one occasion even attempted to kill a black policeman.77

The assistant secretary of war, John L. McCloy,

attributed much of the violence to the black press,

which he accused of overemphasizing alleged

instances of mistreatment. More to the point were the

observations of Benjamin Davis. Surveying the situation for the Army, the general concluded that much

of the problem could be traced to the prejudiced attitudes of white soldiers and to poor leadership on the

part of white officers commanding black units.78

In the end, although many whites steadfastly

contended that blacks accepted the separation of the

races, rigid segregation proved so controversial and

unworkable that the Army felt compelled to abolish

some of the constraints it had imposed upon blacks.

As a result, from 1944 onward theaters, post

exchanges, and recreational facilities, although they

might still be reserved for the use of particular units,

could not be restricted on the basis of race. The

innovation made little practical difference because

blacks by then usually occupied self-contained areas

and had little need to share facilities, but it did

improve the morale of the black soldier. As for the

attempt to establish segregated hospitals, it failed

almost completely. Throughout the war, black and

white patients in military hospitals found themselves

occupying adjacent beds.79

To blacks, however, one of the most annoying

features of segregation was the Army’s practice of

employing them, whatever their education and

background, almost exclusively in service units.

The men resented the duty because it confined

them to manual labor and excluded them almost

completely from combat. As rifleman Leon Hiers of

the 24th Infantry recalled, all concerned believed

they had trained for “something better.”80

20 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

74 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, p. 315.

75 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 163; Dalfiume,

Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 92.

76 Memo, John McCloy for Chief of Staff, 3 Jul 43, sub:

Negro Troops, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United

States Armed Forces, vol. 5, item 73.

77 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 164; Interv, Cash with

John McClary, 9 Sep 88.

78 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp.

75–76. McCloy is quoted on p. 87.

79 War Department Pamphlet 20–6, Command of Negro

Troops (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944),

in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces,

vol. 5, item 83. See also Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 165.

80 Interv, Cash with Leon C. Hiers, 24 Mar 89. Other veterans of the period agreed. See Intervs, Timothy Rainey with
What happened to the 24th fit the pattern.

The unit departed Fort Benning for the West

Coast on 2 April 1942. Its preparations for combat were incomplete because many of its NCOs

and experienced soldiers, as was common practice throughout the Army at the time in both

white and black units, had been siphoned off to

become cadre for newly forming black organizations. Morale was nevertheless high. The men

expected to do their part. Upon arriving in San

Francisco, the unit spent several days training at

the city’s horse arena, the Cow Palace, then sailed

for the South Pacific. “We sailed approximately

three days before instructions were released concerning our whereabouts or what to expect when

we debarked,” one sergeant recalled. “Every day

aboard ship was devoted to calisthenics and lectures on tropical diseases and jungle warfare.”

Arriving on the island of Efate in the New

Hebrides on 4 May 1942, the men found to their

chagrin that they were destined not for combat

but to serve as a garrison force for a logistical

base. They occupied the island for five months

without ever seeing an enemy soldier.81

The 24th moved to Guadalcanal early in 1943,

after the fighting there had also ended. Its battalions

again filled a support role, loading and unloading

ships, building roads, maintaining wire communications, draining marshy areas to control mosquitos,

and guarding air bases. The 1st Battalion even reorganized some of its men into a provisional truck

company.82 By the end of the year, only the unit’s 3d

Battalion had experienced anything close to contact

with the enemy. Stationed in the New Georgia island

group, the battalion was far enough forward to come

under heavy air bombardment. Because of that, it

received battle credit for participating in the

Northern Solomons Campaign.83

By the beginning of 1944, the Army’s racial policies were under heavy attack in the United States.

The black press was indignant and organizations

such as the NAACP were contending angrily that

blacks had been excluded unfairly from the Army’s

combat arms. Seeing an opening, President Franklin

Roosevelt’s political opponents in Congress took up

the cry. A veteran of the 93d Division in World War

I, Republican Congressman Hamilton Fish of New

York, declared that, in a war undertaken to advance

freedom, the sons of 14 million black Americans

should have “the same right as any other American

to train, to serve, and to fight . . . in defense of the

United States.” Hastie’s successor as civilian aide on

Negro affairs to the secretary of war, Truman Gibson,

underscored Fish’s message by noting that the

Republicans clearly intended to make black participation in combat an issue in the coming presidential

campaign.84

PROLOGUE 21

Malone, 4 Dec 89; Cash with McClary, 9 Sep 88; Walter Scott,

10 Sep 88; Booker T. Washington, 6 Jan 90. See also Scipio, Last

of the Black Regulars, pp. 74f; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 167.

81 M. Sgt. Claude Breitenbach is quoted in Scipio, Last of

the Black Regulars, p. 71. See also Intervs, Rainey with Malone,

4 Dec 89; Cash with McClary, 9 Sep 88; Scott, 10 Sep 88;

Washington, 6 Jan 90.

82 Interv, Rainey with Malone, 4 Dec 89; Scipio, Last of the

Black Regulars, pp. 70–78.

83 Ibid.

84 Quote from U.S. Congress, House, “Colored Troops in

Combat,” Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 23

February 1944, pp. 2007–08. See also Nalty, Strength for the

Fight, p. 168.

The 24th Infantry receives last-minute instructions before going

out to patrol the Bougainville jungle.
The failure to make full use of black troops had

critics within the Army as well. They noted that the

practice wasted valuable manpower and exposed the

service to unnecessary criticism. Repeated studies of

black units meanwhile brought forward not only the

usual criticisms levied against black troops but also

praise from some frontline commanders. Those officers made the point that members of all-black units

in dangerous forward areas had won medals. One air

base security battalion at the Faid Pass in North

Africa had held its ground even when a white organization had panicked and fled to the rear, abandoning most of its equipment in the process.85

The pressure had its effect. Under instructions

from the War Department, commanders in the

Pacific relieved the 1st Battalion of the 24th of its

duties as a service element and attached it to the

37th Infantry Division fighting on the island of

Bougainville. On 11 March 1944, the battalion

transferred to the operational control of the 148th

Infantry regiment, which immediately moved

Company B forward to reinforce units in contact

with the Japanese. Coming under enemy attack that

very evening, the company held its ground, but at

the cost of two men killed. Those soldiers, Pfc.

Leonard Brooks and Pvt. Annias Jolly, appear to have

been the first black infantrymen and the first members of the 24th to be killed by enemy grenade and

rifle fire in World War II. Despite the fumbling that

usually occurs when inexperienced units of any race

first enter combat, the battalion continued to hold its

own in the fighting that followed, sending out

patrols and suffering more casualties.86

The 24th took up station on the islands of Saipan

and Tinian during December 1944, supposedly to

perform routine garrison duty. The islands, however,

concealed many Japanese holdouts. Entering combat,

the unit became so adept at the often bloody process

of cleaning out pockets of enemy resistance that a visiting inspector general team commended it for its

diligence to the deputy chief of staff of the Army. “The

conduct of the 24th Infantry as observed on Saipan

was so meritorious as to be deemed worthy of special

mention,” the team reported in April 1945.

Upon arrival at Saipan, the 24th Infantry regiment was

given the task of clearing the island of all Japanese not

previously subjugated. Since then, this regiment is credited with having killed or captured an impressive number of the enemy, and even today is engaged in continuous patrolling and jungle fighting. The morale of this

regiment is high, its discipline is excellent and it has definitely demonstrated what can be accomplished with

negro soldiers under the leadership of competent officers and noncommissioned officers.87

The team made it a point to note that the regimental

commander, Col. Julian G. Hearne, Jr., had been

with the regiment for four years and had advanced

from battalion to regimental command during that

time. In addition, a dozen or more noncommissioned officers had been with the regiment since

before the war and had taken pains to maintain the

unit’s customs and traditions.88 Following the lead of

the inspector general’s team, the commander of U.S.

Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Lt. Gen. Robert C.

Richardson, commended the men of the 24th for

their “military proficiency” and their “unwavering

devotion to duty” during the fighting on Saipan.89

With Saipan and Tinian in U.S. hands by July

1945, the 24th proceeded to the island of

Okinawa for another clearing operation. The war

ended one month later. Although relegated to routine tasks for much of World War II, the men of

the 24th had managed nonetheless to show their

mettle by succeeding in the difficult job of eliminating, one by one, die-hard enemy resisters

determined to perish to the last man.

If the 24th gained a measure of distinction in the

war, other black units were embroiled in controversy almost from the moment they entered combat.

22 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

85 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 456–58,

468–72.

86 Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 75.

87 Memo, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, Actg Inspector

General (IG), for Deputy Chief of Staff, 14 May 45, sub:

Exemplary Conduct of the 24th Infantry at Saipan, in

MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces,

vol. 5, item 95.

88 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 533–35.

89 Commendation, Commanding General, U.S. Army

Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, n.d. [1945], reprinted in Scipio,

Last of the Black Regulars, p. 128.
Serving as part of the 93d Division, the 25th

Infantry, for one, fought well on Bougainville, but

portions of one of its companies, untried in combat,

became overly alarmed during an early engagement.

In the wild firing that followed, a black lieutenant

and nine enlisted men were killed and twenty enlisted men wounded, mostly by friendly fire.90

The event was the sort of thing that might have

happened to green troops of any race freshly committed to combat in the jungle, but it took on racial

overtones when a rumor spread throughout the

Pacific theater that the 93d Division itself had broken

under fire. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

told New York Post correspondent Walter White that

the report was “false and ridiculous.” He added that

he knew “from experience with the 25th Infantry and

the Filipino Army . . . that race and color have nothing whatever to do with fighting ability.”91 The slander nevertheless endured. Four years later, the

wartime chief of staff, General George C. Marshall,

repeated it, erroneously asserting in an interview that

the men of the 93d on Bougainville “wouldn’t fight—

couldn’t get them out of the caves to fight.”92

The all-black 92d Infantry Division in Italy also

became the subject of contention. Fighting along the

Gothic Line, a series of German fortifications that

stretched across the Italian boot from La Spezia

north of Florence to Pesaro on the Adriatic, the unit

lost momentum and bogged down.93 Failures to

communicate, badly organized attacks, and missing

officers were often the reason. The men of the unit

fought at times with extreme courage; one group

held off eight German counterattacks before using

up its ammunition and finally withdrawing. Still,

whole platoons occasionally refused to advance out

of confusion, on account of conflicting orders, or

due to lack of motivation.94

The division’s commander and his staff tended

to impute the problems the unit experienced to supposed characteristics of the black race. “During my

period of observation,” a regimental executive officer

for six months, Lt. Col. John J. Phelan, declared, “I

heard of just as many acts of individual heroism

among Negro troops as among white. . . . On the

other hand, the tendency to mass hysteria or panic is

much more prevalent among colored troops.”95 The

blacks, meanwhile, blamed their white officers,

asserting that their commander, Maj. Gen. Edward

M. Almond, was so prejudiced against them that he

wanted them to fail to discredit their race.96

In fact, as Truman Gibson noted after an

inspection of the unit in 1945, the system

imposed by segregation was itself a major cause of

what had happened. The 92d possessed two commands, Gibson said, one black and junior, the

other white and senior. The blacks seethed at promotion policies that excluded them from higher

rank. The whites, meanwhile, avoided close association with the blacks whenever they could. The

lack of mutual confidence between the two

groups made little difference while the 92d was in

training and transit, but it became apparent under

the strains of combat. White commanders could

hardly hide their lack of reliance on the abilities of

their subordinates. Black soldiers who perceived

that attitude came to place more emphasis upon

personal survival than success in battle.97

Toward the end of the war, social scientists

from the Research Branch of the Army’s

PROLOGUE 23

90Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 506–12.

91White paraphrases MacArthur. His article appeared in

the New York Post during the week of 26 March 1945 and was

widely reprinted in the black press. It is quoted by Lee, The

Employment of Negro Troops, p. 531.

92The Marshall interview occurred on 25 July 1949. It is

quoted by Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, fn. 35, p. 512.

93For combat operations of the division, see Thomas St.

John Arnold, Buffalo Soldiers: The 92nd Infantry Division and

Reinforcements in World War II, 1942–1945 (Manhattan, Kans.:

Sunflower University Press, 1990), and MS, Hunter and Clark,

The Buffalo Division in World War II.

94Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 548–51.

95Phelan is quoted in Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops,

p. 549.

96Ibid., p. 577.

97Memo, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., Civilian Aide to the

Secretary of War, for John J. McCloy, Asst Secretary of War, 20

Dec 44, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States

Armed Forces, vol. 5, item 94; Lee, The Employment of Negro

Troops, pp. 576f. The role of the 92d’s leadership in the unit’s

problems is examined in Dale E. Wilson, “Recipe for Failure:

Major General Edward N. Almond and Preparation of the U.S.

92d Infantry Division for Combat in World War II,” Journal of

Military History 56 (July 1992): 487.
Information and Education Division did a survey

of the attitudes and motivation of black soldiers

that added further dimensions to Gibson’s perception. They found that although blacks shared the

patriotic attitudes of whites when the United

States entered the conflict, those concerns and

aspirations were offset at least partially by bitterness about the treatment they received at the

hands of their countrymen and by resentment

toward the Army’s racial policies. Given their

mixed feelings, they came to be less likely than

whites to express a desire for action in combat.

Although convinced that they were making a

valuable contribution to the war and proud of the

units they served, 71 percent of those interviewed

thus preferred to do their duty in a stateside unit,

versus 54 percent of a carefully matched sampling

of whites. Overall, the researchers asserted in their

final report, black soldiers tended to perceive the

world in racial terms, as members of an oppressed

minority. In that sense, if some were eager to fight

because they believed their sacrifices would benefit their race, many more were concerned about

the black community’s lack of progress at home.98

Having little status to lose in black society for a

failure to conform to white norms, they doubted that

they would acquire much of benefit for themselves

or for their race if they performed well in combat.

The United States had always been a white man’s

country, so the reasoning went, and it would remain

one after the war had ended. By conforming to white

expectations, blacks would do little more than maintain the status quo. “It seems to me,” a black lieutenant in the 92d’s 365th Infantry regiment, Wade

McCree, Jr., observed, “you cannot treat people as

second-class citizens or second-class soldiers and

expect them to behave in a first-class fashion, particularly when they are ambivalent about the mission

they are called upon to perform and can’t relate it to

the success of the larger enterprise.”99

Many members of the 92d fought well, but that

very fact also told against the unit. Outstanding

black officers and NCOs became casualties quickly

while less effective men who took fewer chances

tended to survive and rise to positions of authority.

Commanders of white units had the ability to move

outside of their own organizations to find suitable

replacements. The 92d had to look mainly to itself,

especially for the experienced black officers who

could inspire the troops, because there were none to

be had in nearby units. The Army’s limited ability to

supply black enlisted replacements added a further

dimension to the problem. Already hampered by the

poor education that inferior “separate but equal”

schools in the United States had dealt the black soldier, the division often had to settle for men who

were psychologically unfit for combat, had gone

AWOL from the Army’s East Coast Processing

Center, or were former inmates of disciplinary facilities. Those individuals did not do well in combat.100

Reasoning that the press already knew of the

92d’s failure but had little inkling of why it had

happened, Gibson held a press conference in Rome

to put the division’s experience into context. His

candid remarks were replayed throughout the

United States, where the press laid heavy emphasis

on comments he had made about low literacy rates

24 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

98 See Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier:

Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1949), pp. 507, 521, 526–27, 587; MS, Bell Wiley, The

Training of Negro Troops, Study 36 [Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Army, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946], p. 12.

For a more complete treatment of the issue, see Joyce Thomas,

“The ‘Double V’ Was for Victory: Black Soldiers, the Black

Protest, and World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University,

1993), pp. 22–26.

99 Ibid. For the views of African-Americans serving in the

armed forces, see Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army:

Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II (Lexington:

University of Kentucky Press, 1993). McCree, who later graduated from Harvard Law School and became a circuit court

judge, is quoted in Mary Penick Motley, The Invisible Soldier:

The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit: Wayne

State University Press, 1975), p. 304.

100 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, p. 552. In a

detailed study of the 92d Division during World War II, Jehu

Hunter and Major Clark point out that the unit achieved more

than might have been expected, given the Army’s attitude and

the personnel policies it followed. See MS, Hunter and Clark,

The Buffalo Division in World War II, pp. 2, 95–97. Mary

Penick Motley uses a series of telling interviews with veterans

of the division to make many of the same points. Motley, The

Invisible Soldier, pp. 258–347.
among black soldiers and a supposed assertion that

some units had “melted away” in combat.101

Gibson later denied he had ever said that units

of the 92d had “melted away.” Instead, he said he

had merely confirmed that individuals in some units

had retreated in a panicky fashion, a fact well known

to all newspapermen in the theater, including those

who worked for the African-American press. He continued that some of the information he had supplied

to reporters as background had never made it into

print. He had pointed out, for example, both in his

press conference and later at the War Department,

that segregation as a policy would “inevitably produce militarily unsound results.” He had then contrasted the educational level of the men of the 92d

with that of white divisions, adding that the Army

applied one standard to white units and quite another to black units. “I further pointed out that military

authorities repeatedly stated that no units could efficiently operate which consisted of more than 10 percent class 5 men. The 92nd Division included more

than 80 percent class 5 troops. The investigation further revealed and I therefore stated that because

only Negro replacements could be furnished to the

92nd Division, untrained service troops had been

rushed into combat while trained infantry replacements were made available to white units.” Collins

George, a black war correspondent for the Pittsburgh

Courier who was present at the news conference,

later confirmed Gibson’s story. He blamed the

episode on an inept substitute reporter who attended the session in place of the regular correspondent

for Stars and Stripes.102

Gibson’s remarks were well founded, but

since no other division in the entire European theater had been singled out for such criticism, the

black press took umbrage and began to call for the

counselor’s resignation. “If the 92nd is made of . . .

illiterates and near-illiterates, whose fault is it?”

the Crisis asked.

Certainly not the Negroes. . . . Why would the War

Department, if it really wanted to give a fair test, send a

division into the front lines with 92 out of every 100

men in the two lowest classifications? The 92d was

licked before it started.

It must be remembered that these men [during their

training] were beaten up by bus drivers, shot up by military and civilian police, insulted by their white officers,

denied transportation to and from the post, restricted to

certain post exchanges, and jim crowed in post theaters.103

Gibson had defenders, especially among black

journals that employed correspondents in the field

who had long known of the 92d’s problems, but he

was still stunned by the reaction. Returning to

Washington, he remarked in an interview, “It is

hard for me to see how some people can, on the

one hand, argue that segregation is wrong, and on

the other hand, blindly defend the product of that

segregation.”104

If many white military men found support in

the performance of all-black units for their contention that African-Americans were best suited

only for service in labor battalions, evidence backing a different set of conclusions emerged in the

winter of 1944–1945, after the Battle of the Bulge.

At that time, the Army experienced a severe shortage of infantry replacements. In order to fill the

gap, suggestions arose that U.S. commanders integrate black volunteers into any unit that needed

them, without regard to race. The U.S. commander in the European theater, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower, resisted the suggestion on the grounds

that it was contrary to War Department policy. He

agreed, however, to form black volunteers into platoons that could be attached to white units.105

PROLOGUE 25

101See “A Behavior Pattern,” Newsweek, 26 Mar 45, p. 37.

102Gibson is quoted in Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the

Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 12–13. The

interview with Collins George is in Motley, The Invisible Soldier,

pp. 345–46.

103The Crisis 52 (April 1945): 97, quoted by A. Russell

Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II (Santa Barbara,

Calif.: Clio Books, 1979), p. 97.

104The newspapers and Gibson are quoted in Lee, The

Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 579–80.

105Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 689–95;

Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, pp. 99–101.

See also Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 229–31,

960–63.
The experiment succeeded beyond the most

optimistic expectations. In surveys completed shortly after the war ended, a majority of whites who had

fought alongside the blacks approved of the platoons’ performance in combat, with the highest ratings coming from officers in companies where blacks

had seen the hardest fighting. Some whites argued

that the men were volunteers and therefore more

willing to fight than the normal black soldier, but

others contended that “an average of Negroes would

probably do as well as the average of white soldiers.”

Both officers and enlisted men reported that blacks

and whites got along well together, and 77 percent of

whites reported that their feelings had become more

favorable as a result of the experience. Many whites

observed that relationships among the men were

better in combat than in garrison, but they could cite

few if any instances of overt friction. Overall, blacks

and whites got along so well in the mixed units that

96 percent of the officers interviewed pronounced

themselves agreeably surprised.106

General Davis and others within the Army

who advocated an end to segregation sought to

have the results of the survey released to the public to show that the integration of whites and

blacks could succeed. Nonetheless, the Army held

back, apparently in the belief that publication

would threaten support for a peacetime draft on

the part of southerners in Congress. As soon as

the war ended the platoons were disbanded, with

their men transferring to service battalions or

returning home for discharge.107

So had it been over all the years of American history. Time and again, the black soldier had demonstrated that he could fight well when given a fair

chance, but after every war racial prejudice had

intervened to erase the gains he and his race should

have received. The experience of the 24th Infantry

was a case in point. The unit accomplished as much

as any white regiment fighting under similar circumstances on the American frontier, during the

Spanish-American War, and in World War II. Yet few

white officers paid any attention. Official surveys

and analyses set aside the accomplishments of the

black soldier in those wars to concentrate on the failures of black units and the supposed infirmities of

the African race. No one admitted to the injustices at

the root of the problem or to the fact that people

denied even routine opportunities for education and

advancement had little incentive to give their lives

for the system that had failed them. It would take

another war for that to occur, and even then the

advance would come reluctantly, after racial prejudice had once more taken a heavy toll.

26 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

106 Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment During

Army Life, pp. 587–90.

107 Ibid., p. 593; Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed

Forces, p. 100.
A

t the end of World War II, the U.S. Army consisted of 8,268,000 men organized into 89

divisions. Of that number, 694,333 were

black. They constituted 8.5 percent of the Army’s

ground force strength and 9.5 percent of its enlisted ranks. Most worked in combat service support

units as stevedores, truck drivers, wiremen,

cooks, and mess men.1

Over the years that followed, as the American

public clamored for budget cuts and the United

States readjusted its priorities to fit a peacetime

economy, military strength and readiness fell. The

Army shrank to 1,891,000 men in 1946; to

991,999 in 1947, when Congress permitted the

draft law to expire; and to 554,000 in 1948. The

total climbed to 660,000 in 1949, when a peacetime

conscription law temporarily spurred enlistments.

But on 30 June 1950, at the brink of the Korean

War, Army commanders could count only 591,000

men in uniform. Of those, 1,317 officers and

56,446 enlisted men were black—9.8 percent of

ground force strength and 10.9 percent of all enlisted ranks. Most still served in support units.2

The combat readiness of the troops during the

period of heaviest drawdown, between 1946 and

1947, was marginal at best. In those years, the

Army’s regiments and divisions became for all practical purposes demobilization centers whose

strength fluctuated wildly from month to month as

veterans of the war and recent draftees arrived,

took up temporary residence, and then either

departed for home or to some new station. The

24th Infantry provides a case in point. Numbering

152 officers and 3,053 enlisted men at the height of

World War II in 1944, its strength declined to just

82 officers and 384 enlisted men by April 1946.

The numbers then began to increase as the Army

prepared the unit for service as part of the U.S.

occupation force in Japan. By 31 January 1947, it

totaled 104 officers and 3,271 enlisted men.

During the months that followed, many of the men

were transferred to higher priority service units in

Japan and others completed their terms of enlistment. By 31 December the unit once more comprised fewer than one thousand enlisted men.3

(Table 1) So precipitous was the nation’s demobilization, President Harry S. Truman would later

CHAPTER 2

Turbulence and Reappraisal, 1945–1950

1 Office of the Adjutant General of the Army, STM–30,

Strength of the Army (hereafter cited as STM–30), 30 Jun 50,

CMH files.

2 STM–30, 30 Jun 50. See also Eliot A. Cohen, Citizens

and Soldiers (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University

Press, 1985), pp. 154–55. This chapter is deeply indebted to

the work of Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., in The Integration of the

Armed Forces, 1940–1965, Defense Studies series (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government

Printing Office, 1989).

3 HQ, 24th Inf Rgt, Annual Histories of the 24th Infantry

Regiment for 1946, 1947 (hereafter cited as Annual Hist of the

24th Inf Rgt), 2 Mar 48, copy in CMH files.
remark, that it hardly seemed a demobilization at

all. “It was disintegration.”4

As reductions continued, the Army ransacked

its forces around the world not only to provide

troops for the occupation of Germany and Japan

but also to build up a reserve in the United States.

As a result, by 1948 all but a few of the regiments

stationed in Japan and other theaters of occupation

fielded two rather than the usual three battalions.

Similarly, artillery battalions had two firing batteries rather than three, and active infantry battalions

carried two rather than three line companies.

Despite those economies, the number of men available was so uncertain that the units designated to

enter combat first if an emergency occurred, in theory the most battle-ready forces within the Army,

could conduct company or battalion-size field

exercises only by drawing all of their regimental

personnel into a single unit.5

28 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

4 Truman is quoted by David McCullough, Truman (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 474.

5 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1947

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 35.

All secretary of the Army annual reports are hereafter cited as

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army with the pertinent

year. See also Lt Col Joseph Rockis, Reorganization of the Army

Ground Forces During the Demobilization Period, Army

Ground Forces Study 3 [1948], pp. 36–52, CMH files;

Working Paper, William W. Epley, Demobilization and

Rebuilding of the Army, 1945–1950 [U.S. Army Center of

Military History, 1992], pp. 1–3, CMH files; Russell F. Weigley,

History of the U.S. Army (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 503;

Maurice Matloff, general editor, American Military History

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 528–42; James F.

Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States

Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center

of Military History, 1972), pp. 42–46.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Enlisted Officer

DecOctSepAugMayJanDecOctJulJunAprJan

Table 1—24th Infantry Strength, 1946–1947

Source: HQ, 24th Inf Rgt, Annual Histories of the 24th Infantry Regiment for 1946, 1947, CMH files.
Hard put to supply replacements for the many

units requiring them, the Army slashed basic training for new recruits from the seventeen weeks it

had observed during World War II to just eight in

1946. It increased the term to fourteen weeks in

March 1949, when pressures decreased, but in the

interim soldiers arrived at their duty stations

around the world with only the barest knowledge

of military life and little practical feel for the duties

they were about to undertake. By 1950 cutbacks

were again having an effect. Officers commissioned

that year, even those who graduated from the U.S.

Military Academy at West Point, went to their duty

assignments without spending an interval at the

schools for their designated specialties, as had been

the custom in earlier years.6

With policymakers convinced that the atomic

bomb was America’s main defense and that little

chance remained within the foreseeable future for a

major war involving the Army, budget cutters also

reduced military funding for personnel and equipment. The development of new conventional

weapons thus lagged, and projects only remotely

connected with traditional military concerns

gained prominence. During 1948 and 1949, as a

result, units in the field made do with materiel left

over from World War II, much of it in increasing

disrepair because of replacement part shortages

and a lack of trained maintenance specialists.

Meanwhile, the Army diverted major portions of its

procurement budget to Marshall Plan programs

designed to stabilize postwar Europe.7

As the armed forces demobilized, blacks tended to remain in uniform. Many had less combat

time than whites and therefore lower eligibility for

discharge. Others feared reentry into a hostile society and preferred the security that even segregated

military life provided. A number, poorly educated

by white standards, lacked the ability to compete

for the opportunities postwar America offered.

While younger, better-educated blacks often left

the Army to take a place in that new world, those

less skilled tended to reenlist.8

If the Army seemed a refuge for some, life in its

segregated system still irritated many. Racial incidents proliferated during the years following the

war, both in the United States and overseas.

Indeed, the Eighth Army reported in 1946 that

“racial agitation” was one of the primary causes of

assaults, the most frequent violent crimes among

American troops in Japan.9

The turbulence brought on by the rapid

decrease in the Army’s size, along with the freedom

and expanded leisure time soldiers experienced

with the coming of peace, created additional stresses. According to official statistics, black soldiers

were court-martialed and punished out of all proportion to their percentage in the Army’s population. In 1945, for example, when blacks were 8.5

percent of the Army’s average strength, 17.3 percent of the soldiers entering rehabilitation centers,

disciplinary barracks, and federal penal institutions

were black. In 1946, with 9.35 percent of the Army

composed of blacks, 25.9 percent of the soldiers

confined in military stockades were black. They

committed 49.6 percent of reported offenses

against senior officers, 17.4 percent of desertions,

13.4 percent of rapes, 33.1 percent of robberies,

46.3 percent of acts of manslaughter, 29 percent of

burglaries, and 59 percent of assaults. In Europe,

blacks had a court-martial rate of 3.48 per thousand compared to 1.14 for whites. In the Far East,

black service units suffered a court-martial rate

nearly double that of the Eighth Army as a whole.10

Although those statistics seem straightforward,

their meaning is open to question. On one hand,

during the early postwar period most black soldiers

were assigned to service units which, because of

their locations, the nature of their duties, and

TURBULENCE AND REAPPRAISAL, 1945–1950 29

6 Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, p. 504; Epley,

Demobilization and Rebuilding of the Army, pp. 2, 10;

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 45.

7 Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, pp. 502f; Epley,

Demobilization and Rebuilding of the Army, p. 9. Diversions of

Army funds to the Marshall Plan are mentioned in Annual

Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1949, p. 155.

8 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 154.

9 U.S. Eighth Army, Occupational Monograph of the

Eighth Army in Japan, January–August 1946, vol. 2, p. 176,

CMH files.

10 The statistics are cited in MacGregor, Integration of the

Armed Forces, pp. 206–09.
relaxed discipline, provided more of an opportunity for troublemaking and wrongdoing than

other units. On the other, commanders defined

the offenses, and they possessed great latitude in

the framing of charges. In that sense, the heavy

weighting of crime statistics toward black offenders

might have been the result of racial prejudice.

Where one commander could have viewed the facts

of a case narrowly and might have accused a black

of aggravated assault, another, dealing with an

identical set of circumstances, might have charged

a white lawbreaker with a lesser offense.11

A review of statistics contrasting civilian with

military crime rates on the basis of race might provide some insight, especially since 1946 was the

worst year in the decade between 1941 and 1950 for

crime in the United States. Comparisons are

nonetheless difficult to make. Except for federal

statutes, which apply primarily to offenses committed on government property, no single body of criminal law or procedure covers the United States as a

whole. As for state and local laws, their definitions of

what constitutes a particular crime may vary

between jurisdictions and may sometimes differ

from those that apply to military offenses.12

The problems blacks faced become evident,

however, in an analysis of the high incidence of

venereal disease (VD) that occurred among U.S.

troops serving in Europe and Japan at the end of the

war. As was the case with crime, the statistics for

blacks far exceeded those for whites.13 In that light,

it was easy for some commanders to conclude that

blacks as a group were less sexually inhibited than

whites. In fact, as a study done by the Army’s

Preventive Medicine Section in 1945 demonstrated,

the situation was far more complicated.14 The study’s

author, Samuel Stouffer, observed that since men

with the lowest educational levels experienced the

highest percentage of cases, a lack of education

among blacks was probably involved. He did not

give that consideration heavy weight, however,

because the Army had taken pains to indoctrinate

blacks on the danger of VD, and tests indicated that

they were as aware as whites of the prophylactic

measures necessary to avoid infection. More important appeared to be the locations of black units and

the sort of women available to black soldiers. Many

African-Americans were assigned to port facilities

located in areas populated by large numbers of prostitutes. Others served in transportation companies,

where they frequently performed their duties without close supervision. In both cases, sexual inhibitions were not what mattered. Blacks simply had

more opportunities for sexual contact and were thus

more likely to contract the disease than whites, who

were based more often in desirable areas and in

touch with a higher class of women.15

30 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

11 Ibid., pp. 206f.

12 During 1946, 745,282 major crimes—including murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, and

burglary—were known to have occurred in the 353 U.S. cities

inhabited by 25,000 persons or more. Over that year, federal

statistics show that some 645,000 people were arrested, of

whom 478,000 were white and 159,000 were black. Although

the numbers seem impressive, the two indices have only a tenuous relationship to one another because the arrest figures

involve detentions not only for major offenses but also for

minor infractions such as drunkenness and vagrancy. In addition, although the arrest statistics provide a useful index to

racial involvement in crime, they are burdened by detentions

for crimes such as disorderly conduct that are easy to solve.

They also fail to equal the number of individuals actually taken

into custody. Instead they note each separate occasion in which

a person was detained, notified, or cited without accounting

for the fact that an individual may be arrested several times

during the course of a year on different charges. See U.S.

Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical

Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975), pt.

1, ch. H, Crime and Correction (ser. H 952–1170), pp. 407–09.

The figures are from ibid., Table, Urban Crime by Type of

Major Offense: 1937 to 1957, p. 413. See also ibid., Table,

Persons Arrested by Race, Sex, and Age: 1932 to 1970, p. 415.

13 HQ, U.S. Eighth Army, Japan, Occupational Monograph

of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September 1946–December

1947, vol. 3, p. 171, CMH files. The figures for Europe are in

MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 209.

14 HQ, U.S. Eighth Army, Japan, Occupational Monograph

of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September 1946–December

1947, vol. 3, pp. 172–73.

15 For a more extended treatment, see Stouffer et al., The

American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, pp. 545–49.

Testimony to the general validity of the study appears in the fact

that when the incidence of VD reported by the men in the sample for themselves was projected against that of the
A delegation of black newspaper publishers

toured U.S. military installations in Europe during

1946. Its conclusions also show that the behavior

problems black units experienced had more to do

with the circumstances in which AfricanAmericans found themselves and the corrosive

effects of racial prejudice than with the race of the

men. If discipline lagged in all-black military organizations, the editors told the secretary of war in

their final report, they could readily attribute the

problem to poor camp locations, inadequate recreation facilities, hostile military policemen, the lack

of education of many black soldiers, inexperienced

noncommissioned officers, the Army’s failure to

commission enough black officers, and the fact that

new recruits often arrived in Europe without basic

training. The discriminatory practices the Army

condoned only added to the problem, the publishers said, by promoting racial prejudice among

whites and corresponding disaffection among

blacks. The system’s effects were readily apparent in

the resentment and poor morale of black regulars.

Although proud of their service in combat, those

soldiers believed they had gained little for their sacrifices during the war. As soon as the conflict had

ended, they had been relegated once more to the

menial tasks that had seemed the lot of their race.

The publishers concluded that the Army would

experience difficulties with its black soldiers until

racial discrimination ended.16

Army leaders themselves had long been concerned about how best to employ blacks in the

postwar years. Two weeks after the war ended in

Europe, the War Department issued questionnaires

to determine how commanders had employed their

black troops and to ascertain their recommendations for the future. The responses that returned

were largely unfavorable. The officers conceded

that small black units had fought well during the

last months of the war, when platoons of black volunteers had seen action in combination with larger,

all-white forces. But most characterized the black

soldier, officer or enlisted, as unreliable, ineffective,

and difficult to train. They understood that racial

discrimination contributed to poor morale among

black troops, but they viewed segregation as a

given and were concerned mainly that turbulence

might result if the Army stepped too far ahead of

American society as a whole. For the sake of efficiency, they said, the Army might reduce the size of

its all-black units and fill them with better qualified

men. Even so, it should retain the practice of

appointing whites to positions of command.17

There were dissents. Col. Noel Parrish, the former commander of the Army Air Field at Tuskegee,

Alabama, where the all-black 99th Fighter

Squadron had trained, pointed out in August 1945

that if the Army dealt with blacks as a group they

would come to think and react as a group. Over

time, group feeling and spirit would prevail, even

when it was contrary to national feeling and spirit.

In that case, criticism of one soldier would tend to

become criticism of all. Such fierce resentment

might result that “even the boldest commander will

not dare criticize his troops or their performance if

they happen to be colored.” The best policy, Parrish

said, was one that looked forward to the end of segregation and that took measured but definite steps

toward treatment of blacks as individuals.18

Lost in the chorus of complaints about black

soldiers, Parrish’s comments had no effect. Of

greater impact was a discovery by the Army later in

the year that the percentage of nonwhites within its

ranks was increasing and might well reach 15 percent by 1947. Given the lack of education of many

blacks and the resulting possibility that a large proportion of the Army’s future enlisted strength might

be unskilled and difficult to train, Chief of Staff of

the Army General George C. Marshall, at the direcTURBULENCE AND REAPPRAISAL, 1945–1950 31

Mediterranean theater as a whole it matched known rates

among whites and blacks almost exactly. See also Lee, The

Employment of Negro Troops, pp. 278f.

16 Frank L. Stanley, Report of the Negro Newspaper

Publishers Association to the Honorable Secretary of War on

Troops and Conditions in Europe, 18 Jul 46, CMH files;

MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 209–11.

17 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp.

130–43. 

18 Ltr, Col Noel Parrish to Brig Gen William E. Hall,

Deputy Asst Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, United States Army

Air Force (USAAF), 5 Aug 45, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks

in the United States Armed Forces, vol. 7, item 19.
tion of Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson,

appointed a board of inquiry to study what should

be done. Convened during October 1945 under

the direction of Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., a

Tennessean who had risen through the ranks to

command a corps in Europe during the war, the

panel was to prepare a policy to achieve the best

possible use of black manpower if some national

emergency occurred.19

The board’s members recognized that racial

discrimination harmed the morale of the black soldier and avowed that the Army should “eliminate at

the earliest practicable moment, any special consideration based on race.” Even so, the system they

proposed left the Army’s practice of segregation

largely undisturbed. In their draft recommendation

to the chief of staff, they proposed that black soldiers should work side by side with whites, perform the same kind of duties in the same units, and

compete with whites on an equal basis. But blacks

should still live and eat in separate barracks and

messes. In the same way, the Army should abolish

all-black division-size units in the postwar period

but retain smaller segregated units of up to regimental size that could be grouped with larger white

organizations.20

The board’s other recommendations were similarly pragmatic. Warning that the Army should

refrain from experimenting in areas that threatened

“the disruption of civilian racial relationships,” the

panel indicated that blacks should have the opportunity to enter a broader selection of military occupations than in the past. Nevertheless, the Army

should adopt a quota system to ensure that the

ratio of black to white manpower in the civilian

population became the accepted proportion of

blacks to whites in its own ranks. Although all officers, regardless of race, should meet the same standards and enjoy equal opportunity for advancement and black officers should command black

units, the board made no mention of the custom of

restricting black officers to service in black units, a

practice that sorely inhibited their ability to compete with whites.21

The civilian aide on Negro affairs to the secretary of war, Truman Gibson, and the assistant secretary of war, John McCloy, both considered the

report an advance but also saw flaws. Gibson

believed that the Army had begun a process that

would weaken racism and lead inevitably to the

end of segregation. If he was willing to settle for

less than total integration as an interim measure,

however, he asserted that the report was too vague

and that it needed a clear statement on the basic

issue of segregation.22

32 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

19 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 153.

20 Memo, General Gillem for Chief of Staff, 17 Nov 45,

sub: Report of Board of General Officers on the Utilization of

Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army, Chief of Staff of the

Army, 291.2, War Department Records, National Archives and

Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.

21 Ibid. For a full description and analysis of the board’s

recommendations, see MacGregor, Integration of the Armed

Forces, pp. 152–205.

22 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 159–60.

See also Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 215–16.

Truman Gibson
McCloy agreed—experience had shown that it

was impossible to enforce policies that allowed for

any measure of misinterpretation. If the board

wanted black officers to command whites or if it

believed the Army should try mixed units, it

should say so. McCloy continued that the panel

clearly wanted the Army to take advantage of

recent advances in black education by suggesting

that the service deny reenlistment to blacks who

failed to meet minimum educational criteria. What

it gave with one hand, however, it took away with

the other by imposing the quota. Since poorly educated and skilled careerists would inevitably occupy many positions approved for blacks under the

system, a large number of highly qualified young

blacks would never have a chance to enlist.23

If McCloy and Gibson criticized the board’s

report for its imprecision, others approved of it for

that very reason. It committed them to little and left

existing institutions largely intact. The assistant

chief of staff for organization and training, Maj.

Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, thus concurred with the

report’s recommendations but immediately began

to backpedal by warning that the Army, in attempting to use black manpower, had to pay due attention to the “ineptitude and limited capacity of the

Negro soldier.” The chief of the General Staff’s

Operations Division, Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, warned

that even if black and white officers should be subjected to the same standards, no black should have

command of white troops. The deputy commander

of the Army Air Forces, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker,

agreed with the board that the Army should never

become “a testing ground for problems in race relationships.” The headquarters of the Army Ground

Forces approved the report but suggested that the

Army should not act alone. Instead, the War

Department should frame a policy applicable to the

entire military establishment. The acting commanding general of Army Service Forces, Maj. Gen.

Daniel Noce, meanwhile reported that his organization had already successfully employed a larger

percentage of blacks than the board contemplated.

Nevertheless, he said, the War Department should

refrain from dictating how commanders used their

men since that would infringe upon the legitimate

right of officers in the field to select and assign personnel as the demands of war might require.24

In the end, the Gillem Board stood by its report

but added a number of clarifications that did little

more than compromise the message it had hoped to

send. While asserting that the Army’s ultimate objective should be the effective use of all available manpower “without regard to antecedents or race,” it

refused to set a timetable or any intermediate goal

“beyond the utilization of the proportionate ratio” it

had set. In the same way, if black units eventually

ought to fall under the command of black officers,

the Army did not need to assign black commanders

to white units. As for the quota, it was necessary for

planning purposes and suitable for the moment but

could always be altered in the future.25

The War Department accepted the Gillem

Board’s recommendations in April 1946, but only

superficial changes resulted. Black enlisted men

began to enter many military occupational fields;

black infantry and artillery battalions were incorporated into formerly all-white regiments and divisions; and the Army began an attempt to recruit

more black officers while replacing white officers in

all-black units. Even so, racial prejudice remained

a compelling feature of military life. Although the

Army was going to put black battalions in white

divisions, the commanding general of Army

Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers, told his

staff, when notified in 1946 to begin incorporating

black units into all-white contingents, the move

was “purely business.” Segregation on all other levels would continue. There would be no mixing on

what Devers called “the social side.”26

TURBULENCE AND REAPPRAISAL, 1945–1950 33

24 The reactions are summarized in MacGregor, Integration

of the Armed Forces, pp. 158–61.

25 Quote from Supplemental Report of War Department

Special Board on Negro Manpower, 26 Jan 46, CMH files. The

Army promulgated the Gillem Board’s findings in War

Department Cir 124, Utilization of Negro Manpower in

Postwar Army Policy, 27 Apr 46, in MacGregor and Nalty,

Blacks in the United States Armed Forces, vol. 7, item 28.

26 Devers is quoted by MacGregor, Integration of the Armed

Forces, p. 165. 23 Ibid.
True to Devers’ word, over the years that followed, the small black units that the Gillem Board

had sought to distribute equitably throughout

major commands were grouped with white units as

far as work was concerned but remained segregated otherwise. Meanwhile, since the number and

nature of black units determined the assignments

and training their members could receive, 198 of

490 military occupational specialties and more

than half of the Army’s schools remained closed.

There were simply too few technical specialty positions in the segregated units that remained in the

Army’s force structure. On top of that, even when

blacks were eligible to receive specialized training,

racial prejudice limited their opportunities. For

example, although the Ordnance Department

declared itself ready to train the representatives of

all races, the 440 openings at the department’s

school in Atlanta were still inaccessible to blacks

more than a year after the Army accepted the

Gillem Board’s recommendations.27

The diminishing size of the Army made matters

worse. Many of the blacks who managed to receive

training found their new knowledge of limited use

simply because the Army had less need than before

for all kinds of specialists, whatever their race. The

graduates of the Army’s Medical and Signal Corps

schools provide a case in point. A number received

certification in those specialties only to learn upon

arrival at their duty stations that no openings existed in their fields. Entering some less skilled occupation, they had to content themselves with jobs as

riflemen, wiremen, or clerical assistants.28

The inadequate preparation of many blacks

joining the service further complicated matters.

One hundred and eleven of the Army’s 124 school

courses required a test score above 90, the bottom

of Category III, for admission. Because of the deficient education many blacks received and the low

rankings they achieved on general qualifications

tests, most failed to qualify. Indeed, 62 percent of

new black recruits in 1949 fell into the Army’s two

lowest classifications for educational accomplishment and aptitude, Categories IV and V, compared

with only 33 percent of the whites.29 (Table 2)

Those low scorers became a continual drag on

the efficiency of all-black Army units because they

often lacked the ability to read technical manuals

and were less adaptable and more difficult to train

than better-educated soldiers. The Army might

have solved the problem quickly by discharging all

men in the lowest categories, but the number of

whites in those classes equaled or exceeded the

number of blacks. Since the service could parcel

those men out, a few at a time, to a broad range of

units, it barely felt the effect of their presence and

saw no reason to exclude them. Under segregation,

however, the blacks had to be concentrated in a relatively small number of all-black units. Their effect

upon efficiency was sometimes pronounced.30

Declining the simple solution, the Army thus

attempted time and again to restrict the number of

black low scorers by reducing draft calls and

rejecting unqualified volunteers. Yet recruiters

were under great pressure to boost enlistments

because of manpower shortages and often subverted the system by accepting enlistees without

concern for what seemed to them mere paper

requirements. The quota imposed by the Gillem

Board, as McCloy had predicted, only made matters worse. Limiting the proportion of blacks in

the Army to 10 percent, it ensured that there was

often no space left for highly accomplished enlistees because the slots they might have occupied

were already filled by poorly skilled careerists

unlikely ever to depart. The Army attempted to

limit reenlistment to men who had scored higher

than 70 on its general classification test but even

then had to make exceptions—especially for sol34 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

27 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 197–99;

Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 251–52.

28 Nalty, Strength for the Fight, p. 227.

29 The table is drawn from Operations Research

Organization, Johns Hopkins University, Utilization of Negro

Manpower in the Army: A 1951 Study (Washington, D.C.:

Research Analysis Corporation, 1951), p. 4, CMH files. See

also MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 138,

198–99. Category I required a test score of 130 or better; II,

110–129; III, 90–109; IV, 60–89. Category V included all

scores below 59.

30 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 204.
diers decorated for valor and for those with marginal test scores who had nonetheless received

recommendations from commanders.31

In the end, the service achieved a measure of

relief only by opening special schools in each

command for men with less than a fifth-grade

education. It also invoked Army Regulation

615–369, which allowed commanders to terminate soldiers incapable of meeting military standards. Included were those who were mentally

unfit, required continual special instruction,

exhibited habitual drunkenness, or repeatedly

contracted venereal disease. The total number of

soldiers discharged under the regulation is

unknown, but the 24th Infantry alone processed

301 cases during 1946.32

The effects of education and command attention can be seen in a decline in VD rates for black

servicemen in the Eighth Army during 1946 and

1947. When commanders took steps to remedy the

problem by promoting proper prophylaxis, disciTURBULENCE AND REAPPRAISAL, 1945–1950 35

31 Ibid., p. 183.

32 HQ, 24th Inf Rgt, Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for

1946, 2 Mar 48.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

White 1949 Black 1949 White 1950 Black 1950

I II III IV V

Table 2—Percentage Distribution of AGCT Scores of Men in Army, 

1949–1950

Source: Operations Research Organization, Johns Hopkins University, Utilization of Negro Manpower in the 

Army: A 1951 Study (Washington, D.C.: Research Analysis Corporation, 1951), p. 4, CMH files.

Categories

Percentages
plining those who contracted VD, and eliminating

repeat offenders from the service, incidence of the

disease fell drastically from 1,186 per thousand in

June 1946 to 202 per thousand in 1947.33 (Table 3)

In general, if the Army’s leaders made do with

half measures, insisting that their response to the

Gillem Board’s recommendations had been reasonable and adequate, enough changes were occurring

within American society at large to render the

stance untenable.34 As soon as the war had ended,

for example, the NAACP had redoubled its effort to

achieve racial equality for African-Americans.

Reacting to Nazi atrocities against Jews and other

minorities during the war, civic associations, religious denominations, and labor organizations had

taken up the call. So had the federal courts, which

found increasingly in favor of blacks seeking

redress for racial injustices. As for blacks themselves, starting in World War I and continuing

through World War II, they had conducted a massive migration north in search of opportunity. Once

established, they registered to vote in such numbers in some northern cities that they frequently

held the balance in close elections.35

President Truman himself was stricken in conscience. “My very stomach turned,” he told a friend

shortly after the war, “when I learned that Negro

soldiers just back from overseas were being

dumped out of Army trucks in Mississippi and

beaten.” Referring to an incident in which a return36 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

33 HQ, U.S. Eighth Army, Japan, Occupational

Monograph of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September

1946–December 1947, vol. 3, p. 171.

34 See, for example, the statement of Secretary of the

Army Kenneth C. Royall in Transcript, National Defense

Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr 48, pp. 49–51, 58–59,

in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed

Forces, vol. 8, item 153. 35 Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 608–14.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

Black

White

DecNovOctSepAugJulJunMayAprMarFebJanDecNovOctSepAugJulJunMayAprMarFebJan

Table 3—Eighth Army VD Rates

Source: HQ, Eighth U.S. Army, Japan, Occupational Monograph of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September 

1946–December 1947, vol. 3, p. 171, CMH files. Rate per thousand per annum
ing soldier, Isaac Woodward, had lost his sight,

Truman continued: “When a mayor and a city marshal can take a Negro sergeant off a bus in South

Carolina, beat him up and put out one of his eyes,

and nothing is done by the state authorities, something is radically wrong with the system.”36

Truman appointed an interracial committee in

1946 to investigate the status of civil rights in

America. The committee’s final report denounced

Jim Crow and issued a ringing call for the elimination

of segregation. A second interracial panel commissioned that same year highlighted inequities in higher education between black and white schools and

called upon the government to abandon all forms of

discrimination in higher education. Neither report

had much influence on the Army, which still viewed

integration only as an option for the far future.37

The increasing power of the black electorate

took on new significance in 1948 when the

approaching presidential election found Truman

facing apparent defeat in his bid to retain the White

House. His Republican opponent, Thomas A.

Dewey, sought to capitalize on the disaffection of

blacks by promising to put an end to segregation in

the armed forces. The Democratic Party meanwhile

seemed increasingly divided, with northern liberals

seeking to expand civil rights through the enlargement of federal authority, while southern conservatives stood fast for states’ rights and segregation.

The liberals gained the upper hand at the party’s

national convention, winning approval for a platform that committed the candidate to voting rights

for blacks, equal opportunity for all, and an end to

segregation in the armed forces. Southern delegations then walked out to form a new party that

selected Governor Strom Thurmond of South

Carolina to run for president as States Rights candidate. The far left wing of the party also broke

away to promote the presidential candidacy of Vice

President Henry Wallace, who favored accommodation with an increasingly hostile Soviet Union.38

All seemed lost for the president, but he

rebounded quickly. Seeking to build a new political

coalition that included the increasingly influential

black electorate, he issued Executive Order 9981

on 26 July 1948. This measure stipulated equal

treatment and opportunity for all within the armed

services without regard to race. The directive

allowed the military enough time to make the

change without damaging efficiency or morale, but

Truman left no doubt about its ultimate intent.

Questioned at a news conference on whether the

order meant an eventual end to segregation, he

replied with an unequivocal yes. The rejoinder had

the desired effect. Although Truman received a cool

reception when he appeared before Congress on

the day after issuing the order, black leaders who

had earlier planned a program of civil disobedience

against the draft called off the effort and rallied to

his side. In the end, aided by blacks and other

groups that had also received concessions, Truman

won the election by a narrow margin.39

Even with the president on record as supporting

an end to segregation, the Army continued to delay.

The policies established by the Gillem Board,

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall declared,

were “sound in the light of actual experience” and

already largely in accord with the president’s wishes.

When a committee Truman had established to monitor compliance with the order suggested that the

Army break up its all-black units and replace the

quota system with one based principally on test

scores rather than race, the service rejected the proposal.40 In doing so, Secretary of the Army Gordon

TURBULENCE AND REAPPRAISAL, 1945–1950 37

36 Woodward lost the sight in both of his eyes. Truman is

quoted by Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York:

William Morrow, 1972), p. 429. See also McCullough, Truman,

pp. 588–89.

37 Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 608–11.

38 McCullough, Truman, pp. 639–40. See also Joseph

Goulden, The Best Years, 1945–1950 (New York: Athenaeum,

1976), pp. 215–33; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, pp. 238–42.

39 EO 9981, 26 Jul 48, and The President’s News

Conference of 26 July 1948, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in

the United States Armed Forces, vol. 8, items 164 and 165,

respectively.

40 Memo, President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment

and Opportunity in the Armed Services for Secretary of the

Army, 8 Sep 49, sub: Substitution of a GCT Quota for a Racial

Quota, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States

Armed Forces, vol. 11, item 22.
Gray, who succeeded Royall in June 1949, declared

that the quota remained the best means for ensuring that the Army received only the highest quality

black recruits.41

In the end, the committee’s chairman, Charles

Fahy, took the matter to Truman himself and won

the president’s support. Shortly afterward, the

Army agreed to a compromise and on 15 January

1950 announced the enactment of Special

Regulation 600–629–1, requiring that “Negro manpower . . . be utilized in accordance with [its] skills

and qualifications.” In pursuit of that goal the service would assign soldiers where needed, without

regard to race.42 A further concession came two

months later, when Army administrators agreed to

replace the quota with a system that relied upon

nonracial physical, mental, and psychological standards. Even then, however, Secretary Gray could

bring himself to bend only to a degree. The Army

would give the new system a fair trial, he told the

president, but reserved the right to return to procedures based on race if the experiment failed.43

Truman responded with a quiet emphasis that left

little doubt that there would be no turning back. “I

am sure,” he told Gray politely but pointedly, “that

everything will work out as it should.”44

The end of the quota in April 1950 marked the

beginning of racial integration in the Army.

Although the service was inclined to hold back, the

Korean War started a mere two months later. When

recruits began to arrive in Army training centers,

planners found it impossible to predict how many

would be black or white. Lacking firm numbers,

they could not provide for separate facilities to

accommodate each race. They proposed the integration of training units as a solution. In the same

way, with casualties running high in the field and

commanders hard pressed to find replacements,

soldiers were shoved into the line where needed,

without regard to race. When the performance of

blacks in the integrated units matched that of

whites, no excuses were left. The Army moved to

put an end to segregation.45

The indecision and half measures that had distinguished the Army’s journey to that point in the

years following World War II nevertheless had

their effect, especially on the 24th Infantry. As the

great debate over segregation proceeded in

Washington, the regiment had taken up station in

the Far East, where it occupied a world in which

the old standards still prevailed and in which forward movement on matters of race seemed almost

imperceptible. The problems that resulted were

manageable as long as peace endured, but once

war began and the unit entered combat, their consequences were profound.

38 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

41 Memo, Secretary of the Army for Secretary of Defense,

30 Sep 49, sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the

Armed Services, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United

States Armed Forces, vol. 11, item 25. See also Nalty, Strength for

the Fight, p. 253.

42 DOD Press Release 64, 16 Jan 50, Army Revises Policy

Governing Utilization of Negro Manpower, in MacGregor and

Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces, vol. 11, item

29. See also Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces,

p. 196.

43 Ltr, Gordon Gray to the President, 1 Mar 50, in

MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces,

vol. 11, item 33.

44 Memo, Harry S. Truman for Secretary of the Army, 27

Mar 50, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States

Armed Forces, vol. 11, item 36.

45 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 203.
A

s the end of World War II approached in early

August 1945, the 24th Infantry transferred from

Saipan and Tinian to the Ryukyu Islands to assist

in mopping-up operations on the Kerama Islands,

some fifteen miles to the west of the southern tip of

Okinawa. The regiment reached perhaps its highest

point for the war on 22 August, when its commander, Col. Julian G. Hearne, Jr., accepted the surrender of Aka Island, the first formal capitulation of a

Japanese Army garrison.1 Shortly thereafter, the regiment joined occupation forces on Okinawa, an area

that had been ravaged by some of the war’s worst

fighting. The troops were greeted, according to Sgt.

Maxie Fields, by “empty tents, nothing more.” It was

the beginning of a long letdown.2

Okinawa and Japan

The unit had hardly arrived when two typhoons,

three weeks apart in September, destroyed 95 percent of the island’s tentage and severely damaged the

few permanent structures that had survived the

fighting. Conditions improved during January 1946,

when the regiment occupied buildings that had formerly housed the 9th General Hospital. From then

on, with that facility as a base of operations, the unit

carried out a range of missions—from guard duty at

the Yontan-Kadena ammunition depot to patrolling

for fugitive Japanese soldiers. To assist the 186th

Port Battalion in moving perishable food from dock

to destination as quickly as possible, Company M

became a provisional trucking unit with 5 officers

and 100 enlisted men. Meanwhile, the rest of the

regiment took instruction in such subjects as military courtesy, first aid, sanitation, Army organization,

and the history of the 24th Infantry. In addition, an

ad hoc school staffed by some of the unit’s bettereducated soldiers taught reading, writing, and simple arithmetic to those men whose formal education

in the United States had been more limited.3

With some stability, life might have become

very pleasant for the men of the 24th. They had few

major tasks, according to former enlisted man

Edward Pratt. During abundant free time, they

played cards with the Japanese prisoners in their

charge and gambled with white officers who would

stop by their barracks on payday. On the many

days when there were no details or training, they

would get up in the morning and go to the beach.

For a time they even had a zoo with pet monkeys,

parrots, and dogs.4

1 Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, p. 535.

2 Interv, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with Maxie Fields, 2 Nov

88, CMH files. All interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash,

Bernard L. Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers,

Richard O. Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files.

3 HQ, 24th Inf Rgt, Annual History of the 24th Infantry

Regiment (hereafter cited as Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt)

for 1946, 2 Mar 48, pp. 1–2, copy in CMH files.

4 Ibid. See also Interv, John A. Cash with Edward Pratt, 16

Jun 89.

CHAPTER 3

Gifu: “Our Own Little World”
All that changed, however, as 1946 progressed.

With the Army pursuing its postwar drawdown, the

regiment became little more than a holding detachment. Officers and enlisted men arrived continually,

remained just long enough to qualify for rotation

home, and then departed. The constant turnover in

personnel left the unit scarcely able to fulfill even a

limited mission. On 1 January 1946, for example,

out of an authorized strength of 135 officers and

2,861 enlisted men, the regiment totaled 75 officers

and 706 enlisted men. By April, 82 officers but only

384 enlisted men were present. In June the number

of officers decreased to 73 while that of the enlisted

men rose to 1,321. Of the officers assigned in June,

at most 50 were on hand for duty. The rest had

received temporary duty assignments elsewhere on

Okinawa with units as badly short of officers as the

24th. The number present held steady at 51 during

July, but 36 of those officers were eligible to rotate

home as soon as a ship arrived to take them.5

The turbulence had a serious effect on readiness. With few soldiers to fill the 24th’s rifle and

weapons companies, the regiment soon had to

inactivate some of its battalions to provide minimal

staffing for those that remained. By June the regiment had no choice but to organize its companies

by their assigned missions. The headquarters company of the 1st Battalion, for example, contained all

of the men employed as guards for Japanese prisoners of war and the staff required to administer

that activity. Company A provided construction

workers, Company B utilities personnel, and

Company C cooks and mess crews. Company D

and the headquarters company for the 3d Battalion

contained administrative personnel. At the direction of the commanding general of the services

command on Okinawa, Company F became a provisional trucking unit similar to Company M.6

Shortages of drivers, mechanics, and heavy

equipment operators also began to occur, threatening the ability of motor pools and truck companies

to operate safely. Since few maintenance men

remained for long, crews had to be trained continually to operate plumbing, water pumps, electrical

generators, and communications equipment. In the

end, the movement of men in and out of the regiment became so rapid that formal training ceased

and on-the-job instruction became the rule.

Meanwhile, by July so many men began to arrive

from branches of the Army other than the infantry

that the unit had to conduct continual on-the-spot

training just to familiarize its personnel with such

rudimentary tasks as guard duty and patrolling.

The regiment’s commander, Col. Michael E.

Halloran, who had seen some of the heaviest fighting on Okinawa as commander of the 96th Infantry

Division’s 381st Infantry regiment, departed on 15

February after little more than a month with the

unit. A temporary commander took his place until

10 July, when the former commander of the 96th’s

382d Infantry, Col. Macey L. Dill, took charge.7

With so many officers and enlisted men arriving on Okinawa and departing, discipline

declined among all the troops, both white and

black. Bored, resentful because of the primitive

conditions they sometimes endured, and lacking

consistent supervision, many American soldiers

sought relief among the prostitutes who flourished in the island’s villages. Taking temporary,

40 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

5 Strengths are from Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for

1946, 2 Mar 48, pp. 1–7. The authorized strength figure is

taken from Adjutant General (AG) Form 016, 24th Inf Rgt,

copy in CMH files.

6 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1946, 2 Mar 48, p. 6.

7 Ibid.

Aerial view of the 24th Infantry regiment area, Gifu, Japan
“French” leave—no one could truly desert on the

island—some inevitably contributed to a rising

crime rate that characterized the initial stages of

the American occupation. Numerous cases of

rape, kidnapping, and assault occurred along with

a number of murders. Although blacks were

sometimes blamed, there is no indication in official records that the men of Dill’s command were

involved to any great extent. If, as Sgt. Michael

Pierre recalled years later, the soldiers of the 24th

had as little to do as everyone else and were often

just as bored, crime reports that survive from the

period mention individuals assigned to various

truck and port units but say nothing about any of

the men of the regiment.8 Indeed, by that time the

unit was undergoing intensive training to prepare

for occupation duties in Japan. Its officers made it

a point to note in their reports that their platoons

and companies were in better condition than they

had seen in many months.9

On 18 September 1946, the 24th departed for

the island of Ie Shima, some three miles west of

Okinawa. The site of a small airfield, military depots,

and a cemetery, it had seen heavy fighting during the

war, when it had gained notoriety as the site of war

correspondent Ernie Pyle’s death. The regiment

would stay on the island only long enough to incorporate enough men to reach its authorized strength

and to train the newcomers to infantry standards.

Then it would relocate to Japan, where it would join

the occupation as part of the 25th Infantry Division.

After the 24th arrived on Ie Shima, Dill sent nine

officers and seventy-six enlisted men from Company

C to Japan to prepare for the arrival of the entire regiment.10

However temporary, the 24th’s sojourn on Ie

Shima, Japanese for Ash Island, represented a low

point in the regiment’s history. According to

enlisted man Fred Thomas, there were still skeletons in the island’s caves, and live ammunition left

over from the war was scattered about. Amenities

were few. A quonset hut with two Ping-Pong

tables served for an enlisted men’s club, and the

only other forms of entertainment were cards and

dice. The food was wretched. The men varied

their diets with wild sugarcane and sweet potatoes

they harvested themselves from abandoned fields.

There was even a shortage of cigarettes. Red Cross

personnel, all black according to Thomas, were

hoarding them, possibly for later sale on the black

market. Although a black special service hostess,

according to Edward Pratt, visited white officers,

there were few if any other women nearby. The

cook’s tent became the “red light district,” Fred

Thomas observed, with the unit’s homosexuals—

termed “sissies” or “field WACs” by the men—

serving as hosts.11 Overall, the men considered

themselves prisoners in exile.12

Despite privations and short rations, commanders labeled September a “Gold Star” month. The

regiment, in preparation for the move to Japan, at

long last received much-needed officer replacements: a lieutenant colonel, 10 captains, 11 first lieutenants, and 2 chief warrant officers. October was

perhaps even better. Nine hundred and twenty-six

more enlisted men arrived along with another complement of officers: 5 captains and 7 first lieutenants.

All of the officers in the second group were black, an

indication that the Army was putting the Gillem

GIFU 41

8 Interv, Cash with Michael Pierre, 29 Nov 89. For concerns about black involvement in crime, see Memo, Director of

General Affairs, Lt Cdr James T. Watkins IV, for Deputy Cdr for

Military Government, 6 Apr 46, sub: Negro Troops—

Withdrawal From Okinawa, HQ, U.S. Naval Military

Government, Watkins file, Record Group (RG) 200, National

Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington,

D.C.; Memo, Public Safety Department, Military Government,

Ryukyu, for Deputy Cdr for Military Government, 3 Sep 46,

sub: Report of Public Safety Department for Month of August

1946, copy in CMH files; Memorandum for the Record (MFR),

Public Safety Department, Military Government, Ryukyu, 31

Oct 46, sub: Report of Public Safety Department for the Month

of October 1946, copy in CMH files.

9 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1946, 2 Mar 48, p. 8.

10 Ibid., pp. 8–9; Interv, Cash with Alexander Shearin, 17

Aug 88. See also Scipio, Last of the Black Regulars, p. 79.

11 Intervs, Cash with Pratt, 16 Jun 89; Fred Thomas, 24

Aug 89. Thomas is the only one to mention homosexuals on Ie

Shima, but there is little reason to doubt his story. The presence and activities of homosexuals in the 24th in Japan and

throughout the Army are well documented.

12 See Ltr, Waymon R. Ransom to John A. Cash, 22 Oct

88, CMH files; Interv, Cash with Pratt, 16 Jun 89.
Board’s recommendations into effect. Another 667

enlisted men arrived during November. Of those,

161 had test scores in the very useful ranges above

70 (Category IV). A number were also either qualified for skilled jobs or showed enough potential to

warrant special training.13

Many of the new men were draftees or enlistees

with at best eight weeks of basic training. In addition,

800 of the 926 men who had arrived during

September had transferred into the unit from

branches of the service other than the infantry. Some

were former airmen. In order to build esprit de corps

among the new men, the regiment set aside a special

day during October to commemorate the 80th

anniversary of its founding and to honor Sgt. Edward

J. Nickens, who had spent twenty-six of his twentyeight years in the Army as a member of the 24th.14

The unit also began heavy training in basics

such as military courtesy, drill, and weapons

familiarization. The island’s lava ate great holes in

the men’s shoes and ripped field jackets and

trousers to shreds, but the effort had its effect. By

the end of November, although the men’s shoes

were sometimes stuffed with old newspapers,

commanders could note with satisfaction that 984

members of the regiment had qualified on the M1

rifle and 990 had fired submachine guns and M1

carbines for familiarization.15 A board of officers

convened at that time under the provisions of AR

615–369 to rate soldiers who had been referred

for separation because of low test scores or discipline problems. By 23 December 1946, it had

processed a total of 301 cases. As the year ended,

regimental strength stood at 93 officers and 2,463

enlisted men.16

The 24th completed its thirteenth and final

week of training on 4 January 1947. According to

unit reports, its soldiers were solidly grounded in

infantry basics with 98.5 percent of them qualified on their weapons. A number had also

received specialized training as medics and personnel administrators.17

During the first week in January, the regiment

moved to Japan. Arriving at the port of Kobe on

the island of Honshu, 270 miles southwest of

Tokyo, it rode a train to Gifu, midway between

Kobe and Tokyo, and then marched to

Kagamigahara Airfield, a former Japanese

kamikaze base located some ten miles east of the

town. (See Map 1.) The post had recently housed

a sister regiment in the 25th Division, the allwhite 27th Infantry regiment. “I recall the

Japanese kids licking their fingers and then running up to us and rubbing it [sic] on our skin to

see if it would come off,” Fred Thomas recalled.

“They called us ‘chocoleta’ soldiers and called the

27th ‘ice cream’ soldiers. The 27th had been there

before us and was leaving. They said, ‘soldiers

why you no washa washa.’”18 Camp Gifu, as it

came to be called, would be the unit’s home until

the beginning of the Korean War three years later.

The other regiments of the 25th Division, the 35th

42 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

13 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1946, 2 Mar 48, p. 9.

14 Ibid.

15 Interv, Cash with Thomas, 24 Aug 89.

16 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1946, 2 Mar 48, p.

9. See also Interv, Muehlbauer with Fields, 2 Nov 88.

17 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p.

1. See also Intervs, Cash with Edward Dixon, 20 Jan 89;

Shearin, 17 Aug 88.

18 Interv, Cash with Thomas, 24 Aug 89. Leonard H.

Kushner mentions the 27th’s stay at Gifu. See Interv, Cash with

Leonard H. Kushner (Mrs. Kushner participated in her husband’s interview), 16 Jun 89.

Enlisted men of the 24th Infantry ride through the shallow

Kiso River.
and 27th Infantry regiments, were stationed in

similar facilities nearby.19

Despite the efforts of the 27th, which had done

some ground work, and the 85-man team that had

preceded the unit, the accommodations at Gifu were

rudimentary at first. Officers’ quarters were dirty and

had holes in them. There were few indoor latrines.

The facility’s runway was littered with wrecked and

cannibalized aircraft.20 To make matters worse, the

Army’s supply system would take several months to

catch up with the unit. During that time, mops were

GIFU 43

19 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p. 1.

20 Intervs, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Shearin, 17 Aug

88; Thomas, 24 Aug 89; Muehlbauer with Norman Taylor, 16

Sep 88; Charles A. Smith, 27 Sep 88; Clifford Allen, 18 Oct 88;

Bill W. Gunter, 28 Feb 89.

PACIFIC OCEAN

SEA OF JAPAN

CHINA

UNION OF SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

P'yongyang

Chungch'on SEOUL

Osan

Pusan

KOREA

Gifu Fuji

TOKYO

Kobe

Kokura

Moji

Sasebo

HOKKAIDO

HONSHU

SHIKOKU

KYUSHU

J

A

P

A

N

KOREA AND JAPAN

1950

0 200

Miles

Map 1
unavailable, stocks of soap were insufficient, the

camp’s dry cleaning and laundry facilities often

lacked solvents and detergent, and the men had to

continue to wear clothing and shoes torn to shreds

by Ie Shima’s lava.21 According to Edward Pratt, the

supply problem came to the attention of the U.S.

Eighth Army’s commander, Lt. Gen. Robert L.

Eichelberger, during an inspection shortly after the

regiment arrived in Japan, when the general’s wife

was moved almost to tears by the men’s lack of shoes.

A few days later, a train arrived with combat boots.22

Those problems notwithstanding, by 15 March

enough repairs had been made at Gifu for the 24th

to begin to feel at home. The regiment experienced

a setback on 29 March, when the enlisted quarters

for Companies E, F, and G were destroyed in a fire

that blazed for six hours, killing one enlisted man

and injuring two others. By the end of the month,

however, forty-five units of family housing had

been built and fifty-eight more were slated to be

done by the end of April to accommodate the families that would arrive over the months to come. A

new regimental aid station was in place, and completion of a new steam plant was well in sight.23

When the men of the 24th began their stay at

Gifu, their mission was to complete their training as

an infantry regiment in order to assume their share

of the duties assigned to the four-division force occupying Japan. To that end, although hampered by a

lack of training areas near Gifu because the camp

was surrounded by rice paddies, they spent most of

1947 honing their skills as infantrymen by undergoing tactical and technical instruction. Officers took

courses in military law and the fundamentals of

command; noncommissioned officers attended

classes in leadership, administration, and methods of

instruction; the regimental motor officer conducted

a driver’s school; and infantrymen continued their

training on squad- and platoon-level tactics.24

As was the case with many all-black units, a

few college and high school graduates were

44 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

21 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, pp.

1–2. See also Interv, Cash with Thomas, 24 Aug 89.

22 Interv, Cash with Pratt, 16 Jun 89.

23 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, pp.

1–2; Interv, Cash with Richard Haynesworth, 6 Sep 88.

24 Ibid. See also Ltr, John S. Komp to George L.

MacGarrigle, 14 May 95, CMH files.

Camp Majestic, near Gifu, Japan, home of the 24th Infantry, 12 June 1947
among the troops, but a large number of the enlisted men possessed below a fifth-grade education.

Some of the veterans were completely unschooled.

According to Richard W. Saxton, who served in the

personnel section during 1947, the problem was so

acute that only four enlisted men in the regimental

headquarters company possessed a high school education. Saxton added that one of his platoon

sergeants could neither read nor write. “I had to read

the rosters for him.”25 The regimental historian, for

his part, could only note that the lack of education

of many of the men within the regiment ranked high

among the impediments to progress within the unit.

“Despite our gains,” he observed in his conclusion

for March 1947, “we have not attained the desired

degree of proficiency which we are striving for. This

is due largely to the fact that the regiment is not adequately equipped and has not received sufficient

numbers of the desired calibre of personnel.”26

In an attempt to find a solution, following the

policies of the Eighth Army command, the 24th

gave self-improvement and education great emphasis. Within two months of arriving in Japan, 220 of

its members were involved in academic, trade, or

business courses sponsored by the Army Education

Program. In addition, the unit’s literacy school was

in full swing, with 125 soldiers attending either

morning or evening classes. The literacy effort in

particular achieved some benefit according to Sgt.

Edward L. Horne, who worked in the program during 1947. The men were eager to learn, and 85 percent made good progress, especially those under

thirty years of age.27 Over the years that followed,

remedial instruction continued to receive special

emphasis from both the regimental commander,

who kept close tabs on the effort, and the sergeants,

who advised their men to seek an education if they

wanted to succeed in the world.28

Colonel Halloran returned to take command

of the regiment in April 1947. Known as

“Screaming Mike” because of his booming voice—

the result of a hearing impairment—he took

immediate action to remedy the supply deficiencies afflicting his unit. A troop commander with

the all-black 92d Infantry Division during the

early days of World War II, when the unit was still

training in the United States, Halloran also understood the value of education to a black unit and

made it a priority within the regiment.29

Most of the enlisted men admired the colonel

because he seemed forthright in manner and honest

in his dealings with them.30 “Screaming Mike” was

“something else . . . a character,” rifleman Norman

Taylor asserted, but he “loved us; wouldn’t let anything happen to us.” First Sgt. Richard

GIFU 45

25 Intervs, Cash with Richard W. Saxton, 3 Dec 88;

Shearin, 17 Aug 88; Albert Griffin, Jr., 5 Oct 88; William A.

Bobo (Mrs. Bobo participated in her husband’s interview), 27

Jan 90; Rollie Evans, 13 Oct 88; Robert Taylor, 15 Sep 88;

Harold Rogue, Jr., 14 Oct 88; Muehlbauer with William M.

Factory, 2 Nov 88; Houston McMurray, Jun 88.

26 Quote from Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2

Mar 48, p. 3. See also Intervs, Cash with Leroy Williams, 6 Oct

88; William T. Bowers with Richard Sanders, 5 May 95.

27 Interv, Muehlbauer with Rev. Edward L. Horne, 3 Nov

88. See also MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 216.

White stucco building at Camp Majestic, occupied by

Company D, 24th Infantry

28 Ibid. See also Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947,

2 Mar 48, p. 4; Intervs, Muehlbauer with Harry A. Davis, 26

Sep 88; Richard Sanders, 16 Dec 88; Cash with Griffin, 5 Oct

88; Walter Smith, 25 Sep 88; Saxton, 3 Dec 88; Theodore R.

Eldridge, Jr., 26 Aug 88.

29 Interv, Muehlbauer with Horne, 3 Nov 88.

30 See, for example, ibid.; Intervs, Cash with James

Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Robert Taylor, 25 Sep 88; Muehlbauer with

Beverly Scott, n.d.
Haynesworth and others considered him “a soldier’s soldier,” who was open to his troops and

available to them twenty-four hours a day. He was

a fantastic person, medic James Perkins avowed, an

officer who loved the regiment and did many

things for the men.31

The enlisted men’s attitude was built upon their

perception that Halloran was on their side. He

attempted to make sure they were well supplied,

supported their interest in sports, fostered their

advancement through education, and at times took

their part when other officers of the regiment

seemed unfair. Halloran did not play favorites, MP

Sgt. Clarence Ferguson asserted. If something was

wrong, it was wrong. As a result, Ferguson said,

when several clearly prejudiced white officers

joined the regiment, Halloran had them reassigned.

Halloran never drove to work, Joel T. Ward

observed. Instead he would walk across the training area. If it was cold outside, he would tell the

men to go indoors. He visited them everywhere,

Fred Thomas added—in the barracks, in training,

at play. “Considering those days, I would give him

an AA rating as a white officer.”32

Affectionate stories about Halloran, some bordering on myth, were repeated continually among

the men. On one occasion, it was said, the Eighth

Army failed to invite the 24th’s honor guard and

band to participate in an annual Fourth of July

parade in Tokyo. The colonel sent them along anyway, with instructions to report directly to the U.S.

commander in the Far East, General Douglas

MacArthur. As a result, the band received a place in

the parade. Soldiers also told of how Halloran, on

at least one occasion during an inspection, supposedly came upon a private whose boots were so

ragged they were almost unwearable. Receiving

unsatisfactory explanations from the man’s commanding officer and supply sergeant, he instructed

the individual responsible to exchange his own

footwear with the soldier in full view of a company

formation. The men also told the story of an unannounced inspection in which Halloran stood up to

a general. When that officer arrived at Gifu to begin

the review, the colonel was said to have met him at

the gate and to have informed him, “You didn’t say

you were coming. We aren’t ready, and you aren’t

inspecting.”33

The regiment’s officers dealt with Halloran on a

different level and had of necessity a different perspective. Among the most negative was black 1st

Lt. Richard L. Fields, who asserted that Halloran

had reprimanded him in front of the regimental

sergeant major because he had won too many

acquittals for soldiers tried by court-martial. Young

lieutenants were afraid of Halloran, Fields said. He

screamed, ranted, and cursed. Overall, if he was

paternalistic toward the enlisted men, he was prejudiced against blacks as a group and looked down

on them. “I did not respect him,” Fields said, “as a

man, commander, officer, or whatever.”34

Senior black Capt. William A. Bobo conceded

that Halloran had his faults. He expected more than

could be produced, the officer said, and ended a

few careers, black and white. Nevertheless, Bobo

continued, Halloran was as fair as most people, and

he had become so identified with the 24th that

some said he could have been born black. In the

same way, a black second lieutenant at Gifu, Albert

Brooks, who had served with Halloran in an earlier

assignment, asserted that the colonel was known

for raising hell and had never pleased everyone.

Even so, he was “totally colorblind.”35 Screaming

46 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

31 Intervs, Cash with Haynesworth, 6 Sep 88; James

Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Muehlbauer with Norman Taylor, 16 Sep 88;

Factory, 2 Nov 88. Over a hundred veterans spoke of Halloran

positively. Only a handful had anything negative to say.

32 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Clarence Ferguson, 2 Sep 88;

Cash with Thomas, 24 Aug 89; Girard Sammons, 27 Aug 88;

Vernie Scott, 7 Sep 88; Hollis Reese, 24 Sep 88; Taylor Moore,

19 Aug 88; Walter Smith, 25 Sep 88; Joel T. Ward, 21 Jul 88.

33 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Ferguson, 2 Sep 88; Cash

with John W. Anderson, 2 Sep 89; John French, 21 Jul 89; Leo

Roberts, 10 Nov 88. Quote from Interv, Cash with Albert

Brooks, 6 Aug 88.

34 Interv, Cash with Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88.

35 Intervs, Cash with Bobo, 27 Jan 90, and quote from Cash

with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88. See also Interv, Timothy Rainey

with Harold Montgomery, 26 Mar 90. Montgomery had served

under Halloran both during World War II and at Gifu. Although

he made no specific comments about the colonel, it was obvious

that there was a mutual respect between the two officers.
Mike was an intense and demanding officer, white

platoon leader Charles E. Green observed, constantly out checking on his units and screaming

when things were not done as he expected. He

liked doing what the Army paid him to do, and he

did it with a vengeance.36

Halloran had yet to arrive when the turbulence

affecting the rest of the Army once more began to tell

upon the 24th. During March the unit absorbed 25

officers and 515 enlisted men from its sister regiment, the all-black 25th Infantry, which was moving

to Fort Benning prior to inactivation. That put it at

137 regularly assigned officers and 3,174 enlisted

men. From then on the totals fluctuated. During

April the unit was under its authorized strength of

3,055 by some 190 men, but by the beginning of

May it had grown to 153 officers and 3,215 enlisted

men. The numbers dropped after that. At the end of

the month, they stood at 126 and 2,951 respectively. June was worse—by the last day of the month

commanders could count only 121 officers and

2,348 enlisted men. At the end of July, at best 119

officers and 2,272 enlisted men were present.37

Training continued at first despite the turbulence. During July the 3d Battalion and elements of

the 2d traveled to the Fujino-Susono Maneuver Area

(called Fuji for short), on the slopes of historic

Mount Fujiyama, to participate in weapons practice

and combat simulations. Toward the end of the

month, the 1st Battalion and the remaining portions

of the 2d took to the field to undergo the same program. By the beginning of September, however, only

105 officers and 1,616 enlisted men remained, forcing the regiment to curtail training and to place the

2d Battalion in an inoperative status.38

Further reductions in the months that followed

prompted more realignments. The unit managed to

conduct a three-day, two-night field test exercise

and bivouac with the 3d Battalion during October,

but by November that battalion, one platoon of the

antitank company, one platoon of the cannon company, and the intelligence and reconnaissance

(I&R) platoon were the only combat components

of the regiment still operational. By the end of

December, the 24th numbered only 94 officers and

988 enlisted men. As on Okinawa, unit-level

instruction ended and commanders had no choice

but to conduct on-the-job training to sustain basic

services at Gifu. For their own part, the soldiers

who remained could do little more than preserve

their basic individual skills.39

During the first months of 1948, as replacements began to arrive from the phase-out of allblack units in the United States, the 24th gradually

regained its strength, growing to 126 officers and

2,446 enlisted men by the end of May. As the last

black regiment in the U.S. Army serving overseas,

it was in effect a segregated holding unit for the

many black soldiers who arrived in the Far East.40

By contrast, because of the cutbacks and stringencies plaguing the Army at the time, white regiments operated with far fewer soldiers. During May,

for example, the 27th Infantry contained only a fraction of the men the 24th could count, 59 officers and

391 enlisted men. The 35th Infantry meanwhile

numbered 49 and 355 respectively. Whole battalions

in those units were all but inoperative, retaining a

first sergeant, a supply sergeant, and little else.41

If the 24th had reached relative equilibrium by

mid-1948, personnel turbulence continued in

other forms. Approximately 80 percent of the officers in the regiment, both white and black, were

reservists subject to reduction-in-force programs

affecting the officer corps.42 In order to gain career

GIFU 47

36 Interv, George L. MacGarrigle with Charles E. Green,

16 Jun 94.

37 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p. 3.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., pp. 3, 9; Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88.

40 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 52; 25th Inf Div,

History of the Occupation of Japan, May 48, p. 3, CMH files.

See also Matloff, American Military History, pp. 528–42;

Intervs, Cash with Steve G. Davis, 2 Sep 88; Shearin, 17 Aug

88; Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88.

41 The figures for the 27th and 35th are in HQ, 25th Inf

Div, History of the Occupation of Japan, May 48, pp. 4–5.

42 See “Reserve Officer Morale,” Infantry Journal (May

1950). For more on reductions in the 24th, see Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Sam J. Adams, Jr., 15 Jun 94; Sidney B. Berry,

11 Aug 93; Bowers with Charles L. Gray, 2 and 3 May 94;

Rainey with Leopold Hall, 2 Jun 90; Cash with Shearin, 17

Aug 88; Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88. In 1947 only 8 percent
stability, many decided to participate in what the

Army called the Competitive Tour program.43

Serving in a series of command and staff positions

for three months at a time, they moved from

assignment to assignment within the regiment. In

the end, if an individual achieved high enough ratings in each job and met certain predetermined

standards, he received an appointment to the

Regular Army. That opened up career and educational opportunities denied to less permanent

members of the armed forces and spared him from

the uncertainties that remained a feature of Army

life for reserve officers on active duty. The continual switching of officers from job to job nonetheless

took a toll on the men of the regiment. They would

hardly become accustomed to a commander before

another would arrive to take his place.44

Life at Gifu, 1946–1948

Overall, life at Gifu had many attractions.

Although some Japanese showed disdain for black

Americans, racial friction itself appears to have

been rare. The local people needed the money and

commodities the soldiers could provide and were

eager to work. As a result, both noncommissioned

and commissioned officers, whether accompanied

by families or not, had servants. Enlisted soldiers

meanwhile enjoyed the ministrations of Japanese

laborers who made beds, performed kitchen duties,

and might for a small fee even clean personal

weapons after stints on the firing range. That left

the men with time to tour the country, study

Japanese, and enroll in martial arts classes.

Although a nonfraternization policy was in effect,

some soldiers and a few officers dated Japanese

women and lived with their female friends off post.

When the policy changed just before the 24th went

to Korea in 1950, despite official discouragement a

few marriages occurred.45

Many officers brought their wives and children

to Gifu. In August 1947 the base housing area contained 108 families. By May 1948, 148 families totaling 254 dependents lived there. The addition of so

many civilians created problems for the regiment.

Food and tempers sometimes grew short. Colonel

Halloran responded by advising one and all to stay

home, stay out of trouble, and avoid becoming

involved in military affairs. The chaplains meanwhile

spent considerable time in marriage counseling.

Despite the challenges, the presence of so many

young families was beneficial. It added a sense of

permanency and stability to the installation that

would have been absent otherwise.46

Many of the facilities at Gifu were integrated, but

social segregation still marked life at the base.

Although black and white officers sometimes mingled at the officers’ club, the two groups largely kept

apart at the facility, occupying separate seating and

48 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

of the officers at Gifu were West Point graduates or members of

the Regular Army. They were mostly in the ranks above major

and almost all were white because black regular officers were

rare. The number of regulars increased to 19 percent in 1948,

bringing the 24th into line with its sister regiment, the 35th

Infantry, where, by the end of 1949, 22 percent of the officers

were regulars. See Unit Rosters, 24th Inf Rgt, 6 Jun 47, 1 Nov

48, 1 Mar 49, and 35th Inf Rgt, 1 Nov 49, all in CMH files.

43 See Col. Henry C. Newton, “The Officer Problem,”

Infantry Journal (December 1948), p. 19.

44 The Competitive Tour is described in “General Staff:

Personnel & Administration, Competitive Tours,” Infantry

Journal (June 1948). See also Intervs, Cash with Gorham L.

Black, Jr., 18 Dec 88; Don Eunice, 3 Nov 89; Joseph Hilyer, 17

Aug 88; Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88; Kushner, 16 Jun 89; John

B. Zanin, n.d.; Muehlbauer with Wilbur T. Felkey, 3 Sep 88.

45 Komp mentions that some Japanese refused to welcome

black Americans. See Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 Apr 95.

The overall attitude of Japanese toward blacks is mentioned in

General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC),

Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, vol. 9, Intelligence

Series, Documentary Appendices (II), n.d., p. 10, CMH files.

See also Intervs, Cash with Eugene Edmonds, 6 Jan 90; Bobo,

27 Jan 90; Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Bradley Biggs, 15 Aug 88;

Ward, 21 Jul 88; Walter Bufford, 13 Mar 89; Muehlbauer with

Clinton Moorman, 5 Sep 88. Bufford married a woman from

Gifu. Other units besides the 24th experienced the good life.

The 24th Division at Camp Kokura employed 1,352 Japanese

laborers by the month and 842 by the day in 1947. See

Occupational Monograph of the 24th Division in Japan, Jun

47, p. 7, CMH files.

46 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p.

10; HQ, 25th Inf Div, History of the Occupation of Japan, May

48, p. 13. Intervs, Cash with Shearin, 17 Aug 88, and quote

from Cash with Bobo, 27 Jan 90. Although senior NCOs were

sometimes accompanied by their families, junior enlisted men

were not.
table areas even at official functions. In the same way,

chapel services tended to be predominantly black

with only a few whites attending.47 As far as living

arrangements were concerned, some enclaves were

apparent. West Point graduates had their own special canton, but the Bachelor Officer Quarters and

dependent housing were integrated. Field-grade officers, at least one of whom was black, all lived in a

special area known as “the Circle” if their families

had joined them in Japan.48

The dependent school at Gifu likewise served

all, but there an unwritten code existed. Black and

white children played and studied together from

kindergarten through junior high school but went

their separate ways when high school and puberty

approached. A black female, the wife of an infantry

officer, served for a time as principal of the school

and headed an integrated teaching staff. She

became the social arbiter for the black civilian

women on base because no formal Officer’s Wives

Club existed, only a euphemistically named bridge

club for whites only.49

Since blacks and whites were not expected to

fraternize socially, most in-quarters social events

were confined to single-race affairs. Nevertheless,

some mingling did occur, especially among the

families of the younger white officers and their

black counterparts.50 Even where people stayed

apart, most got along, and many whites had at least

a few black friends.51

Racial prejudice was so ingrained in the society

of the day, however, that the men of the 24th faced

GIFU 49

47 Interv, Cash with Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88.

48 Gorham Black says housing was basically segregated.

See Interv, Cash with Gorham L. Black, Jr., 12 Mar 89. Bradley

Biggs, William Bobo, and Albert Brooks, however, say that all

facilities were integrated even though a segregated social climate prevailed. Bobo mentioned “the Circle.” See Intervs, Cash

with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Bobo, 27 Jan 90; Albert Brooks, 28 Sep

88; Rainey with Hall, 2 Jun 90.

Members of the 24th Infantry Band march during an inspection and review of the troops.

49 Intervs, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Bobo, 27 Jan

90; Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88.

50 Intervs, Cash with Bobo, 27 Jan 90; Kushner, 16 Jun

89. See also Ltr, Bobo to Cash, 28 Jan 90, CMH files.

51 Intervs, Cash with Bobo, 27 Jan 90; Kushner, 16 Jun

89; Biggs, 15 Aug 88; John W. Anderson, 28 Aug 88; Ellis

Dean, 7 Aug 88; French, 21 Jul 89; Haynesworth, 6 Sep 88;

Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Sammons, 27 Aug 88; Saxton, 3 Dec 88;

Edward Simmons, 18 Mar 89; Muehlbauer with Ira Simon, 2

Sep 89; Rainey with Frank Kelly, 23 Oct 89.
special difficulties whenever they left Gifu or came in

contact with the other regiments of the 25th

Division. The annual Fourth of July parade in Tokyo

marked a particular low for some. They felt degraded and insulted by cat calls, racial slurs, and comments from the sidelines about “blackbirds,” “boys,”

and “niggers.” They also complained because their

band received the position behind the tanks, at the

very end of the line of march, where it seemed certain to go unnoticed by reviewers. The day often

degenerated into arguments and brawls.52

The bad feelings that resulted from occasions of

that sort obscured reality in the memories of some of

the men. The fights, for example, according to platoon sergeant Walter Bufford, often resulted less

from racial antipathies than from intense competition between the men of the 25th Division and those

of the 1st Cavalry, which was stationed in Tokyo.

There were also fights in Yokohama with men from

the 11th Airborne Division because some of the soldiers of the 24th liked to wear jump boots. As for the

band, the unit’s flag bearer, Harold Rogue, recalled

that even if it did come last, it was so good and the

men marched with such rhythm and spirit that all of

the spectators on the main reviewing stand cheered

wildly when it stepped around the corner into view.

At some of the parades, Colonel Halloran stood

proudly next to MacArthur as his men passed. Their

step—a “jive turkey type of march” according to

Lieutenant Hilyer—was so distinctive and so popular that on at least one occasion the men were asked

to reassemble for an encore.53

A few members of the regiment suggest that the

Army considered them so inferior that higher headquarters all but ignored them. General MacArthur,

some avowed, never once paid a visit to the base at

Gifu. In fact, whatever the prejudices of the high

command, the 24th received its full share of

inspectors and official visitors. MacArthur himself

arrived during 1949. Although few details survive,

black 1st Lt. Gorham Black recalled that he served

as public affairs officer for the occasion, and Mrs.

William A. Bobo recalled that Mrs. MacArthur visited the 24th’s school at least once.54

Despite segregation and the humiliations it

involved, the camp at Gifu itself became an enclave

where black soldiers could pursue their own interests without undue stress from the outside world.

They had their own newspaper. Those who wished

to do so could swim at the regimental pool. They

also had access to an American Red Cross club on

post that was so popular it counted 10,000 patron

visits during the month of July 1947 alone. One of

the most attractive places in the camp, the club

contained a lounge, a photographic laboratory, a

library, a craft shop, a canteen, writing and game

rooms, a patio, and a “Little Theater”—all for the

use of enlisted personnel. Eventually, the camp

would also include a commissary, a post exchange,

a school for dependent children, and a combination stage and movie house equal to those found in

many large cities. The men of the 24th also had the

exclusive use of Camp Patterson, a former Japanese

hotel and recreation facility located near Gifu on

the picturesque Kiso River. Overall, life with the

regiment was so pleasant that it exceeded anything

many of the soldiers had ever known. It was so

agreeable, indeed, that some of the men preferred

the assignment to Gifu to service elsewhere and

were reluctant to leave when their tours of duty in

Japan ended. The base at Gifu was, as Norman

Taylor put it, “our own little world.”55

Unit pride was high within the 24th. James

Perkins recalled that commanders wanted the regi50 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

52 Intervs, Cash with Albert Kimber, 11 Mar 89; Earline

Richardson, 6 Aug 88; Ward, 21 Jul 88; Willard D. Carter, 24

Sep 88.

53 Intervs, Cash with Rogue, 14 Oct 88; Bufford, 13 Mar

89; Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Ward, 21 Jul 88;

Thomas, 24 Aug 89. A veteran of the 35th Infantry, Lt. Gen.

Sidney Berry, agreed with Bufford. Men of his unit also fought

with members of the 1st Cavalry. See Ltr, Sidney Berry to

Jeffrey J. Clarke, 14 Mar 95, CMH files.

54 Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Richard L. Fields,

18 Aug 88; Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89; Bobo, 27 Jan 90.

55 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, pp.

4–8; Intervs, Cash with Eldridge, 26 Aug 88; Raymond C.

Hagins, 28 Aug 88; Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Moore, 19 Aug

88; Rogue, 14 Oct 88; Ward, 21 Jul 88; Bowers with Genous

S. Hodges, 13 Apr 94; Muehlbauer with Norman Taylor, 16

Sep 88; Harry A. Davis, 26 Sep 88. Camp Patterson is

described in Interv, Cash with Bufford, 13 Mar 89.
ment’s men to dress well and ensured that they

looked smart when they left the base on leave. He

recalled that on one occasion he was turned back at

the gate three times until he got his uniform in

order. Some of the men, Perkins noted, would

carry the habit to Korea, going into combat with

their uniforms looking as though they were ready

for a parade.56

The 24th’s band added to the men’s self-esteem

by winning renown throughout the Far East

Command, where it was on constant call to perform at special functions. Due in part to the large

pool of black soldiers available, the regiment also

fielded many of the best athletic teams in the

Eighth Army. Its members dominated sports such

as baseball, football, basketball, and boxing and

often filled the ranks of teams from higher headquarters. During 1949 a heavyweight boxer from

the 1st Battalion, M. Sgt. Howard “Big Boy”

Williams, won the All Japan, Far East Command,

Inter-Command, and All Army Boxing titles. In

December of that year, the unit’s football and basketball teams also won divisional championships.

The coach of the successful football team, 2d Lt.

Joseph W. DeMarco, received a special letter of

commendation.57

The unit’s athletic prowess was a source of

particular pride for Colonel Halloran, who could

always be found at sporting events, especially

those that pitted his soldiers against teams from

the 27th and 35th regiments. Following the custom of the Army in that day, Halloran made practice and conditioning the principal occupations of

soldiers with exceptional athletic ability while

banishing those who failed in interunit competitions to the status of riflemen.58

Most soldiers at Gifu presented their officers

with few serious disciplinary problems beyond

those common to any military unit. Although some

of the replacements who arrived during early 1948

were street toughs who had chosen to enter the

Army rather than go to jail, commanders gradually

eliminated those who failed to listen to reason,

either reassigning them at the first opportunity to

port units or invoking AR 615–369, a regulation

designed to remove enlisted personnel from the

service for ineptitude or unsuitability. Meanwhile,

the 24th’s military police detachment, the 512th

MP Company, whose members were selected for

their size and intimidating appearance, kept behavior problems on and near the base to a minimum.

Those that did occur usually involved black-market

trading, curfew violations, unauthorized absences,

public intoxication, or fistfights.59

GIFU 51

56 Intervs, Cash with Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Rainey with

William Cobb, 4 Dec 89; Kelly, 23 Oct 89.

Colonel Halloran with Pfc. Buffalo Simmons, a 24th Infantry

boxing team member

57 See Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50,

p. 3, CMH files. The Annual History of the 24th Infantry

Regiment for 1948 is missing. See also Intervs, Cash with

Saxton, 3 Dec 88; Bufford, 13 Mar 89; Colon Britt, 18 Aug 88;

HQ, 24th Inf Rgt, Letter of Commendation to 2d Lt Joseph W.

DeMarco, 31 Jan 50, CMH files.

58 24th Inf Rgt Newsletter, May 49, CMH files; Annual Hist

of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50, p. 7. Ellis Dean talks

about Halloran’s approach to failed athletes. See Interv, Cash

with Dean, 7 Aug 88. See also Intervs, Cash with Haynesworth,

6 Sep 88; Muehlbauer with Allen, 18 Oct 88; Harry A. Davis, 26

Sep 88; Ferguson, 2 Sep 88; Bowers with Donald E. LaBlanc, 28

Feb 94. An officer in the 27th Infantry, Uzal W. Ent, notes that

similar practices prevailed in that unit. See Interv, MacGarrigle

and Bowers with Uzal W. Ent, 20 Oct 93.

59 Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Bufford, 13 Mar

89; Edmonds, 6 Jan 90; Ward, 21 Jul 88; Muehlbauer with
As with Army units around the world, venereal

disease was a constant concern. It caused more lost

duty time in the Eighth Army than any other illness,

including the common cold.60 Commanders and

regimental medics labored continually to remedy

the problem, yet they were never truly certain they

had it in hand. Some units, both white and black,

saved face by failing to report VD cases or by labeling them “non-specific urethritis.” In addition, at

least a few of the soldiers who became infected

consulted civilian doctors rather than face damage

to their military careers.61

The Japanese police were of little assistance

because local law had no provisions banning prostitution. They took hundreds of girls into custody

for physical examination but could do little else to

keep them off the street. Those found to be infected were sent to hospitals for treatment with medications supplied by U.S. forces, but since the

drugs involved had to be outdated before the

Army could release them to civilians, the procedure was rarely effective. Indeed, it appears to

have made matters worse. After the women were

released they were regarded as preferred risks by

their customers. As a result, so many volunteered

for treatment, medical officers concluded that the

entire process encouraged rather than inhibited

spread of the disease.62

Contacts with prostitutes posed little problem

for the 24th while it was on Ie Shima, but difficulties

began as soon as the regiment arrived at Gifu.

Unable to stop the disease at its source, by inspecting local prostitutes and providing effective treatment for them, the unit concentrated on its own

people. Regimental chaplains continually lectured

on the subject, and medical officers conducted VD

prevention classes, distributed prophylactic kits,

maintained treatment stations for each battalion, and

operated a rehabilitation center (some called it “a VD

company”) to handle the cases that came to light.

Before the troops left post to go downtown, they

received a “penicillin cocktail.” As they went through

the camp’s gates, they were also exposed to large,

cartoon-style posters showing the effects of the disease. When they returned, they had to certify in

writing whether they had performed a sex act.63

The 24th conducted unannounced monthly

inspections to determine whether individual soldiers had broken out with symptoms of the disease.

Those who had were called to Halloran’s office with

their commanding officers, where all concerned

were chastised. First-time offenders received thirty

days of medical attention and underwent a punishing regime of physical conditioning. In an attempt

to incorporate unit pride into the treatment process

and to ensure that officers understood they would

be held responsible for failures within their units,

Colonel Halloran also saw to it that the company

with the most venereal disease cases in a month

carried a guidon during regimental parades marked

with a prominent VD.64

The regiment’s efforts had their effect, but parts

of the program proved counterproductive over the

long run. Continual doses of penicillin, for example, brought out allergies in some of the men or

built up immunities to the drug. Meanwhile, peer

pressure had a more powerful influence over the

52 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Allen, 18 Oct 88; Eddie Capers, 2 Nov 88; Ferguson, 2 Sep 88;

MacGarrigle with Green, 16 Jun 94. The gang members were

mentioned both by Waymon R. Ransom and William A. Hash.

See Interv, Bowers with William A. Hash, 17 Mar 94; Ltr,

Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88.

60 HQ, Eighth U.S. Army, Japan, Occupational

Monograph of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan,

January–December 1948, vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 107–08, CMH files.

61 HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Annual Command and Unit

Historical Reports, 1949, p. 17, AG 314.7–D, box P–473, RG

338, WNRC. Quote from Interv, Cash with Perkins, 28 Jul 89.

62 HQ, Eighth U.S. Army, Japan, Occupational

Monograph of the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September

1946–December 1947, vol. 3, p. 171, CMH files. See also

Interv, Rainey with Cobb, 4 Dec 89.

63 For a description of the Eighth Army’s VD programs,

see HQ, Eighth U.S. Army, Japan, Occupational Monograph of

the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September 1946–December

1947, p. 172. See also Intervs, Rainey with Cobb, 4 Dec 89;

William Hough, 16 Nov 89; Cash with Edmonds, 6 Jan 90;

William E. Gott, 2 Sep 89; Waymon R. Ransom, 5 Aug 88;

Saxton, 3 Dec 88; Thomas, 24 Aug 89; Williams, 8 Oct 88;

Muehlbauer with Houston McMurray, Jun 88; MacGarrigle

with John S. Komp, 1 Jun 94.

64 Ibid. The story of the guidon is mentioned in Interv,

Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88.
conduct of soldiers than strictures laid down by

officers. Indeed, most took it as a matter of honor

to have sex while on leave, and any who denied

that they had opened themselves to the laughter of

their fellows. As for attempts to badger offenders

and their officers, they were so demoralizing,

according to the commander of Company L, Capt.

Bradley Biggs, that at least one commander ceased

reporting the full extent of VD infection within his

unit. Others probably did the same. Some enlisted

men attempted to hide the disease by treating

themselves with black-market penicillin or by

resorting to quack doctors in Gifu whose remedies

only made matters worse.65

One procedure Colonel Halloran began worked

very well. Halloran warned his troops that he would

send a letter to the parents or wives of those who

contracted the disease more than once to explain the

problem and the course of therapy. The threat alone

was usually enough to keep relapses from occurring.

If a man came down with VD three times, he was

discharged as a recalcitrant.66 By December 1947 the

regiment’s efforts had paid off. The command could

boast that it had discovered only five cases of venereal disease during the month. At that time the

Eighth Army as a whole was experiencing a rate of

202 per thousand among blacks in general and 121

per thousand among whites.67

By the start of 1948 the 24th had completed

its training and was prepared to take up its occupation duties. As with the other American units

serving in Japan, it began searching the countryside for abandoned Japanese weapons and munitions, conducting police patrols in the area

around Gifu, and furnishing security assistance to

the military government. During April, when civil

disturbances broke out among angry Korean

immigrants at Kobe, some of the unit’s men assisted in restoring order. After an earthquake struck

at Fukui during June, the regiment provided a

medical team to aid in relief efforts.68

According to Sgt. Waymon Ransom, if 1947

“saw the peak of the 24th,” 1948 was “the beginning

of the end.” Since the regiment had more members

than any other in Japan, the Eighth Army assigned it

to provide security for Kobe Base, an important

dock, ordnance depot, and storage area located west

of Osaka. Beginning in January 1948 the battalions

of the regiment alternated in the task, standing guard

on a ninety-day rotation schedule.69

At that time, Kobe was a major transshipment

point for reparations materiel going abroad in accord

with the terms of Japan’s surrender. An international

city, it was a magnet for vices of every sort, a hub of

prostitution, and an important point of entry into

the country for hard drugs. Duty there was dangerous—several members of the 24th were killed by

Japanese, Korean, or American thieves attempting to

steal valuable equipment from the warehouses—but

it was also attractive to the men of the 24th because

life at the port was much more interesting than at

Gifu. Commanders attempted to keep their troops

out of trouble, going so far as to post guards between

housing for the regiment and that of a problem-ridden U.S. quartermaster company stationed permanently nearby, but the duty was a losing proposition

from the start. Although some of the men did their

jobs so well they were commended for their initiative and attention to duty, many more caused problems. By March venereal disease had begun once

more to rise within the unit, black-market activities

were increasing, and drugs, for the first time, were

becoming a concern.70

GIFU 53

65 Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Muehlbauer with

McMurray, Jun 88; MacGarrigle with Komp, 1 Jun 94; Ltr,

Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 Apr 95.

66 Interv, Cash with Thomas, 24 Aug 89.

67 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p.

17; HQ, Eighth U.S. Army, Japan, Occupational Monograph of

the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, September 1946–December

1947, vol. 3, p. 171.

68 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p.

17. The earthquake duty is covered in HQ, Eighth U.S. Army,

Japan, Occupational Monograph of the Eighth U.S. Army in

Japan, January–December 1948, vol. 4, pt. 2, G–3 Annex C,

Incl 6, CMH files. The 24th’s role in deterring civil disturbances is mentioned in ibid., Judge Advocate General’s section,

vol. 4, pt. 2, app. M–1.

69 Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88; Annual Hist of the

24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p. 17.

70 HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Annual Command and Unit

Historical Reports, 1949, p. 17; Kobe Base Historical files, boxes

P–266, P–268, RG 338, WNRC. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle
Where the men were housed at Kobe was part of

the problem. The commander of Company B, Capt.

William A. Hash, recalled that his unit was stationed

in an old Japanese hospital that had been damaged

during the war. No longer used for its original purpose, the building contained long hallways and

many rooms into which the men could disappear

when off duty. Another Japanese hospital across the

street still functioned as a medical facility, treating

female patients who had contracted venereal disease.

The street between the two was populated with drug

peddlers and other unsavory characters.71 The combination of those circumstances came close to tearing a battalion apart. It would take three months,

platoon leader 1st Lt. Leonard Kushner avowed, to

reconstitute a unit after it had returned from Kobe.

Then it would be time to go back again.72

The problem with VD declined later in the

year when commanders renewed their efforts to

stem the spread of the disease, but drug abuse

grew, not only at Kobe but also at Gifu. Prostitutes

at the port and others nearby would lure the men

into buying heroin by offering their favors free to

users. The men would then carry their addictions

back to Gifu, where they would at times sell their

gear, down to the sheets off their beds, to service

their habits. At one point, just prior to the 24th’s

deployment to Korea, the problem became so serious at Gifu that 3d Battalion platoon leader 2d Lt.

Alfred Tittel found syringes and needles scattered

everywhere in one of the unit’s latrines. A few

drug users overdosed and died. Others managed

to hide their dependencies. Some became addicted for life and even carried their habits into combat in Korea, where they continued to indulge.

The full extent of the problem itself is difficult to

determine. Few officers were familiar with drug

abuse and its consequences at the time, and doctors sometimes misdiagnosed overdoses as heart

attacks or as alcohol poisoning.73

As commanders became more familiar with the

problem, they took what steps they could to suppress it. One of their favorite tactics was the socalled shakedown. They conducted night raids,

searched the men’s lockers, separated suspects from

the rest of the troops, and then held the men for up

to seventy-two hours in their underwear to see

which would develop withdrawal symptoms.

During 1949 and 1950, criminal investigation

teams made a special effort to entrap and apprehend drug pushers at Gifu. Urinalysis tests were

also conducted when they became available. Early

in 1950, one of the few black field-grade officers in

the Army, Lt. Col. Forest Lofton, took charge of

drug eradication efforts at the camp. He seemed

stern and harsh to Pvt. William Cobb. When he

caught an offender, Cobb said, he would throw the

man in jail and begin the process of removing him

from the Army.74

Raids and searches notwithstanding, as the

commander of the 3d Battalion’s Company K, 1st

Lt. Jasper Johnson, avowed, the regiment never

managed to determine who the dealers were

because of a seemingly unbreakable code of

silence among the men. Captain Hash agreed—

although he was able to apprehend drug users

from time to time, he never caught a dealer until

one of his best soldiers was killed in Korea.

Opening a small Bible retrieved from the man’s

body, he found the records of the soldier’s clients

and their transactions and suddenly realized that

54 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94; Lloyd V. Ott, 19 Jul 94; Cash

with Willie Brooks, 14 Oct 88; Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Gorham

Black, 12 Mar 89; Muehlbauer with Marion Boyd, 13 Feb 89.

71 Interv, MacGarrigle with Hash, 9 Jun 94. Regimental

personnel officer Sam Adams notes that drug abuse became a

particular problem for the 24th because of the requirement for

the regiment to station a battalion at Kobe. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94.

72 Interv, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94; Ott, 19 Jul 94.

Only two battalions were available for duty at Kobe. The 2d

Battalion remained inactive because of personnel shortages.

73 Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88; Annual Hist of the

24th Inf Rgt for 1947, 2 Mar 48, p. 17. See also Intervs, Cash

with Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89; Nathaniel Reed, 6 Jan 90;

Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88; Rainey with Cobb, 4 Dec 89;

Muehlbauer with Harry Davis, 26 Sep 88; Bowers with Alfred

F. Tittel, 15 Apr 94; MacGarrigle with William A. Hash, 9 Jun

94; Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 Apr 95.

74 Intervs, Rainey with Cobb, 4 Dec 89; Cash with Jasper

Johnson, 5 Oct 88; Reed, 6 Jan 90; MacGarrigle with Komp,

1 Jun 94.
some of his troops were still using drugs even as

combat raged around them.75

Overall estimates of the size of the problem

vary. Although a few veterans of the regiment

remain unconvinced that much of a problem existed, Jasper Johnson asserted that he had thirteen

soldiers in the stockade on drug charges when his

unit embarked for Korea and that most of them

rejoined the force for the trip. Cobb observed that

perhaps ten out of a hundred men were involved in

one way or another. Sergeant Ransom claimed that

by the spring of 1950, up to one-third of the regiment’s assigned strength was either using drugs or

dealing in them.76

The extent of the problem in other units is difficult to determine, but it must have been substantial, at least in those serving near ports and

large cities. Eighth Army provost marshal summaries for the first half of 1950 indicate that criminal violations involving narcotics constituted the

largest single category of crimes committed within the command, running at an average of 25 percent of all offenses in any given month between

January and May.77

Although venereal disease and drug abuse were

serious within the regiment, they paled in comparison with a further affliction that ate continually at

the 24th. For if, as the Gillem Board had stipulated, the 25th Division dealt evenhandedly with the

regiment where training and occupation duties

were concerned, racial prejudice was still woven

into the very fabric of military life as blacks knew

it. The black members of the unit, whether officers

or enlisted, who did their jobs well, avoided prostitutes, and never touched drugs understood that

their good conduct and performance meant little

because the Army considered them second rate and

put whites first.

The regiment’s black officers experienced the

problem most acutely, beginning with the assignment process that brought them to Gifu. When a

black officer arrived in Japan, the U.S. Eighth

Army interviewed him as though it had positions

matching his training and ability and sent him

around the country to speak with various commanders who supposedly also had openings. All

concerned nevertheless understood that the procedure was a charade. Except for one public

affairs officer, some military policemen, and a few

civilian federal employees, the Eighth Army

employed no blacks at its headquarters in Tokyo.

Meanwhile, the segregated 24th Infantry and the

77th Engineer Combat Company, both located at

Gifu, and the affiliated artillery unit, the 159th

Field Artillery Battalion, located somewhat to the

south of Gifu at Nara, were the only combat commands in Japan where blacks were welcome. As

the commander of the 24th’s Company I, black

1st Lt. Gorham Black, Jr., observed, black officers,

whatever their skills and backgrounds, always

ended up at Gifu, at Nara, or with a service unit.78

Racial discrimination continued once a black

officer joined his unit. Following the dictates of a

1944 War Department pamphlet, The Command of

GIFU 55

75 Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88; Intervs, Rainey with

Cobb, 4 Dec 89; Cash with Hagins, 28 Aug 88; Jasper Johnson,

5 Oct 88; MacGarrigle with Hash, 9 Jun 94. For other comments about drugs in Korea, see Intervs, Cash with William

Shepard, 27 Oct 88; Edward Simmons, 18 Mar 89; Bowers

with Hodges, 13 Apr 94; Clifton F. Vincent, 20 Apr 94; Tittel,

15 Apr 94.

76 Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88; Intervs, Rainey with

Cobb, 4 Dec 89; Cash with Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88.

77 The Provost Marshal Reports are in Eighth U.S. Army,

Korea, Monthly Historical Summaries, Jan–May 50, box

P–480, RG 338, WNRC. The extent of drug abuse in Japan

appears never to have come close to what the Army experienced during the Vietnam War. In 1971, 45 percent of a random sampling of soldiers leaving Vietnam who were interviewed under promises of immunity from prosecution admitted that they had used unauthorized narcotics, barbiturates, or

amphetamines at least once during their tours of duty. Twentynine percent said they had used them regularly (more than ten

times and more than weekly), and 20 percent reported that

they had been addicted. See Lee N. Robbins, Executive Office

of the President, Special Action Office for Drug Abuse

Prevention, The Vietnam Drug User Returns (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. vii–ix, 29–44.

78 Interv, Cash with Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89. For experiences of other black officers, see Intervs, Bowers with Clifton

F. Vincent, 19 and 20 Apr 94; Cash with John “Tommy”

Martin, 12 Jan 90; Roger Walden, 18 Mar 89. See also MS,

Bradley Biggs, Were Black Scapegoats for Our Failures in

Korea? n.d., p. 1, CMH files.
Negro Troops, the Eighth Army allowed black lieutenants and captains to lead only at the platoon and

company levels and assigned field-grade positions

at the rank of major and above almost entirely to

whites. Indeed, the few black majors and lieutenant

colonels at Gifu were either chaplains or filled

administrative positions within the regiment’s

headquarters. Even in those cases, blacks were convinced that discrimination occurred.79 The regimental chaplain in the 24th was a black lieutenant

colonel, John Deveaux. In all-white regiments,

Chaplain Gray Johnson observed, majors usually

served as chaplains at the regimental level while

lieutenant colonels became the chaplains of divisions. Deveaux was the exception. He failed to

receive a job appropriate to his standing because of

his race.80 In the same way, Leo Hall observed, two

black majors who had served in combat with the

92d Division, Maj. Augustus Hamilton and Maj.

James A. Porter, failed to receive positions appropriate to their rank. Hamilton became the regimental support services officer and Porter the camp

utilities officer.81

Although the number of black officers in the

24th was substantial—ranging from 52 percent in

June 1947 to 40 percent in March 1949—those individuals almost never supervised or commanded

white officers, even in cases where their dates of rank

gave them precedence.82 The regimental command

would even reassign officers wholesale within a battalion or in the regiment rather than allow a black to

lead anyone but other blacks.83 Indeed, each time

the race of a commander changed in one of the regiment’s twelve companies, a turnover in officers from

white to black or black to white occurred. Between

6 June 1947 and 1 November 1948, as a result,

Companies B, C, E, and K exchanged black officers

for white while Companies G and L went from white

to black.84 In the same way, although most of the

black officers in the 24th did well and were respected by both their men and their white counterparts,

whites obtained most of the career-enhancing positions and sometimes moved rapidly ahead while

blacks stayed in place, rarely advancing to ranks

above captain.85 One of the few exceptions was

Capt. Richard W. Williams, a superlative leader who

earned the admiration of his black officer colleagues

and the awed reverence of his enlisted subordinates.

As operations officer for the 1st Battalion in Japan,

Williams was in a position where upward movement

was possible.86

56 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

79 War Department Pamphlet 20–6, The Command of Negro

Troops, in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed

Forces, vol. 5, item 83; Intervs, Cash with Gorham Black, 12 Mar

89; Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Oliver Dillard, 26 Oct 88; Charles

Bussey, 6 and 14 Jan 89; Biggs, 15 Aug 88.

80 Interv, Cash with Gray Johnson, 23 Mar 89.

81 Interv, Rainey with Hall, 2 Jun 90. See also Interv, Cash

with Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88. For the positions of Majors

Hamilton and Porter, see Officer Rosters, 24th Inf Rgt, 1 Nov

48 and 1 Mar 49, CMH files.

82 The percentages were taken from unit rosters on file in

CMH. See Officer Rosters, 24th Inf Rgt, 6 Jun 47, 1 Nov 48, 1

Mar 49, 18 Sep 50, CMH files. Some blacks did supervise

whites at the battalion and regimental levels. Capt. Richard W.

Williams, for example, was a battalion operations officer for a

time in Japan. Although rumors exist that other blacks occasionally commanded whites, unit rosters give no indication

that anything of the sort occurred in Japan. See Interv, Bowers

with Leonard H. Kushner, 29 Jun 94. A few blacks did command whites in Korea, where, for example, the black commander of Company A, Capt. William J. Jackson, commanded

at least one white, 1st Lt. Clair L. Rishel.

83 Interv, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88. The commander of

Company D, John Komp, described such a change of command. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Komp, 1 Jun 94. Harold

Montgomery recalls that all of the white officers were transferred out of his company just before he took command. See

Interv, Rainey with Montgomery, 26 Mar 90.

84 The changes become visible when the various rosters

for the 24th Infantry are compared.

85 For judgments on the quality of black officers, see

Intervs, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Haynesworth, 6 Sep 88;

Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Pratt, 16 Jun 89; Reed, 6 Jan 90; Rogue, 14

Oct 88; Simmons, 18 Mar 89; Robert Taylor, 25 Sep 88; John S.

Williams, 5 Aug 88; Bowers with Hash, 17 Mar 94. The

Information and Education Branch survey of African-American

soldiers in World War II noted that black soldiers overwhelmingly preferred black to white officers. See Stouffer et al., The

American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, p. 580. For information on the relative promotability of blacks and whites, see

Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug

88; James Perkins, 10 Aug 88; Walden, 18 Mar 89; Rainey with

Hall, 2 Jun 90; Muehlbauer with Moorman, 5 Sep 88.

86 “Black Daddy” Williams was mentioned in more than

forty interviews, almost always in a positive vein. See, for

example, Intervs, Cash with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Richard
Unlike the regiment’s black officers, the unit’s

noncommissioned officers were able to move ahead

in their careers because they were competing only

among themselves and not with whites. Many

among both their subordinates and their superiors

considered them exemplary soldiers. Some had

been officers during World War II and a number

had combat experience. If their test scores were

often low, they still knew their weaponry, understood their soldierly duties, and were of enormous

assistance to newly assigned lieutenants just beginning to feel their way.87

Opinions of that sort, however, were hardly

universal. In the estimation of some enlisted men,

the senior NCOs in particular were sometimes

harsh, illiterate time servers and compromisers

who had long since sold their souls to the white

power structure and stayed in the Army because

they had nowhere else to go. Wireman Raymond

Hagins contended that his NCOs, in order to gain

and keep their jobs, had learned to keep quiet and

to stay in their place.88 Mortarman Robert Taylor

labeled many of his NCOs illiterate “Uncle Toms”

who ruled by fear. “My 1st sergeant . . . was killed

in Korea and I was so glad to see it. He was so

mean and evil.”89

As for the officers, their opinions varied. If

many loyally stood behind their NCOs, others

were critical. While most could name senior

NCOs they considered exceptional, some considered the overall quality of the group less than

desirable. Many senior NCOs were outstanding,

Company K’s white commander, Lieutenant

Johnson, thus observed, but few of the younger

men coming up behind them had much to offer.

Some were very sharp but most had been promoted too fast and lacked the qualifications and experience to do the job properly.90 The white commander of Company B, Captain Hash, agreed.

Although he would have willingly followed some

of his senior sergeants anywhere, he said, he had

to remove twelve to fourteen of his corporals after

he took command because they lacked the skills

to be good NCOs.91 Company D’s white commander, 1st Lt. John S. Komp, remarked that if his

first sergeant, Sgt. James Geiger, was an excellent

soldier who got things done, the abilities of the

rest of his NCOs ran a gamut from good to bad.

One, Komp noted, was decidedly substandard,

but he was smart enough to find a bright young

junior NCO to tend to the day-to-day business of

his operations.92

The white officers serving with the 24th often

had little choice as to their assignment, but some

were volunteers who had taken up station at Gifu

because the facilities were better and family housing was more plentiful than in other units.93 A

number of northerners were present, but many of

the regiment’s officers appear to have been from the

South. If Army studies after World War II had

established that black soldiers preferred to serve

under black officers or failing that, under whites

from the North, the word had been slow to move

through the chain of command.94 As a result, Army

personnel officers still continued to believe that

African-Americans performed best under white

southerners. When shortages of officers occurred,

they assigned whoever was qualified to the 24th,

but if enough officers were present or too many

GIFU 57

L. Fields, 18 Aug 88; Griffin, 5 Oct 88; Leroy Williams, 8 Oct

88. Williams retired a full colonel but gained the assignments

necessary to do so in the years following the war, when the

Army adopted a policy of equal opportunity for all. His

chances for higher promotion may have been affected by his

alcoholism, which was well known both at Gifu and in Korea.

87 Intervs, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Shearin, 17 Aug

88; Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89; Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Richard L.

Fields, 18 Aug 88; Rainey with Montgomery, 26 Mar 90;

Bowers with Hash, 17 Mar 94.

88 Interv, Cash with Hagins, 28 Aug 88.

89 Interv, Cash with Robert Taylor, 25 Sep 88. Leonard

Kushner gives an example of the harsh discipline that black

sergeants sometimes dealt to their men. See Interv, Bowers

with Leonard H. Kushner, 29 Jun 94.

90 Intervs, Bowers with Hodges, 13 Apr 94; Jasper

Johnson, 18 Apr 94. Captain Hash was also critical of the regiment’s junior NCOs. See Interv, Bowers with Hash, 17 Mar 94.

91 Interv, Bowers with Hash, 17 Mar 94.

92 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94.

93 Intervs, Cash with Gray Johnson, 23 Mar 89;

MacGarrigle with Berry, 11 Aug 93.

94 Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment During

Army Life, p. 580.
arrived in theater at one time, the southerners tended to be the first chosen.95

According to both black and white veterans of

the unit, while a number of the whites did well as

commanders and dealt equitably both with their

troops and their black counterparts, others complained bitterly, blaming everything that went

wrong on the troops they commanded.96 “What

do they expect us to do?” white Lieutenant Hilyer

recalled one asking. “Look at the troops we got.”97

A few, as enlisted ambulance driver James T.

Burke perceived, so detested blacks that they

made hardly any attempt to hide their feelings.

Burke described his own immediate superior, a

surgeon, as “very prejudiced. Very prejudiced.”98

Kushner agreed. His own battalion commander,

he said, frequently disparaged the black officers

under him, sometimes in their presence. He also

excluded them from officer calls, preferring to

present them with a condescending, five-minute

briefing after the whites had departed.99

Exposed to such treatment, many black officers

lost confidence in their white superiors. Becoming

frustrated and resentful, some concluded that the

Army expected so little of them that it had turned

the 24th into a dumping ground for white officers no

other unit would have. The 24th was a “penal” regiment for white officers who had “screwed up,” black

2d Lt. Albert Brooks thus believed. It was their last

chance to redeem their careers. The officers kept the

feeling mostly to themselves, but once in a while it

broke into public. On one occasion during a training

exercise, Lieutenant Johnson recalled, a frustrated

young black officer lashed back at an abusive white

by saying, “The only reason you are here is because

you are no damned good.”100

The unit’s enlisted men were often of the same

opinion. The more charitable among them dismissed problems with their white officers as a

product of the cultural gap between blacks and

whites. It was difficult for the average white officer

to command black troops, Walter Bufford said,

because they had little understanding of their

men.101 Others concluded that their white commanders hated them and were not above retaliating, when they could, against those they perceived

to be the most against them.102

A case in point occurred when the 1st Battalion

of the 24th Infantry, commanded by the officer

Kushner referred to as a bigot, was selected to participate in a special parade at Osaka honoring

Secretary of the Army Royall. The men practiced

diligently and looked good at Gifu, but they traveled to Osaka overnight by train. Arriving tired and

in wrinkled uniforms, they were unfairly reprimanded for their appearance by their commander,

who was probably under considerable stress himself but should have known better.103

They got back at him during the parade that followed. When the unit received the order “eyes

right,” up to 20 percent of its members fell apart on

58 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

95 The commander of Company K, 1st Lt. Jasper

Johnson, would later assert that twenty-one of the twentythree officers that he and his wife could recall from their service in Japan were northerners. See Interv, Cash with Jasper

Johnson, 5 Oct 88. Others dispute the observation. See, for

example, Intervs, Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Richard L.

Fields, 18 Aug 88. Houston McMurray notes that he and four

other southerners were assigned to the 24th on the same day

because there was an oversupply of officers when they

arrived in Japan. See Interv, Muehlbauer with McMurray, Jun

88. Since the Stouffer study makes a point of the Army’s

predilection for appointing white southern officers to allblack units and many members of the 24th commented on

the practice, we have sided with Hilyer, McMurray, and the

others. See Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment

During Army Life, pp. 580–84.

96 Intervs, Cash with Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88; Adolf

Voight, 21 Sep 88; Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88;

Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Reed, 6 Jan 90; Rainey with

Montgomery, 26 Mar 90; Muehlbauer with Ferguson, 2 Sep 88.

97 Interv, Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88.

98 Interv, Muehlbauer with James T. Burke, 23 Jan 89.

99 Interv, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89.

100 Intervs, Bowers with Jasper Johnson, 18 Apr 94; Cash

with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88. Some white officers agreed. One

told 1st Lt. Leonard Kushner that he had fouled up in an earlier assignment and had been sent to the 24th as punishment.

See Interv, Bowers with Kushner, 29 Jun 94.

101 Interv, Cash with Bufford, 13 Mar 89.

102 Intervs, Cash with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Reed, 6

Jan 90; Robert Taylor, 15 Sep 88.

103 Intervs, Cash with Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Bowers with

Kushner, 29 Jun 94.
cue, slouching, scratching themselves, and losing

step. Then, when the command “ready front” was

given, they all returned to the march and performed

flawlessly. All the while, the battalion’s commander

marched smartly in the lead, oblivious to what was

happening, while General MacArthur and the other

officials on the reviewing stand looked on in chagrin.

In the end, none of the soldiers were punished

because none of the culprits could be identified, but

their commander was roundly rebuked for his poor

leadership by the 25th Division’s commanding general, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean.104

Although Colonel Halloran was admired by

many within the 24th for his lack of racial bias, an

attitude of condescension appears to have prevailed

within the unit, even among whites who were well

disposed. It mirrored the low expectations the

Army as a whole held toward blacks. “This corps

has the only colored regimental combat team in

this theater and the largest group of colored combat units within Eighth Army,” the annual history

of the I Corps command, which contained the 24th

Infantry, reported at the end of 1949. “The command and training of such units has always presented certain problems. By assignment of the better officers to these units and increasing the time

allotted for completion of training phases, it is possible for colored units to reach the same standard of

training as other similar type units.”105

A comparable attitude was plain to see in the

24th Infantry. A recruiting officer in Japan who visited all the units, Capt. Martin A. Peters, for example, told the Eighth Army inspector general that the

24th’s officers “would more or less bend” in the

direction of their black subordinates to “keep them

happy and avoid any rumors of discrimination.” He

added that he did so himself. “My remarks are

guarded; I never say anything in their presence or

indirectly that might indicate discrimination. I

wouldn’t want to injure their feelings. I have seen

that with a lot of other people.”106

Lieutenant Hilyer agreed. Commanders at

Gifu rarely came down hard on their men, he

said. Instead, there was “a lot of pussy footin’

around.” A white West Point graduate, 1st Lt.

Houston McMurray, added that when black

NCOs complained that he was prejudiced

because he had required them to salute and to follow regulations, the company commander called

him in and told him, “You have come over here

for a 30-month tour in the Far East. You’re

assigned to this outfit. What you’re going to have

to do is lower your standards and go with the way

things are and not the way you’d like them to

be.”107 Colonel Halloran may not have been

responsible for the many problems at Gifu—high

rates of drug abuse, low literacy levels, the VD

problem—the 1st Battalion’s white intelligence

officer, Capt. Gustav J. Gillert, Jr., observed, but

under him “a climate of cover-up, benign neglect,

acceptance of inadequate performance, and often

resignation” prospered.108

The idea that more could be tolerated in the

24th than in a white unit appears to have extended, to some degree, to the unit’s homosexuals.

Most were very capable and kept to themselves, but

the regiment apparently had enough difficulties to

prompt comments from a number of knowledgeable soldiers.109 The problem was “terrible,” enlisted man James Perkins remarked. “It scared me half

to death.”110 It extended from minor episodes of

sexual harassment—cat calls while units were

drilling and comments in passing, such as “ain’t he

cute,” that women have long had to endure—to

incidents of brazen indiscretion.111 Some of the

GIFU 59

104 Ibid.

105 HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Annual Command and

Unit Historical Reports, 1949, p. 18.

106 Interv, Inspector General (IG) with Capt Martin A.

Peters, 7 Feb 51, exhibit B–91, in General Headquarters, Far

East Command, Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged

Irregularities in the Administration of Military Justice in the

25th Infantry Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation), RG 159, WNRC.

107 Intervs, Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Muehlbauer

with McMurray, Jun 88.

108 Interv, MacGarrigle with Gustav J. Gillert, 4 May 94.

109 See Intervs, Cash with Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89;

Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Rogue, 14 Oct 88; Ransom, 5 Aug 88;

Saxton, 3 Dec 88; William Shepard, 27 Oct 88.

110 Interv, Cash with Perkins, 28 Jul 89.

111 Ibid.
unit’s officers were alleged to have been homosexual, and Halloran’s orderly himself is said to have

thrown wild homosexual parties in his quarters at

times when the colonel was absent.112 There were

also instances of outright corruption. Since homosexuals were heavily concentrated in the regiment’s

personnel section, I&R platoon member Harold

Rogue observed, they were in a position not only to

take care of their own but also to provide many of

the same services to heterosexuals in return for

bribes. On one occasion, Rogue said, he gave “the

man” in the recreation office $100 and received

three weeks instead of one at Camp Patterson.113

As in the case of the mess tent on Ie Shima, commanders at Gifu looked the other way, even though

the Army itself was in the process of tightening its

policies on homosexuals and beginning in 1947 had

tripled its discharge rate per thousand for men and

women of that persuasion.114 They may have been

naive, as Gorham Black observed, speaking of himself, or they may have been lax to the point of ineptitude, as Capt. Charles Bussey commented in the

case of a failure by the 25th Division and the Eighth

Army to permit the discharge of a flagrant homosexual who had set up a veritable love nest in the 77th

Engineer Combat Company’s barracks at Gifu.115

Nonetheless, a suspicion lingers that they declined

to take action in at least some cases, as Waymon

Ransom alleged, because they expected little from

blacks, and the unit’s homosexuals were among the

regiment’s most intelligent and efficient members.116

When one soldier complained about the homosexuals in his unit, squad leader Roscoe Jones recalled,

Halloran laughed the issue away by declaring at a

troop formation, tongue-in-cheek, that if every

member of the regiment were homosexual the unit

would have no VD problem.117

A Time of Change, 1949

If 1947 was a peak for the 24th and 1948

seemed a year in which problems predominated,

1949 was a time of change. During the spring, the

United States eased its occupation policies toward

Japan in preparation for that country’s return to full

independence. At that time, the Eighth Army

dropped many of the policing and administrative

functions that had occupied its men. Meanwhile,

tensions were increasing between the Soviet Union

and the United States. Much of Eastern Europe had

fallen into the Communist orbit, and the proAmerican government of Nationalist China had

given way to the Communist forces of Mao Tsetung. Since threats to the United States were on the

rise around the world and the men of the Eighth

Army had less and less to do, the commander in

chief of the Far East Command, General

MacArthur, decided to put an end to the easy life

that was sapping his forces in Japan and to begin a

course of intensive training that would energize

them into the hard, competent, combat-ready team

they were supposed to be.118

To that end, the Eighth Army’s commander, Lt.

Gen. Walton H. Walker, instructed all Eighth Army

combat units in Japan to complete their training at

the rifle company level by December 1949.

Battalion-level conditioning was to be finished by

May 1950 and regimental exercises by July.

Between July and December full divisions would

train as complete units. Meanwhile, logisticians,

signalmen, and other specialists were to refine their

skills. Once all concerned had reached maximum

60 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

112 Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88.

113 Interv, Cash with Rogue, 14 Oct 88. A platoon leader

in the 14th Infantry, Edward King, also noted that homosexuals tended to congregate in the personnel, mess, and administrative sections of Army units. See Interv, Cash with Edward L.

King, 27 Jun 89.

114 Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of

Gay Men and Women in World War Two (New York: Free Press,

1990), p. 262. See also Colin J. Williams and Martin S.

Weinberg, Homosexuals and the Military (New York: Harper &

Row, 1971), pp. 26–29, 45–49.

115 Interv, Cash with Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89; Charles

M. Bussey, Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in the Korean

War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s [U.S.], 1991), pp. 65–69.

116 Ibid. See also Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88.

117 Intervs, Cash with Roscoe Jones, 16 Jun 89; Ransom,

5 Aug 88.

118 For more on the period, see Schnabel, Policy and

Direction, pp. 41–60; Steven L. Reardon, History of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, The Formative Years, 1947–1950

(Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 1984), pp. 209–308.
efficiency, the Eighth Army’s combat units were to

begin joint training exercises with U.S. Air Force

units stationed in Japan.119

For a number of reasons, as with the other regiments in Japan the 24th Infantry achieved only

mixed results from its training. Personnel turbulence, for example, remained heavy, with the unit

sometimes experiencing annual turnover rates

exceeding 50 percent. Understrength by about 100

men at the beginning of 1949, it was 600 men over

its assigned enlisted complement of 3,400 in March

but fell short of that number by more than 400 on

31 December. At that time, it numbered 150 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 2,993 enlisted men.

The churning created such turmoil that training

inevitably lagged and routine duties themselves

seemed difficult to fulfill.120

Complicating matters further, the Army

reduced basic training in the United States from

thirteen weeks to eight or less during 1948, forcing

the regiment to complete the familiarization and

individual instruction of newly arrived recruits

before proceeding with unit training. As a result,

when 526 inadequately prepared replacements

arrived at Gifu during March 1949, commanders

had no choice but to turn the newly reactivated 2d

Battalion into a basic training unit. At that point,

with one battalion still in residence at Kobe, only

one battalion remained available to carry on with

the regiment’s routine duties.121

Heavy training appears to have begun in earnest

during June, when the new men had completed their

basic courses. At that time, the regiment conducted a

three-day road march and field exercise, the first

overnight bivouac many of the unit’s soldiers had

ever experienced. Work continued during July and

August 1949, when the 24th—minus its 2d

Battalion, on duty at Kobe—participated in exercises

at the Mount Fuji training area. Companies and battalions ran individual and crew-served weapons

instruction sessions and practiced attacking,

patrolling, scouting, and outposting. While better

than nothing, whether the effort had much effect on

the unit’s readiness for war is difficult to tell. As in the

rest of the Eighth Army, equipment in the 24th was

often outdated and in poor condition, training areas

were few and small in size, and experienced officers

and NCOs were lacking. In addition, the poor education of many of the 24th’s men, more than 70 percent of whom continued to occupy the two lowest

rungs on the Army’s aptitude scale, meant that large

numbers of the unit’s soldiers lacked the necessary

background and qualifications to absorb complex

instruction in the time allotted. The situation

improved slightly during 1950 with 62 percent of

the unit’s men in categories IV and V, but the 24th

was still at a disadvantage in comparison with the allwhite units of the 25th Division.122 (Table 4)

GIFU 61

119 HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Training Directive 2, 15

May 49, box P–473, RG 338, WNRC. See also Schnabel, Policy

and Direction, p. 55.

120 The Eighth Army had a turnover rate of 43 percent

between 1946 and 1948. Rpt, First Office of the Chief of Army

Field Forces Observer Team to Far East Command, 16 Aug 50,

pp. 4–9, box 171, RG 337, WNRC. See also Schnabel, Policy

and Direction, p. 54.

121 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 45; Annual Hist of the

24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50, pp. 2–4. The basic training

cycle increased to fourteen weeks in March 1949.

122 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50, p.

3. See also HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Annual Command and

Troops of the 25th Infantry Division unload trucks and equipment at Sasebo Railway Station, Japan.
At the end of August the 25th Division’s companies tested the skills of their squads and platoons. Those of the 24th all passed, possibly

because the highly trained men of the regiment’s

I&R platoon moved quietly from unit to unit to

take the lead in performing technical exercises,

such as map reading, that poorly lettered sergeants

were sometimes incapable of completing. When

the instructors finally discovered what was going

on, according to Sergeant Ransom, a member of the

platoon, their sense of the importance of the exercise and perhaps of the regiment itself was so small

that they disregarded the cheating.123 In the end,

the ploy probably had little effect on the readiness

of the unit. Personnel turnover within the regiment

was so great that only 27 percent of the men who

had supposedly passed the tests remained with the

unit at the end of the year.124

During August Colonel Halloran’s assignment

with the 24th came to an end. If a few of his officers were happy to see him go because they had

been offended by his intimidating ways and his

practice of rebuking commanders in front of their

subordinates, most enlisted men regretted his

departure.125 Halloran had been “a forgiving father”

to them, Lieutenant Kushner noted, and whatever

his faults he had instilled a sense of pride within

the unit. Some of the men wept when they learned

that he was leaving.126

Halloran’s successor, Col. Horton V. White,

had served with the all-black 25th Infantry during the 1920s and early 1930s. An intelligence

specialist, he had won the Army’s Distinguished

Service Medal in May 1945 for planning and

coordinating the liberation of 500 Americans

from the notorious Japanese prisoner-of-war

camp at Cabanatuan in the Philippines. Some saw

his assignment to the 24th as a possible reward

for that effort and as an opportunity which the

Army provided for White to put in the time he

needed with a combat unit to qualify for a

brigadier general’s star.127

62 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Unit Historical Reports, 1949, p. 15. Problems with training

continued into 1950. See Rpt, First Office of the Chief of Army

Field Forces Observer Team to Far East Command, 16 Aug 50,

pp. 4–9.

123 Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88. William Hash

describes the way the tests were run in Interv, MacGarrigle

with William A. Hash, 5 Jul 94.

124 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50, p.

1; Rpt, First Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces Observer

Team to Far East Command, 16 Aug 50, pp. 4–9.

125 See, for example, Intervs, Cash with Richard L.

Fields, 18 Aug 88; Eldridge, 26 Aug 88; MacGarrigle with

Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94; Gillert, 4 May 94; Green, 16 Jun

94. 

126 Intervs, Bowers with Kushner, 29 Jun 94; Muehlbauer

with Norman Taylor, 16 Sep 88; Horne, 3 Nov 88; Cash with

French, 21 Jul 89; Willie Griffith, 10 Nov 88; Haynesworth, 6

Sep 88; Moore, 19 Aug 88; Perkins, 28 Jul 89; Sammons, 27

Aug 88.

127 Register of Graduates and Former Graduates of the United

States Military Academy, Horton V. White, no. 7145 (West

Point, N.Y.: Association of Graduates, USMA, 1986); Interv,

Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88. See also Clay Blair, The Forgotten

War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: Times Books,

1987), pp. 147, 150–52.

Table 4—GCT Breakdown—25th Division Units

(As of 19 September 1950)

Source: Memo for AG, 19 Sep 50, sub: GCT Breakdown, exhibit D–2, 

in Eighth U.S. Army, Korea (EUSAK),Report of Investigation Concerning 

24th Infantry Regimentand Negro Soldiers in Combat, 15 Mar 51, 

boxes 1013–1014, RG 159, WNRC.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

24th 27th 35th

Percentages

IV & V

Categories

I, II, III

Categories
Whatever White’s accomplishments, the

colonel made less of an impression on his subordinates, whether white or black, than Halloran had.

If the white operations officer of the 3d Battalion,

Capt. John Zanin, considered him an excellent officer and white Captain Gillert believed him to be

intelligent, hardworking, low key, and direct, the

regiment’s white personnel officer, Capt. Sam J.

Adams, considered him aloof and uncomfortable

when dealing with the men. Meanwhile, black 1st

Lt. Gorham Black saw only a nice enough man who

rarely if ever “raised hell.” Black Capt. Bradley

Biggs asserted that White rarely left his desk to visit

the regiment’s companies, and black Chaplain Gray

Johnson was simply unimpressed. Rifleman

Clarence Ferguson added an ominous note, asserting that the number of racial incidents in the unit

increased under White because the commander

failed to follow the strong example his predecessor

had set. Whatever the validity of those observations, as white Lieutenant Hilyer observed,

Halloran had presented a difficult act for White to

follow: “You could still hear his footprints.”128

Conditions changed at Gifu just as the new

commander was taking charge. During August the

Eighth Army installed bright lights and began to

employ war dogs and civilian Japanese guards at

Kobe and other seaports to free its regiments for

training. As a result, while Company F remained on

duty at Kobe, the rest of the 2d Battalion returned

to Gifu.129 The arrival was a mixed blessing.

Although some of the morale problems that accompanied duty at the port diminished and almost the

entire regiment was in one place for the first time in

almost two years, simplifying command and control, an extreme housing shortage resulted. Making

do with tents at first, the regiment had no choice

when winter approached but to squeeze the men

into whatever buildings were available. With the

battalion’s elements scattered across the post, the

unit became extremely difficult to supervise.130

Intensive training continued during the final

months of 1949 and into 1950. Over that time, the

24th established a technical instruction school at

Gifu where each specialist could further his education in his field. Officers either taught a subject or

attended classes themselves. During December all

battalions conducted a review of squad, platoon,

and company tactics at the Fuji training area, with

the final four days of the ten-day program devoted

to battalion-level maneuvers. The commander of

the 25th Division, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, was

present for part of the exercise.131

During April 1950, despite many deficiencies

noted by General Kean, both the 1st and 2d

Battalions of the 24th passed field forces tests

administered by the Eighth Army. The 3d Battalion

proved deficient on its first attempt—as did the 2d

Battalion of the 27th Infantry, and an entire regiment, the 31st Infantry, stationed in northern

GIFU 63

Colonel White

128 Intervs, Cash with Zanin, n.d.; Gorham Black, 12 Mar

89; Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Muehlbauer with

Ferguson, 8 Sep 88; MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94.

129 The regiment continued to rotate one company to

Kobe until March 1950, when the commitment ceased. See

U.S. Eighth Army, Korea, Monthly Historical Summary, Mar

50, box 480, RG 338, WNRC.

130 Annual Hist of the 24th Inf Rgt for 1949, 21 Jan 50, p.

4. See also HQ, I Corps, Eighth Army, Annual Command and

Unit Historical Reports, 1949, p. 17.

131Ibid.
Japan—but the unit succeeded with difficulty after

a second try during May.132 Shortly after the testing

ended, the 1st and 2d Battalions participated in

regimental maneuvers at Fuji with their supporting

units, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, the 77th

Engineer Combat Company, and Company A of the

79th Heavy Tank Battalion. It was the first time

since World War II that major segments of the regiment had exercised in proportions near those of a

full combat team.133

How well prepared was the regiment for the test

to come? A firm judgment is difficult to reach. The

24th Infantry was hardly homogeneous. It had 3 battalions, 9 rifle companies, 3 weapons companies, a

heavy mortar company, and 4 headquarters companies, to name just its major components. Each was

an entity unto itself with its own officers and NCOs,

all of whom possessed different attitudes, standards,

and capabilities. Some of those commanders placed

heavy emphasis on spit and polish but were less than

diligent about other aspects of discipline, perhaps

because higher commanders placed it in low priority or because they wanted to avoid charges that they

were racially prejudiced.134

Other commanders kept better watch over

their soldiers and enforced better discipline. The

troops sometimes accused them of racial bias

because their policies were so stringent in comparison with those of other units, but the commander

of Company B, Capt. William A. Hash, had an

effective response. Confronted by the allegation at

a company formation, he responded that yes, he

was prejudiced, but not against people of color. He

was prejudiced against soldiers who failed to clean

their rifles or stole overcoats and sheets and took

them to town to trade for drugs and prostitutes.135

Under the circumstances, a strong, sensitive

hand capable of instilling trust was needed to set

standards and bring the unit together. Colonel

Halloran came close, winning the support of the regiment’s enlisted men and most of its officers. His

policies nevertheless centered mainly upon building

pride and esprit de corps by concentrating on sharp

dress, expert marching, and success in sports.

Because of the occupation-oriented duties of the regiment, its problems with VD and drugs, and the personnel turbulence afflicting the entire Eighth Army,

he had no choice but to concentrate his main attention on issues that had little bearing on readiness for

combat. His regime, as a result, sometimes gave the

appearance of tolerating poor performance and fostering benign neglect.136 As for Colonel White, he

appears to have been intelligent and hardworking,

but he lacked the force of personality that Halloran

had projected. Since he was inclined to stay in his

office, aloof from the men, his arrival left a void.

In some ways, the 24th as a whole was better

off than the all-white portions of the Eighth Army.

In others, it was as poorly prepared as they. In a

few, because of its segregated nature, it was at a definite disadvantage. On the positive side, the regiment was up to strength with a full complement of

men, a condition characteristic of few other

American units in Japan. In addition, all of its battalions had passed their tests. Two had even participated in rudimentary regiment-level exercises at

Gifu with portions of their supporting engineering,

artillery, and tank elements.

More negatively, the 24th still suffered from the

problems confronting the occupation forces guard64 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

132 U.S. Eighth Army, Japan, G–3 Rpt, Reinforced Infantry

Combat Firing Tests, April–May 1950, box 480, RG 338,

WNRC; U.S. Eighth Army, Japan, G–2 Rpt, Battalion Tests,

April–May 1950, box P–602, RG 338, WNRC. For comments

about the 3d Battalion test failure, see Intervs, Muehlbauer

with Amos Turner, 26 Sep 88; Bowers with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr.,

23 Mar 94; MacGarrigle with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 28 Mar 94;

Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94. Kean’s displeasure is noted in Interv,

MacGarrigle with Hash, 5 Jul 94.

133 For the state of training in general in the 24th, see

Intervs, Cash with Willie Brooks, 14 Oct 88; Carter, 24 Sep 88;

Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88; Gray

Johnson, 23 Mar 89; Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Muehlbauer with

Charles Piedra, 3 Nov 88.

134 Lack of diligence on the part of some commanders is

apparent in a number of interviews. See, for example, Intervs,

Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Ransom, 5 Aug 88; Muehlbauer

with McMurray, Jun 88; MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Green, 16 Jun 94.

135 Hash’s comment is in Interv, Bowers with Hash, 17

Mar 94.

136 Gustav Gillert makes this charge. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.
ing Japan: drugs, venereal disease, black-market

trading, and all the institutional debilities brought

on by the post–World War II drawdown of the Army.

As with the rest of the force in Japan, because of wear

and tear and a lack of spare parts, the unit’s equipment was substandard and often in disrepair. In the

same way, its training limped. Although most of the

units in the Eighth Army ultimately passed squad,

platoon, company, and battalion tests, many experienced little sense of urgency in doing so. According

to the reports of official observers from the headquarters of the Army Field Forces, mastery of such

basic combat techniques as scouting, patrolling,

night operations, and the selection and preparation

of firing positions for weapons left much to be

desired in all units across the board.137

If the 24th was one with the rest of the Eighth

Army in many of the difficulties it experienced, its

segregated nature nonetheless compounded every

problem. Over the years, some of the white officers

assigned to the unit had come to view themselves as

outcasts. Their black counterparts meanwhile had

no doubt that the Army considered them secondclass soldiers and that the military system they

served was designed to prevent them from moving

ahead. The blacks stayed on because life at Gifu and

in the Army appeared a cut above what was available

to them in the civilian world, and they clearly made

every attempt on that account to keep up appearances. Beneath the surface, however, neither group

associated much with the other, and mutual respect

and trust were often in short supply.

Ironically, lacking any point of comparison and

equating spit and polish, the ability to march well,

and good sports teams with combat capability, the

men of the 24th tended to believe that they were

ready for war. With the conditions prevalent in the

Eighth Army in the spring of 1950 they may have

been as well prepared as was possible. Nevertheless,

given the corrosive influence of segregation and the

mistrust it instilled, they were sorely handicapped in

comparison with their white counterparts. For what

matters the most in battle is the loyalty that bonds

one man to the next and to his officers and his

unit—the instinctive, trusting, mutual dependence

that welds the whole into the sort of force that can

withstand the worst hardships and tribulations and

still keep fighting. On that score, even if a few units

within the regiment may have measured up, a suspicion lingers that many others did not.138

The discontents that festered beneath the surface of the regiment were difficult to see at Gifu,

while the relaxed conditions of garrison life prevailed and everyone had room to get along. But

when the 24th entered combat in Korea and

bloodletting began, the men had to confront the

possibility that some of them might die. When

they did, their commitment to one another, to

their unit, and to the larger society which they

represented came under consideration. A question

arose upon whose answer the fates of many would

hang, not only within the 24th but also within the

other units that would fight nearby. As a black

communications officer in the 1st Battalion, 1st

Lt. Beverly Scott, put it, why should black

Americans give up their lives for the independence of South Korea when they themselves still

lacked full rights at home?139

GIFU 65

137 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 55–61; Rpt, First

Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces Observer Team to Far

East Command, 16 Aug 50, pp. 4–9. See also Intervs,

Muehlbauer with Harry A. Davis, 26 Sep 88; MacGarrigle with

Hash, 9 Jun 94; Cash with Gustav J. Gillert, n.d.; Gorham

Black, 12 Mar 89.

138 For views that the 24th was well trained, see Intervs,

Cash with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Dixon, 20 Jan 89; Olin

Dorsey, 6 Oct 88; Richard L. Fields, 18 Aug 88; Hagins, 28 Aug

88; Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Charlie Lee Jones, 6 Sep 89;

Roscoe Jones, 16 Jun 89; Kimber, 11 Mar 89; Wilfred Matthews,

23 Sep 88; Reed, 6 Jan 90; Eugene Rumpf, 15 Aug 88; Saxton,

3 Sep 88; Walter Smith, 25 Sep 88; James Thompson, 6 Aug 88;

Rainey with William Hough, 16 Nov 89; Montgomery, 26 Mar

90; Muehlbauer with Gunter, 28 Feb 89; Norman Taylor, 16 Sep

88; Roscoe Van Buren, 3 Nov 88; Bowers with Henry D. Doiron,

22 Apr 94. See also William Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The

Human Element in Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press, 1985), pp. 161–66; Nora Kinzer Stewart, South

Atlantic Conflict of 1982: A Case Study in Military Cohesion

(Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, 1988), pp. 11–26.

139 Interv, Muehlbauer with Beverly Scott, n.d. Other soldiers brought up the same question. See Intervs, Cash with

Charles Bussey, 6 Jan 89; Charlie Lee Jones, 6 Sep 89.

When the North Korean Army invaded South

Korea on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, the

United States was poorly prepared to take

action. During the years leading up to the attack,

American policymakers and strategic planners had

considered Korea of minor importance to American

ends in the Far East and had acceded to a de facto

partition that split the country along the 38th

Parallel between Communist and non-Communist

factions. Official Washington appears to have

viewed the arrangement as temporary and to have

been prepared to concede that the Communist side

would eventually gain control over the entire

peninsula. Since North Korea bordered in part on

the Soviet Union, so the reasoning went, the

Communists would have all the natural advantages

in any great power competition over the region. If

an emergency occurred in the Far East, it seemed

far better to defend the Japanese islands and to concentrate the main body of U.S. Army forces on

Okinawa, the Marianas, and Honshu.1 (See Map 1.)

Those intentions notwithstanding, the United

States found it difficult to back away from North

Korea’s challenge when that country, urged on by the

Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China,

invaded the South. It was one thing to allow South

Korea to slide almost imperceptibly into the Soviet

camp, but quite another to permit it to fall to an act

of outright aggression. When the United Nations

Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union,

issued a declaration that the invasion constituted a

breach of world peace and called upon all member

nations “to render every assistance” to South Korea,

President Truman used the opening to authorize his

Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur,

to dispatch ammunition and equipment to South

Korea and to evacuate American dependents.2 As

appropriate, MacArthur was to employ his air and

naval forces to ensure that both operations proceeded unmolested. The next day, in response to continuing bad news from the field and frantic appeals

from South Korean President Syngman Rhee,

Truman broadened MacArthur’s mandate to permit

air and naval attacks against North Korean forces

operating below the 38th Parallel. He took the action

on his own, but the Security Council ratified it on 27

June with a second resolution calling emphatically

for member nations to “furnish such assistance to the

Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the

armed attack and to restore international peace and

security in the area.”3

1 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 49–52.

2 The Soviet Union was boycotting the meetings to protest

the selection of the Republic of China (Nationalist) over the

People’s Republic of China (Communist) as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations.

3 The United Nations resolutions are quoted in Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, pp. 66–74. See also Roy E. Appleman,

South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950),

CHAPTER 4

Korea
Despite intelligence indicating that war might

be imminent, the assault on South Korea had come

as a surprise. As a result, although four of South

Korea’s nine divisions, a total of twelve regiments,

supposedly guarded the border, no more than onethird of the force, four regiments, was in position

on the day of the attack. The rest of those units had

stood down for the weekend or were scattered in

reserve positions well to the rear.4

Even if South Korean forces had been present in

full strength, it is doubtful that they could have done

much more than delay the enemy onslaught.

Although they numbered 154,000 men at the start of

the war and had the benefit of 482 American military

advisers, most of their members were trained only to

the company level. They possessed U.S. Army motor

vehicles and 105-mm. howitzers, but ammunition

for all their weapons was in short supply and they

lacked heavy mortars, recoilless rifles, and antitank

weapons capable of stopping the latest Soviet tanks.

They had no tanks of their own because their U.S.

advisers had judged the land, roadways, and maintenance capabilities of South Korea poorly suited to the

efficient use of armor. Fifteen percent of their

weapons and 35 percent of their vehicles were unserviceable because of a lack of spare parts.5

By contrast, the North Korean Army was well

prepared for its task. Many of the soldiers in the

135,000-man force, especially those at the spearhead of the attack, were battle-hardened veterans

who had fought on the side of the Communists in

the Chinese civil war. Well equipped, they could

rely for support on 150 late-model Soviet T34

tanks and 180 mostly propeller-driven aircraft.6

At first there seemed some hope that the air

and naval operations Truman had authorized might

alone suffice and that the South Koreans would be

able to hold their own on the ground. On 27 June

American fighter bombers flew 163 sorties and

claimed a total of seven North Korean aircraft.

Meanwhile, the 6th South Korean Division, firmly

entrenched at Ch’unch’on, a religiously significant

town located atop Peacock Mountain to the northeast of Seoul, shattered the 6th North Korean

Regiment and held off most of the 2d North Korean

Division for three days. The air operations nevertheless gained little long-term effect, and ground

resistance, even when determined, proved futile

against the heavy weight of the enemy onslaught.

When Seoul itself fell on 29 June Truman felt he

had no choice but to take further action. The next

day, he authorized MacArthur to commit American

ground forces to the battle and to begin a naval

blockade of North Korea’s coastline.7

MacArthur’s Eighth Army was ill prepared for

the task. All of its regiments but the 24th were

understrength, and their equipment was old and

heavily worn. Although some of the officers and

NCOs had seen intense combat in World War II,

others had little idea of what war was like.8 In most

units, training at the regimental level was incomplete because of insufficient time and a shortage of

adequately sized exercise areas. Interest in night

operations and the maintenance of defensive positions, the problems that would preoccupy

American forces during their first months in Korea,

had also been scant. As for the men, it would be

unfair to say that they were in poor physical condition—training at company and battalion levels dur68 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office,

1961), pp. 37–40.

4 Ibid., pp. 61–62; Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in

Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army

Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1962),

p. 114.

5 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

13–17. For a more detailed discussion of the South Korean

Army prior to the war, see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea,

pp. 27–113.

6 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

10–12. For more detailed information, see Far East Command,

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), Interrogation

Rpts, 1951, Intelligence Research Collection, U.S. Army

Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

7 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

26–27, 37–40, 46–47, 59; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.

76–80. For the fighting at Peacock Mountain, see Sawyer,

Military Advisors in Korea, p. 116.

8 The commander of the 24th Infantry Division, Maj.

Gen. William F. Dean, noted that no more than 15 percent of

his men were combat veterans. See Maj. Gen. William F.

Dean, General Dean’s Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954),

pp. 13–14.
ing 1949 and early 1950 had been intense and

hard—but their mental condition was a different

matter. Many had joined the Army to learn a skill

or to escape hardship at home. Inured to occupation routines that left considerable time for personal pursuits, even those who were unaffected by easily available prostitutes, drugs, and alcohol were

unprepared for the sacrifices that war entailed.9

The unit MacArthur chose to lead the move to

Korea, the 24th Infantry Division, commanded by

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, was among the least

prepared in Japan. It had the smallest number of

men (12,197) and the lowest effectiveness rating

(65 percent) in the command. Since it shared many

of its defects with the other divisions in the Eighth

Army and because it was stationed in southern

Japan at a location readily accessible to ports near

Korea, MacArthur decided time was what mattered.

Augmenting the division with nearly four thousand

men from other divisions, he sent it off in hopes

that it would delay the enemy long enough for

more units to arrive.10

Task Force Smith, composed of two reinforced

companies, preceded the division to its destination

on 2 July. Arriving at Pusan, a major port on South

Korea’s southern coast, the unit moved north hoping

either to deter or to slow the enemy advance. Little

better prepared for the enemy’s armor than the South

Koreans and hopelessly outnumbered, the task force

was crushed on 5 July, just to the south of Seoul near

the town of Osan. Learning of the disaster, Dean

rushed the rest of his division north to block the

enemy advance, only to see his regiments outflanked

and overrun in turn. Within the week the division’s

strength declined from 15,965 to 11,440 men.

Fifteen hundred were missing in action.11

The 24th Infantry Prepares for War

Following an initial alert at the time of the North

Korean invasion, most portions of the Eighth Army

prepared for the possibility that they would soon

move to Korea, but the 24th Infantry at first experienced only minor disruptions. Although commanders canceled a track meet at Tokyo and the members

of the 24th’s baseball team returned home abruptly

on 25 June after finishing an out-of-town game, the

all-black regiment contributed none of its men to the

effort to reinforce the 24th Division. Instead, its 3d

Battalion continued training at Fuji and various individuals departed Gifu to participate in official activities in other parts of Japan. Capt. Bradley Biggs, for

example, traveled to a naval base south of Tokyo to

observe a Marine amphibious exercise.12

Overall, the men of the regiment appear to

have remained largely unconcerned about the possibility that they would go to war. “A lot of people

felt that we weren’t going to go,” 1st Lt. Houston

McMurray recalled. The regiment had served as a

port unit during much of World War II, he said.

The men “were aware of that, and they were operating [in Japan] more as a port unit than . . . as

combat troops.” According to a squad leader in

KOREA 69

9 This paragraph is based upon a broad range of interviews with the men of the 24th Infantry. See also Schnabel,

Policy and Direction, pp. 52–57; William Glenn Robertson,

Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, Leavenworth Papers 13

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1985), p.

4; Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division,” in

Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First

Battles, 1776–1965 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,

1986), pp. 272–74. Most histories assert that the men of the

Eighth Army were in poor physical condition. The history of

the 24th Infantry and of the other regiments covered in this

study fails to support that. Although there were exceptions, the

men were in generally good physical shape. If they tired in

combat in Korea, it may have been because of the climate and

terrain, which were more extreme than those of Japan; or the

living conditions, especially poor rations and the lack of sleep

over long periods; or the psychological burdens they carried,

particularly the change in personal expectations the advent of

war entailed.

10 The story of the 24th Division is summarized in

Robertson, Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, pp. 6–11. See

also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

59–100. That General Dean had served earlier in Korea may

have been a consideration in the selection of the 24th Division

to go first. See Dean, General Dean’s Story, pp. 11–12.

11 Ibid. Dean’s story is told in Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 177.

12 Intervs, John A. Cash with Bradley Biggs, 15 Aug 88;

Walter Bufford, 13 Mar 89; Ellis Dean, 7 Aug 88; Bernard L.

Muehlbauer with Charles B. Gregg, 8 Sep 88. All interviews

hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L. Muehlbauer,

Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O. Perry, and

George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files.
Company M, Sgt. Richard Sanders, one of the officers in the unit, 2d Lt. Joseph DeMarco, told his

men outright that the regiment’s chances of going

to Korea were “about zero” because few if any

blacks had fought in World War II.13

The 1st Battalion’s intelligence officer, Capt.

Gustav Gillert, avowed that there was some discussion, for a time, over whether the Army would disband the regiment, integrate it, use it to guard

newly vacated U.S. installations in Japan, or send it

off to Korea as it was.14 The talk appears to have

been groundless. According to the 25th Division’s

operations officer, Lt. Col. Wayne Hardman, no one

in a position to know ever addressed the possibility of leaving the 24th Infantry behind. At least one

officer, the regimental adjutant, Capt. Sam J.

Adams, Jr., protested at a meeting that the 24th was

poorly trained and psychologically unprepared to

enter combat immediately. Hardman insisted, however, that it was most unlikely that the commander

of the 25th Division, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean,

would have broached an idea of that sort to the

Eighth Army command. Adams himself observed

that his word apparently carried little weight.

Shortly after he returned from the meeting, on 6

July, he said, the regiment received notice that it

was going to Korea.15

As the 24th prepared for war, three all-black

units, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, the 77th

Engineer Combat Company, and the 512th Military

Police Company, were assigned to accompany it.

With their addition, the 24th Infantry became a

regimental combat team. Armor and other combat

and combat service support elements would join

the unit in due course, as soon as they could assemble. In Korea the 512th would be detached from

the 24th and would operate solely in rear areas.

At first few leaders had much idea of what was

happening. Although the commander of the 3d

Battalion, Lt. Col. Samuel Pierce, Jr., kept his officers

informed as well as he could, the news, heavily salted with rumors and guesses, appears to have trickled down mainly by word of mouth. Black 2d Lt.

Albert Brooks of the headquarters company learned

that he was going to Korea from a bartender in Gifu.

The commander of Company D, black Capt. Charles

Piedra, thought the unit was undertaking a thirty- to

sixty-day temporary assignment and that it would

then return to Japan.16

Soldiers within the enlisted ranks were even

more confused. Since President Truman had

described the conflict as a “police action,” some concluded that they would be serving on riot-control

duty or standing guard on the docks in Korea, much

as they had done earlier at Kobe. Others believed

70 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

13 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Richard Sanders, 16 Dec 88;

Houston McMurray, Jun 88; William T. Bowers with Genous S.

Hodges, 13 Apr 94.

14 Interv, Cash with Gustav J. Gillert, 20 Aug 90.

15 Intervs, George L. MacGarrigle with Wayne Hardman,

6 Jul 94; Sam J. Adams, Jr., 15 and 17 Jun 94.

16 Intervs, Muehlbauer with William M. Factory, 2 Nov

88; Sanders, 16 Dec 88; Amos Turner, 22 Dec 88; Roscoe Van

Buren, 3 Nov 88; Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Rollie Evans, 13

Oct 88; Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Harold Rogue, Jr., 14 Oct

88; Eugene Rumpf, 15 Aug 88; William Shepard, 27 Oct 88;

Bowers with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 23 Mar 94.

General Kean commanded the 25th Infantry Division from

August 1948–February 1951.
that they would be gone for only a few days or that

they would travel only as far as the Japanese port of

Sasebo, where the regiment would fill in until the

regularly assigned unit, the 24th Division, had completed its duties in Korea and returned.17

Col. Horton V. White did little to dispel the

confusion. He met with his officers at the post theater to brief them and to take questions, but the

information he relayed was apparently little better

than theirs. Commenting that he believed the unit

would be in Korea for only “a short time,” he indicated in particular that officers should pack their

“pinks and greens” because the semidress uniforms

would be needed for “a big parade.”18

The official newspaper for the U.S. armed

forces in the region, Pacific Stars and Stripes, added

little to the discussion. Throughout the period the

journal’s headlines spoke mostly of success. On 30

June, even as Seoul fell, the paper stated: “NORTH

KOREANS HIT BY AIR, SOUTH KOREANS

HOLDING.” It had no choice on 1 July but to confirm that the South Korean line had cracked, yet by

4 July it was again optimistic: “U.S. TROOPS

REPEL ATTACK.” The theme held through 7

July—“CRACK RED UNIT HELD OFF BY OUTNUMBERED YANKS”; on 8 July—“U.S. LINES IN

KOREA STABLE, OUTLOOK BETTER”; and on 9

July—“SOUTH KOREANS HALT INVADERS.” All

the while the enemy was advancing relentlessly,

mauling one after another of the American units in

his way. Reality only began to penetrate on 10 July,

when a brief notice appeared to the effect that all

dependent travel in the Pacific theater had been

suspended, a sure sign to knowledgeable soldiers

that a major emergency was in progress. On 12 July

the newspaper revealed that the North Koreans

were killing American prisoners of war and that all

members of the Far East Command had been

retained on station until further notice.19

With that, any remaining illusions began to

disappear. Although many of the men still believed

that it would be a short war or that the 24th would

mainly fill a service role, a number became anxious. The stories about soldiers being executed by

the enemy bothered some. Others realized that the

easy life was ending. Those who had brought families with them worried about the well-being of

their loved ones. With time, all those concerns

diminished. As rifleman James Little put it, there

were no alternatives. “Everyone had gotten used to

the idea of going.”20

When the possibility emerged that the 24th

might face combat, the commander of the 25th

Division, General Kean, and Colonel White began a

major effort to strengthen the quality of leadership

within the regiment. In some cases, combat veterans

replaced officers with only peacetime experience. In

others, the physical fitness of the officer in charge

may have been a concern.21 Whatever the reason,

the changes seemed to come “out of the blue” for

some of the men, and instability, with all the uncertainties it brought, appeared the rule.22

The process of change had actually begun during the weeks just prior to the outset of the crisis in

Korea, when Colonel White had made a number of

officer reassignments. With the advent of war, he

left virtually all of those in place and retained

recent substitutions in Company D that had altered

that unit’s command from all white to all black. He

did, however, replace six out of twelve company

commanders—three in the 1st Battalion, one in the

2d, and two in the 3d—exchanging captains,

where he could, for first lieutenants. At that time

the 1st Battalion received a new commander, Lt.

Col. Paul F. Roberts, and a new executive officer, a

former military policeman, Maj. Eugene J. Carson.

The 2d Battalion acquired a new executive officer,

Maj. Horace E. Donaho. A number of shifts also

occurred among the regiment’s lieutenants. Adding

KOREA 71

17 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Charles Piedra, 3 Nov 88;

Cash with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88.

18 Interv, MacGarrigle with Lloyd V. Ott, 19 Jul 94. A first

lieutenant with Company H, Ott is the only officer to recall the

briefing, but he is quite specific.

19 Copies of pertinent issues of Stars and Stripes are on file

at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

20 Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Muehlbauer with

James Little, 27 Aug 88.

21 Intervs, Bowers with Henry D. Doiron, 22 Apr 94;

Hodges, 13 Apr 94.

22 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94.
to the turbulence, the Army’s Competitive Tour

assignment program stayed in effect throughout the

period. Within a week of deploying to Korea,

indeed, the regiment had to reassign a seventh

company commander to comply with the system’s

requirements.23

Through it all, segregation remained the norm.

Although the regiment appears to have been

preparing to comply with the Gillem Board’s recommendations and had in fact appointed a senior

black, Lt. Col. Forest Lofton, as commander of the

1st Battalion just prior to the outbreak of war, the

officer remained in charge for only a few days. Why

his tenure was so short remains unclear, but when

the 24th moved out for Korea, a white, Roberts,

was again in command of the battalion.24 At that

time, except for black Captain Piedra, who briefly

supervised a white warrant officer serving in

Company D, no blacks commanded whites.

Instead, the 1st and 3d Battalions each had two

companies officered entirely by whites and two by

blacks. As for the 2d Battalion, Company F had a

black commander and Company G a white.

Companies E and H had both blacks and whites in

72 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

23 A black officer, Oliver Dillard, describes some of the

problems that resulted from the change of officers, particularly from the men’s tendency to test their new commanders. See

Interv, Cash with Oliver Dillard, 26 Oct 88, p. 24. For the

experiences of a white officer and the resentment some faced,

see Interv, MacGarrigle with Alfred F. Tittel, 20 Apr 94. Some

of the changes are described in Ltr, John S. Komp to George L.

MacGarrigle, 14 May 94, CMH files.

24 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94;

William A. Hash, 9 Jun 94; Gillert, 4 May 94; Bowers with

Charles L. Gray, 2 and 3 May 94.

Table 5—Racial Distribution of Officers When the 

24th Infantry Deployed to Korea

Unit Race Comment Capt 1st Lt 2d Lt

1st Bn, A . . . . Black 1 4 2

B . . . .White 1 3 2

C . . . .White 1 5 1

D . . . . Black Weapons Co. 1 1 3 2d Bn, E . . . .Mixed (1 Black 2d Lt) 1 3 3

F . . . . Black 0 2 5

G . . . .White 1 2 2

H . . . .Mixed Weapons Co. 1 2 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1 Black 1st Lt)

3d Bn, I . . . . . Black 1 1 4

K . . . .White 0 2 3

L . . . . Black 1 4 2

M . . . .White Weapons Co. 0 5 1

Totals . . . . . .5 White 9 34 30

5 Black

2 Mixed

Source: Officer Rosters, 24th Inf Rgt, CMH files.
positions of command, but the black officers in

each were junior in rank.25 (Table 5)

Other units in the Eighth Army also made

changes. The 7th Infantry Division was virtually

demolished to provide replacements for understrength units departing for Korea. Nevertheless,

few regiments experienced the large-scale shifts

among commanders that occurred in the 24th.

Although the 27th Infantry regiment received a

new regimental commander, Lt. Col. John H.

Michaelis, and one new battalion commander, a

platoon leader at the time in the unit who later

became a brigadier general, Uzal W. Ent, could

recall hardly any other changes prior to the regiment’s departure for Korea. A platoon leader in the

35th Infantry regiment who later became a lieutenant general, Sidney B. Berry, recalled that a

number of NCOs from his regiment became

replacements for the 24th Division prior to its

departure for Korea, stripping the unit of first-line

NCO leadership and necessitating the promotion of

inexperienced men to key positions. Even so, he

could recall few changes among the officers. The

regimental commander, Col. Henry G. Fisher, he

said, made some shifts to adapt his force for combat but ordered no wholesale reassignments.26

Colonel Fisher had wanted White’s new 1st

Battalion commander, Roberts, for his regiment,

but General Kean decided that the officer would be

more useful in the 24th Infantry. Although assigned

as the 25th Division’s personnel officer at the time,

Roberts had led a battalion in Europe during World

War II and had also served as a regimental executive officer. Well seasoned in combat, he would be

especially valuable to the 24th because the unit’s

other two battalion commanders had much less

experience but were impossible to replace on short

notice and from the pool of personnel available at

the time. In denying Fisher’s request, Kean signaled

his concern. “Don’t mention this again,” he told the

colonel. “Do you want me to completely destroy

the 24th?”27

A survey of the backgrounds of the regiment’s

other two battalion commanders shows why Kean

was concerned. The 2d Battalion’s commander, Lt.

Col. William M. Cohoon, was successful and well

liked at Gifu but had virtually no experience in war.

A commander of a National Guard battalion activated during World War II, he had supervised the

training of his unit but had never left the United

States except for a brief tour of duty in Alaska after

all the fighting there had ended. An unknown

quantity on that account and nearly forty-three

years of age, he seemed too old for combat to some

of his men, or not tough enough.28

The commander of the 3d Battalion, Lt. Col.

Samuel Pierce, Jr., had even less experience. An

ROTC instructor in the United States during World

War II, he had completed a tour of duty with the

Army Service Forces at the Pentagon before accepting a commission in the Regular Army and joining

the 24th at Gifu in 1949. The assignment was his

first with troops. The commander of Company K,

white 1st Lt. Jasper Johnson, considered him well

intentioned but green, the sort of officer who had

no choice in combat but to place inordinate

reliance on more knowledgeable subordinates. In

that regard, Johnson said, the 3d Battalion’s operations officer, Capt. John B. Zanin, held particular

importance. The regimental adjutant, white Capt.

Samuel J. Adams, agreed with Johnson’s estimate,

asserting that Zanin was indeed “the glue” that held

KOREA 73

25 Changes in Company D are described in Ltr, Komp to

MacGarrigle, 14 May 94. The various changes were determined by analyzing regimental rosters. Companies A, C, D, F,

G, I, and K received new commanders.

26 Intervs, MacGarrigle and Bowers with Uzal W. Ent, 20

Oct 93; MacGarrigle with Sidney B. Berry, 11 Aug 93. See also

War Diary (WD), 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, 13–14 Jul 50. Unless

otherwise indicated, records for June and July 1950 relating to

the 25th Infantry Division, its three regiments, and the supporting units, including war diaries, historical summaries,

command and staff reports, and staff journals, are contained in

boxes 3746–3747, Record Group (RG) 407, Washington

National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.

27 Ltr, Henry G. Fisher to Roy E. Appleman, 22 Jul 53,

attached comments on Appleman manuscript, copy in CMH

files. See also Ltr, Bernice A. (Mrs. Paul F.) Roberts to David

Carlisle, 27 Jan 90, copy in CMH files.

28 DA (Department of the Army) Form 66, Personnel

Record for William M. Cohoon, CMH files; Intervs, Cash with

Colon Britt, 18 Aug 88; Joseph Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Bowers with

Bradley Biggs, 23 Mar 94.
Pierce’s battalion together. According to Company

L’s commander, black Captain Biggs, the colonel

showed little interest in the troops and appeared

to have reservations about serving with blacks. He

visited Company L only once in seven months,

Biggs said, and had been overheard to say that he

would have preferred to serve in Europe rather

than with “these people.” The acting personnel

officer of the battalion, white 2d Lt. Roscoe E.

Dann, Jr., also believed that Pierce would have

liked to have been elsewhere. Whatever the

colonel’s attitude, Pierce’s battalion was the one

that failed its tests at Fuji and that missed the

24th’s important regimental field exercise in May

because of a retest.29

Colonel White’s experience, for that matter,

also left much to be desired. A West Point graduate,

class of 1923, the 24th’s commander had served

with the all-black 25th Infantry between 1923 and

1926 and again from 1929 to 1931, but had never

again commanded troops until joining the 24th.

Instead, he had followed a successful career in

intelligence that had included service as the chief of

intelligence for the Sixth Army during World War

II. After the war, he had continued in that occupation, serving with the Korean Military Advisory

Group and later at the Intelligence School at Fort

Leavenworth. His assignment to the 24th may have

been a reward for long service well done.30

White appears to have been a capable administrator, but a number of his officers considered him

aloof and inexperienced as an infantry commander.

He seemed uncomfortable leading troops, whether

black or white, Captain Adams observed. “He didn’t fit into foxholes.” The tendency might have mattered little if the unit’s battalion commanders had

been strong, knowledgeable leaders, but two out of

three were still learning their jobs. In that case, as

White’s predecessor, Halloran, had done, it was

incumbent upon the regimental commander to fill

in the gap by closely monitoring the training of his

troops and by supervising the work of his battalion

commanders with their companies. White, however, appears to have been too reserved for that. He

supported the chain of command and attempted to

tighten discipline at Gifu, an assistant regimental

operations officer, 1st Lt. John S. Komp, observed,

but he spent most of his time in his office rather

than out with his men.31

By contrast, White’s counterparts in the 27th

and 35th Infantry regiments, Colonels Michaelis

and Fisher, had enormous combat experience and

knew how to prepare men for battle. The commander of an airborne regiment in Normandy during

World War II, Michaelis had received a battlefield

promotion from lieutenant colonel to colonel and

had served as the chief of staff of the 101st

Airborne Division at Bastogne during the Battle of

the Bulge. Reduced to the rank of lieutenant

colonel in the drawdown that followed the war, he

was still one of the Army’s brightest stars. Indeed,

his regiment had earned a Distinguished Unit

Citation during World War II and an equivalent

honor from the government of Holland. Intensely

74 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

29 DA Form 66, Personnel Record for Samuel Pierce, Jr.,

CMH files; Intervs, Cash with Jasper Johnson, n.d.; John B.

Zanin, n.d.; MacGarrigle with Zanin, 22 Oct 93; Adams, 15 and

17 Jun 94. The Biggs quote is from Interv, Cash with Biggs, 15

Aug 88. See also Interv, Bowers with Dann, 23 Mar 94. Zanin

declined to say anything about Pierce’s abilities. Regarding matters of race, he considered the colonel the sort of realist who

accepted conditions as they were but never spoke or acted as a

bigot. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Zanin, 27 Oct 93.

30 Interv, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88. See also Interv,

MacGarrigle and Bowers with Ent, 20 Oct 93. A detailed military record for Colonel White is in George W. Cullum,

Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United

States Military Academy (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley & Sons,

1950), vol. IX, item 7145. In an interview with Clay Blair,

General John H. Michaelis remarked that many of the regiments that went to Korea were commanded initially by officers

with noncombat backgrounds. Enjoying servants, staff cars,

and well-appointed quarters, they went to war as ordered but

were miserable until replaced. See Interv, Clay Blair with

General John H. Michaelis, n.d., U.S. Army Military History

Institute Senior Officer Oral History Program, Combat

Leadership in Korea series, p. 38, MHI.

31 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Adams, 15 and 17 Jun 94;

Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94; Zanin, 22 Oct 93; Cash with

Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Gray Johnson, 23 Mar 89; Bowers with Gray,

2 and 3 May 94. Adams was the regimental personnel officer

at Gifu. Later he became the operations officer. Biggs and

Komp were company commanders. Johnson was a chaplain.

Gray was a platoon leader in Company F and an evaluator of

the 24th’s final tests at Fuji during April and May 1950.
interested in the infantry and infantrymen, the

colonel was a hands-on commander similar to

Halloran. If White seemed to keep a low profile,

rifleman Nathaniel Pipkins thus observed, “when

Michaelis was around, everyone knew it.”32

Fisher was perhaps even more accomplished.

Commander of the 317th Infantry regiment of the

80th Infantry Division in Europe during World War

II, he had come ashore following the Normandy

invasion and had led his unit through ten months of

the war’s most vicious fighting, including the relief of

Bastogne. Highly decorated for his service, he held

the Silver Star, two Bronze Stars, and the French

Croix de Guerre. Unlike Michaelis, he retained his

rank when the war ended. Although less demonstrative than his more colorful counterpart, he was a

man of strong opinions, the sort of complete professional who left nothing to chance where his troops

were concerned.33

Although White clearly intended to improve the

efficiency of his regiment, the effect of the changes

he made among his officers on the morale and effectiveness of the 24th is difficult to discern. For officers

such as black 1st Lt. Roger Walden, White’s efforts

appear to have become a source of resentment. “I

commanded A Company just until we went to

Korea,” Walden protested angrily in an interview

years later. “I had trained the unit for six months but

had to turn it over to a captain.” Even so, some of the

men who came in were well respected. The captain

who took Walden’s place in Company A, William J.

Jackson, for example, was one of the most senior of

the regiment’s black officers and a former commander of the unit’s headquarters company at Gifu.

Walden himself ultimately received command of

Company F when the former commander, black 1st

Lt. Charles Ellis, became the regimental ammunition

officer. “Since I had just given up A Company,”

Walden said, “I was a prime candidate.” Nevertheless,

some of the other replacements had little infantry

experience. The new commander of Company C

had been the regimental signal officer, a position that

provided hardly any preparation for combat command in an infantry unit. The company’s new executive officer, who might have compensated for some

of his commander’s inexperience, had spent much of

his time as a military policeman. One of Company

C’s new platoon leaders had been the regimental athletics officer at Gifu.34

Overall, in combination with the persistent

turmoil fostered by the Army’s Competitive Tour

program and the desire to maintain racial segregation among company officers, the abrupt imposition of so many unfamiliar officers and the adaptations soldiers had to make to the standards and

styles of the new commander intensified problems

of leadership and discipline already present within

the regiment. The effect can be seen in the contrast

between Company B—considered one of the most

reliable units in the regiment during the first

months of the war—and other companies in the

24th Infantry. In combat, Company B experienced

the lowest casualty rate in the regiment among its

officers. The figures for the rest of the regiment

were much higher.35

KOREA 75

32 Michaelis retired as a four-star general. See General

Officer Biographical file, John H. Michaelis, CMH files.

Michaelis served on the Eighth Army staff in Japan and took

command of the 27th as it was deploying to Korea. See Interv,

Muehlbauer with Nathaniel Pipkins, 23 Aug 88.

33 Obituary, Henry Granville Fisher, U.S. Military

Academy, Assembly, Mar 85, p. 126.

34 Interv, Cash with Roger Walden, 18 Mar 89. Officer

assignments were drawn from Officer Roster, 24th Inf Rgt (officers present with unit upon arrival in Korea, 12 July 1950), 18

Sep 50, exhibit D–12, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. See also Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, p. 123;

Intervs, Cash with Alvin Bryant, 7 Oct 88; Bowers with Gray,

2 and 3 May 94; Donald E. LaBlanc, 28 Feb 94; Laurence M.

Corcoran, 1 Mar 94; MacGarrigle with LaBlanc, 1 Mar 94.

35 24th Inf Rgt Casualty Statistics, Officer and NCO,

Jul–Sep 51, in 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt, Sep 51, box 3848,

RG 407, WNRC. Company B experienced 26 casualties among

its officers and NCOs between July and September. Company

C had 80. Most of the regiment’s companies suffered between

44 and 60. When the 25th Division investigated the 24th later

in the year, the inspector general remarked on the divergence.

See Interv, Inspector General (IG) with Capt William A. Hash,

14 Feb 51, exhibit B–142, in General Headquarters, Far East

Command, Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged

Irregularities in the Administration of Military Justice in the

25th Infantry Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation), RG 159, WNRC.
Although the unit was often used as a backup

and may have been somewhat less exposed to

enemy fire on that account, special circumstances

within the company clearly contributed to the

effect. Its commander, white Capt. William A.

Hash, had never participated in the Competitive

Tour program. As a result, he not only remained

with the company for a year before the war but also

took it to Korea. A “cautious, methodical” commander, according to the 1st Battalion’s intelligence

officer, white Capt. Gustav Gillert, Hash used the

time to earn the respect of his troops.36 Gifted with

a strong sense of detail, he kept the unit on course,

enforcing regulations, developing a consistent program of training and morale building, and refusing

to condescend to his men just because they were

black. When he discovered by chance, for example,

that his first sergeant was a homosexual, he

declined to overlook the matter and had the man

removed.37 When Company B departed for Korea,

the battalion headquarters recognized that it was

one of the most stable in the unit. The company

thus spent much of its time during its first weeks in

combat responding to emergencies, conducting

counterattacks, and plugging gaps in the line.38

If personnel turbulence kept the 24th’s roster of

officers in turmoil, the regiment’s enlisted ranks were

in better shape than those of the other units in Japan.

While the Eighth Army levied its all-white regiments

to fill out the 24th Division, withdrawing 20 percent

of the enlisted strength and 39 percent of the NCOs

from just one company of the 35th Infantry, it left

the 24th alone to maintain segregation.39

A number of new men arrived just as the regiment was preparing to depart for Korea. Some were

replacements fresh from the United States or from

support units stationed in Japan, but others appear

to have been members of the regiment who had

been detached for special duties such as sports or

housekeeping. Ellis Dean, for one, had functioned

as a high jumper for the regiment and held the

Eighth Army record in that event. With the beginning of the war, he was assigned to the antitank and

mines platoon in the regiment’s headquarters company. When he joined the unit, he said, he had no

knowledge of infantry tactics other than what he

had learned during eight weeks of basic training

almost three years before.40

Dean, at least, was physically fit. According to

the regimental supply officer, black Lieutenant

Brooks, many of the other new arrivals were what

he considered the “servants” of the Army—mess

men, cooks, quartermasters, teamsters, and clerks

of various sorts. Brooks emptied the regiment’s

clothing store in an attempt to bring the men’s gear

up to par.41 Augmenting the influx were a number

of soldiers from the Eighth Army’s stockade.

Company K, for one, had thirteen soldiers in confinement on charges of heroin abuse or distribution. Most, Jasper Johnson observed, went to Korea

with the unit. The same was true in other units of

the regiment.42 Although poorly prepared replacements such as the ones Brooks encountered were

common throughout the Army and remained a

drag on the regiment during much of the war, the

“punks” from the brig, as Company D’s commander, black Captain Piedra, and a platoon leader in

Company E, 2d Lt. Joseph Hilyer, observed, sometimes “fought like Hell.”43

76 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

36 Interv, MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

37 Interv, MacGarrigle with Charles E. Green, 16 Jun 94.

Green was a platoon leader in Company B.

38 Ibid. See also Interv, IG with Hash, 14 Feb 51, exhibit

B–142, Far East Command Inspector General Investigation.

39 Intervs, MacGarrigle and Bowers with Ent, 20 Oct 93;

MacGarrigle with Berry, 11 Aug 93. See also WD, 2d Bn, 35th

Inf Rgt, 13–14 Jul 50; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, p. 59.

40 Interv, Cash with Dean, 7 Aug 88.

41 Interv, Cash with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88.

42 Interv, Cash with Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88. For similar

instances in other companies, see Intervs, Bowers with Hash,

17 Mar 94; Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Muehlbauer with

Piedra, 3 Nov 88; Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, p. 81.

43 Quote from Interv, Muehlbauer with Piedra, 3 Nov 88.

See also Intervs, Cash with Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; MacGarrigle with

Ott, 19 Jul 94. For testimony on the poor quality of replacements and their effect on the regiment, see Interv, IG with M Sgt

David Robinson, Co E, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6, in Eighth U.S.

Army Korea, Report of Investigation Concerning 24th Infantry

Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat, 15 Mar 51, boxes

1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation), RG 159, WNRC.
As the day of departure approached, the poor

condition of the regiment’s equipment became a

matter of increasing concern. The 3d Battalion

was on maneuvers at Fuji when the call to war

arrived. It returned immediately to Gifu, but its

equipment remained loaded on flatcars for the

move to Korea. Everything went straight to the

combat zone without cleaning or maintenance.44

Meanwhile, heavy training at Fuji over the previous year had taken its toll. Numbers of trucks

were deadlined, in need of maintenance, overhaul, or repair. Eighty percent of the radios on

hand in the regiment were nonoperational

because of poor upkeep and heavy usage in the

field, and the unit’s basic load of communications

wire was in bad condition with many breaks.45

Many of the World War II–vintage M1 rifles in the

hands of the troops were heavily worn and unreliable. A few even lacked firing pins.46

Physical shortages of weapons and supply parts

also dogged the regiment. Browning automatic rifles

(BARs), 4.2-inch mortars, light machine guns, rocket launchers, and the supplies to maintain them

were rare or nonexistent in some units. Companies

B, E, F, and G lacked radios at the platoon level, and

even in portions of the regiment that had them, batteries were in short supply. In the end, commanders

had no choice but to scrounge. Company L, for

example, had few light machine guns and BARs. But

the company commander still managed to equip

himself with a .50-caliber machine gun, which he

mounted on his jeep just before departing for

Korea. Company M meanwhile had to cannibalize

several weapons to render just one 75-mm. recoilless rifle operative.47 Concerned that the regiment

would be unable to repair weapons that broke during combat and to replace those that were lost or

destroyed, supply officers dispatched a second lieutenant, Albert Brooks, to Tokyo to gather what parts

and weapons he could.48

Given the personnel turbulence, the uncertainties caused by the regiment’s poor equipment,

and the historic mistrust of black soldiers in the

U.S. Army, doubts festered among some officers of

the regiment, both black and white. Uncertainty

circulated in particular around the highest ranking

black in the regiment, Lt. Col. Forest Lofton, who

had commanded a black battalion at Fort Dix and

had just taken charge of the 1st Battalion.

According to the battalion’s intelligence officer,

Captain Gillert, Lofton personally declined to

accompany the regiment to Korea. Gillert said that

he was in Lofton’s office when Colonel White

called to inform the officer that the 24th would be

committed to combat. Lofton responded, Gillert

said, that the regiment was neither trained nor prepared for war and that the event would be a disaster. He “wanted no part of that” and requested

reassignment. White took him at his word and

made him the commander of the detachment in

charge of maintaining the base at Gifu until the

regiment returned.49

Lofton, for his part, never communicated any

personal doubts when informing his commanders

of the change. According to Captain Hash, he simply said that he was being replaced and would not

be allowed to command the battalion in combat.

That being the case, blacks within the regiment

came to their own conclusions. Learning that

Lofton would stay behind, they viewed the change

in command as one more indication of white prejKOREA 77

44 Interv, Cash with Gorham L. Black, Jr., 12 Mar 89.

45 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 6–31 Jul 50, p. 5. See also Interv,

Cash with Waymon R. Ransom, 5 Aug 88.

46 Interv, Muehlbauer with Calvin Bryant, 1 Mar 89.

47 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50; Intervs, Muehlbauer with

Bryant, 1 Mar 89; Bowers with Corcoran, 1 Mar 94; Doiron, 22

Apr 94; Gray, 2 and 3 May 94; Hash, 17 Mar 94; Sanders, 5

May 95; MacGarrigle with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94; Cash

with Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89; George Bussey, 13 Nov 88;

Albert Griffin, Jr., 5 Oct 88; Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Biggs,

15 Aug 88; Walden, 18 Mar 89. See also John G. Westover,

Combat Support in Korea, U.S. Army in Action series

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 238.

48 Intervs, Cash with Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Albert Brooks, 6

Aug 88; George Bussey, 13 Nov 88; Roscoe Jones, 16 Jun 89;

Walden, 18 Mar 89.

49 Quote from Interv, MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

See also Interv, Cash with Gillert, 25 Mar 89. Lofton’s role at

Gifu is described in Interv, Muehlbauer with Norman Taylor,

16 Sep 88; Ltr, Waymon R. Ransom to John A. Cash, 22 Oct

88, CMH files.
udice. Since Lofton was a lieutenant colonel and a

battalion commander, so the reasoning went, he

would have had to command white officers in combat. Rather than see that happen, the regiment had

contrived an excuse to leave him behind.50

White officers, especially those recently

assigned to the unit, also had concerns. According

to 1st Sgt. Peter Paulfrey, who would later be courtmartialed for abandoning his company, they

seemed nervous and upset and showed signs of

fear. They “began to question the NCO’s pertaining

to the men. They were completely afraid. They

heard rumors or had been taught that the Negroes

were cowards and they would question us as to

whether the men would seek revenge on the battlefront.”51 Condemned to prison at the time he made

the statement, Paulfrey may well have blamed his

own poor performance on the bad faith and leadership of his officers. Since some of those individuals were newcomers with little practical knowledge

of the regiment or its men, their questions may in

fact have been nothing more than an awkward

attempt to gain a feel for problems within their

units and for what they would need to do once they

reached Korea.

Even so, a suspicion lingers that Paulfrey had

touched a nerve. A story was circulating at the time

among white officers to the effect that a black chaplain had observed in a sermon to enlisted personnel that he felt it was inappropriate for black

Americans to fight an enemy of “color.”52 The exact

content of what was said, if anything of the sort

even occurred, has been impossible to determine.

The existence of the rumor, however, is in itself

telling—an indication that profound mistrust festered beneath the surface of the regiment. Indeed,

it appears that Colonel White himself had misgivings. Questioned several months after being

relieved of command on the combat effectiveness

of the regiment when it had gone to war and any

changes that had occurred, he had difficulty suppressing his disgust. “I had no great amount of confidence because of their past history,” he responded, “but my estimate gradually deteriorated.”53

White 1st Lt. Houston McMurray was even

more to the point. Although some men in his unit

were the sort of soldiers with whom he would have

been happy to go to war, he said, “By and large, I

had a lot that I was disappointed with, and it

became a case that you didn’t really . . . develop any

esprit de corps. You didn’t really feel like this is my

outfit. . . . Under these conditions it was hard to

feel like, well, you were pulling together and everybody was in this all the way through. . . . Some way,

you have to feel like somebody’s covering my left

rear, my right rear, and so on. If I’m there and I

trust them explicitly and I don’t have to worry

about them, I just have to take care of what I have

here.” McMurray added that with the advent of

war, personnel turbulence only made matters

worse. “Once you started turning over officers over

there, you really didn’t know anything about the

people you were with. . . . If you don’t know the

people, how much real trust do you have?”54

The conduct of some of the men on one of the

evenings just prior to the unit’s departure from Gifu

did nothing to allay white concern. Aware that the

troops were keyed up and that discipline might

slide in the confusion that preparations for a major

move always entailed, Colonel White canceled

leaves and restricted his soldiers to post. Lowerranking officers questioned the decision, considering the move an invitation to disorder because

many of the men had formed close attachments to

women in nearby towns and would want some

final time with them. “A bunch of us,” black 2d Lt.

Clinton Moorman recalled, “said if these guys can’t

get off post here, we’re in deep trouble. We don’t

78 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

50 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Hash, 9 Jun 94; Muehlbauer

with Emmett Allen, 23 Aug 88; Cash with Nathaniel Reed, 6

Jan 90. Lofton would have been a prime candidate for an interview, but the Army has no address for him, an indication that

he is probably deceased.

51 Interv, IG with Sgt Peter J. Paulfrey, 29 Dec 50, exhibit

B–31, Far East Command Inspector General Investigation.

52 Interv, Cash with Gillert, 20 Aug 90.

53 Interv, IG with Col Horton V. White, 27 Sep 50, exhibit B–21, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

54 Interv, Muehlbauer with McMurray, Jun 88. The punctuation of the quote has been changed for the sake of clarity.

One of the regiment’s new officers, 2d Lt. Alfred F. Tittel, felt

the same way. See Interv, Bowers with Tittel, 15 Apr 94.
even need to take them into Korea if they can’t get

off of this post.”55

Those apprehensions were soon borne out.

When some of the men went AWOL to see their

girlfriends and the military police attempted to

round them up, at least fifty joined in confrontations that became, in the words of rifleman James

T. Burke, “Real heavy. Real heavy.”56 Refusing to

obey orders, some gave cat calls and threw rocks.

Others were armed, according to the new regimental adjutant, white Maj. John Wooldridge, and fired

weapons. The 24th Infantry investigated the incidents but dismissed them because no one had been

hurt and no desertions had occurred.57 The next

night, however, a change of policy appears to have

gone into effect. A number of prostitutes and girlfriends, according to Burke, were allowed unofficially to come on post.58

The Journey to Korea and First Assignments

The 24th’s band, which would stay behind at

Gifu, played at the railroad station on 11 and 12

July, when the regiment departed Gifu on the first

leg of its journey to Korea. The mood among the

men was upbeat, bandsman Walter Bufford

recalled. It seemed like a football game. The soldiers even called out as they passed, “Be ready to

play us back at Thanksgiving!”59

Although few of the men could recall any problems, disturbances did apparently occur. Many

Japanese girls were present. Some climbed aboard

one of the trains, slowing its departure by what

seemed to mortarman William Hough several

hours. Soldiers were pulling them through the windows, Hough said, and the police had problems getting them off. In another case, according to rifleman

William Gregg, a black GI attempted to kiss his

Japanese girlfriend goodbye on the loading platform

at Camp Gifu. When a military policeman intervened, a scuffle occurred in which a number of

nearby men participated. In the end, those incidents

were minor. Much more menacing was a littlenoticed pattern of activity witnessed by a white platoon leader in Company K who had just arrived

from the 7th Infantry Division, 2d Lt. Alfred Tittel.

As the trains pulled out, Tittel said, girls ran alongside, passing packages through the windows to their

boyfriends within. Some of the bundles, according

to Tittel, were later found to contain drugs.60

During the trip that followed, due to unexpected congestion at the ports, the Eighth Army diverted

the 24th from its original destination at Sasebo to

Camp Juno near the port of Moji, 100 miles to the

northeast. It did the same to the all-white 27th and

35th Infantries, portions of which also used Moji.

Since no plans had been prepared to load the 24th at

the port, an advance party of four officers had to

improvise everything. Within a scant sixteen hours

they set up a holding facility at Moji and a loading

area at Kokura; located a small collection of fishing

boats, fertilizer haulers, coal carriers, and tankers to

transport the regiment to Korea; and made what

arrangements they could to accommodate the unit’s

men before the convoy departed. A lack of time and

proper facilities kept the officers from preparing personnel-loading rosters. They also found it impossible

to draw up plans to connect and move the regiment’s

various parts with their equipment. Instead, equipment and personnel went on board the ships in the

approximate order of their arrival.61

The confusion that reigned when the men of

the 24th began pouring into the port provided an

opportunity for lawless elements within the regiKOREA 79

55 Interv, Muehlbauer with Clinton Moorman, 5 Sep 88.

56 Interv, Muehlbauer with James T. Burke, 23 Jan 89. See

also Interv, Muehlbauer with Benjamin Headden, 24 Aug 88.

57 Interv, IG with Maj John Wooldridge, 23 Aug 50,

exhibit 1 attached to Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th Inf Div, to

Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9 Sep 50,

sub: Combat Effectiveness of the 24th Infantry Regiment.

Kean’s letter and its attachments are contained in Far East

Command Inspector General Investigation, sec. BX, boxes

1013–1014, RG 159, WNRC. Statements attached to General

Kean’s letter each have an exhibit number and are hereafter

cited as in the Kean Letter file. See also Interv, Muehlbauer

with Burke, 23 Jan 89.

58 Interv, Muehlbauer with Burke, 23 Jan 89.

59 Interv, Cash with Walter Bufford, 13 Mar 89.

60 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Gregg, 8 Sep 88; Timothy

Rainey with William Hough, 16 Nov 89; Bowers with Tittel, 15

Apr 94.

61 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 6–31 Jul 50, pp. 2–3.
ment to step out of line. While officers struggled to

feed the troops and organize loading details, a

number of individuals from Pierce’s 3d Battalion

decided to slip away for one last evening in town.

Shortly thereafter the regimental adjutant, Major

Wooldridge, received a call from the 25th Division’s

assistant commander, Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson,

who stated that enlisted men from the 24th were

“all over town causing disorders, such as being

drunk, fighting, beating up civilians, and attempting rape.”62 The assistant operations officer of the

3d Battalion, white 2d Lt. Roscoe Dann, recalled

walking down the middle of a street with Wilson

and ordering men to “fall in.” He did not recall any

great problem. A cook with the 3d Battalion,

Joseph Davis, however, remembered vividly that

some of the men had weapons and that “they shot

the town up. It was very bad.” A platoon leader in

Company I, black 2d Lt. Reginald J. Sapenter, also

recalled shooting. He was alerted in the middle of

the night, he said, to go into town and round up

the troops. He met General Wilson in a jeep in the

middle of a road and warned him to take cover

because the men had weapons and ammunition

and were taking pot shots. Wilson responded that

Sapenter and his men had weapons as well, the

clear implication being that they should respond as

the situation dictated. In the end, return fire was

unnecessary. Over the next three hours, according

to Wooldridge, battalion officers organized squads

to comb the town, detaining about seventy-five

enlisted men and marching them down to the

docks where they were needed to load ships. A

number more escaped.63

Since all concerned rejoined their units and

everyone embarked on time for Korea, neither the

regiment nor the Eighth Army was much inclined

to pursue the matter. When the Japanese police

lodged a formal complaint, however, alleging that

approximately one hundred black deserters from

an unknown unit had killed a Japanese citizen,

seriously injured another, and committed acts of

rape, U.S. military authorities in Japan had no

choice but to investigate. Unable to contact

Wooldridge or other eyewitnesses within the 24th

who could have confirmed, as enlisted man Joseph

Davis put it, that the 24th had “shot up” Moji, the

investigators were quick to dismiss the report as a

gross exaggeration. Only ten soldiers had been

implicated, they asserted, and no one had been

killed or injured. They did concede, however, that

the troops involved had responded with gunfire

80 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

62 Interv, IG with Wooldridge, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 1, Kean

Letter file. See also Interv, Muehlbauer with Burke, 23 Jan 89.

63 Intervs, IG with Wooldridge, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 1,

Kean Letter file; Cash with Joseph C. Davis, 21 Jan 89;

MacGarrigle with Dann, 28 Mar 94; Bowers with Reginald J.

Sapenter, 10 Mar 94. Several other officers and enlisted men

confirmed the incident. See Intervs, Cash with Charlie Lee

Jones, 6 Sep 89; Muehlbauer with Ray Koenig, 20 Mar 89; Ltr,

Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 May 94. Japanese journalist Seiichi

Matsumoto wrote a book on the episode, Kuroji no E [Picture on

a Black Background]. On 9 May 1993, the Japanese television

station Kyushu TV–Asahi aired a documentary on Matsumoto’s

life that gave extensive coverage to what it called “the Kokura

incident.” See Ltr, Betsy Cooke, Masaoka & Associates, Inc., to

Richard Boylan, Archivist, National Archives, 23 Sep 93, with

attached fact sheet, copy in CMH files.

General Wilson (front left) confers with officers.
when the military police had arrived and that no

one had been punished.64

Although only a small minority of the more

than three thousand members of the 24th were

involved in those incidents and the majority of the

unit’s men went off to war without demur, the

wholesale change of officers preceding and even

during the move, the rumors and lack of communication attending it, and the episodes of undiscipline at Gifu and Moji raise many questions. Were

the regiment’s leaders at all levels, especially the

new officers in the companies, capable of overcoming the problems that were clearly widespread

within the regiment while at the same time dealing

with the special circumstances of war? Would the

lack of trust within the unit between whites and

blacks, both officer and enlisted, have a bearing on

how the regiment performed in battle? Was discipline, itself a function of trust, sufficient to give the

men the tenacity and determination they would

need to survive in combat?

Whatever the answers, the problems that

accompanied the 24th’s move to Korea appear not to

have occurred in all-white regiments making the

same journey. Because of that, the disorders tended

to confirm the prejudiced stereotypes of whites who

were already disposed to question the decision to

commit an all-black regiment to the war. “[Despite]

the background of WW II in which like organizations functioned, the training background of the

24th in Japan and the inherent characteristic [sic] of

the negro soldier,” the 35th Infantry’s commander,

Colonel Fisher, thus avowed, “the decision was to

move the organization to Korea. The undisciplinary

conduct on the part of this organization while it was

awaiting sea transportation in Kokura, Japan, was a

final demonstration indicative of the type of conduct

which could be expected against an enemy.”65

The trip from Moji, on Japan’s west coast, to

Pusan, on the southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula, occurred on 11 and 12 July, took more than

twelve hours, and covered 150 miles. With conditions Spartan in port and aboard ship, it was anything but refreshing for the officers or the men of

the 24th. The equipment and personnel of the regiment were loaded on an assortment of old

Japanese and American ships, many of them used

for hauling fish and fertilizer. “After much confusion,” the 3d Battalion’s war diary noted:

the battalion was alerted to board ship at 1200 hours

and movement to the docks began. . . . Three companies

. . . were returned to the staging area by direction of

Brigadier General Wilson . . . with orders to wait there

until all material, equipment, etc., had been loaded. At

2013 hours the units were again ordered aboard ship

and . . . loaded on a Japanese vessel, Hari-Mura [sic],

during the remainder of the night . . . The Battalion

Commander and the Executive Officer were fortunate in

being billeted in a 6’X 15’ cabin. There was no fresh

water, cooking facilities, nor toilets aboard ship. All the

rest of the battalion sat or slept on the filthy deck.66

Years afterward, the commander of the battalion’s Company L, Captain Biggs, recalled that the

ship assigned to his unit still had fish in its hold.

Alluding to the pungent smell that hung over

much of Korea because the farmers of the country

used human waste as fertilizer, he commented

that “we stunk of fish and the smell of Pusan

before we even saw it.”67

If the crossing to Korea proceeded without

problems for most of the 24th, disorders continued

here and there aboard ship. According to

Lieutenant Komp, some stealing of rations, equipment, and even rifles occurred among the men on

KOREA 81

64 Interv, Cash with Joseph C. Davis, 21 Jan 89; Far East

Command (FEC) Provost Marshal Weekly Summary, 15 Jul 50,

box 9894, RG 331, WNRC.

65 Ltr, Col Henry G. Fisher to Col S. W. Foote, Chief,

Histories Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, 19

Nov 57, CMH files. Fisher knew what had happened because

his unit had arrived at Moji just after the 24th Infantry had

departed. Although a search was made for similar episodes in

other American units, none remotely comparable have come to

light. Since the Eighth Army attempted to play down what had

happened in the 24th, similar, more successful cover -ups may

have occurred in the case of other units. It stands to reason,

however, that if evidence of misconduct by all-white units

existed, Japanese commentators would have brought it to light

when they dealt with the 24th. To date, they have not done so.

66 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 8–31 Jul 50.

67 Ltr, Bradley Biggs to Clay Blair, 20 Oct 86, Clay and

Joan Blair Collection, Forgotten War, 24th Division, MHI.
his ship. It was a sign, he said, that at least a few had

little trust in their fellows and viewed the coming test

of battle as every man for himself. Others, rifleman

James Burke observed, had loaded a truck with

“booze.” As a result, he said, “When we got to Korea,

most of us were feeling pretty good.”68

In fact, if some seemed to be out for themselves, morale among the majority of the regiment’s

members was high. Taking Colonel White at his

word and packing their “pinks and greens” for a

victory parade, few of the officers expected the war

to last long. As for the enlisted men, some, according to rifleman Jerry Johnson, seemed eager to get

to the front because the war would be an adventure, and it provided an opportunity to earn the

coveted Combat Infantryman’s Badge. Others,

according to rifleman Nathaniel Pipkins, were just

“tired of running up and down [the training area at]

Fuji. This would be different.”69

All elements of the regiment had reached Pusan

by 1400 on 13 July. When they arrived, they

encountered a number of problems brought on by

the haste in which the United States had gone to war.

A lack of cranes and other equipment for unloading

the ships at the port of Pusan was complicated by a

sitdown strike by local stevedores either sympathetic to the Communists or hoping to sell their services

at the highest possible profit. In the end, some units

enlisted help in unloading their ships at gunpoint

while others did the work themselves.70

The haphazard loading of some of the vessels

snarled matters further. Since some of the materiel

and supplies the men would need almost immediately in the field had been stowed deep within the

holds of the ships and would take over a day to

unload, the regiment’s battalions moved out of the

port toward the combat zone without all of the

vehicles and supplies they had packed.

Compounding those problems, many of the men

had brought excess baggage—winter uniforms,

athletic equipment, and the sort of creature comforts that they had been allowed to carry when they

had traveled to Fuji for exercises. All of that gear

had to be stored, much of it never to be seen by its

owners again.71

When the regiment arrived at Pusan on 12 and

13 July South Korea seemed on the verge of collapse. On the west General Dean’s 24th Division

was pulling back under heavy pressure to the Kum

River, and there was no assurance that the force

would be able to hold the line for long. Meanwhile,

to the east, in South Korea’s central region and

along the far coast, some five enemy divisions were

advancing south, putting the important east coast

port of P’ohang-dong at risk and threatening to cut

off the entire American force from its base at Pusan.

The combat effectiveness of the enemy force varied.

The 1st North Korean Division was highly aggressive,

but U.S. intelligence ranked the effectiveness of two

others as low. Even so, the five understrength South

Korean divisions contesting the enemy advance

were poorly armed, supplied, and trained. As with

Dean’s force, no one knew how long they would

last or when they might break. Surveying the situation, Eighth Army commanders decided to use the

25th Division to back up the South Koreans in the

central and eastern highlands but to put it in a

position where, if necessary, it could also slide west

in support of Dean.72 (Map 2)

The regimental headquarters and the 2d

Battalion were the first segments of the 24th Infantry

to reach port, arriving in midmorning on 12 July. On

instructions from Eighth Army headquarters, they

immediately moved north to P’ohang-dong, a 110-

mile trip by rail. Both were on station by evening,

but the 2d Battalion was short Company H, which

had stayed behind in Pusan to finish unloading the

unit’s equipment and vehicles. The move was so

hasty and supplies so lacking that the men had no

rations of any sort. Many resorted to eating the local

fruit and came down with diarrhea.73

82 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

68 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94;

Muehlbauer with Burke, 23 Jan 89.

69 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Allen, 23 Aug 88; Eddie

Capers, 2 Nov 88; Pipkins, 23 Aug 88; Cash with Biggs, 15

Aug 88; Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Walden, 18 Mar 89.

70 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 6–31 Jul 50. See also Intervs, Cash

with Albert Brooks, 6 Aug 88; Gorham Black, 12 Mar 89.

71 Ibid.

72 WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

73 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 6–31 Jul 50; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf
The next day, responding to further reverses on

Dean’s front, the Eighth Army repositioned the

24th to the west of the Naktong River at the town

of Kumch’on, 85 miles west of P’ohang-dong by

road and 100 miles from Pusan by train. The 2d

Battalion immediately began to load for the trip but

the move took until midnight on 13 July to finish.

By then the 3d Battalion had already arrived, having departed Pusan by train directly for Kumch’on

at 0500. The 1st Battalion arrived in port that

evening and also began the trip north. By the next

day the entire regiment, minus work details that

had remained behind at Pusan, was present at

Kumch’on, where it was in position either to move

north some thirty miles to protect an important

road junction at Hamch’ang, or to swing west some

forty miles to support Dean at Taejon.74

KOREA 83

Rgt, 13–31 Jul 50. See also Interv, Cash with Britt, 18 Aug 88.

For food shortages in other units, see Intervs, Cash with Biggs,

15 Aug 88; Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88.





25

XX

8

XXXX

I I

1 24

I I

2 24

NK 6

XX

NK 2

XX

NK 15

XX

NK 1(+)

XX

NK 12

XX

NK 5

XX

NK 4(+)

XX

NK 3(+)

XX

III

NK 766

Han R

Kum R

Naktong R

7th Div Redesignated

12th Div at Wonju

on or about 4 July

III

23d Regt

ROK 3d Inf Div

III

27th Regt

U.S. 25th Inf Div

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

ROK 8th Inf Div

ROK 6th Inf Div

Rmnts, ROK 2d CAP

and 1st Inf Div

U.S. 24th Inf Div

Rmnts, ROK 7th

Inf Div and NYG

III

Arrived Pusan,

 1630, 13 Jul

24th Regt(-)

U.S. 25th Inf Div

INCH'ON

SEOUL

Kimpo

 Afld Yongdungp'o

Uijongbu

Hongch'on

Wonju Ich'on

Suwon

 Afld

P'yongt'aek

Ch'onan

Chonui

Chinch'on

Ch'ongju

Umsong

Ch'ungju

Chech'on

Ch'unyang

P'unggi

Yongju

Ulchin

P'yonghae-ri

Yongdok

Andong

Ulsong

Yech'on

Tanyang

Mun'gyong

Kallyong Pass

Sangju

Hamch'ang

Poun

Taejon

Taep'yong-ni Kongju

Kunsan

Chonju

Yongdong

Hwanggan

Kumch'on

TAEGU

Yonch'on

P'ohang-dong

TAEBAEK

MTNS

0 40

Miles

THE U.S.—ROK FRONT

13 July 1950

ROK Army Front, Evening, 28 Jun

U. S. and ROK Dispositions, Evening, 13 Jul

Direction of North Korean Attacks, 13 Jul

National Youth Group (500-1000)

High Ground Above 200 Meters

XX

NYG

Map 2

74 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 6–31 Jul 50; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, 13–31 Jul 50.
When the unit arrived in Pusan and began its

move north into position, the enthusiasm of some

of the men began to fade, a characteristic common

of soldiers approaching combat for the first time.75

The sight at Pusan of jeeps and trucks filled with

stretchers and wounded soldiers caused stress and

uncertainty. “I felt bad,” enlisted man Raymond

Hagins recalled. “Who’s goin’ to help us. . . . They

got whipped.” At that point, according to rifleman

Eugene Rumpf, a junior NCO went mad and had to

be taken away in a straitjacket.76 Apprehension

increased during the ride north. The floors of some

cars on the trains were covered with bloody straw;

seats in the coaches were also bloody, and many

windows had been shot out. The trip itself was

often arduous, adding to the effect. “I recall vividly,” Company C’s commander, Capt. Laurence

Corcoran, said, “that we had to get off the train and

help push it up . . . [a] hill.”77

As the anxiety of the men increased, rumors

spread, especially one to the effect that the regiment’s white executive officer, Lt. Col. James B.

Bennett, who had been evacuated for medical reasons, had faked a heart attack along the way rather

than face the rigors ahead.78 When the unit arrived

at Kumch’on and its various portions settled into

night positions, some of the men were so anxious

they began to fire indiscriminately at anything. As

Sgt. Richard Sanders of the 3d Battalion’s Company

M recalled, they “killed a lot of trees.” One enlisted

man was wounded by an accidental weapons discharge. Much the same thing happened in other

units. When the 27th Infantry spent its first night

in the field at Andong, Uzal Ent recalled, the troops

became nervous and fired freely from their positions in the hills around the town.79

Yech’on

Late on the night of 13 July the 1st and 2d

Battalions of the 24th went into Eighth Army

reserve, prepared to move either to the Hamch’ang

or Taejon areas, as circumstances required. The 3d

Battalion, augmented by an artillery battery, was

directed to proceed to Yech’on, a small town seventeen miles northeast of Hamch’ang by road.80

The continuing enemy advance had dictated

the order. Reports had arrived that enemy forces

were threatening to push the 8th South Korean

Division out of the town of Tanyang in the Han

River valley and south through the mountains

84 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

75 Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in

Battle (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 138.

76 Intervs, Cash with Raymond C. Hagins, 28 Aug 88;

Rumpf, 15 Aug 88. See also Interv, Muehlbauer with Burke, 23

Jan 89.

77 Intervs, Cash with Britt, 18 Aug 88; Hagins, 28 Aug 88.

Quote from Interv, Cash with Corcoran, 28 Jul 89.

78 Intervs, Cash with Walden, 18 Mar 89. See also Interv,

Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88; Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, pp.

84, 86. Whether Bennett’s physical problem was a heart attack

is unknown. In support of the heart attack, see Interv,

MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94. Captain Hash says Bennett

commented openly that he would never go into combat with a

black unit. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Hash, 18 and 22 Mar

94. Some evidence exists of a nervous breakdown. See Intervs,

Cash with Leonard H. Kushner, 16 Jun 89; Bowers with

LaBlanc, 28 Feb 94.

79 Interv, Muehlbauer with Sanders, 16 Dec 88;

Memorandum for the Record (MFR), MacGarrigle and Bowers,

26 Oct 93, CMH files. For details on the first death in the unit

resulting from an accidental weapons discharge, see Interv,

Rainey with Hough, 16 Nov 89. See also Interv, MacGarrigle

with Sapenter, 21 Mar 94. Sapenter of Company I describes

indiscriminate weapons firing that killed a cow in the dark a

few days later near Yech’on.

80 WD, 25th Inf Div, 13–14 Jul 50.

The 24th Infantry waits to move out from Pusan, 14 July 1950.
toward Andong, an important crossroad on the

Naktong River, twenty miles east of Yech’on. Kean

sent the 27th Infantry to backstop the South

Korean defense by securing the high ground north

of Andong. The 3d Battalion of the 24th was meanwhile to do the same at Yech’on, which stood at a

critical position on the enemy’s line of advance

because it commanded roads running east to

Andong and southwest to Hamch’ang. If the North

Koreans took it, they would be in position to move

either east or west.81

With the other two battalions of the 24th still

en route to Kumch’on, only the 3d Battalion was

available for the mission. It had just arrived itself,

after a four-day trip from Gifu that had included 20

hours on a train in Japan, 17 hours aboard ship,

and 12 hours on the train that carried it to its final

destination. There had been little time for unbroken sleep and little food or water on the way.

Indeed, the first regular meal the men ate came

only at 2300 on 13 July, close to seven hours after

they arrived in Kumch’on and a scant five hours

before they were alerted to begin preparing for the

move to Yech’on—another seven-hour ride by

truck. Two officers and twenty-five enlisted men

from the battalion still remained behind in Pusan to

find lost equipment—including the unit’s kitchen

trucks—and to complete the unloading and shipment of materiel.82

Because of time constraints, the unit’s officers

had difficulty finding enough train coaches and

boxcars to move the battalion by rail. Trucks themselves were hard to find. In the end, after an

exhausting search, the unit had to await the arrival

of trains from Pusan bearing some of its trucks.

When those proved too few, it borrowed the

remainder of what it needed from the 90th Field

Artillery Battalion, which was supplying a battery

to support the operation. Since there was little

room for nonessentials, the troops themselves carried only combat packs—a change of socks and

underwear, indispensable personal items, and no

more than a day’s supply of C-rations. The remainder of their gear was stored under guard in a school

building at Kumch’on.

The battalion arrived at Yech’on at 1600 on 14

July and had its command post in place within thirty minutes. By 1745 the troops themselves were

digging into defensive positions on high ground

and preparing to patrol the roads leading into the

town. Battery A of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion

positioned its 155-mm. guns to support the

infantry, placing two in forward positions where

they could serve as antitank weapons. Later in the

evening, the 3d Platoon of the 77th Engineer

Combat Company arrived.83 Since the 3d Battalion

was to cooperate with South Korean soldiers and

policemen already in the area, an intelligence specialist from the South Korean II Corps joined the

unit. Contact with higher headquarters was difficult to maintain because of the shortage of radios

and the continuing lack of spare parts.

The problem with communications diminished the next morning, when the commander of

the 27th Infantry, Colonel Michaelis, arranged for

the 25th Division to provide the battalion with a

powerful SCR–193 radio so he could stay in touch

with the unit protecting his flank.84 Shortly thereKOREA 85

81 WD, 25th Inf Div, 14 Jul 50.

82 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 8–31 Jul 50.

83 WD, 65th Engineer (Engr) Bn, 14 Jul 50, p. 8.

84 G–1 Journal, 25th Inf Div, 15 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf

Div, Jul 50.

Soldiers on a flatcar ready to move out from Pusan
after the assistant division commander, General

Wilson, arrived. Wanting the division to do well

in its first engagements with the enemy, he had

spent the day before with the 27th Infantry. He

would remain at Yech’on all that day and spend

the night, inspecting the 3d Battalion’s positions

and conferring with its officers.

Despite all the attention from higher-ups, the

battalion’s first contact with the enemy was less than

auspicious. On 15 July a platoon from Company I

on a long-range reconnaissance patrol encountered

scattered mortar fire and moved back to the company position, abandoning some equipment in the

process. The platoon leader, black 2d Lt. William D.

Ware, along with his sergeant, after being reprimanded by the company commander, walked two

miles to the battalion command post to report that

he was unable to hold his position in the face of

enemy fire. Ordered to return his men to their original position, he did so. As with the firing at

Kumch’on during the regiment’s first night in the

field, the episode was an indication of the uncertainty, indecision, and anxiety that inexperienced troops

and leaders sometimes feel when facing combat for

the first time. Less than two weeks later, on 26 July,

Ware would earn the Army’s second highest medal

for valor, the Distinguished Service Cross, while giving his life for his men.85

86 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

85 Interv, IG with Maj Theodore J. Cook, Exec Ofcr, 3d

Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 10, Kean Letter file. Ware’s

citation is in Eighth U.S. Army, Korea (EUSAK), GO 54, 6 Sep

50. Unless otherwise indicated, general orders for this volume

are on file in the Army’s Awards Branch of the Personnel

Service Support Division of the Adjutant General Directorate

Troops of Company G, 24th Infantry, ready to move to the firing lines, 18 July 1950
Wilson departed on the morning of 16 July but

his superior, the commander of the 25th Division,

General Kean, arrived to inspect the front line.

Kean also spent the night. The 3d Battalion continued to depend on its regimental headquarters for

supplies and ammunition, but it came under the

operational control of Michaelis’ 27th Infantry

shortly after the general arrived.86

Throughout 16 and 17 July the American commitment in the area increased. Company A of the

79th Heavy Tank Battalion (less one platoon)

arrived from the 27th Infantry. Later, Company B of

the 65th Engineer Battalion also took up station to

finish a partially constructed landing strip in a

nearby riverbed. Both were white units. During the

afternoon Company I fired on an unidentified aircraft. The plane returned fire, making two strafing

runs over the battalion command post before withdrawing to the south. The weather was hot and

humid with scattered showers.87

While Kean was visiting, the unit’s members

complained about the condition of their automatic

weapons. Inventory checks had meanwhile confirmed that fully one-third of the equipment that

had supposedly accompanied the unit from Gifu

had never arrived from Pusan. With combat possible at any time, Kean arranged to provide enough

additional equipment from division stocks to bring

the force up to strength.88

The general had much to consider. To the

north, one of North Korea’s most dangerous units,

the 1st Division, was fighting a bitter battle with the

6th South Korean Division over a pass at

Mun’gyong that commanded a critical communications corridor running due south 90 miles from

Wonju to Kumch’on through the rugged mountain

range that separated the watersheds of the Han and

Naktong Rivers. If the pass fell, Hamch’ang, 10

miles to the south, would follow and the road to

Kumch’on, the Naktong River valley, and Pusan

would beckon. Meanwhile, east of the Mun’gyong

Pass and north of Yech’on, the troubled but still

powerful 12th North Korean Division had captured

the Han River town of Tanyang on 14 July and was

pushing the 8th South Korean Division south, back

across the mountains toward Andong, 35 miles to

the southeast. Advancing down the TanyangAndong road, the enemy appeared to have split his

force, with the main body continuing on toward

Andong while the 31st Infantry Regiment veered

south in the direction of Yech’on.89 To make matters worse, to the east, the 5th North Korean Division

was advancing southward along the coastal highway. It had taken the town of P’yonghae-ri, 50

miles above P’ohang-dong, on 13 July and had then

sent the 766th Independent Infantry Unit inland

across the coastal mountains with instructions to

cut communications between Pusan and the Eighth

Army’s headquarters at Taegu.90

With the 21st Regiment of the 8th South

Korean Division opposing the 31st Regiment’s

advance toward Yech’on and reports arriving that

the enemy was threatening Hamch’ang, General

Kean decided to organize Task Force ABLE under

General Wilson to secure the Hamch’angKumch’on road. Receiving permission to detach

the 2d Battalion of the 24th from Eighth Army

reserve, on the evening of 17 July he moved it

KOREA 87

of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM),

Alexandria, Va. Ware’s citation stations him with Company L

rather than I, but Ware was clearly part of Company I. See

Officer Roster, 24th Inf Rgt, 18 Sep 50. The S–3 of the 3d

Battalion, Zanin, confirmed Cook’s story, as did a fellow platoon leader in Company I. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Zanin, 22 Oct 93; Bowers with Sapenter, 10 Mar 94. All the

lost equipment was apparently recovered, but it is not clear

how that was done.

86 25th Inf Div Opns Rpt 6, 16 Jul 50. See also WD, 25th

Inf Div, 16 Jul 50.

87 WD, 25th Inf Div, 16 Jul 50. See also Interv, Bowers

with Sapenter, 10 Mar 94.

88 WD, 25th Inf Div, 16 Jul 50.

89 ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue

99, 24 Apr 51, 7th NK Infantry Division, pp. 44–45, Intelligence

Research Collection, MHI.

90 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

101–08. See also 25th Inf Div Periodic Info Rpt 7, 19 to 20 Jul

50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50; FEC, Military Intelligence

Section, Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 15

Oct 50, MHI, hereafter cited as North Korean Order of Battle;

ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue 9, no.

1468, 29 Sep 50, Interrogation of Senior Col Lee Hak Ku, former Chief of Staff, 13th North Korean Division, pp. 158–74,

Appleman Papers, MHI.
north from Kumch’on to hold roads coming

through the mountains near Sangju, a town some

ten miles south of Hamch’ang. Wilson took operational control of that battalion, the 3d Battalion of

the 24th, and Company A of the 79th Tank

Battalion shortly thereafter. He planned to use the

3d Battalion to block the roads around Hamch’ang.

Employing the vehicles of Company B of the 65th

Engineer Battalion to assist in transporting the unit

to Hamch’ang, he left the engineers at Yech’on temporarily to serve as a rear guard.91

The 3d Battalion hastily redeployed south to

the Hamch’ang area at 0900 on 18 July, at a time

when the unit’s men were already unsettled. As a

result, the force began to experience problems

almost as soon as it reached its destination. About

noon a vehicle arrived from the division reconnaissance company with word that five or six enemy

tanks were on the approach, a scant five miles away.

The battalion’s commander, Colonel Pierce, sounded the alarm, whereupon a heavy mortar platoon

attached to the battalion turned its vehicles around,

drove at high speed to the rear, and ended up plowing eight of its trucks into rice paddies that lined

the road. Other men were caught up in the confusion and began to mount their own vehicles, but

officers quickly asserted their authority and managed to regain control.92 Nothing came of the supposed enemy attack, but on the same day, when

South Korean units some seven hundred yards to

Company I’s front became involved in a firefight,

that company likewise started to withdraw. It went

back into position upon order, however, abandoning none of its equipment.93

Shortly after arriving at Hamch’ang, General

Wilson learned that the situation there was far less

threatening than intelligence analysts had supposed. South Korean troops still held the town

and its approaches and remained in possession of

the Mun’gyong Pass to the north. With circumstances on that front in hand for the time being,

Wilson decided to return the 3d Battalion to

Yech’on the next morning. But he modified his

decision late that afternoon, when a patrol from

the 27th Infantry reported that enemy activity was

increasing near the town.94 Concerned about the

engineers he had left in place there, Wilson immediately instructed Colonel Pierce to form a task

force under the 3d Battalion’s operations officer,

Capt. John B. Zanin, and to send it back to

Yech’on immediately. Composed of a platoon of

tanks from Company A of the 79th Tank

Battalion, a 75-mm. recoilless rifle section, and a

section of heavy machine guns, the force departed

at 1800.95

Zanin’s force had hardly reached Yech’on at

2000 when advance elements of the enemy’s 31st

Regiment arrived and the engineers began to

receive mortar fire and to register small-arms fire

from their front, right, and left rear. Zanin immediately brought his tanks into position to support

the defenders but, under increasing enemy pressure, within the hour decided he was poorly positioned to withstand any kind of a ground attack

and withdrew his force to Hamch’ang. As the

move began, the retreating column encountered a

truck blocking the road, a sign that the enemy was

about to spring an ambush. The vehicle wheeled

and sped off when the force neared, but machine

guns then opened fire from both sides of the road.

88 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

91 WD, 25th Inf Div, 17 Jul 50. See also WDs, 24th Inf Rgt;

2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt; and 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt. All for Jul 50, in

WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50. WD, 65th Engr Bn, Jul 50, in WD,

25th Inf Div, Jul 50. For the operations of the 21st South Korean

Regiment, see FEC Communique 87, 170100–171430 Jul 50,

CMH files; Interv, MacGarrigle with Rennie M. Cory, 10 Jun 94.

92 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 6; Interv, IG with

1st Lt Christopher M. Gooch, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 25, Kean

Letter file. Gooch was the intelligence officer (S–2) of the 3d

Battalion.

93 Interv, IG with Cook, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 10, Kean

Letter file. Cook was the executive officer of the 3d Battalion.

A forward observer from Battery A of the 90th Field Artillery

Battalion recalled being abandoned in the field at Hamch’ang

by a company of the 24th Infantry. See Interv, MacGarrigle

with Cory, 10 Jun 94.

94 WD, 25th Inf Div, 18 Jul 50. The whereabouts are

unknown of the 21st South Korean Regiment that had earlier

opposed the enemy’s advance down the Tanyang-Yech’on road.

95 The 25th Division’s war diary says Wilson told Pierce

to appoint a staff officer. See ibid. Zanin says he was appointed directly by Wilson. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Zanin, 22

Oct 93.
Zanin’s tanks, in a brief but sharp engagement,

eliminated the problem. His force continued on

its way, reaching Hamch’ang at 0310 on 19 July.

Zanin reported that he had fought his way out of

Yech’on against heavy opposition and that nine

enlisted men from the engineer company were

missing. In all, he said, the force had lost a 2 1

⁄2-

ton truck and four 1

⁄4-ton trailers. Two casualties

were evacuated. Zanin and Pfc. Jesse J.

Willingham of Company M both received Silver

Stars for their roles in the action.96

Rather than dash back to Yech’on, General

Wilson reacted with caution. Although assigning

Company K to patrol the roads in the direction of

the town and moving Company I to a position five

miles east of Hamch’ang, he postponed the return

of the 3d Battalion to Yech’on that he had earlier

ordered. He may have been waiting for Battery B of

the 159th Field Artillery Battalion to arrive or for

an instruction team from the 24th Infantry that was

slated to brief men from the unit on the use of the

Army’s new 3.5-inch rocket launcher, a weapon

lethal to North Korea’s tanks. He may also have

been concerned about the events that day in

Hamch’ang and may have sought to provide time

for Pierce’s men to settle down.97

For a time, Wilson was of a mind to leave the

3d Battalion at Hamch’ang and to shift the 2d

Battalion from Sangju to Yech’on. At 1720 on 19

July he issued orders to that effect, and the unit’s

commander, Colonel Cohoon, set the process in

motion.98 At the last moment, General Kean

stepped in. He may have been aware that it would

be difficult for the 2d Battalion to move and

regroup with the sort of dispatch that circumstances required. He may also have concluded

that the job at Hamch’ang was best suited for a

regimental commander and that Wilson, his

assistant division commander, would be of more

use elsewhere. Whatever the reason, late that

night he gave the 35th’s commander, Colonel

Fisher, charge of the entire Yech’on-Hamch’angSangju area. Establishing a headquarters at

Hamch’ang, Fisher was to return the 2d Battalion

of the 24th to Sangju, bring his own 2d Battalion

forward to Hamch’ang, and move the 3d

Battalion of the 24th back to Yech’on. With those

deployments in place, he would be able to support the South Korean forces fighting north of

Hamch’ang while both assisting Cohoon’s battalion at Sangju and backing up Pierce’s move

against Yech’on. Although the 3d Battalion would

make the initial attack on Yech’on, plugging the

gap that appeared to have developed in the allied

line, the plan was for the 18th Regiment of the

South Korean Capital Division to fill in for the

unit as soon as possible.99

Pierce’s task force departed for Yech’on the

next morning, 20 July, after being relieved by the

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, in its positions around

Hamch’ang. It was supported by the 3d Platoon of

the 77th Engineer Combat Company, Battery B of

the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, and a detachment from the 25th Division’s signal company.

Preceded by scouts from the battalion’s intelligence section and protected from surprise attack

on the northern flank by a screening force from

the 35th Infantry’s intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, leading elements of Pierce’s column

arrived at a position about one mile from Yech’on

at midmorning. (Map 3) The weather was cloudy

and cool.100

The men of Company L, under Captain Biggs,

left the trucks that had brought them from

Hamch’ang and moved up the main road toward

KOREA 89

96 Zanin’s report is in WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p.

6. The war diary for the 65th Engineer Battalion reported 1

killed, 2 missing, and 2 wounded. See WD, 65th Engr Bn, Jul

50. Zanin described the action in Interv, MacGarrigle with

Zanin, 22 Oct 93. See also 25th Inf Div GO 107, 4 Sep 50, and

GO 123, 8 Sep 50.

97 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50.

98 WDs, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jun 50; 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

Jun 50.

99 WDs, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jun 50; 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

Jun 50; 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, Jun 50; S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf

Rgt, 19 Jul 50; Historical Rpt, 25th Inf Div, 8–31 Jul 50.

100 WDs, 25th Inf Div, 20 Jul 50; 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 20

Jul 50; Unit Journal, 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50; Morning

Rpt, HQ, 3d Bn, Co L, 24th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50, CMH files;

Comments by Col Henry G. Fisher on Appleman MS, 27 Oct

51, Appleman Papers, MHI.
Yech’on on foot. After a short distance, they shifted

to the left of the road to avoid clusters of houses and

small villages scattered along the way that might provide cover for an ambush. As they neared a group of

houses located to the side of a small irrigation ditch

about one-half mile from Yech’on, their leading elements came under rifle and mortar fire. About that

time, enemy mortar fire from the hills north of

Yech’on began to hit the road, separating Biggs’ unit

from the remainder of the task force, which was

beginning to assemble near the point where

Company L had dismounted and moved off.101

Pierce replied by ordering his own mortars and

artillery to silence the enemy’s weapons. The mortarmen of Company M and the platoon from the

heavy mortar company responded almost at once,

but the artillery had difficulty moving into position

because the road was jammed with the infantry’s

vehicles. In the end, the artillery commander

cleared the way only by instructing his men to push

many of the vehicles into surrounding rice paddies.

Once the artillery was in position in a dry, sandy

riverbed about three thousand yards behind Biggs

and prepared to fire, Pierce added to the confusion

by questioning the commands the unit’s officers

were issuing. When the artillery battalion commander responded by explaining the artillery’s grid

system for targets, Pierce relented and apologized,

but the episode set poorly nonetheless. The

artillery fired its first rounds at 1545.102

90 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

101 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50; Morning Rpts,

HQ, 3d Bn, Co L, Co M, 24th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50, CMH files;

MS, Bradley Biggs, Were Black Scapegoats for Our Failures in

Korea? n.d., CMH files; Intervs, Bowers with Walter W. Redd,

18 Feb and 24 Mar 94; Clifton F. Vincent, 19 and 20 Apr 94;

Muehlbauer with Turner, 22 Dec 88. There is conflicting evidence on the route Company L took. This version is based on

the account of the company commander which is supported

by WD, 159th Field Artillery (FA) Bn, Jul 50, sketch 4.

102 WD, 159th FA Bn, Jul 50, pp. 3–4; Morning Rpt,

Battery B, 159th FA Bn, 20 Jul 50, CMH files.

Han-ch'on R

B/159

105

to Andong 20 Miles

 14 Milesto Hamchang

Hwaji-dong

PONGDOK-SAN Yech'on

to Tanyang

 20 Miles

0 1

Miles

BATTLE FOR YECH'ON

20–21 July 1950

3/24 Positions

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 300 and Above

Levee

BASED ON SKETCH OF B BATTERY, 159TH FAB

Map 3
Company I, commanded by black Capt.

Thurston Jamison, and Company K, under 1st Lt.

Jasper Johnson, arrived in midafternoon. Pierce

ordered Jamison to move his unit toward high

ground to the northeast to cover Company L’s flank

while Johnson moved against Yech’on along the

main road. As Company K advanced, checking the

huts in the small villages along the way, an enemy

force opened fire and wounded one of the unit’s

platoon leaders. Even so, part of Johnson’s force

moved on ahead and managed to enter Yech’on.103

After Jamison’s and Johnson’s companies began

to move out, the 77th Engineer Combat Company

commander, black 1st Lt. Charles Bussey, arrived in

the area where the battalion’s trucks were parked. He

had mail for his men. Observing that the 3d

Battalion’s units were under mortar and machinegun fire from enemy forces on the high ground, he

maneuvered a squad equipped with two machine

guns to commanding terrain and attempted to provide relief. When friendly mortars registered on the

enemy position and some of the enemy soldiers

began to break and run, Bussey was in position and

brought many of them down. He won a Silver Star

for his role in the episode.104

With the coming of darkness, enemy fire died

down. Johnson, however, decided his position was

too exposed with the enemy retaining the high

ground and requested permission to pull back.105

Shortly thereafter, Pierce broke off the assault and

drew his battalion into defensive positions to await

the dawn. The artillery fired throughout the

remainder of the night, expending more than seven

hundred and fifty rounds and setting Yech’on

ablaze. Its officers later claimed that the battery

destroyed several enemy mortar positions at the

cost of one forward observer.106

As the battle progressed, higher headquarters

had at best a confused impression of what was

happening. Colonel Fisher in Hamch’ang had

received word at noon on 20 July that Company K

had killed two of the enemy and captured one at

Yech’on.107 That evening the 25th Division reported: “K Co inside city limits, opposition negative.

Encountered 120mm mortar and mortar fire

comp[arable] to our 60mm at 201710 July 50,

estimated YECHON will be secure by our forces

by 201800 Jul 50.”108

Whatever sense of success those reports may

have indicated was short lived. When Pierce reported at 2155 that his force was still pushing the assault

and that it had been held up outside of Yech’on,

Fisher grew concerned and requested more information.109 General Kean also became anxious and

began to monitor the situation closely. At 0013 on

21 July, aware that a South Korean regiment was

preparing to relieve the 3d Battalion, he instructed

Fisher to take Yech’on before turning it over to the

arriving force. At 0018 he called to ask, “Has your

mission been accomplished?” At 0035 he requested

information on the disposition of the units attached

to the 3d Battalion, including the battery from the

KOREA 91

103 WDs, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50; 159th FA Bn, Jul

50, sketch 4; Morning Rpts, Co I, Co K, 24th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul

50, CMH files; Intervs, Cash with Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88;

Bowers with Jasper Johnson, 18 Apr 94; Roy Appleman with

Jasper Johnson, 11 Jul 52, cited in Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 190; Bowers with Tittel, 15 Apr

94; MacGarrigle with Tittel, 20 Apr 94; Bowers with Dann, 23

Mar 94; MacGarrigle with Dann, 28 Mar 94. Two of Johnson’s

platoon leaders state that they did not get into Yech’on, but the

company commander is certain that at least part of his force

did. Portions of Company L may also have entered the town.

See Interv, Bowers with Redd, 24 Mar 94.

104 Although the war diary for the 3d Battalion, 24th

Infantry, describes the fight at Yech’on, it makes no mention of

Bussey’s encounter. The war diary of the 65th Engineer Battalion

contains only a very general description of Bussey’s actions. The

account given here is based on the war diary of the 65th

Engineer Battalion, Bussey’s award citation for the Silver Star,

and an interview. See WD, 65th Engr Bn, Jul 50, dtd 24 Oct 50,

p. 13; 25th Inf Div GO 324, dtd 12 Nov 50, Award of the Silver

Star for Capt Charles M. Bussey. See also Sworn Statement,

LaVaughn E. Fields, 25 Jun 84, CMH files; Interv, Cash with

LaVaughn E. Fields, 5 Feb 89. Bussey’s own account of the

episode is in Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, pp. 100–106.

105 Intervs, Cash with Jasper Johnson, 5 Oct 88 and n.d.;

Roy Appleman with Jasper Johnson, 11 Jul 52, cited in

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 190.

106 WD, 159th FA Bn, 20 Jul 50; S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th

Inf Rgt, 19 Jul 50.

107 S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50.

108 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 19, 20 Jul 50, in WD,

25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

109 S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf Rgt, 20 Jul 50.
159th. He repeated the request at 0250 and five

minutes later radioed again urgently, “Has . . . mission been accomplished?”110

Determined to complete the operation, Pierce

assembled his commanders and staff and turned

the meeting over to Captain Zanin, his operations

officer. Zanin laid out the attack order for the following day. The operation would begin at 0500, 21

July, with Biggs’ Company L driving “straight

through the center of Yech’on” to seize foothills

north of the town. Jamison’s Company I in echelon

to the west would take high ground to the left while

Johnson’s Company K would stand in reserve.111

Although Pierce and Zanin could not have known

it at the time, evidence exists that the 31st Regiment

had been ordered to rejoin its parent unit in the

attack on Andong. Advance elements of the force

slated to continue the attack at Yech’on, the 8th

North Korean Division, may have been moving up,

but the main body would not arrive until four days

later, on 24 July. The 3d Battalion’s assault would

fall into the gap.112

As planned, Biggs’ unit moved to the attack at

first light on 21 July. The lead platoon, under 1st

Lt. Oliver Dillard, followed by the other platoons,

approached the town directly with the intention of

running straight through it.113 Biggs recalled years

later that those units came under sporadic

machine-gun and sniper fire. Silencing the enemy’s

weapons, he said, “we moved out on the double,

down the main street, firing at anything that fired

at us. . . . We did not bother to do any search of

huts or go up any of the side streets. Our objective

was to get to the end of the city and occupy our

previous positions.”114

The attack was over within an hour but

Colonel Pierce appears to have had little idea of

what was going on. More than two miles to the

rear, unable to see clearly because of smoke from

fires in the town, lacking good communications

with his frontline units, and hearing heavy firing in

the distance, he concluded that Biggs was in trouble. At 0825, after the attack on Yech’on had actually ended, Pierce radioed the 35th Infantry to

report that he was unable to go any farther because

of heavy enemy fire and requested reinforcement

by either a tank or a quad-50 half-track. He cited

casualties from the previous day—in all, two had

been killed and twelve wounded—to support his

request. The regiment sent several tanks, but they

did not arrive until much later in the day.115

About the time Pierce made his request

Colonel Fisher arrived to see for himself what was

happening. Locating Pierce far to the rear, where

the officer was attempting to follow the action with

binoculars, Fisher at first learned little. Unaware

that Biggs had already captured the heights around

the town, he decided to drive forward to investigate. Encountering no resistance upon entering

Yech’on, he concluded that Pierce had been overly

cautious and ordered him to move his troops to

their objectives. Shortly thereafter, Pierce reported

that he had possession of Yech’on and that he was

preparing to defend it. Fisher himself then turned

cautious. He waited two hours before reporting the

development to 25th Division headquarters. In all,

the 3d Battalion counted two dead and twelve

wounded for the entire two-day operation, almost

all from Companies K and M. Vehicle, weapons,

and equipment losses may have been substantial

but the record remains unclear. Enemy casualties

were unknown.116

92 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

110 S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf Rgt, 19 Jul 50 and 21 Jul 50.

111 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50; Interv, Cash with

Biggs, 15 Aug 88; Ltr, John B. Zanin to MacGarrigle, 21 Apr

95, CMH files.

112 ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpts, issue

99, 24 Apr 51, 7th NK Infantry Division, pp. 44–45, and issue

4, p. 22, Intelligence Research Collection, MHI.

113 Interv, Cash with Dillard, 26 Oct 88.

114 MS, Bradley Biggs, The Attack Into Yechon, n.d., p. 5,

CMH files. See also WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 21 Jul 50. For

the account of another soldier in the assault, see Interv,

Muehlbauer with Sanders, 16 Dec 88. Cpl. Reginald

Washington of Company M received a Silver Star for his role in

the action. See 25th Inf Div GO 62, 17 Aug 50.

115 S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf Rgt, 21 Jul 50; WD, Co A,

79th Hvy Tank Bn, Jul 50. See also Interv, Cash with Jasper

Johnson, n.d.

116 Ltr, Fisher to Col S. W. Foote, 27 Oct 57, CMH files.

Weapons losses are mentioned in the journal but the account

is garbled. It reads, “Lost 3 lot [sic] of vehicles and weapons,
Yech’on was enough of a victory to cause elation at Eighth Army headquarters, but the Far East

Command in Japan paid little attention.117 On 20

July the enemy had overrun the 24th Infantry

Division’s forces in Taejon and the division’s commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, had disappeared, ultimately to become a prisoner of war. In

that light, Yech’on seemed insignificant. General

MacArthur and his officers afforded it scant notice,

crediting the achievement to the South Koreans in

official communiques.118

During the weeks that followed, nevertheless,

the victory received wide acclaim in the United

States. Drawing upon an account by Associated

Press reporter Tom Lambert, who had been present

at Yech’on, black periodicals such as the Pittsburgh

Courier and the Washington Afro-American made

much of the story. So did such prominent white

newspapers as the New York Times.119 Congress

itself took notice. Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts

praised the victory on the floor of the House of

Representatives, specifically mentioning that black

soldiers had been responsible.120 So did Walter H.

Judd of Minnesota, who added that the men of the

24th, by fighting gallantly and willingly for free

institutions and the rule of law, had contradicted

Communist assertions that the American effort in

Korea was merely an attack by whites on the colored people of Asia.121

Although journalists and politicians sought to

play up Yech’on for reasons of their own, the battle

told little about what would happen to the 24th

Infantry during the weeks to come, when combat

would begin in earnest. Far more revealing were

events and circumstances that had long preceded

KOREA 93

and equipment. Need supplies.” See S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf

Rgt, 21 Jul 50. For the views of Fisher’s S–3, who accompanied

the colonel to Yech’on, see Intervs, MacGarrigle with Carleton

S. Johnson, 12 and 19 May 94. Dead and wounded statistics

are taken from HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of the

24th Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51], box 3848, RG

407, WNRC.

117 Interv, Cash with John “Tommy” Martin, 12 Jan 90.

Martin was a black public affairs officer assigned to Eighth

Army headquarters at the time.

118 FEC Communique 113, 21 Jul 50, CMH files. See also

“SK Unit Holding Invader,” Stars and Stripes, 22 Jul 50; Map

inset with accompanying text, “Communist Columns,” Stars

and Stripes, 23 Jul 50; “Build-Up Gains in Fourth Week,” Stars

and Stripes, 23 Jul 50, all in MHI files. All cites are from the

Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes.

119 See Tom Lambert, “Negro Troops Score Victory; Few

Losses,” Los Angeles Examiner, 22 Jul 50; Lindesay Parrott,

“Yongdok Regained,” New York Times, 22 Jul 50; “Oldest Negro

Regiment,” New York Times, 23 Jul 50; “Negro Troops Take

Yechon,” New York Times, 23 Jul 50; “Negro GI’s First Heroes,

24th Takes City in Bloody Battle,” Pittsburgh Courier, 29 Jul 50.

There is some doubt as to when Lambert arrived at Yech’on

and how much of the fighting he witnessed. Although Bradley

Biggs, a company commander in the 3d Battalion, said that

Lambert accompanied his unit from Hamch’ang, Lambert himself stated in an interview 37 years later that he flew into

Yech’on and that the engagement could hardly have been

much of a battle if he had done so. Although Lambert’s article

was written as an eyewitness account, the officer that he

claimed was next to him during the fighting was Fisher’s S–3,

Carleton Johnson, who arrived at Yech’on only on the morning

of 21 July, after the fighting had ended. Johnson believes that

a reporter accompanied him and Fisher to Yech’on. So did

Fisher. But both Fisher and Johnson saw little resemblance in

Lambert’s article to what they had seen. See Intervs, Richard O.

Perry with Tom Lambert, 5 Nov 87; MacGarrigle with Carleton

Johnson, 12 and 19 May 94; Ltr, Fisher to Foote, 27 Oct 57.

120 U.S. Congress, House, “First United States Victory in

Korea Won by Negro GI’s,” Congressional Record, 81st Cong.,

2d sess., vol. 96, pt. 8, 24 July 1950, p. 10866.

121 U.S. Congress, House, “Negro Troops Fighting

Valiantly in Korea Give Lie to Soviet Propaganda,” Appendix to

the Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., vol. 96, pt. 8, 31

July 1950, p. A5531.

A South Korean town (Yech’on) burns after being shelled by

American artillery on 21 July 1950.
the engagement. At Gifu wholesale changes in

command, designed to improve leadership but calculated as well to ensure that segregation persisted

on the field of battle, may have improved the quality of leadership in some units, but they fostered

resentment in others, and they left intact the racial

prejudice that would fester beneath the surface of

the regiment in the weeks to come. At Moji the rioting and looting brought on by a lack of discipline

in part of one battalion augured poorly for the regiment as a whole. For if some companies seemed

reasonably well trained and led, others clearly

lacked the sort of discipline and leadership they

would need during the trials to come.

Meanwhile, from the moment the unit had

received notice that it would go to war, rumors had

circulated that chaplains had given sermons questioning the propriety of black men fighting brown,

that white officers were either afraid of their troops

or unwilling to lead blacks in battle, that a black

lieutenant colonel had been pushed aside so that

white officers could continue to be rated and

ranked by whites, and that the unit’s executive officer had faked a heart attack rather than go into

combat. Whether those stories were true or not, the

widespread, uncritical certainty with which they

were received by both whites and blacks was a sure

sign that deep-seated divisions existed within the

regiment and that the basic requisites for survival

and success in war, mutual trust and unity of purpose among men, were sorely lacking. By themselves, none of those impediments was fatal. But

when combined with the inexperience of the officers and men of the 24th, the understandable fears

of soldiers new to battle, the prevalence of worn

and outdated arms and equipment, and the presence of a well-armed and motivated enemy, they

made a powerful combination.

94 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Yech’on from top of a hill after U.S. troops moved in on 21 July 1950
When the 3d Battalion moved to Yech’on on 14

July 1950, the rest of the 24th Infantry

remained at Kumch’on to guard against an

enemy threat that seemed to increase by the day. To

the north, the 1st and 12th North Korean Divisions

pushed southward through the Mun’gyong and

Tanyang Passes toward Hamch’ang and Andong

against the battered remnants of the 6th and 8th

South Korean Divisions. To the west, on the Kum

River above Taejon, the 3d and 4th North Korean

Divisions continued their attack against Dean’s

hard-pressed 24th Infantry Division. Meanwhile,

between the two forces, a third drive was developing at Chongju and Koesan as the 2d and 15th

North Korean Divisions began to attack south

toward Poun and the important rail and agricultural center at Sangju, twenty-two miles above

Kumch’on. The remnants of the South Korean 1st,

Capital, and 2d Divisions stood in their way, along

with the inexperienced 1st and 2d Battalions of the

24th Infantry regiment. The men of the 24th had

the mission of patrolling in force to the rear,

preparing to counterattack in any direction where

the need arose.1 (See Map 2.)

The 24th Moves South

On 17 July the commander of the 25th Infantry

Division, General Kean, visited Colonel White at

Kumch’on to discuss the situation. The 27th Infantry

and White’s 3d Battalion were already supporting the

South Koreans on the approaches to Andong. It

seemed time to send additional units north to cover

other areas. To that end, Kean decided to keep

Fisher’s 35th Infantry at the east coast port of

P’ohang-dong, where the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division

was slated to land shortly. Meanwhile, to fill the gap

between Hamch’ang and Kumch’on, White was to

dispatch the 24th Infantry’s 2d Battalion to Sangju to

participate in General Wilson’s Task Force Able. The

1st Battalion and the regimental headquarters would

remain in reserve at Kumch’on.2

Although White kept tabs on his 2d and 3d

Battalions, they were out of his control. His attention

was thus of necessity directed toward his 1st

Battalion, where minor organizational problems had

developed. On 18 July, the day the unit assumed its

1 For the enemy situation, see Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 101–05. The mission of the 24th

is in War Diary (WD), 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 6. Unless otherwise indicated, records for July 1950 relating to the 25th

Infantry Division, its three regiments, and the supporting units,

including war diaries, historical summaries, command and staff

reports, and staff journals, are contained in boxes 3746–3747,

RG 407, WNRC, Suitland, Md. See also 25th Inf Div Periodic

Intelligence Rpt 1, 13–14 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

2 WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. The missions of the 1st and 2d

Battalions are described in WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p.

1, and WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 2–3, both in WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50.

CHAPTER 5

Sangju
mission as reserve, its leader, the only combat-experienced battalion commander White had at his disposal, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts, had moved to regimental headquarters to assume the duties of the

executive officer, who had been evacuated as a nonbattle casualty. With no other officer replacements

immediately available, Roberts’ executive officer at

the battalion, Maj. Eugene J. Carson, took temporary

charge. An infantry platoon leader at the end of

World War II who had gone on to become a military

policeman, Carson was a “no-nonsense” officer who

had both a measure of experience and good

instincts. Because of the heat, for example, he

ordered the men to carry only essentials into combat—food, water, entrenching tools, weapons, and

ammunition. He was nonetheless an unknown who

had been with the unit for less than two weeks. He

would have to earn the men’s trust and respect.3

On 19 and 20 July, while the 1st Battalion conducted patrols and prepared for contingencies, the

situation to the west continued to deteriorate. On

those dates, in heavy fighting around Taejon, part of

Dean’s 24th Division was overrun and Dean himself

was reported missing in action. In response, the

Eighth Army ordered the arriving 1st Cavalry

Division forward to the area below Taejon, where it

would replace the remnants of Dean’s command. As

for the 25th Division, Fisher’s 35th Infantry would

take charge at Hamch’ang; Michaelis’ 27th would

reposition itself to the area northwest of Kumch’on

and tie in with the 1st Cavalry Division on its left;

and White’s 24th would relocate with the division

headquarters to Sangju, where it would cover the

gap between Kumch’on and Hamch’ang and prepare

to assist in the relief of the South Korean Capital, 1st,

and 2d Divisions fighting west of Sangju.4

White moved his headquarters and the 1st

Battalion to Sangju on 21 July in a driving rain

caused by Typhoon Grace.5 The regiment entered

an exceedingly rugged area with mountains that

sometimes rose to more than two thousand feet

above sea level. Two dirt roads crossed it. One, a

northwest-southeast route between Koesan and

Kumch’on, traversed the Kallyong Pass, twenty

miles to the northwest of Sangju. The other ran

between Sangju and Poun, some thirty miles to the

west. White directed the 1st Battalion to move west

and block the Poun road. The 2d would rejoin the

24th and link up with the well-experienced 17th

South Korean Regiment, operating south of the

Kallyong Pass, on 22 July. The 3d Battalion would

remain under the operational control of the 35th

Infantry for the time being. When it arrived from

Yech’on, it would initially become White’s reserve.6

The 2d Battalion had operated in the Sangju

area since 17 July, patrolling, maintaining contact

with the 17th Regiment, skirmishing with the

enemy’s forward elements, and suffering its first

casualties. For a time, General Wilson had slated it

to spearhead the assault on Yech’on. On 19 July,

indeed, he had ordered it to withdraw from its

positions near Sangju and to proceed to

Hamch’ang, where it would gather for the attack.

Company F and the headquarters had held for the

time being at Sangju, but Companies G and H had

immediately begun the first leg of the journey,

moving to Hamch’ang by truck. Company E had

followed on foot. Later that night, when General

Kean had reversed Wilson’s decision, assigning

Yech’on to the 3d Battalion, Companies G and H

had experienced little difficulty making the return

trip to Sangju in their trucks. Company E, however, lacked transportation. Holding in place

overnight on the road to Hamch’ang, it had no

96 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

3 The change in command is mentioned in WD, 1st Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 1. Carson’s methods are described in

Intervs, John A. Cash with Gray Johnson, 23 Mar 89, and

George L. MacGarrigle with William A. Hash, 18 and 22 Mar

94, all in CMH files. All interviews hereafter cited by John A.

Cash, Bernard L. Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T.

Bowers, Richard O. Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in

CMH files. Quote from Interv, MacGarrigle with Gustav J.

Gillert, 4 May 94. Carson was the 25th Infantry Division’s

provost marshal when the war began.

4 WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50, Narrative Summary, p. 4.

5 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 18. For the weather, see

WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50, Narrative Summary, p. 5.

6 For a description of the terrain, see Map, Korea,

1:250,000, series L551, 3d edition, Army Map Service (AMS)

1950, sheets J 52 U and J 52 T, and Map, Korea, 1:50,000,

series L751, 4th edition, AMS 1950, Sheets 6723 II and 6823

III, both in National Archives and Records Administration

(NARA), College Park, Md. For details on unit missions, see
choice the next morning but to make a wearisome,

eight-mile trek on foot back to its former position.

When it arrived, the troops had no time to rest.

Since enemy activity was increasing to the west, the

battalion commander, Colonel Cohoon, ordered it

to send out patrols. Having made contact with the

enemy, those units returned in the evening with

two prisoners.7

Incidents Near Idang

On 21 July, after several more successful skirmishes, the 2d Battalion received instructions to

conduct a joint operation with the 17th South

Korean Regiment. Word had arrived that portions

of a North Korean regiment had entered the area.

The attack would strike its forward elements and

throw them off balance. In preparation, the 2d

Battalion moved to Idang, a small village about

thirteen miles by air to the west of Sangju on the

road to Poun. Artillery batteries went into position nearby. After arriving, the command post and

other units of the 2d Battalion and Battery A of the

159th Field Artillery Battalion came under enemy

artillery fire. That evening, the battalion

commander and his staff traveled forward to the

Korean headquarters to evaluate the latest intelligence and to coordinate final plans for the attack.8

(Map 4)

The enemy unit moving toward Sangju, the

15th North Korean Division, was one of North

Korea’s least capable. Although it possessed a core

of combat-experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers, it had received most of its

soldiers from youth training camps in late June,

after the attack on South Korea had begun. As a

result, the bulk of its fighting strength comprised

relatively new conscripts whose training varied

from four months to just a few days, depending

upon the induction date of the individual. Its forward element, the 48th Regiment, had possessed

SANGJU 97

WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 18–21; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

Jul 50, p. 1.

7 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 13; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 4–5; 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence Rpt 7,

19–20 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

8 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 19; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 5–6. See also 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence

Rpt 8, 20–21 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50; WD, 159th

Field Artillery (FA) Bn, Jul 50, p. 3; Intervs, William T. Bowers

with Joel T. Ward, 13 and 15 Jul 94. The order to the 24th

Infantry for this operation on 20 July 1950 is recorded in WD,

35th Inf Rgt, Operation Orders and Instructions, Jul 50.

A patrol from Company F, 24th Infantry, moves up a hill to observe Communist-led North Korean action near Sangju, Korea; (right) North

Korean–held territory, fifteen miles west of Sangju.
I I

2 17 ROK

I I

3 17 ROK

I I

1 17 ROK

I I

2 24

I I

2 24

I

A 159

I

C 90

I-dong

PONGHWANG MTN

Pongjong-ni

Chogam-ni

to Kallyong Pass

1 mile

Iso-ri Sokch'on

to Poun

10 miles

Map 4
I I

1 24

I I

3 24

III

24

25

XX

(from Hamchang)

(from Kumch'on)

Nakso-ri

Namjang-ni

Sangju

18 mles

to Kumch'on

to Hamchang

6 miles

0 2

Miles

SANGJU AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

22 July 1950

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 400 and Above

Route of 2/24, Morning, 22 Jul

Planned Attack

Enemy Forces
more veteran troops than its sister regiments at the

beginning of the war, but the South Koreans had

inflicted such a heavy toll on the unit that it had

taken in 500 replacements during mid-July. Most of

those men were raw recruits inducted by force from

captured South Korean towns. Meanwhile, ammunition stocks were beginning to decline because of

the continual pounding of U.S. air attacks, and

morale was deteriorating because of high casualties, poor medical care, and harsh discipline.9

Cohoon had planned a relatively simple

assault. The 2d Battalion would work its way into

the hills northwest of Idang to attack from the west

positions supposedly held by portions of the 48th

North Korean Regiment. The 17th South Korean

Regiment would position two of its battalions south

of the enemy to support the American effort. A

third would go farther west to shield Cohoon’s

exposed flank. The 2d Battalion would take

responsibility for the assault itself, but the more

experienced Koreans would stand by to provide

assistance if necessary.10

To reach the point of departure for the attack,

slated to begin at 1000 on 22 July, the troops would

have to march more than five miles from their

bivouac. The final leg of the maneuver followed a

trail to the north through a two-mile-long defile

dominated at its far end by a 500-foot-high hill

overlooking the last segment of the line of

approach. The walls of the gorge were daunting.

Those to the west towered more than one thousand

feet in height. On the east, they were lower and

slightly more sloping but still loomed nearly eight

hundred feet above the trail. A stream flowed to the

right of the trail down the entire length of the draw.

It was swollen by rain on the day of the attack,

which began overcast with intermittent showers

but lightened during the afternoon.11

Although planning seemed detailed, poor tactics, communication failures, and inept leadership

marred the operation from the beginning. On the

morning of the attack, the 2d Battalion moved up

the gorge two men abreast in a column of platoons

with Company E in the lead, followed by Company

F and then Company G. Although the companies

initially had radio communications with the headquarters of the 2d Battalion, platoons within the

companies relied on runners because of a lack of

operable radios. As the operation developed, the forward companies lost radio contact. Instead of moving forward with his men, Cohoon sent his operations officer, Capt. James O. Gardner, forward with

the column while he remained in his command post

at Idang, more than five miles to the rear of the battalion’s destination. He may have believed that the

operation involved little threat because of the presence of the veteran 17th Regiment, or he may have

been waiting for the battalion to get into position for

the attack before moving forward himself by vehicle.

Whatever the reason, he was in the wrong place to

learn immediately about what was happening or to

respond to circumstances as they developed.12

100 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

9 Far East Command (FEC), Military Intelligence Section,

Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 15 Oct 50,

U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks,

Pa., hereafter cited as North Korean Order of Battle; FEC,

History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52, CMH files;

Annex to 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence Rpt 17, 29–30 Jul

50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. Details on the composition

and history of the 15th North Korean Division vary somewhat

between intelligence reports, but all agree on the poor quality

of the unit. See Annex to 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence Rpt

1, 13–14 Jul 50, and Annex to Opns Directive, 31 Jul 50, both

in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

10 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, Map Overlay 3; WD, 2d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 2–5. The plan of attack is also

described in Interv, Inspector General (IG) with M Sgt David

Robinson, Co E, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6, in Eighth U.S. Army

Korea, Report of Investigation Concerning 24th Infantry

Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat, 15 Mar 51, boxes

1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. According to South Korean

police patrols, there were no more than sixty to a hundred men

on the objective. See 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence Rpts 8,

21 Jul 50, and 9, 22 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

11 The ground is described in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p.

19. More exact details may be gleaned from Map, Korea,

1:50,000, series L751, 4th edition, AMS 1950, sheet 6723 II.

See also Intervs, Bowers with Ward, 13 and 15 Jul 94.

12 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 19–20; WD, 2d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 6. The position of Cohoon’s command post

is shown on Situation Overlay 3 and Attack Plan, for 2d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, and 17th Republic of Korea (ROK) Inf Rgt, 22 Jul

50, in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50. The position of the operations
When Company E’s lead platoon reached the

upper end of the gorge, it came under fire from an

enemy force of undetermined size stationed on the

hill to its front. At that time a platoon leader, 1st Lt.

Leonard Preston, was seriously wounded. “We were

supposed to make contact with the 17th regiment

of the ROK and make a coordinated attack,”

recalled the battalion intelligence officer, 2d Lt.

Colon R. Britt, who was near the head of the column. “We never did make contact. While going up

the draw the leading elements were hit with what I

believed to be three machine guns, and small arms

fire and mortar fire.”13 Advised by Korean officer

guides to push to either side of the hill to envelop

the enemy force and relieve the pressure on the

front, the company commander, Capt. Frank O.

Knoeller, failed to take any action and allowed the

forward platoons, now under 2d Lt. Joseph Hilyer,

to fight alone for more than an hour.14 During that

time, Lieutenant Britt moved to the rear to report to

Captain Gardner.15 Gardner informed Cohoon,

who appears initially to have issued instructions to

“hold if possible, withdraw if necessary,” but later

called for a withdrawal. Complying with the second order, Gardner followed standard procedure in

specifying a phased pullback. Company F was to

provide a shield as Company E withdrew. In turn,

Company G would cover for F.16

Britt moved back toward the head of the column with Gardner’s instructions in hand. As he

did, he noticed men drifting to the rear. “There

would be one man who had been wounded,” he

said, “and four or five others [rendering assistance].” Directed by Gardner to coordinate covering fire in order to ease the withdrawal, he could

get none of the men to stop. “They just continued

on with no regards for orders.”17

Shortly after receiving the order to withdraw,

Captain Knoeller informed Lieutenant Hilyer.

Hilyer assumed that following customary practice

his unit would fall back first under the covering fire

of his own parent company. Knoeller declined to

make any commitment of the sort. Citing the

authority of the battalion commander, he said he

had been told to break contact and leave. The leading elements of Company E, in other words, would

have to fend for themselves.18

“I had some wounded in action,” Hilyer told an

interviewer years later. “I stayed up there and got

them all out. We floated them down the creek. The

current carried them out.” He added that one of his

gunners, employing a Browning automatic rifle,

had done especially effective work. Recently

released from the Eighth Army stockade in Japan,

the soldier had leapfrogged down the creek, time

and again providing the critical covering fire the

SANGJU 101

officer is mentioned in Interv, IG with 2d Lt Colon R. Britt, S–2

of 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 12, attached to Ltr,

Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th Inf Div, to Commanding General,

Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9 Sep 50, sub: Combat Effectiveness

of the 24th Infantry Regiment. Kean’s letter and its attachments

are contained in Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation, sec. BX, boxes 1013–1014, RG 159, WNRC.

Statements attached to General Kean’s letter each have an

exhibit number and are hereafter cited as in the Kean Letter

file. See also Ltr, Waymon Ransom to John A. Cash, 22 Oct 88,

CMH files; Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88; Interv, IG with

Col Horton V. White, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 28, Kean Letter file;

Interv, IG with Maj Owen H. Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14,

Kean Letter file. Deficiencies in communications are covered in

Intervs, William T. Bowers with Ward, 13 and 15 Jul 94;

Charles L. Gray, 2 and 3 May 94; Henry D. Doiron, 22 Apr 94;

Cash with Edward Simmons, 18 Mar 89.

13 Interv, IG with Britt, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 12, Kean

Letter file.

14 Interv, IG with Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14, Kean

Letter file.

15 Interv, IG with Britt, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 12, Kean

Letter file.

16 Most sources indicate that Gardner gave the order, but

Cohoon was clearly in radio contact with Gardner even if communications at lower levels had given out. The 25th Division

Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Lt. Col. Charles R. Herrmann,

mentions the “hold if possible” order. He asserts emphatically

that the order came from neither the division nor the regiment.

See Statement of Lt Col Charles R. Herrmann, 17 Sep 50,

exhibit D–20, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

The regimental war diary states that the order was issued by

the battalion commander. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 19.

See also Interv, IG with Capt James O. Gardner, 24 Aug 50,

exhibit 24, Kean Letter file.

17 Interv, IG with Britt, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 12, Kean

Letter file.

18 Intervs, Cash with Joseph Hilyer, 17 Aug 88; Bowers

with Ward, 13 and 15 Jul 94.
unit needed to make its escape. Hilyer, a white,

stressed that his platoon had acted honorably,

whatever the performance of the rest of Company

E. “We left under orders from the Battalion

Commander,” he said. “We did not pull out on our

own or break and run. I did not approve of what

we did, but then, I was only a second lieutenant.”19

At Sangju, Colonel White began to hear rumors

and to receive unconfirmed reports that the 2d

Battalion was in trouble.20 Since radio contact with

the battalion had ceased, he decided to go forward

to see for himself. Collecting his operations officer,

Maj. Owen Carter, and his intelligence officer,

Capt. Walter Simonovich, and enlisting the assistance of the intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R)

platoon to provide security, he drove up the road

toward Cohoon’s headquarters at Idang. Three

miles west of the village, he observed a jeep careening down the road toward him at excessive speed.

It was overloaded with unarmed, frightened men.

White stopped the vehicle and questioned its occupants. They said that at least one company of the

2d Battalion had been wiped out and that the battalion itself was surrounded on at least three sides.

During the conversation, ten more vehicles arrived,

all similarly overloaded with men and piled with

odds and ends of equipment. Cohoon was in the

group along with three white officers of his headquarters company.21 He told White that he was

withdrawing his command post to a more secure

location because the enemy had cut him off from

his battalion and the old position had become a target of enemy artillery fire.

While the conversation continued, Captain

Simonovich climbed a nearby hill. He could see

that if Cohoon’s headquarters had abandoned

Idang, it had left the artillery behind. At least one

battery was still in position and firing. Simonovich

informed White, who turned on Cohoon and

ordered him to go back and find his people. By that

time a traffic jam more than a mile long had developed. Several vehicles had slid off the road, blocking the shoulders and further contributing to the

chaos. Cohoon moved up the road a short distance,

sat down on a rock, and, according to Sgt. Waymon

Ransom of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, began to cry.22

In the end, White determined that none of the

men he encountered except those from the command post had been ordered to withdraw. Instead,

rear-area personnel had based their decision to

move on the displacement of Cohoon’s command

post and rumors that the units fighting closer to the

front had been either surrounded or destroyed.23

The battalion aid station had remained in place, but

the withdrawal affected the artillery. When White

arrived at Idang he found that the battery from the

90th Field Artillery Battalion had withdrawn from

its position, bringing its guns with it, and that the

battery from the 159th had attempted to depart but

had held up when one gun had slipped into a

ditch. Waymon Ransom described the scene: “We

went back up there and the 159th had started to

withdraw but . . . the battery commander, he ain’t

leaving that tube. So here’s an artillery battery with

five pieces standing there bangin’ away . . . just

bangin’ away in general. And here’s a battalion

headquarters sittin’ there empty and no troops.”24

White and his officers began the process of

rounding up the men but were only partially suc102 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

19 Ibid. See also 25th Inf Div GO 63, 18 Aug 50, which

awarded the Bronze Star to Hilyer, and 25th Inf Div GO 352,

18 Nov 50, which awarded the Silver Star to M. Sgt. David

Robinson. Unless otherwise indicated, general orders for this

volume are on file in the Army’s Awards Branch of the

Personnel Service Support Division of the Adjutant General

Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Va.

20 Unless otherwise indicated, this description is based on

Interv, IG with Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14, Kean Letter file.

See also Interv, IG with White, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 28, Kean

Letter file.

21 The officers are mentioned by name by M. Sgt. Dean

Russell, the 24th Infantry’s sergeant major, who accompanied

White forward. See Interv, IG with M Sgt Dean Russell, 23 Aug

50, exhibit 17, Kean Letter file.

22 Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88.

23 Statement of Herrmann, 17 Sep 50, exhibit D–20,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

24 Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88; WD, 159th FA Bn,

Jul 50, p. 3. For the aid station, see 25th Inf Div GOs 341, 15

Nov 50, and 352, 18 Nov 50, which awarded the Bronze Star

to eight medics.
cessful. Some of the retreating soldiers reached the

position of the lead elements of the arriving 3d

Battalion at Namjang-ni, just outside of Sangju.

Piling into the parked vehicles of the unit—which

had lined up its machine guns to defend itself in case

of an enemy breakthrough—they drove on into the

town at breakneck speed. The 3d Battalion’s officers

attempted to stop them, but their efforts were in

vain. It took several hours to retrieve the vehicles

and to return them to their units.25

The 1st Battalion had also just arrived. Moving

up the road toward Idang on the way to Poun,

where it was slated to relieve the 1st South Korean

Division, it ran headlong into the “disturbingly tangled” 2d Battalion.26 Arriving on the scene shortly

thereafter, Colonel White instructed the commander of the 1st Battalion, Major Carson, to position

his unit on nearby high ground to shield the

retreating men. Upon consideration, Carson elected to station his men 1,000 yards farther to the

rear, where the ground seemed better suited to

defensive action. The battalion spent the night in

the area but encountered no enemy.27

As for the units in direct contact with the

enemy, the withdrawal was initially disorderly.

Company G held in place, but the other companies immediately began to experience difficulties.

“The unit leaders in all positions could not control

their men,” the battalion’s operations officer,

Captain Gardner, noted. “The personnel from F

Company and some from E Company were hurrying to the rear, and in many cases went as far back

as the rear train area, some using organic transportation.” With time, officers reestablished control. One commander even assembled his men

and marched them to the rear. By the end of the

day, as a result, all three units had reestablished

themselves to the east of Idang and were sending

out patrols.28

The next morning, 23 July, the South Koreans

seized the hill at the end of the gorge where the

episode had begun, capturing two light machine

guns, one mortar, and thirty enemy soldiers. Most

of the soldiers they took appeared to have been

operating as guerrillas. In all, twenty members of

the 2d Battalion went down as casualties, but none

were killed.29

Although the losses incurred by the 2d Battalion

were relatively small, the damage to the unit’s morale

and discipline was serious and required immediate

attention. The men needed encouragement, rest, and

refitting, and a number of officers merited removal

and reassignment. Cohoon in particular seemed vulnerable. His decision to position himself far to the

rear while his troops had been moving to the attack

was questionable. More important, his attempt to

relocate his command post even farther to the rear at

the very moment when he should have been moving

forward to assert his authority cast serious doubt

upon both his fortitude and his ability as a combat

leader. In the face of a strong enemy attack rather

than an ambush by a small force of guerrillas, his

poor judgment might have spelled disaster not only

for his battalion but for the entire regiment.

SANGJU 103

25 Interv, IG with 1st Lt Christopher M. Gooch, 26 Aug

50, exhibit 25, Kean Letter file. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle

with Lloyd V. Ott, 19 Jul 94; John B. Zanin, 27 Oct 93. Zanin,

the 3d Battalion’s operations officer, recalls working that

evening with General Wilson to untangle vehicles.

26 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 2.

27 Ibid. For other recollections from the 1st Battalion, see

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94; Lyle Rishell, 10

Aug 93.

28 Interv, IG with Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14, Kean Letter

file; Statement of Herrmann, 17 Sep 50, exhibit D–20, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation; Interv, IG with Gardner,

24 Aug 50, exhibit 24, Kean Letter file. For the withdrawal of the

line companies, see, in addition to the Gardner interview, WD,

2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 6; Intervs, Bowers with Gray, 2

and 3 May 94; Ltr, Charles L. Gray to William T. Bowers, 9 May

94, CMH files. See also Intervs, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with

Nathaniel Pipkins, 23 Aug 88; Cash with Joshua Storrs, 8 Sep

89; Roger Walden taped comments to David Carlisle, 25 Feb 87,

CMH files. The commander of Company F, Roger Walden, disputes Gardner’s assertion that officers in all positions failed to

control their men. He says his unit came out in good order. See

Walden Reply to MacGarrigle interview on 28 and 29 June

1995, 7 Sep 95, CMH files.

29 The casualties are taken from HQ, 25th Inf Div,

Reported Casualties of the 24th Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul

50–Sep 51], box 3848, RG 407, WNRC. The breakdown of

casualties is the following: Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 1;

Company F, 3; Company G, 1; and Company E, 15, including

the commander, 2 platoon leaders, and 3 NCOs.
Colonel White, however, took no action

beyond replacing the 2d Battalion’s lost equipment.

Stating for the record with less than total honesty

that “as the fighting troops were still in position no

harm was done,” he failed to re-form the unit or to

rest its men.30 Instead, at 0300 on 24 July he

ordered the battalion to move east to the outskirts

of Sangju, eight miles to the rear. The trip took five

hours by foot. Then, shortly after Cohoon’s men

arrived at their destination, they received instructions to retrace their steps and to position themselves astride the road to the Kallyong Pass at a

point some fifteen miles to the northwest of where

they were starting. “Troops departed the assembly

area at 1030 hours by foot and motor,” the author

of the unit’s war diary noted, “without receiving

any rest from the previous day’s activities.” The battalion arrived at its new position in the hills above

the road at 1600 and immediately began preparing

defensive positions for the night. The men were

exhausted.31

As for the officers, White again did nothing.

Even Cohoon received a second chance. The colonel

may have believed he had no choice because the

next in line for command, Cohoon’s executive officer, Maj. Horace E. Donaho, was a recent arrival and

an unknown. Then again, White and other officers

may have presumed that failures of leadership and

the possible cowardice of white commanders were

less to blame for what had happened than the blackness of the soldiers themselves. “Have you ever seen

the pictures of ‘Step-and-Fetchit’ where [the actor’s]

eyes were sticking out?” white 1st Lt. Donald F.

Pidgeon of the 2d Battalion asked the inspector general, referring to the antics of a popular black actor

during the 1940s who played to white prejudices.

“That is what they reminded me of.”32

An example of how White should have reacted

occurred within the 24th’s sister regiment, the 35th

Infantry, on almost the same date as the breakdown

at Idang. On 21 and 22 July, twenty miles north of

Sangju, Company F of that regiment’s 2d Battalion

also encountered a baptism by fire and experienced

extreme difficulties. Becoming heavily engaged with

a North Korean battalion, a force three times its size,

the unit fought well during the first day, inflicting

heavy casualties on the enemy. It nevertheless ran

into trouble on the second, when a rain-swollen

river to its rear overflowed, cutting all lines of support and reinforcement. During midafternoon on 22

July, assisted by intense artillery and mortar fire and

accompanied by five tanks, the North Koreans

attacked again. When the South Korean battalion

supposedly guarding the company’s right flank disappeared and engineers found it impossible to float

rafts across the river because of continuing enemy

fire, some of the unit’s men panicked and drowned

while attempting to swim the gap. Others straggled

down the embankment for four miles before coming upon a bridge that allowed them to cross. A

number abandoned their weapons.33

Although stung by the mishap, the regimental

commander, Colonel Fisher, set to work immediately. Seeing to it that the company’s members

received a warm meal and new equipment, he

brought in new leaders from other units within the

battalion and replaced the wounded company

commander. Those men who had distinguished

themselves in the fighting—the unit first sergeant

had stayed behind with the wounded until he

could bring most to safety—were written up for

medals and quickly received their awards. For two

days Fisher intentionally kept the unit in the rear

near his command post, where he instituted a rigorous retraining program designed to restore the

men’s confidence in themselves. No one was pam104 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

30 Quote from Interv, IG with White, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 28,

Kean Letter file.

31 Quote from WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 7. See

also WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 20, and app. VI, item 9. The

reason for the move remains unclear. There was considerable

confusion in the orders issued by the regimental and division

command posts.

32 Interv, IG with 1st Lt Donald F. Pidgeon, S–4, 2d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 26, Kean Letter file.

33 This paragraph is based on WD, 35th Inf Rgt, 12–31 Jul

50; 35th Inf Rgt Narrative Rpt, Jul 50; S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with Carleton S.

Johnson, 12 and 19 May 94; Rennie M. Cory, 10 Jun 94.

Johnson was the operations officer for the 35th Infantry. Cory

was an artillery observer supporting the 2d Battalion, 35th

Infantry.
pered, but all learned that their commanders cared

for their well-being and that survival in battle

depended upon training and each individual soldier’s loyalty to the group. The company then went

back on line. Over the weeks that followed, it held

up well in combat.34

In contrast, by 24 July Cohoon’s 2d Battalion

had not recovered, and straggling was becoming a

serious problem in some portions of the 24th.

Shortly after the 2d Battalion moved into position

on that date, for example, the unit began to receive

heavy artillery fire. A number of the troops moved

to the rear, leaving positions so poorly defended

that at one point Company E had only four men

defending an entire hill on the battalion perimeter.35 The regimental adjutant later stated that

about two hundred men drifted to the rear, many

using kitchen trucks and other vehicles from

Company H to make their way. Sometimes as many

as ten men occupied a single jeep.36

In the end, Cohoon succeeded in loading the

stragglers on trucks and returned them to the front,

but by then other problems were occurring in the

line. Six miles to the west on the road to Poun, in

an action reminiscent of the 3d Battalion’s nervousness prior to their first combat at Yech’on, a black

lieutenant in Company A of the 1st Battalion, 2d Lt.

Theodore R. Joyner, led his platoon to the rear after

receiving a scant few rounds of enemy fire. He was

intercepted by the battalion executive officer, black

Capt. Richard W. Williams, Jr., and relieved of command on the spot. The lieutenant later returned to

his unit. He was killed in action on 20 August.37

General Wilson became involved early on the

morning of 25 July, when he received word that

some of the troops were deserting their positions

above Sangju. Traveling to the scene to investigate,

he encountered five men from Company I of the 3d

Battalion coming down a trail in single file. “They

had thrown away their weapons,” he later told the

inspector general,

and when questioned reported that the enemy was in

their position and that the entire platoon had left. The

company commander was not aware of the situation. He

investigated after having been informed by me. . . . He

found very little of his platoon left, so immediately he

sent his reserve platoon into the positions that had been

deserted. This was done without difficulty as there was

no enemy in the positions. There was mass hysteria in

the platoon that deserted its positions. I found 5 more of

these men at the aid station for minor injuries, obviously they were more scared than hurt.38

As time passed, it became clear that the loss of

weapons and other equipment was also becoming

a problem. On 25 July the 2d Battalion’s supply

officer, Lieutenant Pidgeon, observed a machinegun section from his unit’s heavy weapons platoon

moving to the rear under orders. The group had

both of its machine guns when it started out, but by

the time it reached its destination the weapons

were gone. Since there had been no enemy firing at

the time, Pidgeon could only conclude that the

men had abandoned both guns rather than endure

the inconvenience and discomfort of having to

carry them over a distance. During the next month,

he told interviewers, the battalion lost all seventeen

of its assigned heavy and light .30-caliber machine

guns. Half of its assigned complement of eight .50-

caliber machine guns also disappeared. Despite

those losses, the unit was able to produce only one

damaged weapon to show that any had been hit or

destroyed by enemy fire. Inadvertently confirming

the wisdom of the 1st Battalion’s commander,

SANGJU 105

34 Ibid. See also Unit Journal, 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, entries

for 26 and 30 Jul 50, in WD, 35th Inf Rgt, Jul 50. Two members of Company F were recommended for the Distinguished

Service Cross, four for the Silver Star, and three for the Bronze

Star.

35 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 24 Jul 50, p. 23; WD, 2d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 7.

36 Interv, IG with Maj John R. Wooldridge, 23 Aug 50,

exhibit 1, Kean Letter file.

37 Interv, IG with Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14, Kean

Letter file; Interv, IG with Maj Richard W. Williams, Jr., 10 Feb

51, General Headquarters, Far East Command, exhibit B–109,

in Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged Irregularities in

the Administration of Military Justice in the 25th Infantry

Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation), RG 159,

WNRC. See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Rishell, 10 Aug 93.

38 Interv, IG with Brig Gen Vennard Wilson, 5 Sep 50,

exhibit 29, Kean Letter file.
I I

3 24

I I

2 24

I

F 24

I I

2 24

I I

3 24

I I

3 24

I I

1 24

I I

1 24

I I

1 24

26 Jul 26 Jul 27 Jul

26 Jul

27 Jul

28-30 Jul

27 Jul

27 Jul I

I-dong

PONGHWANG MTN

Pongjong-ni

Chogam-ni

to Kallyong Pass

1 mile

Iso-ri Sokch'on

to Poun

10 miles

Map 5
I

E 35

I

F 24

I I

2 24

I I

1 24

I I

3 24

I I

1 35 I I

2 24

28-30 Jul

I I

30-31 Jul

30-31 Jul

27-30 Jul

Nakso-ri

Namjang-ni

Sangju

18 mles

to Kumch'on

0 2

Miles

SANGJU AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

26–31 July 1950

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 400 and Above

Unit Positions, Date
Major Carson, who had stripped his men to the

essentials upon entering combat, Pidgeon added

that within one week of making first contact with

the enemy the individual soldier in the battalion’s

line companies had abandoned all of his equipment except for his personal weapon and the clothing on his back.39

By 25 July all three battalions of the 24th

Infantry occupied a line that intersected both the

Kallyong and the Poun roads through very rough

terrain. (See Map 5.) The frontage they manned

totaled more than seventeen thousand yards, an

area at least twice the width prescribed by military

manuals for a regiment involved in a defensive

action.40 The 1st Battalion held the western flank

in the hills above Chogam-ni, some nineteen

miles west of Sangju, and blocked the road to

Poun. The 3d, taking over positions from the 17th

South Korean Regiment, occupied the middle

ground on Ponghwang-san mountain (Hill 741),

which peaked at 741 meters above sea level and

whose slopes paralleled the Kallyong road at a

point where it bent to the east toward Sangju. The

2d Battalion was on the right, manning positions

on either side of the Kallyong road but extending

to the east, well into the hills.41 Conditions were

Spartan. The position of the 1st Battalion’s

Company C was so remote, it took up to eight

hours to resupply the unit on foot from the farthest point attainable by vehicle. Backed by a narrow road, the 3d Battalion was more accessible,

but even there a five-hour round trip was necessary to supply the unit. As a result, few of the men

in either battalion received hot meals, and even Crations were in short supply.42

Those difficulties notwithstanding, the 24th

Infantry’s position presented problems much more

serious than mere supply. Even with a third battalion, which other regiments deploying from Japan

lacked, Colonel White had nowhere near the

troops he needed to defend his assigned sector. As

a result, his thinly manned, overextended line was

unconnected to those of other allied units and presented the enemy with an easy opportunity for a

flanking attack. On top of that, because of the

rough terrain, it was impossible to plug holes in the

line. Enemy infiltration thus became an ever-present possibility, and a danger existed that the entire

position would fall prey to an enemy attack concentrated on one of its weak points.

Ordinarily, reserve units stationed to the rear

would have stood ready to counter any threat that

developed, but White had only one platoon from

Company A and the regiment’s I&R platoon under

his immediate control for that purpose. Each battalion did what it could to compensate. The 1st and

2d on the regiment’s flanks each held a company off

of the line, while each line company of the 3d

Battalion in the center held a platoon in reserve,

but those arrangements were stopgaps at best.

Although better than nothing, they left White with

little ability to effectively commit his reserves if a

major enemy attack occurred at one point or

another in his line. In addition to the problems

with unity and self-confidence that had begun to

develop in some of the regiment’s companies and

platoons over the previous few days, the situation

did not bode well for the future.43

108 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

39 Interv, IG with Pidgeon, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 26, Kean

Letter file. The numbers of weapons in a battalion are tallied in

Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment

(T/O&E) 7–15N, 16 Apr 48, CMH files.

40 See Robert J. Best, Analysis of Personnel Casualties in the

25th Infantry Division, 26–31 July 1950, Technical

Memorandum ORO–T–22 (FEC) (Chevy Chase, Md.:

Operations Research Office, 1952), p. 12, copy in CMH files;

Department of the Army (DA) Field Manual (FM) 7–40, The

Infantry Regiment, 11 Jan 50, pp. 234–37.

41 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, Overlay 5, Disposition of

24th RCT on 26 Jul 50, to Map, Korea, 1:50,000, series L751,

4th edition, AMS 1950, sheets 6723 II and 6823 III. There is

some confusion in the war diaries. They state that the 3d

Battalion relieved the 19th South Korean Regiment. The 19th,

however, was part of the South Korean Capital Division. The

3d Battalion in fact relieved the 17th South Korean Regiment,

a part of the 1st South Korean Division. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt,

Jul 50, pp. 18, 21, 25; Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjon

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s [U.S.], 1992), p. 27.

42 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 24 Jul 50, p. 24.

43 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 25, and Overlay 5; WD, 1st

Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 2; Eighth U.S. Army, Korea

(EUSAK), Combat Lesson 1, attachment to Periodic Intelligence

Rpt 7, 19–20 Jul 50, and Interrogation Rpt, North Korean

Methods of Operation, attachment to Periodic Intelligence Rpt
As the day progressed, North Korean combat

patrols began to probe the front and flanks of the

American position, and reports arrived that the

enemy was bringing up reinforcements. During the

afternoon, according to Sgt. Waymon Ransom, the

I&R platoon observed the approach and deployment of “a very large North Korean force” to the

front of the 3d Battalion. The platoon’s members

kept watch and repeatedly passed word of developments along to higher headquarters.44 American

artillery fire dispersed some enemy forces, on one

occasion reportedly aborting an attack by catching

250 North Korean troops in the open.45 The North

Koreans nevertheless also scored, inflicting casualties in Company I with an early morning mortar

attack. An enemy mine planted by infiltrators also

blew up a 3

⁄4-ton truck, wounding a warrant officer

and three enlisted men. The 24th faced the growing threat alone. At 0800 that morning, after conducting an early attack to disrupt the enemy

advance, the 17th South Korean Regiment departed for a new assignment. The weather on 25 July

was hot and humid.46

Combat, 26–31 July 1950

The enemy chose the 3d Battalion’s sector as

his target. In that area, Company K held the left.

Company I in the center had dug in on Hill 741,

which rose several hundred feet higher than the

surrounding terrain. Company L was to the right.

The North Koreans began their assault under cover

of darkness at 0004 on 26 July, when several mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of the 3d

Battalion’s command post. A number of rounds

were also directed at Company K but fell short.

Scattered small-arms and mortar fire followed,

killing at least one American. As day broke, at

0625, enemy attackers struck Company K’s right

flank in earnest. Within minutes, the entire battalion was engaged all along the line.47

Heavy fighting ensued, with the main enemy

attack, supported by heavy mortar and automatic

weapons fire, falling on Company I and the right

flank of Company K. Early morning fog and North

Korean smoke rounds obscured the men’s vision

and reduced the effectiveness of the American

defensive fire. Shortly before 0800, an enemy force

rushing out of the haze hit the platoon on the right

flank of Company I on Hill 741. After a brief struggle in which the unit’s leader, 2d Lt. William D.

Ware, was killed, the troops fell back. When survivors reached the base of the hill, Company I’s

executive officer, 1st Lt. Vernon Dailey, ordered the

reserve platoon under 2d Lt. Reginald J. Sapenter to

counterattack. Sapenter’s men moved forward until

stopped by intense fire about two hundred yards

from the crest. With the enemy maneuvering to cut

off his platoon, Sapenter ordered a withdrawal.

About the same time, the other platoon of Company

I on the west end of Hill 741 recognized that it was

in danger of being cut off and also fell back. At 1030

the remnants of the company began taking up

blocking positions at the base of the hill.48

With the collapse of Company I’s position on

Hill 741, Company K’s defenses to the left became

unhinged. The company commander, white 1st Lt.

Jasper Johnson, recalled that up to that time North

Korean attacks had “bounced off ” the unit. If

enemy fire was heavy, a platoon leader, 2d Lt.

Alfred F. Tittel, added, the attackers themselves

seemed to be “young kids.” When Company I

SANGJU 109

13, 24–25 Jul 50, both in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. See also Ltr,

Oliver Dillard to David Carlisle, 26 Oct 88, CMH files; Interv,

Bowers with Reginald J. Sapenter, 10 Mar 94.

44 Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22 Oct 88. See also WD, 24th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 24–25.

45 WD, 159th FA Bn, 7–31 Jul 50, p. 4. See also WD, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 24–25.

46 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 25; Paik, From Pusan to

Panmunjon, p. 27.

47 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 27–30; WD, 3d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 10–11; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50,

pp. 7–8; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 3; WD, 159th FA

Bn, Jul 50.

48 Intervs, Bowers with Sapenter, 10 Mar 94; Cash with

Charlie Lee Jones, 6 Sep 89; 25th Inf Div GO 82, 25 Aug 50,

awarding the Silver Star to Pfc. Jesse Hooks of Company I,

and G–1 Journal, 25th Inf Div, 26 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf

Div, Jul 50. There are some discrepancies on the details of

Lieutenant Ware’s death. See the interviews mentioned above

with Sapenter and Jones and citation in EUSAK GO 54, 6 Sep

50, which awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to

Lieutenant Ware.
moved back, however, the enemy moved swiftly to

fill the gap left in the line by its absence and soon

reached Company K’s rear. At 1105 the unit reported receiving enemy attacks in waves and heavy

mortar fire. When ammunition ran low, the troops

withdrew by sliding down a steep slope to the west

into a canyon-like valley. When the men reached

the company command post, Lieutenant Johnson

ordered them back up the hill, but only a few

responded. Advancing up the first ridge, they were

soon driven back by enemy fire.49

Since loss of the high ground in the center also

threatened Company L, the unit’s acting commander, black 1st Lt. Oliver W. Dillard, who had been

in place for only a day and had been with the company less than a month, notified Colonel Pierce that

he was launching a counterattack with his reserve

platoon. The effort failed. Not only was the enemy

firmly in possession of the hill, but also,

of the 20 men in my small attack group, only a handful,

eight or nine, actually aggressively fired their weapons

and moved with me when I gave the signal to open fire

and advance up the slope. . . . [Meanwhile] the light

machine gun I had placed to form my base of fire failed

after a few bursts of sustained fire, and with this failure

the machine gunner froze in fear and frustration.50

Dillard had no choice but to pull his troops

back to their starting point. There, he learned that

his right flank platoon was withdrawing under

heavy enemy pressure. “I could find only a handful

of men from this platoon,” he said, “who I put in

position near the crest of the mountain.” There, he

and his men held on, completely surrounded and

in need of ammunition resupply.

As the day lengthened, they made a good

account of themselves. With black 2d Lt. Edward

Greer from Battery B of the 159th Field Artillery

Battalion spotting for that unit’s 105-mm. howitzers and Dillard himself calling in fire from regimental and battalion mortars, Company L circled

its position with a heavy ring of artillery and mortar fire. Dillard noted that some of those barrages

had a “telling effect” on the North Koreans attempting to bypass the unit through the Company I position. Meanwhile, to the enemy’s rear, air strikes

sought out North Korean mortar and artillery positions and enemy vehicles attempting to move down

the Kallyong Pass.51

By late morning, with the failure of the local

company counterattacks, the 3d Battalion’s commander, Colonel Pierce, scraped together a force

from his headquarters personnel and Company M,

the heavy weapons company. At 1215 that group

attacked up the hill in an attempt to open a route

to Company L. After advancing for fifteen minutes

to a point just 300 yards from the beleaguered unit,

they came under heavy fire and stopped. A platoon

from Company A of the 1st Battalion arrived from

regimental reserve and entered the fray. Advancing

through Company I at the base of the hill, it also

came under enemy fire and bogged down.

By that time, General Wilson had taken

charge at the scene. Pulling Captain Hash’s

Company B out of the 1st Battalion’s position to

the west, he ordered the unit to restore Company

I’s position and to relieve the pressure on

Company L. The operations officer of the 3d

Battalion, Captain Zanin, met Hash at the base of

the hill to fill him in on what had happened. As

Hash recalled, the situation was confused. Zanin

told him that part of Company I, which had several men missing, was still on top of the hill and

that his unit was to advance only to the first ridge

and then to wait for instructions.52

The delay may have been meant to clarify

what was happening to Company I or to attempt

110 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

49 Intervs, Bowers with Jasper Johnson, 18 Apr 94; Alfred

F. Tittel, 15 Apr 94; MacGarrigle with Tittel, 23 May 94. See

also 25th Inf Div GO 62, 17 Aug 50, which awarded the Silver

Star to Sfc. Joseph Simmons who took over as a platoon leader

in Company K.

50 Ltr, Oliver Dillard to David Carlisle, 20 May 87, copy in

CMH files. Dillard retired from the Army as a major general.

51 Ibid. See also Intervs, Cash with Dillard, 26 Oct 88;

Edward Greer, 9 Nov 88; Bowers with Clifton F. Vincent, 19

and 20 Apr 94; Walter W. Redd, 24 Mar 94. Greer retired from

the Army as a major general. For the air strikes, see the interview with Vincent and WD, HQ Btry, 159th FA Bn, 26 Jul 50,

in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

52 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Hash, 18 and 22 Mar 94;

Charles E. Green, 16 Jun 94; Zanin, 27 Oct 93.
to arrange a coordinated attack by Company B

and Company G of the 2d Battalion to the east of

Company L’s position. Whatever the reason, the

attack of Company B got under way in the late

afternoon. As it advanced, it came across four or

five groups of 2 or 3 men from Company I withdrawing from the hill. Each indicated that

Company I had been wiped out. Just at dark,

Hash’s men reached the first ridge, with 3 killed

and 4 wounded in the process. As he was consolidating the position and preparing to continue the

attack, Hash received orders to pull back because

of darkness and to cover the withdrawal of the 3d

Battalion.53

Meanwhile, Company L continued to fight on.

Although in constant contact through artillery and

mortar radio channels, Dillard remained unaware

that counterattacks were attempting to break

through to his position or that higher headquarters

considered the situation grave. Liaison planes

dropped ammunition and medical supplies in the

afternoon. About 2000, enemy fire from Company

I’s former position on Hill 741 became intense and

several soldiers were wounded. As Dillard recalled,

it was at that point that

suddenly and surprisingly the voice of the company

executive officer could be heard calling to us. He had

crawled up the rear slope of our position to within calling distance. He indicated that we were surrounded. He

also stated that a company had been trying to get

through to us all afternoon without success and that we

had better “come out of there.” With this call all but a

few men of the company began to crawl out of their

holes and off the mountain dragging what they could

but leaving behind some weapons, ammunition, and

rations. I signaled the remaining few to go.

A short while later, after leading his men off the

hill, Dillard and three volunteers returned in the

dark with a stretcher to retrieve a seriously wounded soldier they had been forced to leave behind.

Carrying their comrade to the rear, they came within a few feet of enemy soldiers cooking their

evening meal.54

SANGJU 111

53 Ibid. See also Interv, IG with Maj Eugene Carson, 6 Sep

50, exhibit 21, Kean Letter file; 25th Inf Div GO 146, 14 Sep

50, awarding the Silver Star to 2d Lt. Lionel Dubuque of

Company B. The regimental war diary states that Companies A

and B attacked together. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 26 Jul 50. But

the 1st Battalion war diary and Hash state that only Company

B attacked. This indicates that the Company A attack mentioned in the regimental war diary was by the reserve platoon

and occurred earlier in the afternoon. Green, a Company B

platoon leader, states that some of the casualties were from

friendly fire. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Hash, 18 and 22

Mar 94; Green, 16 Jun 94; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50,

pp. 10–11.

54 Quote from Ltr, Dillard to Carlisle, 20 May 87. Intervs,

Bowers with Vincent, 19 and 20 Apr 94. For aerial resupply,

Members of Company M, 24th Infantry, prepare to move out of a riverbed in the Sangju area.
Several soldiers in the 3d Battalion later

received awards for gallantry in the action, but

questions remained about the unit and its performance that day.55 Large quantities of equipment

had been left behind: eighty-three M1 rifles, nineteen M1 carbines, twelve .30-caliber machine

guns, three .50-caliber machine guns, eight 60-

mm. mortars, three 81-mm. mortars, four 3.5-

inch rocket launchers, nine SCR–300 radios, and

sixteen EE8 telephones.56 Conversely, casualties

were relatively light. The total for the entire 24th

Infantry amounted to 45, but of that number only

27 came from the 748 officers and men on hand

in the 3d Battalion. Two lightly wounded and 2

missing in action came from Company L, and 2

seriously wounded and 2 missing came from

Company K. Company I incurred the most casualties: 4 lightly wounded, 2 seriously wounded,

and 13 missing in action.57

The scene at the bottom of the hill added to

doubts about the performance of the 3d Battalion.

Exhausted and confused soldiers, arriving in disorder after traversing very rugged terrain, created

an unfavorable impression on those without firsthand knowledge of what had happened at the top.

The acting commander of the 1st Battalion, Major

Carson, ventured an opinion in interviews that

the 3d Battalion was so well situated on its hill

that it should have held against all but overwhelmingly superior odds. The enemy could

hardly have been present in great numbers, he

added, because North Korean forces failed to follow through on their victory by cutting all too

vulnerable American supply lines that ran to the

rear of the battalion. Indeed, he said Company B

encountered only light resistance in its counterattack. General Wilson was of the same mind. He

told interviewers from the Eighth Army without

qualification that “the positions could have been

held as evidenced by the successful defense conducted by L Company. The enemy forces which

had penetrated the positions were not too strong

as evidenced by the successful counter-attack of

Company B.”58

Testimony of that sort to the contrary, there

were other explanations for what had happened.

Patrols had observed the buildup of a large North

Korean force the day before, and reports from all

three companies told of strong assaults or a large

volume of fire directed at their positions. Company

B’s counterattack, which both Carson and Wilson

cited as evidence of the enemy’s weakness, moved

only part way up the hill before encountering

enemy fire that inflicted several casualties. The

attack then ceased because of darkness, and the

company withdrew, hardly convincing evidence of

weak opposition.

General Wilson’s contention that Company L’s

successful defense also exemplified enemy weakness was similarly open to question. Initially the

focus of only a secondary effort by the enemy,

whose main attacks were directed against the companies to the west, the unit most probably survived

when the enemy finally turned on it with full force

only because artillery and mortar fire kept it from

being overrun.

112 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

see 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 37, 26 Jul 50, and 25th Inf

Div G–3 Activities Rpt for 26 Jul 50, both in WD, 25th Inf Div,

Jul 50.

55 In addition to the awards already noted, Lieutenant

Greer received a Silver Star as did 1st Lt. Walter W. Redd, a

Company L platoon leader; Lieutenant Dillard received a

Bronze Star. See 25th Inf Div GOs 51, dtd 11 Aug 50; 333, dtd

13 Nov 50; and 513, dtd 26 Dec 50.

56 The losses listed are for the 3d Battalion. See Interv, IG

with WOJG Clyde C. Duncan, Asst S–4, 24th Inf Rgt, 23 Aug

50, exhibit 13, Kean Letter file. See also Interv, IG with Maj

Theodore J. Cook, Exec Ofcr, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 23 Aug 50,

exhibit 10, Kean Letter file.

57 Regimental reports of the time do not agree on the

number of casualties. The totals cited are taken from the closest thing to a final tally that could be found. It is a roster of all

casualties, listing killed, missing, lightly and heavily wounded,

all by date and unit, for the entire war up until the end of

September 1951. See HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of

the 24th Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51]. The assigned

strength for 26 July 1950 is taken from G–1 Daily Summary

14, 25th Inf Div, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

58 Interv, IG with Maj Eugene Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit

B–2, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. Quote from

Interv, IG with Wilson, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 29, Kean Letter file.

For Wilson’s actions and locations during the battle, see

Statement of Lt Charles A. Munford, in Award file of Brig Gen

Vennard Wilson, box 154, RG 338, WNRC.
Even the assertion that the enemy failed to follow through at the end of the day is open to question. According to U.S. intelligence, the 15th North

Korean Division had already been weakened in earlier fighting with the South Koreans. In addition, food

was short within the unit and ammunition resupply

was intermittent at best. Those conditions, along

with the continual pounding of American air and

ground fire and counterattacks by the companies of

the 24th, may have made North Korean commanders cautious enough to decide that they would do

well to consolidate their gains before pressing on

into the valley where their men would become even

better targets for American air and artillery.

The relatively small number of American casualties is at least partially due to the fact that the 3d

Battalion had occupied the prepared positions of

the 17th South Korean Regiment and had spent a

day on its own improving them. Dillard, for example, remarked how his men had hugged their foxholes and observed that “miraculously our casualties were light although the small arms fire was

intense at times.”59

Yet another influence on the low casualty rate

was that many troops failed either to stay in position and fight when outflanked and attacked from

the rear or to counterattack and close with the

enemy when required. A platoon leader assigned to

Company K two weeks earlier, white Lieutenant

Tittel, described how his unit’s defense fell apart

when the North Koreans moved around his flank

and to his rear. Dillard, who had assumed command of Company L only the day before, likewise

confirmed that some of his own men drifted to the

rear or were otherwise unresponsive to orders.

Dillard, Tittel, and a platoon leader in Company I,

black Lieutenant Sapenter, all commented on how

their counterattacks either collapsed or degenerated into long-range exchanges of fire.

Dillard suggested that inexperience and the limited training of all the American troops involved in

Korea at that time were mainly to blame for what

happened, but unseasoned leadership also appears

to have contributed. In addition to Dillard in

Company L, for example, Companies I and K had

new commanders, and several of Company K’s officers were likewise recent arrivals. As Dillard later

noted, after officers demonstrated their worth to the

men and imposed solid discipline, the troops tended

to settle down. Soldiers whom he had personally

seen running during the early days of the war later

charged bravely into the face of almost certain

death.60

Although conditions were not the same, something similar happened to the 27th Infantry regiment when it first faced the enemy. In that case,

however, despite green troops and junior leaders,

the imagination and combat experience of the regimental commander, Colonel Michaelis, and his

battalion commanders made a major difference.

The incident occurred on 23 July. Ordered into

the line south of the 24th Infantry near the town of

Hwanggan to keep the 2d North Korean Division

from advancing along the road from Poun to

Kumch’on, Michaelis deployed his two battalions

in depth on a very narrow front. To his mind, the

strong front would allow units in the lead to hold

position while those to the rear dealt with

inevitable enemy flanking movements. He made

plans for the liberal use of artillery, mortars, and air

attacks, and he let the commanders of his forward

units know that they were not expected to fight to

the finish but only until the pressure became too

great. At that point, they were to fall back to the

positions of the units to the rear.61

The initial brush with the enemy occurred on

the night of 23–24 July, when a reinforced platoon

went forward to locate the enemy. After a brief

exchange of fire, the unit returned with fourteen

men missing, nine of whom found their way back

to American lines the next day. After that beginning, the 1st Battalion of the 27th waited for the

enemy to attack. At 0400 on 24 July heavy North

Korean artillery and mortar fire began falling on the

SANGJU 113

59 Ltr, Dillard to Carlisle, 20 May 87. The positions taken

over from the South Koreans are described in Interv, Cash with

Dillard, 26 Oct 88.

60 Interv, Cash with Dillard, 26 Oct 88.

61 Historical Rpt, 27th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 2. See also an

interview with Colonel Michaelis in Harold H. Martin, “The

Colonel Saved the Day,” Saturday Evening Post, 9 Sep 50, p. 187.
unit. Two hours later, enemy ground forces

attacked, approaching through the fog just as they

had in the case of the 24th. Supported by heavy

artillery, mortar fire, and air strikes, the battalion as

a whole held even though parts of it were at times

overrun. At one point, it repelled a North Korean

tank assault. By noon, hundreds of North Korean

dead littered the ground. Finally, after dark, the

battalion withdrew a short distance to regroup. The

enemy repeated the same sequence time and again

over the next several days, always to much the

same effect.62

In this case, Michaelis and his regiment had not

stopped the enemy, but they had delayed and punished him with heavy casualties while remaining

intact themselves to fight other battles. All the while

they were learning and gaining confidence. As

Michaelis noted, “The point [was] . . . that the kids

won the first couple of battles and won them big.

From that time on, they were intolerable. You couldn’t stand them, they were so cocky. . . . I don’t think

we were the most popular organization around.”63

If the 27th Infantry’s successful delaying action

and the competence of its commanders showed

forth for all to see, the plodding of the 24th, despite

the examples of heroism and the fortitude shown in

the fighting on the twenty-sixth, seemed equally

clear. To many high-ranking officers in the regiment

and at division, the reasons for the failure of the 3d

Battalion to hold position and the loss of so many

weapons were likewise obvious. Whatever the

extenuating circumstances, many commanders

believed that race was at the root of what had happened. “I think that when [the men of the 24th] . . .

become scared they react with an animal instinct,

which is to run,” Major Carson thus told Eighth

Army investigators, echoing comments to the same

effect by Wilson and others. “I am not saying that

all the men are like that. Five or ten percent are not,

but I am saying that there is about 85 or 90 percent

that do react this way. . . . These people are different in instincts.”64

As the 24th Infantry withdrew to the east on

the night of 26–27 July, General Kean took steps to

help Colonel White. That very night a platoon of

military policemen was assigned to the 24th to

assist in the control of stragglers. To provide a

backstop, elements of the 35th Infantry rushed

from the Hamch’ang area to a blocking position six

miles west of Sangju, arriving at 2230. Farther

south, Company A of the 79th Heavy Tank

Battalion, which had been fighting with the 27th

Infantry, was likewise ordered to move as quickly

as possible to Sangju. Arriving at 0220 on 27 July,

it came under control of Fisher’s 35th Infantry. That

day, the 25th Reconnaissance Company began to

patrol to the south of the 24th while a company

from the 35th Infantry reinforced by a platoon of

tanks moved to the northeast.65

While those forces were moving into place, in

an attempt to form the regiment in a stronger, more

compact configuration, Colonel White pulled the

3d Battalion 1.5 miles to the rear to a position just

to the south of the 2d Battalion near where the

Kallyong road joined the road to Poun. To cover the

open right flank of the regiment, but apparently

without making any prior ground reconnaissance,

commanders had already moved the 2d Battalion’s

Company F, commanded by Capt. Roger Walden,

well to the north and east of the rest of the battalion to a position beyond the supporting range of

114 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

62 Historical Rpt, 27th Inf Rgt, Jul 50; 1st Bn, 27th Inf Rgt,

Opns Rpt, Jul 50; 2d Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, Summary of Activities,

Jul 50. See also Ltr, Gilbert Check to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens,

25 Nov 57, CMH files; Interv, MacGarrigle and Bowers with

Uzal W. Ent, 20 Oct 93. The account contained in Brig Gen G.

B. Barth’s Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., pp.

8–10, in CMH files, provides details not found in most other

printed accounts.

63 Interv, Clay Blair with General John H. Michaelis, n.d.,

U.S. Army Military History Institute Senior Officer Oral

History Program, Combat Leadership in Korea series, p. 20,

MHI.

64 Quotes from Interv, IG with Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–2, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. The comments of twenty-four officers and NCOs concerning the

“Negro characteristics” of the 24th’s soldiers are summarized in

exhibit D–27, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

65 WD, 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, 26 Jul 50, in WD, 35th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50; WD, Co A, 79th Hvy Tank Bn, Jul 50, p. 3. See also

25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 37, 26 Jul 50; 25th Inf Div G–3

Activities Rpt for 27 Jul 50; and G–1 Journal, 25th Inf Div, 26

Jul 50, entry 740 (2400), all in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.
the unit’s sister elements. Walden’s men were to

break down into squads, spread over a large area,

and patrol to the east to make contact with the 35th

Infantry. The 1st Battalion meanwhile occupied

positions at Iso-ri, 2.5 miles southwest of the 3d

Battalion and 12 miles west of Sangju. Its mission

was to block a spur of the Poun road that circled

southward and then turned east toward Sangju.66

At 0630 on 27 July, the enemy attacked and

drove back Company F’s outpost line. Portions of

the company, mainly members of the platoon stationed farthest to the left and nearest the Kallyong

road, drifted to the rear. But the unit’s attached 81-

mm. mortar section reportedly did good work,

inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. Receiving

word of the engagement, the artillery fired on the

enemy but was ineffective. Outflanked and in danger

of being cut off, Walden followed instructions

received the previous night, broke contact with the

enemy, and withdrew the remainder of his company

with its section of mortarmen to the east, away from

his own regiment and toward the shelter offered by

the 35th Infantry. In so doing, he abandoned his

mortar tubes and lost communication with his superiors. Upon learning of his action, the division headquarters directed that Walden’s men remain with the

company of the 35th Infantry already working the

area to form a task force to cover the open flank.

Word of the decision, however, failed to trickle down

to the 2d Battalion. Uncertain of Company F’s location, Cohoon used the stragglers from Walden’s unit

to secure his battalion command post while he continued attempts to locate the rest of the company.67

During the morning, in a confused sequence of

events that occurred while Company F was coming

under fire, the 2d Battalion’s Companies E and G

withdrew toward Sangju. Later that day, they were

nevertheless instructed to return to their former

position, apparently because an attached heavy

mortar platoon had never received word of their

withdrawal and had suffered heavy casualties as a

result. During the operation that followed, Cohoon

was injured in a fall and had to be replaced by his

executive officer, Major Donaho. In the end, the

two companies never reached their objective,

which had already fallen into enemy hands and was

firmly defended. Donaho withdrew his force, moving his companies back toward Sangju.68

As the day progressed and overnight, straggling

within the 2d Battalion reached epidemic proportions. At least one hundred and fifty men deserted

their positions, according to the unit’s black adjutant, 1st Lt. Gorham L. Black, Jr., more than ever

before or after on a single occasion. The situation

became so bad that the 24th Infantry set up a straggler control point on the main road, 1.5 miles west

of Sangju. The next day the military police platoon

arrived to assist. According to the regiment’s white

personnel officer, Maj. John R. Wooldridge, they

apprehended an average of 75 men per day. The 2d

Battalion’s supply officer noted that on 27 July

alone, “I returned one group of 27 men (stragglers)

from the kitchen to the front. I then picked up 15

stragglers at the regimental CP and returned them

to the front. I then returned 12 more from the

kitchen.” On the same day, he added, “the battalion

was placed in a precarious position because the

battalion ammunition trucks drove off when a shell

hit near them. One truck was gone for 18 hours.”69

Major Carson’s 1st Battalion also began to experience difficulties. When Company A and portions

of Company D near Iso-ri attempted to move to

SANGJU 115

66 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 30–31, and Overlay 6,

Regimental Situation 270400 July 50; WDs, 1st, 2d, and 3d

Bns, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50.

67 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 8–9. The regimental war diary gives a different, less candid version of events

that fails to mention any straggling. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt,

Jul 50, pp. 33–34. For the arrival of Company F in the 35th

Infantry, see S–2/S–3 Journal, 35th Inf Rgt, 27 Jul 50, entries

for 1207 and 1233. See also Intervs, Bowers with Gray, 2, 3,

and 11 May 94; Oscar L. Pusey, 29 Apr 94. For the formation

of the task force, see G–3 Activities Rpt for 27 Jul 50.

68 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 8–9; WD, 24th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50, p. 31. The regimental war diary says that the 2d

Battalion was ordered to retake Company F’s old position.

69 Interv, IG with 1st Lt Gorham L. Black, Jr., 21 Aug 50,

exhibit 7, Kean Letter file; Interv, IG with Wooldridge, 23 Aug

50, exhibit 1, Kean Letter file. Quote from Interv, IG with

Pidgeon, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 26, Kean Letter file. See also

Provost Marshal Activities Rpt for 28 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf

Div, Jul 50.
higher ground, the enemy mounted an attack in

response. Carson broke it up with mortar fire, but

a large number of the men fled. Pfc. Robert J.

Jones from Company D was helping his section

dig a 75-mm. recoilless rifle into Company A’s

defensive line when the North Koreans struck.

“They came through,” he said, “and the whole

countryside was covered with them.” According

to Jones, the rifle company left its position without orders, taking the vehicles of Company D to

move to the rear. Jones’ section fired at its own

vehicle to get it to stop so that it could haul the

recoilless rifle out of the area.70

Carson was furious when he heard what had

happened: “I went back on this position that had

previously been occupied by ‘A’ Company, with 3 soldiers, and recovered two 81-mm. mortars, one [SCR]

300 radio, an undetermined amount of ammunition,

several packs, a 50 caliber machine gun, with mount,

a 3.5 rocket launcher, and other items that had been

left on position by this company.”71

During the afternoon of 27 July Lt. Col. Gerald

G. Miller assumed command of the battalion. Fortyfour years old, Miller had served as an enlisted man

for eleven years before entering Officer Candidate

School in 1941. An infantry troop commander for

six months after graduating, he had served in various

transportation and port units until 1943, when he

had transferred to the 25th Division in the Pacific.

He had functioned as a headquarters commandant

for the rest of World War II and then had commanded training battalions at Forts Bragg,

McClellan, and Dix in the United States. He soon

showed himself personally brave and was often with

his troops in forward positions, but his experience in

combat with infantry was nil. Several veterans noted

in interviews years later that at times he seemed

uncertain about what to do.72

Miller faced his first test shortly after he

arrived. At dusk on the evening of 27 July, the

motor park for his battalion came under heavy

mortar fire. The drivers stampeded toward Sangju

in their vehicles, leaving him and the rest of the

unit with no transportation. Officers at regiment

stopped the vehicles and sent them back. After that

disappointing beginning Miller went on with his

work, spending much of the rest of the night resupplying his units and preparing to defend the road

against what seemed a mounting enemy threat.73

About noon the next day, 28 July, in a hastily

conceived and poorly coordinated operation, the

battalion was ordered to move back up the road to

the west to reoccupy the high ground it had relinquished the previous afternoon and to recover abandoned equipment. Companies A and C took the

lead, proceeding abreast and astride the road.

Company B was in reserve to the rear. Advancing

rapidly for 800 yards, they ran into automatic

weapons fire and stopped short near the village of

Sokchon, located just east of Iso-ri. Miller called for

tanks, but they were unable to move forward

because American engineers had earlier mined the

road. Soldiers attempted to clear a path through the

mines, but after a short lag up to three companies of

enemy troops using artillery, mortars, and small

arms counterattacked. They inflicted nearly 60 casualties within an hour, 30 of them in Company D.

One of those killed was black 2d Lt. William M.

Benefield, Jr., a platoon leader in the 77th Engineer

Combat Company. Apparently concerned that

enemy fire was too intense and that many of his men

would be killed in the effort to clear the mines, he

assumed the task himself but was cut down within

200 yards of enemy positions before he could complete it. He received a posthumous Distinguished

Service Cross for his sacrifice.74

116 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

70 Interv, IG with Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–2, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. See also Interv, Cash

with Robert J. Jones, 25 Aug 89.

71 Interv, IG with Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–2, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. Carson said he returned

to the position the next morning, but the records indicate it

was in the afternoon.

72 DA Form 66, Personnel Record for Col Gerald G.

Miller, CMH files; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Stuart Force, 8

Aug 94; Gillert, 4 May 94; Hash, 18 and 22 Mar 94; Joseph

Baranowski, 24 Aug 94.

73 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 4. See also Interv,

MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

74 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 4; WD, 24th Inf

Rgt, Jul 50, p. 34. The casualties are tallied in Best, Analysis of

Personnel Casualties in the 25th Infantry Division, 26–31 July
Despite the attack and heavy casualties, the

battalion held. When a platoon led by white 1st Lt.

Leonard H. Kushner was surrounded and Kushner

himself was severely wounded, a number of men

moved to rescue them. It took four hours, but they

prevailed. The popular lieutenant, who had successfully defended a number of soldiers in courtmartial proceedings at Gifu, left the battlefield

strapped to the back of a tank.75

Circumstances began to deteriorate toward

evening, when Miller attempted to withdraw his

unit into a defensive position for the night. With

Company B and the 25th Reconnaissance

Company covering, the movement began well but

soon disintegrated into a wholesale retreat toward

Sangju. Panic does not appear to have been a consideration, at least at first. Once begun, the move to

the rear continued and gained momentum because

Miller, when given permission to withdraw, had not

been told where to halt. Assuming that the battalion was participating in a general pullback, the

retreating column rolled past a battery from the

159th Field Artillery Battalion in a firing position.

There it encountered Colonel White. Thoroughly

astounded to see that the artillery would soon be in

the front lines, White and a few of his staff members went out onto the road to stop the retreating

men. By that time, however, the head of the column had reached the Kallyong-Sangju road.76

With many casualties among platoon leaders

and noncommissioned officers from the fighting

earlier in the day, restoring order required some

effort. According to Capt. Alfred Thompson, a liaison officer from the 159th, it was 0200 the next

morning before the 1st Battalion pulled into position, and there were so many stragglers that only

part of the unit could be reassembled. A witness to

the whole affair, the 1st Battalion’s intelligence officer, Capt. Gustav Gillert, said that White was furious and that he complained that the 1st Battalion

had gone to the rear without orders, leaving the

artillery and the regimental command post undefended. Miller stood his ground, informing White

that his last orders had been to move to the rear.

White’s only recorded rejoinder came much later in

an interview with a division investigator.

Describing the episode, he noted sourly that “I had

no help from the battalion officer [Miller].”77

The confusion and uncertainty at higher levels

in the regiment and Colonel White’s seeming

inability to control the deteriorating situation were

by then becoming apparent. The new operations

officer, who joined the regiment on 22 July, Major

Carter, found his commander “to be an extremely

nervous, shaky officer, who seemed to be at a loss

as to what to do. Most of the time he remained at

the CP [command post].”78

Aware of the problem, General Kean seems to

have insisted that all operational orders for the regiment go first to Carter before they went to White.

The move, however, was at best partially successful

because Kean’s assistant division commander,

General Wilson, appears to have been as dissatisfied as Kean, not only with White but also with the

operation of the whole regiment. Interposing himself between the regimental headquarters and units

in the field whenever he felt the need, he issued

orders directly to battalion commanders and their

SANGJU 117

1950. Benefield’s actions are described in EUSAK GO 54, 6 Sep

50. See also Statement of Lt Charles A. Munford, in Award file

for Brig Gen Vennard Wilson; Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Gillert, 4 May 94; Rishell, 10 Aug 93.

75 Intervs, Cash with Leonard H. Kushner, 16 Jun 89;

Albert Griffin, Jr., 5 Oct 88; Bowers with Lawrence M.

Corcoran, 1 Mar 94.

76 Intervs, IG with White, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 28, Kean

Letter file, and 27 Sep 50, exhibit B–21, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation. See also Intervs, IG with Capt

Alfred F. Thompson, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 11, Kean Letter file;

MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94; John S. Komp, 5 May and

1 Jun 94; Rishell, 10 Aug 93; Green, 16 Jun 94; Hash, 18 and

22 Mar 94; Force, 8 Aug 94; Gustav H. Franke, 14 Jul 94; Ltr,

Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 May 94, CMH files. The incident is

mentioned in neither regimental nor battalion war diaries.

77 Intervs, IG with Capt Alfred F. Thompson, 24 Aug 50,

exhibit 11, Kean letter file; MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

Quote from Interv, IG with White, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 28, Kean

Letter file. Interv, IG with White, 27 Sep 50, exhibit B–21,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

78 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Owen H. Carter, 21 and 24

Jun 94; Sam J. Adams, Jr., 15 and 17 Jun 94. Adams had been

the operations officer until replaced by Carter. Adams then

became the regimental communications officer.
staff officers without informing the regimental

headquarters. As a result, the regimental staff sometimes had only the faintest idea of what was going

on in the field.79

Several others noticed that something was

badly wrong. First Lt. Sandro A. Barone, reporting to the regimental command post with some

other officer replacements in late July, remarked

that, “Covered bodies lined a walkway to a

schoolhouse where the headquarters was. Colonel

White looked extremely old, haggard, and had little to tell the new men. Mortar and automatic

weapons fire could be heard in the vicinity.”

Major Carter was also concerned. Toward the end

of the month, he observed, “When White would

light his cigarette, the match in his hand was

embarrassingly shaking. He was on the verge of a

nervous breakdown.”80

In the days that followed the incident with

Miller’s 1st Battalion, the enemy continued to press

the 24th Infantry. By the morning of 29 July, the

regiment was located eight miles to the west of

Sangju, where it held a front over ten thousand

yards wide. Donaho’s 2d Battalion, minus

Company F, which was operating to the northeast

with a company of the 35th Infantry, held the Kallyong-Sangju road and faced north. To the south

came Pierce’s 3d Battalion. With its right flank

anchored on the road, the unit extended far to the

southwest, where it tied in with Miller’s 1st

Battalion. That unit was facing west in order to

cover the Iso-ri road. Two battalions of 105-mm.

artillery and a battery of 155-mm. artillery provided support along with a platoon of tanks. Despite

the increased artillery, Colonel White’s position was

still too extensive for the force he had at hand, and,

more important, a one-mile gap separated the

understrength 2d Battalion from the 3d.81

That day observers with Company C discovered a large enemy force to their north massing for

an attack against the 3d Battalion’s left flank.

Raking the North Koreans with mortar and automatic weapons fire, they broke up the attack and

caused many casualties.82 In the afternoon, the regiment received orders from the 25th Infantry

Division to withdraw during the night to a defensive line four miles to the rear.83 At dusk, however,

before the movement could begin, the enemy

attacked and quickly penetrated between the 2d

and 3d Battalions. The main attack fell on the 2d

Battalion’s Company G astride the Kallyong road.

After several hours of fighting, the company commander, Capt. Herman W. Roesch, repelled the

assault by calling in artillery fire close to his own

position. At other locations on the battlefield, tanks

drove back an enemy force that was threatening the

2d Battalion’s command post. The 1st and 3d

Battalions also came under attack but were able to

hold their ground.84

After midnight on the morning of 30 July, elements of the regiment began withdrawing to a new

position to the east, but around dawn heavy attacks

struck the 2d and 3d Battalions, both of which had

yet to begin the move. In the 2d Battalion’s zone,

118 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

79 Ibid. For other views of White’s and Wilson’s dealings

with battalions, see Intervs, MacGarrigle with Zanin, 27 Oct

93; Gillert, 4 May 94; Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94.

80 Interv, MacGarrigle with Sandro A. Barone, 14 Apr 94.

Quote from Intervs, MacGarrigle with Carter, 21 and 24 Jun

94.

81 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, Overlays 7, Situation 24th

Infantry 280700 July 50, and 8, Situation of 24th RCT as of

291800 July 50; WD, 159th FA Bn, Jul 50, sketch 6. The 64th

(2 batteries) and 159th (3 batteries) Field Artillery Battalions

were present along with Battery C, 90th Field Artillery

Battalion. The tank platoon was from Company A, 79th Heavy

Tank Battalion. The defensive doctrine of the day called for

frontages of 2,400 yards for broken terrain and 4,800 in flat,

open terrain. The defense of a front of up to 10,000 yards was

to be undertaken only if key terrain features were organized in

strength and the remainder of the main line of resistance was

lightly held. See Army FM 7–40, The Infantry Regiment, 11 Jan

50, pp. 234–37.

82 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 36–37; WD, 1st Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 5.

83 25th Inf Div G–3 Activities Rpt for 29 Jul 50, dtd 30 Jul

50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. The order had originated from

Eighth Army.

84 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 35–36; WD, 1st Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 5; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 9–10;

WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 12–13. See also Intervs,

IG with Horace E. Donaho, 22 Aug 50, exhibit 19, Kean Letter

file; Bowers with Doiron, 22 Apr 94; Genous S. Hodges, 13

Apr 94.
Company G managed to destroy a North Korean

tank on the road but was eventually overrun along

with part of the battalion command post. As enemy

pressure increased, Company E tried to cover G’s

withdrawal, but the plan immediately went awry.

As the men from Company G rose to execute the

move, so did those from E.85 The two units withdrew together in disorder, so precipitously that a

75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon was left in position.

The platoon held off two enemy tanks before at last

retreating.86

In the 3d Battalion’s area, enemy attacks began

before 0500. By 0930 Company K was holding but

Company I’s position was beginning to give way.

Shortly before 1100, Company L entered the fighting from reserve. Thirty minutes later, the battalion’s headquarters company itself came forward in

an attempt to stop the enemy. Pierce’s command

post came under artillery fire at 1210. On the left

flank of the regiment, Company A of the 1st

Battalion also experienced heavy fighting, and the

1st Battalion’s command post had to displace

because of enemy mortar fire. With casualties and

large numbers of stragglers streaming to the rear

and the regiment’s defensive line collapsing,

Colonel White ordered the units to break contact

with the enemy as best they could and to fall back

to the rear.87

Straggling undoubtedly contributed to the final

collapse, despite the attempts of many capable and

heroic officers and soldiers to stand and fight.88

The straggler control point operated by the military

police west of Sangju had continued to apprehend

about seventy-five soldiers a day during the fighting. Other points operated by the regiment and

battalions in forward areas also collected a large

number. At that time as at others, shirkers congregated in mess areas and around artillery positions.

Battalion aid stations were a favored destination,

with observers remarking that five or six soldiers

would sometimes accompany one of the walking

wounded to the rear.89

Most of the men were compliant when confronted by straggler control parties, but after they

returned to their units they would often straggle

again, as soon as an enemy assault occurred. In

some cases, the mere word that an attack was

imminent was enough to set them off. Most carried

their weapons to the rear, but up to 25 percent, by

some estimates, left them behind. The names of

stragglers were rarely recorded at that time and few

if any were punished. White Capt. Johnny L.

Bearden, who served at a straggler control point

about two miles from the front lines, said that there

were so many it was impossible to keep track of

them. The regimental adjutant, white Maj. John R.

Wooldridge, who coordinated all of the straggler

pick-up points, was more emphatic. “The regiment

was . . . sorely pressed by the enemy and every man

was needed at the front.”90

Although a number of the stragglers were obviously malingerers and shirkers who deliberately

sought to avoid combat, individuals of that sort

were a problem in any military unit, white or black.

SANGJU 119

85 Interv, IG with Robinson, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

86 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 10–11.

87 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 38–40; WD, 2d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Jul 50, pp. 10–11; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p.

13. See also 25th Inf Div Opns Directive, 30 Jul 50, with

Overlay dtd 301250 Jul 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

88 For acts of individual heroism, see awards for the

Bronze Star in 25th Inf Div GOs 330, 13 Nov 50; 420, 25 Nov

50; 430, 26 Nov 50; 473, 11 Dec 50; and 475, 12 Dec 50; and

awards of the Silver Star in 25th Inf Div GOs 84, 27 Aug 50;

175, 22 Sep 50; 178, 23 Sep 50; and 359, 19 Nov 50.

89 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 40. See also Intervs, IG

with Johnny L. Bearden, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 5, Kean Letter file;

Wooldridge, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 1, Kean Letter file; Donaho, 22

Aug 50, exhibit 19, Kean Letter file; Ernest M. Brolley

[Bralley], Jr., 24 Aug 50, exhibit 6, Kean Letter file; Pidgeon,

25 Aug 50, exhibit 26, Kean Letter file; Gorham Black, 21 Aug

50, exhibit 7, Kean Letter file; Bowers with Marshall R. Hurley,

13 Apr 94.

90 Intervs, IG with Wooldridge, 13 Feb 51, exhibit B–132,

Far East Command Inspector General Investigation; Bearden,

21 Aug 50, exhibit 5, Kean Letter file. The official count of

stragglers for July 1950 was 29 for the 24th Infantry, 7 for the

27th Infantry, and 2 for the 35th Infantry. See Certificate,

Office of the Provost Marshal, 25th Inf Div, 13 Feb 51, exhibit K, Far East Command Inspector General Investigation. For

an example of numbers apprehended but not officially

charged, see Provost Marshal Activities Rpt for 28 Jul 50, in

WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50.
Many more, however, clearly were soldiers who

had been caught up in confusion and disorganization at the front, where unseasoned and often ineffectual officers and noncommissioned officers were

unable or unwilling to assert their authority. In that

sense, the failure to take action to stop the straggling was bound up with the straggling itself. If

weak leadership in the companies had allowed the

problem, weak leadership at regiment and the battalions had permitted it to continue.91

If failures of leadership, complicated by a

mounting casualty toll among officers and

sergeants and their inexperienced replacements,

undoubtedly contributed to what was happening,

circumstances peculiar to the 24th were nonetheless also involved. A white platoon leader in

Company G, 1st Lt. Genous S. Hodges, remarked,

“There was a lot of withdrawing. Often [soldiers]

. . . would be pushed off of a position with mortar and sniper fire. This should not have been

enough to force them off of a position.”92

A white platoon leader in Company K, 2d Lt.

Roscoe E. Dann, explained what was happening.

“When the 24th Infantry deployed to Korea . . .

some of its junior officers had a poor attitude; these

officers had not wanted to be in the unit from the

start. They had little faith in their men, who in turn

probably had little in them.” The condition led to

straggling on both sides. “When the situation

became tense,” he said, “and direction from higher

headquarters was unclear, some platoon leaders as

well as their men had a tendency to leave their

position without orders.”93

The problem of manning a defensive position

or of conducting an orderly withdrawal was compounded by the fatigue of the soldiers, who were

deprived of adequate sleep for days at a time and

were often physically exhausted. It was thus hardly

unusual for units of all races hurriedly withdrawing

through rugged terrain to lose individuals or small

groups who would drop back because they could

not keep the pace. Later, the survivors would

appear in rear areas with perfectly honest stories of

being separated from their units. That shirkers

would use the same excuse was of course to be

expected.94

Whatever its cause, straggling increased the

difficulty of holding a line. Attuned to constant and

unexpected withdrawals, a soldier who saw his

buddies leaving was hardly disposed to remain

behind to question whether they were falling back

on orders. “The unit would set up in position and

fire at the enemy until they got return fire,” Pvt.

William Cobb of Company C remarked. “The unit

would then ‘bugout’—or pull back to the next designated position. . . . If you didn’t leave when you

got the word to ‘bugout,’ you would get left

behind.”95

The excessive straggling and failure to hold

positions, despite the best efforts of many, endangered the entire regiment as it fell back in disorder

on the afternoon of 30 July. Only the presence of a

battalion of the 35th Infantry in blocking positions

on ridges four miles to the east appears to have

saved the day. Miller assembled what he could of

his 1st Battalion to the north of that unit while

Pierce’s 3d Battalion took station to the south. The

2d Battalion moved to the rear.96

In the chaos, rumors arose among angry white

officers that a wounded lieutenant had been abandoned and allowed to die when his stretcher bearers, alarmed by nearby mortar fire, dropped his lit120 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

91 Only three offenders were charged for straggling during

the fighting at Sangju in July. All involved incidents that

occurred in Company E on 29 July. See exhibits C, D–1, D–2,

Far East Command Inspector General Investigation.

92 Interv, Bowers with Hodges, 13 Apr 94.

93 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 24 Mar

94; Bowers with Doiron, 22 Apr 94.

94 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 39. For excuses given by

stragglers, see Intervs, IG with Bearden, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 5,

Kean Letter file; Gorham Black, 21 Aug 50, exhibit 7, Kean

Letter file; Charles Heard, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 9, Kean Letter file.

95 Interv, Timothy Rainey with William Cobb, 4 Dec 89.

See also Intervs, Bowers with Tittel, 15 Apr 94; MacGarrigle

with Tittel, 20 Apr 94.

96 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 40; WD, 35th Inf Rgt, Jul

50, p. 7; WD, 1st Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, 11–31 Jul 50. Fisher’s 2d

Battalion, which had been west of Sangju, moved south and

was replaced by the 1st Battalion, which had been fighting

with Michaelis’ 27th Infantry. See 25th Inf Div Opns Directive,

30 Jul 50, with Overlay dtd 301250 Jul 50. See also Interv,

MacGarrigle with Sidney B. Berry, 11 Aug 93.
ter and fled. Whether anything of that sort actually

occurred is difficult to say. What is known is that

on the next day the acting commander of the 1st

Battalion’s Company A, black 1st Lt. Leon A.

Gilbert, refused a direct order from the acting commander of the 2d Battalion, Major Donaho, to

return to the front with a group of his men.

According to the regimental commander’s driver,

black enlisted man Sylvester Davis, who was present, the regiment’s executive officer, Colonel

Roberts, pleaded with Gilbert to go back with his

men: “Don’t you know what they’ll do to you?”

Gilbert responded, “No, I’ll get killed.” After a later

interview with Colonel White, who also gave

Gilbert every opportunity to change his mind, the

officer was arrested and charged with desertion in

the face of the enemy, a capital crime. At the end of

the session, according to white 1st Lt. John Komp,

who witnessed what happened, Colonel White

swore in anger and threw his helmet across the

room. The only black officer serving at the Eighth

Army’s headquarters at the time, Maj. John

“Tommy” Martin, a public affairs officer, related

years later that the Gilbert case became “a major

black eye” for the 24th Infantry.97

Over the night of 31 July–1 August, on orders

from the Eighth Army, which had decided to begin

pulling American forces behind the protection of

the Naktong River, the entire regiment retreated to

the east of Sangju. With the town indefensible and

word circulating that enemy forces were attempting

to cut roads to the rear, it seemed a moment of

great danger. “Sangju was reached before midnight,” the author of the 1st Battalion’s war diary

remarked, “then our trail was turned south through

a valley several miles east of the enemy. . . . The foot

troops had no crew served weapons within reach.

A calculated risk was made to send all these heavy

weapons on carriers over another route, thus relieving the load on the foot troops. . . . The rate of

march was slowed to approximately one mile per

hour by the exceedingly large number of refugees

who clogged the roads for miles on end.”98

Despite the rumors, the enemy failed to press

the retreating units, and the regiment took up a

new defensive line between Sangju and the

Naktong River without incident. On the night of 1

August, covered by the 25th Division’s reconnaissance company, the 77th Engineer Combat

Company, commanded by 1st Lt. Charles Bussey,

destroyed Sangju’s factories, warehouses, and electrical and communications systems and damaged

key installations in the railroad yard. With that, the

24th’s activities in the area came to an end. On 2

August the regiment received orders to move south

along with the rest of the 25th Division to deal with

a new threat developing west of Pusan.99

Since its arrival in Korea, the 24th Infantry had

suffered about a 15 percent loss: 34 killed in action,

275 wounded, and 99 missing along with another

53 nonbattle casualties.100 The corps of officers had

97 The command to Gilbert is mentioned in Interv, IG with

Donaho, 22 Aug 50, exhibit 19, Kean Letter file. The wounded

officer is mentioned both by Donaho and by Capt. James O.

Gardner. See Interv, IG with Gardner, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 24,

Kean Letter file. The Gilbert affair is also dealt with in Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94; Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94;

Cash with Sylvester Davis, 19 Sep 89; John “Tommy” Martin,

12 Jan 90; Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 May 94.

98 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul 50, p. 5. See also Memo,

Provost Marshal, 25th Inf Div, for Chief of Staff, 31 Jul 50, in

WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. It was estimated on 31 July 1950 that

85,000 refugees had passed through Sangju and that 55,000

remained in the area.

99 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, pp. 1–3, and Overlay 1, box

3750, RG 407, WNRC. For the destruction at Sangju, see, in

addition to the war diary, Silver Star Recommendation, 1st Lt

Charles M. Bussey, signed by Maj Milledge Beckwith, 31 Aug

50, in CMH files.

100 G–1 Daily Summary, 25th Inf Div, 14 and 31 Jul 50, in

WD, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50. The percentage of losses for the 24th

Infantry was derived by comparing the 14 July strength of

3,157 with total battle and nonbattle casualties of 461. These

are not the final numbers since many of those considered missing in action (MIA) were eventually accounted for. In October,

when the 24th Infantry’s war diary for July was compiled, there

were only 3 MIA for the month. The 27th Infantry had about

an 18 percent loss (435 battle and nonbattle casualties out of a

strength of 2,370 on 14 July). The major difference between

the 24th and 27th was in officer casualties. In the 27th

Infantry, the six line companies only lost 5 officers. The 35th

Infantry suffered 6 percent casualties for July (122 casualties

out of 1,979 assigned on 14 July). See Best, Analysis of

Personnel Casualties in the 25th Infantry Division, 26–31 July

1950; Officer Rosters, 24th Inf Rgt, 27th Inf Rgt, 29th Inf Rgt,

SANGJU 121
been especially hard hit. Twenty-eight percent, 7

out of 25, had been killed or evacuated as nonbattle casualties or for wounds in the 1st Battalion;

58.3 percent, 14 out of 24, in the 2d; and 43.5 percent, 10 out of 23, in the 3d. Companies E, F, and

L had each lost 4 of 7 officers, and Company K had

lost 3 of 5. In addition, of 4 lieutenants who had

joined the regiment as replacements, 2 had been

killed in action and 1 wounded by the end of the

month.101 Although no comparable statistics exist

for sergeants, the toll among them was also heavy.

By 2 August Company C had lost 11 leaders of the

rank of corporal or above in combat, D had lost 12,

E 15, G 14, and I 16.102 As General Vennard

Wilson and others observed, many of those losses

had come about because unit leaders had been

forced to expose themselves to an undue extent

while attempting to control their men.103

By the beginning of August, the 24th bore little

resemblance to the unit that had traveled to

Kumch’on and had fought at Yech’on just two

weeks before. Not only had it lost the equivalent in

men of over half of any one of the battalions that

had fought in the hills west of Sangju, much of its

equipment was missing. Although most soldiers

might have been in good physical condition when

they deployed, they were not prepared for the rigors of combat in the mountains of Korea.

Lieutenant Dann recalled constantly moving from

one position to another in the rear. “The weather

was hot, humid, and I was terribly tired. On one

occasion, I must have gone to sleep while walking

because when I woke up, I was stumbling into a

rice paddy.”104

Physical exhaustion, combined with confusion,

defeats, constant withdrawals, and an enemy who

rarely gave quarter and seemed ever present, produced a powerful effect on the unit’s morale, discipline, and combat effectiveness.105 Some soldiers

reacted with anger and an increased effort to try to

turn things around. For many others, their spirit

seemed broken. “As far as I am concerned,” a black

master sergeant from Company E, David Robinson,

told an interviewer with disdain, “we actually have

men who are afraid.”106

Fear, however, hardly explains the full dimensions of what was happening. As a team of highranking officers from the United States noted after

visiting all of the American divisions and regiments

in Korea in late July and early August, the entire

Eighth Army was experiencing difficulties similar

to those of the 24th at that time. “The troops were

fighting under severe disadvantages,” the authors of

the group’s final report noted, 

having been . . . commited [sic] more or less piecemeal,

after incomplete training, and at reduced strength, with

much of their equipment of marginal serviceability. . . .

Our troops were opposed by an enemy who vastly outnumbered them, and who was well trained, well

equipped, skillfully led and inspired by a fanatical determination to attack. . . . The frontages were enormous

and precluded a continuous line of defense. This facilitated outflanking and penetrating operations by the

enemy and forced a continuous withdrawal.107

122 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

and 35th Inf Rgt, exhibits D–12 thru D–19, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation.

101 HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of the 24th

Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51]. See also Officer

Roster, 24th Inf Rgt (officers present with unit upon arrival in

Korea, 12 July 1950), 18 Sep 50, exhibit D–12, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation.

102 HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of the 24th

Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51].

103 This is the consensus of virtually all the officers

queried on the subject during the inspector general investigation of the 24th Infantry during 1950. See Intervs, IG with

Wilson, 5 Sep 50, exhibit 29, Kean Letter file; Gooch, 26 Aug

50, exhibit 25, Kean Letter file; Gardner, 24 Aug 50, exhibit

24, Kean Letter file.

104 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Dann, 24 and 28 Mar 94.

105 For an example of discipline problems, see Msg from

Chief of Sangju Police Station, translation, 30 Jul 50, in WD,

25th Inf Div, Jul 50.

106 Interv, IG with Robinson, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

107 Rpt, First Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces

Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 Aug 50, pp. 1–3

and app. B, box 171, RG 337, WNRC. The team was in Korea

from 24 July to 3 August 1950. They visited the 24th Infantry

on 29 July talking with White, Miller, Donaho, and Pierce and

visiting Companies E and G. For a description of the problems

afflicting other units at the time, see Roy K. Flint, “Task Force

Smith and the 24th Division,” in Heller and Stofft, America’s

First Battles, 1776–1965, pp. 272–74.
The team went on to observe that the Americans on

line were less mature and of lower intelligence than

enlisted personnel in World War II. On top of that,

personnel policies had led to the assignment of inexperienced and inadequately prepared officers and

noncommissioned officers to combat units. “This

had often resulted in poor leadership, especially at

the regimental and lower levels.”108

More disturbing, the group continued, was a

“noticeable absence” of combat aggressiveness in

many infantry units.

The absolute discipline and automatic obedience to

command that is vital for control in combat is lacking.

All troops were deficient in measures for cover and concealment, and in maintaining signal communications.

The troops were disinclined to leave the roads, and were

unskilled in use of mines and in night operations. Like

all green troops, they magnified the strength of the

enemy, and tended to become panicky and stampede

when small hostile groups got in their rear. . . . Infantry

troops were specifically deficient in . . . aggressiveness in

counter-attack, steadiness under fire, [and] confidence

in their own weapons. . . . Lack of leadership in regimental and subordinate echelons was often evident, in

both field and company grades, and among the noncommissioned officers.109

Recognizing that there was little that could be

done in the United States to provide immediate

solutions to most of the problems, the report’s

authors concentrated on recommendations for

improving equipment, the system of supply, and

personnel and training policies. For the rest, no

short-term remedies were possible. The units in

Korea were left to find their own solutions for their

problems.110

While the 24th Infantry shared the tactical

defects found in all the other units, the observers

still considered it a special case. After talking to the

white leadership of the regiment and of the 25th

Infantry Division and after visiting only two companies for part of one day, they reported that the

“effectiveness of colored troops . . . was about 80%

of white troops.”111 In reaching that conclusion,

they shared the prejudices of other whites who were

at that time evaluating the effectiveness of the regiment. Those individuals tended to blame the 24th’s

failures upon the racial characteristics of the soldiers

who composed the unit without considering the

inexperience of the men, the effects of substandard

equipment, the problems that necessarily accompanied a withdrawal under attack for even the most

veteran troops, their own failures as commanders, or

the contribution that segregation had made to the

climate of mistrust that prevailed within the regiment and that had damaged the unit’s ability to function as a dependable whole. Even if the observers

and the leaders of the regiment themselves had recognized the true nature of what was wrong, however, it is doubtful if they could have made meaningful

changes. The war was moving so fast at that moment

that the commanders of most units were hard put to

stay even, much less to make the sort of wholesale

changes in personnel and procedure that might have

made a difference in the 24th.

General Kean, with his command post located at

Sangju and his assistant, General Wilson, directly

involved in the fighting, was nevertheless well aware

that something had to be done. Shortly after the

24th pulled back behind the Naktong, he attempted

to replace Colonel White. By then, however, the regiment was so tainted with failure and so beset by

white racial prejudices that few colonels were eager

to take the job. When the commander of the Eighth

Army, Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, took up the issue, he

met with the same problem. “When I reported to

Walker in Korea,” one colonel remarked years later,

“he wanted me to take over the all black 24th regiment. Nobody, including me, wanted command of

the 24th.”112 In that light and under the circumstances, it was thus perhaps inevitable that the problems the unit had encountered at Sangju would

repeat themselves at Masan, a town some thirty

miles by road west of Pusan, where the regiment

would fight during the coming month.

108Rpt, First Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces

Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 Aug 50, p. 4.

109Ibid., pp. 8–9.

110Ibid., pp. 12–16.

111Ibid., p. 4.

112Interv, Clay Blair with Ned D. Moore, in Blair, The

Forgotten War, p. 164.

SANGJU 123

While other North Korean Army units pushed

down South Korea’s eastern coastline and

poured across the country’s central mountain passes toward Kumch’on and Sangju, the 6th

North Korean Division turned off the main SeoulPusan highway to begin a sweep down South

Korea’s western coastline. In the days that followed, the division encountered only minor resistance from scattered South Korean military units

before capturing Kunsan, a port town at the

mouth of the Kum River. Moving inland at that

point, it secured the town of Kwangju on 22 July

1950 and took only three more days to reach

Sunch’on, where it paused briefly to regroup

before pushing toward the crossroads town of

Chinju, a mere fifty-five miles by air to the west of

Pusan. Halfway to Chinju, at Hadong, it met and

almost destroyed a newly arrived battalion from

the U.S. 29th Infantry.1 (Map 6)

Composed of the 13th, 14th, and 15th

Regiments, the 6th North Korean Division possessed a

hard core of highly trained and motivated leaders,

many of whom had seen duty in the Chinese civil

war. Although it outran its supply system during its

drive to the south, it made good many of its logistical difficulties by appropriating local resources

and by using captured South Korean and American

weapons, including at one point six U.S. tanks. The

morale of the unit’s personnel was high—the troops

had met with little opposition on their way south

and were flushed with victory.2

The Eighth Army Withdraws

Chinju itself fell on 31 July, but from that point

on the division began to meet increasing opposition as the U.S. 19th and 27th Infantry regiments

moved to obstruct its path. Even if those forces

inflicted heavy casualties, however, General Walker

recognized that the enemy’s deep drive into his

western flank still had a good chance of cutting his

main supply line out of Pusan. To eliminate that

possibility, shorten his defensive lines, and take

advantage of the additional protection that natural

1 Far East Command (FEC), Allied Translator and

Interpreter Section (ATIS), Research Supplement,

Interrogation Rpt, issue 100, 6th NK Infantry Division, 30 Apr

51, pp. 34–37, Intelligence Research Collection, U.S. Army

Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; FEC,

Military Intelligence Section, Order of Battle Information,

North Korean Army, 15 Oct 50, MHI, hereafter cited as North

Korean Order of Battle; FEC, History of the North Korean

Army, 31 Jul 52, pp. 62–64, CMH files. For the 29th Infantry

combat, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,

pp. 214–21 and 4th Historical Detachment, Action at Chinju,

31 Jul 50, n.d., CMH files. The 29th Infantry was a separate

unit unconnected with a division.

2 ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue

100, 30 Apr 51, 6th NK Infantry Division, pp. 28–30, 35; North

Korean Order of Battle; FEC, History of the North Korean

Army, 31 Jul 52, pp. 62–63. The 6th North Korean Infantry

Division had been the 166th Division, 56th Chinese Communist

Army, until 25 July 1949, when it moved to North Korea.

CHAPTER 6

The Pusan Perimeter
ROK 1

XX

ROK 1

XX

ROK

XX

ROK 6

XX

ROK

XX

NK 4(+)

XX

NK 3(+)

XX

NK 6

XX

NK 2

XX

NK 15

XX NK 1(+)

XX

NK 13(+)

24 Jul

(from Seoul)

XX

NK 8

19 Jul

(from Chech'on)

XX

NK 12

XX

NK 6(+)

26 Jul

XX

XX

ROK 1

25

XX

25

1 Cav

XX

1 Cav

24

XX

1 Cav

24

XX

24

25

XXX

RO

EIGHT

7th Cav Regt(-)

ROK 17th Inf

21st Inf

34th Inf

24th Inf 35th

Inf

5th Inf(-)

27th Inf(+)

8th Cav

Regt

5th Cav

Regt

Kum R

Nam

R

Naktong R

YELLOW

SEA

Han R

Ch'onan

Ch'ungju

Tanyang

P'unggi

Yech'on

Hamch'ang

Sangju

Hwanggan

Yongdong

Kumch'on

Poun

Taejon

Kunsan

Chonju

Namwon

Kurye

Anui

Sanje-ri

Waegwan

Sam

Haman

Saga-ri Chungni

Masan

Chindong-ni Sach'on

Chinju Much'on-ni

T'ongyong

Yosu

Sunch'on

Mokp'o Posang

Kwangju

TAEGU
Map 6



K 6

ROK 8

XX

K 8

ROK Cap

XX

ROK Cap

XX

ROK 3

XX

NK 5

XX

XX

OK A

HTH

Naktong R

SEA

O F

JAPAN

Andong

mnangjin

PUSAN

P'ohang-dong

Yonil Afld

Yangdok

P'yonghae-ri

0 30

Miles

THE FRONT MOVES SOUTH

14 July–4 August 1950

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 1000 and Above

N. K. 6th Inf Division Movement, 13–25 Jul

Axis of N. K. Attacks, 14 Jul–1 Aug

Eighth Army Positions, Evening, 1 Aug

Eighth Army Positions, Evening, 4 Aug
barriers could provide, he had already decided to

abandon South Korea’s central region and to pull

his forces behind the Naktong and Nam Rivers. To

that end, on the morning of 1 August he instructed

General Kean to begin moving the 25th Division

south to Samnangjin, a town some thirty-five miles

northwest of Pusan by air and just to the east of the

point where the Nam and Naktong joined. The

next day, at a conference with Kean, he had second

thoughts and changed the division’s destination to

Masan, a port located thirty miles west of Pusan on

the enemy’s probable line of attack.3 (See Map 6.)

The move south was dogged by difficulties. In

the case of the 24th Infantry, the troops departed

the Sangju area by motor and on foot on 2 August,

using the Kumch’on-Waegwan road, the only route

leading from the Sangju region to the lower

Naktong. When they arrived at Waegwan, where

they were to cross the Naktong, they found a horde

of refugees clamoring to board trains that had been

assigned to take the troops south. Adding to the

confusion, the 17th South Korean Regiment simultaneously arrived in the town, on its way west to

reinforce the exhausted 24th Division. Many delays

followed, but individual units shoved through the

chaos, cleared the refugees from the trains, and

loaded their men and equipment aboard.4

Even as they did, however, more problems

were developing. When the regiment’s trucks, after

returning to Sangju to pick up the rear guard,

began the journey back to Waegwan, they encountered the 1st Cavalry Division crossing their path at

right angles. If the enemy had chosen that moment

to launch a strong attack, all might have been lost.

Instead, officers at the scene served as traffic policemen and managed to maintain order. Although the

meeting broke the convoy’s line of march, the

trucks reached Waegwan before the trains departed.

In the end, confusion and delays notwithstanding, it

took the 25th Division a scant thirty-six hours to

reach its final destination at Masan, 100 miles to the

south. The division received a Republic of Korea

Presidential Unit Citation for the achievement.5

Although General Walker believed that the

Eighth Army had begun to lose its aggressive spirit,

he had few options. He pushed the 25th Division

into the path of the oncoming 6th Division, giving it

charge of the region between Chinju and Masan that

stretched south of the Nam and Naktong Rivers to

the sea.6 Within that sector, the division assumed

command of all United Nations forces. They included a sprinkling of South Korean battalions known as

Task Force Min, the just-arriving U.S. 5th

Regimental Combat Team (RCT), the battered 1st

and 3d Battalions of the 29th Infantry regiment, the

89th Medium Tank Battalion, and the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade. At that time, the 27th Infantry

returned briefly to division control, but it would go

back into Eighth Army reserve as soon as the 5th

RCT was in place.7

Overall, allied forces were too few to establish

anything like a continuous line of defense. Instead

the 35th Infantry regiment, which replaced the

19th Infantry regiment when that unit moved

north to rejoin the 24th Division, guarded the

northern portion of the division’s area of responsi128 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

3 Robertson, Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, pp. 1–11;

Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 113–14, 125–27; Blair, The

Forgotten War, pp. 166–72; WD, 25th Inf Div, 1–2 Aug 50, box

3748, RG 407, WNRC, Suitland, Md. 4 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

248–49; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, pp. 3–4, box 3750,

RG 407, WNRC. See Department of the Army (DA) GO 35, 4

Jun 51. Unless otherwise indicated, general orders for this volume are on file in the Army’s Awards Branch of the Personnel

Service Support Division of the Adjutant General Directorate

of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM),

Alexandria, Va.

5 Ibid. For a description of the confusion within the 24th

Infantry during the move south, see Intervs, George L.

MacGarrigle with William A. Hash, 18 and 22 Mar 94. All

interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O.

Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files. 6 Robertson, Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, p. 10. See

also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 253. 7 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 5, box 3750, RG 407,

WNRC; WD, 25th Inf Div, 3 Aug 50, box 3748, RG 407,

WNRC. The 89th Medium Tank Battalion was originally

denominated the 8072d. The unit was redesignated the 89th

by the Eighth Army on 7 August 1950. See WD, 8072d

Medium Tank Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 3, box 3751, RG 407,

WNRC. In early August the battalions of the 29th Infantry

were incorporated into the 27th and 35th Infantry regiments

to bring them up to three battalions.
bility, a zone that extended from the confluence of

the Nam and Naktong Rivers south toward the

coastal town of Chindong-ni, six miles southwest of

Masan. The 27th and later the 5th took charge to the

south, an area that straddled the road running

between Chindong-ni and Chinju to the west. The

24th Infantry was responsible for the region between

Masan and Haman, a town nine miles to the west,

with the mission of suppressing enemy guerrillas

and infiltrators in the 25th Division’s rear areas.8

North of the 25th Division, the worn U.S. 24th

Division guarded a twenty-mile stretch of the

Naktong above the river’s confluence with the Nam.

The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division went into the line

above that for about the same distance. South Korean

divisions held the remainder of the perimeter, from

Waegwan in the west to Naktong-ni in the north and

then eastward some fifty miles toward Yongdok and

the coast. About one hundred and forty miles in circumference, the “Pusan Perimeter,” as it was dubbed

by journalists, was two to three times longer than it

should have been for the number of troops that held

it. Even so, it blocked all the roads into the region,

gave Walker’s forces the flexibility of interior lines of

communication, and provided a margin of security

for the port at Pusan, through which reinforcements

were already beginning to arrive.9

The 24th Infantry arrived at Masan on 3 and 4

August. The 1st Battalion assumed positions some

five miles northwest of the city, while the 2d moved

three miles farther north. The 3d Battalion went to

Haman, nine miles west of Masan, where it occupied

positions on the high ground commanding the roads

into Masan from the west. Each battalion had been

reinforced with a South Korean company. Upon

arrival, all units began housekeeping chores, laying

emphasis on physical musters of their personnel,

weapons checks, vehicle maintenance, and personal

hygiene. Beginning on 4 August, patrols began to

suppress guerrilla activity and infiltration into the

Masan area. No contact with the enemy occurred.10

Combat, 5–15 August 1950

It rained heavily the next day, 5 August. All battalions began to patrol their areas while holding reaction forces in reserve to counter any enemy threat

that developed. Units of the 1st Battalion apprehended six South Korean deserters but made no

contact with the enemy. The 2d Battalion also sent

out patrols that failed to result in action, but it suffered one casualty in a strafing attack by an unidentified aircraft during the early morning hours. The

3d Battalion launched its patrols toward Sobuk-san,

a large hill five miles to the south of Haman, where

one took a prisoner. The man revealed that approximately 200 enemy soldiers were in the vicinity. At

1500, with rain continuing, the 3d Battalion’s commander, Colonel Pierce, moved out to engage the

force. He was accompanied by his intelligence and

operations officers, an artillery liaison party headed

by Capt. Alfred F. Thompson, Company L reinforced

with a portion of Company I and elements from

Company M, and the battalion’s attached company

of South Koreans. In all, he had the better part of a

battalion at his disposal.11

The force rode part of the way toward Sobuksan on vehicles loaned by the 159th Field Artillery

Battalion. During the trip out, the battalion operations officer, Capt. John B. Zanin, broke off with a

patrol of five men to reconnoiter the area.

Discovering after dark that he was separated from

Pierce’s main force by an enemy unit of unknown

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 129

8 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 5; WD, 25th Inf Div, 3 Aug

50; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, Overlay 3, box 3750, RG

407, WNRC. See also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, p. 253. 9 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 255.

See DA Field Manual (FM) 7–40, The Infantry Regiment, 11 Jan

50, pp. 234–37. A regiment in defense was normally assigned

a frontage of 2,400 to 4,800 yards depending on the type of

terrain. In the Pusan Perimeter, regimental frontages averaged

about 10,000 yards. At that time, several regiments still had

only two understrength battalions.

10 WDs, 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 5; and 24th Inf Rgt Periodic Opns Rpt

42, 4 Aug 50. All in box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. See also

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Hash, 18 and 22 Mar 94. 11 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 5 Aug 50, p. 6; Letter of Instruction,

24th Inf Rgt, 5 Aug 50; and WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 5 Aug 50.

All in box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. WD, 159th Field Artillery

(FA) Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 2, box 3751, RG 407, WNRC. For

details of the terrain, see Map, Korea, 1:50,000, series L751,

Army Map Service (AMS) 1950, sheets 6819 I, 6819 II, 6819 III,

6819 IV, 6919 III, and 6919 IV, all in NARA, College Park, Md.
size, Zanin took evasive action until dawn and then

led his men back to friendly lines on his own.12

Moving forward, elements of the rest of the battalion task force encountered and dispersed a small

enemy party. At dusk Pierce dispatched a platoon

from Company L to determine whether a nearby

village contained more North Korean troops. The

platoon leader, white 1st Lt. Sandro A. Barone, a

newly arrived combat veteran of World War II,

noted that his troops “were noisy and seemed

untrained in night patrolling.” A short while later,

determining that no enemy were in the village, the

platoon returned to Pierce’s position.13

Meanwhile, the rest of the battalion had halted

on the approaches to a small plateau south of the village. The battalion staff, company command elements, and many of the officers gathered in a hollow

to await the return of the patrols and to discuss what

to do next. Inertia grew. No one laid out defensive

positions, and Pierce himself went to sleep. “They

were all just sort of sitting around,” black 1st Lt.

Oliver Dillard recalled. “No one seemed in command, and the troops, of course, had been told to

stop, and when troops are told to stop, as they do in

the Army today, they just stop where they are and go

to sleep, resting on their packs.”14

After dark, just as Barone’s platoon was rejoining the battalion, a small group of North Koreans

estimated to number fewer than thirty men

pushed quietly to within small-arms range of the

unit and opened fire with automatic weapons.

Whether the South Koreans or the men of

Company L broke first is unclear. What is known

is that after a brief fight both groups fled down the

hill, overturning two jeeps in the process and

abandoning a radio, a number of M1 rifles and

carbines, and most of their heavy weapons. Pierce

was shot in both legs. Company L’s recently

arrived commander, black Capt. Rothwell W.

Burke, was killed along with two enlisted men.

Eleven American soldiers were wounded and two

were listed as missing and never recovered. Losses

among the South Koreans are unknown.15

White officers would later use the incident as

one indication that the men of the 24th Infantry

had lost their nerve. In fact, if Company L and its

attached units were routed, the officers were as

much to blame as those who had run. Pierce had

allowed his troops to wait for several hours in the

dark without insisting that they establish defensive positions or guard against surprise attack. It

was a surefire formula for disaster, especially

when troops who were already tired and skittish

faced an enemy who had turned the tactics of the

unexpected into a fine art.16

130 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

12 WD, 159th FA Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 2; Interv,

MacGarrigle with John B. Zanin, 27 Oct 93. 13 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Sandro A. Barone, 14 Apr 94;

Interv, Inspector General (IG) with Christopher M. Gooch, 26

Aug 50, exhibit 25, attached to Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th

Inf Div, to Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9

Sep 50, sub: Combat Effectiveness of the 24th Infantry

Regiment. Kean’s letter and its attachments are contained in Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation, sec. BX, boxes

1013–1014, RG 159, WNRC. Statements attached to General

Kean’s letter each have an exhibit number and are hereafter

cited as in the Kean Letter file. See also WD, 159th FA Bn, Aug

50, p. 2; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 2; Statement by

Eddie S. Lowery, 5 Nov 50, in William Thompson Award file,

box 172, RG 338, WNRC; Interv, MacGarrigle with Gustav H.

Franke, 14 Jul 94. The village was Habyol, about four miles

south of Haman on a trail leading to Sobuk-san. See Sketch

Map, in Thompson Award file cited previously. Gooch, who

accompanied Barone’s men, stated that the platoon started for

the rear when they heard a prearranged signal of three shots

and had to be stopped “with force.” Neither Barone nor any

others in the vicinity mention this incident. 14 Quote from Interv, John A. Cash with Oliver Dillard, 3

Jun 89. The location is well described in Ltr, Oliver Dillard to

David Carlisle, 20 May 87, copy in CMH files. Other comments on the lack of security and carefree attitude of Pierce are

in Interv, MacGarrigle with Franke, 14 Jul 94. 15 Intervs, Cash with Dillard, 3 Jun 89, and MacGarrigle

with Barone, 14 Apr 94. Lost equipment is detailed in Interv,

IG with Walter Simonovich, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 16, Kean Letter

file. The number of wounded is mentioned in Interv, IG with

Alfred F. Thompson, the artillery liaison officer who accompanied Pierce, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 11, Kean Letter file. A more

precise count can be gleaned from HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported

Casualties of the 24th Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51],

box 3848, RG 407, WNRC. See also Interv, IG with

Christopher M. Gooch, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 25, Kean Letter file;

Interv, Cash with George Bussey, 13 Nov 88; WD, 3d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 2, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. Some

details of the fighting are in statements in the Thompson

Award file previously cited. Gooch said the enemy numbered

thirty; Barone put them at fifteen. 16 Interv, IG with Gooch, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 25, Kean

Letter file. Oliver Dillard remarked later that Gooch had ruined
Whatever the condition of the unit as a whole,

some of its men were clearly willing to stand their

ground. Pfc. William Thompson of Company M,

for one, covered the retreating force with his

machine gun. Hit repeatedly by enemy grenade

fragments and small-arms fire, he refused the

entreaties of comrades to withdraw and continued

to lay down covering fire until his company was

clear of the area and he was mortally wounded. But

for him, casualties that day might have been far

worse. In the same way, rifleman George Bussey

and others saw to it that the wounded Pierce

reached safety. Thompson received a posthumous

Medal of Honor for his valor and two other men

received Silver Stars, but the action was, in many

respects, a dismal and embarrassing defeat.17

By 0230 on 6 August the men of Pierce’s force

were beginning to congregate at Haman, five miles

to the rear. They would continue to straggle in

throughout the morning. At 0915 Company I, reinforced with one platoon from the 77th Engineer

Combat Company, attempted to return to the area

of the attack to collect lost weapons and to search

for the missing. Encountering the enemy in

strength before reaching that goal, the force was

pinned down by intense small-arms and mortar

fire. In the ensuing engagement, Company I

became separated from the engineers. Many of its

men headed south to Chindong-ni where they

joined up with other American units.18

Trailing Company I, the engineer platoon,

under black 2d Lt. Chester Lenon, was also pinned

down. Lenon sought to eliminate the enemy’s

machine guns with grenades but fell wounded in

the attempt. Staying behind to cover his platoon’s

withdrawal, he hid for five days along with six

wounded enlisted men. A seventh, Pfc. Edward

Sanders, sometimes crawling, sometimes walking,

eluded enemy patrols to make his way eight miles to

the rear to seek help. Bitten by a poisonous snake

during the journey and terribly swollen as a result,

the man was found by an American patrol on 11

August, five days after he and his comrades had

been written off as dead. When informed, the commander of the unit, 1st Lt. Charles Bussey, set out

immediately with two platoons to rescue the lost

men. When he arrived, he found that two had died.

Burying them temporarily on the spot, he delivered

the others to the regimental clearing station.19

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 131

the reputation of the regiment with the story by telling it without mentioning the leadership failures that had accompanied

the incident. See Intervs, William T. Bowers with Dillard, 8 and

9 Mar 95. 17 The recommendation for the Medal of Honor was not

submitted until 4 January 1951, apparently only after an

exhaustive and vigorous investigation by the 3d Battalion’s

commander at the time, Lt. Col. Melvin Blair. See Thompson

Award file; Interv, MacGarrigle with Melvin Blair, 15 Feb 95.

For other awards for the action, 25th Inf Div GOs 345, 6 Nov

50, Silver Star Award Citation for Capt Rothwell Burke, and

319, 11 Nov 50, Silver Star Citation for Sfc Laurence Lane. 18 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, pp. 7–8. The war diary

states that Company I became disorganized and dispersed. A

platoon leader of Company I disputes this and says there was

no straggling. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Reginald J.

Sapenter, 14 and 21 Mar 94. The battalion war diary is silent

on the matter. See WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 2. 19 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 7, 8; WD, 65th

Engr Bn, Aug 50, pp. 7–11, box 3751, RG 407, WNRC. See

also Statements of Sgt Joseph Knight, Sfc Bennie R. Cox, and

Pfc. William Thompson, posthumous Medal of Honor winner
On 5 August, while Company L was suffering

its ordeal, General Kean had relieved Colonel

White as commander of the 24th Infantry and had

appointed Col. Arthur J. Champeny to take his

place. Present at the regimental command post

when White had received the word, the operations

officer of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, Maj.

Cloyd V. Taylor, remarked that Kean’s move clearly

had come as no surprise to White and that the officer seemed glad to hear the news. His exertions had

been too much for him, Taylor said. He had lost a

great deal of weight and seemed almost gaunt.20

At fifty-seven years of age, Champeny was four

years older than Kean himself, but he was an experienced combat commander. He had won a

Distinguished Service Cross and the French Croix de

Guerre during World War I and had commanded the

351st Infantry regiment of the 88th Infantry Division

for thirty-two months during World War II. While

leading the unit in Italy during the Cassino campaign of 1944, he had received a second

Distinguished Service Cross. Following the end of

the war, he had served as deputy commander of the

U.S. Military Government in Korea, a position that

had required him to wear the star of a brigadier general even though he had not at that time been promoted to the rank. When the Korean War broke out,

he was serving at the Boston Army Base. Identified as

a proven regimental commander because of his

experience in the two world wars, he was immediately assigned to Korea. A man of “amazing energy

and courage,” according to the 25th Division

artillery commander, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, he

was also “peppery and brutally frank.”21

Champeny’s combat experience notwithstanding, he got off to a bad start with the 24th. At noon

on the day after taking command, becoming aware

of the misfortune that had befallen Pierce’s unit

near Sobuk-san, he called together those portions

132 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Cpl John G. Van Ness, attachments to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea

(EUSAK), GO 54, 6 Sep 50, Distinguished Service Cross

Citation for Chester J. Lenon. See also Interv, Cash with

Chester J. Lenon, 7 Dec 88. Lenon received the Distinguished

Service Cross for his actions in rallying his men on the day of

the attack. Sanders was recommended for a Medal of Honor

but never received it. Since many unit award files from the

Korean War period are missing, it is unclear whether he

received some alternate decoration. See Intervs, Cash with

David Carlisle, 24 Aug 89; John French, 21 Jul 89. Details of

the fighting can be found in award citations in 25th Inf Div

GOs 189, 25 Sep 50, awarding a Bronze Star to Sgt LaVaughn

Fields; 227, 10 Oct 50, Silver Star for Sgt Joseph Knight; 478,

12 Dec 50, Bronze Star for Cpl Thomas; and 21, 4 Jan 51,

Silver Star for Sgt Jerome Barnwell.

20 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Cloyd V. Taylor, 23 Aug 93;

Owen H. Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31

Aug 50, p. 7. 21 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs,

Biography of Brig Gen Arthur Seymour Champeny, USA, 19

Jun 52, CMH files; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 13,

172. Quote from Brig Gen G. B. Barth, Tropic Lightning and

Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 16, CMH files. After receiving a

third Distinguished Service Cross for his Korean War service,

Champeny was promoted to brigadier general in 1951 and

returned to Korea as an adviser to the South Korean armed

forces. He was later named commandant of the Republic of

Korea (ROK) Leadership School. His service was controversial.

See Memorandum for the Record (MFR), 5 Jun 53, sub: IG

201.61 O’Hearn, Wm. Joseph Wall, with attachments, CMH

Champeny file.

Colonel Champeny
of the 3d Battalion that were present at Haman and

delivered an angry dressing down. Correspondent

James L. Hicks of the Baltimore Afro-American was

nearby and later told investigators what he had

heard. “He got up and told them . . . that he had

been in the 88th [Division] in Italy, and at that time

he had an element of the [all-black] 92d [Infantry]

Division attached to him, and he said that this was

the outfit that had a reputation for running, and

they ran all over Italy, and he said that his observations had proved that colored people did not make

good combat soldiers, and that his job down there

was to change the frightened 24th into the fighting

24th.” Hicks continued that a number of the men

present had been in the 92d and had not run and

that they had left the meeting insulted and angry. “I

went to Champeny,” Hicks said, “and asked him

why he made the statement such as he did, and he

said ‘I said it . . . Isn’t it the truth?’ Those were his

very words. It almost knocked me out. . . . He said

that he did not intend to insult my race. He was

only trying to make those men so mad that they

would really get mad enough to fight.”22

Champeny’s hard-boiled approach, if that is

what it was, appears to have split the men of the

regiment into two groups. On one hand, many

knowledgeable blacks and even some whites

resented the colonel’s methods. Years later, the

white intelligence officer of the 1st Battalion, Capt.

Gustav Gillert, observed that Champeny’s remarks

demonstrated the colonel’s “misunderstanding of

the combat situation and the poor tactical condition of the regiment.” They “appalled me and others,” he continued, “who had put our anatomies on

line over the previous two months and were working hard at motivation and personal leadership.”

Sgt. Daemon Stewart of the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon recalled that Champeny was one

of the worst officers he encountered during his military career. Rifleman Charlie Lee Jones, who was

present for Champeny’s speech, observed that

many of the men believed the colonel was bluffing

and from then on declined to place any trust in

him. “If you don’t trust officers,” he added, “you

won’t fight for them.”23 On the other hand, the regiment’s awards and decorations officer, black 2d Lt.

Clinton Moorman, recalled that Champeny was

fairly well respected; Zanin considered him a topnotch commander; and Hicks himself remarked

that he considered the officer the victim of an illadvised impulse. “Col. Champeny is a brave and a

hard working man,” he said. “I had to get out there

at 5:30 a.m. to catch him, and he would stay out

until 9:00 o’clock [P.M.], but it takes time to take

these unfortunate things down.”24

The 1st Battalion operations officer at the time,

black Capt. Richard W. Williams, Jr., was hardly as

generous. Implying in sworn testimony before an

Eighth Army inspector general that the colonel was

a bigot, he gave an example of what he meant.

“One time, when I was commanding ‘Charlie’

Company, I had a position organized and had white

and colored NCO’s and Negro and ROK troops.

Col. Champeny told me to build a wire enclosure

around the hill with a six-foot opening, so the colored troops wouldn’t run, and if they did run, they

would hurt themselves. He also stated in front of

many of those people that he would not have a

Negro NCO in charge of ROK troops and white

troops.” Champeny later confirmed in an interview

that on 6 September he had indeed ordered double-apron wire fences constructed around the 1st

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 133

22 Interv, IG with James L. Hicks, 8 Sep 50, exhibit B–23,

in Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Report of Investigation Concerning

24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in Combat, 15 Mar

51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. See also

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Barone, 14 Apr 94; Stuart Force, 8

Aug 94; Ltr, John S. Komp to George L. MacGarrigle, 14 May

94, CMH files.

23 Intervs, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with Daemon Stewart,

2 Nov 88; Cash with Gustav J. Gillert, 25 Mar 89; Charlie Lee

Jones, 6 Sep 89. The quote from Gillert is in Ltr, Gillert to

MacGarrigle, 22 May 95, CMH files. For other negative reactions to Champeny, see Intervs, Muehlbauer with William M.

Factory, 2 Nov 88; Charles B. Gregg, 8 Sep 88; MacGarrigle

with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 24 Mar 94. 24 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Clinton Moorman, 5 Sep 88;

MacGarrigle with Zanin, 27 Oct 93; IG with Hicks, 8 Sep 50,

exhibit B–23, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

For generally favorable opinions of Champeny, see Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Sam J. Adams, Jr., 15 and 17 Jun 94; Charles

E. Green, 16 Jun 94; Owen Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94; Komp,

5 May and 1 Jun 94.
Battalion to “impress upon the men . . . that if

they would remain in their fox holes, they would

not get hurt.”25

Whatever Champeny’s intentions, his approach

did nothing to restrain those among the unit’s white

officers who were inclined to racial prejudice.

According to Williams, several instances occurred

during the weeks that followed, while intense combat raged, in which those individuals ridiculed the

men of the regiment instead of encouraging them.

“This caused the troops to lose confidence in themselves,” Williams said. “Then they lost all hope.”26

During the days following Champeny’s arrival,

General Walker concentrated his attention on the

region between Chinju and Masan and the enemy’s

6th Division. Since U.S. forces were stronger in that

area than anywhere else on the Pusan Perimeter, he

decided to counterattack and gave the task to the

25th Division. Designated Task Force Kean, the

effort would disrupt the enemy’s advance, relieve

pressure on U.S. and South Korean positions in the

area, and buy time for American forces to regroup

and continue their buildup.27 (Map 7)

There were three roads that connected Chinju

with Masan. The main route, about twenty-five

miles long, ran in a southeasterly direction from

Chinju through the town of Muchon-ni to the

coast. There it turned eastward to pass through the

town of Chindong-ni before entering Masan. The

second route, making a wide sweep to the south,

stretched 6 miles from Chinju to the town of

Sach’on. Turning southeast at that point and running 16 miles to the town of Kosong, it then swung

northeast toward Chindong-ni and Masan, covering a distance of some fifteen miles more. A third

route followed the main road from Chinju to

Much’on-ni, but after that it veered to the north

some six miles through a long, narrow pass to the

town of Saga-ri. Turning east, it then covered a final

4 miles into Masan.28

Low hills interspersed with rice paddies typified

the entire area, but there were two significant mountain barriers. One, traversed by a low pass, was located 7 miles to the east of Chinju on the road to Masan

through Saga-ri. The other, a larger and more mountainous obstacle, 2,400-foot-high Sobuk-san, stood

12 miles east of Chinju above the heavily traveled

road that ran through Much’on-ni and Chindong-ni

to Masan. The land farther to the south along the

coastal road through Sach’on was lower but

remained rugged. The weather at that time of year

was troublesome. By 7 August, when Task Force

Kean began, the rain in the area had ceased but

scorching heat had become the rule. The temperature often rose to 1050 during the day, and on some

occasions it reached 1200 in midafternoon.29

The plan for Task Force Kean envisioned a

three-pronged attack. Fisher’s 35th Infantry would

follow the northern route through Saga-ri to Chinju

while the 5th RCT took the route through

Chindong-ni to Much’on-ni. At a point where the

roads the two regiments were following converged,

near Much’on-ni, the 5th and 35th would join and

push together through a pass that overlooked

Chinju. The 5th U.S. Marine regiment would

meanwhile advance from the south along the road

through Kosong and Sach’on. The 24th Infantry

was to operate in the rear of the attack, especially

in the region around Sobuk-san, clearing enemy

units and infiltrators who managed to elude the

main assault. The regiment was also to secure a sixmile-long, north-south road that ran to the west of

Masan from Chindong-ni through Haman to Sagari. A battalion of South Korean marines and a second battalion of South Korean army troops were

134 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

25 Interv, IG with Maj Richard W. Williams, Jr., 10 Feb 51,

exhibit B–109, in General Headquarters, Far East Command,

Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged Irregularities in the

Administration of Military Justice in the 25th Infantry

Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation), RG 159,

WNRC. Williams commanded Company C briefly in late

August and early September after Captain Corcoran left the

unit. Champeny’s comment is in Interv, IG with Col Arthur S.

Champeny, 28 Sep 50, exhibit B–22, Eighth Army Inspector

General Investigation. 26 Ibid. 27 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p.

15. See also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,

pp. 266–67.

28 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p.

268. 29 Ibid., p. 269. See Map, Korea, 1:50,000, series L751,

AMS 1950, sheets 6819 I, 6819 II, 6819 III, 6819 IV.
attached to the 24th for a time, but they were withdrawn after only a few days.30

The operation began on 7 August with elements

of the 35th Infantry striking west toward Chinju.

They immediately encountered an estimated five

hundred enemy troops but, after a hard fight lasting

more than five hours, destroyed much of that force.

On the following day, the regiment advanced to the

high ground above Much’on-ni and dug in to await

the arrival of the 5th. “The morale of the men was

high,” General Barth, who arrived at the scene shortly after the battle, later commented, “and they

seemed eager to press on.”31

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 135

30 25th Inf Div Opns Order 8, 6 Aug 50, and WD, 25th

Inf Div, 6 Aug 50, pp. 6–7, both in box 3748, RG 407, WNRC;

WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 9.

31 WD, 25th Inf Div, 7–8 Aug 50, box 3748, RG 407,

WNRC; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d.,

 



III

35

7-12 Aug

III

5

7-12 Aug

III

5 Mar

6-8 Aug

III

5 Mar

9-12 Aug

Masan Bay

Nam R

Naktong R

Elms, N. K. 6th Div

A/29(-)

B/29(-)

2/35 2/24

35

5

III

5

5 Mar

III

3/24

5th RCT

3/24

2/24

1/24

24

25

XX

1/24

Uiryong

Chungam-ni

Haman

Komam-ni

(Saga-ri)

THE

NOTCH

Tundok

Much'on-ni

Pansong

Wonsan

Taejong-ni

Pongam-ni

Kogan-ni

255 342

Chindong-ni

SOBUK-SAN

738

Masan

Chinhae

Kosong

Sach'on

Changch'on

Chinju

Keisan South RR

CHINJU

PASS

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 100 300 500 and Above

U.S. Positions, Morning, 7 Aug

24th Inf Positions, 12 Aug

U.S. Attacks, Date

Principal Engagements

N.K. Attack, 7–12 Aug

Unit Positions, 12 Aug

7–12 August 1950

TASK FORCE KEAN

Miles

0 10

Map 7
The 5th Infantry was less fortunate. When

Task Force Kean began, the enemy’s 6th Division

was continuing its advance to the east and had

begun to filter troops onto the ridge lines dominating the road the regiment would use in its

westward thrust toward Chinju. As a result, when

the operation commenced on the morning of 7

August, the unit’s 1st Battalion at first encountered little opposition when it moved out along

the road. The 2d, echeloned to the right along

enemy-occupied high ground, came under attack.

In the intense fighting that followed over the next

two days, the enemy attempted to cut the 25th

Division’s supply line out of Chindong-ni while

the 5th, assisted by the 5th Marines, sought to

take control of rocky outcroppings to the northeast of the town that dominated the terrain in that

entire area. The enemy yielded those positions

only on 9 August, after two days of heavy pounding by American artillery, tanks, air strikes, and

mortars. During one 36-hour period, Batteries B

and C of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion fired

1,600 rounds in support of the operation.32

The 24th Infantry for its part took charge of a

territory that included virtually everything of any

importance between the 35th Infantry’s line of

attack along the Saga-ri–Chinju road and the

route which the 5th Infantry was supposed to follow between Chindong-ni and Chinju. In the

process, the 1st Battalion moved to Pup’yong-ni, a

village two and one-half miles north of Chindongni. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion moved south to

relieve a Marine unit fighting on the

Masan–Chindong-ni road, and the 3d Battalion,

which had earlier relocated from Haman to a position in the hills just north of Chindong-ni, was

ordered back to Haman. Unable to assume its new

role because the marines were in heavy contact

with the enemy, the 2d Battalion held up

overnight with the 3d Battalion.33

The next morning, 8 August, the 2d and 3d

Battalions were in the process of moving out when

the enemy launched an attack from the ridge and

hillside that the 3d Battalion had just vacated.

Recognizing that the enemy’s new position threatened communications between Haman and

Chindong-ni, General Kean at that time canceled

the 3d Battalion’s move north and ordered the unit

to drive the enemy from the hill. That done, the

unit was to screen the 25th Division’s supply lines

in that area from further enemy attack.34

Under the temporary command of the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts,

because Pierce had been evacuated for his wounds,

136 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

p. 16. See also WDs, 35th Inf Rgt, 7–8 Aug 50, and 2d Bn,

35th Inf Rgt, 7–8 Aug 50, both in box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. 32 WD, 25th Inf Div, 7–9 Aug 50, box 3748, RG 407,

WNRC; WD, 159th FA Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 2–3; WD, 25th

Recon Co, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50, p. 1, box 3751, RG 407,

WNRC. See also Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, The

Pusan Perimeter (Washington, D.C.: HQ, U.S. Marine Corps,

1954), pp. 103–22.

33 The regimental war diary puts the 1st Battalion north of

Chung-ni. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 8. The battalion’s war diary says the unit was to patrol in the vicinity of

Pup’yong-ni, where the 2d and 3d Battalions were also located. See WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 5, box

3750, RG 407, WNRC. The battalion’s version is followed

here. WD, 159th FA Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 3; WD, 3d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 2–3. 34 Ibid.

The men of Battery A, 159th Field Artillery Battalion, fire a

105-mm. howitzer.
the battalion launched the attack during the afternoon but made little headway. Instead, old patterns

reasserted themselves. The men moved forward

reluctantly, the battalion’s white executive officer,

Maj. Theodore J. Cook recalled, and some began to

straggle. Those who remained “would go for a few

yards and get behind cover, and then it was next to

impossible to get them to go forward again.” When

the battalion came within 100 yards of the top of

the hill, misdirected fire from friendly planes added

to the unit’s agony, scattering many of the men who

had thus far stood their ground and fought.35

At dark, the hill was still in enemy hands, and

the 3d Battalion had no choice but to withdraw. That

day and overnight, regimental and battalion officers

scoured rear areas for stragglers, apprehending well

over a hundred. They sent some forward with supplies for the men who had remained at their posts,

but by the time those groups arrived at their destinations, many of their members had once more disappeared. Colonel Champeny spoke to some of the

stragglers, perhaps in another attempt to instill fighting spirit. His words went unrecorded.36

At the time, the white regimental operations

officer, Maj. Owen Carter, remarked that officers

within the regiment were forced to expose themselves so regularly to enemy fire to keep their men

moving that it had become possible on some occasions to predict who the next casualty would be.

Something of the sort happened on the hill.

Observing a nearly exhausted second lieutenant

from Company K moving his men along, General

Kean remarked to the 3d Battalion’s operations officer, Captain Zanin, that the officer would probably

never make it. Kean was right. After the air strike,

the officer, white 2d Lt. William H. Hall, collected

six of his men and led them in a savage charge that

almost succeeded in gaining the top of the hill

before an enemy counterattack threw it back.

Observing that his battalion was withdrawing, Hall

then laid down covering fire until he was killed.37

The battalion continued its attack the next

morning, but encountered little opposition.

Attaining its objective by 1100, it began to police

the position and to dig in for the night. During the

patrolling that followed, Company I captured six

enemy prisoners and counted ten enemy dead from

the day before. The weather was so hot that more

American casualties resulted from the heat that day

than from combat.38

While the 3d Battalion was fighting for the hill

near Chindong-ni, the 1st and 2d Battalions were

starting their own operations. On the morning of

10 August, after patrolling for two days without

making any contact with the enemy, the 1st

Battalion received orders to move by foot along the

ridge lines leading to Haman to engage North

Korean units believed to be operating in the area. It

sighted the enemy but made no contact. At 1500 it

came under long-range enemy small-arms fire and

halted. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion relieved the

marines operating near Chindong-ni. As the 5th

Infantry again began to move west along the road

to Much’on-ni to link up with the 35th, the 2d

Battalion patrolled to the rear, seeking out pockets

of enemy bypassed in the advance. On that day, Lt.

Col. George R. Cole took command of the battalion, allowing Major Donaho to return to his position as the unit’s executive officer. A West Pointer,

Cole had earned a Silver Star during World War II

and had served in combat as a battalion commander during the final three months of the conflict.39

The 1st Battalion’s move north faltered on 11

August when the unit came up against an enemy

force of unknown size near Haman. Since those

troops appeared to be withdrawing to the west,

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 137

35 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 2–3. Quote

from Interv, IG with Maj Theodore J. Cook, Exec Ofcr, 3d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, 23 Aug 50, exhibit 10, Kean Letter file. Intervs,

IG with Maj Owen H. Carter, 25 Aug 50, exhibit 14, Kean

Letter file; MacGarrigle with Zanin, 27 Oct 93; Tittel, 23 May

94. See also EUSAK GO 54, 6 Feb 51, Distinguished Service

Cross Citation for 2d Lt William H. Hall; William Hall Award

file, box 161, RG 338, WNRC. 36 Ibid.

37 Ibid. 38 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 3. 39 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 5–6; WD,

2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 4–5, box 3750, RG 407,

WNRC. Cole’s career is described in U.S. Military Academy,

Assembly, Winter 71, p. 129. See also Cullum, Biographical

Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military

Academy, vol. IX, item 934.
Colonel Miller received orders to concentrate on

clearing Tundok, a mining village on the western

slopes of P’il-bong Mountain, about four miles to

the southwest of Haman. As part of that operation,

Company C, assisted by radio vehicles and drivers

provided by the artillery liaison officer for the battalion, received instructions to flank the enemy by

road from the north. The convoy was to proceed

north through Haman to Saga-ri, turn west along

the road the 35th Infantry had taken in its drive

toward Much’on-ni, and then swing back at

Chungam-ni on a byway that wound into the

mountains toward Tundok. Unknown to the

Americans until later, the enemy was turning the

area into a major entrepot. Honeycombed with

mine shafts virtually immune to American artillery

and air strikes, it provided excellent concealment

for his storehouse and command facilities. He had

no intention of giving it up.40

During the course of the afternoon Colonel

Miller’s men succeeded in occupying two ridges

between Mount P’il-bong and Tundok, but by

nightfall, despite air strikes that leveled Tundok

and produced a large secondary explosion, the 1st

138 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

40 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 6; WD, 24th

Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 10; WD, 159th FA Bn, Aug 50, p. 5.

The dates in the war diary for the 159th are wrong, but there

is no doubt that the action the chronicle describes corresponds

to the one mentioned in the battalion and regimental diaries.

See also Interv, Bowers with Edward H. Skiffington, 14 Apr 94.

Communist-led North Koreans hid in this old gold mine in Tundok, which was subsequently captured by the 24th Infantry.
Battalion failed to gain the top of a third ridge

immediately overlooking the town.41 Meanwhile,

accompanied by two tanks, Company C, under

Capt. Laurence Corcoran, worked its way down the

road from Chungam-ni. About 1700, rifleman

Albert Griffin recalled, “A recon jeep with a Lt.

White [actually 1st Lt. Donald LaBlanc] asked for

volunteers to go ahead into the mountains.

Several soldiers went with the jeep including Jesse

Hatter. . . . who went because he could ride. After

the jeep left they heard gunfire. Sergeant Williams

[an acting platoon leader] persuaded [Captain]

Corcoran to see what had happened. The company

got ambushed trying to get the recon people out.”42

One tank was in the front while the second held up

at the rear, Cpl. William Cobb remembered. The

bulk of the company was in the middle. “They

moved forward until the tank came to a bridge that

wouldn’t bear its weight. The enemy attacked and

knocked out the rear tank. . . . The enemy must

have watched them move forward all day.”43

Caught in the initial ambush, LaBlanc had been

severely wounded and was playing dead. When an

opportunity arose, he managed to escape and

attempted to warn the approaching company, but

to no avail. In the confusion that followed, some of

the men threw down their weapons and ran. A

number of officers and sergeants attempted to rally

the troops, and, when that failed, covered their

men’s withdrawal with fire. One of them, white 1st

Lt. Ralph S. Gustin, was killed in the process.

White Captain Gillert described the scene: “An

enemy force of about a platoon ambushed

Company C. Many of the troops panicked. What

had been a company when the firing started had all

but ‘evaporated.’ All sorts of weapons and equipment were left behind.” Gillert believed that “this

action had a devastating effect on Corcoran, who

must have realized what he thought to be the ‘good’

unit had suddenly collapsed and fled.”44 In the

end, Company C came out of the engagement

badly shaken and had to be “re-equipped and reorganized” when it rejoined its battalion. The incident further confirmed Champeny’s already low

opinion of the regiment.45

The next morning, 12 August, with the enemy

still holding out against the 1st Battalion,

Champeny brought up the 2d Battalion to

strengthen the attacking force. Moving along the

ridge lines overlooking the road that Company C

had followed the day before, the battalion

attacked southward toward the area where the

unit had come to grief.46

Fighting began in earnest on the morning of the

thirteenth, when Company G of the 2d Battalion

encountered a well-entrenched and -camouflaged

enemy force and began to receive heavy fire.

Company F also began to take fire, but the unit held

in place because its commander, black Capt. Roger

Walden, determined that it would not be able to

move forward until Company G had secured the

high ground from which the enemy was firing. By

that time, casualties were beginning to flow to the

rear from Company G’s position along with a large

number of stragglers, many of whom asserted that

they were merely accompanying the wounded.

There were moments of heroism. A medic, the AllArmy Heavyweight Boxing Champion for 1949,

Cpl. Levi Jackson, for one, lost his life while using

his own body to shield two of the wounded from

enemy fire.47

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 139

41 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 6–7; WD,

159th FA Bn, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 5–6. 42 Interv, Cash with Albert Griffin, Jr., 5 Oct 88. 43 Interv, Timothy Rainey with William Cobb, 4 Dec 89. 44 Quote from Interv, MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94.

Distinguished Service Cross Award file for 1st Lt Ralph S.

Gustin, box 153, RG 338, WNRC; Silver Star Award file for 2d

Lt Donald E. LaBlanc, box 154, RG 338, WNRC; 25th Inf Div

GO 177, 22 Sep 50, Award of Silver Star to M Sgt Howard

Williams; 25th Inf Div GO 203, 27 Sep 50, Award of Bronze

Star to 1st Lt William Blackburn. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle

with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94; Donald E. LaBlanc, 1 Mar 94;

Bowers with LaBlanc, 28 Feb 94. 45 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 7; Interv, IG with

Champeny, 28 Sep 50, exhibit B–22, Eighth Army Inspector

General Investigation. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94. Members of the 24th wounded in

the action appeared at the aid station of the 1st Battalion, 29th

Infantry. See S–2/S–3 Journal, 1st Bn, 29th Inf Rgt, 11 Aug 50,

item 3, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. 46 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 6–7; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 11. 47 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 6. Jackson

received the Distinguished Service Cross. See EUSAK GO 77,
By the end of the day, according to Eighth

Army investigators, fewer than seventeen men from

Company G remained in position. The artillery liaison officer for the 2d Battalion, white Capt.

William M. Kennedy, would later allege, however,

that none held. “I talked to [1st] Lt. [Joseph]

O’Neil, G Company commander, and he told me

that the men ran off and left him on the hill alone.

He said he pleaded with them to stay, but they left

him. He apparently was the last man off the hill as

he was coming from that direction when I saw

him.”48 Fighting continued for another day, but the

battalion’s efforts were hampered by rain and poor

visibility. On 15 August Champeny ordered the two

battalions to break contact with the enemy and to

form a defensive line north of Sobuk-san.49

According to the black commander of the

77th Engineer Combat Company, Capt. Charles

Bussey, who often accompanied units of the 24th

Infantry into combat, some of those who straggled

did so because they were fed up with their circumstances. The troops “were very bitter,” he

said. “They felt they were stupid to risk their lives

unduly because when they got home they didn’t

have the rewards citizenship should have provided . . . such as voting. This was another thing we

[officers] had to deal with.”50

Other soldiers, Bussey continued, had been

intimidated. The enemy had made it a point to terrify his opponents, and word flowed through the

ranks about how the North Koreans tortured and

killed captured Americans. A number of soldiers had

personal experiences to tell. According to Cpl. Joel

T. Ward, one young rifleman had been tied between

a truck and a tree and then torn in two when the

vehicle drove off. On another occasion, according to

Pvt. Jerry Johnson, both white and black American

captives were burned alive in a bonfire within full

view of American patrols. Both times, the heartrending screams of the victims were audible to their

comrades, who inevitably resolved not to be captured themselves.51 In response, many Americans in

frontline units established their own, unofficial policy of no quarter and brought back captives only

when ordered to do so. Others allowed their fears to

predominate and ran to the rear whenever combat

was imminent and they could find an opening.52

Whatever the men’s concerns, General Kean

decided that straggling had been tolerated for so

long within the 24th that it had become almost

routine. Resolving to take action, he distributed a

letter on 9 August to all units within the division

directing commanders to take action to punish

men guilty of misconduct before the enemy. Where

White had disciplined only a few soldiers for straggling on the grounds that the fast-moving situation

precluded the proper gathering of evidence,

Champeny had instructions to prosecute all who

left their positions without permission.53

One week after Kean issued the letter, on 15

August, he appointed an infantry officer, Capt.

Merwin J. Camp, to begin an investigation of the

24th to determine the names of men worthy of

punitive action. Because of the episode at Tundok,

Company G became Camp’s initial target. The effort

to gather evidence was difficult, in part because

officers in the field had never bothered to record

the names of those who had strayed or received

warnings. In addition, according to Camp, a code

of silence prevailed, with those men who had stood

their ground fearing retaliation if they gave testi140 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

23 Sep 50. See also 25th Inf Div GOs 172, 21 Sep 50, and 276,

1 Nov 50, for other examples of heroism in Company G on 13

August. 48 The investigators’ findings are in Statement of Capt

Merwin J. Camp, 9 Sep 50, Reference 24th Infantry Regiment,

exhibit D–21, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

But see Interv, IG with Capt William M. Kennedy, 25 Aug 50,

exhibit 15, Kean Letter file. O’Neil is identified as Company G’s

commander. Unit rosters for July and September 1950 place

him in Company H. See Officer Roster, 24th Inf Rgt, 18 Sep

50, exhibit D–13, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. 49 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 6. See also

Interv, IG with Capt James O. Gardner, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 24,

Kean Letter file. Gardner alleges Company E also collapsed

with many stragglers, but the war diary is silent on the issue.

Gardner was possibly describing the Company G action. 50 Interv, Cash with Charles Bussey, 6 Jan 89.

51 Ibid. See also Intervs, Cash with Joel T. Ward, 21 Jul 88;

Jerry Johnson, 23 Sep 88; Theodore R. Eldridge, Jr., 26 Aug 88. 52 Intervs, Cash with Hollis Reese, 24 Sep 88; Floyd B.

Williams, 6 Aug 88; Robert H. Yancy, 21 Jan 89. 53 The letter is summarized in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 8 Aug

50, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC.
mony against those who had run. By 9 September,

as a result, only a relative few had been charged.54

Court-martial was a last resort, Kean would later

assert, against men who were well aware of the consequences of their deeds but had flagrantly chosen

to ignore their responsibilities. The situation confronting the 25th Division was grave, he added.

The effectiveness of the 24th Infantry as a fighting

force was at stake.55

While the 1st and 2d Battalions were moving to

Tundok and beginning their attempt to take the

town, changes were occurring within the 3d

Battalion. On 9 August the unit had received word

that it had a new commander, Lt. Col. John T.

Corley, a West Point graduate who had commanded battalions in North Africa and Europe during

World War II. A self-assured Irishman who spoke

“Brooklynese” out of the side of his mouth, he had

risen from first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel in

just three years during World War II and numbered

among his decorations for valor not only five

awards of the Silver Star, but also the Distinguished

Service Cross. Although Corley joined the battalion

on 9 August, he apparently took formal command

on the twelfth. During the interim, he exercised

authority indirectly, with Colonel Roberts retaining

nominal full control.56

Over the months that followed, Corley became

very popular with his men. Although there were

indications that he had his prejudices—black Capt.

Charles Bussey would later assert that the officer had

told him he had downgraded an award to a Silver

Star because he did not want smart black officers to

do well—almost all of the officers and enlisted men

who observed Corley closely liked him. As black 2d

Lt. Albert Brooks observed, he seemed “a man of culture and human feeling.” His driver, enlisted man

Sylvester Davis, who was with him often and in a

position to know, considered him unprejudiced.

Black 1st Lt. Gorham Black described him as even

tempered and unbiased. Pfc. Floyd B. Williams

asserted that men in combat looked at him and drew

strength. Sgt. Calvin Bryant had even seen the officer

give a cold enlisted man his field jacket.57

Corley received his first mission at 0130 on the

tenth. Champeny instructed him to move his battalion northwest from Pup’yong-ni to the town of

Wonsan, some three miles to the south of Tundok

on the same road where Company C would shortly come to grief. During the advance that followed,

the main body of the battalion traversed another

rough mountain road that ran directly to Wonsan

from Chindong-ni. Because vehicles found the

rugged terrain impassible, Corley took his command post along the more-traveled southerly route

that the 5th Infantry was following in its attack

toward Chinju, the Chindong-ni–Much’on-ni road.

Arriving about one mile south of Wonsan, at 1730

that evening, he decided the position was too

exposed for his command post and backtracked

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 141

54 Statement of Camp, 9 Sep 50, Reference 24th Infantry

Regiment, exhibit D–21, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. Black newspaperman Frank Whisonant later

labeled Camp a racist. See Frank Whisonant, untitled newspaper clipping, Pittsburgh Courier, 25 Nov 50. 55 Interv, IG with Maj Gen William B. Kean, 14 Feb 51,

exhibit B–135, Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation. 56 DA Form 66, Personnel Record for John T. Corley, CMH

files. See also Obituary, Brig Gen John T. Corley, U.S. Military

Academy, Assembly, Sep 84, p. 143. Joseph Baranowski mentioned Corley’s manner and distinctive accent. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. Corley mentioned the

lag between his assignment and his formal assumption of command in an interview with a 25th Division inspector general. He

asserted in the interview that Roberts remained in charge for

twenty-four hours after his arrival. The battalion’s war diary,

however, asserts that Roberts relinquished command. Since

some overlap is common during changes of command in military units, the account that follows places both Roberts and

Corley in the area if not always at the scene of the fighting. See

Interv, IG with Lt Col John T. Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 2, Kean

Letter file; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 3.

57 Intervs, Cash with Charles Bussey, 6 Jan 89; Albert

Brooks, 1 Nov 89; Sylvester Davis, 19 Sep 89; Gorham L.

Black, Jr., 12 Mar 89; Floyd B. Williams, 6 Aug 88;

Muehlbauer with Calvin Bryant, 1 Mar 89. Black Chaplain

Gray Johnson, who was in a position to know, also asserted

that Corley was not a racist. See Interv, Cash with Gray

Johnson, 23 Mar 89. An Air Force officer who worked closely

with Corley as a forward observer, Edwin W. Robertson, asserted that Bussey’s story was entirely out of character for Corley.

See Interv, Cash with Edwin W. Robertson, 29 Mar 89. White

2d Lt. Ray Koenig complained just as vehemently as Bussey

that white officers in the 24th had problems with decorations

because of “reverse discrimination.” See Interv, Muehlbauer

with Ray Koenig, 20 Mar 89. See Chapter 7, p. 174, for another episode that calls Corley’s racial objectivity into question.
about a mile to Yongch’on-ni, where he set up for

the night with Battery B of the 159th Field Artillery

Battalion and the 3d Platoon of the 24th Infantry’s

heavy mortar company.58

At 0300 on 11 August an unknown number of

enemy armed with automatic weapons and antitank

guns attacked the position. Three vehicles loaded

with ammunition and a fourth laden with gasoline

went up in flames almost immediately. Other vehicles also caught fire, including two radio trucks used

to control air strikes, causing a conflagration that lit

up the surrounding area. The Americans responded

quickly. Four drivers courageously drove their vehicles, some of them loaded with ammunition, away

from the explosions, burning gasoline, and smallarms fire, and 1st Lt. Paul F. Mauricio, a Filipino, was

killed silencing a machine gun. At dawn the enemy

could be seen on the adjacent hills, and howitzers

began shelling the North Korean positions with

point-blank fire. It took seven hours, but by 1030

the defenders had beaten off the attack. Shortly

thereafter, Corley’s command post group redeployed

to Taep’yong-ni, one and one-half miles northwest of

Chindong-ni, near where the rest of the battalion

was going into action.59

While Corley and his command post were still

under attack, the main body of the 3d Battalion had

been attempting to reach its objective at Wonsan.

That morning, about two and one-half miles from

the town, the unit came under fire and halted. The

battalion’s white operations officer, Captain Zanin,

coordinated its response. Zanin recalled later that

he immediately attempted to keep the companies

moving forward to gain the crest of a nearby ridge.

From there he would be able to direct heavy fire

upon the enemy’s positions. Over the next three

hours, however, in the face of an estimated two

companies of enemy but suffering only six rounds

of mortar fire and at most ten casualties,

Companies K and L dwindled from a fighting

strength of over a hundred men each to about fifty.

Company I retained most of its strength because it

was occupying a flanking position and remained

relatively uninvolved in the attack. At noon on the

next day, according to Corley, Company L would

number at best twenty effectives and Company K

thirty-five. Once again, many of the stragglers left

their positions on the excuse that they were accompanying wounded men to the rear.60

Unable to take its objective, the battalion was

ordered to hold in place overnight and to resume

the attack the next day, 12 August. Zanin followed

instructions, but the unit again made little

progress. With snipers all around, the troops kept

low and declined to move. In the end, Zanin was

cut down attempting to get the troops to advance.

Turning his radio and map over to a lieutenant who

he said seemed virtually immobilized, the captain

stumbled to the rear alone. Roberts found him and

saw to it that he reached the battalion aid station.

He later received the Distinguished Service Cross

for his actions and fortitude.61

142 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

58 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 3; WD,

159th FA Bn, Aug 50, p. 4. The spelling of Wonsan differs

between sources; the one used here is from Map, Korea,

1:50,000, series L751, AMS 1950, sheet 6819 II. 59 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 3–4, box

3750, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 159th FA Bn, Aug 50, pp. 3–4.

For awards, see 25th Inf Div GOs 169, 19 Sep 50; 205, 27 Sep

50; 264, 30 Oct 50; and 319, 11 Nov 50.

60 Since the battalion war diary is less than candid on the

subject, this treatment is based upon Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Zanin, 27 Oct 93; IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 2, Kean

Letter file. Some details can also be gleaned from the recommendation for the Distinguished Service Cross that Zanin later

received. See in particular the Statements of 2d Lt Reginald J.

Sapenter, 2d Lt Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., and 1st Lt Vernon C. Dailey,

all for 4 Nov 50, attachments to Decorations and Awards Action

Sheet, John B. Zanin, 27 Dec 50, Awards Branch, PERSCOM. In

his interview, Corley speaks as if he was present during the

action, using such phrases as “my attack.” Zanin, however, does

not mention him, and Corley was clearly occupied for at least

part of the time with the problems that accompanied the enemy’s

attack on his command post. Where he was and what he was

doing for the rest of the time remains unclear. Roberts’ role in the

action is also vague but he appears to have been nearby, perhaps

in a command post somewhat to the rear. 61 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Zanin, 27 Oct 93; Dann, 24

Mar 94; Tittel, 20 Apr 94; IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit

2, Kean Letter file. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p.

11. First Lieutenant Vernon Dailey, commander of Company I,

asserts that his unit in fact progressed for 800 yards before

bogging down, and one of his platoon leaders supports him.

Company I, however, was making a flanking maneuver. This

account follows Zanin’s recollection, which states that the bulk

of the battalion made no progress. Statements of Company K

platoon leaders support his assertion. See Statements of 1st Lt
The episode was a sorry revelation for Corley,

who told investigators two weeks after the event

that during the action a powerful force of 550

men had dribbled away to 260, a number that

included the members of Company I, which saw

little combat, and rear-area support troops.

Although the men who stayed in position had

done “all that could be expected of any soldier,”

Corley continued, leadership in the battalion’s

squads and platoons was almost nonexistent. “In

the main, . . . Company C.O.’s had to control their

units by working directly with platoon leaders,

[and] the chain of command stopped at company

level.” As a remedy, Corley could only suggest that

the 25th Division double the number of officers in

the battalion. “One officer must lead,” he said,

“and the other must drive.”62

While Corley’s unit was suffering its ordeal,

the 5th Infantry to the southwest was also experiencing serious difficulties. Over the preceding

week, the unit had worked its way west toward its

rendezvous with the 35th Infantry at Much’on-ni.

By 11 August its lead battalion had reached that

goal, and the other two had advanced to a point

just beyond Taejong-ni, where the road to

Wonsan and Tundok connected with the main

route the regiment was following. Shortly before

midnight that evening, after failing in an attack

the night before that had included the assault on

Corley’s command post at Yongch’on-ni, an estimated two enemy battalions launched a fierce

assault against the rearmost elements of the 5th

Infantry. In the fight that ensued, the unit’s 1st

Battalion suffered heavy losses but the two

artillery battalions supporting the operation were

virtually annihilated, losing all of their guns and

over 50 percent of their people. The regiment’s

supply train, strung out in a long column that

extended through Taejong-ni to a pass above it,

also came under heavy fire, and many of its vehicles were destroyed. By 0800 the next day, the

enemy was in firm possession of Taejong-ni and

its surroundings and had cut off the 5th from

Chindong-ni.63

Appalled at the disaster, General Kean would

wait three days until the regiment had reassembled

but would then relieve its commander. In the meantime, while the smoke was still rising at Taejong-ni

and the remnants of the 5th were continuing their

move to the west, the commander of the 25th

Division’s artillery, General Barth, received instructions to retrieve as many of the 5th’s lost guns and

missing soldiers as he could. To that end, Barth

gained control of two battalions of marines and

Corley’s 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion of the 24th

also received instructions to move south, but at that

time it was still heavily engaged near Tundok.64

For a time it seemed as though Corley’s force

might make the difference in Barth’s counterattack. It was already fighting in the mountains

above Taejong-ni and seemed well positioned to

strike the enemy from the flank and rear. That,

however, was not to be. By late afternoon on 12

August, Barth noted in a postwar memoir, “time

was running out and it was . . . apparent from . . .

reports [by air observers] that the guns were in

enemy hands and only a handful of survivors

remained. . . . The one hope was for a successful

attack by the 3d Battalion of the 24th, but Corley

reported to me about four o’clock that his battalion had been driven back and was badly scattered.” Barth’s marines began their attack at first

light the next morning, after abandoning what

had been a successful assault along the far south

road through Kosong. They reached the hills

above Taejong-ni that afternoon but withdrew

when they received orders to move immediately

to another sector of the Pusan Perimeter. At that

time, they reported that the town was in enemy

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 143

Vernon C. Dailey, 4 Nov 50, attachments to Decorations and

Awards Action Sheet, John B. Zanin, 27 Dec 50; Interv,

MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 14 Mar 94. 62 Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 2, Kean

Letter file.

63 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p.

20. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 12 Aug 50, box 3750, RG 407,

WNRC; WD, 90th FA Bn, Aug 50, box 3751, RG 407, WNRC;

Intervs, MacGarrigle with D. Randall Beirne, 19 Aug 93; Cash

with Rennie M. Cory, 29 Aug 89. Only fragments of the records

for the 5th Infantry regiment for this period have survived. 64 Ibid. The 2d Battalion’s orders are mentioned in WD,

24th Inf Rgt, 12 Aug 50.
hands and that none of the American missing

could be seen.65

A final footnote to the story came one month

later, when American forces recaptured Taejong-ni,

or “Bloody Gulch” as it later came to be called.

Entering the town, they discovered that many of the

artillerymen had gone out fighting. There were shell

casings everywhere along with many bodies, and the

tubes of the artillery pieces had rounds lodged in

them, rendering them inoperable. In the end, some

of the men had surrendered. The searchers found

the decaying remains of fifty-five Americans in a

house and on a nearby hill, all executed with their

hands tied securely behind their backs.66

The 25th Division began to pull back Task

Force Kean shortly after the debacle at Bloody

Gulch. General Kean’s force, primarily through the

efforts of the marines and the 35th Infantry, had

thrown the enemy at least briefly onto the defensive

and had exacted a heavy toll on the 6th North

Korean Division.67 The marines had displayed consistent aggressiveness and unit cohesion, an indication of the soundness of the prewar training they

had received. Colonel Fisher’s 35th Infantry

demonstrated that it likewise had become a reliable, combat-experienced unit. The defeat of

Company F at Hamch’ang was in the past. The confidence-building successes of the companies that

had fought with Michaelis’ 27th Infantry and that

had formed the line to cover the retreat at Sangju

were what the men remembered.

The same could not be said for Kean’s other

two regiments. In its initial combat the 5th Infantry

had showed many of the same weaknesses as the

other regiments from Japan in their first battles.

Deploying from Hawaii with three battalions composed of a few noninfantry fillers but many combat

veterans, the unit failed primarily because of its

senior leaders, whom a platoon leader, 1st Lt. D.

Randall Beirne, described as “armchair officers.”

Morale was affected by the lack of success, and it

was obvious to Beirne that some company commanders and field grade officers had to be replaced.

General Kean agreed, beginning the process by

relieving the regimental commander.68

The 24th Infantry, for its part, was unique.

Although hardly a green, inexperienced unit facing

its first combat, it continued on the whole to perform as one. With minor exceptions, it experienced

no successes, only a string of failures. Some of its

problems could be attributed to poor and careless

leadership, but in other cases the heroic actions of

commissioned and noncommissioned officers

failed to move the troops forward. Even though a

number of officers resorted to forcing soldiers to

advance at gunpoint, the straggling that had begun

at Sangju continued unabated.69

The wastage among leaders continued to

mount. On 13 August, when Company G fell apart

on the ridges above Tundok, there were only two

officers in the company, both lieutenants. One had

been with the unit for two days, the other for five.

In Corley’s battalion, Company L had lost all of the

officers who had deployed with the unit and had

gone through five company commanders by 11

August, when it dwindled to almost nothing.70

Officer replacements continued to arrive, several

with combat experience and solid reputations for

tactical expertise. But a number, such as the new

regimental commander, brought preconceived

notions about blacks and a bluntness that did little

to settle the men. Overall, as the units of Task Force

Kean began to withdraw, the 24th Infantry was

regarded with suspicion and dissatisfaction by

white leaders in both the division and the regiment.

144 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

65 Quote from Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in

Korea, n.d., p. 20. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 12 Aug 50;

Montross and Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, pp. 147–52. 66 Interv, Muehlbauer with James T. Burke, 23 Jan 89.

Burke was with the party that entered the town. His story is

confirmed by General Barth. See Barth, Tropic Lightning and

Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 20. 67 ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue

100, 30 Apr 51, 6th NK Infantry Division, pp. 37–38. Because

of casualties from Task Force Kean and earlier combat, which

were about 50 percent, the division was ordered to go on the

defensive to await replacements.

68 Interv, MacGarrigle with Beirne, 19 Aug 93. 69 Intervs, Bowers with Genous S. Hodges, 13 Apr 94;

MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 14 Mar 94; Barone, 14 Apr 94. 70 Officer Roster, 24th Inf Rgt (who deployed and were

replacements), 18 Sep 50, exhibits D–12 and D–13, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation.
Battle Mountain

On 15 August all units of the 25th Division

pulled behind a line that stretched southward from

the Nam River through Saga-ri and then followed

the ridge lines toward Chindong-ni and the Yellow

Sea. The 35th Infantry held the division’s northern

limits from the Nam River to a point about a mile

north of Haman. The 5th took charge of an area

that stretched from Sobuk-san south to the Yellow

Sea. The 24th stood in between with responsibility

for a rugged stretch of ridges and crags dominated

by 743-meter-high Mount P’il-bong.71 (Map 8)

Within the 24th’s sector, Colonel Cole’s 2d

Battalion went to the north, taking charge of a region

that extended from the regiment’s boundary with the

35th to a position southwest of Haman, about one

mile northwest of P’il-bong. Colonel Miller’s 1st

Battalion went into the important high ground around

P’il-bong itself and extending southeast to Sobuk-san.

Corley’s 3d Battalion stood in reserve to the rear in the

lowlands. Badly battered during Task Force Kean, the

battalion would serve as a reaction force if the other

two came under threat but would spend the first few

days undergoing retraining, especially in patrolling,

all-around defense, care and cleaning of weapons, fire

and maneuver tactics, and ambush prevention.72

At six miles in length, the regiment’s area of

responsibility was considerably wider than normal,

but the situation still had some advantages. For the

first time since the Sangju campaign, the 24th would

occupy a defined regimental front against the North

Koreans with other regiments on its flanks. As a

result, enemy envelopments were no longer a major

concern, and supporting artillery would be able to

mass its fires in greater volume than in the past.

Meanwhile, the regimental commander would know

where his forces were at any moment and have the

ability to coordinate their efforts efficiently.

The North Koreans, for their part, were determined to drive the 25th Division back and to seize

Masan. To the north, at the end of August, the 7th

North Korean Division, which had followed the 6th to

Chinju, would take up station at Uiryong, a town on

the west side of the Nam River eleven miles to the

northwest of Haman. Opposing Fisher’s 35th

Infantry, the unit would remain in the area until well

into September. Just to the south, the 6th Division

continued to oppose the 24th Infantry. It had been

badly bloodied by Task Force Kean but was still in

the fight. Although newly captured prisoners of war

reported that the unit had suffered over four thousand casualties out of an initial strength of 10,000

and that it had lost 20 percent of its artillery, 30 percent of its trucks, and 40 percent of its rifles, it had

received a contingent of 3,100 South Korean

replacements during August and was making

repairs. The new men had no basic training and

received weapons only when they entered combat,

but they advanced on command. According to

North Korean prisoners of war, special guards followed the frontline troops into battle and killed anyone who straggled or attempted to desert.

Throughout the rest of August, the 6th Division

would hold in place to the west of Haman, probing

the 24th Infantry’s lines and those of the 35th and

5th, sometimes in company strength.73

Anticipating enemy pressure, the 24th’s planners

took stock of the formidable terrain in the regiment’s

sector, especially around Hill 665, one-half mile to

the northwest of P’il-bong, which would shortly

become known as “Old Baldy,” “Bloody Peak,” or

“Battle Mountain.” They found that whoever occupied the summit of either that hill or Mount P’ilbong could observe his opponent’s rear area. That

would allow him to receive early warning of attacks

and to direct artillery and mortar fire against any target that appeared. Since the hills were easy to

approach from the enemy side but steep and treacherous from American lines, and since the North

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 145

71 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, Overlay 6A, Planned

Defense, 15 Aug 50, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. See also

Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 20. 72 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 13–15, and Overlay

6B, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC; Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug

50, exhibit 2, Kean Letter file. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Sapenter, 14 Mar 94; Randall P. Stephens, 18 and 27 Jul 94.

73 North Korean Order of Battle; ATIS, Research

Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue 100, 30 Apr 51, 6th NK

Infantry Division. See also ATIS, Research Supplement,

Interrogation Rpt, issue 99, 24 Apr 51, 7th NK Infantry

Division, Intelligence Research Collection, MHI.
I I

2

I I

1

III

24

I I

3

A

L

I K

K

K(-)

K

B

C

E

42

ROK

ROK

G

42

G

G(-)

F

F(-)

G

E(-)

E

24

III

5

1

II

3

2

II

1

35

III

24

Saga-ri

Chungam-ni

Tundok

BATTLE MTN

Engineer Rd

Haman

SOBUK-SAN

OBONG-SAN

YOHANG-SAN

0 2

Miles

HAMAN AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

16–26 August 1950

Unit Positions

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 100 300 500 700 and Above

Map 8
Korean sector contained a number of abandoned

mines that afforded excellent cover, Colonel

Champeny understood that the area would pose

major challenges to the 24th. Rapid resupply and

reinforcement for his units would be a problem, and

evacuation of the wounded would be difficult. In

addition, if pushed back the defenders would have

trouble reorganizing quickly for counterattacks.

Following the lines of the land, the colonel laid

out a simple plan. Stationing Companies F, G, and

E of the 2d Battalion, in that order, north to south,

on a series of small ridge lines that lay to the north

of Battle Mountain, he placed Companies C, B, and

A of the 1st Battalion, in that order, again north to

south, on the mountain itself. The 3d Battalion

went into the lowlands behind the 1st Battalion to

serve as a reserve and to guard the road stretching

south from Haman to Chindong-ni. Wherever necessary, Champeny laid mines, built obstacles, and

strung wire barriers in order to impede enemy

movement into the 24th’s zone.74

The 25th Division did what it could to bolster

the 24th. When it became apparent that a 4,000-

yard gap existed between Champeny’s unit and the

5th Infantry, General Kean assigned a 400-man

South Korean National Police force to plug the

hole. In the same way, with an estimated twentyfive hundred enemy operating in the division’s

immediate area, General Kean approved work to

shorten and protect the 24th’s critical supply line

by expanding a trail that ran from the Masan–Sagari road directly to Haman. Bussey’s 77th Engineer

Combat Company built the southern portions of

the new route while other companies of the 65th

Engineer Combat Battalion worked on those to the

north. Later to gain fame as “Engineer Road,” the

bypass would avoid Saga-ri and a section of road

that crossed the enemy’s most likely avenue of

approach. Cutting the time it took supplies to reach

Haman from Masan, it would provide an emergency backup if an attack severed the regiment’s

vulnerable main supply line.75

While those efforts continued, General Barth

prepared defensive fire plans for his batteries. He

very carefully avoided locating his guns directly to

the rear of the 24th Infantry and instead positioned

most of them to its side, behind the regiments on

its flanks. The arrangement complicated artillery

support for the 24th by increasing the distance the

batteries had to fire and by causing occasional communications problems, but Barth had already suffered the annihilation of the better part of two of

his battalions and had no intention of suffering further disasters. During the previous weeks, he noted

in explanation, portions of the 24th Infantry had

withdrawn without warning, leaving his batteries

unprotected from mass infantry attacks. “It is

expected in this type of warfare,” he said, “that any

battery may be attacked by infiltration and must

defend itself. However, a battery of artillery is not

heavily enough armed to hold out against large

scale attacks.” Colonel Champeny objected to the

arrangement and insisted that at least one battery

remain near Haman. When Champeny hastened

completion of Engineer Road to enhance resupply

and reduce the threat to the town, Barth complied

with his wishes. Even so, the battery in question

stood just across the line between the 24th and the

35th, in the 35th’s area of responsibility.76

Although Barth blamed the unreliability of the

24th for his decision on the location of his batteries, an examination of the terrain leads to a suspicion that he would have done the same thing,

whatever the units on P’il-bong and Sobuk-san.

The roads in the area ran across the enemy’s front

from north to south rather than away from it to the

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 147

74 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 16, 17, 18 Aug 50, box 3750, RG

407, WNRC. 75 Ibid.; WD, 65th Engr Bn, Aug 50, pp. 13–21; Interv,

Cash with Charles Bussey, 6 Jan 89. See also Bussey, Firefight at

Yechon, pp. 157–59. According to Bussey, Champeny opposed

building the road. 76 Barth makes the point about the positioning of his batteries in Memo, Brig Gen George B. Barth for Col William O.

Perry, IG, EUSAK, 8 Sep 50, sub: Statement of Brigadier

General George B. Barth Concerning Performance of 159th

Field Artillery, exhibit D–1, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. The war diary of the 159th Field Artillery

Battalion shows the positioning of that unit’s batteries, all of

which were located outside of the 24th Infantry’s sector despite

the fact that the 159th was in direct support of the regiment.

See WD, 159th FA Bn, Aug 50, p. 8, and attached Sketch 6.

The dispositions of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion were similar. See WD, 90th FA Bn, Aug 50.
east. In case of a North Korean breakthrough, the

artillery batteries would have found it difficult to

withdraw and might have had to be abandoned.

The Engineer Road into Haman remedied part of

the problem, but nothing similar existed to the

south, directly behind the 24th. By contrast, the

Masan–Saga-ri road fed from east to west into the

35th Infantry’s sector, making a location in that

area much safer. The same was true in the 5th

Infantry’s sector, where artillerymen had the support of the Masan–Chindong-ni road.

As the 25th Division readied its defenses, the

North Koreans continued to probe. During the

predawn hours of 17 August, they launched the

first of a series of attacks against the 35th Infantry’s

positions on Sibidang Mountain, four miles northwest of Haman. In the five days of fighting that followed, units of the regiment’s 1st Battalion were

forced off of their positions several times but on

each occasion regained them in counterattacks. On

the morning of 20 August, while visiting a forward

observation post, the regimental commander,

Colonel Fisher, discovered a large enemy force

advancing to renew the attack. Calling in air strikes

and artillery, he caused an estimated three hundred

and fifty North Korean casualties. Undeterred, the

enemy renewed the attack at the same point during

the early morning hours of 22 August, driving

Company A of the 1st Battalion from its position.

Counterattacking, the company regained the

ground it had lost by the end of the day. The next

morning the enemy withdrew.77

Throughout the period, if some members of

the 35th Infantry ran to the rear, their number was

unremarkable and easily managed. The 25th

Division’s provost marshal compiled a list by unit of

stragglers apprehended in the division rear area.

The numbers were small for all units. Even so,

keeping in mind that the 24th had a larger population than most all-white units, the statistics provide

a small-scale representation of straggling within the

various regiments of the division. During August

the provost marshal collected 116 men from the

24th Infantry, 15 from the 27th, and 12 from the

35th. Among artillery units, the all-black 159th

Field Artillery Battalion had 32, while the all-white

90th had 5, the 8th 6, and the 64th 3.78

While enemy units probed the 35th to the

north, the 6th North Korean Division tested the lines

of the 24th Infantry. The attacks began early on the

morning of 18 August, when one of the division’s

units overran a platoon of the 1st Battalion’s

Company C on Battle Mountain. Company C’s

commander, Capt. Laurence Corcoran, adjusted his

defenses and managed to hold in place.79

While that was happening, the enemy also sent

probes north to attack the 2d Battalion. In the fighting that followed, portions of Company E were overrun, and the company commander, 1st Lt. Gabriel

C. Anselmo, was killed. With that, some of the unit’s

platoons began to buckle, but as they did a platoon

leader in the battalion’s weapons company, white 1st

Lt. Ernest M. Williams, assisted in maintaining order

by rallying his men just as they were beginning to

withdraw. Killing three of the enemy with his carbine, he manned a machine gun until seriously

wounded. In so doing, he brought some stability to

the company’s line by gaining the time his men

needed to regroup and return to their positions.80

Even with that assistance, Company E proved

unable to retake the ground it had lost. Turning to

a fresh unit, the battalion commander, Colonel

Cole, instructed Company G to attack and called

in an air strike to assist. In the confusion that followed, poor communication and improper marking of the target brought the strike down on

friendly forces, leaving them no choice but to

148 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

77 WD, 25th Inf Div, 20–23 Aug 50, box 3748; WD, 35th

Inf Rgt, 15–31 Aug 50, box 3750; WD, 1st Bn, 35th Inf Rgt,

20–23 Aug 50, box 3750. All in RG 407, WNRC.

78 Certificate, Office of the Provost Marshal, 25th Inf Div,

13 Feb 51, exhibit K, Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation. Regimental strengths as of 31 August 1950 were

3,024 for the 24th Infantry, 2,577 for the 27th, and 2,910 for

the 35th. See G–1 Daily Summary 50, 25th Inf Div, 31 Aug 50,

in WD, 25th Inf Div, Aug 50, box 3748, RG 407, WNRC. 79 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 9–10. See

also Intervs, IG with Capt Laurence M. Corcoran, 1 Sep 50,

exhibit 3, Kean Letter file; Cash with Griffin, 5 Oct 88. 80 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 18 Aug 50, p. 8, box 3750,

RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div GO 255, 28 Oct 50, Silver Star

Citation for 1st Lt Ernest M. Williams.
withdraw. Seeking a more experienced hand,

Champeny immediately replaced Cole with

Roberts. Under the new commander’s direction,

Company G counterattacked and reclaimed all of

the lost ground.81

Although forced in the end to withdraw, the

enemy was only testing American strength and

foraging for food and weapons. In the days that

followed, his goals became clearer and his purposes hardened. On 20 August North Korean

forces all across South Korea received final

instructions to begin preparations for an all-out

push against Pusan. The 6th North Korean Division

was to anchor the southernmost flank of the

effort, advancing through Haman and Masan to

the western outskirts of Pusan.82

Ten days were to elapse before the start of the

offensive, but the 6th Division’s commander apparently considered American possession of Sobuksan, P’il-bong, and Battle Mountain a threat. Rather

than continue probing for weak points while building up for the assault, he therefore spent considerable time and effort throughout the period attempting to take control of at least the mountain crests.

In that way, he would gain the high ground before

the final attack, hide the movements of his own

troops from prying American eyes, and receive an

unobstructed view of the 25th Division’s dispositions in the valleys beyond.

Beginning on the morning of 20 August the

North Koreans intensified their attacks against the

24th Infantry, making Battle Mountain and the

ridge lines to its north and south their targets.

Companies B and G held their own in the assaults

that followed, but one platoon of Company E

buckled. Avowing later that only eight of his men

had stood and fought, the platoon leader, black

Sfc. Willis Blakley, became so angry that he gave

sworn depositions against fifteen who had run.

Although Blakley was killed in action a few days

later, his story was confirmed by three others,

including Colonel Cole. As a result, charges were

preferred against the men.83

Company C on Battle Mountain bore the brunt

of the attack and likewise began to waver almost

immediately. “At 0630,” the unit’s commander,

Captain Corcoran, told investigators, “I received a

call from Lieutenant Blackburn. He was being

attacked in force. I went over to the observation

post of the 2d Platoon, and while I was there the

Sergeant and another soldier came running to me

and told me that the enemy had broken through

our front. . . . At 0800, I found that I and 25 men

were the only ones left on the high ground.”84

Corcoran pulled his men back to a supply point on

the reverse side of the mountain. Cut off from the

rest of the regiment, the company continued to

resist, even though many of the men who

remained were demoralized and only a few put up

much of a fight. During a lull in combat, a North

Korean officer came forward under a flag of truce

to offer surrender terms. Corcoran declined the

invitation, and one of his soldiers, without instructions, apparently shot the messenger in the back as

he tried to return to his lines.85

The fight became more desperate. Corcoran

ordered 1st Sgt. Peter J. Paulfrey to attempt a

breakthrough to the rear to inform the battalion

commander, Colonel Miller, that he would hold

his position for as long as he could but that he

needed reinforcements.86 “Sgt. Paulfrey came off the

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 149

81 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 8–9; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, 18 Aug 50. 82 FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52, p.

63; ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue 100,

30 Apr 51, 6th NK Infantry Division, pp. 39–40.

83 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 10–11;

WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 9; Statement of

Camp, 9 Sep 50, Reference 24th Infantry Regiment, exhibit

D–21, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. Cole was

in the Battle Mountain area commanding a task force. 84 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 9–10;

Interv, IG with Corcoran, 1 Sep 50, exhibit 3, Kean Letter file.

Corcoran’s dating is off and the number of men that he says

remained differs from the number in other accounts, but the

combat he describes clearly occurred on 20 August. 85 Interv, Cash with Griffin, 5 Oct 88. Griffin tells the

same story in a letter to the secretary of the Army, but fails to

mention that the North Korean was killed. See Ltr, Albert

Griffin, Jr., to Secretary of the Army, 22 May 88, CMH files. 86 Interv, Cash with Corcoran, 28 Jul 89. Another officer,

1st Lt. Louis Anthis, was also ordered to break through for

help. He arrived at the 1st Battalion headquarters after

Paulfrey. See 25th Inf Div GO 176, 22 Sep 50, Silver Star

Citation; Interv, Cash with Griffin, 5 Oct 88.
hill . . . with a few men,” the battalion’s executive

officer, Major Carson, later recalled, “and reported

that the company had been overrun and that there

was no one left on the hill. As a result of [Paulfrey’s]

report, the hill was strafed and napalmed . . ., and

his company commander and twenty men of his

company were still in position on the hill.”87

The air strikes ended the battle. After a prolonged resistance, Corcoran and his men pulled

back. “I don’t know what [Paulfrey’s] motivation was

at the time,” the officer observed years later. “Maybe

it was the stress of the moment or maybe he wanted

to do me in, I don’t really know. I had never had a

problem with him. He was considered one of the top

sergeants in the 24th.” Later in the fighting, on 23

August, after apparently lingering in the rear for over

a day, Paulfrey would be arrested for refusing to obey

a direct order from Carson to rejoin his unit. He was

convicted of disobedience to a superior officer and

sentenced to twenty years in prison.88

“At the close of this day’s operation,” the 1st

Battalion’s historian later remarked in the unit’s war

diary, “it was apparent that the North Korean forces

had struck a mortal blow to the regiment’s defensive positions. Company C was disorganized,

[white 1st] Lt. [Louis] Anthis was able to round up

only 40 men to return to its position. Also significant was the fact that a gap of 1,400 yards existed

between Companies B and E. The said gap was being

occupied by North Korean forces of unknown

strength.”89 Late in the day Champeny ordered the

regimental reserve, Companies I and L of the 3d

Battalion, to restore Company C’s position. The two

units worked their way to a point below the crest of

the mountain, but then pulled in for the night.90

Corcoran received the Silver Star for his role in

the battle, as did Anthis, who led a patrol to the rear

to bring help but arrived too late at the battalion

command post to stop the air strike. Second Lt.

Alexander Hunt, who went forward in the face of

enemy fire to direct air strikes against the enemy

with hand signals, also received a Silver Star.

Corcoran saw to it that virtually every one of the

thirty-five riflemen and medics who had stayed with

him on the hill received the Bronze Star for valor.91

Fighting continued on the next morning, 21

August, when the enemy launched a probing

attack against Company G. All of the men in the

unit except for a small group around the company commander abandoned their positions. The

battalion’s operations officer, Capt. James

Gardner, told investigators later that week that “I

personally heard the company commander pleading with the men to stay on the hill.”92 Company

E was not attacked, but, according to the battalion’s executive officer, Maj. Horace E. Donaho,

some of its men left their positions as well. “We

had a strong point set up,” the officer recalled. “I

was informed that their machine gun position had

been overrun. They left the tripod and all their

ammo. Upon checking, I found that neither

enemy or friendly shots had been fired, that

friendly troops withdrawing through ‘E’ Company

positions had reported the enemy was right

behind them.” The company’s officers later collected the stragglers and sent them back into their

old positions on the hill. They met with no enemy

resistance.93

150 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

87 Carson said that Corcoran was on the hill for twenty

hours and that the air attacks came the next morning, but the

24th Infantry war diary says the air and artillery attacks

began in the early afternoon on 20 August. We have followed

the war diary’s version. See Interv, IG with Lt Col Eugene

Carson, 9 Feb 51, exhibit B–114, Far East Command

Inspector General Investigation; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug

50, p. 18. Corcoran also tells the Paulfrey story. See Interv,

Cash with Corcoran, 28 Jul 89. 88 Interv, Cash with Corcoran, 28 Jul 89. Carson describes

the Paulfrey incident in Interv, IG with Carson, 6 Sep 50,

exhibit 21, Kean Letter file. The particulars of Paulfrey’s court

case are in Court-Martial Data Sheet, M Sgt Peter J. Paulfrey, Jr.,

n.d., exhibit D–1, Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation. For more on the air strike, see Interv,

Muehlbauer with Arthur Thompson, 14 Sep 88. 89 A rare statement in a battalion war diary. See WD, 2d

Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 11.

90 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 18–19. 91 See 25th Inf Div GOs 176, 22 Sep 50; 178, 23 Sep 50;

215, 2 Oct 50; 217, 3 Oct 50; 218, 3 Oct 50; 219, 3 Oct 50;

220, 3 Oct 50; 221, 3 Oct 50; and 222, 4 Oct 50. 92 Interv, IG with Gardner, 24 Aug 50, exhibit 24, Kean

Letter file. 93 Interv, IG with Horace E. Donaho, 22 Aug 50, exhibit

19, Kean Letter file. A period has been added between overrun

and they in Donaho’s statement for the sake of clarity. The battalion war diary is silent on these incidents, only noting that
While those incidents were occurring, the 3d

Battalion was continuing its effort to retake

Company C’s former position. Colonel Corley kept

his command post close to the action and

described what happened. The attack, he said,

went brilliantly, with the troops showing courage

and initiative. In the face of heavy enemy resistance, the commander of Company L, black 1st Lt.

Randall P. Stephens, led his unit up the steep

mountain slope without the benefit of cover or

concealment or the assistance of mortar and

artillery fire. Making use of all the advantages that

fire and maneuver could bring to bear, the officer

and his men took three hours and suffered seventeen casualties but achieved their objective.94

What happened next was less encouraging.

Three hours later, when the enemy launched a counterattack and began to converge on Company L’s

flank, the unit wavered and withdrew down the hill.

Although Stephens again played a prominent role,

rallying the men into strong defensive positions

which allowed them to repel two subsequent

attacks, the development stunned Corley. A few days

later, reflecting on what had happened, he could

only conclude in an interview with the inspector

general that the incident should never have occurred

and that the officers’ inexperience was to blame.

Suggesting that the unit’s commanders had somehow failed either to dig in properly or to take other

precautions that might have thwarted the assault, he

attributed “this unexplained withdrawal after such a

brilliant attack to the complete lack of security of the

men of Company L.” A strong force of approximately eighty-five men, he added, was in position on the

hill when the attack occurred.95

Corley reorganized the company and on the

morning of 22 August sent it back up the hill, but

the unit, its men badly shaken, continued to wobble. A platoon leader, white 2d Lt. Gerald

Alexander, who had arrived less than two weeks

before, described what happened:

It took me over one hour to get the men to move 200

yards and we were not receiving a round of fire. They

would not move with hand signals. I had to plead with

them, give them a direct order, and I had to curse them

and by the way, the latter proved to be most effective. I

continually had to move from man to man to get each

individual to move. I led, I went to the rear and

pushed. It took an hour to move a distance that would

normally take ten minutes. Finally when we reached

our objective, three grenades were thrown by the

enemy that slightly injured six men, including myself.

The entire attacking force took off down the hill. . . . I

got them stopped after they had run a hundred yards,

and we made the attack again. I had them all throw

their grenades and then I ordered them to assault the

knoll, but no one would go. Finally, myself and a

B.A.R. man went up and found no one alive on the hill.

The men finally came up on the knoll with me, but to

get them down on the other side it took me another

thirty minutes.96

While the attack proceeded, Colonel Corley

monitored the action from a position less than two

hundred yards to the rear, coordinating artillery support and often personally directing the fire of individual riflemen and machine gunners. When the

attack faltered and Company L came back off the

hill, he committed Company I to the action and

joined the assault himself. His presence appears to

have bolstered the morale of both the men and their

officers. The battalion retook the hill and, with

Company C following behind as a reserve, consolidated the position.97

The enemy launched six counterattacks on 23

August, two of company size. During one, accordTHE PUSAN PERIMETER 151

the unit received small-arms fire and encountered small groups

of enemy infiltrators. See WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 21 Aug 50,

p. 9, box 3750, RG 407, WNRC. 94 Corley told the story only three days after the event. See

Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 2, Kean Letter file.

See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with Stephens, 18 and 27 Jul 94;

Sapenter, 14 and 21 Mar 94. 95 Quote from Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit

2, Kean Letter file. Stephens received the Silver Star. His role is

described in 25th Inf Div GO 214, 2 Oct 50. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Stephens, 18 and 27 Jul 94; Sapenter, 14 and

21 Mar 94.

96 Interv, IG with 2d Lt Gerald N. Alexander, 2 Sep 50,

exhibit 20, Kean Letter file. 97 Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50, exhibit 2, Kean

Letter file. See also EUSAK GO 141, 27 Oct 50, Distinguished

Service Cross Citation for Lt Col John T. Corley, with attached

Statements by Sgt Levy V. Hollis and Sgt George Wilkerson,

both 12 Oct 50.
ing to Corcoran, the North Koreans used percussion grenades which “made a lot of noise and started a panic; there were two or three officers there

with myself and we rallied the men into a counterattack and we took the position; and we had one

heck of a time accounting for the personnel . . . that

we had originally, before the counter-attack.” In the

end, despite the straggling, all of the enemy’s

attacks failed.98

Even so, the defense was chaotic at best.

Company C was so crippled by casualties and straggling that it could place fewer than sixty men on the

hill. Meanwhile, American units were so thinly

spread across the broad front they had to defend that

enemy infiltrators succeeded in penetrating to the

rear, where snipers became a continual threat.

Complicating matters, firing discipline was weak.

“Men on the extreme left flank of the positions,”

Corley noted, “would indiscriminately open fire

when a probing attack would hit the right flank. The

men had no . . . idea of how to conduct an organized

company defense. The position was held by mortar

and artillery fire and by the officers taking groups of

men regardless of platoons’ assignment and coordinat[ing] their fire.” Although the assault companies

received fewer than a dozen incoming mortar

rounds and no enemy artillery or air action occurred,

“this engagement . . . was as rough as the toughest

action I have had in a campaign in World War II in

Europe. I never felt secure about the position. Prior

to relief, . . . L Company reported a fox hole strength

of 17 and I Company 46, yet half way down the

mountain L Company’s strength had jumped to 48

and I Company to 75. The next morning, both units

had over 100 men in them.” Overall, the two units

suffered the loss of 6 officers and 114 enlisted men

in the engagement.99

152 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

98 Interv, IG with Corcoran, 13 Feb 51, exhibit B–125, Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation.

99 The 1st Battalion’s war diary delineates many of the

problems confronting the hill’s defenders. The 3d Battalion’s

war diary is less communicative. See WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

1–31 Aug 50, pp. 5–6; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50,

A chaplain conducts Sunday morning services along the Pusan Perimeter.
On 24 August Companies I and L withdrew

from the crest, leaving it in the hands of Company

C and a company of South Korean police. Although

the South Korean commander was killed and communication proved a problem between the two

groups, they repelled four enemy assaults over the

next two days, on one occasion employing

flamethrowers to good effect. Throughout the period they tried to link up with units to the north and

south, but the 24th Infantry’s front remained so

extended and enemy resistance was so strong that

the effort proved impossible. When the 1st

Battalion called in heavy air strikes, enemy forces

pulled off their positions, only to return and counterattack when the aircraft departed.100

Over the days that followed, the North

Koreans continued to probe the 24th all along the

line to determine the unit’s weakest links. After

midnight on the morning of 25 August, following

a series of small attacks, they launched a heavy

assault against Company F, located well to the

north on the seam between the 24th and 35th

Infantry regiments. One platoon of the company

gave way, allowing enemy troops to occupy its

position, but artillery fire soon beat them back.

The acting battalion commander, Colonel

Roberts, later observed that the episode “had no

detrimental effect on the overall plan.”101

If that was so, the incident still told a great deal

about the readiness of the unit. According to General

Wilson, who arrived at the scene shortly after

American forces recaptured the position, some of

those who lost their lives in the attack did so because

of poor training and discipline. “On 25 August,” he

said, “I inspected a position of ‘F’ Company which

had been vacated the night before, and there were

dead on the ground, all of whom were outside of

their fox holes. The Company C.O. [a black, Capt.

Roger Walden] informed me that he had done his

best to keep them in their holes at the approach of

the enemy. They threw their grenades too soon and

stood up in their fox holes, fired one clip from their

rifles, and ran.” Wilson remarked that the company

commander had told him he thought the men were

“superstitious about staying in holes.”102

On 25 August, to improve coordination in the

area between the 1st and 2d Battalions, especially

on Battle Mountain, Colonel Champeny established Task Force Baker, comprising Company C, a

platoon from Company E, and a unit of South

Korean police. Commanded by Colonel Cole, the

force held off the enemy for the next two days,

coordinating air strikes and beating back continuing enemy attacks. At one point during the action,

fighter-bombers caught a 100-man enemy force in

the open on a hillside and obliterated it with a hail

of bombs, cannon fire, and napalm.103

On 28 August Companies I and L of the 3d

Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion on Battle

Mountain and the adjacent ridges. Companies A

and B went into reserve, but Company C, heavily

worn from the fighting, remained in place on the

crest under the operational control of Cole’s Task

Force Baker.

Intense fighting began early on the morning of

29 August, with the command posts for both Task

Force Baker and Company C receiving heavy mortar and tank fire. At that time, some of the men

from Company C left their stations, but the company’s commander, Captain Corcoran, and one

remaining officer, black 1st Lt. John M. Jenkins,

reorganized enough of the troops to beat the enemy

back and regain the position. The contest ran all

that day and into the night, with Company C virtually surrounded and at times fighting hand to

hand. Air and artillery fire kept enemy forces from

massing for a final attack during the day, but after

dark the North Koreans infiltrated a force behind

Company C and succeeded for a time in penetrating the unit’s command post. A platoon from

pp. 12–13. Quotes from Interv, IG with Corley, 26 Aug 50,

exhibit 2, Kean Letter file. 100 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 13. See also

WD, 25th Inf Div, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 27, box 3748, RG 407,

WNRC. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Tittel, 15 and 20 Apr 94,

for the connection with the 5th Infantry on the southern flank. 101 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 11; Interv,

IG with Lt Col Paul F. Roberts, 13 Sep 50, exhibit B–1, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation.

102 Intervs, IG with Brig Gen Vennard Wilson, 5 Sep 50,

exhibit 29, Kean Letter file; MacGarrigle with Walden, 5 Jul 95. 103 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 13–14;

Interv, Cash with Corcoran, 28 Jul 89.

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 153
Company E was also surrounded along with the

command post for Task Force Baker.104

Company I received orders to counterattack but

before it could, at 2300, the enemy launched a sharp

assault on the left flank of Company C. Corcoran

described what happened next. “Some unidentified

soldier ran across our position yelling, ‘Withdraw.

Withdraw. We are being attacked.’ The rest of the

men immediately pulled out and left.”105 Out of an

original strength of between eighty-five and ninetyfive men, Corcoran could count only seventeen who

remained: three artillery men, several wounded, and

the command-post group. Notifying his superiors of

the situation, he requested and received permission

to abandon the position.106 As for Company C, the

1st Battalion’s historian could only say that the unit

had become “completely disorganized,” that its men

were “extremely fatigued,” and that its combat efficiency was “questionable.”107

During the hours that followed, the main body

of the enemy vacated the mountaintop and

grouped in a wooded area some five hundred yards

to the west. Champeny called in artillery and then

ordered Company B of the regimental reserve to

counterattack. The unit met light resistance. At

1300 the company’s commander, Capt. William A.

Hash, reported Battle Mountain secure.108 Taking

Company C’s place on the mountain, Hash’s company began to repair the position’s defenses.

According to the 1st Battalion’s war diary, the area

had assumed by that time “all the appearances of

a World War I No-man’s Land.”109

The scene was an indication of the difficulty

the soldiers of the 24th had in defending Battle

Mountain and the other isolated hilltop positions

around P’il-bong. It was a major ordeal to reach

the units to provide basic necessities such as food,

water, and ammunition. A number of Korean

porters were hired to assist in the resupply effort,

but some of them were found to be porters by day

and North Korean soldiers by night. When enemy

troops were close, the porters faded away, and airdrops by light liaison aircraft were sometimes

required in emergencies. As one platoon leader of

Company K remarked, “This is when I gave up

wanting to be a millionaire, because if I had all the

money in the world, I believe that I’d [have]

bought a drink of water and ammunition.”110

Because of the supply problems, concertina

wire was not available in most positions, and the

only available protection was from foxholes.

Because of the rocky ground, they tended to be

shallow and provided little safety. A newly arrived

platoon leader in Company C, white 2d Lt. Wilbur

T. Felkey, described the defensive positions as

“shallow graves.”111 Bodies could not be buried,

and the injured and wounded had to be hauled

down the mountain in a painful and time-consuming journey which not all survived.112

The defenders were under constant stress

from the threat of attack from any direction, the

lack of sleep and need for constant vigilance, and

the miserable living conditions. As if to make

sport of the Americans’ discomfort, North Korean

propagandists chose the night that Company B

replaced Company C on Battle Mountain to

broadcast a loudspeaker message in which they

154 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

104 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 27–28. 105 Quote from Interv, IG with Corcoran, 1 Sep 50, exhibit 3, Kean Letter file. Corcoran attributes some of his information to Jenkins. Since his comments were typed as delivered,

in a stream of consciousness, punctuation has been added for

clarity. The regimental war diary tells the same story. See WD,

24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, pp. 27–28. 106 Ibid. Corcoran tallied the men who remained in Interv,

IG with Corcoran, 13 Feb 51, exhibit B–125, Far East

Command Inspector General Investigation. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94. 107 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 16. For

more on Company C’s condition, see Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Gillert, 4 May 94; Green, 16 Jun 94. 108 Ibid. 109 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 16.

110 Quote is from Interv, Muehlbauer with James C.

Yadon, 22 May 89. Poor living conditions within the 24th were

mentioned by many veterans. Problems with rations, water,

heat, and fatigue were widespread at times within the Eighth

Army as a whole. For comments on the problems of supply, see

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Gillert, 4 May 94; Muehlbauer with

Wilbur T. Felkey, 8 Sep 88; Isaac Smith, 27 Sep 88; Cash with

Edward Dixon, 20 Jan 89; Raymond C. Hagins, 28 Aug 88. 111 Interv, Muehlbauer with Felkey, 8 Sep 88. See also

Interv, MacGarrigle with Green, 16 Jun 94. 112 Interv, Cash with Dixon, 20 Jan 89; Muehlbauer with

Felkey, 8 Sep 88; Isaac Smith, 27 Sep 88.
asserted in good English that “Americans should

not fight North Korean soldiers. We have nothing

against you.”113

General Kean had much to consider as August

ended. His division had done about as well as could

be expected during Task Force Kean. The fight on

the Pusan Perimeter had been equally difficult but

no less successful. Battle Mountain had changed

hands many times, but, along with Sobuk-san and

P’il-bong, it remained under American control.

Meanwhile, the enemy’s continual forays had cost

him dearly. During lulls in the battle, American

forces had collected hundreds of enemy dead, many

the products of U.S. air strikes and artillery.114

Nevertheless, much remained to be done. On

28 August prisoner-of-war interrogations had

revealed that the enemy was planning a major

attack.115 Kean was confident that most of his regiments would stand up to the assault, but he distrusted the 24th. The unit had paid a heavy price

during July and August, suffering a large number of

casualties, particularly among noncommissioned

and junior officers. When properly led, portions of

it did well, and examples abounded of men who

stood by their officers to the end, whatever the cost.

Even so, as a whole the regiment was unreliable. Some of its companies seemed badly demoralized, and the stresses it had experienced had

begun to affect the performance of other units in

the division. The division artillery commander,

General Barth, in particular, insisted that the strain

of working with the 24th was causing severe anxiety among his liaison officers. Expected to serve

with a unit over long periods of time, those individuals had been abandoned to the enemy so regularly by members of the 24th who had run that an

undue proportion of them had become casualties.

The rest had to be rotated in and out of the unit

much more frequently than in other regiments to

avoid mental breakdowns.116 Kean could do little

over the short term because of the enemy’s threatening offensive, but he knew that action of some

sort was imperative. He had instructed his inspectors earlier in the month to investigate allegations

that were beginning to circulate about the regiment

and its performance. They were already hard at

work. He would make up his mind on what to do

as soon as he had a report.117

113 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, p. 16. 114 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 14; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 24. 115 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Aug 50, p. 12.

116 Memo, Barth for Perry, 8 Sep 50, sub: Statement of

Brigadier General George B. Barth Concerning Performance of

159th Field Artillery, exhibit D–1, Eighth Army Inspector

General Investigation. Other interviews support Barth. See, for

example, Intervs, Bowers with Skiffington, 14 Apr 94;

MacGarrigle with Franke, 14 and 28 Jul 94; IG with Kennedy,

25 Aug 50, exhibit 15, Kean Letter file; Alfred F. Thompson, 24

Aug 50, exhibit 11, Kean Letter file. 117 Statement of Camp, 9 Sep 50, Reference 24th Infantry

Regiment, exhibit D–21, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation.

THE PUSAN PERIMETER 155

A

s August gave way to September, the 24th

Infantry regiment remained in place at the center of the 25th Infantry Division’s line, covering

a frontage of some thirteen thousand yards. To the

north the 35th Infantry regiment manned a

22,000-yard line, and to the south the 5th Infantry

regiment defended 12,000 yards. All were augmented by South Korean marine, army, and police

units. The combat west of Masan had been hard,

but it was only a prelude for the three regiments.

Understanding that Pusan was the source of

American strength, the enemy resolved to eliminate

the threat. On the night of 31 August 1950, he set

out to do so, attacking the entire Pusan Perimeter.

Some of the most intense fighting occurred in the

sector occupied by the 25th Division.1 (Map 9)

The 6th North Korean Division would comprise

the backbone of the enemy effort, striking not only

the 5th and the 24th Infantry regiments but also

the southern portions of the 35th. Although

American intelligence analysts considered the

10,000 original members of the unit resourceful,

tenacious, experienced fighters, by mid-August

their number had shrunk to fewer than six thousand. Thirty-one hundred replacements had arrived

shortly thereafter, but more casualties had occurred

over the subsequent two weeks, leaving the unit

with an estimated strength of 6,380 men on the eve

of the offensive. A hard core of several thousand veterans remained, but many of the rest were

untrained recruits dragooned into service from

South Korea’s cities and villages. They were hard to

hold in place during attacks. Overall, the division

was unable to provide its members with proper

nourishment and medical assistance. It lacked

heavy artillery and air support and had lost most of

its armor to American artillery and air assaults.2

To the north of the 6th, staging out of Uiryong,

the 7th North Korean Division would cross the Nam

River to strike the northernmost portions of the

35th Infantry. Formed in early July 1950, the unit

had incurred heavy casualties during earlier

engagements and had likewise received a large

number of untrained replacements. At most 30

1 War Diary (WD), 25th Inf Div, 1 Sep 50, box 3752,

Record Group (RG) 407, Washington National Records Center

(WNRC), Suitland, Md. For problems of South Korean Army

troops serving with U.S. forces, see Eighth U.S. Army, Korea

(EUSAK), Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, 5 Feb 52,

pp. 15–23, CMH files.

CHAPTER 7

The Great Offensive

2 Far East Command (FEC), Military Intelligence Section,

Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 15 Oct 50,

U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks,

Pa., hereafter cited as North Korean Order of Battle; 25th Inf

Div Narrative Rpt, 25th Infantry Division in Korea, September

1950, n.d., pp. 21–22, attachment to WD, 25th Inf Div, Sep

50, boxes 3752–3754, RG 407, WNRC, hereafter cited as

Narrative Rpt, 25th Inf Div in Korea, Sep 50. See also FEC,

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), Research

Supplement, Interrogation Rpt, issue 100, 30 Apr 50, 6th NK

Infantry Division, Intelligence Research Collection, MHI.
I I

1 Sep

2 27

I I

31 Aug

3 35(-)

I I

1630,1 Sep

from Masan

1 27(+) I I

1 Sep

3 27

III

31 Aug

27

I I

1 Sep

1 24(-)

Naktong R

Nam R

MASAN

BAY

Elms, Nk 6th Inf Div

Elms, Nk 7th Inf Div

Elms, A/9

E(-)

F(-) 1/F

3/F

1/E

G(-)

2/G(-)

105

B/64

ROK Police (300)

2/C

B C(-)

3/C

Plat/A

A/64

A/159

B/159 105

C/90

C/159

Plat/F

F(-)

E(-)

B

I

L

K

ROK

Plat/E

G

A(-)

L

2/24

1/24

35

III

24

105

105

105

155

Sqd 2/G

K/35(+), Am, 1 Sep

24

III

5

2

XX

25

0730, 1 Sep

Kihang

 Ferry

Namji-ri

Agok

Kuhe-ri Ferry

Saga-ri

Engineer Rd

Haman

Tundok

Chungam-ni

Chirwon

Chung-ni

MASAN

0 3

Miles

U. S. 25TH DIVISION SECTOR

THE NORTH KOREAN NAKTONG OFFENSIVE

31 August–1 September 1950

U. S. and ROK Positions, Evening, 31 Aug

24th Inf Positions, 1 Sep

U. S. Counterattacks, 1 Sep

Unit Positions, Date

N. K. Attack, 31 Sug–1 Sep

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 100 300 500 700 and Above

Map 9
percent of its soldiers were experienced fighting

men. Of the rest, as was the case in the 6th, many

of the men would respond to orders and advance

because they either believed in their cause or feared

what would happen if they failed to obey. Even so,

a high percentage was of doubtful reliability in

extended combat.3

The 25th Division at the End of August

The regiments of the U.S. 25th Division had

also suffered greatly. By the beginning of September

each had incurred a loss approaching 40 percent of

its men as battle and nonbattle casualties. Although

some replacements had arrived and the 27th and

35th had each gained third battalions, they all

remained far below authorized strength.

Meanwhile, the 5th Regimental Combat Team,

which had been attached to the division, had seen

less combat but had taken over one thousand casualties.4 (Table 6)

While officers arrived throughout the period,

the availability of enlisted men as replacements was

limited until August. During July, as a result, the

24th Infantry received 24 officers but only 94 enlisted men to compensate for 408 casualties. At the end

of August, although the officer shortage had ended,

there was still a shortage of enlisted men, but 53

more officers, 3 warrant officers, and 841 enlisted

men then joined the unit. For a time, there were

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 159

3 Ibid.; ATIS, Research Supplement, Interrogation Rpt,

issue 99, 24 Apr 51, 7th NK Infantry Division, Intelligence

Research Collection, MHI.

4 Percentages were obtained by comparing the strength of

the units upon arrival in Korea with total casualties as of 31

August. See G–1 Daily Summaries, 25th Inf Div, for 14 Jul and

31 Aug 50, in WDs, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50, boxes 3746–3747,

and Aug 50, box 3748, both in RG 407, WNRC.

24th Infantry . . . . 3157 883 352 39.1 3024 3793 6

27th Infantry . . . . 2370 535 255 39.0* 2557* 3793 6

3d Battalion,

29th Infantry

(attached to 27th

on 7 Aug 51) . . . . . . . 922 437 58

35th Infantry . . . . 1979 318 350 37.4* 2810* 3793 6

1st Battalion,

29th Infantry

(attached to

35th on 6 Aug 50). . . . . 922 284 133

5th RCT . . . . . . . 3497 724 403 32.2 3221 4653 4

*Includes totals for attached battalions

Unit

Strength on

Arrival

in Korea

Battle

Casualties

Nonbattle

Casualties

Percent

Loss

Strength on

31 August

Authorized

Strength

Weeks in

Combat

Source: G–1 Daily Summaries, 25th Inf Div, 14 Jul and 31 Aug 50, in War Diaries, 25th Inf Div, Jul 50, boxes

3746–3747, and Aug 50, box 3748, both in RG 407, WNRC; 5th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 1, 031800–041800 Aug 50, and

5th Inf Rgt Regimental History, n.d., both in box 1, RG 338, WNRC.

Table 6—25th Division Losses by 31 August
more black than white replacements available. That

led to the assignment of newly arriving black soldiers to all-white segments of the 25th Division as

well as to the 2d and 24th Infantry Divisions.5

If the new men were welcome, many of them

turned out to be cooks, truck drivers, clerks, automotive mechanics, and various other categories of

soldier rather than the trained infantrymen the unit

needed. The old members of the regiment were

better fighters, but a significant number of them

had fallen in battle, the acting commander of

Company E, black 1st Lt. Charles Ellis, could only

lament. Some of the new arrivals were incapable of

even breaking down a rifle.6

Seasoned sergeants and corporals might have

offset some of the inadequacies by conducting intensive training, but out of a total of 426 noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who joined the regiment

between 1 August and 18 September 1950, only 107

were in infantry-related specialties. The rest had

spent their time in the Army as construction foremen, supply sergeants, communications supervisors, or performing other administrative or housekeeping tasks.7 With heavy combat continuing, the

trained men went into the line immediately. The rest

filled in where they could but were often a burden.

“I have a[n] SFC that cannot do a job a corporal in a

squad can do,” Ellis told interviewers. “I have 29

SFC’s, about 20 of whom are noncombat men from

service units, and they are jumpy.”8

The 25th Division stationed a number of white

NCOs with the regiment at about that time to help

remedy the problem. All were volunteers who had

been promised promotion to officer status if they

succeeded in their duties. Assigned to Company A

under a black captain, they were so few in number

that the development—signaling the breakdown of

segregation under the pressures of combat in

Korea—appears at first to have gone unnoticed by

everyone except the regiment’s higher-ranking

enlisted men and NCOs, some of whom became

incensed. As one enlisted man in the 3d Battalion,

Charlie Lee Jones observed, the whites received

battlefield commissions to second lieutenant, taking places that might have gone to blacks under

other circumstances.9

Because adequate numbers of American

infantry replacements were unavailable to reconstitute depleted regiments, the U.S. Army inaugurated the Korean Army Troops, United States Army

(KATUSA), program to integrate South Korean soldiers into American units. It was not long before

difficulties arose. With little more than ten days of

training and a significant language barrier, the

KATUSAs, as they came to be called, were often

considered more of a hindrance than a help. In the

25th Division, commanders either employed them

160 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

5 WDs, 24th Inf Rgt, Jul and Aug 50, Strength and

Replacement Statistics, boxes 3746–3747 and box 3750, respectively, RG 407, WNRC. For integration in the 2d Division, see

Memo, Col C. C. Sloane, Jr., for General Craig, 29 Oct 50, exhibit D–6, in Eighth U.S. Army Korea, Report of Investigation

Concerning 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in

Combat, 15 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. For

integration in the 24th Infantry Division, see Interv, Inspector

General (IG) with Maj Gen John H. Church, 15 Nov 50, exhibit B–31, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. For integration of the 25th Infantry Division, see Memo for Adjutant

General (AG), 19 Sep 50, sub: GCT Breakdown, exhibit D–2,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. 6 Interv, IG with Capt Charles Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit

B–5, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. See also

Interv, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with James C. Yadon, 22 May

89. All interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O.

Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files. 7 Ibid. See also HQ, 25th Inf Div, Replacements Received

First Four Grades in 24th Inf Rgt Between 1 August 1950 and

18 September 1950, 20 Sep 50, exhibit D–8, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation.

8 Ibid. Quote from Interv, IG with Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. Ellis’ first

sergeant told much the same story. See Interv, IG with M Sgt

David Robinson, Co E, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation. 9 See Interv, IG with Capt William J. Jackson, 16 Sep 50,

exhibit B–16, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.

See also Interv, Clay Blair with John H. Michaelis, n.d., U.S.

Army Military History Institute Senior Officer Oral History

Program, Combat Leadership in Korea series, pp. 24, 34–36,

MHI; Ltr, John S. Komp to George L. MacGarrigle, 14 Apr 95,

CMH files. The assignment of whites to the 24th is described

in Frank Whisonant, “White GI’s Join All-Negro Unit,”

Pittsburgh Courier, 9 Sep 50. Whisonant says the men were

greeted with open arms. The resentment of the white sergeants

by the regiment’s NCOs and enlisted men is mentioned in

Intervs, John A. Cash with Charlie Lee Jones, 6 Sep 89; Floyd

B. Williams, 6 Aug 88.
in separate squads or platoons or paired each

Korean with an American “buddy.” Either way, they

were unreliable and difficult to control in battle.10

On 31 August the 25th Division itself was

stretched from the Naktong River to the Yellow Sea.

To the north, Colonel Fisher’s 35th Infantry had

responsibility for an area extending from the junction of the Nam and Naktong Rivers to a point about

halfway between Haman and Saga. The regiment’s

2d Battalion held the northern flank along the river.

Its 1st Battalion, augmented with Company L of the

3d, straddled the Masan–Chungam-ni road to the

south. A battalion of South Korean National Police

filled the space between the two, while Companies I

and K of the 3d Battalion held back in reserve.11

Next in line came the 24th Infantry, with Colonel

Roberts’ 2d Battalion blocking the western

approaches to Haman, while Corley’s 3d Battalion,

augmented by Company B of the 1st, held the ridge

line between Battle Mountain and Sobuk-san.

Companies A and C of the unit’s 1st Battalion stood

to the rear in reserve. Several platoons of raw South

Korean troops filled gaps here and there in the line.12

Farthest to the south came the 5th Infantry regiment,

now under the command of Lt. Col. John L.

Throckmorton. The regiment’s three battalions stood

in line, the 1st holding the southern approaches to

Sobuk-san, the 2d blocking the Chinju–Chindongni road, and the 3d guarding the region between the

road and the sea.13 (See Map 9.)

Adding to American strength, Lt. Col. John H.

Michaelis’ solid 27th Infantry regiment had just

returned to the 25th Division after serving as the

Eighth Army’s reserve. It was holding at Masan on

the night of 31 August, enjoying a brief respite

before moving forward to replace the 5th Infantry

on line south of the 24th Infantry. The unit’s presence in the area gave General Kean a temporary

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 161

10EUSAK, Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, 5 Feb

52, pp. 15–23. 11WD, 35th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, box 3755, RG 407,

WNRC.

12WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, box 3755, RG 407,

WNRC. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with Stuart Force, 8 Aug

94, with Force’s accompanying notes; Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 24

and 28 Mar 94. 13WD, 5th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, boxes 1–2, RG 338,

WNRC.

The enemy side of rocky crags on Battle Mountain
advantage. In effect, until the exchange of regiments was completed, the 25th Division would

consist of four full infantry regiments rather than

three. “We knew that something big was in the

wind,” the division’s artillery commander would

later write, “but never before had there been plentiful uncommitted reserves behind our precarious

lines. If the Reds had written us a letter and asked

when we would like to have them attack, the

answer would have been ‘on September 1st.’”14

The North Koreans Attack

On the afternoon of 31 August forward observers

within the 24th Infantry’s 2d Battalion noticed enemy

activity increasing 2,000 yards to their front and

called for air strikes and artillery. From that moment

on, all units within the regiment were on alert.15

North Korean mortars and artillery opened up at

2330, laying fire along the entire American front with

one of the heaviest bombardments they had ever

imposed. The gunners paid particular attention to

regimental and battalion command posts and to the

roads leading into Haman.16

Enemy ground forces moved in under the barrage shortly after midnight on the morning of 1

September, mounting attacks from one end of the

American line to the other. To the south, in the 5th

Infantry’s sector, enemy troops entered the position

of one company of the 1st Battalion, but the unit

held its ground and drove them back after an

intense exchange of fire. About 0150 the regiment’s

3d Battalion came under attack. Overrunning an

outpost line and driving on the battalion’s command post, the North Koreans managed to penetrate the positions of all three of the battalion’s rifle

companies as well as that of a company from the 2d

Battalion. In the end, however, they were again driven back with heavy losses. In all, Throckmorton

later reported that the 5th Infantry lost 8 killed, 23

wounded, and 5 missing in the action.17

A much more serious attack occurred on the

25th Division’s northern flank, where the 7th North

Korean Division along with elements from the 4th and

6th Divisions—between eight and ten thousand

men—fell upon Fisher’s 35th Infantry. At the beginning of the attack, shortly after midnight on 1

September, a force estimated at four companies

thrust down the Masan road toward the regiment’s

1st Battalion, striking an attached company from the

north while attempting to slip around the unit’s

southern flank. Meanwhile, on Sibidang Mountain,

four miles to the northwest of Haman, another company came under attack, as did the South Korean

police companies manning the gap between the 1st

and 2d Battalions. Well dug in and surrounded by

several layers of concertina wire and barbed-wire

fencing, most of the Americans held, but the South

Koreans gave way in a matter of minutes.

Discovering the gap shortly after it occurred, a

reserve company assisted by tanks counterattacked

and reclaimed partial control of the area. By that

time, however, up to a regiment of enemy had

passed through. The force began to operate to

Fisher’s rear, causing trouble as far away as Chungni, some six miles to the east of Saga.18

Over the day that followed, 2 September,

Fisher’s beleaguered force held firm, calling air

strikes and artillery down upon enemy troops

attempting to cross the Nam River from Uiryong

and obstructing enemy efforts to resupply the units

that had penetrated to the rear of the American

position. Setbacks occurred. Widely dispersed and

therefore vulnerable, the 2d Battalion suffered a

number of enemy breakthroughs. One of its companies, fighting both to the front and the rear, was

162 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

14 Brig Gen G. B. Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in

Korea, n.d., p. 28, CMH files; WD, 25th Inf Div, Sep 50, p. 2,

boxes 3752–3754, RG 407, WNRC. 15 Interv, IG with 1st Lt John L. Herren, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–8, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Aug 50, pp. 31–32. See also Interv, Cash with

Colon Britt, 18 Aug 88. 16 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50; Interv, IG with Lt Col

Paul F. Roberts, 13 Sep 50, exhibit B–1, Eighth Army Inspector

General Investigation.

17 WD, 5th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50, boxes 1–2, RG 338,

WNRC. See also Interv, MacGarrigle with D. Randall Beirne,

19 Aug 93. 18 WD, 35th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50, box 3755, RG 407,

WNRC. Although elements of the 4th North Korean Division

were positioned in front of the 35th, it is unclear whether they

participated in the attack on the regiment or devoted their full

attention to the U.S. 2d Infantry Division to the north.
completely cut off for a time and incurred heavy

casualties. A platoon from another company was driven from its position by a large enemy force. Even so,

air drops of ammunition and medical supplies

allowed surrounded units to survive, and troops driven from their positions by overwhelming force time

and again rallied to regain lost ground.19

In the end, augmented by clerks and other

administrative personnel from headquarters units,

engineers fighting as infantry, and a battalion from

the 27th Infantry that arrived in time to provide

critical assistance, the 35th prevailed. Although the

enemy force to the regiment’s rear remained active,

the main force to Fisher’s front withdrew to draw

breath. Never before, General Kean would later

observe, had a unit under such heavy assault closed

the gaps in its front line while fighting a full-scale

battle to its rear. He nominated the 35th for a

Presidential Unit Citation.20

On 1 September, at the time when the enemy

struck the 5th and 35th Infantry regiments, the

24th Infantry also came under attack. While North

Korean patrols probed Corley’s 3d Battalion on

Battle Mountain, disrupting the unit’s communications but otherwise doing little damage, the main

enemy force, an estimated one to two thousand

men, swept into the 2d Battalion’s position on the

Haman–Chungam-ni road, four miles to the north.

“Fighting was heard until 0530 hours in the sectors

occupied by the 2d [Battalion],” Corley’s officers

later reported from their vantage point on the

mountain, “also in Haman, to our rear, and north

and northeast of that town. The entire town of

Haman appeared to be in flames.”21

As the attack developed, Capt. Roger Walden’s

Company F astride the road and 1st Lt. Gorham

Black’s Company G to the south received particular

attention. A platoon of South Korean troops to the

north of Company F’s position disintegrated almost

immediately, as did a second platoon of South

Koreans to the south, on the northern flank of

Company G’s position. A third, on the north flank

of Company E, also began to give way.22

When the commanders of the American units

involved saw what was happening, they attempted to mend the developing wound. Informed that

the South Koreans were retreating, a sergeant in

Company G, for one, stopped some of the fleeing

men to determine what had happened. They indicated that they were out of ammunition but a

search of several revealed that they had sufficient

quantities to remain on line. Nevertheless, the

men kept retreating. The acting commander of

Company E, Lieutenant Ellis, also tried to stop

them. “I went down to the Korean captain who

was in charge,” he recalled later, “and asked him

why he was pulling out of position. He said:

‘Enemy was coming.’ I said you cannot fight them

if you run.” The officer tried to pull his men back

into position, Ellis said, but they killed him and

continued to run.23

It took little time for the advancing enemy to

find the gaps the departing Koreans had left.

Although American artillery had been targeted in

advance on the road into Haman and a 50-caliber

machine gun and a 75-mm. recoilless rifle supposedly barred the way, they could do little but

slow the onslaught without the assistance the

Koreans could have provided. The artillery conTHE GREAT OFFENSIVE 163

19 WD, 25th Inf Div, 1 Sep 50; Narrative Rpt, 25th Inf Div

in Korea, Sep 50; WD, 2d Bn, 35th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50, box

3755, RG 407, WNRC. 20 Narrative Rpt, 25th Inf Div in Korea, Sep 50; WD, 25th

Inf Div, 1 Sep 50. 21 Different estimates are provided for the size of the

enemy force which struck the 2d Battalion. Based on prisoner

interrogations, the regimental war diary estimated the enemy

to be in regimental strength. The war diary further stated that

was about three thousand men, but the strength of the 6th

North Korean Division at this time was about sixty-three hundred, making a regiment about two thousand strong. The regimental operations officer, Maj. Owen H. Carter, estimated the

enemy force to be about one thousand. The 3d Battalion,

observing the fighting soon after daylight, estimated six to

eight hundred enemy near Haman. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep

50, p. 3. Quote from WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, p. 1.

Both in box 3755, RG 407, WNRC. Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Owen H. Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94. 22 Ltr, Richard F. Archer to David Carlisle, 6 Jul 89, CMH

files; Intervs, IG with Herren, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–8, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation; Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. 23 Intervs, IG with Herren, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–8, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation; Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.
tinued to fire for a time, but the two direct-fire

guns quickly and inexplicably fell silent.24

As the breakthrough continued, the platoon

from Company F closest to the road was enveloped

and badly mauled. It disintegrated.25 That put the

rest of the company at risk. Although the unit’s men

had dug in, they lacked many of the defenses the

35th Infantry had constructed to the north. They

had never, for example, been organized around

strongpoints and were very spread out.26 As a

result, the company’s center platoon was also overrun and an 81-mm. mortar position somewhat to

the unit’s rear near the road likewise went down.27

Walden had stationed himself in a forward

observation post located toward the northern end

of his company’s line. As the attack developed, he

called in fire support so close to his own position

that battery commanders questioned the map coordinates he was giving them.28 In the end, however,

courage was not enough. Communications with

battalion headquarters broke down. In addition,

although a number of Walden’s men held firm,

some had lost heart and fled.29 As for the rest, they

seemed in danger of annihilation, either by the

enemy or by friendly artillery and mortar fire.30

Deciding after daylight on 1 September that he

could not hold out, Walden pulled his men to the

rear in hopes of relocating them on a hill he had

earlier plotted as a fall-back position. Arriving

toward noon, he found that the enemy already

occupied the site and concluded that he had no

choice but to continue north toward the 35th

Infantry. Circling east toward the Haman-Saga

road, he would then be able to make his way back

to the 24th.31 Eighty-five men took part in the trek

that followed, out of a total of 185 who had been

present at the beginning of the attack.32 When they

arrived in the 35th’s area and informed commanders that there was nothing left on their southern

flank, those officers were, as Walden put it, “somewhat aghast.” The group made it back to the 24th’s

lines at 1800 that evening. Champeny assigned it to

provide security for the regimental command post

until he could reassemble the 2d Battalion.33

While the remnant of Walden’s unit was holding on the hill, the rest of the 2d Battalion came

under pressure and began to crumble. For a time,

the northernmost portions of Company G held

firm, but many of the men were so skittish, according to white 1st Lt. Houston McMurray, that most

expended their ammunition and grenades on false

targets and imaginary noises before the enemy

attacked in earnest. When the final assault came,

they had little left and began to fall back as small

groups straggled to the rear. In the end, McMurray

avowed, “Out of the 21 ROK’s and the 48 men in

my platoon, there were only between 12 and 15

[left] . . ., and a little over half were my men.”

Bypassed, the group pulled into a close circle and

held out until dawn. Then the enemy discovered its

position and forced a retreat.34

164 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

24 American artillery had been zeroed in on the enemy’s

probable avenue of approach days before the attack. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Preston A. Davis, 18 Apr 94. See also Interv,

IG with 1st Lt Arthur Jackson, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–17, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. 25 Interv, Cash with Roger Walden, 25 Feb 87. 26 The defenses of the unit are mentioned in Interv,

MacGarrigle with Preston Davis, 18 Apr 94. Davis was a forward observer assigned to Company F by Battery B of the

159th Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. See also Interv, IG with 1st

Lt Arthur Jackson, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–17, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation. Jackson was a lieutenant in

Company F. 27 WDs, 24th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50, and 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

1–30 Sep 50, p. 1, both in box 3755, RG 407, WNRC. 28 See Interv, MacGarrigle with Preston Davis, 18 Apr 94.

See also 25th Inf Div GO 306, 6 Nov 50, Silver Star Award

Citation for Capt Roger Walden. Unless otherwise indicated,

general orders for this volume are on file in the Army’s Awards

Branch of the Personnel Service Support Division of the

Adjutant General Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel

Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Va. See also Interv, Cash

with Edward Simmons, 18 Mar 89. Simmons was Walden’s

radio operator. 29 Lieutenant Jackson observed that little straggling

occurred until after the breakthrough. See Interv, IG with 1st

Lt Arthur Jackson, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–17, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation.

30 Interv, Cash with Walden, 25 Feb 87. 31 Ibid. See also Hand-drawn Map of Haman area, prepared by Roger Walden, Jul 93, CMH files. 32 Interv, IG with Roger Walden, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–3,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. 33 Roger Walden comments to David Carlisle, 25 Feb 87,

CMH files. 34 Interv, IG with 1st Lt Houston M. McMurray, 5 Sep 50,

exhibit 4, attached to Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th Inf Div, to
Farther south, Company E also broke down. At

the first sign of the enemy attack, the leader of the 3d

Platoon, a lieutenant with no previous combat experience, began to move his men to the rear. The acting commander of Company E, Ellis, intercepted

him. “I asked him where was he going,” Ellis told

interviewers. “He said the enemy was attacking them

in force. I knew it was a damn lie because no small

arms [were] fired. I threatened to kill him if he did

not get back in position. I fired a shot between his

feet just to scare him. He went back into position.”35

Pinned down by enemy fire shortly thereafter,

Ellis could give no orders and watched helplessly as

the lieutenant and his men once more panicked

and ran. Some were cut down by enemy machinegun fire. Others fell into their own minefields. “The

men were just running anywhere,” an acting platoon leader in Ellis’ company, M. Sgt. David

Robinson, remembered. “Many who were killed

would have survived if they had stayed in their foxholes and fought.”36 A squad leader in Company E,

Cpl. Joel Ward, later related that he had shot a

replacement for running.37 Seeing the slaughter,

other soldiers also stayed in place. They endured

for two days against seven attacks, much of the

time without food or water, before a relieving force

arrived. Except for one man who fell to artillery

fire, every one of those men survived.38

The remnants of Companies E and G continued to fight on, but to no avail. In the hours before

dawn on 1 September, according to the battalion

commander, Colonel Roberts, between one-third

and one-half of the men in his unit straggled, with

many withdrawing to the battalion command post,

collocated with the command post for the battalion’s weapons unit, Company H, some nine hundred yards to the rear of Company F’s position. The

men were placed in security details until they could

return to their units, but their presence made little

difference. About 0300 the enemy arrived. Using

the American 75-mm. recoilless rifle that had earlier blocked the road to the rear of Company F, he

destroyed a tank barring his way and breached the

position’s outer defenses. With that, the stragglers

who had congregated at the site began to move out.

Their panic spread to other troops who also broke

and ran, opening the way for the enemy to enter

the command post itself.39

The men who remained fought hard. “We

manned our defensive positions to defend the battalion CP which was on the edge of a village,”

Company H radioman Nathaniel Pipkins recalled.

“We received small arms fire from the vicinity of

the village which was about 100 yards away. We

returned the fire. . . . The battalion S–2 [white 1st

Lt. Colon Britt] organized a counterattack force

and pushed the enemy to the other side of the village. . . . The enemy counterattacked and hit us on

all sides. I could see the flash of weapons all

around. We lost the Company commander . . . and

the S–2. . . . There was a fierce firefight. Grenades

were being thrown. I was blown over and

stunned.”40 Other soldiers continued the fight. Cpl.

Columbus Samuels, for one, later received the

Silver Star for manning the artillery liaison switchboard throughout the attack, despite enemy smallarms, machine-gun, and mortar fire and the presence of enemy soldiers who at times came within

twenty feet of his position. The officers and men of

the battalion aid station, located nearby, also stayed

on line, treating some ninety wounded soldiers at

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 165

Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9 Sep 90,

sub: Combat Effectiveness of the 24th Infantry Regiment.

Kean’s letter and its attachments are contained in Far East

Command Inspector General Investigation, sec. BX, boxes

1013–1014, RG 159, WNRC. Statements attached to General

Kean’s letter each have an exhibit number and are hereafter

cited as in the Kean Letter file. See also Interv, IG with Herren,

16 Sep 50, exhibit B–8, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. 35 Interv, IG with Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. Sfc. Edward Marshall

tells the same story, observing that there was no enemy on the

hill. See Interv, IG with Sfc Edward Marshall, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–7, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. 36 Interv, IG with Robinson, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–6,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. 37 Interv, Cash with Joel T. Ward, 21 Jul 88. 38 Interv, IG with Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation.

39 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50; Interv, IG with Roberts, 13

Sep 50, exhibit B–1, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with Lloyd V. Ott,

19 Jul 94; Cash with Joshua Storrs, 8 Sep 89. 40 Interv, Muehlbauer with Nathaniel Pipkins, 23 Aug 88.
great risk to their own lives. Many were cited for

their heroism.41

Colonel Champeny sent a platoon from

Company A of the 1st Battalion along with two

tanks from Company A of the 79th Heavy Tank

Battalion to provide relief and to rescue Roberts.

Slowed by enemy sniper and artillery fire, the platoon penetrated only as far as a heavy mortar position one-half mile to the rear of the 2d Battalion’s

command post. The tanks continued, reaching

their goal shortly before 0400. By then, however,

all communication between the 2d Battalion headquarters and the regimental command post in

Haman had ceased.42 The tanks assisted in the

evacuation of Roberts and a number of vehicles,

but could do little more. Most of the men who had

defended the position were gone, and key officers

in the battalion’s command—the executive, operations, and intelligence officers along with the commander of Company H—were all either dead or

seriously wounded. The break of dawn shortly

thereafter revealed a scene of incredible carnage

and destruction.43

At 0730, with the remnants of Companies E

and G holding on doggedly, Roberts and the officers who remained attempted to collect enough of

their men to assist an effort by portions of the 1st

Battalion to restore their unit’s old position. Only

forty men could be found to make the attempt. The

assault proceeded as scheduled but soon bogged

down and collapsed. Hit by a counterblow, the men

retreated to positions two miles to the rear on the

high ground east of Haman. By then, the regimental command post in Haman itself had come under

threat. Champeny responded by relocating it to a

valley east of the town near Engineer Road. When

that location came under fire, he moved it again

even farther to the rear.44 Battery C of the 159th

Field Artillery Battalion, located just to the north of

Haman, also came under attack. After fighting at

close quarters to preserve its guns, it made a hair’s

breadth escape down the Haman road and out the

166 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

41 Ibid.; Interv, Cash with Britt, 18 Aug 88. For Samuels,

see 25th Inf Div GO 176, 22 Sep 50. For the medics, see 25th

Inf Div GOs 310, 7 Nov 50; 339, 15 Nov 50; and 346, 16 Nov

50. In all seven medics received the Bronze Star. 42 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50. 43 Intervs, IG with Roberts, 6 Sep 50, exhibit 30, Kean

Letter file; Roberts, 13 Sep 50, exhibit B–1, Eighth Army

Inspector General Investigation; Col Arthur S. Champeny, 28

Sep 50, exhibit B–22, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. The Company H withdrawal is described in

Interv, Cash with Storrs, 8 Sep 89. See also 25th Inf Div GO

235, 20 Oct 50, Award Citation for Cpl Wyatt. For a description of the carnage at the command post, see Lyle Rishell, With

a Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea (College Station:

Texas A&M University Press, 1993), pp. 73–74.

44 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 3–4; WD, 25th Inf

Div, 1 Sep 50. For movement of the 1st Battalion, see Ltr,

Waymon R. Ransom to John A. Cash, 22 Oct 88, CMH files;

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94; William T.

Bowers with Edward H. Skiffington, 14 Apr 94. See also 25th

Inf Div GO 178, 28 Mar 51, awarding Silver Star to

Skiffington.

General MacArthur presents Colonel Roberts with Oak Leaf

Clusters to the Silver and Bronze Stars.
Engineer Road to a new position.45 The situation

might have disintegrated further, but for the good

work of fighter bombers from the U.S. Fifth Air

Force. Throughout the day on 1 September they

laid bombs and napalm on enemy forces attacking

American units from the flank and rear.46

The inclination of many of the men of the 2d

Battalion to abandon their positions and their

unwillingness to go back on line became the source

of angry comment among whites at the scene but

also among some blacks. “There were large numbers

of the 2d [Battalion] milling around and running to

the rear at Haman,” the white executive officer of the

1st Battalion, Maj. Eugene J. Carson, declared. “The

few officers left were attempting to gather the men

up. When the area came under mortar fire, the entire

group took off, except for the officers.”47

Colonel Roberts was equally disturbed.

Although careful to state that the men of Company

G stayed in position until overrun, he also made it

a point to remark on incidents of mass hysteria he

had seen. When officers returned one group of

stragglers to the front and placed the men in foxholes, the soldiers were so skittish that they headed for the rear at the least provocation. When

American tanks came up, he said, the men heard

the noise and immediately withdrew in disorder,

“stomping and running over each other.”48 The

executive officer of Company G, white 1st Lt. John

L. Herren, remarked that even if a number of the

men in his unit held out, forming scattered pockets

of resistance, the conduct of others left much to be

desired. After the enemy entered Haman, he said,

he had been ordered to set up a blocking position

south of the town: “I ordered quite a large group of

G Company to join me, but finally wound up with

approximately eight men.” The others “would not

come.” They “remained under cover of a concrete

wall which surrounded the regimental CP compound.”49 Lieutenant Ellis, a black, was among the

angriest of the officers who commented. After summarizing his experiences in the 1 September attack,

he observed that commanders had become afraid

to use the word withdraw. “You say that, and you

get a mob on your hands.”50

Colonel Champeny was incensed at the performance of his men. Observing in an interview that

the 2d Battalion had discarded most of its weapons

during its withdrawal, he told of Lieutenant Ellis’

difficulties in holding Company E in place. When

he asked the officer for a solution to the problem,

he said the lieutenant had responded that “he did

not believe any all-colored outfit would ever be

reliable, that his solution would be to put a few colored troops with the whites.” Champeny added

that he considered Ellis “one of my good company

commanders.”51

Overall, Champeny’s sense of disgust with his

unit was readily apparent to other whites. When the

1st Battalion of the 27th Infantry joined Companies

A and C of the 1st Battalion of the 24th on the afternoon of 1 September, in an attempt to restore the

positions of the 2d Battalion, a first lieutenant in the

all-white unit, Uzal Ent, recalled vividly how

Champeny drove slowly through the chaos on the

road leading out of Haman. He kept shaking his

head and saying over and over to the deploying

white troops, “I’m sorry boys. I’m sorry.”52

Summarizing the opinions of officers who had

served in or dealt with the 24th Infantry at Sangju

and in the Pusan Perimeter, the Eighth Army’s

inspector general gave special prominence to

“Negro characteristics” as a possible reason for the

problems the unit had experienced. According to

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 167

45 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Gustav H. Franke, 14 and 28

Jul 94; WD, 159th FA Bn, Sep 50, box 3756, RG 407, WNRC. 46 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p.

28. See also Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in

Korea, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force

History, 1983), pp. 142–43. 47 Interv, IG with Maj Eugene Carson, 6 Sep 50, exhibit

21, Kean Letter file. 48 Interv, IG with Roberts, 13 Sep 50, exhibit B–1, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation.

49 Interv, IG with Herren, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–8, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. 50 Interv, IG with Ellis, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–5, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. 51 Interv, IG with Champeny, 28 Sep 50, exhibit B–22,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Sam J. Adams, Jr., 15 and 17 Jun 94; Preston

Davis, 18 Apr 94. 52 Memorandum for the Record (MFR), MacGarrigle and

Bowers, 26 Oct 93, CMH files.
those witnesses, black soldiers as a group were

hardly as alert as white soldiers and tended to sleep

while on duty. In addition, they strayed from their

positions more, lacked trust in one another, suffered from too much imagination at night, tended

to panic under adversity, disliked digging foxholes

or remaining in them, and seemed to have no sense

of responsibility for equipment or supplies.53

In fact, if the 2d Battalion had failed, strictly

military reasons were most often the cause, not

some putative set of Negro characteristics. It is clear

from the comments of observers, for example, that

the unit was hardly as well positioned as it could

have been. A platoon of poorly trained and unpredictable South Koreans separated each one of its

elements, leaving them all vulnerable to attack

from the flank. Colonel Fisher, to the north, was

much more perceptive. He put all of his South

Koreans in one place so that if they broke, the rest

of his line would remain intact.

In the same way, while forward units of the

24th may have been dug in, the front they guarded was too extensive for the force available.

Instead of organizing around several small, easily

defended strongpoints, as Fisher had, Champeny

and his officers attempted to use the 2d Battalion

to guard a two-mile line.54 That might have been

feasible if a strong enough reserve had been available—guarding the more critical Masan road,

Fisher had five companies on line and part of a

battalion in reserve—but Champeny’s 1st

Battalion had already lost Company B to Corley

on Battle Mountain, and Company C was virtually combat ineffective from the beating it had

received during the previous week’s fighting. That

left Company A, fewer than one hundred and fifty

men, to counterattack an invading force of possibly two thousand.

As if that were not enough, while the 24th’s forward positions appear to have been well enough

prepared, fall-back positions to the rear of at least

some of Champeny’s line units appear to have been

inadequate, a possibly fatal weakness if the troops

were forced into a retreat. In the case of Company

F, for example, when the 27th Infantry’s counterattack regained what had been the unit’s former rear

positions late on the afternoon of 1 September, a

cursory inspection of the site revealed only a few

foxholes. “There was nothing to indicate there was

a company position here previously,” Lieutenant

Ent observed. “We remarked on it at the time.”55

Tactical dispositions, however, were only the

beginning of the problem. Because of the racial

antipathies prevalent in the regiment, the practices

they gave rise to and the suspicions they engendered, the men of the 24th Infantry mistrusted many

of their officers. Although regimental and division

war diaries often attempted to cover up failures, Cpl.

Joel Ward, for example, was convinced that many of

the white officers in the regiment wanted the unit to

appear to fail. To that end, he said, they suppressed

good news so that its men would receive no credit

for anything they did well.56

The tensions that resulted often overlapped

onto black officers who seemed too intent upon

developing their careers. Lieutenant Ellis provides

a case in point. Although he had performed about

as well as any officer in the attack at Haman, some

of his men clearly loathed him because they

believed his attitudes were more white than black.

He had a Creole wife and seemed to think he was

superior, Ward believed. “We think he had an

identity crisis. . . . I recall seeing him standing in

a rice paddy mired up to his knees firing his .45’s

into the air. He allegedly was cracking up.

Everyone had a distaste for him. He tried to show

everyone up, even in Gifu.”57

168 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

53 IG, Eighth Army, Summary of Comments by Witnesses,

n.d., exhibit D–20, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation. 54 Department of the Army (DA) Field Manual (FM) 7–50,

The Infantry Division, 11 Jan 50, p. 237. When defending on a

frontage of more than 10,000 yards, a regiment was to organize

key terrain as “self-sustaining powerful fighting forces capable

of continued resistance even when bypassed or surrounded.”

The rest of the main line of resistance was to be lightly held.

55 Ibid. Quote from MFR, MacGarrigle and Bowers, 26 Oct

93. See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Preston Davis, 18 Apr 94. 56 Interv, Cash with Ward, 21 Jul 88. 57 Quote from ibid. For another view of Ellis, see Interv,

MacGarrigle with Preston Davis, 18 Apr 94. For other comments on the lack of trust between enlisted men and officers,

see Interv, Muehlbauer with Charles B. Gregg, 8 Sep 88.
The chaos always attendant upon war only compounded the problem. During the first sixty days in

Korea, another corporal in Company E, Nathaniel

Reed, observed in an interview that his own unit

went through four platoon leaders who were either

killed or wounded. There were also too many

changes among lieutenants and company commanders, he continued. “What do you do when you lose

your leadership and are disorganized and have no

confidence in those who come in as replacements?”

Reed answered his own question. Given the poor

leadership and bad communications that seemed to

dog the unit, he said, the men ran. “I know for a fact

that I ran, too. . . . Everybody ran, but we were poorly led and equipped. I remember when we were out

on listening posts without commo [communications

equipment]. We would put these new replacements

out there, and in the morning they would be gone.58

The arrival of the 1st Battalion of the 27th

Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Gilbert Check, at

1000 on 1 September helped to stem the enemy

advance. But before the unit could counterattack it

had to push its way through the confused mass of

vehicles and men clogging the roads around

Haman. “During the period we were at the 24th’s

regimental CP,” Check’s executive officer, Capt.

Don R. Hickman, recalled, “the regimental CO and

his S–3 were out in the middle of the road personally stopping vehicles and taking stragglers off.”59

The sort of difficulties Check and his men encountered were described by a white military policeman, Sgt. Jack W. Riley. He, along with a chaplain,

three officers, and another military policeman, had

stopped all traffic on a section of Engineer Road.

Taking stragglers off vehicles, they collected about

two hundred and fifty soldiers, only a little more

than half of whom had weapons. Suddenly Riley

heard a mortar shell hit and a short burst from a

machine gun in the distance, then I looked up and heard

the men shouting and then I saw men running down the

mountain. I would ask them, why don’t you stay and

fight, haven’t you got a rifle? Most of them would not

answer, but a few said they were out of ammo. I then

went back and reported to the 24th regiment commanding officer and told him we would go through the

artillery battery and pick up all the men we could. We

rounded up about 50 stragglers the rest of the evening.

Out of all the men we stopped, we asked for sergeants

and officers, but none volunteered. You ask them why

they wouldn’t stay and fight and they would laugh at

you and say, “We didn’t see any M.P.s on the hill.”60

From time to time mortar shells would land,

targeted on Champeny’s command post. When

they did, they had the effect of rocks falling into a

pond, setting off waves of confusion among the

retreating troops as individuals and groups of men

scampered for cover or hastened their way to the

rear. No counterattack occurred until late in the

afternoon, when General Kean finally ordered

Check to restore the abandoned positions. By then

most of the men of the 24th had passed, and the

road west had cleared. Over the next three hours,

assisted by Companies A and C of the 24th, which

served as a reserve, Check’s men advanced three

miles, reaching the 24th’s former fall-back positions

but still some two hundred yards short of the unit’s

main line of resistance on 31 August. As the force

neared its goal, it came upon a mass of abandoned

arms, equipment, and vehicles. Reequipping itself

with the discarded materiel, it dug in for the night.

Resuming the attack the next morning, the battalion reached its goal at noon.61

During the day that followed, 2 September,

Check’s men beat off a strong enemy counterattack

but also spent some time recovering machine guns,

mortars, ammunition, and other equipment abandoned by the 24th. “It was reported to me,”

Hickman told investigators a week later, “that our

men went right into prepared positions left by the

24th and took over the crew-served weapons and

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 169

58Interv, Cash with Nathaniel Reed, 6 Jan 90. Reed was

court-martialed and convicted of straggling but was later exonerated. 59Interv, IG with Capt Don R. Hickman, Exec Ofcr, 1st

Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 32, Kean Letter file.

60Interv, IG with Jack W. Riley, 3 Sep 50, exhibit 23, Kean

Letter file. 61Interv, IG with Hickman, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 32, Kean

Letter file. See also WD, 1st Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, 1 Sep 50, and 1st

Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, Opns Rpt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 1, both in box

3755, RG 407, WNRC; Intervs, IG with Lt Col Gilbert J.

Check, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 31, Kean Letter file; MacGarrigle with

Owen Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94.
ammunition and used them on the spot.” Over the

next two days the 27th held the line against several strong, persistent enemy attacks.62

By the evening of 4 September the companies

of the 2d Battalion of the 24th had been reorganized. At 1900 that day Miller’s 1st Battalion, with

Companies E and F attached but without

Company B which remained on Battle Mountain,

relieved Check’s men in the positions that Roberts’

2d Battalion had held on 31 August. Check

moved his battalion to a location east of Haman.

At the same time, Champeny returned his regimental command post to Haman, stationing the

2d Battalion’s Companies G and H along the high

ground to the west of Haman as security. The

24th’s men arrived, according to Check, in “good

shape and fashion.”63

The enemy tried again just before dawn on 5

September, launching attacks against a number of

points to the front of the 1st Battalion and its

attached units as well as to the rear. Elements of

Company H near Champeny’s command post

received one of the first assaults. In the face of at

most a harassing attack, the force abandoned two

machine guns and withdrew.64 Shortly thereafter

an attack of at best moderate size occurred against

Company C, which likewise left its position.

Whether Company E came under pressure at that

170 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

62 Interv, IG with Hickman, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 32, Kean

Letter file. For a list of weapons and equipment recovered in

the 2d Battalion’s area, see Encl 2, Kean Letter file.

63 Interv, IG with Check, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 31, Kean Letter

file. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, pp. 7–9. 64 Interv, IG with Roberts, 6 Sep 50, exhibit 30, Kean

Letter file.

Mountain mass west of Haman: the town is in the center foreground; the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, position is on the crest of the

second ridge above the town.
time remains unclear, but the unit also relinquished its place in the line.65

Adding weight to an impression growing

among the men that a major attack was in

progress, infiltrators launched a grenade assault

against the regimental command post in Haman.

Several tanks and the regiment’s intelligence and

reconnaissance platoon drove them back, but not

before they had blown up an ammunition truck

located less than two hundred yards from the command post.66 In a similar assault, a platoon of

enemy infantrymen crept to within hand-grenade

range of the 1st Battalion’s command post to the

south of Haman. The unit’s executive officer, Maj.

Eugene J. Carson, managed to beat back the

attack, but by the time he did, his original complement of 45 Americans and 20 South Koreans

had dwindled to no more than 30 men, 7 of

whom were wounded. At dawn, Carson said, “I

looked down the hill and saw approximately 40

men get up out of the rice paddies and go over to

a tank. . . . This same group reported to regiment

that they were driven off the hill.”67

The situation remained confused for some time

after the attacks. A white captain who said he was the

commanding officer of Company E of the 24th led

thirty to forty soldiers to the command post of the 1st

Battalion of the 27th Infantry. He reported that a force

of perhaps 2,000 North Koreans had overrun a

blocking position his unit had assumed on a road

outside of Haman. Meanwhile, he said, obviously

referring to the incident in which the ammunition

truck had exploded, it appeared that the regimental

command post had been overrun and that the

ammunition dump had blown up. Colonel Check

immediately dispatched a rescue force consisting of a

platoon of tanks, one platoon of infantry, and the

group from the 24th.68 Entering Haman, Check’s officers established that nothing of major importance

had occurred, but during their trip into the town they

encountered a number of fleeing men who reported

that the 24th had again been overrun. “I got out on

the road and started to turn some of these soldiers

around,” the 27th’s operations officer, Capt. James

Hunsaker, reported. “Some of them were very reluctant to go back and I took my carbine off my shoulder, pointed it at them and started them back up the

hill. . . . I told them . . . that any man who turned

around or turned back would be shot.” No further

incidents occurred. The men made it to Haman

unopposed. Later that morning, Company C counterattacked and regained the ground it had lost.69

Colonel Corley Takes Command

The following day, 6 September, Colonel

Champeny was inspecting the frontline positions of

Roger Walden’s Company F to the west of Haman.

Despite warnings that enemy snipers were near, he

went ahead with his inspection and soon fell

wounded.70 Shortly thereafter General Kean

appointed the commander of the 3d Battalion,

Colonel Corley, to lead the 24th, making him, for

the moment, the youngest regimental commander

in Korea. The executive officer of the 3d Battalion,

newly promoted Lt. Col. Graydon A. Tunstall, took

Corley’s place in the unit.

The new regimental commander took stock of

the 24th and did not like what he saw. All of the

unit’s battalions had been hard hit or overrun in

either the 1 September attack or in earlier operations,

Corley told investigators ten days after succeeding

Champeny. Although the regiment had maintained

its integrity as a fighting force, he believed it could

never be depended upon in a major action and might

not hold if another strong enemy assault occurred.

Meanwhile, the 2d and 3d Battalions had become so

intermingled that tactical unity was affected; training

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 171

65 Statement of Lt Col Charles R. Herrmann, 17 Sep 50,

exhibit D–20, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation;

Interv, IG with Check, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 31, Kean Letter file.

See also Interv, IG with Maj Eugene Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–2, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation; WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, p. 11. 66 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 10. 67 Interv, IG with Carson, 14 Sep 50, exhibit B–2, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation; Ltr, Ransom to Cash, 22

Oct 88, pp. 9–10.

68 Interv, IG with Check, 8 Sep 50, exhibit 31, Kean

Letter file. 69 Quote from Interv, IG with Capt James D. Hunsaker, 6

Sep 50, exhibit 33, Kean Letter file. See also WD, 24th Inf Rgt,

1–30 Sep 50, p. 11. 70 Walden comments to Carlisle, 25 Feb 87.
was so poor that the men tended to fire off all their

ammunition at the beginning of an engagement

without thinking about what would happen when it

was gone; most key noncommissioned and staff officers had been killed or wounded; bickering between

whites and blacks was on the rise; and morale within the unit seemed at low ebb.

Corley was particularly concerned about his

noncommissioned officers, a number of whom he

believed had failed to carry a fair share of the load.

In order to compensate during the 1 September

attack, all of the 3d Battalion’s first sergeants had

served on the battle line and none could be spared

for important tasks that arose elsewhere. In the

same way, staff officers had been forced to fill gaps

at the front when they should have been at the rear

headquarters in Masan seeing to their primary

responsibilities. Most of all, straggling seemed epidemic within the regiment. During Corley’s three

weeks in command of the 3d Battalion, hundreds

of men had abandoned their positions without

leave or satisfactory cause.71

Corley was unwilling to blame continued straggling on the low quality of the replacements he was

receiving. Those men were, he told investigators,

about as good as could be expected. Neither was he

certain that race was all that great a factor. He had

the same problem with straggling among the South

Korean troops assigned to the regiment, he said, yet

North Korean troops attacked and fought “like

demons.” He suggested that blacks as a group

might hold their ground better if they were integrated into white units. But even then, either out of

prejudice or for practical reasons, he declined to

suggest that whites, except in isolated cases, should

ever be assigned to formerly all-black units.72

Paradoxically, the Army was having so much difficulty finding trained replacements that, at the very

moment when he was stating his reservations, a

number of white sergeants were serving in the 24th

Infantry, and blacks were beginning to be assigned

to all-white units in the 25th Division.73

In the days following his assignment as commander, Corley took steps to remedy many of the

inadequacies he had seen. Rallying his sergeants

and staff officers, he issued instructions that senior

noncommissioned officers and personnel and logistical officers were to remain where their assignments placed them rather than attempt to remedy

conditions in forward areas. He also took steps to

reemphasize the necessity for improved fire discipline. Within a week, he said, he felt he could see

results from the changes he had made. Efficiency

within the unit had improved, and firing discipline

was better. The men were also digging foxholes

with more consistency. As one of Corley’s sergeants

observed in a 15 September interview with the

inspector general, they no longer had any doubts.

“You don’t have to tell them [to dig] anymore.”74

There was, however, no quick and easy solution to the straggling. Where Colonel White had

hesitated to use courts-martial to enforce discipline, Champeny had been very aggressive in

bringing charges against soldiers for misbehavior

before the enemy. Yet except for 1st Lt. Leon A.

Gilbert, who received a death sentence on 6

September, and another soldier in the service company convicted on 2 September, none of those

cases had come to trial by the time Corley took

command and none had made much impression

upon the men. Straggling continued on such a large

172 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

71 Interv, IG with Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation; MFR, Lt Col John T.

Corley, 22 Jan 51, sub: Background of Founding of Eagle

Forward, CMH files. The bickering is described in Frank

Whisonant, “Charge Discontent Riddling ‘Fighting 24th,’ GI’s

Gone Sour on White Officers Slandering Outfit,” Pittsburgh

Courier, 2 Sep 50. For other views of the regiment by new

arrivals, see Intervs, MacGarrigle with Joseph Baranowski, 24

Aug 94; Roscius C. Newell, 10 Nov 94. 72 Interv, IG with John T. Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. See also exhibit

C, in General Headquarters, Far East Command, Report of

Investigation Regarding Alleged Irregularities in the

Administration of Military Justice in the 25th Infantry

Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation), RG 159,

WNRC. 73 The Eighth Army’s adjutant general issued instructions

to assign blacks to all-white units on 5 September 1950. See

also WD, 25th Inf Div, 5 Sep 50, boxes 3752–3754, RG 407,

WNRC; Interv, MacGarrigle with Gustav J. Gillert, 4 May 94. 74 Interv, IG with M Sgt Wilbur Lawton, 15 Sep 50, exhibit B–12, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.
scale that between 15 August and 15 September at

least four hundred and sixty individuals had abandoned their posts. To make the troops more aware of

what could happen to them if they were arrested and

charged, Corley instituted a system of strict record

keeping that kept track of first offenders. He warned

the men that future violations would result in courtmartial and that the maximum penalty could be

death. Nevertheless, whether that policy or subsequent trials of offenders would have any effect on

straggling would be a matter of conjecture until the

24th once more faced heavy combat.75 (Table 7)

Concerned that punitive measures alone would

never improve the fighting ability of the 24th and

that morale would continue to decline within the

regiment unless some way were found to build

pride and self-respect among the men, Corley, with

Roberts’ assistance, decided to begin a unit newspaper. If properly handled, he reasoned, a publication of that sort would open communications within the command. Officers would be able to explain

practices and procedures clearly and succinctly,

giving the men more familiarity than ever before

with official policies and orders of the day.

Meanwhile, company columns would go uncensored and company reporters would be allowed to

write what they felt. In that way, by allowing the

troops to sound off, commanders could not only

defuse tensions within the regiment but also would

gain a feel for the mood of the men.76

Named Eagles’ Flight after the 24th’s successful

athletic teams in Japan, the “Eagles,” the first edition appeared on 13 September. Begun on a hit-ormiss basis, the paper met with such great success

among the men that it rapidly became a daily. The

first edition, however, almost immediately became

the brunt of wisecracks and jokes among white

members of the Eighth Army, who paired the publication’s title with the 24th’s growing reputation as

a “bug-out” unit. Recognizing the problem, Corley

changed the name to Eagle Forward, an allusion to

the code-word designation that General Omar N.

Bradley had selected for the advance headquarters

of his famed 12th Army Group in Europe during

World War II. After that, the jokes ceased. First

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 173

75 Interv, IG with Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. See also exhibit C, Far

East Command Inspector General Investigation.

76 MFR, Corley, 22 Jan 51, sub: Background of Founding

of Eagle Forward.

White . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 3 1

Champeny . . . . . . 38 16 17 3 18

Corley. . . . . . . . . . 13 9 12 1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . 55 28 32 4 19

Commander

Number

Charged

Charges Preferred

by Blacks

Number

Convicted

Number

Acquitted

Number

Withdrawn

Table 7—24th Infantry General Courts-Martial

July–October 1950

Source: Exhibits C, D–1, D–2, in General Headquarters, Far East Command, Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged

Irregularities in the Administration of Military Justice in the 25th Infantry Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014, RG

159, WNRC.
Lieutenant John S. Komp became the paper’s editor

with a roving reporter and a clerk-typist working

for him. Colonel Roberts had a separate column of

his own, entitled “Advice from the Old Man.”77

Corley was much concerned, as he told the

inspector general a week after taking command of

the regiment, that “the 24th, since its entry into

combat, has never had a little victory.” He continued that

This may be one of the . . . factors that contribute to this

fading away attitude that prevails among a large portion

of the men. The fighting ability of the men who stay and

fight is all that could be expected, but for every man that

pulls out, he takes at least 6 men with him. It is difficult

for troops to hold position when they see so many others moving out to . . . the rear. It is felt that, in time, we

may overcome this deficiency . . . after we have withstood an attack and gained a victory. To date this regiment has not had a clear cut victory over the enemy in

some 60 days of intensive combat.78

In an obvious attempt to overcome that defect,

Corley decided to build up what some considered

the unit’s proudest moment in Korea, the battle of

Yech’on. Shortly after taking command, in an open

letter to “The Fighting 24th Infantry regimental

combat team,” he affirmed, “In sixty days of continuous combat you have witnessed a roughness of battle which I have not seen in five campaigns in Africa,

Sicily and Europe. You held ground against superior

odds. You have lived up to the regimental motto,

‘Semper Paratus’ (Always Ready). The first United

States victory in Korea was your action at Yechon. It

has been noted in Congress. . . . Other units have

been unable to accomplish what depleted companies

of the fighting 24th have done. I am proud of the

‘Blockhousers.’”79 That Yech’on had involved little

enemy opposition and had been among the least significant of all the 24th’s engagements in Korea was

unimportant to Corley. Unlike Colonel Champeny,

he believed he could achieve better results by praising his men than by tearing them down, even if

exaggeration was sometimes necessary.

Privately, however, Corley’s concerns about his

unit continued. They came out briefly in instructions he delivered to white 2d Lt. Philip H. Harper

shortly after that officer joined the regiment.

“Remember, Harper,” he said, repeating a rumor

that had gained currency among the white officers

of the unit, “you’re not leading white troops. If

you’re ever wounded, you’re dead. These men will

never bring you down off the hill.”80

Corley’s first full day as regimental commander

was challenging. On 7 September the enemy

attacked all along the 25th Division’s line, laying

down heavy concentrations of fire and then punching forward with ground assaults. Both the 5th and

35th Infantry regiments succeeded in repelling the

attacks, but the 24th once more experienced difficulties. On the unit’s northern flank, following

artillery and mortar attacks against the regimental

command post and that of the 1st Battalion, the

enemy swept into Company F’s position astride the

Haman–Chungam-ni road. Inexperienced replacements wavered and began to straggle, forcing the

unit to pull back. Because of the terrain it occupied

and its placement on the line, Company A was able

to take the attacking force under fire, buying time for

Company F to reorganize and rendering the North

Korean position untenable. With that assistance,

Company F counterattacked. By 1100 it was back in

its old position, and the enemy was in retreat.81

Farther south on Battle Mountain, the 3d

Battalion also came under attack. Although

Company B repelled one assault, an estimated

enemy battalion succeeded in penetrating South

Korean positions on the mountain. It then drove a

wedge through Company K, forcing most of that

unit and Company B to pull back. A small remnant

of Company K managed to hold in place without

174 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

77 Ibid. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with John S. Komp,

5 May and 1 Jun 94; Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 14 Apr 95. 78 Interv, IG with Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. 79 Memo, 11 Sep 50, sub: Col. John Corley to The

Fighting 24th Inf Rgtal Combat Team, CMH files. It is significant that Corley made his comment to the inspector general

five days after issuing this memorandum to his men. See also

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Komp, 5 May and 1 Jun 94.

80 Ltr, Philip H. Harper to MacGarrigle, n.d. [Apr 95],

CMH files. 81 WD, 25th Inf Div, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 14–17, boxes

3752–3754, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50,

pp. 12–15.
communications until forced to withdraw by

friendly mortar fire.82

As the fighting continued, straggling once

again became significant. The newly arrived commander of Company K, white Capt. Buckner M.

Creel, who had led a rifle company in heavy combat during World War II, described the situation

in his unit:

When I took over Company K [on 19 August], the unit

had not achieved any successes. Nor did the men of

Company K have a sense of belonging. Morale was not

particularly good. During the two weeks I first commanded the company, some men fell back during attacks

without orders, offering one excuse after another. I made

a practice to keep my executive officer in the rear to turn

people around. There were times that the stragglers had

to be rounded up and led back to the company position.

. . . When a man straggled, he traveled light—leaving

much of his equipment behind, but often would take his

weapon with him. At daybreak, most who left would be

found at the bottom of the hill, waiting to be told to

return. . . . When I first arrived, some troops left their

position to go down from the hill . . . in ones and twos—

no mass “bugout.” One night I heard a whispered voice

say “TT-TL.” I was told by a soldier next to me that

meant “‘tam time,’ travel light.” He said that earlier the

code for taking off was “get your hat.” On the day I was

wounded [7 September], about half the company left

their positions without permission and went down

Battle Mountain. Those around me, and which I could

control, generally stayed. I was told that the partial

unauthorized withdrawal actually was a big improvement. Before, almost all the men had taken off.83

With a large hole gaping in the 24th’s line,

Corley had no choice but to call in his reserve, the

3d Battalion, 27th Infantry. The unit spent the

remainder of the day counterattacking, but the

enemy mounted a dogged resistance. The 3d

Battalion fought on until midnight and suffered

heavy casualties but was unable to regain the lost

ground.84

The attempt to reclaim the mountaintop continued for two more days, but despite all efforts the

enemy held out. Late on the afternoon of 9

September, with the 3d Battalion of the 27th

urgently needed to the south to assist in the relief

of the departing 5th Infantry, Corley decided to

abandon the attack. Leaving the enemy in place, he

sought to contain the North Koreans through the

skillful positioning of his troops and the application of artillery and air assaults.85 To that end,

doubting that many of his men would hold if hit in

force, he attempted to situate his units so strategically and in depth that individuals would find it

difficult to withdraw without unnecessarily exposing themselves.86

General Kean had had enough of the 24th.

Following the breakthrough at Haman, on the same

day that Corley began to reposition his forces, 9

September, Kean sent a letter to General Walker

requesting that the Eighth Army inactivate the regiment and distribute its soldiers as replacements to

other units. “It is my opinion,” Kean explained,

“that the 24th Infantry has demonstrated in combat

that it is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying

out missions expected of an infantry regiment.”

Kean added that if there “are a number of individuals in the 24th Infantry who have been and are

performing their duties in a creditable manner,” the

efforts of that minority had been “completely nullified by the actions of the majority.” According to

Kean, many of his officers and noncommissioned

officers, whether black or white, agreed. Walker

took the request under advisement, but, beyond

inaugurating his own investigation of the regiment,

made no immediate decision.87

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 175

82WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, pp. 12–15. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Charles E. Green, 16 Jun 94; William A.

Hash, 18 and 22 Mar 94; Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89. 83Intervs, MacGarrigle with Buckner M. Creel, 3 Nov and

3 Dec 93; Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89. 84WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 12–15; WD, 3d Bn,

27th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, box 3755, RG 407, WNRC.

85WD, 25th Inf Div, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 17; WD, 24th Inf

Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 15. Company C, 65th Engineer Battalion,

replaced the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, as Corley’s reserve on

10 September. See WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, p. 16. 86Corley told the inspector general that he had made it a

practice to position his men in this manner. The terrain to the

south of the regimental sector, he said, favored such a defense.

See Interv, IG with Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation. 87Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th Inf Div, to Commanding

General, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9 Sep 50, sub: Combat

Effectiveness of the 24th Infantry Regiment, exhibit A, in

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. The letter was
Over the next several days, Corley’s 1st and 2d

Battalions patrolled in the lowlands while the 3d

remained in position on ridges approaching Battle

Mountain. The enemy fired mortars and launched

several minor probes, but little other action

occurred. Overall, the entire period was marked by

an unfamiliar calm.88

Circumstances changed early on the morning

of 14 September. To the north, about 0330,

Company C came under attack but repelled the

enemy. Farther south on the high ground,

Company L also came under assault. Holding until

after sunrise, the unit received supplies and reinforcements at 0800 and then made a tactical withdrawal to regroup. Launching a counterattack at

1220, it then restored its position. Located somewhat to the north of Company L, Company I also

came under attack but held firm. As firefights continued around the two units and evening neared, a

reinforced platoon from Company K attempted to

relieve Company L but met with stiff enemy resistance and had to fall back to a nearby ridge.89 At

1500 elements of Company B, which had been in

reserve near Haman, arrived. Around that time,

Corley replaced Tunstall as 3d Battalion commander with Maj. Melvin R. Blair. An experienced

combat veteran, Blair had fought in the ChinaBurma-India Theater during World War II, where

he had received a Distinguished Service Cross as a

member of the famed Merrill’s Marauders.90

At some time during the early morning hours

of 14 September, Company L’s highly regarded

commander, black 1st Lt. Randall P. Stephens, had

fallen wounded. The officer available to take his

place, a first lieutenant who had been with the unit

for only two days, proved unable to instill confidence in the men. Stephens attempted to continue

commanding from a stretcher, but the unit dwindled overnight from approximately a hundred men

to perhaps forty. Realizing that Company L was short

of officers, Blair moved forward to determine how it

was doing. Arriving at 1400, he learned that one platoon had lost a vital defensive position. Rallying the

men who remained, the major regained the position

but was unable to hold against fierce enemy attacks

that followed. At 0700 on the fifteenth, with most of

his ammunition gone, Blair ordered the unit to disengage. After staying behind with six enlisted men to

cover the withdrawal, he and his small group were

ambushed while making their way to the rear and he

was wounded.91

To the north, Company I also came under

heavy attack. “We did not give an inch of ground all

night,” the unit’s commander, black Capt. Vernon

C. Dailey, avowed the next day.

Our ammunition started giving out. How they got under

the barbed wire and through the mines, I do not know.

They kept hitting us all night. We had 8 known casualties. We figured they would do the same thing tonight.

We were completely out of ammunition, except for a few

rounds of carbine ammunition. They were making it so

hot on our position that we . . . decided to pull in with

“L” company and bolster their right flank. We found

nothing but dead soldiers and North Koreans. I gave the

order to withdraw.92

Blair had little confidence in Dailey’s account.

In a telephone call recorded shortly after coming off

the mountain, he told General Kean, “I am not sure

‘I’ Company was pushed off [of its position]. When

I came down to the road, I found ‘I’ Company. I

asked how many wounded they had, and they did

not know.” The conversation would have gone

unnoticed, but investigators from the inspector

general’s office were present in the regimental command post at the time when Blair spoke with Kean.

176 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

accompanied by thirty-three statements, including two from

black officers and one from a black noncommissioned officer.

Not all were negative. See, for example, Statement 18, by white

1st Lt Clair L. Rishel. 88 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 17–18. 89 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 6, box 3755,

RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 17–18. 90 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 6.

91 EUSAK GO 31, 18 Jan 51, Distinguished Service Cross

Citation (OLC) for Maj Melvin R. Blair; Interv, IG with Corley,

16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth Army Inspector General

Investigation; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p. 19. While

Stephens was being carried down the hill on a stretcher during

the evacuation, Corley pinned captain’s bars on him. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Randall P. Stephens, 18 and 27 Jul 94. 92 Intervs, IG with Capt Vernon C. Dailey, 15 Sep 50,

exhibit B–9, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation;

Cash with Charlie Lee Jones, 6 Sep 89.
One of them ordered his stenographer to transcribe

Blair’s half of the conversation without the major’s

knowledge.93

Corley was unhappy about the course of the

entire affair. Reporting the straggling in Company

L, Blair’s role in saving the unit, and Company I’s

simultaneous withdrawal, he asserted that the two

units had inflicted at least one hundred and twenty-five casualties on the enemy and would have

won a victory if they had been determined to hold

their position, whatever the seeming odds against

them. “The casualties for ‘L’ Company were approximately 17, and 8 for ‘I’ Company,” he told the

inspector general on the day after the fight. “The

losses, in proportion to the danger inflicted on the

area, and for the type of fighting engaged in, were

relatively few. Former units I commanded would

have suffered heavier casualties and would have

held their position in an organized manner, despite

the hopelessness of the situation. Coordination of

artillery and mortar support during this attack . . .

was all that could be expected.”94

The 3d Battalion attempted all the next day, 16

September, to recover its positions on Battle

Mountain. Company K bogged down in the

advance and gained only 300 yards. Company I

reported heavy casualties and withdrew. A patrol

from Company L reached its objective but failed to

hold on and fell back. Because of the critical situation, General Kean organized a battalion-size task

force out of units from the 65th Engineer Combat

Battalion and the 27th and 35th Infantry regiments

and assigned it to back up Corley’s effort.

Under the command of Maj. Robert L.

Woolfolk of the 35th Infantry, the force moved to

the attack on 17 September, achieved a few small

gains, and then began to slow. Suffering from

adverse terrain and incurring heavy casualties, at

one point during the day Woolfolk requested permission to withdraw and reorganize. Instead,

Corley himself arrived and ordered the unit to

advance. In the end, Corley’s determination

notwithstanding, there was little anyone could do.

Bowing to the inevitable, the colonel disbanded the

force on 19 September and ordered the 3d

Battalion off Battle Mountain. From then on, the

24th would have to attempt to contain the enemy

with artillery fire and to thwart any attack that

occurred by fighting in the foothills and valleys to

the south of Haman.95

Corley’s decision made little difference. By

then, the war had entered a new phase. Early on

the morning of 15 September the commander of

United Nations forces in the Far East, General

MacArthur, had launched an amphibious assault

upon Inch’on, a transportation hub and seaport

located on the coast of the Yellow Sea, some twenty-five miles west of South Korea’s capital city,

Seoul, and more than a hundred miles north of the

Pusan Perimeter. With an American bridgehead

firmly established by 17 September and Seoul in

line for attack, the North Koreans had to fight in

two directions at once, against MacArthur’s landing force to the north and Walker’s increasingly

powerful Eighth Army in the south. Already

bloodied by the severe fighting on the Pusan

Perimeter and under the psychological burdens

imposed by the presence of an aggressive enemy to

their rear, the enemy held for a time but in the end

began to pull back rather than face destruction in

detail. Battle Mountain no longer mattered. The

fight for Pusan had ended.96

In assessing the performance of his division in

the fighting west of Masan, General Kean was well

satisfied with most of his regiments but not with

the 24th. Fisher’s 35th Infantry, in defense of its

sector, had done all that could have been asked of

any unit. The 5th, under its new commander, John

Throckmorton, had shown great improvement

since Bloody Gulch and had held its positions

THE GREAT OFFENSIVE 177

93 Statement, Maj Melvin R. Blair, 15 Sep 50, exhibit D–4,

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. The quote is

from a telephone conversation between Blair and Kean on the

morning of 15 September while Blair lay wounded at the regimental command post. 94 Interv, IG with Corley, 16 Sep 50, exhibit B–18, Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation.

95 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, pp. 24–26. See also

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 569–70. 96 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

542–45, 568–72.
against strong enemy attacks. Meanwhile,

Michaelis’ 27th Infantry had maintained its reputation as the Eighth Army’s “fire brigade” by clearing enemy breakthroughs in the 35th’s and 24th’s

sectors. In contrast, the 24th’s performance had

been lackluster from start to finish. The collapse

of the 2d Battalion on 1 September and the failure

of the regiment’s other units either to hold positions or to retake lost ones had provided all the

evidence the general needed to demonstrate the

regiment’s unreliability.

Although Kean had already made his decision

about what should become of the 24th, there

seemed some reason for hope. The attempts of the

27th Infantry and Task Force Woolfolk to retake

Battle Mountain had shown that combat in Korea

was not easy, even for all-white units. Meanwhile,

despite the 24th’s poor performance, there was a

base of good in the regiment. The heroic and

capable efforts of numerous soldiers and leaders

and the resourcefulness and combat effectiveness

shown by some squads, platoons, and companies

had kept the unit, even at its darkest moments,

from collapsing as a whole. With that as a foundation, there seemed reason to believe that training and morale-building would have a positive

effect. More important, for the first time in the

war, the regiment not only had a commander who

was tactically competent and experienced but also

one who, in his search for the reasons behind the

unit’s failure, seemed to have an open mind about

the abilities of the black soldier.

178 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
I

n support of the landing at Inch’on, the Eighth

Army’s staff devised a plan to break out of the

Pusan Perimeter. Of the more than 150,000 men

General Walker had at his disposal, the six South

Korean divisions holding the northeastern portions

of the Perimeter were to attack northward, up the

east-coast highway and into the Taebaek

Mountains.1 To the west, a newly formed I Corps—

commanded after 11 September 1950 by Maj. Gen.

Frank W. Milburn and composed of the U.S. 1st

Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, the 5th

Regimental Combat Team, a British brigade, and a

South Korean division—would cross the Naktong

River at Waegwan and move west toward Taejon and

beyond. To the south, the U.S. 2d and 25th Infantry

Divisions—initially under the direct control of the

Eighth Army but later as part of a new IX Corps

commanded by Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter—would

press forward in a northwesterly direction toward

Kunsan, a seaport some one hundred miles distant

on South Korea’s west coast. The offensive would follow the same corridors that the North Koreans had

used for their attack into the South. In the 25th

Division’s sector, it would employ in its early stages

the same roads and lines of advance that Task Force

Kean had used during the division’s first week at

Masan. In general, it would complement the

Inch’on-Seoul attacks, keeping the North Koreans

off balance and forcing them to dissipate their waning combat strength between two allied armies.2

The Eighth Army’s planners expected the landing at Inch’on to demoralize the enemy forces facing them and waited a full day after the attack

before launching their own offensive to leave time

for the effect to sink in. Enemy commanders at first

declined to inform their subordinates of what had

happened to the north and retained the initiative

for almost a week. On 19 September, however, following the 2d Division’s successful crossing of the

Naktong, they had no choice but to pull back.

Enemy forces defending Waegwan broke into a

panic-stricken retreat and those occupying P’ilbong, Sobuk-san, and the other heights west of

Masan began to abandon their positions and to flee

north. The 2d Battalion of the 24th Infantry came

up against heavy enemy resistance and suffered

fifty-five casualties taking Hill 212, three and onehalf miles due west of Haman, but elements from

the unit’s 1st and 3d Battalions began to reoccupy

the regiment’s old positions on Sobuk-san and

Battle Mountain, ultimately advancing across them

into the valley beyond.3

1 The strength figure is drawn from Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 547.

2 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

542–45. 3 War Diary (WD), 25th Inf Div, 19–22 Sep 50, boxes

3752–3754, Record Group (RG) 407, Washington National

Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; 25th Inf Div

CHAPTER 8

To Kunu-ri and Back
Breakout and Move North

During the days that followed, the enemy fought

a series of sharp delaying actions against the 35th

Infantry regiment at Chungam-ni and the 27th

Infantry regiment to the south, but American forces

sensed a kill and moved in. The 24th Infantry greeted the threat, as Colonel Corley put it, “in good formation and in good spirits.” The 1st Battalion moved

into Tundok with dispatch, taking the town and capturing the enemy supply depots hidden in the nearby mines. General Wilson was so elated by the swift

and efficient manner in which the troops performed

the task that he gave Corley a fine watch inscribed

on its back with the date of the town’s capture.4

The enemy nevertheless had his say. Early on the

morning of 22 September, infiltrators stole into the

bivouac area of Company A of the 1st Battalion,

where they killed two sleeping men and wounded

several others. Shortly thereafter, enemy mortars

inflicted nearly sixty more casualties on the unit,

killing the commander of the battalion’s headquarters company and wounding its intelligence, personnel, and executive officers. Later in the day, the men

of the unit moved out to find and eliminate the mortars. They succeeded, sometimes with great bravery,

but the effort brought down two more officers. By

the end of the day, virtually the entire command

structure of Company C had been eliminated, leaving only an inexperienced second lieutenant to take

charge. Those losses were nonetheless only temporary. The enemy retreat was gathering momentum.

U.S. forces were everywhere on the move.5

On 23 September operational control of the

25th Division passed to Coulter’s IX Corps, freeing

General Walker and his staff from tactical concerns

and allowing them to concentrate on the larger

issues which the developing American offensive

180 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Narrative Rpt, Sep 50, bk. 1, pp. 33–39, boxes 3752–3754,

RG 407, WNRC; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu, pp. 568–71. Casualties are from WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep

50, app. 5, box 3755, RG 407, WNRC. 4 John T. Corley, “Policy Lifted Morale, Confidence:

Colonel Corley’s Story,” Pittsburgh Courier, 7 Jul 51, p. 10.

5 WD, 25th Inf Div, 22 Sep 50; 25th Inf Div Narrative Rpt,

Sep 50, bk. 1, pp. 33–39; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Sep 50, p.

28, box 3755, RG 407, WNRC; Appleman, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 568–71. For the status of 1st

Battalion officers, see Officer Roster, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, dtd

1 Oct 50, p. 3, in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50.

Members of the 24th Infantry march down a road behind Battle Mountain on 21 September 1950.
entailed.6 That same day, as the 24th Infantry

advanced toward the road junction at Much’on-ni,

General Kean established an armored task force to

exploit the breakthrough fully and to keep the

enemy off balance. Named for its commander, Capt.

Charles J. Torman, and composed of the 25th

Reconnaissance Company, Company A of the 79th

Heavy Tank Battalion, and smaller medical, engineer, and tactical air control units, the force was to

attack along the coastal road from Kosong through

Sach’on to Chinju. The assault made good progress

at first, but it ground to a halt temporarily when

Torman was wounded and a bridge collapsed.

Resuming the attack the next day, 24 September, the

force fought several sharp engagements before finally stopping three miles short of Chinju. Over the

night that followed, while the Americans drew

breath, the enemy destroyed the one highway bridge

across the Nam River that would have given Torman

and his men easy access to their objective.7 (Map 10)

With the bridge gone and enemy resistance continuing, General Kean devised a two-pronged attack

to capture the objective. While Torman’s force,

renamed Task Force Matthews after its new commander, Capt. Charles M. Matthews, persisted in its

assault from the south, units from the 35th Infantry

crossed the Nam downstream, two and one-half

miles to the northeast, and attacked from that direction. The maneuver succeeded. On 25 September,

despite the efforts of some three hundred enemy

troops employing mortar and artillery fire, the town

fell. Meanwhile, sixteen miles downstream from

Chinju, engineers worked all day against sporadic

enemy mortar fire to construct a sandbag ford across

the Nam. Elements of the 27th Infantry then crossed

the river and secured the town of Uiryong before

fighting their way to Chinju against negligible enemy

resistance. The fall of Chinju eliminated any threat to

the port of Pusan from the west.8

Over the days that followed, General Kean

pressed his advantage. In the north, two companies

of armor from the 89th Medium Tank Battalion and

two infantry companies from the 35th Infantry,

forming a task force under Lt. Col. Welborn G.

Dolvin, sought to cut the enemy’s main line of retreat

by attacking along a major road that ran to the north

of the highest peak in South Korea, 7,000-foot Chirisan. Meanwhile, to the south the 24th Infantry,

spearheaded by Task Force Matthews, swung toward

the town of Hadong and then northwest around the

south side of Chiri-san to the town of Namwon,

which fell on 28 September. More than eighty

American prisoners of war were in the town. The

men were in tatters and weak from lack of food, but

all were soon crying and shouting in happiness and

relief at their good fortune.9

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 181

6 WD, 25th Inf Div, 23 Sep 50, boxes 3752–3754, RG

407, WNRC. 7 WD, 25th Inf Div, 23–29 Sep 50, boxes 3752–3754,

RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div Narrative Rpt, Sep 50, bk. 1,

pp. 33–39; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, pp. 29–30. See also

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

574–75. 8 25th Inf Div Narrative Rpt, Sep 50, bk. 1, pp. 43–45;

Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

574–75. 9 Most sources give Task Force Dolvin the credit for liberating the prisoners. Appleman points out that Matthews

and the 3d Battalion of the 24th Infantry were in fact responsible. See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,

pp. 576–77; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, p. 17, box

3755, RG 407, WNRC.

Colonel Corley
Map 10

ROK 3

XX

ROK Cap

XX

ROK 8

XX

ROK 6

XX

21

III

38

III

23

III

35(+)

III

24(+)

III

19

III

TF 777

III

TF LYNCH

I I

ELMS, 17th, 18th and

31st N.K. Divs, 25th N.K.

Brig, 43d TK Regt, 76th IND

Regt, 78th IND Regt and 83d

Regt Elms, 5th, 7th

and 10th N.K. Divs

Elms, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th

8th, 9th, 12th and 15th N.K. Divs

Han R

Kum R

Naktong R

YELLOW

SEA

SEA

O F

JAPAN

Imjin R

EIGHTH

XXX

XXXX

X

26

30

30

30

ROK 3

XX

ROK CAP

ROK 8

XX

ROK 6

2 XX

25

1 CavXX

24

ROK 1XX

1 Cav

I ROK

XXX

II ROK

I XXX

XX

2

I

IX

XXX

II ROKXXX

25 I

19th Inf

5th Inf

25

23

28

30

30 29

1/24

29

TF BLAIR

28

28

TF DOLVIN

TF MATTHEWS

25 2/35

TF TORMAN

28

27th Inf

26

26

26

30

7

XX

1 Mar

Musan-ni

Yonch'on

Ch'orwon

Kumhwa

Hwach'on

Ch'unch'on

Inje

Uijongbu Kangnung

SEOUL

P'yongt'aek

Ch'onan

Wonju

Chech'on

Yech'on

Andong

Yongdok

P'ohang-dong

Songju

TAEGU

Sangju

Poun

Taejon

Kunsan

Chonju

Namwon

Hadong Sach'on

Kosang

Chungam-ni

Masan

PUSAN

Anui

INCH'ON

U.N. Frontline, Evening, 22 Sep

X Corps Frontline, Evening, 30 Sep

Direction of N.K. Withdrawal

General Area of Bypassed N.K.

 Concentrations, 30 Sep

Axis of U.N. Advance, 23 Sep

 to Dates Indicated

THE PURSUIT

23–30 September 1950

0 30

Miles
At Namwon, the two prongs of the 25th

Division’s attack temporarily converged, but Task

Force Dolvin then broke off to the northwest toward

I-ri, 45 miles distant from Namwon, while the 24th

continued on toward Sunch’ang, 15 miles to the

west. Taking the town, the 24th then curved to the

northwest toward the coast and the seaport at

Kunsan, 50 miles distant by air from Namwon and

110 miles to the south of Seoul. As the advance continued, Task Force Matthews ran out of fuel and had

to be replaced by Task Force Blair, a motorized force

composed of the 3d Battalion of the 24th Infantry,

Company D of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, and

attached engineer and artillery elements.10 The

march meandered from Namwon, through

Chongup, Kumje, and I-ri. Arriving at the objective

on 30 September, the unit found that the enemy had

abandoned the city but had left behind large stores

of ammunition, gasoline, and weapons.11

During October, as the Eighth Army pressed its

advance north, the 25th Division remained to the

south, mopping up bypassed enemy forces and

protecting lines of supply. By 16 October the unit

had relocated its headquarters to Taejon, 40 miles

northeast of Kunsan. The 24th Infantry had

responsibility for securing an area stretching roughly from that city northward to Suwon, 20 miles

south of Seoul. The 35th Infantry operated in the

region directly to the regiment’s south while the

27th Infantry occupied the area immediately to the

east. Organized enemy resistance was negligible

throughout the period, but there were a number of

skirmishes with stragglers, guerrillas, and the remnants of defeated and bypassed enemy units.12

Besides eliminating the remnants of the North

Korean Army—many of whose members were by

then reduced to moving in groups at night and to

raiding farms and villages for food and clothing—

the men of the 24th Infantry had charge of finding and collecting the arms and ammunition that

enemy forces had left behind. At Kunsan, they

came across a supply dump that contained thousands of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of

drums of gasoline and petroleum by-products,

dynamite, blasting caps, and antitank mines. They

also guarded highway and railway bridges and

tunnels and maintained the principal supply route

and communications lines for the 25th Division.

All the while, they made certain that law and

order prevailed within what was left of the local

civilian population. Since many of the enemy soldiers they encountered were eager to surrender,

they also accounted for a large number of enemy

prisoners of war.13

Patrolling continued throughout October but

the 24th was also heavily engaged in a program of

instruction that stressed individual, squad, and platoon training, leadership development, and

weapons familiarization. Colonel Corley hoped

that by improving his command’s efficiency in

those areas he might be able to raise standards of

discipline within his regiment. He also sought to

correct deficiencies that had become all too apparent during the weeks of combat that had preceded

the breakout from Pusan.14

Adding to Corley’s concern, by the end of

October more than two-thirds of the 3,663 enlisted

men in the regiment were replacements. During

August, 841 new men had arrived, followed in

September by 756 more. By 1 November another

674 would arrive. Many were truck drivers, heavy

equipment operators, communications specialists,

engineers, or cooks rather than trained infantryTO KUNU-RI AND BACK 183

10 WD, 25th Inf Div, 24 Sep 50, boxes 3752–3754, RG

407, WNRC. 11 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, p. 12, box 3755, RG

407, WNRC. See also Interv, John A. Cash with Oliver Dillard,

3 Jun 89, CMH files. All interviews hereafter cited by John A.

Cash, Bernard L. Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T.

Bowers, Richard O. Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in

CMH files. 12 Overlay 4, 24th RCT Zone of Responsibility, 16 Oct 50,

in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Oct 50, box 3760, RG 407, WNRC.

13 The condition of the North Koreans is mentioned in

WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Oct 50, p. 7. The responsibilities of the regiment sometimes varied from day to day. They are spelled out

in the regimental war diary, especially in Appendix 6, dealing

with operations orders and directives. The most succinct

account of what the unit did appears in HQ, 24th Inf Rgt,

Office of Civil Affairs Officer, Rpt for Oct 50, in WD, 24th Inf

Rgt, Oct 50, app. 7. 14 The program and its rationale are outlined in HQ, 24th

Inf Rgt, Training Directive 1, 2 Oct 50, in WD, 24th Inf Rgt,

Oct 50, app. 6.
men. They had to learn how to maintain and operate unfamiliar equipment, maneuver in combat formations, decipher arm and hand signals, fire their

weapons, and conduct patrols. Corley did his best

to see that they received what training they needed,

but some still complained years afterward that they

went directly into combat without a chance to perfect their skills.15

Many units in the Eighth Army were having

problems finding suitable enlisted replacements.

Of more concern were the 24th’s officers. Because

of heavy turnover during the first months of the

fighting, a circumstance unique to the 24th, only

12 of the 43 officers assigned to the unit’s nine rifle

companies at the beginning of November had

served at Gifu. Eight had arrived during July and

August, but the remaining 23 had come during

September and October. Of the rifle company

commanders, only 2 of the 9 had been with the

unit in Japan. One of those had been wounded

almost immediately at Sangju in July and returned

to duty only in October. Two of the rest had come

in September and 5 in October. The same was true

of the regiment’s battalion commanders. One,

Colonel Miller, had arrived on 27 July, but the

other two, Major Blair and the 2d Battalion’s new

commander, Maj. George A. Clayton, joined the

regiment in September.16

The loss of so many seasoned officers had a

number of effects. On one hand, the influx of new

officers led to a breakdown in the unit’s system of

segregated command. As early as July, with casualties among officers mounting, experienced black

184 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

15 The replacement numbers are in HQ, 24th Inf Rgt,

Strength and Replacement Statistics, 1–30 Sep 50, in WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Sep 50, app. 4. The October figures are in WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Oct 50, app. 5. See also Intervs, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer with Lindsey Bowers, 20 Apr 89; Albert Pough, 5

Aug 88; James C. Yadon, 22 May 89; Wallace C. Mims, 14 Oct

88. Alonzo Cooper complained about having to go into combat without a chance to perfect his skills. See Interv, Cash with

Alonzo Cooper, 8 Sep 88.

16 Problems with replacements for units of the Eighth

Army in general are mentioned in Schnabel, Policy and

Direction, pp. 132–34, 167, 239. The officer profile was compiled by comparing regimental staff rosters for July, August,

September, and November. All are in CMH files.

Members of a 24th Infantry communications element checking radios
officers began to receive assignments wherever the

need arose, regardless of the race of the officers

they would rate. After the breakout from Pusan,

black Capt. Milford W. Stanley thus received command of Company C, a unit that contained a number of white lieutenants, even though white captains were available.

On the other hand, the presence of officers with

combat experience is nonetheless of enormous

value to a unit entering battle, and on that score the

24th’s commanders were sometimes sorely lacking.

Although a number of the new men were veterans

of the fighting in World War II, others had been

commissioned in 1950 directly from the Reserve

Officer Training Corps and the U.S. Military

Academy at West Point. They arrived in Korea without additional training, sometimes with specialties

in branches of the service that had little to do with

the infantry. In addition to being unfamiliar with the

responsibilities that would pass to them once they

entered combat, according to the motor officer for

the 2d Battalion, 1st Lt. Lloyd Ott, a number were

reserve officers involuntarily recalled to active duty

who had little wish to be there. Others, according to

1st Lt. Charles E. Green, a company commander,

were so out of shape physically in comparison with

the battle-hardened veterans who had survived the

fighting around Sangju and Masan that they seemed

“fat and happy.”17

Complicating matters further, by October the

image of the 24th Infantry had sunk so low that

rumors had begun to circulate among the troops

in Korea about the unit’s poor performance in

combat.18 When men were wounded and repatriated to the United States, the stories went with

them. As a result, white 1st Lt. Adolf Voight for

one began to receive warnings to avoid the 24th

before he even departed for Korea, while waiting

in San Francisco to board ship. “Man, you don’t

want to go with them nigger bastards,” one officer

told him. “You’ll get yourself killed.”19 In the end,

even officers who were well-intentioned toward

blacks began to have second thoughts. Aware that

African-Americans often possessed lower aptitude

scores than whites, as white 2d Lt. James Yadon

observed, they could hardly help wondering

about the loyalties of the men they would command, “with their [inadequate] training and less

education and so forth.”20

Overall, a combination of time, training, and

experience appears to have offered the best solution

to the problem. Lieutenant Voight, for example,

received an assignment to the 24th Infantry despite

his reservations and joined the 3d Battalion in late

September. The high morale of the troops when he

arrived, he remarked years later, was immediately

apparent. There was none of the malingering he

had been told to expect. A second officer, a platoon

leader in Company K who had accompanied the

24th to Korea, 1st Lt. Alfred Tittel, agreed. When

he joined the regiment during July at Gifu, he said,

his unit had an obvious drug problem and a number of his troops had appeared to be affected. The

loss of those individuals in combat and the infusion

of new blood, however, provided a tonic. As a

group, the new men performed well and proved to

be excellent soldiers. The commander of Battery C

of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion was similarly

impressed. Although he had little respect, he said,

for some of the individuals who had accompanied

the regiment to Korea because they had panicked

far too often in the face of the enemy, the situation

changed after the breakout from Pusan. The unit

“firmed up” under Corley’s hand and began to act

the way it should have all along.21

Despite the new men and the new esprit evident in the 24th, the unit’s old image died hard. On

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 185

17 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Robert F. Fletcher, 5 Aug 88;

William T. Gant, 15 Sep 88; Fred Sheffey, 27 Feb 89; George

L. MacGarrigle with Gustav H. Franke, 14 and 28 Jul 94;

Charles E. Green, 16 Jun 94; Lloyd V. Ott, 19 Jul 94. Joseph

Baranowski agreed with Ott’s comment. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Joseph Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. 18 A member of the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division,

described the song. See Interv, Cash with Robert C. Bjorak, 1

May 89. Veterans of the 24th also mentioned it. See Intervs,

William T. Bowers with Bradley Biggs, 23 Mar 94; Muehlbauer

with Calvin Bryant, 1 Mar 89; MacGarrigle with Roscius C.

Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94.

19 Interv, Cash with Adolf Voight, 21 Sep 88. 20 Interv, Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89. 21 Intervs, Cash with Voight, 21 Sep 88; MacGarrigle with

Alfred F. Tittel, 20 Apr 94; Franke, 14 and 28 Jul 94.
6 September 1st Lt. Leon A. Gilbert was convicted

and sentenced to death in one of the first in a series

of courts-martial of black infantrymen for misbehavior before the enemy, a violation of the 75th

Article of War. Many of the men involved alleged

that they had been the victims of racial discrimination and that they had been railroaded to set an

example for the rest of the regiment. Their complaint appears to have had at least some weight.

According to white 1st Lt. John S. Komp, who edited the regiment’s newspaper and knew what was

going on within the command, “At the time, and

I’m not sure of the name, there was a white officer

in 1st [Battalion], who kept evading courts-martial

because charges were never brought against him for

one reason or another. I’m sure that this was general knowledge in the battalion.” Whether a double

standard existed in the regiment or not—officers

within all-white regiments were court-martialed

whenever the need arose—Gilbert’s conviction and

those of the others added weight to General Kean’s

contention that the regiment was a threat to the

well-being of the entire 25th Division.22

A number of the convicted men requested that

the NAACP represent them on appeal. The organization responded by sending its chief legal counsel,

Thurgood Marshall, to Japan and Korea to investigate. Arriving in February 1951, Marshall visited

General MacArthur and interviewed the imprisoned

men. Although he remarked in an interview years

later that he came to mistrust Gilbert’s word because

he caught the officer in two lies, he still concluded

that the condemned men had been the victims of

deep-seated racial prejudice. There was a deliberate

pattern of drumhead courts-martial, he avowed.

Although Kean was responsible, MacArthur had

backed everything that had happened.23

Marshall reported his conclusions in a 15

February memorandum to General MacArthur.

The three regiments of the 25th Division, he said,

had been on the front line for up to ninety-two

days. The 24th Infantry in particular had received

favorable press notices for its performance.

Nevertheless, 60 blacks had been charged with

cowardice before the enemy. If the charges against

24 blacks had been dismissed and 4 had been

declared not guilty, 32 of the men were convicted,

receiving sentences that ran from death to life

imprisonment to terms in prison from five to fifty

years. Despite the severe punishments, a check of

trial records showed that many of the men had

never received a full and vigorous defense. Some

alleged that they had seen their defense counsels

for the first time only on the mornings of their trials. Others asserted that even though some meetings with counsel had occurred, they had never

had sufficient time to discuss their cases in detail

or to call all the witnesses they believed they

needed. The men failed to protest at the time,

Marshall said, out of “a feeling of hopelessness”

brought on by excessive time in the line. Sgt.

Nathaniel Reed, for one, had a slip in his pocket

signed by a captain in the Medical Corps stating,

“If possible, this patient should be given duty

away from the front lines for a few days, as he is

bordering on combat fatigue.” The soldier failed

to tell even his defense counsel about it, Marshall

said. The others who shared his plight were in a

similar frame of mind. 

Marshall continued that the trials themselves

were conducted in groups, sometimes at what

seemed breakneck speed. One lasted 42 minutes,

another 44, and two took 50 minutes each. In all

of those cases, the defendants received sentences

of life imprisonment. Over the same period only

eight whites from the 25th Division were charged

with the same crime and only two appeared to

186 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

22 Ltr, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, 25th Inf Div, to Commanding

General, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 9 Sep 50, sub: Combat

Effectiveness of the 24th Infantry Regiment. Kean’s letter and

its attachments are contained in Far East Command Inspector

General Investigation, sec. BX, boxes 1013–1014, RG 159,

WNRC. Statements attached to General Kean’s letter each have

an exhibit number and are hereafter cited as in the Kean Letter

file. See also Thurgood Marshall, “Summary Justice—The

Negro GI in Korea,” the Crisis (May 1951): 297–355. Komp’s

allegation is in Ltr, John S. Komp to George L. MacGarrigle, 14

Apr 95, CMH files. No reason exists to disbelieve it, but there

is also no evidence to substantiate it.

23 Interv, Cash with Thurgood Marshall, 2 May 90. See

also Marshall, “Summary Justice—The Negro GI in Korea,” pp.

297–355.
have been convicted. Four whites were acquitted. A

reading of investigation reports, Marshall continued,

indicated that if all legal technicalities had been

observed, the trials themselves, with a few exceptions, had been conducted in an atmosphere that

“made it improbable, if not impossible, to mete out

justice.” As for the officers standing as defense counsel, all maintained that they had sufficient time to

prepare their cases. Their assertions were understandable, Marshall said, “but I do not believe that

any lawyer will deny that it is impossible to prepare

for the trial of a capital offense in a period of a day or

so. . . . There is no question in my mind that before

a man is sentenced to life imprisonment at hard

labor, counsel and the court should give the fullest

time and effort to be as certain as possible that the

man is guilty and deserves the stiff sentence.”24

Marshall made no attempt to deal in detail with

conditions in the 24th that might have contributed

to the situation, but he did allude to them. “The

men I talked to,” he said,

all made it clear to me that several of the white officers

assigned to the 24th Infantry [had] made it known that

they would have preferred not to be commanding Negro

troops. There is considerable lack of understanding and

mutual respect in many of the companies. . . . If the 24th

had been completely integrated, I am not sure that there

would not have been this disproportionate number of

charges and convictions of Negro troops under the 75th

Article of War. . . . Although the morale of the 24th is

better now . . ., I am convinced that . . . [the unit] will

never reach its highest efficiency as long as . . . [it]

remains a segregated outfit.25

The Far East Command investigated Marshall’s

allegations but concluded that many of them were

groundless.26 Although several of the convictions

had by then been set aside as unfounded and many

of the sentences had been reduced upon review by

higher authorities, the authors of the command’s

final report insisted that Marshall had based his

conclusions upon the self-serving comments of

convicted shirkers and malingerers who could

hardly have been expected to say anything else.

Overall, the men had been defended with as much

vigor as possible under the circumstances. If their

trials had seemed short, the charges in question

had been relatively easy to prove, and the men

themselves had failed in many cases either to take

the stand or to call witnesses in their own defense.

Anytime the presence of a witness had been

requested, the individual had been called to appear.

In each case the accused had a qualified attorney as

part of his defense team. The attorneys involved,

many of them black, insisted that they had worked

hard and that they had even gone into frontline

units to interrogate witnesses. “[The accused] did

not have the witnesses [they needed] to cast a

doubt [on the allegations],” one had remarked, “or

at least we could not find anything from interrogating the accused that would have warranted spending days and days waiting.”27

If the accused suffered from a sense of hopelessness, the officers who wrote the report continued, the evidence still indicated that the Army

had exercised considerable restraint. Out of sixty

initially charged for misbehavior before the

enemy, a considerable number were never tried

and four were acquitted. In that sense, if a feeling

of hopelessness was present, it may have come

from a recognition on the part of those who

remained to be prosecuted that if they were guilty

they would have little chance of escaping conviction and punishment. All concerned had been

informed of the possible results of their refusal to

return to the front and had been given an opportunity to comply with the orders they had initially chosen to disobey. All had refused in one manner or another.

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 187

24 The two preceding paragraphs are extracted from Memo,

Thurgood Marshall for General MacArthur, 15 Feb 51, exhibit

A–10, in General Headquarters, Far East Command, Report of

Investigation Regarding Alleged Irregularities in the

Administration of Military Justice in the 25th Infantry Division,

27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far East

Command Inspector General Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. 25 Ibid. 26 General Headquarters, Far East Command, Office of

the Inspector General, Report of Investigation Regarding

Alleged Irregularities in the Administration of Military Justice

in the 25th Infantry Division, 27 Mar 51, Far East Command

Inspector General Investigation. 27 Ibid., p. 17.
The courts-martial in that sense were a last

resort. As for Reed, the authors acknowledged in an

appendix to their report that at the time of his trial

the soldier had indeed carried a letter from a physician indicating that he might be suffering from

combat fatigue and needed a rest. They noted,

however, that Reed had earlier presented the slip to

his captain, who had seen to it that he received a

two-day rest. His offense had occurred after that,

when he had returned to his unit on the line.

Following the arrest, the black battalion adjutant,

Capt. Gorham Black, Jr., had seen to it that Reed

was examined by the battalion surgeon. The doctor

reported back that the soldier had made a sound

and considered decision and that no psychiatric

disturbances were involved.28

The report’s authors had strong grounds for

some of their assertions, but their response to

Marshall’s claim that there was a considerable lack

of understanding and mutual respect between

whites and blacks in the 24th Infantry tended only

to prove Marshall’s assertion. Noting with some justice that even if racial prejudice was present in the

unit it hardly constituted grounds for straggling,

they dismissed the possibility that segregation itself

might have had a powerful influence on what had

happened. Instead, they quoted a number of comments by black officers to the effect that, as black

Capt. Dan V. Snedecor observed, the relationship

between white and black officers was “wonderful”

and that racial prejudice, while perhaps always a

danger, hardly mattered where the 24th Infantry

was concerned. That some of the officers had made

their comments only in the context of the trials also

went unobserved, as did the possibility that few of

those individuals would have said anything to an

inspector general that might have harmed their

careers in a segregated Army.

The investigators dismissed Marshall’s charge

that some of the regiment’s white officers had made

no secret of their preference for service in an allwhite unit. The allegation, they said, was “so general and vague in its nature” that it was difficult to

determine, and it failed to recognize that “the

shortcomings of the Negro soldiers” themselves

might also have been to blame. “In view of the

excessive number of stragglers and the numerous

instances of misbehavior in the face of the enemy,”

they continued, “it is understandable that an officer

would prefer to be with a unit where these faults

were not so prevalent. . . . The percentage of officers killed in action is 10% of the total of the regiment, as compared with an average of 6% in the

other two regiments of the division. In other words,

an officer assigned to the 24th Infantry has only

60% of the chance of survival of an officer assigned

to other regiments of the division.” In making those

arguments, the authors clearly put the effect in

place of its cause and avoided addressing the real

issue: that it was difficult to make a first-class soldier out of a second-class citizen.29

Appearing at almost the same time as the Far

East Command’s report, the summary of the

Eighth Army’s investigation into General Kean’s

recommendation to disband the 24th was far

more circumspect. Recounting the regiment’s

problems at Sangju and Masan, the investigators

noted that because of the dearth of qualified

replacements within the command, many black

soldiers had been assigned to all-white regiments

within the 25th Division as well as to units in the

2d and 24th Divisions. Fighting in combat units,

those individuals had caused no problems.

Instead, all of the concerned commanders had

insisted that the performance of the blacks was

identical to that of the whites. The investigators

then devoted an entire paragraph to the comments of three black war correspondents, L. Alex

Wilson of the Chicago Defender, Frank Whisonant

of the Pittsburgh Courier, and James L. Hicks of the

Baltimore Afro-American. All had agreed that there

were difficulties within the 24th Infantry, but they

ascribed them “to lack of leadership, esprit-decorps, and close relationship between officers and

men; discrimination against negro officers; and

poor quality of replacements. Their opinions were

that complete integration was the solution, and

188 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

28 Ibid., Encl 27, Rpt, sub: General Prisoner Nathaniel A.

Reed. 29 Ibid., pp. 21–24.
Mr. Hicks stated that 75 percent of the men in the

regiment favored such action.”30

The Eighth Army’s investigators concluded that

even though the facts clearly argued in favor of

integration, with seventy-seven units of company

size or larger in the Eighth Army, the administrative

burdens involved in disbanding the 24th at that

time were “practically insurmountable.” In addition, there was the 24th’s long heritage of service to

consider. If the regiment was designated for inactivation, they said, the move would “place the Brand

of Cain upon the present and former members of

the regiment living, and also upon the memories of

those who died while serving with the organization. This drastic course does not seem warranted.”

In the end, General Walker accepted his investigators’ advice and retained the 24th in service.31

Whatever the conclusions of official investigators and despite the courts-martial, by the end of

October morale within the 24th was at a peak.

The breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the

northward pursuit of the enemy had been, as 1st

Lt. Sandro A. Barone remarked, “a godsend, a

confidence builder.”32 The feeling on the part of

the men was that the war was over and that everyone would be going home, perhaps even before

Christmas. When orders arrived to begin preparations to cross over into North Korea, they came as

a shock to many.33

The plan General MacArthur had devised for

the advance called for Walker’s Eighth Army to proceed up the Korean peninsula from the west, while

X Corps, after conducting an amphibious landing

at Wonson on North Korea’s east coast, moved from

the east. The Eighth Army would have three parts.

The I Corps, composed of the 1st Cavalry Division,

the 24th Infantry Division, and the 1st South

Korean Division, would occupy the left flank and

spearhead the attack. The South Korean II Corps,

incorporating the 6th, 7th, and 8th South Korean

Divisions, would hold the right and portions of the

center. The IX Corps, with the 2d Infantry Division

operating to the east and the 25th Infantry Division

to the west, would follow. A newly formed organization whose untrained headquarters would arrive

in Korea only on 10 October and whose communications battalion was slated to follow three weeks

later, IX Corps would serve as a reserve, securing

lines of communication and policing captured

enemy areas. The initial objective of the Eighth

Army would be the North Korean capital at

P’yongyang, some one hundred and twenty miles

north of Seoul.34

The first phase of the assault began on 9

October, when elements of the Eighth Army

entered North Korea. Only I Corps moved forward

at that time because U.S. logisticians were unable to

support any more troops north of the Han River.

Even then, since most of the rail lines in North

Korea had been heavily damaged by American air

attacks, supplies for the invading force had to be

trucked more than a hundred miles along roads ill

prepared for such heavy traffic. Nonetheless, by 19

October P’yongyang had fallen to allied forces. On

23 October General Walker informed General

Coulter that the South Korean III Corps would

relieve IX Corps as soon as practicable and that he

should be prepared to move his force into North

Korea no later than 10 November.35

By the end of October, the 24th Infantry was

over strength in officers (105 percent) and enlisted

men (103 percent) because a number of wounded

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 189

30 Ltr, Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, Office of

the Inspector General, to Commanding General, Eighth U.S.

Army, Korea, 15 Mar 51, sub: Report of Investigation

Concerning 24th Infantry Regiment and Negro Soldiers in

Combat, p. 5, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Eighth

Army Inspector General Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. 31 Quote from ibid., pp. 5, 6. Although the final report of

the Eighth Army’s investigation was not completed until March

1951, three months after Walker’s death, Walker was briefed

on the conclusions and approved the recommendation to

retain the 24th. See MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces,

p. 437. 32 Interv, MacGarrigle with Sandro A. Barone, 14 Apr 94. 33 Intervs, Bowers with Edward H. Skiffington, 14 Apr 94;

Muehlbauer with Isaac Smith, 27 Sep 88; Charles Piedra, 3

Nov 88. The American objective in North Korea is dealt with

in Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 607.

34 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

610–11; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 135–36. 35 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp.

638–53.
soldiers had returned to duty after hospitalization

in Japan. Even so, and despite Corley’s program of

training, the combat efficiency of the unit was off

because of the loss of crew-served weapons in the

engagements around Masan and a lack of trained

personnel to man the remainder.36

As was the case in the rest of the Eighth Army,

with winter coming and the evenings turning cold, a

lack of warm winter clothing was also becoming a

serious concern. An effort to remedy the problem

was under way, bringing in enough woolens by

November to provide for 90 percent of the regiment,

but supplies of some winter gear were still short. At

one point, according to the operations officer of the

3d Battalion, Capt. Roscius C. Newell, each man was

limited to one fur- or pile-lined garment, be it a field

jacket, cap, or gloves. Apparently, only drivers and

soldiers habitually exposed to the elements received

winter overcoats and parkas. Even then, proper sizes

were often lacking, forcing the men to make do with

whatever was issued, whether it fit or not. By then,

instruction teams had begun to operate within the

regiment to ensure that the troops understood how

to avoid frostbite and other cold-weather ailments.

Understanding that uniforms should hang loosely to

insulate properly, the trainers regarded the ill-fitting

clothing with some dismay.37 Their concern was well

placed. When the weather turned decidedly cold in

mid-November, eighty-five of the men came down

with frostbite.38

The order for the 25th Division to begin the

move north arrived on 2 November. The next day

the division’s command post moved to Kaesong,

thirty-eight miles northwest of Seoul and some one

hundred and fifty miles from the unit’s former base

at Taejon. The 24th Infantry began its march north

by rail and motor on 6 November, arriving at

Musan-ni, some fifteen miles south of Kaesong at the

mouth of the Imjin River, on the evening of 8

November and the morning of the ninth. The unit’s

battalions then moved by truck and foot to

Chindong-myon, sixteen miles to the northeast,

where they established a base. The regiment immediately sent out a reinforced patrol to reconnoiter the

perimeter of the regimental area. The force made no

contact with the enemy but came across caches of

enemy mortar and artillery ammunition.39

By that time the 27th and 35th regiments had

already arrived and portions of the 27th were

engaged in a push toward the town of Ich’on, forty

miles northeast of Kaesong. Since intelligence estimated that from seven to eight thousand enemy

troops were present in the territory south and east of

Ich’on, a region close to the supply routes feeding

allied forces in P’yongyang, the Eighth Army decided to sweep the area with the 25th Division.40 To

that end, on the morning of 9 November, learning

that an enemy force occupied the town of Yonch’on,

just ten miles to the north of Chindong-myon above

the 38th Parallel separating North from South Korea,

the 24th Infantry dispatched a task force to clear the

town. Composed of Company A, the intelligence

and reconnaissance (I&R) platoon, a platoon from

the heavy mortar company, and various recoilless

rifle and light machine-gun elements, the unit came

under fire from an estimated two hundred enemy

but secured high ground south of the town before

pulling in for the night. Seventy-five South Korean

soldiers and eight hundred South Korean police

reinforced the attack by holding the ridges above the

town. The next morning, after a brief firefight, the

enemy withdrew to the north, leaving Yonch’on in

allied hands. A quick survey found that the town

contained large stocks of enemy ammunition, clothing, and medical supplies.41

190 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

36 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–31 Oct 50, pp. 2–11, box 3760,

RG 407, WNRC. 37 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Roscius C. Newell, 10 and 15

Nov 94; WD, 25th Inf Div, 1–30 Nov 50, 1 Nov 50, 6 Nov 50,

boxes 3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30

Nov 50, p. 3, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC. 38 Daily Journal, 24th Medical Co, Casualties for 14–17

Nov 50, in WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, box 3764, RG 407,

WNRC.

39 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 3–4; 24th Inf Rgt Unit

Rpt 39, 9 Nov 50, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC. 40 WD, 25th Inf Div, 8 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG

407, WNRC. 41 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 6–7; 24th Inf Rgt Unit

Rpt 40, 10 Nov 50, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 25th Inf

Div, 10 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 1st

Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 11–12, box 3764, RG 407,

WNRC; Intervs, Cash with Waymon R. Ransom, 5 Aug 88;

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94.
Spending the better part of the day destroying

the enemy’s stores, the task force received instructions that afternoon to leave Yonch’on under the

control of the South Korean police and to return to

base. It began the process immediately but lacked

sufficient trucks to move as a body. As a result, half

of the troops made the trip to Chindong-myon but

the remainder, perhaps a hundred and twenty men,

stayed behind to await the arrival of more trucks.

Finally, toward dark the group reported that it was

on the way.42

Two thousand yards south of the town, the convoy passed a large assemblage of men that many

assumed to be South Korean police. A short distance

farther, the lead truck hit a mine and the rest of the

trucks came under heavy fire from portions of the

group they had just passed. Some of the troops had

apparently been told to unload their weapons

because of an earlier accidental discharge and were

unprepared to fire back. Those who could still walk

or crawl piled out of their burning vehicles into a

ditch beside the road where they took cover.43

Following toward the rear with the I&R platoon,

M. Sgt. Waymon Ransom heard the explosion and

the firing and rushed forward. He rallied the troops

in the ditch, but when enemy mortars zeroed in on

the position and further resistance appeared futile,

he ordered them to withdraw. Cpl. John L. Hicks

described what happened. “It looked like a million

of them was coming after us,” Hicks said. 

Sergeant Ransom cried out to run for it, but he did not because

there were many wounded men. He jumped from his position

and walked into the enemy firing and swearing. . . . I called him

but he didn’t stop. It suddenly dawned on me what he had said

some time ago, “Buster (that’s my nickname), one of these days

they are going to make me so mad with their ‘banzai,’ . . . [I’m]

going to make one of my own.44

Ransom charged into the advancing enemy, firing

until his weapon jammed. He kept fighting hand

to hand, but finally went down with several

wounds. “I rolled over and played dead,” he

recalled years later. “They stomped me around

some and took my field jacket and my billfold and

cap. Then they left me. . . . I think they shot anybody they saw was still moving.”45 Later, another

group of the enemy stole Ransom’s boots, discovered he was alive, beat him, and again left him for

dead. Nearly frozen, he survived nonetheless until

the next day, when a relief force from the 1st

Battalion reached the scene. In all, 42 Americans

were killed in the action, 8 were listed as missing,

and 24 were wounded. Ransom received the

Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism.46

The attack caused a number of difficulties for

the 24th, which had lost two platoons of Company

A and a significant portion of its I&R platoon.

Colonel Corley began work to rebuild those units,

but in the interim, the loss of Ransom, his men, and

his trucks severely limited the regiment’s intelligence-gathering abilities. Corley attempted to compensate by sending out patrols from his battalions,

but the teams failed to operate aggressively and

brought back little information of any consequence.47 On top of those problems, a sudden

freeze shortly after the ambush sidelined twelve

more vehicles, causing shortages in some types of

ammunition, signal supplies, and quartermaster

items that normally moved by truck.48

Limping from its losses and increasingly wary,

the 24th reoccupied Yonch’on on 13 November

and pushed on to seize the city of Ch’orwon, thirTO KUNU-RI AND BACK 191

42 Ibid. 43 Floyd Williams of Company A made the allegation. See

Interv, Cash with Floyd B. Williams, 6 Aug 88. Waymon

Ransom also remarked that the men did not have ammunition,

but did not say why. See Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88. 44 Statement by Cpl John L. Hicks, attachment to

Recommendation for Distinguished Service Cross for M Sgt

Waymon Ransom, 4 May 51, box 167, RG 338, WNRC.

45 Interv, Cash with Ransom, 5 Aug 88. Ransom also

spoke about the ambush in a follow-up interview with Cash on

22 August 1991. 46 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Casualty Statistics for 1–30 Nov 50,

25 Dec 50, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC. See also 24th Inf Rgt

Unit Rpt 42, 12 Nov 50, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf

Div Periodic Intelligence Rpt 116, 12 Nov 50, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC. For a published account of the

action, see Rishell, With a Black Platoon in Combat, pp. 116–25.

An outline of the action is in WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov

50, p. 11. See also Intervs, Cash with Alonzo Cooper, 8 Sep 88;

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug and 6 Sep 94;

Muehlbauer with Ray Koenig, 20 Mar 89. 47 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, S–2 Summary for Nov 50, 14 Jan 51,

box 3764, RG 407, WNRC. 48 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, S–4 Summary for Nov 50, n.d., box

3764, RG 407, WNRC.
teen miles to the north. Although the enemy

resisted mainly with artillery and mortar fire,

causing no casualties, a brief flurry of concern

arose when Colonel Corley disappeared. He

turned up, however, shortly thereafter. A fervent

Catholic, he had stumbled across a church of his

faith and had stepped inside to pray. No further

incident occurred. The regiment occupied the

town, uncovering in the process more enemy supplies, some artillery pieces, and a T34 tank.49 As

for the episode in the church, it became part of

the legend that was beginning to surround the

popular colonel.50

In the days that followed, the 1st Battalion

held blocking positions three miles north of

Ch’orwon. Meanwhile, the regiment’s 2d

Battalion patrolled the unit’s main supply route

through Yonch’on, which was constantly subject

to sniper fire, while the 3d Battalion guarded

crossing sites over the Imjin River.51 There were

some discipline problems among the men. After

the regiment crossed the 38th Parallel, a former

company commander, Capt. Buckner M. Creel,

observed that some individuals in his unit took

the attitude that the enemy’s land was “fair game.”

Sneaking into nearby towns at night, they raped

and pillaged. If a few offenders were apprehended, most went unpunished because local residents had difficulty recognizing their assailants.52

Although Creel spoke only of his own soldiers,

blacks were hardly the only guilty parties. Rapes

were also occurring in areas under the sole

responsibility of all-white units.53

The Push Toward the Yalu

On 17 November, with the Eighth Army’s

preparations for its final offensive north to the

Chinese border in full swing, the 24th turned the

region around Ch’orwon over to the South Koreans

and began the process of moving nearly a hundred

miles north to Sunch’on, 30 miles above

P’yongyang. The trip took more than two days.

Shortly after arriving, Colonel Corley received

instructions to move 30 miles farther to the town of

Kunu-ri, located 70 miles southeast of the nearest

point on the Yalu River, North Korea’s border with

China, and 15 miles east of Anju on the

Ch’ongch’on River. (Map 11) There the regiment

was to participate in the 25th Division’s relief of the

1st Cavalry Division, which had seen heavy fighting during late October and early November in

combat with Chinese forces that were already moving down into Korea. Because of a gasoline shortage, many of the troops covered the final leg of the

journey on foot.54 The troops observed

Thanksgiving on 23 November, the day before the

Eighth Army’s attack was to begin. Although some

of the men in the field had to make do with Crations, most had turkey with all the trimmings.

The weather was clear but cold.55

American commanders were optimistic that

they had the war won, but rough estimates still

indicated that the enemy retained substantial forces

just to the north and east of Anju along the

Ch’ongch’on River valley, the line of departure for

192 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

49 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 15 and 16 Nov 50, pp.

15–16, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC. 50 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 24, 12 Nov 50, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 9.

The story of the church was recalled by Chaplain Gray Johnson

and Gustav Gillert. See Intervs, Cash with Gray Johnson, 23

Mar 89; Gillert, 25 Mar 89. 51 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 28, 13 Nov 50, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 9. 52 Interv, MacGarrigle with Buckner M. Creel, 3 Dec 93.

Edwin W. Robertson, a retired Air Force major general

attached to the 24th as a liaison officer, also dealt with the subject. See Interv, Cash with Edwin W. Robertson, 29 Aug 89.

Vernie Scott, the regimental headquarters sergeant, mentioned

a rape after the breakout from Pusan but did not pursue the

issue. See Interv, Cash with Vernie Scott, 7 Sep 88. Charles

Bussey describes an attempted rape by two sergeants from one

of the 24th’s heavy weapons companies north of Kunu-ri. See

Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, pp. 237–38. 53 See, for example, IX Corps Periodic Intelligence Rpt 62,

27 Nov 50, box 1769, RG 407, WNRC. 54 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 12. The presence of the

Chinese is noted in WD, 25th Inf Div, Intelligence Annex to

Opns Order 15, 21 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG 407,

WNRC. For more on the Chinese and their presence in North

Korea, see Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July

1951, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government

Printing Office, 1990), pp. 51–60. 55 Intervs, Muehlbauer with Charles A. Hill, 28 Feb 89;

MacGarrigle with Reginald J. Sapenter, 21 Mar 94.
XXXX

PLA 50

XXXX

PLA 40

XXXX

PLA 42

XXXX

PLA 38

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX

PLA 66

Ch'ongch'on R

Ch'ongch'on R

Taedong R

Taedong R

12

12

Turk

ROK 6 Div(-)

9

19

24

24

38 3 5

8

10 21

11

27

21

21

35

35

7 Cav

8 Cav

2 XX1 Cav

ROK 1 25 XX

ROK 7 XXROK 8

25 XX2

24

ROK 1

XX

I

XXXIX

I

XXX

IX

IX

XXX

ROK II

Chongju

T'aech'on

Pakch'on

Kaech'on

Kunu-ri

Pugwon

Ipsok

Yongdong-ni

Tokch'on

Somin-dong

Huich'on

Sunch'on

Songch'on

to P'yongyang

Sinanju

Anju

Sukch'on

Yongyu

Samso-ri Pukch'ang-ni

Yalu R

An-tung

P'YONGYANG

Wonsan

Kunu-ri

Chosin Reservoir

Hungnam

CHINA

KOREA

0 20

Miles

BATTLE OF THE CH'ONGCH'ON

25–28 November 1950

Eighth Army Front, Evening, 25 Nov

(Arabic Numerals Identify Regiments)

Chinese Attacks, Night, 25 Nov 

Chinese Attacks, Night, 26–28 Nov 

Eighth Army Front, 28 Nov

High Ground Above 500 Feet

Map 11

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 193

the 25th Division’s push to the Yalu. To the immediate front of the division, according to intelligence

analysts, stood at least two Chinese divisions and

part of a North Korean division, a total of 14,600

men. Another 4,800 men waited in reserve just to

the rear, and behind them 14,600 more. In all, the

25th Division’s intelligence analysts estimated that

the unit faced a combined enemy force of about

thirty-four thousand men.56

The particular contribution the Chinese

would make in contesting the attack remained

unclear. Intelligence estimates indicated that

between forty and seventy thousand Chinese soldiers had entered North Korea. Everyone expected them to be active. Portions of that force had

already bloodied the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division

and the 1st South Korean Division in an area to

the north of Anju that the 25th Division would

have to cross. It had also fought the South Korean

II Corps farther to the east, crippling a South

Korean division and a U.S. regiment. The Far East

Command’s analysts believed, however, that the

Chinese were only bluffing. When the time came,

so the reasoning went, they would conduct counterattacks in self-defense but would refrain from

56 Enemy forces are covered in 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order

20, 22 Nov 50, annex 1, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC.
committing themselves to an all-out war with the

United States.57

In fact, when the Eighth Army launched its

attack on 24 November, it came up against six

Chinese armies composed of nineteen divisions

totaling some 150,000 men. The 25th Division itself

confronted three of those divisions, close to its original estimate. Lightly armed and inadequately supplied, those forces would have little staying power in

comparison with the heavily armed Americans, who

had been joined by that time by Turkish and British

allies. Since the Chinese units were composed

almost entirely of fighting men, however, they would

be able to deliver telling blows over the short term,

especially against units that had no idea of their location or intentions.58

As the Eighth Army advanced toward the Yalu,

it spread out along an eighty-mile front that

stretched from Chonju on the left, some twenty

miles to the north and west of Anju, to Yongdongni on the right, sixty miles to the east. The I Corps

took the far left flank, IX Corps the center, and the

South Korean II Corps the right. Advancing northward from the Chosin Reservoir, forty miles to the

north of Hungnam on North Korea’s east coast, X

Corps would connect with II Corps’ easternmost

flank while moving toward the Chinese border, a

distance of some seventy miles to the northwest of

the unit’s point of departure.59

Within IX Corps, General Kean’s 25th Division

took position to the left and Maj. Gen. Laurence B.

Keiser’s 2d Infantry Division to the right. Within the

25th’s sector, the 35th Infantry moved on the west

toward the town of Unsan, some eighteen miles

north of Kunu-ri on the west side of the Kuryong

River, a south-flowing tributary of the Ch’ongch’on.

Corley’s 24th Infantry advanced on the right, moving

into mountains east of the river valley. Since the 25th

Division’s area of operations was too wide for a tworegiment front and Kean wanted to keep his third

regiment, the 27th, in reserve, a task force under

Colonel Dolvin held the center. Task Force Dolvin

comprised elements from the 89th Medium Tank

Battalion, the 25th Division’s reconnaissance company, Company E of the 27th Infantry, Company B of

the 35th Infantry, and the 8213th Ranger Company.

The 27th Infantry stood in reserve behind Task

Force Dolvin, prepared to move in any direction as

the need arose.60

The plan of operations for the force was relatively simple. While Task Force Dolvin maneuvered up

the east side of the Kuryong River valley between the

35th and 24th Infantry regiments, the 2d Division to

the east was to move up the Ch’ongch’on River valley. The 9th Infantry regiment of the 2d Division,

located at Won-ni, some five miles east of Kunu-ri,

stood on the 24th Infantry’s right flank. Its 3d

Battalion was the only all-black infantry unit in the

Eighth Army besides the 24th.61

In general, Kean expected Task Force Dolvin

and the 35th Infantry to do the work. As a result, he

placed them in low-lying areas on relatively good

routes where Dolvin’s armor in particular could

advance with ease. The 24th Infantry was to keep

pace, working its way through the mountainous

region between the Kuryong and Ch’ongch’on River

valleys and maintaining contact between Dolvin on

the left and the 2d Division to the right.62 (Map 12)

According to Colonel Corley, Kean gave the regiment

that task because he lacked confidence in its abilities

and had long before developed a policy of placing

the unit in areas where, if it performed poorly, it

would not affect the outcome of a battle.63

194 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

57 The figures are from Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in

Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station: Texas

A&M University Press, 1989), pp. 44–45. See also Mossman,

Ebb and Flow, p. 65; 25th Inf Div Periodic Intelligence Rpt 125,

20 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC. For the

Chinese attacks, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu, pp. 673–75, 689–708. 58 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 44–45. 59 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 42; Mossman, Ebb and

Flow, pp. 63–64.

60 Ibid.; Historical Rpt, 25th Inf Div, 22–24 Nov 50, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; S–3 Journal, 27th Inf Rgt, Nov

50, pp. 14–15, boxes 3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC; Unit

Journal, 89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50, Encl 3, WD, Task

Force Dolvin, Nov 50, p. 1, box 3765, RG 407, WNRC. The

composition of Dolvin is described in Unit Journal, 89th

Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50, p. 3. 61 Historical Rpt, 25th Inf Div, 22–24 Nov 50. 62 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order 20, 22 Nov 50. 63 Interv, Roy E. Appleman with John T. Corley, 4 Jan 52,

CMH files.










Sokch'ang R

Kuryong R

Ch'ongch'on R

Kuryong R

Unsan Sokch’ang-dong

Hill 391

I-san

542 m Ch'oni-san

528 m

Unhung

Kuryong

Yongbyon

Hill 234

Ch'udong-san

475m

Isan-dong

Ipsok

Pugwon

Won-ni Sodong

Sojnbyon

Kujang-dong

Kunu-ri

Kae-ch'on

E/27 RG 1/24(-)

25 Nov B/89

3/24 2/24(-)

25 Nov 25 Nov

25 Nov

25 Nov

3/9

3/24 24 Nov

2/24

23 Nov 3/24

2/24

23 Nov

23 Nov

1/24

24 Nov TF DOLVIN

24

III

1/24

C/24

25 Nov

35

III TF DOLVIN

TF DOLVIN(-)

25

XX

2

25 Nov

0 3

Miles

KUNU-RI AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

23–25 November 1950

Unit Locations, Night, Date

Roadblock, Date

Map 12
Whatever General Kean’s intentions, the

region he assigned to the 24th was rugged and

inaccessible. A single unpaved highway crossed it.

Beginning at the ancient walled town of Yongbyon,

ten miles northwest of Kunu-ri, that road

described a rough triangle whose first leg ran some

twenty miles to the north and northeast toward the

town of Sokch’ang-dong on the Sokch’ang River, a

tributary to the Kuryong. Turning southeast at that

point, the highway entered its second leg, moving

a distance of ten miles to Kujang-dong on the

Ch’ongch’on River. Just before reaching that town,

the route’s third leg began with a swing generally

to the west. Following a small valley some eight

miles to the village of Unhung, it then beat twelve

miles through another valley and the town of

Kuryong to its starting point at Yongbyon. The

region along the Yongbyon–Sokch’ang-dong road

paralleled the right bank of the Kuryong River.

Characterized by low-lying hills but otherwise relatively flat and accessible, it would be the area of

operations for Task Force Dolvin. By contrast, the

territory to the east under the charge of the 24th

was a jumble of hills and rocky outcroppings.

Corley’s unit was to move northwest across that

expanse and, as its initial objective, seize the

Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road. After that it

was to proceed to the Yalu with the rest of the

Eighth Army.64

The 24th’s sector had no north-south roads

capable of assisting the unit’s advance. The eastwest portion of the highway between Yongbyon

and Kujang-dong was helpful, becoming for lack of

anything better an extension of the regiment’s main

supply route from Kunu-ri through Yongbyon, but

that road’s eastern end at Kujang-dong was in the

hands of the 2d Division. Corley had to request

permission before he could maneuver his forces

and supply trains into the area. In the same way,

the Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road was accessible only through the 2d Division.65

Within the 24th Infantry’s area, which ran generally southwest to northeast, vehicular movement

above the Yongbyon–Kujang-dong road was also

problematic. Only rough tracks existed, and many

of those routes died out before reaching a definable

destination. In addition, three mountains blocked

the regiment’s advance. The 1st Battalion on the left

faced 475-meter-high Ch’udong-san. The 3d

Battalion in the center had to deal with 528-meterhigh Ch’oni-san. And the 2d Battalion to the right

had 542-meter-high I-san to consider. In the 2d

Battalion’s area, I-san completely blocked all

progress north. Elsewhere, even where motorable

tracks existed, the heights tended to bar the way to

all but the smallest and lightest trucks. In the end,

in order to resupply units operating in the region,

Colonel Corley had to depend upon Korean porters

and parachute drops, neither of which posed an

attractive alternative. Although fifty porters were

assigned to most of the companies operating in the

area, there was no guarantee that they would do

their jobs when fighting began. As for the drops,

efforts of that sort succeeded when danger was

remote but were not reliable when enemy forces

threatened.66

On the morning of 24 November the three battalions of the 24th Infantry moved out abreast from

positions on the north side of the Ch’ongch’on

River. Since the Chinese had pulled back their main

forces in order to gather breath for their own offensive, leaving only observation teams and small

screening forces on ridge lines to face the American

advance, the regiment encountered little enemy

opposition during the first day of the attack.

Proceeding rapidly through the mountain valleys,

the 1st Battalion managed to keep pace with Task

Force Dolvin.67 Accompanied by General Kean for

196 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

64 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order 20, 22 Nov 50. See also

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 137. 65 Map, Korea, 1:50,000, series L751, Army Map Service

(AMS) 1950, sheets 6333 I and 6433 IV, National Archives and

Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Md.

66 Ibid. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with George A.

Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94. The 2d Battalion’s war diary shows

the problems with porters and airdrops. See WD, 2d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 26, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC; Memo,

25th Inf Div G–3, 23 Nov 50, sub: Activities Report for 22

Nov, 25th Division Staff Records, Nov 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div,

Nov 50. In all, the 24th Infantry had 300 Korean ammunition

carriers. 67 WD, 25th Inf Div, 24 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG

407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 13; WD, 1st Bn,
several hours during the day, the 2d Battalion also

made good progress, as did the 3d. By evening,

Colonel Corley could report that his regiment’s forward command post had reached Kuryong, five

miles to the east of Yongbyon on the road to

Kujang-dong, and that his unit as a whole had

advanced nearly five miles.68

The rest of the Eighth Army moved apace. The

35th Infantry on the west of Task Force Dolvin covered three miles over the same period. The 9th

Infantry on the east flank of the 24th was already

several miles ahead of the other attacking units. It

adjusted its position by moving forward some two

miles, but then held in place with the rest of the 2d

Division until the 25th Division’s units could move

up. The South Korean II Corps to the far right of

the 2d Division was the only element of the force to

meet significant enemy opposition. The South

Koreans gained from one-quarter to a full mile in

some areas but in others found themselves unable

to advance. The weather was cold over the entire

region. Despite warming temperatures during the

day, temperatures fell to -150F at night. There was

snow on the ground in some places.69

That evening, elements of Task Force Dolvin

began to report enemy patrols near their positions. Although the night passed largely without

incident, the tempo of enemy activity increased

the next day, 25 November, when Dolvin was able

to advance only 2,000 yards against very heavy

opposition. At that time, Companies A and B of

the 1st Battalion of the 24th, along with Colonel

Miller’s command group, moved off in a column

to the northeast past Ch’udong-san toward their

objective, the northernmost stretch of the Kujangdong–Sokch’ang-dong road. Meeting increased

enemy resistance, Company B ended the day a

mile short of the road. Company A stopped about

one and one-half miles farther to the rear. Since

Dolvin’s lead elements—Company E of the 27th

Infantry, the 8213th Ranger Company, and

Company B of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion—

were about one mile west of Company A, the two

units from the 24th were well positioned to protect the task force’s eastern flank overnight and to

continue their attack the following morning.70

Even closer to the task force, Company C of the

24th had by then reached Hill 234, located some

two miles to the southwest of Company A above a

choke point on the Kuryong where foothills dominated a bend in the river. Protecting the right flank

of Dolvin’s Company B of the 35th Infantry, which

was attempting to advance up the lowlands near

the river, the unit came under heavy enemy mortar

fire, took seven casualties, but still held in place all

day. Toward noon the 25th Division removed it

from the control of the 24th Infantry and attached

it temporarily to Dolvin.71

The forces operating farther to the east of

Dolvin and the 1st Battalion were meanwhile experiencing mixed results. Attacking into the rugged

high ground that separated the 1st from the 2d

Battalion on the morning of the twenty-fifth, the

forward units of Colonel Blair’s 3d Battalion skirmished with the enemy but reported toward

evening that they had still reached all their objecTO KUNU-RI AND BACK 197

24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 24. The Chinese strategy is discussed

in Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 59–60. The reasons for the 1st

Battalion’s speed are mentioned in Interv, MacGarrigle with

Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. Baranowski was the operations officer

of the 1st Battalion. 68 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30 Nov 50, p. 14; WD, 25th Inf

Div, 24 Nov 50; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 6; WD,

3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 10, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC.

See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 21 Mar 94. Kean’s

presence was mentioned by the 2d Battalion commander. See

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94. 69 WD, 25th Inf Div, 24 Nov 50; 25th Inf Div Periodic

Opns Rpt 60, 24 Nov 50, annex to WD, 25th Inf Div, Nov 50.

South Korean gains are described in Mossman, Ebb and Flow,

p. 63. The weather is mentioned in Intervs, Appleman with

Corley, 4 Jan 52; MacGarrigle with Charles E. Green, 16 Jun

94; Sapenter, 21 Mar 94.

70 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 25 Nov 50, box 3764, RG

407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 62, 25 Nov 50,

annex to WD, 25th Inf Div, Nov 50; Map Overlay to 25th Inf

Div Periodic Opns Rpt 63, 25 Nov 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div,

Nov 50; Interv, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 6 Sep 94. 71 Ibid. The situation in Company C is mentioned in Ltr,

Howard H. Eichelsdoerfer to John A. Cash, 23 Sep 90, CMH

files. See also Narrative Account of Action, Task Force Wilson,

26–27 Nov 50, attachment to Medal of Honor Award file for

Reginald Desiderio, box 159, RG 338, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt

Unit Rpt 55, 25 Nov 50, box 3764, RG 407, WNRC; Interv,

Cash with Harry Cramer, 27–28 Aug 89.
tives. They dug in for the night in the hills some

four miles to the northeast of Unhung.72

To the east the 2d Battalion and the rear elements

of the 3d had difficulties. Since the I-san blocked the

way north, the 2d Battalion’s commander, Lt. Col.

George A. Clayton, with his three rifle companies,

moved into the hills north of the Yongbyon–Kujangdong road to skirt the mountain. Company F, under

Capt. Roger Walden, struck out to the northwest

while Clayton with Companies E and G moved

northeast and then north around Hill 391.73

The rest of the 2d Battalion received leave from

the 2d Division to move the unit’s trains along with

two tanks, engineers, and a 4.2-inch mortar platoon through that division’s area of operations and

up the Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road. They

intended to link up with Clayton at the 2d

Battalion’s objective for the day, an area just off the

road about halfway between the two towns.

Combining with command and support elements

from the 3d Battalion that were seeking an easy way

to reach their own forward units, the convoy, composed of some fifty vehicles, moved nearly twelve

miles toward its goal before a message arrived from

the 2d Division canceling the move. An enemy

force farther ahead had blocked the road.74

The command post for the 3d Battalion pulled

back and bivouacked for the night, but part of the

convoy attempted to reach the objective by a different route. Since Clayton and two of his three companies had struck off overland through the mountains, the column had no chance of following them.

Walden’s Company F, however, had taken a more

easily traveled route through the 3d Battalion’s area

of operations to the west. The vehicles fell in behind

it. Over the afternoon that followed, Clayton’s force

198 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

72 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 11; Map Overlay,

attachment to 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 55, 25 Nov 50; Interv,

Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52. 73 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 6; WD, 3d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 11. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94, 5 Oct 94; Ralph J. Davis, 31 Oct

94, with review comments. A first lieutenant, Davis was the

assistant operations officer of the 2d Battalion. 74 Ibid.

Bivouac site of a headquarters unit
skirted the northeastern edge of the I-san and

reached the high ground south of its objective.75

The units that had followed Company F were

less fortunate. Encountering strong enemy opposition some three and a half miles above Unhung, they

had no choice but to pull to the rear. Out of touch

with Clayton because of a breakdown in communications, Walden and his men likewise withdrew.

They held for a time on a large hill to the northeast

of Unhung but then received instructions to move

up the Yongbyon–Kujang-dong road to the boundary between the 25th and 2d Divisions. There they

would guard the 25th Division’s right flank and

maintain contact with the 9th Infantry to the east.76

By the evening of 25 November, two days into

the operation, difficulties were beginning to mount

for the 24th. Although the weather was often below

freezing, some of the men had yet to receive all of

their cold-weather gear. Insulated footwear was in

particularly short supply. Meanwhile, as had been

the case with the 2d Battalion’s convoy, motorized

supply trains were finding it difficult if not impossible to make their way into the mountains. The

porters called in to substitute succeeded in resupplying some of the troops on the evening of the

twenty-fifth, but after that, as enemy attacks

increased, they tended to melt away.77

Compounding those problems, with the high

peaks in the area impeding electronic transmissions

and the cold weather reducing the efficiency of radio

batteries, communications between regimental and

battalion commanders and their units in the field

were beginning to break down. Although supply

officers sent fresh batteries forward whenever possible and radio relays through Task Force Dolvin, the

159th Field Artillery Battalion’s liaison officers, and

other nearby units compensated to a degree, there

was never any certainty as to when contact with a

company or battalion in the field would begin or

end. Connections with Company C, for example,

were often tenuous, and the whereabouts of the unit,

according to the 1st Battalion’s operations officer,

Capt. Joseph Baranowski, were vague from the start.

The same was true for the rest of the 1st Battalion,

which was operating well to the fore of the regiment.

As for the 2d Battalion, reports from the unit all but

ceased. The headquarters of the 3d Battalion was

similarly out of touch. After its units had penetrated

deep into the mountains, their radios failed and it

lost contact with its company commanders.78

The Chinese Attack

The enemy’s counterattack began in earnest on

the night of 25–26 November. To the west of the

25th Division, Chinese forces struck the 1st South

Korean Division, pushing it back on its right flank

with heavy casualties. Meanwhile, to the east of the

25th, the U.S. 2d Division fought desperately to prevent encirclement. The largest threat, however, came

on the Eighth Army’s easternmost flank, where massive enemy forces penetrated the South Korean II

Corps, allowing up to six Chinese divisions to begin

moving into the Eighth Army’s rear.79

The situation was little better in the 25th

Division’s zone. In the center, the 8213th Ranger

Company and Company E of the 27th Infantry,

located about one and one-half miles to the front of

Company C on Hill 205 and a north-south ridge line

to its left, came under heavy attack along with other

portions of Task Force Dolvin. Although Company E

held its ground, the Rangers suffered forty-one casualties out of a strength of sixty-six men and had to

withdraw. A battery from a field artillery battalion

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 199

75 Ibid. See also Roger Walden comments to David

Carlisle, 25 Feb 87, CMH files. 76 The position of Company F between 25 and 27

November is unclear because of errors in map coordinates for

the unit recorded by the 24th Infantry. Walden, however, says

his unit was probably on I-san mountain. Whatever the case, by

the morning of 27 November, the company was stationed on the

Yongbyon–Kujang-dong road where the 2d and 25th Division

boundaries met. See Roger Walden Reply to George L.

MacGarrigle interviews on 28 and 29 June 1995, 7 Sep 95, CMH

files; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpts 55, 56, and 57, 25–27 Nov 50, box

3764, RG 407, WNRC. See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Ralph

Davis, 31 Oct 94, with review comments. 77 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94,

13–14 Oct 94; Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94; Owen H. Carter,

21 and 24 Jun 94; Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52; Ltr,

Eichelsdoerfer to Cash, 23 Sep 90.

78 Ibid. 79 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 79–87, 150–53,

175–202; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 68–76.
was also overrun and one gun captured. According

to a platoon leader in Company C, 1st Lt. Howard H.

Eichelsdoerfer, Company C was ordered to go forward at that time, possibly to assist in repelling the

attack. After it had advanced a few hundred yards,

however, it received instructions to pull back into its

original position on Hill 234. Shortly after finishing

that move, the unit came under what Eichelsdoerfer

considered friendly artillery fire and suffered several

casualties. About that time, the 2d Battalion of the

27th Infantry, minus Company E which was already

present, arrived in the area to serve as a reserve for

the task force.80

On 26 November at about 0745, Colonel Dolvin

was preparing to counterattack when General Kean

ordered him to hold up. Overnight, the Chinese had

attacked the units on the immediate flanks of the

25th Division. The 1st South Korean Division to the

west had been pushed back on its right flank with

heavy casualties, and a gap between that unit and the

35th Infantry to the east was opening. To the east of

the 25th, the 9th Infantry had been hard hit, losing

two companies and a battalion command post.

Farther east, in the South Korean II Corps sector,

large enemy forces had not only penetrated between

units to move into rear areas, where they were posing a major threat, but they were also threatening to

overwhelm the South Koreans, who were on the

verge of collapse. Kean and his staff needed time to

assess the situation.81

Over the next two hours the task force directed

heavy artillery and tank fire into enemy positions in

an effort to discourage further enemy assaults. Then

at 0945 Kean instructed Dolvin to “get word to

Miller” to move Company B of the 24th Infantry,

which had advanced the farthest into enemy territory, back to a position west of Company A, where it

could assist in forming a line against advancing

Chinese forces. The message made it clear that counterattack was out of the question and that defense

was the order of the day. “You will not resume attack

until further instructions,” Kean said. “You are

authorized to adjust your lines in order to put your

troops on better defensive positions. I want Miller to

coordinate his disposition with Dolvin’s.” Miller

relayed the order to Company B, which began moving to its new position.82

From that point on, the sequence of events

involving the 1st Battalion and its units is difficult

to determine. At 1045 General Kean informed

Colonel Dolvin that he was sending his deputy,

Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, forward to take command of the task force, which was then to be

renamed Task Force Wilson. At that time, the entire

1st Battalion of the 24th was to come under

General Wilson’s control.83 When Wilson arrived

and assessed the situation, he ordered the forward

elements of Dolvin to fall back to better defensive

positions to the west of Company C of the 24th

Infantry.84 (Map 13)

200 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

80 WD, Task Force Dolvin, n.d., p. 4, attachment to WD,

89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50, box 3765, RG 407, WNRC;

WD, Task Force Wilson, 26–27 Nov 50, p. 1, attachment to

Medal of Honor Award file for Reginald Desiderio, box 159,

RG 338, WNRC; Ltr, Eichelsdoerfer to Cash, 23 Sep 90.

Whether friendly fire was actually involved is unknown.

According to Harry Cramer, Jr., the son of an officer in the

24th who was killed in Korea, the incident involved enemy

fire. Cramer has kept all of his father’s letters and many more

from other individuals involved with the 24th. According to a

letter in his possession from the first sergeant of the 1st

Battalion’s weapons company, Sergeant McLeod, as soon as the

attack occurred, Company C called to request that Company D

halt its firing. The unit’s mortars, however, were not in service

at that time. According to McLeod, who has since died,

Company C was under enemy attack. 81 WD, Task Force Dolvin, n.d., p. 4, attachment to WD,

89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50; WD, 3d Bn, 9th Inf Rgt, Nov

50, p. 2, box 2471, RG 407, WNRC; Appleman, Disaster in

Korea, pp. 155–86; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 65–68. 82 WD, Task Force Dolvin, n.d., p. 4, attachment to WD,

89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50; WD, Task Force Wilson,

26–27 Nov 50, p. 1, attachment to Medal of Honor Award file

for Reginald Desiderio. Quotes from Unit Journal, 89th

Medium Tank Bn, 26 Nov 50, item 11, in WD, 89th Medium

Tank Bn, Nov 50, box 3765, RG 407, WNRC. Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 13 and 14 Oct 94. 83 The war diaries for the 1st Battalion, the 24th Infantry,

and the 25th Division all say that the entire 1st Battalion was

attached to Task Force Wilson. The war diary for Wilson says

“the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment (less Companies ‘A’

and ‘B’).” See WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 26 Nov 50, p. 26, box

3764, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 15; WD,

25th Inf Div, 26 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC;

WD, Task Force Wilson, 26–27 Nov 50, p. 1, attachment to

Medal of Honor Award file for Reginald Desiderio. 84 Unit Journal, 89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50, box

3765, RG 407, WNRC; WD, Task Force Dolvin, p. 5, in WD,

89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50.










Sokch'ang R

Kuryong R

Ch'ongch'on R

Kuryong R

Unsan Sokch’ang-dong

Hill 391

I-san

542 m Ch'oni-san

528 m

Unhung

Kuryong

Yongbyon

Hill 234

Ch'udong-san

475m Isan-dong

Ipsok

Pugwon

Sodong Won-ni

Sojnbyon

Kujang-dong

Kunu-ri

Kae-ch'on

to Anju

1/24(-)

26 Nov

3/24

F/24

F/24

2/24(-)

26 Nov

26 Nov

3/9

3/24

TF WILSON

TF WILSON(-)

TF WILSON

III

27

1/27 1/24(-) 3/27

C/24

A & B Co

26 Nov

B/35

26 Nov

26 Nov

25

XX

2

26 Nov

27

24

III

TF WILSON

24

III

3/24

1/24(-)

2/24(-)

27th Inf

1/24 3/24

23d Inf

3/23

9th Inf(-)

27th Inf

1/9

28 Nov

28 Nov

28 Nov 28 Nov

28 Nov

27 Nov

27 Nov

27 Nov

27 Nov

0 3

Miles

KUNU-RI AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

26–30 November 1950

Unit Locations, Night, Date

Frontline, Night, 29 Nov

Axis of Withdrawal

Map 13
Colonel Corley visited the 1st Battalion’s command post, located near Task Force Wilson’s headquarters, a short while later. Learning for the first

time of the attacks on Dolvin’s lead elements and of

the readjustments Wilson had ordered, he instructed Miller to leave his forward units and to return to

his command post, where he would be in the best

position to make decisions as the quickly changing

situation evolved. Miller complied, leaving his

operations officer, Captain Baranowski, in charge of

the two companies.85

At 1600 that afternoon, Baranowski and his

men received an air drop of supplies. Shortly thereafter Wilson ordered them to pull back. Whether

the general recognized the perilous position of the

force, which was at that time all but naked to

enemy attack because it jutted precariously to the

northeast of Company C, is unknown. He may only

have been seeking to increase his available reserves

to repel further enemy attacks or to improve his

position before continuing his own assault north

the next day. Whatever the reason, Companies A

and B struck camp after dark and continued their

move south throughout the night.86

While they did so, Wilson received word that

enemy patrols were operating throughout the area

and that the Chinese were about to launch a fullscale attack against the entire task force. Late on the

night of 26 November and early on the morning of

the twenty-seventh, indeed, Company B of the 35th

Infantry, to the left of Company C, came under a

strong enemy frontal assault and began to receive fire

from the rear. Meanwhile, other units also came

under attack, particularly the command post for

Task Force Wilson, which was located to the rear

and somewhat to the west of Company B of the

35th. With two defending tanks knocked out by

enemy rocket fire, the commander of Company B

decided he could not hold his position and received

permission to withdraw to the next ridge line to his

rear in coordination with Company C of the 24th. By

that time the situation was becoming critical. Enemy

roadblocks were operating to the rear of portions of

the task force and it had become impossible to evacuate the wounded. The rest of Task Force Wilson

thus held its ground until daybreak, when the 25th

Infantry ordered a general withdrawal to a new line

of defense about two miles to the south.87

Although Company B of the 35th Infantry

made its withdrawal during the night, Company C

of the 24th immediately to its east apparently failed

to receive word that it was to pull out as well.

When the commander of the 1st Battalion’s

weapons unit, Company D, Capt. Charles Piedra,

passed through the unit that night, Company C’s

commander, Capt. Milford W. Stanley, showed no

sign of preparing to withdraw and even invited

Piedra to spend the night with his unit. Piedra

declined, wishing to rejoin his men.88

Why Stanley never received the order to move

out that night is unclear. His radios may have failed,

but he was close enough to Company B of the 35th

to have learned from them. Confused lines of com202 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

85 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, p. 138; S. L. A. Marshall,

The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the

Chinese Communist Forces, November 1950, in the Battle of the

Chongchon River, Korea (New York: William Morrow, 1953), p.

190; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 13 and 14 Oct 94;

Stuart Force, 17 Oct 94; Curtis H. Alloway, 20 Oct 94.

Alloway, who was the battalion executive officer, states that he

was told by Wilson to have Miller return to the command post.

He does not recall seeing Corley in the 1st Battalion’s area at

that time. 86 See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 13 and 14

Oct 94; Force, 17 Oct 94. Baranowski stated that after the airdrop, an order was received to withdraw to the south. There was

no mention of taking position to the immediate east of Company

C. Force had accompanied Miller to the command post and had

stated that the withdrawal applied also to Company C, but that

the unit did not acknowledge that it had received the message.

Wilson’s withdrawal order, issued soon after the general took

command, applied only to Task Force Dolvin, not to the 1st

Battalion of the 24th. Documents originated by Task Force

Wilson and Task Force Dolvin mention that Companies A and B

were not in position, but the meaning of those references is

unclear. Messages and reports generated by the 25th Division

between 2030 and 2300 are also unclear. One document puts

the units in the positions they occupied at the time of the 1600

airdrop. The other has them moving into those positions. See

Task Force Dolvin Narrative, pp. 5–6, in WD, 89th Medium

Tank Bn, Nov 50; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 26 Nov 50; Msgs,

IX Corps G–4 to IX Corps G–3, 261215 Nov 50 and 262030

Nov 50, both in box 1767, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 66, 26 Nov 50, in WD, 25th Inf Div, Nov 50. 87 WD, Task Force Wilson, 26–27 Nov 50, p. 1, attachment to Medal of Honor Award file for Reginald Desiderio. 88 Interv, Muehlbauer with Charles Piedra, 3 Nov 88.
mand may have been part of the reason. Map overlays prepared by Task Force Wilson indicate that

General Wilson expected Company C to move off

to the south with its sister units, Companies A and

B of the 24th. The 1st Battalion’s commander,

Colonel Miller, appears to have assumed that the

company would take its orders directly from Task

Force Wilson. It had after all been a part of that

force since noon of the twenty-fifth and was tied in

with Company B in Wilson’s forward defensive

line. Rather than leave anything to chance, however, when Stanley failed to acknowledge Wilson’s

instructions, Miller set out on his own to deliver

the message himself. He failed in the attempt

because it was dark, he was on foot, and combat in

the area was too heavy. In the end, all that can be

said is that Stanley and his men, through no fault of

their own, fell through a hole in the 25th Division’s

communications. The 24th Infantry’s war diary

reported that when the enemy attack developed,

“all units of the regiment fought desperately to

maintain contact and tactical unity. There was

much confusion in all sectors and the location of

battalions was constantly in doubt.”89

According to a platoon leader in the unit,

Lieutenant Eichelsdoerfer, Company C stayed in

position without communications until dawn,

when radio links were reestablished. “Based on our

queries by radio,” the officer continued, the unit

finally learned of the order to withdraw. Stanley

pulled his men from the hill they had covered into

the valley floor. Receiving instructions to move

south—“the last communication we had,” according to Eichelsdoerfer—the company headed in that

direction but encountered heavy enemy fire.

Backing up, it then swung to the west toward the

road Task Force Dolvin had first followed. “Enemy

were clearly visible to both east and west moving

parallel to us,” Eichelsdoerfer recalled, “many

appeared to be carrying supplies. We received

harassing fire. . . . A few casualties occurred. . . . At

this point, some few of our company had become

separated and were missing.”90

After a time, the main body of the company hit

an enemy roadblock. Pulling back once more, it

retired to the north, where it began to receive

enemy small-arms and mortar fire from high

ground to its north, east, and south. Proceeding in

the only direction that remained, west, it crossed

the Kuryong River and then attempted to regroup.

There were “substantially fewer troops” compared

to the number who had started the trek,

Eichelsdoerfer said. Ammunition was short. Most

of the unit’s heavy weapons were gone. There were

neither radios nor radio communications:

A liaison aircraft appeared and circled our position. No

contact was possible. Increasingly heavy and somewhat

effective fire caused us to move west away from the river,

only to be confronted by heavy MG [machine gun] fire.

It gave the impression of what might have been [an] MG

company. Attempts to bypass proved to be impossible,

the enemy just increased their fire. It was at this point

the company surrendered. There was no vote and little

discussion. In view of the then existing situation, it

appeared to be the prudent thing to do. Weapons were

destroyed and what little ammo remained was buried.

The enemy—Chinese—separated the wounded and the

remainder were moved northwest as soon as darkness

fell. . . . As we moved out, it became apparent that when

we crossed the river, we had stumbled into a major

[headquarters] with attachments. In retrospect, my

impression is that throughout the day, we were directed,

herded in the direction they wanted us to move by using

the amount of fire required to accomplish their objective.

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 203

89 Ibid. See also WD, 25th Inf Div, 27 Nov 50. Quotes

from WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 27 Nov 50, p. 27, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC; and WD, 24th Inf Rgt, 1–30

Nov 50, p. 16. Baranowski talks about support for Company

C. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. Stuart

Force tells of Miller’s attempt to reach Company C. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Force, 17 Oct 94.

90 First Lieutenant Howard Eichelsdoerfer gave the most

coherent account of what happened. His letter even included a

detailed map, drawn from memory, of the company’s journey.

Since the landmarks he gave correspond closely with the known

topography of the area and his memories seemed clear and

unjumbled, his account is the one generally followed here. See

Ltr, Eichelsdoerfer to Cash, 23 Sep 90. Eichelsdoefer’s account

differs in some details from those of other veterans of the event.

See Intervs, Cash with Walter Chambers, 3 Aug and 5 Sep 90;

Muehlbauer with Fletcher, 5 Aug 88. First Lieutenant Charles

Winn, who changed his name from Wysoczynski, along with

Eichelsdoerfer, is a source for the assertion that portions of the

company became separated from the main body and were lost.

This may be one reason why the accounts of some veterans differ. See Interv, Cash with Charles Winn, 6 Jul 90.
Eichelsdoerfer concluded that the surrender was a

command decision based on a review of the facts

confronting the unit and that there was no dissent at

the time. Other veterans of the event disagree.

Enlisted man Robert Fletcher asserts that Stanley

gave the men a choice and they voted. Enlisted man

Walter Chambers maintains that one lieutenant

wanted to hold out but that a Chinese negotiator

arrived while he was making the plea and shot him

dead on the spot. However the decision was made, 4

officers and 136 enlisted men fell into enemy hands.

A single lieutenant and 6 enlisted men who had been

separated earlier from the main body of men made it

back to American lines.91

As the fate of Company C unfolded, the rest of

the 1st Battalion was also under stress. Located

near the headquarters for Task Force Wilson, the

battalion’s command post and part of its weapons

unit, Company D, fought off continual enemy

attacks overnight. During the day on 27 November

the two withdrew to the south, fighting their way

through enemy roadblocks along the way.

Meanwhile, Companies A and B began moving

south to a point about five miles north of

Yongbyon, where they were to form a line with the

remnants of Task Force Wilson and the 27th

Infantry, which had been assigned from reserve to

cover the withdrawal.92

At one point in the journey, after dark, as the

1st Battalion’s intelligence officer, Capt. Gustav

Gillert, related, the two companies stumbled upon

a Chinese detachment cooking food over campfires. Advancing in column, they stopped just short

of the encampment, doubled back for a short distance, shifted their line of march somewhat to the

west, and then kept moving south as though nothing had happened. The Chinese for their part failed

to react. “The only thing we could figure out later,”

Gillert observed, “is they just assumed that since

we were coming from the north that we were

Chinese. They didn’t say ‘stop,’ ‘hello,’ or anything.” After walking six or seven more miles and

engaging in a firefight with an enemy force that had

infiltrated to the rear of American positions, the

companies reached their destination. Falling in

between units of Task Force Wilson to the west and

portions of the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry to

the east, they held that position until late on 28

November, when they again began moving south.

It was so cold at the time, Gillert recalled, that a

radio operator froze to death. “To get that radio off

that kid’s back,” he said, “we had to cut it off.”93

While the 1st Battalion was undergoing its

ordeal, the 2d Battalion, Companies G and E, located on the seam separating the 25th Division from

the 2d Division and under Colonel Clayton’s direct

command, were also in trouble. About 2100 on the

evening of 25 November an enemy attack had split

Company G into two parts, one falling back southeast into the 9th Infantry’s lines and the other joining Company E.94 (See Map 12.) The next morning,

after holding overnight, Company E and the remnant of G continued their move north. Toward

noon, an observation aircraft had dropped a message to inform Clayton that a large enemy force was

to his front and that allied fighter-bombers would

shortly arrive to take it under fire. The message

instructed Clayton to hold nearby and to wait for

an airdrop of food. The air strike occurred, but it

had little effect on the enemy, who continued to

press forward. As for the airdrop, the situation on

the ground was so fluid that the enemy took pos204 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

91 Ltr, Eichelsdoerfer to Cash, 23 Sep 90. The numbers

are from Morning Rpt with attachments, Co C, 24th Inf Rgt, 28

Dec 50, CMH files. For the views of one who escaped, see

Interv, Cash with Robert H. Yancy, 21 Jan 89. 92 WD, 25th Inf Div, 28 Nov 50, boxes 3761–3763, RG

407, WNRC; WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 27 Nov 50, p. 27,

boxes 3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC; Interv, MacGarrigle with

Force, 17 Oct 94.

93 WD, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 28 Nov 50, p. 28, box 3764,

RG 407, WNRC; 27th Inf Rgt S–2 Periodic Rpt for 16–27 Nov

50, boxes 3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC; Msg, 25th Inf Div to

IX Corps, 271305 Nov 50, box 1769, RG 407, WNRC; IX

Corps Periodic Opns Rpt 189, 27 Nov 50, box 1769, RG 407,

WNRC; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpts 70, 28 Nov 50, 71,

28 Nov 50, and 73, 29 Nov 50, all in boxes 3761–3763, RG

407, WNRC; Interv, Cash with Gillert, 25 Mar 89. Baranowski

also told the story of the meeting with the Chinese detachment

but did not recall that Gillert was present. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. Stuart Force, however, put Gillert with the column. See Interv, MacGarrigle with

Force, 17 Oct 94. 94 Intervs, Bowers with George M. Shuffer, 5 and 6 Dec 94.
session of the target area before the aircraft arrived.

Higher authorities had no choice but to cancel it.95

Shortly after the air strike, the enemy surrounded Clayton’s force and attacked in regimental

strength from all sides. Clayton’s men staggered

under the onslaught, and the battalion command

post itself was almost overrun. Only quick action

by Sfc. Nicholas Smith saved it. Moving forward on

his own, his rifle leveled, Smith distracted the

enemy just long enough to allow the command

group to escape. He kept firing as the enemy converged on his position, bringing down seventeen of

the attackers and forcing the remainder to seek

cover. Thanks to Smith and timely action by

Company E’s commander, white Capt. Frank

Knoeller, who seemed to be everywhere on the battlefield and who even manned a machine gun when

the gunner went down, the force soon regrouped.

Company E held position on a hill just to the west

of the Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road, and

part of Company G clustered nearby to the southwest. Surrounded, both units fought for their lives,

inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy but incurring many losses of their own.96

Earlier, Clayton had lost communication with

the regimental command post and the elements of

the 24th to his west. Because of the topography of

the area, however, he was able to maintain radio

contact with the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry’s

command post to his southeast. Toward dark, he

availed himself of that connection and informed

the unit’s commander that he intended to break out

after dark and to lead his men into the 3d

Battalion’s positions. Stationed on one of the

enemy’s main lines of attack and sorely pressed

himself, the commander of the 3d of the 9th, Lt.

Col. D. M. McMains, welcomed the news that an

infusion of new troops would be arriving.97

After dark on 26 November, with Company E

in the lead and Company G in trail, Clayton and

his men slipped away from the enemy, carrying

their wounded with them. Most of Company E

made it through without any problem but

Company G was less fortunate. Enemy forces stationed on the shoulders of the pass belatedly discovered the move and fired on the retreating unit.

There were some losses, but between 300 and

350 men from the 2d Battalion still managed to

join the 9th Infantry. The unit fed them, resupplied them with weapons and ammunition, and

evacuated some 150 casualties, many suffering

from frostbite, to the rear.98

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 205

95 IX Corps Periodic Opns Rpt 184, 26 Nov 50, and Msgs,

25th Inf Div to IX Corps, 1700 and 1730, 26 Nov 50, all in

box 1769, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50,

p. 7; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpts 56, 26 Nov 50, and 57, 27 Nov

50; Msg, IX Corps G–4 to IX Corps G–3, 260915 Nov 50, box

1769, RG 407, WNRC. The exact location of the two units is

in doubt. Unit Report 56 puts Company E to the east of the

road, but Clayton himself is unsure about whether his force

reached that point. Since the road was a main avenue of attack

for enemy units pressing southward and the enemy already

had struck the 9th Infantry regiment of the U.S. 2d Division,

this treatment places Clayton’s two companies in positions laid

out in an overlay that accompanied a Distinguished Service

Cross recommendation for Sfc. Nicholas Smith. Whether the

units crossed the road or not, they clearly pulled back to the

more defensible positions shown on the overlay. See Interv,

MacGarrigle with Clayton, 5 Oct 94; Overlay accompanying

DSC Award Recommendation for Sfc Nicholas Smith, 17 Feb

51, with affidavits, Awards Branch files, U.S. Army Total

Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Va. See also

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94. Corley

sent a radio vehicle into the 9th Infantry’s area to maintain contact with Clayton and to coordinate the air strikes and the airdrop. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Ralph Davis, 31 Oct 94. 96 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 56, 26 Nov 50; Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94. The Smith story

is taken from Affidavit, M Sgt Raymond I. Coleman, 25 Dec 50,

attachment to DSC Award Recommendation for Sfc Nicholas

Smith, 17 Feb 51. For an act of heroism by a white officer, see

Award Recommendation for Capt Frank O. Knoeller, 8 Feb 51,

with affidavits, box 163, RG 338, WNRC. 97 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94;

Ralph Davis, 31 Oct 94; Memo, Col C. C. Sloane, Jr., Cdr, 9th

Inf Rgt, 2d Inf Div, for Commanding Ofcr, 24th Inf Rgt, 11 Dec

50, sub: Action Elements, E and G Companies, 24th Inf Rgt,

9th Inf Rgt folder, CMH files. Sloane’s memo is courtesy of Clay

Blair and David Carlisle. It is mentioned in Brig Gen G. B.

Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., CMH

files, and Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 1032, n32. Corley had

sent a radio vehicle with Lieutenant Davis, Clayton’s intelligence officer, into the 9th Infantry’s area to maintain contact

with Clayton’s group. Davis was the one Clayton contacted by

radio. See also 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 57, 27 Nov 50; WD, 3d

Bn, 9th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 2; 9th Inf Rgt Combat Narrative,

Nov 50; 9th Inf Rgt S–3 Narrative Diary, 26–27 Nov 50,

attachment to 9th Inf Rgt Combat Narrative, Nov 50. Last

three in box 2471, RG 407, WNRC. 98 Ibid.
The next morning, 27 November, in position

on the Kujang-dong–Yongbyon road, Walden’s

Company F dispatched three 1

⁄4-ton trucks and

twelve men to contact the companies with the 9th

Infantry and to lead them back to their own regiment. The detachment came under heavy enemy

fire, however, and had to return before reaching its

goal. Five men were wounded, and two of the

trucks were lost. Unable to retrieve the two companies, Corley filled the gap their loss created in his

line by employing Company F and the 77th

Engineer Combat Company to man what would

have been the 2d Battalion’s sector.99 (See Map 13.)

The men of Companies E and G remained

with the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry for the

next several days. There they excelled. “On the

night of 28–29 November,” the regiment’s commander, Col. C. C. Sloane, Jr., told Corley in a

subsequent letter of commendation,

after the 9th Infantry had been ordered to withdraw

from the vicinity of Kujang-dong to Pugwan, the two

companies . . . were placed in a new defense line in

depth. After the Chinese had over-run the forward elements of my 3d Battalion, they were surprised upon

running into and coming under fire of your E and G

Companies. As a result of their action, the Chinese

onslaught for the time was halted. It was by this action

that my 3d Battalion was able to hold this temporary

defense line for a sufficient period of time to permit the

23d Infantry to occupy a new defense line further to

the rear.100

Except for some moderate contact, Blair’s 3d

Battalion of the 24th went relatively unscathed

during the first hours of the enemy attack. The

unit had advanced well into the mountains during

the day on 25 November, pulling up at dark

toward the small village of Isan-dong, four and

one-half miles to the north of Unhung and no

more than two miles to the northwest of

Companies E and G. That night the battalion

fought off three enemy probes.101 (See Map 12.)

The fighting continued into the next day, 26

November. Toward noon, with the 9th Infantry to

the east under heavy attack and Companies E and G

of the 2d Battalion under increasing threat on the

Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road, Corley ordered

Blair’s force to pull back several thousand yards

toward the town of Sa-dong on the southern slope of

Ch’oni-san mountain. It was resupplied at 1615 by

air, but the drop fell near enemy-held territory. As a

result, the unit had to fight the Chinese for its food

and ammunition. The next day, 27 November, the

battalion readjusted its position again, falling back

into an area about one and one-half miles north of

Unhung. At some time during the period, Colonel

Corley appears to have lost all contact with the unit.

Its position was so unclear that when the battalion

finally reported in, the colonel concluded it had

become disoriented and was nowhere near where its

commanders said it was.102 (See Map 13.)

According to the battalion’s executive officer,

Maj. Owen Carter, Colonel Blair was with his forward units only part of the time. Although he

accompanied them into the field on the first few

days of the attack and came up again on 27

November to inspect his companies’ positions, he

rarely if ever came forward after that. His conduct

was in marked contrast with that of Colonel Miller

of the 1st Battalion and Colonel Clayton of the 2d,

both of whom remained with their troops in the

field until either ordered to leave, or, in the case of

Clayton, when their men came under the control of

a different unit. Indeed, when it became necessary

to move the 3d Battalion’s command post after the

unit received orders to withdraw, Blair supervised

206 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

99 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 57, 27 Nov 50; Barth, Tropic

Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 44. 100 Memo, Sloane for Commanding Ofcr, 24th Inf Rgt, 11

Dec 50, sub: Action Elements, E and G Companies, 24th Inf

Rgt. For more information on the fighting, see 9th Inf Rgt

Combat Narrative, Nov 50; WD, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 14,

box 2472, RG 407, WNRC.

101 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 56, 26 Nov 50; WD, 3d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, 25–26 Nov 50, pp. 11–12, box 3764, RG 407,

WNRC. See also Intervs, MacGarrigle with Newell, 10 and 15

Nov 94. 102 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 15–16; 24th Inf Rgt

Unit Rpts 56, 26 Nov 50, and 57, 27 Nov 50; WD, 3d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 11; Intervs, Appleman with Corley,

4 Jan 52; MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 21 Mar 94; Cash with

Wilfred Matthews, 23 Sep 88. For the airdrop, see Msg, 25th

Inf Div G–3 to IX Corps G–3, 262030 Nov 50, box 1767, RG

407, WNRC.
the task himself, leaving Carter to deal with his forward units, the exact reverse of normal procedures.

Carter found Blair’s conduct “somewhat puzzling”

because the officer had won two Distinguished

Service Crosses, one during World War II and one

during the fighting at Haman.103

By 27 November the situation was becoming

ominous throughout the 24th Infantry’s zone, where

enemy units had begun to penetrate to the rear of

American positions. Enemy infiltrators ambushed a

mess truck from the 3d Battalion moving up the 24th

Infantry’s main supply route, the road from Yongbyon

to Unhung. Troops from Company M of the 24th, the

3d Battalion’s headquarters company, and two tanks

rushed to the scene to retrieve the truck and rescue

the wounded, but even with the arrival of reinforcements later that afternoon they were unable to dislodge the enemy. During the fighting, Cpl. Earl

Phoenix, although badly wounded twice, stayed at

his machine gun until his ammunition was gone to

keep his squad from being cut off and overrun. He

later received the Distinguished Service Cross. Capt.

George Anderson received a Silver Star for his conduct during the same action. Taking up a weapon

dropped by an injured American after his own rifle

had been shot from his hands, he covered the withdrawal of wounded personnel.104

That night at 2330, the 25th Division’s medical

clearing station two miles to the east of Yongbyon

on the road to Unhung was also attacked and

burned. The enemy then set up a roadblock just to

the east of the facility in hopes of taking any relief

force that arrived under fire. Elements from

Captain Bussey’s 77th Engineer Combat Company

broke the roadblock and restored the site, but

shortly after midnight on the morning of 28

November, the enemy attacked positions manned

by Company M just four miles to the northeast.

The fighting at that site continued until 0400,

when the enemy withdrew. Shortly thereafter, at

0605, in a shuffling of command responsibilities

designed to compensate for the deteriorating situation, the Eighth Army shifted the IX Corps boundary to the east. At that time, it transferred control of

the 25th Division to I Corps.105

During the night of 27–28 November, the 27th

Infantry moved from reserve to take a position in

the line between Task Force Wilson and the 24th

Infantry. Enemy attacks continued throughout the

following day, forcing the Americans back. By dark

on 28 November, the 25th Division was occupying

a line two miles to the south of Yongbyon across the

road that led from that city south to Kunu-ri. That

evening General Kean began the process of dissolving Task Force Wilson, shifting the 1st Battalion of

the 24th east through the lines of the 27th Infantry

to rejoin its regiment.106

Fighting was particularly heavy on the flanks of

the 24th Infantry. To the left, the 3d Battalion, 27th

Infantry, astride the Yongbyon–Kunu-ri road, sustained a strong enemy attack. One company was

overrun and another suffered a severe penetration.

To the right, the 9th Infantry remained under

stress, with combat so fierce that the sound of firing was clearly audible to men of the 24th Infantry

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 207

103 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 12; Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Owen Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94. The battalion’s intelligence officer, Oliver Dillard, likewise asserted that

Blair was almost always with him and that he was rarely with

the troops. See Intervs, Bowers with Dillard, 8 and 9 Mar 95.

The operations officer of the 3d Battalion, Roscius Newell, considered Blair a fine officer but noted that Blair, at the time,

seemed exhausted. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Newell, 10

and 15 Nov 94. Clayton’s radio man, who accompanied him,

was sometimes frightened by his commander’s determination

to be close to the action. “Clayton went further forward than

he should have gone,” he said, “but he felt that it was his position to be there for that encouraged the men to fight better.”

See Interv, Muehlbauer with Arthur Thompson, 14 Sep 88. 104 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 12; 24th Inf Rgt

Unit Rpt 57, 27 Nov 50; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Sapenter,

21 Mar 94; Cash with Voight, 21 Sep 88; Award file for Capt

George Anderson, box 156, RG 338, WNRC; Award file for

Cpl Earl C. Phoenix, Jr., box 167, RG 338, WNRC. Phoenix

was nominated for the Medal of Honor. The award was

reduced to the Distinguished Service Cross. Anderson was

nominated for a Distinguished Service Cross, but his award

was reduced to a Silver Star.

105 The loss of the medical clearing station is mentioned

in Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, pp. 237–38. See also IX Corps

Periodic Intelligence Rpt 63, 27 Nov 50, and Periodic Opns

Rpt 190, 27 Nov 50, both in box 1769, RG 407, WNRC;

Interv, Cash with Voight, 21 Sep 88. 106 27th Inf Rgt Historical Narrative, Nov 50, pp. 10–11,

boxes 3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 25th Inf Div, Nov

50; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 72, 29 Nov 50, in WD

25th Inf Div, Nov 50.
located several miles to the west across the

Ch’ongch’on River.107

Problems continued on 29 November. Moving

into the 25th Division’s new defensive line, the 3d

Battalion of the 24th once more lost contact with

supporting units and for a time came under the

fire of friendly mortars and artillery. That afternoon, with the enemy pressing and the 3d

Battalion reportedly involved in a heavy firefight

near the town of So-dong, four miles to the southeast of Yongbyon, Corley began to reconnoiter a

way across the Ch’ongch’on and new positions

near Kunu-ri on the river’s opposite side. When

Kean ordered all 25th Division units to move

south of the river, Corley was ready. Moving his

troops to a site on the river four miles to the

northwest of Kunu-ri, he began the crossing at

1600 that afternoon. The 1st Battalion of the 9th

Infantry, newly arrived from the fighting at

Kujang-dong, came up from the east to assist the

27th Infantry in covering the redeployment.108

Even as the 25th Division began to pull back,

enemy units, moving through the collapsed lines of

the South Korean II Corps to the east, were threatening to cut off the Eighth Army’s lines of supply to

the south. Although the 1st Cavalry Division and the

24th Infantry Division both shifted to the east to

block the Chinese advance, their presence at best

slowed the assault. When it became clear during the

afternoon of the twenty-ninth that the Eighth Army

would have to fall back, General Walker ordered his

forces to withdraw to a new line south of the

Ch’ongch’on that ran almost to Kunu-ri but curved

to the southeast toward Sunch’on before reaching

the town. Later that afternoon, as circumstances

continued to deteriorate, Walker ordered a deeper

withdrawal to a line some twenty miles to the south

of Kunu-ri. The IX Corps received the two orders

and during the early evening instructed the 2d

Division to retreat to a point well below Kunu-ri.

The I Corps held the line of the Ch’ongch’on for the

time being, leaving the 25th Division in place north

of the town, but the commanders involved appear to

have understood that their forces would withdraw in

due course. None, however, realized how precipitate

the process would be.109 (Map 14)

Fresh from the fighting at Pugwon, four miles

north of Kunu-ri on the road from Kujang-dong, elements from Companies E and G were the first portions of the 24th to depart the battlefield. Leaving

the 9th Infantry on the morning of the twenty-ninth,

the companies had congregated initially near Kunuri. That evening, as soon as Walden’s Company F

arrived along with the remainder of the 2d Battalion’s

headquarters and weapons companies, the entire

force moved off in no particular order toward the

town of Anju, about fifteen miles west of Kunu-ri. At

that point, the battalion turned south, proceeding

some twenty-five miles by road to an area west of

Sunch’on, where it regrouped.110

208 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

107 Unit History, 3d Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, boxes

3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov

50, p. 13; WD, 9th Inf Rgt, Nov 50; WD, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50,

p. 14.108 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 18; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Nov 50, p. 13; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 71, 28 Nov

50, in 25th Inf Div Staff Records; Msg, I Corps G–3 to IX Corps

G–3, 291130 Nov 50, box 1769, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 1st Bn,

9th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 2, box 2471, RG 407, WNRC; WD, 9th

Inf Rgt, Nov 50, S–3 Narrative, 29 Nov 50, p. 5, box 2471, RG

407, WNRC; Unit History, 3d Bn, 27th Inf Rgt, Nov 50;

Historical Narrative, 27th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, boxes 3764–3765,

RG 407, WNRC. The 3d Battalion war diary reports heavy

contact, but the unit’s operations officer, Roscius Newell,

asserted in an interview that the battalion’s withdrawal was

orderly and without enemy opposition. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94. The battalion’s

executive officer, Owen Carter, says the same. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94. The situation was

so fast moving that the actual timing of Kean’s order to the

24th is in doubt, but the 27th Infantry received the order to

move south of the river at 1304. See WD, 27th Inf Rgt, Nov

50, S–3 Journal, boxes 3764–3765, RG 407, WNRC. No written order was issued.

109 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 108–17; 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 75, 29 Nov 50; 25th Inf Div Opns

Instructions 23, 28 Nov 50, and 24, 30 Nov 50, boxes

3761–3763, RG 407, WNRC. It appears that the I Corps staff

did not realize that IX Corps had ordered the 2d Division to

withdraw from Kunu-ri. The I Corps Opns Directive 28,

291600 Nov 50, ordered the 25th Division to occupy and

defend the south bank of the Ch’ongch’on River. It was not

until 2355 on 30 November that the 25th Division was

ordered to move at dawn to the new line south of Anju. See

WD, I Corps, Nov 50, journals and records for 29 and 30 Nov

50, box 1496, RG 407, WNRC. 110 WD, 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 8; Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94; Joseph C.
The unit was sorely depleted and heavily worn.

During the trip south, however, it coalesced, with

parties of individuals from the same platoons and

companies linking up with one another. By the

time it reached its destination, most of its components had reassembled and Clayton was able to

establish that between 400 and 450 “effectives”

remained out of the 900 men who had first accompanied him on the attack toward the Yalu. There

had been equipment losses, he later remarked, but

most of his men had retained their personal

weapons. In the same way, since many of the battalion’s vehicles had also made it out, Company H

had been able to save most of the unit’s heavy mortars and machine guns. Arriving at their objective

in relatively good order, the troops of Clayton’s battalion soon went into the line to provide cover for

other portions of the 25th Division that were also

beginning to congregate in the area.111

Moving across the Ch’ongch’on, Colonel

Miller’s 1st Battalion, minus all but a few men from

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 209

Muzyka, 25 Oct 94. See also 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpts

73 and 75, both 29 Nov 50, for locations of the 2d Battalion of

the 24th.

111 Ibid. Lloyd Ott spoke about the withdrawal of the 2d

Battalion’s vehicles. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Ott, 19 Jul 94.

XXXX

PLA 50

XXXX

PLA 40

XXXX

113(-) 38 PLA

XXXX

125 PLA 42

XXXX

PLA 38(-)

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX

PLA 66

Ch'ongch'on R

12

12 15

Turk

ROK

6 Div(-)

ROK 6 Div(-)

9

24

24

27

27

21

35

35

5 Cav

7 Cav

1st Bn, 8 Cav

2 XX1 Cav

ROK 1

XX25

ROK 1 XX25

24 ROK 1 XX

I

XXXIX

I

XXXIX

Chongju

T'aech'on

Pakch'on

Kaech'on

Kunu-ri

Pugwon

Ipsok

Yongdong-ni

Tokch'on

Somin-dong

Huich'on

Sunch'on

Songch'on

to P'yongyang

Sinanju Anju

Sukch'on

Yongyu

Samso-ri Pukch'ang-ni

0 20

Miles

BATTLE OF THE CH'ONGCH'ON

28 November–1 December 1950

Eighth Army Front, Evening, 28 Nov

(Arabic Numerals Identify Regiments)

Chinese Attacks, Night, 28 Nov and 29–30 Nov

Chinese Roadblocks

Eighth Army Withdrawal, 29–30 Dec

Eighth Army Front, 1 Dec

High Ground Above 500 Feet

Map 14
Company C, took up a blocking position to the

west of Kunu-ri. The last unit of the 24th to cross

the river, Blair’s 3d Battalion also moved into the

area. For a time, there appears to have been some

confusion in Blair’s headquarters about the location

of Companies I and L. They had been involved in

fighting earlier in the day and were thought to be

still on the road. Later in the evening, however,

they and the rest of the battalion were located.

Tying in with Miller’s unit, they had dug in on huge

dikes bordering a large rice paddy just northwest of

Kunu-ri. Colonel Blair had already situated his

command post in a large building in the center of

the town, and Corley had sited the regiment’s forward command post in the same area, about a

quarter of a mile to the southwest.112

As the evening of 29 November lengthened,

heavy fighting continued to the east and southeast of

the 24th Infantry, where the Chinese were pressing

to dislodge the 2d Infantry Division. The enemy also

began to push into Kunu-ri. At 2030 mess personnel

from the 3d Battalion reported that an enemy roadblock in the northern sector of the town had prevented them from reaching their unit.113

The 3d Battalion’s Ordeal

At 2300 the sound of combat ceased. Soon thereafter, the main road through Kunu-ri became clogged

with vehicles as the 23d Infantry regiment of the 2d

Division, which had been stationed to the east of the

3d Battalion, withdrew to the south. The executive

officer of the 3d Battalion, Maj. Owen Carter, was in

210 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

112 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 18–19. The location of

the 3d Battalion is mentioned in Interv, Appleman with Francis

G. Nordstrom, 31 Aug 51, CMH files. Nordstrom was the commanding officer of Company D, 89th Medium Tank Battalion.

A platoon leader in Company K, James Yadon, spoke about the

dikes. See also Intervs, Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89;

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94; Force, 8 Aug 94.

113 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 19; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Nov 50, p. 13; WD, 89th Medium Tank Bn, Nov 50, box

3765, RG 407, WNRC. For more on the fighting in the 2d

Division area, see WD, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 14–15; S–3

Journal, 3d Bn, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50, box 2472, RG 407,

WNRC. The enemy force was probably the 120th Chinese

Communist Forces (CCF) Division. See IX Corps Periodic

Intelligence Rpt 64, 29 Nov 50, box 1769, RG 407, WNRC.

Men of the 24th Infantry and 159th Field Artillery Battalion prepare to leave an assembly area.
the area delivering supplies and checking on his unit’s

positions. Going out to the road to investigate, he

encountered the commanding officer of the 23d’s rear

guard, who informed him that his regiment was

pulling back. Before the conversation ended, the last

segments of the convoy on the road passed.

Commenting in a matter-of-fact manner that to the

best of his knowledge there were no longer any

“friendly” troops to the east, the officer stepped into

his jeep and drove off to the south after his men.114

There were in fact other units to the east and

north of the 24th. Company L of the 23d Infantry,

for example, had remained north of Kunu-ri to cover

the withdrawal of the 38th Infantry, which was moving down from the east.115 Carter, however, had no

way of knowing that. Concluding that the right flank

of the 24th Infantry was open and unprotected, he

returned to the 3d Battalion’s command post in

Kunu-ri to inform Blair of the development. The

colonel immediately called Corley, who in turn contacted General Kean’s headquarters, which confirmed that the 2d Division was indeed withdrawing.

A short while later, at 0100 on 30 November, Corley

decided to move the 3d Battalion to a new position

southwest of Kunu-ri on the road to Anju. The unit

would again tie in with the 1st Battalion, which

would have to bend its line somewhat to the south

to accommodate the change.116

Corley telephoned Blair to pass along those

instructions, but while the two were talking a burst

of machine-gun fire through Blair’s window cut the

conversation short. Blair, who had been resting,

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 211

114 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 19; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Nov 50, p. 13; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Owen Carter, 21

and 24 Jun 94; Ltr, Owen H. Carter to MacGarrigle, 30 Jul 94,

CMH files. 115 WD, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 14–15; S–3 Journal,

3d Bn, 23d Inf Rgt, Nov 50; Interv, Appleman with Major

Radow, 16 Aug 51, CMH files. Radow was the commander of

the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. About the same time that

Carter reached the 3d Battalion’s command post, the 23d

Infantry’s commander, Col. Paul Freeman, also arrived.

Freeman informed the 3d Battalion that his regiment was

withdrawing through the town. See Intervs, MacGarrigle

with Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94. 116 Ibid.; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Owen Carter, 21 and

24 Jun 94; Cash with Dillard, 3 Jun 89.

Men from a 24th Infantry company await instructions.
dove under a table. Soldiers reached for their

weapons and scrambled outside to return fire. The

clothing of the battalion’s intelligence officer, 1st Lt.

Oliver Dillard, was peppered with enemy burp-gun

fire but the officer himself was unscathed. Carter

was less fortunate. A grenade exploded near him,

knocking him unconscious and killing the battalion’s sergeant major.117

From that moment, chaos reigned in the command post. Blair decided to abandon the site and

departed for Corley’s headquarters with part of his

staff, without apparently much attempt to contact

any of his units stationed nearby. As a result, bits

and pieces of the battalion headquarters made

their way out as best they could, and a portion of

Lieutenant Voight’s platoon from Company M was

cut off and overrun in Kunu-ri. Only seventeen

out of thirty-eight of Voight’s men escaped. As for

Blair and his party, they took some time to reach

their destination because Corley’s headquarters

itself had come under fire and had moved to a

point near where the 3d Battalion was to have

relocated. When they finally arrived, they had

traveled through several streams. Their feet were

wet, making frostbite an imminent threat.118

As the full dimensions of what had happened

began to emerge, Corley himself became incensed.

According to mortarman James Miller, an eyewitness, he turned on a group of officers from the 3d

Battalion and rebuked them. “You had the best battalion in the regiment,” he said, “and you went off

and left them.” As for Blair, Corley tore into the officer, ordering him to get control of his unit and to

establish a defensive line. “Tempers were flying and

Blair was crying,” the commander of the 3d

Battalion’s headquarters company, Capt. Noah

Armstrong, recalled. “I witnessed this.”119

Dillard, who said he had driven a jeep “right

down the main drag” of Kunu-ri, “getting shot at all

the time,” had just arrived at Corley’s command

post. Lacking any means to reach the three companies because the 3d Battalion’s communications

were down, Corley turned to him and remarked,

“You’re going to have to go out and make contact.”

Seeing the bullet holes in the officer’s clothing and

212 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

117 Newell claimed that the soldiers guarding the command post froze when the enemy attacked and that only officers were returning fire. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Newell,

10 and 15 Nov 94. The 3d Battalion’s abbreviated account of

what happened at Kunu-ri is carried in the unit’s war diary for

December, where it is mistakenly dated for 1 December. See

WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Dec 50, p. 1, box 3770, RG 407,

WNRC. 118 Ibid. Corley spoke of Blair’s wet feet. See Interv,

Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52. Severely critical of Blair and

Carter, a former warrant officer with the 3d Battalion,

Thomas H. Pettigrew, describes the scene in the command

post in Thomas H. Pettigrew, Jr., The Kunu-ri (Kumori)

Incident (New York: Vantage Press, 1963), pp. 18–22.

Pettigrew implies that Carter deserted the command post

before Blair gave the order and that Carter was at best lightly

wounded. Carter tells a different story. Bleeding from a score

of fragmentation wounds, he said, he picked up his rifle, collected about thirty stragglers and walking wounded, and

made his own way to Corley’s command post on foot. There,

Corley ordered him to seek medical attention. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Owen Carter, 21 and 24 Jun 94. Although

silent on the episode in the command post, unit war diaries

generally substantiate much of Carter’s account of what happened on 29 and 30 November. Indeed, unit records indicate

that Carter was wounded seriously enough to spend two

months recuperating from his injuries. See 24th Inf Rgt

Command Rpt, Sep 51, box 3848, RG 407, WNRC; HQ,

25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of the 24th Infantry

Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51], box 3848, RG 407, WNRC.

Corley also talks about what happened in an interview with

the Pittsburgh Courier. See Frank Whisonant, “True Story of

the 24th: Colonel Corley Gives Facts to Courier War

Reporter,” Pittsburgh Courier, 23 Jun 51, p. 1. Voight tells his

story in Interv, Cash with Voight, 21 Sep 88. James Yadon

confirms that a part of Company M was in Kunu-ri at the

time of the attack. See Interv, Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22

May 89. 119 Intervs, Muehlbauer with James Miller, 1 Nov 88;

Noah Armstrong, 22 Oct 88. An account by Edwin W.

Robertson, a forward air controller attached to Corley’s command post, generally parallel’s Armstrong’s story. Robertson,

who retired a major general in the Air Force, was also present

when Blair arrived. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Edwin W.

Robertson, 24 Feb 95. The regimental S–2, Maj. Walter

Simonovich, told his friends that when Blair arrived at

Corley’s command post, he was hysterical and screamed, “We

can’t win, we better give up.” He said that Corley tried to settle him down. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 13

and 14 Oct 94. Blair, in an interview forty-five years later,

denied going to Corley’s command post. He said he hitched

rides in vehicles moving to the rear and walked what seemed

long distances until finding his battalion late the next day,

several miles south of Anju. See Interv, MacGarrigle with

Melvin Blair, 15 Feb 95. This account accepts the word of the

officers who said they saw Blair at the command post.

Robertson’s account, in particular, was extremely detailed,

and the officer had no reason to dissemble.
apparently taking pity on him, he then withdrew

those instructions and instead turned the mission

over to Blair and 2d Lt. Levi Hollis. At that time he

instructed the regiment’s forward air controller,

Capt. Edwin W. Robertson, a white Air Force officer, to accompany the group and call in air strikes

to cover the 3d Battalion’s withdrawal. Later in the

evening, Lieutenants Tittel and Voight also apparently received instructions to attempt to make contact with the lost battalion.120

Having delivered his instructions, Corley

departed to relocate his command post to the rear

near a hill in the possession of the 23d Infantry. It

was “black dark,” Robertson recalled, and still several hours until daylight. “Corley had not been

gone more than ten minutes,” Robertson continued, “when Blair turned . . . and said that he was

going to the rear to establish his CP and that

Robertson and Hollis should get word to the 3d

Battalion . . . to withdraw. Blair added that his company commanders were experienced officers and

could handle the withdrawal without him.” The

two lieutenants did as they were told, departing on

their mission at first light. Shortly thereafter, they

determined that Blair’s battalion had been cut off

and was exposed to the enemy.121

Meanwhile, at the regimental command post,

Corley was becoming increasingly anxious. When

it became clear that the three companies had not

moved and that the effort to reach them had been

unproductive, he turned to Colonel Miller, the

commander of the 1st Battalion, whose unit

remained on the left flank of the 3d Battalion’s companies. Under instructions from the 25th Division

by then to withdraw entirely from the Kunu-ri area

at daybreak and to relocate to Sukch’on, fifteen

miles due south from Anju, he told Miller to have

his patrols pass the word along to Blair’s units.

Miller agreed, but again in the confusion the message never made it through. After daybreak, with

the 1st Battalion withdrawing but the three companies of the 3d nowhere in sight, apparently at

Robertson’s request, an artillery liaison aircraft went

up to look. It spied the better part of a Chinese

division massing to the north of Kunu-ri and

brought artillery and air strikes down upon it. It

also discovered the 3d Battalion’s lost companies

and dropped a message to them in a can.122

A platoon leader in Company K, Lieutenant

Yadon, recalled seeing the airplane. Observing that

the 23d Infantry had been heavily engaged with the

enemy just to the east of the 24th, he remarked:

Well, . . . that night was when the 23d left. They had a

hell of a fire-fight over on our east, it simmered down,

they had withdrawn. The next morning, . . . we were

roaming around behind the great big dikes, the rice paddies there. We could see movement back on these

ridges, and later on we had an attack air fly over. . . . We

. . . needed ammunition [but] . . . the thought of withdrawing hadn’t entered our minds. We were still a viable

unit. We had the battalion for the most part, a little bit

of our heavy weapons company was back in town. I

remember this airplane threw a note out on a stringer.

Told us that we were in a precarious position. The

Chinese were massing. It said it would be well if we

made plans to depart. They even told us to head . . .

southwest. . . . So we began to make some plans. I

remember the company that was to the southwest,

which was L Company, [was] to start first, and then K

Company, which was facing the Chinese on the south

was to withdraw, peel off, and I Company was to start

back from the rear. The plane flew over again and threw

another note in an empty grenade can and said

“Imperative you start now.” So we started.123

Toward midday, Company L appears to have

moved out as planned, pulling back to a point

where it could cover the withdrawal of Companies

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 213

120 Intervs, Cash with Oliver Dillard, 3 Jun 89;

MacGarrigle with Robertson, 24 Feb 95. Dillard does not mention that Blair received the mission; otherwise his account is

close to Robertson’s. He says that one of the two officers was a

sergeant, a natural mistake since Hollis had just received a battlefield commission to the rank of lieutenant. The roles of

Voight and Tittel remain unclear but both also apparently

received instructions to assist in leading the 3d Battalion to

safety. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Tittel, 23 May 94. 121 Handwritten Ltr, Edwin W. Robertson to George L.

MacGarrigle, 7 Mar 95, CMH files.

122 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, p. 20; 25th Inf Div Opns

Instruction 24, 30 Nov 50; Intervs, Appleman with Corley, 4

Jan 52; MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 21 Mar 94; Robertson, 24

Feb 95; Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89. The timing of

Corley’s instructions to Miller is in doubt, but the colonel obviously made several attempts to contact the 3d Battalion. 123 Interv, Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89.
I and K. The other two companies then began their

moves, but the Chinese were upon them almost

immediately. Bursting over the dike, they caught the

men unprepared and began to mingle in among

them in an attempt to escape the air strikes that had

to that point taken a great toll on their number. The

nature of the terrain and the naivete of some of the

troops aided them. A large irrigation ditch stretched

across the position. Some of the retreating men

attempted to seek cover there because the trench was

low and seemed safe. “I can remember cussing and

yelling and kicking and scratching and telling them

to get up out of there, get up over that hill,” Yadon

recalled. “Some of them thought they were safe there

hidden, but they weren’t.” A squad leader in

Company M, Sgt. Richard Sanders, told a similar

story. He ordered his men to move out two at a time

across a field and take cover behind several tanks

some three hundred yards away on the other side.

The men refused. Sanders ordered them to follow

him and took off by himself. He tripped. As he fell,

enemy tracers went over his head, but he finally

made it to safety. His men were not so lucky. Most

were captured after they refused to cross the field.124

Standing on a hill about two miles to the rear

of the 3d Battalion, the commander of the 23d

Infantry’s Company B, Capt. Sherman Pratt,

watched the scene unfold through his binoculars:

I could see troops moving in the valley below us. But

they were still too distant to make out. It was clear

though that they weren’t organized. They were moving

around in bunches, this way and that, like chickens in a

barnyard, with no clearly discernible direction.

We watched them for a while through our binoculars,

and as they got closer one of my lieutenants said, “My

God, Captain, I think they’re GIs!”

Black GIs, I might add. We could recognize their

American uniforms, but most had no helmets, and few

had any weapons. Even at that distance they looked

thoroughly disorganized and terrorized. From up on our

hill we could see them running and stumbling over the

frozen ground. Some would fall and not get back up.

Here and there we could see one of them stop, look back

and fire. Although there wasn’t much of that, because so

few still had their rifles.

Then we noticed that mixed among these black GIs were

Chinese. They were running in among the Americans,

grabbing them and trying to pull them to the ground.

We could see fistfights as the GIs tried to throw off the

Chinese. We saw other GIs hitting the Chinese with

what appeared to be clubs or sticks. The wild melee continued, off and on, for two or three hours. Watching it,

we felt helpless and frustrated. It was too far below us to

go out and help, and we couldn’t fire on the Chinese

without the risk of hitting the GIs.125

In their arrogance, according to rifleman Wilfred

Matthews, some of the Chinese would run alongside fleeing American soldiers, shove them from the

rear, and say, “Run Joe.”126

As chaos spread, one platoon of Company L

under the command of 1st Lt. Alonzo O. Sargent

functioned as a rear guard. Wielding two pistols,

sometimes in hand-to-hand combat but always in

a hail of gunfire, Sargent jumped from position to

position, administering first aid to those who were

wounded and shifting the aim of his men to meet

each new enemy threat. Whenever the Chinese

temporarily lost momentum or paused to take

stock, he moved the wounded first and then

directed his men into new firing positions to the

rear. In that way, he and his troops finally reached

a sunken railroad track on the edge of the field.

There he and another officer, 1st Lt. Sandro

Barone, rallied frightened soldiers who had congregated in the draw and succeeded in leading

them off. For his bravery, Sargent later received

the Silver Star, as did Barone.127

A number of other officers were similarly

bold. Collecting anyone who would respond, they

fought their way out, sometimes against great

214 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

124 Ibid.; Intervs, Muehlbauer with Richard Sanders, 16

Dec 88; Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52; MacGarrigle with

Sapenter, 21 Mar 94.

125 Pratt is quoted in Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums,

An Oral History of the Korean War (New York: John Wiley &

Sons, 1993), pp. 66–67. The commander of the 1st Battalion,

23d Infantry, Maj. Sam Radow, gave a similar description. See

Interv, Appleman with Sam Radow, 16 Aug 51. 126 Interv, Cash with Matthews, 23 Sep 88. 127 Affidavits of Sfc George M. Bussey, Sfc Olin Dorsey,

Jr., and Cpl Donald Daniels, attachments to Award

Recommendation for 1st Lt Alonzo O. Sargent, 21 Dec 50,

box 168, RG 338, WNRC; Interv, MacGarrigle with Barone,

14 Apr 94.
odds. As for the enlisted men, although some gave

in to their fears, many others held firm.

Responding to a call for volunteers to man automatic weapons, a group of between twenty and

thirty, for example, stayed behind at a critical

moment to cover the withdrawal.128

Air strikes assisted. Coordinated by Robertson

on the ground, some thirty-five fighter-bombers

were stacked up over the battlefield. They fired

their machine guns and dropped bombs and

napalm on the advancing Chinese throughout the

day, killing many of the enemy while separating

them from the retreating troops. Unavoidably, they

also injured and killed some of their own men.129

In the confusion, the lieutenants who had been

ordered to find the battalion did their job. There

was no real organization as the troops left the field,

according to Tittel, a member of the group.

Everyone remained close to the ground until they

were out of small-arms range. Then they stood up

and moved away from the noise of the battle. In all

that day, the 3d Battalion appears to have lost 1

killed, 30 wounded, and 109 missing in action.130

That evening the 24th Infantry began to fall

back toward Anju, the first leg in the 25th

Division’s withdrawal to the south. Except for the

1st Battalion, which had gone ahead on foot, most

of the troops moved in trucks supplied by the

artillery and the 35th Infantry. Somewhere to the

south, the convoy halted briefly in a location that

was near the regimental command post. At that

time, a freezing platoon leader in Company I, 2d

Lt. Reginald Sapenter, caught sight of his battalion

commander, Blair, warming himself by a bonfire on

the side of the road. The image stayed with him

over the next forty years.131

When the 25th Division was finally able to take

stock later in December, it found that the 24th

Infantry had suffered grievous damage in the

retreat. From the standpoint of materiel, the unit

had lost most of its radios and a large quantity of its

equipment. On the human level, however, the

harm had been even worse. The regiment had suffered the loss of 20 percent of its officers and 33

percent of its enlisted personnel. Company C of the

1st Battalion was gone and would have to be rebuilt

from scratch, and both the 2d and 3d Battalions

were sorely depleted. The men who remained were

often in pain. Many suffered from exhaustion.

Frostbite and trench foot seemed epidemic.132

Within the 24th Infantry, morale was low and

tempers continued to be short. Some of the officers

blamed Blair for the disaster at Kunu-ri, and Corley

himself had become concerned that the 3d

Battalion’s commander was “out on his feet.” The

problem came to a head several days after the retreat

from Kunu-ri, when Robertson finally rejoined the

regiment. Learning from the officer that Blair had

declined to follow his instructions and had gone to

the rear rather than to find his companies, Corley

ordered the colonel to report to him immediately.

When Blair arrived Corley listened to his story and

then relieved him, according to Robertson, “on the

spot.” At that time, he told Blair he could say it was

because of combat fatigue.133

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 215

128Intervs, MacGarrigle with Barone, 14 Apr 94; Cash

with George Bussey, 13 Nov 88; Matthews, 23 Sep 88; Bowers

with Roscoe E. Dann, Jr., 23 Mar 94. 129Intervs, Cash with Robertson, 29 Aug 89; MacGarrigle

with Robertson, 24 Feb 95. 130WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 20–21; WD, 3d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 14–15; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

Dec 50, p. 1; Intervs, Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52;

Muehlbauer with Yadon, 22 May 89; MacGarrigle with

Sapenter, 21 Mar 94; Tittel, 23 May 94. The statistics are from

24th Inf Rgt S–1 Rpt of Casualty Statistics, attachment to WD,

24th Inf Rgt, Dec 50, box 3770, RG 407, WNRC. According to

the S–3 journals of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 23d Infantry,

most of the men of the 24th were off the battlefield by 1630

that evening. See S–3 Journals, 1st and 3d Bns, 23d Inf Rgt, 30

Nov 50, box 2472, RG 407, WNRC.

131WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Dec 50, pp. 20–21; Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Sapenter, 21 Mar 94; Tittel, 23 May 94. 13224th Inf Rgt Narrative History, Dec 50, p. 4, box 3770,

RG 407, WNRC; WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Nov 50, pp. 14–15. 133Corley’s forward air controller, Robertson, was emphatic when giving his eyewitness account of what happened. See

Interv, MacGarrigle with Robertson, 24 Feb 95; Handwritten

Ltr, Robertson to MacGarrigle, 7 Mar 95. Blair said he was

transferred to division because General Kean needed an interim chief of intelligence. See Interv, MacGarrigle with Blair, 15

Feb 95. WO Thomas Pettigrew, who claimed also to have been

present at Blair’s relief, told a different story but his version

remains unsubstantiated. By his account, Corley and Blair

argued, and Corley relieved the officer. See Pettigrew, The

Kunu-ri (Kumori) Incident, pp. 27–28; Interv, Cash with
Several months after the episode, Blair gave an

interview to Harold H. Martin of the Saturday

Evening Post. According to Martin, Blair alleged that

the enemy had put his command-post security

guard to flight at Kunu-ri without a shot in return

and that he had watched from a distance the next

day as the enemy had cut his battalion to pieces.

“All three companies broke at once,” Martin wrote.

“The men fled like rabbits across the great open

field, and the commander could see them fall.”

Later that afternoon, Martin continued, Blair had

encountered a group of black soldiers huddled

around a campfire singing. Questioning the men

about their song, he learned that it was what they

called “the official song of the 24th Infantry,” the

“Bugout Boogie.” Set to a tune with an easy swing,

Hank Snow’s “Movin’ On,” the lyrics went: “When

them Chinese mortars begins to thud, the old

Deuce-four begin to bug.”134

Martin went on to observe that the attitude the

song betrayed was at the heart of the Army’s problem

with the black soldier. Going back as far as 1867,

when the first black regiments had been formed, the

service had never succeeded in determining how

best to employ all-black forces. During World Wars

I and II, as a result, those units had performed poorly, and according to Blair’s story they continued to do

so. Martin concluded that black soldiers fighting as

part of all-white units did about as well or as poorly

as their white counterparts and that integration of

the armed forces was the obvious solution to the

problems of all-black units.135

Blair asserted in an interview forty-four years

later that the reporter had distorted his comments.

He had never watched the enemy cut his battalion to

pieces, he said, and the “Bugout Boogie” episode had

taken place much earlier, shortly after he had

assumed command of the battalion at Battle

Mountain. Indeed, as other veterans of the war have

noted, the “Bugout Boogie” was sung by many units

in Korea, usually about themselves as a joke or about

rival units. “The 2d Division is second to none,” one

variation went. “The 1st Cav is the first to run. A

rumble of thunder, [a] stomp of feet, the 1st Cav (or

Deuce Four or 2d Division) is in full retreat.”136

Whatever the case, the African-American press

took umbrage at the article. If Martin had presented

a strong argument in favor of integration, Pittsburgh

Courier correspondent Frank Whisonant avowed,

“he had bloodied the nose of the Negro in doing so”

by implying that the 24th’s problems were related to

the race of the troops rather than to the influence of

segregation and the reduced expectations it instilled.

When the black soldier faltered he got all the blame,

the reporter charged, but when he did well his officers received the credit.137

Whisonant turned to Colonel Corley for a

rebuttal, authoring a series of three articles based

on interviews. Without alluding to the fact that

Blair appeared to have been nowhere near his three

companies at the time when they came to grief at

Kunu-ri and that he was never the eyewitness

Martin had made him out to be, Corley denied that

the men of the 3d Battalion had been at fault. “As

for the attack on our positions which caused Major

Blair to flee,” he said,

he and I and the regiment are responsible. . . . It was also

just plain luck of battle, as the regiment was caught in an

awkward position. . . . [The men] were dead tired on

216 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Thomas H. Pettigrew, 21 Dec 89. The two stories are not necessarily incompatible. Pettigrew may have seen one set of

actions, Robertson another. Both may have contributed to

Corley’s decision to remove Blair. Describing an argument with

Blair and other bizarre behavior on the part of the colonel,

Corley himself remarked in an interview that he had concluded Blair was suffering from combat fatigue and had recommended a staff job for the officer until he could recover and

return to the line with another combat command. See Interv,

Appleman with Corley, 4 Jan 52. The 3d Battalion’s operations

officer, Maj. Roscius Newell, also recalled that Blair was suffering from pronounced fatigue. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94. Blair could not recall ever seeing

either Corley or Robertson in the retreat from Kunu-ri. His version does not square with the written record or with eyewitness accounts provided by Corley, Robertson, and Armstrong.

See Ltr, Melvin Blair to George L. MacGarrigle, 24 Sep 95,

CMH files. 134 Harold H. Martin, “How Do Our Negro Troops

Measure Up?” Saturday Evening Post, 16 Jun 51, p. 32.

135 Ibid. 136 Interv, MacGarrigle with Blair, 15 Feb 95. Quote from

Interv, Bowers with Bernard L. Muehlbauer, a veteran of the

Korean War with contacts in many units, 8 May 95. 137 Frank Whisonant, “Whisonant’s Reply,” Pittsburgh

Courier, 30 Jun 51, p. 1.
their feet. And, . . . Blair’s battalion had just fought for

three days breaking out of an enemy trap. . . . In August

and September, the regiment might have been unpredictable like Martin said, but that is not true now. Today,

the regiment is a fine regiment and quite predictable. It

is a much more seasoned outfit.138

By assuming the blame for the 24th’s problems, Corley was charitable in the extreme.

Confusion and uncertainty at all levels had in fact

dogged the regiment from the first moment of the

Chinese attack, leaving the unit with at best a

mixed record. Although the 1st Battalion had performed well, coming close to its objectives despite

the rugged country and extreme cold, the disorder

that followed the Chinese attack and that accompanied Task Force Wilson’s efforts to contain the

assault had left the unit’s Company C exposed.

Surrounded, the force had ultimately surrendered. The 2d Battalion had done well, withstanding a major Chinese onslaught. But if the

unit maintained its cohesion and continued to

fight, Companies E and G found that they had no

way to return to their regiment. Sorely depleted,

they joined the 3d Battalion of the 9th Infantry

instead, where they fought on with distinction. As

for the 3d Battalion, Blair’s apparent exhaustion

and the lack of leadership that resulted from his

absence, along with confusion at the division and

corps levels, led to the progressive isolation of the

unit and calamitous losses.

Problems of that sort, however, were hardly

unique to the 24th Infantry. In the 2d Division,

Company K of the highly regarded all-black 3d

Battalion of the 9th Infantry, lacking communications and occupying an insecure position, was all

but destroyed in the enemy attack. The men of

Company L of the same unit, poorly supervised

and suffering from the cold because of a lack of

overcoats, had meanwhile lit bonfires to keep

warm. Short of ammunition when the enemy

attacked their well-lit position, they too were

destroyed as a fighting force. While those incidents were occurring, to the east of the 9th

Infantry the headquarters and the 3d Platoon of

Company G of the all-white 38th Infantry, occupying a poorly selected site and out of touch with

neighboring units, were annihilated with only

one survivor. The rest of the company was devastated. Out of 4 officers, 115 enlisted men, and 44

South Koreans present at the start of the attack,

only 1 officer and 60 enlisted men survived.

Similar stories could be told of other American

units, and of the troops of the South Korean II

Corps farther to the east, which bore the brunt of

the enemy attack. Combat units were stretched to

their limits everywhere above Kunu-ri as the

momentum of the enemy’s attack built in

strength. If many units survived because of good

luck or superior leadership, many others suffered

grievous losses.139

The difficulties those units experienced were

not blamed on race but on tangible military considerations—poor supply, improper training, ineffective leadership, or merely the fortunes of war. A

case in point was the segregated 3d Battalion of the

9th Infantry. Although the unit had suffered some

setbacks during the fighting, the causes of the

problems it encountered were attributed to military

considerations, rather than race, as were the unit’s

successes. The atmosphere prevalent within the 9th

Infantry itself was the reason. Because of casualties,

replacements had been assigned where needed

within the unit, whatever their race. In that way, a

black officer had taken command of an all-white

company and about two hundred and twenty black

soldiers had joined formerly all-white platoons.

Meanwhile, several white enlisted men had joined

the 3d Battalion.140

TO KUNU-RI AND BACK 217

138 Quote from Whisonant, “True Story of the 24th:

Colonel Corley Gives Facts to Courier War Reporter,” p. 1.

See also John T. Corley, “I Was Proud of My Men: Colonel

Corley’s Story,” Pittsburgh Courier, 30 Jun 51, p. 1; Corley,

“Policy Lifted Morale, Confidence: Colonel Corley’s Story,” p.

10; Frank Whisonant, “Whisonant’s Answer,” Pittsburgh

Courier, 7 Jul 51, p. 10.

139 These and many other stories can be found in

Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp. 154–92. 140 Interv, Inspector General with Maj Gen Laurence B.

Keiser, 14 Nov 50, exhibit B–24; Memo, Lt Col D. M. McMains

for Col Perry, 31 Oct 50, exhibit D–7; and Memo, Col C. C.

Sloane, Jr., for General Craig, 29 Oct 50, exhibit D–6. All in

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.
The end result was a natural process in

which mutual confidence and respect had grown

under the strains of combat. As a white squad

leader in the black 3d Battalion, Sgt. Lyman D.

Heacock, remarked when offered a transfer to a

white unit:

Right now I would prefer to go back to the colored

unit. When I first went into the company, I had a sort

of a funny feeling, kind of out of place. I just took it

easy. Now I don’t even look at the color anymore. It can

be done, it is up to the individual himself. I don’t think

there is any difference between white and colored in

combat.141

Overall, building on a host of similar experiences,

commanders had come to judge units and individuals within the regiment on performance and nothing more. The 3d of the 9th benefited.

The same was not true in the case of the 24th

Infantry. If the regiment, as Corley had observed,

was stronger and more self-reliant than earlier in the

war and had conducted itself as well as any other in

the attack toward the Yalu, any credit it might have

received for its overall performance disappeared

with the loss of Company C and the debacle involving the 3d Battalion. Although Companies E and G

had won commendation from the 9th Infantry and

most of the other companies in the regiment had fulfilled their roles before pulling back, accomplishments of that sort hardly mattered. Martin’s charges

in the Saturday Evening Post prevailed. The already

battered reputation of the 24th fell to the lowest

point it would ever reach in the Korean War.

218 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

141 Interv, IG with Lyman D. Heacock, 15 Nov 50, exhibit B–30, Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation. For

additional comments about the attitudes in the regiment, see

Intervs, IG with Cauthion T. Boyd, 15 Nov 50, exhibit B–29,

and Freeman R. Tiffany, 15 Nov 50, exhibit B–26, both in

Eighth Army Inspector General Investigation.
T

he retreat from the Ch’ungch’on proved disastrous for the 2d Division. When the unit withdrew along a route that ran directly from Kunuri to the town of Sunch’on, some twenty miles to

the south, the enemy set up a roadblock at a pass

eight miles along the way and managed to stop

almost the entire force. In the agony that followed,

the Chinese destroyed a column of trucks and

other vehicles many miles long and inflicted a multitude of casualties. Air strikes saved the day, with

pilots sometimes flying so low against enemy positions that the men on the ground thought the

planes would crash. By the time the 2d Division

reassembled at Sunch’on on 1 December 1950, it

had shrunk by nearly half. Of the 18,931 men who

had marched north toward the Yalu on 25

November, only 10,269 remained.1 (See Map 14.)

The 24th Infantry regiment had few difficulties

by comparison, but none of the soldiers present

would have said so at the time. The unit’s path of

withdrawal fell farther to the west than that of the

2d Division, through the town of Sinanju, where

few enemy were present. Even so, to avoid Chinese

ambushes on the road south the 77th Engineer

Combat Company had to cut a steep bypass

through the mountains. Since many of the regiment’s trucks were unable to climb the trail, they

were burned along with surplus supplies. Already

suffering from the effects of previous marches, various injuries from the cold, and exhaustion, the

men of the regiment took only what they could

carry on their backs. There was little food, and the

cold was so intense that temperatures sometimes

fell to as low as -60

F at night.2

The Eighth Army Withdraws

The retreat continued in the days that followed.

General Walker saw no alternative. He estimated

that the Chinese force opposing him numbered a

full six armies with eighteen divisions and 165,000

men. Against it he could mount only the 1st South

Korean Division; the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 24th and

25th Infantry Divisions; and two British brigades.

Much of the rest of his force—the U.S. 2d Infantry

1 The withdrawal of the 2d Division is detailed in

Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 117–27. The book also contains

the strength statistics. See also Appleman, Disaster in Korea, pp.

226–93; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the

Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November 1950, in

the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River, Korea, pp. 280–361.

2 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 2 Dec 50; 24th Inf

Rgt Unit Rpt 62, 2 Dec 50; War Diary (WD), 1st Bn, 24th Inf

Rgt, Dec 50, p. 1; Morning Rpt, 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, 24 Dec 50.

All in box 3770, Record Group (RG) 407, Washington National

Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Brig Gen G. B. Barth,

Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., pp. 47–48, CMH

files; Intervs, John A. Cash with Robert H. Yancy, 21 Jan 89;

George L. MacGarrigle with Buckner M. Creel, 3 Nov and 3 Dec

93. All interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O.

Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files.

CHAPTER 9

Across the Rivers
Division; the Turkish Brigade; and the 6th, 7th, and

8th South Korean Divisions—was heavily worn

and in grievous need of repair. As for reserves, he

had a number of disparate allied units from the

Netherlands, France, Thailand, and the Philippines;

a U.S. airborne regimental combat team; and four

South Korean divisions. Most of those units were

either very new to the war or relatively untrained.3

(Map 15)

Given the available resources, when a threat

arose that the enemy might cut the American line of

withdrawal by launching a drive into P’yongyang

from the east, Walker decided that he had no choice

but to abandon the city. Pulling his forces farther

south, he opened Army storehouses and depots in

the area to his retreating troops and then ordered his

men to burn everything that remained. Eight to ten

thousand tons of supplies went up in flames, including fifteen operable M46 tanks that had to be

destroyed with air strikes when they were mistakenly abandoned on a railroad siding. Many of the men

in the 24th took advantage of the situation to

reequip themselves with clothing and arms, but the

unit itself appears to have received little benefit from

Walker’s order. On 4 December regimental supply

officers took stock of their inventories and decided

220 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

3 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 149.

1 Dec

I X

XXX

I XXXIX

I IXXXX

IX ROK III XXX

ROK II ROK I

XXX

ROK III ROK II

XXX

1 Dec

3 Dec

5 Dec

5 Dec

23 Dec

23 Dec

24 Jan

24 Jan

23 Dec

Taedong R

Pukhan R

Imjin R

Yesong R

Han R

Han

YELLOW SEA R

SEA OF

JAPAN

Hwach'on Res

Sukch'on Sunch'on

P'YONGYANG

Wonsan

Kyomip'o

Yul-li

Sin'gye

Haeju

Ch'orwon Kumhwa

P'yonggang

Munsan-ni

Uijongbu

Chech'on

Wonju

Samch'ok

Yangyang Hwach'on

Kimpo

INCH'ON

SEOUL

Kaesong

Yongju

P'yongt'aek

Chonan-ni

Kumyangjang-ni

Eighth Army Frontline, Date

1 December 1950–24 January 1951

EIGHTH ARMY WITHDRAWAL

Miles

0 60

Map 15
to replenish critically needed supplies by returning

to P’yongyang to retrieve what they needed. By the

time they arrived the city was in flames and its

ammunition dumps were exploding.4

From there the Eighth Army pulled progressively to the rear, occupying a series of positions farther

and farther south. It came to rest toward midDecember on a line twenty miles above Seoul that

ran across the Korean peninsula from the mouth of

the Imjin River on the west to the seacoast town of

Yangyang on the east. The 24th set up its headquarters at Karhyon-ni, northwest of Seoul and just to the

east of the confluence of the Han and Imjin Rivers.

In a touch of absurdity, the mail arrived just as the

retreat was ending, bearing with it not only letters

from home but also recently ordered gear for the regiment’s football team. Seizing on any chance for levity, as soon as it seemed safe some of the men made

light of their misery by donning helmets and numbered jerseys.5

The weather was so cold during the period that

it became a constant threat to the well-being of the

regiment. Soldiers selected to hold flanking positions out of reach of their buddies had to guard

against freezing to death in their foxholes

overnight, and carbon monoxide poisoning

became a problem because cold infantrymen

declined to keep truck windows and hut doors ajar

to circulate the air. The worst afflictions dogging

the 24th, however, were frostbite and other coldweather injuries. Although the men’s clothing

appears to have been no better or worse than that

of the members of all-white regiments, the rate of

cold-wet injury in the unit far exceeded that of

either the 27th or the 35th Infantry regiments.

Indeed, between 15 November and 31 December

1950, the 24th suffered 469 cases of frostbite while

the 27th incurred 77 and the 35th 112.6

A number of causes have been suggested for

the high incidence of cold-weather injuries in the

24th. Since the unit may have had more men than

either of the other two regiments in the 25th

Division, its size may have accounted for part of the

disparity. Poor morale may also have had an influence. The white operations officer of the 3d

Battalion, Maj. Roscius C. Newell, observed that

some of the men in his unit were so disheartened

and naive that a few intentionally attempted to

freeze their feet by pouring water into their boots to

gain a trip to the rear for treatment.7

That a large number of soldiers would have

injured themselves in order to win reprieve from

the war is not as improbable as it seems. Armies in

every conflict have experienced the phenomenon,

sometimes on a large scale. Yet officers within the

25th Division were on the watch for the problem

and deterred those who might have sought to maim

themselves by taking immediate action against violators. During December 1950, as a result, despite

an inspector general investigation into the high

incidence of cold-weather injuries in the 24th, the

regiment’s medical officers could identify only six

instances in which they suspected that soldiers had

done violence to themselves. Overall, according to

a report by the 25th Division’s inspector general

during March, self-inflicted wounds within the

division were few in number, and when they

occurred they were seldom intentional.8

ACROSS THE RIVERS 221

4 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, S–4 Summary for 7 Dec 50, box

3770, RG 407, WNRC; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Curtis H.

Alloway, 20 Oct 94; George A. Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94;

Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 149–51; Barth, Tropic Lightning

and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 48. 5 WD, 24th Inf Rgt, Dec 50, box 3770, RG 407, WNRC;

Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 149–51; Barth, Tropic Lightning

and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 48. John Komp recalled seeing

the football gear as did Roscius Newell. See Ltr, John S. Komp

to George L. MacGarrigle, 15 Jun 94, CMH files; Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Roscius C. Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94.

6 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Dec 50,

box 3770, RG 407, WNRC; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Creel, 3

Nov and 3 Dec 93; Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 15 Jun 94. The

frostbite statistics are from WD, 25th Inf Div, Jan 51, p. 21, box

3766, RG 407, WNRC. 7 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Dec 50;

WD, 24th Inf Rgt, S–4 Summary for Dec 50, box 3770, RG

407, WNRC. The demoralization of the men was mentioned

both by Newell and by Curtis Alloway. See Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94; Alloway, 20 Oct

94. The understrength condition of all-white units at this time

is described in Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military

Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free

Press, 1990), pp. 182–84. 8 The 25th Infantry Division’s inspector general observed

in March 1951 that self-inflicted wounds within the division

had declined sharply by February because of prompt investi-
A more important consideration may have been

the physical makeup of the men themselves. Army

studies later in the war determined that blacks as a

group were more susceptible to cold injury than

whites. During the winter of 1951–1952, when integration was a fact in the Eighth Army, investigators

determined that while whites constituted 91.1 percent of the strength in U.S. regiments in Korea,

blacks were only 9.9 percent. Even so, whites experienced a rate of only 5.8 cases of cold-weather

injury per 1,000 men while blacks suffered 35.86.

Although clothed and fed in the same manner as

their white counterparts and subject to the same discipline, the blacks came down with frostbite after

somewhat shorter periods of exposure and began to

experience injury at temperatures somewhat higher

than their white counterparts.9

Whatever the reason, once the leaders of the

24th became conscious of the extent of the problem and took action to impose remedies, the situation readily yielded to good management. As soon

as officers began daily inspections, insisted on regular foot massages, and inaugurated a program that

distributed up to 2,300 pairs of dry socks per day

to the men, the number of injuries declined.

During January 1951, as a result, frostbite cases

reported by the regiment numbered only 68 for the

month, as compared with 72 cases in the 27th and

91 in the 35th.10

While the officers of the 24th were pushing to

control frostbite, they were also working to restore

the fighting efficiency of the regiment. The task was

enormous. By 2 December more than one-third of

the unit’s men had fallen in battle or become the

victims of frostbite and other ailments. In addition,

the regiment had lost most of its signal equipment

and much of its ordnance. Antifreeze was in such

short supply that the unit’s vehicles had to be left

running overnight, a severe waste of gasoline, or to

be drained of fluids every evening and refilled the

next morning.11

The problem of supply gave way so quickly to

the efforts of logisticians that by Christmas most of

the regiment’s lost equipment had been replaced.

Personnel shortages, however, proved more difficult to correct because replacements were scarce.

Even when an influx of new men occurred toward

the end of the month, unit efficiency rose only

slightly. Lacking money, facilities, and experienced

trainers to handle a large infusion of draftees, the

Army had reduced basic training from fourteen

weeks to six. Most of the new arrivals, as a result,

still required considerable supervision. As for officer replacements, they were usually better trained,

but some nevertheless arrived after only the most

basic orientation. One lieutenant, a World War II

222 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

gation and disciplinary action. See 25th Inf Div Inspector

General Command Rpt for Feb 51, 7 Mar 51, p. 2, box 3777,

RG 407, WNRC. The inspector general investigation of coldweather injuries is mentioned in 25th Inf Div Inspector

General Command Rpt for Dec 50, 12 Jan 51, box 3768, RG

407, WNRC. The statistics on the 24th Infantry are from 24th

Inf Rgt Medical Co Journal, Dec 50, box 3770, RG 407,

WNRC. 9 The susceptibility of blacks to cold-weather injury is

detailed in Kenneth D. Orr and D. C. Fainer, Cold Injury—

Korea, 1951–52, Rpt 113 (Fort Knox, Ky.: Army Medical

Research Laboratory, 1953), pp. 372–88. Orr and Fainer noted

(pp. 387–88) that a study of Norwegian ski troops had found

that dark-complected Norwegians tended to develop frostbite

of the ears and face more often than blond individuals when

exposed to virtually identical circumstances. They cautioned,

however, that until psychosocial factors are more nearly adequately appraised the validity of their hypothesis had to be

held in abeyance. They added, nonetheless, that as a practical

measure, “recognizing the Negro as being at greater risk, unit

commanders responsible for cold weather orientation and

training must emphasize . . . hygiene, mobility, and proper

wearing of gear to the Negro to a greater degree to overcome

this disparity in vulnerability.” Orr and Fainer published a

digest of their findings in “Cold Injuries in Korea During the

Winter 1950–1951,” Medicine 31 (1952): 177f. Later studies

have confirmed many of the Orr and Fainer study’s findings.

See, for example, Lt. Col. Mark S. Taylor, “Cold Weather

Injuries During Peacetime Military Training,” Military

Medicine 157 (November 1992): 602. The Army’s principal

textbook on military dermatology notes that “Race is an

important risk factor” in cold-weather injury, “with blacks

being 2- to 6-fold more vulnerable to frostbite than whites.”

See Col. William D. James, MC, U.S. Army, Military

Dermatology (Falls Church, Va.: Department of the Army,

Office of the Surgeon General, 1994), p. 26.

10 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94.

Instructions for remedying the problem are detailed in 25th Inf

Div Command Rpt for Dec 50, p. 23, box 3761, RG 407,

WNRC. The frostbite statistics for January are in 25th Inf Div

Narrative Rpt for Jan 51, p. 21, box 3773, RG 407, WNRC. 11WD, 24th Inf Rgt, S–4 Summary for Dec 50. Strength

figures are from 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 62, 2 Dec 50.
veteran, according to the commander of Company

C, Capt. Joseph Kahoe, had been processed so

quickly that he had eaten Thanksgiving dinner at

home the month before as a civilian. In general,

officer replacements went into the line where needed. There were no illusions left in the 24th about

maintaining companies with all-black or all-white

officer groupings.12

Fortunately for all concerned, the Chinese

lacked the means to sustain the intense pressure

they had exerted during their initial attack in

November. By failing to follow up on their victory

at the Ch’ongch’on, they gave the Eighth Army

time to heal. Occupying its position on the Imjin

line, the 24th Infantry, for one, had the latitude to

keep only one-third of its men in position at any

time and to allow the rest to train, repair equipment, lay mines and wire, fill sandbags, participate

in foot-care programs, and just keep warm.13

Those efforts, along with warm food and the

arrival of additional winter clothing, had their effect

on morale within the regiment. By mid-month, confidence was growing among the men and patrolling

had once more begun. On the night of 18–19

December, for example, the regimental intelligence

officer conducted a foray across the frozen Imjin

River to determine the enemy’s whereabouts.

Penetrating six miles into the no-man’s-land that

separated the armies, the force encountered and

drove off a band of North Korean or Chinese soldiers guarding eight civilian youths. The youths

later explained that they were about to be executed

for having aided United Nations forces. After an

early holiday dinner on 23 December the unit settled down to prepare for an enemy offensive that

intelligence officers had predicted would occur

sometime near Christmas Day.14

As combat eased, a series of changes occurred

within the 25th Division and the Eighth Army. On

9 December the commander of the 35th Infantry,

Colonel Fisher, was hospitalized for pneumonia

and a well-experienced combat commander, Lt.

Col. Gerald C. Kelleher, took his place. About that

time, Col. John H. Michaelis left the 27th Infantry

to be succeeded by another well-regarded officer,

Lt. Col. Gilbert Check. On 22 December, Brig.

Gen. Vennard Wilson broke his back in an airplane

crash and had to be evacuated. He was replaced

during February by the former assistant division

commander of the 2d Division, Brig. Gen. J.

Sladen Bradley, but when General Kean left Korea

during February to take a routine reassignment,

Bradley moved up to become the commander of

the 25th Division. At that time, Colonel Michaelis,

a brigadier general designee, took his place as

assistant division commander.15

With the war lengthening, changes of that sort

were to be expected. More telling was the loss of Lt.

Gen. Walton H. Walker on 23 December in an

automobile crash and his replacement within the

week by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, a highly

regarded combat commander who had led the 82d

Airborne Division during the invasions of Sicily

and Italy during World War II and had jumped into

Normandy on D-day. The personal choice of

General MacArthur, who placed complete confidence in him, Ridgway was deeply concerned

about a defeatist mentality he believed had begun

to fester within the Eighth Army. He was resolved

to lead his forces back onto the offensive.16

Ridgway’s intentions notwithstanding, the

Chinese once more stole the initiative, launching

their long-awaited attack on New Year’s Eve, just

four days after the new commander took charge.

Their assault came all along the Imjin line, but it

ACROSS THE RIVERS 223

12 Strength figures are from 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 91, 31

Dec 50, box 3770, RG 407, WNRC. Problems with supplying

replacements are detailed in George Q. Flynn, The Draft,

1940–1973 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), p.

115. See also Interv, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with Joseph

Kahoe, 5 Dec 88. 13 WD, 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Dec 50, p. 5, box 3770, RG

407, WNRC; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Alloway, 20 Oct 94;

Muehlbauer with Kahoe, 5 Dec 88. See also Barth, Tropic

Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., pp. 48–50. Mossman

notes that some fighting did occur in areas to the east in the IX

Corps zone. See Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 161.

14 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Dec 50,

p. 3. 15 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d.,

pp. 48–50. 16 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 177–91; Bart Barnes, “Gen

Matthew B. Ridgway Dies,” Washington Post, 27 Jul 93.
struck the hardest against South Korean units located well to the east of the 25th Division. When those

forces began to buckle and the Chinese gave evidence that they might be moving to encircle Seoul,

Ridgway decided he had no choice but to withdraw. In an attempt to retain possession of Seoul,

he pulled the Eighth Army into a line of prepared

positions twenty miles to the south that maintained

a bridgehead north of the city.17

On the evening of 3 January 1951, however, as

the enemy continued to press and the whole allied

front wavered and began to develop holes, he withdrew again and abandoned both the bridgehead

and the city. Falling back in stages with the British

29th Brigade, which took heavy casualties, the 24th

and 35th Infantry regiments made the trip in good

shape. Serving as the 25th Division’s covering force,

the 27th Infantry did the same. On 7 January, while

the rest of the Eighth Army consolidated on a new

line some forty miles to the south of Seoul that ran

through the town of P’yongt’aek and the 35th

pulled into place just to the rear to reinforce forward units, the 24th and the rest of the 25th

Division went into reserve at Ch’onan, some thirteen miles farther south.18

Time To Mend, January–March 1951

Over the next several weeks Ridgway pushed

strong infantry and tank reconnaissance forces

north to keep the Chinese off balance and to

determine their positions and intentions. While

those operations proceeded the 24th Infantry formulated counterattack plans in support of any

contingency that might arise but otherwise spent

much of its time repairing equipment and conducting a cleanup campaign to emphasize personal hygiene and the replacement of clothing and

gear. Post exchange sales of beer, cookies, and

other delicacies resumed after a long absence.

Mail deliveries increased; new movie projectors

arrived along with a variety of feature films; and

the regiment’s chaplains began to hold regular services and counseling sessions.19

As morale improved, on 13 January the 1st

Battalion received orders to secure the main supply

route from Ch’onan to Taejon, a town some forty

miles to the south by road. Guarding bridges, manning outposts at critical points, and searching for

guerrilla hideouts, the unit was particularly successful at finding enemy infiltrators and South

Korean draft dodgers hiding in the countryside.20

In the interim, on 11 January the battalion’s

commander, Colonel Miller, fell sick and had to

be evacuated. He was replaced by the regiment’s

operations officer, Lt. Col. Joseph Missal, a close

friend to Colonel Corley. A good staff officer but

“unhappy being a battalion commander,” according to his operations officer, Captain Baranowski,

Missal found a new job and left after a bit more

than two weeks. On 1 February the battalion’s

executive officer, Maj. Martin L. Davis, took his

place, but he proved incapable of handling the

assignment and was removed from command. On

14 February the executive officer of the 3d

Battalion, Major Newell, took command.21

The 2d and 3d Battalions fulfilled roles similar to

those of the 1st Battalion but experienced less turmoil within their commands. Initially, the 2d

Battalion patrolled vigorously in areas adjacent to its

position and conducted practice alerts to gauge the

readiness of its companies and platoons. After 15

January, when the 27th and 35th regiments began

probing north toward the town of Suwon in prepa224 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

17 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 187–227. See also Barth,

Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., pp. 51–53; 25th

Inf Div Narrative Rpt for Jan 51, pp. 3–4. 18 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Jan 51,

pp. 1–2, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div Command

Rpt for Jan 51, pp. 2–4, box 3773, RG 407, WNRC.

19 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Jan 51,

pp. 2–4; 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Battalion Narrative Summary for

the Month of Feb 51, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC. 20 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Jan 51,

pp. 1–2; 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Evaluation To Accompany

Battalion Narrative for Month of Jan 51, 1 Feb 51, attachment

IX to Regimental Narrative Summary for Jan 51, box 3841, RG

407, WNRC. 21 Ibid.; 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 83, 11

Jan 51, S–3 Operations Instructions file, box 3841, RG 407,

WNRC; Intervs, MacGarrigle with Joseph Baranowski, 24 Aug

and 6 Sep 94. The commander of the 3d Battalion’s headquarters company, Capt. Noah Armstrong, also mentioned that

Davis had been unable to handle the job. See Interv,

Muehlbauer with Noah Armstrong, 22 Oct 88.
ration for a new allied offensive slated for the end of

the month, it also began conducting patrols, occupying blocking positions, guarding bridges, and

securing lines of communications just to the rear of

the advancing units. Although it took a number of

enemy prisoners, it experienced little combat itself.

The 3d Battalion did much the same in its own area

of operations, to about the same effect.22

On 23 January the 25th Division began preparations to participate in Operation THUNDERBOLT,

an attack north designed both to retake Seoul and

to inflict, as Ridgway desired, as much damage

upon the enemy as possible. When H-hour came

on the morning of 25 January, the 35th Infantry

and the Turkish Brigade, which had been attached

to the 25th Division, spearheaded the attack in the

25th Division’s sector, sometimes with fixed bayonets. The 27th Infantry fell into reserve, and the

24th continued its mission of securing supply

routes and blocking to the rear of attacking forces.

For a time the 3d Battalion of the 24th came under

the operational control of the British 29th Brigade,

but little else changed for the unit. Although hampered by extreme cold and icy roads, it experienced little contact with the enemy and concentrated on training, vehicle maintenance, and activities designed to build morale. Returning to the

24th Infantry’s control on 30 January, the battalion

assumed responsibility for the security of a newly

recaptured airstrip at Suwon.23

Overall, during January, while the other regiments of the 25th Division had been sometimes

heavily engaged, the 24th Infantry had had time to

mend. On 1 February, as a result, having experienced no killed and at best fifteen wounded in

action during the preceding month, the unit was

once more at nearly full strength. At the beginning

of January it had possessed a relatively full complement of officers but only 75 percent of its enlisted

men. By the end of the month it could rate its

enlisted ranks at a substantial 95 percent.24

During the first two weeks of February, the

25th Division advanced steadily north toward

Seoul with Corley’s 24th Infantry holding its left

flank. On 5 February the 1st Battalion accompanied Turkish forces into the Inch’on peninsula.

ACROSS THE RIVERS 225

22 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Jan 51, pp. 4–7; 24th

Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Jan 51, pp. 2–3.

24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 24 Jan 51; 2d Bn, 24th

Inf Rgt, Evaluation To Accompany Battalion Narrative for

Month of Jan 51, 1 Feb 51, attachment X to Regimental

Narrative Summary for Jan 51; and 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt,

Evaluation To Accompany Battalion Narrative for Month of Jan

51, 1 Feb 51, attachment XI to Regimental Narrative Summary

for Jan 51. All in box 3841, RG 407, WNRC.

23 I Corps, U.S. Eighth Army, Opns Directive 40, 23 Jan

51, in 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Jan 51, p. 7, box 3773,

RG 407, WNRC; see also pp. 39–63. 24 Memo, Capt Paul A. Carson, Medical Co, 24th Inf Rgt,

for Commanding Ofcr (CO), 24th Inf Rgt, 1 Feb 51, sub:

Historical Data of Medical Company, 24th Infantry, Period

1–31 January 51, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC. Strengths are

contained in 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 32, 1 Feb 51, box 3841, RG

407, WNRC.

A soldier relays a message to the S–3 of the 24th Infantry.
They made slow progress at first, taking some casualties, but on 9 February elements from the regiment

probing to the east of the town discovered that the

enemy was pulling back to prepare for an all-out

defense of Seoul. Moving into the vacuum left by the

departing Chinese and largely unopposed, the regiment moved past Inch’on to the northeast to secure

the town of Kimpo with its strategic airfield. At that

point it stood on the banks of the Han River, just five

miles west of Seoul. Shortly thereafter, on 13

February, the 2d Battalion served as an honor guard

for a visit by General MacArthur to Kimpo Airfield.

During the day MacArthur singled out the unit by

awarding a Distinguished Service Cross to Sgt.

Curtis Pugh and by presenting Silver Stars to a number of the other men. While those ceremonies were

taking place, the rest of the regiment was pulling

back to the town of Kumyangjang-ni, thirty miles

southeast of Seoul, where it relieved frontline units

from the 1st Cavalry Division and began preparations to recapture the last enemy bridgehead south

of the Han River.25

The regiment began the attack on 15 February.

Encountering high, rugged terrain, it came up

against portions of two Chinese regiments backed

by strong artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire.

There were no casualties at first, but enemy resistance consolidated the next day, when Chinese

counterattacks forced Company G off of one of its

objectives and the regiment incurred three killed

and fifty-two wounded. Assisted by heavy tank and

artillery fire, Company F soon regained the lost

position, but not before a stream of visitors had

begun to arrive at Corley’s command post to check

226 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

25 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Feb 51,

pp. 1–3, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC; Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94. See also Mossman, Ebb and Flow,

pp. 253, 256–57.

General MacArthur salutes the men of the 24th Infantry at Kimpo Air Base and (right) presents the Distinguished Service Cross

to Sergeant Pugh.
on the regiment and how it was doing in its first

significant fight in months. Shortly after the start of

the operation, at 0930, General Bradley arrived.

Acting as the assistant division commander, he

would take over as commander of the 25th

Division within the next three days, as soon as

General Kean departed for a new assignment. The

25th Division’s operations officer, Lt. Col. George

DeChow, followed an hour later to check, he said,

on unit positions. The division’s artillery commander, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, appeared at 1100,

and General Kean himself arrived at 1117. At 1405

the I Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Frank W.

Milburn, arrived—again, so it was said, to check on

the location of the troops. By then, all units were on

their objectives and buttoning in for the night, and

the 24th itself had advanced some sixteen miles. Its

new command post was located at P’abalmak,

about twelve miles southwest of Seoul. By 19

February patrols from the regiment had reached

the Han, and surveys had begun to determine the

best ground near the river for defenses and to lay

out possible crossing sites.26 (Map 16)

On that day Bradley succeeded Kean as commander of the 25th Infantry Division. A combatexperienced officer who had led the 126th Infantry

regiment during the New Guinea Campaign in

World War II, he had won the Distinguished

Service Cross and two Silver Stars for heroism during that conflict. Following the war he had served

for a time as the assistant commandant of the

ACROSS THE RIVERS 227

26 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for Feb 51, 12 Mar

51, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpts 46, 15

Feb 51, and 47, 16 Feb 51, both in box 3841, RG 407, WNRC.

Enemy dispositions are mentioned in 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order

26, 14 Feb 51, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC. The stream of visitors is noted in 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 16 Feb

51, box 3841, RG 407, WNRC.

General Bradley meets troops of the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry.
Infantry School, but shortly after North Korea invaded South Korea, he had been appointed the assistant

commander of the 2d Infantry Division. Evacuated

shortly after that unit’s disastrous retreat from the

Ch’ongch’on, he had spent much of December and

January in the hospital and had just returned to the

field. According to Michaelis, Bradley was somewhat high strung with a nervous stomach. “Any

time before any major engagement, he’d get violently ill. . . . He was a good division commander other

than that. He ran it well, delegated.”27

Arriving at P’abalmak on 20 February, the day

after taking command, Bradley came into immediate

conflict with Colonel Corley, who apparently disagreed with him on what dispositions were best for

the 24th Infantry. According to a staff member present at the time, the regiment’s assistant operations

officer, white 1st Lt. John S. Komp, Corley had set

elements of the unit in a defensive position on the

back side of a slope, the sort of location that keeps

troops safe from enemy artillery but is otherwise dif228 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

27 Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

(OSDPA) Press Release, sub: Major General Joseph Sladen

Bradley, n.d., CMH files; Interv, Clay Blair with John H.

Michaelis, n.d., U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI)

Senior Officer Oral History Program, Combat Leadership in

Korea series, MHI, p. XXII-81, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.





PLA 40

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX

PLA 26

XXXX

Imjin R

Han R

Yongp'yong R

Hongch'on R

Han R

Pukhan R

Hant'an R

ROK 1 3

XX

3 25

XX

ROK 6 XX1 Mar

ROK 6 1 Cav

XX

1 Cav 1 Mar

XX

Br 27 XXROK 6

1 Cav XXBr 27

24 XX1 Cav

24 ROK 6

XX

1 Cav 1 Mar

ROK 6

XX

1 Cav

24

XXROK 6 XX

IX

XXXX

IX

XXXX

3 ROK 1 3XX

25

XX

I

XXXIX

I

XXXIX

35

27

24

Munsan-ni

Yongp'yong

Ch ́unch ́on

Han'gye

Hoengsong

Wonju

Yangp'yong

Kyongan-ni

Anyang-ni

Yongdungp'o

Uijongbu

Kimpo

Afld SEOUL

CHONGP ́YONG 

RES

HWACH'ON

RES

Hwach ́on

Yanggu

Haengju

0 15

Miles

WESTERN FRONT

OPERATION RIPPER

6–31 March 1951

Forward Positions, Evening, 6 Mar

Forward Positions, Evening, 13 Mar

Forward Positions, Evening, 31 Mar

Enemy Order of Battle, 31 Mar

Map 16
ficult to defend unless the men are well disciplined

and experienced. The reason why Corley made the

decision to adopt that posture is unknown, but he

clearly believed his troops could do the job. While

he was never sure of the regiment, he told an inspector general on 14 February, he believed the unit was

up to any task it received. Casualty rates would be

high, “but we get better every day.”28

Bradley, according to Komp, was of a different

mind. The ensuing argument became so loud,

according to Komp, that everyone present could

hear it. In an attempt to create privacy, Bradley took

Corley aside, but the effort had little effect. Finally,

Komp said, the general told Corley in tones audible

well outside the headquarters, “Perhaps you’d

understand me better if you stood at attention!”

What Bradley said next was inaudible, but shortly

thereafter Corley left the regiment and the unit’s

executive officer, Lt. Col. Paul F. Roberts, took temporary charge.29

If Corley had been relieved of command, it was

hardly to the advantage of either Bradley or his

superiors that the fact should become general

knowledge. The officer was revered by the men of

the 24th, almost all of whom stood in awe of him.30

That he should have been disciplined could only

have harmed their confidence in the division’s command. At the same time the black newspaper

reporters who covered the 24th Infantry also

thought highly of the colonel. They would have

inevitably scrutinized the reasons for his relief and

might well have sided with him in print. Although

it is difficult to say how the black community

would have responded, some sort of outcry might

have developed. The effect would inevitably highlight the Army’s policy of segregation and the service’s continued intolerance for the black soldier.31

Whatever the reason, the regimental executive officer’s journal for the day said nothing about Corley’s

relief. Instead, it noted blandly that the officer had

left for the 25th Division’s clearing station at 1320

for ten days and that Bradley had arrived at 1645,

more than three hours later.32

As for Corley himself, he never said anything

about the episode, stating in his interview with the

Pittsburgh Courier that he had been evacuated

because of a bad back. In the end he was promoted to brigadier general, but unlike Michaelis, who

was already on the list for promotion and would

ultimately achieve four stars, it took him twelve

more years to reach the rank. During that time, his

wife noted in an interview years later, because of

his defense of the 24th in his interview with the

Pittsburgh Courier, he was under orders at least

ACROSS THE RIVERS 229

28 Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 15 Jun 94. Quote from

Interv, Inspector General (IG) with Col John T. Corley, 14 Feb

51, exhibit B–134, in General Headquarters, Far East

Command, Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged

Irregularities in the Administration of Military Justice in the

25th Infantry Division, 27 Mar 51, boxes 1013–1014 (hereafter cited as Far East Command Inspector General

Investigation), RG 159, WNRC. 29 Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 15 Jun 94. Gustav Gillert also

witnessed the argument. He remembers Bradley telling Corley,

“You can blame it on your back,” but he adds that “[Corley]

made the mistake of taking on the CG [Bradley] and thinking

they needed him to ‘handle’ the 24th.” See Interv, MacGarrigle

with Gustav J. Gillert, 4 May 94. Baranowski says much the

same thing, observing that while he was not a witness to the

argument, he had heard the story afterward from an officer who

had been present. He mentions that Corley may have forced

Bradley’s hand during the argument by committing an act of

insubordination. The colonel avowed, he said, that he believed

he could “get along quite well without [Bradley’s] . . . guidance,”

or words to that effect. See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Joseph

Baranowski, 24 Aug and 6 Sep 94. Baranowski’s version is

hearsay. Except for the comment about possible insubordination, however, it is a virtual duplicate of Komp’s and Gillert’s eyewitness reports. Clay Blair questions whether Corley was

relieved of command, quoting Michaelis to the effect that Corley

knew he could never get along with Bradley and therefore chose

to depart. See Blair, The Forgotten War, p. 684. The daily journal

of the regimental executive officer supports that view by giving

a different sequence of events. It puts Corley’s departure more

than three hours before Bradley’s arrival. See 24th Inf Rgt Exec

Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 20 Feb 51, box 3770, RG 407, WNRC. In

light of Komp’s and Gillert’s recollection and the reminiscences

of Baranowski, those versions seem suspect. Indeed, Michaelis

was no more present at the event than Baranowski, and Komp

and Gillert had no reason to lie. As for the regiment and Corley,

however, both had every reason to cover up what happened. 30 Interv, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94. Out

of all of the interviews conducted in the research for this study,

there were only two individuals who did not have a high opinion of Corley. See Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, pp. 212–15;

Interv, Timothy Rainey with Conway Jones, 26 Mar 90. 31 See Whisonant, “True Story of the 24th: Colonel Corley

Gives Facts to Courier War Reporter,” p. 1, and “Whisonant’s

Answer,” p. 10. 32 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 20 Feb 51.
part of the time to stay away from the press.

“[General] Mark Clark got on my husband in

September [1951] when we first arrived,” she

said. “At that time he was getting a lot of inquiries

about the 24th, when they were getting ready to

break it up. . . . John talked to reporters and mentioned individual cases of heroism.” Corley retired

from the Army in 1966.33

The Han River Crossing

In the days that followed Corley’s departure,

Roberts moved the 24th up to the Han River. There

the unit conducted patrols and improved its defenses by preparing alternate positions, laying mines,

and stringing thousands of yards of barbed wire. By

1 March the regiment was firmly entrenched and

speculation was beginning to rise about when the

Eighth Army would attempt a crossing and the possible role of the 24th.34 (Map 17)

On 3 March the 25th Division answered those

questions. Roberts received word that the main

attack would come to the right of his unit in sectors controlled by the 27th and 35th Infantries

and farther east in the IX Corps zone. The 24th

would use its 2d Battalion to conduct a diversionary attack on the left flank designed to broaden

the 25th Division’s front and to prevent the enemy

from rushing troops to the main crossing points

when their locations became clear. The 3d

Battalion was to prepare to reinforce the 2d’s

attack. The 1st, assisted by the 2d Battalion of the

27th Infantry, was to support the crossing by firing into enemy positions from hills to the rear of

the bridgehead overlooking the Han. If all went

well and the 25th Division’s attack succeeded,

General Barth told commanders during a visit to

the regiment, the terrain gained might well

become the hinge upon which the Eighth Army

would swing back north to the 38th Parallel.35

In preparation for the assault, code-named

RIPPER, tanks began patrolling along the bank of the

Han in the 24th’s sector to determine enemy positions and by their presence to draw the defenders’

attention away from areas to the east where the

main attack would occur. On 4 March the 1st

Battalion of the 7th Infantry regiment (3d Infantry

Division) moved up to assume the positions of the

2d Battalion of the 24th, allowing that unit to begin

a program of vigorous training for the crossing.

Meanwhile, the 77th Engineer Combat Battalion

and Company A of the 65th Engineer Combat

Battalion began preparations to construct a footbridge on the day of the attack. The units would

also build two motor rafts, one of eight tons capable of carrying three jeeps or their equivalent, the

other of fifty tons and large enough for tanks.36

Information on the enemy was scarce, but

extensive photographic coverage from observation

planes revealed that both the far bank of the Han

and the mountains beyond were heavily fortified.

Forays by tanks toward the river also attracted

heavy artillery and antitank fire, making it clear

that the enemy intended to mount a determined

defense. Under the circumstances, since only overwhelming firepower stood any chance of preventing heavy casualties within the attacking force, the

25th Division’s artillery planned to conduct one of

the heaviest artillery preparations of the war, firing

5,000 rounds over a mere twenty minutes from the

more than 150 howitzers available near the 25th

Division’s zone. In addition, some sixty-three tanks

and thirty-six 4.2-inch mortars would combine

their fire with that of every other heavy weapon in

the division, from antitank guns to quadruplemounted 50-caliber machine guns normally

employed in antiaircraft batteries. In all, excluding

munitions to be expended in air strikes against targets of opportunity after the sun came up and air

controllers could begin to operate, planners intended to fire off close to nineteen thousand artillery,

tank, and mortar rounds prior to the assault.37

230 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

33 Corley, “I Was Proud of My Men: Colonel Corley’s

Story,” p. 1; Interv, Cash with Mrs. John T. Corley, 2 Nov 89. 34 24th Inf Rgt Narrative Summary for Feb 51, p. 5; 24th

Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, p. 1, box 3842,

RG 407, WNRC. 35 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, pp.

1–4; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 67.

36 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, p. 2.

37 Ibid., pp. 3–5; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in

Korea, n.d., pp. 67–69. Artillery statistics and ammunition

expenditures are from a condensation of the commander’s
Since any forward movement by artillery or engineering units would alert the enemy to an impending attack, commanders went to extremes to hide

bridging equipment in nearby streambeds and to disguise newly prepared artillery positions by moving

tanks into them as soon as possible. Tanks also made

continual sorties toward the river during the nights

prior to the crossing. The hope was that the enemy

would become so used to their noise that he would

disregard the clamor that would inevitably arise

when the time for the final attack came and tanks

moved forward pulling trailers loaded with assault

boats. Apparently the ruse worked. On the night of 6

March, when the tanks delivered their cargo and

assumed firing positions along the river’s bank, the

enemy failed to respond with a single shot.38

The attack began before first light on 7 March,

at 0545 precisely. For twenty minutes, General

Barth recalled, the guns of the 25th Division

kept up an almost continuous roar as 5,000 shells

arched across the river, making bright bursts of light as

they exploded. We could see the flashes as forty-five

ACROSS THE RIVERS 231

report on the operation. See “Operation RIPPER,” Infantry

School Quarterly 39 (October 1951): 13–16.

38 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d.,

p. 69.







E

G(-)

G

L

K

F

L G

E 13 Mar

15 Mar

12 Mar

11 Mar

10 Mar

K L

I

A B

A B

I

K L

B

A

I L E G F

E

G F

K

K

A L I B

K

L I

I

K

E F

I L G

C A

B E

F

G

G

F E B

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A

15 Mar

C

A

A B

K

C

K I

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F E 12 Mar 11 Mar

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G 9 Mar

11 Mar

A

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C

7 Mar

8 Mar

K L I

C

B

C

G E F

A

Tank Route

8 Mar

7 Mar

A

B

C

E G

F

L K

I B

C 2/35 A

L I K

A

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B

10 Mar

9 Mar

Contact Point with 19th Inf 

Crossing Site

Crossing Site

15 Mar

K

I L

7 Mar

III

27 XTAFC

1 II

3 2 II

1

3 II

1

3 II

1

3 II

1

24

III

27

III

35 19

III

27 35

I I

Han R

Pukhan R

Wolgong-ni

Sao-ri

Hill 89

Tokso-ri

P'altang-ni Hill 683

Oesuyo-ri

Hill 73

Uch'on-ni Chech'ong-ni

Sochongtan

Togong-ni

Changyu-ri

0 3

Miles

HAN RIVER CROSSING

7–15 March 1951

Unit Positions, Date

BASED ON SKETCH IN INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY

Map 17
tanks and forty anti-aircraft guns fired over the heads of

the men on the river bank waiting to launch their boats

for the assault. Far to the left but out of sight, the fire of

the guns and tanks in support of the 24th Infantry . . .

lit up the river. The spectacle was one I’ll never forget. It

resembled a Fourth of July celebration, but one designed

for death and not amusement. I watched anxiously and

breathed a sigh of relief when the cannonade ended

without a single round falling short on our infantry. . . .

At 6:15 the artillery fire lifted to targets well back from

the river bank, and in the dim light of dawn the assault

boats of the infantry crossed.39

All three regiments of the 25th Division

launched their attacks at the same moment. In the

center Companies I and L of Colonel Check’s 27th

Infantry made the principal crossing, using a landing

site with a firm and trafficable beach, well serviced

by all-weather roads, that the North Koreans had

employed as a point of debarkation for ferries transporting vehicles across the Han. By 0742 the two

units had their initial objectives in hand, and by

midmorning, with a footbridge in place, the rest of

the regiment was streaming across the river.40

The enemy’s response was halfhearted and

hardly more than a harassment to the men, in part

because of the furious barrage that had preceded

the assault and in part because Company C of the

89th Medium Tank Battalion had managed to ford

the river some eight hundred yards east of the regiment’s main bridgehead. Its appearance in that

area outflanked enemy positions opposing the

27th’s crossing and, in combination with an assault

by the 1st Battalion of the 27th about the same

time, so surprised an enemy artillery battery that its

men abandoned their guns and fled in terror. The

24th Infantry also contributed. Firing from the

west across the river, which made a wide curve at

that point, a 75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon from

the unit’s 1st Battalion delivered at least one hundred and seventy rounds into the back side of a hill

the 27th had been assigned to assault. The fire

caught the enemy off guard and saved many lives in

the attacking force. By 1700 the 27th had advanced

between four and five thousand yards inland and

was digging in for the night. It had suffered six

killed and thirty-six wounded.41

To the right of the 27th, the 35th Infantry had

a more difficult time. Taking advantage of the

shock delivered by the artillery, the unit’s 3d

Battalion made the crossing with ease and rapidly

moved into the lee of a railway embankment

intersecting its area of operations. By that time,

however, the enemy was recovering and a series of

mishaps had begun to occur. Although a footbridge that was supposed to speed the unit’s

crossing was constructed on time, the structure’s

moorings were too weak to hold against the river’s

current, which was running at least five miles per

hour faster than planners had anticipated. As a

result, one end of the bridge broke loose and

swung back against the opposite shore. With daylight advancing and enemy fire increasing, all

attempts to rebuild the footway in time to assist

the attack proved unsuccessful. In the same way, a

fifty-ton floating bridge for vehicles was under

construction, but enemy fire was so heavy that the

engineers were unable to complete it until the following morning. When the men of the 35th began

to cross in assault boats, an enemy gun concealed

at the mouth of a railway tunnel added to the

havoc. Although Barth’s artillery found and

destroyed the weapon, before that happened it

succeeded in sinking two of the regiment’s assault

boats, causing many casualties.42

In the end the 35th still managed to make its

way, using the assault boats, two amphibious

trucks, and a small ferry. Four out of its five tanks

also got across, despite considerable doubt at first

that the ford they had found was shallow enough to

use. By 1415 the regiment was on its objectives. By

1600 Colonel Kelleher had ordered all battalions to

emplace their tanks, register their artillery, and dig

232 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

39 Ibid., pp. 69–70. 40 Unit History, 27th Inf Rgt, Mar 51, n.d., pp. 2–5, box

3851, RG 407, WNRC. The story of the recoilless rifle platoon

is told in 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 139, 8 Mar

51, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC. Casualty statistics are from

27th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, S–1 Summary,

Casualty List, box 3851, RG 407, WNRC.

41 Ibid. 42 35th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, pp.

11–16, box 3861, RG 407, WNRC; Barth, Tropic Lightning

and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 70.
in for the night. In all, the regiment had lost seven

killed and thirty-three wounded in the attack.43

To the left of the 27th, the 24th Infantry had its

share of problems, but they seemed minor during

the first day of the attack. Company F, commanded

by black 1st Lt. George M. Shuffer, took the lead,

with the mission of establishing and securing a

beachhead. The unit made its way to the target

without undue opposition, but during the crossing

the swift current disorganized some elements of the

force. Seeing the problem and exercising good leadership, Shuffer stepped in immediately, corrected

the situation, and pressed on with the mission. By

0800 he and his men were on their objective, the

western edge of Hill 688, near the seam between

their regiment and the 27th Infantry.44

By then, the enemy had recovered from the

shock of the artillery barrage and had begun to

concentrate heavy small-arms and automaticweapons fire on a footbridge and landing rafts the

engineers had begun to build. The engineers finished the footbridge in short order, but enemy

artillery in the hills beyond the landing site scored

a direct hit on a heavy barge they were assembling.

A number of men were either killed or wounded.

By midmorning, nonetheless, at least the footbridge

was in place and in full use.45

Company E, which crossed the Han shortly after

Shuffer’s unit, had slightly harder going than

Company F, but by 0945 it too was on its objective,

a few hundred feet to the northwest of Company F.

Company G crossed later in the morning. By 1600 it

was in place just to the southwest of Company E,

where it guarded the stretch between that unit and

the river. Company K of the 3d Battalion crossed the

Han at 1300. Under the operational control of the 2d

Battalion, it fell into position just above the river to

the south of Company F to protect that unit’s flank.

By 1730 all of the 24th’s forward units were in place

and buttoned up for the night. The remainder of the

regiment remained south of the Han, where it could

be available to react immediately if an emergency

arose either in its own sector or that of the 27th

Infantry to the east. It had lost two killed and thirtyfour wounded.46

All remained quiet overnight in the 27th’s and

35th’s sectors. Shortly after first light the next

morning, both regiments moved out in good order.

Enemy resistance was so light that each secured its

objectives by early afternoon.47

The 24th Infantry found the going more difficult. At 0315 on 8 March Company F came under

heavy attack by an estimated reinforced battalion.

Within five minutes the unit’s commander reported

that the enemy had penetrated his company’s position. Shortly thereafter, the commander of

Company E also called to report that his unit was

under attack and that grenades were coming into

his position from the rear. About that time several

squads of men in forward platoons were overrun,

and Company G began to receive fire. At 0530,

with Company G holding, the two forward units

pulled back to form a perimeter while still clinging

to the ridge overlooking the river. There they held,

taking a heavy toll of the enemy.48

ACROSS THE RIVERS 233

43 35th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, pp.

11–16. Casualty statistics are from ibid., S–1 Summary,

Casualty List. 44 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for Mar 51, 4 Apr 51,

p. 1, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC. Recommendation for Silver

Star Award, with attachments, 1st Lt George M. Shuffer, 18 Apr

51, box 168, RG 338, WNRC, hereafter cited as Shuffer Award

Recommendation; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 66, 7 Mar 51, box

3842, RG 407, WNRC. See also “Operation RIPPER,” pp.

24–25. Shuffer retired from the Army as a brigadier general. He

states that the current did not affect the early crossings but did

have some effect on those that came later. See Intervs, William

T. Bowers with George M. Shuffer, 5 and 6 Dec 94. 45 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for Mar 51, 4 Apr

51, p. 1. The hit on the barge is mentioned by Barth, Tropic

Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 70.

46 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for Mar 51, 4 Apr

51; Shuffer Award Recommendation; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 66,

7 Mar 51; 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51,

S–1 Rpt Casualty Statistics (1–31 Mar 51), box 3842, RG 407,

WNRC; “Operation RIPPER,” pp. 24–25. See also Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94; Baranowski, 24

Aug 94; Creel, 3 Nov and 3 Dec 93; Bowers with Shuffer, 5 and

6 Dec 94; Muehlbauer with Lindsey Bowers, 20 Apr 89;

George W. Brown, 28 Feb 89; Kahoe, 5 Dec 88; Arthur

Thompson, 14 Sep 88; Levine White, n.d.; Cash with William

M. Dandridge, 7 Aug 88; Carey A. Harris, 8 Sep 89; Oscar

Robinson, 18 Aug 88; Robert H. Yancy, 21 Jan 89. 47 Unit History, 27th Inf Rgt, Mar 51, pp. 2–5; 35th Inf

Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, pp. 11–16. 48 The best description of what happened appears in

Colonel Clayton’s award recommendation for Lieutenant

Shuffer. See Shuffer Award Recommendation. See also Intervs,
Although it seemed for a time that the 2d

Battalion might lose the bridgehead and the unit’s

command post took the precaution of withdrawing

back across the Han, Colonel Clayton stayed forward with his men. Meanwhile, within an increasingly pressed Company F, Lieutenant Shuffer

moved through intense small-arms and mortar fire

to reassure his troops and to see to the care of the

wounded. At one point, Company E lost contact

with Shuffer and his men but reported that it could

hear considerable small-arms fire coming from

their direction. With the dawn, enemy fire from

higher on the hill concentrated with great accuracy

upon individual foxholes, but commanders once

more prevailed upon their men to hold their

ground. There was no panic. At 0700 the hardpressed battalion counterattacked but made only

marginal gains. As a result, at 1105 Clayton

ordered Company K into the line to the right of

Company F. Even with the extra weight, however,

the 2d Battalion was unable to regain the ground it

had lost. At nightfall, despite inflicting severe casualties on the enemy, it was still 300 yards short of

its position on the previous day.49

The battalion resumed the attack at 0655 the

next day, following a five-minute artillery and mortar barrage. Although Company G was pinned by

enemy fire for a time, the men of Company K

moved up the hill against only light resistance.

Entering the enemy’s former position, they found

that the Chinese had pulled back in such haste that

they had discarded enough equipment to supply

the better part of a company—15 Japanese 25-caliber rifles; up to 150 U.S., Japanese, and Russian

rifles; 6 machine guns; 3 Johnson automatic rifles;

5 Bren guns; 3 pole charges; and 4 boxes of 60-

mm. mortar ammunition. In all, over the two-day

fight the enemy had suffered 446 killed and 72

captured. As for Companies E and F of the 24th,

they had incurred a total of 17 killed and 85

wounded out of a line strength of no more than two

hundred and forty men. Significantly, despite those

losses, which approached 50 percent, both units

were so solid that each remained an effective fighting force. Indeed, the next day, despite their losses,

the men of the 2d Battalion secured the slopes of

Hill 688 and tied in with the 27th Infantry to their

east. They then joined with the 3d Battalion in

launching tank-infantry patrols to the north to feel

out enemy positions for the following day’s attack.

In the process, they assisted in routing two enemy

companies, inflicting 75 killed and capturing 17

prisoners of war.50

With that the enemy began a phased withdrawal, moving to the rear in stages behind screening forces that kept his opponents at bay at little

234 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Bowers with Shuffer, 5 and 6 Dec 94. For additional accounts,

see 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for Mar 51, 4 Apr 51,

p. 1; 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 147, 8 Mar 51,

box 3842, RG 407, WNRC; “Operation RIPPER,” pp. 24–25.

The timing of events and summaries of radio calls can be

found in 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, S–3 Journal, 8 Mar 51, box 3842,

RG 407, WNRC. 49 Ibid.

50 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 148, 9 Mar 51,

box 3842, RG 407, WNRC. The equipment is tallied in 2d Bn,

24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 150, 11 Mar 51, box 3842, RG

407, WNRC. See also 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, G–3 Journal, 8 Mar

51, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC. The fighting on 9 March 1951

is mentioned in 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 149,

10 Mar 51, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC; U.S. I Corps

Command Rpt for Mar 51, p. 62, box 1517, RG 407, WNRC.

Men of the 24th Regimental Combat Team shield themselves

from exploding mortar shells.
long-term cost. On 10 March the 2d and 3d

Battalions of the 24th launched a coordinated

assault that covered up to twelve hundred yards in

just a few hours. By 1100 that morning, the two

units had reached their objectives and had

launched patrols to the next ridge line. Those

probes came up against the enemy’s wellentrenched screening force, experienced heavy

mortar and small-arms fire, and made no further

headway. Even so, the next day, when the 1st

Battalion of the 24th relieved the 2d on the line and

moved forward with the 3d, the two units met with

only slight opposition and forward patrols reported

no enemy resistance. The same pattern occurred

over the days that followed throughout the 25th

Division. Wherever roads were lacking, slopes were

steep, and natural approaches were few, the enemy

took his toll but then fell back. Overall, attacking

units encountered tank obstacles and some smallarms and automatic weapons fire but had little difficulty keeping to their schedules. Between 7 and

14 March, as a result, the 25th Division advanced

eight miles with relative ease. On 14 March word

arrived that the enemy was abandoning Seoul. The

next day, I Corps moved to secure Line Golden, a

stretch of high ground that extended to the north

and east of the city.51

During the advance, on 11 March, Col. Henry

C. Britt had taken charge as commander of the

24th Infantry regiment, replacing the acting commander, Roberts, who returned to the United

States. One week later, Lt. Col. Hugh D. Coleman

took over as the regiment’s executive officer. A

graduate of the West Point class of 1932, Britt had

nowhere near the pedigree of the much decorated

Corley, but he was on the spot and available since

he was already serving as the assistant intelligence

officer of General Milburn’s I Corps. In addition,

he had experience in dealing with black troops.

He won two Bronze Stars and two Commendation

Ribbons during the Italian campaign of World

War II while serving as a battalion commander

and regimental executive officer in the all-black

92d Infantry Division.52

Whatever Britt’s qualifications, the colonel failed

to make much of an impression on the men he had

come to command. During more than two hundred

interviews, not one enlisted veteran of the 24th mentioned him. The officers were more familiar with

him, but even they had little to say, and those who

did tended to give lukewarm appraisals. The regiment’s white assistant operations officer, Lieutenant

Komp, thought well enough of him. Having endured

enemy attacks with White, Champeny, and Britt in

Korea, he said, he had come to the conclusion that

all three officers were “cool under fire and quite

capable of making decisions.”53 One of the regiment’s most experienced white combat commanders, Colonel Clayton, was less positive. Remarking

that he saw Britt in a forward position only once

between March and May 1951—in sharp contrast to

Corley, who was often up front with the troops—he

implied that the commander was much more

detached from the fighting than he should have

been. Since Britt relieved Clayton of command in

May, Clayton’s opinion may be suspect, but the white

executive officer of the 3d Battalion, Capt. Buckner

Creel, agreed with him, remarking that Britt rarely

came forward and hardly seemed as dedicated to his

job as Corley. The 1st Battalion’s commander at the

time, white Maj. Roscius Newell, made much the

same observation. Britt never came up to visit units

in the field, he said. Instead, after dark, battalion

commanders, “myself, Clayton, and [Lt. Col.

William D.] Mouchet, would have to travel three to

five miles to reach Britt’s CP. Normally we were tired

and dirty, while he was well rested and wore

starched fatigues.” Black Chaplain Gray Johnson

compared Britt to Corley, remarking that Corley’s

accommodations were always austere but that Britt

ACROSS THE RIVERS 235

51 U.S. I Corps Command Rpt for Mar 51, pp. 62–85;

“Operation RIPPER,” pp. 27–30; U.S. Eighth Army Command

Rpt for Mar 51, sec. 1, Narrative, and U.S. I Corps Opns

Directive 48, 15 Mar 50, both in box 1517, RG 407, WNRC.

The men of the 24th called the line Lincoln, but most histories

refer to it as Line Golden.

52 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United

States Military Academy (West Point, N.Y.: Association of

Graduates, USMA, 1993), p. 231. 53 Ltr, Komp to MacGarrigle, 15 Jun 94. Komp made the

point that he never came under attack when Corley was regimental commander.
set up his command post like a fortress, a source of

much amusement to the men. Britt for his part

appears to have felt little affinity for his regiment.

According to the white former commander of

Company B at Sangju and Masan, Capt. William A.

Hash, who served with the officer in an assignment

following the Korean War, Britt never had anything

good to say about the 24th.54

For all of the hard fighting between 1 and 15

March, Operation RIPPER failed to have much effect

upon the enemy’s overall combat capabilities. As

United Nations forces poured across the Han, their

Chinese and North Korean opponents managed to

keep the bulk of their forces and supplies just out

of reach by fighting a delaying action on the high,

rugged ground to the front of the advancing force.

Laying mines in likely bivouac areas and along

roads and trails, they sometimes put up a fierce

resistance, but more often they took what toll they

could and then pulled back before becoming heavily engaged.55 (Map 18)

On 21 March, in an attempt to destroy the

enemy forces and materiel that remained to his

immediate front, General Ridgway began moving I

Corps in stages toward Line Kansas, some thirty

miles above Seoul and extending in a northeasterly

direction along high ground just to the south of the

38th Parallel. While the 1st South Korean Division

held the left flank of the attack, the U.S. 3d Infantry

Division took to the center, and Bradley’s 25th

Division swung from the right. Within the 25th

Division, the 24th and 27th Infantry regiments

would make assaults, but the 24th would be the

spearhead. In a special briefing, General Bradley

informed the officers of the regiment that he knew

they would appreciate the honor and that he

believed the unit was ready to do the job. The

instructions under which they were to operate were

simple. The attacking force was to take on any

enemy within its reach that was strong enough to

jeopardize friendly units.56

The attack began on the morning of 22 March

with the 24th Infantry encountering minefields and

sporadic enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion in particular came up against enemy groups concealed in

caves and had to root them out one by one with

flamethrowers and grenades. Meanwhile, two communications jeeps hit mines with a loss of three

killed and five wounded. By day’s end, despite long

gains, the regiment was short of its objectives, but

when the assault continued the next morning, the

fighting went well. Although the regiment continued

to be annoyed by mines, the enemy lacked the

resources and materiel to put up a concerted resis236 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

54 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Creel, 3 Nov and 3 Dec 93;

William A. Hash, 9 Jun 94; Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94;

Newell, 10 and 15 Nov 94; Cash with Gray Johnson, 23 Mar

89; Ltr, George A. Clayton to George L. MacGarrigle, 9 Sep

94, CMH files.

55 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Mar 51, 15 Apr 51, pp.

9–15, box 3779, RG 407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order 42,

15 Mar 51, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC; Mossman, Ebb and

Flow, p. 334.

56 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Mar 51, 15 Apr 51, p.

8; 24th Inf Rgt Opns Order 29, 21 Mar 51, box 3842, RG 407,

WNRC; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 335. Bradley’s talk is mentioned in 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 21 Mar 51,

box 3842, RG 407, WNRC.

Colonel Britt after receiving the Silver Star for gallantry in action

.
tance and backed off to bide his time. So it went over

the next several days. The enemy fell back after making some initial resistance while the 24th Infantry

along with the rest of the 25th Division made considerable gains at moderate cost. The 24th, for one,

except for its losses on 22 March, suffered no killed

and fewer than fifty wounded during the period.57

Although the assault was progressing in good

order, General Ridgway had no doubt that the

enemy retained the ability to mount a counterattack employing tens of thousands of troops. In

that case, even if United Nations forces inflicted

heavy casualties, they were so thinly spread that

they would inevitably have to give way. Rather

than see another disaster of the sort that had

occurred at Kunu-ri, followed by another retreat

from Seoul, the general ordered the construction

of strong fallback positions just to the north of

Seoul along Line Golden.

The regiments and artillery batteries of the

Eighth Army would provide supervisory personnel

for the effort, but most of the construction was to be

performed by some two thousand South Korean

ACROSS THE RIVERS 237

57 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt 155, 23 Mar

51, box 3842, RG 407, WNRC; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp.

337–44. Casualties are taken from 24th Inf Rgt Command

Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, S–1 Rpt Casualty Statistics (1–31

Mar 51).

NK I

XXX

NK 8

XX

NK 47

XX

PLA 63

XXXX

PLA XIX

XXXXX

PLA 64

XXXX

PLA 65

XXXX

PLA 60

XXXX

PLA 15

XXXX

PLA III

XXXXX

PLA 12

XXXX

PLA 40

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX PLA XIII

XXXXX

PLA 27

XXXX

PLA 20

PLA IX XXXX

XXXXX

Hant ́an R

Imjin R

Imjin R

Yongp'yong R

Pukhan R

Pukhan R

Han R

IX

XXXX

ROK 6 1 Mar

XX

KANSAS

WYOMING

LINE

LINE

I

XXXIX

25 XX24

3 25

XX

ROK 1 3XX (22 Apr) 3

ROK 1 3

XX (1 Apr)

25

XX

I

XXXIX

ROK 6 1 Cav

XX

24 ROK 6

XX

27 24 TURK

Munsan-ni

Ch ́orwon

Kumhwa

IRON

TRIANGLE

PAEGUN-SAN

POGAE-SAN

P'yonggang Kumsong

Hwach ́on

Chich'on-ni

Yongp'yong

Uijongbu

Ch ́unch ́on

CHONGP ́YONG 

RES

to Seoul

0 15

Miles

OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

1–22 April 1951

Forward Positions, 1 Apr

Forward Positions, Evening, 22 Apr

Enemy Order of Battle, Evening, 22 Apr

Map 18
laborers. Stringing wire, surveying fields of fire, rigging trip flares, and laying mines, crews were to

build enough gun emplacements and camouflaged

bunkers to protect both the city and the Han River

crossings from an all-out enemy attack. In locations

where stony ground prevented digging, they were

even to blast foxholes so that everything would be in

readiness for a strong defense if a pullback to the

position became necessary. By 23 April, just in the

sector assigned to the 25th Division, workers had

completed 786 crew-served weapons positions,

installed 74,000 yards of double-apron fence, strung

5,400 rolls of barbed wire, put down 510,000 sandbags, and laid out 30,000 pounds of demolitions.58

As the 25th Division’s advance neared Line

Kansas, enemy resistance increased. On 28 March

the 24th Infantry came up against an estimated reinforced regiment well entrenched in difficult terrain.

Despite artillery support and repeated attacks, it

proved unable to break through and had to pull

back with heavy casualties in some units. The 1st

Battalion alone incurred some five killed and sixty

wounded. True to form, however, the enemy backed

off the next morning, allowing the 24th, with the

assistance of the 27th Infantry regiment on its right

flank and the 187th Infantry regiment on its left, to

sweep the position with little difficulty. The force

then began to advance swiftly. On 30 March the 27th

took the 24th’s place in the line, allowing the regiment to pull back into reserve.59

Crossing the Hant’an

By 5 April the 25th Division had advanced to

Line Kansas and the heights overlooking the Hant’an

River, a narrow and relatively shallow but rapidly

flowing tributary to the Imjin. The next day, orders

arrived for the 25th to cross the river and to continue in stages to a line named Wyoming, which looped

about twenty miles farther north toward what was

known as the Iron Triangle. This strategic rail and

communications nexus was marked to the north by

the town of P’yonggang and to the south by the

towns of Ch’orwon on the west and Kumhwa on the

east. If United Nations forces invested the region, so

the reasoning went, they would cause many enemy

casualties and impede the enemy’s ability to move

troops and supplies into forward areas.60 (Map 19)

In preparation for the attack, on the night of

9–10 April the 5th Ranger Company crossed the

Hant’an near Hill 383, some four miles to the northeast of the bridgehead selected for the main attack.

The unit secured the hill but had to pull back after a

short time because of a strong enemy counterattack

backed by mortars and automatic weapons.61

Undeterred by the enemy’s vehement

response, General Ridgway announced that day

that the Eighth Army’s attack would begin before

dawn on the following morning, 11 April. To the

west the 65th Infantry of the 3d Division reinforced by Philippine units and two companies

from the 64th Tank Battalion would push north

along Route 33, the main north-south road to

238 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

58 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Mar 51, 15 Apr 51, p.

9; 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Apr 51, 26 Jun 51, p. 1, box

3783, RG 407, WNRC; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf

in Korea, n.d., p. 74; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, p. 366.

59 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Mar 51, 14 Apr 51, pp.

15–16; 1st Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpts 160, 28 Mar

51, and 162, 30 Mar 51, both in box 3842, RG 407, WNRC;

Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d., p. 75. 60 25th Inf Div Command Rpt 5, 1–30 Apr 51, 8 Jul 51,

p. 2, box 3779, RG 407, WNRC; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp.

348–49; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, n.d.,

p. 75.61 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51,

p. 3, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC.

Men of the 24th Infantry adjust cases of ammo on “A” frames

of Korean porters.




















Hant'an R vi er

Hant'an River

TAFC X

III 24

TAFC X

III 24

TAFC X III

3

II

1

3 II

2

3 II

2

1 II

2

3 II

1 1 II

2

2 II

1

2 II

1

2 II

1

24 III

27

XX

24

25

24 III

27

24 III

27

Co. L.D.s f or 1s t Bn 22 Apr

21–22 Apr

1/24

1/24

1/24

2/24

2/24

3/24

3/24

3/24

2/24

2/24

3/24

2/24

22 Apr

18 Apr

18 Apr 18 Apr

17 Apr 17 Apr

17 Apr

16 Apr

16 Apr

13 Apr

Initial Bridgehead 11–12 Apr

Route of 3 Bn

13 Apr 11–13 Apr

G

K(-)

L(-)

L

K

I

A B

F

E

G

Hill 482

Hill 877

Hill 616

Kamun-ni

Unch'on-ni

Sach'ong-ni

Hill 463

Hill 642

Hill 383 Hill 452

Hill 349

Hill 677

Hill 687

III

24

0 2

Miles

NORTH OF HANT'AN RIVER

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT ADVANCE

7–22 April 1951

Company Jump Off Positions

Axis of Advance

Map 19
Ch’orwon. The 25th Division would take the center, pressing toward the same objective through

the rugged Pogae-san mountains. Advancing on

the division’s western and eastern flanks respectively, the Turkish Brigade and the 24th Infantry

would spearhead the 25th’s assault while the 27th

and 35th Infantry regiments remained south of

the Hant’an in reserve. Next in line to the right

came the 24th Infantry Division, which would

attack north along the Yongp’yong River valley. To

its east in the IX Corps zone, the British 27th

Brigade would clear enemy forces from the

Paegun-san mountains.62

Facing his first major operation as a commander, Colonel Britt selected the 1st and 3d Battalions

to make the crossing while putting the 2d Battalion

in reserve. The commanders of the two assault battalions, experienced infantrymen from World War

II, were well suited to the task. The 1st Battalion’s

commander, Major Baranowski, who had served as

a company commander and battalion operations

officer before taking command in April, had fought

with his unit at Kunu-ri and knew it well. The 3d

Battalion’s commander, Colonel Mouchet, had

replaced Blair in early December. Although the battalion’s intelligence officer at the time, black Capt.

Oliver Dillard, found him paternalistic, the officer

had gone on to win the respect of his unit by

attempting to be fair, maintaining a professional

attitude, and demonstrating that he knew the business of commanding troops.63

Britt’s original plan on 6 April called for the

1st Battalion to make a daylight crossing to secure

a bridgehead while the 3d followed to add

momentum to the attack. Based upon reconnaissance indicating that the heights across the river

were held by strongly entrenched enemy forces,

Britt decided to launch the assault at night to

limit enemy observation as much as possible. On

the day before the operation was to begin, however, he had second thoughts. Although patrols

had confirmed that the site he had selected was

the best available, he struck new orders on 10

April, the day before the attack was to begin.

Under his new plan, so hastily devised it was

apparently never written down, the 3d Battalion

was to shift to the west and to cross in the sector

controlled by the Turkish Brigade. The change in

plans left little time for reconnaissance.

Furthermore, the new location was not well suited either for a crossing or for the attack that was

to follow into the hills above the river. According

to Captain Dillard, it was a “terrible crossing site,”

and Mouchet was “outraged that we were trying

to . . . attack here.” The 3d Battalion executive

officer, Captain Creel, agreed. Mouchet “was not

pleased—perhaps a better word would be disgusted—with the regimental plan,” he remarked

in an interview, “but [he] saluted and set out to

implement his portion of it.”64

About twelve miles south of Ch’orwon, the

location selected for the attack would have been

difficult under any circumstances. Two hills dominated it, Hill 463 in the 3d Battalion’s sector to the

west, and Hill 642 in the 1st Battalion’s zone to the

east. Both were screened by trees and underbrush

and dotted with well-concealed bunkers and hiding places from which the enemy could fire, and

the draws that led toward the heights often con240 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

64 24th Inf Rgt Opns Instruction 53, 6 Apr 51, and Opns

Order 32, 9 Apr 51, both in 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for

Apr 51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC. Quotes from Intervs,

MacGarrigle with Creel, 20 Dec 94; Bowers with Dillard, 8 and

9 Mar 95. There is no written record of a new order being

issued. Unit reports on 10 April make no mention of any

change in plan and all patrolling was directed toward the regiment’s front and not into the Turkish Brigade sector. See 24th

Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 99, 10 Apr 51, and 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Unit

Rpt 41, 10 Apr 51, both in 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Apr

51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC. The only explanation for the

change in plan is provided by the regiment’s executive officer

and is unsatisfactory in several respects. See Interv, Edward C.

Williamson with Hugh D. Coleman, Exec Ofcr, 24th Inf Rgt,

13 Jun 51, attachment to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea (EUSAK),

Command Rpt, Hant’an River Crossing, May 51, CMH files,

hereafter cited as Hant’an River Crossing Intervs. See also

Intervs, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94; Creel, 3

Nov and 3 Dec 93.

62 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 371–72. 63 Intervs, MacGarrigle with Creel, 3 Nov and 3 Dec 93;

Yadon, 9 Dec 94; Stuart Force, 8 Aug 94; Baranowski, 24 Aug

94; Bowers with Oliver Dillard, 8 and 9 Mar 95. See also

Rishell, With a Black Platoon in Combat, pp. 137–38; Army

Register, 1951 and 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1951 and 1964).
tained blind approaches that became virtual death

traps by ending in sheer cliffs. Complicating matters even more, there was no bridge in the 3d

Battalion’s zone or in that of the Turkish Brigade

just to the west. The men of both units would have

to wade a sometimes shoulder-high stream in the

dark using only ropes strung from bank to bank to

steady themselves. An ungraded dirt trail led to the

1st Battalion’s crossing. The Chinese had constructed a rude mud and stick bridge at the site

but had carefully destroyed the structure’s center

span after retreating to the river’s north bank. A

patrol from the 24th had surveyed the break, however, and had assured the engineers that they

would be able to span the gap with a mere twenty

feet of planking.65

Despite the benefits that the trail and the bridge

offered, the spot assigned to the men of the 1st

Battalion was particularly dangerous. Not only was

the river waist deep, 125 feet wide, and fast flowing,

it also bent sharply to the south no more than a

quarter of a mile to the west of the point where they

were to cross. Flowing for almost a half-mile in that

direction before looping north again through a deep

gorge toward the 3d Battalion’s crossing, it formed a

finger of land surmounted by an eighty-meter-high

knoll. Once the sun arose, enemy observers would

have a clear view of the battalion’s crossing site from

that slope and would be able to dominate the area

with machine guns and mortars.

The 24th began its attack at about 0430 on 11

April. There was virtually no enemy opposition at

first because the unit achieved surprise by avoiding

the sort of preparatory artillery barrage that would

have signaled an imminent assault. Even so, problems began almost immediately, particularly in the

1st Battalion’s zone. The patrol that had surveyed the

bridge across the Hant’an had apparently made its

measurements by eye rather than by tape. When the

engineers arrived with precut timbers, they found

that the gap they had to span was at least fifteen feet

longer than they had planned. Because of the delay

in construction that followed, Companies A and B

had no choice but to wade across the river. As they

did, several of the men slipped and were swept away,

causing enough of a commotion to alert the enemy.

As a result, when the first platoon to enter the river

reached the far shore and proceeded up the bank, it

was met with a challenge in the Chinese language

and then a hail of grenades and machine-gun fire.

One American was killed. In the fighting that followed, the wind and rain made it easy to conceal

movement, but they impaired artillery and air support by limiting visibility throughout the area.66

ACROSS THE RIVERS 241

65 Hant’an River Crossing Intervs; 24th Inf Rgt Regimental

Narrative Summary for Apr 51, p. 6; Intervs, Williamson with

Coleman, 13 Jun 51, attachment to Hant’an River Crossing

Intervs; MacGarrigle with Alfred F. Tittel, 23 May 94.

Captain Dillard receives the Silver Star from General Bradley.

66 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 21, 11 Apr 51, box

3784, RG 407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative

Summary for Apr 51, pp. 5–6; Ltr, Joseph Baranowski to

George L. MacGarrigle, n.d., CMH files; Intervs, MacGarrigle

with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94; Williamson with 1st Lt Gordon

J. Lippman, Cdr, Co A, 16 Jun 51; Sfc Willie Robinson, platoon sergeant, 1st Platoon, Co A, 16 Jun 51; 1st Lt Edward

Greer, artillery liaison ofcr, 13 Jun 51. Last three attachments

to Hant’an River Crossing Intervs.
Those problems notwithstanding, the 1st

Battalion began crossing the river and moved to the

attack. Companies A and B took the lead but came

under heavy fire and were almost immediately

pinned down. That discouraged Company C from

crossing, but strong leadership quickly asserted

itself. The commander of the unit, who had crossed

before his men, went back and rallied them. By then

the engineers had repaired the bridge. Dodging

machine-gun fire that continued to rake the structure, the men crossed and began their assault. The

knoll that commanded the area and the machine

guns that had tormented them became their first

objectives, with the company’s 1st Platoon taking

responsibility. The attackers were driven back several times by grenades and automatic weapons, but

they kept trying, and after three attempts, at about

0715, they captured the position.67

Meanwhile, the 2d Platoon of Company A

formed a line of skirmishers and attacked across

an open field toward the 1st Battalion’s main

objective, Hill 642. While patrols reconnoitered

the hill in search of a route to the top, other members of the 1st Battalion crawled forward to secure

a firm foothold at the base of the mountain. In the

fighting that followed, they knocked out a series

of strongly fortified enemy positions with

flamethrowers and hand grenades. The fighting

was often vicious and sometimes touch and go. By

1835 on 11 April the men of the battalion were,

as the unit’s commander, Major Baranowski,

reported, “pretty well beat up.” Even so, the unit

itself was well positioned in a crescent of companies along the south and southeastern approaches

to the mountain. Although enemy dugouts were

present and might have provided convenient

overnight protection for the men, most of the

troopers, despite their fatigue, preferred to dig

their own foxholes. The enemy’s positions were

full of dead and infested with fleas.68

242 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

67 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 21, 11 Apr 51; 24th Inf

Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51, pp. 5–6.

68 Ibid. Quote from Interv, Williamson with Baranowski,

12 Jun 51, attachment to Hant’an River Crossing Intervs. Ltr,

Men of the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, fight with Chinese Communists north of the Hant’an River.
The 3d Battalion also experienced a hard crossing. There was no bridge in the unit’s area, so its men

had to wade the river with the assistance of ropes

strung from shore to shore. According to the operations officer of the 3d Battalion, Maj. Stanley P.

Swartz, the “water was swifter than hell, chest deep.”

About halfway across, a soldier stepped into a hole

and fell. As the river carried him away, he screamed

for help. Another did the same. The noise alerted the

enemy, who began firing blindly into the dark

toward the noise. In the confusion that followed, two

men drowned and one platoon of Company K

became partly disorganized. Nonetheless, as with the

1st Battalion, the unit reached shore, collected itself,

and began to attack its objective, Hill 463. Company

L followed shortly thereafter while Company I held

to the rear in reserve.69

At dawn, around 0600, the enemy began firing his mortars. The troops at first moved well

under the assault. By 0755 Company K reported

that it was approaching its first objective, a ridge

line that connected Hill 463 with Hill 642, but

that it was receiving heavy fire from enemy

bunkers along the side of the hill. At that time the

unit began to run short of rifle ammunition and

grenades and requested resupply by air. Visibility

was too poor for an immediate air drop, but portions of the 1st Battalion, located to the east,

began attacking toward the ridge line in hopes of

relieving some of the pressure on the 3d

Battalion.70

Over the next hour the situation in the 3d

Battalion began to spin rapidly out of control.

Waving flags, firing burp guns, and throwing

grenades, the enemy launched a fierce counterattack into Company K’s position. A machine gunner went down in the 2d Platoon. The unit began

to waver and then to pull to the rear. From a forward observation post, the battalion’s commander,

Colonel Mouchet, radioed for the 1st Platoon to

hold firm. It did, for a time, but then, under

increasing pressure and taking casualties, it also

began to pull back. In the confusion, disorder

began to spread to Company L, which had also

come under fire and was beginning to withdraw.

When the men of the two units learned that

Company I was still to the south of the river but

under machine-gun fire from the opposite bank,

they pushed westward into the Turkish zone. At

that point, according to white 1st Lt. Alfred Tittel,

a platoon leader in Company K, the withdrawal

turned into a rout. If the Turks had not covered

for the fleeing men, the commander of Company

K, white 1st Lt. John L. Herren, said, the battalion

would have incurred far greater losses than it did.

As it was, the executive officer of the 24th

Infantry, Colonel Coleman, would report that

some two hundred and forty men from the 3d

Battalion were missing from the unit when it finally made its way south of the Hant’an.71

The full extent of what was happening dawned

only gradually on General Bradley at 25th Division

headquarters. Regular reports had come in from the

24th Infantry throughout the morning of 11 April

but no word that anything was amiss. At 1000, however, Bradley received an alarming message from the

Turkish Brigade requesting permission to fire artillery

on Hill 463 since Company K had withdrawn. Five

minutes later a second message arrived with word

that the 3d Battalion’s commander had gone to the

crossing site, “to personally sense the 3d Battalion sitACROSS THE RIVERS 243

Baranowski to MacGarrigle, n.d.; Intervs, MacGarrigle with

Baranowski, 24 Aug 94; Williamson with Lippman, 16 Jun

51; Sfc Willie Robinson, 16 Jun 51; 1st Lt Edward Greer, 13

Jun 51. Last three attachments to Hant’an River Crossing

Intervs. 69 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51, box 3784, RG

407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for

Apr 51, pp. 5–7; Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, pp. 2–3;

Intervs, Williamson with Maj Stanley P. Swartz, 13 Jun 51,

attachment to Hant’an River Crossing Intervs; MacGarrigle

with Tittel, 23 May 94. 70 Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, pp. 6–7; 25th Inf Div

G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51.

71 What happened to the 3d Battalion remains unclear

because the records chronicling the event are uncommunicative and many of the officers involved, both at the time and

later, had little they wanted to add. This account is drawn

from Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, pp. 6–7; 25th Inf Div

G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51. See also Intervs, Williamson with

1st Lt Scott K. Cleage, artillery liaison ofcr, 20 Jun 51;

Swartz, 13 Jun 51; 1st Lt John L. Herren, 13 Jun 51;

Coleman, 13 Jun 51. All are attachments to Hant’an River

Crossing Intervs. Intervs, MacGarrigle with Tittel, 23 May 94;

Creel, 3 Nov and 3 Dec 93.
uation.” Thoroughly alarmed, Bradley notified

Colonel Britt that “I am placing no restrictions on

your reserve battalion, but at such time as you wish

to move it, please notify me immediately.”72

At 1050 the operations officer of the 24th

Infantry notified Bradley’s headquarters that the

3d Battalion was reorganizing but would jump off

in a new attack about 1200. “Earlier this morning,” he explained, “3d Battalion got right into the

enemy positions and then was split up.” At 1155,

Bradley called the 24th to ask how preparations

for the attack were coming: “Where are

Companies L and K?” He received more assurances that although the two had fallen back “along

the north bank of the river,” they were reorganizing and resupplying and would attack as soon as

artillery fire lifted, “which should be soon.” When

no attack occurred, at 1230 Bradley instructed the

commander of the 27th Infantry, Colonel Check,

to be prepared to move a battalion to the north to

back up the 24th Infantry, or to the west to assist

the Turks.73

An hour later, Bradley arrived at the 24th

Infantry’s command post to see for himself. Ten minutes after that, furious at the dissembling of the regiment’s officers, he notified his command post that

“3d Battalion, 24th Infantry is disorganized and

south of the river. I have directed Col. Britt to reform

the battalion on I Company which had not crossed

river. I have also directed that the battalion recross

the river prior to dark if that can be done in an organized fashion. If this cannot be done, the battalion

will cross at daylight tomorrow.” In a comment that

could only have sent chills through officers within

earshot, Bradley ended his transmission by ordering

his division’s operations section to “make this conversation a matter of record.”74

The 3d Battalion never made it back across the

river that day. At 2130 Company K was still fifty-four

men short and Company L fifty-eight. Indeed,

toward night the Turkish Brigade, which had made

good progress all day and was on or near most of its

objectives, had to pull one of its companies to the

south of the Hant’an because the absence of the 3d

Battalion from the line had left the unit’s flank

exposed. The 1st Battalion of the 24th was also

affected. The men of that force had performed

admirably throughout the day and were well positioned to continue their attack when they dug in for

the night of 11 April, but their accomplishment

received little notice. Instead, at 1555 Bradley

instructed Baranowski to have an officer in the field

verify that the companies of his unit had indeed

achieved the advances they claimed. The next day

the assistant division commander, Colonel

Michaelis, arrived at the battalion’s command post

and demanded to see “all those dead people” whom

the unit’s officers had reported killed. In both cases,

Major Baranowski was only too happy to comply.75

Throughout the day on 11 April the engineers

worked to construct a bridge across the Hant’an. A

masterpiece of improvisation resting on prefabricated log cribs that should have taken up to three

days to build, it was passable to wheeled vehicles

within just seven hours. When the attack jumped

off the next morning, as a result, tanks were able to

cross the river in support of the 1st and 3d

Battalions. From then on, they placed direct fire in

front of the advancing troops and made periodic

dashes up a valley to the east of the attackers to lay

fire on the Chinese from that direction.76

Following a fifteen-minute artillery barrage, the

1st and 3d Battalions kicked off the attack at 0700

on 12 April. By 1025 the leading elements of the 1st

244 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

72 Quotes from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51. For

clarity, we have spelled out abbreviations within quotations

from the journal. See also S–3 Journal, 24th Inf Rgt, 11 Apr 51,

box 3843, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt

22, 11 Apr 51, box 3784, RG 407, WNRC. 73 Ibid. Quotes from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51.

74 Ibid. Quotes from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51.

By a comparison of the operations journals of the regiment and

the division, it is clear that the regiment, in its reports to division, was trying to present a more optimistic picture of the situation than the one reported by the 3d Battalion. 75 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 11 Apr 51. Quote from

Interv, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 6 Sep 94. 76 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51,

p. 8; Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, p. 7; Intervs, Williamson

with 1st Lt David K. Carlisle, asst S–3, 65th Engr Combat Bn,

20 Jun 51, and 1st Lt Orval Belcher, CO, Co B, 89th Medium

Tank Bn, 16 Jun 51, attachments to Hant’an River Crossing

Intervs; 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 101, 12 Apr 51, box 3843, RG

407, WNRC; Ltr, Baranowski to MacGarrigle, n.d.; Interv,

MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 6 Sep 94.
Battalion had begun to climb Hill 642 and were

receiving small-arms, automatic-weapons, and mortar fire from a well-dug-in enemy. They responded

with flamethrowers. As they climbed the mountain,

the trail became steeper. Sometimes the men had no

choice but to advance hand over hand. By 1200,

according to Michaelis, lead elements of Company A

were within fifty yards of the top but were unable to

make further progress against the stream of hand

grenades and automatic-weapons fire that seemed to

pour from the crest.77

Late in the afternoon, aware that Company A

was down to about half strength and hoping that a

less battered unit would be able to make some

headway, Baranowski passed Company B through

A to lead the attack. The unit’s men ran bravely, one

at a time, across a precarious dip and up the ridge,

but were again unable to make much headway.

Seeking to apply even more pressure, General

Bradley removed Clayton’s 2d Battalion from

reserve and placed it at Britt’s disposal. By the time

the unit arrived, however, evening was deepening

and it seemed best to hold up for the night. It

pulled in to the right of the 1st Battalion, where it

held until morning. Fire from tanks at the bottom

of the hill kept the enemy at bay for the two battalions until first light the next day.78

As the 1st Battalion continued its progress up

Hill 642, the 3d Battalion recrossed the Hant’an and

renewed its attack on Hill 463. Although officers at

the scene reported that the river was higher than the

day before, complaints from the field continued

throughout the morning that the unit’s men “aren’t

moving too aggressively.” The enemy offered little

opposition at first, but by 1045 the battalion was

receiving mortar fire from the hill. By 1200 all of the

unit’s companies were pinned down. At 1500 an

intense artillery assault against the hill broke the

impasse. According to a forward observer, 1st Lt.

Scott K. Cleage, the men “advanced beautifully in

close coordination with the artillery.” By 1600 they

were within seventy-five yards of their objective, but

despite heavy fire, the Chinese continued to fight,

replacing their losses again and again.79

At 1930 Colonel Mouchet reported that two of

his men had made it to the top of the hill but that

the enemy retained possession of the north slope of

the mountain. Because of that, he would be unable

to hold the steep south slope in case of a counterattack. When the executive officer of the 24th,

Colonel Coleman, who was with Mouchet, backed

the colonel’s recommendation, Colonel Britt

ordered the 3d Battalion to break off the attack for

the night and to withdraw once more across the

Hant’an. Ten minutes after Britt gave the order, an

exasperated Bradley radioed him to issue a direct

order. “Your 3d Battalion,” he told the colonel, “will

cross the river again tomorrow and will remain

across the river.”80

At 2050 on 12 April Colonel Britt requested

permission to pull officers back from Line Golden,

where they, along with representatives from other

regiments, were supervising construction of the

Eighth Army’s fall-back position. Forward, in the

1st Battalion, Company A had only one officer

remaining, a brand-new second lieutenant.

Company C had two officers and Company B only

one. General Bradley accepted the request but

imposed a condition. Concerned that a major

enemy attack was in the offing and that Line

Golden would be of critical importance if it

occurred, he allowed Britt to pull officers back to

staff his companies, but only if individuals from

other portions of the regiment took their places.

The number of transfers that followed remains

unclear, but some definitely occurred.81

On the night of 12–13 April a tank platoon

moved through the Turkish area to support the 3d

Battalion in the next morning’s attack. By the time

ACROSS THE RIVERS 245

77 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 12 Apr 51, and 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 24, 12 Apr 51, both in box 3784, RG 407,

WNRC; Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, pp. 9–10. 78 Ibid. See also Intervs, Williamson with Baranowski, 12

Jun 51; 1st Lt David A. Freas, Cdr, Co A, 16 Jun 51; and Capt

Morgan D. Griffiths, 12 Apr 51. All attachments to Hant’an

River Crossing Intervs.

79 Quote from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 12 Apr 51.

Interv, Williamson with Cleage, 20 Jun 51, attachment to

Hant’an River Crossing Intervs. 80 Ibid. Quote from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 12 Apr 51.

81 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 13 Apr 51, box 3784, RG

407, WNRC.
the assault occurred, however, the bulk of the

enemy’s forces had pulled off of Hill 463. When the

3d Battalion moved out at 0700 on 13 April it

encountered no resistance and made good

progress. By 0950 it had secured the hill and was

preparing to move up the ridge line to join the 1st

Battalion on Hill 642.82

The 1st and 2d Battalions found the going

more difficult. The 1st Battalion secured Hill 642

by 1055, but only at a cost of many casualties. The

unit then began dispatching patrols to the northeast to protect the left flank of the 2d Battalion,

which was moving up to its right. That afternoon it

cleared two enemy bunkers defended by an estimated platoon. Meanwhile, to the east, operating

on a ridge line that ended in a sheer cliff, the 2d

Battalion came up against stiff resistance.

Encountering Chinese at the top of the cliff who

yelled, waved flags from long poles, and threw

hand grenades, it came within no more than a hundred and fifty yards of its objective before having to

stop for the night. By then, nonetheless, the contest

for the hill was over. The enemy had begun pulling

back, and General Bradley was already making

plans for the next day’s operations to the north. In

all, between 10 and 13 April the 1st Battalion

incurred 48 killed and wounded, the 2d Battalion

had 12, and the 3d Battalion had 52.83

Although the enemy had withdrawn, the

ground still favored him. In the days that followed,

the wooded, rocky hills north of the Hant’an

increased steadily in height, forcing the men of the

24th to make major exertions while providing their

opponents with ample cover. Gullies and narrow

defiles that rose precipitously provided the only

avenues of approach to many of the hills. The crests

of those ridges were easily defended by relatively

few troops wielding hand grenades, which were

particularly effective in that terrain.84

On 14 April the 24th made steady advances

against light small-arms and mortar fire. One of its

attached units, Company B of the 89th Medium

Tank Battalion, achieved a particular success.

Patrolling to the north, it brought two enemy platoons under fire and drove them off. In the process

it destroyed the ammunition dump of the 76th

Chinese Division. Late in the day the 24th shifted its

boundaries to the left to make room for the arrival

of the 27th Infantry, which was pulling into position to its right. It then held in place for a day while

the Turkish Brigade moved up on the left and the

27th relieved the 1st Battalion, which went into

reserve for a much-needed rest. Despite the relative

calm, during the day reconnaissance patrols to the

front reported back that the enemy was building

and improving bunkers all along possible lines of

advance into the mountains, a sure sign that he was

determined to resist further inroads by the 25th

Division at all costs.85

Problems with the 3d Battalion occurred again

early on the morning of 16 April, when the 11th

Company of the Turkish Brigade, alarmed by

some sound or movement to its front, began to

fire into the dark. Surprised, some fifty men of

Company I abandoned their positions and ran.

Within the hour between twenty and thirty of

them turned up in the Turkish sector, fifteen of

them without arms. Initial reports alleged that all

of Company I had fled, but a later investigation by

the executive officer of the 3d Battalion, Maj.

James W. Boring, indicated that no more than fifty

246 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

82 24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 102, 13 Apr 51, and 24th Inf Rgt

S–3 Journal, 13 Apr 51, both in box 3844, RG 407, WNRC;

Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, p. 11; 25th Inf Div Periodic

Opns Rpt 25, 13 Apr 51, box 3784, RG 407, WNRC. 83 Ibid. Casualty statistics used here are from HQ, 25th Inf

Div, Reported Casualties of the 24th Infantry Regiment, n.d.

[Jul 50–Sep 51], box 3848, RG 407, WNRC. Reports from the

time noted higher numbers but seem extreme and cannot be

verified. For example, the Eighth Army’s after-action report for

the Hant’an River crossing indicates that in taking the crest of

Hill 642 on 13 April, Company B incurred three killed and

forty-four wounded. It cites a forward observer and the commander of Company B. Those numbers do not jibe with the

official total listed by name and unit for that date. They may

have included men who were only slightly wounded and

returned to duty, but, if such was so, casualties of that sort

would have had little significant impact upon the unit’s

strength. See Hant’an River Crossing Intervs, pp. 10–11.

84 24th Inf Rgt Intelligence Summary for Apr 51, attachment to 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr

51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC. 85 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51,

pp. 8–9; 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 15 and 16 Apr

51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC.
men had been involved. Since the unit had suffered at least fifty-two casualties during the fighting to that point, however, that number still represented a significant portion of its fighting

strength. Companies K and L for their part were

uninvolved in the episode.86

Although some ground was initially lost in the

confusion, by 0530 many of the stragglers had

been collected and the company was moving back

into position. That day’s attack stepped off shortly

thereafter, at 0720, with Companies K and L taking

the lead. By evening the 24th had advanced another 1,500 yards against continuous enemy fire.

Although the 2d Battalion was unable to achieve its

goal for the day and pulled back at dark, the 3d

Battalion attained its objective. Even so, Colonel

Britt was furious at the unit’s performance to that

point. At 1905 he radioed the commander of the

3d Battalion, Colonel Mouchet, to provide instructions for the following morning’s attack and to issue

a stern warning: “Mission tomorrow, seize and

secure Phase Line Daisy in Zone. . . . Your personal future dependent upon your efforts to accomplish assigned mission.”87

The 25th Division’s advance continued over the

next four days. On 17 April the enemy withdrew to

the north, allowing the division to move with relative impunity against scattered, light resistance.

There was no change on 18 and 19 April. The 24th

Infantry gained about a mile each day while incurring at most minor casualties. The Turkish Brigade

to the regiment’s left moved forward apace, as did

the 27th Infantry to its right. By 20 April the 27th

was well ahead of the 24th, with its forward elements occupying the northernmost limit of the

Eighth Army’s advance during that phase of the

war. In the 24th’s zone the 3d Battalion took the left

while the 1st Battalion occupied the right. The 2d

Battalion was in reserve.88

Enemy resistance began to stiffen on 20

April. The 25th Division’s attack continued with

little letup during the day, but problems soon

occurred. The 3d Battalion met with heavy resistance as it approached Hill 482, some eight miles

north of where it had crossed the Hant’an, and

had to pull back overnight to a more tenable

position. Meanwhile, in the 1st Battalion’s area,

after making progress all day, Company B began

to receive mortar and small-arms fire. At 2140

between fifty and seventy-five enemy attacked

through heavy fog, forcing elements of the unit

off of a ridge.89

The company counterattacked and restored

the position, but indications continued that the

enemy had no intention of retreating further. On

21 April the 1st Battalion made slow gains on

three sides of Hill 687, located some nine miles to

the north of the Hant’an, but in the end proved

unable to seize the objective and had to withdraw.

Much the same thing happened to the 3d

Battalion, which made slow gains all day in the

hills to the west of the 1st Battalion but also never

gained its objective and withdrew to the positions

it had occupied the previous night. (Map 20)

Either that evening or the next day, weary with the

continuing slow progress of the 3d Battalion,

Colonel Britt replaced Mouchet with the unit’s

executive officer, Major Boring.90

ACROSS THE RIVERS 247

86 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 16 Apr 51, box 3785, RG

407, WNRC. It was later alleged that the company was

attacked by an estimated enemy platoon. See 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 31, 16 Apr 51, box 3785, RG 407, WNRC.

As reported by the very candid 25th Division G–3 Journal,

however, officers at the scene who investigated were of the

opinion that no contact with the enemy occurred. That version

is the one followed here. The assistant S–3 of the 3d Battalion,

1st Lt. James Yadon, noted in an interview that the episode

occurred at a time when Colonel Mouchet was out of his command post and somewhere forward with Companies K and L.

See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Yadon, 9 Dec 94. 87 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 16 Apr 51; 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 32, 16 Apr 51, box 3785, RG 407, WNRC;

24th Inf Rgt Unit Rpt 105, 16 Apr 51, box 3843, RG 407,

WNRC. Quote from 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 16

Apr 51. The 2d Battalion’s commander, George Clayton, noted

that Mouchet had experienced a personality conflict with Britt

and had already asked to be relieved. Britt, he said, had refused.

See Intervs, MacGarrigle with Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94.

88 25th Inf Div Command Rpt 5, 1–30 Apr 51, 8 Jul 51,

pp. 37–40, box 3779, RG 407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt

Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51, pp. 10–12. 89 Ibid. See also 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 20 Apr 51, box

3785, RG 407, WNRC. 90 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51,

pp. 12–13; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 42, 21 Apr 51, box

3785, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div Command Rpt 5, 1–30
The Chinese Spring Offensive

The next morning, 22 April, while the 3d

Battalion rested and reorganized, the 1st and 2d

Battalions continued the attack on Hill 687. The

fighting was difficult all day with the troops

sometimes eye-to-eye with the enemy, but by

evening the force had seized its objective. Even

so, as the light faded forward observers began to

report that the Chinese were massing just to the

north. Units all along the Eighth Army’s line also

began to report incoming artillery fire.91

The Chinese launched their long-awaited

Spring Offensive shortly after midnight the next

day, 23 April. Three field armies, a total of 270,000

men, were involved. To the west, the Chinese First

Field Army moved on a twelve-mile front against

the 1st South Korean Division, the British 29th

Brigade, and other allied units located near the

Imjin River. To the east, the Third Field Army moved

against the 5th and 19th regiments of the U.S. 24th

248 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA



PLA 60

XXXX

PLA 20

XXXX

PLA 40

XXXX

PLA 39

XXXX PLA 27

XXXX

PLA 15

XXXX

PLA 63

XXXX

PLA XIII

XXXXX PLA IX

XXXXX PLA III

XXXXX

PLA XIX

XXXXX

PLA 64

XXXX

PLA 65

XXXX

PLA 12

XXXX

NK I

XXX

NK 8

XX

NK 47

XX

27 19

19

19

24

24

35

35

27

ROK 1 3XX

24

Turk

1 Cav

25

XX

25 24 XX

ROK 6 1 Mar

XX

3 25 XX Turk

KANSAS

24 ROK 6 XX

ROK 6 1 Mar

XX

LINE GOLDEN

LINE

I

XXXIX

I

XXXIX

IX

XXXX

Hant ́an R

Imjin R

Pukhan R

Han R

Imjin R

Han R

Pukhan R

Ch ́orwon

Yongp'yong

Kaesong

POGAE-SAN

to Kumhwa

Hwach ́on

Munsan-ni

Ch ́unch ́on

Uijongbu

Haengju

Kimpo

 Afld

Yongdungp ́o

INCH ́ON

SEOUL

Yangp ́yong

0 15

Miles

THE MAIN EFFORT

THE CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE

22–30 April 1951

Forward Positions, Evening, 22 Apr

Forward Positions, Evening, 23 Apr

Forward Positions, Evening, 25 Apr

Forward Positions, Evening, 30 Apr

Axis of Enemy Attacks, 22–30 Apr

Map 20

Apr 51, 8 Jul 51, box 3783, RG 407, WNRC. The position of

the 3d Battalion is mentioned in 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily

Journal, 21 Apr 51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC.

91 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Apr 51,

pp. 14–15; 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 43, 22 Apr 51, and

25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 22 Apr 51, both in box 3785, RG 407,

WNRC; 25th Inf Div Command Rpt 5, 1–30 Apr 51, 8 Jul 51.
Infantry Division and the 27th Infantry regiment of

Bradley’s 25th Division, all of which were blocking

the route to Seoul along the Kumhwa-Uijongbu

road. The main attack, however, came between

those two assaults in the region below Ch’orwon,

where the 60th Army of the Chinese Second Field

Army, moving in a column of divisions, attacked

toward Seoul down the seam between the U.S. 3d

and 25th Divisions. It brushed up against the 24th

Infantry regiment, holding the relatively well-protected ridges of the Pogae-san mountains, but

threw much of its weight against the Turkish

Brigade, which held a long valley leading through

the mountains toward Seoul.92

As the attack developed, the enemy encountered

little difficulty in penetrating the valley that separated the 24th Infantry from the Turkish Brigade,

apparently because neither of the two units had

positioned blocking forces along the valley’s floor. In

the fighting that followed, Britt received permission

from Bradley to pull his exposed 3d Battalion onto

the slopes of Hill 877, one and a half miles to the

south. If the 24th’s line bent, however, it did not

break. Even in withdrawing, the regiment fought

hard, inflicting many casualties on the enemy. To the

east, the 27th Infantry also stood up well, stopping

the enemy in his tracks.93

The Turks were a different matter. Heavily

engaged at almost every point and so intermingled

with the enemy that artillery fire proved useless,

their units lost communication with one another.

One company was annihilated. Several more were

surrounded but managed to fight their way to safety

as units. A few collapsed. Toward dawn on the

morning of 23 April, with nearly a thousand disorganized Turkish stragglers congregating to the rear,

General Bradley instructed what was left of the

brigade to reorganize south of the Hant’an and

moved the 35th Infantry forward to take its place.94

If most of the 25th Division had held its ground

or had withdrawn in good order, Hill 877 still

proved impossible to hold against the enemy’s

onslaught. Indeed, as the men of the 3d Battalion of

the 24th went up one side, mortarman Levine White

recalled, the enemy went up the other. For a time the

fighting was intense, but the contest soon ended. By

0730 enemy troops were swarming on the hill and

Colonel Britt had pulled the 3d Battalion another

one and a half miles to the south under the covering

fire of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion.95

ACROSS THE RIVERS 249

Companies B and C, 24th Infantry, battle Communist counterattacks on rocky mountain slopes on the western central front.

92 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 379–84; Roy E.

Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station: Texas

A&M University Press, 1990), pp. 454–55. 93 The failure to set up blocking positions is mentioned in

Interv, MacGarrigle with Creel, 20 Dec 94. Creel was the commander of Company L, which had responsibility for maintaining contact with the Turkish force. This account of the action

is drawn from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 23 Apr 51, box 3785,

RG 407, WNRC. The journal gives an almost moment-bymoment account of what was happening. See also 24th Inf Rgt

Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 23 Apr 51, box 3843, RG 407,

WNRC; Interv, MacGarrigle with Baranowski, 24 Aug 94.

94 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 23 Apr 51; Mossman, Ebb

and Flow, pp. 384–85. 95 Interv, Muehlbauer with Levine White, n.d.; 25th Inf

Div G–3 Journal, 23 Apr 51.
Little more than an hour later, the I Corps command instructed all of its units to withdraw across

the Hant’an to Line Kansas, which at that point ran

just north of the Yongp’yong River, a tributary of the

Hant’an, flowing some three miles to the south. In

the move that followed the 24th was, for a time,

strung out in a column of companies almost nine

miles long. The enemy, however, took little advantage of the circumstance. He had by then suffered

grievous losses of his own and needed time to gather breath. By 1540, as a result, the entire regiment

was across the Hant’an, and engineers had begun the

process of dismantling the bridge over the river.

They completed the task at 1900 in such good order

that they managed to recover up to 75 percent of the

valuable metal decking that had paved the structure.

On Line Kansas the 35th Infantry held the western

flank of the 25th Division, the position formerly

occupied by the Turkish Brigade. To its east came the

24th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion taking the sector

to the left, the 1st Battalion the center, and the 2d

Battalion the right. The 27th Infantry stood in

reserve to the rear. The regiments of the 24th

Division took position to the east of the 24th

Infantry.96

Although the 24th escaped, it was hardly done

fighting. The enemy wasted little time crossing the

Hant’an and was soon pressing the regiment hard. At

0100 on 24 April Company A came under attack

and all three battalions of the regiment began to

250 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Members of the 24th Infantry fighting south of Ch’orwon, Korea

96 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 23 Apr 51.
receive fire. By 0230 commanders in the field reported that the enemy had overrun Company A and that

the entire 1st Battalion was “pretty badly shot up.”

The fighting seesawed back and forth all the rest of

the day. The 1st Battalion relinquished its position

early in the morning, but it counterattacked successfully later that afternoon with the assistance of units

from the 27th Infantry. In the interim, however, the

2d Battalion came under such a heavy assault that no

one could estimate the number of the enemy

involved. Forced off of its position, that unit also

counterattacked, but to no avail.97

The situation degenerated further as night fell.

With the 1st Battalion of the 24th under continuing heavy pressure and members of a Turkish

blocking force behind the regiment straggling

individually and in groups to the rear, both the

regiment and the 25th Division had no choice but

to withdraw to new positions. Shortly thereafter,

following five days of heavy, bitter fighting, the

25th Division withdrew the sorely battered 24th

from the line and placed it in reserve. In all, during April the regiment had lost 381 killed and

ACROSS THE RIVERS 251

Battling a Chinese counterattack south of Ch’orwon 

97 Quote from 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 24 Apr 51. 25th

Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpt 47, 24 Apr 51; 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpts 48, 25 Apr 51, and 49, 25 Apr 51; Msg,

Commanding General (CG), 25th Inf Div, to CO, 24th Inf Rgt;

CO, 25th Reconnaissance Co; and CG, Turkish Army Forces

Command (TAFC), 240630 Apr 51. All in box 3785, RG 407,

WNRC. 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 24 and 25 Apr

51, box 3843, RG 407, WNRC.
wounded. One hundred and ninety-three of them

fell in just the five days between the twenty-first

and twenty-fifth of the month.98

Overall, throughout the first four months of

1951 the regiment’s performance had been generally solid. After the retreat from Kunu-ri and a

long period of training and rebuilding, the unit

had participated energetically in the 25th

Division’s advance on Seoul. In the crossing of the

Han River, the 2d Battalion performed as well as

any other unit. Suffering the only enemy counterattack the night after the crossing, the battalion

gave ground but did not break, a significant

improvement over its performance at Haman on 1

September of the year before. In the same way, the

1st Battalion was outstanding in the discharge of

its duties during the crossing of the Hant’an River.

The unit secured its bridgehead and advanced

steadily toward its objectives against a determined, well-dug-in enemy. At the Hant’an, however, and during the days following the attack the

1st Battalion’s success was overshadowed by the

failure of the 3d Battalion.

In that case, given the achievements of the rest

of the regiment, it might be tempting to blame

Mouchet for what happened, much as Britt did.

When the officer was relieved of command, however, he immediately transferred to the 27th

Infantry, where he performed ably enough to preserve his future in the Army. He retired a few years

later as a full colonel.

In that light, Britt’s change of plan takes on

great weight in explaining what happened. The

3d Battalion was thrown, almost at the last

moment, with only the barest of plans, into a dangerous night river-crossing on difficult terrain in

the face of strong enemy opposition. It is conceivable that any combat-experienced, cohesive

unit would have had problems, but the 3d

Battalion, still recovering from its experience at

the Ch’ongch’on, floundered. By contrast, the

men of the 1st and 2d Battalions had the benefit

of a known situation for which there was time

both to plan and to prepare physically and mentally. Indeed, under more stable circumstances

and despite grave danger, in the retreat to Line

Golden during the Chinese Spring Offensive, the

3d Battalion fought ably along with the rest of the

regiment, incurring a host of casualties in some of

the most vicious fighting of the war. 

Even so, time was growing short for the 24th.

Whatever the good performance of the regiment,

the 3d Battalion’s experience had again left higher

commanders with doubts. Already convinced that

segregated units were unreliable and possessing the

time and resources at last to do something about it,

they were resolved to end forced separation of the

races in Korea and to move ahead on Kean’s recommendation to disband the unit. Although the

24th would see further fighting in the weeks that

followed, its days were numbered.

252 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

Men of the 3d Battalion withdraw near Ch’orwon after heavy

counterattacks by Communist forces.

98 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 24 Apr 51. Casualties are

from HQ, 25th Inf Div, Reported Casualties of the 24th

Infantry Regiment, n.d. [Jul 50–Sep 51].
O

ver the days that followed the pullback from

the Hant’an, enemy pressure forced the 25th

Division into a series of withdrawals. By the

morning of 28 April 1951, the unit had fallen

back as far as Line Lincoln, the series of strong

fortifications that General Ridgway had constructed just north of Seoul. At that time, following several days of rest, the 24th Infantry returned to the

front, where it began the process of strengthening

its position with mines and wire. The area the

regiment had to defend, the unit’s executive officer, Lt. Col. Hugh D. Coleman, noticed, was far

smaller than in the past, making it “the best

defensive line . . . we’ve . . . occupied in Korea.”

At least a few of the unit’s enlisted men had a different opinion. Viewing the fortifications and

realizing that a major fight was at hand, some of

the soldiers began to circulate rumors that commanders expected the regiment to hold to the last

man and that everyone would soon be dead.

Morale was good up until that point, a medic in

Company E, Lawrence Holmes, declared. Then it

began to fall.1

The concerns of the men proved groundless.

Although the enemy began a large buildup in the

25th Division’s zone, powerful air attacks and

artillery barrages removed any possibility of a

major attack in that area. Instead, toward the end of

the month newly captured Chinese and North

Korean prisoners began to reveal that the enemy’s

organization and system of supply was collapsing

and that motivation was lagging among the troops

because of the pounding they had received and

heavy casualties among the political officers who

maintained discipline within the force. By the first

week in May patrols were penetrating up to six

miles into enemy territory without major opposition and combat consisted mainly of quick skirmishes and chance encounters.2

On 14 April, following a major controversy in

which President Truman replaced General

MacArthur with General Ridgway as U.S. commander in the Far East, Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet took

charge of the Eighth Army. A proven combat commander who had led the 8th Infantry of the U.S.

4th Infantry Division on UTAH Beach during the

Normandy invasion and had won three

Distinguished Service Crosses during the fighting

at Cherbourg, on the Siegfried Line, and in the

Battle of the Bulge, Van Fleet began immediate

CHAPTER 10

Last Days

1 Quote from 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 28

and 29 Apr 51, box 3843, Record Group (RG) 407,

Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.

Interv, John A. Cash with Lawrence Holmes, 18 Aug 89. All

interviews hereafter cited by John A. Cash, Bernard L.

Muehlbauer, Timothy Rainey, William T. Bowers, Richard O.

Perry, and George L. MacGarrigle are in CMH files.

2 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for 1–31 May 51, box 3787,

RG 407, WNRC; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 435–36.
plans for a counterattack to regain the territory

United Nations forces had lost in the enemy’s

Spring Offensive. On 16 May, however, the Chinese

and North Koreans preempted that plan with a

major attack of their own, centering it some seventy-five miles east of Seoul in the rugged Taebaek

Mountains. The fighting was touch and go for a

time, but United Nations forces soon slowed the

enemy enough to permit Van Fleet to proceed.3

On 20 May, as a result, Operation PILEDRIVER

began. Involving a general attack along the Eighth

Army’s entire line, the assault laid heavy emphasis

upon the I Corps zone, where the U.S. 1st Cavalry

Division and the 3d and 25th Infantry Divisions

were to press north toward the mouth of the Imjin

River and the towns of Ch’orwon and Kumhwa to

its east. When the attackers reached their goals

and began to penetrate the Iron Triangle above

Ch’orwon and Kumhwa, so the reasoning went,

they would block the enemy’s main routes of

access to the fighting on the eastern front and

would relieve much of the pressure on allied

forces in that area.4 (Map 21)

Earlier in the war U.S. commanders would

have expected to drive past the Iron Triangle

toward North Korea’s border with China. During

May, however, President Truman had redefined

American ends in the conflict by promising to

stop the fighting just as soon as he could conclude

a suitable armistice with the enemy. Because of

that, toward the middle of the month the Joint

Chiefs of Staff instructed Ridgway to keep the

enemy off balance with limited operations, but to

make no major moves north of the area above

Ch’orwon without permission from higher

authority. From then on, military actions in Korea

were to concentrate less on seizing territory than

on causing the sort of damage to the enemy’s

forces that would preserve South Korea while

speeding a negotiated settlement to the war.5

During the assault north, the 24th Infantry

occupied the eastern flank of the 25th Division’s

attack, moving up Route 3 toward Kumhwa.

Enemy opposition was light at first, leading intelligence officers to conclude that the Chinese and

North Koreans had shifted their main forces to the

east for their attack in that area. Temperatures were

relatively cold at night throughout the period but

warm during the day, and rain was frequent.6

Enemy resistance stiffened on 21 May.

Advancing up a hill at 1045, a platoon from

Company E in Colonel Clayton’s 2d Battalion

encountered heavy enemy machine-gun and mortar

fire and withdrew. As it pulled back, the two platoons nearest to it did the same. The officers of the

units involved reorganized their men and returned

them to the attack. Supported by a platoon of tanks

from the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, the troops

advanced well enough after that. Despite sometimes

telling enemy artillery fire, they reached their objective by 1230. Even so, the episode aggravated officers at the 25th Division. One of them, the division’s

operations officer, noted in his journal for the day

that Company E broke under pressure.7

254 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

3 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, pp. 444–65, 485. 4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., pp. 488–90.

6 Weather mentioned in 3d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Unit Monthly

Summary, 1–31 May 51, box 3844, RG 407, WNRC. Stiffening

combat and intelligence analyses are mentioned in 25th Inf Div

Command Rpt for May 51, p. 7, box 3787, RG 407, WNRC. 7 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 21 May 51, box 3788, RG

407, WNRC. See also 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Periodic Opns Rpt

Ready and waiting in a bunker for the Chinese advance along

the front near Seoul
The next day Clayton’s Company F took its

objective but then encountered similar problems

and withdrew a thousand yards to the south.

Clayton went forward to see what was wrong and

soon had the situation in hand, but the regimental commander, Colonel Britt, apparently held

him responsible for what had happened and

shortly thereafter relieved him of command. By

then the officer had been a battalion commander

in the line for seven full months. His weight had

dropped from 180 to 135 pounds and he was

approaching exhaustion. The 2d Battalion’s popular executive officer, Maj. Franklin W. McVay, took

charge of the unit, remaining in command for the

next several months until killed by a mine.8

The 2d Battalion went into reserve to give

McVay time to organize, but the 1st and 3d

Battalions continued the attack north. In the days

that followed, the Chinese and North Koreans

pulled back and then broke contact completely.

Only on 1 June, when the 25th Division

LAST DAYS 255

8 25th Inf Div G–3 Journal, 22 May 51, box 3788, RG

407, WNRC; 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Command Rpt for May 51,

10 Jun 51, box 3844, RG 407, WNRC; Intervs, George L.

MacGarrigle with George A. Clayton, 10 and 11 Aug 94.

221, 21 May 51, box 3844, RG 407, WNRC; 25th Inf Div

Periodic Opns Rpt 41, 21 May 51, box 3788, RG 407, WNRC.











3

3A

33

PLA 26

XXXX

PLA 47

XXXX NK II

XXX

NK III

XXX

NK V

XXX

PLA 20

XXXX

PLA 65

XXXX

PLA 63

XXXX

ROK 1

XX 1 Cav

XX

25

XX 24

XX

Imjin R

Hant ́an R

Pukhan R

Hwach ́on Res

Han R

SEA

 OF

 JAPAN

LINE

LINE

WYOMING

KANSAS

KANSAS

LINE

X

XXX

ROK I

(22 May)

ROK III

XXX

ROK I

X

XXXROK III

IX

XXX

X

(23 May)

IX

XXXX

I

XXXIX

Sibyon-ni

P ́yonggang

Hwach ́on Yanggu

Ch ́unch ́on

Hongch ́on

Habae-jae

Kangnung

38°

Wonp'o-ri

Yangyang

Kojin-ni

Kumhwa

Ch ́orwon

Munsan-ni

Uijongbu

Yongdungp ́o

Yangp ́yong

Kumyangjang-ni

Suwon

Afld

SUWON

P ́yongt ́aek

Heongsong

Wonju

Chech ́on

SEOUL

Haengju

INCH ́ON

Kimpo

 Afld

38°

IRON TRIANGLE

0 25

Miles

EIGHTH ARMY ADVANCE

20 May–1 July 1951

Allied Frontline, 20 May

Allied Frontline, 15 Jun–1 Jul

Enemy Order of Battle

Map 21
approached Kumhwa and the Iron Triangle and

began to threaten important supply lines to the

west and east, did the enemy begin to mount any

sort of determined resistance. That night they

launched a ferocious artillery and mortar attack

against the 24th, sending more than a hundred

rounds into the vicinity of the regimental command

post. Several hundred more rounds fell on artillery

positions and other nearby installations. Heavy

casualties resulted.9

The next day Company L of the 3d Battalion

attacked a heavily fortified enemy hilltop but fell

back with five killed and thirty wounded.

Company C of the 1st Battalion then entered the

fray, but because of heavy automatic weapons fire

it also made little progress. At that time the platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon in Company C,

Sgt. Cornelius H. Charlton, began an advance of

his own against heavy fire. He reached the enemy’s

main position and held in place for a time, but

then fell back in a hail of bullets and grenades.

Learning that his lieutenant had fallen wounded,

he then took command of the platoon to lead it in

another attack. An enlisted man in the company,

Pfc. Ronald Holmes, recalled what happened.

Charlton was wounded in the chest, Holmes said,

but he refused to be evacuated. “He got the rest of

the men together, and we started for the top. The

enemy had some good emplacements . . . we

couldn’t get to him. Grenades kept coming at us

and we were chased back down. Again we tried,

but no luck. Sgt. Charlton said he was going to

make it this time and he yelled, ‘Let’s go,’ and we

started up again. We reached the top this time. I

saw the Sergeant go over the top and charge a

bunker on the other side. He got the gun but was

killed by a grenade.” Charlton caused heavy casualties among the enemy and saved many lives

among his own men. He posthumously received

the Medal of Honor.10

The 24th continued its assault north the next

day, but the going proved difficult because the

enemy was well entrenched along a rocky ridge

line that commanded the valley below. Launching

frequent counterattacks, he leveled heavy fire

against the advancing Americans, who could

make little use of their tanks and machine guns on

account of the terrain but still managed to make

their way by lashing the hillsides with great waves

of artillery and mortar fire. The artillerymen

appear to have resented the extra work. The white

commander of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion,

for one, belittled the 24th, observing in a letter to

his wife during the early part of the operation,

256 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

9 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for May 51; 24th Inf Rgt

Regimental Narrative Summary for Jun 51, box 3845, RG 407,

WNRC.

10 The quote, with punctuation added for clarity, is from

Statement, Pfc Ronald Holmes, 9 Sep 51, attachment to Medal

of Honor Recommendation for Sgt Cornelius H. Charlton, 28

Nov 51, box 173, RG 338, WNRC. See also Statement, 2d Lt

Moir E. Eanes, 13 Nov 51, attachment to Medal of Honor

Recommendation for Sgt Cornelius H. Charlton, 28 Nov 51;

Department of the Army (DA) GO 30, Award of the Medal of

Honor, 19 Mar 52. Both in box 173, RG 338, WNRC. In 1951,

after Charlton had already been buried, the Army failed to offer

him a final resting place in Arlington National Cemetery due to

what it said was an administrative error. Whether that was so

or not, his family never doubted that the lapse was racially

motivated. In March 1990 he was re-buried with full honors in

the American Legion Cemetery in Beckley, West Virginia. The

controversy surrounding Charlton’s burial is outlined in Shawn

Pogatchnik, “After 39 Years, a Town Honors Its Black Hero,”

Los Angeles Times, 28 May 90.

Sergeant Charlton
“This regiment we support is averse to shooting

their rifles so the artillery has to do it all.”

Whatever the case, on 4 June the men of the 24th

withdrew. The 35th Infantry regiment took their

place in the line, allowing them to pull twenty

miles to the rear to the town of Uijongbu to

become the I Corps reserve.11

From that moment on, discipline within the

regiment began to lag. On 10 June, nearly a week

after the regiment withdrew from combat, a regimental inspection team reported that some units

had decided that their status as corps reserve constituted a rest period. Soldiers were taking showers during working hours, indulging in athletic

activities, and cleaning equipment and gear that

should have undergone maintenance one or two

days after the unit pulled back. Meanwhile, officers had been caught sleeping during the middle

of the day, soldiers attending training classes were

paying little attention to the instructors, and the

instructors themselves seemed unprepared. The

situation appeared serious to the inspectors. Units

in reserve were expected not only to work on correcting faults and deficiencies that had arisen during their time in combat but also to be prepared

to move back into combat on a moment’s notice if

an emergency arose.12

Part of the problem appears to have arisen with

the leadership of the regiment, which at that time

seemed to be suffering from a malaise of the spirit

closely related to how some officers viewed their

service in the 24th. As with the soldiers who had

complained that they would all surely die on Line

Lincoln, those individuals appear to have believed

that they were doomed. “Our officer personnel . . .

[are] pretty low at this time,” the executive officer

of the 24th thus told the chief of personnel for the

25th Division on 17 June. “You see, we have some

intelligent people here and they are wondering just

how they’ll get out of here. They are well aware of

the fact that the casualty rate among officers is far

greater in this regiment than [in] any other unit in

the Eighth Army.”13

An enemy air attack on 20 June did nothing to

remedy morale problems in the regiment, but it may

have put the unit back on alert. Flying in at dusk, a

lone raider who usually appeared at that time of the

day killed 8, wounded 8, and damaged 14 vehicles

in Company M. He also caused 5 wounded in

Company I. From then on, according to the intelligence officer of the 2d Battalion, 1st Lt. Ralph J.

Davis, who recalled the incident, the regiment took

its antiaircraft defenses more seriously.14

On 8 July Colonel Britt returned to the United

States. A battalion and regimental commander in

Europe toward the end of World War II who would

later rise to the rank of major general, Lt. Col.

Richard W. Whitney, took his place. General

Bradley also departed during July, relinquishing

LAST DAYS 257

11 24th Inf Rgt Regimental Narrative Summary for Jun 51.

Quote from Ltr, T. E. Watson to his wife, 23 May 51, CMH files. 12 Memo, Maj Walter D. Stevens, Jr., Adjutant, 24th Inf

Rgt, 10 Jun 51, in 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Jun 51, box

3845, RG 407, WNRC.

13 The quotation, edited slightly for clarity, is from 24th

Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s Daily Journal, 17 Jun 51, box 3845, RG

407, WNRC. That the unit’s executive officer had his clerk

record his remarks verbatim in his journal is an indication of

how concerned he was about morale among his officers at the

time. For other comments along the same line, see Interv,

MacGarrigle with Buckner M. Creel, 20 Dec 94. 14 The air attack is mentioned in 24th Inf Rgt Exec Ofcr’s

Daily Journal, 20 Jun 51, box 3845, RG 407, WNRC. See also Ltr,

Ralph J. Davis to George L. MacGarrigle, 12 Dec 94, CMH files.

Men from Company D, 24th Infantry, clean their weapons after

spending thirty-eight days on the front lines.
charge of the 25th Division to Maj. Gen. Ira P.

Swift, an officer of long experience who had served

as the assistant commander of the 82d Airborne

Division in Europe during World War II.15

The 24th stayed in reserve until 15 July, when

it relieved the 7th Cavalry regiment on Line

Wyoming, six miles southwest of Ch’orwon. The

2d Battalion patrolled aggressively, meeting stiff

enemy resistance at first, but as the probes continued the enemy faded away. The weather was poor.

It rained heavily throughout the final two weeks of

the month.16

On 31 July the 24th moved three miles northwest of Kumhwa, where it established a companysize patrol base in the vicinity of Hill 400, a height

that stood just north of an abandoned railroad

embankment running east-west between

Ch’orwon and Kumhwa. Securing the right flank

of the 35th Infantry, the rest of the regiment took

position near the town of Ugu-dong, some four

miles west of Kumhwa, in hills just south of the

rail line.17 (Map 22)

Antipathy toward the 24th on the part of whites

remained heavy during those days, as a description

provided by an artillery forward observer assigned to

Company B, white 2d Lt. Gaston Bergeron, indicates. When the regiment moved up to Kumhwa to

replace an all-white unit in the line, Bergeron,

recalled, its men made the final leg of the journey on

foot, walking up one side of a narrow dirt road while

the soldiers they were relieving walked down the

other. During that time, the officer said, the whites

hurled terrible insults and racial slurs at the blacks

without any interference from their officers, who

were present. In the end, Bergeron said, the only

thing a man could do was tuck his chin down into

the collar of his coat and keep on walking. It was

“ten hours of crap.” The lieutenant added that the

experience was hardly unique. The same thing had

happened to him before during his tour of duty with

the regiment. How, he asked, could any soldier, subjected to such abuse time after time, develop a good

opinion of himself or summon up a resolve to fight

for the country that permitted it to occur?18

The men of the 24th nonetheless went about

their duties. The unit spent the first two weeks of

the month improving its position, training, and

patrolling in force. The enemy was active in the

area but engaged mainly in laying mines on the

roads. On 7 August the 3d Battalion, less its heavy

weapons unit, Company M, came under the operational control of the Eighth Army and moved 100

miles to the rear to the area around Chech’on,

where it would spend the next several months

guarding strategically important tungsten mines

from possible guerrilla attack. Ten days later, after

only five weeks in command, Colonel Whitney

departed the regiment to become the chief of staff

of the 25th Division. An armor officer who had

served on the I Corps staff from the early days of

the war, Col. Thomas D. Gillis, took his place.19

By that time, according to Lieutenant Bergeron,

morale had fallen within the regiment. No longer on

the offensive, the unit’s men participated in patrols

and blocking operations but otherwise had considerable time on their hands. The Army’s rotation program was in full stride. Old soldiers were departing,

and those who would leave shortly were increasingly concerned with the possibility that they might be

killed or dismembered. As for the officers and the

sergeants, Bergeron said, some were outstanding but

258 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

15 U.S. Army, Office of Public Affairs, Biography of Maj

Gen Richard W. Whitney, USA, Jun 70, and U.S. Army, Office

of Public Affairs, Biography of Maj Gen Ira Platt Swift, USA,

Nov 53, both in CMH files. 16 25th Inf Div Command Rpt for Jul 51, box 3794, RG

407, WNRC; 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Jul 51, box 3845,

RG 407, WNRC. See also 159th Field Artillery (FA) Bn

Command Rpt for Jul 51, 15 Aug 51, box 5185, RG 407,

WNRC. Most of the 24th Infantry was in reserve from 24–30

July 1951. 17 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt 10, 1–31 Aug 51, 15 Sep

51, box 3846, RG 407, WNRC.

18 Interv, Bernard L. Muehlbauer with Gaston P. Bergeron,

1 Mar 89. 19 Thomas D. Gillis Diary for 1951, attachment to Ltr,

Thomas D. Gillis to Clay Blair, 13 Nov 84, Clay Blair file, U.S.

Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

When the 24th Infantry disbanded in October, the 3d

Battalion was redesignated the Eighth Army Special Provisional

Battalion. The unit remained all black and was inactivated 27

December 1951. See DA GO 80, 22 Nov 54, CMH Unit Data

files. See also Interv, MacGarrigle with Creel, 20 Dec 94. A forward observer with the regiment located the position of the

unit. See Interv, Muehlbauer with Bergeron, 1 Mar 89.
many others seemed inept. Company B, as a result,

did little more than required.20

The status of the 24th Infantry only added to

the unit’s problems. Toward the end of the month,

the men learned from press and radio announceLAST DAYS 259

20 Interv, Muehlbauer with Bergeron, 1 Mar 89. Creel also

mentioned the personnel turbulence in the regiment at this

time, noting that many old timers were departing and new

men arriving, a fact that forced regimental officers to begin a

program of training and review for everyone. See Interv,







TURK

III

24(-)

24(-)

III

27

1

II

2

F

G

E

C

A B

Hant'an River

Hill 1062

 'Papa San'

Hill 351

Hadong-ni

Hill 400

Mando

Ugu-dong

Chongyon-ni

Kumhwa

0 2

Miles

KUMHWA AREA

24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

31 August 1951

Company Positions

ELEVATION IN METERS

0 200 400 and Above

Map 22

MacGarrigle with Creel, 20 Dec 94. The executive officer of

the 2d Battalion, Maj. Curtis H. Alloway, also remarked on the

problem. See 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Exec Summary, 1–31 Aug

51, box 3847, RG 407, WNRC.
ments that the Army planned to inactivate their

unit. No date was given, but the individual soldier

began to feel that his job was over and that he was,

as the executive officer of the 2d Battalion, Maj.

Curtis H. Alloway, remarked in a report, “just wasting time waiting for the event.” Alloway was convinced that morale would have been much higher

if the pending dissolution of the regiment had not

become public.21

Under the circumstances, it was probably

inevitable that discipline problems would increase

in the regiment. According to Alloway, while on

patrol or in combat the men performed in a satisfactory manner. When located in static positions,

however, they tended to wander to the rear.

Straggler lines were in place, so most failed to get

far, but some of the men were gone for weeks at a

time. When finally apprehended, those individuals

were usually arrested. During the first part of the

year, while heavy combat continued, the 24th thus

experienced only a small number of court-martial

cases, no more than in any of the other regiments

in the 25th Division. As the summer lengthened,

however, and the period of static warfare began, the

situation changed. By September the 24th had 14

general court-martial cases, versus 2 for the 27th

Infantry regiment and 1 for the 35th. And in

October 1951 the regiment had 11 cases to only 1

for the 27th and none at all for the 35th.22

Overall, in the context of the thousands of men

present in the three regiments, the number of judicial proceedings was small, and few of the cases in

any of the regiments had to do with the sort of

straggling in combat that had afflicted the 24th

during the early months of the war. Indeed, the

25th Division’s staff judge advocate made it a point

to investigate the 24th’s problems to see whether its

difficulties were having any impact on unit effectiveness. He concluded, as he told General Swift,

that “the character of service of the offenders . . .

had been [in the main] ‘poor’ and ‘unsatisfactory’

prior to their being assigned to the regiment, and

thus their actions could not truly reflect the efficiency of the regiment as a combat unit.”23

Colonel Gillis had been warned of the regiment’s

problems prior to taking command. General Swift

had pulled him aside to inform him of the unit’s poor

condition and that he believed the 24th had “the

weakest line in all of the Eighth Army.” Arriving at

the regiment’s headquarters, Gillis found himself,

despite some preconceived notions, “neither favorably nor unfavorably impressed,” but he quickly

decided that much still needed to be done. The unit’s

former commanders, he noted, had failed to develop

a proper line of outposts and had located the troops

on the forward slopes of a heavily wooded hill

among trees and underbrush that obstructed fields

of fire. Setting out to improve the situation, he

relieved a battalion commander, a battalion executive officer, several company commanders, and a

number of platoon leaders for dereliction of duty

and other infractions. Rather than attempt to rebuild

the poorly sited positions the men occupied, and

possibly because many of the troops had too much

time on their hands and could use the activity, he

requested permission to move his lines forward and

began the work of tunneling the regiment into the

railroad embankment that ran through the unit’s sector. Building two-man emplacements with firing

ports facing the enemy and railroad ties piled on top

for protection, he reinforced everything with sandbags and strung barbed wire everywhere it was

needed. When he was done, he reported years later,

many of the men detested him because of the work

he had forced them to do, but General Swift was well

impressed.24

As work proceeded on the regiment’s new position, Gillis continued a program of ambushes and

260 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

21 2d Bn, 24th Inf Rgt, Exec Summary, 1–31 Aug 51. 22 The September statistics are from 25th Inf Div Judge

Advocate General Rpt for Sep 51, box 3804, bk. 2, RG 407,

WNRC. The October statistics are from 25th Inf Div Judge

Advocate General Rpt for Oct 51, box 3807, bk. 2, RG 407,

WNRC. Alloway’s remarks are in Interv, MacGarrigle with

Curtis H. Alloway, 20 Oct 94.

23 Memo, Lt Col Edgar R. Minnich, Div Staff Judge

Advocate, for Commanding General (CG), 25th Inf Div, 11 Oct

51, sub: Staff Section Report for September 1951, box 3804,

RG 407, WNRC. 24 Quotes from Ltr, Thomas D. Gillis to David K. Carlisle,

12 Sep 86, copy in CMH files. See also 24th Inf Rgt Command

Rpt for Aug 51, p. 5, box 3846, RG 407, WNRC; Gillis Diary,

28 Sep 51.
tank-infantry patrols begun earlier in the month.

The success of the ambushes, as Gillis observed in

his diary, was “not apparent.” As for the patrols, the

Chinese and North Koreans responded vigorously

but mainly in a defensive manner. A large number

of tanks was lost to mines, but there were no major

enemy attacks. On 8 September Company B

launched a heavy assault on Hill 351, slightly more

than a mile north of the regiment’s main line on the

embankment. The force in possession of the hill

resisted vigorously, withdrew to regroup, and then

counterattacked, but the Americans prevailed. In

the process, however, Company B suffered two

killed and twenty-five wounded.25

The most significant combat of the month

occurred on 15 September, when Company F of the

2d Battalion mounted an attack on Hill 400, two

miles northeast of Hill 351, in an attempt to prevent

the enemy from using the height to fire on the 24th’s

positions, some two miles to the south in the valley

below. The attackers came within twenty feet of the

top of the hill, but at 0845 that morning, in the face

of a furious enemy assault with grenades and mortars, they pulled back with nine casualties. The unit

went back up the hill at 1215, but again withdrew in

the face of heavy enemy fire. Recognizing that the

company had been slow in mounting its attacks and

had committed squads and platoons piecemeal,

Gillis and the 2d Battalion’s commander, Maj. Joseph

Baranowski, arrived at the scene to take personal

charge of the attack. Following a ferocious mortar

barrage, the men of the company charged the hill

once more, this time with fixed bayonets. Within

moments, the men of one squad reached the top and

began what Gillis described as “the damndest handto-hand grenade fight I’ve ever seen.” By 1435 the

hill was secure. In all, the 24th suffered forty-four

wounded.26

Patrolling continued throughout the remainder of the month and other hills were taken, but

the incident on 15 September marked the last significant attack conducted by the 24th Infantry. On

22 September the regiment received formal notice

that on 1 October the 14th Infantry regiment

would replace it on the line and that it would

cease to exist as a unit. In the days that followed,

commanders arranged for final disposition of

their equipment, the return home of those of their

men who qualified, and the assignment of the rest

to racially integrated units. At that time General

Swift agreed that since the men of the 24th had

been on duty for seventy-two days without relief,

those moving to new units would be able to

remain in rear areas for a few days to rest before

having to go back into combat.27

For a time, some thought had been given to

the possibility that the 24th might remain in

Korea as an integrated force. In that case, since

many of the unit’s men were eligible for rotation,

the regiment would merely have exchanged

groups of personnel with the 34th Infantry regiment, then training in Japan. In the end, however, the Far East Command rejected the plan. The

reason sometimes given was that integration

would have violated the 1866 act of Congress that

had designated the 24th as an all-black unit, but

that law had in fact been repealed during the early

months of 1950. Whatever the reason, when integration came the all-black 3d Battalion of the 9th

Infantry regiment remained in existence, dropping the asterisk from its name that designated it

as a segregated unit and exchanging personnel

with other regiments in the 2d Division. The 64th

Tank Battalion did the same, trading its people

with other tank units in the Eighth Army. Only

LAST DAYS 261

2524th Inf Rgt S–2 Rpt, 1–31 Aug 51, box 3846, RG 407,

WNRC; Gillis Diary, 21 Aug 51, 23 Aug 51. Company B’s

attack is described in 25th Inf Div Periodic Opns Rpts 16, 8

Sep 51, and 17, 9 Sep 51, both in box 3802, RG 407, WNRC.

See also 24th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Sep 51, p. 5, box

3848, RG 407, WNRC. 2624th Inf Rgt Command Rpt for Sep 51, p. 2; S–3

Journal, 24th Inf Rgt, 15 Sep 51, box 3848, RG 407, WNRC.

Quote from Gillis Diary, 15 Sep 51. See also Ltr, Thomas D.

Gillis to John A. Cash, 31 Oct 89, CMH files. The bayonet

attack was described in Stars and Stripes. See Sgt. James

Gilbert, “Heroic Eagle Men Rack Up Red Hill,” Stars and

Stripes, undated clipping attached to Ltr, Gillis to Cash.

Baranowski had given up command of the 1st Battalion in May

when a lieutenant colonel had arrived. He took over the 2d

Battalion on 3 September when the commander was relieved

by Gillis. 27Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, GO 717, Inactivation of Unit,

22 Sep 51, box 3848, RG 407, WNRC; Gillis Diary, 30 Sep 51.
the 24th Infantry, because of its peculiar legal status, ceased to exist.28

The loss prompted little concern in the United

States. The editors of the Pittsburgh Courier met

the dissolution of the unit with what they called a

“twinge of regret,” but said they preferred to concentrate on the “new deal” a completely integrated Army would bring to the African-American soldier. There were some objections from interested

members of Congress, according to Col. Steve G.

Davis, who had served in the Pentagon at the time

as a member of the Army’s Plans Division, but the

Army itself argued that inactivation would preserve the regiment’s well-founded reputation as an

all-black unit. Since the same reasoning had been

given to justify the inactivation of all-white units,

all concerned dropped the matter. On 1 October,

as a result, the 24th Infantry passed into history to

only the briefest notice in the United States. Its

men departed Kumhwa for their final destinations

just as they had arrived, the way infantrymen

often do, on foot.29

262 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA

28 MS, 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, History of the Korean

War, vol. 3, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, Jun 50–Jul 51 [Military

History Section, Far East Command, 1952], pp. 150–58, copy

in CMH files. The 1866 law was repealed in Public Law 581,

Army Organization Act of 1950, Section 401 (81st Cong.),

published in DA Bulletin 9, 6 Jul 50. See also MacGregor,

Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 443.

Members of the mortar platoon of Company M, 24th Infantry, prior to inactivation of the regiment, 1 October 1951

29 Pittsburgh Courier, 4 Aug 51, quoted by Dalfiume,

Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, p. 212; Intervs, Cash

with Steve G. Davis, 2 Sep 88; Muehlbauer with Bergeron, 1

Mar 89.
What happened to the 24th Infantry in Korea?

The regiment’s experiences were similar in

many respects to those of all-white units. It

had its heroes and its cowards, its successes and its

failures, its good times and its painful memories

just as any other military force in the war. Yet it was

stigmatized for its deficiencies while its accomplishments passed largely into oblivion. In the end

it became the only regiment in Korea recommended for dissolution. It was unreliable, Maj. Gen.

William B. Kean told his superiors, and a hindrance

to the well-being and good performance of the rest

of the 25th Division.

Were Kean’s charges accurate, or were they the

products of racial prejudice? If they were false,

were there nonetheless some grains of truth at the

base of the regiment’s poor reputation? If they were

true, what were their immediate causes, and were

there underlying considerations that might elude

the passing observer? In the final analysis, where

does the truth end and bias begin?

The 24th’s record in Korea reveals an undue

number of military failures, particularly during the

early months of the war. White leaders blamed the

problem on the supposed racial characteristics of

their African-American subordinates, but a lack of

unit cohesion brought on by racial prejudice and

the poor leadership it engendered at all levels was

mainly at fault. Some units within the regiment

performed well, and many black soldiers laid down

their lives willingly and heroically for their comrades in arms. Segregation and the racial prejudices

behind it—the entire system of beliefs and practices that assigned blacks to an inferior position

within society and the Army—nonetheless hindered the emergence of effective leadership within

the regiment and destroyed the bonds of mutual

trust and reliance that were necessary if the unit

was to hold together in combat. With military commanders at all levels prone to expect less from the

black soldier than the white and inclined to discount the mistakes of white commanders leading

black units, misfortune became virtually inevitable.

The problems the regiment experienced grew

out of a history extending back over a hundred

years to the abolition of slavery that had marred the

American experience from its beginning and the

attempts of the nation and its people to come to

terms with the dilemmas that resulted. For once

the African-American had been freed of his

bondage and had gained some rights of citizenship,

it made sense that he should serve in the nation’s

armed forces. Yet vast hostility to blacks remained

in the very fabric of the society, so much so that the

integration of whites and blacks within the armed

forces seemed out of the question. As a result,

although black units were often brigaded with

white regiments or incorporated into white divisions, black soldiers were never included in allwhite units. They served their time in the Army

CHAPTER 11

Conclusion
apart, segregated into battalions, regiments, and

divisions reserved exclusively for them.

Despite the affliction of racial prejudice,

African-American soldiers fought dependably and

creditably in the Civil War, on the Western frontier,

in the Spanish-American War, and during the

Philippine Insurrection. Even so, they never

seemed able to overcome the misgivings of the predominately white nation that employed them.

Instead, the white world pulled back into itself and

enacted “separate but equal” laws that had the

effect of rendering African-Americans and their

accomplishments invisible. When segregated soldiers rebelled against that system in Houston and

elsewhere, attacking civilian communities that had

oppressed them, the mistrust they engendered

among whites erased whatever credit blacks had

received in earlier wars and influenced how white

commanders viewed them in World Wars I and II.

In both conflicts the African-American soldier

seemed destined for failure from the beginning.

Accepting assertions that blacks were lazy, shuffling, and of low intellect, the Army’s commanders

would have been happy to have them out of the

service completely and used them mainly to perform menial tasks such as unloading ships and digging ditches. Even when finally compelled by political pressure from the black community and white

liberals to form all-black regiments and divisions

and to allow them to enter combat, the Army

employed them with reluctance. Then, when

African-Americans performed well, as when they

fought under French command in World War I,

white America made little of their successes, but

when they failed the news was well circulated.

Overall, few in positions of authority were willing

to admit that their own attitudes might be at fault

or that a lack of mutual confidence and respect

between the black soldier and his white commanders might have destroyed the sense of oneness,

mutual dependency, and self-worth in black units

that is at the core of every successful military force.

At the end of World War II, the Army’s commanders began to seek ways to use the black soldier

more effectively. Falling back on the successful

example which black platoons integrated into allwhite units had set in the European theater, they

began to advocate the dissolution of all-black regiments and divisions and the inclusion of their platoons and battalions into white units. The nub of the

problem remained, however. Although panels such

as the Gillem Board endorsed equality in the work

place, they put off dealing with segregation and left

important issues unresolved, such as whether blacks

could ever command whites. Indeed, even when

President Truman issued Executive Order 9981,

which stipulated equality of treatment and opportunity for all within the armed services without regard

to race, the Army temporized, well aware of the

racism prevalent in the community it served and

unwilling to do anything that might harm its ability

to gather funds and recruits.

The 24th Infantry in Japan was a model not

only of the tensions that dogged all-black units in

that day but also of the subtle interplay those problems could have in combination with the many

challenges the Army faced in the postwar period.

On the surface, conditions within the unit seemed

favorable. The regiment was well situated at Camp

Gifu, and life seemed good for its troops. Down

below, however, there was much that was wrong.

To begin with, the Army itself was undergoing

extreme turbulence. Personnel strengths declined

rapidly following World War II and then swung

drastically up and down in both white and black

units as budgets and manpower policies shifted

with the political winds. Training declined, equipment shortages grew, and officers who might have

sought to make the military a career found themselves without employment. Training improved in

1949, but if Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker’s Eighth

Army is any criterion, it remained incomplete.

Complicating matters, soldier and officer alike were

unprepared mentally for war. Many had joined the

Army to get an education, to improve their economic prospects, or because there was nothing better for them in the civilian world. War was the last

thing on their minds.

The Eighth Army again provides a case in point.

Many of the unit’s soldiers were civilians at heart,

intent upon enjoying the pleasures of life in occupied Japan, where a G.I.’s salary could pay for an

264 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
abundance of readily available pleasures. Black-market activities thrived among the troops, alcoholism

flourished, and venereal disease was rampant. But

the number-one transgression in the Eighth Army in

the spring of 1950 was drug abuse, which spread

with apparent abandon in some units, particularly

those such as the 24th Infantry regiment which

operated in or near large port cities.

The 24th Infantry experienced the same difficulties as the rest of the Eighth Army, but if the

unit’s duties at Kobe increased the incidence of

venereal disease and drug-related problems within

its ranks, the regiment appears to have managed

the situation relatively well once deployments to

the port ceased in September 1949. Maintaining

generally high esprit de corps, the unit gained a

deserved reputation for its prowess at sports and its

fine marching. Its training was on a par with that of

most other regiments in the Eighth Army, and at

the beginning of the Korean War it was one of only

a few that had undergone some form of regimental

maneuvers. While the Army General Classification

Test scores for the 24th Infantry’s men were significantly lower than for the whites in its sister regiments, those figures were inadequate as measures

of innate intelligence. Indeed, many white officers

assigned to the regiment would later insist that the

enlisted men and noncommissioned officers of the

unit, whatever their schooling, often knew their

jobs and did them well.

All that said, the 24th nevertheless suffered

from a virulent racial prejudice that ate incessantly

at the bonds uniting its men. Its effects were often

hidden at Camp Gifu, which had become an artificial island for blacks—“our own little world,” as

some of the men described it—but even there, discontent festered just beneath the surface calm.

Unwritten but firmly held assignment policies, for

example, ensured that black officers, whatever their

competence, would rarely if ever command whites.

Except for Lt. Col. Forest Lofton, as a result, the

senior commanders of the regiment were all white.

As for the field-grade officers, only the chaplains

and a few majors in staff assignments were black.

The mistrust that smoldered on both sides at

Camp Gifu was largely hidden behind a screen of

military conventions and good manners, but it was

still there. Aware that most promotions and careerenhancing assignments went to white officers,

some of whom were clearly inferior in education

and military competence to their black colleagues,

many black officers were frustrated and resentful.

Since few if any of them would ever rise to a rank

above captain, they could only conclude that the

Army considered them second class. They retaliated by developing a view that the 24th was a “penal”

regiment for white officers who had “screwed up.”

The whites, for their part, although a number got

along well with their black counterparts, mainly

kept to themselves.

The tensions that existed among the regiment’s

officers had parallels in enlisted ranks. Although

black soldiers worked well with their white superiors at times and relations between the races were

open, honest, and mutually fulfilling, those cases

involved situations in which white officers recognized the worth of their subordinates and afforded

them the impartiality and dignity they deserved.

Many whites nevertheless shared the racially prejudiced attitudes and beliefs common to white civilian society, and the labored paternalism and condescension they practiced were readily apparent to

any soldier with a mind to see them.

Although it would be a mistake to conclude

that every black soldier disliked his white superior,

the enmity that resulted ran deep enough in some

cases to overlap onto the black officers of the regiment. Although Capt. Richard W. Williams, Jr., was

well admired because he stood up to the white

power structure, those officers who gave evidence,

whether true or not, of attempting to play along

with the whites were sometimes vilified for abandoning their race. “He had a Creole wife and

seemed to think he was superior,” one soldier thus

said of 1st Lt. Charles Ellis. “We think he had an

identity crisis.”

As the regiment’s stay lengthened in Japan, an

unevenness came into being that subtly affected military readiness. In companies commanded by white

officers who treated their men with respect but

refused to accept low standards of discipline and

performance, racial prejudice tended to be insignifiCONCLUSION 265
cant. A bond of sorts developed between those who

were leaders and those who were led. In other companies, often commanded by officers who failed to

enforce high standards because they wished to avoid

charges of racial prejudice or because they were simply poor leaders, mutual respect and reliance were

weak. On the surface, all seemed to run well.

Underneath, however, hostility and frustration lingered, to break forth only when those units faced

combat and their soldiers realized their lives

depended on officers they did not trust.

The problem might have had little effect on

readiness if commanders had received the time to

work out their relationships with their men, but the

competition among some of the unit’s officers for

Regular Army commissions, the Competitive Tour

program, produced a constant churning within the

regiment as officers arrived at units, spent three

months in a position, and then departed for new

assignments. In addition, the officer complements

of entire companies might change to maintain segregation or to ensure that a black would never command whites. Under the circumstances, officers

often had little time to think through what they

were doing. A confluence of good men might produce a cohesive, effective, high-performing company or platoon, but everything might dissolve

overnight with a change of leaders.

Given the situation, the personality of the regimental commander was vital, and for much of

the time in Japan the unit was endowed with an

officer who seemed ideally suited for the job.

Strong, aggressive, and experienced, Col. Michael

E. Halloran held the respect and support of most

of his subordinates, whether commissioned or

enlisted. Although a few claimed that his policies

undermined the chain of command and contributed to an atmosphere of condescension and

low standards, the performance of the regiment

while he was in charge was all that anyone could

have expected at that time and in that place. The

effectiveness of Halloran’s successor is more in

question. Col. Horton V. White was intelligent

and well intentioned, but his low-key, hands-off

style of command did little to fill the void when

Halloran departed.

It would be interesting to know what the

results would have been if the 24th had gone to

war under Halloran rather than White, but the efficiency of a unit in combat is rarely determined by

the presence of a single individual, however competent, experienced, or inspiring. What is clear is

that if the 24th went into battle much as the other

regiments in the Eighth Army did, incompletely

trained, badly equipped, and short on experience,

it carried baggage none of the others possessed—all

the problems of trust and self-confidence that racial

prejudice had imposed.

The mistrust endemic to the regiment began to

appear just as soon as word arrived that it was to

depart for Korea. Almost immediately rumors

began to circulate among both whites and blacks

that the unit would never go into combat because

of the supposed poor performance of all-black

units in earlier wars. Then, as the date of departure

approached, white officers began to hear reports

that a black chaplain had undermined the chain of

command by suggesting during a sermon that it

was inappropriate for men of color to fight one

another on behalf of whites. Black officers received

unsubstantiated word that the black commander of

the 1st Battalion, Colonel Lofton, had been reassigned to prevent him from commanding whites in

combat. Even as the unit moved from Pusan to

Sangju, a purely speculative story made the rounds

to the effect that the regimental executive officer

had pretended to have a heart attack rather than go

into combat with an all-black unit. None of those

stories were ever substantiated and the one about

Lofton may have been wrong, but they were still

indicative of the deep divisions that existed within

the regiment.

Although symptomatic of poor discipline in

portions of the 24th and a source of doubts on the

part of some whites about the advisability of committing the regiment to war, the disturbances at

Camp Gifu and at Moji on the first leg of the trip to

Korea involved only a small minority of the unit’s

men and said little about its readiness. In fact, on

paper the 24th was probably more prepared for

combat than most of the other regiments that

accompanied it. It had three full battalions instead

266 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
of two, and if its equipment was old and worn and

its men nervous and unseasoned, it had at least

exercised at the regimental level in field maneuvers.

Unlike General Dean’s 24th Division, the unit also

had the opportunity to introduce itself gradually to

combat rather than having to face enemy fire from

almost the moment it arrived. Indeed, the 3d

Battalion was fortunate enough to achieve a success

at Yech’on, one of the first accomplishments of the

war for United Nations forces.

While hardly significant to the overall course

of the war, Yech’on could have had important

benefits for both the 3d Battalion and the rest of

the 24th. Once the soldier has tasted victory, so

the reasoning goes, his self-confidence rises and

combat becomes easier for him to face. In the case

of the 24th, however, there was no time for

Yech’on to take root. Almost immediately the unit

began to encounter misfortunes that shattered the

faith of its men in their officers and the trust of its

officers in their men. 

There was no single reason for what happened.

An aggressive enemy, inadequate equipment, inexperience at all levels, leadership failures high and

low, casualties among key personnel, and a lack of

bonding and cohesion in some units all played

their part. There was no lack of courage among the

regiment’s officers and men. A number of welltrained squads, platoons, and companies performed ably. Nevertheless, all military units undergo a weeding-out process when they first enter

combat. Inept officers and NCOs die or move aside

to make room for the more competent.

Much the same thing happened in the other

American regiments fighting in Korea at that time.

The same reasons for failure were present and the

same process of winnowing occurred. But within

the 24th, when disturbing trends emerged, no one

took action. Although straggling increased to

sometimes epidemic proportions, the leadership

of the regiment did little more to stop it than to

return offenders to their units. Every occurrence

made the next one easier. Some squads and platoons became so accustomed to withdrawals that

their men began to abandon their positions after

only the sound of firing in the distance or minor

enemy sniper or mortar fire. As the trend continued, the trust of one soldier on the line for the

man next to him deteriorated and each became

more inclined than ever to flee.

Other regiments experienced the same phenomenon, but what happened to the 24th was

complicated by mistrust and the expectations it fostered. In an attempt to lead by example, commissioned and noncommissioned officers stayed at

their posts with those of their men who were willing to hold and suffered inordinately high casualties as a result. As they did, suspicions took root

among them and rumors began to rise about how

black soldiers would sometimes abandon wounded

white officers. Feeding the process, failures in the

24th tended to be attributed less to their military

causes than to the race of the unit’s soldiers. Blacks

were afraid of the dark, so the stories went. They

would not dig foxholes, and they lacked the innate

intelligence to keep their equipment in good repair.

The problems confronting the regiment deepened when the fighting shifted south from Sangju

to the area west of Masan. Casualties among officers reached critical levels, with some companies

going through five commanders in less than a

month. The replacements were often inexperienced and untrained in infantry skills. The situation was little better among the sergeants. As for

the enlisted men, replacements arrived who were

unable even to load and fire their rifles without

first receiving instruction. Although a number of

soldiers continued to perform capably, the selfconfidence of the unit as a whole and the trust of

its members in one another continued to decline,

and as they did more failures occurred.

Despite the pattern, when the 24th pulled into

the Pusan Perimeter, it managed to hold the line. In

the fight for Battle Mountain, Company C was

reduced to a shell and other portions of the regiment suffered greatly. Focused on the mountains

south of Haman rather than on the low hills just

west of the town, the regiment was nevertheless

unprepared on 1 September when the enemy

attacked through the center of its position and the

2d Battalion collapsed. Poorly trained South

Korean troops manning portions of the line were

CONCLUSION 267
partially to blame. So was a weak regimental

reserve and poorly fortified positions. A key ingredient in the collapse, however, was the large number of stragglers who left their positions without

permission during the early portions of the attack.

Remnants of Companies E and G held on. Much of

Company F escaped to the north, and the battalion

command post conducted a brief but spirited

defense, but the 2d Battalion ceased to exist as a

combat organization. Only the fortuitous presence

of the 27th Infantry regiment saved the day.

The white leadership of the regiment and the

division blamed the soldiers of the 24th for what

had happened, but they themselves were at least as

much at fault. The new regimental commander,

Col. Arthur J. Champeny, and his staff had not only

approved the weak tactical dispositions of the 2d

Battalion, Champeny himself had done much to

destroy whatever trust was left in the regiment with

ill-advised, public remarks about the conduct of

blacks in World War II.

At that point General Kean recommended that

the Eighth Army dissolve the regiment. The evidence submitted—a whole series of interviews

with black and white officers—gave overwhelming testimony to the presence of heavy straggling

within the unit but said little about the tactical

incompetence and the accumulating failures of

leadership at the root of what had happened.

Perhaps, given the climate of the time, there was

little possibility for any other conclusion. Whites

expected blacks to fail. When they did, few

looked beyond race to find a cause.

Kean’s recommendation led to further investigations and to a determination by the Far East

Command that the 24th should be disbanded, but

the Eighth Army’s inability to organize a new regiment to take the 24th’s place on short notice put the

decision on hold for a time. In the interim

Champeny and his successor, Lt. Col. John T.

Corley, moved at last to punish chronic stragglers.

That long overdue effort, combined with reforms

which Corley instituted, put an effective end to the

problem. The courts-martial that followed did nothing to rehabilitate the 24th Infantry’s reputation.

Indeed, the sentence of death handed down against

1st Lt. Leon A. Gilbert only added to the aura of

shame surrounding the regiment.

The 24th itself soldiered on despite those difficulties. Over the preceding months, casualties had

taken a heavy toll on the unit’s problem soldiers, but

a core of brave, capable enlisted men had remained.

Those individuals had performed numerous acts of

heroism, sometimes standing their ground when all

had seemed lost and earning many medals for bravery under fire. To their number was added a whole

new shift of soldiers, untrained and inexperienced

but also lacking the feelings of mistrust, racial alienation, and drug dependency that had afflicted a

number of their predecessors. Those men learned

their jobs and drew together under the strain of

combat. A new group of white officer replacements

also arrived. Some were also inexperienced, but

many were capable, combat-seasoned veterans of

World War II. If they had their prejudices, they kept

them enough to themselves to gain the confidence

of their men.

The regiment took long strides toward recovery

during the attack north that followed the Inch’on

landing and the break out from Pusan. The men

had time to train, and in the process of fighting

their way back to Seoul they grew in confidence.

The order to attack north across the 38th Parallel

came as a shock to some because they were looking

forward to a return to Camp Gifu, but all concerned made the best of a difficult moment and

performed their mission.

The test for the regiment came shortly after

United Nations forces crossed the Ch’ongch’on River

and neared North Korea’s border with China.

Advancing through rugged terrain while flanking

units moved to either side along valley floors, the

body of the regiment played only a minor role in

meeting the Chinese counterattack. Portions of the

regiment, however, incurred heavy damage. Located

on a ridge overlooking a valley where part of the

enemy’s main assault occurred, Companies E and G

held off strong attacks for most of the day before

escaping overnight into the lines of the 9th Infantry

regiment. There they fought on with distinction. To

the west, most of the 1st Battalion was able to pull

back with only minor difficulty, but Company C,

268 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
fighting with Task Force Wilson, was less fortunate.

Because of communications failures and confused

command arrangements, the unit found itself abandoned and eventually surrendered. Occupying the

center, the 3d Battalion withdrew without major difficulty and in relatively good order, but breakdowns

in control at the battalion’s command post as well as

at the corps and division levels led to another

tragedy. Holding in an exposed position at Kunu-ri

while the rest of the regiment received orders to pull

back, the unit collapsed in an enemy attack and was

all but overwhelmed in the debacle that followed. In

that case, as with Company C, what happened was

the product not only of the confusion of war but also

of a failure of command. It received heavy play in the

press, however, as an example of black ineptitude

and the inability of all-black units to carry their load

in combat. After that, visitors to the regiment from

higher commands became frequent, always inspecting to see whether the old problems would reappear. 

The regiment once more recovered. When it

reentered combat in late February it demonstrated its ability both in the attack and on the defense,

but it was hardly immune to the misfortunes of

war. The unit’s performance at the Han River

crossing, for example, was all that anyone could

have hoped for. The assault across the Hant’an,

however, only added to the mistrust encircling the

regiment. In that operation, the 1st Battalion performed well, securing a crossing and then advancing through difficult terrain against a strongly

emplaced enemy. Setbacks in another area

nonetheless diminished that accomplishment.

The 3d Battalion also crossed the river, but only

after a last-minute change of plans that put it well

downstream from the 1st Battalion in difficult terrain heavily defended by a well-entrenched enemy

force. The unit did as it was ordered, made the

crossing, and pressed forward up a steep mountainside, but then it collapsed under enemy fire

and fell back in disorder. Either inadvertently or

on purpose, officers passed information to the

rear depicting a far more favorable situation than

the one that prevailed. When the division commander found out, he lost all confidence in the

regiment forever.

From that day on, the division followed the

unit’s operations even more closely. Although the

regiment delivered a generally solid performance in

the attack north of the Hant’an and then conducted a withdrawal to Line Golden after the Chinese

Spring Offensive, the suspicion never departed.

The unit participated in the Eighth Army’s drive

back to the north in May and June 1951 and again

performed well.

When the last commander of the regiment,

Col. Thomas D. Gillis, took charge in August 1951,

Maj. Gen. Ira P. Swift warned him that the 24th

held the weakest line in all of the Eighth Army.

Gillis was not convinced. Surveying the regiment,

he concluded that leadership was the problem and

proceeded to relieve a number of officers. His

efforts were rewarded on 15 September, when

Company F conducted a heroic bayonet and

grenade assault, but the accomplishment, like so

much that had happened to the 24th, went largely

unnoticed. Although it received minor mention in

a small article in Stars and Stripes, it went unrecognized by higher commanders in the crush that

accompanied the dissolution of the regiment.

What, in the end, can be said about the 24th?

All told, it seems clear that if the unit failed at

times, the race of its people was not the reason.

Instead, in addition to the lapses of command and

the deficiencies in training and supply that burdened any military unit at the time, whether black

or white, the regiment labored under a special burden, unique to itself, that seemed to doom it to

misfortune. Afflicted by a stereotype that AfricanAmericans were innately inferior, the finest black

officers were unable to rise to positions of responsibility within the organization. Meanwhile, if some

highly talented whites were present, they were too

few to have the sort of effect that might have made

a difference. Most whites of high potential had little incentive to seek duty with the regiment and

actively avoided it when they could.

With leadership deficient, particularly at the

beginning of the war, failures large and small proliferated. As they did, the self-confidence and motivation of the common soldier declined, and he

began to lose any sense that he was part of someCONCLUSION 269
thing worthwhile, larger than himself. In the end

every man stood alone, unsure not only of his

own abilities but also of those of the soldier next

to him. Many fought well but others fled. In that

light, the regiment’s achievements—during the

first weeks of the war, in the breakout from the

Pusan Perimeter, at the Han and Hant’an River

crossings, and elsewhere—bear a special mark.

They underscore the courage, resilience, and

determination of those among the unit’s members

who chose to do their duty, to fight in the face of

adversity, and to prevail.

270 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
* Regiments from Japan did not have a heavy tank company.

Units attached to form a regimental combat team.

Headquarters 

and

Headquarters

 Co

Service Heavy Mortar Medical

Heavy Tank* Engineer Artillery

1st 2d 3d

A, B, C—Rifle Cos

D—Weapons Co

E, F, G—Rifle Cos

H—Weapons Co

I, K, L—Rifle Cos

M—Weapons Co

Appendix A—Infantry Regiment Organization
2d Ranger Infantry Company

2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery

24th Infantry regiment

25th Chemical Decontamination Company

28th Transportation Truck Company

42d Transportation Truck Company

46th Transportation Truck Company

47th Transportation Heavy Truck Company

48th Transportation Heavy Truck Company

49th Transportation Truck Company

51st Military Police Criminal Investigation 

Detachment

54th Transportation Heavy Truck Company

55th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company

55th Ordnance Ammunition Company

56th Army Band

57th Ordnance Recovery Company

58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

58th Quartermaster Salvage Company

60th Transportation Truck Company

64th Tank Battalion

65th Ordnance Ammunition Company

69th Ordnance Ammunition Company

69th Transportation Truck Battalion

70th Transportation Truck Battalion

71st Chemical Smoke Generator Company

73d Engineer Combat Battalion

73d Transportation Truck Company

74th Engineer Combat Battalion

74th Transportation Truck Company

76th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 

Battalion

76th Engineer Dump Truck Company

77th Engineer Combat Company

78th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 

Battalion

78th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion

91st Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance 

Company

93d Engineer Construction Battalion

95th Transportation Car Company

96th Field Artillery Battalion

112th Army Postal Unit

130th Quartermaster Bakery Company

159th Field Artillery Battalion

167th Transportation Truck Battalion

212th Military Police Company

231st Transportation Truck Battalion

250th Quartermaster Laundry Detachment

375th Chemical Smoke Generator Company

376th Engineer Construction Battalion

396th Transportation Truck Company

402d Engineer Panel Bridge Company

403d Signal Construction Company

503d Field Artillery Battalion

505th Quartermaster Reclamation and 

Maintenance Company

506th Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company

512th Engineer Dump Truck Company

512th Military Police Company

513th Transportation Truck Company

514th Transportation Truck Company

515th Transportation Truck Company

529th Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company

539th Transportation Truck Company

540th Transportation Truck Company

541st Transportation Truck Company

546th Engineer Fire Fighting Company

548th Engineer Service Battalion

549th Quartermaster Laundry Company

551st Transportation Truck Company

553d Transportation Heavy Truck Company

556th Transportation Heavy Truck Company

558th Medical Collecting Separate Company

558th Transportation Amphibious Truck 

Company

559th Medical Ambulance Company

560th Medical Ambulance Company

Appendix B—Black Units Serving in the Korean War

September 1950–September 1951
563d Military Police Service Company

567th Medical Ambulance Company

568th Medical Ambulance Company

570th Engineer Water Supply Company

571st Engineer Dump Truck Company

573d Engineer Pontoon Bridge Company

584th Transportation Truck Company

595th Engineer Dump Truck Company

619th Ordnance Ammunition Company

630th Ordnance Ammunition Company

636th Ordnance Ammunition Company

665th Transportation Truck Company

696th Ordnance Ammunition Company

715th Transportation Truck Company

726th Transportation Truck Company

811th Engineer Aviation Battalion

821st Quartermaster Bath Company

822d Engineer Aviation Battalion

839th Engineer Aviation Battalion

849th Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company

863d Transportation Port Company

866th Transportation Port Company

933d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 

Battalion, Battery A

945th Quartermaster Service Company

999th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

Source: Army Directory and Station List, published

bimonthly during the Korean War. In this directory, black units were designated by an asterisk (“*”)

before the unit name through September 1951.

After that date black units are not separately designated, so it is impossible to state which black units

served in Korea from November 1951 through the

end of the conflict.

APPENDIX B 273

Primary Sources

For the most part, except in the early chapters, we based this book on records, reports, and

documents generated in the course of the operations it describes. With a few exceptions, most are

housed in the National Archives Center in College

Park, Maryland. The collection is uneven because

some items have been lost, but much that is pertinent to the story of 25th Infantry Division and

the 24th Infantry regiment still remains on file.

The records of U.S. Army commands, including correspondence and histories pertaining to the

units themselves, are contained in Record Group

(RG) 338 at College Park. This record group also

contains documents relating to the I Corps command in Japan. The box numbers prefaced with a

“P” are particularly important. Although not completely cataloged, they contain much of value for

the history of the Eighth Army in Japan and Korea,

especially the Kobe base files. The Awards files in

RG 338 are incomplete, but the general orders for

awards are located at the Awards Branch of the U.S.

Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria,

Virginia. Some of the materials in RG 338 are

duplicated in files of the adjutant general’s office,

RG 407, which contains war diaries and other official reports submitted by units. There, most of the

reports, journals, and registers of the 25th Division

and the various regiments included in this study

are found. The provost marshal records are in RG

331. The Okinawa records are in RG 200, and the

Far East Command Observer Team reports are in

RG 337. The inspector general interviews and

reports are housed in RG 159. Box numbers have

been cited in the footnotes, but they may be different now because the National Archives sometimes

rearranges its material.

Some annual reports from individual commands are on file in the collections of the U.S.

Army Center of Military History (CMH) in

Washington, D.C., especially those for 1946, 1947,

1948, and 1949. Copies of the Eighth Army’s command histories for those years are also there.

Documents and interviews compiled by journalist

Clay Blair for his book The Forgotten War were of

great use. All are now housed in the collections of

the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania. The Army’s view of the

Houston affair is in Headquarters, Southern

Department, Office of the Department Inspector,

Report on the Houston Riot, 13 September 1917,

file 370.61 (Riots), 11 October 1917, RG 393,

National Archives and Records Administration

(NARA) Washington, D.C. Backup papers and documents pertaining to Billy Mossman’s Ebb and Flow

and Roy Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to

the Yalu are on file at NARA. Records and notes that

deal with Appleman’s commercial works are

housed at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Bibliographical Note
The maps used in this study are all available in the

Cartography Division at the National Archives

Center in College Park, Maryland.

Oral History Interviews and Manuscript Sources

We also based this book heavily on oral history interviews conducted over a space of several

years by John A. Cash, Bernard L. Muehlbauer,

Timothy Rainey, Mary L. Haynes, William T.

Bowers, Richard O. Perry, and George L.

MacGarrigle. The transcripts of those sessions are

in CMH files, but they will ultimately go either to

the National Archives or to the U.S. Army Military

History Institute.

A number of sources that are either in manuscript or limited-distribution form were also of

value. Francis E. Lewis’ “Negro Army Regulars in the

Spanish-American War: Smoked Yankees at Santiago

De Cuba” (M.A. diss., University of Texas at Austin,

1969) was useful for the Spanish-American War

period. The opinions of white officers on the performance of African-American units during World War

I are set down in MS, Historical Section, Army War

College, The Colored Soldier in the U.S. Army [May

1942], CMH files. For a brief history of the 92d

Division in World War I, see MS, Jehu C. Hunter and

Major Clark, The Buffalo Division in World War II

[copyright Jehu C. Hunter, 1985], CMH files.

Two particular works were of special importance. Brig. Gen. George B. Barth’s Tropic Lightning

and Taro Leaf in Korea, an undated, limited-issue

publication in CMH’s collection, was composed as

a history of the 25th Division’s artillery force.

Candid and forthright, if overly observant of the

artillery’s point of view, the work tracks the 24th

through most of its first year in combat. It is an

important source for aspects of the regiment’s story

that have gone unnoticed until now. Also of value

was Col. Thomas D. Gillis’ handwritten diary for

the few weeks he commanded the 24th. An invaluable picture of the regiment during its last days, the

work is on file with the transcript of Gillis’ interview at CMH. Other diaries and several collections

of letters home to wives were available to the

authors, but only as background. Their owners

declined to have them cited or used in any form.

Although they were of no value as sources for this

study, their descriptions of some units of the 24th

at Gifu and during training exercises at Fuji were

telling. We hope those collections will become

available to researchers at some future date.

Secondary Sources

A number of printed works detail the role of

blacks in the U.S. armed forces during the early

years of American history. Among the most comprehensive are Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the

Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military

(New York: Free Press, 1986), and Morris

MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, Blacks in the

United States Armed Forces, Basic Documents

(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1977). 

John Hope Franklin’s From Slavery to Freedom:

A History of Negro Americans (New York: Vintage

Books, 1969) provides a general history of the

African-American in American life. More specific

works dealing with the early years include

Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American

Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press, 1961); Lorenzo Johnston Green,

“The Negro in the War of 1812 and the Civil War,”

Negro History Bulletin (March 1951); and Roland

MacConnell, Negro Troops in Antebellum Louisiana: A

History of the Battalion of Free Men of Color (Baton

Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1968).

African-Americans came into their own as soldiers during the American Civil War. Good general

histories are Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm:

Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865 (New

York: Longmans, Green, 1956), and Benjamin

Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (New York: Da

Capo Press, 1989). Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in

Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and

White Officers (New York: Free Press, 1990), is a

more recent study that deals with officer-enlisted

relations during the period.

The black soldier during the Indian Wars has

been the subject of many studies. Among the

more important are the following: William H.

276 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Leckie, The Buffalo Soldiers (Norman: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1967); Monroe Lee Billington,

New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, 1866–1900 (Niwot:

University of Colorado Press, 1991); Arlen

Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West, 1869–1891

(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971); and

Preston Amos, Above and Beyond in the West: Negro

Medal of Honor Winners, 1870–1890 (Washington,

D.C.: Potomac Corral of the Westerners, 1974).

Frank Schubert has two recent studies of the subject: Buffalo Soldiers, Braves and the Brass, The Story

of Fort Robinson, Nebraska (Shippensburg, Pa.:

White Mane Publishing Co., 1993) and On the

Trail of the Buffalo Soldier: Biographies of AfricanAmericans in the U.S. Army, 1866–1917

(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1995).

Paul H. Carlson’s Pecos Bill, A Military Biography of

William R. Shafter (College Station: Texas A&M

University Press, 1989) contains considerable

information on the 24th Infantry and its campaigns in Texas during the 1870s.

For background on the late nineteenth century

and the repression of African-Americans during the

period, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career

of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press,

1966). Among the most prominent articles on

blacks in the armed forces during the period are

Frank N. Schubert, “Black Soldiers on the White

Frontier: Some Factors Influencing Race Relations,”

Phylon 32 (Winter 1971); Schubert, “The Fort

Robinson Y.M.C.A., 1902–1907,” Nebraska History

55 (Summer 1974); Schubert, “The Suggs Affray:

The Black Cavalry in the Johnson County War,”

Western Historical Quarterly 4 (January 1973);

Schubert, “The Violent World of Emanuel Stance,

Fort Robinson, 1887,” Nebraska History 55

(Summer 1974); John H. Nankivell, ed., The

History of the Twenty-Fifty Regiment, United States

Infantry, 1869–1926 (Fort Collins, Colo.: Old Army

Press, 1972); and Marvin Fletcher, The Black Soldier

and Officer in the United States Army, 1891–1917

(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).

Graham A. Cosmas’ An Army for Empire: The

United States Army in the Spanish-American War, 2d

ed. (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Publishing

Co., 1994) provides a general history of the Army’s

role in the Spanish-American War with special

insights on the Battle of San Juan Hill and its environs. Cosmas also deals with the role of black regulars at San Juan in “San Juan Hill and El Caney,

1–2 July 1898,” in Charles E. Heller and William A.

Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776–1965

(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), pp.

109–48. Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., “Negro Troops in

Florida, 1898,” Florida Historical Quarterly 49 (July

1970), is a good account of black-white relations in

Florida just prior to the American force’s departure

for Cuba. Gatewood also has an excellent, fulllength study on African-Americans in the age of

empire. See Willard B. Gatewood, Black Americans

and the White Man’s Burden, 1898–1903 (Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1975). Initial reports of

the 24th’s role in combat during the war itself are

contained in U.S. War Department, Annual Report

of the War Department for 1898 (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1898).

Conditions during the effort to quell the

Philippine Insurrection are described in Michael C.

Robinson and Frank N. Schubert, “David Fagen:

An Afro-American Rebel in the Philippines,

1899–1901,” Pacific Historical Review 44 (February

1975), and Willard B. Gatewood, “Black Americans

and the Quest for Empire,” Journal of Southern

History, vol. 37. For firsthand accounts of the conflict, see Sanford M. Thomas, War in the Philippines

(Privately published, 1903), MacArthur Memorial,

Norfolk, Va., and Willard B. Gatewood, Smoked

Yankees and the Struggle for Empire: Letters From

Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902 (Fayetteville: University

of Arkansas Press, 1987). Thomas was a black noncommissioned officer who served in Company H of

the 24th.

An early examination of the Brownsville affair

was conducted by the Constitution League of the

United States. The league’s preliminary report,

along with basic documents relating to the episode,

is in U.S. Congress, Senate, Preliminary Report of the

Commission of the Constitution League of the United

States on Affray at Brownsville, Texas, August 13 and

14, 1906, 59th Cong., 2d sess., 10 December 1906,

doc. 107 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1906). For more modern treatments, see

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 277
John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid (New York: W.

W. Norton, 1970), and Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville

Affair (Port Washington, New York: National

University, 1971).

The best examination of the Houston Riot and

its aftermath is Robert V. Haynes’ A Night of

Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917 (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1976). Shorter

treatments include Rosalind Alexander, “Houston’s

Hidden History,” Texas Observer, 7 April 1989, and

“The Houston Riot and Courts-Martial of 1917,”

n.d., copy in CMH files. Garna L. Christian examines a little-known episode of the same sort involving the 1st Battalion of the 24th at Waco, Texas, in

“The Ordeal and the Prize: The 24th Infantry and

Camp MacArthur,” Military Affairs 50 (April 1986).

Timothy K. Nenninger’s “American Military

Effectiveness in the First World War,” in Allan R.

Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military

Effectiveness: The First World War (Boston: Unwin

Hyman, 1990), vol. 1, provides an overall context

for how well-prepared American forces were prior

to and during World War I. William E. B. DuBois

dealt with the problems of the black soldier in “The

Negro and the War Department,” the Crisis 16

(May 1918). DuBois’ work is heavily summarized

in Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops,

United States Army in World War II (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History,

Government Printing Office, 1990). For a first-person description of the 93d Infantry Division and its

371st regiment, see Chester D. Heywood, Negro

Combat Troops in the World War, The Story of the

371st Infantry (Worcester, Mass.: Commonwealth

Press, 1928). For more on the subject, see Arthur

E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown

Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974).

The most detailed study of the AfricanAmerican in World War II is Lee’s The Employment

of Negro Troops. Sociological and anthropological

dimensions of the subject are treated in Samuel A.

Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment

During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1949). Excellent oral histories are Mary

Penick Motley’s The Invisible Soldier: The Experience

of the Black Soldier, World War II (Detroit: Wayne

State University Press, 1975) and Phillip McGuire’s

Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers

in World War II (Lexington: University of Kentucky

Press, 1993). McGuire has also written a biography

of Judge William H. Hastie. See Phillip McGuire,

He, Too, Spoke for Democracy: Judge Hastie, World

War II, and the Black Soldier (New York: Greenwood

Press, 1988). Based on personal interviews with

black and white officers in command of AfricanAmerican troops during the war, Bell I. Wiley’s

monograph, The Training of Negro Troops, Study 36

(Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, Army

Ground Forces, 1946), provides important background information on the problems the members

of all-black units encountered during this era.

The period between World War II and the

Korean War, the Korean War itself, and the effort to

integrate the Army are dealt with in a number of

important works, the most thorough being Morris

J. MacGregor, Jr.’s The Integration of the Armed

Forces, 1940–1965, Defense Studies series

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, Government Printing Office, 1989).

Richard M. Dalfiume’s Desegregation of the U.S.

Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953

(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969) is

very effective in describing the problem with racial

quotas. Lee Nichols’ Breakthrough on the Color Front

(New York: Random House, 1954) is an unfootnoted, journalistic account that nonetheless provides

important insights into the integration of the armed

forces. For a report on the effectiveness of the black

soldier in combat in Korea, apparently written

specifically to justify integration, see Operations

Research Organization, Johns Hopkins University,

Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army: A 1951

Study (Washington, D.C.: Research Analysis

Corporation, 1951).

Among the most thorough works on President

Truman and his views are Margaret Truman, Harry

S. Truman (New York: William Morrow, 1972), and

David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1992). For a detailed history of the period, see Steven L. Reardon, History of the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, The Formative Years, 1947–1950

278 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the

Secretary of Defense, 1984).

Two works on homosexuality in the armed

forces during this period were of interest and use:

Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of

Gay Men and Women in World War Two (New York:

Free Press, 1990), and Colin J. Williams and Martin

S. Weinberg, Homosexuals and the Military (New

York: Harper & Row, 1971).

There are a number of general works on combat in Korea that proved of particular usefulness.

Roy E. Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to the

Yalu (June–November 1950), United States Army in

the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army

Center of Military History, Government Printing

Office, 1961), remains the most thorough and

authoritative source for combat operations during

the early period of the war. Appleman later produced two somewhat less well-organized but still

detailed works: Disaster in Korea: The Chinese

Confront MacArthur (College Station: Texas A&M

University Press, 1989) and Ridgway Duels for Korea

(College Station: Texas A&M University Press,

1990). James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The

First Year, United States Army in the Korean War

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, Government Printing Office, 1972), covers

high-level concerns. Clay Blair’s more popularly

written The Forgotten War: America in Korea,

1950–1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), is particularly valuable for the insights it gains from

interviews. Billy C. Mossman’s Ebb and Flow,

November 1950–July 1951, United States Army in

the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army

Center of Military History, Government Printing

Office, 1990), describes the period following the

breakout from Pusan. Walter G. Hermes’ Truce Tent

and Fighting Front, United States Army in the

Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center

of Military History, Government Printing Office,

1992), covers the final three months of the 24th’s

existence. Rudy Tomedi’s oral history, No Bugles, No

Drums, An Oral History of the Korean War (New

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), has interviews with soldiers from all-white units who witnessed the 3d Battalion’s retreat at Kunu-ri. The

book is also valuable for the descriptions it contains

of the fighting experienced by all-white units.

Among shorter works, studies of specific aspects

of the fighting for the early days of the war include

William Glenn Robertson, Counterattack on the

Naktong, 1950, Leavenworth Papers 13 (Fort

Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute,

1985), and Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the

24th Division,” in Charles E. Heller and William A.

Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles, 1776–1965

(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986). For a

South Korean officer’s view of the 24th and some of

its officers, see General Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to

Panmunjon (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s [U.S.],

1992). Although sometimes too quick to judge, S. L.

A. Marshall’s The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the

Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces,

November 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River,

Korea (New York: William Morrow, 1953), re-creates

the pain and confusion prevalent when the Chinese

attack occurred. “Operation RIPPER,” Infantry School

Quarterly 39 (October 1951), is a good source for

details of the 25th Division’s counterattack.

Works on military cohesion in combat that

proved particularly useful include William Darryl

Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University

Press, 1985); Nora Kinzer Stewart, South Atlantic

Conflict of 1982: A Case Study in Military Cohesion

(Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for

the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1988); and

Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in

Battle (New York: Free Press, 1985).

There are a number of works on the 24th

Infantry itself. Among the more important are

William G. Muller, The Twenty-Fourth Infantry

Past and Present (Fort Collins, Colo.: 1972;

reprint, n.d.); L. Albert Scipio II, Last of the Black

Regulars: A History of the 24th Infantry Regiment

(1869–1951) (Silver Spring, Md.: Roman

Publications, 1983); Michael J. T. Clark, “A

History of the Twenty-Fourth United States

Infantry Regiment in Utah, 1896–1900,” (Ph.D.

diss., University of Utah, 1979); and L. Albert

Scipio II, The 24th Infantry at Fort Benning (Silver

Spring, Md.: Roman Publications, 1986). Charles

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 279
Bussey’s Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in

the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s

[U.S.], 1991) gives a veteran’s view of the 24th’s

experience not only in Korea but also in prewar

Japan. David Carlisle has two articles on the regiment: “Remember Yechon!” Assembly, March

1994, and “The Last of the Black Regulars,”

Assembly, November 1994. Lyle Rishell’s With a

Black Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea (College

Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993) contains a very personal account of some of the fighting the 24th endured. A warrant officer with the

3d Battalion, Thomas H. Pettigrew, Jr., constructs

an impressionistic picture of the fighting at Kunuri in The Kunu-ri (Kumori) Incident (New York:

Vantage Press, 1963).

280 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Adams, Capt. Samuel J., Jr.: 54n, 63, 70, 73–74, 117n

“Advice from the Old Man,” by Lt. Col. Paul Roberts: 173–74

Air Force, Fifth U.S.: 166–67

Airborne Division, 11th: 50

Aka Island: 39

Alexander, 2d Lt. Gerald: 151

Allensworth, Allen: 8

Alloway, Maj. Curtis H.: 202n, 221n, 259n, 260

Almond, Maj. Gen. Edward M.: 23

Ammunition

captured enemy: 183, 190, 234

losses of: 116, 142, 150, 169–70

shortages of: 68, 110, 176, 191, 203, 243

and supplies: 87, 111, 154, 162–63

Anderson, Capt. George: 207

Andong: 84–85, 87, 92, 95

Anselmo, 1st Lt. Gabriel C.: 148

Anthis, 1st Lt. Louis: 149n, 150

Apache Indians: 6–7

Arlington National Cemetery: 256n

Armstrong, Capt. Noah: 212, 224n

Army Education Program: 45

Army Field Forces: 65

Army Ground Forces headquarters: 33

Army Organization Act of 1950: 262n

Army Regulation 615–369: 35, 42, 51

Army Reorganization Act of 1866: 7n

Army Service Forces: 33

Army War College: 13

Artillery support: 256–57

protection of: 147, 155

in the Pusan Perimeter: 136, 147–48, 155, 164

for river crossings: 230, 244

Ash Island: 41

Associated Press: 93

Ballou, Brig. Gen. Charles C.: 15, 16n

Baltimore Afro-American: 19, 133, 188–89

Baranowski, Maj. Joseph: 141n, 197n, 199, 202, 204n, 224, 

229n, 240, 242, 244, 245, 261

Barone, 1st Lt. Sandro A.: 118, 130, 189, 214

Barth, Brig. Gen. George B.: 132, 135, 143, 144n, 147, 155, 

227, 230, 231–32

Battle Mountain: 145, 147, 148, 149, 153, 154–55, 163, 170,

174–75, 177, 178, 179, 267–68

Bearden, Capt. Johnny L.: 119

Beirne, 1st Lt. D. Randall: 144

Benefield, 2d Lt. William M., Jr.: 116

Bennett, Lt. Col. James B.: 84

Bergeron, 2d Lt. Gaston: 258–59

Berry, Lt. Gen. Sidney B.: 50n, 73

Biggs, Capt. Bradley: 49n, 52–53, 63, 69, 74, 81, 89–90, 92, 93n

Black, 1st Lt. Gorham L., Jr.: 49n, 50, 55, 60, 63, 115, 141, 

163, 188

Black, M. Sgt. Joe: 18

Black press: 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 25, 31, 50, 141n, 216, 229

Blackburn, 1st Lt. William: 139n, 149

Blair, Lt. Col. Melvin R.: 131n, 176–77, 184, 197–98, 206–07,

210, 211–13, 215–17, 240

Blakley, Sfc. Willis: 149

Bliss, Maj. Gen. Tasker: 13

Bliss, Col. Zenas R.: 7

“Bloody Gulch”: 143–44

Bobo, Capt. William A.: 46, 49n

Boring, Maj. James W.: 246–47

Bougainville: 22, 23

Bradley, Brig. Gen. J. Sladen: 223, 226–29, 236, 243–46, 

248–49, 257–58

Bradley, General Omar N.: 173–74

British forces in Korea: 179, 194, 219–20, 224, 225, 239, 

248–49

Index
Britt, 1st Lt. Colon R.: 101, 165

Britt, Col. Henry C.: 235–36, 240, 243–45, 247, 249, 252, 

255, 257

Brooks, 2d Lt. Albert: 46–47, 49n, 58, 70, 76, 77, 141

Brooks, Pfc. Leonard: 22

Brown, Sgt. Benjamin: 7

Brownsville, Tex.: 12–13

Bryant, Sgt. Calvin: 141

Bufford, Sgt. Walter: 48n, 50, 58, 79

“Bugout Boogie”: 216

Burke, James T.: 58, 79, 82, 144n

Burke, Capt. Rothwell W.: 130, 131n

Bussey, Capt. Charles M.: 60, 91, 121, 131, 140, 141, 147, 

192n, 207

Bussey, George: 131

Camp, Capt. Merwin J.: 140–41

Camps

Gifu, Japan: 42–65, 77, 78–79, 81, 184, 265, 266–67

Kokura: 48n

Logan, Tex.: 14

Patterson, Japan: 50, 60

Carson, Maj. Eugene J.: 71, 96, 103, 105, 108, 112, 114, 

115–16, 149–50, 167, 171

Carter, Maj. Owen H.: 102, 117, 118, 137, 163n, 206–07, 

208n, 210–12

Casualties

of artillery personnel: 147, 155

in battle for Sangju: 103, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 

117, 118, 119

at battle for Seoul: 226, 236–37, 238

of black noncommissioned officers: 24, 117

of black officers: 24, 116

at Chindong-myon: 191

Civil War: 4–5

enemy: 114, 115, 118, 137, 145, 148, 155, 157, 162, 166,

177, 205, 233, 234, 245, 249, 253, 256

evacuation of: 136–37, 139, 142, 147, 154, 202, 205, 207,

214

at Haman: 171

at Han River: 226–27, 228–29, 232–33, 234

at Hant’an River: 241, 243, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251–52

from heat: 137

at Hill 205: 199–200

at Hill 212: 179

at Hill 234: 197, 200

at Hill 351: 261

at Hill 400: 261

at Idang: 103

in the Iron Triangle: 256

in Korea: 75, 89, 91, 92, 96, 101, 121–22, 159, 268

of noncommissioned officers: 120, 155, 169

north of the 38th Parallel: 197, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 

212n, 215, 217, 219

Casualties—Continued

of officers: 24, 75, 96, 105, 120, 121–22, 137, 144, 152, 

155, 166, 169, 171–72, 176, 180, 181, 184–85,

188, 191, 215, 245, 257, 267

predictions of: 137

in Pusan Perimeter: 129, 130, 131, 136–37, 139, 142, 143, 

144, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 162–63, 165–66, 175, 176,

177

from racial incidents: 14

retrieval of: 111

2d Division: 219

soldier response to, in battle: 101, 119, 139

South Korean: 199, 200

Spanish-American War: 10

at Tundok: 180

Turkish: 249

in Uijongbu: 257

World War I: 16

World War II: 22, 23, 24

Cavalry Division, 1st: 50, 95, 96, 128, 129, 179, 189, 192, 

193–94, 208, 216, 219–20, 226, 254

Cavalry regiments: 6

7th: 258

9th: 5, 8, 12

10th: 5, 6

Chambers, Walter: 204

Champeny, Col. Arthur J.: 132, 137, 140, 141, 147, 148–49, 

150, 153, 154, 164, 166, 169, 170, 172–73

attitude toward black soldiers: 132–34, 139, 167, 174

leadership of: 168, 268

wounded: 171

Chaplains: 48, 52, 55–56, 78, 224, 265, 266

Charlton, Sgt. Cornelius H.: 256

Chech’on: 258

Check, Lt. Col. Gilbert: 169, 170, 171, 223, 244

Chicago Defender: 188–89

China, People’s Republic of: 67

Chindong-myon: 190, 191

Chindong-ni: 128–29, 131, 134, 136, 142

Chindong-ni–Much’on-ni road: 137, 141

Chinese Communist Forces

attacks by: 199, 200

Spring Offensive: 248–52, 253–54, 269

strength: 192–93, 194, 219–20

Chinese Communist Forces (units)

Armies

First Field: 247–48

Second Field: 248

Third Field: 247–48

56th: 125n

60th: 248

Divisions

76th: 246

120th: 210n

282 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Chinju: 125, 129, 134, 135, 136, 181

Ch’onan: 224

Ch’ongch’on River: 194, 196, 208, 209–10

Chongju: 95

Ch’oni-san: 196, 206

Ch’orwon: 191–92, 238–41, 250, 251, 254

Ch’udong-san: 196, 197

Ch’unch’on: 68

Civil War, American: 3, 4–5

Clark, General Mark: 230

Clayton, Lt. Col. George A.: 184, 198–99, 204–05, 206, 207n,

209, 234, 235, 245, 247n, 254, 255

Cleage, 1st Lt. Scott K.: 245

Climate. See Weather.

Coast artillery units: 12

Cobb, Cpl. William: 54, 55, 120, 139

Cohoon, Lt. Col. William M.: 73, 89, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103,

104, 105, 115

Cold-weather injuries: 190, 205, 212, 215, 219, 222–23

Cole, Lt. Col. George R.: 137, 145, 148–49, 153

Coleman, Lt. Col. Hugh D.: 235, 243, 245, 253

Columbus, Ga.: 18

Combat frontages

north of 38th Parallel: 194

on Pusan Perimeter: 129n, 145, 147, 153, 157, 168

Combat readiness

of troops during period after World War II: 27, 40

of troops in Japan: 61–62, 65, 77, 265–66

Command of Negro Troops, The: 55–56

Communications

battlefield: 92, 100, 102, 115, 148, 163, 164, 166, 199, 

202–03, 208, 249

with Eighth Army headquarters: 87

and messages dropped by aircraft: 204, 213

problems with: 87, 100, 115, 148–49, 163, 164, 169, 199,

202–03, 208, 212–13, 268–69

radio: 100, 102, 199, 205

and runners: 100

Communications equipment

abandonment of: 116, 130

batteries for: 77, 199

effects of cold on: 199

losses: 215

and radios: 77, 85–86, 100, 112, 130, 199, 203, 204, 215

shortages: 77, 85

spare parts for: 85

and telephones: 112

and wire: 77

Competitive Tour program: 47–48, 72, 75, 76, 266

Constitution League of the United States: 13n

Construction: 17, 237–38, 241, 244, 245, 260

Cook, Maj. Theodore J.: 86n–87n, 88n, 137

Cooper, Alonzo: 184n

Corcoran, Capt. Laurence: 84, 134n, 139, 148, 149, 150,

Corcoran, Capt. Laurence—Continued

151–52, 153, 154

Corley, Col. John T.

appointed regimental commander: 171

assigned to 3d Battalion: 141–42

at Battle Mountain: 151–52, 174–78

and defense of Seoul: 224, 226–27, 228–29

at Kunu-ri: 191–92

leadership style of: 235–36

and morale of troops: 174–75

and operations north of the 38th Parallel: 191–92, 196–97,

202, 205n, 206, 208, 210–13, 215, 216–17, 218

relief of: 229–30

and straggling: 171–73, 268

and training: 183–84, 185, 190

at Tundok: 180

and unit newspaper: 173–74

and visit to church: 192

at Wonsan: 141–43

Corps

I: 179, 189, 194, 207, 208, 227, 235, 236, 250, 254, 

256–57, 258

IX: 179, 180–81, 189, 194, 207, 208, 223n, 230, 240

X: 189, 194

Cory, Rennie M.: 104n

Coulter, Maj. Gen. John B.: 179, 189

Courts-martial

of black soldiers: 29–30, 46, 78, 117, 185–88, 189

for disobedience to a superior officer: 150

in period after World War II: 29–30

for racial incidents: 14–15

for straggling: 141, 169n, 172–73, 185–88, 260, 268

World War I: 16

Cramer, Harry, Jr.: 200n

Crawford, Neb.: 8

Creel, Capt. Buckner M.: 175, 192, 235, 240, 249n, 259n

Crisis: 13, 25

Cuba: 9–10, 12

Dailey, Capt. Vernon C.: 109, 142n, 176

Dann, 2d Lt. Roscoe E., Jr.: 74, 80, 120, 122

Davis, Brig. Gen. Benjamin O.: 19, 20, 26

Davis, 2d Lt. Benjamin O., Jr.: 18

Davis, Joseph: 80

Davis, Maj. Martin L.: 224

Davis, Preston: 164n

Davis, 1st Lt. Ralph J.: 198n, 205n, 257

Davis, Col. Steve G.: 262

Davis, Sylvester: 121, 141

Dean, Ellis: 76

Dean, Maj. Gen. William F.: 68n, 69, 82–83, 93, 95, 96

DeChow, Lt. Col. George: 227

Demarcation line (38th Parallel): 67

DeMarco, 2d Lt. Joseph W.: 51, 69–70

INDEX 283
Demobilization after World War II: 27–28, 40

Democratic Party: 37

Deserters. See also Stragglers.

of battle positions: 105, 115–16

in Korea: 121

during post–Civil War years: 7–8

in post–World War II period: 29–30

South Korean Army: 129

Spanish-American War: 12

Desiderio, Reginald: 200n

Deveaux, Lt. Col. John: 56

Devers, General Jacob L.: 33, 34

Dewey, Thomas A.: 37

Dill, Col. Macey L.: 40–41

Dillard, Capt. Oliver: 72n, 92, 110, 111, 112n, 113, 130–31, 

207n, 211–13, 240

Discipline

in all-black units: 31, 42, 64

and AWOLs: 79

in battle: 103, 153, 172

effect on combat effectiveness: 81, 113, 123

effect on officer casualties: 122

problems, causes of: 31, 40–41, 51, 75, 122, 257, 260

problems at Gifu: 51, 64, 78–79, 81, 266–67

problems at Ie Shima: 42

problems in Japan: 79–81, 94, 265–66, 267

problems north of the 38th Parallel: 192

problems on Okinawa: 40–41

problems prior to departure for Korea: 79–82

use of training to improve: 183

Dolvin, Lt. Col. Welborn G.: 181, 194, 197, 200, 202

Donaho, Maj. Horace E.: 71, 104, 115, 118, 121, 137, 150

Dred Scott decision: 3n

Drug abuse: 53, 54–55, 64, 65, 76, 79, 264–65, 268

DuBois, William E. B.: 13, 16n, 19

Dubuque, 2d Lt. Lionel: 111n

Eagle Forward: 173–74, 186

Eagles’ Flight: 173

Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C.: 33

Education, lack of: 37

effect on military performance: 31, 33, 34–35, 44–45

effect on training: 39, 61–62

and VD: 31, 35–36

Edwards, Maj. Gen. Idwal H.: 33

Efate, New Hebrides: 21

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.: 44

Eichelsdoerfer, 1st Lt. Howard H.: 199–200, 203–04

Eighth Army

and cold-weather injuries: 221–22

discrimination against blacks: 55–56, 59

and education: 45

headquarters: 121

inspector general investigations: 112, 114, 133–34, 167–68, 

Eighth Army—Continued

171–72, 174, 175, 176–77, 188–89

in Japan: 29, 44, 46, 58n, 59, 60–61, 63–65, 69, 75n, 80, 

81n

in Korea: 68, 69, 73, 82–83, 87–88, 118n, 122

replacement personnel: 184

request to, that 24th Infantry be disbanded: 175, 188

and segregation: 76, 172

Special Provisional Battalion: 258n

and sports: 51

Eisenhower, General Dwight D.: 25

Ellis, 1st Lt. Charles: 75, 160, 163, 165, 167, 168, 265

Engineer Battalion, 65th: 87, 88–89, 91n, 147, 175n, 177, 230

Engineer Combat Company, 77th: 55, 60, 64, 70, 85, 89, 91,

116, 121, 131, 140, 147, 206, 207, 219, 230

Engineer Road: 147–48, 166–67, 169

Ent, 1st Lt. Uzal W.: 73, 84, 167, 168

Equipment. See also Communications equipment.

abandoned: 86, 87n, 104, 112, 116, 130, 139, 169–70, 175

captured enemy: 103, 145, 234

losses of: 92, 104, 105, 122, 142, 169, 209, 215, 222

maintenance of: 29, 40, 77

quality of: 29, 61, 65, 77, 110

recovery of: 116

shortages of: 29, 82, 87, 222

signal: 222

spare parts for: 29

transportation of: 79–80, 81

Equipment operators: 40

Executions: 14

Executive Order 9981: 37, 264

Fagen, Pvt. David: 12

Fahy, Charles: 38

Families at Gifu: 48–49

Far East Command: 51, 60, 71, 93, 187–88, 193–94, 261

Fatigue: 96–97, 104, 120, 122, 154, 188, 207n, 215, 216–17,

219, 242, 255

Fayetteville, N.C.: 20

Felkey, 2d Lt. Wilbur T.: 154

Ferguson, Sgt. Clarence: 46, 63

Field artillery battalions

8th: 148

64th: 118n, 148

90th: 85, 88n, 102, 118n, 147n, 148

159th: 55, 64, 70, 89, 91–92, 97, 102, 110, 117, 118n, 

129–30, 132, 136, 141–42, 147n, 148, 164n, 166–67, 

185, 199, 249, 256–57

Fields, Sgt. Maxie: 39

Fields, 1st Lt. Richard L.: 46

Fish, Hamilton: 21

Fisher, Col. Henry G.: 73, 74–75, 81, 89, 91, 92, 93n, 95, 96,

104–05, 114, 120n, 148, 168, 223

Flamethrowers: 153, 242, 244–45

284 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Fletcher, Robert: 204

Florida: 8–9

Foraker, Joseph: 13n

Force, Stuart: 202n, 203n, 204n

Forts

Bayard, N. Mex.: 6–7, 8

Benning, Ga.: 17–18, 20, 21

Bowie, Ariz.: 6–7

Concho, Tex.: 6, 8

Davis, Tex.: 6

Des Moines, Iowa: 13

Douglas, Utah: 8, 11

Grant, Ariz.: 6–7

Huachuca, Ariz.: 6–7, 8, 19–20

Ontario, N.Y.: 12

Reno, Okla.: 6

D.A. Russell, Wyo.: 11, 12

Sill, Okla.: 6

Stockton, Tex.: 6

Supply, Indian Territory: 8

Thomas, Ariz.: 6–7

Fourth of July parade in Tokyo: 46, 50

Foxholes

construction of: 154, 237–38, 242

and discipline: 172

dislike of: 153, 165, 167–68

France: 15–17, 219–20

Freeman, Col. Paul: 211n

Friendly fire: 208

Frontages. See Combat frontages.

Frostbite: 190, 205, 212, 215, 221, 222

Fujino-Susono Maneuver Area: 47, 61, 63–64

Fukui, Japan: 53

Gardner, Capt. James O.: 100, 101, 103, 121n, 140n, 150

Geiger, 1st Sgt. James: 57

George, Collins: 25

Gibson, Truman: 21, 23–25, 32–33

Gifu, Japan: 42–65, 77, 78–79, 81, 184, 265, 266–67

Gilbert, 1st Lt. Leon A.: 121, 172, 185–86, 268

Gillem, Lt. Gen. Alvan C., Jr.: 32

Gillem Board: 32–33, 34, 36, 37–38, 41–42, 55, 72, 264

Gillert, Capt. Gustav J., Jr.: 59, 63, 64n, 70, 76, 77, 117, 133,

139, 192n, 204, 229n

Gillis, Col. Thomas D.: 258, 260–61, 269

Gooch, 1st Lt. Christopher M.: 88n, 130n–131n

Grant, General Ulysses S.: 6

Gray, Gordon: 74

Green, 1st Lt. Charles E.: 46–47, 76n, 111n, 185

Greer, 2d Lt. Edward: 110, 112n

Gregg, William: 79

Griffin, Albert: 139, 149n

Guadalcanal: 21

Guerrillas, enemy: 129, 134–35, 224, 258

Gustin, 1st Lt. Ralph S.: 139

Habyol: 130n

Hagins, Raymond: 57, 84

Hall, Leo: 56

Hall, 2d Lt. William H.: 137

Halloran, Col. Michael E.: 40, 45, 46–47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 

59–60, 62, 63, 64, 74, 266

Haman: 129, 131, 132–33, 136, 137–38, 147, 149, 162, 163,

166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 175, 179, 207, 252

Haman–Chungam-ni road: 163, 174

Hamch’ang: 83, 84, 85, 87, 88–89, 95, 96, 114

Hamilton, Maj. Augustus: 56

Han River: 84–85, 87, 226–28, 230–33, 234, 236, 238, 252, 

269

Hant’an River: 238–41, 242–44, 245, 246n, 249–51,

252, 269

Hardman, Lt. Col. Wayne: 70

Harper, 2d Lt. Philip H.: 174

Hash, Capt. William A.: 54–55, 57, 64, 76, 77, 84n, 110–11,

154, 236

Hastie, William H.: 19, 21

Hatter, Jesse: 139

Hawaii: 15

Haynesworth, 1st Sgt. Richard: 45–46

Heacock, Sgt. Lyman D.: 218

Hearne, Col. Julian G., Jr.: 22, 39

Heroism, examples of. See Military honors.

Herren, 1st Lt. John L.: 167, 243

Herrmann, Lt. Col. Charles R.: 101n

Hickman, Capt. Don R.: 169–70

Hicks, James L.: 133, 188–89

Hicks, Cpl. John L.: 191

Hiers, Leon: 20

Hill 205: 199–200

Hill 212: 179

Hill 234: 197, 200

Hill 351: 261

Hill 383: 238

Hill 391: 198

Hill 400: 258, 261

Hill 463: 240–41, 243–44, 245–46

Hill 482: 247

Hill 642: 240–42, 243, 244–46

Hill 665: 145

Hill 687: 247, 248

Hill 688: 233, 234

Hill 741: 108, 109–11

Hill 877: 249

Hilyer, 2d Lt. Joseph: 50, 58, 59, 63, 76, 101–02

Hodges, 1st Lt. Genous S.: 120

Hollis, 2d Lt. Levi: 213

Holmes, Lawrence: 253

Holmes, Pfc. Ronald: 256

INDEX 285
Homosexuals: 41, 59–60, 76

Hooks, Pfc. Jesse: 109n

Horne, Sgt. Edward L.: 45

Hospitals, military: 20–21

Hough, William: 79

Housing: 44, 48–49, 57, 63

Houston, Tex.: 14–15

Howitzers, 105-mm.: 68, 110

Hull, Lt. Gen. John E.: 33

Hunsaker, Capt. James: 171

Hunt, 2d Lt. Alexander: 150

Idang: 97, 100, 102, 103, 104

Ie Shima: 41, 44, 52, 60

Imjin River: 190, 192, 221, 223–24, 248–49

Inch’on: 177, 179

Inch’on peninsula: 225–26

Indian reservations: 6–7

Indian Territory: 6–7, 8

Infantry Battalions: 33

1st, 9th Infantry: 208

3d, 9th Infantry: 194, 205, 206, 217–18, 261

1st, 24th Infantry: 14, 21, 22, 40, 47, 56, 58, 63–64, 70, 

71, 72, 76, 77, 83, 84, 95–96, 103, 105, 108, 110, 

111n, 112, 115–16, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121–22, 129,

133–34, 136, 137–39, 141, 145, 147, 150, 153, 154,

161, 166, 170, 171, 174, 176, 179, 180, 191, 192,

196–98, 199, 200, 202–03, 204, 207, 209–10, 211, 213,

215, 217, 224, 225–26, 230, 232, 235–36, 240–42, 243,

244–45, 246, 247, 248, 250–52, 255–56, 261n, 268–69

headquarters company: 40, 180

Company A: 40, 56n, 73n, 75, 105, 108, 110, 111n, 

115–16, 119, 121, 147, 153, 160, 161, 166, 167,

168, 169, 174, 180, 190, 191, 197, 200, 202–03,

204, 241–42, 244–45, 250–51

Company B: 22, 40, 54, 56, 57, 64, 75, 76, 77, 

110–11, 112, 116, 117, 147, 149, 150, 153,

154–55, 161, 168, 170, 174–75, 197, 200,

202–03, 204, 241–42, 245, 246, 247, 258–59, 261

Company C: 40, 41, 56, 73n, 75, 84, 108, 116, 118, 

122, 134n, 137–39, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,

152, 153–55, 161, 167, 168, 169, 170–71, 176,

180, 185, 197, 199–200, 202–04, 209–10, 215,

217, 218, 242, 245, 256, 267, 268–69

Company D: 40, 56n, 57, 71, 72, 73n, 76, 115–16, 

122, 200n, 202, 204

2d, 24th Infantry: 10, 47, 54n, 61, 63–64, 71, 72–73, 82, 

83, 84, 87–88, 89, 95, 96–97, 100–103, 104, 105, 108,

110–11, 115, 118–19, 120, 121–22, 129, 136, 137,

139–40, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148, 153, 161, 163, 164,

166–67, 168, 170, 171–72, 176, 178, 179, 184, 192,

196–98, 199, 204–05, 206, 208–09, 215, 217, 224–25,

226, 230, 233–35, 240, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250–51,

252, 254, 255–56, 257, 258, 261–62, 267–68

Infantry Battalions—Continued

headquarters company: 100–103, 166, 208

Company E: 44, 56, 72–73, 76, 77, 96–97, 100–102,

103, 105, 115, 119, 120n, 122, 140n, 147,

148–49, 150, 153–54, 160, 163, 165, 166, 167,

169, 170–71, 198, 204–05, 206, 208, 217, 218,

233, 234, 253, 254, 268–69

Company F: 18, 40, 44, 63, 72, 73n, 77, 96, 

100–101, 103, 105n, 114–15, 118, 122, 139, 147,

153, 163, 164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 174, 198–99,

206, 208, 226–27, 233, 234, 255, 261, 268, 269

Company G: 44, 56, 72, 73n, 77, 96, 100–101, 103, 

110–11, 115, 118–19, 120, 122, 139–41, 144,

147, 148–49, 150, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170,

198, 204, 205, 206, 208, 217, 218, 226–27, 233,

234, 268–69

Company H: 72–73, 82, 96, 105, 140n, 165, 170, 209

3d, 24th Infantry: 14, 21, 47, 54, 63–64, 69, 70, 71, 

72, 73, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84–87, 88, 89, 91–92, 93n,

95, 96, 103, 108, 109–11, 112, 114, 118–19, 120,

121–22, 129, 131n, 132–33, 136, 137, 141, 142,

143, 145, 147, 150–51, 153, 161, 163, 171–72,

174–75, 176, 177, 179, 181n, 183, 185, 190, 192,

196–99, 206–07, 208, 210, 211–15, 216–17, 218,

224–25, 230, 233, 234–35, 240–41, 243–47, 248,

249, 250, 252, 255–56, 258, 267, 268–69

headquarters company: 40, 110, 119, 199, 207, 211–12

Company I: 55, 73n, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 105, 

109–11, 112, 113, 119, 122, 129, 131, 137, 142,

143, 150, 151, 152–53, 154, 176, 177, 210,

213–14, 243, 244, 246–47, 257

Company K: 11–12, 54, 56, 57, 73, 76, 89, 91, 92, 

109–10, 112, 113, 119, 120, 122, 137, 142, 154,

174–75, 177, 185, 210n, 213–14, 233, 234,

243–44, 246–47

Company L: 56, 77, 81, 89–90, 91, 92, 109, 110–11,

112, 113, 119, 122, 129, 130, 132, 142, 144, 150,

151, 152–53, 176, 177, 210, 213–14, 243, 244,

246–47, 249n, 256

Company M: 39, 40, 69–70, 90, 92, 110, 129, 131, 

207, 212, 214, 257, 258

1st, 27th Infantry: 113–14, 167, 171, 232

2d, 27th Infantry: 63–64, 169, 200, 230

3d, 27th Infantry: 175, 204, 207–08

1st, 29th Infantry: 128

3d, 29th Infantry: 128

1st, 35th Infantry: 148, 162

2d, 35th Infantry: 89, 104, 114, 162–63

3d, 35th Infantry: 232

1st, 371st Infantry: 16–17

Infantry Division, 25th: 96n, 101n, 223–24, 227, 257–58

area of responsibility: 82, 87, 95–96, 128–29, 134, 149, 

157, 161, 179, 189, 190, 192–94, 199, 207, 208,

219–20, 236, 238–40, 248, 254

286 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Infantry Division, 25th—Continued

components: 42–43

and homosexuals: 60

inspector general investigations: 75n, 221

integration in: 172

and occupation of Japan: 41, 55

racial prejudice in the: 49–50, 61–62

relationship with the 24th Infantry: 91–92, 118, 123, 213

at Sangju: 121

sent to Korea: 70

strength: 159–61

supply lines: 136–37

Infantry Divisions

2d: 159–60, 162n, 179, 188, 189, 194, 196, 198–99, 204,

205n, 208, 210–11, 216, 217, 219–20, 223, 227–28, 261

3d: 230, 236, 238–40, 248–49, 254

7th: 73

24th: 48n, 68n, 69, 73, 82, 93, 95, 96, 128, 179, 188, 189,

219–20, 240, 248–49, 250

37th: 22

92d: 15–17, 23, 24–25, 56, 133, 235

93d: 15–17, 23

96th: 40

Infantry regiment, 24th. See also Morale.

area of responsibility: 128–29, 134–35, 136, 145, 147, 157,

183, 249–50, 253

band: 46, 49, 50, 51, 79

combat readiness of: 68, 69n, 70

as corps reserve: 257–58

and courts-martial: 185–88

disbanded: 258n, 259–60, 261–62

Kean’s proposal to disband: 175, 188, 194, 252, 263, 268

leadership changes: 71

as occupation force for Japan: 27–28, 42–65

organizational problems of: 95–96

regimental headquarters: 82, 87, 95–96

South Korean attachments to the: 134–35

strength: 27, 40, 42, 47, 61, 148n, 159–60, 189–90, 225

Infantry regiments

2d: 7–8

5th: 136, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147–48, 157, 161, 162,

163, 174, 175, 177–78, 248–49

7th: 230

9th: 194, 197, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207–08, 217–18, 

268–69

14th: 261

15th: 7–8

19th: 125, 128, 248–49

23d: 206, 210–11, 213, 214

25th: 5, 6, 7, 8–9, 12–13, 15, 23, 47

27th: 42–43, 47, 51, 73, 74, 75n, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 95, 96,

113–14, 119n, 120n, 121n, 125, 128–29, 148, 159,

161–62, 163, 167, 168, 169–70, 177–78, 180, 181, 183,

190, 194, 197, 199–200, 204, 207, 208, 221, 222, 223, 

Infantry regiments—Continued

224–25, 230, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238–40, 244, 246,

247, 248–49, 250–51, 252, 260–68

29th: 18, 125, 139n

31st: 63–64

34th: 261

35th: 42–43, 47, 50n, 51, 73, 74, 76, 89, 92, 95, 96, 104, 

114–15, 118, 119n, 120, 121n, 128–29, 134–35, 137,

143, 144, 145, 147–48, 153, 157, 159, 161, 162–63,

164, 174, 177, 180, 181, 183, 190, 194, 197, 200,

202–03, 215, 221, 222, 223, 224–25, 230, 232, 233,

240, 250, 256–57, 258, 260

38th: 5–6, 211, 217

41st: 5–6

54th Massachusetts: 5

65th: 238

148th: 22

187th: 238

368th: 16

371st: 16–17

Infantry School: 18

Infiltrators, enemy: 128–29, 134–35, 150n–151n, 152, 

153–54, 162, 171, 180, 204, 207, 214, 224, 249

Inspector General reports

on casualties among officers: 75n, 122n

on Houston, Tex., riot: 15

on troops in Korea: 122–23

World War II: 22

Integration. See also Segregation in the armed forces.

of dependent schools: 49

of housing: 48–49

Iron Triangle: 238, 254, 255–56

I-san: 196, 198–99

Iso-ri: 115–16

Italy: 23

Jackson, 1st Lt. Arthur: 164n

Jackson, Cpl. Levi: 139

Jackson, Capt. William J.: 56n, 75

Jamison, Capt. Thurston: 91, 92

Japan

occupation forces for: 27–28, 29, 30, 41, 42–65

racial relations in: 48

Jenkins, 1st Lt. John M.: 153

Jim Crow laws: 7, 10, 14, 37

Johnson, Carleton S.: 93n, 104n

Johnson, Gray: 56, 63, 74n, 141n, 192n, 235–36

Johnson, 1st Lt. Jasper: 54, 55, 57, 58, 73, 76, 91, 92, 109–10

Johnson, Pvt. Jerry: 82, 140

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 254

Jolly, Pvt. Annias: 22

Jones, Charlie Lee: 133, 160

Jones, Pfc. Robert J.: 116

Jones, Roscoe: 60

INDEX 287
Joyner, 2d Lt. Theodore R.: 105

Judd, Walter H.: 93

Kaesong: 190

Kagamigahara Airfield, Japan: 42

Kahoe, Capt. Joseph: 222–23

Kallyong Pass: 96, 104, 108, 110, 114, 115, 118

Karhyon-ni: 221

Kean, Maj. Gen. William B.: 59, 63, 70, 71, 73, 85, 87–88, 89,

91, 95, 114, 117, 123, 128, 132, 136, 137, 140–41, 143,

144, 147, 155, 161–62, 163, 169, 171, 175, 176–78,

181, 186, 188, 194, 196–97, 200, 207, 208, 211, 223,

227, 263, 268

Keiser, Maj. Gen. Laurence B.: 194

Kelleher, Lt. Col. Gerald C.: 223, 232–33

Kennedy, Capt. William M.: 140

Kerama Islands: 39

Kimpo Air Base: 226

King, Edward: 60n

Knoeller, Capt. Frank O.: 101, 205

Kobe, Japan: 53

Kobe base, Japan: 53–54, 61, 63

Koenig, 2d Lt. Ray: 141n

Koesan: 95

Kokura, Japan: 80–81

Komp, 1st Lt. John S.: 56n, 57, 74, 81–82, 121, 173–74, 186,

228–29, 235

Korean Army Troops, United States Army (KATUSA): 160–61

Kujang-dong–Sokch’ang-dong road: 196–97, 198, 205

Kum River: 82, 95, 125

Kumch’on: 83, 84, 85, 86, 87–88, 95, 96

Kumhwa: 254, 255–56, 258, 262

Kunsan: 125, 183

Kunu-ri: 192, 208, 209–10, 212–13, 215, 216, 240, 269

Kuryong: 197

Kuryong River: 194, 196, 197, 203

Kushner, 1st Lt. Leonard H.: 54, 58, 62, 117

Kwangju: 125

Kyushu TV–Asahi: 80n

LaBlanc, 1st Lt. Donald: 139

Lambert, Tom: 93

Lane, Sfc. Laurence: 131n

Lane, Thomas J.: 93

Leadership

failures of: 16, 20, 100, 103, 104, 119–20, 123, 130, 143, 

144, 169, 217, 257, 258–59, 260, 263, 265–66, 267,

268–69

inexperience of: 113, 144, 151, 165, 185, 188–89

problems with: 73–75, 78, 94, 103n, 123

triumphs of: 235, 241

in the 27th Infantry: 113–14

Lenon, 2d Lt. Chester: 131, 132n

Lincoln, Abraham: 3–4

Line Golden: 235, 237–38, 245

Line Kansas: 236, 238, 250

Line Lincoln: 235n, 253

Line Wyoming: 238, 258

Little, James: 71

Living conditions: 48–49, 69n

Lofton, Lt. Col. Forest: 54, 72, 77–78, 265, 266

MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas: 23, 46, 50, 59, 60,

67, 68, 69, 93, 177, 186, 189, 223, 226, 253

McClary, Sgt. John: 20

McCloy, John L.: 20, 32–33, 34

McCree, Lt. Wade, Jr.: 24

MacKenzie, Brig. Gen. Ranald S.: 6

McLeod, 1st Sgt.: 200n

McMains, Lt. Col. D. M.: 205

McMurray, 1st Lt. Houston M.: 58n, 59, 69–70, 78, 164

McVay, Maj. Franklin W.: 255

Madison Barracks, N.Y.: 12

Maintenance personnel: 40

Malaria: 10

Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional: 128

Marine Regiment, 5th: 134, 136, 137, 143, 144

Marshall, Sfc. Edward: 165n

Marshall, General George C.: 23, 31–32

Marshall, Thurgood: 186–87, 188

Martin, Harold H.: 216–17, 218

Martin, Maj. John “Tommy”: 93n, 121

Masan: 123, 128–29, 134, 145, 147, 149, 179

Masan–Chindong-ni road: 136, 148

Masan–Saga-ri road: 148

Matsumoto, Seiichi: 80n

Matthews, Capt. Charles M.: 181

Matthews, Wilfred: 214

Mauricio, 1st Lt. Paul F.: 142

Mays, Cpl. Isaiah: 7

Medical supplies: 162–63, 190

Medics: 102n, 150, 165–66

Mexico: 6, 12–13, 15

Michaelis, Lt. Col. John H.: 73, 74–75, 85–86, 87, 96, 

113–14, 120n, 223, 228, 229–30, 244–45

Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W.: 179, 227

Military honors: 112

Bronze Star: 102n, 105n, 112n, 132n, 139n, 150, 166n

Croix de Guerre (French): 16–17

Distinguished Service Cross: 16, 86, 105n, 109n, 116, 

132n, 137n, 139n, 142, 151n, 191, 205n, 207, 226

letter of commendation: 51

Medal of Honor: 7, 131, 132n, 200n, 207n, 256

Presidential Unit Citation: 163

problems with: 141

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation: 128

Silver Star: 89, 91, 92n, 102n, 105n, 109n, 110n, 111n, 

112n, 121n, 131, 132n, 139n, 141, 148n, 150, 151n, 

288 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Military honors—Continued

164n, 165, 207, 214, 226, 233n

Military intelligence relating to black subversives: 13

Military police: 31 

companies: 114, 115, 119

confrontations with: 79, 80–81

Military Police Company, 512th: 51, 70

Military reconnaissance: 114–15, 190, 191, 192–93, 224, 230,

240, 246, 248

Militia: 3

Miller, Lt. Col. Gerald G.: 116, 117, 118, 120, 137–39, 145, 

149–50, 170, 184, 197, 200, 202–03, 206, 209–10, 213,

224

Miller, James: 212

Missal, Lt. Col. Joseph: 224

Missing in action (MIA)

Maj. Gen. William F. Dean: 96

at Pusan Perimeter: 130, 131, 143–44

at Sangju: 110, 112

24th Infantry: 96, 121–22, 191, 215

Moji, Japan: 79–80, 81, 94, 266–67

Montana: 12

Montgomery, Harold: 46n, 56n

Moorman, 2d Lt. Clinton: 78–79, 133

Morale

of black troops: 20, 21, 22, 23–24, 31, 171–72, 185

effect on combat effectiveness: 175, 221

efforts to improve: 173–74, 178, 223, 224, 225

of enemy forces: 125

of 5th Infantry: 144

at Gifu: 51, 63, 64

in Korea: 103, 108, 122

of officers: 57, 65, 257

at Pusan Perimeter: 149, 151, 155

of 24th Infantry: 75, 76, 82, 134, 171–72, 185, 187, 189, 

215, 221, 223, 224, 253, 257, 258–60, 267, 268, 269–70

of 35th Infantry: 135, 144

and VD: 52–53

Mortars: 68, 110, 209

4.2-inch: 77, 230

60-mm.: 112

81-mm.: 112, 116

Mouchet, Lt. Col. William D.: 235, 240, 243, 245, 247, 252

Much’on-ni: 143, 181

Mun’gyong Pass: 87, 88, 95

Naktong River: 84–85, 87, 121, 128–29

Nam River: 128–29, 145, 181

Namjang-ni: 103

Namwon: 181, 183

Napalm: 149–50, 153, 167, 215

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 

(NAACP): 8, 13, 21, 36, 186

National Guard: 12, 13–14, 16–17

National Medical Association: 19

Netherlands: 219–20

New Georgia islands: 21

New Hebrides: 21

New York Age: 14

New York Post: 23

New York Times: 93

Newell, Maj. Roscius C.: 190, 207n, 208n, 212n, 216n, 221, 

224, 235

Newspaper, unit: 173–74

Nickens, Sgt. Edward J.: 42

Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel: 33

Noncommissioned officers

advancement of: 57

casualties among: 24

families of: 48n

noncombat backgrounds of: 160

training for: 31

World War I: 14

World War II: 21

Nordstrom, Francis G.: 210n

North Africa: 22

North Korean Army. See also Casualties.

casualties: 100, 114, 145, 157

combat effectiveness of: 82

infiltration of U.S. lines: 108, 109, 162–63

morale: 100

replacements: 100, 145, 157

shortages: 112–13

strength: 68, 145, 157, 163n, 192–93

supplies: 100, 157, 162–63

training: 68, 97, 100, 145, 157

North Korean Army (units)

Divisions

1st: 82, 87, 95

2d: 68, 95, 113

3d: 95

4th: 95, 162

5th: 87

6th: 125, 128, 134, 136, 144, 145, 148, 149, 157, 159, 

162, 163n

7th: 145, 157, 162

8th: 92

12th: 87, 95

15th: 95, 97, 100n, 113

Regiments

6th: 68

13th: 125

14th: 125

15th: 125

31st: 87–88, 92

48th: 97, 100

Independent Infantry Unit, 766th: 87

North Solomons Campaign: 21

INDEX 289
Occupation forces

in Japan: 41, 264–65

on Okinawa: 40–41

training for: 41, 44

Officer candidate schools: 20

Officers. See also Leadership.

assignments: 55–56, 57–58, 72, 184–85, 217, 265

battlefield commissions to: 160

black, command of white officers: 56, 72–73, 264, 265, 266

casualties among: 24, 75, 96, 105, 120, 121–22, 137, 144,

152, 155, 166, 169, 171–72, 176, 180, 181, 184–85,

188, 191, 215, 245, 257, 267

Civil War: 4–5

combat experience of: 116, 132–33, 137, 141, 176, 185

and Competitive Tour program: 47–48

courts-martial of: 16

desertion by: 121

morale of: 57, 65, 257

prejudice on the part of white: 15–17, 19, 20, 23, 29–30, 

33, 58, 59, 74, 78, 104, 114, 120, 123, 132–34, 141,

144, 167–68, 185, 187–88, 258, 260, 263, 265–66, 268

promotions of: 265

recruitment of: 33

Regular Army: 47n–48n

replacement of: 41–42, 144

reserve: 47–48

shortages of: 31, 159–60, 176

training for: 13–14, 20, 29, 44, 185

turnover of: 47–48, 71–73, 76, 78, 81, 94, 184–85, 257–59

World War I: 13–14

Okinawa: 22, 39–41, 67

O’Neil, 1st Lt. Joseph: 140

Operations

PILEDRIVER: 254

RIPPER: 230, 236

THUNDERBOLT: 225

Ordnance Department: 34

Ott, 1st Lt. Lloyd V.: 71n, 185

P’abalmak: 227, 228–29

Pacific Stars and Stripes: 71

Parrish, Col. Noel: 31

Pate, Maj. Joseph B.: 16–17

Patterson, Robert P.: 31–32

Paulfrey, 1st Sgt. Peter J.: 78, 149–50

Peacock Mountain: 68

Perkins, James: 46, 50–51, 59

Pershing, Brig. Gen. John J.: 12, 16

Personnel turnover

in Japan: 47–48, 61, 62, 64, 71, 75, 81, 266

in Korea: 183–84, 224–25, 245, 258–59

of officers: 47–48, 71–73, 76, 78, 81, 94, 184–85, 224–25,

245, 266

on Okinawa: 40

Peters, Capt. Martin A.: 59

Pettigrew, WO Thomas H., Jr.: 212n, 215n–216n

Phelan, Lt. Col. John J.: 23

Philippine Islands: 11–12, 15, 219–20, 238–40

Phoenix, Cpl. Earl: 207

Pidgeon, 1st Lt. Donald F.: 104, 105, 108

Piedra, Capt. Charles: 70, 72, 76, 202

Pierce, Lt. Col. Samuel, Jr.: 70, 73–74, 88, 89, 90, 91–92, 110,

118, 119, 120, 129, 130, 131, 136–37

Pierre, Sgt. Michael: 41

P’il-bong Mountain: 137–39, 145, 147–48, 149, 155, 179

Pipkins, Nathaniel: 75, 82, 165

Pittsburgh Courier: 93, 188–89, 216, 229–30, 262

Plessy v. Ferguson: 7

Pogae-san mountains: 238–40, 248–49

P’ohang-dong: 82, 83, 95

Port Battalion, 186th: 39

Port operations: 82

Porter, Maj. James A.: 56

Porters, South Korean: 108, 154, 196, 199

Poun, road to: 96, 103, 105, 108, 114–15

Pratt, Edward: 39, 41, 44

Pratt, Capt. Sherman: 214

Preston, 1st Lt. Leonard: 101

Prisoners of war

American: 71, 93, 140, 144, 181, 203–04, 214

Japanese: 39, 40

North Korean: 145, 155, 253

taken by South Koreans: 103

taken by 24th Infantry: 97, 129, 137, 183, 225, 234

Prostitutes: 30, 40–41, 52, 53, 54, 64

Pugh, Sgt. Curtis: 226

Pup’yong-ni: 136, 141

Pusan: 69, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 129, 149, 157, 177, 181

Pusan Perimeter: 125–55, 157, 159–78, 179, 267–68

Pyle, Ernie: 41

P’yonghae-ri: 87

P’yongyang: 220–21

Quad-50: 92

Racial discrimination. See also Segregation in the armed forces.

and burials: 256n

and military justice system: 14–15, 29–30, 185–88

and troop morale: 31, 32

Racial disturbances: 14–15, 20, 29

Racial quotas: 32, 33, 34, 37–38

Racism

black reactions to: 8–9, 10, 23, 36, 55–56, 140, 168, 

188–89, 258, 265–66

effects on armed forces: 12–13, 23, 49–50, 55–56, 168, 

171–72, 188, 258, 268

in Japan: 48, 49–50

Radow, Maj. Sam: 214n

290 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Ranger Companies

5th: 238

8213th: 194, 197, 199–200

Ransom, M. Sgt. Waymon: 53, 55, 60, 62, 102, 109, 191

Rapes: 192

Recoilless rifles, 75-mm.: 77, 88, 116, 119, 163–64, 232

Reconnaissance Company, 25th: 114, 117, 121, 181, 194

Recreation facilities: 20, 31, 50

Recruitment: 13, 19, 34, 37–38

Red Cross: 41, 50

Redd, 1st Lt. Walter W.: 112n

Reed, Sgt. Nathaniel: 169, 186, 188

Reenlistments: 34–35

Refugees: 121, 128

Regimental Combat Team, 5th: 128–29, 134–35, 159, 179

Replacements, individual

black: 47, 159–60, 188

enemy: 157

enlisted men: 41–42, 51, 159–60, 169, 183–84

for Korea: 73, 76, 159–60, 183–84

officers: 41–42, 159–60, 169, 184, 222–23, 267, 268

quality of: 24, 25–26, 41–42, 76, 160, 172

shortages of: 222

sources of: 73, 76

training of: 15, 25, 42, 61, 76, 160, 172, 183–84, 222–23,

267

for 24th Infantry: 159–60, 169, 174, 267, 268

in World War I: 15

in World War II: 24, 25–26

Republic of Korea (ROK)

assault on: 67–68

marine forces: 134–35, 157

Presidential Unit Citation: 128

Republic of Korea Army

area of responsibility: 134–35, 168, 179, 189, 190, 192, 

223–24

battle performance: 163, 164, 168, 174–75

black U.S. Army NCOs in charge of troops of: 133–34

combat effectiveness of: 82

deserters from: 129, 130

strength: 68

Task Force Min: 128

training for: 68

U.S. military advisers to: 68

Republic of Korea Army (units)

Corps

II: 85, 189, 193–94, 197, 199, 200, 208, 217

III: 189

Divisions

1st: 95, 96, 103, 108n, 193–94, 199, 200, 219–20, 236,

248–49

2d: 95, 96

6th: 68, 87, 95, 189, 219–20

7th: 189, 219–20

Republic of Korea Army (units)—Continued

8th: 84–85, 87–88, 95, 189, 219–20

Capital: 89, 95, 96, 108n

Regiments

17th: 96, 97, 100–101, 108, 109, 113, 128

18th: 89

19th: 108n

21st: 87–88

Republican Party: 21

Reserve Officer Training Corps: 185

Rhee, Syngman: 67

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C.: 22

Richmond (Virginia) Planet: 8

Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Matthew B.: 223–24, 225, 236, 237, 

238–40, 253, 254

Riley, Sgt. Jack W.: 169

Rishel, 1st Lt. Clair L.: 56n

River crossings: 230–33, 240–41, 242–45, 246n, 252, 269

Roberts, Lt. Col. Paul F.: 71, 72, 73, 95–96, 121, 136–37, 

141, 142, 148–49, 153, 165–66, 167, 170, 173–74,

229, 230, 235

Robertson, Capt. Edwin W.: 141n, 192n, 212n, 213, 215

Robinson, M. Sgt. David: 102n, 122, 165

Rocket launchers, 3.5-inch: 89, 112, 116

Roesch, Capt. Herman W.: 118

Rogue, Harold: 50, 60

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 19, 21

Roosevelt, Theodore: 12–13

Royall, Kenneth C.: 37–38, 58

Rumors

about 24th Infantry: 185–86, 266, 267

effect on performance: 120–21

effects on morale: 253

regarding attitudes toward officers: 174, 267

Rumpf, Eugene: 84

Russell, M. Sgt. Dean: 102n

Ryukyu Islands: 39

Saipan: 22, 39

Salt Lake City, Utah: 8

Samuels, Cpl. Columbus: 165

San Juan Hill, battle of: 9–10

Sanders, Pfc. Edward: 131, 132n

Sanders, Sgt. Richard: 69–70, 84, 214

Sangju: 88, 89, 95–123

Santiago, Cuba: 9

Sapenter, 2d Lt. Reginald J.: 80, 84n, 109, 113, 215

Sargent, 1st Lt. Alonzo O.: 214

Saturday Evening Post: 216, 218

Saxton, Richard W.: 45

Schools

for dependents: 49, 50

Fort Des Moines, Iowa: 13–14

Ordnance Department: 34

INDEX 291
Schools—Continued

for undereducated recruits: 35, 39, 44–45

Scott, 1st Lt. Beverly: 65

Scott, Sgt. Vernie: 192n

Secretary of war, civilian aide on Negro affairs to the: 19, 21, 

32

Segregation in the armed forces: 187, 188, 229, 269

calls for an end to: 216

during the Civil War: 4–5

effects on combat performance: 23, 123

effects on readiness: 64–65, 76, 265–66

effects of, in World War II: 23, 25, 31, 216, 263–64

end of: 159–60, 172, 184–85, 188–89, 217–18, 222–23, 

252, 258n, 261–62

and Jim Crow laws: 7, 14, 37

in military social life: 33, 34, 48–49, 50

phased out in the United States: 47, 264

of training facilities: 34

after World War II: 29, 31–32, 33, 34, 37–38, 76

Selective Service system: 13, 19

Seoul: 68, 71, 224, 225–26, 235, 236–38, 248–49, 252, 253

Shafter, Maj. Gen. William R.: 9

Shuffer, 1st Lt. George M.: 233, 234

Sibidang Mountain: 148, 162

Siboney, Cuba: 9, 10

Simmons, Edward: 164n

Simmons, Sfc. Joseph: 110n

Simonovich, Maj. Walter: 102, 212n

Sloane, Col. C. C., Jr.: 206

Smith, Sfc. Nicholas: 205

Snedecor, Capt. Dan V.: 188

Sobuk-san: 129, 134, 140, 147–48, 149, 155, 179

So-dong: 208

Sokchon: 116

South Korea. See Republic of Korea (ROK).

South Korean National Police: 147, 153, 157, 161, 162, 190,

191

Spanish-American War: 8–9, 13

Special Regulation 600–629–1: 38

Sports: 18, 51, 64

Stanley, Capt. Milford W.: 185, 202–03, 204

Stars and Stripes: 269

Stephens, 1st Lt. Randall P.: 151, 176

Stewart, Sgt. Daemon: 133

Stouffer, Samuel: 30

Stragglers: 105, 115, 119–20

accompanying wounded: 139, 142

control of: 114, 115, 117, 119, 171–72, 260

enemy: 145

north of Hant’an River: 246–47

in Pusan Perimeter: 131n, 134, 139, 140, 142–43, 144, 

148, 149, 150, 151–52, 153, 154, 164, 165, 167, 169,

171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 267–68

punishment of: 140–41, 169n, 172–73, 185–88, 260, 268

Stragglers—Continued

at Sangju: 101, 105, 113, 115, 117, 119–20

South Korean: 163, 164, 171, 172

Turkish: 249, 251–52

Strength data

for blacks in Civil War: 4–5

for blacks in Navy: 4–5

effects of straggling on: 152, 154

enemy: 68, 145, 157, 163n, 192–93

24th Infantry Division: 69

24th Infantry regiment: 27, 40, 42, 47, 61, 148n, 159–60, 

189–90, 225

25th Infantry Division: 148n, 159

World War II: 27–28

Sukch’on: 213

Sunch’on: 125, 192, 208

Supplies. See also Ammunition.

abandonment of: 111, 219

airdrops of: 154, 162–63, 196, 202, 204–05, 206, 243

antifreeze: 222

captured enemy: 183, 190, 192

clothing: 190, 199

concertina wire: 154

destruction of: 220–21

food: 41, 82, 85, 108, 154, 165, 204–05, 219

footwear: 42, 44, 199

fuel: 183, 192

medical: 162–63, 190

personal items: 44, 82

shortages of: 44, 45, 77, 82, 108, 154, 165, 190, 191, 199

transportation of: 108, 189, 191, 199

water: 154, 165

Suwon: 224–25

Swartz, Maj. Stanley P.: 242

Swift, Maj. Gen. Ira P.: 257–58, 260, 261, 269

Taebaek Mountains: 179, 254

Taejon: 83, 84, 93, 96, 183

Taejong-ni: 143–44

Taep’yong-ni: 142

Taney, Roger B.: 3n

Tank Battalions 

64th: 238–40, 261–62

79th Heavy: 64, 87, 88–89, 114, 118n, 166, 181

89th Medium: 128, 181, 183, 194, 197, 210n, 

232, 246, 254

Tanks

enemy: 68, 114, 118–19, 192

South Korean lack of: 68

U.S., captured by the enemy: 125

Tanyang: 84–85, 87

Tanyang Pass: 95

Task Forces 

Able: 87–88, 89–90, 95

292 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA
Task Forces—Continued

Baker: 153–54

Blair: 183

Dolvin: 181, 183, 194, 196–97, 199–200, 202n, 203

Kean: 134–35, 144, 145, 155, 179

Matthews: 181, 183

Min: 128

Smith: 69

Torman: 181

Wilson: 200, 202–03, 204, 207, 217, 268–69

Woolfolk: 178

Taylor, Maj. Cloyd V.: 132

Taylor, Norman: 45–46, 50

Taylor, Robert: 57

Terrain: 69n, 96, 100, 134, 145

effects on battles: 108, 112, 120, 125, 128, 129n, 136, 

138–39, 145, 147–48, 175n, 177, 197–98, 214, 217,

226–27, 236, 238, 240–41, 244, 246–47, 256–57

effects on resupply: 108, 154, 196, 199

effects on transportation: 141, 147, 196

Texas: 6

Thailand: 219–20

Thomas, Fred: 41, 42–43, 46

Thompson, Capt. Alfred F.: 117, 129, 130n

Thompson, Pfc. William: 131

Throckmorton, Lt. Col. John L.: 161, 162, 177

Thurmond, Strom: 37

Tinian: 22, 39

Tittel, 1st Lt. Alfred F.: 54, 78n, 79, 109, 113, 185, 213, 215,

243

Torman, Capt. Charles J.: 181

Training

with Air Force: 61

apparent lack of: 130, 152, 153, 171–72

basic: 29, 31, 38, 42, 61, 222–23

for black officers: 13–14, 20

for black recruits: 15–16, 18, 19, 21, 38

for black units: 59, 60–61, 74

combat: 60–61, 74

for drivers: 44

for equipment operators: 40

facilities for: 44

by French officers: 16

at Fujino-Susono Maneuver Area: 47, 61, 63, 74

at Gifu: 39

in Japan: 60–61, 65, 68–69

of KATUSAs: 160–61

for Korean War: 38

maneuvers, participation in regimental: 63–64, 74, 265, 

266–67

for noncommissioned officers: 44, 160

of North Korean soldiers: 97, 100

for occupation forces: 41, 53

officer: 29, 44, 185, 222–23

Training—Continued

on-the-job: 40, 47

for patrolling: 145

problems affecting: 40, 47, 61, 62n

qualification for: 41–42, 44–45

of replacements: 15, 25, 42, 61, 76, 160, 172, 183–84, 

222–23

and retraining: 104–05, 145, 183

for river crossings: 230

selection for: 34

for technical specialties: 34, 40, 41–42, 63, 190

of troops in Korea: 113, 183, 223, 225, 257, 258, 259n, 268

unit: 47, 61–62, 76

World War I: 13–14, 15–16

Transportation

by air: 154, 196, 202, 243

of equipment: 79–80, 81–82

on foot (of supplies): 108, 154, 196, 199, 219

and inadequacy of roads: 108, 154, 196

problems: 108, 196, 198, 199

by train: 83, 84, 85, 128, 190

by truck: 85, 88, 96, 105, 189, 190, 191, 215

by water: 79–82, 85

Trench foot: 215

Trucking units, provisional: 39, 40

Trucks

losses of: 88, 89, 92, 219

quality of: 77

shortages of: 77, 85, 191

Truman, Harry S.: 27–28, 36–37, 38, 67, 68, 70, 253, 254, 

264, 266

Trust, lack of mutual: 77, 78, 81–82, 84n, 94, 96, 168, 187, 

188, 263–64, 265, 267, 268

Tundok: 137–39, 140–41, 143, 180

Tunstall, Lt. Col. Graydon A.: 171, 176

Turkish forces: 194, 219–20, 225–26, 238–41, 243–44, 

245–47, 248–49, 250, 251–52

Turner, Henry M.: 11

Typhoon Grace: 96

Uijongbu: 257

Uiryong: 145, 157, 181

Unhung: 199

Union Army: 3–5

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 67

United Nations Security Council: 67

U.S. Army

Information and Education Division: 23–24, 56n

organization of units: 5

Preventive Medicine Section: 30

and segregated units: 4–5, 12, 15–16, 19, 20, 21, 25

U.S. Congress

and blacks in the armed forces: 4, 5, 7, 37

and Civil War: 4

INDEX 293
U.S. Military Academy: 185

U.S. Navy: 3, 4–5, 12

U.S. Supreme Court: 7

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.: 253–54

Venereal disease (VD)

effect of education programs on rate of: 35–36

factors in contracting: 30

among occupation forces: 30, 52–53, 54, 55, 64, 65, 265

prevention: 52–53

rates in Eighth Army: 35–36, 52, 53, 65, 265

treatment of: 52–53, 54

Vietnam War: 55n

Villa, Francisco “Pancho”: 12

Voight, 1st Lt. Adolf: 185, 212–13

Waco, Tex.: 14–15

Walden, Capt. Roger: 75, 103n, 114–15, 139, 153, 163, 164,

171, 198–99, 206, 208

Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H.: 60–61, 123, 125, 128, 129, 134,

175, 179, 180–81, 189, 208, 219–20, 223, 264

Wallace, Henry: 37

War Department

and military justice: 14–15

and segregation: 25, 31–32, 33

and use of black units in combat: 22, 25

Ward, Cpl. Joel T.: 46, 140, 165, 168

Ware, 2d Lt. William D.: 86, 87n, 109

Washington, Pvt. George: 10

Washington, Cpl. Reginald: 92n

Washington Afro-American: 93

Weapons

abandonment of: 105, 108, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 

130, 139, 150, 167, 169–70, 246–47

captured enemy: 183, 234

shortages of: 77

spare parts for: 68, 77

training in the use of: 153, 160, 183–84, 190

Weather: 69n

cold: 190, 191, 192, 197, 199, 204, 212, 215, 217, 219, 

221, 225

fog: 109, 113–14

heat: 96, 123, 134, 137, 154n

Weather—Continued

rain: 96, 100, 129, 140, 241

Wham, Maj. Joseph W.: 7

Whisonant, Frank: 141n, 160n, 188–89, 216

White, Col. Horton V.: 62–63, 64, 71, 73, 74–75, 77, 78, 82,

95–96, 102–03, 104, 108, 114, 117–18, 119, 121, 123,

132, 140, 172, 266

White, Levine: 249

White, Walter: 23

Whitney, Lt. Col. Richard W.: 257–58

Williams, 1st Lt. Ernest M.: 148

Williams, Pfc. Floyd B.: 141, 191n

Williams, M. Sgt. Howard “Big Boy”: 51, 139

Williams, Maj. Richard W., Jr.: 56, 105, 133, 134, 265

Willingham, Pfc. Jesse J.: 89

Wilson, L. Alex: 188–89

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Vennard: 80, 81, 85–86, 87–88, 89, 95, 

96, 103n, 105, 110, 112, 114, 117–18, 122, 123, 153,

180, 200, 202–03, 223

Wilson, Woodrow: 14

Winn, 1st Lt. Charles: 203n

Wonsan: 141–42

Woods, M. Sgt. Harry: 18

Woodward, Isaac: 36–37

Wooldridge, Maj. John R.: 79, 80, 115, 119

Woolfolk, Maj. Robert L.: 177

World War I: 13–17, 19

World War II: 18–26, 27, 56n

Wygant, Capt. Henry: 10

Wysoczynski, 1st Lt. Charles: 203n

Yadon, 1st Lt. James: 185, 210n, 212n, 213, 214, 247n

Yech’on: 84, 85–86, 87, 88, 89–90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 174, 

267

Yellow fever: 10

Yonch’on: 190, 191–92

Yongch’on-ni: 141–42

Yongbyon–Kujang-dong road: 197, 198, 199, 206

Yongbyon–Kunu-ri road: 207–08

Yongbyon-Unhung road: 207

Zanin, Capt. John B.: 63, 73–74, 87n, 88–89, 92, 103n, 110, 

129–30, 133, 137, 142

294 THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN KOREA