War Without Oil: A Catalyst For True 

Transformation 

by 

Michael J. Hornitschek, Lt Col, USAF 

17 February 2006 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 56 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 56 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 

author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US 

government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force 

Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United 

States government. 
Abstract

This monograph seeks to objectively explore the strategic energy 

leadership role the Department of Defense (DoD) can play within the 

context of its national defense mission and President Bush’s 2006 

Advanced Energy Initiative. By examining current and projected global 

energy/security environments, the energy roles of various branches of the 

Federal Government, and the unique responsibilities and characteristics of 

the DoD as America’s largest single energy consumer and security 

instrument of national power, the author analyzes whether a methodology 

exists in which the DoD can lead an immediate, coherent, and viable longterm strategy toward a vision of replacing petroleum as its primary energy 

source while maintaining all necessary strategic and operational capability 

to guarantee U.S. security to 2050 and beyond. By envisioning and 

actively creating a post-petroleum military, the DoD not only guarantees 

the “American way of war” and national security in an increasingly 

energy-insecure and complex security environment, but actually obligates 

the organization to undertake such an endeavor as a transformational 

lever, catalyzing the best of government, industry, and the private sector as 

a positive force for a more secure world. 
Table of Contents

Tables and Figures ii 

Introduction 1 

Chapter 1 – Creating a Sense of Urgency 5 

 The Big Picture 5 

 Global Oil Supply/Demand 8 

 Energy Implications for America 12 

 DoD Energy Dependencies 15 

 The National Security Strategy 19 

 The National Defense Strategy 22 

Chapter 2 – Creating a Guiding Coalition and an Assured Energy 

Vision 25 

 Leading Change 25 

 Creating the “Office of Assured Energy” 27 

 Creating an Assured Energy Vision 30 

 The Vision – DoD Petroleum Independence 

 by 2050 32 

Chapter 3 – Creating an Assured Energy Strategy 35 

 Building Strategy from a Vison 35 

 A Three Stage Approach 37 

 Stage I – 2006-2015 Near Term Strategy 38 

 Stage II – 2020-2035 Mid Term Strategy 56 

 Stage III – 2035-2050 The “New Energy Force” 61 

Conclusion 65 

Bibliography 69 

Appendix A – Peak Oil Production A-1 

Appendix B – Alternative Energy Options B-1 

Appendix C – Energy Transformation Strategy Comparison 

 C-1 

- i - 
Tables and Figures 

Tables 

1. 2004 Top 10 Petroleum Producers and Consumers 8 

2. Top Suppliers of U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum, 2004 9 

3. FY04 DoD Fuel Purchases By Service 18 

4. Peak Oil Predictions A-1 

5. Three Possible DoD Future Energy Strategies C-2 

Figures 

1. The “Big Picture” 5 

2. EIA’s Model for Conventional Oil Resources 6 

3. 36 Estimates of the Time of Peak World Oil Production 7 

4. Proven Worldwide Oil Reserves 10 

5. Worldwide Energy Consumption by Fuel Type 11 

6. World Energy Consumption by Region 12 

7. U.S. Petroleum Supply, Consumption and Imports 13 

8. 2000 U.S. Oil End Use 14 

9. 2025 U.S. Oil End Use 14 

10. A Methodology to Achieve DoD Petroleum Independence 63 

- ii - 
Introduction 

Transforming to War Without Oil 

“Keeping America competitive requires affordable 

energy. And here we have a serious problem: America 

is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable 

parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction 

is through technology” 

- President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 31 Jan 2006 1

On 31 January 2006, in his annual State of the Union Address, 

President Bush pronounced that “America is addicted to oil” and the key 

to eliminating U.S. dependence on foreign energy was through the 

application of breakthrough technologies as part of his Advanced Energy 

Initiative (AEI).2

 Focused on revolutionizing energy sources and uses for 

facilities and automotive applications, the President proposed increasing 

Department of Energy (DOE) research & development (R&D) funding by 

22 percent to accelerate technologies in clean coal consumption; nuclear 

energy; solar, wind, and bio-fuel renewables; hybrids, and fuel-cells in 

order to move beyond a petroleum-based economy.3 The President’s AEI 

represents one of the numerous energy independence proposals to surface 

on the nation’s agenda since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Despite 

decades of effort by government institutions, industry, and academia to 

free America of its petroleum “addiction,” the simple fact is that over the 

last 30 years American oil consumption has increased by one-third and 

imports have more than doubled, such that by 2025 the Energy 

Information Agency predicts that Americans will be importing 68 percent 

of their petroleum needs.4

 

Although the DoD uses only approximately 1.5 percent of the 20 

million barrels of oil consumed each day in the U.S., it is the largest single 

institutional energy customer in the United States and likely the world.5

 

Subscribing to a National Defense Strategy that values effectiveness over 

efficiency, the DoD relies upon petroleum to deliver the energy-intense 

 

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the 

bibliography.) 

1

 President Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address. 2

 Ibid. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, Figure 8. 5

 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 36 & 84. 

- 1 - 
global power projection, agile logistics, and operational maneuver 

capabilities essential to waging a dominant and uniquely high-technology 

“American way of war.” As the nation’s primary security provider, the 

DoD has a vested interest in ensuring that it possesses the uninterrupted 

energy resources needed to deter all would-be aggressors and decisively 

engage in the full spectrum of conflict, particularly as it prepares for a 

decades-long global war on terrorism. The question then becomes, how 

can the Department of Defense contribute toward the President’s goal of 

creating a petroleum-free society while simultaneously ensuring it has the 

energy and capabilities to complete its mission? 

Mankind’s long-term supply of petroleum fuel is threatened by a 

phenomenon known as Hubbert’s Peak—that point in time when the 

production of oil reaches a maximum, and then declines steadily 

thereafter. The debate about when the world will reach its Hubbert’s 

Peak has raged for decades, with many credible sources predicting dates 

which have already passed, others predicting dates within the next decade, 

and others proclaiming there will never be a peak. This discussion has 

recently intensified when ExxonMobil, the world’s largest oil company, 

achieved record profits of $36B in 20056 on all-time-high oil prices, but 

also quietly predicted in that same year that world oil production in nonOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would peak 

within 5 years.7 If this prediction is in fact true, the potential global 

geopolitical and economic consequences could be profound considering 

the effects Hurricane Katrina and Iranian nuclear brinksmanship have 

already demonstrated on an 84-million barrel/day world oil market8 in 

which 2/3 of all reserves reside in the Middle East9

 and the growth of 

emerging economies have pushed global demand to within 2 percent of 

available production capacity.10

If the U.S. were ever forced to rely upon domestic petroleum 

supplies exclusively, it only possesses enough indigenous reserves to meet 

2005-level demand for 4-5 years (equal to 2 percent of global reserves 

which includes Alaska National Wildlife Refuge supplies).11 The 

President is correct in proclaiming that technology will be necessary to 

break America’s addiction to oil. Another strong proponent of technology 

is the DoD, which has embraced its benefits as a key enabler for strategic, 

 

6

 Lynch, “ExxonMobil Amasses Record $36B 2005 Profit”, 30 Jan 2006. 7

 Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, Ireland, 14 Feb 2006. 8

 Energy Information Agency, “World Oil Balance (2001-2005)”, Table 2.1. 

9

 EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, Most Recent Estimates.” 10 Caruso, Report to U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Resources, 5. 

11 Deutch, “Think Again: Energy Independence” 20. 

- 2 - 
operational, and tactical success—a concept validated by the swift combat 

victories in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia over the last 15 years. 

However, the demand for increasingly more complex high-technology 

systems has placed the DoD at the end of increasingly long acquisition 

cycles, of which the 20+ year development of the F-22A Raptor is a 

perfect example. It is precisely the long acquisition lead times of these 

petroleum-fueled weapon systems, in conjunction with their decades-long 

life cycles (reference the 45-year-old B-52 fleet), that will uniquely force 

the DoD to be the first government agency to address an approaching 

global oil peak. 

The Department has already felt the impacts of a tight oil supply 

within the past two years. Increased global demand and Hurricane 

Katrina-induced shortages have doubled the price of a barrel of oil from 

$36 in 2003 to $73 by 2005, forcing the DoD to redirect nearly $3B of its 

FY05 budget to the detriment of other programs to cover the cost of fuel.12 

This budgetary “pain” has caused every Service to sit up and take action 

by forming senior-level focus groups aimed at exploring and 

implementing various approaches to reduce the Department’s fuel burden. 

Proposals range from promoting conservation efforts, expanding the use of 

renewable energy for base support, intensifying turbine engine efficiency 

research, and even establishing an independent DoD oil shale-to-synthetic 

fuel industry. While actionable, these various strategies appear to be 

occurring relatively independently within DoD, absent an official grand 

vision or long-term, overarching strategy to move the DoD beyond 

petroleum as the President has asked America to do. This condition also 

appears representative of the competition among future energy strategies 

vying for dominance in American society at large. 

An uncertain world energy prospect, a vital national defense 

mission, and the unique organizational capacity and situation of the 

Department of Defense invites one to ask if an opportunity exists for the 

DoD to serve as an example for a national transformation toward a new 

energy future. Based upon the first three elements of Dr. John P. Kotter’s 

popular eight-step model for organizational transformation, this paper 

presents a methodology for determining if the DoD can lead an immediate, 

coherent, and viable long-term strategy toward a vision of replacing 

petroleum as its primary energy source in order to maintain all necessary 

strategic and operational capability for U.S. security to 2050 and beyond. 

The three-part approach begins in Chapter 1 by scoping the dimensions of 

the American energy security problem to create a sense of urgency. It 

 

12 Hampton, E-mail to Author, 25 Nov 05. 

- 3 - 
continues in Chapter 2 by examining the method in which an assured 

energy guiding coalition and a DoD grand energy vision can be 

formulated within the context of the specific security responsibilities and 

desired capabilities of the DoD, as well as responsibilities of the 

Department of Energy (DOE). The methodology finishes in Chapter 3 by 

highlighting the process in which a grand strategy can be developed that 

supports a DoD new energy vision. While there are a multitude of 

possible and competing DoD energy visions suitable of separate debate, 

the analysis in this paper is accomplished under the structure of a 

conceptual three-phase hydrogen/electric-based military transformation 

strategy that supports a 2050 post-petroleum vision aligned with President 

Bush’s State of the Union goals. 

If the above methodology demonstrates a feasible approach for 

guiding DoD energy transformation to serve the Department’s own 

requirements, it can then be argued that the lessons learned and knowledge 

gained from such an endeavor could be applied toward a larger national 

energy transformation. The DoD-to-civilian transition model has been 

successfully applied in other major societal changes to include racial 

integration, sexual equality, and the benefits of networked-based 

information sharing (i.e., Arpanet/internet) to highlight a few. The 

creation of a broadly supported post-petroleum DoD vision and 

transformation strategy could not only preserve a relevant military force, 

but also lead a positive, bi-partisan, interagency, and economic 

demonstration for preserving American security overall. 

- 4 - 
Chapter 1

Creating a Sense of Urgency 

“The world is fast approaching the inevitable peaking of 

conventional oil production...(a problem) unlike any yet 

faced by the modern industrialized society.” 

- Feb 2005 DOE Report13

Figure 1 – “The Big Picture”14

Washington, D.C.

“The Big Picture” 

Two hundred million years ago the foundations of modern

civilization were laid. Not only was it the evolution of man that gave us

our world as we know it today, but also the life, death, and decay of 

nondescript vegetation, creatures, and microbes that would eventually 

become the 2 trillion barrels of crude oil man discovered and harnessed to 

write his modern history.15 How does one visualize 2 trillion barrels? 

 

13 Lynch, David. “Debate brews: Has oil production peaked?”, 4. 14 Map produced from Mapquest.com source; tank drawing added by author. 15 2 trillion barrel figure derived from EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, 

Most Recent Estimates – ‘World Oil’” estimate of 1,081T barrels remaining, plus 920B 

- 5 - 
Simple—the 76 mi3

 of oil man has ever discovered would fill a single tank 

just 5 miles across and less than 4 miles high—hardly the “Great Lakes” 

worth of oil that many may have imagined the Earth’s petroleum reserves 

to be. That 5-mile tank would fit nicely inside the 10-mile boundaries of 

Washington, D.C. and rise to an altitude of just 20,500 ft—an elevation 

equal to half of a typical passenger jet’s cruising altitude or no more than 

37 Washington Monuments (555 ft each) stacked one atop another. Now 

consider the most dramatic visualization: based upon a widely accepted 

model of peak oil production known as Hubbert’s Peak, many world 

petroleum geologists believe that by 2020 traditional global oil production 

will reach a maximum,16 followed by a predictable and potentially very 

rapid decline as depicted by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy 

Information Agency (EIA) in Figure 2 below: 

17 Figure 2 – EIA’s Model for Conventional Oil Resources

Complicating the matter is a lack of professional consensus on the 

actual expected date of global peak oil production, with credible 

organizations such a ExxonMobil predicting that the non-OPEC Hubbert’s 

Peak will arrive within 5 years18, and the U.S. Government claiming the 

planet’s absolute peak will occur somewhere around 2037, the midpoint of 

an officially estimated 45-year window: 

 

of oil consumed figure from Amidon, “America’s Strategic Imperative, A ‘Manhattan 

Project’ for Energy”, 70. 

16 See Appendix A for a complete list 

17 Caruso, “When Will Oil Production Peak?”, Slide 9. 

18 Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, Ireland, 14 Feb 2006. 

- 6 - 
19 Figure 3 – 36 Estimates of the Time of Peak World Oil Production

What cannot be disputed is that since the first drop of oil was 

discovered in 1859, 920 billion20 21 of the Earth’s 2.001 trillion barrels in 

proven conventional petroleum have been consumed building homes, 

growing food, producing plastic packaging, creating industries, running to 

the corner video rental store, and waging wars. There is now only one 

question left to answer—with a depth of only 20 Washington Monumentequivalents left, is the tank that remains half full...or is it half empty? 

 

19 Caruso, “When Will World Oil Production Peak?”, Slide 3. 

20 Amidon, “America’s Strategic Imperative, A ‘Manhattan Project’ for Energy”, 70. 

21 2 trillion barrel figure derived from EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, 

Most Recent Estimates – ‘World Oil’” estimate of 1,081T barrels remaining, plus 920B 

of oil consumed figure from Amidon, “America’s Strategic Imperative, A ‘Manhattan 

Project’ for Energy”, 70. 

- 7 - 
Global Oil Supply/Demand

22 Table 1 – 2004 Top 10 Petroleum Producers and Consumers

Each day mankind consumes approximately 84M barrels of oil 

exchanged through a global commodities market that maintains a 

supply/demand equilibrium through the fluctuations of a single trade 

price.23 An immediate observation from Table 1 is that Saudi Arabia and 

Russia occupy the #1 and #2 producer positions ahead of the United 

States, and that of the top 10 producer countries listed, only Mexico, 

Norway, and Canada can be considered strategically reliable sources for 

the U.S... Furthermore, amongst major consumers, only Russia, Canada, 

and Brazil are petroleum self-sufficient. This imbalance highlights the 

fact that the majority of nations rely upon some form of petroleum imports 

to satisfy domestic energy needs; for example, the U.S. imports 53 percent 

of daily demand (25 percent of which comes from OPEC, with 60 percent 

of that amount imported from Saudi Arabia), China 44 percent, Germany 

93 percent, and Japan, South Korea, and France import virtually all their 

oil.24 The top fifteen U.S. oil suppliers are: 

 

22 EIA, “Top Oil Producers, 2004” and “Top Oil Consumers, 2004”. 

23 EIA, “World Oil Balance (2001-2005)”, Table 2.1. 

24 Deutch, “Think Again: Energy Independence” 20. 

- 8 - 
Crude Rank Country Products Total Oil

1 Canada 1,616 522 2,138 

2 Mexico 1,598 66 1,665 

Saudi 

Arabia 3 1,495 63 1,558 

4 Venezuela 1,297 258 1,554 

5 Nigeria 1,078 62 1,140 

6 Iraq 655 1 656 

7 Algeria 215 237 452 

United 8 238 142 380 Kingdom 

Virgin 

Islands 9 0 330 330 

10 Angola 306 10 316 

11 Russia 158 140 298 

12 Kuwait 241 9 250 

13 Ecuador 232 13 245 

14 Norway 143 101 244 

15 Colombia 142 34 176 

 Total 10,088 3,057 13,145

Persian 

Gulf ** 2,400 93 2,493 

25 Table 2 – Top Suppliers of U.S. Crude Oil and Petroleum, 2004 

(Thousand barrels/day) 

While the U.S. is the third leading oil producer, it does not enjoy a 

podium position when it comes to known oil reserves—a much greater 

measure of long-term energy vulnerability. Figure 4 depicts global oil 

reserve distribution (note – Canada’s 178B barrels includes 4.3B barrels of 

conventional crude and 174B barrels of synthetic oil to be potentially 

derived from tar sands):26

 

25 EIA; “Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products into the United States by Country, 

2004.”, Table 21. 

26 EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, Most Recent Estimates.” Table 

footnotes 2 – 4. 

- 9 - 
27 Figure 4 – Proven World Oil Reserves

Saudi Arabia’s 262B bbls, together with OPEC’s additional 449+B 

bbls, represent 68+ percent of known oil reserves.28 Russia, Venezuela, 

and Nigeria together control the next major share, at 14 percent.29 What 

this means for the U.S., which possesses only 2 percent of the world’s 

reserves (including Alaska National Wildlife Reserves), is that if it were 

forced to consume only domestic oil starting tomorrow, pumping the 

additional 4 billion barrels a year over current levels would deplete the 

country’s supplies within 4-5 years.30 Most of America’s declared allies 

would last only months on internal reserves. The simple consequence is 

that because Western economies depend on foreign oil, today the U.S. and 

its allies cannot unilaterally control their own economic and physical 

securities. 

Global reserve figures fluctuate with the discovery of new oil 

fields and extraction technologies—an activity directly related to the 

profitability of each barrel of oil. Easily discovered and recovered oil is 

produced first, while more difficult sites are only identified or developed 

when technically and financially feasible. This basic condition leads to a 

reduction in discoveries over time. The fact that 80 percent of today’s oil 

reserves were discovered before 1973 supports this simple model.31 

 

27 Caruso, “World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 18. 

28 EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, Most Recent Estimates.” 

29 EIA, “World Proved Reserves of Oil and Gas, Most Recent Estimates.” 30 Deutch, “Think Again: Energy Independence” 20. 

31 Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves, Strategic Significance of 

America’s Oil Shale Resource; Assessment of Strategic Issues. 7. 

- 10 - 
Additionally, reserves are being depleted at three times the discovery 

rate32 and since 2000 the cost of finding and developing new oil sources 

has risen about 15 percent annually.33 

Possessing accurate international reserve data is extremely 

important in the development of national security strategy—it defines 

acceptable near- and long-term energy dependence risks, international 

relationships, and economic/military structures for each nation on Earth. 

Herein lies great uncertainty, in that many countries withhold reserve 

information or may actually inflate values to obtain economic or 

diplomatic leverage. The obvious conclusion is that public world oil 

reserve prediction is both and an imprecise art and a science, encouraging 

prudence when it comes to performing national security calculations. 

Reserve data itself only becomes meaningful when applied against 

projected consumption rates. DOE’s EIA tracks, analyzes, and predicts 

global energy supply and demand. EIA Administrator, Mr. Guy Caruso, 

predicted that, “Worldwide energy consumption will grow by 57 percent 

between 2002 and 2025, at an average annual growth rate of 2 percent, 

with the strongest growth in the emerging economies, particularly in 

Asia.34 World oil demand will grow from 78 to 119 million barrels per 

day, with the United States and emerging Asia, including China and India, 

accounting for 64 percent of the growth.”35 

36 Figure 5 – Worldwide Energy Consumption by Fuel Type

 

32 Ibid. 

33 Lynch, David. “Debate brews: Has oil production peaked?”, 2 

34 Caruso, ”World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 2. 

35 Caruso, ”World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 2. 

36 Caruso, ”World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 9. 

- 11 - 
As a result of globalization, the ability of individuals in emerging 

economies (such as China) to rapidly improve their quality of life has 

exploded in the last 10 years, which when combined with projected 

population growth patterns reveals a first-of-it’s-kind event in human 

history: emerging economies will overtake the energy needs of 

economically mature and transitional (i.e. former Communist) economies 

by 2020, with potentially profound socio-political consequences for the 

world.

37 Figure 6 – World Energy Consumption by Region

Energy Implications for America 

This type of mushrooming emerging-economy demand elevates 

prices and precisely collides with a growing U.S. demand for imported oil. 

U.S. demand is expected to grow by 37 percent (1.5 percent per year) in 

the next 20 years to a total of 27.9M bbls/day in 2025, at which point it 

will be importing 68 percent of its oil.38 The EIA chart in Figure 7 most 

clearly illustrates America’s expected oil future: 

 

37 Caruso, ”World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 6. 

38 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee; and Deutch, “Think 

Again: Energy Independence” 20. 

- 12 - 
39 Figure 7 – U.S. Petroleum Supply, Consumption and Imports

What are the U.S. military consequences of this situation? First, as 

the world’s largest single oil consumer, the DoD will pay significantly 

more to sustain its daily operations. Whereas the temporary 1973 and 

1980 energy crises were politically motivated, OPEC-engineered, supply 

shortages that self-corrected after world demand constricted and nonOPEC suppliers expanded production, the 2005 energy situation appears 

semi-permanent, with global demand essentially equaling available global 

production capacity. EIA reported that in 2005 surplus global oil 

production capacity was only 1.5M bbls/day, less than 2 percent above the 

daily 84M bbl/day demand.40 Consequently, Goldman Sachs expects oil 

to remain at $60+ a bbl for at least the next 5 years—indicating that a new 

oil equilibrium in world oil prices has been reached.41 Acute regional 

crises such as another Gulf Coast Katrina-style weather event, a terrorist 

destruction of the 5M-barrel/day Saudi Ras Tanura petroleum processing 

facility42, or a UN-sponsored embargo of Iran, could also temporarily 

drive the price of oil to as high as $131 per barrel.43 The second and 

greater significance of a permanently tightening global energy market is 

that precisely when the energy cost of national security is rising, by 2025 

DoD’s activities and America’s foreign policy could be ever more dictated 

by the requirement to secure the 68+ percent share of oil it needs to 

acquire internationally. 

 

39 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, Figure 8. 

40 Caruso, Statement to Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 41 “Oil and the Global Economy, Counting the Cost.” The Economist. 42 Amidon, “America’s Strategic Imperative, A ‘Manhattan Project’ for Energy”, 72. 

43 Zarocostas, “Skyrocketing Costs Feared in Nuke Standoff.” 

- 13 - 
The simple fact is that America’s (and the world’s) economic and 

physical health are dependent upon a fragile oil lifeline. While this system 

is so distributed that it would be virtually impossible to ever destroy it in 

its entirety, the evaporation of excess global production capacity in the 

past decade ensures that any major disruption (2M bbls/day or more) in 

one area, cannot be compensated for by increasing production in another. 

It is important to understand how the U.S. economy and military depend 

upon oil so that when shortages do occur, military leaders are 

knowledgeable about the challenges they will face. 

The major end use for oil in the U.S. should be a surprise for no 

one: transportation. Figure 8 from Winning the Oil Endgame best 

describes this situation. In 2000, America consumed approximately twothirds of its 19.7M barrels of oil per day for all forms of transportation—

by 2025 this percentage is expected rise to 73 percent of a total 28.3M 

bbl/day consumption rate (see Figure 9)44. 

45 Figure 8 – 2000 U.S. Oil End Use 

46 Figure 9 - 2025 U.S. Oil End Use

 

44 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 36.. 45 Ibid. 

46 Ibid. 

- 14 - 
These statistics reinforce the observation that it is difficult to 

replace petroleum-based fuels as a source of mobility for American 

society—the combination of relatively low production cost and high 

energy density make it very attractive for this purpose. Mobility allows 

America to take advantage of its natural resources, entrepreneurial spirit, 

and intellectual capacity to become the world’s economic and military 

leader. In addition to transportation uses, the remaining one third of 

petroleum powers America’s industrial engine, heats and electrifies its 

buildings, and most importantly, forms the industrial feedstock to produce 

a wide variety of organic compounds, the most significant of which is the 

family of plastics and fertilizers. 

DoD Energy Dependencies 

In addition to the direct consumption of petroleum to power 

combat systems, there are four under-recognized DoD petroleum 

dependencies: 1) military industrial supply, 2) contractor support, 3) 

commercial logistics, and 4) installation requirements. While most policy 

makers and analysts will focus on the 1.5 percent of national petroleum 

consumption directly used by the DoD when studying DoD petroleum 

dependency (94 percent of which is for mobility/transportation),47 this 

approach ignores the indirect dependencies of a highly intertwined 

military/industrial complex necessary for modern high-technology 

warfare. While it may be virtually impossible to quantify and categorize 

the amount of petroleum specifically required to create/support every 

activity or procured end item within DoD, the fact that DoD relies upon an 

industrial base for medical syringes, M-16s, and C-17 parts serves to 

illustrate that the DoD is just as reliant upon petroleum-fueled civilian and 

governmental institutions as the rest of American society. Recognizing 

the fact that fueling national defense goes beyond just the direct use of 

petroleum by armed forces and into a much deeper supply chain 

dependency is fundamental to understanding the vulnerability of 

America’s security to strategic petroleum supply disruptions or declines. 

This military/industrial dependency necessarily links civilian and military 

future energy solutions. 

The second under-recognized DoD petroleum dependency exists in 

the realm of increasingly ubiquitous contractor support. DoD relies upon 

service contractors to fulfill a broad spectrum of requirements ranging 

from base maintenance to military interrogations. With the exception of 

DoD-provided combat zone fuel, the vast majority of DoD service 

 

47 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 36. 

- 15 - 
contracts expect the contractor to independently acquire all fuels necessary 

to fulfill his obligations. This presents another accounting category that is 

not represented on DoD total fuel tally sheets nor is it easily projected into 

the minds of military leaders as a potential Achilles’ heel should their 

contractors ever be unable to economically or physically purchase fuel 

during a strategic or even operational energy shortage or crisis. 

The third under-recognized DoD petroleum dependency is in 

commercial logistics. DoD possesses one of the greatest organic mobility 

fleets in the world, for which the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) 

and Service fuel managers diligently supply and track fuel usage. What is 

often ignored in determining total national security energy requirements, 

however, is the fuel required to transport military supply chain materials 

within the industrial production cycle and then from the factory to the 

point of military possession. Similarly, fuel used by contract commercial 

air carriers, Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants, and oceanic shippers to 

shuttle DoD personnel and material to/from deployments or on routine 

business does not receive an entry on military fuel balance sheets. While 

it is virtually impossible to precisely tabulate the amount of transportation 

fuel used by the civilian sector to support the DoD, suffice it to say that 

some non-negligible civilian portion of the 67.8 percent of U.S. oil used 

for transportation in Figures 8 & 9 is used to directly or indirectly support 

DoD operations 

The final under-recognized defense petroleum dependency is in 

installation requirements. While most permanent U.S. military 

installations rely upon commercially purchased coal- or natural gas-fueled 

electricity or heat, expeditionary bases rely upon petroleum-fueled organic 

power production because of their temporary nature and high security 

requirements. Today’s increasingly electrified forces demand large 

quantities of uninterruptible power to support critical garrison, command 

and control, and expeditionary functions. Even where reliably safe 

commercial electrical power is available in the U.S., mission critical 

functions utilize diesel back-up generators to guarantee uninterrupted 

power. The implication then is that any DoD future energy strategy must 

also address how to provide installation power in a petroleum-constrained 

environment, regardless of whether it is in an austere forward deployed 

location, or in the U.S. after a natural gas “Hubbert’s Peak” that occurs 

within only a few years of petroleum’s peak (EIA expects U.S. domestic 

natural gas production to peak in 2015).48 As will be discussed later in this 

paper, the similarities between permanent base energy requirements and 

 

48 Caruso, Statement Before the Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee. 

- 16 - 
their civilian institutional counterparts provides the DoD with a double 

opportunity to immediately leverage commercial advances against 

installation energy vulnerabilities and then again by applying this same 

progress toward solving more demanding expeditionary base energy 

vulnerabilities. 

Having explored the four under-recognized forms of DoD 

petroleum dependence and vulnerability, the more obvious question can 

now be asked of how much and in what way does the DoD depend upon 

petroleum to directly complete its combat mission? Few would disagree 

that combat is one the most energy intense activities known to man. The 

military depends on oil to provide agility, global power projection, and 

focused logistics.49 It must also be able to rapidly produce and sustain 

these effects in maximum performance scenarios, under broad climate 

extremes, and in hostile fire situations—criteria for which petroleum fuels 

are typically well suited. The two most recent U.S. military operations 

serve as perfect examples of the fuel required to sustain decisive combat 

activities. In its FY04 Fact Book, the Defense Energy Support Center 

(DESC) reports that between Oct 2001 and Sep 2003 Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM required 2.6M gallons (61,500 bbls) of fuel a 

day and between Mar 2003 and Sep 2004 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

consumed 1.06M gallons (25,300 bbls) a day.50 

A review of the last 60 years of American military doctrine reveals 

a heavy emphasis on airpower as either a stand-alone strategic instrument 

or as a complement to ground forces that can gain, achieve, and then 

exploit air superiority to maximize terrestrial opportunities. Airpower 

leverages inherent surprise, maneuverability, mobility, and the ability to 

mass firepower to overwhelm an enemy and reduce risk to one’s own 

forces. This American-perfected and synergistic air-land dominance 

comes at great energy cost, and by studying the DESC FY04 Fact Book 

one can identify some force structure vulnerabilities that would quickly 

manifest themselves should the U.S. military ever find itself in a 

strategically or operationally constrained petroleum environment. The 

first clue can be found in the breakdown of total fuels used in DoD. 

Accounting for $5B of the Department’s $437B FY04 budget, DESC 

procured 134M barrels of liquid fuel (370,000 barrels/day), of which 75 

percent or 101M barrels were some form of aviation fuel (JP-4, JP-5, JP-8, 

or Jet A).51 

 

49 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, xi. 50 Defense Energy Support Center, DESC FY2004 Fact Book, 5. 51 Ibid, 21. 

- 17 - 
US Marine Service Air Force US Navy US Army Corps 

Fuel 

Purchased 

($ millions) 

$2,841 $1,627 $440 $23 

52 Table 3 – FY04 DoD Fuel Purchases By Service

By combining the Air Force’s $2,841M bill with the $722M JP-5 portion 

of the Navy’s $1,627M bill53, and other smaller Army and USMC 

amounts, Table 3 reveals that in fact 75 percent of DoD’s petroleum 

purchases went to fuel aircraft and some ships, with the Air Force 

accounting for 57 percent of the total DoD bill in FY04.54 Deeper 

analysis reveals that of the Air Force’s $2.8B aviation fuel bill, 54 percent 

went to mobility air forces, 38 percent went to combat air forces, and the 

remaining 8 percent was consumed by aircrew training and other aviation 

operations.55 The fact that 8 of 10 entries on DESC’s list of Top Ten 

Customers for FY04 are air mobility bases56 seemingly confirms that air 

mobility (airlift and air refueling) is the single most petroleum-intense 

activity within DoD, making focused logistics and dominant maneuver the 

most energy-vulnerable dimensions within DoD’s vision of full spectrum 

dominance for Joint Vision 2025. 

It is at this point that operational commanders and future force 

planners should take note of the petroleum dependencies of their systems 

and contemplate the loss of combat power or force multipliers during 

hypothetical conditions of extreme fuel constraint (conceivably created by 

asymmetrical attack, large-scale fuel contamination, or limited future 

global availability). Taking a quick scroll through today’s weapon 

systems inventory, it is not unreasonable to visualize that in the 

hypothetically extreme case of 100 percent expeditionary fuel nonavailability, only nuclear submarines (nuclear aircraft carriers are 

relatively useless without jet fuel), missile forces, space forces, cyber 

forces, and certain self-sufficient special operations forces could likely 

operate in a petroleum-free environment. In the case of a 75 percent 

severely constrained petroleum environment, perhaps only light infantry 

that could “live off the land” would be persistent. In a 50 percent, 

medium-fuel-constrained environment, sea shipping, light-medium ground 

 

52 Defense Energy Support Center, DESC FY2004 Fact Book, 18. 53 Defense Energy Support Center, DESC FY2004 Fact Book,, 20. 54 Ibid, 18. 

55 Sega, “Air Force Energy Strategy for the 21st Century”, Slide 5. 56 Defense Energy Support Center, DESC FY2004 Fact Book, 50. 

- 18 - 
forces, and some limited range combat air support might be available. In a 

25 percent, mildly constrained-fuel environment the greatest shortfall 

would likely be in air mobility followed by combat air support (a potential 

issue for a U.S. Army that has committed to reducing field artillery in 

exchange for reliance on air power to provide indirect fire effects). The 

only way to be scientifically confident of the impact that various levels of 

fuel constraint would place upon U.S. operational forces would be to 

conduct a purpose-built modeling simulation that specifically asks this 

question—an endeavor that sources polled by this author in OSD(AT&L), 

Joint Staff/J4, Joint Forces Command/J3 & J9, Sandia National 

Laboratory, the U.S. Army Battle Command Training Center, and Air 

Force Research Laboratory offices indicates has not yet occurred. This 

vulnerability/capabilities drill demonstrates that the effectiveness of 

necessary JV2025 dominant maneuver, focused logistics, precision 

engagement, full dimension protection, and information security concepts 

following a possible Hubbert’s Peak will be dependent upon the force 

structure and energy security decisions DoD policy makers elect to make 

today. 

 

The National Security Strategy

Before setting out to create a future energy vision and strategy for 

the DoD, it is important to understand America’s basic envisioned security 

future and credible threats to it, the best grand strategy to counter those 

threats, and then analyze how dependent that strategy is upon known and 

projected energy supplies so that adjustments can be made if necessary. 

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the President’s cornerstone 

document for articulating America’s perceived threats and how he expects 

to protect the nation. The NSS provides broad strategy for both near- and 

long-term threats, while enabling subordinate documents such as the 

DoD’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy (NMS) to identify ever more 

detailed approaches for converting strategy into actionable security. 

Examining these documents provides a framework within which to study 

America’s future defense requirements and how they relate to the subject 

of assured energy. 

In his most recent NSS (2002) President Bush acknowledges that: 57 

Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and 

fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. 

Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the 

 

57 Bush, The National Security Strategy, Introduction. 

- 19 - 
past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to 

endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals 

can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less 

than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are 

organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power 

of modern technologies against us.58

America is now threatened less by conquering states than 

we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and 

armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the 

embittered few. We must defeat these threats to our Nation, 

allies, and friends59

We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a 

safer, better world alone. The United States is committed to 

lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World 

Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, 

and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. 

.

To achieve the goals of political and economic freedom, peaceful relations 

with other states, and respect for human dignity, the strategy of the United 

States is to: 60

• Champion aspirations for human dignity 

• Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to 

prevent attacks against us 

 and our friends 

• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts 

• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our 

friends, with weapons of 

 mass destruction 

• Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets 

and free trade 

• Expand the circle of development by opening societies and 

building the infrastructure of 

 democracy 

• Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers 

of global power 

• Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the 

challenges and 

 opportunities of the twenty-first century 

 

58 Ibid. 

59 Ibid, 1. 

60 Ibid, 1-2. 

- 20 - 
 These NSS excerpts infer the following tasks for the DoD: 1) be 

prepared to cooperate with friends and allies to prevent WMD or other 

attacks, 2) be prepared to help diffuse regional conflicts, 3) protect the 

foundations of free markets and trade, and 4) be prepared to transform to 

meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. In essence, 

these strategic defense responsibilities become the DoD’s mission—how 

well these tasks are accomplished become the standards of performance 

against which any present or future force will be measured, regardless of 

whether it is petroleum or alternatively fueled. It is an ongoing 

responsibility of force structure planners to create a capable and relevant 

force not only for today, but to 2050 and beyond. 

Before creating a defense energy strategy from the NSS, it would 

also be prudent to incorporate the President’s guidance with regards to 

strategic energy security. On this matter the NSS states: 61

We will strengthen our own energy security and the shared 

prosperity of the global economy by working with our allies, 

trading partners, and energy producers to expand the sources and 

types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western 

Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. We 

will also continue to work with our partners to develop cleaner 

and more energy efficient technologies.

And under the strategy for reducing carbon dioxide emissions to slow 

global warming the NSS promotes: 62

Renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as well 

as nuclear power— 

which produces no greenhouse gas emissions, while also 

improving fuel economy for 

U.S. cars and trucks 

Increasing spending on research and new conservation 

technologies, to a total of $4.5 

billion—the largest sum being spent on climate change by any 

country in the world and 

a $700 million increase over last year’s budget. 

While the four-year-old NSS does not appear to directly discuss the risk of 

a growing reliance on increasingly scarce foreign energy, the President’s 

 

61 Bush, The National Security Strategy, 19. 62 Ibid, 20. 

- 21 - 
2006 State of the Union Address updates this concept by elevating the 

security imperative of eliminating foreign energy dependence.63 

The National Defense Strategy 

 The DoD is the primary organization charged with ensuring 

America’s external physical security. The Secretary of Defense translates 

the President’s NSS into a National Defense Strategy that guides DoD 

thought and action. DoD’s specific strategic objectives are to: 1) secure 

the US from direct attack, 2) secure strategic access and retain global 

freedom of action, 3) strengthen alliances and partnerships, and 4) 

establish favorable security conditions.64 Force structure builders 

recognize that securing the US from direct attack requires possessing the 

means to 1) gather superior intelligence and 2) deter and defend against 

identified threats; securing strategic access and global freedom of action 

requires possessing the means to 3) ensure uncontested movement on the 

seas, in the air, in space, and cyberspace; strong alliances and partnerships 

requires the means to 4) provide material assistance and 5) directly aid a 

threatened friend while simultaneously satisfying the first two 

requirements; and finally, establishing a favorable security environment 

requires the means to 6) respond rapidly to world developments. 

 To accomplish the objectives of assuring allies and friends, 

dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression/countering coercion, 

and defeating adversaries when necessary, the NDS implementation 

guidelines advocate the use of an active and layered defense, continuous 

transformation, a capabilities approach, and risk management to guarantee 

success.65 66 This strategy is built upon several important assumptions:

1. The U.S. will retain a resilient network of alliances and 

partnerships 

2. The U.S. will have no global peer competitor and will remain 

unmatched in traditional military capability 

3. The U.S. will maintain important advantages in other elements of 

national power—e.g., political, economic, technological and 

cultural. 

4. The U.S.’s capacity to address global security concerns alone will 

be insufficient 

 

63 President Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address. 64, DoD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 1. 65 DoD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 1. 66 Ibid 

- 22 - 
5. Natural forces of inertia and resistance to change will constrain 

military transformation. 

The NDS unequivocally states that the U.S. cannot achieve its defense 

objectives alone—the concept of active, layered defense includes 

international partners.67 This admission and the assumption that the U.S. 

will work through a network of alliances and partnerships necessarily 

dictates that any national defense/energy analysis must include the energy 

limitations or strengths of those aligned nations, many of which are 

significantly worse off than the U.S. 

The U.S. also assumes no current global peer competitor or 

traditional military equal. This is certainly the case in 2006, but it would 

be foolish to assume the same for 2050 since the U.S. cannot unilaterally 

control the power rise of every nation on Earth—the U.S. can only control 

the level of effort it will expend to maintain its sole super power position. 

Since superpowers typically seek to maintain their strength through 

various forms of innovation68, it is not unreasonable to assume the 

presence of technological advantages for the U.S.—but, it is an 

assumption that can only be made if one also expects the rate of American 

innovation to exceed that of security competitors—another security 

concern raised by President Bush in his 2006 State of the Union 

Address.69 Finally, the NDS strategy correctly recognizes that 

institutional inertia will act to resist the NSS’s guidance to transform 

ahead of emerging threats. 

 Based on these assumptions, the NDS strategy for achieving an 

active, layered, defense is to possess several key operational capabilities:70

1. Protect critical bases of operation 

2. Operate from the global commons 

3. Project and sustain forces in distant, anti-access environments 

4. Improve proficiency against irregular challenges 

5. Increase capabilities of partners—international and domestic 

These capabilities must exist so that when deterrence fails or efforts short 

of military action do not forestall gathering threats, the U.S. can employ 

military power with other instruments of national power to swiftly defeat

adversaries and achieve decisive, enduring results.71 In all cases the DoD 

 

67 Ibid, 10 

68 Kluz, Theodore M. (USAF Air War College Professor), interviewed by author, 3 Oct 

2005. 

69 Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address. 70 DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America12. 71 Ibid, 17. 

- 23 - 
plans to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of 

military operations.72 Operational experience since 1990 also indicates 

that the DoD should no longer expect to fight in place, but rather it should 

plan to surge from a global posture to respond to crises.73 DoD’s goal is 

to develop greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing 

agility and by not concentrating military forces in a few locations.74 The 

U.S. sees itself operating with increasingly rotational forces in four 

forward regions: 1) Europe, 2) Northeast Asia, 3) the East Asian Littoral, 

and 4) the Middle East-Southwest Asia.75 

Using words such as “swiftly defeat”, “seize the initiative”, “surge 

from a global posture”, “emphasizing agility” and “increasingly rotational 

forces” indicates that the U.S. defense strategy relies heavily upon highenergy strategic mobility and operational/tactical maneuverability. The 

conclusion that can be drawn from this NSS and NDS review is that to 

remain secure the U.S. will need to be both proactively engaged and ready 

to respond globally on a moment’s notice against the full spectrum of 

threats—including non-warfare events such as humanitarian crises and 

natural disasters. In 2006, the military capabilities providing this security 

are powered predominantly by liquid petroleum fuels. Acknowledging an 

uncertain global petroleum future and the uniquely energy-intense nature 

of modern warfare, the question then becomes, how does the U.S. envision 

the military force of 2050 to be reliably fueled and configured to 

provide the security America requires? 

 

72 Ibid, 8 

73 Ibid, 18. 

74 Ibid, 18. 

75 DOD, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 17. 

- 24 - 
Chapter 2 

Developing a Guiding Coalition and an 

Assured Energy Vision

“By applying the talent and technology of 

America, this country can dramatically 

improve our environment, move beyond a 

petroleum-based economy, and make our 

dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of 

the past.” 

President George W. Bush, 2006 State of the Union 

Address76

Leading Change 

In his popular book, Leading Change, renowned Harvard 

Business School professor John P. Kotter advocates an eight-step 

process for leading institutional change:77 

1. Establish a sense of urgency 

2. Create a guiding coalition 

3. Develop a vision and strategy 

4. Communicate the change vision 

5. Empower employees for broad-based action 

6. Generate short-term wins 

7. Consolidate gains and produce more change 

8. Anchor new approaches in the culture 

Dr. Kotter’s approach would seem to indicate that a structure exists 

to guide successful organizational transformation. While all eight 

steps are fundamental for creating lasting change, this paper seeks 

to consider only the first three—establishing a sense of urgency, 

creating a guiding coalition, and developing a vision and 

strategy—as a basis for answering the question of whether DoD 

can lead a long-term energy conversion vision and strategy in order 

to remain relevant to 2050 and beyond. 

Chapter 1 of this paper was intended to highlight the type 

of data necessary for generating a sense of urgency within the 

minds of policy decision makers. Acquiring a sense of urgency 

regarding any problem is a personal event, something strategic 

leaders must individually develop based on their perception of how 

facts and trends within a particular context might combine to 

negatively affect an organization’s goals. Without a basic belief 

by senior leadership that an organization’s fundamental mission is 

 

76 Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address. 77 Kotter, Leading Change, Table of Contents. 

- 25 - 
at risk, it is likely that little, if any, transformation will result, 

regardless of the organization. 

Once a senior leader believes that his organization’s 

mission is threatened and that corrective action is warranted, 

Kotter suggests that the next step is to form a guiding coalition that 

will develop a vision and a strategy toward a better future.78 

Building upon the previous chapter’s presentation of energy data, 

NDS assumptions, and required key operational capabilities, this 

chapter examines a methodology in which senior defense leaders 

could conceptually assemble an effective guiding coalition 

responsible for creating the vision of defense energy 

transformation. According to Dr. Kotter, the strong coalition is 

necessary: 

Because major change is so difficult to accomplish, 

a powerful force is required to sustain the process. 

No one individual, even a monarch-like leader, is 

ever able to develop the right vision, communicate 

it to large numbers people, eliminate all of the 

obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and 

manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new 

approaches deep in the organization’s culture. A 

strong guiding coalition is always needed—one 

with the right composition, level of trust, and shared 

objective.79 

Furthermore, building a coalition that can make change happen 

requires finding the right people, creating trust between them, and 

then allowing them to develop a common goal.80 Bottom-line, a 

guiding coalition must function as a championship team. 

The first step in forming a winning assured energy team is 

to include representatives of the major elements inside and out of 

the DoD who would play a fundamental role or be fundamentally 

affected by an energy transformation. The list would include such 

easy choices as highly motivated strategic leaders in the 

operations, plans, and logistics communities, the science and 

technology research and development community, the acquisition 

community, and leaders of individual Service energy senior focus 

groups. Less obvious might be the public affairs community 

needed to effectively market an energy vision and transition 

 

78 Kotter, Leading Change, 52. 79 Ibid, 51-52. 

80 Ibid, 66. 

- 26 - 
strategy, the budget and programming community to advise and 

execute programming decisions, and representatives of key interagencies such the Department of Energy, the National Science 

Foundation, or the Environmental Protection Agency to provide 

specific expertise. These members would all serve in full-time 

positions, while additional expertise could be provided through 

outside consultations or partnerships with industry and academia. 

 Because of the potentially profound Department-wide 

scope that that an energy transformation could entail, and the 

typical institutional resistance to transformational change 

acknowledged in Chapter 1’s review of NDS assumptions, the 

guiding coalition would need to occupy a position of significant 

authority within the organization such that coalition decisions 

could be sufficiently respected and executed within all elements of 

the Department. Such authority is best exercised in close 

proximity to the strategic leader forming the guiding coalition, 

which in this case would mean an office no less than that of an 

undersecretary. 

Creating the “Office of Assured Energy” 

Proposing a high-level agency to lead energy 

transformation is not without precedence. In a December 2005 

pre-decision proposal to USD(AT&L), Dr. Theodore Barna, 

Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense/Advanced Systems 

and Concepts, recommended that DoD establish an Energy, Power, 

and Fuels Office (EPFO) of Service, OSD, and interagency 

representatives to lead a multi-faceted approach for military energy 

security focused primarily on synthetic fuels production called the 

Assured Fuels Initiative 81 This EPFO represents the type of 

“guiding coalition” that Dr. Kotter recommends. However, by 

broadening the scope of Dr. Barna’s proposal beyond synthetic 

fuels to include all forms of military energy, it may be 

advantageous to elevate the EPFO synthetic fuels office that Dr. 

Barna recommends into an all-encompassing DoD future energy 

guiding coalition, designated as the OSD “Office of Assured 

Energy”, or USD(AE). This permanent office, in cooperation with 

force structure developers, would possess the overarching mission 

and authority to lead a comprehensive 40+ year DoD energy 

transformation strategy toward the vision of a petroleum-free 

combat force that is relevant to 2050 and beyond. With the full 

 

81 Barna, Power and Energy, A Plan for Reducing DoD’s Reliance on Foreign 

Oil and Assuring DoD’s Continued Access to Energy, 1-6. 

- 27 - 
support of the Secretary, the President, and Congress, this new 

office would be the driving force for DoD cultural and physical 

change vertically down to the lowest level of the organization, 

while simultaneously ensuring that the DoD both provides and 

receives maximum horizontal interagency support to meet DoD 

objectives as part of a larger and more aggressive national energy 

independence agenda. 

Expecting to create additional bureaucracy or another 

undersecretary position without institutional skepticism would be 

unrealistic. One of the loudest arguments would be that 

government energy leadership belongs in the hands of the $24B-ayear82 Department of Energy (DOE) whose mission is “to advance 

the national, economic, and energy security of the United States; to 

promote scientific and technological innovation in support of that 

mission, and to ensure the environmental cleanup of the national 

nuclear weapons complex.”83 Examination of the energy security 

and scientific research strategic goals within the DOE’s 2003 

Strategic Plan:84

Goal 4. ENERGY SECURITY: Improve energy 

security by developing technologies that foster a diverse 

supply of reliable, affordable, and environmentally 

sound energy by providing for reliable delivery of 

energy, guarding against energy emergencies, exploring 

advanced technologies that make a fundamental 

improvement in our mix of energy options, and 

improving energy efficiency. 

Goal 5. WORLD-CLASS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 

CAPACITY: Provide world-class scientific research 

capacity needed to: ensure the success of Department 

missions in national and energy security; advance the 

frontiers of knowledge in physical sciences and areas of 

biological, medical, environmental, and computational 

sciences; or provide world-class research facilities for 

the Nation’s science enterprise. 

reveals that when it comes to energy, the DOE is an institution that 

focuses primarily on science and technology R&D—the 

Department’s affirmation that its principle tool for implementing 

 

82 DOE, Department of Energy Budget by Appropriation, 18. 83 DOE, The Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 1,3. 84 DOE, The Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 4. 

- 28 - 
policy is conducting the high-risk, high-value energy R&D at 24 

world-renowned national research laboratories and facilities that 

the private sector alone would not or could not develop in a 

market-driven economy confirms this observation.85 For the DoD 

assured-energy strategist then, it is important to realize that the 

DOE performs its mission for a broad national cliental, not just the 

DoD. In this context, DOE’s natural focus and obligation is to 

perform basic research with the broadest potential impact (further 

reinforced in the Energy Policy Act of 2005). It is then up to 

individuals, corporations, institutions, and governments to apply 

this newly acquired knowledge for the greatest national benefit in a 

free-market system. DOE makes this relationship very clear in its 

strategic plan:86 

It is the role of the Federal Government to promote 

competitive energy markets, not to choose the energy 

sources for the country, now or in the future. The 

Department’s aim is to assist the private sector where 

appropriate to develop technologies capable of 

providing a diverse supply of reliable, affordable 

energy, and environmentally sound energy, while 

protecting the environment (emphasis added). Market 

forces, influenced by these Federal investments and 

other policies such as tax incentives and environmental 

regulation (emphasis added), will determine the supply 

mix that consumers choose.

 The tremendous lead times needed to uniquely adjust 

military force structure, systems, and doctrine may prevent the 

DoD from waiting for market forces to shape an energy future. 

This obligates DoD energy strategists to be keenly aware not only 

of the DOE’s ongoing efforts, but also of expected energy 

advances so that institutional changes can be made early enough to 

guarantee required combat capabilities are protected before 

petroleum scarcity becomes an issue. Understanding this situation 

is key to understanding why the DoD must actively lead its own 

energy transformation. DOE can and will accelerate 

transformation technology development as rapidly as the President, 

Congress, and DoD resource, but in the end it will still be up to 

DoD to acquire, deploy, and absorb the risk of not having the 

technologies necessary to complete an energy transformation 

before petroleum supplies become a critical concern. Considering 

this relationship between the DoD and DOE, it can then be argued 

 

85 DOE, The Department of Energy Strategic Plan, 1, 15. 86 Ibid, 16. 

- 29 - 
that establishing an Undersecretary of Defense for Assured Energy 

office would not only provide the appropriate organizational level 

to synergize transformation activities within the DoD, but would 

also be perfectly suited to facilitate the necessary interagency 

cooperation with DOE’s new Undersecretary of Science office as 

created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to accelerate energy 

technology development.87 

 Assembling the right people is only the first part of creating 

a guiding coalition, the next two steps are to create trust and 

develop a common goal. Creating trust in a newly formed 

organization can be accomplished by dedicating the first several 

months and up to the first year of the coalition’s existence to 

collectively gather information about DoD’s multitude threats, 

required capabilities, energy vulnerabilities, and future concepts, 

while also gaining familiarity with international energy systems, 

alternate energy options, and anticipated problems to ensure that 

maximum knowledge is possessed prior to developing a postpetroleum vision and strategy. The daily immersion and 

interaction between members during this period can also be used to 

gradually reinforce the common goal of developing and executing 

the best energy strategy to ensure the U.S. military remains 

effective and relevant to 2050 and beyond. 

Created an Assured Energy Vision 

 Once formed into an effective guiding coalition, the Office 

of Assured Energy’s first deliverable is to write the vision of an 

alternate energy future that it will lead the DoD to create. The 

vision should refer to a picture of the future with some implicit or 

explicit commentary on why people should strive to create that 

future.88 Good vision is imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, 

flexible, and communicable, and serves three important purposes: 

1) by clarifying the general direction for change, it simplifies 

hundreds or thousands of more detailed decisions, 2) it motivates 

people to take action in the right direction, even if the initial steps 

are personally painful, and 3) it helps coordinate the actions of 

different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a 

remarkably fast and efficient way.89 By progressively moving 

backwards in time from an effective vision of the future to the 

present day, the guiding coalition can then identify the milestones, 

 

87 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sect 1006 (b)(1). 88 Kotter, Leading Change, 68. 

89 Ibid, 69, 72. 

- 30 - 
tasks, and resources—the strategy—that will be necessary to create 

a petroleum-free military. 

 To frame the creation of an effective vision, the guiding 

coalition must possess a deep understanding of the threat they are 

trying to mitigate (loss of military ineffectiveness following 

Hubbert’s Peak), the task for which the vision is being created 

(operationally executing America’s NSS and NDS), and the 

options and resources (the means) that are reasonably available to 

construct the desired end state. The Office of Assured Energy’s 

trust-building first year is designed to gather that knowledge. With 

recent advances in materials, biotechnical, and computational 

sciences, the technological solution set is building rapidly, and 

understanding the true pros and cons of each option may require 

significant objective learning on the part of each coalition member. 

Today, the list of proven and most promising energy and 

technology options includes coal, natural gas, synthetic fuels, biofuels, nuclear power, hydroelectric power, wind power, solar 

power, oceanic power, hydrogen science, methane hydrates, 

material science and nanotechnology, fuel cell science, six-sigma 

concepts, and even enhanced use of petroleum (the scope of this 

paper does not permit detailed descriptions of the identified 

emerging energy options, however, a small synopsis is presented 

on each in Appendix B). Only after understanding these energy 

sources and technologies, as well as the nation’s defense and 

energy objectives, strategies, capabilities, and limitations, are the 

members of the Office of Assured Energy ready to create an 

assured energy vision. 

 The visioning process can be lengthy and produce any 

number of possible outcomes, but for illustrative proposes, 

consider the following hypothetical proposal that is not only 

imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and 

communicable, but also aligns with the President’s statements 

regarding a long-term national energy vision he sees for the United 

States: 

- 31 - 
The Vision – DoD Petroleum Independence by 2050 

In 2050 the Department of Defense is a highly effective, 

networked, interdependent, and dominant military 

force, protecting all required American and allied 

interests, powered almost exclusively by an electrical 

and hydrogen energy standard that is reliably, 

efficiently, securely, and environmentally produced in a 

distributed manner without the need for foreign sources 

of energy. 

The above vision statement represents the potential for a 

tremendous paradigm shift in the way modern forces wage war. 

Food, fuel and ammunition logistics constraints have vexed 

commanders as long as war has existed. Envision the logistically 

unconstrained maneuver capabilities of a force that is purposely 

designed to be 50 percent more efficient than today’s force and 

requires no physical ammunition resupply and only a fraction of 

the liquid fuels consumed by today’s forces. A directed-energybased, highly automated force, capable of generating a majority of 

its own power in a distributed fashion from local and 

environmental sources, could theoretically provide that future. The 

potential efficiency, environmental ubiquity, universality and 

convertibility from one form to another of this configuration, make 

strong arguments that the force of 2050 can be powered almost 

exclusively by electricity and hydrogen. 

Setting aside conventional paradigms allows one to 

imagine a conceptual 2050 force. All Navy ships might employ 

nuclear-powered direct-electric drives, lightweight nanoengineered hulls, and directed energy armament. All Army and 

Marine Corps future combat system (FCS) land vehicles (many of 

which are unmanned) are designed for modular upgrades with 

plug-in electric hybrid or fuel-cell power, lightweight carbon 

nanotube-based armor, and directed energy weaponry. Today’s 

vulnerable tanker fuel trucks are replaced with smaller hybrid or 

fuel-cell powered trucks carrying stable, solid hydrate-based 

hydrogen batteries or combat safety-engineered liquid hydrogen 

containers. Individual soldiers are outfitted with pocket hydrogen 

fuel cells to power 10-15 onboard electric systems. Virtually all 

combat fighter aircraft are small, unmanned or single-seat, and 

powered by liquid or even nano-engineered solid hydrogen-based 

fuels. Ultra-efficient aircraft designs eliminate the need for tanker 

aircraft. All imagery, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

platforms are either space-based or unmanned vehicles, orbiting 

- 32 - 
for weeks at a time exclusively on solar-generated power while 

peering through weather from above. Similar platforms, orbiting 

alongside ISR brethren, reflect friendly, ground-based, directedenergy fires on rapidly moving enemy forces or weapons. 

Expeditionary bases would generate most base-support power 

autonomously through a flexible menu of options best suited for 

the particular mission or environment. Choices could include 

truck-portable nuclear electric generation (for secure 

environments); waste-stream and local biomass biofuel production; 

portable wind generation; extensive solar energy systems; ocean 

thermal; solar photolysis or hydrocarbon-based hydrogen 

production; high-efficiency, thermoelectric waste-heat recovery; 

fuel cells; or quite simply, local electrical grid connection—

whatever best suits the situation. 

Every networked physical component within the 2050 force 

structure would possess low-power optical computing; very lowpower LED lighting; nano-engineered superconducting power 

transmission; whole-surface, thin-film solar panels; a modular 

construct to enable component upgradeability, and most 

importantly, all systems would use the same universal electrical 

standards to ensure interconnectivity. Most systems could 

recharge from an expeditionary base local power grid during nonactivity periods, but would also be capable of enhancing unit 

survivability and flexibility by using excess on-board power 

production to energize the unit grid or any other single force 

component if its primary means were rendered ineffective. 

Operational-level energy could be delivered from sea-based, 

nuclear powered, hydrogen production ships. Strategic energy 

augmentation from orbiting solar-generation satellites or spacebased relay satellites linked to terrestrial CONUS generators could 

even be delivered via microwave to a suitably configured tactical 

receiver anywhere in the hemisphere. 

While the envisioned force of 2050 may sound like Star 

Wars fantasy to some, imagine how the following vision statement 

may have sounded to the War Department in 1906: 

In 1950 the U.S. Military is a highly effective, 

mobile, and mutually supporting force, protecting 

all required American interests through dominant 

air, land, and sea operations powered by a 

petroleum energy standard that is reliably and 

economically produced from domestic sources. 

- 33 - 
Most of the horse-riding officers at the time would likely not have 

even imagined the aircraft carrier-, jet fighter-, and tank-based 

force America went to war with against North Korea 45 years later. 

The vision of a petroleum-independent military in 2050 is certainly 

imaginable, and virtually each of the systems concepts discussed 

has already been proven physically feasible or at least theoretically 

so. Proposing a hydrogen/electric standard focuses all subsequent 

development activity into the framework of a purpose-designed 

force, while sufficient flexibility remains in the vision so as to not 

force specific solutions. Finally, the vision communicates a 

desirable future in which military effectiveness is preserved, but 

where security, efficiency, environmental consciousness, and 

energy independence are also achieved. It is clear that by 

eliminating the constraints of conventional paradigms in any 

problem-solving exercise, a potentially better, revolutionary future 

can be envisioned. Converting what exists today into the future of 

tomorrow is the realm of strategy—Chapter 3 examines how to 

develop the best strategy to create the vision of a petroleum-free 

Department of Defense. 

- 34 - 
Chapter 3 

Developing an Assured Energy Strategy 

The magnitude of the DoD’s fuel consumption indicates substantial changes 

must be made in the performance DoD requires of its future systems in order to 

achieve the goals of JV2010 and 2020. 

- Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency in Weapons 

Platforms, OSD (AT&L), Jan 2001.90

Building Strategy from a Vision 

Forty-five years ago, on 25 May 1961, under the very real 

security threat of losing a space race with the Soviet Union, 

President Kennedy issued to the nation an urgent challenge of 

placing a man on the Moon by the end of the decade.91 Given the 

state of rocket technology in 1961 President Kennedy knew that to 

many the goal of landing on the Moon 230,000 miles above the 

Earth seemed impossible . With great observation he stated:92

I believe we possess all the resources and talents 

necessary. But the simple facts of the matter are 

that we have never made the national decisions or 

marshaled the national resources required for such 

[international] leadership. We have never specified 

long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or 

managed our resources and our time so as to ensure 

their fulfillment. 

Let me make it clear that I am asking the Congress 

and the country to accept a firm commitment to a 

new course of action, a course which will last many 

years and carry very heavy costs... This decision 

demands a major national commitment to scientific 

and technical manpower, material and facilities, and 

the possibility of their diversion from other 

important activities where they are already thinly 

spread. It means a degree of dedication, 

organization, and discipline, which have not always 

characterized our research and development efforts. 

 

90 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden, 

Summary Page. 

91 Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 

279. 

92 Ibid. 

- 35 - 
What President Kennedy gave America was a vision, a 

vision of a future it could create, a vision each American could 

personally imagine by simply gazing upward on any cloudless 

night. Working backwards from the President’s clearly stated 

goal, thousands of Americans from government, industry, and 

academia teamed together to correctly dissect one seemingly 

“insurmountable” problem into thousands of smaller solvable ones. 

Only eight years later, through courageous leadership, teamwork, 

and pure determination, a Saturn V rocket lifted the Apollo 11 

astronauts to the moon. While the energy/Apollo problem scope 

cited here is not an original analogy, the similarities in trying to 

solve a grand challenge are compelling and can serve as an 

example of how the DoD can focus government, science, and 

industry to ensure the U.S. military has the energy to guarantee 

America’s security to 2050 and beyond. 

The methodology for forming a strategy requires starting at 

the desired end state and stepping backward in time toward the 

present to identify the hierarchy of goals that must be met to 

support follow-on achievements. For example, in order to deploy 

an envisioned hydrogen-powered force, the capability to 

effectively and efficiently produce hydrogen fuel must first exist. 

Before the capability to produce hydrogen fuel exists, certain 

technical challenges must be solved, and before that, certain 

research institutions must be formed and resourced. This 

deductive process can be repeated hundreds of times over to design 

a complex system or system of systems. In this manner, a series of 

milestones are identified to serve as short-term wins that Kotter 

states are essential for sustaining the transformation process.93

In the case of creating a future hydrogen/electric powered 

force, there are two primary strategies: 1) allow market forces and 

timing to create and deliver necessary transformational capabilities 

(the DOE model), or 2) allow DoD to lead an energy 

transformation much as it did the race into space (with NASA), the 

adoption of computational problem solving, or creating ubiquitous 

modern high-speed commercial air travel through development of 

the high-bypass turbofan jet engine. The fundamental difference 

between the two is acknowledging who must bear the risk of 

stranded development in an environment with an as-of-yet unclear 

future—should it be the commercial sector or government to bear 

that responsibility? As previously argued in Chapter 2, the unique 

 

93 Kotter, Leading Change, 123. 

- 36 - 
acquisition lead times and vital responsibilities of the DoD may 

force it to address this problem long before market forces have 

identified winning solutions, and is therefore the basis for selecting 

the latter option to continue examining in this paper. A strategy of 

waiting for market forces to deliver options is not without merit, 

and a more detailed comparison of market-led vs. DoD-led 

strategies is outlined against a status-quo standard in Appendix C. 

Working backwards from the vision then, the overarching 

strategy can be imagined to address the following tasks: 1) acquire 

alternate-fueled systems, 2) create an alternate fuel delivery 

infrastructure, 3) develop new energy standards, 4) determine a 

new energy force structure, 5) conduct R&D to acquire 

transformational technologies, and throughout the process, 6) 

protect against negative oil peaking effects to allow sufficient 

transformation time, 7) minimize transformation costs, and 8) 

preserve military capability during the transition. This type of 

temporal task ordering is not new, but demonstrates that a logical 

flow exists from the present condition to the desired end state, 

which in this case is complicated by the need to preserve defense 

capability while transitioning away from significant legacy 

investments in a resource-constrained environment. The strategy 

for accomplishing these tasks will take several decades and can be 

subdivided into three separate phases: 2006-2020 Near Term, 

2020-2035 Mid Term, and 2035-2050 Long Term. 

A Three-Stage Approach 

The DoD would be best served to lead three stages to 

military petroleum independence: 1) a near-term (2006 – 2020) 

DoD-wide focus on establishing proper strategic leadership, energy 

efficiency, conservation, acquisition reform, bridge energy sources, 

and research & development (R&D), 2) a mid-term (2020-2035) 

focus on infrastructure and technology transition, and 3) a far-term 

(2035-2050) focus on employing the “new” energy. Quite simply, 

the concept is to use the DoD’s enabling hierarchy and economic 

leverage of a $400+B annual budget to reduce or reverse the 

annual rise in energy consumption while simultaneously 

developing bridge energies that will buy the necessary time for an 

intensive DoD/DOE-facilitated R&D effort designed to discover 

and deploy distributed, clean, diverse, affordable and selfsustaining energy sources before petroleum scarcity or high prices 

directly impact military capability. Using a process that Amory 

- 37 - 
94 Lovins calls “creative destruction,” the “new energy” conversion 

must occur in a way that maximizes the remaining return-oninvestment value of legacy systems while simultaneously enabling 

a convincing paradigm shift for users toward the “new” energy. 

Much as DoD-funded projects like Arpanet and the global 

positioning system set early industry standards that gave the 

commercial sector the framework upon which to create exponential 

market developments, so too could the early establishment of “new 

energy” infrastructure standards (production, transmission, 

connectivity, and modularity) prove to be DoD’s greatest 

contribution to America’s long-term energy security 

Stage I – 2006-2020 Near-Term Strategy 

Five upfront activities can be initiated through effective and 

immediate DoD policy changes: 1) promoting the “Office of 

Assured Energy”, 2) increasing energy efficiency and 

conservation, 3) promoting acquisition reform, and 4) developing 

bridging energy sources to buy time to 5) complete intensive R&D 

efforts for the “new energy” beyond petroleum. 

 

Promoting the Office of Assured Energy – After 

creating a DoD energy vision, the Office of Assured Energy’s next 

most important task would be to accomplish Kotter’s 4th step in 

leading change which is communicating the change vision to 

create a common understanding of its goals and direction.95 To 

prepare the entire DoD, industry, and academia for the magnitude 

of change they are about to help create, the Office of Assured 

Energy must effectively convey the urgency of the energy problem 

facing the DoD, the envisioned petroleum-free future, the 

fundamental transformations that will need to unfold over the 

course of several decades, the breadth of the leadership role the 

Office of Assured Energy will directly play in that transformation, 

and the commitment that will be required of leadership and each 

individual member of the organization in helping create a more 

secure envisioned energy future. The message should be simple, 

continuous, ubiquitous, and those delivering it should be prepared 

for both positive and negative feedback as they work to overcome 

the resistive forces of doctrinal dogma and risk aversion.96 

 

94 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 138 

95 Kotter, Leading Change, 85 96 Kotter, Leading Change, 85-100. 

- 38 - 
Increasing efficiency & conservation – The first 

logical physical step toward any long-term petroleum 

independence is reducing consumption through increased 

efficiency and conservation. The military has always valued 

capabilities and effectiveness (such as speed, mass, stealth, etc) 

over efficiency for good reason—restraint when national survival 

is at risk is illogical. However, this is a short-term perspective and 

in an energy-constrained environment, efficiency becomes its own 

effect, enabling the sustained application of other desired military 

effects. Not only does conservation through increased efficiency 

directly and immediately enhance and help stabilize an 

organization’s typically tight budget from gross energy cost 

fluctuations (such as after Hurricane Katrina, Operation DESERT 

STORM, or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), it also lays the 

necessary groundwork for enabling new alternate energy futures. 

If for example some new promising energy technology still 

requires a 20 percent process efficiency increase in the system it 

would support in order to become feasible, then the argument for 

making the original system 20 percent more efficient is powerful 

not only because it saves petroleum energy costs in the short term, 

but it also pushes the realm of the new technology from the 

theoretical to the practical, and should therefore be pursued 

whenever possible while to preserve needed military capabilities. 

To date, the definitive DoD internal document advocating 

increased efficiency remains the 2001 Defense Science Board 

(DSB) Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

Platforms’ report entitled, More Capable Warfighting Through 

Reduced Fuel Burden. It identified five major efficiency 

recommendations: 

1. Base investment decisions on the true cost of delivered 

fuel, warfighting, and environmental benefits 

2. Strengthen warfighting and fuel logistics links in 

wargame modeling 

3. Have leadership incentivize fuel efficiency throughout 

DoD 

4. Specifically target fuel efficiency improvements 

through investments in S&T and systems designs 

5. Explicitly include fuel efficiency in requirements and 

acquisition processes 

- 39 - 
Arguably, it is the report’s third suggestion, “Have leadership 

incentivize fuel efficiency throughout DoD” that is the most 

important and transformational.97 The authors go on to emphasize: 

For the DoD to take advantage of the large cost and 

performance benefits of significant improvements 

in weapons platform fuel efficiency, senior civilian 

and military leadership must set the tone and agenda 

within the Department. Leadership must begin 

promoting the message that efficiency at the tactical 

platform and system level is a clear strategic path to 

improve performance, reduce logistics burden and 

free resources for modernization and readiness. This 

needed emphasis by DoD leadership is not merely 

desirable; it is an essential ingredient to achieve the 

force improvements to execute joint doctrine 

(emphasis added).

98 

 While looking specifically at improving existing and 

future weapon systems, the DSB’s advice applies equally well to 

all operating procedures and installation infrastructure as well. 

This is a message that all Service Chief’s and Combatant 

Commanders could broadcast loudly and repeatedly through their 

established information outlets. Subordinate levels of command 

would have to internalize and demonstrate acceptance of these 

concepts to junior ranks until even basic recruit and contractor 

behavior reflects the DoD’s emphasis on efficiency and 

conservation. Success will depend largely on providing 

meaningful behavior change incentives to energy users for the 

purpose of long-term payback. One incentive model could be to 

return any normalized energy savings over the previous year 

directly to the saving organization—a potentially powerful 

motivator for under-resourced units. It is important though that to 

avoid the temptation of compromising safety to earn energy 

efficiency rewards, commanders and leaders not be penalized for 

exceeding the previous year’s normalized energy bill. Bottom line: 

properly incentivized people will make a difference. 

 

97 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,, 

ES-7. 

98 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,, 

ES-7. 

- 40 - 
Promoting acquisition reform – To date, DoD 

acquisition has undervalued weapons system efficiency as a critical 

desired system effect. In 2001 the DSB Task Force on Improving 

Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms, remarked, 

Efficiency attributes are not addressed in acquisition 

process. Military requirements documents 

understandably place the highest priority on 

performance. Energy and fuel efficiency would 

become a major design variable if specified as 

KPPs”99 

The board continued, 

The PPBS does not reward efficiency or penalize 

inefficiency. Interest in fuel and energy efficiency 

is largely limited to meeting federal executive 

orders or legislative mandates. However, since 

federal mandates do not apply to military weapons 

systems, there are neither policy focus nor resource 

incentives to seek operational fuel efficiencies. 

Consequences of no efficiency requirement and a 

subsidized fuel price are that investments to 

improve efficiency do not compete well (or at all) in 

the PPBS process—the result is increased costs and 

degraded warfighting capability.100 

 

99 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,, 

ES-2. 

100 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,, 

ES-3. 

- 41 - 
KPP Enforcement 

Strict KPP eforcement has been 

problematic at times as program 

managers are forced to make cut-orcontinue acquisition decisions on 

programs with billions of dollars already 

invested. However, with sufficient OSD 

emphasis, as evidenced in recent 

universal interoperability KPP 

enforcement successes, a universal 

energy efficiency KPP can also succeed. 

Modular Upgradeability 

Take the next generation hybrid HUMVEE as an 

example of the concept of modular upgradeability. 

Since the vehicle would be expected to last 15 

years, it would be required to incorporate state-ofthe-art systems at IOC, but then be designed to 

accept efficiency replacements as the technology 

matured. Original electric motors could be replaced 

by superconducting types. The JP-8 powered 

engine could be replaced by a high efficiency FFV 

or bio-diesel version. Perhaps the entire 

engine/generator power pack could be removed by 

a hydrogen fuel cell. Batteries could be exchanged 

for better components with each life-cycle 

replacement. Heavy structures and armor could be 

replaced by light-weight nano-materials. The result 

is that at the end of the vehicle’s original chassis life 

cycle, the system would look radically different from 

how it entered service 15 years earlier. 

There are several examples of the type of 

efficiency-related changes DoD might 

consider as a matter of ongoing acquisition 

policy reform. First, as the DSB suggests, all 

future operational requirements documents 

could require an energy efficiency key 

performance parameter (KPP) for systems and 

infrastructure purchases. In one approach, 

acquisitions that would last 5 years or less, 

commercial-equivalent, state-of-the-art 

efficiency would be acceptable; for 

acquisitions lasting more than 5 

years, the KPP should require an 

efficiency standard better than 

state of the art. If better-thanstate-of-the-art is not immediately 

feasible, then the new system 

would have to adhere to the second 

proposed change, which is that it 

must start with state-of-the-art 

efficiency at the time of 

acquisition, but possess modular 

upgradeability such that as more 

efficient subsystems and 

components are developed, they 

can be interchanged with legacy 

components to reduce life-cycleenergy costs and maximize legacy system total return (this is a 

critical concept—it answers the question of how to avoid 

discarding inefficient legacy systems and minimizing the risk of 

stranded investments). A required element of the efficiency KPP 

would be to require each new system or facility proposal to 

calculate estimated operating energy costs based on the price of 

delivered energy at the point of use as the DSB suggests—this is 

similar to the familiar yellow “Energy Guide” labels found on 

major home appliances. The third change is to begin requiring 

proposed systems to adhere to the “new energy” standards 

(connectors, power/energy quality, operating limits, etc) as they 

are developed and approved by the Office of Assured Energy in 

conjunction with appropriate DoD partners like DOE or industry 

standards consortiums. Actual adoption of this third step into 

hardware design will be the signal of progress and sound one of 

- 42 - 
DoD’s most important contributions to the expansion of energy 

reform for American society at large. 

Developing bridge energies – Conservation and 

efficiency can provide immediate returns, but the total impact will 

not be sufficient to eliminate (foreign) petroleum dependence. 

Because full-scale transition to the “new energy” will take at least 

40 years to complete, and many professionals predict Hubbert’s 

Peak will occur by 2020, bridge energy sources are necessary to 

maintain combat capability. Bridging energy sources are those 

energies and fuels other than petroleum which are available or can 

be made available in sufficient quantity in the near term to supply 

necessary energy needs until a revolutionary energy is deployed; 

examples include natural gas; synthetic fuels from oil shale, tar 

sand, or coal liquification; nuclear power; possibly methane 

hydrates; and renewables like biofuels, solar, wind, and geothermal 

power. 

Catalyzed by the 2002 OSD(AS&C) Clean Fuels Initiative, 

the DoD began exploring the mechanics of liquid fuel production 

from Western U.S. oil shale and Canadian tar sands through the 

German-developed Fischer-Tropsch process used in WWII.101 

The Clean Fuels Initiative segregated development into two 

parallel foci: 1) Total Energy Development (TED) for overcoming 

the economic and technical obstacles necessary to enable largescale industrial fuel production, and 2) certifying a Joint 

Battlespace Use Fuel for the Future as a single non-petroleumderived fuel suitable for use in all current, legacy, and emerging 

systems.102

Congress’s Energy Policy Act of 2005 formally authorized 

DoD to pursue development of coal/shale/sands fuel extraction 

technologies with the statement, “The SECDEF shall develop a 

strategy to use fuel produced, in whole or in part, from coal, oil 

shale, and tar sands (or other resources) that are extracted by either 

mining or in-situ methods and refined or otherwise processed in 

the US in order to assist in meeting the fuel requirements of the 

DoD when the Secretary determines that it is of national 

interest.”103 It appears that time has come through the advocacy of 

Mr. John Young, representing the Naval Research Advisory 

Committee (NRAC), in his Oct 2005 post-Hurricane Katrina 

 

101 Barna, OSD/AT&L Clean Fuel Initiative Briefing to Sen. John Thune’s Staff,. 102 Ibid, Slide 9.. 103 ,U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 2398a(a). 

- 43 - 
memo to USD(AT&L) with the statement (also subsequently 

endorsed by the Air Force104), 

I believe that DoD can complete the necessary due 

diligence and have a program well underway within 

3 years. With sufficient priority we can achieve 

IOC by 2011 and full energy independence for DoD 

by 2020.” He continues, “We can do this by 

making a long term commitment to shift from 

petroleum products to manufactured fuels produced 

by assured domestic sources of supply. Such a DoD 

commitment now could also generate economic 

benefits for the Department and the nation in 5-10 

years. In light of the current painful reality of DoD 

fuel price adjustments, and the risks to our fuel 

sources posed by natural disasters and terrorists 

threats, I believe we need to act on this 

recommendation with a sense of urgency (emphasis 

added).”105

At the time of this of this writing, it appears that OSD is 

poised to commit toward leading development of synthetic fuels 

from oil shale, tar sands and coal. The promise of 2 trillion barrels 

of oil equivalence, the need to supply the DoD with approximately 

only 400,000 bbls of oil a day by 2020, the fact that Canada 

already produces one million bbls of oil a day using these 

techniques from Albertan tar sands (of which 95 percent is already 

sold to the U.S)106, and the existence of Congressional preapproval, makes this low-risk decision virtually inevitable. Many 

would claim this event marks the end of U.S. petroleum worries; 

there is no need to be concerned about alternate energies if DoD 

can catalyze industrial production by 2020—Hubbert’s Peak 

becomes a non-event. This program, however, may not provide a 

permanent panacea. 

The primary benefit of using synthetic liquid fuels is that 

virtually no infrastructure modification is necessary—simply 

certify all current engines for use and start pumping shale oil into 

the existing fuel distribution system and America’s air, sea, and 

land power is preserved. However, four problem areas arise from 

military reliance on synthetic fuels as a potentially long-term 

energy solution : 1) increased lines-of-communication (LOC) 

 

104 Hoffman, Memorandum to OSD(AT&L), 23 January 2006. 105 Young, Memorandum to OSD(AT&L), 11 November 2006. 106 Fialka, “In Oil Quest, U.S. Says Rock On”, 4. 

- 44 - 
demands, 2) potential environmental harm (strip mining, high 

water consumption, CO2 emissions), 3) increased public-sector 

synthetic fuel consumption, and 4) neglected allies. 

According to Defense Energy Supply Center standard 

procedures, the DoD globally purchases fuel from regional and 

local suppliers at a DoD-wide contract price. Oil corporations 

ensure that adequate regional supplies exist through an established 

global shipping and distribution system, while organic military 

systems provide final fuel delivery into combat zones or to end 

users. DoD’s universal adoption of oil-shale fuels by 2020 will 

create a unique distribution situation not seen since the U.S. last 

exported fuel: the flow of full tankers leaving U.S. sea ports! It is 

unclear from available literature what type of cargo these ships will 

carry—will it be finished fuels or unrefined crude requiring 

dependence on potentially vulnerable host nation refining before it 

is ready for use? Project sponsors must specify this information in 

their proposals. Additionally, is the U.S. Navy prepared to protect 

these shipments that an asymmetric enemy could clearly identify 

and target on the open seas? Because it would flow through the 

existing petroleum distribution infrastructure, the post-2020 

synthetic-fuel military might end up relying on a reversed supply 

system as fragile and vulnerable as today’s. 

Virtually every industrial process comes at an 

environmental cost—coal/shale/tar sand oil is no exception. While 

it is widely known that the FT process produces liquid fuels that 

burn cleaner than their petroleum-derived counterparts, the 

environmental advantage ends there. Oil shale/tar sand/coal 

extraction requires intensive mining operations—subterranean and 

strip processes in the Appalachians and strip mining in Wyoming 

and Colorado where the largest deposits are found. Strip mining 

would tear open vast tracks of pristine wilderness and destroy 

natural habitats. The alternative is to liquefy underground solids 

with electrical heaters—a process that requires substantial energy 

of its own. Combine that with the one to four barrels of water and 

400 – 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas needed to refine each barrel 

of shale oil107 in a historically water-scarce region of the country, 

and the millions who live downstream of the Colorado River will 

certainly raise loud voices. Finally, shale oil products release a 

significant amount of CO2, the primary cause in the theory for 

global warming. The significant amounts released during the FT 

 

107 Cavallo, “Oil: Caveat Empty.” 

- 45 - 
extraction process can be sequestered below ground, but widescale 

adoption of synthetic fuel does not prevent release of CO2 at the 

point of end use combustion. Consuming approximately only 

400,000 of the world’s estimated 120M bbls a day by 2020,108 one 

could successfully argue that DoD’s contribution to global 

environmental harm would be relatively negligible, but taking a 

minimalist approach would not excuse the program from 

addressing the third looming issue with DoD conversion to shaleoil: purchase competition from growing public sector synthetic 

fuel demand. 

Preliminary studies have shown that coal/shale/sands oil 

production becomes economically feasible at approximately $45 a 

barrel.109 Considering oil’s recent $70-a-barrel peak, and the fact 

that each $1/bbl price increase costs the DoD $135M annually,110

synthetic fuels become very attractive financially. It would only 

be realistic to assume that the same attraction drawing the DoD to 

shale-oil conversion would also generate a stampede of publicsector consumption for the fields of Wyoming. On the one hand, 

increased economies of scale should help drive down production 

costs for DoD, but since oil is a commodity, one must expect 

synthetic oil to sell for the same volatile price as petroleum oil. 

Philip Deutch, in his Nov/Dec 2005 Foreign Policy article “Energy 

Independence” correctly observes that, “No private oil company 

will sell oil on its domestic market for one penny less than it could 

realize on foreign markets, and the price that a barrel of oil 

commands will be based upon pressures beyond any one 

government’s control.”111 Unless the U.S. Government enters 

long-term contracts or cooperatives with producers to provide 

federal fuel at a fixed price in exchange for Department of the 

Interior mining rights on federal lands, free market forces will 

negate the last portion of the NRAC’s justification for oil-shale 

development: “Setting a 2020 goal of complete conversion to 

assured domestic sources of manufactured fuels will enhance 

national security and potentially save money compared to riding 

the curve of rising global petroleum prices.”112

 

108 Caruso, World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025, Slide 17. 

109 Barna, Power and Energy, A Plan for Reducing DoD’s Reliance on Foreign 

Oil and Assuring DoD’s Continued Access to Energy, 6. 110 Ibid, 2. 111 Deutch, “Think Again: Energy Independence”, 21. 112 Young, Memorandum to OSD(AT&L), 11 November 2005, Atch 1. 

- 46 - 
The final concern with DoD reliance on shale-oil regards 

America’s strategic allies and friends. Today and to 2020, allies 

such as Canada and the United Kingdom can approximately meet 

or exceed domestic and security needs. However, nations such as 

Germany, France, or Japan already rely upon imported oil for over 

90 percent of their requirements. None of these allies have 

sufficiently vast solid hydrocarbon reserves to accomplish their 

own internal shale/coal/or tar sands conversion. For these 

countries, military foreign energy independence will be a virtual 

impossibility by 2020, severely shaping the foreign policy 

objectives and freedom of these nations reliant on petroleum 

imports. Unless the United States is willing to develop its 

synthetic fuels resources beyond the levels needed to power only 

the DoD, many of America’s international military partners may 

simply be unavailable for the coalitions the U.S. has acknowledged 

it will need to favorably shape tomorrow’s world. 

Synthetic liquid fuels are only one bridging energy 

alternative. At present, they provide the only real option for 

mobile systems which rely on high-energy-density liquid 

hydrocarbon fuels to provide the maneuver and logistics capability 

that allows the U.S. military to dominate all others. They would be 

intended to serve as the main mobility bridge to the 20-40 year 

hydrogen energy future America has placed great faith in as 

evidenced by the 2005 Energy Policy Act allocating $2.1B for 

hydrogen research over the next 5 years.113 In the mean time, 

other bridging options exist for non-mobility energy requirements 

such as base facilities at home, overseas, and in expedition. If 

fully developed, many of these emerging installation bridge 

energies can become permanent infrastructure energy solutions. 

There is positive news to report in the area of installation 

bridge energy development–here DoD is accomplishing true 

energy leadership. DoD leads the federal government in the 

purchase of Green Energy by responding to a 2 Nov 2004, DoDwide, DUSD(AT&L) for Installations and Environment 

Memorandum for Installation Energy Policy Goals in which the 

Honorable Philip W. Grone states, “The DoD will strive to 

modernize infrastructure, increase utility and energy conservation 

and demand reduction, and improve energy flexibility, thereby 

saving taxpayer dollars and reducing emissions that contribute to 

air pollution and global climate change.”114 In addition to 

 

113 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, compiled from various pages. 114 Grone, Memorandum for Installation Energy Policy Goals, 1. 

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directing a reduction of installation petroleum use, Mr. Grone also 

directed that, “Each Defense component shall strive to expand the 

use of renewable energy within its facilities and in its activities by 

implementing renewable energy projects and by purchasing 

electricity from renewable energy sources.”115 

The Air Force began adopting this practice long before 

2004, resulting in the Environmental Protection Agency 

announcing that the Air Force was the largest single buyer of 

renewable energy, responsible for 40 percent of all purchased by 

the federal government in 2004.116 Edwards AFB was able to 

meet 60 percent of its annual energy needs by securing a 5-yr 

contract that saved $42M over fluctuating conventional electrical 

prices; Fairchild AFB is nearly 100 percent Green Energy, 

supporting local wind farms; and Dyess AFB became the 2003 

Green Power Partner of the Year as the nation’s largest singe-point 

Green Energy consumer, meeting 100 percent of its electrical 

needs.117 

Other Services are following suit, which allowed OSD to 

provide a positive report to Congress on 14 Mar 2005 that, “...at 

the end of 2004, 2.5 percent of energy used by U.S. military 

installations came from renewable sources.”118 And that, “While 

the current level of DoD’s renewable energy use meets the federal 

goal set by DOE, it only represents a small fraction of the 

possibilities.”119 Because the Air Force has already demonstrated 

the ability to operate one base on 100 percent renewable power, if 

all installations adopted some form of this goal, commercial 

renewable energy suppliers would be incentivized to develop more 

capacity. In fact, demand for wind power has been rising so 

rapidly that 2005 was a record year for the U.S., with 2,500 MW of 

new capacity installed causing a 35 percent increase in national 

production capacity and the U.S. to be placed at the top of all 

countries for new installations.120

The wind power explosion is not a solo actor in the race to 

develop bridging energies. Solar power has seen dramatic price 

drops in recent years, with the emergence of exciting new 

 

115 Ibid. 116 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Leads in Purchase of Renewable Energy”. 117 U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Leads in Purchase of Renewable Energy”. 118 DoD, Report to Congress: DoD Renewable Energy Assessment, Final 

Report.iii. 

119 Ibid iii. 120 American Wind Energy Association, “U.S. Wind Industry to Break 

Installation Records, Expand by More Than 35% in 2005.”. 

- 48 - 
technologies such as solar-electric shingles, thin-film solar, and 

solar day lighting offering opportunities for bases to pay a onetime energy installation cost and then reap “free” energy for the 

life of the system. Many of the technologies can also be used in 

expeditionary environments. These types of exciting advances 

have led OSD to make such commitments to Congress as, “Where 

economical, DoD should pursue on-installation production of 

renewable energy because it provides energy savings, reduces our 

dependence on foreign energy, and saves money, while increasing 

energy security.”121 OSD further enlightens, “...DoD is 

continuing its historic role as a catalyst for the development of 

other emerging renewable technologies. The DoD’s renewable 

energy vision is to maintain a commitment to renewable energy 

supported by a DoD-wide appreciation for the economic, 

environmental, and security benefits of renewable energy 

technologies.”122 Quite simply, the DoD’s installation renewable 

energy program demonstrates the positive effects of a coherent 

DoD energy strategy fully supported by leadership. This “warmup” event can provide valuable lessons and the short-term gains 

Kotter claims are mandatory to sustain motivation123 for the much 

larger and anticipated upcoming fuels transformation event. 

Energy research & development – The final required 

element in the DoD’s quest for foreign oil independence is the 

recreation of R&D accomplishments on the scale that allowed 

America’s aerospace engineers to send Neil Armstrong to the 

moon. After decades of successful innovation since Apollo, 

President Bush and others have stated that today America’s global 

innovation leadership position is under attack by the effects of 

globalization. On the positive side, U.S. companies can 

significantly reduce costs by outsourcing both menial and 

intellectual work for pennies on the dollar in a globalized world. 

On the negative side, the growing lack of interest (and ability) on 

the part of American students to pursue engineering and science 

degrees, coupled with a reverse brain-drain of R&D talent back to 

new renaissance countries like India and China, has left the U.S. 

with a quickly aging science and engineering community and the 

 

121 DoD, Report to Congress: DoD Renewable Energy Assessment, Final 

Report,ii. 122 DoD, Report to Congress: DoD Renewable Energy Assessment, Final 

Report,iii. 123 Kotter, Leading Change, 122. 

- 49 - 
prospect of losing its position of science and technology leadership 

in the world. To illustrate, last year in Germany 36 percent of 

undergraduate students earned degrees in math and science, in 

China 59 percent, and in Japan 66 percent–in the US the figure was 

only 32 percent124. In 2004, China graduated over 600,000 

engineers, India 350,000, and America only about 70,000.125 

Underscoring the President’s acknowledgement of this problem in 

his 31 January 2006 State of the Union Address126, the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on Prospering in the 

Global Economy of the 21st Century best articulates the alarm in 

their 2005 report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, in which they 

state: 

It is easy to be complacent about the US 

competitiveness and pre-eminence in S&T. We 

have led the world for decades, and we continue to 

do so in many research fields today. But the world 

is changing rapidly, and our advantages are no 

longer unique. Without a renewed effort to bolster 

the foundations of our competitiveness, we can 

expect to lose our privileged position. For the first 

time in generations, the nation’s children could face 

poorer prospects than their parents and grandparents 

did.” The report continues, “The US faces 

enormous challenges because of the disadvantage it 

faces in labor costs. S&T provides the opportunity 

to overcome this disadvantage by creating scientists 

and engineers with the ability to create entirely new 

industries (emphasis added)—much as has been 

done in the past.127 

In response to their alarm, the committee identified two 

challenges tightly coupled to scientific and engineering prowess: 

creating high quality jobs for Americans and responding to the 

 

124 Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, Rising 

Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Economic Future, ES-7. 125 Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, Rising 

Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Economic Future,, ES-7. 126 President Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address. 127 Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, Rising 

Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Economic Future,ES-6 . 

- 50 - 
128 nation’s need for clean, affordable, and reliable energy. The 

NAS identifies a nexus of opportunity that simultaneously 

strengthens the economy and national security while 

simultaneously solving America’s looming energy crisis—the 

intense application of an R&D commitment that promises 

intellectual and financial reward for those Americans already 

inspired, and those yet to be inspired in the sciences. With a DoD 

commitment to lead its own energy revolution, the U.S could 

create an entirely new, leading-edge, commercial sector for the 

global market; a sector that could propel the U.S. economy for 

decades and turn this nation into a new energy or energy 

technology exporter, much like the U.S. achieved in the 1940’s and 

50’s when it dominated the export of petroleum development 

technology. 

Solving the DoD’s and country’s energy future problem 

will take 20-40 years—an inspiring and exciting potential lifetime 

career for a new engineering graduate. Might DoD partner with 

DOE to create a world-renown “New Energy” Research Center of 

Excellence? To generate the necessary intellectual enthusiasm and 

capability for this endeavor, the NAS proposes four 

recommendations below (including some selected subpoints), with 

implementation responsibility falling to Congress; the Departments 

of Energy, Education, and Defense; and the National Science 

Foundation:129

Recommendation A: Increase America’s talent pool by 

vastly improving K-12 science and math education 

Recommendation B: Sustain and strengthen the nation’s 

traditional commitment to long-term basic research that has 

the potential to be transformational to maintain the flow of 

new ideas that fuel the economy, provide security 

(emphasis added), and enhance the quality of life. 

B-1: Increase the federal investment in long-term 

basic research by 10 percent a year over the next 7 

years (emphasis added). Special attention should go to 

the physical sciences, engineering, mathematics, and 

 

128 Ibid, ES-2 . 

129 Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century, Rising 

Above The Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Economic Future,, ES2-ES6. 

- 51 - 
information sciences and to DoD basic research 

funding (emphasis added). 

B-4: Allocate at least 8 percent of the budgets of 

federal research agencies to discretionary funding 

B-5: Create in DOE an organization like the DARPA 

called the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy 

(ARPA-E). The agency would be charged with 

sponsoring specific research and development 

programs to meet the nation’s long term energy 

challenges. ARPA-E would be based on the successful 

DARPA model and be designed as a lean and agile 

organization with a great deal of programs that can 

start and stop programs based on performance. The 

agency would perform no research or transitional effort 

but would fund such work conducted by universities, 

start-ups, established firms, and others. 

Recommendation C: Make the United States the most 

attractive setting in which to study and perform research so 

that we can develop, recruit, and retain, the best and 

brightest students, scientists, and engineers from within the 

Unites States and throughout the world. 

C-1: Increase the number and proportion of US 

citizens who earn physical sciences, life sciences, 

engineering, and mathematics bachelor’s degrees by 

providing 25,000 new 4-yr competitive undergraduate 

scholarships each year to US citizens attending US 

institutions 

C-2: Increase the number of US citizens pursuing 

graduate study in “areas of national need” by funding 

5,000 new graduate fellowships each year 

Recommendation D: Ensure the US is the premier place 

in the world to innovate; invest in downstream activities 

such as manufacturing and marketing; and create highpaying jobs that are based on innovation by modernizing 

the patent system, realigning tax policies to encourage 

innovation, and ensuring affordable broadband access. 

The aviation and computer industries exploded shortly after 

they were created because hundreds of thousands of innovators 

were interested in the fascinating subject matter and expended 

tremendous personal energy expanding these fields. The 

potentially dark future of conventional energy supply is sufficient 

- 52 - 
to generate the same type of broad interest that aircraft and 

computers still enjoy today. Scientists and engineers live for the 

excitement of new discovery and associated peer recognition—it 

may be as simple as DoD and DOE creating the R&D 

opportunities so that the inspired will come. Case in point is 

DARPA’s recent Grand Challenge contest. By offering a $2 

million prize to the university, industry, or government team that 

could build an autonomous vehicle capable of auto-navigating 131 

miles of Mohave Desert, DARPA received some 20+ approaches 

to solving the problem with a clear demonstration of what works, 

and what doesn’t.130 Much like the Gossamer Albatross and 

Spaceship One were inspired by standing prizes, the DoD may find 

its energy answers in a team of bright college seniors competing to 

win a million dollars of government prize money. Could 

innovation prizes be the DoD’s low-budget R&D model of the 

future? It certainly appears as one attractive low-cost option for 

the government. 

Where can the DoD best focus R&D efforts to maximize 

energy solutions? Fortunately work has begun in all necessary 

fields, but the energy research percentage in the Department’s 

$75B FY2005 R&D budget would likely still need to be increased 

substantially to help create the “new energy” before Hubbert’s 

Peak arrives.131 The President has proposed a 22 percent increase 

in certain areas of federal government alternate energy research 

even though the Energy Policy Act of 2005 already allocates $7.5B 

of R&D funds over the next five years.132 Four areas of possible 

focus spring to the forefront: 1) efficiency technologies, 2) nanoscience, 3) Energy and Power Technology Initiatives, and 4) 

infrastructure technologies. 

The 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving 

Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Systems recommended that DoD, 

 Specifically target fuel efficiency improvements 

through investments in S&T and systems designs. 

DoD labs could produce a large number of 

technologies in their portfolios that could improve 

the efficiency of their platforms and systems; a 

consistent message was that their customers, the 

operators, were generally not asking for efficiency. 

 

130 Lerner, “Robots Go to War”, 48. 131 Brody, “What Matters Most Depends Where You Are”, 52. 132 President Bush, 2006 State of the Union Address; and U.S. House Committee 

on Energy and Commerce, “Energy Policy Act of 2005”, 4. 

- 53 - 
S&T community should make platform efficiency a 

primary focus to identify, track, and package 

technologies that improve efficiencies. It is 

fundamental that DoD support fundamental 

(Category 6.1 and 6.2) investments that can lead to 

revolutionary improvements in the fuel efficiency of 

tomorrow’s weapons platforms.”133 

For instance, with thousands of gas turbine engines in the 

inventory consuming billions of gallons of fuel annually, every 

percentage increase here matters—programs such as the Versatile 

Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine (VAATE) are critical. 

Agencies such as the Air Force Research Laboratory already seek 

engine efficiency gains as elements of contracted research projects, 

but need dedicated funds for the sole purpose of revolutionizing 

aircraft propulsion. A good example of such a project was the 

development of the hydrogen-fueled PW304 jet engine designed 

and tested in the 1940’s and 50’s for the “Suntan” project.134 

The exciting and new field of nano-science offers great 

hope for a DoD energy vision. As part of the National 

Nanotechnology Initiative, the National Science and Technology 

Council’s (NSTC) Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and 

Technology Subcommittee (NSET) concluded that, “At the root of 

the opportunities provided by nanoscience to enhance our energy 

security is the fact that all of the elementary steps of energy 

conversion (charge transfer, molecular rearrangement, chemical 

reactions, etc) take place on the nano-scale.”135 DOE’s Basic 

Energy Sciences Advisory Committee’s “Basic Research Needs to 

Assure a Secure Energy Future” and their Office of Basic Energy 

Science’s “Basic Research Needs for the Hydrogen Economy” 

have recognized that solutions will require scientific breakthroughs 

and truly revolutionary developments...within this context, 

nanoscience and nanotechnology present exciting and requisite 

approaches to addressing these challenges136 Participants of the 

 

133 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improve Fuel Efficiency of Weapons 

System Platforms, More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden,, 

ES-7. 

134 NASA, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959, Ch 8. 135 Committee on Technology, Nanoscience Research for Energy Needs, Report 

of the National Nanotechnology Initiative Grand Challenge Workshop, March 

16-18, 2004, v. 136 Committee on Technology, Nanoscience Research for Energy Needs, Report 

of the National Nanotechnology Initiative Grand Challenge Workshop, March 

16-18, 2004, v. 

- 54 - 
March 2004 National Nanotechnology Grand Challenge Workshop 

identified nine research targets in energy-related S&T in which 

nanoscience is expected to have the greatest impact:137

1. Scalable methods to split water with sunlight for 

hydrogen production 

2. Highly selective catalysts for clean and energy-efficient 

manufacturing 

3. Harvesting solar energy with 20 percent power efficiency 

and 100 times lower cost 

4. Solid state lighting at 50 percent of the present power 

consumption 

5. Super-strong and lightweight materials to improve the 

efficiency of cars, planes and the like 

6. Reversible hydrogen storage materials operating at 

ambient temperatures 

7. Power transmission lines capable of 1 gigawatt 

transmission 

8. Low-cost fuel cells, batteries, thermoelectrics, and ultracapacitors build from nanostructured materials 

9. Materials synthesis and energy harvesting based on the 

efficient and selective mechanisms of biology 

Involving the basic building blocks of all matter, the nine material 

science areas above indicate that the foundation of the world’s 

energy future lies within nano-science research. 

The third area of impact involves enhancing the DoD’s 

2001 Energy and Power Technologies Initiative (EPTI). 

Expanding across all military Services in only 5 years, EPTI’s 

objective is to revolutionize the energy and power components of 

military systems to enable an envisioned “all-electric” force. 

Divided into power generation, energy storage, and power control 

& distribution categories, EPTI will draw heavily from nanoscience discoveries and quantum physics to create the physical 

components (electric motors, batteries, capacitors, low-resistance 

wiring, electric actuators, and high-power electronics) necessary to 

reduce the logistics burdens and operational capabilities of future 

military systems.138 Each new advance should cascade rapidly to 

other DoD systems which in turn will inspire other new 

applications discoveries. Most importantly, EPTI technologies 

have the potential to gain rapid public sector use propelling mass-

 

137 Ibid, vi. 138 Barna, “Power and Energy, A Plan for Reducing DoD’s Reliance on Foreign 

Oil and Assuring DoD’s Continued Access to Energy”, 4-5. 

- 55 - 
production cost reductions and even greater innovations. Already 

funded at over $250M for research this year,139 this funding level 

could easily again be tripled or quadrupled to accelerate innovation 

returns with the strategic blessing of a hypothetical “Office of 

Assured Energy”. 

Energy infrastructure is perhaps the least glamorous of all 

the research areas, but is as fundamental to the total solution as 

discovering the Holy Grail fuel of the future itself. In lockstep 

with the most promising of any new fuels/energy research must 

exist the development of the systems that will produce and 

distribute the “new energy.” By objectively examining the most 

promising alternatives early, the DoD can be the first to establish 

new industry standards for energy quality, format, 

interconnectability, transportability, etc. to maximize universality 

and modularity. The consumer electronics industry demonstrates 

time and again how a particular technology will not flourish until 

an industry standard is established (i.e., Betamax vs. VHS, CD and 

DVD formats, etc). The computer industry did not expand rapidly 

until universality and modularity were adopted that allowed users 

to custom configure and continually upgrade their systems, 

preserving their legacy investment. This model can be seized upon 

and articulated early by DoD—until this is accomplished, neither 

military nor commercial developers have frameworks to build 

upon. Creating these frameworks through future acquisition 

requirements would serve as a catalyst for industrial activity and 

could become DoD’s greatest contribution to energy security. 

Stage II – 2020-2035 Mid Term Strategy 

If the seeds of change are to be sown in Stage I of an 

energy transformation strategy; then the concept and idea seedlings 

must be cultivated in Stage II before the benefits can be harvested 

in Stage III. By the end of Stage I, the DoD should have 

internalized the commitment of energy transformation across the 

entire department, selected its primary and supporting long-term 

future energy sources, deployed necessary bridging energies, and 

created the necessary R&D momentum and energy standards to 

support the transition to Stage II. In Stage II the DoD would need 

to focus on 1) adjusting force structure for the “new energy” 

future, 2) adjusting operational training and procedures, and 3) 

investing in “new energy” infrastructure and transition 

 

139 Barna, “Power and Energy, A Plan for Reducing DoD’s Reliance on Foreign 

Oil and Assuring DoD’s Continued Access to Energy”, 4.. 

- 56 - 
technologies while continuing intense R&D efforts to meet the 

Stage III goal of remaining militarily relevant in 2050 and beyond. 

Adjusting Force Structure – The world’s looming 

energy situation has the potential to dictate historic force structure 

decisions. The DoD’s primary mechanism to assess force 

composition relative to threats and Joint Vision 2025 goals is the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This comprehensive 

approach produces force structure decisions that the Services are 

subsequently expected to execute. In the February 2006 QDR, no 

force structure decisions were made based on fuels/energy 

limitations–the next opportunity to formally adjust force structure 

will occur in 2009. 140 Four years from now the state of 

world/DoD petroleum supplies may be much more acute, at which 

point the DoD would likely be required to address energy 

efficiency/consumption as part of its force structure decision 

matrix. Attention to detail and proper QDR energy-related course 

corrections would be one of the most effective tools available to 

ensure the DoD reaches its goal of long-term relevancy. 

 2009 QDR force structure decisions will be reaching full 

effect by 2020. In the proposed 40+-year transformation strategy, 

the U.S. would need to begin retiring all inefficient systems 

between 2020 and 2035, and activating those new 30-year systems 

which support a force structure deemed most effective in an 

energy-constrained world. In order to minimize any capability 

gaps between retirement of traditional systems (at the beginning of 

the window) and the arrival of high-efficiency and perhaps radical 

replacements (at the end of the window), the grand force structure 

strategy must maximize multi-role capabilities of remaining 

systems, perform risk/cost analyses of extending inefficient system 

lifespans, and plan to accept certain mission limitations and 

vulnerabilities for a period if necessary. The sooner replacements 

are produced, the smaller this vulnerability window—the U.S. 

missile defense system being deployed today is a perfect example 

of how the earliest-maturing technologies of a system can be 

spiraled into warfighter hands long before full system capability in 

order to mitigate enemy threats as soon as possible. 

Adjusting Operational & Training Procedures – 

Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs—the most energy 

 

140 Brown, Mike, E-mail to Author, 27 September 2005. 

- 57 - 
intensive portion of the budget–consume 31 percent of today’s 

DoD funds.141 If the DoD is unable to deploy bridge energies 

before the arrival of Hubbert’s Peak, the DoD will need to have 

adopted universal energy conservation approaches to control the 

volatility and size of O&M expenses. Traditional infrastructure 

and operating procedures will need to continue improving 

efficiencies, reducing footprint, and maximizing alternate energies 

to guarantee security and stabilize energy costs. A good example 

of the change is the growth in electrically powered computer 

training simulations that are replacing more expensive and 

petroleum-intense physical training events. 

High energy costs may also force warfighters and national 

security decision makers to carefully select future engagements. If 

so, then operational commanders will also be required to integrate 

maximum fuel efficiency and opponent energy limitations in their 

planning calculus. Since within two decades a deployed 

operational force may be relying upon synthetic fuels shipped from 

North America and shared with coalition partners, a joint force 

commander may find his maneuver options limited that in turn 

drive certain, less energy-intensive courses of action. As a 

minimum, it is not unreasonable to expect the military of 2020-

2035 to be forced to rely upon very lean logistics, as this 

dimension is typically the most energy intensive of modern 

warfare. 

New Energy Infrastructure and Transition 

Technologies – Today’s petroleum extraction, refinement, and 

distribution systems were developed and built over the course of a 

century. Fortunately, in today’s environment, broad knowledge 

sharing, instant communications, rapid mass production and 

distribution, and large resource capital movements can enable the 

construction of a properly envisioned and planned “new energy” 

infrastructure in less than 100 years. The first major infrastructure 

activity DoD will have to address is incentivizing commercial 

development for manufactured liquid hydrocarbon fuels—this is 

akin to DoD buying an energy life insurance policy and should 

already be executed in Stage I of the DoD’s energy transformation. 

Without this bridge energy ensured upfront, time may run out to 

satisfactorily complete development of any “new energy” 

infrastructure. Because manufactured fuels can be distributed 

 

141 OMB, Department of Defense FY2006 Budget. 

- 58 - 
through slightly modified existing liquid fuel networks, the only 

area needing new investment is site extraction and refinement. 

The NRAC estimates that the 10 plants needed to meet DoD’s 

daily needs could be operational by 2020.142 

Within its current civil engineering construct, the DoD may 

also need to deploy a collection of smaller infrastructures that 

contribute to the total energy supply for both permanent and 

expeditionary installations. For example, as biofuel processing 

technology rapidly advances, it may become practical in the 2006-

2020 timeframe to actually build on-site biofuel and bioelectric 

generation plants that utilize a base’s own waste stream and 

surrounding biomass as raw energy sources. In addition to helping 

solve environmental concerns, these bio-energy plants could be 

produced in standardized, modular sizes from semi-truck portable 

to the mega-plant, expandable to appropriately meet each base’s 

needs. Every DoD roof and sun-facing flat surface should be 

covered with mass-produced thin-film solar panels. All 

fluorescent and street lighting, efficient by today’s standards, could 

be replaced by 50+ percent more-efficient LED lighting. Wind 

power farms subsidized by long-term DoD purchase contracts 

could become the norm vs. the exception as they are today. 

Coastal bases should be able to purchase green energy from 

subsurface tidal and ocean thermal production systems facilitated 

by Congress and DOE with DoD as a guaranteed buyer. If 

successful, this collaborative model can be repeated endlessly with 

any number of new concepts. 

The above mentioned infrastructures (with the exception of 

synthetic fuels) point to a developing trend: in contrast to today’s 

energy production at large-scale centralized facilities, distributed, 

on-site production has the potential to become prominent. 

Historically, industrial societies have produced energy at a few 

central locations for good reason: 1) proximity to raw energy 

resources, 2) economies of scale, and 3) consolidation of limited 

expertise to manage the process. Unfortunately, much of the 

central production benefit is lost through inefficient and vulnerable 

distribution systems. While scientific advances are occurring with 

the potential to overcome these distribution inefficiencies, today, 

technology has also balanced the playing field, increasing the 

efficiencies of smaller producers, automating control and 

maintenance functions through computers and better design, and 

 

142 Young, Memorandum to OSD(AT&L), 11 November 2005. 

- 59 - 
enabling the extraction of energy from proximate sources (much in 

the same manner that nature does). By “unleashing us from the 

tether of fuel”143 as Lt Gen James Mattis, USMC, has desired, 

DoD’s forces can use the maneuver-enhancing logistical and 

security freedom of distributed production to offset the high 

mobility benefit, but precarious security, of delivered liquid fuels. 

Up to this point, the subject of hydrogen infrastructure 

development has not been mentioned. As evidenced in the 2005 

Energy Policy Act, DOE, Congress, and the President place great 

faith in the potential of hydrogen as the only viable large-scale, 

long-term replacement to hydrocarbon liquid fuels. This optimism 

is no doubt inspired by such recent exciting nanotech discoveries 

as the ability to create hydrogen from direct sunlight, enhanced 

electrolysis, or biological mimicry, as well as new discoveries for 

safer and more efficient hydrogen storage. Sufficiently researched 

during Stage I and later developed in Stage II, these capabilities 

could theoretically be used to locally produce and directly power 

hydrogen-fueled maneuver and mobility forces. Early and active 

research involvement would enable the DoD to make the earliest 

possible commitment toward a hydrogen-based military as a 

permanent replacement to temporary manufactured bridging fuels 

(interestingly, the technology already exists to extract hydrogen 

from hydrocarbons, meaning that local hydrogen production is 

already possible today from traditional feedstocks). To facilitate 

the entire three-phase strategy for energy transformation, the DoD 

will likely have to commit to building the necessary field 

infrastructure to support a hydrogen conversion by the end of Stage 

I, while simultaneously supporting the legacy liquid fuel system 

for unconverted systems—this has the potential be the most 

difficult phase of an energy transition. Fortunately, if the 2005 

EPAct’s hydrogen technology goals are met, the commercial and 

private sectors will be involved in a similar pursuit, lending their 

accomplishments and interests to the DoD success. 

The last Stage II activity would be converting selected 

legacy systems and early acquired modular systems to the “new 

energy” Standard. This can be as simple as replacing individual 

components (such as lighter/more reliable linear electric actuators 

vs. hydraulic components) or incorporating major replacements of 

power-generation and energy storage systems during depot 

overhauls. Each system would need to be assessed on a case-by-

 

143 Naval Research Advisory Committee, “Future Fuels”, Slide 2. 

- 60 - 
case cost-activity analysis to determine if and when such a 

conversion is possible (example: conversion of hybrid HUMVEEs 

from a standard JP-8 fueled engine/generator configuration to 

hydrogen fuel cells). Unless this activity is initiated by 2020, it is 

likely that insufficient time will exist to create a fully converted 

and viable force for Stage III. 

Stage III – 2035-2050: “The New Energy” Force 

 DoD will see the culmination of three decades of work as it 

enters Stage III—“The New Energy Force.” To capitalize on the 

transformation momentum already in place, in Stage III the DoD 

would need to focus on 1) completing a full conversion of all 

infrastructure and systems to the “new energy” standard, 2) 

ensuring distributed, ubiquitous, and adequate energy production 

exists to provide greater agility and survivability, and 3) continuing 

R&D to develop even more superior forms of energy production 

and use. By envisioning and creating its own energy future, DoD 

would be able to maintain the freedom of action and operational 

capability it needs to defend America’s interests. 

 Mindful of the fact that DOE has predicted Hubbert’s Peak 

will occur around 2037, by 2035 both DoD and the private sector 

will likely be deeply involved in a large-scale conversion to the 

“new energy.” The real and environmental costs of maintaining 

old systems will likely rise exponentially, building the case for 

rapid elimination. Because of Stage I and II efforts, state-of-the-art 

facilities, systems, and even soldiers should by this time operate on 

a standard energy “bus,” relying heavily on computer optimization 

and networking for maximum communication and situational 

awareness. As the vision for 2050 draws near, energy can be 

expected to be produced in a variety of manners as part of a highly 

distributed network (not to be confused with a centralized 

distribution network) and almost exclusively take one of two 

forms: electricity or hydrogen. It is not inconceivable that 

electricity will be produced by state-of-the-art coal/natural gas 

facilities; ubiquitous solar, wind, geothermal, thermoelectric, and 

ocean tide/thermal sources; various-sized nuclear plants, hydrogen 

fuel cells, and even on-vehicle generators. Hydrogen will be 

derived from water electrolysis, large scale photolysis, reformation 

of remaining hydrocarbon fuels, and other chemical processes. It 

will be either safely shipped from domestic sources, or more likely 

produced locally, but in only the rarest of cases will it rely on 

foreign fuel stocks—only if the risk/benefit analysis demonstrates 

- 61 - 
is situationally more advantageous to do so. Unfortunately 

aircraft systems will likely be the last to undergo the “new energy” 

conversion, operationally restricted by power/weight/volume 

constraints until technologies are most mature (remember that DoD 

actually produced a hydrogen-powered jet engine as early as 1957, 

indicating that once hydrogen storage issues are resolved, the 

hydrogen aircraft may become a reality).144 In the end, as the DoD 

and nation grow comfortable with the new energy paradigm and 

threat of petroleum energy insecurity fades, the transition of 

remaining activities to the new energy standard will be selfsustaining. A new-found post-petroleum energy security and the 

experiences of a somewhat long and painful, but otherwise 

successful energy transformation, will likely enable the DoD and 

the nation to eventually continue pursuit of even more advanced 

energy concepts such as nuclear air & space propulsion, nuclear 

fusion, space solar generation, moon energy exploration, and 

matter/anti-matter propulsion to name a few. 

As Chapter 3 has demonstrated, the journey to DoD’s 

energy future will be both monumental and complex, requiring 

enormous strategic leadership to accomplish. By using a proven 

transformation methodology such as Dr. Kotter’s eight-step 

process to develop a sense of urgency and the vision of the energy 

future it wishes to create, the DoD can then begin to dissect the 

scope of the problem and identify and execute the best strategy for 

creating the energy future it desires. To quote EIA’s director, Dr. 

Caruso, oil peaking is a problem that will occur “...within the 

present century”145—it is therefore a problem the DoD will have to 

solve before the end of this century, the only questions are 

therefore when and where will it begin to do so? 

 

144 NASA, Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959, Ch 8. 145 Caruso, When Will Oil Production Peak?, Slide 2. 

- 62 - 
A Methodology to Achieve DoD 

Petroleum Independence 

1. Create an Undersecretary of Defense Office 

of Assured Energy to serve as a guiding 

coalition that leads a comprehensive 

military energy transformation in concert 

with DOE Office of Science efforts to 

technologically facilitate a national energy 

transformation 

2. Develop an agreed-upon 2050 DoD energy 

vision 

3. Communicate vision to lowest levels in 

DoD, academia, industry, & inter-agencies 

4. Build strategy backwards from envisioned 

end state; identify all requirements, 

subdivide and time-order technology/policy 

developments into manageable tasks to 

create a continuing series of short-term 

wins 

a. Stage I – (2006 – 2020) 

i. Promote conservation by directly 

rewarding efficient practices & 

technology 

ii. Reform/streamline acquisition system to 

reward energy efficiency, adopt new 

standards, and support modular 

Figure 10 – A Methodology to Achieve DoD Petroleum 

Independence 

- 63 - 
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- 64 - 
Conclusion

From bottom to top, the military meritocracy is full of 

talented, dedicated and courageous people who can move out 

smartly to implement changes, even radical changes if they 

make sense and save money. 146 - Amory Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame

 The United States is the world’s only superpower today 

because its 5 percent of the global population has transformed its 

personal energy and 25 percent of the world’s energy resources 

into the economic and military might necessary to earn such a 

position.147 By 2025, when the United States is expected to be 

importing 68 percent of its petroleum needs, a majority of 

scientists predict that world petroleum production will have 

already peaked or be within a decade of doing so. The global 

security situation associated with the arrival of Hubbert’s Peak has 

the potential to be of a complexity and magnitude likely never 

before seen in the history of man. The question then becomes, 

how can America ensure its security in this type of scenario? 

 President Bush and the Congress have offered the Assured 

Energy Initiative and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as starting 

points on the journey of eliminating American dependence on 

foreign oil and creating a post-petroleum economy. While 

mainstream attention is being focused on the Department of 

Energy as the logical leader in this endeavor, closer inspection 

reveals that DOE’s charter is to specifically produce the 

technologies and knowledge that in turn enable a free market 

economy to decide the best sources and mixture of energy to 

power the American way of life. While a technology-intense DoD 

increasingly benefits from the innovations that a free market 

military/industrial complex provides, it has also become dependent 

upon its technological tools for success. Some of these combat 

systems now take over two decades to acquire and have 40+ year 

life cycles. 

 As America’s (and likely the world’s) largest single 

institutional petroleum consumer, the DoD has also become 

dependent upon liquid hydrocarbon fuels to power a unique and 

dominant “American way of war,” in which effectiveness is valued 

over efficiency to execute the National Defense Strategy. The 

 

146 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 264. 147 Ibid, 3. 

- 65 - 
combination of long systems acquisition lead times, an 

overwhelming petroleum dependence, and a non-transferable 

national security mission may drive the DoD into the position of 

being the first government agency forced to practically address the 

problem of Hubbert’s Peak. This condition begs the question of 

whether an opportunity exists for the DoD to contribute toward the 

President’s goal of creating a petroleum-free society while 

simultaneously ensuring it has the energy and capabilities to 

complete its own national defense mission to 2050 and beyond. 

 By applying the first three steps of Dr. John P. Kotter’s 

eight-step process for leading organizational change, this paper has 

proposed a method in which the DoD can lead an immediate, 

coherent, and viable long-term strategy toward a vision of 

replacing petroleum as its primary energy source in order to 

maintain all necessary strategic and operational capability for U.S. 

security to 2050 and beyond. The first step is to create a sense of 

urgency within the DoD that its long-term existence is threatened 

by rising energy costs and the prospect of declining energy 

supplies. The second step is to create a guiding coalition in the 

form of an Office for the Undersecretary of Defense for Assured 

Energy that possesses both the internal and interagency authority 

and the singular purpose necessary to lead a 45+ year energy 

transformation process. Consisting of permanent representatives 

from OSD, the Services, and inter-agencies, as well as 

representatives of industry and academia, this group must develop 

and communicate the vision of a desired energy future it wishes to 

create. Finally, by working backwards from that desired end state, 

the team must then build, communicate, and execute an 

overarching strategy that subdivides this grand challenge into a 

continuum of manageable short-term goals. 

 Using the hypothetical vision of a 2050 U.S. military 

unconstrained by conventional paradigms, this paper proposed a 

three-stage transformation strategy to illustrate the incremental 

issues that will likely present themselves in a wholesale energy 

transformation. Stage I (2006 – 2020) includes undertaking 

conservation, efficiency, acquisition and organizational reforms; 

the development of bridging energies; massive R&D efforts; the 

establishment of “new energy” standards; and identification of a 

primary alternate energy source most likely to be some 

combination of electricity and hydrogen produced from a variety 

of sources. Stage II (2020 – 2035) focuses on adjusting force 

structure, adjusting operational & training procedures, and creating 

- 66 - 
a distributed energy infrastructure and technology transition in a 

modular fashion. Stage III (2035 – 2050) involves finishing 

infrastructure conversion; ensuring adequate, distributed, and 

ubiquitous energy production; and a continuation of R&D efforts 

that strive for ever greater energy answers. 

 The Department of Energy confirms that the production of 

petroleum will peak sometime this century—it is perhaps the most 

fundamental strategic problem the DoD, the U.S., and the world 

will all inevitably have to face in the next 100 years. The Kotterbased organizational change methodology presented in this paper 

demonstrates just one approach for guiding DoD energy 

transformation to serve the Department’s own requirements. The 

lessons learned and knowledge gained from such an endeavor 

could be reasonably applied toward a much larger national energy 

transformation. The DoD-to-civilian transition model has been 

successfully applied in other major societal changes; there is no 

reason to believe this grand challenge to be any different. The 

creation of a broadly supported post-petroleum DoD vision and 

transformation strategy could not only preserve a relevant military 

force, but also lead a positive, bi-partisan, interagency, and 

economic demonstration for preserving American security overall. 

The DoD possesses the capacity to succeed in making war without 

oil the catalyst of true transformation. 

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- 68 - 
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- 74 - 
Appendix A 

Peak Oil Predictions 

Projected Date Source of Projection Background 

2006-2007 Bakhitari, A.M.S. Oil Executive (Iran)

2007-2009 Simmons, M.R. Investment banker (U.S.)

After 2007 Skrebowski, C. Petroleum journal editor (U.K.)

Before 2009 Deffeyes, K.S. Oil company geologist (ret., U.S.)

Before 2010 Goodstein, D. Vice Provost, Caltech (U.S.)

Around 2010 Campbell, C.J. Oil geologist (ret., Ireland)

After 2010 World Energy Council World Non-Government Org

2012 Pang Xiongqi Petroleum Executive (China)

2010-2020 Laherrere, J. Oil geologist (ret., France)

2016 EIA nominal case DOE analysis/ information (U.S.)

After 2020 CERA Energy consultants (U.S.)

2025 or later Shell Major oil company (U.K.)

148 Table 4 – Peak Oil Predictions

1 

 

148 Hirsch, “The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil Production”, 9. 

- A-1 - 
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- A-2 - 
Appendix B 

Alternative Energy Options 

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 

 The President’s 2001 National Energy Policy spawned a massive, 

4-year Congressional effort to craft a comprehensive 1,724–page national 

Energy Policy Act signed into law in August of 2005.149 Tasking DOE 

with primary execution responsibility and backed with a 5-year funding 

plan of almost $4B for energy and conservation, $3+B for renewable 

energy efforts, and $2.5B in fossil fuel efforts, this historic act addressed 

every aspect of energy policy.150 A small snapshot of examples includes 

reducing federal building energy usage 20 percent by 2015, reauthorizing 

the Renewable Energy Production Incentive program and requiring the 

federal government to use 7.5 percent or more renewable energy by 2013, 

increasing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve from 700M to 1B barrels, 

authorizing DOE to develop oil shale liquid fuel development with DoD, 

spending $1.8B to fund the Clean Coal Power Initiative, and renewing the 

Price Anderson nuclear liability protection laws for another 20 years to 

stimulate nuclear reactor development. It also authorizes spending 

$2.15B over 5 years to create a state-of-the-art national hydrogen program 

designed to place 2.5M hydrogen-powered vehicles on the road by 2020 as 

well as a hydrogen fuel cell Clean School Bus program and a Hybrid 

Retrofit and Electric Conversion program to enhance or replace traditional 

internal combustion engines, spending $6M to revise CAFÉ standards, 

development of superconducting power transmission lines as part of a 

comprehensive electrical infrastructure upgrade, and introducing 5B 

gallons of renewable liquid fuels into the market place by 2010.151

 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 charged DOE with extensive R&D 

tasks ($783M in FY07, $865M in 2008, $952M in FY09) 152 to include 

conducting a balanced set of programs of energy research, development, 

demonstration, and commercial application with the general goals of:153

1. Increasing the efficiency of all energy intense sectors 

through conservation and improved technologies 

2. Promoting diversity of energy supply 

3. Decreasing the dependence of the U.S. on foreign energy 

supplies 

 

149 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005. 150 U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, “Energy Policy Act of 2005”, 4. 151 Ibid, 1-5. 152 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005., Sect 911(b). 153 Ibid, Sect 902(a). 

- B-1 - 
4. Improving the energy security of the US 

5. Decreasing the environmental impact of energy-related 

activities 

Specific R&D programs reflect research vision and bring the potential to 

forever alter the planet’s energy paradigms. For example, within 2 years 

DOE is to build a solar-hydrogen powered car and report on the feasibility 

of constructing a commercial pilot plant for hydrogen-production using 

solar energy only. 154 Starting with $15M in FY07 and increasing to $50M 

in FY10, the National Research Council is to explore the feasibility of 

extracting up to 200,000 trillion cubic feet of methane hydrate from deep 

sea regions,155 to explore the feasibility of distributed energy programs 

and small scale generation,156 and to conduct fundamental research in the 

Next Generation Lighting Initiative.157 In addition to the assigned 

research tasks, DOE was also charged with three important 

organizational/policy changes: 1) to create S&T graduate, post-doctoral, 

and senior research fellowships with post-program DOE employment 

requirements,158 2) to report to Congress by FY06 on the advisability of 

creating a high-risk research agency within DOE modeled after the DoD’s 

highly successful Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA),159 and 3) to incorporate a new SES3 Undersecretary of Science 

position responsible for coordinating all DOE S&T activity.160 This last 

change, creation of an Undersecretary of Science position, consolidates all 

research activity under one high-level office singularly responsible for 

providing focused strategic energy research leadership and affecting 

productive interagency coordination. 

Existing and Emerging Energy Alternatives 

DOE energy research will focus on three main areas of energy 

creation and utilization: 1) improving existing mainstream energy systems 

such as petroleum, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, and coal, 2) 

improving and developing energy distribution systems to include energy 

carriers such as electricity and hydrogen, and 3) enhancing the maturation 

of emerging energy systems such as a) the family of renewables (biofuels, 

wind power, solar power, oceanic), b) previously underutilized 

hydrocarbon sources such as tar sands, oil shale, and methane hydrates, 

 

154 Ibid, Sect 933. 155 Ibid, Sect 968(a)(2). 156 Ibid, Sect 924(b)(1). 157 Ibid, Sect 912. 158 Ibid, Sect 984A. 

159 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sect 1821(b). 160 Ibid, Sect 1066. 

- B-2 - 
and c) the exotic world of six-sigma technologies (nuclear fusion, 

matter/anti-matter, etc). The plethora of problems and potential solutions 

in both the creation and utilization realms ensures no shortage of R&D 

requirements and guarantees short to mid-term turmoil associated with 

identifying winning services or technologies in a period of high innovation 

and experimentation.161 Detailed analysis of each opportunity would 

consume several volumes beyond the scope of this paper; consequently the 

following paragraphs attempt to only briefly discuss the status and main 

issues in each major energy area as needed to support this report. 

Petroleum 

Petroleum distillates are the primary mobility/maneuver fuels of 

the DoD and the planet, and possess an uncertain future regarding 

peak production date estimates. Concentrated in certain regions of 

the world, it is sold as a single-price commodity through an 

established exploration and distribution network that the Paris 

International Energy Agency predicts will take $5 trillion to 

maintain over the next 30 years.162 DoD is the world’s single 

largest institutional user today, consuming approximately 134 

million barrels a year.163 The U.S. is expected to import 68 

percent of its requirements by 2025.164 

Natural Gas 

An annual U.S. 19 trillion cubic feet demand is used to fuel 16 

percent of U.S. electrical requirements (expected to rise to 24 

percent by 2025) and to satisfy a major portion of U.S. heating 

requirements. 2,500 trillion of world’s 6,000 trillion cubic feet 

reserves are owned by the Middle East—North American 

reserves are only approximately 250 trillion cubic feet,165 and 

U.S. imports are expected to grow to 6 trillion cubic feet/yr by 

2025.166 Natural gas is presently the primary feedstock to 

produce most U.S. hydrogen. With the exception of liquefied 

natural gas, it must be utilized via direct connection to source. 

Natural gas is used by the DoD to either directly heat facilities 

or indirectly produce electricity via commercial producers. 

 

161 Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 252-253. 162 Lynch, David. “Debate brews: Has oil production peaked?”, 4. 163 Defense Energy Support Center, DESC FY2004 Fact Book, 21. 164 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee. 165 Caruso, “World Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 20. 166 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee. 

- B-3 - 
Nuclear 

All existing U.S. power plants are fission type and are expected 

to continue operating through 2025, but no new plants are 

expected to be built either.167 Nuclear power share of U.S. 

electrical production will drop from 20 percent to 14 percent in 

2025.168 Japanese aggressively pursuing breeder reactor 

technology which will produce more power than it consumes, 

but will also produce plutonium byproducts that could 

complicate world counter proliferation efforts. Many nations 

are seeking to develop hot fusion technology. Aside from 

nuclear powered sea vessels, DoD uses nuclear power 

indirectly through commercial electricity purchases. 

Coal 

The U.S. possesses the world’s largest coal reserves, 

approximately 270 of the world’s 1,001 billion short tones—an 

amount sufficient to power America for 250 years at present 

consumption rates.169 Major environmental drawbacks are 

from mining activity and heavy carbon dioxide production. 

New technologies are demonstrating ability to sequester nearly 

all carbon emissions. Coal can be converted into natural gas, 

hydrogen, or liquid hydrocarbon fuel. The DoD presently uses 

coal indirectly through commercial electricity producers. 

Hydroelectric 

The U.S. derives 6.5 percent of electrical energy from 

hydroelectric power.170 No significant production increases 

expected (other than efficiency increases) due to maximization 

of existing sites. 

Biofuels 

 

167 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee 168 Ibid. 

169 Caruso, Statement Before Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, and Caruso, “World 

Energy and Economic Outlook to 2025”, Slide 22. 

170 Energy Information Agency. “Generation and Consumption of Fuels for Electricity 

Generation, November 2005.” 

- B-4 - 
Biofuels are a rapidly growing energy segment due to 

discovery of bio-engineered catalysts that produce gasolinecompatible ethanol from cellulosic plant elements (vs. 

sugars/starches) and due to improvements in producing organic 

waste-stream bio-diesel compatible with existing diesel 

engines. Ethanol and bio-diesel are both compatible with fuelcell reformers. Virgin Airways is the first airline to begin 

building bio-fuel production plants to power its 100-aircraft 

fleet.171

Wind Power 

Rapid European technology advancements enable large scale, 

low cost wind-power production at rates comparable to coalfired power plants—Denmark obtains 20 percent of electricity 

from wind power.172 U.S. led world capacity installation in 

2005 to 2,500 MW total; demand so great that all commercial 

turbine production has been purchased through mid-2006.173 

Provides secure, price-stable source of electricity. U.S. Air 

Force is the largest single green power consumer in federal 

government, primarily through wind power. 

Solar Power 

Solar energy technology provides photo-voltaic (PV) electrical 

power and solar heating. Significant nano-technological 

breakthroughs are driving cost reductions, efficiencies, and 

flexibility to record levels. The ability to print thin-film 

photovoltaic ribbons has enabled the production of PV roof 

shingles and California Million-Roof Solar Initiative. DoD 

installation structures provide ideal PV and solar heating 

platforms—Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs installation of 

PV systems on 20,000 federal buildings by 2010.174

Oceanic 

 

171 Kulczycki, “Green Vehicle News. “ 172 Danish Wind Energy Association. “Did You Know?”. 173 American Wind Energy Association, “U.S. Wind Industry to Break Installation 

Records, Expand by More Than 35% in 2005.”. 

174 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sect 3177. 

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New technologies are entering pilot stage demonstrations to 

produce electrical power from coastal tide, ocean current, and 

temperature gradient sources. This capability would be best 

suited for coastal installations (U.S. Navy primary), but could 

be adapted to ship electricity or hydrogen to distant users. 

Hydrogen 

Hydrogen, the most abundant element in the universe, is an 

actual energy transporter vs. an original energy source (it is 

similar to electricity in this regard). Hydrogen possesses four 

times the energy density of petroleum by weight and can be 

either directly combusted to produce mechanical energy or 

consumed in fuel cells to produce electricity and heat. 

Hydrogen can be produced on a large scale or locally from 

virtually any renewable or hydrocarbon source, but presently 

requires electrical or hydrocarbon “feedstock” energy to 

produce. Hydrogen must presently be stored in 5,000-10,000 

psi compressed gas or super-cooled liquid form, but new nanotechnology breakthroughs provide for the prospect of stable 

ammonia hydrate solid form storage and photolysis-based 

production through direct sunlight exposure. 

Solid-to-Liquid Hydrocarbon Conversion 

Synthetic fuel production utilizes the Fisher-Tropsch process 

developed by Germany before WWII to convert coal, tar sands, 

and shale oil into clean liquid hydrocarbon fuels. The process 

is presently in use by South Africa and Canada, with Canada 

producing 1M bbls of oil a day.175 North America possesses 

3.7 trillion bbl oil equivalent—1.7 trillion in Alberta tar sands 

and 2.0 trillion in primarily U.S. western and south-central 

states that in total surpass world liquid oil reserves by 40 

percent176. In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 “Congress 

declares that it is the policy of United States that United States 

oil shale, tar sands, and other non-conventional fuels are 

strategically important domestic resources that should be 

developed to reduce the growing dependence of the United 

States on politically and economically unstable sources of 

 

175 Fialka, “In Oil Quest, U.S. Says Rock On”, 4. 176 Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves, Strategic Significance of 

America’s Oil Shale Resource; Assessment of Strategic Issues., 23. 

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177 foreign oil.” DoD and DOE are exploring establishment of a 

pilot production facility with the goal of providing all DoD 

liquid fuels from shale oil at an estimated 2M bbl/day 

production by 2020 with a 10M bbl/day ultimate capacity.178 

Process requires potential strip mining, high water 

consumption, and carbon dioxide emissions that may present 

significant environmental constraints. 

Methane Hydrates 

Methane hydrate is a solid crystalline form of methane that can 

be converted into hydrogen or hydrocarbon fuels. With 

potentially up to 200,000 trillion cubic feet of methane 

available,179 methane hydrates offer the largest longest term 

potential for military fuels, but significant research is required 

to enable recovery of those materials in a safe and efficient 

manner.180 Found primarily under the ocean floor, the U.S. 

Navy is researching locations of vast offshore deposits and 

may have deep underwater technologies that could be applied 

to the recovery. Methane would be liberated from the hydrate 

and processed on a ship or barge into transportation fuels using 

the Fischer-Tropsch process. 

Material Sciences/Nanotechnology 

Nanoscience is the study of the unique ability to characterize, 

manipulate, and physically assemble material structures at the 

atomic and molecular levels. By producing previously 

inconceivable material properties, nanotechnology holds the 

potential to revolutionize the energy industry. DOE’s Basic 

Energy Sciences Advisory Committee has established the 

following energy goals for nanoscience to achieve:181

- Scalable methods to split water with sunlight for hydrogen 

production 

 

177 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sect 369.. 178 Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves, Strategic Significance of 

America’s Oil Shale Resource; Assessment of Strategic Issues., 23. 

179 U.S. Congress, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Sect 933. 180 Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves, Strategic Significance of 

America’s Oil Shale Resource; Assessment of Strategic Issues, 23. 181 Committee on Technology, Nanoscience Research for Energy Needs, Report of the 

National Nanotechnology Initiative Grand Challenge Workshop, March 16-18, 2004, v.

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- Highly selective catalysts for clean and energy-efficient 

manufacturing 

- Harvesting solar energy with 20 percent power efficiency and 

100 times lower cost 

- Solid state lighting at 50 percent of the present power 

consumption 

- Super-strong and lightweight materials to improve the 

efficiency of cars, planes and the like 

- Reversible hydrogen storage materials operating at ambient 

temperatures 

- Power transmission lines capable of 1 Gw transmission 

- Low-cost fuel cells, batteries, thermoelectrics, and ultracapacitors built from nanostructured materials 

- Materials synthesis and energy harvesting based on the 

efficient and selective mechanisms of biology 

Fuel Cells 

Fuel cell are a class of power production technology that use 

non-combusting chemical reactions with reformed hydrocarbon 

or hydrogen fuels to produce electricity, heat, and water. 

Originally designed for the space program, fuels cells now 

range from industrial applications to micro sizes that power 

cell phones, laptops, individual soldiers and micro-air vehicles 

due to energy densities superior to that of batteries.182 This 

rapidly growing market segment is now seen as a follow-on to 

hybrid automotive technology. DARPA is also working on 

fuel cell technology powered by high-energy propellants and 

explosives.183

“Six-Sigma” Technologies 

“Six Sigma” technologies represent those extreme fields of 

science which are shown to be theoretically possible, but as of 

yet lack any physical evidence of existence or the means to be 

applied toward useful problem solving. The atomic bomb was 

a six-sigma technology before the invention of quantum 

physics. Generally, six-sigma concepts require decades of 

research and several fundamental scientific discoveries before 

becoming realistically possible. Modern six-sigma concepts 

 

182 Gibson, Allen. “Powering the Battlefield: Fuel Cells and Renewable Energy.” 183 Ibid. 

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with energy solution applicability include matter/anti-matter; 

anti-gravity, and nuclear fusion. 

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Appendix C 

Energy Transformation Strategy 

Comparison 

Three Possible Energy Transformation Strategies for DoD 

There are three major strategies the DoD can take with respect to 

its energy future: 1) Embrace a More Efficient Petroleum-Based Status 

Quo, 2) Await Industry-Led Energy Transformation or 3) Initiate a DoDLed Energy Transformation. Each successive option acknowledges a 

significantly greater level of energy security urgency and level of effort to 

complete. While a detailed paper could be written on each of these 

scenarios, this appendix simply serves to highlight the major benefits and 

risks of each (see Table 5 on the following page) as they would be 

observed in 2050, allowing the reader to independently opine about the 

plausibility and merit of one over the other. 

 In the Status Quo Strategy, the DoD remains reliant upon 

petroleum and concentrates primarily on energy conservation and source 

protection. This scenario holds fundamental that technology will continue 

to find additional oil resources and more efficient methods to use them, 

and that the DoD will pay close to market prices for that energy. The 

benefits are that virtually zero scarce funds must be spent on 

infrastructure, force structure, or doctrine changes—there is very little 

institutional upheaval. On the negative side, this strategy forces the DoD 

to pay unpredictable but likely rising commodity prices, to remain 

operationally tethered to fuel logistics lines, to assure unrestricted U.S. 

and allied access to petroleum supplying nations, and to be prepared to 

face a strategic competitor that may someday develop and use an 

operationally advantageous energy source. The largest concern for Status 

Quo proponents is that distant peak predictions turn out to be false or are 

artificially accelerated due to a major geopolitical event, 

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Strategy Philosophy Benefits Dangers • Rely on petroleum future via new 

and existing oil fields 

• Only military infrastructure & 

systems maintenance required 

• Energy costs consume 

greater percentage of budget, 

• Purchase energy via global free- reducing training 

market methods 

• Minimal acquisition/development 

changes needed • During crises military 

readiness comes at expense 

of civilian energy demands 

• Increase efficiencies and 

conservation for infrastructure & 

combat systems 

• Present force structure & doctrine 

preserved 

• Oil competition from rising 

powers limits supply 

• Reduced demand through more 

efficient systems and practices 

A More Efficient • Import producer volatility; 

petro-dollar support to failing Status Quo states 

• Increased security risks 

associated with single-pointfailure, of centralized energy 

production and distribution 

• Strategic opponent may 

develop new disrupting 

energy source 

• No “Plan B” 

• Increase efficiencies and 

conservation for infrastructure & 

combat systems 

• Minimize operational/transition risk 

and development costs by relying 

on the commercial/international 

sector to conduct R&D 

• 20+ yr military acquisition 

timelines create a potential 

20-year capabilities gap after 

commercial energy 

conversion 

• Switch to alternate fuels only after 

commercial sector development & 

transition 

• Energy infrastructure established 

• Proprietary technology 

possessed by non-friendly 

entities 

• Reduced demand through more 

efficient systems and practices 

• Potential for abrupt and 

painful force 

structure/doctrine changes Industry-Led 

Transformation • Delayed oil energy costs 

consume greater percentage 

of budget 

• Prolonged oil competition with 

unconverted, exploding 

population developing 

countries 

• Longer exposure to oil 

producer volatility, failing state 

petro-dollars 

• Define and strive toward a DoD 

alternate energy vision and 40-yr 

strategy/timeline 

• Consolidated, defined goal that 

many eager soldiers, citizens, and 

industry can focus efforts on (with 

civilian spill-over benefits) 

• Budget sacrifices - $ billions 

of potentially unavailable 

investment capital required 

• Focus on efficiency/conservation; 

distributed energy production 

• An eclipsing technology might 

• Most rapid freedom from paying negate all investment to date 

and protecting non-friendly energy 

producers 

• Develop bridge energy sources for 

those systems/missions not easily 

converted 

• Streamlined acquisition could 

lead to unfulfilled promises 

• Forced operational efficiencies 

through decades of concerted 

effort 

• Effort may stall mid-stream 

when new oil reserves are 

found or energy prices decline 

• Heavy R&D/educational 

development 

• Increased security through 

distributed and/or autonomous 

power production 

• Acquisition reform toward 

efficiency KPPs, modular 

upgradeability & new energy 

standards 

DoD-Led 

Transformation • Potential environmental benefits—

• Leverage commercial sector improves public image 

advancements • Forms strong inter-agency 

partnership with gov’t agencies, 

industry, and academia 

• Employ new energy sources into 

legacy systems to preserve 

investment/capabilities • Enhanced national intellectual 

• Deploy clean-sheet alternate base 

energy weapon systems for the 

long-term while continuing 

research toward 3-sigma solutions 

• By default, DoD establishes 

national/international new energy 

standards 

Table 5 – Three Possible DoD Future Energy Strategies

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and the nation suddenly finds itself without a “Plan B” if petroleum 

production were to decline rapidly after peaking as EIA predicts it will (it 

is important to note that military fuel scarcity is not considered a primary 

detractor of this strategy since even under the most extreme conditions the 

U.S. is expected be able to domestically and indefinitely produce adequate 

petroleum [300,000-400,000 barrels/day, only 1.5 percent of national 

demand]184 to supply what would be the nation’s highest-priority DoD 

mission; this same claim cannot be stated with as much confidence for the 

industrial complex supporting the U.S. military or for several U.S.-allied 

militaries). 

 The Industry-Led Strategy has its roots in the Status Quo Strategy 

in that both place great faith in free market forces. Using the new 

industry-led technology development model increasingly in vogue since 

the end of the Cold War, in an industry-led energy transformation DoD 

waits for the ever more R&D- and investment capital-capable international 

commercial sector to develop, test, and deploy a new technology before 

acquiring it for military purposes. The major benefit here is that the R&D 

and infrastructure development risk is transferred away from DoD to some 

other entity and the DoD can quickly buy off-the-shelf products from the 

best qualified vendor. This configuration becomes limiting though in that 

DoD’s only mechanism to drive significantly larger commercial forces 

would be at the system end through contract specifications; there would be 

little opportunity to drive options early in the process—DoD could only 

take-it or leave-it when it came to the technologies offered. Additionally, 

if a desired commercially developed alternative belonged to a foreign 

multi-national corporation or a foreign government, the U.S. could not be 

guaranteed access to that technology. Finally, the worst-case situation in 

one in which a typically shorter-minded free-market system recognizes 

and responds to an impending petroleum crisis just in time to solve what is 

essentially a civilian transportation problem, but too late for longer-range 

military requirements. For the DoD this is not only a race against time, 

but also against other global military powers. Because major new weapon 

systems with 30-year life spans can take 25 years to field, it is conceivable 

that a 10-15 year capability gap could exist as increasingly more 

unsupportable petroleum systems must be maintained while awaiting 

arrival of “new energy” system acquisitions that must be initiated from 

scratch. 

 The final option, in which the DoD leads an energy transformation, 

proposes that the DoD develops an alternate energy vision for some future 

date, and then goes about methodically identifying and constructing with 

 

184 Lovins, Winning the Oil End Game, 26. 

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partners the milestones necessary to achieve that envisioned future. 

Precision guided munitions capability is an example of how the DoD 

recognized the benefits of truly precise aerial bombing, envisioned a GPSenabled solution, and then spent two decades and billions of dollars 

creating today’s reality. The spiral development approach of an 

envisioned national missile defense system is another example of such a 

program currently in progress. 

 A DoD “new energy” initiative would focus thousands of willing 

and interested minds thereby preserving our nation’s shrinking science & 

technology (S&T) intellectual base, protect operational freedom and 

national security from energy cost and supply constraints; and most 

importantly, retain strategic initiative and technological advantage. In 

addition to primary R&D efforts, the collaborative program would place 

significant emphasis on efficiency, bridge energies, spiral development, 

acquisition reform, modularity, and the early creation of “new energy” 

standards. Transformational successes could serve as models for the 

civilian sector. On the negative side, diverting significant resources to 

early R&D will be disruptive to existing near-term programs (potentially 

even weakening some risk-managed capabilities in a zero-sum resource 

environment), a better, later-developed technology might strand hundreds 

of billions of dollars and decades of earlier work, massive new petroleum 

discoveries might undermine the entire effort, or streamlined acquisitions 

may fail to deliver on expected promises. A DoD-Led Strategy is also not 

without significant risk. 

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