SAND 2004-1380 

Unlimited Release 

April 2004

Blue Sensors: Technology and Cooperative 

Monitoring in UN Peacekeeping 

Dr. A. Walter Dorn 

Professor of Strategic and Security Studies 

Canadian Forces College 

Toronto, Ontario

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 36 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and technical 

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For specific information on this report contact: 

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This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 
Blue Sensors: 

Technology and Cooperative Monitoring 

in UN Peacekeeping

Abstract 

For over a half-century, the soldiers and civilians deployed to conflict areas in UN peacekeeping 

operations have monitored ceasefires and peace agreements of many types with varying degrees 

of effectiveness. Though there has been a significant evolution of peacekeeping, especially in 

the 1990s, with many new monitoring functions, the UN has yet to incorporate monitoring 

technologies into its operations in a systematic fashion. Rather, the level of technology depends 

largely on the contributing nations and the individual field commanders. In most missions, 

sensor technology has not been used at all. So the UN has not been able to fully benefit from the 

sensor technology revolution that has seen effectiveness greatly amplified and costs plummet. 

This paper argues that monitoring technologies need not replace the human factor, which is 

essential for confidence building in conflict areas, but they can make peacekeepers more 

effective, more knowledgeable and safer. Airborne, ground and underground sensors can allow 

peacekeepers to do better monitoring over larger areas, in rugged terrain, at night (when most 

infractions occur) and in adverse weather conditions. Technology also allows new ways to share 

gathered information with the parties to create confidence and, hence, better pre-conditions for 

peace. In the future sensors should become “tools of the trade” to help the UN keep the peace in 

war-torn areas. 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 

See Appendix 1 for abbreviations of individual UN peacekeeping operations. 

CMC Cooperative Monitoring Center 

CP Checkpoint 

GPR Ground penetrating radar 

GPS Global Positioning System 

IR Infrared 

MAC Mixed Armistice Commission 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NVE Night vision equipment 

OP Observation posts 

PKO Peacekeeping operation 

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 

SOMA Status of Mission Agreement 

TCN troop-contributing nation 

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle 

UN United Nations 

UNEF United Nations Emergency Force 

UNMO United Nations military observer 

UNPA United Nations Protected Area 

UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 

UPS Uninterruptible power supply 
Contents 

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 7 

1.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping ........................................................................................... 9 

2. Cooperative Monitoring and UN Peacekeeping ....................................................................... 14 

2.1. Joint Commissions............................................................................................................. 17 

2.2. The Benefits of Cooperative Monitoring in Peacekeeping................................................ 17 

3. Blue Sensors: Monitoring Using Technology .......................................................................... 19 

3.1. Basic Monitoring Tasks..................................................................................................... 23 

3.2. Analysis and Dissemination of Information ...................................................................... 27 

3.3. Technology Selection Criteria ........................................................................................... 29 

Legal Aspects.................................................................................................................... 30 

Political Aspects................................................................................................................ 31 

Practical Aspects............................................................................................................... 32 

Terrain and Weather ......................................................................................................... 33 

4. Conclusions............................................................................................................................... 35

Appendix 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations: Four Categories......................................................... 1 

1. Observation Missions.............................................................................................................. 1 

2. Interpositional Peacekeeping Forces....................................................................................... 2 

3. Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations ........................................................................ 3 

4. Transitional Administrations .................................................................................................. 4 

About the Author ............................................................................................................................ 5 
Figures 

Figure 1. Worldmap of UN peacekeeping operations, completed and ongoing (bold)............................. 8 

Figure 2. Composite diagram showing various sensors that might be employed in a peacekeeping 

operation ............................................................................................................................... 21 

Figure 3. Diagram showing how sensors might be deployed to assist with monitoring a cease-fire ....... 24 

Figure 4. Diagram showing how monitoring technologies might be deployed in a demilitarized zone and 

a weapons-exclusion zone ....................................................................................................... 25 

Figure 5. Diagram showing the types of areas which might require protection: UN camps, safe 

areas, strategic locations (such as airports) ........................................................................ 26

Figure 6. Cooperative monitoring by the UN, aided by technology, to foster durable peace 

agreements ....................................................................................................... 37 

Tables 

Table 1. From Cold War to Hot Wars: different conflicts and different peacekeeping .......................... 11 

Table 2. The Evolution of Peacekeeping: The Four Types or “Generations” of UN Operations ........... 13 

Table 3. Various Levels of Cooperation and Access Provided to Peacekeepers ................................... 15 

Table 4. Monitoring Technologies for Peacekeeping ......................................................................... 20 

Table 5. Degrees of Information Dissemination ................................................................................ 28 

Table 6. Costs for Selected Items Listed in the "Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations" . 33

This work is dedicated to my father, Paul Carl Dorn (1924-1999). 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank David Barber and Kerry Herron for their support and encouragement 

during the course of this work. Current and former peacekeepers, especially Col. (ret’d) David 

Harries and Lt. Col. (ret’d) Christian Harleman, Col. Peter Leentjes and Lt. Col. Ulf Jershed, 

provided many anecdotes and insights from their wide-ranging UN peacekeeping experiences. 

Dr. Waheguru Sidhu, Karl Horak, Andrew Enterline, and Maj. David Last gave excellent 

comments on drafts of this paper. Finally, I am indebted to Prof. Jeremiah Sullivan for having 

invited me years ago to consider the subject of technology in peacekeeping. 
 1. Introduction 

No other organization has as much experience monitoring peace agreements as the United 

Nations. For over a half-century, the UN has played the role of primary third-party verifier of 

agreements between a wide range of conflicting parties around the world: colonial powers and 

independence-seeking groups; “communist” and “capitalist” forces (usually armed groups who 

fought proxy wars with superpower support during the Cold War); warring states in the Middle 

East; rebel groups and governments in Central America and the former Soviet Union; armed 

factions in South East Asia after periods of genocide (e.g., Cambodia and East Timor); 

governments and ethnic groups in Africa, Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia; even superpowers 

seeking international confirmation of troop withdrawals (e.g., US withdrawal from the 

Dominican Republic in 1965 and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89), and others. 

The UN calls the missions that it sends to the field with a military component to monitor and 

help maintain the peace, peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The UN definition of peacekeeping 

has changed several times, but a recent definition is entirely adequate1

: 

Peacekeeping is the deployment of international (UN) military and civilian 

personnel to a conflict area, with the consent of the parties to the conflict, 

in order to: 

 - stop or contain hostilities or 

 - supervise the carrying out of a peace agreement. 

The UN peacekeepers, sometimes called “Blue Helmets,” “Blue Berets,” and even "Blue Caps" 

(civilian peacekeepers) because of the color of their headgear, have had to monitor a great range 

of areas and activities: from disputed borders to entire countries; from cease-fires to combatant 

disarmament and demobilization programs; from human rights violations to national elections. 

These soldiers and civilians have served as early warners of war, investigators of complaints, 

judges of compliance and witnesses to raging conflicts. They have also been called upon to 

intervene forcefully to try to stop the buildup of tensions and the escalation of violence. 

UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably over time. The mandates became more complex and 

the monitoring tasks became more elaborate. Conflicting parties gave more access, more 

responsibilities and, on paper at least, pledged more cooperation to the UN. In particular, the 

types and number of missions jumped significantly after the Cold War. In the 1990s, for 

instance, the number of new missions was double the number of the previous forty years. The 

map in Figure 1 shows the locations of UN peacekeeping operations, both completed and ongoing (bold print). Descriptions of the UN operations are provided in Appendix 1, including the 

monitoring and other mandates. This paper explores the evolution of these functions, how the 

concept of cooperative monitoring was applied in peacekeeping and the use of technology to 

assist with the wide range of monitoring tasks. 

 

1

 This definition of peacekeeping was taken from the UN web site (www.un.org/Depts/dpko, accessed 

February 1999). 
Monitoring technologies were included to a much greater degree in the later missions, facilitated

by the fact that technology was increasing in effectiveness while decreasing in cost. The use of 

technology, however, was and is nowhere near its potential and the subject is just beginning to be 

explored in the literature (see Bibliography) and in the field by the UN. Some scenarios for using 

sensors are suggested in this paper. 

Figure 1. Worldmap of UN peacekeeping operations, completed and ongoing (bold) as of March 1999 

(Descriptions of all the missions deployed up to 2003 are given in Appendix 1.)
1.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping 

UN OBSERVERS. Their beat—no man’s land. Their job—to get the facts straight. 

A frontier incident, an outbreak of fighting ... Which nation is responsible, whose 

story is true? The UN must know. So its peace patrols keep vigil to prevent flareups, supervise truces, investigate and report. Already this vital work has helped to 

end bloodshed, bringing a promise of peace to millions of people. 

— UN Department of Public Information poster, c. 19602

UN peacekeeping can logically be divided into four broad functional categories 

corresponding roughly to “generations” of operations covering its 50-odd year history.3

 Each 

new category brings new tasks and monitoring requirements. The oldest type is the “observer 

mission,” characterized by the quotation cited above. In this type of operation, the main purpose 

is to observe the deployments and activities of the armed forces of two or more conflicting states, 

usually in relation to a cease-fire agreement negotiated by the states, often with UN meditation. 

Sometimes the operation’s title and mandate included the ambitious term “supervision” but 

conditions rarely put these UN operations in such an elevated position over the parties. The 

unarmed observers on the ground, however, have had many opportunities to help de-escalate or 

contain violence. In addition to the “observe and report” function, they often attempt to 

influence parties to quell violence using advice, aid and mediation.4

 The UN's first official 

peacekeeping operation (still operating), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 

(UNTSO), provides excellent examples of how monitoring is used in basic peacekeeping, as we 

shall see. A list of observer missions is provided in Appendix 1, Table 1. 

The second type of operation was initiated in 1956 when a "UN force" was deployed to the Sinai 

to separate the Egyptian army from the invading forces of Israel, France and the United 

Kingdom, thus ending the Suez crisis. In second-generation operations, UN troops are interposed 

between conflicting armed forces. These forces typically number in the thousands, while 

observer missions usually number in the hundreds. Unlike soldiers in observer missions, the 

peacekeepers in these “second-generation” operations are armed, and they are deployed in 

preformed units (e.g., battalions). By separating combatants such forces reduce the number of 

military contacts and flare ups and allow more effective monitoring of the tense zones between 

the parties. To prevent parties from violating a cease-fire or gaining new ground, the UN must 

keep constant watch over the positions of combatants on the ground. The peacekeepers must 

 

2

 Presentation 2235, 1E, UN Audiovisual Unit, New York. 

3

 It is common in the peacekeeping literature to talk about only two categories or generations: traditional 

peacekeeping and second generation peacekeeping. This breakdown ignores the fact that “traditional” 

peacekeeping is itself divided into the categories of observer missions (first used in 1946) and 

interpositioning missions (first used in 1956). In the 1990s, the range of functions increased dramatically. 

At the end of the decade another jump was made, with some new missions actually governing territories 

during a transitional period. Hence the concept of four generations of peacekeeping is more precise. 

4

 In all generations of peacekeeping operations, the UN tries to prevent or reduce fighting through 

negotiation, mediation and the exercise of its “good offices” but it can only succeed to the extent that the 

parties allow. 
anticipate any forward movements of military forces from agreed positions and sometimes seek 

to place themselves in the way of any such advances. 

In his pioneering report to the General Assembly on the proposed United Nations Emergency 

Force (UNEF) in 1956, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold set out the basic principles that 

have guided this type of “traditional” peacekeeping operation.5

 The Force was to be: 

• Under the command of the Secretary-General (as the earlier missions had 

become) 

• Recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the 

Security Council (i.e., China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom 

and the United States were excluded from direct, on-the-ground participation 

due to their Cold War strategic involvement in most disputes in the world); 

• Paid for by the United Nations, except for the salaries of troops, which would 

continue to be covered by the contributing states; 

• Impartial, i.e., the forces would not seek to influence the military balance, and 

• Non-combatant, using force only in self-defense. 

Hammarskjold negotiated an agreement with the host state, Egypt,6

 that was to become a model 

for future Status of the Force Agreements (SOFAs), covering a wide range of concerns and 

issues, including the freedom of movement and legal immunity of the UN peacekeepers. Almost 

all first and second generation operations required and received invitations from the host state 

and they could be withdrawn upon request of the host (as was the case when Egypt requested the 

withdrawal of UNEF in 1967). So the operations are of limited value once the parties are 

determined to engage in serious fighting.7

The third generation of UN operations arose from the changed character of the majority of 

conflicts since the end of the Cold War, as generalized in Table 1. The UN became more 

involved in internal conflicts, which had increased in intensity as well as number. The UN 

sought to bring a lasting harmony between warring factions, not just a cease-fire, and to assist in 

the difficult task of nation building. This required “multidimensional” peacekeeping, 

encompassing a wide range of functions and methods, from traditional observation of armed 

forces to the delivery of humanitarian aid to human rights promotion and the supervision of 

elections. While the previous two “generations” monitored mainly military activities, the new 

missions have had to monitor additional categories of activity: political, humanitarian, police, 

judicial, electoral, economic and human rights. The UN had to keep track not only of military 

 

5

 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/3289 of 4 November 1956.

6

 David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, stated in parliament that “on no account will Israel 

agree to the stationing of foreign forces, no matter how called, in her territory, or in any of the areas 

occupied by her.” (Blue Helmets, United Nations, New York, third ed., 1996, p.45) While UNEF was not 

stationed on Israel, UNTSO continued to operate there (with its headquarters still in Jerusalem) and 

UNIFIL later worked in areas occupied by Israel in Lebanon.

7

 The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) which occupied territory on both 

nations is an exception. The Security Council created the mission under Chapter VII and, under 

international law, it cannot be withdrawn without the authorization of the Council, even if the states (i.e., 

Iraq or Kuwait) demand its removal. Some other missions (e.g., in Somalia) have had similarly strong 

mandates. 
forces, but also try to reform the security sector such as a whole, since unreformed agencies

posed a threat to the peace process. This meant training new border guards, prosecutors and

judges, and in some instances tacking the difficult issue of the reform of intelligence agencies.

The task further expanded in some missions to include the supervision of certain departments of 

the government (defence and foreign affairs), fighting crime, controlling cross-border smuggling 

and enforcing UN sanctions. Major powers, including permanent members of the Security

Council (the P5), now actively participated in “third generation” operations. Though such 

operations are usually considered a phenomenon of the end of the Cold War, a forerunner 

operation was staged in the early 1960s in the Congo. Since 1989, when the pioneering operation 

in Namibia was deployed, over twenty operations have been launched that could be classified 

under the multidimensional heading. 

Table 1. From Cold War to Hot Wars: different conflicts and different peacekeeping, reflecting the 

changed focus of the international community 

Cold War Post-Cold War 

Predominant Conflicts Interstate, inter-alliance Intrastate, internal 

Origins Power bloc rivalry;

Ideology

Ethnic/tribal/religious animosities, secessionism

Main Threats Armed attack/invasion Civil war, human rights violations (including 

 genocide, torture), terrorism

Goals National/international 

 security; 

Conflict management: 

 cease-fire and 

 withdrawal agreements 

Human security; Conflict resolution: 

 comprehensive (multidimensional) peace 

 agreements; Conflict prevention 

Means Deterrence, negotiation, 

 classical peacekeeping 

Cooperation, mediation, modern peacekeeping 

 (classical peacekeeping PLUS humanitarian 

 action, disarmament, elections, enforcement, 

 sanctions, economic assistance, peacebuilding)

Peacekeeping 

 Locations 

State boundaries Throughout a nation or region 

Peacekeepers Soldiers (non-P5) Soldiers, civilian police, civilian monitors 

 (elections, human rights); includes P5 (i.e., 

 permanent members of the Security Council) 

At the end of the 1990s, a new type of operation was created for the purpose of “transitional 

administration.” Here the UN found itself not merely supervising a peace accord but actually

governing an entire territory during a transitional period. The main cases are the missions in 

Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET). While East Timor became self-governing in 

2002, Kosovo is still under UN administration. 

A summary of the purpose and methods of each of the four major categories of operations is 

provided in Table 2. A list of the peacekeeping operations in each generation is presented in

Appendix 1, illustrating the "alphabet soup" of UN acronyms and the main monitoring activities
of these missions. There have been over sixty operations since the first one was created in 1948.8

 

But the vast majority of these (over 40) have been launched since the end of the Cold War.9

To perform the wide range of monitoring tasks required for all four types of peacekeeping 

operations, the UN has used a host of methods, including observation posts (OPs), checkpoints 

(CPs), foot and vehicle patrols, as well as aerial reconnaissance and occasionally some 

technological means. It has also benefited from information supplied by the parties themselves, 

locals, foreign governments and the media. This paper explores the different levels of 

cooperation that the parties have provided to help the UN in its monitoring tasks and the various 

technological means that the UN has deployed (or could have deployed) to enhance such 

monitoring. 

 

8

 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), created in 1948, is considered by the 

UN as its first peacekeeping operation, since it came under the control of the UN Secretary-General. 

Earlier missions of the UN, though not under the Secretary-General's control, could also be considered as 

peacekeeping operations, namely the Commissions sent to Greece (1946), Indonesia (1947) and Korea 

(1947). 

9

 The end of the Cold War is taken to be 1988, when it became clear that the Soviet Union, under 

Michael Gorbachev, was no longer going to continue its participation in it. In February 1988, the Soviet 

Union announced it would start repatriating its troops from Afghanistan with UN verification. There was 

constructive engagement in the UN Security Council on a range of international issues since 1986 and on 

17 September 1987, Gorbachev had made his dramatic proposals for strengthening the United Nations. In 

December 1988, Gorbachev made the announcement of unprecedented cuts in Soviet Armed forces. 
Table 2. The Evolution of Peacekeeping: The Four Types or “Generations” of UN Operations 

Type of Operation Purpose Means and Methods Original Examples 

Observer Missions To determine if parties are 

respecting a cease-fire or 

other peace agreements, 

and assist in local 

settlements 

Monitoring through foot 

and vehicle patrols, 

observation posts, 

checkpoints, etc. 

Mostly used UN military 

observers (UNMOs) 

UNTSO (1948-) in the 

Middle East was the first 

official mission of this 

type; UNMOGIP (1949-) 

in Kashmir followed 

shortly thereafter 

Interpositional Forces To prevent or put an end to 

combat between parties 

Placing peacekeeping 

troops, mostly battalions, 

between combatants. 

Using patrols, checkpoints 

(fixed or mobile), 

searches, escort, show of 

UN presence/force 

UNEF (1956-67), 

stationed between Israeli 

and Egyptian forces was 

the first peacekeeping 

force 

Oversee or assist in the 

implementation of a 

complex peace agreement 

(which may involve 

disarmament, 

demobilization and 

reintegration of former 

combatants, humanitarian 

assistance, electoral 

assistance, human rights, 

civilian police, mine 

clearance, etc.) 

All of the above, plus 

protection of assembly 

areas and civilians, storage 

and destruction of 

surrendered weapons, 

escorts and protection of 

key personnel/facilities, 

oversight of police forces 

and other parts of the 

security sector, etc. Uses 

military, civilian police 

and civilian peacekeepers. 

The UN Operation in the 

Congo (ONUC, 1960-64) 

was the first of this type; 

UNTAG (1989-90) in 

Namibia pioneered this 

type of mission in modern 

times; UNTAC (1992-93) 

in Cambodia saw a large 

increase in UN roles and 

responsibilities 

Multidimensional 

Operations 

Protection of vulnerable 

populations 

Humanitarian aid convoys, 

road clearing, evacuation 

plans for vulnerable 

persons, securing sites and 

territory. Uses military 

forces and civilian police, 

humanitarian workers, etc. 

UNPROFOR (1992-95) 

had responsibility for “UN 

Protected Areas” in its 

mandate; these missions 

work in close cooperation 

with humanitarian 

agencies (e.g., UNHCR) 

Transitional 

Administrations 

Govern a territory during a 

transition to independence 

and self-governance 

Comprehensive missions 

covering all aspects of 

society (from military and 

legal to education and 

sanitation). Uses soldiers, 

police and administrators 

of all types. 

UNMIK (1999-) in 

Kosovo and 

UNTAET (1999-2002) are 

main examples. Earlier 

UNTEA (1962-63) in 

West New Guinea 

(Indonesia) 
2. Cooperative Monitoring and UN Peacekeeping 

Observers and observation groups are an essential part of any peacekeeping 

machinery which the United Nations is likely to set up. However, their 

effectiveness will depend on the cooperation received from the country in which 

they are observing. If the host country cooperates by giving them reasonably 

correct and full information, and allows them to go where they must in order to 

ascertain the true situation, then the task of the observer is relatively easy. 

Unfortunately, such cooperation on the part of the host countries has seldom been 

experienced by UNTSO. 

 - General E.L.M. Burns, commander of the UN Truce Supervision 

Organization, 1954-5610

The term “cooperative monitoring,” coined by the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC), was 

initially applied to arms control, but it can be applied to almost any kind of issue between 

disputants. Certainly, UN peacekeeping is a relevant application. The UN has been 

experimenting with cooperative monitoring with varying success for over a half century. 

As defined by the CMC, cooperative monitoring refers to a “process of gathering and sharing 

agreed information among the parties to an agreement.” This process has four major 

characteristics. First, it uses sharable technologies and methods for gathering information. 

Second, all parties have equal access to the gathered information. Third, cooperative monitoring 

includes mechanisms for securing and validating the information. Fourth, it stipulates 

procedures for dealing with anomalies. 

While monitoring as used in UN peacekeeping operations differs from cooperative monitoring 

strictly defined, it shares many of these characteristics. At a minimum, cooperation in UN 

peacekeeping means having the consent of the parties to the physical presence of UN observers. 

The UN has almost always obtained the consent of the host state for the deployment of its 

personnel.11 Furthermore, the UN usually seeks an undertaking, often written into a Status of 

Forces Agreement (SOFA), from the host state and other parties to give the peacekeepers 

complete freedom of movement in order to carry out their monitoring tasks and other functions. 

However, theory and practice have often been at odds. Beyond initial consent, cooperation with 

the UN has varied across the board. 

In practice, conflicting parties frequently fail to live up to their undertakings under peace 

agreements. Party leaders or local officials have often balked at the full implementation of their 

commitments to assist UN monitoring, especially when it comes to sensitive undertakings that 

 

10 Burns, E.L.M., Between Arab and Israeli, Clarke, Irwin and Co., Toronto, 1962, p. 277. General Burns 

goes on to describe his monitoring difficulties in UNTSO: “The narrative has shown how both sides 

restricted the observers’ movements from time to time, especially when they thought that their “military 

security” would be prejudiced—that is, when the had something to hide, either offensive preparations or 

some infraction of the terms of the GAA [General Armistice Agreements], such as having troops or 

defensive works in zone where none should have been.” 

11 Even the host nation’s consent to the presence of UN personnel can be conditional and tentative, as 

shown by the Iraqi acceptance and rejection of inspectors from the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). 
would make a difference politically or militarily. Sometimes these officials insist that 

observation is permitted for a limited time only, in limited areas, or is conditional on the 

behavior of the opposing party or on the provision of aid from the UN. In missions like 

UNPROFOR (1991-95) in the former Yugoslavia, the UN was not permitted to monitor many 

militarily activities or visit strategic areas considered off limits by the parties. Armed 

combatants at checkpoints prevented UN peacekeepers from entering strategically sensitive 

areas, particularly ones in which there was fighting or preparation for such. They were also not 

permitted to take photos of sensitive sites. In most operations, however, an intermediate degree 

of cooperation and access is provided, though this may not be sufficient to completely fulfill the 

UN mission mandate. Full cooperation was forthcoming in a few missions (e.g., from Soviet 

forces during their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-89 though not from the opposing 

Afghan/Pakistani side). Despite such hindrance, in almost all missions the UN was able to make 

a constructive contribution to peace with whatever means and freedoms it was able to obtain. 

The experience of UN peacekeeping has shown that cooperation between parties and the UN is, 

in practice, a wide spectrum, a sliding scale, and not two discrete states (on or off). The degree of 

cooperation is closely paralleled by the degree of access that the UN is given by the parties. 

Examples of the various degrees of cooperation and access are given in Table 3. There were 

times in UN history where it found itself in each of these positions, from maximum to minimum. 

Table 3. Various Levels of Cooperation and Access Provided to Peacekeepers 

TASK MAXIMAL INTERMEDIATE MINIMAL 

Deployment of UN 

personnel 

 

All privileges and 

immunities 

guaranteed; free 

use of local 

facilities 

UN to act strictly within its 

mandate; host has veto over 

presence of certain contingents or 

individuals; moderate charges for 

local amenities 

Consent only for the 

establishment of certain bases 

and the deployment of 

authorized units; large charges 

for use of facilities 

Freedom of 

movement 

Complete freedom 

guaranteed 

Escort required; restricted in 

certain areas; prohibited in others; 

UN searched at checkpoints 

Ground and aerial observation 

only in host’s vehicles or 

aircraft; carefully controlled 

and frequently denied access 

Picture/video taking Anywhere, anytime Authorized UN individuals only; 

authorization required for each 

site; certain sites (military) 

prohibited 

Within or from UN sites or 

observation posts only; 

Prohibited under any other 

circumstance 

Access inside 

buildings 

All rooms Advance notice required Prohibited unless specifically 

invited (with authorization at a 

high level) 

Access to documents 

and files 

All documents, 

filing cabinets and 

computers 

Relevant documents only (on 

“need to know” basis as 

determined by host); 

Not permitted; only officially 

published documents may be 

sought 

UN sensors Any resolution, any 

location, real time 

transmission 

Medium resolution (e.g., 

sufficient to count but not identify 

individuals); certain instruments 

only at agreed upon (known) 

locations 

Not permitted, including 

personal cameras 

Observation Posts Anywhere, 

anytime, without 

right of refusal 

Authorized locations only on a 

temporary basis 

Not permitted 
Checkpoints Set up anywhere, 

anytime 

Agreed locations only; limited 

search ability (e.g., not inside 

vehicles); UN prohibited from 

turning back vehicles 

Only for counting purposes 

UN communications Complete freedom 

of transmission and 

encryption 

Encryption not permitted Transmission must be in the 

clear; use of host’s facilities 

only 

Information 

provided 

Any information 

upon request; 

information on 

internal activities 

Agreed upon categories of 

information only; only 

information relevant to 

complaints issued 

Only information strictly 

related to the verification 

mandate; no info. transmitted to 

other party without permission 

Complaints Made to 

UN 

Made promptly 

with extensive 

supporting 

documentation 

(e.g., photos, 

witness’ reports, 

etc.) 

Complaints made with no 

supporting documentation or 

evidence 

No complaints made by party; 

no response to complaints 

against party; no access to 

witnesses 

Though the UN’s use of technology over the decades has been minimal, its basic methods of 

operation have been transparent to the parties in almost all cases.12 On the second characteristic 

of cooperative monitoring (equal access to the results), however, experience is quite varied. 

Parties do not necessarily receive identical sets of information from the UN, but the world 

organization does try to uphold a standard of impartiality so each side is treated equally 

according to established rules. Furthermore, access to the “results” does not necessarily mean 

access to all information gathered by the UN. The emphasis in UN missions has been on 

providing regular reports to UN headquarters but the missions rarely try to hide their conclusions 

or methods from the parties, especially since the official mission reports of the Secretary-General 

are almost always UN documents with unrestricted circulation. 

In the field, a standard UN practice has been to protest an observed violation to the party 

committing the violation, without necessarily notifying the other side(s), who might otherwise 

become alarmed or use the information for propaganda or hostile purposes. However, when one 

party complains about atrocities to the UN about the other parties, the report of the resulting UN 

investigation would normally be shared with all parties. In addition, parties have access to most 

of the reports of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in the field and the activities of the 

UN mission, as presented to the Security Council in formal, public documents.13

 

12 At times the UN has used subtler methods for gathering information. A case study was published by 

Dorn, A.W. and Bell, J.H., “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64.” 

For a broader discussion of the overlap of monitoring and intelligence-gathering, see Dorn, A. Walter, 

“The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-Gathering in UN Peacekeeping”, Pearson 

Paper, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, 1999.) 

13 In recent years, the Security Council has increasingly conducted its business behind closed doors in 

private consultations outside the regular Security Council chamber. However, non-members have often 

claimed their right under Article 31 of the Charter to “participate, without vote, in the discussion of any 

question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter consider that the interests of that 

Member are specially affected.” The Security Council has, however, not always granted permission for 

parties to attend its private sessions and the minutes of these meetings, in which the Secretary-General or 

his representative often describe field situations, are not public. 
If and when the parties agree to establish a common forum to discuss compliance issues 

regarding their agreement (e.g., a cease-fire or peace agreement), it gives the UN a place to raise, 

and hopefully resolve the compliance problems it detects. Otherwise, the UN might hold ad hoc

meetings with the parties, either together or separately, after an incident. This meets the fourth 

and final requirement for cooperative monitoring as stipulated by the CMC ("procedures for 

dealing with anomalies"). 

2.1. Joint Commissions 

In about half of the UN peacekeeping missions, joint commissions or similar bodies were set up 

to discuss monitoring and compliance issues with the parties. For instance, the 1948 armistice 

agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors created Mixed Armistice Commissions 

(MACs), chaired by an UNTSO official, where parties could lodge and discuss complaints. 

Similar bodies were established in Namibia (1989), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992) and 

Tajikistan (1994). If formal bodies were not created, the UN tried to sponsor or encourage joint 

meetings of the parties (as was the case in the Soviet-Afghan conflict) as a forum to present its 

reports and to discuss alleged violations and other issues of concern. In some cases, such 

meetings also served as negotiating fora to develop future accords, especially if a peace 

agreement had not yet been reached. In some conflicts, however, the parties refused even to meet 

face-to-face (e.g., in the Iran-Iraq conflict). Then the UN officials would have to deal with each 

party separately and often engage in shuttle diplomacy, moving between rooms, buildings or 

even cities (e.g., capitals) to help bring the parties closer to agreement. 

A common forum is invaluable to share information, to promote dialogue, to remove 

misunderstandings and to resolve anomalies. Such bodies help the parties understand each other 

and their respective actions, positions and policies. It also helps the UN iron out difficulties in 

the functioning of the monitoring system. 

2.2. The Benefits of Cooperative Monitoring in Peacekeeping 

Once a cooperative monitoring system has been set up in a mission, how does it help to promote 

peace? It can: 

• Build confidence among parties if few or only minor violations are shown to be taking 

place 

• Reduce false accusations and propaganda from the conflicting parties 

• Alert parties if actual violations are taking place 

• Provide a basis for the peacekeepers to deal with violations 

• Keep the UN in New York informed of the situation in the field. 

It is not, however, usually sufficient to simply monitor a conflict. To effectively keep the peace, 

there must be a mechanism for the UN to react once a problem has been identified. This is 

particularly important when the problem is likely to lead to an escalation of conflict. The UN has 

a variety of means of influence, from moral suasion to diplomatic pressure to military 

enforcement and a range of incentives (e.g., aid and trade) and disincentives (e.g., sanctions and 

isolation). 
An example of the UN’s capacity to de-escalate a conflict was provided by UNTSO. In July 

1955, the Jordanian army rushed troops to reinforce its positions on the West Bank after hearing 

reports of a possible Israeli attack on Jerusalem. The UNTSO head, General E.L.M. Burns, 

sought out Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir to discuss this “war scare.” Mrs. Meir was able to 

reassure him that there was no concentration of Israeli troops in the Jerusalem sector, confirming 

the information that Burns had received from his own UN military observers. He then conveyed 

the Israeli assurances to the commander of the Jordanian army in Amman. The commander 

agreed to withdraw his reinforcements on condition that further inspections by UN military 

observers (UNMOs) confirm the Israeli assertion. Apparently, the false alarm was sounded by 

apprehensive Jordanian agents who merely watched traffic on certain roads into Jerusalem. It 

was easy for UNMOs to disprove the allegations through careful counts and surveys. In the end 

the Jordanian forces were withdrawn, something confirmed by UNMOs, thus bringing the 

immediate threat of escalation to an end.14

This is but one of the thousands of ways, subtle and direct, that the UN has used monitoring to 

help keep the peace through its field missions. Most of the UN's experience has involved visual 

observation by UN officials on site. However, technology has increasingly been used to assist the 

UN in its field monitoring duties, especially as it has become cheaper and more effective. Still 

the scope for UN applications is far greater than the present usage suggests. 

 

14 Burns, p. 157. 
3. Blue Sensors: Monitoring Using Technology 

Too often UN peacekeepers find themselves reacting to tragic events after they have occurred 

rather than acting to prevent or even mitigate them. Investigations are usually conducted after 

violations are committed and the results of an atrocity are plain for all to see. Even then, the UN 

often faces the difficult challenge of determining who is responsible. Who fired the first shot? 

Who crossed the cease-fire line first? Who violated the peace agreement? Guilty parties usually 

try to obfuscate the facts to avoid accepting blame. Conflicting stories, propaganda and rumor 

among the conflicting parties are the norm. Thus, there is a great need for independent sources of 

information. 

Because violations could take place anywhere or any time in areas of confrontation, it is 

important that the UN possess an effective system for monitoring over large areas. A proactive 

approach to monitoring is needed by the UN because: 

• For prevention of violence, early warning is essential; 

• For any investigation of violations, objective and independent information is needed; 

• For deterrence against violations, a sound monitoring system is required since only then 

will parties fear getting caught or blamed; and 

• For confidence-building, an effective system will ensure that the parties get information 

rapidly that they consider vital for their security. 

Technology offers the UN an ever-increasing set of tools to meet the demanding tasks of 

monitoring. Just as technology has revolutionized war-fighting, it has the potential to do the 

same for peacekeeping. Unfortunately, the literature on technology for peacekeeping is miniscule 

and only in its infancy. Compared to the thousands of books on technology for war-fighting, 

there is only one book devoted to technology for peacekeeping (see the Bibliography). This 

section seeks to contribute to the exploration of technology uses in peacekeeping. 

Using technology, the UN would be better able to acquire the information it needs for a proactive 

stance and effective reporting, both to UN headquarters and to the parties. Specifically, 

technologies offer the following benefits. They can: 

• Increase the range and accuracy of observation 

• Permit continuous monitoring (e.g., 24-hour radar) 

• Increase effectiveness (incl. cost effectiveness in some circumstances) 

• Decrease intrusiveness (since human bodies need not be permanently present at a site) 

• Increase UN safety (since UN gains more situational awareness, including around the 

UN’s own camps). 

A description of the main monitoring technologies is given in Table 4. The sensors can detect 

various types of signals, including electromagnetic radiation (using either passive or active 

systems), magnetic fields, acoustic waves, or pressure/strain. In addition, chemical and biological 

sensors can also be important in some missions, for example, in the detection of landmines, 

explosives and even chemical, biological or other toxic agents. 
Table 4. Monitoring technologies for peacekeeping 

TECHNOLOGY QUANTITY MEASURED EXAMPLES OF USE 

Electromagnetic Sensing (Passive) Electromagnetic radiation, emitted or 

reflected, of wavelength ... 

Visible light imaging (using film or 

charge-coupled device (CCD)) 

 0.4–0.7 μm Photograph or video troops, tanks, 

vehicles in a demilitarized zone 

Infrared (IR) imaging (i.e., heat sensing) 

Near infrared 

Short wave infrared (SWIR) 

Mid wave infrared (MWIR) 

Long wave infrared (LWIR) 

0.7–1.4 μm 

1.4–2.0 μm 

3.0–5.0 μm 

9.0–12.0 μm 

Locate operating vehicles, warm bodies 

moving across cease-fire lines at night, 

aid to patrols 

Radiowave monitoring >30 cm (HF: 3-30 MHz; 

 VHF: 30-300 MHz) 

Receive and monitor radio 

communications 

Electromagnetic Sensing (Active) Electromagnetic radiation, originating 

from the sensor system and reflected 

by object, in the wavelength range ... 

LIDAR (LIght Detecting And Ranging) 0.4–1.1 μm Determine vehicle speed, location of 

combatant's positions 

RADAR (RAdio Detecting And Ranging) 

 Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) 10-30 cm (X-band: 10 GHz; K-band: 

24 GHz; Ka band: 33-36 GHz) 

Detect person entering monitored zone 

 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) 2-10 m (30-150 MHz, typically) Find buried weapons or mass graves 

 Doppler Radar 0.1–100 cm Determine vehicle speed 

 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 

 

 3–50 cm Spot weapons and deployments, day 

and night & in all weather conditions 

 Aerial Surveillance Radar 3–50 cm (e.g.) Detect planes violating no-fly zones 

X-Ray detection and imaging 0.03-3 nm Identify weapons inside metal or 

wooden cases or beneath clothes of 

person passing through detector 

Magnetic (and Quasi-Static Electric 

Field) Detection 

Magnetic field perturbations due to 

large ferromagnetic objects 

Detection of mines in fields; vehicles 

passing on roads 

Acoustic Wave Sensing

Seismic sensing (long-range) using a 

seismograph 

Elastic waves traveling through 

earth’s interior and along its surface 

Underground explosions (e.g., in 

explosives testing and in mining) 

Seismic detection (short-range) using a 

geophone 

Elastic waves traveling along Earth’s 

surface 

Detect vehicle or combatant intrusion 

into restricted areas 

Sonar (SOund Navigation And Ranging) 

detection 

Acoustic waves, in water, of 

wavelength 10 cm-1 km (passive) 

0.1–30 cm (active) 

Observe ship passage into restricted 

areas or presence of sea-mines 

Ultrasound probing Sound waves frequency >20 kHz Probe artillery shells for chemical 

weapons’ agents 

Microphone Sound waves in air of frequency 

20Hz-20kHz (wavelength 1 cm-20m) 

Determine which side/party fired first; 

provide alert if tanks are traveling 

along roads or removed from storage 

Pressure and Strain Sensing Pressure (or strain) applied on contact 

with 

Strain sensitive cable a cable (fiber optic or piezoelectric 

cable or pneumatic tube) 

Detect vehicles moving on monitored 

roads, e.g., before or near checkpoint 

Weight scale a plate Weigh truck or tank passing atop scale 

for sanctions monitoring 
Figure 2. Composite diagram showing various sensors that might be employed in a peacekeeping 

operation 

The composite diagram in Figure 2 depicts a wide range of practical technologies that can assist 

monitoring in peacekeeping. A regional UN station (bottom right) could receive, gather and

disseminate data, as well as to dispatch UN interception vehicles to respond rapidly. The top 

portion illustrates the variety of potential aerospace reconnaissance platforms: helicopters, 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reconnaissance aircraft, AWACS planes (e.g., as used by

NATO during the UN’s operation in Bosnia), balloons (tethered, guided or free floating) and 

satellites. Overhead reconnaissance permits surveillance over large areas that can help spot the 

locations of the armed forces and any illegal movements of troops or weapons, as well as the 

locations of refugees and aid stations. . On the ground, the UN can equip its observation posts 

with powerful binoculars (as it has in the past), and use ground surveillance radar (GSR) to cover 

open ground and waterways, especially to observe movements of forces or materiel across

borders or into demilitarized or buffer zones. It can deploy video surveillance cameras for remote 

monitoring and use ground penetrating radar (GPR) to look for buried objects (such as weapons) 

and underground bunkers and tunnels. The UN could employ infrared breakbeams and 

seismometers to detect the movements of vehicles or persons, perhaps in conjunction with traffic

monitoring at a checkpoint or a system of interception patrols. Certain areas which are favorite 
entrance routes for intruders can be blocked off with taut-wire fences, which not only act as 

barriers but also send signals when touched (or climbed), giving the location of the intrusion. 

The following scenario illustrates how a technologically-advanced cooperative monitoring 

system might provide vital assistance to peacekeepers (“Blue Sensors for Blue Helmets”). 

Consider a buffer zone between two conflicting parties: A and B, for simplicity. The UN places a 

number of sensors in the buffer zone and at its edges. An armed night-time intruder moves from 

side A to the buffer zone to reach side B by vehicle and foot, setting off several sensors. These 

might include a magnetic detectors on roads and seismic detectors on a nearby field. The signals 

are transmitted to a UN field station several kilometers away that is responsible for the sector. 

From the sequence of seismic signals the direction of movement is determined. A pair of UN 

military observers is dispatched from the station in a UN vehicle. They keep in radio contact 

with the station and are informed of the rough movements of the possible intruder. As they 

approach, the sound of the jeep engine alerts the intruder, who scurries into the bush for cover. 

But the UNMOs, equipped with infra-red vision devices, are able to see a warm body against the 

background of foliage. Furthermore, they know that something set off the metal detector though 

the intruder is on foot. This alerts them to the possibility of a weapon. They are able to 

apprehend him with their superior numbers and discover that he is carrying a mortar. The 

intruder is questioned about his weapon, from which it is deduced that he probably intended to 

attack a local garrison that night. The next day, both he and his weapon are returned to the 

authorities in side A, who place him under arrest. The UN observers file a report, which is sent 

to all parties and to UN headquarters. 

Furthermore, in this idealized scenario, the intrusion incident is raised in the next meeting of the 

Joint Commission. Party A explains that the intruder was a renegade soldier who was acting 

without orders. Furthermore, the representative alleges that the soldier is being disciplined. Party 

B insists that the UN follow the case in the military tribunals of side A to see if punishment is 

actually being exacted. The UN agrees to do so. At the next meeting of the Joint Commission a 

month later, the UN described its follow-up along with the sentence. The matter is considered 

closed. What could have been a major international incident, such as an attack on a garrison, is 

now de-fused by the UN through a combination of technologies for early detection, a quick UN 

response, a forum for discussion and a means to verify the implementation of any promises. In 

short, this is an effective cooperative monitoring system. 

Such incidents have occurred in UN peacekeeping operations, though the response of the parties 

is rarely so ideal. The UN’s resources to detect movements are limited, especially at night and 

over large areas. Many opportunities for proactive or even reactive measures were missed 

because the UN could not monitor more thoroughly more territory more of the time. 

The system could be further enhanced with a direct communication lines between New York, the 

mission headquarters and local commanders. These may even be able to contribute to the UN’s 

information, e.g., provide their own alerts to the UN about intruders. “Hot lines” and special 

radio links have, for instance, been established in past UN missions (e.g., in Cambodia and 

Afghanistan). 
The ability to share sensor data with parties can also be greatly facilitated by technology. Data 

links can be established between the UN and the parties to whatever extent is deemed desirable 

and agreed in advance. At a minimum, summary reports can be faxed or e-mailed periodically 

(e.g., weekly). In addition, parties might receive the UN’s reports of its investigations soon after 

they are completed. For maximum feedback, the UN might even share raw data gained by 

sensors with the parties in near real time. Through regular and systematic reporting, the parties 

will gain increased confidence in the UN and the monitoring system. With the prior consent of 

the parties, the results and even the data might be placed on the world wide web for universal 

access. 

3.1. Basic Monitoring Tasks 

The UN has performed a great many monitoring tasks in its history. These have grown in scope 

and complexity with each successive type or generation of peacekeeping. The most frequent 

monitoring objectives are basic to all missions: cease-fires; demilitarized or controlled zones; 

and strategic/protected sites, including the UN’s own facilities. These tasks are regularly found 

in each category of peacekeeping: observation missions, interpositional forces, multidimensional operations and transitional administrations. The possible technology applications for 

these basic monitoring objectives are described below. 

After a cease-fire (see Figure 3), the parties are usually in close proximity of each other, as 

determined by their last wartime engagement. Sometimes they continue to seek territorial gain by 

moving their forces forward or otherwise violating the cease-fire. Thus, an outside verifier, such 

as the UN, needs to keep a careful watch over the military positions of the two sides. The UN 

can usually patrol along the cease-fire line and often on either side as well, among the opposing 

forces, but such patrols can only cover a small area for a specific amount of time and are 

hampered at night. The cover of night is frequently used by smugglers and violators of peace 

accords. For 24-hour surveillance, technology is usually needed. The use of acoustic sensors can 

be useful to permit the UN to determine which side breaks the cease-fire first. Acoustic devices 

could, for example, be pointed in opposite directions, towards the parties on opposite sides. From 

the timing and nature of the acoustic signals (mortar, artillery or even rifle fire), the UN might be 

able to determine which side is responsible for the initiation of hostilities. 

Parties sometimes deliberately send infiltrators across the cease-fire line to the other side. To 

detect this, the UN can consider using ground surveillance radar, which will detect movement 

over large areas. Ground surveillance radar was used in the UN's Lebanon mission (UNIFIL) to 

detect intruders along the Litani River dividing line. Roads can be monitored remotely using a 

combination of magnetic, IR breakbeam and pressure sensors. 

Infrared night vision devices have proven extremely useful for night-time observation of forces 

on opposing sides of a cease-fire line. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 

(UNFICYP) provides a useful and interesting example. Swedish peacekeepers had a lookout 

over the positions of both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish sides on opposite sides of the “Green 

Line,” which divided the country. Employing night-vision equipment, they could easily see that 

Turkish soldiers were digging new positions each night in contravention of the cease-fire. This 
was obvious to the UN but the Turks continued to deny it. The chief Swedish officer cunningly 

decided to invite the local commander of the Turkish forces to an evening tea at the UN post. 

Figure 3. Diagram showing how sensors might be deployed to assist with monitoring a cease-fire. 

Legend for Figures 3-4.
Figure 4. Diagram showing how monitoring technologies might be deployed in a demilitarized zone and 

a weapons-exclusion zone 

While there, the Swedish officer asked the Turkish commander if he would like to have a look 

through a night vision device, to which the commander eagerly agreed. To his embarrassment, 

what he saw was his own soldiers undeniably digging in the distance. The activity at the site 

stopped after that night. 

Various types of zones can be monitored, in accordance with an armistice or peace agreement. 

These include: demilitarized zones, where no military personnel or weapons or materiel are 

permitted; limited forces zones, where only designated forces and certain equipment (e.g., 

personal weapons) are permitted; or controlled zones where a range of restrictions may apply. 

The layered approach, incorporating both types of zones, is illustrated in Figure 4. Often these

zones are created from the no-man's land that existed between the combatants at the time of their 

last engagement. In most cases, they are areas of contention each side would like to control.

Therefore the UN has to keep watch over the territory and move its own forces into areas 

coveted by one or both sides. Also, to prevent attacks across the zones, it is sometimes necessary 

to construct fences or other barriers and to patrol the area continuously. 

Finally, Figure 5 shows some types of sites that UN peacekeepers might be mandated to guard.

This task necessarily involves intensive monitoring, sometimes over large areas. United Nations 
Protected Areas (UNPAs), for instance, may be designated by the Security Council to cover 

entire cities and surrounding regions. Other guarded sites in UN history have included: 

- Strategic facilities (airports, train stations, bridges, cultural facilities)

- Key sites under potential threat (Presidential residences, rebel headquarters) 

- Communications facilities/routes (radio stations, telephone and power lines) 

- Transport routes (roads, train tracks) 

- Other infrastructure (power-generating plants, mines) 

- Humanitarian sites (aid stations, refugees camps) 

- UN facilities (headquarters, camp). 

The UN must be aware of the vulnerabilities of such sites to attack and sabotage, and be able to

provide early warning of any encroachments or hostile acts. Here again, the UN would benefit 

from a range of equipment and technology. These include fences, especially those that are 

designed to signal when an attempt is made to breach them and the wide range of intruder

detection technologies. 

Figure 5. Diagram showing the types of areas which might require protection: UN camps, safe areas, strategic 

locations (such as airports) and rebel bases during a disarmament period
3.2. Analysis and Dissemination of Information 

In addition to gathering information, the UN must also analyze and disseminate information 

appropriately. Here again technology has a key role to play. 

Information Analysis

The analysis of data is important for several reasons. First, data from sensors must be made 

intelligible! Raw data often consists of a string of digital pulses that require computers analysis 

to produce images or other useful information. Patterns may need to be analyzed at various 

levels, from the basic identity of an imaged object to determining the potential strategy behind 

the movement of many weapons and combattants over time. Second, the operators and analysts 

must determine whether there are any technical difficulties with the system. By analyzing the 

signals, conducting quality checks and occasionally calibrating the system (if necessary), the 

operators can gain confidence in the accuracy of the signals. Furthermore, it may be necessary to 

utilize various methods of “authentication” to make sure that the signal is not being manipulated 

for hostile purposes. Often redundancy checks are made by verifying that two identical sensors 

respond the same way to the same stimuli. (These redundancy and authentication processes 

parallel, on the technical level, a standard UN practice of having two UN military observers from 

different nationalities both sign any reports of violations.) Thus, the UN will usually need to 

analyze information for a short period of time before sharing the results with the parties. 

Dissemination of Information

When an armed conflict is in progress it is difficult to tell what is actually 

happening. Both sides put out their own versions of events, usually censored and 

sophisticated. If the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United 

Nations is to take appropriate action in a confused situation of conflict obviously 

it should have accurate and unbiased information. What is really going on? That 

is the question which the United Nations first of all wants answered when it sends 

military observers to Palestine, or anywhere else. Later, if either of the UN organs 

have made decisions or recommendations, it will want observers to tell it whether 

the parties are complying with them.15

The view expressed by General E.L.M. Burns illustrates how monitoring in peacekeeping was 

traditionally done more to inform United Nations bodies in New York than to inform the parties 

in the field. The concept of cooperative monitoring shifts the emphasis to supplying the parties 

with information. In this way, cooperative monitoring serves as a confidence-building system as 

well as a verification one. The UN Secretary-General’s 1995 study on “Verification in All Its 

Aspects” highlights this approach: 

In crisis situations or in post-conflict contexts, the ability of all parties to have 

accurate, timely information so that threatening actions can be avoided, or early 

warning of impending danger, may be central to the successful resolution of the 

dispute ... Because parties to a conflict, especially intra-State conflict, have little 

or no confidence in each other, verification and transparency take on special 

importance ... The United Nations may, upon request, provide such monitoring 

 

15 Burns, p.277 (italics added). 
and could assist the parties involved in their monitoring activities in other

instances.16

When parties receive regular, systematic information about events in the field from objective 

sources, they generally feel more secure. It is also harder for hostile elements within the parties 

to introduce falsehoods and spread propaganda. What is important is that the parties receive 

regular information in a convincing fashion, preferably identical reports containing sufficient 

detail, from a body that has shown competence in catching even minor infractions of agreements. 

Just as there are degrees of cooperation in information gathering, so there are also a range of 

possibilities for data dissemination. On first blush, one might think that the ideal way to create 

complete transparency is by freely distributing all UN data to all the parties. The UN, however, 

rarely does this for several good reasons. A conflicting party could take advantage of certain 

information provided by the UN on the military disposition of the other party to help prepare for

an attack or other aggressive acts. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the UN to provide 

equally significant data to both sides – and, besides, the UN would not want to be an unwitting 

accomplice to aggression. Also the UN would not want to reveal in too obvious a fashion any

weaknesses in its information-gathering, should these exist. Furthermore, some of the UN’s 

methods and local sources may need to remain unknown to the parties to prevent their hurting or 

tampering with them. 

Still, a good flow of information is a key ingredient in building confidence among conflicting 

parties. Thus, the UN has to judge, in each case, the best level of information sharing with the 

parties. Some options are presented in Table 5. In almost all cases, it should make sure that the 

sharing is done impartially, i.e., that both parties are treated according to the same rules. This 

means similar, but not necessarily identical, information is provided to both sides. In UN 

tradition, such sharing need not be done in the public gaze or in the presence of all parties; one 

side does not always need to know what the other side is getting. 

Table 5. Degrees of Information Dissemination 

All information is provided ... to all parties 

Only violations, major or minor, are reported ... 

- to all parties 

- to the offending party (as a protest) 

Violations are reported ... 

- with all supporting evidence (information essential 

to demonstrate non-compliance) 

- only with supporting evidence that will not affect 

military security of offending party 

- with no supporting evidence 

Situation reports are provided ... 

- on a real-time basis 

 

16 "Report of the Secretary-General on Verification In All Its Aspects, including the Role of the United 

Nations in the Field of Verification," UN Doc. A/50/377 of 22 September 1995, para. 18, 39 and 277. 
- periodically (daily/weekly/monthly) 

- only after violations occur 

In cases where one party brings an allegation of a violation to the UN, the peacekeepers will try

to investigate. The results (if not the report) of the investigation will be provided to the parties,

especially if there is a Joint Commission or other dispute settlement forum to formally, though 

often confidentially, present such reports. Coming to firm decisions on violations, however, can 

also land the UN into trouble: parties may resent being accused of non-compliance. General 

Burns, who chaired the Mixed Armistice Commissions between Israel and the neighboring Arab 

states in 1955, had much experience in such matters. He found that parties would sometimes 

accuse UN officials, unjustly, of currying favor with the other side for personal reasons. Such 

allegations have often been made in UN missions.17 Almost forty years later the UN SecretaryGeneral was to write that the UN Operation in El Salvador “was operating in an atmosphere of 

deep distrust. Its insistence on maintaining its impartiality is sometimes misperceived by each

side as being partiality towards the other.”18 When reconciliation between the parties is 

achieved, though, such criticism quickly fades away. 

In spite of some negative UN experiences in sharing information with conflicting parties, the 

arguments for an automatic and equal feed of some significant information is compelling. There

are definite benefits to a monitoring system in which identical information is given automatically

to each party. For one, the parties can less easily accuse the UN of playing favorites in its

information dissemination. Such a cooperative monitoring system builds confidence because 

parties can see that violations are being detected and responded to; the parties are better able to 

judge the performance of each other. In addition, they can corroborate UN information with 

their own. Furthermore, they may be in a position to correct the UN when information is

erroneous. In the end, the decision whether the UN should provide parties with a regular pipeline 

of identical information automatically will depend on the case. The situation on the ground, the 

psychology of parties, the danger of break out (resumed fighting) and, indeed, the quality of the 

UN’s information gathering system must all be taken into account. It would be valuable, 

however, to explore this new dimension of cooperative monitoring in future peace agreements. 

The ability to gather, analyze and disseminate useful information will depend in great part on the 

selection of appropriate technologies. 

 

3.3. Technology Selection Criteria 

In choosing which technologies to deploy to the field, there are legal, political and practical 

factors that the United Nations must take into account. Even the decision whether to use 

advanced technologies and the choice of specific technologies, as well as the method and 

location, will depend greatly on these considerations. 

 

17 Burns, p.46. 

18 Blue Helmets, p.431. 
Legal Aspects

In order to use monitoring technologies in the field, the UN must overcome political and 

practical hurdles but legally there are relative few problems. There is no provision of 

international law prohibiting the UN from employing sensors in its field operations. There are, 

however, some legal “constraints,” as well as legally-guaranteed freedoms, that are stipulated in 

international legal documents (treaties and agreements) that have a bearing on monitoring and 

the stationing of devices to do it. To begin with, the United Nations Charter states, in Article 

2(7), that 

Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 

matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, but this 

principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 

Chapter VII. 

While some peacekeeping operations are mandated under Chapter VII,19 in which case the UN is 

legally permitted to over-ride the non-consent of a party, the vast majority of UN operations are 

deployed under conditions of consent of the host state. Once the UN has gained such overall 

consent for the deployment of a peacekeeping force and has a mandate to carry observation 

activities, there is no reason under international law why it cannot bring observation equipment 

to the field to fulfill its mandate. 

The 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, reinforces the Charter 

provision (Article 105) that the officials of the UN “shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 

Member such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 

functions in connection with the Organization.” It could easily be argued that such “independent 

exercise” of peacekeeping duties includes the use of monitoring technologies. Decisions of the 

International Court of Justice, other treaties and extensive state practice support the provisions of 

the Convention.20 

Still, the UN usually seeks to negotiate a formal agreement with the parties to the conflict. This 

is wise because a written agreement can clarify many fine points, codify agreed behavior and 

provide written assurances to both sides. Also, only 120-odd member states of the UN, of which 

there are 191 in total, have signed the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. The UN seeks 

formal assurances from the parties to respect its rights during deployment, especially in case 

questions or difficulties arise in the future. The parties, often in a protective and suspicious frame 

 

19 In such case, Chapter VII mandates are given to permit the UN operation to use force to achieve its 

mandate. Frequently, the expression “all necessary means” (or similar wording) is used in the Security 

Council resolution. Cases include: UNIKOM to prevent incursions across the Iraq-Kuwait border and 

UNOSOM for the protection of humanitarian supplies and the apprehension of war criminals in Somalia. 

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, Chapter VII was invoked (e.g., S/RES/807 of 19 February 1993 and 

several resolutions in June 1993) so that UNPROFOR could carry out certain tasks using force, e.g., the 

protection of “safe areas.” Similarly the Security Council authorized the NATO Implementation Force 

(IFOR) under Chapter VII (S/RES/1031 of 15 December 1995). 

20 The International Court of Justice ruled in 1949 that “the rights and duties of an entity such as the 

[United Nations] must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent 

documents and developed in practice” [Reparation for Injuries Case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p.174 as quoted 

in Czarnecki, Ralph, p.190. See also the “Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 

Personnel” available at www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm, accessed 12 January 2004.] 
of mind, similarly would like to have formal assurances that the UN will behave appropriately 

and not overstep its mandate. The agreement between the UN and the host state is called a Status 

of Forces [or Mission] Agreement, abbreviated SOFA or SOMA (henceforth SOFA is used to 

denote both). The UN has made public its model SOFA.21 While the UN’s model SOFA does 

not go into the detail on the types of equipment which may be brought in, it does include 

provisions for the UN’s unrestricted “freedom of movement,” the “right to unrestricted 

communication” within the territory of the host state and to the exchange of message traffic with 

the “United Nations global telecommunication network.” The SOFA usually quotes the mandate 

of the force as written in the Security Council resolution and/or the peace agreement. 

The SOFA also provides reassurance to the parties: “The United Nations peacekeeping operation 

and its members shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and 

international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present arrangement. The 

United Nations peacekeeping operation shall respect all local laws and regulations” (Article 6, 

emphasis added). Since local laws often include prohibitions on monitoring of military activities, 

a legal problem can potentially arise. Also conflicting powers may claim to be the legitimate 

legal authority in the area. The UN’s fulfillment of its mandate would, however, take precedence. 

The UN usually tries to gain the consent of all parties to the conflict in the territory where the 

UN is to located, though for legal reasons it needs only the consent of the host state. As well, the 

UN concludes agreements with the member states contributing personnel based on a draft model 

agreement.22 This is done for political as well as strictly legal reasons. 

Political Aspects

Political and human factors make up the greatest challenge to technical innovation in 

peacekeeping. Firstly, at the UN, it is necessary to overcome the inexperience and general lack of 

awareness of monitoring technologies among diplomats and Secretariat staff. There is a natural 

tendency in human nature to mistrust something that has not yet been tried, or something that 

might fail unexpectedly. The solution is, of course, to gain experience. 

Among the parties, the mistrust would be of a different sort. They might fear that the UN could 

gain compromising information about them that could lead to a loss of security. They might fear 

that, under the guise of cooperative monitoring, UN could engage in a kind of “legalized 

spying.” Should sensitive political or military information pass to the other side, either through 

deliberate action or inadvertently, this might lead to political damage, or worse, loss on the 

battlefield. Furthermore, they might worry that the other side might be able to manipulate sensors 

to fool the UN. 

These types of fears among parties have arisen many times in past UN operations where UN 

personnel had selective access to military, political or other sites and information. The UN has 

dealt with these fears by reassuring the parties that it will act impartially and in strict accordance 

 

21 See “Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations” in UN Doc. A/45/594 of 8 

October 1990. 

22 An early version of the “Draft Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States 

contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peacekeeping operations” is contained in UN 

Doc. A/46/185 and Corr.1 (annex) of 3 June 1991. 
with its mandate. Similarly, the UN can alleviate fears associated with the introduction of 

technology by providing such assurances backed by detailed explanations. It could, for instance, 

detail the type of information that will be sought and the general methods and devices that will 

be employed. Furthermore, it could provide the party with regular reports on its monitoring 

activities and results. 

Practical Aspects

It is obvious that the equipment must work! This entails a host of considerations including 

procedures for operation, maintenance and repair. To operate the devices, training may be 

necessary, especially if the equipment is complicated. The UN has experienced a wide 

divergence of technological capacity between peacekeeping contingents, particularly between the 

developed and the developing world. An example from the UN operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 

illustrates this. Swedish peacekeepers brought in night vision equipment (NVE) in the 1970s. 

They offered to share the technology with peacekeepers from a developing nation that had no 

experience with NVE. Sharing this equipment would permit more frequent and effective night 

patrols thereby enhancing mission success as well as the security of the Swedish contingent. The 

Swedes warned their African colleagues about the danger of exposing the NVE to direct 

sunlight. Being new to the technology, the untrained soldiers blinded the device by testing them 

in daylight on the first day. Modern NVE incorporates technology to prevent such damage but at 

the time there was a loss of tens of thousands of dollars. The lesson from this experience is not 

that technologies should not be shared, but rather that an international capacity is needed to train 

inexperienced contingents in the new technologies that are deployed, whether the equipment is 

UN-owned or borrowed from nations. Instead of creating a gap between national contingents, 

technology can be an equalizer of capabilities and a harmonizer over the various zones of 

reporting. 

The UN has procedures to compensate troop-contributing nations (TCNs) for equipment loans. It 

usually issues a “letter of assist” to these nations for equipment leases that can be either “wet or 

dry”, i.e., with servicing or not. The Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations23 (1997) 

provides standard reimbursement rates per annum for observation/optical equipment as 10% and 

for communications equipment at 14.29 % of the market value of the equipment. It also gives 

reimbursement rates for the UN's lease of thermal imaging systems (Ground Version) at $1,487 

(wet) and $1,058 (dry) per month for equipment whose generic market value is US$ 100,000. 

The aerial version is more expensive for the UN to lease: US$1,708 (wet) and US$1,270 (dry). 

Night observation devices (tripod mounted) are estimated to cost $12,000 or lease at a rate of 

$130/148 and maintenance rate of $130, not much more expensive than high-magnification 

binoculars (also tripod mounted) at $ 7,500 or monthly lease rate of $ 66/76 and monthly 

maintenance rate of $10. Over time technology usually gets both better and cheaper. 

According to the Manual on reimbursement. The estimated costs for purchase of other equipment 

are given in the manual as follows. 

 

23 Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations, Revision 3 (1997) and “Manual on Policies and 

Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of TroopContributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, Field Administration and Logistics 

Division, ”, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, 1997.
Table 6. Costs for Selected Items Listed in the "Standard Cost Manual for Peacekeeping Operations" 

(1997) 

Selected Item Cost ($US) Comment

Bar code reader 1,000 1/01/95 

Camera, Instant 545 15/01/95 

Fogging Machine 850 01/01/95 

Metal Detector, hand-held 200 

Metal Detector, walk-through 4,500 

Hedgehogs & Obstacles 170 

Watch Tower 15,000 

Mine Detector 2,500 Schiebel AN-19/2 

Sandbag 0.40 

Barrier, Bastion Wall 120 

Camera [Video] 1,000 

Camera, Betacam 75,000 

Radio Station Transmitter 35,000 4 kilowatts 

Observation Equipment (Area Coverage) 

Binoculars 6,500 20 mag 120 dia 

 200 handheld 7x50 

Infrared system 50,000 

Night Observation Device 3,000 

Searchlight, handheld 200 

Thermal Imaging System 120,000 Aerial Version 

Thermal Imaging System 72,000 Ground Version 

The manual also lists the basic amount paid to TCNs for each soldier: $988 (plus various 

allowances) per month, though specialists may earn the nation a supplementary pay of $291. 

Most nations pay their soldiers regular (national) salaries during missions. This means that 

peacekeeping is revenue generating for many developing nations and revenue loosing for others. 

Finances are a very important practical consideration for the UN, which has faced a continual 

budgetary crisis. For some equipment (such as commercial GPS or motion detectors), the costs 

are expected to be small (under $300 per device). But for some systems, additional factors must 

be included. In addition to the purchase or lease, the UN has to consider the costs for transport, 

set up, operation, maintenance, repair and storage. Specialized personnel, requiring additional 

salaries, may be needed to operate or train for some types of equipment. This important aspect 

deserves further study through detailed case studies. Such studies would look at specific 

scenarios, with defined UN monitoring mandates, and specific conditions, like the anticipated 

terrain and security threats. 

Terrain and Weather

The type of terrain in the monitored area needs to be considered when designing the appropriate 

sensor system. The first factor to consider is the possible range of observation, given the terrain. 

In flat areas where the line of sight is long, such as in desserts, open fields, water bodies (lakes, 

rivers and oceans), long-range sensors can be used. These sensors include radar, cameras (still 
and video, with zoom capability), and laser range-finders. In terrain typified by a short line of 

sight and many obstacles, as found in jungles, rapidly undulating areas and built-up urban 

regions, one might have to use numerous short-range sensors, spaced periodically, to cover the 

desired area. Such devices typically include seismic, acoustic, magnetic and infrared breakbeam 

sensors. Radar has poor penetration in jungle foliage, but nevertheless some short-range signals 

can be obtained. Mountainous or hilly terrain gives a line of sight that can be both long and short 

– long from high lookouts and short in narrow passes – so neither long- nor short-range sensor 

type is usually sufficient on its own. The combination of the two, however, can be excellent. 

Overhead reconnaissance using aircraft can be extremely useful because vast tracts of terrain, 

including mountainous and difficult to navigate territory, can be surveyed at comparatively great 

speed and ease from above. Helicopters, while generally slower and smaller, with less space for 

equipment are particularly useful because they permit hovering and landings on small plots of 

land so that reconnaissance on foot can be permitted. 

Terrain can impose other limitations on the choice of sensors. In the open dessert where there 

are many if not an infinite number of possible paths through the sand, point sensors are of limited 

value since they measure signals at one small location only. Also seismic devices are rendered 

ineffectual in the dessert because seismic waves are quickly absorbed by the sand. Similarly, in 

difficult mountainous terrain where vehicles are unlikely to pass, buried magnetic sensors are of 

limited value. Devices which require substantial power (e.g., X-ray machines) that cannot be 

battery or solar powered will be difficult to operate far from an electric grid, though diesel 

powered electric generators (frequently brought on peacekeeping missions) may in some cases 

be sufficient (though they are noisy). It is often necessary to bring an uninterruptible power 

supply (UPS) to conflict areas where electrical power frequently fails, especially if sensitive 

devices like computers are being operated (for example, to avoid data loss). 

Weather conditions also play a role in the choice of sensors. Cameras operating in the visible 

part of the electromagnetic spectrum can become virtually useless in heavy fog or rain. Similarly, 

image intensifiers work better at night when there is more ambient light, for instance, from a full 

moon on a cloudless night. Infrared devices work better when the targets (warm bodies) are at a 

greater temperature difference from the background (e.g., in colder weather). Acoustic sensors 

have more difficulty distinguishing target sounds from loud noise caused by thunder, rain or 

even wind. One of the great benefits of radar is that it works in almost all weather conditions. 

Even if the sensors can overcome adverse weather conditions, one must also consider the effects 

on the sensor units' housing and any telemetry (radio signal) equipment associated with them. 

For instance, casings should not become deformed in very hot weather or cracked in very cold 

weather. Other criteria for technology selection include false alarm rates and 

response/assessment times, as well as other factors suggested in a previous CMC study: 

affordability, simplicity, durability, reliability and validity.24

 

24 Salerno, Reynolds M., Randall R. Parish, Michael G. Vannoni and David S. Barber, “Peace Operations: 

The Potential Role of Monitoring Technologies”, Sandia Report, SAND2000-2947, Sandia National 

Laboratories, NM, 2000. 
4. Conclusions 

There can be no “technological fix” to the problem of peace in our troubled world. The 

individual human being, whether patrolling as a peacekeeper in a demilitarized zone or sitting as 

a mediator at a negotiating table, will always be the most important element. Monitoring 

technologies, however, can make such UN personnel more vigilant, more productive and much 

safer. Technologies can multiply the monitoring capacity of a peace operation in many ways, 

such as extending the range of the patrols and the areas covered, and providing quantifiable and 

usually accurate information. 

Technology becomes especially important when the UN presence is more than just symbolic, 

when the UN must fill its mandates with competence and completeness. Monitoring technologies 

also grow in importance when peacekeepers find themselves in dangerous areas, where 

situational awareness is vital for mission safety as well as mission success. In cases where the 

parties are able to pull many “tricks” on the UN – either through advanced technologies, simple 

ingenuity or sheers numbers – the UN can benefit from a technological edge. Finally, when the 

mandate is broad or the field of observation is large, technology can be an indispensable aid. 

This having been said, there are a number of potential problems that can arise with technologies, 

as mentioned above. Some technologies are vulnerable to countermeasures (for example, some 

night vision devices can be blinded and GPS is susceptible to jamming). Some technologies may 

prove unreliable, especially in adverse weather conditions (for example, photoreconnaissance in 

a snow storm), but this does not mean that tried and true technologies should not gradually 

become a standard part of UN peace operations, or that technological innovation should not be 

constantly pursued. 

At this formative stage, it would be valuable for the United Nations to develop its own in-house 

expertise and to learn from its experiences. There is at present no staff to study and explore 

technology use in the field, let alone to handle advanced technologies (except for 

communications technology). The institutional memory is slight, the ability to train new 

peacekeepers in technology use is nonexistent, and the capacity for innovation and growth is far 

from ideal. 

It is now vitally important that the UN, if it is to move along the path of technological literacy 

and improved effectiveness in the field, gain more awareness of the possibilities and limitations 

of technologies. Even if peacekeepers do not find themselves using all the available technologies 

in the field, they must know about such capabilities because they are frequently used by 

conflicting parties and by organizations with which the UN frequently cooperates (e.g., NATO). 

Technology goes hand in hand with the emerging concept of cooperative monitoring, as 

pioneered by the Cooperative Monitoring Center. Cooperative monitoring technologies have 

much to offer the further development of UN peacekeeping. Though monitoring has been a 

standard feature of UN peacekeeping since the first operation, the new emphasis on sharing 

information with parties in a regular and systematic fashion using modern technologies merits 

further attention and practical application. Many parties in current and future UN operations will 

appreciate the technical and objective nature of sensor information. Furthermore, technology 
offers the potential for rapid communication of information (including to UN headquarters) and 

with a wide range of analytical outputs (e.g., graphs, statistical analysis, etc). 

With a host of new types of activities to monitor, from elections to disarmament to sanctions, the

United Nations needs to broaden its technology base and explore new monitoring procedures. 

While cooperative technical monitoring is only one component of a UN operation, it can make a

considerable difference for the better. Technologies in the service of the United Nations would 

help the organization to become more effective in its field operations and thus help to move the 

world towards greater peace and security. 

Figure 6. Cooperative monitoring by the UN, aided by technology, can foster 

durable peace agreements.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Monitoring Technologies for UN Peacekeeping

Altmann, Jurgen, Horst Fischer, and Henny van der Graaf (eds.), “Sensors for Peace: 

Applications, Systems and Legal Requirement for Monitoring in Peace Operations”, United 

Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), UN Publication Sales No., 

GV.E.98.0.28, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1998. 

Dorn, Walter, "Peacekeeping Satellites: The Case for International Surveillance and Verification", 

Peace Research Reviews, Vol. X, No. 5 & 6, Peace Research Institute—Dundas, Dundas 

(Ontario), Canada, 1987. 

Fainberg, Anthony, Alan Shaw, Dean Cheng, Xavier Maruyama and Donald Gallagher, 

"Technology for International Peace Operations," Institute for Technology Assessment, 

Washington, D.C., March 1998. 

Fleming, S.B., Charpentier, R., Marwood, G.J. and Chesney, R.H., “Surveillance and Detection 

Systems for United Nations Peacekeeping,” Report 611, Operational Research and Analysis 

Establishment (ORAE), Department of National Defence, Canada, December 1992. 

International Peace Academy (IPA), "Weapons of Peace: How New Technologies can Revitalize 

Peacekeeping—A Report of the IPA Task force on Technology," International Peace Academy 

(IPA), New York, 1980. 

International Peace Academy (IPA), "Peacekeeping and Technology: Concepts for the Future", 

Hanning, Hugh (ed.), IPA Report No. 17, 1983. 

Office of Technology Assessment, "Improving the Prospects for Future International Peace 

Operations," U.S. Congress, OTA-BP-ISS-167 (Workshop Proceedings), US Government 

Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1995. (see esp. paper by Finger, Milton, “Technologies to 

Support Peacekeeping Operations”) 

Salerno, Reynolds M., Michael G. Vannoni, David S. Barber, Randall R. Parish, and Rebecca L. 

Frerichs, "Enhanced Peacekeeping with Monitoring Technologies," SAND2000-1400, 

Cooperative Monitoring Center, New Mexico, 2000. 

Sullivan, Jeremiah (ed.), “Technology for Peace: Improving the Effectiveness of Multilateral 

Interventions,” Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security (ACDIS), 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001. 

Tsipis, Kosta, Hafemeister, David W., Janeway, Penny (ed.), "Arms Control Verification: The 

Technologies that Make it Possible," Pergamon/Brassey's, Washington, 1986. 

Relevant UN Documents on Peacekeeping

“Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,” 13 February 1946, United 

Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1, p.15. 

“Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations,” contained in “Comprehensive 

Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All their Aspects”, UN Doc. 

A/45/594 of 8 October 1990. 

"Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of 

International Peace and Security," endorsed in resolution 46/59, 1991. 

“Draft Model Agreement between the United Nations and Member States Contributing 

Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Doc. 

A/46/185/Corr.1 of 3 June 1991. 
“Troop Contributing Nations Guidelines,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1996. 

“Guidelines for Standard Operating Procedures,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1996. 

"Verification in All Its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of 

Verification: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. A/50/377 of 22 September 1995. 

Reports of the Secretary-General on specific peacekeeping operations, typically presented to the 

Security Council every six months. 

UN Monitoring

Wainhouse, David Walter, “International peace observation; a history and forecast” in 

association with Bernhard G. Bechhoefer [and others], Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966. 

Wainhouse, David Walter, “Arms control agreements; designs for verification and organization” 

in association with Bernhard G. Bechhoefer [and others], Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 

1968. 

Papers on UN Monitoring by Walter Dorn 

"An International Monitoring Agency for the Arctic," Information North, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 

1989, Arctic Institute of North America, 4 pp. 

"U.N. Should Verify Treaties," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, 1990, pp. 

"The Case for a U.N. Verification Agency," IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Special 

Issue on Disarmament Verification, Vol. 9(4), December 1990/January 1991, pp. 16-27. 

"The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the IAEA: A Comparative 

Overview," IAEA Bulletin, 3/1993, pp. 44-47. 

"Keeping Watch for Peace: Fact-finding by the UN Secretary-General," in Altmann, J., Stock, T. 

and Stroot, J-P (eds), "Verification After the Cold War: Broadening the Process," VU 

University Press, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 308-317. 

"Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960-64," International 

Peacekeeping, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 11-33. (with David J.H. Bell). 

"Keeping Tabs on a Troubled World: UN Information-Gathering to Preserve Peace," Security 

Dialogue, Vol. 27(3), September 1996, pp. 263-76. 

"Early (and Late) Warning by the UN Secretary-General: Article 99 Revisited," in Schmeidl, 

Suzanne, "Synergies in Early Warning," Columbia International Affairs Online 

(wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao), 1998. 

"The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence Gathering in UN Peacekeeping," 

Pearson Paper Number 4, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, 1999. 

"Technologies to Support UN Peace Operations" in The Long Roads to Peace: Proceedings of 

the Forty-Eighth Annual Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs (held at

Querataro, Mexico, 29 September - 4 October 1998), World Scientific, River Edge, N.J., 2001. 
Appendix 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations: Four Categories 

1. Observation Missions 

2. Interpositional Forces 

3. Multidimensional Operations 

4. Transitional Administrations 

1. Observation Missions 

Name Acronym Main 

Location(s) 

Initial Observation 

Tasks 

Initial Security 

Council Res. 

Year(s) 

UN Truce 

Supervision 

Organization 

UNTSO Palestine, later 

other areas1

Observe cease-fires and armistice 

between Israel and neighbouring 

Arab states 

50 (1948) 1948- 

UN Military 

Observer Group in 

India and Pakistan 

UNMOGIP State of Jammu 

and Kashmir 

Observe cease-fire and 500 mile 

CFL2

, investigate complaints of 

violations 

47 (1948) 1949- 

UN Observation 

Group in Lebanon 

UNOGIL Lebanon Identify infiltration of personnel or 

arms, keep SC informed 

128 (1958) 1958 

UN Yemen 

Observation 

Mission 

UNYOM Yemen (esp. DMZ 

along section of 

Saudi border) 

Observe disengagement agreement 

between Saudi Arabia, UAR and 

Yemen 

179 (1963) 1963-64 

Mission of the 

Representative of 

the SecretaryGeneral in the 

Dominican Republic 

DOMREP Dominican 

Republic 

Observe situation and report on 

breaches of cease-fire 

203 (1965) 1965-66 

UN India-Pakistan 

Observation 

Mission 

UNIPOM India-Pakistan 

border 

Supervise cease-fire and observe 

withdrawal 

211 (1965) 1965-66 

UN Iran-Iraq Military 

Observer Group 

UNIIMOG Iran and Iraq 

(border areas) 

Monitor cease-fire and supervise 

withdrawal of forces at end of IranIraq war 

588 (1987) 1988-91 

UN Good Offices 

Mission in 

Afghanistan and 

Pakistan 

UNGOMAP Afghanistan and 

Pakistan 

Observe Soviet troop withdrawals 

from Afghanistan; investigate and 

report violations of Geneva Accords 

622 (1988) 1988-90 

UN Angola 

Verification Mission 

UNAVEM I Southern Angola Verify departure of Cuban and South 

African Troops 

626 (1988) 1988-91 

UN Observer Group 

in Central America 

ONUCA Costa Rica, El 

Salvador, 

Guatemala, 

Honduras & 

Nicaragua 

Oversee regional peace plan, 

including demobilization of Contras 

644 (1989) 1989-92 

UN Angola 

Verification Mission 

II 

UNAVEM II Angola Verify various Angolan Peace 

Accords and 1992 elections 

697 (1991) 1991-95 

UN Mission for the 

Referendum in 

Western Sahara 

MINURSO Western Sahara Observe cease-fire and confinement 

of Moroccan troops and, later 

Polisario forces 

690 (1991) 1991- 

UN Advance 

Mission in 

Cambodia 

UNAMIC Cambodia Supervise cease-fire prior to 

establishment of UNTAC; provide 

mine-awareness training to civilians 

717 (1991) 1991-92 

UN Observer 

Mission in Georgia 

UNOMIG Georgia (Abkhazia) Observe cease-fire; monitor 

Abkhazian and Georgian forces as 

well as Russian military contingents 

849 (1993) 1993- 

UN Observer 

Mission UgandaRwanda 

UNOMUR Uganda-Rwanda 

Border 

Monitor border to verify no passage 

of military aid 

846 (1993) 1993-1994 

UN Observer 

Mission in Liberia 

UNOMIL Liberia Work with ECOMOG3 for 

implementation of Cotonou Peace 

Agreement 

866 (1983) 1993-1997 

UN Observer 

Mission in El 

Salvador 

ONUSAL El Salvador Monitor agreements between Gov. of 

El Salvador and FMLN2

; 

humanitarian concerns 

893 (1991) 1991-95 

 

1

 Later Suez Canal area, Golan Heights, Beirut and the Sinai 

2

 Cease-fire line (CFL) later became the "Line of Control" 

3

 Economic Community Military Observer Group: A separate peacekeeping force composed of 4,000 troops from 

Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria and Sierra Leone. 
UN Aouzou Strip 

Observer Group 

UNASOG Republic of Chad Verify withdrawal of Libyan 

administration and forces from 

Aouzou Strip 

915 (1994) 1994 

UN Mission of 

Observers in 

Tajikistan 

UNMOT Tajikistan Monitor cease-fire on Tajik-Afgan 

border; investigate cease-fire 

violations and report them to UN 

968 (1994) 1994-2000 

UN Mission of 

Observers in 

Previaka 

UNMOP Prevlaka, 

peninsula, Croatia 

Monitor demilitarization of Pervlaka 

Peninsula 

1038 (1996) 1996-2002 

UN Verification 

Mission in 

Guatemala 

MINUGUA Guatemala Verify fulfillment of cease-fire 

provisions of Dec. 1996 Peace 

Accords; later verify disarmament, 

human rights and other tasks 

1101 (1996) 1997- 

UN Observer 

Mission in Angola 

MONUA Angola Assist in consolidating peace and 

national reconciliation, enhance 

democratic development 

1118 (1997) 1997-99 

UN Mission in the 

Democratic 

Republic of the 

Congo

MONUC Dem. Rep. Congo Monitor cease-fire; facilitate 

disengagement; maintain liaison with 

parties and carry out humanitarian and 

other tasks

1291 (2000) 2000- 

2. Interpositional Peacekeeping Forces 

Name Acronym Main 

Location(s) 

Initial Monitoring Tasks Initial Security 

Council Res. 

Year(s) 

UN Emergency 

Force 

UNEF I Sinai Peninsula 

and Gaza Strip 

Secure cease-fire and removal of 

foreign (France, Israel, UK) forces from 

Egypt; serve as buffer between Israeli 

and Egyptian forces 

GA 998 (ES-1) 

(General 

Assembly Res.) 

1956-67 

UN Peacekeeping 

Force in Cyprus 

UNFICYP Nicosia Maintain cease-fire zones and 

encourage normal civilian activity in 

"buffer zone" 

186 (1964) 1964- 

UN Emergency 

Force II 

UNEF II Sinai Peninsula 

and Suez Canal 

Supervise ceasefire after Yom Kippur 

War and later 1974 and 1975 

Egyptian/Israeli agreements; deploy 

troops to buffer zone 

340 (1973) 1973-79 

UN Disengagement 

Observer Force 

UNDOF Syrian Golan 

Heights 

Maintain cease-fire between Israel and 

Syria; supervise disengagement of 

forces and areas of limitation and 

separation 

350 (1974) 1974- 

UN Interim Force in 

Lebanon 

UNIFIL Southern Lebanon Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces 

from S. Lebanon; assist Lebanese Gov. 

in return of its authority 

425 (1978) 1978- 

UN Iraq-Kuwait 

Observation 

Mission 

UNIKOM Iraq/Kuwait Border Monitor Khawr Abd Allah waterway, 

DMZ along border; observe any hostile 

acts; later, act as an interpositional 

force to deter border violations 

687 (1991) 1991- 

UN Preventive 

Deployment Force 

UNPREDEP Former Yugoslav 

Republic of 

Macedonia 

Replaced UNPROFOR in Macedonia, 

keeping same mandate: monitor border 

area for events that could undermine 

stability in Macedonia; act as "trip-wire" 

983 (1995) 1995-99 

UN Mission in 

Ethiopia and Eritrea 

UNMEE Ethiopia, Eritrea Monitor cessation of hostilities and 

temporary security zone; assist in 

ensuring observance of security 

commitments agreed by parties 

1320 (2000) 2000- 

 2

 Frente Farabunddo Marti para la Liberacien Nacional (FMLN): A liberation group in opposition with the El 

Salvador Government. 
3. Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations 

Name Acronym Main 

Location(s) 

Initial Mandate Initial Security 

Council 

Resolution 

Year(s) 

UN Operation in the 

Congo 

ONUC R.O. Congo (Zaire) Ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces; 

assist Gov. with law and order; secure 

removal of all foreign and mercenary 

personnel 

143 (1960) 1960-64 

UN Transition 

Assistance Group 

UNTAG Namibia Supervise transition of Namibia from 

South African rule to independence 

435 (1978) 1989-90 

UN Protection 

Force - later UN 

Peace Force, UN 

Confidence 

Restoration 

Operation & 

UNPROFOR 

UNPROFOR - 

later UNPF, 

UNCRO, 

UNPROFOR 

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, 

Croatia, Federal 

Rep. of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and 

Montenegro), 

former Yugoslav 

Rep. of Macedonia 

Create a secure environment for 

negotiation of overall settlement to 

Yugoslav crisis; ensure demilitarization 

of UNPAs4

 by conflicting parties 

743 (1992) 1992-95 

UN Transitional 

Authority in 

Cambodia 

UNTAC Cambodia Ensure 1991 peace agreements3

, 

including fair elections, keeping law and 

order, humanitarian concerns 

745 (1992) 1992-93 

UN Operation in 

Somalia I 

UNOSOM I Somalia Monitor cease-fire; later worked with 

UNITAF for humanitarian assistance, 

secure population centres 

751 (1992) 1992-93 

UN Operation in 

Somalia II 

UNOSOM II Somalia Establish a secure environment for 

humanitarian relief operations in 

Somalia 

814 (1993) 1993-95 

UN Operation in 

Mozambique 

ONUMOZ Mozambique Monitor cease-fire and withdrawal of 

foreign forces, also elections and 

humanitarian concern 

782 (1992) 1992-94 

UN Mission in Haiti UNMIH Haiti Establish new police force; monitor 

Haitian Police; rebuild community and 

civilian concerns 

867 (1993) 1993-96 

UN Assistance 

Mission for Rwanda 

UNAMIR Rwanda Ensure cease-fire zone; assist with 

mine clearance, election preparation, 

and humanitarian concerns 

872 (1993) 1993-96 

UN Angola 

Verification Mission 

III 

UNAVEM III Angola Assist in establishing peace and 

national reconciliation 

976 (1995) 1995-97 

UN Confidence 

Restoration 

Organization in 

Croatia 

UNCRO Croatia Replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia; 

facilitate humanitarian assistance 

through Croatia, monitor demilitarization 

of Previaka Peninsula 

981 (1995) 1995-96 

UN Mission in 

Bosnia and 

Herzegovina 

UNMIBH Bosnia and 

Herzegovina 

Assist with law enforcement activities 

and police reform; coordinate UN 

activities for humanitarian relief & 

refugees, demining, human rights, 

elections and rehabilitation of 

infrastructure and economic 

reconstruction. Established IPTF5

 and a 

UN civilian office to help uphold 1995 

Dayton Peace Accords 

1035 (1995) 1995-

2002 

UN Support Mission 

in Haiti 

UNSMIH Haiti Help maintain secure and stable 

environment; assist with establishment 

& training of national police force; 

support economic rehabilitation 

1053 (1996) 1996-97 

UN Transition 

Mission in Haiti 

UNTMIH Haiti Assist in professionalization of Haitian 

National Police; promote economic 

rehab. 

1123 (1997) 1997 

UN Civilian Police 

Mission in Haiti 

MIPONUH Haiti Oversee technical assistance to Haitian 

National Police, funded by UNDP6

1141 (1997) 1997-

2000 

UN Mission in the 

Central African 

Republic 

MINURCA Central African 

Republic 

Promote national reconciliation, security 

and safety of country; provide advice in 

development of police program and 

elections 

1159 (1996) 1998-

2000 

 

4

 UN Protected Areas: Areas containing a high Serb population and are therefore under close UN supervision. The 

three UNPAs are: Eastern Slovania, Western Slovenia and Cambodia. 

3

 Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict granted full governing power of 

Cambodia to the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. 

5

 International Police Task Force is a group created for civilian protection. 

6

 United Nations Development Programme 
UN Civilian Police 

Support Group 

UNPSG Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja and 

Western Sirmium 

(Croatia) 

Monitor Croatian police in Danube 

region; ensure safe return of displaced 

people 

1145 (1997) 1998 

UN Mission in 

Sierra Leone 

UNAMSIL Sierra Leone Cooperate with Government and other 

parties in implementing Lome Peace 

Agreement; assist with disarmament, 

demobilization and reintegration of excombatants 

1270 (1999) 1999- 

UN Assistance 

Mission in 

Afghanistan 

UNAMA Afghanistan Promote national reconciliation; various 

peacebuilding tasks entrusted to UN in 

Bonn Agreement, incl. human rights, 

rule of law and gender issues; 

managing all UN humanitarian, relief, 

recovery and reconstruction activities 

1401 (2002) 2002- 

UN Mission of 

Support in East 

Timor 

UNMISET East Timor (Timor 

Leste) 

Provide assistance to East Timor as 

operational responsibilities are fully 

devolved to East Timor authorities 

1410 (2002) 2002- 

 

4. Transitional Administrations 

Name Acronym Location Functions Security Council 

Resolution 

Year(s) 

UN Temporary 

Executive 

Authority 

UNTEA West New Guinea 

(West Papua), 

currently part of 

Indonesia

For 6 months, accept governance of 

territory from Netherlands before 

turning it over to Indonesia. Act with 

full authority to administer territory, to 

maintain law and order, to protect 

rights of inhabitants and ensure 

uninterrupted, normal services 

GA 1752 (XVII) 

(General Assembly 

Resolution)

1962-63 

UN Security Force 

in West New 

Guinea (West Irian) 

UNSF West New Guinea 

(West Papua) 

Security arm of UNTEA; maintain 

law and order; monitor cease-fire 

area 

GA 1752 (XVII) 

(General Assembly 

Resolution) 

1962-63 

UN Transitional 

Administration for 

Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja and 

Western Sirmium 

UNTAES Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja and 

Western Sirmium 

Govern region for 12 months; 

maintain security; facilitate 

demilitarization; ensure safe return of 

refugees and implementation of 

Basic Agreement, organize elections 

1037 (1996) 1996-98 

UN Interim 

Administration in 

Kosovo 

UNMIK Fed. Rep. 

Yugoslavia 

(Kosovo) 

Administer (govern) territory of 

Kosovo; wide-ranging tasks, such as 

overseeing health and education, 

banking and finance, post and 

telecommunications, and law and 

order; organize elections

1244 (1999) 1999- 

UN Transitional 

Administration in 

East Timor 

UNTAET East Timor Administer the Territory, exercise 

legislative and executive authority 

during transition period and support 

capacity-building for self-government 

1272 (1999) 1999-

2002 
About the Author 

Dr. Walter Dorn is an Associate Professor at Canadian Forces College in Toronto and crossappointed to the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. He is a member of the 

external faculty of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and an Adjunct Research Professor at 

Carleton University (Ottawa). A physical scientist by training (Ph.D., Univ. of Toronto), he 

worked on the detection of chemical weapons and helped with the drafting and ratification of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention. He currently teaches courses in political science, arms control 

and international peacekeeping. His research focuses on the evolution of UN monitoring and 

compliance systems to maintain international peace and to promote human security. Having been 

awarded the inaugural Human Security Fellowship from the Canadian Department of Foreign 

Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), he is now writing a book on the development of UN 

monitoring systems generally. He has written articles about many peacekeeping operations, 

including those in Rwanda, Namibia, the Congo, Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor. Some 

publications are available on his homepage: http://www.cfc.dnd.ca/dorn.

Dorn served with the UN as an electoral officer in East Timor, as a development consultant in 

Ethiopia, and as a Training Adviser with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN 

headquarters. In 1999 he was a visiting scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center of Sandia 

National Laboratories in New Mexico, where he did the main research for this paper. 

Previously, he was Senior Research Fellow at Cornell University and a consultant to Yale 

University (UN Studies), as well as a Research Associate at the University of Toronto. 

Distribution 

100 MS 1371 CMC Library, 6929 

1 MS 9018 Central Technical Files, 8940-2 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4916