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Cut along dotted line

GPS versus Galileo

Balancing for Position in Space

Beidleman
COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

GPS versus Galileo

Balancing for Position in Space

SCOTT W. BEIDLEMAN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 23

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

May 2006
ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Beidleman, Scott W.

GPS versus Galileo : balancing for position in space / Scott W. Beidleman.

p. ; cm. – (CADRE paper, 1537-3371 ; 23)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-149-X

1. Global Positioning System. 2. Galileo Joint Undertaking. 3. Artificial satellites

in navigation. 4. Astronautics and state. I. Title. II. Series. III. Air University (U.S.).

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

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iii

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 GPS VERSUS GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 WHY GALILEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Illustrations

Figure

1 Satellite geometry 9

2 Global positioning system (GPS) satellite 14

3 Galileo satellite 16

Table

1 Number of visible satellites for various masking

angles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

v

Foreword

This study investigates Europe’s motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the

existence of America’s successful global positioning system

(GPS). The study begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize

the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to

provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of

GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, Galileo will provide better accuracy for

civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is

only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe’s

pursuit of Galileo is driven by a combination of reasons, including performance, independence, and economic incentive. With

Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security, and technological independence from the United States. Additionally, Europe envisions overcoming the US monopoly on GNSS by seizing

a sizable share of the expanding GNSS market and setting a new

world standard for satellite navigation. Finally, the author explores Galileo’s impact on the United States and reviews US

policy towards Galileo. The study concludes with recommendations to strengthen the competitiveness of GPS.

GPS versus Galileo: Balancing for Position in Space was originally written as a master’s thesis for the Air University’s

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell

AFB, Alabama, in June 2004. The College of Aerospace Doctrine,

Research and Education (CADRE) is pleased to publish this

SAASS research as a CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a wider audience within the US Air Force and beyond.

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

Chief of Research

Airpower Research Institute, CADRE

vii

About the Author

Lt Col Scott W. Beidleman (BS, Pennsylvania State University;

MS, University of Colorado; Master of Military Operational Art

and Science, Air Command and Staff College; Master of Airpower Art and Science, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space

Studies) is assigned to the Air Staff Directorate of Operational

Plans and Joint Matters, Pentagon, Washington, DC. An experienced space operator, he earned his commission from the Air

Force Reserve Officer Training Corps at Pennsylvania State University in 1988. Graduating from Undergraduate Space Training, Vandenberg AFB, California, in 1989, he went on to serve

in a number of space-operations positions, including satellite

mission-analysis officer, chief of standardization and evaluation, chief of operations training, chief of space-control war

plans, space-surveillance crew commander, and operations officer. He has worked with a variety of space systems including the

global positioning system at Schriever AFB, Colorado; the Deep

Space Tracking System and the Low Altitude Space Surveillance

System at Royal Air Force Feltwell, United Kingdom; and the

AN/FPS-85 phased-array surveillance radar at Eglin AFB,

Florida. He is a distinguished graduate of the Air Command and

Staff College and a June 2004 graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), both based at Maxwell

AFB, Alabama. Colonel Beidleman was selected to command the

533d Training Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California, in the

summer of 2006. His paper was recently recognized as the best

SAASS thesis in airpower and technology for 2004.

ix

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Dr. Everett Dolman for suggesting a great

thesis topic, providing guidance to strengthen my argument,

and applying his outstanding editing skills to increase the

quality of my written work. I also wish to thank Col Jon Kimminau for his insight in making a good product even better. Finally, and above all else, I thank my wonderful wife and

daughter for enduring many “husbandless/fatherless” weekends and for those times when I was with them, but my

thoughts were in “thesis-land.” Their love and encouragement

made this work possible.

xi
Chapter 1

Introduction

And who can doubt that it will lead to the worst disorders

when minds created free by God are compelled to submit

slavishly to an outside will? When we are told to deny our

senses and subject them to the whim of others?

––Galileo Galilei

In 1633 the Roman Catholic Church declared Galileo Galilei

a heretic because his beliefs conflicted with the status quo.1

Almost four centuries later, Europeans have christened their

proposed global navigation satellite system (GNSS) with the independent thinker’s name, a not so subtle challenge to the

status quo dominated by America’s global positioning system

(GPS). Considering that GPS has become a global public good,

an international utility paid for by the United States and free

for use by anyone, and that most of Western Europe has been

a staunch American ally since World War II, Europe’s pursuit

of the Galileo GNSS approaches heresy from an American perspective. Europe has broken ranks and is acquiring an independent space capability in a way that seems sure to conflict

with American national interests. 

In the post–Cold War environment, Europe has increasingly

shown a desire to act independently of the United States to enhance its prestige and sovereignty. Despite long-standing

cooperation agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), Europe has pursued its own security initiatives, including the European Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP) and the Rapid Reaction Force.2 In this context, Galileo

not only could strengthen European military independence,

but also could bolster the European space program—adding

credibility and prestige to Europe’s effort to grow as a world

power. Additionally, Galileo could challenge the US monopoly

in the GNSS market and compete for its lucrative applications

(air traffic control, shipping, etc.). This effort is not unprecedented—similar attempts to introduce pan-European competi1
tion in the past include the development of Airbus aircraft and

Ariane launch boosters. Those efforts were seen as crucial to

maintaining Europe’s place in military matters and the most

lucrative world markets. Competition with GPS is a challenge

at least on par with these previous ventures and could prove

even more rewarding.

Over the past quarter century, GPS has established itself

as the world’s standard for position, velocity, and timing information, providing a free, continuous, and all-weather

navigation service to the entire planet. With innumerable

applications such as guiding precision munitions, synchronizing the Internet, or locating a seafood restaurant in an

unfamiliar city, GPS has become embedded in global society.

Moreover, the United States openly shares technical details

of the system’s signal structure. Public documents specify

the format of various data streams emanating from the

satellites—data streams a receiver must recognize and decode

to operate navigation and synchronization applications

properly.3 In this way, the United States provides key information enabling all interested parties to prosper by developing

and marketing their own versions of GPS receivers. Finally,

GPS is backed by the US government and operated by the

US Air Force; clearly, the system’s host is an extremely stable

and competent authority. 

Consequently, a puzzle arises: why is Europe pursuing the development of Galileo when a global space-based radio navigation

system already exists that is free to all? Despite the high costs of

developing and deploying its own redundant system, Europe is

pressing ahead. From this action, follow-on questions emerge.

Does GPS have deficiencies that Galileo will fix or improve? Are

there motives that have not yet been made public? What are the

implications of the proposed Galileo system for the United

States? How should the United States respond? 

To address these questions, I examined technical design

documents, publications, and discourse from the European

Union (EU) and the European Space Agency (ESA); various

periodicals; and newspapers. I conducted my research in the

midst of ongoing negotiations between the United States and

the EU as they attempted to forge a cooperative agreement

2

INTRODUCTION
ensuring compatibility and interoperability between Galileo

and GPS. While future talks may affect the relevance of the

analysis contained herein, this study utilized data accurate as

of 1 March 2004. Accordingly, I interviewed US military personnel and representatives from the US Departments of State

and Transportation and attempted to do the same with corresponding EU officials. The sensitivity of these negotiations

understandably tempered the candidness of some US government officials and resulted in no response from representatives of the European community with whom I inquired. I

gleaned the European perspective chiefly from official government publications and press releases, promotional material

from Galileo developers, and foreign newspapers and periodicals. In general, the bulk of the analysis relies on various

defense- and space-related journals and periodicals to piece

together the whole story. 

My research shows that although GPS and Galileo were

founded on different principles and were designed to meet

the needs of different user communities, the two systems

employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts.

The key finding is that when operational, Galileo will provide

better performance for global civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. This overlap represents a window of opportunity for Europeans to take advantage of lagging GPS

updates and seize a significant market share. After this, the

two systems will provide analogous free services with comparable performance; however, only Galileo will offer a service guarantee for fee-paying customers. 

Beyond providing an improved source for civil navigation

(albeit temporary), Europe is pursuing Galileo to achieve a

degree of independence from the United States. Trusting

that satellite navigation will become increasingly embedded

in the daily lives of its citizens, Europe views a public good

controlled by a foreign power’s military as a breach of sovereignty. Europe may also be acting on the belief that the

prestige-enhancing aura of large space programs like

Galileo will enrich its international standing. Besides political independence, Galileo will figure prominently in European efforts to develop a security apparatus independent of

3

INTRODUCTION
NATO, in part to protect against the possibility that the

United States would degrade or deny GPS signals during a

crisis. Lastly, Europe hopes Galileo will cultivate European

technological independence by nurturing homegrown technical know-how in space technology that enables the EU’s

industrial capacity to compete with that of the United States

on an equal footing.

In addition to strengthening European independence, the window of opportunity Galileo offers may include more than just the

possibility of seizing a significant share of the satellite-navigation

market from the United States. It opens the possibility that Europe could set a new global standard for navigation. With incredible growth forecasted for the satellite-navigation sector, if

the EU can make itself the perceived leader in GNSS technologies and applications, it stands to gain considerably by overcoming the current US monopoly. Whether Galileo becomes—or

GPS remains—the top satellite navigation service, either situation will have far-reaching effects. While a clear winner in the

coming struggle for GNSS superiority is unknown, I argue here

that civil and commercial users would reap the greatest benefit from the combination of both systems working together in

a seamless GNSS.

The struggle will play out. The advent of Galileo presents a

number of national security and economic implications for the

United States. As originally proposed, Galileo would impede

US space superiority by interfering with GPS signals and

greatly complicating the ability to deny satellite navigation to

hostile users. Economically, Galileo challenges US dominance

of satellite navigation and poses a threat to usurp GPS as the

world standard. In view of this potential reality, US concerns

include ensuring fair trade and assured access to the global

satellite-navigation market.

In response to early Galileo proposals, the United States

initially downplayed the need for Galileo and took measures

to forestall its development. As it became clear that Galileo

would be developed over its objections, the United States

changed its adversarial stance and sought ways to limit the

potentially detrimental impact of Galileo on GPS users. Accordingly, the United States and EU continue to negotiate a

4

INTRODUCTION
cooperative agreement to produce an interoperable and

compatible system for global navigation. To maintain and

enhance its position, the United States must cooperate

where it can and compete where it must by continuing efforts

to develop a common standard for satellite navigation and

by taking steps to strengthen the commercial and military

competitiveness of GPS.4 Specifically, I recommend that the

United States and EU work towards standardized formats

for satellite navigation, much like the standardization of Internet protocol, and that the United States formally separate the civilian and military aspects of GPS. These recommendations assume that Galileo will progress towards full

operational capability as planned with no major delays and,

when operational, will provide services as prescribed by the

EU and ESA.

Overview

The analysis begins in chapter 2 with an assessment of the

GPS and Galileo systems through a comparable evaluation of

their respective strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, I examine the origins of the systems, their space and control segments, the services and capabilities provided, and the limitations

and vulnerabilities. The chapter provides the reader with an understanding of both systems and determines if—and to what extent—Galileo provides a better source of navigation than GPS.

In chapter 3, I put forward a number of potential motives that,

in combination, propelled Europe to build a GPS competitor.

European incentive for an independent GNSS revolved around a

desire for improved performance, independence from the United

States, and economic aggrandizement. This requires an examination of performance in terms of accuracy, reliability, and vulnerability. I then explore European independence from political,

security, and technological perspectives. The chapter concludes

with a discussion of Europe’s intent to increase its share of the

potentially lucrative satellite-navigation market and Galileo’s

economic window of opportunity.

In chapter 4, I conclude the paper by examining the implications of Galileo from a US perspective, reviewing US policy,

and recommending actions for the future. Galileo has poten5

INTRODUCTION
tially severe national security and economic implications, including encroachment on US space superiority and the potential loss of the GNSS market share. How the United Sates addresses Galileo’s impact on US national interests in space sets

the stage for future cooperation and confrontation on space

policy as more nations attempt to become space powers. 

Before settling into an analysis of the two space-based navigation systems, Europe’s motives for Galileo, and the subsequent

implications, it is necessary to put the issues into context. I begin

with a concise history of space navigation and an overview of

fundamental concepts. 

Brief History of Navigation

from Space

The idea of space-based navigation emerged from military necessity. While the terrestrial-based radio-navigation methods of

the 1940s and 1950s supported intercontinental bombers in

their missions to find city-sized targets, intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBM) moved too fast to conduct the required navigational computations.5 Developments in inertial navigation systems (INS) partially remedied the problem, but accuracy in INS

without external updates decreased over time. In addition to

missile guidance, as the United States developed the Polaris

submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program, the Navy

also needed an accurate method to determine the location of the

submarine. To calculate a precise SLBM trajectory, one needs to

know the location of the mobile launch site (submarine) as well

as the target. “No INS alone would suffice for SLBM guidance.

The drift over time would produce a navigational error too great

to ensure target destruction.”6 Furthermore, terrestrial navigation systems lacked truly global coverage and were vulnerable to

enemy attack. The solution lay in space. 

Shortly after the launch of Sputnik, US researchers tracked

the Soviet artificial moon by measuring the Doppler shifts of its

frequency.7 Using the same concept, researchers convinced the

Navy to field a constellation of satellites broadcasting Sputniklike signals. If the Navy knew the orbital locations of the satellites, its submarines could quickly determine their exact locations via the Doppler shifts. With this logic as a mandate, the

6

INTRODUCTION
United States launched the Transit program, the world’s first

operational satellite-navigation system.8 Transit satellites transmitted their orbital positions every two minutes on two signals, affording two-dimensional accuracies up to 25 meters for

users tracking both signals.9 The Transit constellation served

military and civilian users quite well for 32 years and played an

essential role supporting the sea-based leg of the nuclear

triad.10 However, a two-dimensional fix did not support aircraft or munitions in flight. 

In the early 1970s, plans for a GPS emerged from the lessons

of Transit and a combination of the Navy’s Timation program

and the Air Force’s System 621B, with a goal of obtaining

“greater accuracy with air-launched weapons and weapon systems.”11 Timation tested spaceborne atomic clocks, while

System 621B demonstrated a new satellite-ranging signal based

on pseudorandom noise (PRN).12 When combined, these technologies and concepts offered the designs and techniques required to provide three-dimensional position, velocity, and timetransfer information.

Fundamentals of Navigation

from Space

The new means for space-based navigation went well beyond

measuring Doppler shifts and remain the fundamental principles of GPS and Galileo today. The operation is somewhat complex, but application has become essentially transparent and instantaneous to users. In order to locate one’s position in

three-dimensional space, a user needs eight ingredients from

GPS at any given time: the distances or ranges between the user

and at least four satellites, as well as the positions of these four

satellites in space. 

First, the user’s GPS receiver measures the distance between

itself and a satellite by measuring the time it takes for the signal

to traverse from the satellite to the receiver’s antenna.13 The receiver measures the transit time by matching two codes. The

process is straightforward. Each satellite transmits a unique

PRN code (a pulse-train or stream of ones and zeroes) on its signal, allowing receivers to distinguish between satellites. Receivers internally generate the same codes. Since receivers and

7

INTRODUCTION
satellites are synchronized to the same time reference (GPS

time), the satellite code and the receiver code should be identical. However, when the user set receives the satellite’s code and

compares it to its own code, the satellite code appears shifted.

The receiver then slews its code until the ones and zeroes align.

The amount of slewing required to match the codes represents

the transit time of the satellite signal and, subsequently, the distance between the satellite and receiver, since the signal moves

at the speed of light. In this manner the user obtains the ranges

to four different satellites.

Second, each GPS satellite constantly transmits its unique

orbital parameters in a data stream known as the navigation

message (contained within the signal and the PRN code). Having locked onto a satellite’s signal via the PRN code, the receiver downloads the satellite’s position in space. Essentially,

the satellite broadcasts, “I am here, and the time is (current

time).” Once in possession of a set of four satellite positions

and four ranges, the receiver calculates the user’s location by

solving four equations for four unknowns: the user’s altitude,

longitude, and latitude, together with the receiver’s clock

error.14 The accuracy of this solution depends heavily on

which four satellites the receiver chooses.

The accuracy of a user’s position fix depends on where the

satellites are in the sky with respect to the user, otherwise

known as satellite geometry. Consider the geometry of a polyhedron with the user at the vertex (fig. 1). The volume of the

polyhedron affects GPS accuracy. As a rule, greater satellite

spacing results in a larger volume and better accuracy. Ideally,

the best geometry results from having one satellite directly

overhead and three satellites spread equally near the user’s

horizon. With as many as 12 GPS satellites in view at any

given time, the receiver must carefully select the optimum

satellite combination to obtain the best fix.15 Again, this is a

relatively instantaneous and transparent function of the receiver’s computer. The receiver examines all possible satellite

combinations and chooses the solution with the best satellite

geometry. The user is now in receipt of three-dimensional position information accurate to within 50 feet.16

8

INTRODUCTION
Now that I have described the issue to be analyzed, accounted

for the method of analysis and the outline of the thesis, and reviewed the history and fundamentals of space-based navigation,

the reader is equipped to embark on a comparative analysis of

American and European satellite-navigation systems. 

Notes

(Notes for this chapter and the following chapters appear in shortened

form. For full details, see the appropriate entries in the bibliography.)

1. Halsall, “Crime of Galileo.”

2. “EU Law + Policy Overview.”

3. Warner, “GPS ICD-200,” 1.

4. Parkinson, “Capability and Management Issues.”

5. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 57.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 60.

8. Federation of American Scientists, “Military Space Programs.”

9. Ibid.

10. The Navy deactivated Transit in December 1996.

9

INTRODUCTION

Goo d Poor

Figure 1. Satellite geometry
11. Sietzen, “Galileo Takes on GPS,” 38.

12. Pace et al., Global Positioning System, 239.

13. Moving at the speed of light, the signal’s travel time is roughly oneeleventh of a second.

14. For a more detailed discussion of the navigation solution, see chaps.

1 and 2 of Logsdon, Navstar.

15. Using a five-degree elevation mask, according to European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 28.

16. Logsdon, Navstar, 64. The quoted accuracy refers to the Standard

Positioning Service.

10

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2

GPS versus Galileo

GPS has become a global utility.

—Pres. Bill Clinton

—1 May 2000

In this chapter I compare the two navigation systems to determine critical similarities and differences and to evaluate their

strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, I attempt to determine

GPS operational deficiencies from a European perspective and

the extent to which Galileo intends to improve upon them. The

assessment begins with a review of the primary purpose and

sponsorship of each system, followed by an examination of active and proposed system infrastructures, services, limitations,

and vulnerabilities. 

Purpose and Sponsorship

The raison d’être and sponsorship of the two navigation

systems produce two fundamentally different outlooks. As

previously discussed, GPS was driven by the military’s need

for increased weapon’s accuracy. Consequently, the US Air

Force owned and operated the system—fully funded by the US

taxpayer—and the Department of Defense (DOD) maintained

ultimate authority. Recognizing the growing use and importance of GPS to the civilian community, the US government

established the Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) in

1996. While the Air Force still operates the system, the IGEB

manages senior-level policy for GPS and is chaired jointly by

the DOD and Department of Transportation (DOT). Nevertheless, and regardless of its dual-use potential, the primary purpose of GPS is “enhancing the effectiveness of US and allied

military forces.”1 US national security remains the top policy

goal for decisions concerning GPS.2

In contrast, Galileo came about as a direct response to the

perception that GPS catered to US military requirements at the

11
expense of global civilian needs. Although the United States

promoted GPS as a worldwide utility, it did not promote global

participation in managing that increasingly depended-upon

global resource, nor would it guarantee continued access to it.

Thus, Galileo emerged as a joint venture between the European Commission (EC) and the ESA, spurred by transport

ministers with a decidedly nonmilitary perspective. Furthermore, Galileo is funded through a public-private partnership

in which the EC and ESA provide funding in tandem with private companies participating in the project. When operational,

a consortium-created private company, referred to as the

Galileo Operating Company (GOC), will operate and maintain

the constellation. In short, “the US places priority on security

and allied military capability, [and] Europe places it on commercial viability.”3

System Infrastructure

Both the GPS and Galileo systems are subdivided into three

components: the space segment, comprised of the satellites;

the control (or ground) segment, consisting of the command

and control infrastructure; and the user segment, encompassing the end user or customer.

Space Segment

The purpose of the GPS space segment is to transmit timing

pulses and satellite positional data to users worldwide. The

GPS space segment is comprised of 24 satellites in a “Walker

constellation” at an altitude of 10,898 nautical miles (roughly

20,200 km), organized in six orbital planes equally spaced in

right ascension around the earth, with an inclination of 55 degrees.4 Walker constellations (named after the British Royal

Aircraft Establishment’s J. G. Walker) are satellites configured

in circular orbits with common altitudes and inclinations that

provide global coverage of the earth.5 The design of the GPS

constellation guarantees that at least five satellites with favorable

satellite geometry (table 1) are always in view to users worldwide to meet accuracy requirements.6 Since their inception,

12

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
the 2,175-pound GPS satellites have been launched individually

from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on Delta II boosters.7

Table 1. Number of visible satellites for various masking angles

Receiver elevation Number of visible Number of visible

masking angle Galileo satellites GPS satellites Total

5° 13 12 25

10° 11 10 21

15° 9 8 17

Source: European Commission, Galileo–Mission High Level Definition, Version 3.0, 23 September 2002.

Four generations of GPS satellites have served the mission

thus far—Block I, Block II, Block IIA, and Block IIR (replenishment). The Block I satellites were prototypes to test the concept

of navigation from space. Block II vehicles, the first operational

series, added radiation hardening and a 14-day autonomous

navigation message to increase survivability during war. Further

emphasizing military utility, Block II satellites also debuted selective availability and antispoofing. With selective availability

the United States can degrade GPS accuracy to unauthorized

users. Similarly, antispoofing allows the United States to deny

high-accuracy GPS signals to real and potential enemies through

encryption and prevents enemies from transmitting false GPSlike signals intended to fool or corrupt GPS receivers. The Block

IIA series extended the autonomous navigation message to 180

days, providing slowly degrading data for six months in the event

the ground-control segment was destroyed. The most recent

Block IIR satellites added additional radiation hardening and

operational redundancy, as well as a cross-link ranging mode

that enables IIR vehicles to update their own navigation message

without support from the ground for up to 180 days. The current

constellation is comprised of Block II/IIA and IIR vehicles. Future

satellite generations include Blocks IIR-M (modified), IIF (followon), and GPS III. These future system upgrades will add additional signals for civilian and military users and increase signal

power. In particular, the GPS III constellation “will have the

ability to surge the signal over a specific area for certain intervals” via spot beams.8

13

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
GPS satellites (fig. 2) transmit their timing pulses and positional data to Earth via radio waves in the L-band frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. The system currently uses

two carrier signals, known as L1 (at 1575.42 MHz) and L2 (at

1227.6 MHz). The timing pulses (i.e., the unique PRN codes) are

superimposed on the carriers, and the navigation message is superimposed on the timing-pulse trains.9 In addition to specific

positional information, the navigation message of each satellite

also carries satellite health status and an almanac listing the orbital positions of the entire constellation. Furthermore, GPS employs pulse trains, or PRN codes, in two different formats: the

precision (P)-code and coarse acquisition (C/A)-code. The P-code

resides on L1 and L2 and is available only to authorized users,

mostly military and government. The C/A-code resides only on

the L1 signal and is available to everyone. As designed, the P-code

14

GPS VERSUS GALILEO

Figure 2. GPS satellite (Courtesy of ESA at their Web site at http://www.esa

.int/externals/ images/estec-photo-archive/1059.jpg.)
has two primary advantages over the C/A-code. First, the P-code

provides a more precise fix because of its faster chipping rate. It

streams down at 10 million bits per second (bps) compared to

the C/A-code chipping rate of one million bps.10 Second, it further boosts accuracy as it’s transmitted on both (L1 and L2) signals at different frequencies, enabling users to correct for range

errors due to the ionosphere (occurring in the atmosphere where

propagation of radio waves is hampered due to ionization of

gases). Hence, the GPS design segregates the user pool into the

haves (military users) and have-nots (civilian users) regarding

precision accuracy. Finally, powered by solar arrays generating

700 watts,the satellites transmit signals at low power to Earth.11

In fact, GPS signals are so weak they have been likened to a

“whisper at a cocktail party,” leading to vulnerabilities discussed later.12

Similar to GPS in its operations, the proposed Galileo space

segment will perform the space navigation mission with only

minor differences. Galileo employs more satellites in fewer orbital planes with a slightly higher altitude and inclination.

Specifically, Galileo consists of 30 satellites in a Walker constellation at an altitude of 23,616 km, equally spaced within

three orbital planes with a 56-degree inclination. The higher

altitude and inclination afford Galileo better coverage in the

higher latitudes, including some polar regions, than does

GPS—especially benefiting civilian users in Scandinavian

countries. Moreover, the higher number of satellites increases

the availability of satellites visible to a user, thereby improving

satellite geometry and enabling better accuracy. Of note, although Galileo’s additional satellites only marginally improve

satellite geometry compared to GPS, combining the two systems would produce a significant increase in visible satellites

(see table 1). Interestingly, Boeing—the GPS Block IIF contractor—

has advocated switching GPS to a Galileo-style 30-satellite,

three-plane constellation in the future.13

Physically, Galileo satellites are smaller and lighter than their

GPS counterparts (fig. 3). Unhindered by military-threat requirements, Galileo satellites will forgo nuclear hardening, will not

carry a nuclear-detonation-detection payload, and do not require

a six-month autonomous operational capability. Hence, the Galileo

15

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
spacecraft, at approximately 650 kg, will weigh roughly half as

much as GPS. Consequently, Galileo’s smaller size supports the

launch of multiple satellites aboard a single European Ariane

booster to quickly populate the original constellation, with

smaller launch vehicles envisioned to replace failed satellites.14

Similar to GPS, Galileo will transmit its timing and navigation information in the L-band spectrum. However, whereas

GPS currently provides only two signals, Galileo will provide

10 navigation signals to support a number of different services. Specifically, Galileo plans to employ two signals on the

E5A band centered at 1176.45 MHz, two signals on E5B at

1207.14 MHz, three signals on E6 at 1278.75 MHz, and three

signals on E2-L1-E1 at 1575.42 MHz.15 This proposed signal

plan has stirred considerable controversy regarding potential

interference with existing GPS signals (an issue discussed in

more depth in chap. 4). Also similar to GPS, Galileo signals

16

GPS VERSUS GALILEO

Figure 3. Galileo satellite (Courtesy of ESA at their Web site at http://esamulti

media.esa.int/images/navigation/galileo02775A4.jpg.)
will carry different PRN code schemes that effectively segregate

users into three distinct groups: the general public, commercial users, and authorized government users.16 However, unlike GPS, Galileo will transmit the PRN code available to the

general public on two signals, enabling everyone to correct for

ionospheric delays and obtain higher accuracy. In essence,

GPS segregates users by controlling access to better accuracy,

whereas Galileo divides users by controlling access to ancillary

data. One primary type of segregated ancillary data is integrity, which constitutes a major difference between GPS and

Galileo. The EC defines integrity as the ability “to provide

timely warnings to the user when [the system] fails to meet

certain margins of accuracy.”17 Thus, Galileo plans to constantly monitor system accuracy and quickly update the constellation upon detection of a problem.18 Specifically, Galileo

will broadcast integrity flags in the navigation message with a

time-to-alert of six to 10 seconds.19 Currently, GPS can take

as long as 30 minutes to notify users of an out-of-tolerance

condition.20 Galileo will be the first GNSS to incorporate realtime signal-integrity monitoring, a capability not planned for

GPS until the GPS III upgrade, currently scheduled for 2012.21

Control Segment

As with the GPS and Galileo space segments, the control

segments of the two systems are very similar. While the satellites of the space segments constantly transmit their locations

to the users, the satellites themselves do not know where they

are. They transmit only what they are instructed to transmit.

The control segment on the ground develops, monitors, and

updates each satellite’s navigation message and then feeds the

data to the satellite for retransmission.

The US Air Force maintains and operates the GPS constellation via a control segment comprised of the Master Control

Station (MCS), monitoring stations, and ground antennas. The

MCS, located at Schriever AFB, serves as the central processing facility for GPS. Operated continuously by Air Force crew

personnel, the MCS houses the operations center for command and control of the constellation, the computers used to

17

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
predict orbits, and the array of atomic clocks that constitutes

the system’s timing reference, known as GPS time. 

Linked to the MCS, five unmanned monitoring stations support GPS, spread across the globe at Hawaii, Colorado Springs,

Ascension Island (South Atlantic Ocean), Diego Garcia (Indian

Ocean), and Kwajalein (western Pacific Ocean). The monitoring

stations constantly track each satellite in view, measure the

range to each satellite (known as a pseudorange), and download

each navigation message. Then the stations send the pseudoranges and navigation messages to the MCS for processing. 

The MCS receives the constant flow of information from the

monitoring stations and calculates a fresh predicted orbit

(ephemeris) for each satellite from the pseudoranges. Additionally, the MCS examines the navigation message of each

satellite to verify that the satellites are transmitting the correct

ones and zeroes. Finally, the MCS updates the navigation

message for each satellite based on the new orbit predictions

and sends the resulting navigation uploads to one of five

ground antennas. 

The GPS control segment employs four dedicated, unmanned

ground antennas located at Cape Canaveral, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, and Ascension Island. A fifth antenna at Schriever AFB is

also available upon request to support GPS requirements.22 The

ground antennas provide the MCS an uplink and downlink capability. They receive navigation uploads and other commands

from the MCS and transmit them to the satellites. Moreover, they

collect and transmit telemetry, tracking, and commanding

(TT&C) data, enabling the MCS to monitor and maintain the constellation’s health and to control each satellite. Thus, the GPS

control segment is a data-processing loop that maintains a continuous flow of accurate navigation information.

The Galileo control segment greatly resembles the GPS infrastructure. As proposed, a private business enterprise to be

called the GOC will manage the constellation from two navigation system control centers (NSCC) located somewhere in Europe

(possibly France and Germany, based on their sizeable contributions), along with a global network of unmanned orbitography

and synchronization stations (OSS) and TT&C stations.23

18

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Like the GPS MCS, the Galileo NSCC serves as the “heart of

the system and includes all control and processing facilities,”

providing orbit determination and maintaining time synchronization (with Galileo time as the reference).24 As with GPS

monitoring stations, the Galileo OSS collects and measures

navigation data and passes it to the NSCC. Finally, similar to

GPS ground antennas, Galileo TT&C stations provide uplink

and downlink capabilities, linking the NSCC with the constellation. Despite all of these resemblances, the Galileo control

segment is not a mirror image of its GPS counterpart. 

The major difference between the control segments is Galileo’s

addition of integrity monitoring. Galileo satellites are designed to

provide integrity alerts to users within the navigation signalin-space. Thus, the Galileo control segment includes an Integrity

Determination System comprised of integrity monitoring and uplink stations.25 The system will monitor each satellite’s signals,

determine whether the signals are outside specifications, and

uplink an integrity flag to the constellation identifying faulty

satellites. Hence, a user’s receiver will reject the signals from

satellites identified in the alert.26

User Segment

Since the DOD developed GPS to support national security,

the US armed forces are the primary intended customer. However, in 1983 after the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner that

erroneously wandered into Soviet airspace, Pres. Ronald Reagan

declared that the United States would provide civilian airliners

access to GPS signals, essentially establishing GPS as a dualuse system.27 Pres. Bill Clinton reiterated the US commitment

to providing civilian access free of charge in the 1996 Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6.28 In contrast, Europe has

marketed Galileo as a public GNSS geared to civilian and commercial user requirements and has downplayed Galileo’s military utility. Generally speaking, nonmilitary customers comprise the overwhelming majority of all GNSS users; however,

GPS places the military user above the civilian for reasons of

national security.

19

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Services

GPS provides position, navigation, and timing (PNT) services

with two different levels of accuracy: the Standard Positioning

Service (SPS) and the Precise Positioning Service (PPS). The unencrypted SPS offers PNT services free of charge to all users.

Based on the less accurate C/A-code transmitted on L1, the

SPS cannot self-correct for ionospheric errors and so produces

less accurate navigation solutions than the PPS. Additionally,

to prevent adversary use of GPS against US forces during

conflicts, the US government can intentionally degrade SPS

accuracy via selective availability. For many years, selective

availability fixed SPS accuracy at roughly 100 meters. However, in 2000 President Clinton directed that the DOD turn off

selective availability; consequently, SPS accuracy increased

tenfold to roughly within 10–20 meters.29 While the SPS is unencrypted, the United States currently encrypts the PPS and

restricts access to authorized users, mainly the armed forces

and government agencies. Based on the P-code transmitted on

L1 and L2, the PPS offers more accurate PNT services with positional accuracy of approximately 25 feet.30

In contrast to GPS, Galileo plans to offer five types of services—Open Service (OS), Commercial Service (CS), Safety-ofLife (SoL) Service, Public Regulated Service (PRS), and Search

and Rescue (SAR) Support Service. 

Open Service 

OS is similar to the GPS SPS in that it is intended for the general public and is provided for free. However, since OS will be

transmitted on two frequencies, users of this basic service can

correct for ionospheric effects and obtain better accuracy than

with the GPS SPS. Specifically, the ESA expects to achieve fourmeter accuracy with a service availability of 99.8 percent.31 GPS

will not provide this level of accuracy until the Block IIF constellation is operational circa 2012.32 Again, similar to the GPS

SPS, the OS provides no service guarantee or integrity information to the general public. Like the GPS’s civilian users, Galileo’s

OS customers use Galileo at their own risk.

20

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Commercial Service

CS is a combination of OS plus two encrypted signals separated in frequency from OS signals.33 Like OS, CS will not explicitly carry integrity data; however, CS accuracies will be

guaranteed. Designed to support users requiring higher performance than OS, CS’s additional signals allow the development of professional applications such as producing highdata-rate broadcasting, resolving ambiguities in differential

applications, and integrating Galileo with wireless communications.34 Access to the encrypted signals will be restricted to

fee-paying users who will subscribe to CS. Third-party service

providers will determine the specific services offered and will

purchase the rights to utilize the encrypted signals via a license

agreement with the GOC.35 Finally, the company will provide

a guarantee for disruption or degradation of service and will

provide timely warning to users. Failure to meet standards

would lead to compensation to affected users and/or service

providers. Service guarantees addressing liability constitute a

major difference between Galileo and GPS.

Safety-of-Life Service

SoL will offer the same accuracies as OS, but it will provide

both integrity data and service guarantees for a fee. SoL is designed to serve safety-critical users who require precision accuracy and signal reliability. Anticipated customers include

airlines, trains, and transoceanic maritime companies.36 With

SoL, Galileo plans to comply with “levels of service stipulated

by law in various international transportation fields,” such as

those prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization.37 SoL’s integrity monitoring is essential to meeting this

goal. Galileo will reportedly inform users of out-of-tolerance

conditions within six to 10 seconds of occurrence, supporting

safety-critical applications such as Category I landings (aircraft landings with weather conditions of a 200-foot ceiling

and visibility of one-half mile). However, this additional service

comes at a price. Users will need specialized receivers to get

the enhanced signals,38 and the EC retains the option to encrypt integrity data and administer access fees.39

21

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Public Regulated Service 

The objective of PRS, according to the EC and ESA, “is to improve the probability of continuous availability of the SIS [signalin-space], in [the] presence of interfering threats.”40 Envisioned

as a protected navigation service for government and publicservice users, PRS will employ robust signals with interference

mitigation technologies to reduce susceptibility to jamming

and interference from terrorists, criminals, or hostile entities

that could affect national security.41 Furthermore, PRS must remain operational during crises, when other services may be

jammed. Hence, Galileo transmits PRS on two wideband signals

(to increase jamming resistance) and spectrally separates them

from other Galileo services, so these other services “can be denied without affecting PRS operations.”42 Additionally, PRS will

be encrypted to restrict access to interference-mitigation technologies and to prevent hostile use of PRS against EC member

states (in this paper, the word states used in context with Europe

refers to EU nation-states).43 Accordingly, EC member states will

control PRS access via cryptological keying systems. Based on

this description, the Galileo PRS sounds very similar to GPS PPS

and presents a potential military capability in a system strictly

trumpeted as “the first satellite . . . navigation system specifically

for civil purposes.”44 In fact, while Galileo is frequently touted as

“a civil system, operated under public control” and “a non-military programme,” the design and spectral locations of PRS signals mirror future GPS military upgrades, potentially conflicting

with US navigation warfare (NAVWAR) concepts (see chap. 4).45

Search and Rescue Support Service 

SAR will augment the Cospas-Sarsat system, which assists

international search and rescue efforts by detecting and locating distress signals worldwide. Galileo satellites will employ

SAR transponders that will detect distress alerts and relay the

detection to Cospas-Sarsat ground stations. Moreover, Galileo

will also send an acknowledgement to the stranded persons

informing them they have been located. Consequently, Galileo

will reportedly fine-tune alert-location accuracy, greatly improving the current specification of five kilometers.46 Also,

22

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Galileo will provide near-real-time reception of distress messages, greatly reducing the current wait time of one hour.47

In short, both GPS and Galileo provide basic PNT services

open to all users, as well as augmented services restricted to

authorized users. However, Galileo plans to offer additional

features such as service guarantees, global-integrity monitoring, and additional data services supporting commercial markets in an attempt to capitalize on GPS limitations from a civilian perspective.

Limitations and Vulnerabilities

In general, the performance of GPS and the impact of its PNT

capabilities have led to its perception as a global utility.48 However, like every system, GPS has limitations and vulnerabilities.

While the proposed Galileo design will purportedly overcome several GPS deficiencies, including liability, integrity, and inadequate civilian accuracy, other issues affect both systems. These

include “urban canyons” (often occurs in cities, created by tall

structures obscuring signals), susceptibility to jamming, and

hostile use by potential adversaries. 

One of the primary differences between GPS and Galileo is

the latter’s liability service guarantee. Unlike GPS, Galileo

plans to provide a guarantee against disruption of service in

terms of accuracy, continuity of availability, and integrity,

where interruptions “would have significant [safety] or economic impacts.”49 This translates to a service guarantee for

Galileo’s CS and SoL service. Thus, Galileo will provide a legal

framework to increase the confidence of users previously reluctant to utilize space-based radio navigation signals as a primary means of navigation. As mentioned before, the GOC (the

private company chosen to manage the constellation) will commit to providing the signal quality required to support the

specified services and will compensate users if signal quality

falls short of specifications without adequate warning.50 In

this manner, Galileo users sidestep the potential barriers

faced by GPS users who file claims against the US government

as GPS owners—GPS does not provide a service guarantee. 

On the surface, a service guarantee appears marginal or insignificant—the general public will largely ignore it. However,

23

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
a significant subset of users (such as air traffic controllers)

would highly value service guarantees for safety-critical or

precision operations. The functions these users provide, primarily accomplished through national governments employing

Galileo and GPS as the basis of their transport policies, do affect entire populations. The lack of a service guarantee could

impede GPS’s ability to compete in this critical niche. As a senior fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations observed, “Until

GPS is certifiable for aviation use worldwide, its usefulness

will be unavoidably curtailed.”51

The viability of Galileo’s service guarantee remains to be seen.

Its credibility depends on the system’s ability to compensate a

user’s loss, leading to a multitude of contractual and liability issues beyond the scope of this study. In short, the EU foresees

the guarantee relying on legal mechanisms “to prevent, inform,

alert, or compensate failure, disruption, or provision of a service” due to failing specifications.52 These may include certification of risks, licensing usage, and mechanisms to manage compensation or reimbursement and jurisdiction/recourse issues,

yet to be defined.53 The crux of Galileo’s service guarantee is adequate warning of substandard performance, accomplished via

integrity monitoring. 

Lack of real-time integrity monitoring is another shortcoming

of GPS from the civilian perspective. Currently, if a GPS satellite’s

navigation signal drifts out of tolerance, the GPS control segment

must schedule a contingency contact to refresh the satellite’s

memory with a new navigation upload or set the satellite’s health

flag within the navigation message. Depending on satellite visibility, this process could take up to 30 minutes before the satellite transmits corrected information.54 Meanwhile, users are not

warned of the out-of-tolerance condition and could continue to

use less accurate data.55 In contrast, Galileo plans to directly

warn users of substandard performance in less than 10 seconds,

allowing customers “of standard commercial services to react

rapidly to malfunctions,”56 albeit potentially for a fee. Similar to

the reaction to Galileo’s service guarantee, one might conclude

that integrity for a price would appeal only to a small number of

professional users, certainly not the majority of recreational

GNSS users. Although integrity could be characterized as a

24

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
niche service, many users who prefer integrity provide services

that affect the mass public, such as the airline, banking,

telecommunications, and transport industries. Therefore, while

integrity may directly serve the needs of only a few niche users,

integrity indirectly affects virtually everyone. Consequently,

Galileo bests GPS by offering fee-based integrity. However, with

respect to free/open services, neither GPS nor Galileo provides

real-time integrity monitoring, though Galileo’s free services will

reportedly be more accurate.

A third shortcoming of GPS is its level of accuracy afforded to

civilian users. This deficiency is in part a deliberate characteristic of the system. Designed as a national-security asset, GPS provides better accuracy for military users. Selective availability

intentionally decreased civilian accuracy in the past, but even

without selective availability, civilian accuracy is inherently less

precise than Galileo’s because the SPS is transmitted on only

one signal. In contrast, the military utilizes two frequencies in

order to improve accuracy by correcting for ionospheric errors.

Galileo plans to transmit its free OS on dual frequencies,

enabling higher accuracies for civilians than is currently

possible with GPS.57 In addition to dual-frequency use, the GPS

constellation design causes accuracy to degrade at higher latitudes. Accuracy degrades because satellite geometry (as defined

in chap. 1) diminishes at higher latitudes. At latitudes above 55

degrees, GPS satellite spacing becomes increasingly confined to

the user’s horizon, with no satellites directly overhead. Thus,

poor satellite geometry results in lower overall accuracy. Consequently, Galileo hopes to improve satellite geometry at higher

latitudes by orbiting satellites in higher inclinations and altitudes than those offered by GPS, thereby providing users with

satellites higher on their horizon (although not directly overhead).

Lower accuracy at higher latitudes is one of the orbit-limiting

characteristics of GPS. Accuracy also suffers in cities and

other areas of severe occultation where signals are prohibited

from reaching the user. In fact, such urban canyons can limit

service availability to 55 percent of a typical city’s territory.58

While Galileo will also endure the same coverage problems

on its own, the combination of 29 GPS and 30 Galileo satel25

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
lites could improve positioning-service coverage to 95 percent

of an urban area.59

In addition to signal blocking by natural and man-made

barriers, jamming can also affect signal availability by denying

service to local areas. By design, GPS signals reach the user

at very low power levels of only a few milliwatts.60 With such a

weak signal, even low-watt jammers can be effective. Less than

one watt of power will suffice to jam standard receivers at a

range of 25 kilometers, while a 100-watt jammer “can blanket

a 65-kilometer region.”61 To put this into contemporary perspective, “a single electronic jammer radiating at one-tenth of

a watt could prevent [civilian receivers] from tracking GPS within

the Baghdad metropolitan area.”62 In a real-world example, at

a tank competition in August 2000 sponsored by the Greek

government, a French security agency jammed British and US

tanks during trial demonstrations, causing significant navigation problems.63 Although Galileo plans to transmit at a

slightly higher power, it too will be susceptible to intentional

and possibly inadvertent jamming. Various techniques are

available to reduce this susceptibility, but susceptibility to

jamming is not altogether a bad thing because it enables the

United States to deny locally the use of GPS to potentially hostile individuals, parties, etc.64

GPS and Galileo are mutually susceptible to hostile use by

an enemy or adversary. Since both systems offer free and open

services to anyone with a receiver, significantly increased accuracy is available to rogue states, terrorists, and rising peer

competitors like China. Originally, selective availability served

to deprive hostile users of precise GPS PNT services, but it also

deprived legitimate civilian users, who outnumber military users

100 to one.65 For this reason, the United States terminated the

capability in 2000. Likewise, Galileo currently has no method

of denying its OS to undesirable users (other than jamming).

As a result, many states, including EU members and those in

the so-called axis of evil, have enhanced their military capabilities via GPS.66 North Korea has reportedly utilized GPS on

its submarines, China is integrating it into fighter aircraft, and

Iran Aircraft Manufacturing plans to incorporate GPS on

board new variants of its Ababil unmanned air vehicle.67

26

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
This chapter has examined GPS and Galileo for similarities

and differences to determine if GPS had deficiencies that

Galileo could exploit and, ultimately, to forecast if Galileo

could provide a better source for navigation than GPS. Although the two systems were founded on fundamentally different visions, the similarities outnumber the differences. GPS

is designed to support national security, while Galileo is designed to make Euros. Nevertheless, the two systems share

similar infrastructures, performing virtually the same functions to provide like PNT services. 

While GPS has arguably become a global public utility, the

system is not without significant limitations and vulnerabilities.

Galileo claims it will resolve several GPS deficiencies, including liability, integrity, and inadequate civilian accuracy. Even

if these assertions prove true, GPS modernization programs

(see subsequent chapters) will eventually level the playing field

once again. Moreover, GPS and Galileo are mutually deficient

and vulnerable regarding urban canyons, jamming, and hostile use by potential adversaries.

Assuming Europe fields Galileo as claimed, Galileo will outperform GPS in the near term from a civilian perspective by

providing a guaranteed service with better accuracy and

global-integrity monitoring—for a price. However, in the not-toodistant future the United States will upgrade GPS, enabling it

to provide the same services to the same users for free. Given

this inevitable outcome, it remains uncertain why Europeans

would expend the enormous capital involved to compete with

a successful and reliable system not only backed by the US

government but also available free of charge.

Notes

1. United States Mission to the European Union, “US Global Positioning

System.”

2. Ibid.

3. Julie Karner (assistant director, Office of Space and Advanced Technology, US Department of State), interview by the author, 5 Jan. 2004.

4. As of 14 Jan. 2004, GPS had 29 operational satellites in orbit. Maj

Michael Brownworth, GPS Operations flight commander, interview by the

author, 13 Jan. 2004.

5. Wertz and Larson, Space Mission Analysis and Design, 175.

27

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
6. Pace et al., Global Positioning System, 218.

7. The weight listed is the on-orbit weight of Block II satellites. Block IIR

satellites weigh 2,370 pounds, and Block IIF satellites will weigh 3,407 pounds.

8. Sirak, “Holding the Higher Ground,” 21.

9. Logsdon, Navstar, 20–21.

10. Ibid., 20.

11. The power listed is for Block II satellites. Block IIR satellites generate

1,136 watts, and IIF will generate 2,900 watts.

12. Divis, “This Is War.”

13. Richardson, “GPS in the Shadows of Navwar,” 26.

14. Benedicto et al., “Galileo: Satellite System,” 9.

15. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 41–42.

16. Ibid., 29.

17. Ibid., 16.

18. Galileo will provide integrity monitoring independent of augmentation systems like the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service

(EGNOS). Also, Galileo will provide global-integrity monitoring, whereas

EGNOS is a regional system serving greater Europe.

19. Benedicto et al., “Galileo: Satellite System,” 13.

20. Brownworth, interview.

21. Pappas, “Effects of the Galileo,” 8.

22. Unlike the dedicated antennas, the antenna at Schriever AFB (known

as PIKE) is part of the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and supports many satellite programs in addition to GPS.

23. Benedicto et al., “Galileo: Satellite System,” 1. The NSCC, OSS, and

TT&C are also known as the Galileo Control Center, Galileo Sensor Station,

and Galileo Uplink Station, respectively. 

24. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 30.

25. Current documentation implies separate equipment for integrity

functions vice assigning the mission to OSS and TT&C stations.

26. Benedicto et al., “Galileo: Satellite System,” 13.

27. Statement by the principal deputy press secretary to the president,

16 Sept. 1983, in Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 429.

28. Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6, US Global Positioning System

Policy.

29. US Department of State, “US Global Positioning.”

30. Logsdon, Navstar, 64.

31. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 14.

32. Parkinson, “Capability and Management Issues.”

33. Ibid., 15.

34. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 20.

35. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 15.

36. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 20.

37. Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 16.

38. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, 13.

28

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
39. Karner, interview.

40. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 17.

41. Ibid.

42. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 21.

43. The European Commission (EC) contains the executive function of

the European Union (EU). The EU, which currently has 25 member “states”

or nations, works towards and oversees the economic and political integration of these states.

44. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 5.

45. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 6; and

European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to the European Parliament, 40.

46. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 19.

47. Ibid.

48. Adams, “GPS Vulnerabilities,” 11.

49. European Commission, European Dependence, sec. 3; and European

Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 11.

50. European Commission, European Dependence, 12.

51. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 159.

52. European Commission, European Dependence, 24.

53. Ibid.

54. Brownworth, interview.

55. Augmentation systems like the Wide Area Augmentation System

(WAAS) provide localized or regional GPS integrity information to civilian

users, but these systems operate independently of GPS. Galileo allegedly will

inherently provide global integrity coverage.

56. European Commission, European Dependence, sec. 3.

57. Future GPS upgrades will provide additional signals for civilian

users, but Galileo will provide this service first.

58. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 28.

59. Ibid.

60. A milliwatt is approximately -160 dBW (power level in decibels relative to one watt). Alterman, “GPS Dependence,” 54.

61. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 278; and Richardson, “GPS in

the Shadows of Navwar,” 22.

62. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 280.

63. Adams, “GPS Vulnerabilities,” 12.

64. Jam-resistance techniques have fortified military receivers such that

a 100-watt jammer would need to be within 0.3 nautical miles to cause significant problems. Roos, “Pair of Achilles Heels,” 22.

65. GPS Joint Program Office, “Navstar GPS Fact Sheet.”

66. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were termed axis of evil nation-states in

Pres. George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 Jan. 2002.

67. Snyder, “Navigating the Pacific Rim”; and Adams, “GPS Vulnerabilities,” 11. China is not exactly an axis of evil state, per se.

29

GPS VERSUS GALILEO
Chapter 3

Why Galileo?

If you use your parent’s car, there will come a day when it’s

not available. 

—Gilles Gantelet

—European Commission Spokesman

In 1996 the US government pledged to provide GPS “for peaceful civil, commercial and scientific use on a continuous worldwide basis, free of direct user fees,” and it has largely kept its

word.1 Since its operational inception in 1994, GPS remains

omnipresent and complementary. However, Europe, America’s

traditional ally for the past six decades, has decided to expend 3.6

billion euros to pursue its own satellite-navigation system. Why

would anyone pay to build a capability that is already available

for free? Only the Soviet Union, America’s Cold War enemy, saw

fit to build a Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) primarily to guide its bombers and missiles against America and its

allies.2 Europe harbors no such plans, so why Galileo? 

In this chapter, I examine Europe’s rationale to build a separate satellite-navigation system. I contend there are three main

sources of motivation propelling Europe towards Galileo: improved performance, independence from the United States, and

economic opportunity. 

Performance

Many Europeans believe that “consumer reliance on satellite navigation will turn into dependence, as [its] use becomes

an essential tool for business and daily lives.”3 They are further concerned that as business expands and reliance increases, GPS may not be upgraded to meet future needs in a

timely fashion. Hence, GPS performance in the form of accuracy, reliability, and vulnerability has become a primary concern and motive for European development of Galileo.

31
Originally, the United States designed GPS as a military

support system and intentionally degraded civilian-accessible

accuracy through selective availability to approximately 100

meters. This policy continued until President Clinton terminated

it in May 2000. However, as the Europeans quickly point out,

the United States still maintains the capability to degrade civilian GPS accuracy immediately upon direction.4 Thus, many

Europeans fear (or claim to fear) that the “military character of

GPS means there is always a risk of civil users being cut off in

the event of a crisis.”5 Although technically possible, such an

occurrence is remote because the United States has never degraded (beyond established selective-availability policy levels)

or removed GPS signals during wars or crises. For instance,

the United States neither increased degradation beyond the

standard 100 meters during operations in Bosnia and Kosovo

nor reactivated selective availability during post-9/11 operations

in Afghanistan and Iraq.6 Nevertheless, even with selective

availability turned off, GPS accuracy does not meet requirements for all civil applications. 

Although GPS civilian accuracy suffices for recreational and

many other functions, accuracy of 10–20 meters provided by

a single signal does not meet requirements for sole-means

navigation in safety-critical applications such as entering a

seaport or landing aircraft under poor weather conditions.7

Moreover, “current space-based radio navigation systems do

not provide adequate performance to meet European multimodal and multi-sector needs.”8 For that, Europe’s use of GPS

would require heavy investments in differential technology in

which line-of-sight limitations constrain use to localized areas

(without additional investments in Wide Area Augmentation

Systems [WAAS]).9 Alternatively, the proposed Galileo system

will transmit multiple civilian signals, providing a global accuracy of approximately four meters.10 Additionally (as discussed

in chap. 2), GPS accuracy degrades at high latitudes and in

urban settings. The Center for Transport Studies at Imperial

College, London, tested the urban-canyon problem in the English capital and discovered that GPS five-meter accuracy was

available only 17 percent of the time.11 Galileo’s orbit design

hopes to improve accuracy for Nordic users, but it is unlikely

32

WHY GALILEO?
to overcome the urban-canyon occultation problem on its own.

The largest improvement in accuracy for any environment

would come not from a new system, but from the combination

of GPS and Galileo systems. More satellites in orbit will increase the “probability of having a clear view to sufficient

satellites for a robust positioning solution.”12 However, while

“mediocre and varying position accuracy” is an issue, Europeans are more concerned with the availability and reliability

of GPS signals.13

The GPS civilian service, the SPS, is not guaranteed worldwide at all times. In fact, it is not guaranteed at all. Nor does it

quickly inform users of substandard performance. While GPS is

generally reliable and system failures are rare, outages have

caused discontinuous service in the past. In 2000, for example,

GPS satellite malfunctions deprived the areas of Oklahoma,

Kansas, and Nebraska of navigation signals for 18 minutes.14 In

other cases, a Canadian research body reported that one aircraft was affected by an unannounced signal interruption

greater than 80 minutes, and Icelandic aviation authorities

noted that several transatlantic flights in their control zone were

similarly disturbed.15 Likewise, the deactivation of a satellite for

maintenance shut down a series of automated bank-teller machines as well as a communications network that relied on GPS

for synchronization.16

Consequently, if satellite navigation is a keystone of transportation infrastructure, even minor service discontinuities

can have severe consequences for safety. For this reason the

European transport industry is a primary driving force behind

Galileo.17 Not surprisingly, Europeans have identified satellite

navigation as an essential tool for implementing the European

Transport Policy.18 Extant terrestrial navigation aids vary

widely in number and technology across Europe, and each

transport community uses different types of systems without

a coordinated policy at the European level.19 Europe plans to

employ a GNSS to standardize and “harmonize future transport guidance systems.”20 Numerous safety-critical applications will depend on the GNSS. Accordingly, EU directives for

safe transport of people and goods require a GNSS to provide

service guarantees with liability commitments.21 Given that

33

WHY GALILEO?
GPS does not provide such guarantees, Europe is seeking a

separate GNSS.

The last European concern regarding GPS performance is vulnerability. As confirmed in the US DOT’s Volpe Report, GPS is

susceptible to intentional (jamming) and unintentional interference. As previously noted, GPS is easily jammed because it

employs extremely low-power signals. For the same reason it is

also susceptible to unintentional disruption from mobile-phone

satellite systems, television broadcasts, and natural phenomena

such as ionospheric interference and solar flares.22 This situation was illustrated when interference affecting GPS receivers

and differential stations in and around the harbor of Monterey,

California, was traced to a fishing boat and two other sources

using active television antennas emitting in the L1 frequency

range.23 In view of these vulnerabilities, the Volpe Report states

that GPS cannot serve as a sole source of PNT services for

critical applications and that backup systems are vital for all

GPS applications involving the potential for major economic or

environmental impacts or SoL situations.24

The United States has not sat idle in the face of these performance drawbacks. The ongoing GPS modernization plan will

eventually address all of these shortcomings. Next-generation

satellites—the Block IIR-M—will add a second civilian signal

on L2 (referred to as L2C), greatly increasing civilian accuracy.

Block IIR-M will also debut the military M-code on L1 and L2,

“which will provide improved signal-processing techniques for

enhanced jamming resistance.”25 Block IIF satellites will add a

third civilian signal, L5, featuring more power and a new coding scheme. The signal will increase availability and civilian

accuracy, potentially to the centimeter level.26 The United States

plans to begin launching Block IIF satellites in 2006.27 GPS III

satellites will have 100 to 300 times the transmission power of

the current constellation to mitigate jamming and interference.28 They will also debut high-gain antennas to generate directional spot beams several hundred kilometers in diameter.

29

Spot beams will allow the US military to focus more power in

particular regions to resist jamming.30 Lastly and perhaps

most importantly, GPS III will provide integrity monitoring, increasing reliability by quickly informing users of performance

34

WHY GALILEO?
degradation.31 Unfortunately, GPS III will not begin launching

until 2012.32 In due course, GPS will address all these stated

performance concerns regarding accuracy, reliability, and vulnerability. However, Europe and the rest of the world will not

wait—they plan to act independently. 

Independence

An increasingly integrated Europe has progressively sought

to “acquire power and project geopolitical ambition,” especially

since the end of the Cold War.33 One of the EU’s chief goals is

to create “a superpower on the European continent that

stands equal to the United States.”34 Naturally, this ambition

extends to space. As early as 1991, the EC hinted at the potential development of an independent navigation system to

reduce European dependence on US space-defense systems.35

Unsurprisingly, the ESA claims that “European independence

is the chief reason” for building Galileo.36 Indeed, Galileo

strengthens Europe’s bid for political, security, and technological independence from the United States.

Political Independence 

Originally, Europe did not plan to build its own satellitenavigation system. It had hoped to participate in an internationally developed global system similar to GPS for civilian use

“under the aegis of the United Nations.”37 However, the United

States concluded that this idea was not in its best interest. It

would not cede control of GPS and was not interested in running an additional system, effectively stalling the development

of a global system under civilian control and, ultimately, planting the seeds for Galileo.38 In the meantime, GPS flourished.

To the extent that it affects sovereignty, the impact of GPS

on modern European society is pervasive. Europe plans to employ a GNSS to aid the implementation of a broad set of policies that includes regulating agriculture, fisheries, and transportation services.39 For example, Europeans forecast high

growth rates for inland transport that will double loading by

2020.40 This increase is expected to overwhelm the existing infrastructure.41 The European GNSS is expected to provide a

35

WHY GALILEO?
sustainable transport policy by monitoring traffic flows, preventing congestion, and enabling automatic toll payments

without stopping for tollgates.42 Thus, GNSS technology will

become increasingly embedded in European domestic policy,

forming “the basis of important commercial applications and

government-supported infrastructures.”43 In the absence of

Galileo, these basic governmental decisions and policies would

depend upon US policy for GPS, which is subject to change

without reference to European requirements. Without Galileo,

European critical infrastructure will rely on a system owned

and operated by a foreign power’s military. This potential condition conjures up fearful images that “Europe can be held to

ransom on all issues related to its use of GPS and might be

obliged to pay governmental levies to the US in the future.”44

Additionally, under various international conventions, EU

member states have public obligations to provide safe navigation and certain other public services, such as SAR.45 These

European states have laws requiring them to control and regulate navigation aids used in SoL applications, but Europe cannot control or regulate GPS.46 Ultimately, the European Parliament (EP) concluded that “the sovereignty and safety of

Europe will be in serious danger if the European navigation

systems are removed from European control.”47

In addition to sovereignty, a powerful political motive spurring

the pursuit of Galileo is prestige, influencing the development of

policies that allocate status and acknowledge achievement.48 In

1957 the launch of Sputnik instigated an international space

race—essentially a superiority contest between the United States

and USSR to garner influence over the rest of the world. Many

believed that “emerging Third World nations would follow the

country considered most technically advanced, for development

and political reasons.”49 However, “since the end of the Cold War,

the stakes in the space race have shifted from prestige . . . towards market shares and dominance for applications.”50 Today

space activities are judged by what they provide to society in the

broad sense, especially economically.51

Nonetheless, Europeans still regard space as an area for significant technological innovation that can elevate international

standing.52 Similar to the impacts of Ariane and Airbus, Euro36

WHY GALILEO?
peans believe Galileo will enhance the international influence of

the EU.53 Galileo will help build leading-edge technology and a

strong economy, prime assets regarding Europe’s influence and

attractiveness in the world.54 According to an EU government

advisor, “There was a prestige aspect involved in the whole development [of Galileo], that Europe wanted to show that they

could indeed do something.”55 Epitomizing the influence of

vying for status, French president Jacques Chirac warned that

Europe’s failure to develop Galileo “would inevitably lead to [Europe] becoming . . . vassals” of the United States.56

Additionally, anti-American sentiment on the part of European

elites may be augmenting the pursuit of Galileo.57 Inflamed by

America’s unilateralist expansion of the war against terrorism to

Iraq and the explicitly preemptive rhetoric contained in the 2002

National Security Strategy of the United States, some European

leaders have grown disgruntled “with America’s might and its

overbearing ways.”58 Consequently, Europe may symbolically

view Galileo as “a means to struggle against American hegemony.”59 Regardless of the political motive, would the United

States place its policies for national security and economic development on critical infrastructure owned by Europe? 

Security Independence 

The European security perspective has changed over the

years, and Galileo will play an important role in the future defense of Europe. Europe has depended on the United States

for security since the end of World War II. NATO was designed

to keep the “Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans

down.”60 However, the end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical landscape. In Europe today, the Americans are superfluous, the Russians are irrelevant, and the Germans are integrated. European security has faded as an American priority

in the absence of the USSR, as illustrated both by Congress’s

insistence that Europe bear a greater defense burden and by

America’s reluctance to prosecute the war in Kosovo.61 Certainly, the post-9/11 environment refocused American priorities on homeland defense and the war on terrorism. 

While originally slow to respond to these changes, Europe

has redoubled its efforts to build a common defense policy in

37

WHY GALILEO?
the wake of the Kosovo campaign, an indication that “the Europeans are scared . . . that America will not show up the next

time war breaks out somewhere near Europe’s periphery.”62

Indeed, by 2000 the EU established the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and committed itself to fielding a rapid-reaction force of 60,000 troops deployable for at least a year to conduct peace operations.63 After

the Kosovo war, “several European governments agreed that

an autonomous satellite navigation capability must serve as the

basis for Europe’s security and defense policy.”64 Thus, Europe

is taking steps to end its security dependence, and Galileo will

figure prominently in the endeavor. However, supporting military

operations goes against a founding principle of Galileo.

Europe insists Galileo is designed “specifically for civilian purposes,” as compared to GPS, which was “designed during the

Cold War for military purposes.”65 By contrasting Galileo’s peaceful orientation with GPS’s military roots Europe implies that

Galileo is the best choice for civilians, since meeting civilian

needs is not the Pentagon’s top priority.66 The European Parliament expressly stated that “[Galileo] is being developed by civilian organizations . . . and run under civilian control. . . . [Galileo]

is not designed for specifically military purposes.”67 Some EU

states were quite emphatic that Galileo remain strictly civilian in

nature.68 In particular, the British insisted that all public statements about Galileo stress civilian applications.69 Moreover, they

did not see the need for the PRS, Galileo’s encrypted service with

potential military value.70 Essentially, the Galileo doves felt that

“using Galileo for military purposes would jeopardize business

investments.”71 In contrast, France has quietly championed

Galileo for military purposes and has previously threatened to

withdraw support for it without the PRS.72 Historically, France

led European efforts for autonomy, marked by its independent

procurement of nuclear weapons in the face of American nonproliferation policy, its departure from NATO’s military command

structure, and its push for the Airbus and Ariane programs. In

fact, France believed that “Europe as a whole was destined to

eventually move away from military, economic, and technological dependence on the US.”73 As the giant of the European

space industry, France used its influence to help move the EU’s

38

WHY GALILEO?
position on Galileo from a civil system under civil control, to a

civil system usable by the military, to a system critical for European defense.74 In the end, the Directorate-General for Energy

and Transport (DG-TREN) acknowledged, “Although designed

primarily for civilian applications, Galileo will also give the EU a

military capability.”75

GNSS technology has proven essential to military capabilities, as illustrated by the impact of GPS on US military operations. During Operation Desert Storm, GPS guided coalition

forces through the featureless desert, from the tanks involved

in the famous left-hook maneuver to the Apache and Pave Low

helicopters that provided the opening salvos of the war.76 During Operation Allied Force (OAF), GPS-guided munitions became a requirement, enabling precision all-weather bombing

of Kosovo and Belgrade.77 Without GPS, pilots facing 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time would have

to wait for clearer skies, creating sanctuaries and operational

lulls.78 GPS-guided munitions proved so effective that US reliance on them increased from 3 percent of all bombs during

OAF to roughly 60 percent in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).79

In addition to precision navigation and munitions, GPS also

provided enhanced battlefield awareness. During OIF the US

Army and special operations forces utilized Blue Force Tracking (BFT) systems that integrated GPS with other space technology to provide theaterwide situational awareness. BFT significantly reduced fratricide in OIF, during which only one soldier

was killed by friendly direct ground fire, as compared to 35

deaths in Desert Storm.80 Also, BFT proved essential to the famous “race to Baghdad,” greatly accelerating the tempo of

combat through battlespace awareness and real-time information.81 Without it the maneuver would have lost cohesion

because the vehicles moved so fast they outran the range of

their radios.82 Consequently, space activities such as GPS

have become indispensable to US national security.83

Europeans clearly understand the value of a GNSS to security

and view Galileo as a means to “hedge against the perceived risk

that the US Department of Defense would deliberately degrade or

jam a signal increasingly vital to European interests.”84 The first

line of defense for Europe, NATO has sanctioned GPS as its pri39

WHY GALILEO?
mary navigational aid.85 But not all EU states are members of

NATO. There may come a time when the EU acts on its own, outside of NATO and possibly against US interests. According to the

DG-TREN, “If the EU finds it necessary to undertake a security

mission that the US does not consider to be in its interest, [Europe] will be impotent unless it has the satellite navigation technology that is now indispensable.”86 In other words, “Galileo will

underpin the common European defense policy.”87

Technological Independence

Since the 1950s “the drive for advanced technology . . . [has

been] and remains a key motivation for European activities in

space” and serves as a primary incentive fueling the development of Galileo.88 While early European space efforts were tied

to cooperation with NASA, Europe sought more than just a cooperative role in space; “the Europeans [wanted] to master the

technology of space activity.”89 Indeed, “the most fundamental

reason for cooperation . . . was to help European industry develop its know-how and potential.”90 This was especially important because Europeans perceived that a technology gap,

created by heavy US spending on research and development,

divided America and its allies and provided American firms

leverage in European markets.91 In the early 1960s the fear of

falling behind led the Europeans to establish “their own space

research organizations . . . precisely to promote European

competitive independence from the United States in advanced

technology.”92 One organization explicitly advocated that Europe

should forgo importing US space technology so that Europeans might acquire experience in research and development.93

Today Europe looks to Galileo to serve this exact purpose.

Without access to technological developments in the satellitenavigation sector, the EU’s industrial capacity to compete in

the US-dominated market would be seriously constrained—a

lesson learned from previous experience.94

Galileo is not the first European venture designed to overcome US technological dominance in space. In the 1960s the

United States enjoyed an almost total monopoly in communication satellites and sought to control international developments in the field through the creation of the International

40

WHY GALILEO?
Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).95 Predictably, the provisions of INTELSAT nourished American hegemony and heightened the technology gap, galvanizing the Europeans to move away from scientific projects to pursue their

own “technologically relevant, commercially viable endeavors”

such as the Symphonie satellite communication program.96

However, as the Europeans shifted away from scientific spacecraft with hopes to achieve some measure of technological

independence, they ran headlong into additional obstacles imposed by a near-monopoly of American launch systems. In

1972 the United States prohibited the export of space-launch

technology “in support of its own launch providers . . . creating

a clear state of dependence by other countries.”97 Previous US

policy pledged to launch European spacecraft only of a scientific or experimental nature.98 As a result, the United States

refused to launch Symphonie until “assured that . . . [it] would

not compete with Intelsat for commercial traffic.”99 The United

States eventually launched the satellite but not until the Europeans begrudgingly acquiesced to the required concessions.100

Thus, to escape their technological dependence on the United

States and America’s unwillingness to guarantee space-launch

services, the Europeans independently pursued development

of the Ariane launch booster.101 Fast-forwarding to the present,

US dominance in satellite-navigation technology once again

threatens Europe with technological dependence and has

spurred the pursuit of Galileo.

According to Alenia Spazio, a major Italian space company, as

recently as three years ago Europe had no industry for satellite

navigation.102 The market was and remains dominated by GPS

and US industries. Accordingly, Carl Bildt, a former Swedish

prime minister, contends that “the most important reason for

Europe to develop Galileo is to maintain Europe’s high-tech industrial base.”103 Europeans believe that developing Galileo will

help build technical skills and knowledge on a learn-as-you-go

basis as engineers meet the challenges of satellite and groundsystems design, manufacturing, and certification.104 For example,

European engineers will enhance their competency in “spacequalified clocks and volume parts procurement for multi-satellite

constellations,” skills transferable to various other space appli41

WHY GALILEO?
cations.105 Still fearing the technology gap, Europe feels it “cannot allow itself to lag behind in the future development of technological capacities and the management of related technologies.”106

Most significantly, technological independence enables the

ability to influence or set system standards. “Whoever defines the

requirements, develops the specifications and sets standards for

[Galileo] satellite signals and equipment will have tremendous

commercial leverage.”107 For example, in the 1980s, Europe

lagged considerably behind the United States in digital cellular

telephony.108 In response, the EU “supported the launch of the

Global System for Mobile Communications, which ultimately set

the new digital standard,” enabling European companies like

Nokia and Ericsson to lead the industry.109 Certainly, the Europeans feel that their “absence from the definition of the [GPS]

space segment” significantly hurts their position “in the rapidly

expanding markets for user equipment and value-added services.”110 Furthermore, “experience shows that only those nations and industries with a decisive influence on the system infrastructure will remain competitive in the market.”111

Economic Opportunity

The third pillar of Europe’s three-tiered European Space

Strategy is to reap the benefits of space for markets and society.112 Germany’s federal minister of education and research

underscored this objective by asserting that “the most important goal of the European Space Strategy is the consistent use

of space technologies to seize market opportunities.”113 In addition to concerns about GPS performance and European

independence, economic opportunity emerges as a major incentive to develop Galileo. 

The market for GNSS civil applications is immense and

growing rapidly. In 2002 “commercial services based on free

access to GPS [had] revenues estimated at around $12 billion,” and the global market for services and receivers is forecasted to approach Euro 40 billion by 2005.114 By 2020 Europeans estimate “that over 65 percent of the population of

Europe will rely on GNSS while going about their business and

daily lives,” driven largely by an anticipated surge in personal

GNSS use in vehicles and services integrated with mobile

42

WHY GALILEO?
phones.115 Currently, however, Europe’s share of the satellitenavigation-terminal market is minuscule, amounting “to 15%

in Europe, and only 5% worldwide.”116 Moreover, a study in

2000 that examined European competitiveness in the GNSS

industry reveals that “Europe had few suppliers of GPS

chipsets/receivers for high-end applications as well as lowend mass market products.”117 In fact, during that time over

80 percent of the GPS receivers were designed and manufactured in the United States.118 With Galileo, Europeans believe

they will gain a foothold in the market, much like they did with

Ariane.119 Today, Ariane commands nearly 50 percent of the

commercial-satellite-launch market.120

If Europe can establish a foothold, sales of Galileo receivers

are expected to increase from “[Euro] 100 million in 2010 to

some 875 million by 2020, representing market penetration

rising from 13 percent to 52 percent.”121 Increasing the European share of the satellite-navigation market via Galileo would

drive the creation of jobs. Studies performed for the EU vary

in their predictions, ranging from 100,000 jobs by 2020 to

146,000 by 2025.122 In addition to driving up market share

and creating jobs, Galileo is forecast to begin turning a profit

by 2011 through royalties and service charges.123 Given these

predictions, a substantial market exists in the future, and, according to the EU’s vice president, “The challenge is to ensure

that Europe can take a fair share of this global market.”124 For

an economically competitive Europe, Galileo provides a window

of opportunity—but the window will not stay open long.

According to an independent study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, Galileo must commence service by 2008 because

“the market will be in a rapid growth phase by then, and GPS

III . . . is expected to commence operations one or two years

thereafter. Galileo will only become established if it is in the

market with enough time to gain acceptance in the launch of

new equipment and services.”125 If launched as planned (an

assumption most economic studies rely upon), Galileo will

provide improved accuracy and integrity monitoring several

years before GPS can introduce comparable services. As discussed previously, GPS III will provide virtually the same services as Galileo for free “and would thus close the window of

43

WHY GALILEO?
opportunity for Europe to set the global standard in satellite

navigation.”126 Because the United States does not plan to

launch GPS III before 2012, however, Galileo has a four- to

five-year window to establish itself with a superior product.

Considering that most space programs encounter delays during development, any setback for Galileo could nullify its competitive advantage.127 Accordingly, the EU fears that if it postpones Galileo, the market will adopt GPS as the standard,

relegating Europe to a supporting role.128 Hence, Galileo is a

classic case of the need to “git thar fustest with the mostest”

in order “to combat the USA’s current monopoly.”129

In general, monopolies stifle “technological innovation and

economic progress,” and so the US monopoly on satellite navigation services provides additional economic incentive to

launch Galileo.130 Europe believes the “absence of competition

means that optimal service cannot be provided for private

users, neither can free reception be guaranteed in the long

term.”131 It looks to Galileo to remedy the US monopoly, just as

Airbus challenged the Boeing monopoly and “brought airlines,

passengers, and crews the benefits of real competition.”132 The

same may be said for Ariane and the commercial launch industry. To at least some degree, it can be argued that the rise

of Galileo is America’s own fault. 

In 1995 Irving Lachow warned that “international acceptance

of GPS is important from an economic and commercial standpoint because the lack of it could lead to competing satellite

navigation systems.”133 With no competition to drive improvements for civilian users, the Pentagon focused on refining GPS

military applications and did not satisfy major concerns of the

civilian-user community, especially foreign governments.134 A

lack of competition allows the United States to follow a launchon-need policy, whereby it replaces GPS satellites only when

they fail.135 GPS satellites have routinely outlived their design

life, however, and this has had the unintended result of preserving old technology in orbit and, for economizing, holding

improvements hostage to the failure rate.136 One does not wait

until the family computer ceases to operate before purchasing an

upgraded model to exploit faster processing or other new features.

Nevertheless, it is likely that the status of the on-orbit Block IIR

44

WHY GALILEO?
constellation will influence the launch of Block IIF satellites,

which would delay the debut of L5, the third civilian signal.

Additionally, Lachow warned that “the technologies required

to develop and deploy a satellite navigation system are no longer

state-of-the-art,” falling well within the capabilities of private

companies.137 The biggest obstacle preventing other players from

entering the satellite-navigation market is investment capital,

which the Europeans have overcome through collective action.138

Consequently, one cannot fault Europe for pursuing Galileo because “societies which fail to maintain competitiveness run the

danger of economic stagnation and eventual decline.”139

In short, while individual motives for Galileo may vary depending on the nation, collectively the EU is pursuing it for improved performance, independence from the United States, and

economic opportunity. Specifically, Europe believes Galileo will

outperform GPS and is inherently more accurate, more reliable,

and less vulnerable by design. With Galileo, Europe can secure

a degree of political, security, and technological independence

from the United States. Finally, Galileo offers Europe an economic

window of opportunity to seize the satellite-navigation market

from the United States and to set a new global standard. While

Galileo should have a considerably positive impact on Europe,

the ramifications of Galileo’s development and implementation

may have an equally significant impact on the United States. 

Notes

1. The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, “US Global

Positioning System.”

2. Dinerman, “GPS and Galileo,” 10.

3. European Commission, “European Dependence,” technical note, 2.

4. Ibid.

5. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 7.

6. US Department of State, “US Global Positioning System.” The United

States has discontinued selective availability because it has developed methods

to deny enemy use of GPS signals in localized areas. See Public Papers: Clinton,

803.

7. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 8.

8. de Palacio, “Importance of Galileo for Europe.”

9. Lembke, Competition for Technological Leadership, 69.

10. European Commission, Galileo: Mission High Level Definition, 14.

11. Byrne, “What’s So Wrong with GPS?” 32. 

45

WHY GALILEO?
12. European Commission, European Dependence, 27.

13. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 7.

14. European Commission, European Dependence, 1.

15. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 7.

16. Dornheim, “GPS Improvements Set,” 56.

17. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 12.

18. European Commission, European Dependence, 3.

19. European Commission, Galileo, 8.

20. de Palacio, “Importance of Galileo for Europe.”

21. European Commission, European Dependence, 3.

22. US Department of Transportation, “Vulnerability of the Transportation Infrastructure,” 25–27.

23. Dornheim, “GPS Improvements Set,” 56.

24. US Department of Transportation, “Vulnerability of the Transportation Infrastructure,” 6.

25. Sirak, “USA Sets Sights on GPS,” 30.

26. Dornheim, “GPS Improvements Set,” 56; and Kirk Lewis (senior analyst, Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA], Alexandria, VA), interview by the

author, 9 December 2003.

27. Hewish, “What Is Happening with GPS?” 54.

28. Sirak, “USA Sets Sights on GPS,” 30.

29. Hewish, “What Is Happening with GPS?” 54.

30. Sirak, “USA Sets Sights on GPS,” 30.

31. Dornheim, “GPS Improvements Set,” 56.

32. Ibid.

33. Kupchan, End of the American Era, 151.

34. Reid, “EU Summit Ends,” Washington Post, 17 March 2002.

35. European Commission, European Community, 27.

36. European Space Agency, “Why Europe Needs Galileo.”

37. Lembke, Competition for Technological Leadership, 59.

38. Ibid.

39. European Commission, European Dependence, 3.

40. Lembke, “EU Critical Infrastructure,” 108.

41. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 12–13.

42. Ibid, 13.

43. Bulmahn, “Europe’s Ambitions in Space.”

44. European Commission, European Dependence, 6.

45. European Commission, Galileo: Involving Europe, 2.

46. Pace et al., Global Positioning System, 39.

47. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 15.

48. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 4.

49. Ibid., 20.

50. European Commission, “Towards a Coherent European Approach,” 5.

46

WHY GALILEO?
51. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 2.

52. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 9.

53. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, 8.

54. European Commission, “Galileo: A Decision,” 6.

55. Lembke, Competition for Technological Leadership, 99.

56. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 160.

57. Dinerman, “GPS and Galileo,” 10.

58. Kupchan, End of the American Era, 154.

59. Ibid. Kupchan quotes French president Jacques Chirac.

60. Robertson, referring to Lord Ismay’s famous quote in “NATO in the

21st Century.”

61. Kupchan, End of the American Era, 152.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 149.

64. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 159.

65. Wilson, Galileo: The European Programme, 5, 7.

66. National Academy of Public Administration, Global Positioning System: Charting the Future, 42.

67. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 14.

68. Bell, “GPS and Galileo.”

69. “Europe: Eppur Si Muove,” 53.

70. Divis, “Galileo Breaks Free.”

71. Lembke, “Politics of Galileo,” 10.

72. Karner, interview (see chap. 2, n. 3).

73. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 171.

74. Karner, interview.

75. European Commission,“Galileo: A Decision,” 6.

76. Mackenzie, “Apache Attack.”

77. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations, 51.

78. Ibid.

79. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 158.

80. Dunn, “Blue Force Tracking,” 11.

81. Robinson, “Who Goes There?”; and Peartree et al., “Information Superiority,” 120.

82. Robinson, “Who Goes There?”

83. Condoleeza Rice, quoted by Butler in “Rice Wants President to Initiate.” 

84. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 159.

85. Bell, “GPS and Galileo.”

86. European Commission,“Galileo: A Decision,” 6.

87. Ibid.

88. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 21.

89. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space, 133.

47

WHY GALILEO?
90. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 172. Handberg quotes

A. Dattner, Reflections on Europe in Space: The First Two Decades and Beyond (Noordwijk, Netherlands: ESA Scientific and Technical Publications

Branch, ESTEC, 1982).

91. Sebesta, “US-European Relations,” 139.

92. McDougall, . . . the Heavens and the Earth, 208.

93. Ibid., 426.

94. European Commission, Galileo: Involving Europe, iv.

95. Sebesta, “US-European Relations,” 141.

96. Ibid., 140.

97. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 170.

98. Sebesta, “US-European Relations,” 150.

99. McLucas, Space Commerce, 54.

100. Sebesta, “US-European Relations,” 155.

101. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 170.

102. Lembke, Competition for Technological Leadership, 123.

103. Grant and Keohane, “Europe Needs More Space,” R14.

104. European Commission, “European Dependence,” technical note, 7.

105. Ibid.

106. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 6.

107. Lembke, “Politics of Galileo,” 22.

108. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 162.

109. Ibid.

110. European Commission, “Towards a Coherent European Approach,”

17.

111. European Commission, European Union and Space, 23.

112. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to

the Council, Europe and Space, 3.

113. Bulmahn, “Europe’s Ambitions in Space.”

114. “Business: Navigating the Future,” 92; and European Parliament,

Report on the Commission Communication to the European Parliament for the

2005 estimate.

115. European Commission, European Dependence, 14–15.

116. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 11.

117. European Commission, European Dependence, 17. The document

refers to the “Structural Analysis of the European Satellite Application Segment” study from Technomar GmbH, October 2000.

118. Lembke, Competition for High Technology, 123.

119. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, 29.

120. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 9.

121. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inception Study, 4.

48

WHY GALILEO?
122. See de Palacio, “Importance of Galileo for Europe,” for 100,000 jobs;

and Lembke, “EU Critical Infrastructure,” 109 for 146,000 jobs. The numbers include employment in design, manufacturing, operations, sales, and

services sectors.

123. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inception Study, 3, 7.

124. de Palacio, “Importance of Galileo for Europe.”

125. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inception Study, 4.

126. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 160.

127. “Europe: Eppur Si Muove,” 53.

128. European Commission, Galileo: Involving Europe, 44, 54.

129. General Nathan Bedford Forrest Historical Society, “Quotes by General Forrest”; and European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication.

130. Gibbons, “World of Difference.”

131. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 10.

132. “Airbus Today.”

133. Lachow, “GPS Dilemma,” 141.

134. Ibid.

135. Divis, “GPS III,” 10.

136. Ibid.

137. Lachow, “GPS Dilemma,” 141.

138. MacDonald, “Econosats,” 44–54.

139. Handberg and Johnson-Freese, Prestige Trap, 1.

49

WHY GALILEO?
Chapter 4

Implications and Recommendations

Failure to master space means being second best in every

aspect.

—Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson

Today, through lack of focus and funding, the United States

stands to lose not only its primacy but even its capability in

satellite navigation if it does not rise to the occasion.

—David Braunschvig

The European public and private sectors, driven by the motives outlined in the previous chapter, have provided the necessary financial and political backing for Galileo to proceed to the

development phase. Additionally, Galileo has attracted interest

and investment from many non-European nations, including the

People’s Republic of China. With this groundswell of international support, Galileo is fast becoming reality. Assuming Europe

implements Galileo as planned, the implications for US space

policy are significant, and its response will be carefully monitored around the world. In this final chapter, I examine the national security and economic concerns generated by the emergence of Galileo, review US policy towards Galileo, and provide

recommendations for the future. 

Implications

The primary goals of the US national policy for GPS are to

strengthen and maintain US national security and to support

and enhance US economic competitiveness and productivity.1 As

currently designed and promoted, the proposed Galileo system

directly challenges these US national interests. Since GPS is now

integrated into virtually every facet of US military operations,

anything that potentially interferes with GPS threatens national

51
security.2 As a result, the advent of Galileo sparks security concerns centering on space control and superiority. 

The Air Force defines space superiority as the “degree of control necessary to employ, maneuver, and engage space forces

while denying the same capability to an adversary.”3 This includes protecting the benefits of space support to the friendly

war fighter as well as denying these same benefits to the

enemy. One tool of space superiority is navigation warfare.

The concept of NAVWAR, initiated in 1996 by the United

States, protects US as well as allied use of GPS during conflicts, prevents the enemy from exploiting GPS, and preserves

normal signal availability outside the theater of operations for

global civilian users.4 Essentially, the United States plans to

jam GPS (or any other satellite-navigation system) to deny the

enemy’s access in a localized area. Currently, civilian and military signals share the same GPS frequency on L1, and military

receivers utilize the civilian signal to acquire the more complex

military signal.5 Thus, jamming L1 would effectively reduce military accuracy.6 For this reason, in order to optimize NAVWAR,

future GPS satellites (beginning with Block IIR-M) will transmit military signals (M-code) spectrally separated from civilian

signals, eliminating the potential for signal fratricide and

enabling more efficient jamming. However, at the 2000 World

Radiocommunications Conference, the International Telecommunications Union authorized Galileo to transmit its PRS and

OS signals in the same frequency range as the GPS M-code.

Furthermore, Europeans planned to transmit the PRS signal

using the same modulation scheme as the GPS M-code,

thereby directly overlaying Galileo’s PRS signal on top of the

GPS M-code signal. In addition to interfering with GPS signals,

any attempt by the United States to jam the PRS would also

jam the M-code, effectively nullifying NAVWAR. 

As a result, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz emphasized US concerns in a letter to NATO defense ministers,

stating that “the addition of any Galileo services in the same

spectrum . . . will significantly complicate our ability to ensure

availability of critical GPS services in time of crisis or conflict and

at the same time assure adversary forces are denied similar capabilities.”7 Subsequently, George Bell, NATO’s assistant secretary

52

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
general for defence support, reiterated these security concerns,

stating that the signal-overlay condition produced “a negative

impact on NATO’s military effectiveness in the area of operations,

potentially risking fratricide on friendly forces and civil populations.”8 Not surprisingly, the EU viewed things differently.

The Europeans insisted on pursuing the proposed PRS signal

specification because it “offers the best performance in peacetime, particularly in terms of resistance and robustness.”9 Arguments for optimum signal robustness aside, by overlaying the

PRS on the M-code, Europeans could force the United States to

include them in jamming decisions.10 In fact, the EU asserted

that “a political agreement on the cooperation necessary between

the two radionavigation systems is required in preparation for a

crisis.”11 With this pronouncement, it is clear that the EU is positioning itself to be consulted before the United States implements NAVWAR and jams Galileo.12 In November 2003, US-EU

negotiations appeared to resolve the PRS overlay problem in

principle; however, the final terms have yet to be agreed upon.13

Furthermore, some believe that the EU’s concession could be

temporary and that the EU, driven by France, intends to change

the frequency once it has demonstrated its ability to manage an

encrypted signal.14 Despite negotiations, the French remain committed to a direct PRS overlay of the M-code, in part because they

plan to incorporate Galileo into weapons manufactured for export,

and because an unjammable signal would undoubtedly boost

sales in the arms market.15 Indeed, the French firm Thales already

offered a presentation on PRS-based military-equipment markets at the Institute of Navigation’s annual conference in 2002.16

Besides posturing for a joint US-EU decision process for denial of service, the EU believes that the need to jam the PRS is

negligible because the signal will be encrypted and restricted

to authorized users.17 In response, NATO highlighted concerns

regarding the integrity of the PRS encryption regime, fearing

that PRS signals could be compromised and exploited by an

adversary.18 Likewise, the United States fears that rogue

states, terrorists, or even states acting against US interests

could use Galileo to their advantage.19 Although the EU avers

that PRS access requires a special cryptographic key that will

be strictly controlled by key-management systems approved

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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by EU member states, the EU has not yet addressed the

specifics of the crypto-security regime or who exactly will have

access.20 According to Bell, “Detailed discussion on the crucial

issues . . . related to the control and possible proliferation of

user equipment, the robustness of associated cryptography

and distribution and control procedures for the keys have [sic]

not been initiated or authorized between NATO and the EC.”21

For the moment, the EU believes that the United States

should trust Europe to secure its PRS signal. Hoping to convince the United States of the encrypted service’s viability, the

EU stated that “some EU Member States have the know-how

to design and implement effective government encryption. The

resulting technology could be made available to the European

authorities controlling the Galileo PRS signal.”22 In this manner, Galileo would mitigate fears of a PRS compromise and

“ensure signal denial to hostile nations where necessary.”23

The EU asserts that European nations within NATO have

trusted the US security mechanisms for GPS ever since a 1993

memorandum of understanding between the US DOD and

NATO provided them access to the PPS.24 Consequently, “the

EU would like the US to show the same trust regarding its capability to implement a secure Galileo system.”25

Also worrisome for the United States is that in the process

of seeking additional funding and support for Galileo, the EU

has welcomed non-European investment and participation in

Galileo’s development, further complicating the issue of controlled access. China, India, Israel, Canada, and South Korea

have expressed interest in assisting the EU, with some degree

of access and influence in return.26 In particular, China’s

prime minister has “expressed his country’s interest in being

fully involved in the Galileo programme financially, technically

and politically.”27 In fact “China’s support . . . can facilitate

EU’s negotiation with the US . . . on cooperation” by providing

the EU with additional diplomatic leverage.28 An EC minister

confidently stated: “We expect Chinese support to our positions on frequencies and international standardization activities.”29 The issue is more than merely speculative. China recently pledged Euro 200 million ($236 million) for Galileo and

is primarily interested in investing in the PRS.30 The prospect

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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
of China with access to an encrypted and potentially unjammable navigation service raises concerns among US military

and foreign policy officials.31 Moreover, through continued investment and support, China could possibly buy a seat on the

Galileo security committee that controls access to the PRS—a

committee currently conceived to decide issues via unanimous

vote.32 Although the EU insists that China will not have access

to the PRS or any other security aspects of the system, the extent of China’s participation will be determined in subsequent

agreements and will likely be influenced by “how [China’s] initial investment takes shape.”33 Beyond China’s direct investment and support, access to its 100 million mobile users provides a huge market for Galileo.34

Along with national security issues, Galileo challenges US economic competitiveness, with implications for fair competition

and assured access to the global satellite-navigation market. The

US national policy for GPS encourages worldwide acceptance

and integration of GPS for peaceful civil and commercial purposes, promoting GPS as a worldwide standard for international

use.35 “The acceptance of GPS as the world standard . . . enhances the position of the US and allows it to lead in . . . the

process of technological and economic globalization.”36 Moreover,

“the globalization of GPS markets provides an economic stimulus to firms in the growing US GPS industry, many of which already rely on exports for a significant share of their revenues.”37

Civilian users are not the only economic driver for navigation services as “the potential market for military equipment incorporating satellite navigation is huge.”38 Eventually all defense systems

will utilize navigation signals, with big money at stake.39 In terms

of the overall defense market, the American defense industry accounts for roughly $100 billion in market capital, with 22 percent representing exports, compared to $50 billion for the EU,

with around 25 percent exports.40 Specifically, “by 2005, the

world market [for GPS] is expected to reach $31 billion, 55 percent of which will be outside of the [United States].”41 Galileo

marks the end of the US monopoly on satellite-navigation services; with its planned service upgrades, Galileo could capture a

significant share of the market. If Galileo can gain enough market share, it could conceivably threaten, then redefine, the world

55

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
standard that GPS policy has long sought to control. In order to

prevent Europe from introducing an incompatible standard and

establishing its own monopoly, the United States argued for international consultations prior to initiating new standards or

regulations regarding satellite navigation.42

The United States not only fears losing its grasp on the world

standard, but also is concerned that the EU (and supporting

non-European nations) may pass laws or regulations mandating

the use of Galileo within certain regions. Since Galileo is partially

funded by private investment and is a for-profit enterprise, the

EU may be further tempted to compel the use of Galileo by member states or require it for certain purposes in order to generate

revenues.43 EU officials have already publicly asserted that

“there will be a transitional period during which Europe will

authorize a choice between GPS and Galileo, but EU users eventually will be required to utilize receivers equipped for Galileo,”

and that “fees and royalties will be levied for use of Galileo

chips.”44 An EU mandate could trigger a reactionary US mandate

for GPS, needlessly complicating navigation for commercial airlines and other transnational users. 

Such pronouncements have spurred the United States to pursue policies which ensure that all satellite-navigation users have

the freedom to choose the service (or combination of services)

that best meets their needs and to protect the extant GPS-user

base.45 The US position is that GPS users traveling to and from

Europe should be required neither to pay Galileo fees nor to install specialized Galileo equipment on boats or airplanes when

they can already obtain the same performance from GPS equipment.46 An EU mandate such as that described above could effectively close the European market to US manufacturers of GPS

equipment and cause the United States to take retaliatory measures. For instance, it could respond in kind with mandates or

attempt to take legal action against the EU for restraint of fair

trade in proper international forums such as the World Trade

Organization. Without redress, the current de facto global utility

in space navigation would be effectively privatized. And it is not

just commercial and civil navigation that would be negatively affected by these potential dictates. A Galileo regional mandate further raises questions regarding NATO and US military equip56

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ment in Europe that relies on the GPS M-code. A split, or worse—

a declaration requiring Galileo use on European soil—could

cause divisions that unravel long-standing US-European military cooperation and integration. 

The United States is also concerned that the EU will restrict

access to its OS signal specifications. To fully participate in the

equipment manufacturing and services markets, US and nonEuropean companies need equal access to technical information.47 Any restrictions or fees on technical data would either

deny American firms access to the Galileo market or unfairly increase their costs. In contrast, the United States openly publishes GPS signal parameters for the SPS (but controls PPS parameters as classified information) at no charge to the public as

stipulated in an interface control document (GPS ICD-200),

thereby “enabling businesses, scientific and academic institutions, and government entities [worldwide] to develop products,

services, and research tools on an equal basis,” with no attempt

to control the resulting innovations.48 Like the United States,

the EU has no intention of regulating the GNSS applications

market, other than carving out a share for Galileo. Whether or

not Galileo follows the GPS precedent of openness, the EU will

charge royalties “on chipset sales, paid by equipment providers

who incorporate a Galileo chip in their products to [access] the

Open Service.”49 To earn revenue and control Galileo intellectual-property rights incorporated in the chipsets, the EU may

rely on patent protection and may elect to encode the signal, requiring chipsets to contain copyrighted software to decode the

OS.50 A recent EU economic study that analyzed the Galileo

business plan deemed the encoding scheme feasible, providing

the EU charges all manufacturers the same one-time royalty to

facilitate fair competition.51

Fair trade is an important concern for the United States. With

respect to Galileo, the United States seeks obligations similar to

“normal trade relations” (NTR) from Europe.52 The pressure to

produce income for Galileo concessionaires and investors may

make it politically difficult for the EU to refrain from imposing

tariffs or discriminatory taxes on GPS-related equipment.53 In

particular, the United States disdains any tax on European sales

of GPS receivers to provide a revenue source to fund Galileo.54

57

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Unfair trade practices extend beyond government actions to encompass individual businesses as well, and here the Europeans

have some legitimate complaints. At least one American company refused to sell individual cryptological components to Europe and insisted on selling only complete GPS receivers at 10 to

50 times the price.55

The advent of Galileo raises additional US concerns regarding technology proliferation. Some of the third-party nations

lining up to invest in Galileo are not members of the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to include China, and

there appears to be no safeguard ensuring they will not gain

access to advanced space technology that could be applied to

missile development and applications. Furthermore, as Galileo

shareholders, their privileged access enables them to incorporate satellite-navigation technology into their own domestic

weapons programs, including arms manufactured for export.

China is already incorporating GPS into its fighter aircraft,

and its neighbor and trading partner, North Korea, has reportedly utilized GPS on its submarines.56 Given access to all

phases of satellite-navigation production, launch, control, and

operations, these countries could be expected to advance significantly. The North Korean Taepo Dong 2 missile can reach

portions of the United States, and the potential addition of

satellite-navigation technology would greatly increase its longrange accuracy and amplify the danger of this threat.57 France

sees Galileo as a means to help sell French weapons, further

magnifying the potential for technology proliferation.58 France

“cannot sell GPS-supported arms outside of NATO” and chafes

at the thought of the United States disapproving sales of

French GPS-guided cruise missiles to countries not meeting

US criteria.59 No such requirement could be placed on Galileocompatible systems. Consequently, controlling technology

transfer and proliferation is a primary US goal for cooperation

with the EU regarding Galileo.60

The US Response

Considering the broad potential ramifications of Galileo’s coming operations, the United States has a great deal at stake. Having invested approximately $20 billion in GPS since its inception,

58

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
not to mention having groomed the concept of satellite navigation

to global-utility status, the United States is not about to watch

its investment become irrelevant or obsolete.61 Accordingly, US

policy has evolved as Galileo has gained momentum. 

Initially, US policy employed a wait-and-see approach towards

Galileo, downplaying the need for another system and doubting

Europe’s ability to pull it off. Officially, the United States saw “no

compelling need for Galileo” because GPS would continue to

meet the needs of users worldwide.62 The United States convinced itself that “the availability of GPS without direct charges

[would] be enough to win international acceptance of the system”

and minimize “the likelihood that competing satellite navigation

systems [would] be deployed.”63 It seemed improbable that anyone would pay for a service already available for free. However,

as Thomas Schelling explains, “There is a tendency in [US] planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered looks strange; what looks strange

is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.”64 Thus, the United States did not take Galileo seriously, expecting that “plans for a satellite navigation system

would be ground to pieces in the gears of the Brussels bureaucracy.”65 As time went by and plans progressed, the United

States could not completely ignore Galileo. 

In March 1996, the United States reiterated its commitment

to providing GPS signals for free and established the Interagency GPS Executive Board.66 The IGEB, jointly chaired by

the Departments of Defense and Transportation, was an effort

to downplay the military nature of GPS and strengthen the

perception of increased civilian control. In May 2000, the

United States stopped degrading GPS civilian accuracy by

turning off selective availability in an “effort to make GPS more

responsive to civil and commercial users worldwide” and further soften its military image.67 Then in September 2000, it accelerated GPS modernization by upgrading 12 of the 20 Block

IIR satellites to include an additional civilian signal (L2C) and

two military signals (M-code).68 The effort accelerated “the GPS

modernization program by approximately eight years” and will

eventually raise GPS accuracy on par with Galileo.69 Ultimately, these efforts failed to increase the international ac59

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ceptance of GPS and forestall the need for Galileo. In February

1999, the EU announced plans to pursue an independent system, and in March 2002, it obtained approval and funding to

launch the Galileo program.70

Once the United States accepted that the EU would build

Galileo—whether it liked it or not—policy softened from blocking Galileo’s progress to ensuring its compatibility and interoperability with GPS.71 Indicative of this new perspective, the

United States announced that it would share its space technology if the EU agreed to a common signal for its OS that

would not disrupt the GPS M-code.72 In particular, the United

States recommended a specific signal structure to be shared by

Galileo’s OS and GPS III. Appealing to European prestige, a

member of the US negotiating team called the offer “a major political swing because it says that the US would recognize Galileo

as the [international] standard which [GPS III] would follow.”73

In reality, the compromise creates a neutral world standard that

Galileo will transmit first since it is scheduled to go operational

several years ahead of GPS III. However, the signal that the

United States proposes would be slightly less accurate than

Galileo’s original design.74 To sweeten the incentive for a common standard, the United States would provide a “favorable

view toward export control” on items like space-qualified clocks

and radiation-shielded parts, as well as sharing experience in

managing large constellations deployed in a very hazardous

space environment.75 In February 2004, Heinz Hilbrecht, EU’s

chief negotiator for Galileo, responded positively to the US offer,

potentially removing the last major obstacle.76 As the dialogue

continues, officials are optimistic that ongoing negotiations will

produce a GPS-Galileo cooperation agreement that resolves the

technical, trade, and security issues.77

Recommendations

“Policy provides the framework within which military and

industry leaders can plan for the future.”78 As discussed previously, the current US policy towards Galileo attempts to foster a “cooperative relationship . . . allowing industry to compete in the applications market.”79 However, the “current GPS

management, funding and modernization plans are not struc60

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
tured to respond to international competition.”80 Faced with

the reality of Galileo, the United States needs to cooperate

where it can and compete where it must by continuing efforts

to develop a common standard for satellite navigation and taking steps to strengthen the competitiveness of GPS.81

A common standard for satellite navigation provides a

framework for competition and cooperation, creating “a level

playing field for commerce.”82 Jeffrey Bialos, former head of

the US delegation for negotiations on the future of GPS and

Galileo, likened the utility of satellite navigation to the World

Wide Web and argued that it “would make no more sense to

have two disconnected, non-interoperable and exclusionary

global navigation systems . . . than it would to have two Internets.”83 Standardized competition provides a better product

for the user as it leads to more innovative applications and

more responsive modernization. Without it, the resulting complacency stagnates development. The lack of a competitor in

space “is most assuredly causing complacency in the United

States, stunting the expansion of its space capabilities, and

further causing [its] allies to develop their own potentially conflicting . . . space capabilities.”84 Arguably without the threat

of Galileo, GPS civilian users would still suffer degraded accuracy via selective availability and would not enjoy the benefits

of a second civilian signal (L2C) until the launch of Block IIF

satellites in mid-2006.85

Europe clearly understands that in order to succeed, Galileo

must be interoperable and compatible with GPS because

“compatibility is the only way to open new applications and to

increase market interest in areas in which the existence of two

systems offers numerous advantages.”86 Compatibility also

implies Galileo will not interfere with or degrade GPS, so development of a common standard will inherently mitigate any

signal-overlay issues.87 From a national security perspective,

this is the primary reason the United States should seek compatibility with Galileo. 

Beyond healthy competition, a common standard also promotes cooperation. Standardization enables the United States

and Europe to exploit the synergy of combining GPS and Galileo

capabilities. According to a US DOT report, “Using signals from

61

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
other satellite navigation systems along with GPS . . . offers the

potential to enhance integrity, availability, and . . . accuracy for

civilian users.”88 The report also deduces that Galileo could effectively mitigate “the consequences of a major GPS system disruption or satellite problem.”89 The EC agreed, noting that “combined performance will provide significant enhancements over

individual performances of either GPS or Galileo, opening up applications that would otherwise be impossible for either GPS or

Galileo to fulfill alone.”90 Combining the two systems provides

users with access to more than 50 satellites, versus 24 or 30 for

GPS and Galileo alone, respectively. More satellites mean a

higher probability of better satellite geometry—and therefore better accuracy—especially in cities, mountainous and heavily

forested terrain, and higher latitudes. Furthermore, a common

standard simplifies and streamlines development of combined

GPS/Galileo receivers utilizing the same antenna and circuitry.91

Continuing the themes of cooperation and compatibility, a

1995 RAND report remarked that “there is no international

organization that can address all [GNSS-related] issues.”92 A

common standard between GPS and Galileo could provide

the foundation for a new international paradigm for global

navigation, setting the precedent for potential upgrades to

Russia’s GLONASS and other emerging systems like China’s

Beidou constellation. 

Besides developing a common standard, the United States

must strengthen the competitiveness of GPS if it is to compete

successfully and remain viable. A recent Foreign Affairs article

warned, “Today, through lack of focus and funding, the United

States stands to lose not only its primacy but even its capability in satellite navigation if it does not rise to the occasion.”93 Analysis of proposed constellation fill plans indicates

that GPS would cede global leadership to Galileo sometime between 2008 and 2010.94 To remain competitive, the United

States must separate the military and civilian aspects of GPS

and aggressively pursue upgrades to the latter.

The United States has already taken the first step towards

separate military and civilian systems by spectrally separating

the M-code from the SPS. Although spectral separation improves

the military’s ability to deny GPS in localized areas, the separation

62

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
provides no benefit to civilian users and does little to strengthen

GPS competitiveness. However, taking the idea of separation one

step further could greatly boost GPS’s global viability.

Dividing GPS into autonomous military and civilian systems

using the same or slightly modified infrastructures “would

enable GPS to address Galileo’s challenge more effectively.”95

The Air Force would manage the M-code service, and some

civilian organization, possibly the DOT, would manage the

SPS. The DOT already maintains a liaison at the GPS Master

Control Station.96 Splitting off the SPS into a separate civilianmanaged service would create a civil subset of GPS with the “crucial commercial orientation required to define, develop, and market customer-oriented services.”97 By virtue of its predominant

military disposition, GPS competes globally with a decided disadvantage in commercial markets. Freed of the restraints of

commercial and civilian requirements, however, the military aspects of GPS could flourish under Air Force leadership, both enhanced by civil advances and complementing them.

Another way in which the United States can strengthen the

competitiveness of GPS is to provide comparable services by the

time Galileo is expected to begin operation. By accelerating GPS

modernization and moving up the launch schedules for the

Block IIF and GPS III programs, the United States can reduce

Galileo’s appeal—but doing so is far beyond current budget outlays for GPS modernization. When Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld inquired about the feasibility of accelerating the GPS

III launch schedule by two years (to begin in 2010), he learned it

would cost the Air Force an additional $300 million through FY

2009.98 Separating military and civilian GPS costs could reduce

the DOD portion of that increase significantly, while accelerating

the development of a competitive civilian GPS infrastructure.

With the DOD (specifically the Air Force) solely in charge of the

GPS budget, civilian requirements take a backseat to military

priorities—directly encroaching upon the system’s global competitiveness. While national security must always come first, the

current system creates a zero-sum environment where military

and civilian needs compete, usually to the detriment of the latter. The United States created the IGEB in 1996 to increase civilian involvement and establish joint management of GPS between

63

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
the DOD and DOT. However, the Defense Department remains

the main funding and operating agency for GPS and continues

to acquire, operate, and maintain all GPS services.99 Since the

US Air Force funds GPS, it must compete with other Air Force

space programs and other air platforms for its budget. In 2002,

for example, the Air Force contemplated cutting funding and delaying the launch of the GPS III program to bail out the SpaceBased Infrared System.100 In 2003, when the DOD reviewed the

possibility of accelerating the GPS III program, the Air Force advised against acquiring GPS improvements ahead of schedule.101

Maj Gen Franklin J. “Judd” Blaisdell, the Air Force’s director of

space operations and integration, questioned “whether it is

worth the billions and billions of dollars to get it early,” and

stated that the war fighter appeared satisfied with the state of existing GPS capabilities and planned improvements.102 The general added, “At this point in time, maybe I have some other

things I need to spend my money on.”103 Also in late 2003, Pentagon officials considered delaying procurement and launch of

Block IIF satellites to free up $220 million for other Air Force

uses in fiscal year 2005.104 Delays in the procurement of GPS

modernization prolong the performance gap between GPS and

Galileo, widening Galileo’s window of opportunity. As I have

shown, the biggest challenge to GPS’s competitiveness is the

brief window of opportunity for Galileo to capture market share

with its enhanced services. It is not advisable to lengthen that

window intentionally and increase Galileo’s appeal. A separate

budget supporting only civilian requirements and managed outside the DOD would help reduce the dilemma of balancing military priorities against civilian needs.105

A distinct budget complements the current plan that spectrally separates military and civilian signals as initial steps towards independent military and civilian services and, possibly,

separate constellations in the long term. Most space missions

have some dual-use aspect, and many have spawned separate

satellite constellations to support US military and civilian users.

For example, the weather-forecasting mission produced the military Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and the

civilian Geostationary Operational Earth Satellite (GOES) system; the two systems work in tandem for the benefit of both

64

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
groups of users.106 Separation of satellite communications

generated various military systems like the Defense Satellite

Communications System (DSCS) and civilian systems like

INTELSAT and Inmarsat. Earth observation produced numerous

classified military systems as well as civilian programs like

France’s Satellite Pour L’observation de la Terre (SPOT) and

America’s Ikonos and Landsat programs. The satellite-navigation

mission should not be any different, especially when one considers

that the inability of a military system to meet civilian needs in a

timely manner served as a major incentive to build Galileo. 

The time is undoubtedly not right for the United States to

separate military and civilian navigation programs completely.

At Euro 3.6 billion, the staggering cost of Galileo is reason

enough for the United States to forgo building a civilian sibling

to GPS. Alternatively, pooling resources to form a civilian international consortium to manage a system based on GPS SPS

and Galileo would distribute the costs, treating satellite navigation like the public good it has become. Separate systems

enable military and civilian communities to focus on their primary missions, unhindered by each other’s conflicting or nonsupportive requirements. Thus, each can concentrate on producing the best systems to meet their unique perspectives.

In conclusion, the proposed Galileo satellite-navigation system

challenges US national security and economic productivity. The

European system currently impinges on US space superiority

because it could interfere with GPS signals and nullify the concept of NAVWAR. Questionable security of the PRS encryption

scheme and broad international participation heighten the fear

of future hostile use of Galileo against US interests. Economically, Galileo erodes GPS’s status as the world standard. The

EU’s need to generate revenue raises concerns regarding access

to signal specifications, fair-trade practices, and proliferation of

space technology. In response, the United States must work with

the EU to develop a common standard for satellite navigation as

a framework for cooperation and competition. Within this framework, the United States must strengthen GPS’s competitiveness

by (1) accelerating GPS modernization where possible to minimize Galileo’s appeal and (2) separating military and civilian services to enable both sectors to minimize conflict within a dual65

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
use system and focus on their specific needs. In this manner, the

United States can rise to the occasion, cooperating where it can

and competing where it must, to maintain global leadership in

satellite navigation and uphold its position in space.

Notes

1. The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, “US Global

Positioning System.”

2. Ibid.

3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 85.

4. Hewish, “What Is Happening with GPS?” 57.

5. Richardson, “GPS in the Shadows of Navwar,” 23.

6. Ibid.

7. “US Warns EU.”

8. Bell, “GPS and Galileo.”

9. European Commission, State of Progress, 9.

10. Divis, “This Is War,” 13.

11. European Commission, State of Progress, 13.

12. Karner, interview (see chap. 2, n. 3).

13. de Selding, “Europe Concedes to US,” 3.

14. Karner, interview.

15. Ibid.; and Divis, “This Is War,” 13.

16. Karner, interview.

17. European Commission, State of Progress, 33.

18. Bell, “GPS and Galileo.”

19. “USA to Fall behind Europe.”

20. European Commission, State of Progress, 8.

21. Bell, “GPS and Galileo.”

22. European Commission, State of Progress, 33.

23. Taverna, “Europe Declares Satnav Independence,” 24.

24. European Commission, State of Progress, 33–34.

25. Ibid., 34.

26. “Galileo Progress.”

27. European Commission, State of Progress, 14.

28. “China Joins EU Space Program.”

29. Lamoureux, “Opening of EU-China Negotiations.”

30. Buck and Dempsey, “China to Join EU’s Galileo.”

31. “Galileo Progress.”

32. Taverna, “Europe Declares Satnav Independence,” 24.

33. Taverna and Wall, “Chinese Connection,” 23; and Buck and

Dempsey, “China to Join EU’s Galileo.”

34. “China Joins EU Space Program.”

35. The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, “US

Global Positioning System.”

66

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
36. National Academy of Public Administration, Global Positioning System, 42.

37. Ibid.

38. Divis, “Military Role for Galileo Emerges,” 12.

39. European Commission, “Galileo: An Imperative for Europe,” annex 1, 8.

40. Ibid.

41. National Academy of Public Administration, Global Positioning System, 16.

42. Braibanti and Kim, “GPS-Galileo Negotiations,” slide 8.

43. “U.S. Officials Cite Concerns.”

44. Taverna, “Europe Declares Satnav Independence,” 25.

45. Boucher, “State Department Spokesman on GPS.”

46. “U.S. Officials Cite Concerns.”

47. Boucher, “State Department Spokesman on GPS.”

48. Bureau of Public Affairs, “U.S. Global Positioning System.”

49. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Inception Study, 3.

50. Ibid., 4.

51. PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Galileo Study, Phase II,” 18.

52. Braibanti and Kim, “GPS-Galileo Negotiations,” slide 13. Also, “NTR

is the norm in bilateral trade relationships between countries. Under NTR

both parties agree not to extend to any third party nation any trade preferences that are more favorable than those available under the agreement

concluded between them unless they simultaneously make the same provisions available to each other” (http://www.itds.treas.gov/mfn.html).

53. Karner, interview. Based on her statement that “the bidders for the

concessionaire contract want a guaranteed level of revenue. If they cannot

achieve it from the market, they want the EC to make up any difference.”

54. Sietzen, “Galileo Takes on GPS,” 38–42.

55. European Commission, “Galileo: An Imperative for Europe,” annex 1, 8.

56. Snyder, “Navigating the Pacific Rim,” chap. 10.

57. Lindstrom and Gasparini, Galileo Satellite System, 24.

58. Divis, “Galileo Breaks Free.”

59. Ibid.; and Grant and Keohane, “Europe Needs More Space,” xiv.

60. Braibanti and Kim, “GPS-Galileo Negotiations,” slide 6.

61. “Business: Navigating the Future,” 92.

62. Derse, “U.S. Position on Galileo.”

63. Lachow, “GPS Dilemma,” 141–42.

64. Space Commission, Report of the Commission, xv.

65. “USA to Fall behind Europe.”

66. Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6.

67. Public Papers: Clinton, 803.

68. Foust, “U.S. Air Force Awarded.”

69. Ibid.

70. European Commission, Galileo: Involving Europe, iv; and Yoshida,

“Complex, Costly Galileo,” 1.

71. Singer, “White House Directs Negotiators,” 4.

67

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
72. Dinmore, “Deal Offered in Satellite,” 9.

73. Karner, interview.

74. Knight, “Row over GPS Jamming.”

75. Karner, interview.

76. de Selding, “Frequency Concession Removes Galileo,” 6.

77. Dempsey, “US and EU Poised,” 8.

78. Pace et al., Global Positioning System, 204.

79. Karner, interview.

80. Parkinson, “Capability and Management Issues.”

81. Ibid.

82. Braibanti and Kim, “GPS-Galileo Negotiations,” slide 6.

83. Bialos, “Togetherness on Galileo?” 15.

84. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics,” 157.

85. “Boeing to Upgrade GPS.”

86. European Parliament, Report on the Commission Communication to

the European Parliament, 17.

87. Parkinson, “Capability and Management Issues.”

88. US Department of Transportation, Vulnerability of the Transportation

Infrastructure, 49.

89. Ibid.

90. European Commission, “European Dependence,” technical note, 22.

91. Braibanti and Kim, “GPS-Galileo Negotiations,” slide 11.

92. Pace et al., Global Positioning System, 209.

93. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 162.

94. Parkinson, “Capability and Management Issues.”

95. Braunschvig et al., “Space Diplomacy,” 163.

96. Steven Bayless, program analyst, Office of Navigation Spectrum Policy, Department of Transportation, interview by author, 19 February 2004.

97. Braunschvig et al., 163.

98. Stephens, “Boeing, Lockheed Awarded.”

99. Except augmentations to GPS. See Presidential Decision Directive

NSTC-6.

100. Divis, “GPS III,” 10.

101. Sirak, “Holding the Higher Ground,” 21.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Butler, “GPS Spacecraft Lasting Longer,” 5.

105. A civilian budget would also need to cover expenses addressing the

impact of civil requirements on military requirements.

106. The Air Force transferred control of the DMSP to a joint operational

team comprised of the Air Force and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration in May 1998, but they remained separate systems for many

years.

68

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Abbreviations

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network

BFT blue force tracking

bps bits per second

C/A-code coarse acquisition code

CS Commercial Service

DG-TREN Directorate-General for Energy and Transport

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DOD Department of Defense

DOT Department of Transportation

EC European Commission

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay

Service

ESA European Space Agency

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

EU European Union

GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System

GNSS global navigation satellite system

GOC Galileo Operating Company

GOES Geostationary Operational Earth Satellite

GPS Global Positioning System

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missiles

IGEB Interagency GPS Executive Board

INS inertial navigation systems

INTELSAT International Telecommunication Satellite

Organization

M-code military code

MCS Master Control Station

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NAVWAR navigation warfare 

NSCC navigation system control center

NTR normal trade relations

OAF Operation Allied Force

69
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OS Open Service

OSS orbitography and synchronization stations

P-code precision code

PNT position, navigation, and timing

PPS Precise Positioning Service

PRN pseudorandom noise

PRS Public Regulated Service

SAR Search and Rescue

SLBM submarine launched ballistic missile

SoL Safety-of-Life

SPS Standard Positioning Service

TT&C telemetry, tracking, and commanding

WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System

70

ABBREVIATIONS
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GPS versus Galileo

Balancing for Position in Space

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