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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Command and General Staff College 

Afghanistan Study Group: 

Operational Campaign Plan 

Class 2009-01, Staff Groups 16A and 16B 

100 Stimson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 15 January 2009 Send Comments to Dr. Jack Kem (Jackie.kem@us.army.mil) 
UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Written permission was received for the reproduction of all copyrighted material contained within this report. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................1-5
 

BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................................................... 1
 

PROCESS ............................................................................................................................................................................2-3
 

MISSION STATEMENT ........................................................................................................................................................... 4
 

PLANNING FACTORS ........................................................................................................................................................4-5
 

METHOD ............................................................................................................................................................................... 5
 

COURSE OF ACTION SUMMARY/CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 5
 

STRUCTURE .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
 

BASE REPORT ...................................................................................................................................6
 

CHAPTER 1: RED CELL (ADVERSARY)........................................................................................................................... 6-21
 

SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................................................ 6
 

METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................................................................. 6
 

ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS.....................................................................................................................................6-8
 

THREAT ANALYSIS..................................................................................................................................................... 8-15
 

CONSOLIDATED THREAT CONSTRUCT ...............................................................................................................15-18
 

COURSES OF ACTION.............................................................................................................................................18-20
 

WARGAME ANALYSIS ..........................................................................................................................................20-21
 

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................21
 

REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................21
 

CHAPTER 2: BLUE CELL (COALITION).......................................................................................................................22-54
 

SUMMARY.......................................................................................................................................................................22
 

BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................................................................22
 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................................................22-24
 

PROBLEM FRAMING AND MISSION ANALYSIS........................................................................................................24-27
 

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................................27-50
 

WARGAME ANALYSIS ..............................................................................................................................................50-53
 

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................53
 

REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................................................53-54
 

CHAPTER 3: GREEN CELL (HOST NATION)...............................................................................................................55-64
 

SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................................................55
 

PROBLEM STATEMENT...................................................................................................................................................55
 

ASSUMPTIONS..........................................................................................................................................................55-56
 

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................................................56-57
 

GIROA CONSIDERATIONS....................................................................................................................................57-61
 

CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................61-63
 

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................64
 

REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................65
 

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CHAPTER 4: YELLOW CELL (OUT-OF-THE-BOX) ....................................................................................................66-70
 

PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................................66
 

METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................................................................................................66
 

ISSUE PAPER 1: POPPY CULTIVATION AWARENESS ..............................................................................................66-68
 

ISSUE PAPER 2: ENHANCING PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM EFFECTS................................................68-69
 

ISSUE PAPER 3: INTRODUCTION OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTO THE FATA ...........................................70-71
 

CHAPTER 5: TEAM LEADER SUMMARY .............................................................................................72-82
 

OVERVIEW...............................................................................................................................................................72-74
 

ORGANIZATION......................................................................................................................................................74-76
 

OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................................................76-79
 

TEAM LEADER COMMENTS.....................................................................................................................................79-80
 

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ...............................................................................................................................80-81
 

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................82
 

ANNEX A (WARGAME RESULTS) .............................................................................................. A1-A27
 

ANNEX B (CAMPAIGN PLAN BRIEFING) .....................................................................................B1-B44
 

ANNEX C (AFTER ACTION REVIEW)........................................................................................... C1-C2
 

ANNEX D (POINT OF CONTACT LISTING) .................................................................................. D1-D2
 

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Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

Executive Summary 

Ruins enroute to Darlaman, Afghanistan. 

Background 

For more than 2000 years, the area known today as 

Afghanistan proved to be a formidable region for 

conquering and occupying armies. Since the time of 

Alexander the Great, the high rugged mountains, vast 

deserts, and mountain passes navigable only during 

certain times of the year posed significant challenges 

for logistics and sustainment of military operations. 

Today terrain is not the only challenge. The main 

challenge is the people of Afghanistan, who have a 

history of being warriors and resisting any occupying 

force. 

For most of the history of this region, the territory 

was inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations 

linked to neighboring nations or occupying forces. In 

the 1700s Afghanistan adopted a monarchy. 

However, Afghanistan‘s tribal system continued as the 

local form of power and government. In the early 

1900s Afghanistan fought and won their 

independence from Britain. The monarchy system 

continued up until the 1960s. During this decade, the 

Soviets increased arms and political aligning with the 

Afghani government. 

Afghanistan became unstable in the 1970s when two 

large and growing political groups clashed for control. 

The Communist Party and Islamic movements were 

diametrically opposed to each other. A few coups 

took place in 1978 which ultimately led to the Soviet 

Union sending troops into Afghanistan in 1979. 

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan lasted 10 years. 

Despite superior combat power and resources, the 

Soviets never established control throughout 

Afghanistan. The Islamic militias, known as the 

mujahedin, conducted attacks upon Soviet targets, 

which ultimately led to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. 

After the Soviet‘s departure, a brief civil war allowed 

the Islamic political movement known as the Taliban 

to seize power. 

The Taliban were known supporters of Osama Bin 

Laden and refused to extradite him to the United 

States after the events of September 11, 2001. The 

lack of cooperation with the US government resulted 

in direct military intervention and the collapse of the 

Taliban in 2002. In 2007 and 2008 President Hamid 

Karzai, the Afghanistan President, sought assistance 

from Saudi Arabia to negotiate a peaceful 

reconciliation with the Taliban. In addition, he asked 

for the leader of the Taliban to come forward for 

negotiations without harm. The Taliban leader 

refused, and the reconciliation efforts continue 

without a peaceful resolution. 

Presently, the state of the country remains unstable 

and compartmentalized with little improvement in the 

government and infrastructure. With rising violence 

in 2008, the Commander of the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) asked for an additional 

20,000 troops in Afghanistan. As of January 2009 

there are approximately 40,000 troops contributing 

to ISAF, 14,000 of which are American (Shanker, 10 

January 2009)1

. There exists a fragile balancing act in 

1 Shanker, Thom. International Harold Tribune, 

Pentagon to Propose Increase of US Troop Strength in 

Afghanistan, 10 January 2009. 

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order to determine what strategy will work to bring 

about a stable environment and a reasonably 

representative government for Afghanistan. 

From December 1, 2008 to January 9, 2009, thirtytwo students from Staff Groups 16A and 16B (16A/B) 

at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 

conducted an operational level study in order to 

recommend a course of action for the Afghanistan 

Campaign Plan. For the purpose of this report, the 

study will be referred to as the Afghanistan Study 

Group, also known as the ASG. 

This campaign plan framework considers the 

operational issues faced by ISAF for the next 18 

months and offers an operational level methodology 

to achieving the strategic goals and objectives of the 

new US strategy for Afghanistan. The basis of analysis 

used for this study encompassed the doctrinal joint 

operational planning process in order to sufficiently 

identify the problems in Afghanistan, analyze the 

current situation, and devise possible solutions within 

the very complex operational environment. 

A Herat Elder, Afghanistan 

Process 

Lacking an established template for CGSC staff group 

analysis for contemporary issues, Sections 16A/B 

used a familiar methodology standard to the CGSC 

curriculum – the joint operational planning process. 

Highlights of key facts, assumptions, constraints and 

limitations surrounding this process are listed below: 

(a) Facts. 

(1) The required deliverable is an 

operational level strawman campaign plan to 

support the new US Strategy in Afghanistan. 

(2) The study group focused on 

analyzing three courses of action for the 

employment of three additional US Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) to Afghanistan, to 

include two  ̳surge‘ BCTs. 

(3) The study group was not 

constrained by open source speculation on 

what MNC-A‘s strategy shift might be. 

(4) The analysis methodology 

prescribed for this study is a combination 

modified box/critical events doctrinal 

wargame process. 

(5) Conduct of this study did not 

detract from the academic objectives of the 

AOWC 1 (also known as W100) curriculum. 

The study met the 87 hours of academic 

analysis requirements and the curriculum 

objectives. 

(b) Assumptions. 

(1) The surge deployment will 

consist of two US BCTs by the summer of 

2009. 

(2) Various enemy factions in 

Afghanistan and regional spoilers are rational 

actors despite differing interests. 

(3) The Government of Afghanistan 

will sustain its resolve with respect to the 

shift in the joint US-Afghanistan strategy. 

(c) Constraints & Limitations. 

(1) The study was conducted at the 

unclassified level, using available open source material. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

This allowed International Military Students to 

participate and provide their unique perspectives and 

contributions. 

(2) The study‘s focus is at the 

operational level, not at the strategic/policy level. 

(3) Because the study was 

conducted at the unclassified level, requisite source 

documents limited the campaign planning teams to set 

some arbitrary measures of performance and 

measures of effectiveness to facilitate analysis. 

(4) Strategic objectives and the 

means to accomplish these objectives will be 

determined at the strategic/political level. This study 

focuses on the operational level ways to accomplish 

the strategic ends with the means provided by the 

United States. 

(5) No Afghanistan national or 

interagency representation was available to facilitate 

analysis consistent with Afghanistan cultural norms, 

thinking, and nuances essential to the problem solving 

process. 

(d) Organization of Sections. A total of 

32 CGSC Sections 16A/B students were involved in 

the study, including two international officers. The 

study was facilitated by all five instructors assigned to 

teaching teams 16A/B. In order to prosecute a 

thorough and credible analysis, Sections 16A/B were 

divided into five cells: three cells were dedicated to 

the roles of key actors central to the strategy, one 

cell was dedicated to researching and analyzing a 

menu of solutions outside the conventional military 

thought process, and one cell was charged with 

editorial revision of respective cell reports, analysis 

process recording, final report compilation and public 

relations. A summary of each cell is to follow: 

(1) Red Cell (Adversary): The 

RED Cell conducted research to identify sources 

revealing insurgent groups‘ histories, capabilities, 

requirements, vulnerabilities, objectives, and end 

states in order to allow it to conduct mission analysis 

and course of action development from the 

insurgents‘ perspectives. The RED Cell provided an 

insurgency overview; identification of insurgency 

groups and the interrelationships between groups; a 

review of their capabilities; lines of operation for 

insurgent groups; insurgent group requirements; 

vulnerabilities; most likely courses of action; most 

dangerous courses of action; and target decision 

making. This approach provided an overview of 

potential insurgent group activities to counter the US 

and current Government of Afghanistan efforts to 

secure and stabilize the nation. After initially 

identifying the enemy threat construct in Afghanistan, 

the group further divided into key sub-groups 

consisting of Crime, the Iranian threat, the Taliban, al 

Qaeda, and Splinter Groups. 

(2) Blue Cell (Coalition): The 

BLUE Cell was divided into two teams. Each team‘s 

role was to develop a strawman campaign plan 

consisting of multiple lines of operation supporting 

the ISAF commander‘s strategy to secure and 

stabilize Afghanistan. The plan was broken down into 

phases throughout the deployment of the two surge 

brigades. 

(3) Green Cell (Host Nation): 

The GREEN Cell conducted extensive research into 

the nature and composition of the current 

Afghanistan government. Students gathered 

information from a wide variety of sources in order 

to ascertain the Afghanistan government‘s official 

position on a variety of issues. This process enabled 

the GREEN Cell to identify the Afghanistan 

government‘s top priorities for the next 18 months, 

broken down by the phases governing the analysis. 

The GREEN Cell created lines of operation for each 

priority policy area. Within the constraints listed, the 

GREEN Cell facilitated recommendations and 

simulated the Afghanistan Government perspective to 

assist the BLUE Cell in reconciling their priorities and 

problems with the Afghanistan Government by 

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illustrating the Afghanistan perception of issues and 

actions. 

(4) Yellow Cell (Out-of-theBox): The YELLOW Cell was assigned as the-outof-the box thinkers. This cell was created as a means 

to have an independent and unconstrained creative 

perspective applied to the more traditional 

approaches of the other cells. As such it conducted 

research and analysis of various ideas, past proposals, 

recommendations and thought processes in order to 

develop concepts, ideas, and solutions worth 

considering in the attempt to resolve the dynamic 

problems currently confronting both the United 

States and Afghanistan governments. This cell‘s ideas 

were not intended as stand alone operational level 

courses of action; the intent was that they may be 

tailored into the operational plan to address some of 

the underlying frustrating factors that perpetuate 

instability in Afghanistan. 

(5) Black Cell (Research and 

Publications): The Black Cell provided editorial 

support, overall direction and quality assurance for 

the compilation and completion of all deliverable 

products. It served to integrate and synthesize the 

cells‘ methodologies and dynamics into the final 

report. Additionally the Black Cell worked with the 

CGSC Public Affairs Office (PAO) to maximize 

coordination efforts for the groups‘ strategic 

engagements. 

(e) Resources Used. The CGSC 

Afghanistan Study Group used a number of 

unclassified resources throughout the conduct of the 

study. Much of the background information was 

gleaned from think tank reports, open source links on 

the web, and the perspectives of the section 

students—many of whom are Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) combat veterans. In addition, the International 

Military Students offered valuable insight into the 

thinking of international partners and informed the 

process of differing global perspectives of the 

problem. Specific information resources used are 

cited within their respective chapters of this report. 

Mission Statement 

The identified mission for the US is to determine how 

to employ Coalition Forces before the Fall 2009 

Afghanistan Presidential elections and subsequent 

Afghanistan Parliamentary elections, US and other 

international elections in 2009 and 2010. This is 

paramount in order to influence the Afghan people‘s 

support for the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA). We must assist in 

establishing a secure, stable, and sovereign nation 

capable of providing for the needs of its populace and 

conducting full spectrum operations that will result in 

the disintegration of the insurgency. Key tasks 

include the conduct of Joint Reception, Staging, 

Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) for 

additional US forces, securing population centers, 

developing governmental institutions at the provincial 

level and below, and collaborating with and assisting 

the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

The end state is that the GIRoA is stable and capable 

of self-governing in a safe, secure environment that 

denies safe haven to domestic and foreign extremists 

with security forces that are loyal to the GIRoA, 

viewed as legitimate by the Afghan population and 

capable of planning and operating autonomously. 

Planning Factors 

The ASG considered numerous planning factors. 

Some of these included the US, international and 

Afghani elections within the next two years, the flow 

of additional forces into Afghanistan, additional 

sustainment architecture for surge forces, poor 

existing civilian infrastructure, a multi-faction threat 

(Al-Queada, the Taliban, and outside threats), 

complex terrain, tribal culture and the xenophobic 

nature of the populace, a weak central government, 

porous borders and limited lines of communication 

(LOCs). Also taken into consideration were the 

2006 National Security Strategy Essential Tasks. 

Efforts were made to ensure that we champion 

aspirations for human dignity, strengthen alliances to 

defeat global terrorism, work to prevent attacks 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

against the US and our allies, cooperate with others 

to diffuse regional conflicts, prevent our enemies 

from threatening us, our allies and our friends with 

weapons of mass destruction, and ignite a new era of 

global economic growth through free markets and 

trade. 

Method 

The ASG considered three courses of action (COA) 

consisting of multiple logical lines of operation for the 

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to act 

upon within the next 12-18 months. It conducted 

extensive wargames to determine which COA is best 

for accomplishing the United States‘ objective of 

building a stabilized secure nation and supporting the 

development of a reasonably representative 

government. The evaluation criteria used ensured 

legitimacy, perseverance, freedom of action, restraint 

and transitionability. The group determined that the 

most optimal COA is to focus efforts on building the 

ANSF. Extensive details concerning this 

recommendation are further outlined in this report. 

Course of Action Summary /Conclusion 

The study concluded that success in Afghanistan is 

achievable but is entirely dependent upon 

Afghanistan‘s ability to take responsibility for their 

security. Although the COA teams acknowledged 

this critical fact, they predicated their COAs on 

fundamentally divergent assumptions regarding the 

best way to foster this ability. COA Team 1 focused 

on dislocating the enemy and influencing the 

population using the clear-hold- build and secure 

method to garner influence from the population 

centers (cities) to the rural areas. COA Team 2 

concentrated on dislocating and isolating enemy 

forces across the border by introducing a three-star 

headquarters and re-establishing boundaries. COA 

Team 3 centered their COA on building the 

Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), 

dislocating the enemy, and influencing the populace. 

The wargame revealed that, when analyzed using the 

predetermined evaluation criteria, COA 3 had 

significant advantages over COA 1 and COA 2. The 

most significant advantage is that COA 3 offers 

Afghanistan the long-term stability to govern their 

country and provide security for their own people by 

building an effective ANSF. This success will enable 

Coalition forces to transfer governance, security and 

reconstruction efforts to the Afghan government. 

Structure 

The remainder of this report will provide the detailed 

methodologies, analyses, and conclusions garnered 

through the study. It is self evident that this study 

produced an abundance of detailed information and 

thorough analysis; worthy of documentation in order 

to inform the report‘s consumers. In an effort to 

capture the true value of this study, the remainder of 

the report is organized as follows: 

Chapter 1: Red Cell (Adversary) 

Chapter 2: Blue Cell (Coalition) 

Chapter 3: Green Cell (Host Nation) 

Chapter 4: Yellow Cell (Out-of-the-Box) 

Chapter 5: Team Leader Summary 

ANNEXES: 

A – Wargaming Results 

B – Campaign Plan Briefing 

C – Study Group After Action Report 

D – Study Group Point of Contact Listing 

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Chapter 1: Red Cell (Adversary) 

Heart Independence Parade, Afghanistan. 

Summary 

This chapter articulates the multiple threats and 

agents operating within Afghanistan. It identifies, 

through deliberate methodology, the complexity and 

diversity of what is RED. By nature, decentralized 

and amorphous, RED elements within Afghanistan 

consist of a broad range of actors, each with their 

own centers of gravity but with a common end state 

ranging from splinter cells, criminal warlords, ―rogue‖ 

ISI, Iran, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Elements of RED 

interact and either coordinate or support through a 

loose network void of traditional concepts of 

command and control. The collective RED end state 

coalesces over the desire to eliminate western 

influence in the region, and form a conservative 

Islamic-based government. Additionally, elements 

identified as ―rogue‖ ISI desire the maintenance of 

secrecy in their efforts. Finally, Iranian interests are 

associated with their desire to achieve strategic depth 

against Western (US) influences. This chapter will 

explain the methodology used in analysis, a 

description of the environment and its affect, a 

detailed delineation of the threat, likely and 

dangerous courses of action and the RED perspective 

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results of wargaming. At conclusion, this chapter 

provides a concise examination of the context of the 

Afghanistan problem and both the complexity and 

dynamics associated with any proposed solution. 

Methodology 

The primary task for the RED cell was to develop a 

feasible threat model and develop courses of action 

for wargaming utilizing unclassified sources. The Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) 

Process formed the basis for developing the threat 

model. The JIPB process‘s four steps, Define the 

Battlespace Environment, Describe the Battlespace‘s 

Effects, Evaluate the Adversary, and Determine 

Adversary Courses of Action provided an effective 

tool for conducting the project. In order to develop 

a single RED threat model, the team conducted 

Center of Gravity (CoG) analysis for six threat 

elements. Analysis of these elements, consisting of 

the Taliban, Iran, Crime, al Qaeda, Rogue ISI 

(Pakistan‘s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate) and 

Splinter Groups; identified supporting and 

coordinating relationships as well as their individual 

CoGs, Critical Capabilities (CC), Critical 

Requirements (CR) and Critical Vulnerabilities (CV). 

A thorough comparison of all of these individual 

elements enabled the team to develop a consolidated 

RED construct with corresponding CoG, CCs, CRs, 

and CVs. This consolidated RED construct was used 

to develop lines of operation (LOOs) directed at 

attacking the perceived BLUE CoG of Western 

Resolve. The LOO analysis transitioned to specific 

RED Courses of Action (COA) focused on a long 

term war of attrition and fracturing the BLUE 

Coalition. The RED Team wargamed the two COAs 

with the team leader presenting the RED scheme of 

maneuver in the form of Task and Purpose with the 

remaining team members following with specific 

details from each RED Line of Operation. 

Environment and Effects 

Weather. The Afghanistan region consists 

predominately of arid geography. There are regions 

in the North and Northeast that contain areas with 

large forestation and ample rainfall. Annual 

precipitation is less than three inches in the 

southwest and greater than 50 inches in Hindu-Kush 
 

 

 

 

 

 

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Mountains – causing potential for flooding of trails 

and roads in the spring. From November through 

April trafficability along the lines of communication 

(LOCs) is reduced due to closure of mountain passes 

to Pakistan. Severe cloud cover occurs from 

December to April and moderate blowing of sand 

occurs for approximately 120 days from May to 

October, impacting Coalition Air Operations. 

Terrain. In general, Afghanistan is about the size of 

Texas and divided into three Regions: the Northern 

Plains, the Central Highlands, and the Southwestern 

Plateau. Two-thirds of the country consists of rugged 

mountains, the other third consists of high elevation, 

arid plains. Mountain peak extremes reach 

approximately 7300 meters in the Northeast and the 

abundant high ground channelizes Coalition aircraft. 

Restrictive mountain terrain has compartmentalized 

the local population and provides them with a ―home 

field‖ advantage for movement and intelligence. The 

limited roads and their poor condition increases 

Coalition movement time, in addition to increasing 

route predictability of Coalition forces. 

Population. Afghanistan has approximately 32 million 

people with most living around the major cities of 

Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and 

Khowst. The population outside the cities is very 

isolated and the infrastructure is very immature. The 

population is approximately 84% Hanafi Sunni and 

15% Ismaili Shi‘a Muslim. The literacy rate is 31.5%. 

The main ethnic group is Pashtun 42% and the 

minority groups are Tajiks 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbeks 

9%, and 13% other. 

Culture. The major tribes of Afghanistan are Pashtun, million in Pakistan. They speak Pashtu, live by the 

Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek. There are approximately code of Pushtunwali and ruled Afghanistan from 1747 

24 million Pashtuns, 10 million in Afghanistan and 14 to 1992. The Tajiks are the second largest tribe in 

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Afghanistan and have a population of 4.3 million. 

They speak Dari and have never ruled Afghanistan. 

The Hazaras inhabit central Afghanistan in the area 

known as Hazarajat. They are mongoloid, possibly 

mixed with Turkic people and speak Hazaragi. They 

are considered to be the lowest social class. The 

Uzbek tribe has approximately 1.3 million people and 

live mingled with the Tajiks. They speak Uzbeki and 

use old tribal names and sometimes the towns they 

come from (Wings of Lightning, 17-19). 

Threat Analysis 

Overview. The RED Cell identified six entities that 

represented major threats to US national objectives 

in Afghanistan. These entities, made up of the 

Taliban, Iran, Crime, al Qaeda, Rogue ISI and Splinter 

Groups (A combination of smaller threat 

organizations), make up the primary elements that 

threaten BLUE objectives and goals within the region. 

While the RED Team identified these groups as the 

primary threat organizations, they do not represent 

all of the complex forces at play in the conflict. The 

team conducted CoG analysis for each group and 

compared and contrasted their individual CoGs, CCs, 

CRs, CVs and endstates in order to develop a 

consolidated threat construct. 

Iran. The government of Iran is a major player in 

Afghanistan from an enemy perspective because it 

shares a long border with Afghanistan, and in recent 

years, has had tensions with that nation. A long 

history of relations between the two countries exists, 

as both were at one time part of the Persian Empire. 

A dialect of Persian (Dari) is one of the two official 

languages of Afghanistan. In addition, one of 

Afghanistan‘s major ethnic groups, the Hazara, is 

Shiite Muslim, as are most Iranians. 

Following the rise of the Taliban in 1998, tensions 

between Iran and Afghanistan increased. The 

Taliban‘s Sunni extremist regime was perceived as 

being harsh on Shiite elements within Afghanistan, 

and at one point, Iran threatened to invade 

Afghanistan. Since the overthrow of the Taliban in 

2001, however, Iran has developed closer relations 

with the new Afghan government. Trade, energy, 

investment, and scientific projects have increased 

between Tehran and Kabul, and plans for road and 

rail links between the two nations have been 

developed. The RED Cell believes that Iran will use 

western Afghanistan to gain strategic depth against 

both the United States and the Taliban. Following the 

fall of the Taliban, Iran established economic and 

cultural dominance in Herat Province. Moreover, 

ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran 

make it probable that Iran will actively undermine US 

efforts in Afghanistan. 

The RED Cell conducted strategic CoG analysis on 

Iran. The team believes that Iran will attempt to 

undermine Western influence in the region and 

prevent the US from achieving its political objectives 

in Afghanistan in order to maintain strategic depth on 

its eastern border. The team also believes that Iran 

will attempt to extend its influence in Afghanistan in 

order to protect Afghanistan‘s Shiite minority and 

prevent the Taliban from taking control. At the same 

time, we believe that Iran considers Afghanistan to be 

a hedge against a possible US and Israeli strike against 

its nuclear facilities. According to a March 21, 2007 

article in the International Herald Tribune, Iranian 

intelligence agents have limited contacts with the 

Taliban and have provided money and training to a 

small number of insurgents in Eastern Afghanistan, 

and could use its close relationship with warlords in 

order to undermine US efforts and spread violence in 

the country. 

The RED Cell determined that Iran‘s strategic CoG is 

its Supreme Leader and President. This CoG has the 

critical capability to create a public perception of 

support to the Afghan government, while at the same 

time covertly supporting groups that subvert 

Coalition efforts. The CoG has the critical 

requirements of conducting civil-military and 

information operations in the region, engaging in 

diplomacy with the Afghan government while 

simultaneously supporting anti-government elements, 

and providing significant conventional and nonconventional threats. 

Iran has several critical vulnerabilities. These include 

unpopularity among many of the other RED forces in 

Afghanistan (especially the Taliban); the Shiite 

population in Afghanistan is a small minority, and the 

growing opium problem that exists over the IranianAfghan border. Coalition forces should attempt to 

exploit these vulnerabilities wherever possible in 

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order to undermine Iranian efforts that might be attempt to retain an element of plausible deniability in 

adverse to BLUE forces. At the same time, Iran will most of its anti-Coalition operations. 

The Taliban. 

The Taliban, translated as ―students‖, is a Sunni 

Islamist movement that became active in September 

1994 in the fight against the Soviet Occupation of 

Afghanistan. Between October and November 1994, 

they marched from Maiwand in southern Afghanistan 

to capture Kandahar City and the surrounding 

provinces, losing only a few dozen men. (Rashid 2000, 

27-9) The fighting continued over the next two years 

and by September 1996 the Taliban controlled 

roughly one-third of the country to include Kandahar 

and Kabul. Leaders from this Pashtun movement 

would largely govern Afghanistan from 1996 until 

2001 when they were removed from power by the 

Northern Alliance and NATO forces. Since that 

time, the Taliban has regrouped and led an insurgency 

using guerrilla tactics against the central government 

and Coalition forces. In 2008, it is estimated that the 

insurgent force facing the Afghan and Coalition forces 

has a strength of between 7,000 to 11,000 fighters2 

Sustainment of the movement has largely been based 

on ideological acceptance by the Pashtun majority 

(CIA World Fact Book 2004), freedom of movement 

and action in the Federally Administered Tribal Area 

(FATA), and the ability to maintain or ―fund‖ the 

insurgency. 

2 9/11 seven years later: US  ̳safe,‘ South Asia in 

turmoil. ―There are now some 62,000 foreign 

soldiers in Afghanistan, including 34,000 US troops, 

and some 150,000 Afghan security forces. They face 

an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 insurgents, according to 

US commanders.”

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

The purpose of the Taliban movement is to restore 

Afghanistan to the time of the Prophet. As a Pashtun 

movement where the majority of the population is 

Sunni Islamist, these ideas are consistent with their 

basic religious beliefs, giving the Taliban a sympathetic 

base of support in the population. In developing such 

an environment, the Taliban staunchly opposes 

politics and political parties and supports a strict 

interpretation of Sharia Law banning a wide array of 

activities which were previously deemed lawful in 

Afghanistan. These activities include employment, 

education and sports for women; movies, television, 

videos, music, dancing, hanging pictures in homes, 

clapping during sporting events, kite flying, and beard 

trimming. The Taliban used their ―religious police‖ as 

the means for enforcing moral behavior. Punishments 

included amputations, public executions, stoning 

individuals to death, and beatings with sticks. These 

rigid rules were applied based on the idea that 

―Western activities‖ prevented followers from 

clearing their minds to study Islam. 

Following the ousting by the Northern Alliance and 

NATO Forces in 2001, the Taliban largely withdrew 

to the FATA in Pakistan, seeking a sanctuary to 

organize, train, and equip their insurgency. The 

FATA lies within what is known as the Pashtun Belt. 

The Pashtun Belt, a geo-ethnic zone, extends from 

Pakistan‘s Northwest Frontier through southeastern 

Afghanistan to the Iranian border and is the area of 

the highest concentration of Pashtuns. Due to the 

location of the FATA within Pakistan, Coalition and 

Afghan forces have been limited in their ability to 

influence the area. The government and military of 

Pakistan has historically focused on the long-term 

conflict with India and done relatively little to 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

influence the domestic situation in the FATA, thereby 

providing the Taliban both freedom of movement and 

action in this sanctuary. 

The Taliban has used the poppy trade to exert 

control over local populations and fund the 

insurgency. As of 2008, 26 of Afghanistan‘s 34 

provinces had less than 3,000 hectares of cultivation 

according to the UNODC Opium Rapid Assessment 

Survey; southwestern Afghanistan remains an area of 

significant poppy cultivation. The majority of the 

world‘s opium supply comes from southwest 

Afghanistan. Local control of the opium trade allows 

the Taliban to economically control populations in 

poppy producing areas. The poppy trade accounts 

for approximately 40% of Taliban funding. The 

Government of Afghanistan has been unable to offer 

an economic alternative to poppy farming. 

Al Qaeda. 

Al Qaeda is a global network of common-minded 

―jihadist‖ terrorists. The leadership, generation 

forces, and key command and control elements 

enjoyed freedom of action (sanctuary) in Afghanistan 

under the facilitating protection of the Taliban 

government. Al Qaeda‘s sanctuary in Afghanistan is 

the primary reason for the US and Western presence 

there. 

With the toppling of the Taliban government by 

Coalition forces in late 2001, the leadership of al 

Qaeda moved to largely ungoverned and sympathetic 

areas of the FATA in neighboring western Pakistan. 

The relocation to the Pakistani sanctuary has 

significantly reduced the global network‘s influence 

within Afghanistan. However, al Qaeda continues to 

wield influence with the Taliban, the larger threat to 

Coalition Forces. 

The operational center of gravity for al Qaeda in from local insurgents and the general population. 

Afghanistan remains the ability to generate support This is significantly different than the organization‘s 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

strategic center of gravity which the team identified 

as al Qaeda‘s senior leadership. Critical capabilities 

include: ideology/theology, financing, assimilation 

with local insurgents, and the conduct of spectacular 

attacks. 

In order to conduct operations against coalition 

efforts (both kinetic and humanitarian), al Qaeda 

must be able to influence the local population with 

their ideology/theology. They do this by exploiting 

local poverty, oppression and xenophobia. Al Qaeda 

ideology provides religious fervor and moral force to 

its members and supporters. This translates to 

fanaticism among its members and a willingness to 

seek martyrdom through suicide operations. The al 

Qaeda philosophy must be powerful enough to 

convince followers to willingly commit suicide and 

purposely murder civilians. 

Al Qaeda must retain the ability to finance terrorist 

operations globally. Funding sources range from 

opium sales to large donations from an international 

populace sympathetic to the movement. The current 

financial network of al Qaeda continues to provide 

sufficient financial support to operations around the 

world. Decentralized, elaborate, or safeguarded by 

sympathetic governments, these financial means 

remain well protected against Coalition efforts. 

As a global network, al Qaeda must also have the 

ability to assimilate regional terrorist organizations. 

These decentralized groups often coalesce with 

common purposes, methods, and philosophy, or 

through the leveraging of financial resources. This 

capacity enhances the complexity of the problem 

associated with targeting and neutralizing the 

network. Al Qaeda continues to find sympathizers 

and active supporters of its terrorist activities. 

The most dangerous critical capability of al Qaeda is 

their ability to influence, conduct, and exploit largescale spectacular attacks internationally. Timelines 

for planning and execution of these attacks can 

extend over long periods of time, with potentially 

years spanning between operations. This 

deliberation, patience, and meticulous nature provide 

exceptional complexity for US national security 

personnel. 

In order to be effective and relevant, al Qaeda 

require several key components including: popular 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 12 

support for their cause; Salafi (predecessors) vision of 

Sunni Islam (puritanical); decentralized cell structure 

with global flexibility; safe haven to plan, train and 

command and control; successful strategic 

communication opportunities; galvanizing ideology; 

and effective leadership. 

Analysis of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and neighboring 

Pakistan enumerated two potential vulnerabilities. 

First and foremost is the perception of consanguinity3 

and affinity of ideology. Moderate Muslims continue 

to make headway against the puritanical theories, 

chipping away at the fallacies associated with the 

partitioning writings and teachings of Al Wahhab 

(Wahhabism) by providing counter theology of 

tolerance associated with more acceptable principles 

of Islam. If puritanical Muslims associated with al 

Qaeda can be construed as ―fanatical‖ to followers of 

Islam, they can potentially be marginalized to the 

fringe of the general Muslim population. 

A second potential vulnerability of al Qaeda centers 

on the violent nature of their current operations. 

The level of violence achieved, especially in regards to 

non-combatant (innocent) death, provides the avenue 

to portray, through information and psychological 

operations, that the movement‘s ideals are neither 

benevolent, nor desirable. The network‘s 

documented brutality provides the US and Coalition 

partners an opportunity to convince Muslim 

populations that al Qaeda‘s actions are both 

illegitimate and immoral. 

Al Qaeda continues to provide the single greatest 

adversarial threat within the current global 

community. However, al Qaeda, though clearly 

supportive and genuinely interested in operations in 

Afghanistan, is no longer clearly tied to it for 

existence. Afghanistan provides another nation or 

theater of operations in its existential struggle against 

countering influences to their conservative Islamic 

philosophy. 

3 A relationship by descent from a common 

ancestor; kinship 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Rogue ISI. 

Pakistan‘s Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence 

(or ISI) is a joint military entity within the Pakistani 

intelligence community charged with coordinating 

intelligence efforts between the various branches of 

the Pakistani military. The RED Cell believes that 

various Rogue ISI agents and leaders could constitute 

a threat, insofar as they may attempt to use various 

Islamist and insurgent elements in Afghanistan to gain 

strategic depth against India. Rogue ISI personnel 

may also work to ensure that Pakistan‘s influence in 

the region remains greater than that of Pakistan‘s 

enemies. 

During the mid-1990s, the ISI became involved in 

support for the Taliban in their struggles against 

various Afghan warlords. The Taliban‘s ascent to 

power was, to a degree, the culmination of ISI efforts 

over the previous several years. Since 9/11, Pakistan 

has largely cooperated with the US led coalition in 

Afghanistan, and supported the Northern Alliance. 

However, the ISI has also been accused of supporting 

various Islamist operations in the region. According 

to a June 26, 2008 New York Times article, Afghan 

intelligence officials reportedly believe that the ISI was 

involved in a failed assassination attempt against 

Afghan President Hamid Karzai during an April 2008 

parade in Kabul. ISI agents have also been accused of 

involvement in recent terrorist shootings in Mumbai, 

India involving Islamic extremists. 

While Pakistan remains a US ally in Afghanistan, and 

the ISI is a branch of Pakistan‘s military, the RED Cell 

believes that various Rogue ISI elements could 

undermine Coalition efforts in Afghanistan in order 

to provide strategic depth versus India. This could 

involve funding and training operatives from various 

Islamist groups to conduct attacks within India itself, 

as well as training Islamist forces in disputed Kashmir. 

Such operations might provoke an Indian reaction 

that could force Pakistan to commit additional troops 

to the Indian border regions. This would likely 

require Pakistan to remove forces from the FATA, 

thereby weakening efforts to combat Taliban and alQaeda insurgents there. 

The RED Cell CoG analysis of the Rogue ISI 

determined their strategic center of gravity to be 

Rogue ISI leaders. These leaders have the critical 

capability to reduce Indian influence in the region, 

strengthen Pakistan‘s position in the region, and to 

undermine allied efforts by supporting terrorist 

attacks that would withdraw Pakistani forces from 

critical Afghan border areas. They have the critical 

requirements of secrecy, funding, sympathetic 

recruits, a good communication network, and lack of 

centralized control that permits them to operate 

independently of the government. 

The Rogue ISI‘s critical vulnerabilities include the 

possibility of operational overreach, increased 

government oversight, the ability of other nations to 

track financial exchanges, and exposure via employee 

screening. Coalition forces should focus on these 

vulnerabilities in an attempt to undermine any 

operations that could negatively affect Coalition 

efforts in Afghanistan. The Rogue ISI‘s desired end 

state of strategic depth against India, combined with 

plausible deniability, must not be permitted to 

hamper efforts to defeat insurgent forces. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Splinter Groups. 

In defining the RED THREAT construct the RED Cell 

batched several of the ―Lesser Afghan Players‖ and 

collectively labeled them as Splinter Cells. This is not 

intended to address the scope of the individual 

organizations internationally but in regards to their 

level of activity and role in Afghanistan. Specifically, 

the label Splinter Cells consists of Hezb-I Islami 

Gulbuddin (HIG), Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (HIK), Lashkare-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). 

Similar to the Taliban most of these groups gained 

notoriety with the populace through their fight 

against foreigners. LeT and JEM have sought to 

separate Kashmir from Indian control while the HIG 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 14 

and HIK have fought foreign influence in their 

respective areas of Afghanistan. While LeT and JEM 

have predominately been players in the struggle 

between Pakistan and India, it is believed that there is 

some cooperation with the Taliban and other 

insurgent groups, at least in training. These groups 

have historically utilized terrorist attacks like suicide 

bombing to influence the populace and political 

situation. While these groups individually have 

various motivations for their fight and who they are 

allegiant too, their end state appears to be 

independence from foreign influence and Islamic Rule 

in lieu of Western-style political systems. 
 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Threat Comparison. 

The RED Cell compared and contrasted each entity 

and recorded the results in the synchronization 

matrix. This matrix further enabled the team to 

identify supporting and coordinating relationships 

between these groups as well as providing the basis 

for a common CoG analysis. The comparison matrix 

may also serve as a reference for planners in 

identifying fissures between disparate threat entities 

that the BLUE force may exploit in the future. 

Consolidated Threat Construct 

Consolidated Threat Construct. 

Developing a consolidated RED threat construct 

required the team to use common aspects identified 

during comparison of the six individual threats to 

develop a common problem statement, CoG, and 

conduct corresponding CoG and lines of operation 

analysis. The construct depicted below became the 

primary tool in visualizing the threat forces that 

would make up the RED forces during CoG analysis, 

course of action development and wargaming. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Once the team developed the threat construct, it 

developed the following problem statement to 

address the unified goals of the RED forces: 

How to establish conservative Islamist rule in 

Afghanistan while eliminating Western influence 

before the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA) /coalition gains the 

support of the Afghan people. 

This statement represents the RED unity of resolve 

to remove Western influence and establish Islamist 

rule within Afghanistan. It is important to note that 

this unity does not equate to the BLUE concept of 

Unity of Command, as the relationships within the 

threat model are limited to coordination and support. 

Following the development of the construct and 

problem statement, the RED Cell identified a dual 

Center of Gravity for the consolidated RED Forces 

and continued with a CoG Analysis. The 

consolidated threat model used the combined RED 

Center of Gravity of AFGHAN POPULATION / 

LEADERSHIP due to the importance of those 

elements to all elements within the construct. 

Consolidated CoG analysis used Critical Capabilities, 

Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities and 

the common End state found in common between 

the elements of the consolidated threat model. 

Linkages between the CCs, CRs, and CVs identified 

critical elements highlighted in blue text. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Based on the RED construct‘s unity of resolve, 

problem statement and common critical capabilities, 

requirements and vulnerabilities, the team 

determined threat Lines of Operation in order to 

achieve their desired end state. Analysis of the 

consolidated RED Lines of Operation (LOO) resulted 

in the development of a model which showed the 

RED LOOs extending from the threat Center of 

Gravity (RED ellipse) towards desired conditions 

(GREEN ellipses) attacking the perceived BLUE force 

Center of Gravity of Western Resolve (BLUE ellipse). 

Defeat and support mechanisms as well as specific 

objectives (YELLOW boxes) for each LOO were also 

identified. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Courses of Action 

COA 1 War of Attrition (Most Likely). 

In development of the MLCOA Sketch, the RED Cell 

attempted to visually depict the three areas that we 

see as key to the RED ability to conduct a war of 

attrition against the Coalition Forces (CF) and 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA). We overlaid the Pashtun Belt which 

extends from the Northwest Frontier Province in 

Pakistan through the southeastern Afghanistan to 

Iran, allowing RED a sympathetic populace along their 

main LOCs from the sanctuary in the Federally 

Administered Tribal Area (FATA) to the poppy 

cultivation areas in SW Afghanistan. The FATA‘s 

isolating terrain, lack of governance on the part of 

Pakistan, and continued controversy over CF 

operations in the FATA will likely continue to allow 

RED adequate training areas for future attacks. 

The cell also examined the historical operational 

tempo of RED and developed an annual battle rhythm 

with two distinct phases; Preparation Phase from 

November to April and a Fighting Season Phase that 

lasts from April to November. In our view, RED‘s 

Fighting Season Phase is categorized by a main effort 

(ME) being weighted toward offensive actions against 

Security and Development Forces; a supporting effort 

(SE) of attacking CF LOC‘s and continuous 

harassment with improvised explosive devices and 

indirect fire. In the Preparation Phase, the SE remains 

unchanged from the Fighting Season Phase but the ME 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

shifts to focus on growing and building for the next 

fighting season. The Preparation Phase ME can be 

categorized by extensive training in the FATA and 

maintenance of caches. 

COA 2 Fracture The Coalition (Most 

Dangerous). 

Course of Action Two is the RED Most Dangerous 

Course of Action (MDCOA). It involves a 

coordinated and phased offensive against Coalition 

partners, synchronized with domestic political 

elections, in an effort to fracture the Coalition. 

For a graphical description of this course of action, 

see the chart below: 

The offensive consists of four phases. The first 

phase involves a series of attacks against German 

Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and civilian targets 

in Germany, designed to coincide with the 2009 

German elections. The purpose of these attacks is 

to influence the outcome of the German elections 

and prompt a German withdrawal from the 

Coalition. Once Germany, a major coalition 

partner, is eliminated, other coalition partners might 

also re-think their roles in Afghanistan and also 

consider withdrawal. 

The second phase involves a series of attacks in RCWest against Italian and Spanish forces. The attacks 

will be planned around Christmas in order to have 

religious significance in these predominately Roman 

Catholic countries. The purpose of these attacks is 

to influence domestic public opinion in order to 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

force a Spanish and Italian withdrawal from the 

Coalition. 

The third phase involves a series of attacks in RCSouth with the purpose of weakening the resolve of 

UK, Australian, and Canadian forces. Public opinion 

in Canada for the Afghan War effort has been 

declining, and the prospect of additional Canadian 

casualties may force their people and government to 

consider withdrawal. The attacks may negatively 

impact the public opinion of the British and 

Australian people as well. 

The final phase of the offensive will be a massive 

terrorist attack at the Port of Karachi, with the 

purpose of damaging US supplies at the SPOD, 

thereby forcing Pakistan to reconsider its role in 

supporting the Coalition effort. Ideally, the coalition 

forces will be deterred from using Pakistan as its 

primary supply route and will be forced to use 

longer and more expensive supply routes in the 

North. It will also show the people of Pakistan how 

vulnerable their nation is to terrorist attacks as a 

consequence of supporting the Coalition and force 

the Pakistani government to withdraw coalition 

support. 

Wargame Analysis 

The RED Cell wargamed the RED Most Likely 

Course of Action against all three friendly courses of 

action, and recorded their results on 

synchronization matrices. Each wargame followed a 

series of critical events. The Most Likely Course 

of Action (War of Attrition) involves steady state 

operations of the sort seen in Afghanistan since the 

Soviet invasion in 1979. Attacks will utilize Taliban 

and other insurgent forces focused on RC-South and 

East, and will attempt to overrun FOBs. Additional 

attacks will target polling centers with the purpose 

of de-legitimizing the election process, erode 

support for the Afghan government by portraying 

the existing Afghan government as incapable of 

protecting the people and its polling stations, and 

also attack ANSF secured areas to exploit their lack 

of capacity and ruin their legitimacy. It is important 

to note that these types of operations have been in 

progress for years and have slowly eroded support 

for Coalition efforts in several countries. RED 

forces have already proven that they can conduct 

them over an extended period, and will use the 

FATA as their staging and training base. The 

fundamentals of this course of action vary little 

overall when wargamed against the different friendly 

courses of action. Operations will capitalize on soft, 

high-payoff targets. 

The Most Dangerous Course of Action, as described 

previously, will involve a major RED offensive with 

the goal of fracturing the coalition. The attacks will 

focus on coalition members, particularly Germany, 

that are perceived as being vulnerable to shifts in 

public opinion at home. Information operations will 

focus on portraying the coalition as weak, thus 

encouraging them to support the insurgents as an 

alternative. The campaign will attempt to capitalize 

on Western war fatigue, and hopefully improve 

insurgent recruiting by showing RED Forces as being 

capable of conducting spectacular attacks, and 

providing evidence of possible REDFOR victory. We 

wargamed our Most Dangerous Course of Action 

against Friendly COA 2. The following bullets 

provide an overview. 

Summary: Strategic focus on fracturing 

coalition-targeting individual coalition members 

at times of political vulnerability; Incidents in 

Area 1 designed to force Germany out of 

coalition; Germany‘s resolve proves to be too 

strong and sustains them through the attack. 

No L-T impact. 

Task Organization: Wider Employment of alQaeda elements; al-Qaeda centric 

Scheme of Maneuver: Spectacular attack in 

Germany; Kinetic operations in RC-North 

against German forces. 

Defeat/Stability Mechanism: 

Isolate/Disintegrate 

Red Lines of Operation (LOO): 

o	 Undermine West: Capitalize on 

Western war fatigue. 

o	 Increase Popular Support: Portray 

Afghan government as ineffective in 

maintaining security. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

o	 Sustainability: Spectacular attacks 

improve recruiting efforts; no change 

to logistics or sanctuary. 

o	 Information Ops: Attacks in 

Germany affect IO campaign; force 

Western nations to focus on local 

Muslim communities. 

o	 Destabilize GIRoA: Exploit increased 

violence, taking advantage of 

perception that Afghan government is 

ineffective at preventing it. 

The RED Cell identified that the MDCOA is a very 

high-risk operation, one that could have the 

unintended result of strengthening German resolve, 

and forcing them to become even more involved in 

Afghanistan. In the end, our study group adjudicated 

that this COA would NOT have the desired effect 

of forcing Germany out of the coalition. For this 

reason, we believe that our Most Likely Course of 

Action is the one that the RED Forces will pursue, as 

it has already proven to be feasible, and has been 

effective in weakening some aspects of the allied 

effort. 

Branches and Sequels 

Two major branches and sequels resulted from the 

wargaming process. The first involved the possible 

BLUE Force development of an alternate supply line 

through the Caucasus via Georgia, Azerbaijan, and 

Turkmenistan. In the event that the Coalition 

develops such a supply line, the RED Forces intend 

to use sympathetic Islamists in neighboring Chechnya 

to stage a major terrorist attack on rail lines in 

Georgia carrying coalition materiel. The purposes of 

the attacks will be to cause public opinion in the 

countries involved in the new supply line to turn 

against their governments and force them to 

withdraw their support from the Coalition. Success 

in such an operation would result in Coalition supply 

lines being even further strained than they currently 

are. 

The second major branch involved a possible 

German withdrawal from the Coalition. The loss of 

one of the largest Coalition partners would force 

the other Coalition members, most likely the United 

States, to send additional forces to RC-North in 

order to fill the void left by the Germans. If the 

Coalition is forced to shift these forces from 

southern and eastern Afghanistan in order to fill this 

void, it gives RED greater freedom of movement in 

those regions and improves their chances for 

success there. If other nations in the coalition are 

forced to deploy additional troops to that South and 

East to fill the void, then public opinion in the 

countries providing the additional forces could turn 

negative. 

Conclusion 

The RED Cell developed a thorough assessment of 

the enemy threat by using the Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlefield process and the 

elements of campaign design found in Joint 

Publication 5-0. The cell developed a consolidated 

construct to visualize the ―enemy‖ and assessed 

their centers of gravity including critical capabilities, 

requirements, and vulnerabilities. RED Cell research 

assisted in the development of BLUE courses of 

action and effective wargaming. While conducted 

with purely unclassified sources, the report 

nevertheless provides substantial information about 

this complex problem and how the enemy may 

attempt to achieve their objectives. The cell 

intended to provide a comprehensive analysis 

representative of the dynamic threat in Afghanistan. 

References 

Bureau of Intelligence Research. International 

Boundary Research, 

http://74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:QIjcvintlDUJ:w 

ww.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/IBS006 

.pdf+Boundary+between+Afghanistan+and+Iran&hl= 

en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (Accessed 19 Dec 2008). 

CIA World Factbook, 2004. 

Rashid, Taliban, 2000. 

Wings of Lightning, 25th ID. Afghanistan AOR 

Unclassified Presentation. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

Chapter 2: Blue Cell (Coalition) 

Summary 

The following report offers an alternative campaign 

plan for consideration by ISAF for the next eighteen 

months and beyond. This chapter summarizes the 

procedures and findings of the BLUE Cell, which 

developed this plan from the perspective of the ISAF 

J-3/J-5. The recommendations herein are based on 

an open-source analysis of the problems currently 

confronting Afghanistan and ISAF. 

Background 

Afghanistan is an area about the size of Texas and is 

divided into three regions: the Northern Plains, the 

Central Highlands, and the Southwestern Plateau. 

Afghanistan is a country of extremes with very arid 

desert areas and mountains in the northeast up to 

7300 meters. The terrain alone poses a significant 

challenge to maneuver and line of sight, isolating 

regions and areas from one another and channeling 

movement. Weather presents additional obstacles 

for air operations, and travel in mountainous areas is 

hindered from November through April. Combined 

with the immature infrastructure - sometimes 

described as 17th century - Afghanistan is a 

forbidding place for military operations. Afghanistan 

is a cultural and economic crossroads between south 

and southeast Asia and the Middle East. Many 

empires sought control of the area including the 

Greeks, British and Russians, yet all ultimately failed. 

Afghanistan‘s border doesn‘t reflect a true nation. 

The border encloses a loose collection of tribes, not 

all of which agree. In many cases, tribal loyalty 

with Pakistan divides one of the largest ethnic groups 

in the region, the Pashtuns. A similar situation exists 

on the western and northern borders, Iran and 

Tajikistan respectively, though with much smaller 

ethnic groups affected. As a result of the terrain, the 

country consists of relatively isolated areas and 

ethnic groups that speak multiple dialects and have 

different cultural norms. 

Outside of Afghanistan, regional neighbors seek their 

own interests - often at odds with US and ISAF 

interests. Additionally, the US operates in 

cooperation with coalition partners each with their 

own levels of commitment, and influences from 

domestic and international public opinion. 

Permission received from Mr. Mastafa Rasuli to 

reproduce photograph, 8 January 2009. 

Research Methodology 

This section provides an overview of the BLUE cell‘s 

composition and the methodology used for this 

study. Additional details concerning specific steps of 

the joint operations planning process are included in 

subsequent sections of this chapter. 

The BLUE cell consisted of ten Intermediate Level 

Education (ILE) officers and two faculty members 

from Sections 16A and 16B. Within the BLUE cell, 

transcends any sense of true nationalism. The border there was one Air Force officer (with intelligence 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 22 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

background) and nine US Army officers from the 

following branches; AR, FA, LG, AV, EN. The faculty 

consisted of two retired Army officers. Some BLUE 

cell officers had prior Afghanistan / Iraq experience. 

At the outset of the study, the assigned faculty 

provided an information brief that helped ―frame‖ 

the problem and develop a common operating 

picture. The faculty advisors also appointed one 

student as the ―J-5‖ with the first major task of 

organizing the BLUE cell. 

As a starting point, the J-5 divided the BLUE cell into 

two teams that answered a series of problem 

framing questions outlined in TRADOC PAM 525- 5-

500 (The Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign 

Design). This effort yielded the problem statement 

contained in the Problem Framing and Mission 

Analysis Section of the present report. 

The two groups were maintained for mission analysis 

with one group focused on determining facts, 

assumptions, specified and implied tasks, and 

constraints by warfighting function. The second 

group conducted the BLUE center of gravity analysis 

and developed the BLUEFOR lines of operation. As 

a basis for mission analysis, these groups referenced: 

the 2006 National Security Strategy; the 2008 National 

Defense Strategy; the 2004 National Military Strategy 

Objectives; the 2006 Declaration by NATO; and the 

Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA), the CENTCOM and ISAF mission 

statements. Additionally, the BLUE cell referenced 

some recent interview comments by GEN David 

Petraeus (Commander, USCENTCOM) and also an 

article written by LTG William Caldwell 

(Commander, Combined Arms Center and Fort 

Leavenworth). 

After conducting mission analysis by war fighting 

function, the team developed six logical lines of 

operation (LLOOs): (1) Information Operations, (2) 

Support to Governance, (3) Security and Combat 

Operations, (4) Reconciliation, (5) Infrastructure 

Forces. LLOOs, and their associated objectives, are 

discussed in detail in the Problem Framing and 

Mission Analysis Section of this report. 

Each day began with a short meeting among all 

personnel in each of the Afghanistan Study Group 

cells. These meetings were a forum to disseminate 

information and allow each of the cells to give a brief 

update for the daily focus. Within the BLUE cell, a 

key leader meeting was conducted about half-way 

through the day in order to provide the J-5 with an 

update and to preview information that was going to 

be presented to the entire group at the end of the 

day IPR, conducted at 1400 hours. 

On day two of the study, the J-5 presented the initial 

problem statement to the BLUE LLOO Chiefs, who 

were responsible for monitoring the second and 

third order impacts of the BLUE plan throughout the 

planning process. After lengthy discussion, an 

agreement was reached to generate two more 

problem statement options for comparison against 

the original problem statement. During the BLUE 

cell‘s next meeting, the cell members reviewed the 

LLOO-specific problem statement, the end state, 

and the quantifiable objectives necessary to attain 

the desired end state. From this review, a revised 

problem statement was generated and the focus 

shifted to developing operational objectives and subobjectives for each of the LLOOs. 

To facilitate the development of friendly courses of 

action (COAs), the BLUE cell divided into three 

COA teams of four officers each. The first COA 

was centered on securing the population. The 

second COA focused on building the PRTs and 

infrastructure development. The third COA focused 

on building the Afghan Security Forces. 

After applying the screening criteria to the three 

COAs, the second COA was found to be unfeasible. 

Thus, the second COA team was redirected to 

develop a COA that was focused on securing the 

borders. For additional details concerning COA 

Development, (6) Train /Employ Afghan Security 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

development, refer to the section within this chapter 

on Course of Action Development. 

Problem Framing and Mission Analysis 

During the problem framing process significant 

characteristics of the situation in Afghanistan were 

discussed and yielded the following problem 

statement: 

How to employ Coalition Forces to support the GIRoA to 

disintegrate sources of instability before anti-Afghan 

forces supplant the established government. Coalition 

forces must support & develop GIRoA capacity to employ 

and sustain National Security Forces. 

The following planning factors were taken into 

account: 

• Elections (Afghan, US, Coalition) 

• Sustaining surge forces 

• Flow of forces into Afghanistan 

•	 Limited LOCs and APODs 

•	 Poor infrastructure 

• Weak central government 

• Tribal culture / nature of populace 

• Complex terrain 

•	 Porous borders 

•	 Sources of instability: 

AQ 

Taliban 

External threats 

Drug trafficking 

Mission: ISAF conducts military operations with 

GIRoA and in coordination with OEF, UNAMA and 

the international community in order to assist 

GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure 

environment, extend viable governance, and 

promote development throughout Afghanistan. 

Intent: The purpose of this operation is to create a 

secure environment in Afghanistan to facilitate 

Afghani economic, political, and military 

development. 

Facts: 

• All JRSO&I currently conducted in Bagram 

•	 Afghan security force advisory teams are 

currently fielded at 44% strength (Brookings, 

NOV 18, 2008) 

•	 Current ANA strength is 68,000 soldiers 

(Brookings, NOV 18, 2008) 

•	 Current ANP strength is 80,000 police officers 

(Brookings, NOV 18, 2008) 

•	 Current coalition troop strength is 51,000 

(Brookings, NOV 18, 2008) 

•	 Limited MOG at Bagram will require a time 

phased approach to troop deployment into 

Afghanistan 

•	 Currently one ground LOC supports equipment 

movement into Afghanistan 

• Additional BCTs will begin arriving in JAN 09 

Assumptions: 

The political situation does not deteriorate 

globally and divert troops and resources to 

another contingency 

The security situation in Iraq remains stable 

allowing the allocation of additional forces to 

OEF (a minimum 3 x BCTs) 

Additional ISR assets will be needed to support 

increased forces and intelligence efforts in 

Afghanistan 

Additional reconstruction funds will be allocated 

to ISAF/OEF 

Multi-National forces will accept minor 

adjustments to C2 structure and boundaries 

There will be no decrease in the total strength 

of coalition forces available over the next 18 

months 

Afghan elections will take place NET AUG  ̳09 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 24 
 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

1

Operational Center of Gravity Analysis -

ISAF

COG CC CR

To build a 

legitimate/effective 

Afghan government

To build ANA and 

ANP capability

Sustainment

Coalition support

To influence the 

Afghan population

Military Advisors

Unity of command

CV

Force structure

Ways 

(verb)

Means 

(noun)

Concerns 

(noun)

Secure and stable GIRoA

End state

To conduct 

operations to 

defeat the 

insurgency and 

stop external 

influencing

Diplomatic 

Support

Source of 

Power

To protect the 

Afghan population

Neutral 

population

Coalition

Forces

Governance 

Advisors

Interagency participation *

UN/NGO cooperation *

UN/NGO vulnerability

Ground LOC vulnerability

LOC viability *

Populace support

Sufficient funding *

Sufficient manning *

Sufficient training *

Post Afghan national election government will 

not fundamentally change the 

nature of Afghani-US relations or the nature of 

operations 

ANA generates 2,000 trained soldiers monthly 

Sufficient interpreter support is available 

Centers of Gravity (COG) Analysis: 

While determining the BLUE COG, the debates 

centered on whether the US armed forces or 

coalition forces (in total) should represent the BLUE 

COG. It was subsequently determined that coalition 

forces were more appropriate due to the more 

holistic perspective it provided when subsequent 

steps of the COG analysis were conducted. 

Maintaining a focus on coalition forces allowed us to 

explore international and non-governmental 

US BCTs are interchangeable by capability for 

conducting population security 

organization support as critical vulnerabilities which 

would have been excluded if the focus was narrowed 

to only US armed forces. COG analysis revealed the 

critical role that security forces and governmental 

advisors will play in the campaign plan. Numerous 

links were drawn between the advisory effort and 

other characteristics identified as critical 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses, highlighting their 

importance to the overall effort. Diplomatic support 

was also identified as a critical requirement for the 

execution of successful operations. Maintenance of a 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

strong international base of support was seen as 

linked to almost half of the critical vulnerabilities and 

weaknesses identified. The Operational COG 

analysis diagram below illustrates these linkages. 

Logical Lines of Operation (LLOOs): 

Six logical lines of operation were selected based on 

information from two sources. First, FM 3-24 served 

as the basis for LLOO selection. The selected 

LLOOs were then modified by subtracting one line 

and adding two lines specific to the situation in 

Afghanistan derived from LTG Caldwell‘s post on the 

Small War‘s Journal website (Caldwell, 2008). These 

LLOOs provided general guidance on focus areas that 

needed inclusion in all COAs. The LLOOs, and their 

justification, are detailed below: 

Information Operations. Use of information is a 

critical component of gaining the support of the 

Afghan population as an element of legitimizing the 

Afghan government. Moreover, various RED forces 

continually use information to counter ISAF efforts 

and therefore must be dealt with. 

Support to Governance. Those measures taken to 

strengthen the Afghan ability to create an effective 

form of government that fits their culture, and 

provides for the basic issues of rule of law, popular 

representation, and providing for the basic needs of 

the population. 

Security / Combat Operations. Provides the essential 

security and stability needed for the government, 

infrastructure, economy, and basic life to develop and 

grow. 

Reconciliation. Recognizes that ISAF and Afghanistan 

can‘t defeat every RED element and therefore those 

with less fervor may be co-opted. They must be 

convinced that disagreements with the government 

can be solved peacefully through discussion, not 

through force of arms. 

Infrastructure Development. Information and 

security must be reinforced with tangible benefits that 

demonstrate the government‘s ability to deliver basic 

needs such as roads, electricity, schools, markets, etc 

for its population. The population must be convinced 

through real results that the government provides a 

better future for them than RED forces. 

Train / Employ ANA / ANP. Any long-term success 

(5-10 years from now) hinges on the ability of 

Afghanistan to secure itself. This directly reinforces 

the security and support to governance LLOOs 

described above. 

Operational Objectives: Nineteen operational 

objectives were established and aligned with the six 

lines of operation. Objectives roughly fall into three 

broad categories (1) tactical operations focused on 

security, (2) operations focused on developing 

capacity in the Afghan security forces and provincial 

governments and, (3) operations focused on 

developing Afghan infrastructure: 

1.	 Influence Afghan population 

2.	 Inform Afghan population (of Coalition 

successes) 

3.	 Co-opt Afghan tribal leaders 

4.	 Develop agricultural alternative to Poppy 

5.	 Secure Afghan civilian population 

6.	 Secure key border crossings 

7.	 Develop Afghan electrical grid 

8.	 Develop Afghan road network 

9.	 Develop Afghan schools 

10.	 Defeat enemy organization‘s C2 structures 

11.	 Enhance/develop ANP individual training capacity 

12.	 Enhance/develop individual ANA training capacity 

13.	 Enhance/develop Afghan Border Police capacity 

14.	 Enhance ANA/ANP operational capability 

(advisory effort) 

15.	 Conduct ANA collective training 

16.	 Develop/enhance provincial government capacity 

17.	 Develop provincial justice capabilities 

18.	 Conduct effective provincial and national 

elections 

19.	 Increase Afghan economic capacity 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 26 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

1. Influence Afghan population

2. Inform Afghan population of (Coalition successes)

3. Co-opt Afghan tribal leaders

4. Develop agricultural alternative to Poppy

5. Secure Afghan civilian population

6. Secure key border crossings

7. Develop electrical grid

8. Develop road network

9. Develop Afghan schools

10. Defeat enemy C2 of organizations

11. Enhance/develop ANP individual Trng capacity

12. Enhance/develop individual ANA Trng capacity

13. Enhance/develop Afghan Border Police capacity

14. Enhance ANA/ANP operational capability (advisory 

effort)

15. Conduct ANA collective training

16. Develop/enhance provincial government capacity

17. Develop provincial justice capabilities

18. Conduct effective provincial and national elections

19. Increase Afghan economic capacity

ISAF

Infrastructure 

Dev.

1 2 3 4 5 10 16 17 18 19 

DM/SM

Coalition

Forces

LOO Conditions

Neutral Afghan 

Population

Functional Afghan 

Govt.

Govt. capable of 

securing populace 

w/o external aid 

Co-opt willing 

insurgent leaders 

Infrastructure 

commensurate w/ 

1979 standards

150,000- ANA

80,000- ANP

Information 

Operations

Support to 

Governance

Security / 

Combat Ops

Reconciliation

Threat

Forces

Afghan 

Tribal 

Culture

Train / Employ 

ANA / ANP

1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 

1 2 3 5 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 

1 2 3 4 5 10 16 18 19 

1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 

1 2 4 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 

The 19 objectives listed above were subsequently 

aligned with the LLOOs they apply to. The LLOO 

diagram, below, displays the relationship between 

LLOOs and objectives. Additionally, defeat and 

stability mechanisms were associated with each line of 

operation that reflected the broad psychological or 

physical effects to be achieved along each LLOO. 

Lines of operation emanate from the BLUE COG on 

the left side of the diagram and are directed at the 

RED and GREEN COGs displayed on the right side. 

Additionally, each LLOO has an associated set of 

conditions that represent an ―end state‖ for the 

LLOO to be achieved when all of the associated 

objectives aligned with the LLOO have been 

accomplished. 

Course of Action Development 

To facilitate COA development, the BLUE cell was 

split into three COA development teams. Each COA 

development team was augmented with two 

personnel from the RED cell and one individual from 

the GREEN cell in order to provide RED and GREEN 

cell insights and expertise that were garnered during 

mission analysis. 

Each group developed their COAs independently 

while simultaneously ―cross-talking‖ to ensure the 

COAs were distinguishable. Three COAs were 

developed with the following emphasis for each: 

COA #1 - Security focused on the major population 

centers; COA #2 - Initially developed with a focus on 

stability operations, but after being screened out by 

the faculty advisors, the COA was refined with a 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 27 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

focus on security efforts along the Afghan-Pakistan 

border region; COA #3 - Main effort focused on 

Afghan Security Force advising effort. Personnel 

with sustainment expertise formed a fourth COA 

development team in order to more fully explore the 

sustainment requirements that the addition of 20,000 

troops would generate. 

COA1 (Population Focus): 

COA 1 revolves around the counter-insurgency 

technique described as the ―oil-spot‖ method and is 

heavily influenced by two sources. The concept and 

execution of COA 1 closely mirrors the methods 

described in David Galula‘s book Counterinsurgency 

Warfare Theory and Practice. COA 1 envisions 

commanders at the regional and provincial level 

determining which population centers require 

immediate attention and will garner the greatest 

returns based on population size and enemy activity 

in that region. Subsequently, operations will be 

conducted to clear those population centers and 

maintain security there until such time as Afghan 

governmental and security forces are established and 

capable of executing operations independently. Once 

a sufficient level of security is established and the 

initial population centers are cleared, coalition forces 

will repeat the process in adjacent population 

centers, thereby expanding the zone controlled by 

the Afghan government and ultimately denying the 

insurgent‘s access to the population and the 

resources they provide (Galula, 1964). The decision 

to focus operations on population centers was 

influenced by David Kilcullen‘s interview with New 

Yorker magazine in which he states that 80% of the 

population in the contentious southern provinces is 

located in the urban centers, thereby focusing 

operations in urban and population centers which can 

garner support from the majority of the people 

(Packer, 2008). 

In COA 1, the first additional US BCT is committed 

to RC South, with the next BCT committed to RC 

East, and a final additional BCT committed to RC 

South. Intelligence efforts throughout would utilize 

HUMINT capabilities with a focus on the 

identification of insurgent networks, political 

infrastructure, and vetting Afghan Security Forces. 

These three core intelligence tasks align themselves 

respectively with the clear, hold, build portions of 

operations. Without effective intelligence support to 

enable transitions between phases, actual progress 

will be difficult to achieve. Another key enabling 

operation central to the effective execution of COA 

1 is information operations. Information operations 

will be used to influence the population concerning 

coalition commitment to security at the local level. 

Without the population‘s sincere belief that we will 

not vacate an area as soon as it‘s cleared, they will 

not provide the critical information required to 

defeat insurgent networks and political infrastructure. 

COA 1 Phasing: 

COA 1 phasing is based on three major 

considerations (1) the projected force flow of 

additional BCTs into Afghanistan (2) external political 

events such as National elections in the United 

Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany and 

(3) internal Afghan elections both at the provincial 

and national level. Phases are not discrete in nature 

and overlap is expected based on two factors within 

the population centers (1) the speed with which 

insurgent organization are defeated and (2) the rate 

at which Afghan governmental and security force 

capacity is developed. The diagram on the following 

page depicts the projected phase transition points and 

their relationship to external political events. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 28 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

COA 1- PHASE I (Deploy) 

Phase I begins when additional US Brigade Combat 

Teams enter APOD and ends when final additional 

BCT is capable of conducting operations. 

Decisive Operation. Additional troop strength is 

received at Bagram Air Base (APOD) and Khandahar 

(APOD), equipment transits via ground transport 

thru Pakistan and is married with troops IVO Bagram 

and Kandahar in preparation for onward movement. 

Sustainment BDE(s) are the ME. 

Shaping Operations. Initial effort of shaping 

operations is security of the APOD and MSRs 

required for transit of equipment into the AOR and 

subsequent onward movement to unit AOs. Joint 

fires support onward movement of units to AOs, 

additionally information operations influence Afghani 

population to develop understanding that coalition 

build up will enhance security in Afghanistan. C2 is 

enhanced by the addition of an operational level 

headquarters to control tactical level operations 

located in RC SOUTH. This additional higher level 

headquarters within one of the more contested 

Regions will better operational and strategic 

situational awareness. Intelligence focus is to 

warnings and indications of attack on APOD and 

MSRs, targetable intelligence on threat forces, and IO 

theme development. 

Sustaining Operations. Units deploy through 

SPOD at Karachi (commercial move), and proceed to 

staging bases at Peshawar and Quetta (commercial 

line haul); commercial convoys then move to Kabul, 

Kandahar, and other FOBs. Sensitive items fly in to 

APODs at Bagram and Kabul. The opening of an 

additional GLOC and APOD facilitates the movement 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 29 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

and sustainment of additional troop strength Operational Risk. Accept risk by shifting priorities 

committed to RC SOUTH. from units already in theater to those conducting 

JRSOI. 

COA1 Sketch- Phase I (Deploy) 

Phase 1 End State. Three additional US BCTs 

postured for integration within RC SOUTH and RC 

EAST. Population centers selected for initial clearhold-build operations. Additional GLOC and APOD 

opened IOT support build up of forces in RC 

SOUTH. 

COA 1- PHASE II (Clear-Hold-Build): 

Phase II begins when units initiate clearance 

operations in enemy controlled population centers 

and ends when all enemy controlled population 

centers are pacified. 

Decisive Operation. Additional BCT strength is 

committed to RC South (2 x BCT) and RC East (1 x 

BCT) for utilization in clear-hold-build operations 

focused on large to midsized population centers 

within their AOs. Units will partner with ANA and 

ANP based on current Afghan dispositions. Units 

employ the ―oil spot‖ concept and expand pacified 

areas from population centers initially seized to 

adjacent villages and towns. ME is RC South. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 30 
 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

X

X (-)

X

X

X

MNC-A

XXX

X

X

MN

X

MN

II

III

MN

II(+)

X

MN XX

XX

XX XX

XX

Shaping Operations. Protection is focused on LOC 

security required to sustain clearing operations then 

transitions to development of battalion and company 

level operating bases required to support hold-build 

operations. Joint fires initially are focused on support 

of clearing operations via close air support. Purpose 

of information operations is to influence Afghan 

population to cooperate with increased presence of 

coalition forces and persuade Afghan population to 

provide human intelligence information ISO clearhold-build portions of the operation. Intelligence 

efforts focused on providing targetable intelligence, 

IO theme development, and assessing operations 

impact ISO clear-hold-build phases of the operation. 

C2 effort supports the establishment of architecture 

required to support the increased distribution of 

COA 1 Sketch- Phase II (Clear-Hold-Build) 

units throughout the RC AOs. CMO efforts are 

focused on building governmental capacity at the 

provincial level. 

Sustaining Operations. Establishment of an ESC(-) 

in theater will facilitate command and control of 

additional sustainment brigades and assets in the 

theater. Additional Sustainment Brigade establishes 

logistics hubs IOT provide area support to the 

additional forces located in RC SOUTH. 

Operational Risk. Risk is accepted in the 

countryside and portions of the frontier due to 

increased focus on population centers. 

Reserve. MNC-A maintains IN BN reserve taken 

from second US BCT committed to RC SOUTH. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 31 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Phase II End State. Additional BCTs completed 

onward movement and integration into RC SOUTH 

and RC EAST. Initial clearance operations 

commenced in selected population centers. Insurgent 

military structure defeated in initial population 

centers. Afghan provincial government(s) establish 

initial infrastructure for effective governance. 

COA 1- PHASE III (Stabilize) 

Phase III begins when units cease clear-hold 

operations and ends when sufficient Afghan security 

force capacity is generated to ―hold‖ all pacified 

population centers. 

Decisive Operation. Regional commands build 

Afghan capacity and consolidate the progress 

developed in Phase II. Local Afghan security forces 

are recruited and trained to assume security mission 

and free maneuver forces to conduct subsequent 

clearance operations. PRTs focus on building Afghan 

provincial government capability. ME is PRTs and 

Security Force trainers. 

Shaping Operations. Coalition maneuver units 

continue to secure and ―hold‖ population centers to 

facilitate Afghan capacity growth. Joint Fires support 

security operations via CAS. Information operations 

inform Afghan population of coalition successes and 

influences Afghan population to understand long-term 

commitment of coalition forces to local security. 

Focus of protection remains LOC security and 

operating base security. C2 continues to monitor 

and control operations. Intelligence focus is vetting 

of Afghan security force recruits and identification of 

insurgent political structure and providing targetable 

intelligence, IO theme development, and assessing 

operations impact. CMO continues to develop 

governmental capacity at the provincial level. 

Sustaining Operations. Sustainment units continue 

area support. Estimates for Class X support are 

received based on the requirement to replace the 

equipment usage and attrition incurred by increase 

force structure OPTEMPO. Retrograde of battle 

damaged equipment is executed ICW fielding of 

replacement items. 

Operational Risk. No change, risk is accepted in 

countryside and portions of the frontier due to 

increased focus on population centers. 

Reserve. MNC-A maintains IN BN reserve taken 

from second US BCT committed to RC SOUTH. 

Phase III End State: Major population centers have 

been cleared of insurgent military elements, Afghan 

security and governmental capacity is fully established 

and controlling population centers selected during the 

initial stages of clear-hold-build operations. Enemy 

insurgent groups defeated in 95% of population 

centers. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 32 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

X

X (-)

X

X

X

MNC-A

XXX

X

X

MN

X

MN

II

III

MN

II(+)

X

MN XX

XX

XX XX

XX

COA1 Sketch- Phase III (Stabilize) 

COA 1- PHASE IV (Transition) 

Phase IV begins when units occupy positions along 

the Afghan-Pakistani border and ends when units 

start redeployment operations. 

Decisive Operation. Large and midsized population 

centers are transitioned to pure Afghan security 

forces and provincial governmental control. 

Embedded training teams and PRTs continue to 

advise Afghan security forces and provincial 

governmental agencies in order to maintain gains 

made during Phase II and III. ME is PRTs and Security 

Force trainers. 

Shaping Operations. Coalition maneuver units 

transition to security assistance with Afghan border 

security forces in order to isolate Afghan population 

from external insurgent forces. Joint fires continue 

to utilize CAS IOT disrupt infiltrating insurgent forces 

and focus information operations to reaffirm 

commitment of coalition forces to the Afghan 

population during this critical phase. C2 architecture 

adjusts to facilitate control of border security 

operations. Intelligence focus is identification of 

critical infiltration routes and insurgent groups 

crossing the border. CMO focus is continued build 

up of Afghan infrastructure. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 33 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

X

X X

MNC-A

XXX

X

X

MN

X

MN

II

III

MN

II(+)

X

MN XX

XX

XX XX

XX

X (-)

X

Sustaining Operations. Sustainment units continue 

area support. Additionally, prioritize backhaul 

requirements and identify equipment for foreign 

military sales and aid. 

COA 1 Sketch- Phase IV (Transition) 

Phase IV End State. Afghan security forces and 

governmental agencies established and controlling 

major population centers with little to no coalition 

assistance. US BCTs postured on Afghan-Pakistani 

border IOT control border crossing points. 

Insurgent military and political structure defeated. 

Operational Risk. Accept risk in pacified regions by 

moving maneuver units to Afghan borders. 

Reserve. MNC-A maintains IN BN reserve taken 

from second US BCT committed to RC SOUTH. 

COA 2 - (Border Security) PHASE I (Deploy) 

COA Statement. The purpose of this phase of the 

operation is to deploy the first BCT and set the 

conditions to receive follow on forces with the 

following key tasks (1) Conduct RSO&I for surging US 

forces (2) Conduct an ISR plan to identify key 

crossing sites (3) Conduct border security 

operations. The first BCT deploys into Afghanistan 

and establishes an ISR plan to identify key border 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 34 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

crossing sites. A new 3 Star Level command is 

established to command and control border security 

forces. Additionally, theater enablers set conditions 

to receive follow on forces by establishing the 

infrastructure to support the deployment of the 

additional forces into theater. 

Decisive Operation: The decisive operation in this 

phase is to develop an ISR plan to identify key 

crossing sites along the border. 

Shaping Operations: 

•	 Shaping Operation (SHPOP) 1, establish a 3 star 

headquarters 

•	 SHPOP 2, Build combat power in Afghanistan 

•	 SHPOP 3, Build the infrastructure to support the 

additional troops deploying into theater 

•	 SHPOP 4, Information operations IOT set the 

conditions for the follow-on force deployment 

Sustaining Operations: 

Sustaining Operation (SUSTOP) 1, Integration- CS 

and CSS units in theater integrate arriving units into 

their support operations IOT enable PH II 

operations. 

Combat Power Available: 

•	 New 3-Star Headquarters 

•	 3 BCTs (including the deployment of one 

additional BCT) 

•	 AVN BDE 

Force multipliers available: 

•	 BFSB 

•	 EN BDE 

•	 Sustainment BDE 

•	 PRTs 

•	 SOF 

•	 PSYOP 

•	 CA 

•	 State Department 

•	 NGOs 

Operational Objectives for Phase I (Numbered 

for Future Reference): 

1. Reconnaissance along the border to ID enemy 

crossing sites and develop a deployment plan along 

the border for follow-on forces. 

2. Secure the border and disrupt enemy movement 

into Afghanistan 

a. Conduct IO to increase understanding of 

surge operation 

b. Conduct IO to encourage attitude that US 

surge is to protect Afghanistan population 

c. Proactively counter enemy disinformation 

3. Destroy terrorist C2 and infrastructure IOT 

increase stability and viability of Afghan government 

a. Deny enemy safe havens 

b. Capture / kill enemy forces crossing the 

border 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 35 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

COA 2 Sketch- PHASE I (Deploy) 

Phase I End State. US and ISF forces in place, initial following conditions, Measures of Effectiveness, and 

clear and hold operations begun, and conditions set Measures of Performance were identified: 

for PH II. Looking across each of the LLOOs, the 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 36 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

COA 2 - (Border Security) PHASE II (ClearHold-Integrate) 

Phase II begins when the first BCT is conducting 

border security missions. Main Effort is to the 

maneuver forces, based on the intelligence of the 

most likely crossing points along the border. 

COA Statement. The purpose of this phase of the 

operation is to dislocate and isolate enemy forces 

from crossing into Afghanistan with the following key 

tasks: (1) Identify enemy crossing sites (2) Disrupt 

enemy from crossing by capturing or killing the 

enemy (3) JRSO&I of follow-on forces By Summer of 

2009 (4) Integrate ANSF into border security 

operations. BCTs conduct borders security 

operations IOT disrupt enemy forces from crossing 

into Afghanistan and destabilizing the GIRoA. 

Main Effort. Based on intelligence the main effort is 

to the maneuver forces that have identified the most 

likely crossing sites along the border. 

Supporting Efforts: 

SE 1, A new CJTF is stood up and is occupying 

the newly defined AO IOT C2 new BCTs into their 

Area of Operation 

SE 2, ISR – Reconnaissance IOT ID enemy 

crossing sites 

SE 3, Build additional infrastructure IOT support 

follow-on forces 

SE 4, IO – Influence the population to set the 

conditions for additional force deployment 

Operational Risk. One Battalion TF remains the 

reserve. Moving along the border opens the risk to 

attacks by enemy forces. If violence remains 

constant, or increases, the population may not remain 

supportive of the surge. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 37 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Decision Points: 

DP 1, Commitment of the Reserve – If forces 

along the border engage enemy forces greater than 

their capability to destroy them. 

DP 2, Phase Transition – Security along the 

border is decreased sufficiently to transition 

operations to HN and forces move back into 

populated areas to transition to security for NGOs, 

PRTs IOT conduct infrastructure development. 

Combat Power Available: 

•	 3-Star Headquarters 

•	 2 x CJTF Headquarters 

•	 5 BCTs (including the deployment of one 

additional BCT) 

•	 AVN BDE 

Force multipliers available: 

•	 BFSB 

•	 EN BDE 

•	 Sustainment BDE 

•	 PRTs 

•	 SOF 

•	 PSYOP 

•	 CA 

•	 State Department 

•	 NGOs 

Operational Objectives for Phase I (Numbered 

for Future Reference): 

1. Reconnaissance along the border to ID enemy 

crossing sites and develop a deployment plan along 

the border for follow-on forces. 

2. Secure the border and disrupt enemy movement 

into Afghanistan 

a. Conduct IO to increase understanding of 

surge operation 

b. Conduct IO to encourage attitude that US 

surge is to protect Afghanistan population 

c. Proactively counter enemy disinformation 

3. Destroy terrorist C2 and infrastructure IOT 

increase stability and viability of Afghan government 

a. Deny enemy safe havens 

b. Capture / kill enemy forces crossing the 

border 

Phase II End State. BCTs conducting border 

security operations and conditions are set to 

transition to phase III operations. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 38 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

COA 2 Sketch- (Border Security) PHASE II (Clear-Hold-Integrate) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 39
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Measures of Effectiveness / Measures of Performance 

COA 2 - (Border Security) PHASE III (Sustain) 

COA Statement. The purpose of this phase is to 

sustain the security conditions set along the border 

and allow PRTs, NGO, etc. to continue to build the 

Afghanistan infrastructure with the following key 

tasks: (1) Maintain adequate forces to interdict enemy 

forces from crossing the border (2) Maintain security 

within the populated areas to allow for infrastructure 

development (3) Build positive relationship between 

Afghani populace and coalition forces. Phase III 

sustains the security operations. Conditions are set 

along the border to allow the redeployment of the 

majority of the BCTs to the populated centers of 

Afghanistan and support the infrastructure 

development.. 

Main Effort. Transition of border security to HN 

control. 

Supporting Efforts: 

SE 1, Border Security – Transitioning border 

security to HN 

SE 2, Information Operations – Reinforce the 

message that the GIRoA stopped the violence caused 

by insurgent forces 

Operational Risk. Transitioning border security to 

HN may cause a spike in violence within the 

populated area. 

Decision Points: 

DP 1, Commitment of the Reserve – Enemy 

forces crossing the border has exceeded the 

capabilities of the forces deployed along the border 

to stop them. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 40 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

DP 2, Transitioning to HN control of border 

security operations. 

Combat Power Available. 

•	 3-Star Headquarters 

•	 2 x CJTF Headquarters 

•	 5 BCTs (including the deployment of one 

additional BCT) 

• AVN BDE 

Force multipliers available: 

•	 BFSB 

•	 EN BDE 

•	 Sustainment BDE 

•	 PRTs 

•	 SOF 

•	 PSYOP 

•	 CA 

•	 State Department 

•	 NGOs 

Operational Objectives for Phase I (Numbered 

for Future Reference): 

1. Reconnaissance along the border to ID enemy 

crossing sites to maintain border security. 

2. Secure the border and disrupt enemy movement 

into Afghanistan 

a. Conduct IO to increase understanding of 

surge operation 

b. Conduct IO to encourage attitude that US 

surge is to protect Afghanistan population 

c. Proactively counter enemy disinformation 

3. Destroy terrorist C2 and infrastructure IOT 

increase stability and viability of GIRoA government 

a. Deny enemy safe havens 

b. Capture / kill enemy forces crossing the 

border 

4. Provide security to reconstruction efforts within 

Afghanistan 

Phase III End State. Border security operations 

are transitioned to HN and majority of the BCT 

forces are redeployed to populated areas of 

Afghanistan to support infrastructure development. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 41 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

COA 2 Sketch- (Border Security) PHASE III (Sustain) 

COA 3 – (Building ANSF) PHASE I (Building 

ANSF) 

COA Statement. This is ongoing and will continue 

throughout the operation until the infrastructure 

supports additional forces. The purpose of this phase 

of the operation is to deploy the first BCT and set 

the conditions to receive follow on forces with the 

following key tasks: (1) Conduct JRSOI for surging 

US forces (2) Augment MTT/Advisor forces to 100% 

capacity (3) Implement GO HQs (4) Establish regional 

training facilities. The first BCT deploys to 

Afghanistan and augments the existing ANP and ANA 

authorized mentor/trainer billets to 100%. A new 

command structure, MNC-A, is created under a 3-

star commander IOT command and control all RC 

elements, as well elevating CSTC-A to a 3-star 

commander with a 2-star commander in charge of TF 

Phoenix. 

Decisive Operation. The decisive operation is the 

augmentation of MTT/advisor forces. 

Shaping Operations: 

•	 Shaping Operation 1 (SHPOP) - Establishment of 

regional training facilities for ANP forces 

•	 SHPOP 2 - Creation of the new GO HQ‘s 

•	 SHPOP 3 - Build combat power in Afghanistan 

•	 SHPOP 4 - Build the infrastructure to support 

the additional troops deploying into theater 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 42 
UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Main Effort. TF BUILD IOT fill authorized 

MTT/advisor billets to 100% (5k). 

Supporting Effort. TF CLEAR IOT to begin 

clearing operations of the northern RC East 

provinces. 

Sustaining Operations. Sustaining Operation 

(SUSTOP) 1, Integration: CS and CSS units in theater 

integrate arriving units into their support operations 

IOT enable PH II operations. 

Combat Power Available: 

New 3-star Headquarters (MNC-A, CSTC-A) 

TF Phoenix 2-star Headquarters 

• 3 BCTs (including the deployment of one 

additional BCT) 

• AVN BDE 

Force Multipliers Available: 

• BFSB 

• EN BDE 

• Sustainment BDE 

• PRTs 

• SOF 

• PSYOP 

• CA 

• State Department 

• NGOs 

NESTING DIAGRAM

PH I - III: Clear Provinces and Augment ANA/ANP

M P

ANA

X 

II

I I I I I I

TF CLEAR

T: Clear each provincial 

area

P: Prevent enemy 

presence in AO

TF HOLD

T: Control key terrain in 

provincial areas

P: Prevent enemy 

presence

P: Protect the population

P: Support local 

governance

TF BUILD

T; Build ANA forces

P: Enhance Afghan 

security capability

T: Build ANP forces

P: Support local civil 

and governance 

systems

M P

X (-)

X X

3/1 4/101

X

101 CAB

X (+)

M P BSB

x +

BFSB

SUS ESC

Proposed Increase

in Forces

ENABLERS

T; Build infrastructure / 

sustain forces / enable 

forces

P: Support additional 

forces flowing into 

theater with expanded 

bases and logistical 

support

Existing

OEF Forces

ANP

I I I I I I

I I I I

I I

II I I I

I

I

II

I

I

I I

I I I I I I I I

II

BSB

II

BSB

II

 

 

 

 

 

•

•

COA 3 - (Building ANSF) Nesting Diagram 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 43 
 

 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Proposed Command Structure 

End State for Phase I:	 • Engage with local population through Information 

•	 New BCT fully integrated into the MTT/advisor Operations (IO) and relationship building to 

teams to establish the conditions for PH II spread an understanding of the coalition‘s intent 

•	 One additional BCT fully deployed to provide a stable and secure environment in 

•	 BFSB fully deployed conducting operations Afghanistan 

COA 3 - (Building ANSF) PHASE II: 

COA Statement. This phase begins with JRSOI of 

TF CLEAR completed (APR 09) and ends w/TF 3-1 

holding the North, TF 4-101 holding the East (o/a 

JAN 10). The purpose of this phase of the operation 

is to deploy the second BCT and set the conditions 

to receive follow on forces with the following key 

tasks: (1) Conduct JRSOI for surging US forces (2) 

Augment MTT/advisor forces to 100% capacity with 

an increase to 11K (6k ANA, 5k ANA) (3) Clear 

northern provinces and hand over control to TF 3-1 

and TF 4-10. Second BCT begins deploying into 

theater to begin clearing operations to the North of 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 44 

RC East with the continued development of the 

infrastructure and support to arriving forces. 

Decisive Operation. The decisive operation is the 

clearing of the Northern provinces in RC-East. 

Shaping Operations: 

•	 SHPOP 1 - Build combat power in Afghanistan 

•	 SHPOP 2 - Build the infrastructure to support 

the arrival of additional troops 

Main Effort. TF BUILD IOT fill authorized 

MTT/advisor billets to 100% (5k). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Supporting Effort: 

•	 SE 1, TF CLEAR IOT to begin clearing operations 

of the northern RC-East provinces 

•	 SE 2, Build additional infrastructure IOT support 

follow-on forces 

•	 SE 3, IO – Influence the population to set the 

conditions for additional force deployment 

Sustaining Operations: SUSTOP 1, Integration: CS 

and CSS units in theater integrate arriving units into 

their support operations IOT enable PH III 

operations. 

Combat Power Available: 

•	 New 3-star Headquarters (MNC-A, CSTC-A) 

•	 TF Phoenix 2-star Headquarters 

•	 4 BCTs 

•	 AVN BDE 

Force Multipliers Available: 

•	 BFSB 

•	 EN BDE 

•	 Sustainment BDE 

•	 PRTs 

•	 SOF 

•	 PSYOP 

•	 CA 

•	 State Department 

•	 NGOs 

PHASE II End State: 

•	 Regional training facilities established in 

Asadabad, Qalat, Ghazni and Gardez 

•	 Northern provinces cleared with control 

transitioned to TF 3-1 and TF 4-101 

•	 Engage with local population through IO and 

relationship building to spread an understanding 

of the coalition‘s intent to provide a stable and 

secure environment in Afghanistan 

•	 ANP/ANA MTT/advisor forces increased to 6k 

and 5k respectively for a total of 11k 

MTT/advisor forces 

COA 3 Sketch- PHASE I (Building ANSF) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 45 
 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Phasing

Phase 2- Clear to the NE

D/S Mechanism

- Dislocate RED elements 

regionally

- Influence local populace to 

build Afghan security forces 

capacity

Scheme of Maneuver

Phase II – TF CLEAR clears 

from Kabul NE to Asadabad; 

Hold Northern cleared areas 

with TF 3-1 and East with TF 4-

101 already in theater; 

Augment MTTs to 11k: 5k ETT, 

6k to PMT; Move focus of ANP 

training to regional facilities 

in provinces (Asadabad, Qalat, 

Ghazni, Gardez); ME is TF 

CLEAR Sustaining Operations

Additional APOD and GLOC opened in the south to sustain additional 

forces

Reserve

Use of reserve to be determined below BCT level

Phase II (Building ANSF)

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

X

X

X

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

COA 3 Sketch- Phase II (Building ANSF) 

COA 3 – (Building ANSF) PHASE III: 

COA Statement. Phase begins w/JRSOI of TF 

HOLD completed (Dec 2009) and ends when all 

three BCT sectors are in control of US presence (Jul 

2010). The purpose of this phase of the operation is 

to clear the remaining provinces upon the redrawing 

of the RC-East boundary to the South. Key 

considerations include: (1) Conduct JRSOI for surging 

US forces (2) Augment MTT/advisor forces to 100% 

capacity (3) Include Zobol and Oruzgon provinces 

into RC-East AO (4) Establish regional training 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 46 

facilities. Phase III is the clearing of the entire AO 

and transition to sustainment operations. Remaining 

BCT is processed in theater with JRSOI in Bagram 

and Kandahar and regional training facilities are 

operational with the continued support of increasing 

the force sustainment infrastructure. 

Decisive Operation. The decisive operation is the 

clearing of all remaining provinces in RC-East. 
UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Shaping Operations: 

SHPOP 1 - Build combat power in Afghanistan. 

SHPOP 2 - Build the infrastructure to support 

the additional troops deploying into theater 

Main Effort. Will transition to TF CLEAR from 

TF BUILD. 

Supporting Efforts: 

SE 1: TF BUILD continuing to create ANS. 

SE 2: Information Operations Reinforce the 

message that the GIRoA stopped the violence 

caused by insurgent forces 

Combat Power Available: 

New 3-star Headquarters (MNC-A, CSTC-A) 

TF Phoenix 2-star Headquarters 

AVN BDE 

Force Multipliers Available: 

• BFSB 

• EN BDE 

• Sustainment BDE 

• PRTs 

• SOF 

• PSYOP 

• CA 

• State Department 

• NGOs 

PHASE III End State: 

• Transition of TF CLEAR to either a theater 

reserve or augmentation force to TF Central 

• All RC-East provinces cleared with control 

transitioned to TF 3-1, TF 4-101 and TF HOLD 

• Engage with local population through IO and 

relationship building to spread an understanding 

of the coalition‘s intent to provide a stable and 

secure environment in Afghanistan 

Phasing

Phase 3- Clear to 

south/sustain

D/S Mechanism

- Dislocate RED elements 

regionally

- Influence local populace 

to build Afghan security 

forces capacity

Scheme of Maneuver

Phase III - RC East 

boundary is changed to 

include Zobul and Oruzgan

provinces; ANP training 

centers at Qalat and 

Ghazni are opened; TF 

Hold conducts JRSOI in 

Kandahar, ME is TF CLEAR Sustaining Operations

Additional APOD and GLOC opened in the south to sustain additional 

forces

Reserve

Use of reserve to be determined below BCT level

Phase III (Building ANSF)

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

X

X

X

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

•

•

•

•

•

• – 

•

•

• 5 BCTs 

•

COA 3 Sketch- Phase III (Building ANSF) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 47 
 

 

Proposed Brigade Boundaries

TF 3-1 North

TF 4-101 East

TF HOLD South

PMT TNG Locations

LLOs Conditions MOEs MOPs

Information Operations

(Influence)

I: Red

II: Yellow

III: Yellow / Green

25% Red

50% Yellow

75% Green

•# of media outlets

• # of messages countered

Support to Governance

(Support)

I: Red

II: Yellow

III: Yellow / Green

25% Red

50% Yellow

75% Green

• # of people with basic 

needs met

• # of people receiving 

basic utilities

Security / Combat Ops

(Isolate / Disintegrate)

• Insurgent activity 

neutralized, populace is 

confident in Governments 

ability to secure citizens

• BCTs providing security to 

PRTs

• Decrease in # of daily 

attacks by province

Reconciliation

(Influence)

• Co-opt all insurgents 

capable and willing to 

reconcile

• # of belligerents who no 

longer oppose GIRoA

• # of Key Leader 

Engagements 

Infrastructure Development

(Support)

• Establish infrastructure 

commensurate or better 

than 1979 Afghan standards

• % of population 

accessible to governmental 

infrastructure

• # of schools

• # of markets active

• # of miles paved

Train / Employ ANA/ANP

(Support)

• 134,000 trained members 

of the ANA

• ANA/ANP Forces securing 

province independently

• # of ANA / ANP units 

capable of independent ops

• Increase in retention rate

Phase Endstates

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Proposed BDE Boundary Changes 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 48
 
 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Sustainment C2 and Architecture 

We recommend deploying an Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command (ESC) along with an additional 

Sustainment Brigade, two additional Combat 

Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSB), and an AFSB. 

Currently there is one Sustainment Brigade and it is 

―double-hated‖ as the Joint Logistics Command (JLC) 

and as the Sustainment Brigade. It is therefore 

required to conduct logistics at all three levels of war 

– tactical, operational, and strategic. By doctrine, a 

Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) should be 

conducting logistics at the Strategic and Operational 

Levels. Also by doctrine, with the appropriate 

enablers, the TSC can serve as a JLC. Since the ESC 

is really designed as a forward deployed 

Headquarters of the TSC, it would be appropriate to 

serve as the JLC and synchronize logistics at the 

strategic and operational levels. This would also free 

up the sustainment brigade to function at the tactical 

level. 

The addition of the second sustainment brigade to 

the logistics architecture would have a number of 

benefits and fill a number of requirements. This 

sustainment brigade would be able to provide 

command and control of at least one CSSB. This 

CSSB should be a robust multifunctional CSSB that 

will be able to support the increased OPTEMPO with 

the surge BCTs. Emphasis should be on functional 

companies such as an Inland Cargo Transfer 

Company (for A/DACG operations, etc), a 

Light/Medium Truck Company (convoy security and 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

in/around transportation requirements), maintenance 

companies, and quartermaster companies. Maneuver 

companies will be needed to augment security 

support to logistical units. 

Infrastructure Improvements 

There are significant infrastructure improvements 

required. These include, but are not limited to: rail 

line, road construction, buildings, living space, DFACs, 

maintenance bays, maintenance lift facilities, motor 

pools, bag farms, grey water & black water 

management, trash disposal, Shower, Laundry, and 

Clothing Renovation (SLCR) services, mortuary 

affairs increases, finance support, mail support & 

facilities, warehouses, retail fuel points, runway 

improvements, potable water sources, refrigerated 

storage (both CL I and MA), Ammunition Holding 

Areas (AHA‘s), and open storage sites. Additionally, 

there will be more requirements for small FOBs 

(a.k.a. ―COPS‖) at locations throughout the area of 

operations. 

Sustainment and Recommendations 

We recommend the creation of four Ground Lines of 

Communication (GLOCs). The first GLOC should 

be considered the current one in use and hereafter 

known as the Eastern GLOC. This is the GLOC 

which passes through the Khyber Pass. The amount 

of sustainment should be reduced to a manageable 

level through this pass (i.e. defensible by the Frontier 

Corps). 

The second GLOC should be established through the 

Khojak pass. This should be known as the Southern 

GLOC. There should be a Northern GLOC starting 

at Port Poti in Georgia, going through Georgia and 

Azerbaijan, through the Caspian Sea into Kazakhstan, 

and then into Uzbekistan (Eurasia Net, 2008). Finally, 

the fourth GLOC should be established as the 

Central GLOC going through Georgia, Azerbaijan, 

Turkmenistan and into Afghanistan. 

Wargaming 

The ASG conducted wargaming for three BLUE 

(friendly) courses of action against both the RED‘s 

(enemy) most likely and most dangerous COAs using 

a modified box method. For simplicity, critical events 

defined each of the ―boxes‖, and each critical event 

equated to a ―turn‖ in the wargame. In total, the 

wargaming process spanned approximately four class 

days and 16 classroom hours. Specific wargame 

details are discussed in each of the individual cell 

chapters with specific details captured in Annex A 

(Wargaming Results). 

Wargame Guidelines 

To facilitate the wargame process, the ASG 

leadership and faculty advisors established the 

following guidelines: 

Six different wargames would be conducted 

(i.e., each of the three BLUE COAs against 

the RED most likely COA and RED most 

dangerous COA) 

Operational aspects and elements of combat 

power would be presented in ―Asset / Task / 

Purpose‖ format 

The second and third order impacts of each 

action/reaction would be discussed for each 

of the cell‘s Logical Lines of Operation 

(LLOO) 

An ―umpire‖ (provided by the YELLOW 

(out-of-the-box) cell) would adjudicate each 

of the wargame turns (added after the first 

day of wargaming) 

The YELLOW cell would represent the 

international community during the 

wargaming (added after the second day of 

wargaming) 

Wargame Critical Events 

The critical events used for the wargaming process 

included: 

Critical Event 1: Introduction of a Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) and a proposed 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 50 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

―winter offensive‖ in February or March 

2009 

Critical Event 2: REDFOR offensive in April 

2009 (RED takes initiative) 

Critical Event 3: Introduction of two 

additional BCTs and a 3-star Headquarters 

3a) Joint, Reception, Staging, Onward 

Movement and Integration in July 2009 

3b) Open a second ground Line-ofCommunication (LOC) to Afghanistan 

from the north and expand operations 

in August 2009 

3c) Initial BCT operations in August 

2009 

Critical Event 4: Afghanistan National 

Elections in the Fall of 2009 

Wargame Sequence 

The wargame followed a three-part progression 

(BLUE, GREEN, RED). The specific sequence for 

wargame turns 1 and 5 was: 

BLUE / GREEN (Action)
 

RED (Reaction)
 

BLUE / GREEN (Counteraction)
 

YELLOW (by exception)
 

For turns 3a, 3b, and 3c, the sequence was: 

BLUE / GREEN (Action) 

RED (Reaction) 

For turn 2 (RED Initiative), the sequence was: 

RED (Action)
 

BLUE / GREEN (Reaction)
 

RED (Counteraction)
 

YELLOW (by exception)
 

Wargame Turn Content 

During each of the turns, wargame participants 

presented the following information: 

BLUE: 

o	 A pre-turn summary (task 

organization, scheme of maneuver, 

main effort, defeat/stability 

mechanism, reserve) 

o	 Elements of combat power 

(maneuver, fires, protection, 

sustainment, intelligence, command 

and control, leadership, 

information) 

o	 Impact on LLOOs (information 

operations, governance, 

security/combat operations, 

reconciliation, infrastructure, 

training ANSF) 

o	 An end-of-turn summary (task 

organization, scheme of maneuver, 

main effort, defeat/stability 

mechanism, reserve) 

GREEN: 

o	 A pre-turn narrative summary 

o	 Government and ANSF 

considerations 

o	 Impact on LLOOs (governance, 

information, security, economy, rule 

of law, social development, 

reconciliation) 

o	 An end-of-turn narrative summary 

YELLOW: Briefed by exception 

RED: 

o	 A pre-turn summary (task 

organization, scheme of maneuver, 

main effort, defeat/stability 

mechanism, reserve) 

o	 RED operations 

o	 Impact on LLOOs (undermine 

western leaders, popular support, 

sustainability, information 

operations, delegitimize/destabilize 

government of the Islamic Republic 

or Afghanistan (GIRoA)) 

o	 An end-of-turn summary (task 

organization, scheme of maneuver, 

main effort, defeat/stability 

mechanism, reserve) 

Wargame Conclusion 

Wargaming revealed that COA1 (Population Focus) is 

best for short term results. The population focus will 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 51 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

garner near term success by immediately addressing 

the symptoms of the insurgency and securing the 

majority of the population in a short amount of time. 

COA 3 (Building ANSF) was determined best from a 

long term perspective as it builds the long-term 

capacity for Afghanistan‘s self governance and security 

at the provincial level, thereby allowing the Afghani‘s 

to ultimately control their country. Impacts and 

conclusions by LLOO are described below: 

Information Operations 

A universal theme throughout all the COAs is the 

need to convince the Afghani people that the threats 

they face are not merely anti-government forces or 

elements, but anti-Afghan elements. The intent is to 

inspire a sense of nationalism amongst the people that 

balances their tribal loyalty with a wider belief in 

Afghanistan as a nation. 

Another major theme is coalition‘s need to convince 

the Afghani people that the US and its allies are there 

for the long-haul. Afghanistan has historically seen 

western nations, including the US, enter and leave as 

interest in the region has waxed and waned. Since 

Afghani people place great emphasis on building longterm, personal relationships, they remain skeptical of 

our long-term commitment to the region. 

Support to governance 

Foremost, the government must demonstrate the 

capability to provide useful services, security and 

infrastructure to the Afghani people. The 

government has to furnish a viable and beneficial 

alternative to the various threat forces in the area. 

At the same time, a strong central government is not 

required. Any central government must respect the 

tribal, provincial nature of the country and balance 

the need for centralization with decentralization. 

Whatever form democracy takes in Afghanistan must 

incorporate the tribal culture to succeed. Western 

nations must not impose its version of democracy 

that conflicts with this underlying element. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 52 

Security / combat operations 

Traditional COIN strategies emphasize population 

security as the blanket of protection from which all 

other efforts and operations succeed, though how 

each COA does it is different and related to time. 

Afghanistan is no different. COA 1 (Population 

Security) provides the quickest means for 

accomplishing this task. 

That said, one of the central issues is the current 

dilemma between establishing security as a shortterm problem versus the long-term need to develop 

ANSF. While the two are not mutually exclusive, the 

concern is which one should be the main effort over 

the next 18-24 months. Using the additional BCTs to 

focus on population security can arrest the 

deteriorating security situation, but it continues to 

relegate ANSF development as a secondary priority 

and delays the long-term solution to the country‘s 

security problem. However, to focus on ANSF 

training risks the security situation spiraling out of 

control to the point of becoming unrecoverable. 

Excessive use of firepower is severely hurting 

coalition efforts by causing collateral damage and 

other unintended or unanticipated effects. The 

unnecessary or disproportionate use of force has 

historically been shown as a major problem in any 

COIN scenario. It causes more long-term damage 

than benefit by disenchanting civilians and providing 

threat forces examples for its own propaganda. 

Reconciliation 

There must be recognition that we cannot eliminate 

every anti-Afghan element. Every attempt must be 

made to co-opt major portions of the insurgent 

organizations, especially low and mid-level individuals. 

This strategy will not only shorten the conflict and 

allow coalition forces to focus efforts and resources 

on those irreconcilables, but also ensure a lasting 

peace. Additionally, the reconciliation process must 

be focused at the provincial level for it to have lasting 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

impacts. This is the best level at which tribal leaders 

can be engaged on a consistent and effective basis. 

Infrastructure development 

Afghanistan‘s overall infrastructure has sometimes 

been equated to 17th century standards. It‘s 

unrealistic to think even the most robust efforts can 

bring anything approaching western standards. Any 

infrastructure development must realistically assess 

the need to bring some improvement in the situation 

with the desire of providing a near perfect situation. 

In this sense, simple is better. High-tech solutions 

can not only be expensive in the near-term, but also 

unsustainable over the long-term. 

Afghanistan is the world‘s largest poppy seed 

producer as the base ingredient for opium. This 

product not only provides a significant source of the 

nation‘s GDP, as high as 50% according to some 

sources, but is also an important source of income 

for various threat forces in country. A 

comprehensive program is needed to convert 

production to alternative crops. 

Finally, the surge in forces provides both positive and 

negative consequences. On the positive side, the 

increased forces will require additional goods and 

services (i.e. infrastructure building and sustainment) 

that funnel extra money into the economy and 

creates jobs. In contrast, the increased footprint will 

also stress infrastructure such as roads due to 

increased vehicle traffic and combat operations. 

Train/employ ANA/ANP 

The long-term solution for Afghanistan‘s security 

situation is a robust capability to handle the problem 

internally. With MITT teams at only 44% manning, 

they are under strength to effectively train ANSF. 

Additional ANA / ANP training sites are needed to 

increase training capacity, and greater emphasis is 

needed on professionalizing the ANP. Increasing 

ANSF capability is a supporting element for all other 

lines of operation. 

The Soviet Union learned many lessons during its 

involvement in Afghanistan. Most importantly, it 

recognized the importance of advisers within ANSF 

units, yet failed to give it the proper attention. In 

addition to under-resourcing this area, it didn‘t hold 

the adviser position in high regard and therefore 

assigned marginal personnel. Moreover, cultural 

differences and arrogance reduced the effectiveness 

as well (Pomper, 2005, 26-29). 

Conclusion 

Success in Afghanistan is achievable but is entirely 

dependent upon Afghanistan‘s ability to take 

responsibility for their security. Although the COA 

teams acknowledged this critical fact, they predicated 

their COAs on fundamentally divergent assumptions 

regarding the best way to foster this ability. COA 

Team 1 focused on dislocating the enemy and 

influencing the population using the clear-hold- build 

and secure method to garner influence from the 

population centers (cities) to the rural areas. COA 

Team 2 concentrated on dislocating and isolating 

enemy forces across the border by introducing a 

three-star headquarters and re-establishing 

boundaries. COA Team 3 centered their COA on 

building the Afghanistan National Security Forces 

(ANSF), dislocating the enemy, and influencing the 

populace. 

COA 3 had significant advantages over COA 1 and 

COA 2. The most significant advantage is that COA 

3 offers Afghanistan the long-term stability to govern 

their country and provide security for their own 

people by building an effective ANSF. This success 

will enable Coalition forces to transfer governance, 

security and reconstruction efforts to the Afghan 

government. 

References 

Blanchfield, First Lieutenant Mary K. "Transportation
 

Challenges in Afghnaistan." Army Logistician, 2005: 24-

27. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 53 
 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Defense, The Department of. The National Defense 

Strategy. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 2008. 

EurasiaNet. TOL. November 8, 2008. 

http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1& 

IdPublication=4&NrIssue=296&NrSection=1&NrArtic 

le=20219&search=search&SearchKeywords=tashkent 

&SearchMode=on&SearchLevel=0%20(accessed%20D 

ecember%2011,%202008) (accessed December 11, 

2008). 

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice. New York: Praeger, 1964. 

Gall, Carlotta. "Insurgents in Afghanistan Are Gaining, 

Petraeus Says ." New York Times, October 1, 2008: 

A12. 

Islam Online. December 13, 2008. 

http://www.islamonline.net/completesearch/english/C 

ompleteSearchAck.asp?hDepartment=52&hkeyword= 

New+NATO+Routes+to+Escape+Taliban+Trap&hC 

hoice=2&hJoin=1&hSort=desc (accessed December 

15, 2008). 

Islam Online. December 14, 2008. 

http://www.islamonline.com/news/newsfull.php?newid 

=193645 (accessed December 15, 2008). 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV. Small 

Wars Journal. November 25, 2008. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/authors/frontier-6/ 

(accessed December 4, 2008). 

McDermott, Roger N. Asia times Online. December 

12, 2008 . 

http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JL12Ag01.html 

(accessed December 12, 2008). 

McDonnell, Major James J., and Major J. Ronald 

Novack. "Logistics Challenges in Support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom." Army Logistician, 2004: 

9-13. 

NATO Online Library. September 6, 2006. 

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b060906e.htm 

(accessed Decemeber 4, 2008). 

Norton-Taylor, Richard, Julian Borger, and Suzanne 

Goldberg. Mail and Guardian Online. December 15, 

2008. http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-12-15-raceto-open-new-afghan-supply-lines (accessed Decmeber 

15, 2008). 

Packer, George. "Kilcullen on Afghanistan: It's Still 

Winable, But Only Just." The New Yorker, November 

14, 2008. 

Pomper, M.S. "Don't Follow the Bear: The Soviet 

Attempt to Build Afghanistan's Military." Military 

Review, 2005: 26-29. 

President, Office of the. The National Security Strategy . 

Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 2006. 

Program, World Food. World Food Program Newsroom. 

December 8, 2008. 

http://www.wfp.org/Newsroom/in_depth/afghanistan11_9_01.asp?section=2&sub_section... (accessed 

December 8, 2008). 

Reuters. World Bulletin. 

http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_print.php?id=3318 

1 (accessed December 15, 2008). 

Rodeaux, Candace, and Walter Pincus. "US Seeks 

New Supply Routes Into Afghanistan." The Washington 

Post Foregin Service, November 19, 2008: A01. 

Staff, Joint Chiefs of. The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America. Washington D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 2004. 

United States Central Command. 

http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/ourmission/ (accessed December 4, 2008). 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

Chapter 3: Green Cell (Host Nation) 

Summary 

The GREEN Cell represents the interests and 

operational objectives of the Government of the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the Afghan 

population and the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) as they attempt to combat insurgent forces 

while solidifying the government‘s base of support 

with the help of Coalition Forces. The Green Cell 

serves as an honest broker for the BLUE Cell to 

ensure their actions positively affect the GIRoA 

objectives. 

The GREEN Cell identified four key considerations. 

The first consideration is the diversity of ethnic 

groups and the establishment of the arbitrary Durand 

Line of 1893 that split the Pashtun population 

essentially in half. Approximately fourteen million 

Pashtuns reside in Afghanistan and ten million reside 

in Pakistan. Additionally, there are three million 

refugees outside of Afghanistan. The second 

consideration revolves around the concern of the 

local people for their lack of security. The third 

consideration is the inherent friction between the 

centralized GIRoA and the decentralized tribal 

culture. The fourth consideration is the production 

and trafficking of poppy for the development of 

narcotics. Approximately 50% of Afghanistan‘s gross 

domestic product comes from growing poppy. 

The GREEN Cell identified the tribal culture as the 

strategic center of gravity (CoG) for Afghanistan. 

The key component to achieving the GIRoA and 

Coalition objectives is national and local security. 

The key to achieving national and local security is the 

development and sustainment of a legitimate ANSF. 

Governance, social development, rule of law, and 

reconciliation are integral parts to success in 

Afghanistan. Getting the Afghanistan people to 

realize that a central government can provide a safe, 

secure and prosperous Afghanistan will assist in 

legitimizing the GIRoA. 

In summary, the GREEN Cell believes the major 

problems that need to be addressed in order to 

succeed in Afghanistan must consider the ethnic 

differences, the lack of security throughout the 

country, incorporation of the tribal system into the 

concept of central government, and address the 

poppy/drug production and trafficking that dominates 

the Afghanistan economy at all levels. 

Problem Statement 

There are a number of problems that plague the 

country of Afghanistan. 68% of the population has 

never known peace; the life expectancy is 44 years; it 

has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the 

world; terrorist incidents and insurgent violence is 

rising; and the GIRoA at provincial and districts level 

is largely dysfunctional and corrupt. Analysts 

estimate that the security situation, the economy, the 

giant heroin/opium criminal enterprise, and Afghan 

governance are all likely to get worse in the coming 

24 months. 

Assumptions 

In the diplomatic, information, military and economic 

(DIME) elements of Afghan society, there are several 

assumptions that the ASG made in order to facilitate 

the wargaming process. Within the diplomatic realm 

the ASG assumed the sustainment of international 

support, an improved regional comprehensive 

approach and that the US will continue to support 

the GIRoA. 

In the area of information, the assumptions were 

made that the GIRoA would oversee the transition 

from the existing tribal mentality to a global mentality 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 55 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

and that an attempt would be made to balance the 

tribal culture with the GIRoA. 

From a military perspective, the ASG maintained that 

ISAF will remain until the GIRoA is stabilized, there is 

a successful transition from NATO to the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces (ANSF), there is a 

prosperous build-up of the Afghan National Army 

(ANA) from 68,000 (January 2009) to 134,000 

soldiers no later than 2014 and that the US will not 

withdraw military support prior to the stabilization of 

the GIRoA. 

Finally, on the economic front, the ASG assumed that 

Pakistan will support the GIRoA efforts to counter 

illicit narcotics and to develop a realistic plan for an 

alternative livelihood in agricultural trade to sustain 

and increase the GIRoA gross domestic product. 

Blakh, Afghanistan 

Research Methodology 

The initial challenge was to determine how the 

GREEN Cell should define itself. The conclusion was 

to approach the problem from the perspective of the 

Afghan populace, GIRoA, and ANSF. The intent was 

not to develop different options for the GIRoA to 

implement, but rather to conduct an in depth analysis 

of Afghanistan as it exists today and extrapolate what 

the GIRoA objectives would be over the next 18 

months. 

The GREEN Cell initially conducted an extensive 

amount of research along four interrelated functions 

of Afghanistan: a regional perspective, a national 

perspective, a provincial perspective, and a sociocultural perspective. This allowed us to develop a 

better understanding of the current organization and 

function of the GIRoA and its relationship with the 

populace. Research included exploring the public 

statements by the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai. 

Those government publications, along with other 

open-source documents available on the internet and 

through CGSC, helped us provide an assessment of 

Afghanistan and potential problems the ISAF 

Commander may encounter. 

The GREEN Cell further refined this process through 

the DIME methodology. Further refinement led to a 

more complex depiction of the Afghan system that 

included Political, Security/Military, Economic, SocioCultural, Information and Infrastructure. The intent 

was to identify critical nodes within the Afghan 

system and how they are interrelated. This led into 

CoG analysis and assisted in identifying some initial 

strengths and vulnerabilities within the system. The 

nodes and their relationships should also be leveraged 

by the BLUE Cell in the implementation of their plan. 

Using the information that the cell members gained 

during their independent research, the GREEN Cell 

framed the initial problem statement from the Afghan 

perspective. The cell established the Afghan strategic 

CoG and the strategic endstate. 

Primarily based on a public declaration by President 

Hamid Karzai on his website under the GIRoA, Office 

of the President, the GREEN Cell extracted seven 

Logical Lines of Operation (LOOs): Governance, 

Information, Security, Economic Growth, Rule of Law 

/ Human Rights, Social Development, and 

Reconciliation (see Diagram 1). Subsequently, the 

GIRoA strategic endstate was refined to reflect the 

end state envisioned for each LOO. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 56 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Diagram 1: Lines of Operations

GIRoA LOOs

A stable, functioning 

and Islamic 

Afghanistan

that is accepted as 

legitimate by its 

citizens and capable 

of preventing 

terrorist groups 

from operating 

domestically and 

abroad

Objectives

1. National Defense

2. Internal Security & Policing

3. Disband Illegal Armed Groups

4. De-Mining

5. The national Assembly

6. Justice and the Rule of Law

7. Religious Affairs

8. Public Administration Reform 

9. Human Rights

10. Infrastructure and Natural Resources

11. Agriculture and Rural Development

12. Economic Governance and private 

sector development

13. Education 

14. Health and nutrition

15. Social protection

16. Empowering Women 

17. Counter –narcotics

18. Regional Cooperation

19. Anti-corruption

20. Environment 

Not in order of priority

Governance 

Information

Security

Economic growth

Rule of law/Human Rights

Social development

Reconciliation

1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 16 17 18 19 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

1 4 8 10 11 12 13 16 18 19 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

2 3 4 6 8 9 13 14 15 16 18 19 20

2 3 4 5 6 8 9 13 15 17 18 19 

1 2 3 4 6 7 8 13 15 16 17 18 19 

The GREEN Cell was divided between the seven 

LOOs to identify objectives that the GIRoA published 

in an open source that supported these LOOs. The 

GREEN Cell then revisited the CoG analysis and 

developed Critical Capabilities (CC), Critical 

Requirements (CR), and Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) 

for Afghanistan (see Diagram 2). The GREEN Cell 

conducted a cross-walk between the identified 

vulnerabilities and LOO objectives ensuring there was 

an associated objective on one of the LOOs that 

addressed vulnerabilities. Any uncovered area was 

passed to the BLUE Cell for course of action 

development. The BLUE Cell could then either 

allocate resources to address vulnerabilities or 

recommend discussions by the ISAF leadership with 

the GIRoA to address shortfalls. The different 

GREEN Cell LOO groups then developed Measures 

of Effectiveness (MOE) for the operational objectives 

to assist ISAF in defining success in the GIRoA 

processes. During the wargame, the GREEN Cell 

acted primarily as a reality check for the BLUE Forces 

and an interjector on their actions if their actions 

were not in conjunction with the GIRoA objectives. 

GIRoA Considerations 

I. GIRoA‘s Problem Statement. Afghan governance 

challenges have plagued the counterinsurgency effort. 

Polls show that the lack of roads, electricity, and 

water are key concerns of the population, particularly 

in rural areas. The majority of the Afghans convey 

that corruption is a serious problem, and nearly twothirds believe it is increasing. In particular, GIRoA 

profits from the drug trade in the region contribute 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

to the corruption. In addition, the majority of Afghan 

National Police (ANP) is viewed as corrupt, 

incompetent, and often loyal to warlords. ANP 

reports to the provincial level of governance and is 

only national in name. Finally, Afghanistan possesses 

virtually no viable criminal justice system, which 

further undermines confidence in the central 

government and cripples legal and institutional 

mechanisms for prosecuting insurgents and criminals. 

B. GIRoA Assumptions. Major governance, 

security, and development challenges in Afghanistan 

will have to be managed by the GIRoA and people, in 

full partnership with the international community. 

Also, GIRoA presidential and provincial elections will 

take place between April and October 2009. 

C. GIRoA Limitations. The GIRoA lacks the 

ability to control cross border and criminal activities. 

D. GIRoA Strategic Endstate. A stable, 

functioning, and Islamic Afghanistan that is accepted 

as legitimate by its citizens and is capable of 

preventing terrorist groups from operating 

domestically and abroad. 

II. Key considerations. 

A. Pashtunistan Issue. In 1893, the Emir of 

Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, agreed under pressure 

to set out the border between Afghanistan and India. 

This border cuts through tribes of Pashtun and bares 

little relation to topography, demography and military 

strategy. Abdur Rahman is said to have not accepted 

the Durand line as a permanent international frontier. 

The Durand line, dividing the Pashtun people, is a 

major problem to the Afghan and Pakistan 

governments. Tribal uprising against the Durand 

agreement from Pashtuns continues to cause friction 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The international 

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is still not 

recognized by the GIRoA who wants to renegotiate 

it. The GIRoA cannot defend the entire 1640 mile 

border. Approximately 14 million Pashtuns live in 

Afghanistan and 10 million Pashtuns live in Pakistan 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 58 

(17% of the Pakistani population). Furthermore, 

three (3) million refugees live in refugee camps in Iran 

(1 million) and Pakistan (2 million). Approximately 

80% of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan are Pashtuns. 

The Government of Pakistan announced their 

decision to close the refugee camps by December 

2009 and to repatriate all refugees. The GIRoA must 

involve the Pashtun leadership for the future 

development of Afghanistan. 

B. The Tribal Culture and Ethnic Groups. 

Understanding the tribal culture and ethnic groups is 

crucial in the dealing with the tribal oriented society 

in Afghansitsan. The Pashtuns are the largest ethnic 

group in Afghanistan and comprise 42% of the Afghan 

population. The major Pashtun tribes are Durrani and 

Ghilzai. The tribe culture is based on clan structure 

(clans are often named after male ancestors). The 

language is Pashtu. The Pashtuns live on a legal and 

moral code named Pashtunwali. The Pashtuns ruled 

Afghanistan from 1747 until 1992. Afghans display 

pride in their religion, country, ancestry, and above 

all, their independence. They are regarded with 

mingled apprehension and condescension, for their 

high regard for personal honor, for their clan loyalty 

and for their readiness to carry and use arms to 

settle disputes. As clan warfare and internecine 

feuding has been one of their chief occupations since 

time immemorial, this individualistic trait has made it 

difficult for foreign invaders to hold the region. From 

a religious standpoint, Afghans are over 99% Muslim. 

Although estimates vary, approximately 75% are 

Sunni and 25% are Shi'a Muslim. In addition to the 

Pashtuns, other major ethnic groups are Tajik: 27%, 

Uzbek: 9% and Hazara: 9%. 

C. Security. The biggest problem facing 

Afghanistan as a whole is the lack of security. Other 

problems involve the Taliban, a struggling economy 

and immense corruption. In local areas the leading 

issues are electricity, economy, roads, education and 

security. The bulk of Taliban fighters are disaffected 

Pashtun tribesmen who have lost their traditional 

power and are disillusioned with Kabul. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Furthermore, a rural insurgency cannot be beaten 

without rural security presence. The Taliban is 

estimated to control 10% of the population while the 

GIRoA controls 30% of the population. 

Consequently, 60% of the population remains 

undecided until the GIRoA can obtain and sustain 

security for Afghans wide. President Karzai claims 

that the war on terrorism cannot be fought in Afghan 

villages. A regional approach must be adopted to 

concentrate on the sanctuaries of those who train, 

equip and motivate the extremists. The problem is 

regional and concerns institutional support for 

extremism that incites terrorism. Unless we 

collectively address the roots of the problem by 

ending that support, as well as financial support for 

radicalism in all forms, we will not defeat terrorism. 

According to President Karzai, this has not been 

properly understood in the West, which has been 

fighting the symptoms of terrorism, but has failed to 

attack its underlying causes. 

D. Governance. Afghanistan has been governed 

by nearly every system including a monarchy, 

republic, theocracy and communist state of 

government over the past century. Politically and 

strategically, the most important level of governance 

in Afghanistan is neither national, nor regional nor 

provincial. Afghan identity is rooted in the 

wholeswali; the districts within each province that 

typically contain a single clan or tribe. The center of 

gravity in Afghanistan is the rural Pashtun districts and 

villages where the Afghan Army and Coalition forces 

are seldom seen. Because rural Pashtun south has its 

own systems of tribal governance and law, the people 

do not want the Western style of governance and 

law. It is imperative to strengthen the relations with 

the tribal elders to win local support. The major 

challenge is to merge the centralized government 

operating from Kabul compromising 34 provinces and 

398 districts with the tribal system of governance. 

E. Economy and Drugs. Afghanistan is an 

impoverished country, one of the world's poorest 

and least developed. Two-thirds of the population 

lives on fewer than two US dollars a day. Only 12% 

of the land is arable. 50% of Afghanistan's GDP 

comes from growing poppy, which supplies 

approximately 93% of world`s illicit opium. Other 

than 19th century China, no country has ever 

produced narcotics on such a deadly scale. The crop 

is a major factor in the economic life and stability of 

the country. Poppy farmers are heavily concentrated 

in the southern part of the country, and the Taliban 

draws an estimated 40% of their funds from this 

industry. 

IV. GIRoA Center of Gravity & Endstate. The Tribal 

Culture is defined as the Center of Gravity for the 

Afghanistan people. A stable functioning and Islamic 

Afghanistan that is accepted as legitimate by its 

citizens and capable of preventing terrorist groups 

from operating domestically and abroad is the 

endstate. 

V. Development of Logical Lines of Operation. 

A. Governance: Functional nation assembly 

B. Information: Becoming a player of the 

world stage 

C. Security (Main Effort): ANSF; 

policing; and disbanding illegal armed groups 

D. Economic Growth: Infrastructure; 

agricultural and rule development 

E. Rule of Law/Human Rights: Functional 

legitimate branches of government (Executive, 

Legislative and Judicial) and empowering women 

F. Social Development: education system; 

health care system; and social protection 

G. Reconciliation: Uniting the country under 

the GIRoA 

VI. GIRoA Center of Gravity Analysis. The critical 

capabilities of the tribal culture are based on a need 

to survive. The critical requirements of weapons, 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 59 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

leadership, and ownership of land, income, Islam 

(religion), tribal education and access to water are all 

recourses or means needed for tribal survival. The 

tribal culture is vulnerable to a higher form of 

legitimate government that supports anti-corruption 

where officers of the government are elected or 

appointed based on merit, capabilities, education, and 

credentials rather than tribal status. The ANSF are 

capable of policing and providing security from 

external and internal threats to the GIRoA. The 

culture enforces a formal education system that is 

structured to promote tolerance and individual 

mobility. 

VII. Wargame Analysis. 

A. Security. 

(1) Use of the ANA for Security 

Operations. The ANSF is comprised of the ANA and 

the ANP. The ANSF is the means by which the 

United States and NATO will be able to draw down 

forces in Afghanistan. However, the ANA is the only 

legitimate, competent means of security that has been 

able to effectively support and lead operations with 

Coalition Forces. The ANA is an all volunteer and 

ethnically balanced, Muslim military force. The 

organization is the only nationally recognized law 

enforcement force in Afghanistan. Currently, the 

ANA conducts military operations and assists with 

law enforcement throughout Afghanistan. Eventually, 

the GIRoA will have to cease the ANA‘s involvement 

with law enforcement and compel the ANP to 

perform their job. The ANA has the ability to 

execute the concept of ―clear‖ and ―hold‖ 

(sustainment). However, due to the ANA‘s inability 

to support themselves logistically over an extended 

period of time (three to four weeks), the ANA 

cannot effectively ―hold‖ an area. It is necessary for 

the ANP to focus on providing stability (―hold‖) and 

security within the local areas. 

(2) ANP Strengthens Local Security. In 

order for the ―hold‖ (sustainment operations) 

concept to be successful, the immediate focus will 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 60 

have to be the Auxiliary Uniform Police (AUP), which 

is one of the police components of the ANP. The 

AUP serves at the regional, provincial and district 

levels of Afghanistan. The AUP is closer to the 

population; therefore, the AUP is one of the 

immediate faces of the GIRoA. The ANP is a critical 

element to allowing the ANA to focus more readily 

on military operations instead of both military and 

law enforcement operations. 

(3) Readiness of the ANA & ANP. 

Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Operational 

Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are severely 

limited to the number of trainers/mentors tasked to 

properly train, mentor, and advise the ANSF. The 

ANA mentors (ETTs) are 44% filled of the desired 

end strength and the ANP mentors (ETTs) are only 

at 39% of the desired end strength. The numbers of 

ETTs and OMLTs have to increase in order to 

provide the proper mentorship needed to 

successfully accomplish the capability measurement 

(CM) of a level 1 (needed for the ANSF to eventually 

operate independently). Once a unit within the ANA 

and ANP reach a CM level 1, the unit is able to plan 

and lead operations with Coalition support. The 

more units that reach CM level 1, the closer the 

United States and Coalition Forces are to the goal of 

drawing down forces within Afghanistan. The short 

and long term requirements for mentors will 

continue to increase with serious shortfalls in 

manning the required billets. 

B. Information. 

(1) The citizens of Afghanistan 

understand that the Coalition forces are in their 

country for an extended period of time. As a result 

the Coalition must take a proactive approach to 

dissemination of information throughout the country. 

The Afghanistan people would like the Coalition to 

do what they came to do and go home. In order to 

achieve this, the GIRoA, ANA and ANP must show 

that they are in control and conditions throughout 

Afghanistan are improving. With the Afghan military 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

and police leading the effort, the Coalition can serve 

in a supporting role rather than a primary role in the 

public eye. 

(2) The elections are essential to 

establishing a positive relationship with the citizens of 

Afghanistan. The Coalition must initiate an IO 

campaign to influence the population to participate in 

the legitimate election and that the polling areas are 

safe. The ANP and ANA providing security for a 

successful election demonstrates that Afghan people 

are protecting themselves. 

(3) Informing the general population of 

the exceptional training provided to the ANA and 

ANP will have a positive influence on the recruitment 

of candidates to volunteer. When operations are 

successful, the word needs to get out to the 

population that Afghanistan forces are protecting the 

Afghanistan people, providing a safe and secure 

country. 

C. Rule of Law. Afghanistan needs law and 

order for the government to enforce and for the 

citizens to follow. Aside from the policing issue, the 

country lacks laws. A safe and secure Afghanistan 

requires a legitimate legal system that provides a 

process that supports the ANP and ANA in enforcing 

the law. 

D. Social Development. The build phase 

should concentrate on the building of schools and 

medical facilities. In order to win the hearts and 

minds of the people, the GIRoA must show that a 

central government will positively influence them. 

Medical care and schools need to extend from the 

city centers into the tribal regions. The success of 

social development will hinge on the ability for the 

ANP and ANA to provide security throughout the 

country. 

E. Reconciliation. 

(1) The Taliban recognizes the King of 

Saudi Arabia as an influential Islamic leader 

throughout the world. The GIRoA needs to continue 

to support talks with the King of Saudi Arabia to 

further the reconciliation efforts with the Taliban. A 

Taliban candidate in the elections is a possible first 

order effect of a tentative reconciliation. The 

wargame also determined that the Taliban would 

reconcile under the condition that the coalition 

forces withdraw from Afghanistan. 

(2) Provincial Government. As a tribal 

nation, the Afghan people do not observe a central 

government. The GIRoA must work with the 

provincial governments to extend its influence into 

the tribal communities. 

F. Governance. The most important critical 

event that surfaced in the wargame was the 

presidential and provincial elections. It is essential 

that legitimate elections occur. Requesting outside 

observers will aid in having a legitimate election. 

Security is the greatest concern during the elections. 

It is imperative that the ANP with support from the 

ANA and Coalition Forces are the primary providers 

of security. 

Center of Gravity Analysis 

COG: The tribal culture 

CC: To Network with other tribes 

CR: Weapons 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: National Security force 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Ownership of land 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 61 
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Islam 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Tribal Education 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Access to water 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CC: To Survive 

CR: Weapons 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: National Security force 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Ownership of land 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Access to water 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CC: To form alliances 

Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Islam 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Access to water 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CC: To sustain the family 

CR: Weapons 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: National Security force 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Ownership of land 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 62 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Islam 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Access to water 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CC: To self govern 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Islam 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Tribal Education 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CC: To develop a local society 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Ownership of land 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CR: Income 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Islam 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Tribal Education 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: Formal education 

CR: Access to water 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CC: To develop a local society 

CR: Weapons 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: National Security force 

CR: Leadership 

CV: High form of legitimate 

government (legislative, Executive, 

Judicial) 

CV: Anti-Corruption 

CV: National Security force 

CV: Formal education 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 63 
 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

UNCLASSIFIED

1/16/2009 UNCLASSIFIED SG 16 A/B 1

Weapons

Leadership

Ownership of 

Land

Income

Islam

Tribal 

Education

Access to 

Water

CC CR CV

Conclusion 

A. Main effort: Security, building ANSF in C. Social development will require a 

order to provide and sustain security perpetuating judicial system and 

locally and nationally. continual progress in deterring 

B. Merging of a tribal and central form of corruption. Social development 

Governance that is recognized as requires a decrease in crime, an increase 

legitimate by the Afghan population and in economic and social infrastructure, 

representative of the people. This will and an increase in the standard of living 

require reconciliation with non-violent for the Afghan people. 

segments of the Taliban organization 

and marginalization of those who will 

not reconcile. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

References 

Baker, A. (2008, November 10). Afghanistan. 

Corruption, Drugs, and a Weak Central Government 

Have the Country in a "Downward Spiral." Is Talking 

To the Taliban the Answer? Time , pp. 63-65. 

Brookings. (2008, November 18). Afghanistan Index; 

Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post 

9/11 Afghanistan. Retrieved December 04, 2008, from 

http://www. brookings.edu/afghanistanindex 

Center for Strategic International Studies. (2008). 

Follow the Money: Why the US is Loosing the War in 

Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: CSIS. 

Congressional Research Service. (2008). Afghanistan: 

Post-War Governance, Security, and US Policy. 

Washington, D.C.: CRS. 

Congressional Research Service. (2008). NATO in 

Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance. 

Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 

Feldman, N. (2008, November 30). Fighting the Last 

War? Retrieved December 04, 2008, from 

http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2008/12/03_feldma 

n.html 

Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency Warfare. 

Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 

Global Secuity Organization. (2008, June 03). Global 

Security Organization. Retrieved December 04, 2008, 

from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military 

Johnson, T. H. (2008). All Counterinsurgency Is Local. 

The Atlantic , 36-37. 

Karzai, H. (2008, November 17). Fight Terror at its 

Roots. The Miami Herald , p. 21. 

Kem, D. J. (2006). Campaign Planning: Tools of the 

Trade (Second ed.). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA: 

Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, 

CGSC. 

President, G. O. (n.d.). Retrieved December 04, 2008, 

from Official Website of President of Hamid Karzai: 

http://www.president.gov.af/ 

Tanner, S. (2002). Afghanistan: A Military History From 

Alexander The Great to the Fall of the Taliban. New 

York: DaCapo Press. 

United States Government Accountability Office. 

(2008). Afghanistan Security. Washington, D.C.: 

Governmental Accountability Office. 

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Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

Chapter 4: Yellow Cell (Out-of-theBox) 

Purpose 

The Yellow Cell served two purposes. First, the cell 

provided objective analysis of the conduct of the 

other cells in order to reduce bias, enlighten blind 

spots, etc., that might potentially limit their progress. 

Second, the cell developed three high impact and 

fresh concepts that could be inserted into any COA. 

These concepts are outlined in the following Issue 

Papers 1-3. 

Methodology 

The group was comprised of three members. The cell 

accomplished its first task by remaining detached 

from the other staff cells and processes to ensure 

that cell members could maintain the objectivity often 

lost among groups who become stakeholders in a 

concept. The cell accomplished its second task by 

using brainstorming and dynamic discourse to ensure 

that the ideas presented in the following issue papers 

presented new thoughts that possessed the significant 

potential to enhance the ISAF Counterinsurgency 

(COIN) Campaign. 

Issue Paper 1: Poppy Cultivation 

Awareness 

This information paper discusses the potential impact 

agricultural development can have for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. The following 

paragraphs outline the current agricultural 

environment in Afghanistan, detail existing agricultural 

efforts in the country, and present a potential plan 

that can yield a positive outcome for the coalition 

effort. 

Local freedom fighters, Afghanistan 

The country of Afghanistan covers approximately 

647, 500 sq km (slightly smaller than the state of 

Texas). However, only 12 % of the land is arable and 

less than 6% is currently cultivated. Wheat is the 

most common licit crop grown in Afghanistan, making 

up 80% of all grain production (Encyclopedia of the 

Nations 2007). The US Department of State (USD) 

noted in its November 2008 report of Afghanistan 

that even when properly irrigated, Afghan farming 

cannot produce enough cereals to feed its population 

(US Departmentof State 2008). This is due to the 

fact that poppy is the largest crop grown in the 

country. Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium 

in the world (Bell 2007). According to the British 

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Afghanistan supplies 

over 90% of the world‘s entire opium supply. The 

country suffers from erratic seasonal weather and 

does not currently have a viable irrigation plan in 

place to compensate for droughts. Only 20% of 

cultivated land receives its irrigation by modernized 

canal structures. The remaining 80% receive water 

from the traditional canal structure created centuries 

ago and only sparingly maintained through today. 

Success in Afghanistan will require its people to 

ultimately manage and provide for themselves. To 

facilitate this, numerous US and international agencies 

have pledged to provide aid to Afghanistan‘s 

agricultural industry. The United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) managed Afghan 

agricultural projects totaling $67M during FY07. The 

USD is credited with increasing Afghan agricultural 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

production, services, and industries by $643M during 

the same time frame. International support includes 

the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan 

(UNAMA) scheduled to commit $178M. This 

number represents the largest single share of the 

UN‘s total special mission budget of just over $495M 

(Buerle 2008). Further, at a British led conference in 

2006, numerous countries agreed on the Afghanistan 

Compact, pledging nearly $10B of aid for the country. 

Unfortunately, much of the pledged monetary aid has 

yet to reach the Afghan people. Spinwatch reporter 

Andy Rowell writes that ―according to the Agency 

Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the 

donation of aid has been heavily influenced by the 

political and military objectives of donors, especially 

the imperative to win so called  ̳hearts and 

minds‘...and it is not what Afghan communities want 

and need. It is being used to achieve military or 

political objectives, rather than help Afghans on the 

ground.‖ Rowell further states that the Afghan 

agriculture industry has received only $400-500 

million since 2001, a tiny fraction of the multi-billion 

international aid budget to Afghanistan. In order for 

the agricultural development to continue, 

international donors must be accountable for their 

commitments. 

Along with financial issues, an ideology of acceptable 

crops exists in Afghanistan. Poppy crops dominate 

the Afghan landscape. A 2006 International Herald 

Tribune article stated that 40% of Afghanistan‘s 

farmable land harvested poppy, and up to 80% in 

some areas (Gall 2006). In October 2008, NATO 

announced its troops will target Afghanistan's opium 

trade directly, for the first time ever. This continues 

a trend of increased poppy eradication efforts. The 

USD quietly continues to campaign for an aerial 

eradication campaign similar to the one used in 

Colombia (Kirschke 2008). However, these 

continued efforts fail to affect current Taliban efforts 

using this crop to finance its operations. The 

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 by the United 

Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) 

declared "the size of Afghanistan‘s opium economy 

exceeded half the country‘s licit gross domestic 

product (53 per cent)...the total export value of 

opiates in Afghanistan reached about $4 billion, a 29 

per cent increase compared to 2006.‖ 

Although farming limitations and an illicit drug 

cultivation problem exist in Afghanistan, a large 

opportunity exists to positively influence the Afghan 

people. The Afghan population grows poppy because 

it provides money through which they provide for 

their family. An estimated 500,000 Afghan families 

support themselves by raising poppies, according to 

the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Last year, those 

growers received an estimated $1B for their crops or 

approximately $2,000 per household. With at least 

six members in the average family, opium growers' 

per capita income is roughly $300. Using these 

numbers, the recommendation is to enact a plan 

similar to the plan used by the US government 

concerning tobacco. 

According to the US Tobacco Support Program and 

Multistate Support Agreement, a program was 

initiated in the early 1980‘s requesting that farmer‘s 

stop growing tobacco. In order to facilitate this, 

state‘s received payments to subsidize the lost 

earnings from tobacco production. The government 

based subsidy payments on the amount of land each 

state historically used for tobacco production. 

Additionally, farmers received technical, financial, and 

administrative support to grow alternative crops. 

The land owners (farmers) kept any additional profits 

from these alternative crops. Applying this to 

Afghanistan, poppy farmers would receive a subsidy 

not to grow poppy. Funding for these subsidies could 

come from a copious amount of sources such as the 

EU and United States counter-narcotics funds. 

The recommendation for this paper stems from 

counter-narcotics sources. The rationale is that the 

counter-narcotics program is a widely emphasized 

program on the international level. Numerous 

countries maintain counter-narcotics funding along 

with both the EU and UN. The existing programs in 

place by USAID and other non-governmental 

organizations would increase to cover all poppy 

farming regions. These programs would focus on the 

agricultural aspect of farming. The technical support 

provided by these agencies must include improved 

irrigation, storage, and transportation of the 

alternative crops to market. Technical support 

should also include instruction in farming techniques 

associated with the alternative crop(s) chosen. The 

technical support should also include education 

programs similar to the Future Farmers of America 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

(FFA) program instituted throughout the southern 

and Midwestern United States. Financial support is 

required to procure the required seed and 

fertilization needed to establish alternative crops. 

Administrative support should come from the Afghan 

provincial governments, in coordination with 

international buyers. This plan will not succeed if a 

market does not exist for the alternative crops. This 

paper purposefully omits potential alternative crops 

for the Afghan farmer. A deliberate effort should 

occur to best determine the replacement crop(s) for 

each Afghan farming region. This will ensure buy- in 

from both the farmer and support agencies. 

The preponderance of profits from poppy (opium) 

production goes to the drug trafficker. With this in 

mind, security forces must provide safety to the 

newly liberated farmers. Initial security must come 

from Coalition forces along with the Afghan National 

Police. The initial security must enforce the ―no 

poppy growth‖ agreement. This will require constant 

surveillance during the planting phase, along with 

continued over watch for potential outlying or 

―underground‖ poppy growth campaigns. Eventually, 

security for these farmers will come from local, 

regional, or national Afghan personnel. Technical 

training for these specialized forces will come from 

US and international agencies familiar with drug laws 

and enforcement. 

REFERENCES 

Bell, Bethany. Burmese opium production soaring. 

October 10, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7038037.stm (accessed January 2, 2009). 

Buerle, Sharon van. "Relief Web." United Nations 

General Assembly. New York: UN General Assembly, 

2008. 

Encyclopedia of the Nations. Afghanistan-Agriculture. 1 

1, 2007. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asiaand-Oceania/Afghanistan-AGRICULTURE.html 

(accessed 12 30, 2008). 

Gall, Carlotta. International Herald Tribune. February 

17, 2006. 

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/17/news/poppy.p 

hp (accessed January 2, 2009). 

Kirschke, Joseph. World Press Organisation. Febrauary 

28, 2008. http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3082.cfm 

(accessed January 2, 2009). 

Rowell, Andy. "Tragedy of Afghan Aid." Spinwatch, 

April 23, 2006: 3. 

US Departmentof State . Bureau of South and Central 

Asian Affairs-Afghanistan. 11 1, 2008. 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm#econ 

(accessed 12 30, 2008). 

USAID. USAID-Afghanistan. 12 30, 2008. 

http://afghanistan.usaid.gov//en/Program.19a.aspx 

(accessed 12 30, 2008). 

Issue Paper 2: Enhancing Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT) Effects1 

This paper offers diagnostic analysis of PRTs in 

Afghanistan and offers two potential areas where PRT 

effects could be extended beyond their current 

capabilities. 

Integral to its counterinsurgency campaign, ISAF 

currently employs 26 PRTs throughout Afghanistan to 

conduct stability operations in 26 of 34 provinces. 

Despite their disproportionate advantage in 

conducting stability operations when compared to 

maneuver units, ISAF PRTs are among the most 

under-resourced assets in ISAF. The inability of the 

United States to provide adequate manpower within -

or to field more - PRTs limits the ability of ISAF to 

pacify the Afghan population. The inability of the US 

Government to solve the manpower solution in the 

near-term compels ISAF to seek ways to extend the 

reach of its PRTs without demanding greater 

manpower. 

It‘s important to discuss the issue of COIN and 

Stability Operations doctrine versus the reality on the 

ground: 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Unity of Command 

- Joint Pub 3-0 and Army FM 3-0 posit that 

unity of command transcends unity of effort 

by placing attainment of objectives under 

one commander. 

- Joint Pub 3-08 (Interagency, etc.) stresses 

coordination and integration with negligible 

emphasis on unity of command. 

- Unity of effort and command of PRTs in 

Afghanistan largely comes from the 

cohabitation of PRTs on bases with their 

supporting tactical units and the appointment 

of a PRT commander. However, interagency 

members bear responsibility to both their 

parent agency and the PRT/RC commanders. 

In this environment, stove-piped reporting 

and competing agendas leave much of the 

synergy in PRTs to personality-based 

relationships. Additionally, PRT efforts 

commonly take second seat to those of 

maneuver commanders who wield 

disproportionate influence on COIN 

operations in Afghanistan. 

- Instances of poor interagency unity of 

effort/command are not without precedent 

in US military history. The Revolutionary 

Development Office and Office of Civil 

Operations merged into the Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support (CORDS) program under one 

commander to solve problems of unity of 

effort and command during the Vietnam 

War. 

Transition 

- Army FM 3-07 describes the PRT role as 

one that includes mentoring of host nation 

ministries. 

- USAID Principle of Development ownership 

asserts that the host nation must assume full 

leadership of development operations. 

- PRTs in Afghanistan regularly interface with 

host nation actors but their role remains 

largely in the realm of action, not 

mentoring/training; PRTs are the owners of 

development in the provinces. 

- Military and Police Transition Teams (TT) 

offer the best example of how to foster 

ownership within Afghan Ministries. 

The doctrinal concepts above, when contrasted with 

the reality of operations in Afghanistan, indicate two 

points of entry for PRT enhancement, both of which 

place minimal demand on manpower augmentation. 

First, using the CORDS program as a model, ISAF 

may consider organizing PRT efforts in Afghanistan 

under one czar similar to Robert Komer, a special 

assistant to President Johnson, who assumed control 

of CORDS. A single czar, civilian or military, with 

complete control of PRT efforts, appropriate rank, 

and command authority could streamline the 

byzantine interagency dynamics that hinder PRTs. 

Such a transition could morph today‘s dubious unity 

of effort into genuine unity of command. Such unity of 

command would also give PRTs a fighting chance 

when their efforts become improperly trumped or 

limited by the conventional efforts of Reserve 

Component (RC) or maneuver unit commanders. 

Second, ISAF may consider a shift in PRT focus from 

―doing‖ to ―training.‖ Using the TTs as an example, 

PRTs could expand their own capacity and that of the 

host nation by activating and training Afghan RTs 

capable of assuming a reasonable portion of the role 

of coalition PRTs. In essence, PRTs would become 

PRTTs (Provincial Reconstruction ―Transition‖ 

Teams). Though slow to start and yield results, this 

possesses great potential to expand reconstruction 

efforts and place greater ownership in the hands of 

the Afghan government. The endstate of this concept 

would see PRTs serving as trainers, supervisors, and 

check writers for several times their manpower 

equivalent in sub-provincial RTs led by Afghans. 

Point of Contact: MAJ Teddy Kleisner, 

teddy.kleisner@us.army.mil 

1

This paper derives its information from Army and 

Joint doctrine, interviews with officers with PRT 

exposure in Afghanistan, and the writings of Andrew 

Krepinevich of CSBA and Henry Nuzum of OSD 

Policy. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 69 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Issue Paper 3: Introduction of a 

Multinational Force into the FATA 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 

This information paper discusses the potential impact 

United Nations involvement in the Federally 

Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West 

Frontier Province (NWFP) can have for the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. The following 

paragraphs outline the current environment in the 

FATA, detail existing Afghani, Pakistani, and Coalition 

efforts in the FATA, and present a potential plan that 

can yield a positive outcome in the region. 

The FATA borders Afghanistan to the west and 

Pakistan to the east. The chart below lists the most 

recent census data, as of 1998: 

Demographic indicators (Pakistan, NWFP and FATA, 1998) 

Indicator Pakistan NWFP FATA 

Geographical area (sq km) 796,096 74,521 27,220 

Population (thousands) 172,800 

(CY07) 

17,378 3,138 

Annual population growth, 1981–98 (%) 2.69 2.82 2.19 

Average household size (persons) 6.80 8.00 9.30 

Urban population (% of total) 32.50 16.87 2.70 

Population density (persons per sq km) 166.30 238.10 116.70 

Pakistan continues to face the difficult challenge of 

securing geographically separated borders from its 

―enemies.‖ To the west resides Afghanistan, with 

India sitting to Pakistan‘s east. The United Nations 

(UN) has a unique and fleeting opportunity to 

support Pakistan in defense of its western border. 

FATA stationed troops redeployed to the eastern 

Indian border on December 26, 2008. UN 

peacekeepers should fill this void until Pakistan can 

resume border security operations. The UN 

peacekeeping force will be comprised of multi-nation 

security teams under a UN mandate to secure 

Pakistan‘s western border (to include the NWFP and 

FATA). The inclusion of US assets in these teams 

must come from the UN Security Council, not the 

US government alone. However, the US must fight 

for inclusion to ensure that Taliban and al Qaeda 

FATA eradication remain at the forefront of the 

effort. Secondary efforts should focus on lines of 

communication (LOC) security and intelligence 

development. Once these teams are in place, the 

ability to fight insurgents within their sanctuary will 

pay enormous dividends to the counter-insurgency 

effort in Afghanistan. 

The most important aspects of this plan deal with its 

second and third order affects. First, ―western‖ 

troop insertions into the FATA will adversely affect 

Muslim perceptions. Muslims will view this as 

another example of western encroachment into the 

Muslim world. World leaders must ensure that the 

request for UN sponsored troops comes directly 

from the Pakistani government. Second, the UN 

mandate must definitively identify the area of 

operation for the effort. This will ensure the Muslim 

world understands the extent and nature of the 

effort. The third aspect to consider relates to the 

FATA and its inhabitants. Mistrustful of any outside 

support, the UN peacekeeping effort must recognize 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

the requirement to build relations among the 3+ 

million people living in the FATA. The timeframe of 

this operation should be considered within the next 

18 months. With this in mind, relationship 

development will facilitate later interactions with 

Pakistanis as they freely travel throughout the FATA 

(both in Afghanistan and Pakistan). This relationship 

development will also identify LOCs used by the 

nomadic populations throughout the FATA. 

Opposition to this plan remains heavy in both 

political and ideological arenas. However, if this plan 

is able to occur, the insurgents would lose the main 

sanctuary for their operations. As well, the 

insurgents would lose their ability to freely maneuver 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

REFERENCES 

Hussain, F. (2008, December 26). Tensions with India 

rise: Pakistan moves forces. Retrieved January 8, 2009, 

from Aaj TV Online - Pakistan Ki Awaz: 

http://www.aaj.tv/news/National/125222_detail.html 

Mukand, R. (2007, September 30). Bojoli. Retrieved 

January 8, 2009, from NGO Presence in FATA: 

http://www.boloji.com/opinion/0411.htm 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

Chapter 5: Team Leader Summary 

Overview 

In November 2008, the Command and General Staff 

College approved a pilot special research study to be 

conducted with two staff groups – staff groups 16A 

and 16B – to study the impact of the ―surge‖ in 

Afghanistan. The intent was to study the time period 

from December 2008 to August 2010, a critical time 

for operations in Afghanistan based on the election of 

a new administration and a shift in focus for the 

United States military from operations in Iraq to 

operations in Afghanistan. In this 18-20 month time 

frame, a critical planning factor was to show 

―discernible progress‖ in the security of Afghanistan. 

The intent of the special study was to use the two 

staff groups (32 officer students and five faculty 

members) to analyze in detail at least three different 

courses of action for the ―surge‖ effort in 

Afghanistan. The analysis would include a series of 

detailed wargames and a recommended executable 

course of action for the operational commander in 

Afghanistan. This study was similar to three other 

studies that had been conducted during the AOWC 1 

period in the past four years: 

* January-February 2004. US Army 

Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

Study Group. Sponsored by US Army G3 

IED Task Force Rapid Equipping Force. 

Research conducted by 68 student officers 

and 12 faculty members; produced a 238-

page report. 

* January-February 2007. US Army 

Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC) Operational Level Iraq Campaign 

Plan Study Group. Sponsored by the US 

Army Command and General Staff College. 

Research conducted by 64 student officers 

and 12 faculty members; produced a 568-

page report. 

* November-December 2007. US Army 

Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 

Domestic Drivers Study Group. Sponsored 

by Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). 

Research conducted by 15 student officers 

and 3 faculty members; produced a 68-page 

report. 

This pilot study was intended to be used as a different 

approach to meeting the same learning objectives 

from the AOWC 1 classes. AOWC 1 is focused on 

the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and 

Joint Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) 

level, using the current GAAT (Georgia-ArmeniaAzerbaijan-Turkey) common scenario. Using the 

current Afghanistan scenario was intended to meet 

the same purpose for AOWC as the GAAT scenario. 

The stated purpose for AOWC 1 is: 

To develop military professionals adept at 

making repetitive discretionary judgments 

and skilled in problem-solving under lethal, 

non-lethal, volatile, ambiguous, complicated, 

and uncertain circumstances within the 

spectrum of conflict in Joint, Interagency, and 

Multinational operations. 

To prepare Maneuver, Fires & Effects and 

Force Sustainment career field officers to 

serve on battle staffs of operational 

headquarters, to lead missions assigned to 

battalion- and brigade-size units, and to 

develop the professional skills and 

competencies they will require as senior 

field-grade leaders. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

AOWC also has designated ―Decisive Outcomes‖ 

and ―Supporting Outcomes‖ from the block of 

instruction. Again, the Afghanistan scenario was 

intended to use the identical outcomes – albeit with a 

different scenario – as the AOWC 1 common 

curriculum. The ―Decisive Outcomes‖ and the 

―Supporting Outcomes‖ for AOWC 1 are‖ 

AOWC Decisive Outcomes: 

AOWC graduates will be capable of... 

o	 Orchestrating the organization, 

manning, equipping, training, 

sustainment, administration and lifesupport, and the movement of units 

and task forces to produce 

Expeditionary Force Packages 

available for deployment to and 

ready for employment in a Theater 

of Operations. 

o	 Orchestrating the warfighting 

functions—Intelligence, Movement 

& Maneuver, Fire Support (lethal 

and non-lethal), Sustainment, 

Protection, Command & Control, 

and Leadership—within an area of 

operations to produce outcomes 

that further or accomplish assigned 

missions in Campaigns using fullspectrum combinations in: 

 Major Combat Operations. 

 Counterinsurgency. 

 Peace Operations. 

 Peacetime Military 

Engagement. 

AOWC Supporting Outcomes: 

AOWC graduates will accomplish AOWC 

Decisive Outcomes by... 

o	 Adapting and applying doctrine to 

solve military problems or address 

complex situations on the basis of 

professional judgment and 

knowledge, grounded in a critical 

evaluation the circumstances and 

military history and theory. 

o	 Supporting commanders or 

exercising command through 

visualizing, describing, and directing 

action and activities through military 

orders. In particular, demonstrating 

proficiency in crafting mission 

statements, concepts of operation, 

schemes of maneuver, lethal and 

non-lethal fire plans, and concepts 

of support. 

o	 Achieving proficiency in the war 

fighting function competencies and 

skills that underlie the battle staff 

tasks associated with their 

particular career fields. 

For the AOWC 1 Block, the specific goal of the 

month-long block was to: 

Develop officers with the attributes to serve 

effectively as JTF and JFLCC staff personnel 

immediately upon arrival in the unit of 

assignment. 

To meet the specific block goal and to achieve the 

decisive and supporting outcomes, there were three 

major Terminal Leaving Objectives (TLOs) for 

AOWC Block 1. These Terminal Learning 

Objectives were: 

TLO 701-AOW-2001: Evaluate Land 

Component Command Operations. 

TLO 701-AOW-2002: Recommend an 

executable concept for a Land Component 

Commander. 

TLO: 701-AOW-2003: Apply the Battle 

Command Systems. 

The pilot special research study – the Operational 

Level Afghanistan Campaign Plan Study Group – was 

designed to meet the same purpose, outcomes, and 

learning objectives as the common curriculum 

AOWC 1 block. The study was also conducted as an 

unclassified project using available open source 

material which allowed the use of International 

Military Students to provide their unique perspectives 

and contributions. The Study was centered on the 

operational level, and not the strategic/policy level 

(we did not address whether or not a ―surge‖ or 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

adding force structure in Afghanistan is the right 

course of action). Strategic objectives and the means 

to accomplish these objectives were taken from 

available sources as determined at the 

strategic/political level. The Study ultimately focused 

on the ―ways‖ to accomplish the ends with the means 

provided by the National Command Authority – the 

best way to use these additional forces associated 

with the ―surge.‖ 

In addition to meeting the purpose, outcomes, and 

learning objectives for AOWC 1, specific objectives 

for the pilot study included: 

1) Continue the piloting of the use of real 

world topics to meet learning objectives in 

the CGSC classrooms (as piloted in the 

three previous studies). 

2) Providing research products to the 

operational force through specialized studies 

to enhance CAC as the "Intellectual Center 

of the Army." 

3) Pilot a shift in focus from Iraq to 

Afghanistan within the leader development 

and education community. 

4) Pilot curriculum at 1:32 (the Iraq Surge 

two years ago study was 1:64; the GWOT 

study last year was 1:16). 

5) Pilot parallel strategic engagement 

opportunities with the study (including 

articles for publication and press interviews). 

Organization 

The organization of the two staff groups was designed 

in a ―cellular structure‖ based on the different 

stakeholders involved in the Afghanistan problem. 

These cells consisted of a faculty lead, a student lead, 

and students assigned within each of the cells. The 

cells were also given additional responsibilities to 

meet their requirements for the various products 

from the study. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page 74 

A total of 32 officer students were involved in the 

study, including two international officers, with 5 

faculty members. A total of five cells were 

established; a description of each of the cells follows. 

I. Red Cell (Adversary) 

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to conduct an indepth study of the various adversary organizations 

including their histories, composition, relationships, 

capabilities, objectives, operations, centers of gravity, 

end states, requirements, vulnerabilities, decision 

making, strategy, and targeting decisions in order to 

develop a RED strawman campaign plan for a current 

problem in the contemporary operational 

environment. 

Methodology: The RED Cell conducts research to 

identify sources revealing insurgent groups‘ histories, 

capabilities, requirements, vulnerabilities, objectives, 

and end states in order to allow the RED cell to 

conduct mission analysis and course of action 

development from the insurgents‘ perspectives with 

an end state of a tentative plan to gain the initiative to 

secure a culturally and ethnically diverse government 

supported by neighboring countries. After initially 

identifying the key enemy actors in Afghanistan, the 

RED Cell identified the major adversary groups and 

their interaction, and then represented their 

respective groups during the wargaming process. 

End State: The RED Cell provides an insurgency 

overview, identification of adversary groups and the 

interrelationships between groups, review of 

capabilities, lines of operation for insurgent groups, 

insurgent group requirements, vulnerabilities, most 

likely courses of action, most dangerous courses of 

action, and target decision making in order to provide 

an overview of potential adversary activities to 

counter International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIRoA) efforts to secure and stabilize 

Afghanistan. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

II. Blue Cell (Coalition/US Forces) 

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to conduct an 

in-depth study of the ISAF Coalition mission and 

objectives in order to develop a strawman campaign 

plan for current problem solving in the contemporary 

operational environment. 

Methodology: The BLUE Cell conducted research to 

identify different courses of action within Afghanistan 

to establish security, conduct combat operations, 

develop infrastructure, develop Afghan Security 

Forces, and to establish the rule of law in Afghanistan. 

This research was conducted in order to conduct a 

framing of the problem, mission analysis, course of 

action development, end state, major objectives, and 

then to represent the coalition forces in the 

wargaming process. As an important component of 

the development of the different courses of action, 

special emphasis was placed on the sustainment of 

forces and the JRSOI process for the introduction of 

the  ̳surge forces.‖ 

End State: Provide a recommended course of action 

to the ISAF commander for the use of surge forces to 

accomplish his mission of conducting military 

operations with GIRoA and in coordination with 

OEF, USAMA, and the international community in 

order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, 

establish a secure environment, extend viable 

governance, and promote development throughout 

Afghanistan. 

III. Green Cell (Host Nation) 

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to identify the 

GIRoA‘s critical issues and key consideration, and 

then to ensure that the BLUE Cell addresses those 

concerns in its proposed campaign plan with a viable 

plan for transitioning security to Afghan Security 

Forces. 

Methodology: The GREEN Cell conducted extensive 

research into the nature and composition of the 

current GIRoA government and the key factors 

within Afghanistan that must be considered by the 

ISAF forces. These considerations included the issue 

of ethnic groups (complicated by the Durand Line of 

1893), the Afghan and regional issues for security and 

confidence of the people, the tribal culture of 

Afghanistan and the lack of an historically-based 

central governance, and economic issues – 

particularly drug trafficking. The GREEN cell 

developed lines of operation for GIRoA, as well as a 

detailed center of gravity analysis and end state for 

Afghanistan, and represented Afghan interests in the 

wargaming process. 

End State: Create a product that the BLUE Cell can 

use to reconcile their priorities and problems with 

the GIRoA, and illustrate the Afghan perception of 

these issues. 

IV. Yellow Cell (“Out of the Box”) 

Purpose: To conduct research and analysis of various 

ideas, past proposals, recommendations and thought 

processes in order to develop concepts, ideas, and 

solutions worth considering in the attempt to resolve 

the dynamic problems currently confronting both the 

ISAF and GIRoA. 

Methodology: The group was comprised of three 

officer students and one faculty advisor. The group 

worked under the concept of minimal constraints to 

generate as many unique ideas as possible. The group 

discussed research findings, shared and recommended 

information sources, and discussed the validity of 

proposals and research findings. The cell identified 

potential branches to the courses of action during 

wargaming, as well as considering the larger regional 

issues that potentially impacted actions in Afghanistan. 

End State: As a result of individual research efforts 

and collaborative analysis, several branches to the 

courses of action were identified, as well as potential 

solutions for some of the ―wicked problems‖ within 

Afghanistan and the region. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

V. Black Cell (Research and Publications) 

Purpose: To provide overall direction and quality 

assurance for the compilation and completion of all 

deliverable products. 

Methodology: The Editorial Review Cell consisted of 

four students. Initially, the group identified the 

deliverable products for the entire study and created 

a template for the cell reports. It then created 

deadlines for drafts of the cell reports. Each cell was 

responsible to create a report of its methodology, 

course of action, and analysis of the best LOOs. Each 

author was responsible for providing academic 

citations to referenced works. The editorial cell 

facilitated this process and collaborated with each cell 

to ensure that each report was complete, 

understandable, and properly annotated. The Black 

Cell also coordinated strategic engagements and 

visitor control for the study. 

End State: To compile the final written report and to 

consolidate findings. 

Objectives 

I. Meet all of the terminal learning objectives 

of the Advanced Operations and Warfighting 

Course (AOWC) Block One while conducting 

the special study. 

AOWC Block 1 met for a total of 20 instructional 

days. During this time frame, students continued to 

attend the normally scheduled History and 

Leadership classes, as well as guest speakers and the 

Air Force JFACC class (W131). As a result, the 

actual time dedicated to the Afghanistan study was 

approximately 90 hours of contact instruction over a 

four week period (interrupted by the two week 

Christmas holiday break). 

Five of the 90 hours of instruction was dedicated to 

designated case studies (Soviets in Afghanistan, The 

French in Algeria, and Galula’s Counterinsurgency 

Warfare: Theory and Practice). 

The Terminal Learning Objectives for the remaining 

periods of instruction covered the following areas: 

TLO 701-AOW-2101: Evaluate Land 

Component Command operations 

TLO 701-AOW-2102: Recommend an 

executable concept for a Land 

Component Commander. 

TLO 701-AOW-2103: Apply the Battle 

Command Systems 

The Enabling Learning Objectives (ELOs) covered 

during this block included: 

Assess the challenges of Land 

Component Command organizational 

structure and command element. 

Analyze an operational level mission 

(mission analysis). 

Analyze the Courses of Action 

(Conduct Wargaming) 

Prepare an estimate 

Analyze historic COIN Operations. 

Develop a theater concept of support. 

Analyze how SOF functions in the 

military decision making process 

(MDMP). 

Incorporate SOF into the military 

decision making process (MDMP). 

Plan land component shaping operations 

The students satisfied all of the Terminal Learning 

Objectives and Enabling Learning Objectives during 

the period of instruction – in fact, most of the 

learning levels were exceeded during the period of 

instruction due to the amount of detail and extensive 

wargaming that was conducted. One additional 

enabling learning objective that was met during the 

Afghanistan Study was ―comparison of courses of 

action.‖ Because the students conducted multiple 

wargames against both adversary most likely and 

most dangerous courses of action, this ELO was met 

(which is met in the common curriculum in AOWC 

2). 

In terms of assessment, the product for the students 

was briefed in detail to the CAC Commander and 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Commandant, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, on 18 

December 2008; the students additionally provided a 

detailed briefing of their findings and 

recommendations to LTG (Ret) Lawson W. 

Magruder III. The written report also serves as a 

major assessment instrument for achieving the TLOs 

and ELOs, as well as daily observations by the faculty. 

II. Meet the Decisive Outcomes of the 

Advanced Operations and Warfighting 

Course. 

As mentioned above, the decisive outcomes of the 

AOWC course are to create AOWC graduates who 

are capable of: 

Orchestrating the organization, manning, 

equipping, training, sustainment, 

administration and life-support, and the 

movement of units and task forces to 

produce Expeditionary Force Packages 

available for deployment to and ready for 

employment in a Theater of Operations. 

Orchestrating the warfighting functions— 

Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, Fire 

Support (lethal and non-lethal), Sustainment, 

Protection, Command & Control, and 

Leadership—within an area of operations to 

produce outcomes that further or 

accomplish assigned missions in Campaigns 

using full-spectrum combinations in: 

o Major Combat Operations 

o Counterinsurgency 

o Peace Operations 

o Peacetime Military Engagement 

These decisive outcomes were the focus for the 

Afghanistan Study – to use a real world situation to 

orchestrate the introduction of additional forces into 

a theater of operations. The additional emphasis on 

sustainment and JRSOI provided realistic constraints 

for the force flow, as well as the realities of the 

ARFORGEN cycle and availability of forces for the 

―surge.‖ Wargaming was also conducted using the 

warfighting functions as a driving factor to develop 

―asset-task-purpose‖ statements for the BLUE and 

RED forces; this was expanded to include the entire 

array of the instruments of national power to go 

beyond the warfighting functions, including a 

comprehensive approach to Afghanistan. 

III. Meet the Supporting Outcomes of the 

Advanced Operations and Warfighting 

Course. 

As mentioned above, the supporting outcomes of the 

AOWC course are to create AOWC graduates who 

are capable of: 

Adapting and applying doctrine to solve 

military problems or address complex 

situations on the basis of professional 

judgment and knowledge, grounded in a 

critical evaluation the circumstances and 

military history and theory. 

Supporting commanders or exercising 

command through visualizing, describing, and 

directing action and activities through 

military orders. In particular, demonstrating 

proficiency in crafting mission statements, 

concepts of operation, schemes of 

maneuver, lethal and non-lethal fire plans, 

and concepts of support. 

Achieving proficiency in the war fighting 

function competencies and skills that 

underlie the battle staff tasks associated with 

their particular career fields. 

The students gained a much greater appreciation for 

doctrine and campaign planning skills as identified in 

Joint Doctrine, Army Doctrine, TRADOC Pam 525-

5-500 (Commander‘s Appreciation and Campaign 

Design), and through available sources such as Galula 

and open source material. The students additionally 

adapted doctrine and campaign design tools to 

establish a rubric for evaluation criteria (used for 

comparison of courses of action), and for further 

development of the CC-CR-CV construct in JP 3-0 

and JP 5-0. In addition, the students developed the 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

TTP for operational level wargaming using campaign 

planning tools such as lines of operation and COG 

analysis. Students also used the new construct of 

―understand-visualize-describe-direct‖ as described in 

FM 3-0, as well as the problem framing techniques in 

TRADOC Pam 525-5-500. 

IV. Continue the piloting of the use of real 

world topics to meet learning objectives in the 

CGSC classrooms (as piloted in the three 

previous studies). 

The students were able to use the Afghanistan 

Scenario to fully pilot meeting the learning objectives 

and outcomes of the AOWC block. This pilot kept 

the students and faculty engaged during the entire 

instructional period, and provided a level of relevance 

not met in the current GAAT scenario. 

The study, admittedly, took a great amount of 

preparation for both students and faculty. Although 

the learning objectives for the AOWC 1 block were 

already established, gathering the materials to help 

―drive‖ the study from a multitude of unclassified 

sources was a challenge. The easier path of using 

existing curriculum that has already been fully 

developed would eliminate much of the preparatory 

time for the study – but would also diminish the 

relevance and salience of the instruction. 

V. Providing research products to the 

operational force through specialized studies 

to enhance CAC as the "Intellectual Center of 

the Army." 

The primary research product, the written report, 

will provide the operational decision maker an 

independent analysis of how to approach the 

operational level planning in Afghanistan. The outline 

of the initial product has been provided to GEN 

McKiernan; although he will likely not adopt some of 

the recommendations of the study, it does provide 

not only independent analysis but also an indicator of 

the intellectual capacity of Fort Leavenworth – all 

while meeting the learning objectives of the CGSS 

course. 

VI. Pilot a shift in focus from Iraq to 

Afghanistan within the leader development 

and education community 

Institutionally, the Army is moving from the COIN 

fight in Iraq to focusing on the ―wicked problem‖ in 

Afghanistan. By necessity, CGSC should also stay 

abreast of the current operational environment by 

continuing to adapt the curriculum to the challenges 

of the real world. 

A real benefit of the study – apart from meeting 

learning objectives and providing the ISAF 

commander with independent analysis, is the 

knowledge base of the students and faculty. The 

focus on Afghanistan has increased the knowledge 

base of those involved in the study of the current 

situation; addressing a new problem has also caused a 

focus on the process of addressing a new problem 

and new environment. As a result, the shift in focus 

has not only had a benefit in the content, but also in 

the process – furthering the concept of addressing 

―how to think‖ and how to approach problems. 

VII. Pilot curriculum at 1:32 (the Iraq Surge 

two years ago study was 1:64; the GWOT 

study last year was 1:16). 

The physical configuration of the Lewis and Clark 

facility creates challenges for four staff groups to 

conduct a similar study; since the largest classroom 

that can be created is a two-staff group configuration, 

this objective was addressed primarily because of 

physical constraints. The results, however, were 

promising – 32 students and 5 faculty members does 

provide a sufficient number to address a problem in 

sufficient detail to conduct wargaming and still have a 

number of disparate cells. For the pilots, I have been 

involved in using one staff group (16 students) and 

four staff groups (64 students) in the past; the most 

promising configuration to date is with two staff 

groups (32 students). 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

VIII. Pilot parallel strategic engagement 

opportunities with the study (including articles 

for publication and press interviews). 

There were several excellent opportunities for 

strategic engagement with the Afghanistan study. 

Because the study was unique and relevant, it was 

much easier to get press interested in conducting 

interviews and covering the story. The initial story in 

the Associated Press (Mr. John Milburn) also helped 

to attract the attention of the local FOX affiliate in 

Kansas City to conduct interviews and cover the 

story. 

As a direct result of the study, over a third of the 

students in the two staff groups were able to meet 

their strategic engagement requirement for the year – 

and this opportunity enabled them to point to some 

of the great things they were able to work on. 

More importantly, the emphasis on strategic 

engagement raised the visibility of the students (and 

faculty) to engage the American public – let them 

know the great things they are working on, and share 

their own story. This was evident in the interviews, 

the blogs, and the other strategic engagements that 

were conducted in conjunction with the Afghanistan 

study. 

Team Leader Comments 

The Afghanistan Study group is the fourth time in the 

past five years that CGSC students and faculty have 

―departed from the curriculum‖ to address a complex 

problem in the real world as the ―driver‖ for meeting 

the learning objectives for CGSS. Both CGSC and 

outside agencies can greatly benefit from allowing 

CGSS staff groups to undertake such challenges. A 

CGSS staff group (or combination of staff groups) is a 

unique group that is ideally suited to tackle problems 

in the COE. A typical staff group consists of over 30 

field grade officers (O-4) from each military service as 

well as international students from across the globe. 

These students bring a wealth of operational 

experience and perspective with them to CGSC. 

Many of the students have impressive academic 

credentials as well. By combining their experiences, 

academic abilities, and the resources of CGSC— 

especially the time and resources to conduct 

research— a CGSS staff group has the unique ability 

to serve the nation at essentially no cost and be a 

force multiplier to the units who are engaged in 

fighting a current problem but who do not have the 

time or the ability to thoughtfully study the problem. 

A CGSS section contains a massive amount of talent 

and ability. It makes sense to tap into these qualities. 

Moreover, the study group process greatly benefits 

the students as well by developing their research and 

writing skills, as well as their critical thinking skills. 

The study group process forces each student to 

communicate his or her views and to express, both 

verbally and in writing, the rationale behind those 

views. This process is more challenging than the 

traditional AOWC Block One curriculum, yet it 

satisfies each of the TLOs for the block. More 

importantly, though, the process enables students to 

immerse themselves in the complex problems that 

they will likely face upon graduation from CGSC. 

Hence, students will take the lessons of the study 

group—both the substantive conclusions as well as 

the process used to reach those conclusions—out 

into the force and immediately make a positive 

contribution to their gaining units. This is in keeping 

with AOWC‘s overall purpose to develop in students 

the professional skills and competencies they will 

require as senior field-grade leaders. 

Like the students, the faculty team for a CGSS staff 

group is also ideally suited to guide students through 

the study of complex problems. The faculty is 

composed of a diverse group of instructors. The vast 

majority of instructors have completed full military 

careers of 20 years or more service. An everincreasing number of the faculty have PhDs or have 

completed extensive graduate-level schooling. Many 

of the faculty members have at least five years of 

teaching experience at CGSC and are intimately 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

familiar with complex problem solving methods and 

MDMP. 

In the Afghanistan Study, the faculty guided the 

students through the process of organizing each cell 

and grasping the true nature of the problems 

confronting each cell. They also facilitated the 

identification of critical objectives for each cell and 

how to best address those objectives through 

research and collaboration with other students and 

faculty. Additionally, the faculty provided feedback 

and azimuth checks to students on a regular basis. By 

combining their experience and expertise as well as 

their understanding of the objectives of ILE/AOWC, 

the faculty served as a force multiplier that greatly 

enhanced the students‘ experience with the study. 

There are several additional problems that could 

serve as the basis for a future CGSS study. These 

include: 

Detailed development of the 

―comprehensive approach‖ (Beyond 

Goldwater-Nichols); 

 ―Re-set‖ issues for the operational force at 

the conclusion of OIF/OIF; and 

 Future GWOT campaigns. 

Another interesting possibility would be to establish a 

much longer study with closer collaboration with 

operational headquarters – establishing a six month 

study as an independent ―think tank‖ to work long 

term on a contemporary problem. 

Additional Observations 

I. Functions of the individual cells. 

The design for the cell structure was based upon a 

similar study conducted for the IED problem in Iraq 

in 2004 and the Iraq Study Group in 2007. The cell 

structure worked well for all three of the studies. 

The importance of a separate cell (the GREEN Cell) 

for the host nation is absolutely essential to ensure 

that their interests are represented. In addition, 

using a YELLOW Cell to institutionalize the ―out-ofUNCLASSIFED  Page 80 

the-box‖ approach is necessary to ensure that there 

are students charged with thinking beyond the stated 

problem. 

One addition to the cell structure would be to 

ensure that interagency partners are fully 

represented. As more interagency students attend 

CGSC, this will be easier – but was a particular 

challenge with the Afghanistan study. Although the 

students and faculty tried to represent the 

perspectives of the interagency, there is inadequate 

understanding within the current staff group to do 

this function properly. The same holds true for the 

NGO and PVO community. A possible short term 

solution would be to invite interagency to participate 

in these types of studies on a TDY basis to at least 

have these interests represented. 

II. Support of the Study. 

This study, like the other previous studies, received 

enormous support from the college and the individual 

departments within CGSS. After initially presenting 

the concept of the Afghanistan Study, the students 

and faculty received full support to complete the 

study. COL Dan Roper and COL Bob Burns 

generously gave of their time to talk with the 

students concerning their recent trips to Afghanistan; 

LTG Caldwell made time in his schedule to visit the 

classroom and to receive an in-depth IPR briefing. 

Many of the members of the CGSC faculty dropped 

by the classroom to observe the process and 

provided useful comments. It was greatly appreciated 

to have this level of support and interest in the study. 

There were also a number of other agencies within 

the school that provided superb support to the 

Afghanistan Study. Classroom Services was 

enormously helpful in the set up of the classroom as 

we continually reconfigured between 1:16 and 1:32. 

DLDC provided great assistance with automation and 

mapping capabilities. Many faculty members with 

subject matter expertise made themselves available to 

assist with the study. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

III. Doctrinal Issues 

Two years ago, during the Iraq study Group, there 

were a number of doctrinal issues that were 

identified that posed problems – these included the 

concept of stability mechanisms and defeat 

mechanisms, lines of operation, and center of gravity 

analysis. 

For the Afghanistan Study, most of these issues have 

been resolved with the publication of FM 3-0 and FM 

3-07. The only remaining doctrinal disconnect that 

was apparent during the Afghanistan Study was 

concerning Center of Gravity Analysis. JP 5-0 

describes the ―Dr. Strange‖ model of center of 

gravity analysis (CC-CR-CV), but this construct does 

not exist in Army doctrine. This became apparent 

when the students briefed senior officers – who were 

unfamiliar with the construct. 

Conducting a wargame at the operational level 

provided some additional challenges for the 

Afghanistan Study, as it did during the Iraq Study. 

Joint and Army doctrine do not provide sufficient 

clarity to wargaming at the operational level, so there 

were modifications to the wargaming procedures 

used within the Afghanistan Study. These 

modifications included conducting a ―three-way 

wargame‖ because of the importance of including the 

GREEN Cell (GIRoA) in the wargame process. The 

use of considering logical lines of operation during 

each of the wargaming turns was also incorporated to 

ensure that second and third order effects were 

analyzed during the wargame. 

IV. Student and Faculty Participation. 

One of the important issues for such a study is to 

garner student and faculty ―buy in‖ for the process. 

This is particularly true when participation in the 

study requires a greater workload for the students 

and faculty. The relevance of the study – in the eyes 

of the participants – is absolutely necessary for buy in 

and voluntary active participation. For the 

Afghanistan study, there was no question about the 

relevance and importance of the subject matter – but 

there still required emphasis that the actual work 

being done on the important subject was, in itself, 

important. For all of the students and faculty, simply 

studying the issues in Afghanistan in-depth led to a 

greater personal understanding of the issues in 

Afghanistan and emerging doctrine. One of the 

advantages of the Afghanistan study was the personal 

involvement of the CAC commander, as well as the 

press interest in the study. 

For studies of this type in the future, the outcomes 

must be clearly stated – first, the outcomes should 

indicate educational outcomes that replicate the 

classes being replaced (the reason for being in 

CGSC); secondly, the outcomes should have a 

personal impact on the professional development of 

students and faculty; and thirdly, the outcomes should 

indicate if the report or findings will have an impact 

outside CGSC. 

V. Educational Outcomes. 

An important issue for the ASG was the quality of the 

educational outcomes as compared to what would 

have been achieved had the team conducted the 

regular classes (W100) as designed. This is an 

enormously difficult assessment to make, since there 

is no clear assessment mechanism that can compare 

what happened to what did not happen. Even though 

the assessment from the faculty was that all of the 

learning objectives were met, this is primarily a 

subjective assessment. 

There still remains, however, a cost to conducting 

the Afghanistan Study. The transition from AOWC 1 

to AOWC 2 (back to the GAAT) will require 

additional effort and time for the students. This 

transition will require a ―reset‖ to the previous 

scenario to get back ―up to speed.‖ 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Conclusion 

The Afghanistan Study was a huge success – both 

students and faculty feel privileged to have had this 

opportunity to address the real world problem. The 

study process challenged students academically as 

they conducted independent research and engaged in 

critical thinking about the challenges facing the US 

and Afghanistan in the next 18 months. It also 

afforded students the opportunity to immerse 

themselves in the problems confronting Afghanistan, 

enabling them to gain a deeper, more informed 

understanding of those problems than they had 

before beginning the study. Moreover, the study 

highlighted the utility of using CGSS students and 

faculty to study contemporary complex problems. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan
 

Study Group
 ANNEX A: Wargaming Results 

NOTE: In this section, the words ―Task‖ and 

―Purpose‖ are abbreviated by the letters ―T:‖ and 

―P:‖ respectively. 

COA 1 – Winter Offensive (Feb-Apr 09) 

(TURN 1) 

Forces Available: 

1 BCT, 2BCT, 3BCT 

Overall Task and Purpose: 

T: Clear, Hold, Build throughout the AO: 1BCT-RCS, 

Kandahar, Konar; 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita; 3BCTKandahar 

P: Establish a secure environment to enable growth of 

capabilities within the Afghan government and 

security force. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver - T: Clear, Hold, Build throughout the AO 

1BCT-RCS, Kandahar, Konar 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita 

3BCT-Kandahar, P: Establish a secure environment to 

enable growth of capabilities within the Afghan 

government and security force. 

Fires –T: Support Ground Operations; P: Allow BCTs 

freedom of maneuver 

Protection – T: Secure operating bases P: Provide 

security of operating bases for follow on forces 

Sustainment –T: Conduct supply of operational 

forces; Support coalition forces 

Intelligence – T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan P: Prepare for RSOI, 

develop intelligence on LOCs, and protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2 –T: Develop C2 infrastructure; P: Enable ongoing 

operations. 

Leadership –T: Develop and manage new C2 

structure; P: Maintain positive control of all assets. 

Information – T: Co-op fractionalized/marginalized 

elements of anti-Afghan forces, P: Allow MNF to 

destroy anti-Afghan forces; T: Disrupt anti-Afghan 

forces‘ command and control capabilities, P: Isolate 

the anti-Afghan forces leadership; T: Inform the 

Afghan populace, P: Deny the anti-Afghan forces 

popular support; T: Co-opt the Afghan populace, P: 

Create public support for GIRoA. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: This will lessen the fear 

created by AQ. 

Governance: This will support the populace and 

government by providing security and safety. They 

will be more likely to support the coalition and the 

Afghan government. 

Security / Combat Operations: There will be an 

increase in Afghan patrols in the local areas. 

Reconciliation: This will allow for continued 

identification of elements that will and will not 

support the coalition. 

Infrastructure: This will assist in creating /rebuilding 

the infrastructure and C2, hubs to support inflow of 

new forces. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Train ANSF: This will assist in training Afghan security 

forces. 

COA 1 – Winter Offensive (Feb-Apr 09) 

(TURN 1 - Reaction) 

Forces Available: 

No change. 

Overall Task and Purpose: 

No change. 

Elements of Combat Power (Task and 

Purpose): 

No change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: We will begin losing the 

initiative on the frontier region. 

Governance: Services provided by the Afghan 

governments and NGOs will be impacted based on 

RED actions and may reduce or withdraw support. 

Security / Combat Operations: Conducting raids on 

RED supply points, interfacing with the people. 

Afghani people see increase in ANSF patrols. 

Insurgent actions begin to decrease. 

Reconciliation: Work with tribal leaders to influence 

non-compliant or wavering players. 

Infrastructure: No change. 

Train ANSF: Continue to recruit more ANSF. 

COA 1 – RED Offensive (APR - MAY 09) 

(TURN 2) 

BLUE Counter-Action: 

Forces Available: 

1 BCT, 2BCT, 3BCT 

Overall Task and Purpose: (no change from 

before) 

T: Clear, Hold, Build throughout the AO: 1BCT-RCS, 

Kandahar, Konar; 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita; 3BCTKandahar. 

P: Establish a secure environment to enable growth of 

capabilities within the Afghan government and 

security force. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: (only change is sustainment) 

Maneuver - T: Clear, Hold, Build throughout the AO 

1BCT-RCS, Kandahar, Konar 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita 

3BCT-Kandahar, P: Establish a secure environment to 

enable growth of capabilities within the Afghan 

government and security force. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Secure operating bases P: Provide 

security of operating bases for follow on forces. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct supply of operational 

forces; Support coalition forces; T: With additional 

Sustainment Brigade, build upon existing 

infrastructure; P: prepare the logistical architecture. 

Intelligence –T: Identification and Warning (I&W) of 

possible attacks, targetable intelligence on threat 

forces, IO theme development, pattern analysis to 

develop counter-tactics, surging focus to RC-S and E 

w/additional BCTs, work w/ CENTCOM J-2 on 

threats & intelligence support to GLOCs external to 

Afghanistan; P: protect population and coalition 

forces. 

C2 –T: Develop C2 infrastructure; P: Enable ongoing 

operations. 

Leadership –T: Develop and manage new C2 

structure; P: Maintain positive control of all assets. 

Information – T: No change; P: No change. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: RED continues to maintain 

the initiative. 

Governance: No change. 

Security / Combat Operations: There will be an 

increase in Afghan patrols in the local areas. 

Reconciliation: No change. 

Infrastructure: Additional contracting personnel are 

moved into theater to support the increased force 

structure. Increase the number of finance personnel 

to support payment of local contracts. 

Train ANSF: Higher than normal attrition and 

turnover rate, but we are still able to recruit new 

forces. 

COA 1 – Command and Control 

Enhancements (TURN 3) 

BLUE Action: 

Forces Available: 

1 BCT, 2BCT, 3BCT, 4BCT, 5 BCT; two new 3-star 

HQs (MNC-A and CSTC-A). 

Overall Task and Purpose: 

T: Clear, Hold, build throughout the AO: 1BCT-RCS, 

Kandahar, Konar; 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita; 3BCTKandahar. 

P: Establish a secure environment to enable growth of 

capabilities within the Afghan government and 

security force. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver - T: Clear, Hold, Build throughout the AO 

1BCT-RCS, Kandahar, Konar 2BCT-Pakita, Parhita 

3BCT-Kandahar; P: Establish a secure environment to 

enable growth of capabilities within the Afghan 

government and security force. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Secure operating bases; P: Provide 

security of operating bases for follow on forces. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct supply of operational 

forces; Support coalition forces. 

Intelligence –T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan P: Protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2 –T: Develop C2 infrastructure; P: Enable ongoing 

operations. 

Leadership –T: Develop and manage new C2 

structure; P: Maintain positive control of all assets. 

Information – T: No change; P: No change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: This action will lessen the 

fear created by the AQ. 

Governance: This action will support the populace 

and government. 

Security / Combat Operations: There will be an 

increase in Afghan patrols in the local areas 

generating support for Coalition forces. 

Reconciliation: This action will allow for continued 

identification of elements that will and will not 

support the coalition. 

Infrastructure: This action will assist in creating 

/rebuilding the infrastructure and C2 hubs to support 

inflow of new forces. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Train ANSF: This action will assist in training Afghan 

security forces . 

COA 1 – Winter Offensive (Feb-Apr 09) 

(TURN 3 - Reaction) 

Forces Available: 

No change. 

Overall Task and Purpose: 

No change. 

Elements of Combat Power (Task and 

Purpose): 

No change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Assessment of Winter Offensive: 

Information Operations: We will begin losing the 

initiative on the frontier region. 

Governance: Services will be impacted based on RED 

actions. 

Security / Combat Operations: Conducting raids on 

RED supply points, interfacing with the people and 

building local relationships. 

Reconciliation: Work w/tribal leaders to influence 

non-compliant players. 

Infrastructure: This will assist in creating /rebuilding 

the infrastructure and C2 hubs to support inflow of 

new forces. 

Train ANSF: This will assist in training & recruiting 

Afghan security forces. 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT FREEDOM OF 

ACTION 

TRANSITIONABILITY 

Neutral 

Total population 

not impacted. 

Neutral 

Still building power 

that has not 

materialized. 

Plus 

Committed 

more toward 

building forces 

rather than 

disrupting the 

population. 

Not conducting 

offensive Ops. 

Neutral 

Committed to the 

COA, still have 

freedom of 

maneuver for RC 

CDRs. 

Neutral 

No focus on the other 

operational capabilities. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Assessment of RED Offensive: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

Neutral 

Total population 

not impacted. 

Neutral 

Still building power 

that has not 

materialized. 

Plus 

Committed 

more toward 

building forces 

rather than 

disrupting the 

population. Not 

conducting 

offensive Ops. 

Neutral 

Committed to the 

COA, still have 

freedom of 

maneuver for RC 

CDRs. 

Neutral 

No focus on the other 

operational capabilities. 

Assessment of Command and Control Change: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT FREEDOM OF 

ACTION 

TRANSITIONABILITY 

Neutral 

Total population 

Neutral 

Still building power 

Plus 

Committed 

more toward 

building 

Neutral 

Committed to the 

Neutral 

No focus on the other 

Assessment of External Hostility: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT FREEDOM OF 

ACTION 

TRANSITIONABILITY 

Neutral 

Total population 

Neutral 

Still building power 

Plus 

Committed 

more toward 

building 

Neutral 

Committed to 

the 

Neutral 

No focus on the other 

COA 1 – Command & Control (JUL/AUG 09) Forces Available: Command and Control: to 

(TURN 1 – 3A) occur July/August 2009; Introduces 3-star operational 

HQs; incorporates 2 new BCTs. 

BLUE Action: 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Summary: 

Sustainment Brigade in Kandahar to set up APOD; 

British Brigade in South; US Brigade in South; Multinational Brigade in South; in west situation not 

changed; in east, will split up AO‘s for BCTs; one will 

have Konar; one will have Kandahar and Bagram 

(smaller battle space). 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver - T: Deploy into Bagram; Kandahar; P: 

Conduct RSOI to enable future ops. 

Fires –T: Support Ground Operations; P: Allow BCTs 

freedom of maneuver. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct RSOI; P: Facilitate inflow of 

2 US BCTs and Supporting elements. 

Intelligence –T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: Prepare for RSOI 

and developing intelligence on LOCs. 

C2/ Leadership –T: Establish 3-Star MNC HQ; P: 

Controlling tactical operations. 

Information – T: Co-op fractionalized/marginalized 

elements of anti-Afghan forces; P: Allow MNF to 

destroy anti-Afghan forces; T: Disrupt anti-Afghan 

forces‘ command and control capabilities, P: Isolate 

the anti-Afghan forces leadership; T: Inform the 

Afghan populace, P: Deny the anti-Afghan forces 

popular support; T: Co-opt the Afghan populace, P: 

create public support for GIRoA. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: More troops to reassure and 

strengthen will to mobilize; will split population 

(invader vs. secure) some challenge with people on 

frontiers (xenophobes); population may be split -

some ethnic groups will be frustrated. 

Governance: Support to Afghan government with 

additional troops; question Afghan government 

capabilities (timing of elections and results) additional 

US troops require us to emphasize to Afghan 

government that we are here to support them. 

Security / Combat Operations: Heightened security 

as units move towards JRSOI and preparing for 

RIP/TOA; less patrols and combat ops because units 

conducting JRSOI. 

Reconciliation: Interacting w/tribal leaders; adverse 

affect as BCTs deploy, need to orient/introduce them 

to tribal leaders and location population; ultimately 

has adverse effect on reconciliation. 

Infrastructure: Template C2 for surge brigades; 

additional contracts and construction to support 

influx of personnel; re-establishes support; C2 more 

difficult especially US communications infrastructure; 

drop down to critical commodities (US); negotiations 

with government to take more land; stress road 

networks; increasing contracts; black & grey water 

support; stressed; living quarters tight; DFACs at max 

capacity; real estate issues at Bagram and Kandahar; 

increasing road stress; lead time required about 45 to 

60 days to set up operations for life support. 

Train ANSF: Focused on building combat power. 

COA 1 – Command & Control (JUL/AUG 09) 

(TURN 2 – 3B) 

BLUE Action: 

Forces Available: Command and Control: to 

occur July/August 2009; Introduces 3-star operational 

HQs; incorporates 2 new BCTs. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Summary: 

Main route to Nimroos Province; other BCTs will 

shift east; relief in place; clear, hold, build ops; US 

BCT conducting clear, hold, build; will start ops in 

suburbs around Kandahar; last BCT in east of RCSouth centered on Malac; in east, 5th BCT in Bagram 

will move along main MSR and move north; other 

BCT in Jalabad in south; 3rd will operate in are X; 4th 

and 5th relief in place. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(additional info listed; all others no change): 

Maneuver - T: Deploy into Bagram; Kandahar; P: 

Conduct RSOI to enable future ops. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement; additional info - Larger 

convoys; relook size of PCF; may consolidate forces 

for greater power; increase ISR assets. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct RSOI; P: Facilitate inflow of 

2 US BCTs and supporting elements. 

Intelligence – T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, additional 

info - push to mountains as available, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership –T: Establish 3-Star MNC HQ; P: 

Controlling Tactical Ops; additional info -

Operational HQ by Aug 09- Multi-national 3-star 

HQs (may need mandate; US led - support by multinational staff). 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: population centers; divide 

growing bigger w/ frontier; coalition partners have 

pressure to pull-out due to increased activity; 

reporting on news; 3rd parties (NGOs) scaling back 

due to increased attacks on frontier. 

Governance: disruption of government services; 

NGOs and IGAs may pull-out. 

Security / Combat Operations: Increased resources; 

ISR; combat flights, attack aviation, CAS; foot patrol 

size; raids on suspected sites; reduce VBEDs and 

suicide bombers; working with IO; more ANA and 

ANP in joint ops; increase combat ops and more 

forces to isolated areas. Afghani people see more 

ANSF taking a leading role with US forces in support 

generates support for the GIRoA; Enemy begins to 

lay low as a result of increase kinetic strikes. 

Reconciliation: Working with frontier region using 

IO. 

Infrastructure: Template C2 for surge brigades; 

additional contracts and construction to support 

influx of personnel; re-establishes support; C2 more 

difficult especially US communications infrastructure; 

drop down to critical commodities (US); negotiations 

with government to take more land; stress road 

networks; increasing contracts; black & grey water 

support; stressed; living quarters tight; DFACs at max 

capacity; real estate issues at Bagram and Kandahar; 

increasing road stress; lead time required about 45 to 

60 days to set up operations for life support. 

Train ANSF: Recruitment at population centers due 

to high turnover rate. 

COA 1 – Command & Control (JUL/AUG 09) 

(TURN 2 – 3B, Reaction) 

BLUE Reaction: 

Forces Available: Command and Control: to occur 

July/August 2009; Introduces 3-star operational HQs; 

incorporates 2 new BCTs. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Summary: 

Main route to Nimroos Province; other BCTs will 

shift east; relief in place; clear, hold, build ops; US 

BCT conducting clear, hold, build; will start ops in 

suburbs around Kandahar; last BCT in east of RCSouth centered on Malac; in east, 5th BCT in Bagram 

will move along main MSR and move north; other 

BCT in Jalabad in south; 3rd will operate in are X; 4th 

and 5th relief in place. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(no change): 

Maneuver - T: Deploy into Bagram; Kandahar; P: 

Conduct RSOI to enable future ops. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement; additional info - Larger 

convoys; relook size of PCF; may consolidate forces 

for greater power; increase ISR assets. 

Sustainment – T: Conduct RSOI; P: Facilitate inflow of 

2 US BCTs and supporting elements. 

Intelligence – T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, additional 

info - push to mountains as available, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership –T: Establish 3-Star MNC HQ; P: 

Controlling Tactical Ops; additional info -

Operational HQ by Aug 09- Multi-national 3-star 

HQs (may need mandate; US led - support by multinational staff). 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Losses due to enemy attack 

- Challenge to keep Platoon size FOBs with enemy 

attempts to overrun Platoon size FOBs; continuing to 

win support in population centers however there is 

still an extant divide between frontier and population 

centers. Some concerns about news in CONUS. 

Coalition partners will be challenged to leave 

however they will probably not depart at this stage 

yet. Some challenges for NGOs due to increased 

hostilities 

Governance: There will be a disruption of limited 

government services especially due to reduced 

services from NGOs/PVOs. 

Security / Combat Operations: Increase in personnel 

in smaller COPs as well as the number of smaller 

COPs. There will be more ISR and assets available to 

them. There will be increased number and numbers 

of patrols. Within the cities will be more permanent 

checkpoints and as well as increased raids on cache 

sites and VBIED construction sites. More ANA and 

ANP working with coalition forces on joint 

operations to show Afghan face for operations. More 

indirect fire assets will be available to COPs. New 

relationships are fostered with new US forces and 

local Afghanis. 

Reconciliation: Working to get populace to support 

the coalition. 

Infrastructure: Support to ISR by bringing some assets 

out of Iraq. 

Train ANSF: Recruitment of new forces is high 

because of turnover rate, improvements to assets. 

COA 1 – Command & Control & Expansion 

(JUL/AUG 09) (TURN 3 – 3C, Action) 

BLUE Reaction: 

Forces Available: (no change) Command and 

Control: to occur July/August 2009; Introduces 3-star 

operational HQs; incorporates 2 new BCTs. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Summary (no change): 

Begin "spider web" from large population centers to 

rural areas; en-roads into rural areas controlled by 

RED; partnering with ANA / ANSF; limited coalition 

forces will remain in population centers to sustain 

progress. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(no change unless listed as additional): 

Maneuver - T: Deploy into Bagram; Kandahar; P: 

Conduct RSOI to enable future ops. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement; additional info - Larger 

convoys; relook size of PCF; may consolidate forces 

for greater power; increase ISR assets; additional T: 

Protect new GLOC; P: protect Coalition forces. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct RSOI; P: Facilitate inflow of 

2 US BCTs and Supporting Elements; Additional T: 

Expand theater log infra; prepare to open a new 

GLOC; P: Take over log infra from Sustainment 

brigade, facilitate coalition operations. 

Intelligence – T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, additional 

info - push to mountains as available, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership –T: Establish 3-Star MNC HQ; P: 

Controlling Tactical Ops; additional info -

Operational HQ by Aug 09- Multi-national 3-star 

HQs (may need mandate; US led - support by multinational staff). 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: No change. 

Governance: There will be a disruption of limited 

government especially due to reduced services from 

NGOs/PVOs 

Security / Combat Operations: Increase in personnel 

in smaller COPs as well as the number of smaller 

COPs. There will be more ISR and assets available to 

them. There will be increased number and numbers 

of patrols. Within the cities will be more permanent 

checkpoints and as well as increased raids on cache 

sites and VBIED construction sites. More ANA and 

ANP working with coalition forces on joint 

operations to show Afghan face for operations. More 

indirect fire assets will be available to COPs. New 

relationships are fostered with new US forces and 

local Afghanis. 

Reconciliation: Work to get populace in support of 

coalition. 

Infrastructure: Contracting build-up of HUBs, 

supporting new GLOC. 

Train ANSF: Could develop growing discontent 

among ANSF - US forces have taken the lead with 

security ops. 

COA 1 – Command & Control & Expansion 

(JUL/AUG 09) (TURN 3 – 3C, Counter-action) 

BLUE Counteraction: 

Forces Available: (no change) Command and 

Control: to occur July/August 2009; Introduces 3-star 

operational HQs; incorporates 2 new BCTs. 

Overall Summary (no change): 

Begin "spider web" from large population centers to 

rural areas; en-roads into rural areas controlled by 

RED; partnering with ANA / ANSF; limited coalition 

forces will remain in population centers to sustain 

progress. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(no change except for Protection) 

Maneuver - T: Deploy into Bagram; Kandahar; P: 

Conduct RSOI to enable future ops. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement; additional info - Larger 

convoys; relook size of PCF; may consolidate forces 

for greater power; increase ISR assets; additional T: 

Protect new GLOC; P: protect Coalition forces; T: 

Additional engineer assets to move to GLOC 

support; P: provide protection of GLOC. 

Sustainment –T: Conduct RSOI; P: Facilitate inflow of 

2 US BCTs and supporting elements; T: Expand 

theater log infra; prepare to open a new GLOC; P: 

Take over log infra from sustainment brigade, 

facilitate coalition operations. 

Intelligence – T: I&W of possible attacks, targetable 

intelligence on threat forces, IO theme development, 

pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics, surging 

focus to RC-S and E w/additional BCTs, additional 

info - push to mountains as available, work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support to 

GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: protect population 

and coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership –T: Establish 3-Star MNC HQ; P: 

Controlling Tactical Ops; Operational HQ by Aug 09-

Multi-national 3-star HQs (may need mandate; US led 

- support by multi-national staff). 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: (No Change) Losses due to 

enemy attack - Challenge to keep Platoon size FOBs 

with enemy attempts to overrun Platoon size FOBs; 

continuing to win support in population centers 

however there is still an extant divide between 

frontier and population centers. Some concerns 

about news in CONUS. Coalition partners will be 

challenged to leave however they will probably not 

depart at this stage yet. Some challenges for NGOs 

due to increased hostilities. 

Governance: Still a divide between population centers 

and frontier. 

Security / Combat Operations: (No change). 

Reconciliation: (No Change). 

Infrastructure: (No Change). 

Train ANSF: Contracting build up of hubs for 

support of new Northern GLOC; expanding life 

support facilities 

COA 1 – Fall Elections (TURN 4, Action) 

BLUE action: 

Frces Available: (no change) 

Overall Summary: (no change) 

Support elections; continue to push out into 

countryside; how will ASF develop in city and enemy 

sit with population. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(no change except for Protection) 

Maneuver - T: Secure election polling sites; P: Enable 

successful elections. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement. 

Sustainment –T: Provide DS to election process; P: 

Enable successful elections. 

Intelligence –T: IEW of attacks; polling center and; P: 

Targetable intelligence; supporting push out of 

population centers; T: I&W of possible attacks, 

targetable intelligence on threat forces, IO theme 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

development, pattern analysis to develop countertactics, surge focus to protect polling centers, 

election infrastructure, coercion tactic awareness, 

work w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence 

support to GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: 

protect population and coalition forces, ensure 

relatively peaceful election environment. 

C2/ Leadership –T: no change; P: no change. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Population centers will be 

excited about elections; Varying degree of turn-out in 

frontier villages; frontiers will not be as enthusiastic; 

elections will be a news story some news in the US 

media too; NGOs will participate in oversight. 

Governance: US and Afghan forces providing security 

primarily in high population areas. 

Security / Combat Operations: Target high population 

to reduce VBEDs joint ops polling site security 

operations; targeted raids on insurgent leaders prior 

to election; trying to stop "spectacular" attacks. 

Reconciliation: May be difficult in frontier area; less 

difficult in cities; still ongoing attempts to incorporate 

Taliban et al. into process. 

Infrastructure: (No Change) 

Train ANSF: Continue to make improvements; 

heavily reliant on working w/American counterparts. 

COA 1 – Fall Elections (TURN 4, Counter -

Action) 

BLUE Counter - action: 

Forces Available: (no change) 

Overall Summary: (no change) 

Support elections; continue to push out into 

countryside; how will ASF develop in city and enemy 

situation with population. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and Purpose 

(no change except for Protection) 

Maneuver - T: Secure election polling sites; P: Enable 

successful elections. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: Provide mobility support; P: Allow 

support of movement. 

Sustainment –T: Provide DS to election process; P: 

Enable successful elections. 

Intelligence – T: no change; P: no change. 

C2/ Leadership –T: no change; P: no change. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation (no 

change except IO): 

Information Operations: Persuade frontier people to 

vote any actions that insurgents take will be exploited 

through an IO campaign focusing on the enemy 

impeding Afghan's ability to make their own decisions 

and self-reliance. 

Governance: US and Afghan forces providing security 

primarily in high population areas. 

Security / Combat Operations: Additional Info - No 

drive policy around election sites for protection 

(prevent suicide bombers); dogs available; more 

ANSF and Intelligence driven raids against insurgents. 

Afghanis see increased security and greater support 

given to elections. 

Reconciliation: May be difficult in frontier area; less 

difficult in cities; ongoing attempts to incorporate 

Taliban into process. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-11 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Infrastructure: (No Change).	 Train ANSF: Continue to make improvements; 

heavily reliant on working w/American counterparts 

Assessment of Winter Offensive: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

B-Neutral B- Positive; in 

country 6 months, 

units assoc with 

population center for 

extended duration 

B- Neutral; in the 

cities - need 

limitations on 

fires & it doesn't 

focus on the 

frontier 

B-Neutral; RC 

commanders 

control their action 

B- Neutral; government / 

security forces are 

immature 

RED Offensive / Command and Control Changes: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION RESTRAINT TRANSITIONABILITY 

Positive Positive Neutral to 

Negative 

Neutral (Positive 

on international 

side) 

Positive (if elected President 

based on popular support); 

Neutral - haven't talked about 

infrastructure improvements, 

security, etc. 

WARGAME RESULTS (BLUE Forces) 

COA 2 – (Critical Event 3a) 

Offensive (July 2009) -- Incorporates additional 3 x BCTs 

Forces Available: 

5 x BCTs, CAB, ENG BDE, SUST BDE, ANSF, CF. 

Overall Summary: 

Deployment of forces into RC East (3 x BCTs in 

North; 2 x BCT in South). 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – T: dislocate and isolate enemy forces; 

recon border areas; P: disrupt / destroy enemy from 

crossing border. 

Fires – T: Support Ground Operations; P: Allow 

BCTs freedom of maneuver. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) Allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow-on 

forces, training facilities. 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Sustainment –T: provide sustainment support; 

support JRSOI; P: Sustain Coalition forces. 

Intelligence – T: 1) Surge ISR focus to border areas of 

RC-S and E w/additional BCTs to locate infiltration 

routes; 2) I&W of possible attacks; 3) Targetable 

intelligence on threat forces; 4) IO theme 

development; 5) Conduct training for ANA intel 

capability (within security constraints); 6) Pattern 

analysis to develop counter-tactics; 7) Work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intel support to GLOCs 

external to Afghanistan P: protect population and 

Coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership – T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: Co-op fractionalized/marginalized 

elements of anti-Afghan forces, P: Allow MNF to 

destroy anti-Afghan forces; T: Disrupt anti-Afghan 

forces‘ command and control capabilities, P: Isolate 

the anti-Afghan forces leadership; T: Inform the 

Afghan populace, P: Deny the anti-Afghan forces 

popular support; T: Co-opt the Afghan populace, P: 

Create public support for GIRoA. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: probably not significant IO 

problem with AFG population centers (may even be 

positive) although there will be some real challengers 

in frontier where these operations are on-going; 

coalition nations & US - neutral or slightly positive; 

NGOs may be concerned but will remain status quo. 

Governance: working heavily with IO and AFG govt 

to show AFG face to operation. 

Security / Combat Operations: increase border 

activity will yield more COPs, more combat ops, 

more combat patrols. 

Reconciliation: no changes with actions on the 

frontier 

Infrastructure: limited effects on infrastructure since 

forces will be on the border; although some will be 

focused on road-rebuilding. 

Train ANSF: no change, continue training ANA 

forces. 

COA 2 –(Critical Event 3b) 

Offensive (Late Summer 2009) -- total of 5 x BCTs; AFG 

election 

Forces Available: 

5 x BCTs, CAB, ENG BDE, SUST BDE, ANSF, CF 

Overall Summary: 

Deployment of forces into RC East (3 x BCTs in 

North; 2 x BCT in South). 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – T: dislocate and isolate enemy forces; 

recon border areas; P: disrupt / destroy enemy from 

crossing border. 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment –T: provide sustainment support; 

support JRSOI; P: Sustain Coalition forces. 

Intelligence – T: 1) Surge ISR focus to border areas of 

RC-S and E w/additional BCTs to locate infiltration 

routes; 2) I&W of possible attacks; 3) Targetable 

intelligence on threat forces; 4) IO theme 

development; 5) Conduct training for ANA 

intelligence capability (within security constraints); 6) 

Pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics; 7) Work 

w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

to GLOCs external to Afghanistan P: protect 

population and coalition forces. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: probably not significant IO 

problem with AFG population centers (may even be 

positive) although there will be some real challengers 

in frontier; may be a gradual increase in negative news 

in international media; US news will be 

underreporting other than casualties; NGOs will be 

okay. 

Assessment: 

Governance: positive within city centers but
 

challenging within frontier areas.
 

Security / Combat Operations: security will be 

increased around polling sites; targeting raids on
 

VBIEDs and other cells; AFG police will lead the way
 

on protection; overall effect on populace will be that
 

they are in traffic jams and suffer other
 

inconveniences; increased direct actions.
 

Reconciliation: no changes with actions on the 

frontier.
 

Infrastructure: minor improvement within
 

infrastructure in cities.
 

Train ANSF: train ANA; more recruiting from 

isolated areas.
 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

Neutral - but 

potential for 

negative 

Neutral - effects 

won't be evident 

immediately 

Neutral - goes 

both ways; 

potential for 

going downhill 

Positive - it's 

unhindered 

Negative - no point 

identified yet where BLUE 

can transition to host 

nation 

WARGAME RESULTS (BLUE Forces) 

COA 2 –(Critical Event 2) 

Significant event in RC north, German casualties 

Forces Available: 

5 x BCTs, CAB, ENG BDE, SUST BDEs, ESC, ANSF, 

CF 

Overall Summary: 

Deployment of forces into RC East (3 x BCTs in 

North; 2 x BCTs in South); provide support to 

German forces in the north. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver –see below: 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-14 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

Dislocate and isolate enemy 5 x BCTs forces; recon border areas 

Provide CAS; provide 

CAB mobility; additional support 

to German forces 

Fires – T: Support Ground Operations; P: Allow 

BCTs freedom of maneuver. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment –T: provide sustainment support; 

support JRSOI; P: sustain Coalition forces. 

Intelligence – T: 1) Surge ISR forces to RC-North as 

necessary; 2) I &W of possible attacks; 3) Develop 

targetable intel on threat forces; 4) Develop IO 

themes; 5) Conduct training for ANA intel capability 

(within security constraints) 6) Pattern analysis to 

develop counter-tactics; 7) Work w/ CENTCOM J-2 

on threats & intel support to GLOCs external to 

Afghanistan; 8) Conduct training for ANA intel 

capability (within security constraints); P: Protect 

people / coalition forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Disrupt / destroy enemy from crossing border 

IOT destroy enemy forces; provide friendly freedom 

of movement in the AOR 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Some people will be 

encouraged but most will be apathetic IO Theme 

towards AFG populace in RC North: prevent 

imposing the Arab will on the AFG people; coalition 

= increased pressure on German populace; Domestic 

media: can we win in AFG?; NGOs: will pull back 

(security oriented). 

Governance: Continuing close coordination NGOs, 

IGOs will pull out, create a vacuum. 

Security / Combat Operations: For northern sector -

forces will be required to increase security because 

of the latest string of attacks Security posture will 

heighten across AFG, RC-North will adopt kinetic 

focus aimed at perpetrators of attack. 

Reconciliation: May be difficult to work with tribal 

leaders due to the attacks and increased raids. 

Infrastructure: No major impact. 

Train ANSF: Focus may shift but will still be operating 

at capacity. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-15 
 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Assessment: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT FREEDOM OF 

ACTION 

TRANSITIONABILITY 

Positive - would 

strengthen 

BLUE legitimacy 

Neutral - based on 

the long term ops in 

the hinterlands 

Positive - based 

on this critical 

event but there 

is a risk overall 

Positive - nothing 

restrictive for 

maneuver units 

Neutral - not really 

focused on transition to 

HN yet 

WARGAME RESULTS (BLUE Forces) 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 1) 

BLUE Action: Winter Offensive (February-April 2009) --

Incorporates additional BCT 

Forces Available: 

3 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA) 

Overall Summary: 

BCT (TF Hold) arrives in theater and fills to 100% 

ANSF (assigned to CSTA-C); flows into Bagram and 

then into Kabul; followed by support elements. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – see below: 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 

MNC-A / ISAF 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 

101 CAB 

1) Complete RSOI; 2) 

Integrate into ANA/ANP 

Establish MNC CP at Bagram 

1) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 2) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

1) Provide CAS ISO TF 3-1 

and TF 4-101; 2) Provide air 

mobility to TF 3-1 and TF 4-

101 

Augment existing trainers to 100% 

Facilitate C2 in AOR 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

IOT destroy enemy forces; provide friendly freedom of 

movement in the AOR 

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UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Fires –T: Destroy anti-AFG forces; P: Allow forces 

to destroy enemy and allow freedom of maneuver. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment –T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) Provide 

sustainment support; P: Enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence –T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intel on threat forces; 3) Develop 

IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA intel 

capability (within security constraints) 5) Pattern 

analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intel support to GLOCs 

external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people / coalition 

forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: Co-op fractionalized/marginalized 

elements of anti-Afghan forces, P: Allow MNF to 

destroy anti-Afghan forces; T: Disrupt anti-Afghan 

forces‘ command and control capabilities, P: Isolate 

the anti-Afghan forces leadership; T: Inform the 

Afghan populace, P: Deny the anti-Afghan forces 

popular support; T: Co-opt the Afghan populace, P: 

Create public support for GIRoA. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Surge will be "blip" on radar 

screen; US government - some media might cover it . 

Governance: Emphasis will be that we are there to 

help AFG populace and their police force. 

Security / Combat Operations: Increase in Afghanis 

joining ANA/ANP; combat ops will continue - no 

change; during RSOI there may be some decrease in 

operations but continuing drug patrols. 

Reconciliation: Many tribal leaders will be seeing 

policemen come back and this will assist in making 

progress all around. 

Infrastructure: Working A/DACG improvements; 

critical commodities increased: TO 139 increased; 

CERP and GWOT dollars will increase. 

Train ANSF: ANA 60K, ANP 80K (current start); 

looking at increase in CMP level; about 2K trainers 

target will be 5K ANA and 6K ANP trainers; initially 

may be some resentment among the AFG forces for 

having these "new" trainers come in; critical enablers 

are vetted interpreters. 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 1, reaction) 

BLUE reaction: Winter Offensive (February-April 2009) --

Incorporates additional BCT 

Forces Available (no change): 

3 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA) 

Overall Summary (no change): 

BCT (TF Hold) arrives in theater and fills to 100% 

ANSF (assigned to CSTA-C); flows into Bagram and 

then into Kabul; followed by support elements. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – see below: 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 

MNC-A / ISAF 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 

101 CAB 

1) Complete RSOI; 2) Integrate 

into ANA/ANP 

Establish MNC CP at Bagram 

1) Develop effective governance 

and continue to build ANSF in 

AOR; 2) Provide provincial 

security and support to 

governance in sector 

1) Provide CAS ISO TF 3-1 and 

TF 4-101; 2) Provide air mobility 

to TF 3-1 and TF 4-101 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment –T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) Provide 

sustainment support; P: Enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence –T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intel on threat forces; 3) Develop 

IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA intel 

capability (within security constraints) 5) Pattern 

analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intel support to GLOCs 

external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people / coalition 

forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Augment existing trainers to 100% 

Facilitate C2 in AOR 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

IOT destroy enemy forces; provide friendly 

freedom of movement in the AOR 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: We must "spin" the 

boundary change as a consolidation of MNF in AFG 

(specifically the British Commonwealth forces). 

Governance: no change. 

Security / Combat Operations: increased security on 

LOCs, increased border security 

Reconciliation: tribal leaders will be pleased with 

additional ANA / ANOP recruits. 

Infrastructure: increased infrastructure development.
 

Train ANSF: no change.
 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 2, Action) 

BLUE counter-action: RED Offensive (April-May 2009) 

Forces Available (no change): 

3 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA); 101 CAB 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-18 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Overall Summary (no change):	 Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

BCT (TF Hold) arrives in theater and fills to 100% 

ANSF (assigned to CSTA-C); flows into Bagram and Maneuver – see below:
 

then into Kabul; followed by support elements. 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

ASSET TASK	 PURPOSE 

TF Build 

(3-10) 

MNC-A / 

ISAF 

TF 3-1 / 

TF 4-101 

101 CAB 

1) Integrate into ANA/ANP 

Establish MNC CP at Bagram 

1) Develop efffective goverenance and 

continue to build ANSF in AOR; 2) 

provide provincial security and support 

to governance in sector 

1) Provide CAS ISO TF 3-1 and TF 4-

101; 2) Provide air mobility to TF 3-1 

and TF 4-101 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment –T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) Provide 

sustainment support; P: Enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence –T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intel on threat forces; 3) Develop 

IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA intel 

capability (within security constraints) 5) Pattern 

analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work w/ 

CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intel support to GLOCs 

external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people / coalition 

forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

Augment existing trainers to 100% 

Facilitate C2 in AOR 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

IOT destroy enemy forces; provide friendly freedom 

of movement in AOR 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Focus on the successes so 

far; advising AFG populace about evils of AAF; 

support Canadian radio station and other media 

events in AFG. 

Governance: May need to use IO to help diffuse AAF 

advantages. 

Security / Combat Operations: Developing more 

intelligence on cache's from ANA/ANP. 

Reconciliation: Pushing off election could cause 

problems but ramping up of ANA/ANP forces will 

assist. 

Infrastructure: Working A/DACG improvements; 

critical commodities increased: TO 139 increased; 

CERP and GWOT dollars will increase. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Train ANSF: ANA 60K, ANP 80K (current start); 

looking at increase in CMP level; about 2K trainers 

target will be 5K ANA and 6K ANP trainers; initially 

may be some resentment among the AFG forces for 

having these "new" trainers come in; critical enablers 

are vetted interpreters. There are significant 

concerns about the ANA/ANP personnel numbers. 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 3a, Action) 

BLUE action (JUL-AUG 2009) 

Forces Available (no change): 

4 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA / BCT); 1 x 

CAB 

Overall Summary (no change): 

Command and Control enhancements; two new 3-

star HQs (MNC-A and CSTC-A); plus two additional 

BCTs. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – see below: 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 1) Complete RSOI; 2) 

Integrate into ANA/ANP 3) 

Reinforce MITT 

Augment existing trainers to 100% and enable training 

forces to support sufficient training ability 

TF Clear (BCT w/ 

ANA BN) 

Clear and control AO East 

conduct relief in AO North 

Remove enemy activity in northern areas; prevent 

enemy from re-occupying AO 

TF Hold 1) Conduct RIP/TOA with TF 

Clear 2) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 3) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

IOT establish security presence in AOR 

MNC-A / ISAF Establish MNC CP at Bagram; 

change RC east and southern 

borders 

Facilitate C2 in AOR; 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 1) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 2) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

101 CAB 1) Provide CAS ISO TF 3-1 

and TF 4-101; 2) Provide air 

mobility to TF 3-1 and TF 4-

101 

IOT destroy enemy forces; provide friendly freedom of 

movement in the AOR 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment – T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) provide 

sustainment support; 3) Create JLC HQ; 4) open 

GLOC from North; P: enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence – T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intelligence on threat forces; 3) 

Develop IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA 

intelligence capability (within security constraints) 5) 

Pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work 

w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support 

to GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people 

/ coalition forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Some success with message. 

Governance: As ANSF improves, it will build 

confidence in coalition forces. 

Security / Combat Operations: Increase in Border 

security is successful , working with locals to support 

border security and minimize inconvenience to 

people crossing the border; new "Afghan" face on 

operations. 

Reconciliation: Tribal leaders will begin to see 

progress in tribes. 

Infrastructure: High risk due to land management; 

continuing to build up infrastructure up north; 

additional contracts to support surge; CERP and 

GWOT funds - no issues. 

Train ANSF: Afghan government will make 

improvements. 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 3b, Action) 

BLUE action (Election s - JUL-AUG 2009) 

Forces Available (no change): 

4 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA / BCT); 1 x 

CAB 

Overall Summary (no change): 

Command and Control enhancements; two new 3-

star HQs (MNC-A and CSTC-A); plus two additional 

BCTs. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – see below: 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 

TF Clear (BCT w/ 

ANA BN) 

TF Hold 

MNC-A / ISAF 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 

1) Complete RSOI; 2) 

integrate into ANA/ANP 3) 

reinforce MITT 

Clear and control AO East 

conduct relief in AO North 

1) Conduct RIP/TOA with TF 

Clear 2) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 3) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

1) Establish MNC CP at 

Bagram; 2) Change RC east 

and southern borders 

1) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 2) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment – T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) provide 

sustainment support; 3) Create JLC HQ; 4) open 

GLOC from North; P: enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence – T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intelligence on threat forces; 3) 

Develop IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA 

intelligence capability (within security constraints) 5) 

Augment existing trainers to 100% and enable training 

forces to support sufficient training ability 

Remove enemy activity in northern areas; prevent 

enemy from re-occupying AO 

IOT establish security presence in AOR 

Facilitate C2 in AOR; 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

Pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work 

w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support 

to GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people 

/ coalition forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Successful attacks on CF 

may cause media problems - depends on Afghan 

"face"; may be increase pressure on partner 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-22 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

governments to withdraw; US Government news -

probably be negative; 3rd parties - some backlash due 

to various reasons. 

Governance: A MASCAL could seriously undermine 

effectiveness of government. 

Security / Combat Operations: Increased security on 

rail, GLOC; checkpoints to eliminate suicide 

bombers; targeted suicide cells; working on countermortar fire from fires from Pakistan; working on 

combat operations to kill/capture enemy; working 

with regional police and trying to build better rapport 

with tribes. 

Reconciliation: May be intimidating to tribal leaders in 

area. 

Infrastructure: Working on additional security 

infrastructure. 

Maneuver – see below: 

Train ANSF: Slightly degrades relationship between 

ETT and AFG forces. 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 3c, Action) 

BLUE action (2009) 

Forces Available (no change): 

4 x BCTs (3-10 MTN / 3-1 IN/ 4-101 AA / BCT); 1 x 

CAB 

Overall Summary (no change): 

TF 3-1 operate in AO North, TF Hold doing RSOI, 

TF Clear operating in AO south, TF Build working 

with ANSF, TF 4-101 operating in AO East. 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 1) Complete RSOI; 2) 

Integrate into ANA/ANP 3) 

Reinforce MITT 

Augment existing trainers to 100% and enable training 

forces to support sufficient training ability 

TF Clear (BCT w/ 

ANA BN) 

Clear and control AO East 

conduct relief in AO North 

Remove enemy activity in northern areas; prevent 

enemy from re-occupying AO 

TF Hold 1) Conduct RIP/TOA with TF 

Clear 2) Develop effective 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 3) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 

IOT establish security presence in AOR 

MNC-A / ISAF 1) Establish MNC CP at 

Bagram; 2) Change RC east 

and southern borders 

Facilitate C2 in AOR; 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-23 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 1) Develop effective Facilitate continued regional stability 

governance and continue to 

build ANSF in AOR; 2) 

Provide provincial security 

and support to governance in 

sector 3) Prepare for 

RIP/TOA 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment – T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) provide 

sustainment support; 3) Create JLC HQ; 4) open 

GLOC from North; P: enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence – T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intelligence on threat forces; 3) 

Develop IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA 

intelligence capability (within security constraints) 5) 

Pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work 

w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support 

to GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people 

/ coalition forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Successful attacks on CF 

may cause media problems - depends on Afghan 

"face"; may be increase pressure on partner 

governments to withdraw; US Government news -

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-24 

probably be negative; 3rd parties - some backlash due 

to various reasons. 

Governance: A MASCAL could seriously undermine 

effectiveness of government. 

Security / Combat Operations: no change. 

Reconciliation: This action may be intimidating to 

tribal leaders in the area. 

Infrastructure: Working on additional security 

infrastructure. 

Train ANSF: Slightly degrades relationship between 

ETT and AFG forces. 

COA 3 –(Critical Event 4, Action) 

Fall Offensive (October -December 2009); incorporates 4 

new BCTs and new 3* HQs, approx 120K ANSF - FOCUS 

on ELECTION 

Forces Available: 

5 x BCTs, 1 x CAB 

Overall Summary: 

Steady state with three AO's cleared in RC East 

Elements of Combat Power, Task and 

Purpose: 

Maneuver – see below: 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

ASSET TASK PURPOSE 

TF Build (3-10) 

TF Clear (BCT w/ 

ANA BN) 

TF Hold 

MNC-A / ISAF 

TF 3-1 / TF 4-101 

1) Complete RSOI; 2) Integrate 

into ANA/ANP 3) Reinforce MITT 

Clear and control AO East 

conduct relief in AO North 

1) Develop effective governance 

and continue to build ANSF in 

AOR; 2) Provide provincial 

security and support to 

governance in sector 

Conduct C2 

1) Develop effective governance 

and continue to build ANSF in 

AOR; 2) Provide provincial 

security and support to 

governance in sector 3) Prepare 

for RIP/TOA 

Fires – T: no change; P: no change. 

Protection – T: 1) Construction efforts; 2) allow 

freedom of mobility; 3) Submit RFF for EOD; 4) force 

protection measures; P: Enable flow of follow on 

forces, training facilities. 

Sustainment – T: 1) Conduct RSOI; 2) provide 

sustainment support; 3) Create JLC HQ; 4) open 

GLOC from North; P: enable flow of forces into 

theater; provide sustainment support throughout 

AOR. 

Intelligence – T: 1) I &W of possible attacks; 2) 

Develop targetable intelligence on threat forces; 3) 

Develop IO themes; 4) Conduct training for ANA 

intelligence capability (within security constraints) 5) 

Pattern analysis to develop counter-tactics; 6) Work 

w/ CENTCOM J-2 on threats & intelligence support 

Augment existing trainers to 100% and enable training 

forces to support sufficient training ability 

Remove enemy activity in northern areas; prevent 

enemy from re-occupying AO 

IOT establish security presence in AOR 

Facilitate C2 in AOR 

Facilitate continued regional stability 

to GLOCs external to Afghanistan; P: Protect people 

/ coalition forces and build AF capability. 

C2/ Leadership –T: 1) Establish GO HQ for TF 

Phoenix; 2) Develop training base for ANA and ANP; 

P: IOT enable increased support structure; IOT 

create larger training capacity for ANA / ANP. 

Information – T: no change; P: no change. 

Impact on Logical Lines of Operation: 

Information Operations: Conducting IO on 

reconciliation and proper election procedures; 

international news emphasis son AFG doing security 

for elections. 

Governance: Elections will have high turnout in 

populated areas; additional security will be required. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-25 
 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Security / Combat Operations: Increased security for 

election polling sites. 

Infrastructure: We are working on additional security 

infrastructure. 

Reconciliation: No change. 

Assessment: 

Train ANSF: We are gaining momentum and great 

publicity with elections. 

Winter Offensive: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

BLUE neutral -

not widely 

accepted that US 

taking over 

BLUE positive - BLUE positive -

because not 

targeting / 

destroying 

infrastructure and 

building 

ANA/ANP 

BLUE Neutral -

because BCTs allow 

status quo 

BLUE neutral - because we 

are still building the force in 

theater (may eventually be 

positive) 

RED Offensive: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

BLUE negative -

because RED is 

exploiting info ops 

BLUE positive -

increasing ANSF 

capacity 

BLUE positive -

not targeting 

infrastructure 

BLUE neutral - BCTs 

are maintain status 

quo 

BLUE neutral - because we 

are still building the force in 

theater (may eventually be 

positive) 

Command and Control: 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

BLUE positive -

population 

starting to see 

merits of increase 

forces in theater 

BLUE positive -

increasing ANSF 

capacity 

BLUE neutral -

operating out in 

theater now 

BLUE positive -

created MNC-A and 

readjusted borders 

for RC East and RCSouth 

BLUE neutral - because we 

are still building the force in 

theater (may eventually be 

positive) 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-26 
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Fall Offensive (Election): 

LEGITIMACY PERSEVERANCE RESTRAINT 

FREEDOM OF 

ACTION TRANSITIONABILITY 

BLUE positive -

Election takes 

place and 

population 

participates 

BLUE positive -

increasing ANSF 

capacity 

BLUE neutral -

focus on election 

BLUE Neutral -

restricted to election 

process 

BLUE neutral - focused on 

election 

UNCLASSIFED  Page A-27 

 

Campaign Plan Overview

Afghanistan Special Study

W100

08 JAN 09

Agenda

• Recommended COA

• Mission Analysis 

– GREEN Considerations (Host Nation)

– RED Considerations (Enemy)

– BLUE Considerations (Coalition)

• Recommended COA Overview

• COA Comparison and Analysis

– Wargame Methodology

– Evaluation Criteria

– Comparison

• YELLOW Considerations

• Way Ahead

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan Study Group
 

ANNEX B: Campaign Plan Briefing 

Slide 1 

Slide 2 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-1 
 

Recommended COA

Title: Building ANSF

Phasing:

• Phase 1- Augment ANA/ANP to 100%

• Phase 2- Clear to the NE

• Phase 3- Clear to south and sustain

Defeat/Stability Mechanism:

• Dislocate RED elements regionally

• Influence local populace to build Afghan security forces 

capacity

Host Nation Considerations

GREEN CELL

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 3
 

Slide 4
 

Slide 5
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-2
 
 

Pashtun 42%

Tajiks 27%

Hazara 9%

Uzbeks 9%

Other 13%

Key Considerations (1 of 4)

Ethnic Groups and the Durand Line of 1893

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-3
 
 

Key considerations (2 of 4)

Security and the confidence of the people

• Security

• for the Afghan population – today and tomorrow

• a regional problem – fight terrorism at its roots

Controlled by 

Taliban 10 %

Governmental 

control 30 %

Undecided 60 %

SECURITY TALIBAN ECONOMY CORRUPTION

What is the biggest problem facing 

Afghanistan as a whole? The next?

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 6
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-4
 
 

Key Considerations (3 of 4)

GIRoA versus the TRIBE

KANDAHAR

KABUL

HERAT

MAZAR-E SHARIF

KONDUZ

JALALABAD

• Governance

• Centralized Government operating from Kabul

34 Provinces, 398 Districts 

• Tribal loyalty

Afghanistan has been governed by nearly 

every system including a monarchy, republic, 

theocracy and communist state of government 

over the past century 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 7
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-5
 
 

Key Considerations (4 of 4)

Drug Trafficking

• Economy

• 50% of GDP comes from growing poppy

• What is the alternative?

• Only 12% of the

land is arable

KANDAHAR

KABUL

HERAT

MAZAR-E SHARIF

KONDUZ

JALALABAD

OIL and GAS ? Heroin as a WMD

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 8
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-6
 
 

Weapons

Leadership

Ownership of 

Land

Income

Islam

Tribal 

Education

Access to 

Water

National Center of Gravity Analysis

COG Critical 

Capabilities

Critical 

Requirements

Critical 

Vulnerabilities

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 9
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-7
 
 

National LOO

A stable, functioning 

and Islamic 

Afghanistan

that is accepted as 

legitimate by its 

citizens and capable 

of preventing 

terrorist groups 

from operating 

domestically and 

abroad

Objectives

1.National Defense

2.Internal Security & Policing

3.Disband Illegal Armed Groups

4.De-Mining

5.The national Assembly

6.Justice and the Rule of Law

7.Religious Affairs

8.Public Administration Reform 

9.Human Rights

10.Infrastructure and Natural Resources

11.Agriculture and Rural Development

12.Economic Governance and private 

sector development

13.Education 

14.Health and nutrition

15.Social protection

16.Empowering Woman 

17.Counter –narcotics

18.Regional Cooperation

19.Anti-corruption

20.Environment 

Governance 

Information

Security

Economic growth

Rule of law/Human Rights

Social development

Reconciliation

CoG

The Tribal 

Culture

1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 16 17 18 19 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

1 4 8 10 11 12 13 16 18 19 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

2 3 4 6 8 9 13 14 15 16 18 19 20

2 3 4 5 6 8 9 13 15 17 18 19 

1 2 3 4 6 7 8 13 15 16 17 18 19 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 10
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-8
 
 

Enemy Considerations

RED CELL

Enemy Situation 

How to establish conservative Islamist rule in Afghanistan while 

eliminating Western influence before the GIRoA /coalition gains 

the support of the Afghan people.

“War of Attrition”

COA Statement: RED maintains their set in 

anticipation that the US/International 

communities support will wane and inevitably 

withdraw from Afghanistan. 

Key Tasks:

• Survival - Long Term Focus (5-10 years)

• Bleed the West through economical & 

psychological burden

“Insurgency is cheap / counterinsurgency is 

expensive”

• Outlast Western resolve

• Disrupt CF LOCs in PK as a way of increasing cost 

of war

• Strike Targets of Opportunity

Defeat Mechanism: Disintegration of Coalition will

“Fracture the Coaltion”

COA Statement: RED will attempt to influence 

the European coalition nations IOT disintegrate 

the Coalition. By phase, RED will conduct 

guerilla and terrorist attacks in force against 

European forces. Attacks will coincide as much 

as possible with European political cycle and 

Islamic holidays.

Key Tasks:

• By phase, attack in strength German, 

Italian and UK forces 

• Attack Port of Karachi

Defeat / Stability: Influence NATO public opinion 

IOT disintegrate Coalition

PROBLEM STATEMENT:

MOST LIKELY COA: MOST DANGEROUS COA:

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 11
 

Slide 12
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-9
 
 

IRAN

CoG:

Supreme Leadership council

End State:

Strategic Depth

vs. U.S. / PK / TB

CRIME

CoG:

Criminal Leaders

End State:

Financial Gain

AQ

CoG:

Senior Leadership

End State:

Islamic Caliphate

ROGUE

ISI

CoG:

Rogue Leaders

End State:

Strategic Depth

vs. India

Relationships:

• Supporting

• Coordinating

Enemy Threat Construct

Hi

G

Hi

K

Le

T

Splinter Groups

CoG:

Leaders

End State:

Regional Influence

CoG:

Afghan Population

End State:

Return to the Time of the Prophet

Removal of W. Influence

TALIBAN

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 13
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-10
 
 

Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis

Red

COG

Pop / 

Ldrshp

To conduct 

terrorism

To conduct 

Information Ops

Divergent 

Interests • No Western 

Influence

• Form of 

Islamic-based 

Government

• Retention of 

Afghan Pashtun

ISI/Iran

• Maintain 

Secrecy

• Strategic 

Depth

To maintain unity 

of resolve

Mass Media

Sanctuary

Logistics

Inability to

Provide 

Services

Financial 

Support

Weak Central 

Governance

Historical

Sectarian 

Conflict

PashtunCentricity

Backlash From 

Population

To sustain 

insurgency

To finance/sustain

anti-western

activities

To 

influence/compel 

the population

Common

Enemy

Religious

Institutions

COG

Critical 

Capabilities

Critical 

Requirements

Critical 

Vulnerabilities

Ways 

(verb) 

Means 

(noun) 

Enemy 

concerns

End state

Coalition 

concern

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 14
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-11
 
 

Undermine Western Leaders

1. Financing/Recruiting

2. Sanctuary

3. Coercion

4. CMO

5. Terrorism

6. Unity of Resolve

1

3 4

Enemy LOO

• No Western

Influence

• Form of 

Islamic-based 

Gov’t

• Retention of

Afghan Culture

Iran / ISI:

• Deniability

• Strategic 

depth

DM/SM Conditions

LOO Objectives

RED ENDSTATE

RED

CoG

BLUE

CoG

Popular Support

I/O (Anti-West/Pro-Islam)

Delegitimize/Destabilize

GIRoA

7. Crime

8. Propaganda

9. Insurgent/Guerrilla Activities

10. Training

11. Border Infiltration

12. Logistics

POPULATION

LEADERSHIP

WESTERN

RESOLVE

GIRoA unable 

to provide 

governance

Legitimacy 

Increases / 

W. 

Discredited

Population 

Neutral or 

Supportive

Coalition 

Unity 

Disrupted

Sustainability Operations

Feasible for 

long term

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

7 9 10 11 12

7 8 9 11

8 9 10

11 12 8 9

8 9 11

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 15
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-12
 
 

Coalition Considerations

BLUE CELL

Problem Framing 

How to employ Coalition Forces to support the GIRoA to 

disintegrate sources of instability before counter-government 

forces supplant the established government. Coalition forces 

must support & develop GIRoA capacity to deploy and sustain 

National Security Forces.

•Elections (Afghan, US, Coalition)

•Sustaining surge forces

•Flow of forces into Afghanistan

•Limited LOCs and APODs

•Poor infrastructure

•Weak central government

•Tribal culture / nature of populace

•Complex terrain

•Porous borders

•Sources of instability:

•AQ

•Taliban

•External threats

•Drug trafficking

PROBLEM STATEMENT:

CRITICAL PLANNING FACTORS:

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 16
 

Slide 17
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-13
 
 

ENDSTATE

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA) is stable and capable of self governing in a safe, secure 

environment that denies safe haven to domestic and foreign 

extremists with security forces that are loyal to the GIRoA, 

viewed as legitimate by the Afghan population and capable of 

planning and operating autonomously. 

Problem Framing 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 18
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-14
 
 

1

9

Coalition Center of Gravity Analysis

COG

Critical 

Capabilities

Critical 

Requirements

To build a 

legitimate/effectiv

e Afghan 

government

To build ANA and 

ANP capability

Sustainment

Coalition support

To influence the 

Afghan population

Military Advisors

Unity of command

Critical 

Vulnerabilities

Force structure

Ways 

(verb) 

Means 

(noun) 

Coalition 

concern

Secure and stable GIRoA

End state

To conduct 

operations to 

defeat the 

insurgency and 

stop external 

influencing

Diplomatic 

Support

Enemy concern

To protect the 

Afghan population

Neutral 

population

Coalition

Forces

Governance 

Advisors

Interagency participation *

UN/NGO cooperation *

UN/NGO vulnerability

Ground LOC vulnerability

LOC viability *

Populace support

Sufficient funding *

Sufficient manning *

Sufficient training *

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 19
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-15
 
 

1. Influence Afghan population

2. Inform Afghan population of (Coalition successes)

3. Co-opt Afghan tribal leaders

4. Develop agricultural alternative to Poppy

5. Secure Afghan civilian population

6. Secure key border crossings

7. Develop electrical grid

8. Develop road network

9. Develop Afghan schools

10. Defeat enemy C2 of organizations

11. Enhance/develop ANP individual Trng capacity

12. Enhance/develop individual ANA Trng capacity

13. Enhance/develop Afghan Border Police capacity

14. Enhance ANA/ANP operational capability (advisory effort)

15. Conduct ANA collective training

16. Develop/enhance provincial government capacity

17. Develop provincial justice capabilities

18. Conduct effective provincial and national elections

19. Increase Afghan economic capacity

Infrastructure 

Dev.

1 2 3 4 5 10 16 17 18 19 

DM/SM

Coalition

Forces

LOO Conditions

Neutral Afghan 

Population

Functional Afghan 

Govt.

Govt. capable of 

securing populace 

w/o external aid 

Co-opt willing 

insurgent leaders 

Infrastructure 

commensurate w/ 

1979 standards

150,000- ANA

80,000- ANP

Information 

Operations

Support to 

Governance

Security / 

Combat Ops

Reconciliation

Threat

Forces

Afghan 

Tribal 

Culture

Train / Employ 

ANA / ANP

1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 

1 2 3 5 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 

1 2 3 4 5 10 16 18 19 

1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 

1 2 4 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 

Coalition LOO

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 20
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-16
 
 

Course Of Action Development

Facts

• JRSO&I for US Forces conducted in Bagram.

• MTTs are fielded at 44% (Brookings, NOV 18, 2008).

• ETT 44% (2,391 required)

• PMT 39% (2,358 required)

• MTT adjusted numbers:

• ETT 5k

• PMT 6k

• ANA = 58K (Brookings, NOV 18, 2008) – Objective Force 134K.

• ANP = 80K (Brookings, NOV 18, 2008) – Objective Force 82K.

• ANP is at 3% CM2.

• Coalition = 51,000 (Brookings, NOV 18, 2008).

• 20K to deploy (Open Source).

• At least 3x Army BCT’s

1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 21
 

Slide 22
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-17
 
 

Facts

• Attacks on coalition forces rose sharply in 2008 up 36%.

• Current TF Phoenix C2 is using US NG O6 (COL Kalfe).

• Current TF strength = 1700 (+) NY NG (27th BCT).

• Current Task/Purpose CSTC-A:

• UK: ANA NCO Tng

• CAN: Sqd/Plt collective Tng

• CRO, ITL, NDE, NOR, POL, SLO, SWE: OMLT (NATO ETT)

• FRA: ANA Officer Tng

• GER: ANA Armor

• MON: ANA Field Artillery

• ROM: ANA AIT

• US: ANA mentors from MOD to company level

• ANA/ANP Forces are all initially trained in Kabul.

• 3-10 MTN will begin moving into theater in Jan 2009.

2 of 2 Assumptions

• US will increase forces into RC-East and RC-South (w/ border 

change).

• Initial force required for completion of the COA is the addition 

of 20K of US Forces.

• CERP funds significantly increased supporting operations in 

OEF.

• Iraq remains stable allowing the movement of additional 

forces to OEF.

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 23
 

Slide 24
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-18
 
 

Mission Statement

ISAF:

ISAF conducts military operations with GIRoA and in 

coordination with OEF, UNAMA and the international 

community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, 

establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, 

and promote development throughout Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 25
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-19
 
 

Phasing

Phase 1- Deployment

Phase 2 (DO)- Clear-Hold-BuildSust

Phase 3- Stabilize

Phase 4- Transition

D/S Mechanism

-Disintegrate enemy C2 structure

- Support growth of Afghan SF 

and Provincial Govt. Capability

Scheme of Maneuver

Initial BCT is committed to RC 

South, 2d BCT committed to RC 

East, last BCT committed to RC 

South. RC CDRs identify 

population centers with 

significant AAF activity to 

conduct initial C-H-B-S 

operations. ME is RC SOUTH. 

Based on enemy activity and 

Afghan SF capacity units use oil 

spot methodology to expand 

pacified areas. Intelligence 

efforts focused on ID of 

insurgent networks, political 

infrastructure, and vetting 

Afghan SF. MNC-A activated to 

control tactical operations. 

Information operations influence 

population concerning coalition 

commitment to security at the 

local level. 

Sustaining Operations

Additional APOD and GLOC opened in the south to sustain additional forces. 

One Sustainment BDE added in Kandahar and one ESC(-) established to 

control sustainment operations

Reserve

1 x IN BN

X

X

X

X

MNC-A

XXX

X

X

MN

II

III MN

II(+

)

X

XX MN

XX

XX

XX

XX

COA 1 (Population Focus)

X (-

)

MN

X

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 26
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-20
 
 

Phasing

Phase 1- Deploy

Phase 2- Clear-Hold-Integrate

Phase 3- Sustain

D/S Mechanism

Dislocate and isolate enemy 

forces moving across the border

Scheme of Maneuver

Introduction of a 3 star 

headquarters (C2 of CJTF and TF 

PHEONIX) additional CJTF and 

redrawing the boundaries to 

create a RC – SE. Initially the 

focus is on ISR along to border 

to ID main crossing points. As 

forces flow into the theater 

they’re arrayed along the border 

in correlation to the G2 

assessment their task is to ID 

enemy crossing point IOT disrupt 

and destroy the enemy from 

crossing the border. 

Sustaining Operations

Additional APOD and GLOC opened in the south to sustain additional forces

Reserve

BN TF Planning Priorities to reinforce Task Forces along the border and 

reinforce security within the population areas

COA 2 (Border Security)

X

X

X

X

X

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

RC - SE

RC - E

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 27
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-21
 
 

Phasing

Phase 1- Augment ANA/ANP

Phase 2- Clear to the NE

Phase 3- Clear to south/sustain

D/S Mechanism

- Dislocate RED elements regionally

- Influence local populace to build 

Afghan security forces capacity

Scheme of Maneuver

Phase I - MTT/Advisor forces 

augmented to 100% capacity; TF 

Phoenix implemented GO HQ; Establish 

Regional Training ANP Centers; Flow 

into theater will be BUILD, ENABLERS, 

CLEAR and HOLD; initial JRSOI of all 

forces will be at Bagram; ME is for TF 

BUILD

Phase II – TF CLEAR clears from Kabul 

NE to Asadabad; Hold Northern cleared 

areas with TF 3-1 and East with TF 4-

101 already in theater; Augment MTTs 

to 11k: 5k ETT, 6k to PMT; Move focus 

of ANP training to regional facilities in 

provinces(Asadabad, Qalat, Ghazni,, 

Gardez); ME is TF CLEAR

Phase III - RC East boundary is changed 

to include Zobul and Oruzgan 

provinces; ANP training centers at 

Qalat and Ghazni are opened; TF Hold 

conducts JRSOI in Kandahar, ME is TF 

CLEAR

Sustaining Operations

Additional APOD and GLOC opened in the south to sustain additional forces

Reserve

Use of reserve to be determined below BCT level

COA 3 (Building ANSF)

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

ANA/ANP 

TRNG SITE

X

X

X

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 28
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-22
 
 

CSTC-A

TF 

Phoenix

XX

X

I

I

I

I

I

XX XX XX XX

RC North RC South RC Central RC East RC West

III

II

I

I

X

I I

II

I

II

I

I

I

II

II

II

X

X

II

I

I

II

II

I

II

II

I

I

I

Air Task

Force

F16

F16

C-130

AFGHAN

MOD

XX

X

XX

X

XX

X

XX

X

X

OPCON

Coordinating Relationship

XX

X

X

X

X

ISAF Task Org

Proposed Increase in Forces

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 29
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-23
 
 

Disposition of Coalition Forces

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 30
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-24
 
 

NESTING DIAGRAM

PH I - III: Clear Provinces and Augment ANA/ANP

M P

ANA

X 

II

I I I I I I

TF CLEAR

T: Clear each provincial 

area

P: Prevent enemy 

presence in AO

TF HOLD

T: Control key terrain in 

provincial areas

P: Prevent enemy 

presence

P: Protect the population

P: Support local 

governance

TF BUILD

T; Build ANA forces

P: Enhance Afghan 

security capability

T: Build ANP forces

P: Support local civil 

and governance 

systems

M P

X (-)

X X

3/1 4/101

X

101 CAB

X (+)

M P BSB

x +

BFSB

SUS ESC

Proposed Increase

in Forces

ENABLERS

T; Build infrastructure / 

sustain forces / enable 

forces

P: Support additional 

forces flowing into 

theater with expanded 

bases and logistical 

support

Existing

OEF Forces

ANP

I I I I I I

I I I I

I I

II I II

I

I

II

I

I

I I

I I I I I I I I

II

BSB

II

BSB

II

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 31
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-25
 
 

Proposed Command Structure

MNC-A

RC-North RC-South RC-East RC-West RC-Central

CSTC-A

TF PHOENIX

ANP ANA

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 32
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-26
 
 

Proposed OEF Changes

• Adjustment between RC East and RC South 

Borders.

• Change OIC of TF Phoenix to a General Officer 

from an O6.

• Establishment of 4x provincial ANP Training 

locations.

• Increase in 20K of US Forces (Primarily Army).

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 33
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-27
 
 

T/O: 

See nesting diagram

ME: TF BUILD

SE: TF CLEAR

Reserve:

Use of reserve to be 

determined below BCT level 

local

PH I: Augment ANA/ANP 

Scheme of Maneuver:

Augment ANA and ANP 

MTT/Advisor forces to 

100% capacity; PRTs 

provide support to local 

infrastructure and 

governance; Establish 

Regional Training 

Centers; Flow will be 

BUILD, SUPPORT, 

CLEAR and HOLD; JRSOI 

of all forces flowing into 

theater at Bagram; As 

forces flow into theater, 

TF CLEAR will begin 

operations clearing in the 

NE

Proposed 

Boundary 

Change

R

T

C

Regional 

Training Center 

(RTC)

(Asadabad)

Phase Begins: Presently Ongoing

Phase Ends: (July 2010) Will be ongoing throughout the

operation until the infrastructure supports additional forces

INTEL

-1x BFSB

- Est. regional Fusion Cells

- CF / ANA / ANP

- CF / AF / PK

- Develop ANA ISR Capability

- “TF ODIN” like capability

- Shift 3xISR orbits from OIF-OEF

D/S Mech:

• Dislocate RED elements regionally

• Influence local populace to build 

Afghan security forces capacity

Sustainment:

• Coordinate infrastructure 

expansion (FOB, Kabul, Bagram)

• Provide sustainment support to 

BCT

• Additional SB & ESC in AOR

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 34
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-28
 
 

T/O: 

See nesting diagram

D/S Mech:

• Dislocate RED elements 

regionally

• Influence local populace to build 

Afghan security forces capacity

ME: TF CLEAR

SE: TF BUILD

Reserve:

Use of reserve to be 

determined below BCT level 

local

PH II: Clear to the NE

INTEL:

-No Change

Proposed 

Boundary 

Change

Scheme of Maneuver:

Clear from Kabul NE to 

Asadabad; Hold 

Northern cleared areas 

with TF 3-1 and East 

with TF 4-101 already in 

theater; Increase MTTs 

to 11k, 5k ETT, 6k to 

PMT; Move focus of 

ANP training to regional 

facilities in 

provinces(Asadabad,Qal

at, Ghazni,, Gardez 

Focus of training effort 

is to ETTs: PRTs 

provide support to local 

infrastructure and 

governance; Establish 

Regional Training 

Centers

R

T

C

Phase Begins: (Apr 2009) w/JRSOI complete of TF 

CLEAR

Phase Ends: (Jan 2010) w/TF 3-1 holding the North, TF 

4-101 Holding the East

Sustainment:

• Coordinate infrastructure 

expansion (FOB, Kabul, Bagram)

• Provide sustainment support to 

BCT

• Additional SB & ESC in AOR

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 35
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-29
 
 

T/O: 

See nesting diagram

D/S Mech:

• Dislocate RED elements 

regionally

• Influence local populace to build 

Afghan security forces capacity

Reserve:

Use of reserve to be 

determined below BCT level 

local

PH III: Clear to South / Sustainment

INTEL:

-No Change

Proposed 

Boundary 

Change

Scheme of Maneuver:

Clear south to Qalat; 

Hold cleared areas with 

forces in theater; 

Augment ANA and ANP 

forces to 100% capacity; 

Focus of training effort 

is to ETTs: PRTs 

provide support to local 

infrastructure and 

governance; Establish 

Regional Training 

Centers

R

T

R C

T

C

R

T

C

Phase Begins: (Dec 2009) w/JRSOI complete of TF

HOLD

Phase Ends: (Jul 2010) All three sectors in control of 

U.S. presence

ME: TF CLEAR

SE: TF BUILD

Sustainment:

• Coordinate infrastructure 

expansion (FOB, Kabul, Bagram)

• Provide sustainment support to 

BCT

• Additional SB & ESC in AOR

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 36
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-30
 
 

Proposed Brigade Boundaries

TF 3-1 North

TF 4-101 East

TF HOLD South

PMT TNG Locations

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 37
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-31
 
 

LOOs Conditions MOEs MOPs

Information Operations

(Influence)

I: Red

II: Yellow

III: Yellow / Green

25% Red

50% Yellow

75% Green

•# of media outlets

• # of messages countered

Support to Governance

(Support)

I: Red

II: Yellow

III: Yellow / Green

25% Red

50% Yellow

75% Green

• # of people with basic 

needs met

• # of people receiving 

basic utilities

Security / Combat Ops

(Isolate / Disintegrate)

• Insurgent activity 

neutralized, populace is 

confident in Governments 

ability to secure citizens

• BCTs providing security to 

PRTs

• Decrease in # of daily 

attacks by province

Reconciliation

(Influence)

• Co-opt all insurgents 

capable and willing to 

reconcile

• # of belligerents who no 

longer oppose GIRoA

• # of Key Leader 

Engagements 

Infrastructure Development

(Support)

• Establish infrastructure 

commensurate or better 

than 1979 Afghan standards

• % of population 

accessible to governmental 

infrastructure

• # of schools

• # of markets active

• # of miles paved

Train / Employ ANA/ANP

(Support)

• 134,000 trained members 

of the ANA

• ANA/ANP Forces securing 

province independently

• # of ANA / ANP units 

capable of independent ops

• Increase in retention rate

Phase Endstates

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 38
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-32
 
 

Analysis and Comparison

BLUE Effort

– Elements of Combat Power

(Maneuver, Fires, Protection, Intelligence, Sustainment, Information, C2, Leadership)

• Impact on BLUE LOOs

GREEN Influence

– Government and ANSF

• Impact on GREEN LOOs

YELLOW (by exception)

– Regional / Coalition partners

RED Activity

• Impact on RED LOOs

Wargaming Methodology

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 39
 

Slide 40
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-33
 
 

• Introduction of BCT / Proposed “winter 

offensive” in February or March 09

• REDFOR Offensive in April 09 [RED takes initiative]

• Introduction of 2 additional BCTs + 3-star HQs

– JRSOI in July 09

– Open 2d GLOC / expand operations in August 09

– Initial BCT operations in August 09

• Afghanistan National Elections in October 09

• Regional Hostility (India / Pakistan)

Wargaming Events

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 41
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-34
 
 

Evaluation Criteria

-Legitimacy-

• Develop and maintain the will necessary to attain the national 

strategic end state. For Coalition Forces, legitimacy comes from 

three important factors. First, the campaign or operation should 

develop or reinforce the authority and acceptance of the hostnation government by both the governed and the international 

community. Second, the operation must be conducted according to 

international laws and treaties recognized by the United States and 

any Coalition partners, particularly the law of war. Third, the 

operation or campaign must be conducted under U.S. law. 

The COA acts in the interest 

of the Afghan people as 

defined by the norms and 

laws of both the Afghan 

people and the international 

community.

The COA has clear legality in its 

contribution to the resolution of 

the problem; it will earn the 

respect of the Afghan population 

/ international community and 

reinforce our enduring 

relationship with them.

The COA involves operations 

which challenge any of the 

three criteria; it has the 

potential for INFO OPS 

exploitation by REDFOR.

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 42
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-35
 
 

• Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the strategic end 

state. Commanders prepare for measured, protracted military 

operations in pursuit of the desired Coalition strategic end state. 

Some multinational operations may require years to reach the 

desired end state. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of 

coalition goals and objectives often is a requirement for success. 

The COA fosters 

commitment within the 

Coalition and its international 

and Afghan partners while 

preserving the Coalition and 

Afghan Security 

forces/assets over time.

The COA demonstrates unity of 

effort and coalition will by 

presenting an opportunity to fortify 

what our enemies assume is our 

primary vulnerability; convincing 

the population and our partners 

that we intend to stay the course.

The COA involves operations 

which fail to demonstrate 

unity of effort, or those that 

degrade legitimacy (indirectly 

affecting perseverance)

Evaluation Criteria

-PerseverenceUNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 43
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-36
 
 

• The ability of a Commander to execute mission command, 

characterized by minimal constraints or restrictions. Flexible 

application of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational force capabilities to maximize their ability to act. 

Freedom of action allows units at all levels to operate free of 

unnecessary internal and external constraints and emphasizes 

adjacent unit collaboration/cooperation. 

The COA promotes flexibility, 

cooperation, collaboration, 

and initiative between units 

at all levels, while 

maintaining centralized 

command. 

The COA specifically offers the 

potential to liberate 

subordinate commands and 

promote adaptive solutions 

within the context of their AO 

while supporting the theater 

commander’s intent.

The COA involves operations 

which are directive in nature 

Susceptible to prohibitive 

ROE, numerous restrictions, 

and participants with 

constraining national 

caveats.

Evaluation Criteria

-Freedom of ActionUNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 44
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-37
 
 

• Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

Restraint requires careful and disciplined balancing of security, the 

conduct of military operations, and the desired strategic end state. 

Commanders at all levels ensure their personnel are properly 

trained in rules of engagement and quickly informed of any 

changes. Rules of engagement vary according to national policy 

concerns, and local cultural & historic norms.

The COA rules of engagement 

are carefully matched to the 

strategic end state and the 

situation. Personnel can be 

properly trained in rules of 

engagement and quickly 

informed of any changes. 

The COA fosters more support 

than it alienates by limiting 

physical damage to the minimum 

necessary. Inherently protects 

the population sector friendly to 

our cause while encouraging the 

neutral sector to join them.

The COA implements 

excessive force -- possibly 

antagonizing those friendly 

and neutral parties involved. 

Damages the legitimacy of 

the COA.

Evaluation Criteria

-RestraintUNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 45
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-38
 
 

• Actions taken directly correlate to future requirements and 

contribute towards quantifying the strategic endstate. Host nation 

ability to assume responsibility and control in order to successfully 

manage and employ along all lines of operation. The transitionability

principle encompasses military, government, and civil domains. 

Compels host nation leaders to facilitate necessary advancements in 

the key areas of military, government, and civil operations in order to 

produce productive, long-term, and sustainable effects on the native 

population.

The COA maximizes 

simplicity and creates the 

capacity of the host nation to 

assume control from the 

Coalition. 

The COA focuses on issues 

central to transition of 

authority. Improvements in 

the infrastructure and 

governance are measurable 

and support all operational 

variables (DIME). 

The COA focuses on the 

security threats attempting to 

destabilize the country and 

region; neglects some 

operational variables (DIME).

Evaluation Criteria

-TransitionabilityUNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 46
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-39
 
 

COA Comparison - Most Likely

COA1 

Population Focus

COA2 

Border Security 

COA3

Building ANSF Comments

Legitimacy 1- Optimal

1- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

1- Optimal

1- Desirable

1- Less Than Desirable

1- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

COA3 = Most 

Legitimate

Perseverance 0- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

1- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

1- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

COA3 = COA2 for most 

Perseverant 

Freedom of 

Action

0- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

0- Optimal

3- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

2- Optimal

1- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

COA3 = Most Freedom 

of Action

Restraint 1- Optimal

1- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

3- Optimal

0- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

0- Optimal

2- Desirable

1- Less Than Desirable

COA2 = Most Restraint

Transitionability1- Optimal

1- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

1- Optimal

2- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

0- Optimal

2- Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

COA 2 = Most 

Transitionable

Total 3- Optimal

7- Desirable

0- Less Than Desirable

6- Optimal

8- Desirable

1- Less Than Desirable

4- Optimal

9- Desirable

2- Less Than Desirable

COA 2 tied 

with COA 3

47

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 47
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-40
 
 

COA Comparison - Most Dangerous

COA1 

Population Focus

COA2 

Border Security 

COA3

Building ANSF Comments

Legitimacy 1 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

0 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

3 - Optimal

0 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

COA3 = Most 

Legitimate

Perseverance 1 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

1 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

2 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

All COAs equally 

support Perseverance

Freedom of 

Action

1 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

2 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

1 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

COAs 1&2 equally 

provide the most 

Freedom of Action

Restraint 0 - Optimal

3 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

0 - Optimal

3 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

2 - Optimal

1 - Desirable

0 - Less Than Desirable

COA 3 exercises the 

most Restraint

Transitionability0 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

0 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

0 - Optimal

2 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

All COAs equally 

support 

Transitionability

Total 3 -Optimal

9 - Desirable

2 - Less Than Desirable

3 -Optimal

9 - Desirable

3 - Less Than Desirable

8 -Optimal

6 - Desirable

1 - Less Than Desirable

COA 3

48

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 48
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-41
 
 

COA Comparison - Intuitive

COA1 

Population Focus

COA2 

Border Security 

COA3

Building ANSF Comments

Total 6 4 19 COA 3

49

“While operational art is the manifestation of informed vision and creativity, 

operational design is the practical extension of the creative process. Together 

they synthesize the intuition and creativity of the commander with the analytical

and logical process of design.” JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 49
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-42
 
 

Recommended COA

Title: Building ANSF

Strengths:

• Legitimacy (ANSF focus ties to original ISAF mandate)

• Perseverence (legitimacy strengthens resolve of member nations)

• Transitionability (ANSF is the long-term solution for Afghan security)

“Out of the Box” Considerations

YELLOW CELL

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 50
 

Slide 51
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-43
 
 

Innovative Approaches

• Introduction of a multinational force into the 

FATA under a U.N. mandate

• Enhancing the effectiveness of PRTs without 

demanding more manpower

• Alternatives to poppy cultivation

Concepts are complementary by nature and can be applied to all courses of actions.

Final Thoughts

• National Resolve

– Difficult to address adequately in wargame execution 

– Most likely opportunities to measure progress will be 

various elections of coalition partners

– US Midterm elections in November 2010 critical

“Work on a wicked problem will continue until strategic leaders judge the situation is 

‘good enough,’ or until national interest, will, or resources have been diverted or 

exhausted. TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Slide 52
 

Slide 53
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Page B-44
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan 

Study Group
 

ANNEX C: After Action Review 

General 

At the conclusion of the Afghanistan study, members 

of the study group conducted an After Action Review 

(AAR) in order to capture how training, tasks and 

procedures could be sustained and/or improved for 

similar studies in the future. The AAR process was 

facilitated by a member of the YELLOW Cell, and 

was focused on three content areas: (1) ―Plans / 

Products / Pre-Briefings‖ (the preparation for the 

study), (2) ―Study Execution‖, and (3) ―Conclusions‖ 

(faculty comments). This section details the 

observations and recommendations derived from the 

AAR. 

Plans / Products / Pre-Briefings 

SUSTAIN: 

The study was UNCLASSIFIED thereby allowing 

international officers to fully participate. In addition, 

the UNCLASSIFIED nature of the study lent itself to 

frequent and open strategic communication 

opportunities. 

Using a contemporary (―real-world‖) problem to 

meet the W100 objectives is highly desirable and 

professionally beneficial. 

IMPROVE: 

Identify the cell chiefs a week in advance to allow 

them more time for preparation. In addition, lock in 

the study schedule prior to the start in order to 

improve cell chiefs‘ ability to manage the time 

available. 

Consider adding a ―GREY‖ cell to focus on civilian 

issues using interagency personnel. There would be 

coordination required with the college and other 

small groups to facilitate this. 

Strategic engagement opportunities were available 

during the study, but they were not optimized. 

Improvements in this area include: (1) a POC listing 

for media representatives to speed up the process of 

scheduling interviews and (2), spreading out the 

media interviews a little better and maximizing the 

opportunities to do a strategic engagement. The 

CGSC Public Affairs office could assist with these 

issues. 

Consider seeking input and insight from subject 

matter experts in the CAC/Leavenworth community 

who have recent experience in the area under study. 

Also, seek the input from fellow CGSC students 

(international officers) who are from the study 

region. 

Resource availability, specifically NIPRNET-capable 

computers and quality maps of the AO, were a 

limitation. 

Study Execution 

SUSTAIN: 

From a doctrinal standpoint, continue to use CoG 

analysis methodology IAW joint doctrine. Specifically, 

use the ―CC/CR/CV‖ construct consistently with 

aspirations to incorporate it in Army doctrine. 

Sustain briefings and discussions with senior officers / 

mentors. These sessions provided valuable feedback 

and insights. 

IMPROVE: 

In terms of COA development, it could have been 

better to plan without resource constraints (i.e., 

develop courses of action that do not include what 

forces were currently in the AO). Another 

consideration is developing two COAs that focus on 

the current real-world constraints and developing a 

third COA that is unrestricted. 

Wargaming at the operational level was challenging. 

Cell chiefs needed more tools to assist in the 

wargame process. An example of a tool that would 

be useful is a ―scorecard‖ that would allow each cell 

chief or LLOO representative to continuously track 

the accomplishment of tasks towards the plan‘s 

UNCLASSIFED  Page C-1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

objectives. Also, consider the physical set-up for the 

wargame and ensure that it facilitates the process for 

the large group (i.e., acoustics, seating, maps, ―eye 

candy‖). 

Another methodological consideration for the 

wargame is to divide the courses of action up to 

facilitate analyzing more COAs in the given time. 

However, this may cause some problems with 

evaluation criteria and validity of the assessments 

made. It would also impact the educational value of 

the process. 

To optimize the wargame process, ensure that the 

evaluation criteria rubric is agreed to early on. This 

will mitigate confusion during the final evaluation of 

the COA s. 

Consider videotaping the wargame and briefings for 

future reference. 

Additional Comments and Observations 

BLUE : Improve understanding of where problem 

framing ends and mission analysis begins. Need 

better information management system for the 

Student Sharepoint (network data server). Provide 

clearer standards of what COAs should look like 

prior to development of COAs. Personnel 

responsible for LLOOs need to fully understand the 

LLOO so that they can adequately discuss second and 

third order impacts of BLUE/RED/GREEN actions. 

RED: Consider a more in-depth IPB with the whole 

group so that all are better prepared to conduct the 

study. Blackboard and Student SharePoint (network 

storage) worked well for sharing of digital products. 

Start preparing the final written report prior to the 

final week of the study. 

GREEN: The study was an overall positive experience 

doing an in depth special case study on a current 

issue for four weeks, combining theory and 

experience in order to gain situational understanding 

of a region that is, and will be, important to us for 

years ahead. From the GREEN perspective, there is a 

need for more interagency/joint emphasis and 

involvement, as well as the consideration of more 

non-military aspects to Afghan problems. 

YELLOW: There were times during the execution 

when workload was not ―spread out‖ (some people 

were busier that others). Cell leads should make 

sure their personnel are ready to discuss what they 

are doing and prepared to cover the media talking 

points. 

BLACK: Sustain the practice of using a recorder 

from each cell during the wargame. These additional 

recorders assisted immensely in consolidation of 

reports. Study cells need to submit their 

contributions for the final report in accordance with 

the designated suspense times to allow BLACK cell 

members adequate time to consolidate the report. 

Ensure that everyone utilizes the notes section of the 

briefing slides (MS PowerPoint) to facilitate 

production of the final report. 

Faculty Comments 

Overall quality of the work done by the groups was 

far superior to sections working with the GAAT 

scenario. 

Appreciate the value in the process. These processes 

and products will assist everyone in future 

assignments. 

The primary purpose of the study is educational. Use 

the knowledge you‘ve gained through this process to 

challenge and fill the voids in our Army and Joint 

doctrine. 

UNCLASSIFED  Page C-2 
 

 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

Afghanistan Study Group
 

ANNEX D: Point of Contact Listing 

Position Rank & Name Comp Branch E-mail 

Faculty Lead Dr. Jack Kem CIV N/A jackie.kem@us.army.mil 

Student Lead MAJ Andre’ Abadie RA SC dre.abadie@us.army.mil 

BLUE Cell (Coalition) 

Faculty Lead Dr. Thomas Clark CIV N/A thomas.clark19@us.army.mil 

Student Lead MAJ Scott Allen RA AR scott.allen1@us.army.mil 

Members MAJ David Fielder RA EN david.fielder@us.army.mil 

MAJ Michael Buchheit RA FA michael.buchheit@us.army.mil 

MAJ Michael McBride RA IN michael.f.mcbride@us.army.mil 

MAJ Matthew Hill RA AV matthew.hill2@us.army.mil 

MAJ Amanda Akers-Vornholt RA LG amanda.akersvornholt@us.army.mil 

MAJ Justin Herbermann RA LG justin.herbermann@us.army.mil 

MAJ Chad Mitchell RA LG chad.mitchell@us.army.mil 

MAJ Hans-Jorg Dochtermann RA FA doc.dochtermann@us.army.mil 

GREEN Cell (Host Nation) 

Faculty Lead Mr. Tim Civils CIV N/A timothy.civils@us.army.mil 

Student Lead MAJ Jan Erik Haug IMS IN jan.haug@us.army.mill 

Members LTC Zeljko Marjanovic IMS AV zeljko.marjanovic@us.army.mil 

LCDR John Lepak USN USN john.c.lepak@us.army.mil 

MAJ Jarrett Hunter RA IN jarrett.hunter@us.army.mil 

LTC Don Algeo RA MC don.algeo@us.army.mil 

MAJ Frank Jefferson RA AG frank.jefferson@us.army.mil 

LCDR Ryan Bender USN USN ryan.j.bender@us.army.mil 

YELLOW Cell (Out of the Box) 

Faculty Lead Mr. Brian Blew CIV N/A brian.g.blew@us.army.mil 

Student Lead MAJ Theadore Kleisner RA IN teddy.kleisner@us.army.mil 

Members MAJ Brian Montgomery USAF USAF brian.r.montgomery@us.army.mil 

RED Cell (Adversary) 

Faculty Lead LTC Mark Mumm RA AR mark.mumm@us.army.mil 

Student Lead MAJ Justin Haynes RA MI justin.haynes@us.army.mil 

MAJ David Dengler USAF USAF david.dengler1@us.army.mil 

MAJ Juan Nava RA MP juan.p.nava@us.army.mil 

MAJ Ryan Chandler USAF USAF ryan.chandler@us.army.mil 

MAJ Ryon Adams RA LG ryon.adams@us.army.mil 

MAJ Todd Peebles ARNG AD todd.peebles@us.army.mil 

UNCLASSIFED  Page D-1 
 

UNCLASSIFIED  Afghanistan Study Group: Operational Campaign Plan, 15 January 2009 

MAJ Steven Fahlenkamp RA FA steven.fahlenkamp@us.army.mil 

MAJ Barry Matthews USAR EN b.matthews@us.army.mil 

MAJ Andrew Beyer RA AV andrew.beyer@us.army.mil 

BLACK Cell (Research and Publication) 

Student Lead MAJ Devon Blake RA MI devon.blake@us.army.mil 

MAJ Thuy Klea RA SC thuy.klea@us.army.mil 

MAJ Scott Cockrell USAR LG scott.cockrell@us.army.mil 

MAJ Jeffrey Reibestein RA MS jeffrey.reibestein@us.army.mil 

UNCLASSIFED  Page D-2