IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

THOMAS A. MORGAN,
Defendant Below

Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below

Appellee. § § § No. 508, 2014 § § § Court Below

— Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, § in and for Sussex Coun ty § C .A. No. S14 M

- 0 4

- 0 32 § §
Submitted: May 8, 2015 Decided: July 1 , 2015
Before HOLLAND , VALIHURA , and VAUGHN , Justices.
O R D E R
This 1 st day of July 2015 , upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: (1) The appellant, Thomas Morgan , filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s d ismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Morgan sought the writ in order to compel the Department of Correction ( “ DOC ” ) to credit him with
additional good time he claims to have earned for progr ams he participated in from
1993

- 200 6 . We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. (2) The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted Morgan in
19 93 of two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in the first degree, one count of2

unlawful sexual intercourse in the second degree, and one count of kidnapping in the second degree. The Superior Court sentenced Morgan to a total period of thirty

- six years at Level V imprisonment to be suspended after serving thirty

- two years in prison for decreasing levels of supervision

. (3) Morgan filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in May 2014 claiming that he was entitled to 1050 days of meritorious good time cre dit, which would change his projected release date from April 16, 2020 to June 10, 2016. In response, the Superior Court directed the State to have the appropriate DOC employee provide an affidavit to the court outlining Morgan’s program participation in order to determine if Morgan had been credited with all of the good
time he was entitled to receive. (4) The State provided the requested affidavit, which included a detailed spreadsheet and explanation of the audit process used to determine Morgan’s cre dit
time . The affidavit also explained the statutory limits and the DOC ’s policies on awarding good time, which resulted in Morgan earning more good time credits than he was legally entitled to have deducted from his sentence. 1 After considering
the addi tional paperwork provided by Morgan, the DOC determined that Morgan
was entitled to have an additional 68 days of credit time deducted from his

1 U nder the version of the good time statute in effect during 1993

- 2006, an inmate could earn, at most, 4.5 days of good time for satisfactory participation in education, rehabilitat ion, and work programs. Thus, even if an inmate “earned” 9 meritorious good time credits in one month, only 4.5 could legally be deducted. See 11 Del. C. § 4381(c), (d) (2007).3

sentence, which resulted in an adjustment of his projected release date. After considering the DOC’s affidavit, the Superior Court determined that the DOC had awarded Morgan all of the good time to which he was entitled and had recalculated his project ed release date accordingly. Thus, the Superior Court dismissed Morgan’s petition for a writ of mandamus . This ap peal followed. (5 ) Morgan’s sole issue on appeal is that the Superior Court erred by not reviewing the DOC’s policies regarding the deduction of good time credits, which “are violative as an unlawful delegation of legislative power.” Morgan, however,
did not raise his unlawful delegation argument to the Superior Court in the first instance. Accordingly, we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal in the absence of plain error, 2 which we do not find. (6) The good time statute, 11 Del. C. § 4381, specifies which sentences are subject to an award of good time and sets limits on the amount of good time that may be awarded. Subject to the provisions of the statute, the award of good time is to be governed by “rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of
Corrections.” 3 Contrary to Morgan’s su ggestion, the General Assembly wa s not required to spell out every detail concerning the administration of good time under
Section 4381

. 4 We conclude that Section 4381 does not unlawfully delegate

2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.
3 11 Del. C. § 4381(a).
4 In re Request of Governor f or Advisory Opinion , 12 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Del. 2009).4

legislative power to the Commissioner because the statute establish es adequate
standards for the administration of the award of good time. 5 (7) Moreover, we find no merit to Morgan ’s suggestion that the Superior Court erred in failing to issue the writ or dering the DOC to deduct all of the good
time credits that he claimed. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued to compel an administrative agency to perform a duty. 6 As a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ, the petitioner must d emonstrate that : ( a) he has a clear right to the performance of the duty; ( b) no other adequate remedy is available; and ( c) the agency has arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty. 7 We find no error in the Superior Court’s reliance upon the DOC’ s affidavit in
conclu ding that Morgan had received all of the good time credit to which he had a right. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly dismissed Morgan’s petition. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRME D.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice

5 Id

. 6 In re Bordley , 545 A.2d 619, 620 (Del. 1988).
7 Id.