2024 IL App (2d) 230423-U 

No. 2-23-0423 

Order filed June 18, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

DENISE HOPMAN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of Kane County. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 22-LA-239 

) 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE ) 

INSURANCE COMPANY, ) Honorable 

) Mark A. Pheanis,

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Jorgensen and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint because the plaintiff 

could not maintain a private cause of action based on the defendant’s alleged 

violations of the insurance rules and statutes. 

¶ 2 The plaintiff, Denise Hopman, appeals from the trial court’s order granting the motion of 

the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, to dismiss the plaintiff’s first 

amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
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¶ 4 The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident with one of State Farm’s insureds, 

Giampaolo Cherubin. Cherubin collided with the car in front of him and that car then hit the 

plaintiff’s car. Cherubin is not a party to this action. The plaintiff filed a separate suit against 

Cherubin, based on negligence, to recover for the injuries she suffered in the accident. That lawsuit 

remains pending (see Hopman v. Cherubin, et al., No 17-L-280 (Cir. Ct. Kane County)). The 

plaintiff also initiated this suit directly against State Farm. 

¶ 5 On July 13, 2023, after the dismissal of her original complaint, the plaintiff filed a twocount first amended complaint. Both counts alleged that State Farm violated sections 919.50(a) 

and 919.50(a)(1) of the Illinois Department of Insurance Rules (Insurance Rules) (50 Ill. Admin. 

Code § 919.50(a), (a)(1) (2004)) and committed improper claims practices under sections 154.5 

and 154.6 of the Illinois Insurance Code (Insurance Code) (215 ILCS 5/154.5, 154.6 (West 2022)). 

Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that State Farm failed to timely settle her insurance claim related 

to the accident or provide a reasonable written explanation of the basis for failing to settle the 

claim. Count I sought damages based on tort, alleging that there was an implied private right of 

action under the Insurance Rules and the Insurance Code. Count II sought damages for breach of 

contract, on the alleged basis that the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary of the insurance 

contract between State Farm and Cherubin and that State Farm had breached its statutory and 

regulatory duties incorporated into that contract. 

¶ 6 Section 919.50(a) of the Insurance Rules states that:

“[An insurance] company shall affirm or deny liability on claims within a reasonable time 

and shall offer payment within 30 days after affirmation of liability, if the amount of the 

claim is determined and not in dispute. For those portions of the claim which are not in 
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dispute and for which the payee is known, the company shall tender payment within said 

30 days.” 50 Ill. Admin. Code § 919.50(a).

Section 919.50(a)(1) states that, “Within 30 days after the initial determination of liability is made, 

if the claim is denied, the company shall provide the third party a reasonable written explanation 

of the basis of the denial.” Id. § 919.50(a)(1). Section 154.6 of the Insurance Code enumerates 

acts that constitute improper claims practices if, according to section 154.5, they are committed 

knowingly. 215 ILCS 5/154.5, 154.6 (West 2022)). Under these sections, it is improper for an 

insurance company to fail to settle claims in good faith or provide an explanation for its failure to 

settle claims. Id. 

¶ 7 On August 23, 2023, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant 

to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)). State 

Farm argued that there was no private right of action, express or implied, for alleged violations of 

the Insurance Rules or the Insurance Code. State Farm also argued that the plaintiff could not state 

a claim for breach of contract because she was not a party or an intended third party beneficiary of 

State Farm’s insurance contract with Cherubin. 

¶ 8 On October 18, 2023, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint with 

prejudice. The trial court found that there was no private right of action, express or implied, for 

violations of the Insurance Code and Insurance Rules at issue in this case. The trial court also 

found that the plaintiff could not state a claim for breach of contract because she was not a third 

party beneficiary of Cherubin’s insurance contract with State Farm. The plaintiff thereafter filed 

a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 10 On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint. She 

argues that she stated sufficient facts to imply a private right of action and to establish that she was 

a third party beneficiary of Cherubin’s insurance contract with State Farm. Further, she asserts 

that the failure to imply a private right of action is a violation of article I, section 12, of the Illinois 

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12)) and the Illinois Common Law Act (5 ILCS 50/1 (West 

2022)). 

¶ 11 A motion to dismiss brought under section 2-615 of the Code attacks the sufficiency of the 

complaint, on the basis that, even assuming the allegations of the complaint are true, the complaint 

does not state a cause of action that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 

2022); Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1992). A trial court should grant a 

section 2-615 motion to dismiss only if “it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved 

that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 

2d 463, 473 (2009). A court must accept as true “all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Id. “[O]nly those facts apparent from the face of 

the pleadings, matters of which the court can take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the 

record may be considered.” Id. This court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

dismiss. Handley v. Subscriber Doe, 2015 IL 118000, ¶ 29.

¶ 12 In the present case, both of the claims in the plaintiff’s amended complaint stem from 

violations of the Insurance Rules and the Insurance Code. However, the provisions cited by the 

plaintiff do not provide for a private cause of action. It is well established that “a violation of the 

insurance rules contained in Title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code does not give rise to a 

private cause of action.” Weis v. State Farm Mutual Insurance, 333 Ill. App. 3d 402, 406 (2002); 

see also Vine Street Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276, 301-02 (2006); Goldberg v. ISMIE 
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Mutual Insurance Company, 2021 IL App (1st) 210622-U, ¶ 12; Pryor v. United Equitable 

Insurance Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 110544, ¶ 8. “Under these regulations, the Illinois Department 

of Insurance has the sole authority to enforce the codes, and the proper remedy for a party who 

alleges a violation is to submit a complaint with the department.” Bernacchi v. First Chicago 

Insurance Company, 52 F.4th 324, 329-330 (7th Cir. 2022). 

¶ 13 Furthermore, sections 154.5 and 154.6 of the Insurance Code also do not provide for a 

private right of action. While sections 154.5 and 154.6 of the Insurance Code set forth improper 

claims practices, sections 154.7 and 154.8 authorize the State Director of Insurance to enforce the 

codes and penalize any improper practices. See 215 ILCS 5/154.5-154.8 (West 2022). 

Accordingly, “section 154.5 et seq. [of the Insurance Code] does not give rise to a private remedy 

or cause of action by a policyholder against an insurer but is instead regulatory in nature.” 

American Service Insurance Company v. Passarelli, 323 Ill. App. 3d 587, 590 (2001); see also 

Bernacchi, 52 F.4th at 330. 

¶ 14 The plaintiff argues that, even if there is no explicit private right of action, the Insurance 

Code and Insurance Rules provide for an implied private right of action. This argument is also 

without merit. “The standard that must be met for a court to imply a private right of action in a 

statute is quite high.” Channon v. Westward Management, Inc., 2022 IL 128040, ¶ 33. The 

implication of a private right of action is appropriate only if (1) the plaintiff is a member of the 

class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, (2) providing a private right of action is consistent 

with the underlying purpose of the statute, (3) the plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed 

to prevent, and (4) providing a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy 

for violations of the statute. Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 391 (1982). 

“All four factors must be met before a private right of action will be implied.” Marque Medicos 
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Fullerton, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 160756, ¶ 57. Whether a 

statute creates an implied private right of action is an issue of statutory interpretation and, thus, 

presents a question of law that we review de novo. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34 (2004). 

¶ 15 In the present case, the fourth factor for the implication of a private right of action—the 

need to provide an adequate remedy—is missing. As noted above, the Insurance Rules and the 

Insurance Code vest the Illinois Department of Insurance with the task of regulating the actions of 

insurance companies. See Weis, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 406; Bernacchi, 52 F.4th at 330. An aggrieved 

party can submit a complaint to the Department of Insurance (Bernacchi, 52 F.4th at 330) and the 

department can “investigate violations of its rules and regulations, hold hearings, and impose 

penalties on those it finds in violation” (Weis, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 406 (citing 215 ILCS 5/401(b), 

(c), (d) (West 2000)). As there exist adequate remedies for violations of the Insurance Code and 

Insurance Rules, it is unnecessary to imply a private right of action and the plaintiff’s claim 

necessarily fails. Marque Medicos, 2017 IL App (1st) 160756, ¶ 57. 

¶ 16 The plaintiff argues that the failure to imply a private right of action is a violation of the 

open courts provision of the Illinois Constitution. Article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution 

of 1970 provides:

“Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he 

receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, 

freely, completely, and promptly.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12.

The plaintiff asserts that, without an implied private right of action, she lacks any remedy against 

an insurance company for violations of the insurance laws or rules of this state. However, “the 

open courts provision is merely an expression of philosophy and does not mandate that a certain 

remedy be provided in any specific form.” Martinez v. Department of Public Aid, 348 Ill. App. 
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3d 788, 794 (2004). Here, the plaintiff does not lack a remedy against an insurance company 

because she can file a complaint with the Department of Insurance. Bernacchi, 52 F.4th at 330. 

Further, she has a remedy for her injuries as set forth in her pending lawsuit directly against 

Cherubin. 

¶ 17 The plaintiff also argues that the failure to find an implied private right of action violates 

the Illinois Common Law Act (Act) (5 ILCS 50/1 (West 2022)). In so arguing, the plaintiff relies 

on two legal principles. First, the common law of England “shall be the rule of decision, and shall 

be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” Id. Second, “[u]nder several 

centuries of English common law, the courts adhered to the view that every act of Parliament gave 

rise to private remedy to a party wronged by its violation.” Noyola v. Board of Education of City 

of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 128 (1997). We have no dispute with these legal principles. Rather, 

as recognized in Noyola, our courts have enforced these legal principles by developing the fourfactor test necessary to imply a private right of action under a statute. Id. at 130-131 (citing cases). 

As we have determined above, the implication of a private right of action is not necessary to 

provide an adequate remedy in this case. Thus, there is no violation of the Act. 

¶ 18 Finally, the plaintiff argues that she has stated a cause of action for breach of contract 

because section 919.50 of the Insurance Rules is incorporated into every insurance contract and 

she is a third party beneficiary of Cherubin’s insurance contract with State Farm. However, it is 

well settled that a plaintiff cannot use a breach of contract claim to enforce statutory provisions 

that lack a private right of action. Ochoa v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 910 F. 3d 992, 995 

(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Village of McCook v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 335 Ill. App. 3d 32, 39 

(2002) (artful pleading does not disguise plaintiff’s effort to enforce a statutory violation as a 

breach of contract claim)). Accordingly, even assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff
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alleged sufficient facts to establish that she is a third party beneficiary of Cherubin’s insurance 

contract with State Farm, the breach of contract claim is insufficient as a matter of law as it is an 

improper attempt to personally enforce the Insurance Rules and the Insurance Code. Id. 

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County. 

¶ 21 Affirmed.