FI L ED U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S EL EVENTHCI RCUI T DECEMBER 2, 2009 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VENTH CIRCUIT

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ No. 0 9- 10 14 4

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ D. C. Dock etNo. 0 6- 01 86 4 C V-ORL-2 8DAB DART INDUSTRIES, INC., Pl ai nt iff -Co un te r-Defe nd an t-Ap pe ll ee

Cro ss -Ap pe ll an t,
ve rs us DAVID ACOR, in di vi du al ly, Defen da nt -Co un te r-Cl ai m an t Cro ss -Ap pe ll ee, UNITED INVEN TORY SERVICE, INC., d.b .a. UIS Po lym ers , Defen da nt -Co un te r-Cl ai m an t-Ap pe ll an t Cro ss -Ap pe ll ee.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ App eal s fr om

th e Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co urt fo r th e Mi dd le Dis tri ctof F lo rid a

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ (Dece m be r 2, 2 00 9) Befo re MAR CUS, FAY an d ANDERSON, Ci rcu itJu dg es .PER CURI AM:

Afte r or al arg um en t an d c aref ul co ns id erat io n, we co nc lu de th atth e jud gm en t o f th e d is tri ctco urt i s due to be affi rm edin all res pe ct s. With res pe ctto Uni te d In ve nt ory

Serv ic e’s (“ UIS”) c ou nt ercl ai m ag ai ns t Dart fo r ne gl ig en ce, we
can ass um e arg ue nd o t ha t Dart re ta in eda du ty as own er o f th e b ui ld in g t o m ai nt ai n th e fi re s up pr es si on syste m , andwe can ev enass um e arg ue nd o t ha t Dart m ay ha ve be enne gl ig en t i n t ha t re ga rd . Howev er, UIS’s n eg li ge nc e cl ai m fai ls forsev eral
reas on s, t he m os t o bv io us of wh ic h i s t ha t the re i s i ns uf fic ie ntev id en ce tha t an op erat io na l fi re s up pr es si on syste m wou ldha ve reduc edUIS’s lo ss es . In o th er 1
wor ds , UIS’s ne gl ig en ce cl ai m fai ls forin su ffi ci en t ev id en ce o f cau sa ti on . The
on ly argu m en t as se rte d o n app eal by U IS t o c ha ll en ge th e d is tri ctco urt’s in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce o f cau sa ti on ho ld in g i s t ha t the di st ric t co urt erro ne ou sl y

Actually , we be lieve that both Dar t, as owner , and UI S, as tenant, had duties with 1 respe ct to the fire suppression sy stem. We agree with the district court that, under §4.1.5 of the rele vant code , a duty

was imposed upon UI S to evaluate the a dequac y of the fir e suppre ssion sy stem when it cha

ng ed the usa g e of the building. Although this duty was imposed upon UI S, we doubt that it relieve d Dar t from the duties as owne r imposed upon it by the same c ode. Thus, we be lieve that both par

ties had a duty . Although U I S’s neg lige nce w ith reg ard to its duty is clea rer in the evidenc e than is Da rt’s, we can a ssume arguendo some ne g lige nce on the part of Dar t. Howeve r, eve n assuming a rguendo some ne g lige nce on thepart of D art, a s landlord, a landlord is liable for ha

rm resultingfrom a da

ng erous c ondition on the premises only if both the landlord could have discove red the dang erous c ondition through re asonable diligenc e, and the tenant injured a s a re sult of the dang erous c ondition ex erc ised rea sonable c are and dilige nce. Roberts v. Tenn. Wesleyan Colleg e, 450 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tenn. Ct.App. 1969). Thus, wholly aside fr om UI S’s failure be cause of the lac k of ca usation, its claim would also have fa iled on acc ount of its own neg lige nce. F or this same re ason, UI S’s claim that Dar t was neg lige nt in maintaining the elec trical sy stem fails. Moreove r, we also believe UI S failed to adduc e suff icient evidenc e that Da

rt was ne g lige nt in maintaining the e lectric al sy stem. 2ex cl ud edth e te st im on y of Ke n B rid ge s. Inth atreg ard , we read il y rejectUIS’s ch al le ng e. W e co nc lu de th atth e d is tri ctco urt d idno t ab us e it s d is cret io n i n
co nc lu di ng th atKen B rid ge s was pu rp orti ng to tes ti fy with re sp ectto sci en ti fic or te ch ni cal m at te rs , andth us di d n otqu al ify as a l ay witne ss . See Uni te d S ta te s v . Tay lo r, 17 F.3d33 3, 3 38 (11 Cir . 19 94 ). th 2 Fo r th e fo reg oi ng reas on s, we re ject a ll of UIS ’s arg um en ts init s ap pe al . W e tu rnne xtto Dart ’s cro ss -ap pe al
. Dartarg ue s t ha t UIS i s g ui lt y of n eg li ge nc e p er s e b ecau se itfai le d t o
ev al ua te th e fi re p ro te ct io n s y st em forit s capabi li ty to p ro te ctth e n ew us e – i.e., st or ag e o f co m

bu st ib le m at eri al s –to whi chUIS was pu tt in g t he bu il di ng . Alt ho ug h we a gr ee wi thDartth atth e fi re co de im po se d s uc h adu ty on UIS , and al th ou gh we ag ree t ha t UIS f ai le d t o d is ch arg e th atdu ty, Dart ’s cla im ne ve rth el es s fai ls be cau se Dartco nc ed edth atth ere was in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce tha t an op erat io na l fir e p ro te ct io n s y st em

wou ldha ve reduc edth e lo ss es su ffer edas ares ul t o f th e fir e. 3
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in denying the

2 motion by

UI S for a c hang e of ve nue. See Palmer v. Br own, 376 F.3d 1254, 1257 ( 11 Cir. th 2004). In its responsive brief on appea l, UI S appare ntly rea ds Dart’ s cross-a

ppeal a s 3 asser ting - in addition to it s per se neg lige nce c laim – a common law wa ste claim. As we have noted, any

neg lige nce c laim based on UI S’s failures w ith respec t to the fire pr otection sy stem fail for insuff icient evidenc e of c ausation. We are doubtful that Dart ha s fairly prese nted on appe al any claim for w aste ba sed upon any other a ction or omission of UI S. Accordingly , we de em any

3Fo r th e fo reg oi ng reas on s, t he jud gm en t o f th e d is tri ctco urt i s af firm edin all
res pe ct s. AFFIR MED.

other such c laim to have bee n abandone d. 4