Evaluation of the 

Military Base 

National Emergency Grants 

Final Report 

December 2006 

Employment and Training Administration 

Occasional Paper 2007-02
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Evaluation of the Military Base 

National Emergency Grants 

U.S. Department of Labor 

Elaine L. Chao 

Employment and Training Administration 

Emily Stover DeRocco, Assistant Secretary 

Office of Policy Development and Research 

Maria K. Flynn, Administrator 

December 2006 

This report was prepared for the U.S. 

Department of Labor, Employment and 

Training Administration, Office of Policy 

Development and Research by 

MATHEMATICA Policy Research, Inc. 

Since contractors conducting research 

and evaluation projects under 

government sponsorship are encouraged 

to express their own judgment freely, this 

report does not necessarily represent 

official opinion or policy of the U.S. 

Department of Labor. 

Contract No.: AF-12540-02-30(02) 

MPR Reference No.: 8967-930

Evaluation of the Military 

Base National Emergency 

Grants 

Final Report 

December 2006 

Karen Needels 

Jeanne Bellotti 

Mina Dadgar 

Walter Nicholson 

iii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

 This Evaluation of the Military Base National Emergency Grants (NEGs) required both 

extensive data collection from six sites that received grants from the U.S. Department of Labor 

(DOL) and guidance and assistance from DOL. State staff members involved in the grant efforts 

at Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and San Diego provided a wealth of information during inperson visits to the sites and in many conversations during the evaluation. The NEG coordinators 

and supervisors at these sites provided valuable assistance in coordinating the visits, ensuring 

that we could meet with key staff members and observe service activities and that logistical 

issues pertaining to the visits were handled smoothly. These individuals include Leland Lewis, 

Manager of Military Initiatives at Opportunity Inc., in Hampton Roads; Mary Sabillo, Director of 

the Workforce Advancement Division of the San Diego Workforce Partnership; Marla Rye, 

President of Workforce Essentials, Inc. and John Watz, Field Operations Manager at Workforce 

Essentials, Inc., at Fort Campbell. 

Many other staff members at these three sites kindly provided us with the data that we 

requested, answered our questions, or helped in other ways. At Fort Campbell, Renee Neill and 

Barbara Unruh provided data extracts and financial information, respectively. At Hampton 

Roads, Clif Duncan and Joe Holicky aided in similar ways. At San Diego, Jacqueline Collins 

provided data; Maggie Collins, Cecile Cowan, and Jenny Marinko provided financial 

information; Rebecca Bianconi helped to plan the site visit; and Brandalyn Patton and Vanessa 

Escalante provided insights through telephone and email exchanges. We greatly appreciate the 

help of all these staff members, and others with whom we met, at the NEG sites. 

Data collection from Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak was less extensive than from 

the other three sites, but it too was valuable for providing insights to the experiences at military 

base NEG sites. We would like to thank the following staff for their willingness to provide us 

information on their experiences operating military base NEGs: at Fort Bragg, Patrick S. Hurley 

and Geneva Mixon; at Fort Hood, Linda Angel, Jerry Haisler, and Susan Kamas; and at Pikes 

Peak, Jeff Braxton, Joan Powers, and Vydia Torres. 

 At DOL, we received guidance and support from Anissa Holm, who served as our project 

officer. During the evaluation, we also received helpful comments and feedback from many 

other DOL staff, especially those in the Office of Policy Development and Research and the 

Office of National Response. 

 Several individuals at MPR contributed in substantive ways to the evaluation and also 

deserve thanks. Vatsala Karwe provided expert programming for the analysis of the data files. 

Rob Olsen provided valuable comments that led to improved design report, while Paul Decker 

and Linda Rosenberg did so for the final report. Leah Hackleman edited the final report, and 

Cindy McClure and Jill Miller produced it. 

Karen Needels 

Project Director 

 v

CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................... xi 

 I INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS......................................................................................4 

B. SITES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY .....................................................................6 

C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY..............................9 

D. OUTLINE OF THE FINAL REPORT ..................................................................15 

 II ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE GRANT...................................17 

A. OVERVIEW OF GRANT OPERATIONS............................................................20 

1. Designing the NEGs Around the Military Community and Workforce 

Development System......................................................................................20 

2. Locations and Collaboration...........................................................................22 

B. CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PRIMARY TARGET GROUP FOR 

SERVICES.............................................................................................................27 

1. Advantages of Serving All Military Spouses .................................................30 

2. Challenges in Serving All Military Spouses...................................................31 

C. MARKETING........................................................................................................32 

D. STAFFING.............................................................................................................35 

1. Responsibilities of NEG Staff ........................................................................35 

2. Desired Characteristics for NEG Management Staff......................................36 

3. Desired Characteristics for NEG Case Managers...........................................37 

4. Staff Retention ................................................................................................38 
CONTENTS (continued) 

Chapter Page 

 vi

III PROVISION OF NEG SERVICES ..............................................................................41 

A. CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES..................................................................43 

B. TRAINING SERVICES ........................................................................................46 

1. The ITA Approval Process .............................................................................47 

2. In-Demand Training Programs .......................................................................49 

3. The ITA Caps .................................................................................................50 

4. Duration of Eligibility for Training ................................................................52 

5. Other Factors Affecting Training ...................................................................53 

C. SUPPORT SERVICES ..........................................................................................54 

1. Child Care.......................................................................................................56 

2. Transportation and Other Support Services....................................................59 

D. SERVICES TO CLIENTS WHO RELOCATE OUT OF THE NEG 

COMMUNITIES ...................................................................................................60 

 IV PROGRAM COSTS .....................................................................................................65 

A. METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING PROGRAM COSTS ........................66 

B. PER-CLIENT COSTS BY SITE ...........................................................................71 

C. OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING COSTS INCURRED BY 

 NEG SITES............................................................................................................78 

 V CHARACTERISTICS, SERVICE RECEIPT, AND OUTCOMES 

 OF NEG CLIENTS.......................................................................................................85 

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF GRANT CLIENTS.....................................................87 

B. PARTICIPATION IN NEG-FINANCED ACTIVITIES ......................................94 

C. CLIENT OUTCOMES ..........................................................................................97 

D. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS ..........................................................103 
CONTENTS (continued) 

Chapter Page 

 vii

VI LESSONS FROM THE NEGS FOR PROVIDING WORKFORCE 

 SERVICES TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES..........................................................107 

A. LESSONS AFFECTING SERVICES TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES .........108 

1. Coordinating with Partners and Operating in a Military Community 

Poses Special Challenges and Opportunities for Grantees ...........................108 

2. Services to Military Communities Must Take into Account the 

 Mobility Issues that Pervade the Clients’ Lives ...........................................112 

B. LESSONS ABOUT STRUCTURING NEGS TO MILITARY 

COMMUNITIES .................................................................................................115 

1. Integrating NEG Services with WIA Services Allows the Effective and 

Efficient Delivery of Services ......................................................................115 

2. Developing Informal Screening Procedures to Ensure that Military 

Spouses Wanted to Work Appears to be a Successful Approach for 

Enrolling Clients and Using Grant Resources Effectively ...........................117 

3. Training and Support Services Are Expensive Components of the 

Package of Services Offered to Military Personnel and Military 

 Spouses .........................................................................................................119 

4. The Difficulties in Locating Space for Services, the Shifts in the Target 

Population, and the Temporary, Short-Term Nature of the Grants 

 Led to Large Inefficiencies...........................................................................121 

5. Some of the Fort Campbell Experiences May Not be Duplicated in 

Other Locations ............................................................................................122 

C. LESSONS ABOUT EVALUATING EMERGENCY GRANTS........................124 

1. Having a Clearer Set of Goals for the NEGs Would Enhance the Ability 

to Identify the Most Appropriate Design for the Evaluation and to 

Determine Grant Successes in Meeting Those Goals...................................124 

2. Quantitative Analysis to Support an Evaluation Would be Greatly 

Improved by Clarifying and Coordinating Data Collection 

 Expectations at the Outset of the Grants.......................................................126 

REFERENCES.....................................................................................................129 

APPENDIX A: COST DATA COLLECTION FORM ......................................A.1 

APPENDIX B: DETAILED RESULTS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 

 DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................................B.1 

 ix

TABLES 

Table Page 

 I.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF GRANTEES ..................................................................7 

 I.2 DATA SOURCES USED FOR EACH GRANTEE...............................................10 

 II.1 LOCATION OF NEG STAFF AND SERVICES ................................................. 24 

 II.2 CHANGES IN THE TARGET GROUPS FOR THE MILITARY BASE 

 NEGs...................................................................................................................... 28

 III.1 NEG SUPPORT SERVICES POLICIES .............................................................. 55 

IV.1 AVERAGE COST PER MILITARY NEG CLIENT BY SITE ............................ 72 

 IV.2 COSTS OF TRAINING AND SUPPORT SERVICES BY SITE......................... 75 

 IV.3 COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR CALCULATING 

AVERAGE COST PER PARTICIPANT .............................................................. 79 

 V.1 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES UNDER 

 NEGs TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES.............................................................. 88 

 V.2 LABOR MARKET HISTORY FOR RECIPIENTS OF NEG-FINANCED 

SERVICES............................................................................................................. 90 

 V.3 TARGET GROUPS FOR NEG-FINANCED SERVICES.................................... 93 

 V.4 PARTICIPATION IN NEG-FINANCED ACTIVITIES ...................................... 95 

 V.5 OUTCOMES FOR NEG CLIENTS .......................................................................98 

xi 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Authorized by Section 173 of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), as amended, the 

Secretary of Labor may award National Emergency Grants (NEGs) to states or local areas that 

require supplemental resources for workforce development, employment services, or other 

adjustment assistance, usually in response to an event such as a firm closing, mass layoff, or 

natural disaster. These funds are intended to temporarily increase the capacity of states or 

localities to provide services in response to an unanticipated increase in demand for those 

services. Applications for new grants or supplemental funds are to be submitted as the events 

occur and as the need for these funds arises. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has also 

awarded several NEGs to communities with large military populations; these NEGs initially 

were designed to provide services as a result of anticipated downsizing of the Department of 

Defense (DoD) starting in the mid-1990s. In this report, we provide an evaluation of those 

grants, starting in 2001. 

During at least part of the time the grants have been operating in these military communities, 

four types of clients have been targeted to receive NEG services: 

1. Involuntarily separated military personnel during their transition to the civilian 

labor market. This group was the primary group targeted by the first grants awarded. 

2. Military spouses whose families have been transferred to the targeted communities. 

The eligibility of spouses for NEG services originally was restricted to spouses who 

qualify as displaced homemakers or dislocated workers. Some NEGs were later 

modified to allow service to spouses who are incumbent workers or new labor 

market entrants. 

3. DoD civilian personnel are eligible for services to help them as they make the 

transition to civilian-sector employment. This group makes up a very small 

proportion of all NEG clients. 

4. Returning members of the National Guard and Reserves who are not able to return 

to their former employment or who were previously enrolled in WIA or Trade 

Adjustment Assistance programs and require help to complete their training. This 

group also makes up a very small proportion of all NEG clients. 

The evaluation was designed to address six key questions about the use of the emergency 

grant funds to provide services to these groups: 

1. What gaps in regular-formula funding for services and training are the military 

base NEGs intended to address? 

2. What are the demographic characteristics and employment backgrounds of clients 

who have participated in military base NEG activities? 
xii 

3. Do NEG-funded services appear well targeted to address the challenges NEG 

clients face as they try to obtain employment? 

4. How much did grant-financed services cost? 

5. What were the labor market outcomes of grant participants? 

6. What challenges and opportunities for the provision of services to the target groups 

do the temporary and emergency nature of these funds pose? 

A. DESIGN OF THE EVALUATION 

To address these questions, the evaluation focused explicitly on the three earliest and largest 

military base NEGs that DOL provided to (1) the state of Tennessee (providing services in Fort 

Campbell, Kentucky); (2) Opportunity, Inc., of Hampton Roads (providing services in Norfolk, 

Virginia); and (3) the San Diego Workforce Partnership, Inc. (providing services in San Diego 

County, California). To understand how NEGs have operated in smaller military communities, 

we also included a less extensive examination of three medium-sized NEGs: (1) the county of 

Cumberland, North Carolina (serving Fort Bragg, North Carolina); (2) the Central Texas 

Workforce Board (serving Fort Hood, Texas); and (3) the El Paso County/Teller County 

Consortium (serving Pikes Peak, Colorado). 

Our evaluation design drew on both qualitative and quantitative data. To learn about the 

three largest sites, we conducted a qualitative analysis based on comprehensive in-person 

interviews with local program administrators. We also conducted focus groups with a small 

number of clients at each grantee and case file conferences with staff to discuss the situations of 

a few clients. We supplemented the qualitative information collected through discussions with 

site staff and clients with a review of program documents and other publicly available 

information. 

Our data collection efforts for the NEGs that operated in smaller military communities (Fort 

Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak) relied exclusively on qualitative data collected through 

program documents and telephone interviews with two or three NEG staff, usually senior 

managers from the grantees or program operators. 

The quantitative component of our evaluation had two segments. For an analysis of 

program costs at the three largest sites (Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and San Diego), we 

developed a detailed form to capture a breakdown of costs associated with providing the full 

range of services to clients during fiscal year 2004–2005, which represents a period during which 

operations were relatively stable compared to other years. Based on this information, we 

estimated a cost per client for core services, intensive services, training, supportive services, and 

administrative services. By design, our per-participant cost analysis does not include 

expenditures on start-up, infrastructure development, and other one-time expenditures that 

grantees incurred; as a result, it focuses on only a portion of the entire grant amount that 

represents the cost of serving clients during steady-state operations. The second component of 

our quantitative analysis was based on individual-level management information systems (MIS) 

data about participants whose services were financed under the three large NEGs. In principle, 

these data contained information about clients’ demographic characteristics, education and 
xiii 

employment histories, services received under the NEGs, and employment and earnings 

outcomes. In many ways, however, data inadequacies plagued the analysis, which made our 

findings less definitive than what would have been possible had data quality been higher; 

furthermore, there are some instances in which we do not present tabulations that we think would 

be unreliable. 

Here, we summarize the findings in the report, focusing on (1) administration and operations 

of the grants; (2) types of services provided to NEG clients; (3) costs of providing services; and 

(4) clients’ characteristics, details on the services in which they participated, and their labor 

market outcomes. We also tie together the findings of the analysis into lessons for policymakers. 

B. ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE GRANTS 

Based on our examination of the experiences of the NEGs in our six sites, we conclude that 

the nature of the “emergency” that the grants were intended to address changed over time and 

was, in the end, unclear. The original motivation for the grants was to provide temporary 

assistance to military communities in the face of military downsizing. However, this rationale 

largely disappeared after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, because the military was no 

longer downsizing. When the primary target group shifted from involuntarily separated military 

personnel to military spouses, the rationale changed to the provision of services to military 

spouses to help DoD retain military personnel. To assess whether NEG funds were intended to 

address not an emergency, per se, but a chronic shortfall in regular WIA funding to military 

communities and families, we investigated whether military families are adequately represented 

in current procedures for WIA formula funding. Our general conclusion was that the Bureau of 

Labor Statistics (BLS) formulae at the state level adequately capture concentrations of military 

personnel and their families. We also believe that adaptations of the formulae to within-state 

allocations do so as well, though we did not pursue the details of such funding in our study 

states. Nevertheless, several NEG administrators reported that military clients may require more 

extensive services than regular WIA clients because the military clients move frequently and are 

hindered in their ability to develop skills and work experience. Thus, site staff believe that there 

is a special need in these communities, but the need does not arise either from a one-time 

emergency or from inadequacies in the basic WIA formula funding methodology. 

Our examination also led to four general lessons about grant administration and operations 

(Chapter II): 

1. Obtaining support from, and coordinating service delivery with, the military 

enhances client recruitment and avoids service duplication. For example, sites 

tried to capitalize on the systems and services provided by military family support 

centers, because potential clients already are familiar with these centers and these 

centers already offer services similar to WIA core and intensive services. The sites 

that did not initially do so found their start-up efforts were not as productive as they 

would have liked, and they had to backtrack to develop these linkages that would 

facilitate smooth client recruitment and service delivery. 
xiv 

2. Because the types of services available through the NEG program mirror those of 

the WIA program, the two programs can, and should, be effectively integrated to 

avoid duplication of the existing WIA system. Using one-stop operators to 

administer NEGs created efficiencies in service delivery. One site that initially 

established a separate structure for the provision and management of NEG services 

encountered problems supervising staff. In addition, some sites that allowed 

different caps for training funds for WIA and NEG clients subsequently revised their 

NEG caps to be the same as the WIA caps, due to problems that arose when the two 

client groups found out about the different caps in funds. 

3. In the three large sites, changes in NEG eligibility from involuntarily separated 

military personnel to military spouses meant that frontline staff needed different 

skills and backgrounds. Having staff with the same types of background 

characteristics as the clients they served improved the relationships between clients 

and their case managers. Some sites encountered difficulty when this was not the 

case after the target groups switched from involuntarily separated military personnel 

to the spouses of military personnel, because, as site staff reported, these two groups 

have dramatically different backgrounds, expectations, and needs. 

4. Large sites needed to adjust their recruitment and eligibility determination policies 

when non-dislocated worker spouses became part of the target group because, as a 

group, they were less motivated than other clients to work. Some staff reported that 

non-dislocated worker spouses were not highly motivated to work, even though they 

wanted to participate in training. Sites reported that entered employment rates 

declined after non-dislocated worker spouses enrolled, and MIS data show that they 

were 19 percentage points less likely to enter employment than were dislocated 

worker spouses. As a result, sites introduced informal screening procedures to 

ensure that clients wanted to work after completing training and had thought through 

the implications of common life events on their ability and desire to work. Although 

the MIS data could not be used to examine whether employment rates rose as a result 

of these new procedures, site staff reported that they did. 

C. SERVICES FINANCED UNDER THE NEGS 

Chapter III describes the types of services that were available to NEG clients and the five 

general conclusions we reached from our detailed examination:

1. NEGs greatly increased the amount of funds available for employment-related and 

support services compared to what is typically the case in these communities, 

although services were generally similar to those already available. Core and 

intensive services made available to NEG clients were similar to those available to 

WIA clients. They were also similar to services offered by the military through 

military support centers and their related websites, and NEG staff leveraged existing 

services for their clients. In some cases, however, NEG-financed intensive services 

were more extensive than those available elsewhere. For example, comprehensive 

assessments to guide clients to identify potential career tracks were especially valued 

by San Diego caseworkers and clients who did not have much work experience. 
xv 

Grantee staff tried to distinguish their services from existing ones by focusing on the 

provision of training and support grants, which military family support service funds 

did not make available on a widespread basis. 

2. Offering more generous training allowances to NEG clients than to WIA clients in 

the same local area led to dissatisfaction when clients found that their peers were 

obtaining a different level of support. Some sites initially offered their NEG clients 

more generous allowances, but they subsequently adopted the WIA grant caps for the 

NEG program. 

3. About 60 percent of clients received funds for training. A frequently reported field 

of training was the medical field, which is desirable because its occupations are often 

in demand and because the skills are portable. The portability of skills is especially 

valuable because military spouses are likely to move from one military base to 

another every two or three years. 

4. Both NEG staff and focus group participants reported that child care services, 

provided in large part by NEGs, were helpful for the success of clients who had 

children, but they also were expensive. A primary reason for this is that military 

spouses often do not live near friends or extended family, who might otherwise be 

informal sources of care. Furthermore, some staff reported that child care support 

was provided predominantly through the NEGs, rather than through other sources, 

because clients were unlikely to qualify for financial support because of their family 

income levels and long waiting lists at military providers of child care. The cost of 

child care could be expensive, however. For some clients, it could be as much as the 

cost of training. This finding suggests that helping this portion of clients participate 

successfully in training can be particularly expensive for society after support service 

needs, regardless of the source, are taken into account. 

5. Staff did not successfully provide services to clients who moved out of the local 

area. The sites developed plans for delivering services to clients who moved or who 

anticipated moving. These plans included having case managers provide information 

on the labor market and training options to the client before relocation, retain contact 

with him or her after the move, and work with one-stops in the new area to make 

participation in training easier. However, implementing those plans was often given 

a low priority. Instead, sites used eligibility screening of potential clients to reduce 

the likelihood that someone who might relocate soon would be enrolled for services. 

D. COSTS OF NEG-FINANCED SERVICES 

Our detailed examination of costs for the three large sites consisted of three approaches to 

estimate per-client costs. The first and most extensive approach built up costs based on granteeprovided estimates of the amount of staff time spent on activities during a one-year period (fiscal 

year 2004–2005) and the proportion of clients who participated in each activity. This approach 

allowed us to examine the per-client costs associated with different types of activities and was 

designed to allow us to estimate steady-state per-client costs. This estimate does not include 

other costs, such as one-time, start-up, and other types of nonservice costs that the grantees 

incurred. The second and third approaches take into account these other types of expenditures, 
xvi 

but they do not allow for a breakdown of costs into different components. The second approach 

looked at average per-client costs based on the site budget and the projected number of clients to 

be served by the grantee; the third approach looked at actual expenditures and numbers of clients 

served. 

Our examination of costs, discussed in Chapter IV, led to five important conclusions: 

1. Average steady-state costs of serving NEG clients were similar for two of the three 

sites: Fort Campbell ($4,401) and Hampton Roads ($5,001). However, costs at San 

Diego ($8,002) were nearly double these figures. 

2. The average cost estimates based on grantee budgets and actual expenditures were 

similar to steady-state costs in Fort Campbell (at around $4,000 to $5,400), 

somewhat higher than steady-state costs in Hampton Roads (at around $7,000 to 

$8,000), and much higher in San Diego (at around $14,000 to $16,000). Our 

approach did not allow us to pinpoint reasons for such large differences in some of 

the sites. However, they probably arose from large costs associated with the startup 

of the grants, changes in operations due to the shifts in the primary target group, and 

other types of expenses not directly related to services. 

3. About 60 percent of steady-state costs in all three sites was spent on training. 

Variation in average training expenditures was the primary determinant of 

differences in average steady-state costs across the sites, with average training 

expenditures in Fort Campbell ($2,577) and Hampton Roads ($3,122) about $2,000 

lower than those in San Diego ($4,963). 

4. Costs of support services varied significantly across the sites. They constituted 17 

percent of steady-state average costs in Fort Campbell and 14 percent in San Diego. 

These costs are not surprising, given the reports of significant expenditures on child 

care support in these sites. However, expenditures on support services in Hampton 

Roads were minimal because the two largest workforce investment boards (WIBs) 

out of the three providing services at this site did not offer support services. Staff at 

these WIBs tried to encourage clients to come up with informal child care 

arrangements, such as alternating baby-sitting with other military families or 

attending training when their spouses were not at work. However, site staff reported 

that some clients were unable to start or continue training because of difficulty 

setting up or keeping these types of arrangements. 

5. Administration of the grants constituted between 9 and 12 percent of average costs 

in each of the sites. Based on descriptions given by local staff, about 80 percent of 

administrative costs in all sites were attributed to grant management and accounting 

functions. Additional costs included developing partnerships with local military 

leaders, conducting human resource functions, and managing data. 
xvii 

E. CHARACTERISTICS AND LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF NEG CLIENTS 

In Chapter V, we use individual-level data provided by the three large sites to look at the 

characteristics of NEG clients, their experiences with grant-financed services, and their labor 

market outcomes. We encountered a variety of problems with these data files. These include (1) 

lack of a reliable, accurate way to distinguish between the different target groups at all three 

sites; (2) lack of data on all of the clients at one site; (3) few data items in the file from one site; 

and (4) incomplete data entry by case managers at one site for the data items in their file. While 

we still think that the data provide a useful picture of the NEG caseload, we had to use discretion 

about which tabulations are reliable enough to be presented and which are not. Our major 

conclusions from our examination of the data were the following: 

• More than 80 percent of NEG clients were female, reflecting the increasing focus 

of the grants on military spouses. The mean age of the clients was about 30 years 

old and, in general, the clients were fairly well educated. More than 97 percent were 

high school graduates, and about 43 percent had at least some college. 

• More than three-fourths of NEG clients had prior employment recorded in the MIS 

data. This might be an underestimate, since we suspect that some prior employment 

was not reported in our data. About 43 percent of NEG clients were reported as being 

dislocated from their prior jobs. Prior wage rates averaged about $11 per hour. 

• Because almost all NEG clients received basic core and intensive services, the 

primary difference among them in service receipt was between the 60 percent who 

undertook training and the 40 percent who did not. As mentioned above, about 60 

percent of NEG participants entered NEG-financed training paid for through 

individual training account (ITA) grants, which contain funds allocated for a specific 

client’s usage. The percentage of clients who received ITAs did not vary much 

across the sites, but the ITA amounts varied widely. In San Diego (the only site for 

which we had good information on ITA amounts for our entire sample), the median 

ITA grant was $8,000. About five percent of San Diego grants exceeded $19,000 

before the site requested and received permission from DOL to institute a cap on ITA 

amounts. Before San Diego’s institution of this cap, occupations such as teaching, 

paralegal, bookkeeping and accounting, automotive, finance, and translation were 

more common. After the institution of the cap, more clients selected medical fields 

for their occupations. 

• Among participants who had formally exited the program, which is the group of 

clients upon whom NEG performance goals are based, the entered employment rate 

was 76 percent, while the average wage of those entering employment was nearly 

$13 per hour. According to the data we analyzed, the entered employment rate was 

between 85 and 90 percent in San Diego and Fort Campbell and around 44 percent in 

Hampton Roads. We had some difficulty in identifying the specific target group to 

which NEG clients belonged (primarily because target groups were not identified in 

the data). However, it generally appeared that employment rates were lowest for 

people in the non-dislocated worker spouse eligibility category. As discussed above, 
xviii 

a possible explanation provided by staff is that this group is less motivated than other 

groups of clients to work. 

• Exit rates for clients ranged from 26 to 72 percent by site, while entered 

employment rates for all clients ranged from 13 to 53 percent. The rate was 72 

percent in San Diego’s data, 52 percent in Fort Campbell’s data, and 26 percent in 

Hampton Road’s data. Given these relatively low exit rates, we supplemented our 

analysis of entered employment rates by examining these rates for all clients, not just 

those who exited. Looking at all the clients, 41 percent had entered employment by 

the time our data were collected. Site-specific entered employment rates among all 

clients were 53 percent in San Diego, 48 percent in Fort Campbell, and 13 percent in 

Hampton Roads. Controlling for the dates at which clients entered the programs did 

not affect the relative magnitudes of these rates. One possible explanation for the low 

exit rates and low entered employment rates, which is consistent with what we heard 

during interviews, is that some clients had relatively little motivation to complete 

services, exit from the program, and obtain a job. Another explanation, also 

supported by what was reported to us, is that case managers delayed exiting clients 

with poor employment outcomes due to performance pressures. Of course, each of 

these possibilities might account for a portion of the findings. 

• Although this evaluation did not have a formal experimental design, we found that 

training increased employment rates among all participants by about 8 percentage 

points and among program exiters by about 15 percentage points. Similarly, we 

estimated that subsequent wages were increased by about $1.21 per hour. Such 

estimates should be treated with caution because the nonexperimental design of the 

study does not allow us to fully disentangle the effects of training on outcomes from 

the effects of a nonrandom selection of clients into training. 

F. LESSONS FROM THE EVALUATION 

The evaluation of the military base NEGs suggests several lessons about providing services 

to military communities. First, for special issues involved in serving military populations, two 

lessons seem most salient:

1. Coordinating with partners and operating in a military community poses special 

challenges and opportunities for grantees. Because the military controls access to 

potential clients and because access to military bases is restricted, coordination 

through cooperative agreements and cross-referrals is crucial to attaining outreach 

goals. Staffing of the grants also requires having senior-level managers who can 

effectively communicate with senior-level military partners by “talking the military 

language” and having frontline staff who work well with specific client target 

groups. These skills include understanding military protocols, requirements, and 

constraints, as well as the ability to understand and interpret military policies and 

paperwork. 

2. Services to military communities must take into account the mobility issues that 

pervade the clients’ lives. Many clients are in the area for a short time. Therefore, it 
xix 

is difficult for them to complete services or to be hired for good jobs, because 

employers prefer job applicants who are likely to stay in the area. Over time, site 

staff developed procedures to soft-screen potential clients to increase the likelihood 

that enrolled clients would be able to complete training and obtain a job in the local 

area before moving to another military base. They also needed to encourage clients, 

more so than WIA clients, to focus on occupations that are likely to be in high 

demand regardless of where the client relocates. 

There are five general lessons about the specific operations of the NEGs:

1. Integrating NEG services with WIA services, to the extent possible, provides 

efficient and effective methods for service delivery. Although some sites initially 

developed separate structures for organizing their NEGs, they ultimately switched to 

a closer integration of both operations and staffing. Use of the WIA MIS also 

allowed a more nearly complete and accurate data file to be used for the analysis, 

and we suspect it also may be more useful from a management perspective. 

2. Developing informal screening procedures to ensure that military spouses wanted 

to work appears to be a successful approach for enrolling clients and using grant 

resources effectively. By helping clients identify their own goals and priorities 

within their dynamic family situation, staff were able to target resources effectively 

by indirectly encouraging clients who were not serious about working to self-select 

out of the application and enrollment process. 

3. It may be difficult to duplicate some aspects of military base NEG implementation 

at other sites and with other client groups. Other sites may have challenges in 

replicating the degree of military cooperation established in Fort Campbell before the 

increased security on military bases arising after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks on the United States. Furthermore, while military base NEGs generally have 

not served many returning members of the National Guard or the Reserves, future 

efforts to serve them may pose distinct wrinkles to service delivery that were not 

encountered in the group of NEGs that are included in this evaluation. 

4. The difficulties that some sites had locating space for services, the shifts in the 

target population, and the temporary, short-term nature of the grants led to large 

inefficiencies and challenges in grant operations. The challenges in locating 

facilities hampered the startup of service delivery at all three large sites. As 

discussed above, the shifts in the primary target group—first from involuntarily 

separated military personnel to dislocated worker spouses, then from dislocated 

workers spouses to all spouses—at the three large sites meant that they needed to 

make major changes in many aspects of program operations. Furthermore, the 

temporary and short-term nature of the grants made it hard for sites to manage the 

grants and to retain staff who wanted permanent jobs. 

5. Training and support services are expensive components of the package of services 

offered to military personnel and military spouses. As mentioned above, training 

costs were about 60 percent of expenditures during a one-year period when sites had 
xx 

stable operations, and support services were about 15 percent at the two large sites 

that provided them. NEG staff reported that, by design, they focused expenditures 

on training. Both NEG staff and military partners thought that these training funds 

filled a gap in services in the military communities, because non-NEG sources of 

funds for these expensive activities could not meet the demand for them. For some 

military spouses to effectively participate in training and other employment-related 

activities, strong linkages with other support services providers may be beneficial. 

Finally, our experiences suggested two important lessons about designing evaluations of 

emergency grants: 

1. Having a clearer set of goals for the NEGs would enhance the ability to identify 

the most appropriate design for the evaluation and to determine grant successes in 

meeting those goals. An original goal of the large NEGs was to provide temporary, 

supplemental funding to help involuntarily separated military personnel make the 

transition from military employment to civilian-sector work. As that goal became 

less relevant, a new goal emerged as the grants were used to aid military spouses in 

their employment-related efforts, thereby boosting their entered employment rates 

and wage replacement rates. It was hoped that doing so would help DoD retain 

military personnel because the military family would be more self-sufficient. 

Whether this goal was consistent with the “emergency” nature of the grants is an 

open question. However, the evaluation was not intended, nor was it able, to 

determine whether the grants increased the retention rate of military personnel. 

Therefore, it seems clear that a stronger link between the NEG goals and the design 

of the evaluation would help the evaluation determine the effectiveness of the grants. 

2. Quantitative analysis to support an evaluation would be greatly improved by 

clarifying and coordinating data collection expectations at the outset of the grants. 

Data needs both for costs and for client characteristics, service receipt, and outcomes 

might be considered as part of the grant approval process. For example, grantees 

might be asked to show precisely how they will take advantage of current data 

collection procedures available under Workforce Investment Act Standardized 

Record Data or other WIA-related activities. Doing so might avoid many of the 

limitations that we encountered due to the poor quality of the MIS data provided by 

the three large sites. As is true for WIA reporting requirements, however, the Office 

of Management and Budget would need to approve any proposed new data collection 

for NEGs. 
1 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Authorized by Section 173 of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), as amended, the 

Secretary of Labor may award National Emergency Grants (NEGs) to states or local areas that 

require supplemental resources for workforce development, employment services, or other 

adjustment assistance, usually in response to an event such as a firm closing, mass layoff, or 

natural disaster. NEG funds are intended to temporarily increase the capacity of states or 

localities to provide services in response to an increase in demand for those services. The 

Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) publishes 

application guidelines in the Federal Register and provides Training and Employment Guidance 

Letters (TEGLs) on procedures for submitting applications and on policies under which awards 

are made. Applications for new grants or supplemental funds are to be submitted as the need for 

these funds arise. The DOL has also awarded several NEGs to communities that have large 

military populations to address their unique employment-related needs. The first award was in 

1996, while others followed starting in 2001. DOL contracted with Mathematica Policy 

Research, Inc. (MPR), to conduct an evaluation of military base NEGs. 

Since DOL first awarded NEGs to military communities, four types of clients have been 

targeted to receive services: 

1. Involuntarily separated military personnel transitioning to the civilian labor market 

was the primary group targeted by the first three grants to be awarded.1

 

 1

Throughout this report, we use the term “involuntarily separated” military personnel to pertain only to 

personnel who are honorably discharged. 
2 

2. Military spouses whose families have been transferred to the targeted communities 

are also eligible for services.2 

3. Department of Defense (DoD) civilian personnel who are dislocated from their jobs 

are targeted for services to assist them as they make the transition to civilian sector 

employment. 

4. Returning members of the National Guard and Reserves who are not able to return 

to their former employment or who previously were enrolled in WIA or Trade 

Adjustment Assistance programs and require assistance to complete their training are 

also eligible for NEG services.3

 

Originally, NEG funds were awarded in response to base reductions and were to be used to 

assist involuntarily separated military personnel. However, military actions taken subsequent to 

the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States led to decreases in the number of military 

personnel who were involuntarily separated from their uniformed service duty. Since 2003, the 

original three grantees have been able to complete the provision of services for involuntarily 

separated military personnel who already had begun receiving services, but they have not been 

able to enroll members of this group as new clients.4 Subsequent grantees have not targeted this 

 2

The eligibility of spouses for NEG services originally was restricted to spouses who qualify as displaced 

homemakers or dislocated workers, including those who were required to move to accompany their spouses for the 

convenience of the government. However, some NEGs have been modified to allow grant funds to be used to serve 

spouses who are already in jobs or who are new labor market entrants. 

3

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) governs the employment 

and reemployment rights of uniformed service members (U.S. Department of Labor, Veterans Employment and 

Training Service 2004). It delineates conditions under which employers are required to provide reemployment to 

people who have been absent from their jobs because of service in the uniformed services. USERRA also specifies 

conditions under which employers are not obligated to provide reemployment (for example, because a returning 

employee did not report back to work within prescribed time limits, an employer’s circumstances changed so much 

since the employee left for uniformed services duty that reemployment would be impossible or unreasonable, or 

qualifying the person for the job to which he or she is entitled would be so difficult or expensive that it would cause 

the employer to suffer undue hardship). The military base NEGs were expected primarily to serve, from among 

returning members of the National Guard and Reserves, returning members who were laid off from their jobs prior 

to deployment or who already were participating (or eligible to participate) in the workforce investment system prior 

to deployment. 

4

Under current DOL policy, military personnel who are exiting military service are expected to seek and 

receive services through WIA formula funds, unless their exit arose as a result of a base realignment and closure 

decision that involves significant employment dislocations or unless they qualify, as described above, as returning 

members of the National Guard or Reserves (U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration 

2004). 
3 

group. Thus since 2003, most clients served by the military base NEGs have been military 

spouses. Very few DoD civilians, Reservists, or National Guard members have enrolled at the 

sites. 

Clients in each of these groups may face special challenges as they look for work in the 

civilian labor market. For example, those employed by DoD may have difficulty obtaining jobs 

in which they can use their DoD experience; even DoD personnel with previous work experience 

in the civilian sector may find that their skills need refreshing or updating since their absence 

from civilian sector work.5 Workers who relocate to a new state because their military personnel 

spouses were transferred by the government may have difficulty finding jobs that are comparable 

to those they left (for example, because of a mismatch between their skills and the skills required 

by the local economy in the new area or because they are required to obtain state-specific 

certification). Consequently, the needs of the target groups and the strategies that NEG grantees 

use to serve the groups might differ from those of a broader civilian population. 

Given both the diversity of clients who have been included in the grants and the fact that 

similar initiatives may be planned in the future for military bases, an investigation of the 

experiences of the organizations and individuals involved in the NEGs can be of great value. 

Thus the evaluation of military base NEGs has three specific objectives. The first objective is to 

obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the NEGs’ history and implementation 

experiences, so that DOL can understand how operational and implementation issues related to 

the grants affect the delivery of services to the target populations. To achieve this objective, we 

 5

Many DoD jobs do not have civilian sector counterparts. However, even if DoD employees were to find 

civilian sector jobs comparable to their DoD jobs, some of the skills developed while working for the DoD might 

not be transferable because of the uniqueness of the DoD work environment. Furthermore, DoD often does not 

require its employees to get formal certifications that are necessary to do a comparable job in the civilian labor 

market, so involuntarily separated military personnel and DoD civilian employees may need to obtain civilian-sector 

certification even if their skills are sufficient to perform a job. 
4 

have explored the way that the structure of the grants affects the delivery of services and how 

grant funds have been allocated across direct client services and administrative activities. 

The second objective is to provide information about the makeup of the target populations, 

the costs associated with serving them, the services they received, and the employment 

experiences of those exiting program services. This information enables policymakers to 

understand who has received services and what their experiences have been during and after 

service receipt. The information also enables policymakers to understand how NEG funding has 

helped to address service needs.6 

Our third objective is to identify the policy implications of the study’s findings, such as how 

the workforce investment system might better serve military populations and what the distinctive 

features of NEG service delivery to military communities are. To identify these lessons, we have 

focused directly on strategies in program design and implementation that are most useful to 

policymakers. 

In Section A of this chapter, we present the research questions that have been crafted to help 

us address these three objectives and guide the evaluation. In Section B, we indicate which NEG 

sites are included in the study and our reasons for choosing them. In Section C, we describe our 

data collection efforts and analysis methodology, while Section D explains where in the report to 

turn for further information on topics of interest. 

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 

The evaluation was designed to provide insight into the issues associated with the use of 

emergency grant funds to provide services to involuntarily separated military personnel, the 

 6

As explained in Section C, the study design prevents us from determining what would have happened in the 

absence of the military base NEGs, so the information we collected does not provide definitive guidance for policy 

regarding the appropriateness of these types of services. 
5 

spouses of military personnel who qualify for services, DoD civilian personnel, and Reservists 

and National Guard members. The evaluation addresses the following six sets of research 

questions: 

1. What gaps in regular formula funding for services and training are the military 

base NEGs intended to address?7 What demands are placed on the workforce 

investment system because of the concentration of military personnel and their 

spouses in the community? How are regular DoD- and DOL-funded efforts 

coordinated to address these demands? 

2. What are the demographic characteristics and employment backgrounds of clients 

who have participated in military base NEG activities? What portion of clients 

served are from each of the grant target groups? What special challenges do these 

clients face in entering or reentering the civilian labor market?8

 

3. Do NEG-funded services appear well targeted to address the challenges faced by 

NEG clients as these individuals try to obtain employment? What specific services 

are received? In what ways do NEG-funded services differ from WIA services? 

How and why do patterns in service use differ across the target groups and across 

client characteristics and backgrounds? Which types of clients receive large, 

complex packages of services, which receive minimal packages, and why? What 

differences across sites exist, and why? What services are used by clients 

who relocate? 

4. How much did grant-financed services cost?9 What portion of grant funds was 

spent directly on client services? How do the costs of services differ across target 

 7

We discussed with staff from the Bureau of Labor Statistics whether military families are adequately 

represented in current procedures for WIA formula funding. Although we did encounter some complex conceptual 

issues in seeking an answer, our general conclusion was that the BLS formulae adequately capture concentrations of 

military personnel and their families at the state level. We believe that adaptations of the formulae to within-state 

allocations also provide adequate representation of the military personnel and their families, though we did not 

pursue the details of such funding in each of our study states. Therefore, we do not present a detailed examination 

of funding formulae here. We did hear from several NEG administrators that military clients may require more 

extensive services than do regular WIA clients because the military clients move frequently and are hindered in their 

ability to develop skills and work experience; this may be a reason why formula funding may be inadequate. Our 

study does provide insights into why military spouse clients may need more intensive services than does a typical 

WIA client. We also have excluded from the discussion another sub-question that was originally included in the 

study—“To what extent do military personnel and their spouses receive WIA services?”—which could not be 

answered in a meaningful way through the data that were collected. 

8

Additional questions posed early in the study included how the characteristics and employment backgrounds 

of NEG clients differed from those of clients who received formula-funded WIA services and how NEG clients 

differed from target group members who did not participate in NEG services. However, the study design and the 

lack of adequate data from publicly available sources hindered our ability to address these questions. 

9

Our ability to answer some of the sub-questions is limited by the data collection plans developed during the 

design phase of the study and also by the individual-level data provided by sites. Most importantly, the study design 
6 

groups? How are service costs related to clients’ demographic characteristics and 

employment backgrounds? How do costs differ across sites, and why? How do the 

costs of NEG-funded services compare with the costs of WIA services, and what 

were reasons for any differences? What were the largest categories of expenditures 

other than direct client services? How much funding went towards the creation of 

one-stop centers on bases? 

5. What were the labor market outcomes of grant participants? How do they differ 

across target groups? How do employment rates and the characteristics of jobs, such 

as earnings and occupation, differ according to clients’ demographic characteristics? 

How do they differ from the pre-NEG job characteristics of clients who had previous 

civilian work experience? How do they vary according to the types of services 

received and according to whether clients move out of the local area? What 

proportion of clients stay in the local community? How do outcomes for NEG 

clients differ from those for WIA clients? 

6. What challenges and opportunities for the provision of services to the target 

groups do the temporary and emergency nature of these funds pose? How do the 

timing and duration of the grants influence operational issues? What administrative 

challenges have arisen while implementing the grants? What challenges are 

expected to arise after the grants end? 

Taken together, the answers to these six sets of questions provide information about the 

experiences of the organizations and clients involved in the NEGs. We have also used the 

answers to examine pertinent policy issues in order to fulfill our third study objective. Thus, the 

evaluation findings of how the NEG program operates in military communities can provide 

important insights about how services, and—when appropriate—emergency grants, to similar 

communities might be best structured and evaluated in the future. 

B. SITES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 

For the evaluation, DOL expressed particular interest in an examination of the experiences 

of six specific NEGs (Table I.1). Primary importance was given to the three earliest and largest 

 

(continued) 

did not allow us to analyze expenditures such as start-up costs or expenditures on infrastructure, which occurred 

during the first few years of the grants. We also were unable to make comparisons between NEG expenditures and 

WIA expenditures for similar types of clients, which would allow us to assess whether NEG expenditures might be 

considered high or low. 
7 

TABLE I.1 

CHARACTERISTICS OF GRANTEES 

 Large NEG Sites Medium NEG Sites 

 Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego Fort Bragg Fort Hood Pikes Peak 

Grant Characteristics 

Grantee State of Tennesseea Opportunity, Inc., of 

Hampton Roads, Norfolk, Virginia 

San Diego Workforce Partnership, Inc., San Diego, California 

County of Cumberland, North Carolina 

Central Texas Workforce Board 

El Paso County/Teller County Consortium, Colorado Springs, Colorado 

Contract Period June 2002 - 

June 2007b

June 2001 - June 2007 June 2001 - June 2007 March 2004 - 

September 2006 

November 2003 - June 2007 

July 2003 - June 2007 

Contract Amount $6.0 millionb $23.9 million $41.6 million $5.7 million $6.8 million $5.1 million Main Bases Served Fort Campbell, 

Naval Support Activity Mid-South 

Naval Station Norfolk, Naval Air Station Oceana, Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Langley Air Force Base, Fort Eustis Army Installation, Fort Lee 

Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Naval Submarine Base Point Loma, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 

Fort Bragg, Pope Air Force Base 

Fort Hood Fort Carson Army Post, Air 

Force Academy, Peterson Air Force Base, Schriever Air Force Base 

Grant Characteristics 

Involuntarily Separated Military Personnel X X X Spouses of Military Personnelc X X X X X X DoD Civilian Personnel X X X X X X Military Reservists X X X Xd Xd X National Guard Members X X X Xd Xd X Source: Data on grant characteristics and target populations are from program documents and communication with DOL staff. 
TABLE I.1 (continued) 

8 

Note: Modifications made since the grants were established include changes in the contract period, the contract amount, the bases to be served, and the target 

populations to be served. The information in this table includes modifications made as of December 2006. 

aThe Fort Campbell project involves close collaboration between the states of and service delivery providers in Kentucky and Tennessee, as military personnel and their 

families reside in both states. Fort Campbell is in Kentucky, not Tennessee. 

bSince 1996, Fort Campbell has received nearly $15 million in NEG funds from DOL funding. Funds prior to June 2002 were to be used to develop and implement a Career 

Advancement Center (CAC) and the National Leadership Learning Academy (NLLA), which provided training to staff from military communities on how to implement the Fort Campbell model of service delivery to military personnel and to spouses of military personnel who met eligibility criteria for these services. Funds received during and 

after June 2002 were to be used to support a modified version of these activities for an additional period of time. As part of the evaluation, we examined a subset of 

activities occurring as part of the grant that began during June 2002, focusing on the operations of the CAC. We did not focus on the operations of the NLLA. 

cAt Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak, this category pertains to spouses who qualify as dislocated workers or displaced homemakers. At Fort Campbell, Hampton 

Roads, and San Diego, this category includes those spouses as well as spouses who are incumbent workers and new labor market entrants. 

dThe most recently available information shows that these sites were in the process of modifying their grants to include military Reservists and National Guard Members. 

DoD = U.S. Department of Defense; MIS = management information system; NEG = National Emergency Grant. 
9 

military base NEGs: (1) the State of Tennessee (providing services in Fort Campbell, Kentucky); 

(2) Opportunity, Inc., of Hampton Roads (Norfolk, Virginia); and (3) the San Diego Workforce 

Partnership, Inc. (San Diego County, California).10 Because these grants were the first ones 

provided by DOL, policymakers have the opportunity to learn from the experiences at these sites 

while similar activities at other bases have been in a more incipient form. These three grantees 

also may be the most interesting ones to policymakers because they received the largest grants 

(and therefore can afford the most comprehensive programs) and because they served both 

involuntarily separated military personnel and the spouses of military personnel. 

To understand how NEGs have operated in smaller military communities, we also included 

in the study three medium-sized NEG grantees: (1) the County of Cumberland, North Carolina 

(serving Fort Bragg, North Carolina); (2) the Central Texas Workforce Board (serving Fort 

Hood, Texas); and (3) the El Paso County/Teller County Consortium (Pikes Peak, Colorado). 

C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 

To address the research questions, our study design methodology drew on qualitative and 

quantitative data (Table I.2). Some questions, such as those about the influence of the grant 

structure on administrative and operational issues, had to be addressed almost in their entirety by 

qualitative data obtained from discussions with coordinators of the NEG activities at each site. 

However, other research questions, such as those about clients’ backgrounds, services received, 

and outcomes, could be addressed with both qualitative and quantitative data. 

 10Although the Fort Campbell grant amount shown in Table I.1 is smaller than the grant amounts shown for the 

medium-sized grantees, we include Fort Campbell with Hampton Roads and San Diego as the “large” grantees 

because Fort Campbell has received more in total funds since its inception of NEG activities in 1996 than have the 

three medium-sized NEG grantees. 
 10

TABLE I.2 

DATA SOURCES USED FOR EACH GRANTEE 

 Large NEG Sites Medium NEG Sites 

 Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego Fort Bragg Fort Hood Pikes Peak 

Qualitative Data 

In-Person Interviews X X X 

Focus Groups with Clients X X X 

Case File Conferences X X X 

Observations of Service 

Delivery X X X 

Review of Program 

Documents X X X X X X 

Telephone Interviewsa

 X X X X X X 

Quantitative Data 

MIS Data X X X 

Cost Data X X X 

a

Throughout most of the evaluation, we held brief telephone discussions with NEG staff at the three large sites to 

supplement the data collected during the site visits. Although we tried to address a broad range of topics in the 

telephone interviews with staff at the small sites, we were inherently unable to cover topics in as great a depth as 

we could with the in-person and telephone interviews with staff at the larger sites. 

MIS = management information system; NEG = National Emergency Grant. 
11 

To learn about the three largest sites, we conducted a qualitative analysis based on 

comprehensive in-person visits. During a three-day period, two MPR staff interviewed NEG 

administrators, case managers, service providers, technical staff in charge of the data systems, 

and accounting staff. We also conducted focus groups with a small number of clients at each 

grantee and case file conferences with staff to discuss the situations of a few clients. Based on 

the periods of operations for the grants, we concluded that making one concentrated effort to 

collect information from staff and clients would likely be the most cost-effective design for the 

study. Some of the NEGs were awarded several years ago, so the details of grants’ start-up 

periods were viewed through a retrospective lens. In addition, at the time we developed the 

evaluation design, some grants had been scheduled to expire in 2005 (although these received 

contract extensions and all six grants were still operating as of spring 2006). 

In these sites, we supplemented the focus groups and interviews with a review of program 

documents and other publicly available information. These documents, including grant 

applications, planning reports, interagency agreements, progress reports, and other available 

materials, construct the record of changes in the grants’ implementations. For example, the grant 

proposal describes the initial plans for the grants, whereas contract modifications and the sites’ 

progress reports document changes over time. These written documents enabled us to track 

information that otherwise might be hard to obtain through discussions with staff: some staff 

who had been involved with the NEGs were no longer involved by the time the evaluation data 

collection activities began; others were challenged to recall the details of events that occurred 

several years prior to the data collection effort. 

The quantitative component of our evaluation is based primarily on individual-level data 

about participants whose services were financed under the three large NEGs. Ideally, we wanted 

these data to contain information about clients’ demographic characteristics, education and 
12 

employment history, services received under the NEGs, and employment and earnings outcomes. 

Since the data systems varied from site to site, we worked with each site to collect the data that 

were available. In many instances, the data were considerably less comprehensive than we 

would have liked, and these shortcomings imposed important restrictions on the questions we 

could answer in a fully satisfactory way. For example, none of the three sites from which we 

collected administrative data had a data item indicating the target group to which each client 

belonged. We tried to create this type of variable based on a client’s enrollment date and other 

characteristics, but the inability to confidently identify clients by their target group limited our 

ability to look at the distinct experiences of the different groups. Also, Hampton Roads’ inability 

to provide a data extract that contained information on all their clients, as well as the lack of 

comprehensive data entry by staff at this site, hampered the conclusions that we could draw from 

that site’s data file. Furthermore, the data extract by Fort Campbell was extremely limited in the 

number of data items, which made analysis very difficult. (The content and analysis of the 

individual-level data, including their limitations, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.) 

As part of our initial design efforts for the evaluation, we considered but rejected the use of 

a comparison group. Since involuntarily separated military personnel and the spouses of military 

personnel face labor market problems that are unique, we did not anticipate being able to identify 

any other subgroup of, say, regular adult or dislocated worker WIA participants that has similar 

backgrounds and challenges. Obtaining data from comparison sites of other military 

communities also would have been difficult. In addition, we would not have been able to 

determine whether differences between the NEG participants and their comparison counterparts 

could be attributed to the NEG funding itself or to underlying differences among the groups. As 

a result, the evaluation is unable to provide answers to questions about how NEG and WIA 

experiences and outcomes differ. 
13 

For an analysis of program costs at the three largest sites (Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, 

and San Diego), we developed a detailed form to capture a breakdown of costs associated with 

providing the full range of services to clients during fiscal year 2004-2005 (FY0405), a one-year 

period during which operations were relatively stable compared to other years. Grantees 

completed the form with information about the staff costs; activities conducted with NEG 

clients; staff time spent preparing for, conducting, and following up on each activity; other 

expenses associated with the activity; the average number of attendees; and the overall 

percentage of NEG clients who participated. Based on this information, we calculated a cost per 

client for core services, intensive services, training costs, supportive services, and administrative 

services. Being able to decompose a total per-client cost estimate into these component parts is a 

distinctive strength of this type of analysis approach. Furthermore, the estimate is not influenced 

by potentially large start-up costs or costs attributable to the changes in the primary target group. 

However, since this approach focused on a single program year, we do not have information on 

start-up costs and other one-time costs, and we cannot provide answers to questions about these 

costs, which are interesting in their own right. (The approach to cost data collection and the 

analysis of the data are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.) 

Our data collection effort for the NEGs that operated in smaller military communities (Fort 

Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak) was more limited than for the three larger NEGs. For these 

sites, we relied exclusively on qualitative data collected through program documents and 

telephone interviews with two or three NEG staff, usually senior managers from the grantees or 

program operators. The telephone interviews enabled us to collect basic information about the 

local areas in which the NEGs are operating, the reasons why the grantees applied for NEG 

funds, the types of clients served, the clients’ experiences in receiving services, the challenges 

faced by grantees in serving the target groups, plans for the remainder of the NEG period, and 
14 

lessons learned from providing NEG services and administering the grant. As with the large 

grantees, program documents from the medium-sized grantees served as important records of 

initial plans and changes in the grants over time. The narrower data collection effort for these 

three smaller sites meant that our analysis of their experiences was more limited than our 

analysis for the larger sites; for example, we did not collect as rich a set of information about the 

staffs’ perspectives as would have been possible with in-person visits, nor did we collect 

information directly from clients about either their motivations for participating in NEG 

activities or their perceptions about the usefulness of the services in helping them to obtain 

civilian employment. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these three sites has allowed us to obtain a 

broader perspective than would otherwise be the case. 

For all six sites, our analysis approach depended on the types of data that were available to 

us. We developed a synthesis of the qualitative data that we collected from staff, clients, and 

program documents and supplemented this with available quantitative data. Our approach to the 

analysis of the quantitative data consisted primarily of an examination of differences in mean 

outcomes across sites and, in some instances, target groups. When appropriate, we gained 

greater precision in measuring cross-site or cross-group differences by using regression analysis 

to control for measurable differences among participants that might have affected the clients’ 

outcomes. By doing so, we obtained “adjusted” differences across the sites that better reflected 

differences in the actual experiences of grant participants. 

Although the evaluation was designed to collect detailed data on each of the grant program’s 

target groups, the analysis is richest on the spouses of military personnel, for four reasons. First, 

the qualitative interviews at the three large sites focused primarily on the spouses of military 

personnel. Considerable time had elapsed since these sites had been able to enroll involuntarily 

separated military personnel, so the interviewed staff did not provide much detail about the 
15 

activities related to involuntarily separated military personnel compared to those for spouses. 

Furthermore, turnover among frontline staff and some one-stop managers meant that some 

interviewed staff had not been at the sites when their NEG was serving involuntarily separated 

military personnel. In addition, very few DoD civilian personnel, members of the National 

Guard, or members of the Reserves have enrolled for NEG services, so NEG staff could not 

provide as much insight about serving these client groups. Second, for reasons similar to those 

listed above, only one of the three large sites was able to recruit enough involuntarily separated 

military personnel or members of the National Guard or Reserves to form a focus group. Third, 

changes in the data system at the Hampton Roads site meant that data on clients who enrolled 

during the early part of the grant period are unavailable.11 Because the primary target group at 

the beginning of the large grants was involuntarily separated military personnel, most of the data 

for this target group at this site are incomplete. Fourth, since the very beginning of their grant 

periods, all three medium-sized grantees have focused on serving spouses as their primary target 

group; none was authorized to serve involuntarily separated military personnel, and—as in the 

large sites—few DoD civilians, Reservists, or National Guard members have enrolled for 

services. 

D. OUTLINE OF THE FINAL REPORT 

In Chapter II of this report, we describe the administration and operations of the grants, 

including details on the startup of the grants, eligibility criteria for clients, marketing and 

recruitment of clients, the location of services and the coordination with other service providers, 

and issues related to staffing the programs. In Chapter III, we focus on the provision of services 

 11By design, the study focused on activities at Fort Campbell during the past several years, even though the site 

received its initial NEG to provide services to involuntarily separated military personnel in 1996. Therefore, we did 

not collect individual-level data on Fort Campbell clients who enrolled during the first several years of the program; 

the program served involuntarily separated military personnel almost exclusively during that time. 
16 

to NEG clients, including specific issues that arise due to client mobility. In Chapter IV, we 

explore the costs of providing services to clients. Chapter V contains a description of clients’ 

characteristics at the time they enrolled, the services in which they participated, their labor 

market outcomes, and the impact of service receipt on these outcomes. Finally, in Chapter VI, 

we tie together the findings of the analysis into lessons for policymakers. 
17 

II. ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE GRANT 

As explained in Chapter I, NEGs were originally designed to temporarily increase the 

capacity of states or localities to provide services in response to an increase in demand for those 

services. In 1996, the state of Tennessee received the first NEG given as a result of concern 

about the transition that military personnel were making between military and civilian-sector 

employment. The state obtained DOL funding for a $100,000 pilot project to provide 

employment services to involuntarily discharged military personnel in Tennessee and Kentucky. 

Tennessee subcontracted with the state’s one-stop operator, Workforce Essentials, to operate the 

project. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) offered involuntarily discharged 

soldiers job search assistance services similar to Workforce Investment Act (WIA) core and 

intensive services, but staff perceived a gap in services. According to the staff at ACAP, as early 

as 1995 the military was considering alternative ways to help involuntarily separated soldiers 

obtain civilian certification in jobs for which they were qualified or could become qualified; the 

military and local workforce investment system staff thought they may qualify as dislocated 

workers. The success of the pilot project in training 100 discharged military personnel motivated 

Workforce Essentials to subsequently apply for and administer NEGs. 

After its success, Fort Campbell instituted a National Leadership Learning Academy 

(NLLA) to help policymakers, military leaders, and workforce professionals learn how the Fort 

Campbell model could be replicated to provide training and job search assistance to involuntarily 

discharged military personnel at other locations.1 Other sites in our study followed the Fort 

 1

Throughout the duration of the NLLA, it worked with seven different areas to help them replicate the Fort 

Campbell model. To accommodate participants who traveled long distances to attend the academy, NLLA replaced 

intensive onsite assistance with smaller teaching communities at multiple installations closer to the sites served. 
18 

Campbell model. For example, Hampton Roads and San Diego examined the model, and in 

2001 they decided to send their Workforce Investment Board (WIB) staff to a four-day 

leadership workshop at Fort Campbell. Their local boards saw this service delivery strategy as 

an opportunity to prepare military personnel for separation and for entry into the civilian 

workforce, a challenge the local communities had faced in the past. 

After the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

however, few military personnel left the service. The three NEG sites successfully requested 

permission from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao to 

shift the focus of the NEGs from serving involuntarily separated military personnel to serving 

dislocated worker spouses of military personnel, so the spouses could develop work skills and 

high-quality jobs. The sites hoped that serving spouses would both help the local economy and 

alleviate economic pressures on military personnel that might induce them to leave the military. 

The three smaller sites in this study (Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak) received 

funding after learning about the Fort Campbell experience with NEGs and after spouses became 

the primary target group for services. Fort Bragg and Pikes Peak previously had approached 

DOL with proposals to serve involuntarily separated military personnel. However, these 

proposals were not approved because the need for serving involuntarily separated military 

personnel disappeared. DOL approached the sites later to ask them to change their original 

proposals and shift the target population to spouses of military personnel instead of involuntarily 

separated military personnel. Pikes Peak then received funding in July 2003, Fort Bragg was 

funded in March 2004, and Fort Hood received funding in November 2003. 
19 

The experiences of the six sites yield four lessons in administering and operating NEGs. 

1. Obtaining military support and coordinating service delivery with the military’s 

efforts is valuable to avoid service duplication and to enhance client recruitment. 

Most sites were able to obtain military support by soliciting military partners’ input 

during the start-up phase and later on by hiring staff who had military backgrounds 

and who could effectively communicate with military commanders. Compared with 

other sites, Fort Campbell had more opportunity to collaborate with military partners 

during the grant design stage and thus was better able to establish up-front military 

support. As a result, Fort Campbell was able to collocate its program with military 

partners and coordinate client recruitment and service delivery with them. Other sites 

were unable to fully locate services on the bases, but they developed other strategies 

to facilitate collaboration with the military. 

2. Because the NEG structure and services mirror that of the WIA program, the two 

programs can be effectively integrated to avoid potential duplication of the existing 

WIA structure. The sites learned that one-stop operators were more effective than 

other organizations in operating NEGs and that the one-stop supervisor could directly 

supervise NEG case managers regardless of their locations. 

3. The three large sites needed to adjust their advertising, recruitment, and eligibility 

policies when the target group was expanded from dislocated worker spouses to all 

military spouses. The sites saw their employment outcomes plummet when the 

eligibility criteria expanded to include all spouses. This was in part because the 

newly eligible spouses had less work experience and less attachment to the labor 

market than did their dislocated worker counterparts. To improve outcomes, the sites 

adopted strategies that emphasized employment rather than training to clients and 

potential clients. To ensure that potential clients were interested in employment, sites 

also introduced new screening procedures. 

4. Changes in the target group, from involuntarily separated military personnel to 

military spouses, had implications for the skills and backgrounds most valuable in 

sites’ front-line staff. Having staff with the same types of background 

characteristics as clients they served helped clients relate better to their case 

managers. Whereas case managers who had military backgrounds were effective in 

working with involuntarily separated military personnel, they were regimented and 

often intimidated young female spouses. After the change in eligibility to military 

spouses, many sites hired female case managers, some of whom were military 

spouses themselves. The sites reported improvements in case management and 

service delivery as a result of the change. 

Our analysis in this section is based on qualitative data. The information we collected from 

the three larger sites is based on the sites’ grant documents, interviews with staff working for the 

NEG project, and information collected during focus groups with clients. At the smaller sites we 
20 

reviewed grant documents and had shorter telephone interviews with administrative staff. 

Because of more extensive data collection at the larger sites, our analysis of grant operations and 

administration is more detailed for those sites. 

We provide an overview of important issues that influenced grant operations and 

administration, including the grantees’ WIA and military environments and their choice of 

location for NEG services (Section A). We then examine how the changes in eligibility criteria 

affected the approach to recruitment and service delivery at the three large sites (Section B). We 

go on to discuss the implications of the grantees’ location choices for collaboration with military 

partners and for service delivery and explore the factors that constrained the sites’ location 

choices (Section C). We then discuss challenges the sites faced in hiring, training, and retaining 

NEG staff (Section D). 

A. OVERVIEW OF GRANT OPERATIONS 

The military and WIA contexts in which each NEG operates have had a strong influence on 

almost every facet of the military base NEG operations and administration. Specific issues 

include the way in which the military community is defined in each local area and the way in 

which the workforce development delivery system is structured. These contexts have affected 

the structure of the grant activities, the choice of a contractor for operating the NEGs, 

coordination with the military and other partners, and the location for the delivery of NEG 

services. Therefore, we begin our discussion with these issues to provide an understanding of 

the landscape in which the grants have operated. 

1. Designing the NEGs Around the Military Community and Workforce Development 

System 

The number and type of military bases clustered in a geographic area and the corresponding 

number of WIBs in that area created distinct operational environments for NEG grantees. The 
21 

Hampton Roads NEG includes multiple WIBs and serves multiple Navy and Army bases. San 

Diego has only one WIB but has three different one-stop operators that serve three different 

bases. In contrast, Fort Campbell has a simple operational structure, with a single WIB and a 

single one-stop serving a single military base. When sites developed plans for their NEGs, they 

took into consideration both the way in which the military community is defined in the local area 

and the existing WIA organizational structure. Since the geographic area covered by the locally 

understood definition of the military community did not always correspond with the geographic 

divisions within the WIA structure, the grant planners needed to develop an organizational 

structure for the NEGs that, to the extent possible, made sense from the perspectives of both the 

military community and the workforce delivery system. 

Given these overlapping systems, the NEG structure and organization is sometimes 

complicated. When a site had the involvement of more than one WIB, coordination of their 

policies was necessary. Local staff found it helpful to develop advisory boards that met 

periodically to ensure that all stakeholders were aware of changes in the program and could 

express and address any concerns that arose. For example, Hampton Roads learned that it was 

helpful for the WIBs to coordinate policies because clients sometimes moved to a new local area, 

and learned from other clients about the services that are provided. 

The WIB or WIBs contracted out grant operations and service delivery to a local agency, 

typically to one or more existing one-stop operator(s) in the area. The WIBs found that one-stop 

operators were more effective than other organizations at operating NEGs because they already 

had the expertise and the experience to provide employment services, an existing service 

delivery structure, and active linkages to local jobs. In San Diego, the local WIB initially 

decided not to contract with local one-stop operators and instead to directly hire and supervise 

NEG staff. This proved to be difficult as it required significant oversight and management by 
22 

the WIB representatives. After the one-stop operators took over the operation of the grant in 

April 2004, they replaced some of the NEG staff hired by the WIB and moved the NEG staff to 

the local one-stops, while maintaining full time staff at Miramar. The San Diego grant managers 

believed that the change in operators offered staff more resources to serve clients and improved 

service quality. 

2. Locations and Collaboration 

Another important decision for the grantees was choosing the location from which to 

provide NEG services. According to WIA philosophy, collocation is desirable because it 

facilitates collaboration and more streamlined and convenient service delivery to clients; WIA 

requires partners who offer workforce development services to collocate at a one–stop, which 

increases convenience to clients and, to some extent, has the potential to reduce the risk of 

duplication of services. Therefore, since grantees wanted a strong collaborative relationship with 

military partners, they recognized that it would be desirable to collocate NEG services with 

military entities that already provide job search assistance services to military personnel 

transitioning out of the military and to spouses of military personnel. These services typically 

include job search assistance similar to WIA core and intensive services and quality-of-life 

assistance such as child care and family counseling.2 

Sites recognized the advantages of working closely with the military support centers, but 

collocating was not always possible. At the time of our site visits to grantees, sites used three 

approaches to locating their services: (1) offering services on base, (2) offering them at the local 

 2

The military also offers a variety of relocation grants and services to provide temporary assistance to families 

being relocated. All such military-provided services are accessible through the Military Onesource website 

(http://www.militaryonesource.com/skins/MOS/home.aspx, accessed as of August 7, 2006). 
23 

one-stop, or (3) offering services both at the local one-stop and on the base (Table II.1). Fort 

Campbell is the only site that was fully located on the military base. The other two large sites, 

San Diego and Hampton Roads, use a hybrid approach, where NEG services are offered both at 

the local one-stops and on the bases by full-time and part-time staff who are stationed at the 

military support centers.3 The smaller sites (Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak) only offer 

NEG services at the local one-stops. 

By collocating with military support services, Fort Campbell was able to integrate job search 

assistance services and to enhance customers’ access to information. NEG and Military Family 

Support Services Center staff mutually refer clients for services to ensure smooth transition 

between the two programs. Additionally, being located close to clients and the Military Family 

Support Services Center enhanced Fort Campbell’s ability to recruit clients. Generally, military 

support services staff are effective at making referrals to the NEG program because spouses 

already go to these programs to get help. The staff said collocation was particularly important 

because spouses who had recently moved to Fort Campbell are unfamiliar with the local 

environment and are often afraid to travel far from the base. The staff working at the Military 

Family Support Services Center felt that the spouses need to be directed personally to the NEG 

program. Finally, because the NEG and its military partners are collocated, they also can share 

staff time for activities of benefit to both programs and their clients. 

Several other NEG sites (Fort Bragg, Hampton Roads, and San Diego) wanted and planned 

to locate their services on bases near their military partners but were unable to do so. Hurdles 

 3

San Diego and the Southside (one of the three Hampton Roads WIBs) tried without success to create a center 

on the base. Subsequently San Diego integrated staff in the local one-stop and stationed some staff on base. Crater 

and Greater Peninsula (the other two Hampton Roads WIBs) had instituted the hybrid strategy since the beginning; 

the South Side followed that model after unsuccessfully attempting both collocation with military services and the 

use of a separate one-stop center very close to the entrance of the base. 
24 

TABLE II.1 

LOCATION OF NEG STAFF AND SERVICES 

 Fort 

Bragg 

Fort 

Campbell 

Fort 

Hood 

Hampton 

Roads 

Pikes 

Peak 

San 

Diego 

All NEG Services Offered on Base X 

NEG Services Offered at the Local 

One-Stop and by NEG Staff 

Stationed on Base X X 

All NEG Services Offered at the 

Local One-Stops X X X 

Note: The locations shown in the table are as of the time of our data collection. Our data 

collection efforts were concentrated during summer 2005 for Fort Campbell, Hampton 

Roads, and San Diego and during autumn 2005 for Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes 

Peak. 
25 

they faced included security issues with locating services on the base, regulations about 

renovations of facilities on military bases, and limitations on the use of DOL funds for building 

renovations. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, military bases went on “lock 

down” mode, and heightened security precautions made it difficult to add new services to base 

facilities. As a result, Hampton Roads reported going through several “start-and-stop” phases to 

acquire and renovate space on base. In addition, for security reasons, military bases only allow 

military contractors to perform renovations on base. Hampton Roads reported facing challenges 

when it wanted to use DOL funds to renovate a facility on a military base.4 Finally, another 

challenge related to security was that involuntarily separated military personnel had some 

difficulty accessing the base for services. 

Two of the one-stops at the San Diego site and the Fort Bragg site also made unsuccessful 

attempts to locate the programs on the base. San Diego had planned to locate NEG centers at 

two military bases. At one base, the grantee proposed to expand the facility by approximately 

2,500 square feet on the second floor of a building occupied by the Military Family Support 

Center so that the space could be used by NEG program. The local WIB had spent $1.7 million 

on refurbishing the place when it received news from DOL that the renovations could not be 

funded through the grant.5

 San Diego reached an agreement with Military Family Services that 

 4

Fort Campbell staff also reported some problems in trying to locate NEG services on the military base. 

Overcoming these challenges required perseverance and close collaboration with military commanders so that the 

program could receive a waiver to allow a non-DoD contractor to perform renovations for NEG facilities on a 

military base. Although we cannot tell for sure why Fort Campbell was successful in locating NEG services on base 

while other sites were not, one possible explanation is that Fort Campbell is the only site to have completed the setup of its NEG program prior to September 11, 2001, after which the military operated on heightened security 

procedures. 

5

Early versions of the grant agreements between the site and DOL included line items for facilities renovations. 

However, with a few exceptions, regulations for WIA Title I funds must not be spent on construction or purchase of 

facilities or buildings (20 CFR 667.260). Since our data collection occurred several years after the start of the grant, 

we could not identify how the miscommunication between the site and DOL about the use of funds for renovation 

arose. 
26 

allowed NEG staff to locate full-time on base, to recruit clients, and to offer on-site case 

management while other activities occur at the WIA one-stop. At Fort Bragg, the NEG operator 

also wanted to use the space on base, but DOL rejected the use of grant funds for renovations of 

this facility. Consequently, Fort Bragg located NEG services at a one-stop that is very close to 

the military base. 

Despite physical distance from the military bases, the NEG programs that were located at 

the one-stops tried to collaborate with the military support services staff to receive their help in 

recruitment. Furthermore, they obtained greater access to clients by sending NEG staff who had 

access to the base (because of their status as military spouses, for example) to the base to recruit 

clients, to conduct orientation, and to provide case management services. At Pikes Peak, where 

all NEG staff are located at the local one-stop, the program relies heavily on the military staff for 

referrals. Military staff even perform the preliminary eligibility determination and ask potential 

clients to fill out NEG application forms. At Fort Bragg, the Military Family Support Center 

hosts a program orientation in its facilities and refers clients to the NEG program. 

Regardless of where sites located their NEG services, grantees found it useful to have the 

same oversight structure and maintain a similar flow of services for the NEG and WIA programs. 

All six sites learned that it was best to have the NEG process mirror the WIA process. Even at 

Fort Campbell, where NEG services were administered in an independent one-stop, the center 

was structured and managed in a way similar to the other one-stop centers in the area. Likewise, 

other sites found it particularly important to integrate out-stationed NEG staff who were partially 

located on base and partially working from a one-stop. In San Diego, according to some case 

managers, there were challenges initially in keeping NEG staff who were physically isolated 

from their supervisors accountable to the program. Staff believed that the challenges were 

successfully overcome after the site integrated the NEG and WIA programs and moved NEG 
27 

case managers to local one-stops, an approach that made case managers more accountable and 

improved NEG service delivery. In contrast, Fort Campbell supervised NEG staff despite their 

physical distance from the one-stop managers by hiring a senior case manager who was located 

on the base and who was given authority for many program decisions. The senior case manager 

reported directly to the manager responsible for overseeing the NEG and WIA programs. 

B. CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PRIMARY TARGET GROUP FOR SERVICES 

At the beginning of NEG activities at the three largest sites (Hampton Roads, San Diego, 

and Fort Campbell), involuntarily separated military personnel were the main population served 

by the grants (Table II.2). However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq decreased the number of 

personnel being involuntarily separated from the military, and by January 2003 all three sites had 

stopped enrolling them as new clients. 

When eligibility shifted from involuntarily separated soldiers to spouses, spouses had to 

qualify as dislocated workers or displaced homemakers in addition to being married to an active 

duty military personnel. At the three larger military sites, the dislocated worker criterion was 

eventually removed. As a result of efforts of a Congressional representative serving the San 

Diego area, sites were allowed to request permission from DOL to use NEG funds to serve all 

military spouses instead of only serving those military spouses who were dislocated workers. 

San Diego was the first site to begin doing so, and Hampton Roads and Fort Campbell followed 

suit. 

At the time of our site visits, military spouses made up over 90 percent (and in some sites 

over 99 percent) of NEG clients. The other target groups eligible to be served by the sites were 

DoD civilian personnel who were laid off and Reservists and National Guard members who were 
28 

TABLE II.2 

CHANGES IN THE TARGET GROUPS FOR THE MILITARY BASE NEGs 

Dates 

Fort 

Bragg 

Fort 

Campbell 

Fort 

Hood 

Hampton 

Roads 

Pikes 

Peak 

San 

Diego 

Involuntarily Separated Military Personnel 

Began enrollments n.a. June 1996b n.a. July 2001 n.a. July 2001 

Ended enrollments n.a. December 2002 n.a. June 2003 n.a. January 2003 

Spouses of Military Personnel 

Began enrollments of 

dislocated workersa March 2004 May 2002 October 2004 July 2001 July 2003 October 2002 

Eliminated dislocated 

worker eligibility 

criterion n.a. December 2004 n.a. February 2005 n.a. November 2003

DoD Civilian Personnel 

Began enrollments March 2004 June 1996 October 2004 July 2001 July 2003 October 2002 

Military Reservists and National Guard Members 

Began enrollments n.a. n.a. n.a. July 2001c n.a. October 2002 

Source: Reviews of NEG documents and interviews with military base NEG site staff. 

Note: No site that serves spouses of military personnel, DoD civilian personnel, or military Reservists or National 

Guard members has ended enrollments for them. However, Fort Campbell has not enrolled DoD civilians since 

1998, even though the site has been authorized to do so. 

a

The term “dislocated worker” is used to include displaced homemakers. 

b

The focus of the evaluation is on Fort Campbell grant activities since July 2002 when the Management Information Systems 

data begin. Therefore, the data collection did not include information on prior activities. 

c

Hampton Roads discontinued enrollment of Reservists and National Guard members in June 2003 but reinstated enrollment of 

them in February 2005. 

DoD = U.S. Department of Defense. 

n.a. = not applicable. 
29 

unable to return to their previous employment.6 However, the sites have served few civilian DoD 

personnel, according to site staff, because few were laid off and those that have been are able to 

transition to civilian jobs. For similar reasons, few Reservists and Guards members had enrolled 

at the sites. 

By the time of our interviews held in autumn 2005, the three smaller sites had not yet 

received permission from the DOL to expand eligibility to all spouses. At Pikes Peak, dislocated 

worker spouses had to meet an additional eligibility criterion of being “unlikely to return” to 

their previous type of employment.7 According to this eligibility criterion, case managers have 

to show that there are no available positions in the client’s previous occupation in the new 

location before the client can receive training or re-employment services. 

The changes in the eligibility criteria at the large sites had a strong influence on how and 

where the grants recruited clients, on how the needs of the clients were addressed so that they 

could participate in services and obtain jobs after completing services, and on the desired 

backgrounds and skills of staff who could effectively work with the clients. Unlike the larger 

sites, the smaller sites have served dislocated worker spouses throughout their grant periods and 

consequently did not face many of the operational challenges that the larger sites faced as a result 

of the changes in the primary target group for the grants. 

 6

Reservists and National Guard members were never served at Fort Campbell. 

7

The “unlikely to return” requirement does not apply to all dislocated workers as defined in WIA, nor does it 

apply to “displaced homemakers” who also qualify under the dislocated worker definition at WIA section 101(9). 

There is no definition of “unlikely to return” in WIA, but it is based upon policies implemented by states and local 

boards. The “unlikely to return” criterion can take into account a number of factors, including a worker’s skills and 

it can, in practice, restrict service access. 
30 

1. Advantages of Serving All Military Spouses 

As discussed above, the three large sites expanded eligibility from military spouses who 

were dislocated workers or displaced homemakers to all spouses. Most of the site staff with 

whom we spoke considered the expansion in eligibility from dislocated worker spouses to all 

spouses to be a positive change although it also posed challenges. They mentioned three 

advantages. First, they thought that all spouses, and not only dislocated worker spouses, were in 

need of training and job search assistance because of their high rates of mobility. Because of this 

mobility, spouses needed training in high-demand occupations to make up for the concerns that 

potential employers may have about hiring an applicant unlikely to stay in the area for very long. 

The grant manager at Pikes Peak explained that even though many spouses could obtain lowpaying jobs that were similar to their old ones (and hence, they did not meet the “unlikely to 

return” criterion as a dislocated worker), the spouses nonetheless needed training to improve 

their skills so they could obtain better jobs. 

Additionally, the staff believed that rejecting some spouses and serving others was divisive 

for the military community. They said that, in a tightly knit community where spouses talk 

extensively to each other, rejecting some spouses categorically based on eligibility criteria gave a 

bad reputation to the program. 

Finally, removing the dislocated worker criterion has helped sites to meet their enrollment 

goals. About one-third of the spouses in the focus group at Hampton Roads said that they had 

not been eligible for the program under the old rules and had reapplied as soon as they heard that 

the rules had changed. Meeting enrollment goals was initially challenging to sites because, in 

contrast to most NEGs that are provided because of one-time emergencies, the potential clients 

were not facing an emergency and thus the sites needed to reach out to them. For example, San 

Diego had originally proposed to serve 3,300 clients, but by March 13, 2004, had only served 
31 

1,811; Hampton Roads initially proposed to serve 3,200 clients but later reduced that number as 

well.8

2. Challenges in Serving All Military Spouses 

Even though the expanded eligibility made it easier for sites to meet enrollment goals, they 

found it more difficult to meet employment outcome targets for entered employment rates and 

wage rates. Whereas the dislocated worker spouses are likely to have high levels of education 

and experience, the newly eligible spouses often do not have recent work experience and are 

generally more likely to be disadvantaged. As a result, sites reported having to spend more time 

and energy with clients on average in order to get them job-ready. In addition, many of the 

clients who enrolled shortly after the change in eligibility were not employment-focused; they 

viewed the program as a free training program and had no intention of going to work after 

finishing training. For these reasons, the three large sites reported difficulty achieving their 

employment and wage outcomes for these spouses. 

At the outset of services to spouses, San Diego emphasized training as a way to market the 

program and encourage potential clients to want to find out more information. According to the 

grant manager, training was offered to help military retention by improving spouse employability 

in any duty station regardless of where military spouses next located. However, some front-line 

staff reported that outreach materials were not clear early in the period when spouses were 

recruited that the ultimate goal of the program was to help clients find employment. To improve 

employment outcomes, particularly after the site was more able to meet its recruitment goals, 

San Diego added new “soft-screening” strategies to screen out clients who were not 

employment-focused. The screening included “ability to benefit” forms to identify potential 

 8

Sites’ goals also changed as a result of their getting extensions and additional funding. 
32 

clients who were not motivated to work. Furthermore, the staff helped clients assess their ability 

to remain in training by encouraging them to consider financial needs, child care needs, and 

family responsibilities. At Hampton Roads, case managers required clients who wished to enroll 

in training to show that they had applied to and been turned down for several jobs. 

Fort Campbell pursued a particularly holistic strategy that emphasized the program’s 

employment focus at different stages of the client flow, including at marketing, recruitment, 

orientation, and eligibility determination. Over time, the program changed its outreach material 

and orientation message to emphasize employment over training. If the case manager decided 

that the applicant was not employment-focused or did not need to receive training to find 

employment, then the client would be asked to attend employment workshops or receive 

employment services other than training. In addition, the senior case manager encouraged 

clients to think about their needs if their personal situations were to change. For example, he 

would ask clients to consider what they would do if they became pregnant or if their spouse was 

deployed. By doing so, he tried to ensure that the grant funds would be directed to clients who 

were most likely to succeed with training and obtain post-training employment. 

Another strategy that two of the sites used to improve employment outcomes was to restrict 

eligibility to clients who recently moved to the area—typically enrolling those spouses who had 

been in the local area for less than a year. Staff thought this change would ensure that clients 

would have time to receive training, find employment, and develop work histories before their 

military spouses were relocated or deployed. 

C. MARKETING 

To recruit involuntarily separated military personnel, NEG staff relied on referrals from 

existing military programs. For example, the Transition Assistance Officer at Hampton Roads 

contacted every soldier who was leaving the military to suggest that he or she come to the 
33 

program to prepare for the transition to civilian life. The military partner responsible for helping 

military personnel transition out of the military counseled the client initially and referred him or 

her to the NEG program if needed. Similarly, at other sites NEG staff relied on military 

programs to refer involuntarily discharged military personnel to the program. 

However, after the primary target group shifted to dislocated worker spouses, the sites 

became aggressive in their efforts to recruit clients. Local staff pointed out that when a typical 

NEG is awarded in the case of an emergency, clients are lined up at the door. However, the 

military spouse population, while in need of services, was difficult to locate and recruit without 

an advertising campaign, especially because there was no single event that caused the clients to 

think they were facing an “emergency”. 

The sites learned that the best ways to reach out to spouses were (1) to market the program 

services to the spouses directly, rather than indirectly through the military family member, via 

collaborations with military partners, and (2) to have an organized aggressive marketing 

campaign undertaken by an individual or group with expertise in marketing and recruitment. 

Advertising modes that reached the spouses directly were most effective, perhaps because the 

information that was distributed to the military personnel was not always transferred to their 

spouses. Some sites were able to take advantage of effective yet low-cost marketing strategies 

by collaborating with the military and taking advantage of in-kind contributions. At Fort 

Campbell, the Army Public Affairs Office agreed to run a 30-second infomercial about NEG 

services periodically on the military cable channel for a year free of charge. Fort Hood 

advertised the program on its website, which staff thought was an effective advertising method. 

At Pikes Peak, the NEG director said the program had almost exclusively relied on military 

partners to recruit clients and perform initial eligibility screenings. The management found that 

many new clients were obtained through referrals from the military support services center. 
34 

The sites also found that it was helpful to have a person or an organization that was already 

experienced with marketing techniques in charge of outreach. Fort Campbell was able to use 

only minimal resources and staff time by relying on the marketing expert who shared her time 

among the 10 local one-stop sites. In contrast, Pikes Peak initially had the NEG director 

responsible for the marketing effort. However, he acknowledged that this was not an effective 

approach because he had neither the time nor the expertise to conduct a successful outreach 

campaign. The outreach efforts became more successful after the staff member in charge of 

outreach for all the grants in the local area took responsibility for marketing and outreach. The 

NEG director regretted that it took some time to make the transition; in retrospect, he would have 

liked to have begun with a more aggressive advertising campaign led by a specialist in the field. 

At Hampton Roads, the grant managers decided to contract out marketing efforts to a private 

company, Zeiders Enterprises, because they had neither the time nor the staff to undertake 

marketing and outreach efforts. A marketing group at the WIB developed the NEXStep program 

name (the local name for the NEG program) and created brochures and flyers, but Zeiders did 

most of the distribution and outreach. According to Zeiders’ recruitment records, the company 

organized numerous activities between July 2002 and June 2005. These activities included both 

large events such as a July 4th concert and a Thanksgiving Day booth as well as smaller outreach 

activities such as briefings, meetings, and newcomers’ orientation. Outreach staff made 2,857 

referrals that led to 579 enrollments, slightly more than one-third of the total enrollments in the 

program during the same period. The Zeiders staff said that their goal was not limited to 

increasing enrollments in the short run but included ensuring that the program would be so wellknown in the community that it would continue to receive new clients after the outreach contract 

ended. 
35 

The sites found that once they met initial enrollment goals, little outreach was needed since 

word of mouth became an effective source of recruitment. The tight-knit nature of the military 

spouse community in each local area meant that word spread quickly about NEG services. At 

the time of our data collection efforts, most sites reported that they were having little trouble 

meeting their enrollment goals. However, as mentioned above, the large sites had to develop 

new screening procedures to ensure that clients who enrolled were likely to want to work after 

completing services.

D. STAFFING 

Our discussion of the staffing issues include the role of various NEG staff, important staff 

characteristics for NEG managers and case managers, and challenges the sites faced in retaining 

NEG staff. 

1. Responsibilities of NEG Staff 

Sites used NEG funds to support a variety of full-time or part-time staff including case 

managers, business developers, financial specialists, administrative assistants, supervisors, a 

marketing person, and a resource room specialist. The client caseload and general 

responsibilities of case managers were similar across sites. Across the larger sites, caseloads 

ranged from about 60 to about 100 clients per case manager; staff reported that these are larger 

than the standard WIA caseloads. In all sites, case managers were responsible for intake, 

orientation, eligibility determination, counseling, running workshops, and post-exit follow-up. 

Most sites had a full-time or part-time business developer who was responsible for 

developing networks with businesses. Staff said the position was particularly important for two 

reasons. First, given their client caseloads, case managers had little time to network with 

employers. In the absence of a business developer, case managers typically relied on secondary 
36 

sources for information on employment, which were often dated and already available to the 

general public. Second, in the absence of a single point person, case managers did not have a 

collaborative network to share job information. Instead, each case manager looked at the same 

information separately, leading to a duplication of effort. Because the job of business developer 

is so important to the success of the NEG program, Hampton Roads increased the number of 

business developers from one person to three.9 

2. Desired Characteristics for NEG Management Staff 

Grantees recognized that hiring NEG management staff with military backgrounds was 

helpful since they could communicate effectively with and obtain cooperation from the military 

commanders. The NEG managers needed to be able to speak the military language and 

understand the military culture so they could obtain critically important military buy-in and 

collaboration. For example, at Hampton Roads the NEG grant manager is a former Navy vice 

Air Force pilot who served in Vietnam and who “helped bring the DOL and DoD worlds 

together.” 

Fort Campbell initially did not have an NEG manager with a military background, and as a 

result the site experienced problems because of challenges in having military staff and NEG staff 

“speak each other’s language.” Fort Campbell later hired managers with military backgrounds 

and overcame the challenges to establish what staff describe as excellent collaboration with the 

military. In particular, the senior case manager responsible for the day-to-day management of 

the NEG and the program manager responsible for overseeing the entire program are military 

retirees. 

 9

Fort Campbell initially had a business developer but no longer does; staff regret this loss. 
37 

3. Desired Characteristics for NEG Case Managers 

The sites found that NEG clients related well to case managers who had backgrounds and 

characteristics similar to the target population. Involuntarily separated military personnel clients 

at the three large sites related well to counselors who had been in the military, could speak the 

military language, and understood the military culture. They were also familiar with the military 

procedures and could easily read the military personnel’s paperwork. Most of these staff 

members were also men, reflecting the composition of the large NEGs’ target population at the 

start of their grants. 

As spouses became the target population of the grant at the large sites, the sites gradually 

shifted to hiring more case managers who were military spouses rather than former military 

personnel. The transition was helpful because management staff thought that some former 

military personnel lacked flexibility in working with military spouse clients and that the clients 

related better to female case managers. At Fort Campbell, the replacement was a “natural 

progression”; as the program recruited more spouses, the case managers who left were replaced 

by case managers who were military spouses themselves and who therefore were able to better 

understand the spouse clients’ needs and constraints. San Diego experienced a similar transition 

in the backgrounds of its case managers after the new operators took over the program. San 

Diego found that the former military personnel who were originally hired were sometimes too 

regimented and strict and were not able to communicate effectively to most of its spouse clients, 

who typically are young females. 

Although having a military background or being a military spouse was potentially a valuable 

characteristic for NEG case workers, it was not sufficient expertise for a case manager to be 

effective. The staff at San Diego felt that case management experience had not been sufficiently 

taken into account when hiring decisions were made for the original staff who had military 
38 

backgrounds. When the San Diego one-stop operators took over supervision and hiring of NEG 

staff, they kept the case managers who had solid case management experience and put less 

priority on military experience for future staff recruitment. However, most sites reported that it 

was not difficult to hire case managers who had both case management experience and military 

affiliation. 

Regardless of where sites provided NEG services, they valued having NEG case managers 

with expertise and experience in WIA procedures. Sites typically cross-trained NEG staff with 

WIA for three reasons. First, at sites that had NEG services collocated with WIA services, it 

increased the flexibility of the program to serve any target group member who came through 

their doors and therefore increased efficiency in providing services. Second, it gave NEG staff a 

broader view of the available services in the community; this benefit was especially important at 

sites where staff spent all or significant portions of their time on base. Third, in situations where 

case managers worked with both WIA and NEG clients, new staff were able to learn from more 

experienced staff at the one-stops. 

4. Staff Retention 

Most sites reported that retaining staff was a challenge. The grant’s temporary nature and its 

incremental funding made it difficult for the sites to offer NEG staff stable positions. As a result, 

and as typically occurs with temporary programs, many NEG staff left the program when they 

found long-term employment elsewhere, leading to high turnover at most of the sites. This was a 

problem for most types of NEG staff, but especially among case managers. 

High staff turnover led to two types of problems. First and foremost, it disrupted clients’ 

work with their case manager. In all three larger sites, clients who participated in focus groups 

complained about staff turnover and having to start over with a new case manager who was 

unfamiliar with their situation. In many cases when a case manager left, his or her clients were 
39 

not informed about the change. After discovering that a staff member had left, many clients felt 

abandoned and frustrated as they tried to determine whom to see. 

The second problem of staff turnover was the cost of training new staff and the general 

instability in the program while the new staff were being trained. Most sites spent a lot of effort 

training new staff. Early in San Diego’s grant period, when case manager’s client caseloads 

were low, San Diego’s managers allowed new case managers to shadow experienced case 

managers for a month before they were given a client caseload.10 This increased the workload of 

the existing case managers. 

 10As the number of clients grew, giving newly hired case managers this extensive a training period prior to 

their receiving a caseload of clients was no longer feasible. 

41 

III. PROVISION OF NEG SERVICES 

Providing services to assist clients to obtain high-quality jobs is the crux of the NEGs. The 

services available to NEG clients can be categorized in the same way as are WIA services; that 

is, NEG clients receive core services, intensive services, training services, and support services. 

Core services typically include those that clients access on their own without staff assistance. 

Examples include the use of computers or newspapers provided through NEG funds, so that 

clients can search for job leads or learn about the skills and experience needed for certain jobs. 

Intensive services are typically staff-assisted services that are provided to clients either in groups 

or in one-on-one settings. Examples of intensive services include workshops that help clients 

learn how to look for jobs, how to behave during interviews and other interactions with potential 

employers, or how to prepare a resume. When staff determine that clients cannot obtain jobs 

through core and intensive services only, staff consider whether clients’ participation in training 

services is appropriate. Support services, such as child care and transportation, also may be 

available to clients participating in NEG services. 

The data that we use here are primarily drawn from interviews with site administrators and a 

review of program documents. However, we also supplement the data with information we 

collected from focus groups conducted with NEG clients. Because the data collection effort for 

the three large NEG sites (Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and San Diego) was greater than the 

effort for the three medium sites (Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak), most of the discussion 

in this chapter pertains to the three large NEG sites. However, we supplement the discussion 

with information on the three medium sites when it is available. 
42 

We have four findings pertaining to the provision of NEG services to clients: 

1. Core and intensive services made available to NEG clients were similar to those 

available to WIA clients. According to site staff and clients in the focus groups, 

clients were generally satisfied with the core and intensive services they received. 

Furthermore, comprehensive assessments that guide clients to identify potential 

career tracks seemed to be highly valued in San Diego, especially when the clients 

did not have much prior work experience. 

2. Some sites initially offered more generous training allowances to NEG clients than 

what were available to WIA clients in the same local area, although they have since 

matched the WIA caps. Providing NEG clients with larger individual training 

accounts (ITAs), through which training is funded, allows them more training 

options; however, the disparity in funds caused problems. In some instances, there 

was tension between NEG clients and WIA clients who may have been in the same 

classrooms. The high training cap also may have inadvertently discouraged NEG 

clients from obtaining a job. 

3. Both NEG staff and focus group participants reported that funding for child care 

services, provided in large part by NEGs, was very helpful for the participation and 

success in training of clients who had children. A primary reason is that military 

spouses often do not live near friends or extended family, who might otherwise be 

informal sources of care. Furthermore, some staff reported that child care support 

was provided predominantly through the NEGs, rather than through other sources, 

because clients were unlikely to qualify for financial support given their family 

income levels and long waiting lists at military providers of child care. But, the cost 

of child care could be very expensive. For some clients, it could be as large as the 

cost of training. This finding suggests that helping this portion of clients participate 

successfully in training can be particularly expensive for society after support service 

needs, regardless of the source of funds for meeting them, are taken into account. 

4. Staff were not successful at providing services to clients who moved from the NEG 

areas. Several sites had planned to continue to provide services to clients who 

relocated outside the NEG area, and they developed policies and procedures to do so. 

However, investing the effort to keep in touch with relocated clients was often a low 

priority for staff. Rather, as was discussed in more detail in Chapter II, sites relied on 

techniques used during the eligibility screening of potential clients to reduce the 

likelihood that clients would relocate from the area prior to their completion of 

service activities. 

In this chapter, we discuss the different types of services available to NEG clients. We 

begin by discussing core and intensive services (Section A). After that, we discuss the issues 

related to clients’ participation in training (Section B), followed by a discussion of NEG sites’ 

support services policy (Section C). Finally, we conclude by explaining the distinct issues 
43 

related to the provision of services to clients who relocate out of the NEG communities 

(Section D). 

A. CORE AND INTENSIVE SERVICES 

In many ways, the sites’ core and intensive services offered to NEG clients are very similar 

to, and in some instances the same as, WIA services offered to dislocated workers and adults. 

Core services typically include resource room usage, career exploration, initial self-administered 

assessments of skills and needs, unassisted job search, and some group workshops. Computers 

allow access to labor market and career information, details about employers, job requirements, 

and local area education and training programs. 

In many ways, the core and intensive services offered to NEG clients are similar to those 

offered through military support center programs. Military-provided services that can be 

accessed through the Military Onesource website (http://www.militaryonesource.com/

skins/MOS/home.aspx, accessed as of August 7, 2006) include activities such as occupational 

and skills assessment, assistance in resume development, job search assistance, and access to job 

listings. They also include a number of services, such as travel grants and monetary assistance 

with temporary housing, that are specifically related to problems that may be encountered in 

family relocations. As discussed in Chapter II, the NEG sites typically worked with the military 

support centers to reduce potential duplications of services among clients who could access the 

centers. One way to do that was to focus primarily on the most distinctive features of the NEG 

programs. These consisted mainly to the provision of training grants and support services to 

clients because these types of direct grants generally were unavailable through the military 

sources. In some cases (such as the Fort Campbell site), the NEG-financed resource centers also 

filled a void for spouses and civilian personnel because use of the military resource center was 

restricted to active duty military personnel. 
44 

Intensive services financed by the NEGs typically include comprehensive assessment 

services, the development of an Individual Employment Plan (IEP), case management, staffassisted job search and placement, and basic skills education and training services.1

 Usually, the 

IEP is based on the results of a comprehensive assessment and one or more detailed discussions 

with the client about the client’s aspirations, needs, and constraints on service receipt. The IEP 

typically includes a plan and activity schedule that might delineate clients’ efforts to obtain 

employment immediately, to participate in intermediate education and training services, or to 

pursue intensive education or training assistance. These plans are dependent upon both a client’s 

eligibility for funding and services and the availability of specific education and training 

programs within the client’s time frame and regional restrictions. Meetings between the case 

manager and the client after an IEP has been developed often depend on the specific details of 

the plan. For example, San Diego staff reported that a client’s achievement of a milestone in the 

IEP triggers a conference meeting between the client and the case manager so that progress can 

be assessed and corrective actions or revisions can be made. In most instances, case 

management is offered until job placement. Basic education services will be provided, typically 

through a community college or other adult education program, if a client needs help with 

reading, math, or language skills. 

San Diego uses an especially intensive approach to conducting assessments. All one-stop 

assessments—including those conducted with NEG clients—are conducted by staff at local 

community colleges and universities; these staff members have master’s degrees in counseling or 

are school psychologists. The assessments include skills, temperament, personality, interest, and 

aptitude tests. San Diego offers more than 15 different tests; depending on a client’s need and 

 1

Fort Hood also offers a distinctive program that allows clients to take online training and certification courses 

by having computers set up for internet access in their homes. 
45 

initiative, a client may take numerous tests. All clients without a college degree also are required 

to take the Test for Adult Basic Education (TABE), a standardized test that is designed to help 

test-takers learn about their basic skills level. Staff thought that having some clients take the 

TABE helped them to recognize their need for basic skills classes to upgrade rusty skills. After 

an assessment test is completed, staff review the results with clients to help them find appropriate 

career paths. They help clients research occupations and labor markets, investigate the education 

and skills needed for each job, and explore how widely across the U.S. different occupations are 

in demand. The latter is important because of the high mobility rate of the clients. 

Both staff and clients appear to value the comprehensive assessments. The San Diego staff 

that conduct them believe that the detailed assessments became especially valuable after NEG 

eligibility expanded to include all spouses, as many clients who meet the broader eligibility 

criteria are young and inexperienced workers. Some clients thought the assessments confirmed 

their intuition about what training to pursue; other clients used the assessments to determine the 

best career path given their skills and experience. 

More generally, most focus group attendees at all three large sites found the core and 

intensive services to be helpful. For example, clients reported liking and valuing the one-on-one 

counseling they received and the workshops they attended. 

However, clients had varied experiences working with individual case managers. Some 

clients thought their case managers were helpful in guiding them in the receipt of services 

because their case managers were approachable and knowledgeable. Furthermore, some 

reported that their case managers took great initiative to help; if case managers did not know the 

answer to clients’ questions, they asked their supervisors. However, other clients expressed 

frustration about their case managers. Common complaints were that the case managers were 

difficult to reach or that clients were not kept abreast of changes that arose due to staff turnover; 
46 

some clients reported that they had not been contacted when they were assigned a new case 

manager. Also of concern is that some clients reported that their case managers gave them 

incorrect or incomplete information. One example is that some clients reported that their case 

managers grossly overestimated the average entry salary they could expect to receive upon 

completion of their degree; as discussed in Section C, another example is that clients were 

dissatisfied that they were told about the availability of financial assistance only for some needs, 

such as for child care, but not for others, such as for car repairs.2 

B. TRAINING SERVICES 

As is the case with WIA procedures, the NEGs make training services available to eligible 

clients who are unable to obtain self-sufficient employment through core or intensive services. 

At some sites, for both NEG and WIA clients, the IEP specifies information on the provider, 

projected cost, and time frame for training to be purchased under the ITA, which is an account 

through which training funds are made available to a specific client. Staff at most sites indicated 

that potential clients come to the site specifically to get funds for training, particularly if they 

have low skill levels.3

 Training services may include occupational skills training, on the job 

training (OJT), customized training, or, in some situations, pursuit of a higher education degree 

or diploma that would facilitate a client’s obtaining a job.4 In almost all sites, the primary type 

 2

As discussed in Section C, this dissatisfaction may arise because of a site’s policy regarding the provision of 

support services, even though clients expressed their dissatisfaction with the case managers. 

3

This was especially the case at some sites that initially marketed the program as providing training services; 

however, some staff thought that potential clients still came to the program because they were interested in training 

even after the staff strengthened the program’s emphasis on employment. 

4

Customized training is training that is tailored to the specific needs of an employer or set of employers. When 

workers go through a customized training program, they typically are trained in the specific tasks that an employer 

will require employees to perform; furthermore, the worker is highly likely to obtain a job with the employer after 

the successful completion of the training program. The training also often occurs at the employer’s worksite. In 

contrast, many other types of training are not tailored to the needs of a specific employer, and a trainee typically 

must actively search for a job after the completion of the training. 
47 

of training is classroom-based occupational training and is implemented through the use of ITAs 

that allow clients access to funds for training if certain criteria are met. OJT and customized 

trainings were rarely used.5 

Clients access to and use of training depended on (1) the process for approving training 

plans, (2) the types of programs that were in demand, (3) the caps on the ITA funding amounts, 

(4) the length of time that clients are allowed to be enrolled in a training program, and (5) other 

factors, such as whether they can obtain funding from other sources and whether they are 

considered in-state residents. We discuss each of these topics in the following subsections. 

1. The ITA Approval Process 

In order for a client to obtain an ITA, the client must select a training provider from the 

Eligible Training Provider List (ETPL) and obtain approval for the training plans. The ETPL is 

established by the state and designates the training providers that have satisfied state-specified 

requirements for the referral of WIA and NEG clients and the receipt of WIA and NEG funds. 

Staff encourage clients to make an informed decision about their training choices prior to their 

embarking on a plan. For example, each Fort Campbell client that receives an ITA is required to 

research three training institutions before choosing one. This approach is designed to encourage 

the clients to choose the schools proactively with a counselor’s guidance. 

In some instances, the training programs refer students or potential students to the NEG for 

funding. For example, San Diego staff reported that these “reverse referrals” became even more 

 5

Fort Bragg staff reported that use of these types of training was rare because plant closings and downsizing at 

large companies reduced industrial demand for workers trained through these methods. However, Pikes Peak staff 

said that about one half of clients who participated in training were in customized training. This site tried to avoid 

using OJT because of legal complications in the process. 
48 

common after spouses became eligible for NEG services. Most training schools encouraged 

clients to visit the one-stop to seek funding. 

Several staff in different sites expressed reservations about the ETPLs from which NEG 

clients could choose, although these limitations were not unique to NEG clients. For example, 

one Fort Campbell staff person mentioned that there were few eligible training providers in the 

local area, even though the site allows clients to choose training providers from either the 

Kentucky ETPL or the Tennessee ETPL. As a result, some clients must commute to Nashville 

(over 50 miles away) for training. San Diego does not have any community colleges on the list 

because its colleges have been unable or choose not to satisfy the reporting requirements to be 

listed on the ETPL. Fort Hood staff reported having to limit the number of classroom training 

placements that could be used by NEG clients because local community colleges did not have 

the capacity to enroll as many clients as were interested, especially in health care fields; staff 

perceived this to be a major challenge in operating the grant. 

Sites’ procedures to obtain approval for each ITA depended on how each site balanced the 

tension between giving case managers authority in approving training and in centralizing that 

power with higher-level administrative staff. For example, the senior case manager at Fort 

Campbell must approve all training costs. Prior to 2005, expenditures over $3,500 required 

additional approval from the organization’s vice president; since then, a higher threshold 

($10,000) has been used. The change was made so that case managers could have more 

authority in the process. The approval process at Hampton Roads differs by WIB. The Hampton 

Roads (Southside) and Crater WIBs allow case managers to approve training selections.6

 

Greater Peninsula’s one-stop managers felt that case managers were giving in to the interests of 

 6

When the new one-stop operator at Southside began in September 2004, the one-stop director approved and 

initialed all ITA vouchers after completion by the case managers and before the disbursement of funds. 
49 

clients too often even when selected occupations were not in demand. As a result, and in 

contrast to the greater flexibility given to Fort Campbell case managers over time, the Greater 

Peninsula WIB created a more formalized review process in 2004. A committee of two program 

coordinators, the one-stop director, two case managers, a representative from the Trade 

Adjustment Assistance program, and the Virginia Employment Commission center manager 

meets every two weeks to review and approve training applications. Resources are only awarded 

for training in occupations that will lead to jobs in the local area. The panel meets on an asneeded basis if a client needs to be fast tracked, but that does not happen often. 

In San Diego, the case managers also need to seek ultimate approval from the Workforce 

Partnership before officially approving each ITA. San Diego case managers reported that, at the 

beginning of the NEG period, clients were not required to do much exploration of training 

providers or career options. Over time, the NEG process began to look more like the typical 

WIA process, which requires more scrutiny of the use of ITA funds to ensure that they are 

provided only for clients who are interested in working after the completion of training. 

The need to obtain approval by higher-level administrative staff has the potential to lead to 

some delays in clients’ accessing training funds, even though all sites reported having a quick 

turnaround process for approving training plans. At one site that required higher-level approval, 

we heard that some clients became frustrated about the challenges of pulling together the 

required paperwork and about the need to wait for long periods of time before getting approval 

for their training funds. As a result, some clients complained to the military partners. 

2. In-Demand Training Programs 

Staff reported that most NEG clients look for occupations that are in demand in the local 

area but also that include skills transferable to other states and local areas. According to the staff 

at the large sites, clients (predominantly spouses) frequently pursued occupations in the medical 
50 

field, including billing and coding; nursing; and surgical, dental, and X-ray technician positions. 

Other fields of interest included computer technology, massage therapy, graphic design, aviation 

training, teaching certification, aesthetic training and cosmetology, computer-aided drafting and 

design technology, and mechanical engineering technology.7 According to staff at the three 

smaller sites (Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak), the most common areas for training for 

NEG clients were similar to those at the large sites, although a few differences emerged. For 

example, Fort Hood staff reported that some clients used training to upgrade their skills in 

keyboarding or one or more specific software packages. Fort Bragg staff mentioned truck 

driving and mechanics, as did Pikes Peak staff for male spouses. 

3. The ITA Caps 

A critical distinction between NEG policy and WIA policy has been in the ITA caps, which 

affect the range of training options that may be paid for through the ITAs. Generally, the NEG 

caps for ITAs have been equal to or higher than the caps for WIA clients. At Fort Campbell, 

training must be in an in-demand occupation in the local area or in another area to which the 

client is willing to relocate. That site’s NEG cap for training and support services is $10,000. In 

contrast, the WIA cap is $3,500. At Hampton Roads, all three WIBs have had a WIA cap of 

$8,000. However, at the time of the site visit in June 2005, one of the three Hampton Roads 

WIBs did not have a cap on its ITAs for NEG clients. The other two WIBs had caps of $12,000 

for their NEG clients. All three boards planned to shift as of July 1, 2005, to an $8,000 cap for 

NEG clients, which would match the caps for WIA adult or dislocated worker ITAs. Staff 

 7

San Diego staff estimate that about 70 percent of spouses pursue credentials in medical occupations. 

According to the site’s grant proposal, an objective of the NEG was to train separating military personnel for hightech jobs that local employers are currently filling with H-1B visa holders. As the client target group shifted to 

spouses, in early 2003, the most common types of training shifted from the information technology field to the 

medical field, which is more appealing to military spouses. 
51 

expected that the lower cap would prevent NEG clients from considering some of the more 

costly training options, such as some expensive proprietary vendors. 

Like Hampton Roads, San Diego began with a much more generous ITA policy towards 

NEG clients, compared to WIA clients, but it has revised its policy since then.8 WIA clients are 

allowed ITAs of up to $5,000 if they want to pursue training in a demand occupation in the local 

area and up to $10,000 for pursuing training in a high demand occupation. Prior to 2003, 

however, San Diego did not have a cap on ITA expenditures for NEG clients, and some of them 

were attending training costing more than $30,000. Staff reported that the discrepancy between 

funding levels for NEG and WIA clients caused problems because the two groups often attended 

the same workshops and would talk about their funding. In 2003, San Diego instituted a cap that 

is comparable to the WIA ITA policy. San Diego staff think that the caps are good, both because 

they conserve grant resources and have forced clients to focus more seriously on their training 

choices. Before the cap, occupations such as teaching, paralegal, bookkeeping and accounting, 

automotive finance, and translation were more common. After the change, more clients selected 

medical fields, possibly because, as occupations that are in very high demand, they warranted a 

higher ITA. Nevertheless, some clients who were already in the pipeline for receiving training 

were very upset when the change went into effect, and some had to try to find funds from other 

sources to cover the difference between the cost of their training and the amount the NEG would 

pay. 

 8

The training cap at Fort Bragg is $10,500 and does not include the cost of support services. Fort Hood staff 

also reported that they did not have an ITA cap for NEG clients. However, they thought that other restrictions on 

training options were useful to ensure that funds were well spent. Examples of these restrictions include 

requirements that the training must be in an in-demand occupation and that case managers determine that a client 

had the ability to benefit from and succeed in training. 
52 

The Pikes Peak policy on ITA caps is in contrast to the policies at Hampton Roads and San 

Diego. Initially the training cap for NEG clients was the same as the training cap for WIA 

clients, at $3,000, but the program later raised the cap to $8,000. Site staff explained that they 

increased the cap because the length of the grant period limits NEG clients to participation in 

vocational schools, which provide certifications or credentials in a shorter period of time than do 

community colleges; vocational schools thus also tend to be more expensive. 

4. Duration of Eligibility for Training 

As is the case with WIA, sites impose restrictions on the length of time that clients may take 

to pursue training using their ITAs. These restrictions are designed, at least in part, to encourage 

clients to finish their training so that they can start working. In practice, they may restrict the 

ability of many clients to attend four-year colleges. At Fort Campbell, clients are required to 

complete all training within 18 months; they are not allowed to use the ITAs to attend a four-year 

college unless the client needs very few credits for a degree. Hampton Roads clients can pursue 

training for between 18 and 24 months, depending on the WIB at which they participate and 

whether a justification can be made for taking a long period of time to complete training. Like 

Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads also restricts clients’ attendance at college: clients are allowed 

to pursue their bachelor’s degree only if they need 45 or fewer credits to graduate. Clients are 

allowed to pursue a graduate degree only if they need 12 or fewer credits to complete their 

program.9

 San Diego does not have an official limit on training. However, most of the providers 

 9

One Hampton Roads staff person reported that, compared to WIA training clients, a larger proportion of NEG 

clients pursue their bachelor’s and graduate degrees. This staff member thought that most WIA dislocated workers 

want to go back to work quickly, while NEG clients want two- or four-year degrees that will help with new longterm careers. This may result because NEG clients tend to be younger and have less work experience than WIA 

clients. 
53 

on the ETPL are vocational schools with programs that last less than two years, and staff 

reported that clients typically prefer short-term training. 

At one of the large sites, however, several focus group members reported having been told 

there was a time limit of 12 months, a limit that is shorter than the official policy and that they 

said prevented them from getting a degree. 

Two of the small sites also mentioned that the lengths of their grants, which are shorter than 

those at the larger sites, imposed a restriction on the length of training in which clients 

participated. Since funding for the grant was provided in short increments of time, clients faced 

pressure to finish their training before the grant period was over. 

5. Other Factors Affecting Training 

Two other factors besides the ETPL and ITA policies also can influence clients’ 

opportunities for training. The first factor is the availability of other sources of funding. As is 

consistent with WIA policy, NEG staff reported that they require clients to pursue other sources 

of funding for their training; coordination between these funding sources is provided to help the 

client achieve his or her training objectives and also to prevent excess awards of financial 

assistance. Some clients have qualified for veterans benefits, which facilitates their participation 

in training. A client who receives a Pell Grant or other scholarship might also attend more 

extensive training or be allowed to use more of his or her ITA funds for support services.10 

Hampton Roads staff mentioned that clients have the opportunity to compete with other students 

for National Science Foundation scholarships to obtain an associate’s degree in computer 

 10The maximum Pell grant award can vary year to year, but it has been $4,050 per year for the past several 

years (http://www.collegeboard.com/article/0,3868,6-30-0-36318,00.html, accessed December 16, 2005). 
54 

science, engineering, or mathematics at Thomas Nelson Community College. Site staff reported 

these other types of funding sources were very valuable in expanding clients’ training options. 

A second factor that may affect clients’ opportunities for training, or their ability to attend 

training in the most cost-efficient way, is clients’ mobility. In the Hampton Roads area, for 

example, most spouses do not qualify for in-state tuition at community colleges and universities. 

Students need to be full-time Virginia residents for at least one year before they qualify for instate tuition. Many spouses choose not to change their permanent residency status after they 

relocate to the Hampton Roads area because they are likely to be in the area for only a few years. 

Clients who must pay out-of-state tuition rates may face even stronger restrictions on their 

training choices than has been the case in the past as a result of Hampton Roads’ newly instituted 

lower ITA cap. 

C. SUPPORT SERVICES 

Most of the NEG sites offer at least some type of support services to clients when their need 

is documented and cannot be addressed through other funding sources.11 Depending on the site, 

the available support services may include financial assistance for child care, transportation, 

health care, tools and equipment that are needed for a job, fees for professional exams and 

licensures, uniforms and specialty clothing costs, or other emergency needs. Table III.1 

summarizes sites’ policies on allowable support services expenditures and restrictions. 

Sites had different policies regarding support service funds that might be available to each 

client. For example, until 2003, San Diego did not have a cap on the amount of funds provided 

 11Our discussions with site staff and clients about support services focused on military spouses because 

military spouses were the largest and most recent target group for the grants. Furthermore, staff thought that 

involuntarily separated military personnel were much less likely to need support services because they less 

frequently needed child care support. Their need for other support services was similar, or slightly lower, than the 

needs of military spouses. In addition, staff at one of the three small sites said that NEG military spouse clients had 

higher levels of need for these services than do WIA clients. 
 55 TABLE III.1 NEG SUPPORT SERVICES POLICIES Support Services Offered Fort Bragg Fort Campbell Fort Hood Hampton Roads (Crater WIB only)a Pikes Peak San Diego Total Allowable Expenditure Support services expenditure is not counted towards the ITA cap. There is no separate cap for support services. The ITA cap includes spending on support services. There are also caps on each type of support. Support service costs are capped at $2,500 per client. The ITA cap includes spending on support services. The ITA cap includes spending on support services. Support services other than childcare capped at $200 per month. Childcare capped at $400 per month per child ($200 per month per child for before- and $200 for after- school care). Allowable Childcare Expenditure No cap (Case managers are responsible to ensure that expenditures are “reasonable.”) Capped at $33 per day. Clients are referred to child care services that are part of the integrated workforce services for child care provision. Lowest of three rate quotations from licensed childcare providers in the local area. No cap Reimbursements are made at a rate that is considered reasonable and customary in the geographical area. Capped at $400 per month per child under age 13 ($200 per month per child for before- and $200 for after-school care, $260 for summer care). Childcare Support Access Period Up to 1 month after a client completes training Up to 3 months after a client completes training Up to 90 days after a client finds employment Up to 12 months after a client exits from the program Available only during a client’s program participation Available only during a client’s program participation Transportation A maximum of 50 miles round trip travel or monthly bus pass A maximum of $9.50 per day (for distances greater than 60 miles round trip) No cap for mileage reimbursement and bus tokens A maximum of 80 miles round trip travel at the rate of $0.325 per mile or monthly bus pass; bus tokens not to exceed $1,000 per program year A maximum of 50 miles per round trip or a monthly bus pass Bus pass available up to $58 per month Other Allowable Support Services Expenditures Medical clothing, relocation assistance, and other needs “of an emergency nature” Medical (up to $250), automobile repair ($800), specialty equipment ($1,500), professional exams ($500), and clothing ($250) On-campus housing and meals (per diem), and relocation assistance of up to $1,000 Medical (up to $1,000); automobile repair (no cap); clothing ($500) ; emergency expenditure including utility bills, food, or rent ($1,500) Emergency assistance including housing, temporary shelter, one- time utility payments, costs of obtaining driver’s license, uniforms and supplies for work, background checks, physicals, and immunizations Medical, auto repair, mileage, housing and utility bills, clothing, food, and other emergency expenditures including car and mortgage emergency payments; a total spending of $200 per month, as well as individual caps on some of the services Source: NEG grantees’ support services policies. 

aThe Hampton Roads NEG includes three WIBs. Two of the three WIBs do not provide support services; the Crater WIB does. 

WIB = workforce investment board. 
56 

to a client for support services; starting in 2003, the site implemented a monthly cap per client 

that allows up $200 a month for support services other than childcare and that has limits on perchild costs of different types of care for children under the age of 13. At Fort Hood, the total 

amount for support services that each client receives cannot exceed $2,500. In contrast, Fort 

Campbell counts support service expenditures towards the ITA cap per client. 

In Hampton Roads, individual WIBs determine the supportive services policy for the NEG 

program. Only one of the three WIBs at Hampton Roads (the Crater WIB) offers any support 

services to its clients. Like Fort Campbell, the Crater WIB (the smallest of the three Hampton 

Roads WIBs) counts the cost of support services towards the client’s ITA cap. The WIB has 

caps for each type of support service received, except in the case of child care services. The 

WIB requires clients who request child care support to obtain at least three rate quotations from 

licensed child care providers in the area; clients are reimbursed at the lowest quoted rate. The 

two larger WIBs at Hampton Roads do not provide support services, since administering those 

services is thought to be too burdensome. 

1. Child Care 

Child care support services were described, by both NEG staff and focus group participants, 

as critical for the military spouse clients’ participation and success in training. A large portion of 

military spouses have one or more young children, and clients may not have been able to attend 

training or to participate in other NEG activities if financial assistance for child care were 

unavailable from the NEG or another source such as one dedicated to the provision of these 

services. Military families often live far away from their extended family and friends, so they 

cannot rely on informal arrangements with these traditional sources of support. Their need for 

child care, especially when they have more than one child, imposes a constraint both on clients’ 

participation in education and training and in their interest in working after completing training. 
57 

Sites differ in how much child care support clients could receive, if any, and under which 

conditions they could receive it. Sites that provided child care support typically stated that they 

do not intend to pay all child care costs; their objective is to reduce the burden on the client by 

paying a portion of the charges. In some instances, however, the child care assistance can equal 

the cost of training. Fort Campbell’s policy is to cap child care reimbursement at $33 per day 

(which equals $660 per month if child care is used for 20 days per month). However, if the cost 

of child care chosen by the client is below the cap, the program reimburses the client for 100 

percent of the cost for the first child. The reimbursement drops to 80 percent for the second 

child, 60 percent for the third, and 40 percent for the fourth child. For children under 13 years of 

age, San Diego provides $400 per month per child, $200 per month per child for before- and 

after-school care, and $260 per month per child for summer care. San Diego does not have a total 

maximum cap per month on child care. Local staff in San Diego speculated that actual child care 

costs in the area are much higher than the reimbursement levels. 

To support clients during their transitional time to work, some sites made child care 

available for a period of time after the completion of training. For example, when necessary for 

clients’ employment success, a Fort Campbell case manager had discretion to provide child care 

assistance to clients for up to three months after they completed training; the site’s strategy was 

to taper off support once a client’s income stabilized. Fort Hood clients can receive support 

services for up to 90 days after they find employment. The Crater WIB at Hampton Roads 

provided assistance for up to 12 months after an exit from the program.12 Fort Bragg’s policy 

was to provide child care assistance for a much shorter period of time, up to one month after 

 12When clients exit from the program also varies across sites. In Fort Hood, for example, staff exit clients from 

the program after clients meet the goals specified in the IEP. Other reasons for exits include a client’s leaving the 

area or deciding that he or she no longer wants to obtain a job. Chapter V shows that sites’ exit practices lead to 

widely varying rates of exit from the programs. 
58 

clients completed training. However, Fort Bragg’s staff recommended extending this time limit, 

since clients with child care needs often had difficulty establishing adequate child care 

arrangements quickly upon obtaining a job. This recommendation is consistent with concerns 

expressed by San Diego focus group participants. Some focus group clients expressed 

frustration about their loss of child care assistance after they finished training since they thought 

they needed, but could not obtain, child care during subsequent job search efforts.13 

Both staff and clients expressed the view that, when child care is necessary, a job must pay 

enough for a client to be able to afford child care after the NEG subsidization is over; the jobs 

that are available to clients who lack strong job skills are not likely to do so. For example, a 

client who makes $15 per hour at a full-time job will earn $31,200 per year. However, if he or 

she needs to pay $600 per month for child care, then the effective pre-tax earnings reduce to 

$11.54 per hour, or $24,000 per year. Taking into account the costs of transportation to and from 

work, other work expenses such as clothing or supplies, and income taxes would reduce a 

client’s net earnings even further. 

Even when child care funds are available to allow clients to attend service and training 

activities, both staff and clients at the three large sites reported that clients have difficulty finding 

good child care providers. The shortage of good child care programs is particularly acute during 

school or training hours. Many nearby programs that might appeal to clients, such as the 

military, Early Head Start, or the YMCA, have waiting lists. As a result of a lack of child care 

providers, some clients have been unable to go to school during the workday. Several traded 

child care responsibilities with other spouses or went to school when their military spouse was 

 13San Diego’s support services policy is that services may be provided to clients who are actively participating 

in approved training, job search, or employment retention services and who have not yet exited NEG or WIA 

services. Therefore, it seems possible that some clients could receive child care services during their job search 

efforts. However, as discussed later in this section, there is no entitlement to support services. 
59 

off duty. However, relying on the military personnel spouse for child care could be problematic 

because of the possibility of deployment. 

2. Transportation and Other Support Services 

Transportation assistance to cover part of the cost of commuting to training and other 

services also has been offered at some sites to help clients who need it. As with child care 

assistance, sites’ policies typically are intended not to reimburse the client for all costs incurred 

for transportation but to reduce clients’ overall burden for participating in services. In the case 

of Fort Campbell, the payments are made to the client directly based on the number of days the 

client attends services. The daily mileage allowance is capped at $9.50 per day ($190 per month 

for 20 days in the month) for distances greater than 60 miles. One staff person felt that the 

transportation assistance was too low to cover the cost of a client’s commute to Nashville, the 

closest area with a large number of training and employment opportunities; however, local staff 

try to help clients identify partners for carpooling so clients can reduce their commuting 

expenses. Other sites also cap the amount of reimbursement provided to clients, to be 

commensurate with a certain maximum round-trip daily commuting distance (such as 50 miles 

per day, in the case of Fort Bragg, or 80 miles for Crater) or with the cost of a bus pass. 

When sites provided child care and transportation assistance, they also were likely to 

provide other support services. Common examples include funds for auto repair, tools, medical 

care, professional exams or licensing fees, and clothing. These types of support services tend to 

be less expensive than child care and transportation assistance since they are usually not required 

by clients on an ongoing basis. 

In some instances, clients reported that they would have tried to use these types of support 

services more extensively if they had known that they were available. For example, a client 

might have found out about the availability of assistance for car repairs only after she or he paid 
60 

for repairs out of her or his own funds. Some clients complained that they were not reimbursed 

for expenditures they incurred prior to knowing that funds could have been available. It is likely 

that clients’ frustrations arose because sites’ support services policies typically do not allow 

clients to seek reimbursement after a non-emergency expense is incurred: most policies indicate 

that support services are only available to clients when funds from other sources are unavailable 

and, except for emergency situations, when the support services are included in the IEP. 

Furthermore, staff at the sites consistently reported that support services were provided to clients 

only when a client demonstrated need for the assistance; in fact, information on support services 

is shared with a client only after the staff determine that he or she has a specific barrier that will 

hinder participation in employment-related activities. Thus, sites stressed that support services 

are not entitlements. 

D. SERVICES TO CLIENTS WHO RELOCATE OUT OF THE NEG COMMUNITIES 

Compared to typical WIA clients who have no military affiliation, both involuntarily 

separated military personnel and spouses of military personnel have very high rates of mobility. 

In the grant proposals, sites explained that involuntarily separated military personnel clients 

could live for up to six months on the base after they received notice that they would be 

discharged, during which time they could avail themselves of occupational training to prepare for 

working in the civilian labor market. However, staff recognized that clients would have high 

rates of relocation after discharge: for example, Hampton Roads and San Diego estimated that at 

least 80 percent of involuntarily separated military personnel leave the area. Staff explained that 

many involuntarily separated military personnel return to their home communities where family 

and friends are located. Furthermore, Hampton Roads and San Diego cited the high cost of 
61 

living in their local areas, compared to the earning potential of involuntarily separated military 

personnel with low skill levels, as another reason why these clients do not remain in the area.14 

Spouses of military personnel, likewise, are a very mobile group. Many move into the NEG 

area as a result of the permanent change of station (PCS) of their military employee spouses, and 

they are likely to leave the area within a few years as a result of another PCS.15 Spouses also 

often return to their family homes when their military employee spouses are deployed. 

The high rate of relocation by spouses plays a strong role in their ability to develop skills 

and workforce experiences as well as in the types of needs that they have and their goals after 

they enroll in the program. For example, some spouses had state certifications that were not 

transferable across state lines, so they came to the NEG site to request help to obtain new state 

certificates. Fort Hood staff reported that clients who moved from areas with a high cost of 

living were unused to the lower wage rates in the area; the site staff tried to encourage the clients 

to recognize that a job that appeared to have a low wage rate was equivalent to a higher-paying 

job in their former area because of the low cost of living near the Fort Hood site. Furthermore, 

sites frequently reported that it was challenging for military spouse clients to get hired in a new 

area because local employers, who know that military spouses are in the area for a short period 

 14Fort Campbell staff estimated that only about 35 to 40 percent of involuntarily separated military personnel 

who participate in NEG-funded training relocated out of the area. The gap between this estimate and the projections 

of relocation rates of involuntarily separated military personnel from the Hampton Roads and San Diego areas may 

arise in part because Fort Campbell has a lower cost of living and in part because its training facilitates retention of 

clients in the area. 

15According to testimony by John Molino, the deputy undersecretary of defense for military community and 

family policy, spouses of active duty military personnel move an average of about once every 25 months (Molino 

2004). As discussed in Chapter II, some sites restrict eligibility of spouses to those who have recently moved into 

the NEG area, so that the clients have sufficient time to participate in services and obtain employment in the local 

area before their next PCS. Fort Campbell staff estimated that less than 10 percent of spouse clients move from the 

area during training, even though almost all will leave the area when the military relocates the family. Case 

managers in San Diego, which does not screen clients based on their length of time in the area, estimated that about 

30 percent of spouses in their caseloads move out of the area before completing training. 
62 

of time only, are reluctant to hire them or invest resources into helping them climb a career 

ladder. 

The mobility of NEG clients in and out of the local areas was an important factor in how 

sites initially planned to serve clients. According to some of the NEG proposals, one of the key 

opportunities that NEG clients would have, that WIA clients do not typically have, is the ability 

to take advantage of nationwide placement and training services. Sites planned to have case 

managers continue to work with clients after the clients relocated out of the NEG community. If 

a client anticipated relocating, the case manager would contact the one-stop in the new area prior 

to the relocation to determine whether a training provider in which the client was interested is on 

the ETPL for the new area; if not, the NEG case manager could determine whether it was 

feasible to get the provider on the list so that the client could attend the training of his or her 

choice shortly after the relocation. San Diego also planned to make information on labor market 

conditions and education and training options available on both the local and national levels; 

furthermore, the site planned to allow involuntarily separated military personnel clients to take 

correspondence courses at their destination school prior to their military discharge and to ensure 

that relocated clients who wanted to continue utilizing the NEG resources would have internet 

access. 

However, instead of developing opportunities or methods to enhance collaboration with 

training providers and other service providers outside of the area, sites typically provide minimal 

intensive services to clients leaving the NEG community. Almost uniformly, NEG staff reported 

that their involvement in assisting relocating clients was less than what had been originally 

envisioned. At a basic level, sites tried to provide a broad scope of labor market information 

through the internet. 
63 

At a more intensive level, staff reported that clients who relocate generally do not make 

extensive use of NEG services and that the sites did not play a large role in the efforts of many 

clients to receive services in their new area. For example, Hampton Roads added some providers 

in other states and local areas to their ETPL; all of these providers were already approved on 

their own state’s ETPL, so the site could simply draft training agreements that used the same 

criteria that was used by the other state or local area. Some of these successes arose with 

involuntarily separated clients, some of whom were given almost a year’s notice that they would 

have a PCS; these clients could begin investigating schools in their new area prior to their move. 

Furthermore, a very small number of clients requested financial assistance to attend out-of-area 

schools that were not on the local ETPL; their case managers directed them to talk to the onestop in the new area to have the providers placed on the ETPL before approving them in the 

Hampton Roads area. In practice, however, case managers at Hampton Roads and other sites 

often simply referred relocating clients to the local one-stop in the new area for labor market 

information or a list of training providers. 

Experiences at other sites were similar. For example, San Diego staff reported that few 

clients have taken advantage of NEG-funded training services in another state; staff try to stay in 

contact with clients or refer them to the local one-stop in the new area, but they have had trouble 

keeping track of clients who are not in the NEG area. Staff at both Fort Bragg and Pikes Peak 

indicated that they allow clients who are relocating to use NEG funds to complete a degree 

program online if they lack only a few credits. Pikes Peak staff noted that it was easier to 

provide long-distance services to clients if the clients had completed training prior to their 

relocation, compared to if the client was in the midst of a training program. 

Clients’ mobility also makes it challenging for NEG staff to obtain data on clients’ postservice outcomes. Case managers follow clients for a full year after they complete training or 
64 

find jobs, even if the clients move from the area. As is the case with providing long-distance 

services to clients, however, tracking relocated clients can be extremely difficult. NEG case 

managers typically ask a client for the names of several contact people anywhere in the United 

States that can be used to locate the client, even if the client moves. However, some staff also 

admitted that following up with clients who have moved is not often a high priority compared to 

their other numerous responsibilities. One site mentioned having implemented techniques such 

as providing clients with a 1-800 telephone number and postage-paid envelopes so they could 

give updates to NEG staff. The site also provided case managers with cell phones and telephone 

cards so they could contact clients during evening hours. These techniques were useful in 

helping case managers to stay in contact with their clients. 

Another implication of clients’ mobility is that some spouses in non-NEG areas want NEGlike services. According to military partners at one site, spouses who move into other local areas 

often talk about the NEG program. Since spouses in non-NEG areas would like similar services 

and supports in their own area, military partners have expressed a desire to have NEG-like 

services expanded to include all military spouses across the country. 
65 

IV. PROGRAM COSTS 

Given the large investment that the DOL has made in funding these military base NEG 

programs, a detailed cost analysis is helpful for understanding program implementation as well 

as for guiding policymakers and practitioners in future planning and development efforts. As 

stated in the study’s key research questions, the analysis below examines the costs of providing 

NEG-funded services, the portion of funds spent on different service components, and how those 

costs vary across sites. Given that the characteristics of clients served through the NEGs differ 

from those typically served under WIA, we also qualitatively explore potential sources of cost 

variation between the two programs. 

Across the three largest NEG sites (Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and San Diego), the 

average cost per client derived through the evaluation ranged from $4,400 to $8,000. ITAs and 

support service reimbursements represented the largest portion of overall costs and explained 

most of the variation across sites. These estimates were made during a steady state of NEG 

operations; thus they vary from sites’ initial budget projections as well as their actual 

expenditures over the course of the grant period. Because the data collection focused on a single 

year of operations, the estimates do not reflect start-up activities, changes in operational 

structure, revisions to training and support service policies, or unexpected interruptions in service 

provision. Hence, the cost analysis does not include a breakdown or examination of all grant 

expenditures to date. 

This chapter begins by describing the methods used to derive the evaluation’s cost 

calculation (Section A). We then present per-client costs for the fiscal year of July 1, 2004, 

through June 30, 2005 (FY0405); examine differences in the cost of serving NEG clients across 

the three largest NEG sites; and discuss how these costs might differ from costs of serving WIA 
66 

clients (Section B). Finally, we account for additional factors that may have influenced the 

overall costs incurred by the NEG sites through the course of their grants (Section C). 

A. METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING PROGRAM COSTS 

The goal of this analysis was to develop an independent estimate of the overall costs of 

serving the typical NEG client. To accomplish this, the evaluation team developed a detailed 

form to capture the breakdown of costs associated with providing the full range of services to 

clients during FY0405. (The form is shown in Appendix A.) Grantees from the three largest 

sites were asked to complete the form during site visits in summer and fall of 2005. WIA 

administrators or one-stop managers typically completed the form.1

The cost form was organized around WIA service categories, including core services, 

intensive services, training services, support services, and administrative costs. Grantee 

administrators were first asked to provide the salary and fringe benefit rates for all staff types 

that worked directly with NEG clients or as part of the administrative functions of the grant. 

These staff could include NEG-dedicated staff as well as one-stop and WIB staff splitting their 

time between the NEG and other programs. Within each service category, staff were asked for 

information about the types of activities conducted with NEG clients. For each activity, the form 

asked for the estimated average activity duration, the amount of staff time required for 

preparation and followup, other direct expenses associated with the activity, the number of 

clients who typically attended each session, and the overall percent of NEG clients who 

 1

In Hampton Roads, only the largest of the three participating WIBs completed the form. Based on discussions 

with the site, we believe these estimated costs are comparable to those incurred by the other two WIBs. One 

exception is that the Crater WIB—the WIB that enrolled the smallest number of NEG clients—was the only one to 

offer support services to its clients. To account for these expenditures, we used estimates based on discussions with 

local staff to derive the average cost per client for support services. 
67 

participated. Based on this information, we used different methods to calculate a cost per client 

for each type of WIA service. 

Core Services. The average cost per client for core services was derived by taking the total 

annual cost of core services—including loaded staff time plus other direct costs—divided by the 

number of clients (both NEG and non-NEG clients) who accessed the center during the year.2

Intensive Services, Training Preparation and Follow-Up Services, and Other Direct 

Costs.

3

 We began by calculating the total cost—including loaded staff time plus other direct 

costs—for a single session of each activity within these categories. Dividing by the number of 

clients who typically attend, we derived the average cost per client who actively participated in 

the activity. Then we multiplied this figure by the overall participation rate among NEG clients 

to develop an average cost for that activity spread across all NEG clients.4 These estimates of 

the cost per client were summed across all activities to derive a total cost per client for that 

service category. 

For example, an interviewing skills workshop was facilitated by career counselors earning 

an average of $35,000 per year with 25-percent fringe benefits (equaling a loaded hourly rate of 

$23.04). Each workshop lasted one hour, required 30 minutes of staff preparation and follow-up 

time, and included $50 in materials and supplies. The resulting calculation estimates an average 

 2

For cost purposes, the definition of “center” is based on the location of NEG service provision at each site. As 

discussed in Chapter II, NEG services were provided through the existing one-stop system in Hampton Roads and 

San Diego and a dedicated one-stop designed for the NEG program in Fort Campbell. 

3

Training preparation and follow-up services include staff time spent helping clients select an appropriate 

occupation and training program as well as time following clients while they were enrolled in training. Other direct 

costs include expenses, such as the salary of an NEG manager, that were incurred by the WIB rather than the onestop and charged directly to the grant. 

4

When participation in specific activities was recorded for NEG clients in the sites’ MIS, we used average 

participation rates across all NEG clients in the cost calculations. When MIS data were not available, site staff were 

asked to estimate participation levels. 
68 

cost of $81.56 [($23.04 * 1.5 hours) + $50] to conduct each workshop. With typical attendance 

of 10 people, the average cost per participating client is $8.16. Knowing that 80 percent of NEG 

clients attend this workshop at some point during their participation in the program, we derive 

the average cost across all NEG clients as $6.52 ($8.16 * 0.8). This estimate was summed with 

other intensive service costs to develop a total cost per client for intensive services. 

ITAs and Support Services. Each site provided data extracts with actual expenditures on 

training and support services for each NEG client.5 Using these data, we calculated the average 

cost per NEG client. These calculations assume a cost of $0 for clients who did not participate in 

or receive the service. Unlike other calculations, these were based on all clients included in the 

data extracts and were not restricted only to those served in FY0405. 

Administrative Services. Administrative functions conducted under the NEGs include 

executive oversight, accounting, data management, and human resources. For each site, we 

received the total administrative expenses billed to the grant for the FY0405. To develop a cost 

per client, we used a three-stage process. First, based on management information systems 

(MIS) participation records, we estimated the number of months that each client was active in the 

project during the cost period and summed across all clients to determine the total number of 

“person-months” of client involvement. Second, dividing the total annual administrative 

expenditures by the total person-months derived the average cost per “participant-month.” 

Third, we calculated a cost per client by multiplying the cost per participant-month with the 

 5

Individual level data on training costs were not available from two of the local WIBs in Hampton Roads. We 

therefore derived an average training cost per client based on the total annual training expenditures divided by the 

number of clients who attended training. Data on support service payments made by the Crater WIB in Hampton 

Roads were also not available, and therefore, we used local staff estimates for the average cost per client who 

received payments. 
69 

average duration of client involvement in the NEG as determined by the dates of enrollment and 

exit.6

Sources of Uncertainty in Per-Client Cost Estimates by Site. Given this overall approach 

to the estimation of costs, several factors could potentially impart uncertainty to the cost per 

client calculations by site. First, selecting FY0405 to represent a relatively steady state of 

operations had implications. As discussed in Chapter II, the population served by the NEG 

shifted in all three sites either just before or early in the fiscal year to include all spouses, 

regardless of whether they were dislocated as a result of a permanent change of station (PCS). 

Given that the spouses who enrolled after the eligibility shift appear to have less attachment to 

the labor force, the cost of serving them could vary from the cost of serving involuntary 

separatees and dislocated worker spouses, the main target populations in earlier years of the 

grant. In addition, the steady-state calculations in FY0405 do not include the start-up expenses 

associated with developing a new program. We discuss these issues in greater detail later in this 

chapter. 

Second, the cost calculations were based on respondent recollections of the average 

resources required to provide a wide range of services. While we believe these estimates are 

reasonable, we acknowledge that there is a margin of error. 

Third, when completing the evaluation’s cost form, local administrators were asked to 

indicate the amount of staff time spent on specific types of activities conducted directly with 

NEG clients. Not all staff responsibilities, however, may have been accounted for in these 

forms. For example, staff are often required to attend general staff meetings to discuss their 

overall caseloads or difficult cases. NEG staff may also spend time assisting in the resource 

 6

We based the average duration of client involvement on those clients in the cost analysis sample who had 

exited from the program. 
70 

room or sharing responsibilities with other programs for general center operations. Taking into 

account the staff time spent on these types of activities, if possible, would increase the per-client 

cost estimates. 

Fourth, we attempted to include some cost-sharing and in-kind resources in the evaluation’s 

cost calculations but were unable to develop a comprehensive estimate of these contributions. 

For example, we included an estimate for the office space rental at Fort Campbell as well as the 

cost of shared staff time required to conduct intensive service workshops. However, other 

donated resources may have been excluded, resulting in a slight understatement of the true cost 

per client. 

Finally, ITA and support service expenditures were derived using data from the sites’ 

management information systems. Except in the case of Fort Campbell, we were not able to 

validate these figures against the sites’ accounting systems. As a result, there could have been 

over- or under-reporting of these costs based on the consistency and accuracy of data entry at the 

local level. 

As a basis for comparison with the evaluation’s cost calculations, we calculated two 

additional measures of the cost per client. First, we divided each site’s overall NEG budget by 

the number of clients it expected to serve, to estimate the expected cost per client. Second, we 

took each site’s total expenditures as reported to the DOL divided by the number of clients 

enrolled to develop an estimate for actual expenditures per client over the life of the grant. 

Qualitative information from site visits was also critical in interpreting our findings, explaining 

differences across the three cost estimates, and understanding the additional costs incurred by the 

sites outside the steady state operations of FY0405. 
71 

B. PER-CLIENT COSTS BY SITE 

Based on the evaluation’s cost calculations, the estimated average cost to serve NEG clients 

was $4,401 in Fort Campbell, $5,001 in Hampton Roads, and $8,002 in San Diego (Table IV.1). 

These costs were driven largely by the cost of ITAs, which accounted for approximately 60 

percent of costs across all sites. Support services also accounted for large portions of costs in 

San Diego and Fort Campbell and were influenced predominantly by local child care 

reimbursement policies. Finally, administrative costs as a percentage of the cost per client 

ranged from 9 percent in Hampton Roads to 12 percent in Fort Campbell. Below, we provide 

additional information about how the evaluation’s cost estimates varied by category across the 

three sites. While there are no comprehensive research studies that provide a cost breakdown of 

providing services under WIA, we also draw some comparisons based on discussions with local 

staff about how NEG costs are expected to differ from the cost of providing services to WIA 

clients. 

Core Services. The small amount of variation across sites in core service costs was likely 

driven by the structure of the one-stop system as well as the proportion of one-stop clients who 

were enrolled in the NEG program. In Hampton Roads and San Diego, NEG clients accessed 

existing core services through the one-stop system. Core services in these centers are typically a 

“quasi-fixed” cost that requires only a small amount of staff time per client and does not shift 

dramatically based on small to moderate changes in the client flow over time. This creates an 

“economy of scale” that likely drives down the cost per client of core services. In both sites, the 

NEG contributed costs proportionate to the number of NEG versus non-NEG clients who used 

the centers. In Hampton Roads, about 10 percent of all clients visiting the centers (or 54 percent 

of registered clients) were ultimately enrolled in the NEG, whereas about 20 percent of all clients 

in San Diego became NEG clients. By contrast, Fort Campbell provided core services 
72 

TABLE IV.1 

AVERAGE COST PER MILITARY NEG CLIENT BY SITE

 Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego 

Dollars ($) 

Percent of 

Total (%) Dollars ($) 

Percent of 

Total (%) Dollars ($) 

Percent of 

Total (%) 

Core Services $62 1.4% $31 0.6% $18 0.2% Intensive Services $212 4.8% $958 19.2% $566 7.1% Training Services 

Training preparation and follow-up services $67 1.5% $231 4.6% $39 0.5% Individual Training Accounts $2,577 58.6% $3,122 62.4% $4,963 62.0% 

Supportive Services $757 17.2% $45 0.9% $1,087 13.6% Other Servicesa $194 4.4% $152 3.0% $486 6.1% 

Administration $531 12.1% $462 9.2% $843 10.5% Total $4,401 $5,001 $8,002 

Source: Evaluation cost forms completed by local administrators during site visits. Note: Estimates are based on fiscal year July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005. 

a Other services or costs include direct program costs incurred by the local WIBs rather than the one-stops. These include staff time for NEG program managers, 

marketing efforts, and other related program costs. 
73 

exclusively to NEG clients in its dedicated one-stop on the Army base. The overall flow of 

clients through this center was smaller than other sites, resulting in a slightly higher cost per 

client. The NEG also paid 100 percent of these core service costs. 

Intensive Services. Two factors appear to have influenced variation in intensive services 

costs across NEG sites. First, the Fort Campbell site was collocated in the family center on the 

base where several military programs provided services that a typical one-stop would offer. 

While all sites attempted to avoid duplication of services with their military partners, this 

collocation in Fort Campbell may have resulted in the NEG program providing fewer intensive 

services, driving down the cost per client. Second, Hampton Roads reported larger amounts of 

staff time spent on one-on-one career counseling and job search assistance than the other sites. 

When comparing WIA and NEG clients, local staff in all three sites felt that intensive 

services for NEG clients were often more expensive. The NEG clients served in FY0405 

included a large proportion of spouses that did not have stable careers or attachment to the labor 

force. Because they had other sources of family income through the salary of their military 

spouse, many of these individuals also did not have the same urgency to move into employment 

as WIA clients. This often resulted in more extended decision-making periods that could have 

added costs for the sites. Clients served in earlier years of the NEG, including involuntary 

separatees and dislocated worker spouses, may have resembled the WIA population to a larger 

extent, leading to more comparable costs. 

Training Services. Training expenditures comprised the single largest budget line item, 

accounting for over 60 percent of the estimated cost per client in all three sites. These expenses 

also explained a large part of the variation across sites: average training costs across all NEG 

clients ranged from about $2,600 in Hampton Roads to about $5,000 in San Diego. The 

composition of the training choices on the state’s ETPL appears to have influenced this variation 
74 

in costs. For example, local community colleges are not included in San Diego’s ETPL, forcing 

clients who participated in training to pay higher tuition and fees at local proprietary schools. 

As Table IV.2 reveals, the cost per service across all NEG clients is based on both the 

percentage of clients who participate in the service and the average cost per participant. The 

proportion of clients attending training did not differ dramatically by site: about 60 percent of 

clients attended training in Hampton Roads and Fort Campbell and 56 percent in San Diego. 

Interestingly, differences in the ITA caps across sites also do not explain variation in 

training costs. The average cost for clients who actively participated in training was $4,239 in 

Fort Campbell, $5,160 in Hampton Roads, and $8,799 in San Diego. As described in Chapter 

III, Fort Campbell maintained a $10,000 cap throughout its entire grant period. However, the 

Southside WIB in Hampton Roads incurred costs comparable to Fort Campbell, with average 

expenditures of $4,591 for its NEG training clients despite not having a cap on training 

expenditures. The Greater Peninsula WIB in Hampton Roads imposed a $12,000 cap on training 

expenditures for up to 18 months but incurred higher costs per training client at an average of 

$6,265. San Diego, on the other hand, averaged the highest cost per training client, even after 

revising its ITA policies in 2003. 

While we do not have data on the actual costs of providing training to WIA clients within 

these three sites, we suspect that NEG training expenditures are higher than those for WIA for 

several reasons. Basic supply and demand principles could be affecting the resources available 

for training under these two programs as well as the proportion of clients who chose to pursue it. 

As discussed in Chapter III, the NEG policies on ITAs were much more generous than those 

offered under WIA. These differences were largely a factor of resource availability, as WIA 

formula funds are very limited. However, the NEG policies also appear to have resulted from 

the efforts of the DOL and the local WIBs to provide flexibility that would help uncover the 
 75 

TABLE IV.2 

COSTS OF TRAINING AND SUPPORT SERVICES BY SITE

 Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego 

Training Services 

 

Percent participating in training 60.8% 60.5% 56.4% 

Average cost per training clienta

 $4,239 $5,160 $8,799 

Average cost across all NEG clients $2,577 $3,122 $4,963 

 

Support Services 

Percent participating in support services 44.0% 3.0% 30.9% 

Average cost per support service client $1,603 $1,500 $1,901 

Average cost across all NEG clients $705 $45 $587 

Sources: Administrative data collected from local management information systems. 

Note: Support services costs in this table reflect actual payments made to clients. By comparison, support 

service costs recorded in Table IV.1 also include staff time dedicated to processing support service 

claims and following up with clients who receive payments. 

a

The average cost per training client in Hampton Roads is a weighted average that assumes two-thirds of training 

clients were served at Southside with average costs of $4,591 and one-third at Greater Peninsula with average costs 

of $6,265. 
76 

unexplored needs of this new population. In the end, these higher caps might have enticed NEG 

clients to pursue more expensive training than would otherwise have been available to them. 

Several other factors could possibly result in higher NEG training costs. As mentioned 

earlier, all military spouses have a stable source of household income through their military 

spouses’ salary and therefore can possibly afford to invest time in training for long-term careers. 

By comparison, WIA clients may have more urgency to enter the workforce quickly and either 

opt to find a job immediately or to attend shorter-term training. In addition, the sites appeared to 

have enforced less stringent criteria for NEG clients to move to training than under WIA formula 

funds where training resources were more limited. Finally, all three sites chose the overall 

strategy of focusing their NEG resources on training to avoid duplicating the employment 

services offered by the military. This could possibly have resulted in some implicit screening of 

candidates referred for NEG services; in other words, individuals that did not need training were 

less likely to become NEG clients. 

Support Services. Support service payments comprised over 17 percent of the cost per 

client in Fort Campbell, 14 percent in San Diego, and only one percent in Hampton Roads.7

 

When examining support service expenditures, child care accounted for the vast majority of 

payments in all three sites. Costs also included payments for transportation, medical expenses, 

clothing, and other items necessary for clients to attend training or obtain work. 

Clearly, a grantee’s choice to offer support services had a direct effect on support service 

costs, and sites varied in whether or not they chose to make support services payments to some 

clients, which might limit the amount of funds available for training to those or other clients. 

 7

Based on discussions with local staff, the MIS data on support service expenditures in San Diego may not be 

complete. Given that the MIS was not used to process payments or report directly to DOL on expenditures, MIS data 

was not reconciled with the local accounting system. As a result, the total support service expenditures per client 

within the evaluation’s cost estimate are likely to underestimate actual expenditures per client in that site. 
77 

Only one of the three WIBs in Hampton Roads offered any support services. Given the small 

volume of NEG clients served by that WIB (Crater), these expenses did not largely affect the 

site’s overall cost per client. Fort Campbell also appears to have provided payments to a larger 

proportion of clients (44 percent) than San Diego (31 percent), driving the site’s overall support 

services costs higher. 

The sites’ payment policies also appear to have influenced costs. San Diego incurred the 

highest support services costs per client who received payments at $1,900 compared to $1,600 in 

Fort Campbell and $1,500 in Crater. That site did not have any caps on support services until 

2003, after which it implemented a cap of $200 per month on all support service assistance 

except for child care. Fort Campbell had a lower cap of $660 per month ($33 per day assuming 

20 days of service) on child care expenses, $9.50 per day for transportation, and limits on other 

expenses such as medical care and auto repair. Neither site imposed an absolute cap on support 

service expenditures over a client’s total participation in the program, although support services 

were limited by the total cap on the ITA for Fort Campbell ITA recipients. The Crater WIB 

provided full reimbursement with no annual cap for child care expenses, based on the lowest of 

three rates quoted by local care providers. They also offered up to $1,000 annually for 

transportation assistance, $1,000 for medical and dental care, $500 for clothing, and $1,500 for 

emergency services. 

Other Direct Costs. Other costs related to the NEG program included direct expenses 

incurred by the local WIBs rather than one-stops. In Hampton Roads, three local WIBs were 

involved in the provision of services. As a result, the NEG funded a full-time project manager to 

coordinate grant efforts. In addition, the site billed part of a salary for a fiscal technician who 

worked directly on the project. In San Diego, other direct costs incurred by the WIB for FY0405 

included staff time for overall grant management and oversight of the three one-stop contracts as 
78 

well as travel, computer, and telephone expenses associated with that staff time. San Diego’s 

costs also included marketing, partial rent payments for two of the one-stop facilities, and a 

$284,000 contract to upgrade a data system that tracks business-client contacts, facilitates 

tracking of business services, records performance measures, and provides management reports. 

Fort Campbell’s other direct costs included the half-time salary of a project manager at 

Workforce Essentials as well as internet, telephone, and newspapers used to serve NEG clients. 

Administration. The percentage of per-client costs associated with administrative functions 

ranged from 9 to 12 percent across all three sites. All sites allocated a portion of their overall 

administrative pool to the NEG based on the percentage of all local clients who were enrolled in 

the NEG program. As a result of this allocation method, local administrative staff did not keep 

precise records on how their time was split across different funding sources. However, based on 

descriptions of local staff, about 80 percent of administrative costs in all sites were attributed to 

grant management and accounting functions. Additional costs included developing partnerships 

with local military leaders, conducting human resource functions, and managing data. 

C. OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING COSTS INCURRED BY NEG SITES 

The cost calculations derived for the evaluation were based on steady-state operations in 

FY0405. Many changes have occurred over the life of the NEG project that could have resulted 

in cost variations from prior years of the grant. As a basis for comparison, Table IV.3 presents 

three different cost-per-client calculations. The first estimate is based on the cost analysis 

described and utilized above. The second estimate divides the overall grant budgets submitted 

by the NEG sites to DOL by the total number of clients each site expected to serve with those 

funds. The third estimate takes the total site expenditures reported to DOL from the start of the 

current grant period—through June 30, 2005, in Fort Campbell; June 30, 2005, in Hampton 

Roads; and November 30, 2005, in San Diego—divided by the number of clients enrolled to that 
 79 

TABLE IV.3 

COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT METHODS FOR CALCULATING 

AVERAGE COST PER PARTICIPANT

 Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego 

 

Average Cost Per Participant Based on 

Evaluation Dataa $4,401 $5,001 $7,874 

 

Average Cost Per Participant Based on Site 

Budgets $5,384 $7,142 $15,623 

Time frame for budget 4/30/03 – 6/30/06 7/01/01 – 12/30/05 7/1/01 – 6/30/07 

Total site budget $3,849,633 $20,000,000 $41,479,836 

Projected number of clients to be served 715 2,800 2,655 

 

Average Cost Per Participant Based on 

Quarterly Financial Reportsb

 $3,980 $7,870 $14,548 

Time frame for expenditures 4/30/03 – 6/30/05 7/01/01 – 6/30/05 7/01/01 – 11/30/05 

Total expenditures $2,742,528 $15,708,189 $38,623,736 

Number of clients enrolled 689 1,996 2,655 

Sources: Data sources include evaluation cost forms completed by site staff during site visits, administrative 

data collected from local management information systems, grant budget documents, and expenditure 

reports submitted to DOL. 

Note: Differences between the three estimates of costs per participant arise because of different assumptions 

underlying each calculation. The text explains in detail some of the potentially numerous reasons why 

per-participant costs calculated through the evaluation data are lower than the per-participant costs 

calculated through the site budgets and site quarterly financial reports. Importantly, the evaluation data 

are based on a one-year period during which sites’ operations were relatively stable compared to the 

earlier portion of the grant period. Start-up expenses, such as the development of a service strategy 

and service procedures, the recruitment of staff, and the remodeling of facilities, generally were 

incurred prior to the one-year period to which evaluation data pertained. Furthermore, many 

expenditures that were necessary as a result of the change in the target group from involuntarily 

separated military personnel to military spouses occurred prior to the period to which evaluation data 

pertained. However, these types of expenses are included in the other calculations of per-participant 

costs. See the text for additional details on both the expenses that are not included in the evaluation 

data and the reasons that the three cost estimates differ. 

a

Estimates are based on fiscal year July 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005. 

b

This average cost per participant based on quarterly financial reports is likely a low estimate of total expenditures 

per client. Not all clients enrolled at the time of the expenditure report had been fully served and exited from the 

program. As a result, additional expenses for a portion of these clients were likely incurred in the subsequent year. 
80 

point in time. Note that this third calculation may be a slight underestimate of the total cost per 

client, as not all enrolled clients had completed services by the end of the expenditure period. As 

a result, the sites may have continued to incur costs in future expenditure periods for some 

clients in this sample. 

Evaluation cost estimates for FY0405 appear to be about 50 to 55 percent lower in San 

Diego and 30 to 35 percent lower in Hampton Roads than cost calculations based on site budgets 

and expenditures. The three estimates for Fort Campbell appear to be more closely aligned. The 

Fort Campbell site had several additional years of operational experience prior to the cost period 

to fine-tune their procedures and appeared to have stable policies and operations in FY0405. In 

addition, the budget and expenditure periods reflected in Table IV.3 only reflect its most recent 

grant award beginning in 2001 and do not include expenditures from the first five years of site 

operations. Expenses incurred in the early years of the project, changes in operations and policy, 

and interruptions in service provision could possibly account for these differences. 

Start-Up Expenses. The evaluation’s cost estimate does not include initial expenses 

incurred at the start of the project. As a result, the evaluation’s cost per client estimates based on 

FY0405 are lower than estimates based on sites’ overall budgets and actual expenditures. In 

general, costs are often weighted more heavily toward the start-up phases of new projects rather 

than during steady-state operations. In organizing a new program, sites needed to develop their 

service strategy and procedures, establish facilities, and hire staff. Before enrolling clients, local 

staff also had to make the community aware of the project, conduct outreach and recruitment, 

and develop linkages with the military. 

During site visits, local staff members described some of the start-up expenses they incurred 

on their NEGs. In Fort Campbell, the initial facilities development at the Army base cost 

approximately $80,000. These expenditures, however, are not reflected in the budget and 
81 

expenditures in Table IV.3 since the Fort Campbell grant began in 1996. San Diego and 

Hampton Roads, however, had start-up expenses that were included in the cost per client 

calculations recorded in the table. As discussed in Chapter II, San Diego spent over $1.7 million 

refurbishing space at the Miramar naval base and Camp Pendleton before renovations were 

halted by DOL in spring 2002.8

 The site also spent a significant amount of funds updating its 

case management system to capture information unique to NEG clients. In Hampton Roads, the 

Greater Peninsula WIB spent a small amount of funds to refurbish space on the military bases 

before DOL stopped renovations. (The space is still being used by the WIB to provide services.) 

The subsequent decision to open a separate one-stop center near Naval Station Norfolk dedicated 

to serving military NEG clients resulted in significant expenditures. Due to these developments, 

the site was not able to enroll any NEG clients during the first six months of the grant. 

Changes in Operational Structure. Both San Diego and Hampton Roads changed their 

overall strategy for serving NEG clients after several years of grant operations, potentially 

resulting in slightly lower costs per client during the steady state than overall. In FY0405, the 

San Diego WIB contracted with its three one-stop operators to serve NEG clients. However, in 

prior years, the WIB hired and oversaw NEG staff directly. Local administrators believe the new 

structure created more efficiencies in service provision but could have added some 

administrative costs when the WIB began oversight of the three NEG subcontracts. In spring 

2004, the Southside location in Hampton Roads also changed its operational structure by closing 

the dedicated NEG one-stop. Instead, NEG staff were integrated into the existing one-stops and 

spent a portion of their time on the military bases. The two other WIBs in Hampton Roads 

adopted this integrated approach from the start of the grant. 

 8

With a few exceptions, regulations for WIA Title I funds must not be spent on construction or purchase of 

facilities or buildings (20 CFR 667.260). 
82 

Changes in the ITA Policy. In San Diego, revisions to the training policy likely reduced 

the cost per client from higher levels in earlier years. San Diego’s placing an ITA cap in 2003 

appears to have decreased its training costs by about $1,000 per client. Fort Campbell and 

Hampton Roads, on the other hand, maintained steady caps on their training policies through the 

cost analysis period. 

Changes in Eligibility and Interruptions in Service. Several local administrators reported 

during site visits that changes in eligibility as well as interruptions in service due to funding 

availability added administrative expenses in earlier years of the project. Additional outreach 

and recruitment efforts were needed to make the community aware of the reinstatement of the 

program and the changes in eligibility. These changes also caused some additional expenses for 

both grant administration and NEG staffing. To account for these shifts, San Diego and 

Hampton Roads chose to use dedicated marketing staff or marketing contractors for several years 

until enrollment became steady. All three sites also reported necessary shifts in hiring when the 

focus changed from involuntary separatees to spouses. However, due to its location on the 

military base, Fort Campbell found that inexpensive advertising mechanisms were effective and 

therefore did not experience as many difficulties due to eligibility shifts. 

Some Leveraged and Donated Resources. The evaluation’s cost estimate included some 

leveraged or in-kind resources, whereas the other calculations based on site budgets and 

expenditures do not. Throughout the life of the grant, the sites were able to leverage some local 

resources to help serve NEG clients. In all three sites, the military donated office space, 

conference rooms, and related expenses for collocated NEG staff. In addition, case managers 

often referred NEG clients for educational services and testing conducted by the military or other 

local agencies. All three sites also participated in some cost sharing with other programs. For 

example, NEG staff at Fort Campbell took turns with military center partners to facilitate 

interviewing skills workshops. In theory, the amount of NEG staff time dedicated to a shared 
83 

activity is roughly proportionate to the percent of participants who are NEG clients. However, 

these cost-sharing agreements can sometimes benefit one program more than another, depending 

on fluctuations in the percentage of participants who come from each program or the intensity of 

the needs of each program’s population. In the case of the NEG program, we do not have a solid 

indication of whether these arrangements appear to benefit the grant or not. In the evaluation’s 

cost per client estimate, we have chosen to include an estimate for the office space rental at Fort 

Campbell as well as the cost of shared staff time required to conduct intensive service 

workshops. 

85 

V. CHARACTERISTICS, SERVICE RECEIPT, AND 

OUTCOMES OF NEG CLIENTS 

In this chapter we look at the characteristics of the individuals who participated in services 

financed through the NEGs to the three major military communities in our study. The goal of the 

chapter is to illustrate who the recipients were, to describe the types of services they received, 

and to look at outcomes they experienced. This information is helpful both for conceptualizing 

the nature of the individuals who participated in NEG-financed services and for assessing 

whether grant funds were well targeted and how well those services helped clients. 

All of the data in this chapter come from individual administrative data collected from the 

three large NEG sites.1

 In principle these data cover all individuals who received any services 

under the grants during a specified time period. For San Diego we include data for all grant 

participants enrolled between 2001 and mid-2005, for Fort Campbell we include only clients 

served2 during 2003-2005, and for Hampton Roads we include only clients with official 

enrollment dates3 during 2004 and 2005. Strictly speaking, these are not sample data but instead 

 1

The design of the evaluation did not include the collection of individual-level administrative data from the 

three medium-sized NEGs (Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, and Pikes Peak). 

2

Many of these clients may have had enrollment dates prior to 2003. 

3

Hampton Roads changed data systems during the grant period. We were unable to obtain useable data from 

the earlier system on clients served prior to April 2004. However, we received an extract of the new system for 

clients served between April 2004 and June 2005. Site staff reported that case workers were asked to enter all 

clients into the system and maintain up-to-date records on their progress through NEG activities. It appears that 

most clients were entered into the system. However, given that the system was relatively new and was not used 

directly for reporting to DOL, site staff believe that many data elements were not entered consistently. In the data 

extract we used for analysis, many of the Hampton Roads clients were shown as having official enrollment dates 

during 2004-2005 but services received prior to these dates. To increase our sample size, we redefined the 

“enrollment” date for Hampton Roads clients as being either the stated enrollment date or the date of first service, 

whichever came first. 
86 

represent the entire population of participants during these time periods.4 It is important, 

however, to keep in mind the varying time periods covered in each site because this can affect 

some of our analytic results. 

Some shortcomings of the sites’ data should be recognized at the outset. Most of these arise 

because the sites used very different approaches to data collection and retention (and some sites 

changed methods during the grant period). In terms of data items, the data from the San Diego 

site were most extensive, especially in the availability of information on clients’ labor market 

histories; Fort Campbell kept the least extensive data, having only a few measures of 

demographics and labor market histories. In Hampton Roads the data were severely limited 

because they did not include records of most of the clients who enrolled during the early part of 

the grant period; furthermore, site staff believe that data items were not consistently recorded for 

many of the clients who had records in the file. In our discussion, we point out important gaps in 

the data when doing so is relevant to our exposition. 

A second important shortcoming of the data is that no site collected information that would 

permit us to unambiguously categorize recipients into the four eligibility groupings: (1) 

involuntarily separated military personnel; (2) military spouses who are dislocated workers or 

displaced homemakers; (3) other military spouses; and (4) Reservists, National Guard members, 

and civilian employees of the DoD. Hence it is often necessary to group these four 

heterogeneous sets of recipients together for analysis and in presenting our results. This may 

obscure some of the more important patterns in the data about target groups. In order to clarify 

such matters we have tried to develop an allocation of the sample into eligibility groupings based 

 4

For this reason, statistical tests on these samples are not strictly correct—any differences detected are indeed 

differences in the population. Occasionally, however, we will report results of statistical significance based on the 

notion that participants are a subsample of the population of potential clients. 
87 

on the data we had and information provided by the sites about changes in their enrollment 

patterns. But our analysis based on these groupings can be considered at best suggestive of 

broad patterns of the target groups and cannot be taken as precise measurements. 

The remainder of this chapter examines characteristics of recipients (Section A), the NEG 

services they received (Section B), and client outcomes (Section C). Our summary and 

interpretations of the findings may be found in Section D. In general we find that individuals 

who participated in NEG-financed services were predominantly females aged 18 to 35. The vast 

majority had at least a high school education and a significant minority (about 40 percent) was 

dislocated from a prior job. Virtually all participants received basic services under the NEGs and 

about 60 percent received some form of training. There is some evidence that this training was 

effective in helping clients get jobs and obtain higher wages. 

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF GRANT CLIENTS 

Across the three sites, the typical NEG client was female, about 30 years old, and a high 

school graduate (Table V.1). The population of military spouse clients was predominantly 

female. Only at Fort Campbell (which started earlier and therefore had a longer time period to 

enroll individuals who were involuntarily separated from the military before this group’s 

eligibility ended) were as many as one-third of the enrolled clients male. In the other two large 

sites more than 85 percent of clients were female (although more males may have been served 

before the period covered by our data, especially at Hampton Roads for which we are missing 

information on the earliest portion of the grant). The age distribution of NEG-served clients was 

broadly similar across the sites, though the Fort Campbell population was slightly younger than 

the populations at the other sites. Overall the mean age of served clients was about 30 years, 

although there were significant numbers of both younger (less than 25) and older (over 35) 

clients. The racial composition of the populations served varied importantly across the sites, 
 88 

TABLE V.1 

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RECIPIENTS OF SERVICES UNDER NEGs TO 

MILITARY COMMUNITIES 

(Percentages Unless Stated Otherwise)

Characteristic Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego All Sites 

Percent Female 66.4 93.4 85.7 84.4 

 

Age (years) 

 18-25 41.6 30.2 34.8 34.7 

26-35 45.7 42.3 42.0 42.7 

35+ 12.7 27.3 23.2 22.6 

Mean Age 28.1 30.5 30.1 29.8 

Racial Composition 

White 61.4 38.2 38.4 42.4 

African American 24.1 45.0 20.0 27.6 

Hispanic 11.3 7.9 19.9 15.1 

Other 3.2 8.9 21.7 14.9 

Education 

Not high school graduate 0.1 1.0 3.9 2.4 

High school graduate 70.9 57.4 48.2 54.6 

Some college 20.7 30.5 33.8 30.7 

College graduate 8.3 11.1 14.1 12.3 

Have Children 49.0 NA 63.4 NA 

Number in Sample 844 1,346 2,656 4,846 

Source: Individual-level data on clients provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: Data refer to differing time periods for different sites (see text). 

NA = not available. 
89 

with whites being the most predominant group in Fort Campbell, African Americans being most 

predominant in Hampton Roads, and Hispanics and other races or ethnicities (primarily Asians) 

being most prevalent in San Diego. 

In general the population of recipients of NEG-financed services had fairly high levels of 

formal schooling. More than 97 percent of the sample graduated from high school and about 43 

percent had at least some college. It therefore appears that the needs of this group were primarily 

for occupational training rather than for basic skills instruction. 

The administrative data we were provided had little information from any of the three sites 

on the family situations of NEG clients. Only Fort Campbell and San Diego provided 

information on the presence of children in clients’ households. About half of Fort Campbell 

clients and three-fifths of San Diego clients reported having children. Consistent with the 

relatively younger ages in Fort Campbell, fewer of the clients there reported having children than 

did clients in San Diego. 

All sites were able to provide at least some information on the labor market histories of their 

clients, though only in San Diego were these data fairly extensive (Table V.2). The data show 

that about three-quarters of NEG clients reported having some prior employment. The fact that 

this figure is much higher for San Diego (93 percent) than for the other sites suggests, however, 

that the lower rates of previous employment in the other sites may more likely reflect a failure to 

collect the data than an actual difference. Prior wage rates for those with reported employment 

were relatively low, averaging about $11 per hour in all of the sites. A few clients in each site 

reported having relatively high wages; approximately 15 percent had wages in excess of $15 per 

hour (not shown). 

All of the sites provided us with data on whether a NEG client was dislocated from his or 

her prior job. Overall about 43 percent of all clients reported that they were dislocated, though 
90 

TABLE V.2 

LABOR MARKET HISTORY FOR RECIPIENTS OF NEG-FINANCED SERVICES 

Variable Fort Campbell 

Hampton 

Roads San Diego All Sites 

Had Prior Recorded Employment 

(%) 41.0 64.6 93.2 76.1 

Mean Recorded Wage ($/hour) $10.90 $11.64 $11.34 $11.33 

Dislocated from Prior Job (%) 39.0 60.8 35.2 42.9 

Employed at Enrollment (%) NA 15.3 17.8 17.0 

Total Preprogram Employment: 

< 1 year NA NA 13.8 NA 

1-5 years 56.9 NA 

5+ years 29.3 NA 

Months Not Employed Prior to 

Enrollment: 

0 months/missing NA NA 36.9 NA 

< 6 months NA NA 30.6 NA 

6-12 months NA NA 11.0 NA 

12-24 months NA NA 10.1 NA 

24+ months NA NA 11.4 NA 

Number in Sample 844 1,346 2,656 4,846 

Source: Individual-level data on clients provided by military base NEG grantees. 

NA = not available. 
91 

the proportion of workers who were dislocated was much higher in Hampton Roads than in the 

other sites. One possible source for this difference is that Hampton Roads began enrolling nondislocated worker spouses about one year after the Fort Campbell and San Diego sites did, hence 

we would expect a larger portion of their client population to be dislocated. Furthermore, the 

Fort Campbell data contain a large portion of involuntarily separated military personnel who 

may not be treated in the data as dislocated. It is also possible, however, that the data represent 

some other consequence of the way in which the sites collected this type of information from 

clients. 

Data from Hampton Roads and San Diego suggest that about 17 percent of NEG clients 

were employed when they entered the program. Other calculations (not shown) suggest that 

many of these individuals had jobs with relatively low wages or were working only part time. 

They presumably entered the program in the hope of bettering their circumstances. 

Information on clients’ histories of labor market involvement was much more extensive in 

San Diego than in the other sites. Because these data may shed some light on the clients’ 

situations generally, we report a few representative measures in Table V.2. The data show that 

86 percent of clients had more than one year of job experience before entering NEG-financed 

services. Hence, many NEG clients were relatively experienced workers. Of course, in sites 

with a younger client base (notably Fort Campbell), the proportion of clients who had little labor 

market experience may have been more significant. 

Many San Diego clients did have significant gaps between their most recent employment 

and entry into NEG-financed services. Nearly one-third of the San Diego clients had a gap of 

more than six months.5

 It seems likely that mobility associated with changing military postings 

 5

This figure probably understates the true proportion with a significant gap because individuals with missing 

data were included in the table with a figure of zero weeks. 
92 

was largely responsible for such gaps in these individuals’ employment histories. Child care 

responsibilities may also have played a role in creating gaps in employment. 

As described in previous chapters, the NEGs to military communities served a changing set 

of target populations. Knowing which target group each client belonged to would significantly 

enhance our understanding of the nature of the NEG client base and how well NEG-financed 

services met their needs. Unfortunately, none of the sites could provide us with individual-level 

data on target group membership. Hence, we constructed hypothetical target group 

classifications on the basis of the specific dates at which clients entered the program and 

whatever other data were available (primarily data on a worker’s dislocation status). Our 

assignments to the target groups based on this strategy are shown in Table V.3. Because of 

potential inaccuracies in the grouping algorithms we used, these data should be taken as being, at 

best, suggestive. 

Only Fort Campbell had large numbers of involuntary separations in our sample.6 For both 

Hampton Roads and San Diego, we estimate that at least 85 percent of all clients were spouses. 

Although Hampton Roads did serve involuntarily separated personnel in the early years of its 

grant, data on these clients were generally not available to us. They were included in the San 

Diego data, however. A second major difference between Hampton Roads and San Diego is in 

the categorization of the spouse caseload into its “dislocated worker” and “other” components. 

Whereas more than 60 percent of all spouses were identified as dislocated workers in Hampton 

Roads, the percentage is only about 25 percent in San Diego. Again, whether this stems from the 

 6

Data do not allow us to distinguish the branch of the military to which military personnel belonged. Attempts 

to identify this information based on the military facilities that are located at each site did not seem likely to be 

fruitful, given the challenges in distinguishing between the NEG target groups. 
 93

TABLE V.3 

TARGET GROUPS FOR NEG-FINANCED SERVICES 

(Percentage Estimated to be in Each Group)

Target Group Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego Total Sample 

Involuntary Separations 55.7 0.1 15.3 18.2 

Dislocated Worker Spouses 39.0 60.7 24.7 37.1 

Other Spouses 5.3 39.0 58.5 43.8 

Other (Reservists, National 

Guard, Civilian) 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.9 

Number in Sample 844 1,335 2,655 4,834 

Source: Individual-level data on clients provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: Data refer to differing time periods for different sites (see text). 
94 

different initial enrollment dates for non-dislocated worker spouses in the two sites or from some 

possible differences in data collection methods is difficult to determine from the available data. 

In general, we believe the data shown in Table V.3 are not very precise. We simply did not 

have enough information to establish target group membership with a high degree of certainty. 

Hence, we do not use these groupings extensively in most of our subsequent analyses. However, 

we did perform disaggregated analyses by these target groups for many of the topics we will be 

considering and we describe results of these briefly when they seem to offer special insights. 

B. PARTICIPATION IN NEG-FINANCED ACTIVITIES 

Administrative data from the sites provided insights about the services each client received 

within the four principal service categories (core, intensive, training, and support). Table V.4 

offers an overall summary of these data. In our site visits we found that receipt of core services 

was nearly universal and the data from Hampton Roads and San Diego show that. Perhaps 

surprisingly, however, the data from Fort Campbell suggest that fewer than 60 percent of all 

clients received core services. A possible explanation is that Fort Campbell did not record core 

services that were self-accessed by clients, whereas the other sites did. Another possibility is 

that core services that were used by Fort Campbell clients several years ago may not have been 

recorded at all in the data we have. Hence, the shortfall in core service receipt recorded for Fort 

Campbell in Table V.4 is probably a data anomaly and we doubt that it accurately reflects 

activities in that site. 

Hampton Roads and San Diego also recorded very high proportions of clients as having 

received intensive services—mainly individual counseling. Again, the shortfall in Fort Campbell 

may be a reporting phenomenon. Because individual counseling usually precedes entry into 

training, the fact that seemingly fewer Fort Campbell clients received intensive services than 
95 

TABLE V.4 

PARTICIPATION IN NEG-FINANCED ACTIVITIES 

(Percent Participating in Each Activity Unless Stated Otherwise) 

Activity Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego All Sites 

Any Core Activity 58.9 99.9 99.9 92.7 

Intensive Activity 55.3 94.4 98.8 90.0 

Support Service 44.0a NA 30.9 NA 

Training Activity 60.1 60.5 56.4 58.2 

Number in Sample 844 1,302 2,655 4,801 

Source: Individual-level data on clients provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The Hampton Roads data on activities were in a different data file from the data on clients. 

Forty-four Hampton Roads clients were not included in the activities file. If one were to 

assume that all 44 clients received no services, then the percentages for participating in 

activities would be 96.6 percent for core activities; 91.3 percent for intensive activities, and 

58.5 percent for training activities. 

a

It is possible that this estimate slightly underreports the percentage of Fort Campbell clients who 

received support services because of an ambiguity in the recording of support service participation for 

clients who enrolled in the program prior to July 2003. 

NA = not available. 
96 

received training provides further evidence that intensive service receipt was probably underreported there. 

Roughly 60 percent of clients received ITA grants in each of the sites. Hence, receipt of an 

ITA is an important reason for differential levels of service receipt in the NEG population.7 

Analysis of the determinants of receipt of training (reported in detail in Appendix B) showed 

that (after controlling for differences in client characteristics) individuals in Fort Campbell and 

Hampton Roads were somewhat more likely to obtain training than were otherwise similar 

workers in San Diego. With other factors held constant, women were more likely to undertake 

training than men. Older clients were less likely to participate in training than were younger 

ones. As was expected, it also appeared that workers with greater skills (as shown by higher 

levels of education or more significant prior employment) were less likely to undertake training 

than were workers with fewer skills. Among eligibility groups, both dislocated and nondislocated worker spouses were more likely to obtain training than were individuals in other 

groups (involuntarily separated personnel and reservists). 

Among those individuals who received NEG-financed training there were also significant 

variations in the size of their training grants. Unfortunately, relatively complete data on ITA 

amounts were only available for the San Diego site, so we will focus our discussion of training 

costs on that site alone. The median ITA amount in San Diego was about $8,000. About 20 

percent of grants exceeded $10,000 and about one-fourth of those were over $19,000 (these 

grants were allocated before San Diego implemented caps on grant amounts—see Chapter III). 

A separate analysis of the determinants of grant amounts found that among individuals receiving 

 7

Our data also show that individuals in San Diego received many more specific core and intensive services that 

did clients in other sites. This result more likely reflects differential reporting methods than actual differences in 

service levels, however. 
97 

training grants in San Diego there were some modest differences in who got the larger grants. 

Specifically, involuntarily separated military personnel were the most likely group of clients to 

get large grants (over $8,000) whereas non-dislocated worker spouses were least likely to get 

these larger grants. This result may in part be explained by the institution of caps on training 

grants relatively soon after the non-dislocated worker spouses became eligible for services. No 

other characteristics were significantly correlated with the receipt of large grants. Most notably, 

there was no correlation between clients’ education levels and their likelihood of getting large 

grants. 

Data show that almost half of Fort Campbell clients and almost one-third of San Diego 

clients received at least one type of support service. Frequently used support services include 

payments for child care and transportation assistance; other types of common support services 

include payments for uniforms for work, medical expenses, and other items necessary for clients 

to attend training or obtain work, such as tools (not shown).8

C. CLIENT OUTCOMES 

Historically two outcome measures have been used throughout the WIA program: 

(1) entered employment rates and (2) entered employment wage rates.9 In this section we focus 

on these two measures for recipients of NEG-financed services. Table V.5 shows the basic data 

 8

Chapter IV provides additional information on the cost of support services. The frequency of use of different 

types of support services does not inherently correspond with the most expensive types of support services; 

however, recurring expenses, such as child care and transportation, were both expensive per client and frequently 

used. 

9

NEGs were not subject to the same common measures reporting requirements as have been used for WIA 

until 2004. 
98 

TABLE V.5 

OUTCOMES FOR NEG CLIENTS 

Outcome Measure Fort Campbell Hampton Roads San Diego All Sites 

Exit Rate (Percent) 52.4 25.6 72.0 53.6 

Entered Employment (Percent of 

Exits) 88.5 43.6 86.8 76.4 

Entered Employment (Percent of All 

Clients) 47.6 12.9 52.7 40.9 

Mean Entered Employment Wage 

($/hour) 11.90 12.04 13.40 12.96 

Entered Employment Wage > 

$15/hour (Percent) 16.9 16.0 24.1 21.6 

Received Certification (Percent) NA 8.8 25.3 NA 

Number in Sample 844 1,346 2,657 4,847 

Source: Individual-level data on clients provided by military base NEG grantees. 

NA = not available. 
99 

that were provided to us.10 Because entered employment rates have usually been calculated only 

for individuals exiting WIA services, we also show exit rates for individuals in each of our three 

sites.11 These rates varied widely—in San Diego more than 70 percent of NEG clients had 

exited the program by the time our data were collected whereas in Hampton Roads the data show 

that only about 26 percent had done so. Administrators in Hampton Roads believe that these 

outcome data are incomplete, primarily because their data system was in its infancy and still 

being debugged at the time they provided the extract to us.12 Because we wished to include data 

from Hampton Roads in our analysis, however, we generally analyzed all the information we 

had. 

Focusing only on clients who were determined to have exited from the program yields 

relatively high (above 85 percent) entered employment rates in both Fort Campbell and San 

Diego.13 Even taking account of the low reported exit rate in the Hampton Roads data provided 

to us, the entered employment rate among exiters was significantly lower than in the other sites. 

Some analysts of the WIA program have argued that reporting entered employment rates 

only on the basis of program exits may serve to inflate these numbers because administrators 

can, to some extent, control the statistic by the way that staff record program exits. Indeed, some 

 10Table V.5 also shows rates at which NEG participants obtained certification for such occupations as teaching, 

nursing, or social work in Hampton Roads and San Diego. We did not analyze this outcome specifically, however. 

11The labor markets in our three sites were roughly similar over the period covered by our data. All had 

experienced a large increase in unemployment rates between 2001 and 2002 with rates falling after that. In 2004 

unemployment rates were 5.3 percent in the Clarksville Metropolitan Area (Fort Campbell), 4.1 percent in Hampton 

Roads, and 4.7 percent in San Diego. 

12More recent data for the end of May 2006 have been reported by Hampton Road grantee staff to DOL. These 

data indicate that the number of clients enrolled was 2,038 and the exit rate was 62 percent. The entered 

employment rate among exiters was reported as 58 percent. The entered employment rate among all participants 

was reported as 36 percent. 

13WIA procedures indicate that clients should be exited from the program after they have not received services 

for 90 days. 
100 

staff told us that, due to performance pressures, some sites attempted to delay exiting some 

clients who were no longer interested in services or who chose not to seek employment. (They 

accomplished this by offering periodic counseling or job search assistance by telephone or email 

to maintain active engagement with these clients.) As a result, overall exit rates among the full 

NEG population are relatively low. For this reason we have also calculated entered employment 

rates on the basis of the entire NEG population in each site. By this measure, entered 

employment rates varied even more widely across the sites, from a high of 53 percent in San 

Diego to a low (and probably inaccurate) rate of 13 percent in the data we had from Hampton 

Roads. The apparently rather high entered employment rate for Fort Campbell was reduced 

substantially (to 48 percent) once its relatively low program exit rate was taken into account. 

Entered employment wage rates were relatively high in all of the sites, averaging nearly 15 

percent higher than the mean wage from prior employment reported in Table V.2. Of course, 

this higher wage in large part reflects compositional effects—NEG clients who had higher wages 

prior to participating in the program were more likely to find subsequent employment than were 

those with lower wages. Still, a detailed look at changes in hourly wages for individual clients 

showed that about two-thirds of them experienced wage increases over the period (not shown). 

The median wage increase was about $1.50 per hour. In many cases, of course, we did not have 

data on clients’ prior wages either because they had no prior employment or because their prior 

wages were not recorded. Hence the increases found here may not be representative of the 

experiences of all clients. 

In order to understand better the determinants of successful outcomes for NEG clients we 

used a variety of regression-based techniques to explain entered employment rates and 

subsequent wage patterns. Details of these regressions are provided in Appendix B.1. Here we 
101 

briefly highlight some of the key findings. With regard to the probability of entering 

employment, we found the following results: 

• Controlling for factors related to clients’ demographic characteristics and the time 

period during which clients enrolled, clients who exited from the program in Fort 

Campbell were significantly more likely to enter employment and those who exited in 

Hampton Roads were significantly less likely to enter employment than were clients 

from San Diego. 

• Most demographic variables, such as gender, age, or education, had little effect on the 

likelihood of entering employment for those who exited the program. The timing of 

clients’ entry into NEG-financed services also had very little effect on clients’ 

outcomes. 

• Among all NEG clients, the probability of entering employment was highest in San 

Diego, followed by Fort Campbell and Hampton Roads, even after controlling for 

possible differences in the composition of the client caseload in the sites. 

• Among all NEG clients, non-dislocated worker spouses were the least likely 

eligibility group to enter employment. (This result was also true among only those 

participants who had exited from the program.) 

For those who entered employment, regressions performed on the wages they earned 

showed the following: 

• Greater levels of education and higher pre-program wages were significantly 

associated with higher post-program wages. Older workers also tended to earn higher 

post-program wages. 

• Holding other factors constant, women had significantly lower post-program wages 

than did men. For non-dislocated worker spouses this wage shortfall was even larger. 

• Post-program wage rates tended to be significantly lower in Fort Campbell than in the 

other two sites, perhaps because the cost of living is lower in this site. 

Although the varying implementations of the NEGs to military communities did not allow 

for a precise experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of NEG-financed services, we did 

attempt to estimate outcome differences among NEG clients on the basis of whether or not they 

received training. We recognized at the outset, of course, that such results should be viewed 
102 

with caution because the group of NEG clients entering training is a selected sub-sample of all 

NEG participants.14 At a minimum this required that special statistical procedures be used to 

estimate the impact of training. 

We employed two such special statistical procedures. The first attempted to model the 

training decision and the entered employment outcome together, using the so-called “Heckman” 

treatment effect estimator (see, for example, Greene 2003). These results are not reported here.15 

Our second approach to evaluating training results used a matching procedure to match each 

NEG participant who received training to a similar composite comparison case that did not. This 

process (the details of which are described in Appendix B) suggested that participation in 

training increased entered employment rates among all participants by a statistically significant 

7.7 percentage points. For exiters the increase was even larger—over 15 percentage points. The 

matching estimators also found that hourly wage rates were about $1.21 per hour higher for NEG 

participants who had training than for participants who did not. Hence, there was some evidence 

that training was relatively beneficial for those NEG participants who received it, though we 

must again offer a caution against using these kinds of non-experimental estimators to infer 

causal relationships. 

 14Ideally, one might want to estimate the benefits of training through an experimental design in which 

comparisons are made between clients who were randomly assigned either to a group that could participate in 

training or to a group that was not allowed to do so. That approach was not feasible for this study. Other types of 

approaches for estimating the effects of training, such as comparing NEG clients who may be more likely to 

participate in training to WIA clients who may be less likely to do so, suffer from limitations because the 

backgrounds and future job prospects of the two groups differ in ways that would be difficult to take into account in 

an analysis. For example, we suspect that NEG clients are much more likely to relocate from the NEG area, 

possibly even to an overseas military location, so the future earnings patterns of the two groups are likely to be 

different even in the absence of training services. 

15These procedures yielded very unstable estimates of the effect of training, in part because we had no good 

“instrumental variable” which predicted receipt of training, but which did not predict employment outcomes. 
103 

The analysis of the impact of training was carried a bit further in San Diego, a site for which 

we had relatively comprehensive data on ITA amounts. In that analysis we focused only on 

individuals who undertook training and asked whether those who had ITA amounts greater than 

$8,000 had more favorable outcomes than did those with smaller grants. Results of this analysis 

(which appear in Appendix B) failed to find any significant improvement in outcomes for those 

with higher grant amounts. Again, however, these results must be treated with caution both 

because they are not derived from a formal experimental methodology and because we could not 

control adequately for the time spent in training by clients with different grant amounts. 

D. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS 

We used MIS data extracted by Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and San Diego for our 

analysis of the characteristics, service receipt, and outcomes of military base NEG clients. 

However, those extracts suffered from important gaps that limited our ability to have confidence 

in some of the estimates. Some of the major data problems we encountered were: 

• We did not have any data that indicated to which target group a client pertained; no 

site collected information that would allow us to unambiguously categorize clients 

into target groups. Although we constructed hypothetical target group classifications 

based on data that were available to us, this approach led to considerable uncertainty 

about the accuracy of the classifications for some clients. 

• The data files provided to us contained considerable amounts of missing and 

inaccurate data. This problem was most severe for the Hampton Roads data but 

existed, to some extent, with the other sites’ data as well. The Hampton Roads 

extract did not generally contain information on clients who enrolled in the early 

years of the program. Furthermore, the program manager told us that front-line staff 

were not diligent in recording information (especially outcomes) into the MIS from 

which the data extract was made. 

• Much of the data we received on service receipt were incomplete. That was 

especially the case for data on support services received by individual clients. 
104 

Despite these short comings, the administrative data did provide us with a general picture of 

clients served under the military base NEGs. As expected, we found that the NEGs provided 

services primarily to military spouses, at least during the period covered by our data. As might 

have been expected, this recipient group was predominantly female and relatively young. On 

average recipients had relatively high amounts of formal schooling—the vast majority were high 

school graduates and a significant minority had at least some college. A fairly large number of 

these individuals reported having been displaced from a previous job, possibly because of 

relocations demanded by their spouses’ military postings. But many spouses were not dislocated 

workers and, although data on their work histories are rather incomplete, it appears that many 

had only sporadic prior employment. Overall, then, the service needs of this group were rather 

heterogeneous, ranging from needing limited help with finding a job through needing 

comprehensive occupational training. 

Overall, about 40 percent of the individuals in our sample were recorded as having entered 

employment. These entered employment rates varied considerably across sites: at 13 percent for 

Hampton Roads, 48 percent for Fort Campbell, and 53 percent for San Diego. Each site’s 

entered employment rate was much higher if calculated on the basis of program “exiters” only: 

the rates were over 85 percent in Fort Campbell and San Diego, but only about half this (44 

percent) at Hampton Roads. In our detailed analysis of entered employment rates we generally 

tried to control for the date at which an individual enrolled for services under the NEGs so that 

the results would not be biased by the experiences of clients who received services relatively 

recently. But we did not focus exclusively only on those who formally exited from the program, 

in part because recording of exits was in some cases rather haphazard and because some staff 

told us that they intentionally delayed exiting clients with negative outcomes. Of course, looking 

at entered employment rates among all clients may significantly understate ultimate program 
105 

performance, so this summary measure must be used cautiously. (WIA performance measures 

focus only on clients exiting the program.) In general our results show that, relative to other 

target groups eligible for benefits under the NEGs, non-dislocated worker spouses had 

significantly lower entered employment rates when measured both among exiters only and 

among all clients. These clients also earned slightly lower wages on the jobs they got than did 

other target group members. Such results should be interpreted cautiously, however, both 

because of problems in accurately identifying target group membership and because nondislocated worker spouses generally entered the programs at later dates than did other client 

groups. 

Whether or not an individual received training was the most important factor in determining 

differences in the levels of services received by NEG clients. Overall about 60 percent of clients 

received some form of training. Although women and younger individuals were more likely to 

obtain training, there was little difference in the likelihood of receipt of training between 

dislocated worker spouses and other spouses. Of course, it is likely that these two target groups 

may have received different types of training (and our qualitative data suggested that was the 

case), but the data we had did not permit a detailed categorization of the specific training 

programs entered. Data from San Diego did suggest that within the group of spouses who 

received training there were large differences in overall costs. In general it seems that the most 

expensive training was undertaken by clients involuntarily separated from the military and the 

least expensive by non-dislocated worker spouses, but these apparent differences in the 

likelihood of getting larger ITAs were not statistically significant. 

Although our examination of recipients of NEG-financed services was not designed to 

assess the effectiveness of the training received, we did use a variety of methods to explore 

whether this training appeared to pay off. The results from our attempts to use formal matching 
106 

procedures to compare training participants to non-participants were the most consistent. These 

showed that training recipients were more likely to enter employment than were similar nonrecipients and that those with training did tend to earn higher wages. Our examination of the San 

Diego data, however, did not show increased effects for larger training grants. Hence, caps on 

training amounts, as were instituted by San Diego (described in more detail in Chapter III), may 

be warranted as a way of making the available funds go further, so that more clients who qualify 

for training and for whom staff think training is appropriate can participate in it. Of course, the 

groups of clients that participate in training or that participate in especially expensive training are 

not necessarily similar to those who do not participate in training, so the results form the type of 

non-experimental estimation that we used should be interpreted cautiously. 
107 

VI. LESSONS FROM THE NEGS FOR PROVIDING WORKFORCE 

SERVICES TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES 

In this chapter, we tie together key findings from earlier chapters to describe three types of 

lessons from our evaluation. First, in Section A, we discuss how our findings help to illustrate 

the problems of providing workforce services to military communities, which have distinctive 

features compared to civilian ones. These distinctive features, such as the military’s ability to 

restrict client access, tight-knit communities, and mobile populations, affected how the NEG 

grantees could collaborate with the military and serve military personnel and spouses. 

Second, in Section B, we discuss lessons specifically about operational issues and the 

structuring of the military base NEGs. We explain how combining broad eligibility criteria with 

screening procedures to ensure that military spouses want to work appears to be a successful 

approach for using grant resources efficiently. We also describe how integrating NEG services 

with WIA services is an effective and efficient way to provide services and how training and 

support services were large components of the services provided to military spouses. We then 

describe lessons arising from inefficiencies that arose with these grants. Finally, we explain why 

some of the successes of the Fort Campbell military base NEG experience may not easily be 

duplicated in other locations. 

Section C is devoted to lessons related to designing and conducting analyses for future 

evaluations of emergency grants. These lessons include the need to ensure that there is a strong 

link between the goals for the NEGs and the evaluation design and the need to strengthen data 

collection expectations at the beginning of the grant. This latter need is especially important for 

avoiding limitations that we encountered due to the poor quality of the management information 

systems (MIS) data that we used for analysis. 
108 

A. LESSONS AFFECTING SERVICES TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES 

The distinctive focus of the NEGs on military communities led to two important lessons 

about the provision of workforce investment services to these communities: (1) coordination 

with military partners poses special challenges and opportunities for grantees and (2) services to 

military communities must take into account the mobility issues that pervade the clients’ lives. 

1. Coordinating with Partners and Operating in a Military Community Poses Special 

Challenges and Opportunities for Grantees 

Workforce development agencies, such as workforce investment boards (WIBs) or onestops, that want to successfully collaborate with other agencies must be flexible and sensitive to 

the distinct priorities, constraints, and strengths that the other organizations bring to the table. 

These grantees’ experiences show that this is especially the case when collaboration is with the 

military. The grantees needed to be attuned to several unique issues that arose with having the 

military as a key partner. These issues include the need to recognize that (1) military policies, 

and changes to them, will trump the priorities and concerns of workforce development agencies; 

(2) military communities are likely to have services similar to WIA core and intensive services, 

so a synergy can be developed between DOL-funded services and other services in the 

community; and (3) the tight-knit nature of military communities means that service providers 

need to have consistent policies for similar clients, even if the services for those clients are 

funded through different mechanisms. 

One unique aspect of partnering with the military is that the military regulates access to 

potential clients. In one way, the sites’ dependence on the military’s policies and procedures is 

not qualitatively different from what occurs with civilian-sector employers, since civilian-sector 

employers control whether, and how many, workers are laid off. However, the sheer size of the 

military presence in military communities heightens the sites’ dependence on the military’s 
109 

employment policies. Having the military as an employer can, in many cases, affect a worker 24 

hours per day, 7 days per week. The military determines workers’ schedules, including whether 

or not they will keep a routine schedule while on base; whether and when a worker will be 

deployed; and how much advance notice is given to personnel who will be separated from 

employment. And, the military also frequently relocates its employees and their families through 

permanent changes of station (PCSs). Thus, much more so than many other organizations or 

employers with which a workforce development agency may collaborate, the military controls 

the ability of potential clients to enroll in NEG services and to continue receiving services. This 

is especially the case if NEG grantees want to provide services on military bases, since access to 

military bases is restricted. 

Sites that had been serving involuntarily separated military personnel found that their flow 

of clients into the program stopped after the September 11, 2001, hijackings and the start of the 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the large sites (Fort Campbell, Hampton Roads, and 

San Diego) had to identify, in conjunction with DOL, other clients for their very large grants. 

The solution arose in recognition of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) revised goal—not to 

release military personnel from service but to retain them. Providing NEG services to the 

spouses of the military personnel was expected to help DoD to achieve this goal. 

Military policies and procedures also affect other aspects of collaborative efforts. We 

frequently heard of the importance of employing NEG staff who could “talk the military 

language” and understand the “military mentality.” These skills include understanding military 

protocols, requirements, and constraints, as well as the ability to understand and interpret 

military policies and paperwork. Having senior administrative staff with military experience was 

especially important since collaboration between the military and the NEG grantee needed to be 

negotiated at a high level of authority. Sites also found it useful for front-line staff who worked 
110 

directly with involuntarily separated military personnel to have a military background as well as 

workforce development or case management experience. However, after the primary target 

group shifted to military spouses, grant administrators recognized that the interpersonal skills of 

front-line staff who worked well with involuntarily separated military personnel were less 

successful with military spouses. It became less important for new front-line staff who were 

hired to have the “military mentality” and more important for them to be able to encourage and 

support clients who were sometimes described as timid or in need of extra hand-holding 

compared to a typical WIA client. In some instances, sites hired front-line staff who were 

themselves military spouses. 

The military’s very stringent security concerns also have a strong influence on collaborative 

efforts. Because of the concentration of prospective clients on base and because of the potential 

to leverage the military’s workforce development services provided to military employees and 

their families, several NEG sites wanted to use facilities on bases as their primary location for 

service delivery. However, with the exception of Fort Campbell, no site was able to do so in the 

end. Two sites initially received permission to renovate facilities on base, but for several reasons 

they encountered difficulties in doing so. Some site staff who did not have military affiliations 

also had difficulty obtaining access to the bases. Eventually, some sites were able to negotiate 

access to the bases for only some of their employees on a part-time or out-stationed basis.1

Collaboration with the military also is distinctive is because the military community 

operates as a “community within a community,” with its own services, its own social networks, 

and its culturally distinct policies and procedures. Military families often live on base, although 

 1

Although we cannot tell for sure why Fort Campbell was successful in locating NEG services on base while 

other sites were not, one possible explanation is that Fort Campbell is the only site to have completed the set-up of 

its NEG program prior to September 11, 2001, after which the military operated on heightened security procedures. 
111 

the prevalence of this varies across military branches and bases. To ease the burdens imposed on 

military personnel and their families, the military offers to them a wide array of services and 

activities. Some of these services are very similar to WIA core and intensive services. Sites 

learned early on that they needed to ensure that the NEG services were complementing, rather 

than duplicating, services provided by the military and its support organizations. In all sites, 

funding for training was identified as the special advantage that NEGs could offer. As one 

interviewee explained, traditional military services could help clients find jobs, but the NEGs 

could help them find careers. 

As a result of the distinct pressures placed on military families and the military sense of 

community, military spouses who are far from their extended families and friends tend to form 

strong informal networks. This tight-knit nature of military communities posed both challenges 

and opportunities for grantees. Problems arose when the sites treated people differently. After 

military spouses became the primary NEG client group, some sites encountered problems 

because military spouses could not understand why some of them were eligible for services and 

others were not. The distinction between spouses who were dislocated workers or displaced 

homemakers and those who were not was difficult for the community to understand. 

Furthermore, an initial disparity at one site between the NEG caps at different WIBs caused 

dissension among training participants who may have been in the same classrooms with each 

other but who had received different training benefit amounts. However, sites also found that the 

tight-knit nature of military spouses worked to their advantage. After sites had been serving 

military spouses for a while, and especially at sites where eligibility was expanded to include all 

military spouses, word of mouth advertising of the program among military spouses was so 

strong that sites did not need to invest a lot of their own resources into advertising. 
112 

2. Services to Military Communities Must Take into Account the Mobility Issues that 

Pervade the Clients’ Lives 

Both primary NEG target populations—involuntarily separated military personnel initially 

and, later, military spouses—are highly mobile, a pattern that NEG staff had to contend with 

when designing their recruitment and service strategies. All three large NEGs were designed 

originally to assist involuntarily separated military personnel to obtain civilian-sector job skills 

or credentials. These workers have the potential to be very desirable civilian-sector employees, 

but high proportions of them leave the area upon the completion of their military service. 

Grantees wanted to use the NEGs to help their local economies by encouraging these workers to 

stay in the local area after the completion of training programs. At the time that these sites 

submitted NEG proposals to the DOL, involuntarily separated military personnel were expected 

to have about six months’ advance notice prior to their military separation during which they 

could take advantage of NEG-funded services. In contrast to the short notice that many civilian 

workers receive prior to job loss, this advance notice could provide an opportunity for the 

involuntarily separated military personnel to plan for their transition to a new job in the civilian 

sector. 

A different set of mobility-related issues arose when military spouses became the primary 

target group of the grants:2

 military spouses, who are typically in the NEG area for only about 

two or three years, face unique challenges in gaining work-related skills and experience. They 

move into the area after their spouses serving in the military receive a PCS to the area, and they 

will leave the area when the next PCS takes them elsewhere. Furthermore, because military 

spouses typically do not have extended family or friends (or other strong ties) to the NEG area, 

 2

As is described in Chapter II, the three large sites shifted eligibility from involuntarily separated military 

personnel to military spouses. The three medium-sized sites were originally designed with military spouses as their 

primary target group. 
113 

other circumstances may lead to their departures from the area even before the next PCS; for 

example, a military spouse may leave the area if their spouse is deployed. These major changes 

in circumstances also may affect clients’ interest in working regardless of whether or not they 

stay in the area. Thus NEG sites offering services to military spouses have only a short time 

period, with an unpredictable ending, in which to help them become employed. 

The high likelihood that military spouses will move from an area within a few years also 

hinders their ability to develop skills and work experience that would allow them to earn high 

wages or to progress in their chosen careers. Military spouses, many of whom are young adults, 

have difficulty completing educational programs, such as a four-year degree, before they need to 

move. Many spouses also do not change their permanent residency after they move, which 

means that they do not qualify for in-state tuition rates at colleges or universities. It is also 

possible that some spouses had difficulty transferring credits from educational institutions in 

their former areas to ones in their new areas, which meant that some of their educational efforts 

might need to be duplicated. Thus even if they may want to further their education, doing so can 

be difficult. Participating in, but not completing, a training program also may be of little value if 

the military spouse does not obtain some form of recognition, such as certification, for the effort. 

Military spouses also have difficulty developing careers is because their mobility may make 

them less desirable employees. Employers know that military spouses will not be in the area for 

very long, so they have less incentive to hire them compared to less mobile job applicants. 

Furthermore, employers who are willing to hire a military spouse may not provide him or her 

with job-specific training, because the employer is unlikely to reap the long-term benefits of 

having a more skilled employee. We frequently heard from site staff that employers who hired 

military spouses took advantage of them by offering them low wages, since employers 

recognized that military spouses do not have other good job options. The types of jobs that many 
114 

employers would be willing to offer military spouses are low-skilled ones in which high turnover 

is commonplace regardless of the workers’ military affiliations. 

 Sites needed to structure their policies and procedures to take into account these special 

circumstances that involuntarily separated military personnel and the spouses of military 

personnel face. In the case of involuntarily separated military personnel, the sites designed ways 

to capitalize on the advance notice of job separation given to clients. Sites hoped that, with 

training to obtain high-quality civilian-sector jobs, their clients would be more likely to stay in 

the area. However, the expectation of retaining most military spouses in the area for a long 

period of time is not realistic, so sites developed ways to ensure both that their clients could 

participate in services and benefit from them and that the NEG funds would be spent wisely. 

Some sites screened out potential clients who would be unlikely to complete services or to have 

time to work in the area before the next PCS. For example, both Fort Campbell and Fort Bragg 

generally excluded potential clients who had been in the area for more than one year.3 Sites also 

worked with military spouses to help them identify occupations, such as health care fields, that 

would be in demand regardless of the area to which the client relocated. Doing so required site 

staff and clients to think about the national labor market and not only the local one. 

A final way in which most, but not all, sites met the distinctive needs of military spouse 

clients was to offer support services, such as funding for child care, if clients had the need for 

them. Military spouse clients are unlikely to have access to informal sources of child care such 

as extended family or friends because they are new to the area. Tabulations of site MIS data 

show that military spouses who received NEG services are predominantly young female adults, 

who by definition have a working spouse. Even though data on whether the clients had young 

 3

Section B explains other screening criteria to help ensure that clients were serious about working. 
115 

children are unavailable, the MIS data and qualitative evidence collected indicate that the need 

for and availability of child care are very important factors in clients’ participation in services 

and work. Strategies that aggressively leverage other sources of funds for child care and other 

types of support services might be effective in ensuring that clients who want to work and who 

can benefit from training have the supports that are necessary to facilitate successful outcomes. 

B. LESSONS ABOUT STRUCTURING NEGS TO MILITARY COMMUNITIES 

In this section, we discuss five lessons about the use of NEGs to provide employmentrelated services to military communities. First, sites should integrate the NEG program with 

WIA to avoid duplication of effort. The second arises from experiences in serving military 

spouses who were not dislocated workers or displaced homemakers: sites need to balance the 

advantages of expanding the official eligibility criteria with stricter informal criteria to ensure 

that clients would be likely to work after service receipt. Third, service providers to military 

communities must recognize that training and support services are expensive components of the 

services provided to military communities. A fourth lesson is to seek to avoid the common 

inefficiencies and challenges to effective and efficient service delivery that these military NEGs 

encountered. Finally, our fifth lesson is that, if NEGs are available to them, future sites may not 

easily duplicate the Fort Campbell model and should be prepared to tailor their strategies to their 

local characteristics and to the heightened security concerns on military bases. 

1. Integrating NEG Services with WIA Services Allows the Effective and Efficient 

Delivery of Services 

Some sites originally established NEG structures and policies that differed from WIA. For 

example, one site initially did not use the local one-stop operators to provide services; rather, it 

developed a separate structure for supervising NEG staff. Some sites also offered NEG clients 

the opportunity to obtain higher ITAs than what WIA clients were entitled to. Two of the three 
116 

large sites did not appear to record the same set of data as what might be expected to be available 

through the WIA data system. Furthermore, several sites unsuccessfully tried to locate NEG 

services away from the one-stops and on the military bases to increase collaboration with the 

military. However, over time, most sites found it to be more effective and efficient to integrate 

NEG operations and staffing with the WIA system. The site that initially used a separate 

operator for service delivery switched to using the local one-stop operators. Sites also 

restructured to allow the NEG staff to better understand the workforce services system, to learn 

from WIA staff, and to strengthen the lines of authority within the NEG program. One NEG 

coordinator commented to us that just because the NEG is a separate program, the site does not 

need to develop a separate system. The advantages of folding NEG activities into the WIA 

system is even more compelling because the NEGs are temporary programs; developing separate 

policies and procedures for temporary programs may unduly delay the start-up of the activities 

and lead to one-time expenditures that could be avoided. 

Distinctive features of the NEGs can still be taken into account even if the NEG is integrated 

with the WIA system. For example, given the large size of the NEGs compared to WIA funding 

in a local area, it makes sense to have a separate NEG coordinator. However, that coordinator 

can still be included within the WIA management structure. Similarly, the unique eligibility 

criteria for the NEGs, compared to WIA, did not prevent some sites from cross-training NEG 

staff in WIA policies and procedures. Having cross-trained staff allowed sites greater flexibility 

in program management, increased the quality of service provision; in addition, it could reduce 

the burden of staff turnover. We also found that the NEG MIS data quality was higher when the 

site recorded its NEG information within its WIA data system. Comprehensive and accurate 

data can benefit both the site and the evaluation efforts. The site can benefit through the ability 

to confidently use the data for program monitoring. With better data, the U.S. DOL and 
117 

evaluators also will be more likely to obtain answers to questions that are of policy interest, 

answers we could not obtain in this evaluation because of data limitations. 

2. Developing Informal Screening Procedures to Ensure that Military Spouses Wanted to 

Work Appears to be a Successful Approach for Enrolling Clients and Using Grant 

Resources Effectively 

When eligibility changed from involuntarily separated military personnel to military 

spouses, NEG sites were initially given permission to enroll only spouses who met WIA criteria 

as dislocated workers or displaced homemakers. However, sites encountered difficulty meeting 

their enrollment targets, and they had to turn away spouses who were interested in, but ineligible 

for, the program. Subsequently, San Diego, followed by Fort Campbell and Hampton Roads, 

expanded its eligibility criteria so it could serve all military spouses, including incumbent 

workers and new entrants to the labor market.4

 Staff at the three medium-sized sites also 

expressed interest in expanding their enrollments in this way, although none had received 

permission to do so as of the time we conducted our interviews. 

Staff reported that, while enrollments increased, their entered employment rates initially 

declined quite noticeably after the expanded eligibility criteria were implemented, because some 

clients viewed training as an entitlement or as a way to pass their time rather than as a means to 

obtain a high-quality job or career.5 Compared with many WIA clients, who may not have 

another breadwinner in the house, military spouses may be less focused on working because they 

have less need for a job. Some clients are young and have not previously worked, so they may 

 4

Authorization for this expansion of services was through House of Representatives Bill 2657 Section 3607 in 

the 108th Congress (U.S. Congress 2003). The bill became Public Law 108-83. 

5

Staff at some sites also acknowledged that they initially marketed the program as a training program rather 

than an employment program. Thus, some challenges in ensuring that clients were employment-focused may have 

arisen for reasons other than the change in eligibility criteria. 
118 

not have an accurate perspective of what working entails. Furthermore, spouses with children 

have family responsibilities, and the work demands on their military employee spouse are high. 

Their family lives also may be unstable because their military employee spouse may be living at 

home for a portion of time and away from the home for a long period of time. In essence, family 

and other responsibilities may limit the spouses’ work opportunities or work-related efforts. 

Therefore, NEG staff recognized the need to implement additional procedures to increase 

the likelihood that they were serving clients who were committed to working. The informal 

procedures were designed to help clients identify their own goals and priorities within the 

context of their very dynamic family situations. Staff reported that clients who are not serious 

about working tend to self-select themselves out of the revised enrollment process, after hearing 

about the NEG program’s focus on work and after being encouraged to think about their own 

goals. Thus, to a large extent (although not completely), staff are satisfied that these types of 

screening techniques helped focus resources on those interested in working. 

Site staff reported that their entered employment rates rebounded upon implementation of 

the screening procedures.6

 However, we were not able to confirm this through MIS data because 

of the need to restrict the quantitative analysis to clients who had enrolled prior to 2004. 

Nevertheless, it appears that sites were able to design an efficient process for directing services 

to spouses who could be expected to benefit most, while also meeting their enrollment goals and 

avoiding having to turn away potential clients who express interest in the program.7 

 6

Table V.5 shows Fort Campbell and San Diego entered employment rates, as a percentage of clients who 

exited the program, that exceed 85 percent. As discussed in Chapter V, the Hampton Roads data that we included 

in our analysis show a much lower entered employment rate, while staff at this site report a higher rate (but still 

lower than the rates for the other large sites). Our analysis in Chapter V also includes statistics on the entered 

employment rates among all clients, since the exit rates among the full NEG population are low. 

7

Thus, even when an important policy goal of the NEGs was for DoD retention of the military, the sites strove 

to achieve this goal by increasing spouses’ employment rates and earnings levels, which was expected to increase 

family income and self-sufficiency and to reduce pressure on the military personnel to leave the military. 
119 

Furthermore, the MIS data analysis suggests that, across all clients, training seems to have a 

positive effect on clients’ employment outcomes. 

3. Training and Support Services Are Expensive Components of the Package of Services 

Offered to Military Personnel and Military Spouses 

The analysis of program costs at the three large sites found that, during a one-year period of 

stable program operations, the majority of funds went to provide training and support services. 

Training expenditures were about 60 percent of all program expenditures. Support services at 

Fort Campbell and San Diego were about 15 percent. (Only the smallest of the three WIBs at 

Hampton Roads provided support services, so the cost of these services was less than one percent 

of the site’s total expenditures.) Other types of expenses, including core and intensive services, 

marketing efforts, and administration, comprise the remainder of the costs. 

Both NEG staff and military partners thought that the NEG funds for training filled a gap in 

services in the military communities. Staff at most sites reported that, by design, they 

concentrated expenditures on training because of the shortage of funds from other sources for 

training; sites focused on providing training funds since clients already had access to WIA-like 

core and intensive services. The caps on the ITAs also were very generous at some sites, 

especially at the beginning of the grant periods, with San Diego and one of the three WIBs at 

Hampton Roads initially having no cap on ITA funds and some other sites having caps that were 

higher than comparable WIA caps. 

Similarly, support services—particularly child care—both were expensive for the NEGs and 

were used extensively by clients who needed them (at sites that offered them). In some cases, 

child care costs were comparable to training costs. Staff and clients at the sites that provided 

child care funds reported that the availability of these funds was critical; otherwise, some clients 

may have been unable to complete their services and obtain jobs. Staff at the two Hampton 
120 

Roads WIBs that did not offer support services tried to encourage clients to come up with 

informal child care arrangements, such as alternating babysitting with other military families or 

attending training when their spouses were not at work. However, site staff reported that some 

clients were unable to start or continue training because of difficulty setting up or keeping child 

care arrangements. This finding suggests that, after taking into account the costs of addressing 

child care needs, helping clients with these needs so they can be successful in training can be 

particularly expensive for society, regardless of the source of support. Sites that aggressively 

leverage support services funds from other sources are likely to be able to provide training or 

other employment-related services funded by their NEG or WIA dollars to more clients. 

By comparison to training and support services, the cost of core and intensive services 

generally was small. Some of these services are self-accessed, and some are provided to groups 

of clients; both strategies reduce their per-client costs. Furthermore, core and intensive services 

typically are less intensive and shorter in duration than is training, and they can be provided inhouse by NEG (or WIA) staff, which makes them less expensive than training provided by 

community colleges or proprietary vendors. 

We could not tell explicitly whether collocation of NEG services on a military base, 

compared to operating at a one-stop, increased or decreased the cost of providing core and 

intensive service to NEG clients. On the one hand, Fort Campbell was able to benefit from the 

use of donated space for its dedicated NEG center on a military base, which suggests that 

collocation on bases may be advantageous. On the other hand, Hampton Roads and San Diego 

were able to benefit from cost-sharing of core and intensive services with WIA staff, which 

suggests that location at a one-stop may have advantages as well. Given that some sites faced 

difficulty in locating their services on base, despite extensive efforts to do so, it may be a moot 

point as to whether one approach is cheaper than the other. 
121 

4. The Difficulties in Locating Space for Services, the Shifts in the Target Population, and 

the Temporary, Short-Term Nature of the Grants Led to Large Inefficiencies 

Several inefficiencies or distinct challenges were frequently reported by NEG staff. One 

was the difficulty in locating a place for services to be delivered. Both San Diego and one of the 

WIBs at Hampton Roads initially expended significant time and money trying to negotiate 

access to and renovate facilities on base that could be used as NEG service delivery centers. 

However, they were unsuccessful in their efforts. Fort Campbell also encountered challenges in 

renovating facilities on base, but it was successful in resolving the difficulties. Overall, these 

challenges in locating facilities hampered the start-up at all three large sites. Staff at one site also 

reported that the aborted renovation efforts hurt the NEG program’s relationship with military 

staff with whom they needed to collaborate. 

The shifts in the primary target groups for services also led to additional expenses at the 

three large sites. Given that the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq led to a dramatic reduction in the number of involuntarily separated military personnel 

in the NEG communities, the use of the NEG funds for serving military spouses was an 

innovative approach to help DoD to retain military personnel and to allow grantees to continue 

serving their communities. Nevertheless, when the primary target group shifted from 

involuntarily separated military personnel to military spouses, the sites had to use very different 

strategies for most aspects of program operations, from recruitment to the tracking of client 

outcomes. Client flow was interrupted. Furthermore, turnover of front-line staff occurred 

because many of the staff who worked well with military personnel did not work well with 

military spouses. The shift from serving dislocated worker spouses to all spouses also required 

shifts in outreach, recruitment, service delivery, and client tracking. 
122 

Other inefficiencies arose because of the temporary, short-term nature of the grants, 

especially given their large size. By design, NEGs are temporary grants to provide short-term 

supplemental funding to areas that have a greater-than-expected need for WIA funds.8 Staff at 

the small sites complained that planning was difficult because staff who were not sure how long 

they would have their jobs were tempted to look for permanent positions elsewhere. In addition, 

clients who were not sure for how long the program would operate felt pressure to enroll in 

short-term training rather than in the long-term training that might have been more suitable for 

them. Even though sites eventually received extensions to their grant periods, the fast pace and 

originally very short timeframe of the grants made it hard for sites to manage the flow of clients 

in the program, to serve them, and to place them in jobs. 

Recognition of these inefficiencies and challenges, and efforts early on in the design of the 

grants to avoid them, may alleviate some of the problems if future funds are used to provide 

services to similar communities. 

5. Some of the Fort Campbell Experiences May Not be Duplicated in Other Locations 

As explained in Chapter II, Fort Campbell was the first site to obtain a military base NEG, 

beginning initially with pilot efforts and then expanding to a more comprehensive NEG service 

delivery system. Through the training academy that Fort Campbell established, staff at the other 

locations included in this study learned from its experiences. 

 8

Our investigation into whether WIA formula funding led to gaps in funds for military communities compared 

to other communities did not identify any ways that the formula would lead to disparities based on military status 

alone. Site staff expressed a uniform view that the need for additional funding was not temporary. However, our 

study design did not include an investigation of the perceived need for additional funds in other communities, which 

would provide a benchmark (albeit a qualitative one) by which we could assess the NEG staff’s views. 
123 

However, applying the Fort Campbell model to other areas was sometimes challenging.9 

The unique way in which workforce service delivery systems are structured at the local level and 

the way in which the military community is defined in the area affected how sites organized their 

NEGs. The sites tailored their approaches and service delivery strategies to their unique local 

characteristics. As a result, sites other than Fort Campbell needed to negotiate agreements with 

more than one local WIB and more than one branch of the military. For example, Fort Campbell 

included only one WIB; Hampton Roads included three. Fort Campbell had one one-stop 

operator and a single one-stop; San Diego had several of each. Fort Campbell had been able to 

obtain military cooperation to allow NEG services to be fully located on base; other sites could 

not. We suspect that Fort Campbell was successful this way, when other sites were not, because 

Fort Campbell’s NEG activities were developed prior to implementation of heightened military 

security procedures as a result of the September 11, 2001, hijackings and the wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. The relatively straightforward organizational structure of the Fort Campbell NEG, 

compared to those at that the other large sites, is likely to have played an important role as well. 

Each of these complexities in their local contexts and the resulting administrative structure 

of the NEGs may be necessary for a specific military community; however, they are likely to add 

additional tangible and intangible costs to the process of establishing collaborations, as more 

organizations—with potentially different priorities—are involved. Therefore, we conclude that it 

may be a challenge for sites in other military communities, operating in the current environment, 

to duplicate some aspects of Fort Campbell’s model. The variation in the operations and 

administration of the grants in the six locations examined in this evaluation indicate the distinct 

 9

We are not implying that Fort Campbell had an easy time establishing their NEG; although Fort Campbell’s 

initial NEG efforts to serve involuntarily separated military personnel were not a focus of this evaluation, our sense 

is that these efforts faced considerable challenges because the site was trying to serve a new target group—

involuntarily separated military personnel—and to develop a collaboration with a new partner—the military. 
124 

nature of each community and service delivery environment. Furthermore, given the current 

political and military climates, future efforts to establish military base NEGs in new communities 

may focus on serving different target groups, such as members of the Reserve and National 

Guard, about which sites had little experience by when we collected data. 

C. LESSONS ABOUT EVALUATING EMERGENCY GRANTS 

Our experiences in developing this evaluation of NEGs also suggest some lessons that may 

aid in the design and implementation of future evaluations. Because such evaluations can help to 

determine whether a given grant or series of grants met their intended goals, we believe they can 

play an important role in deciding whether scarce grant resources are effectively used. Of 

course, the process of allocating emergency grant funds may often occur in rather chaotic 

situations with little time for careful consideration of costs and benefits. Still, some a priori

thinking about how grants might be evaluated would be useful if evaluations are to be carried out 

in the future. Therefore, we describe two lessons that are relevant to both the design and analysis 

phases of future evaluations. 

1. Having a Clearer Set of Goals for the NEGs Would Enhance the Ability to Identify the 

Most Appropriate Design for the Evaluation and to Determine Grant Successes in 

Meeting Those Goals 

Perhaps the most difficult problem we faced in the design of the military base NEG 

evaluation was that there seemed to be no clearly articulated goals of what the grants were 

intended to achieve. An original goal of the large NEGs was to provide temporary, supplemental 

funding to help involuntarily separated military personnel make the transition from military 

employment to civilian-sector work. Thus, as an initial conception, the military base NEGs 

might be seen as similar to other NEGs, which provide incremental WIA funding to areas facing 
125 

demands for services which were not taken into account through WIA formula funding.10 Under 

that conception, the primary analytic questions would be whether individuals in grant areas 

received services they would not otherwise have received and whether receipt of services led to 

higher employment outcomes. 

When the goal of aiding in transitions from the military became moot, a new goal emerged 

as the grants were used to aid military spouses in their employment-related efforts. It was hoped 

that doing so would help DoD retain military personnel because the military family would be 

more self-sufficient. Whether this goal was consistent with the “emergency” nature of the grants 

is an open question. Many other goals, such as furthering spouses’ educations, could also be 

hypothesized. Each of these goals would imply a different type of methodology for an 

evaluation and a different measure of success. For example, determining whether DoD retained 

military personnel would require an analysis of data files that link the NEG data files used for 

this evaluation with DoD records on military service personnel, possibly covering a period of 

several years or more. In the end, and in conjunction with DOL, we opted for an evaluation 

based on the first conception of the NEGs’ goals, though even in that case we did not have a 

good method for modeling the counterfactual question of what services would have been 

received in the absence of a grant. A clearer articulation of grant goals both from the point of 

view of DOL’s announcements of grant availability and from information incorporated into 

grantees’ requests for funds might have facilitated a more focused evaluation design process, 

 10As noted in Section B, our investigation into whether WIA formula funding led to gaps in funds for military 

communities compared to other communities did not identify any ways that the formula would lead to disparities 

based on military status alone. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter II, the grants were not established in response 

to an “emergency” or other unanticipated demand for services. However, the methodology for conducting an 

evaluation in this scenario could be similar to those used for studying NEGs that address unanticipated needs in 

response to an emergency. 
126 

which would aid in the ability of the evaluation to determine whether a given grant or set of 

grants achieved their intended purposes. 

2. Quantitative Analysis to Support an Evaluation Would be Greatly Improved by 

Clarifying and Coordinating Data Collection Expectations at the Outset of the Grants 

All of the sites included in our evaluation of the NEGs were very helpful in providing both 

qualitative and quantitative data to us. The evaluation would have been impossible to complete 

without such assistance. Still, we found that in some important cases the data we obtained did 

not allow us to conduct analyses that would have informed policy questions. For example, 

although we received excellent cooperation in our site visits to collect qualitative data about the 

grants, it was difficult to assemble an overall picture of what administrators considered to be the 

key issues at different stages of their grants, given that some of the grants had been in operation 

for several years prior to the start of data collection for the evaluation. Requiring more extensive 

and interpretative narrative reports for larger grants would provide a useful record for future 

grant analysis, particularly in cases where the grants might be operating for several years before 

the start of the evaluation of them. 

With respect to the quantitative data, we also encountered major difficulties. First, much of 

the cost data needed for the evaluation were only partially available. For example, we had 

difficulty in our efforts to analyze individual-level amounts of ITA grants because we had data 

on such amounts from only one site. Similar shortcomings occurred with all of the three large 

sites’ administrative data used to study client characteristics and outcomes. Most notably, data 

for a portion of clients from one site were unavailable, and the information on clients who were 

in the data file was incomplete; site staff told us that data entry was not thoroughly and 

consistently done in the file from which the data extract was made. Data from another site also 

suffered shortcomings for our analysis, since the file included information on very few 
127 

characteristics of clients. Furthermore, none of the data files contained information about to 

which target group a client belonged. The causes of such data problems were varied, but the 

reasons we encountered included: (1) the lack of comprehensive data requirements; (2) shifts in 

data systems part-way through the grant period; and, (3) the discarding of old data after new 

systems were in place (since grantees are required to keep data for only three years). 

Better data would make the analysis in any grant evaluation both more complete and more 

accurate. Hence, DOL’s recent incorporation of stricter data standards for emergency grants, 

such as the inclusion of NEGs in the requirements to report on common measures related to 

entered employment, employment retention, and earnings increases, is likely to lead to benefits 

for future evaluations of NEGs. Data needs both for costs and for client characteristics, service 

receipt, and outcomes might be considered as part of the grant approval process. For example, 

grantees might be asked to show precisely how they will take advantage of current data 

collection procedures available under the Workforce Investment Act Standardized Record Data 

system or other WIA-related activities. Doing so might avoid many of the limitations that we 

encountered due to the poor quality of the MIS data provided by the three large sites. As is the 

case for WIA reporting requirements, OMB would need to approve the list of required data items 

for NEGs. 

 129 

REFERENCES 

Dehejia, Rajeev. “Practical Propensity Score Matching: A Reply to Smith and Todd.” Journal of 

Econometrics, vol. 125, 2005, pp. 355-364. 

Greene, William. Econometric Analysis 5th Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 

2003. 

Molino, John. “Written Statement by Mr. John Molino, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 

(Military Community and Family Policy) Before the Children and Families Subcommittee 

of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee,” Washington, DC, May 6, 

2004. 

STATA Base Reference Manual Volume 4 . College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2003. 

U.S. Congress. House. Making Appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the Fiscal Year 

Ending September 30, 2004 and for other Purposes, Public Law 108-83, HR 2657, Section 

3607. 108th Congress, 1st Session. 

U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. “Workforce Investment 

Act: National Emergency Grants—Application Procedures; Notice.” Federal Register, Part 

V, vol. 69, no. 81, April 27, 2004, pp. 23056-23057. 

U.S. Department of Labor, Veterans Employment and Training Service. “A Non-Technical 

Resource Guide to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 

(USERRA).” Available at [http://www.dol.gov/vets/whatsnew/uerraguide0704.rtf]. 

Accessed September 23, 2004. 

APPENDIX A 

COST DATA COLLECTION FORM 

Site Name:

Contact Person:Telephone Number:Email Address:Greeter desk staffHelp desk staffResource room staffOther:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:Other:

MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

Staff Category

Salary Rate

(specify 

annual, 

monthly, or 

hourly)

Fringe Benefits 

(% of salary or $)

INTRODUCTION: To help inform our understanding of your site’s Military NEG, we are requesting information on the actual costs associated with providing services to NEG clients. We are interested in estimating all costs incurred--that is, the true costs of operating the program, including variations from initial projections and invoiced costs. The following questionnaire is designed to collect information on your actual costs.While visiting your local area, Jeanne Bellotti from Mathematica Policy Research will walk you through this form in detail. Please review it in advance of the visit and identify any questions that you have about its contents. (Note that we do not expect you to complete the form before the visit.) During the visit, we will develop a timeframe that is reasonable for the local area to provide the requested information. If supplemental information is available, such as timesheets, we will also talk about the potential use of those materials in our analysis. If you have more than one center that 

provides services to a reasonably large proportion of NEG clients, we may also suggest completing a separate form for each center. At any time during this process, please do not hesitate to contactJeanne Bellotti at (609) 275-2243 or jbellotti@mathematica-mpr.com with questions or comments. I. STAFF SALARY RATESInstructions: Please estimate the salary rates for all categories of staff that serve NEG clients. Staff categories should include those providing core services (e.g. greeter desk, help desk, and

resource room staff), intensive services (e.g. career counselors), and training services (e.g. training counselors). Please also include categories of administrative and support staff involved in theNEG grant. For each category, report the average salary and fringe benefits.

A.3
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

a. Greeter desk? b. Help desk?c. Resource room?a. Office space? b. Computers?c. Software?d. Fax, phone, postage?e. Magazines and newspapers?f. Jobs database maintenance?g. Other costs? Specify:h. Other costs? Specify:i. Other costs? Specify:

Response:Response:Response:

II. CORE SERVICESA. Greeter, Help Desk, and Resource Room CostsInstructions: Please estimate the annual costs for fiscal year 2004-2005 of your greeter, help desk and resource room. The questions below identify the components of cost associated with theseservices. If this information is available in another format, please contact Jeanne at the phone number above to discuss that information.2. Space, equipment and materials: What equipment and material costs do your greeter, help desk, and resource room require during the fiscal year? 1. Staff time: What are the total hours per week needed to staff the... 5. NEG clients: What proportion are NEG clients?3. NEG cost contributions: Are resources from the military NEG used to fund any of these services? If so, what is contributed (e.g. staff time, equipment, other costs)? 

How much money is charged to the NEG for these contributions?4. Annual client flow: On average, how many clients visited your center this fiscal year 2004-2005?

A.4
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

One-stop group orientationJob search assistance workshopsJob readiness workshopsLife skills workshopsOther:Other:Other:Other:Service(name and description)

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

Category of 

Staff

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Cost 

Contribution by 

Military NEG

Instructions:C. Individual Staff Assisted Core ServicesOne-on-one job search assistanceOne-on-one resume assistanceOther:Other:

 For each group activity or workshop offered through core services, please complete the table below.

Average 

Number of 

Participants 

(including 

non-NEG)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

B. Orientations, Workshops and Other Group Activities

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Cost Contribution 

by Military NEG*

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

Category of 

Staff

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

Service(name and description)* Please indicate the proportion (%) of the service cost that is paid by the Military NEG or indicate the type (e.g. staff time, supplies, etc.) and value ($) of costs paid by the NEGInstructions: For all individual staff-assisted core services, please complete the table below.

A.5
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

Interest inventoryBasic skills assessmentOccupational skills assessmentOther:Other:Other:Other:Other:

Response:

a. Direct services:

b. Contracted services:

III. INTENSIVE SERVICESA. Interest Inventories, Skills Assessments, Workshops and Other Group ActivitiesInstructions: For each group activity or workshop offered through intensive services, please complete the table below.2. Method of service provision: Please indicate which services are provided directly through your center and which are contracted out to other organizations or

Service(name and description)agencies?

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

Category of 

Staff

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

B. Basic Skills Education and Training

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Average 

Number of 

Participants 

(both NEG 

and nonNEG)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

1. Basic skills service offerings: What basic skills education and training are offered to NEG clients as intensive services (e.g. GED, ABE, or ESL classes)?

Cost Contribution 

by Military NEG

A.6
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

Response:

Service(name and description)

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

Category of 

Staff

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Cost 

Contribution by 

Military NEG

Cost Contribution 

by Military NEG

IEP developmentCareer counselingPost-placement counseling and followup

3b. Other:Other:Other:

Cost of contracted services: For those services that are contracted, what is the contract arrangement? For example, if you pay a fixed cost per one-stop client that 

participates in the service, please indicate the contracted cost per client.

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Cost Contribution 

by Military NEG

C. Development of Individual Employment Plan (IEP) and Other CounselingInstructions: For all one-on-one counseling and case management provided through intensive services, please complete the table below.3a. Cost of direct services: Please complete the table below for each type of basic skills training provided directly through your center.Service(name and description)

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

Category of 

Staff

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

Average 

Number of 

Participants 

(including 

non-NEG)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

A.7
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

Training orientationDevelopment of training plansSelection of training providerClient follow-up during and aftertrainingOther:

Response:Response:Response:Response:Response:

2. ITA cap: What is the local cap on ITA expenditures? Has the cap changed since the start of the NEG grant period?

Category of 

Staff

IV. TRAINING SERVICES

Average 

Duration

(hr:min)

3. ITA participation, obligations, and expenditures: Please indicate the type of data system where ITA participation, obligations and expenditures are recorded for 1. individual clients, when it is recorded for each client, in what format it is maintained, and how it is updated.

 Training orientation and provider selection: Please complete the following table about orientation and counseling associated with all training services, including use of individual training 

accounts (ITAs), customized training, and on-the-job training (OJT). Note that if an activity is typically one-on-one, indicate "1" as the average number of participants.Service(name and description)

Other Direct Costs 

(copies, materials, etc.)

Average 

Number of 

Participants 

(including 

non-NEG)

Attendance 

Recorded in 

MIS

(yes/no)

If Not in MIS, 

Percent of NEG 

Clients That 

Participate 

Overall

Cost Contribution 

by Military NEG

Average Staff 

Time for 

Preparation, 

Documentation, 

and Follow-up 

(hr:min)

4. Customized training: Does the local area provide customized training?

5. Cost of customized training: What is the contract arrangement for customized training? For example, if you pay a fixed cost per one-stop client that participates in 

the service, please indicate the contracted cost per NEG client.6. Customized training participation, obligations, and expenditures: Please indicate the type of data system where participation, obligations, and expenditures for 

customized training are recorded for individual clients, when it is recorded for each client, in what format it is maintained, and how it is updated.

A.8
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

Response:Response:Response:

V. SUPPORTIVE SERVICES1. What supportive services are available to NEG clients? Is there a cap on supportive service payments?

Response:

2. Are supportive service expenditures for NEG clients recorded in your MIS (yes/no)?

Response:

3. If they are not recorded in the MIS, are they available in some other electronic or paper format? Explain

Response:

4. On average, how much staff time (hr:min) is spent in preparation, documentation, and follow-up to assist each client in receiving supportive service funds?

Response:

5. What category of staff typically assist with accessing supportive services?

Response:

6. Are there any other costs associated with approving or administering supportive service payments? Please explain

Response:

9. OJT participation, obligations, and expenditures: Please indicate the type of data system where participation, obligations, and expenditures for OJT are recorded for 

7. individual clients, when it is recorded for each client, in what format it is maintained, and how it is updated.

 OJT: Does the local area provide OJT?

8. Cost of OJT: What is the cost structure for OJT? For example, does the one-stop pay a proportion of the client's wages for a fixed period of time? Please explain.

Instructions: Please complete the following questions related to supportive service costs (such as relocation assistance, transportation assistance, child care, supplies, books,

and other expenses not covered directly by ITAs).

A.9
MILITARY BASE NATIONAL EMERGENCY GRANTS

COST DATA COLLECTION

a.

b.

c.

d.

Category A Category B Category C Category D

NEG Management

NEG Partner Collaborations

s with Out-of-Area WIBs and Providers

Employer Partnerships

Accounting and Administration

OtherOther

TOTAL (should equal 100%): 0% 0% 0% 0%

VII. INDIRECT COSTS

Response:

VIII. OTHER COSTS

Response:

THANK YOU! We appreciate your help in completing this exercise. Again, please do not hesitate to contact Jeanne Bellotti at (609) 275-2243 or jbellotti@mathematicampr.com if you have questions. Note that if attendance in certain types of activities listed above are not recorded in your MIS, MPR would like to talk in more depth about 2. For each category listed above, what proportion (%) of the time spent on administration is spent doing the followingthe types and proportions of NEG clients who participate.

 types of activities?

1. Please indicate what categories of staff typically assist with administration. Estimate, on average, how much time (hr:min) does each category of staff spend on NEG administration. Please indicate time period (ie. weekly, monthly, annually).

Category Average Staff Time (hr:min)

Are there any other costs associated with serving NEG clients that were not already discussed in this form (e.g. development of new career advancement centers, special job What is your organization’s indirect cost rate? If you do not have an indirect cost rate, how are indirect costs calculated or shared across funding streams?VI. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTSInstructions: Please complete the following questions regarding administrative costs including NEG management (e.g. reporting requirements, tracking finances, special data entry), on-going

collaboration among local NEG partners (e.g. WIBs, one-stops, and military partners), NEG coordination with WIBs and providers in other states and local areas, special coordination with localemployers about NEG clients, and accounting and administration no included in your general indirect cost rate.

A.10
APPENDIX B 

DETAILED RESULTS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 

DATA ANALYSIS

B.3 

In this appendix we provide details on some of the analytic results summarized in 

Chapter V. Three topics are covered: (1) receipt of training, (2) outcomes, and (3) matching 

estimates of the effect of training on outcomes. 

A. RECEIPT OF TRAINING 

Table B.1 reports the results of our analysis of the determinants of which NEG clients 

received training. The dependent variable in the regression is binary, equaling 1 if a client 

received training and 0 if he or she did not. Explanatory variables in the regression include 

indicator variables for the Fort Campbell and Hampton Roads sites, age, dislocation status, 

eligibility group (dislocated worker spouses and other spouses—involuntary separations and 

other recipients constitute the omitted category), gender, highest grade completed, a series of 

race indicator variables, and indicator variables for the date on which the client enrolled in NEGfinanced services. Because the dependent variable in Table B.1 is binary, the equation was 

estimated by the probit technique. Coefficients reported in the table represent the marginal 

effects of each variable on the probability of receiving training. 

As summarized in Chapter V, these results show the following: 

• Individuals in the Fort Campbell and Hampton Roads sites were more likely to get 

training than were those in San Diego. 

• Older and more highly educated clients and clients who had lost a prior job were less 

likely to get training. 

• Women and individuals in the spouse eligibility groups were more likely to get 

training. 

The availability of accurate and comprehensive data on ITA amounts in San Diego allowed 

us to study the determinants of the size of grants that individuals received. For this purpose we 

used a binary dependent variable that took the value 1 if the client received a training grant of 
 B.4 

TABLE B.1 

DETERMINANTS OF RECEIPT OF TRAINING

Variable Marginal Effect Standard Error T-Ratio 

Fort Campbell 0.115*** 0.028 4.00 

Hampton Roads 0.054*** 0.021 2.59 

Age (Years) -0.003*** 0.001 -3.09 

Dislocated -0.177*** 0.044 -3.98 

Dislocated Worker 

Spouse 0.314*** 0.039 7.44 

Other Spouse 0.279*** 0.045 5.90 

Female 0.082*** 0.024 3.40 

Highest Grade -0.033*** 0.005 -6.56 

African American -0.008 0.018 -0.44 

Hispanic 0.028 0.022 1.28 

Other 0.051** 0.022 2.26 

Entry Period 2 0.207 0.237 0.73 

Entry Period 3 0.006 0.299 0.02 

Entry Period 4 -0.077 0.301 -0.26 

Entry Period 5 0.051 0.059 0.85 

Entry Period 6 0.021 0.039 0.54 

Entry Period 7 -0.085 0.293 -0.29 

Entry Period 8 -0.091 0.297 -0.31 

Entry Period 9 -0.151 0.294 -0.51 

Entry Period 10 -0.235 0.286 -0.80 

Entry Period 11 -0.166 0.293 -0.56 

Entry Period 12 -0.273 0.281 -0.94 

Likelihood Ratio Test 296*** 

Sample Size 4,774 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The dependent variable equals 1 if a sample member received training and 0 

otherwise. The equation was estimated by the probit technique. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.5 

more than $8,000 (the median value in the sample) and 0 if he or she received less than or equal 

to $8,000.1 The probit estimates for this analysis are presented in Table B.2.2 Workers suffering 

a job dislocation and non-dislocated worker spouses were slightly less likely to get large ITA 

grants than were other NEG clients, but there generally were few statistically significant 

influences on the grant amount received. 

B. OUTCOMES 

We looked at three outcomes for participants in the NEG evaluation: (1) the likelihood of 

entering employment among all recipients, (2) the likelihood of entering employment from 

among participants who had formally exited the program, and (3) the post-program wage. These 

results are reported in tables B.3 through B.6. 

1. Entered Employment 

The entered employment regression in Table B.3 represents a simple linear regression on a 

binary variable that took the value 1 if the person was reported as having entered employment 

and 0 otherwise.3

 In order to provide adequate opportunity for NEG enrollees to complete their 

program, the regression includes only individuals entering the program prior to 2004. Indicator 

variables are also used to control for dates of entry. Two significant results emerged from these 

estimates: 

 1

Results for using a continuous variable measuring the actual ITA amount are similar to the ones presented 

here. 

2

Because San Diego had more nearly complete labor market data than did the other sites, we were able to 

include two additional variables in all analyses conducted for that site: (1) a job experience measure defined as prior 

weeks employed divided by total possible experience [defined as 52*(Age-18)] and (2) the number of weeks elapsed 

between the most recent pre-program job and entry into the program. 

3

The use of a linear probability model rather than a probit model was chosen to facilitate comparisons to the 

treatment effect regressions reported in Section C. 
B.6 

TABLE B.2 

DETERMINANTS OF RECEIVING A LARGE ITA 

(San Diego Site Only) 

Variable Marginal Effect Standard Error T-Ratio 

Employment Gap (x 10) -0.003* 0.002 -1.90 

Work Experience -0.012 0.030 -0.40 

Age (Years) 0.000 0.002 0.19 

Dislocated -0.447** 0.143 -2.48 

Dislocated Worker 

Spouse 0.130 0.136 0.94 

Other Spouse -0.362* 0.171 -1.85 

Female 0.036 0.068 0.54 

Highest Grade 0.005 0.011 0.44 

African American -0.073* 0.043 -1.67 

Hispanic -0.079* 0.043 -1.81 

Other -0.084** 0.042 -1.99 

Entry Period 6 -0.016 0.317 -0.05 

Entry Period 8 0.041 0.120 0.34 

Entry Period 9 0.010 0.116 0.09 

Entry Period 10 0.066 0.121 0.54 

Entry Period 11 -0.038 0.122 -0.31 

Entry Period 12 0.000 0.124 0.00 

 

Likelihood Ratio Test 26.44*** 

 

Sample Size 1,077 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by the San Diego military base NEG 

grantee. 

Note: The dependent variable equals 1 if a sample member received an ITA of greater than 

$8,000 and 0 otherwise. The equation was estimated by the probit technique. 

ITA = Individual Training Account. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.7 

TABLE B.3 

DETERMINANTS OF ENTERED EMPLOYMENT

Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 

Fort Campbell -0.078* 0.041 -1.88 

Hampton Roads -0.458*** 0.030 -15.22 

Age (Years) 0.002 0.001 1.37 

Dislocated 0.047 0.044 1.06 

Dislocated Worker 

Spouse -0.037 0.042 -0.88 

Other Spouse -0.228*** 0.057 -3.99 

Female 0.004 0.025 0.15 

Highest Grade -0.001 0.006 -0.12 

African American -0.015 0.024 -0.61 

Hispanic 0.010 0.030 0.35 

Other -0.005 0.033 -0.15 

Entry Period 2 -0.327* 0.174 -1.88 

Entry Period 3 -0.357** 0.151 -2.36 

Entry Period 4 -0.039 0.143 -0.27 

Entry Period 5 -0.104 0.139 -0.75 

Entry Period 6 -0.052 0.132 -0.39 

Entry Period 7 0.000 0.130 0.00 

Entry Period 8 -0.004 0.135 -0.03 

Entry Period 9 0.045 0.136 0.33 

Constant 0.679*** 0.158 4.30 

 

R-squared 0.1510 

F (19,1695) 20.41*** 

Sample Size 2,208 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The dependent variable equals 1 if a sample member entered employment and 0 

otherwise. The equation was estimated by the ordinary least squares technique. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.8 

TABLE B.4 

DETERMINANTS OF ENTERED EMPLOYMENT BY PROGRAM EXITERS

Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 

Fort Campbell 0.175*** 0.043 4.11 

Hampton Roads -0.247*** 0.035 -6.95 

Age (Years) 0.001 0.001 0.65 

Dislocated 0.029 0.042 0.70 

Dislocated Worker 

Spouse -0.030 0.042 -0.72 

Other Spouse -0.219*** 0.058 -3.79 

Female -0.016 0.026 -0.60 

Highest Grade 0.002 0.007 0.29 

African American -0.002 0.026 -0.09 

Hispanic 0.013 0.031 0.43 

Other 0.019 0.033 0.58 

Entry Period 2 -0.324 0.210 -1.55 

Entry Period 3 -0.202 0.193 -1.05 

Entry Period 4 0.018 0.174 0.10 

Entry Period 5 -0.011 0.170 -0.07 

Entry Period 6 0.048 0.163 0.29 

Entry Period 7 0.102 0.162 0.63 

Entry Period 8 0.134 0.166 0.80 

Entry Period 9 0.203 0.167 1.22 

Constant 0.604*** 0.184 3.27 

 

R-squared 0.0780 

F (12,1089) 7.59*** 

Sample Size 1,715 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The dependent variable equals 1 if a sample member entered employment and 0 

otherwise. The equation was estimated by the ordinary least squares technique. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.9 

TABLE B.5 

DETERMINANTS OF POST-PROGRAM WAGES (DOLLARS PER HOUR)

Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio 

Fort Campbell -4.258*** 0.859 -4.96 

Hampton Roads -0.904 1.304 -0.69 

Age (Years) 0.107*** 0.031 3.40 

Dislocated -0.954 1.006 -0.95 

Dislocated Worker 

Spouse 0.638 0.847 0.75 

Other Spouse -1.259 1.121 -1.12 

Female -2.045*** 0.506 -4.04 

Highest Grade 0.813*** 0.159 5.13 

Prior Wage 0.289*** 0.051 5.69 

African American -0.945* 0.552 -1.71 

Hispanic -0.656 0.669 -0.98 

Other -2.161*** 0.790 -2.73 

Constant -0.657 2.302 -0.29 

 

R-squared 0.283 

F (12,1089) 35.83*** 

Sample Size 1,102 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The dependent variable equals the sample member’s post-program wage in dollars 

per hour. The equation was estimated by the ordinary least squares technique. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.10 

TABLE B.6 

MATCHING ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF TRAINING

 Entered 

Employment 

Entered Employment 

By Exiters 

Entered Employment 

Wage 

Unmatched Results 

Training 0.572 0.803 10.97 

No Training 0.609 0.692 12.19 

Difference -0.037 0.110 -1.23 

T-Ratio 1.77* 5.27*** 2.91*** 

Treated Sample Size 1,216 851 805 

Untreated Sample Size 982 859 615 

Matched Results 

Training 0.572 0.803 10.97 

No Training 0.495 0.649 9.75 

Difference 0.077 0.154 1.21 

T-Ratio 3.01*** 5.56*** 2.23** 

Treated Sample Size 1,216 851 805 

Untreated Sample Size 982 859 615 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The treated sample size is the group of NEG clients who received training and the 

untreated sample size is the group who did not. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test. 
B.11 

• After controlling for characteristics of clients, entered employment rates were much 

lower (by about 46 percentage points) in Hampton Roads than in San Diego. Rates in 

Fort Campbell were about 8 percentage points lower than in San Diego. 

• After controlling for their later entry dates into the program, non-dislocated worker 

spouses were much less likely (about 23 percentage points less likely) to enter 

employment than were clients in the other eligibility categories. 

Most other variables in the entered employment regression had coefficients that were not 

significantly different from zero. 

2. Entering Employment by Program Exiters 

Table B.4 shows the results of limiting the entered employment regression only to 

individuals who were reported to have exited from the program. These results are similar to 

those for all clients—entered employment rates were lower in Hampton Roads than in San Diego 

and non-dislocated worker spouses had lower rates of entry into jobs than did clients from other 

eligibility groups. Controlling for the exiting process did, however, alter the relative position of 

the Fort Campbell site—that site now had entered employment rates significantly higher than 

San Diego (and Hampton Roads). Hence, the pattern shown in the raw data persists even as 

characteristics of clients in the sites were held constant. 

3. Wages 

Table B.5 looks at post-program hourly wages. In this analysis we used the demographic 

variables that were used in the entered employment regressions. We also added a variable on the 

client’s prior wage as a way to control for each client’s skill level. This equation illustrates 

several significant results: 
B.12 

• Participants’ prior wage rates had a strong positive effect on their post-program wage 

rate.4

• Fort Campbell participants had significantly lower post-program wages than did those 

in other sites. This may be partly explained by the lower cost of living in the Fort 

Campbell area, but it is unlikely to be explained by cost-of-living differences alone 

since the wage difference is very large (over $4 per hour). The difference may also 

reflect the nature of jobs actually available in the sites. 

• Several of the demographic characteristics had significant effects in the wage 

equation—education had a positive effect on wages, women tended to have lower 

paying jobs than did men, and individuals in the “other” race category had lower 

wages than whites or Hispanics.5

• There were no statistically significant differences in wage rates among the eligibility 

groups. 

4. Modeling the Effects of Training Using Econometrics 

We tried to use several econometric techniques to model the impact of receipt of training on 

rates of entering employment and post-program wages. All of these techniques modeled 

outcomes and entry into training simultaneously—that is, they brought together the analyses in 

sections B and C.6

 In general these estimation attempts produced highly unstable estimates of 

the training “effect” and are therefore not reported here. 

C. MATCHING RESULTS 

Because our attempts to model the training “treatment” were relatively unsuccessful, we 

decided instead to explore the usefulness of matching techniques to estimate an effect of training 

on employment and earnings outcomes (for a detailed discussion of these techniques, see, for 

example, Dehejia 2005). To do so, we created propensity scores for participation in training 

 4

We also used the change in the client’s wage as a dependent variable and obtained results that are quite similar 

to those in Table B.5. Some descriptive characteristics of the wage change variable are reported in Chapter V. 

5

The results also suggested that African American clients had lower wage rates, but the difference was only of 

marginal statistical significance. 

6

For a discussion of these techniques, see Greene (2003) or the “treatreg” section of the STATA manual. 
B.13 

based on a probit equation similar to that shown in Table B.1 and, for San Diego, a propensity 

score for receiving a large ITA grant. These propensity scores were then used in conjunction 

with a kernel matching routine that, for each participant, created a hypothetical comparison case 

by developing a weighted average of all of the outcomes in the comparison group. The pool of 

people for the comparison group for the matching routine was NEG clients who did not 

participate in training. We explored several such procedures, ultimately settling on the 

Epanechnikov kernel routine (provided by default in the STATA program).7 Results of 

estimating the effects of training using the matching procedure are reported in Table B.6. These 

suggest that training had a significant positive impact on both the probability of entering 

employment and the ultimate wage received. Among all clients, the matching results show that 

training participants were about 7.7 percentage points more likely to enter employment than were 

individuals who did not get training. When the sample was limited only to individuals who had 

exited the program, the effects were large—individuals who entered training were about 15 

percentage points more likely to enter employment than were otherwise similar individuals who 

exited the program but did not go through training. Finally, the matching results suggest that 

individuals who entered training had wages of about $1.21 per hour higher than did individuals 

without training. Of course, all of these estimates should be viewed with caution. The matching 

techniques used here are not necessarily unbiased when there are large unmeasured differences 

between individuals who participated in training and those who did not. Issues in the timing of 

the receipt of training and of how exiting from the program is defined could also have affected 

the results. The reported estimates should be taken as being at best suggestive. 

 7

For each participant, these weights follow a parabolic shape centered at the participant’s propensity score. 

Comparison group members with propensity scores more than one standard deviation from the participant’s are 

given a weight of zero. 
B.14 

Table B.7 reports the results of using a similar matching technique to examine the effects of 

the size of the ITA grant that individuals in San Diego received. These results indicate that, 

among all clients, receipt of a large training grant had a negative effect on entering employment, 

but that receipt of a large grant had no effect on entering employment among exiters. A possible 

explanation is that those with large training grants had longer programs, thereby delaying their 

entry into the job market. This effect was muted when the analysis focused only on exiters. We 

also found no significant effect of the size of the ITA grant on subsequent wage rates. Again, 

however, it is important to reiterate the potential biases in the matching techniques we used, 

especially because our ability to predict who received large grants (Table B.2) was quite limited.
B.15 

TABLE B.7 

MATCHING ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF LARGE ITAs

 Entered 

Employment 

Entered Employment 

By Exiters 

Entered 

Employment Wage 

Unmatched Results 

Has ITA Greater than $8,000 0.542 0.849 12.87 

Does Not Have an ITA Greater 

 than $8,000 0.694 0.855 12.70 

Difference -0.153 -0.006 0.18 

T-Ratio 4.23*** 0.20 0.39 

Treated Sample Size 373 238 199 

Untreated Sample Size 340 276 236 

Matched Results 

Has ITA Greater than $8,000 0.542 0.849 12.87 

Does Not Have an ITA Greater 

 than $8,000 0.702 0.861 12.69 

Difference -0.161 -0.012 0.18 

T-Ratio 4.37*** 0.38 0.41 

Treated Sample Size 373 238 199 

Untreated Sample Size 340 276 236 

Source: MPR analysis of individual-level data provided by military base NEG grantees. 

Note: The treated sample size is the group of NEG clients who received an ITA greater than 

$8,000 and the untreated sample sizes is the group who did not. 

ITAs = Individual Training Accounts. 

 *Significantly different from zero at the .10 level, one-tailed test. 

 **Significantly different from zero at the .05 level, one-tailed test. 

***Significantly different from zero at the .01 level, one-tailed test.