PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a Michigan corporation, Plaint iff Counter Defendant- Appellee,

v. SUMMIT PARK TOWNHOME ASSOCIATION, a Colorado corporation, Defe ndant Counterclaimant.

---------------- -------------- WILLIAM C. HARRIS; DAVID J. PETTINATO, Appellants. No. 16-1348

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1: 14-CV-03417-LTB)

__________________ _______________ George A. Vaka, Vaka Law Group, Tampa, Florida (Michael L. Hutchinson and Kathleen M. Byrne, Treece Alfrey Musat, P.C ., Denver, Colorado, on the briefs), for Appellants. Terence M. Ridley (Micha el L. O’Donnell, Evan Bennett Stephenson, and Cedric D. Logan, with him on the brief), Wheel er Trigg O’Donnell LLP, Denver, Colorado, fo r Plaintiff Counter Defendant-Appellee.

__________________ _______________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 23, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, BRISCOE , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

__________________ _______________ Mr. William Harris and Mr. David Pettinato are two attorneys who represented Summit Park Townhome Association. While representing Summit Park against its in surer, the two attorney s were sanctioned for failing to disclose information. In th is appeal, the atto rneys chal lenge the sanctions based on five arguments:
1. The district court lacked author ity to require the disclosure requirements.
2. The attorneys did not violat e the court’s disclosure requirements.
3. The district court awarded attorn eys’ fees beyond the scope of an earlier sanctions order.
4. The district court’s award of attorneys’ fees resulted in a deprivation of due process. 5. The amount of attorn eys’ fees awarded was unreasonable. We affirm. Regardless of whether the district court had authority to require the disclosures, the attorneys were obliga ted to comply. They did not, and the district court acted reasonably in issuing sanctions, determining the scope of the sanction s, and calculating the amount of the sanctions.3 I. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato we re sanctioned for failing to comply with the di sclosure order. This appeal grew out of an insurance dispute. Summit Park sustained hail damage and filed a claim with its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. The parties agreed that da mage had occurred but disagreed on the dollar amount of the damage. Au to-Owners sued fo r a declaratory judgment to decide the value. Summit Park retained Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, who successfully moved to compel an appr aisal based on th e insurance policy. In the event of an appraisal, the in surance policy required: [E]ach party will select a comp etent and impartial appraiser. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. The appraisers will st ate separately the value of the property and amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differen ces to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be binding. Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 1 at 123. Based on continuing disputes between the parties, Auto-Owners asked the district court to resolve thes e disputes by orderi ng an “appraisal agreement.” The court did so and ordered disclosure of facts potentially bearing on the appraisers’ impartiality: An individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the appraisal proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an appraiser. Each appraiser must , after making a reasonable inquiry, disclose to all par ties and any other appraiser any known facts that a reasonable pe rson would consider likely to4 affect his or her impartiality, including (a) a financial or personal interest in the outcom e of the appraisal; and (b) a current or previous relationsh ip with any of the parties (including their counsel or repr esentatives) or with any of the participants in the appraisal proceeding . . . . Each appraiser shall have a continuing obligatio n to disclose to the parties and to any other appraiser any fact s that he or sh e learns after accepting appointment that a reas onable person would consider likely to affect his or her impartiality. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 1 at 245-46. The court warned: “Notice is given that, if the court finds that the pa rties and/or their counsel have not complied with this order, the court will impose sanctions against the parties and/or their counsel pursuant to the court’s inherent authority.” Id. at 248 (capitalization removed). Before the court imposed these re quirements, Summit Park selected Mr. George Keys as its appraiser. This selection led Auto-Owners to express doubt about Mr. Ke ys’s impartiality. Bu t Auto-Owners did not object to Mr. Keys or move to compel further disclosures. Mr. Keys and the court-appointed umpire agreed on an appraisal award of over $10 million, which was 47% higher than Summit Park’s own public adjuster had de termined. Auto-Owners then launched an investigation, which culm inated in an objection to Mr. Keys. In the objection, Auto-Owners ar gued that Mr. Keys was not impartial and that Summit Park had failed to disclose evidence bearin g on his impartiality. The district court credited these ar guments, disqualifying Mr. Keys and vacating the appraisal award.5 With vacatur of the appraisal award, Auto-Owners moved for sanctions against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, seek ing attorneys’ fees and expenses based on violation of the di sclosure order. The district court granted the motion, assessing sanc tions against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato for $354 ,350.65 in atto rneys’ fees and expenses.
II. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato were bound by the court’s disclosure order. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challe nge the district court’s authority to enter the disclosure order. But even if the court had exceeded its authority, Mr. Harr is and Mr. Pettinato would s till have needed to comply with the disclosure order. If the two attorneys believed that the order had been unauthorized, they could have sought reconsideration or a writ; but they could not violate the order. See Maness v. Meyers , 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975) (“If a person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending appeal.”). There is “impressive authority fo r the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the par ties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.” United States v. United Mine Workers , 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947). The parties agree that the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; thus, th e attorneys and parties bore an6 obligation to co mply in the absence of an appellate challenge. See United States v. Beery , 678 F.2d 856, 866 (10th Ci r. 1982) (“Since the court entering these orders had jurisdiction over both the subj ect matter and [the defendant], [the defendant ] was bound by these orde rs until reversed or otherwise set aside . . . .”); see also GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S. , Inc. , 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (a pplying “the established doctrine that persons subj ect to an injunctive orde r issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the or der”). In light of the duty to comply, violation of the order would constitute “‘contempt of [the court’s] lawful authority, to be punished.’” United Mine Workers , 330 U.S. at 294 (quoting Howat v. Kansas , 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922)).
* * * Regardless of whether the district court had authority to issue the disclosure order, Mr. Ha rris and Mr. Pettinato

 bore an obligati on to comply in the absence of an appellate challenge and

 could be sanctioned for noncompliance.
III. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato viol ated the disclosure order. The district court concluded that the two attorneys had violated the disclosure order. Challengi ng this conclusion, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato make two arguments:7 1. The district court misinterpr eted the term “impartial.”
2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato di sclosed sufficient information about Mr. Keys. Both arguments fail. A. Standard of Review We ordinarily review sanctions under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Russell v. Weicker Mo ving & Storage Co. , 746 F.2d 1419, 1420 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). But Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato urge a legal error consisting of misinterpreta tion of the term “impartial.” For the challenge involving the meaning of “i mpartial,” we engage in de novo review. Hamilton v. Bois e Cascade Express , 519 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008). We otherwise confine our review to the abuse-of-discretion standard.
B. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato failed to disclose information specified in the disclosure order. The district court required disclosure of

 the appraiser’s “financi al or personal intere st in the outcome of the appraisal,”

 any “current or previous relationship” between the appraiser and Summit Park’s counsel, and

 any other facts subsequently l earned that “a r easonable person would consider likely to affect ” the appraiser’s impartiality. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 1 at 245-46.8 1. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not disclose the extent of their relationships with Mr. Keys. Regardless of whether the district court had correctly defined “impartial,” the disclosure order itself was clear in what was required. For example, the order expressl y required disclosure of the attorneys’ current or previous relationships with the appraiser. The fa ilure to disclose this information constituted a sanctionable violation regardless of the court’s interpretation of the word “impartial.” The district court could reasonably find that the two attorneys had failed to disclose the extent of th eir relationships wi th Mr. Keys. For example, the attorneys fa iled to disclose that

 other attorneys in their law fi rm (the Merlin Law Group) had worked with Mr. Keys on appraisa ls for at least 33 clients,

 Merlin attorneys had represente d Mr. Keys on various matters for over a decade,

 Merlin’s founder and Mr. Ke ys had co-founded a Florida lobbying operation, whose “num ber one goal [was] to protect policyholders and the public adjusting prof ession,” Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 812, and

 Merlin attorneys had served as the incorporator and registered agent for one of Mr. Keys’s companies. 1

1 The district court also pointed ou t that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had failed to disclose a contingent-fee cap in Mr. Keys’s original contract. Auto-Owners asked Mr. Harris in wr iting for all “dra fts, additions, amendments and/or revisions” of the agreement with Mr . Keys. Appellee’s Supp. App’x at 828. Mr. Ha rris responded that he would bring a copy of the agreement, implying that no other drafts existed. Id. at 827.9 Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato argu e that their disclosures were sufficient. They made two disclosures:
1. “Mr. Keys does not have an y significant prior business relationship with [Merlin], Summit Park, or C3 Group. Mr. Keys has acted as a public adjust er and/or appraiser on behalf of policyholders that [Merlin] has represented in the past, however, this obviously does not affect his ab ility to act [as] an appraiser in this matter.” Appe llant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 292.
2. “Mr. Keys has acted as a public adjuster and/or appraiser on behalf of policyholders that [M erlin] has represented in the past. Mr. Keys has no financial in terest in the cl aim, and has no previous relationship with the policyholder in this matter.” Id

. at 298.

Mr. Harris furnished the final version of the agreement, leading Auto-Owners to ask Summit Park’s form er president whet her the agreement had ever been revise d. He responded: “Not to my knowledge.” Id. at 800. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato later ex cused this statem ent on the ground that the former pres ident had not been involved in the discussions with Mr. Keys regarding his contract. But Mr . Harris and Mr. Pettinato were intimately involved in those discussions, and Mr. Harris—who was accompanying the former pr esident at the time—said nothing to correct the false statement. Instea d, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pe ttinato waited until after completion of the appraisal to disclose the existence of a prior version of Mr. Keys’s agreement. With this disclosure, Auto-Owners learned that Mr. Keys had earlier worked under a contingent-fee cap, which raised his maximum fee based on the total amount recovere d by Summit Park. This information revealed another false statement by Mr. Harris himself. While the contingent-fee cap had been in place, Mr. Harris re presented to Auto -Owners that Mr. Keys had “no financial in terest in the claim.” Id. at 327. This representation was false: at the tim e, the contingent -fee cap created a financial interest by allo wing Mr. Keys to earn a greater fee based on the amount of the appraisal. Auto-Owners had no way of learning that the representation was false, however, until Mr. Harris eventually disclosed the existence of an earlier version of the agreement.10 In addition, Mr. Keys disclosed: I do not have a material intere st in the outcome of the Award and have never acted either for or against Summit Park Townhome Association. My fee agreement is based upon hourly rates plus expenses... I do not have any substantial business relationship or financial interest in [Merlin]. There have been cases where both [Merlin] and Ke ys Claims Consultants acted for the same insure d but under separate contracts. Id . at 307-08. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato make tw o defenses of their disclosures:
1. They disclosed e nough information about Mr. Keys’s impartiality.
2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato lacked personal knowledge about the undisclosed facts. These arguments fail. First, the district cour t acted within its discre tion in concluding that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had faile d to disclose the extent of their relationships with Mr. Ke ys. The two attorneys disclosed only that Mr. Keys had worked as an appraiser on behalf of Merlin’s clients, and Mr. Keys stated that he lack ed a substantial business re lationship with Merlin. The district court could reasonably find that these disclosures had failed to provide meaningful information abou t the extent of the relationships between the two attorneys and Mr. Keys. Second, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pet tinato cannot avoid sanctions based on their asserted lack of knowledge about Mr. Keys ’s contacts with other Merlin attorneys. Mr. Harris and Mr . Pettinato kn ew about some of the11 contacts, as reflected in Mr. Petti nato’s description of his firm’s connection with Mr. Keys: “Both Mr. Ke ys and his staff ha ve assisted me as well as my firm in resolving an untold number of large multi-million dollar losses to an amicable resolution and sett lement to the policyholders’ benefit and satisfaction. ” Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 704. In addition, however, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pe ttinato bore an ob ligation to make “a reasonable inquiry.” Appe llant’s App’x, vo l. 2 at 245. In light of this obligation, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato could not profess ignorance while failing to inquire about contacts with other Merlin attorneys. In these circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion in finding a failure to disclose the extent of the relationships between the two attorneys and Mr. Keys. 2. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato distort the effect of the district court’s definition of “impartial.” The district court required disclo sure not only of the appraiser’s relationship with counsel but also of known facts th at a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the appr aiser’s impartiality. This part of the disclosure requirement was tied to the court’s definition of the term “impartial.” Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato focu s on the court’s definition of “impartial,” arguing that it was wr ong and that the court failed to adequately inform Mr. Harris and Mr . Pettinato of th e scope of their12 obligations. But in the disclosure order itself, the court stated what it meant by “impartial”: “A n individual who has a known, direct, and material interest in th e outcome of the appraisa l proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an appraiser.” Id. at 245. Because the court stat ed precisely what it meant by “impartial,” Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettin ato knew what was required. And as we have discussed, Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato coul d not disobey the order even if the court had based the disclosure requirements on a misguided definition of “impartial.” 2
3. The district court reasonably found a violation of the disclosure order tied to this test of “impartial.” Based on this definition, the district court required disclosure of any facts that a reasonable person would view as likely to aff ect the appraiser’s impartiality. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pett inato argue that evidence of an appraiser’s advocacy was unlikely to affect the a ppraiser’s impartiality.
See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condominium Ass’n , 2017 WL 3184568, at *4 (Colo. A pp. July 27, 2017), cert. granted , 2018 WL 948601

2 The district court ultimately held not only that th e undisclosed facts would likely affect a reasonable pers on’s consideration of Mr. Keys as impartial (requiring disclosure), but al so that Mr. Keys was ineligible to serve as an appraiser because of his partiality (requiring vacatur of the appraisal award). In vacat ing the appraisal award, the court ex panded upon its definition of “impartial.” Vacat ur of the appraisal award led to sanctions against Summit Pa rk but not against Mr. Ha rris or Mr. Pettinato. These two individuals were sanctioned for violating the disclosure order, not selecting a biased appraiser.13 (Colo. Feb. 20, 2018). Fo r the sake of argument, let’s assume that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettin ato are right. Still, the dist rict court could reasonably view Mr. Keys’s undisclosed prior st atements as likely to affect his impartiality based on a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome. For example, in a pres entation to a group of public adjusters in Florida, Mr. Keys taught participants how to “harvest the claim money” from an insurer during an appraisal. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 2 at 342. And one of Mr. Keys’s compan ies maintains a website st ating: “Our purpose is simple: To shift the balance of power from the insurer to the policy holder . . . .” Appellee’s Supp. App’x, vol. 4 at 729. Th e district court could reasonably view these und isclosed statements as proof of a material interest in an outcom e favoring the policyholder over the insured. Evidence also suggests that Mr. Harris and Mr . Pettinato were aware of Mr. Keys’s bias. For example, in an advertisement on Mr. Keys’s website, Mr. Pettinato e ndorsed Mr. Keys, saying: “Both Mr. Ke ys and his staff have assisted me as well as my firm in resolving an untold number of large multi-million dollar losses to an amicable resolution and settlement to the policyholders’ be nefit and satisfaction.” Id. at 704. And a profile on Merlin’s website reported that Mr. Keys “ha[d] dedicated his professional life to being a voice for policyholders in property insurance claims.” Id. at 723. In this profile, Mr. Keys stated : “I was taught to always handle a claim as if my momma was the insured.” Id.14 * * * In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had vi olated the disclosure order. C. Waiver Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato cont end that Auto-Owners waived its objection to the sufficiency of the di sclosures by failing to object despite knowledge of Mr. Keys’s re lationship with Merlin and past expressions of bias toward policyholder s. We disagree. Auto- Owners had some knowledge about Mr. Keys’s bias bu t did not know much of what had been withheld. Without full knowledge of the undisclosed information, Au to-Owners did not waive its right to seek sanctions for nondisclosure.
IV. The district court reasonably interpreted the scope of its sanctions order. In sanctioning the two attorneys, the court invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under § 1927, an attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses , and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927 . Applying this statute in the sanctions order, the court f ound that Mr. Harri s and Mr. Pettinato had unreasonably prolonged the pr oceedings: I note that Section 1927 indica tes a purpose to compensate victims of abusive litigation pr actices, not to deter and punish offenders. With this purpose in mind, I reject Auto-Owners’ request for fees for proceedings in this Court th at relate to15 conducting the appraisal proce ss and conducting the appraisal process itself because Auto-Owners would have incurred these fees regardless of Ha rris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. I grant the request, however, as to Auto-Owners’ investigation into George Keys and its objections to his participation in the appraisal, as this work would not have taken place in the absence of Harris’ and Pettinato ’s misconduct. Th e award shall be assessed against Harris and Pettinato jointly and severally. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 607 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato challe nge the scope of th is order. They concede that the award covered Auto-Owners’ objection to Mr. Keys ($186,705.50) and investig ation of Mr. Keys ($33, 805). But the attorneys disagree with the inclusion of attorneys’ fees for

 Auto-Owners’ preparation of the motion for sanctions ($51,309.50),

 Auto-Owners’ prep aration of the applicatio n for attorneys’ fees and expenses ($16,960.50), and

 Auto-Owners’ other relate d work ($61 ,662.50). According to Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato, these activities fell outside of the initial sanctions order. We disagree. In setting attorneys’ f ees following the sanctions order, the district court explained: Thus, viewed properly in its co ntext, my award encompasses any fees incurred as a resu lt of Harris’ and Pettinato’s misconduct. The fees requested by Auto-Owner s for work on the third amended petiti on, the reservation of rights letter, and other matters describe d in the detailed b illing records would not have been incu rred but for Harris’ and Pettinato’s16 misconduct. I therefore conclude they are within the scope of the award. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 671. We gi ve deference to the district court’s interpretation of its own order. See, e.g. , Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Diamond Shamrock Re f. & Mktg. Co. , 865 F.2d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1988) (“We shall not reverse a district court’s interpretation of its own order ‘unless the record clearly shows an abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Arenson v. Chicago Mercantile Exch ., 520 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1975))). With such deference, we conclude that the district court reasonably interpreted its prior sanc tions order. The sanction s order had noted that § 1927 was designed “‘to compensate victims of abusive litigation practices.’” Appellants’ App’ x, vol. 3 at 607 (quoting Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express , 519 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008)). In light of this purpose, the court interp reted its sanctions order against Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato as encompassing all of the attorneys’ fees and expenses resulting from violation of the disclosure order. Id. This interp retation was reasonable. The sanctions order expressly included the investigation of and objection to Mr. Keys. But the district court could reasonably interpret the sanctions order to go be yond the investigation and objection. If Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato had not violated the disclosure order, Auto-Owners would not have had to move for sanc tions, seek atto rneys’ fees and17 expenses, and complete other work. As a result, the district court could reasonably consider thes e litigation expenses as the product of the two attorneys’ misconduct. In these circ umstances, it was re asonable for the district court to conclude that the earlier sanctions order had encompassed attorneys’ fees and expenses from th e motion for sancti ons, application for attorneys’ fees and expenses, and re lated work involvi ng the motion and application.
V. The district court did not deprive the two attorneys of due process. Alternatively, Mr. Harr is and Mr. Pettinato assert a deprivation of due process based on an inability to respond to the district court’s inclusion of litigation ac tivities outside of the in itial sanctions order. We disagree. 3 Auto-Owners filed an applicati on for attorneys’ fees, and Mr. Harris and Mr. Pet tinato had an opportunity to respond. In the response, they could have objected to any of the attorneys’ fees being sought. This opportunity supplied due process. See Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Dabney , 73 F.3d 262, 268 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he opportunity to fully brie f the issue

3 Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not make this argument in district court. Thus, Auto-Owners argues that the argument was forfeited. See Richison v. Ernest Grp. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato disagree, contending that they had no contemporaneous opportunity to object to the due-proce ss violation be cause they learned of it only when they receive d the district court’s written order. We may assume, for the sake of ar gument, that Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato did not forfeit their due- process challenge.18 is sufficient to satisfy du e process requirements.”); see also Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Summit Park Townhome Ass’n , No. 16-1352, slip op. at 17-19 (10th Cir. Mar. 23 , 2018) (to be publi shed) (discussing a similar argument made by Summit Park To wnhome Association).
VI. The amount of atto rneys’ fees awarde d was reasonable. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato also argue that the court awarded an unreasonable amount of attorneys’ f ees. We disagree. We review a determination of at torneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. See AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes , 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997). In applying the abus e-of-discretion standard , we consider whether the district court’s determination a ppears reasonable in light of the complexity of the case, th e number of strategies pu rsued, and the responses necessitated by the other party’s maneuvering. See Robinson v. City of Edmond , 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 ( 10th Cir. 1998). But we do not re quire the district court to identify and just ify every hour allowe d or disallowed. See Malloy v. Monahan , 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996). The district court closely reviewed the information in Auto-Owners’ request for fees, determining that most of the fee requests were reasonable given

 the circumstances of the case,

 the hourly rates pr evailing in the community, and

 the use of billing judgment.19 First, the district court conclude d that it was reasonable for AutoOwners’ counsel to spend long hours because “Auto-Owners had over $30
million at stake” and the issues were co mplex. Appellants’ App’x, vol. 3 at 673-74. This conclusi on was reasonable. Second, the court considered the lo cal market, the qualifications of the attorneys, and th e contentiousness of the litigation. These considerations led the district court to find that the billi ng rates had been reasonable. In our view, this findi ng was permissible under the record. Third, the court considered the us e of billing judgment by AutoOwners’ counsel thr ough concession s such as staffing with lower-billing attorneys, declining to charge for all hours worked, and discounting hours worked by paralega ls and secretaries. 4 The district court acted reasonably in considering these concessions. For these three reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calcula ting the amount of the sanction ($354,350.65). 5

4 The district court ultimately re duced Auto-Owners’ fees by $1,098 for one duplicate entry and one vague entry.

5 Alternatively, Mr. Ha rris and Mr. Pettinato ur ge reversal for more specific findings. But th e district court supported its award with detailed findings. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinat o do not say what other findings should have been made.20 VII. Conclusion The district court did not err in sanctioning Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato. Regardless of th e validity of the disclo sure order, compliance was required in the abse nce of an appellate cha llenge. Mr. Harris and Mr. Pettinato violated the or der by failing to disclose information bearing on Mr. Keys’s impartiality. In light of this violation, the district court had the discretion to sanction Mr . Harris and Mr. Pettinat o and set a reasonable amount. We therefore affirm the assessment of sanctions.