Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

An Ever Present Danger

A Concise History of British Military Operations 

on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947

Matt M. Matthews

Occasional Paper 33

Oxus R

Kunar R

Kabul R.

Indus R

Indus R

Kurram R

.

Hindu Kush Range

Khyber Pass

.

.

.

.

. .

.

.

Kohat

Jalalabad

Kabul

Chitral

Peshawar Rawalpindi

Bannu

Dera Ismail Khan

Wana

Oxus R

Kunar R

Kabul R.

Indus R

Indus R

Kurram R

.

Hindu Kush Range

Khyber Pass

.

.

.

.

. .

.

.

Kohat

Jalalabad

Kabul

Chitral

Peshawar Rawalpindi

Bannu

Dera Ismail Khan

Wana

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Matt M. Matthews

Occasional Paper 33

An Ever Present Danger:

A Concise History of British Military 

Operations on the North-West Frontier, 

1849-1947
CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Matthews, Matt, 1959-

 An ever present danger: a concise history of British military operations 

on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 / Matt M. Matthews.

 p. cm.

 ISBN 978-0-9841901-3-3

 1. North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan)--History, Military--19th 

century. 2. North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan)--History, Military--

20th century. 3. Great Britain. Army--Colonial forces--Pakistan--NorthWest Frontier Province--History--19th century. 4. Great Britain. Army--

Colonial forces--Pakistan--North-West Frontier Province--History--20th 

century. 5. Pashtuns--Pakistan--North-West Frontier Province--History-

-19th century. 6. Pashtuns--Pakistan--North-West Frontier Province--

History--20th century. 7. Afghan Wars. I. Title. 

 DS392.N67M38 2010

 954.91’2035--dc22

 2010017048

First Printing: June 2010
Contents

Page

Introduction............................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1. The Pashtuns and The First Afghan War ........................ 7

Chapter 2. “Discomfiture Might Suffice as Punishment:” British 

Military Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849–

1900 .............................................................................. 15

Chapter 3. “I Doubt If It Is Understood How Desperate the Fighting Has Been During This Operation” British Military 

Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1900–1921..... 29

Chapter 4. British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier, 

1922–1947 .................................................................... 49

Conclusions............................................................................................. 65

Select Glossary of Afghan Tribal Terms ................................................ 71

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 73

About the Author..................................................................................... 77

Maps

1. Map Depicting Pashtun Majority Area ................................................. 6

2. The Pashtun Tribes................................................................................ 9

3. The Pashtun Revolt of 1897-1898. ..................................................... 25

4. The Derajat Encampment.................................................................... 39

5. Operations in North-West Frontier, 1935–1937................................. 57

iii

1

Introduction

When you find yourself fighting in frontier warfare, you 

open the old British manuals. You will find they contain 

many lessons.

 Lieutenant General Asad Durrani

Pakistani Army, 2009

Recent Pakistani military operations against the Taliban have once again 

thrust the historically volatile region of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier into 

the international limelight. According to a number of Pakistani military 

officers, the current fighting bears a striking resemblance to operations 

conducted by the British in the North-West Frontier during its long and 

bloody history of conflict with the frontier Pashtun (“Pathan” as the British 

dubbed them) tribes. 1 Going through the old imperial gazetteers, Pakistani 

Major General Athar Abbas pointed out in 2009; “You see ambushes 

are taking place in exactly the same locations now as they were in the 

1890s. The people of the frontier have always been fierce fighters and their 

motivation has remained the same, whether they are fighting the British, 

the Soviets, or a Pakistan government supported by the Americans. As they 

see it, they are fighting occupation.”2

Indeed many Pakistani Army officers are examining the official histories of British military operations and the numerous manuals, instruction 

booklets and unofficial works by British officers addressing their thoughts 

on fighting in the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan. Possibly one of 

the most recognized unofficial published works of the twentieth century is 

General Sir Andrew Skeen’s Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India, which was published in 1932. In 

the preface to his book, Skeen noted; “When young, I once had cause to 

thank a senior for his wise teaching of the needs of frontier fighting. His 

reply was; ‘That’s all right youngster, pass it on.’ I acted on it during the 

rest of my service and am doing it now in the only way left to me.”3

 By 

1939, Skeen’s small volume was in its fourth edition. Certainly Skeen and 

a myriad of other British and Indian soldiers who served in the North-West 

Frontier have a good deal to “pass along” to more modern armies, including members of the Coalition forces, that are currently operating in this 

same frontier region against an enemy called the Taliban.

Interestingly, the Taliban and other extremist organizations in the border region belong almost exclusively to the trans-border Pashtun tribes. As 

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason have pointed out; “The implica-
2

tions of the salient fact that most of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s violent 

religious extremism and with it much of the United States’ counterterrorism challenge, are centered within a single ethnolinguistic group, have not 

yet been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long 

down-played cultural dynamics.”4

 Given the magnitude of the current situation in the trans-border region, it is surprising that little historic analysis 

has been conducted on the nearly 100 year history of British military operations against the Pashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier. 

In what would surely prove a prophetic piece of advice, the preface 

to the British Army’s official history of the 1920–1935 campaigns on the 

North-West Frontier, which was published in 1945, surmised that; “Wars 

between 1st Class Modern powers come and go. Armaments and battlegrounds change with each upheaval. The tribes of the North-West Frontier 

of India however, remain as heretofore an unsolved problem. The Indian 

Army of the future will still have to deal with the Mohmands and Afridis, 

Mahsuds and Wazirs. History repeats itself. Let it be read profitably.”5

 Certainly, the US Army and its partners can benefit from a historical study of 

British military operations on the North-West Frontier. 

It should be understood, however, that the British Army in India never 

performed anything resembling modern counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against the Pashtuns. Rather, for the most part, the British sought not 

to exert enduring political authority over the Pashtun tribes along the frontier but to maintain tribal autonomy and friendly relations with those groups 

in order to maintain stability in the region. For the British, the wellbeing 

of its colony in India was the main objective and maintenance of peace 

along the North-West Frontier was a means of achieving that goal. For long 

periods of time, British Imperial policy was one of non-interference and 

many tribesmen were enthusiastically accepted into the ranks of imperial 

military forces. Punitive military operations were often carried out only 

after tribesmen committed a crime or conducted a raid outside the tribal 

region. The goal was to punish the errant tribesmen promptly by destroying villages, crops and livestock, and killing the fighters and scattering the 

traditional Pashtun fighting forces which were called lashkars. The British 

objective was to swiftly inflict pain on the tribes and bring them to terms. 

Still, the British campaigns along the frontier relied heavily on tactical innovations focused on defeating an elusive enemy that used unconventional 

operations along the lines of the Taliban. This threat required a succession 

of British leaders to introduce tactical innovations, which included new 

forms of maneuver and the integration of indigenous Pashtun personnel 

into the ranks of its forces. This study will focus on these elements as the 
3

means of providing the most relevant insights for US Army units and other 

Coalition forces active in the region today.

The accumulated knowledge and experience gained by British and 

Indian forces in Frontier Warfare provides a host of important tactical 

lessons for the US Army. The British found early on that their Field 

Service Regulations required considerable alterations when conducting 

operations against the trans-border tribes of the North-West Frontier. For 

example, the introduction to the British Manual of Operations on the 

North-West Frontier of India, which was published in 1925 concluded; 

“The modifications referred to in this manual are such as experience has 

shown to be necessary in operating against such an enemy as is met with 

on the North-West Frontier of India and the instructions are intended to 

supplement, not supersede, those contained in Field Service Regulations 

and the training manuals of the various arms.”6

The British Army in India soon learned that the Pashtuns made excellent 

soldiers. As early as 1845, a veteran British officer published an unofficial 

work intended to teach young officers how to train and command these 

native soldiers. For many years, Pashtuns serving in the imperial ranks 

performed valiantly and efficiently. However, on more than one occasion, 

the British found to their dismay that the Pashtun officers and soldiers they 

had trained so effectively had no misgivings about applying their newfound 

martial skills against the army that had taught them. 

While attempts to “pass on” the experience of training indigenous 

Pashtun forces or preserve other important lessons of frontier warfare 

frequently proved beneficial, the British often paid a heavy price in 

casualties and equipment when this tactical and administrative knowledge 

was not properly retained or was ignored by soldiers in the field. Oftentimes, 

soldiers lacking solid basic training found that they were no match for the 

clever and highly motivated Pashtun guerilla forces. Finally, and perhaps 

most importantly, while the British typically achieved tactical successes, 

they habitually ended each operation with a strategic withdrawal. As 

British historian Alan Warren observed, “On each occasion the tribes in 

the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and 

the bulk of the Indian Army’s troops were forced to withdraw back onto the 

plains of the Indus Valley.”7 

This Occasional Paper will examine the almost continual efforts of 

British and Indian soldiers (both regular and irregular) to combat and 

pacify the Pashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier. It will also examine 

the tactics employed in the various campaigns. Chapter 1 deals briefly with 

the historical background of the British in India, geography of the North-
4

West Frontier, the Pashtun tribes, and a short account of the First Afghan 

War. Chapter 2 addresses British military operations from 1849–1900 and 

discusses the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF) and its efforts to stop Pashtun 

raids into Punjab, as well as early punitive expeditions into the North-West 

Frontier. The chapter also examines the failure to pass along the lessons 

of the PIF to the British and Indian regular forces as they deployed for 

the first time in strength into the North-West Frontier during the Pashtun 

revolt of 1897. The chapter additionally investigates the renewed tactical 

effectiveness of the Pashtun tribes, brought about by modern and more 

effective weapons. Chapter 3 will explore British attempts to capture 

the lessons of the 1897–1898 Pashtun revolt by publishing new training 

manuals, instituting new training programs, and folding the irregular 

forces into the British and Indian Regular Army. The chapter will examine 

the success of these programs (the 1908 Khel and Mohmand campaigns), 

and the dire consequences of their abandonment prior to the 1919–1921 

Waziristan Campaign. Chapter 4 will examine the challenges confronting 

the British and Indian Army on the North-West Frontier during the 1920s 

and 1930s. The chapter will discuss British attempts to “Pass It On” or 

incorporate the past lessons of “hill warfare.” The results of these new 

tactical adjustments will be explored by examining the 1935 Mohmand 

campaign, the 1936–1937 Waziristan campaign, and British efforts to 

track down and kill the elusive Faqir of Ipi. The final chapter will offer an 

analysis of lessons learned by the British on the North-West Frontier and 

their relevance for the US Army and its allies. 
5

Notes

1. The author will use the term Pashtun throughout the text to refer to the 

main ethnic group on the North-West Frontier and the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

border region. When quoting from other sources, the terms Pashtun and Pathan 

will be used interchangeably.

2. David Rose, “Hunting the Taliban in the footsteps of Winston Churchill: 

On lawless battlefields nothing has changed in a century,” Daily Mail Online, 

20 June 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1194352/

Hunting-Taliban-footsteps-Winston-Churchill.html (accessed 21 June 2009).

3. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks On Tribal 

Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India (London: Gale and Polden, 1932); 

T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 

1849–1947 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 240.

4. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of 

Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security, 

Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), 42.

5. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935 (Sussex, UK: Published jointly by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. and The 

Imperial War Museum, n.d.), vii; quoted in T.R. Moreman, 183–184.

6. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India (Calcutta, 

India: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1925), 1.

7. Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The 

North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936–1937 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2000), 290.
6

Map 1. Map Depicting Pashtun Majority Area.

Balochistan

PAKISTAN

IRAN

INDIA

CHINA

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

Sindh

Punjab

Kabul

Northern

Areas

Northwest

Frontier 

Province

Federally

Administered

Tribal Areas

Islamabad

Capital

Territory

Azad

Kashmir

Islamabad

Arabian Sea

0 50 100 m

Pashtun Majority Area

Line of Control

AFGHANISTAN

Balochistan

PAKISTAN

IRAN

INDIA

CHINA

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

Sindh

Punjab

Kabul

Northern

Areas

Northwest

Frontier 

Province

Federally

Administered

Tribal Areas

Islamabad

Capital

Territory

Azad

Kashmir

Islamabad

Arabian Sea

0 50 100 m

Pashtun Majority Area

Line of Control

AFGHANISTAN
7

Chapter 1

The Pashtuns and The First Afghan War

We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, 

we are content with blood. We will never be content with 

a master.

 Elderly Pashtun Tribesman, 1809

The conceit of Imperial Britain to assume that its forces 

were vastly superior to any other native army east of the 

Suez would more than once prove disastrous but this was 

the most egregious miscalculation of all.

 John H. Waller

Beyond The Khyber Pass

Background

By 1818, The East India Company, under the auspices of the British 

government, was firmly entrenched in India. Driven by colonial ambition, 

the Company had managed by the 1830s to increase its assets, expanding 

north to the border of Nepal and in the east, to the edge of Burma. Only 

in the west was the Company’s expansionist policy stymied by the imposing military forces of the Punjab. However, with the death of the powerful 

ruler of Punjab, Ranjit Singh in 1839, the British began casting their gaze 

towards the lands west of the Indus River, specifically Afghanistan. Many 

within the British Government believed the distant kingdom would make 

an excellent “buffer” to counter Russian encroachment from the north.1

Geography and the Pashtuns

Sandwiched between the ill-defined border of Afghanistan and Punjab, 

lies a lengthy expanse of territory known as the North-West Frontier. This 

harsh and mountainous terrain was inhabited by various independent Pashtun tribes who were linked by the Pashtu language and other cultural connections to their brethren in Afghanistan. In fact, many of the tribes were 

trans-border clans inhabiting areas on both sides of the indistinct boundary. 

Composed of approximately 350 tribes, each containing numerous clans 

or khels, the Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group within the North-West 

Frontier. According to one expert in the field, the individual tribesman was: 

Surrounded by concentric rings consisting of family, 

extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and the major 

cultural-linguistic group. The hierarchy of loyalties cor-
8

respond to these circles and become more intense as the 

circle gets smaller. Seldom does the Afghan, regardless of 

cultural background, need the services and/or the facilities 

of the national government. Thus in the case of crisis, his 

recourse is to kinship and, if necessary, the larger cultural 

group. National feelings and loyalties are filtered through 

the successive layers.2

For centuries, the inhospitable terrain and the autonomous warrior 

ethos of the Pashtuns allowed them to resist all outside rule or authority. 

David Dichter writes; “Because of the craggy wilderness of their mountains, 

the Pathans have been able to remain free of the troublesome external 

authority of social institutions in a way that is almost unprecedented in 

the history of either the eastern or western world.”3 The Pashtuns are a 

fiercely democratic and independent people and while most or all are 

Sunni Muslims, their distinct and unwritten code of Pashtunwali is the 

true foundation and guiding principle of their society. As an example, an 

erstwhile Pashtun proverb declared; “Obey the mullah’s teachings but do 

not go by what he does.”4

Pashtunwali, which means “the way of the Pashtun,” is sacred within 

their culture. “The more one adheres to its maxims,” wrote the renowned 

Pashtun authority, Sher Muhammad Mohmand, “the more high esteem 

he enjoys in his brotherhood and community.”5 The code, according to 

Mohmand, compels Pashtuns; “to defend their motherland, to grant asylum 

to fugitives irrespective of their creed or caste and to offer protection even 

to his deadly enemy and to wipe out insult with insult.”6

 As a result, revenge plays a key role in Pashtunwali with reprisals often being repaid tenfold. Today, little has changed. In a recent article in The New York Times, 

Ganesh Sitaraman declared that; “In the midst of these interconnected insurgent relationships, tribal feuds and blood feuds between families put the 

Hatfields and McCoys to shame.”7 One Pashtun, wrote Sitaraman, “waited 

40 years before taking vengeance on his neighbor. Insurgency was his cover for retribution.”8

This unremitting cycle of vengeance often kept the Pashtun tribes at 

each other’s throats, and as a result, they were often incapable of uniting 

under a unified banner. On the other hand, if their homeland was threatened 

or a Faqir or Mullah could incite the tribes into a jihad (holy war) against 

the foreign infidel, the Pashtuns were capable of uniting for brief periods 

against a perceived enemy. When the drums beat, the tribes would form 

into a lashkar which is a term usually applied to a warrior force of over 200 

men. Mohmand pointed out that; “Lashkar as used in the tribal sense, can 
9

Map 2. The Pashtun Tribes. Tribal names in Bold Script.

ORAKZAI

Ambela Pass ] [

Oxus R.

BALUCHISTAN

KHOST

KAFIRISTAN

SWAT

CHITRAL

BAJAUR

BUNER

PESHAWAR

TIRAH

KOHAT

KURRAM

DERA ISMAIL

KHAN

BANNU

WAZIRISTAN

MOHMANDS

Swat R.

Panjkora R.

Kunar R.

Kabul R.

Indus R.

] [

] [

] [

Shandur Pass

Gomal

R.

Shutargardan Pass

Hindu Kush Range

Black Mts

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Wana •Jandola

Dera Ismail Khan

Peshawar

Rawalpindi

Attock

Kabul

Jalalabad

Chakdara

Chitral

Dir

AFGHANISTAN

•Bannu

] [

Lonurai

Pass

Gandamak •

Safed Koh Range

] [

Khurd Kabul Pass

] [

LAGHMAN

Kurram R.

Jagdalak Pass

MAMUNDS

YOSUFZAI

] [

Malakand Pass

Khyber Pass

Peiwar Kotal

] [

•

Kohat

•

Marden

Nowshera

•

AFRIDI

WAZIR

MAHSUD

WAZIR

KHATTAK

•Tank

Zohb R.

WAZIR

Tochi R.

Samana R.

Dargai Heights

Kohat Pass

Bara R.

Wakan R.

TURI

] [

•Charikar

Bazar Valley

0 50 100 m

•Thal

ORAKZAI

Ambela Pass ] [

Oxus R.

BALUCHISTAN

KHOST

KAFIRISTAN

SWAT

CHITRAL

BAJAUR

BUNER

PESHAWAR

TIRAH

KOHAT

KURRAM

DERA ISMAIL

KHAN

BANNU

WAZIRISTAN

MOHMANDS

Swat R.

Panjkora R.

Kunar R.

Kabul R.

Indus R.

] [

] [

] [

Shandur Pass

Gomal

R.

Shutargardan Pass

Hindu Kush Range

Black Mts

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Wana •Jandola

Dera Ismail Khan

Peshawar

Rawalpindi

Attock

Kabul

Jalalabad

Chakdara

Chitral

Dir

AFGHANISTAN

•Bannu

] [

Lonurai

Pass

Gandamak •

Safed Koh Range

] [

Khurd Kabul Pass

] [

LAGHMAN

Kurram R.

Jagdalak Pass

MAMUNDS

YOSUFZAI

] [

Malakand Pass

Khyber Pass

Peiwar Kotal

] [

•

Kohat

•

Marden

Nowshera

•

AFRIDI

WAZIR

MAHSUD

WAZIR

KHATTAK

•Tank

Zohb R.

WAZIR

Tochi R.

Samana R.

Dargai Heights

Kohat Pass

Bara R.

Wakan R.

TURI

] [

•Charikar

Bazar Valley

0 50 100 m

•Thal
10

be employed as a crusade or a holy war or can even be against a particular 

policy of the government. The tribal lashkar in the latter case continues 

until the political authorities see it appropriate to sit down with them across 

the table and carve out an amicable settlement.”9

 It would prove a Pashtu 

term that the British would come to know well. 

The North-West Frontier is slightly over 700 miles, with widths varying between 60 and 280 miles. This combines an unwelcoming landscape 

with an equally unreceptive tribal society.10 In the far north at Chitral, the 

Hindu Kush Mountains dominated the landscape. South of Chitral, in Dir 

Swat, the Yusufzai tribes occupied the productive valleys inter-spaced between the 15,000 to 22,000 feet high mountains. Southwest of Swat, the 

Mohmand tribes straddled the border north of the strategically important 

Khyber Pass. South of the Khyber Pass and Peshawar, the Afridi tribes occupied the area. In the Tirah region, south of the Afridi tribes, the Orakzais 

and Turi tribes lived amid the mass of hills and cultivatable valleys. Further 

south, the Wazir and Mahsud tribes occupied the wooded scrub covered 

peaks of Waziristan, in the shadow of the Sulaiman Mountain Range. Slicing through this mountainous landscape are four major mountain passes 

that, according to one authority in the field, “followed the course of the 

Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal Rivers. These formed the main arteries 

of trade and migration, as well as the historic invasion routes into India.”11

Conversely, these mountain passes also offered a path for British imperial 

aims and ambitions. 

Bloody Prelude: The First Afghan War, 1839–1842

The ease with which the British and Indian soldiers of the Army of the 

Indus toppled the Afghan government, in what would become known as 

the First Afghan War, was truly astonishing. The objective of the foray into 

Afghanistan was regime change to replace the existing sovereign with a 

pro-British ruler. Crossing the Indus River and marching over 1,200 miles 

across some of the most rugged terrain in the world, the Army of the Indus easily brushed aside Afghan forces determined to contest the invasion. 

“For subsequent events,” wrote Dr. Tony Heathcote; “it would have been 

recorded as one of the British Indian Army’s most successful campaigns.”12

Indeed, the occupation of Kabul in August of 1839 proved a major victory 

for both the British Army and the English chartered East India Company.

Over the course of the next two years however, the British Army of 

occupation reduced its numbers, by sending scores of soldiers back to India. At the same time, those officers who remained, sent for their families to join them in Kabul. According to Jules Stewart, the British forces 

ensconced around the city; “had been lulled into a state of complacency 
11

by the ease with which the Afghans had been beaten into submission.”13

While hubris was certainly a factor, inept leadership and major cutbacks in 

expenditures would also play a key role in the looming catastrophe. When 

the cost of propping up the new regime (essentially bribing Afghan tribal 

leaders to support the new ruler) proved too expensive, British authorities 

reduced disbursements to the eastern Pashtuns (Ghilzais) who were paid 

not to disrupt the British lines of communications back to India and who 

also controlled the mountain passes between Kabul and the British fort at 

Jalalabad, Afghanistan, as well as the strategically important Khyber Pass. 

At the same time, another British Brigade was sent back to India in an effort to further reduce cost and “Afghanize” the situation.14

Displeased by the reduction in their stipend, the Pashtuns immediately 

shut down the passes between Kabul and Jalalabad. In a portent of what 

was to come, the tribesmen managed to inflict over 100 casualties on the 

recently removed British Brigade which was still treading its way east toward Jalalabad. Soon, major tribal uprisings were occurring all around Kabul. In Charikar, north of Kabul, frenzied tribesmen butchered wounded 

soldiers as well as women and children. By November of 1841, the situation had grown dire for the British garrison outside Kabul. Last minute attempts at negotiations and diplomatic skullduggery proved fruitless. When, 

in late December, the ranking British political officer was shot and cut into 

pieces and his remaining body parts staked out at the main gate to the Kabul bazaar by Pashtuns, there remained only one real option for the Kabul 

garrison. This was to withdraw to the British stronghold in Jalalabad.15

A first-rate commander, endeavoring to march the garrison of Kabul 

90 miles to Jalalabad in the dead of winter and with thousands of Pashtuns situated in the surrounding mountains and hills, would have found the 

task almost insurmountable. Unfortunately, the aging and doddering Major 

General William Elphinstone, commanded the encircled soldiers and civilians. Elphinstone’s ineptitude at the battle of Waterloo in 1815 was appreciably exceeded during the winter of 1841 to 1842.16 As supplies began to 

dwindle and morale plummeted, “Elphinstone issued and counter-manded 

orders, demoralizing and confusing his men;” wrote Heathcote. “Finally 

his commands degenerated into mere suggestions or invitations to use their 

own judgement.”17

On the 5th of January in 1842, the garrison began its desperate trek 

toward Jalalabad. Those too sick or wounded to make the journey were left 

to the mercy of the Afghans. Traveling through the thin defiles and mountain passes, 4,500 British and Indian soldiers along with a large contingent 

of British women and children and 12,000 camp followers, staggered east 
12

through a canopy of snow and ice. In short order, the Pashtuns commenced 

nipping at the heels of the rear guard.18

On the 13th of January, a lone rider appeared on the frozen plain below the British fortress of Jalalabad. Flinging open the gates of the citadel, a party of British horsemen galloped forward to investigate. To their 

surprise, they found Dr. William Brydon, an assistant surgeon assigned 

to the Kabul garrison. He was covered in blood and both horse and rider 

were barely alive. Brydon was suffering the consequences of a stoning, a 

gunshot wound to the leg, and several sword cuts to his head and other extremities. As they hurried the wounded man back into the fort, the British 

soldiers were stunned by his report. With the exception of a small number 

of hostages held for ransom, the entire column had been slaughtered in the 

ice-covered corridors between Kabul and Jalalabad. Firing their jezails or 

muskets from the jagged cliffs above and closing in on small groups of 

British defenders with shield and sword, the tribesmen had destroyed the 

Kabul garrison.19

While many British politicians were now convinced that their forces 

should withdraw to India, honor demanded revenge for the debacle. “It is 

impossible to impress upon you too strongly,” wrote the celebrated Duke 

of Wellington to the Governor-General of India, “the Notion of the importance of the restoration of reputation in the east.”20 In February of 1842, a 

new British commander, Major General George Pollock, arrived in Peshawar in India, determined to restore British prestige. His plan was to march 

his forces through the Khyber Pass and relieve the garrison at Jalalabad, 

which had been besieged by the Afghans after the destruction of the Kabul 

garrison. Pollock then planned to march on Kabul and deal with the hostage situation.21

On the 5th of April, Pollock launched his assault on the stoutly defended Khyber Pass. Securing the surrounding peaks in order to protect his 

flanks and fire down onto the enemy, Pollock stunned the Pashtun defenders by using the tribe’s own traditional maneuver. According to Heathcote; 

The surprise was not merely one of timing but of tactics 

and Pollock entered Pathan folklore as the first plainsdwelling general to use the Pathan technique of seizing 

the high ground or ‘crowning the heights.’ Flanking columns clambered up the hills on either side of the road, 

each party with its buglers warned to sound the ‘advance’ 

or ‘halt’ if they got too far ahead or behind its neighbours. 

Now it was the turn of the Pathans to be shot down by fire 

from above.22
13

By the end of the day, the British had seized the Khyber Pass and 

routed the defenders. While the tactics employed by Pollock against the 

Pashtuns were simple and consistent with age-old military principles, it 

would be one of many lessons surprisingly difficult for the British to retain 

over the course of the next hundred years.23

By September, Pollock recaptured Kabul and secured the release of the 

hostages. In October however, the British once again abandoned the capital 

and withdrew their forces back to India. They would not make the same 

mistake twice. Seizing control of Kabul had proven simple. Occupying 

the country and maintaining lines of communications with India through 

Pashtun tribal areas on the other hand, was judged to be unworkable. As 

historian Alan Warren pointed out, the British “correctly concluded that the 

task of governing Afghanistan was beyond the scope of India’s resources.”24

Nevertheless, for the British it would not be their last war with Afghanistan 

and it would certainly not be the last time they confronted the Pashtun 

tribes of the North-West Frontier. 
14

Notes

1. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern 

India (Second edition) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 68, 

90.

2. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of 

Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security, 

Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), 51.

3. David Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan: A Study in 

Regional Geography (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1967), 3.

4. Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots 

of Modern Jihad (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 2.

5. Sher Muhammad Mohmand, The Pathan Customs (Peshawar, Pakistan: 

n.p., 2003), 1–2.

6. Mohmand, 42.

7. Ganesh Sitaraman, “The Land of 10,000 Wars,” The New York Times, 17 

August 2009.

8. Ganesh Sitaraman, “The Land of 10,000 Wars,” The New York Times, 17 

August 2009.

9. Mohmand, 1–2, 42.

10. Dichter, 7–8; T. R. Moreman, The Army of India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 1. 

11. T.R. Moreman, 1–2.

12. T.A. Heathcote, The Afghan Wars 1839–1919 (Kent, UK: Spellmount, 

2003), 42–43.

13. Jules Stewart, The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda

(Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2005), 3.

14. Heathcote, 52; Stewart, 4; Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the NorthWest Frontier 1839–1947 (London: Cassell, 1982), 37.

15. Barthorp, 37; Heathcote, 53, 57; Stewart, 4; John H. Waller, Beyond The 

Khyber Pass: The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War (New York, 

NY: Random House, 1990), 232–235; Charles Miller, Khyber: British India’s 

North-West Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine (New York: Macmillan, 

1977), 65–68. 

16. Alessandro Barbero, The Battle: A New History of Waterloo, trans. John 

Cullen (New York: Walker & Company, 2003), 266–267.

17. Heathcote, 58.

18. Heathcote, 58.

19. Barthorp, 3; Waller, 254–255; Miller, 79; Heathcote, 63.

20. Heathcote, 72.

21. Heathcote, 68.

22. Heathcote, 68–69.

23. Miller, 83.

24. Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The 

North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936–1937 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2000), xx.
15

Chapter 2

“Discomfiture Might Suffice As Punishment”

British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier 

1849–1900

The general attitude of the tribes is at present neither 

peaceful nor submissive.

 General Report on the Administration of the Punjab, 

1849–1851

There are many pensioned or discharged officers and soldiers among them who doubtless impart the military training they themselves acquired in the ranks of the Native 

Army.

 British General Sir William Lockhart 

The Punjab Irregular Force

With the successful conclusion of the Second Sikh War in 1849, the 

British East India Company officially annexed the Punjab. The Company 

was now neighbors with the population living west of the Indus River and 

the long running troubles between the Sikhs and the Pashtun tribes of the 

North-West Frontier became a British problem. The new custodians of 

Punjab faced the daunting task of protecting the border areas from transborder Pashtun raids and assaults. This is something the Sikhs had never 

been able to prevent.1

The new British administration in Punjab attempted to introduce a conciliatory policy toward the tribes. There would be no encroachment by the 

British past the foothills of Punjab. This guiding principle was, to a degree, 

rooted in the terrible recollections of the First Afghan War. According to 

the British historian T.R. Moreman “Tribal independence was recognized 

and they were actively encouraged to trade with British India, given access 

to medical and other assistance, and allowed to enlist in the ranks of the 

police and military forces to promote friendly relations. British officials 

were also expressly forbidden to go into tribal territory to minimize incidents in what was commonly known as the ‘close border’ policy.”2

 Over 

100,000 well-armed Pashtun tribesmen confronted the British, determined 

to continue their highly profitable raids into Punjab. That the East India 

Company was exceedingly worried about the tribes is confirmed in early 

testimony by its directors: 

The sense which our predecessors entertained of their 

prowess,” the report noted; “is attested by the forts now 
16

standing and by the tumuli, at short intervals all down the 

Derajat, on which military posts were probably placed 

1,500 years ago to oppose them. They are not capable 

of combination but they could make desultory attacks in 

ceaseless succession. It is clear that, if unopposed, they 

would devastate the . . . country down to the Indus and 

threaten our Cis-Indus districts. Thus, to guard the line of 

the Indus, a greater force would be required than that now 

employed.3

This new military contingent was designated as the Punjab 

Irregular Force (PIF). The organization was composed initially of five 

infantry regiments and five cavalry regiments, as well as three light or 

mountain batteries which were designed along the same lines as the 

irregular forces employed by the British Bengal Army in India. An elite 

force formed primarily of Pashtuns called the “Queen’s Own Corps of 

Guides”, was also created. Fashioned to guide regular army units and 

perform scouting missions, the Guides would become legendary on the 

North-West Frontier. Four British officers, 16 native officers and 96 noncommissioned officers were assigned to each regiment with its ranks 

composed of Sikhs, Pashtuns, Gurkhas, Punjabi Muslims, and others.4

A few of the British officers assigned to the PIF had served in the 

First Afghan War and were somewhat familiar with the trans-border Pashtun tribes. For the cost of three rupees, British officers unacquainted with 

commanding and training irregular forces could turn to Captain Charles 

Farquhar Trower’s Hints on Irregular Cavalry: Its Conformation, Management and Use in Both A Military and Political Point of View. Published in Calcutta in 1845, Trower’s work was an unofficial publication 

designed to aid British officers unfamiliar with irregular forces. Having 

commanded a myriad of native irregulars in India, Trower’s notes on the 

training and oversight of local forces is as important today as it was in the 

mid-nineteenth century, particularly his assessments of how to work with 

the Pashtun tribes.5

“It is,” wrote Trower, “universally admitted, that the efficiency of native soldiers generally depends on their European Officers.”6

 An officer, he 

pointed out, should,

be able to converse really fluently with those entrusted to 

him. He should be well versed in their customs, habits, and 

peculiar modes of thinking and feeling, which can alone 

be acquired by mixing much with natives. He should be 

a man of admirable temper, never hasty, firm and yet pa-
17

tient. For many things apparently trifling to our ideas, are 

of much importance in their estimation and it is a great, 

although a frequent, mistake to judge of the conduct of 

natives by the standard which we have set up for our own.7

Trower also maintained that; “mixing with the men in their warlike 

sports creates affection, as the excelling [of] them in their own line produces admiration.”8

Trower was convinced that the Pashtun tribesmen made the finest irregular cavalry. “They are generally illiterate, haughty and turbulent,” he 

wrote, “but they are gallant and true, hard-working and zealous, and even 

with a little kindness and tact in their management, make such troops as no 

one need hesitate to lead where the blows are most rife.”9 The captain also 

pointed out that there was “a strong feeling of clanship” between the Pashtuns and “they are peculiarly sensitive to the opinion of their own ‘Khel’ 

or ‘Zye.’” In the end, Trower understood it was the treatment the Pashtun 

received “which will make them either cheerful and zealous soldiers or 

useless rabble.” He continued:

There is none however, who can less bear rudeness or offensive language and he must never be submitted to either. 

He must feel that he is certain of being well received by 

his officer. Nothing in treatment or obedience should be 

imposed on, or required of the soldier which may tend to 

lower him in his own estimation or in that of his fellows 

in or out of service. An officer who has not had much intimacy with natives of this description, even with the best 

intentions, may unwillingly offend and annoy them from 

his very ignorance.10

Trower was also convinced that officers should; “Have nothing to 

say to their [Pashtuns’] private and domestic affairs. You will thus escape 

much trouble and considerable ill-will.”11

The PIF was placed under the control of the Board of Administration 

of the Punjab, removing it from regular army control. In his book The 

Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947, T.R. 

Moreman contended that; “This decision to localize the PIF solely for duty 

in the Punjab gave the Board of Administration almost complete control 

of the troops stationed along the border, enabling it to quickly respond 

to raids or other developments without constant recourse to the central 

government for military support.”12 British political officers were also appointed to work with the military and “held sway” over the armed forces.13
18

In what would become known as a “watch and ward” mission, the 

PIF positioned units in every district, establishing quick reaction forces 

to prohibit raids into the border region and to chase down Pashtun 

brigands before they could escape to the safety of their mountain refuge. 

A road running parallel to the border was quickly built as were a series 

of outposts and forts. “Cavalry regiments;” wrote Moreman, “along with 

small detachments of infantry, were dispersed in a chain of small mud 

forts, blockhouses, and outposts that blocked valleys, ravines, and other 

lines of approach leading down from the hills used by raiding gangs. The 

intervening ground between these posts was systematically patrolled by 

cavalry detachments to deter raids, gather intelligence, and attempt to 

intercept parties of marauders following attacks on local villages.”14

 In spite of these arrangements, the 700 mile border proved virtually 

impossible to defend against tribal raids. Pashtun raiders continued to 

infiltrate from the frontier into Punjab. Despite the support of a large 

contingent of regular troops from the Bengal Army of India that had been 

sent to the Peshawar District to guard against Afghan incursions, Pashtun 

marauders continued to commit depredations all along the border. The East 

India Company’s Court of Directors was so astonished by their prowess 

that they described the Pashtun intruders in near herculean prose in an 

early report to the government. They wrote; “The mountaineers can both 

attack and fly with the utmost rapidity, all of them being active footmen and 

many of them being mounted on small and hardy cattle, capable not only of 

making extraordinary marches in the open country and threading the rough 

narrow glens and passes of the hills but also of ascending their sides and 

literally passing over rocks, hillocks, and ridges that a mere denizen of the 

plains would not dare to face.”15

 The construction of 15 forts and 50 outposts and the stationing of 

12,800 irregular and 10,821 regular soldiers in Punjab by 1855, did little to 

quell the forays. While British political officers tried their best to maintain 

amity with the tribes of the North-West Frontier, the constant raiding 

by the Pashtuns forced them to retaliate against the tribes. Frequently, 

these retaliatory measures included curtailing payments to the clans, 

hostage taking, fines, trading blockades, and the withdrawal of economic 

development. Many times these corrective measures proved successful;. 

When they did not however, the British often resorted to punitive 

expeditions that were soon given the implacable moniker of “butcher and 

bolt.”16

These punitive expeditions were also called “harry and hurry” and “tip 

and run.” They were often the last resort for British officials attempting to 
19

bring an errant tribe back into line. On more than one occasion, Pashtuns 

refused to turn over wanted criminals to the British authorities as this violated the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali. This refusal triggered a punitive 

expedition. Significantly, this is the same code which today allows the Taliban and al-Qaida to find sanctuary with the trans-border Pashtun tribes. 

The code is also a societal paradigm that the US Army and other western 

forces have struggled to comprehend in the years since 2001.17

The “butcher and bolt” operations often included the destruction 

of Pashtun villages, crops, concealed provisions, and supplies of water. 

According to one historian, the expeditions were designed to create the 

maximum inconvenience and total bankruptcy.18 While not every British 

commander and soldier favored these techniques, many believed it was 

the best solution to the problem short of occupying the entire North-West 

Frontier, a remedy that at the time, was completely unacceptable to the 

government. British commander Sir Richard Temple concluded in 1855:

When an expedition is undertaken, then if the enemy were 

to assemble in force and take up a position and offer battle, 

they could be attacked and defeated and their discomfiture 

might suffice as punishment, without any further measure. 

In that event, the affair would be conducted after the manner of regular warfare.19

Temple quickly identified operations in the frontier region as something other than regular warfare:

In civilized warfare, force is directed against the armed 

enemy and his defensible positions but not against his 

country and subjects, who may be morally unconcerned 

in the hostilities and innocent of offence. However, this is 

not civilized warfare. The enemy does not possess troops 

that stand to be attacked nor defensible posts to be taken 

nor innocent subjects to be spared. He has only rough hills 

to be penetrated, robber fastnesses to be scaled, and dwellings containing people, all of them to a man concerned in 

hostilities.20

In summing up the key to achieving victory over the rebellious Pashtuns, Temple made it clear that the Pashtun population could be considered combatants. He claimed; “To spare these villages would be about as 

reasonable as to spare the commissariat supplies or arsenals of a civilized 

enemy.”21
20

Carrying out these operations in Pashtun territory was no easy task. 

An expedition would have to be supported by a lengthy logistical column 

forced to snake its way through the narrow valley floors and across dry riverbeds and other precipitous and challenging terrain. More often than not, 

wheeled transport could not maneuver through this type of terrain, forcing 

the expedition to rely on pack mules. “As there was a limit to the number 

of men and pack animals that could move over one road in daylight;” wrote 

Moreman, “large forces normally had to be broken into several columns 

and moved by separate routes.”22 These columns were of course, extremely vulnerable to attack from a Pashtun lashkar perched in the mountains 

above the slow moving force. As Moreman has pointed out; “Lashkars excelled at desultory hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, attacking isolated parties 

of troops, raiding convoys on the lines of communication, sniping foraging 

parties, and attacking rear guards at the end of each day’s operation.”23

While many of the tribesmen within a lashkar were armed with swords, 

knives, and shields, countless others were able to acquire the jezail which 

was a locally manufactured muzzle-loading musket. In both range and accuracy however, the jezail surpassed the Brown Bess muskets employed 

by the British during the early years on the North-West Frontier.

Fifteen major “butcher and bolt” expeditions were conducted between 

1849 and 1857.24 T.R. Moreman has noted that; “By trial and error, the PIF 

evolved a series of specialized principles and minor tactics tailored to local 

conditions in tribal territory. To meet tribesmen on equal terms, its infantry 

regiments developed light infantry skills, skirmishing skills, skill at arms, 

marksmanship skills, self-reliance skills, and fieldcraft. These [skills] were 

modeled on those of their opponents. Mountain artillery batteries were 

equipped with light ordnance [which was] capable of being dismantled 

and transported in the hills on muleback.”25

The main objective of British and Indian soldiers was to bring about a 

large engagement with the Pashtun tribes in order to inflict as many casualties as possible and thus discourage the enemy and bring him to terms. 

Many times however, this type of punitive action proved unsuccessful. 

Whereupon, the British Army in India often resorted to burning villages 

and crops in order to chastise and dishearten the tribesmen. As Pollock 

had done years before in his operation in the Khyber Pass, British and 

Indian soldiers moving against tribes protected themselves by maintaining the high ground. Piquets, which is a French term for outpost or guard, 

were almost always positioned on the high ground to protect the slow moving columns as they inched their way into tribal territory. As the columns 

passed the piquets would pack up and either move to a new location or 
21

join the column. It was indeed a dangerous undertaking as the tribes were 

frequently waiting to assail the outpost while it was being built or during 

its withdrawal.26

Night encampments also had to be protected. These military camps 

were ringed by piquets with the main force ensconced behind sturdy barricades made of rocks, ammo boxes, or whatever material could be found 

to protect against tribal snipers and massed attacks by sword-wielding 

Pashtuns. While marching into tribal territory to conduct a “butcher and 

bolt” mission was always risky, the withdrawal phase of the operation often proved the most dangerous. More often than not, the Pashtuns would 

attack the rear guard elements during this delicate phase of the expedition. “The brutal treatment frequently meted out to British or Indian dead 

and wounded by tribesmen;” wrote Moreman, “exerted a powerful influence on hill warfare which necessitated rapid counterattacks to recover the 

dead bodies and prisoners, as they could not be allowed to fall into enemy 

hands.”27

An operation carried out in 1850 provides insight to how many of 

these actions were conducted. While the British disbursed a large annual 

subsidy to an Afridis’ khel to maintain security in the Kohat Pass, 1,000 

of their tribesmen attacked a small group of British engineers constructing a road, killing and wounding many. Soon, an expeditionary force was 

marching toward the Kohat Pass. As the column advanced, a Punjab infantry regiment picketed the surrounding peaks. As the British approached the 

village of Akhor, the maliks (tribal elders) came forward to meet them and 

state their case. The British commanders told the maliks that they had one 

hour to surrender and turn over all their weapons. After briefly discussing 

the matter, the elders refused these British terms. Immediately, elements 

of the PIF crowned the heights around the village while horse artillery and 

infantry formed for an assault. 28 Stationed behind a stone breastwork or 

sangar, the tribesmen put up a gallant but brief defense. Once the village 

was captured, it was partly destroyed.

Marching into the pass, the British sent pickets to the high ground and 

encamped for the night. Thus far, the operation had gone off without a 

hitch. However, this was only because the Pashtuns had been unable to exploit a British mistake. In the morning, as the pickets manning the heights 

around the pass were relieved, the Pashtuns found their chance to strike. 

An Indian officer failed to follow the correct procedures in relieving the 

pickets, neglecting to provide security as they were coming off the mountain. From their hiding places, the Afridis quickly assailed the pickets and 

wounded several. The attackers were eventually driven back by the horse 

artillery. 
22

Before marching out of the pass, corrective measures were applied 

by the British command to ensure that everyone understood proper picket 

procedures and, as a result, the return march home proved uneventful. One 

historian of the North-West Frontier wrote that; “As expedition followed 

expedition and the tribesmen grew more and more expert at ‘reading’ the 

movements of troops, the relief of pickets and the relative positions of 

advance and rear guards as well as the main bodies of columns, had to 

be regulated with absolute precision if trouble were to be avoided. The 

whole business in fact, became a battle drill.”29 Like the Taliban of today, 

the Pashtuns of the mid-nineteenth century were exceedingly capable of 

shifting tactics and exploiting mistakes. History would show that if their 

enemies were not fully versed and practiced in this type of warfare, that the 

outcome often led to disastrous consequences. 

Between 1849 and 1886, the PIF (whose name was changed to the 

Punjab Frontier Force or PFF, in 1865) acquired valuable skills in fighting 

the Pashtuns in the rugged mountainous terrain of the North-West Frontier. 

It was soon realized that these operations were poles apart from operations 

conducted elsewhere and required new tactics and skill sets. Native 

contingents within the PIF who were familiar with this type of warfare, 

proved invaluable in helping to implement many of these procedures. 

In 1862, a new Frontier Militia was created. Its members were Pashtun 

tribesmen and, according to one source, they provided local knowledge, 

acted as guides, and collected valuable intelligence regarding raids and 

offences committed by the trans-border tribes.30 The new militia also 

provided employment to Pashtuns, who might otherwise have been 

involved in continued criminal activity. The Pashtun militiamen proved 

immensely successful and greatly increased the effectiveness of the PIF.

Throughout this period, many British officers were troubled by the 

Regular Army’s lack of training in frontier warfare. Regular Army soldiers 

of the Bengal Army who were posted to Peshawar, rarely conducted punitive expeditions and trained almost exclusively in conventional tactics. 

They also lacked the light logistical transport needed to conduct campaigns 

in the tribal regions of the North-West Frontier. The Irregular Forces on the 

other hand, trained constantly in mountain warfare as well as in light infantry tactics which emphasized individual initiative and continually sharpened their skills by participating in numerous expeditions. 

A British Commissioner assigned to Peshawar in this period noted that 

frontier warfare required special training. The simple transfer of regular 

forces to the area, he believed, would always fail. The commissioner explained:
23

I have no hesitation in saying that troops freshly and indiscriminately brought to the work must fail even physically, 

they would break down. I can assure the government that 

I have seen sepoys of the Regular Army shot down and 

cut down on the hillside, perfectly helpless, whilst their 

comrades of the Irregular Force have been driving the enemy up a neighbouring hill and if you look to smaller matters (which in truth make up the efficiency of the whole) 

we shall see how the Irregular of the Punjab Force excels 

[over] his comrade in the Regular Army.31

Moreover, according to the commissioner, the nature of operations 

dictated a dispersed disposition of forces, making the competency and 

initiative of the lower level leaders of critical importance. He asserted; 

“It is necessary to occupy many points and to keep up communications 

with them all. This involves the detachment of many parties, and Native 

Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are frequently commanding 

small but important posts which requires intelligence, care, and prudence 

of mind [as well as] knowledge of the enemy’s tactics.”32

As an illustration, during the disastrous Second Afghan War (1878–

1880), the regular British-Indian Army struggled to conduct irregular 

mountain warfare against the Pashtun tribes, while the PFF performed remarkably well. Since the PFF fell under the purview of the Punjab Government instead of the British military command, little attempt had been made 

to disseminate irregular doctrine and tactics to the regular forces. As T.R. 

Moreman has pointed out, the PFF was not responsible for the circulation 

of tactical information beyond the few regulars that had fought alongside 

it on active service. As long as PFF units could cope with fighting tribesmen with limited outside assistance, there was simply no need to develop 

a tactical doctrine for training the rest of the British and Indian armies.33 In 

1886, the PFF was finally placed under the control of the British military. 

However, it would take a massive Pashtun uprising to convince the British 

of the need to publish new training manuals and to train the entire regular 

force in frontier warfare. 

The Pashtun Revolt of 1897-1898

In July 1897, Wazir tribesmen murdered a British political officer in 

Northern Waziristan while he participated in a jirga (council). A Pashtun 

mullah, known by some as the “Mullah of Swat,” had generated the unrest. The British more commonly referred to this firebrand as the “Mad 

Mullah.” Following the assassination, the British moved swiftly to punish 

the culprits, advancing two brigades into Waziristan. The force consisted 
24

of veteran units well versed in frontier warfare. The brigades, designated 

as the Tochi Field Force, quickly quelled the rebellion and punished the 

wayward tribesmen.34

Unfortunately for the British, the rebellion soon spread outside of 

Northern Waziristan, fanned by the Mad Mullah’s call for a jihad against 

the infidels. On the 26th of July, a sizeable lashkar laid siege to a British 

fort at Chakdara near the Malakand Pass. Heavy attacks by sword and 

knife carrying Pashtuns led to bloody close quarters combat and nearly 

succeeded in overrunning the entire command. Enemy fighters in fact 

managed to enter a portion of the camp held by the engineers and remove a 

large quantity of ammunition before being forced back. Tribesmen armed 

with modern rifles also shot down scores of British and Indian soldiers. By 

the first week of August, British reinforcements, the Malakand Field Force, 

arrived and the siege was lifted. During the ensuing weeks, the British once 

again directed punitive operations against the tribesmen, this time in the 

Swat Valley.35

The retaliation had little effect on the tribes and the rebellion again 

spread. Pashtun tribes, aided by their Afghan brethren, launched an assault 

on a British fort in the Peshawar District on the 7th of August. By September, 

the new Mohmand Field Force joined the Malakand Field Force and set out 

to punish the tribes responsible for the attack in the Peshawar District. Both 

the Mohmand Field Force and the Malakand Field Force were seriously 

mauled in the ensuing actions. Large numbers of Pashtun tribesmen armed 

with Martini-Henrys and Remington rifles, used long-range fire to cut 

down advancing British and Indian soldiers, attacking with swords and 

knives only when their enemy conducted a withdrawal or committed a 

serious tactical error. The operation resulted in many missteps, leading 

to hundreds of British and Indian casualties. Although the British were 

finally able to bring the responsible tribes to terms, the brief campaign was 

marked by a lack of frontier skills on the part of many British and Indian 

soldiers and by the tactical expertise of the Pashtuns. “There is no doubt 

that our officers and men have much to learn in regard to keeping together 

and seeing to mutual support and to the ground, when they get away from 

direct authority;” wrote the commander of the expedition. “All the mishaps 

that have occurred here are traceable to carelessness on these points, which 

is brought out by the superior smartness of the enemy.”36

While the British had come to terms with the tribesmen who had 

attacked the Peshawar District, the conflict was not yet at an end. In the 

Khyber Pass region, the rebellion continued as the Afridis and Orakzais 

tribes formed lashkars and launched attacks against local levies. 
25

Map 3. The Pashtun Revolt of 1897-1898.

Peshawar

AFGHANISTAN Oxus R.

BALUCHISTAN

PUNJAB

KASHMIR

KHOST

SHINWARI

KAFIRISTAN

BOKHARA

DAREL

CHILAS

SWAT KOHISTAN

CHITRAL

MASTUJ

WAKHAN

BAJAUR

UTMANKHEL

BUNER

PESHAWAR

HAZARA

TIRAH

KOHAT

KURRAM

SHAWAL

BARGHA

SHERANI

DERA ISMAIL KHAN

BANNU

WAZIRISTAN

BIRMAL

MOHMANDS

Yarkhun R.

Chitral R.

Swat R.

Panjkora R.

Kunar R.

Kabul R.

Zhob R.

Indus R.

Jhelum

R.

Chenab R.

Indus R.

Sikaram▲

Durah Pass

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

Zidig Pass

Showal Pass

Shandur Pass

Malakand Pass

Khyber Pass

Gomal Pass

Shutargardan Pass

Hindu Kush Range

Little Pamir

Shandur Range

Black 

Mts

SHERANI

WAZIRISTAN

LARGHA

•

•

•

• •

• •

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

] [

Babusar Pass

Quetta & Bolan Pass

Wana •

Jandola

Dera Ismail Khan

Tank

Bannu

Maizar

Bagh

Rawalpindi

Attock

Kabul

Jalalabad

Chakdara

Chitral

Kamdesh

Dir

Yasin

Kalam

Chandak

Chilas

Kala Panja

Jhelum

Lala

Musa

Ali Musjid

] [

Kohat Pass

] [

Nahakki Pass

•Charikar

Sulaiman Mtn Range

Outer Boundary (Durand Line)

Inner Boundary (Administrative)

Provincial Boundary

Railways

0 50 100 m

•Thal

Peshawar

AFGHANISTAN Oxus R.

BALUCHISTAN

PUNJAB

KASHMIR

KHOST

SHINWARI

KAFIRISTAN

BOKHARA

DAREL

CHILAS

SWAT KOHISTAN

CHITRAL

MASTUJ

WAKHAN

BAJAUR

UTMANKHEL

BUNER

PESHAWAR

HAZARA

TIRAH

KOHAT

KURRAM

SHAWAL

BARGHA

SHERANI

DERA ISMAIL KHAN

BANNU

WAZIRISTAN

BIRMAL

MOHMANDS

Yarkhun R.

Chitral R.

Swat R.

Panjkora R.

Kunar R.

Kabul R.

Zhob R.

Indus R.

Jhelum

R.

Chenab R.

Indus R.

Sikaram▲

Durah Pass

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

] [

Zidig Pass

Showal Pass

Shandur Pass

Malakand Pass

Khyber Pass

Gomal Pass

Shutargardan Pass

Hindu Kush Range

Little Pamir

Shandur Range

Black 

Mts

SHERANI

WAZIRISTAN

LARGHA

•

•

•

• •

• •

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

] [

Babusar Pass

Quetta & Bolan Pass

Wana •

Jandola

Dera Ismail Khan

Tank

Bannu

Maizar

Bagh

Rawalpindi

Attock

Kabul

Jalalabad

Chakdara

Chitral

Kamdesh

Dir

Yasin

Kalam

Chandak

Chilas

Kala Panja

Jhelum

Lala

Musa

Ali Musjid

] [

Kohat Pass

] [

Nahakki Pass

•Charikar

Sulaiman Mtn Range

Outer Boundary (Durand Line)

Inner Boundary (Administrative)

Provincial Boundary

Railways

0 50 100 m

•Thal

The famed unit known as the Khyber Rifles was soon forced to surrender 

along with a sizable amount of their Snider rifles and ammunition.37 To put 

down the rebellion, the British formed an enormous new force christened 

as The Tirah Expeditionary Force. This new command contained over 
26

34,000 combat soldiers as well as over 19,000 combat support personnel 

supported by 34,000 pack animals. This sizable force faced nearly 50,000 

tribesmen, many of who were heavily armed with modern rifles. Many of 

the tribesmen were also veterans from the Indian Army and as Moreman 

has remarked; “[They were] aware of the tactics employed by imperial 

troops.”38

In the campaign that followed, the tribesmen used their modern rifles 

with deadly effect. British and Indian soldiers from the regular army, 

accustomed to slow and measured volley fire and untrained in frontier 

warfare, were no match for the tribesmen who used cover and concealment 

to fire down on the slow moving columns. In one engagement, a British 

and Indian battalion suffered 172 casualties while assaulting Pashtuns 

armed with quick-firing rifles. In many cases British artillery proved 

ineffective as clever tribesmen sought shelter in mountain fissures and other 

advantageous defensive positions. The Afridis and Orakzais soundly out 

shot and out maneuvered the slow and tactically inefficient expeditionary 

force. “The Afridis and Orakzais appear to be as well armed as our native 

troops;” wrote a high-ranking British officer. “There are many pensioned 

or discharged officers and soldiers among them who doubtless impart the 

military training they have themselves acquired in the ranks of the Native 

Army.”39 These men not only conveyed their knowledge of British tactical 

methods to their fellow tribesmen but developed new tactics based on their 

familiarity with the British system. As the British would find out more than 

once, the ally one trains and arms can suddenly become the enemy one has 

prepared and equipped.

It would take until April of 1898 to bring the tribes to terms. By that 

date, British and Indian forces had suffered almost 2,000 casualties from 

the frontier rebellion. In the Tirah Campaign alone, the expeditionary force 

had suffered over 1,000 casualties. An unidentified British officer wrote 

during the campaign; “Tirah is but the history of a failure, redeemed by 

gallant pluck and endurance of the fighting ranks and their officers.”40 He 

was probably not far off the mark in his observations. By the end of the 

campaign, the British Army in India began to issue new handbooks to its 

soldiers and institute a new training regime that was specifically designed 

to improve its capabilities in frontier warfare. While great improvements 

were made, the true test of these new methods could only be measured by 

renewed operations against the Pashtuns. 
27

Notes

1. Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839–1947

(London: Cassell, 1982), 49; T.R. Moreman, “‘The Greatest Training Ground in 

the World:’ The Army in India and the North-West Frontier 1901–1947,” in A 

Military History of India and South Asia from the East India Company to the 

Nuclear Era edited by Daniel P. Marston and Chandar S. Sundaram (Westport, CT: 

Praeger Security International, 2007), 53–54; T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: 

The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822–1922 (New York, NY: Hippocrene 

Books, 1974), 27.

2. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 5

3. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab for the Years 1849–

50 and 1850–1851 (London: Printed for the Court of Directors of the East India 

Company, 1854), 18.

4. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6; Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 

1839–1947, 51; Charles Miller, Khyber: British India’s North-West Frontier: 

The Story of an Imperial Migraine (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 113; Rajit K. 

Mazumder, The Indian Army and the Making of Punjab (Delhi, India: Permanent 

Black, 2003), 8.

5. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6; Captain Charles Farquhar Trower, Hints on Irregular 

Cavalry, Its Conformation, Management and Use in Both a Military and Political 

Point of View (Calcutta, India: W. Thacker and Co., 1845). 

6. Trower, 6.

7. Trower, 7–8.

8. Trower, 7–8.

9. Trower, 41.

10. Trower, 42.

11. Trower, 47

12. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6.

13. Arthur Swinson, North-West Frontier: People and Events, 1839–1947

(New York: Praeger, 1967), 102–103.

14. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6–7.

15. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab for the Years 1849–

1850 and 1850–1851, 31.

16. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 8; Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts (London, 

UK: Jonathan Cape, 1985), 2.

17. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 8–9; Miller, 116; Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, 

“No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

Frontier,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), 64.
28

18. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 8–9; Miller, 116.

19. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6.

20. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6.21.

22. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 9.

23. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 6.

24. Barthorp, 52.

25. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’” The Army in India and Frontier 

Warfare, 1914–39” in War and Society in Colonial India 1807–1945 edited by 

Kaushik Roy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 276–277.

26. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’” The Army in India and Frontier 

Warfare, 1914–39,” 276–277.

27. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’” The Army in India and Frontier 

Warfare, 1914–39,” 277.

28. Swinson, 105–106.

29. Swinson, 106.

30. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 23.

31. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 22.

32. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 22.

33. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 35.

34. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 53–54; Swinson, 232–233.

35. Swinson, 232; Captain H.L. Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West 

Frontier (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1912), 226; T.R. Moreman, The Army 

in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 54.

36. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 54–55.

37. For a complete history of this engagement, see Jules Stewart, The Khyber 

Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda (Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton Publishing 

Ltd., 2005), 121–156.

38. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 57.

39. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 62–63.

40. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 68, 71.
29

Chapter 3

“I Doubt If It Is Understood How Desperate the Fighting Has 

Been During This Operation”

British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier 

1900–1920

A military operation in Waziristan always seemed to exceed its predecessor in carnage.

 Charles Miller

For many years . . . we followed the policy of non-interference with the inhabitants . . . We hoped that if we left them 

alone, they would leave us alone.

 Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, August 1920 

The 1908 Zakka Khel and Mohmand Expeditions

In the aftermath of the Tirah campaign, the British Army in India 

introduced new frontier warfare training manuals and established a new 

training regime for its regular forces. In addition, the de-localization of 

the PFF in 1903 significantly cut down on the problems associated with 

sustaining a sole specialized force in Punjab. In February of 1908, after a 

series of raids by the Zakka Khel Afridis, the new training program was 

put to the test.1

Major General Sir James Willcocks’ Bazar Valley Expeditionary Force 

mobilized and marched quickly out of Peshawar, a bare minimum of 

logistical transports bolstering the speed of the columns. While Willcocks 

marched his main force directly on the Zakka Khel stronghold, the 800 

men of the Khyber Rifles, whose ranks included a number of Afridis from 

the Zakka Khel, moved swiftly around the errant tribesmen and sealed 

off any possible escape route into Afghanistan. Forty-eight hours into the 

operation, the Khyber Rifles blocked all passes into the Bazar Valley as 

Willcocks’ main force proceeded to thrash the tribesmen with their new 

ten-pounder guns and direct assaults. Within a week, the Zekka Khel was 

completely crushed. Incapable of further resistance, the tribesmen sued for 

peace on the 28th of February.2

The campaign proved so successful that the press christened it the 

“weekend war.” The Zakka Khel suffered staggering losses while the British and Indian forces lost three soldiers. According to one source; “The 

Zakka Khel had suffered casualties far in excess of those lost in the Tirah 
30

Expedition with every family in the Bazar Valley suffering losses from 

amongst its fighting men.”3 The commander of the Khyber Rifles reported 

that; “The Afridis, who are no mean judges of hill fighting, express themselves amazed at the handling and conduct of the troops as unlike anything 

they have seen or heard of and the fact that they have obtained no loot in 

mules, rifles, stores, or ammunition on which they confidently counted to 

compensate for their own losses, has given them a strong distaste for expeditions conducted on these novel lines.”4

A few months later, Willcocks launched a comparable operation 

against the Mohmands with almost identical results. Beyond a doubt, the 

new frontier warfare training manuals and new training methods implemented by the British and Indian regulars after the 1897–1898 campaigns, 

were proving highly successful. As one senior British official pointed out:

From a military point of view the most satisfactory features of the expedition were the ease and rapidity with 

which it was sent off without any dislocation of the separate commands, the excellence of the transport and supply 

arrangements, the signaling communications, and above 

all the unexampled efficiency of the troops themselves in 

their knowledge of hill fighting. They proved as good or 

even better than the Zakkas themselves among their own 

hills. It speaks volumes for the pains bestowed on their 

training. 

The official saw the training as the key to a military turning point in the 

campaign against the Zakka enemy, noting that; “In 1897 the superiority 

of the tribes over us in the hills was very marked and we suffered heavily, 

whilst I believe the Zakka loss on the present occasion exceeds the whole 

tribal loss in the Tirah campaign and our own loss has been extremely 

small.”5

Unfortunately, British accomplishments in hill warfare would be 

short lived. In 1909, the British General Staff in India did away with the 

handbooks and instruction manuals produced after the frontier uprisings 

of 1897–1898. Citing a need for more standardized training, the General 

Staff introduced Field Service Regulations that were to be implemented 

by all British and Indian forces. “Thenceforth,” wrote military historian 

T.R. Moreman; “British and Indian troops relied for guidance in frontier 

fighting on the general principles of war and six condensed paragraphs that 

only provided a bare outline of the specialized tactics required in tribal 

territory.”6

 At first, the new regulations had little effect as many British and 

Indian soldiers were well versed in frontier fighting and could rely on their 
31

past experience in conducting operations against the tribes. The eruption 

of the First World War in 1914, however, would completely change the 

state of affairs on the North-West Frontier and a new wave of violence 

would find British and Indian forces sadly lacking in the expertise needed 

to conduct hill warfare against the Pashtun tribes.

As the First World War intensified and casualties increased, veteran 

frontier fighting units from the British Indian Army were assigned to various 

fronts around the world. Although their replacements were well equipped, 

they possessed little experience in tribal warfare. These units of the British 

Territorial Army (TA) not only lacked training in hill warfare but were also 

deficient in basic combat skills and training. Regrettably, they had only the 

Field Service Manual to turn to as manuals for conducting frontier warfare 

had been removed from the system in 1909. As one historian pointed out; 

“The inherent limitations of relying solely on the principles of war and 

limited information contained in the FSR [Field Service Manual] to govern frontier warfare training were exposed.”7

 Outbreaks of tribal violence 

from 1915–1918 confirmed the vulnerability of the TA and, even though a 

Mountain Warfare School was set up in 1916 to assist newcomers, the new 

training program had little effect on the replacements. 

A senior British officer in 1917 went so far as to say that he thought 

frontier warfare was a science:

I have always regarded it as a thing very much like chess 

which wants a great deal of skill to avoid mistakes but at 

the same time it is not a science that can be said at any one 

time to have reached its finality. We are always going on 

evolving new things and a great many of these points that 

have been raised have been evolved gradually from experience. We must not assume that the stage we have reached 

now is the last stage in the process. We must remember 

that the increased armament of these tribes that we fight 

against will go on modifying our rules and systems.8

Indeed, by 1917, the tribes of the North-West Frontier had increased 

their armaments substantially, equipping themselves on a massive scale 

with new breech-loading magazine-fed rifles, all of which used smokeless 

powder. For example, a British historian noted that; “Tribal made versions 

of the Martini-Henri and Lee-Enfield rifles had became the principal 

Mahsud weapon.”9

 The lack of trained, skilled, frontier fighters combined 

with the improved weaponry of the tribes would lead to what General Sir 

Charles Monro, the British Commander-in-Chief in India would later call; 

“unparalleled hard fighting and severity.”10
32

The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919–1920

On the 4th of May in 1919, the military forces of Afghanistan, in 

an effort to regain control of external relations from the British, crossed 

the Durand Line into the North-West Frontier and set off what one high 

ranking statesman called “the most meaningless, crazy and unnecessary 

war in history.”11 It was clear from the beginning that the Afghans intended 

to use the tribes of the North-West Frontier to assist in their operations 

against British forces. Calling for a jihad and inciting the Pashtun tribes 

with the promise of money and weapons, the Afghan regular army quickly 

seized Bagh near the strategically important Khyber Pass. A large Afghan 

force also occupied Dakka, about ten miles west of Bagh. Twenty-five 

miles to the east in Peshawar, the British Army began preparations to eject 

the invaders.12

The British and Indian forces had little trouble defeating the Afghan 

regulars and quickly recaptured Bagh and Dakka. At Dakka, the British 

were also able to effectively divide the Mohmands and Afridis and thwart 

their plans to combine forces with the Afghan regular army. Afghan offensives into Chitral and Baluchistan were also swiftly repulsed by British and 

Indian forces. Strangely enough, the defeat of the Afghan regular army in 

the Khyber region only served to bolster the hostility of the Pashtun tribes. 

As one historian pointed out; “The successive Afghan defeats at Bagh 

and Dakka could have been expected to damp down any thoughts that the 

Mohmands and Afridi tribes on either side if the Khyber might have had 

of coming out in support of their co-religionist but old habits die hard and 

with what might seem curious timing, the British successes touched off a 

wave of insurrection among both tribes.”13

The British attempted to consolidate their gains in the Khyber Pass 

by building a series of permanent piquets to protect the route through the 

corridor. G.N. Molesworth, a British officer serving on the frontier in this 

period, left an interesting account of how one of the largest piquets was 

constructed and of the fighting techniques of the Pashtun tribesmen:

This piquet was built to contain 100 rifles, one of the 

largest built on the Frontier. We always garrisoned it and 

worked on improving it continuously during the months 

to come. In its final form, it was like a long [and] shallow 

oval with blunted ends. The stone breastwork was some 

[four to six feet] high to enable a rifleman to fire over it 

standing and about two to three feet thick. Large stones 

were placed on the parapet at intervals, like almonds on 

a tipsy-cake, and loopholes were constructed at ground 
33

level. It was a tribal custom when attacking a piquet by 

day or night, to divide into a rifle party and a knife party. 

The rifle party kept the heads of the defenders down, while 

the knife party crept up and jumped over the parapet to 

start a “free-for-all,” often with success. The ground-level 

loopholes frustrated this amiable tactic.14

According to Molesworth, small bastions were built at each end of the 

piquet designed to house machineguns that could provide flanking fire. In 

the center of the position, the soldiers located the command post, supplies, 

first aid station, and kitchen. At a later stage, barbed wire and a landline 

telephone were added.15

Even with these formidable outposts and the commitment of a British 

infantry brigade to protect their lines of communication, the Afridis were 

able to carry out sniper attacks, sever telephone lines, build roadblocks 

and ambush convoys along the road. As the British prepared to conduct 

punitive expeditions, large lashkars began forming in the adjacent hills. To 

make matters worse, tribal militia units began deserting. Taking their guns 

and ammunition with them. Many Afridis belonging to the famed Khyber 

Rifles joined their fellow tribesmen in the hills. To the south of the Khyber 

Pass, the Afghan offensive continued.16

By the third week in May, Afghan regular army units had penetrated 

into Waziristan where they received support from the Mahsuds and Wazirs. 

According to British military historian Brian Robson; “The British strategy 

for Waziristan was to maintain an active defence within the resources available, if necessary abandoning temporarily the westernmost Militia posts in 

the Tochi and Gomal Valleys.”17 In the Tochi Valley, Pashtun militiamen 

occupying several posts mutinied. Shortly thereafter, in South Waziristan, 

Afridi and Wazir officers and soldiers also mutinied, forcing the remaining 

British and Indian forces into headlong retreat back to Mir Ali. “The 1,100 

deserters seized 1,190 rifles and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition from 

their posts which were then employed with deadly effect against imperial 

troops;” wrote Moreman.18

By the 27th of May in 1919, Afghan forces, in conjunction with their 

Pashtun brethren, surrounded the British encampment at Thal. British 

Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, a solid veteran of tribal warfare, hastily 

moved south from the Khyber region with a relief column and sent the 

Afghan army into a hurried retreat. Dyer hounded the retreating Afghan 

forces with aircraft, armored vehicles, and cavalry. By the first week in 

June, the Afghans had had enough and an armistice was signed, effectively 

ending the Third Afghan War. In an effort to punish the Wazirs, the British 
34

attacked a Wazir village south of Thal, destroying fortifications and taking 

away grain and livestock. However, these punitive expeditions had little 

effect. As the summer wore on, the Pashtun tribes continued to form 

lashkars and attack British and Indian forces. “On 17th July 1919,” wrote 

Moreman; “the Khyber Pass was closed when 10,000 tribesmen gathered 

in the Bazar Valley and attacked piquets between Bagiari and Ali Musjid. 

Barley Hill piquet was captured the following day by Afridi tribesmen 

and deserters still wearing khaki uniforms who carried out a carefully 

implemented assault under the cover of intense rifle fire, demonstrating the 

growing sophistication of tribal tactics.”19

The new Pashtun expertise resulted from skilled soldiers, well versed 

in modern tactics, deserting from the British ranks, and the acquisition by 

many tribesmen of high velocity rifles which used smokeless powder. Sir 

Andrew Skeen, a British general who played a vital role in the campaign, 

described the impact of the new tactics and the high velocity rifle in his 

book Passing it On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West 

Frontier of India:

The greatest change so far in tribal methods and in steps 

needed to counter them has been brought about by the 

high velocity rifle and by smokeless powder. The first 

has, of course, added to the tribesmen’s power for harm 

but it has done more than that. It has made every valley 

into a “Tangi,” or defile, and in place of piquets covering 

the close vicinity of columns on the move or in camp, we 

now have to hold the heights at any distance up to fifteen 

hundred yards and more from it. Longer to reach, more 

loss in taking them, more men to hold them, and harder to 

get away from. 20

Skeen offered that the arrival of modern rifles among Pashtun enemies 

meant that British forces had to slow down. He noted; 

When I started this game, seizing a piquet position was a 

simple thing, taking the time it took to scale some point 

overlooking the line of march at three hundred yards or 

so and when you got to it, you hadn’t to expect bullets 

snickering in from far off and from somewhere you 

couldn’t see. Holding it was equally simple, for though 

sometimes overlooked at the then effective range, it was 

not practically always overlooked [by the enemy], as at 

present.21
35

The new technology would force the British to reconsider their tactics.

 While the conventional fight with the Afghan Army had gone well 

for the British, outbreaks of tribal violence continued into the fall of 1919. 

According to Moreman, from late summer and into the fall; “Mahsud and 

Wazir raiding gangs, varying between 70 and 600 tribesmen, committed 

182 offences in Zhob, the Derajat, and the Punjab, killing 225 British 

subjects and wounding 276 [as well as] kidnapping and ransoming a 

further 126 civilians. In the process, large quantities of camels, cattle, and 

private property were stolen and carried off into the hills.”22 The lack of 

trained soldiers and skilled frontier fighters greatly enhanced the Pashtuns 

marauding success.23 As usual, the British and Indian forces planned to 

launch retaliatory expeditions against the culprits. However, punitive 

operations had to be delayed due to the deficiency of trained soldiers. 

Lord Chelmsford, the British Viceroy, described the reasons for the 

postponement: 

We have roughly two experienced officers per battalion in 

the Indian Army. The rest are men of practically no military 

experience and certainly no frontier war experience. 

Moreover, the troops on the whole have very short service. 

The result is that vis-à-vis the Wazir and Mahsud our men 

are inferior and the officers, through their inexperience, 

are unable to make up for deficiencies in the rank and file. 

It was because of this inexperience of our officers and 

troops that during the recent operations, we had to mass 

such a large force on our frontier.24

The Viceroy, like other contemporary officers, stressed that the type 

of campaigns on the frontier required dispersed action and that would lead 

to mistakes among less experienced leaders. He contended; “in the case 

of tribal operations, the junior officers have to take responsibility for the 

work, we must expect these setbacks from time to time.”25

Finally in November, the British were able to assemble a force of over 

29,000 soldiers for the planned punitive expedition into Waziristan. Major 

General Skipton Climo would command the expedition. According to one 

source; “The size of the force which assembled in the Derajat during the 

autumn of 1919 was unprecedented, reflecting the serious fighting that was 

anticipated against the heavily armed local tribesmen in Waziristan and the 

recognized poor quality of the available manpower.”26 Six infantry brigades 

along with a large contingent of cavalry, engineers, aircraft from the Royal 

Air Force, and several mountain batteries, along with a massive combat 

support element were organized for the offensive. In South Waziristan, 
36

16,000 Mahsuds and 7,000 Wazirs armed with 11,000 rifles waited for the 

British advance.27

By mid-November, two British infantry brigades had moved into the 

Tochi Valley. For the most part, the Tochi Wazirs put up little resistance. 

The RAF dropped leaflets on Wazir villages informing villagers that if they 

did not comply with the terms of the government, the RAF would return 

with bombs. On the 17th of November, General Climo met with a large 

Tochi jirga and the Tochi Wazirs maliks agreed to the government terms. 

A few noncompliant sub-tribes were swiftly dealt with by the RAF who 

attacked their villages with 17 aircraft. The next day, the sub-tribes also 

agreed to the government’s terms.28

While the British were dealing with the Tochi Wazirs, they were also 

conducting negotiations with the Mahsuds in southern Waziristan. At a 

jirga conducted at Kirghi on the 11th of November, the Mahsuds, unlike the 

Tochi Wazirs, steadfastly refused to submit to the government terms. The 

government’s conditions were considered mild but included the building 

of fortifications on Mahsud territory. Acting swiftly, the RAF launched a 

series of massive bombing raids on Mahsud villages dropping an average 

of 10,000 pounds of bombs a day for nine days. The bombing however, 

had little effect on the tribesmen and considering the Pashtunwali code’s 

emphasis on revenge, almost certainly fueled Mahsud intransigence.29

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason have contended that the revenge 

was so important that; “It may take generations to avenge the wrong but 

retribution will be the focus of the [Pashtun] family’s life until honor is 

recouped.”30

Taken as a whole, the air campaign against the tribes had a negligible 

effect. “Whilst the RAF could be very effective at intimidating wavering 

tribal sections into making a settlement with the government,” wrote 

historian Alan Warren; “determined lashkars learned to cope with air 

attacks. Insurgents became accustomed to protecting their bases from aerial 

bombing by siting them in caves.”31 To be sure, the Mahsuds were self 

confident and certain of success. A British officer would later suggest that 

the source of Mahsud confidence lay in their knowledge that British forces 

did not have the proper training and that the aircraft had not delivered a 

decisive weapon to those forces. This officer further emphasized the role 

of the British trained tribesmen who had joined up with enemy elements:

The number of deserters from the Waziristan Militias and 

of former soldiers of the regular Indian Army who were 

to be found amongst them, was large. This total has been 

calculated at over 1,800. Not only would the presence of 
37

these men greatly influence the tactics of the tribesmen in 

action but their knowledge of the habits and routine of the 

Indian troops opposed to them would prove of great value 

and a source of much confidence in the class of warfare in 

which the tribesmen excelled.32 

Unable to bring the Mahsud to terms through the use of airpower, the 

British began planning for ground operations against the tribe. Major General Skeen would command two brigades that would assemble at Jandola 

and advance into Mahsud territory. The strike force was christened the 

Derajat Column. Unlike past campaigns, only one column would advance 

against the enemy. According to Moreman;

[This] reflected the shortage of transport, the large winter scale of baggage and stores required, the recognised 

low fighting ability of the raw and untrained regiments 

available, and the large number of breech-loading rifles 

in Mahsud hands. A single line of communication also required fewer troops, a smaller number of administrative 

units, and reduced the demand for transport and supplies 

to a minimum. Moreover, it was hoped that an advance by 

a single column would encourage the tribesmen to mass, 

giving imperial troops an opportunity to inflict a decisive 

defeat at the outset of the campaign.33 

Unfortunately for the British, they had greatly underestimated their 

enemy.

On the 11th of December, as Skeen’s two brigades prepared to move, 

two battalions accompanied by two mountain guns advanced approximately 

one and a half miles west of Jandola. Their mission was to set up piquets

on the high ground in order to protect the strike force as it moved into 

Jandola. Over the course of the next three days, the Mahsuds launched 

vicious assaults on every small unit they could find, inflicting over 50 

casualties on the inexperienced British forces. These attacks caused great 

consternation within the British command. It was soon determined that 

any major encampment that was established or any advance by the Derajat 

column up the Tank Zam would have to be protected by permanent piquets. 

As one British officer later pointed out:

To protect the valley road, it was therefore proposed to 

have recourse to the system of permanent piquets in preference to the employment of piquets temporarily posted 

day by day as the Striking Force should advance and to 
38

a system of escorts for the protection of subsequent supply columns. These permanent piquets were now to be 

placed at moderately close intervals on all commanding 

points on either side of the road so that the Striking Force 

and, in turn, all convoys should be able to move along 

the valley unattended by any large escort as it were up a 

corridor, held by garrisoned posts on either flank. All of 

these posts were to be strongly fortified, surrounded with 

strong barbed wire entanglements, designed for all around 

defence, strongly traversed, and supplied with a store of 

hand grenades or Lewis guns.34

The officer underlined the mission of the piquets as “the greatest degree of protection obtainable for the valley road at the cost of the smallest 

number of troops.”35

By the time Skeen’s entire Derajat Column rolled into Jandola on the 

17th of December, seven permanent piquets had been established on the 

key terrain surrounding the new encampment. While Skeen surveyed the 

area, work continued on a few positions above Jandola. Before long, a 

delegation of Mahsud maliks arrived at Jandola to talk with Skeen about 

immunity for their property which they believed would soon be destroyed 

by the British forces. At 1530 hours, while Skeen and the maliks were 

still conducting their meeting, a large force of Mahsud fighters attacked a 

security detail protecting soldiers working on the piquets above Jandola. 

The security detail retreated forthwith and the Mahsuds quickly overran 

the easternmost piquet. “In the face of rifle, Lewis gun, and mountain gun 

fire,” a British officer reported; “the Mahsuds rushed in to close quarters 

with the utmost recklessness.”36 After killing or wounding 40 men, the 

Mahsuds were finally forced back, leaving behind 20 lifeless fighters on 

the hillside. The same British officer concluded that the attack emphasized 

the prevalent lack of experience of the troops in this class of warfare.37

Undeterred by the ferocious Mahsud assaults, Skeen began his advance on the 18th of December. Advancing with his 67th Infantry Brigade, 

two mountain batteries, the 2d Battalion, 19th Punjabis (2/19), a company 

of sappers and miners, and a battalion of Sikh pioneers, Skeen marched his 

column past the intersection of the Shahur and Tank Zam Rivers and soon 

emerged on the Plain of Palosina. 

Here, Skeen halted his column in preparation for building an encampment and placing permanent piquets in the hillsides and along his communications lines. Seven airplanes swept the area for signs of the enemy. 

Initially, the aircraft spotted Mahsud fighters moving up the valley but the 
39

Map 4. The Derajat Encampment.

lashkar quickly broke into small bands and the pilots lost sight of their 

prey.38

The next day, Skeen’s soldiers set out to capture the key terrain 

surrounding Palosina and begin building permanent piquets. The British 

general planned to capture one hill at a time and then build a permanent 

piquet on each one. The first hill on the list was Mandanna Hill and the 

assignment fell to the 1st Battalion of the 103d Mahrattas Light Infantry 

(1/103) and the 1st Battalion of the 55th Rifles (1/55). Their artillery fire 

quickly cleared a group of Mahsud fighters out of a nearby ravine as the 

Mahrattas made their way up to “Red Rocks” and “Sandbag Hill.” At the 

Nai Kach

Comb Rocks

Broken Boulders

Sandbag Hill Red Rocks

White Breasts

Black Breasts

Black & White Hill

Do Tak

Shahur R.

Ibrahim

Gulzt

2360

Jandola

Sarkai

Hill H

2880

2815

Tank Zam

3264

3584

Nai

Kach

Shekhzt

Mandanna Hill

Broken Hill

Pink Bowl

Chalk Hill

Black Hill

Sagarzai

Mandanna Kach

Spinkai

Ghash

PALOSINA

Kotkai

0 1⁄2 1 m

Picquet

•

•

Skinkai

2830

Derajat Column Camp

Nai Kach

Comb Rocks

Broken Boulders

Sandbag Hill Red Rocks

White Breasts

Black Breasts

Black & White Hill

Do Tak

Shahur R.

Ibrahim

Gulzt

2360

Jandola

Sarkai

Hill H

2880

2815

Tank Zam

3264

3584

Nai

Kach

Shekhzt

Mandanna Hill

Broken Hill

Pink Bowl

Chalk Hill

Black Hill

Sagarzai

Mandanna Kach

Spinkai

Ghash

PALOSINA

Kotkai

0 1⁄2 1 m

Picquet

•

•

Skinkai

2830

Derajat Column Camp
40

same time, the 1/55th Rifles supporting the left flank of the Mahrattas 

occupied “Broken Boulders” and the lower portion of “Sandbag Hill.” 

With these locations secured, the Mahrattas were ordered to secure “Comb 

Rocks.” At this point, reconnaissance flights by the accompanying aircraft 

failed to spot additional Mahsud fighters and a ground reconnaissance of 

“Comb Rocks” according to one British source, was deemed “inadequate.”39

As the Mahrattas made their way over the broken terrain toward their 

new objective, Mahsud fighters opened a substantial and deadly converging fire from “Comb Rocks.” The rifle fire stopped the Mahrattas in their 

tracks. Even with the support of the prepositioned artillery, the 1/103d 

failed to capture the position and suffered devastating casualties. “So fully 

were the Mahsuds alive to the value of their improved armament that no 

black powder weapons were allowed into the fight by day and their application of fire was carefully organized;” Skeen would later declare. “The 

use of long range sniping and covering fire from all ranges,” he stated “was 

designed to let the swordsmen close.”40

As the Mahrattas began to waver, the Mahsuds launched a massive 

and well coordinated counterattack which swept the 1/103d from Sandbag 

Hill. Using well directed covering fire from the summit, the Mahsuds shot 

down the flanking companies of the Mahrattas causing a complete rout. 

As the soldiers from the 1/103d fell back, they ran through a company 

of the 1/55th Rifles triggering great alarm in the ranks. In short order, 

the Mahsuds, numbering about 900 fighters, drove both battalions back 

toward Palosina. According to one British source; “The British casualties 

amounted to some 250, whilst 130 rifles and 10 Lewis guns were lost. 

The fall of their commanding officer early in the day followed by that of 

four other British officers, had left the 103d virtually helpless. Moreover, 

the behavior of the men also showed that they had lost all confidence in 

themselves and all control of their weapons. The Mahrattas had kept no 

reserve and their small supports were inadequate to control the retreat.”41

A few British officers also blamed the disaster on a lack of air support. So 

complete was the mad dash down the hillside that the day became known 

as “Derby Day” by those who witnessed the event.42

On the next day, Skeen threw in four battalions and all of his artillery 

and aircraft to capture Mandanna Hill. This time there was no opposition 

from the Mahsud and the British quickly began building a piquet on the 

hilltop. However, as the covering force withdrew from Mandanna Hill, the 

Mahsud struck the incomplete fortification along with the 110 defenders 

from the 2/19 Punjabis, sending them scurrying back towards Palosina. 

Moreman noted that; “The demoralized survivors—abandoning rifles, 
41

Lewis guns, Mills bombs, and other equipment—frantically withdrew to 

the safety of the perimeter camp in the valley below pursued by a Mahsud 

force under half their strength.”43

Skeen now decided to change direction and attempt to re-establish his 

force’s shattered morale. Bringing up the 67th Brigade under the command 

of Brigadier General F.G. Lucas, the British quickly occupied “Black Hill” 

north of Palosina and began constructing a piquet on the 21st of December. In the early afternoon, the Mahsuds struck again with approximately 

1,000 fighters. Covering fire from up to 1,500 yards away allowed Mahsud 

swordsmen to overrun the security detachment and close in on the Sikhs 

inside the piquet. Although the 3/24th Sikh Pioneers put up a gallant struggle, they were soon forced to retreat. While Skeen’s artillery was able to 

adjust fire on the throng of tribesmen, killing 250 and wounding 300, British casualties totaled over 300 soldiers. Bolstered by the success of their 

artillery, the British counterattacked up “Black Hill” but were soon forced 

back by the highly accurate fire from well masked Mahsud riflemen.44

Thus far in the campaign, the British and Indian forces had proven no 

match for the Mahsud. On the 30th of December, Skeen offered his assessment to his superiors regarding the debacle:

The actions last week have given some valuable lessons 

which will be of immediate interest and importance. Those 

operations have shown the vital necessity of regaining 

some standard of musketry efficiency. Marksmanship 

and fire discipline are two of the first essentials in frontier 

fighting and the present Indian Army as a general rule 

has never learnt these arts. The result is that as the men 

have no faith in their rifles, they have little self confidence 

and look to auxiliaries such as artillery, aeroplanes, and 

Lewis guns for their protection and to win the battle. In 

this connection, it may be remarked that practically none 

of the junior British officers have had experience of hill 

warfare and experience of warfare against a civilized and 

organised enemy is not necessarily good training for hill 

warfare against a savage enemy.45

Skeen concluded; “Nothing can replace these arts and frontier warfare 

must remain expensive on lives and rich in unpleasant incidents until 

our infantry regains some of its ancient knowledge of musketry and 

fire discipline and so get renewed confidence in themselves and in their 

weapons.”46
42

Skeen’s assessment was correct. However, he failed to mention the 

former Mahsud soldiers and militiamen who had deserted and who now 

bolstered the ranks of the lashkars. According to one source “These 

men formed one-fifth to one-sixth of the Mahsud fighting strength—

approximately 2,000 men— encountered during the initial phase of the 

campaign, providing lashkars with leadership, discipline, and tactical 

training that they had always lacked before in Waziristan.”47 British 

Lieutenant Colonel Herman de Watteville also concluded; “Much of the 

newly found skill may be attributed to the presence in their ranks of exofficers and many hundreds of ex-privates of the Waziristan Militia and of 

the regular Indian infantry.”48

Fortunately for the British and Indian forces, heavy casualties and a 

shortage of supplies forced the Mahsud lashkars to disband on the 21st 

of December. This respite allowed Skeen’s command to finish building 

their permanent piquets around Palosina and along their communication 

lines. It had been a close call for the British. In fact, the prospect of defeat 

loomed so large that Skeen and Climo had called for reinforcements and 

for the use of poison gas. While their request for poison gas was rejected, 

reinforcements consisting of two Gurkha battalions were quickly rushed 

to Waziristan. On the 28th of December, Skeen began his new offensive 

up the Tank Zam Valley. Bad weather, horrific terrain, the lack of trained 

soldiers, and continued resistance from the Mahsuds forced Skeen to rely 

heavily on his air and artillery assets and the permanent piquet system. 

Until the first week of January in 1920, Skeen’s command was unable to 

advance more than four miles a day.49

British and Indian spirits soon began to improve as the Gurkha 

battalions and veteran British officers started to arrive at the front and 

unreliable units were pulled out of the line. Fierce combat continued from 

the 9th of January to the 15th. On the 14th of January alone, the British 

suffered 450 casualties in fighting in and around Ahnai Tangi. During this 

period the British and Indian forces had some success in conducting night 

attacks against the Mahsud. As an example, Skeen’s forces captured the 

Barari Tangi gorge on the 28th of January in a successful night assault. 

“Night operations,” wrote Moreman; “were now regularly employed to 

seize piquets, jumping off areas, and important defensive positions during 

five of the larger operations. These avoided heavy casualties, extended 

operations outside daylight hours, and often forestalled the tribesmen 

occupying and defending strong positions and thereby using their rifles to 

full effect.”50 New lashkars that had assembled to launch counterattacks 

in the Barari Tangi gorge area were pummeled by artillery and the RAF 
43

causing them to retreat into the hills. At this point, tribal morale plummeted 

and as one British historian suggested; “There were definite limits to the 

amount of punishment an irregular tribal force could withstand.”51

By mid-February, the Derajat column had penetrated into Mahsud 

country and Skeen’s engineers began punitive operations in the Makin 

Valley. Over 451 Mahsud structures were destroyed. In March, a second 

round of punitive operations was launched in the vicinity of Kaniguram. 

While the tribesmen continued to snipe at the British and Indian forces 

conducting the reprisals, it was clearly evident that the Mahsud had reached 

their limit of endurance.52

By early April, active operations were over and Skeen’s command built 

a permanent camp near Ladha. Alan Warren observed; “One advantage of 

the Ladha camp was that it was within six-inch howitzer range of Makin, 

meaning that future bad behavior by the residents of that area would 

be speedily punished.”53 As the British official history of the campaign 

pointed out however; “It was impossible to force this tribe of unruly and 

obdurate individuals, recognizing no responsible leaders and no form of 

organized government, to make any engagements or to keep such promises 

if made, once the troops had left the country.”54 Indeed, even after terms 

were settled upon with some tribal sections, raids and attacks continued 

from Mahsud sanctuaries in Afghanistan. It would take until November of 

1920 to reoccupy all the posts formerly in British hands.55

It had been a costly campaign for the British. From December of 

1919 until April of 1920, their forces suffered 2,286 dead, wounded, 

and missing. As a British historian noted; “This represented the highest 

‘butcher’s bill’ ever suffered during operations against the trans-border 

Pathan tribes.”56 General Monro, the Commander-in-Chief, was convinced 

that the operations;

have merely borne out the principles of mountain warfare, 

which are well known from former campaigns. It is necessary here however, to lay emphasis upon the supreme 

importance of adequate training of troops prior to their 

employment in a mountain campaign. Nothing can take 

the place of careful individual training. If possible, it is 

more essential in mountain warfare then in any other class 

of fighting that troops should have confidence in their 

weapons. This can only be obtained by systematic individual training which must include instructions in making 

the best tactical use of the ground, in principles of fire and 

movement, and the mental development of the soldier to 
44

such a degree of alertness that no target escapes from detection and appropriate action is immediately taken.57

Once again, the British Commander-in-Chief’s assessment was accurate but failed to mention the superior performance of the enemy. As de 

Watteville would later suggest; “The opening days of the campaign found 

the Mahsuds in a state of elation and of determination hitherto unknown 

on the Frontier. Their armament had improved, their supply of ammunition 

was large while their tactical conceptions had made enormous strides.”58

These tactical conceptions were brought about by trained Pashtuns who 

fled the British ranks and joined their brethren in the holy war against the 

infidel. Not only were these deserters well versed in modern tactics, they 

were able to train their fellow fighters in an astoundingly short period of 

time and nearly overwhelm the British at Palosina. As the British experience demonstrated, training of the indigenous population in military tactics 

and techniques, although necessary, can become a liability. 

At the conclusion of the major fighting in Waziristan, the Indian 

Army once again began retraining its forces to conduct trans-border or 

hill warfare. As in the aftermath of the Tirah campaign, the British set 

about writing new training manuals and instituting new training programs 

to ensure that all soldiers confronting the Pashtuns on the North-West 

Frontier were properly trained. Part of the new British military pacification 

program included the building of new roads into Waziristan and the 

stationing of British and Indian soldiers close to Mahsud territory. These 

new all weather roads would allow the military to move rapidly into the 

region. However, the construction of the new roads would set the stage for 

further conflict in Waziristan.59
45

Notes

1. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–39,” in War and Society in Colonial India edited by Kaushik Roy (Oxford, 

UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 277–278.

2. Jules Stewart, The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda

(Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2005), 167–168; T.R. Moreman, 

The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947 (London: 

Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 91–92.

3. Stewart, 167–168

4. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 92.

5. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 92.

6. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–39,” 278.

7. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–39,” 278.

8. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–39,” 279.

9. Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The 

North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936–1937 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2000), 37.

10. Quoted in H. de Watteville, Waziristan, 1919–1920, Campaigns and 

Their Lessons Series (London: Constable and Co. Ltd, 1925), 5.

11. Quoted in Brian Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War 

and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919–1920 (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 2004), 

xi.

12. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 103; Robson, xi, 43.

13. Robson, 83.

14. Lieutenant General G.N. Molesworth, Afghanistan 1919: An Account of 

Operations in the Third Afghan War (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962), 

73.

15. Lieutenant General G.N. Molesworth, Afghanistan 1919: An Account of 

Operations in the Third Afghan War (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962), 

73.

16. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 104; Robson, 83.

17. Robson, 165.

18. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 104.

19. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 105–106. 
46

20. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks on the Tribal 

Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India (London: Gale and Polden, 1932), 

12–13.

21. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks on the Tribal 

Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India (London: Gale and Polden, 1932), 

12–13.

22. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 107.

23. de Watteville, 64. de Watteville listed the misdeeds as follows: “Tochi 

Wazirs: Fifty raids and various offences resulting in British-Indian casualties: 

30 killed, 60 wounded, 5 missing; also a large quantity of loot in the shape of 

cattle, stores and money. Mahsuds: Over 100 raids and various offences resulting 

in British-Indian casualties: 135 killed, 100 wounded, 38 missing; also loot to 

the extent of 448 camels, 1674 cattle and property to the value of Rs. 35,000. 

Wana Wazirs: Thirty-two raids and various offences resulting in British-Indian 

casualties: 55 killed, 106 wounded, 83 missing; also a large quantity of loot, 

including camels and cattle.” 

24. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 106–107.

25. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 106–107.

26. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 107.

27. Warren, 285.

28. de Watteville, 80–81; Warren, 45.

29. de Watteville, 82; T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development 

of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 108; Warren, 45–46.

30. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of 

Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security, 

Vol. 32, No.4 (Spring 2008), 63.

31. Warren, 285.

32. de Watteville, 65–66.

33. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 108. 

34. de Watteville, 98–99.

35. de Watteville, 98–99.

36. de Watteville, 99.

37. de Watteville, 99–100.

38. de Watteville, 101; Warren, 46; T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the 

Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 108.

39. de Watteville, 104.

40. Skeen, 14.

41. de Watteville, 104–105.

42. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 108–109.
47

43. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 109.

44. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 109; de Watteville, 108–109. 

45. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 112.

46. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 112.

47. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 111.

48. de Watteville, 114–115.

49. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 111–113;

50. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 119.

51. Warren, 49.

52. Warren, 49; T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 119–120.

53. Warren, 49–50.

54. Quoted in Warren, 49.

55. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 119–120.

56. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 120.

57. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 120–121.

58. de Watteville, 222.

59. Warren, 53–55.

49

Chapter 4 

British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier 

1921–1947

The tribesman will never believe that passivity is due to 

anything but fear and weakness.

 Colonel S.F. Muspratt

The leading consideration is to deny to the enemy, the most 

important points from which he can bring effective fire to 

bear. This is a precaution which must never be neglected, 

even when the country is to all appearance, unoccupied. 

Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier

Army Headquarters, India, 1925

From 1920 to 1924, British and Indian forces in Waziristan continued 

to battle the tribes in what has been described as a low intensity campaign. 

The persistent combat as well as a new training program, greatly enhanced 

the fighting ability of British and Indian soldiers on the North-West Frontier. During this time, some British officers also sought to introduce new 

more lethal weapons systems to the North-West Frontier such as poison 

gas. A few British officers however, remained skeptical of these new weapons, fearing their extreme effects. In 1923, British Colonel Frederick Keen 

wrote that; “We should realize, as we have perhaps not done in the past, 

that in fighting the Pathans we are engaging in civil war and that it is to 

our advantage that enemies of today should be turned into our friends of 

tomorrow. In a word, our coercive measures should always be directed 

with a view to eventual pacification and control.”1

 Although Keen’s assessment was more enlightened than that of many of his fellow officers, it 

certainly did not reflect most counter-insurgency doctrine of the early 21st 

century. In fact, in his 1925 publication Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier 

Force Officer to his Nephew, British Colonel J.P. Villiers-Stuart captured 

the views of the majority of the British officers on the North-West Frontier. 

“In operating against tribesmen we have two objects in view;” he wrote to 

his nephew. “Emphatically to kill as many as possible. That being by far 

the most convincing form of argument,” and, he concluded, “To destroy 

his villages and stores of food and capture his cattle and sheep.”2

 It was 

the tried and true British method of dealing with the Pashtuns, a strategy 

designed to inflict quick and decisive punishment and to bring the errant 

tribes back into line as quickly as possible. This approach however, significantly increased the Pashtuns desire for revenge. While countless British 
50

officers were familiar with the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali, they seem to 

have never fully grasped the fact that their punitive operations against the 

tribes only increased the Pashtun fervor for settling old scores. It was an 

error of assessment that would play a major role in the continued reciprocal 

violence on the North-West Frontier.

While the British Army in India remained steadfast in its strategic and 

operational approach to the Pashtuns, it was determined after the near debacle of the 1919–1920 campaign, to regain its tactical prowess on the 

North-West Frontier. In 1925, the British army published the Manual of 

Operations on the North-West Frontier of India and distributed 35,000 

copies to its soldiers. According to British historian T.R. Moreman, the 

new manual reflected the important changes that had occurred in frontier 

warfare since the First World War. Its pages reflected the Indian Army’s 

extensive experience of military operations against the trans-border Pathan 

tribes and brought up to date the existing doctrine and system of training 

caused by improved tribal tactics, leadership and equipment, and changes 

in the organization, training, and equipment of imperial troops.3

 The document proved highly instructive for both British and Indian soldiers on the 

frontier and although filled with the usual early 20th century British hyperbole, retains its relevance for military forces operating in the region in the 

early 21st century. 

In reference to the Pashtuns, the new Manual of Operations stated 

that the tribes were formidable when attacking a detachment isolated 

beyond reach of support and were adept in all arts of individual warfare, 

always seeking and seldom missing an opportunity.4

 Indeed, attacks on 

small remote US combat outposts in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009 

reveal that little has changed. The Manual of Operations also concluded 

that; “In all movements involving a subsequent withdrawal such as 

reconnaissances, foraging, etc., no defile through which the troops will 

have to pass in returning and no commanding point from which the enemy 

could harass the withdrawal, should be left unguarded.”5

 The instruction 

manual also pointed out that all outposts or camps should be protected by 

piquets in order to deny the enemy commanding ground from which to 

bring effective fire to bear on the camp by day or night.6 While securing the 

high ground above a combat outpost or camp would seem to be an obvious 

necessity and time honored tactic, it is one that the British periodically 

failed to incorporate. 

In confronting the Pashtuns, British and Indian soldiers learned early 

on that they could not wait for multiple intelligence reports or for patterns 
51

to develop before securing or reinforcing a camp, as the enemy was always 

prepared to strike a poorly defended or isolated detachment. “They will attack readily if they see a chance and when they do, they make very clever 

use of covering fire;” wrote Colonel Villiers-Stuart. “They also occasionally put in very determined charges, covered by rifle fire, either day or 

night. They always come suddenly. It may sound odd that such charges can 

succeed, but I have myself seen a party of fifteen men of a thoroughly good 

regiment cut up with swords and knives in broad daylight. So it can happen.”6

 As the British yet again learned, camps or combat outposts had to be 

protected by securing the surrounding high ground. To be sure, by 1925, 

British and Indian officers were well aware that the first step in establishing a new camp was to send parties up to seize the commanding ground.7

From 1925 to 1930, units stationed in the North-West Frontier continued to train in mountain warfare using the Manual of Operations on the 

North-West Frontier of India as their guide. During this period, a heated 

debate arose among British officers. Many were convinced that the Army 

in India spent too much time focusing on mountain or “savage warfare” 

and not enough time focusing on conventional warfare. A veteran British 

officer summed up the debate in a professional journal; “There are two 

forms of warfare to be taught in India, open warfare and mountain warfare. 

Except for those stationed on the frontier, the former of course requires the 

most attention but mountain warfare should never be entirely neglected in 

view of the fact that whenever the Army of India fights in the future it is 

almost certain to be in mountainous country.”8

While this debate raged on in the professional journals, the Army in 

India was rapidly becoming more mechanized. The new road networks 

constructed within the North-West Frontier, particularly in Waziristan, 

allowed trucks, armored cars, and light tanks to move swiftly up and 

down the valley floors. According to Moreman, this; “clearly altered the 

strategic, tactical, and administrative conduct of frontier warfare, enabling 

reinforcements to be rushed to the threatened points along the border.”9

This newfound mobility however, created many unforeseen problems. 

More soldiers were now required in supporting roles and the logistical 

tail of the columns increased considerably. However, congested avenues 

of approach and lines of communication could be easily observed by the 

Pashtuns. Additionally, a company of Vickers medium machine guns was 

added to each battalion while the number of riflemen in the battalion was 

decreased. This caused a reduction in piquets employed to guard against 

surprise and greatly increased the column of pack animals needed to 

convey the extra equipment. 
52

In short, the mechanization and modernization of the British Army 

in India, at least initially, produced a force both cumbersome and selfassured. These attributes were ill advised when fighting the Pashtuns in 

the mountains of the North-West Frontier. Not surprisingly, tactical offroad mobility suffered and any column advancing along the valley floors 

slowed significantly due the increased use of pack animals. “In the early 

1930s a certain complacency about the Frontier became discernible;” wrote 

a British veteran of the North-West Frontier. “An almost reluctant belief 

that with planes, light armor, improved mountain artillery, a higher scale 

of light machine guns, the scales were so heavily weighted against him 

that the poor Pathan would be reduced to a little long range sniping. The 

events of the next decade were to correct these ideas. Keen young officers 

who were disappointed that the Frontier was not all it was cracked up to be, 

discovered that indeed it was.”10

The British Army in India was greatly embarrassed when far reaching 

tribal violence erupted in the summer of 1930. Tribal lashkars successfully 

penetrated into the Peshawar District and vanished back into the mountains 

with little loss. The ensuing campaign produced a firestorm of derision 

from the press and both political and military communities. Moreman cited 

many of the problems associated with this campaign:

The additional machine guns dramatically increased 

the firepower making lashkars wary of engaging Indian 

columns or following up rear guards thereby limiting 

opportunities to inflict heavy casualties. Further problems 

were caused by an obsession with security that overrode 

other operational requirements, slowed movement 

to a crawl, and tied Indian columns to cautious and 

unimaginative advances along the valley floors. It now took 

longer to picket a route as periodic halts were necessary 

while covering machine gun and artillery fire was carefully 

arranged to support the placement and withdrawal of 

pickets. Fear of casualties, recovery of the dead and 

wounded, and efforts to prevent the theft of arms and 

ammunition also stultified efforts to bring hostile lashkars

to battle or to achieve surprise. An inability to differentiate 

between the tactical requirements of conventional warfare 

and those of the frontier compounded the problems.11

To its credit, the Army in India took immediate steps to rectify the 

problems. The first priority was to build more roads in the North-West 

Frontier in order to increase mobility. While this project proved effective, 
53

it also triggered violent clashes with many of the Pashtun tribes who 

vehemently objected to the new road building projects. “Henceforth,” 

wrote Moreman; “punitive operations in tribal territory were normally 

combined with road construction to allow small lightly-equipped columns 

to be supplied and to operate in the hills as well as extending political 

control.”12

Other measures adopted by the high command included reducing the 

load of the infantry in order to increase both their off road mobility and 

the time spent establishing piquets. The number of pack animals used for 

punitive operations was also greatly curtailed. New training initiatives 

were quickly adopted while many experienced veteran frontier officers 

and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were placed into the regimental 

ranks.13

Perhaps one of the most important developments was General Andrew 

Skeen’s 1932 unofficial publication Passing it On: Short Talks on Tribal 

Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India. Skeen was widely considered 

the most experienced frontier officer in the British Army. His book 

contained a wealth of information on the Pashtuns and advice regarding 

how to conduct tactical operations against them. The work proved so 

instructive that it was distributed to both officers and NCOs. The book’s 

lessons have proven so durable that a Pakistani press reprinted it in 2009 

under the new title Tribal Fighting in NWFP.

14

By 1935, the British and Indian forces on the North-West Frontier had 

made great strides. New roads into tribal territories increased mobility 

while the reduction of light infantry loads further improved the army’s offroad capabilities. New training manuals and unofficial publications greatly 

enhanced the soldier’s knowledge of the enemy and the tactical expertise 

required to defeat him. However, in the late summer of 1935, further road 

construction into Mohmand tribal land and anti-British agitation incited by 

a local Faqir or holy man ignited yet another war which would test the new 

training and equipment of the Army in India.15

Operations Against the Mohmand, 1935

Druing the night of 14-15 August 1935, a Mohmand lashkar of 

approximately 1,400 fighters descended on the newly constructed 

Gandab road and began to destroy it. On the morning of 15 August as the 

enemy lashkar continued to dismantle the highway, a small tribal levy of 

Khassadars who had been paid by the British to protect the road, quickly 

retreated from the area. While the British hurriedly alerted a brigade column 

in Peshawar to move against the tribal fighters, the British High Command 
54

ordered the RAF to bomb the lashkar along the Gandab road. In a departure 

from previous punitive actions, British political officers ordered the RAF 

not to bomb nearby villages. However, as additional reinforcements began 

arriving from two other tribal khels, the RAF was authorized to conduct 

air operations against their villages and, as the official order stated; “Bomb 

any persons and livestock seen in those areas.”16

With an eye toward ultimate conciliation, efforts were made to limit 

these coercive procedures. Royal Air Force pilots were instructed; “This 

aim was to be attained with the minimum of casualties to the tribesmen and 

without more material damage than was necessary to compel evacuation.”17

Leaflets were dropped on villages warning the inhabitants of the impending 

bombing and a demonstration of 38 aircraft flew over the area in hopes 

of intimidating the tribes. In the end, the RAF bombing did cause some 

fighters to leave the lashkar. Many of the tribesmen quickly left in order to 

move their families and livestock to safety. As the official history reported 

however, the bombing did not secure the submission of the hostiles and 

it was evident that air action alone was unlikely to secure all the objects 

desired by the government.18 A warning order was soon issued for three 

brigades to advance. “Mohforce” as the command was designated, was 

ordered to remove the tribesmen from the Gandab road and to provide 

protection for the continued construction of the highway. 

The commander of Mohforce, Brigadier C.J.E. Auchinleck, wasted 

little time in moving his forces into Mohmand country. Although the heat 

and humidity were stifling, Auchinleck’s command pushed into the tribal 

territory quickly and with great proficiency. Employing light infantry, 

light tanks, cavalry, and artillery, the British and Indian forces were able 

to advance with several columns in the face of determined Mohmand 

resistance. Night movements and the addition of light tanks as part of the 

constituent field force played a key role in the swiftness of the advance and 

the battering inflicted on the enemy.19

As the official history of these operations pointed out; “the Mohmand 

Force made full use of movement by night and were thus able to extend 

their radius of action to round up hostile bodies and to effect surprise by 

seizing and occupying essential tactical features before it was light.”20

Indeed, two of Auchinleck’s brigades were able to conduct a simultaneous 

night movement to capture the heavily defended high ground around the 

Nahakki Pass on the 18th of September. 

Mohforce also made extensive use of its light tanks which aided 

the infantry in establishing piquets by silencing enemy fire and blasting 
55

through Mohmand positions from both flank and rear. In short, according 

to the official record, the tanks made; 

full use of their mobility and invulnerability against rifle 

fire [and] established fixed machine gun posts in rear of 

the general line held by the tribesmen thereby threatening their normal line of retreat and forcing them to withdrawal to the flank. In this way, opposition offered to a 

direct advance by our infantry was reduced . . . In the withdrawal, tanks accompanied the rear party where possible 

[and] covered with their fire, the withdrawal of piquets by 

pinning the tribesmen to their ground. On more than one 

occasion, the mere presence of tanks in a valley was sufficient to deter the tribesmen from following up.21

Even before this campaign, General Skeen made it clear that he would 

hate to be without armoured vehicles anywhere where they could be used.22

By September of 1935, Auchinleck had inflicted enough punishment 

on the Mohmand tribesmen to persuade their leaders to call for jirgas and 

come to terms with the British. In a training memorandum produced by the 

General Staff, senior British officers concluded; 

The recent Mohmand operations showed marked advance 

in the conduct of operations of this nature and the methods 

employed. Apart from the advantages of a L. of C. [Line of 

Communications] with a road for M.T., [Motor Transport] 

which was effectively maintained and of efficient 

administrative arrangements, the rapid and complete 

success obtained in this campaign may be attributed to 

enterprising leadership, development of existing methods, 

and the introduction of innovations.23

British and Indian soldiers learned well from the successful tactics used 

during the campaign. Soon, they expanded their training in night fighting, 

the employment of tanks, securing lines of communications, and air-land 

coordination. As they continued to train, violence once again erupted on a 

grand scale in Waziristan.24

The Faqir of Ipi and the 1936–1937 Waziristan Campaign

In early 1936, a Pashtun schoolteacher married a young Hindu girl who 

went by the name of Islam Bibi. She converted to Islam and soon after, the 

family of the young girl charged the schoolteacher with kidnapping. The 

case was quickly brought before a magistrate. The issue probably could 

have been quietly settled by a British political officer and a Waziri jirga
56

but by the time the legal action went to court it had gained a great deal of 

public notoriety. When the magistrate handed down a decision taking the 

girl away from her Pashtun husband, many Wazirs were convinced that 

British law had sided with the Hindus. Although British political officers 

attempted to calm the tribes by engaging in numerous jirgas, the situation 

quickly spiraled out of control. In Waziristan in Tori Khel country, a large 

lashkar began to form led by a cunning religious zealot known as the Faqir

of Ipi.25

According to the historian Arthur Swinson, the Faqir of Ipi, whose real 

name was Mirza Ali Khan, was a man who; “could be brutal and treacherous even by Pathan standards. He took bribes, he sheltered outlaws, he was 

not above hiring assassins to deal with his enemies, and even his enemies’ 

children.”26 The Faqir of Ipi used the Islam Bibi case to stir up the tribesmen and advocate a new holy war against the infidel. In Tori Khel country, 

the Faqir of Ipi managed to incite many of the more volatile tribesmen, 

many of whom welcomed a chance to fight the British once more. Loyal 

maliks or elders in the region convinced the Government of India that a 

visit by British and Indian soldiers into Tori Khel country would probably 

encourage the tribe to expel the Faqir of Ipi. Unfortunately, this “peaceful demonstration” as the British official history called it, would stir up a 

hornet’s nest and plunge most of Waziristan into turmoil.27

On the 25th of November in 1936, two brigade-sized columns began 

a synchronized move into Tori Khel country. The Razmak Column (Razcol) would move from Damdil while the Tochi Column (Tocol) advanced 

from Mir Ali. Both columns were to converge at Biche Kashkai and then 

return to their starting locations. The British official history reported; “It 

was hoped that this move would strengthen the hands of the local maliks

and check the Faqir’s propaganda. The attitude of the Tori Khel as a whole 

seemed satisfactory and serious opposition was not anticipated. The troops, 

therefore, were to carry out what was purely a peaceful demonstration on 

a timed programme and were to take no offensive action unless forced to 

retaliate in their own defence.”28 Since this was a peacetime operation, 

British commanders saw no need for a well defended line of communication. In fact, no logistical arrangements were made at all.

Razcol soon ran into stiff tribal resistance on the outskirts of Biche 

Kashkai. Although “close piquets” were used along the route, 14 soldiers 

had been killed and 43 wounded by the time the column made its way into 

Biche Kashkai. While Razcol went to work constructing a perimeter camp 

at Biche Kashkai, Tocol found its way blocked by tribesmen determined to 

stop the advance. A cavalry charge and RAF close air support finally forced 
57

Map 5. Operations in North-West Frontier, 1935–1937.

Damdil

Razani

SALIENT

Kareskia R.

AFGHANISTAN

AHMADZAI WAZIRS

Gumal R.

KHOST

BIRMAL

BANNU

MAHSUD

GURBAZ

KABUL

KHEL

SHAM SHAWAL

TANNIS

MAIZAR

BHITTANNIS

SHAKAI

ZILLI KHEL

ZADRANS

MANZAR KHEL

Luni R.

Shakur R.

Shaktu R.

Tochi R.

Kurram R.

Kaithu R.

Kaithu R.

Gharoshti

Mastol R.

Shawal Tangi

Maidan

Mhasara R.

•

• • •

•

•

• •

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

• •

•

Kohat Thal

Shinki

Defile Mir Ali

Miram Shah

Khaisora R.

Biche Kashkai

Walo

Tangi

Arsal Kot

Jandola

Tank Zam

Manzai

Ahmad Khel

Chaprai

Barzai

Razamk

Wana

Makin

Kaniguram Ladha

Musa Nika

Tank

D.I.K.

Showali

Alqad

Durand Line

Administrative Border

M.T. Roads before 1/12/36

M. T. Roads after 1/12/36

Limits of Mahsud Territory

BANNU

AHMADZAI

Sham

Plain

0 5 10 15 20 m

Damdil

Razani

SALIENT

Kareskia R.

AFGHANISTAN

AHMADZAI WAZIRS

Gumal R.

KHOST

BIRMAL

BANNU

MAHSUD

GURBAZ

KABUL

KHEL

SHAM SHAWAL

TANNIS

MAIZAR

BHITTANNIS

SHAKAI

ZILLI KHEL

ZADRANS

MANZAR KHEL

Luni R.

Shakur R.

Shaktu R.

Tochi R.

Kurram R.

Kaithu R.

Kaithu R.

Gharoshti

Mastol R.

Shawal Tangi

Maidan

Mhasara R.

•

• • •

•

•

• •

•

•

•

• •

•

•

•

•

•

• •

•

• •

•

Kohat Thal

Shinki

Defile Mir Ali

Miram Shah

Khaisora R.

Biche Kashkai

Walo

Tangi

Arsal Kot

Jandola

Tank Zam

Manzai

Ahmad Khel

Chaprai

Barzai

Razamk

Wana

Makin

Kaniguram Ladha

Musa Nika

Tank

D.I.K.

Showali

Alqad

Durand Line

Administrative Border

M.T. Roads before 1/12/36

M. T. Roads after 1/12/36

Limits of Mahsud Territory

BANNU

AHMADZAI

Sham

Plain

0 5 10 15 20 m

the Wazir tribesmen back. While the road to Biche Kashkai appeared 

open, Tocol was now behind schedule. In order to link up with Razcol, 

the decision was made by the Tocol commander to continue the advance 

toward Biche Kashkai after dark. As Tocol moved forward in the darkness, 

tribesmen fired down on the column triggering a stampede by the pack 

mules laden with supplies. Approximately four miles from the perimeter 

camp at Biche Kashkai, Tocol was forced to hunker down in a defensive 

perimeter. During the night the situation grew so desperate for Tocol that 

the RAF was forced to parachute in four tons of supplies and ammunition 

to the beleaguered column at dawn. The next morning, Tocol managed to 

link up with Razcol at Biche Kashkai.29
58

On 27 November, however, a lack of supplies and the urgent need to 

evacuate casualties, forced both Tocol and Razcol to withdraw back to 

Mir Ali. The retreat greatly enhanced the power of the Faqir of Ipi. As 

historian Alan Warren pointed out; “The leadership displayed by the Faqir

of Ipi was crucial to transforming the tribesmen’s traditional desires for 

cultural and political autonomy and capacity for militancy, into active opposition. The Faqir also provided a charismatic focus for the tribesmen to 

identify with. Religion was used to define the enemy and to legitimize a 

military campaign. Religion was so closely allied to tribal culture that to 

some tribesmen a call to defend Islam had a clear political message.”30

The tenacious resistance of the tribesmen had come as a shock to 

the British and Indian soldiers involved in the fighting. “The extent of 

the opposition offered to the columns was a surprise which exceeded all 

estimates;” wrote the author of the British official history. “In view of the 

amenability which the Tori Khel had shown previous to the operations, the 

only explanation seems to be that the Faqir’s propaganda had succeeded to 

an extent which had not been considered possible.”31 While the Faqir had 

managed to incite the population, the fact that the British telegraphed their 

intentions played a key role in the Faqir’s victory. There was no surprise 

and no effort to secure a line of communication. As the British official 

history makes clear, the mission was undertaken with the expectation 

that it would be practically a peacetime operation. That is to say that any 

opposition would be slight only and the difficulties of reaching the day’s 

objective would be those that might be expected normally in a column 

march.”32 Indeed, the Army of India had once again underestimated the 

Pashtun tribes and propelled the Faqir of Ipi into the spotlight. What had 

begun as a peacekeeping mission, now turned into a mission to punish the 

Tori Khel and track down and kill the Faqir of Ipi.

Reinforcements were immediately sent into North Waziristan. Light 

tanks, aircraft, and additional mountain batteries as well as engineers 

moved into position to support a new punitive expedition. While the new 

force was being assembled, British political officers met with various tribal khels. These jirgas convinced many tribal leaders to pull their fighters 

away from the Faqir of Ipi’s lashkar. Although the Faqir lost many tribesmen, he gained more from Afghanistan as Pashtun tribesmen crossed the 

border to join the new holy war. Soon however, the additional manpower 

began to strain the primitive supply system of the lashkar.

33

In early December, the new strike force advanced into the Khaisora 

Valley. This time they met with limited resistance as meager supplies and 

bad weather had forced many fighters to leave the lashkar. While the RAF 
59

conducted reduced bombing missions, the ground forces burned villages 

along the route belonging to Pashtun fighters. During the last week of December, British forces burned Biche Kashkai to the ground, forcing the 

Faqir of Ipi and about 850 fighters out of the Khaisora Valley. By January 

of 1937, the RAF had driven the Faqir and several hundred diehard fighters into caves outside of Arsal Kot. “Ultimately,” wrote Alan Warren; “the 

lack of loot, supplies, and military success led to the dispersal of the insurgents.”34 As of mid-January of 1937, the Tori Khel Wazirs agreed to stop 

fighting. During this limited operation, 34 soldiers from the Army of India 

were killed and an additional 132 were wounded.

In the spring of 1937, after a short lull, violence once again flared 

in Waziristan. Far from beaten, the Faqir of Ipi emerged from his cavernous lair promoting a new jihad, while Wazir tribesmen launched new 

raids against the Hindu population along the Waziristan border. A limited 

bombing campaign by the RAF did little to stop the violence or placate 

the tribes. Permanent camps and outposts as well as permanent piquets

throughout Waziristan, were frequently harassed by snipers while roving 

tribal gangs smashed telephone lines and other important infrastructure 

projects within Waziristan. The “Forward Policy” of occupying Waziristan 

and constructing a road network throughout the tribal areas was proving 

more of liability than an asset. Soldiers defending these outposts had to be 

supplied and maintaining the lengthy lines of communications proved a 

daunting task. The legendary John Masters, a young British officer serving 

in a Gurkha battalion at the time, recalled the difficulties of protecting the 

road networks in Waziristan;

This was the hardest task [that] the Frontier offered and 

we did it three times a week. R.P. [Road Protection] was 

hard because every day we had to cover the same stretch 

of road and every day it became more difficult to obey the 

Cardinal Frontier principle of never doing the same thing 

in the same way twice running. We had to fight against 

fatigue and carelessness because someone was watching. 

Someone was always watching, someone with an inborn 

tactical sense, someone who missed nothing.35

Indeed, the tribesmen missed little. They were tactically proficient and 

always ready to attack an unsuspecting enemy. A case in point is the assault 

on the morning of the 9th of April in 1937. A convoy of 49 trucks carrying 72 men returning from leave and escorted by two automobiles, four 

armored cars, and two platoons of infantrymen proceeded up the road from 

Manzai and bound for Wana. Near the Shahur Tangi gorge, the convoy was 
60

ambushed by a force of Mahsud and Bhittani tribesmen led by the infamous 

Mahsud criminal, Khonia Khel. As the convoy rolled around the sharp 

curves of the gorge, the tribesmen unleashed a torrent of close range small 

arms fire. Drivers and passengers inside the trucks were riddled with bullets. The few who managed to get out of the vehicles, found little cover. To 

make matters worse, the armored cars were unable to elevate their machine 

guns high enough to engage the tribesmen on the high cliffs. The Mahsud 

and Bhittani fighters had chosen their ambush site well. “The tribesmen 

were in skillfully chosen positions on both sides of the road;” wrote the 

author of the British official history. “Concealed behind rocks and in catchment drains . . . and the tribesmen in many cases were completely protected 

from air attack under big overhanging slabs of rocks in front of which they 

had built walls.”36 The tribesmen even succeeded in shooting down a lone 

RAF aircraft that flew over the site of the ambush. During the course of 

the day and into the next morning, the fighting increased as reinforcements 

from Jandola and Wana rushed to rescue the survivors. By the time the 

fighting ended, the lashkar had disappeared into the hills, leaving 47 British and Indian soldiers dead and another 50 wounded.37

By the third week of April in 1937, British and Indian forces in 

Waziristan were confronting another powerful lashkar in Northern 

Waziristan. Restrictive bombing, negotiations, and limited punitive 

operations had all failed and the Faqir of Ipi once again returned, bringing 

with him approximately 3,000 fighters. On the 23rd of April, a force of 

nearly three brigades reinforced with light tanks and additional mountain 

artillery batteries advanced once again from Mir Ali into Khaisora Valley. 

A large amount of infantry was also employed to protect the vital lines of 

communication back to Mir Ali, while a wing from the RAF was placed 

under the direct control of the British ground commander.38

The ground forces at Biche Kashkai established a new base camp and 

piquets were positioned on the surrounding high ground. On the night of 

the 27th of April, Tori Khel tribesmen attacked the surrounding piquets

with hand grenades and rifle fire while a larger force made a direct assault 

on the heavily defended camp at Biche Kashkai. This assault was easily 

beaten by machinegun and rifle fire from within the camp. Within days, 

the British commander was able to force a large section of the lashkar out 

into open ground where it was severely pummeled by aircraft, artillery and 

machinegun fire. While the Faqir of Ipi’s lashkar suffered grievous losses, 

it was not destroyed. The tribesmen simply fell back into the Shaktu Valley where new fighters, including many Afghans, flocked to their banner 

forming more lashkars.

39
61

In May, the British formed a new force christened the Waziristan Division or Wazdiv. This new division wasted little time in striking the lashkars in the Shaktu Valley. In a bold converging night movement across 

treacherous terrain, Wazdiv attacked the lashkars in the Shaktu region. Led 

by the Tochi Scouts, they surprised and overwhelmed the tribesmen who 

withdrew across the Sham Plain where they were cut down in large numbers by bombs and machinegun fire from RAF aircraft. Most of the Afghan 

fighters fled and were soon followed by other dejected tribesmen. As the 

British and Indian soldiers advanced toward the Faqir of Ipi’s headquarters 

in the village of Arsal Kot, the RAF dropped 13,000 pounds of supplies. 

At the same time, ground forces secured the lines of communication back 

to Mir Ali. On the 28th of May, Arsal Kot was captured and destroyed 

without a fight. With the destruction of Arsal Kot, the Tori Khel tribesmen 

had had enough. Most of the fighters quit the field and returned to their 

homes, marking an end to large scale operations in Northern Waziristan. 

Once again however, the Faqir of Ipi slipped away.

From May until November in 1937, the British army continued to conduct small operations against hostile tribesmen in Waziristan. British and 

Indian soldiers built an additional 90 miles of road while continuing to 

fend off attacks by small groups of tribesmen. The operations had proven 

costly, with British and Indian forces sustaining almost 1,000 casualties 

during the campaign. By December, many of the brigades sent to reinforce 

Waziristan had returned to India. Interestingly, a light tank company was 

left in Waziristan to support the remaining soldiers in their garrison duties. 

According to one British historian; “The weight of firepower provided by 

machine guns, artillery, light tanks, and aircraft operating with Indian columns had proved highly effective against large concentrated lashkars in 

the opening phases of operations but conversely exacerbated the problem 

of bringing the elusive tribesmen to battle.”40 Indeed, as operations progressed and the tribesmen witnessed the destructive capabilities of these 

new weapon systems, they adjusted their tactics accordingly.41

As had been the case in past campaigns, the British sought to quickly 

inflict as much pain and punishment as possible on the errant tribesmen 

in order to establish calm. However, realizing the potential backlash of 

exceedingly harsh punitive measures, political officers sought to limit the 

damage inflicted on the tribes. It was perhaps, an early glimpse of today’s 

COIN operations. Still, as British Army Officer John Masters pointed out; 

“We took few prisoners at any time and very few indeed if there was no 

political agent about.”42
62

In the late 1930s, the British Army published Frontier Warfare, a 

new tactical manual for the North-West Frontier. The new handbook discussed the importance of converging attacks, night operations, piqueting, 

and strong firepower to cover withdrawals. Also identified as indispensable in frontier warfare against the Pashtuns, were the following: secrecy 

as regards intention, simplicity of plan, strict limitations of the objective 

through prior reconnaissance, mystification of the enemy, close control and 

supervision, and an ample margin of time.43 While the new tactical manual 

provided solid lessons of past experiences, little had changed strategically 

on the North-West Frontier by the time the Second World War erupted in 

1939. As T.R. Moreman asserted; “Despite repeated punitive campaigns 

and various attempts to pacify tribal territory, the now heavily armed transborder Pathans still remained fiercely independent and an insistent threat to 

the security of the settled areas. Apart from where roads had penetrated the 

hills, the main distinguishing characteristics and tactics of frontier warfare 

still remained essentially unchanged from those initially encountered in 

1849 with large mobile columns reliant on pack transport protected by a 

ring of piquets.”44

Even after the end of the Second World War, the Faqir of Ipi continued 

his war against the British from caves near the Afghan border. He would 

never be apprehended or killed by the British and died of old age in the 

1960s.45 When British rule ended in 1947, the problems associated with the 

Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier fell to the new Pakistani Government. 

That government chose at the time to remove all regular forces from the 

region. Today the Pakistani Army has returned to Waziristan and is confronted by a persistent and daunting adversary that closely resembles those 

cunning and resourceful enemy forces who opposed the British for much 

of the 20th century.
63

Notes

1. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier 

Warfare, 1914–39” in War and Society in Colonial India edited by Kaushik Roy 

(New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2006), 282.

2. Colonel J.P. Villiers-Stuart, Letters of a Once Punjab Frontier Force 

Officer to His Nephew Giving His Ideas of Fighting on the North-West Frontier 

and in Afghanistan (London: Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., 1925), 25.

3. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 136.

4. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India (Calcutta, India: 

Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1925), 3.

5. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, 20.

6. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, 25.

7. Villiers-Stuart, 24–25. 

8. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting 

on The North-West Frontier Of India (London: Gale and Polden, 1932), 62. 

9. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and 

Frontier Warfare, 1914–1939,” 284.

10. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–39,” 285–286.

11. Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts (London, UK: Jonathan 

Cape, 1985), 129.

12. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–1939,” 285–286.

13. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–1939,” 287.

14. T.R. Moreman, “‘Passing It On:’ The Army in India and Frontier Warfare, 

1914–1939,” 289.

15. See Tribal Fighting in NWFP (Lahore, India: Vanguard Books, 2009).

16. Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The 

North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936–1937 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2000), 65.

17. Official History of Operations the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935 (Sussex, UK: Published jointly by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. and The 

Imperial War Museum, n.d.), 192.

18. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 196.

19. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 196–197.

20. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier 1920–1935, 

240–241.

21. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 241.

22. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 243;
64

23. Skeen, 20.

24. Quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of 

Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 152–153.

25. Swinson, 326. 

26. Warren, 80–82; Swinson, 327.

27. Swinson, 327.

28. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937 (Sussex, UK: Published jointly by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. and The 

Imperial War Museum, n.d.), 6–7.

29. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937, 7–8.

30. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 

1936–1937, 8; T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 155.

31. Warren, 120.

32. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937, 15.

33. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937, 231.

34. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 156; Warren, 132.

35. Warren, 134–135. 

36. Warren, 139, 144; T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development 

of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 156; John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger: My Life 

in the Gurkhas (London: Casell, 2002) quoted in T.R. Moreman, The Army in 

India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849–1947, 158.

37. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937, 55. 

38. Warren, 157.

39. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 159; Warren, 171–172.

40. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 159; Warren, 172.

41. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 165.

42. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 160–165.

43. Warren, 282.

44. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1936–

1937, 234.

45. T.R. Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare, 1849–1947, 173.

46. T.R. Moreman, The Army of India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare 1849–1947, 185; Warren, 259–260.
65

Conclusions

When the British finally withdrew from India in 1947, the Pashtun 

tribes of the North-West Frontier remained to a great extent, as they were 

in the 1840s. British efforts at pacification as well as punitive expeditions 

had failed to significantly alter the strategic situation. In the end, the introduction of modern weapons and continued tactical successes did little 

to fundamentally alter circumstances on the North-West Frontier. As they 

had been since the British arrived, the Pashtun population remained “an 

ever present danger” to those outside powers which sought control over 

the frontier area.1

 This assertion is underscored by the fact that in 2009, 60 

years after the British departure from the region, the Pakistani government 

felt obligated to launch a military offensive against thousands of Pashtun 

insurgents in South Waziristan.2

In reviewing the pattern of military operations in the North-West 

Frontier over the last two centuries, it is clear that British objectives and 

practices differed from those of the Pakistani or US-led Coalition forces 

operating in the frontier region in the early 21st century. Most important is 

the fact that senior British military and political leaders were not interested 

in winning the hearts and minds of the Pashtun population on the NorthWest Frontier. Thus, British Imperial forces cannot be viewed as prosecuting campaigns of counterinsurgency in the region. 

Then what can the US Army and its allies learn from the British experience on the North-West Frontier? Arguably, there are three fundamental 

insights offered by this historical experience. The first involves the set of 

problems associated with the training of an indigenous force. The significant tactical lessons from the British experience encompass the second, 

to include salient lessons on the use of key terrain and the integration of 

modern technology such as armored vehicles and aircraft. The third insight focuses on the importance of sustaining tactical doctrine and insights 

through the publication of both official and unofficial studies, manuals, and 

collections of lessons learned.

Like the US Army today, the British in the North-West Frontier 

trained and equipped thousands of native soldiers. Many of these soldiers 

served professionally and bravely in the British imperial ranks and certainly proved their worth in the mountains of the region. On at least two occasions however, trained Pashtun soldiers joined their fellow tribesmen in 

rebellions or holy wars against the British Army in India. In the 1897–1898 

Pashtun revolts, tribesmen, both officers and soldiers, joined the jihad 

against the British Army in India. These former soldiers greatly inspired 
66

their comrades and communicated their considerable military knowledge 

to them. They also designed new tactics based of their familiarity with the 

British system. In the end, the British and Indian soldiers paid a heavy 

price in blood and equipment.

Once more during the campaigns of 1919–1920, a large number of 

Pashtuns soldiers trained by the British, joined forces with rebelling tribesmen. Many of these officers and soldiers had served in World War I and 

their insight and training allowed them to quickly form the lashkars into 

an imposing and tactically proficient force. As British historian Alan Warren pointed out, “Between 1900 and 1919 several thousand Wazirs, mainly 

Mahsuds, were recruited into the Indian Army and Frontier militias. Wazir junior officers learned how to control platoons and companies, and received an overview of battalion tactics.”3 Their training and skill undoubtedly helped bring about the enormous British and Indian losses incurred 

during this campaign. The British experience with training the indigenous 

population in the tactics and techniques of their own army cost the lives 

of many of their soldiers and proved to be a practice fraught with risk, 

however necessary it might have been. This is an important lesson that the 

US military should not overlook as it places more emphasis on building 

security forces in Afghanistan.

In the realm of tactical use of terrain, one of the most important lessons discovered by the British army in its campaigns against the Pashtuns 

was the importance of maintaining the high ground. Although it would 

appear to be a basic and straightforward tactical modus operandi, it was 

a practice sometimes overlooked by the British Army in India, often with 

deadly consequences. In order to guard against night attacks and deny the 

enemy the commanding terrain, trained and experienced frontier units 

almost always maintained piquets, or what today are called observation 

posts or combat outposts, on the high ground above their camps. Decades 

of lethal Pashtun surprise attacks in the rugged mountains of the NorthWest Frontier encouraged this tactical routine. “As soon as your battalion 

reaches camp, an officer reports for orders as to the camp piquets;” wrote 

General Andrew Skeen: 

If your C.O. [Commanding Officer] is wise, he will do 

what he can to speed up the occupation of these piquets . 

. . Meanwhile as many as can be spared from the rest of 

the company, with the company commander and good understudies to select the piquet sites, have gone up with full 

precautions and with ample tools and material, and there 

collect stones, fill sandbags, and build the walls.4
67

British units who failed to heed this advice were often ferociously 

battered by Pashtun tribesmen. 

Piquets were sometimes employed by march columns to prevent ambush and surprise attacks by the Pashtuns. As the Manual of Operations 

on the North-West Frontier of India noted in 1925; “Piquets should be 

posted so as to deny to the enemy the most dangerous approaches and most 

important points within effective range of the route and to support one another. They must never withdraw without a definite order to do so.”5

 Many 

times, a system of permanent piquets was also employed to guard lines 

of communication. This approach required plenty of soldiers and proved 

a slow and tedious process but was highly effective, nonetheless. Once 

again, British units that neglected to occupy the high ground were often 

severely punished by Pashtun tribes who rarely failed to exploit a mistake. 

Recent events in Afghanistan have shown that when Coalition forces have 

likewise failed to carefully place positions on key terrain, insurgents have 

been able to mount devastating attacks and inflict significant casualties.

As a modern industrialized power, the British Empire was able to 

introduce new technologies to the region beginning in the 20th century. 

Indeed, armored cars and light tanks offered important advantages on the 

North-West Frontier. When the terrain permitted their use, British and Indian soldiers fully exploited the armor, armaments, and mobility of these 

new weapons. “Armored cars are invaluable here;” wrote Skeen, “with 

command and protection, combined with fire power and speed, which 

gives them surprise properties of the greatest value.”6

 The Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, published in 1925, made clear 

that the armored vehicles were “valuable for reconnaissance and pursuit, 

for the rapid support of a detachment, and for escorting motor convoys.”7

The Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 

1920–1935, also pointed out,“Armoured troops, owing to their invulnerability to rifle fire and to the absence of hostile artillery or aircraft can be 

of great value in Frontier Warfare.”8 The Official History also stated that 

through the use of tanks; “opposition to a direct advance by our infantry 

was reduced.”9

 Indeed, during the campaigns, light tanks proved highly 

successful in neutralizing enemy small arms fire, threatening the flanks 

and rear of the lashkars, and assisting in the placement and withdrawal of 

infantry piquets.

10

While the insurgent enemy in Afghanistan is now equipped with modern anti-tank weapons and a profusion of improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs), it would be incorrect to assume that armored vehicles and tanks 

have no place in current operations. The Canadian Army’s experience with 
68

tanks in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2007, to a great extent, mirrors that 

of the British on the North-West Frontier. According to Canadian Major 

Trevor Cadieu, tanks and other armored vehicles; “have better protected 

our dismounted infantry soldiers in Southern Afghanistan, allowing them 

to close with and destroy a fanatical and determined enemy in extremely 

complex terrain.”11 Cadieu also confirmed the psychological importance of 

tanks in Afghanistan, contending that; “Numerous signal and human intelligence (HUMINT) reports confirm that lower-level Taliban fighters are 

terrified of the tanks and their ability to manoeuvre and they are often reluctant to attack coalition forces equipped with integral armoured assets.”12

British light tanks produce the same effects on the Pashtun tribesmen of the 

North-West Frontier. The US military in 2009 began introducing Stryker 

Combat Vehicles to combat operations in Afghanistan. US commanders 

and planners should consider the recent Canadian experience as well as the 

British experience from the previous century in their considerations of how 

to use these vehicles. 

Aircraft also became increasingly important in British operations 

in the North-West Frontier. In his recent paper Britain & the North-West 

Frontier: Strategy, Tactics and Lessons, Jules Stewart writes; “From the 

early years of the 20th century, air power came to play a significant role 

in combating tribal insurgents.”13 Indeed, the Royal Air Force performed 

a number of important missions and closely supported the British Army 

ground operations. As T.R. Moreman pointed out; “The RAF assisted the 

army with supporting piquets, assisting withdrawals, directing artillery 

fire, communicating between advance and rear guards, and supplying photographic intelligence.”14 The RAF also operated independently, often carrying out punitive attacks on Pashtun tribesmen and their livestock in an 

effort to bring the wayward tribesmen to terms. However, British political 

officers frequently forced the RAF to limit these measures, cognizant of 

the fact that this type of activity was counterproductive and would only 

broaden the conflict. This serves as a critical caution for both the US Army 

and its allies. 

Perhaps the best observation regarding the use of air power against 

the Pashtuns on the North-West Frontier however, came from British General Sir Andrew Skeen; “My own view is that these people [the Pashtun 

tribes] are really so invulnerable in their miserable property and in their 

persons save from accurate close range use of ground weapons and are 

moreover so scattered and so adept at cover and concealment that I doubt 

whether any tribe that has the will to resist, will ever be coerced by air 

power alone.”15 While written nearly 80 years ago and before the advent of 
69

precision-guided weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, Skeen’s insight 

on the use of air power against the Pashtun tribes in the region remains a 

useful caveat about the limits of modern technology. 

The broadest, and perhaps most durable, insight concerns the manner 

in which military institutions learn and develop. As documented in this 

study, a host of British officers produced both official and unofficial tactical studies and manuals during the nearly one hundred years of conflict on 

the North-West Frontier. From Captain Charles Farquhar Trower’s Hints 

on Irregular Cavalry, published in 1845, to General Sir Andrew Skeen’s 

Passing It On, published in the late 1930s, British officers sought to convey 

their knowledge and experience in unofficial publications designed to assist fellow officers and soldiers in conducting operations on the North-West 

Frontier. Official British army manuals also attempted to pass on this same 

understanding of mountain warfare and the complexities of confronting the 

Pashtun tribes. For the most part, these authors succeeded in educating the 

soldiers who would conduct punitive operations against the tribes. However, when British senior commanders failed to disseminate this doctrine 

to the regular forces or minimized frontier fighting manuals by combining 

them with more standardized field service regulations, lessons were lost 

and problems often followed. Conducting combat operations against the 

Pashtuns in the mountainous terrain of the North-West Frontier required 

specialized training for soldiers as well as specific training manuals. By 

the late 1930s and 1940s, the British army had learned these lessons well 

and provided their soldiers with the required frontier manuals as well as 

instructive official histories of past campaigns. In its collection and dissemination of lessons learned in Afghanistan and publication of studies 

like the present volume, the US Army has wisely chosen to emulate this 

practice and should continue to do so into the future. 
70

Notes

1. Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Bruce, Waziristan: The Problems of the NorthWest Frontiers of India and Their Solutions (Aldershot, Gale & Polden, Ltd., 

1938), vii.

2. Ishtiaq Mahsud and Nahal Toosi, “Pakistan attacks militant bases,” The 

Kansas City Star, 18 October 2009.

3. Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The 

North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936–1937 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2000), 280.

4. General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting 

on the North-West Frontier of India (London: Gale and Polden, 1932), 71.

5. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India (Calcutta, 

India: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1925), 21–22.

6. Skeen, 99, 116.

7. Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India, 14

8. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935 (Sussex, UK: Published jointly by The Naval & Military Press Ltd. and The 

Imperial War Museum, n.d.), 243.

9. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 243.

10. Official History of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India 1920–

1935, 243. 

11. Major Trevor Cadieu, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” Canadian 

Army Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2008), 5.

12. Cadieu, 21.

13. Jules Stewart, Britain & the North-West Frontier: Strategy, Tactics and 

Lessons (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009), 6.

14. T.R. Moreman, The Army of India and the Development of Frontier 

Warfare (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), 131.

15. Skeen, 21–22.
71

Select Glossary of Afghan Tribal Terms

faqir a holy man

ghazi a Muslim who devotes his life to killing an infidel or fighting 

unbelievers

jezail Pashtun long musket

jirga a gathering of tribal representatives or elders

khassadar a tribal levy who, in return for certain responsibilities, receives 

pay from the government

khel tribal sub-group or kinship group

lashkar a tribal army (not usually applied to less than 200 men)

malik a tribal representative or elder

mullah a religious teacher or leader

Pashtunwali unwritten Pashtun code of conduct; “the way of the Pashtun”

sangar a stone breastwork

73

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77

About the Author

Matt M. Matthews joined the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) in July 

2005. For 16 years he was a member of the World Class Opposing Forces 

(OPFOR) of the Battle Command Training Program (BCPT) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Enlisting in the Army at age 17, he served in the light 

infantry from 1977 to 1981. Mr. Matthews also served as a Cavalry officer 

in the US Army Reserve from 1983 to 1986 and as an Armor Officer in the 

Kansas Army National Guard from 1986 to 1991. He graduated from Kansas State University in 1986 with a BS in History and continued his graduate studies there. Mr. Matthews is the author of several CSI Press publications including The Posse Comitatus Act and The United States Army: A 

Historical Perspective, Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine 

Corps Joint Operations, The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective, and We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 HezbollahIsraeli War. He also contributed the chapter titled “Hard Lessons Learned 

A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST 

LEAD: A Historical Overview” in the CSI publication Back To Basics: A 

Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. 

Matt has coauthored numerous scholarly articles on the Civil War in 

the Trans-Mississippi with Kip Lindberg, including “Shot All to Pieces: 

The Battle of Lone Jack,” “To Play a Bold Game: The Battle of Honey 

Springs,” “Better Off in Hell: The Evolution of the Kansas Red Legs”, 

and “It Haunts Me Night and Day: The Baxter Springs Massacre.” Mr. 

Matthews is a frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables and recently appeared on the History Channel as a historian for Bill Kurtis’ Investigating 

History program. Mr. Matthews is a former mayor of Ottawa, Kansas. He 

is currently writing a biography of Kansas Civil War General James G. 

Blunt and a book on the Kansas Red Legs.


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