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WMD Forecasting in Historical and Contemporary Perspective CONTRACT NUMBER 

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·{ 

P:>nP 1 nf? 
WMD Forecasting in Historical and 

Contemporary Perspective 

Dr. Lewis Dunn, Aaron Arnold (Primary Authors) 

Paul Bernstein, Jennifer Borchard, Jack Boureston, Rebecca Cathell, 

Jeffrey Cooper, Amanda Grosiak, Jason Wood (Contributors) 

Science Applications International Corporation 

Dr. Rodney Jones (Primary Author) 

Policy Architects International 

Jonathan Fox, Dr. James Scouras 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency / Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

March 2010 

This report is the product of a collaboration between the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office and 

Science Applications International Corporation 

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do no necessarily reflect the 

official policy or position of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the 

Department of Defense, or the United States Government 

This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

Report Number ASCO 2010 001 

DTRA01-03-D-0017/ TO 18 / TI 7-01 
The mission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of 

mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, 

and counter the threat, and mitigate its effects. 

The Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) 

supports this mission by providing long-term rolling horizon 

perspectives to help DTRA leadership identify, plan, and 

persuasively communicate what is needed in the near term to 

achieve the longer-term goals inherent in the agency’s mission. 

ASCO also emphasizes the identification, integration, and 

further development of leading strategic thinking and analysis 

on the most intractable problems related to combating weapons 

of mass destruction. 

For further information on this project, or on ASCO’s 

broader research program, please contact: 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

8725 John J. Kingman Road 

Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6201 

ASCOinfo@dtra.mil 
WMD FORECASTING 

TABLE OF CONTENTS i 

WMD Forecasting in Historical and Contemporary Perspective 

Table of Contents 

Section I: Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

Proliferation Forecasting: Some Lessons from the Past Record........................................I-1 

Section II: Historical Assessments – Synopses 

Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries Likelihood and 

Consequences.....................................................................................................................II-1 

1970 Without Arms Control ...................................................................................................II-9 

Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences ..............................................................................................II-17 

Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems.............II-25 

Memorandum for the President: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons 

With and Without a Test Ban Agreement..................................................................II-33 

A Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation ........................II-37 

Nuclear Proliferation Phase II ..............................................................................................II-43 

Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Through the Mid-1980s 

(Volume 1 of 3)................................................................................................................II-49 

Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995: Projections, Problems and 

Policy Options .................................................................................................................II-53 

Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet 

Strategic Objectives – An Alternative View................................................................II-59 

Swords from Plowshares – The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear 

Energy ...............................................................................................................................II-63 

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation..............................................................................II-69 

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and 

Constraints........................................................................................................................II-75 

Missile Proliferation – Survey of Emerging Missile Forces .............................................II-83 

Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm After the Lull.........................................II-89 

Section III: Historical Sources 

Historical Assessments Source List...................................................................................... III-1 
Table of Contents 

TABLE OF CONTENTS i i

Section IV: Contemporary Assessments -- Synthesis Paper 

Contemporary WMD Forecasting: Themes, Projections, and Findings in Contemporary 

Studies................................................................................................................................ IV-1 

Section V: Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

Executive Summary of Report of Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the 

Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.................................................................. V-1 

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, a Guide in Maps and Charts .......................................... V-9 

Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology .........................V-15 

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 

2015....................................................................................................................................V-19 

Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015 ..................................................................V-27 

Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force .......................................................................................................V-33 

Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense......................................V-45 

Mapping the Global Future...................................................................................................V-51 

The Nuclear Tipping Point ...................................................................................................V-57 

The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm ...........................................................................V-65 

Global Evolutions and the Role of Nuclear Weapons: Alternative Futures 

for the Next Decade .......................................................................................................V-77 

Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats..........................................V-81 

The Changing Face of Proliferation: Some Thoughts, Speculations, 

and Provocations.............................................................................................................V-87 

The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses.............................................V-97 

Special Issue: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016.......................................................V-101 

Thwarting an “Evil Genius”: Summary of Workshop Proceedings.............................V-111 

Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation............................................................V-117 

What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe .................................................................V-121 

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test ......................................V-127 

Section VI: Contemporary Sources 

Contemporary Assessments Source List ............................................................................. VI-1 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-1

 

Section I: Historical Assessments 

Synthesis Paper 

Proliferation Forecasting: Some Lessons from the Past Record 

Introduction 

Since the earliest days of the atomic age, efforts to forecast future nuclear proliferation 

trends and developments have figured prominently in U.S. political-military planning. At 

that time, the critical question for U.S. planners was how soon the Soviet Union would be 

able to match American possession of atomic weapons. From the start, the difficulties of 

accurately forecasting future proliferation developments became clear in the U.S. failure to 

assess how quickly the first Soviet test would take place. The most accurate possible 

proliferation forecasting – and its contribution to avoiding proliferation surprises – remains 

an essential foundation for future U.S. policies to prevent proliferation or contain its 

consequences. More broadly, credible and accurate forecasting is essential for anticipating 

and responding across the spectrum of future security-related threats. 

This paper reviews a select set of past proliferation-related forecasts. These “historical” 

forecasts were performed between 1957 and 1990. They addressed nuclear proliferation 

most prominently but also included forecasts of Soviet strategic forces developments and 

wider missile proliferation. These forecasts also covered a broad spectrum of sources: declassified U.S. intelligence estimates, official memos, assessments by “special commissions,” 

think tank reports, and writings by individual experts. Each forecast sought to project future 

proliferation-related developments as well as the drivers of those trends. 

The paper briefly reviews the main features of the forecasts and then presents a series of 

potential guidelines for future proliferation forecasting efforts based on the record of past 

forecasts. These guidelines are intended to support ASCO’s exploration of options for 

developing a forecasting capability as part of its threat anticipation mission and in support of 

the wider threat reduction activities of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

The following historical forecasts were reviewed: 

1. Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences. National 

Intelligence Estimate, 1957 

2. Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences. National 

Intelligence Estimate, 1958 

3. 1970 Without Arms Control. National Planning Association, 1958 

4. Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems. National Intelligence 

Estimate, 1963 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 2 WMD FORECASTING 

5. Memorandum for the President: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban 

Agreement. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 1963 

6. Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation. Gilpatric Committee, 1965 

7. Nuclear Proliferation Phase II. Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus (eds.), 1974 

8. Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Through the Mid-1980s. National Intelligence Estimate, 

1975 

9. Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995: Projections, Problems, and Policy Options. Lewis A. 

Dunn and Herman Kahn, 1976 (prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency) 

10. Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strategic Objectives – An 

Alternative View. “Team B Report,” 1976. 

11. Swords from Ploughshares – the Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy. Albert Wohlstetter 

and Harry Rowen (eds.), 1979 (based on a 1976 report for U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency) 

12. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Stephen M. Meyer, 1984 

13. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints. National 

Intelligence Memorandum, 1985 

14. Missile Proliferation – Survey of Emerging Missile Forces. Congressional Research Service, 1988. 

15. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm after the Lull. Leonard Spector, 1990 (Appendix 

A to New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Delivery 

Capabilities in the Third World, Aspen Strategy Group Report) 

 

Proliferation Forecasting – a Synopsis of the Historical Cases 

As reflected in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below, these forecasts relied on a range of analytic 

methodologies, highlighted a number of key variables, envisaged different proliferation 

outcomes, and evinced various strengths and weaknesses. No attempt is made here to 

examine each these past projections in detail.1 Instead, the discussion that follows focuses 

on a number of recurring themes. Taken as a whole, these themes provide insight into the 

potential limitations or dangers to be avoided in forecasting future proliferation – but also 

wider security – developments. 

Nuclear Proliferation Forecasting – The Initial Analyses

Table 1 distills the findings of a series of initial proliferation forecasts carried out in the 

period 1957-1965. During this period, there was increasing concern about the possible 

further spread of nuclear weapons beyond the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), 

and the United Kingdom (1951). 

 

1

 Section II of this report provides detailed summaries.
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-3

 

Table 1. Selected Nuclear Proliferation Forecasts 1957-1965 

 

The initial proliferation forecasts examined in this historical study used a broad range of 

methodologies: country case studies; an extrapolation of current technical-military trends; 

alternative scenarios; and wise-men Delphi survey techniques. Key crossing-cutting themes 

include: 

Study Methodology Key Variables Projection Strengths Limitations 

National 

Intelligence 

Estimate – 1957 

Country case 

studies – expert 

analysis 

Indigenous technical 

capability + 

neighbor’s behavior 

Widespread 

proliferation 

Provided capabilities 

baseline; focused on 

regional spillovers 

Both under and 

overestimated 

capabilities; 

technology push too 

alarmist 

National 

Intelligence 

Estimate – 1958 

Country case 

studies – expert 

analysis 

Indigenous technical 

capability + 

neighbor’s 

behavior/spillover 

effects 

Widespread 

proliferation; 

collaboration 

among existing 

and new 

proliferators 

Capabilities baseline Technology push too 

alarmist; undercut 

by wild cards 

National 

Planning 

Association: 

1970 Without 

Arms Control – 

1958 

Trends analysis 

and extrapolation 

Indigenous technical 

capability 

Widespread 

proliferation from 

inexorable 

technological 

advances; U.S.-

Soviet nuclear 

arsenals in many 

10,000s 

Flagged potential 

dangers 

Technology push too 

alarmist; 

underestimated role 

of political-socialeconomic factors; 

undercut by wild 

cards 

Secretary of 

Defense 

McNamara: 

Memo on 

Comprehensive 

Nuclear Test Ban 

– 1963 

Alternative 

scenarios 

Different nuclear 

testing limits; spread 

of nuclear energy to 

developed and 

developing countries 

Marginal impact of 

CTBT on 

proliferation 

outcomes 

Focused on political 

incentives and 

disincentives, not 

only on technological 

capabilities 

Overestimated 

spread of nuclear 

energy 

National 

Intelligence 

Estimate – 1963 

Country case 

studies 

Nexus of technology 

and motivations 

Acquisition of 

nuclear weapons 

by China – but via 

plutonium 

pathway; India’s 

acquisition; 

lessened fears of 

very widespread 

proliferation 

despite many 

countries with 

technical option 

Multiple variables 

vice only 

technological 

capabilities; impact 

of regime initiatives 

(e.g., eventual nonproliferation treaty) 

Over – and underestimated timing; 

overestimated 

spread of nuclear 

energy; 

underestimated 

domestic factors and 

nation-unique 

approaches; 

undercut by wild 

cards 

Gilpatric 

Commission 

Report – 1965 

Wise Men-Delphi 

survey 

Technology – 

especially spread of 

nuclear energy; 

perceptions of 

security 

On brink of 

worldwide nuclear 

proliferation 

Focus on securityrelated variables vice 

only technological 

capabilities 

Role of domestic 

factors 

underestimated; 

nuclear energy 

overestimated 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 4 WMD FORECASTING 

Warnings of Widespread Proliferation. Many of the early forecasts envisaged 

increasingly widespread nuclear proliferation. Perhaps most typical, the National 

Planning Association’s 1958 report warned of a world of dozens of nuclear weapon 

states by 1970. Internal U.S. intelligence estimates were somewhat more restrained 

but also erred toward projecting possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by many 

countries. As late as 1965, the Gilpatric report – based on a Delphi methodology – 

warned of a world on the “brink” of global proliferation and called for specific 

actions to be taken to prevent that outcome. 

Proliferation Drivers. In large part, these early fears of very widespread future 

proliferation resulted from a “technology push” model of the proliferation process: 

a projected global spread of nuclear technology would lead to decisions to pursue 

nuclear weapons. Toward the end of the 1957-1965 period, there was a greater 

recognition that the spread of technical capability alone need not result in decisions 

to build nuclear weapons, particularly if policies and actions to prevent proliferation 

were put in place. 

Spread of Nuclear Energy. The spread of technology to produce nuclear weapons was 

seen by these initial proliferation forecasts as an inexorable by-product of the spread 

of civilian nuclear technology. The common theme was that as countries began to 

use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, especially for nuclear power production of 

electricity, they would acquire technology, skills, and materials that could be diverted 

into a nuclear weapons program. In that regard, however, virtually all of these 

forecasts turned out to have exaggerated the use of nuclear power as a source of 

nuclear energy by other countries. Technical, economic, and other factors all 

resulted in a far slower spread of nuclear power than anticipated in the late 1950s 

and early 1960s. 

Uncertainty in Estimating the Emergence of New Nuclear Powers. Individual forecasts both 

overestimated and under-estimated how long it would take individual countries to 

acquire nuclear weapons. In some instance, this reflected faulty assessment of the 

future technological capabilities of specific countries. For example, the 1957 

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that China would not be able to 

acquire nuclear weapons without major external assistance. Similarly, while the 1963 

NIE projected China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, it overestimated how long it 

would take China to acquire the needed nuclear weapons materials and expertise to 

do so. By contrast, the 1963 NIE underestimated how long it would take India to 

emerge as a nuclear weapon state – in part because it misjudged the extent of Indian 

ambivalence about nuclear weapons, and in part because of “wild cards” (see below). 

Focus on U.S. Allies and Friends. One of the primary areas of attention of these early 

forecasts was proliferation by U.S. allies and friends in Europe. In large part, this 

focus reflected the emphasis on the availability of indigenous technical capability as a 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-5

 

key proliferation driver as well as the spillover effects from a neighbor’s acquisition 

of nuclear weapons. The initial studies, e.g., the 1958 NIE, also highlighted the 

impact of U.S. policy – in particular, a U.S. nuclear guarantee through NATO, as a 

countervailing factor. Indeed, these initial warnings of proliferation partly 

contributed to new U.S. policy steps to enhance the American nuclear guarantee to 

key allies. 

Reliance on a “Proliferation Mental Model.” Sometimes, a mental model or mindset about 

the proliferation process proved faulty. Again to cite the case of China, the 1963 

NIE assumed that China would follow the plutonium production route to acquire 

nuclear weapons material for a first device. The U.S. Trinity test had used plutonium, 

as had the first Soviet atomic bomb test. Production of highly-enriched uranium for 

nuclear weapons also was thought to be beyond China’s capabilities at the time. This 

assumption was proved wrong when analysis of China’s 1964 test showed that it had 

been of a uranium device 

Impact of “Wild Cards.” The occurrence of unexpected developments sometimes 

undercut the accuracy of these initial forecasts. India’s projected advance toward 

nuclear weapons proved slower than anticipated by the 1963 NIE partly because of 

the deaths of critical leaders (Prime Minister J.N. Nehru in 1964 and his successor 

Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966) and key bomb proponents (Homi Bhabha, the founder 

of India’s atomic energy program in 1964). 

Forecasting Changed the Forecast. To varying degrees, the forecasts became an 

independent factor shaping the future proliferation outcomes that they were seeking 

to forecast. By way of example, the 1958 NIE emphasized the importance of a U.S.-

NATO nuclear guarantee to reassure Germany. Also, the Gilpatric Report’s fears of 

widespread proliferation gave a push for U.S. efforts to negotiate the NPT. 

Nuclear Proliferation Forecasting – The “Second Wave”

India’s detonation of a nuclear explosive device in 1974 once again focused U.S. attention on 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, what may be termed a second wave of 

proliferation forecasts resulted, including studies undertaken directly for the U.S. 

government. By the 1980s, there had been sufficient past internal forecasts to warrant a 

National Intelligence Estimate on “lessons learned.” Summarized in Table 2, these studies 

again used a variety of methodologies. Some key themes include the following: 

Proliferation Scope and Pace Overestimated. Once again, there was a tendency among the 

more prominent of these forecasts to overestimate the scope and pace of future 

nuclear proliferation. The Dunn-Kahn study set out a series of alternative 

projections of proliferation, ranging from “slow but steady” proliferation to a world 

of “runaway” proliferation. Somewhat differently, the Wohlstetter-led analysis 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 6 WMD FORECASTING 

warned of what it called a “plutonium overhang,” with upwards of 40+ countries 

having access to nuclear weapons material. This led the authors to warn of potential 

“exponential” growth in the number of nuclear weapon states. By contrast, in its 

review of past assessments for lessons learned, the 1985 NIE explicitly noted that 

earlier fears of overt proliferation had been exaggerated, partly due to a an emphasis 

on access to technology as the proliferation driver, partly due to a “domino effect” 

theory assuming many inter-linked proliferation decisions. 

More Sophisticated Understanding of Proliferation Drivers. Technology availability 

continued to figure prominently as a variable shaping future proliferation trends in 

these studies – and in the case of the Wohlstetter study was the overriding reason for 

concern about the prospect for widespread acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the 

same time, these studies reflected overall a more varied and complex assessment of 

proliferation drivers. Several of them highlighted the interaction of technical and 

political factors leavened by bureaucratic and scientific momentum as well as 

domestic politics. The NIE’s review of past forecasts acknowledged the role of U.S. 

non-proliferation policies as an independent variable in its own right. 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-7

 

Table 2. Selected Nuclear Proliferation Forecasts: 1970-1990 

Study Methodology Key Variables Top Forecasts Strengths Limitations 

Robert Lawrence 

and Joel Larus, 

“Nuclear 

Proliferation Phase 

II” – 1974 

Country case 

studies – experts 

from each country 

Officiallyarticulated security 

doctrines and 

policy 

Some 

proliferation likely 

– India, Israel, but 

not South Africa 

Provide insights from 

country nationals 

Too fixed in time – 

overtaken by 

events; undercut by 

wild cards (e.g., 

Cuban-Soviet 

intervention in 

Africa) 

Lewis Dunn and 

Herman Kahn, 

“Trends in Nuclear 

Proliferation – 

1975-1995” – 1976 

ACDA report 

Alternative futures Technical options, 

political-security 

incentives and 

disincentives, 

bureaucratic and 

scientific 

momentum, 

proliferation shocks 

Slow but steady 

proliferation taken 

as starting point – 

but only one of 

15+ conceivable 

alternative futures 

up to runaway, 

global 

proliferation 

Concept of 

proliferation chains; 

highlighted multiple 

drivers and more 

complex proliferation 

dynamics via 

alternative futures; 

focus on dealing with 

consequences as 

well as prevention 

Too many 

possibilities set out 

– no single “most 

likely”; chain 

reaction effect 

over-estimated; 

undercut by wild 

cards (e.g., internal 

political change in 

Argentina-Brazil) 

Albert Wohlstetter 

and Harry Rowen 

(eds.), “Swords 

from 

Ploughshares” – 

1979 (original 

version in 1976 as 

ACDA report) 

Trends analysis – 

quantitative 

estimates of 

plutonium 

availability 

(“overhang”) with 

widespread use of 

nuclear energy 

Spread of nuclear 

energy; estimates 

of available 

plutonium 

Emerging access 

to nuclear 

weapons material 

by 40+ countries 

– danger of 

exponential 

growth of nuclear 

weapon states 

Highlighted potential 

impact of nuclear 

energy use; 

baseline of worst 

case risk 

Extrapolation of 

trends overtaken 

by events – 1979 

Three Mile Island 

nuclear accident 

damped nuclear 

energy use; 

problems with use 

of civil plutonium 

Steven Meyer, 

“Dynamics of 

Nuclear 

Proliferation” 

Quantitative model 

– with Delphi 

ranking by experts 

Risk factors – 

technical 

capabilities, 

motivations, 

proliferation impact 

Assessed 

proliferation risk 

across 36 

countries 

Summarized large 

body of country data; 

provided relative 

proliferation risk 

rankings with both 

technical and 

motivation factors 

Individual experts 

with varied 

knowledge of many 

countries; overand underestimated internal 

factors 

National 

Intelligence Council 

– 1985 

Historical 

assessment of 

previous NIEs for 

lessons learned 

Technical 

capabilities, 

political 

motivations, 

internal factors, 

non-proliferation 

norms, impact of 

U.S. policies 

Future 

proliferation likely 

to be covert not 

overt; acquisition 

by Pakistan 

Use of multiple 

variables; identified 

lessons to be 

learned from past 

assessments 

Underestimated 

technical advances 

– DPRK, Iraq, 

Brazil; undercut by 

wild cards (e.g., 

A.Q. Khan network) 

Leonard Spector, 

“Nuclear 

Proliferation in the 

1990s: The Storm 

After the Lull” – 

1990 

Country case 

studies by an 

individual author 

Technical 

capabilities; 

security 

motivations; 

domestic factors 

Additional 

horizontal 

proliferation; lack 

of progress on 

nuclear 

disarmament 

threatens Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) 

Comprehensive 

assessment 

provided baseline for 

more detailed 

country analysis 

Undercut by 

domestic political 

wild cards (e.g., 

collapse of Soviet 

Union apartheid 

South Africa); limits 

of single author 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 8 WMD FORECASTING 

Spread of Nuclear Energy Overestimated. Many of these forecasts (most prominently the 

Wohlstetter-led study) overestimated the global spread of nuclear energy generally, 

and the use of plutonium as a civilian nuclear reactor fuel more specifically. Once 

again, there was an assumption of nuclear energy finally “taking off”. In good 

measure, this assumption reflected the impact of the 1973 oil embargo, tightening of 

global energy markets, and stated plans of many countries to rely more heavily on 

nuclear energy to generate electricity as well of some countries to use plutonium to 

fuel breeder and light-water reactors. Such plans did not materialize – due to 

changing economics, technical problems, and the occurrence of wild cards. 

Timing Considerations. In some cases, proliferation forecasts identified future 

developments that did not come to pass in the period covered by the projection but 

which have since occurred. While the Wohlstetter study’s projection of a world of 

nuclear-capable states proved exaggerated for its time, it now is acknowledged that 

many states are acquiring latent nuclear proliferation options. Somewhat similarly, 

while the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group proved very effective in controlling technology 

from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, its effectiveness was dramatically undercut in 

the past decade by new illicit sources of supply (e.g., the A.Q. Khan network). 

Wild Cards Again Affected Outcomes. The occurrence of many different types of wild 

cards again influenced the extent to which these forecasts proved accurate. The 

Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979 – followed by the far more 

serious Chernobyl accident in1986 – dramatically undercut public and political 

support for pursuing nuclear power. Somewhat differently, Soviet-Cuban 

intervention in Angola changed the political-military context for South Africa’s 

thinking about nuclear weapons, thereby undercutting the Lawrence-Larus forecast 

that South Africa would not seek nuclear weapons. Domestic political changes in 

Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s also was unanticipated but had significant 

non-proliferation spillovers. At the end of the period, the collapse of the Soviet 

Union in 1991 and South Africa’s change of nuclear policy were two other wild cards 

that could not have been anticipated but which shaped proliferation dynamics. 

The Forecasts Influenced Outcomes. Once again the forecasts themselves played a part in 

shaping and reinforcing U.S. non-proliferation policy. Conducted for the U.S. Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency in the aftermath of India’s nuclear test, both the 

Dunn-Kahn and the Wohlstetter-Rowen studies contributed to the overall 

reinvigoration of U.S. non-proliferation efforts in the mid-to-late 1970s. 

Proliferation Forecasting – Soviet Strategic Forces and Missile Proliferation

Several other forecasts addressed Soviet strategic forces and missile proliferation. These are 

captured in Table 3. 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-9

 

Table 3. Selected Forecasts of Soviet Strategic Forces and Missile Proliferation: 1970-1990

Two key themes recur in this related but distinct area. 

The Impact of Mindsets – and Counter-Mindsets. Facing criticism of its policy toward the 

Soviet Union, the Carter Administration asked a team of outside experts to review 

past intelligence assessments of Soviet strategic policy and posture. At the heart of 

this so-called “Team B” assessment was the view that earlier formal estimates had 

downplayed what the group viewed as Soviet pursuit of nuclear superiority and 

global strategic hegemony. To the Team B outsiders, these estimates had assumed 

that the Soviet military and political leadership shared the same strategic goals as the 

United States – a case of mirror-imaging. At least in part, later revelations after the 

Study Methodology Key Variables Top Forecasts Strengths Limitations 

National 

Intelligence 

Estimate on Soviet 

Forces for 

Intercontinental 

Attack through the 

mid-!980s – 1975 

Quantitative 

modeling of 

alternative 

outcomes 

Technological 

research and 

development 

advances; 

alternative SALT II 

strategic arms 

control scenarios 

Continued 

augmentation of 

Soviet military 

capabilities – new, 

more accurate 

ICBMs; increased 

force survivability 

and flexibility; but 

strategic balance 

unlikely to be 

decisively altered 

Comprehensive 

assessment of 

strategic trends 

Overtaken by wild 

card of Soviet 

invasion of 

Afghanistan, 

resulting in failure 

of SALT II 

agreement to 

enter into force; 

discounted Soviet 

strategic culture 

(see Team B 

assessment) 

Soviet Strategic 

Goals – “Team B” 

Assessment -- 

1976 

Use of outside 

experts to review 

in-house 

assessment; 

extrapolation from 

history, strategic 

culture 

Historical evidence 

– as discerned by 

Team B members – 

compared to 

previous NIEs 

Soviet leaders 

seeking strategic 

superiority and 

global hegemony; 

did not accept 

mutual assured 

destruction but 

were pursuing warfighting capability; 

U.S. mirror images 

– projecting its own 

assumptions and 

policies onto Soviet 

Union 

Challenged insider 

“mindsets” 

Team B had its 

own “mindsets” 

‘Missile 

Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging 

Missile Forces” – 

Congressional 

Research Service 

(CRS) -- 1988 

Country case 

studies – technical 

assessment 

Technical 

capabilities 

Country-by-country 

assessment of 

future advances of 

missile programs 

around the world 

Comprehensive 

survey – overall, 

accurate in its 

assessment of 

country capabilities 

Underestimated 

some capabilities; 

did not consider 

internal and 

external 

geopolitical factors 

– vice technology 

options – as 

motivating factors 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 1 0 WMD FORECASTING 

end of the Cold War supported this contention that the Soviet political-military elite 

did not fully share U.S. strategic concepts, especially a commitment to mutual 

assured destruction as a strategic concept. That said, the Team B outsiders’ view 

equally reflected its own mindset about the Soviet Union, one that exaggerated the 

extent of these differences and the Soviet readiness to run risks in pursuit of global 

strategic advantage. 

The Impact of Wild Cards. The occurrence of wild cards was again evidenced. In 

particular, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the U.S. Senate’s 

decision not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, whose ratification was one of the key 

assumptions of the 1975 NIE on Soviet intercontinental forces. 

 

Proliferation Forecasting – Some Guidelines from the Historical Cases 

The review of past proliferation forecasts suggests a series of inter-related guidelines for 

future proliferation forecasting. These should be considered in the development of 

forecasting “best practices.” 

 Don’t rely only on a single methodology. 

 Assessing technical capabilities is only the starting point. 

 Don’t forget the intangibles. 

 Be wary of extrapolating trends. 

 Develop alternative possibilities. 

 Don’t mirror image. 

 Find a way to challenge mindsets and fashions. 

 Think about wild cards. 

Don’t Rely on a Single Methodology. Over the past decades, many different forecasting 

methodologies have been used, sometimes more rigorously, sometimes less so. No 

single methodology proved sufficient. This experience indicates the importance of 

relying on multiple methodologies in seeking to forecast the future scope, pace, and 

dimensions of proliferation. Looking ahead, no single preferred approach for mixing 

multiple methodologies stands out. Instead, the particular mix of methodologies 

chosen may depend significantly on the more specific question at hand. By way of 

example, assume the goal is to develop a forecast of 2015 proliferation in a given 

region. Country case studies using a variety of technical, political, and domesticinternal variables would provide a means for developing a baseline. Thinking about 

possible interactions among country decisions – if not quite proliferation chains – 

would complement more static one-by-one country assessments. Several different 

alternative futures could be developed. In turn, this baseline could be assessed 

against a number of national, regional, and/or global wild cards that could change 

the projection. 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-11

 

Assessing Technical Capabilities is Only the Starting Point – and Uncertain. Assessing 

technical capabilities is essential, but only provides a point of departure. Other 

political-security variables shaping national decisions – and the unique internal 

dynamics, bureaucratic features, and strategic cultures of specific countries – also 

must be considered. Moreover, technical capabilities – and especially the time it 

would take a country to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons – have 

proved uncertain. Unfortunately, past experience offers little guidance on whether 

to err on the side of assuming more rapid advances or less rapid advances – only that 

forecasting can err in either direction. More recently, technical capabilities have also 

been affected by proliferation wild cards, including the type of nuclear 

entrepreneurship typified by the A. Q. Khan nuclear supply network. This, too, 

suggests the need to recognize the inherent uncertainties involved in assessing 

technical capabilities. 

Don’t Forget the Intangibles – Including Proliferation Psychology. Even as past proliferation 

forecasts moved beyond an essentially “technology push” model of proliferation to 

focus on the interaction of political-security motivations and technical possibilities, 

too little attention still was paid to more intangible factors that can affect 

proliferation decisions. Several of these factors already have been mentioned, 

including domestic politics, bureaucratic-scientific momentum and national strategic 

culture. In addition, one further, particularly intangible factor that needs to be 

considered is what may be termed “proliferation psychology.” Usually overlooked, 

proliferation psychology has many dimensions. At one level, it encompasses unique 

ways of thinking and acting among senior-most leaders. For example, it is difficult 

to understand France’s pursuit of a significant nuclear weapons capability without 

taking into account French President Charles de Gaulle’s belief in and commitment 

to restoring France as a great power. Proliferation psychology also reflects national 

memory, exemplified by continuing public and official Israeli support for nuclear 

weapons as the ultimate guarantee against another Holocaust. Still other dimensions 

include perceptions among decision-makers of the utility and usability of WMD, 

perceptions of the legitimacy and credibility of existing non-proliferation institutions, 

and more diffuse beliefs about the possibility of avoiding more widespread 

proliferation. 

Be Wary of Extrapolating Trends. Proliferation related trends – political, military, 

economic, social, and technological – can provide a starting point for proliferation 

forecasting. However, past trends have sometimes proved short-lived or weaker 

than anticipated. The best example in proliferation forecasting is the repeated 

prediction of ever-greater reliance on nuclear energy globally. In that case, economic 

uncertainties, technical problems, and public resistance fueled by wild cards all shortcircuited what seemed an inexorable trend. Sometimes, perceived trends can create 

countervailing responses on the part of governments, economies, societies, and 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 1 2 WMD FORECASTING 

individuals. Fear of a perceived trend toward national enrichment and reprocessing 

capabilities, for instance, led in the 1970s to a U.S.-led agreement on national 

suppliers’ restraint in the export of such capabilities – and may do so again today. 

Develop Alternative Possible Outcomes. One of the most important lessons of past 

proliferation forecasting is the need to think in terms of alternative possible 

outcomes. Focusing on alternatives provides a check against the types of forecasting 

uncertainties and unexpected shifts that have been revealed in this assessment. An 

appreciation of potential alternative outcomes would also provide a more nuanced 

basis for policy development. In that regard, it would help especially to identify the 

potential drivers of less desirable outcomes, which in turn would support actions to 

avoid them. Thinking in terms of alternative outcomes also would help to test 

existing forecasting assumptions and challenge established mindsets. Thinking in 

terms of alternative possible outcomes could entail a highly structured alternative 

futures approach, or could be more informal with an emphasis on more general 

scenarios. 

Don’t Mirror Image. Proliferation forecasting also should be attuned to the risk of 

mirror imaging and thinking that other countries will share U.S. perspectives, 

concepts, or technical approaches. In practice, this calls for focusing on the unique 

cultural, psychological, historical, and other features of various states – and for 

thinking about how these may shape proliferation decisions, choices, and actions. It 

also calls for a readiness to accept evidence that other countries may be choosing 

different technical paths than those pursued by U.S. programs. More broadly, as 

suggested next, there is a need to challenge existing mindsets about the proliferation 

process. 

Find a Way to Challenge Existing Mindsets. Challenging entrenched proliferation 

mindsets can be done a number of ways. One way is to use a structured analytic 

approach aimed at making assumptions explicit – and then testing their credibility. 

Use of formal “red team” methodologies is another approach. A more routine 

readiness on the part of analysts to revisit their assumptions and conclusions can be 

encouraged. Also, some combination of these approaches could be built into the 

proliferation forecasting process. 

Think about Wild Cards. The impact of wild cards in undercutting forecasts of the 

scope, pace, and characteristics of proliferation is one of the most striking features of 

past proliferation forecasts. Many different kinds of wild cards were revealed: 

changes in domestic political leadership, deaths of key individuals, military 

intervention and conflicts, nuclear power plant accidents all were prominent. Thus, 

it is especially important to build possible wild cards into any approach to 

proliferation forecasting. One way to focus on wild cards is to ask explicitly what 

types of unexpected developments could undermine any given baseline forecast. Or 

a set of wild cards could be identified and their impact assessed. Still another 
Proliferation Forecasting: 

Some Lessons from the Past Record 

WMD FORECASTING I-13

 

approach would focus less on possible proliferation outcomes than on the 

assumptions underlying current expectations about proliferation – and how different 

wild cards could reinforce or undermine those assumptions. 

Concluding Thought 

 This assessment of historical proliferation forecasts highlights both some pitfalls to be 

avoided and some guidelines for approaching the challenge of forecasting future 

proliferation-related threats. As noted above, forecasts can change the future that they seek 

to project. By energizing and informing policy responses, forecasts can become “selfdenying” prophecies, as was the case with the oft-made, but repeatedly exaggerated historic 

forecasts of very widespread proliferation. So viewed, whether or not a forecast proves 

accurate is only one test – and in some ways not necessarily the most critical test – of its 

ultimate utility in informing U.S. policies. 
Section I 

Historical Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

I- 1 4 WMD FORECASTING 
Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 1 

Section II: Historical Assessments - Synopses 

Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries Likelihood and Consequences 

National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 1957 

Overview 

The NIE forecasts proliferation developments from 1957-1967 using a country case study 

methodology (with an emphasis on technical capabilities as well as potential neighboring 

country spillover effects). Its technical assessment projected the amount of nuclear weapon 

material likely to be available indigenously as a key to determining countries of most 

proliferation concern. It considered the potential role of outside technical assistance as a 

proliferation accelerator – both in terms of the timing of access to a limited fission capability 

as well as in jumping to more sophisticated weapons. The emphasis on indigenous technical 

capabilities underestimated some countries’ ability to go beyond limited weapons programs 

(even without outside assistance), while overestimating the likelihood that some other 

countries would seek nuclear weapons. (This overestimate proved to be a continuing 

weakness of technically-weighted country studies.) The study’s focus on neighboring 

country spillover effects served to highlight some potential proliferation spillovers but also 

overemphasized others. The NIE’s emphasis on the potential importance of foreign 

assistance likely shaped the conceptual approach taken by U.S. officials to preventing 

proliferation, with an attempt to impede that assistance via international institutions and 

treaties. It identified the potential impact of technical-political surprises in affecting 

proliferation, a factor illustrated by the soon-after creation of a new Fifth French Republic 

under President Charles de Gaulle. 

Timeframe Examined 

1957 through 1967 (ten years) 

Prevailing Context 

With regard to the overall geopolitical situation, this estimate was undertaken in the midst of 

a troubled international political-security environment. During the preceding years, the 

following political shocks had occurred: the aborted Hungarian Revolution and Soviet 

invasion of Hungary to put it down; the Suez Crisis with UK-France-Israel invading Egypt – 

and being forced out when Soviets threatened nuclear war and the United States did not 

back the UK and France; and France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which led to its 

withdrawal from Vietnam. Technically, first the United States and then the Soviet Union 

detonated rudimentary thermonuclear weapons – H-bombs – in 1954. Somewhat differently, 

the context for this study reflected speculation about which country would become the 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

II-2 WMD FORECASTING 

fourth nation– after the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom – to 

acquire nuclear weapons. 

Methodology: Country Case Studies 

The NIE is comprised of a set of discrete country assessments. In making judgments about 

future trends, the NIE placed considerable emphasis on assessing indigenous technical 

capabilities and developments among the fourth states discussed. It stopped short, however, 

of what later came to be termed as the “technology-push methodology” in forecasting 

proliferation trends. Two technical dimensions that would figure prominently later, however, 

were not emphasized: access to imported technology and the role of gray market 

proliferation rings. Instead, in projecting future trends, the assessment focused on whether 

or not a state could develop a limited arsenal based on its own resources. The country case 

study methodology also considered motivational and deterrent factors, particularly as to how 

these factors could affect the timelines for weapon development in each country examined. 

As part of the case study methodology, possible spillover effects on other countries were 

considered. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Based on its country-by-country assessment of technical capabilities, this NIE judged that 

within the period from 1957-1967 up to 10 countries would have the technical capability to 

indigenously develop first generation fission nuclear weapons with yields of 20-40 kt. The 

authors based that assessment primarily on each country’s access to uranium, overall level of 

technology development, and civilian nuclear energy programs. In addition, the country 

studies examined the role of nationalism and alliances in nations’ decisions to pursue or not 

to pursue nuclear weapons. The NIE noted that a technological breakthrough or successful 

espionage could significantly increase the capabilities of the countries discussed. The NIE 

assessed, however, that no fourth country would be able to develop more sophisticated 

thermonuclear weapons without outside assistance. 

Technical Assessment:

France 

The nation will be able to have a weapons production capability by 1958. It estimated that 

France would have produced enough plutonium for up to 3 nominal nuclear weapons of 

between 20-40 kt yield a year. By 1962, France will have the capability to produce enough 

plutonium for up 50 weapons per year, and by 1967, France will be able to produce enough 

for 110 nuclear weapons annually. 

Sweden 

Sweden would not be able to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon until 1961. 

By 1964, it would be able to produce enough plutonium for approximately 10-20 to 40kt 

weapons annually and by 1967, Sweden would be able to produce enough for the production 

of up to 35 weapons a year. 
Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 3 

The NIE predicted that French and Swedish decisions to produce nuclear weapons would 

not automatically spark immediate nuclear weapons production efforts in other Western 

European States. However, it might motivate others to call for a jointly developed pool of 

weapons for a common defense. According to the NIE, Switzerland may also consider 

independent development if this happens. 

Canada 

The nation was projected to have the capability to support the production of plutonium for 

about 35 weapons per year by 1965. (Canada, however, had decided not to pursue nuclear 

weapons over a decade prior, in the late 1940s.) 

West Germany 

The country would be able to produce nuclear weapons at the end of the ten-year study 

period, if it remained totally dependent on its own low-grade uranium ores. If West 

Germany had access to “high-grade” uranium ores, it could produce nuclear weapons within 

five years. 

Other European countries of concern included Belgium, which the NIE estimated could 

begin a nuclear weapons program by 1967 with no external assistance. Without 

extraordinary efforts and assigning the highest priority to a weapons program, Italy would 

not be able to develop a weapon within a ten-year period. Switzerland, Norway, and the 

Netherlands would require unrestricted access to uranium supplies or spent fuel from 

reactors to develop nuclear weapons within a ten-year period. Czechoslovakia, East 

Germany, and to a lesser extent, Poland were thought able to develop a program based on 

their uranium resources, but also were seen to be at the early stages of nuclear energy 

development. 

Elsewhere around the globe, Japan was thought technically capable of producing nuclear 

weapons within 10 years, if given unrestricted access to uranium supplies or if it was able to 

exploit recently reported uranium deposits to fuel its nuclear reactors. India was seen as 

unable to develop a nuclear weapons program within the ten-year period without 

extraordinary efforts and assigning the highest priority to a weapons program. The NIE 

assessed that in comparison to the above countries, the PRC and Australia possessed fewer 

of the resources required to develop nuclear weapons and therefore would require major 

external assistance. Israel was seen to be in a comparable situation. The NIE noted 

however, that these countries were obtaining assistance from external sources and had 

already begun nuclear energy programs. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

Motivations

With regard to the motivations that each country may have to acquire a nuclear weapons 

capability, the NIE highlighted the role of prestige in France’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

II-4 WMD FORECASTING 

well as the potential spillover effects of nuclear weapon acquisition by neighboring countries, 

e.g. the impact of France’s development of nuclear weapons on West Germany’s incentives 

to develop its own nuclear program. The NIE estimated that if the United States agrees to 

provide nuclear weapons to Western European countries (e.g., as eventually occurred under 

dual-key arrangements), this step could provide an alternative means of enhanced deterrence 

for these countries at least in the short term. Domestic political-regime changes were 

identified as a possible surprise that could affect proliferation. 

Other Judgments

One of the major conclusions and unique dimensions of the study was the assessment that 

up to 10 countries could develop nuclear weapons programs capable of producing 20-40kt 

nuclear weapons while relying solely upon indigenous resources. At the same time, the NIE 

was skeptical about the ability of a fourth country to develop more than a limited nuclear 

weapon system without outside assistance. Disarmament agreements were not seen to be a 

deterrent to the longer-term development of nuclear weapons by the fourth countries 

considered. 

In turn, the NIE estimated that fourth country weapon development would neither reduce 

reliance on security alliances nor would it increase the possibility of outright war. However, 

more fourth power nuclear weapons development could reduce a nation’s susceptibility to 

Soviet pressure and might even lead these countries to assert their independence from 

Western alliances. 

The NIE estimated that the Soviets would not be overly concerned if a fourth country 

obtained nuclear weapons, but that the Soviets might find ways of taking advantage of 

assertions of independence by the United States’ Western allies in an attempt to worsen U.S. 

relations with these nations. On the critical question of how the Soviet Union would 

respond to German acquisition of nuclear weapons, it was judged that the Soviet Union 

would not attack westwards. Indeed, it was judged that the Soviet Union might be prepared 

to accept a regional nuclear weapons program for Western Europe. 

More broadly, the NIE also concluded that disarmament agreements could offer a means to 

help contain proliferation incentives in some important countries. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? 

Which aspects have not? 

France 

Prestige considerations will lead France to become the “fourth” nuclear power. 
Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 5 

Result: France tested a nuclear weapon in 1960. At the same time, prestige alone cannot 

provide a sufficient explanation for France’s continuing commitment to acquiring a serious 

nuclear force posture. Rather, a political upheaval leading to Charles de Gaulle’s assuming 

the presidency of the new Fifth Republic and memories of France’s 1940 defeat by Germany 

as well as U.S. failure to support it at Suez were critical drivers of an expanding French 

program. 

China 

Communist China would require major foreign assistance to acquire nuclear weapons in 10 

years. 

 

Result: Neutral or wrong. Most analysts believe that China received some limited assistance 

from the Soviet Union, but undertook most of its weapons development activities 

indigenously. Without outside assistance, China also proved able to test a thermonuclear 

weapon in 1966, thereby jumping from a limited to a more sophisticated capability. In 1964, 

during the ten-year forecast period, China conducted its first test without assistance. 

India 

If China acquires nuclear weapons, then Indian opposition to pursuing an indigenous 

program may fade. 

 

Result: China’s 1964 nuclear weapon test did provide a major impetus to India’s pursuit of a 

nuclear weapons capability. 

Japan 

Within the next five years (1957–1962), Japan will take initial steps to build a nuclear 

weapons program independent of U.S. assistance. A Japanese nuclear weapons program will 

not affect Soviet policies unless the Chinese demand support of their own nuclear weapons 

endeavors. 

Result: Japan did not develop nuclear weapons, partly because of domestic factors and partly 

due to the American alliance connection. 

Canada 

If fourth countries obtain weapons and the United States does not provide Canada with air 

defense, then Canada too will seek its own nuclear weapons. 

 

Result: The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was created in 1958 to 

organize U.S. and Canadian air defense cooperation. Along with wider defense cooperation 

with the United States in NATO, NORAD reinforced Canada’s earlier decision to not to 

pursue nuclear weapons. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

II-6 WMD FORECASTING 

Israel 

Israel will attempt to acquire nuclear weapons if it can obtain access to a source of nuclear 

weapons material. 

 

Result: With assistance from France (provision of the Dimona research reactor and heavy 

water for that reactor’s operation) and the United Kingdom (heavy water), Israel completed 

the first stage of a nuclear weapons program, R&D, by 1966. On the eve of the 1967 SixDay War, it may have assembled its first nuclear weapon. 

Soviet Reactions 

It is unlikely that the actual initiation of fourth power production [nuclear weapons 

development] in a non-Communist state would alter Soviet estimates of Western intentions 

or Soviet policies. Moscow would probably accommodate itself to a regional nuclear 

weapons program of Western European countries. 

Result: French acquisition of nuclear weapons did not appear to alter Soviet threat analysis 

or cause it to attack the West. 

In the next 10 years, the Soviet Union will not give Czechoslovakia or East Germany nuclear 

weapons. Subsequently, these two countries may work to develop indigenous programs. 

Result: Unlike some of the more independent East European countries (e.g., Romania and 

Yugoslavia), neither country ever pursued nuclear weapons. 

U.S–UK nuclear cooperation will be seen as a threat by the Soviet Union, leading Moscow 

to react. 

 

Result: After the United Kingdom’s test of a thermonuclear weapon in May 1957, the United 

States and the United Kingdom initiated a program of bilateral nuclear weapon cooperation. 

Soon thereafter, in September 1958, the Soviet Union strengthened its alliance with China 

against the United States, while Soviet Premier Khrushchev stepped up pressures against the 

Western outpost in Berlin. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

Country-by-country assessments – including an emphasis on spillover effects on immediate 

neighbors – remain a “core methodology” of proliferation forecasting. The NIE’s heavy 

focus on indigenous access to resources (uranium) and technological inputs may have 

contributed to the NIE’s underestimate of some countries’ abilities to develop more 

sophisticated nuclear weapons (e.g., China) as well as its overestimate of some countries’ 

likelihood of pursuing a more limited nuclear weapons capability (e.g., Japan). At the same 

time, the study’s emphasis on spillover effects did rightly highlight some of the proliferation 

pressures that resulted in the 1957-1967 period (e.g., China-India), even though it 
Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 7 

exaggerated the prospects for others (e.g., France-Germany). Finally, technical opportunities 

alone cannot adequately explain the nuclear weapons program of the newly formed Fifth 

French Republic. For that, the importance of “regime change” (one of the NIE’s surprises), 

historic memories of past defeats, and perceived abandonment need to be considered. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

The NIE’s emphasis on the potential importance of outside assistance to nuclear weapons 

programs most probably contributed to U.S. support for the soon-to-be created 

International Atomic Energy Agency and its responsibility to safeguard peaceful nuclear 

cooperation. Over the longer term, it is likely that the NIE helped shape the conceptual 

thinking that contributed to the ban under Article I of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on such assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 

weapons. Its technical projections also likely heightened concern about future proliferation. 

At the same time, its warnings that U.S. transfer of nuclear weapons technologies to fourth 

powers would be perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union did not prevent either U.S.-UK 

nuclear weapon cooperation or the broader set of U.S. dual-key nuclear sharing with its 

NATO allies. In both cases, the relative influence likely reflects the broader policy interests 

perceived to be at stake. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The study recommended that disarmament agreements be pursed as a short-term solution to 

contain fourth countries’ proliferation aspirations. Along with other actions, the eventual 

negotiation of the NPT did contribute to containing proliferation pressures in some of the 

countries in question. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

II-8 WMD FORECASTING 
 1970 Without Arms Control 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 9 

1970 Without Arms Control 

In Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control, Washington, D.C. 

National Planning Association, 1958 

Overview 

This study is a three-section nongovernmental report that forecasted what weapons and 

weapons systems (with particular emphasis on nuclear weapons) would likely be developed 

in the following twelve years. In so doing, it explored the effects of nuclear war and 

weapons technologies. The report’s methodology entailed an assessment of technology 

trends and an extrapolation of future technology-driven developments. Its projection of the 

future was based on the assumptions that no arms control agreements would be reached in 

the timeframe examined and that the United States and the Soviet Union would compete 

technologically in development and deployment of new weapons. Its overall purpose was to 

inform political leaders and the public of the perils that were ahead, should the arms race 

continue unabated. As such, it was part of the intellectual ferment that accompanied the 

development of the concept of arms control. It also helped to lay the groundwork for some 

of the initiatives of the Kennedy Administration, including some actions (e.g., on nuclear 

force posture, command and control, and nonproliferation) that made the report’s more 

pessimistic forecasts a self-denying prophecy. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of this study is to provide greater awareness of current developments to 

increase support for the negotiation of arms control agreements.

Timeframe Examined 

1958 through 1970 (twelve years) 

Prevailing Context 

The Cold War was at its height and the destruction of World War II was still fresh in the 

minds of political and military analysts. The Soviet Union had recently used military force to 

put down the Hungarian Revolution (1956), while Soviet Premier Khrushchev was 

threatening to block Western access to Berlin. The Soviet Union had also launched Sputnik 

in 1957 and was claiming to be deploying a large number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

At the same time, NATO was solidifying, while Western Europe had begun its process of 

unification with the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the 

European Atomic Energy Community in January 1958. 

Regarding proliferation, there were only three nations with atomic weapons capabilities: the 

United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. France was pursuing nuclear 

weapons but would not test a device until 1960. China was presumed to be seeking nuclear 

weapons but was further behind. Popular opposition to nuclear testing was starting to take 

root, particularly in the United Kingdom which had a very strong anti-nuclear movement. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 10 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology: Technology Trends Analysis and Extrapolation 

The NPA Special Project Committee analyzed ongoing technological and weapon-system 

trends, with an emphasis on technology-push to explain political-military outcomes. Their 

report begins with a baseline analysis of then-current advanced weapons systems in the 

United States and the Soviet Union, divided into types. Across each of these types of 

weapon-systems, future technology possibilities were identified. Past rates of technological 

development (wherein it had taken approximately 10-15 years from the inception of a new 

weapons system to its operability) were superimposed on current weapons trends to project 

the characteristics of the Cold War arms race by 1970. In passing, a closely related 

technology-push methodology was used to project the future global spread of nuclear 

weapons. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Prospects for Proliferation:

Though the principal focus of this report was not on which countries would next go nuclear 

but on the development of new weapons systems, characteristics, and concepts, the report 

did set out certain judgments about prospects for proliferation. Specifically, it expressed 

concern that many states without nuclear weapons would acquire them within 5-7 years: 

namely Canada, Sweden, Belgium, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, China, Japan, India, 

Switzerland, Italy, and West Germany. Three paths were identified that a country might 

employ to go nuclear: 1) military assistance from a nuclear power; 2) diversion of peaceful 

nuclear technology for military purposes; and 3) independent development. The most rapid 

path was assessed to be through bilateral assistance, with the report citing on-going 

negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom as a precedent (though the 

United Kingdom had tested its initial nuclear device in 1951 without any outside assistance.) 

Technical Trends and Developments:

Nuclear Weapons 

It was predicted that nuclear weapons would become smaller, lighter, and more useable. 

Nuclear warheads would become available for many different tactical uses, including air-toground missiles, ground-to-ground missiles, artillery, anti-submarine weapons, and mines. 

The development of suitcase-sized nuclear weapons for sabotage or psychological warfare 

was anticipated. The authors clearly assumed that the future role of nuclear weapons would 

be for use in conflict as opposed to serving as a strategic deterrent. In that regard, however, 

the authors stressed the risks of fallout and dangers that nuclear weapons use would backfire: 

both on the user and neutral countries. 

Aircraft and Submarines 

The authors predicted that military aircraft would become faster, perhaps with the 

development of a hybrid spaceship (rocket) and aircraft, which would be able to evade 

enemy air defenses. However, the role of aircraft was seen to be largely dependent on the 
 1970 Without Arms Control 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 11 

skills of the pilot and likely to be used primarily for reconnaissance and navigation. Aircraft 

were seen to play a smaller role in future wars, being somewhat displaced by missiles in 

attack scenarios. 

The authors also predicted that submarines and related technology would undergo great 

strides in their development. They foresaw the growing importance of nuclear powered 

submarines capable of launching nuclear-tipped missiles from hidden locations near the 

enemy’s territory. They also estimated that submarine navigation would be improved as well 

as advances in sonar detection systems. Other possibilities for under-water military 

equipment were seen to include submersible aircraft carriers and missile launch platforms, 

which would be towed into place. 

Missiles 

The report projected that long-range missiles would undergo improvements in targeting, fuel 

quality, simplicity of detonation, and re-entry speeds. Rocket fuel might even be replaced 

with nuclear power. Missiles deployments were seen to have two options: either highly 

mobile or stationary and hardened. It was estimated that stationary launching sites would 

prove to be more costly, as their location could be detected by the enemy, and thus would 

require more hardening and concealment. Should this path be taken, launch sites would 

likely be self-contained entities, so as to maintain the possibility of a retaliatory strike even 

after the severe damage of an adversary’s first strike. 

Space based systems

The study argued that the advantages of space-based weapons were uncertain. However, 

satellites were seen to have uses for weather forecasting and inspections should an arms 

control agreement be reached. It was envisaged that further technological developments 

were needed (but could be expected) to harness power from the sun for satellites to improve 

telemetry (long distance radio transmissions) and reduce the size of recording equipment to 

enable information to be sent back to earth. There was concern that a potential for national 

claims on land in space (i.e., the moon) could lead to outer space wars and weapons being 

developed for the purpose of counterbalancing the other country’s weapons. (The study also 

warned that science and technology would advance to the point that governments could use 

weather control as a weapon.) 

Toxicological warfare 

Toxicological warfare was stated to include chemical, biological, and radiological warfare. 

Chemical warfare (CW) was assessed to have limited use because delivery systems were weak 

and the effects of CW agents were slow. Biological warfare (BW) was seen as potentially very 

useful, as the agents employed would be generally self-replicating and could in theory destroy 

human life, animals, or crops of an enemy nation. BW agents would work well in a covert 

attack or act of sabotage, but would be useless for defense since the effects of the agent 

could easily backfire onto non-target populations. BW was seen to be somewhat useful for 

retaliatory or genocidal purposes: in the latter case, most probably by a dictator against his 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 12 WMD FORECASTING 

own people. The study also judged that delivery systems for CW and BW were still 

underdeveloped and the causes of infectivity and virulence (in BW agents) were yet 

unknown. 

Radiological warfare (RW) was seen as a good method for leaving structures in place, while 

blocking access to and use of the structure by humans who would naturally try to avoid 

contaminated locations. However, for RW to be most effective, the half-life of the 

radioactive material would have to be carefully selected. It would need not to contaminate 

the target for too short of a time (as it could fall back into enemy hands) nor for too long of 

a time (as it would become useless to the attacker). Thus, RW was seen as having a mine-like 

purpose, limiting the access of enemies to a territory. But then it would naturally disintegrate 

so as to simplify cleanup and re-use of the territory in question. Delivery systems for RW 

could potentially be radioactive dust dispersed by plane or high-radiation nuclear weapons 

being detonated at a precise time and place, and under the right weather conditions, so that 

the resulting fallout would contaminate a target area. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

Reaction Time 

The report estimated that the reaction time for launching nuclear weapons would be greatly 

reduced. Reduced reaction time would increase the probability that mistakes could cause an 

accidental nuclear war – either with tactical nuclear weapons or longer-range ballistic missile 

systems. Furthermore, reduced reaction time would mean that the decision to fire or not to 

fire a nuclear weapon would likely be delegated to diverse command posts, taking away from 

presidents and parliaments the power to decide whether or not to engage in nuclear war. The 

more people with this decision-making capacity, the more likely it was estimated that 

mistakes could be made. 

Massive Retaliation 

With every advance made in weapons technology, either for defensive or offensive purposes, 

the enemy nation was assumed to respond in kind. This action-reaction process, the study 

argued, had led to the U.S.-Soviet arms build up. The study estimated that each Soviet 

missile site would need to be attacked with between 2-26 missiles in order to assure 90% 

destruction. Thus, stockpiling enough missiles for a massive counteroffensive should not be 

a strategic goal in the 1960s, as the build up would simply get out of hand. Instead, the goal 

should be to have weapon systems which by guaranteeing retaliation would assure that no 

attack occurred in the first place. 

Diplomatic Negotiations 

Negotiations for arms control were determined to depend on the political will of the leaders 

of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The report urged that negotiators be kept 

abreast of technological developments so that they could focus any potential negotiations 

not only on the weapons that existed at the time but also on negotiations concerning future 
 1970 Without Arms Control 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 13 

weapons systems. Doing so would guarantee more informed diplomatic relations and longerlasting agreements. 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

Projections of proliferation 

Although its analysis of which countries would develop nuclear weapons systems was not 

the main purpose of the report, those predictions proved far off the mark. The scope and 

pace of proliferation was far less than the study’s forecast. Virtually all of the countries 

identified as future proliferators in the report chose not to acquire nuclear weapons. At the 

same time, the study underestimated China’s nuclear drive and failed to identify a number of 

other countries as potential proliferators, including India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa. 

(For a brief discussion of why the report’s forecast proved so wrong see below). 

Projections of technical trends 

Many, but not all of the study’s technical projections proved relatively accurate. Its 

projections of military doctrine and concepts proved more mixed in terms of accuracy. 

Consider some examples. 

Nuclear weapons 

Smaller, lighter, more usable weapons with reduced radioactive fallout would be developed. 

Comment: Tactical nuclear weapons were developed, although they still have not been used 

and have been the target of arms control negotiations. 

Aircraft and submarines 

Aircraft would be increasingly displaced by missiles as attack platforms, while submarine 

technology would be used in many ways other than traditional submarines. 

Comment: Aircraft have remained a primary tool in most wars since 1958. Submarines have 

emerged as a critical platform for missile launch but not for the other purposes envisaged. 

Ballistic missiles 

Improvements were forecasted in targeting, fuel quality, simplicity of detonation, re-entry 

speeds, and launch sites. 

Comment: Virtually all of the technical advances envisaged took place over time. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 14 WMD FORECASTING 

Space based systems 

Multiple uses for satellite systems were forecasted as well as the possibilities of conflict in 

outer space and the development of space-based weapons systems. 

Comment: The results were mixed. Technological developments have improved imaging and 

transmission methods. Also, satellites are now widely used for weather and reconnaissance 

purposes. Weapons, including nuclear weapons, were not deployed in space. Ultimately, 

space a field of international and scientific collaboration, rather than a location for hostilities 

between nations. 

Toxicological warfare 

As described above, the study projected that CBR weapons would have limited utility, while 

radiological weapons could prove promising. 

Comment: During the period covered by this study, there was considerable U.S. and Soviet 

investment in chemical weapons. Similarly, during the period 0f 1958-1970, both countries 

invested heavily in biological weapons. The Soviet Union probably remained more 

convinced than the United States of the military utility of both chemical and biological 

weapons, particularly toward the end of the period in question. Radiological warfare proved 

less attractive to either Cold War adversary during this period. Later, the United States 

would seek unsuccessfully to deploy enhanced radiation nuclear weapons in Europe. 

Reaction time 

The study envisaged greatly shortened nuclear reaction time with the delegation of the power 

of firing a nuclear missile into the hands of military commanders, rather than the president 

or his Soviet counterpart. 

Comment: Reaction times did continue to shrink greatly. Some delegation of launch 

authority also appears to have occurred initially in both the United States and the Soviet 

Union. Both countries put in place technical and procedural means to ensure effective 

control at the highest levels of nuclear decisions. 

Arms build up 

It was forecasted that without any arms control agreements, the number of nuclear warheads 

could run into the millions. This was seen to be especially true if the United States and the 

Soviet Union chose to proceed with a strategy of preparing for massive retaliation against 

missile launch sites, rather than against cities. 

Comment: The numbers never reached anywhere near the projected levels but still measured 

in the tens of thousands on each side at the height of the Cold War. 
 1970 Without Arms Control 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 15 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

This study’s methodology of technology extrapolation contributed directly both to what the 

study got right and what it got wrong. At the same time, its technology-driven approach 

meant that the impact of important political-social-cultural variables in shaping the outcome 

of U.S.-Soviet competition was overlooked. Here too, wild cards played a part. 

On the one hand, the study’s look back at past rates of technology change as a means to 

project future technological possibilities led it to correctly identify many key trends that 

shaped the U.S.-Soviet military competition, from the development of smaller, lighter 

nuclear weapons to satellite surveillance from space. 

Even in terms of its projections of future technological possibilities, its technology-driven 

assessments exaggerated some developments, e.g., from the decline of manned aircraft to the 

build up of nuclear forces to truly astronomical levels. Moreover, its emphasis on 

technological possibilities underestimated the role of political, social, economic and other 

policy considerations in shaping what came to pass between 1958 and 1970. All of those 

factors interacted to confound, for example, the study’s projections of vast nuclear weapon 

numbers, delegations of nuclear decision-making, and war in outer space. The impact of the 

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis – a wild card – also cannot be underestimated in explaining the 

ultimate pattern of U.S.-Soviet military competition or the aftermath of the crisis, the 

fledgling cooperation to contain the risks of nuclear weaponry. (As discussed below, some 

of the study’s projections also helped trigger governmental actions, thereby making it partly a 

self-denying prophecy.) 

The limitations of the study’s methodology are most evident in its predictions of widespread 

proliferation. As with other technological assessments, it was assumed that technology 

availability was the main impediment to developing nuclear weapons. Consistent with the 

extrapolation of past technology trends, it also was assumed that over time a growing 

number of countries would be able to – and then would – acquire nuclear weapons. But this 

technology-push approach has repeatedly been proven too limited by the decisions of 

technologically capable nations (Sweden, Japan, and West Germany) not to develop nuclear 

weapons. In turn, by not focusing on the full set of political-security motivations, the study 

underestimated the nuclear proliferation potential of less technologically advanced countries. 

This type of technology assessment can be replicated to forecast future technology 

developments – and indeed, has been a staple of future forecasts. But because it does not 

take into account political, security, economic, social, cultural, and many other “soft” factors, 

it needs to be complemented by other methodologies. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 16 WMD FORECASTING 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

The report played an important part in the development of the new concept of arms control, 

which was beginning to take shape in the late1950s and early 1960s. Its technology 

projections highlighted a number of problems that were already beginning to figure 

prominently in the thinking of the defense and foreign affairs communities inside and 

outside of government (e.g., on nuclear command and control) limiting the dangers of 

military-nuclear competition in space, preventing proliferation, and generally avoiding a 

runaway arms race. In addition, its calls for communications between diplomats and 

scientists and for bringing scientific expertise to bear on future arms control negotiations 

directly contributed to the thinking that went into the creation of the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency in the Kennedy Administration. That new agency set out to bring into 

the government highly-trained technical experts to provide the type of support to U.S. 

negotiations being proposed in the study. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The report was influential in changing the course of events. Indeed, it was designed 

precisely with the hope that it would be proven wrong. Its projections of future dangers led 

U.S. policymakers to take actions aimed at ensuring that those dangers did not come to pass 

– whether it was very widespread proliferation (from pursuit of nuclear security guarantees 

to NATO allies to negotiation of the NPT); vast deployments of nuclear weapons (pursuit 

of survivable nuclear forces leading to nuclear arms control talks), delegations of nuclear 

control and decision-making (technical command and control arrangements as well as 

ensuring survivable nuclear postures); or weaponization and conflict in space (the Outer 

Space Treaty). Finally, as already suggested, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was an external 

wild card factor that also confounded the more pessimistic projections of the National 

Planning Association’s report and helped to energize the use of arms control that the 

authors were seeking. 
Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 17 

Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences 

In National Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 1958 

Overview 

This forecast’s methodology relied on the analytic judgments and experience of its study 

team, informed undoubtedly by intelligence information. Reflecting the international 

political-military context, its discussion of potential disincentives included the impact of a 

U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban nuclear testing in pressuring “fourth” countries not to seek 

nuclear weapons. Particular attention focused on China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. That 

said, the forecast reflected the mindset of the 1950s; its estimate of China’s capabilities 

assumed Soviet cooperation and did not foresee the Sino-Soviet split (although that split was 

already commencing). The estimate explored possible collaborative nuclear weapons 

programs or activities among different sets of European countries. For the most part, the 

NIE reflected an alarmist assessment, especially when one views its emphasis on the 

technical capabilities countries would have to acquire in order to develop nuclear weapons. 

This derived partly from its strong technology-push methodology. At the same time, the 

study’s alarmist nature contributed to U.S. efforts to prevent the more extreme projections 

from coming to pass – particularly at this stage by moving ahead with dual-key nuclear 

cooperation with key European allies. 

Authors 

CIA with participation from analysts at the Department of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Commissioned By 

This report was submitted and commissioned by the Director of Central Intelligence. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of “fourth countries” in terms of nuclear weapons 

development and determine how it affects U.S. interests. 

Timeframe Examined 

1958 through 1968 (ten years) 

Prevailing Context 

This study was conducted at a time when some states were seeking nuclear weapons, fuel 

cycle capabilities, and delivery systems. Within the document, there tends to be a high level 

of concern regarding the possibility of states pursuing nuclear weapons programs. With 

regard to the overall geo-political context, this study was conducted in the aftermath of the 

Soviet launch of the first earth-orbiting satellite, Sputnik as well as somewhat earlier, the 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 18 WMD FORECASTING 

Soviet use of military force to end the Hungarian Uprising (1956) and the Suez Crisis (1956). 

This period also was characterized by an overall intensification of Cold War competition that 

would lead, at the end of 1958, to a U.S.-Soviet Crisis over Berlin, testing the credibility of 

the United States and the NATO alliance. 

Methodology: Country Case Studies 

Drawing on qualitative understanding and professional expertise on specific countries, a 

team of analysts assessed fourth countries’ nuclear proliferation activities. They assessed 

motivators, disincentives, and security alliances that might influence a state’s nuclear 

decision-making process. Particular attention was focused on technical options as well as the 

spillover effect of proliferation in one country on nearby neighbors. The authors also 

assessed how the development of nuclear weapons programs would impact the international 

security environment and U.S. interests. This resulted in projections of potentially available 

fissile material for a weapons program, in effect, using a technology-push approach. After 

the leaders of the intelligence community determined the research topic, the research was 

delegated to the appropriate agencies for further analysis. 

Regarding the report’s structure, it begins by briefly stating the issue and then lists its 

conclusions. An executive summary and tables offer judgments on when specific fourth 

countries could develop nuclear weapons. The main body of the report is a country-bycountry analysis of each fourth country’s capabilities, intent, and external determinants. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Proliferation Drivers

The key motivators for the acquisition of nuclear weapons are described as the desire for 

national prestige, pursuit of military capabilities that may be used militarily or politically in 

local conflicts, a belief that the development of nuclear capabilities is the most efficient form 

of defense, the desire to buttress a neutral position, and the desire of U.S. allies to acquire 

enough military power to exercise some degree of deterrence against the Soviet Union. In 

terms of motivations to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, the authors state that all fourth 

countries share aspirations for greater national prestige. Domestic incentives are also seen to 

play a role in their motivations to pursue nuclear weapons. France’s case is cited to 

emphasize the role of national support in facilitating the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

In terms of disincentives to the production of nuclear weapons among U.S. allies, the 

inhibiting factors were seen to include the risk of a breakdown of relations with the United 

States and technological challenges associated with the manufacture of a functional weapons 

system. In the study, the authors forecasted that U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on a nuclear test 

ban would result in pressures on other states not to test nuclear weapons. 
Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 19 

Regions/Countries of Greatest Concern

The regions of greatest concern reported in the NIE were the Soviet Bloc countries, 

including China (prior to the Sino-Soviet split, China was seen as a member of the Soviet 

Bloc). The study also assessed that France, Sweden, Canada, West Germany, and the 

Western European Union (WEU) would be the most capable of producing a substantial 

nuclear deterrent. 

Specific Weapon Types (N, B, C, Delivery Means)

Bombers and missiles were seen as the likely delivery vehicles. As referenced in the study, 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), armed with a megaton warhead, were considered 

to be the test of a substantial nuclear deterrent posture. 

Acquisition Patterns/Trends

This study focuses on the indigenous capabilities of states to pursue independent programs, 

the development of nuclear weapons programs through foreign assistance programs, and 

possible regional efforts such as the France-Italy-Germany or WEU. 

Deterrence and Employment Concepts

It is presumed that the possession of nuclear weapons could enable states to operate with 

impunity in their regional locales. It is also presumed that ICBMs are the only delivery 

mechanisms that can deter the U.S.S.R.. 

Areas for Potential Surprise

The areas of potential surprise cited are based upon an unexpected change in leadership as 

well as technological advancements that could potentially increase the capability of weapons 

development. To wit: “There is the possibility that nuclear weapons get into the hands of 

almost totally irresponsible governments.” “A technological breakthrough could markedly 

increase the capabilities of the countries discussed in this paper.” 

Risk of War

The 1957 NIE’s overall judgment was that the spread of nuclear weapons to fourth 

countries would not in and of itself cause an increase in the likelihood of general warfare. In 

the 1958 NIE, it was judged that the spread of nuclear weapons would certainly cause issues 

and likely increase the chance of war through the expansion of local conflicts. To reflect the 

disagreement on this issue, the Deputy Director of Intelligence and the Joint Staff added a 

footnote noting the disagreement with the statement that “fourth country nuclear 

capabilities would probably tend to increase the chances of general war.” 

 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The assessment concludes inter alia that: 

 A large number of countries will have the capability to produce a few nominalyield weapons and deliver them with aircraft by 1968; 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 20 WMD FORECASTING 

 If reached, a U.S.-U.S.S.R. test-ban agreement would pressure other states to 

comply with this standard and thus impede proliferation; 

 By 1963, only Sweden and West Germany would have the resources to 

independently produce nuclear weapons; 

 The long-range goals of fourth countries are to produce thermonuclear weapons 

with a megaton yield and solid or liquid propellants; and 

 100 IRBMs with a 1500 mile range could be produced for $2 billion. A surfaceto-surface missile program would cost $1 billion and could be produced by 

Western Europe and Japan because of their educational standards and competent 

scientists. 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

China 

The NIE assessed that China would not be pressured to forgo acquiring nuclear weapons by 

a disarmament agreement. The NIE 100-57 also argued that China would develop nuclear 

weapons with the assistance of the Soviet Union. “Communist China could, with Soviet 

assistance, produce fission weapons on its own territory.” It also pointed out that China was 

likely to continue depending on the Soviet Union for its military advancement in the years to 

come. “Peiping would probably continue to recognize its fundamental dependence on the 

U.S.S.R. for strategic security.” 

Comment: The authors were correct in their assessment that China was actively seeking to 

develop nuclear weapons. However, China obtained nuclear weapons without Soviet 

assistance and the Sino-Soviet split occurred in 1960, two years after the NIE report was 

released. The NIE concluded that it was unlikely that China could produce missiles with the 

capacity of carrying nuclear warheads by 1968. This underestimated China’s capabilities. In 

1966, China launched its first guided missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. 

Sweden 

Sweden has the independent capability to produce a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons 

by 1968. The assessment predicts that by 1961 Sweden will initiate a nuclear weapons 

production program. Its authors also estimated that if Sweden increases its amount of fuel it 

could produce 75 kg of PU by 1961, 200 kg by 1963, and 400 kg by 1968. In 1963, Sweden 

would have the capability to start producing nuclear weapons. Sweden also has a developed 

delivery system, which contains two types of fighter-bombers. By 1966-68 Sweden can 

obtain an adequate nuclear delivery missile system. “Sweden will initiate production of 

nuclear weapons,” if the U.S.S.R. does not disarm. Sweden is considered to seek nuclear 

weapons for the “buttressing of a neutral position.” 
Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 21 

Comment: In the mid-1960s, the Swedish government decided not to acquire nuclear 

weapons, though some nuclear weapons-related activities continued for some time after the 

announcement. One of the constraints on Sweden’s early program was the difficulty related 

to acquiring fissile material from an otherwise civilian nuclear research program. Instead, 

Sweden moved to the forefront of the international nuclear disarmament movement. 

Canada 

The NIE predicted that Canada would have an independent capability to produce a growing 

stockpile of plutonium – 100 kg of Pu by 1963 and 350 kg by 1968. It is also estimated that 

Canada could produce a small stockpile of nuclear weapons by 1968 without access to 

foreign assistance. The NIE noted, however, that while Canada has the capacity to produce 

a nuclear device, it had made an agreement to sell all of its plutonium to the United States. 

Canada possesses a modern aircraft system with the potential of being used for bombers. 

However, the NIE judged that in order to deter the U.S.S.R., Canada would need ICBMs. 

According to the study, the production of ICBMs could be achieved in ten years but it 

would require an enormous effort unless Canada sought foreign assistance. The NIE 

concluded that Canada would not seek to produce nuclear weapons but rather it would rely 

on the U.S. extended deterrence policy. 

 

Comment: By the late 1940s, Canada had decided not to acquire nuclear weapons. This 

study’s emphasis on technical capabilities led the authors to give more credence to the 

possibility of a Canadian bomb than otherwise would have been warranted. 

France 

France was expected to continue its nuclear weapons program to reestablish itself as a power, 

to gain prestige, and for military effectiveness in local conflicts. The NIE concluded that 

France would have the capability to produce indigenously a substantial stockpile of nuclear 

weapons by 1968. A possible U.S.-Soviet test ban would not impose sufficient pressures to 

keep France from that nuclear goal. More specifically, the analysts predicted that France 

would test a fission weapon of 20-40kt yield by 1958 or early 1959. The study also estimated 

that France could produce a limited nuclear missile capability by 1963-64 and an operational 

capability by 1966-67. It could arm long-range missiles with thermonuclear warheads by 

1968 as well as produce a “family of fission weapons.” The authors judged, however, that 

France would be unable to support an extensive nuclear program without strains on its 

resources, thereby providing an incentive to pursue regional cooperation and production. 

Comment: France tested its first fission weapon in 1960 and achieved a thermonuclear 

weapon capability by 1968. Its nuclear weapons program did strain its conventional military 

capabilities but France remained dedicated to its independent nuclear force. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 22 WMD FORECASTING 

West Germany 

The NIE expected that if France acquired nuclear weapons, West Germany would seek 

access to nuclear weapons, either via an independent nuclear weapons program or other 

means. Specifically, a French program would “generate pressure in Germany for the 

removal of the WEU Treaty restrictions on German weapons production . . . .” However, 

the NIE also judged that Germany could be prepared to accept the alternative of U.S. dualkey nuclear programs of cooperation. 

 

Comment: Considerable efforts had to be made within the NATO alliance to assuage 

German nuclear security concerns. Dual-key weapons proved only a partial solution, with 

the discussion (not implemented) of a Multi-lateral Force and ultimately the creation of the 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group. 

The FIG, SIX, and UK 

The NIE examined the possibility of combined efforts to produce nuclear weapons by what 

it termed the FIG (France, Italy, and West Germany). It assessed that the FIG efforts would 

assist the countries involved by spreading the costs of building a nuclear weapons program. 

In particular, the FIG states could collaboratively develop facilities capable of processing 

weapons-grade fissile materials. The analysts ultimately judged that any such FIG alliance 

would be limited to the production of missile capabilities. The SIX countries – the WEU 

countries – were thought likely to pursue nuclear weapons if the FIG were to proceed with a 

program. The performers concluded that this grouping could produce fission weapons by 

1968 if it obtained needed uranium from the Belgian Congo. The UK was seen as strongly 

opposed to the FIG’s production of nuclear weapons but in favor of a nuclear program 

under WEU and NATO. The UK, however, would not support such a program without 

U.S. backing. 

Comment: The combination of NATO dual-key systems as well as the eventual Nuclear 

Planning Group served to neutralize nuclear incentives of most WEU countries. The 

eventual Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons also made nuclear 

collaboration considerably more difficult. 

Eastern European Countries 

The performers accurately predicted that the U.S.S.R. would block East Germany or 

Czechoslovakia from starting a nuclear weapons program. 

Japan 

The estimate judged that Japan was unlikely to begin a nuclear weapons program in the time 

period being analyzed, assuming that international controls remained in effect. It was 

predicted that Japan could produce missiles that could target China and the Soviet Union but 

would not be able technically to produce fission weapons until the 1970s. It was assumed 

that in the absence of nonproliferation commitments, Japan would eventually seek a nuclear 
Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: 

Likelihood and Consequences 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 23 

missile system to serve as a deterrent. However, according to this estimate, a nuclear Japan 

would not necessarily affect U.S. interests. 

Comment: While correct in its assumption that Japan would be unlikely to develop nuclear 

weapons, the NIE may have underestimated the importance of domestic factors in that 

policy. 

Italy 

The NIE predicted that Italy could and is likely to produce nuclear weapons that could 

target the U.S.S.R. between 1968 and 1970. 

Comment: This judgment proved wrong, in part due to the NATO Alliance’s nuclear role. 

The NIE may also have overestimated the appeal of nuclear weapons to Italy and the impact 

France’s nuclear weapons program had on the country. 

Israel 

Israel is likely to pursue a nuclear weapons program by 1968. 

Comment: In 1966, Israel completed the research stage of its nuclear program with the 

capability of producing 14-40 kg of Pu per year. It is reported that Israel assembled its first 

nuclear weapon on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War. 

India 

The NIE assessed that although India would possess the resources necessary to produce 

nuclear weapons by 1968, it would be unlikely to do so. 

Comment: This judgment over-estimated India’s technical advances. It also could not 

anticipate the impact on India’s perception of China’s 1964 nuclear test. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

Country case studies have become the core methodology of proliferation forecasting. Some 

of the NIE’s assumptions, however, may have impacted the accuracy of its forecast, for 

example, the assumption that China would need Soviet assistance. The NIE’s emphasis on 

spillover effects may also have overestimated the impact of France’s acquisition of nuclear 

weapons on its neighbors. These limitations suggest the importance of finding ways to test 

mindsets and assumptions when using any such forecasting methodology. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

In October, following the distribution of the NIE report, the Department of State sought to 

investigate the status of the French Nuclear program, the FIG, and the WEU projects. The 

Department also called for a more in-depth and accurate analysis of the countries’ ballistic-
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 24 WMD FORECASTING 

missile efforts. Most important, the United States moved ahead with actions to enhance 

NATO’s nuclear role and the dual-key component of the U.S. nuclear security guarantee to 

European allies. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The study’s emphasis on the dangers of proliferation likely contributed to U.S. efforts to 

enhance the nuclear security guarantee to European allies. This guarantee continued to 

evolve and proved essential in checking proliferation pressures in Europe. More broadly, 

the warnings of proliferation in the 1958 NIE, like those of the 1957 NIE, contributed to 

greater policy interest in the problem. 
Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons Systems 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 25 

Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation of 

Nuclear Weapons Systems 

In National Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 1963 

Overview 

This forecast primarily entailed a series of country case studies. In carrying out these case 

studies, it focused on the nexus between technical capabilities and motivational factors in 

making judgments about proliferation propensity. This provided a more nuanced and 

qualified set of assessments than earlier assessments (which had a more one-dimensional 

technology-push emphasis). The forecast’s assessment of the time needed by given 

countries to produce a nuclear weapon may well have been underestimated. In part, this 

underestimation reflected the difficulties of factoring “wild cards” (e.g., deaths of key 

individuals) into an estimate potential. The forecast may have overestimated the future 

spread of nuclear energy as well as the pursuit of a civilian nuclear energy program – vice a 

dedicated program – as a route to the bomb. A focus on the most obvious route that a 

country might follow to obtain a nuclear weapons capability proved misleading – as 

exemplified by the NIE’s emphasis on China’s building of a plutonium production reactor. 

The importance of internal political considerations was rightly noted. 

Author 

It was prepared by the CIA with participation from the CIA and Departments of State, 

Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and NSA. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce 

nuclear weapons and compatible delivery systems in the next 10 years as well as to estimate 

the subsequent consequences of those developments. 

Timeframe Examined 

1963 through 1973 (ten years) 

Prevailing Context 

Within the Kennedy Administration there was increasing concern about the possible 

proliferation of nuclear weapons. In part, this concern reflected the recent emergence of 

France as a nuclear weapon state and China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In part, concern 

about proliferation reflected an increased interest in nuclear energy on the part of a growing 

number of countries. This concern about proliferation was expressed in President 

Kennedy’s June 1963 American University speech in which he warned of the spread of 

nuclear weapons. This NIE was also conducted at a time when the Kennedy Administration 

was assessing different options for nuclear testing limitations. It shortly preceded the 

negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 26 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology: Country Case Studies – Technology-Motivations Interactions 

This assessment entailed a series of country studies. For each study, the NIE focused on a 

set of critical variables, including time lag, technical capability, existence of a nuclear energy 

program, and motivations to forecast a country’s proliferation propensity. In applying these 

variables, the assessment first considered the technical capabilities (nuclear and missile) of 

the program, then factored in motivational aspects (internal issues and implications of other 

countries’ proliferation successes). This nexus between the technical and motivational factors 

was seen as essential to make a judgment about “if” – a country’s future propensity to 

proliferate or not. The assessment then forecasts the specific country’s proliferation 

propensity over the coming decade, often using various qualifying statements, for example: 

“ if [ ]... were to happen, then ... [ ] could make a decision to,” “evidence with respect 

to ... is insufficient to make a confident conclusion”; and “could probably”...and “fairly 

advanced.” 

With regard to specific sections, the assessment covers: 

I. General Considerations Bearing on Nuclear Proliferation 

II. Capabilities and Intentions of Potential Nuclear Candidates (technical and 

internal motivational factors to proliferate) 

III. Implications of the Success of Specific Programs (factors of external 

proliferation) 

IV. Broad Implications of Nuclear Proliferation 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The assessment included an evaluation of how rapidly a series of countries with both the 

physical and financial resources could acquire nuclear weapons in the 1963-1973 timeframe. 

The countries were: 

Canada First device in 1-2 years after decision 

Israel First device in 2-3 years after decision 

Sweden First device in 2-3 years after decision 

West Germany First device in 4-5 years after decision 

India First device in 4-5 years after decision 

Japan First device in 2-3 years after decision 

Communist China First device in 2-3 years after decision 

 

Specific Country Forecasts of Proliferation Propensity:

Canada 

Although Canada could easily develop nuclear weapons, its political parties and constituents 

were judged to oppose acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

Comment: This judgment stood the test of time. 
Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons Systems 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 27 

China 

China’s small air-cooled reactor was judged to be incapable of producing enough plutonium 

for more than two low-yield fission weapons per year. “If the reactor went critical in early 

1962 – the earliest date – and the Chinese experienced no major problems in chemical 

separation or metal fabrication, the earliest a first device could be tested using plutonium 

from this reactor alone would be early 1964. However, if the reactor were not to go critical 

in 1962 or if the Chinese encountered the normal run of difficulties, the more likely date for 

a first device would be late 1964 or beyond.” The drafters judged that approximately two 

years after a first nuclear test, the Chinese could probably produce their first crude, 

operational fission weapon. They predicted that China would be incapable of acquiring more 

than a relatively small operational capability in the present decade. 

Comment: This judgment proved faulty in two important respects. China’s first nuclear 

weapon was based not on plutonium but on highly-enriched uranium, a possibility that this 

NIE failed to emphasize. Second, within two years of China’s first nuclear test, China went 

on to test a thermonuclear weapon. In both instances, the initial judgment significantly 

underestimated China’s technical capabilities. This failure to focus on China’s enrichment 

program was an initial example of a persistent trend in U.S. proliferation projections of 

focusing only on the most prominent route to the bomb for a given country, rather than all 

potential routes. 

The assessment judged accurately that if the Chinese were successful at developing their first 

nuclear weapons in mid-1960s, they would be able to rely on TU-4 and TU-16 aircraft to 

deliver them. However, the assessment underestimated China’s ability to produce ballistic 

missiles by arguing that the Chinese would not develop medium-range missile systems until 

the late 1960s. In fact, China developed its first ballistic missile in 1966. However, China 

does not appear to have been able to miniaturize nuclear devices for missile delivery until 

later, closer to the 1980s. 

The authors also stated that “We do not believe that the explosion of a first device, or even 

the acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons capability, would produce major changes in 

Communist China’s foreign policy in the sense that the Chinese would adopt a general policy 

of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military 

risks.” 

Comment: This judgment proved accurate. 

France 

The NIE assessed that if France continued to encounter technical difficulties in the 

construction of its gaseous diffusion plant, it could seek German technical assistance. This 

judgment reflected wider concerns about German acquisition of nuclear weapons, linked 

partly to the French program. According to the drafters, “While many Europeans are in 

general sympathy with de Gaulle’s challenge to U.S. dominance of the alliance, they are also 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 28 WMD FORECASTING 

fearful that the existence of an independent French nuclear force will increase the likelihood 

of further nuclear proliferation, further erode the NATO concept, and perhaps most 

important, provide the vehicle for German acquisition of nuclear weapons.” 

Comment: Under President de Gaulle, France vigorously pursued its own nuclear 

independence and indigenous program. Fears of German pursuit of nuclear weapons 

proved a self-denying prophecy: U.S.-led NATO actions (e.g., creation of NATO’s Nuclear 

Planning Group) combined with internal German political interests neutralized any interest 

in nuclear acquisition. 

India 

According to the drafters, “China’s success[ful] nuclear test will further motivate the Indians 

to consider developing nuclear weapons, but that the explosion alone will not push the 

Indians to develop a weapon.” 

Comment: This judgment is ambiguous. China’s possession of nuclear weapons was an 

important motivator of India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. But even with that Chinese push, 

the Indian program evolved very slowly over the ensuing decades. 

The forecast went on to assess that: “India could reach a position of independence from 

present controls in about two years, after which time it would take another two or three 

years for India to produce its first nuclear device. By about 1970, India could have a limited 

nuclear capability using aircraft.” 

Comment: This technical forecast underestimated how long it would take India to acquire a 

nuclear weapon capability. India tested its first “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and 

there is no evidence in the open sources that confirms that they would have been able to 

deliver it against an enemy at that time. The NIE may have underestimated the timing of a 

nuclear India partly because the head of India’s atomic energy program died in an airplane 

crash a year after the NIE was concluded. Moreover, the death of then-Prime Minister 

Nehru and the fact that his immediate successor Lal Badri Shastri was relatively politically 

weak likely slowed the program’s advance. Both of these factors were unexpected “wild 

cards.” 

Israel 

The assessment projected that the Israelis would acquire a nuclear capability to intimidate 

the Arabs, not to use in war. The Arabs will blame the West for allowing Israel to become 

nuclear, the assessment continued, while the Soviets will find ways of exploiting it. 

Comment: The assessment proved correct that Israel would not view nuclear weapons as 

war-fighting means. However, Israel also did not use its possession of nuclear weapons to 

openly intimidate its Arab neighbors but instead pursued a posture of what has been termed 

“nuclear opacity.” 
Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons Systems 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 29 

Italy 

Without a radical change in national sentiment, the NIE projected that it is unlikely that Italy 

would do more than continue in its present nonmilitary nuclear energy program. The swing 

to the left of the Italian electorate during the 1963 national elections was seen to reinforce 

this decision for some time. 

Comment: As forecasted, Italy did not seek nuclear weapons for various reasons, including 

its alliances with the U.S. and NATO as well as internal developments. 

Japan 

The NIE assessed that if Japan made the decision to go ahead within the next year or so (of 

1963), it could probably develop an operational nuclear capability using aircraft by 1970. The 

deep-rooted reluctance of the Japanese to undertake a nuclear weapons program, however, 

was seen to make it unlikely that Japan would initiate such a program within the next decade. 

Comment: This forecast was accurate, although it may have underestimated Japan’s pursuit 

of what has come to be called a “latent” nuclear capability. 

Sweden 

If a decision to go ahead is made in the next year or two, the Swedes could test a first device 

two or three years later. Moreover, if the Swedes decided to press ahead after the first 

detonation, they could have a weapon deliverable by aircraft by about 1968 and a missile 

system carrying compatible fission warheads by 1970. “If the trend toward nuclear 

proliferation continues and it appears unlikely that progress is being made toward a test ban 

or broader disarmament arrangements, the Swedish Government will be under increasing 

internal pressure to resolve the nuclear weapons question.” 

Comment: By this time, the sentiment in Sweden was already turning against the decision to 

pursue nuclear weapons. This assessment, however, may have overestimated the internal 

pressures on Sweden to seek nuclear weapons. Indeed, by the early 1960s, the domestic 

politics in Sweden were shifting toward anti-nuclear political parties. Additionally, the 

assessment does not take into account the later-disclosed importance of Sweden’s perceived 

de facto coverage by the U.S. nuclear guarantee in Europe. This may reflect too much 

emphasis on the spillover effects of initial proliferation regardless of more unique country 

factors. 

West Germany 

According to the drafters, there were no indications of any plans by West Germany for 

developing an independent nuclear weapons capability. However, the assessment stated that, 

“Our information is insufficient to make a confident judgment as to future developments. 

We believe that West Germany is probably seeking through its broadly based nuclear 

program to increase its industrial and technical competence in fields related to nuclear 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 30 WMD FORECASTING 

technology and eventually to become a world leader in the nuclear sciences. As a possible 

consequence...West Germany may become a major world supplier of nuclear technicians 

and components.” 

Comment: Although West Germany did not develop nuclear weapons, it did develop a 

strong nuclear industry and is a major player in the uranium enrichment market, just as the 

drafters of this estimate forecasted. 

Outlier Nations 

The authors add that it could not be ruled out that at some point within the next decade, a 

country with a growing sense of national ambition such as Indonesia could decide to enter 

into the “nuclear weapons field.” 

Comment: No outlier country developed a nuclear weapons program during the 1963-1973 

time frame of the estimate. 

Nonproliferation Agreements

In an era in which the Kennedy administration was pondering the pursuit of what came to 

be the Nonproliferation Treaty, the NIE assessed that if the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and the Soviet Union could come together in terms of a “non-diffusion” 

agreement, that agreement would help prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any 

non-nuclear signatories. Communist China would almost certainly refuse to sign. The 

French would certainly not sign unless they were considered one of the nuclear powers; even 

if France were accorded nuclear power status, the NIE assessed that French adherence 

would be doubtful. Nevertheless, the existence of such an agreement would constitute a 

political and psychological inhibition to the initiation of an independent weapons capability 

by other non-signatories and would reinforce internal opposition where it already existed. 

Comment: For more than twenty years after the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entry-intoforce, both China and France refused to adhere to it. Additionally, although some hold out 

countries did develop nuclear weapons, the NPT did have a proliferation damping effect. 

Other Significant Points:

Overall, proliferation was not seen as significantly changing the future global geopoliticalmilitary environment as a whole. “In strictly military terms, the nuclear proliferation likely to 

occur over the next 10 years will almost certainly not upset global power relations. None of 

the prospective or potential nuclear powers will acquire capabilities, which, if added to those 

of the U.S. or U.S.S.R., would significantly affect East-West military relationships, or bulk 

large militarily as an independent force.” 

Comment: This proved accurate. 
Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons Systems 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 31 

Regarding pursuit of nuclear energy, the NIE forecasted that, “an increasing number of 

nations will actively pursue nuclear energy programs right up to the threshold of a weapons 

capability. Such programs can be justified domestically as a source of energy and as 

providing a stimulus to the development of technological skills and sophisticated industries. 

Such a threshold capability would facilitate the development of a weapons program if 

circumstance required.” Sweden and India were cited as examples. 

Comment: While countries did pursue nuclear energy, this assessment may have 

overestimated the pace of that development as well as the role of nuclear energy programs as 

a pathway to nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy growth proved slower in the 1960s and 

1970s than anticipated for technical and other reasons. Successful constraints in the 1970s 

on reprocessing and enrichment made it harder for countries to advance to the nuclear 

weapon threshold through nuclear power. In addition, while India did leverage its nuclear 

power program in moving to its 1974 test, some other countries pursued dedicated programs, 

such as Israel, Pakistan, and later North Korea. In Sweden’s case, moreover, one 

contributing factor for its shift away from nuclear weapons was the recognition that it could 

not simply leverage its nuclear research and power program as a stepping-stone to the bomb. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 32 WMD FORECASTING 
Memorandum for the President: The Diffusion of 

Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 33 

Memorandum for the President: 

The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement 

Robert McNamara 

Washington, D.C., 1963 

Overview 

Using an “alternative scenarios methodology,” this memo assesses the impact of different 

types of nuclear testing limits on proliferation. In certain respects, its results reflect the 

context of the time. For example, its emphasis on the possibility of a Chinese bomb is quite 

consistent with China’s advancing nuclear weapons program, which would result in a 

Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Similarly, its concern about the implications of widespread use 

of nuclear power fit with then-prevalent projections for nuclear power programs. Regarding 

proliferation forecasting, this memorandum’s concern with the proliferation impact of 

nuclear power may show the extent to which particular forecasts are linked to the events of 

the time. Somewhat differently, it highlighted concerns that Sweden may reflect a “lag-time” 

phenomenon, in this case, in recognizing that a particular country had ceased to be a major 

source of proliferation concern. 

Commissioned By 

The President of the United States. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the President of the various policy options 

that are available to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Timeframe Examined 

1963 through 1973 (ten years) 

Prevailing Context 

This memorandum was written in the aftermath of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 

Within the Kennedy Administration, there was an interest in the steps needed to strengthen 

the constraints on nuclear arms competition and proliferation; this interest led to the 

decision to send Ambassador Averill Harriman to Moscow in June 1963 to negotiate what 

became known as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This memorandum was also written 

at a time of concern about accelerating proliferation due to a number of factors, including 

the projected expansion of nuclear power. Possible Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear 

weapons program also provided part of the background. 

Methodology Used: Alternative Scenarios 

This memorandum defines and assesses three different possible scenarios that could occur 

with regard to nuclear testing: 1) unrestricted nuclear testing, 2) a comprehensive ban on 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 34 WMD FORECASTING 

nuclear testing, and 3) a partial nuclear test ban. The memorandum analyzes the expected 

impact of each scenario on the prospect of nuclear diffusion. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The assessment identified various incentives and disincentives for the acquisition of nuclear 

weapons. The incentives identified included the coercive and deterrent value of nuclear 

weapons as well as their prestige and military utility. The report identified as relevant 

disincentives: high costs, fear of international sanctions, legal restrictions, unclear military 

needs, moral pressures, and lack of assistance for programs in Soviet “satellite” countries. 

The memorandum cited China as the country of greatest concern, with Israel, Sweden and 

India likely following. According to the memorandum, Chinese developments may motivate 

Australia and Japan to try to obtain nuclear weapons. West Germany and Italy might be 

pressured to start a nuclear program, and South Africa should not be ruled out. 

Acquisition Patterns/Trends 

The memorandum assesses the potential impact of expanding nuclear power use on 

proliferation, with nuclear power programs seen as shortcuts to military use. Use of nuclear 

power was seen as leading to potential access to plutonium, training of scientists and a 

general diffusion of technology. Specifically, the memorandum identifies eight countries, in 

addition to the existing four nuclear powers, that will have civilian nuclear capabilities by 

1973. However, it was thought unlikely that all of the countries capable of pursuing nuclear 

weapons programs would start them. The memorandum estimated that depending on the 

country, it would take 1 – 10 years to complete a nuclear weapons program once the 

decision was made to start the program. 

The memorandum estimated that starting a nuclear weapons program would cost 

approximately $150 – $175 million dollars. It predicted that the costs of acquiring nuclear 

weapons would decrease over time, linked to a decrease in the costs of producing fissile 

materials by a factor of 2-5. 

The memorandum judged that a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing was likely 

to slow proliferation. Moreover, the memorandum argued that a comprehensive test ban 

would facilitate much needed cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, a 

consideration that may have contributed to negotiations soon after the Limited Test Ban 

Treaty. However, the memorandum assessed that China would not likely agree to a 

comprehensive treaty. It would also be hard to persuade Israel and France to accept a 

comprehensive ban; at the time, France and China were not even prepared to sign the Partial 

Test Ban Treaty of 1963. 

As for unrestricted testing, the memorandum concludes that while such testing might not 

have a substantial influence in the short-term, it is likely that it will increase proliferation 

over the long-term. 
Memorandum for the President: The Diffusion of 

Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 35 

Finally, the likelihood that some countries could produce nuclear weapons without testing 

was addressed as a possibility. In addition, existing and proposed monitoring systems – 

either international or national – were considered to be incapable of detecting underground 

tests. 

Assessment 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

An alternative scenarios methodology remains a proven means to examine future 

proliferation trends and assess how those trends might change under different conditions. 

In this case, the assessment considered how changes in the dependent variable – test ban 

policy – could impact proliferation trends. Later assessments considered how a mix of 

conditions could affect alternative scenarios for the independent variable – alternative 

scenarios for proliferation trends. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led 

decision-makers to take notice of it? 

This memorandum raised awareness about the importance of U.S. test ban policy. Although 

its proposal was not accepted for the U.S. pursuit of a comprehensive test ban, its emphasis 

on the political payoffs of a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union may have contributed 

to the successful pursuit of the LTBT several months later. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

This memorandum provided part of the background for the Kennedy Administration’s 

decision to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was signed on October 10, 1963. 

This treaty banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 36 WMD FORECASTING 
A Report to the President 

by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 37 

A Report to the President 

by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 

Edited by Gilpatric Committee, Washington, D.C 

The White House, 1965 

Overview 

Directly linked to China’s 1964 nuclear test and prepared by a group of “wise men,” the 

Gilpatric Report uses an expert judgment Delphi methodology to warn that the world is on 

the brink of worldwide proliferation. That expert judgment is based on a number of critical 

international or external variables, e.g., regional insecurity and the pursuit of prestige. 

Increased national access to fissile material is seen to be the result of a trend toward growing 

global use of nuclear energy. On the other hand, internal variables received little attention, 

e.g., more unique country-specific political-psychological-cultural factors shaping national 

approaches to nuclear issues. In light of that forecast, the Report sets out a series of 

recommendations to prevent worldwide proliferation. The Report contributed to the 

Johnson Administration’s pursuit of a nonproliferation treaty as well as the strengthening of 

U.S. nuclear security arrangements with key allies, Japan and Germany. Some other Report 

recommendations were not pursued, e.g., new security guarantees to Israel and India as well 

as other steps to provide alternatives to nuclear weapons for prestige. 

Authors 

This report was prepared by a group of senior “bipartisan wise men”, chaired by then 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. The group was comprised of Arthur Dean 

(Senior Diplomat), James Perkins (President of Cornell University), Allen Dulles (Former 

Director of Central Intelligence), Arthur Watson (CEO of IBM), Alfred Gruenther (General 

– retired), William Webster, George Kistiakowsky (Harvard Professor), Herbert York 

(Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and John McCloy (Senior Outsider). 

Commissioned By 

President Lyndon B. Johnson 

Purpose and Objectives 

The stated purpose was to study the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons 

and put forward recommendations for how to deal with the problem. Unlike many of the 

other “studies” examined, its primary focus is not a forecast of future proliferation but rather 

a set of recommended policy actions. 

Timeframe Examined 

None explicitly stated. Implicitly, the next 1-5 years. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 38 WMD FORECASTING 

Prevailing Context 

China tested a nuclear device in October 1964, which provided the immediate catalyst for 

this report. Additionally, there was growing concern about the possible contribution of 

more widespread uses of nuclear energy to the future proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

There was also uneasiness about the possible pursuit of nuclear weapons by other European 

countries, including Germany, which led to the consideration of possible multilateral nuclear 

arrangements for NATO. At the same time, negotiations were underway on what would 

become the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 

Methodology: Expert Judgment Delphi Method 

The report relied on expert judgment by a group of “wise men”. Their assessment focused 

heavily on several proliferation drivers: the impact of China’s nuclear test as a triggering 

event, projected growth in the use of nuclear energy (giving more countries access to fissile 

material), regional and international security concerns, and the pursuit of international 

prestige. The group of wise men consulted with principal officers and relevant agencies in 

the U.S. Government to help make their own judgments about potential proliferation drivers 

and trends, consequences for the United States, and possible future policies. There was 

diversity within the group concerning the costs and feasibility of the policy proposals, which 

was clearly expressed in the Report. 

 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Brink of Worldwide Proliferation 

The report judged that the United States and other countries were on the brink of worldwide 

proliferation. Several factors were seen as potentially leading to such proliferation. These 

drivers of future proliferation were: 

 China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, which was seen as compelling Japan and 

India to seek nuclear weapons programs, affecting in turn still other countries; 

 The presence in other countries of fissile material, which was seen to be 

destabilizing regardless of its quality or grade; 

 Pursuit of nuclear weapons as a source of international prestige; 

 Heightened perceptions of security threats in countries’ immediate regions; and 

 Unconstrained technology transfers and exports from existing nuclear weapon 

powers. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The Gilpatric Report set out a wide range of recommended actions aimed at preventing 

worldwide proliferation. These recommendations dealt with both global/regional initiatives 

and more country specific actions. The recommendations were as follows: 

Global-Regional Recommendations:

The Report stated that the United States should intensify its efforts to negotiate and seek an 

early conclusion to a nonproliferation agreement. Strong pressure should be put on 

countries such as Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the United Arab Republic, and 
A Report to the President 

by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 39 

Sweden to participate in such an agreement. Efforts should also be made to persuade the 

Soviet Union and its allies to support the treaty. 

The United States should renew its efforts to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive 

nuclear test ban treaty. This step was seen as impeding national development programs. 

The United States should pressure nation-states to maintain non-nuclear status. If states 

pursue the acquisition or manufacturing of nuclear weapons, the United States should 

impose economic sanctions. 

The United States should support the establishment of nuclear free zones in Latin American 

and Africa (to include Israel and the United Arab Republic). 

The United States should expand the influence and budget of the IAEA in order to ensure 

international safeguards on nuclear power reactors. EURATOM should use IAEA 

safeguards to ensure compliance with nonproliferation. 

The United States should be prepared to reduce its own nuclear arsenal and overall reliance 

on strategic and tactical nuclear armaments through adherence to arms reduction treaties. 

Closely related, the Report contended that the United States should encourage other states 

such as the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to accept 

future treaty limitations. China, on the other hand, was thought to be inevitably committed 

to expanding its nuclear capacity and have no interest in any such limiting agreements. Even 

so, the United States could seek to encourage China to apply IAEA safeguards to its nuclear 

energy program. 

The use of Permissive Active Links (PALs) on United States nuclear weapons in Europe 

should be expanded to all United States nuclear weapons deployed overseas. 

Recommendations for Specific Countries 

India 

The United States should encourage India to remain non-nuclear by providing a nuclear 

security umbrella and conditioning it on India remaining non-nuclear. The United States 

should also support India playing a larger role in the United Nations if it remains nonnuclear. 

Japan 

The United States must provide alternative prestige mechanisms to dissuade Japan from 

seeking nuclear weapons. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 40 WMD FORECASTING 

Israel 

The United States should join a strategic alliance with Israel against the United Arab Republic, 

conditioned on Israel remaining non-nuclear. 

United Arab Republic 

The United States should motivate the United Arab Republic to reverse its nuclear program 

by dissuading France and Germany from the supplying necessary technology. 

Germany 

Whether or not to pursue a Multilateral Nuclear Force that includes Germany is considered 

but not resolved. The alternative discussed would entail a bilateral U.S.-German sharing 

agreement that is designed to avoid an independent German nuclear program. 

France 

The United States should continue to oppose France’s independent nuclear weapons 

program, including nuclear testing by France. 

Soviet Union 

The United States should promote the limiting of fissile materials and delivery vehicles. 

There should also be a delay in the development of ballistic missile defense as well as pursuit 

of an agreement with the Soviet Union to halt the production of ICBMs. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

The report concluded that China’s nuclear weapons development was inevitable. 

Comment: China did continue to develop its nuclear weapons program. 

The report predicted that Israel could be kept from pursuing nuclear weapons by a 

combination of pressure from the United States and the provision of a U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

Comment: U.S. pressure alone proved insufficient to dissuade Israel from acquiring nuclear 

weapons and ultimately the pressure was relaxed. 

The report projected that Japan might be influenced to seek nuclear weapons if its neighbor 

China does so. 

Comment: Concerns about China’s nuclear status did create insecurity in Japan but ties to 

the United States provided an alternative security mechanism. In addition, domestic political 

factors, the post-war nuclear allergy, also played an important part in Japan’s calculations. 
A Report to the President 

by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 41 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The “wise men” group focused primarily on external influences and the international 

political environment. They placed less emphasis on the role of key leaders, national 

strategic personalities, and domestic political considerations. These latter factors, however, 

played a part both in Israel’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and Japan’s decision not to do so. 

The Delphic Survey by a group of wise men is a methodology that can be readily replicated – 

and has often been – in thinking about future proliferation trends and related policy issues. 

Its use of trends analysis and triggering events is also replicable. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

Many, but not all of the Report’s recommendations were later pursued. For instance, the 

study suggested that the United States propose an internationally binding treaty to stop the 

spread of nuclear weapons. It also suggested that the United States seek ways to reinforce 

the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Germany and Japan as a means to prevent proliferation. But 

the Report’s recommendation that the United States extend deterrence outside of Europe 

was not pursued, e.g., with Israel and India. Nor did was its recommendation of a significant 

reduction in the nuclear stockpiles pursued. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The Gilpatric Report was a significant step towards a nonproliferation regime. The Report 

influenced President Johnson’s nonproliferation policy, including the strengthening of the 

nuclear linkage to Germany as well as the pursuit of what came to be known as the NPT. 

Some of its recommendations did set in motion developments that helped to prevent its 

worst fears of worldwide proliferation. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 42 WMD FORECASTING 
Nuclear Proliferation Phase II 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 43 

Nuclear Proliferation Phase II 

Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds 

National Security Education Program: University Press of Kansas, 1974 

Overview 

Written shortly after the entry-into-force of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), this book is composed of overview essays and a set of country case studies. 

Even though the case studies provided insights into national security thinking in these 

countries, they underestimated the role of domestic factors. The case studies also did not 

pay sufficient attention to the impact of wild cards and unexpected regional developments in 

shaping proliferation choices in directions thought to be unlikely by the authors. 

Commissioned By 

National Security Education Program of New York University 

Purpose and Objectives 

The editors of the book state that their objective was to examine why some states chose to 

accept or reject the NPT. 

Timeframe Examined 

The book is mainly focused on the negotiation, signing, and entry-into-force of the NPT – 

from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Some of the essays also look at the future of the 

nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Prevailing Context 

The essays were written shortly after the NPT entered-into-force in 1970. The nuclear 

nonproliferation regime was strengthened by the treaty’s fairly wide approval. However, the 

number of states that refused to sign it at that time was also troubling, especially since 

several seemed determined to possess nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. Since China 

in 1964, no other country had openly acquired nuclear weapons. India’s 1974 nuclear test of 

a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive had yet to occur. More broadly, the United States and 

the Soviet Union had signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which created expectations of further arms control. 

Methodology: Country-Case Studies – National Expert Analysis 

The case study methodology includes reliance on assessments from nationals of the specific 

countries examined. The case studies emphasize security considerations – as reflected in 

official thinking and doctrines – as the primary proliferation driver. The book is a collection 

of eight essays: one essay is a background discussion on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT), one essay is on nuclear weapons technology, and the six other essays are case studies 

that explore the decisions to accept or reject the NPT made by individual states. The 

individual state essays were written by authors originating from the nations in question. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 44 WMD FORECASTING 

Each case study assessed the likelihood that the state would decide to acquire nuclear 

weapons, while seeking to summarize official thinking on this question. Given their 

emphasis on official doctrine, these case studies put the most emphasis on security 

considerations as opposed to more technical or internal political-bureaucratic-cultural factors. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Prospects for Proliferation 

In their conclusion, the two editors judged that additional countries would acquire nuclear 

weapons. No legal measures would hold the number of nuclear weapon states to the five 

states recognized in the NPT. 

Comment: Very soon after the book was published, India tested its first nuclear explosive in 

1974. Israel also likely possessed a small nuclear arsenal by this point. In turn, South Africa 

was building nuclear weapons by the end of the decade. 

Country Specific Assessments:

Australia 

The essay on Australia predicted that if the United States were to abrogate the AustraliaNew Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), then Australia would likely try 

to build its own nuclear weapons. Its motivation would be to provide an alternative to its 

reliance on the United States for its security. However, the author noted that such an 

abrogation looked unlikely. 

Comment: The United States did not leave the ANZUS Treaty. U.S.-Australian security 

relations remained one of the main reasons why Australia did not make serious, sustained 

attempts at building a nuclear weapons program. However, over time, domestic political 

considerations also played an important part in this decision. 

West Germany 

The essay reflecting on West Germany emphasized the unique dimensions of the 

cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in pushing for the NPT. The 

author surmised that West Germany political leadership did not expect that such 

cooperation would recur. This cooperation was seen as a driving force that pulled the rest of 

the world along into the NPT, including ultimately West Germany. 

India 

Various factors were highlighted that might lead the Indian Government to build nuclear 

weapons. They were: 

 External threats from China or Pakistan that might require a military-nuclear 

response or the ability to negotiate from a nuclear position; 

 A superpower presence in the Indian Ocean – especially a nuclear-armed 

presence; 
Nuclear Proliferation Phase II 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 45 

 Increasingly close American relations with Asia and Pakistan left India feeling 

vulnerable; and 

 The inherent unfairness of the NPT – separating the world into nuclear haves 

and have-nots. 

Comment: Most of these factors have been cited over the years as the reasons for India’s 

decision to build a nuclear stockpile. However, other domestic political and bureaucratic 

factors as well as leadership preferences were also important determinants of India’s posture. 

These other factors were not highlighted due to the focus on more traditional security 

drivers. 

Israel 

The essay suggested that continued Soviet involvement in the Middle East, especially in 

Egypt, could lead Israel to declare its nuclear weapons capability. 

Comment: Despite continued Soviet ties to various Middle Eastern states, Israel never 

officially declared its nuclear weapons capability. Israel’s decision reflected a number of 

considerations, including the purpose of Israeli nuclear weapons was last resort, the regional 

and global political benefits to Israel of not openly declaring its nuclear status, and the 

leadership’s reluctance to integrate nuclear weapons fully into Israel’s day-to-day defense 

posture. 

Japan 

Three main issues were seen as possibly causing Japan to refuse to adhere to the NPT and 

seek nuclear weapons. These were: 

 Continued external threats (e.g., from a nuclear China); 

 Abandonment by the United States, forcing Japan to take care of its own security; 

and 

 Pressure by the U.S. to ratify the NPT, resulting in a rise in Japanese nationalism. 

Comment: After a vigorous internal debate, Japan signed and ratified the NPT. As 

indicated, the U.S. security guarantee was and has remained a key factor in shaping Japan’s 

readiness to renounce nuclear weapons. While Japanese nationalism has increased in 

successive decades, it has never reached the point at which Japanese leaders considered 

giving up the U.S.’s security guarantees in favor of Japan’s own nuclear arsenal. 

South Africa 

The case study suggests that it is unlikely that South Africa would build nuclear weapons. 

This forecast rested on three judgments, which included: 

 South Africa would not likely build nuclear weapons if doing so meant damage 

to cooperative relationships with traditional allies; 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 46 WMD FORECASTING 

 South Africa would not likely build nuclear weapons if doing so jeopardized its 

strategic advances in the world. In other words, if having nuclear arms might 

hurt its political and economic advancement; and 

 South Africa appeared to have more to gain from using its nuclear resources to 

strengthen commercial and technological ties with other nations, rather than 

hoarding them to build its own nuclear arms. 

Comment: All of these judgments were confounded by later developments. In particular, 

due to its apartheid regime, South Africa was internationally shunned, politically and 

economically, from both its traditional allies and the broader global community. With 

economic and political sanctions, the opportunity costs of going nuclear also increasingly 

declined. Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa from the mid-1970s onward also 

transformed South Africa’s perceived security environment. As a result, South Africa started 

building nuclear weapons capability very shortly after the essay’s forecasts. Quite likely, its 

leaders believed that they had nothing to lose by taking that course of action. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

As noted, the editors’ major, if not necessarily very difficult, projection that there would be 

additional proliferation beyond the five NPT nuclear-weapon states was correct. The 

specific essays appear to have underestimated the likelihood, however, that India would 

move very slowly towards nuclear weapons after its 1974 test as well as that Israel would not 

deploy nuclear weapons openly. It rightly identified possible reasons for South Africa to 

remain non-nuclear but underestimated the extent to which those conditions were eroding 

or about to be upset by the wild card of Soviet-Cuban intervention in the soon-to-begin 

Angolan civil war. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

Having nationals of specific countries write the case studies was intended to ensure that the 

authors were knowledgeable about their government’s security policies. This methodology 

did lead to occasional insights about each of the countries in question; however, many of the 

nuclear drivers listed in each country were already well-known to U.S. analysts. Moreover, 

analysts from the nations did not turn out to be more accurate than outsiders might have 

been. Additionally, perhaps because of the heavy focus on security motivations, other 

important factors were not given sufficient weight. The close linkage to existing security 

policies as opposed to speculating about the future environment meant that important 

changes were not highlighted. 
Nuclear Proliferation Phase II 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 47 

The methodology of case studies by experts from the countries in question is replicable 

though its comparative advantage compared to reliance on experts regardless of their 

country of origin is not clear. Indeed, depending on the particular country, nationals may 

have less knowledge of programs and policies or be less able to reveal them for fear of 

punitive action. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

This study was part of an overall increase in analytic attention paid to the problem of nuclear 

proliferation during the 1970s. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

Independent of the assessments, external political-economic changes and wild cards did 

fundamentally change the context in which several of the nations in question made decisions 

on the costs and benefits of seeking nuclear weapons. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 48 WMD FORECASTING 
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack 

 Through the Mid-1980s (Volume 1 of 3)

WMD FORECASTING I I - 49 

Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Through the Mid-1980s 

(Volume 1 of 3) 

In National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 1975 

Overview 

This estimate focused on the present and future Soviet forces for intercontinental attack 

(using ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) and strategic defense against bombers, missiles, and 

ballistic missile submarines. It examines the prospect of intercontinental conflict with the 

U.S.S.R. by analyzing three main topics: Soviet offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities, 

and projected future Soviet capabilities. The latter projection is based on estimates of 

improvements in Soviet strategic missile and defensive technology as well as the outcome of 

the SALT II negotiations. Rather than a single estimate, the NIE offers a set of alternative 

projections. Per its mandate, the estimate focused heavily on the military aspects of conflict. 

The wild card, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, contributed to the refusal of the U.S. 

Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of what came to be the SALT II 

agreement. Thus, the NIE’s projections of Soviet forces under different SALT II scenarios 

were largely overtaken by events. 

The report was broken into three volumes. Volume I presents the key judgments and a 

summary of the estimate. Volume II is the full estimate and Volume III is a set of annexes 

that includes tables on future projections and supplementary technical material on ICBM 

accuracies and directed-energy weapon systems. 

Authors 

The contributors were the Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence organizations part of the 

Departments of State and Defense, and the Energy Research and Development 

Administration. 

Commissioned By 

The Director of Central Intelligence.

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose was to analyze the Soviet Union’s capabilities in terms of strategic missile 

capabilities and defense. 

Timeframe Examined 

1975 through 1985. 

Prevailing Context 

Globally, the prevailing context was a period of relative détente in the ongoing Cold War 

confrontation. The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement (SALT I) had been signed 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 50 WMD FORECASTING 

and ratified by both sides to place limits on their strategic nuclear forces. They also had 

signed and ratified the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limiting deployments of ballistic 

missile defenses. Negotiations were underway for a follow-on SALT II agreement. President 

Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had reached the Vladivostok 

Agreement in November 1974, which was intended by the U.S. to remedy some of the 

perceived flaws of the SALT I agreement. Domestically, the SALT I agreement had been 

heavily criticized because it was viewed as providing the Soviet Union with strategic 

advantages. The Jackson Amendment that accompanied its passage called for the United 

States not to accept strategic forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union. A little over a 

year after the jump in oil prices during the 1973 Middle East War, the United States was 

experiencing the beginning of an economic crisis related to the supply of petroleum. 

Methodology: Alternative Outcomes, Quantitative Modeling 

Based on what was known about the Soviet Union’s capabilities, the estimate evaluated 

Soviet capabilities for attack and survival during an intercontinental nuclear conflict. To do 

so, it developed a series of projections of future Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities, 

dependent on the possible outcomes of the SALT II negotiations as well as future Soviet 

research and development efforts. Little emphasis was given to overall economic capability, 

political will, and leadership. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The NIE judged that the United States maintained a qualitative superiority in ICBMs and 

SLBMs, while the Soviet Union had a quantitative advantage in terms of the strategic balance. 

The Soviet Union was seen to maintain the largest air defense system in the world and 

devoted more resources to improving and maintaining defensive capabilities than on 

improving capabilities for intercontinental attack. The future strategic balance would depend 

most heavily on the success or failure of the SALT II negotiations and technological 

advances on each side. 

Overall, this estimate explored various projections for Soviet strategic forces. Each 

considered one outcome of the SALT II negotiations as well as the bilateral political 

situation and Soviet technical achievements. According to the author’s findings, new 

systems deployment will continue at about the pace demonstrated at the time of this NIE’s 

writing. ICBM accuracy will continue to improve as well as force survivability and flexibility. 

Future Strategic Balance

The strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was characterized by 

the nations’ efforts to utilize and improve upon the technologies developed by the other. 

Improvements in offensive weapons have led to improvements in defensive measures in 

both countries. 

The NIE highlighted that the Soviet Union maintains a quantitative advantage over the 

United States in strategic offensive nuclear forces. This advantage was likely to continue 
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack 

 Through the Mid-1980s (Volume 1 of 3)

WMD FORECASTING I I - 51 

into the future across the alternative scenarios identified. Specifically, the NIE estimated 

that the Soviet Union would continue its development and deployment of new ICBMs, 

resulting in a growing Soviet capacity to destroy hardened missile silos in the United States. 

Based on the Soviet developments of low-altitude detection systems, it would become more 

difficult for U.S. bombers to penetrate Soviet airspace. 

Possible new technologies that could upset the strategic balance were assessed. The NIE 

focused heavily on laser technology for both countries. Other cutting edge technologies 

discussed included particle beams, non-acoustic submarine technologies, and improved radar 

systems. 

Nonetheless, the overall NIE judgment was that it was unlikely that any one event would tip 

the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance decisively to the advantage of either side. In the event of a 

conflict, both states would likely rely first on conventional weapons because a nuclear attack 

would provoke massive retaliation. In particular, the NIE assessed that uncertainty about the 

precise offensive (and retaliatory) capabilities of the adversary would make massive first 

strikes unlikely. Neither state could guarantee absolute success. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study have withstood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which 

aspects have not? 

During the 1975-1985 period of the estimate, as projected, the strategic balance remained 

basically stable, if measured using the metric that neither side had incentive to launch a first 

strike. The NIE’s judgment of a growing Soviet capacity to destroy U.S. silo-based missiles 

also proved accurate. The NIE’s assumption that there would be a SALT II agreement 

proved wrong given the impact of the wild card of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as well 

growing U.S. political debate about Soviet pursuit of a nuclear advantage. Thus, this aspect 

of its projections was overtaken by events. In terms of technology, disruptive technologies, 

including lasers, influenced but did not develop at a sufficiently rapid pace to upset the 

strategic balance. 

The NIE also accurately forecasted that the deployment of new systems and force 

survivability and flexibility would continue to improve. However, the author’s were not 

certain about issues regarding the development of long-range cruise missiles or bombers 

given the lack of evidence that was available at the time. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

An alternative scenarios methodology allowed the NIE to cover the range of future 

developments of the Soviet forces. Its assessment, however, was vulnerable to the collapse 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 52 WMD FORECASTING 

of one of its critical assumptions that the SALT process would continue to produce a SALT 

II agreement. 

The methodology, taking two variables and forming different scenarios based on their values, 

is replicable and widely used in many assessments. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

With its overall reassuring assessment of the strategic balance, it is likely that this study 

facilitated the successful SALT II negotiations, even if other events resulted in the treaty not 

entering-into-force. At the same time, the NIE was not able to put an end to a highly 

political elite-public debate about Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Instead, there was 

considerable criticism of the strategic posture of the Carter Administration by outside 

former officials. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The actual course of events was not influenced directly by the estimate. However, the 

optimistic tone vis-à-vis arms limitation talks probably had some influence on their initial 

positive outcome. Similarly, the very high estimates of Soviet capabilities probably served to 

communicate to policymakers the urgency of the situation and need for a long-term remedy. 

However, external events, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. economic crisis and 

change of leadership, the Soviet decision to deploy SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, and 

the change of Soviet leadership with the death of Brezhnev in 1982 also played a large role in 

the evolution of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship in the 1975-1985 period. 
Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 

 1975-1995: Projections, Problems and Policy Options 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 53 

Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 

1975-1995: Projections, Problems and Policy Options 

Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn 

Edited by Hudson Institute: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976 

Overview 

This study used an alternative futures methodology to develop a series of projections of 

possible proliferation trends from 1975-1995. These projections broke away from 

traditional country case studies and were made up of one or more inter-related proliferation 

chains of country decisions. In turn, the projections were intended to highlight the breadth 

of possible proliferation outcomes as well as the dynamics of proliferation,; not to forecast 

any single proliferation future. In developing these projections, the authors identified 

pressures for and the constraints upon a decision to acquire nuclear weapons by different 

states as well as the impact of proliferation triggering events and momentum. The 

projections were varied to show how changing conditions could result in differing outcomes 

in terms of the scope and pace of proliferation. Implications for policy were discussed. 

Over time, considerably less proliferation occurred than was forecast in the more extensive 

projections. In part, this “real world” outcome suggests that the alternative futures 

methodology may exaggerate proliferation possibilities even though it proves to be a 

valuable means for understanding the dynamics of the proliferation process. As with other 

forecasts summarized in this overall “forecasting project,” unexpected developments and 

wild cards shaped the proliferation outcomes in ways not envisaged by this study; 

notwithstanding the fact that it did emphasize the importance of such events but as 

proliferation accelerators not proliferation decelerators. 

Commissioned By 

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The objectives of the study were to explore future trends in proliferation and policy 

approaches for limiting proliferation. Specifically, the study assessed pressures for and 

constraints upon proliferation; delineated the possible scope and dynamics of proliferation; 

and characterized the potential parameters of Nth country nuclear programs and postures. 

Timeframe Examined 

1975 through1995 

Prevailing Context 

The study was initiated and carried out in the immediate aftermath of India’s May 1974 

nuclear test. Other important proliferation-related developments at that time included: the 

entry-into-force of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970; 

concerns about the supply of sensitive reprocessing and enrichment equipment to third 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 54 WMD FORECASTING 

world countries; the creation of the Zangger Committee aimed at regulating the international 

nuclear supply under the NPT; and continued concerns about the nuclear activities of Israel 

and South Africa. More broadly, the strategic nuclear arms control process involving the 

United States and the Soviet Union had begun. 

Methodology: Alternative Futures-Proliferation Chains 

Instead of examining future proliferation trends via a series of country-by-country case 

studies, the authors developed a set of fifteen proliferation futures. The purpose of these 

alternative futures was not to “predict the future” but to bound the range of plausible 

possibilities while identifying the dynamics of the proliferation process. Each of these 

alternative futures comprised one or more proliferation chains, linking together specific 

countries in light of each country’s proliferation incentives-disincentives, the impact of 

different proliferation-related events in causing or hindering proliferation amongst a number 

of states, and potential proliferation “tipping points.” Both external security-prestige related 

considerations and internal domestic political-bureaucratic factors – as well as the role of 

proliferation triggering events, momentum, and shocks – were set out as proliferation drivers. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The authors note that their alternative futures are not meant to be predictions of what will 

occur. Rather the different proliferation chains are intended to facilitate the analysis of future 

proliferation trends and dynamics, thereby shaping policy actions and choices to prevent 

more widespread proliferation. Thus, the discussion explicitly considers the factors or 

conditions that could lead to each particular outcome. 

Projection 1:

Limited but steady proliferation to 1995: Every five years, additional countries “go nuclear” 

either overtly or covertly. 

 

Projection 1A, Proliferation Phase

International constraints against proliferation are reinforced by the international community. 

As a result, proliferation is significantly reduced with only a few other countries after India 

acquiring nuclear weapons – either covertly or by claiming to have a peaceful nuclear 

explosives program. 

Projection 1B, Suppressed Proliferation Following the Use of Nuclear Weapons 

An initial late 1970s-early 1980s spurt of proliferation in Asia is followed by the first use of 

nuclear weapons since WWII. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the 

international community band together to suppress any further nuclear proliferation. 

Projection 2, Early to Mid-1980s Latin American Proliferation

Rapid and extensive proliferation in Latin America occurs, with Brazil and Argentina leading 

the Latin American arms race. The study also projected that a Latin American nuclear arms 

race could lead to several other states in other regions to develop nuclear weapons as well. 
Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 

 1975-1995: Projections, Problems and Policy Options 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 55 

Projection 3, Libyan-Triggered Early 1980s Middle East Proliferation 

After Libya acquires nuclear weapons in the early 1980s, either by purchase or theft, the rest 

of the Middle East begins to build nuclear weapons. This, in turn, increases proliferation 

momentum around the world. 

Projection 3A, Limited, Early to Mid-1980s Proliferation in Europe (No European Nuclear Force) 

Following proliferation in Asia and the Middle East, proliferation occurs in Europe. Italy 

and Spain both acquire nuclear weapons. However, West Germany does not for both 

internal and alliance reasons. 

Projection 4, Early to Mid-1980s Emergence of a Nuclear Exports “Grey Market” 

A grey market emerges in nuclear supply, resulting in a general breakdown of supplier 

restraint and very extensive proliferation. 

Projection 5, More Extensive Mid-1980s Global Proliferation: Repercussions of Growing 

Perceptions of American Unreliability 

This projection assumed that the United States comes to be seen as an increasingly unreliable 

ally, resulting in increased nuclear proliferation. 

Projection 6, Explosive Late 1980s-Early 1990s European Proliferation: A West German Nuclear 

Weapons Program 

Proliferation in other regions as well as an erosion of the American security guarantee lead to 

a West German decision to build nuclear weapons. Efforts to create a European Nuclear 

Force prove abortive and as a result, a small group of West German officials arranges for 

covert participation in and assistance to an emerging Brazilian or South African nuclear 

program. Eventually, the nonproliferation regime breaks down and the suppliers market is 

essentially uncontrolled. 

Projection 7, Widespread Mid-to-Late 1980s Proliferation in Asia: Japan “Goes Nuclear” 

In what the study labels a proliferation turning point, Japan seeks nuclear weapons 

motivated by a mixture of heightened perceived vulnerability, nationalism, proliferation 

momentum and status, and U.S. disengagement. After Japan reveals its nuclear weapons, 

several other Asian nations are pressured to proliferate, and the nonproliferation regime 

sharply erodes. 

Projection 7A, Asian-Influenced Late-1980s Middle East Proliferation 

Proliferation in Asia creates a proliferation chain in the Middle East, partly linked to the 

impact of a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons eroding the NPT system overall. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 56 WMD FORECASTING 

Projection 7B, Asian-Influenced Late 1980s-Early 1990s Proliferation in Europe 

Another variant on Projection 7, Japan’s nuclear weapons program heightens pressures on 

several European states to acquire nuclear weapons. In turn, West Germany acquisition of 

weapons to triggers Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland to follow. 

Projection 8, Late 1980s Erosion of Technological Constraints and the NPT System 

Technological constraints are seen in this projection to have been eroded as new enrichment 

technologies become easier to engineer and build and safeguards are routinely violated with 

no consequences. The scope and pace of proliferation are very significantly increased in a 

world of widespread proliferation. 

Projection 9, Mid- to Late 1980s Proliferation in Eastern Europe 

Yugoslavia and then Romania acquire nuclear weapons. 

Projection 10, Widespread, Multi-Regional Chain Reaction Proliferation to 1995 

The authors viewed this projection as a means to show how the interaction of specific trends 

and events highlighted in their earlier futures could result in a world of runaway proliferation 

with multiple nuclear arms races across all the world’s regions. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

Proliferation Turning Points 

The study highlighted a number of potential proliferation “turning points,” including: 

 Sale or gift of a nuclear weapon; 

 Use of a nuclear weapon; 

 Withdrawal from the NPT; 

 Emergence of a nuclear-exports grey market; 

 Widespread dissemination of nuclear enrichment technologies; 

 Sharp reduction in U.S. alliance credibility; 

 Breakdown of NPT system; and 

 Unsuccessful or ineffective application of sanctions following a safeguards 

violation. 

Proliferation Characteristics 

The study included an extensive discussion of the potential parameters of Nth country 

nuclear weapon programs and postures. This discussion focused on critical technical 

characteristics, issues of doctrine and command and control, and survivability. Different 

possible Nth country nuclear doctrines and postures were set out. 

Impacts of Proliferation 

The impacts of proliferation in terms of regional arms races, new dangers, and global 

competitiveness were explored. The potential impacts that proliferation could have on 

intensifying domestic political conflict were considered, including the “nuclear coup d’etat.” 
Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 

 1975-1995: Projections, Problems and Policy Options 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 57 

Policy Implications 

The report included a set of policy recommendations to prevent the more dangerous 

proliferation projections from coming to pass. The authors noted the importance of 

reinforcing constraints placed upon potential Nth countries and reducing the pressures to go 

nuclear. The study also included a discussion of U.S. actions to manage the problems of 

proliferation, influencing the postures and policies of new proliferators, contributing to 

regional stability, and containing global repercussions. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

Overall Projections 

As the authors’ noted, the purpose of the projections was not to predict future proliferation 

but to help understand its potential dynamics and drivers as well as support the efforts of 

U.S. policy to shape the proliferation future. Nonetheless, the experience of the next two 

decades suggests that there may well be more internal constraints on national decisions to 

acquire nuclear weapons than suggested by the type of “rational” model set out here. At the 

least, the overall pressures for proliferation – if not the momentum and chain reaction effect 

– was considerably less than anticipated. 

Proliferation Drivers 

The study’s emphasis on a broad set of proliferation drivers, including both external factors 

and internal developments, proved to be a solid framework for thinking about proliferation 

in the ensuing decades. In turn, its broad emphasis on the importance of proliferation 

turning points or shocks proved correct. By the early 1980s, its projection of a “grey 

market” involving clandestine purchases, shadowy suppliers, and networks of illicit trade had 

definitely emerged. This “grey market” would be formalized a decade later in the A.Q. Khan 

network. 

Countries of Critical Proliferation Concern 

The study identified the following countries as being “critical potential Nth countries” in 

terms of the impact a decision by any one of them not to acquire nuclear weapons could have 

on the scope and pace of further proliferation: Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, 

Libya, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany. For each, the study examined 

pressures for proliferation, most critical constraints, and triggering events. In the decades 

after the study, Israel, India, and Pakistan did build nuclear weapons. Libya sought to do so 

but lacked the technical capabilities needed. Iran, Argentina, and Brazil either considered or 

began nuclear weapons programs but then stopped for differing reasons – all of which 

included wild card changes of regimes. Both South Korea and Taiwan also considered 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 58 WMD FORECASTING 

resuming their nuclear weapon pursuits but were stopped by American pressure. Japan and 

West Germany remained committed to their non-nuclear status, in part for reasons 

identified in the study (e.g., the U.S. security guarantee). 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The alternative futures-proliferation chains methodology proved a valuable means to explore 

proliferation dynamics. However, it may have a built-in bias toward exaggerating the scope 

of future proliferation. The emphasis on proliferation triggering events or tipping points 

also proved useful to explore proliferation dynamics. However, the study underestimated 

the role of such events or tipping points – leading to slowing proliferation or the roll-back of 

nuclear weapons programs. Further, though the study did identify the importance of 

internal bureaucratic factors as well as technical momentum, in some cases it may have 

underestimated the importance of these factors. 

The alternative futures-proliferation chains methodology is replicable. It would be 

important, however, to combine it with more in-depth country expertise to refine any 

projections. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

The study reinforced the efforts already underway to strengthen suppliers’ controls. It also 

contributed to ongoing thinking within the government on nonproliferation policy. Its 

emphasis on managing proliferation proved controversial. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

Over the two decades covered by the study, continuing policy actions by the United States – 

and in many instances other countries – often served to increase the constraints and reduce 

the pressures that could lead to proliferation decisions. The continued vitality of U.S. 

alliances, the emergence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the strengthening of 

international norms and institutions all are examples. The study’s alternative projections 

highlighted the importance of such actions. Still other external developments and wild cards 

contributed to “negating” some of the more expansive projections. Changes of leadership in 

Iran, Argentina, and Brazil are three examples of wild card changes. At the same time, the 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to U.S. decision to come to terms with Pakistan’s pursuit 

of nuclear weapons; lest it lose the support of that ally in the 1980s during its efforts to 

defeat the Soviet Union. 
Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: 

Soviet Strategic Objectives – An Alternative View 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 59 

Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: 

Soviet Strategic Objectives – An Alternative View 

Richard Pipes, William Van Cleave, Daniel Graham, Thomas Wolfe, John Vogt 

In Report of Team B, 1976 

Overview 

The “Team B” report relied on the professional expertise of its members to conduct an 

alternative assessment of the data and resulting National Intelligence Assessments of Soviet 

strategic goals from 1962-1975. As such, it came to epitomize a methodology of bringing in 

outside experts to do an independent, alternative assessment of a tough national security 

problem – in effect, a “Team B analysis.” This “Team B” assessment concluded that past 

analyses of Soviet goals were seriously flawed: both underestimating a Soviet pursuit of 

global hegemony as the core of its grand strategy and assuming that Soviet strategic nuclear 

thinking “mirror imaged” that of the United States. The resulting “Team B” report 

influenced the ongoing U.S. official and unofficial debate about Soviet goals and policies in 

the late 1970s. More important, it shaped the thinking and actions of the future Reagan 

Administration. Though the conclusions put forward remain controversial, the basic “Team 

B” approach of an independent outside assessment has become an accepted analytic tool. 

Commissioned By 

The Director of Central Intelligence, on behalf of the President’s Foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To provide an independent examination of the data that go into the preparation of the 

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and on that basis determine whether or not Soviet 

strategic objectives are more ambitious than they appear to the authors of the NIEs. The 

report focuses on Soviets intentions not simply a review of their technical capability. 

Timeframe Examined 

The focus of the report is the set of NIEs from 1962-1975. There are also references to the 

beginnings of the Soviet state in 1917 and the beginning of the Soviet nuclear era in 1949. 

Prevailing Context 

On the one hand, the early to mid-1970s were the era of U.S.-Soviet détente. This period 

included summits between President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev 

and later between President Gerald Ford and Brezhnev. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 

Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) Interim Agreement were signed and 

entered into force in 1972. The 1975 Vladivostok Accord appeared to augur further 

strategic arms limitations. On the other hand, there was a strong – if minority – U.S. 

opposition to this process of détente as well as to the nuclear arms control process. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 60 WMD FORECASTING 

Conservative critics from both parties argued that the Soviet Union was gaining unilateral 

advantage and was seeking strategic nuclear superiority. 

Methodology: “Team B” – Historical Analysis-Expert Judgment 

These individuals were established intentionally to provide a “Team B” assessment of Soviet 

strategic intentions. Drawing on qualitative insights and professional expertise on the Soviet 

Union, the team of analysts performed two tasks: first, the authors re-examine the data 

gathered for the 1962-1975 NIEs with a focus on why certain data (quantitative and 

technical) was emphasized in those reports and other information (human intelligence and 

other “soft” data) was not included. To do this, they critically analyzed ten NIE reports and 

other drafts section by section. The authors offer their own assessment of Soviet strategic 

objectives, based on their wider view of Soviet history and intelligence, a view that was 

incorporated in to the original NIEs. Their approach was not unique. It was intended to 

address what the authors saw as a perceived shortcoming in the NIEs – too little attention to 

the role of Soviet strategic objectives in formulation of broader Soviet strategy. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The main finding is that analyses of Soviet behavior in the NIE report were seriously flawed 

for two reasons. First, the NIE’s “mirror-imaged” when determining Soviet strategic 

intentions – assuming that Soviet political, economic and military intentions were the same 

as (or mirror-images of) U.S. intentions. Second, the NIE was focused on “hard” data such 

as technical assessments and generally excluded “soft” data like human intelligence and 

judgments based on the broader political background of Soviet behavior. The authors then 

formulated their own estimate of Soviet strategic objectives: 

 Soviet “Grand Strategy”: Available political, economic, and military evidence 

pointed to a Soviet desire for hegemony. The Soviet Union sought to both 

weaken Western capitalism and strengthen Soviet socialism. 

 Soviet Military Strategic Objectives: The Soviet Union was striving for effective, 

strategic superiority in all branches of the military, including nuclear forces. 

Further, Soviet leaders were not concerned with Western ideas of “mutually 

assured destruction,” but were instead concerned with “war fighting” and “war 

winning” capabilities. With this in mind, efforts like détente and the SALT arms 

control process were not seen by the Soviets as cooperative efforts, but rather as 

means of competing more effectively with the United States. 

 
Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: 

Soviet Strategic Objectives – An Alternative View 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 61 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

This is difficult to judge because the goals and strategies of the former Soviet Union remain 

controversial to this day. Moreover, specific Soviet military and technical choices of that era 

also are subject to differing interpretations, e.g., the steady expansion of its nuclear posture, 

its investment in “heavy” missiles – each capable of carrying a large numbers of nuclear 

warheads, and shortly afterwards, its deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in 

Eastern Europe. 

At the same time, other Soviet actions of the time lend credence to this more skeptical 

assessment of Soviet goals, not least the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, 

some evidence that has come to light in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union 

can be cited in support of the “Team B” assessment, including the fact that not until after 

the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant accident did the Soviet military leadership fully accept that 

a nuclear war cannot be won. Suffice it to conclude that at the least, the Team B report’s 

assessment stands as a valuable counter-point to the more optimistic assessment at the time 

of Soviet goals. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The methodology relied on qualitative judgment and professional expertise to examine 

various data sources and past documents. Given the authors’ backgrounds and previous 

writings – and their task of reassessing previous NIEs – they had an acknowledged 

inclination to second-guess earlier assessments. From another perspective, however, it is 

less a question of what the “Team B” assessment “got right” or “got wrong” than whether it 

served its purpose of challenging the assumptions and analysis of past NIE’s on Soviet goals 

and policies. For that purpose, use of a set of outsiders would have been essential. 

 

This type of “Team B” analysis can be readily replicated in other instances as a means to 

examine established assumptions, cause analysts to reassess data from different perspectives, 

and most of all, challenge long-standing analytic mindsets. Such “Team B” analysis, 

however, cannot replace ongoing efforts to implement a balanced approach. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led 

decision-makers to take notice of it? 

Substantively, the “Team B” assessment contributed to an ongoing debate in the late 1970s 

about Soviet goals and intentions. Its arguments appeared to have been partly validated by 

the Soviet 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. It also directly fed into the conceptual thinking and 

assumptions of the Reagan Administration. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 62 WMD FORECASTING 

Analytically, the “Team B” assessment provided a continuing example of the use of 

outsiders to carry out an independent assessment of a tough issue. As such, the “Team B” 

methodology was re-used in the ensuing decades, sometimes informally and sometimes more 

formally as in the 1998 assessment of the ballistic missile threat carried out by former 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The “Team B” assessment directly influenced the thinking and actions of the Reagan 

Administration. Several of its authors directly advised that Administration, including 

President Reagan himself. As such, their arguments contributed to new U.S. initiatives to 

confront the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, to buttress U.S. strategic and other military 

capabilities, and to resist Soviet power in Europe and globally. Taken alone, this greater 

American readiness to confront Moscow’s ambitions would not have sufficed to bring about 

the changes that led to the eventual end of the Cold War. Political change in the Soviet 

Union with the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev (seeking to reform Soviet communism) 

and the role of U.S. Presidential leadership (in President Reagan’s commitment to working 

with Gorbachev) were also critical to the eventual outcome. 
Swords from Plowshares – 

The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 63 

Swords from Plowshares – The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy 

Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Rowen, eds. 

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979 

Overview 

The core of this study uses a trends analysis methodology to extrapolate future global use of 

nuclear energy, accessibility of stockpiles of fissile material, and resultant dangers of 

widespread proliferation. Focused on the 1980s and 1990s, it forecasts a growing danger of 

widespread proliferation arising out of a projected spread of civilian nuclear energy and 

fissile material to 40 plus states. Its projections were confounded by a radical and 

unanticipated shift away from nuclear energy that ensued in the decade after its publication, 

not least due to the occurrence of two wild card events – the nuclear power plant accidents 

at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. As nuclear power gains credibility as a critical energy 

source, the study’s concerns warrant attention and international policy actions. In that 

regard, this study typifies the fact that some forecasts may be proven wrong for their 

particular time and place but may eventually warrant renewed attention. 

Date 

1979 – Based on earlier report “Life in a Nuclear-Armed Crowd” undertaken in 1975 for the 

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Authors 

Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A. Brown, Gregory S. Jones, David McGarvey, Henry Rowen, 

Vince Taylor, Roberta Wohlstetter. 

Commissioned By 

This book stemmed from an earlier report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency in 1975. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The authors intended to raise questions for policy makers about the spread of civilian 

nuclear technology and how that technology may contribute to the spread of nuclear 

weapons. 

Timeframe Examined 

The future of proliferation from 1975 onward, with forecasts for 1985 and 1990. 

Prevailing Context 

India’s 1974 nuclear test had created growing concern among U.S. officials that a secondwave of nuclear proliferation was about to commence. There were many reasons for this 

concern. West Germany appeared prepared in 1975 to sell Brazil a full nuclear fuel cycle. 

France’s proposed 1975 sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan – as well as that country’s 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 64 WMD FORECASTING 

pursuit of nuclear weapons – intensified this concern. Though ultimately these deals did not 

go forward, there remained uncertainty about whether the newly-created (1977) Nuclear 

Suppliers’ Group would be able to contain the spread of sensitive technologies around the 

globe. In turn, South Africa’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was commencing, while in Asia 

both Taiwan and South Korea had initiated nuclear weapons programs only to be forced by 

U.S. pressures to give them up. Not least, there was a strong belief yet again that the 1980s 

and 1990s would witness a steady and unabated expansion of the use of nuclear energy 

around the globe. There was intense debate in the United States and overseas about whether 

that expansion would include widespread reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to separate out 

the plutonium for either recycling in light-water reactors or use in breeder reactors. 

Methodology: Trends Analysis-Quantitative Analysis 

The primary methodologies are trends analysis and quantitative modeling. The former is 

used to develop projections for the global use of nuclear energy. The latter is relied on to 

develop forecasts of the possible future stockpiles of fissile material countries and these 

countries’ resultant potential to produce nuclear weapons. The authors also perform 

quantitative modeling is done of the economics of nuclear energy – examining various 

aspects of building and maintaining nuclear power as opposed to reliance on fossil fuels and 

other sources of energy. Linkages between civilian nuclear technologies and weapons 

production are described. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Drivers of Future Proliferation 

The main projection – and the core of the study’s argument – relates to the future 

production and accessibility of fissile material around the globe. The authors predicted that 

by 1985, forty states would have enough fissile material from their civilian nuclear energy 

programs to make three or more nuclear weapons. As a result, the study argues that while 

there was a linear trend of slow proliferation growth from 1945 to 1974, the Indian nuclear 

test in 1974 likely marked a turning point. Henceforth, the spread of fissile material – or 

what they call the “nuclear overhang” could lead to the exponential growth of nuclear 

weapons states. 

In addition, the study finds that this trend toward a global spread of civilian nuclear 

technology will result in a proliferation of sources of supply. Thus, it will become much 

more difficult to restrict access to specific nuclear weapons or dual-use technologies. A 

single state or small group of states – typified by the Nuclear Suppliers Group – will not 

have the same power to deny access as they did before the spread of civilian nuclear energy. 

Nuclear Instabilities and Risks 

In a confrontation between a large nuclear state and a small nuclear state, the large state 

would have the ability to destroy the small state but the small state would not have the ability 

to destroy the large state. Nonetheless, the smaller state may have slightly increased 

bargaining power but not to a significant degree. The study conditions this judgment by 
Swords from Plowshares – 

The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 65 

noting that very rarely do two states deal with each other in a vacuum – there are almost 

always other states involved in alliances or negotiations. 

Nuclear arms racing can be the result of proliferation involving two “lesser powers” such as 

China and India, India and Pakistan, or Iran and Iraq. In these cases, a nuclear arms race 

could lead to great instability regionally. 

As thirty or forty states come into possession of fissile material, more proliferation will occur. 

The result likely will be instability in the international system as states compete with each 

other. Nuclear accidents and dangerous alliances will become more likely. In turn, the 

continuing spread of materials – and potentially weapons – could lead to attack with nuclear 

weapons by an extra-governmental group, e.g., a radical group taking over in a coup d’état. 

Over time, the taboo against possessing and using nuclear weapons will weaken. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

The Spread of Fissile Material 

The study’s main forecast was that an exponential growth of civilian nuclear energy use 

would lead first to widespread stockpiles of readily accessible fissile material and then to 

more nuclear weapons states. 

Comment: This forecast proved wrong during the timeframe of the study. By the early 

1990s, there had not been an exponential growth in the use of nuclear energy or the 

presence of separated fissile material. Moreover, the number of nuclear weapons states or 

countries pursuing nuclear weapons remained much the same as what it had been in 1979. 

(See below for a discussion of what confounded the study’s prediction of a global trend 

toward nuclear energy use and separation of fissile material during the 1980s and 1990s.) 

However, the world appears to be facing a similar turning point at present (in 2008): as in 

1979, global energy consumption is rising incredibly quickly, projections are being made of 

many states turning to nuclear energy to fill the gap in their energy supply, and it remains to 

be determined whether it will be possible to avoid the spread of national enrichment and 

reprocessing capabilities as well as stockpiles of separated fissile materials. 

Difficulties Restricting Supply 

The study projected that the spread of civilian nuclear technology would make restricting 

access to nuclear or dual-use technologies much more difficult. 

Comment: Nuclear suppliers’ cooperation was steadily strengthened over the two decades 

after the study. The Nuclear Suppliers Group lists were strengthened and there were no 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 66 WMD FORECASTING 

further offers to sell sensitive technologies. Covert access to sensitive technology and gray 

market supply was a challenge – but one that was not linked to a global spread of civilian 

nuclear activities. Indeed, the most serious challenge during this period – and now – to 

controlling the spread of nuclear technology – the A.Q. Khan supply network – had little to 

do with civilian nuclear energy use. A.Q. Khan came out of the Pakistan nuclear weapons 

program. (Nonetheless, from today’s vantage point, as more countries come to use nuclear 

energy, there will be more potential sources for gray market or illicit supply. Even here, 

however, the issue remains of whether new international efforts to meet that challenge under 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 will be successfully implemented or not.) 

Nuclear Instabilities 

As predicted, an emerging nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan in the 1990s 

arguably led to greater instability in that region. But so far, nuclear accidents have been 

avoided and the taboo against using nuclear weapons is still intact – even if the taboo against 

possessing nuclear weapons has seemingly weakened. In turn, concern has increased about 

possible terrorist or rogue regime use of a nuclear weapon, not least given the combination 

of fundamentalist terrorism and unrest in a nuclear-armed state such as Pakistan. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The methodology of extrapolating trends directly led to the study’s exaggerated forecast of 

future global use of nuclear energy and stockpiles of fissile material for the period in 

question (1980s and 1990s) – the key steps to its forecast of a great danger of more 

widespread proliferation. That extrapolation, however, was undermined by a number of 

factors: the very changing economics of nuclear energy use that the study highlighted, the 

technical difficulties of recycling plutonium or developing breeder reactors, heightened 

domestic opposition in many countries to nuclear energy use on multiple grounds, the 

success of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and U.S. efforts to buttress nuclear export controls, 

and not least two critical wild cards – nuclear power plant accidents first at Three Mile Island 

(1979) and Chernobyl (1986). Nonetheless, as the possibility of growing use of nuclear 

energy again looms on the horizon, the dangers forecast by the study will need to be 

addressed yet again. 

 

Trends analysis can readily be replicated as part of an overall forecast of proliferation futures. 

As with this study, it risks being confounded by future events that may or may not be 

foreseeable. 
Swords from Plowshares – 

The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 67 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led 

decision-makers to take notice of it? 

Undertaken for the Director of ACDA (Dr. Fred Ikle), the initial study – “Life in a NuclearArmed Crowd” – directly contributed to the Carter Administration’s policies. In particular, 

along with several other analyses, the study provided the conceptual basis for the U.S. 

initiative to encourage other countries not to use plutonium as part of their nuclear energy 

programs in what was called the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). This 

study also reinforced the U.S. policy commitment to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 

with its commitment that suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfers of sensitive 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The Carter Administration’s efforts to influence other countries’ nuclear energy choices 

consistent with the study’s assessments proved unsuccessful. Instead, the external factors 

noted above played the greatest role in leading to much less global use of nuclear energy – 

and thus, less access to fissile materials – than this study forecast. Most of all, the wild cards 

of nuclear energy accidents played a key part. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 68 WMD FORECASTING 
 The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 69 

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation 

Stephen M. Meyer 

University of Chicago Press, 1984 

Overview 

This book develops and applies a quantitative model to forecast future proliferation risk. To 

do so, the author identifies and defines three risk factors – time lag (to a first nuclear 

weapon), nuclear propensity (reflecting the interaction of technical and motivational factors), 

and salience (impact on regional stability and conflict). For a set of 36 countries known to 

have had an interest in seeking nuclear weapons, a Delphi method of surveying experts is 

used to rank the risk factors. This approach provides a useful way of summarizing 

considerable data in a proliferation risk factor index and then comparing different countries. 

However, in contrast to the more traditional country case study methodology, the Delphi 

method may sometimes result in experts with only limited knowledge of one or more 

countries ranking that country in terms of the factors identified. As a result particular 

rankings may be either underestimated or overestimated. Domestic political, economic, 

bureaucratic, and cultural “internal” factors also are not broken out as a separate risk factor, 

though these have since proven very important in proliferation decision-making. 

Purpose and Objectives 

According to the author, this book undertakes a rigorous and systematic examination of the 

assumptions and contending hypotheses that constitute contemporary thinking on nuclear 

proliferation. According to the author, his objective is to develop a better picture by using 

the various schools of thought as analytical windows. He hopes that a better understanding 

of how the proliferation process operates will offer better guidance for predicting future 

nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, for controlling it. 

Timeframe Examined 

1982 – 1987 (five years) 

Prevailing Context 

The Meyer Study was carried out in a period from the mid-1970s into the early 1980s of 

sustained controversy among experts and officials about the causes of proliferation. Two 

contending schools had emerged: one emphasized the role of technology in pushing 

proliferation; the other emphasized the role of incentives in pulling countries toward the 

bomb. This period was also characterized by major shifts in U.S. policies, exemplified by the 

passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (which set out tougher standards for U.S. 

peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries) as well as by the Carter Administration’s 

proposed international evaluation of nuclear fuel cycle alternatives and then by the efforts of 

the Reagan Administration to modify restraints on such cooperation. On the international 

front, the Reagan Administration was moving to confront the Soviet Union after its invasion 

of Afghanistan, while Pakistan was continuing to advance toward nuclear weapons. In May 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 70 WMD FORECASTING 

1981, Israel bombed an Iraqi research reactor intended by Saddam Hussein to be part of 

Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. 

Methodology: Quantitative Modeling with Delphi Method Inputs 

The author develops a formal quantitative forecasting model to help determine the relative 

likelihood (or risk) that countries will make proliferation decisions and subsequently acquire 

nuclear weapons within a fixed time frame. Three risk factors are defined and then used in 

this model: nuclear propensity, proliferation salience, and time lag. These three factors are defined 

as follows: 

Lag Time 

The amount of time required after a proliferation decision is made to produce the first 

nuclear weapon: 

1. Short: takes a short amount of time (possibly within one year). 

2. Moderate: takes more time (up to four years). “There is some ‘breathing room’ 

between a proliferation decision and the initial output of nuclear weapons.” 

3. Long: takes longer (longer than six years). 

Nuclear Propensity

The dynamic convergence between technical and motivational factors that lead a country to 

develop nuclear weapons: 1 

1. Strong: may lead a country to make a decision to proliferate. 

2. Moderate: may cause a country to develop a nuclear option building. 

3. Weak: may not cause nuclear proliferation to become a serious policy issue. 

Salience

The expected impact on regional stability and conflict and on further proliferation: 

1. High: has a great affect on regional stability and will probably cause further 

proliferation. 

2. Moderate: has an affect on regional stability, but may or may not cause further 

proliferation. 

3. Weak – may affect regional stability and follows all proliferation norms. 

For each of 36 countries known to have had interest in developing nuclear weapons at some 

time, the author assigns numerical values to each factor. This allows the creation of a 

country-specific risk factor index comprised of that country’s score on each of these three 

separate factors. In scoring each country, the study relies partly on an expert judgment 

Delphi methodology to judge proliferation salience in light of specific criteria identified by 

 

1 A strong nuclear propensity – or perhaps even a moderate nuclear propensity – is sufficient to motivate a 

government to dedicate resources specifically to acquiring a latent capacity; that is, to make a capability 

decision. Once a latent capacity is acquired, and should strong motivations persist, a proliferation decision – 

an explicit decision to proceed with nuclear weapons development and production – should follow.
 The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 71 

the author. Rankings are from 1-3 with a “1” in lag time indicating the “shortest”, a “1” in 

nuclear propensity indicating the “highest”, and a “1” in salience indicating the “highest”. 

Further, the methodology also highlights the convergence between the technical and political 

aspects of the nuclear proliferation process – rather than focusing on either aspect to the 

exclusion or detriment of the other. Based on the country indices, the study goes on to 

explore categories of technical-motivational interaction. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Impacts of Proliferation:

In terms of salience, the consequences of proliferation could be seriously destabilizing in 64 

percent of the cases examined. Proliferation decisions by Japan, the Federal Republic of 

Germany, Israel, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea, 

and Cuba would have high salience. Decisions by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, German 

Democratic Republic, Greece, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, and 

Yugoslavia would have moderate salience. 

Time to the Bomb 

In terms of lag time the author finds that 58 percent of the 36 countries examined could be 

producing nuclear weapons within four to five years of his writing. In particular, Argentina, 

Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, South 

Africa, and Spain have short lag times, and Austria, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, German 

Democratic Republic, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have 

moderate time lag. 

Nuclear Propensity 

In terms of nuclear propensity, about thirty percent of the countries examined “seem to have 

some interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.” Specifically, six countries including South 

Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Algeria have a high propensity to proliferation. 

Five of the 36 have a moderate propensity to proliferate. These include Japan, Taiwan, South 

Korea, Egypt, and Nigeria. 

 

Country Specific Assessments (in alphabetic order) 

The table below summarizes the country assessments. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 72 WMD FORECASTING 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

Overall, the study’s assessment of proliferation risk for different countries proved accurate. 

However, there were several cases in which it either underestimated or overestimated 

particular rankings: 

In addition, there are a number of other country-specific judgments that warrant mention: 

Argentina (Risk Factor Index – 1-1-2) 

“. . . the convergence of motivation with the capability implicit in Argentina’s advanced 

nuclear infrastructure should see a proliferation decision followed by a first Argentine 

nuclear weapon operational within several years of such a decision.” 

Comment: Argentina’s program moved more slowly than suggested both in terms of 

political commitment and technical advances. 

Belgium (Risk Factor Index – 1-3-3) 

Comment: Focusing only on Belgium’s civilian nuclear program may result in an 

overestimate of its technical capabilities. 

Country/Risk 

Factor Index 

Short 

Lag time 

(1 = 

shortest) 

Nuclear 

Propensity 

(1 = 

highest) 

Salience 

(1 = 

highest) 

Country/ 

Risk Factor 

Index 

Short 

Lag time 

(1 = 

shortest) 

Nuclear 

Propensity 

(1 = 

highest) 

Salience 

(1 = 

highest) 

Algeria 3 1 2 Italy 1 3 3 

Argentina 1 1 2 Japan 1 3 1 

Australia 3 3 3 Libya 3 1 1 

Austria 2 3 3 Mexico 3 3 2 

Belgium 1 3 3 Netherlands 1 3 3 

Brazil 2 3 2 Nigeria 3 2 2 

Canada 1 3 3 North Korea 3 3 1 

Chile 3 3 2 Norway 2 3 2 

Cuba 3 3 1 Pakistan 2 1 1 

Czechoslovakia 2 3 3 South Africa 1 1 2 

Egypt 3 2 1 South Korea 2 2 2 

FRG 1 3 1 Spain 1 3 3 

Finland 3 3 3 Sweden 2 3 3 

GDR 2 3 2 Switzerland 2 3 3 

Greece 2 3 2 Taiwan 2 2 2 

Iran 3 1 1 Turkey 3 3 2 

Iraq 3 1 1 Yugoslavia 2 3 2 

Israel 1 1 1 
 The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 73 

Brazil (Risk Factor Index – 2-3-2) 

Brazil’s nuclear propensity is seen to suggest no serious interest in nuclear weaponry during 

the assessment period, but that country could be pushed to seek nuclear weapons were 

Argentina to do so. 

Comment: Later public revelations showed that Brazil was more actively pursuing nuclear 

weapons capability at this point in time compared to Argentina. 

Netherlands (Risk Factor Index – 1-3-1) 

Very short lead time but little likelihood for shift to a higher propensity in the near term. 

Comment: Again, focus on civilian nuclear infrastructure results in overestimation of 

technical capabilities. 

North Korea (Risk Factor Index – 3-3-1) 

Comment: A major misestimate in terms of nuclear propensity since North Korea was in the 

midst of a nuclear weapons program at this point in time. Accurate assessment of how long 

it would take, though even there, external constraints may have played a role. 

Romania (Risk Factor Index – 3-3-3) 

Comment: Revelations after the collapse of the regime suggested that Romania may have 

had a higher nuclear propensity than suggested. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The methodology entailed a quantitative model (with scoring for three proliferation risk 

factors) combined with use of a Delphi method of surveying analysts to determine specific 

ranking. The resulting risk factor index was a useful way to summarize and display analysts’ 

assessments. Three possible ways that the methodology may have shaped the results warrant 

mention: 

 First, reliance on a Delphi method depended on the detailed knowledge about 

many countries of the experts surveyed – and on the author’s own knowledge of 

the full set of countries. But outside experts frequently have only partial 

knowledge of some specific countries and often are reluctant when asked to 

make a ranking judgment not to do so. Use of multiple analysts may sometimes 

neutralize that factor but not always. Use of the Delphi model may have resulted, 

therefore, in the study’s underestimating of the nuclear propensity of several 

important countries. 

 Second, the model’s “lag time” index may have relied too heavily on status of 

peaceful nuclear activities as an indicator of how quickly a country could obtain a 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 74 WMD FORECASTING 

nuclear weapon, underestimating the difficulty of weaponization activities even 

after possession of fissile material. 

 Third, the model did not take into account either domestic political changes, 

economic orientation, or unanticipated “wild cards”. In the latter case, this is not 

surprising given the difficulties of projecting such developments in advance let 

alone quantifying them. In contrast, domestic political support or constraints on 

proliferation are sufficiently important and might have been added as another 

explicit risk factor. By way of example, domestic political changes in Argentina, 

Brazil, and South Africa all contributed to shifts downward in nuclear propensity. 

More recently, economic orientation – whether a country’s leaders are committed 

to an outward looking, globalist economic policy – has been identified as another 

factor shaping proliferation decisions. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led 

decision-makers to take notice of it? 

There is no evidence that the study directly shaped U.S. proliferation decision-making in the 

mid to late 1980s. However, its emphasis on the need to focus on the interaction of 

technical and political factors likely contributed to a more general broadening of how experts 

and officials though about proliferation dynamics. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

The study itself did not influence policy. However, U.S. and other countries’ policy efforts 

did make it harder for some countries, e.g., both Argentina and Brazil, to move toward 

nuclear weapons. 
The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: 

 Balance of Incentives and Constraints 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 75 

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: 

Balance of Incentives and Constraints 

In Memorandum 85-10001 

National Intelligence Council, 1985 

Overview 

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) memorandum’s methodology combines an 

historical assessment of prior National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) to identify lessons 

learned with country assessments. Looking back to the 1960-1980 period, it identifies a 

series of limitations of past reports. Most broadly, it noted that earlier fears of very 

widespread proliferation had proven to be unfounded. Those fears reflected a number of 

analytic judgments, including giving too much importance to technical developments, 

overestimating the spread of nuclear energy, and thinking in terms of a proliferation domino 

effects theory. Actions by the United States and other countries, such as creation of the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as the growth of a norm of nonproliferation, were also seen 

as having contributed to negation of more pessimistic forecasts. Looking ahead in light of 

the lessons of past studies, the NIC memorandum emphasized that countries would be 

reluctant to deploy nuclear weapons openly, which was one feature of proliferation for over 

the next decade. It also highlighted the importance of internal political-cultural factors in 

exploring the possible pursuit of nuclear weapons by more xenophobic regimes. Technical 

forecasting continued, however, to prove difficult. The NIC memorandum appears to have 

underestimated technical advances in Brazil, North Korea, and Iraq. Unless not mentioned 

for reasons of classification level, this memorandum appears to have missed what would be 

one of the most important proliferation wild cards from the mid-1980s onward – the 

emergence of the non-state actor A.Q. Khan proliferation network. 

Purpose and Objectives 

This study is a historical critique of NIE accuracy in predicting proliferation trends. It 

analyzes proliferation decision-making over the preceding twenty years to assess the balance 

of incentives and disincentives to proliferation. It also points out significant events that may 

have been influential in nonproliferation efforts. 

Timeframe Examined 

1960 to 1980 (twenty years). Future predictions extended for five and ten years from the 

time of the study, from 1990-1995. 

Prevailing Context 

In the Cold War context, the United States was actively engaged in covert activities to 

support the Mujahideen forces that eventually would force the withdrawal of the Soviet 

Union from Afghanistan. U.S.-Soviet relations were tense, following the successful U.S. 

deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing missiles to Europe and the Soviet walk-out from 

nuclear arms control talks. In terms of proliferation, Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 76 WMD FORECASTING 

program continued to advance, while India tested a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 

1974. In 1981, Israel bombed the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq. North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons program had only recently become a major focus of U.S. nonproliferation policies. 

Methodology: Historical Assessment (Lessons Learned)-Country Case Studies 

This study is a historical analysis in which the authors critically evaluate earlier National 

Intelligence Estimates and relevant papers on proliferation to assess whether or not past 

predictions have withstood the test of time. The authors propose their own 

predictions/projections based on lessons learned from the past. In so doing, they focus on a 

wider set of multiple variables, explicitly criticizing both the technology push and the 

proliferation chains concepts. Domestic political-economic-cultural-regime factors are 

explicitly considered. This assessment also took into account the impact of changes in the 

overall regime that had been partly animated by past fears of more widespread proliferation, 

e.g., the impact of nuclear suppliers’ restrictions on transfers of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 

components and facilities. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Judgments on Past NIE Assessments

The 1985 NIC assessment argues that past NIE reports all had certain weaknesses or 

limitations. Specifically, past reports: 

 Were too fearful of additional overt proliferation, with no other country overtly 

deploying nuclear weapons since China’s 1964 nuclear test; 

 Gave as much importance to technical capability as to the political, security, and 

economic situations, often overemphasizing the extent to which technical 

capability and expertise will drive nuclear proliferation; 

 Frequently referred to proliferation as being a result of a domino effect theory, 

resulting in a exaggerated concern about the inevitability of proliferation; 

 Did not sufficiently analyze the implications of important proliferation events or 

shocks such as the Indian 1974 nuclear test; and, 

 Did not have a clear definition of proliferation. 

At the same time, the NIC assessment notes that past NIE reports also accurately assessed 

the status of nuclear weapons programs in Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea. The 

NIC assessment further notes that earlier assessments could not take into account the 

impact of various changes in global nonproliferation efforts over the period from 1960-1990, 

some of which were encouraged by the more pessimistic earlier forecasts, e.g., U.S.-NATO 

nuclear burden sharing, negotiation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT), and the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: 

 Balance of Incentives and Constraints 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 77 

Country-Specific Forecasts 

Pakistan 

The 1985 NIC assessment argues that Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the greatest 

concern in terms of U.S. interests. The study assesses that Pakistan’s nuclear decisions will 

continue to be shaped by its continuing insecurity vis-à-vis India as well as its security 

relations with the United States. The report noted that the United States could cut off 

military and economic aid to Pakistan which would harm U.S.-Pakistan relations. It was 

presumed that Pakistan would be the first country since China to deploy nuclear weapons 

openly. 

Comment: Ultimately, any leverage provided by Pakistani concerns about a cutoff of U.S. 

assistance proved too limited to influence Pakistan’s steady advance to nuclear weapons. 

India 

The scope of India’s future program (and whether India conducts a nuclear test) will be 

shaped by India’s relationship with China. If that relationship continues to deteriorate, it 

could impel India to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. 

Comment: India’s 1998 decision to test a nuclear weapon had less to do with China than 

with pursuit of status and prestige. 

South Africa & Israel 

The study assess that there exists no security situation that would cause South Africa and 

Israel to declare their weapons programs. 

Comment: As events played out, South Africa did declare its nuclear program in 1991 but 

only to give it up. Israel has continued not to declare its nuclear capabilities. 

Argentina & Brazil 

The authors predict that Argentina will not be able to complete its reprocessing plant but 

will operate its uranium enrichment plant. Nationalism will be the main motivating factor. 

If a xenophobic regime takes power in Argentina, it could decide to acquire nuclear weapons 

as a reaction to its political isolation from the rest of the world. Brazil is assessed to be many 

years away from producing unsafeguarded plutonium. 

Comment: The assessment may have underestimated Brazil’s parallel nuclear weapons 

program which was later publicly revealed by new civilian leaders in Brazil. 

Iran, Iraq and Libya 

The authors state that Iraq and Iran have interests in a nuclear program with safeguards. It 

would, however, take at least 10 years to develop nuclear facilities that could develop a 

weapon. Libya’s Qaddafi might try to buy or steal weapons but there is a low chance that 
Section II 

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I I - 78 WMD FORECASTING 

he will obtain the needed assistance from the Soviets or Western Europe for a weapons 

program. 

Comment: Though correct for Iran, this estimate may have underestimated the eventual 

scope and pace of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. Its emphasis on 

government assistance to Libya overlooked the wild card of assistance from an individual 

non-state entity such as would soon be the case with A.Q. Khan’s supply activities from the 

later 1980s onward. 

North Korea 

The authors judge that North Korea’s research reactor will be able to produce significant 

quantities of plutonium by 1990. They also conclude that North Korea lacks a capability to 

reprocess the spent fuel from this reactor. The influence of the U.S.S.R. and China on 

North Korea is seen to be limited. 

Comment: This assessment underestimated North Korea’s technical capabilities because it 

succeeded in building a reprocessing plant only some years later. 

South Korea 

South Korea might build a weapons program in response to North Korean actions. The 

credibility of U.S. security commitments would be pivotal in persuading South Korea not to 

do so. 

Comment: An accurate assessment, though South Korea has proved more ready not to 

overreact to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons than anticipated. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

Process of Proliferation – 1960-1980 

In contrast to predictions made in the NIE reports, proliferation remained in check from 

1960-1980. A number of changes contributed to that outcome, reflecting the fact that 

proliferation supply and demand, incentives and disincentives have altered. 

The NIC memorandum noted that U.S. security alliances and economic incentives have 

successfully influenced states’ nuclear weapons programs. Taiwan and South Korea are 

both cited as showing the benefits of giving up a nuclear weapons program in exchange for 

security ties with the U.S. 

In turn, nuclear technology export controls and nuclear suppliers’ cooperation were seen by 

the NIC memorandum as having successfully restricted access to sensitive items that could 

lead to proliferation. This has enhanced disincentives and created delays in proliferation. In 

particular, transfers of reprocessing or enrichment technology did not occur, forcing states 

to build their own plants at a higher cost. Most suppliers of nuclear technology voluntarily 
The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: 

 Balance of Incentives and Constraints 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 79 

put their exports under IAEA safeguards. Still other delays have resulted from the growth of 

an international norm against proliferation. 

With regard to past fears that widespread use of nuclear power would give a growing 

number of countries access to fissile material, the NIC memorandum noted that economic 

conditions have slowed the spread of nuclear power to third world countries. Their 

economies are nearly incapable of providing the large budget demanded by nuclear power 

programs. The 1980s economic slump in many third world countries also forced many 

countries to borrow from international financial institutions. These debts were seen to have 

limited the behavior of third world leaders who want to remain in good standing with 

nonproliferation regime in order to have access to the international financial system. 

In addition, the assessment judged that domestic interest groups are increasingly competing 

for control of nuclear technology and decision-making. Decisions are no longer in the realm 

of the privileged few. A social taboo also has emerged against nuclear technology, both for 

peaceful purposes, as well as for military use. 

Future of the Nonproliferation Regime 

The assessment forecasts that the international nonproliferation regime can withstand 

isolated instances of proliferation. This is particularly so if there is ambiguity about the 

status of a country’s activities, as in the case of Israel. The NIC also projects that the nuclear 

suppliers will continue to cooperate, strengthening their controls on sensitive fuel cycle 

exports rather than being prepared to provide such exports under IAEA safeguards. Thus, it 

concludes that the nuclear status quo should not be threatened in the next ten years. 

The memorandum also judged that nonproliferation norms would continue to become 

stronger and nonproliferation standards would become harder to breach. It also envisioned, 

however, a continuing spread of nuclear-related technology over the period from 1990-1995. 

Among possible threats to the nonproliferation regime, the NIC memorandum discussed the 

spread of technology to states that are not capable of protecting and securing sensitive 

materials. It also warned of the impacts of a possible decline of U.S. and U.S.S.R. support of 

nonproliferation efforts. That said, it expected that the United States and the Soviet Union 

would do everything in their power to prevent their allies from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study have withstood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which 

aspects have not? 

On balance, the nonproliferation regime did prove very resilient, absorbing Pakistan’s 

acquisition of nuclear weapons as well as North Korea’s continuing pursuit of such weapons 

in the timeframe under discussion. International nonproliferation norms also continued to 
Section II 

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I I - 80 WMD FORECASTING 

become stronger, reflected not least in the moves away from nuclear weapons by Argentina 

and Brazil as well as by South Africa. Strengthened norms also contributed to the decisions 

by three former Soviet states – Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan – to give up former Soviet 

nuclear weapons stationed on their territories and to become non-nuclear NPT states. 

As noted above, however, the NIC memorandum underestimated the technical activities of 

both North Korea (reprocessing) and Iraq (pursuit by 1990 of a virtual mini-Manhattan 

Project). 

The memorandum also did not foresee the emergence of the A.Q. Khan network, one of the 

most important proliferation developments in the late 1980s onward. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

Looking back at past historical analyses as a step to forecasting the future proliferation 

environment may have contributed to the memorandum’s correct assessment – at least for 

the time – that the nonproliferation regime was more robust than often assumed. Historical 

warnings of widespread proliferation had been proved overdone. Similarly, that historical 

retrospective provided a good vantage point to see how suppliers’ cooperation had been 

institutionalized and norms of nonproliferation developed. That said, the historical analysis 

of the limits on the spread of nuclear technology which suggested how little had changed 

since China’s bomb – or how slowly capabilities developed – may have partly contributed to 

the underestimation of the capabilities of North Korea and Iraq. 

The method of applying the lessons of historical analysis to understanding a present or 

emerging situation is quite common. In this case, the lessons learned from the earlier 

National Intelligence Estimates appear to have improved this analysis. A lessons learned 

methodology could be replicated as part of other proliferation forecasts. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

The NIC memorandum was an input into ongoing U.S. nonproliferation policy formulation 

in the 1980s. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

U.S. policy intervention did not result in the NIC’s judgments being proved wrong. But 

external developments both validated some of the memorandum’s judgments and disproved 

others. By way of example, facts on the ground later showed that the NIC had 

underestimated North Korea’s ability to develop a reprocessing capability as well as the 

extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons activities. Somewhat differently, the strength of 
The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: 

 Balance of Incentives and Constraints 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 81 

nonproliferation norms was validated by decisions of former Soviet states to give up nuclear 

weapons. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 82 WMD FORECASTING 
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 83 

Missile Proliferation – Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

Washington, D.C. 

Congressional Research Service, 1988 

Overview 

Prepared for the U.S. Congress, this report assesses missile developments in developing 

countries. It partly entails a technical assessment of the characteristics of missiles and their 

warheads. The report also includes country case studies that describe missile programs as 

well as the production and acquisition activities of a set of states. Its purpose was to provide 

background for Congressional members and their staffs on the growing build-up of missile 

arsenals in the developing world and provide policy options curb the build up. With some 

exceptions, its country case studies provided an accurate assessment of broad missile 

proliferation trends. Some countries, however, proved less capable than anticipated in 

advancing their missile programs, while others moved somewhat more rapidly than 

projected. 

Date 

October 3, 1988; revised February 9, 1989 

Commissioned By 

Although not stated, the report was probably commissioned by a Congressional committee 

member staffer. The Congressional Research Services (CRS) works exclusively for the 

Congress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and providing information at the 

request of committees, members, and their staffs. This was an update of CRS Report 87-654 SPR, 

“Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential of Non-Major Military Forces”, August 6, 1987. 

Timeframe Examined 

Current developments, with some 10-year technical projections. 

Prevailing Context 

From the early 1980s, there was growing concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles 

around the globe. The Missile Technology Control Regime had been formally established in 

1987. Within the Congress, Senator Glenn was specifically concerned about Pakistan and its 

nuclear weapons developments. He was also troubled about missile proliferation in Iraq, 

Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Starting in the mid-1980s, the Senate had held hearings regarding 

exports of arms, missiles, and components that could be used for WMD proliferation. China 

had begun exporting its M-Series missiles to Pakistan and possibly other nations, and the 

U.S.S.R. was selling a number of shorter range Scud missiles to potentially belligerent nations. 

The War of the Cities between Iran and Iraq, with each side firing ballistic missiles at the 

other side’s capital, had reached its height in 1988, just prior to Iran’s decision to seek a 

cease-fire with Iraq. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 84 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology: Technical Assessment and Country Case Studies 

The CRS report focuses on missile technology and the production or foreign acquisition of 

missiles by countries other than the members of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and China. The 

report described at length the technologies behind both ballistic and cruise missile systems as 

well as current trends in their development. The technical characteristics also are set out of 

nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads. The report uses open-sources exclusively to 

support its conclusions. This technical assessment was accompanied by a set of country-bycountry descriptions of missile developments of 17 countries in three regions including the 

Middle East and Africa, Asia, and South America. This part of the report assesses the 

indigenous production capabilities of nations and reviews the known and probable cases 

where technical assistance or outright transfers of whole assemblies may have taken place. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

As discussed below, the report assesses the capabilities of nations to development missile 

systems. 

Regional Stability Impacts 

In its assessment of the military and political significance of missile systems, it is argued that 

the high speed of ballistic missiles enables an attacker to strike with little warning and makes 

it very difficult for a defender to destroy incoming missiles. The report projected that as 

countries acquire more powerful rocket motors, they will be able to deliver larger, more 

destructive warheads. Some of the countries investigated in this report had or were 

developing missiles that could carry 1,000 to 2,000 pound warheads. 

The report predicted that newly acquired missile systems would sometimes result in regional 

arms races. Nonetheless, the report judged that the spread of ballistic missiles had not yet 

made drastic shifts in regional military balances nor significantly affected the vulnerability of 

some nations to attack. Several factors were seen to explain this limited impact: counters to 

the systems that had been acquired; the inaccuracy of most systems that have been acquired; 

and the fact that if ballistic missiles in a regional crisis were believed to carry a WMD 

warhead, a major world power would intervene. 

 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study stood the test of time (i.e. came true)? Which aspects have 

not? 

With some exceptions, the study provided an accurate description of missile programs and 

activities around the globe. For instance: 

Brazil 

The study assessed that short-range systems were probably in an advanced stage of 

development but had not been put into production. The development and testing of longer-
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 85 

range missiles was thought probably constrained by the lack of key foreign-made 

components and perhaps by insufficient testing of short-range systems on which bigger 

missiles will be based. 

Comment: Brazil conducted research on short and longer range rockets as a part of its space 

launch program. It also attempted to build its own space launch vehicles and lessons, 

providing it with experience could be used in developing a long-range missile. 

It also was assessed that Brazil could construct an atomic bomb with a crash program in five 

years (from the 1988 publication date of the report). 

Comment: Brazil’s leadership decided instead to shelve its parallel nuclear program and not 

to seek a nuclear weapon capability. 

India 

The study assessed that India’s Agni missile had two stages with a liquid fueled first stage 

and solid fueled second stage. This would provide it a range of 1,500 miles. 

Comment: First tested in 1992, the Agni missile was developed by stacking the shorter 

range liquid fueled Prithvi on top of a solid rocket booster thought to have come from 

India’s developing space launch vehicles (SLV-3). Since then, India has developed variances 

on the Agni to extend its range and payload capability. 

Iran 

The study identified China as the largest supplier of military equipment to Iran with over 600 

million dollars in sales. It posited that China may have provided its own version of the 

Scud-B missiles to Iran and that North Korea may have been transferring missiles to Iran. 

Comment: In fact, since the 1980s, Iran has focused its missile cooperation on relationships 

with China, Russia, and North Korea. 

Iraq 

The study assessed that while Iraq had a growing research and development program, there 

was little reason to believe that it would have the indigenous capability to produce key 

components such as guidance systems, reentry vehicles, or nuclear missile warheads in the 

near future. 

Comment: When United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors visited 

missile and other facilities in Iraq after the first Gulf War, they were surprised at how far 

along the Iraqis had been able to proceed in developing missiles. They noted that Iraq had 

sophisticated equipment and designs that were imported from various Western countries. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 86 WMD FORECASTING 

Pakistan 

The report assessed that there is mounting evidence that Pakistan will possess nuclear 

weapons shortly (in 1988-1989). 

Comment: Open sources suggest that Pakistan probably achieved its nuclear capability in the 

late 1980s into the early 1990s, as indicated by the inability of President George H. Bush to 

certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device (as required by Congressional 

legislation). 

North Korea 

The study judged that North Korea did not possess nuclear weapons and that without 

external assistance it would be unable to produce a nuclear warhead suitable for a missile by 

the turn of the century. 

Comment: Although there was much speculation regarding the amount of plutonium 

available to North Korea to produce a nuclear weapon, North Korea did not test a device 

until 2006. It remains to be seen if the North has been able to miniaturize and adapt a device 

into a warhead to be delivered on a missile. 

South Korea 

The study noted that South Korea had announced that it intended to test-fire a space launch 

vehicle in 1991 and to launch a 1,000-pound satellite into orbit by 1996. By the year 2001, 

its goal was to build a sophisticated space launcher and telecommunication satellites. If 

South Korea achieves these goals, it would probably be able to produce long-range ballistic 

missiles as well. 

Comment: South Korea has yet to build and/or launch a space launch vehicle. Under its 

revised plans to launch a vehicle by the end of 2007 or early 2008, South Korea has been 

working with Russian companies to construct a launch platform. 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The authors used a straight forward technical reporting methodology for assessing the 

missile developments of the target nations. The report is focused mainly on indigenous 

production capabilities and foreign assistance. This methodology is standard for this type of 

reporting. The report does not consider the geopolitical interplay (both internal and external) 

that both motivates and constrains a country in developing missiles. 
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 87 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decision 

makers to take notice of it? 

The report probably provided useful background to Congressional staffs in addressing 

missile proliferation issues. More direct impacts are unknown. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

Policy efforts to slow the spread of ballistic missiles proved at best partly successful. The 

Argentine Condor program was shut down, for example, but China continued supplying 

Pakistan and Iran with missiles. North Korea also emerged as a major missile supplier, 

accelerating missile proliferation. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 88 WMD FORECASTING 
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 89 

Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: 

The Storm After the Lull 

Leonard Spector 

In New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third 

World 

Aspen Strategy Group Report, 1990 

Overview 

Using a country case study methodology, this assessment depicted an expanding nuclear 

threat stemming from threshold states’ movement to acquire nuclear weapons and efforts by 

emerging nuclear states to improve the technical sophistication of their nuclear postures in 

the 1990s. The assessment also expressed concern that the continuing gap between the 

nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states in the Treaty on the 

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would lead to an erosion of support for that 

treaty. Particular attention was focused on Pakistan’s acquisition of an untested nuclear 

device as well as on North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the perceived pressure 

that this action could be putting on South Korea to follow suit. The emergence of secondtier suppliers was also flagged as a cause of concern, and the important role of domestic 

political developments in Argentina and Brazil was noted. Ultimately, several of the study’s 

assessments were undercut by unexpected domestic political wild cards, including the 

collapse of the Soviet Union (affecting the dynamics of the North Korean nuclear program) 

and the decision of the South African government to transfer power and give up nuclear 

weapons. The case study methodology, with its reliance on available information and with 

the depth of the case studies tied to the knowledge of the single author was not attuned to 

such factors. (By contrast, an alternative futures sensitivity analysis tied to each case study 

might have flagged such wild cards.) 

Commissioned By 

This assessment was presented at the August 1989 meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group, 

and subsequently published in the Aspen Strategy Group Report. 

Purpose and Objectives 

This estimate seeks to explain what proliferation trends and events will occur in the 1990s, 

based on long-term assessments of individual states in possession of nuclear capabilities. 

Timeframe Examined 

The historical timeframe examined covers the decade of the 1980s, with projections 

extending through the 1990s. 

Prevailing Context 

Written in 1989, the prevailing historical context was the start of the end of the Cold War. 

The Soviet Union had not yet collapsed nor had the Berlin Wall come down but Premier 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 90 WMD FORECASTING 

Gorbachev had brought about major changes in Soviet life with Perestroika and Glasnost. 

The U.S.-Soviet arms control process had led to the 1986 Stockholm Agreement and the 

1987 Intermediate and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In Asia, the Soviet Union had 

withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan. In terms of nonproliferation, there was continuing 

concern about Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but neither India nor Pakistan had yet 

to become open nuclear weapon states. Israel’s nuclear technician, Mordechai Vanunu, had 

confirmed the existence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. There had been significant use of 

chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, though that war had recently 

ended. In South America, Argentina and Brazil were emerging from their military regimes 

of the 1980s, while taking cautious steps towards nuclear rapprochement. The white regime 

in South Africa, however, had yet to take steps to turn over power to the black majority nor 

to acknowledge and then give up its nuclear arsenal. 

Methodology: Country Case Studies 

The study focused on a list of countries of proliferation concern on a case-by-case basis, 

taking into account the domestic and regional motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons as 

well as the technological capabilities of each state. In so doing, it addressed each state’s 

particular context and perception of how and why it should or should not go nuclear. The 

impacts of elections, security concerns, threat perceptions, and international diplomatic 

pressure were also considered. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Horizontal Proliferation 

The author estimated that Pakistan had acquired an untested nuclear capability in response 

to India’s nuclear capability and its superior conventional capacity. He also estimated that 

both countries would apply technological advances as quickly as possible, increasing the 

reach of ballistic missiles and the yield of the nuclear weapons they would seek to develop. 

If North Korea should acquire nuclear weapons, then South Korea might also follow suit. 

The study postulated that the end of the Iran/Iraq war meant that those countries could 

now devote their resources to nuclear development, but that these efforts would not bear 

fruit for at least ten years (until 1999). He argued that whether or not Argentina and Brazil 

continued to move toward a nuclear rapprochement in the region would be principally based 

on the success of the civilian governments and economic recovery. Policies in both 

countries would also be strongly influenced by popular opinion, which at the time was 

decidedly anti-nuclear. In turn, the author noted that the lines between nuclear and 

advanced conventional weapons were being blurred through technological advances and 

horizontal proliferation of the latter. This could ultimately lead to a weakening in the norm 

against acquisition of nuclear weapons as well. 

Proliferation Dynamics 

The estimate argued that the decision to go nuclear would depend on the individual state, 

the regional balance of power, domestic political factors, and technological capability. It was 
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 91 

concluded that diplomatic pressure may convince a state to delay its nuclear progress, as in 

the case of Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. 

Vertical Proliferation 

The assessment was pessimistic regarding several nonproliferation related treaties. The 

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was viewed as being in danger 

of complete dissolution, given the belief of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that the 

United States and the Soviet Union had failed to comply with their Article VI obligations 

and to work towards disarmament. In his estimate, the author hypothesized that the NAM 

might use this leverage to force the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to trade significant 

progress toward nuclear disarmament for an indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 (when 

the issue of NPT extension would come up by the treaty’s terms.) Moreover, the ongoing 

negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention – which would ban an entire class of 

weapons for all states – was seen as highlighting the perceived unfairness of the NPT’s twotiered system of nuclear haves and have nots. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern 

Although the study assessed the nuclear capabilities of eleven states, Pakistan and North 

Korea were seen as the two countries of greatest concern. Pakistan was considered to be an 

untrustworthy ally of the United States and involved in black market trade in nuclear and 

weapons-related materials. It had the potential to be a “second-tier” supplier of 

unsafeguarded materials. North Korea was a concern because it was a staunch communist 

ally of the Soviet Union, which was at the time considered a threat to the United States. 

North Korea’s proximity to U.S. troops in South Korea and allies such as Japan reinforced 

this assessment. Moreover, the assessment concluded that should North Korea gain nuclear 

weapons, South Korea and Taiwan could be provoked to respond in kind to the new 

security situation. 

Acquisition patterns/trends 

Potential proliferant states were seen as seeking to acquire an unsafeguarded enrichment 

capability. It was noted that even if safeguards were applied, such as in Iraq and Iran, the 

stockpiling of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium would still not be illegal, as long as it 

was accounted for and not used for weapons purposes. Thus, states were able to engage in a 

practice of nuclear hedging, while at the same time clandestinely acquiring weapons 

components for future assembly. 

In addition, a nuclear black market was also seen to be emerging. This trend was evidenced 

by Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear equipment and raw materials from West Germany as 

well as Brazil’s and Argentina’s avoidance of safeguards and use of clandestine purchasing 

operations in the growth of their nuclear programs. This black market availability could lead 

to the emergence of a group of second-tier supplier states, willing to sell unsafeguarded 

materials to potential proliferant states. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 92 WMD FORECASTING 

As noted, those states with an existing nuclear weapon capability were seen to be working to 

improve those capabilities. For example, India and Israel were developing longer-range 

ballistic missile systems and, it was suggested, likely seeking to increase the explosive yield of 

their nuclear weapons, through “boosting” or gaining thermonuclear technology. These 

states were seeking to acquire radioactive substances such as lithium deuteride (Israel and 

India), tritium (India and Pakistan), and lithium (India and Pakistan). 

The assessment argued that all of the existing proliferators had managed to acquire the 

majority of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons materials in the 1980s. This implied that a 

state may hold on to its stockpiled materials for approximately ten years before actually 

developing weapons. 

Deterrence and employment concepts 

Deterrence was discussed primarily as it applies to Israel’s capabilities. Given the author’s 

estimate that Israel possessed between sixty to one hundred nuclear devices, the study 

concludes that this would ensure Israel sufficient deterrent power to guarantee its survival as 

a state. Furthermore, Israel’s development of longer-range ballistic missiles served as a 

deterrent against Soviet intervention in the Middle East, particularly in support of Syria. 

In terms of the Middle Eastern regional balance of power, Israel’s nuclear weapons 

capabilities were seen to deter other nations in the region from using chemical weapons and 

missiles against Israel. However, the assessment noted that this relationship could also work 

in reverse – with the missiles and chemical weapons of Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt 

preventing Israel from attacking. If deterrence were to fail in the Middle East, it is possible 

that the threshold for nuclear weapons use could be breached, even absent the threat of 

Israel’s national annihilation. 

The author argued that the India-China relationship was not based on deterrence. Despite 

China’s nuclear capabilities, India had not pushed ahead to deploy nuclear weapons, even if 

they had developed a nuclear weapon capability. Had India’s leaders thought India 

threatened by China, the assessment argued, India would have gone a step further and 

deployed and/or tested nuclear weapons. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

Overall, the nuclear nonproliferation regime was seen as returning to a 1970s period of 

uneasiness, with several states on the threshold of possessing nuclear weapons and others 

seeking to improve their already existing nuclear capabilities. Bilateral and multilateral 

pressure could yet stem this trend, especially in the case of Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, 

and Brazil. North Korea would be most susceptible to pressures from the Soviet Union. 

 
Missile Proliferation – 

Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 

WMD FORECASTING I I - 93 

Assessment 

Which aspects of the study have withstood the test of time (i.e., came true)? Which 

aspects have not? 

This assessment entailed case studies of eleven states. The actual outcome of events for 

each state varied: 

North Korea and South Korea 

North Korea did continue to resist IAEA safeguards, withdraw from the NPT, and 

eventually explode a nuclear device in 2006. Expectations that Soviet pressures could 

prevent this outcome were proved wrong – possibly due to the collapse of the Soviet Union 

in 1991 and the internal chaos that followed. As in other instances, a wild card event 

appears to have had a major impact. However, the political and security repercussions of 

North Korea’s advance toward the bomb were not nearly as negative as expected. South 

Korea has not responded in kind to the North’s pursuit of acquisition of nuclear weapons; it 

has even taken steps to improve its relationship with North Korea. 

Iran 

Iran has proved to be more of a problem than anticipated by the author. At the time, 

information was not available about Iran’s mid-1980s decision to launch a clandestine 

uranium enrichment program. While noting the possibility of second-tier supplier states, 

the assessment missed the emergence of the A.Q. Khan as a “one-man” nuclear weapon 

entrepreneur, with that development’s contribution to Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. 

Libya 

Libya was seen to be in a “dormant” state, but as was revealed by Colonel Qaddaffi after his 

2003 promise of full disclosure of Libya’s proliferation activities, Libya at that time actually 

was pursuing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. 

South Africa 

The estimate failed to predict the decision of South Africa’s white leadership to transfer 

power to the black majority as well as then to give up its nuclear weapons in 1993 and join 

the NPT. Again, a domestic wild card had a decisive proliferation impact. But that 

development was virtually unpredictable at the time of the estimate. 

Effects on the Nonproliferation Regime 

The estimate expressed concern that the Nonproliferation Regime was in peril due to a 

perceived lack of progress on implementing Article VI of the NPT. As it turned out, the 

1995 Review and Extension Conference managed to achieve a grand bargain and extend the 

NPT indefinitely. 
Section II 

Historical Assessments – Synopses 

I I - 94 WMD FORECASTING 

Did the particular methodology used influence what the study “got right” and what it 

“got wrong”? How replicable is the methodology? Can it be employed by others? 

The author’s case study methodology – drawing on existing open source materials – resulted 

in a careful assessment of the state of play in each country. However, given that one author 

carried out the analysis, the results were inevitably more thorough for some states and 

regions than others. Constraints on information also shape the depth of the analysis for any 

given country. As a result, in the assessment, Iran and Libya were somewhat under-analyzed, 

whereas the North Korea and Israel assessments were very thorough. The case study 

methodology did not focus on the types of wild card events that proved so important in 

shaping some of the outcomes. 

Was the study influential in some way? If so, how and why? What factors led decisionmakers to take notice of it? 

Presented at the Aspen Strategy Group meeting in August of 1989, the study likely 

contributed to the thinking of prominent analysts and policy makers, many of whom 

subsequently went on to even more powerful positions in government. The organization of 

the estimate was easily accessible, with analysis divided up according to capabilities and states, 

offering a clear look at which states presented what type of threat or potential threat. 

Was the study itself influential in changing the course of events, (i.e., did policy 

intervention result in some aspects of the study being proven wrong)? Or did other 

external factors change the outcome? 

Unanticipated changes in the 1990s dramatically impacted proliferation trends during that 

decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to Russia playing little role in stemming the 

proliferation threat from North Korea. Rather, the loss of an external ally and source of 

economic support may have reinforced North Korea’s pursuit of its nuclear weapons 

program. Somewhat differently, the wild card of South Africa’s regime change dramatically 

affected the proliferation situation as to a lesser degree (and in the opposite direction) did 

the rise to power in 1998 of the BJP Party in India. 

More broadly, the estimate reflected a continuing tendency to stress that the NPT is in crisis 

due to the differences over Article VI. This may eventually prove correct. But at least as of 

the time of the study, criticism of the NPT continued not to lead to action against the treaty 

by the NAM movement. 
 

WMD FORECASTING III-1

 

Section III: Historical Sources 

"1970 Without Arms Control." In Special Project Committee on Security Through Arms Control. 

Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1958. 

"Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences." 

In National Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1958. 

Dunn, Lewis A., and Herman Kahn. "Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995. 

Projections, Problems, and Policy Options." edited by Hudson Inst: U.S. Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency 1976. 

"The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints." In 

Memorandum 85-10001: National Intelligence Council, 1985. 

Lawrence, Robert M., and Joel Larus, eds. Nuclear Proliferation Phase II, National Security 

Education Program: University Press of Kansas, 1974. 

"Likelihood and Consequences of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems." In National 

Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1963. 

McNamara, Robert. "Memorandum for the President: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons 

With and Without a Test Ban Agreement." Washington, D.C., 1963. 

Meyer, Stephen M. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 

"Missile Proliferation - Survey of Emerging Missile Forces." Washington, D.C.: 

Congressional Research Service, 1988. 

"Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences." In 

National Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1957. 

Pipes, Richard. "Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet 

Strategic Objectives – an Alternative View." In Report of Team B, 1976. 

"Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation ", edited by Gilpatric 

Committee. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1965. 

"Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack Through the Mid-1980s (Volume 1 of 3)." In 

National Intelligence Estimate. Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1975. 
Section III 

Historical Sources 

III-2 WMD FORECASTING 

Spector, Leonard. "Appendix A: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s: The Storm after the 

Lull." In New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery 

Capabilities in the Third World: Aspen Strategy Group Report, 1990. 

Wohlstetter, Albert, and Henry Rowen, eds. Swords from Plowshares – the Military Potential of 

Civilian Nuclear Energy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-1

 

Section IV: Contemporary Assessments 

Synthesis Paper 

Contemporary WMD Forecasting: Themes, Projections, and Findings 

Introduction 

This section of the report provides an analytical survey of twenty-three contemporary WMD 

forecasting studies conducted since 1997. It identifies general features of the WMD forecast 

studies reviewed, overarching themes, consensus propositions, areas of disagreement, wild 

cards, and methodology. The study also discusses how WMD forecasting has changed since 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

General Features of the WMD Forecast Studies Reviewed 

Subject Matter

The list of 23 contemporary studies assessed appears below in Table 1. Of these studies, six 

focus primarily on nuclear issues, six on biological, and three on missile systems. The 

remaining eight studies address a composite array of WMD, usually covering nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons, and missile delivery systems as distinct elements of a the 

overall WMD threat. Some of the studies touch on radiological weapons, but none focus on 

radiological dispersal devices (RDD) to a significant degree. The sample as a whole addresses 

the range of NBC and missile delivery systems. 

Date 

Four of the assessed studies appeared after 1997 but before 9/11. One, a declassified 

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat was published in 

December 2001. However, most of its objectives and preparation predated 9/11. The 

remaining eighteen studies appeared post-9/11. Not surprisingly, these studies featured nonstate actor WMD threats more prominently than earlier WMD forecast studies typically had 

done. 

Scope and Methodology

The contemporary WMD studies in the sample are rather diverse in their scope and 

methodological approaches. Generally, they all aim to foresee potential WMD development 

or proliferation. However, most of their forecasts extend only a decade into the future and 

lack specificity. They vary widely in the extent to which they attempt to forecast one or 

another form of WMD proliferation by specific regions and actors, and types of prospective 

WMD use. Few carry their projections beyond the hypothetical into the realm of concrete 

political-military or operational WMD threats. Those that do – and these typically are 

intelligence assessments in our sample -- rarely venture to pinpoint expected developments 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-2 WMD FORECASTING 

in WMD weaponization and military delivery capability in a precisely defined span of time. 

Most of the sampled studies fall into one of the following categories: 

 Nuclear and/or missile proliferation: political-military and technical assessments 

of the status, rate, locations and possible future forms and patterns of nuclear 

weapons proliferation and long-distance means of delivery. 

• Biological weapons development: science-based studies of potential bioengineering of existing pathogens and creation of novel pathogens, and foreseeable 

methods of delivery, that pose unique challenges to detection and effective response. 

• Physical WMD technologies: technology-based studies that seek to ascertain how 

technology evolution or breakthroughs might support previously unforeseen types of 

WMD and strategic delivery, and thereby stress U.S. defense or contemporary 

deterrence, and how appropriate R&D may counter or neutralize those threats. 

• Alternative futures, conjectures, and scenario analyses that attempt to identify 

what kinds of WMD threats might plausibly be mounted operationally against US 

interests by certain types of state and non-state actors, and what countermeasures 

those threats would call for. 

• Geopolitical trend analysis: traditional geopolitical analysis and forecasts of trends 

among adversaries and their prospective acquisition or development of WMD 

capabilities that could harm the U.S. or challenge its interests overseas. 

• Quantitative proliferation analysis: quantitative analysis of country data-sets with 

variables that purport to explain whether and when, or under what ascertainable 

conditions, states attempted to acquire or, alternatively, shifted away from possessing 

nuclear WMD in the past, and that might operate similarly in the future. 

• The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threat and Response is one of a kind and 

does not fit into any of these categories neatly. Rather, it polls national security 

experts on what they estimate to be the probability of certain kinds of WMD attack 

in future time spans and publishes tabulations of their responses. 

 

 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-3

 

Sponsor

A quick scan of Table 1 also reflects the diversity of these studies in terms of sponsorship 

and initiative. More than half of the studies have U.S. government sponsorship of some kind. 

The representation of intelligence and defense agencies is in keeping with the fact that 

forecasting is a core part of their organizational mission. Of the remainder, roughly half are 

NGO think-tank studies or studies by individuals, including academic scholars. 

Table 1. Assessed Contemporary WMD Forecast Studies 

Date 

Range No. Title Source Type 

Modal WMD 

Type 

1 Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998, June 1998 Carnegie (NGO) Nuclear 

2 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat (Rumsfeld), 

July 1998

USG Commission Missile 

1997-

2000 

3 Living Nightmares: Biological Threats, 1999 Jasons Biological 

4 Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015, March 2001 DIA to SASC Composite 

WMD 

5 Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat To 

2015, Dec. 2001 

CIA: Declass NIE Missile 

Gathering Biological Storm (GBS), April 2002 USAF Counter-Prolifer. 

Center 

 

6 GBS - Prospects of Biological War in Middle East “ ” Biological 

7 GBS - Assessment of the Emerging Biocruise Threat “ ” Biological 

8 GBS - Next Generation Bioweapons and Biological Warfare “ ” Biological 

9 GBS - Biological Warfare Wake-Up Call: Prevalent Myths and 

Likely Scenarios 

“ ” Biological 

2001-2003 

10 Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense,

2003

Individual Biological 

11 Role of Nuclear Weapons: Alternative Futures for the Next 

Decade, May 2004

CIA - NIC Nuclear 

12 Nuclear Tipping Point – Why States Reconsider Nuclear 

Choices, 2004

CSIS and William & Mary 

(NGO) 

Nuclear 

13 Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation, Dec 2004 Individual Nuclear 

14 Mapping Global Future - Report of NIC's 2020 Project, Dec 

2004

CIA - NIC Composite 

WMD 

15 Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats,

2005

Carnegie (NGO) Composite 

WMD 

16 Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threat and Response, June 

2005

US Senator Composite 

WMD 

17 Changing Face of Proliferation: Thoughts, Speculations, and 

Provocations, Feb. 2005

CSIS (NGO) and Sandia 

(USG) 

Composite 

WMD 

18 Thwarting an "Evil Genius," Aug 2006 SAIC (NGO) Composite 

WMD 

19 What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe, 2006. Individual Missile 

20 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016, November 2006. Naval Post-graduate 

School 

Nuclear 

21 Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United 

States, January 2007

DIA Composite 

WMD 

22 Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, February 

2007.

Individual Nuclear 

2004-2007 

23 Air Force Futures Project: Emerging WMD Technologies, 2007 USAF Composite 

WMD 

9-11 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-4 WMD FORECASTING 

As a side note, the sample of studies is statistically skewed towards USG and DOD sources 

because the study team decided to include four chapters of a single volume – The Gathering 

Biological Storm, prepared by the USAF Counterproliferation Center – as individual 

assessments, rather than as parts of a single composite assessment. The distinctive 

substantive focus of each of the four chapters – united though they are under the biological 

weapons theme – made it appropriate that they be assessed separately. 

Overarching Themes 

Several overarching themes ran through most of the contemporary studies. None of the 

overarching themes provide benchmarks, however, for precise forecasts of the locations, 

timeframes or specific types of WMD acquisition and the distribution among states and nonstate entities in the future. 

 Any major future conflict is most likely to occur in Asia. However, the likelihood of 

large conflict is low. Limited local and internal conflicts are likely to be 

commonplace, however, in the Middle East, Africa, and even in parts of Latin 

America. 

 The international diffusion of scientific knowledge and weapons-related technology 

is accelerated by the forces of globalization and international trade. Accordingly, the 

know-how to develop WMD will be more widespread and easier to access. 

 Globalization and international trade are also expanding forms of transnational 

economic and political activity. Such activities are not easily monitored or controlled 

by states, even when the activities pose a threat to public health or law and order. 

 Globalization enables the transnational networking of illicit organizations, terrorists, 

criminal enterprises, clandestine state procurement networks, and black markets – 

where conventional arms and WMD materials are prone to circulate. 

 While the barriers to independent development of nuclear technology and longrange missile delivery capabilities remain significant, a large number of states have 

the means to pursue these capabilities. At some point, a wave of nuclear proliferation 

among states with latent capabilities could occur, changing the threat environment 

systemically. 

 In the chemical and biological weapon fields, the technical, financial, and regulatory 

barriers to proliferation are lower than with nuclear technology. Therefore, an 

increase in covert state military development of CW and BW can be expected. 

 As advanced scientific knowledge spreads among nation states, the development of 

more potent classical pathogens and new classes of pathogens and biological agents 

is virtually inevitable – presenting threats of catastrophic, and perhaps apocalyptic, 

magnitude. 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-5

 

 As WMD capabilities proliferate and become more widely available, these weapons 

are likely to pass into the hands of non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations 

but also criminal networks. These weapons will be used to cause mass destruction or 

disruption in ways that are hard to prevent and almost impossible to deter. 

 International controls probably help slow the rate and volume of WMD proliferation. 

However, they are incapable of arresting it entirely. 

 The United States is far less well prepared to meet these future challenges than it 

could be. Specifically, the U.S. must develop better intelligence, support more 

focused research on evolving capabilities, sponsor the research and development 

needed for countermeasures, and invest in countervailing capabilities. 

Consensus Propositions 

The comparative analysis of the assessed studies reveals a number of concrete points of 

agreement about future WMD proliferation. Put together, these points can be condensed in 

a series of 27 propositions that reflect a measure of consensus among sources in the sample. 

The propositions can be divided into three broad categories: (1) consensus concerning 

potential threats from WMD proliferation; (2) consensus concerning military technology

associated with WMD proliferation; and (3) consensus concerning opposing strategies likely to 

be favored by WMD proliferators. 

WMD Threats 

 

1. Nuclear weapons will remain the gold standard for most future WMD 

proliferation. 

Among the WMD options available to proliferating states, the assessed studies evinced a 

high level of agreement on the proposition that nuclear weapons will remain the gold 

standard for most dedicated proliferator states and hedging states as a perceived way to level 

the military playing field against the military power of advanced countries or the emerging 

nuclear capabilities of rival states. Most studies also agreed that poorer or developing 

countries that could not easily obtain nuclear technology but desired to develop WMD 

capabilities probably would attempt to develop CW or BW options as cheaper alternatives 

first, and might not get past that point. Studies that emphasized the BW potential of the 

biological sciences also suggested that advanced countries would have to explore this field to 

understand and prepare for future BW threats, at least for defensive purposes. But there 

were no studies that suggested that states capable of pursuing nuclear weapons would view 

CW or BW as long-term substitutes or preferred alternatives. The assessed studies 

acknowledged that terrorist organizations probably would find access to CW or BW much 

easier than to full-fledged nuclear weapons but could still attempt to exploit purchased or 

stolen nuclear material and radiological dispersal devices, and that some terrorist 

organizations would pursue these options. 

 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-6 WMD FORECASTING 

2. WMD use is more likely in the foreseeable future than it was during the Cold 

War. 

Many of the studies agreed that the likelihood of some WMD use, either as a direct attack on 

the United States or its allies’ homeland, or against forward deployed U.S. and allied forces 

or facilities in a regional conflict, is higher now and will remain so in the foreseeable future 

than it was during the Cold War. This was a relative judgment that seemed to reflect 

agreement that nuclear deterrence was effective during the Cold War against any adversary 

attacking the West in an overt military operation with nuclear weapons (or CW/BW for that 

matter), but that Cold War deterrence could not be counted on against future rogue state or 

terror threats. At the same time, while the studies tended to agree such an attack could 

occur at any time, they provided no forecasts of particular adversaries mounting such an 

attack, which form of WMD would be used, or a specific timeframe for such an attack. 

Senator Lugar’s Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, which polled national security 

experts, was indicative of their expectations of some form of attack: some 60% of 

respondents, for example, judged that there was a 10% probability that the world would see 

a nuclear attack somewhere within 5 years, and a 20% probability of a nuclear attack 

somewhere within 10 years. About 79% of the respondents also judged that if a nuclear 

attack occurs within the next 10 years, it would more likely be an attack by a terrorist 

organization than a state.1

 In the studies overall, however, other scenarios also thought likely 

to result in WMD use were posited in the military context, e.g., a state uses WMD to attack 

the U.S. or allies in a regional conflict overseas, where U.S. or allied forces were preparing to 

intervene or had intervened in the conflict. 

 

3. Nuclear proliferation by states will continue gradually, as in the past – unless a 

“tipping point” is reached. 

A prominent theme in the nuclear proliferation-focused studies was the possibility that 

runaway nuclear proliferation could ensue at some point, after a tipping point has been 

reached, probably due to a chain of security shocks in the international system. Some of the 

studies emphasized, however, how gradual actual nuclear proliferation has been globally over 

the last five decades, and how important key reversals have been – notably, in Taiwan, South 

Korea, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and, recently, 

Libya – in keeping the number of states that are recognized as nuclear powers or believed to 

have secret programs far smaller in number than earlier forecasts in the 1950s and 1960s (or 

even some more recent assessments) had projected. 

 

1 In the Lugar survey, the suggested probability among experts for CW, BW, and RDD attacks in the next 5 

and 10 years was higher than for nuclear. On the risk of an actual biological attack, the estimate was a 10-20% 

likelihood in 5 years, and a 20% probability in 10 years. For an actual chemical attack, the estimate ranged from 

10-30% likelihood in 5 years, and a 20% likelihood in 10 years. For a radiological attack, the risk was seen as a 

25% likelihood in 5 years, and 40% likelihood in 10 years. 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-7

 

4. The increasing pace of technology innovation, globalization of commerce, and 

the formation of black markets will ease access to dual-use technologies and 

relevant nuclear proliferation materials, widening latent as well as overt nuclear 

proliferation. 

While the nuclear proliferation studies tended to focus on the relatively small number of 

current states of concern, there was a high level of agreement that nuclear proliferation as a 

process is unlikely to be arrested and will continue inexorably. Many studies saw technology 

diffusion and the globalization of commerce as ineluctable forces that contribute to the 

spread of nuclear (and other WMD) capabilities. Those that were published after the 

disclosure of the A. Q. Khan’s nuclear network also emphasized the role that black markets 

can be expected to play in future nuclear (and other WMD) proliferation. 

5. A “tipping point” of nuclear proliferation by state actors between 2005 and 2025 

(or beyond) could quadruple or quintuple the number of emerging nuclear 

powers in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. 

Events demonstrating Iranian and North Korean success in developing nuclear weapons and 

long-range missile systems, or an actual use of nuclear weapons in conflict, are cited as 

examples of what could trigger an “explosive burst” of proliferation. These events could 

convince a large number of other nations, particularly among neighbors in the Middle East 

and in East Asia, to conclude that the nonproliferation regime had failed and starting a 

nuclear weapons development program, or at least a hedge against a worsening security 

environment, was imperative. Countries that are compliant with the NPT today but 

considered possible candidates for reversing course if a tipping point is reached include 

Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Ukraine, Serbia, 

Greece, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. 

6. Chemical weapon proliferation among state actors can be expected to continue 

in the Middle East and North Africa as the “poor man’s” entry point to WMD 

through 2015 and beyond, but as Western defenses against CW improve, state 

CW use is more likely against regional states than advanced countries. 

Following the pointers in unclassified intelligence reports, many studies already attribute past 

or existing CW programs to such countries as Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq (before 

2003), Iran, Israel, Syria, Egypt, Libya (until 2004), Sudan, India, and Pakistan. The assessed 

studies share a measure of consensus that most if not all of these countries probably would 

retain their infrastructure capabilities (even if some of them have given up or no longer 

maintain stockpiles of CW agent) as a deterrent hedge, as a baseline for development of 

“defensive” equipment and countermeasures, or to jump-start modern an offensive 

programs in the event their security environment worsens. Underlying concerns expressed in 

many of the studies are that some of these states with CW capabilities might assist other 

states in acquiring CW capabilities as their entry-level WMD program, and that one or 

another state may be tempted to provide sponsored terrorists access to CW agents. 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-8 WMD FORECASTING 

A theme in the assessed studies – more as a question mark than a forecast – was whether the 

slowly improving U.S. and Western defensive capability against CW would lead CW-capable 

countries to reduce their emphasis on this form of WMD. A related thought expressed in 

Lewis Dunn’s “Changing Face of Proliferation” paper was that this improving defensive 

capability against CW could lead military planners in adversary countries to set CW aside in 

confronting the outside powers but would not necessarily lead them to set CW aside in 

conflicts with regional neighbors. 

Not in outright disagreement with the consensus proposition but as a difference of emphasis, 

the Carnegie Endowment Deadly Arsenals book draws sharp distinctions between the 

different types of WMD. It considers CW to be a serious but much less consequential 

WMD threat than nuclear or biological weapons and ascribes a higher level of arms control 

compliance to the elimination of declared CW programs and arsenals under the Chemical 

Weapons Convention, which by implication would forecast a lesser CW threat from states 

than the consensus view would suggest. 

7. As knowledge of the biological sciences and genetic engineering diffuses, the 

spread of biological weapon capabilities among state actors can be expected to 

expand in advanced and developing states. 

This science and technology-driven proposition was advanced by the science-based BW 

studies and generally shared by the composite WMD studies. It rests on the assumption that 

the database of DNA and genomic analysis, the power of computers, and availability of 

inexpensive laboratory equipment for biological engineering will become pervasive around 

the world, readily accessible to biological scientists even in developing countries. It further 

assumes that while biological advances will be exploited for constructive social and 

economic objectives, some scientists recruited and funded, or self-selected, to do weapon 

research in every substantial country will explore all imaginable avenues of biological 

engineering, learning how to modify classical bacterial and viral pathogens, how to devise 

new agents, and how to exploit the pathways of human physiology to spread old and new 

diseases in methodical ways that will be hard to detect, will surprise, and will be designed to 

thwart effective treatment and countermeasures. The studies assume that relatively advanced 

countries and past adversaries, such as Russia and China, will build on past BW programs to 

discover new ways to wage biological warfare, and file them away for undefined future 

contingencies, and that the same knowledge and technology will be acquired by developing 

countries and perhaps even by terrorist and criminal organizations. 

8. It is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda, one of its affiliates, or some other 

terrorist organization, gains access to one or more usable NBC capabilities and 

uses them to threaten and/or attack U.S. or Western interests or territory. 

All of the composite WMD studies published since 9/11 and the discovery by U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan in December 2001 of documentary evidence of dedicated al-Qaeda research and 

experiments on rudimentary CW and BW, together with intelligence on al-Qaeda efforts to 

obtain fission weapons and fissile material from post-Soviet sources, reflect this proposition 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-9

 

that it is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda or one of its stateless affiliates acquires and 

uses some form of WMD in what could be a spectacular attack. No time-bound forecasts of 

this eventuality are represented, but neither did any of the studies dissent from this 

consensus expectation. Rather, it was assumed that a WMD terrorist attack could be so 

targeted and implemented as to take us by surprise, like the attacks of 9/11, and could occur 

at almost any time. As reflected in the January 2007 DIA statement, “Current and Projected 

National Security Threats,” the pursuit of the al-Qaeda network globally, in Iraq since 2004, 

and within the Afghan borderland with Pakistan, coupled with a full court press on 

communications surveillance, more detailed monitoring of air passengers and traffic, and 

tightened border controls presumably makes terrorist preparation and implementation of a 

spectacular attack more difficult than before, but hardly impossible. Until “al-Qaeda Central” 

has been surfaced and destroyed, there will be no rest because force protection overseas is 

imperfect, and homeland defenses cannot be perfected against the many infiltration routes 

and likely domestic sympathizers that exist, as well as the innumerable forms of deception 

that are possible. 

 9. Contingency planning cannot rule out threats by which one or more WMDcapable states transfer WMD capabilities to terrorist organizations to carry out 

clandestine attacks against U.S. or Western interests. 

None of the studies specifically forecasts WMD-capable states transferring WMD to 

terrorist organizations, but the intelligence estimates and several other studies are concerned 

that lowered contemporary inhibitions about the use of WMD and the hostile agendas of 

regional adversaries could lead to state cooperation on WMD with sponsored terrorist 

organizations. The same speculative logic and incentives to preserve deniability might 

eventually lead to adversary state cooperation on an ad hoc and opportunistic basis with other 

terror organizations that have no history of state sponsorship. This logic becomes more 

compelling and the real world risks almost certainly rise when the United States and its 

coalition allies engage a regional adversary on its own turf. A persuasive speculative scenario 

in the studies is the option of a regional adversary that fears regime change to attempt to 

deter by implicitly threatening, or to retaliate against U.S. and allied intervention by, 

diversionary terrorist attack in the homeland. The possibility that Saddam Hussain might 

adopt such a tactic was clearly a concern in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in March 

2003. 

10. Development and deployment of strategic nuclear capabilities by post-Soviet 

Russia is still resource-constrained. In emerging China, development and 

deployment of strategic nuclear capabilities has been technologically 

constrained. Regardless, these capabilities are moving forward and could reach 

new levels that pose significant challenges by 2025. 

This Russia- and China-related consensus proposition is reflected in the two DIA 

intelligence statements represented, and the NIC’s Mapping the Global Future – Report of the 

2020 Project. Each was concerned with a larger geopolitical picture. The DIA forecasts were 
Section IV 

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IV-10 WMD FORECASTING 

concerned not only about WMD threats from future regional proliferation and terrorism, 

but also about the future strategic offensive and advanced conventional military capacity of 

Russia and China to challenge the United States or constrain U.S. regional power projection. 

Hence each sought to project in general terms Russia’s and China’s development, 

modernization and deployment of their latest strategic missiles, theater nuclear military 

systems, and related capabilities. The intelligence assessments recognize that Russia and 

China both have had CW and BW programs, but the primary thrust of their WMD 

projections about both countries is strategic nuclear, space, and power projection capabilities 

If their forecasts have a common implicit concern about CW and BW, it is that Russian and 

Chinese technical knowledge may be divulged to other countries. One of the chapter authors 

in the Gathering Biological Storm book (Michael Ainscough), bases his forecasts of “Next 

Generation Bioweapons” on reports from former Soviet defectors about past developments 

in the Soviet BW program, but his estimate of where the most likely future BW challenges 

will come from emphasizes developing countries that are likely to adopt asymmetric 

strategies, rather than Russia. 

11. Russia, China, and North Korea have been at the forefront of WMD supplier 

countries. These states, as well as emerging offshore powers like India, Pakistan, 

Iran, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, may largely determine the rate and shape 

of future WMD proliferation. 

Virtually all the nuclear proliferation and composite WMD studies categorically agreed that 

the key state sources of nuclear and long-range missile proliferation for decades have been 

the trio of Russia, China, and North Korea, and that barring major changes in their policies 

or incentives, they are likely to continue preeminently in that role for the foreseeable future. 

A number of the studies, however, forecast that emerging powers – particularly India, 

Pakistan and Iran – could also play significant future roles as suppliers in the nuclear and 

missile proliferation domains. One study, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Nuclear Weapons 

Proliferation: 2016, suggested that by 2016, Brazil, Argentina and even Venezuela potentially 

could enter this league. 

Military Technology 

 

1. Emerging ballistic missile states, like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are 

developing long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking parts of Europe and 

the United States with NBC warheads. North Korea may have such a missile 

before 2010 while Iran may succeed by 2015. 

During the Cold War, the only states that had long-range ballistic missiles in strategic 

arsenals were the two superpowers and the three other classical nuclear weapon states, 

Britain, France and China. During the last three decades of the Cold War, ballistic missile 

and cruise missile proliferation took place in a significant number of developing countries, 

although most of this proliferation was of Soviet-origin – Scud-based short-range ballistic 

missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles. By the end of the Cold War, inherent long-range 

ballistic missile capability was present outside the five traditional nuclear powers in the space 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

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WMD FORECASTING IV-11

 

launch programs of a small number of states, including Japan, India, and Brazil. In the 1990s, 

the pace of programs that aimed at long-range ballistic missile development picked up in 

developing countries, particularly in North Korea, but also in Iraq and Iran. By the mid1990s, concerns existed that North Korea’s ballistic missile program was developing a Scudderived Taepo Dong missile system with intercontinental range. This missile was believed to 

have the potential to reach the United States carrying a WMD warhead, and might reach that 

milestone earlier than previously estimated by U.S. intelligence analyses. The Rumsfeld 

Commission was formed by Congress to provide an independent analysis and forecast of 

emerging ballistic capabilities in emerging missile states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. 

Its analysis and July 1998 report drew not only on then available intelligence findings and 

industry model analysis but also on new assumptions about how the standards and practices 

of emerging missile programs differed from the classical ballistic missile programs of the 

Western powers and the Soviet Union (see proposition 2 below) in order to expedite and 

thus shorten development and deployment timelines. In essence, it judged that the ICBM 

threat from emerging missile powers was much closer at hand than intelligence estimates 

suggested. 

The sample of studies also contains the NIE on the ballistic missile threat developed in 2001, 

three years after the Rumsfeld Commission report, with its main conclusions published in an 

unclassified summary in December 2001. The NIE summary forecast of ICBM-capability in 

North Korea and Iran is encapsulated in proposition 1. The summary concluded that the 

U.S. should expect to face an ICBM threat from both North Korea and Iran by 2015. While 

the NIE acknowledged that the Rumsfeld Commission report methodology had influenced 

the analysts compiling this NIE, what remains interesting about the final forecast, despite 

the reference to calendar years, was its vagueness regarding exactly when North Korea 

(which had recently instituted a moratorium on missile testing) and Iran could be expected 

actually to cross the threshold of ICBM capability. Published before the March 2003 

invasion of Iraq, it also attributed greater long-range capability to Iraq’s missile program than 

appears in retrospect to have been warranted. 

2. The pattern and pace of development of long-range missiles by states such as 

Iran and North Korea differ from superpower programs during the Cold War. 

Specifically, they conduct few full-scale tests and produce weapons in small 

quantities. These states may deploy a nuclear or WMD-equipped long-range 

missile ready for launch against the United States with little or no warning. 

This proposition reflects a 1998 finding of the Rumsfeld Commission that was adopted by 

the NIE preparers in 2001, to the effect that the development and testing practices of the 

emerging missile powers was strikingly different from the practices maintained by the 

superpowers. The superpowers tested each type of missile repeatedly during development 

before making commitments to produce and deploy each system, and then typically 

produced relatively large numbers of each system for deployment. The emerging missile 

powers appeared to be satisfied with just one or two tests of a new system before deciding to 
Section IV 

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IV-12 WMD FORECASTING 

produce and deploy it, but also produced very few missiles for deployment, overall a striking 

break with past patterns. The implication was that basing forecasts on the classical 

assumptions regarding missile development would not work well to estimate the timeframes 

of the emerging missile powers. The latter might complete development of an ICBMcapable missile with few or no observable tests and deploy the system in small numbers 

quite suddenly, providing the United States with little or no time to respond. Clearly this 

would also make it far more difficult to intervene diplomatically in a timely fashion, and 

make strategic missile proliferation milestones much harder to evaluate. 

3. Cruise missiles are spreading rapidly as a cheap and stealthy means of WMD 

delivery. 

The studies that addressed missile proliferation recognized that cruise missile proliferation in 

the 1990s was providing another potential WMD delivery system of choice for emerging 

missile powers. Cruise missile platforms and technology were more widely available, 

commercially and as conventional naval armaments, from Western sources as well as Russia 

and China, and acquisition is generally much cheaper than for ballistic missiles. 

While the assessed studies that include cruise missiles in their analyses do not provide 

country-specific forecasts of WMD-capable cruise missiles acquisition, they point to the 

increasing adaptation of cruise missiles to air-, sea-, and land-based variants, the inherent 

capacity of cruise missiles to carry BW and CW warheads, and the evident appeal of 

incorporating guidance systems using GPS signals for targeting accuracy and navigation to 

evade traditional defenses. India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states, and Iran as a 

likely nuclear proliferator, are actively pursuing nuclear-capable cruise missile delivery 

options. 

In the same generic category, some of the assessed studies forecast the accelerated spread to 

states of concern of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) as lighter WMD delivery platforms, and 

foresee that these technologies may also become accessible to well-funded terrorist 

organizations as potential mechanisms for remotely controlled dissemination of BW agents. 

4. Biological weapon technologies that will be developed through advances in 

biological science and genetic engineering will include genetically modified, 

naturally-occurring pathogens (e.g., anthrax and smallpox) that are safer to 

handle and deploy, more infectious or toxic, more difficult to detect, more drug 

resistant and harder to treat, and with a variety of other self-enhancing or selflimiting characteristics that evade timely discovery and response, and that 

conceal the identity of perpetrators. 

Forecasts of BW developments in our assessed studies sample are primarily science- and 

technology-based descriptions of possible biological weapon types rather than politicalmilitary assessments of particular actors that may develop, stockpile and use BW agents. 

These forecasts are driven by the scientific logic of understanding avenues that will open up 

as a result of experimental work in the biological sciences and genetic engineering. The 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

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WMD FORECASTING IV-13

 

emphasis is not on military technologies, e.g., physical delivery systems or active defense 

interceptors in the conventional military sense, but rather on biochemical and physiological 

pathways for transmissivity and human infection with pathogens. The forecasts anticipate 

that development of biologically modified traditional pathogens as bioweapons is just around 

the corner. Some of the assessed studies note that low-tech BW threats to agriculture and 

livestock are already with us and warn us to expect related agro-terrorist attacks that could be 

economically debilitating. 

5. By the second half of the 21st century, genome research and biological 

innovations will lead to development of “advanced biological warfare” (ABW) 

agents - entirely new kinds of bio-engineered bacterial and viral agents and 

delivery mechanisms, including Binary BW, Designer Genes and Life Forms, 

Weaponized Gene Therapies, Stealth Viruses, Host-Swapping Diseases, and 

Designer Diseases. 

The forecast of BW development two to three decades out anticipates entirely new classes of 

disease-producing agents, dissemination pathways, and possibly even the means of 

engineering pathogens to differentially select and target various categories of human beings, 

including groups based on age, national background, or ethnic or racial differences. The 

potential challenges to intelligence, attack detection and warning, data security management, 

and consequence management become extraordinarily complex and difficult to predict or 

parse. These potential challenges are replete with elements of surprise. 

 6. Innovation in the fields of cybertechnology, nanotechnology, energy, and 

propulsion can be expected to lead to new types of WMD and delivery systems, 

that may transform combat techniques, military organization, and battlefields. 

Apart from the science-based biological studies, the most far reaching WMD technology 

assessment in our sample, and certainly the most technologically-specific, was offered by the 

Air Force Futures Project: Emerging WMD Technologies (2007), which emphasized physics-based 

technologies, including information technology. It sought to explore what new types and 

new kinds of WMD might emerge from technological innovation in cybertechnology, 

nanotechnology, advanced forms of energy release, and novel means of propulsion. Its 

underlying concern was anticipating WMD-capable military technologies that would challenge 

the U.S. Air Force on future battlefields. 

It was the most specific of the forecast studies in its description of military technology 

possibilities. It also sought to clarify the difference between “weapons of mass disruption” 

and “weapons of mass destruction” that could emerge as challenges to U.S. national security 

and operationally to the U.S. Air Force. It chose not to conflate WMDisruption with 

WMDestruction but rather to separate them in its military technology forecasts. Cyber threats, 

for example, were deemed by the study largely as threats of mass disruption rather than 

threats of mass destruction. The study also distinguished between technological innovations 

that could be enablers of weapons of mass destruction, and the WMD themselves. 
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Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-14 WMD FORECASTING 

Information technology and novel propulsion technologies were considered enablers of 

novel types of WMD. Nanotechnologies, on the other hand, could be represented in both 

categories, as enablers or as actual WMD, depending on their functions. 

New military nano-technologies forecast for attack or dissemination include explosive 

microdust (nanoexplosives), nanobots serving as BW delivery systems or as micro-weapons 

themselves, and inhalable micro-particles to cripple personnel. Conceivable advanced energy 

forms of WMD include pure fusion weapons, novel non-nuclear energetics, microwave 

weapons, and new propulsion technologies for delivery of other WMD. Conceivable 

propulsion technologies would support ultra-light, long-range UAVs and space vehicles, and 

would derive from novel methods such as ‘blast-wave propulsion’ or the use of a ‘slingatron’ 

(means of accelerating projectiles). 

Technology evolution was also forecast to make “traditional” WMD more lethal, deliverable 

and dangerous. An increased threat will come from making nuclear weapons programs 

harder to detect, more powerful but with smaller payloads, and from advances in the 

infectivity, virulence, persistence, and resistance if disease agents. The ability of state and 

non-state actors to develop and possess these weapons will improve. 

With anticipated technology revolutions, not only will “improvements” to existing WMD 

occur, but new weapons with massively destructive effects may become possible. These new 

systems could come in different forms, whether new high explosives that when combined 

with affordable, long-distance UAVs can deliver a swarming effect and cause massive 

destruction, or new non-biological pathogen-like effects from nanites. 

7. As the main geo-strategic competitors of the United States for the foreseeable 

future, Russia and China will continue to: (1) improve the survivability of their 

strategic assets; (2) modernize strategic nuclear offensive weapons and spacefaring technologies; (3) develop and deploy advanced conventional weapons; (4) 

upgrade the military applications of telecommunications, information, and 

surveillance technologies, and; (5) exploit the concurrent WMD or WMDsupport applications of the latter technologies. 

Post-Cold War forecasts of competitive military technologies with WMD potential that 

could be developed in Russia and China are an obligatory as well as natural part of the 

intelligence reports in our sample, and of Mapping the Global Future – Report of NIC’s 2020 

Project (2004), but are burdened with uncertainty as to whether either Russia or China should 

be regarded as a future adversary or as a peer competitor. They also reflect uncertainty on 

how to estimate future technological prospects in either state. The consensus proposition 

reflects hedging forecasts that assume a competitive but not necessarily confrontational 

relationship with both Russia and China, as each seeks to enhance it national scientific 

knowledge and engineering power in every domain that has strategic and WMD content, 

including space. The implication is that Russia and China could once again, some day, be the 

leading sources of WMD threat to the United States. An underlying concern is that both 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-15

 

Russia and China are prone to use technology leverage in ways that can be seen as more 

permissive of WMD and missile proliferation than the United States and its Western 

partners. 

8. Non-state entities seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) materials would be willing to use them without missiles. WMD attacks 

on U.S. territory – particularly by terrorists – are more likely to be from nonmissile delivery means than by missiles. Non-missile delivery means are less 

costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate, and can be used with 

less risk of attribution. 

The studies shared a high level of agreement on the proposition that the terrorist (or other 

non-state) WMD threats to the United States are not likely to be based on long-range missile 

delivery systems, but rather on other covert methods of delivery that are cheaper, easier to 

acquire, likely to be more reliable and accurate, and that lend themselves to anonymity. 

There were no studies in the sample that disagreed directly with this proposition. 

9. Terrorists will use novel operational concepts to employ relatively simple WMD 

weapons for maximum effect. 

This last consensus proposition on military technology forecasts that terrorist threats will be 

noted less for adoption of novel military technologies than for their operational ingenuity, 

e.g., attention to detail in covert preparation for attacks, and self-discipline in execution. As 

a general statement about the priority contemporary foreign terrorists would attach to hitting 

hard, suddenly, with spectacular public effects, and where the defender is ill prepared, this 

proposition may seem incontestable. If a low-tech approach can do as good or better a job 

of terrorizing a nation than a high-tech attack, the forecast suggests that the defenders 

should look there first. But several of the assessed studies would dissent from this 

proposition if it were interpreted to mean that terrorists would overlook well-publicized 

military technology developments in the biological and nanotechnology fields. For example, 

the possibility of using small UAVs as a means to remotely disperse a disease agent – over 

shopping centers or schools, for example – could easily be included in a foreign terrorist 

organization’s playbook of options, if and when the means are available. 

Opposing Strategies 

1. Russia’s “opposing strategies” will continue to be concerned with domestic 

economic recovery, rebuilding internal strength, and preserving core strategic 

delivery and WMD assets to balance against potential military threats from the 

West or from China. 

Russia’s opposing strategies following the disintegration of the Soviet Union were focused 

not on sustaining military confrontation but rather on cutting its losses – by reducing the 

economic burden of military assets, downsizing military forces, and restructuring the 

economy to shrink the public sector and take selective advantage of foreign trade and capital. 
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Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-16 WMD FORECASTING 

The contraction of the economy was stemmed by the end of the Yeltsin period. Russia had 

grudgingly accepted a stylized form of cooperation with NATO and the European Union, 

both of which expanded by taking in Eastern Europe states as members. Putin’s ascent 

coincided with rising energy prices and Russian sales of oil and gas have reversed the 

nation’s economic decline and revived economic growth and a measure of national self 

confidence. Politically, Putin has emphasized the reinvigoration of Russian national pride, a 

strengthening of central authority in Moscow, and new initiatives to revive Russian influence 

in the newly independent FSU states of Central Asia. But having fallen so far in the 1990s, 

Russia will need to rebuild its resources peacefully for at least two decades to recover a 

semblance of its strategic role. 

Russia’s opposing strategies will be calibrated to rebuild a positive image of Russia and to 

extend political and economic influence abroad, taking advantage both of Western setbacks 

and internal NATO or US-European quarrels, as well as U.S. tension with regional 

influentials like Iran. It will attempt to capitalize on Russia’s still technologically advanced 

science sector and its heavy industrial and arms production systems. It has successfully 

expanded its trade with China and maintained its trade with India, and hopes to benefit from 

their respective surges in the world economy. As a technologically advanced but 

economically smaller state, post-Soviet Russia seeks to maintain military R&D in all strategic 

and space-faring fields, and resists implementing pledges to eliminate CW and BW programs 

and capabilities totally. Geopolitically, Russia’s opposing strategies will be to encourage 

balancing reactions by emerging powers, particularly China, India, and Iran, to U.S. global 

preeminence. It will maintain and modernize its WMD capabilities at reduced levels to 

sustain its status as a strategic nuclear power and for continuing leverage and deterrence 

against hostile action by either the United States and NATO, or China. 

2. China’s “opposing strategies” will continue to focus on using its rapid economic 

advances to develop of a full spectrum of modern WMD, strategic, space-faring, 

and conventional military capabilities, including theater air power and blue 

water naval forces. 

China’s economic transformation from a relatively poor agrarian country to an international 

trading powerhouse since the Nixon/Kissinger rapprochement in the early 1970s is 

unprecedented. China’s first priority is to continue to ride this remarkable trend and build a 

modern and prosperous society, making adjustments in its Communist Party-controlled 

political system to avoid serious outbreaks of internal political instability. It has avoided, 

since the end of the Korean War, major confrontations with Japan and the United States, as 

well as with Russia, while using the intervening decades to modernize and professionalize its 

armed forces and strategic nuclear and space systems, with improvements in warning, 

command and control, and ICBM survivability. Its CW and BW programs were a legacy of 

World War II but probably have been kept up to date through R&D. It still has a long road 

ahead to equip its conventional air and naval forces with advanced conventional arms and 

blue water naval projection capability. China and the United States have both worked to 

avoid major military confrontation over Taiwan, and have cooperated closely for several 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-17

 

years in seeking, along with Russia, Japan, and South Korea, to negotiate denuclearization of 

North Korea. China is also careful to avoid provocations of Japanese nationalism, despite a 

deep undercurrent of animosity left over from World War II, and one may surmise that 

China’s interests in not risking the awakening of nuclear and strategic missile ambitions in 

Japan remains beneficial to Chinese security as well as to broader regional stability. 

China’s opposing strategies probably will seek to limit U.S. military dominance East Asia, but 

not to weaken the United States as a society or economy directly, given that economic 

interdependence has become extensive. China will seek to outgrow the United States 

peacefully. But there are potential collision points that could impair relations or precipitate 

conflict. China will hedge against overt Taiwanese declarations of independence and seek to 

shrink the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. Other frictions with the United States may 

grow over foreign energy and mineral resources – for which China’s appetite has become 

voracious – and possibly over U.S. military relations with India should they take the form of 

proactively arming India to contain China. China will seek to balance U.S. influence in 

Southeast Asia by warm overtures to regional states and by seeking to win acceptance of 

itself as an unspoken pillar of security and stability in that neighboring region. 

3. Both Russia and China will cultivate allies to support opposing strategies to U.S. 

global preeminence. These strategies may lead them to export conventional and 

dual-use military technologies to WMD-interested regional states – especially oil 

suppliers -- to strengthen regional relationships opportunistically. 

None of the assessed studies attempts to determine directly whether Russia and China use 

WMD and missile proliferation deliberately to replace U.S. influence with their own in 

strategically important regions, or to secure access to or control over energy and mineral 

resources. But if one were to infer from their collective probes of the future WMD behavior 

of Russia and China why most conclude they have been and continue to be, along with 

North Korea, the leading suppliers of WMD-related and missile technologies to the Middle 

East and South Asian regions, one would be led to the impression that proposition 3 

represents an uneasy consensus – perhaps uneasy because the implications might not sit well 

with the politically correct mainstream of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policies toward Russia 

and China. Several of the nuclear nonproliferation studies that lean toward the validity of 

this proposition in the past nonetheless emphasize evidence of course corrections by Russia 

and China that augur well for their nonproliferation commitments in the future. 
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IV-18 WMD FORECASTING 

4. Regional states that have acquired WMD often do so to counter threats from 

regional rivals, elevate their status and regional influence, or engage U.S. and 

Western assistance. But those regional states that are durable adversaries of the 

United States are likely to harbor asymmetric opposing strategies that assume 

their WMD capabilities would serve as deterrents against direct attack by a 

conventionally superior U.S. force. 

This consensus proposition on WMD-backed asymmetric political-military strategies in 

sensitive regions probably is the proposition most strongly and universally subscribed to by 

all the assessed studies. It enumerates the most common dominant motives for regional state 

acquisition of WMD: filling status aspirations, pursuing regional dominance, compensating 

for security deficits against rival neighbors, and in some cases aiming for the capability to 

deter outside intervention. The proposition further links the last motive to the opposing 

strategies that local WMD-equipped antagonists might employ against U.S. intervention. 

Collectively, these opposing strategies are asymmetric in nature, contests of will between the 

weaker but locally rooted and autocratically-governed nation and the more physically 

powerful but politically and culturally alien outsider. They recognize the overwhelming 

conventional military superiority of the United States and its closest Western allies, and the 

existence of nuclear weapons as an American trump card, but also shrewdly weigh U.S. and 

allied inhibitions in exercising their military power (given their need for sustainable domestic 

public support) when faced by local adversaries armed with and willing to employ WMD on 

the battlefield or against nearby staging facilities, whether the WMD is nuclear, biological, or 

chemical. 

A thoughtful chapter on the “Prospects of Biological War in the Middle East” in the 

Gathering Biological Storm (2002) compendium offers a carefully scripted outline of what a 

regional conflict with U.S. engagement and adversary BW use plausibly might look like. It 

lays out the military strategy and tactics that a BW- and missile-equipped regional adversary 

could rationally play out in seeking to deter or defeat U.S. intervention and avoid complete 

military defeat or regime change. 

5. Regional adversaries with WMD may develop other asymmetric opposing 

strategies to exert preventive leverage against U.S. or Western decision-makers. 

Examples of this include deploying cruise missiles clandestinely in merchant 

ships, or by cooperating with or working through terrorist organizations to 

infiltrate and position WMD that could be activated in the homeland and 

publicized and used on short notice. 

This consensus proposition is supported by a few of the assessed studies more strongly than 

by others. The caveat of the weak supporters would be that scenarios of this kind cannot be 

ruled out entirely, but would be of low probability, partly because the perpetrators could not 

really count on anonymity for long, the retaliation would be severe, and deterrence still 

counts with decision makers of states. Others would argue that the delivery method of 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-19

 

collaboration with terrorists is a more credible strategy for coercion by a high-risk taking 

state than its resort to covertly deployed and launched cruise missiles against U.S. territory. 

This proposition has the virtue nevertheless of alerting us to contingencies that may seem to 

be low in probability, but that could jump to a higher level of plausibility if they were 

ignored. 

6. Terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda will find justifications for collaborating on 

the piecemeal acquisition and use of each type of WMD to amplify their already 

articulated “opposing strategies.” 

This consensus proposition is generally shared by those assessed studies published after 

9/11 that address the prospects of WMD terrorism in one form or another. The opposing 

strategy of al-Qaeda and related Islamic extremists relies on spectacular attacks that kill many 

civilians and arouse horror, but none of the successful attacks thus far has employed WMD. 

WMD use probably would be a force multiplier. What is most ominous is al-Qaeda’s 

affirmation of its willingness to use WMD and its public justification of such use in religious 

and legal terms as part of its war with the United States and Israel. 

7. States that are determined to acquire (or supply) WMD components will develop 

and refine opposing strategies against proliferation detection and interdiction in 

order to conceal their facilities and capabilities and harden them against air 

attack, and thwart or circumvent international nonproliferation controls. 

This last consensus proposition is on the opposing strategies of the community of 

proliferating states and their black market suppliers to effective nonproliferation controls. 

Like the opium and heroin market, and criminal organizations, those who have vested 

interests in WMD and related illicit activities will fight the regulations and authorities that 

prohibit WMD and seek to shut down illicit activities. Many of the individuals involved will 

have no direct interest in the use of WMD themselves or in the enabling technologies; some 

are merely doing a job they are paid to do, and others may be involved because their services 

are indispensable and enable them to profit immensely. Their opposing strategies are indirect 

and evasive, based on money and influence-peddling networks, or outright corruption. They 

do not pose direct security threats to states. The fact that the cumulative fruits of their labors 

do create security threats is too remote for them to have feelings about. They would be 

relatively easy to shut down if they had no patrons in positions of state influence. 

Areas of Disagreement 

WMD Proliferation Outcomes

Forecasts of proliferation outcomes could specify who would get what kinds of WMD by 

when, in what military operational quantities, and when those actors would actually use 

WMD in what circumstances. By and large, most of the forecasts were similar in not being 

specific on these benchmarks, and disagreements about WMD proliferation outcomes 

therefore do not stand out. There were no rival forecasts, for example, of when North 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-20 WMD FORECASTING 

Korea would go nuclear (as it actually did in 2006), or when Iran might do so, or on what 

scale. None of the forecasts anticipated Libya’s reversal in 2003. Some of the studies forecast 

that India and Pakistan would continue to enlarge their arsenals, but without attempts to 

specify numbers of weapons or types of weapons, deployment timeframes, or when new 

military capability thresholds would be crossed. 

The most specific forecasts were those of the intelligence community (IC) that focused on 

missile proliferation and that attempted to estimate when North Korea, Iran, or Iraq (prior 

to 2003) might develop an ICBM. These provided timeframe references, but were 

nonetheless quite vague, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of the consensus 

propositions. The IC forecasts and those in most of the other missile studies also covered 

shorter-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and essentially agreed on the “who” – 

which countries were acquiring them – as a pool of the “usual suspects.” There were no 

surprises there. If the forecasts differed, it was on how to measure the pace of missile 

proliferation (how rapid and wide) and how to characterize the military threat to the United 

States, e.g., what probability of use, by whom, in what circumstances. Some addressed these 

as near-term problems or matters of urgent concern – as was the case with the IC 

projections of ICBM potential. Others treated the problem as real but emerging more 

gradually and with less certainty about the specific threats and their defense implications, as 

in the article on “What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe” (2006). 

The nuclear proliferation forecasts generally agreed on the set of “likely suspects” and 

“regions of concern.” All treated Northeast Asia and the Middle East as the most potentially 

volatile regions in which new nuclear (and missile) proliferation should be expected within 

the next decade or two. If there was an area of disagreement, it was a general one of whether 

and when a “tipping point” would be reached, bringing a cascade of new nuclear 

proliferation. Some studies or authors seemed to regard that as a likely eventuality. On that 

point, there were few if any sharply framed disagreements, but rather a nuanced difference in 

emphasis – either more optimistic or more pessimistic that an “explosive burst” of 

proliferation could be headed off by suitable policy measures. Readers probably would agree 

with the author here to assign the majority of the studies to the pessimistic forecast category. 

The more optimistic studies on this tipping point question are the Carnegie Endowment’s 

Deadly Arsenals (2005) and the CSIS-William & Mary book, The Nuclear Tipping Point (2004). 

There are also elements of optimism among some of the authors in the Naval Postgraduate 

School study, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 2016 (2006), and the Sandia workshop paper by 

Lewis Dunn, The Changing Face of Proliferation, analyzes both outlooks without coming down 

in favor of one or the other. 

Interestingly, one of the assessed studies, Air Force Futures Project: Emerging WMD Technologies

(2007) reflected disagreements internally on how to classify future WMD based on evolving 

technologies. In this case, the question was: What kinds of WMD may emerge in the future 

from evolving technologies? The study dealt with biological and physical technologies, but 

mainly physical. The study approach involved reading and assessing a series of studies done 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-21

 

by others on the subject of technology evolution and then interviewing a group of experts to 

help adjudicate or refine propositions found in those studies. Experts who were interviewed 

disagreed on three points: (i) whether evolving information and cyber technology, and 

certain energy release technologies like Microwave, could become “weapons of mass 

destruction;” (ii) whether “weapons of mass disruption” could be considered “weapons of 

mass destruction;” and (iii) whether the definition of the term “weapons of mass 

destruction” should be widened to include cumulative mass destruction by conventional 

weapons or by inflicting a large number of deaths by successive actions over a longer period 

of time (rather than in a single strike). 

The authors of this future WMD technologies study for the Air Force concluded on point (i) 

that IT, cybertechnology, and Microwave technology probably themselves would not produce 

weapons of mass destruction), but could potentially become enabling technologies for 

WMD. They concluded on point (ii) that WMDisruption should not be equated with 

WMDestruction, but that the former could in some cases serve as enablers for the latter. They 

concluded on point (iii) that it would inadvisable to expand the definition of WMD beyond 

classical NBC, especially not in advance, because this could lead to charges by foreign actors 

that U.S. military R&D was developing WMD and these allegations could politically 

constrain future U.S. choices of weapons that did not fit the classical definition of WMD. To 

reduce U.S. defense flexibility by redefining WMD in advance, they argued, would be 

imprudent. 

WMD Proliferation Drivers

In the sample of studies, three different kinds of variables were associated with WMD 

proliferation as drivers (or inhibitors) among state actors: 

 Internal factors such as the motives of governments, often seeking WMD to counter 

perceived external threats, or in some cases to elevate status, and the availability of 

internal resources and other capabilities to pursue WMD; 

 External factors, such as objective threats from larger, heavily-armed or aggressive 

neighbors, the occurrence of war, and externally provided security, if available; and 

 Exogenous factors, such as globalization and technology diffusion, that increase 

technical availability or access to WMD knowledge and technologies. All of the 

studies seemed to agree that some mix of these factors would drive most WMD 

proliferation in states. 

The studies exhibited no wide or sharp disagreements overall on what should be included as 

relevant drivers, but there were some differences among the studies in the drivers that were 

treated as paramount for analytical and forecasting purposes. For instance, the narrower 

science-based BW studies – Living Nightmares: Biological Threats (1999), Biotechnology: Impact on 

Biological Warfare (2003), and the BW component of Air Force Futures Project: Emerging WMD 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-22 WMD FORECASTING 

Technologies (2007) – tended to share a view that the diffusion of biological science and 

dropping costs of scientific exploration and bioengineering would open doors to advanced 

biological weapons and techniques that would be pursued by bad actors as a matter of 

course – a line of reasoning bordering on technological determinism for BW proliferation. 

Assessments of broader scope, such as the 2001 and 2007 DIA statements, as well as 

Mapping the Global Future – Report of NIC’s 2020 Project (2004), and the ballistic missile 

forecasts, tended to emphasize globalization factors as drivers of technological opportunity, 

but generally were focused on the motives and settings of particular state actors for 

explanations of the drivers of their forecasts of where BW and other forms of WMD 

acquisition could be expected. 

Those studies that focused most specifically on nuclear proliferation generally paid more 

attention to state motivations and security variables than to globalization factors as the key 

nuclear proliferation drivers. Several of these nuclear-specific studies, notably the Nuclear 

Tipping Point (2004) and The Changing Face of Proliferation (2005), emphasized the role of U.S. 

security alliances or assurances with allies and friends as a counter to state motivations for 

nuclear weapons capability stemming from external security threats. But this factor of U.S. 

security provision was not available to a number of state actors forecast to be likely nuclear 

proliferators, and The Changing Face of Proliferation noted in its survey that the earlier 

importance of U.S. security provision as a barrier to nuclear proliferation has diminished in 

the current era. This study also noted that the single most powerful driver of a burst of new 

nuclear proliferation could be an event in which nuclear weapons are used – successfully. 

On the question of what may drive terrorist interest in acquiring WMD, there were no 

noteworthy differences in the studies. The motivations of non-state actors were considered 

the primary driver. At the same time, the forecasts that dealt with the subject of terrorist 

WMD potential often were concerned with the possible avenues of terrorist acquisition of 

WMD, and typically reflected the concern about eventual leakage of nuclear weapons grade 

material or even removal of nuclear weapons themselves from nuclear weapons states by 

insider theft and black marketeering, or terrorist infiltration and intrusion into nuclear or 

other WMD storage sites. 

One BW study, Prospects for Biological War in the Middle East (2002), argued that the drivers of 

BW acquisition and the drivers of BW use are not necessarily the same and may be quite 

different. This scenario-based analysis of prospective use of WMD in a hypothetical regional 

conflict stood out from the others in that most of the studies were limited to forecasts of 

where state WMD proliferation was most likely to occur rather than forecasts of what might 

transpire in subsequent conflicts with (or between) WMD-armed states. 

Disagreement on Other Matters Relevant to WMD Forecasting

One of the more unusual assessed studies – Thwarting an ‘Evil Genius,’ the sole study 

mandated to try to ascertain what an “evil genius” could do were he to organize an attack on 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-23

 

the United States homeland that exploits U.S. vulnerabilities for maximum psychological and 

political effects2 -- went at least partly beyond the WMD proliferation focus of the other 

assessed studies to consider orchestrated attacks on the homeland with conventional 

methods, not only WMD. This should not necessarily be construed as a disagreement with 

the main body of forecasts of WMD proliferation. But as an effort to think outside the box, 

the participants in this study identified a number of potentially catastrophic threat scenarios, 

several of which did not depend on WMD use at all. 

 

This study’s “thought process” would lead its audience to consider that some of the most 

dangerous threats to the domestic stability of the United States could come from clever 

attacks (e.g., a sustained campaign of bombings of school children) that did not depend on 

WMD. It did not suggest that WMD proliferation was any less important a threat to U.S. 

national security, merely that huge societal injury could be inflicted by attacks using more 

mundane techniques. The implication for WMD forecasting is that the same pool of highly 

intelligent hostile actors that might consider using WMD to strike at U.S. vulnerabilities 

could also consider using other means and techniques for equally profound objectives. In 

constructing a forecast of WMD use, the conclusions of this study, it could be seen as 

narrowing the odds of forecasted WMD use in pursuit of objectives that could also be 

pursued by non-WMD means. 

How confidently the United States can rely on deterrence of WMD use by states and nonstate actors has been an area of controversy and could have been a subject of forecasts and 

disagreements. In fact, many of the assessed studies showed some awareness of the issue, 

but none addressed it as a focal issue or as a forecast. Generally the studies that touched on 

this issue seemed to agree that U.S. efforts to deter rogue state use of WMD against the 

United States or its forces could be expected to be effective, although they probably would 

not be conclusive under all conditions, especially under active war conditions. Generally the 

studies would also agree that U.S. means of deterrence could not be counted on to deter 

terrorist use of WMD. 

 

Wild Cards and Potential for Surprise 

Most of the assessed studies acknowledged the potential importance of surprises in the 

WMD domain as generic factors or abstract conditions that could alter WMD proliferation 

outcomes. Only a small number of the assessed studies identified possible surprises as 

concrete events or milestones that can be readily described. The few studies that dealt with 

surprise more concretely flagged potential surprises in the following areas: 

 

2 The participants in this workshop were told to craft scenarios of what an “evil genius” (a lone malefactor or 

an organized terrorist group) could do to damage American society and government. They were given only two 

restrictive parameters, first that the attacks had to be conceivable in the next five years, and they had to employ 

existing technology. 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-24 WMD FORECASTING 

 The technologies that could produce new types of WMD, and those new types of weapons or methods 

of employment. The findings of the science-based biological studies that illuminated 

advanced biological warfare agents, methods of employing them and the challenges 

to response probably would not pose surprise to specialists in this subject – at least 

not today – but might to the larger national security community of WMD and policy 

analysts. However, the futuristic findings of the Air Force Futures Project on 

prospective WMD technologies and methods of employment surely contained some 

items that would surprise the broader national security community, particularly in the 

areas of nano-weapons, “swarm-attack” operational methods, and novel longdistance propulsion technologies. 

 The effects on the international system of a “surge” of new nuclear proliferation. Two of the 

nuclear proliferation-focused studies, The Nuclear Tipping Point and The Changing Face of 

Proliferation, address surprise at the systemic or macro level. The idea of a nuclear 

tipping point itself points to a looming potential surprise of a collapse of 

nonproliferation regime elements and a burst of nuclear proliferation by states – a 

threshold that the forecasters believe is possible but hope is avoidable. The central 

argument of the authors of The Nuclear Tipping Point was that while reaching a tipping 

point is possible, it is also possible that appropriate policy actions and commitment 

by the United States and the international community could entirely avert it. Part of 

the basis for this argument is that many of the factors that states weigh in decisions 

on whether to acquire WMD would lean against doing so, and is illustrated by states 

like South Africa and Libya reversing course to give up former WMD programs. The 

Changing Face of Proliferation offered a number of surprise-oriented vignettes, but a key 

one related to forecasting whether (and why) a tipping point could be reached was its 

judgment that the free-good value of U.S. security provision that once played a 

paramount role as an inhibitor of new nuclear proliferation has been significantly 

depreciated in the perceptions of the international community. 

 The possible effects of an actual WMD use (especially nuclear use) on subsequent proliferation 

decisions by state actors, and on efforts to rally the international community to prevent further 

WMD proliferation. A closely related “wildcard” point was that the next “successful” 

use of a nuclear weapon could be a critical driver of wider and more accelerated 

proliferation. But it could also serve to catalyze stronger nonproliferation responses, 

a point emphasized in The Changing Face of Proliferation, which addresses how WMD 

surprise events could be an ally of nonproliferation goals provided the international 

community is ready to act and act intelligently. Forecasting real possibilities 

imaginatively and in an anticipatory mode is actually demonstrated in this article as a 

way of making it a tool of potentially effective policy response. The article suggests 

that the key anticipatory issue in how to bend the outcomes of our current forecasts 

in a favorable direction is being prepared to deal with a generic WMD surprise – 

especially a WMD use event, such as the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945, or 

a terrorist or rogue state’s first known use of biological weapons against the United 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-25

 

States. Surprises can work in a favorable direction. A messy first use of biological 

weapons by a terrorist organization, for example, might be used to turn the leaders 

of BW-aspiring states, even rogue states, away from considering use or retention of 

those weapons. Similarly, intelligent international response to the first use of nuclear 

weapons since 1945, perhaps in South Asia, or perhaps closer to home, could be 

used to characterize and remediate the event where it occurs, while galvanizing 

stronger international controls against further proliferation. 

 New kinds of organizations that might be formed by proliferator states to enhance their acquisition 

of WMD capabilities, and new security relationships between emerging nuclear states and their allies 

or clients that could result from new WMD proliferation in the international system. Both The 

Changing Face of Proliferation and the Naval Postgraduate symposium on Nuclear 

Weapons Proliferation: 2016 anticipate related WMD developments that might surprise 

many national security observers who do not follow proliferation closely. The 

disclosures of the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network led authors in these two 

studies to consider how other offshore phenomena made plausible by globalization 

could emerge to enable proliferation by determined states, e.g., through use of 

offshore sites for nuclear explosive testing, or offshore facilities to conceal 

production of nuclear components. The Changing Face of Proliferation also anticipates 

surprise by delineating scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used by 

protagonists in coup-making or civil war within emerging nuclear powers such as 

Pakistan, and suggests the likelihood of a proliferation nexus being formed with 

criminal organizations. With respect to new relationships where the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella does not exist, the two studies note the surprising possibility that an 

emerging nuclear power like Pakistan might provide extended nuclear deterrence to 

Saudi Arabia to offset the effects of a nuclear weapons program in Iran. More 

specific state-related surprises in the 2016 Symposium’s section on Southeast Asia 

include the possibility that recently growing nuclear transactions between China and 

Burma (or Myanmar) could pose an eventual WMD proliferation threat, and the 

assessment that Indonesia’s efforts to build a civil nuclear power program probably 

would not. The Latin America section of the 2016 Symposium identifies Venezuela 

potentially as a nuclear proliferation problem. 

 New ways of attacking U.S. domestic vulnerabilities that rank order unconventional homeland 

threats, some employing WMD and others more mundane means. The Thwarting an ‘Evil 

Genius’ report identified and ranked several types of attack that would represent 

surprises in their ingenuity and in the ways in which they contrast with the typical 

planning against homeland threats attributed to al-Qaeda terrorists. The types of 

attack ranked in order of “greatest risk” were: 

1. The Kiddie Bomb – a foreign or home-grown terrorist recruits small cells 

of like-minded individuals to launch a sustained campaign of school bus 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-26 WMD FORECASTING 

bombings. The campaign adapts/escalates to include other target classes 

such as churches, sporting events, etc.., to undermine public confidence in 

government. 

2. Synthesized, Resistant, Hard to Detect Smallpox – a malevolent 

individual bent on mass killing develops and releases a new strain of 

smallpox. 

3. Dual Campaign of Dirty Bombs and Nuclear Threat – a group of 

terrorists, possibly with state support, orchestrates a campaign of attacks 

across the United States, detonating radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). 

The aims are to inflict economic damage and to exploit public fear of 

radiation. To exacerbate anxiety, the terrorists plant traces of highly-enriched 

uranium and claim to have a fission bomb. The group relies on American 

media to whip up public hysteria of imminent nuclear attack. 

4. Attacks with Dual Bio Agents against Mega-Malls – an anti-globalist 

loner recruits unwitting accomplices to infect 3-4 U.S. shopping malls with 

two different types of biological agents. The aim is to damage the American 

economy during the critical holiday shopping period. Use of dual bio agents 

delays prompt identification and treatment of the infected. 

5. The Perception Bomb – an internal or external group infects a small 

number of migrant workers in the United States and Mexico with a 

contagious viral disease to fuel public demand for border closure. The attack 

is intended to create economic disruption and exacerbate societal tensions. 

6. Serial Arson Campaign – a loner conducts an ongoing campaign to set 

buildings, whole neighborhoods, and the countryside ablaze in an effort to 

inflict casualties, property loss, indirect economic costs, and otherwise 

disrupt society. 

7. Civil Aviation—Nuke—Iran – an Islamist group bent on provoking U.S. 

military operations against the Muslim world uses corporate jets rigged with 

shaped charges to damage or destroy 2-3 U.S. nuclear power reactors. The 

operation is conducted under a “false flag” to implicate Tehran, thereby 

provoking U.S. military “retaliation” against Iran. 

8. The Katrina Bomb – a hostile element launches an opportunistic attack 

against a region stricken by a natural disaster to amplify the consequences. 

9. Variegated Kaczynski – an exceptionally bright domestic terrorist launches 

a campaign of attacks against schoolchildren and infrastructure targets using 

such low-tech means as a sniper rifle, incendiary devices, and bombs. 

Operating alone, this terrorist is extremely difficult to detect beforehand and 

to pursue even after his campaign becomes clear. 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-27

 

These nine imaginative conceptions of how an “evil genius” – whether as an 

individual or with the support of a dedicated group – might seek to harm the United 

States fundamentally, weaken the resolve of the government, and create social 

distrust are aptly framed to test for logical gaps in homeland security threat 

anticipation and response planning. The conceptions are not forecasts, of course, in 

the usual sense of that term. 

Observations on Methodology 

The sample of assessed studies contained a variety of traditional analytical methodologies for 

forecasting future WMD conditions. Table 2 lists the general features of the methodologies 

employed (bearing in mind that some studies had two or more of these general traits at the 

same time). 

Table 2. General Methodology Traits 

Estimative Intelligence 4 

Collective Judgment 8 

Individual Judgment 6 

Trend Analysis 5 

Technology-Threat Inferences 4 

Quantitative Data Analysis 2 

Alternative Futures (Scenarios) 4 

Sen. Lugar Polling NP Experts 1 

Estimative Intelligence simply refers to the institutional methodology underlying intelligence 

projections based on assessments of technical as well as political-military sources. Collective 

Judgment refers to the methodological use of panels of experts or a symposium of authors to 

generate the forecasts. Individual Judgment refers to a study produced by an individual expert 

(or pair of experts), usually based in a think tank or in academia. Trend Analysis refers to 

studies that based their forecasts on extrapolating trends, focused usually on real world 

WMD technology acquisitions and political trends in key states and regions. The 

methodology of Technology-Threat Inferences refers to the science- and technology-based studies 

that forecast new types of WMD expected to emerge in due course from natural science and 

engineering trends. Quantitative Data Analysis refers to studies that applied statistical analysis 

to country data sets to determine which variables have driven WMD proliferation in the past 

and could be expected to in the future. Alternative Futures (Scenarios) refers to studies that 

employed scenarios to visualize future possibilities that would not be easily discerned in the 

extrapolation of trends. Quite different from all the others, one study sponsored by Senator 

Lugar polled national security experts to generate forecasts about WMD outcomes at home. 

What may be of greater interest here, however, is a qualitative discussion of how the study 

methodologies performed, either to forecast the status of contemporary WMD proliferation, 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-28 WMD FORECASTING 

or to generate key questions about what to look for in anticipating future changes in the 

scope, rate and patterns of future WMD proliferation. As a caveat, if one were looking 

beyond what was already known for relatively precise and concrete forecasts of who would 

have, or use, one or another kind of NBC by a date certain, none of the forecasts 

represented here stood out as particularly trenchant, specific, or satisfying. This is not to 

belittle their utility. We probably would be far more adrift in our threat assessments, strategic 

warning sensibility, and response planning without these studies and others like them. But 

one would have to infer that WMD forecasting to date does little to resolve the prevalent 

uncertainties in the real world of WMD players. The art and science of forecasting WMD 

developments probably can be improved upon, but it seems unlikely that it will ever be akin 

to a crystal ball. 

Following are more specific observations about the how the study methodologies made 

forecasts and generated key questions. 

Forecasts of WMD Proliferation Status

The studies based on estimative intelligence and trend analysis go a long way toward 

portraying the actual distribution of WMD capability among particular states and regions of 

concern, and mapping the technical trends in the countries of concern. If one asked whether 

any of these studies overlooked a country or regional WMD proliferation trend that 

retrospectively appears to be critical, the answer would be no. If there were accuracy issues 

in the studies’ forecasts of WMD and missile capabilities, they may have been on the high 

side in particular cases (as with Iraq prior to the discoveries on the ground following the 

March 2003 invasion, or in the forecasts that attempted to provide specific timeframes for 

ICBM development in Iran and North Korea), but they were not necessarily wrong on 

judgments about regime intent or the direction of technical trends. They were also largely 

effective in depicting what was technically possible, and therefore on what long-term early 

warning would need to look for. They were unable to estimate whether and when North 

Korea would test a nuclear device, or to predict Iran’s transit of uranium enrichment 

thresholds, but they were on track in describing WMD and missile programs and emerging 

capabilities, and indicating their implications. They were also indisputably on track in 

flagging the potential WMD-related instabilities in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the 

Middle East. 

Arguably, the areas of greatest weakness in the studies based on estimative intelligence and 

trend analysis was in the depth of their political analysis. This is not necessarily a 

shortcoming of the methodology employed, however. Rather it probably is due in large part 

to the intrinsic difficulty of predicting political outcomes with any methodology. It could 

also be attributed partly, however, to institutional insufficiency of resources devoted to 

gathering and analyzing political data on less familiar parts of the world. All of these studies 

noted certain possibilities of surprise, such as a WMD use in Northeast Asia or in conflict 

between India and Pakistan, hypothetical contingencies no well-informed WMD analyst 

would take objection to. None anticipated Libya’s WMD proliferation-reversal in 2004, or 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-29

 

forecast the disclosure and extent of the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. None 

alluded to the possibility disclosed as a factual judgment in a recent NIE that Iran in 2003 

closed down a previously active nuclear weapons design program. 

Several studies relied on collective judgment (panels of experts) and alternative futures 

analysis as integral parts of their methodology. This collective judgment feature lends itself 

to addressing larger questions about the future of WMD proliferation. For instance, the 

Nuclear Tipping Point study – written by individual authors but under a collective framework 

of key questions – attempted to forecast the likelihood, or more precisely the contextual 

conditions under which, the nuclear nonproliferation regime might collapse in a sudden 

burst of nuclear proliferation. This analysis included the earlier history of states that started 

and then gave up nuclear weapons programs on both political and security grounds, and 

probed the circumstances that might lead states that have complied with the NPT to 

reconsider and exit from the regime. The net forecast of the study is at least mildly optimistic 

that a tipping point can be avoided. But the methodological significance of this study for 

WMD forecasting is its emphasis on the critical importance of political factors that work to 

shape proliferation decisions that serve to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons. In 

another collective judgment study using individual authors, Rebecca Hersman makes the 

point on the importance of political factors in her chapter differently – that “rollback” in a 

proliferator state like Taiwan or South Korea “is a process, not an outcome or state of being.”3

 

The current political intent could change, and go back into a proliferation gear. Taiwan and 

South Korea are regarded as likely backsliders if a tipping point is reached. 

Another collective judgment study, Mapping the Global Future – Report of NIC’s 2020 Project, 

also addresses larger questions, aided by the use of a large array of participants in various 

phases of the project. Its focus was on globalization and the drivers of geopolitical changes, 

with WMD threats only one of several concerns. The depicted geopolitical trends and 

changes are a useful contextual backdrop for political and military analysis of the impact of 

proliferation outbreaks on regional security dynamics. This study also utilized the alternative 

futures or scenarios methodology to enrich and presumably to test specific forecasts in the 

workshops that were held. It dedicated one scenario entitled A New Caliphate to sharpen 

understandings of future challenges to governance from Islamic political forces, and another 

entitled Cycle of Fear to illuminate potential WMD dangers and set its WMD forecasts in a 

more evocative context. 

Most of the assessed studies shared similar judgments about the prospects of non-state 

actors, especially terrorists, gaining access to or using WMD. None of the studies offered a 

unique methodology for dealing with this subject. None of the assessed studies dealt 

exclusively with terrorists, either. While forecasts in this area of WMD and terrorism were 

 

3 Rebecca K.C. Hersman and Robert Peters, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese 

Rollback,” in Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 (see bibliography for full citation), 

pp. 539-554. 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-30 WMD FORECASTING 

fairly general, they tended to converge on the expectation that terrorist attacks using WMD 

would eventually occur, and probably in the near future. The forecasts did not assign relative 

probabilities to terrorist use of N, B, or C, or even RDD. Some studies did expect that 

innovation would characterize terrorist attacks, but also that these might just as easily use 

conventional explosives or take advantage, as the 9/11 attackers did with fully fueled 

passenger aircraft, of the built-in destructive potential in the surroundings. 

Yet another use of collective judgment, by the Air Force Futures Project: Emerging WMD 

Technologies study, was to structure and extract from a highly-expert debate about hypothetical 

WMD outcomes of technological evolution. Panels of experts in relevant technologies were 

enlisted and pressed to agree or disagree on whether expected future developments in cybertechnology, nanotechnology, and advanced energy-release technologies would be realized, 

what these developments would consist of, and whether their use could produce new types 

or new kinds of WMD. This led to a clearer understanding of the boundaries between 

weapons of mass disruption and of true mass destruction, and between enablers of WMD 

and true WMD. This gave the authors an opportunity to reach their own conclusions on 

how to classify potential new weapons and to discuss the practical advisability of expanding 

the definition of WMD. In summarizing their results, the authors were also able to portray 

how certain new technologies and modes of utilization could present foreseeable challenges 

to the Air Force, and also how some of them could be used by the Air Force itself. 

The two quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation by academic authors, Correlates of Nuclear 

Proliferation (2004) and Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation (2007), were not designed to 

be forecasts of the future status of nuclear proliferation around the world. Rather, their 

purpose was to use rigorous quantitative methods to drill down in uniformly structured 

“country” data sets, collected in time series on the past, to determine which variables best 

explained relevant state-level decisions to proliferate, hedge, or abstain. To the extent the 

explanatory variables could be shown to be powerful, the presumption was that they could 

have forecasting utility for the future, using updated data. These studies generally found that 

the best traditional analysis of proliferation motivations – particularly on security variables – 

was already on the mark, or close to it, and that their own findings in that respect added 

nothing dramatically new or different. Still, they contained a few minor surprises that could 

be food for thought, either in critiquing the quantitative methods and data they used or in 

interpreting or improving on traditional proliferation analyses. The Determinants study’s 

findings, for instance, suggested counter-intuitively that states already facing nuclear-armed 

rivals are more likely to desist than proliferate. More plausibly, this study also found that 

democratic states are less likely to proliferate if they do not already have a nuclear weapons 

program, and more likely to proliferate if they already have such a program. It found the 

strongest driver of nuclear proliferation to be the rise of an external conventional military 

threat, the thrust of which few experts would disagree with. 

The two studies in this particular sample of statistically oriented quantitative studies were 

quite ingenious in their definitions, variables, and use of regression, but disappointing in 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-31

 

their paucity of novel findings. Statistical analysis of country data of the past to model the 

future probably is going to be only as good as the data collected and the meaningfulness of 

the variables specified. This type of statistical analysis may be useful for heuristic purposes in 

thinking about future motivations and drivers, but is unlikely to be a reliable means of 

forecasting real world proliferation. Other quantitative data analysis methods and data sets, 

such as content analysis of national statements and media reports, or public opinion survey 

data, may prove useful to WMD forecasting but were not represented and are not evaluated 

here. 

 

Generating Key Questions 

A relatively small number of the studies used methodologies that were suitable for framing 

innovative or unconventional questions about the future of WMD proliferation and 

potential use of WMD. Estimative intelligence, trend analysis, and technological 

extrapolation face natural limits in forecasting how proliferation conditions and the 

challenges they could pose may change unexpectedly. It can be highly useful to use 

intelligent types of conjecture, thoughtfully structured scenarios, and other stimuli to 

imagination to envision alternative futures. Out of the box thinking can be ignited by a 

serendipitous leap of imagination but it can also be elicited in well-led structured exercises. 

In the same vein, state decision-making and interaction patterns on WMD could also be 

modeled to project reactions to newly introduced conditions – a kind of futures 

methodology unrepresented in our sample. Modeling methodologies would not necessarily 

produce real world WMD forecasts, but could, in principle, go a long way to define and test 

contingent forecasts, such as hypotheses on how certain states of concern might react to a 

hostile use of WMD on a vital target on their territories, or to nuclear explosive testing by a 

neighbor. Examining those models and their results could be valuable for sensitivity training 

of analysts and efforts to forecast future developments. 

Three of the assessed studies were particularly fertile in reciting or eliciting imaginative 

thought about the future of WMD, and represent methodologies that are suitable for 

generating key questions about how the WMD proliferation terrain or WMD weaponry may 

change. A fourth study that focused narrowly on how a conflict in the Middle East involving 

BW use might evolve was also well configured to pose key questions about WMD use that 

have not been settled. Consider each in turn. 

Perhaps the most imaginative of all in the sample of studies assessed, The Changing Face of 

Proliferation: Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations (2005), raised key questions about the future 

of WMD proliferation in four areas: What would be a suitable way to denominate WMD 

actors – state and non-state -- to reflect their motivations and character on the emerging 

proliferation stage, incidentally moving beyond the overly simple “rogue state” terminology? 

What might actors from each denomination do with WMD? How may transnational 

opportunities alter WMD acquisition and production structures? And how might the next 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-32 WMD FORECASTING 

WMD use – especially a first nuclear use by a state since 1945 -- affect the future decisions 

of WMD proliferators and of the anti-proliferation community? This study invents new 

captions for the types of actors on the proliferation stage, distilling 

WMD-related motives and geopolitical tendencies.. At the state level they comprise the 

Reformed Proliferators, the Status Seekers, the Tough-Minded Independents, the Reluctant 

Non-Proliferators, the Newly Threatened Good Guys, the New Global Powers, Not the 

Last and Not the Least, and the Renunciationists. Likewise, the non-state characters include 

Islamist Revivalist-Restorationists, the Islamic Freelancers, Apocalyptic Movements, 

National Liberationists-Rebels, Home Grown Extremists, Criminal Organizations, and 

Coup-Makers. The study goes on to speculate about how these actors might behave with 

WMD under prospective conditions, how best to characterize the challenges they will 

present, and how to visualize responses to actual WMD use that could shape the 

environment in desirable ways. This essay is a model of how to elicit a deeper understanding 

of what the WMD future may look like, and how to stimulate creative thinking about 

response. 

A second unusually fertile study in eliciting unconventional ways to visualize the WMD 

future is Thwarting an ‘Evil Genius’ (2006), already commented on at some length in the 

section above on “Wild Cards and Potentials for Surprise.” This study is narrowly structured 

to anticipate near-term threats to the homeland and includes but is not restricted to WMD 

technologies. Its methodology of setting participants loose to simulate how an “evil genius” 

using current technology could do the most damage to American self-confidence, social 

cohesion, and political culture produced unusually insightful results. The scenarios are well 

designed to challenge and expand the thinking of those who have the responsibility for 

planning and executing response. 

The third study that is methodologically designed to stimulate imaginative inquiry is the Air 

Force Futures Project (2007), focused on future WMD technologies, particularly the physical. 

This study has also been commented on earlier. Part of its virtue is to expand the 

understanding of future potential forms of WMD and conceivable employment mechanisms. 

By doing so, it forces creative thought about response. Its methodological use of expert 

interviews on the evolution of new technologies also led to a key question about the 

adequacy of the present definition of WMD and a tentative implication for policy that 

retaining the present definition may be prudent, at least for the time being. 

The fourth study to merit attention here as a generator of key questions is Prospects of 

Biological War in the Middle East (2002). The central question this study addressed was: How 

likely is the use of BW by a regional state against the United States or its allies, and what 

form could that WMD use take in the event of another serious conflict in the Middle East? 

There are a number of historical cases of CW use in the Middle East since World War II, but 

no known cases so far of BW use in a military conflict. The presumption has been that state 

use of BW against the United States has been deterred (e.g., in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 

in 1991 and 2003), and will be deterred again if needed. But the reliability of this deterrence 
Contemporary WMD Forecasting: 

Themes, Projections, and Findings 

WMD FORECASTING IV-33

 

proposition against WMD-armed regional powers has become increasingly controversial. 

This study walks through the calculus of a hostile BW-armed regional power at various 

stages in a conflict in which the United States intervenes, to show that it is plausible to 

anticipate BW use by the regional power under certain circumstances, which the study 

dissects methodically. This study models the kind of contingency analysis of BW military use 

at one or another stage of a live conflict that U.S. military planners will have to apply to 

every BW-armed regional power that emerges when U.S. intervention in its neighborhood is 

plausible. 

How Have WMD Forecasts Changed Since 9/11? 

WMD forecasts since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 have 

changed in significant ways. Those studies in our sample that were published after 9/11 

generally show: 

 Greater awareness of and more emphasis in analysis on the potential for future 

spectacular terrorist threats to the homeland; 

 Greater acceptance of the credibility of terrorist acquisition of WMD, and of the 

likelihood of terrorist use of WMD inside the United States and Western countries 

generally; and 

 Elevation of terrorist WMD threats to “strategic status,” at least in U.S. intelligence 

statements and in the analytical work on WMD sponsored directly or indirectly by 

the U.S. Government. 

Not surprisingly, most of the new emphasis on terrorism focused on al-Qaeda and other 

Islamic extremist groups. However, the more disciplined studies also included references to 

Aum Shinrikyo, secular terrorists, and home-grown terrorists. No forecasts attempt to 

measure the probability of WMD terrorist attacks succeeding in their objectives, or failing. 

On choices of methodology for analysis and forecasting, there were no obvious differences 

between studies in the sample prepared before 9/11 and those prepared later. 
Section IV 

Contemporary Assessments – Synthesis Paper 

IV-34 WMD FORECASTING 
Executive Summary of Report 

of Rumsfeld Commission 

WMD FORECASTING V - 1

Section V: Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

Executive Summary of Report of Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic 

Missile Threat to the United States 

In Rumsfeld Commission, Washington, D.C. 

U.S. Congress, 1998 

Overview 

The 307-page full Report of the Commission is classified and accompanied by two classified 

appendices, as well as an unclassified Appendix III of working papers. This assessment is of 

the unclassified Executive Summary only. 

Commissioned By 

U.S. Congress, pursuant to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, PL 

104-201, Section 1321(g). 

Purpose and Objectives 

To assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to 

the United States. The ballistic missile threats examined by the Commission included those 

deployed on the territory of potentially hostile states; those that could be launched from a 

surface vessel or submarine operating off the U.S. coasts, or from an aircraft; and, those 

deployed by a potentially hostile nation on the territory of a third party to reduce the range 

required to strike the United States. The Commission examined the potential of existing and 

emerging powers to arm ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC). The Commission noted but 

excluded examination of the cruise missile threat and excluded assessment of the impact of 

the ballistic missile threat on U.S. military strategy and doctrine or U.S. policy issues 

associated with response to the threat. 

Timeframe Examined 

The Commission did not specify a future time-frame for its assessment, but made 

forecasting judgments looking out 5, 10, 15 or more years, varying implicitly according to the 

information available about the ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and infrastructure or 

behavior of each assessed country and the trends in diffusion of technology. 

Prevailing Context 

The domestic context for the study was controversy in the U.S. Congress and policy 

community circa 1997 about growing international ballistic missile and WMD threats and 

dissatisfaction surrounding the absence of construction of a U.S. strategic defense shield 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-2 WMD FORECASTING 

against ballistic missiles. The study also stemmed from dissatisfaction over perceived 

limitations of earlier National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) in projecting – with sufficient 

warning time – long-range and unconventional ballistic missile threats to U.S. territory and 

to U.S. interests overseas. Additionally, there were many international factors driving the 

study. Concerns at the strategic level included Russia’s reported retention of biological 

warfare capabilities and revival of Russian policies that implied nuclear response to 

conventional war, and growing Chinese prowess with space systems. Concerns about the 

infrastructure for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and stockpiling had 

been accentuated by the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war and the results of international 

inspections of missile and WMD programs in Iraq after the first Gulf War. More 

immediately pressing was wider proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities and acceleration 

of the North Korean and Iranian ballistic missile programs to develop long-range ballistic 

missiles with prospective ICBM and WMD payload capability. 

Methodology 

The methodology was ultimately the use of a senior and experienced panel to extract and 

formulate qualitative propositions about prospective or projected ballistic missile and WMD 

threats. It aimed to access a wide range of opinion and the greatest possible depth and 

breadth of analysis. In comparison with earlier IC estimates, the Commission’s findings 

diverge due to “use of a somewhat more comprehensive methodology in assessing ballistic 

missile development and deployment programs.” This approach, unique at the time for 

estimative intelligence, took fuller “account of three crucial factors shaping new ballistic 

missile threats to the United States”: 

 Newer ballistic missile and WMD development programs do not follow the 

patterns and the high standards of U.S. and former Soviet programs with respect 

to missile accuracy, reliability, and safety, nor produce large numbers of missiles, 

and therefore can deploy more rapidly (or with shorter warning). 

 Nations currently attempting to develop ballistic missiles and WMD can avail 

themselves of technical assistance from outside sources (shortening time frames to 

deployment). 

 Nations developing ballistic missiles and WMD can now conceal important 

elements of their programs and are highly motivated to do so (reducing timely 

warning). 

 

Executive Summary Format 

I. Charter and Organization 

II. Executive Summary: 

 A. Conclusions of the Commissioners 

 B. The Commission and its Methods 

 C. New Threats in a Transformed Security Environment 

 1. Geopolitical change and role for ballistic missiles 

 2. Russia 

 3. China 
Executive Summary of Report 

of Rumsfeld Commission 

WMD FORECASTING V - 3

 4. Countries with Scud-based missile infrastructures 

 a. North Korea 

 b. Iran 

 c. Iraq 

 5. India 

 6. Pakistan 

 D. A New Nonproliferation Environment 

 1. Increased competence and trade among emerging ballistic missile 

 powers 

 2. United States as a contributor to proliferation 

 3. Motives of countries of concern 

 4. Readier market access to technology 

 5. Availability of classified information and export-controlled technology 

 E. Alternative Ballistic Missile Launch Modes 

 F. Erosion of Warning 

 G. Methodology 

 H. Summary 

 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire 

Some countries with regional ambitions oppose the U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their 

regions and see the acquisition of missile and WMD technology as a means of restricting U.S. 

capability to project power or influence in those regions. Since the Cold War, the geopolitical 

environment and the roles of ballistic missiles and WMD have evolved. Ballistic missiles 

provide a cost-effective delivery system for both conventional and non-conventional 

weapons. Nations seeking to block the projection of U.S. power will combine ballistic 

missiles with WMD in the belief these can provide a strategic counter to U.S. conventional 

and information-based military superiority.

Regions/countries of greatest concern 

The countries of greatest concern include: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India and 

Pakistan. (The summary mentions that Syria and Libya are also addressed as countries of 

concern, but detailed information about these nations is only found in the classified report.) 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, and Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

The Commission was concerned primarily with NBC forms of WMD and with their delivery 

by ballistic missiles, particularly long-range ballistic missiles. The unclassified summary 

suggests that the Commission was also concerned about the proliferation of cruise missiles 

but more directly concerned with ballistic missiles as delivery systems, and did not address 

other forms of delivery. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-4 WMD FORECASTING 

Acquisition patterns/trends 

The assessment generally highlights the widespread availability of ballistic missile 

technologies from a variety of suppliers on a commercial or closely-held government-togovernment basis as a fact, in contrast to the past when export controls may have made a 

difference. These available technologies include: Scud infrastructure and scaled-up versions 

of the Scud missile; the reported availability of former Soviet SS-4 solid-fuel MRBM 

technology; solid-fuel missiles produced for export by China; Indian exploitation of U.S.-

origin Scout rocket technology; reported Russian cooperation with India on SLBM 

technology; and the availability of various West European rocket technologies and 

components. Acquisition patterns, primary suppliers, and trends are described for recipient 

countries case by case rather than as a global system. These patterns and trends are projected 

to continue and possibly to diversify. 

Deterrence and employment concepts 

Emerging powers see ballistic missiles equipped with WMD as highly effective deterrent 

weapons and as a means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the United States. 

Such weapons can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward-based forces and 

their staging areas, and to U.S. friends and allies. The projection is that this perspective on 

hampering U.S. projection of power and influence will intensify. 

Areas for potential surprise 

The key area for “surprise” in the Commission’s assessments is not of the sudden shift in a 

country toward proliferation or the materialization of a WMD weapon system of unfamiliar 

type but rather the general problem of eroding and shortening of warning time between the 

decision to acquire and the effective deployment of a threatening WMD-equipped ballistic 

missile system by a hostile emerging power. This is due in the case of contemporary 

emerging powers to their typically low standards for proof and testing of systems in 

development and the small number of units produced or procured to deploy a threat, as well 

as to their capability and determination to conceal these systems. 

Specific assessments with implicit or conditional forecasts (assumes trends will continue and 

are accelerating)

Russia 

The country is in a precarious transition that could lead either to democracy and stability or 

to a resurgent nationalism. The number of deployed Russian missiles will drop, but Russia 

will modernize and deploy more capable – if fewer – systems. If Russia further deteriorates 

internally, the risk of an accident or loss of control over its missile forces could increase 

sharply and with little warning. Russian export of enabling technologies to countries hostile 

to the United States will continue to be a problem, as exemplified in Russia’s assistance to 

Iran, an action that is perceived to have greatly accelerated Iran’s ballistic missile program. 
Executive Summary of Report 

of Rumsfeld Commission 

WMD FORECASTING V - 5

China 

China’s future is also subject to a range of uncertainties. The U.S. and China are developing a 

more cooperative relationship but significant potential conflicts remain, with China less 

constrained by fear of Russia than in the past. Taiwan is an obvious flashpoint. Chinese 

missile deployments and test firings opposite Taiwan show a confrontational tendency. Like 

Russia, China poses a threat to the United States as a proliferator of ballistic missiles, WMD 

and enabling technologies. These transfers are unlikely to cease. 

North Korea 

The nation is working hard on the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ballistic missile. Once the system is 

assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six months. If North Korea 

considers the test successful, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly, and the United States may 

have very little warning. North Korea has developed and deployed the No Dong, a MRBM 

using a scaled-up Scud engine capable of flying 1,300 km. North Korea tested the No Dong 

only once before deploying it and deployment occurred long before the United States 

recognized the fact. North Korea also poses a major threat as a proliferator of its ballistic 

missiles and related support equipment to countries of concern, including Iran and Pakistan. 

North Korea has an active WMD program, possibly has separated fissile material for one or 

two nuclear weapons, possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, 

and the capability to deploy CW or BW warheads on missiles. 

Iran 

Iran is placing great emphasis on its ballistic missile and WMD programs. Its ballistic missile 

infrastructure is now more advanced than North Korea’s, having benefited from extensive 

Russian and some Chinese assistance. Iran’s Shahab-3 MRBM, like the No Dong, has a 

range of 1,300 km. It could be flight tested at any time and be deployed soon after. Iran has 

the technical capability to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to the TD-2, 

within 5 years of a decision to proceed. Iran has also acquired and is seeking advanced 

missile components (e.g., the RD-214 engine which powered the Russian SS-4 MRBM) that 

can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the United States. 

Iran is developing WMD. It has a nuclear energy and weapons program with aims to design, 

develop and produce nuclear weapons. The main uncertainty at present is whether Iran has 

enough fissile material to produce a weapon. Because of gaps in knowledge, the U.S. is 

unlikely to know whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons until after the fact. Iran’s civil 

nuclear program is under IAEA safeguards, but it could be used as a source of sufficient 

fissile material to construct a small number of weapons within the next ten years, if Iran is 

willing to violate safeguards. If Iran could accumulate enough fissile material from foreign 

sources, it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only one to three years. Iran also 

has an active CW development and production program, and is conducting research into 

biological weapons. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-6 WMD FORECASTING 

Iraq 

The nation has maintained the skills and industrial capabilities to reconstitute its long-range 

ballistic missile program, though its plant and equipment are less developed than those of 

North Korea or Iran as a result of actions forced by UN Resolutions and monitoring. If 

UN-imposed controls are lifted, Iraq could mount a determined effort to acquired plant and 

equipment and could pose an ICBM threat to the United States within 10 years. Prior to 

invading Kuwait, Iraq could have had nuclear weapons in the 1993-1995 timeframe. Iraq has 

the capability to reconstitute its nuclear weapon program, with the speed of reconstitution 

depending on availability of fissile material. It would take several years to build the required 

production facilities from scratch. Iraq also had large CW and BW programs before the war 

and produced CW and BW warheads for its missiles. It could reconstitute these programs 

rapidly following the lifting of sanctions. 

India 

India is developing a variety of ballistic missiles with short to medium and long ranges, and 

ship-launched missiles including a SLBM. Both liquid and solid-fueled types are in 

development. India’s space launch program now provides an ICBM option. India tested 

several nuclear devices and is developing warheads for its missile systems. India also has 

biological and chemical weapons programs. India has acquired and continues to seek Russian, 

U.S. and Western European technology for its missile programs. Russian assistance has 

accelerated India’s missile development and sophistication, and is critical to India’s 

development of a SLBM and related submarine platform. India’s industrial base is diversified, 

and it is in a position to become a supplier of missile technology. Supplier control regimes 

could affect only the rate of acceleration of India’s programs. 

Pakistan 

The country has a more advanced missile infrastructure than North Korea, and can support 

development of a 2,500 km range missile. Success will give Pakistan the technical base for 

developing a much longer range missile system. Through foreign acquisition, Pakistan 

acquired its capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea have been Pakistan’s primary 

sources of ballistic missiles, production facilities, and technology. Pakistan has tested nuclear 

weapons based on highly enriched uranium and has also built a nuclear reactor that could be 

used to produce plutonium. In addition to nuclear weapons, Pakistan has biological and 

chemical weapons programs. Chinese assistance has been crucial to Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons program. 

 

India and Pakistan are not hostile to the United States. Hence the prospect of U.S. military 

confrontation with either seems slight. But the possibility of nuclear war on the subcontinent 

and the nations’ aggressive development of ballistic missiles and WMD pose three concerns: 

1) it enables them to supply relevant technologies to other nations; 2) they may seek 

additional technical assistance from their current major suppliers; 3) their growing missile 

and WMD capabilities have direct effects on U.S. regional and global policies, and could 

affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia. 
Executive Summary of Report 

of Rumsfeld Commission 

WMD FORECASTING V - 7

Emerging Missile Powers 

A new strategic environment now gives the emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, 

through domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. 

within about five years of the decision to acquire such a capability. 

Significant Points

 Changes in the strategic environment have expanded the range of available ballistic 

missile technologies and enabled the acceleration of ballistic missile development 

programs. 

 This coupled with emerging missile powers adopting a different model of 

development and testing, with few tests and low production levels, and 

sophisticated denial and deception, means that the warning time the intelligence 

community once took for granted has drastically eroded. 

 New methods of intelligence assessment are required to evaluate the levels of 

achievement and rate of progress in such programs. 

 Several of the programs of emerging missile powers have actual or inherent ICBM 

capabilities underway. 

 Potential options of emerging missile powers to launch from other countries closer 

to their targets, and sea-launch options close to U.S. shores, need to be taken into 

account in ballistic missile assessments. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The unique aspects of the Rumsfeld Commission’s study were threefold, first to challenge 

the methods and results of the IC on inadequacies in its assessments of the rates and 

patterns of ballistic missile development globally, second, to demonstrate an expanded 

methodology that assesses the patterns of supply and technology diffusion in estimating the 

capacities and rates of development in emerging missile powers, and third, to warn of the 

immediacy of the encroaching strategic threat from emerging missile powers’ growing 

capacity to strike the United States directly with WMD-equipped ballistic missiles. 

Conclusions 

Most of the major conclusions of the Executive Summary are given above under Significant 

Points. The Commission further recommended that U.S. analyses, practices, and policies 

that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment of ballistic missiles be 

reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there 

may be little or no warning. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-8 WMD FORECASTING 
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 

a Guide in Maps and Charts 

WMD FORECASTING V - 9

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, a Guide in Maps and Charts 

Rodney Jones 

Carnegie, 1998 

Commissioned By 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as one of its own study projects and 

publications for public education and substantive relevance to national and international 

security policy and the furtherance of peace, supported by funding from several private 

foundations. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of this book was to provide the most complete and authoritative resource 

available from open sources on the spread of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as 

well as an account of successful nuclear arms reduction and dismantlement in the former 

Soviet states. Tracking Nuclear Proliferation compiles and evaluates technical and political 

developments in the nuclear programs and capabilities of the selected countries with detailed 

open-source reference information on nuclear facilities, technology, materials, and sites in 

countries of concern. While the main focus is nuclear, the country chapters also weave in 

information on other known or suspected WMD capabilities and programs, and a separate 

chapter is devoted to country-specific developments in missile proliferation. The objectives 

of the study were: to increase public knowledge and attention to nuclear proliferation trends; 

provide broad support to public policies and arrangements designed to prevent, arrest or 

control proliferation; and to make available in one place a detailed and objective reference 

work for the use of scholars, experts, think tanks and even public officials. With a broad 

scope, the work contains appendices on the NPT and the results of NPT review conferences, 

the CTBT, IAEA safeguards, nuclear weapon-free zones, Nuclear Supplier organizations and 

export controls, and the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement. 

Timeframe Examined 

1995-2000. The study contains limited proliferation forecasts based on acquisition trend 

analysis looking to the near future. 

Prevailing Context 

The prevailing context at the time was the general glow of the end of the Cold War and 

expansion of arms control arrangements (particularly the INF and START Treaties), with 

the expectation that more effective progress would be made to stop nuclear, missile and 

WMD proliferation. The book emphasized the rising challenges of proliferation. 

Methodology 

Methodology used was a classical policy-oriented compilation of technical, political and 

economic data from open sources and qualitative analysis by non-government experts based 

on an understanding of the technical aspects of nuclear proliferation, trends in technology 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-10 WMD FORECASTING 

acquisition or development, and preventative measures ranging from the NPT and IAEA, 

export controls, and safeguards to diplomatic intervention. The in-house study team had 

considerable expertise on the history of the nonproliferation regime, the special issues of 

dealing with strategic arms control and the former Soviet Union, and the technical and 

political developments related to nuclear and missile proliferation in key regions and the 

reference countries. The study team occasionally solicited outside regional or country 

expertise, as needed, and obtained reviews of work in progress by other experts. 

Report Format 

With a broad scope, the work offered an overview of proliferation trends, new challenges, 

and the proliferation status at the time of potential suppliers and aspiring countries with 

nuclear and missile development programs. The main body tracked proliferation 

developments in specific regions and countries of concern. The countries selected for 

proliferation tracking analysis include Russia and China as classical nuclear weapon states 

and potential suppliers; the denuclearized post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and 

Kazakhstan; and the other countries then considered to be of proliferation concern grouped 

by geographic region: Romania in Eastern Europe; India, Pakistan and North Korea in 

South and East Asia; Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya in the Middle East; Brazil and 

Argentina in Latin America; and South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa. A chapter is devoted to 

each of the seventeen selected countries, together with appendices displaying tabular 

information on nuclear capabilities and a map of known nuclear facilities and sites. The 

larger study also contains a series of appendices on the NPT and the results of review 

conferences, the CTBT, IAEA safeguards, nuclear weapon-free zones, Nuclear Supplier 

organizations and export controls, and the MTCR and Wassenaar Arrangement. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire 

The authors projected that increased international security due to US-Soviet strategic nuclear 

reductions, the end of the Cold War and the denuclearization of the former Soviet Union 

(FSU) states could reduce global proliferation pressures, and they suggested this would be 

most salient in the advanced countries – especially in NATO, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and 

South Africa. Elsewhere, particularly in certain parts of the Middle East, South Asia and the 

Korean peninsula, the tracking analysis indicated that motives for acquiring nuclear weapons 

and missile delivery were growing stronger, and that the 1998 nuclear tests in India and 

Pakistan were not only bound to aggravate arms competition in the subcontinent but also 

likely to increase regional proliferation pressures, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, and 

to pose unprecedented challenges to the nuclear non-nonproliferation regime and the missile 

technology control regime (MTCR). The authors described the dangers of weapons or fissile 

material diversion from Russia and tracked U.S. cooperative threat reduction (CTR) efforts 

to neutralize those threats. The tracking analysis recorded the history of chemical weapon 

acquisitions in Iraq and Iran and the suspected presence in North Korea. 
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 

a Guide in Maps and Charts 

WMD FORECASTING V - 11

Regions/countries of greatest concern

The regions and countries of greatest concern were reflected in the country chapters: Russia 

and China as potential suppliers, India and Pakistan as newly declared nuclear powers, North 

Korea with a covert nuclear capability and as a missile technology exporter, Iran and Iraq as 

likely proliferants, Israel as an undeclared nuclear power, Algeria and Libya as aspiring states, 

and Romania as a suspect ex-Warsaw Pact state with past clandestine acquisition. The study 

did not foresee that Libyan efforts to develop nuclear and WMD programs could be totally 

reversed. 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, delivery means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

This study focused primarily on nuclear weapon programs and secondarily on missile 

delivery systems. It wove in reports of chemical weapons capability in certain country 

reports, but did not assess chemical or biological weapons programs systematically. A 

separate chapter was devoted to Missile Proliferation and the objectives of the MTCR. The 

data in this chapter extended beyond the 17 countries addressed in separate chapters. It dealt 

primarily with legacy delivery systems (e.g., SCUD missiles and derivatives, Silkworm-type 

cruise missiles, and export versions of Chinese solid-fuel ballistic missiles) that had been 

acquired by countries in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The Chart listing countries 

possessing ballistic missiles and their origins contains 30 possessing countries, not including 

Russia and China, although they are frequently noted in the column of suppliers. This 

compilation of missile data, however, was not employed to project nuclear military postures 

or force structures of emerging nuclear powers or proliferant states, nor was it oriented to 

assessing futuristic delivery system or special weapons effect technologies or to Russian or 

Chinese strategic challenges to U.S. military power. These subjects were outside the scope 

and objectives of this work. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

This study assembled fairly detailed information on nuclear and missile acquisition patterns 

and trends in proliferant countries, and, where relevant, the nuclear and missile supplier 

behavior of the countries studied. Since the study focused on countries of proliferation 

concern and not on the advanced industrial countries of the free world, it did not attempt to 

develop a comprehensive picture of nuclear or chemical supplier behavior relevant to 

proliferation. The cross-section of missile development in the study was reasonably accurate 

for its time and holds up well ten years later. 

 

Deterrence and employment concepts

This study made no systematic effort to assess or project the likely military posture, planning, 

employment policies or doctrines of emerging nuclear powers or potential nuclear 

proliferant states, or of other WMD capabilities in their inventories. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-12 WMD FORECASTING 

Areas for potential surprise 

The projections in this study were primarily forecasts of further acquisition of sensitive 

technologies and nuclear capability by a selected set of countries of concern. To date, with 

the possible exception of Syria, no other countries have come to notice as likely nuclear 

proliferation candidates. This study reflected concerns about the danger of leakage of nuclear 

materials to terrorists, but was focused on acquisition patterns of countries of concern rather 

than on potential proliferation to non-state actors or terrorist organizations. The projections 

in the study took into account the existence of a nuclear black market and the history of A. 

Q. Khan’s role in using centrifuge technology from Europe to develop uranium enrichment 

programs in Pakistan but did not specifically forecast his network as a supplier to other 

proliferant countries. 

Specific forecasts

 Post-Cold War Russian nuclear export behavior would pose certain export-driven 

challenges to the nonproliferation regime, particularly in Iran and India, possibly 

Iraq (then under UN sanctions and inspection activities), and possibly North 

Korea. In retrospect, it appears Russia has, however, distanced itself from North 

Korea. 

 China’s cooperation with the main thrust of the nonproliferation regime had 

improved, and was likely to improve further – conforming to NSG and MTCR 

guidelines. It subsequently became a member of the NSG. Despite lingering 

questions, this forecast appears to be valid, and is currently reflected in China’s 

leadership in the Six-Nation Talks with North Korea. 

 Korea’s nuclear weapon ambitions were real but with uncertainty as to its success 

in making technical breakthroughs in operational weapons capability as well as on 

whether the Agreed Framework would hold. In retrospect, it did not, but the 

current Six Nation Talks are similar in inducement-based approaches, seeking to 

use material and political incentives to convince Pyongyang to freeze and 

disassemble nuclear facilities and any weapons it may have stockpiled. 

 The 1998 nuclear tests in India and Pakistan would cause a more vigorous 

conventional arms competition locally, a buildup of nuclear-capable delivery 

systems on both sides, and probably stimulate deployment and elaboration of 

command and control and early warning systems. The study noted India’s effort to 

develop nuclear-powered submarines as missile platforms. These forecasts were 

largely on track although keeping most weapons in storage and evidently 

unassembled, together with reticence in deploying combat-ready systems on alert, 

was not directly anticipated and contrasts with most U.S. and Soviet practice 

during the Cold War. 
Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 

a Guide in Maps and Charts 

WMD FORECASTING V - 13

 Iran would likely achieve sensitive nuclear technologies and potential breakout 

capability but in a more distant future than seems possible from recent disclosures 

of its goals for uranium enrichment capacity. 

 Russia and FSU states would cooperate more unequivocally in rapid dismantlement 

of Cold War nuclear and chemical capabilities than has proved to be the case. The 

denuclearization of Ukraine was successful, and the reductions and dismantlement 

of delivery systems called for under INF and START I has been largely 

implemented. But dismantlement has lagged in areas not covered by treaties, e.g., 

tactical nuclear warheads. 

 Russia would be ambivalent in strict application of NSG guidelines was forecast 

realistically. 

 The United States would press hard for restraint in South Asia; this projection did 

not foresee U.S. courtship of India as a strategic partner and willingness to 

cooperate with India on civil nuclear affairs. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The most unique dimensions of this study are in the thoroughness of its system for 

compiling, tracking, and displaying the types and size of nuclear capabilities, materials, and 

programs in countries of concern from open source information. With the end of the Cold 

War as a backdrop, it was, in addition, important in enlarging the scope of proliferation 

analysis to track FSU nuclear facilities and materials, with a view to strengthening internal 

and nonproliferation controls and indirectly supporting Congressionally-funded threat 

reduction and dismantlement programs in the FSU region. Officials in service in 

nonproliferation related offices found this study to be a most useful reference as to what 

information was already in the public domain on nuclear matters, country by country, and 

that could be discussed, therefore, with private experts and ordinary citizens on an 

unclassified basis. Researchers without the specialized knowledge on proliferation found this 

a really useful volume to read up on the subject, or on countries of concern. 

 

Conclusions 

Tracking Nuclear Proliferation was not designed as a systematic or explicit forecast of all 

WMD proliferation or even of nuclear proliferation, but it nevertheless provided a detailed 

compilation and analysis of global nuclear proliferation trends based on an appropriate level 

of policy-relevant understanding of nuclear technology and nuclear-capable delivery systems. 

Those depicted trends were a sound basis for estimative judgments or extrapolations about 

the pace and scope of proliferation in the regions and countries of concern, and have stood 

up quite well since. It also provided a compilation of legacy missile technology spread in 

countries of concern that was a useful reference source as well as basis for estimating trends. 

One should also consider the list of specific forecasts above to be conclusions of this work. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-14 WMD FORECASTING 

Its main objective was to enlarge understanding of the threat of proliferation, particularly 

nuclear, and to encourage preventative efforts across the policy spectrum. 
Living Nightmares: 

Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology 

WMD FORECASTING V - 15

Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology 

Steven Block, edited by S.D. Drell, A.D. Sofaer and G.D. Wilson 

In The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons. 

Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999 

Commissioned By 

Steven Block’s article draws on the his experience in leading the JASONS Group’s 1997 

Summer Study which assessed work at the forefront of the life sciences (biology), specifically 

the threat posed by the development and use of biological agents. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To determine the future of biological warfare based on how recent advances in the life 

sciences (especially the potential for genetically engineered pathogens) have changed the 

nature and scope of that threat. 

Timeframe Examined 

Study was performed in 1997, and looks into 21st century, but without a specific timeframe. 

Prevailing Context 

Dissemination of the JASON’s summer study was spurred by the publication of Richard 

Preston’s, The Cobra Event, in 1997 – a popular novel on bioterrorism. President Clinton read 

the book and asked about the issues. A 1997 issue of the Journal of the American Medical 

Association (JAMA) was published on biological warfare, and a surge of media interest 

peaked in 1997 and 1998 in the potential for BW attacks. Two Presidential Directives, PDDs 

62 and 63, on CBW and cyber threats, were being prepared. 

Methodology 

The 1997 JASON summer study aimed to identify avenues of future development for 

biological warfare (BW) agents. It was an opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses 

of bioweaponry currently believed to exist. The study provided an imaginative framework 

for projecting what might someday come into existence, both through traditional approaches 

and through recent advances in biotechnology. The study attempted to help the researchers 

consider the kinds of countermeasures that might be needed to defend populations or 

minimize the damage of bio-attacks. The essence of the study’s forecast is that if it can be 

done technologically, eventually it will be done. Creating entirely new biological WMD of 

extraordinary potency has become comparatively easy and cheap, the means have been 

spread as public knowledge globally, and some BW capabilities would even be accessible to 

terrorist groups. 

Report Format 

A. Block’s report discusses conventional BW agents (bacterial, viral, toxin, and fungal) 

and anthrax and its limitations as a bioweapon; the report also generates a list of 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-16 WMD FORECASTING 

attributes that, theoretically, a genetically engineered pathogen could have, 

transcending the limitations of airborne anthrax. The paper also briefly reviews 

evidence of Soviet biowarfare programs, including bioengineering of anthrax as a 

weapon. From this background, he distills biological attributes that could be on a 

“wish list” of scientists attempting to build more effective bioweapons: 

 Safer handling and deployment 

 Easier propagation and/or distribution 

 Improved ability to target the host 

 Greater transmissivity, infectivity 

 More difficult to detect 

 Greater toxicity, harder to treat or counter (e.g., drug resistant) 

 Self-limiting, self-enhancing, or other special features 

B. The 1997 JASON summer study arrived at a list of six broad classes of 

unconventional pathogens that might, or might not, come to pose a threat in the 21st

century. Not intended to be all inclusive, the list was meant to convey a sense of the 

spectrum of possibilities: 

Binary BW 

Two bacterial substances that are produced separately to be materials that are safe to handle 

and store, but when combined by a trigger in a reactor, form a lethal agent with antibiotic 

resistance. 

Designer Genes and Life Forms 

Carrying out “evolution” in a test tube to produce organisms equipped with antibiotic 

resistance; or to manufacture synthetic viruses with pre-selected attributes to evade the 

human immune system, or even combine genes to create a complete organism from scratch. 

Gene Therapy as a Weapon 

Introduction of genes as vectors in therapy that interact with host physiologically to induce 

illness rather than curing it. 

Stealth Viruses 

Using a viral vector that can enter and spread in human cells and remain resident for lengthy 

periods without producing detectable harm, until triggered by an appropriate external (or 

internal) signal, when the cryptic virus is activated and causes disease. Stealth virus could be 

designed to be contagious and spread silently throughout a given population. 

Host-Swapping Diseases 

Most viruses are symbiotic and depend on the host. As such, they do not cause disease that 

kills the host (which is akin to suicide for the virus). However, virus mutations and host 

swaps occur in nature and sometimes a virus that swaps hosts is deadly to the new host. 

Biotechnology with stringent genetic selection may experimentally transform animal hosted 
Living Nightmares: 

Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology 

WMD FORECASTING V - 17

viruses to produce disease or become lethal when these viruses swap their host to humans – 

the potential for a man-made emergent disease. 

Designer Diseases 

With advances in cellular and molecular biology, it is becoming possible to contemplate a 

disease and then construct a pathogen to produce that disease, using molecular signaling 

pathways that are critical to human health. Such diseases may target the immune system or 

instruct cells to commit suicide. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

This study’s forecast is not specific in relation to countries, regions, or military contexts. It is 

a generic forecast of scientific and technological capability in biology; specifically, it states 

that biowarfare agents will be experimented with and developed. If it can be done 

technologically, eventually it will be done. The study identifies six classes of unconventional 

pathogens (see previous section), among which real bioweapons may materialize in the 

future. It does not forecast which classes or which types within classes may be the most 

likely pools to monitor.

Specific forecasts

This study makes no specific forecasts. 

Significant points

This study’s significant points are the imaginative projection (hypothesization) of classes of 

bioweapons capability. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

As part of a growing class of studies on the implications of genetic engineering for 

bioweapon threats, the study makes a persuasive contribution in raising the level of alert with 

respect to BW and calling for preparatory actions. 

 

Conclusions

The nature of the forecast – that unprecedented bioweapon capabilities are likely to be 

invented and produced as a matter of course in the 21st century – set the stage in Block’s 

article for recommendations to the scientific, medical and public policy communities on how 

to prepare and organize to meet the challenges. These recommendations cover the following 

challenges in dealing with the next generation of pathogens: 

1. Anticipation and Detection 

 – Identification and classification 

 – Screening 

 – Vigilance 

2. Mitigation and Remediation 

3. Political and Military Response 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-18 WMD FORECASTING 
Foreign Missile Developments and the 

Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 19

Foreign Missile Developments and the 

Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 

In National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 2001 

Note 

This analysis discusses the Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, 

December 2001, approved for publication by the Foreign National Intelligence Board under 

the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence; prepared under the auspices of the 

National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs. 

Commissioned By 

The NIE was commissioned by the Director of Central Intelligence. The NIE was also the 

fourth annual report on foreign ballistic missile developments prepared per request of the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The NIE describes new missile developments and Intelligence Community (IC) projections 

of possible and likely ballistic missile threats to the United States, U.S. interests overseas, and 

military forces or allies through 2015. It updates earlier assessments of theater ballistic 

missile forces worldwide, discusses the evolving proliferation environment, and provides a 

summary of forward-based threats and cruise missiles. The report covers future ballistic 

missile capabilities of several countries that have ballistic missiles and ballistic missile 

development programs. Each country section includes a discussion of theater-range systems 

and current and projected long-range systems. 

Timeframe Examined 

2001-2015 

Prevailing Context 

The underlying NIE in the form of an annual report to the SSCI means that the study would 

be considered a routine annual assessment of the IC rather than a study precipitated by 

unusual national or international events or politics. However, it is worth noting that 

publishing an unclassified version of this assessment came soon after the al-Qaeda terrorist 

attack on the United States of September 11, 2001. The underlying assessment was done 

early in the first term of George W. Bush’s administration following years of growing 

congressional interest in ballistic missile defense and particular concerns about emerging 

missile powers developing ICBM capabilities that could target and deliver WMD payloads to 

the United States. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-20 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology 

The development then of an NIE followed estimative assessment methods of intelligence 

data analysis, along with interaction among appropriate representatives and offices of the 

relevant intelligence agencies. However, emulating methods used by the Rumsfeld 

Commission (1998), the IC’s NIE methodology on ballistic missile development projections 

in 1999 and 2001 incorporated data not only on industry models and technical intelligence 

collected on a host state’s testing of particular missiles but also on the nature of supplier 

relationships of missile technology to better estimate the rate of development in the missile 

programs of each emerging missile state of concern. 

Report Format 

The Unclassified Summary of the NIE was organized under the following topics and 

sections on countries of concern: 

 Key Judgments 

 Discussion 

 Introduction 

 Russia 

 China 

 North Korea 

 Iran 

 Iraq 

 Libya 

 Syria 

 India 

 Pakistan 

 Forward-Based Missile Threats to the United States 

 Non-missile WMD Threats to the United States 

 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 Non-missile means for delivering WMD do not provide the same prestige, 

deterrence, and coercive diplomacy as ICBM’s provide, but they are less expensive, 

more reliable and accurate, more effective for disseminating biological warfare 

agents, can be used without attribution, and would avoid missile defenses. 

 The key drivers behind Iraq’s ballistic missile program are Baghdad’s goal of 

becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile relations with many of its 

neighbors. 

 Foreign nonstate actors –including terrorist, insurgent, or extremist groups that 

have threatened or have the ability to attack the United States or its interests–have 

expressed interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials. 

 New Delhi believes that a nuclear-capable missile delivery option is necessary to 

deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and thereby preserve the option to 
Foreign Missile Developments and the 

Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 21

wage limited conventional war in response to Pakistani provocations in Kashmir or 

elsewhere. Nuclear weapons also serve as a hedge against a confrontation with 

China. New Delhi views the development, not just the possession, of nuclearcapable ballistic missiles as the symbols of a world power and an important 

component of self-reliance. 

 Pakistan sees missile-delivered nuclear weapons as a vital deterrent to India’s much 

larger conventional forces, and as a necessary counter to India's nuclear program. 

Pakistan pursued a nuclear capability more for strategic reasons than for 

international prestige. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

 Most of the IC projects that before 2015 the United States most likely will face 

ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq (barring 

significant changes in their political orientations) in addition to the longstanding 

threat posed by the missile forces of Russia and China. One agency assessed that 

the United States is unlikely to face an ICBM threat from Iran before 2015. 

 UN sanctions have impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its 

longer range missile programs. If a missile were offered with range sufficient to 

strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to obtain it. Libya lacks the 

infrastructure required to develop by 2015 a ballistic missile system with sufficient 

range to target U.S. territory. Libya’s paths to obtaining an ICBM during this time 

frame would probably be to purchase a complete missile system or to set up a 

foreign assistance arrangement where foreign scientists and technicians design, 

develop, and produce a missile and the necessary infrastructure in Libya. 

 Syria maintains a ballistic missile and rocket force of hundreds of FROG rockets, 

Scuds, and SS-21 SRBMs. With considerable foreign assistance, Syria progressed to 

Scud production using primarily locally manufactured parts. Syrian regional 

concerns may lead Damascus to seek a longer range ballistic missile capability such 

as North Korea’s No Dong MRBM. The IC judges that Syria does not now have 

and is unlikely to gain an interest in an ICBM capability during the time frame of 

this Estimate. 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 The worldwide trend in ballistic missile development is toward a maturation 

process among existing ballistic missile programs rather than toward a large 

increase in the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles. 

 Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and 

accuracy of the missile systems in their inventories–posing ever greater risks to U.S. 

forces, interests, and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, U.S. and allied 

forces abroad faced threats from SRBMs–primarily the Scud and its variants. 

Today, countries have deployed or are on the verge of deploying MRBMs, placing 

greater numbers of targets at risk. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-22 WMD FORECASTING 

 Concerns over the U.S. Missile Defense (MD) program have led high-ranking 

Russian officials to openly discuss military countermeasures to the system. The SS27–developed in the 1980s as a response to the Strategic Defense Initiative– is 

probably the basis for Russia’s most credible responses to MD. 

 The IC assesses that Iraq retains a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles, 

launchers, and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

 Proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise–

especially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities–has enabled emerging 

missile states to accelerate missile development, acquire new capabilities, and 

potentially develop even more capable and longer range future systems. 

 North Korea is the missile and manufacturing technology source for many 

programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has 

enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise 

would have been possible–notably the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. 

 The North has also helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as the basis 

for domestic development efforts–as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of the No 

Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its efforts to sell 

missile technology. 

Deterrence and employment concepts

 Ballistic missiles were used against U.S. and allied forces during the Gulf war. 

Although the missiles used in the Gulf war did not have WMD warheads, Iraq had 

weaponized ballistic missile warheads with BW and CW agents and they were 

available for use. 

 Some of the states armed with missiles have exhibited a willingness to use chemical 

weapons with other delivery means. In addition, some nonstate entities are seeking 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and would be 

willing to use them without missiles. In fact, U.S. territory is more likely to be 

attacked with these materials from non-missile delivery means–most likely from 

terrorists–than by missiles, primarily because non-missile delivery means are less 

costly, easier to acquire, and more reliable and accurate. They also can be used 

without attribution. 

 China’s leaders calculate that conventionally armed ballistic missiles add a potent 

new dimension to Chinese military capabilities, and they are committed to continue 

fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing’s growing SRBM force provides China with a 

military capability that avoids the political and practical constraints associated with 

the use of nuclear-armed missiles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable 

and effective conventional strike force and expand conventional ballistic missile 

coverage. The IC projects an SRBM force in 2005 of several hundred missiles. 
Foreign Missile Developments and the 

Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 23

Areas for potential surprise 

 Several countries could develop a mechanism to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or landattack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are likely 

to do so–more likely for cruise missiles–before 2015. 

 The dependence on foreign technology assistance of all emerging missile powers 

means that their programs could accelerate rapidly if existing restraints on foreign 

assistance were disregarded by key missile suppliers.

Specific and Contingent Forecasts

 Unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian 

arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015–with or without arms 

control. 

 Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's 

future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States – which will 

number around 75 to 100 warheads – will remain considerably smaller and less 

capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia and the United States. Beijing is 

concerned about the survivability of its strategic deterrent against the United States 

and has a long-running modernization program to develop mobile, solid-propellant 

ICBMs. The IC projects that by 2015, most of China’s strategic missile force will 

be mobile. 

 China could begin deploying the DF-31 solid-fuel, mobile ICBM during the first 

half of the decade. Beijing could begin deploying the DF-31 follow-on ICBM and 

JL-2 SLBM in the last half of the decade. China has had the capability to develop 

and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a MIRV 

system. The IC assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system for the 

liquid-fuel, silo-based CSS-4 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple 

RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant 

technical hurdles and would be costly. 

 North Korea’s Taepo Dong 2 may be ready for testing but testing may be deferred 

as long as North Korea holds to its voluntary moratorium on testing of long-range 

missiles that was extended in May 2001 to 2003. A TD 2 test probably would be 

conducted in a space-launch mode, in the same way that the TD 1 test was 

conducted in 1998. 

 Iran is pursuing an ICBM/SLV system that the IC agrees it could launch by middecade (2005) but also agree that Iran is not likely to flight test before the last half 

of the decade (2006-2010). One agency believes that Iran is unlikely to conduct a 

successful test until after 2015. Iranian acquisition of complete systems or major 

subsystems – such as North Korean TD-2 or Russian engines – could accelerate its 

capability to flight-test an ICBM/SLV. If Iran were to acquire complete TD2 

systems from North Korea, it could conduct a flight test within a year of delivery, 

allowing time to construct a launch facility. Iran is unlikely to acquire complete 

ICBM/SLV systems from Russia. If Iran’s foreign missile technology assistance 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-24 WMD FORECASTING 

were cut off, it would take Iran much longer to develop an ICBM/SLV system or 

other missiles still in development. 

 The Intelligence Community judges that Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapon. 

Most agencies assess that Tehran could have one by the end of the decade, 

although one agency judges it will take longer. All agree that Iran could reduce this 

time frame by several years with foreign assistance. 

 Iraq could test different ICBM concepts before 2015, if UN prohibitions were 

eliminated in the next few years. Most agencies, however, believe that it is unlikely 

to do so, even if the prohibitions were eliminated. Some believe that if prohibitions 

were eliminated Iraq would be likely to test an ICBM masked as an SLV before 

2015, possibly before 2010, if it received foreign technology. For the next several 

years at least, Iraq’s ballistic missile initiatives probably will focus on reconstituting 

its pre-Gulf war capabilities to threaten regional targets and probably will not 

advance beyond MRBM systems. 

 Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for missile delivery in 

1990, but coalition bombing and IAEA and UNSCOM activities significantly set 

back the effort. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained, 

would take several years to produce enough fissile material to make a weapon. 

 The probability that a missile with a WMD will be used against U.S. forces or 

interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to 

grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature. More nations have ballistic 

missiles, and they were used against U.S. and allied forces during the Gulf war. 

Although the missiles used in the Gulf war did not have WMD warheads, Iraq had 

weaponized ballistic missile warheads with BW and CW agents and they were 

available for use. 

 Rumors persist surrounding Indian plans for an ICBM program, referred to in 

open sources as the Surya. Some Indian defense writers argue that possession of an 

ICBM is a key symbol in India’s quest for recognition as a world power. Most 

components needed for an ICBM are available from India’s indigenous space 

program. India could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an ICBM within a 

year or two of a decision to do so. 

Significant Points

 Certain terrorist groups that have threatened to attack, and are capable of attacking 

the United States have expressed interest in WMD. These groups are much more 

likely to use non-missile delivery means to attack the United States or U.S. or allied 

interests overseas. 

 Emerging missile powers are not growing rapidly in numbers but the capabilities of 

their programs are increasing due to the availability of assistance, particularly from 

Russia, China, and North Korea. The rate of successful progress in developing 

ballistic missiles, particularly longer-range ballistic missiles, is heavily influenced by 

the extent of assistance from supplier sources. 
Foreign Missile Developments and the 

Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 25

 Inherent ICBM capability in SLV development exists in several emerging missile 

powers. Nuclear-capable India and North Korea could test such systems early in 

the decade, Iran probably not until late in the decade at best, and Iraq probably not 

in the estimate’s timeframe – unless UN sanctions were lifted and it obtained 

significant foreign assistance. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

This unclassified Executive Summary of an NIE was published shortly after the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001. In accordance with its mandate, this intelligence statement 

focuses on the ballistic missile threat but the summary points out and reiterates at several 

places that terrorist delivery of WMD directly against the United States is most likely to use 

delivery systems other than ballistic missiles. The 9/11 attacks did not employ WMD as such 

but used the unconventional delivery means of fully fueled civilian air liners diving into 

buildings as manned cruise missiles. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-26 WMD FORECASTING 

 
Global Threats and 

Challenges Through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 27

Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015 

Thomas R. Wilson, edited by Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 

Senate Armed Services Committee, 2001 

Commissioned By 

Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Purpose and Objectives 

As the title “Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015” suggests, the unclassified 

statement is a broad and wide-ranging assessment of near term and long term threats to U.S. 

security and America’s position in the world, covering globalization trends, proliferation, 

terrorism, and security problems with Russia, China, the Middle East, Korean peninsula, 

India-Pakistan, the Balkans, and Latin America. 

Timeframe Examined 

Near term, 12-24 months (through March 2003), and longer term, 10 to 15 years, or through 

2015. 

Prevailing Context 

A time of “transition and turmoil” in the 1990s, from the Cold War issues to new security 

paradigms and problems. This assessment came 6 months before 9/11, early in the first 

George W. Bush administration, with rising concerns about terrorism as the most significant 

asymmetric threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad. India and Pakistan had gone nuclear 

in May 1998, and fought a brief, limited conventional conflict over Kashmir in the summer 

of 1999. UN sanctions on Iraq were under strain, and US/NATO engagements in the 

Balkans were a concern. About a year earlier, Russia announced changes in military doctrine 

indicating increased reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for its diminished 

conventional military capabilities. 

Methodology 

This is a public DIA statement and based on DIA’s style of estimative intelligence. No 

distinctive methodology is apparent. The statement is an assessment of trends and their 

impact on existing U.S. military and defense capabilities. 

Report Format 

The statement follows the outline below: 

I. The Emerging Global Security Environment 

 Globalization 

 Global demographic trends 

 Rapid technology development and proliferation 

II. Key Near Term Concerns 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-28 WMD FORECASTING 

 A major terrorist attack 

 Worsening conditions in the Middle East 

 Dramatic changes on the Korean peninsula 

 An expanded India-Pakistan military conflict over Kashmir 

 Intensifying disagreements with Russia 

 Another outbreak of violence in the Balkans 

 Increased anti-American violence and regional instability in Colombia, Latin 

America 

 Conflict between China and Taiwan 

III. Longer-Term Threats and Challenges 

 Engagement challenges 

 Asymmetric challenges 

 Terrorism 

 Information operations 

 WMD and missile proliferation 

 The foreign intelligence threat 

 Cover, concealment, camouflage, denial and deception (C3D2) 

 Counter-space capabilities 

 Threats to critical infrastructure 

 Criminal challenges 

 Strategic challenges 

 Regional military challenges 

- China 

- Russia 

- Iran 

- North Korea 

 The bottom line 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire 

To deter U.S. military pressure and divide the United States from its allies, and to be able to 

deny U.S. (allied) forces easy access to key theaters, ports, bases, facilities and air, land and 

sea approaches. Many potential adversaries believe they can preclude U.S. force options by 

developing WMD and missiles. Others are motivated more by regional threat perceptions. In 

either case, the pressure to acquire WMD and missiles is high. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern 

Russia, China, and North Korea remain the “WMD and missile” suppliers of primary 

concern. Russia has exported ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Iran, and China has 

provided missile and other assistance to Iran and Pakistan. North Korea remains a key 

source for ballistic missiles and related components and materials. Over time, as other 

nations (such as Iran) acquire more advanced [WMD and missile] capabilities, they too are 
Global Threats and 

Challenges Through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 29

likely to become important proliferators. Iran and Iraq could acquire nuclear weapons during 

the next decade or so, and India and Pakistan as existing nuclear states will undoubtedly 

increase their inventories. Some 25 countries now possess – or are in the process of 

acquiring and developing – WMD or missiles. Meanwhile a variety of non-state actors are 

showing increasing interests. 

 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means 

CW and BW are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and will be readily 

available to those with the will and resources to obtain them. More than two dozen states or 

non-state groups either have, or have an interest in acquiring, chemical weapons, and there 

are a dozen countries believed to have biological warfare programs. CW and BW will be 

widely proliferated, and over the next 15 years, they could well be used in a regional conflict 

or terrorist attack. The potential development/acquisition of ICBMs by North Korea, Iran, 

and Iraq could fundamentally alter the strategic threat. The numbers of longer-range theater 

(up to 3,000 km range) ballistic and cruise missile systems will increase significantly over the 

next 15 years, as will their accuracy and destructive impact. 

For at least the next decade or so, Russia will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons to 

compensate for its diminished conventional capability. Russia will seek to modernize its 

strategic forces albeit at lower levels, deploying the SS-27 ICBM and continuing 

development of several other systems. China will seek to strengthen and modernize its small 

strategic nuclear deterrent. The number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese 

strategic missiles capable of striking the United States will increase during the next 20 years. 

Acquisition patterns/trends 

New alliances have formed, providing pooled resources for developing WMD and missile 

capabilities. Globalizing conditions have made it easier to transfer material and expertise. A 

concern due to Russia’s turmoil is the potential for a nuclear weapon or, more likely, nuclear 

material to be stolen or diverted to a state of concern, a terrorist group, or other criminal 

organization. 

Deterrence and employment concepts 

Adversaries understand U.S. civilian and military reliance on advanced information 

technologies and systems, and public opinion, and numerous potential foes are pursuing 

means to undermine support for U.S. actions, to attack key parts of the U.S. national 

infrastructure, or to impede our attainment of information superiority. 

Areas for potential surprise 

Middle East terrorist groups will remain the most important [terrorist] threat but our 

interests will be targeted worldwide. State sponsors (primarily Iran) and individuals with 

financial means (such as Osama bin Laden) will continue to provide economic and 

technological support to terrorists. A move toward “higher-casualty attacks” is predictable as 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-30 WMD FORECASTING 

globalization provides terrorists access to more destructive conventional weapons 

technologies and WMD. 

Specific forecasts

 Over time, as other nations (such as Iran) acquire more advanced [WMD and 

missile] capabilities, they too are likely to become important proliferators. 

 Iran and Iraq could acquire nuclear weapons during the next decade or so. 

 India and Pakistan as existing nuclear states will undoubtedly increase their [nuclear 

and missile] inventories. 

 CW and BW are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons and will 

be readily available to those with the will and resources to obtain them. One can 

expect CW and BW to be widely proliferated, and they could well be used in a 

regional conflict or terrorist attack over the next 15 years. 

 The numbers of longer-range theater (up to 3,000 km range) ballistic and cruise 

missile systems will increase significantly over the next 15 years, as will their 

accuracy and destructive impact. 

 The potential [and expected] development/acquisition of ICBMs by North Korea, 

Iran, and Iraq could fundamentally alter the strategic threat. North Korea’s Taepo 

Dong II now under development could, if equipped with three stages, deliver a 

several-hundred kg payload anywhere in the United States. North Korea has the 

potential to field an ICBM sometime within the next several years. Under certain 

conditions, Iran and Iraq each could develop an ICBM capable of reaching the 

United States by 2015. If Iran purchased the TD II system from North Korea, it 

could attain ICBM capability earlier. 

 For at least the next decade or so, Russia will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons 

to compensate for its diminished conventional capability. 

 China will seek to strengthen and modernize its small strategic nuclear deterrent. 

The number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles 

capable of striking the United States [about 20, in the current assessment] will 

increase during the next 20 years. 

 A move toward “higher-casualty attacks” is predictable as globalization provides 

terrorists access to more destructive conventional weapons technologies and 

WMD. 

 Although Iran’s force modernization will proceed gradually, during the next 15 

years it will likely acquire a full range of WMD capabilities, field substantial 

numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles – including, perhaps, an ICBM – increase 

its inventory of modern aircraft, expand its armored forces, and continue to 

improve its anti-surface ship capability. Iran probably will face obstacles to 

generating and employing this increase military potential against an advanced 

adversary. 

 Should sanctions be removed or become ineffective, Iraq under Saddam Hussain 

will move quickly to expand its WMD and missile capabilities 
Global Threats and 

Challenges Through 2015 

WMD FORECASTING V - 31

Significant Points

Despite its breadth and unclassified status, this DIA statement is quite specific regarding 

WMD activities in particular countries of concern and also about these countries’ 

relationships with Russia, China, and North Korea as missile and WMD technology 

suppliers (see previous two sections). The statement is also fairly accurate in its WMD and 

missile development projections and, read carefully, does not greatly overstate the WMD 

status of Iraqi programs under UN sanctions. Written before 9/11, Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and the March 2003 inception of the Iraq War, it could not 

reasonably forecast WMD-related consequences of those events. Subsequent developments 

suggest the forecast of North Korea fielding an authentic ICBM within the next few years 

has not held, but the characterization of the North Korean effort is correct on its direction. 

The statement flags the existence of evidence of terrorist group (particularly al-Qaeda) 

interest in WMD, later verified by discoveries on the ground in Afghanistan. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

No unique dimension of underlying defense intelligence studies stands out in this statement, 

but it is forward looking in warning of the broadened scope and complexity of U.S. military 

requirements related to asymmetric threats, particularly missiles and WMD, and how 

stretched U.S. forces may become in dealing with these challenges. The statement virtually 

omits any assessment, however, of defense threat-reduction programs in the Former Soviet 

Union. 

Conclusions 

Missile and WMD proliferation is expanding rapidly in a well known list of countries of 

concern, is heightening the risks of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, and will 

pose increasing challenges of asymmetric threat to U.S. interests, U.S. and allied forward 

military operations, and even to the U.S. homeland over the next 15 to 20 years. The Middle 

East, South Asia, and East Asia are the regions of greatest concern. Traditional strategic 

WMD threats (Russia and China) have either diminished (Russia) or are on a slow track 

(China), but are still growing. Emerging power WMD and missile threats are coming to the 

forefront as the new strategic problem. Middle East terrorism is the biggest immediate threat 

and sponsoring states and expressed terrorist interest in WMD gives this threat strategic 

importance. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-32 WMD FORECASTING 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 33

 Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

Jackie Geissinger, Michael George, Tim Miller, and Forest Waller 

In AF Futures Project, U.S. Air Force, 2003 

Note 

Some of the assessed written work (e.g., a PowerPoint document), however, appears to be of 

2006 or 2007 vintage. 

Commissioned By 

U.S. Air Force, AF/XO. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The focus of this study is to analyze those advancements in technology that could potentially 

become new types of WMD. Information technology affects virtually all elements of human 

activity and advancements in materials engineering, biological science and energy research 

are making a significant impact on both the civilian and military realms. The goal of this 

study is to understand what technologies may have such WMD potential and what their 

implications are for conflict in the future, U.S. national security policy, and the plans and 

policies of the U.S. Air Force. 

Timeframe Examined 

The timeframe examined is not explicit, but as a composite appears to be fifteen to twentyfive years. 

Prevailing Context 

The inspiration for the study was geared less to national/international events or politics than 

to an understanding of critical changes in key areas of technology. 

Methodology 

The study was conducted by first researching relevant documents on which technologies are 

emerging. This included testimony from intelligence officials, reports by think tanks, 

academic institutions, and various governmental research institutions. From the research 

emerged a guide to what technologies to further research and to ask two dozen technology 

and policy experts about during the interview phase. The research and interviews were 

synthesized and assessments, conclusions and recommendations were made. 

Four of the most relevant documents in the literature review for this study were forecasts 

that looked at a range of futures. The four shared a common theme for the technologies 

that would be the most influential in the future: 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-34 WMD FORECASTING 

 Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts (2000)

which examined trends that will affect the world, including the advancement of 

science and technology, and more specifically, the fields of information technology, 

biotechnology, nanotechnology, and materials science. 

 The Hart-Rudman Commission’s report, New World Coming: American Security in the 

21st Century (1999), which looked out to 2025 and highlighted the impact of 

information technology, biotechnology, micro-electro-mechanical systems 

(MEMS), and advanced energy research as key future technologies. 

 George Washington University’s “GW Forecast” based on bringing experts 

together to forecast future technologies and trends within them, and concerned 

with how information technology, advances in medicine, micro-electro-mechanical 

systems (MEMS), and new energy technologies are accepted by the public. 

 The Army Training and Doctrine Command conducts an exercise examining 

technology from the “Red Team” perspective. Dr. Dennis Bushnell, a NASA 

scientist, has taken the lead on this project. After reviewing the game over several 

years, Dr. Bushnell produced a 2001 briefing, Future Strategic Issues/Future Warfare, 

Circa 2025, in which he identified several technologies that could lead to new 

WMD. He examined information technology, biotechnology, advanced energy 

sources, and nanotechnology. 

Report Format 

 I. Four technology revolutions 

 Based on the literature review and interviews with experts, four technology revolutions 

appeared to hold the most potential to produce technological advancements that could 

have massively destructive effects: information technology, biological science, 

nanotechnology, and advanced energy sources. 

• Information Technology: Some experts believed cyberattack and IT operations 

could be used as a weapon of mass disruption but not as a weapon of mass 

destruction (WMD) that could itself cause casualties or damage property in a major 

way. All regarded IT as a key enabler in the advancement of other technologies and 

systems that will have the potential for massively destructive effects. 

• Biological Science: A second area that will impact current and future WMD is 

biological sciences and advancements in bio-engineering. These developments offer 

many constructive possibilities for societies, but also can increase the potential 

dangers from pathogens like anthrax and smallpox and open the way to more 

virulent strains of these pathogens with new characteristics including survivability 

against vaccines and countermeasures and ability to evade detection. 

• Nanotechnology: Although it is a relatively new field, nanotechnology and microscale electronic machines hold enormous potential for revolutionary changes in how 

humans live. This field holds the potential to create materials and electromechanical 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 35

devices that are stronger, smaller, lighter, and have a range of other key properties. 

Nanotechnology holds potential both as an enabler of other forms of WMD and as a 

weapon itself. 

• Advanced Energy Sources: The benefits of such new sources of energy could be 

reduced pollution, more concentrated forms of energy, and more renewable sources. 

A myriad of energies are being investigated from solar power and biomass to new 

ways to release energy from chemical bonds and harnessing nuclear energies like 

pure fusion and nuclear isomers. While new energy sources have potential for 

benefits in energy efficiency and reduction in pollution, they can also be harnessed 

for WMD purposes. 

II. Impact of the Technology Revolutions on Threat and Weapons Development 

• New Biological Weapons: A key concern is over new pathogens derived from 

genetic engineering, but also in combination with nanotechnology processes. This 

could lead to pathogens that are more virulent, more resistant to vaccines or 

treatment, easier to deliver, and more persistent once delivered. A new generation of 

biological weapons could target specific groups, whether of a certain age, national 

background, or other characteristic. Strains of DNA, called aptamers, could be 

developed which could cause a particular disease but without the disease organism. 

Nano-particles capable of working at the subcellular level could be designed as 

molecular poisons evading normal cellular and physiological defense mechanisms. 

Another concept is binary BW, which would work by introducing a latent pathogen 

into a body that would later be activated by some environmental factor or exposure 

to a trigger. 

• Nanoscale Weapons: The “new kinds” of WMD concern about nanotechnology is 

its potential both as an enabler of other forms of WMD and as a weapon itself. 

 As an enabler, nanotechnology can be used to “improve” chemical, biological, 

and nuclear weapons. Leveraging the manufacturing techniques on a small scale 

could produce chemical weapons that are more lethal and hard to defend against 

or detect, or improve the ability to develop modified and more lethal biological 

pathogens. In the nuclear realm, nanotechnology would be a key to producing a 

new generation of nuclear weapons that are lower yield and cleaner. 

 As its own form of WMD, nanotechnology could take several forms. Devices 

could have characteristics that make them undetectable or very difficult to detect 

due to their size, or be designed to act to avoid detection. Examples of possible 

nanotechnology weapons include: (a) explosive microdust – a cloud of 

nanoexplosives to fill in a large area or infiltrate spaces otherwise hard to reach; 

(b) “nanobots” – small destructive microelectronic machines that could be either 

directed or autonomous, able to attack individuals as a type of man-made BW 

but much harder to detect or defend against, or serviceable as delivery vehicles 

for biological pathogens); and (c) the use of nanoparticles, such as carbon fibers 

or nanotubes, to cripple personnel through inhalation. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-36 WMD FORECASTING 

• Advanced Energy Weapons: New energy sources can also be harnessed for WMD 

purposes. 

 In the nuclear weapons area, pure fusion, while potentially a significant source of 

energy, also makes development of nuclear weapons more difficult to detect and 

reduces the technical roadblocks to their acquisition, including “fourth” 

generation nuclear weapons with much smaller yield. 

 New advances in releasing energy from chemical bonds or by working at the 

atomic level, such as certain energy states of the element hafnium, could provide 

increased destructive potential from new forms of chemical explosives. Other 

ways to increase non-nuclear explosives are under research and conceivable in 

the field of “novel energetics”, through strained-bond energy release, nuclear 

isomers, and the potential for antimatter. These technologies are in various stages 

of examination and theoretical work. However, they do have the potential for 

significant energy releases relative to TNT. 

 Microwave weapons are currently designed to affect electronic equipment, but 

can be configured to affect personnel, e.g., in crowd control situations. 

Microwaves can have anti-personnel effects through loss of control of the body, 

disorientation in the brain, and heating of the skin. Achieving mass effects from 

microwave weapons is a challenge due to the large input of energy required but 

in combination with other technological developments may be feasible. 

 Beside their potential as new forms of WMD, the new energy sources may aid in 

other forms of WMD, such as providing power to delivery vehicles. If more 

energy can be extracted from a smaller amount of matter, power sources for 

weapons can last longer or the weapons themselves could be made smaller. 

• New Delivery Systems: The technological advances discussed above could generate 

new weapon delivery systems. These could take on various forms, but a common 

characteristic is that distance will be less of a concern, with the potential for 

intercontinental systems becoming more easily available: 

 Long-distance, ultra-light unmanned aerial and space vehicles based on 

nanotechnology, new materials, and more efficient energy sources. 

 Propulsion systems based upon novel methods, such as blast wave propulsion 

(BWP) systems and the slingatron concept. (a) BWP involves sequential 

detonation of charges behind a projectile (without a barrel) yielding ICBM or 

IRBM speeds after only 100 to 200 feet of acceleration. Essentially this is a 

‘rocket’ in which the external structure and propellant never leave the launcher - 

only the warhead. A BWP would offer not only stealthy launch - no plume - but 

also exceptional flexibility, affordability, and survivability, while retaining the 

ability to be recalled. (b) The Slingatron would use an oscillating horizontal tube - 

much like a ‘hula-hoop’ - to accelerate projectiles in a spiral path until launch 

velocity is reached. Such an arrangement appears capable of lofting hundreds to 

thousands per minute of ten-kilogram projectiles over even intercontinental 

ranges. (c) These new forms of delivery can be paired with new guidance systems, 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 37

whether the current GPS, networked nanosensors, or other future systems for 

precise delivery of payloads. 

• Technology Synergy: A key factor for future WMD is the prospective combination 

of advances from several of the technology revolutions. For example, new ultra-high 

explosives individually may not approach the power of a nuclear weapon, but if 

combined with new delivery systems that can mass attacks into a particular 

geographic area with precision, they would have massively destructive effects. In the 

case of microwave weapons, while some experts doubt their ability to be used in a 

massively destructive manner, advances in energy sources and materials could allow 

the energy needs of microwave weapons to be met to allow for WMD-like effects. 

• Technological Possibilities: Like all predictions, examining the potential for 

technology is an uncertain endeavor. Some technologies of concern may not receive 

the funding to further develop technologies or there may be fundamental limitations 

in physics that prohibit the development of these technologies in the ways discussed. 

The technology experts interviewed had differing views on these new technologies 

and their potential. However, it appears likely that some technologies that emerge 

from the technological revolutions will result in effective and affordable weapons. 

III. Interview Results

 Interviews were conducted with individuals possessing a range of experience, including 

the Defense Science Board, the Air Force Research Lab, the Department of Energy 

nuclear programs, and DoD’s Defense Research and Engineering Office. In all, over two 

dozen interviews were conducted. In the course of the interviews a series of themes 

emerged – with implicit forecasts – on the future of new weapons of mass destruction 

technology: 

• Technology Potential: Some of the interviewed experts were skeptical that some of 

the prospective technologies could become militarily effective, controllable, or 

affordable, or that there would be an incentive to develop them for WMD capability 

and effects. They doubted that three of the technologies investigated would actually 

be developed as WMD: lasers and directed energy weapons, enhancements to 

conventional explosives, and information technology. Of the technologies that do 

have WMD potential, nanotechnology, advanced energy sources, biotechnology and 

robotics were mentioned. 

• U.S. Technology Leadership: Respondents noted that while the U.S. generally is a 

leader in the technology areas of interest, it does face competition from European 

and Asian countries. However, it faces little competition from nations outside of the 

G-8 and China. In certain niche technologies the U.S. does not have the lead, e.g., in 

wireless communications or in high quality, high technology manufacturing. This 

diversity in global technology R&D means that the U.S. may not be the source of 

technology breakthroughs and how they are used and disseminated. 

• Controlling New Technologies: Experts commented on the feasibility and 

desirability of controlling these technologies and their developments. A general 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-38 WMD FORECASTING 

theme emerged that these technologies are too immature and their potential for 

benefit or harm is still unknown and it would not make sense to place political 

controls on them this early in their development. In addition, it was felt that such 

controls would not likely be accepted by other nations, both because of the 

technologies’ unknown potential and the high likelihood that new technologies 

would have significant commercial uses beyond the military ones that might be 

envisioned. 

• Definition of WMD: One theme that emerged from the interviews is that the 

definition for WMD, as currently formulated, is inadequate. Some felt that only 

nuclear weapons belong in that category because of their massive destructive power, 

and not BW, CW, or radiological. Others pointed out the weapons that could be 

derived from the new technologies being developed, or that attacks based on a 

system of system approach using current and future technology, could be added to 

the definition. Some noted that IT technologies, e.g., used for cyberattack, might not 

be massively destructive but could be massively disruptive and classed as “weapons 

of mass disruption.” 

• Rationale for New WMD: Some interviewees were skeptical adversaries would seek 

new kinds of WMD, because the current versions, particularly nuclear, could not be 

topped. Some felt that the developed nations would have no need to develop new 

WMD because of the general trend toward warfare based on precision, not on mass 

destruction. Respondents also stated that less developed states and non-state actors 

would likely focus on current WMD like BW or nuclear weapons, and would 

leverage any advancements in technology from the developed states. 

IV. What implications do such developments have for warfare, U.S. security policy, 

and Air Force Plans & Policy?

• New WMD are likely to appear: As technology evolves in IT, nanotechnology, 

new energy systems, and biotechnology, the “traditional” WMD will become more 

dangerous. 

 The increased threat will come from making nuclear weapons programs harder 

to detect, more powerful but with smaller payloads, and advances in biological 

weapons in terms of their: ability to infect, virulence, persistence, and resistance. 

The ability of state and non-state actors to develop and possess these weapons 

will improve. 

 With the technology revolutions, not only will “improvements” occur with 

current WMD but new technologies will likely allow the development of new 

weapons that will have massively destructive effects. These new systems could 

come in different forms, whether new high explosives that when combined with 

affordable, long-distance UAVs can deliver a swarming effect and cause massive 

destruction or new non-biological pathogen-like effects from nanites. 

 Not all of these technologies will make this transition if they are feasible, but 

some will. 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 39

 These developments are not likely to happen soon, providing the luxury of time 

to monitor developments and create a response. 

• New technologies may be disruptive: Several technologies envisioned by the 

study may be disruptive in the sense that developed countries may not view them as 

effective or as good as the technology in their inventory. However, these 

technologies might provide a niche capability to an adversary to overcome an aspect 

of U.S. strength. For example, small light weight, long-distance UAVs may not be 

pursued by the U.S., but may fill a role for an adversary, perhaps because they are 

cheaper and provide enough capability, whereas the U.S. may not see such systems 

fitting in its inventory. 

• Political Controls: Although some experts believe political controls may not work, 

may not be necessary, or may be premature, they may nonetheless serve a useful role. 

Political controls can be used to limit or stop new technologies from getting in the 

hands of rogue states or non-state actors. They can help establish “rules of the road” 

for new technologies, laying out what is and is not acceptable. Given such rules, 

political controls would allow national and international responses to those who 

violate the rules. 

• WMD definition: The current NBC (or CBRNE) definition of WMD tilts towards a 

political selection of targets and swift interactions between weapon and target. The 

definition creates blinders because it does not address other technologies that 

potentially could produce massive destructive effects. If such threats are overlooked, 

strategic surprise is a possibility. This could lead to a loss of public confidence in the 

government’s ability to protect the country. 

 A new definition of WMD might take into account that there are several sources 

of massively destructive effects beyond those associated with NBC technologies. 

These would include new technologies and a broader range of the types of 

events that are massively destructive. 

 One way to view these events is to quantify the total destruction in a given 

physical or geographic space and add together the effects over time, rather than 

merely counting the immediate number of casualties of a sudden discrete attack. 

A formula to quantify massively destructive acts could standardize them on an 

‘effects-based’ Mass Destruction Index (MDI), which takes the form: (C/T) x K, 

where C = Casualties, T = Target Area, and K = Scaling Constant. So quantified, 

two attacks that did not use WMD as currently defined – the Tokyo firebombing of 9-10 March 1945 (MDI = 63) and the Twin Towers attack of 11 

September 2001 (MDI=113) – come out higher on the MDI than the atomic 

bomb attacks on Hiroshima (MDI=34) and Nagasaki (MDI=44) in August 1945. 

This effects-based comparison gives more attention to ‘effect on target’ than 

characteristics of the weapon, is flexible on the time period for weapon-target 

interaction, and an expanded list of massively destructive events – and thus 

longer list of WMD. 

 A case can also be made for leaving the definition as is because the technologies 

discussed here are in the future and it is unclear which of them will develop. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-40 WMD FORECASTING 

Because of this time lag in development, the U.S. has the luxury of time to 

analyze and reflect upon the most appropriates responses. 

• Aid to the Air Force: While challenging Air Force operations and missions, the 

technology revolutions will also provide the Air Force with access to technologies 

that will enhance its capabilities. Improvements could come in precision strike, the 

payloads available to the service, as well as new modes of propulsion and enhanced 

C4ISR. New capabilities will also provide the Air Force new capabilities to combat 

the threat from any new WMD. For example, nanotechnology may provide the 

ability to improve sensors against traditional and new biological weapons, mitigating 

the current detection problem. 

• Challenges to the Air Force: The new kinds of WMD would pose several 

challenges to the Air Force. 

 New kinds of WMD could complicate the Air Force role of providing air 

defense of the U.S. if new technologies allow rapid, intercontinental delivery of 

payloads or difficult to defend against swarms of small UAVs. New WMD may 

also call into question the Air Force’s ability to maintain air superiority and 

continental United States (CONUS) and forward bases for power projection. 

 Attack detection and assessment will be more complex. If new forms of BW are 

developed or non-organic forms of BW-like attacks are developed with 

nanotechnology, then detecting and assessing an attack will be that much harder. 

 Higher potential destruction from new kinds of non-nuclear explosives: If the 

technology develops to increase the explosive yield of non-nuclear weapons, 

whether by improving the energy release from conventional explosives or using 

techniques like nuclear isomers, then adversaries can cause more damage with 

smaller attacks or smaller payloads. This exposes the Air Force to the potential 

for more destructive payloads. 

 The sum of much of this will be that an adversary will have an increased ability 

to strike Air Force bases, from longer distances away, with more precision, with 

more firepower, and in some cases, without detection. 

• National security impact: The new kinds of WMD are not a problem solely for the 

Air Force; they will challenge all elements of U.S. national security and homeland 

security. The characteristics for some of these weapons pose unique challenges or 

duplicate challenges posed by the current generation of WMD. 

 Detection of these new methods will be difficult. Nanotechnology, 

biotechnology, and new energy sources all can have dual-uses. 

 Determining which programs by other nations are for military purposes and 

which are for civilian purposes will be a significant challenge. 

 Detection of an actual attack will also be difficult in some cases. Like the current 

concerns over detecting a biological attack, detecting an attack of non-organic, 

“invisible” nanites, from anti-respiratory nanotubes or other hard to detect 

materials, will pose a serious problem and require new forms of detection. 

Similarly attacks carried out using swarms of small, long-range UAVs may be 

difficult to detect because UAVs fly below radar. 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 41

 Defending against new types of WMD will also be a problem. Whether the 

attacks are by small nanomaterials, new delivery systems that can deliver 

projectiles rapidly, or swarms of precisely guided UAVs, current U.S. technology 

will have a difficult time providing a defense. 

 The new WMD could challenge some key elements of the approach the U.S. 

takes to warfighting. For example, air dominance may be called into question or 

made irrelevant by some of the new delivery systems. This might entail small, 

long-distance UAVs that swarm an area with ultra high-explosives. Air Force air 

defense techniques would be hard-pressed to stop such an attack if hundreds or 

thousands of such UAVs were involved. These could overwhelm the advantage 

the U.S. has in aircraft technology. They also call into question the ability of the 

U.S. to protect U.S. and overseas bases as staging areas for operations. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

This study did not deal concretely or specifically with the motivations of particular actors 

and adversaries around the world to acquire WMD but generally assumed that the expansion 

of technological opportunities would lead some adversaries to adopt some of the options. 

 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

This study was focused on technological change in generic terms and not on specific 

adversaries. It contains no forecast content on specific countries or regions, other than on 

where technology R&D is advanced and may pose competitive conditions for the United 

States. 

 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

This study does address the “possibilities” of new types and new kinds of weapons, 

including new delivery system concepts, that could challenge U.S. national security and could 

pose threats that the U.S. Air Force would need to be able to counter – but in generic rather 

than regional or country-specific terms. The study projects such possibilities in terms of 

judgments about their “limited potential” or “high potential” but does not forecast timelines 

for these technologies to materialize. 

 Limited Potential (for WMD): 

- High-energy lasers and directed energy weapons (DEW) (noting however that 

Physics does not support DEW as WMD); 

- New chemical high explosives (noting that there are limits to high explosive 

energy release and “consecutive miracles” would be required to develop 

materials and mechanisms that could achieve destructive results similar to 

nuclear explosives); 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-42 WMD FORECASTING 

- Information technology and information operations (IO) could, at present, achieve 

“disruptive” effects but not mass destruction effects (i.e., not mass 

casualties). 

 High Potential (for WMD): 

- Nanotechnology and Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems; 

- Advanced energy sources and devices (e.g., for new long-range delivery systems of 

kinetic or high explosive weapons); 

- Biotechnology and genomically engineered weapons; and 

- Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Robotics (e.g., ‘Swarms’ of smart, small, 

unmanned weapons focused on key centers of gravity or creating massively 

destructive effects). 

Acquisition patterns/trends

This study did not address or forecast acquisition patterns/trends of WMD proliferating 

states or entities, other than to note that certain other countries/regions of the world may be 

ahead of the United States in certain niche technologies. 

Deterrence and employment concepts 

This study deals more with U.S. opportunities to adapt deterrence and employment concepts 

to changes in weapons technology for U.S. defense operations and does not forecast or 

speculate on the deterrence or employment concepts of potential adversaries that may 

engage in WMD proliferation. The U.S. opportunities are covered in other sections, above. 

Areas for potential surprise 

The current NBC (or CBRNE) definition of WMD tilts towards a political selection of 

targets and swift interactions between weapon and target, but its narrow perspective on a 

handful of technologies creates blinders since it overlooks other technologies that potentially 

could produce massive destructive effects. If such threats are overlooked, as with a system of 

systems approach in the case of the attacks of September 11, 2001, then strategic surprise is 

a possibility. This could lead to a loss of public confidence in the government’s ability to 

protect the country. 

Specific forecasts

 New WMD are likely to appear: As technology evolves in IT, nanotechnology, 

new energy systems, and biotechnology, the “traditional” WMD will become more 

dangerous. 

- The increased threat will come from: making nuclear weapons programs 

harder to detect, more powerful but with smaller payloads, and advances in 

biological weapons in terms of their ability to infect, virulence, persistence, 

and resistance. The ability of state and non-state actors to develop and 

possess these weapons will improve. 
Emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies: 

Impact on the Air Force 

WMD FORECASTING V - 43

- With the technology revolutions, not only will “improvements” occur with 

current WMD but new technologies will likely allow the development of 

new weapons that will have massively destructive effects. These new 

systems could come in different forms, whether new high explosives that 

when combined with affordable, long-distance UAVs can deliver a 

swarming effect and cause massive destruction or new non-biological 

pathogen-like effects from nanites. 

- Not all of these technologies will make this transition if they are feasible, 

but some will. 

- These developments are not likely to happen soon, providing the luxury of 

time to monitor developments and create a response. 

 Aid to the Air Force: While challenging Air Force operations and missions, the 

technology revolutions will also provide the Air Force with access to technologies 

that will enhance its capabilities. Improvements could come in precision strike, the 

payloads available to the service, as well as new modes of propulsion and enhanced 

C4ISR. New capabilities will also provide the Air Force new capabilities to combat 

the threat from any new WMD. 

Significant Points

 The current definition of WMD is problematic, but broadening the definition of 

WMD to encompass certain new technologies could also inhibit needed U.S. R&D 

and defense programs by creating controversy over the production and use of 

WMD. 

 Although powerful “new kinds” will eventually emerge, nuclear will remain the 

gold standard for many years. 

 Future changes of technology will pose challenges and threats but also add to the 

capabilities and means of the U.S. Air Force in combating new threats. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The unique dimensions of the study are of several kinds: (1) reviewing and assimilating the 

findings from a series of long-range studies by other entities on the characteristics and 

implications of future technological change; (2) interviews of well-informed policy and 

technical experts on a series of dimensions extracted on forecasts of technological change 

and threats to U.S. national security; (3) an operational focus on the implications of the 

findings for the long term requirements of the U.S. Air Force; and (4) a conceptual and 

policy-relevant critique of the definitions and terminology related to “weapons of mass 

destruction”. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-44 WMD FORECASTING 

Conclusions 

 Powerful “new kinds” & disruptive military systems are likely to appear as 

technology revolutions mature/merge. 

- Some early products are ready for prototyping; nuclear will remain the 

“gold standard” for many years. 

 Many “new kinds” approaches escape existing proliferation constraints. 

 Few in policy positions recognize “new kinds” as a problem. 

 Greater awareness of disruptive technologies challenge. 

 U.S. leadership in “new kinds” or disruptive military technology is uncertain; 

competition is intense. 

- “New kinds” technologies may appear first among U.S. adversaries. 

 Good reasons exist for changing U.S. definition of WM: WMD definition is 

incomplete now; obsolete as technology progresses. 

 Strong reasons also exist, however, for leaving the definition alone; policy, 

programmatic, and operational impacts must be weighed (expansive definition 

could make new U.S. weapons choices ‘become’ WMD by definition). 

 “New kinds” & disruptive technologies could challenge important DOD 

operational expectations. 

 “New kinds” & disruptive technologies are not uniquely an Air Force problem–

they are a national problem. 

 Four technology revolutions will dramatically improve Air Force capabilities in key 

mission areas. 

 Air Force should be concerned about new kinds technologies or disruptive systems 

in adversary hands: 

- Genomic biological weapons; 

- Destructive MEMS/nanites; 

- Ultra-high explosives & ultra-incendiary devices; 

- Electromagnetic weapons; and 

- Small, smart, swarming, mass-effects systems.

 Challenges to Air Force include: 

- “New kinds” could complicate key USAF missions (e.g., Homeland 

defense, power projection, precision attack, space control, air superiority); 

- Early detection/attack assessment likely to be more complex; 

- Higher energies for non-nuclear weapons means more destruction; and 

- A much larger OPSEC problem. 
Biotechnology: 

Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense 

WMD FORECASTING V - 45

Biotechnology: 

Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense 

Mary Ann Liebert and James B. Petro 

Biosecurity & Bioterrorism 1, no. 3 (2003): 161-68 

Purpose and Objectives 

The stated purpose is “to highlight the impending potential for biotechnology to 

revolutionize concepts underlying development, weaponization, and limitations of biological 

agents for” biological warfare. 

Timeframe Examined 

Timeframe is not explicit, but implicitly looking out ten years and beyond (2013-2020); the 

thesis is that “advanced biological warfare” (ABW) agents could materialize about ten years 

out. 

Prevailing Context 

No specific events indicated, but, based on date of publication about a year after 9/11, one 

would surmise that the shock of 9/11 itself and subsequent discovery in Afghanistan of 

evidence of al-Qaeda’s experimentation with chemical and biological weapons (CW/BW), 

and perhaps other developments in the international terrorist threat were significant in the 

context of this article. 

Methodology 

This article is not a study as such but rather a think piece that synthesizes judgments about 

future threats based on the several authors’ special knowledge of Biotechnology and 

Biosecurity issues. 

Report Format 

The article is outlined as follows: 

 Introduction 

 Traditional and Genetically Modified BW Agents 

 Advanced Biological Warfare (ABW) Agents 

 Implications for Downstream BW Processes 

 Production 

 Weaponization 

 Delivery 

 New BW Use Options 

 Challenges for Biodefense 

 Counterproliferation 

 Attribution 

 Need for “Next-Generation” Approaches to Biodefense 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-46 WMD FORECASTING 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire 

The article is focused on biological agents and not on specific foreign users. Hence, there is 

no specific content on motivations, other than the potential appeal to hostile states or 

entities of biotechnology and BW options as asymmetric weapons that have low cost-toeffect ratios, few technical barriers, and force multiplier potentials. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern 

The article is theoretical and does not delve into regions or countries of greatest concern, 

other than to suggest generically that traditional as well as some of the novel techniques and 

BW uses could appeal to technologically proficient rogue nations and possibly sophisticated 

terrorist organizations (given asymmetric weapon characteristics above). 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 The assessment deals with three categories of biological warfare agents: (1) 

Traditional Agents (e.g., naturally occurring pathogens like anthrax and smallpox, 

and toxins; (2) genetically-modified Traditional Agents (e.g., antibiotic-resistant 

bacteria); and (3) Advanced Biological Agents (e.g., novel BW agents created using 

recombinant DNA or other biotechnological applications). 

 The assessment surmised that traditional agents have been the dominant threat for 

about a century and probably will remain the dominant threat concern for about 

ten years, but anytime after that genetically-modified agents and advanced 

biological warfare (ABW) agents will be developed and become part of the threat 

spectrum. The genetically-modified threats have a finite potential and eventually 

would plateau out, but the capability-based ABW potentials are multiplicative and 

will continue to expand indefinitely in parallel with advances in biotechnology. 

 The ability to introduce foreign genes into animal and plant DNA in a way that 

allows the organism to produce new proteins (transgenic systems) has benign and 

potentially malign options. Transgenic plants could produce bioregulatory or toxic 

proteins and be introduced with benign counterparts to cause injury. Transgenic 

insects could be developed to produce and deliver protein-based biological warfare 

agents, and be used offensively against targets in a foreign country. 

 Nano-research in pharmaceuticals may employ micro-encapsulation technology to 

encapsulate biologically active organisms, proteins, and even DNA within a coating 

nanoparticle substance, with increased capacity for storage and survival, and 

increased ability of bioproducts to be disseminated as an aerosol. 

 Research on genetic and molecular mechanisms that regulate biofilm formation in 

complex sugars may protect bacteria colonies not only from environmental hazards 

but allow them to avoid the host immune system. Discoveries in this field may be 

diverted to enhanced storage and delivery of bacterial warfare agents. 

 A systems approach to the creation of novel BW agents will likely occur 

concurrently with development of more advanced methods for agent delivery. 
Biotechnology: 

Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense 

WMD FORECASTING V - 47

Because ABW agents will be targeted against specific biochemical pathways, lethal 

dosage may be reduced, while “vectors” (organisms or mechanisms to transmit a 

biological compound) that formerly could not be used for biological warfare now 

would become potential delivery vehicles. Viral vectors developed to carry and 

express foreign genes could permit targeted delivery of nucleic acid-based BW 

agents. Engineered viral vectors could use alternative strategies for delivery, 

including lipid-based and other non-colloidal vectors. The ultimate expression of 

this technology would be development of a vector that encapsulates, protects, 

penetrates, and releases DNA-based BW agents into target cells but is not 

recognized by the immune system. Such a “stealth” agent would be a huge 

challenge to current medical countermeasure strategies. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

Application of biotechnological advances which have revolutionized many processes 

associated with bacterial and viral production and purification of proteins, reduce the 

technical expertise needed to produce bio-agents in quantity and quality. 

Deterrence and employment concepts

The wide range of effects that can be designed into ABW agents will expand employment 

options and ultimately may decrease the current threshold for use of biological warfare. 

Among the new use options would be the opportunity, for example, to covertly target a 

civilian population for strategic effect with minimal risk of attribution. 

Other properties favoring development of ABW agents may include: (1) customizable 

features allowing predictable, desired results following agent release; (2) concealment of BW 

attack as a natural out-break; (3) novel BW agents that circumvent vaccines or treatments 

against traditional agents and that are commensurately difficult to diagnose and treat; (4) 

novel agents tailored to target a specific population based on genetic or cultural traits; (5) 

novel agents that have sterilizing, oncogenic (cancer-causing), or debilitating effects could be 

created to use as a strategic weapon against a target population for long-term effects. 

 

Areas for potential surprise 

The range of ABW products possible from biotechnological advances is replete with 

possibilities of surprise, although proactive research and enhanced detection methods may 

be able to limit the scope of surprises. 

Specific forecasts

 Biotechnology will significantly affect the global proliferation of agents of concern 

in a manner that will be difficult to monitor or regulate. Genomes of many 

organisms have been determined and stored as digital data files that are commonly 

accessible in a non-attributable manner over the Internet. It is becoming possible 

to reconstruct viruses from digital genomic data files, a process recognizable as 

“digital proliferation.” As the number of commercial DNA synthesis enterprises 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-48 WMD FORECASTING 

increases, standard approaches to monitoring the spread and acquisition of 

organisms on the CDC select agent list will become less effective. 

 The way in which ABW agents are engineered will automatically permit them to 

circumvent systems currently under development to permit detection of threats 

posed by traditional agents. New profiling systems are need to ensure detection of 

a wide range of pathogens, both traditional and ABW agents. 

 ABW agents will pose the greatest challenge to development of appropriate 

medical countermeasures. Given that ABW can be engineered to circumvent 

standard medical countermeasures, there will be an increasing need for research 

into novel strategies for protecting military and civilian populations from agents of 

unknown properties and origin. 

Significant Points

 Unfortunately, the potential threat presented by the proliferation of biotechnology 

information cannot be contained as easily as the threat presented by nuclear fission 

research. Unlike much of the fission research, which has few applications except 

to the development of nuclear weapons, all biotechnology research builds on 

previous findings across a variety of disciplines. Restricting the spread of 

discoveries in the biological sciences may well impede progress in development of 

new therapeutics and vaccines, including those that will be essential to biodefense. 

 Intelligence and domestic security communities will need to engage the published 

literature head-on and develop systems to monitor access to questionable research 

findings via pattern recognition. The national security community will need to 

become more engaged in educating academic and industrial researchers regarding 

foreign exploitation efforts and in establishing approved mechanisms for 

communicating suspicious activity. Identifying potential malefactors based on their 

information requirements should be possible. Additional counterproliferation 

efforts could then be targeted against individuals of concern. 

 The potential for attribution could be increased by incorporating software into 

DNA synthesizers that “tags” products with signature sequences. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

No discernible unique dimensions of this think piece. However, as a series of propositions 

about potential biological threats and steps needed to counter them, it is an illuminating and 

persuasive article. 

Conclusions

A variety of steps should be taken to upgrade biodefense capabilities: (1) Resources should 

be allocated to permit evaluation of emerging biotechnologies that may foster ABW agent 

development and to prioritize possible threats among them; (2) A federally funded venue for 

experimentally validating biotechnology threat assessments needs to be established at a single 

federal facility, along with an independent panel of bioscience experts responsible for 

approving and reviewing research at the facility; and (3) Some federal funds should be 
Biotechnology: 

Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense 

WMD FORECASTING V - 49

dedicated to promoting development of next-generation systems for environmental 

detection, medical diagnostics, prophylactics, and therapeutics. 

Successful implementation of a national biosecurity strategy will require integration of a 

variety of independent efforts across the federal, bioscience research, and medical/public 

health communities, devoted to protecting populations against bioterror attacks employing 

the traditional BW agents that will remain the primary threat for the next few years. 

However, further effort must be devoted to the potential for biotechnology to have an 

impact on biological warfare in a manner that exponentially amplifies the threat both to 

civilian and military populations. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-50 WMD FORECASTING 
 Mapping the Global Future 

WMD FORECASTING V - 51

Mapping the Global Future 

In NIC 2020 Project. Washington, D.C. 

National Intelligence Council, 2004 

Commissioned By 

The National Intelligence Council. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purposes are to “map” (decipher) how the world is changing, what determinants count 

most in shaping those changes, and what this implies for the promotion or protection of U.S. 

interests, position, and leadership in global affairs. The introduction to the study postulates a 

number of assumptions, that the traditional post-war fault lines of East-West conflict and 

the North-South divide have lost their former relevance while shifts in emerging power 

status (e.g., China and India as “rising powers”) and the growing importance of religious 

identity politics across broad regions are reshaping global geopolitics. Thus, the study 

attempts to map the effects of globalization variables driving change within a perspective 

that assumes broad shifts in geopolitics. Among the inspirational concepts is the idea of 

mapping non-linear changes through scenarios with alternative futures. 

Timeframe Examined 

2004-2020 (fifteen years) 

Prevailing Context 

The immediate context in which the study was commissioned appears to be its place as third 

in the series of NIC-sponsored efforts, beginning in the 1990s, to anticipate the implications 

of globalization and various drivers of change in the post-Cold War environment and the 

transition to the new millennium for challenges to the United States in international affairs. 

The study is not focused narrowly on national security issues but rather broadly on 

geopolitics, including shifts in major power positions, interaction with global and regional 

communities, and the impact of political, economic, and technological changes. This 2004-

2020 study began about two years after 9/11, but does not appear to be driven mainly by 

those terrorist events. The contents of this NIC study also reflect awareness of the first year 

or so of the U.S.-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq. 

 Methodology 

“Mapping the Global Future” built on “Global Trends 2015,” a NIC-sponsored team 

project that identified seven key drivers of global change: demographics, natural resources 

and the environment, science and technology, the global economy and globalization, 

national and international governance, future conflict, and the role of the United States. 

“Global Trends 2015” was based upon discussions between the NIC and selected 

nongovernmental organizations and experts in the United States about the forces that will 

shape our world. “Mapping the Global Future” picks up where Global Trends 2015 left off 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-52 WMD FORECASTING 

but differs from the earlier efforts in three principal respects: (1) Foreign experts were also 

engaged in a series of regional conferences to obtain an authentically global perspective;. (2) 

scenarios were used to envisage how key trends might play out, offering several plausible 

alternate futures; and (3) the project developed an interactive Web site to facilitate 

continuing dialogue. 

The approach, combining NIC and nongovernmental expertise was unique in its scope and 

breadth of participation, as an effort to chart key areas of change and how they shape the 

future. After scenario concepts were explored, critiqued, and debated within a Scenario 

Steering Group set up by the NIC, and with other groups that the NIC engaged, eight global 

scenarios that held particular promise were developed. The NIC then held a wrap-up 

workshop with a broader group of experts to examine the eight scenarios, discuss the merits 

and weaknesses of each, and ultimately narrow the number of scenarios included in the final 

publication to four. The scenarios depicted in this publication were selected for their 

relevance to policymakers and because they tend to force experts to question key 

assumptions about the future–although the scenarios do not attempt to predict it. 

WMD-related technologies and threats represent one theme, but only one, in this broad 

NIC-sponsored effort. This assessment focuses on its WMD content, particularly trends and 

forecasts of WMD, and the geopolitical or military context of that WMD content as it is 

treated by the report. 

Report Format 

The format, scope and organization of this report are indicated by the table of contents: 

Executive Summary 

Methodology 

Introduction 

I. The Contradictions of Globalization 

 – An Expanding and Integrating Global Economy 

 – The Technology Revolution 

 – Lingering Social Inequalities 

 – Fictional Scenario: Davos World 

II. Rising Powers: The Changing Geopolitical Landscape 

 – Rising Asia 

 – Other Rising States? 

 – The “Aging” Powers 

 – Growing Demands for Energy 

 – U.S. Unipolarity – How Long Can it Last? 

 – Fictional Scenario: Pax Americana 

III. New Challenges to Governance 

 – Halting Progress on Democratization 
 Mapping the Global Future 

WMD FORECASTING V - 53

 – Identity Politics 

 – Fictional Scenario: A New Caliphate 

IV. Pervasive Insecurity 

 – Transmuting International Terrorism 

 – Intensifying Internal Conflicts 

 – Rising Powers – Tinder for Conflict? 

 – The WMD Factor 

 – Fictional Scenario: Cycle of Fear 

Policy Implications 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

Growing distrust of U.S. unipolarity (U.S. assertiveness as sole superpower) could prompt 

governments to take a more hostile approach, including resistance to support for U.S. 

interests in multinational forums and development of asymmetric military capabilities as a 

hedge against U.S. exercise of military force. 

Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be employed surreptitiously 

and generate dramatic impact, the report’s authors expect to see terrorist use of some readily 

available biological and chemical weapons. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

China 

The country will continue to strengthen its military by developing and acquiring modern 

weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines, and increasing 

numbers of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia and others as the second largest 

defense spender after the United States over the next two decades and will be, by any 

measure, a first-rate military power. 

Middle East and Muslim World 

Growing numbers of people around the world, especially in the Middle East and the broader 

Muslim world, believe the U.S. is bent on regional domination–or direct political and 

economic domination of other states and their resources and may seek asymmetric military 

capabilities as countermeasures. 

Countries Susceptible to Internal Conflict 

For the most part, those states most susceptible to violence are in a great arc of instability 

from Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, into the Middle East, the Balkans, the 

Caucasus and South and Central Asia and through parts of Southeast Asia. Countries in 

these regions are generally those “behind” the globalization curve. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-54 WMD FORECASTING 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 Most terrorist attacks will continue to employ primarily conventional weapons, 

incorporating new twists to keep counterterrorist planners off balance. Terrorists 

will probably be most original not in the technologies or weapons they employ but 

rather in their operational concepts – i.e., the scope, design, or support 

arrangements for attacks. One such concept that is likely to continue is a large 

number of simultaneous attacks, possibly in widely separated locations. 

 While vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices will remain popular as 

asymmetric weapons, terrorists are likely to move up the technology ladder to 

employ advanced explosives and unmanned aerial vehicles. 

 Terrorist use of biological agents is therefore likely, and the range of options will 

grow. 

 Security will remain at risk from increasingly advanced and lethal ballistic and 

cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). States almost certainly will 

continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in 

their inventories. 

 By 2020 several countries of concern probably will have acquired Land-Attack 

Cruise Missiles (LACMs) capable of threatening the U.S. Homeland if brought 

closer to U.S. shores. Both North Korea and Iran probably will have an ICBM 

capability well before 2020 and will be working on improvements to enhance such 

capabilities, although new regimes in either country could rethink these objectives. 

 Several other countries are likely to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs) by 2020 

to put domestic satellites in orbit and to enhance national prestige. An SLV is a key 

stepping-stone toward an ICBM: it could be used as a booster in an ICBM 

development. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

 Even as the dispersion of biotechnology promises a means of improving the 

quality of life, it also poses a major security concern. As biotechnology information 

becomes more widely available, the number of people who can potentially misuse 

such information and wreak widespread loss of life will increase. An attacker would 

appear to have an easier job–because of the large array of offensive possibilities 

available–than the defender, who must prepare against them all. 

 Countries will continue to integrate both chemical and biological weapon 

(CW/BW) production capabilities into apparently legitimate commercial 

infrastructures, further concealing them from scrutiny, and BW/CW programs will 

be less reliant on foreign suppliers. 

 The most worrisome trend has been intensified attempts by some terrorist groups 

to obtain weapons of mass destruction. It is of the greatest concern that these 

groups might acquire biological agents or less likely, a nuclear device, either of 

which could cause mass casualties. 
 Mapping the Global Future 

WMD FORECASTING V - 55

 The assistance of proliferators, including former private entrepreneurs such as the 

A.Q. Khan network, will reduce the time required for additional countries to 

develop nuclear weapons. 

Deterrence and employment concepts

India and Pakistan appear to understand the prices to be paid by triggering a conflict could 

be very high, but because nationalistic feelings run high a conflict is possible. Under 

plausible scenarios Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to counter success by the larger 

Indian conventional forces, particularly given Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth. 

Areas for potential surprise

 With advances in the design of simplified nuclear weapons, terrorists will continue 

to seek to acquire fissile material in order to construct a nuclear weapon. 

 Concurrently, they can be expected to continue attempting to purchase or steal a 

weapon, particularly in Russia or Pakistan. Given the possibility that terrorists 

could acquire nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons by extremists before 2020 

cannot be ruled out. 

 If governments in countries with WMD capabilities lose control of their 

inventories, the risk of organized crime trafficking in nuclear, biological, or 

chemical weapons will increase between now and 2020. 

Specific forecasts

 As biotechnology advances become more ubiquitous over the next 10 to 20 years, 

stopping the progress of offensive BW programs will become increasingly difficult; 

there is a risk that advances in biotechnology will augment not only defensive 

measures but also offensive biological warfare (BW) agent development. 

 Major advances in the biological sciences and information technology probably will 

accelerate the pace of BW agent development, increasing the potential for agents 

that are more difficult to detect or to defend against. Through 2020 some countries 

will continue to try to develop chemical agents designed to circumvent the 

Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime. 

 With advances in the design of simplified nuclear weapons, terrorists will continue 

to seek to acquire fissile material in order to construct a nuclear weapon. 

 Over the next 15 years, a number of countries will continue to pursue their nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons programs and in some cases will enhance their 

capabilities. 

 Current nuclear weapons states will continue to improve the survivability of their 

deterrent forces and almost certainly will improve the reliability, accuracy, and 

lethality of their delivery systems as well as develop capabilities to penetrate missile 

defenses. 

 The open demonstration of nuclear capabilities by any state would further discredit 

the current nonproliferation regime, cause a possible shift in the balance of power, 

and increase the risk of conflicts escalating into nuclear ones. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-56 WMD FORECASTING 

 Countries without nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East and Northeast 

Asia, may decide to seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional 

rivals already are doing so. 

 Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be employed 

surreptitiously and generate dramatic impact, the report’s authors expect to see 

terrorist use of some readily available biological and chemical weapons. 

 Significant Points

 Asia is the likely locus of major future conflicts, e.g., with China over Taiwan, with 

North Korea over the Korean peninsula, or between India and Pakistan as nuclear 

powers, but the likelihood of large conflicts (resembling the previous world wars or 

former Cold War potential for an East-West nuclear exchange) is low. Limited 

local and internal conflicts are likely to be commonplace, however, in the Middle 

East, Africa, and even in parts of Latin America. 

 Biotechnology research and innovations derived from continued U.S. investments 

in Homeland Security–such as new therapies that might block a pathogen’s ability 

to enter the body–may eventually have revolutionary healthcare applications that 

extend beyond protecting the U.S. from a terrorist attack. 

 Organized crime could form an important nexus with WMD terrorism. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The most unusual features of the study are: (1) the range of participants drawn in by the 

NIC, including corporate think tanks with strong reputations for futuristic analysis and 

foreign experts and agencies; and (2) the interactive features of the analytical methods, using 

specialist papers and conferences, and the iterative process of distilling results from highly 

diverse materials. Perhaps the most unique dimension of the study is the effort to project the 

future (or develop forecasts) qualitatively – in non-linear fashion. 

Conclusions

The basic conclusions related to WMD are that further state and non-state spread of NBC 

and longer-range missile delivery capabilities, as well as some covert infiltration and delivery 

can be expected, and that novel BW agent development will accelerate and pose increasingly 

difficult biodefense problems. Terrorists probably will be most original, however, not in the 

technologies or weapons they employ but rather in their operational concepts–i.e., the scope, 

design, or support arrangements for attacks. 
The Nuclear Tipping Point 

WMD FORECASTING V - 57

The Nuclear Tipping Point 

Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds. 

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004 

Commissioned By 

Funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York as a 3-year collaborative project between 

Reves Center of the College of William & Mary and the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS) to examine factors in the international system that might trigger 

non-nuclear countries to reconsider their nuclear abstention, and the implications for the 

future of the nonproliferation regime. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of the study is to examine factors in the international system that might lead 

non-nuclear countries to reconsider their nuclear abstention and “go nuclear,” and to 

explore the implications for the future viability of the nonproliferation regime. The eight 

states selected for the study, which are in good standing of the Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT), were assumed to represent a “barometer of the health of the international 

nonproliferation regime.” 

Timeframe Examined 

The timeframes differed somewhat for each of the eight case studies. However, each of the 

case studies described the nuclear activities or interests of the countries concerned both in 

the Cold War period and also in the post- Cold War context. The projections of future 

behavior were for the foreseeable future in each case, but not specified as a precise 

timeframe. 

Prevailing Context 

The study was conducted between 2001 and 2004 with the impact of September 11, 2001 

fresh in mind and amidst growing international concern about the erosion of the global 

nonproliferation regime and the possibility that a nuclear proliferation “tipping point” would 

be reached, bringing a cascade of new nuclear states. 

Methodology 

The study involved overviews of the history of international efforts to prevent nuclear 

proliferation in the early chapters of the book together with separate chapters on the 

historical analysis of eight countries in good standing under the NPT: Japan, South Korea, 

Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Germany. In each case study, the authors 

examined the historical reasons each country gave up its “nuclear option” and under what 

circumstances each might reconsider its position and take steps toward acquiring nuclear 

weapons or shortening the lead time to a nuclear weapon capability. The countries chosen 

for the case studies were selected because “they serve as a barometer of the health of the 

international nonproliferation regime and as an early warning system measuring the pressure 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-58 WMD FORECASTING 

for independent nuclear arsenals.” The study leaders who edited the book are experts on 

nuclear nonproliferation policy and each has held senior appointive positions in the U.S. 

Government. The country case studies were authored in most cases either by experts on the 

respective country or region, or experts who had significant USG service or American think 

tank experience with national security policy and nuclear nonproliferation policy. 

Report Format 

Part One: Nuclear Past and Present 

1. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States 

(Mitchell B. Reiss) 

2. Reconsidering a Nuclear Future: Why Countries Might Cross over to the Other Side 

(Kurt M. Campbell) 

3. Will the Abstainers Reconsider? Focusing on Individual Cases (Robert J. Einhorn) 

Part Two: Case Studies 

4. Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course (Robert J. Einhorn) 

5. Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained without Nukes (Ellen Laipson) 

6. Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of Uncertainty (Thomas W. Lippman) 

7. Turkey: Nuclear Choices Amongst Dangerous Neighbors (Leon Fuerth) 

8. Germany: The Model Case, A Historical Imperative (Jenifer Mackby and Walter 

Slocombe) 

9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara) 

10. South Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexations of History (Jonathan D. 

Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss) 

11. Taiwan’s Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor (Derek J. 

Mitchell) 

Part Three: Prospects for a Nuclear Future 

12. Avoiding the Nuclear Tipping Point: Concluding Observations (Kurt M. Campbell 

and Robert J. Einhorn) 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The authors note five international and domestic factors that could potentially motivate a 

country to retreat from a “well-established non-nuclear identity” and move towards a latent 

or overt nuclear weapons capability: 

1. An unfavorable or unwanted change in direction of U.S. foreign and security policy 

or a change in the perceived stability or credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

Specific changes might include the umbrella drifting away from Germany by U.S. 

removal of its troops and assets from German soil, a U.S. retreat from a historic 

emphasis on the international nonproliferation regime, and the U.S. development of 

new nuclear weapons. 
The Nuclear Tipping Point 

WMD FORECASTING V - 59

2. The breakdown of the nonproliferation regime caused by proliferating rogue states 

such as North Korea and Iran. 

3. The erosion of regional or global security. For example, increased tensions between 

China and Japan could lead to Japan seeking to acquire a nuclear capability. 

4. A decline in a state’s domestic social condition. For example, seeking a nuclear 

capability may be one way in which a state may forestall vulnerabilities to economic 

and societal insecurities. 

5. The increased availability of nuclear technology and potential sources of nuclear 

material. However the authors emphasize that “the potential availability of fissile 

material is unlikely to be the sole driver of a country’s decision to go nuclear.” 

 

Specific forecasts

Egypt 

The authors note that historically, Egypt was deemed likely to seek nuclear weapons due to 

regional fighting and a “cold peace” with neighbors who have nuclear capabilities. 

Additionally, Egypt flirted several times with civilian nuclear programs which could have 

potentially been used to develop military uses of nuclear technology. 

The authors note that Egypt has pursued chemical weapons in cooperation with Iraq as well 

as purchased medium range missiles from North Korea. It is possible that these programs 

were pursued because of their cost-effectiveness when compared to developing nuclear 

weapons. 

Additionally the authors note that no single event marked Egypt’s decision to forgo nuclear 

weapons. However, they argue that strong U.S. relations are critical today for Egypt’s 

continued renunciation as well as continued U.S. engagement in the Middle East peace 

process. 

Syria 

As a signatory of the NPT for over thirty years, Syria has been able to take little advantage of 

the many technical support services that the IAEA provided non-nuclear states. Syria’s 

history with domestic nuclear activities began in 1976 with the establishment of the Atomic 

Energy Commission in Damascus. Throughout the 1980’s Syria sought to negotiate deals to 

acquire nuclear power reactors, but in each case the proposed deals eventually went awry. 

Syria’s first success came in 1991 with the purchase of a 30-kilowatt Chinese mini-reactor for 

research with no immediate military applications. In acquiring this reactor, Syria followed 

proper IAEA protocols. Syria sought to purchase an additional larger reactor from 

Argentina, but Argentina reportedly did not deliver due to pressures from the US. In 1998 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-60 WMD FORECASTING 

Russia agreed to build one light water reactor in Syria but this project has not so far 

materialized. 

The authors rate the possibility of Syria breaking with its non-nuclear commitment as quite 

low. However, factors which might lead Syria to decide to proceed down the nuclear path 

include: 

1. National security requirements deriving from regional power imbalances. 

2. The loss of status in the Middle East region because of other countries’ nuclear 

advancements. 

3. Rocky relations with the U.S. and the tendency in Syria to perceive the survival of its 

regime to be at stake. 

Saudi Arabia 

The chapter on Saudi Arabia suggested that Riyadh signed the NPT in 1988 primarily to 

placate the US. The authors also report that Saudi Arabia does not have the domestic 

technological capabilities to develop nuclear weapons and most analysts agree that Saudi 

Arabia has other concerns and is not interested in pursuing nuclear capabilities. However, 

the authors do report factors which may some day propel Saudi Arabia down the nuclear 

path. 

1. There is no clear line of succession past Prince Sultan and a weakening economy 

might lead to domestic strife. Additionally, the Saudi military is reported as being 

well-equipped but poorly trained and possibly incapable of defending the country 

against an all out attack by Iran. 

2. Though Saudi Arabia cooperates peacefully with Iran, Sunni/ Shiite tension is never 

far beneath the surface and if Tehran acquired nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia may 

feel compelled to counter this threat. 

3. If Saudi Arabia feels that it can no longer rely on U.S. security assurances, Riyadh 

may seek security through different avenues. 

One possible scenario that may take place if Saudi Arabia decided to seek nuclear weapons is 

for Saudi Arabia to look to Pakistan. Some U.S. Government officials believe that Pakistan 

and Saudi Arabia have an understanding that Pakistani nukes would be made available to 

Saudi Arabia in extreme situations–guaranteed by Saudi funding of Pakistan’s nuclear energy 

program. 

Turkey 

Though the collapse of the Soviet Union may have alleviated Turkey’s most obvious 

incentive for seeking a nuclear capability, the authors point to six circumstances which might 

drive Turkey nevertheless to acquire nuclear capabilities. 

1. An increase in insecurities surrounding a perceived decline in the credibility of 

NATO security guarantees. 

2. The collapse of the international nonproliferation regime caused by the United 

State’s failure to stop North Korea and Iran. 
The Nuclear Tipping Point 

WMD FORECASTING V - 61

3. A strong shift in Turkish public opinion to reflect a more Islamic or nationalist 

orientation. 

4. A revival of Russian expansionism. 

5. The creation of a power vacuum in the Middle East. 

6. Permanent damage to US-Turkish relations due to Turkey’s unwillingness to 

substantially assist the United States with transit in 2003 during the outset of the Iraq 

war. 

If Turkey was eventually to decide that its national security interests required nuclear 

weapons, it may pursue them under the auspices of a civilian nuclear energy program. To 

meet growing energy demands, Turkey’s electric output must be doubled by 2010. However, 

five separate Turkish attempts to foster outside support for a civilian nuclear capacity in 

Turkey have all failed. 

The authors conclude that any measure designed to enhance the credibility of NATO and 

the U.S. and EU as underwriters of Turkish national security would greatly diminish the risk 

of Turkey seeking nuclear weapons. A potential obstacle to the success of this approach is 

the continued spread of ballistic missiles throughout other parts of the Middle East. 

Germany 

Germany has formally committed to forgo the nuclear weapons option on three separate 

occasions since the end of World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of 

the Berlin Wall fundamentally changed Germany’s strategic situation and almost eliminated 

entirely any perceived need for nuclear weapons. Even though Germany has always 

maintained a non-nuclear weapons status and policy, there is no doubt that Germany has the 

technical capability to quickly develop nuclear weapons and thus has a “virtual nuclear 

capability.” The authors conclude that Germany is the clearest example of renunciation 

becoming a permanent national policy and they do not foresee any future developments that 

would shake this commitment. 

Japan 

Today Japan remains steadfast to its non-nuclear commitment despite the India-Pakistan 

nuclear tests as well as the North Korean flight of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan. 

However, the authors envision four situations in which Japan may reconsider the 

development of a nuclear capability. 

1. An increase in the perceived security threat from North Korea. 

2. The rise of Chinese strategic military power. 

3. An inability or perceived inability of successive U.S. administrations to manage 

threats perceived by the Japanese as vital to their security. 

4. The weakening of the international nonproliferation regime. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-62 WMD FORECASTING 

South Korea 

Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has responded to DPRK threats by three 

principal means: 

1. Deterrence through a close alliance with the US. 

2. The maintenance of a large conventional force. 

3. Periodic diplomatic outreach to the DPRK. 

There is no doubt that South Korea possesses an indigenous capability to develop nuclear 

weapons if and when it so chooses. South Korea has long pursued nuclear power as a 

means to address energy security. However, up to this point, South Korea as maintained 

that it is more viable to remain under the U.S. nuclear security umbrella than to develop 

indigenous capabilities. 

The authors list several factors that could persuade South Korea to develop nuclear weapons 

despite the belief that that South Korea is intent on accommodation. 

1. A major shift in the U.S. alliance. 

2. A change in threat perception of North Korea. 

3. The growing alignment with China. 

4. The outcome of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 

5. The aftermath of the political end to the Pyongyang regime. 

Taiwan 

The authors cite that the key constraints to Taiwan’s pursuit of the nuclear option are 

political rather than technical. These constraints are: 

1. Nuclearization would serve China as a justification for ending Taiwan’s de facto 

independence by force. 

2. Maintaining a secret weapons program is possible, but highly unlikely in modern 

Taiwan. 

3. The U.S. is adamant about its opposition to any provocation from either China or 

Taiwan. 

Finally, the authors cite two inducements which might persuade Taiwan to take the nuclear 

path. 

1. A significant change in the security balance in the Straights and a perception that 

Taiwan can no longer count on U.S. security assurances. 

2. A reduction in overall U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan. 

Significant Points

The authors note five specific commonalties to each of the eight case studies: 

1. The main motivating factor in deciding whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons 

was the state of the regional security environment. That is, states which saw a clear 

and present acute regional threat were more likely to consider the nuclear option. 
The Nuclear Tipping Point 

WMD FORECASTING V - 63

2. U.S. foreign security policy has a significant effect on the “nuclear behavior” of 

countries as long as the U.S. nuclear security umbrella is perceived to be credible. 

The case studies show that the reliability and credibility of U.S. security assurances 

have played an important role in determining whether or not a state decides to seek 

nuclear weapons. 

3. The perceived erosion of the international nonproliferation regime is a motivating 

factor when placed in concert with other factors that adversely affect a state’s 

security. 

4. Despite increased availability of critical nuclear technology, barriers to nuclear 

weapons are still quite formidable. 

5. Democracy often does exert real constraints on the ability to pursue and acquire 

nuclear weapons. One exception to this rule in the selected case studies is Egypt. 

Egypt remains non-nuclear because it is not democratic. The authors posit that free 

elections in Egypt would make the country susceptible to populist movements which 

demand nuclear security. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The study is unique in that it gives attention to the nuclear policies of states that have been 

stalwart in their observance of the NPT and non-nuclear commitments and to the 

conditions that could, if they materialize, cause one or more of these countries to reconsider 

their non-nuclear weapon commitments. 

Conclusions

The authors make the following recommendations to increase the likelihood that countries 

committed to non-nuclear weapon status stay committed: 

1. Stop Iran and North Korea from going nuclear. 

2. Alleviate regional security concerns. 

3. Raise barriers, both political and technological, to nuclear acquisition. 

4. Strengthen verification, intelligence, and analytic capabilities. 

5. Reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-64 WMD FORECASTING 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 65

The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider, eds. 

Maxwell AFB: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2002 

Note 

Consists of four assessments 

1. The Prospects for Biological War in the Middle East 

Brad Roberts 

Purpose and Objectives 

The author examines four primary questions to provide insight into the prospects for the use 

of biological weapons (BW) in the Middle East. The questions the author examines are: 

1) How might BW be used in conflicts in the Middle East over the next decade? 

2) How probable is such use? 

3) By what rationales might certain types of targets be selected and concepts of 

operations (CONOPS) elaborated? 

 What use scenarios stand out as of highest potential impact? 

Timeframe Examined 

2001-2010. 

Prevailing Context 

The context in which the forecast is conducted is in regard to increased proliferation of BW 

in the Middle East and especially the threat of Iraqi use of BW in Desert Storm. 

Methodology 

In addressing the above questions, the author focuses on the motivating factors that drove 

decision makers to seek acquisition of BW capabilities. However, the author makes a 

distinction between motivations to acquire and motivations to use– specifically noting that 

they are not one and the same. 

A second approach the author cites is one that attempts to use the technical characteristics 

of BW to argue logically about the likely military applications. However, in the absence of 

hard data, the author notes that this is a highly speculative process and if it is to offer any 

real insights, it must be systematically employed. 

Finally, the author approaches BW proliferation from both the perspective of the state and 

non-state actor. To illustrate the author’s projections, one scenario is selected to provide a 

more in-depth analysis of how the motivations to acquire and/ or use BW could play out in 

the Middle East. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-66 WMD FORECASTING 

Report Format 

I. General considerations on the motivations to acquire and/or use BW weapons. 

II. A taxonomy of conflict in the Middle East which also uses a 1999 study to 

develop trends for “likely” future conflicts in the Middle East. 

III. The likelihood that a future conflict will see the use of BW. 

IV. Scenario entitled, The Canonical Major Theatre War which explores how, “a BWarmed regional aggressor use BW to commit and secure that aggression, and to 

cope with the political-military consequences of a U.S. effort to reverse that 

aggression.” 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

The motivations to acquire BW are underpinned by the kinds of conflict that are likely to 

occur in the Middle East region. The author presents nine potential categories of conflict 

and assigns his own views of the probability of conflict in each category: 

1) Large-scale wars between states/regions are perceived to be unlikely. 

2) There are likely to be limited interstate wars that do not call into question regime 

survival. 

3) Acts of aggression by one state against another state in the region that bring U.S. 

involvement is likely. Also, Iranian coercion of GCC countries and/or Iranian 

attempts to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz are considered to be moderately likely. 

4) Low-intensity conflicts raising questions of regime legitimacy and survival 

currently exist and will continue and may intensify. 

5) Some regimes will be likely to violently suppress low-intensity conflicts (i.e., Iraqi 

suppression of the Kurds in the 1980’s). 

6) The emergence of splinter groups that violently oppose the Arab-Israeli peace 

process is likely. 

7) State support for terrorism will continue on a constant path (same as before). 

8) Transnational terrorism will not disappear from the region. 

9) States and regimes will continue to place a high value on WMD as a “coin of 

power.” WMD potential military utility is too powerful for most states and 

regimes to resist. Also, WMD possession will continue to be viewed as a status 

symbol of power, and can only help to reinforce the power of the ruling faction 

within the state. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

The author focuses on the Middle East region, especially Iran, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Libya, 

Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Turkey. 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 67

Deterrence and employment concepts

The above categories of conflicts and estimated likelihood serve as a vehicle to explore the 

potential use of BW. For example, the author predicts that the use of BW in anti-regime, 

low-intensity, conflict settings would prove too much of a destabilizing factor for the regime 

to consider BW a viable option. The loss of international support and risk of severe 

sanctions would be too great. The author also estimates the employment of a BW in a 

border-skirmish setting to be a low probability. 

At the other end of the spectrum, the author posits that large interstate wars which threaten 

a regime’s survival could legitimize a defending regime’s use of BW. Further, BW use in 

asymmetric warfare against U.S. or U.S.-led intervention is also likely. Motivations of use for 

this scenario could include: coercion of the U.S. and allies, war fighting, escalation, and 

conflict termination. The author also describes international terrorists as a category of 

groups likely to use BW. The precedents the author cites are the established determination 

of known terrorist groups to acquire WMD and their demonstrated interest in mass 

casualties. 

States that sponsor terrorist organizations have been hesitant to open their BW arsenals to 

the terrorist organizations they support. The author believes this is attributable to the 

regime’s fear of retaliation against the state. The author’s probing question, however, is: how 

much restraint will these states show in the future? 

Specific forecasts

“The Canonical Major Theatre War” is the context in which the author forecasts how a BWarmed aggressor might use BW as a deterrent as well as a means of seeking to preclude or 

limit U.S. political-military efforts to reverse that aggression. Prior to the act of aggression, 

the aggressor is likely to attempt to isolate the U.S. by destabilizing U.S. allies. The potential 

use for BW at this pre-open war stage is unlikely; however, the author does note that the 

likelihood may rise if the aggressor has plausible deniability. 

Once the aggressor acts, one of its primary goals will be to achieve decisive victory before 

any outside intervention. If the aggressor sees BW as useful or significant to the conflict, 

early use is likely. However, the aggressor’s disincentives for use may include: increasing the 

odds of U.S. intervention, concerns over international backlash, and using BW when 

conventional weapons would work just as well. 

If the aggressor fails to dissuade the U.S. from intervention by other means, BW may be 

used for their deterrent value. Additionally, the author notes that if BW were used for this 

purpose, then the aggressor may actually use the BW deliberately against civilian targets to 

serve as a warning against further U.S. action. If deterrence fails, the aggressor’s interests in 

use of BW probably will shift to military strikes intended to cripple U.S. intervention. The 

use of BW in this scenario is quite high. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-68 WMD FORECASTING 

Finally, if the aggressor fails to defeat the U.S., the aggressor may use BW as last resort to 

prevent strategic defeat in terms of military dismemberment. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions

The author focuses on the motivations to use BW militarily and politically, and not only on 

the motivations to acquire BW. 

Conclusions

The author concludes that the context of the “canonical major theatre war” stands out as 

potentially the richest in insights for understanding the future role of BW in the Middle East. 

Finally, the author raises the question of how a potential BW attack would be prevented or 

defeated by, for example, detecting the delivery systems and/or protecting against the 

biological agent. In such scenarios, the author raises the question of how such a failed attack 

with WMD would reshape security relations with the U.S. 

2. Assessment of the Emerging Biocruise Threat 

Rex R. Kiziah

Purpose and Objectives 

This chapter focuses “on a subset of the growing threat of cruise missiles (CM),” and 

evaluates the prospects for “rogue nation acquisition and use of land-attack cruise missiles 

(LACM) to deliver BW agents against future U.S. military operations in regional conflictions 

around the world and also against military and civilian targets within the United States and 

allied countries.” The author seeks to answer the question of how likely a rogue state is to 

employ cruise missiles with BW agents against the U.S. beyond 2005. 

Timeframe Examined 

2005 and beyond. 

Prevailing Context 

The author’s paper was conducted in light of a prevailing Western use, and the regional 

proliferation of cruise missiles and cruise missile technology over the past two decades. 

LACMs have become a centerpiece of the U.S. military inventory and their use has expanded 

dramatically since the Gulf War. However, advances in technology have made LACM 

acquisition a real possibility also for rogue nations. In 1999, much discussion revolved 

around the proliferation of cruise missiles to rogue nations such as Iran, Iraq, and North 

Korea. 

Methodology 

The author uses a trend analysis of cruise missile technology and acquisition to predict future 

likelihoods of nations using LACMs equipped with BW agents. 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 69

Report Format 

I. General Considerations of LACM proliferation and use (both by U.S. and rogue 

nations). 

II. Motivations behind rogue state acquisition of BW and an assessment of their 

BW programs. 

III. A look at the technical characteristics of LACMs and those attributes which 

make them desirable as a delivery platform for BW. 

IV. Examination of proliferation pathways that rogue states could potentially use for 

acquisition of LACMs and to arm them with WMD. 

V. An overall assessment of how likely rogue states will be able to employ cruise 

missiles to deliver BW agents. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

The author lists four key motives for acquisition: 

1) For use as military and economic levers of strategic power: The author cites this 

as the most compelling reason a rogue state would acquire a CM with BW in a 

post-Cold War era–that is, deter, constrain, and harm the U.S. He concludes that 

because in the near term rogue states are unlikely to be able to compete with the 

U.S. on conventional military terms, they will perceive they can level the playing 

field with WMDs such as BW. 

2) Technology and WMD proliferation. It is easier now to acquire CM than ever 

before. Exacerbating the problem is the willingness of other countries to 

provide WMD delivery systems by direct sale. 

3) Difficulties deterring WMD use. Another trend that enhances a rogue state’s 

desire to acquire WMD is the contemporary erosion of inhibitions on WMD use. 

For example, Saddam Hussain’s Iraq has already demonstrated willingness to use 

WMD on the battlefield and against its own people. Also, deterrence relies on 

retaliation–which in turn relies on knowing who launched the attack. It is 

possible to use LACMs to deliver BW without the attacked state necessarily 

knowing the origin of the attack. 

4) National prestige. Some regimes in developing countries view the possession of 

WMDs as a status symbol that ushers them into the company of the great 

powers. 

The author also underlines the appeal of BW to potential proliferators by highlighting their 

characteristics, and thus their nature as serious proliferation concerns: 

1) Can cause a large number of casualties. The author argues that BW provide 

“more bang for the buck,” they are cheap to make and easy to deliver. 

2) Economically and technically attractive. That is, BW are more easily made 

available than nuclear or chemical weapons. Also, almost all of technology 

required for a BW program is dual-use technology and thus available from a 

variety of legitimate enterprises. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-70 WMD FORECASTING 

3) Clandestine acquisition. BW programs can be disguised as legitimate research. 

4) Clandestine use. There are no reliable detection devices available that provide 

advanced warnings of a BW attack. Also, the origin of a BW can be easily 

masked. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

Iran

Iran’s BW efforts are part of an overall campaign to become the dominant power in the 

Middle East. Iranian leaders view WMD and means of delivery as essential to Iran’s overall 

security and military requirements. Also, the Iranians are known to have hired Russian, 

Chinese, and North Korean BW experts. 

Iraq 

Iraq has precedents for using WMD. Also, it was discovered that during Desert Storm, Iraq 

had 166 bombs, 25 Scud missiles, 122mm rockets, and fighter aircraft equipped with spray 

tanks–all of which were filled with BW agents. 

Libya 

A 1997 report suggested that Libya was seeking BW and may have a limited capability to 

already produce weaponized BW agents. 

North Korea 

North Korea has been conducting BW research since the 1960’s and is likely to already have 

a capability that is equal to, or greater than Iraq’s. 

Syria 

Syria has strong motivations to acquire BW because it views Israel as an “aggressive and 

expansionist state.” Syria could view BW as a deterrent to Israel’s nuclear capabilities. 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

The study solely addresses land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) as a delivery vehicle type for 

biological weapons. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

The author cites three major proliferation pathways that are likely to be used by rogue states: 

1) Direct purchase. The author deems this method as the quickest and most direct 

path to CM acquisition. The author projects that within the next decade, the 

number of state CM producers will increase from two to nine. Many countries 

such as France and Russia will most likely make their LACMs available for 

export and sales could reach as high as 6000-7000 by 2015, excluding U.S., 

Russian, and Chinese sales. 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 71

2) Indigenous development. This is the most lengthy and technically difficult path. 

However, factors which are making this pathway more likely are developments in 

technology which ultimately make LACM components cheaper and easily 

available on the open market. 

3) Conversion of Air-to-Surface Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) to LACMs. Rogue states 

and lesser developed countries are likely to convert the large number of ASCMs 

they possess (approximately 75,000 have proliferated throughout the world). 

Specific forecasts

Though the author does not make specific forecasts in a traditional sense, his trend analysis 

and conclusions lead the reader to believe that biocruise missiles present a real threat to U.S. 

and international security and the proliferation of biocruise missiles should be a primary 

concern. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions

The author concludes with a summary and assessment of the biocruise missile threat, stating 

that it is now easier than ever for rogue states to acquire cruise missile technology which can 

easily be equipped with BW. Also, the author is quick to point out that rogue nation 

capabilities will likely emerge quickly and with little if any warning. 

3. Next Generation Bioweapons: 

Genetic Engineering and Biological Warfare 

Michael Ainscough

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to consolidate accounts of genetic engineering from 

sources close to the former Soviet Union (FSU), and discuss near term future capabilities of 

genetic engineering and biowarfare from a U.S. perspective. 

Timeframe Examined 

The projections the author makes are not limited to a specific timeframe, but are in the 

context of the “near future.” 

Prevailing Context 

No discernable context can be determined. However, the trend analysis that the author uses 

is taken from the account of fairly recent FSU defectors who revealed information regarding 

advanced Soviet BW programs. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-72 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology 

The author uses the accounts of FSU scientists to substantiate projections about the future 

of BW. 

Report Format 

I. Description of the FSU BW program and testimony from FSU defectors. 

II. Scientific reports of genetic advancement and their implications. 

III. Pathways that enhance biothreats 

IV. Pathways that can enhance biodefence 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Acquisition patterns/trends

According to FSU defectors, the FSU: 

1) genetically engineered bacteria and viruses; 

2) weaponized microbes in powder form; 

3) loaded microbes onto various munitions; 

4) integrated BW into doctrine; 

5) continued secret research on new forms of plague even after President Yeltsin 

terminated the program; 

6) possessed fifty-two different biological agents engineered as “battle-strains”; and, 

7) shared BW knowledge with other states including, Iran, Iraq, India, Cuba, and 

Eastern Europe. 

The author specifically noted that since the FSU classified their BW as “special information” 

(higher than Top Secret), it is clear that the FSU valued their BW missiles as equally as their 

nuclear missiles. 

Specific forecasts

 The author predicts that biotechnology will contribute to a future revolution in 

military affairs. That is, the same techniques that are being used to enhance genes 

and create resistances to harmful bioagents, can be just as easily adapted to a 

military setting. 

 BW will always be viewed as advantageous to the state looking for asymmetric 

warfare. 

 Terrorist organizations will likely seek BW to use against civilian populations. If 

such BW are used, it would likely take a fair amount of time to determine whether 

the attack was that of an aggressor or naturally occurring. 

 BW use will create tremendous attribution problems for the attacked state and an 

enormous advantage to the aggressor. 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 73

Significant Points

The author cites six broad categories in which the biothreat could potentially be enhanced: 

1) Binary biological weapons (i.e., enhancing pathogenic bacteria with plasmids); 

2) Designer genes; 

3) Weaponized gene therapy; 

4) Stealth viruses (i.e., viruses that remain dormant until an external stimuli activate 

them); 

5) Host-swapping diseases (i.e., viruses that can cross infect humans and animals); 

and, 

6) Designer diseases. 

To counter the biothreat, the author cites six areas which could potentially improve 

biodefense: 

1) Understanding the human genome; 

2) Boosting the immune system; 

3) Understanding viral and bacterial genomes; 

4) Rapid and accurate bio-agent detection; 

5) New vaccines; and, 

6) New antibiotic and antiviral drugs. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

None that are discernable. 

Conclusions

The author concludes that engineered pathogens will be the “next generation” of biological 

warfare agents. The author states, “Although biologically engineered weapons may currently 

be less of a concern than their naturally occurring counterparts, the threat they pose can only 

increase as technology develops.” 

Additionally, the author predicts that even though the use of BW against the U.S. to date has 

been restrained, this benign condition is likely to be disrupted as rogue states begin to view 

BW as a viable means of pursuing their objectives. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-74 WMD FORECASTING 

4. A Biological Warfare Wake-Up Call: 

Prevalent Myths and Likely Scenarios 

Jim A. Davis

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose the author’s study is to examine the nation’s vulnerability to BW by illustrating 

three of the most likely scenarios the U.S. may face. Ultimately, it is the objective of the 

author to identify the areas where the U.S. can best spend dollars and create a coherent 

national plan to prepare for BW attack. 

Timeframe Examined 

The scenarios that the author presents have the potential to occur at any point in time. 

Prevailing Context 

There is no discernable prevailing context to the study other than the general perception of 

BW as a great threat to the security of the U.S. 

Methodology 

The author uses motivations for a BW attack against the U.S. to develop the three most 

likely BW attack scenarios. The scenarios are: 

1) The Agroterrorist Scenario; 

2) BW Attack on U.S. or allied forces in the Middle East; and, 

3) A Large Bioterrorist attack on a large U.S. or allied population center. 

Report Format 

I. Six myths as to why people do not believe a mass casualty attack will occur. 

II. Possible motivations for a BW attack. 

III. Possible Future BW scenarios 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

The author cites four motivations that might drive an adversary to attack the U.S. with a BW: 

1) To gradually erode U.S. influence as a world superpower. 

2) The desire to reduce the U.S. as a competitor. 

3) Religious differences may motivate an attack. 

4) Envy, rage, or hatred against the U.S. 

Specific forecasts

 Scenario A - The Agroterrorist Scenario: In the agroterrorist scenario, the moral 

barriers to using BW are quickly overcome. Inflicting damage to U.S. agriculture 

could cause the U.S. economy to become chaotic. The 2001 foot and mouth 

outbreak in Britain is estimated to have cost $30 to $60 billion in clean up and 

recovery. Also, one of the benefits of this type of attack is that the aggressor may 
The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm 

WMD FORECASTING V - 75

never be identified. A drawback is that such an attack might take years to 

accomplish the end goals. 

 Scenario B - BW Attacks on Forces in the Middle East: The goal of this attack 

would be to force the U.S. to withdraw military forces from the region. One 

option is use a non-lethal BW agent to cause mass sickness. Again, it would be 

possible for the perpetrator to avoid detection and retaliation from the U.S. 

Another option would be for the adversary to make the U.S. look responsible for 

an attack, such as releasing agents downwind from the U.S. base. This type of 

attack could be used to create tension between the U.S. and host nation. Finally, 

the aggressor could use a small amount of BW agent to kill Americans as a warning 

of possible, larger future attacks. 

 Scenario C - A Bioterrorist Attack on a Large U.S. or Allied Center: Similar to the 

9/11 attacks, such a BW attack would take place in several major U.S. cities at once. 

The perpetrators could easily depart the country before onset of symptoms. If 

anthrax were used as the BW agent and the conditions were right, hundreds of 

thousands of people would potentially be infected and die. 

Significant Points

The author points out six beliefs that explain why individuals do not think a mass casualty 

BW attack is imminent: 

1) There never really has been a significant BW attack. According to the author, this 

blatantly contradicts historical facts, citing examples such as plague used by 

Mongols in 1346, anthrax used by the Germans in WWI against allied horses and 

mules, Japanese use of typhoid in WWII, and the anthrax attack on U.S. 

government offices in 2001. 

2) The U.S. has never been attacked by a BW agent. Two counter-examples that the 

author cites are the 2001 anthrax attacks and the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cult 

contamination of 10 restaurant salad bars. 

3) You have to be extremely intelligent, highly educated, and well funded to grow, weaponize, and 

employ a BW agent. A group’s financial status or brilliance is no longer a 

significant roadblock to BW agent acquisition. According to recent reports 

from the Johns Hopkins University, BW agent acquisition has probably already 

crossed over from “too difficult” to “doable.” 

4) Biological warfare must be too difficulty because, when it has been tried, it has failed. Not 

true, the author notes, since all of the previously mentioned attacks have resulted 

in deaths. 

5) There are moral restraints that have kept, and will keep, BW agents from being used. Past 

history does not validate this argument. However, the author cites 9/11 and 

other mass casualty attacks as evidence that the previous moral constraints are no 

longer applicable. 

6) The long incubation period required for BW agents before onset of symptoms makes BW useless 

to users. This reasoning does not negate the use of BW as a weapon of terror. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-76 WMD FORECASTING 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The author concludes that despite the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax attack shortly afterwards, 

many decision makers do not believe a BW attack on the United States will happen in the 

next ten years. Noting that the counterterrorism effort is under funded, the author suggests 

that billions of extra dollars be invested in upgrading the protection of the U.S. agricultural 

industry. 
Global Evolutions and the Role of Nuclear Weapons: 

Alternative Futures for the Next Decade 

WMD FORECASTING V - 77

Global Evolutions and the Role of Nuclear Weapons: 

Alternative Futures for the Next Decade 

Daniel J. Whiteneck 

In NIC 2020 Project. Washington, D.C. 

The CNA Corporation, 2004 

Commissioned By 

The study was conducted by the CNA Corporation as part of the National Intelligence 

Council’s 2020 project. 

Purpose and Objectives 

The purpose of the study is to present three alternate scenarios based on six global trends. 

The six trends are framed in a context of an increasingly complex global system. In each of 

the three alternative scenarios, the author describes the role of the U.S. and its allies’ nuclear 

arsenals in a world of increased rivalry and regional competition. The author’s stated 

objective is not to suggest a particular policy, “...but to illuminate the potential directions of 

the evolving global system, and the choices those directions impose on nuclear weapons 

policy decision makers in the United States and its allies.” 

Timeframe Examined 

2004 to 2014 (ten years). 

Prevailing Context 

The prevailing context of the study is world of increased political, economic, social, and 

military globalization. Additionally, the author emphasizes the role of the rogue-state and 

non-state actor in nuclear proliferation. 

Methodology 

The methodology used was a qualitative analysis by non-government experts based on six 

identified global trends. 

Report Format 

The author first presents the current “state of play” in terms of global trends applicable to 

forecasting nuclear proliferation. In summary, these trends are: the increasing gap between 

globalization of economic interactions and the localization of political interactions, the 

erosion of nation-state sovereignty by international organizations as well as regional 

enterprises, increased democratic “revolutions” in the global community, the diffusion of 

technology continues to increase, the “Americanization” of global culture continues to make 

positive and negative impacts, and finally a single military superpower with dominant forces 

of global reach continues to exist. Next, each of the three alternatives is characterized and 

projected as possible outcomes over the next ten years. The author termed these alternate 

futures as: the cooperative future, the competitive future, and the chaotic future. The main 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-78 WMD FORECASTING 

discussion of the author attempts to postulate the role of nuclear weapons in each of the 

three alternate scenarios. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The Competitive Future

In the competitive future, the U.S. would most likely retain a nuclear arsenal that resembles 

its past structures. Additionally, the U.S. nuclear arsenal would rely on a traditional triad to 

ensure a strategic deterrent. The author predicts in this scenario, however, that the nuclear 

forces of other states would be much smaller. In regards to nuclear testing, the author 

suggests that opposing states in this competitive scenario could potentially resume nuclear 

testing to ensure weapons reliability as they built deterrents against the U.S. In this case, 

nuclear weapons would serve as a break on “great power confrontations” and thus, “would 

return nuclear weapons to a central role for the U.S. and other states as a measure of great 

power position.” 

The Chaotic Future

In the chaotic future, the author posits that the U.S. would change its nuclear posture to 

target WMD-related facilities and delivery systems of rogue states. Additionally, in this 

scenario, terrorist organizations and leaders would also be targeted if evidence existed of 

their WMD development or their planned attacks. U.S. nuclear forces would be smaller 

overall and with more emphasis on tactical strike capabilities. The development of these 

types of tactical strike weapons would most likely result in the failure of the CTBT as other 

states followed suit. 

The Cooperative Future

The cooperative future presents the greatest challenge to the currently planned posture of 

the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. The author asks, “How would the need for robust 

nuclear forces be explained, what would such a force look like, and what rationale would be 

offered for targeting policies or the resumption of testing?” In such a scenario, there would 

be no compelling rationale for the U.S. to adhere to the CTBT. Such an action would run 

the risk of the resumption of testing by other states and sparking a new round of 

proliferation. The size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the cooperative scenario would likely be 

much smaller as well as the reserve stockpiles. According to the author, the rationale for 

maintaining a nuclear arsenal would be based on maintaining U.S. hegemony. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

According to the author, global trends are directing the world more toward the cooperative 

future scenario than the alternatives. Though the global trends do not conclusively lead to 

the cooperative future, the author predicts it is the most likely path for politics in the next 

decade. Global trends that have lead the author to make this assertion, have been the 

increased concerted action among the great powers to address critical issues. These 

concerted actions include the development and implementation of cooperative measures of 

the G7, OECD, and IMF to address: global economic problems, global security threats from 
Global Evolutions and the Role of Nuclear Weapons: 

Alternative Futures for the Next Decade 

WMD FORECASTING V - 79

rogue states which have decreased, global terrorism which has been set back by collective 

military and police action, the need for collective actions of the UN, NATO, and other 

alliances which have involved the U.S. and its allies in many peacekeeping and nation 

building efforts, and finally, the fact that the U.S. and Europe have worked cooperatively to 

address security issues around the world. 

The “potential surprise” factor in the cooperative future is the possible proliferation of 

nuclear weapons to rogue states or terrorist groups. Thus, one of the chief concerns for the 

viability of this cooperative scenario would be the prevention of the spread of technology or 

finished weapons from various sources to the rogue states or terrorist groups. 

Finally, the study predicts that by 2020, the NSG, CTR, and IAEA could form the core of a 

better nonproliferation regime, “...and the number of nuclear powers could be at no more 

than ten.” 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-80 WMD FORECASTING 
Deadly Arsenals: 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats 

WMD FORECASTING V - 81

Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats 

Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, eds. 

Second ed. Washington, D.C. 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 

Commissioned By 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To produce the most complete and authoritative resource available from unclassified sources 

on the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. 

Timeframe Examined 

1998-2005, with some limited forecasts into near future based on existing trends. 

Prevailing Context 

Key events bearing on WMD proliferation between the 2002 edition and the second edition 

in 2005 were the attack of 9/11 (bringing threat of non-state actors to top of agenda), the 

post-Iraq War discoveries of intelligence misjudgments on WMD capabilities in Iraq, North 

Korea’s violation of its nuclear nonproliferation commitments and withdrawal from the 

NPT, the disclosures in 2003 of the A. Q. Khan network, information on the acceleration of 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and the success story of Libya dismantling its clandestine 

nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. 

Methodology 

The methodology used was essentially the same qualitative, policy-oriented analysis based on 

compilations of open source data on national programs and capabilities (by a small team of 

experts at Carnegie and help from consultants) as that of the Tracking Nuclear Proliferation

predecessor study, (see methodology paragraph in its assessment). But Deadly Arsenals

expanded the scope of its study to include the arsenals of the Western nuclear powers, the 

United States itself, and the United Kingdom and France, rather than restricting the study to 

“countries of concern” in the usual U.S. national security policy perspective. In the 2005 

edition, the authors of Deadly Arsenals dropped the terminology of WMD and addressed 

nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons capabilities separately, arguing that 

the term WMD “conflates very different threats from weapons that differ greatly in lethality, 

consequence of use, and the availability of measures that can protect against them,” so that 

“failure to differentiate these threats can lead to seriously flawed policy.” 

Deadly Arsenals reports almost exclusively on the current status of programs and only 

episodically provides forecasts or projections. It also advocates policy changes in the form of 

a “universal compliance” framework and suggests that such policy changes, if adopted, 

would limit proliferation trends and, implicitly, alter forecasts. The study is a mix of 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-82 WMD FORECASTING 

optimism and pessimism. On the optimistic side, it suggests that many cases of historical 

proliferation have been reversed, limiting the number of countries of real concern to a 

handful. 

With respect to CW and BW programs and capabilities, this study appears to be almost an 

afterthought. It relies heavily on unclassified or media-reported U.S. intelligence statements 

as sources and to a lesser extent on reported CWC-compliance-required disclosures; it 

contains little independent information or analysis of CW/BW in the country case studies 

and the CW/BW treatment has relatively little depth. 

Report Format 

The format of this book is indicated by its table of contents, in 5 parts and 21 chapters, as 

follows: 

Part One: Assessments and Weapons 

 1. Global Trends 

 2. The International Nonproliferation Regime 

 3. Nuclear Weapons and Materials 

 4. Biological and Chemical Weapons, Agents, and Proliferation 

 5. Missile Proliferation 

Part Two: Declared Nuclear Weapon States 

 6. Russia 

 7. China 

 8. France 

 9. United Kingdom 

 10. United States 

Part Three: Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States 

 11. India 

 12. Pakistan 

 13. Israel 

Part Four: Two Hard Cases 

 14. North Korea 

 15. Iran 

Part Five: Nonproliferation Successes 

 16. Libya 

 17. Iraq 

 18. Non-Russian Nuclear Successor States: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 

 19. Argentina 

 20. Brazil 

 21. South Africa 
Deadly Arsenals: 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats 

WMD FORECASTING V - 83

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 Treatment of motivations is uneven, explicit and sometimes extensive on the 

countries mentioned immediately below, but not addressed explicitly or 

systematically in most cases. 

 India’s motives for developing and demonstrating nuclear weapons were primarily 

to achieve strategic autonomy and symbols of power that would confer status, but 

Indian officials also cited China (and its strategic cooperation with Pakistan) as a 

threat requiring that India acquire a strategic counter-capability. 

 Pakistan’s motives for developing and demonstrating nuclear weapons centered 

largely on perceived Indian threats to its security and fears of Indian military 

dominance. 

 Israel’s motives for acquiring a nuclear arsenal were the belief of key leaders that a 

nuclear deterrent was vital for the small nation’s survival in a region filled with 

large enemy states. 

 Iran’s motives for unconventional weapons and missile delivery systems are 

attributed to its size, location, history, and sense of self-importance, its aspiration 

to become the region’s major power, its wartime experience with Iraq (in which 

CW and ballistic missiles were used), and perceived value of such weapons in 

deterring U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf. Iranian officials probably have 

been influence also by Israeli, Pakistani, and Indian possession of nuclear weapons. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

 Europe: Russia 

 East Asia: China, North Korea 

 South Asia: India, Pakistan 

 Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 8 countries with nuclear arsenals: Russia, China, USA, United Kingdom, France, 

Israel, India and Pakistan. 

 2 countries with suspected nuclear weapon programs: Iran, North Korea. 

 7 countries suspected of retaining biological weapons or BW programs: Russia, China, 

Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Syria. 

 Countries that declared possession of chemical weapons or of former CW programs 

or facilities but made commitments to eliminate stockpiles and programs: Albania, 

Bosnia, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, South Korea, the United 

Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. (The authors note that Iraq’s 

program was dismantled under UN sanctions.) 

 7 countries suspected of retaining national CW programs: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, 

North Korea, and Syria. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-84 WMD FORECASTING 

 5 countries with ICBMs: Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States. 

 1 country with IRBMs (3,000-5,500 km range): China. 

 7 countries with MRBMs (1,000-3,000 km range): China, India, Iran, Israel, North 

Korea, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The authors consider these seven countries and their 

MRBM programs, together with Russian missile technology exports, to be the ballistic missile 

programs of greatest proliferation concern.

 19 countries with only SRBMs (range less than 1,000 km): Afghanistan, Armenia, 

Bahrain, Belarus, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Slovakia, South Korea, 

Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, 

and Yemen. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

India 

The country’s space, ballistic missile and cruise missile programs have received critical 

technology from the United States, France, Germany, the former Soviet Union/Russia, and 

Israel. India’s closely-related SLV program has inherent ICBM capability. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan’s ballistic missile capabilities were acquired primarily from China (until 2001) and 

North Korea. 

Israel 

The nation was secretly assisted by France in developing nuclear capabilities has been a de 

facto nuclear weapons state since the late 1960s. For nuclear delivery purposes, in addition 

to fighter-bomber aircraft, Israel has deployed MRBMs and, more recently, has acquired a 

fleet of Dolphin-class submarines from Germany and modified U.S.-supplied Harpoon 

missiles for use with nuclear warheads – the basis of a second-strike capability. Israel 

reportedly also has developed air- and ground-launched cruise missiles, reportedly with 

Chinese assistance, as well as its own UAVs. Israel also has active missile defense capabilities 

in the Arrow and is cooperating with the U.S. on laser-based anti-rocket defenses. 

Iran 

Iran’s acquisition of nuclear technology has long depended almost entirely on outside 

suppliers, including several countries in Western Europe, Russia, and China. Disclosures in 

January 2004 revealed that the A.Q. Khan network had made gas-centrifuge enrichment 

technology available to Iran together with a list of suppliers of essential equipment. Iran’s 

missile programs depended primarily on exports of technology, components, production 

equipment, and training by Russia, China and North Korea. 
Deadly Arsenals: 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats 

WMD FORECASTING V - 85

Iraq 

The country’s former nuclear weapons program infrastructure and chemical and biological 

stockpiles and production infrastructure, and the production capability and stocks of ballistic 

missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers, were largely destroyed either during the 

bombing of the 1991 Gulf War or by the IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors and 

dismantlement teams in the mid-1990s. These efforts are described in the Iraq chapter in 

some detail. 

 

Deterrence and employment concepts

India claimed a minimum nuclear deterrence posture of no-first use (NFU) but readiness to 

use massive retaliation if the country is attacked with nuclear weapons, and would suspend 

NFU if its military forces are attacked with CW or BW. Despite a range of nuclear-capable 

aircraft and development, testing, and limited production of a wide range of nuclear-capable 

ballistic and cruise missiles, the deployment status of India’s nuclear weapons is considered 

to be ambiguous although nuclear-capable missiles have been integrated in certain Army 

units. 

Pakistan had not enunciated an explicit nuclear posture but former officials indicated it could 

be considered one of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. Like India, Pakistan disclaimed 

deployment of nuclear forces, and also like India, put certain nuclear-capable ballistic 

missiles into active service with specific Army units. 

Areas for potential surprise

 The likelihood that the full extent of A.Q. Khan’s network and the nuclear black 

market has not been uncovered. 

 Hard evidence (not publicly available at that time) that North Korea had 

successfully developed and assembled a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. (North 

Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006.) 

Specific forecasts

1. Overall the ballistic missile threat is limited and changing slowly. 

2. The danger of nuclear weapons acquisition by Iran or North Korea is not that 

either would likely use these weapons to attack the United States, Europe, or 

other countries. They will be deterred by the certainty of swift and massive 

retaliation. The greatest danger is the reaction of other states in the region, 

setting off a ripple of weapons decisions and wider proliferation. That in turn 

could lead to regional wars and eventually to nuclear catastrophes. 

3. The long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan, and their nuclear arming, 

has made South Asia the region most likely to experience the first use of nuclear 

weapons since 1945. 

4. Miscalculation or misunderstanding could bring nuclear war to the Korean 

peninsula. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-86 WMD FORECASTING 

5. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program together with Israel’s nuclear arsenal 

and the chemical weapons of other neighboring states would increase the 

volatility of this conflict-prone region. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons 

could cause Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or others to start or revive nuclear weapons 

programs. Thus, this region could go from a region with one nuclear state to two, 

three, or five such states – within a decade. 

6. Many years will be required before India has a test-proven (ICBM) capability to 

carry nuclear weapons to ranges of 5,500 kilometers or more. 

7. It is unlikely that Israel will follow India and Pakistan’s examples of declaring 

nuclear weapons status, and give up its policy of ambiguity – unless Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions trigger such a change. 

Significant Points

 The study gives high priority to assessment of nuclear capabilities and provides a 

meaningful basis for differentiating the various types and consequences of WMD 

for threat assessment and policy response. 

 The study has an elaborate dissection of the post-war findings regarding Saddam 

Hussein’s WMD programs, based on reports by inspectors on the ground after the 

March 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

A distinct dimension of this study is that by including the Western nuclear powers it suggests 

that their nuclear and WMD capabilities are part of the overall WMD proliferation problem 

in a fashion that is not customary for standard forecasts and projections of national security 

threats to the United States. 

Conclusions

This study does not have a set of conclusions as such. Its broader conclusions tend to be 

interwoven in the introductory overviews and the more specific conclusions are in the case 

studies – usually taking the form of current status reporting. Its broader conclusions put 

considerable emphasis on past nonproliferation successes. The study is seriously absorbed in 

the two chapters pertaining to North Korea and Iran with the WMD problems each poses, 

but its treatment of the range of countries of concern on balance suggests that the 

proliferation problems – although serious, and potentially worsening – are not as serious as 

claimed by some USG agencies and defense experts, and could be brought under control 

with a concerted strategy that observes the principle of universal compliance and that combines 

diplomatic and international instruments with military and security approaches. 
The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

WMD FORECASTING V-87 

The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

Lewis A. Dunn 

In CSIS-Sandia Workshop on Changing Face of Proliferation, 2005 

Commissioned By 

Sandia National Lab and the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Purpose and Objectives 

To help provoke discussion of how the NBC proliferation problem could change in the next 

decades. 

Timeframe Examined 

2005-2050 (next several decades) 

Context 

No specific indication of major events. The author notes that the key characteristics of 

proliferation have changed repeatedly over the past decades, sometimes for the better, 

sometimes for the worse, but often surprisingly. 

Methodology 

The paper is a thought piece that seeks to anticipate how NBC proliferation may change by 

breaking down the problem into its different parts, asking what factors could “drive” and 

“shape” future NBC proliferation, and discussing the next use of NBC weapons, particularly 

the consequences to the next user. The approach adopted is intentionally free-wheeling and 

kaleidoscopic, if not idiosyncratic. It is not a research monograph, but rather a speculative 

inquiry that reflects over thirty years of thinking about and working with proliferation issues 

both inside and outside the government. 

Report Format 

The paper is organized to look successively at descriptive categories that are named to 

illuminate the “changing face” of proliferation. The author’s forecasts regarding 

proliferation are woven into the categories, which are neither mutually exclusive nor are 

events or trends in one category independent of events or trends in another. But the very 

nature of the chosen descriptors is a forecast of what may be the most salient and important 

features of the future of proliferation for which to anticipate and prepare. The treatment of 

the descriptors also allows for twists and turns, including the possibility of moving away 

from nuclear or WMD proliferation. 

I. The “Who” of Future Proliferation 

 The “Who” – the Nation-States: 

 The Usual Suspects 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-88 WMD FORECASTING 

 The Reformed Proliferators 

 The Status Seekers 

 The Tough-Minded Independents 

 The Reluctant Non-Proliferators 

 The Newly Threatened Good Guys 

 The New Global Powers 

 Not the Last and Not the Least 

 The Renunciationists 

 The “Who” – the Non-State Entities 

 Islamist Revivalist-Restorationists 

 The Islamic Freelancers 

 Apocalyptic Movements 

 National Liberationists-Rebels, Home Grown Extremists, and Criminal 

 Organizations 

 Coup-Makers 

II. The “What” of Future Proliferation

 The “What” – the States 

 Nuclear First and Foremost – Barring... 

 Threat Perception 

 Perceived Deterrent Utility 

 Perceived Potential Coercive Utility 

 Relatively Greater Status and Prestige 

 But Some Caveats... 

 Disastrous Use 

 Events Get out of Control 

 Radical Nuclear Revisionism 

 The Fact of Non-Use 

 Chemical Weapons – Drifting Downward? 

 Perceived Relative Utility 

 Changed U.S. Chemical Weapons (CW) Defense Capabilities 

 Less Fit with the “Whos” 

 But Some Caveats Again ... 

 New CW Options 

 CW Use All Over Again 

 Biological Weapons – Treading Water until...? 

 Plausible but Unproven Utility 

 Proven Low Deterrent Value v. the United States 

 Relative Ease of Production 

 Shifting Balance of Offense-Defense 

 A Few Caveats or Wild Cards 

 First Use 

 Response to First Use 
The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

WMD FORECASTING V-89 

 Lethal Biological Weapons (BW) to Buy Time – for Nuclear? 

 Lessons of Terrorist BW Use 

 Missile Proliferation – Shifting Directions

 Product Improvement and Upgrades 

 Shifting Directions 

 Rusting Relics, or What if BMD Works – and Spreads? 

 The What – Non-State Entities

 Al-Qaeda: Harbinger or Outlier? 

 Isolated Development or Routine Phenomenon? 

III. The “Why” of Future Proliferation 

 The “Why” – the States

 The Why of Explosive State Nuclear Proliferation

 Lack of Proliferation Firebreaks 

 Erosion of Structures, Norms, and Institutions 

 U.S. Security Structures 

 The NPT Factor 

 Successful Use 

 Changing Leadership Beliefs and Psychology 

 Hedging Bets 

 Reduced Supplier Cooperation 

 Globalization – and Increasing Technical Opportunity 

 Latent Capabilities in Key “Proliferation Spark-Plug” Countries 

 Successful Use – the Key Trigger? 

 The “Why” – the Non-State Entities

 The “Why” of Non-State Proliferation

 The Islamic Revivalist-Restorationists – Use but...? 

 The Record 

 Visually-Pleasing Destruction 

 Too Valuable to Detonate? 

 Fit with the Islamist Revivalist-Restorationists Goal? 

 The Islamist Freelancers 

 The Apocalyptic Movements 

 National Liberationists and the Other Non-State Entities 

 National Liberationist-Rebels 

 Home Grown Extremists 

 Criminal Organizations 

 The Coup-Makers 

IV. The “How” of Future Proliferation

 The “How” – the States

 The Traditional “Tried and True” – Do it Yourself

 Back to “Openness” – Ever? 

 Surge Bio Capability – or Capabilities in Being? 

 The Right People 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-90 WMD FORECASTING 

 Getting By with Some Help from Friends

 More A.Q. Khans – and More than Nuclear 

 Nuclear Two-Key Transfers 

 Joint Ventures and Off-Shore Production

 Joint Proliferation Ventures 

 Off-Shore Production 

 The “How” – the Non-State Entities

 Gift or Inheritance of a Nuclear Weapon

 Independent Production

V. The “What If” of Future Proliferation

 The Past State Experience

 Cold War Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons 

 Nuclear Non-Use in South Asia – So Far, So Good? 

 Use of Chemical Weapons 

 Non-Use of Biological Weapons 

 One Caveat 

 The Presumptive State Proliferators

 The Non-State Entity-State Entity Relationship

 Prudential Policy-Military Planning

VI. The “Who Cares” of Future Proliferation

 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 – the Wave of Things to Come? 

 Demoralization and Resignation – at What Point? 

 The Next Use of NBC Weapons

 Not Whether but When, How, and by Whom 

 Uncertain Impacts 

 Danger but also Opportunity 

Closing Thought

 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 For future nuclear proliferation, status (e.g., Indian case) is increasing as a motive 

for States. 

 Other future motives for States will resemble the past, for example enhanced 

political-military security, desire for regional aggrandizement, and claims of status 

or desires for prestige. 

 The motives of non-State entities are suggested by the type of non-state entity – 

Islamist Revivalists (al-Qaeda and others wanting NBC to bolster efforts to create a 

new “caliphate”), Apocalyptic Movements (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo), National Liberationists

(nukes to win internal wars), Coup-Makers (e.g., Revolt of the Generals in Algiers, 

nukes to enable seizure of power). 
The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

WMD FORECASTING V-91 

 Perceptions of nuclear weapons as the likely weapons of choice for most future 

proliferators could be pushed into reverse, however, by “shocks.” Shocks could 

include examples of disastrous use (Taiwan-China-U.S. clash?), events getting out 

of control (India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir), nuclear revisionism (U.S. 

conventional global strike options sending signal that nukes are “old hat”), and fact 

of non-use (strengthening perception that these weapons are not usable). 

 Potential state proliferators that have a high regard for their perceived status may 

be disinclined to deploy CW or BW. 

 Apart from Japan’s use of plague in China in World War II and the controversy 

about mycotoxins in Southeast Asia in the early 1970s, there is no modern track 

record of state use of BW. The scope, nature, and consequences of a first use of BW

could have a major shaping impact on subsequent motivations. If a nuclear 

response is employed against a first BW user, then the perceived utility of BW 

could be reduced. 

 The impact of use of BW agents by a terrorist group could affect state BW 

proliferation calculations. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

 The Usual Suspects have been around for quite some time and are the most 

likely to be the next potential NBC states in the upcoming decades. These include: 

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 

 Reformed Proliferators could revert to a proliferation track. This list includes 

South Korea and Taiwan, and, though less likely, Libya and South Africa. 

 Status Seekers are likely to be nuclear proliferators (status does not seem to be a 

motivation for CW or BW proliferation). India is a recent example. Their claims 

to major power status have been increasingly recognized and there is a possibility 

that they will receive a permanent seat on the UNSC. Potential status seekers 

include: Japan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and South Korea. 

 Tough-Minded Independents like Sweden and Switzerland launched atomic 

bomb programs after World War II, but then ceased work. In the decades ahead, 

tough-minded independent nations such as Singapore and Vietnam, or Former 

Soviet Union (FSU) states like Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan could pursue 

an NBC track for security or to undergird independence. 

 Reluctant Non-Proliferators who signed up to the NPT out of a sense of 

political necessity rather than deep conviction could drop out of the regime. 

Possible candidates are: Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Iraq, 

and FSU states. 

 Newly-Threatened Good Guys could reconsider nuclear abstinence. Germany

was a former concern, but the most obvious future possibility is Japan facing a 

resurging China or a nuclearizing North Korea and fading U.S. power. 

 New Global Powers could make a bid to become a nuclear power. Though 

seemingly unlikely today, one possibility is the European Union (EU), especially 

if Europe and the U.S. continue to drift apart. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-92 WMD FORECASTING 

 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 In the past, proliferation most often meant nuclear proliferation. By late 1970s, 

ballistic missile proliferation was important, chemical weapons proliferation gained 

prominence during the 1980s, and biological weapons proliferation was still an 

undercurrent until almost the 1990s. Looking ahead, the “what” of proliferation 

for state proliferators could be summarized as: nuclear up, chemical down, 

biologicals treading water, and ballistic missiles giving way to cruise missiles and 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). For non-state entities, the “what” could range 

widely across the possibilities of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. 

 Barring some shock or decisive turn of events, there are many reasons to believe 

nuclear weapons will continue to be the “proliferation of choice” for tomorrow’s 

proliferators. 

 Chemical weapons over the next decades could be viewed as useful by local leaders in 

clashes between third world countries (e.g., Iran-Iraq War), but could fade in 

appeal as a means of taking on the great powers. 

 Biological weapons could conceivably become an increasingly prominent element of 

the changing face of proliferation, but questions persist regarding the ease of 

dissemination by regional adversaries, the effectiveness of response, the risks of 

escalation, and other dimensions. Nonetheless, the relative ease of producing 

“entry-level” BW (e.g., Tularemia, Anthrax) needs to be factored into the equation. 

Some countries may begin down the BW proliferation path, exploring options and 

possibly designing a surge capability, but then “tread water,” watching and waiting 

to determine whether their BW would be practically useful. 

 For countries contemplating BW as an asymmetric response to U.S. conventional 

capabilities, the relative balance of offense and defense has already begun to shift 

in favor of operational defense preparedness, albeit less rapidly than hoped. 

 Missile proliferation could follow three trends in the decades ahead: (1) upgrading 

ballistic missile capabilities in range, accuracy, and penetration of defenses; (2) 

pursuit of other missile proliferation options, such as spread and refinement of 

cruise missiles and UAVs, and ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in a growing 

number of countries; and (3) the possibility that if BMD works, and spreads, it 

could diminish the utility and appeal of offensive ballistic missiles. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

 It can be taken as a given that additional terrorist use of BW of some sort will 

occur (recalling Aum Shinrikyo use in the Tokyo subway and unsuccessful alQaeda use of Ricin in London in 2003). 

 A successful high-casualty terrorist use of BW could make BW more attractive to a 

regional state that is seeking nuclear capability, but is still years away from the 

threshold, as an interim deterrent against its adversaries. 
The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

WMD FORECASTING V-93 

 The near-universally accepted judgment today is that it is not a matter of whether 

non-state entities will gain access to NBCR weapons, but when. Writ large, the 

judgment is probably correct. In practice, however, it is unlikely that each of the 

specific non-state entities will actually seek, and succeed, in acquiring access to the 

full spectrum of NBCR. How states proliferate has followed various pathways in 

the past. Therefore, looking out several decades, new pathways should be 

expected. 

 For non-state entities, purchase or theft may be the most usual paths, but “gifts” 

or dedicated production are conceivable. A “gift” to a terrorist group by a state 

sponsor could occur if the state anticipates defeat by another power, or even if the 

state simply enlists a terrorist entity to help pursue a regional agenda assuming the 

link can be concealed and denied. “Inheritance” is also conceivable if, for example, 

Islamic extremists take power in Pakistan and thereby achieve control of nuclear 

weapons. If proliferation accelerates in the decades ahead, both “gift” and 

“inheritance” become more plausible. Independent production of nuclear and BW 

weapons is a high bar for a non-state entity, but the bar may be lowered over time. 

 Dedicated national programs to develop NBC weapons and missiles will continue. 

Such programs are likely to be covert initially, unless a proliferation tipping point is 

reached when many countries might pursue nuclear weapons openly. Past 

experience suggests that a few key persons drive virtually all successful NBC and 

missile programs, and one may expect this to be true in the future. 

 Most successful national proliferation programs have had help from friends. 

Future help could take on some “new” dimensions: 

- More A.Q. Khans – and more than nuclear: A.Q. Khan’s virtual nuclear 

weapons for sale operation came as a surprise. Now that Khan has 

shown the way, it is difficult to believe other entrepreneurs will not 

follow suit. 

- In the BW arena, past participation in a weapons program would not be a 

prerequisite for entry to this business; smart and talented individuals 

from the bio-research and bio-technology worlds would be potential 

entrepreneurs. 

 Technically weak countries may seek outside help on the U.S.-NATO “nuclear 

two-key transfer” model. Two possibilities that come to mind are Chinese supply 

of two-key nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia (for guaranteed oil supplies) and 

Pakistani supply of nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia (in return for funding 

expansion of its nuclear arsenal). 

 Other acquisition patterns of future NBC and missile proliferation could be: (1) the 

creation of joint ventures by more than one country or (2) offshore production by 

one or more countries, especially after, but even short of, an explosive proliferation 

breakout. Offshore production of BW would be the easiest to conceal, but nuclear 

might be feasible. CW would be the most difficult given the logistics of 

production and safe transport. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-94 WMD FORECASTING 

Deterrence and employment concepts

 Although not used for six decades, nuclear weapons will still retain the aura of 

valuable instruments of deterrence. 

 One lesson from the second Iraq War that is likely to carry into the future is that 

neither CW nor BW (both of which Iraq was believed to have) are a credible 

deterrent against large-scale U.S. intervention in a region of concern. 

 Among non-state terrorist actors, such as al-Qaeda, the conventional wisdom is 

“acquisition will equal use.” This may be true in some instances, but there are 

other possibilities. Future Islamic Revivalists that get a nuclear weapon could 

conceivably regard it as too valuable to detonate because it could offer a means of 

deterrence and coercion. Not using the weapon could legitimize and strengthen 

their support among Muslims at large. Using the weapon with large-scale loss of 

innocent life could cause the Muslim population to turn away. 

 Future apocalyptic movements would be prone to use WMD – the greater the 

destruction and loss of life the better. While Islamic revivalists might draw the line 

at the release of contagious BW agents, fearing harm to the populations they seek 

to control, apocalyptic movements might consider such deaths a bonus. 

 National Liberationist-Rebels (like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka) may or may not 

use WMD depending on their calculation of relative strategic-tactical advantage in 

an ongoing conflict. 

 Instead of using WMD, criminal organizations would be more likely to seek a 

profit by selling them, or would preserve threat of use for sub-state deterrence to 

gain sanctuary for other activities. 

 Coup-Makers would acquire WMD to strengthen their legitimacy, confound their 

opponents, and support their claim to power. They would probably avoide use, 

except in extremity. 

Areas for potential surprise

 Tipping Point to “Explosive” Proliferation: A dramatic proliferation shock or 

continued erosion of nonproliferation barriers coupled with a slow drift in 

reassessing nonproliferation postures in future decades could lead to a burst of NB 

or C proliferation, amplified by a bandwagon effect in which no technically capable 

country would want to be left behind (the “not the last and not the least” 

proliferation scenario). 

 Successful use of nukes could be the most critical driver of widening “explosive” 

proliferation. 

 Goal of nuclear use to change “status quo”: Nuclear weapons were not used 

after World War II. The U.S. and eventually the Soviet Union came to believe that 

nuclear weapons could not be used to change the East-West status quo. The 

future may not closely emulate this past convention. Looking to the future, China, 

North Korea, Pakistan, and a future nuclear-armed Iran each may be tempted to 

consider use of nuclear weapons or threats of use to change an unpalatable status 
The Changing Face of Proliferation: 

Some Thoughts, Speculations, and Provocations 

WMD FORECASTING V-95 

quo, e.g., over Taiwan, the division of the Korean peninsula, Kashmir, or foreign 

military presence in the Persian Gulf. 

 Renunciation: Decisions to renounce the pursuit of NBC weapons and give up 

related capabilities could also spread, if events move in a more positive direction 

for proliferation prevention – although current trends seem to obscure this 

possibility. 

 Demoralization, or Stronger Regime? International concern about proliferation 

has oscillated, and could either lead to resignation that widespread proliferation is 

inevitable or galvanize stronger commitments and tools to head it off and contain 

its effects. 

 

Specific forecasts

 The analysis above is rich in “contingent forecasts,” but also posits the following 

straightforward forecasts: 

(1) Nuclear weapons are likely to remain the weapon of choice for 

proliferators; 

(2) Future proliferation will both resemble the past and adopt new pathways 

and forms; 

(3) Status motivations will increase in frequency; 

(4) Proliferation by or to non-state entities is likely; 

(5) Countries are likely to form WMD development joint ventures and 

conduct WMD development offshore; and, 

(6) The scope of proliferation could reach a tipping point and then spiral 

explosively, although its specific outcomes and shaping will depend in 

part on how the international community responds, particularly to the 

next first use of nuclear weapons or first use of BW. 

 The paper also forecasts that missile proliferation trends will continue in the areas 

of accuracy and range, thus augmenting ballistic and cruise missile delivery 

capabilities for nuclear weapons and other WMD, which will probably hasten 

development of missile defenses. 

Significant Points

 The shape of future proliferation will depend not only on current state and nonstate entity motivations for WMD acquisition and the technical diffusion that 

accompanies globalization, but also on how the international community responds 

to proliferation events, particularly the next big shock or shocks. 

 It is unclear how the international community will react to the next use of nuclear 

(or biological or chemical) weapons. 

 Many nations will not believe that nonproliferation is practically attainable if the 

tipping point is reached. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-96 WMD FORECASTING 

 The successful use of NBC weapons would be a powerful proliferation multiplier. 

But, conversely, the next use of NBC weapons could galvanize international action 

against proliferation. 

 Past experience shows that the most critical U.S. and global actions to strengthen 

nonproliferation have followed proliferation shocks. 

 UNSC Resolution 1540 can be a template and building block for rallying nations to 

act against state and non-state entity proliferation. This is both significant to note 

and should not be underestimated. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The author’s thought process and presentation offers a uniquely complex portrait of the 

possible forms and permutations of future WMD proliferation among states and non-state 

entities and the variety of motives that could determine whether, when, and how NBC 

weapons obtained through future proliferation are actually used. The author is sure-footed 

in tracing the potential calculations or scenarios of regarding nuclear, biological, and 

chemical weapons acquisition and use throughout his analysis of numerous characteristic 

types of proliferators. 

Conclusions

The paper descriptively analyzes many facets of the changing face of proliferation, at state 

and non-state levels, but emphasizes that the future of proliferation is not a given. The 

policies pursued (and not pursued) by the U.S. and like-minded countries can significantly 

impact the scope, shape, characteristics, and timing of NBC proliferation. The dire 

predictions about runaway nuclear proliferation of the 1950s and early 1960s did not 

materialize as self-fulfilling prophecies because international actions intervened to make 

them self-denying prophecies. Intensified actions today along many fronts could have a 

similar impact. 
 The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses 

WMD FORECASTING V-97 

The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses 

Richard G. Lugar 

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate, 2005 

Purpose and Objectives 

To collect and identify consistencies and divergences in views on the prospects for 

nonproliferation through a poll of selected experts on proliferation and national security. In 

illustrating consistencies and divergences, the author’s hope is that the results will be useful 

in defining the risk parameters of proliferation as well as in identifying public policy issues 

that need more attention. 

Timeframe Examined 

2010-2015 (between five and ten years) 

Prevailing Context 

The rising post-9/11 concerns about WMD proliferation threats, in particular, the possible 

terrorist group acquisition or use of a WMD in the U.S. homeland. 

Methodology 

The survey analyzes the responses of eighty-five experts to a questionnaire. Experts ranged 

from scholars, policy makers, diplomats, and technicians known for their experience with 

national security and nonproliferation policies. The majority of the respondents were from 

the U.S., but a few were from overseas. Survey participants were instructed that they could 

leave questions blank if they felt that they did not have the expertise to provide an answer. 

Report Format 

The study has two parts: assessing proliferation threats and international nonproliferation 

responses. In part one, the study surveys how many nations are expected to proliferate 

nuclear weapons, the risk of a CBRN attack, and the most likely method of terrorist 

acquisition of a WMD. Part two of the study surveys respondents’ views in the following 

categories: status of international nonproliferation efforts; government spending on 

nonproliferation; recommended spending increases; encouragement of developments in 

nonproliferatation capabilities; nonproliferation priorities; and underrated proliferation risks. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Part I 

a. Nations that will be added to nuclear club: 

i. In next 5 Years: 90% agreed between 1 and 3 

ii. In next 10 Years: 78% agreed between 2 and 5 

iii. In next 20 Years: 75% agreed between 4 and 10 

b. Risk of Nuclear Attack (somewhere?) 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-98 WMD FORECASTING 

i. 5 Years: 60% of respondents judged the probability to be at least 

10%. 

ii. 10 Years: 20% probability 

c. Nuclear attack: by a government or by terrorists? 

i. 79% said that if a nuclear attack occurs in the next 10 years, then 

it is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization. 

d. Most likely method of terrorist acquisition 

i. 75% of respondents judged the black market to be the most likely 

means of acquisition. 

e. Risk of biological attack: 

i. 5 Years: 10 - 20% likelihood 

ii. 10 Years: at least 20% likelihood 

f. Risk of chemical attack: 

i. 5 Years: 10 - 30% likelihood 

ii. 10 Years: 15% likelihood 

g. Risk of radiological attack: 

i. 5 Years: 25% likelihood 

ii. 10 Years: 40% likelihood 

Part II 

a. Status of nonproliferation efforts 

i. 46% of respondents believed international nonproliferation 

efforts have regressed during 2004. 

b. Government spending on nonproliferation 

i. 78% of respondents indicated that their country was spending 

too little. 

c. Recommended spending 

i. 70% of respondents stated that their country should spend at 

least 25% more on nonproliferation programs. 

d. Encouraging developments in nonproliferation capabilities 

i. 27 respondents noted the PSI as the most important 

ii. 23 respondents noted UNSCR 1540 as the most important 

iii. 20 respondents cited CTR as the most important 

iv. 14 respondents cited GTRI 

v. 12 respondents cited the reaffirmation of the G8 Global 

Partnership 

e. Nonproliferation priorities 

i. 27 respondents noted dismantling, securing, and destroying 

CBRN weapons in the former Soviet Union. 

ii. 14 respondents noted ending the North Korean nuclear 

program 

iii. 9 respondents noted global control of fissile material 

iv. 8 respondents noted strengthening NPT 
 The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses 

WMD FORECASTING V-99 

f. Underrated proliferation risks 

i. The risk that requires the most attention is the possiblility of 

terrorists acquiring WMD 

Conclusions 

None provided. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-100 WMD FORECASTING 
Special Issue: 

 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

WMD FORECASTING V-101 

Special Issue: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

The Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (2006): 617-25 

Note 

Guest Editor, Peter R. Lavoy. This symposium volume consists of seventeen articles, one 

by the guest editor, and fifteen individually authored pieces, and one co-authored piece (see 

“Report Format section below for table of contents): 

Commissioned By 

The “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016” conference organizers at the Center for 

Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California in July 2006. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To forecast nuclear proliferation conditions ten years out. The outline of questions 

originally used to organize the conference is not spelled out in the journal. However, the 

editor of the journal, Stephen Schwartz, states in his preface to this special issue that the 

collected essays “examine the issues most likely to influence nuclear proliferation over the 

next decade,” and all the authors “address to some extent three underlying questions: (1) 

What drives and enables a country to pursue nuclear weapons? (2) What early warning signs 

can be observed in countries seeking nuclear weapons? And (3) What steps can be taken to 

halt or impede proliferation during the next decade to keep instability and threats to the 

[nonproliferation] regime at a minimum?” 

Timeframe Examined 

2006-2016. 

Prevailing Context 

The prevailing context for commissioning the individual papers was not spelled out explicitly. 

Internal evidence suggests that the most important international events which provided 

background to those essays that contain some form of forecasts were: (1) disclosures of 

Iran’s progress in developing and installing gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology; 

(2) reports that North Korea had successfully sequestered a stockpile of weapons-grade 

plutonium and could test a nuclear device in the near future (North Korea actually detonated 

a plutonium nuclear device on October 9, 2006, just before the journal issue was published 

but well after papers had been assigned and the July, 2006 conference was held); and, in 

reaction to these developments, (3) news reports suggesting there could be further nuclear 

proliferation in East Asia and the Middle East. Other developments that affected the 

perspective of individual authors were the Libyan about-face on WMD and missile programs 

in 2003; reports in 2002-2003 of a non-state actor’s (i.e., al-Qaeda’s) efforts to purchase and 

to develop and produce WMD; and, the disclosures of the A.Q. Khan network and its 

activities in early 2004. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-102 WMD FORECASTING 

Methodology 

The articles are all qualitative analyses, either historical (with lessons) or thought pieces about 

the future based on a combination of past research and expertise in the field of nuclear 

proliferation and on various regions of the world. The uniqueness is not in methodology as 

such, but in the conference approach of drawing a panel of experts together to attempt to 

identify “what issues [are] most likely to influence nuclear proliferation over the next 

decade.” The focus of the symposium is primarily on nation-state proliferation, and 

secondarily on “transnational proliferation networks.” The one essay dedicated to non-state 

actor proliferation deals not with the demand side (e.g., terrorist acquisition of WMD) but 

rather with the supply side, i.e., the prospective emergence and operation, beyond the reach 

of the nonproliferation regime, of networked non-state entities whose business is to supply 

and service products of proliferation importance to buyers, whether states or non-state 

entities, possibly including, among the latter, criminals, warlords, or terrorists. 

Report Format 

The table of contents of the journal’s special issue on “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 

2016” is reproduced below. Not all of the essays provide future nuclear weapons 

proliferation “forecasts;” pieces that have been assessed in this document have an asterisk in 

front of a title. 

I. Introduction 

*Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses, Peter R. 

Lavoy. 

II. Insights from the Past: Theory, Intelligence, and Policy

Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field, Jacques E. C. Hymans. 

Anticipating Nuclear Proliferation: Insights from the Past, Torrey C. Froscher. 

*Countering Proliferation: Insights from Past “Winds, Losses, and Draws,” Lewis A. Dunn. 

*Identifying Nuclear Aspirants and Their Pathways to the Bomb, Robert J. Einhorn. 

III. Past Cases of Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Reversal

Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan, Feroz Hassan Khan. 

South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Stephen F. Burgess. 

Lessons Learned from Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, Mark Fitzpatrick. 

*Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback, Rebecca K. C. Hersman 

and Robert Peters. 

Egypt’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons Learned, Maria Rost Rublee. 

 

IV. Future Nuclear Proliferation Risks

*Nuclear Proliferation in Europe: Could It Still Happen? Bruno Tertrais. 
Special Issue: 

 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

WMD FORECASTING V-103 

*The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, Abbas Kadhim. 

*Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia, James Clay Moltz. 

*Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Southeast Asia, 2006-2016, Michael S. Malley. 

*Assessing Potential Nuclear Proliferation Networks in Latin America: 2006-2016, Harold A. 

Trinkunas. 

V. New Dynamics in the Proliferation Environment

 

*The Nuclear Energy Market and the Nonproliferation Regime, Chaim Braun. 

*Peering into the Abyss: Non-State Actors and the 2016 Proliferation Environment, James A. Russell. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 Once critical U.S. security guarantees are no longer a nonproliferation “free good”. 

Looking ahead, the scope and pace of future nuclear proliferation will continue to 

be closely intertwined with the robustness and credibility of U.S. security alliances 

in meeting (or failing) the real and perceived security needs of critical countries. 

(Dunn) 

 Whatever its format, the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe probably remains the 

most important factor for dissuading motivations for further nuclear proliferation 

on the continent. 

 Security shocks (e.g., nuclear weapons in North Korea or Iran) that impact the 

security and influence the calculations of neighbors could open up new nuclear 

weapon motivations in their regions. (Various authors) 

 A combination of two factors could make Turkey think seriously about going 

nuclear. The first is the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program and the second is 

a sense of alienation vis-à-vis the rest of the Western community. (Tertrais) 

 Several Middle East states exhibit a felt need to acquire WMD to counterbalance 

Israel’s nuclear arsenal and conventional military superiority. (Kadhim) 

 Iran’s current and projected motivations for nuclear and missile capabilities are to 

protect against U.S. pressures for regime change; potential U.S. and Israeli 

preemptive conventional military attack; and perceived nuclear-backed threats 

from the U.S., Israel, and Pakistan. (Khadim) 

 Iran’s rise as a nuclear power is likely to give Saudi Arabia the incentive to build a 

nuclear program, but it lacks the scientific base and would find it difficult to keep it 

covert given the U.S. military presence there as well as in Kuwait and Qatar. 

Consequently, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will have a nuclear program in the 

coming decade (2006-2015). (Khadim) 

 Iran’s rise as a nuclear power could also precipitate a revived nuclear program in 

Egypt, which has the requisite scientific base but would face serious constraints in 

moving forward successfully due to scarce financial resources. (Khadim) 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-104 WMD FORECASTING 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

 The symposium considers the regions of greatest nuclear proliferation concern to 

be the Middle East and Northeast Asia, but also includes second or third order 

concerns about the future of potential proliferation in Europe, Latin America, 

Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. 

 Countries of greatest concern on the demand side, either because of their interest 

in the past or possible interest in the future, include: Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey, Syria, 

Iran, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Burma, 

Indonesia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and 

Venezuela. (Various authors.) 

 Proliferation indicators and warning signs that will continue to be useful in 

detecting and characterizing nuclear proliferation are: (1) nuclear myths and mythmakers (e.g., public statements and activities intended to create support for nuclear 

weapons programs); (2) travel of nuclear managers or technicians to interact or 

procure; (3) promotion of known or presumed nuclear weapons advocates to 

higher positions; (4) acute, adverse changes in a state’s security circumstances – as 

perceived by that state’s leaders and strategists; (5) indicators in nuclear program 

activities (e.g., sending people abroad for training, procurement efforts in sensitive 

items, involvement of military and intelligence officials in ostensibly civilian nuclear 

research and development programs, and technical cooperation or trade with key 

countries or with entrepreneurs in key technical areas); and (6) evidence of covert 

dealings in the market or covert cooperation with suspicious partners. (Lavoy) 

 Adverse developments and trends have increased the likelihood that we are headed 

toward a more widely proliferated world. These events and trends include the 

impact on neighbors of nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, 

China’s military buildup; U.S. preoccupation with Iraq and strains with allies; 

diffusion of nuclear and dual-use technology; the A.Q. Khan black market 

phenomenon; acquisition of concealable technologies; and U.S. and NSG 

members’ willingness to engage in nuclear cooperation with India, thus lowering 

the perceived costs of going nuclear. (Einhorn) 

 Countervailing developments and trends, such as increased international scrutiny, 

strengthened nonproliferation tools (including UNSC Resolution 1540 and the 

Proliferation Security Initiative), and the still-limited technical and industrial base 

of many potential proliferators could also slow nuclear proliferation. (Einhorn) 

 Middle East: See below under “Specific Forecasts”. 

 Currently, Southeast Asia has almost no interstate or extra-regional security threats 

that would be an incentive for nuclear weapons programs. Addtionally, the region 

has evolved associational agreements, political cooperation, and norms that make 

nuclear proliferation very unlikely, at least during the next ten years. Burma 

(Myanmar) is a possible exception to the regional trend in its military rule, general 

isolation, and military ties with North Korea. Even so, Burma probably does not 

have the resources to develop a serious nuclear weapons program in the coming 

decade. Indonesia has the largest national concentration of civil nuclear expertise 
Special Issue: 

 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

WMD FORECASTING V-105 

and infrastructure in the region and newly invigorated interest in building nuclear 

plants for electricity-generation, but no apparent interest in nuclear weapons. The 

primary proliferation concern for Indonesia is the possible participation of its 

public or private firms in multinational nuclear trading networks with Iran, other 

proliferator states, or illicit nuclear and dual-use supplier firms. (Malley) 

 Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile 

regions of the world with respect to nuclear weapons. It contains two established 

nuclear weapon states – Russia and China, a third with presumed nuclear weapons 

– North Korea, and three threshold nuclear states – Japan, South Korea, and 

Taiwan. One cannot escape the conclusion that Northeast Asia is a nuclear 

tinderbox that could easily ignite. (Moltz) 

 In Latin America, nuclear weapons proliferation trends of the 1960s and 1970s 

(primarily in Argentina and Brazil) have largely been reversed by democratization, 

confidence in national sovereignty, economic advances, and international legal 

instruments with monitoring institutions such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the 

Argentine-Brazil bilateral nuclear inspection agency (ABACC). The main 

proliferation risks from Brazil and Argentina over the next ten years would be 

from their inclination to be alternative suppliers of nuclear technology and 

potential to be caught up in multinational nuclear networking with critical nations 

and illicit end users. Otherwise, the main state of concern is Venezuela under 

Chavez, who envisages a domestic nuclear energy program, has spoken out against 

nonproliferation norms, and attempted to cultivate nuclear import relationships 

with Argentina and Brazil and possibly with Iran and North Korea. Venezuela 

today has virtually no nuclear scientific base, infrastructure, or interest groups to 

support a nuclear research and energy program. Notwithstanding revenues from 

oil and the possible import of turnkey technology, it is highly unlikely that 

Venezuela’s nuclear program could be developed sufficiently in the next decade to 

pose the direct risk of nuclear weapons production. (Note: Cuba is not discussed 

as a significant nuclear proliferation risk in this article on Latin America.) 

(Trinkunas) 

 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

This symposium focused on nuclear weapons proliferation and has no specific analyses of 

CW, BW, or radiological threats, and virtually no content or analysis of delivery systems. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

 Acquisition patterns by determined proliferators will “innovate,” even as 

nonproliferation regime controls tighten. (Dunn) 

 Despite military modernization programs, China has maintained relative restraint in 

the size of its nuclear arsenal which is generally estimated to be about 400 weapons 

(some recent analysis that suggests it may be only between 80 and 130 deployed 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-106 WMD FORECASTING 

nuclear weapons). China has substantial fissile material stockpiles, however, that 

would allow production of upwards of 1,000 nuclear weapons. (Moltz) 

 Burma has military cooperation with North Korea that evidently includes nuclear 

technology content and possible transfers. (Malley) 

 Iran has been seeking to cultivate ties with Indonesia including cooperation in 

nuclear technology. While Indonesia itself shows no interest in nuclear weapons, 

its growing technical ties with Iran to foster serious nuclear energy plans to meet 

Indonesian energy requirements could lead Indonesia to become, inadvertently, a 

part of wider regional and global proliferation networks. (Note: the author has no 

estimates or analysis of nuclear proliferation conditions or potential in Vietnam.) 

(Malley) 

 Non-state and quasi-government organizations doing business in transnational 

networks, essentially offshore, may become very important on the supply side of 

nuclear proliferation by 2016, by producing, selling, and servicing products of 

proliferation importance to government agencies as well as to other non-state 

entities best characterized as criminals, warlords, or terrorists. (Russell) 

Deterrence and employment concepts

This symposium focused primarily on prospective nuclear acquisition and infrastructure and 

did not address the military doctrines or uses of nuclear weapons. Basic deterrence is 

considered a generic motive for nuclear weapons programs and acquisition, but generally the 

authors do not explore or analyze nuclear deterrence or nuclear weapons employment issues. 

 

Areas for potential surprise

 Proliferation shocks that could impact and shape the state of future proliferation, 

such as: a successful or aborted use of nuclear weapons by terrorists; a nuclear 

weapon accident in India or Pakistan; a confirmed theft of nuclear materials or 

weapon; an escalation to nuclear use between India or Pakistan; an NPT breakout 

by Iran; Pakistani or Chinese deployment of nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia 

under a ‘NATO-like’ dual-key arrangement; a U.S.-China-Taiwan crisis with threats 

or actual use of nuclear weapons; or open Israeli deployment of nuclear weapons. 

(Dunn) 

 Fears of runaway proliferation have energized the U.S. and other governments to 

act together to make those fears a self-denying prophecy; leveraging future nuclear 

surprises in favor of nonproliferation has worked in the past and could work this 

way again. (Dunn) 

 The attention currently focused on North Korea and Iran is imperative, but it is 

also problematic. Keeping the spotlight focused on Iran and North Korea ... risks 

keeping too much of the rest of the nuclear landscape in the shadows and opening 

ourselves to dangerous surprise. (Hersman and Peters) 

 Countries that formerly pursued nuclear weapon programs but were “rolled back” 

by pressures and incentives could resume such programs. “The record of rollback 

in [South Korea and Taiwan] emphasizes the fact that nuclear rollback is a process, 
Special Issue: 

 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

WMD FORECASTING V-107 

not an outcome or state of being – success in the past by no means assures success 

in the future. Rollback in South Korea and Taiwan is not ‘over’ – intent could 

change rapidly with little warning, sending these countries back into the ‘danger 

zone.’ ... Failure to maintain attention might invite an era in which the long-feared 

scenario of ‘nuclear dominoes’ – when one state’s decision to reconsider the role 

of nuclear weapons in its national security calculus sets off a cascade of such 

decisions in other states – comes to pass.” (Hersman and Peters) 

Specific forecasts

 Nuclear Turkey possible: timeframe 2010-2025, probability under 10%, under 

conditions of continued degradation of U.S.-Turkish relations, Iranian nuclear 

capability, non-entry in the EU, withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, 

Russian assertiveness in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and NPT breakdown. 

(Tertrais) 

 Nuclear Ukraine hypothetical: timeframe 2015-2025, probability under 5%, under 

conditions of non-entry in NATO and EU, proximity to and continued tensions 

with Russia, and NPT breakdown. (Tertrais) 

 Nuclear Serbia hypothetical: timeframe 2015-2025, probability under 5%, under 

conditions of non-entry in NATO and the EU, exacerbated Serbian nationalism, 

and NPT breakdown. (Tertrais) 

 New EU nuclear state wildly speculative: timeframe 2015-2025, probability under 

1%, only under conditions of complete breakdown or severe crisis of existing 

security arrangements in Europe (NATO, EU) and emergence of serious regional 

threats. EU countries not already mentioned that come to mind under various 

scenarios: Finland, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Poland, Greece, and Germany. (Tertrais) 

 In Northeast Asia, following a decision to develop nuclear weapons, the 

timeframes for the three threshold states to fabricate a bomb would be as little as 1 

year for Japan, 1-2 years for South Korea, and 2-3 years for Taiwan. (Moltz) 

 Burma’s increasing isolation and suspicion, growing access to North Korean 

nuclear technology, and increasing financial resources from natural gas discoveries 

make it plausible that Burmese leaders may seek to acquire nuclear explosive 

devices during the coming decade. However, its capacity to develop and 

manufacture such weapons is so limited today that it is difficult to imagine how, 

within a decade, Burma could do more than rely on outsiders to construct, supply, 

and maintain a limited nuclear weapons capability. (Malley) 

 The global nuclear energy system of 2016 will probably bring a 10% increase in 

installed nuclear power plant (NPP) capacity (an evolutionary increase) and thus 

will not be qualitatively much different than the system of 2006. With the 

implementation of currently proposed enhancements, the nonproliferation regime 

of 2016 should contain the expected proliferation risks related to sustain nuclear 

energy growth. There are, however, many qualifications and caveats to the above 

statements touched on by the author. In the following decade to 2026 qualitative 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-108 WMD FORECASTING 

changes (e.g., spread of FRs or “fast reactors”) and related challenges are likely. 

(Braun) 

Significant Points

 Indicators of nuclear weapons decisions that may be detected: (1) declaratory 

policy in writings and statements, from carefully reading original-source documents 

in the native language; (2) decisions to remain in NPT, withdraw, or complicate 

inspections; (3) unusual construction activity; (4) explosives tests that may be 

bomb related; (5) suspicious purchases; (6) delivery vehicle tests; and (7) the 

relocation and cessation of open publication by top scientists. (Moltz) 

 Detecting and interpreting proliferation effects of trigger events such as: (1) 

DPRK nuclear test (the article was completed before the DPRK’s nuclear test on 

October 9, 2006); (2) collapse of the NPT; (3) major Chinese nuclear expansion; (4) 

ultra-nationalist Korean reunification; (5) sudden U.S. withdrawal from the region; 

and (6) nationalist Russian nuclear rearmament. These six possible trigger events 

are particularly important in Northeast Asia. (Moltz) 

 Nuclear rollback is a process, not an outcome or state of being. (Hersman and 

Peters) 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

 Taken together, the journal articles amount to a serious effort to identify future 

proliferation conditions and outcomes around the world, anticipate indicators of 

new proliferation, and foresee triggering events, with special attention to key 

countries of concern and each region of concern. 

 This symposium is one of the first to take transnational nuclear supply networks 

into account as a major supply side variable in proliferation forecasts. (Dunn and 

Russell) 

 The collection of analyses is also one of the first to attempt to assess how the 

projected expansion of the global nuclear power industry over the next decade may 

affect the scope and rate of nuclear proliferation. (Braun) 

 Europe is nearly immune to further horizontal nuclear proliferation, according to 

conventional wisdom. While the chapter on Europe agrees that there is a very low 

probability over the next two decades for further nuclear proliferation, it speculates 

on conditions under which it could occur, especially if there is a cascade of new 

proliferation elsewhere. 

 

Conclusions

The symposium as a whole forecasts that nuclear proliferation is slow and may be contained, 

but acknowledges that proliferation triggering events in Northeast Asia or the Middle East 

could bring the state of proliferation to a tipping point, when barriers are breached and a 

cascade of new nuclear proliferation occurs. 
Special Issue: 

 Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016 

WMD FORECASTING V-109 

Several of the articles deal with states that formerly had nuclear weapons programs and have 

dropped them, but also discuss the conditions under which a number of these states could 

resume that path, often from a more established base in nuclear and, in some cases, missile 

technology. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-110 WMD FORECASTING 

 
Thwarting an “Evil Genius”: 

 Summary of Workshop Proceedings 

WMD FORECASTING V-111 

Thwarting an “Evil Genius”: Summary of Workshop Proceedings 

Gregory F. Giles, Eleanore Douglas, Todd Koca, and Tom Skypek 

In Thwarting an Evil Genius Workshop 

Washington, D.C., SAIC and DTRA, 2006 

Commissioned By 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To postulate how intelligent and innovative enemies might attack the American homeland in 

the near future. 

On June 28-29, 2006, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) convened a 

group of the nation’s most creative thinkers to address this topic, drawn from the realms of 

literature, entertainment, academia, public health, science, and technology. The stated 

working assumption was that creative, intelligent, and innovative adversaries exist and are 

seeking ways to attack the U.S. with the desire to achieve effects that would alter individual 

and collective decision-making, as well as having the potential to fundamentally change our 

societal interactions. The objective for the group was to use their creative thinking to 

imagine what kinds of attacks such adversaries could devise. What would “evil geniuses” do 

to exploit vulnerabilities and harm the U.S? 

Timeframe Examined 

2006-2011 

Prevailing Context 

Critical security risks in U.S. homeland security made evident by the 9/11 attacks. 

Methodology 

In considering more novel approaches to how an intelligent and determined adversary may 

attack U.S. homeland, DTRA assembled a group of the nation’s most creative thinkers from 

the psychology, sociology, law, information technology, fiction, design innovation, and 

terrorism fields. The groups were given only two restrictive parameters to follow when 

developing scenarios: that the attack must occur within the next five years and that the 

adversary must use existing technology. 

Report Format 

I. Today’s conventional wisdom: a review of the compendium of existing 

homeland attack scenarios as well as the participants’ reaction to the baseline 

scenarios. 

II. Participant’s ideas, schemes, and “unthinkables.” 

III. Working group presentations and discussion of “Evil Genius” scenarios. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-112 WMD FORECASTING 

IV. Workshop results and implications for DTRA. 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

The study’s focus was not on any one particular WMD or method of attack. Additionally, 

working group participants did not focus on a single perpetrator, but rather posited that the 

next attack could come from a lone terrorist or from a state-sponsored terrorist group. 

The motivation for a person or group to attack the U.S. was generalized in the term “evil.” 

Evil was used to describe the ultimate intent of the actor, i.e., to achieve effects that result in 

sudden, dramatic changes to the U.S. and the U.S. way of life. 

Specific forecasts

Workshop participants were also asked to develop scenarios that reflected the notion of an 

“evil genius” and ways in which such an enemy might seek to exploit existing or unidentified 

vulnerabilities in American society. Participants rank-ordered these scenarios as posing the 

greatest risk to the U.S. homeland: 

1. The “Kiddie Bomb” – a foreign or home-grown terrorist recruits small cells of 

like-minded individuals to launch a sustained campaign of school bus bombings. 

The campaign adapts/escalates to include other target classes such as churches, 

sporting events, etc., to undermine public confidence in government. 

2. “Synthesized, Resistant, Hard to Detect Smallpox” – a malevolent individual 

bent on mass killing develops and releases a new strain of smallpox. 

3. “Dual Campaign of Dirty Bombs and Nuclear Threats” – a group of terrorists, 

possibly with state support, launches a campaign of attacks across the U.S. 

involving the detonation of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). The attacks 

are designed to inflict economic damage on America and to exploit the public’s 

fear of radiation. To exacerbate that anxiety, the terrorists leave behind traces of 

highly-enriched uranium and claim to have a fission bomb, as well. The group 

relies on American media to whip up public hysteria of imminent nuclear attack. 

4. “Attacks with Dual Bio Agents against Mega-Malls” – an anti-globalist loner 

recruits unwitting accomplices to infect 3-4 U.S. shopping malls with two 

different types of biological agents. The attacks are designed to damage the 

American economy during the critical holiday shopping period. The use of dual 

bio agents delays prompt identification and treatment of the infected. 

5. “The Perception Bomb” – an internal or external group infects a small number 

of migrant workers in the U.S. and Mexico with a contagious viral disease to fuel 

public demand for border closure. The attack is intended to create economic 

disruption and exacerbate societal tensions. 

6. “Serial Arson Campaign” – a loner conducts an on-going campaign to set 

buildings, whole neighborhoods, and the countryside ablaze in an effort to inflict 

casualties, property loss, indirect economic costs, and otherwise disrupt society. 

7. “Civil Aviation—Nuke—Iran” – an Islamist group bent on widening U.S. 

military operations against the Muslim world uses corporate jets rigged with 
Thwarting an “Evil Genius”: 

 Summary of Workshop Proceedings 

WMD FORECASTING V-113 

shaped charges to damage or destroy 2-3 U.S. nuclear power reactors. The 

operation is conducted under a “false flag” to implicate Tehran, thereby 

provoking U.S. military “retaliation” against Iran. 

8. “The Katrina Bomb” – a hostile element launches an opportunistic attack against 

a region stricken by a natural disaster to amplify the consequences. 

9. “Variegated Kaczynski” – an exceptionally bright domestic terrorist launches a 

campaign of attacks against schoolchildren and infrastructure targets using such 

low-tech means as a sniper rifle, incendiary devices, and bombs. Because he 

operates alone, this terrorist is extremely difficult to detect beforehand and to 

pursue even after his campaign becomes clear. 

Significant Points

The working group participants identified the following “white space” in the current threat 

assessments and homeland security preparations: 

 While much of current planning is focused on al-Qaeda and like-minded foreign 

extremist groups, technology diffusion increasingly enables lone actors from 

ordinary American society to inflict harm on a scale that could fundamentally alter 

the American way of life. 

 Whereas current U.S. homeland security planning is focused on an isolated event, 

or a small number of attacks occurring nearly simultaneously, we are not prepared 

to address terrorist campaigns, that is, multiple attacks sustained over an extended 

period. Among other effects, a campaign of attacks could have a deeper impact on 

the American psyche, causing people to lose more faith in government the longer 

the attacks continue. 

 Similarly, current efforts tend to focus on dealing with the direct effects of a given 

attack (e.g., casualties, property damage), yet sophisticated terrorist attacks may be 

centered on achieving second- and third-order effects, such as prompting the 

government to react in ways that serve the terrorists’ goals (e.g., triggering 

retaliation, curtailing civil liberties). 

 Although much of our attention has been focused on protecting infrastructure, 

continuity of government, and business operations, the safety and security of 

schoolchildren is also a critical vulnerability. Attacks on this segment of the 

population could have profound national effects. For example, as fear gripped 

parents, they would be forced to stay home from work to protect their children, 

causing major workforce, economic, and societal disruptions. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

One unique dimension to the study was in the way “genius” was defined. The working 

group suggested five ways in which “genius” could manifest itself in threats to homeland 

security: operational innovation; technological savvy; infrastructure expertise; manipulation 

of passions; and gaining access. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-114 WMD FORECASTING 

 Genius as Operational Innovation. Genius could entail operational innovation in 

effect, an ability to find an unexpected and previously unknown way to attack a 

given target or carry out an overall attack. Operational innovation could also 

involve carrying out a given attack with far fewer resources, less visibility, and 

generally in a way that would lessen the risk of detection or defeat. 

 Genius as Technological Innovation. Genius could involve technological 

innovation, such as coming up with a new means of attack. In that regard, one of 

the tasks of the participants was to identify such technical innovations. Perhaps 

with the exception of an attack entailing two different biological agents with 

different incubation times, few technically innovative means were identified; 

instead participants tended to focus on the other three dimensions of evil “genius.” 

 Genius as Infrastructure Expertise. Some of the attacks considered in the 

workshop required neither operational innovation nor technological innovation. 

Instead, the genius was the understanding of vulnerabilities in the U.S. critical 

infrastructure, so that a relatively simple attack might have very large-scale 

consequences. 

 Genius as Manipulation of Passions. The goal of an evil genius adversary may be 

to provoke the American public and even more, America’s governing institutions 

at all levels to “over-react” to an attack (e.g., via conflict-widening retaliation, 

curtailment of civil liberties). 

 Genius in Gaining Access. A knowledgeable “insider” could have both the 

expertise and the access needed to conduct a high-impact attack on the U.S. 

homeland; thus, the genius of an evil person might be to patiently position himself 

in a job where he can do catastrophic damage. 

Conclusions

The conclusions confirmed that attacks against school children, the sophisticated use of 

biological agents, and a campaign involving RDD’s were the participants’ top concerns as 

the types of threats posing the “Greatest Risk to U.S. Homeland”. 

Scen. 

Rank Greatest Risk to U.S. Homeland Hardest to Thwart 

1 The Kiddie Bomb Variegated Kaczynski 

2 Smallpox The Kiddie Bomb 

3 RDD/Threat Campaign RDD/Threat Campaign 

4 Dual Bio The Perception Bomb 

5 The Perception Bomb The Katrina Bomb 

6 Serial Arson Campaign Smallpox 

7 Civil Air—Nuke—Iran Dual Bio 

8 The Katrina Bomb Serial Arson Campaign 

9 Variegated Kaczynski Civil Air—Nuke—Iran 
Thwarting an “Evil Genius”: 

 Summary of Workshop Proceedings 

WMD FORECASTING V-115 

The study highlighted the following implications for DTRA in terms of WMD detection, 

modeling, and consequence management: 

 A terrorist campaign involving multiple RDD attacks and nuclear weapon threats 

underscores the excessive and sustained demands that a future attack could place 

on DTRA nuclear detection, modeling, and consequence management capabilities. 

A systematic, structured assessment of these demands based on the RDD/Nuclear 

Threat Campaign scenario could be undertaken to determine if current capabilities 

are sufficient or if remedial action, including new investment, is needed. 

 Similarly, the workshop highlighted the threat posed by synthesized, resistant, and 

hard to detect strains of smallpox. It also called attention to the use of dual 

biological warfare agents to mask effects and delay detection. DTRA’s activities 

with respect to bio detection could be re-examined to determine how they might 

contribute more effectively to countering these threats. 

 On a related note, previous work by DTRA to compile the various federal, state, 

and local statutes and authorities that would govern DoD involvement in domestic 

consequence management could be revisited in light of the evil genius scenarios to 

determine if the existing authorities remain adequate or if new ones should be 

sought. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-116 WMD FORECASTING 

 
 Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING V-117 

Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 

Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke 

 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2006): 167 

Commissioned By 

Independent academic study by Dong-Joon Jo of the University of Seoul, Korea and Erik 

Gartzke of Columbia University. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To increase overall understanding and cumulative knowledge of nuclear proliferation trends 

and outcomes by applying statistical analysis. Noting that few attempts have been made at 

applying quantitative concepts to predict or forecast nuclear proliferation decisions and 

outcomes, the authors view multivariate regression analysis essential to diversifying the 

theoretical claims and “contingent nature” of nuclear proliferation. 

Timeframe Examined 

1939-1992 

Prevailing Context 

Not conducted in response to any particular national or international event. However, the 

authors did conduct the study in the wake of the North Korean nuclear tests. 

Methodology 

The authors bin time series and country data gathered on a series of narrower variables into 

nuclear determinants in two categories: opportunity and willingness. Nuclear opportunity 

refers to environmental constraints as well as a country’s physical capacity to build a nuclear 

weapon. Willingness describes a country’s desire to possess nuclear weapons. According to 

the authors, willingness includes both domestic and geopolitical conditions that could 

influence a country’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. 

A standard cross-sectional time series dataset is used for the period 1939 to 1992. A probit 

regression analysis is used to estimate the effect of variables on the presence of a nuclear 

weapons program as well as a censored probit analysis of nuclear weapons conditional on a 

given state having a nuclear weapons program (weapons possession contingent on program 

status). (Editorial Note: The probit coefficients measure the effect of a unit change in the 

independent variable on the likelihood of Y=1 in terms of z-score.) The combination of 

nuclear weapons program status and nuclear weapons possession yields three outcomes: (1) 

states that lack both a program and weapons; (2) states with programs but no weapons; (3) 

states with both a nuclear weapons programs and nuclear weapons. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-118 WMD FORECASTING 

Report Format 

Conceptual Framework

o Opportunity: The opportunity concept is permissive and assumes a state’s nuclear 

proliferation acts will, if they occur, depend on existing national capabilities. The 

concept as used is organized into three categories: (1) the set of technologies and 

knowledge the state has in relation to nuclear weapons production; (2) the state’s 

access to fissile material; and (3) the state’s economic capacity. 

o Willingness: In contrast to opportunity as a permissive concept based on 

capabilities, the willingness concept contains drivers. Under willingness, the 

motivations to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities can be divided into four 

categories: (1) to acquire based on insecurity, as when a state finds that an 

adversary possesses nuclear weapons and pursues its own nuclear weapons to 

offset the adversary’s threat; (2) to divert attention from domestic issues or 

because of domestic/ internal pressures; (3) to proliferate or not proliferate in 

order to adjust their behavior in accordance with international expectations; and 

(4) to enhance its international status. 

Research Design

o Dependent variables 

 NWEAPON: Whether a state possess a nuclear weapon in a given year 

provided that state has an active nuclear weapons program. 

 NPROGRAM: Whether a state has an active nuclear weapons program 

within a given year. 

o Explanatory variables 

 Opportunity variables 

• Latent nuclear weapons capacity

• Economic capacity

• Diffusion

 Willingness variables 

• International security 

o Conventional threat: Based on the Composite Index of National 

Capabilities (CINC). 

o Nuclear threat (binary) 

o Nuclear defense pact (binary)

o Diplomatic isolation: Ratio of the number of states with which a 

given state lacks diplomatic relationships to the number of 

neighboring states and major powers. 

• Domestic Politics 

o Domestic unrest: Weighted number of reported domestic 

conflicts. 

o Democracy: Uses the Polity IV democracy score. 

o NPT membership (binary)
 Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 

WMD FORECASTING V-119 

o NPT (system effect): Measure between the number of NPT 

signatories and the total number of states. 

• Status 

o Major power status: Uses the standard COW classification. 

o Regional power status: Measure based on a state’s resources 

compared to the resources of the largest state in a region. 

Results and Implications

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 The results of the statistical analysis indicate that the majority of the opportunity 

variables behave as the authors hypothesized. That is, diffusion increases the 

probability of a state developing a nuclear weapons program and raises the risk of 

nuclear weapons proliferation. Also, the authors determined that economic 

capacity is a critical factor in “deepening nuclear proliferation” while an already 

established latent nuclear weapons production capability is more useful in 

determining whether or not a state will initiate a nuclear weapons program. 

 The authors report that diplomatic isolation is not by itself a good predictor for 

states that are “at risk” of developing a nuclear weapons program. According to 

the authors, this evidence is contrary to the beliefs of many pundits who argue that 

diplomatic isolation is a determining factor of nuclear proliferation. (Editorial Note: 

North Korea is an important counter example.) 

 A surprising finding is that states with a nuclear rival tend to refrain from nuclear 

proliferation. This supports the “...somewhat controversial arguments of 

proliferation ‘optimists’ that the fear of preventative war from nuclear rivals 

discourages the pursuit of proliferation.” (Editorial Note: This statistical finding is 

inconsistent with major cases. It may be consistent with Egypt complying [despite 

Israel’s presumed nuclear weapons, after Camp David and the bilateral peace treaty 

with Israel], with nuclear nonproliferation agreements, but not with the history of 

Pakistan and India, nor India and China, nor China and the USSR and U.S.) 

 Also surprising is the finding that the democracy variable has a significant and 

positive coefficient in proliferation actions in what the authors call the “nuclear 

weapons possession stage.” This indicates that democratic states are more likely to 

produce nuclear weapons provided they already have a nuclear weapons 

development program, supporting arguments that democratic states are more 

vulnerable to nationalist pressures. 

 Out of the willingness variables related to security, the statistical analysis indicates 

that an external conventional military threat is the most significant determinant in 

nuclear proliferation. The results indicate that states which are facing a substantial 

conventional threat and have the requisite economic capacity are more likely to 

seek nuclear weapons. 

 Finally, the major power status variable is the most potent determinant of nuclear 

proliferation. That is, recognized major powers and states that seek to be 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-120 WMD FORECASTING 

recognized as major powers are more likely to have, or strive for, nuclear weapons 

programs than non-major powers. 

Specific forecasts

None made. 

Significant Points

In their concluding interpretation, the authors note that U.S. hegemonic status probably 

does more to proliferate nuclear programs and weapons than it does to stop them. 

Additionally, the authors’ concluding comments seem to indicate that global perception is 

critical to nonproliferation. The authors write, “A strong policy of asymmetric nuclear 

deterrence may deliver the U.S. a world with few nuclear adversaries but at the risk of greater 

friction and possibly nuclear war [with the determined adversaries that remain]. Similarly, 

while a national missile defense system might make it harder for proliferators to directly 

challenge the U.S., states facing more proximate conventional threats...may still find that 

nuclear weapons are an appealing option in an uncertain world.” 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

The study was unique in that it used two dimensions of proliferation: opportunity and 

willingness. While many case studies are only one-dimensional, this multivariate quantitative 

analysis tries to account for the complexities of nuclear proliferation. 

Conclusions

The authors draw the following conclusions: 

 States facing major conventional military threats may seek nuclear weapons to 

counter them. 

 Nuclear defenders discourage proliferation among protégés. 

 States facing threats from other nuclear powers exhibit a lower propensity to 

pursue nuclear weapons. 

 Major powers have been more likely to develop nuclear weapons programs than 

lesser powers. 

 Regional powers are prone to develop programs but not actual weapons. 

 Pariah states appear to be statistically neutral in terms of developing a nuclear 

program and a weapon. 

 Democracy deepens proliferation if the nuclear weapons program is already in 

place. 

 Leaders facing domestic unrest seldom seek the nuclear option. 

 Membership in the NPT encourages states to maintain pledges of nonproliferation. 

 Latent production capabilities increase the predicted probability of having a nuclear 

weapons program but not a nuclear weapon. 

 The diffusion of knowledge and technology eases barriers to nuclear programs and 

weapons. 
 What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe 

WMD FORECASTING V-121 

What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe 

Anthony Seaboyer and Oliver Thranert 

Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 85-96 

Commissioned By 

Independent examination by the authors. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To evaluate the present, globally spreading, missile proliferation threat to Europe and to 

contribute to discussion of the means to address it. The key questions the authors seek to 

answer are: 

(1) Given that NATO and the European Union are militarily active around the globe in 

the fight against international terrorism or in attempts to re-establish international order, 

will missile proliferation – especially missiles equipped with nuclear warheads – affect 

Europe’s ability to act internationally? 

(2) If hostile states achieve the ability to hit the European heartland with missiles, to 

what extent are deterrence, pre-emption, and missile defenses useful tools in response? 

Timeframe Examined 

Future. 

Prevailing Context 

The authors acknowledge that in the Cold War context, the main missile threat was from 

strategic ballistic missiles based in the former USSR and that in that era of strategic mutual 

deterrence, missile defenses came to be viewed as destabilizing. The authors frame this 

article in a post-Cold War context in which the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles to other 

parts of the world, with the capacity to threaten Europe from many different locations, 

creates a different set of instabilities and these alter the way in which the threat, and 

responses such as missile defense, should be understood. The authors are skeptical of the 

U.S. advocacy of missile defense, but are “reluctant proponents” of Europe undertaking 

limited missile defense preparations in their own interests.

Methodology 

The authors make predictions about missile proliferation based on past and present 

economic and political trends. However, the authors specifically note that forecasting based 

directly from the past is inherently flawed for three primary reasons. The first is the lack of 

adequate and reliable intelligence. For example, intelligence is likely to be fragmentary and 

controversial, such as the case with North Korea. Second, states do not necessarily need to 

develop a missile program; they can simply buy them as in the case of the Saudi purchase of 

CSS-2 missiles from China. Finally, political factors play a substantial role in the nature of 

missile proliferation (i.e., political motivations may change, political systems may change, and 

states may lose assistance from foreign technicians). 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-122 WMD FORECASTING 

Report Format 

I. Current Status of Missile Proliferation 

II. The Future of Missile Proliferation 

III. Consequences for Europe 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 Though not specifically stated, it can be inferred that the authors believe from 

recent trends that potential proliferators are acquiring and will continue to seek to 

acquire and upgrade ballistic and cruise missiles because of their relatively 

inexpensive cost for long-range delivery and their perceived high political and 

military value for leverage against the U.S., NATO, and EU. 

 They note that more than 75,000 cruise missiles are already in existence worldwide, 

although the bulk of these are relatively short-range anti-ship systems. The longerrange cruise missiles some proliferators are developing or acquiring, however, can 

be launched from a large array of platforms and can be tipped with a variety of 

warheads, including chemical, biological, and nuclear. 

Regions/countries of greatest concern

 As suppliers: Russia, China, North Korea, and Ukraine; 

 As recipients and users: Iraq and Libya (formerly), Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, 

Syria, and Saudi Arabia. 

Specific weapon types (N, B, C, R, Delivery Means), to include new or non-traditional 

weapons/effects/production techniques/delivery means

 Adaptation of missile programs in proliferator states to employ U.S. GPS and 

Russian GLONASS systems for missile guidance and targeting. 

 Ukrainian covert supply of 18 Soviet-era KH-55 (strategic air-to-surface) cruise 

missiles with potential range of 2,500-3,000 km, between 1999 and 2001, to Iran is 

the kind of illicit trade that may be conducted with proliferators from time to time. 

 Storable (more stable) liquid fuel is increasingly in use for North Korean-derived 

ballistic missiles, circumventing previous warning time based on requirement to 

load fuel only when alert or possible launch was anticipated. 

Acquisition patterns/trends

 Most of the proliferating ballistic missile programs in the developing world have 

been based on former Soviet-era Scud technology (short-range, liquid-fueled 

ballistic missiles), employing elongated fuel tanks and stage-adding adaptations (e.g., 

by North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan) to increase range, or (as evidenced in Iran) to 

attempt to retrofit solid-fuel engines in Scud-type airframes. 

 Proliferation of solid fuel ballistic missile technology (i.e., from Russia and China) 

has gained ground in Pakistan and Iran, and even Syria (which obtained Russian 
 What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe 

WMD FORECASTING V-123 

SS-21 short-range missiles and may have transferred some to North Korea to 

analyze the propellant). 

 These trends will probably continue, but it is hard to project which countries will 

achieve what technologies and which systems will be available at what time. When 

it comes to missile proliferation, predicting the future directly from the past is 

almost always wrong. 

 The authors note that changes in U.S. intelligence estimates push back the 

likelihood of North Korea and Iran developing intercontinental missiles from 2010 

to 2020. 

 As biological weapons (BW) gain significance, cruise missiles could become more 

important since they are better suited for aerosol dispersal than ballistic missiles. 

 It will be a long time before states currently developing nuclear weapons will be 

able to miniaturize them for delivery by cruise missiles. 

Specific forecasts

 Cruise missiles with enhanced capabilities will increasingly appear in the missile 

proliferating countries. 

 Because the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is flawed, it can only 

slow proliferation, not stop it. The authors cite specific flaws such as nonmembers (i.e., North Korea) who continue to export missiles and technology, and 

the existence of missile technology export firms in new members such as Russia 

and, prospectively, China that disregard the MTCR guidelines. 

 Europe cannot dismiss the possibility that in the medium-term, a Middle Eastern 

country whose interests oppose the West, such as Iran, will be capable of 

launching a missile that can target a location in Central Europe. 

 Because missiles with a sufficiently long range to target countries in the West are 

expensive, it is likely that countries that shoulder these costs will also want to 

pursue acquisition of nuclear warheads, since use of conventional and/or chemical 

warheads on long-range missiles would not be cost-effective. 

- The authors propose that the above scenarios present three dangers to 

Europe: (1) the possibility of Tehran using missiles to attack Paris, 

London, or Berlin even though, the authors believe, the realistic 

probability of such an attack occurring is very low; (2) Iran attempting 

nuclear coercion against Europe – the probability of this occurring is also 

low because France and the UK already have their own nuclear weapons 

which serve as a sufficient deterrent, while most other Europeans can 

rely on U.S. nuclear protection through NATO; and (3) Iran could use 

the threat posed by its weapons to deter Europe from intervening on the 

side of the U.S. to fight regional aggression or a humanitarian outrage. 

The final danger is the most likely Iran-nuclear-and-missile threat 

scenario for Europe, according to the authors. 

- The authors cite another scenario, however, in the event Europe joins a 

future U.S.-led coalition in a high-intensity military operation in the 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-124 WMD FORECASTING 

Middle East, analogous to the 1991 Gulf War. The adversary might use 

missiles with NBC to attack critical regional targets such as harbors, 

airports, and bases during the deployment of Western troops to raise the 

costs to the West in the hope of stalling or repelling a major intervention. 

Europe will need to “think hard” about the only three ways to lower 

those costs: deterrence, preemption, and missile defense. 

 Alternatively, countries such as Syria and Iran might not want to provoke the West 

directly through military confrontation or by launching strikes first. Therefore, it 

could be likely that such states would support terrorist operations against Western 

interests in neighboring countries, as asymmetric warfare in their own defense 

against perceived aggression by the West. 

Significant Points

 The face of deterrence has changed significantly. The relatively stable situation of 

the East-West conflict has gone. Regional conflicts may involve a dynamic quite 

different from the Cold War years. Proliferating countries may use their new status 

as nuclear weapons states to enforce interests and regional aims rather than only as 

a means of deterrence against outside intervention. 

 If Europe is highly vulnerable to attack not only on its forces in the theater but 

also directly at home, then it will have to contemplate options of preemptive 

elimination of adversarial missile systems (which operations would be fraught with 

complexity) and of by attempting to build a shield against offensive missiles over 

Europe through the deployment of missile defense, which is currently under 

examination by NATO. 

 Unless such defenses were effective against adversarial missiles, political problems 

in making European decisions might not be eased. Still, missile defense 

deployment – even on a limited scale – would affect an aggressor’s calculations by 

imposing uncertainty as to expected damage. 

 European indecision would not necessarily force U.S. indecision, but could be an 

influence. 

 If deterrence fails, then European missile defense, even limited, would be the 

instrument of choice. 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

This study fills a gap in European expert analysis – in open literature – of the implications of 

missile threats to Europe from the Middle East that could impair U.S./NATO collaboration 

against adversaries in that region. In the post-Cold War environment, Europeans have 

tended toward skepticism about the value of missile defense against emerging threats based 

on the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. This article probes, in a subtle way, the 

dimensions of European security that could be improved by reexamining afresh, in the postCold War proliferation environment, the issues of deterrence, preemption, and missile 

defense. 
 What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe 

WMD FORECASTING V-125 

Conclusions

The authors conclude that, “in the coming years, a small number of states will further 

develop their ballistic as well as cruise-missile capabilities.” However, due to the technical 

and political factors, it is not possible to predict which countries will possess what types of 

missiles and when. Noting that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and MTCR can 

only slow proliferation and not completely stem it, the authors note that a European missile 

defense system should be considered to help protect Europe from a third-party’s ability to 

restrain Europe from intervening in operations beyond NATO and EU member territories. 

Yet with only a moderate threat perception, tight budgets, and other military necessities, 

missile defenses can not be a political priority. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-126 WMD FORECASTING 
The Correlates of Nuclear 

 Proliferations: A Quantitative Test 

WMD FORECASTING V-127 

The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test 

Sonali Singh and Christopher R Way 

 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2007): 859 

Commissioned By 

Independently conducted by Sonali Singh of Bain and Company and Christopher R. Way of 

Cornell University. 

Purpose and Objectives 

To use a quantitative data set and methods to test and critique the findings in the existing 

qualitative literature on nuclear proliferation, which consists mainly of comparative case 

studies, and to provide an analytical complement to that literature. The authors believe the 

value of quantitative study is that it corrects the current literature’s tendencies toward: underemphasis on assessing countries that have never proliferated; overuse of deterministic 

methods rather than probabilistic methods; and leanings toward singling out mono-causal 

determinants of proliferation rather than understanding multiple determinants of 

proliferation. A related objective of the study is to show that nuclear proliferation is a 

continuum, rather than a dichotomy. 

Timeframe Examined 

1945-2000. 

Prevailing Context 

Conducted in 2004 amidst national missile defense (NMD) debates. Central to the context 

of the study, is the theme of perception. The authors conclude that whether or not a NMD 

increases proliferation or stems it is a matter of how other countries perceive the U.S. NMD 

system. For example, if a state views the U.S. NMD system as neutralizing to their own 

deterrent capability, they may be spurred to acquire larger nuclear arsenals. 

Methodology 

The authors used survival models and multinomial logistic regression to test hypotheses 

from three broad approaches to nuclear proliferation. These approaches to nuclear 

proliferation are characterized as: technological determinants; external determinants; and 

internal determinants. Technological determinants of nuclear proliferation emphasize the 

role of economic development. External determinants emphasize conditions relating to the 

overall security environment. Internal determinants emphasize a range of domestic factors 

(political and economic). 

The survival, or event history, models offer several advantages, most notably their suitability 

in handling rare events and their ability to model the effects of time. Additionally, the 

survival models allow for explanatory variables which change in value over the observation 

period. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-128 WMD FORECASTING 

Report Format 

The study was organized under the following framework: 

Overview of the three types of proliferation literature: 

o Technological determinants: Technology is the driving force behind proliferation. 

Once a country develops a latent technological capacity to build nuclear weapons, 

it is only a matter of time before that country will develop nuclear weapons. 

o External determinants: According to the authors, the external determinants 

literature emphasizes a state’s willingness rather than capacity to build nuclear 

weapons. The threat environment is a driver of proliferation; that is, as the 

threat environment increases, so will the likelihood of a state pursuing nuclear 

weapons.

o Domestic determinants: The domestic determinant literature emphasizes the role of 

internal politics and economy on a country’s decision to pursue or to not pursue 

nuclear weapons. 

Proliferation data 

o Dependent variables (multivariate) 

 First explosion/ assembly of weapon: Any country that has exploded a nuclear 

weapon or has assembled a nuclear weapon is considered to be a 

proliferator. 

 Pursuit of weapons: Countries that have pursued nuclear weapons are 

considered to be proliferators from the year of that country’s first effort. 

 Exploration of weapons: Countries are coded as proliferators from the year 

they begin considering nuclear weapons. 

 No interest: Countries are coded as non-proliferators of nuclear weapons. 

o Explanatory variables 

 Technological determinants: 

• Gross domestic product per capita 

• Industrial capacity index (binary) 

• Energy, electricity, and steel production and consumption 

 External determinants: 

• Enduring rivalry: Binary variable indicating whether or not a state 

was involved in one or more enduring rivalry in a given year. 

• Frequency of dispute involvement: Uses the militarized interstate 

dispute dataset to calculate a 5-year moving average of the number 

of militarized interstates per year a state was involved. 

• Security guarantee: Measure of defense pacts. 

 Internal determinants 

• Democracy and democratization: Uses Polity IV data to create 

variables relating to regime type and proliferation. 

• Economic interdependence and liberalization: A measure of 

exposure to the global economy. 
The Correlates of Nuclear 

 Proliferations: A Quantitative Test 

WMD FORECASTING V-129 

• Status inconsistency/ symbolic motivations: Measures a countries 

“prestige deficit” and countries dissatisfaction with the international 

status quo. 

Methods and Results 

Key Projections/Forecasts 

Motivations to acquire

 The decision to seriously explore nuclear weapons 

- The results indicate that a country’s decision to explore nuclear weapons 

seriously is most affected by GDP per capita and industrial capacity. 

This supports the theory that at low levels of GDP, steady economic 

growth increases the likelihood that a country will pursue nuclear 

weapons. The inverse is also true. At high levels of development, 

countries are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons. 

- Due to low significance levels, the results offer little support to the claim 

that alliances with great-powers provide threatened states with a 

substitute for nuclear arms. 

 The decision to acquire nuclear weapons 

- By and large, the authors’ results suggest that the commonsense theory of 

nuclear proliferation may have more weight then previously thought. 

That is, states decide to “go nuclear” when they are faced with a security 

threat that cannot be overcome by other means. 

Specific forecasts

The authors presented the following probabilities: 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-130 WMD FORECASTING 

TABLE 3 

Substantive Effects of the Explanatory Variables 

on the Likelihood of Exploring Nuclear Weapons 

 Percentage Change from

Baseline Hazard Rate 

Variable Explore Acquire 

Great-power military alliance -49 -64

Participation in ongoing enduring rivalry +382 +743

Increase in frequency of MIDs (two more/year) +38 +52

Industrial capacity threshold +563 +2,340

Increase in trade openness -72 -2

Increase in per capita GDP - $500 at very low level +26 +12

Increase in per capita GDP - $500 at high level -20 -17

Satisfaction +40 -82

Increase in democracy +25 +94

NOTE: MID = militarized interstate dispute; GDP = gross domestic product. 

For example, a country with a great-power military alliance has a hazard rate for exploring a 

nuclear capability that is 49% lower than a similar country without an alliance, as well as a 

64% lower risk of acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

The following table lists countries that had a high predicted hazard rate for exploring nuclear 

weapons, but never actually did so: 

Country Years of Maximum Predicted Hazard 

Saudi Arabia Mid 1980s – mid 1990s 

West Germany Mid 1950s – early 1960s 

Japan Mid 1950s – 1960s 

Yugoslavia / Serbia 1950s – 1960s 

Turkey Late 1960s – 2000 

Bulgaria 1950s 

Spain 1960s – early 1970s 

Greece 1960s & 1980s 

Italy 1950s – early 1960s 

Syria Various 
The Correlates of Nuclear 

 Proliferations: A Quantitative Test 

WMD FORECASTING V-131 

The authors note that it is no surprise that Japan and Germany were predicted to have high 

hazard rates for exploring nuclear weapons because of their high levels of economic 

development and strong security threats that they face. 

Significant Points

The authors emphasize the need to move beyond the “...search for deterministic, univariate 

accounts of proliferation decisions...” Thus the authors remain sensitive to the diverse 

stages of proliferation by using multivariate indicators of nuclear proliferation. For example, 

the dependent variable was not simply a dichotomous “proliferate” or “not proliferate” 

variable, but three separate measures. Additionally, the study is unique in that the authors’ 

findings and conclusions do not vary widely from conventional wisdom on nuclear 

proliferation. The authors state that the results suggest that, “...contrary to what some 

scholars have argued, existing arguments about the determinants of nuclear weapons 

proliferation do a reasonable job of accounting for the data.” 

Other Major Conclusions and Unique Dimensions 

In conclusion, the authors note that existing theories deserve more credit than they are 

frequently given. In this respect, it is the authors’ intention to complement previous 

empirical analyses of proliferation by providing a dataset on nuclear weapons proliferation to 

test theoretical arguments. The following actions are proposed to reduce a country’s 

likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons: (1) reduce the threat posed by external environment; 

(2) accelerate economic growth beyond the threshold of temptation; (3) integrate into the 

world economy; and (4) forge a defensive alliance with a nuclear power. 
Section V 

Contemporary Assessments – Synopses 

V-132 WMD FORECASTING 
 

WMD FORECASTING VI-1

 

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Section VI 

Contemporary Sources 

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