Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

The SOF advisory role is a long-term commitment to help enable 

and aid other nations improve their military forces and security. SOF 

advisors have traditionally operated at the tactical level to increase 

partner capabilities ‘by, with and through’ to generate sufficient rule 

of law, address local needs, and advance rapport building. Mr. White 

advocates for a SOF role in advising foreign militaries at the high 

operational/strategic and ministerial levels. He provides real world 

examples through four vignettes of SOF advisors in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, Colombia, and the Philippines. This monograph is a handy 

resource for commanders and planners needing to establish a rapport with allies and friends at the highest operational/strategic and 

ministerial levels.

ISBN 978-1-941715-22-2

Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum 

of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Troy White

JSOU Report 18-1

JSOU Report 18-1 Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities White 

Iraqi Special Operations Forces advance on the opposing force during a field 

training exercise near Baghdad on 15 May 2017. U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY CHIEF 

MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST BRANDON RAILE
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Boyd L. Ballard, Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Francis X. Reidy, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Elizabeth Sylvester, B.S., Journalism, JSOU Press Assistant Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University and the 

Center for Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission 

is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing 

specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific 

undergraduate and graduate level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach in support of USSOCOM objectives. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 

where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.
JSOU Report 18 -1

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2018

Growing SOLO: 

Expanding the Spectrum of 

SOF Advisory Capabilities

Troy White
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) is currently accepting written works 

relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 

contact the CSS Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in February 2018.

ISBN 978-1-941715-22-2
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence? 

JSOU Report 17-11, Robert Haddick

The Death of the Golden Hour and the Return of the Future Guerrilla Hospital, 

JSOU Report 17-10, Warner D. Farr

Property Rights and Social Justice as an Indicator of Stability: The SOF Nexus, 

JSOU Report 17-9, Bill Mandrick 

Transitioning from War to Peace: Post-Deployment Support for Special Operations 

Forces, JSOU Report 17-8, Jennifer M. Hazen 

2017 Special Operations Student Essays, JSOU Report 17-7

Special Operations Theory, JSOU Report 17-6, Volume 3, edited by Peter McCabe and 

Paul Lieber

On the cover. Afghan Commandos tactically move into a room during a close quarters combat exercise at Camp Morehead, Kabul, Afghanistan on 4 October 2017. Their 

training consists of weapons familiarization, weapon drills and tactical movement 

as part of their 14-week course. U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTO BY SENIOR AIRMAN 

XAVIER NAVARRO/RELEASED 

Back cover. Iraqi Special Operations Forces advance on the opposing force during 

a field training exercise near Baghdad on 15 May 2017. This training-part of the 

overall Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR)-focuses 

on building partner capacity missions by training and improving the capability of 

partnered forces fighting ISIS. CJTF-OIR is the global coalition to defeat ISIS in Iraq 

and Syria. U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY CHIEF MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST BRANDON RAILE
v

Contents

From the Director ........................................................................vii

Foreword ......................................................................................ix

About the Author...........................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1. Partnering and Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) 

in U.S. Strategy ............................................................................. 5

Chapter 2. Clarifying the Concepts of Partnering and BPC ............. 9

Chapter 3. Building Partners for the Long Run: Security Sector 

Reform ........................................................................................ 15

Chapter 4. SOF Doctrine and Perspectives................................... 21

Chapter 5. Skills and Traits of Effective Military Advisors.............. 25

Chapter 6. Skills and Traits of High-Operational/Strategic and 

Ministerial-Level Advisors............................................................ 29

Chapter 7. SOF History Advising Foreign Security Forces (FSF) 

at the High-Operational/Strategic Level ....................................... 35

Chapter 8. Critiques of SOF Advisors Working at the 

High-Operational and Strategic/Ministerial Levels ....................... 45

Chapter 9. Training SOF for High-Operational/Strategic and 

Ministerial Level Advisory Tasks................................................... 51

Chapter 10. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA)

Training Program ......................................................................... 55
vi

Chapter 11. Subject Matter Expert Observations on 

Ministerial Training Requirements Beyond MODA ...................... 59

Chapter 12. Synthesizing Potential Solutions for the 

Training of SOF Advisors ............................................................. 63

Chapter 13. Conclusions, Observations, and Implications ........... 69

Acronym List ............................................................................... 75

Endnotes...................................................................................... 79
vii

From the Director 

While Troy White’s research and conclusions are focused on how to 

make special operators “better” when serving in an advisory capacity, there are clear implications and parallels that all Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) could reflect on in this monograph, regardless of their rank or 

assignment. Considerations on how to more effectively “maneuver” in the 

higher operational and strategic levels of national and international security—whether one is a special operator in a formal advisory role or not—is 

useful in many positions and circumstances. As an academic institution, 

it is always refreshing to see an author conclude that deeper education and 

training are part of the solution. Mr. White provides specific examples and 

opportunities instead of the general or sweeping conclusions seen in other 

works. As always, tell us what you think.

Boyd L. Ballard

Director, Center for Strategic Studies

ix

Foreword 

Mr. Troy White’s Growing SOLO: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF 

Advisory Capabilities tackles a difficult and under-researched 

topic—one of extreme salience for SOF. The SOF advisory role is a longterm commitment to help enable and aid other nations improve their 

military forces and security. SOF advisors have traditionally operated at 

the tactical level to increase partner capabilities ‘by, with and through’ to 

generate sufficient rule of law, address local needs, and advance rapport 

building. Mr. White advocates for a SOF role in advising foreign militaries at the high operational/strategic and ministerial levels. He asserts the 

additional training and education requirements can be found in existing 

ministerial advisor training and education programs. 

The monograph is well organized and begins by anchoring the advisory role in U.S. strategic documents and SOF doctrine. While providing advisory services at such a high level is not a specified SOF task, it 

is consistent with SOF core activities such as security force assistance 

and foreign internal defense. To answer the question whether SOF skills 

are capable enough to succeed at the higher level, Mr. White explores 

the skills and traits of effective military advisors, specifically, ones at 

the high operational/strategic and ministerial levels. He concludes that 

many of the skills identified for ministerial advisors (technical expertise, knowledge of local culture, customs, history and politics) are fully 

consistent with SOF. 

To provide real world examples, this monograph explores four 

vignettes of SOF advisors in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, and the Philippines. Through these vignettes, the author builds a case that SOF have 

previously performed these roles (in somewhat limited fashion) and have 

performed admirably. Expanding on the advisory role will require additional training and education. Mr. White proposes a few of these programs and how they might be adapted for SOF. 

The strengths of this monograph include its comprehensive review 

of the SOF advisory role and its inclusion of various points of view and 

perspectives. As a result, this monograph will be a handy resource for 
x

commanders and planners needing to establish a rapport with allies and 

friends at the highest operational/strategic and ministerial levels. 

Peter M. McCabe, Ph.D.

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies 
xi

About the Author

Troy White is a nonresident senior associate with the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Americas Program. He joined 

CSIS after 15 years of service as a strategic analyst 

and interdiction analyst in the White House Office 

of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). While 

at ONDCP, he drafted core sections of the National 

Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 

and the National Drug Control Strategy. He was also 

instrumental in the coordination of budget guidance 

for over $4 billion in U.S. international drug control 

programs. He contributed to multiple other counternarcotics and border security strategies, including the 

Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the Northern Border Strategy, 

and the National Synthetic Drug Control Strategy. In addition, he participated in the initial implementation of Plan Colombia and later developed 

lessons learned for application in other countries threatened by illicit drug 

trafficking. Prior to joining ONDCP, Mr. White was a U.S. Navy officer 

serving in the Pentagon on the Joint Staff after several years of duty with the 

Pacific Fleet. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a 

bachelor’s degree with a minor in Spanish and was selected for postgraduate 

Cox Fund studies in Spain. He holds a master’s degree from Georgetown 

University, where he is also working toward completion of his Ph.D. studies.

1

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Introduction

The United States is currently engaged in at least two major defense 

institution-building missions simultaneously in the Middle East, linked 

to U.S. involvement in major regional contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been critical enablers in both the 

tactical- and operational-level advisory and combat missions associated with 

these events. While some researchers may argue that the lessons from these 

contingencies will limit U.S. commitments to similar operations and associated defense institution-building endeavors in the future, other experts assert 

that the demand for U.S. advisory support for the development of partner 

nation defense capabilities is likely to persist at the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels.1 Given the evolving vision for the employment of SOF, 

the unique skillset of SOF, and the proven performance of SOF advisors in 

tactical, operational, theater/strategic, and interagency environments, the 

expansion of the spectrum of SOF advisory capabilities to include combatant 

commanders’ counterparts at the high-operational/strategic level,2 as well as 

the ministerial level of a partner nation’s defense establishment, is a reasonable extension of existing SOF initiatives such as the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) programs 

and a logical emerging requirement for future SOF plans. Leveraging the 

training requirements developed for Department of Defense (DOD) ministerial advisors during the contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a 

framework for updating training programs to add this strategically impactful 

capability more broadly across SOF at a relatively limited additional expense. 

Although relatively early in the administration of U.S. President Donald 

Trump, Secretary of Defense General James Mattis and National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster have already articulated 

expectations that the United States military will continue, and potentially 

strengthen, its partnerships with forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.3 Similarly, 

the 2015 National Security Strategy released by President Barack Obama’s 

administration highlights U.S. and partner nation defense advisory activities in Afghanistan, stating “We are working with NATO and our other 

partners to train, advise, and assist the ANSF.” It also notes ongoing U.S. 

efforts “leading an unprecedented international coalition to work with the 
2

JSOU Report 18-1

Iraqi government and strengthen its military to regain sovereignty.”4 In addition to these ongoing requirements for defense institution-building, the 

2015 National Security Strategy and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 

describe two broad challenges that will continue to require the defense 

institution-building capabilities developed during the conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

First, there is the challenge posed by weak, fragile, and failing states. The 

2015 National Security Strategy identifies the “significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states” as one of the “top strategic 

risks” to U.S. interests. These “fragile and conflict-affected states” are considered to be sources of “infectious disease, illicit weapons and drug smugglers, 

and destabilizing refugee flows.” Moreover, trends that are diffusing power 

“below and beyond the nation-state” also have the ability to “foster violent 

non-state actors and foment instability– especially in fragile states where 

governance is weak or has broken down.”5

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review adds that “unrest and violence” 

provide “a fertile environment for violent extremism and sectarian conflict, 

especially in fragile states, stretching from the Sahel to South Asia, and 

threatening U.S. citizens abroad.” It describes particular concerns in Africa 

and the Middle East, where terrorist groups already “seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their influence.” In Africa, the Quadrennial 

Defense Review asserts that “terrorists, criminal organizations, militias, 

corrupt officials, and pirates continue to exploit ungoverned and undergoverned territory on the continent and its surrounding waters.” Moreover, 

“the potential for rapidly developing threats, particularly in fragile states, 

including violent public protests and terrorist attacks, could pose acute challenges to U.S. interests.” In the Middle East, the same source projects that 

“competition for resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions 

in the coming years and could escalate regional confrontations into broader 

conflicts,” once again “particularly in fragile states.”6

The second major challenge that will require a continuation of U.S. 

defense advisory efforts is the number of U.S. allies, partners, and friends 

that find themselves overmatched by the security threats they face. The 2015 

National Security Strategy highlights efforts to “Build Capacity to Prevent 

Conflict” by “reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners” 

and “investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion.”7 This issue has 

particular resonance with countries in Eastern Europe, where “Russia’s 
3

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—as well as its 

belligerent stance toward other neighboring countries”8 has caused the 

United States to reassure “our allies by backing our security commitments 

and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a 

dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian 

aggression.”9

 The National Security Strategy provides a clear commitment 

to “support partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can 

better work alongside the United States and NATO, as well as provide for 

their own defense.”10

The 2015 National Security Strategy and 2014 Quadrennial Defense 

Review propose partnering and BPC as the solution to these problems. In 

efforts to “build capacity to prevent conflict” the National Security Strategy 

indicates that the United States will “prefer to partner with those fragile 

states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate 

governance and providing for their people.”11 The Quadrennial Defense 

Review asserts that “the Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, 

especially in fragile states.” It also commits the DOD to placing “even more 

emphasis on building the capacity of our partners” in the Middle East “in 

order to complement our strong military presence in the region.” From this 

perspective, “building security globally not only assures allies and partners 

and builds their capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring 

conflict and increasing stability in regions like the Middle East and North 

Africa.”12

Discussions regarding building partner capacity (BPC) often break down 

the supporting security cooperation programs and activities into the categories of security assistance, security force assistance (SFA), and foreign 

internal defense (FID). SFA and FID are SOF core activities,13 and these 

tasks are typically considered to take place substantially at the tactical and 

operational levels of interaction with partner nations involving smaller units 

and task forces. In some cases, however, SOF performance of these functions 

can have a significant impact on the more high-operational and strategic 

activities of defense institution building and security sector reform involving 

partner nation forces and organizations that interact with U.S. combatant 

commanders. SOF activities to BPC in some cases can impact all levels of 

partner nation defense establishments, raising the question of whether SOF 
4

JSOU Report 18-1

advisory efforts should routinely expand to include the tactical, operational, 

and high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels as well. 

Given this background, this study seeks to answer two primary research 

questions. First, is advising foreign militaries at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels an appropriate task for U.S. SOF to perform 

on a regular basis? Second, what additional training would be required to 

accomplish this task?

This study concludes that based on the vision for the employment of 

SOF, unique skills of SOF, and proven performance of SOF in advisory 

roles worldwide, advising foreign militaries at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels is indeed an appropriate and necessary task for 

U.S. SOF. The primary U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

initiative that addresses this challenge—the SOLO program—however, may 

not be sufficient on its own to fill the demand for SOF advisors at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels to fully support the global SOF 

network envisioned in the United States Special Operations Command 2020 

(SOCOM 2020).14 Adding training requirements extrapolated from existing training 

programs for civilian ministerial advisors 

to select SOF advisor training plans can 

serve as a critical force multiplier, developing this increasingly important high-level 

advisory capability across a broader group 

of SOF personnel. This monograph develops 

this argument in greater detail through the 

exploration of existing research and applicable cases, and ends with a summary of conclusions, observations on a tentative lesson 

learned from the cases, and initial thoughts 

on potential implications for SOF under the 

President Trump administration. To lay a foundation for the analysis to 

follow, the next section explores the application of the concepts of partnering and BPC by senior U.S. leaders and in key national security strategic 

documents.

Adding training requirements extrapolated from 

existing training programs 

for civilian ministerial advisors to select SOF advisor 

training plans can serve as 

a critical force multiplier, 

developing this increasingly important high-level 

advisory capability across 

a broader group of SOF 

personnel.
5

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Chapter 1. Partnering and Building 

Partnership Capacity (BPC) in U.S. Strategy 

Partners, partnering, and BPC have been featured in the comments 

of several U.S. national security leaders across multiple presidential 

administrations. USSOCOM Commander General Raymond A. Thomas III 

highlighted the importance of BPC to counter and defeat violent extremist organizations in his May 2017 testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed 

Services Committee.15 National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. 

McMaster also indicated shortly after returning from Afghanistan in April 

2017, that the Taliban has “redoubled their efforts, and it’s time for us, alongside our Afghan partners, to respond.”16

Previously, partnering and BPC also figured prominently in then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s congressional testimony in 2014, highlighting 

the need to continue to “help build partner capacity so that local forces can 

take the fight to ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] and ultimately defeat 

it.” In his testimony, Secretary Hagel outlined the main components of the 

U.S. plan, “to help strengthen Iraqi Security Forces,” including “partnering 

coalition advisers with Iraqi forces at the headquarters level,” providing 

training to support “the regeneration of Iraqi forces,” and “broader security 

sector reform.”17 Furthermore, in a 2013 speech, then-Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Ash Carter summarized the DOD leadership’s conclusions about 

the importance of BPC, stating that “the United States cannot address the 

challenges of tomorrow alone. And this places a premium on building the 

capacity of others.”18

Secretary of Defense General Mattis, however, has been a particularly 

noteworthy advocate of partnering and BPC over both his military and civilian careers crossing multiple administrations. During his February 2017 trip 

to Iraq, Secretary of Defense General Mattis noted that “the Iraqi people, 

the Iraqi military and the Iraqi political leadership recognize what they’re 

up against and the value of the coalition and the partnership, in particular 

with the United States.”19 In response to advance policy questions during 

his January 2017 confirmation process, he responded that “the role of the 

Department of Defense in providing security assistance should be focused 

on ways to improve the military capacity of other states in order to help 
6

JSOU Report 18-1

them become more reliable and effective partners with the U.S. on security 

matters.”20

Secretary of Defense General Mattis provided a broader rationale for 

these security assistance programs in a book chapter he co-authored in 

2016, asserting that, “Those who oppose sustained international involvement because of its cost have the argument exactly wrong: only by coming 

together with allies and attending to the maintenance of the international 

order can we amass the resources necessary for the long-term management of 

our interests.”21 In this chapter he also noted that, “Civilian departments are 

too weak to keep pace with the military’s contribution in areas like capacitybuilding for friendly governments.”22 Several years earlier, while serving as 

the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, Secretary of Defense General 

Mattis emphasized that partnering with foreign security forces (FSF) would 

be the key to how the United States would fight and win irregular wars such 

as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.23

While President Trump’s administration has not released a new National 

Security Strategy yet, U.S. partnering and BPC activities are discussed 

broadly in several leading national security documents from the prior 

administration. The 2015 National Security Strategy highlights that the U.S. 

military is postured to “build the capacity of our partners to join with us 

in meeting security challenges.” To confront the challenge of terrorism, 

the National Security Strategy highlights that the United States “will train 

and equip local partners and provide operational support to gain ground 

against terrorist groups.” The 2015 strategy also indicates a preference for 

the United States “to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine 

political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing 

for their people.” Furthermore, the focus of these partnership activities “will 

be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling 

effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law 

sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity.”24

DOD strategic documents from the Obama administration also address 

partnering and BPC. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review discusses BPC, 

both in terms of rebalancing DOD “counterterrorism efforts toward greater 

emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states,” and 

of “enhancing our partners’ capacity to address growing regional challenges 

in areas such as missile defense, cyber security, space resilience, maritime 
7

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

security, and disaster relief.”25 The 2012 DOD strategic guidance titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” emphasizes the importance of leveraging exercises, advisory capabilities, and other 

partnering activities to attain U.S. security 

objectives.26

The discussion, drawn from national 

security strategic documents and comments of U.S. leaders, firmly establishes 

the importance of partnering and BPC 

to U.S. national security plans. Partnering and BPC are considered crucial for the 

achievement of U.S. security interests, and 

are essential elements of U.S. plans to fight 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 

Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 

counter other terrorist groups worldwide. In weak and fragile states, BPC 

is critical to address several other regional security challenges as well. A 

closer review of the concepts of partnering and BPC in military doctrine 

and practice is necessary to develop a more comprehensive understanding 

of these activities and their associated requirements. 

Partnering and BPC are 

considered crucial for the 

achievement of U.S. security 

interests, and are essential 

elements of U.S. plans to 

fight the Islamic State of Iraq 

and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and 

the Taliban in Afghanistan, 

and counter other terrorist 

groups worldwide.

9

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Chapter 2. Clarifying the Concepts of 

Partnering and BPC

While the strategic documents and DOD leadership comments discussed above highlight the importance of partnering and BPC to 

U.S. security, the specific details of these activities merit further attention. 

Although partnering is not specifically defined in DOD doctrine, the U.S. 

Army Functional Concept for Engagement describes “partnership activities” as consisting of “civil military operations, Army support to security 

cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and security force 

assistance.” These activities serve projected future requirements for the U.S. 

military to “support, train, advise, and equip and learn from partner security 

forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, and other threats.”27

The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement also recognizes the 

need for cooperation with other governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in unified action scenarios to “build the capacity of 

partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests.” In support of 

these goals, the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement envisions 

military forces “working with foreign counterparts from the individual to 

ministerial levels” to provide “support to governance and the rule of law.”28

Another U.S. Army source—Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 

3-0 Unified Land Operations—frames BPC as “the outcome of comprehensive 

interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, 

economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical 

government functions.”29

Upon surveying the application of both terms in DOD doctrine, one 

scholar offers more detailed definitions for partnering and BPC in a recent 

Joint Special Operations University monograph titled Building Partner 

Capacity. Partnering is described as a process “founded in shared interests 

and objectives” that “leads to and sustains strategic partnerships over time.” 

The partnering process is “implemented” through BPC activities, “which 

include mentoring, advice, support, and training.”30 This leads to the following, broader definition for BPC: 
10

JSOU Report 18-1

BPC is a multifaceted concept involving the integrated application 

of tactical, operational, and strategic actions and resources from 

differing governmental and nongovernmental actors and agencies 

over time to enhance a sovereign partner state’s institutional and 

environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining security 

and clear societal goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. BPC is inherently complex and 

involves issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, and human security. BPC 

may include multiple, smaller-scale activities that occur simultaneously, sequentially, or singularly. These small-scale activities focus on 

building specific capacities and capabilities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term security 

and stability interests of the partner state and the United States.31

The DOD conducts these partnering and BPC efforts primarily through 

three categories of programs and activities: security cooperation, security 

assistance, and SFA. Security cooperation is the umbrella term for all DOD 

foreign assistance programs and activities. As discussed in Joint Publication 

(JP) 3-20, security cooperation “encompasses all Department of Defense 

interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) 

and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the U.S. access to territory, 

infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their 

capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives.”32 Security cooperation also includes a set of Title 10 programs such as personnel 

exchanges and traditional combatant commander activities.33

Security assistance programs are a subset of DOD security cooperation 

efforts that are funded by the U.S. Department of State and administered 

by DOD. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines 

security assistance as “a group of programs ... by which the United States 

provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies 

and objectives.”34 JP 3-22 adds that security assistance “is predominately 

aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external 

vice internal threats.”35 Security assistance is also frequently used to support 

DOD SFA activities, through programs such as foreign military financing, 

foreign military sales, and excess defense articles.36
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

SFA is comprised of the DOD’s “activities that contribute to unified action 

by the U.S. Government”37 to “support and augment the development of the 

capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting 

institutions.”38 A wide variety of units can constitute FSF, such as military, 

police, border control, paramilitary, and regional security forces. Consequently, SFA activities can involve a broad spectrum of “joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and private company 

cooperative efforts” to provide “training, equipment, advice, and assistance” 

to the designated FSF.39

The underlying tasks of SFA are to “organize, train, equip, rebuild and 

build, and advise and assist” FSF and their supporting institutions in support 

of partner nation efforts to “plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, 

and sustain” these forces.40 The resulting FSF “must possess the capability to 

accomplish the variety of required missions, with sufficient capacity to be 

successful and with the ability to sustain themselves as long as required.” The 

corresponding development of the supporting institutional infrastructure 

is vital to the maintenance of these SFA gains.41

From a joint perspective, SFA is a SOF core activity that can also be performed by conventional forces (CF), but while both the Department of the 

Army and USSOCOM sponsor this operational concept, USSOCOM is the 

sole designated joint proponent.42 As alluded to above, SFA activities frequently rely upon support from security assistance programs, however SFA 

activities can draw support from other DOD security cooperation programs 

also. Similarly, security assistance programs are not restricted to funding 

only SFA programs; security assistance programs can support other DOD 

security cooperation activities as well.43

While SFA is a subset of DOD security cooperation programs and activities, it also “spans the range of military operations” from military engagement and deterrence to “crisis response and contingency operations, and if 

necessary, major operations and campaigns.” SFA “may be conducted in both 

permissive and uncertain security environments” and, while not involving 

“direct combat by U.S. forces,” it also “can include combat advisory and 

support activities.”44 Although SFA may be used to help a partner nation 

“defend against external threats or help contribute to multinational operations,” it is primarily provided to support partner nation efforts to defend 

against “internal and transnational threats to stability.”45 These internally 

focused security activities are collectively categorized as FID. 
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JSOU Report 18-1

Joint Publication 3-22 defines FID as “the participation by civilian and 

military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 

another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its 

society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats 

to their security.”47 Similar to SFA, FID is a SOF core activity that can also 

be performed by CF, however, in contrast, it is designated as a USSOCOM 

core task as well.48

Figure 1. SFA Activities. Source: Yarger, Building Partner Capacity46
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

FID activities are comprised of “indirect support, direct support (not 

involving combat operations), and combat operations.” Indirect support 

leverages security assistance programs as well as exchange programs and 

joint/multinational exercises to help build “strong national infrastructures 

through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.” In cases where the partner nation faces “social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle,” U.S. forces can provide direct, 

non-combat assistance through civil-military operations, military information support operations, communications and intelligence cooperation, and 

mobility and logistics support. U.S. combat operations supporting FID can 

only be authorized by the president as a temporary measure until the partner 

nation’s forces are “able to stabilize the situation and provide security for 

the populace.”49

Although other security cooperation programs can contribute to FID 

through initiatives such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs events, SFA 

activities provide substantial support to FID.50 When the United States provides direct or indirect “support to foreign internal defense, security force 

assistance is the means to bolster the host nation’s efforts to counter internal 

threats.”51 SFA can include some FID indirect support and direct support 

activities, but does not include FID combat operations.52

SFA has much in common with FID at “the tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both.” However, at the operational and strategic 

levels, where SFA and FID both share a focus on developing FSF to confront 

internal threats, SFA also prepares FSF “to defend against external threats 

and to perform as part of an international coalition as well.” While security assistance programs fund a substantial portion of FID indirect support 

operations, security assistance is significantly broader than FID.53 SFA activities and security assistance programs can both provide personnel, material, 

and equipment to support the plans and objectives of FID programs. In 

this sense, both FID and BPC activities provide purposes to which security 

assistance and SFA can be applied.54
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JSOU Report 18-1

Figure 2. Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Security Force Assistance, 

and FID. Source: Yarger, Building Partner Capacity55
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Chapter 3. Building Partners for the Long 

Run: Security Sector Reform

To build greater stability in the security circumstances of partner nations 

and enable effective partnering for an extended period of time, additional 

reforms to the partner nation’s broader security sector may be required. 

Security sector reform is “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities 

that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, 

and justice.”56 The objective of security sector reform is to “transform the 

[security and justice] sector into an instrument of conflict prevention and 

management,” that can contribute “to development and paving the way for 

development activities.”57 Security sector reform may include activities “in 

support of security force and intelligence reform; justice sector reform; civilian oversight and management of military support and intelligence services; 

community security; and DDR [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration].” The DOD’s “primary role in security sector reform is supporting 

the reform, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the 

defense sector across the range of military operations.” Yet security sector 

reform also “includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more 

traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence, and policing.”58

FSF enhanced through traditional security assistance comprised of equipment and training can better carry out their responsibilities if the institutional and governance frameworks necessary to sustain them are equally well 

developed.”59 SFA can support security sector reform through FID efforts, 

BPC efforts, and other security sector reform initiatives.60 SFA activities “at 

the ministerial level and down to the tactical unit level” can provide the 

requisite support for a partner nation to achieve and sustain the “transformational objectives” of security sector reform.61

Thus, security sector reform requires attention to both operational capability and institutional support. As highlighted in JP 3-07, “in addition to the 

capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include the 

administrative support and development of a functioning [partner nation] 

defense ministry and chain of command.”62 A 2013 RAND study titled “What 

Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?” reinforces this point, concluding that building the ministerial 
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JSOU Report 18-1

capacity of partner nations is “foundational to other forms of capacity” due 

to its ability to “improve a partner’s absorptive capacity, thus enabling future 

capacity building in other areas.”64 Similarly, JP 3-07 suggests that providing “advice on change and project management” to senior security sector 

officials may also strengthen partner nation “capacity to deliver reform.”65

For these reasons, security sector reform efforts must achieve a balance 

between operationally focused activities and institutionally focused initiatives to be most effective. JP 3-07 asserts that security sector reform programs 

“should focus on the provision of training and advisor teams, simultaneous delivery of equipment and infrastructure, operational support through 

provision of fires [support] and logistic support and delivering financial 

and managerial support for the security forces.” This type of “high-level 

reform” can help partner nation security sector officials “link threats with 

capabilities, leading to affordable plans for developing the sector.” Overall, 

there needs to be a clear commitment to balancing operational support with 

ELEMENTS OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Civilian Oversight/Governance

Security Justice/ROL

• Executive

• Legislative

• Judicial

• Financial

• Armed Forces

• Border Forces

• Militias and

 PSC/PMC 

• Courts

• Corrections

• Law (Formal 

 and Informal/

 Traditional 

MOD

MOI

Intel

MOJ

LE

Intel intelligence services

LE law enforcement

MOD ministry of defense

MOI ministry of the interior

MOJ ministry of justice

PMC private military company

PSC private security company

ROL rule of law

LEGEND

Figure 3. Elements of Security Sector Reform. Source: JP 3-0763
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

institutional reform activities, since “success and sustainability depend on 

developing the institutions and processes that support security forces as well 

as the human capacity to lead and manage them.”66

This defense institution-building is therefore a key component of security sector reform. It can be defined as “programs, structures, and processes 

used to develop effective, efficient, and accountable partner defense establishments, including defense ministries, joint and general staffs and commands, and the supporting institutions of the armed forces.”67 As described 

by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, defense institution-building 

programs “aim to establish responsible defense governance in order to help 

partner-nations build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions.” These efforts “advance American ideals of democracy and the rule 

of law, as well as key strategic interests and secure security cooperation 

investments.”68

As noted by one security sector reform scholar, the promotion of “a civilmilitary relationship in which a civilian led defense institution exercises 

legitimate authority over the state’s military forces” is perhaps the most 

important military aspect of security sector reform. In many of the “newly 

independent nations, developing countries,” and “states in transition or 

emerging from conflict” that often require security sector reform, “civilianmanaged defense ministries are underdeveloped or nonexistent.” Furthermore, in cases where civilian-led defense ministries exist, “the interaction 

between the military and its civilian counterparts tends to be dominated by 

those in uniform.” To perform this most important security sector reform 

task, this same scholar asserts that the DOD requires “a cadre of civilian 

advisors who specialize in the key functional tasks of a defense ministry.”69

In 2013, in testimony before the U.S. Congress, the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict ASD(SO/LIC) highlighted two DOD activities designed to address these defense institution 

building challenges, noting that the Defense Institution Reform Initiative 

(DIRI) and Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program “are important 

capacity building tools that will sustain other security assistance efforts over 

time by building the core competencies needed in effective and accountable 

defense ministries.”70 DIRI focuses on ministry-to-ministry engagement, 

and develops “effective, accountable, professional and transparent partner 

defense establishments in partner countries that can manage, sustain and 

employ national forces” by providing “subject matter experts to work with 
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JSOU Report 18-1

partner nations to assess organizational weaknesses and establish a roadmap 

for addressing the shortfalls.”71 In contrast, the MODA program “partners 

DOD civilian experts with foreign counterparts to build ministerial core 

competencies such as personnel and readiness, logistics, strategy and policy, 

and financial management.”72 While DIRI provides essential ministerial 

assessment and planning capabilities, the MODA program reflects the closer 

ministerial advisory interaction that may ultimately be required to build 

effective defense institutions in developing and transitioning states. 

The DOD established the MODA program in Afghanistan in July 2010 

as a result of increased “U.S. government emphasis on civilian-led capacity 

building at the ministerial level.” In particular, the program addresses concerns that the existing advisory services to Afghan ministries were “often 

carried out on an ad hoc basis, utilizing uniformed or contract personnel 

whose functional expertise and advisory skills were not always well-matched 

to the sociocultural working environment.” Subsequently, the MODA program was expanded to support the provision of advisory services to the 

defense ministries of additional countries following the program’s inclusion 

in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The FY2014 

NDAA extended this authority to include the assignment of advisors to 

“regional organizations with security missions” as well.73

As framed in the FY2012 NDAA, the MODA program is designed to 

“enhance the capabilities and capacity of the partner nation’s defense ministry” by leveraging the DOD’s civilian workforce to “provide institutional, 

ministerial-level advice, and other training ... in support of stabilization or 

post-conflict activities,” and to “assist the ministry in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense-related 

processes.” The DOD also intends for this program to aid the development of 

“long-term relationships that strengthen a partner nation’s defense ministry” 

and “support broader U.S. policy goals” such as “promoting positive civilmilitary relations” and the professionalization of partner military forces.74 

While the ASD(SO/LIC) asserted in his 2013 congressional testimony that 

the MODA Afghanistan program “has demonstrated the positive impact 

that DOD civilian personnel can have in the field by helping to build capable 

defense institutions and providing professional advice and assistance at the 

ministerial level,”75 there have been challenges scaling the program to support other partner nations. Despite deploying over 200 civilian advisors to 

Afghan ministries during FY2010–FY2014, the DOD was only able to deploy 
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a total of five civilian advisors to ministries in other countries by the end of 

FY2014 through the MODA program. Although difficulties obtaining partner 

nation approval for MODA advisors has been part of the problem with the 

program’s expansion outside Afghanistan, 

the recruitment of qualified advisors also 

has been an issue.76

Even in Afghanistan, there are questions about the continued success of 

recruiting for these positions, as the U.S. 

military presence in Afghanistan continues to decline. In addition, gaps in 

the deployments of MODA advisors may 

occur as a result of training and administrative challenges, regardless of the 

effectiveness of recruiting efforts. Given the projected positive impact of 

the MODA program on security sector reform and BPC, would it be feasible 

for SOF to help mitigate shortfalls in civilian ministerial advisors while the 

MODA program scales to achieve a new advisory footprint worldwide?

Despite deploying over 200 

civilian advisors to Afghan 

ministries during FY2010-

FY2014, the DOD was only 

able to deploy a total of five 

civilian advisors to ministries 

in other countries by the 

end of FY2014 through the 

MODA program.

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Chapter 4. SOF Doctrine and Perspectives

In its planning and execution of the SOF core activities of SFA and FID, 

USSOCOM has primarily focused on providing military advisors at the 

tactical and operational levels of FSF. However, there are elements of associated joint doctrine and SOF strategic documents that appear to reinforce 

the possibility of these activities extending to impact the ministerial level as 

well. In fact, the first end state identified for SFA in JP 3-07, is “Competent 

from the ministerial level to the individual soldier and police officer, across 

all related fields of interest and functional specialties.” JP 3-07 also indicates 

that “the level and intensity of advice and assistance is based on local operational conditions and should continue until the security forces establish the 

required systems to provide for themselves.”77

Similarly JP 3-22, states that SFA consists of “activities from the ministry 

level to the tactical units, and the national security sector,” including “organizing institutions and units, which can range from standing up a ministry 

to improving the organization of the smallest maneuver unit.” Furthermore, 

JP 3-22 specifically endorses BPC at the strategic level, highlighting that 

developing “tactical capabilities alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed as well.” It also clarifies that “building 

capability and capacity” includes “personnel, logistics, and intelligence, and 

their support infrastructure,” much of which can typically be found within 

a ministerial apparatus.78

Although USSOCOM has not specifically designated the high-operational/strategic and ministerial level activities as the domain of SOF, it has 

developed a vision for SOF SFA and BPC efforts that could require highoperational/strategic and ministerial level interactions to deliver optimal 

impact. SOCOM 2020 describes SOF missions as actively “building enduring 

relationships through training with partner forces and assisting like-minded 

nations as they address the underlying causes of extremism.” In the case of 

Afghanistan this involves leveraging “SOF’s expertise as advisors and trainers” to develop “the capability and capacity of the Afghanistan National 

Security Force to provide sustainable security, transparency, justice, and 

opportunity for the Afghan people.”79 Assisting countries by addressing 

“the underlying causes of extremism” and the development of security forces 
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JSOU Report 18-1

that can provide “transparency, justice, and opportunity” are both tasks that 

would be consistent with the more high-operational/strategic and ministerial 

level initiatives typically associated with security sector reform.

To accomplish these tasks, the broader SOCOM 2020 vision for SOF 

activities describes a “globally networked force” that includes “interagency, 

allies and partners” with the collective ability to “rapidly and persistently 

address regional contingencies and threats to stability.”80 USSOCOM’s Special Operations Forces Operating Concept expands the list of SOF “strategic 

partners” to include “interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, commercial, and academic” partners in this “Global SOF 

Network.”81 Many of these strategic partners primarily operate at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial level of a government, which suggests 

that the additional SOLOs that the concept calls for stationing in U.S. embassies could reasonably end up providing advice to high-operational/strategic 

and ministerial representatives in a partner nation, as well as partner nation 

SOF.82

USSOCOM established the SOLO program in 2006 to provide SOF representatives who could “coordinate United States SOF (USSOF) development 

efforts at foreign national level SOF command headquarters” and “facilitate 

establishment and nurturing of institutional relationships to the partner 

nation’s (PN) Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the 

Interior, and civilian leadership.” SOLOs also serve as “the SOF advisor to 

the U.S. Chief of Mission, the country team, and the PN SOF commander,” 

and are responsible for assisting the applicable Theater Special Operations 

Command (TSOC) operating under USSOCOM in “the development of PN 

special operations capabilities and capacities from the strategic through the 

tactical level.”83 Although focused largely on the high-operational/strategic 

advisory mission, the program has been challenged with developing the 

supporting accessions, training, assignment, and professional development 

processes necessary to generate highly skilled, senior (O5/O6) SOF officers 

to support the identified partner nation demand for SOLOs. As of June 2014, 

40 countries had been approved to receive SOLO billets by 2019, but as of 

May 2016 only 17 countries have had SOLOs assigned.84

The above excerpts from joint doctrine and USSOCOM strategic documents, plus overviews of applicable USSOCOM initiatives, indicate that 

providing advisory services at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial 

level of a government, while not a specified task for SOF, is at a minimum, 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

fully consistent with the objectives of the SOF core activities of SFA and 

FID, as well as the vision for creating a global SOF network. As indicated 

in Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s 2013 speech mentioned above, 

SOF are clearly “central” to BPC.85 One scholar asserts that SOF BPC efforts 

already “run the gamut of security cooperation from training individuals 

and units to institutional security sector reform.”86 SOF ministerial advisory 

activities appear to be well underway through initiatives such as USSOCOM’s SOLO program, but the program may continue to be challenged with 

delivering a sufficient number of SOLOs to support the broadest vision of 

the global SOF network described in SOCOM 2020. 

With engagements in “approximately eighty countries around the world” 

on any given day,87 and “nearly 8,000 SOF” deployed continuously in “over 

90 countries around the globe” as of December 2016,88 even SOF personnel 

who are not in the SOLO program are well-positioned to provide advisory 

services to partner nation defense ministry officials in cases where SOLO 

and MODA program advisors are not available. Are SOF’ skills, as primarily tactical and operational level advisors, a match for the skills required to 

succeed as advisors at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial level 

of a partner nation’s security forces?

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Chapter 5. Skills and Traits of Effective 

Military Advisors

When BPC requires the deployment of U.S. military advisors, the DOD typically turns to SOF to perform this mission given their experience and expertise with working by, with, and through partner nation security forces.89 Joint 

and service doctrine for SFA and FID identify several of the key skills and 

traits that have enabled SOF advisors to be successful in the performance of 

these SOF core activities. Adding insights from analyses of advisory missions 

yields a better understanding of which skills and traits have proven to be 

most beneficial in U.S. SFA and FID activities over time. 

JP 3-07 highlights the importance of language skills to advisors’ ability to 

communicate and establish a rapport with their partner nation counterparts. 

It also recommends the personal traits of maturity, experience, and patience 

as helpful for dealing with the challenges and frustrations frequently associated with the task of advising FSF.90 In addition to noting the importance of 

advisors having language skills, JP 3-22, asserts that knowledge of the partner 

nation’s history, culture, and customs is also essential.91 Joint Doctrine Note 

1-13 adds that leadership skills are required for advisors at all levels as well, 

from noncommissioned officers to general and flag officers, since SFA spans 

interactions from the tactical level through the strategic level.92

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1 notes three types of skills that are 

particularly important for effective advising. The first skill set is combat 

skills, which are the foundation for any military advisor, but particularly 

for advisors to partner nation security forces that are operating in a combat 

environment. Second, competence or expertise in a particular subject matter 

related to security forces, such as intelligence, communications, operations, 

and logistics is necessary. The third set of essential skills consists of techniques for advising, teaching, and coaching—the core methods that advisors 

use to assist their assigned partner nation counterparts.93

FM 3-07.1 identifies a number of additional personal traits that are helpful for advisors. Advisors should be open-minded, perceptive, intellectually 

curious, and flexible in their approach to challenges. They should be nonjudgmental, tolerant of differences with others, and capable of empathy. It 

is also helpful for advisors to be highly communicative individuals, with 
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JSOU Report 18-1

an ability to motivate themselves and others, as well as a general warmth 

in their relations with others. They should be self-reliant, with a “strong 

sense of self” and a healthy sense of humor to help 

make it through the more difficult times. From a 

broader perspective, advisors must be able to deal 

well with uncertainty, maintain a realistic outlook, 

and accept and learn from failure.94

A review of articles and research primarily 

from the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute on 

advisory missions in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforces the value of many of the skills mentioned 

above, including basic language skills (for rapport 

building), leadership, combat skills, subject matter 

expertise, and cultural competence including local 

history, customs, institutions, and religions. Diplomatic, management, and 

influence and negotiation skills are also considered to be helpful.95 Additional personal traits recommended for advisors include self-discipline, selfconfidence, humility, mental agility, and the ability to learn quickly.96 For 

combat advisors, physical toughness in terms of stamina and energy was 

also cited as an important trait.97

Surveying the body of research from the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies 

Institute, RAND, and other academic sources on tactical and operational 

advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador yields several of the same skills 

and competencies highlighted above. Language skills, advisory techniques 

and cultural competence are recommended most frequently. However, partner nation politics and military institutions plus counterinsurgency (COIN) 

and civic action techniques are also suggested competencies.98 Familiarity 

with the fields of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and economics are also 

recommended for advisors, as well as an independent outlook and a contemplative nature.99

Based on the insights above from both doctrine and research, a composite 

picture of the most valuable skills and traits for military advisors can be 

constructed. The skills and competencies recommended most frequently for 

advisors include language skills, advisory techniques, combat skills, subject 

matter competence, and country-specific knowledge of culture, customs, 

history, and political and military institutions. The personal traits identified most often as being preferable for effective advisors include patience, 

It is also helpful for 

advisors to be highly 

communicative 

individuals, with an 

ability to motivate 

themselves and 

others, as well as a 

general warmth in 

their relations with 

others.
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

empathy, maturity, humility, open-mindedness, flexibility, and tolerance of 

uncertainty. 

SOF training and qualifications focus substantially on the development 

of the language, culture, combat skills, and instructional technique competencies discussed prior.100 SOF selection processes are designed to screen 

for many of the highlighted traits as well,101 and the “Quiet Professionals” 

ethic and culture of SOF encourages their adoption.102 These skills and traits 

have enabled SOF to become the DOD’s first choice as military advisors for 

BPC activities—the bulk of which takes place at the tactical and operational 

levels of partner nation security forces. Surveying the skills and traits associated with effective advisors operating at the high-operational/strategic and 

ministerial levels of partner nations will allow an assessment of whether 

this existing SOF skill set offers a sufficient foundation for BPC at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels as well. 

Skills and Competencies Personal Traits

Advisory Techniques Empathy

Combat Skills Flexibility

Country-Specific Knowledge of Culture, 

Customs, History, and Political/Military 

Institutions

Humility

Language Maturity

Subject Matter Competence Open-Mindedness

Patience

Tolerance of Uncertainty

Table 1. Most Valuable Skills and Traits for Tactical and 

Operational Military Advisors

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Chapter 6. Skills and Traits of HighOperational/Strategic and MinisterialLevel Advisors

While the DOD has not developed any joint or service doctrine specifically focused on military advisors operating at the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels of a FSF, the essential traits and skills required 

for advisors to be effective at these levels can be developed from articles 

and research documents published by various DOD and U.S. government 

sources. In the year before the establishment of the MODA program, the 

U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a guide titled “The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World” 

that identifies negotiation skills, knowledge of U.S. policy and politics, and 

knowledge of partner nation culture, customs, history, and politics as essential competencies of U.S. ministerial advisors. The document also provides 

a broad overview of the personal traits that would be most beneficial for 

advisors, including: patience, savvy, adaptability, and flexibility; the ability 

to work independently, learn quickly, deal with ambiguous circumstances, 

and take action based solely on higher intent; and sufficient experience to 

establish credibility with the assigned ministerial counterpart.103

The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) has also engaged heavily on this topic, 

through both its participation in the development and delivery of the DOD 

MODA program curriculum and its own initiatives. In 2009, USIP released 

a briefing paper titled “The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector 

Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains” summarizing the findings of one 

such initiative that assembled a panel of experts to discuss the challenges 

facing ministerial advisory efforts. The paper notes the importance of language and technical competency for advisors, plus the personal traits of 

patience and humility. By emphasizing that advisors are “not merely experts, 

but are negotiators, teachers and partners,” one can infer that the expert 

panel would support the utility of negotiation and instruction skills as well.104

USIP experts offered additional insights in an article focused on identifying “Lessons from MODA” three years after the program’s inception. 
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JSOU Report 18-1

The article, published in the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations journal PRISM, reiterates the significance of advisors being 

technically competent in their designated advisory field, and the need for 

patience, adaptability, and flexibility to be traits of the individuals selected 

for advisory missions. However, the article recommends several more skills 

for advisors, such as problem solving skills, personal communication and 

interaction skills, and the ability to work with “many local actors at multiple levels.” The article also emphasizes the utility of instructions skills, 

persuasion skills, and motivation skills. The additional personal traits that 

the article suggests for advisors include: maturity, cultural curiosity, and 

resourcefulness; compassion, empathy, and comfort engaging a wide array 

of people and personalities; plus integrity and a team player mentality.105

Two other articles published by DOD organizations help clarify the 

desired areas of technical competence for ministerial advisors. In a 2011 

PRISM article titled “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for an 

Enduring Security Force,” three senior DOD officials associated with the 

MODA program identify a requirement for ministerial advisors with technical expertise in the fields of logistics, financial administration, human 

resources. The article also stresses the need for advisors to have mentoring 

and advising skills.106 Finally, a 2013 Joint Special Operations University 

monograph titled Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform suggests that the fields of technical expertise for ministerial advisors should 

extend to include policy and strategy; force development; and planning, 

budgeting, and management.107

Overall, many of the skills identified above for ministerial advisors—such 

as advisory techniques, language skills, technical expertise, and knowledge 

of local culture, customs, history, and politics –are fully consistent with 

the skills recommendations for tactical and operational advisors. Certainly 

the highlighted personal traits of patience, empathy, adaptability, and flexibility, among others, are familiar as well. Furthermore, Army Doctrine 

Publication 3-05 emphasizes that SOF are deployed in tailored packages 

that are “Language trained; Regionally aligned; Culturally astute; Politically nuanced; Trained in mediation and negotiation; Expected to operate 

autonomously; and Proficient at interorganizational coordination.”108 The 

primary differences between the proposed traits for advisors at the tactical and operational levels, and advisors at the high-operational/strategic 

and ministerial levels are the combat expertise focus of the former and the 
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organization, administration, and logistics concentration of the latter. Based 

on this comparison, it appears that if technical expertise concerns can be 

addressed, existing SOF advisor skills, competencies, and personal traits 

would provide a sufficient foundation for routinely extending SOF advisory activities to include partner nation government ministries. Technical 

expertise, however, is not the only concern that has been raised regarding 

the possibility of SOF personnel performing ministerial advisor roles on a 

more routine basis.

Skills and Competencies Personal Traits

Advising Skills Ability to Deal with Ambiguity

Country-Specific Knowledge of Culture, 

Customs, History, and Politics

Ability to Take Action Solely Based on 

Higher Intent

Financial Administration Expertise Ability to Work Independently

Force Development Expertise Ability to Work with Many Actors at 

Many Levels

Human Resources Expertise Adaptability

Instruction Skills Compassion

Knowledge of U.S. Policy and Politics Cultural Curiosity

Language Skills Empathy

Logistics Expertise Flexibility

Mentoring Skills Humility

Motivation Skills Integrity

Negotiation Skills Maturity

Personal Communication and 

Interaction Skills

Patience

Persuasion Skills Quick Learner

Policy and Strategy Expertise Resourcefulness

Planning, Budgeting, and 

Management Expertise

Savvy

Problem Solving Skills Sufficient Experience to Gain Credibility

Technical Competency Team Player Mentality

Table 2. Summary of Most Valuable Skills and Traits for 

Ministerial-Level Military Advisors
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Consistent with the above analysis, the PKSOI/SSI guide for military 

advisors cited earlier contends that “the core skills necessary for a successful advisory role are the same from the tactical to the strategic level,” with 

the principal factors of “personality, credibility, and perception of value” 

applying to “junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and junior company 

grade officers assigned to provide training to the lowest level of foreign army 

recruits, as well as to the general who is sitting in a meeting with a foreign 

head of state.”109 Most of the SOF advisory skillset that has been so effective at 

the tactical and operational levels of FSF should also be effective at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels. Indeed one of SOF’ principal 

competencies directly addresses one of the challenges that the 2011 PRISM

article lists as a catalyst for the development of the MODA program—contractor and military advisors’ frequent lack of “sufficient working knowledge 

of the sociocultural context into which they were being deployed.”110

The other challenge that the 2011 “Ministerial Advisors” article in PRISM

highlights as a rationale for starting the MODA program is that given the 

wide range of specialties in defense and interior ministries, it was often 

difficult to identify military and contract advisors with the experience or 

expertise in the particular fields where Afghan ministries desired support. In 

this regard, the USIP authors of “Lessons from MODA” note that “successful institution-building requires advanced bureaucratic skills—for example, 

developing policy, logistics, and transport,” which they view as distinctly 

different skills from the combat skills that are the primary domain of military personnel.111 Two COIN researchers with U.S. Army experience offer a 

similar view in a 2008 Armed Forces Journal article titled “New Answers to 

Hard Questions.” The authors asserts that SOF advisors “were not intended 

to develop security forces at the institutional level and cannot provide the 

division- and corps-level planners, personnel and finance specialists, and 

expert logisticians needed to develop security institutions.”112 All of these 

observations support the conclusions of the previous section, which identifies technical expertise in typical ministerial activities as the primary differentiation between the skills of effective advisors operating at the tactical 

and operational levels and the skills of effective advisors working at the 

high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels. 

The “Lessons from MODA,” however, extend beyond the challenge of 

addressing the technical, bureaucratic skills gap. The authors identify two 

additional hurdles for military personnel serving as ministerial advisors. 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

First is the paucity of military personnel “with extensive experience in civilian-led institutions” and not just in military units.113 Similarly, the COIN 

experts’ quote above regarding the inability of SOF advisors to provide 

“division- and corps-level planners” alludes to the lack of SOF personnel 

with strategic or ministerial level experience. Second is the USIP experts’ 

observation that “most U.S. military personnel are significantly younger 

than defense civilian personnel,” an issue that they assert “has been known 

to cause resentment and slow progress.”114 With personality and credibility 

being two of the principal factors for successful advisory missions, this age 

gap issue can clearly have a more substantial impact than may generally be 

expected.

In addition to these issues, there are concerns regarding the capacity 

and availability of SOF to perform security sector advisory roles. In his 

2013 congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael A. 

Sheehan noted that the “large demand for building partner nation capability over the past decade coupled with the limited availability of SOF for this 

mission has required the GPF [general purpose forces] to adapt and develop 

their skills in conducting an increasingly larger portion of security force 

assistance activities.”115 This trend has resulted in the U.S. Army’s recent 

establishment of Security Force Assistance Brigades to collaborate with, but 

not replace, SOF in building partner nation “institutional defense capability.”116 Moreover, the primary cause of the limited availability of SOF for SFA 

efforts—increased SOF counterterrorism activities—is not likely to diminish 

in the near future.117

Overall, it appears that the core skills required for successful advisors 

at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels are similar to the 

skills required for successful advisors at the 

tactical/operational levels, while the identified challenges are not insurmountable. The 

requisite technical and bureaucratic skills 

expertise is increasing in SOF as a result of 

increased assignments to strategy, policy, 

and logistics roles at SOCOM and other combatant command (CCMD) organizations. In 

particular, the assignment of SOF personnel 

to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

and interagency organizations through the 

The requisite technical and 

bureaucratic skills expertise is increasing in SOF 

as a result of increased 

assignments to strategy, 

policy, and logistics roles 

at SOCOM and other 

combatant command 

(CCMD) organizations.
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JSOU Report 18-1

SOST program is helping address a paucity of military personnel with experience in civilian-led organizations. USSOCOM SOST teams are embedded 

“at critical nodes of the interagency process,” facilitating “the exchange of 

information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders”118—activities that 

any civilian advisor to a partner nation ministry might expect to perform.

In addition, there are senior SOF advisors with the age and experience 

to establish close relations with partner nation ministry personnel, and in 

cases where age is not similar, the level of operational experience of SOF 

representatives should be sufficient to command respect. While only civilian personnel like the MODA advisors can “help demonstrate appropriate civil-military interaction” to the civilians leading ministries in partner 

nations, SOF advisors can help demonstrate proper military support to civilian leaders to the former military personnel who often assume roles in the 

defense and interior ministries.119 Perhaps more importantly, although SOF’ 

capacity and availability for the ministerial advisor mission may indeed be 

a significant issue based on the measured progress of the SOLO program, 

there are far more SOF advisors deployed worldwide who may be able to 

perform this mission than SOLO and MODA program advisors combined. 

Moreover, there are several cases where SOF personnel operating outside the 

SOLO construct have effectively served as advisors at the high operational/

strategic level suggesting the potential for broader SOF advisory success at 

the ministerial level as well.
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Chapter 7. SOF History Advising 

Foreign Security Forces (FSF) at the 

High-Operational/Strategic Level

While SOF are frequently called upon to conduct training at the tactical 

level with partner nations, mission requirements and their unique skills 

often lead to them providing advice and assistance at the high-operational 

and strategic/ministerial levels of partner nation governments also. In 2013 

testimony before the U.S. Congress, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Sheehan highlighted that SOF regular engagement in key countries provides 

them with deep understanding of “local culture, society, language, economy, 

history and politics.” This rare appreciation of both “the physical and human 

terrain of their areas” enables SOF to be “more precise and therefore successful” in BPC.120

One researcher adds SOF’ “high level of cross cultural competency,” and 

ability to be employed in sensitive, covert, or clandestine matters to the list of 

attributes that make SOF particularly well suited for BPC at all levels.121 Furthermore, this expert asserts that “SOF’s unique culture, global perspective, 

roles in the U.S. Military, and relationships across the spectrum of domestic 

and international actors also qualify SOF to offer perceptive insights on 

where to pursue strategic true partnerships and how to apply BPC methods and assets.”122 Staff at the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency 

Center have even worked from a list of existing SOF imperatives to provide 

units assigned SFA missions at any level a list of SFA imperatives that can 

serve as a foundation while starting to build a campaign plan. A former 

U.S. military advisor to the commanding general of an Iraqi Army division 

has endorsed these lightly altered SOF imperatives as a useful baseline for 

advisors providing SFA at his high operational level.123

Indeed, since 9/11 SOF have provided advice and assistance from the 

tactical level through the high-operational/strategic level to improve partner 

nation security forces and supporting institutions worldwide. These engagements have ranged from large-scale and long-term advisor deployments to 

Iraq and Afghanistan to smaller-team and shorter-term advisor engagements 

in Colombia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, and the Philippines.124 
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Taking a closer look at four of these engagements—in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

the Philippines, and Colombia—will shed more light on how SOF have performed at the high-operational/strategic level in particular.

SOF Advisors in Afghanistan: Developing Village Stability 

Operations, Afghan Local Police, and Afghan Special 

Operations Capabilities

While SOF direct action (DA) at the tactical level against al-Qaeda and 

Taliban targets in Afghanistan frequently gained more acclaim, SOF programs such as Village Stability Operations (VSO) to build Afghan local 

police (ALP) and efforts to train and equip Afghanistan’s SOF have also 

achieved significant impact—at both the tactical and high-operational/

strategic levels.125 SOF and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–

Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) leaders started initiatives as early as 2005 in Uruzgan province to combine local resistance to the Taliban with governance 

and economic development programs.126 Similarly, CJSOTF-A established 

an Afghan auxiliary police program in 2006-2007 working with local elders, 

and then coordinated with the governor to build ministerial capacities with 

the U.S. Agency for International Development and the state to improve 

economic development and local government appointments. These early 

initiatives demonstrated SOF’ capabilities to operate effectively at the highoperational level with interagency support, however these efforts ultimately 

were not sustainable without a broader strategy; provincial support alone 

was not enough.127

That broader vision for VSO/ALP was provided by Combined Forces 

Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), which 

was established to serve as a strategic headquarters for all SOF in Afghanistan, but was also designated the lead for VSO/ALP programs.128 From its 

base in Kabul, CFSOCC-A was able to coordinate VSO/ALP initiatives more 

effectively with International Security Assistance Force headquarters, Afghan 

ministries, and the U.S. embassy.129 In addition, CFSOCC-A populated the 

regional infrastructure to support the VSO/ALP program by assigning SOF 

personnel from the CFSOCC-A and CJSOTF-A staffs to Village Stability 

Coordination Centers to help coordinate activities from the local tactical 

level through the national/strategic level. SOF teams assigned to VSO/ALP 

initiatives at the local level were also directed to integrate governance and 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

development activities from the start with security operations.130 CFSOCC-A 

was subsumed by Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTFA) in 2012, and SOJTF-A SOF staff members “provided more intensive mentoring of the ALP leadership at the national level starting in 2013.”131 To 

increase program capacity at multiple levels, SOJTF-A grew the number 

of SOF mentors at the national level, while also expanding provincial and 

regional level training activities.132

VSO and ALP were the primary SOF contribution to population-centric, 

indirect approaches to COIN efforts in Afghanistan,133 and can be considered effective given indications from enemy sources that “insurgent leaders 

generally viewed the ALP as the foremost obstacle to the success of the insurgency.”134 Logistical bottlenecks existed at higher levels of the Ministry of 

the Interior where NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) advisors 

were assigned the lead.135 Logistics is an area that SOF might benefit from 

expanding its capabilities in given how vital it is to transitioning programs 

to partner nation control. The strategically significant impact achieved by 

VSO/ALP, however, is a positive indication of the effectiveness of SOF advisors working at both the tactical and high-operational/strategic levels.

In addition to the VSO/ALP program, SOF advisors were engaged in 

developing Afghanistan’s own SOF capabilities at the operational and highoperational/strategic levels, as well as facilitating the interaction between 

Afghan ministries and SOF. Special Operations Advisory Groups (SOAGs) 

were established in 2013 as small teams of SOF advisors operating under 

NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCCA)/SOJTF-A to assist headquarters elements of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). SOAGs focused on building both the operational and 

institutional capacities of ASSF headquarters groups including the Afghan 

National Army Special Operations Command, the General Command of 

Police Special Units (GCPSU), the Special Mission Wing, the Ktah Khas 

Strike Force, and the ALP Headquarters.136

One SOAG, the Ministry Advisory Group Special Operations Forces 

Liaison Element (MAG SOFLE), was specifically assigned to support Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior. MAG SOFLE advisors worked with these two ministries to help resolve issues impacting 

operational-level activities for U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces, while also 

facilitating the ministries’ understanding of NSOCC-A priorities and missions. In turn, MAG SOFLE advisors enabled NSOCC-A and other U.S. 
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JSOU Report 18-1

and coalition commands gain a better understanding of the priorities and 

missions of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior as 

well. SOF advisors operating in this ministerial environment helped facilitate 

understandings of expectations and interests across senior U.S., coalition, 

and Afghan leaders, and increase the likelihood of effective collaboration.137

SOF Advisors in Iraq: Building Iraq’s SOF and 

Counterterrorism Capabilities

In Iraq, SOF were again assigned a DA mission against terrorists and other 

extremists, plus an advisory mission to help Iraq develop its own special 

operations and counterterrorism capabilities as part of its security forces.138 

The mission to train the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) was executed 

by Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq (JFSOCCI),139 and extended beyond tactical-level training of Iraqi troops to the development of a national counterterrorism capability and command structure 

that reached the level of government ministries responsible for policy and 

resources of national assets.140

ISOF are organized into three brigades subordinate to the Counterterrorism Command (CTC) which falls under the Counterterrorism Service (CTS), 

and their primary mission is conducting operations against terrorists, insurgents, and extremists141 CTC was designed to provide operational control 

of ISOF, with the same rank and organizational level as Iraq’s air, ground, 

and naval forces. It became a three-star general level organization.142 CTS 

was initially conceived as a civilian ministry separate from the Ministry of 

Defense and the Ministry of the Interior that would advise the prime minister on counterterrorism policy while also ensuring that ISOF were resourced 

properly and given appropriate civilian oversight. However, it ended up being 

a four-star general level organization commanded by military personnel.143

SOF advisors focused initially on training tactical ISOF and started providing training on command and staff processes such as planning, logistics, 

personnel, and intelligence much later.144 The familiarity and continuity 

created by multiple deployments of SOF trainers, plus the high-quality foundation provided by the use of U.S. Army special forces training doctrine, 

contributed significantly to the successful development of ISOF’ tactical 

capabilities.145 However, this concentration on advising at the tactical level 

reduced SOF availability to advise senior ISOF commanders, staff, and 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

combat service support units.146 Eventually it became apparent that even 

strong Iraqi senior military leaders were often unfamiliar with the senior 

management skills required for optimum ISOF performance.147 Furthermore, 

ISOF lacked a combat service support organization to enable it to operate 

at peak efficiency.148 While ISOF soldiers received basic training on how to 

identify and plan for requirements for parts, ammunition, and other supplies, CTC and CTS personnel did not receive this training, leading SOF 

advisors to be concerned about the ability of CTC, CTS and Iraqi ministries’ 

ability to sustain ISOF properly.149

Based on these initial observations, SOF advisors expanded their engagements to include the development and training of the ISOF brigades at the 

tactical level, the national command and control headquarters, and the 

attending combat service support structure.150 SOF advisors and other subject matter experts were assigned to the CTS headquarters and CTC staff 

was to provide advice and training in not only operations and strategy, but 

also the supporting intelligence, logistics, administration, communications, and legal processes that facilitate operational 

effectiveness.151 This expanded focus on developing a 

sustainable ISOF capability and supporting structure 

led to impressive results. The United States’ Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

highlighted “ISOF’s demonstrated ability to independently conduct operations and missions and to 

sustain its equipment and facilities” as “indicators of 

the program’s success” in 2010.152 In its final report in 

2013, SIGIR judged the program to develop a counterterrorism capability in 

Iraq to have succeeded, yielding “a force of more than 4,100 expertly capable 

soldiers deployed throughout Iraq.”153

These findings matched the assessments of the JFSOCC-I commander as 

SOF prepared to depart Iraq in 2012. In an interview with Special Warfare 

magazine, Brigadier General Darsie Rogers commented that the SOF mission 

in Iraq had been a success, building within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) a 

“reliable, professional counterterrorism capability that has allowed them to 

plan their own successful operations against Iraq’s enemies–be they extremists, criminals or terrorists.” Brigadier General Rogers also pointed to the 

ISOF ability to “conduct counterterrorism operations independently–without 

U.S. adviser support” as an indicator of their effectiveness.154 Perhaps equally 

This expanded 

focus on developing a sustainable 

ISOF capability 

and supporting 

structure led to 

impressive results.
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JSOU Report 18-1

important from a capability and organizational culture perspective, SOF 

advisors had been able to convince the brigades, CTC, and CTS headquarters 

“that capability does not equate to numbers. What matters is how good you 

are today and what you do to be better tomorrow.”155 Notably, a SOF advisor 

who served four tours in Iraq mentioned that although “ISOF will likely be 

the most enduring foreign internal defense success story” for U.S. special 

forces, SOF advisors were already concerned that sustainment would prove 

to be “the unit’s most likely failure point.”156

By 2014, with ISIS on the march in Iraq, these earlier assessments of CTS 

and ISOF capabilities were proven correct. According to a 2015 Brookings 

Institution analysis, “CTS was assessed as the one bright spot of ISF. It was 

the best military organization, and was able to maintain its cohesion and 

effectiveness.”157 The same Brookings Institution report commented that 

CTS “performed better than other ISF units” and “is the most competent 

military partner the U.S. has” within the government of Iraq.158 Similarly, a 

2016 article in The Washington Post remarked that the CTS force of roughly 

10,000 personnel “is a small bright spot in an otherwise lackluster legacy of 

American efforts to rebuild Iraq’s military.”159 Furthermore, Lieutenant General Mick Bednarek, who led all U.S. training activities in Iraq between 2013 

and 2015, stated that ISOF are the “most professional, technically capable 

force” that the Iraqi government has.160 The CTS response to ISIS, years after 

the departure for U.S. military forces from Iraq, offers perhaps the clearest 

evidence of SOF’ considerable skill of advising from the tactical level to the 

strategic level of a host nation to develop a truly strategic capability.” 

SOF Advisors in the Philippines: Advising and Assisting in a 

Counterterrorist Conflict

SOF engagement in the Philippines was focused on advising and assisting 

host nation forces in their efforts to counter a terrorist organization that 

shared ISIS’ vision of establishing its own Islamic state. In response to the 

government of the Philippines’ request for assistance with addressing the 

threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), advisors from the U.S. Army’s 

1st Special Forces Group began training elements of the Philippine Army in 

March 2001 to serve as a counterterrorism force.161 This initial effort expanded 

to include the provision of intelligence assistance following an ASG attack on 

a resort in the Philippines in May 2001 where tourists were also kidnapped 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

for ransom. After 9/11, U.S. military assistance increased again to advance 

counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines, leading to the establishment of 

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) in 2002.162

Under OEF-P, SOF engagement with the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

(AFP) strengthened substantially as SOF advisors deployed in larger numbers 

to advise and assist the AFP in their operations against ASG in the southern 

islands of the Philippines.163 U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Task Force 510 

(JTF 510) led by Special Operations Command Pacific led SOF advisor efforts 

against ASG on the island of Basilan. In July 2002, Joint Special Operations 

Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was stood up as a tailored force to replace 

JTF 510 and perform the FID mission with the AFP to defeat the ASG.164

Based on the outreach of earlier SOF teams with local residents, these later 

SOF advisor units were able to work with the AFP to respond to the issues, 

grievances, and needs of the local community to undermine any ties they 

may have had to terrorist groups.165 In addition to training and advising 

the AFP, SOF advisors “helped coordinate security efforts and interagency, 

sometimes international, programs to address key issues such as water, medical care, transportation, and education” that often left local residents open 

to the presence and influence of ASG and other terrorist organizations.166 

JSOTF-P employed the Liaison Coordination Element (LCE) construct 

“as the core unit to embed with selected host-nation partner forces in strategic locations and key junctures of host nation military command structure”167 LCEs are “flexible, adaptive and scalable” units that can interface 

from the tactical level through the strategic level.168 For nearly a decade, LCEs 

were primarily focused on advise and assist activities with AFP companies 

operating at the tactical level. However, following the Philippine government’s release of a new Internal Peace and Security Plan in 2010, and the 

publishing of Philippine police and army plans soon thereafter, JSOTF-P 

shifted its advisory focus from the tactical level to higher-level operational 

and institutional development.169

By 2012, SOF advisory efforts at the tactical level had been so successful 

that LCEs started to shift their advise and assist efforts to the operational 

level battalion and Joint Task Force headquarters staffs to address challenges 

in planning, coordination, and synchronization.170 Philippine Army battalion, brigade, and division staffs, plus elements of superior commands 

including the Philippine General Headquarters, received training from SOF 

on planning and operations.171 172 JSOTF-P advisors were also able to provide 
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JSOU Report 18-1

training to higher Philippine military headquarters on program management 

and other staff functions.173 Working at the operational level of brigades and 

JTFs enabled SOF advisors to build relationships with a greater opportunity 

to yield change while also allowing engaging with subordinate tactical units 

as required.174

In 2013, JSOTF-P leaders started collaborating with the Philippine Army 

Special Operations Command through an assigned LCE to help identify 

institutional-level options to improve counterterrorism and FID efforts.175 

LCEs for operational activities and functional coordination elements for 

institutional activities concentrated on improving capabilities at the Philippine SOF headquarters and overall joint command.176 SOF advisory cells 

were also established at every Philippine SOF command headquarters to 

improve command and control and other staff functions.177 JSOTF-P personnel worked with the Philippine Army Special Operations Command to 

standardize and institutionalize the training of SOF skills and capabilities 

in the existing training pipeline.178 Furthermore, JSOTF-P and Philippine 

Army Special Operations Command leaders hosted a series of conferences 

to develop a strategic roadmap for Philippine SOF.179

In addition, between 2012 and its deactivation in early 2015, JSOTFP increasingly engaged at the operational and strategic levels to support 

national-level planning, coordination, and institutional development.180 

SOTF-P shifted focus to advising and assisting at the institutional level to 

help resolve operational and tactical level operational capability gaps, to 

improve operational capacity and reduce the need for repetitive Subject 

Matter Expert Exchanges.181 High-level planning, intelligence fusion, and 

institutional development were viewed as critical to the development of a 

sustainable Philippine capability. AFP schools, courses, doctrine, and other 

institutions were strengthened.182

 The JSOTF-P commander and his deputy made particular efforts to cultivate strong relationships with U.S. embassy and national-level Philippine 

military and civilian personnel. As early as 2010, the JSOTF-P commander 

started allocating two days per week for meetings in Manila until 2013 when 

it shifted to five days per week.183 JSOTF-P worked to establish structures 

to improve higher-level operational coordination between the Philippine 

police and military, and increased its efforts to achieve a whole-of-society 

approach to security in the Philippines.184 JSOTF-P’s success was facilitated 
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significantly by this high level of interagency coordination through increasingly close coordination with the U.S. embassy country team over time.185

SOF advice and assistance efforts in the Philippines have resulted in a 

substantially more capable partner nation security force and a significant 

reduction in the threat posed by ASG and other terrorist organizations.186

The OEF-P experience also demonstrates that SOF advisors are sufficiently 

adaptable and flexible to provide high-impact advice and assistance at the 

tactical level, operational level, and strategic level of interaction.187

SOF Advisors in Colombia: Building a Sustainable Capability 

and Regional Partner

In Colombia, SOF advisors contributed to a sustained U.S. interagency effort 

to enhance the government of Colombia’s ability to push back against drug 

traffickers and other associated security challenges within its borders. Starting in early 2003, the United States provided Planning Assistance Training 

Teams (PATT) to division and brigade-level Colombian forces. 

The initial PATT was constructed to assist with operational planning, 

leveraging the expertise of SOF operations, intelligence, logistics, and civil 

affairs personnel.188 However, the SOF advisory mission in Colombia reached 

its broadest impact—including training operational-level Colombian SOF, 

conventional, and police forces—in 2004. SFA activities included support to 

aviation operations, riverine operations, operational planning, intelligence 

fusion, command and control, logistics, security, and medical training.189

The PATT program continued to grow along with the SOF advisory mission, and in early 2005 was comprised of 40 SOF and other U.S. military 

personnel, with a planned increase to 59 military personnel to extend their 

support to Colombian regional joint commands as well. By 2006, the PATTs 

were also working with the Colombian Army operations staff in Bogota, and 

the regional TSOC—Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH)—

established a forward command element at the U.S. embassy also located in 

Bogota. Adding this senior SOF representative to the U.S. embassy gave the 

growing number of typically junior, rotational, SOF personnel in Colombia a stronger voice within the embassy to advocate on their behalf with 

the other senior Defense Attaché Office and Security Cooperation Office 

leaders onsite. It also helped build trust, transparency, and understanding 

among SOF personnel, the U.S. country team, and the Colombians far more 
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JSOU Report 18-1

effectively than what SOCSOUTH could achieve from its headquarters in 

the United States.190

SOF advisors also facilitated the development of multiple Colombian 

SOF operational centers and commands. SOF personnel provided training to elements of a Colombian Army Special Operations Command and 

a Colombian Joint Special Operations Command that included Colombian 

SOF, air force special operations units, and naval special operations units. In 

2008, Colombia’s Defense Ministry requested U.S. assistance with the design 

and implementation of a new service-level SOF command, and SOCSOUTH 

representatives led working groups with Colombian General Staff personnel 

to help establish this new joint special operations headquarters as well.191

Throughout this period, SOF advisors continued to train, mentor, and 

develop relationships with partner forces to substantially increase Colombian security forces’ abilities to confront internal threats to Colombia’s 

security.192 The long-term engagement of U.S. SOF 

advisors helped to develop a self-sufficient Colombian SOF that ultimately achieved strategic impact 

beyond its national borders in Latin and Central 

America through its training of units from other 

countries.193 Moreover, SOF’ persistent and broad 

engagement in Colombia enabled the U.S. to impact 

Colombia’s military training and education institutions significantly.194 Perhaps the biggest impact 

that SOF advisors had on Colombia was what one 

Colombian general termed a “transfer of culture.” 

A vice-minister in the government of Colombia described this culture more 

specifically as “a rigor of training, focus, organization” that also brought a 

“decisiveness,” that helped Colombians “make decisions” and “speeded up 

what may have been a much slower process.”195

Moreover, SOF’ persistent and broad 

engagement in 

Colombia enabled 

the U.S. to impact 

Colombia’s military 

training and education institutions 

significantly.
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Chapter 8. Critiques of SOF Advisors 

Working at the High-Operational and 

Strategic/Ministerial Levels

Based on the historical examples above, SOF have demonstrated the ability to work at the high- operational and strategic levels to attain long-term 

partnering and security successes with FSF and supporting government ministries. There are, however, several critiques to expanding SOF interaction at 

the high-operational and strategic/ministerial levels. First, SOF often lack 

substantial expertise in the finance, logistics, and personnel fields that are 

critical to the development of government ministries and institutions, and 

are traditionally the strong suit of MODA program advisors. One example 

of this concern can be found in assessments of SOF advisory operations in 

Afghanistan. 

In May 2002, U.S. Army special forces arrived in Afghanistan for the task 

of training the Afghan National Army (ANA). However, by October 2002, 

it was clear to Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry—who at the time was a 

Major General serving as the Chief of the Office of Military CooperationAfghanistan and charged with building the ANA—that the development of 

a full national army was going to “exceed what U.S. Special Forces were able 

to do.” One of the main challenges that he was concerned about SOF being 

able to adequately address involved “the complexities of sustaining institutions” and “function systems” that “link that operational unit to their higher 

headquarters or the functional command.” In his analysis, these included 

a wide array of requirements such as “requirements for developing Afghan 

resupply” and “requirements that Afghan soldiers get paid on a regular basis” 

plus a requirements for a promotion system that would “communicate to the 

General Staff when we have an ace Afghan National Army battalion commander.” Ultimately, Lieutenant General Eikenberry decided that although 

SOF advisors could possibly fill these tasks, they still were at the limits of 

SOF advisors’ core capabilities. Lieutenant General Eikenberry instead chose 

to employ separate, non-SOF, Embedded Training Teams to help the ANA 

get their “administration and logistics” and other “non-combat systems up 

and running.”196
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Although Lieutenant General Eikenberry’s observation that the functional skills of supply, financial, and personnel management are outside the 

core capabilities of SOF advisors is largely accurate, the accomplishments 

of the initial special forces teams in these non-core competencies are illuminating. According to Colonel Mark Milley, commander of the U.S. Army 

10th Mountain Division brigade that took over the broader ANA training 

mission from U.S. Army special forces in May 2003, the SOF advisors “got an 

army off the ground, so to speak, in everything from ranks and photographs 

and registration and identification cards to some basic training level stuff in 

individual skills and some collective skills at the squad and platoon levels 

and some basic command and control. They did a lot of good.”197 Clearly, 

the initial SOF advisors in Afghanistan were able to stretch to perform several non-core, functional skills that were required for a task as broad as the 

development of the ANA.

Moreover, the opportunities for SOF personnel to develop these skills are 

increasing as a result of USSOCOM requirements for staff with logistical, 

financial, and personnel expertise. The TSOCs have similar, if somewhat 

slimmer, requirements for these skills as well. Plus an advisor’s strength in 

a particular field does not mean that they will automatically be called upon 

to leverage that specific area of expertise in their assigned duties. 

Even MODA program advisors have been tasked to fill unexpected roles 

and responsibilities based on emergent needs once they arrived in Afghanistan.198 Ultimately, DOD civilians comprise roughly 70 percent of the MODA 

advisors and another 20 percent come from outside the government, typically 

in cases where expertise traditionally does not reside within DOD (but even 

these outside advisors often have prior military or government experience).199

Regardless, SOF advisors excel at the soft skills and personality traits that 

are so critical to the successful match of advisor and counterpart, and those 

skills have enabled them to be effective even without substantial prior experience with the functions of the assigned government ministry.200

A second critique is that SOF lack experience in the division-, corps-, 

and ministry-level activities that are essential to engagement at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels. 

Returning to the Afghanistan example, Lieutenant General Eikenberry 

also thought of this challenge, where he considered SOF to be “extraordinary” at the performance of the FID mission and training FSF by “partnering 

with indigenous forces and working with them in very small numbers and 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

providing advice.” At the same time, he was somewhat less certain of SOF 

advisors’ skills developing “brigade echelons within the Afghan National 

Army and starting the corps echelon” and a “functioning General Staff.”201 

Similarly, Colonel Milley remarked that SOF advisors “have limited capability to train beyond small unit tactics,” but “when it comes to things like larger 

scale command and control, battalion operations and brigade operations” 

as well as “the tactics of combined arms operations at battalion and above” 

it takes “conventional guys that have that kind of experience” to conduct 

training effectively.202

The achievements of SOF advisors in Iraq offer a ready counterpoint to 

this critique. As described earlier, the Iraqi security force that performed 

the best when confronted by ISIS starting in 2014 was the CTS composed of 

three ISOF brigades trained by SOF advisors. While they may not have spent 

much time training in larger scale command and control and combined 

arms operations, the ISOF brigades have demonstrated the ability to learn 

those skills quickly while spearheading the government of Iraq’s advances to 

reclaim territory lost to ISIS. SOF are also gaining additional opportunities 

for high-operational/low-strategic experience through staff tours at TSOCs, 

SOCOM, and other CCMDs. There are also more opportunities for SOF to 

gain experience in ministerial-level activities through an increasing number 

of SOST billets in DOD and other interagency organizations in Washington, 

D.C. Thus, although SOF may not have a robust amount of personnel with 

experience working with larger military formations and ministries, their 

capabilities to develop larger units effectively are proven and the depth of 

SOF’ experience in these organizations is increasing quickly.

A third critique of assigning SOF advisors to the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels is the limited availability of SOF for these requirements relative to other higher priority tasking and the sheer size of the FSF 

and supporting ministries to be engaged. In Afghanistan, Lieutenant General 

Eikenberry questioned whether “there were enough Special Forces available” to train a force the size of the ANA. However, he also wondered if it 

was wise to shift the tasking of “a highly professional well trained operative 

that is out there, that should be out there fighting with the Afghan National 

Army” given that “the Afghans along with our Special Forces have always 

been the deadliest combination from a Taliban perspective.”203 Counterterrorism activities and other DA tasking are additional requirements that 
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JSOU Report 18-1

may also draw away from the pool of SOF available for advising at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels.

The SOCOM vision for an expansion of SOLO and TSOC billets, however, suggests that there will be a number of SOF personnel set aside to focus 

specifically on building relationships with partner nation forces worldwide. 

Concentrating on increasing the capabilities of the SOF personnel assigned 

to these billets to address high-operational/strategic and ministerial-level 

concerns before any broader expansion of applicable training throughout 

SOF would limit any potential impact on SOF units assigned to other higherpriority missions. Occasionally, high-operational/strategic and ministerial 

level requirements may even converge with typically higher priority activities, such as in the case of Iraq where SOF advisors were tasked with developing Iraqi forces that could fight counterterrorism with, and ultimately 

without, U.S. SOF. If, under the prevailing circumstances, the availability of 

SOF advisors would not match the size of the partner nation security force or 

supporting ministry to be engaged, then a model similar to the one applied 

in Afghanistan can be followed, where CF were assigned to augment and 

extend the capacity of the core SOF advisors assigned the FID mission. Consistent with the SOF vision, however, there should be far more BPC requirements that resemble recent engagements 

in the Philippines and Colombia than the 

larger-scale engagements in Afghanistan 

and Iraq.

A final main critique to the expansion 

of SOF advisory activities to include the 

high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels is that the use of military advisors at the ministerial level in particular, 

can undermine the United States’ longterm advocacy for civilian control of the 

military. While having military personnel 

clearly operating at the ministerial level 

may potentially reduce the clarity of U.S. 

messaging regarding the need for civilian control of the military, having military advisors work side-by-side with 

civilians in teams operating at the ministerial level can also be one of the 

most effective demonstrations of civilian control of the military. As asserted 

While having military personnel clearly operating at the 

ministerial level may potentially reduce the clarity of 

U.S. messaging regarding the 

need for civilian control of 

the military, having military 

advisors work side-by-side 

with civilians in teams operating at the ministerial level 

can also be one of the most 

effective demonstrations of 

civilian control of the military.
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

by two scholars who have researched the impact of the MODA program in 

Afghanistan:

Despite the potential for problems and misunderstandings, it is 

worthwhile for military personnel and civilians to work together 

on advisory teams. Military personnel provide instant credibility 

to the host nation’s military and police forces, and civilians are 

visible reminders of the importance of civilian control over the 

armed forces. American civilians must remember that this may be 

a challenging concept and perhaps even a paradigm shift for the 

host nation.204

The addition of military advisors at the ministerial level can also yield 

other benefits. Military advisors can often facilitate civilian advisor interaction with defense ministries. In Afghanistan, having military advisors in 

multiple ministries “facilitated access to the Afghan Ministry of Defense” 

since civilian advisors needed to be introduced by U.S. military personnel “in 

order to be taken seriously by MoD officials.”205 In some cases, the security 

situation may also demand that military advisors take the lead at all levels. 

Once again in Afghanistan, the initial security challenges led to the need for 

advising efforts to focus on military assistance at all levels—a role closer to 

SOF core competencies.206 In addition, sometimes only SOF can provide U.S. 

ambassadors with the options they need to be optimally effective. As Brigadier General Rogers of JFSOCC-Iraq remarked in 2012, as SOF units largely 

withdrew from Iraq, the key enabler would become the remaining SOF staff 

officers who “can help shape the diplomatic environment” and “provide the 

ambassador with options that empower diplomacy and are not restricted to 

a small glass case with instructions ‘break in case of emergency.’”207

With the effectiveness of SOF advisors operating at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels established, and the primary critiques addressed, the next question to address is what the additional training 

requirements for SOF advisors would be in this novel field. U.S. efforts to 

develop capacities at these levels in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in 

several approaches and proposals to this challenge that will be considered 

in the next section. 

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Chapter 9. Training SOF for HighOperational/Strategic and Ministerial 

Level Advisory Tasks

Before venturing into what the requirements would be to train SOF advisors 

to operate effectively at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels, 

it may be worthwhile to consider current SOF, and other military training specifically designed for assignments in locations such as Afghanistan. 

SOJTF-Bragg (SOJTF-B), based in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, provides oneto two-week training options for officers who will be assigned to SOAGs. The 

training includes “leader professional development discussions,” rehearsal of 

concept drills, and language classes.208 SOJTF-B also hosts a monthly five-day 

orientation on the NATO/SOJTF-A mission and force structure including 

one day of training on local culture, history, customs, and religion. This 

course is also available in a one- to two-day training event.209

The U.S. Army recently established a six-week Military Advisor Training Academy course at Fort Benning, Georgia, that the new Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFABs) will attend starting in October 2017. The course 

curriculum is currently under development, but overall SFAB advisor training will include culture training, embassy training, foreign weapons training, 

and up to sixteen weeks of language training. Advanced medical training, 

advanced driver training, and survival, evasion, resistance and escape training are also anticipated to be part of an extensive SFAB training pipeline.210 

The U.S. Air Force offers training for personnel who will be assigned as 

advisors to FSF as well. The Advanced Level of Air Advising Education and 

Training includes “additional air advisor skills, language, regional expertise, culture, planning, assessment, and force protection/fieldcraft skills.” 

This training is designed to prepare U.S. Air Force advisors to “develop a 

partner nation’s aviation enterprise and conduct more complex tasks, with 

a larger scope, on a more frequent basis, or for long duration.”211 Requirements for SOF-related air advisor roles are a step above the Advanced Level 

of Air Advising Education and Training in most topics, adding additional 

competencies in the areas of cross-cultural communications, advisor-specific 
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JSOU Report 18-1

skills, negotiations/mediation, conflict resolution, Key Leader Engagement, 

and communicating with FSF in their native language and with interpreters.212 

The U.S. Marine Corps has developed and maintained substantial training 

opportunities for its personnel engaging in advisory and other security cooperation duties in Afghanistan and other locations worldwide. When advisory 

requirements in Afghanistan were rising, the Marine Corps established an 

Advisor Training Group (ATG) in 2007 at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat 

Center in Twenty-nine Palms, California, to provide a 25-day training course 

to Marines en route to billets with Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan.213 The training provided included “billet-specific skills, mitigating 

insider threat training, rehearsal of common advisor situations, and additional 

language and culture training.”214 The capstone of the ATG training program 

was a “mission rehearsal exercise” that was conducted on “a training facility 

constructed to resemble Afghan districts,” with “more than 250 Afghan-American role players, fluent in Afghan languages and culture” and subject matter 

experts observing the participants’ performance and providing feedback.”215

The Marine Corps eventually disestablished this capability in June 2014,216 and 

centralized all of its advisory training efforts under the Marine Corps Security 

Cooperation Group (MCSCG) at Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Virginia.217

MCSCG was established in 2011 from the consolidation of Marine Corps 

Training and Advisory Group and the Marine Corps Security Cooperation 

Education Training Center.218 Originally founded to cover the wide range of 

Marine Corps advisor assignments beyond Afghanistan, MCSCG offers courses 

spanning from the three-day Basic Engagement Skills Course to the four-week 

Marine Corps Advisor Course.219

The Basic Engagement Skills Course is designed to provide participants with 

the basic knowledge and fundamental engagement skills required to perform 

security cooperation activities effectively with FSF. Participants learn how to 

build relationships and rapport with counterparts, read nonverbal communication, identify and reduce cultural stress, and work with interpreters. Specific 

topics covered during instruction include: an introduction to security cooperation, recognizing culture shock, non-verbal communication, establishing 

cross-culture relationships; employing interpreters, and foreign disclosure.220

Similar to the Basic Engagement Skills Course, the ten-day Security Cooperation Trainer Course covers fundamental advisor skills, training management, 

and foreign weapons training. However, the focus of the training shifts from 

merely engaging effectively with FSF while performing a security cooperation 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

activity, to providing participants with the essential skills to instruct and 

mentor a FSF to achieve higher levels of organizational capability and capacity. 

Participants learn “to analyze and apply operational culture to their mission, 

build and maintain relationships and rapport with FSF counterparts, recognize 

and mitigate cultural stress, develop and implement training plans.”221

The Marine Corps Advisor Course covers advisor skills, security cooperation planning and execution, training management, force protection, and 

weapons skills. Key topics covered during advisor skills instruction include: 

“recognizing culture shock; non-verbal communication; establishing crossculture relationships; employing interpreters; and negotiating differences.” The 

security cooperation planning segment of the course covers, foreign disclosure, 

security cooperation planning, functional-based advising, and designing a 

training plan.222 Additional topics that have also been covered in recent course 

offerings include: language training, operational culture, building relationships 

and rapport, cross-cultural communication, social perspectives, instructional 

methods, developing a security cooperation letter of instruction, legal considerations in security cooperation, and interacting with media.223 Consistent with 

the lessons learned at ATG, each class involves practical application exercises, 

and advisor training activities end with both a written examination and a live 

performance examination with role players.224

Overall, existing training focused on preparing military personnel to serve 

as advisors with FSF share a consistent focus on providing participants with 

regional security and cultural expertise. In preparations for the FID mission 

discussed earlier, SOF personnel receive language, weapons, and advisor skills 

instruction. However, one scholar who has reviewed best practices for SOF advisors based on the Afghanistan experience suggests there are useful insights to 

be gleaned from the MODA program training for civilian ministerial advisors, 

regardless of the proposed level of SOF advisory engagement, such as a focus 

on the latest “coaching, mentoring, and influence techniques” and leveraging 

reach-back video-teleconference capabilities to foster advisor networks and 

continuous training with subject matter experts worldwide, while in-theater.225

A closer look at the MODA training program may yield additional topics and 

activities that can help enable SOF advisors to perform most effectively at the 

high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels of a host nation.

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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Chapter 10. The Ministry of Defense 

Advisors (MODA) Training Program

In a 2015 report titled “Advising the Command: Best Practices from 

the Special Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan,” RAND 

researcher Todd Helmus describes the MODA training program and highlights differences between its offerings and the training covered by SOJTF-B 

for SOF advisors headed to Afghanistan to serve in SOAGs. MODA provides 

7 weeks of training to its civilian ministerial 

advisors, with 5 weeks dedicated to advisor 

training, and 2 weeks of security training plus 

training on battlefield medicine and program 

administration. The advisor training includes 

language, culture, and country familiarization, 

with a concentration on advising and mentoring skills, plus a simulation of ministerial advisor activities in Afghanistan. Helmus offers 

that in addition to providing more “specific 

training for the advisor mission,” discussed 

earlier, SOJTF-B training for SOF advisors 

“should also make ample use of role-playing exercises for both cultural competency and advising to help ingrain classroom lessons learned.” Finally, he 

proposes that training on host nation governing institutions, command and 

control, and logistics are also important for SOF advisor success.226

MODA introductory slides from 2010 summarize the training topics 

covered as including “Culture; Country Familiarization; Language; History; 

counterinsurgency; Nation Building Concepts; Personal Security; Capstone 

Exercise; Weapons; First Aid; Admin and physical aspects.”227 However, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Schear, the commander of the 

NTM-A (Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV), and the DOD’s Acting 

Director of Readiness and Training Policy and Programs for Personnel and 

Readiness Frank DiGiovanni offered additional insights into the MODA 

program in a 2011 article in the journal PRISM. They described the seven 

weeks of MODA training as “extensive, experiential training in culture, 

language, and advisory skills, as well as adaptability, resiliency, and personal 

The advisor training includes language, culture, 

and country familiarization, with a concentration on advising and 

mentoring skills, plus a 

simulation of ministerial advisor activities in 

Afghanistan.
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JSOU Report 18-1

safety training.” This training also included assessments of participants’ 

“innovation and crucial thinking skills” plus training on “complex decisionmaking” and “risk communication.” The five weeks of advisor skills training 

were conducted in a classroom environment with the assistance of U.S. and 

Afghan officials, regional experts, and instructors from the USIP. This training was followed by a ten-day field exercise with Afghan role players and 

interpreters, including personal security and situational awareness courses 

at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center at Camp Atterbury in Indiana.228

In a 2012 evaluation of the MODA program by USIP, Victoria Stattel and 

Robert Perito offer additional details of the MODA training program. Course 

topics included not only advisor training, cultural awareness, country familiarization, and language instruction, but also how to conduct effective executive consultations and briefings. In addition to USIP instructors, National 

Defense University experts also provided instruction on culture, capacity 

building, mediation, negotiation, and gender roles. Another significant detail 

noted in this evaluation is that the Afghan role-players at Muscatatuck Urban 

Center also simulated the operations of an Afghan ministry.229

USIP scholars published two additional documents in 2012 that discussed 

the MODA training program. The first release was an article in PRISM titled 

“Lessons from MODA: Continuing the Conversation on How to Advise 

Institution-Building” in which USIP expert Nadia Gerspacher and research 

assistant Adrian Shtuni describe the training topics covered as including 

“traditions, history, and political dynamics of the country.” More specifically, 

Gerspacher and Shtuni outline the MODA training program as involving 

“professional advisor training; cultural awareness instruction, country familiarization, language instruction, senior-level consultations and briefings, 

and an evaluated Capstone Exercise.” They also note that learning “how 

to work effectively with interpreters” is an essential skill covered in training. However, they highlight that MODA advisors are provided “in-depth 

instruction on both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior,” and 

the knowledge and skills “to be adaptable, responsible, and informed decision makers.”230

In a special report released later that same year, “Preparing Advisers for 

Capacity-Building Missions,” Gerspacher furnishes a helpful synopsis of the 

principles and tools that the MODA training program attempts to convey 

to its participants through the many classes and interactions described 

above. The four principles for ministerial advisors, which align with USIP 
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recommendations in this field include: “supporting local ownership; designing for sustainability; doing no harm; and demonstrating respect, humility, 

and empathy.” MODA training seeks to provide its civilian advisors with: 

coping mechanisms for working in “fragile, uncertain and highly stressful 

environments;” skills to “work with local counterparts to build enhanced 

systems;” and vital country-specific background information including “culture and norms, demographics, legal framework, governance structure, and 

history.”231

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Chapter 11. Subject Matter Expert 

Observations on Ministerial Training 

Requirements Beyond MODA 

In Gerspacher’s two publications for USIP discussed above, the MODA 

training program is central to the ministerial training discussion, but the 

recommendations that she offers on this topic are not bound to the MODA 

curriculum exclusively. In “Lessons from MODA,” Gerspacher expounds on 

how language training for ministerial advisors should be conducted, noting 

that mastering “commonly used key phrases and administrative terms” is 

important, but driving toward fluency in pre-deployment training is “an 

unattainable goal in most instances.” Instead, she suggests that “the focus 

should be on teaching language and cultural norms together” in pre-deployment training, with language being viewed as a “rapport-building tool.” She 

recommends that language training continue “during deployment as a way 

to increase effectiveness.”232 Gerspacher also observes that ministerial advisors “find themselves interacting and coordinating with many international 

actors and agencies every day” and suggests that “advisors learn more about 

the resources that each component of the coalition brings to the table” as 

part of their pre-deployment training in order to improve “unity of effort” 

and “coordination” once deployed.233 In addition, Gerspacher proposes that 

training for ministerial advisors should concentrate more on “how to interact 

with skeptical ministry officials” than the “local mullahs and village elders” 

who are the focus of more widespread foreign advisor training.234

Gerspacher also provides a useful framework for the instruction of ministerial advisors in “Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions.” 

First, she notes several skills required to be an effective advisor, including 

relationship-building techniques, cross-cultural communication, and cultural awareness and adaptability. Gerspacher then lists additional knowledge 

requirements in more specific detail. These topics include the foreign policymaking process in “both the donor country and the host country;” dealing 

with multiple bosses and objectives; working with interpreters; providing 

expertise to people from other countries/cultures; recognizing corruption; 

mediation and negotiation; and assessing and building capacity.235 Next, 
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JSOU Report 18-1

Gerspacher outlines several topics to be covered regarding the country-specific 

situation, including history, culture, politics, and economics; organizational 

structure and key personnel in the advisor’s assigned ministry; ability of the 

ministry to deliver services to the public; existing plans to develop the ministry; 

structure of the multinational command and any other engaged parties; and 

locals’ perceptions of international personnel.236 The third category that she 

highlights in her ministerial training framework is substantive knowledge of 

the sector that the advisor will be assigned to, such as an understanding of the 

applicable host nation “processes and desired end states.” Finally, Gerspacher 

details the key elements to be practiced during supporting role-playing exercises, including building relationships with international actors, local counterparts, and stakeholders; adapting to the local cultural environment; active 

listening and other cross-cultural communication skills; meetings; and identifying, presenting, and providing support to the implementation of solutions.237

International non-governmental organizations have provided recommendations for ministerial advisors as well. In the security sector field, the Geneva 

Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces has published an “operational guidance note” that includes an overview of the characteristics of a successful advisor. Several of these characteristics are skills that can be learned or 

enhanced through training, such as: “ambassadorial/diplomatic skills;” “vision 

and strategic planning skills;” “inter-personal and communications skills;” 

“linguistic skills;” and “technical knowledge.” In addition, the operational 

guidance note highlights that successful advisors must be “an able negotiator 

and teacher/mentor,” and have an “extensive knowledge and experience across 

the fields of politics, diplomacy, development, and security.”238

Several perspectives on improving military advisor training have been 

added by organizations connected to the U.S. military. The U.S. Army’s SSI and 

PKSOI published the first PKSOI paper in 2008 titled “The American Military 

Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World.” In this 

paper, a retired U.S. State Department foreign service officer proposes several 

topics to prepare advisors for their assignments overseas, including history 

and circumstances of the country; local governing structures; fundamental 

documents of the host nation covering government, constitution, and treaties; 

language basics; local culture and etiquette; applicable U.S. command structure; 

and U.S. and international policy in the region.239 

More recently, one analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses highlighted 

the types of skills advisors require to be effective in a 2014 article in the Marine 
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Corps Gazette, titled “Military Advising After Afghanistan.” Describing hard 

skills requirements as the military proficiencies and substantive expertise 

that advisors will need in their assignment, and soft skills requirements as the 

understanding of “language and the cultural, social, and historical environment in which advisors work,” Melissa McAdam asserts that a separate category 

of “interpersonal skills” that “enable effective communication” and “facilitate 

confidence-building” have received far less attention from military trainers.240

She contends that advisors need to practice not just everyday conversation 

but also complex communication through interpreters. In addition, McAdam 

proposes that military advisors need to learn how to adjust teaching methods 

to match how local populaces learn, and suggests that training packages from 

the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences can be 

particularly helpful in preparing advisors to “communicate and teach” effectively in the cultural setting of their assigned host country.241

A 2010 report from the U.S. Army Research Institute highlighted by 

McAdam furnishes greater detail on the competencies and themes required 

to train personnel to be effective teachers in a cross-cultural environment. The 

report’s authors state that personnel who will train in these circumstances 

must gain proficiency in both “intercultural competencies related to teaching and learning” and “effective cross-cultural teaching 

strategies.”242 Unsurprisingly, these scholars also note 

that necessary basic cross-cultural competencies include 

language skills, and a fundamental understanding of 

host nation culture. However, they also extend this set 

of requisite understandings to include cultural differences, including frequent issues such as “relationship to 

time, relationship versus task orientation, relationship 

to authority, face saving behavior, and cultural differences in communication patterns.”243 In addition, the 

authors provide five key themes for training effective 

teachers and trainers in a cross-cultural environment: 

“1) understanding the influence of culture on teaching 

and learning, 2) development of the teaching/advising 

relationship, 3) motivating learners in a cross-cultural environment, 4) effective cross-cultural communication skills, and 5) methods for cross-cultural 

teaching and training.”244

Unsurprisingly, 

these scholars 

also note that 

necessary basic 

cross-cultural 

competencies 

include language 

skills, and a 

fundamental 

understanding 

of host nation 

culture.

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Chapter 12. Synthesizing Potential 

Solutions for the Training of SOF Advisors

The SOF, Service, MODA, and expert perspectives offered above on training 

advisors to FSF and associated ministries span a wide spectrum of training 

options that would be challenging to pursue collectively. A 2015 publication 

written by a security sector reform professor at the U.S. Army organization 

that provided one of the first publications on this topic since the end of the 

Cold War—PKSOI—offers a program of instruction that would be closest to 

the MODA training model. In his paper titled, “Professionalizing Ministerial 

Advising,” Raymond Millen recommends “a basic advisory course, advanced 

degree completion, and a pre-deployment training course” for ministerial 

advisors, which at initial glance might appear to be a challenge for most SOF 

advisors to fit into their training plans.245 However, the details of the training that he proposes offer a serviceable framework for the construction of a 

program of instruction for SOF advisors operating at the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels. For example, Millen suggests that a basic 

advisory course for ministerial advisors could be completed in roughly six 

weeks and cover “structure and missions” of engaged U.S. agencies; applicable CCMDs; U.S. politics, culture, and history; corruption versus patronage and nepotism; the Law of War; ethical dilemma scenarios; assessment 

and measurement processes; strategic thinking and systems approaches; and 

deliberate decision making processes.246

In addition, Millen recommends that ministerial advisors receive a reference “Advisor’s Toolkit” consisting of “practical suggestions and information 

for study” covering matters of personal security and advisor skills. Personal 

security topics include “Stress Resilience, Predictive Threat Profiling, and 

Personal Security and Observation Skills.”247 Advisor skills topics involve 

“The Role of the Advisor, The Art of Asking Questions, Metacognition and 

the Reflective Practitioner, Institution Building Tools, Cross-Cultural Adaptability, Working with Interpreters, Mediation and Negotiation, Principles 

of Good Governance and Comparative Government, Risk Communication, 

Engaging Your Counterpart, and Measuring Progress.”248

Millen also describes the essential components of a pre-deployment training course that would be based on the MODA training program as well. First, 
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there would be classes on host nation language, culture, history, political 

structures, military and police structures, national security council, and 

rule of law. Similar to the MODA training program, regional experts and 

guest lecturers from the host nation would be invited to present these classes, 

including topics such as “history and geopolitics, recent regimes, religion, 

politics and governance, business etiquette, security forces, and governing 

institutions.” Second, there would be a broad review of U.S. and host nation 

“missions, policies, and programs,” potentially led by U.S. State Department 

or Afghan officials, former U.S. ambassadors, retired military officers, and 

prominent academics. Specific topics in this segment of the course would 

include: “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program, Rule 

of Law, Police Reform, Defense Reform, Challenges of Transition (if applicable), Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (if applicable), Engaging Women 

in Reform, country team (or combatant command) assessments and plans.” 

Finally, there would be an immersive advisory exercise, and potentially a 

video-teleconference for participants with the applicable U.S. embassy country teams.249 Collectively, the topics and interactions outlined by Millen for 

a basic advisory course, a pre-deployment course, and an advisor’s toolkit 

provide a robust initial framework for the core training element for SOF 

advisors designated to operate at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels of FSF and their associated government ministries. 

With an initial advisory curriculum identified, the next challenge is identifying the best method to deliver that training program to SOF advisors. 

A 2012 Joint Staff J7 study by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis 

Division, titled “Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past 

Decade of Operations,” recommends that the United States “re-establish 

a Military Assistance and Training Advisory (MATA) course to promote 

effective partnering and advising.” This proposal would restart the MATA 

course that was initially developed in response to Vietnam-era advisory 

requirements, but would “capitalize on recent lessons and Special Forces 

expertise with regard to FID and SFA operations.”250

Based at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg during the Vietnam 

War, the MATA course started in February 1962 as a four-week course featuring 136 hours of classes on “area studies, counterinsurgency, weapons, 

communications, and demolitions.” By April 1962, the course expanded to 

six weeks consisting of 217 hours of classes including “25 hours of area study, 

46 hours Vietnamese language, 57 hours counterinsurgency operations, 8 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

hours communications, 12 hours weapons, 8 hours demolitions, 22 hours 

physical conditioning, and 39 hours general subjects such as land navigation, 

first aid, and night operations.” The MATA course for Vietnam continued 

to evolve and language training eventually occupied half of the hours allotted for the course, with the overall focus of the course shifting to familiarizing participants with language and culture and providing a more general 

Basic Advisory Course Advisors Toolkit Pre-Deployment Course

Structure and Missions of 

Engaged U.S. Agencies

Stress Resilience Host Nation language, culture, history, political structures, military and police structures, 

national security council, and rule of law

Applicable Combatant 

Commands

Predictable Threat Profiling Recent regimes, politics and governance, 

security forces, and governing institutions

U.S. Politics, Culture, and 

History

Personal Security and 

Observation Skills

Host Nation Geopolitics

Corruption vs. Patronage and 

Nepotism

Host Nation Religion

The Law of War The Role of the Advisor Business Etiquette

Ethical Dilemma Scenarios The Art of Asking 

Questions

Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration program

Assessment and Measurement 

Processes

Metacognition and the 

Reflective Practitioner

Rule of Law

Strategic Thinking and Systems 

Approaches

Institution Building Tools Police Reform

Deliberate Decision Making 

Processes

Cross-Cultural Adaptability Defense Reform

Working with Interpreters Challenges of Transition (if applicable)

Mediation and Negotiation Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (if 

applicable)

Principles of Good 

Governance and 

Comparative Government

Engaging Women in Reform

Risk Communication Country Team (or Combatant Command) 

Assessments and Plans

Engaging Your Counterpart Immersive Advisory Exercise

Measuring Progress Video-Teleconference with Applicable U.S. 

Embassy Country Teams

Table 3. Initial Ministerial Advisor Curriculum (Based on Millen, 

“Professionalizing Military Advising”)251
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overview of “advisor duties, responsibilities, and techniques.” A twelve-week 

military assistance security advisor course highlighted by 8 weeks of language training was also added for military intelligence officer advisors.252

Although a six-week, largely classroom-based course at Fort Bragg would 

be similar to the format for MODA training, there may be more efficient and 

more flexible methods to deliver the training curriculum to SOF advisors. 

Leveraging existing online training for the MODA program may offer an 

opportunity to shorten the requirement for classroom training at a location 

such as Fort Bragg. Furthermore, since SOJTF-B training infrastructure 

has already been established at Fort Bragg, it may be possible to modify the 

existing training offerings there for military advisors instead of standing 

up a stand-alone course for advisors along the lines of the MATA course.

USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacekeeping has worked with DOD experts to develop an online certificate course 

for MODA participants. The course is constructed around five main learning objectives. The first objective is understanding “the role of the advisor 

and how to engage” counterparts. Second, is appreciating “how advising is 

interrelated with cultural awareness, ongoing reform efforts, and long-term 

stabilization strategies.” Next comes learning “how to apply good conflict 

analysis and coordination strategies to ministerial advising work.” This is 

followed by analyzing the “personal conflict style” of both the advisor and 

the people the advisor works with. The final learning objective is “gaining 

familiarity with a diverse set of negotiation, mediation, and anti-corruption tools.”253 The course is divided into ten sessions that provide training podcasts, written transcripts, and other resources that participants can 

access covering the following topics: “Role of the Advisor; Negotiation and 

Mediation: Tools and Approaches; Cultural Adaptability in Complex Environments; Coordination Strategies; Personal Skills in Resolving Conflict; 

Working with Interpreters; The Process of Conflict Analysis; Perspectives 

on Reform; Reconstruction and Stabilization Strategies; Corruption and 

Anti-Corruption Strategies.” This USIP online training covers many of the 

same topics that Millen suggests above for advisor training.

Country-specific pre-deployment training, however, would most likely 

need to be addressed primarily onsite in a classroom plus a simulation space 

if available. Many of the existing SOJTF-B training offerings could be built 

upon to address the identified advisor training requirements. Once the SOF 

advisor’s destination is known, additional information on the advisor’s 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

counterpart and the counterpart’s organization can be briefed. The U.S. 

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences can provide 

insights regarding the cultural landscape and various items that could impact 

the effectiveness of SOF advisor engagement and instruction activities. Subject matter experts from the U.S. State Department, DOD, and academia 

can be invited to provide insights on the applicable country and its culture. 

Language skills can be sharpened both onsite at Fort Bragg and online. 

 Perhaps the greatest value addition to the SOJTF-B course offerings 

would come from expanding their capacity for practical exercises that provide SOF advisors with the opportunity to practice their skills working with 

interpreters and interacting with mock FSF leaders at the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels.254 Some SOF units have prepared for mentoring FSF previously by training CF personnel serving as a mock partner 

force. Finding suitable mock personnel to fill high-operational/strategic 

and ministerial roles effectively would most likely require bringing subject 

matter experts or other credible actors to Fort Bragg to augment SOJTF-B or 

having SOF advisors run through an immersive advisory exercise at MCSCG 

at Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Virginia, or preferably the Muscatatuck 

Urban Training Center at Camp Atterbury that the MODA program uses.

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Chapter 13. Conclusions, Observations, 

and Implications

This study sought to answer two primary research questions. First, is 

advising foreign militaries at the strategic and ministerial levels an 

appropriate task for U.S. SOF to perform on a regular basis? Broadening 

the baseline scope of SOF advisors to include both the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels of a partner nation’s defense establishment 

appears to be an appropriate evolutionary step in SOF tasking. This conclusion is based on DOD and SOCOM strategies, statements, and speeches; the 

substantial fit between existing SOF advisory skills and the skills required 

of effective advisors at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels; 

and the demonstrated aptitude of SOF advisors at the tactical, operational, 

and high-operational/strategic levels. 

National security strategic documents and DOD leadership speeches 

have established the significance of partnering and BPC for U.S. national 

security plans. SFA activities including BPA, FID, and other related initiatives from the tactical level through the high-operational/strategic and 

ministerial levels can enable partner nations 

to attain and maintain substantial transformations of their security sectors, including 

their security forces. The equipment and 

training that the United States often provides 

to FSF through security assistance frequently 

yield more lasting improvements in capability when the institutional and governance 

frameworks necessary to sustain them are 

augmented as well. 

The expansion of the MODA program to 

address ministerial challenges in Afghanistan and several other countries and regions 

worldwide has been a challenge given its reliance on identifying civilian 

U.S. government—and sometimes private sector—personnel to advise partner nation counterparts. USSOCOM’s SOLO program has also encountered challenges in providing SOF representatives who can advise at the 

The equipment and training that the United States 

often provides to FSF 

through security assistance 

frequently yield more 

lasting improvements in 

capability when the institutional and governance 

frameworks necessary to 

sustain them are augmented as well.
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high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels of partner nation security 

sectors. Adding more routine training for SOF advisors to operate effectively 

at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels may help address this 

shortfall in a field that is critical to the sustainment of U.S., and primarily 

SOF, efforts to BPC. 

SOF selection processes already screen for many of the skills and personal 

traits highlighted as favorable for effective ministerial advisors. The essential 

difference is the area of expertise—a combat proficiency focus at the tactical 

and operational levels in contrast to a focus on organization, administration, and logistics at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels. 

If SOF advisors can bridge that technical expertise gap, then this analysis 

suggests that they can be effective advisors in the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels of FSF, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, the 

Philippines, and Colombia.

Despite these successes there are several arguments against this proposed 

expansion of SOF advisor duties, but many of these critiques can be readily 

addressed. For example, bureaucratic and technical expertise in fields such 

as supply, financial, and personnel management that are particularly applicable for high-operational/strategic and ministerial advisors may indeed lie 

outside the core competencies of SOF, but these skills are spreading in the 

SOF community as a result of increased assignments to strategy, policy, and 

logistics roles at USSOCOM and other CCMD organizations. 

A second critique is that SOF generally lack the experience in the division, 

corps, and ministry-level activities that is often required to be a successful 

advisor at the high-operational/strategic and ministerial levels. More SOF 

personnel are becoming familiar with these activities, however, through staff 

tours at USSOCOM and TSOCs, SOLO billets at other CCMDs, SOF liaison 

billets in DOD and SOST billets in other ministerial-level U.S. organizations. 

Another criticism of expanding the scope of SOF advisors is that there are 

not sufficient SOF personnel to cover this additional role given other higher 

priority tasking and the sheer size of the FSF and supporting ministries 

that SOF advisors will be called upon to engage at these levels. USSOCOM’s 

vision for an expansion of SOLO and TSOC billets engaging partner nations 

worldwide, however, suggests that there will be a number of SOF personnel 

set aside to build relationships with partner nation security forces worldwide. 

Finally, some experts argue that the use of military advisors at the ministerial level may undermine the United States’ long-term advocacy for civilian 
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

control of the military. Yet having military advisors work side-by-side with 

civilians in teams operating at the ministerial level can also be one of the 

most effective demonstrations of civilian control of the military, and SOF 

personnel are increasingly gaining this experience through assignments to 

the OSD and interagency organizations that are directly led by and composed 

of civilians on a day-to-day basis. 

The second research question for this study was what additional training 

would be required for SOF to advise foreign militaries at the strategic and 

ministerial levels? A review of existing training for military advisors and 

MODA advisors yields several options for upgrading SOF advisor training to add the capabilities required to operate most effectively at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels. In particular, Raymond Millen 

of PKSOI distills several of the relevant topics into a framework that can be 

applied relatively readily to the training of SOF advisors in his recent paper 

titled “Professionalizing Ministerial Advising.” 

General topics such as “The Role of the Advisor, The Art of Asking Questions,” and “Institution Building Tools,” could be covered in a classroom 

setting or provided in a reference volume.255 Several of the more countryspecific recommendations that are focused on host nation language, culture, 

history, geopolitics, political structures, security structures, and rule of law 

are essential elements of existing SOJTF-B training in classrooms and other 

SOF distance learning options. Leveraging regional experts, guest lecturers from the host nation, and U.S. State Department officials and former 

ambassadors to present this content in a classroom setting could be particularly beneficial for more focused pre-deployment training. Furthermore, 

increasing the opportunities for prospective SOF advisors to practice their 

skills working with interpreters and interacting with FSF leaders at the highoperational/strategic and ministerial levels in an immersive, simulated, host 

nation environment would be particularly helpful.256

Through the course of the analysis previously discussed on the appropriateness of SOF advisors expanding their role to include the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels of a partner nation’s security sector on a 

more routine basis, another supporting rationale emerged. Time and time 

again, traditional SOF advisory efforts at the tactical and operational level 

have atrophied significantly upon the departure of SOF advisors. Often the 

most lasting success stories for SOF initiatives with partner nation security 

forces appear to have coincided with either the existence of a functioning 
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JSOU Report 18-1

defense ministry or the development of greater ministerial capacity in the 

host country. SOF advisors’ success with the CTS in Iraq was substantially 

linked with the development of quasi-ministerial level capacity to support 

the high-end capabilities that were being developed. In the Philippines, SOF 

advisors gradually shifted from tactical training to a focus on planning, 

logistics, and other high-operational/strategic skills and ministerial capacities. SOF advisors also sought to build capacity at the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels of the Colombian security forces as well, after 

years of recurrent tactical-level training did not yield the desired results.

Experts have identified similar outcomes in broader studies. In a 2015 

RAND study, Christopher Paul highlights that “When capacity built through 

U.S. BPC efforts has endured rather than atrophied rapidly, an effective 

partner nation ministry has played a role in that outcome.” Paul notes that 

often U.S. efforts to BPC “have focused on the operational and tactical levels 

first, only to determine later that the PN lacked the funding, manpower, 

and other resources needed to sustain the capacity built in the long term.” 

Furthermore, while a lack of ministerial capacity could slow or derail initial 

U.S. efforts to BPC, “effective ministerial oversight” is particularly important 

in the post-engagement phase to “lay the foundation for avoiding attrition 

of capabilities.”257 These considerations have often led SOF to choose not 

to build certain capabilities in partner nation forces to avoid sustainment 

issues due to a lack of ministerial capacity. However, in some cases, certain 

niche capabilities may be required to address a threat effectively, making 

building ministerial capacity a more urgent requirement. Overall, building ministerial capacity emerges as a critical skill to ensure SOF efforts at 

the tactical and operational levels are able 

to deliver partner nation capabilities that 

last beyond SOF advisors’ departure. Otherwise, SOF advisors will likely be called 

upon to retrace their training steps in a 

most inefficient application of a relatively 

scarce U.S. capability.

In a February 2017 trip to USSOCOM, 

President Trump highlighted the DA 

counterterrorism role for SOF. He has not, 

however, made any explicit policy proposals regarding the development and 

deployment of SOF advisors for partner nation capacity-building purposes. 

Overall, building ministerial 

capacity emerges as a critical 

skill to ensure SOF efforts at 

the tactical and operational 

levels are able to deliver partner nation capabilities that 

last beyond SOF advisors’ 

departure.
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Yet, as noted earlier, his national security team appears to support existing 

initiatives to train, equip, and enable partner nation security forces to fight 

and win local battles instead of deploying large numbers of U.S. forces to 

fight and win ensuing conflicts and wars.258

For example, Secretary of Defense General Mattis highlighted in a 2015 

Hoover Digest article that “Friends matter in today’s globalized world—just 

as they have always mattered. Alliances and coalitions are high priorities 

when we confront today’s challenge: we need to embrace those who reject 

terrorism, working with allies even when they are not perfect.”259 More specifically, he proposed that “If a brigade of our paratroopers or a battalion 

landing team of our Marines could strengthen our allies at a key juncture 

and create havoc or humiliation for our adversaries, then we should do what 

is necessary with forces that exist for that very purpose.”260 While serving as the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command several years earlier, 

Secretary of Defense General Mattis asserted that the development of more 

small advisory teams for irregular warfare was a “national priority,” calling 

advisory efforts “a growth industry” and noting that “where we need people 

to build relationships, that’s going to be a Special Forces kind of job.”261

Based on these statements, one can anticipate that Secretary of Defense 

General Mattis will pursue this vision of an internationally engaged military that actively builds the capacity of partner nations, while continuing to 

rely on the unique skills of SOF advisors. It remains to be seen at what level 

of partner nation security forces he will ask SOF to focus their capacitybuilding efforts. With the training enhancements proposed in this study, 

however, even more SOF advisors can be prepared to build relationships and 

sustainable capabilities from the tactical level through the high-operational/

strategic and ministerial levels when called upon to help make the global 

SOF network goals of SOCOM 2020 an enduring operational and strategic 

reality.

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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Acronym List

ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ALP Afghan local police

ANA Afghan National Army

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

ASSF Afghan Special Security Forces

ATG Advisor Training Group

BPC building partnership capacity

CCMD combatant command

CFSOCC-A Combined Forces Special Operations Component 

 Command-Afghanistan

COIN counterinsurgency

CTC Counterterrorism Command

CTS Counterterrorism Service

DA direct action 

DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

DIRI Defense Institution Reform Initiative

DOD Department of Defense

FID foreign internal defense

FM Field Manual

FSF foreign security forces

GPF general purpose forces

ISF Iraqi Security Forces
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JSOU Report 18-1

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Forces

JFSOCC-I Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq

JP joint publication

JTF joint task force

LCE Liaison Coordination Element

MATA Military Assistance and Training Advisory

MODA Ministry of Defense Advisors

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NTM-A NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines

PATT Planning Assistance Training Teams

PKSOI Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

PN partner nations

SFA security force assistance

SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigades

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SOAG Special Operations Advisory Group

SOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

SOCSOUTH Special Operations Command, South

SOF Special Operations Forces
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

SOLO Special Operations Liaison Officer

SOST Special Operations Support Team

SSI Strategic Studies Institute

TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

VSO Village Stability Operations

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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

Endnotes

1. Dominic Tierney, “The Backlash Against Nation-Building,” PRISM 5, no. 3 (2015): 

13–27.

2. Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2017), 

I-12–14 and Figure I-4. The term “high-operational/strategic” is intended to reflect 

the “theater/strategic” level of war that U.S. combatant commanders operate 

at with their international counterparts whose forces often are not organized 

according to a similar “theater” construct. 

3. Robert Burns, “U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis Just Made an Unannounced 

Trip to Afghanistan,” Time (23 April 2017), http://time.com/4752091/mattisafghanistan-war-troops/. Lolita Baldor, “U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis: U.S. 

Will Stay in Iraq a While,” Associated Press (20 February 2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/4b9e191a21a0444f9ed42db657cc3145/us-defense-secretarymattis-no-plan-seize-iraqi-oil.

4. National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 6 February 

2015), 10.

5. Ibid., 1–4.

6. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 

March 2014), iii–5.

7. National Security Strategy, 10.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 25.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 10.

12. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, v–vii, 35.

13. Joint Special Operations University (U.S.) et al., Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 2015, 1–7.

14. United States Special Operations Command 2020 (SOCOM 2020) (MacDill Air 

Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013), 2.

15. General Raymond A. Thomas III, “U.S. Special Operations Command” (Testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 4 

May 2017).

16. Burns, “U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis Just Made an Unannounced Trip to 

Afghanistan.”

17. Chuck Hagel, “Statement on the Administration’s Strategy and Military Campaign 

Against ISIL Before the House Armed Services Committee” (Testimony, U.S. 

Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 13 November 

2014), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1900.
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18. Ashton B. Carter, “Rebalancing Special Forces to Meet Global Challenges” 

(Speech, 40th IFPA-Fletcher Conference, Washington, D.C., 5 June 2013), http://

www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1787.

19. Baldor, “U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis: U.S. will Stay in Iraq a While.”

20. James Mattis, “Advance Policy Questions for James N. Mattis: Nominee to Be 

Secretary of Defense” (U.S. Congress, 12 January 2017), 30.

21. Ibid., 146.

22. James O. Ellis, James N. Mattis, and Schake, Kori, “Restoring Our National 

Security,” in Blueprint for America (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 

2016), 145.

23. Greg Grant, “Grunts to Rebuild Like SOF, Move Away from Bases: Mattis,” DoD 

Buzz: Online Defense and Acquisition Journal, 19 February 2009. 

24. National Security Strategy, 7–10.

25. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, vii–17.

26. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 3.

27. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Functional Concept for 

Engagement, TRADOC PAM 525-8-5 (Fort Eustis, Virginia: U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, 2014), 11–12.

28. Ibid.

29. Headquarters Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0 

(Washington, D.C., 2012), 1–4.

30. Harry R. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, JSOU Press Report 15–1 (MacDill 

Air Force Base, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2015), 43–44.

31. Ibid., 49.

32. Security Cooperation, Joint Publication 3–20 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 

2017), v, I-1.

33. Security Cooperation Programs: Fiscal Year 2017 (Washington, D.C.: Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, 28 February 2017).

34. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2015), 214.

35. Foreign Internal Defense, I-10.

36. Ibid., I-10–I-12.

37. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 215.

38. Foreign Internal Defense, I–16.

39. Ibid., I-16, VI-31, VI-32, figure VI-7.

40. Stability Operations, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 

2011), C-8; Foreign Internal Defense, VI–30.

41. Foreign Internal Defense, VI-32, figure VI-7.
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

42. Joint Special Operations University (U.S.) et al., Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 1-6; Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 72.

43. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 74; Taylor White, “Security Cooperation: 

How It All Fits,” Joint Force Quarterly 72, no. 1st Quarter 2014 (January 2014): 

108; Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Joint Doctrine Note 

1-13 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2013), vii, http://www.js.pentagon.mil/

doctrine/notes/jdn1_13.pdf.

44. Foreign Internal Defense, VI-30.

45. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, I–1.

46. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 72.

47. Foreign Internal Defense, ix.

48. Joint Special Operations University (U.S.) et al., Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 1-6; Foreign Internal Defense, I–3.

49. Foreign Internal Defense, I-10–I-17.

50. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, I-4.

51. White, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” 108.

52. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 74.

53. Foreign Internal Defense, I-10, VI–31.

54. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, I-4.

55. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 73.

56. Stability Operations, III-5, C-1.

57. Richard H. Shultz, “Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform,” 

(MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2013), 51.

58. Stability Operations, C-2.

59. Ibid.

60. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, I-4; Stability Operations, C-7.

61. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, I-5.

62. Stability Operations, C-4.

63. Ibid., C-5. 

64. Christopher Paul et al., “What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and 

Under What Circumstances?” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, National Defense 

Research Institute, 2013), 91.

65. Stability Operations, C-20.

66. Ibid., C-4–C-20.

67. Shultz, “Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform,” 61. Quoting the 

Summary Report from the 2011 Defense Institution Building Conference sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 

Strategy & Stability Operations (June 2011), p. 3.
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68. “Defense Institution Building, The Official Home of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,” accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/

institutional-programs.

69. Shultz, “Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform,” 61–70.

70. Michael A. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. 

Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity 

Conflict on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges” (Testimony, 

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C., 

14 February 2013), 7, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130214/100260/

HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-SheehanM-20130214.pdf.

71. “Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI), The Official Home of the Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency,” accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/

programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative.

72. “Ministry of Defense Advisors, The Official Home of the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency,” accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/

ministry-defense-advisors.

73. “Building Partner Capacity: DOD Should Improve Its Reporting to Congress 

on Challenges to Expanding Ministry of Defense Advisors Program,” Report to 

Congressional Committees (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, February 2015), 1–7.

74. Ibid., 3.

75. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges,” 7.

76. “Building Partner Capacity: DOD Should Improve Its Reporting to Congress on 

Challenges to Expanding Ministry of Defense Advisors Program,” 8.

77. Stability Operations, C-8–C-9.

78. Foreign Internal Defense, VI-30–VI-32.

79. United States Special Operations Command 2020, 4–5.

80. Ibid., 2.

81. Special Operations Force Operating Concept (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 

2013), 3.

82. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 84.

83. John Leitner, Cory Bieganek, and Phillip Madsen, “Special Operations Liaison 

Officer: Looking Back to See the Future,” (Capstone Project, Naval Postgraduate 

School, 2014), 15–19.

84. Leitner, et al., “Special Operations Liaison Officer: Looking Back to See the 

Future,” 15–29; Nyle Wilcocks, “Special Operations Forces Industry Conference: 

Cooperative Acquisition,” Powerpoint Presentation (U.S. Special Operations 

Command, May 2016). 

85. Carter, “Rebalancing Special Forces to Meet Global Challenges.”
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White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

86. Ibid., 98–99.

87. “United States Special Operations Command 2020,” 4–5.

88. Raymond Anthony Thomas III, “Prologue,” PRISM 6, no. 3 (December 2016), 3.

89. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges.”

90. Stability Operations, C-4–C-5.

91. Foreign Internal Defense, V-2–V-3.

92. Security Force Assistance, Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, III-4.

93. Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance 

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2009), 7-4–7-5.

94. Ibid., 7-3; Thomas G. Mahnken, “The Role of Advisory Support in the Long War 

Against Terrorist Extremist Groups,” in Security Assistance: U.S. and International 

Historical Perspectives (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2006), 511–13; Lt. Col. Remi Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) 

About Military Advising After 9/11?,” Military Review 94, no. 6 (December 2014): 

72; Robert D. Ramsey, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from 

Lawrence to the Present, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19 (Fort 

Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 40–51.

95. Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 

9/11?,” 72; Daniel P. Bolger, “So You Want to Be an Adviser,” Military Review 86, 

no. 2 (April 2006): 4-7; Mahnken, “The Role of Advisory Support in the Long 

War Against Terrorist Extremist Groups,” 511–13; Joshua Potter, American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011), 7-9; Rodney W. Symons II, “Retooling the 

Security Adviser,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army 

War College, 2007), 7, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPre

fix=html&identifier=ADA469636; Ramsey, Advice for Advisors, 95-117; Michelle 

Ramsden Zbylut et al., “The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of 

Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role,” 

Technical Report (Arlington, Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 2009), 76–94.

96. Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising After 

9/11?,” 72; Mahnken, “The Role of Advisory Support in the Long War Against 

Terrorist Extremist Groups,” 511–13; Potter, American Advisors, 5; Ramsey, 

Advice for Advisors, 40–51.

97. Bolger, “So You Want to Be an Adviser,” 4–7.

98. Jason M. Bender, “Advising Foreign Security Forces: Implications of Korea and 

Vietnam” (Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), 

29–35; David T. Gardner, “Lessons from the Past: Vital Factors Influencing Military Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 

School, 2012), 10–11, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefi
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x=html&identifier=ADA560642; Ramsey, Advice for Advisors, 12–13; Robert D. 

Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18 (Fort Leavenworth, 

Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 108–15; G.C. Hickey, “The American 

Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam” (Santa 

Monica, California: RAND, n.d.), vi–x.

99. Ramsey, Advice for Advisors, 40–51.

100. Foreign Internal Defense, V-3.

101. Ibid.

102. Joint Special Operations University (U.S.) et al., Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 1–1.

103. Michael J. Metrinko, “The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior 

Foreign Officials in the Islamic World” (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

August 2008), 17–37.

104. Elizabeth K. Panarelli, “The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector 

Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains” (Washington, D.C.: United States 

Institute of Peace, April 2009), 3.

105. Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA: Continuing the 

Conversation on How to Advise Institution-Building,” PRISM 3, no. 3 (June 

2012): 82–83.

106. James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell IV, and Frank C. DiGiovanni, “Ministerial 

Advisors: Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force,” PRISM 2, no. 

2 (2011): 136–41.

107. Shultz, “Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform,” 62–63.

108. Special Operations, Army Doctrine Publication 3-05 (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 12-13.

109. Metrinko, “The American Military Advisor,” 8.

110. Schear, Caldwell, and DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity 

for an Enduring Security Force,” 137.

111. Gerspacher and Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA,” 81.

112. John Nagl and Brian Drohan, “New Answers to Hard Questions,” Armed Forces 

Journal, 1 April 2008, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/new-answersto-hard-questions/.

113. Gerspacher and Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA,” 81.

114. Ibid.

115. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges,” 7.

116. James B. Linder, Eric J. Wesley, and Elliot S. Grant, “A New Breed of Advisory 

Team,” Army, July 2017, 42¬–46.
85

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

117. Nagl and Drohan, “New Answers to Hard Questions.”

118. Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual (MacDill AFB, Florida: JSOU Press, 2013), I-50.

119. Schear, Caldwell, and DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity 

for an Enduring Security Force,” 138.

120. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges.”

121. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, 98–99.

122. Ibid., 95.

123. Potter, American Advisors, 95.

124. Nagl and Drohan, “New Answers to Hard Questions.”

125. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges,” 3. Mark Moyar and 

Joint Special Operations University (U.S.), Village Stability Operations and the 

Afghan Local Police, 2014, 1-2, http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/

JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf.

126. “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: A Case Study” (Suffolk, 

VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 13 February 2012), 2.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid., 1–2.

129. Ibid., 2.

130. Ibid., 4–5.

131. Moyar and Joint Special Operations University (U.S.), Village Stability Operations 

and the Afghan Local Police, 12, 69.

132. Ibid., 85.

133. Ibid., 1–2.

134. Ibid., 78.

135. Ibid., 84.

136. Todd C. Helmus, “Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special 

Operations Advisory Experience in Afghanistan” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, n.d.), vii-ix, 1-25.

137. Ibid.

138. “Q&A: Brigadier General Darsie Rogers, Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq,” Special Warfare, March 2012, 9.

139. Glenn D. Furbish et al., “Iraqi Security Forces: Special Operations Force Program 

Is Achieving Goals, but Iraqi Support Remains Critical to Success” (Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 25 October 2010), 1, http://oai.dtic.mil/

oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA545722.
86

JSOU Report 18-1

140. Michael O’Brien, “Foreign Internal Defense in Iraq: ARSOF Core Tasks Enable 

Iraqi Combating-Terrorism Capability,” Special Warfare, March 2012, 22.

141. Furbish et al., “Iraqi Security Forces,” 1.

142. David Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service” (Washington, D.C.: Center 

for Middle East Policy at Brookings, March 2015), 10.

143. Ibid., 5–10.

144. Austin Long et al., “Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and 

Beyond: Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia” 

(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2015), 48–49.

145. Furbish et al., “Iraqi Security Forces,” 18.

146. Long et al., “Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: 

Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia,” 57.

147. Ibid., 53.

148. Ibid., 51.

149. Furbish et al., “Iraqi Security Forces,” 5.

150. O’Brien, “Foreign Internal Defense in Iraq: ARSOF Core Tasks Enable Iraqi 

Combating-Terrorism Capability,” 26.

151. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” 11.

152. “Learning from Iraq” (Arlington, Virginia: Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction, March 2013), 98.

153. Furbish et al., “Iraqi Security Forces,” 18.

154. “Q&A: Brigadier General Darsie Rogers, Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq,” 9.

155 Ibid., 10.

156. Kevin Wells, “Eight Years of Combat FID: A Retrospective on SF in Iraq,” Special 

Warfare, March 2012, 16.

157. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service,” 35.

158. Ibid., 38–40.

159. Loveday Morris, “The Force Leading the Iraq Army’s Fight Against ISIS Went 

from ‘Dirty Division’ to Golden Boys,” Washington Post, 26 July 2016.

160. Ibid.

161. Richard Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and 

the Way Forward,” Special Warfare, March 2014, 48.

162. Ibid.

163. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges.”
87

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

164. Stuart Farris, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines” (School of 

Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

2009), 31.

165. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges.”

166. Ibid.

167. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 48.

168. Ibid.

169. Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations 

Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014 (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation, 

2016), 79–80.

170. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 48–49.

171. Farris, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” 35.

172. Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 

2001-2014, xiv.

173. Ibid., 124.

174. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 49.

175. Ibid., 50.

176. Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 

2001-2014, 83–84.

177. Ibid., 85.

178. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 50.

179. Ibid., 50–51.

180. Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 

2001-2014, 105.

181. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 50.

182. Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 

2001-2014, 93–94.

183. Ibid., 82.

184. Ibid., 84–94.

185. Ibid., 130–31.

186. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges.”
88

JSOU Report 18-1

187. Oakley, “Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way 

Forward,” 49.

188. Mark Moyar et al., Persistent Engagement in Colombia, 2014, 46, https://jsou.

libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=3575815; Robert D. Ramsey, From El Billar 

to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-

2008, Occasional Paper 34 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2006), 107–15.

189. Moyar et al, Persistent Engagement in Colombia, 31–34.

190. Ramsey, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, 114-115; Anthony Heisler, 

“By, With, and Through: The Theory and Practice of Special Operations CapacityBuilding” (Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 96–97.

191. Moyar et al., Persistent Engagement in Colombia, 31–40; Heisler, “By, With, and 

Through: The Theory and Practice of Special Operations Capacity-Building,” 96.

192. Sheehan, “Statement for the Record by the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 

on Building Partner Capacity for 21st Century Challenges,” 8.

193. Long et al., “Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: 

Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia,” 72.

194. Moyar et al., Persistent Engagement in Colombia, 51.

195. Ibid., 53.

196. Michael G. Brooks, ed., US Army Advisors in Afghanistan, vol. III, Eyewitness 

to War Oral History Series (Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2010), 48–51.

197. Ibid., III: 90–98.

198. Schear, Caldwell, and DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity 

for an Enduring Security Force,” 139.

199. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, “Innovative Transformation: An Evaluation of 

the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, February 2012), 7–8.

200. Schear, Caldwell, and DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity 

for an Enduring Security Force,” 139.

201. Brooks, US Army Advisors in Afghanistan, III: 48–51.

202. Ibid., III: 98.

203. Ibid., III: 48–51.

204. Gerspacher and Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA,” 82.

205. Ibid., 77.

206. Ibid.

207. Wells, “Eight Years of Combat FID: A Retrospective on SF in Iraq,” 16.

208. Helmus, “Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations 

Advisory Experience in Afghanistan,” 36.
89

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

209. Ibid.

210. Linder, Wesley, and Grant, “A New Breed of Advisory Team,” 45–46; C. Todd Lopes, 

“Security Force Assistance Brigades to Free Brigade Combat Teams from Advise, 

Assist Mission,” Around the Command, TRADOC blog, 19 May 2017, accessed 

August 15, 2017, http://tradocnews.org/tag/security-force-assistance-brigade/.

211. Air Advisor Education and Training, Air Force Instruction 10-4201, Vol. 1 (Joint 

Base Anacostia-Bolling, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 25 June 2015), 14–15.

212. Ibid., 14–22.

213. William Rosenau et al., “United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, 

and Future” (Arlington, Virginia: CNA, August 2013), 78.

214. Ibid., 79.

215. Ibid.

216. “Media Advisory #14-010: Advisor Training Group Deactivation” (Marine Corps 

Air Ground Combat Center, 11 June 2014).

217. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources,” accessed 19 December 

2016, http://www.mcscg.marines.mil.

218. Rosenau et al., “United States Marine Corps Advisors: Past, Present, and Future,” 

78.

219. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources.”

220. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources - Basic Engagement 

Skills Course,” accessed 19 December 2016, http://www.mcscg.marines.mil.

221. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources - Security Cooperation 

Trainer Course,” accessed 19 December 2016, http://www.mcscg.marines.mil/

Portals/54/SCT/SC%20Trainer%20Quicklook%20Sept%2016.pdf.

222. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources - Marine Advisor Course,” 

accessed 19 December 2016, http://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/

1184808/spmagtf-sc-marines-complete-marine-advisor-course/.

223. Gunnar Spafford, “Foreign Security Force Advisor Training, Doctrine, and 

Manning for 2015 and Beyond” (Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 59–62.

224. “Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group: Resources.”

225. Helmus, “Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations 

Advisory Experience in Afghanistan,” 38–40.

226. Ibid., 35–41.

227. Dave Clifton, “Ministry of Defense Advisors Training” (Briefing Slides, Camp 

Atterbury, Indiana, May 10, 2010), 8.

228. Schear, Caldwell, and DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity 

for an Enduring Security Force,” 135–44.

229. Stattel and Perito, “Innovative Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan,” 9–10.

230. Gerspacher and Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA,” 83.
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231. Nadia Gerspacher, “Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions,” Special 

Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S Institute of Peace, August 2012), https://www.

usip.org/publications/2012/07/preparing-advisers-capacity-building-missions.

232. Gerspacher and Shtuni, “Lessons from MoDA,” 85.

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid.

235. Gerspacher, “Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions,” 8–9.

236. Ibid., 9.

237. Ibid., 10.

238. “Operational Guidance Note: The Security and Justice Sector Reform Adviser” 

(International Security Sector Advisory Team, Geneva Centre for the Democratic 

Control of Armed Forces, November 2010), 10.

239. Metrinko, “The American Military Advisor,” 76–80.

240. Melissa McAdam, “Military Advising After Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Gazette

98, no. 8 (August 2014): 56.

241. Ibid., 57–58.

242. Andi O’Conor et al., “Cross-Cultural Strategies for Improving the Teaching, 

Training, and Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors,” Technical 

Report (Arlington, Virginia: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 

and Social Sciences, April 2010), vi, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord

&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA507715.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid.

245. Raymond A. Millen, “Professionalizing Ministerial Advising,” PKSOI Paper 

(Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 3 June 2015), 10.

246. Ibid., 13-14.

247. Ibid., 14.

248. Ibid., 12-13.

249. Ibid., 11-17.

250. “Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations” (Suffolk, VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division, Joint 

Staff J7, 15 June 2012), 34.

251. Millen, “Professionalizing Ministerial Advising,” 11–18.

252. Ramsey, Advising Indigenous Forces, 40–42.

253. “Ministry of Defense Advisors Program: Introduction,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 

accessed 19 December 2016, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ministry-defenseadvisors.

254. Long et al., “Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond: 

Challenges and Best Practices from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Colombia,” 56, 92.
91

White: Expanding the Spectrum of SOF Advisory Capabilities

255. Millen, “Professionalizing Ministerial Advising,” 12–13.

256. Ibid., 11–17.

257. Christopher Paul, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts, Research Report, RR-937-OSD (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 

2015), xii-15.

258. Eric Schmitt, “Using Special Forces Against Terrorism, Trump Seeks to Avoid 

Big Ground Wars,” The New York Times, 19 March 2017; Aric Jenkins, “Read 

President Trump’s Speech Claiming the Press Doesn’t Report Terror Attacks,” 

Time, 6 February 2017, http://time.com/4661658/donald-trump-terror-attacksspeech-macdill-air-force-base/; Sean D. Naylor, “Will Trump Break the Special 

Forces?” The Atlantic, 7 December 2016.

259. James Mattis, “The Enemy Is Not Waiting,” Hoover Digest, Winter 2015, 31–32.

260. Ibid., 34.

261. Greg Grant, “Grunts to Rebuild Like SOF, Move Away from Bases: Mattis.”