Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado,

15 December 1917. He took flying training at

Mather Field, California, getting his commission

and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned to

the United States in February 1925 to Langley

Field, Virginia, with a subsequent assignment

in December 1928 to attend the Air Corps

Tactical School. Retained on the faculty as a

bombardment instructor, Walker became the

epitome of the strategic thinkers at the school

and coined the revolutionary airpower “creed of

the bomber.” “A well-planned, well-organized

and well-flown air force attack will constitute

an offensive that cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field,

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United

States in January 1941, as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief

of the Air Corps in Washington, DC.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel July 1941 and colonel in March 1942, it

was during this time in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff that he coauthored the air campaign strategy, Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, deploying, and employing

the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan should the United States

become embroiled in war. It was a monumental achievement, completed in

less than one month and just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and the

United States was, in fact, at war. Walker is credited with being one of the

men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen

George Kenney as commander of the Fifth Air Force Bomber Command. In

this capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning first-hand about combat conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when

opposed by enemy fighter planes and by antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action 5 January 1943 while leading a

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater.

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads “In the face

of extremely heavy antiaircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine

enemy vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced

down by the attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving

personal valor and intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.”

The Walker Papers
After you have read this research report, please

give us your frank opinion on the contents. All

comments––large or small, complimentary or

caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them

to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6428.

Thank you for your assistance.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cut along dotted line

Developing Doctrine for the

Future Joint Force

Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams

Brown
AIR FORCE FELLOWS

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Developing Doctrine

for the Future Joint Force

Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams

CHARLES Q. BROWN JR.

Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 3

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

September 2005
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Brown, Charles Q.

Developing doctrine for the future joint force : creating synergy and minimizing

seams / Charles Q. Brown, Jr.

p. ; cm. –– (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 3)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-147-3

1. Military doctrine—United States. 2. Unified operations (Military science).

3. Command and control systems. I. Title. II. Series.

355.46––dc22

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available

electronically at the Air University Research Web site

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security policy

and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, these programs were accorded senior service school professional military

education in-residence credit. In 2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force development

credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military

ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key

DOD and Air Force issues. SDE-level fellows perform outreach

by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. SDElevel fellows are expected to provide advice, promote, and explain

Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military doctrine

strategy to nationally recognized scholars, foreign dignitaries,

and leading policy analysts. The AF Fellows also gain valuable

perspectives from the exchange of ideas with these civilian

leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected to apprise appropriate

Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging

views on defense and economic and foreign policy issues within

their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access

she or he has as grounds for research and writing on important national security issues. The SDE AF Fellows includes the

National Defense Fellows, the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows.

In addition, the Air Force Fellows supports a post-SDE military

fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

On the intermediate developmental education level, the

chief of staff approved several AF Fellowships focused on career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legislative

Fellows was established in April 1995 with the Foreign Policy

iii

Air Force Fellows
Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Fellowship coming under the AF Fellows program in 2003. In

2004, the AF Fellows also assumed responsibility of the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

iv
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2 FRAMEWORK FOR INTRODUCING FUTURE 

JOINT DOCTRINE CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3 SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING

RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVES AND

EMERGING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERDICTION 

AND MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6 JOINT FIRES CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

7 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES . . . 53

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

8 CREATING SYNERGY AND 

MINIMIZING SEAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

v
Appendix Page

A CURRENT DOCTRINE: 

SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING

RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

B CURRENT DOCTRINE: 

ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

C CURRENT DOCTRINE:

SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERDICTION

AND MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

D CURRENT DOCTRINE:

JOINT FIRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

E CURRENT DOCTRINE:

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Illustrations

Figure

1 Command and control tenet/focus

area relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Operation Iraqi Freedom joint fires

support network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3 Joint fires support command and control . . . . . 46

4 Integrated joint fires and maneuver 

command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5 Operation Enduring Freedom command

and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

6 Kill box grid square . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

vi
vii

Figure Page

7 FSCL placement in nonlinear and 

noncontiguous operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

8 FSCMs in nonlinear and noncontiguous

operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

9 Forward trace fire support coordination line . . . 62

10 Notional AETF structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

11 Future force levels of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

12 Area of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

13 Theater Air Ground System coordination

links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

14 Component air command and control

agencies for close air support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Table

Potential synergies and seams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Foreword

Doctrine governing the integration of air and ground operations has been a hotly contested area since World War I. Historically, the services have developed and published their doctrine separately, often causing seams in thought and execution.

Although joint doctrine exists for today’s joint force, its development followed the same historical pattern—taking service doctrines and “melding” into joint doctrine. This construct for developing joint doctrine has its shortcomings, which are most

often manifested where we least likely want to see them—on the

battlefield.

In many circles, recent contingency operations have been

deemed successful. However, the successes have been more

reliant on the innovation and tenacity of our warriors than

forward-thinking joint doctrine, illustrating that today’s “melded”

joint doctrine is fraught with issues that negatively impact combat effectiveness. Without change, issues related to support relationships, command and control, planning and execution

tools, and coordination measures will constrain potential synergies in future joint operations, particularly in the area of airground integration. The publication of the Joint Operations Concept, representing the willingness to reconsider in toto the way

we will wage warfare in the future, suggests that the time is right

to also address future joint doctrine for air-ground integration.

In this award-winning study on Developing Doctrine for the Future Joint Force: Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams, Colonel

Charles Q. Brown Jr. argues that recent operations have highlighted seams and shortfalls in joint doctrine that need to be addressed in the shaping of a more effective future joint force. The

Joint Operations Concept describes the key attributes required to

operate and achieve full spectrum dominance within the next

15–20 years. Using the current doctrine command and control

tenets and Joint Operations Concept attributes as a framework,

Colonel Brown develops the foundation of air-ground doctrine

for the future joint force. Using case studies from recent contingencies to illustrate gaps in current doctrine, he proposes doctrinal concepts via five air-ground integration focus areas:

supporting/supported relationships, establishing directives and

ix
emerging concepts, synchronization of interdiction and maneuver, joint fires concepts, and fire support coordination measures.

To achieve the vision outlined in the Joint Operations Concept,

Colonel Brown proposes support relationships be defined not by

doctrine, but by the joint force commander based on his operational objectives. Joint force commanders would then articulate

intent, relationships, and objectives through his proposed establishing directive guidance, which communicates to a joint crossfunctional audience. Colonel Brown also proposes a responsive

and interoperable joint organizational construct capable of integrating the effects created by fire and maneuver. He completes

his proposals by recommending a standardized coordinationmeasure construct to allow timely decision making and execution in future joint operations.

Colonel Brown concludes his study by using the proposed

doctrine concepts to conduct a top-level review of the Air Force

Transformation Flight Plan and Army Transformation Roadmap.

He deftly uses the doctrine concepts to bring to light ways to enhance synergies and minimize seams between the services in

future joint operations.

Originally submitted as a thesis for Air University’s Air Force

Fellows Program, Developing Doctrine for the Future Joint Force:

Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams was selected as one of

three inaugural 2004 Brig Gen Kenneth N. Walker Series Award

winners for best papers submitted by an Air Force Fellow.

Developing Doctrine for the Future Joint Force: Creating Synergy

and Minimizing Seams is a thought-provoking study that can ensure we are on the correct path to achieving the vision for future

joint operations. I commend this exceptional work to any joint

war fighter that has a role in the shaping of future joint doctrine. 

DR. MICHAEL FISCHERKELLER

Research Staff Member

Strategy, Forces and Resources Division

Institute for Defense Analyses

x
Col Charles Q. Brown Jr. (BS, Texas Tech University; MAS,

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) is commandant, US Air

Force Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nevada.

After being recognized as a distinguished graduate of Air Force

Reserve Officer Training Corps, Colonel Brown earned his pilot

wings at Williams AFB, Arizona, followed by an assignment in

the F-16 to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea. During his next assignment to the 31st Tactical

Fighter Wing, Homestead AFB, Florida, Colonel Brown served

as instructor pilot and air-to-ground weapons officer, wing

electronic combat pilot, and wing standardization and evaluation

flight examiner. He then graduated from the Fighter Weapons Instructor Course (FWIC) and returned to Homestead serving as

weapons officer and flight commander. Colonel Brown was selected to return to FWIC as an instructor in the F-16 Division

serving as programmer, standardization and evaluation flight

examiner, and Weapons/Surface Attack Tactics phase manager.

He subsequently served in staff tours as Aide-de-Camp to the

Chief of Staff of the Air Force and air operations officer, US Central Command. Colonel Brown returned to the F-16 at Shaw

AFB, South Carolina, serving in several squadron and wing

leadership positions to include expeditionary fighter squadron

commander for Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch

deployments. He completed his assignment to Shaw as commander, 78th Fighter Squadron. Colonel Brown then served as a

xi

About the

Author

Col Charles Q. Brown Jr.
National Defense Fellow (Air Force Fellowship, Senior Developmental Education) at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Prior to his current assignment, Colonel Brown

was the deputy chief, Program Integration Division, Directorate

of Programs, Headquarters, US Air Force, Washington, D.C.

Colonel Brown is a command pilot with over 2,400 hours of

flight time and is a graduate of USAF Fighter Weapons School,

Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College (distinguished graduate), Armed Forces Staff College, Air War College,

and National Defense Fellow. He and his wife, Sharene, have two

sons, Sean and Ross.

xii
Preface

I chose to research air-ground integration doctrine for several

reasons. First, I wanted to research a somewhat familiar and relevant topic from which I could learn something new. Second, my

goal in competing for an Air Force Fellowship and eventually selecting this topic was to conduct research, not just to fulfill a

graduation requirement. Instead, I wanted to research issues

and generate results that might impact future decisions. I realize in taking on this topic that air-ground integration and joint

fires have been debated over many years without much resolution. I also recognize that the ideas I propose are not the panacea

for these contentious issues. My measure of success in this

paper is not the reader’s agreement with the ideas and thoughts

I present. More so, I base the success of this research paper on

its ability to generate discussion that forces the changes required

to create synergy and minimize seams in air-ground integration.

Many thanks to Linda McCabe of Headquarters, Air Force

Concept Development and Strategy Division who was instrumental in the initial stages of establishing my research topic.

I sincerely appreciate the enthusiastic support the Institute for

Defense Analyses (IDA) displays towards Air Force Fellows.

Thanks to division director Michael Leonard and the entire

Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division for creating an exceptional atmosphere for this unique education experience. I

am extremely grateful for the endless sound advice and insight

from my advisor, Dr. Michael Fischerkeller and reviewer, Dr.

Glenn Gotz. The hours I spent talking with them over the course

of this research has been truly enlightening. Additionally, the

opportunity to interact with the attendees of the Air Force–Army

Transformation Symposium hosted by Dr. Fischerkeller proved

to be an outstanding research resource. Thanks to the IDA

staff members who graciously assisted my research efforts in

one way or another, specifically Maj Gen Waldo Freeman, USA,

retired; Col Karl Lowe, USA, retired; Dr. Kent Carson; John

Tillson; Larry Morton; Mark Lewis; and Shelley Smith. Finally,

thanks to my good friend Lt Col Jack Forsythe. He served as

an excellent sounding board not just for this paper, but also

throughout our Air Force careers.

xiii
Most important, I wish to thank my wife, Sharene, and sons,

Sean and Ross. Without fail, they have supported my every effort

during my Air Force career to include this year of research. I

am forever indebted to them for their years of sacrifice and

never ending support.

CHARLES Q. BROWN JR.

Colonel, USAF

xiv
Abstract

The Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC) describes how the future

joint force intends to operate within the next 15–20 years and the

key attributes required for full spectrum dominance—a force

that is fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized,

adaptable, decision superior, and lethal. Recent contingencies

displayed rapidly executable, globally and operationally distributed, simultaneous, and sequential operations characteristic

of the future joint force. Despite the success of these operations,

they highlighted seams and shortfalls in current joint doctrine. For the future joint force to fully realize the synergies of

air-ground integration, joint doctrine should evolve in several

key areas.

This paper addresses five focus areas related to future joint

air-ground integration: supporting/supported relationships, establishing directives and emerging concepts, synchronization of

interdiction and maneuver, joint fires concepts, and fire support

coordination measures. Using the joint doctrine command and

control tenets and JOpsC as a framework, this paper proposes

doctrine concepts for the future joint force. By its completion,

this paper introduces new command and control relationships

and processes, joint organizational structures, and joint fires

concepts. The proposed doctrine concepts offer a framework to

analyze the desired future capabilities of the Air Force and Army.

The analysis concludes by recommending several avenues to

create synergy and minimize seams in future joint operations.

xv

Executive Summary

Despite their successes, the most recent joint operations highlighted seams in joint doctrine, particularly in the area of airground integration. These seams can be categorized into five

focus areas—supported/supporting relationships, establishing

directives and emerging concepts, synchronization of interdiction and maneuver, joint fires, and fire support coordination

measures. The focus areas highlight the following overarching

issues in existing joint doctrine that require attention in shaping doctrine for the future joint force:

• Predetermined support relationships based on areas of

operations and doctrinal missions inhibit agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations.

• Shortfalls exist in articulating to a joint cross-functional

audience authorities, roles, and responsibilities that can

adapt in dynamic situations.

• Planning and execution mind-sets and processes are not

conducive to integrated operations.

• Command and control of joint fires is disparate and

stovepiped along service and component lines.

• Coordination measures lack flexibility and responsiveness

to support rapidly executed, dispersed operations.

Proposed Doctrine Concepts

Grounded in current doctrine, several new doctrine concepts

facilitate achieving the Joint Operations Concept vision. The area

of operation and doctrinal mission construct for declaring support relationships must change to one determined by a joint

force commander based on his operational objectives.

The future joint force will come closer to full integration and

adaptability during dynamic joint operations by expanding the

guidance for establishing directive format and content. To integrate, vice synchronize, interdiction and maneuver, a new joint

organization capable of integrating effects via prioritized effects

lists and effects tasking orders is essential to the future joint

force. Command and control of integrated joint fires and maneuver requires responsive, interoperable joint organizations

xvii
at all levels. Adopting component coordination elements, joint

tactical action support centers, and joint fire control teams into

joint doctrine is a means to achieve this goal. Timely decision

making and execution in future joint operations make a joint

three-dimensional common grid reference standard to facilitate

rapid development of real-time digital coordination measures

an imperative. The combination of these proposals provides

the future joint force with a robust menu of responsive, interoperable, and joint integration tools resulting in synergistic

and seamless air-ground operations. 

Recommendations to Create

Synergy and Minimize Seams

The proposed doctrine concepts offer a framework to conduct

a top-level review of the Air Force and Army future organizational

constructs, transformational capabilities, and interdependencies. The doctrine concepts highlight air-ground integration

synergies and seams and how they might be enhanced or minimized, respectively.

Joint force commanders require capabilities-based trade-off

models to rapidly assemble and adjust joint capabilities to the

most appropriate mix that can achieve the desired operational

objective. Once the required capabilities have been identified,

execution of future joint operations will depend upon seamless

integration of command and control organizations. Seamless

command and control demands development of minimum essential joint communications and information systems lists.

Additionally, the component coordination element concept

should expand to all components. In expanding this concept,

the services must develop the manning requirements for their

coordination elements—activation only during contingencies,

fully manned and functional at all times, or somewhere in between. Maximizing future joint force synergy entails adopting

and digitizing establishing directives, prioritized effects lists,

and effects tasking orders to allow rapid dissemination of mission, intent, and prioritized effects. Not only should control

systems for integrating joint fires be developed, but also the

same should be done for integrating joint maneuver. Once these

xviii
systems are developed, air-ground integration during rapidly

executed, dispersed operations will depend upon adopting responsive, digital, and doctrinally based fire support coordination measure concepts.

The Joint Operations Concept vision is achievable, but not

without changes to existing doctrine. The proposed concepts

do not represent “the approved solution” but are instead offered

as tools to stimulate discussion and generate the changes required to create synergy and minimize seams in future joint

operations.

xix
Chapter 1

Introduction

Transformation is hard, mental work. It has to have an intellectual element. What happens between the ears of the

warfighter, and those who support the warfighter, is more

important in my view than the technology. Innovative ideas

don’t have to involve revolutionary new things or new technology.

—Gen Richard B. Myers,

Speech to 34th Institute for Foreign

Policy Analysis Fletcher Conference,

3 December 2003

Recent operations demonstrated characteristics that war

fighters expect to be the norms in joint operations within the

next 15–20 years. Operations will be rapidly executable, globally and operationally distributed, simultaneous, and sequential.1 Commenting on military operations in southwest Asia,

Gen Tommy R. Franks, former commander, US Central Command, noted, “Joint force synergy was taken to new levels of

sophistication.”2 He stated that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

was the first time that joint forces were able to achieve their

operational objectives by “the integration of forces rather than

deconfliction of forces.”3 Despite the obvious success, seams

in joint doctrine detracted from joint forces reaching the full

integration expected in the future joint force.

One might argue about which aspect of integration is most

important, but few can disagree that air-ground integration

has historically generated the most debate. The topic has been

contentious since America’s first air-land battle at Vaux, France,

in 1918 where the US Army was challenged with the nuances

of command relationships between the pursuit and observation groups and the corps and armies they supported.4 The

contention will likely continue unless planners develop, discuss, and agree upon new doctrine concepts during the shaping of the future joint force. Disparate and stovepiped mindsets and processes in current joint doctrine are not conducive

1
to integrated air-ground operations due to their lack of flexibility and responsiveness. To address these air-ground integration issues, this paper proposes new doctrine concepts in

five focus areas: supported/supporting relationships, establishing directives and emerging concepts, synchronization of

interdiction and maneuver, joint fires concepts, and fire support coordination measures (FSCM).

Chapter 2 identifies the desired core capabilities and attributes of the future joint force as outlined in the Joint Operations

Concept (JOpsC). Enumerating these capabilities and attributes establishes the framework for the doctrine proposals that

subsequent chapters develop. Chapters 3 through 7 propose

future joint doctrine concepts that are grounded in the current

doctrine command and control tenets. To set the stage for the

doctrine proposals, each chapter identifies several current

doctrine issues that, if not addressed, inhibit future joint force

integration. Examples from recent joint operations that illustrate the current doctrine shortfalls follow. The proposals in

each chapter advocate changing joint doctrine concepts, definitions, and organizational constructs as well as mind-sets to

facilitate reaching JOpsC vision of full integration. Chapter 8

uses the proposed joint doctrine concepts to frame an analysis of future Air Force and Army capabilities applicable to airground integration. The paper concludes by recommending

ways to create synergy and minimize seams.

Notes

1. Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Operations Concept (Washington,

D.C.: Director of Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff

J-7, November 2003), 9.

2. Senate, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander US

Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong.,

1st sess., 9 July 2003, 5, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/

July/Franks.pdf.

3. Ibid.

4. Dr. Bert Frandsen, “America’s First Air-Land Battle,” Air and Space

Power Journal 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 35, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.

mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/win03/win03.html. This article describes the

successful air-land battle at Vaux, France, on 1 July 1918. Although a success,

the battle was not without problems. The execution plan changed after the operation began, and command relationships were not well understood. Three difWALKER PAPER

2
ferent commanders—the French Sixth Army, and two American headquarters—thought they commanded the airpower generated by the 1st Pursuit

Group.

BROWN

3
Chapter 2

Framework for Introducing

Future Joint Doctrine Concepts

A concept is a notion or statement of an idea—an expression

of how something might be done.

—CJCSI 3010.02A

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan

Increasing political, economic, ethnic, and religious divisions;

the diffusion of power among hostile state and nonstate actors;

population growth and a scarcity of natural resources; and the

proliferation of dangerous technologies and weaponry are dramatically increasing the range of threats to the US homeland

and the nation’s global interests.1 Considering the potential

range of future adversaries and conflicts, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 directed a movement away from a

threat-based approach for defense to one that is capabilitiesbased.2 Following this guidance, the Joint Operations Concept

articulates an overarching idea to guide the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).3

The JOpsC identifies eight core capabilities, which are generally required to execute joint operations across a wide spectrum

of threats and scenarios. These eight capabilities allow the future

joint force to achieve full spectrum dominance focusing more on

how the United States can defeat a broad array of adversary

capabilities rather than who the adversaries are and how they

might individually engage US national security interests.4 The

JOpsC core capabilities are to

• achieve common understanding of all dimensions of the

battlespace throughout the joint force;

• make joint decisions and take action throughout the joint

force faster than the opponent;

• adapt in scope, scale, and method as the situation requires;

5
• rapidly deploy selected portions of the joint force that can

immediately transition to execution, even in absence of developed infrastructure;

• create and sustain continuous pressure throughout the

battlespace for as little or as long as it takes to accomplish

strategic or operational aims;

• disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy any opponent

with a combination of lethal and nonlethal means; 

• conduct deployment and sustainment activities in support of multiple simultaneous, distributed, decentralized

battles and campaigns; and

• accomplish all of the above in an interagency and multinational context.5

To attain these core capabilities, joint forces will require a joint

and expeditionary mind-set with greater levels of versatility.

The JOpsC outlines seven required attributes to achieve this

goal. The future joint force must be

• fully integrated—able to move beyond deconfliction to fully

integrated elements with all functions and capabilities focused toward a unified purpose;

• expeditionary—rapidly deployable, employable, and sustainable throughout the global battlespace regardless of

antiaccess or area-denial environments and independent

of existing infrastructure;

• networked—linked and synchronized in time and purpose;

• decentralized—capable of leveraging the power of integrated

joint capabilities while operating in a joint manner at lower

echelons;

• adaptable—prepared to quickly respond to any contingency

with the appropriate capabilities mix;

• decision superior—able to make better informed decisions

and implement them faster than an adversary can react,

or in a noncombat situation, at a tempo that allows the force

to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish

its mission; and

• lethal—ready with increased and refined joint force capabilities to destroy an adversary and/or his systems in all

conditions and environments.6

WALKER PAPER

6
The combination of these core capabilities and attributes ensure future joint force commanders (JFC) achieve full spectrum

dominance during any contingency.7 Considering these capabilities and attributes, the entire DOTMLPF continuum requires

review, debate, and change as required. This paper limits its

focus to doctrine, recognizing that as the challenges of the future

evolve, joint doctrine must also evolve to keep pace and drive

advancements in the other elements of the continuum.

Joint doctrine promotes a common perspective from which

to plan, train, and conduct military operations.8 Exercising

authority and direction over this common perspective is rooted

in command and control. In simple terms, joint doctrine outlines command and control concepts for the planning, training,

and conducting of military operations. With these thoughts in

mind, the command and control tenets listed in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), serve as the

framework for developing doctrine concepts that achieve the

JOpsC vision. They are

• clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships;

• information management;

• implicit communication;

• timely decision making;

• robust integration, synchronization, and coordination

mechanisms;

• battle rhythm discipline;

• responsive, interoperable support systems;

• situational awareness; and

• mutual trust.9

Adhering to the command and control tenets during doctrine

development ensures any proposed concepts facilitate a commander’s ability to exercise his authority and successfully direct during joint operations. In this paper’s development of new

doctrine concepts, the five focus areas are linked to the command and control tenets to ensure the concepts maintain relevance to those aspects of joint doctrine that are not likely to

change (fig. 1). The next five chapters detail these relationships and introduce new joint doctrine concepts.

BROWN

7
Notes

1. Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution

in the 21st Century White Paper (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, J7, 28 January 2003), 2.

2. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Secretary of Defense, 2001), 13–14.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3010.02A,

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP), 2001, in Joint Operations

Concept, 3 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

4. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 8 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

5. Ibid., 10–14.

6. Ibid., 14–17.

7. Ibid., 8. Full spectrum dominance is the defeat of any adversary or

control of any situation across the full range of military operations. Full

spectrum dominance is based on the ability to sense, understand, decide,

and act faster than any adversary in any situation. These actions are preceded by decisions that are led by better understanding of the battlespace. 

WALKER PAPER

8

Robust Integration Synchronization, ire Support Coordination Measures

nd Coordination M echanisms

Timely Decision Making

Responsive nteroperable Support oin ires Concepts

Systems

Synchronization o Interdiction and 

Maneuver

Robust Integration Synchronization, 

nd Coordination M echanisms

mplicit Communication stablishing Directives

Clearly Defined Authorities, Roles, Supported/Supporting Relationships

nd Relationships

TENET FOCUS AREA

Command and Control Tenet/ 

Focus Area Relationship s Area Relationship

Figure 1. Command and control tenet/focus area relationship
8. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United

States, 14 November 2000, I-8.

9. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July

2001, III-14–16.

BROWN

9
Chapter 3

Supported/Supporting Relationships

There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a onehanded puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to

shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire. . . . That

is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first

with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the

clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of

a lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music,

each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in

battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins.

You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to

signal you. . . . You must each of your own volition see to it

that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the

proper time.

—Gen George S. Patton Jr.,

8 July 1941, address to the men

of the 2nd Armored Division

The JOpsC describes the future joint force achieving a common understanding, making decisions, and taking joint action

faster than its opponent.1 (For more detailed background on current supported/supporting relationship doctrine, reference appendix A.)

To do so during distributed operations, adhering to the command and control tenet of clearly defined authorities, roles,

and relationships is an imperative. By the same token, adaptability is a required attribute of the future joint force that will ensure unity of effort during joint air-ground operations. Unfortunately, current joint doctrine and definitions have implied and

encouraged a mind-set of associating support relationships with

areas of operations and doctrinal missions, thereby inhibiting

adaptability. Achieving the goals of clearly defined authorities,

roles, relationships, and adaptability requires changes to the

following two current doctrine concepts:

• areas of operations exclusive to land and maritime commanders; as such, land and maritime commanders are

11
declared supported commanders within their area of operations;

• the designation of the air component commander as the

supported commander for certain theaterwide missions.

While perhaps appropriate in the past, support relationships

must not be predetermined in doctrine by virtue of an area of

operations or doctrinal mission. Instead, joint doctrine must

provide a joint force commander (JFC) the flexibility to assign

support relationships to best achieve his objectives. Toward

this end, this chapter proposes changing the area of operations

and mission association construct for support relationships.

Demonstrated Gaps in Support Relationships

As one looks at the last three major combat operations, the

declaration made in current joint doctrine that a land or maritime area of operations would be designated with associated

supported/supporting relationships may no longer hold true.

The air war over Kosovo did not have a land component or a

land area of operations. By default, the air component became

the supported commander in the area of operations. The early

phases of the Afghanistan campaign provide other examples of

where clearly defined supported/supporting relationships consistent with doctrine were not established.2 Although the special operations component commander eventually became the

supported commander, one might argue whether that was the

right choice considering the operational objective and mission

execution. After striking many of the fixed targets, the focus

switched to striking an elusive target set—Taliban and al Qaeda

operatives. Due to the burdensome approval process, opportunities to attack fleeting leadership targets of opportunity were

missed.3 The approval process challenges were likely the result

of a combination of factors: there was no land component or its

habitually associated tactical air control system, the process for

finding and engaging time-sensitive targets was not in place,

and the operation employed a complicated command and control structure.4

As a result of the lessons learned in Afghanistan, war fighters

used a new approach for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Due

WALKER PAPER

12
to concerns about possible Scud attacks on Iraq’s western

neighbors, the air component was the supported commander

in the western area of operations to enable it to execute timesensitive targeting against fleeting targets.5 To achieve his objectives, the JFC used his authority to designate the mission

responsibility, area of operations, and support relationships to

best take advantage of the joint capabilities available. In fact,

OIF had three areas of operations—south, west, and north. The

southern fight was a fast-moving campaign towards Baghdad.6

The western fight focused on logistic nodes, command and control facilities, and the location of Scud launchers.7 The northern

fight consisted of special operations forces, the 173d Airborne

Brigade, and Kurdish forces pressing Baghdad defenses from

the north.8 Each area of operations had a different operational

objective and supported/supporting relationship.

New Approaches for

Designating Support Relationships

In light of the previous discussion, this paper proposes the

following new definition for areas of operations to draw a distinct link to the supported commander and his assigned operational objectives.

Area of operations—an operational area defined by the

joint force commander in which a supported commander

will complete a task or set of tasks to achieve an assigned

operational objective(s).9 Areas of operations do not typically

encompass the entire operational area of the joint force

commander, but may be based on the assigned operational objective(s). In any case, areas of operations should

be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

This proposed definition moves away from the idea that the

area of operations and resultant support relationships are exclusive to surface force commanders to the idea that they

apply to all component commanders. As such, this definition

also follows the precedent established in Joint Publication (JP)

BROWN

13
3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, of not

tying support relationships to specific missions.

Until JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, was published on 23 March 2004, JP 3-30 and the JP

3-05 series, addressing special operations, were the only approved joint publications for component-specific operations.

Prior to March 2004, the lack of approved joint doctrine for

land and maritime operations and predetermined support relationships created a doctrine deficiency worth addressing.

The drafters of JP 3-30 debated whether the joint force air

component commander (JFACC) should be a supported commander. Initial drafts included previously existing language

designating the JFACC as the supported commander for certain

doctrinal missions. The joint community disputed this language,

resulting in the presentation of two options to the service operations deputies for resolution. The first option recommended

maintaining the existing language designating support relationships by mission. The second option recommended listing the

supported missions as JFACC responsibilities and emphasizing

the JFC’s authority to designate supported/supporting relationships.10 As shown below in the excerpt from JP 3-30, the second

option was selected and designated as the model for JP 3-31,

Command and Control of Joint Land Operations and JP 3-32,

Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations.

The JFACC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and

tasks assigned by the JFC. The JFACC typically exercises tactical control over air capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC

may also establish supporting and supported relationships between the

JFACC and other components to facilitate operations. The JFACC conducts joint air operations in accordance with the JFC’s intent and concept of the operation.11 (emphasis added)

The approval of JP 3-30 establishes a construct to give a joint

force commander the flexibility to designate support relationships to best execute his concept of operations. It clarifies the

JFACC’s authority and command relationships and the JFC’s

authority to determine supported/supporting relationships.

JP 3-31 has moved in the right direction, but not as far as

it probably should, particularly when addressing areas of operations. The publication states that the JFC typically defines

areas of operations for the land and maritime component, and

WALKER PAPER

14
the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) will be the

supported commander for operations conducted within the

area of operations when designated by the JFC and may be the

supporting commander for some functions.12 This language

establishes conditions inhibiting vice enhancing the JFC’s authority and flexibility. 

Summary

The current construct of associating support relationships

to areas of operations and doctrinal missions may have worked

well in times when operations were linear with more joint deconfliction than joint integration. As we look towards dispersed,

fully integrated, and adaptable operations of the future, supported/supporting relationships should not be “mentally” constrained to certain components of the joint force based on a

particular mission or area.

This paper advocates a construct where support relationships are not predetermined in doctrine. Rather, a JFC should

have the flexibility to designate support relationships in ways

not previously conceived to more effectively support his concept of operations. Having this flexibility codified in doctrine

ensures the future joint force can adapt in scope, scale, and

method as the situation dictates.13

Notes

1. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 10–11 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

2. Col Mike Findlay, Lt Col Robert Green, and Maj Eric Braganca, “Fires and

Maneuver—Challenges on the Noncontiguous Battlefield,” The Air Land Sea

Bulletin, no. 2003-1 (March 2002): 19–21.

3. Amy Butler, “Moseley: Time Sensitive Targeting Improved from

Afghanistan to Iraq,” Inside Missile Defense, 25 June 2003, n.p., http://

www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask

&docnum = MISSILE-9-13-8.

4. Lt Col Franklin Walden and MSgt Hal Sullivan, “Joint Close Air Support

in Support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM,” 18th

Air Support Operations Group briefing, AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, Re-write

Conference, Langley AFB, Va., 25 June 2003, slide 3.

5. “DOD Briefing on Coalition Forces Air Component,” Inside Defense.

com–Defense Plus, 5 April 2003, n.p., http://www.insidedefense.com/secure

/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask& docnum=dplus2003_978; Butler,

BROWN

15
“Moseley: Time Sensitive Targeting,” n.p.; and Col Jerry Dillion, Chief of SCUD

Strategy, Coalition Air and Space Operations Center, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, interviewed by author, 13 January 2004.

6. “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 23 March 2003,” 23

March 2003, n.p., http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/

transcript_list.htm.

7. Ibid.

8. “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 27 March 2003,” 27

March 2003, n.p., http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/

transcript_list.htm; “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 1 April

2003,” 1 April 2003, n.p., http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/trans

cripts/transcript_list.htm.

9. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, 12 April

2001 (as amended 17 December 2003), 379. Current joint doctrine defines

objective as (1) the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards

which every military operation should be directed; or (2) the specific target

of the action taken (e.g., a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of

which is essential to the commander’s plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features).

10. “Air & Space Doctrine Application Exercise,” briefing, 15 July 2003,

AY 03-04 ISS/SSS Reindoctrination Read Ahead, CD-ROM, Headquarters,

Air Force Doctrine Center, July 2003, slides 193–96.

11. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003,

II-1.

12. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 23 March

2004, II-2 and III-2.

13. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 11 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

WALKER PAPER

16
Chapter 4

Establishing Directives and

Emerging Concepts

It’s all about commander’s intent, to me. Commander’s intent

does not mean that I have to be monitoring every minute. Do I

like to have good situational awareness? Yes, I want the best

technology and the best capability I can get. But there is no

way I think that you can take the place of that timeless commander’s intent.

—Maj Gen James Mattis, USMC

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The command and control tenet implicit communication and

its underlying concepts, commander’s intent and mission-type

orders, are important aspects to defining authorities, roles,

and relationships. An establishing directive is the tool that facilitates communicating authorities, roles, and relationships,

but regrettably, this tool lacks sufficient detail in the following

areas:

• clear guidance on specific format for execution of joint operations;

• ability to communicate authorities, roles, and responsibilities to a joint cross-functional audience; and

• avenues for adapting command relationships during rapidly executed, integrated operations. (For more detailed

background on current command and control doctrine,

reference appendix B.)

Not discounting the goal of implicit communication to minimize restrictive measures and detailed instructions through the

concepts of commander’s intent and mission-type orders, joint

doctrine guidance for establishing directive format and content

should be explicit and contain more detail. This chapter proposes expanding establishing directive guidance and introduces

emerging command and control concepts that may facilitate realizing the JOpsC vision of a fully integrated joint force.

17
Doctrine Disconnects

in Establishing Directives

As the following examples illustrate, failure to clearly communicate command relationships, commander’s intent, and

mission-type orders can impact the execution of joint operations. The command relationships during the initial phases of

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were unclear and not resolved until weeks after the operations in Afghanistan were

under way.1 The lack of clarity and the burdensome target approval process impacted the efficiency of the operation. Designated the supported commander in western Iraq, the air component had difficulty drafting commander’s intent and missiontype orders that were easily understood and executable by the

supporting joint forces.2 Before deploying, elements of the joint

force practiced the time-sensitive targeting mission on the Nellis

ranges for several weeks. Because of these mission rehearsals,

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were written for use

during actual mission execution. In addition to the TTPs, elements of the joint force expected an establishing directive with

commander’s intent and mission-type orders. Unaware of the

expectation, the air component relied on the published TTPs

and never produced an establishing directive.3

In a final example, the JFACC’s nonpublished intent was to

be combat effective versus combat efficient during OIF’s rush

to Baghdad from the south. This drove the use of close air

support stacks to ensure the right mix of effects were available

to support the ground commander 24 hours a day.4 This

sometimes resulted in aircraft returning to base without expending ordnance. Contradictory to the JFACC’s intent, aircrews established artificial fuel limits, which allowed them to

expend ordnance within the Marine Expeditionary Force area

of operations if not used in a timely manner in the V Corps

area of operations.5 This disconnect between the commander’s

intent and mission execution may have been caused by the

lack of a published or clearly delineated commander’s intent

in a daily air tasking order addressing the all-important “why”

element of mission-type orders.6

WALKER PAPER

18
Proposals for Expanding

the Establishing Directive Concept

The definition for command and control that currently exists

in joint doctrine is adequate. However, establishing directive

guidance lacks sufficient detail regarding command and support relationships. This paper proposes several changes to establishing directive guidance that more explicitly communicate authorities, roles, and responsibilities, thereby minimizing

confusion in joint operations. The proposed changes are in

italics for ease of identification.

An establishing directive normally specifies the purpose of

the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope

of the action to be taken. The establishing directive should

be published in the form of a campaign plan, operation

plan, and/or operation order. The published establishing

directive should include sufficient detail to ensure subordinate and supporting commanders understand and can execute the assigned mission. It should also include

• commander’s intent;

• the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting

effort;

• the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;

• mission-type orders for the effort, relative priority of the

supporting effort, and possible command relationship transition points;

• the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to

modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional

opportunity or an emergency; and

• the degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

Unless specifically limited by the establishing directive,

the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction over the supporting effort. General

direction includes the designation and prioritization of

targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.7

BROWN

19
While this proposed establishing directive guidance is similar to the existing guidance, the differences require some explanation. First is the statement, the establishing directive

should be published in the form of a campaign plan, operation

plan, and/or operation order. The reason for the specificity is

that JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, uses the term establishing directive five times, all in the context of command relationships. An establishing directive can come in several different forms and be issued by the secretary of defense or any

level of joint command.

When designating command relationships for joint operations, current joint doctrine states this designation is done with

an establishing directive. However, determining the format or

specific document is not as clear. In the early stages of a strategic event, an establishing directive can be one of several types of

orders (warning, alert, or planning), which will outline command relationships for planning purposes. Determining a campaign plan (or its derivative operation plan and operation order)

using the establishing directive format for execution of joint operations requires a detailed review of JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations, and JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.8

By stating the required establishing directive format for joint operations execution, this proposed change takes the first step in

the future joint force achieving a common understanding when

establishing command and control relationships.

The next recommended change, the published establishing

directive should include sufficient detail to ensure subordinate

and supporting commanders understand and can execute the

assigned mission, addresses the establishing directive format

and content specifically. JP 5-0 series and CJCSM 3122 series

documents provide excellent overarching examples of campaign plan, operations plan, and operation order formats.

However, current joint doctrine fragments the desired full integration of the future joint force.

The approved and draft functional component doctrine publications—air, land, maritime, and special operations—include

discussion and/or examples of their respective operation plan

and operation order formats. However, each focuses on their

respective domain of operations and varies in format and level

WALKER PAPER

20
of detail. They appear to be written more for subordinate commanders within the component than for all commanders who

might support the operational task(s) assigned to the component commander. This construct creates seams, rather than

synergy for the joint force. To achieve the adaptability and integration desired, the future joint force should adhere to a single format that communicates to a joint cross-functional audience vice continuing to use the stovepiped and diverse formats

found in current doctrine.

Clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships require

unambiguous communication to minimize seams in joint operations. Therefore, this paper recommends adding commander’s

intent and mission-type orders to the establishing directive guidance. In his article, “Commander’s Intent: An Aerospace Tool for

Command and Control?” Lt Col Michael Straight highlights the

varied emphasis in this area by reviewing service doctrine. Although the Air Force employs the concepts, it places less emphasis on them in its doctrine than do the other services.9 The

Air Force lacks the doctrinal framework and training to effectively communicate intent across all levels of joint command.

The previously discussed OIF time-sensitive targeting and close

air support examples illustrate how this lack of doctrinal emphasis may have hampered joint operations. Explicitly requiring

commander’s intent and mission-type orders ensures these

concepts receive the appropriate emphasis and are not left to

implication and potential omission. Adopting this proposal

helps achieve the JOpsC vision of decentralized execution where

joint capabilities are organized and interdependently applied at

increasingly lower levels.10

The next proposed addition is possible command relationship transition points. Adding this phrase helps to satisfy one

of the future joint force common core capabilities—to be able

to adapt in scope, scale, and method as the situation requires.11 The future joint force must have the ability to execute

one operation while remaining ready to shift to another, which

may or may not be in the same operational area.12 Based on

this premise, the concept of operations can require a change

in command relationships during execution in response to an

adversary’s actions.

BROWN

21
In his paper, “Employing an Air Maneuver Force: Battlefield

Air Operations with Surface Maneuver in a Joint Campaign,”

Maj James Jinnette discusses the importance of rapid role exchange and the Army doctrinal concept of battle handover.13

Major Jinnette provides several historical examples where air

and land forces switched between a shaping force and a force

actively engaged, effectively a joint force battle handover. However, a joint battle handover definition or concept does not currently exist in doctrine, and the Army ties the concept to a

point on the ground. This paper proposes including and expanding the concept in joint doctrine addressing specific

phases or tactical events where a rapid exchange of command

relationships might occur.14 Including the language possible

command relationship transition points prompts a joint force

commander to account for and document joint battle handover criteria in his campaign plans, operations plans, and operation orders. 

Emerging Command and Control Concepts

Having completed the discussion on proposed changes to

establishing directive guidance, this section reviews recent and

ongoing efforts related to command and control. In the remaining chapters, these emerging concepts are integrated with the

doctrine concepts proposed in this paper. With further development, the integrated concepts can facilitate achieving the

JOpsC vision.

During the conduct of Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02),

US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) explored new concepts

for future joint operations to validate the rapid decisive operations concept.15 Associated with effects-based operations

(EBO), a concept not yet thoroughly defined in joint doctrine,

USJFCOM examined the joint tactical actions (JTA) concept.

JTAs are the range of actions undertaken by functional component commanders to achieve effects.16 The JTA concept prevents the stovepiped use of force by a single component by

using the best mix of capabilities from across the joint force to

achieve a desired effect.

WALKER PAPER

22
Two tools that proved effective in integrating effects during

MC02 were the prioritized effects list (PEL) and effects tasking

order (ETO). Air tasking orders and maritime tasking orders

are excellent tools for their purpose but are domain centric

and not effective in integrating the desired effects across the

joint force.17 The ETO concept provides an avenue to reinforce

commander’s intent and issue mission-type orders to a joint

force and achieve the desired synergistic effect.

One of the desired capabilities of the future joint force is to

be able to rapidly deploy selected portions of the joint force

that can seamlessly transition to execution. Addressing this

requirement, the standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ)

concept, introduced in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,

is a full-time, joint command and control element within a regional combatant commander’s staff.18 The SJFHQ concept

makes available to combatant commanders a standing,

trained, and equipped command and control capability focused on a designated area, which can respond to emerging

contingencies.19 This concept was also examined during MC02

and demonstrated significant improvements in the combatant

commander’s readiness by enhancing precrisis contingency

planning and rapidly establishing an operational joint task

force headquarters.20 Although still in development, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), with the establishment of its 100-person Center for Special Operations that is

solely focused on planning for the global war on terrorism, is

theoretically employing the SJFHQ concept.21

The JOpsC envisions a networked future joint force with

reachback beyond its organic capabilities.22 Strategic lift and

antiaccess constraints are sure to make having a reachback

capability an imperative. The future joint force will not have

the luxury of deploying an OIF-size 1,900-person air operations center requiring airlift by more than 30 C-17s, 24 C-5s,

and 90 C-130s.23 In fact, the secretary of defense recognizes

reachback as one of the most promising ways to decrease forward presence footprints. With a 9 July 2003 memo, he developed a senior-level steering group and asked the services “to

submit Program Change Proposals to employ the reserve component in continental United States (CONUS)-based operaBROWN

23
tions providing reachback capabilities in support of forwarddeployed forces.”24

The use of reachback is not a far-fetched concept and was

actually employed with success during OEF and OIF. Central

Command headquarters, separated from its execution elements by over 7,000 miles and multiple time zones, achieved

unprecedented real-time situational awareness and connectivity during OEF.25 During OIF, reconnaissance platforms operating over Iraq beamed their data back to Langley Air Force

Base, Virginia, where intelligence specialists conducted realtime analysis and sent their results back to the air and space

operations center in a matter of seconds. Additionally, Global

Hawk and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) flying

missions over Iraq were piloted from CONUS-based locations.

This represents a significant reachback accomplishment considering that just one year prior in OEF, Predators were piloted

in-theater.26

Changes in organizational concepts for command and control have also been proposed and adopted in practice. In

studying OEF, Dr. Milan Vego suggests that a combatant commander should remain at his main headquarters so that he

might effectively monitor events across his entire area of responsibility (AOR) and not get bogged down in tactical details

at the expense of operational and strategic issues.27 Dr. Vego

proposes establishing theaters of operations commanded by a

three-star flag officer directly subordinate to the combatant

commander.28 In effect, this is what US Central Command

elected to do. Although General Franks forward deployed during OIF, he established joint task forces to focus on operations

in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan prior to combat operations commencing in Iraq.29 Continuing this thought process,

Michael P. Noonan and Mark R. Lewis recommend taking joint

task force organization one step further in their article “Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization.” They highlight that joint forces are organized by the environmental medium in which they perform and that jointness

is reserved for very high level component commands. Consistent with the JTA concept discussed earlier, Noonan and Lewis

propose organizing along mission-oriented functional requireWALKER PAPER

24
ments. To handle multidimensional operations similar to those

in OIF, joint force components might include strike, security,

support, and information operations component commanders.30

War fighters examined similar alternative command structures during Unified Quest 2003, a cosponsored Army and

USJFCOM war game, and during the follow-on USJFCOM war

game Pinnacle Impact 2003.31 Pinnacle Impact recommended

adding a joint information commander on the same level as

the other component commanders.32 The point of introducing

these alternative command and control structures is not to

advocate a particular position. Rather, it is to highlight that

the future joint force must be adaptable and not wedded to

past organizational constructs. 

Summary

This paper proposes combining the recommended establishing directive changes with the emerging command and control

concepts and builds on this proposal in the remaining chapters.

In adopting the establishing directive proposals, joint force

commanders will more explicitly communicate command relationships, commander’s intent, and mission-type orders, allowing the future joint force to operate more effectively at lower

echelons. Joint tactical actions will integrate the best mix of

available capabilities to achieve the desired effects. Prioritized

effects lists and ETOs provide an overarching construct to

drive prioritization and execution of EBOs.

Taking advantage of reachback capabilities, future joint

command and control structures and organizations will be

more adaptable than in the past. Ultimately with these concepts, the future joint force will seamlessly and rapidly conduct integrated joint operations with a smaller, more adaptable forward-deployed footprint. 

Notes

1. Findlay, “Fires and Maneuver,” 19 (see chap. 3, n. 2); and Col Gary Crowder, chief of the Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Headquarters Air

Combat Command, interview by the author, 8 December 2003.

BROWN

25
2. Col Jerry Dillon, chief of SCUD Strategy, Coalition Air and Space Operations Center, Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by the author, 13 January

2004.

3. Ibid.

4. “DOD Briefing on Coalition Forces Air Component” (see chap. 3, n. 5).

5. Lt Col Steve Gray, “Evolving FSCM/C2 Issues: An Air Combat Command Perspective,” briefing, Air Force-Army Transformation Symposium,

Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 30 October 2003, slide 4.

6. Maj Michael E. Fischer, “Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations:

The Empowerment of Air Leadership” (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower

Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., May 1995), 57.

7. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16

July 1997), 662. This definition is adapted from the establishing directive

discussion in the Supported Commander section of the document.

8. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001,

III-7; and Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13

April 1995, II-20.

9. Lt Col Michael Straight, “Commander’s Intent: An Aerospace Tool for

Command and Control?” Airpower Journal 10, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 37, http://

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/spring96.html.

10. Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concept, 9 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

11. Ibid., 11.

12. Ibid., 12.

13. Maj James Jinnette, “Employing an Air Maneuver Force: Battlefield

Air Operations with Surface Maneuver in a Joint Campaign” (Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, June 2003), 17.

14. Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 September 1997, 1-18. Battle handover is defined as a designated point (phase

line) on the ground where responsibility transitions from the stationary force

to the moving force and vice versa. It is within direct fire range and observed

indirect fire range of the stationary force. 

15. Millennium Challenge 2002 Executive Report (Norfolk, Va.: United States

Joint Forces Command, March 2003), 2–4. MC02 was a joint war-fighting field

experiment conducted from 24 July to 15 August 2002. MC02 involved over

13,500 troops from across all services. The joint force headquarters operated

out of the United States Joint Forces Command Suffolk complex, while the

bulk of computer simulation and live-force action took place at various locations throughout the southwest United States.

16. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17

November 2003, 118. AFDD 1 defines effects-based operations as actions

taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes. See also Millennium Challenge 2002 Executive Report, 18.

17. Millennium Challenge 2002 Executive Report, 18.

WALKER PAPER

26
18. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001, 32–33 (see chap. 2, n. 2).

The current concept evolved from the 2001 QDR’s Standing Joint Task Force

Headquarters concept.

19. US Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation’s Concept Primer: Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Norfolk, Va.:

US Joint Forces Command, October 2003), 1.

20. Ibid., 1–2.

21. Vice Adm Eric T. Olson, USN, deputy commander, US Special Operations Command, address to the 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy Security Planning and Military Transformation after

Iraqi Freedom, 2 December 2003, n.p., http://www.ifpafletcherconference.

com/.

22. Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 440 (see chap. 3,

n. 9). Reachback is defined as the process of obtaining products, services,

and applications, or forces, or equipment, or materiel from organizations

that are not forward deployed.

23. US Central Command Air Forces, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - by the

Numbers (Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Analysis and

Assessment Division, 30 April 2003), 3. By 21 March 2003, the combined air

operations center had grown from a pre-OIF size of 672 personnel to 1,966

personnel; and Laura M. Colarusso and Gordon Trowbridge, “The Future Is

NOW: Reach-back Technology Lets Airmen Fight in Iraq from Comfort of

Home,” Air Force Times, 10 November 2003, 14.

24. Elizabeth Rees, “DOD Creates Senior Officer Steering Group to Study

Reachback,” Inside the Air Force, 17 October 2003, 1, http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=AIR

FORCE-14-42-2.

25. US Senate, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, 7 (see chap. 1, n. 2). 

26. Colarusso, “The Future is NOW,” 14 (see chap. 4, n. 23).

27. Dr. Milan Vego, “What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?” Proceedings 128/7/1, 1193 (July 2002): n.p., http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/

Articles02/PROvego07.htm.

28. Ibid.

29. CJTF-Horn of Africa History Fact Sheet (Tampa, Fla.: US Central Command, 23 July 2003), n.p., http://www.cjtfhoa.centcom.mil/factsheet.asp. The

core Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa headquarters was formed from

elements of the 2d Marine Division in October 2002. The headquarters sailed

from Morehead City, North Carolina, on 13 November 2002, aboard the USS

Mount Whitney joining forces already at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti to form

what is the current organization of CJTF-HOA. Jim Garamore, “Operation

Mountain Lion Continues, Task Force Assumes Control,” American Forces

Press Service, 6 June 2002, n.p., http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Jun2002/n06062002_200206063.html. On 31 May 2002, Combined Joint

Task Force 180 assumed control of operations in Afghanistan. Commanded by

a lieutenant general, this task force is responsible to USCENTCOM and to the

BROWN

27
secretary of defense and commands US and coalition forces in Afghanistan and

supporting troops in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

30. Michael P. Noonon and Mark R. Lewis, “Conquering the Elements:

Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization,” Parameters: U.S. Army War College

Quarterly, 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 11, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/

Parameters/03autumn/noonan.pdf.

31. Sandra I. Erwin, “War-Gaming a Future That’s Much Like Today,”

National Defense Magazine, June 2003, n.p., http://www.nationaldefense

magazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1116.

32. US Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, PINNACLE IMPACT 2003: Joint Concept Development Seminar

Wargame (Norfolk, Va.: US Joint Forces Command, 14 July 2003), 14.

WALKER PAPER

28
Chapter 5

Synchronization of

Interdiction and Maneuver

Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an

adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements

in theory, and the changing face of war itself.

—Gen C. C. Krulak, USMC

Marine Corps Doctrinal

Publication 1, Warfighting

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-03, Doctrine for

Joint Interdiction Operations, describe the synergistic effects that

can be achieved by synchronizing interdiction and maneuver.

However, recent operations have demonstrated that serendipity

drives synchronization of interdiction and maneuver more than

doctrine. Shortfalls in the command and control tenet robust

integration, synchronization, and coordination mechanisms

created conditions more geared towards serendipity than synchronization. The following constraints in existing joint doctrine create seams, thereby preventing synergy:

• Focus on air interdiction planning and execution processes

creates a myopic and constrained view of joint interdiction

operations.

• Assumption of air interdiction in support of surface maneuver; as such, doctrine lacks comparable planning and execution processes for all interdiction and maneuver assets.

• Concept of synchronization encourages disparate organizations and processes that fall short of future joint force

integration. (For more detailed background on current synchronization of interdiction and maneuver doctrine, reference appendix C.)

The future joint force will not be adaptable or integrated without adding several robust integration, synchronization, and coordination mechanisms to address these existing joint doctrine

29
issues. Incorporating concepts already proposed by this paper,

this chapter recommends a new joint organization to fully integrate interdiction and maneuver in future joint operations.

Synchronization Challenges

in Recent Joint Operations

Contingency operations of the recent past validate synchronization of interdiction and maneuver as a viable concept applicable to the future joint force. However, they illustrate that

current doctrine processes and mind-sets make synchronization more a result of serendipity than a well-planned and wellexecuted joint operation.

Although some planners considered Operation Desert Storm

a successful joint operation, in retrospect the “Highway of

Death” was more a stroke of luck than a synchronized joint effort. Throughout the operation, air support to the ground effort

was a contentious issue. In fact, the Army ensured their air

support displeasure received high-level attention by including

comments in situation reports to that effect on two consecutive days.1 The Marines’ rapid advance through Kuwait combined with the VII and XVIII Corps attack from the west channeled retreating Iraqi forces up through Basra. The retreat was

subject to interdiction attacks from coalition airpower, but an

improper placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL)

hampered the interdiction effort. The debate between air and

land forces about FSCL placement and interdiction support

indicates that synchronized maneuver and interdiction were not

by design. After the war, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated he

knew little about the FSCL debate.2 Had the Highway of Death

been planned as a joint mission, the joint force commander

would have been aware of and resolved the FSCL issue.

Bearing resemblance to future joint operations, Operation Enduring Freedom was a noncontiguous and dispersed operation

devoid of traditional boundaries and areas of operations. In the

opening months of the operation, there was no area of operations or joint special operations area assigned to any element

of the joint force below the combatant commander.

3 The lack

of an area of operations, unclear command relationships, and

WALKER PAPER

30
the unprecedented air and special operation forces (SOF) combination complicated efforts to synchronize interdiction and maneuver.4 During this conflict, SOF personnel with their Northern Alliance partners were a maneuver force that required joint

fire support akin to a conventional force. As a de facto ground

commander, the SOF component lacked expertise in the joint

targeting process and did not possess a robust air support organization to execute the operation.5 Even if the expertise and resources had been available, the joint fire support did not easily

fit into the traditional joint fires mission areas. The majority of

joint fires provided by the air component were neither close air

support nor air interdiction as defined in joint doctrine, but

somewhere in between. Using SOF personnel as sensors, the air

component generated sorties without designating specific targets. SOF personnel, not in direct contact with enemy forces,

provided mensurated targeting data to the arriving aircraft.6

This ground-directed interdiction concept combined with indigenous force maneuver proved successful, but the success

could be attributed more to field solutions than to execution of

existing doctrine concepts.

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the most integrated

joint operations seen to date with the air war designed to stay

tightly lashed to the ground campaign.7 Despite the campaign

design, synchronization of interdiction and maneuver again

seemed the result of serendipity. During the last week of March

2003, ground forces having progressed to just south of the Karbala Gap were coming to grips with the logistic problems generated by their rapid advance.8 A blinding sandstorm coincided

with the requirement to regroup and refit prior to the push towards Baghdad. The apparent operational pause was not a

pause at all. Although ground maneuver had stopped, interdiction from the air component kept pressure on the Iraqi resistance. Believing they could use the sandstorm as cover, Iraqi

forces massed and moved south towards the battle line, subjecting themselves to detection by coalition reconnaissance and

destruction by precision munitions.9 The sandstorm and lack of

coalition ground maneuver enticed an Iraqi reaction, resulting

in engagement by another element of the joint force—airpower.

On the surface, this appears to be an excellent example of synBROWN

31
chronized interdiction and maneuver, but closer examination

illustrates this was more a result of circumstance than design.

Moving towards Integration: Proposals

to Satisfy the Demands of the JOpsC

Although the previous examples are not synchronized interdiction and maneuver in the purest sense, they demonstrate how

recent operations have outpaced current joint doctrine. JP 3-0

states that all levels of war require agility and versatility of

thought, plans, operations, and organizations.10 With this statement in mind, the following paragraphs propose changes to joint

doctrine to ensure the realization of the attributes of the future

joint force.

Synchronization as a goal—military actions arranged in time,

space, and purpose—falls short of describing the full joint force

integration desired by the JOpsC.

11 JP 1-02 defines integration

as the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create

a force that operates as a whole.12 For a joint force to effectively

execute interdiction and maneuver as a whole, serendipity will

have to be replaced by defined planning and execution processes

in joint doctrine. The first recommendation is to change “synchronization of interdiction and maneuver” to “integration of

interdiction and maneuver.” This change would better emphasize that interdiction and maneuver should not be separate

operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives.13

This paper proposes integration of interdiction and maneuver be considered a joint tactical action, bringing together the

best mix of capabilities to achieve a desired effect. As currently

written, joint doctrine does not facilitate executing integrated

interdiction and maneuver as a joint tactical action. To include

recommendations in this paper, several new joint doctrine

concepts are required to allow seamless integration of interdiction and maneuver. Consider the following scenario.

During a contingency operation, a joint force commander determines that a joint tactical action is required to achieve a specific objective or effect. To execute the joint tactical action, the

WALKER PAPER

32
joint force commander designates one of his functional commanders as the supported commander and assigns an area of

operations. Within the area of operations, the supported commander is responsible for the integration of all effects—interdiction, maneuver, and so forth. To ensure the joint force

achieves a common understanding of the desired effects, an

establishing directive is published to communicate commander’s intent and mission-type orders to all elements of the joint

force participating in the joint tactical action. This establishing

directive, a common format operation plan and/or order, also

identifies situations where the main effort might shift between

elements of the joint force requiring a battle handover.

To execute the joint tactical action, the supported commander

requires expanded apportionment and tasking mechanisms

similar to those in current joint doctrine. A framework currently

exists for supported surface commanders requesting nonorganic

interdiction from the air component. Upon receipt of the request,

the JFACC melds the theaterwide and supported commander’s

interdiction priorities into an apportionment recommendation to

the JFC. Once approved, the air apportionment recommendation

is translated into an air tasking order for execution. For future

operations, this paper recommends supported commanders—

air, land, maritime, or special operations—use a prioritized effects list to request nonorganic interdiction and maneuver capabilities from supporting commanders. Associating the listed

prioritized effects with an element of the joint force would, in

effect, be an apportionment recommendation to the JFC. The

apportionment recommendation is put into execution by publishing an effects tasking order.

To make this scenario a reality, the future joint force requires

established organizational structures and processes, allowing

commanders at all levels to collaborate in bringing the appropriate joint capability to bear at the right place and time. Current joint doctrine states that interdiction-capable commanders require access to command and control systems to take

advantage of real-time and near-real-time intelligence.14 Targeting and apportionment processes are fairly well established

for interdiction support of maneuver. The same requirements

probably are valid for maneuver-capable commanders, but are

BROWN

33
missing in joint doctrine. The command and control systems and

processes currently available that might facilitate integrated interdiction and maneuver operations tend to be domain centric.

This lack of integrated systems and processes exposes a seam

inhibiting integrated joint operations.

During Operation Allied Force, for example, the air operations

center lacked a strong Army intelligence presence to facilitate

attacking field forces. Instead, the air component relied on information from the Army’s Task Force Hawk and the construction of its own flexible targeting cell to address the issue.15 As

the Air Force brings direct attack online as a doctrinal mission,

the challenges associated with organizing, training, and exercising command and control for integrated interdiction and maneuver are highlighted.16 The article “Direct Attack: Enhancing

Counterland Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground Operations” suggests that land-warfare experts be resident on the air component’s staff in a formal capacity, rather than serve as members

of the land component’s battlefield coordination detachment.17

The article also suggests that functional command and control

requirements for direct attack be executed by an organization

that approximates the capabilities of an air support operations

center (ASOC).18 To execute effectively integrated interdiction

and maneuver, this paper suggests the adoption of two new organizational concepts—a component coordination element and

a joint tactical action support center (JTASC). Similar to the 11-

person air component coordination element (ACCE) used during Operation Iraqi Freedom, component coordination elements

(CCE) give each component headquarters senior-level air, land,

maritime, and special operations expertise resident and formally

assigned to its staff.19 Subordinate to the supported component, a JTASC approximates a combined ASOC and fire and effects coordination cell (FECC). A JTASC would have a set of core

capabilities and could adapt based on the situation either by

deploying additional resources or using reachback.

The previous discussion of integrated interdiction and maneuver operations addresses sustaining pressure on an adversary by employing lethal means, but has not addressed nonlethal means like information or psychological operations.20

During the first week of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition

WALKER PAPER

34
forces dropped over 28 million leaflets, some of which included

capitulation instructions, creating both positive and negative

nonlethal effects.21 On the positive side, some Iraqi forces became prisoners of war with little resistance. On the negative side,

a great many of the Iraqi force laid down their weapons and

walked away from their positions.22 Had maneuver forces been

present to complement this nonlethal effect, a greater number of

prisoners of war may have been taken, preventing forces from

being available to fight another day as insurgents. Like integrated interdiction and maneuver, a JTASC can integrate nonlethal effects by having information or psychological operations

capability either resident inside its organization or available via

reachback.

Summary

Applying the doctrine concepts proposed thus far to the Afghanistan example discussed in this chapter may have yielded

more synergy and fewer seams. Based on the objectives of attacking mobile Taliban and al-Qaeda targets, the joint force commander would have designated a supported commander and an

area of operations to conduct the mission. Since there was no

surface area of operations, one could argue that the air component could have been the supported commander since he owned

the bulk of the firepower and command and control assets.23

The air component commander would have published commander’s intent and mission-type orders for the involved joint forces

in an operation plan and/or order. The document would identify events and times when the main effort might shift between

the air and SOF components affecting a joint battle handover.

Both the air and special operations component would have had

CCEs facilitating real-time joint decisions in planning and execution. The air component would have generated a PEL with

an apportionment recommendation and published an ETO for

execution. A JTASC would have deployed to integrate the mix

of joint capabilities available for the operation’s execution. The

proposed doctrine concepts would have ensured interdiction

and maneuver operations and processes were integrated from

the initial stages of planning to the final stages of execution.

BROWN

35
Serendipitous integration is not objectionable since war fighters

expect the future joint force to be adaptable enough to be able

to react as the situation dictates. However, serendipitous integration of interdiction and maneuver should be the exception,

not the norm.

Changing synchronization to integration, adding PELs and

ETOs, standing up CCEs, and establishing JTASCs can facilitate successful future joint force operations. The turf battles,

confusion, lack of deployed capability, and reactive operations

experienced in the examples discussed will likely decrease and

be replaced by well-planned, coordinated, and executed integrated joint operations. If nothing else, adoption of the proposed

concepts allows the future joint force to respond more readily to

emerging integration opportunities during the course of a conflict. It is worth noting the Force Application Functional Concept

takes strides towards the proposed concepts in this chapter.

This document defines force application as the integrated use

of maneuver and engagement to create the effects necessary to

achieve assigned mission objectives.24

Notes

1. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 330.

2. Ibid., 413.

3. Findlay, “Fires and Maneuver,” 18–19 (see chap. 3, n. 2).

4. Ibid., 19. Since there was not a surface area of operation with a traditional supported/supporting commander, one might assume that the air

component commander was the supported commander. Similarly, the joint

special operations task force (JSOTF)-North was the de facto ground commander conducting maneuver and requiring interdiction support since leaders had designated his operations the main effort. This designation, however,

was not a command relationship to make the JSOTF a supported commander.

5. Ibid., 20–22.

6. Ibid., 20–21.

7. Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “An Air War of Might, Coordination

and Risks,” Washington Post, 27 April 2003, A1, http://www.washingtonpost.

com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contented=A42694-2003Apr26&

notFound=true.

WALKER PAPER

36
8. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003),

196.

9. Graham and Loeb, “An Air War of Might, Coordination and Risks,” A1;

and Dr. Rebecca Grant, Gulf War II: Air and Space Power Led the Way, An Air

Force Association Special Report (Arlington, Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2003), 21.

10. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, IV-10 (see chap. 4, n. 8).

11. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 14 (see chap. 1, n. 1). The JOpsC

states that the joint force must move beyond deconfliction to fully integrated

elements with all functions and capabilities focused towards a unified purpose.

12. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 261 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

13. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, IV-14 (see chap. 4, n. 8).

14. Ibid., IV-13.

15. Lt Col Phil M. Haun, “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Construct for

Air Operations in the Twenty-First Century,” Aerospace Power Journal 15, no.

4 (Winter 2001): 84, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/

apj01/win01/haun.html.

16. Maj Gen David Deptula, Col Gary L. Crowder, and Maj George L. Stamper Jr., “Direct Attack: Enhancing Counterland Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground

Operations,” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 8, http://

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/win03/deptula.html.

Direct attack is becoming a counterland-apportionable mission category to

complement close air support and interdiction. The working definition for direct

attack is air operations conducted to render the adversary’s military capabilities ineffective outside an established land area of operations or when surface

forces are operating in a supporting role to air forces.

17. Ibid., 11. A battlefield coordination detachment is an Army liaison provided by the Army component or force commander to the air operations center

(AOC) and/or to the component designated by the joint force commander to

plan, coordinate, and deconflict air operations. The battlefield coordination detachment processes Army requests for air support, monitors and interprets the

land battle situation for the AOC, and provides the necessary interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data.

18. Ibid., 11–12. An ASOC is the principal air control agency of the theater

air control system responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground combat element. It processes and coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. It normally collocates

with the Army tactical headquarters senior fire support coordination center

within the ground combat element.

19. Elaine M. Grossman, “Iraq War Could Feature Unprecedented Air-Land

Collaboration,” Inside the Pentagon, 13 February 2003, 1, http://www.inside

defense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PEN

TAGON-19-7-1.

BROWN

37
20. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 12–13 (see chap. 1, n. 1). In accordance

with the JOpsC, the future joint force should have the capability to create and

sustain continuous pressure throughout the battlespace and disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy any opponent with a combination of lethal and nonlethal means.

21. “CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 24 March 2003,” 24

March 2003, n.p., http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/

transcript_list.htm.

22. Ibid.

23. Findlay, “Fires and Maneuver,” 19 (see chap. 3, n. 2).

24. DOD, Force Application Functional Concept (Washington, D.C.: Force

Application Assessment Division, Joint Staff, J-8, February 2004), 4. This

concept recognizes that we have moved beyond the current doctrinal definitions of fires and engagement.

WALKER PAPER

38
Chapter 6

Joint Fires Concepts

If as one people speaking the same language they have begun

to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for

them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so

they will not understand each other.

Biblical Story of the Tower of Babel

Genesis 11:6–7

Joint fires and joint fires support enabled recent operations

in Afghanistan and Iraq to reach new heights of combat effectiveness but fell short of their potential since they were not

grounded in the command and control tenet: responsive, interoperable support systems. Outdated mind-sets and doctrinal

processes impacted the joint force’s ability to be fully integrated.

Until the following issues are addressed, a future joint force

with a pervasive joint team mind-set will remain a concept and

not become a reality.1 (For more detailed background on current joint fires doctrine, reference appendix D.)

• Command and control of joint fires focuses on air-delivered

fires and is primarily close air support centric.

• Command and control of joint fires is challenging due to

five disparate and complex service-specific structures that

lack commonality, compatibility, and standardized capabilities.

— Command relationships determine which of the five

systems will support an operation.

— Without an established command relationship, each

component uses its own command and control system.

— Doctrinal associations and domain centric orientation

inhibit integrated joint operations.

• The two-service mind-set constrains the joint fires concepts,

thereby hampering integration of effects under a joint force

commander.

39
To address these issues and propose changes, this chapter

reviews examples from recent contingencies that illustrate the

doctrine gaps in joint fires. By chapter’s end, the author recommends a new organizational construct, creating a joint team

mind-set with responsive, interoperable support systems for

joint fires employment.2

Joint Fires Support Challenges

Joint fires support during recent operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq often did not have linking support systems that possess commonality, compatibility, and standardization to the

greatest extent possible.3 The Operation Enduring Freedom

example discussed in chapter 5 highlights some of the issues

associated with joint fires support. The operation executed nondoctrinal fire missions, and, due to rigid doctrinal relationships,

the joint force did not have adequate planning and execution

expertise deployed to theater.

Even with the entire command and control system deployed

for operations in Iraq, the existing systems and processes did

not adequately provide for effective communications within the

air component or between components early in the conflict.4 In

fact, many of the interfaces to support joint fires were unwieldy,

ineffective, and inefficient.5 The operation employed a number

of command and control systems, and each provided different

information in a variety of formats requiring personnel to be

proficient on several interrelated and partially redundant systems.6 Due to the lack of standardization and compatibility, the

forces developed standard operating procedures to decrease the

chances of error resulting from the manual transfer of data between systems. With the multitude of systems and differing formats, most headquarters defaulted to using Microsoft Office applications and chat rooms to more effectively create decision

tools and communicate ideas.7 Information system incompatibility was just as challenging at the tactical level, requiring

ground commanders to monitor up to 12 different and incompatible information systems to execute fire support.8

Joint doctrine and the scheme of maneuver in OIF led to

several disparate joint fires support networks executing the

WALKER PAPER

40
same functions (fig. 2). The execution differed between support

networks and was not necessarily joint. Within their respective

areas of operations, the Army and Marines had their own habitually associated and service-specific air support centers. In

contrast, the SOF task forces had a joint air control element

(JACE) to provide joint fires support. The Air Force provided

two ASOCs to support V Corps operations. The main one in

Kuwait and another roughly half the size that was forward deployed.9 Traditionally separated by other staff functions, the

ASOC and V Corps FECC were collocated during OIF to better

handle the rapidly changing situation.10 V Corps lessons

learned recommended continued placement of the ASOC immediately next to the FECC in future operations.11 In the Marine area, there was a total of four Marine direct air support

centers (DASC), three surface-based and one airborne, supporting Marine and coalition forces.12 All of these organizations and platforms served the same functions, but their airground relationships and execution philosophies were not

necessarily the same.13

As figure 2 illustrates, each of the air support organizations

is associated with a senior-level ground element. The difference

in command channels sometimes requires liaisons to get the job

done but not always in the most efficient manner. For example,

a Marine liaison was placed on the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to conduct real-time battle management

of joint fires air assets.14 Though a liaison officer proved to be an

effective asset, it took several weeks before this ad hoc arrangement realized its full utility.15

Due to information system compatibility issues and the inability of some systems to operate on the move, the 3rd Infantry

Division (Mechanized) (3ID[M]) also relied on Marine liaison officers using Iridium phone communications to conduct crossboundary fires. The lack of common communications capabilities made the clearance of these fires extremely slow.16

The uncoordinated employment of Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) during OIF illustrates the lack of a surfacebased fires support structure that compares with that for airdelivered fires. V Corps forces fired three ATACMS, and, for a

variety of reasons, did not complete adequate coordination with

BROWN

41
the air component to clear the airspace.17 Although some may

not consider the three events joint fires per current joint doctrine, they illustrate that air and land fires are not integrated

at the lowest level. Established procedures required V Corps to

coordinate airspace deconfliction for long-range ATACMS shots

up through the land component commander who in turn would

coordinate with the air component.18 It is not clear what role the

ASOC played in the coordination, but the established processes

and dual command chains probably did not result in seamless

coordination. Although service-specific structures and processes

have the same functional responsibilities, the combination of

capability gaps, doctrinal associations, and domain-specific

orientation limits the flexibility of joint force commanders to

create an integrated joint fires support network.

WALKER PAPER

42

GFAC

ELEMENT GFAC GFAC

TACP ASOC

ACCE

COIC

CFLCC

OC

FC

CFMCC

GFAC

FOB

ODA

GFAC

FOB

ODA

TACP

FSE

DIV

FSE

BDE

BN

FSE

CORP MEF

DASC

MEB

AC

MEU

AC

A2C2

FSE

TACP

TACP

AOC SOLE

CFSOCC

BCD

MARLO

CFACC TF

CJSOTF-W

ACE ACE

ACE

NALE

CJSOTF-N

NO

Command an Control

xecution

oint Ai Request Net

TACSAT)

Marine

Air Control Net

(HF)

Figure 2. Operation Iraqi Freedom joint fires support network.

(Reprinted from Lt Col Franklin Walden and MSgt Hal Sullivan, “Joint Close

Air Support in Support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI

FREEDOM,” 18th Air Support Operations Group briefing, AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, Re-write Conference, Langley AFB, Va., 25 June 2003, slide 10.)
Terminal Control Challenges

Army lessons learned recognized that the integration and relationships between fire support elements and terminal air control parties greatly improved timely and responsive joint fires.19

However, terminal control during operations in Afghanistan and

Iraq was not without issues.

Dispersed and highly mobile operations in Afghanistan and

Iraq highlighted limitations in communications capabilities and

terminal control asset density. During OIF, the Air Force established the 484th Air Expeditionary Wing, which focused on the

Tactical Air Control System and air-ground operations. Instead

of using standard formulas to place tactical air control parties

(TACP), the wing proactively placed and assigned TACPs based

on mission and/or unit requirements.20 Despite these efforts,

the 3ID(M) still felt they had a shortage of enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETAC) to control the amount of airpower available.21 There was a robust package of ETACs at the brigade

and battalion levels, but not sufficient numbers available to

the lower elements of the ground force.22 Army channels concluded that company-level fire support teams (FIST) require

training as universal observers capable of not only supporting

indirect (type 2 or 3) close air support (CAS) control, but also

support all means of joint fires.23

Incompatible equipment and the inability to communicate

over dispersed distances or on the move also hampered fire control. During Operation Anaconda, fire supporters did not have

equipment that allowed them to communicate with all delivery

platforms.24 During OIF, the 20–25-kilometer-range radios typically used for fire support were not capable of supporting brigade

combat teams separated by up to 270 kilometers. Additionally,

the inability to conduct communications on the move contributed to decreases in joint fires situational awareness and

effectiveness.25 Even with reliable communications, CAS employment was degraded and at times dangerous due to nondoctrinal terminology and procedures.26 The nondoctrinal employment of CAS assets likely was due to the lack of a joint fire

support qualification standard. Prior to adding the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) definition in joint doctrine in September 2003, there were four different terminal control qualiBROWN

43
fication standards, none of them universally recognized across

the joint community.27 Despite communications issues and

their perceived limited numbers, the ETACs and JTACs deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom executed superbly. Pilots

on CAS missions did not have trouble talking to the ETACs

and JTACs, rather the communication issues were a matter of

control agencies not being similarly configured.28

Propositions for Responsive

and Interoperable Joint Fire Support

Joint warfare is team warfare where effectively integrated

joint forces expose no weak points or seams to an adversary.29

To execute team warfare, joint force commanders may choose

to employ capabilities from any service or component that is

part of the joint team.30 An integrated joint force concept approaches a stage where the two-service requirement to consider a function or operation joint may be obsolete. A joint force

might still be a force composed of significant elements, assigned

or attached, of two or more military departments operating

under a single joint force commander.31 This paper proposes that

the operative words defining an entity joint move from “two service” to “operating under a single joint force commander.” In simple terms, fires supporting the joint objectives of a joint force

commander are joint fires. This change in thinking dictates

changes in command and support relationships and processes.

Considering all fires as joint fires does not discount the fact

that a service or component has a requirement to maintain

certain joint fires capability to support its assigned task(s).

Services or components may follow the Marine Air Ground

Task Force (MAGTF) model making excess joint fires capabilities available to a joint force commander for tasking. 

The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of organic air assets. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF

mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the

JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking

through the JFACC for the support of other components of the joint

force or joint force as a whole.32 

WALKER PAPER

44
Using this construct for joint fires, a component commander

retains control of his organic joint fires assets to support his

assigned joint tasks and makes excess capability available to

the JFC for tasking through the supported commander.

Making Joint Fires Organizations Joint

Reviewing current joint doctrine and the joint fires challenges

from OEF and OIF highlights the fact that most joint fires support is not in fact joint and lacks interoperability. Interoperable

at some levels, joint fires processes and structures require the

ingenuity of outstanding personnel to create nonstandardized

solutions to achieve interoperability at all levels. Displaying the

four elements of joint fires command and control illustrates how

far we have to go to make the future joint force fully integrated

so that joint capabilities are organized and interdependently applied at increasingly lower echelons (fig. 3).33

To meet the JOpsC objectives, joint fires structures and

processes must be decentralized and leverage the power of integrated joint capabilities while operating in a joint manner at

lower echelons.34 To facilitate achieving these goals, this paper

recommends adopting a joint fires structure similar to the one

shown in figure 4.

Incorporating the proposed concept from previous chapters,

a JFC uses an establishing directive to delineate command

and support relationships to achieve joint objectives. Part and

parcel to those objectives is joint fires execution. Every functional component has joint fires and maneuver capabilities that

can be integrated with sister component joint fires and maneuver capabilities to achieve a synergistic effect. Figure 4 illustrates these capabilities creating a single joint effect. When in

reality, this same construct can be duplicated numerous times

in the same or another area of operations to achieve the objectives of a joint commander.

Different from past organizational constructs, each component headquarters would have CCEs instead of liaison officers.

Similar to the successful ACCE employed in OIF, the CCE makes

senior-level cross-component expertise resident on sister component staffs that are capable of planning and integrating joint

BROWN

45
operations. The ACCE concept is founded on and success depends on representation at a level commensurate to staff principals of the host components.35 The battlefield coordination detachment, located at the air component headquarters, served

the same role as the ACCE for the land component, but did not

have the same senior-level representation.36 Joint doctrine captured the ACCE concept with its inclusion in the September

2003 approval of JP 3-09.3. However, joint doctrine limits this

concept to air component support of the land component. This

paper recommends formalizing the CCE concept for all components in future joint doctrine.

Perhaps the most important level of joint fires execution, the

joint fires planning, coordination and control agencies are currently the least joint entity of all the joint fires command and

control areas. Each of the elements at this level is either serviceor component-specific with disparate capabilities and processes

preventing fully integrated, responsive, and interoperable joint

WALKER PAPER

46

oint

fec t

SERVICE

AC

ASOC/

DASC

URFACE 

IRE 

COORDINATOR

IRE SUPPORT EAM

URFACE 

IRE

OMPONENT

OMMANDERS

OMPONENT HEADQUARTERS

IAISON ELEMENTS

LANNING OORDINATION,

ND CONTROL AGENCIES

TERMINAL CONTRO SETS

ASOC – A Support Operations Center

ASC – Dire Ai upport 

enter

AC – Termina Atta ontro er

int E m nt

JOINT FIRES SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

AIR COMPONENT AND COMPONENT

IAISON ELEMENT IAISON ELEMENT

TAC

LOSE AIR 

SU PORT

Figure 3. Joint fires support command and control
fires support. Chapter 5 proposed the JTASC as the organization to integrate interdiction and maneuver. Carrying this concept a step further, the JTASC would be the joint organization

with responsibilities to integrate joint fires (interdiction, CAS,

surface fires, nonlethal, etc.) and maneuver. Instead of the ASOC

and FECC just being collocated, the JTASC concept makes

them a single joint entity responsible for the integration of

joint fires and maneuver. Considering that a supported component commander can have several dispersed areas of operaBROWN

47

AUGMENTATION/

REACHBACK

CCE

CCE

oin

fec t

COMPONENT COMMANDERS

JTASC

JOINT FIRES 

AND MANEUVER 

ASSETS

SUPPORTING OINT FIRES 

AND MANEUVER 

ASSETS

TERMINALLY CONTROLLED

JOINT FIRES

JOINT FIRES 

CONTROL TEAM

JOINT FIRES REQUIRING

TERMINAL 

CONTROL

JOINT MANEUVER

NTEGRATION

JOINT FIRES

CCE – Component Coordinatio lement

TASC – Join Tactica

Action Support Center

Joint Element

NTEGRATED

JOINT FIRES AND MANEUVER 

COMMAND AND CONTROL D AND CONTROL

COMPONENT SUPPORTED COMPONENT SUPPORTED

Figure 4. Integrated joint fires and maneuver command and control
tions, it is conceivable that he can have more than one JTASC

under his command.

The future joint force would have a requisite number of

JTASCs with core capabilities. Following the construct established in the 2003 Joint Close Support Action Plan, this paper

suggests developing for the JTASC a single comprehensive

(battle planning through combat assessment) listing of joint essential tasks required for integrated joint fires and maneuver.37

In conjunction with a list of core tasks, a list of joint interoperable communications and information systems needs to be developed. Establishment of JTASC joint essential task lists and

standardized communication requirements would facilitate

the development of JTASC TTPs. The goal of this initiative is

twofold: (1) make JTASC command and control of integrated

joint fires and maneuver transparent regardless of which component is the supported commander, and (2) establish standards so that any appropriately qualified personnel, regardless of service, could operate in any JTASC and be effective.

This approach would yield a fully integrated and adaptable

joint force capable of delivering responsive and interoperable

joint fires support.

Terminal control of joint fires, specifically CAS, made a move

towards jointness with the establishment of JTAC. JP 3-09.3 recently added the JTAC to the doctrine lexicon in September

2003.

A [JTAC is a] qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward

position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint terminal attack controller will be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to perform terminal attack control.38

Although a definition has been agreed upon, qualification

and certification standards are still in development as part the

2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan (the same is being

done for forward air controller-airborne). Notwithstanding, the

JTAC construct brings some degree of standardization to joint

fires, but it should not stop there.

An Army fire support coordinator from Operation Anaconda

stated, “We cannot continue to operate with add-on conglomerate of Air Force personnel, especially during combat operaWALKER PAPER

48
tions. We must train and fight as a team.”39 Statements like

these and lessons learned from recent operations have generated discussion within the joint community to train and equip

more Airmen, soldiers, and Marines to call in air strikes.40

There is a proposal within the Army to create joint fire control

teams of multiservice troops trained to call in strikes from air,

sea, or ground weapons.41 Under this concept, soldiers, sailors,

Airmen, and Marines would be qualified to safely and accurately deliver the entire range of joint fires from mortars to air

strikes.42 However, having a single individual qualified for all

joint fires control may be counterproductive, creating jacks of

all trades, masters of none.

It takes two years to create a fully qualified terminal attack

controller.43 Terminal attack controllers are dedicated to the single, complex mission area of air-delivered joint fires, and some

consider the singular focus an advantage.44 Considering the

amount of training required to be proficient in this one joint

fires area, the training pipeline to create a qualified (certified)

terminal controller for all joint fires may not be feasible without lowering the standard. Due to the lethal capability of US

joint fires and the obvious fratricide concern, lowering the

standard should not be an option.

Instead of creating “mile-wide, inch-deep” terminal controllers

capable of controlling all joint fires, a true joint fire control

team might better serve the future joint force. This paper proposes a joint fire control team consisting of experts with each

member having a unique capability to control a segment of the

joint fires spectrum. A joint fire control team member would be

qualified (certified) in his or her service-specific skill sets and

trained and intimately familiar with other joint fires assets.

Different from today’s disparate joint fires elements, terminal

attack controllers and surface fire supporters would merge

into a single team under this concept. For example, a two-person

tactical air control party would now become a joint fire team

consisting of a terminal attack controller and a fire support

team member. Each has his or her respective expertise but

supports his or her counterpart as the situation dictates, facilitating a real-time joint battle handover. Representing jointness

at the lowest level, this example has the potential to create

BROWN

49
greater numbers of fully capable joint fires control teams that

can be dispersed throughout the battlespace.

Summary

Changing the mind-set for defining entities as joint will be the

first step to achieving responsive and interoperable joint fires.

Second, adopting the component coordination elements, joint

tactical action support centers, and joint fire control team concepts proposed in this chapter creates a single joint fires structure to replace the five disparate structures that exist today.

Combining these concepts with a list of joint essential tasks

and interoperable communications and information systems facilitates achieving the rapid information transfer and decision

making that the future joint force requires. A more “joint” and

standardized joint fires structure ensures future joint operations reach the full integration desired by the JOpsC.

Notes

1. Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, An Evolving Joint Perspective, 11 (see chap. 2, n. 1).

2. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), III-16 (see chap. 2, n. 9).

3. Ibid.

4. Lt Col Thomas L. Kelly and Lt Col John P. Andreasen, USA, retired,

“Joint Fires: A BCD Perspective in Operation Freedom,” Field Artillery, November– December 2003, 21, http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/.

5. Ibid., 20.

6. Ibid., 22.

7. Ibid.

8. “Operation Iraqi Freedom, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized), ‘Rock

of the Marne,’ After Action Report,” final draft, 12 May 2003, 12–28.

9. Col Bruce Curry, commander, 4th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by the author, 3

March 2004.

10. Lt Col William L. Thomas Jr., 4th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom, interview by the author, 3

March 2004.

11. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “V Corps Field Artillery Lessons

Learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” n.d., http://call.army.mil/

homepage/abca.htm.

WALKER PAPER

50
12. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Studies and Analysis

Division, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One Lessons Learned,

April 2003, issue 219, http://www.mawts1.usmc.smil.mil.

13. Curry interview.

14. Marine Corps Combat Development Command Studies and Analysis

Division, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics, issue 68.

15. Ibid.

16. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, n.d., 4–6,

http://www.strategypage.com/articles/3IDAAR/default.asp.

17. Elaine M. Grossman, “Lapses in Coordinating Missile Launches Pinned

on V Corps,” Inside the Pentagon, 19 June 2003, 1, http://www.inside defense.

com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON19-25-2.

18. Ibid.

19. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Emerging Observations, Insights, and Lessons,” briefing, slide 19, June 2003,

http://call.army.mil/homepage/abca.htm; and Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, 14-1.

20. Elizabeth Rees, “Standup of 484th AEW Proved Vital to Army, Air

Force Ops Integration,” Inside the Air Force, 5 September 2003, 3, http://

www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask

&docnum=AIRFORCE-14-36-7.

21. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, 12-23.

22. Ibid., 4-2.

23. Ibid., 12-23. JP 3-09.3 defines type 2 and type 3 CAS control as follows: Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC desires control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft

are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons

release/launch. Type 3 control may be used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize type 3 control, JTACs grant a “blanket” weapons release

clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the

prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC.

24. Lt Col Christopher F. Bentley, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire

Support in Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery, September–October 2002,

14, http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/.

25. Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, 14; and Jason

Ma, “Marines on the Ground Lacked on-the-Move Situational Awareness,”

Inside the Navy, 17 November 2003, n.p., http://www.insidedefense.com/

secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=NAVY-16-46-9.

26. Lt Col John M. Jansen, Lt Cdr Nicholas Dienna, Maj Wm Todd Bufkin

II, Maj David I. Oclander, Maj Thomas Di Tomasso, and Maj James B. Sisler,

“JCAS in Afghanistan: Fixing the Tower of Babel,” Field Artillery, March–April

2003, 24, http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/; and Marine Aviation Weapons

and Tactics Squadron One Lessons Learned, issue 140.

BROWN

51
27. Maj Robert G. Armfield, “Joint Terminal Attack Controller: Separating Fact from Fiction,” Research Report no. AU/ACSC/03-1257R (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, April 2003), 5.

28. Sandra I. Erwin, “Close Air Support Tactics Sharpened in Iraq,” National

Defense Magazine, June 2003, n.p., http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.

org/article.cfm?Id=1125.

29. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, i (see

chap. 2, n. 8).

30. Ibid.

31. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 279 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

32. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), V-4 (see chap. 2, n. 9).

33. DOD, Joint Operations Concept, 9 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

34. Ibid., 15.

35. “Air Component Coordination Element Checklist” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, no date), 1.

36. Amy Butler, “As A-10 Shines in Iraq War, Officials Look to JSF for Future CAS Role,” Inside the Air Force, 23 May 2003, n.p., http://www.inside

defense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=

AIRFORCE-14-21-7.

37. 2003 Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Action Plan (Norfolk, Va.: US Joint

Forces Command, 1 August 2003), 1.

38. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air

Support (CAS), 3 September 2003, GL-12.

39. Bentley, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation

Anaconda,” 14.

40. Bruce Rolfsen, “On Time and On Target,” Air Force Times, 1 December

2003, 14.

41. Elaine M. Grossman, “Army Eyes ‘Joint Fire Control Teams’ to ‘Enable’

Lighter Ground Troops,” Inside the Pentagon, 29 January 2004, 1, http://

www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask

&docnum=PENTAGON-20-5-1.

42. Ibid.

43. Bruce D. Callander, “Controllers,” Air Force Magazine 86, no. 9 (September 2003): 55–56, http://www.afa.org/magazine/sept2003/0903controller.

pdf. 

44. Grossman, “Army Eyes ‘Joint Fire Control Teams,’” 1.

WALKER PAPER

52
Chapter 7

Fire Support Coordination Measures

On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located,

tracked and targeted almost instantaneously through the

use of data-links, computer-assisted intelligence evaluation

and automated fire control. With first-round kill probabilities

approaching certainty, and with surveillance devices that

can continuously track the enemy, the need for large forces

to fix the opposition physically will be less important.

I see battlefields that are under 24-hour real or near-real

time surveillance of all types. I see battlefields on which we

can destroy anything we can locate through instant communications and almost instantaneous application of highly

lethal firepower.

—Gen William C. Westmoreland

Speech to the Association of the US Army,

14 October 1969

Successful execution of fire support coordination measures

relies on these command and control tenets: robust integration,

synchronization, and coordination mechanisms, and timely

decision making. Recent fast-paced and dispersed operations

have demonstrated fire support coordination measure gaps related to these tenets that detract from joint operations synergy.

This is not to say joint forces did less than an outstanding job

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Several issues that hamper coordination measure responsiveness made their job more difficult. (For

more detailed background on current fire support coordination

measure doctrine, reference appendix E.)

• Perspectives on employment of permissive fire support coordination measures, particularly fire support coordination

lines and kill boxes, differ.

• Kill box concept and area reference systems are not well

understood or codified in joint doctrine.

• Common grid reference systems lack standardization and

fail to adequately address the airspace above the grid

system.

53
• Current fire support coordination measure constructs lack

the flexibility and responsiveness required to support rapidly executed, dispersed operations.

The goal by the end of this chapter is to recommend a fire

support coordination measures model that provides the future

joint force with robust integration, synchronization, and coordination mechanisms to facilitate timely decision making during rapidly executed and dispersed operations.

Seams in Fire Support

Coordination Measures

Operation Enduring Freedom provided a glimpse into the

future of dispersed and noncontiguous operations. Instead of

using doctrinally permissive fire support coordination measures (FSCM) like a fire support coordination line (FSCL), the

majority of the measures were restrictive due to the noncontiguous environment and multiple organizations involved in

the operation.1 This translated into more than 200 restrictive

FSCMs during Operation Anaconda, making coordination measure management a full-time job for fire supporters—a challenge likely complicated by not having the full array of command and control assets and processes in place during the

operation (fig. 5).2 Additionally, permissive special engagement

zones (SEZ) were established, which essentially created freefire areas along known and suspected infiltration and exfiltration routes to facilitate interdiction operations.3 During the

course of OEF, coordination measures evolved to a system of

kill boxes and fires clearance procedures to more effectively

support operations.4

During the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the

FSCL was 100 km or more beyond the forward edge of the battle area.5 This was well beyond the doctrinal placement of 30–40

km—the maximum range of division-level organic fires.6 Some

argued that the FSCL placement created a command and control burden to getting joint fires on target in an expeditious

manner.7 The combination of rapid advance and extended coordination time required to move the FSCL is a likely reason

for its extended placement. The FSCL movement times were

WALKER PAPER

54
FC

OC

CFLCC CFACC CFSOCC AOC

BCD NO

TF

SO E

CFMCC

COIC

ACC

ASOC ACE

BN

BDE

SE

TACP

TACP

TACP

TACP SE

ODA

ODA

STS

GFAC

CTF MTN

ACE

ODA

GFAC ODA

STS

GFAC

SE A2C2

ELEMENT C SOTF-S CJSOTF-N

MISSING

Late Feb 2002

ommand and Control

xecution

Air Request Net

Air Reques Net Air Reques Net

FC

OC

CFLCC CFACC CFSOCC AOC

BCD NO

TF

SO E

CFMCC

COIC

ACC

ACE ACE

BDE

DIV

A2C2

SE

TACP

TACP

TACP

TACP SE

BN

TACP

TACP

SE

ODA

ODA

STS

GFAC

CTF MTN

ACE

ODA

GFAC ODA

STS

GFAC

ELEMENT CJSOTF-S CJSOTF-N

MISSING

Anaconda

ommand and Control

xecution

Air Force Air Reques Net (AFARN)

SE A2C2

Figure 5. Operation Enduring Freedom command and control.

(Reprinted from Lt Col Franklin Walden and MSgt Hal Sullivan, “Joint Close

Air Support in Support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI

FREEDOM,” 18th Air Support Operations Group briefing, AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, Re-write Conference, Langley AFB, Va., 25 June 2003, slides 4–5.)
coordinated with and published in the air tasking order, resulting in a coordination measure that was not always responsive

to the ground scheme of maneuver. Twice during OIF, the lead

brigade combat teams of the 3ID(M) were on the verge of crossing the FSCL.8 Considering the 3ID(M) traveled 350 kms in 48

hours, a doctrinal placement and movement (six hours coordination) of the FSCL would not have been possible.

The kill box concept alleviated some of the FSCL issues but

was unsuccessful in some cases. The inability to rapidly update target information and to close kill boxes as friendly forces

approached or the fact that the concept is not well understood

in joint doctrine were just a few of the stumbling blocks.9 Forces

used several work-arounds including battlefield coordination

lines (BCL) or similar measures, but in all cases, joint operations were more restrictive than permissive, particularly in the

V Corps area of operations.10 Despite all these challenges,

FSCL placement and kill box employment became more effective and efficient as the operation progressed.11

Future Fire Support Coordination 

Measures Assumptions

Without going into specific material solutions for interoperable

communications, the future joint force will require a network of

information systems that will maximize machine-to-machine interface. This capability assists in the movement of targeting and

coordination information throughout a joint force in a timely

manner. Ideally, the capability to disseminate and display

FSCMs digitally changes the hours of coordination time to several minutes. Assuming that the command and control structures, processes, and information systems are in place, the remainder of this chapter focuses on developing a responsive

FSCM system.

Adopting a Construct for Future

Coordination Measures Development

The FSCL is not a dead concept, but with the fast-paced and

dispersed operations envisioned by the JOpsC, the FSCL conWALKER PAPER

56
cept may not be applicable in all future joint operations. Certainly, six hours of coordination time is no longer an acceptable standard. The first step in developing a future FSCM system conducive to nonlinear and noncontiguous operations is

to look at area reference systems.

Since an area reference system is a three-dimensional reference, it can be a useful tool for creating coordination measures; however, it requires standardization. JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, leaves the standardization to each theater,

which equates to no standard for an expeditionary joint force.

Combined Forces Command, Korea; European Command; and

Central Command all use a common grid reference system

(CGRS) or a common geographic reference system, but each

uses a different numbering and subdivision convention for its

respective theater.12 Additionally, when kill boxes are established, the theaters use different terminology to designate kill

box status. This creates a condition where joint force units

and information systems must be capable of employing three

different systems for no apparent operational reason—a detriment to expeditionary operations. 

To date, established and proposed CGRSs have focused on

two-dimensional numbering conventions. Modeled after the

battlefield coordination line/airspace control area construct,

this paper recommends developing a three-dimensional numbering convention to subdivide the airspace above the surface

grid. For example, the airspace above the surface grid or z-axis

could be divided in 5,000-foot increments that can be combined to rapidly create coordination measures. Similar to an

airspace coordination area, the dividing line for the z-axis is

based on threat avoidance, aircraft ordnance release altitudes,

and artillery trajectories. It is conceivable that a standardized

z-axis dividing line or base altitude can be established that accounts for the majority of the friendly and adversary weapons

systems. This is not to say that one size fits all, but one size

fits most. An outcome of a standardized base altitude is that it

establishes an expectation for the expeditionary future joint

force. A joint force can deploy to any theater and not only expect the same numbering convention for the surface grid system,

but also standard altitudes for the z-axis. Additionally, it estabBROWN

57
lishes a standard that can be used in training, irrespective of the

theater to which the joint force might be deployed. This paper

proposes a numbering convention that not only includes the grid

square, but also the altitude division for the z-axis. The kill box

example in figure 6 is based on a three-dimensional common

grid reference system using a 15,000-foot base altitude over flat

terrain.

Although the FSCL is not a measure of the past, nonlinear

and noncontiguous operations may not be conducive to having a line defining the boundaries for fire control. The FSCL

can be curved or enclosed, but the word line does not imply an

enclosed FSCM. Instead, it implies a division of the battlespace into forward and rear areas that have distinct differences in fire support coordination. During nonlinear and nonWALKER PAPER

58

Figure 6. Kill box grid square

5K’ AGL

UNLIMITED

SURFACE

K’ AGL

0K’ AGL

5K’ AGL

0K’ AGL

2

A BC

GRID DESIGNATION 2B-15K

KILL BOX GRID SQU LL BOX GRID SQUARE

SURFACE

IRE

AIR

IRE
contiguous operations, the differences between forward and

rear areas are less distinct, and a simple line cannot divide the

battlespace (fig. 7).

To account for nonlinear and noncontiguous operations, this

paper suggests adding the fire support coordination area (FSCA)

concept to joint doctrine. An FSCA serves the same purpose as

an FSCL but avoids additional and unnecessary coordination

in areas where friendly forces have bypassed or sandwiched

pockets of adversary resistance. The previously proposed threedimensional CGRS defines the lateral and vertical limits of the

FSCA and associated kill boxes. In simple terms, there would

be four three-dimensional coordination measures in effect for

the future joint force—no-fire area, restrictive fire area, fire

support coordination area, and free-fire area. The no-fire areas

BROWN

59

NONLINEAR AND

NONCONTIGUOUS OPER CONTIGUOUS OPERATIONSI

JOINT 

MANEUVER 

ORCE

OINT

MANEUVER

ORCE

OINT

MANEUVER

ORCE

JOINT 

MANEUVER 

ORCE

JOINT 

OBJECTIVE

FSCL

FSCL

FSCL FSCL

Figure 7. FSCL placement in nonlinear and noncontiguous operations
would be over friendly force locations and encircled by an FSCA.

Outside the FSCA, an area of open kill boxes would exist where

joint fires can shape the fight for a surface force in accordance

with the commander’s intent and mission-type orders. The

definitions for the no-fire area, restrictive fire area, and freefire area currently found in joint doctrine would not require

change. What would change is their employment and display

in joint doctrine (fig. 8).

A review of operations in Afghanistan highlighted that decision time has become the long pole in the tent, an issue rooted

in command authorities.13 This paper recommends combining

a standardized three-dimensional CGRS with FSCMs based on

valid assumptions to decrease the decision and coordination

WALKER PAPER

60

Figure 8. FSCMs in nonlinear and noncontiguous operations

Restricted Fire Area: an area where specific restr ictions are imposed and in which fires 

that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination

No-Fire Area: prohibits fires or their effects into an area unless approved on a mission- by-mission basis o friendly forces are engaged

Free-Fire Area a specific designated area into which any weapons system may fire without additional 

coordination

NFA

SCA

OPEN KILL BOXES

RFA

RFA

FSCMs IN NONLINEAR AND SCMs IN NONLINEAR AND

NONCONTIGUOUS OPER NONCONTIGUOUS OPERATIONSI

FREE F RE AREA

F RE AREA

FREE F RE AREA

F RE AREA
times for joint fires and maneuver integration. To do so, realtime digital tracking of friendly forces and digital dissemination and display of FSCMs throughout the future joint force

are requirements. Using agreed upon doctrinal assumptions

in the development of digital FSCMs would move commanders

and staffs from active participation to oversight of the FSCM

process. For example, digitally tracked friendly forces would

be covered by a no-fire area and encircled by a fire support coordination area defined by the doctrinal limits of its organic

fires. As the friendly force maneuvered, the no-fire area and

fire support area would reshape to accommodate the fire support requirements of the surface maneuver force. In real-time,

the status of the appropriate grid squares would be digitally

transmitted and displayed so that joint fires and maneuver

could be rapidly integrated to achieve the desired effects. At all

times, the supported commander would have the ability to adjust or override the organic fires buffer to match his concept

of operations. Depending on the situation, the supported commander could also delegate this authority to a supporting

commander, the JTASC, or a subordinate commander. This

same concept can be employed in linear operations. As the

friendly force moves forward, the buffer advances, and the status of the grids changes appropriately. In effect, the forward

trace of the grids defining the extent of the buffer zone would

be the FSCL (fig. 9).

Summary

A standardized three-dimensional common grid reference system combined with digital capabilities and doctrine concepts

introduced earlier could have decreased the FSCM friction that

existed during OEF and OIF. A supported commander would

have published an effects tasking order for the forces executing and supporting joint objectives in the area of operations.

The ETO would have described the concept of operations for

integrated joint fires and maneuver. Knowing the concept of

operations, desired effects, and the doctrinal FSCM standards,

the joint force would have had certain expectations on FSCM

placement and likelihood of change. Using these proposed docBROWN

61
trine concepts, friendly force tracking systems would have triggered automatic FSCL or FSCA updates that would have been

digitally broadcast throughout the joint force. Additionally,

open kill boxes inside the FSCL or FSCA would have closed to

prevent fratricide incidents as friendly forces approached. In

addition, FSCAs could have been established for the logistic lines

of communication supporting the rush towards Baghdad. With

a few exceptions, the FSCM system would have been primarily

hands-off monitored by the supported component headquarters and appropriate JTASC and overridden only as the situation dictated. Adopting the concepts proposed in this chapter

provides the future joint force with robust integration, synchronization, and coordination mechanisms to conduct joint

operations with less friction and greater efficiency. 

Notes

1. Bentley, “Afghanistan,” 12 (see chap. 6, n. 24).

2. Ibid., 12.

3. Ibid.

4. Findlay, “Fires and Maneuver,” 19 (see chap. 3, n. 2).

WALKER PAPER

62

Figure 9. Forward trace fire support coordination line. (Adapted from Lt

Col Steve Gray, “Joint Air-Ground Operations: Lesson Learned from Recent

Conflicts,” briefing, Langley AFB, Va., 12 May 2003, slide 18.)

LOT

D

C

B

A

4 6 8 9 10

7 9

B

SCL

FSCL

Air Component

Ground Component

oint
5. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 12-8 (see chap. 6, n. 8).

6. Ibid., 12-14.

7. Grant, Gulf War II, 20 (see chap. 5, n. 9).

8. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 4-5 (see chap. 6, n. 8).

9. Ibid., 4-5, 12-4, 12-5 (see chap. 6, n. 8); Marine Corps Combat Development Command Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Aviation Weapons

and Tactics Squadron One Lessons Learned, 67 (see chap. 6, n. 12).

10. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 12-8, 12-11 (see chap. 6, n. 8); Marine

Corps Combat Development Command Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One Lessons Learned, 151 (see

chap. 6, n. 12).

11. Grant, Gulf War II, 20 (see chap. 5, n. 9).

12. Maj Lynn I. Scheel, “Bullet Background Paper on Common Grid Reference System” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center,

20 November 2003), attachments 1–5; Air Land Sea Application Center,

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive

Targets, 20 April 2004, G-1. The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets changed the term common grid

reference system to common geographic reference system with its publication

in April 2004.

13. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lesson of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2002), 110.

BROWN

63
Chapter 8

Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams

There are many ways of going forward, but only one way of

standing still.

—Franklin D. Roosevelt

Having proposed doctrine concepts for the future joint force

in chapters 3 through 7, this chapter offers a top-level look at

the respective service concepts—Air and Space Expeditionary

Task Force (AETF) and the Army’s Future Force—and transformation efforts as they relate to the proposed doctrine concepts. The intent is to highlight synergies and seams detailing

how the doctrine concepts may enhance or minimize them, respectively. The conclusions reached in this chapter do not represent the “approved solutions,” rather they are food for

thought for use in shaping the future joint force.

In accordance with the Transformation Planning Guidance,

each of the services is required to publish its detailed transformation strategy to address the challenges of the future. The Air

Force’s Transformation Flight Plan and the Army’s Transformation Roadmap are the basis for analysis in this chapter. The

analysis reviews the future organizational constructs for each

service and the transformational capabilities and interdependencies that apply to air-ground integration. This chapter concludes with an estimation of synergy and seams and suggestions regarding areas for improvement and further study.

Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force

As a result of the post-cold-war environment which required

smaller and diverse regional commitments, the Air Force created

the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) concept.1 The concept allows the Air Force to present trained and ready combat

and support forces to combatant commanders on a rotational

and predictable basis. An AEF is not an employable entity but

is a pool of trained forces that can provide a set of capabilities to

65
a combatant commander. The Air Force has formed five AEF

pairs (10 AEFs total) which evenly divide expeditionary combat

and combat support resources across the AEFs. To round out

the capabilities of each AEF, air mobility, low-density/highdemand, and enabling (stealth, space, intelligence, and bomber)

forces are available to supplement, as required.2

Elements of an AEF will organize and deploy as an AETF. An

AETF presents a JFC with a tailored, task-organized, and integrated package of Air Force capabilities that have the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection.3 An AETF command element will have a commander, Air

Force forces (COMAFFOR); an appropriately sized staff and

adequate command and control facilities; and mechanisms to

direct and support forces in their achievement of joint objectives.4 Under this construct, an air and space operations center (AOC) serves as the command and control center for operational air and space forces and, an A-staff is responsible for

the range of support activities such as logistics, personnel,

medical, and security.5

The AETF force structure is completed by the deployment of

tailored AEF force packages organized as air and space expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons. Each of the expeditionary organizations can be either a deployed unit or unitslice with the appropriate level of command and control and

support assets deployed with it. Figure 10 displays a notional

AETF structure.6

An Air Force organizational concept in development is the

warfighting headquarters (WF HQ). The Air Force plans to have

10 WF HQs—seven regionally focused and three globally focused. A three- or four-star general will lead each WF HQ, and

the organization will be right-sized based on its geographic location, responsibilities, and mission. The WF HQ is designed

to enhance combat capability, integrate combat staffs with

AOCs, and provide the combatant commander with a single

Air Force voice that has a focused war-fighting structure.7 The

WF HQ will also enable the Air Force to integrate a standing

joint force headquarters into its organization.8

WALKER PAPER

66
Air Force Transformational

Capabilities and Interdependencies

The Air Force envisions joint force commanders will be able to

see the entire battlespace, identify key adversary centers of gravity, and apply the right force to the right place at the right time.9

Two concepts that facilitate this vision are parallel warfare and

effects-based operations (EBO).10 Under the EBO concept, joint

forces may strike fewer targets, with fewer weapons mitigating

risk to friendly forces and noncombatants. These concepts can

theoretically be effective, but current limitations in technology

and organizational structure prevent the military from achieving the full potential of parallel warfare and EBO.11

To address some of the current limitations and also enhance

future joint war fighting, several initiatives are ongoing between

the Air Force and other services. Those applicable to air-ground

integration include

• air component coordination element. During OIF, an

ACCE team was located within each component headquarters to integrate air and space power with the operations of the other components.

BROWN

67

COMAFFOR

AETF/CC

Air and Space Expeditionary Wing Air and Space Expeditionary Wing

A-Staff Air and Space 

Operations Center

Air and Space Expeditionary Group Air and Space Expeditionary Group

Air and Space Expeditionary Squadron

Air and Space Expeditionary Squadron

Figure 10. Notional AETF structure
• Army–Air Force discussions on improving cooperation. The Air Force and Army are working to improve air

support of ground forces in a number of forums. Action

items applicable to this paper include

— updating Joint Publication 3-09.3;

— providing ATACMS fire support to the JFACC;

— developing Joint Air Liaison Element Concept;

— improving liaison office manning, training, and teamwork;

— installing common, interoperable software;

— developing a joint simulator requirement for combat

air support;

— strengthening joint training;

— instituting battalion air liaison officers attending the

Army Battle Staff Course concept; and

— identifying command and control integration and

training improvements.

• improved data modem. This will provide critical Joint

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) data

to Army Apache helicopter gunships.

• joint command and control. Navy, Marines, and Air Force

are collaborating to synchronize the development of their

respective command and control programs, FORCEnet, and

the Command and Control Constellation.12

To move to a capabilities-based expeditionary force, the Air

Force developed six concepts of operations (CONOPS): global

mobility; global response; global strike; homeland security; nuclear response; and space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(C4ISR).13 The CONOPS are used to identify war-fighting capabilities needed to successfully engage and defeat potential enemies and drive the investment strategies to obtain those capabilities. Although the CONOPS are still evolving, preliminary

analysis by the Air Force has resulted in an anticipated 16

transformational capabilities. All 16 transformational capabilities will impact future joint operations, but seven have particular application to the concepts proposed in this paper:

WALKER PAPER

68
• seamless joint machine-to-machine integration of all

manned, unmanned, and space systems;

• real-time picture of the battlespace;

• predictive battlespace awareness;

• ensured use of the information domain via effective information assurance and information operations;

• order of magnitude increase in number of targets hit per

sortie;

• achievement of specific, tailored effects on a target short

of total destruction; and

• rapid and precise attack of any target on the globe with

persistent effects.

The Transformation Flight Plan lists a number of Air Force

programs that will make these transformational capabilities a

reality. Besides the Air Force programs, relevant DOTMLPF solutions and support from the other services are required for

these capabilities to reach their full potential. The support the

Air Force requires from the other services that is specific to

air-ground integration includes

• jointly developed communications and information systems to satisfy all services’ requirements and to ensure a

common operational picture and a single interpretation of

processed information. All services should jointly pursue

common hardware and software development to ensure

interoperability and to reduce development, procurement,

and overall operation and maintenance costs.

• all services should follow the new Defense Information Systems Agency Net-Centric Operations and Warfare and the

Net-Centric Enterprise Services processes. This will ensure

better machine-to-machine interfaces and system interoperability between the services and joint commands.

• a joint fire control system-of-systems that enables the

joint force commander to seamlessly access the sensorto-shooter assets of all the services to put a cursor over a

target in a timely manner.

• coordinated information operations efforts, to include ensuring that all information systems are effectively protected against adversary information operations.

BROWN

69
• continued improved coordination of air operations and combat air support between the services. This includes coming to a common agreement with the Navy on metrics to

measure capabilities packaged in an air and space expeditionary force and a carrier strike group.14

The Future Force

Like the Air Force, the Army is transforming its force to meet

the national security demands of the post-cold-war environment.

The Army intends to develop more modular, strategically responsive organizations while cultivating and institutionalizing a joint

and expeditionary mind-set throughout the force.15 This organizational transformation enables the Army to significantly contribute to increasing a combatant commander’s ability to rapidly

defeat an adversary or control any situation across the range of

military operations.16 To achieve this end, the future force will be

organized into two modular capabilities-based joint organizations—unit of action (UA) and unit of employment (UE).17

The UA will be brigade-size combat maneuver elements and

be the decisive, tactical war-fighting elements within the Army.18

Modular units of employment, as either an UEX or UEY, will

provide command and control for units of action. Within this

construct, the UEX would be a higher tactical headquarters

and the UEY would be an operational-level headquarters.19

Besides being able to accept joint capabilities such as a standing joint force headquarters, both UE types will have the organic capability to serve as a joint task force or land component headquarters.20 Figure 11 illustrates how the future force

levels of command will transform from their current state to

one which supports the modular and responsive future force.

In addition to the UE, future force organizations will be supported by home station operations centers (HSOC) which facilitate rapid force projection and provide reachback, planning,

and analysis capabilities while reducing the forward-deployed

footprint.21

WALKER PAPER

70
Army Transformational

Capabilities and Interdependencies

The modular capabilities-based future force will enable a joint

force commander to create rapidly deployable and tailorable

force capability packages, which will enhance and enable fullspectrum dominance by the future joint force.22 Future force

campaigns will embody interdependent, network-centric, effectbased operations, which will be characterized as simultaneous,

distributed, noncontiguous, and nonlinear.23 The broad dispersal of joint forces in a rapidly executed operation with these

attributes will place heavy demands on joint force leadership

and command and control.24 In that light the Army views battle command, the art and science of applying leadership, and

decision making to achieve mission success as an essential

operational capability.25

BROWN

71

xxxx

xxx

xx

x

Levels of Command – Transformed From 3 to 2 Standing Echelons

o n – Campaign Level

tegrates the militar nstr ment with other

instr ments o w (DIM

tegrates all elements o he oint rce

Operationa – Ma or Land Operations

an and exec ma or land o rations

O chestrates oint MN & nteragenc

rations

Exec ADCON/A O

Tactical – Battles

ts together com imentar and rein rcing

c a lities with engagements to achie

militar conditions w hin a s ci ied AO

Tactical – Engagemen

Close com at

G nerates s ci ic eff cts comes within

th AO

JFC

ASCC

CORPS

JFLCC

DIV

UA R& tri

AVN ROT

UEx

UEv

BDE

ll types o mane nd

upp igades

Curren Transformed

Figure 11. Future force levels of command. (Reprinted from Unit of Employment [UE] Operations White Paper, version 2.4, fourth draft [Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Army Command and General Staff College, 19 February

2004], 8.)
Under the overarching JOpsC, there are four supporting joint

operating concepts (JOC). The Army Transformation Roadmap

uses the JOCs to define capabilities the future force and joint

force will require to be successful. Although the JOCs are interrelated and are not likely to be executed in isolation, the Army

identifies the following required air-ground integration applicable capabilities to support the major combat operations JOC:

• modular, combined arms combat forces rapidly deployable

in a ready-to-fight configuration into a JOA or multiple

JOAs at the times and locations required by the combatant

commander and consistent with time frames specified in

the defense strategy;

• part of networked joint fires linking sensors to shooters,

line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS), kinetic

and nonkinetic lethality capabilities that deliver precise and

desired effects at the ranges required for decisive operations by rapid, integrated, and near-simultaneous application of joint forces throughout the joint operations area;

• battle command on-the-move capabilities that support and

enable rapid, integrated, and near-simultaneous operations

throughout the joint operations area, including the land

force component of the common operational picture, realtime blue and gray force (commercial, civilian, noncombatant, etc.) tracking, en route/on-the-move mission planning

and rehearsal capabilities, and long-range communications;

• knowledge-based collaborative planning and decision support tools integrated with joint planning systems/processes,

including near-term good-enough capabilities and, for the

longer-term, development of a single, joint interoperable

battle command system of systems;

• Army force headquarters designed to operate as a JFLCC

headquarters, and when augmented with the appropriate

SJFHQ and Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)

elements, function as a joint task force headquarters; and

• home station operations centers to support rapid force

projection and provide reachback, planning, and analysis

capabilities, while reducing footprint in the joint operations area.26

WALKER PAPER

72
The Army also identifies several interdependent capabilities

required by the joint community that are applicable to future

air-ground integration:

• joint-integrated command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

capabilities and networks to gain information superiority,

share a common operational picture, determine the enemy’s

systemology, enhance joint-integrated information operations, and improve the ability of joint force and component commanders to synchronize operations based on

better, more timely decisions at a pace that the enemy

cannot match;

• commonality of doctrine, terms, graphics, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and visual tools and displays;

• networked joint fires that support mounted and dismounted

maneuver in all conditions throughout the breadth and

depth of the joint operations area; and

• joint-integrated fire control system of systems for more effective and timely application of all-source fires and effects.27

The Army Transformation Roadmap lists a number of transformational capabilities to make the future force a relevant

and ready asset to the joint team. In addressing future battle

command issues, Army and joint analysis has provided some

insight into essential capabilities for the future joint force:

• joint and coalition interoperability—a requirement to meet

joint interoperability existing and emerging standards

over time;

• friendly locations—a need for a near-real-time, digitized,

visualization tool to display locations of all services, allies,

coalition, and interagency formations within the battlespace;

• current enemy situation—a need for a digital visualization

tool to display and provide knowledge of all enemy formations in the battlespace;

• running estimate—a collaborative, predictive tool and capability tied to the commander’s critical information requirements and decision making;

BROWN

73
• graphic control measures—a need for a management and

visualization tool to display operational graphics in relationship to the joint operations area and terrain;

• fragmentary order—a digital capability to exchange information changes of mission, intent, or priorities with

higher, lower, and adjacent units in the battlespace; and

• fire support coordination measures—a need for a digitized, visualization and management tool that enables the

execution and deconfliction of fires.28

The combination of the interdependent capabilities and the

battle command essential capabilities points out the types of

capabilities the future joint force will require to achieve airground integration.

The Way Ahead

Before specifically addressing the potential synergies and

seams and how the doctrine concepts introduced in this paper

may enhance or minimize them, a short summary of the concepts might be helpful.

• Supported/Supporting Relationships. An area of operations or doctrinal mission should not predetermine support relationships. Declaration of support relationships,

areas of operations, and mission responsibilities are left

to the discretion of the JFC to best facilitate the concept

of operations.

• Establishing Directives and Emerging Concepts. Use establishing directives, campaign plans, operation plans and/

or operation orders that explicitly state support relationships, commander’s intent, mission-type orders, and triggers for joint battle handover. The establishing directive

would employ a standardized format and be written for a

joint cross-functional audience. Emerging command and

control concepts include joint tactical actions, prioritized

effects lists, effects tasking orders, standing joint force

headquarters, reachback, and alternative command structures.

WALKER PAPER

74
• Synchronization of Interdiction and Maneuver.

Change synchronization to integration, employing prioritized effects lists and effects tasking orders. Consider integrated interdiction and maneuver a joint tactical action

controlled by joint tactical action support centers that can

increase their core capabilities via augmentation or reachback as required.

• Joint Fires Concepts. All fires in support of a joint force

commander’s concept of operations are joint fires. Command and control of integrated joint fires and maneuver executed by responsive and interoperable joint organizations

at every level—component coordination elements, joint tactical action support centers, and joint fire control teams. 

• Fire Support Coordination Measures. Establish a joint

three-dimensional common grid reference standard that

can be used to rapidly designate coordination measures.

Use fire support coordination areas in nonlinear and noncontiguous operations. Couple digitized friendly force tracking with digitized coordination measures using established

doctrinal standards to facilitate real-time updates.

Considering the transformation efforts by the Air Force and

Army, the doctrine concepts listed above can become a reality

for the AETF and the future force. Both services have common

goals that they are either working towards or have identified

as requiring more attention. A top-level review of these efforts

shows not only the promise for future joint force synergy, but

also the potential for seams (table).

The AETF and future force are both modular and expeditionary organizational structures designed to support the needs

of future JFCs. These organizational schemes can allow a JFC

to create tailored force packages to generate the synergistic effects required to achieve the operational objectives. However, a

methodology does not exist to allow a JFC to execute capabilities-based trade-offs to ensure the best mix of capabilities is

included in a tailored joint force package. The Air Force has

specifically mentioned this requirement when comparing AEFs

with carrier strike groups, but this concept needs to expand

throughout the joint force to avoid an inappropriate mix of capabilities with an oversized deployed footprint. The paper

BROWN

75
recommends development of capability trade-off models to assist

future commanders in rapidly assessing a mix of joint capabilities and making adjustments as the situation dictates to maximize synergy and minimize seams.

Both services are developing operational-level command structures to support their modular forces. The warfighting headquarters and unit of employment both state that they can be

augmented by SJFHQs. However, seamless augmentation will

depend upon jointly developed communications and information

systems—an interdependent capability identified by both services. As these headquarter concepts are developed, this paper

recommends developing a minimum essential joint communications and information systems list. Developing and enforcing

such a list facilitates the seamless integration of command and

control organizations like the SJFHQs, component coordination

elements, and joint tactical action support centers.

WALKER PAPER

76

Modular, tailorable, and expeditionary organizational structureMethodology or tools for capabilitiesbased trade-offs

New operational-level organizations focused on war fightingLacking jointly developed and interoperable communication and information systems to allow seamless integration

Liaison concepts for new headquarters

Digital fragmentary order Digitized establishing directive and overarching mechanisms to integrate effects

Joint integrated fire control system-of-systemsComparable maneuver control system-ofsystems to integrate joint fires and

maneuver

Digitized coordination measures Methodology to decrease decision-cycle

times

Table. Potential synergies and seams

Potential Synergy Potential Seam
Liaison manning, training, and teamwork have had success

and are still being worked by the Air Force and Army. As the

WF HQ, UE, and HSOC concepts are developed, liaison concepts

must evolve to keep pace. Adopting the coordination control

element for all components, as proposed in this paper, can assist in addressing this broad issue. The services must identify

their liaison requirements for each of their respective headquarters organizations. They must also determine CCE manning levels for both steady-state and contingency operations.

During OIF, the air component stood up seven previously nonexistent air component coordination elements, the largest being

at the land component headquarters.29 Conversely, the Army

has four standing battlefield coordination detachments, three

active duty and one reserve, that can be placed in an AOC.30

The services must settle on the number of CCEs required and

whether they are activated only during contingencies, fully

manned and functional at all times, or somewhere in between.

Regardless of what liaison concept the services elect to pursue, liaison manning and training requirements will be issues

that must be dealt with, preferably sooner than later.

A promising essential capability described in the Army Transformation Roadmap related to establishing directives is the digital fragmentary order.

31 An abbreviated operation order, the

digital fragmentary order, is designed to quickly disseminate

changes of mission, intent, and priorities. This paper recommends expanding this capability to include the establishing

directive (which articulates the original mission, intent, and

priorities), prioritized effects list, and effects tasking order

concepts. Adopting and expanding this capability enables the

future joint force to digitally disseminate mission, intent, and

prioritized effects and rapidly match those effects to capabilities for execution.

Joint integrated fire control systems that allow machine-tomachine interface to facilitate seamless sensor-to-shooter execution have been identified by both services as a capability

that needs joint attention. Creating the previously discussed

minimum essential joint communications and information systems list is an avenue to address this issue. However, an airground integration seam is likely to exist until fully interoperBROWN

77
able communications and information systems are available

that can execute integrated joint fires and maneuver. This

paper recommends the services expand this issue to include

developing comparable systems to control joint maneuver.

Adopting the proposals in this paragraph and fire support coordination measure recommendations in this paper can facilitate digitized coordination measures and decrease decision

cycle times during rapidly executed, dispersed operations.

Conclusion

The future joint force has outstanding potential for synergy

at the right place, at the right time, with the right effect. However, as this paper suggests, reaching that potential still requires some work to eliminate or at least minimize the seams.

Despite the challenges associated with the fog and friction of

combat operations, today’s joint force has executed exceptionally well. Successful operations have relied on ingenuity and

drive when doctrine for the situation was either not appropriate or not yet developed. Advancing air-ground integration will

require doctrine compromises by both services and several

technological solutions that are either in development or still

need joint attention.

While waiting for technological solutions, doctrine development for the future joint force should not stagnate, and the

services should recognize that doctrine compromises in the

near-term are sure to be less costly than seams in future joint

operations. To create synergy and minimize seams, the doctrine concepts proposed in this paper should be adopted

and/or explored in more detail to facilitate air-ground integration during rapidly executable, globally and operationally distributed, simultaneous, and sequential operations.32

Notes

1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 73

(see chap. 4, n. 16).

2. United States Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, United States Air Force, Future Concepts

and Transformation Division, November 2003), 31.

WALKER PAPER

78
3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 73

(see chap. 4, n. 16).

4. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 February 2000, 36.

5. Ibid., 36–37.

6. Ibid., 42.

7. United States Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 40.

8. Ibid., B-3.

9. Ibid., 6.

10. Ibid. Parallel warfare refers to simultaneous attack of carefully selected targets as opposed to a sequential destruction of targets. Effectsbased operations are based on designing campaign actions to achieve desired outcomes rather than simply destroying targets.

11. Ibid., 7.

12. Ibid., 15–16.

13. Ibid., 41.

14. Ibid., 72–73.

15. United States Army, 2003 United States Army Transformation

Roadmap (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army

Transformation Office, 1 November 2003), 1-11.

16. Ibid.

17. United States Army, The Army in 2020 White Paper (Arlington, Va.:

Objective Force Task Force, 1 November 2003), 10.

18. United States Army, The Army in 2020, 10.

19. United States Army, 2003 United States Army Transformation

Roadmap, 1-11.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 3-10.

22. Ibid., 1-11.

23. Ibid., 1-9.

24. Ibid., 3-6.

25. Ibid., 2-1.

26. Ibid., 3-9 to 3-10.

27. Ibid., 3-11 to 3-12.

28. Ibid., 8-7.

29. Amy Butler, “As A-10 Shines in Iraq War” (see chap. 6, n. 36).

30. Kelly and Andreasen, “Joint Fires” (see chap. 6, n. 4).

31. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 213 (see chap. 3, n. 9). A fragmentary order is an abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written,

or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for

restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued

in sections. It is issued after an operation order to change or modify that

order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

32. Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concept, 9 (see chap. 1, n. 1).

BROWN

79
Appendix A

Current Doctrine:

Supported/Supporting Relationships

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),

states that support is a command authority that can be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of

combatant command.1 Flexible by design, the support relationship conveys priorities and resources required for the

planning and execution of joint operations.2 In short, it helps

commanders manage expectations between and within elements of a joint force.

When designating a supported commander, the JFC stipulates the purpose and time associated with the designation.

Unless limited by the JFC, the supported commander has the

authority to exercise the general direction of the supporting effort to include designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and any

additional guidance to ensure the efficiency and success of the

supported effort.

In accordance with current joint doctrine, the supporting

commander aids, protects, complements, or sustains the supported commander’s force and is responsible for providing the

assistance required by the supported commander.3 A supporting commander is involved in the planning and integration of

forces and capabilities into the supported commander’s scheme

of operations. The supporting commander ascertains the needs

of the supported force, ensures the support requirements are

communicated within his organization(s), and takes the appropriate actions within existing capabilities, consistent with

priorities and requirements of the assigned tasks.4

Designating Support Relationships

by Areas of Operations and Missions

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military Terms, describes an area of operations as “an opera81
tional area defined by the joint force commander for land and

naval forces.”5 An area of operations does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander,

but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.6 More importantly, joint doctrine declares that land and maritime component commanders are the supported commanders within their

assigned areas of operations. Additionally as supported commanders, they are responsible for integrating and synchronizing maneuver, fires, and interdiction within their assigned

area of operations. Under this authority, land and naval commanders designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires

within their respective areas of operations. 7

As depicted in figure 12, the area of operations definition

connotes that the areas outside the land and naval areas of

operations belong to the JFC and are not assigned necessarily

82

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER’S AREA OF OPERATIONS

Land Force Commander ’s

Area of Operations

Joint Force Commander’s Operationa Area

Nava Force Commander ’s Area of Operations

Figure 12. Area of operation. (Reprinted from Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia,

16 July 1997, 46.)
to another component commander. The JFC can, however,

designate a joint special operations area for the conduct of

special operations activities.8 Similar to the land and maritime

component commanders, joint special operations commanders are supported commanders within a joint special operations area.9

As with areas of operations, doctrinal missions have been

used in the past to define supported/supporting relationships.

For example, the JFACC is normally the supported commander for the theater and/or joint operations areawide counterair and overall air interdiction missions.10 The joint doctrine

tide, however, is shifting away from specifically designating

supported/supporting relationships by mission with the recent approval of Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control

of Joint Air Operations. Specific missions that once defined

supported/supporting relationships for the air component are

now listed as responsibilities.11

Notes

1. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), xii (see chap. 2, n. 9).

2. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 659 (see chap. 4, n. 7).

3. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 511 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

4. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 664–65 (see chap. 4, n. 7).

5. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 385 (see chap. 3, n. 9). An operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted.

6. Ibid., 44.

7. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, II-10 (see chap. 4, n. 8).

8. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 288 (see chap. 3, n. 9). A special

operations area is defined as a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a special operations

force to conduct special operations activities.

9. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, III-7.

10. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 October 1999, II-4. Counterair is defined as a mission that integrates offensive

and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. Also see JP 3-03, Doctrine

for Joint Interdiction Operations, 10 April 1997, II-8.

11. JP, 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, II-1 to II-2

(see chap. 3, n. 11).

83
Appendix B

Current Doctrine: Establishing Directives

Joint Publication 1-02 defines command and control as

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through

the arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,

and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.1

Command requires joint force commanders to visualize the

current state of friendly and enemy forces, then formulate concepts of operations to achieve a desired end. Control regulates

friendly forces and functions to execute commander’s intent by

assessing requirements, allocating means, and integrating effects.2 Carrying out these inherent command and control functions requires capable planning and execution systems. The precision with which these systems operate significantly enhances

the speed and accuracy of information transfer between commanders, thus increasing synergy during joint operations.3

Establishing Directive

To allow the exercise of command and control authorities, the

joint force commander normally issues an establishing directive.

As an establishing authority, the JFC is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commanders understand the supported commander’s degree of authority. An

establishing directive is used at all levels of command. The establishing directive guidance from existing joint doctrine is provided as a frame of reference.

An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the

purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the

scope of the action to be taken. It should also include

• the forces and other resources allocated to the supporting

effort;

• the time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;

85
• the relative priority of the supporting effort;

• the authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and

• the degree of authority granted to the supported commander

over the supporting effort.

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported

commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the

designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing

and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions

necessary for coordination and efficiency.4

Commander’s Intent and Mission-Type Orders

Embedded within an establishing directive and key to

achieving the implicit communication desired are two underlying concepts discussed in joint doctrine—commander’s intent

and mission-type orders. Both of these concepts are essential to

allow decentralized execution of joint operations. Commander’s

intent concisely expresses the purpose and desired end state

of an operation. It is not a summary of the concept of operations but is the overarching guidance that allows subordinates

to pursue the desired end state without further orders.5 So as

not to stifle initiative during changing situations, the intent

statement may contain an assessment on where and how the

commander is willing to accept increased risk during the operation. Despite the changing conditions and unexpected challenges during the operation, the commander’s intent usually

remains unchanged.

Having defined the desired end state with commander’s intent, mission-type orders outline the execution to reach that end

state. Mission-type orders direct the joint force to perform a

mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. In accordance with commander’s intent and concept of operations,

a superior commander delegates the authority and responsibility to conduct elements of operations by issuing missiontype orders. Most importantly, the details of execution and

freedom of action to accomplish the mission are left to the

86
subordinate.6 The lack of specifics encourages initiative and

facilitates decentralized execution within a joint force.

Notes

1. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms (see chap. 3, n. 9), 100.

2. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (see chap. 4, n. 7), 161.

3. Ibid., 162.

4. Ibid., 663.

5. Ibid., 175; and JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (see chap.

2, n. 9), III-15.

6. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (see chap. 4, n. 7), 522–23; and JP 0-2,

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (see chap. 2, n. 9), III-15.

87
Appendix C

Current Doctrine: Synchronization

of Interdiction and Maneuver

Joint Publication 1-02 defines interdiction as “an action to

divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military

potential before it can be used effectively against friendly

forces.”1 The target type, weapon employed, or executing component does not define an operation or mission as interdiction;

the desired effect makes this determination. Current joint doctrine outlines four objectives, or effects, that can be achieved

by interdiction—diversion, disruption, delay, and destruction. 

Diversion prevents enemy forces from reaching their operational or tactical objectives. More specifically, interdiction missions are designed to divert adversary resources from being

used for their intended purpose(s). This includes personnel,

equipment, or supplies reaching a specific location at a designated time to counter friendly force objectives. It could also include diverting enemy resources to repair damage from an interdiction mission or protect vulnerable centers of gravity.2

Interdiction attacks on lines of communications, critical infrastructure, and telecommunications nodes disrupt an enemy’s

movement of resources and information.3 Additionally, interdiction can delay an enemy’s movement of war-fighting resources,

increasing the time an adversary is vulnerable to attack and

maneuver effects promulgated by a joint force.4 Finally, destruction is the “most direct” interdiction method and can cause diversion, disruption, and/or delay to an enemy force.5 Clearly,

the four interdiction objectives, or effects, are closely related and

are not typically realized in isolation. Each objective or effect

has the potential to make an enemy vulnerable to the joint force

by channeling movement, constricting logistics, and forcing inadequately planned and time-urgent movements.6

Although Joint Publication 3-03 suggests that interdiction is

accomplished by any component of the joint force, the focus of

the publication is air interdiction. Additionally, the Joint Publication 1-02 definitions for air interdiction and interdiction differ.

89
Air interdiction operations are defined as air operations conducted to

destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can

be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance

from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with

the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.7

A JFACC, who has the preponderance of the interdiction assets that have theater- and/or joint operations area (JOA)-

wide range and capability, is delegated the responsibility to

plan and execute theater- and/or JOA-wide interdiction operations.8 Also, if supported land or naval commanders cannot

strike an interdiction target in their respective areas with organic assets, the target is turned over to the JFACC for prosecution with joint interdiction assets.9 Interestingly, the only

joint interdiction assets the JFACC controls are air assets. 

Maneuver Definition

In the context of synchronizing with interdiction, joint doctrine defines maneuver as the “employment of forces in the

battlespace through movement in combination with fires to

achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission.”10 Maneuver places an adversary in a

position of disadvantage through the flexible application of

combat power at decisive points achieving surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum.11 By maneuvering to

a position of advantage, air, land, and naval forces control an

adversary’s centers of gravity, achieving an effect instead of

using attrition warfare. Creating the right effect at the appropriate time renders an opponent incapable of resistance and

impacts his ability to operate as an effective fighting force.

The concept of maneuver is in a process of evolution within

joint doctrine. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, dated 1997, identifies land and naval forces (including their organic air assets) as

the only elements of the joint force that can maneuver to control

enemy centers of gravity.12 The 2001 update of Joint Publication

3-0 no longer makes the distinction between organic and nonorganic air assets and now includes air forces as a maneuver element.13 Considering all air assets maneuver elements is a step in

the right direction. However, joint doctrine lacks detail on how air

maneuver might be integrated into joint operations. 

90
Synchronization of

Interdiction and Maneuver

Joint Publication 1-02 defines synchronization “as the

arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to

produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place

and time.”14 When interdiction and maneuver are synchronized, they can be the most dynamic concept available to the

joint force.15 The complementary aspects of maneuver and interdiction create dilemmas for an adversary force requiring

time-critical decisions, which could put that force at a disadvantage. An opponent can elect to remain stationary and engage maneuver forces from a disadvantage or reposition and

expose its resources to interdiction strikes. If the joint force is

at a disadvantage, interdiction can divert, disrupt, delay, or

destroy elements of an adversary force so the joint force can

maneuver and engage on advantageous terms.

Notes

1. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms (see chap. 3, n. 9), 266.

2. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations (see app. A, n. 10), I-2.

3. Ibid., I-2 to I-3.

4. Ibid., I-3 to I-4.

5. Ibid., I-4.

6. Ibid., I-4 to I-5.

7. Ibid., II-4.

8. Ibid., II-7.

9. Ibid., II-13.

10. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms (see chap. 3, n. 9), 316.

11. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (see chap. 4, n. 8), IV-9.

12. Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (see chap. 4, n. 7), 481.

13. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (see chap. 4, n. 8), IV-10.

14. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms (see chap. 3, n. 9), 516.

15. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (see chap. 4, n. 8), IV-13 to IV14.

91
Appendix D

Current Doctrine: Joint Fires

Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, defines fires as “the effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons.”1 In

accordance with doctrine, air, land, naval, space, and special

operations assets are all capable of delivering fires.2 This definition covers the whole gambit of effects available to a joint

force commander. Lethal weapons effects come to mind when

one thinks of fires in combat operations. However, this definition includes nonlethal weapons effects usually delivered via

nonkinetic means, like electronic warfare, psychological operations, and information operations.3 “Fires produced during

the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective” are defined as

joint fires.

4

Joint fire support is defined as “joint fires that assist air,

land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to

move; maneuver; and control territory, populations, airspace,

and key waters.”5 The joint fire support structure is composed

of three parts: target acquisition, command and control, and

attack resources.6 In combination, these three subsystems enable a joint force commander to achieve his objectives by being

able to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess an adversary

target set.

Joint Fires Command and Control

Joint fire support command and control should encompass

the entire realm of joint fires, both surface-delivered and airdelivered. Joint doctrine, however, focuses its discussion on

the command and control of air-delivered joint fires as can be

seen in both joint interdiction and CAS doctrine discussions.

In fact, the command and control structure used to execute

joint fire support is found in Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, and

is extremely complicated. A wiring diagram of the Theater Air

93
Ground System coordination links (fig. 13) is included below not

so much for its content, but to merely demonstrate the complexity associated with the command and control of joint fires.

Joint Publication 3-09.3 outlines how these coordination

links are executed relative to command relationships. It states

that if a command relationship is established between components, the supporting components use the command and control system of the supported component.7 If a command relationship is not established, each component uses its own

command and control system.8 This can be a daunting task

considering that joint doctrine discusses five different command and control systems that might be used. As figure 14 illustrates, the CAS command and control agencies vary by

component and do not possess the same capabilities across the

board. For ease of explanation within this paper, the CAS command and control agencies have been grouped into four cate94

AFFOR

OC OC

RE

RC

LS

ADA

WACS

CC NO

FAC/TAC(A)

DA DA

DE

-STARS

BN

X X

X X

XXX

X X

X X

CP

FSE

ACP

C(A)

AC(A)

SSE

DASC(A)

AC(A)

AC

BN

ACP

AO

TF NETS

CE/DIV

EGT

ACP

FS

AO

CP

ACP

AO

BDE

CP

FSE

ACP

NGP

CP

FSE

A2C2

ACP

ORPS

LO

ASOC

FSE

A2C2

ACP

NO ARFOR JFACC

AOC

ADC

CD

ARLO

OLE

ALE

ME

LO

ALCE

AADC CA MARFOR NAVFOR FSOC

FSOC RSOC NSOC

TF/OTC

CV

CE/WING

ACC/TADC

ASC ATCD

AGTF/MEF

AD COC

AWC

ADC

W/C HAWK DET

REC

DG

SUWC VW STAFF STAFF

2WC

DRPS

BDE/REGT

BN

AWC TWC SWC

TRIKE

PS

ACTICAL A

REQUEST NET

AIR FORCE AIR

EQUEST NET

VENGER

NITS TINGER

NITS

GAGEMENT

ECTION

TRIKE

LANS

OMCARGRU/CWC

ADC/TA

ATF/CWC

ACC

JFC

OC

THEATER AIR GROUND SYSTEM COORDINATION LINKS

Figure 13. Theater Air Ground System coordination links. (Reprinted from

Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998, II-8.)
gories: component headquarters; liaison elements; planning, coordination, and control agencies; and terminal control assets.

The component headquarters is the senior agency for tasking and exercising joint fires support. The liaison elements

provide an interface between the supported and supporting

components of the joint force. Figure 14 depicts the liaison elements that are found within an air and space operations center. The planning, coordination, and control agencies are pri95

Component

Headquarters

Liaison

Elements

Planning,

Coordination,

and Control

Terminal

Control

A sets erminal Attack ontroller

actical Air ontrol Part y

orward Air ontroller Airborne)

actical Air ontroller Airborne)

A Support Operations Center

ontrol and eporting Center

A and Space Operations Center

SAF

heater Air ontrol System

ire Support lement/Airspace ommand an ontrol

attlefield 

ordination Detachment

SA

Army Air-Ground

ystem

COMPONENT AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPOR LOSE AIR SUPPORT

orward Air ontroller Airborne)

actical A ontroller Airborne)

Supporting Arms ordination enter

A Support ordination ection

lee Air Warfare enter

aval and Amphibious Liaison Element

actical A ontrol Center/

actical A Direction Center

SN

avy Tactical A ontrol System

orward Air ontroller

actical A ontrol Part y

orward Air ontroller Airborne)

actical A ontroller Airborne)

ire Support ordination enter

Direct Air Support enter

actical A Operations Center

Marine Liaison O cer

actical A ontrol Center/

actical A Direction Center

SMC

Marine Air ommand an ontrol System

oin erminal A tack Controlle Qual ied Specia Operations ersonnel

pecial Operations ommand and ontrol Element

pecial Operations ommand and ontrol Element

pecial Operations iaison Element

oin pecial Operations Air omponent

OF

A Command nd Control

Figure 14. Component air command and control agencies for close air

support. (Adapted from Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Close Air Support [CAS] [see chap. 6, n. 38].)
marily responsible for battle management and joint fire support planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization

functions. Finally, terminal control assets are typically the

principal liaison with ground maneuver units serving as advisors on the employment and limitations of airpower. They assist in the planning, requesting, and coordinating of CAS assets and are uniquely qualified to conduct terminal attack

control for CAS aircraft. In some cases, terminal control assets

may include a forward air controller (airborne) or FAC(A), an

airborne extension of surface-based terminal control assets.9

As the last couple of paragraphs have described, the execution of joint fire support is CAS-centric. When doctrine addresses joint fire support, CAS command and control structures and processes are the only ones discussed. Current joint

doctrine provides very little guidance on the command and

control of all joint fires. The combination of CAS-focus and

lack of other joint fires command and control guidance is a

doctrine deficiency. To achieve the JOpsC vision, doctrine concepts are required to support joint fires from any and all elements of the joint force. 

Notes

1. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998, I-1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 279 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

5. Ibid.

6. JP 3-09, II-1.

7. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), II-1 (see chap. 6, n. 38).

8. Ibid., II-1.

9. Ibid., II-10.

96
Appendix E

Current Doctrine:

Fire Support Coordination Measures

Fire support coordination measures expedite attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical pieces of infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; deconflict

fire support operations; and establish conditions for future operations.1 Permissive measures facilitate the attack of targets.

With the exception of the fire support coordination line, permissive measures do not require additional, detailed coordination prior to weapons employment.2 Conversely, restrictive

measures primarily protect friendly forces and impose requirements for specific coordination before target engagement.3 Elements of the joint force have different perspectives on permissive FSCMs and how their placement takes the best advantage

of their respective capabilities. This difference of opinion has

led to some air-ground operations friction. The ability for so

many elements of the joint force to affect an adversary with

fires in a permissive environment drives the debate on two of

the more commonly employed permissive measures, the fire

support coordination line and kill box.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The FSCL might well be considered the most important line

in the battlespace related to air-ground operations. The FSCL

placement defines command and control and support relationships for the execution of joint fires. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the FSCL as follows:

A fire support coordinating measure that is established and adjusted by

appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCL) facilitate the

expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by

defining a boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for

close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and seabased weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attack97
ing targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in

sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the

attack will not produce adverse attacks on, or to the rear of, the line.

Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders

of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circumstances,

the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of

targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the

risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources.4

There is a distinct difference in joint fires employment short

of and beyond the FSCL. Short of the FSCL, the appropriate

surface commander controls all fires. Beyond the FSCL, all

commanders must coordinate in sufficient time to allow the

necessary deconfliction and protection actions to take place.

Attacks beyond the FSCL must not produce adverse effects or

be considered “free-fire area” operations. They must be coordinated and deconflicted to the maximum extent possible in the

support of joint force objectives.5 Additionally, FSCL changes

must be coordinated and disseminated to all affected forces in

sufficient time to allow incorporation within these forces

and/or their components. Six hours is the doctrinal standard

to accomplish coordination and dissemination.6

The FSCL is not a requirement for joint operations, but if

used, its placement should be based on the commander’s concept of operations (anticipated rate of movement and tempo),

enemy force locations, and organic firepower.

7 Per Army doctrine, the primary consideration for placement of a FSCL is

that it be located beyond the area in which a corps intends to

shape the deep fight. Under this premise, the FSCL may be established well beyond the range of cannon and multiple rocket

field artillery systems.8 The firepower that a corps uses to

shape the battlespace deep fight is not limited to surface fires

but also includes air-delivered fires. Air Force doctrine has a

slightly different take on FSCL placement. 

The optimum placement of the FSCL varies with specific battlefield circumstances, but typically it should be placed where the capability to

produce the preponderance of effects on the battlefield shifts from the

ground component to the air component. In this way, the FSCL placement maximizes the overall effectiveness of the joint force, and each

98
component will suffer the minimum reduction in efficiency. To place

the FSCL so deep or shallow that one component is given complete

freedom to operate will usually result in the other components being

so restricted that overall joint effectiveness suffers.9

Deep placement of the FSCL can create situations where the

range and density of organic fires, when combined with the

requisite control of inorganic fires, can give an adversary a

sanctuary from attack. Conversely, an FSCL not placed deep

enough may constrain the ground scheme of maneuver due to

the coordination time required to implement an FSCL change.

Ideally, tactical units would place the FSCL at a range where

most of the organic indirect fires could engage targets short of

the FSCL. However, FSCL placement is typically a nominative

process with the JFC making the final determination. For a

variety of reasons, the FSCL is often placed further out than

some tactical ground units and the air component might prefer, hence the continuing debate.

Current joint doctrine makes a single cursory comment on

FSCMs in nonlinear operations stating: FSCLs do not have to

follow “traditional” straight-line paths; curved and/or enclosed

FSCLs have applications in nonlinear joint operations.10 Air

Force doctrine gives a more detailed discussion, but recognizes

that FSCMs in a nonlinear environment can be very complex.

One option is to create a new fire support coordination measure, based

on a standardized box, circle, or other easily employed shape, to accomplish the same task that the FSCL performs for the linear battlefield. By drawing lines around the areas occupied by friendly troops,

properly padded for both close proximity and intended scheme of maneuver, there would be large areas left available for more unrestricted

“beyond the FSCL” type of air attack. This discussion presents the concept of nonlinear coordination in very simple terms, as any real example would be very complex and would require great flexibility.11

Battlefield Coordination Line

and Airspace Coordination Area

Although not codified as joint doctrine, the Marines have instituted a complementary permissive FSCM to prevent the creation of a perceived sanctuary for enemy forces between the

maximum range of organic artillery and the FSCL.12 The battlefield coordination line (BCL) is designed to allow Marine Air

99
Ground Task Force aviation assets to attack surface targets in

the ground command element’s area without approval.13 To

deconflict air and surface fires between the BCL and FSCL, an

airspace coordination area overlies the area.14

An airspace coordination area (ACA) is a three-dimensional

block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires.15 Threat avoidance, ordnance release altitudes, and artillery trajectories are used to

determine an ACA’s altitude limits.16 The BCL/ACA combination facilitates the expeditious attack of targets short of the

FSCL by both surface- and air-delivered fires.

The Kill Box Concept

Similar to the BCL/ACA concept, the kill box concept has

been employed to achieve some of the same objectives. The kill

box concept, in its present form, was first used in earnest during Operation Desert Storm. Coalition aircraft were not destroying targets within the Kuwaiti theater of operations as

rapidly as desired. One of the adjustments made was to use F16s as killer scouts to improve target acquisition for incoming

flights. Aircraft would be directed to predesignated 15-by-15

nautical mile areas to attack their assigned targets or more lucrative targets found by the killer scouts.17 In theory, kill

boxes can rapidly open and close, both short and long of the

FSCL, to facilitate deconfliction or expeditious employment of

air-delivered fires. The merits of this concept led to its inclusion in Air Force doctrine and adoption by three combatant

commands.18 The concept, however, is not standardized

across commands and is not fully embraced and explained in

joint doctrine. The confusion that exists in this area is not surprising since during Operation Desert Storm kill boxes and a

grid-based reference system were developed together. Joint

doctrine adds to the confusion by essentially making the

terms area reference system and kill box virtually synonymous

in its discussion of common reference systems.

The kill box concept, in theory an FSCM, is addressed in the

area reference system section of Joint Publication 3-60, Joint

100
Doctrine for Targeting. An area reference system is defined as “a

three-dimensional reference, enabling timely and effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks throughout

the designated JOA.”19 Once an area reference system has been

developed for a theater, the system may be used to designate

control and coordinating measures, like FSCMs and airspace

control measures (ACM). It is important to understand that area

reference system and kill boxes are not one in the same. A theater-level area reference system is the framework used to establish kill box parameters. As Joint Publication 3-60 states, theater-level kill boxes can be an effective coordination tool.

Theater-level kill boxes often combine FSCMs with ACMs as

a single coordination and control measure. This combination of

fire support and airspace coordination enables the use of these

area reference systems to be a reactive, timely and simple tool

for joint force employment and component integration.20

In publishing the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets, the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center is introducing a standardized common

geographic reference system (formerly known as the common

grid reference system).21 The ALSA publication is not joint doctrine, but it can serve as the means for getting a standardized

common geographic reference system into joint doctrine. Once

a standard has been established, the common geographic reference can be used throughout the future joint force to designate

• location of friendly forces,

• surface force maneuver boundaries,

• areas of intended attack,

• airspace control measures,

• fire support control measures,

• high threat areas, and

• terrain or airspace orientation.22

Notes

1. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, III-13 (see app. D, n. 1).

2. Ibid., III-13.

3. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), III-23 (see chap. 6, n. 38); and JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, III-13 (see app. D, n. 1).

101
4. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 199 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

5. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, A-2 (see app. D, n. 1).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., A-3.

8. Field Manual (FM) 6-20-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, 18 October 1989, F-3 to F-4.

9. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 27 August 1999, 61.

10. JP 3-09, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), A-2 (see chap. 6, n. 38).

11. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 62.

12. Lt Col Michael R. Kennedy and Lt Col Larry J. Holcomb, “Genesis and

Development of the Battlefield Coordination Line,” Marine Corps Gazette 86,

no. 4 (April 2002): 64.

13. Ibid., 66.

14. Ibid.

15. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms, 27 (see chap. 3, n. 9).

16. Kennedy and Holcomb, “Genesis and Development of the Battlefield

Coordination Line,” 66.

17. Col Richard B. H. Lewis, “JFACC Problems Associated with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm,” Aerospace Power Journal 8, no. 1 (Spring

1994): n.p., http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/

lewis.html.

18. Scheel, “Bullet Background Paper on Common Grid Reference System,” 1 (see chap. 7, n. 12); and AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 64.

19. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002,

D-1.

20. Ibid.

21. Air Land Sea Application Center, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets, G-1 (see chap. 7, n. 12).

22. Scheel, “Bullet Background Paper on Common Grid Reference System,” 1 (see chap. 7, n. 12).

102
Glossary

3ID(M) 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)

ACA airspace coordination area

ACCE air component coordination element

ACM airspace control measure

AEF air and space expeditionary force

AEG air and space expeditionary group

AES air and space expeditionary squadron

AETF air and space expeditionary task force

AEW air and space expeditionary wing

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

ALSA air land sea application

AOC air and space operations center (formerly air 

operations center)

AOR area of responsibility

ASOC air support operations center

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

BCL battlefield coordination line

CAS close air support

CCE component coordination element

CGRS common grid reference system or common 

geographic reference system

CJCSI chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

COMAFFOR commander of US Air Force forces

DASC direct air support center

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership, personnel, and facilities

EBO effects-based operations

ETAC enlisted terminal attack controller

ETO effects tasking order

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)

FECC fire and effects coordination cell

FM field manual

FIST fire support team

FSCA fire support coordination area

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSCM fire support coordination measure

HSOC home station operations center

103
JACE joint air control element

JAOC joint air and space operations center (formerly

joint air operations center) 

JCAS joint close air support

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JIACG joint interagency coordination group

JIMP Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan

JOC joint operating concept

JOpsC Joint Operations Concept

JSTARS joint surveillance targeting attack radar system

JTA joint tactical action

JTAC joint terminal attack controller

JTASC joint tactical action support center

LOS line-of-sight

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MC02 Millennium Challenge 2002

NLOS non-line-of-sight 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

PEL prioritized effects list

SEZ special engagement zone

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

SOF special operations forces

TAC terminal attack controller

TACP tactical air control party

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UA unit of action

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UE unit of employment

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

USJFCOM US Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM US Special Operations Command

WF HQ warfighting headquarters

WALKER PAPER

104
Bibliography

“Air Component Coordination Element Checklist.” Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, n.d.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2. Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 February 2000.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3. Counterland, 27

August 1999.

Air Land Sea Application Center. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets, 20 April 2004.

“Air & Space Doctrine Application Exercise.” Briefing, 15 July

2003. AY 03-04 ISS/SSS Reindoctrination Read Ahead. CDROM. Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, July 2003.

Armfield, Maj Robert G. “Joint Terminal Attack Controller:

Separating Fact from Fiction.” Research Report no.

AU/ACSC/03-1257R. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command

and Staff College, April 2003.

Bentley, Lt Col Christopher F. “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda.” Field Artillery,

September–October 2002, 10–14. http://sill-www.army.

mil/FAMAG/.

Butler, Amy. “As A-10 Shines in Iraq War, Officials Look to JSF

for Future CAS Role.” Inside the Air Force, 23 May 2003.

http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.as

p?f= defense_2002.ask&docnum=AIRFORCE-14-21-7.

———. “Moseley: Time Sensitive Targeting Improved from Afghanistan to Iraq.” Inside Missile Defense, 25 June 2003.

http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.as

p?f= defense_2002.ask&docnum=MISSILE-9-13-8. 

Callander, Bruce D. “Controllers.” Air Force Magazine 86, no. 9

(September 2003): 51–56. http://www.afa.org/magazine/

sept2003/0903controller.pdf.

“CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 23 March

2003.” 23 March 2003, n.p. http://www.centcom.mil/

CENTCOMNews/transcripts/transcript_list.htm.

105
“CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 24 March

2003.” 24 March 2003, n.p. http://www.centcom.mil/

CENTCOMNews/transcripts/transcript_list.htm.

“CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 27 March

2003.” 27 March 2003, n.p. http://www.centcom.mil/

CENTCOMNews/transcripts/transcript_list.htm.

“CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 1 April 2003.”

1 April 2003, n.p. http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/transcript_list.htm.

“CENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Briefing ~ 7 April 2003.”

7 April 2003, n.p. http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/transcripts/transcript_list.htm.

Center for Army Lessons Learned. “Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF) Emerging Observations, Insights, and Lessons.” Briefing, slide 19, June 2003. http://call.army.mil/homepage/

abca.htm.

———. “V Corps Field Artillery Lessons Learned from Operation

IRAQI FREEDOM.” n.d., http://call.army.mil/homepage/

abca.htm.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3010.02A. Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP),

2001. In Department of Defense. Joint Operations Concept. Washington, D.C.: Director of Operational Plans and

Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, November 2003.

CJTF-Horn of Africa History Fact Sheet. Tampa, Fla.: US Central Command, 23 July 2003. http://www.cjtfhoa.centcom.

mil/factsheet.asp.

Colarusso, Laura M., and Gordon Trowbridge. “The Future Is

NOW: Reach-back Technology Lets Airmen Fight in Iraq

from Comfort of Home.” Air Force Times, 10 November 2003.

Cordesman, Anthony H. The Lesson of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force Transformation. Washington,

D.C.: CSIS Press, 2002.

Department of Defense. Force Application Functional Concept.

Washington, D.C.: Force Application Assessment Division,

Joint Staff, J-8, February 2004.

———. Joint Operations Concept. Washington, D.C.: Director

of Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint

Staff, J-7, November 2003.

106
Deptula, Maj Gen David, Col Gary L. Crowder, and Maj George

L. Stamper Jr. “Direct Attack: Enhancing Counterland

Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground Operations.” Air and Space

Power Journal 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 5–12. http://www.

airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/win03/

deptula.html.

“DOD Briefing on Coalition Forces Air Component,” Inside

Defense.com – Defense Plus, 5 April 2003. http://www.

insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense

_2002.ask&docnum=dplus2003_978.

Erwin, Sandra I. “Close Air Support Tactics Sharpened in

Iraq.” National Defense Magazine, June 2003. http://

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1125. 

———. “War-Gaming a Future That’s Much Like Today.” National Defense Magazine, June 2003. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1116.

Field Manual (FM) 6-20-30. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations,

18 October 1989.

Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Graphics,

30 September 1997. 

Findlay, Col Mike, Lt Col Robert Green, and Maj Eric Braganca. “Fires and Maneuver—Challenges on the Noncontiguous Battlefield.” The Air Land Sea Bulletin, no. 2003-1

(March 2002): 17–23.

Fischer, Maj Michael E. “Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations: The Empowerment of Air Leadership.” Thesis.

School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

May 1995.

Frandsen, Dr. Bert. “America’s First Air-Land Battle.” Air and

Space Power Journal 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 31–35.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/a

pj03/win03/win03.html.

Garamore, Jim. “Operation Mountain Lion Continues, Task

Force Assumes Control.” American Forces Press Service, 6

June 2002. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/

n06062002_ 200206063.html.

107
Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals’

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston,

Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

Graham, Bradley, and Vernon Loeb. “An Air War of Might, Coordination and Risks.” Washington Post, 27 April 2003, A1.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=

article&node=&contented=A42694-2003Apr26¬Found=

true.

Grant, Dr. Rebecca. Gulf War II: Air and Space Power Led the

Way. An Air Force Association Special Report. Arlington,

Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 2003.

Gray, Lt Col Steve. “Evolving FSCM/C2 Issues: An Air Combat

Command Perspective.” Briefing. Air Force–Army Transformation Symposium, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 30 October 2003.

———. “Joint Air-Ground Operations: Lesson Learned from Recent Conflicts.” Briefing. Langley AFB, Va., 12 May 2003.

Grossman, Elaine M. “Army Eyes ‘Joint Fire Control Teams’ to

‘Enable’ Lighter Ground Troops.” Inside the Pentagon, 29

January 2004, 1. http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/

defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTA

GON-20-5-1.

———. “Iraq War Could Feature Unprecedented Air-Land Collaboration.” Inside the Pentagon, 13 February 2003, 1. http:

//www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?

f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-19-7-1.

———. “Lapses in Coordinating Missile Launches Pinned on V

Corps.” Inside the Pentagon, 19 June 2003, 1. http://

www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=

defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-19-25-2.

Haun, Lt Col Phil M. “Airpower versus a Fielded Army: A Construct for Air Operations in the Twenty-First Century.”

Aerospace Power Journal 15, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 81–88.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/a

pj01/win01/haun.html.

Jansen, Lt Col John M., Lt Cdr Nicholas Dienna, Maj Wm

Todd Bufkin II, Maj David I. Oclander, Maj Thomas Di

Tomasso, and Maj James B. Sisler. “JCAS in Afghanistan:

108
Fixing the Tower of Babel.” Field Artillery, March–April

2003, 22–30. http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/.

Jinnette, Maj James. “Employing an Air Maneuver Force: Battlefield Air Operations with Surface Maneuver in a Joint

Campaign.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff

College, June 2003.

Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 16 July 1997.

Joint Publication 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10

July 2001.

Joint Publication 1. Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the

United States, 14 November 2000.

Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended 17 December

2003). 

Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001.

Joint Publication 3-01. Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and

Missile Threats, 19 October 1999.

Joint Publication 3-03. Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, 10 April 1997.

Joint Publication 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,

17 December 2003.

Joint Publication 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May

1998.

Joint Publication 3-09.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 September 2003.

Joint Publication 3-30. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003.

Joint Publication 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land

Operations, 23 March 2004.

Joint Publication 3-60. Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002.

Joint Publication 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,

13 April 1995.

Joint Staff Directorate for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development. An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare

and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century White Paper. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, J-7, 28 January 2003.

109
Kelly, Lt Col Thomas L., and Lt Col John P. Andreasen, retired.

“Joint Fires: A BCD Perspective in Operation Freedom.”

Field Artillery, November–December 2003, 20–25. http://

sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/.

Kennedy, Lt Col Michael R., and Lt Col Larry J. Holcomb.

“Genesis and Development of the Battlefield Coordination

Line.” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 4 (April 2002): 64–69.

Lewis, Col Richard B. H. “JFACC Problems Associated with

Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm.” Airpower Journal

8, no. 1 (Spring 1994). http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.

mil/airchronicles/apj/apj94/lewis.html.

Ma, Jason. “Marines on the Ground Lacked on-the-Move Situational Awareness.” Inside the Navy, 17 November 2003,

n.p. http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=NAVY-16-46-9.

Marine Corps Combat Development Command Studies and

Analysis Division. Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics

Squadron One Lessons Learned. http://www.mawts1.

usmc.smil.mil.

Millennium Challenge 2002 Executive Report. Norfolk, Va.:

United States Joint Forces Command, March 2003.

Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales Jr. The Iraq War: A

Military History. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, 2003.

Noonon, Michael P., and Mark R. Lewis. “Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization.” Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 11. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/

Parameters/03autumn/ noonan.pdf.

Olson, Vice Adm Eric T., deputy commander, US Special Operations Command. Address. The 34th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy Security

Planning and Military Transformation after Iraqi Freedom, 2

December 2003. http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/.

“Operation Iraqi Freedom, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized),

‘Rock of the Marne,’ After Action Report.” Final draft. 12 May

2003.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001. Washington, D.C.:

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 2001.

110
Rees, Elizabeth. “DOD Creates Senior Officer Steering Group to

Study Reachback.” Inside the Air Force, 17 October 2003, 1.

http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.as

p?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=AIRFORCE-14-42-2.

———. “Standup of 484th AEW Proved Vital to Army, Air

Force Ops Integration.” Inside the Air Force, 5 September

2003, 3. http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_

docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=AIRFORCE14-36-7.

Rolfsen, Bruce. “On Time and on Target.” Air Force Times, 1

December 2003, 14.

Scheel, Maj Lynn I. “Bullet Background Paper on Common

Grid Reference System.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, 20 November 2003.

Straight, Lt Col Michael. “Commander’s Intent: An Aerospace

Tool for Command and Control?” Airpower Journal 10, no. 1

(Spring 1996): 36–49. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/

airchronicles/apj/straight.pdf.

Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, n.d.,

4–6. http://www.strategypage.com/articles/3IDAAR/default.asp.

2003 Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Action Plan. Norfolk, Va.:

US Joint Forces Command, 1 August 2003.

United States Air Force. The U.S. Air Force Transformation

Flight Plan. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters United States

Air Force, Future Concepts and Transformation Division,

November 2003.

United States Army. 2003 United States Army Transformation

Roadmap. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department

of the Army, Army Transformation Office, 1 November

2003.

———. The Army in 2020 White Paper. Arlington, Va.: Objective Force Task Force, 1 November 2003.

US Central Command Air Forces. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM -

by the Numbers. Prince Sultan Air Base, Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia: Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 April 2003.

US Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development and

Experimentation. PINNACLE IMPACT 2003: Joint Concept

111
Development Seminar Wargame. Norfolk, Va.: US Joint

Forces Command, 14 July 2003.

———. Joint Concept Development And Experimentation’s Concept Primer: Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Norfolk,

Va.: US Joint Forces Command, October 2003.

US Senate. Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former

Commander, US Central Command before the Senate

Armed Services Committee. 108th Cong., 1st sess., 9 July

2003. http: //armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/

July/Franks. pdf.

Unit of Employment (UE) Operations White Paper. Version 2.4,

fourth draft. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Army Command and

General Staff College, 19 February 2004.

Vego, Dr. Milan. “What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?” Proceedings 128/7/1, 1193 (July 2002). http://

www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROvego07.htm. 

Walden, Lt Col Franklin, and MSgt Hal Sullivan. “Joint Close

Air Support in Support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.” 18th Air Support Operations

Group Briefing. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland. Re-write Conference, Langley AFB, Va., 25 June 2003. 

112
Developing Doctrine

for the Future Joint Force

Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Emily Adams

Copy Editor

Lula Barnes

Book Design and Cover Art

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Composition and

Prepress Production

Vivian O’Neal

Quality Review

Mary J. Moore

Print Preparation

Joan Hickey

Distribution

Diane Clark