International Arament Cooperative Programs: 

Benefits, Liabilities, and Self-Inflicted Wounds – 

The JSF As A Case Study 

by 

Stephen G. Di Domenico, Lt Col, USAF 

February 2006 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 55 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 55 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 

author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US 

government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force 

Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United 

States government. 

ii
Contents 

 

Page 

ILLUSTRATIONS.................................................................V 

ABSTRACT.......................................................................VI 

INTRODUCTION.................................................................1 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM........................................5 

JSF Background................................................................5 

History......................................................................5 

Program Overview.........................................................6 

International Partnership Strategy.......................................7 

Setting up the Problem..................................................10 

BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENT COOPERATIVE 

PROGRAMS..................................................................13 

Political Analysis.............................................................14 

Strengthens Alliances...................................................14 

Reduces Acquisition Costs and Increases Market Share for US 

Industry...............................................................16 

Breakdown of the JSF Numbers.......................................17 

Bolsters Domestic and Allied Industrial Bases.......................19 

Strategic Analysis............................................................23 

Coalitions Provide Access and Credibility..............................23 

Increases Coalition Capability..........................................24 

JSF Provides Coalition Partners with “Turn-Key” Solutions......26 

Business Case Analysis......................................................28 

Increases Funding Stability.............................................28 

Partner Contributions Increase Program Managers Flexibility....29 

Encourages “Best-of-Breed” Technologies...........................29 

LIABILITIES OF AND BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL 

ARMAMENT COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS..........................33 

Political Analysis.............................................................33 

Risk of Partner Defection...............................................34 

Undue Risks Assumed by Lead-Country..............................36 

Invigorates Industrial Competitors....................................37 

Strategic Analysis............................................................39 

iii
Limits of Coalition Warfare.............................................39 

Rogue Nation Scenario..................................................40 

Information Exploitation................................................41 

Business Case Analysis......................................................41 

Incorporating Partners in Daily Operations...........................41 

Diverse Partner Requirements..........................................42 

Inter-Agency Involvement in Acquisition Process..................43 

Complexity of Policies, Processes, Regulations, and Laws........46 

The Impact on the Development Process.............................48 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...........................51 

Conclusions—Conditions for Successful International Cooperative 

Programs..................................................................51 

Recommendations to Policy Makers and Program Managers..........52 

Policy Makers............................................................53 

Program Managers.......................................................54 

Epilogue........................................................................54 

APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS................................................59 

What are International Armament Cooperative Programs?................59 

New International Cooperative Program Guidelines.....................60 

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................63 

ENDNOTES.......................................................................71 

iv
Illustrations 

Page 

Figure1. JSF Variants............................................................7 

Figure 2. JSF Partners and Committed Buy...................................9 

Figure 3. Historical Fighter Production and Unit Costs....................17 

Figure 4. Number of Fighter Foreign Customers per Unit Recurring Flyaway Costs........................................................................18 

Figure 5. Notional JSF Average Unit Recurring Fly-away Costs as a 

Function of Buy...................................................................19 

Figure 6. 2004 World Defense Spending.....................................26 

Figure 7. JSF Interoperability...................................................27 

Figure 8. Increased Development Cost as a Function of Delays...........49 

Figure 9. DSB Recommendations to INcrease IACP Opportunities for 

Success.............................................................................57 

v
Abstract 

The Joint Strike Fighter international program is unique; indeed 

there is no other example of a U.S. major prime contractor co-developing 

and co-producing a U.S. combat aircraft with other foreign entities. 

Consequently, the program provides an excellent model to evaluate in 

view of the new Department of Defense international acquisition strategy 

requirements. This paper is a preliminary analysis that seeks to answer 

the questions: what are the benefits and liabilities of the JSF international 

acquisition approach thus far, and what are the necessary precursors or 

conditions that should exist for future international cooperative programs 

to have the best chance of success? Such answers are relevant given that 

DoD now looks to international armament cooperative programs as the 

first option for future weapon systems acquisition strategies. Finally, the 

paper will identify barriers that are ‘hard-wired’ into our acquisition 

regulations, policies and statues that restrict cooperation, fail to take 

advantage of the global defense industrial market, and are antithetical to 

our National Security Strategy coalition goals. The paper concludes with 

recommendations intended to improve the success for future international 

cooperative initiatives. 

vi
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

The history of the 20th century has proven time and again 

that America’s security is linked directly to that of other 

nations, and that America’s prosperity depends on the 

prosperity of others. America seeks to use its current 

political, economic, and military advantages not to 

dominate others, but to build a durable framework upon 

which the United States and its allies and friends can 

prosper in freedom now and into the future. 

Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2000

In May 1994, the Principal Undersecretary of Defense for 

Acquisition and Technology requested the Defense Science Board review 

the Joint Advanced Strike Technology study program. Specifically, the 

Secretary wanted to know, “[w]hat are the benefits and disadvantages of 

international cooperation intended to produce favorable foreign sales of 

the Joint Advanced Strike study products, thereby reducing overall cost to 

the U.S.?” At study completion, the board concluded the next generation 

fighter should be developed with the foreign market in mind (as with the 

F-16) but not adopt the international cooperation model for development 

and production. The board summarized it this way, “[f]oreign 

participation in co-development of [the] next generation fighter, other than 

limited participation for special reasons, would complicate the program to 

the point of reducing the probability of success.”1

 The board went on to 

note “mixed results” associated with co-development programs, producing 

only “expense and bad feelings” and when they appeared to work, they did 

so only at a high cost. 

In July 2005 DoD 5000.1 regulation for the defense acquisition 

s,ystem required all programs to consider international cooperation 

approaches before any joint or service specific materiel solutions. This 

signaled a significant change for weapon system acquisition strategies and 

a departure from the earlier Defense Science Board recommendation (see 

Appendix). What occurred in the intervening 11 years? Why is JSF now 

considered by DoD to be the model international armament cooperative 

program?2

 

This research began with the intent to analyze the JSF international 

acquisition strategy, arguing first for and then against the JSF model for 

1
future tactical aircraft acquisitions. As proper for a research paper, no 

conclusion was assumed. After extensive review, however, the research 

did not support a compelling argument against the approach. Rather, what 

fell out were essential conditions for success and existing barriers in the 

U.S. statutes, regulations, and policies that must be removed to realize an 

international cooperation program’s full benefit. This is not to say that 

there are no good examples of bad cooperative programs; there are many, 

but the same can also be said of indigenous programs. 

The JSF makes an interesting case study because it has 

incorporated many of the lessons learned from previous programs. 

Indeed, there is no other example of a U.S. major prime contractor codeveloping and producing a U.S. combat aircraft with another foreign 

company. Consequently, JSF provides an excellent model to evaluate in 

view of the new DoD international acquisition strategy requirements. It 

must be noted that the vote is still out on the ultimate success or failure of 

the model, since the program is only into its fourth year of a twelve-year 

System Development and Demonstration phase. This paper is therefore a 

preliminary analysis that seeks to answer the questions: what are the 

benefits and disadvantages of the JSF international acquisition approach 

thus far, and what are the necessary precursors or conditions that should 

exist for future programs to have the best chance of success? Such 

answers are relevant, given that DoD now looks to international armament 

cooperative programs as the first option for future weapon systems 

acquisition strategies. Finally, the paper will identify barriers that are 

“hard-wired” into our acquisition regulations, policies, and statutes that 

restrict cooperation and are antithetical to our coalition goals as outlined 

in the U.S. national security strategy. The paper concludes with 

conditions that portend favorable international cooperative outcomes and 

recommendations for acquisition professionals, government lawmakers 

and policy makers for the U.S. to take full-advantage of the international 

cooperative approach and align our laws, regulations, and policies with 

our national security stated objectives. 

The JSF international model will be evaluated using criteria from 

three dimensions: 

political, strategic, and business-case. These were chosen on the basis of 

the principal stakeholders in the defense acquisition system; the political 

(Congress and partners), the warfighters (Combatant Commanders), and 

the business managers (acquisition professionals). The author has made 

extensive use of literature reviews from books, journals, newspaper 

articles, and interviews with industry experts, acquisition professionals, 

warfighters and other government agency officials. The JSF is used 

2
throughout the paper as the predominant case study but other international 

programs were analyzed to provide a comprehensive review. 

3
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4
Chapter 2 

Joint Strike Fighter Program 

I believe that national security - ours and that of our friends 

and allies - now, and in the future, will increasingly rely on 

bi- and multi-lateral armaments cooperation. The 

underpinning for this will be a shift towards giving greater 

importance to the economic and industrial considerations of 

material acquisition programs in the future. This belief is 

the basis for the renaissance in armaments cooperation 

occurring on both sides of the Atlantic. 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Paul 

Kaminski, 19963

JSF Background 

History 

In 1993, with the incoming Clinton administration and the changing 

national security environment created by the end of the Cold War, DoD 

initiated a review4

 to address a balance among budget priorities, national 

military strategy, and future force structure. Over the subsequent 15 years, 

the services had planned to develop four tactical aircraft: the F-22 to 

replace the F-15, the Multi-Role Fighter as an F-16 replacement, the F18E/F to replace the aging F-18C models, and an Advanced Fighter 

Aircraft. In addition, the Marine Corps had launched an advanced short 

take-off and vertical landing study with the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency. The review determined all four programs, and the study, 

could not be supported within the future DoD budget. The DoD 

subsequently cancelled the Multi-Role Fighter and Advanced Fighter 

Aircraft. Recognizing the capability gap, however, the Secretary of 

Defense directed establishment of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology 

program in July 1993 to incorporate the Air Force and the Navy 

programs.5 Congress later directed the Marine Corps study also be 

merged into the new program.6 Thus began the predecessor study that 

would later lead to the JSF program. 

5
Program Overview 

The JSF, at $200B,7

 is the largest acquisition program in DoD 

history. The DoD views the JSF as a model for 21st century acquisition, 

promising three-planes-in-one jointness, low-risk development, and an 

unprecedented acquisition strategy through its international cooperative 

approach. The program seeks to produce three aircraft variants to satisfy 

the individual service requirements to replace four aircraft (F-16, A-10, 

F/A-18, and AV-8B). Additionally, international partners are seeking to 

replace eight different aircraft of their own. The three variants are: the Air 

Force Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL), the Navy Carrier 

Variant (CV), and the Marine Corps Short Take Off and Vertical Landing 

(STOVL). All are designed with a high degree of commonality (80% 

goal), greatly reducing non-recurring engineering and follow-on logistical 

and sustainment costs. During the Concept Development phase, 

requirements were developed along side the United Kingdom (UK). The 

UK was also part of the source selection team that selected LockheedMartin over Boeing in October of 2001, thus kicking off the $30B8

System Development and Demonstration phase. In addition to the UK, six 

other NATO countries joined the partnership: Denmark, Norway, the 

Netherlands, Italy, Canada, and Turkey. Australia, an ANZUS treaty 

country, was the last partner to join. The services are planning Initial 

Operational Capability in 2012 for the USMC and 2013 for the Air Force 

and Navy. Partners may begin taking delivery as early as 2014. 

Lockheed-Martin is the prime contractor partnering with NorthropGrumman and British Aerospace (BAe). Additionally, the U.S. 

government has separate engine contracts with Pratt & Whitney and 

GE/Rolls Royce. 

6
Figure 1. JSF Variants 

International Partnership Strategy 

Partnerships are a relationship in which two or more nations attempt 

to engage in what they perceive as mutually beneficial activity through 

actions and policies.9 The JSF international acquisition strategy is a 

complex set of relationships between government and industries of the 

U.S. and the eight international partners. The U.S. hopes to benefit by 

sharing program development costs and profits from international sales. 

The partners desire to improve capabilities and interoperability with the 

U.S. and NATO but primarily anticipate a significant benefit from the 

industrial participation throughout the development, production, and 

sustainment phases of the program. 

Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

and the JSF Framework MOU with associated supplements, each partner 

signed as a tier one, two, or three partner. Partnership tiering, defined by 

the level of financial commitment each country makes to the system 

development and demonstration phase, comes with commensurate 

benefits. The UK, as a tier I partner, will be the first to pick its delivery 

schedule. Additionally, tiers define the level of insight into the design and 

development process. For example, for $2B, the UK is allowed 30 

cooperative program personnel during the system development and 

demonstration phase of the program. As a tier II partner, the Italians, 

however, are only allowed 10 representatives in the program office and 

7
have little influence on the capabilities except for their identified 

capability gaps in their ‘delta’ System Development and Demonstration 

version of the aircraft10 (see Table 1). The international representatives 

are dual-hatted, working for the US program director and their respective 

MoDs. They attend program reviews but are not allowed access to nondisclosure related content as defined by the National Disclosure Policy. 

Partner tiers also do not determine the level of industrial participation. 

Work share is defined as the percentage of industrial participation each 

partner secures. It is the holy grail of international cooperative programs 

and, by far, its most acrimonious component. 

JSF’s work share determination is quite revolutionary and therefore 

useful to analyze. In the European Fighter Aircraft program between the 

UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain, each partner country secured work share 

on the basis of the number of aircraft they were purchasing. For example, 

if the UK was planning on buying 20 percent of the production run, UK 

companies would receive 20 percent of the work share. The JSF program, 

however, adopted a different and highly controversial approach based 

upon “best value” or “best athlete.” All sub-contractor industries, 

regardless of country, were to compete on a best value basis—a 

combination of performance and price. The three U.S. prime contractors, 

Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, and Pratt & Whitney, were 

responsible under the terms of their contracts, to ensure the playing field 

remained level for prospective U.S. and foreign subcontractors. “There 

will be no predetermined work share on JSF, no cozy juste retour

arrangements for foreign partners signing up behind the programme.”11 

JSF is about affordability, says Lockheed Martin’s deputy program 

manager, so “the U.S. is casting its net worldwide to find companies with 

specialized expertise to help keep costs down.”12 This approach has its 

benefits and liabilities, which will be addressed later in the paper. At this 

writing, however, all nine countries had industries on contract13 and all 

will more than recoup their initial investment.14 Italy, for example, will 

build 50% of all wings, and the UK will manufacture the aft fuselage and 

horizontal stabilizers.15 

8
Figure 2. JSF Partners and Committed Buy 

USAF: Multi-role (primarily air-to-ground) fighter to replace F-16 & A-10 & to complement F-22A 

USMC: Multi-role, short takeoff, vertical landing strike fighter to replace AV-8B & F/A-18C/D 

USN: Multi-role strike fighter to complement the F/A-18E/F 

UK (RN and RAF): Supersonic replacement for Sea Harrier and GR-7 

Table 1. JSF Partner Major Work Share and Contributions16

Work share is among the major advantages to the partners in the program 

and is viewed as critical to their participation. Eight nations have 

cumulatively contributed $4.5B dollars to participate in these expected 

benefits. Each nation, in addition to the U.S., also has stakeholders in the 

process who must be satisfied. Identifying these stakeholders and their 

interests is critical to successful international programs. 

9
Setting up the Problem 

According to George E. Hudson, the following conditions generate 

successful cooperative programs: 

1. The existence of complementary interests between or among the 

nations; 

2. The pressure of politically important domestic audiences to pursue 

a cooperative relationship; 

3. A national security and/or foreign policy basis that can incorporate 

cooperation with the other party or parties involved.17

Goals and expectations of each party are also important to the probable 

outcomes of the cooperative relationships: 

1. Increased economic benefits; 

2. Improvement of military power on either a regional or global 

basis; 

3. Enhancement of regional or global stability; 

4. Assistance in gaining an advantage over a specific competitor in 

the international system or at least deterring the activity of a 

potential or actual competitor.18

Others, who have studied IACP histories, have compiled very similar lists. 

The Manual for Security Assistance lists the following advantages: 

1. Operational—to increase military effectiveness through 

interoperability with allies and coalition partners; 

2. Economic—to reduce weapons acquisition cost by sharing costs 

or avoiding duplication of development efforts with our allies and 

friends; 

3. Technical—to access the best defense technology and help 

minimize the capabilities gap with allies and coalition partners; 

4. Political—strengthen alliances and relationships with other 

friendly countries, and; 

5. Industrial—bolster domestic and allied defense industrial bases.19

A useful paradigm to view this complex international environment is 

through the lens of stakeholders, specifically, their interests, 

responsibilities, and risks. The common stakeholders in any acquisition 

program, and who also nicely coincide with the lists above, are the 

following: 

1. Those who hold the purse strings—Congress and the respective 

partner parliaments); 

10
2. Those who will use the weapons in anger—the warfighters 

(COCOMs/partner MoDs); 

3. Those who will determine the requirements, develop the systems, 

perform follow-on tests, tactics, techniques, procedures and 

training—the services; 

4. Those responsible for all program objectives—the Program Office, 

and; 

5. Those who will actually perform the work—the prime contractor 

(Lockheed-Martin) and their subcontractors. 

Congress is interested in minimizing outlays by sharing both costs and 

risks of the program development with the international partners; this of 

course is juxtaposed with the risk of transferring crucial program data that 

may invigorate industrial competitors. The warfighter is interested in 

increasing the capabilities and interoperability of their forces along with 

that of their allies without revealing vulnerabilities or the risk of critical 

technologies falling into the hands of their adversaries. The service’s 

desires are equivalent to the Combatant Commanders except they have the 

additional risk of cost since they are footing the bill. The program 

manager is interested that all program objectives are met—cost, schedule, 

and performance. Lockheed-Martin, and their subcontractors, is 

concerned with the same but does not share as much of the risk since the 

services have assumed most through the cost-plus contract. The 

contractor’s major concern is that of its stockholders—return on 

investment. The partners are interested in capabilities and 

interoperability, but their primary interest is industrial work share and 

technology transfer. Lockheed-Martin must the bear burden of 

responsibility for managing partner expectations in this regard. This area 

is arguably the most sensitive and difficult to manage. Under the work 

share arrangement, Lockheed-Martin must keep the playing field level 

with regard to competition. Best value sounds great, but if the partners do 

not secure what they consider to be a fair share of the contracts, they may 

defect from the program thereby increasing the risks and costs to the 

remaining partners. Currently, at least one of the partners are considering 

reduced scope or program pullout by the production and sustainment 

MOU signing because of work share This is the greatest danger to 

international cooperative programs, and Europe is replete with examples. 

Therefore, Lockheed-Martin has its work cut out and must play both sides 

of the ball in addition to being the referee. 

11
Table 2. Stakeholders, Interests, Responsibilities, and Risks 

Table 2 describes interests, responsibilities, and risks of the various 

stakeholders. The next chapter will analyze the benefits of international 

cooperative programs across the three stakeholder dimensions: political, 

strategic, and business case. 

12
Chapter 3 

Benefits of International Armament Cooperative 

Programs 

The core objectives of armament cooperation for programs 

like JSF are to increase military effectiveness through 

standardization and interoperability, and to reduce weapon 

acquisition costs by avoiding duplication of development 

efforts with our allies. The United States will benefit from 

sharing JSF program costs, improving interoperability with 

key allies, gaining access to selected foreign industrial 

capabilities and increasing international sales potential. 

Our Joint Strike Fighter partners will benefit from 

cooperatively developing and acquiring an affordable next 

generation strike fighter weapons capability, participating 

in the day to day management of the program and building 

long-term Industrial relationships with US. aerospace 

companies. 

Mr. Alfred G. Volkman, Director for International Cooperation, 

OUSD(AT&L) 

Partnership benefits can be enjoyed in non-common areas with one 

party seeing economic gains while the other benefits politically.20 Said 

another way, international cooperative programs may not always be the 

most cost-effective means to acquire a new weapon system—other 

considerations may prevail. For example, from a political-military 

perspective, international cooperative programs may pay tremendous 

dividends in foreign relations, regional stability, future coalition 

opportunities, and help bolster a healthy and vibrant defense industrial 

base. Such a strategic view must be considered when assessing their 

efficacy. This chapter analyzes the benefits to the three major dimensions: 

political, strategic, and business case. 

13
Political Analysis 

Strengthens Alliances 

Our National Security Strategy hinges upon the cooperation of our 

allies and friends: 

There is little of lasting consequence that the United States 

can accomplish in the world without the sustained 

cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. 

Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most 

able international institutions in the world: the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its 

inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and interEuropean security, and the European Union (EU), our 

partner in opening world trade.21

There is an inevitable “nexus”22 among trade, investment partners, 

and our military allies. The U.S. strategy recognizes this nexus 

and outlines a number of objectives to achieve the above: 

1. Ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate 

combat contributions to make in coalition warfare; 

2. Take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies 

of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military 

forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our 

vulnerabilities; 

3. Streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to 

meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of 

training, integrating, and experimenting with new force 

configurations; and 

4. Maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as 

we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our 

forces.23

The National Defense Strategy says we must increase our coalition 

partner capabilities and our strategic objectives are not attainable 

without these partners.24 Rear Admiral Enewold, the JSF Program 

Director, relates: 

When we start operating JSF together I think we will lock 

our partners into the coalition much tighter. I think the 

partners will be much better prepared to operate in the 

coalition, much more comfortable because of the 

14
connectivity we will have, will be much more capable, and 

the capabilities gap will close significantly so they can go 

after some of the harder stuff...by virtue of getting the 

same hardware and compatibility at a significant level 

which is not there right now. And the COCOMs are going 

to be more agreeable to tasking them because they will 

have the capabilities to do it. Presently, they’re not going 

to send a [coalition] Block 30 F-16 [into a high threat area] 

to go get whacked.25 

Past cooperative programs have produced long-term relationships that 

paid dividends throughout the sustainment period of the systems 

developed and purchased by the respective partners. Indeed, these 

programs are extremely important to allies. Colonel Michael Williams, 

former F-16 Systems Program Office director and current Wing 

Commander for Fighter and Attack Aircraft at the Aeronautical Systems 

Center, stated: 

...it’s all about building relationships...often with 

[collaborative programs] it is very important for these 

countries to believe they are equal partners with the United 

States. The original F-16 EPAF nations [Denmark, 

Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal] believed 

they were partners because of the F-16...this was not a 

NATO thing.26 

Buying fighters can be compared to a consumer buying a car; sometimes 

emotions win the day. 

International cooperation history abounds with countries making 

financial decisions that appear on the surface as foolhardy. National pride 

and political motivations often prevail over fiscal responsibility. Finland 

spent 50% of its defense budget on the F/A-18.27 The Japanese developed 

the F-2 fighter with General Dynamics, the original producer of the F-16, 

even though they ended up with an F-16 like capability at three times the 

cost of an F-15.28 Turkey, in the 1983 Peace Onyx I co-production 

agreement, produced 160 F-16’s for $4.16B U.S. dollars. This does not 

seem exorbitant until one considers it was twice the Turks’ entire defense 

budget for that year. The Turks knew that co-producing the aircraft was 

likely to increase the unit cost by millions per unit but they considered the 

additional cost worth the prestige and potential return on investment for 

their defense industry.29 They eventually hit pay dirt with the Peace 

Vector sales to Egypt (46 F-16s produced in Turkey in 1994-1995). The 

15
U.S. had interests beyond the financial as well. In 1983 the U.S. 

strategists saw bolstering Turkey’s armed forces as an important hedge 

against the Soviet build-up.30 In addition, the agreement provided the 

U.S. with basing rights across Turkey. This proved pivotal during the first 

Gulf War, enabling the U.S. to secure a northern and southern approach 

during the bombing campaign.31 Often, however, economic realities 

demand a strong business case; cooperative programs can deliver in 

spades. 

Reduces Acquisition Costs and Increases Market Share for US 

Industry 

DoD acquisition regulations acknowledge the benefits of 

international cooperation: “leveraging of U.S. resources through cost 

sharing and economies of scale afforded by international cooperative 

research, development, production, and logistics support programs should 

be fully considered when DoD components work with users to define 

needed capabilities as well as during the preparation of the technology 

development strategy and subsequent acquisition strategy.”32 Why this 

emphasis on international participation? On average, DoD invests $100 

billion each year in a wide array of weapon systems; these range from 

tanks and fighter aircraft to sophisticated satellites. It is not unusual for a 

single program to cost over $40 billion. The Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) estimates the F-22A will be $70B. These investments 

often represent the largest discretionary portion of the U.S. budget.33 Cost 

growths are not limited to major acquisition programs. The GAO recently 

studied 26 weapon systems, analyzing their cost growths based upon 

initial and latest estimates. On average, the programs suffered a 19.6% 

schedule slippage and a 14.5% acquisition cost increase (Table 3). 

First full 

estimate 

Latest estimate Percent change 

Total cost $479.6M $548.9M 14.5% 

RDT&E cost $102.0M $144.7M 41.9% 

Weightedaverage 

acquisition cycle 

times 

146.6 months 175.3 months 19.6% 

Table 3. Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems34

 

16
The soaring costs have resulted in significantly reduced unit buys 

compared to previous eras. In 1951 the US procured a total of 6,300 

fighter aircraft (Air Force and Navy) at a cost of $7B (1983 dollars). In 

1999 the U.S. programmed for 95% fewer fighters (322) at $11B.35 This 

trend started years earlier. In the 1940s the US produced 15,386 P-51 

fighters over a 5-year period. The economies of scale realized were 

remarkable; each P-51 cost a mere $55,000 (then year dollars); but over 

the decades, due to increased effectiveness of weapon systems, shrinking 

discretionary acquisition funds, and acquisition program cost overruns, 

unit buys have significantly decreased. As unit buys decreased, unit costs 

skyrocketed. For example, in the 1980s the Air Force purchased 100 B1B bombers at a relative cost of more than its weight in silver.36 In the 

1990s the B-2 bomber, with 21 aircraft procured, cost more than its weight 

in gold. 37 Now, in the 21st century, the F-22A, at 183 aircraft, will be 

more than four times its weight in platinum.38 

Fighter Production and Costs

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

P-51 F-86 F-5 F-4 F-15 F-16 F/A-22

1942 1948 1954 1958 1972 1978 2003

Years

Total Produced

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Number

Cost

Figure 3. Historical Fighter Production and Unit Costs 

Such realities prompted Norm Augustine, former CEO of Martin Marietta 

Corp and later Lockheed-Martin, to predict lightheartedly that at this rate, 

in 2054, the entire DoD defense budget will only be able to afford one 

tactical fighter.39 

Breakdown of the JSF Numbers 

The U.S. is currently programming for 2,457 F-35 aircraft. This 

breaks down to 1763 CTOL (Air Force) and 680 CV/STOVL for the 

Department of the Navy. The UK has agreed to purchase 150 STOVL 

aircraft, bringing the total aircraft buy to 2607 aircraft. The additional 14 

17
aircraft are for test. Other partner and Foreign Military Sales numbers are 

estimated at greater than 2000 aircraft. Such a production run, if realized, 

would rival the F-16. The total buy is critical to maintaining the proposed 

Unit Recurring Fly-away (URF) costs of $40M for the Air Force variant 

and $45-50M for the Navy and Marine Corps.40 The importance of a 

large production buy, reducing unit cost, is underscored by the importance 

of the number. If the F-35’s cost increases beyond a certain point, much 

of its competitive advantage will be eroded because the defense market is 

very cost-sensitive. For example, in the past two decades, there have been 

26 export customers for fighters in the $25-million-$35-million range (F16, Mirage 2000, Gripen, and Harrier). There have been nine export 

customers for fighters in the $36-million-$45-million range (F/A18A/B/C/D, and Su-27/30). Notably, however, there have been a mere 

three export customers for fighters in the $45-million-and-above range (F15, and Tornado).41 The JSF, at $40M-$50M, is right at the knee in the 

curve. A majority of escalating program costs is due to a reduction in the 

total buy of the aircraft. The F-22A is a prime example. Under the elder 

Bush administration, the buy was 750; by the end of his administration, 

the buy had been reduced to 648. During the Clinton administration, the 

buy was further reduced to 339. Under the current Bush administration, 

the buy has been reduced twice from 279 to 183.42 

Country Density per Fighter URF

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

$25-$35M $36-$45M >$45M

URF Ranges

Number of Fighter Export 

Countries

Countries

Figure 4. Number of Fighter Foreign Customers per Unit Recurring 

Fly-away Costs 

18
 

Figure 5. Notional JSF Average Unit Recurring Fly-away Costs as a 

Function of Buy43

Without a large production buy, JSF will go the way of the F-22A, which 

is now estimated to cost $70B. If one includes development and 

procurement, this translates to $383M per aircraft.44 Total sales do more 

than just reduce the average unit cost; they also keep the industrial base 

invigorated for years. 

Bolsters Domestic and Allied Industrial Bases 

In the aftermath of the Cold War, defense budgets shrank, industries 

merged, and collaboration between aircraft manufacturers became 

increasingly important. In 1985, US defense-related production accounted 

for 3.7M jobs; just a decade later it eroded to only 2.4M jobs—a 35% 

decrease. In 1993 there were 20 U.S. companies doing major defense 

work. Today there are five.45 Only three of these companies build aircraft 

for the DoD (Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and Northrop-Grumman). Then 

Undersecretary of Defense William Perry called the now famous “last 

supper,” where he urged the remaining defense industry CEOs to 

consolidate through vertical and horizontal integration in light of the 

coming defense downturn.46 The purpose of the proposed consolidation 

was to reduce the U.S. defense asset base in both commercial and 

government sectors by over 40%.47 If assets were not reduced, declining 

defense dollars would mean unit costs would rise, ultimately affecting 

19
profit margins. If returns on investments declined, defense aerospace 

industries, essential to a strong defense infrastructure, could collapse. 

This was clearly not in the best interest of the U.S.,48 but the unintended 

consequence of consolidation was reduced competition. 

The DoD must appropriate the reality that the U.S. is in a 

fundamentally different acquisition environment today than 20 years ago. 

In 1985, DoD had multiple new-starts and large annual production runs 

(585 aircraft, 2,031 vehicles, 24 ships, 32, 714 missiles).49 Today, new 

starts have slowed to a trickle and production rates have plummeted (188 

aircraft, 190 vehicles, 8 ships/subs, 5,702 missiles).50 There are two 

solutions to this problem: create a subsidized (and expensive) design 

bureau (as in the former Soviet model and similar to our ship building 

industry) or secure additional markets through international participation. 

“In the era of globalization, United States defense companies can no 

longer rely on their home market any more and need to secure an 

increasing share of international markets to maintain their revenues, 

profits and share prices.”51 Even the skeptical Defense Science Board 

report, mentioned earlier, concluded that the JSF should design to the 

export market, saying it can significantly contribute to the overall success 

of the program and that some level of participation during development 

may be required to secure foreign markets.52

To some extent this is happening, unfortunately namely across the 

Atlantic. Europe came to this reality long before the U.S. and has been 

building fighters using the partnership model for over 30 years.53 Rarely 

does a country in Europe venture out and develop any weapon system on 

its own. Those who have, (French Rafael fighter), have suffered 

significant losses because they were unable to purchase enough aircraft to 

cover development overhead. Moreover, because they have developed the 

weapon system indigenously, they did not secure foreign markets. Boris 

Yeltsin recognized that the Russian defense system could no longer prop 

up the old communist defense industry. Under Yeltsin, the Russians 

increased their export of military equipment by over 42 fold compared to 

the Gorbachev years (1985-1991). Yeltsin stated in 1992, “[t]he weapons 

trade is essential for us to obtain the foreign currency which we urgently 

need to keep the defense industry afloat.”54 Diversity is of course 

important in this regard; today the Russian industry is almost completely 

dependent on Beijing for survival, giving the Chinese unusual access to 

Russian technologies and arms.55 International cooperation in the defense 

industry has flourished overseas because of intensifying competition for 

global markets, rising development costs, rapid obsolescence of new 

products, and considerable uncertainties and risks regarding performance, 

20
schedules, and market size.56 The bottom-line message is this: the U.S. 

defense market is no longer sufficient to maintain its own industrial base 

and this is true in spades for the fighter market. When Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautics signed the latest Peace Marble contract with Israel for 52 

additional F-16s in 2001, CEO Dain Hancock said, 

This contract is very important to us for a number of 

reasons, it completes the deal for a very important 

customer, it extends the firm F-16 production base through 

2008 and it boosts our firm orders for 2001. This buy 

provides an excellent base for future F-16 sales and 

provides a solid bridge to JSF production at our Fort Worth 

facility.57

Another more recent example is the sale of F-16 Block 60 aircraft to the 

United Arab Emirates. This $6.7B agreement competed directly with the 

French Rafael. Such international agreements have sustained the F-16 

production line for 26 years, which reached its U.S. production peak of 25 

aircraft per month in the late 1980s. Only in 2003 did the line start seeing 

reductions and, due to the Block 60 sale to U.A.E., the line will not shut 

down until late in the decade.58 In all, close to 5000 F-16s will have been 

produced, making it one of the most successful fighter programs in 

history. Such a feat would not be possible were it not for international 

sales secured by international markets. JSF international sales portend 

increased market share to U.S. and partner industries while taking share 

away from European competitors such as the French Dassault Rafael, 

European Eurofighter, and the Saab-BAe Systems Gripen. Richard 

Aboulafia, a U.S.-based industry analyst with the Teal Group, was blunt 

when asked for his assessment of the F-35: “[i]t could do to the European 

fighter industry what the F-16 almost did–kill it.”59 Curiously, two of the 

JSF partners, the UK and Italy, became partners after their commitments 

to the Eurofighter program. Such a reality brings serious doubt into the 

efficacy of the European Fighter Aircraft Foreign Military Sales program. 

The key to strengthening alliances is perceived benefits by all 

stakeholders. Congress benefits because more sales mean more jobs in 

their districts. The services benefit because of lower unit costs. Partners 

benefit because, by purchasing the JSF, they have greater incentive 

marketing the aircraft elsewhere for reasons of investment recoupment, 

return levies from non-partner sales, and larger incremental revenues for 

their participating companies.60 There are several benefits that these 

provide to international participants. Among them are production 

technology transfer and the ability of the country to relatively 

21
inexpensively acquire high-tech weapon systems without paying highpremiums for development. For example, when a country purchases an 

aircraft through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, a 1.7% 

processing fee is normally attached along with a stipend to cover costs 

associated with security assistance, non-recurring engineering, 

development, and production. This can add millions of dollars to the unit 

recurring fly-away costs. Conversely, participating partner countries do 

not pay for non-recurring engineering and portions of the R&D as they 

would for Foreign Military Sales programs. They may even benefit from 

reimbursements from other countries that later purchase the end item 

under a Foreign Military Sales agreement, defraying some of their costs.61 

The Netherlands identified the JSF program as one of the two pillars upon 

which it expected to build a world-class aerospace industry. Danish 

industry was so impressed by the opportunities that they invested, along 

with the Danish government, in the system development and 

demonstration phase. Major Italian companies are sending around 100 of 

their engineers to be part of six Lockheed integrated product teams in Fort 

Worth and El Segundo, along with Danish engineers. Australia 

established integrated teams to parallel Lockheed’s teams for maximum 

program productivity. Such involvement of partner industry is 

unprecedented in any previous U.S. led international venture and 

underscores the benefits each partner expects to derive.62

Strategic leaders see cooperative programs as a grand strategy for 

improving international relations. When the U.S. sells or co-develops a 

weapon system with a trusted ally, they cement relationships far beyond 

the performance period of an acquisition program. The relationship is 

maintained throughout sustainment, a period normally exceeding 30 years. 

Such is particularly important with traditional allies, like Australia, whose 

relationships with the U.S. may be based more upon history than current 

benefits. 

Australia has been a trusted ally for over 60 years, fighting along 

side the U.S. in almost every conflict since 1941. Recently, however, this 

country has developed a mutually beneficial trade relationship with China. 

Indeed, Australians live closer to Southeast Asia than to the U.S. China 

and Australia rely heavily upon each other for international trade. 

China’s growing demand for energy resources places Australia near the 

top of its list for their plentiful natural gas resources. It is not out of the 

question then that, should the U.S. and China have a falling out, Australia 

may have to seriously consider who butters its bread. If the relationship is 

based more upon history than future long-term opportunities, the decision 

may be a difficult one. If the U.S. establishes long-term financial interests 

22
with Australia through the JSF, then it will have more to rest on than just 

their common history or past laurels. Along with political considerations 

comes the all-important question of how does an international program 

benefit the only real customer—those at the pointy end of the spear? 

Strategic Analysis 

Coalitions Provide Access and Credibility 

The United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach.63 

Turkish Admiral Sezai Orkunt, a former staff planner, once remarked: 

Countries accepting military assistance should be prepared 

to allow the use of military bases in their territory to 

countries providing assistance. Such assistance will 

include advanced weapons systems only in exchange for 

the highest assurances on their use. Great powers have 

dealt and continue to deal to this day on these terms. The 

receiving side is obligated to bring to the negotiations an 

offer in some form to provide bases on its soil, to host 

foreign troops, or better to arrange for joint bases and 

operation organizations along the country’s territorial 

borders.64

In today’s international environment, access to some regions can only be 

achieved through previous relationships forged with international 

cooperative programs or security assistance. 

General Chuck Horner, Gulf War I Joint Air Component Commander, 

stated after the war: 

 Desert Storm was an international team effort. It couldn’t 

have worked as well as it did—or maybe even worked at 

all—if all the nations hadn’t cooperated, paid respect to one 

another, and shouldered equal portions of the burden. This 

was not an American war. It was a Coalition war. And 

we’d better remember how we did it if we’re to be 

successful in the wars of the future.65 “[O]ur combined 

efforts gain legitimacy because they come for many 

nations, not just one. Therefore, we need to prepare in 

peacetime to undertake combined operations during a 

crisis.66 

General Horner notes that coalition partners provide three main benefits: 

bases and ports for access; soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and; counsel and 

23
legitimacy. Beyond credibility and counsel, increasing the capabilities of 

our allies brings effectiveness in coalition warfare by closing the widening 

capabilities gap. 

Increases Coalition Capability 

The Secretary of Defense’s second priority is to “strengthen 

combined/joint warfighting capabilities.”67 Regarding coalition 

capabilities, the current National Defense Strategy states: 

Our strategic objectives are not attainable without the 

support and assistance of capable partners at home and 

abroad...encouraging partners to increase their capability 

and willingness to operate in coalition with our 

forces...Spurring the military transformation of key allies 

through development of a common security assessment and 

joint, combined training and education; combined concept 

development and experimentation; information sharing; 

and combined command and control.68

Why is this important? The U.S. is not likely to fight without partners in 

the foreseeable future. Regrettably, there is a growing capabilities gap 

between the U.S. and its allies. 

During the first Gulf War, the U.S. fashioned together an 

impressive coalition to help evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. When it 

came time to incorporate the lagging coalition capabilities into a cogent 

Air Tasking Order (ATO), however, planners found they could only 

assign meaningful tasks to the UK and a few other NATO countries. 

Coalition warfare capabilities planning, for all intents and purposes, was a 

deconfliction exercise. None of the coalition partners were capable of 

deep strike, due to lack of stealth. No other country was capable of 

dropping precision-guided munitions, none could perform the important 

role of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and only a few could 

perform adequate offensive counter air (OCA) missions. Where capability 

was lacking, interoperability and training lacked even more. Many 

coalition air assets were relegated to small grids (designed to keep them 

from becoming a friendly fire casualties). 

Almost a decade later, things hadn’t improved. Operation Allied 

Force consisted almost entirely of air operations. Of the 19 NATO 

nations, four did not even participate because they lacked relevant 

capabilities. Though the remaining flew 15,000 sorties, or 39% of the 

total, the U.S. delivered 80% of the ordnance.69 Many capabilities such as 

electronic warfare, all weather precision-guided munitions, aerial 

24
refueling, airborne command and control, and suppression of enemy air 

defenses were accomplished almost completely by the U.S.70—and this 

was in NATO’s backyard. 

Why has the U.S found it so difficult to increase the capabilities of 

its allies? The reasons are money and the fact that doing so often invites 

the ire of those concerned about technology and capability transfer. It is 

customary for DoD to charter a ‘Red Team’ to investigate the dangers of 

exporting critical technologies and capabilities. Seeking to counter what 

they viewed as a traditionally protectionist approach, the JSF Joint 

Program Office (JPO) asked that a ‘Blue Team’ look at the advantages of 

exporting critical capabilities. The joint staff chartered the team and 

tasked them interview the Combatant Commanders to determine what JSF 

capabilities they desired for their regional coalition partners.71

The Blue Team went to the regional commanders where JSFs were 

likely to be sold either through the partnership or later Foreign Military 

Sales.72 Instead of showing the Combatant Commanders a list of 

technologies, however, they were shown a list of capabilities that JSF 

could bring to the fight if sold to their regional allies: strategic attack, 

close air support, air interdiction, suppression of enemy air defenses, 

destruction of enemy air defenses, cruise-missile defense, and 

interoperability. The greatest concern of the commanders was that their 

partners were not interoperable and not capable of materially contributing 

to the fight. All the Combatant Commanders desired to give their 

coalition partners most of the capabilities. They wanted to avoid the 

capabilities gap seen in the first Gulf War, and later Bosnia and Kosovo. 

In each of these cases, when it came time to fill out the Air Tasking Order, 

the allies were relegated to menial tasks and told to stay out of certain 

areas lest they become victims due to incompatibility of electronic 

identification capabilities. This caused planners to view coalition partners 

as simply “tickets to the dance,” with no corresponding value added. 

Moreover, coalition partners felt as if they were not appreciated. General 

Horner remarked after the Gulf War, “[t]he Arab coalition did not have the 

combat experience of Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Thus they 

entered the fight as an equal partner who did not feel equal.” The JSF F35, as the Combatant Commanders viewed it, would provide the “turnkey” solution to these woes. 

Lt General Michael C. Short (ret), former Joint Forces Air 

Component Commander (JFACC) during Operation Allied Force (OAF) 

in Kosovo, lamented that we had not paid the proper attention to the state 

of our allies. “Several wanted to come to the fight but did not possess 

capabilities that we could use, or often came to us asking for weapons 

25
such as Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) because they could not afford any.” 

Asked how the JSF would contribute to a regional commander’s options, 

Gen Short said the JSF would bring both interoperability and capability, 

thereby significantly increasing the Combatant Commander’s options. He 

whole-heartedly supported the program for those reasons.73 Lack of 

money is the second reason why coalition partners lag in capability and 

interoperability. International partnerships, in general, and JSF, in 

particular provide a relative solution to this as well. 

JSF Provides Coalition Partners with “Turn-Key” Solutions 

The United States spends more on defense than 25 of the next 

closest nations. To put this in perspective, the poorest ten NATO nations 

spend less money on defense than Mexico. Coalition partners are 

becoming increasingly alarmed that they can no longer keep up with the 

U.S. in either quality of the technologies or quantity of the equipment. 

One international officer in the JSF program office remarked that his 

country could not afford HAVE QUICK radios, much less keep up with 

the U.S. on sophisticated weaponry, were it not for international 

cooperation. Interoperability became a 

2004 World Defense Spending

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

United States

Russia

China

United Kingdom

Japan

France

Germany

Saudi Arabia

India

Italy

South Korea

Australia

Turkey

Israel*

Canada

Spain

Brazil

Netherlands

Taiwan

Greece

2004 $M

Figure 6. 2004 World Defense Spending 

constant thorn in the coalition’s side during Desert Storm and Operation 

Allied Force. Most of the coalition forces lacked compatible 

communication equipment with each other. Those compatible lacked 

encryption. Consequently, command and control of aircraft had to be 

done ‘in the clear’ compromising operations security.74

26
The JSF, through its partnership approach, may be able to provide an 

economically achievable, interoperable solution for coalition partners. 

One of the key benefits of the JSF is the instant interoperability it 

provides. Interoperability is defined as systems, units, and forces 

providing and accepting data, information, materiel, and services to and 

from other systems, units, and forces effectively interoperating with other 

U.S. forces and coalition partners.75 

The F-35 was designed with interoperability at the forefront, instead 

of as an add-on requirement. Consequently, the F-35 is a Command, 

Control, and Communication (C3) node in the sky, with over 120 

information exchange requirements.76 The aircraft is intended to be a 

network-centric fighter going beyond the traditional single-task 

capability.77 Embedded in the architecture are interconnecting grids 

bringing together a bevy of on-board and off-board sensors. It is 

considered to be a ‘contributor’ rather than just a consumer of 

information. Because partner interoperability requirements were 

incorporated up front, each partner, by default, will be able to receive and 

contribute to the C4ISR grid. 

Figure 7. JSF Interoperability 

The F-35 sensor suite includes an impressive array of sensors—a MultiFunction Array (MFA), Advanced Electronic Sensors Suite, an ElectroOptical Tracking and Sensor (EOTS), and a Distributed Aperture System 

(DAS) consisting of multiple infrared sensors. In addition, it interfaces 

with off-board platforms such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System (JSTARS) and the Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS) or any other Link-16 compatible systems. After the political 

and strategic considerations are tallied, the JSF represents a compelling 

case. However, when acquiring the largest DoD weapon system in 

history, a strong business case is also necessary. 

27
Business Case Analysis 

Increases Funding Stability 

Each year DoD must decide where it is going to get the money to pay 

for all its acquisition programs—there are always more programs than 

money. Those programs not executing well or cancelled are sources of 

some money, but in most years, this is not enough to cover the shortfalls. 

The OSD comptroller solves this problem by sending the services a bill. 

The services comply by ‘peanut butter spreading’ the cuts across all their 

programs. Unfortunately, cutting money from programs results in highly 

costly delays. Some studies suggest for every $1 saved, an additional $4 

will be added in the out-years. The F-15 air superiority fighter is a prime 

example. Due to budget constraints, a substantial number of production 

aircraft were pushed three years to the right during the peak production 

period in order for the Air Force to pay for other shortfalls. The total 

number of aircraft remained constant at 729 but the bill to the Air Force in 

the out-years was $2B. This amount could have been used to produce an 

additional wing of F-15s (72 aircraft).78 Adding insult to injury, there was 

now $2B less in the Air Force budget to fund future programs. This is a 

vicious cycle that unfortunately plays out in all programs not ‘fenced’ 

from the cuts. 

 Unlike most program managers, however, Rear Admiral Steven 

Enewold, JSF Director, has some protection from funding instability: 

...people have the tendency not to tinker [re: cut budget] 

with us as much because the implications on the 

international side. DoD is pretty good at recognizing that 

State, and Commerce are affected...[While] Tony Blair 

doesn’t call President Bush on JSF unique stuff, JSF still 

often comes up during bi-lateral talks. The Brits are very 

concerned with having an aircraft for their new carrier and 

are concerned that the program is moving forward...some 

people say it freezes us into immobility but it really gives 

us a measure of stability that I don’t think any other 

program has.79

Financial flexibility—the ability to apply resources wherever needed and 

whenever needed—is also extremely important. 

28
Partner Contributions Increase Program Managers’ Flexibility 

International partner contributions are extremely important for a 

program manager, particularly during development, because they can be 

counted on to be there when promised, cannot be taken, and allow the 

program manager flexibility to apply across several areas without a 

lengthy Congressional approval process. Rear Admiral Enewold 

remarked: 

There is certainly the financial benefit with the 

international partners contributing a significant amount of 

money. This year is a big year in terms of contributions 

and next year the partners will contribute over $800M. 

[While] it has R&D restrictions analogous to the 3600 

money in support of system demonstration and 

development...it does not expire. We try to spend the 

money in a timely manner because they have requirements 

like the U.S., but by the MOU, we can just spend it on 

other things. You can count on it and it can fill gaps that if 

for some reason you can do something that you don’t have 

permission from Congress to do and if we convince 

ourselves it is good for the program, we can go to the 

partners and get approval.80

There are other advantages to partners, such as better ideas, approaches, 

and technologies. 

Encourages “Best-of-Breed” Technologies 

The common argument among those who would restrict 

technology transfers is that it only benefits the technologically inferior 

party. They believe that the international partners and their industry 

benefit far more from the technology than does the United States. 

Interestingly, this view is not widely held by many in government 

leadership, industry, or high-tech laboratories and smacks of technical 

hubris. Admiral Enewold believes that the U.S. has benefited 

tremendously from foreign participation in the program. 

From a program manager perspective, there are all kinds of 

technical benefits. We find stuff that other people are 

doing that we haven’t thought of, you get all ideas not just 

U.S. ideas. The perception in the system is that all the 

technology is leaving shore, but the truth of the matter is 

that there is stuff coming on shore also; especially in 

29
manufacturing. We see Euro fighter as being the state of 

the art manufacturing that set up those kinds of things.81 

Mr. Warren Boley, Vice President of F100 engines at Pratt and Whitney, 

is a firm believer in taking advantage of the global industrial market. He 

remarked on the collaboration between the U.S. and the Japanese: 

Pratt benefited directly from Japanese production methods 

namely from Toyota moving production line processes. 

Japanese quality on the F100 was very good and did not 

have many of the problems that Pratt encountered. This 

was due to process control and lean manufacturing 

methods, much of which we incorporated in our processes. 

While Pratt was aware of the theory, the Japanese went 

beyond theory to demonstration.82 

Many U.S. industry professionals say most foreign technology transfers 

on-shore are in the form of production capabilities and represent better 

value for the dollar. “In 1980, 100% of Pratt engine parts were 

manufactured in Connecticut. In 2000, only 30% of parts were. Now, 

70% are manufactured by other suppliers, many of them being 

international.”83 While Pratt can match the quality of these parts, they 

found they could not beat the value due to much lower burden rates (Mr. 

Boley cited $65/hr labor rates compared to $16/hr overseas). But what 

about the concern of giving away too much for short-term wins? Mr. 

Boley indicated there is still plenty of room between export restrictions 

and where U.S. industry would like to be before they would even get close 

to giving away the crown jewels. Industry, in general, does not believe 

that many of the technologies that are labeled ‘critical’ should be in a 

category that requires protection. Moreover, clearly they do not fear 

invigoration of global competitors as a result of the licensing agreements, 

otherwise they would not pursue outsourcing these technologies. 

It is interesting to note that while many in government, the 

military, and industry are sanguine regarding international cooperation 

and their accompanying technology transfers, other stakeholders have 

erected safeguards against what they consider a threat to the U.S. interests. 

Such safeguards come in the form of regulations on non-disclosure 

policies and outright prohibitions in public law, such as the Buy America 

Act discussed in the next chapter. Many, if not most, of these safeguards 

were intended to protect the industrial lead the U.S. enjoyed and prevent 

other nations from achieving parity with the U.S. military on the 

battlefield. Unfortunately, most of these safeguards have outlived their 

30
useful life, preventing the U.S. from taking advantages of the global 

industrial defense market and from achieving its stated national security 

strategy goals. The next chapter will analyze the disadvantages of 

international cooperative programs and address some of the roadblocks 

that limit their success. 

31
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32
Chapter 4 

Liabilities of and Barriers to International 

Armament Cooperative Programs 

In meeting our national and global security obligations, 

collaborative programs with allies offer the potential for 

common doctrine, shared training, and far greater 

operational integration in combat. That level of 

collaboration also demands greater access to sensitive 

defense technologies than we are accustomed. It also may 

demand technology transfers at a pace and volume our 

current laws, regulations, and management systems cannot 

handle safely. 

 Government Accountability Office Report on JSF 

Acquisition, July 2003 

Political Analysis 

The United States has committed to the design, development, and 

testing of the JSF with foreign partners. In doing so it also, for all intents 

and purposes, has approved the development of a configuration common 

within the limits of national disclosure policy. Congress, Commerce, 

State, and DoD, all approved the acquisition strategy.84 The devil is in the 

details—now the hard part begins. Each U.S. stakeholder has its own 

peculiar interests and concerns. Congress and Commerce are interested in 

keeping jobs at home and preventing the U.S. from ‘giving away the farm’ 

in critical military technology transfers, thereby invigorating industrial 

competitors. State is concerned with ensuring industry is following the 

export control process and not upsetting the balance of regional powers. 

DoD is concerned with technology exploitation and third-party transfers to 

rogue states. In a sense, it was easy to say that the U.S. would design, 

develop, and sell up to 2000 fifth-generation stealth fighters to its allies. 

However, the commensurate laws, disclosure policy, and acquisition 

environment is diametrically opposed to doing much of this. Said another 

way, laws, regulations, and policies are hard-wired against such a strategy. 

The following sections will describe the disadvantages of international 

33
cooperative programs, due to their nature and the hostile environment in 

which they often must operate. 

Risk of Partner Defection 

Work share, in international parlance, can be a four-letter word. 

Much of the acrimony in international partnerships surrounds how to 

divide the available work among the partner industries. The European 

Fighter Program is the ‘international poster-boy’ for unsuccessfully tying 

work share to the total aircraft buy of each partner. This approach 

unraveled when French officials demanded 46% of the division of labor 

even though they were only going to purchase 25% of the production 

run.85 France eventually withdrew from the EFA program, leaving the 

remaining partners to divvy up the work. Each time a partner’s parliament 

decided to reduce their buy due to fiscal constraints, work share had to be 

renegotiated. This was inefficient and expensive due to delays and costs 

of contract modifications and terminations, and was further exacerbated 

by the difficulty of finding meaningful work among partners with unequal 

manufacturing capabilities. It also instituted an unstable system; each cut 

produced higher unit costs thus putting pressure on the partner countries to 

reduce the buy, thereby adding pressure to raise costs. The European 

Fighter Aircraft unit cost eventually reached $110M USD, making it 

almost as expensive as the F-22A with arguably much less capability. 

Not all was well in paradise either. When JSF adopted the 

revolutionary work share approach “best athlete,” it worked well initially. 

After a time, however, it became clear some of the partner industries were 

not winning what they believed to be their fair share of the ‘pie.’ This was 

despite the program office and Lockheed-Martin making it clear, during 

the MOU discussions, that money ‘won’t buy you love.’ The Program 

Office tinkered with another approach termed “strategic sourcing,” which 

modified the best value approach by allowing work packages to be 

directly awarded to foreign partner industries where contract awards had 

not met partner expectations. Only a few contracts were ever awarded on 

this basis because it created more hate and discontent than it was worth.86 

The countries that were most competitive viewed it as breaking a promise 

of best value. U.S. stakeholders began asking why they were spending 

more money on poorer performance. The Joint Program Office moved 

away from strategic sourcing, although not exclusively. It is now used 

only in those rare cases where there would be no contract awarded to a 

partner country.87 

A second reason for defection is increased cost. Escalating unit 

costs, due to a U.S. reduction in the buy, development delays, or 

34
production delays have been a prime cause for partners to leave in droves. 

This scenario was foreseen by European defense experts: “If the F-35 does 

not meet its cost numbers and adhere to schedule, the foreign partners will 

bail out of the effort and the export market for the aircraft would disappear 

overnight, causing what is called the “death spiral” of the program.”88 

A third reason for defection involves inordinate partner 

expectations—they almost always exceed the art of the possible. Turkey 

and the Peace Onyx co-production of the F-16 is a prime example. 

Turkey saw the agreement as an opportunity to improve their long-term 

military modernization goals while bolstering their defense industry.89 

Throughout negotiations and into the production, however, they employed 

hard-line tactics seeking to shield themselves from financial risk by tying 

the U.S. to financial oversight. The U.S. eventually hedged against this 

approach by definitively stating in the contract, “it is understood that the 

U.S. government will not be responsible for assuring the initial or future 

viability of the Turkish industrial base or Turkey F-16 related facilities.”90 

Ultimately, while the modernization of Turkey’s Air Force was achieved, 

Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. was damaged. 

For the JSF, the original country MOUs and subsequent exchange of 

letters91 outlined what each partner hoped to secure in long-term benefits. 

Unfortunately, lack of progress on the exchange of letters has been a great 

source of frustration for the JSF partners, causing several of them to 

threaten to pull out of the program.92 Most of these requests ran afoul of 

the national disclosure policies and were further exacerbated by the 

bureaucratic process of national disclosure policy exceptions. The 

partners were upset that the JSF program office lacked the authority to act 

as a final policy adjudicator. Many of the partner’s requests dealt with 

long-lead issues, such as depot maintenance, that require more time to 

define programmatically. These negotiations took an immense amount of 

the program’s time working out details and reassuring partners that the 

disclosure process was being engaged. At the end of the day, all 

international programs are at the mercy of the national disclosure 

community. This process is not clear-cut and must be negotiated carefully 

with political adeptness and patience outside of the view of the 

international community thereby increasing suspicions. 

Not all can be blamed on the disclosure process. A program can also 

be its own enemy by making promises to partners that have not been 

vetted at the appropriate levels. Ultimately, clear communication and 

managing expectations early is critical to avoiding much of the rancor. 

Such has become a full-time job for JSF program office officials. Admiral 

Enewold explained: 

35
We need to get the expectations down on peoples financial 

contributions and expected outcomes of the program. I 

think that we... I won’t say rushed into the MOU’s, I think 

we talked passed each other during the MOU discussions. 

Each of the countries have a business case as to why they 

want to be part of JSF both operational, financial, industrial 

participation, coalition, it ran the gamut. But I don’t think 

they understood how we were going to include them into 

the program and certainly we didn’t understand how they 

wanted to be included into the system. We’re working our 

way through a lot of this stuff right now and it has been 

pretty painful at the beginning. For the first three or four 

years it was pretty rocky with them saying, well, I thought 

we were going to do this and we said no, we’re going to do 

this ... so trying to get the expectations down at the start is 

really important. Overall, it has been a healthy dialog. It’s 

not been as bad as the press and everybody says it is; it’s 

actually working pretty well. You have to remember, none 

of these countries are taking possession of their airplanes 

for at least five years, maybe ten, so we have some time to 

work these issues. Just by virtue of the lead time, it’s 

impossible to determine how this is all going to work but 

every body wants to know now.93

In a recent 2003 report on the JSF, the Government Accounting Office 

(GAO) addressed the same issue as a primary concern. “Differing 

expectations between the U.S. and its partners are inevitable. Partners 

have complained that their expectations regarding technology transfer, 

indigenousness sustainment, and industry work share have not been 

met.”94 Risks of partner defection abound due to any number of factors. 

Nothing, however, is more lethal to a program than the country-lead 

canceling because they have assumed too much risk. 

Undue Risks Assumed by Lead-Country 

A hearing before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on 

National Security Emerging Threats and International Relations discussed 

the concern over the U.S. taking the bulk of the development risk for JSF. 

The committee asked whether international participation and technology 

sharing are being managed so as to maximize benefits and minimize risk 

to the Department of Defense.95 A GAO report, released earlier, found 

the JSF program in need of stronger management and oversight, because 

36
international participants, “currently have no requirement or incentive to 

share in cost growth.”96 The report was right. The JSF MOU cost sharing 

provisions require the program director only to notify the partners if there 

is a cost increase or overrun.97 There is no requirement for the partners to 

‘pitch-in’ covering their commensurate share beyond the previously 

agreed upon target cost. What would be the incentive for the partners to 

pony-up when the tin cup was passed? The JPO says because it would be 

in the partners’ best interest since the health and future success of the 

program is critical to achieve the force structure updates the JSF partners 

require.98 It remains to be seen if this is what truly would happen since 

the JPO has not gone back to the partners and asked, even after a $3B cost 

increase ensued following a weight reduction exercise in 2004. Moreover, 

passing the tin cup does not engender an atmosphere of trust amongst the 

partners. While Congress clearly called this one correctly, sometimes it 

doesn’t need all the facts before it injects itself into the process. 

Invigorates Industrial Competitors 

On the surface, Congressional fears of losing U.S. jobs to offshore 

defense contractors appear to be warranted. In the F-15, F-16, and F-18 

programs, several countries99 legally secured co-production licenses. 

Turkey produced 46 F-16 aircraft for Egypt under the Peace Vector 

agreement. Israel developed two aircraft in the KFIR and Phantom 2000 

programs that were considered to be in competition to U.S. foreign 

military sales and sold them on the international market.100 The U.S. lost 

business to aggressive Israeli modernization kits for Turkish F-4 

Phantoms and a $20M Radar Warning Receiver upgrade to Venezuelan F16B aircraft.101 While these sales were significant for the countries 

producing them, however, they were insignificant in terms of total jobs 

lost to U.S. industry. 

To be fair, sometimes a country illegally transfers technology that can 

harm U.S. industry. Israel is the worst offender of third-party transfers,102

which involve taking U.S. technologies and porting them over to another 

weapon system. Israel sold missile and tank technology to China in the 

1990s and more recently has sold, to non-aligned countries such as India, 

advanced avionics in the Python missile, a derivative of the U.S. Aim-9 

Sidewinder, and the Mapatz anti-tank missile developed from TOW-2 

technology.103 

This type of behavior, fortunately, is not the norm. Japan coproduced nine tactical fighters and trainers with the U.S. over 26 years but 

has not used the technology for other markets. Indeed, co-production 

technology does not give a country much of the know-how to develop 

37
indigenousness capability. It should be noted that it took Japan 22 years, 

from its first co-production program, to where they were capable of 

developing their own indigenous fighter in the F-1.104 Years later, Japan 

abandoned its plans to develop the FSX (F-2) on their own, opting instead 

to co-develop it with Lockheed-Martin.105 Ironically, at the time of the 

FSX decision in 1989, Japan had been co-producing F-15s with the U.S. 

for 12 years but still did not have the ability to produce a fighter 

indigenously.106 Speaking from his cooperative relationship with Japan 

on F100 co-production, Mr. Warren Boley, Vice President of Pratt and 

Whitney for the F100 engine, did not see the danger of technology transfer 

invigorating an engine competitor. “[T]he Japanese have been very 

respectful of intellectual property, the TAA, and the ITAR restrictions on 

their licensed production. They have been producing the F-100 since the 

1980s. Pratt has not seen an industrial competitor out of the Japanese on 

tactical engines.”107 Today, over 15 years later, Japan is still not 

competing with the U.S. in defense exports or commercial offshoots such 

as jet engines. Unfortunately, bad experiences can give the impression 

that technology transfer automatically equals plundering our defense 

intellectual capital; such is generally not the case. 

Rather than take a protectionist stance, Dr. Tom Cruse, the 

technical director of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), believes 

the U.S. benefits from technology collaboration. The lab actively seeks 

technical exchanges with foreign research partners, particularly in 

theoretical areas, because many countries are ahead of the U.S. in certain 

fields. These exchanges often provide a catalyst for innovation. 108 Many 

in industry agree. When it comes to applied research, transfers bring 

enabling technologies that solve difficult problems. The Short Take-Off 

and Landing (STOVL) technologies that power the JSF Marine Corps 

variant would not be possible if were it not for offshore partners.109 

Even in the unlikely event technology transfers were to create an 

offshore competitor, Colonel Michael Leahy of AFRL’s Air Vehicles 

directorate believes, regardless of its origin (domestic or otherwise), that 

competition is a good thing: 

Competition is key; you stay ahead with it not by 

protecting your technologies. The more the U.S. invests in 

technology to stay ahead, the more it outweighs protecting 

the family jewels. Once a technology gets to the market, 

it’s a commodity and you don’t get ahead by protecting a 

commodity, you get ahead and stay ahead by doing the next 

thing...technology protection is very difficult to do in 

terms of time and cost.110 

38
Doctors Cruse and Leahy believe that U.S. industry lacks a natural 

predator and would benefit even if it came from a foreign competitor. “If 

one prime contractor wins, he just brings the other one or two on 

board.”111 Such an ‘everyone gets a trophy’ atmosphere does not 

engender taking risks on new advance opportunities. Leahy noted, 

“Boeing is taking risks today on the 787 they would never have taken if it 

wasn’t for Airbus scaring the [expletive] out of them. This has 

engendered a ‘bet the company’ environment and benefits commercial 

industry by encouraging innovation. Competition, even if invigorated by 

technology transfer, is a good thing.”112 Slightly modifying a famous 

quote by Alan Kay, the father of the graphical user interface (which 

everyone copied), “[t]he best way to protect the future is to invent it.”113 

Like the political realm, however, there are downsides of international 

programs to the warfighter. The next section will address some of the 

more salient ones. 

Strategic Analysis 

Limits of Coalition Warfare 

The U.S. National Security Strategy acknowledges the limits of 

coalition warfare: “[s]ome allies and partners will decide not to act with us 

or will lack the capacity to act with us.”114 The Combatant Commanders, 

during the Blue Team process discussed earlier, expressed concern that 

coalition partners often lacked the capabilities and training to accomplish 

critical warfighting tasks or the political will to do so. Successful 

coalitions cannot be achieved through ad hoc coalitions of the willing 

argues Jeffery Balios of Defense News. “Coalition war fighting is not like 

a pick up game of basketball, rather, it requires joint training, new 

doctrine and creating institutional ‘plug and play’ command and control 

architectures.” 115

Following the first Gulf War, General Horner lamented: 

Though F-16’s are easy jets to fly and maintain, it is 

difficult to maximize the full capabilities of this amazing 

aircraft’s avionics suite. In the USAF, years of training are 

required before pilots are capable of using the F-16 to its 

fullest. The Bahrainis didn’t have a year, and they didn’t 

have homegrown leaders who had fought in Vietnam to 

guide them.116

39
The Combatant Commanders are interested in releasing advanced 

capabilities only to those countries that will train with the U.S. and have 

the political will to employ these capabilities along side of the United 

States. NATO countries and Australia have shown the greatest 

willingness in this regard. Ostensibly, this is was an important factor in 

determining who the JSF sought as partners. Countries outside this 

fraternity pose greater risks. There is always the question, how they will 

handle the technology, or worse, who will they give it to? 

Rogue Nation Scenario 

Rogue nation concerns are often invoked but rarely live up to their 

billing. When a nation goes rogue, the consequences have been dubious. 

Perhaps the classic example of the ‘rogue nation’ scenario is Iran 

following the 1979 Islamic revolution. The U.S. had delivered 79 

advanced F-14 Tomcats117 to the pro-Western Shah regime, only to find 

them in the hands of revolutionaries now bent on the West’s destruction. 

How the Iranians would use the F-14s, or perhaps who they might share 

this technology with, was of great concern to the U.S. The U.S. 

responded by cutting off all spare parts, which significantly limited Iran’s 

ability to sortie the aircraft. The aircraft was never employed against the 

U.S., and the technology has since been superseded. Unfortunately, in 

July 1988 the USS Vincennes, patrolling in the Persian Gulf, misidentified 

an Iranian Airbus A300 jetliner as an F-14, shooting it down and killing 

all 290 passengers.118 More recently, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 

glibly threatened to sell some or all of his 20 F-16A/B fighters to Cuba or 

China because the U.S. withheld spare parts. Chavez intoned: "[m]aybe 

we will just send them back to them, or perhaps we will send 10 planes to 

Cuba, or to China, so they can have a look at the technology of these 

aircraft."119 Clearly, ten or twenty F-16s are not going to make even a 

tactical difference in any conflict between Venezuela and the U.S., nor 

will it change the balance of power in the region.120 Turning over aircraft 

to hostile nations who have the intent to exploit technologies and 

determine vulnerabilities, however, could be harmful in some scenarios, 

but not in this case, as the technology is 25 years old. With high-tech 

weapon systems, however, the U.S. is concerned about three areas: 

technology migration/transfer, information exploitation, and the U.S. 

ability to counter if such capabilities are employed against them. 

Information Exploitation 

Exploitation can be defined as reverse engineering to determine how a 

system works for the purpose of manufacturing a like system or 

40
determining vulnerabilities. Exploitation is most often used to determine 

the capabilities and vulnerabilities of a system so that an effective 

countermeasure can be developed, thus negating capabilities. Effective 

exploitation, however, normally requires several components: capability, 

intent, opportunity, and time. Oftentimes countries come into possession 

of advanced defense technologies but do not possess one or any of these 

components, thus deriving no benefit either industrially or militarily. On 

these occasions, however, a third party transfer of the technology can 

occur. Most of these transfers are for financial gain and can be extremely 

damaging when made to nations with the capability and intent to exploit. 

Fortunately, however, payoffs do not occur overnight. Even when a 

country possessing the capabilities comes in possession of a high tech 

weapon system, it takes years and sometimes decades to fully exploit the 

capability—possession does not equal immediate gratification. This 

notion was a common argument against including high-tech capabilities 

with the JSF. The Joint Program Office countered that aircraft were being 

sold to trusted NATO allies who were not likely to ‘go rogue.’ 

Additionally, they were to be sold to their respective defense forces, not 

their industrial centers. Moreover, critical or highly sensitive 

technologies, such as sensors and low observable technology integration, 

would be carefully controlled, produced, and maintained by U.S. depots. 

Finally, these nations would not receive the capabilities or technologies 

for up to fifteen years. With conservative estimates, even in the unlikely 

event that a country made a concerted effort to exploit the technologies 

and was able to overcome anti-tamper techniques, it would be years before 

any real benefits would be derived. 

Business Case Analysis 

Incorporating Partners in Daily Operations 

At the Defense Systems Management College in Ft. Belvoir, VA, 

future senior acquisition professionals are schooled in the rigors of 

program management and how to navigate the often troubled and complex 

waters of acquisition. Numerous perils lay in the path to successfully 

executing a program: requirements development, budget instability, source 

selections, and managing in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous 

environment. Added to this are seemingly yearly acquisition reforms that 

are designed to ‘unleash’ the program manager but often serve only to 

fetter him in a morass of acquisition regulations, milestone documents, 

and federal law. Major Gen Hough (USMC), former JSF program 

41
director, lamented that, prior to acquisition reform, a major milestone 

review required him to deliver 18 major documents to the Defense 

Acquisition Executive but now, as a result of acquisition reform, he only 

has to deliver 24! Werner von Braun once remarked, “We can overcome 

gravity, but sometimes the paperwork is overwhelming.”121 

If this environment were not difficult enough, program managers 

must now determine if pursuing an acquisition strategy that includes 

international cooperation is a prudent course. Along with the benefits 

come additional regulations, laws, and interagency coordination that 

increase their overhead in an already constrained (fiscal and manpower) 

resource environment. 

The first such challenge is what to do with foreign program office 

personnel. There are currently 50 internationals in the JSF program 

office. This number will swell by an additional 40 people once 

operational tests begin. Each foreign national is assigned duties alongside 

their U.S. counterparts. Seamless integration of the internationals, 

however, is another matter. Due to national disclosure policy, foreign 

personnel are not allowed access to any information or material that has 

not been reviewed by the disclosure office and to which they have been 

cleared. This includes any ‘For Official Use Only’ material through colateral Top Secret. The practical implications can and have been very 

difficult on program office staff as well as being the source of great 

frustration to international partners. International personnel often view 

such policies as ‘slow-rolling’ or deliberate stonewalling. On some 

occasions, information is never released, which damages positive relations 

with the partners who have, in their minds, paid good money to have 

access to information they deem necessary to making informed decisions. 

A second challenge with partnerships is dissimilar interests. Partners 

often come with unique requirements they desire to fulfill through a 

weapon systems acquisition and a program manager must seek to satisfy. 

Diverse Partner Requirements 

Requirements have long been the bane of acquisition programs. 

Requirements creep, changing requirements due to changes in threats and 

gold plating, can kill any development program.122 The longer the 

development cycle, the greater the probability requirements will change, 

resulting in higher costs. The average acquisition program is susceptible 

to creep because cycle times have increased to 175 months.123 If the 

acquisition program is joint, formulating a common set of requirements 

between the services becomes more problematic. The services clearly 

intend to use the weapon system for different missions. For example, one 

42
service requirement, such as carrier suitability, may be so far outside the 

trade space for another service that is precludes a critical capability of the 

former. Ultimately, all services must compromise their requirements. 

One of the remarkable achievements of JSF is the services were able to 

hammer-out a Joint Operational Requirements Document and yet still 

maintain a high level of commonality among the three variants. 

Requirements have also been the most troublesome factors affecting 

collaborative attempts between states.124 The JSF had to trade 

requirements across three services and eight countries. This could have 

become untenable. The JSF, however, included many of the partner 

countries in the process early and was able to define a common set of 

mission capabilities. This highlights the need for all parties to achieve 

agreement on the overall specifications and reach consensus on 

performance, capabilities, and operational characteristics early.125 

Oftentimes programs have to invent new processes on schedule 

because much of the international cooperative depths remain unfathomed; 

processes and even laws need to be created to accommodate the 

complexities. Colonel Mike Williams, former F-16 Systems Program 

Director, related the following challenge during the early days of the F-16 

program. At that time the MOA with the original European Participating 

Air Force countries (Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, and 

Portugal) was the largest section 27 cooperative development program: 

They asked us to co-produce. We had never co-produced 

before. This was the first time we just didn’t sell them our 

developed aircraft. The system didn’t know how to handle 

a co-production program. An MOA was produced. It 

bound the five partners together. They had to create their 

own law and even a bank. We had to modify ancient 

foreign military sales rules from the post WW II era 

intended to sell jeeps and spoons to something useful for 

the complex European program.126 

As seen above, international programs are not conducted in a vacuum. 

Their very nature demands coordination with agencies outside the DoD. 

Weapons acquisitions are challenging enough, but they can become 

extremely complex when the interagency process is introduced. 

Interagency Involvement in the Acquisition Process 

There is no central decision-making authority within the export 

control process.127 Authority is spread throughout the executive agencies 

and Congress. At inception, international agreements for armaments 

43
cooperation programs must complete the interagency consultation and 

congressional notification requirement.128 In addition, the Case Act 

requires executive agencies to consult with the Secretary of State before 

signing an international agreement. Finally, DoD is required to consider 

the effects of any international agreement on the U.S. industrial base and, 

in consultation with the Department of Commerce, determine the potential 

effects on the international competitive position of U.S. industry. In all, 

the export control process can involve as many as seven cabinet-level 

departments: President, Department of State, DoD, Department of Energy, 

Joint Staff, National Security Council, and National Economic Council. 

 Once the program is approved, several interagency working groups 

may become involved in the process of developing the acquisition strategy 

and reporting at required milestones, these include: the Advisory 

Committee of Export Policy; the Economic Defense Advisory Committee; 

the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S.; three interagency 

escalation groups (e.g., resolution of interagency disputes); three different 

intelligence agencies; two independent agencies; and three enforcement 

agencies. 

National Disclosure Policy-1 describes the authorizations process for 

DoD export policy. The Secretary of Defense and the Undersecretary are 

the principal adjudicators of export decisions. They delegate secret level 

decisions to the service international program offices at the service staff 

levels. It is rare, however, for a single service international program 

office to have approval authority for an export decision. The service 

levels are just the first stop in a long coordination line. Most export 

decisions regarding disclosure, technology, end items, or capability must 

be vetted by the National Disclosure Policy Committee, a joint 

interagency committee chaired by the Defense Technical Security 

Administration. It develops and implements technology and security 

policies for international transfers and prepares for the future threats 

through activities and programs that control, monitor, and prevent the 

transfer of defense related goods, services, and technologies that can 

threaten the U.S. national security interests.129 

Other agencies represented within the community are the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Service International Program 

Offices, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, NSA, CIA, and NRO. Unfortunately, the National 

Disclosure Policy Committee only adjudicates unclassified and secret 

level decisions. Technologies or capabilities at the Special Access 

Required levels are delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Low 

Observables/Counter Low Observables Export Committee. This 

44
committee is chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition 

and administered through the Special Programs office. A tri-service group 

chaired by representatives from the Special Programs groups of each 

service act as a lower committee to vet issues prior to meeting the export 

committee. 

Finally, if a system has any cryptological capabilities (JSF has 16 

keys), algorithms, or technologies, it must receive approval through the 

National Security Agency (NSA) on a case by case basis, unless a 

Combatant Commander specifically requests an exception. Interestingly, 

the NSA reports to the Director of Policy, who also owns the Defense 

Technical Security Administration. On the one hand, such consensus 

staffing is important; but on the other, it can be terribly inefficient. 

One wonders why these processes cannot be integrated under one 

adjudicating body. Complicating this frustrating process are other DoD 

agencies that occasionally have ‘rolled-in’ during the vetting process and 

carried a significant veto-like voice. When this occurs, the program office 

must spend more time to explain and convince ‘all-comers’ why such a 

decision is being sought to assuage their concerns. According to the 

Defense Technical Security Administration website, they perform the 

export control function “consistent with foreign policy and national 

security objectives.” Unfortunately, they own but a small piece of the 

puzzle. A truly interagency committee, whose chair is empowered by the 

Executive branch and DoD to make decisions within a year’s period, 

would significantly improve the export control process. Such decisions 

cannot be made on the consensus of a disparate set of communities in 

sequential fashion—this is too inefficient and sustains stovepiping. Such 

a process can best be accomplished with a single committee. A central, 

‘one-stop-shop’ is required to fix this broken process. 

The JSF program office has sought to stay ahead of this process by 

conducting senior-level reviews every four months. These reviews are at 

the 3-star or equivalent level and include the Service Acquisition 

Executives, the requirements communities, and all the partners and their 

principal users together. This meeting can have up to 60-75 general 

officers to make sure everyone is baselined on the program. In addition, 

every six months the joint program office brings together the Chief 

Executive Officers from Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, BAE, 

Pratt and Whitney, GE, and Rolls as well as the Service secretaries, 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Service Acquisition 

Executives, requirements users from the services, and the national 

armaments directors from each of the partners and their chiefs. All told, 

up to one hundred 4-star level executives convene every six months. 

45
While Admiral Enewold believes this process is valuable from the 

standpoint of keeping down the ‘urban rumors,’ he also admits it can be 

very cumbersome.130 An even greater challenge, and often a barrier, is the 

U.S. export policies, processes, regulations and laws, which are not 

friendly to international entrepreneurial environments. 

Complexity of Policies, Processes, Regulations, and Laws 

 DoD warns program managers that international cooperative 

programs are fraught with red tape. “The complexity of laws, regulations, 

and policies that apply to armaments cooperation activities should not be 

underestimated.”131 

The most important point to remember about the legal basis 

for armaments cooperation activities is that international 

program related statutes and associated regulations and 

policies in most instances apply in addition to, not instead 

of, applicable domestic DoD acquisition laws and policies. 

Acquisition personnel, with the assistance of supporting 

DoD international programs organizations, must comply 

with both domestic and international cooperation related 

laws, regulations, and policies while developing and 

implementing armaments cooperation initiatives.132

Delays and uncertainty in acquisition are not conducive to efficient or 

profitable operations. 

 Lockheed-Martin and the program office have the unenviable task of 

pushing through timely and favorable disclosure decisions and in some 

cases, exceptions to national disclosure policy. Under law, U.S. 

contractors must receive authorization to transfer needed data and 

technology through the export licensing process. Export authorizations 

for critical suppliers need to have timely planning, preparation, and 

deposition to avoid costly schedule delays. The joint program office 

attempted to streamline this process through what was called the Global 

Project Authority. Over a year was spent pushing this initiative through 

the disclosure process, specifically, the State Department. The purpose 

was to identify common, non-sensitive, unclassified, technical data 

associated with JSF subcontracting activities. For example, Technology 

Assistance Agreements (TAAs) are required before any technical 

discussions can take place between the U.S. contractor and a foreign 

contractor. Such discussions are necessary before the U.S. contractor can 

determine if the foreign entity even has the capabilities to design and 

manufacture a particular part. Before the Global Project Authority, 

46
thousands of individual TAAs had to be submitted serially though this 

process. The majority were standard requests with no critical information 

exchange required. This process invited the ire of the partners. The 

Global Project Authority was eventually approved, but the authority given 

to the joint program office was so watered down that it didn’t help over 

the original TAA process. Even Canada’s statutory advantage of 

exemption from U.S. International Traffic in Arms regulations did not 

eliminate their need for TAAs. The partner’s single uppermost complaint 

of the JSF program is the ineffectiveness of the Global Project 

Authority.133

 Another example of a law restricting the flexibility of international 

programs is the Buy American Act. Codified in 1933. Many consider this 

to be a leftover from a prior protectionist’s era. The act, on the surface, 

appears to make the playing field very uneven, requiring acquisition of 

U.S. only products for public use. Fortunately, there are five waiverable 

conditions that are often invoked with success by U.S. industry and 

government acquisition professionals. While these waivers take some of 

the teeth out of the Act, it is still a concern to industry and program 

managers because of its complicated nature, the requirement for 

certification of compliance, and its continued existence even in the postacquisition reform era.134 It appears disingenuous to foreign partners, 

who already suspect U.S. export and import policies to be rigged against 

them. Adding to this perception are frequent forays by unions and 

Congressional stakeholders who invoke the act when they perceive threats 

to local jobs. Protests typically range from loss of U.S. industry share to 

out and out protectionism. U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, concerned over 

the abuse of the act’s five waivers, recently proposed broad changes to the 

act to prevent, as he put it, the “hemorrhaging of U.S. manufacturing 

industry.”135 Part of the complexity stems from its implementation in the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations. The Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) defines the “unreasonable price” difference (waiver 

number 2) as six percent. The regulations increase this to 50 percent, for 

which there is no basis in statute or regulation.136 Ultimately, such 

regulations limit a manager’s ability to choose amongst a globally 

competitive market. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act panel of 

1994 recommended Congress repeal the restrictions and reporting 

requirements but these were eventually rejected. The rationale for 

removing the restrictions was cogent: 

 Commercial sellers should be able to utilize their 

established facilities, technology, supplier networks, 

processes, employees and other standard commercial 

47
practices in performing Government contracts. The reality 

that global markets exist and that global markets can be 

responsive to mobilization needs must be recognized. 

Waiver is not always possible under current regulations. It 

is to our strategic and economic advantage to maintain vital 

foreign sources during peacetime as well as domestic 

sources or at least have the option to do so when market 

conditions and the international situation so dictates.137

Such laws add more requirements to an already too-full agenda, requiring 

program managers to determine if a proposed acquisition is in compliance 

with the Buy American Act and certify such in the contract. Violations 

come with commensurate penalties, including grounds for protest of a 

contract award to a foreign source by domestic suppliers that are 

unsuccessful, industry debarment from bidding on contracts for 

contractors who violate the provisions, and stop work orders on contested 

contracts while the protests are adjudicated.138 The unintended 

consequences include limiting technology options, decreasing competition 

and innovation, and lengthening the development cycle, thereby 

increasing costs. 

The Impact on the Development Process 

Of all the “best practices” adopted by JSF, perhaps the most 

revolutionary was termed “Cost As an Independent Variable” or CAIV. 

This simply meant that a cost cap was set for each aircraft variant such as 

$40M per unit for the Air Force. This cap served as independent variable 

when determining what requirements the Air Force could afford. If a 

requirement caused the unit cost to be exceeded, then that requirement 

was said to be outside the trade space or other requirements were traded 

off to make room under the cap. 

When the JSF program office was directed to develop a 

partnership version of the aircraft that satisfied the national disclosure 

policy criteria other export restrictions, the team determined that the nonrecurring engineering required to develop a delta configuration based 

upon current disclosure limits was prohibitive.139 But the trade space for 

the partnership version was mostly out of the hands of the program office 

and at the disparate whims of State, OSD, and Congress. Program office 

engineers wryly referred to this approach as ‘DAIV’ (Disclosure As an 

Independent Variable). Unfortunately, this ‘export compatible’ version’s 

cost was to soar due to the differences mandated by export controls and 

disclosure rules. Much of the funding contributed by the partners was 

going to be used not to pay for development costs of the baseline aircraft 

48
but for non-recurring engineering of the partnership version. After over a 

year, and much coordination with the far-flung disclosure community, the 

JSF team was able to significantly reduce restrictions, and consequently 

the ‘delta’ costs. Much of the burden, however, was shifted to the antitamper design to ensure the technologies would not be exploited.140 This 

cost is classified but it is a significant additional burden that was not 

included in the original contract award. Ironically, none of the countries 

would receive this ‘critical’ technology for thirteen years or more. 

Ostensibly, technology at this point would no longer be considered 

‘critical’ but rather ‘commodity.’141

Long delays in the development phase of any program can be a costly 

penalty to pay. A study on the cost of acquisition delays concluded the 

development costs of an average program is related to the following 

equation142: 

Dev Costs ($M) = (1.36 + 0.3 x development time in months)4

Costs as a function of Development 

Time

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240

Months

$M

Figure 8. Increased Development Cost as a Function of Delays 

For example, according to the model, if JSF had a development time of 

144 months and was delayed an additional 10 months, the corresponding 

cost increase would be $238M dollars.143 This is not to say all delays are 

due to the export control process. Under the present system, however, 

49
delays are inevitable because of disjointed release processes spread across 

the DoD and other executive agencies. 

Each of the aforementioned challenges, in and of themselves, can be 

daunting; collectively, they can quickly becoming paralyzing to any 

program. Defense program management in the 21st century is not for the 

timid, and adding an international cooperative flavor, while oftentimes 

beneficial, must be done with malice of forethought. The following 

conclusions and recommendations are put forth to improve the success of 

such endeavors. The recommendations will require a powerful champion 

within the defense acquisition system because they are comprehensive 

enough to knock over more than a few rice bowls and challenge some well 

defended fiefdoms. Without their implementation, however, the U.S. will 

continue to castrate the geldings and bid them to be fruitful and multiply. 

50
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

There is a broad perception in the defense community, here 

and in Europe, that the DoD does not view globalization as 

a policy tool to facilitate interoperability and competition. 

This perception is fueled by the reality that, despite years 

of effort, the regulatory hard wiring for globalization is still 

not in place. Underlying these are serious questions over 

the U.S. commitment to true coalition war fighting and 

alliance relations. In short, despite rumors of megadeals, 

we are not ready — institutionally, culturally or politically 

— to create a truly trans-Atlantic set of primes that draw 

transformational research and development from the United 

States and its allies and share technology across national 

boundaries. 

 Jeffery Balios, Defense News 

Conclusions—Conditions for Successful International 

Cooperative Programs 

International armament cooperative programs can be a beneficial 

acquisition strategy for future weapons procurement in the United States. 

An analysis of past and current programs reveals significant advantages 

across all three dimensions of political, strategic, and business realms. 

Among these are strengthened alliances, reduced acquisition costs through 

economies of scale, bolstered defense industrial base, provision of 

capabilities and interoperability to our allies, and finally, increased 

program flexibility through cost and risk sharing, thereby availing the 

manager with the best of technologies. The truthful answer to any 

acquisition question is, “it depends.” As such, there are no secret 

formulas guaranteeing a successful program. From the JSF experience 

thus far, however, and previous international programs, nine salient 

conditions appeared most often and portended success. Not all of these 

51
conditions need to exist simultaneously, or even at all; but to the extent 

they do exist, they appear to increase the probability of a successful 

cooperative venture. 

The following conditions that portent success are in no particular 

order: 

1. Solid political and economic ties with the U.S.; 

2. Record of fair and equitable dealings with the U.S.; 

3. Similar military requirements; and mutual agreement on party 

expectations; 

4. Reasonably robust defense science technology base; 

5. Defense treaty aligned partners with the U.S. such as NATO or 

ANZUS; 

6. Trusted ally with no record of third-party transfers; 

7. A national security policy that can accommodate international 

cooperation; 

8. Existence of complementary interests such as political or 

domestic interests; and 

9. Sound weapons program, technically, programmatically, and 

fiscally 

Recommendations to Policy Makers and Program 

Managers 

With any partnership, along with the benefits come liabilities. 

These include inefficiencies from more stakeholders to satisfy, risk of 

partners defecting, undue risks assumed by the lead country, incorporating 

foreign nationals in the program office, a complex interagency national 

disclosure process, and additional laws, regulations, and policies. While 

these problems hamper a program, most barriers are self-inflicted. The 

U.S. defense acquisition system, and the statutes under which it must 

operate, does not take advantage of the global market environment. Many 

of our policies and statues discourage international competition. Concerns 

over critical technology transfer and export controls directly affect the 

health of the U.S. defense industry in a global market environment. A 

recent panel of acquisition experts concluded: “DoD has not adequately 

addressed the globalization of the defense industry.”144 The following 

recommendations address the inherent limitations of international 

programs, and the policies, regulations, and laws in the U.S. that limit 

their effectiveness. 

52
Policy Makers 

1. Approach ‘critical technology’ export decisions at the capabilities 

level. Include the timeframe when these capability-enabling 

technologies will be delivered and to whom they will be 

delivered. If timelines are short, protect ‘critical technologies’ 

with anti-tamper and logistics/depot agreements that protect 

technologies at risk. 

2. Consolidate the policy interagency process within the State, 

Commerce, and DoD, to ensure the United State is speaking with 

one voice regarding their support for or against a particular IACP 

approach before initiating an IACP. 

3. Remove impediments to the international cooperative process 

such as the restrictions of the Buy American Act. Its existence 

alone speaks against the U.S. rhetoric for free international trade 

and a level playing field vis-à-vis international industry 

participation on the basis of ‘best value.’ 

4. Technology transfer and export controls must be relaxed to take 

advantage of the global market environment. The DoD is not 

taking advantage of the potential benefits of defense 

globalization. Competition fosters both innovation and lower 

costs for defense products. 

5. Expedite the slow and inefficient process of export approval by 

consolidating the disparate National Disclosure Policy Committee 

and other policy/approval committees, such as the Service 

International Program Offices, special program committees such 

as the export committee for low observable and counter low 

observables, and security agencies within DoD such as the 

Defense Technical Service Administration and the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency into a one-stop shop to vet exceptions to 

national disclosure policy, TAAs, technology transfers, and 

capability releases at all classification levels. 

6. After international buy-in and monetary commitment, protect the 

program from bill-paying exercises that tend to push content to 

the right to saving money but costing the program more in the out 

years. Additionally, fence high-priority international programs 

53
from ‘peanut-butter spread’ cut drills. Such practices increase a 

program’s cost and, in the case of international cooperative 

programs, significantly increase the probability of partner 

defection. 

Program Managers 

1. Do not embark on an international cooperative armament path 

without political and strategic leadership top-cover. 

2. Establish a streamlined interagency panel process led by an 

empowered voting body whereby issues can be quickly 

adjudicated. 

3. Decide up front what are the “crown jewels”—what capabilities 

the U.S. is willing to give up and what they will not. Ensure 

capabilities are vetted by the entire nondisclosure policy 

community before starting development. Ensure those at the table 

are empowered to make decisions. Provide insight to these 

communities early and often during development as the 

technologies that enable the capabilities as they become more 

defined. 

4. Clearly communicate expectations to the partners early to prevent 

later acrimony or possible defection. Ensure these agreements are 

specifically documented in the MOUs. Include in the MOUs the 

conditions and responsibilities regarding cost-sharing when 

program costs escalate. Do not make or intimate promises for 

which you have no authority. 

Epilogue 

 The recommendations from the Defense Science Board, shown in 

Figure 9, were made almost a decade ago. This research paper was 

completed before the author had access to the report. Consequently, the 

author’s recommendations above, particularly with respect to policy 

makers, were made without reference to the DSB recommendations. 

Interestingly, many of the recommendations of the DSB coincide with this 

paper. The following were major conclusions of that study: 

54
First and foremost, the Task Force believes that there is a 

compelling need for international cooperation in the 

development and production of armaments—particularly 

with European allies. Without considerable changes in the 

ways that DoD and U.S. allies approach cooperation, 

however, the Task Force has concluded that efforts to 

develop and implement cooperative programs will likely 

meet with significantly less success than is needed.145

Currently, no single voice exists within OSD for the 

implementation of international programs. Each office has 

is own narrow goals and objectives, and views armaments 

cooperation from a parochial perspective (e.g., a dynamic 

tension exists between those who would share technology 

with allies and those who would hide it). DoD and U.S. 

industry are thus hindered in their ability to respond 

quickly to events, and achieve the cooperative agreements 

and industrial alliances required to compete in the global 

market.146 

Of note, none of the DSB recommendations have been incorporated. Had 

they been, the JSF would have been spared many of the barriers addressed 

in this paper. It also raises an important question, why have the 

recommendations not been implemented? 

Dr. Jacques C. Gansler, the task force chairman for the DSB 

report, became the Principal Undersecretary for Acquisition (AT&L) one 

year later. Consequently, he was in a major position to enact some of the 

changes. What were the institutional drivers that prevented 

recommendations of a Blue Ribbon Panel of acquisition and international 

experts from being adopted? It is the author’s opinion they have not been 

adopted because of institutional inertia caused by bureaucratic 

unwillingness to relinquish authority that is not in their self-interest. 

Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the recommendations lacked 

a champion above the level of change required. Dr. Gansler as 

USD(AT&L) was but one principal of three that were required to enact the 

necessary changes. Per the recommendations, USD (Policy) was to 

relinquish control of two agencies to AT&L (DTSA and DSAA). 

However, this never occurred. It is extremely difficult to get 

organizations to relinquish power for the sake of efficiency—true for any 

bureaucracy, and in spades for the world’s largest. 

55
Even though the Goldwater-Nichols Act was not popular with the 

services prior to its enactment, it is difficult to find anyone today who 

does not believe it was tremendously successful. It was a huge boon to the 

Combatant Commanders and, even more importantly, to the soldiers, 

sailors, and airmen in harm’s way. It also would not have been 

implemented without the aid of Congressional champions and its 

enactment into law. 

OFFICE ACTION ITEMS 

SECDEF 1. Establish a clear national policy framework, based on the 

model, and assure that it is agreed to by OSD, the Services, 

other relevant agencies, and the Congress. Evolve this policy 

in consultation with potential international partners. 

2. Direct USD(A&T) to review current and planned 

international arms cooperation efforts in light of framework. 

3. Merge the various, dispersed elements throughout DoD with 

responsibility for international acquisition and technology 

programs into a single, coherent organization. In particular, 

the SECDEF should: 

a. Consolidate all OSD international implementation 

activities into one organization that reports to 

USD(A&T), encompassing the functions of: 

i. OSD International Programs Office 

ii. Defense Technology Security 

Administration (DTSA) 

iii. Defense Security Assistance Agency 

(DSAA) 

b. Establish a position at the Assistant Secretary level 

to pro-actively manage these activities 

4. Facilitate continuous involvement by senior leadership. 

5. Urge the Military Committee of NATO and the Major NATO 

Commands to give priority in their requirements generation 

activities to working with CNAD via the CAPS process. 

USD(A&T) 1. With the Service Secretaries, assign outstanding officers to 

international programs, and institute incentive structures. 

a. Build in performance and career incentives that 

encourage international cooperation. 

b. Elevate international experience to the same level as 

“joint duty” 

c. Assure that cooperative programs are led by program 

managers with international/joint experience 

2. Initiate a thorough training program to educate program 

managers. 

3. Establish administrative procedures that require that 

56
acquisition executives and program managers demonstrate 

serious attention to international opportunities. This should 

be required at the department-wide level for ACAT I 

programs, and in Service reviews for smaller-scale programs. 

4. Accelerate “acquisition reform”—with a focus on short cycle 

times—by providing special waivers to facilitate 

international programs (e.g., multi-year funding and 

DARPA’s “other agreements authority” 

5. Establish a project team to review 50 international programs, 

and make recommendations for long-term improvement. 

This team should be comprised of not more than 50 percent 

“internationalists,” and should deliberate for no more than 

six months. 

6. Propose CNAD, at its next meeting, that the results of the 

CAPS process be given higher priority. 

USD(Policy) Create a special fast-track process within DoD for resolving 

technology transfer issues arising in international cooperative 

programs, and ask the State Department to collaborate in designing an 

expedited process outside DoD 

Service 

Secretaries 

Create Service incentives for international armaments cooperation by 

linking international programs to military missions and priority needs. 

CJCS Insert CINCs into the definition of coalition needs by convening them 

frequently enough to create an advocacy group for interoperability and 

relationship-building with other countries. 

Figure 9. DSB Recommendations to Increase IACP Opportunities for 

Success 

The DSB Task Force was under no illusions in this regard; indeed, the 

cover letter in the report admitted, “[r]ecognizing the inherent resistance 

to a change of this magnitude, the Task Force believes that sustained, 

high-level leadership is necessary for success.”147 

The above changes will require an empowered champion at or above 

SECDEF to ensure the recommendations are implemented and to provide 

continued attention to monitor the progress and issue the necessary course 

corrections. An advocate above SECDEF may be required in order to 

enjoin the State Department to “collaborate in designing an expedited 

process outside of DoD.” Such lofty goals probably require an 

interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act to ensure they are implemented. 

U.S. strategies, from the National Security Strategy to the National 

Military Strategy, have all paid lip service to the importance of 

international alliances and coalitions and the need to strengthen their 

capabilities. They all acknowledge that the best way to accomplish these 

57
goals is through international cooperative armament programs, the Joint 

Strike Fighter program notwithstanding. Our armaments export law, 

policy, and regulations, however, remain divorced from our technology 

transfer policy because of unwillingness to release capabilities to key 

allies due to any number of concerns—most without merit. Cooperative 

relationships are heavily influenced by foreign policies of all parties. 

Since the 1960s the general trend in Europe has been to relax policies to 

encourage participation. The U.S., however, has leaned toward greater 

congressional assertiveness through protectionist means, introducing 

disparate interests.148 The U.S. must formulate a national security and/or 

foreign policy basis that generates cooperation with the other parties.149

At the end of the day the question comes down to how seriously the U.S. 

views the benefits of globalization. The answer will determine if the U.S 

will be willing to take the next step, as painful as that may be, by 

dismantling ‘hard-wired’ laws and policies in order to enjoy the benefits 

of international cooperation. 

58
Appendix A 

Definitions 

What Are International Armament Cooperative Programs? 

The DISAMs manual identifies up to 12 different types150 of 

cooperative programs.151 

Cooperation and collaboration are terms often interchanged but can be 

defined as an agreement between two or more countries to share in the 

cost of development and production. 

International Cooperation (Collaboration) Defined: 

Collaboration is defined in Europe as an agreement between two or more 

countries to share in the cost of development and production. Further 

distinctions can be made based on the degree of interdependence between 

partners, including the presence or absence of work and technology 

sharing agreements and/or the existence of control/oversight through an 

international consortium. (International Military Aerospace 

Collaboration, p. 53). 

Collaboration is a specific concept that applies to the engagement of two 

or more states in the specification, design, development, testing, and 

production of defense equipment. 

Cooperation basically means getting other companies in other nations to 

supply the necessary components, parts, or even machine tools needed to 

develop defense equipment. 

Licensed Production refers to states that cannot afford to develop 

equipment across the entire spectrum of weapons systems would seek to 

produce or assemble equipment or weapons systems under license from 

those states that can. (common approach with NATO countries, F-104, F16). 

Foreign Military Sales are when a state seeks to defray its R&D costs by 

selling them on the international market. The development costs are 

recouped by adding a stipend to the cost of the aircraft. In addition, 

economy of scales are realized, making the unit costs cheaper. 

[Note each of these are approaches by nations to reduce their costs of 

development and production of aircraft.] 

59
More authoritatively, Title 10 U.S.C. 2350a defines it this way: 

(1) The term “cooperative research and development project” means a 

project involving joint participation by the United States and one or more 

countries and organizations referred to in subsection (a)(2) under a 

memorandum of understanding (or other formal agreement) to carry out a 

joint research and development program— 

(A) to develop new conventional defense equipment and munitions; or 

(B) to modify existing military equipment to meet United States military 

requirements.152 

Further distinctions can be made based on the degree of 

interdependence between partners, including the presence or absence of 

work and technology sharing agreements and/or the existence of 

control/oversight through an international consortium.153 Specifically, it 

is two or more states sharing costs, resources, or expertise toward any 

number of phases of weapon system acquisition to include requirements 

definition, specification, design, development, testing, and production. 

International cooperation can also mean other international companies 

supplying the necessary materials, parts, production techniques, tooling, or 

technologies to develop weapon systems. Whether it is collaboration or 

cooperation, both forms require a degree of technology transfer but only 

the former (collaboration) involves all entities assuming risks associated 

with the acquisition process. It is the degree of risk sharing that 

determines the level of international collaboration. When using 

international programs or IACPS, the definition of collaboration is 

intended in this paper, unless specifically noted otherwise 

. 

New International Cooperative Program Guidelines 

As of this year (July 2005), the new DoD 5000 series for 

acquisition requires DoD to evaluate potential opportunities to co-develop 

a new acquisition system with one or more allies before any joint or 

service specific alternative acquisition strategies are pursued (see order of 

preference list below). Consequently, all future acquisition programs will 

have to determine if co-development is in the US’s best interest, and if the 

answer is no, they must justify a US-only approach. 

60
Orde

r 

Acquisition Approach 

1. Procurement or modification of commercial products, services, 

and technologies or dual-use technologies from domestic or 

international sources. 

2. Production or modification of previously-developed U.S. or 

allied systems. 

3. Cooperative new development program with one or more 

allied nations. 

4. New DoD joint service development program. 

5. New DoD single service-unique development program. 

Table A1. Acquisition Approach Order (DoD 5000.2) 

The justification for pursuing a cooperative program is 

documented on a Cooperative Opportunities Document (COD), which 

answers the four questions listed below. Based on the responses, the COD 

concludes whether cooperative development should be pursued. 

1. Are there any similar projects in development or production by one or 

more major allies of the United States? 

2. Could any of these projects satisfy, or be modified in scope, so as to 

satisfy the U.S. military requirements? 

3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of trying to structure a 

cooperative development program? Things such as program timing, cost 

sharing, technology sharing and standardization should be addressed. 

4. What are the opportunities for alternative forms of cooperation such as 

FMS, co-production, licensed production, component/sub-component codevelopment or incorporation of subsystems from allied sources and what 

are the advantages and disadvantages? 

Anti-Tamper (AT) 

Anti-tamper is a general term that describes activities 

encompassing the system engineering process intended to prevent or delay 

exploitation of critical technologies in U.S. systems. These activities 

involve the entire life cycle of systems acquisition, including research, 

design, development, testing, implementation, and validation of antitamper measures. Properly employed, anti-tamper measures are designed 

to add longevity to a critical technology by deterring efforts to reverse 

engineer, exploit, or develop countermeasures against a system or system 

component. SAF/AQL is the AT executive agent for all of DoD. 

61
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62
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60. Tucker, Jonathan B., “Partners and rivals: a model of international 

collaboration in advanced technology,” International Organization, Vol. 

45, Winter 1991. 

61. Undersecretary of Defense USD (AT&L). International Armaments 

Cooperation Handbook, 3rd Edition, November 2004. 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/handbook.pdf (accessed 4 November 2005). 

62. US House of Representatives. Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 

GAO, 21 July 2003. 

63. Wall, Robert, “Export Issues Bedevil JSF,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, pp. 36-37, Vol 158, no. 9, 3 Machr 2003. 

64. Wilson, George C., This War Really Matters—Inside the fight for 

defense dollars, CQ Press, Washington D.C., 2000 

65. Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, International Military 

Aerospace Collaboration, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hants, England, 2000. 

66. Wortman, Forest B. “Equipping Foreign Air Forces: How Far Should 

the US Government 

Go?” Air University, Air Command and Staff College, April 1999. 

67. Yost, David S., “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European 

Union,” Survival, Winter 

2000/2001. 

68 
Interviews 

1. Lt General Michael C. Short (ret), JFACC and AFFOR Operation 

Allied Force, Maxwell AFB, AL, 10 November 2005. 

2. Rear Admiral Steven L. Enewold, JSF Program Manager, Crystal 

City, VA, 9 November 2005. 

3. Dr. Tom Cruse, Technical Director AFRL, Colonel Michael 

Leahy, Air Vehicles Directorate, AFRL, Maxwell AFB, AL, 19 

Oct 2005. 

4. Colonel Michael D. Williams, Wing Commander, Fighter and 

Attack, Air Force Material Command, former F-16 Systems 

Program Office Director, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 14 Sep 

2005. 

5. Mr. Warren Boley, VP Pratt and Whitney F-100 engines, 

telephone, 3 November 2005. 

6. Lt Col Todd Johnston, Lead, JSF National Disclosure Policy, 9 

November 2005 

69 
This page intentionally left blank. 

70 
Endnotes 

1 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Advanced 

Strike Technology Program, Sept 1994, Memorandum for Chairman, 

Defense Science Board, May 10, 1994, p. 49 

2 Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Emerging 

Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government 

Reform House of Representatives, 108th Congress, July 21, 2003, Serial 

No. 108-94, p. 10 

3

 Speech to Transatlantic Armament Cooperation, 1996 

4

 Known as the BUR for Bottom Up Review 

5 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Advanced 

Strike Technology Program, Sept 1994, Memorandum for Chairman, 

DSB, May 10, 1994, p. ES-1 

6

 JSF Program Office Website, http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jast.htm, 

downloaded on 1 Nov, 2005 

7

 Program costs can be stated in many forms. The $200B comprises the 

research and development phase ($37B) with the procurement phase 

($162B) across the estimated 2,457 US aircraft planned purchase. 

8

 The program later added $3B to incorporate weight reduction measures 

and anti-tamper technologies. 

9

 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, International Military 

Aerospace Collaboration, p. 1 

10 The partners will have a different configuration of the U.S. aircraft 

based upon disclosure policy and unique country requirements. 

11 Cook, Nick., “JSF—A Model for International Cooperation?” Interavia, 

Feb 1999. 

12 Ibid. 

13 The final Production and Sustainment MOU will specify firm orders 

from all partners should be finalized in 2006. 

14 This return on investment does not even take into account future 

opportunities in the production phase of the program. 

15 JSF Program Office, Mr. Michael Dorman, International Program 

Directorate 

16 JSF Program Office Website, http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_intl.htm, 

downloaded on 1 November, 2005 

17 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 134 

18 Ibid., p. 134 

19 The International Armaments Cooperation Handbook, Office of the 

Director for International Cooperation, 3rd Edition, November 2004, p. 2 

71 
 

20 The Management of Security Assistance Manual, Defense Institute of 

Security Assistance Management, Wright-Patterson, AFB, OH, 2005, Ch. 

19 

21 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

September 2002, section viii. 

22 Barnett, P.M, Thomas, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 

Twenty-First Century, p. 196 

23 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

September 2002, section viii. 

24 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 

2005, pp iii-iv and 1-20, Published by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Washington DC, available at 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/ndsusa_mar2005_iic.htm 

25 Interview with Rear Admiral Steven L. Enewold, JSF Program 

Manager, Crystal City, VA, 9 November 2005. 

26 Interview with Colonel Michael Williams, Wing/CC, Fighter and Attack 

Programs, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, September 14 2005 

27 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 94 

28 Military Analysis Network, available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod101/sys/ac/row/f-2.htm, downloaded on 6 October 2005 

29 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 161 

30 Ibid., p. 159 

31 The agreement was no longer in effect at the advent of the second Gulf 

War and the U.S. was not able to convince the Turks to allow combat 

sorties to pass through their airspace even after considerable pressure and 

the promise of $38B in grants and loans. 

32 DoDD 5000.1 

33 GAO website, http://www.gao.gov/sp/html/strobj228.html, downloaded 

2 Oct 05 

34 GAO report downloaded on 2 Oct 2005, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05301.pdf

35 Wilson, George C., This War Really Matters, CQ Press, Washington 

D.C., p. 191 

36 Based on the cost of Silver at $7.5/ounce and the B-1B unit cost of 

$205M, and weight of 190,000 lbs. Information obtained at 

http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/b1-lancer/b1bfacts.html

and http://www.kitco.com/market/ downloaded on 6 November 2005 

37 Based on a nominal gold price of $457/ounce and a B-2 unit cost of 

$2.2B. Information obtained at 

72 
 

http://www.cdi.org/issues/aviation/B296.html and 

http://www.kitco.com/market/ downloaded on 6 November 2005 

38 Based on the cost of Platinum, at $934/ounce and the F-22A unit cost of 

$139M. Information obtained at 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf and 

http://www.kitco.com/market/ an 

http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=199 downloaded on 6 

November 2005. 

39 Augustine, Norm, Augustine’s Laws, p. 111 

40 2001 year dollars 

41 Aboulafia, Richard, “World fighter market waits for JSF answers,” 

AIAA Magazine, February 2002. 

42 Latest QDR number 

43 Australian Flight Test Services and Airpower Australia, October 2005 

44 The F-22A Unit Recurring Fly-away cost is approximately 

$120M/aircraft with 183 aircraft 

45 Linster, Bruce G., Slate, Lt Col Stephen, USAF, Waller, Robert L., 

“Consolidation of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Impact on Research 

Expenditures,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 143 

46 While Perry appeared prescient, he was wrong in one respect. At the 

meeting with industry in 1993, Perry invited the top 12 companies and 

told them in five years he expected to only see half of them still around. 

By 2005, the top 15 were reduced to just 4. 

47 Deutch, John, “Consolidation of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,” 

Acquisition Review Quarterly, Fall 2001, p. 138 

48 Ibid, p. 139 

49 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, November 2005, 

Executive Summary, slide 34 

50 Ibid. 

51 Defense Systems Daily, “U.S. Defense Industry Global Partnerships,” 1 

June 2005, available at http://defence-data.com/ripley/pagerip2.htm, 

downloaded on 28 October 2005 

52 Curiously, the DSB report recommended against using an IACP model 

for JSF saying it would complicate the program to the point of reducing 

the probability of success. 

53 Cook, Nick., “JSF—A Model for International Cooperation?” Interavia, 

Feb 1999 

54 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 142 

55 Ibid. p. 142 

73 
 

56 Tucker, Jonathan B., “Partners and rivals: a model of international 

collaboration in advanced technology,” International Organization, Vol 

45, Winter 1991, p. 83 

57 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics article, “Israel Contract adds to Lockheed 

Martin Firm Backlog, available, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/12-20-

2001/0001637565&EDATE, downloaded on 5 December 2005 

58 Shlachter, Barry, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, November 15, 2005 

59 Johnson, Rueben, F., “JSF Puts Squeeze on its European Rivals,” 

Aviation International News, Farnborough 2002 

60 Patrick, Suzanne., DUSD(AT&L) Industrial Policy, Statement before 

the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House of Representatives, 21 July 2003., p. 40 

61 The President may waive these fees for selected FMS countries, South 

Korea is asking for such a waiver on their recent FMS purchase of F15K’s. 

62 Patrick, Suzanne, DUSD (AT&L) Industrial Policy, Statement before 

the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House of Representatives, 21 July 2003, p. 41 

63 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Chapter 2, A 

Defense Strategy for the 21st Century, March 2005 

64 David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” 

Survival, Winter 2000/2001, p. 103 

65 Clancy, Tom, and Lt Gen (ret) Chuck Horner. Every Man a Tiger: The 

Gulf War Air Campaign, p. 526 

66 Ibid., p. 546 

67 Lamartin, Glenn F., AT&L Needs and Initiatives, briefing presented to 

the NDIA Systems Engineering Conference, October 2004, slide 4 

68 National Defense Strategy of the United States, section III, para. 8 

69 David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” 

Survival, Winter 2000/2001, p. 103 

70 Ibid. 

71 Per Joint Publication, five combatant commands have responsibilities 

for the conduct of the U.S. security assistance program within their 

respective geographical regions. 

72 The COCOM staff was first sent the questionnaire. The Blue Team 

members then and briefed the respective air component commanders and 

requested they fill out the matrix of capabilities. Once this was 

74 
 

accomplished, the team briefed each COCOM in-turn on the results and 

asked for their concurrence or non-concurrence. 

73 Interview with Lt Gen (ret) Michael C. Short, Maxwell AFB, AL, 10 

November 2005 

74 Yost, p. 105 

75 DoDD 5000.1, Defense Acquisition Systems, para E1.1.13 

76 JSF Program Office Briefing given to the AFA conference, 13 Sep 

2005, Slide 21 

77 Asti, Corinne, “The F-35 JSF in Europe: The Consequences of 

Pragmatism,” CeMiSS Quarterly, Summer 2005, p. 95 

78 Augustine, p. 14 

79 Interview with Rear Admiral Steven L. Enewold, JSF Program 

Manager, Crystal City, VA, 9 November 2005. 

80 Ibid. 

81 Ibid. 

82 Interview with Mr. Warren Boley, VP F100 engines, Pratt and Whitney, 

telephone, 3 November 2005. 

83 Ibid. 

84 Major General John L. Hudson, JSF Program Manager, Statement 

before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House of Representatives, 21 July 2003, p. 48 

85 Tucker, p. 115 

86 Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Emerging 

Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government 

Reform House of Representatives, 108th Congress, July 21, 2003, Serial 

No. 108-94, p. 11 

87 Enewold interview 

88 Johnson, Rueben, F., “JSF Puts Squeeze on its European Rivals,” 

Aviation International News, Farnborough 2002 

89 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, pp. 155-158 

90 Ibid, p. 161 

91 The ‘Exchange of Letters’ began as an unofficial letter from the UK 

MoD to the U.S. that outlined desired logistics and sustainment 

agreements following the system development and demonstration 

program. Other partner’s, upon hearing of the letters, also forwarded their 

own versions. 

92 Both Italy and the UK have intimated that unless their grievances are 

addressed they may be required to withdrawal 

93 Enewold interview 

75 
 

94 GAO report downloaded on 2 Oct 2005, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05301.pdf

95 Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Emerging 

Threats and International Relations of the Committee on Government 

Reform House of Representatives, 108th Congress, July 21, 2003, Serial 

No. 108-94, p. 1 

96 GAO report on Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition, Report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, committee on Government Reform, GAO, July 

2003. 

97 Hudson testimony, p. 52 

98 Ibid. 

99 Finland built 61 F-18 Hornets, and Canada built 138. Turkey and Israel 

also co-produced F-16 aircraft. 

100 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, pp. 172, 186 

101 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 89 

102 Ibid. 

103 Ibid., pp. 18, 95, 103 

104 Ibid., p. 16 

105 It is noteworthy that after all the hand-wringing and acrimony over the 

Japanese plundering our advance technologies, neither side believes today 

it reaped all that much benefit. 

106 Melloan, George, “Technology Transfer in Weapons is a Two-Way 

Street,” The Wall Street Journal, 14 Nov 1989, p. 1 

107 Boley interview 

108 Interview with Dr. Tom Cruse, Technical Director, Air Force Research 

Laboratory, Maxwell AFB, AL, 19 October 2005. 

109 Hudson testimony, p. 56 

110 Interview with Colonel Michael Leahy, PhD, Air Vehicles Director, 

Air Force Research Laboratory, Maxwell, AFB, AL, 19 October 2005. 

111 Leahy interview 

112 Leahy interview 

113 Alan Kay actually said “The best way to predict the future is to invent 

it.” 

114 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 

2005, pp iii-iv and 1-20, Published by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Washington DC, available at 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/ndsusa_mar2005_iic.htm 

76 
 

115 Bialos, Jeffery P., “Last Supper Fallout: Can Defense Industry Meet 

Tomorrow’s Challenges, Defense News, November 2003 

116 Clancy, Tom, and Lt Gen (ret) Chuck Horner, p. 554 

117 F-14 Tomcat, Wikipedia encyclopedia, available on-line at 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-14_Tomcat, downloaded 12 November 

2005 

118 US Navy website, available on-line at http://navysite.de/cg/cg49.html, 

downloaded 12 November 2005 

119 “Venezuela threatens US over F-16’s,” BBC News, 2 November 2005 

120 Not one of the COCOMs, in the Blue Team study, expressed concerns 

over JSF’s getting into the hands of a rogue nation. 

121 Augustine, p. 248 

122 Gold plating is derisive term to describe the addition of capabilities that 

are not warranted by the baseline requirements. They can be “nice to 

haves” but often only contribute to increased cost of development. 

123 General Accountability Office (GAO) report on Cost and Cycle Time 

Growth for 26 Weapon Systems, available at 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do5301.pdf, downloaded on 2 Oct 2005. 

124 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 75 

125 JSF was able to establish requirements in the Concept Development 

Phase with partners ensuring their requirements were incorporated. The 

program was careful to ensure the MOU’s addressed nation-unique 

requirements from the baseline configuration. If a country wanted to 

integrate a unique capability or weapon, the MOU required them to pay 

for that change. 

126 Interview with Colonel Michael Williams, Wing/CC, Fighter and 

Attack Programs, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 14 September 2005. 

127 Patrick, Suzanne, DUSD(AT&L) Industrial Policy, Statement before 

the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House of Representatives, 21 July 2003, p. 41

128 10 U.S.C. 2350a, Section 2751 22 U.S.C. 2751 [Section 1, Arms 

Export Control Act (AECA)], and 10 U.S.C. 2531. 

129 DTSA SAP Report for the 2005 Budget Estimate Submission, available 

on-line at 

http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/budget_justific

ation/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/DTSA_FY05_PB.pdf 

130 Enewold interview 

131 International Armaments Cooperation Handbook, 3rdEdition, 

November 2004, p. 7, available at: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/ 

132 Ibid., p.7 

77 
 

133 Patrick, Suzanne, p. 41 

134 Smyth, Lt Col Joseph, S., “The Impact of the Buy American Act on 

Program Managers,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1999, p. 263 

135 Senator Russ Feingold, Speech on the Buy American Act, July 29, 

2003 

136 Smyth, p. 268 

137 Ibid., p. 266 

138 Ibid., p. 268 

139 NDP establishes a framework for the approval or denial of critical 

military information to foreign governments. Basis authority and policy 

for transferring classified information is contained in the National Security 

Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119, which is stated as 5 criteria in the 

DoDD 5230.11. 

140 Anti-tamper is a general term that describes activities encompassing 

the system engineering process intended to prevent or delay exploitation 

of critical technologies (see Appendix).

141 The exceptions to NDP and export release approval process began in 

late 2001. A first configuration was not approved until late 2002 but even 

then required multiple ‘come-backs’ to the various committees for updates 

and approvals. The UK, as a tier I partner, would ostensibly be the first to 

receive their aircraft, but this wouldn’t be until 2014 at the earliest, 13 

years after the approval process began. 

142 Major Ross McNutt, P.H.D., “Reducing Air Force Acquisition 

Response Times: Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development,”13 

September 2000. 

143 JSF was delayed 10 months due to a 4000 lb weight reduction 

requirement during SDD. 

144 Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, Executive Summary, 

slide 34 

145 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on International 

Armaments Cooperation, “International Armaments Cooperation in an Era 

of Coalition Security,” August 1996. p. 8 

146 Ibid., p. 6 

147 Ibid. Cover letter to the report. 

148 Hamilton, Lee H., Tama, Jordan, “Changes in the Making of Foreign 

Policy,” Air War College, National Security and Decision Making Reader, 

AY06, p. 433 

149 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 134 

78 
 

150 Includes: Collaboration, Consortium/Consortia, Cooperative Research 

and Development, Co-production/Assembly, Family of Weapons, 

Government led Initiative, Industry led Initiative, Joint Venture, Licensed 

Production, Mergers and Acquisitions, Strategic Alliances, and Teaming. 

151 Management of Security Assistance, Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, Chapter 19 

152 Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2350a 

153 Wood, Christina, and David S. Sorenson, p. 53 

79