IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30516

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DONALD DOMINGUE, also known as Donald Domingues, also known as 

Donald Dominguez,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 6:16-CR-216-1

Before WIENER, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Donald Domingue pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He argues that 

the district court wrongly applied a two-level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G

§ 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust. He argues that this court has not held

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 6, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 17-30516

2

that the position that he portrayed himself as occupying—an immigration 

consultant—is a position of trust. 

The district court’s application of § 3B1.3, including its factual finding as 

to whether a defendant held a position of trust, is reviewed for clear error. 

United States v. Dial, 542 F.3d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 2008). Under § 3B1.3, an 

adjustment is proper if the defendant (1) held a position of trust and (2) abused 

it in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of 

the offense. § 3B1.3; United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 165 (5th Cir. 2009). 

The adjustment applies if a defendant provides sufficient indicia to the victim 

that he validly holds a position of trust even if he does not. § 3B1.3, comment. 

(n.3). 

The unrebutted facts in the presentence report (PSR), which the district 

court adopted, support the adjustment. See Dial, 542 F.3d at 1060. Domingue

falsely portrayed himself to detainees in Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) facilities, and their relatives and friends, as an immigration 

consultant whose company performed immigration-related services. These

alleged services, included, inter alia, bonding detainees out of ICE facilities, 

assisting them with their deportation proceedings, consulting with them on 

immigration laws and procedures, and otherwise aiding with their 

immigration cases. Domingue thus convinced his legally unsophisticated 

victims—who were desperate to avoid possible deportation and confinement—

that he and his company could ably handle their immigration concerns. 

Relying on Domingue’s misrepresentations, his victims transferred him money 

for the promised services. Instead, however, Domingue exploited the discretion 

afforded to him by his victims: after receiving the transfers, he and his 

company would cease all contact with the detainee and the transferor, not pay 

the bond, and not represent or assist the detainee in deportation proceedings. 

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Domingue’s position within his company—which he founded, owned, and 

managed—afforded him autonomy over the scheme, control over its operation, 

and discretion over these funds. The district court did not clearly err by finding 

that Domingue, by fraudulently indicating to his vulnerable victims that he 

was a professional they could rely on to skillfully perform services of 

considerable importance, assumed and abused a position of trust. See § 3B1.3, 

comment. (n.1); United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 149–50 (5th Cir. 2010);

United States v. Sudeen, 434 F.3d 384, 386, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2005); United 

States v. Reeves, 255 F.3d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 2001).

Domingue has not meaningfully briefed any argument that the second 

requirement—that the position of trust significantly facilitated or concealed 

the offense—does not apply. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Accordingly, any 

argument as to this second element of this enhancement is forfeited for failure 

to brief. See, e.g., United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Regardless, the record demonstrates that the district court did not clearly err 

by determining that this position of trust significantly facilitated or concealed 

Domingue’s offense. See § 3B1.3; Ollison, 555 F.3d at 165. Domingue’s 

cultivation and generation of the belief that he was an immigration consultant 

was crucial to his scheme. His victims, in reliance on his alleged qualifications,

made payments and gave him professional discretion that allowed him to 

misuse these funds without fear of ready or quick notice. See Reeves, 255 F.3d

at 212–13. Also, given his control over the operation, he could direct whether 

actions should be taken in furtherance of the scheme and had unfettered 

discretion over the victims’ funds. See § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1); United States 

v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 248–49 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 

786, 795 (5th Cir. 2003).

For these reasons, the judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.

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