### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe br ua ry 13, 200 8 S es sio n

PROGRES S PRINTI NG COMPANY, INC. v. RELI ABLE PRI NTI NG & GRAPHI C DESI GN, INC.

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Sevier County No. 2006-0667-IV

O. Duane Sl one, Judge

No. E2007-1492-COA- R3-CV- F ILED APRIL 23, 2008

P r o g r e s s P r i n t i n g C o mp an y, In c

. ( “ P l a i n t i f f ” ) f i l e d a p e t i t i o ni n th e C i r c u i tC o urtf o r S e v i e r C o u n ty, Te nn e sse e (“ Tr ia l Co ur

t” ) se e kin g to do me sti c a te a fo re ig n jud g me nt o bta ine d in Vi rg ini a a g a ins t Reliable Printing & Gra

phic Desig n, I nc. (“De fe ndant”) . Def endant f iled a motion to dism iss the petition claiming, in par

t, that the Virg inia court lac ked per sonal jurisdiction over De fenda nt and, therefo re , t h e Virg inia judgme nt is void. The Trial Court enter ed an or der on June 7, 2007, inter ali a , den y in g Def

e nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s th e pe tit ion , a nd g ra nti ngPla int if

f’ s p e tit ion

to domesticate the Virg inia judgme nt. Defe ndant appe als to this C ourt. We aff irm the denia l of the motion to di smiss t he p etition, vacate that portion of the Tria l Court’s order grantingPlaintiff’s pe tit ion to do me sti c a te the Vi rg ini a jud g me nt, and re mand to the Tr ia l Court fo r fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed, in p art; and Vacated, in p art; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J . and S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined. Dudley W. Tay lor and Jonathan S. Taylor, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee for the Appellant, Reliable Printing & G raphic Desig n, I nc.
Preston A. Hawkins, Knox ville, Tennesse e for the Appellee , Prog ress Printing Company , Inc.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

I n Aug ust of 2006, Plaintiff obtained a judgment ( “the Judgment” ) ag ainst Defe ndant in the Circuit Court for C am p b el l County , Virg inia for $62,245.41 plus pre - and post-judg ment interest, attorne y s fee s, and costs for damag es related to a claimed br eac h of contra ct. As De fenda nt
c an b e fo un d in

Pig e on F or g e , T e nn e sse e , Pl ain ti ff fi le d a pe tit ion (“ the Pe tit ion ” ) i n th e Cir c uit Court for Sevier

County seekingto domesticate the Judgment. A c ertified c op y o f t he Judgment attache d to the Petition s hows that the Virg inia court found that proper se rvi ce o f p rocess was obtained on De fenda

nt, but that Defe ndant fa iled to file any responsive ple adingin that case

. Def endant r esponded to the Petition by fi ling a motion to di smiss alleging , among other thing s, that the Virg inia court lac ked per sonal jurisdiction ove r Def endant a nd, there fore , the Judg me nt w a s v oid

and un e nf or c e a ble. Defe nd ant atta c he d th e a ff ida vit of Cha rl e s R. Da

vis , Def endant’ s principal off

icer (“D avis Aff

idavit”), in suppo rt o f its motion alleging , amongother things, that De fenda

nt never had qualified to tr ansac t busine ss in the state of Virg inia and had not transac ted b u s i n ess in the state of V irg inia. The Da vis Affidavit admitted that Plaintiff and Def endant ha d had business dea lings, but alleg ed that these dealing s arose out of a solicitation of De fe nd ant b y

on e of Pla int if f’ s e mpl oy e e s, a Tenne sse e re sid e nt, and that “ [m]ost

of the bu sin e ss tr ans a c tio ns we re arr ang e d thro ug h e -m a il, wi th o c c a sio na l f a c sim ile and

USP O m a il communications...” with one of Plaintiff’s employ ees oc casiona lly coming to Def endant’ s place of business in Tennessee

.

Plaintiff opposed Def

endant’ s motion to dismiss and filed, a mong othe r thing s, the aff i d av i to f S t ev e P et t y

j o h n , P l ai n t i ff

’s cr ed i tm an age r ( “P et ty

john Affidavit”) , which alleg ed, among
o t h e rt h i n g s , t h a t i n O c t o b e r o f 2 0 0 3 P l a i n t i f f r e c e i v e d a c r e d i t a

p p l i c a t i o n f

i l l e d o u t b y a re pr e se ntativ e of Defen da nt a nd op e ne d a c re dit a c c ount f

or De fe nd ant. Th e Pe tty

john A ff ida vit further alleg ed that duringthe next two y ea rs , P l aintiff and D efe ndant conduc ted business “on at least twenty

eig ht (sic) (28) separ ate oc casions, in a n amount totaling more than $724,000.00.” A copy of th e c r e d it

a p p li c a ti o na ll e g e d ly

c o mp le te d

b y D e f e n d an t w a s a tt a c h e d

to th e Pe tt

y jo hn Affida vit and contains the followinglanguag e:
The Purcha ser wa ives any objection that it may now or he reina fter ha ve to the lay

ing of juris d i ction and venue of any such suit, action, or proc eedingbroug ht in the Cir c uit Court fo r t he Count ( sic ) o f C ampb e ll, Vi rg ini a , an d cla im that any su c h s uit , a c tio n o r p ro c e e din g ha s b e e n b ro ug ht i n a n in c on ve nie nt f

or um. Cop ie s o f s e ve ra l invo ic e s f ro m Pla int if

f t o D e fe nd ant a lso we re a tta c he d to t he Pe tty john A ff ida vit , and e a c h of t

he se inv oic e s c on ta ins the same fo rum se le c tio n c la us e a s a pp e ars in t

he c re dit application.-3- De fe nd ant t

he n f ile d a r e s p o n s e t o P l a i nt i f

f ’ s r e sp on se a sse rt ing , in

pa rt , th a t th e c re dit application attac hed to the Petty john Affidavit wa s not signed by or o n behalf

of De fenda

nt and, fu rt h er, that Defe ndant, a Te nnessee corpor ation, was not in exist ence in October of 2003. De fe nd ant atta c he d a s an e xhibi t a c op y of its c ha rt e r sho wi ng that De fe nd ant wa s in c or po rate d in September of

2004. Def

endant a lso disp u t ed P l ai n tiff’s asse rtion “that the invoice s contained a ‘cle ar a nd unambig uous forum selec tion clause.’”

The Tr ial Court h ea rd o n l y argument from counse l for both sides on Def endant’ s motion on the issue of whether the Virg inia court ha d persona l jurisdiction over Def endant. The Trial Court then ente red a n order on J une 7, 2007, inte r a lia , d e nyingDe fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s the Pe tit ion , a

nd g ra nti ng the Pe tit ion to dom e sti c a te the Vi rg ini a jud g me nt. De fe nd ant a pp e a ls t o this Court.

Discussion

Although not state d exa ct ly as such, De fenda

nt raises two issues on appe al: 1) whether the Trial Court e rre d in de nying Def endant’ s motion t o dismiss the Petition; and, 2) whether the Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe Pe tit ion

to d ome sti c ate the Vi rg ini a jud g me nt.
We f ir st c on sid e r whe the r t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in de nyingDe fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dismiss the Petition. Since Def endant prese nted “matter s outside the pleading s” to the Trial Court in support of i ts motion to dismiss , the Trial Court corr ectly treated t he mot ion as one for summary judgme nt. Tenn. R. Civ. P . 12.03. I n Blair v

. W est T ow n Mal l , our Supreme Court r eiterated the standards applicable when appellate courts are r eviewinga motion for summary judgme nt. Blair v. W est Town Mall, 130 S.W .3d 761 (Tenn. 2004) . In Blair , the Court state d:

The standa

rds g overningan appe llate court’s revie w of a motion for summary judgme nt are well settled. Since our inquiry invo l v es p u re l y a question of law , no pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss atta c he s to the low e r c ourt ’s jud gme nt, and our t a sk is confine d to review ing the rec ord to d e te r mine whether

the re quirements of Te nnessee Rule of Civil P ro ce d u re 56 have be en met. See Staples v . CBL & Assoc., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000) ; Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (Te nn. 1997); Cowden v. Sovran Bank /Central South, 816 S.W .2d 741 , 744 (Tenn. 1991)

. Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civil Pr oc e dure 56 .0 4 p ro vid e s th a t summa ry jud g me nt i s a pp ro pr iate wh e re : 1) th ere is no g e nu ine iss ue wi th r e g ard to t he mate ri a l f

a c ts
re le va nt t o th e c la im o r de fe ns e c on ta ine d in the mot ion , a nd 2) the mov ingpa

rt y is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law on the undisputed fac ts. Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88.

* * *

Whe n th e pa

rt y se e kin g summa

ry ju dg me nt m ake s a

pr op e rl y supported motion, the burde n s hifts to the nonmoving par ty to set-4- forth spec ific fa cts establishin g t h e exis tence of disputed, mater ial fac ts which must be resolved by the trier of

fac t.

To proper ly

support its mot ion, the moving pa rty must either aff irmatively neg ate an essential element of the non-moving party ’s claim or c onclusively

establish an aff

irmative defe nse. I f the moving party fails to neg ate a

claime d basis for the suit, the non-moving party ’s burde n to produce evidenc e esta blishing the e x istence of

a g enuine issue f

or trial is not trigg ere d and the motion for summary jud g me nt m

us t f a il. I f t he mov ingpa

rt y su c c e ssf ull y ne g a te s a c la ime d b a sis fo r t

he act io n, the no n- mov ingpa rt y may no t si mpl y rest upon the pleading s, but must off er pr oof to establish the existence of the e ssential elements of the claim.
Blair, 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 6 3 , 7 6 7 (q u o t i n g Staples , 15 S.W . 3d at 88-89) ( citations omitt ed))

. Our Supreme Court also has provided instruc tion reg ardingassessingthe evidenc e wh en d ea l i n g wi tha m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en ts t at i n g:
The standa

rds g overningthe as s es sment of evidenc e in the summary judgme nt context are also we ll established. Courts must vi ew the evi d en ce in the l i g h tm o s tf

av o r a b l e t o t h e n o n m o v i n g p arty an d m u s ta l s o dr aw a l l r e a so nable infer ences in the nonmoving pa rty ’s favor. See R obinson v. Ome r, 952 S.W .2d at 42 6; Byrd v. H

all, 847 S.W .2d at 210-11. Courts should gr ant a summary judgme nt
on ly whe n b oth

the fa c ts a

nd the inf e re nc e s to be dr awn

fr om t he fa c ts p e rm it a
rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusion. See McCall v. W ilder, 913 S.W .2d 15 0, 15 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995)

. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc
., 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Def endant moved for judgment based on its asser tion that the Virginia c ourt lacke d persona l jurisdiction over Def endant, whic h, if true, would r ender the J udg ment void. I n Hart v. Tou rte , t h i s C o u rt d i s cu s s edfo re i gnj u d gm en t s s t at i n g:

F or e ig n ju dg me nts or din ari ly are e nti tle d to fu ll f a ithand c re dit in t he c ourt s of this state. Biogen Distributors, Inc. v. Tanner , 842 S.W .2d 253, 256 (Tenn. A pp. 1992). We have previously stated that “[t] here are a limited number of c ircumstance s wher e a f oreig n judgme nt may

be denie d full faith an d cr ed i t.” Benham v . Fisher , 6 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d

7 5 9 , 7 6 0 (T en n

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 3 ). T

. C

. A. § 2 6 -6 -1 0 4 (c ) p ro v i d es th at fo re i gn judgme nts are “ subject to the same pr ocedur es, d ef enses and proce eding s for reope ning, va cat i n g, o r s t ay ing a s a judg ment of a c ourt of re cord of this state and may be enforce d or satis fied in like manner .” Id .; se e als o B ioge n D ist rib uto rs , 842 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 5 6

. T h u s , “t h e gr o u n d s an d p ro ce d ure s fo r v ac at i n g o r r eo p en i n g fo re i gn-5-

judgme nts are those contained in Te nn

. R

. C iv. P. 60.02.” Id . Apa rt y se e kin g to attack the v al idity

of a f oreig n judgme nt bear s a “ster n and hea

vy ” burde n. Id .; De me nt v . Ki tts , 777 S.W .2d 33, 36 (Tenn. App. 1989). I ssues of fac t underlying the fore ign judgment may

not form the basis of suc h an attac k, Benham , 650 S.W .2d at 7 6 0 ; b u tt h e j u d g m en twi l l n o tb e a ff o rd edfu l l fa i than d

cr ed i twh er e t h e f

o re i gn court lac ked jurisdiction. Id .; see also De ment , 777 S.W .2d at 36.

Ha rt v . To ur te , 10 S.W .3d 263, 269 (Tenn. Ct. App. 199 9 ). T o d et ermine if a fore ign c ourt had jurisdiction, we must look to t he law of the state where the judgme nt was obtained. See B iogen Distribs., Inc. v. Tanner , 842 S.W .2d 253, 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Plaintiff opposed Def

endant’ s motion for summ ary judgme nt alleg ing, in pa

rt, that the Virg inia court ha d o btained jurisdiction over D efe ndant by virtue of f

orum selec tion clauses contained in the cre dit a

pplication and invoices. In order to de termine if the Virg i n i a c o u rt had jurisdiction under the for um selection cl au s es , we look to Virg inia law. Se e id . With r e g ard to forum sele ction clause s, the Supreme Court of V irg inia has stated:

Acc ording to the modern vi ew , which we now embra ce, c ontrac tual provisions lim iting the plac e or c ourt wher e potential ac tions between the parties may be broug ht a

re pr ima fac ie valid and should be e nforc ed, unless the pa rty challeng ing enforcement establishes that such provisions are unfair or unrea sonable, or a

re aff ecte d by fra ud or unequa l barg aining power

. Paul Bus. Sys., Inc . v. Canon U.S.A., Inc

. , 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va. 1990)

.

The Petty john Affidavit alleg ed that Plaintiff rec eived a cre dit application in Octobe r of 2003 complete d by

Def endant, that Plaintiff then ope ned a c redit account for Defe ndant, that the two parties c ommenced doingbusiness with one another , and that they continued to do business over the next two y ear s. Copies of t he refer ence d cre dit application and seve ral invoice s were attache d to the Petty

john Affida

vit and each contains a for um selection cla

use selec ting the Circ uit Court for the County

of Campbell, Virg inia as a pr oper jurisdiction for suit to be filed.

Plaintiff a ls o o p p osed De fenda

nt’s motion for summary

judgme nt by

alleg ing that the Vi rg in ia cou rt

ha d o bta ine d ju

ri sd ic tio n o ve r D e fe nd ant b y vir tue of su ff ic ie nt m ini mum

c on ta c ts by Def endant to s ati sfy

the Virg inia long- arm statute. As pe rtinent to this case, Va . Code Ann. § 8. 01 -3 28 .1 pr ov ide s:
A. A cour

t may exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over a person, who a cts direc tly or by
an a g e nt, a s to a

c a us e of a c tio n a ri sin g fr om t

he pe rs on ’s :
1. Transa cting any

business in this C ommonwealth;....

Va . Co de Ann. § 8 .0 1- 32 8. 1 ( 20 05 ). Th e Vi rg ini a Sup re me Court

ha s in str uc te d:-6- Acc ording to the long- arm statute, a Virg inia court “ may

exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction o v er a person, who acts dire ctly or by an ag ent, as to a c ause of action arising from the person’ s

... [t ]ransacting any business in thi s C o m m o nwea lth.” Cod e § 8 .0 1- 32 8. 1( A) (1 ). A “ pe rs on ,” a s u se d in the fo re g oin g st atu te, inc lud e s a corpor ation “whe ther or not a citizen or domiciliary

of this State and whethe r or not org anized under the laws of this State.” Code § 8.01- 328.

Th e fu nc tio n o f o ur

lon g -a rm statut e is t o a s s e rt

jur isd ic tio n o ve r n onre sid e nts who eng ag e in some purposeful activity in Virg inia, to the extent permissibl e under the Due Proc ess Clause of the Constit ution of the United States. Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain and Fancy Kitchens, I nc. , 218 Va. 533, 534, 238 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1977). The Due Proc ess C lause, however, pr otects a pe rson’s liberty interest in not beingsubject to the binding judgme nts of a forum unless he has “ cer tain minimum contac ts” within the territory of the for um so that maintenanc e of the ac tion does not offe nd “tra ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. W ashington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L

. Ed. 95 (1945). See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S. Ct . 2174, 2181, 85 L . Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
And, an e x amination of the history of lit i gat i o n i nvolving the limits placed by the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla

us e on the po we r o f s tate c ourt s to e nte r b ind ingjud g me nts ag ainst persons not serve d withi n th e ir b o undarie s shows a “c lear ly discernible” trend “t o wa rdex p an d i n g t h e p erm i s s i b l e s co p e o f s t at e j uri s d i ct i o no v er fo re i gn corpor ations and other nonr esidents.” McG ee v. International Life Ins. Co. , 3 55 U. S. 220, 222, 78 S. Ct . 199, 200, 2 L . Ed. 2d 223 (1957).

“In part this is attributable to the fundame ntal transfor mation of our n a ti o n a l e c o n o my

o v e r th e y e ar s

. T o d ay

ma n y c o mm e r cial transac tions t o u ch two or more States and may involve parties separ ated by

the full continent. Wit h this increasingnationalization of c omm e rc e ha s c ome a

g re a t in c re a se in t

he amou nt o f b us ine ss conducte d by

mail acr oss state line s

. At the same time moder n tr ans port a tio n a

nd c omm un ic a tio n h ave ma de it muc h le ss burde n s o m e fo r a party

sued to defe nd himself in a State wher e he eng ag es in ec onomic activity .” Id . at 222-23, 78 S. Ct. at 200-01.

B e cau s e o u r s t at u t e s p ea k s o f t ra n s ac t i n g anyb u s in e s s , it is a s ing le-a ct statut e re qu ir ingon ly

on e tr ans a c tio n in

Vi rg ini a to co nf e r j ur isd ic tio n o n o ur

c ourt s. Kolb e, Inc. v . Chromodern, Inc. , 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S. Ct. 2d 664, 667 (1971).

Nan Y a P las tics Co rp . U

.S .A . v . D e Sa nti

s , 377 S.E.2d 388, 391 (Va. 1989)

.-7- The P et t y j o h nAf fi d av i tal l ege d , i np art , th at De fe n d an ts u b m i t t eda c re d i tapplication to Plainti ff, that Plaintiff opene d a cre dit a ccount for Def endant, that over a two y ear period Plaintiff and De fenda

nt transac ted business on at l east twenty -eig ht separ ate occasions in an amount totaling over $724,000.00, a

nd that the primary

sales per son re s p o nsible for wor king w ith Defe ndant was based in Plaintiff’s Ly

nchburg , Virg inia office

. V i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e i nth e l i g h tm o s t f av o r a b l e t o P l a i n t i f

f , th e n o n m o v i n g p arty, and dra wing all rea sonable infe renc es in Plaintiff’s favor , as we must, we find that Plaintiff has, at a mi nimum, raised a g enuine mate rial issue of f act r eg ardingwhether

the Virg inia court ha d persona l jurisdiction over Def

endant by virtue of the forum selec tion c lauses and a lso by virtue of minimum contac ts sufficient to satisfy the Virg inia long- arm statute. See Staples, 15 S.W .3d at 89. As such, De fe nd ant wa s not en tit le d to summa ry jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw, and

the Tr ia l Co ur

t c or re c tly denied De fenda

nt’s motion.

We n e xt co ns ide r whe the r t h e T r i a l C o ur

t e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe Pe tit ion

to d ome sti c a te the Vi rg ini a

jud g me nt. Pla int if

f n e ve r m ov e d f

or summa ry ju dgmen t. Ins te a d, Pla int if f s imp ly opposed De fenda

nt’s motion.

A situation factua lly

and proc edura lly

simil ar to the issue at h and ar ose in W itt v. Ten n es s ee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. wher e a tr ial court de nied a motion for summary judgme nt in a
case involving domestication of a fore ign judg ment and then g rante d the petition to domesticate the fore ign judg ment without allowing f urther r esponse or

a hea ring on the merits. W

itt v. T en nessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. , No. 03A01-9709- CH-00400, 1998 Tenn. A pp. L EXI S 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 27, 1998), no appl. perm. appeal filed . In W itt , this Court ex plained that this proce dure:
[wa s] ir re g ula r a nd inc on sis ten t with t

he pr ov isi on s o f t

he Rul e s o f C ivi l P ro ce d u re

. ... By s u m m ar i l y gra n t i n g th e [ p et i t i o n t o d o m es t i ca t e th e f o re i gn ju d gm ent] and ther eby

denying the defe ndant the rig ht to plead furthe r and put on proof with re spect to its defe nses, the trial c ourt committed err or.

I t is clear that t he Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a proc eedingunder T.C.A. § 26-6-101, et seq. SeeRule 1, Tenn. R. Civ. P., (“Subject to such exceptions
as ar e state d in them, these rules sha ll gove rn the proc edure in the circ uit and chanc ery courts of Tenne ssee..., in a ll c ivil ac tions, whe ther at law or in equity , ...). Se e als o Rule 2, Tenn. R. Civ. P., (“All actio n s i n l aw o r equity shall be known a s ‘c ivi l a c tio ns .’ ” ) Wh ile we fi nd no c on fl ic t betw e e n th e pr oc e dure s o utl ine d in T.C.A. § 26-6-101, et seq. , and the pr ovisions of the Rules of Civil Pr o ce d ure perta ining to the r ight of

a def endant to file a

n answe r and its fur

ther rig ht to a

trial on the merits of all issues proper ly raised in that answer, a ny such conf

lict must be resolved in f

avor of the Rules. See Lock v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pa. , 809 S.W .2d 483, 489 (Tenn. 1991) . I t is c lear that a def endant ha s the rig ht to contest the
va lid ity of a fo re ig n jud g me nt by a tr ia l on the me ri ts i f i ssu e s are pr op e rl y ra ise d in its answer. See F

our Seasons Gardening & Landscaping, Inc. v. Crouch , 688-8-

S.W .2d 439, 441-42 (Te nn. App. 1984) (“ the courts of this State will presume, absent pr op e r p ro of to th e c on tra ry , that the dec ree s of the cour ts of rec ord of a

ny sister states ar e valid.”) (Emphasis adde d).

W itt , 1998 Tenn. App. L EXI S 156, at **5-7.

De fe nd ant i s e nti tle d e ith e r t o a re so lut ion

by a mot ion for su mmar

y jud g me nt, if Plaintiff files such a motion and the g ranting of t hat m otion is proper under the rec ord then be fore the Trial Court, or to a

trial on the merits of a ll issues properly raised. W e, t h ere fore , vaca te that portion of the Tria l Court’s order g rantingthe Petition to dom esticate the Virg inia judgme nt and
re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.
Conclusion

Th a t po rt ion

of the Tr ia l Co ur

t’ s ju dg me nt d e nying De fe nd ant’ s mot ion to d ism iss the Pe tit ion , a

mot ion proper ly tr e a te d b y

the Tr ia l Co ur

t a s a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, is aff irmed. That por

tion of the Trial Court’s judg ment g rantingPlaintiff’s Petition t o domesticate the Vi rgi n i a j u d gm en ti s v ac at ed

. T h i s c a u s e i s r e m an d edt o th e T ri al C o urt fo r f urt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this Opinion a nd for collection of the costs below. The c osts on appeal a re a ssessed one-ha lf ag ainst the Appellant, Reliable P rinting & Gra phic Desig n, Inc., and one -half a g ainst the Appellee , Prog ress Printing Company , Inc.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE