In summary, the soon to be released battalion and brigade MTPs contain great detail but
few, if any, digital tasks or sub-tasks. It does not appear likely that this will change any time
soon. Despite this absence of digital tasks in doctrinal publications, there is ample evidence that
differences exist between brigade and battalion leaders in terms of their responsibilities and
professional development. While fundamental tasks may not change, differences in conditions
and standards for those tasks at brigade and battalion levels are emerging.

Echelonment of Skills

The differences in type and number of digital skills and tasks between battalion and
brigade were deemed “minimal” by experts (both government and contractor). However,
interviews and expert panel assessments emphasized skill level and “‘task-condition-standard”
differences between these echelons. These differences are, in part, a result of emerging
functional distinctions between the two headquarters in network centric operations,
rearrangement of responsibilities that accompanies changes in force structure, and the inherent
“digital maturity” of transforming units. Although this doesn’t translate into requirements for
many new digital skills at operator/leader level, the emerging notions of skill differences
between brigade and battalion can now be identified with some clarity.

While tactical concepts, responsibilities, and dynamics differ between battalion and
brigade, the staff operations and operator command and control (C2) tasks and skills at the two
echelons are essentially the same. Speaking strictly in terms of digital operator skills for specific
Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) and Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2), there is no difference in the skills required between battalion and
brigade. The operators must have the same capabilities. The staff officers and NCOs at both
echelons must have the same knowledge of how the systems function and interact. One need not
serve first at battalion to be a proficient digital operator at brigade.

The battalions have four ATCCS systems: All Source Analysis System (ASAS),
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Maneuver Control System (MCS),
and Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS). 'A Force XXI combat task force
(battalion) will also have up to 140 FBCB2 platforms. These numbers and the powerful
emerging focus on execution in network-centric operations highlight the battalion’s
concentration on FBCB2 platforms. Understanding the FBCB2 nuances, capabilities,
maintenance, and connectivity is critical to the success of the maneuver battalion commander,
his staff, and subordinates. Training first on the FBCB2 systems is paramount to success on the
battlefield. Effective TTPs are essential for building, maintaining, and monitoring the network
that supports FBCB2, the focus at the battalion level. Until ATCCS systems possess greater
reliability, they will remain a lesser part of the battalion network effort.

' This was the Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) at the time this report was written. Per guidance
from the Chief of Staff-Army, this basis of issue will change. A new BOIP has yet to be
finalized/approved.

10


Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: Controlling Friendly Contact with the Enemy

Controlling contact with the enemy requires the utmost coordination, integration, and
synchronization by commanders and staffs. It is the equivalent of “rocket science” in the
business of warfighting. It requires a host of actions across multiple echelons and BOSs, cutting
to the heart of combat operations. Maneuver companies and battalions cover the uncertain
ground that leads to direct contact with the enemy. When both friendly and enemy elements are
moving or when a defending enemy is using concealment, deception, and local security forces,
intelligence from staff estimates or standoff systems will not pinpoint the enemy for the friendly
commanders who make first contact. These commanders may have the help of air or ground
scouts who can give them final reports on exact enemy dispositions, but controlling initial
contact and maintaining it afterward remains difficult.

This report can only sample the scope of the actions required to control friendly contact
with the enemy, describing some of the numerous actions involved and explaining the digital
tasks, skills, and knowledge that are applicable. Further, discussing every doctrinal form of
contact would be overwhelming. Accordingly, the term “contact” will generally apply to all
forms of contact unless otherwise specified. In short, the findings related to control of contact
with the enemy merely spotlight the tip of the iceberg.

This section focuses on setting the conditions under which friendly forces contact the
enemy. Because discussing the actions required at every echelon is beyond the scope of this
report, the presentation emphasizes the brigade, given its predominant role in controlling contact
with the enemy. However, it should be noted that it is the company/team/troop/battery level of
command where the forms of contact are orchestrated and managed.

Maneuver brigades (and battalions) set the conditions for companies to engage the enemy
by seeing and understanding the enemy force, suppressing his fire, limiting his maneuver, and
directing friendly company level units to advantageous positions in time to take advantage of
specific vulnerabilities. Initial contact by committed companies generally fixes key elements of
the enemy force while subsequent contact forces full commitment of the enemy under conditions
that threaten his survival.

Key Terms and Concepts

Several concepts associated with controlling contact with the enemy merit definition.
They will be used to highlight the utility and integration of digital C4I systems later in this
section. The concepts are:

Situational understanding: the condition of knowing the position, strength and direction
of movement of both enemy and friendly forces and understanding the combat power and
options available to both combatants. Situational understanding should be considered a transient
state that fluctuates in quality during combat because of casualties and changes in the enemy’s
dispositions and strength. Late detection of the movement of an enemy reserve, for instance,
represents a temporary lapse in situational understanding that affects controlling the situation.

31



UAV target identification. Target identification is as important a skill for UAV operators
as it is for soldiers firing direct fire weapons. Misidentification of targets by UAV operators may
result in fratricide by indirect fires. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Validation of electronic targeting information. The increasing prevalence at lower
echelons of electronic information on the enemy (fed by systems such as CGS) leads to frequent
instances where indirect fires are prompted by electronic data. There is the possibility of
fratricide occurring as friendly units become intermingled or acquired as part of the electronic
picture. Positive clearance of fires procedures as well as close battle tracking and validation of
the intelligence acquisitions can reduce the risk of fratricides. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Obstacle Contact

Obstacles, primarily minefields, have long been a major cause of direct fratricides that
occur when friendly troops move into their neighbors’ minefields and indirect fratricides that are
caused when friendly obstacles prevent friendly forces from maneuvering to avoid the enemy.
The likelihood of such events has increased with the fielding of systems like the Volcano, which
can be emplaced quickly. Digital systems can make a substantial difference in disseminating
obstacle information and providing obstacle warning to units, particularly those equipped with
FBCB2.

Obstacle planning/execution. Brigade and battalion staffs plan and integrate obstacle
operations with maneuver and fire support before and during operations. The operation plan,
associated graphics, and the rehearsal of operations all help reduce the risks of obstacle
fratricide. A detailed obstacle overlay that is widely disseminated, in advance and updated
throughout the execution (construction) of the obstacles, is key to preventing fratricide.
Additionally, the overlay must include enemy obstacles as they are discovered. Division and
brigade level obstacle overlays (showing only obstacle zones and belts) do not significantly help
in preventing fratricide, though they do assist in defining areas that must be kept free of obstacles
to facilitate maneuver. The detailed obstacle overlays showing the exact location, orientation,
dimensions, and nature of obstacles contribute the most to reducing obstacle fratricide risks. The
most effective way of creating and disseminating the information is at company and battalion
level, utilizing the FBCB2’s Obstacle Overlay function and the geo-referenced Obstacle Report.
That overlay can display obstacle planning and intent as well as known enemy obstacles and
emplaced friendly obstacles. The benefit of utilizing the Obstacle Report is that it creates an
icon for the obstacle that is disseminated network-wide and displayed on all FBCB2 systems.
Additionally, FBCB2 will provide an audio and/or visual warning on the display when the
platform comes within 500 meters of a reported obstacle. In brigades and battalions with analog
supporting units, marked maps along with obstacle marking and guards remain important means
of preventing fratricide. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Obstacle reporting and FBCB2 filter settings. There are also digital tasks at the platform
level that relate to obstacles. Obstacle reports should be sent initially by voice followed by
digital reports to generate a geo-referenced SA representation in the COP. Operators must be
trained to set FBCB2 filters properly for geo-referenced messages. They can choose to hide or
display all geo-referenced data from the filter dialog box. Operators equipped with CVC helmets

27



planning and controlling maneuver, direct fire, and supporting (indirect) fire for his own unit.
Where field grade commanders plan using their staffs and the MDMP, company/team level
commanders use the simpler troop leading procedures (see U.S. Department of the Army, 1998,
Chapter 2) in planning and preparing for operations. The company level plan must be flexible
enough to account for a changed position in the task force formation or defense, changed enemy
array, and changed time, yet still yield the same battlefield results. Company commanders
therefore tend to focus on preparation and execution—actions on contact and actions on the
objective. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Planning Phase

During the planning phase the friendly force will begin to set the conditions that will
enable it to control contact with the enemy. The ABCS enhances planning by expediting the
traditional method for preparing and distributing operation orders, plans, and overlays. For
example, complete orders can be transmitted directly (instead of using a courier) to every
echelon/platform that has FBCB2. With the Operator Response capability in FBCB2 messaging,
leaders are assured the receipt of the order. (This feature requires that the operator respond to the
critical message before another FBCB2 action can be accomplished.) At every echelon FBCB2
operators can post the operational graphics and envision the commander’s intent with each sector
clearly marked, while viewing a real time picture of the friendly forces. They can also view the
reported Red picture in relation to the array of Blue forces, facilitating situational understanding
down to the platform level.

The following activities must occur during the planning phase.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Controlling contact requires detailed
intelligence on enemy dispositions, combat systems, fire support, obstacles, security, and battle
command. In planning, the commander oversees an IPB effort to determine these factors and
other relevant information about the area of operations.

The IPB process is continuous. The brigade receives intelligence from EAB via digital
communications. These feeds build the foundation for the brigade’s planning. Some of the
intelligence gathering tools at EAB are air scouts, HUMINT (human intelligence) collected at
national levels, satellite imagery, STARS, and Quickfix (a helibome electronic warfare
system).. The brigade staff utilizes MCS, AFATDS, ASAS, and the UAV workstation to
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate the information to subordinate units via the lower TI.

As the brigade is receiving information from EAB, it is simultaneously receiving data and
information from its subordinate units via the lower TI. The primary tool to receive and pass
information at battalion echelon and below is FBCB2. It can pass Red SA (Spot reports, Contact
reports), Blue SA (individual platform icons), geo-referenced icons (NBC contaminated areas,
enemy and friendly obstacle icons, logistical point icons) and operational graphics. Analysis of
the bottom-up information by battalion and brigade S2s (especially by the ACT) and the
integration of this information with the top-down information form the mainstay of creating a
common enemy picture. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

36


of evolving TTPs, SOPs, and mission essential tasks on training and assessment requirements is
unknown. Relatively little is known about collective digital tasks and skills, especially for staff
elements. Contemporary concepts of digital skill proficiency are yet to be developed, and
practical requirements for assessing digital proficiency are undocumented. It is not known
whether digital skills are common across echelons or perhaps characterized by unique aspects at
different echelons. Likewise, investigators have yet to explore how performance conditions and
standards may change in the digital environment. In a nutshell, much work lies ahead to
establish the knowledge base needed by training developers who are supporting the future force.

There is little doubt that digitization has the potential to overwhelm trainers with
observation requirements (Brown, Anderson, Begley and Meliza, 1999, Gerlock and Meliza,
1999, Meliza, 1999). In addition to observing the same events applicable to analog units,
trainers for digitized units must attend to interactions between operators and digital systems,
interactions between system operators and digital information users, and even interactions among
system operators. One means of addressing this measurement problem is to identify the aspects
of digital proficiency that most warrant the attention of trainers, due to their potential
contributions to unit effectiveness. Another approach is to tailor observation requirements to fit
unit digital proficiency levels.

As the Army’s First Digital Division (FDD), the 4ID represents the primary repository of
organizational experience regarding digital performance and assessment. The project described
in this report was designed to document the insights of warfighters in the 4ID’s digitization
progress. A key goal was to document digital performance and assessment requirements,
including potential differences between battalion and brigade echelons in terms of digital tasks
and skills. The research team compared battalion and brigade activities to determine if new skill
requirements emerge at brigade level. They also explored two key combat tasks to determine
how unit performance relates to digital proficiency and how the latter should be measured.

Technical Objectives
The following technical objectives guided the MEDD research:

« Describe changes in the behavior of units as they gain experience using digital
systems.

Describe expected benefits of changes in the behavior of units associated with
digitization.

Describe changes in unit understanding of digital skills, the value and role of
digitization, and the need for additional guidance regarding system operation or
employment.

« Assess whether new digital skills emerge at brigade level.

«@ Examine the use of graduated versus all-or-none measures of digital skill/task
proficiency.

This report addresses the last two technical objectives, which were the focus of the
second phase of the project. The first three technical objectives are the subject of a companion
report (Dudley, Johnston, Jones, Strauss, & Meliza, 2001).




Because they are rapidly emplaced and can be positioned in response to enemy
maneuver, dynamic minefields pose special challenges to SA. When they are employed, friendly
units must be made aware of their location, orientation, and duration. The FBCB2 can rapidly
disseminate obstacle reports across the brigade. These reports will visually cue leaders of the
proximity of the minefields. Additionally, FBCB2 will also provide each FBCB2 equipped
platform an audio and/or scrolling marquee warning when a platform comes within 500 meters
of a reported minefield. The same can be done for contaminated areas. The Obstacle and NBC
reports are “geo-referenced” so that all FBCB2 equipped platforms receive this report in the form
of an icon. If the brigade must breach or bypass an enemy obstacle a similar report can be sent
(FBCB2 Bridge report). This report populates the brigade FBCB2 screens with a bridge icon at
the appropriate location, giving leaders a visual cue of where to steer. Once in the general area,
the normal “analog” cues (VS-17 panel and lane markers) can be used. Scoring: Graduated T,
P,U

Updating airspace control measures. In conjunction with updating FSCMs, air space
control measures are updated via MCS, AMDWS and FBCB2, as well as FM networks. These
updates help assure that Army aviation units supporting the brigade make contact on
advantageous terms and avoid inadvertent contact. They also assist in preventing fratricide and
in providing effective support for ground forces in the direct fire fight. Scoring: Graduated T,
P,U

Initiating friendly contact with the enemy. The cumulative brigade and battalion
planning, preparation, and execution activities culminate in this sub-task. As the company
commander approaches the PLD, he compares the top-down SA and direct reports of scouts or
other observers who see the enemy with his own understanding of the battlefield (another
instance of the continuous commander’s estimate). If these pictures are consistent, the
commander can act quickly and in coordinated fashion even if the enemy’s actual dispositions
and the terrain differ slightly from his earlier understanding. He can modify his basic plan to fit
the actual circumstances and to strike the enemy effectively.

If the pictures do not match and the situation is unclear, the commander will adjust his
maneuver plan on the move and approach the suspected enemy position more deliberately. If the
discrepancy is not significant—say, a matter of enemy orientation or exact positioning—he may
not be substantially affected. If there are more serious gaps in information, however, the
commander will be forced to deploy to a linear formation earlier, to use supporting fires earlier
on suspected enemy locations, and to adopt movement techniques that provide greater general
security.

The commander can use FBCB2 to adjust his plan on the move by sharing the COP
among the company elements. Rapid visualization and common terms and reference points
allow the commander to shift location (from ABF 1 to ABF 2, TIR 236 to TIR 451, etc.), array
(from platoon bounding by alternate bounds to successive bounds, echelon left/right, etc.), and/or
action (action left or action right). By this point in the operation, time has most likely been fixed
by the next higher commander. The first company-sized units to make direct fire contact with
the enemy play an important role in assuring that the remaining elements of the battalion/task
force have an accurate, confirmed understanding of the enemy. First reports from direct fire

46


Updating the intelligence picture and ISR plan. As the enemy is acquired throughout the
battlespace, reports are input via digital systems to update the enemy picture. The results of
successfully accomplishing this task are two-fold. The first is the ability to recognize battlefield
opportunity and risk. Second is the effect on future plans. For effective intelligence support to
their operations, commanders must review and revise CCIR during the fight. The S2 sections at
both brigade and battalion echelons will continually monitor friendly and enemy situations,
advising leaders of changes in the situation and the impacts on when and where contact can be
expected to occur. As units transition out of movement to maneuver and gain visual, then direct
fire contact with the enemy, Red SA, is updated to “ground truth” via FBCB2 Spot reports.
These Spot reports are sent to the battalion S2 section and analyzed with the aid of ASAS. Once
analyzed, the battalion S2 sends an updated ASAS enemy situation template to the brigade. At
the brigade, subordinate ASAS templates are analyzed and compiled as part of a continuing
intelligence estimate process for current and projected operations. This Red picture is the part of
the COP that allows commanders to visualize the battlefield risks and opportunities associated
with the changing conditions of the interaction between friendly forces, enemy forces, and
terrain. Skills that support this task span brigade and platform levels. They encompass TOC
connectivity, unit connectivity, Red icon “handoff” and management, and such mundane (but
critical) issues as filter settings. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Transitioning from movement to maneuver. This is a routine task at battalion level.
However, CTC experience (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1998) indicates it is rarely
conducted to standard and precious combat power is lost as units stumble into opposing force
(OPFOR) kill sacks/engagement areas. With the appropriate application of FBCB2 skills and
leader tactical experience, the transition from movement to maneuver can be anticipated,
visualized, and controlled. Company/team commanders can use the enemy situation template,
the FBCB2 circular line of sight, and overlay tools to determine the Probable Line of
Deployment (PLD). This phase line, as part of the overall company plan, is sent digitally via
FBCB2. The commander (both company and battalion) can view on FBCB2 the change in
movement techniques and formations as subordinate elements cross the PLD. Outside the CTCs,
where zones tend to be larger, commanders will have to anticipate multiple PLDs as their attacks
continue to cover ground.

Brigades or battalions initially held in reserve must make special and particularly flexible
plans for commitment and for initial contact with the enemy. Typically, these units will move
behind committed units in an attack or be positioned in depth behind committed units in defense.
Their commitment will normally depend on the progress of the battle. Accordingly, they will
have to be prepared for movement on several possible routes, for maneuver in one of several
possible areas, and for contact in a variety of possible circumstances. They will have to follow
the intelligence situation across the full AO of their parent unit. The FBCB2 will facilitate their
movement through the areas of other battalions or companies on assigned routes and keep them
up to date on friendly movements. Their initial contact with the enemy may be controlled and
fairly clear (as in a reserve occupying a defensive position in depth) or difficult (as in a reserve
committed through a penetration to seize a deep objective). In the more difficult cases, reserve
units will have to depend on reports of units in contact, on information developed by standoff
sensors and on rough estimates of enemy location and activity. Digital battle command tools
will help commanders resolve vague situations faster than in the past and manage imminent


related reports and listing required user interactions with current digital systems to produce a
series of tables like that illustrated by the first two columns of Table 6.

Table 6

Desired Outcomes of Digitization and Diagnostics as a Function of Current Digital Systems and

Hypothetical FCS Systems

Desired Outcomes

Diagnostics For User
Employment of Current
Digital Systems

Diagnostics For User
Employment of Hypothetical
FCS Systems

Location of minefields
automatically made
available to digital systems
collocated with users

Users report locations of
minefields using the
Obstacle Report message
format

Users report locations of
minefields using the
Obstacle Report message
format

Users automatically alerted
when they are close to
minefields

User sets FBCB2 filters to
properly receive geo-
referenced icons

Commanders with combat
vehicle crewman’s (CVC)
helmets set filters to turn on
audible messages

or

Commanders periodically
check displays to find out if
they are approaching
minefields

User checks threat vibrator
battery and puts vibrator in
pocket (Vibrator is triggered
if user or immediate
subordinates come within
500 meters of minefield or
minefield blocks planned
route of user or immediate
subordinates)

50



© Given performance standards, training strategy developers and the research/ development
community can gain a greater understanding of how training devices can be designed and
applied to support necessary practice opportunities (e.g., the setting must provide company
commanders with the digital information flow needed to predict the probable line of
deployment and time to make and act upon such predictions).

© Given standards and a description of the settings in which standards are likely to be applied,
the information can be used to decide how to apply automation in analyzing ground truth
data (e.g., snapshot showing a unit’s formation as it crosses the probable line of deployment)
and digital communications (e.g. which echelons and BOSs have access to a company’s
probable line of deployment) to provide units with timely feedback.

© Digital system developers and digitized units can use performance standards to guide the
evolution of digital systems and TTPs (how can we reduce the time to decide and/or
disseminate the location of the probable line of deployment or increase the accuracy of the
decision?).

Recommendations

The findings of this project form a preliminary database that speaks to measuring digital
skills proficiency. Much work lies ahead to expand the database so it can fully support the
training development needs of the digital force. The authors recommend the steps listed below.

¢ Establish a comprehensive framework to guide the documentation of digital tasks,
sub-tasks, procedures, and skills.

¢ Capture the digital sub-tasks and procedures emerging within digital units.

¢ Expand the analysis of digital skills by applying task analysis methods in operational
environments.

¢ Establish a digital training laboratory to support the systematic investigation of future
force performance and proficiency assessment needs.

¢ Continue the investigation of inter-echelon differences in digital performance
requirements and conditions.

¢ Extend the analysis of digital proficiency assessment requirements to the Objective
Force.

¢ Review the literature on measuring skill proficiency to identify promising approaches
for the digital performance environment.

« Determine “best practices” among industry, academia, and other military services for
measuring digital skill proficiency.

¢ Develop a comprehensive model for characterizing and measuring the various types
of digital skills and knowledge.

¢ Compare the utility and effectiveness of alternative approaches for measuring digital
skill proficiency in operational settings.

The research findings of the MEDD project pave the way for measuring digital skills

proficiency. However, the results provide merely a point of departure. A significant amount
remains to be learned through follow-on research. Expanding the knowledge base is an

54


Track and update CCIR. The CCIR developed and approved during the planning phase
should be tracked and reviewed during preparation. Digital TOCs have the capability to
electronically display information on a large-screen display or on an overhead projection screen.
When displayed in a prominent location, the staff can easily refer to the CCIR during the
preparation phase and adjust accordingly. Prominently displaying the CCIR electronically
reduces the risk of inadequate tracking and updating of the CCIR. In addition, each BOS
manager should have some mechanism for tracking his BOS-related CCIR so he can cue the
TOC battle captain when CCIR-related information is received by his BOS element. The CCIR
must obviously not only be tracked, but also acted on appropriately. Changes to the CCIR are
common during preparation as new enemy information emerges. These changes must be
distributed to the staff and units and be reflected in event tracking. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Execution Phase

Shaping operations. Shaping operations continue throughout the execution phase of the
brigade operation. Tactical doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2001) describes shaping
operations as actions at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the success of the
decisive operation. Shaping operations include lethal and non-lethal activities conducted
throughout the AO. They support the decisive operation by attacking enemy capabilities and
forces or by influencing enemy decisions. Shaping operations use all elements of combat power
to neutralize or reduce enemy capabilities. They typically occur before, concurrently with, or
after the start of the decisive operation. They may involve any combination of forces and occur
throughout the AO. Fires in depth, electronic warfare (EW), maneuver that limits enemy
freedom of action and mobility/countermobility actions are the chief means of shaping the
brigade fight.

Reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts also remain important during shaping
operations. Both must continue throughout the fight if situational understanding is to be
preserved. Damaging the enemy in depth to assist in establishing contact on favorable terms
depends on continued observation of key NAI/TAI and on employment of fires and dynamic
obstacles in depth. Managing direct fire contact in an objective or engagement area requires the
same continuous observation along with a transition from observation to attack by a friendly
force that initiates contact based on reports of observers. In this case, information has to pass
directly from scouts to the commander of the attacking force, and a time-sensitive transfer of
responsibility for fires and terrain management from the reconnaissance force to the attacking
force must take place.

Continued reconnaissance in depth during the main force fight helps shape the action by
clarifying tactical options for the commander and confirming the practicality of anticipated
branches and sequels.

Digital C4I systems play a dominant role in shaping operations because they enable
commanders to observe the execution of the shaping operations. Success or failure determines if
conditions for decisive operations have been achieved. The digital brigade’s ability to monitor
shaping operations without the delays and errors induced by analog relay reporting (echelon to

42


organization for a breaching operation is composed of support, breach, and assault teams. This
doctrine eliminates the former requirement for a reserve. To reduce tactical risk, the brigade
must either task organize additional combat power to the three-team task force, or take on the
execution responsibility of the breach. In either case, the brigade “owns” the preponderance of
fire support assets and must shape the battlefield prior to this breaching operation. This is an
example of the increased execution role of the brigade in Force XXI operations.

Another example is the “new” requirement for the brigade R&S plan. Brigade staff
members must synchronize this plan in terms of resources, time, and space while maintaining the
COP, providing analog backup, and reducing fratricide risks. In some digitized units the R&S
plan is rehearsed with task force commanders at the brigade rock drill, prior to the maneuver
rehearsal. Reducing fratricide risk is addressed in a later section.

The brigade then focuses intensively and extensively on integration and synchronization
of the entire combined arms spectrum across all BOSs. Brigade commanders and their staffs
must have an increased understanding of integration and the importance of synchronization.
This should manifest itself in the planning effort, but does not obviate their execution
responsibilities. Brigade personnel must not only identify the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR) but also use the information gleaned from situational understanding to
facilitate planning, reallocate resources, and seize the execution advantages provided by
enhanced battlefield visualization. The brigade staff must know how to set filters on their
various systems, refine information into useable decision-making tools, and then understand how
to display the information for the brigade and subordinate commanders. In short, the brigade
staff must know how to leverage the information they receive. They must understand how to use
the information to reduce risk and exploit the opportunities visualized on the battlefield. To
accomplish these tasks, the individuals on brigade staffs must possess far broader experience
than the typical battalion staff officer.

The final influence on digital skill level and task condition differences is “digital
maturity.” We are seeing the digital maturation of mid-grade leaders who have worked with
MCS, AFATDS, and FBCB2, and have remained in the division for four years. These officers
and NCOs now operate at a qualitatively higher level of digital understanding. These leaders can
decisively influence tactical operations because of their past experiences. This increases the skill
level of selected tasks, especially at brigade, by virtue of available expertise. The brigade
Executive Officer (XO), S3, S2, and senior NCOs are often selected from subordinate battalion
positions. In digital brigades, this means a brigade XO is a former task force S3/XO (trained in
FBCB2 and MCS and familiar with ASAS and CSSCS). The brigade communications NCOIC
(NCO In Charge) is a former task force communications NCOIC and trained in FBCB2, Tactical
Internet Management System (TIMS), and connectivity centered on the tactical operations center
(TOC). Obviously, a similar situation has existed in analog brigades, but that does not diminish
the role of digital maturity as a key requirement for brigade staffs.

The tasks for the brigade have grown in number and importance with the evolution of

digitization. Not only does the brigade staff have to operate and integrate multiple systems but
they have also become the custodians of assets and responsibilities from both the division and

14


Time: the timing of first contact and the sequencing of the contact, which should be
chosen by the commander of the formation that initiates contact. That unit may be either a
battalion or a company sized unit, depending on terrain and formation. Mission constraints—
movements directed by a higher level commander or requirements to make contact at a specific
time or as soon as possible—may affect the local commander’s freedom of action where time is
concerned.

Location: the terrain aspects defining physical relationships between forces; the terrain
on which contact initially occurs should afford the friendly element an advantage (cover and
concealment, line of sight, etc.) over the enemy.

Formation: the tactical dispositions that affect speed, maneuverability, and delivery of
direct fires affect the terms of initial contact and the commander’s overall ability to maintain
contact. Speed and maneuverability are major considerations in making contact on advantageous
terms. The formations that maximize speed and maneuverability, however, rarely permit optimal
employment of direct fire weapons and may increase the vulnerability of the friendly force to
enemy action. Maneuvering commanders must, therefore, alter their dispositions skillfully to
achieve all the advantages of speed, maneuver, and massed direct fires.

Action: the weapon system tasks that will place the enemy in danger of destruction, in a
specific performance timeframe.

Freedom of action: the ability to maneuver and adjust dispositions. As long as the
friendly force retains freedom of action it can maneuver to maintain contact and shape the terms
of battle. Once all available forces are in the fight, freedom of action is limited to actions in
contact with the enemy and future freedom of action depends on the outcome of the action. As
long as the enemy maintains his own freedom of action, he can evade contact or break it.
Retaining reserves, using delaying tactics and impeding the opponent’s maneuver with obstacles
are principal means of protecting freedom of action.

Framework for Discussion

The discussion in this section will rely on the doctrinal framework for conducting combat
missions: planning, preparation, and execution. The digital enhancers involved at the brigade,
battalion, and company levels during each phase of planning, preparation, and execution will be
addressed. The parallel processes that are performed at each echelon will be examined, along
with how friendly forces’ digital capabilities expedite those processes.

Figure 1 graphically depicts the continuous nature of operations. It portrays the brigade
planning, preparing, and executing sequential missions. It shows the battalions and companies
receiving input from echelons above brigade (EAB), such as plans from higher headquarters and
JSTARS feeds, and then planning, preparing, and executing. At the bottom of the chart the
activities inherent in the first mission—setting conditions, shaping the battlefield, and decisive
operations—are indicated where (in general) they will occur during the operation. All of these
activities take place simultaneously and in parallel. It is a maze of activity that is greatly
facilitated by digital capabilities.

32


How do you use FBCB2 to control unit movement?
. Do you use FBCB2 during movement prior to contact? If so, how?
. Once you have engaged the enemy (or vice versa), do you use FBCB2? If so, how?

How does digitization affect or change the way you conduct troop leading procedures in
your unit?

Has digitization changed what you as a company commander or platoon leaders
emphasize during mission planning, preparation, and mission execution? Has digitization
made your job easier or harder? Please explain.

. How has digitization affected/changed the duties/activities of your track commanders
during mission planning, preparation and execution?

Do you have a unit SOP that specifies when LOGSTAT reports are sent up by crews?



FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI)
Simulator Systems Research Unit (SSRU) conducts research to investigate the training and
performance assessment requirements of the future force. The SSRU supports the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Simulation, Training and
Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) by defining current and future training requirements,
developing performance measurement technology, and evaluating training concepts.

The research described in this report investigated key aspects of measuring performance
in a digital combat unit, including echelon differences in warfighter tasks/skills and the nature of
proficiency assessment needs. Based on an analysis by a panel of experts, review of Army
documents, and interviews with digital warfighters, knowledge and performance differences
were charted between brigade and battalion staff levels. Suitable measurement approaches for
sub-tasks involved in two key combat tasks were then explored.

The investigation established a preliminary knowledge base for understanding the
performance and assessment requirements of the future force. It created an initial foundation for
developing realistic measures of digital skill proficiency capable of supporting successful digital
operations.

This report is one of two reports documenting the methods and findings of the research
project. The companion report addresses the behavioral and performance changes that occur in
units transitioning to digital operations. The contractor briefed the results of this work at Fort
Hood, TX on 15 June 2001. The audience included representatives of the III Corps Battle
Command Training Center. ARI briefed the preliminary results at the Quarterly Army Battle
Command System Integration Meeting, on 19 December 2001, held at the Applied Research
Laboratory of the University of Texas. This meeting included representatives of the Army
Battle Command System TRADOC Program Integration Office, the TRADOC Army
Modernization Directorate, the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center, the U.S. Army’s
National Training Center, the STRICOM Project Manager for Digitized Training, and the
STRICOM Project Manager for Training Devices.

MICHAEL G. RUMSEY
Acting Technical Director





APPENDIX B
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The documents listed below were reviewed as part of the data collection effort. Copies of
Fort Knox Special Manuals and Fort Knox Special Texts can be obtained through the United

States Army Armor Center and School, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. Other documents are
available from TRW Inc., 100 E. Central Texas Expressway, Suite 200, Killeen, Texas 76541.

FKSM 71-3-1-(EXFOR)-MTP Mission Training Plan for the FBCB2-Equipped Brigade Combat
Team Post Limited Users Test (LUT) #1. 7 Dec 1998

FKSM 71-2-1-(EXFOR)-MTP Mission Training Plan for the FBCB2-Equipped Battalion/Task
Force Post LUT #1. 7 Dec 1998

FKSM 71-1-1-(EXFOR)-MTP Mission Training Plan for the FBCB2-Equipped Tank and
Infantry Company Team Post LUT #1. 7 Dec 1998

FKSM 71-2 (2005) Armored and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force TTP. Nov 1999
FKSM 71-2X (IBCT) Interim Brigade Combat Team TTP. Feb 2001.

FKSM 71-3 (2005) Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade TTP. Nov 1999.

Digital Operator’s Guide for Brigade and Battalion Staffs. June 2000.

Special Text, TRADOC-ST-20-101-5 (draft). The Digitized Battle Staff Task Map, published by
Warrior-T, June 2001.

Digital Unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for 1-22 Infantry Battalion, 1 BCT, 4 ID.
March 2001.

B-1



BRT

C4

CAS

CATS

CCIR

CGS

COA

COP

cP

CSS

CSSCS

CTC

CVC

DCX

DS

DTSS

EAB

EAD

EPLRS

EW

EXFOR

FBCB2

Brigade Reconnaissance Troop

Command and Control

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
Close Air Support

Combined Arms Training Strategy
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
Common Ground Station

Course of Action

Common Operating Picture

Command Post

Combat Service Support

Combat Service Support Control System
Combat Training Centers

Combat Vehicle Crewman’s

Division Capstone Exercise

Direct Support

Digital Topographic Support System

Echelons Above Brigade

Echelons Above Division

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
Electronic Warfare

Experimental Force

Force XX] Battle Command Brigade and Below

C-2


guidance based on the amount of risk he is willing to accept in executing fires in close proximity
to friendly troops.

During the planning process, commanders should consider the fire support tasks that can
be pre-cleared. Pre-cleared fires are specified tasks identified during the planning process. The
commander can leverage the capabilities of digital systems to set the conditions required for the
execution of a task without clearance confirmation at the time of execution. Some examples of
conditions that a commander can set are:

¢ The fires do not violate any established maneuver control measure or FSCM.

¢ The observer calling for the fires must have positive identification of the target and it
must meet the established engagement criteria.

¢ The observer calling fires on the target must meet established position location
parameters to ensure accurate target location.

¢ The execution of and the digital links established for the mission must be planned and
rehearsed prior to the operation.

Even with the enhanced SA offered by automated systems and the automated checks and
warnings of AFATDS, there may still be instances where fires require voice coordination before
clearance. Scoring: Go/No Go

Use of AFATDS intervention point settings. Another likely cause for indirect fire
fratricides is fire mission processing time or responsiveness (the time it takes to process the fire
mission and get rounds on target). In many cases by the time a fire mission can be processed and
executed the maneuver situation has changed and friendly forces may have moved into the target
area. The use of AFATDS Intervention Point (IP) settings provides a powerful capability to
eliminate the traditional mission delays associated with processing fire missions through multiple
layers of fire support coordination. Not every mission needs to pause at every fire support node
in the mission thread. By tailoring AFATDS IPs, the commander can specify which missions
pause for review (human intervention) at intermediate fire support nodes, and which missions
automatically process through the fire support system to a firing unit for rapid response. This
enables the commander to balance the needs for human control with fire mission responsiveness.

Ultimately, the use of AFATDs IPs is a matter of SOP. Determining when human
intervention is needed and when to allow the computer process to run without intervention
depends on the commander’s confidence that the system will perform reliably, the current tactical
situation, and the type and amount of fire support assets available to support the BCT’s
operation. Tailoring IPs may serve as an alternative to quick-fire channels and has the potential
of offering near-real time sensor-to-shooter capabilities. Scoring: Go/No Go

Establishment and enforcement of safety zones. Safety zones are established that
friendly units must not occupy relative to a target and given types of munitions. As part of the
process for clearing fires, units must ensure that soldiers are not in these safety zones. A
technique for doing this is to determine the largest possible effects radius of munitions to be
used, and then to apply a template over each target to ensure that no soldiers are within that
radius. Generally, two kilometers is an adequate radius, encompassing the effects of all artillery

25



The brigade has a larger digital base and a broader field of digital concerns. The brigade
headquarters will have, at most, 17 organic FBCB2 platforms, not counting those of its
attachments and the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT). The brigade has all five ATCCS
components—ASAS, AFATDS, MCS, CSSCS, and the Air and Missile Defense Work Station
(AMDWS). It also has the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS), the Battlefield
Planning and Visualization (BPV) tool, and the White Board Video Teleconference (VTC) tool.
Table 1 lists the systems and their quantities at the two echelons.

Table 1

Number of Digital Systems Present at Brigade and Battalion Echelons

System Brigade Battalion

FBCB2 17 140
ASAS 4 1
AFATDS 1 1
MCS 3 1
CSSCS 2 1

AMDWS 1 None

DTSS 1 None

BPV 1 None

White Board/VTC 1 None

These digital systems pass information via the tactical internet (TI). The TI is comprised
of tactical radios, linked with routers using addressing and routing protocols that allow digital
systems to send and receive location information and reports. The TI must deliver messages
reliably despite mobility of units, loss of fighting systems and soldiers, obscuring terrain, enemy
interference, destruction of command posts, loss of key elements and replacement of individual
platforms. The TI consists of two primary segments—a lower TI operating at brigade level and
below, and Warrior Information Network-Terrestrial (WIN-T, or upper TI) operating at brigade
level and above. The linkage between the upper and lower TI and the integration of the unique
systems is critical to the entire brigade’s success in forming the COP. This effort is as complex
as the battalion’s task of synchronizing up to 140 FBCB2 operators.

At brigade level, the staff has to employ and integrate a greater variety of systems. For
example, the brigade staff employs or receives information from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and divisional systems.
That information is collated and fed down to the battalions.

The brigade staff’s planning operations are also supplemented by the use of White Board
VTCs with higher and adjacent units. These tools are not available at the battalion level in most
cases. There is a knowledge and experience level associated with gaining the most from these
systems, but it is not appreciably different from the basic knowledge that staff members at any
echelon need to possess. The key difference at brigade level is the greater requirement to
integrate the functions of diverse systems.

11



draw many observers, some of them enemy. This drives the requirement for detailed, brigade
level planning of R&S. The reporting and coordination procedures and processes between these
strange battlefield bedfellows compound the potential for mistaken identity. As the digital
transition progresses, it has become imperative that electronic identification of friendly assets be
pursued and enhanced.

Air Defense. A final example lies in the ADA BOS. Currently, the AMDWS is not
fielded to maneuver at battalion level. The ADA fight is one that occurs largely above the
maneuver battalion’s perspective. However, air tracks generated from AMDWS can now be
portrayed on FBCB2. The brigade’s ADA battery clearly does have different digital C2 tasks
than its maneuver counterpart, as a result of equipment distribution, systems interfaces and
doctrinal responsibilities.

Brigade-Battalion Differences by Position

The foregoing factors and others affect the functions of specific staff leaders. Another
perspective for looking at the differences between brigade and battalion is the differing functions
accomplished by the same staff position at brigade and battalion levels. Several comparisons
follow. |

Executive Officer. The brigade XO is clearly the “battle captain” for the brigade TOC, in
that the brigade XO has responsibilities that are similar to those of a battle captain at battalion
level. He has the responsibility for creating the COP across the brigade AO. This implies that
he knows the ins and outs of his brigade TOC, the various BOSs, and the MDMP. It implies that
he knows how to integrate staffs and is familiar with both subordinate and higher headquarters
requirements and TTPs. It assumes that he is familiar with the various reports and screen
displays on the various ATCCS systems in his TOC. The brigade XO is the “synchronization
cornerstone” for the brigade. He has most likely been a battalion level S3 and probably served
on a division staff in a digital unit. He is the key to digital management within the brigade.

The battalion XO does not have the same job focus or knowledge requirements that the
brigade XO does. The battalion XO may not necessarily be a constant resident of the TOC. He
might focus on combat power generation, maintenance, readiness, and the coordination of
resources internally. This is probably his first job where he has had responsibility for a staff.

Battle Captain. The term “battle captain” is not defined in the primary doctrine on staff
operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 1997). However, the term is widely used to describe
the staff officer exercising C2 authority on behalf of the commander.

The commander must be able to visualize the battlefield and synchronize tasks and
resources in order to accomplish the mission. The staff assists the commander in visualizing the
battlefield, with the unit XO primarily responsible for synchronizing and integrating the staff's
efforts. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (1995), the battle captain assists the
XO in synchronizing and coordinating the staff's effort. The distinction between the two
individuals lies in their levels of experience. During the battle, synchronizing and coordinating
the staff is normally best served by the XO. During the preparation phase, the battle captain can

17



planning, anticipatory reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), integration of fires with
maneuver, other shaping operations (mobility/countermobility, electronic warfare, air defense,
NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] defense, and others), and logistics make its operations
much more complicated than those of the battalions.

The responsibilities for maintaining the COP rest more heavily on the brigade’s
shoulders, but there is one immediate implication of concern to both battalion and brigade
commanders—the importance of network Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR). As
part of their plan for battle command, commanders at both levels must understand network
architecture and monitor information choke points, or weak links, to maintain network integrity
and to assure their commanders’ abilities to make timely decisions (see Table 3).

Force structure changes are key factors that affect the skill level and task-condition-
standard differences between brigade and battalion levels. The Force XXI organization reduced
combat battalions in size from four maneuver companies to three, cut the scout platoons from ten
platforms to six, and reduced the mortar platoons from six tubes to four. These reductions were
taken in anticipation of increased combat power effectiveness brought about by digitization.
Arguably, this gain in combat power effectiveness is beginning to occur. Anecdotal evidence,
collected during interviews with leaders of digitized units after an NTC rotation, indicates that
three-company/team task forces perform to standard at NTC and that fire support and
reconnaissance capabilities are as great as those of earlier organizations. From the brigade
perspective, however, the loss of a quarter of its maneuver companies changes combat dynamics
by making it harder to maintain reserves and by accelerating the rate of full commitment. (“Full
commitment” means the loss of flexibility and acceptance of decisive combat that comes with
employing all company-sized elements in decisive tactical actions.)

Table 3

Representative Friendly Forces Information Requirements

Sample FFIR What/How to Observe Alternatives Failure

At least 4 of 7 TF Monitor the broadcast of | Controlled Loss of Co/Team or TF

position servers the 7 TF position servers substitution of SA to Bde

operational at all via TIMS (snapshots every | FBCB2 or vehicle

times 2 hours) components

Maintain 100% Monitor the broadcast of Controlled Gateway closed, no

broadcast of 2 inter- | S3 TOC server A and S4 | substitution of SA/C2 messages

brigade servers ALOC server A every 2 FBCB2 or vehicle | received or transmitted
hours via TIMS components over EPLRS

MCS generated Maneuver Battle Captain | Switch to FBCB2 | Loss of maneuver

icons in Bde TOC check time of last MCS feed Situational Awareness/
update, if greater than 15 Understanding
minutes

Certain operations now require greater brigade integration efforts. An example of “task
migration” can be found in the task force obstacle breaching procedure. The doctrine for the
mounted task force (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999a) states that the nominal task

13



and MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) munitions. For close air support (CAS), the safety
zone may have to be adjusted just prior to execution if the aircraft arrives with a different
munition than expected. Digital tools can assist in this task through target overlays and the SA
picture. However, staffs must remember that not all elements on the battlefield will be displayed
in the SA picture. Also, how the filters are set on a system is critical. Scoring: Go/No Go

Control of non-broadcasting FBCB2 systems. A technique for reducing the risk of
fratricide in digital units is to have platforms whose FBCB2 system is not functioning remain
within 500 meters of a platform whose system is functioning. If a vehicle has to go outside the
500 meters limit or out of sight, its commander should ensure that the wingman knows his
position via FM (frequency modulated) radio. This will help ensure that the non-functioning
system is not entirely lost from the SA picture, gaining a measure of protection and visibility by
its close proximity to a system that is generating an SA icon. Scoring: Go/No Go

Monitoring SA on co-hosted systems. Many of the digital systems are hosting two sets of
software or have multiple functions. For example, staff fire support elements utilize AFATDS
for tactical gunnery control, technical gunnery, and for monitoring the SA picture. Through the
Joint Common Database, AFATDS has the capability of displaying the COP as well as the
artillery/fire support specific situation. The AFATDS SA picture will also provide an accurate
graphical portrayal of the battlespace using doctrinal battlefield geometries. It can portray
individual friendly units (Blue), enemy units (Red), neutral units (Green), and range fans for
radar, cannon, rocket, and mortar units. This information can be tailored to a number of separate
overlays to enable the operator to view only specific information at any one time. The same
capability exists in other staff elements and on many combat platforms such as Paladin and
Linebacker. Procedures must be developed to ensure that the ability to monitor the COP is not
lost by staff or leader elements while technical tasks are being performed on the digital system.
Scoring: Go/No Go

Verification of target locations. The addition of new target acquisition capabilities on
some systems, in particular the M1A2 and the M2A3, can provide highly accurate (ten digit)
target locations. However, if not functioning properly, they can provide erroneous data that may
cause fratricide. Two sub-tasks to evaluate are pre-combat checks on target location systems,
and the continual checking of observer target location data by fire direction centers for validity
and positive clearance of fires. Scoring: Go/No Go

Electronic Contact

Electronic contact does not directly cause fratricide, but can be a contributing factor.
Some examples follow.

Protection against jamming of friendly systems. Electronic jamming operations that

result in degradation or disruption of friendly communications can result in fratricide if it
precludes communication between units or if it disrupts the COP. Scoring: Go/No Go

26


tasks in the lists produced during data reduction, the team implemented an alternate approach.
The lead SME reviewed the echelon-focused portion of the compiled data file, deriving
implications for echelon differences in the process. He then presented resulting implications and
conclusions to the SME panel for collective analysis. The panel discussed and weighed the
findings, then considered the different knowledge requirements for battalion versus brigade staff
members. The team members reviewed the resulting set of preliminary findings before finalizing
them.

Digital Skill Proficiency Concepts

Working with the two expanded data summaries that resulted from data reduction, a lead
SME sorted and organized the findings into a meaningful framework. The organization step was
guided by the doctrinally recognized forms of contact (U.S. Department of the Army, 1996).
The next analytical step entailed documenting the digital sub-tasks involved in preventing
unwanted circumstances—either fratricide or unplanned enemy contact. Established doctrine
generally drove this step, but the SME panel’s knowledge and judgment played a key role where
digitally anchored solutions were yet to be documented. The next step involved determining
what measurement approach—go/no go or graduated—should be most suitable for a given task.
In targeting a specific measurement approach, the team considered primarily the nature of the
task, and secondarily the training needs of digital units. It should be noted that the team’s
determinations are preliminary and warrant additional study. In the final step, the SME panel
members reviewed the complete analytical products and discussed differences of opinion until
consensus was reached.


1CD

41D

A2C2

ABCS

AFATDS

ALOC

AMDWS

AO

ASAS

ATCCS

AWE

BCIS

BCT

BDA

BOS

BOIP

BPV

APPENDIX C
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
1* Cavalry Division
4" Infantry Division
Army Airspace Command and Control
Army Battle Command System
Attack by Fire
Analysis and Control Team
Air Defense Artillery
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
Air Lines of Communications
Air and Missile Defense Work Station

Area of Operations

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

All Source Analysis System

Army Tactical Command and Control System
Advanced Warfighting Experiment
Battlefield Combat Identification System
Brigade Combat Team

Battlefield Damage Assessment

Battlefield Operating System

Basis of Issue Plan

Battle Planning and Visualization

C1



Digital operations bring a new dimension to FFIR, namely a critical emphasis on
managing platform and network functionality and connectivity. Maintaining proper connectivity
and high broadcast rates is crucial to building and maintaining the COP. The conditions and
standards for meeting digital FFIR requirements vary between brigade and battalion echelons.

Digital tools contribute to preventing fratricide primarily through accurate and efficient
dissemination of battlefield information and high levels of situational understanding. Controlling
contact with the enemy benefits from rapid dissemination of an accurate picture of enemy and
friendly forces, continuous updating of information, digital terrain analysis, and digital
wargaming.

Existing approaches for assessing individual and collective proficiency are expected to be
suitable for measuring digital skill proficiency. The primary approaches are all-or-none
determination and a simple graduated scale (T-P-U). More complicated approaches were judged
to be unsuitable. A major advantage of simpler measurement approaches is the extent to which
they simplify the job of unit trainers and observer/controllers (O/Cs). It is important to
remember that these findings are based on the analysis by the panel of experts, not empirical
investigation.

For the various doctrinal forms of contact with the enemy, preventing fratricide involves
a few sub-tasks that revolve around digital tools and many sub-tasks that benefit directly from
digital capabilities. In most cases the recommended scoring approach is go/no go—reflecting
mainly the critical importance of the various sub-tasks.

For the primary phases involved in combat missions, controlling enemy contact entails a
variety of sub-tasks that benefit directly from digital capabilities. For the limited set of sub-tasks
identified in this project, the recommended scoring approach is uniformly graduated—reflecting
the relative complexity of the various sub-tasks and the long time spans over which they
typically are executed.

The Army needs a systematic framework for articulating digital tasks, sub-tasks,
procedures, and skills. The framework should include general guidelines specifying how digital
systems and operations impact tasks and sub-tasks, as well as the interrelationships among these
various aspects of digital performance.

In looking across activities with the potential to reduce fratricides, one finds that certain
activities are repeated. Such repetitions may be important in identifying high priority
measurement requirements and in defining levels of unit digital proficiency. For example, using
the FBCB2 NBCI report or Obstacle Report creates an icon for the appropriate threat that is
disseminated network wide and displayed on all FBCB2 screens. Using the Bridge Report and
Spot Report, causes icons to displayed showing breach sites and the location of dismounted
friendly elements respectively. This information provides additional help in distinguishing
between threatening and non-threatening situations. For commanders of various platforms to
take advantage of this information they must set their FBCB2 filter settings appropriately.

Being motivated to use structured message formats and properly set filters, and knowing how to
perform these activities are tasks/skills that contribute to the general skill of “maintain awareness

52


List of Tables

. Number of Digital Systems Present at Brigade and Battalion Echelons...........c:cse:sscssseseessee 11
. Sample Brigade and Battalion Differences in Standards and ConditionS............ssssssessesesseees 12
. Representative Friendly Forces Information Requirementts.............:ss:sssssssssssssssessessecessseeesenes 13
. Measurement Framework for Fratricide Prevention.............scsscsssssssssssesssssessseesseseseesessescssesene 30
. Measurement Framework for Control of Enemy Contact..........:cccsscsessssssssssscsseessescsesseesseeeneees! 48
. Desired Outcomes of Digitization and Diagnostics as a Function of Current Digital

Systems and Hypothetical FCS Systems...........ss:sssssssssssssssssecssecsssessessssssecssueesaressctsesssenneeses 50

List of Figures

- The continuous nature of operations..............scessecsessesseeesssessesesssssnesssseessesssesssnecsssceecsneeseeensees 33


Visual and Direct Fire Contact

There are five means of preventing fratricide for the visual and direct fire forms of
contact:

Target identification. This is an individual task and includes the ability to identify targets
through optics and thermal acquisition systems. Scoring: Go/No Go

Fire discipline. The utilization of proper fire discipline on combat vehicles is a means to
ensure positive vehicle identification by the vehicle commander and gunner, and to ensure that
the gunner is firing at the target the commander wants to engage. (This assumes the commander
has identified properly that the target is not friendly.) Scoring: Go/No Go

Use of friendly identification systems. There are several methods and systems for
friendly identification ranging from the high tech Battlefield Combat Identification System
(BCIS) to the low tech approaches such as VS-17 panels (colored fabric panels). Other low-tech
solutions include using reverse polarity tape, painted tactical markings, or colored lights on
vehicles and challenge/password protocols for dismounted soldiers. Scoring: Go/No Go

Direct fire planning and control. The use of direct fire planning and control measures
can reduce the potential for fratricide by orienting crews on the areas into which firing is
permissible or restricted. The FBCB2 can assist by disseminating graphical control measures
(boundaries, Restricted Fire Lines [RFL], No Fire Areas [NFA], and Terrain Index Reference
System [TIRS] features). The digital sub-tasks associated with this are the creation,
dissemination, and posting of an overlay.

With the far target location capability in FBCB2 equipped tanks (and the M1A2 tank), a
ten-digit grid location can be obtained when the crew lases a target. A crew can lase a target and
then look at the location on the FBCB2 screen to determine if it lies outside an area where fires
would be restricted (e.g., across a boundary or beyond an RFL). Used in conjunction with the
fire commands, these techniques reduce the potential for fratricide. This can be used for direct
and indirect fires. To overcome the problem associated with the time required to create overlays
in FBCB2, units have used TIRS for orienting fires. It should be noted that it is difficult to
utilize these capabilities on the move or during rapidly changing situations. Still, the abilities far
exceed what could be done in analog units. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Maintenance of FBCB2 situational awareness (SA). The availability of a relevant picture
of the location of friendly forces and a platform’s own position can significantly reduce the risk
for fratricide. This SA is largely an automated process with FBCB2. However, there are many
digital sub-tasks that must be properly performed by the operator to ensure that the SA picture is
useful. These tasks include ensuring the system and related equipment (SINCGARS, EPLRS,
GPS) are all functioning properly, setting filters, and, for leaders with dismounted soldiers on the
ground, inputting a friendly Spot Report. Scoring: Go/No Go

There are no true collective staff tasks related to this particular area, since it entails
individual soldier and crew actions. Staffs can assist by monitoring the positioning and

23



APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Changes in Unit Attitudes:

a.

Describe how your attitude toward fighting in the digital battle space has changed over
time. Consider the following benchmarks:

¢ Initial train-up assessment before the Customer Test (Mar-Apr 00)

Post-train-up assessment at the Customer Test (May 00)

Initial train-up assessment before NTC rotation (Aug 00)

“Hot” post-rotation assessment (Aug 00)

Reflective assessment (Apr 01)

What attitude or behavioral changes are fundamental to becoming a digitally trained
team? Address the following echelons, as appropriate:

e Platoon

¢ Company

¢ Battalion

e Brigade

What was the role of digitization in the NTC? What value did digitization bring? How
could that value have been enhanced?

2. Meeting Digitization Challenges:

What problems did your unit face in using digital systems?
What changes did your unit make to address these problems?

Did your unit use SOP development, staffing changes, or new TTPs to support the use of
digital systems? How?

3. Digital Leader Tasks and Skills:

a

What are the most important digital leader tasks that require training to achieve minimal
proficiency?

What leader tasks have changed on the digital battlefield for you?

What basic digital skills are required to accomplish the above leader task(s)?

A-l



Did you use digital systems to implement changes in mission planning, preparation and
conduct, or do you rely more on voice or face-to-face communications?

Do you use digital systems (directly or indirectly) to track how well staff members are
working together in planning for a mission? If so, what do you pay attention to?

How do you use digital systems to manage execution of the reconnaissance and
surveillance plan?

What changes has the unit made over time to speed up preparation of the R&S plan or
improve the quality of the plan? Have there been any SOPs developed about who should
provide what information and when?

Do digital systems help the process of analyzing data? If so, how? Do they make it easier
to obtain data and to disseminate the results?

m. How did your unit apply the doctrine and TTPs for digital operations?

n.

oO.

p.

Where does the doctrine or TTP appear flawed?
What shortfalls in digital capability exist?

How do soldiers/leaders overcome these flaws?

6. Digital Skills Unique to the Brigade Echelon:

a.

b.

Cc.

Are there unique digital skills at level that are not learned at lower echelons?
Are those skills significantly different for any subset of the TOC? Which ones?

How are those skills unique to the level?

7. Proficiency Concepts:

a.

How would you measure proficiency in the brigade-unique skills?

8. Maintaining Tactical Adaptability:

a.

What are the new digital sub-tasks required to maintain tactical adaptability at Battalion
level?

What skills are necessary to be successful in maintaining tactical adaptability?

What skills are important in maintaining situational awareness?

A-3



How would you assess progress and determine proficiency in those skills? Go/no go or
multi-value measures? How so?

Is there a different level of proficiency required at level in maintaining tactical
adaptability?

9. Controlling Enemy Contact:

a.

b.

d.

What new digital sub-tasks are required to control enemy contact at Battalion level?
What skills are necessary to be successful in controlling enemy contact?

How would you assess progress and determine proficiency in those skills? Go/no go or
multi-value measures? How so?

Is there a different level of proficiency required at level in controlling enemy contact?

10. Preventing Fratricide:

a.

d.

What new digital sub-tasks are required to avoid fratricide at the Battalion level of
decision-making?

What skills are necessary to be successful in avoiding fratricides? Which skills are
digital related?

How would you assess progress and determine proficiency in those skills? Go/no go or
multi-value measures? How so?

Are there unique digital skills required at the level to avoid fratricide?

11. What other comments do you have about digital tasks and skills?

a.

If you had only five minutes to tell your replacement what he needs to know about
operating in a digital environment, what would you tell him?

12. Digital Operations at the Company and Platoon Level:

a.

b.

Does FBCB2 support the control and distribution of direct fires? If so, how?

Do crews use FBCB2 to prepare and submit range cards? Do they view range cards as
offering greater value or less value in the digital environment?

Are terrain analysis tools used to select or check movement routes? If so, who does the
checking?

Is FBCB2 used in any way to deconflict routes? If so, how?


digital systems and information are used. Experience at battalion level is a prerequisite for some
duties at brigade level in terms of digital skills. There is a difference in experiential knowledge
required of the staffs at the different echelons. Generally, the brigade personnel need to be more
mature both in their tactical backgrounds and in their digital knowledge.

From a leadership perspective, the battle command differences, as defined in doctrine
(U.S. Department of the Army, 1999c), between brigade and battalion commanders are apparent
in their visualization of the battlefield and in the overall complexity of their tasks. Battle
command is the art of decision-making and leading on the battlefield. In order to accomplish
this process, commanders must visualize the battlefield. Key to that visualization is the
establishment of the COP. The differences in the methodology and systems used at these two
echelons to achieve and maintain the COP, as well as the importance of those elements, are
indicative of the unique conditions at the two levels.

Brigade staff officers are required to have a higher level of digital skills because the
volume of digital information is much greater at the brigade level. Brigade staff officers are
expected to filter information rapidly, which implies a capability to operate the digital platforms
with dexterity and manipulate the data quickly into useable formats.

The results of our comparison of brigade and battalion roles and responsibilities for digitized
units provides information that can be used to focus the attention of brigade trainers on activities
unique to brigade. Although our effort has a measurement focus, there are implications for
training as well (e.g., the Army needs to make sure that staff soldiers in the brigade TOC are
aware of the screens available to other BOSs in the TOC). Major echelon differences that need
to be considered when measuring how well brigades employ digital systems are listed below.

¢ Battalion and brigade have different conditions and standards for measuring how well
digital connectivity is maintained.

@ Brigade uses digital systems to develop and monitor the execution of reconnaissance and
surveillance plans that encompass a wide variety of systems.

While brigade engineers use digital systems to define general belts for obstacles, convey
the location of the belts as overlays, and track the progress of obstacle installation and
engineer company employment, battalion engineers use digital systems to create/update
overlays for specific obstacles and submit digital obstacle reports.

Brigade uses digital systems to integrate the movement of artillery units with the scheme
of maneuver, while battalions synchronize the movement of their mortars with the
scheme of maneuver.

+ Brigade staff leaders are at the intersection of operations (current information) and plans
(current information on out-of-contact enemy forces as well as projected enemy
information) and must balance current operations with what will be required in the future.

20


MEASURING DIGITAL PROFICIENCY: ASSESSMENT APPROACHES AND ECHELON
CONSIDERATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The United States Army is engaged in a modernization campaign that relies heavily on
digital technologies and will culminate in the Future Combat System (FCS). Digital warriors of
today and tomorrow need training that enables full realization of the benefits of new digital
systems. Such training requires specification of digital tasks and skills and tools for measuring
proficiency. The U.S. Army needs measures of digital proficiency to examine the impacts of
evolving digital systems and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) on the ability of units to
exploit digital technologies. Digital proficiency goes beyond the mere operation of digital
systems to include using the information from digital systems in performing mission tasks.
Digitization can add to collective trainer workloads by making it necessary to consider operator
interactions with digital systems and interactions between operators and digital information
users. It is crucial to focus measurement on activities that warrant the attention of trainers and to
apply other strategies for reducing trainer workloads (e.g., tailoring measurement objectives to fit
the likely digital proficiency levels). The first objective of this work was to identify aspects of
digital proficiency likely to warrant the attention of trainers, and the second was to develop
information for use in defining the concept of digital proficiency levels.

Procedure:

The research team compared battalion and brigade echelons in terms of how digital
systems are employed and in terms of the knowledge and skills required in applying the systems.
The team also described how a unit can use digital systems to reduce fratricides and gain greater
control over how and when contact is made with the enemy, two of the major “advertised”
benefits of digitization. The analysis of fratricide was organized according to the seven forms of
contact and was enlarged to include instances that are not strictly fratricide prevention (e.g.,
making sure friendly units do not enter areas chemically contaminated by the enemy). The
analysis regarding control of enemy contact variables was organized in terms of mission phases
(plan, prepare and execute) and in terms of major subtasks, such as terrain analysis in fire
support planning. The activities supporting fratricide reduction and control over contact
variables were re-examined in an effort to decide whether an all-or-none or graded performance
measurement approach (trained-needs practice-untrained ) would be more appropriate.

The research team made use of expertise of the Army’s First Digital Division (FDD), the
prime repository of organizational experience regarding digital operations. The team
interviewed leaders and soldiers from the 1‘ Brigade Combat Team of the 4" ID, and the team
employed panels of experts composed of personnel with experience conducting or supporting
digital training. The research team also reviewed reports on digital training experiences, and
Ammy training documents. The training documents included tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) and mission training plans (MTPs) for digitized units, plus system operator guides and
digital unit operating procedures.

vii



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank the members of the 1‘ Brigade, 4 Infantry Division who generously
participated in the interview sessions. The brigade’s Commander, COL Oscar “Randy”
Anderson, was especially supportive. We are grateful to COL (Ret) Darrel Charlton and LTG
(Ret) Don Holder of TRW for invaluable input as subject matter experts and for assistance in
reviewing and refining this report. Ms. Wilma Sanders, also of TRW, expertly supported editing
and production of the report.

vi


FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents and discusses the specific findings that resulted from the warfighter
interviews, document reviews, and expert panel deliberations. It is divided into the following
major sections:

¢ Description of skill level and knowledge differences that separate battalion and
brigade echelons

¢ Analysis of digital skill proficiency assessment for two key combat tasks:
e Preventing fratricide
¢ Controlling contact with the enemy

Echelon Differences

Literature Search Results

The literature search included draft Mission Training Plans (MTPs) for digital battalion
and brigade operations, as well as work being done by TRADOC’s Warrior-T organization at
Fort Hood. The currently issued MTPs, which date back to the 1994-96 timeframe, were
disregarded since they would obviously not have digital tasks. Instead, the review focused on
the draft MTPs for digitized brigades and battalions (see Appendix B), which are nearly
complete and should soon be ready for final approval and distribution.

The literature review results, from a perspective of seeking digital tasks and sub-tasks,
were disappointing. Bluntly, the integration of digital aspects into the draft MTPs is virtually
non-existent. The digitized brigade MTP includes the presence of ABCS in the “conditions”
paragraph, but does not elaborate further in any of its tasks. The digitized battalion/task force
MTP contains a task on establishing the Common Operating Picture (COP), but little else.
Similarly, the Warrior-T work for the brigade staff focuses on individual task analysis with
virtually no mention of digital systems or skills. Their work on brigade collective tasks does not
achieve the level of detail of the draft battalion and brigade MTPs.

The greater level of detail in the draft MTPs is more encouraging. Both the Armor and
Infantry Schools have expended a significant amount of effort to create documents with
extensive detail, including task analysis. However, the documents do not specify digital tasks or
sub-tasks. According to members of the doctrine directorates at both institutions, there are two
main reasons for the absence of digital tasks and sub-tasks in the draft MTPs:

¢ The schools do not desire to have different MTPs for digital and analog units. This
desire stems from the limited assets they have for doctrine development and the
number of MTPs that have to be created for the force.

@ The schools have explicitly adopted a generalized philosophical approach. If, for
instance, the task is “To report,” then the MTPs call for reporting via whatever tools
are available and appropriate. They do not acknowledge a requirement to evaluate all
the sub-tasks of an activity (e.g., operating a radio or sending a report using a digital
system).



MEASURING DIGITAL PROFICIENCY: ASSESSMENT APPROACHES AND ECHELON
CONSIDERATIONS .

CONTENTS

Organization of the Report
Background
Problem Definition .
Technical Objectives

Data Collection Procedures
Data Reduction .......

Analytical Procedures
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ........scssecsssesssssesstessessseesessssssessesssssesseessesesuesessessseessesstesnseneaseneasy 9
Echelon Differences 28
Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: General Findin; 1
Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: Preventing Fratricid 2
Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: Controlling Friendly Contact with the Enemy... 31
APPLICABILITY OF FINDINGS TO THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMG.........s:ssssssssseseee 49
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION G.........::scssssssssssssssssesstsseesessesseesssssesssesnsesesseesessee 51

Conclusions .....
Recommendations ..

Appendix A. Interview Questions ........scscsssssssssssssssnesscssesssnecssnsecssanesssneessasessnuesssoneeesssaneseneeesnee A-L
B. List of Documents Reviewed ........:ss:ssssssessessesssssessesseessssessesseenesseeeneesneessesneneenees B-1
C. Acronyms and Abbreviations ...........cccsssessessessessessessesessesessessseseesseeessesseeareseenees C-1

ix



the subordinate battalions. Brief discussion of each follows to help build the understanding of
the workload now prevalent among the digitized brigade staff.

Brigade versus Battalion: Special Responsibilities

Some specific tactical areas in which the brigades differ from the battalions are discussed
in the following paragraphs. .

Reconnaissance assets. Digitization and redistribution of scouts has forced much more
concentration on the coordinated collection of information. The reconnaissance resources of the
various subordinate maneuver elements are now managed by the brigade staff in its quest for
situational awareness/understanding. The broad range of collection resources now under the
brigade staff includes the reconnaissance platoons of the BRT, battalion scout platoons, Strikers
(artillery-focused reconnaissance squads), ground surveillance radar assets, infantry patrols,
JSTARS, UAV assets, and any other assets linked via the TI. These may even include the
logistics package (LOGPAC) vehicles or a lone FBCB2-equipped fuel truck that sends Spot
reports of enemy activity. The battalions formerly controlled all the scout elements within the
brigade and typically conducted separate and independent reconnaissance and security
operations. Today, all the scouts in the brigade work for the common good. On paper, battalion
commanders still control their scout platoons, but because of the need for broader, overlapping,
and coordinated coverage of larger areas of operation, coordination and synchronization of
tesources for the reconnaissance mission now occur at brigade level.

Analysis and Control Team (ACT). The division now allocates an ACT to each brigade
to process intelligence information. The ACT plans and coordinates intelligence gathering plus
it digests, refines, and disseminates information received from external sources like JSTARS and
its Common Ground Station (CGS) module. The capacity to influence the electronic warfare
plan is also uniquely resident in the brigade. This staff element is tightly integrated with the
brigade S2 section that is integrating the Spot reports from various subordinate FBCB2 or ASAS
reports into a COP of the battlefield.

Common Operating Picture (COP). At the battalion level the COP is provided primarily
from the platform up. The battalions are providers as well as consumers of information. The
battalion commander is interested in generating information for himself (knowing where his
forces and the enemy are) to facilitate his mission execution, as well as to contribute to the
brigade picture. Battalions require updates generally from subordinates to know what’s
happening in their area of operations (AO). The FBCB2 is the tool for that reporting. The
battalion tactical information manager (TIM) is interested in keeping the net open between
battalion and brigade headquarters. The status of battalion servers becomes a new, digitally
related FFIR (see Table 3). With an operating lower TI, the battalion has access to the wealth of
information available at the brigade level.

Maintaining the COP for the brigade is a much more complex task. The brigade has the
responsibility to link the upper and lower TIs and add to the COP. Brigades focus on the sensor-
to-shooter relationships throughout the AO, on the employment of shaping forces, and on
tracking and directing the maneuver of their task forces. Numerous diverse systems must be

15



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1791

Measuring Digital Proficiency:
Assessment Approaches and Echelon
Considerations

Marcus G. Dudley
Randall Hill
John C. Johnston
William S. Jones
Mare LeGare
Bruce C. Leibrecht
Karen Longoria
TRW, Inc.

Larry L. Meliza
U.S. Army Research Institute

June 2002

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

20020829 018



and in deciding when and where to engage the enemy with direct fires. They help planners
determine possible enemy movement rates, choke points, or other terrain features where the
enemy must slow his movement and/or where he may try to hide his forces. This enhances the
friendly forces’ capability to detect and engage the enemy with long-range indirect fires. The
DTSS and Terra-Base systems are also excellent tools to help planners determine the best
locations for observation posts and routes to these posts. They expedite the normal combat
calculations and allow the commander to mass quickly and to apply overwhelming combat
power at the decisive place and time. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Terrain analysis in obstacle planning. The information provided by DTSS facilitates
identification of the best locations for obstacles to effectively tie in with the natural terrain and
the friendly direct fire plan. It enables the placement of the obstacles where they will have the
greatest impact on the enemy's maneuver and may even deny the enemy a particular maneuver
option. It is critical in planning the location and emplacement of dynamic minefields. Improved
terrain analysis tools also permit digitized units to more accurately estimate enemy movement
rates and locations. This, coupled with a more accurate estimate of the time needed to execute a
dynamic minefield, provides the digitally equipped commander a decisive advantage over his
analog counterpart. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Combat Service Support (CSS) operations. Another digital tool the brigade uses in the
planning phase is CSSCS. This system tracks the logistical posture of the brigade. It gives the
commander and his staff an accurate estimate of what assets are currently available, when
additional assets will be available, what the estimated combat power will be at the start of the
operation, and what the estimated casualties will be. This detailed CSS information facilitates
transition to a new mission or the next phase of the current mission. The CSSCS enables the
staff to determine the resources and activities required to set conditions for successful control of
friendly contact with the enemy. For example, it can confirm that adequate mortar ammunition
is on hand to fire the targets required to fix an enemy force over an anticipated period of time. It
can also determine if sufficient fuel is on hand to enable committed companies to maintain
contact with a moving enemy force. The CSSCS interfaces with FBCB2 platforms and can
receive immediate LOGSTATs, PERSTATs, and Commander SITREPs (situation Teports).
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Both DTSS and FBCB2 also support CSS operations by (a) reducing the time needed to
choose routes, logistic resupply points, and location of medical assets, (b) updating CCIR, and
(c) showing commanders where they are accepting risk.

Preparation Phase

During this phase the friendly force shapes the battlefield so that it can make contact with
the enemy where, when, and how it desires. Commanders and their staffs build on the actions
accomplished during the planning phase, step up efforts to gather information on the enemy, and
ready their elements of combat power. They adapt their plan as necessary to adjust to enemy
actions or to seize fresh opportunities. Key activities are described in the following paragraphs.

38


technologies such as the ABCS promise substantially improved warfighting capabilities.
Effective employment of advanced C4I systems is expected to produce faster decision cycles,
greater agility of maneuver and fires, better precision targeting, and improved situational
dominance on dispersed battlefields. Success in future military operations will depend heavily
on confident leaders with consummate digital skills. Training for successful digital operations
will require realistic performance measurement approaches geared to establishing and
maintaining digital proficiency.

As digital systems are fielded across the force, soldiers and leaders are challenged to
become proficient at operating and employing these new capabilities. Evolving tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP), unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), and mission
essential tasks are driving new performance requirements and standards. Digitally grounded
tasks and skills for leaders and soldiers will come into increasingly sharper focus. Meaningful
and accurate measures of performance will be crucial to ensure valid metrics of proficiency.
Understanding the dynamics of digital performance and how it can be quantified across different
tasks, echelons, and situations is a foundation requirement. Such understanding will generate
critical building blocks for effective training programs as well as commanders’ assessment tools.
The resulting products will become critical enablers for units striving to achieve a winning edge
through digital operations.

Based on observations of the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment
(AWE), BDM Federal, Inc. (1997) described how warfighting activities of digitized units differ
from those of analog units. The resulting “Do Differents” paved the way for a series of digital
operator’s guides, tactical SOPs, and digital doctrinal manuals for ABCS operators and staffs
(TRW Inc., 1999, 2000a, 2000b). The digital procedures contained in these documents proved
effective for utilizing current systems and established a start point for defining how units can
exploit digital capabilities. The SOPs and manuals supported digital warfighters with
preliminary how-to-fight descriptions for the emerging battlefield environment. The collection
of techniques and procedures provides a foundation for identifying digital tasks and skills
necessary for successful tactical operations.

Documentation of tasks and skills specifically linked to digital capabilities is a Telatively
new endeavor. Ford, Campbell, and Cobb (1998) analyzed task and skill requirements for the
M1A2 tank, emphasizing individual performance. Sanders and Elliott (1996) identified tasks for
the digitized battalion task force staff, focusing heavily on troop leading procedures. Barnett,
Meliza, and McCluskey (2001) analyzed digital operator and leader skills, with an eye to
developing high-priority measures of performance. The Warrior-T project, a training support
activity of the Army Training Support Center, has recently completed an extensive review of
tasks for the current ABCS systems. A key product is a combined listing, organized by staff
section and battlefield operating system (BOS), of the various collective tasks required of Force
XXI units today (Warrior-T, 2001). This listing provides a baseline of tasks for use by training
proponents and researchers alike as the Army explores changes associated with digitization.

To date, only one division—the 4” Infantry Division (4ID)}—has employed digital
systems in multiple brigade combat teams (BCTs). As the vanguard of the Force XXI program,
the 4ID’s 1" and 2TM BCTs have each completed a digital rotation at the National Training Center


MEASURING DIGITAL PROFICIENCY:
ASSESSMENT APPROACHES AND ECHELON CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) has focused an investigative spotlight on the
human dimensions of Army units transforming from conventional to digital operations. As part
of this research, ARI’s Simulator Systems Research Unit (SSRU) conducted the project entitled,
Measuring the Evolution of Unit Digitization and Digital Skills Proficiency (MEDD). This
project explored the behavioral and performance assessment dimensions of units learning to
accomplish combat tasks using digital capabilities of the Army Battle Command System
(ABCS). Three primary goals drove the research: (1) Describe changes in behavior of units as
they digitize, along with the benefits and impacts of those changes; (2) determine if new digital
skill requirements emerge at brigade level; and (3) explore the measurement of skill proficiency
level and how it relates to unit performance. This report presents the methods and findings
associated with the second and third goals. A companion report (Dudley, Johnston, Jones,
Strauss, & Meliza, 2001) deals with the first goal. \

a

Organization of the Report

The report targets U.S. Army training researchers, training developers, Combined Arms
Training Strategy (CATS) proponents, and leaders of digital units beginning the transformation
from conventional to digital operations. The report’s information is valuable for development of
digitally focused training programs at institutional, installation, and unit levels. Four chapters
organize the contents:

¢ Introduction. Setting the context for the current effort, this chapter describes the
background, briefly defines the problem, and outlines the project’s technical
objectives.

¢@ Method. This chapter explains the sources of data, the data collection procedures, and
the data reduction and analysis approaches.

« Findings and Discussion. This chapter discusses the findings related to potential
differences between digital skills at brigade and battalion echelons, as well as
performance assessment considerations for two key battlefield tasks.

¢ Conclusions and Recommendations. The final chapter distills the major themes and
recommends follow-on research efforts.

Background

As part of a sweeping effort to meet defense challenges of the future, the Army is
transitioning its fighting forces from traditional analog organizations to new digitized units
equipped with platforms and command posts that leverage information age technologies
(Shinseki, 2000). In the process the service is literally revolutionizing its combat force. Tactical
units of the 21* century will rely increasingly on digital capabilities to acquire, exchange, and
employ timely information throughout the battlespace (e.g., U.S. Department of the Army,
2001). Digital command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C41)



CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions

Three primary goals drove the research: (1) Describe changes in behavior of units as
they digitize, along with the benefits and impacts of those changes; (2) determine if new digital
skill requirements emerge at brigade level; and (3) explore the measurement of skill proficiency
level and how it relates to unit performance. Meeting these goals provides information that can
be used to focus the attention of trainers on critical aspects of unit digital proficiency and avoid
the explosive growth in observation requirements that can come with digitization. This report
presents the methods and findings associated with the second and third goals.

Tasks for digital operations are not appreciably different from tasks for non-digital
operations, except for a few system-oriented tasks. This is not surprising since combat tasks are
driven by mission requirements rather than battle command technology (which typically takes
the form of combat multipliers rather than fighting systems).

Digital sub-tasks are generally not being documented, either by schools or units. The
inability of digital units to maintain tactical SOPs means procedures (closely linked to sub-tasks)
are not being institutionalized.

Lacking documentation of digital tasks and skills, the research team’s panel of experts
drew on analysis of digital operations and their own experience to explore performance and
measurement requirements. The findings represent a reasonable start point for the journey
ahead. Validation of the findings has yet to be addressed, and it remains to be seen how well the
results will support the training needs of digital units.

Basic staff procedures and command and control tasks exhibit negligible differences
between brigade and battalion echelons. At the same time, brigade staff operations require more
digital knowledge and experience. There is a greater variety of digital systems at the brigade
level. Integrating and employing the diverse systems requires additional knowledge and more
highly developed digital skills (especially manipulation and integration of data).

The battalion headquarters focuses predominantly on execution of combat activities and
reporting of combat information, with secondary emphasis on planning. In contrast, the brigade
headquarters is equally involved in planning and in integrating and synchronizing combat
activities.

Brigade staff workload is driven, in part, by unique responsibilities. The brigade staff
integrates and synchronizes the activities of all organic reconnaissance elements, to include scout
platoons. The brigade’s ACT executes intelligence analytical functions not found at the battalion
level. Establishing the COP is largely the responsibility of the brigade, as is shaping the
battlefield. The maneuver brigade reorganization has concentrated some key tasks at the brigade
level, most notably R&S planning and planning/directing breach operations.

31



which the brigade or its battalions destroy the enemy in detail. Controlling how friendly contact
with the enemy is made and maintained may determine the outcome, duration, and casualties
suffered in decisive operations. The quality of the transition from digital C4I system observation
to weapon system (tank, IFV, M-16, etc.) optic acquisition of the enemy is critical. If the
transition is seamless (from the viewpoint of the company and below) decisive operations begin
under the best terms possible. If digitized direct fire companies see the enemy they expected in
the terrain compartment indicated and know the general location of nearby enemy forces that can
affect the engagement, the transition can be judged successful.

Current digital C41 systems allow the commander and staff to continuously “see” friendly
units, the terrain, and significant parts of the enemy force. This information forms the basis of
the Commander’s Estimate. This estimate is the continuous assessment by the commander
(supported by his staff’s estimates) of the situation and how to employ forces. Therefore, the
lines between planning, preparation, and execution and between setting conditions and shaping
the battlefield are blurred within this doctrinal framework. The lines are also blurred between
echelons as different levels of command perform their battlefield functions. Figure 1 depicts this
continuous process and highlights some of the more important planning tasks that affect
controlling friendly contact with the enemy.

Digital C41 systems allow the blending of stages/phases/operations with far less
guesswork and stress on the part of commanders and staffs. They also enable greater efficiency,
speed and precision in transition between setting conditions, shaping the battlefield and
commencing decisive operations. All of this amounts to a significant tactical advantage over an
enemy whose responses will be less certain and less rapid

Once physical contact with the enemy is established and contact in its various forms is
maintained, the ability to keep current operations information and projected operations
information separate and distinct is of great value (see U.S. Department of the Army, 1999b,
Chapter 3 for digital C2 techniques). The brigade staff leaders, such as the S3 and S2, are at the
intersection of operations (current information) and plans (current information on out-of-contact
enemy forces as well as projected enemy information). They must balance current operations
with what will be required in the future.

General Activities

The continuous, overlapping process of planning, preparing, and executing missions is
directly related to the ability to receive, digest, disseminate, and apply information. The digital
tools at the brigade level assist in creating the COP, providing leaders and soldiers the ability to
make critical decisions at a much faster pace. Across the plan-prepare-execute framework
recurring tasks form the cornerstone of success. Without question, these tasks are iterated within
each phase of the framework.

Maintain digital connectivity. This task is performed at all levels that have digital C4T
systems. Operators must be able to power-up, troubleshoot their system(s), determine if a
linkage to other system(s) has been established, and validate that information is flowing
properly. This general task is performed by Abrams/Bradley commanders, Forward Observers,

34


Three primary criteria emerged for selecting a suitable measurement approach: (1) the
extent to which a sub-task is critical for mission success, (2) the relative complexity of a sub-
task, and (3) the time span over which a sub-task is typically executed. A sub-task that is an
absolute imperative for mission success is a strong candidate for go/no go scoring. When sub-
tasks are quite complex or lengthy, graduated scoring should be considered. The graduated
approach’s recognition of a partial state of proficiency can be important as a means of avoiding
total retraining.

As explained in the Method chapter, the team selected two high-priority combat tasks for
analysis: prevention of fratricide and control of friendly forces contact with the enemy. The
following sections discuss the sub-tasks involved for these two tasks and identify the preferred
scoring approach (expert panel consensus). Specific scoring standards for each subtask were
beyond the scope of this study and will require additional work.

Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: Preventing Fratricide

Fratricide prevention is a complex subject that encompasses many tasks. Individual
soldier training in tasks such as target identification (visual or thermal) is fundamental and
singularly important. Leader and collective staff tasks in operational planning, execution, and
risk assessment are also critical to avoiding or mitigating conditions that may lead to fratricide.

The team concentrated on identifying means of not only preventing fratricide, but also
reducing the risk of fratricide. Fratricide is considered such a significant event that if it occurs
in training, the individual/unit is under most standards given a “no go” or “untrained” rating no
matter what actions were taken. However, the leaders and staff members may have appropriately
taken a variety of positive actions to reduce the risk of fratricide. Evaluation of leaders and their
unit’s actions should be appropriately considered.

The use of digital tools can help avoid fratricide primarily by increasing the efficiency
and accuracy of information dissemination and by increasing situational understanding at
individual soldier and force levels. However, the majority of the actions that can be taken to
prevent fratricide are based in training and application of techniques and procedures.

As a framework for addressing this complex subject, the team utilized the seven doctrinal
forms of contact (U.S. Department of the Army, 1996):

Visual
Direct Fire
Indirect Fire
Electronic
Obstacle
Air

NBC

5 i a a a a ad

This framework forms a logical approach for addressing the means to prevent fratricide
in the practical contexts or forms in which it occurs.

22


Echeloned reconnaissance. The brigade will employ reconnaissance assets to fill
information gaps during the preparation phase. It is important to note that while most of the
brigade is posturing forces, conducting logistical operations, and conducting rehearsals, the BRT,
along with the battalions’ scout platoons, will move into the execution phase of the brigade’s
R&S plan. Corps or division reconnaissance units may be conducting related operations at the
same time. Intelligence collection will always go on simultaneously and must be closely
coordinated with reconnaissance.

Conducting reconnaissance efficiently requires advanced tactical skills, especially in light
of the larger AOs assigned to digitized units. Commanders must identify their CCIR, assign
primary and alternate collection means, and synchronize collection over time/space to keep the
COP up to date. This means that the brigade R&S plan must be echeloned or “layered” with
different types of collection assets to ensure that the critical Targeted/Named Areas of Interest
(TAI or NAD) are observed and that information can be passed in a timely fashion.

An example of this would be the plan to observe a single TAI. Observers could include
standoff sensors or division reconnaissance for early detection, a STRIKER from the BRT, and
an alternate in the form of a task force (TF) scout. The next layer could include the
company/team Fire Support Team Chief with an alternate being a tank platoon leader. All would
be linked via FBCB2, with the fire support observers having additional systems such as the FOS,
Fire Support Team Vehicle (FISTV), Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
(LRAS3) and Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation System (MELIOS). Enemy entering the
TAI could ultimately be attacked through an indirect fire mission initiated by a BRT request that
goes from the brigade AFATDS, to the direct support battalion AFATDS, to the battery
AFATDS/Battery Computer System, to the platoon Automated Fire Control System. The
brigade UAV, validating target effects as reported by the BRT scout, could provide battlefield
damage assessment (BDA).

The handover from reconnaissance to main force units requires detailed coordination,
which is considerably easier in an FBCB2-equipped force. Reliable communications
connectivity and tactical handoff of approaching enemy units are vital to successful force
tracking.

The reconnaissance information facilitates the COP and situational understanding
throughout the operation. With the feedback from the R&S effort, plans for initial actions
solidify. A critical condition for controlling the friendly forces contact with the enemy—
knowing where the enemy is and determining what he intends to do—begins to develop.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Shaping the battlefield. Elements of shaping the battlefield include defining the unit’s
goals, determining how to achieve those goals, determining what the enemy can do to hinder
friendly efforts, and determining actions to mitigate the enemy’s capabilities. Shaping actions
address both enemy and friendly activities. For friendly forces these actions include
organization, movement and positioning of forces, seizing or securing key or critical terrain,
employing obstacles, infiltrating scouts or other observers, jamming, coordinating and delivering
deep fires, and related logistics actions. Regarding the enemy, actions include determining what

39



The brigade XO is the “battle captain” for the brigade TOC with responsibility for
creating the COP across the brigade AO and acting as the synchronization cornerstone,
while the battalion XO focuses on combat power generation, maintenance, readiness, and
the coordination of resources internally.

The brigade S6, but not battalion S6, has the authority and capability to execute a UTO,
to set or change network passwords, and issue new internet protocol addresses.

Brigades appear to be more involved in planning and synchronization than battalions,
while maintaining the same level of concern with execution.

Because of the greater synchronization role at brigade, the brigade staff soldier must:

"know what is important, what needs to be passed, and with whom (in other BOSs) the
information needs to be shared,

= have a basic understanding of all BOSs,

= and know the screen displays available at his/her level and at subordinate levels to
quickly disseminate the COP.

Brigade has the responsibility to link the upper and lower tactical internet, and the
brigade tactical information manager must manage both the upper and lower net
architecture.

The capacity to influence the electronic warfare plan is uniquely resident in the brigade.
The COP maintained by brigade should help it focus on sensor-to-shooter relationships
throughout the AO, the employment of shaping forces, and tracking and directing task
forces .

The AMDWS is fielded at brigade and above, and the ADA fight is largely above the
battalion’s perspective.

Brigade provides indirect fires, with the exception of mortars.

Digital Skill Proficiency Assessment: General Findings

In analyzing digital proficiency assessment needs, the team focused on determining what

measurement approach—go/no go or graduated—should be suitable at the sub-task level. The
expert panel concluded that existing measurement approaches are sufficient to quantify digital \
skill proficiency. The go/no go approach has stood the test of time and fits many digital sub-
tasks. The established T-P-U (Trained-Practice-Untrained) scale is fully suitable when a
graduated approach is needed. These recognized approaches offer simplicity and familiarity,
which are important advantages in the everyday training environment. The team rejected more
complicated approaches as unsuitable. Validation of these findings has yet to be addressed.

21



TRW Inc. (2000a). Digital operator’s guide for brigade and battalion staffs (ABCS version 6.1).
Killeen, TX: Author.

TRW Inc. (2000b). Digital operator’s guide: Company and platoon level (FBCB2 version 3.2).
Killeen, TX: Author.

U.S. Amy Training and Doctrine Command (1998). TRADOC digital learning strategy
(memorandum from Major General Leroy R. Goff, III, dated 28 September 1998). Fort
Monroe, VA: Deputy Chief of Staff for Training.

U.S. Department of the Army (1996). The tank platoon (FM 17-15). Fort Knox, KY: U.S.
Army Armor School.

US. Department of the Army (1997). Staff organization and operations (FM 101-5).
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

U.S. Department of the Army (1998). Tank and mechanized infantry company team (FM 71-1).
Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor School.

U.S. Department of the Army (1999a). The armored and mechanized infantry battalion task
force (FKSM 71-2 (2005), Coordinating Draft). Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center.

U.S. Department Army (1999b). The armored and mechanized infantry brigade (FKSM 71-3
(2005), Coordinating Draft). Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor Center.

U.S. Department of the Army (1999c). Army leadership (FM 22-100). Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army.

U.S. Department of the Army (2000). Institutional Digital Education Plan (Version 4.0).
Fort Leavenworth, KS. TRADOC Program Integration Office for Army Battle Command
System.

U.S. Department of the Army (2001). Operations (FM 3-0). Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Department of the Army.

Van Fosson, M. H. (2001) Future combat systems: DARPATech 2000. [On-line].
Available:http://www.darpa.mil/DARPATech2000/Presentations/tto_pdf/3VanFossonFCSB&W.
pdf

Warrior-T (2001). Digital battle staff task map (TRADOC ST 20-101-5, Draft). Fort Hood, TX:
Warrior-T Project Office.

58


Findings:

Many of the differences between digitized battalion and brigade echelons are due, in part,
to the reductions in unit size made in anticipation of the benefits of digitization. Many battle
operating system (BOS) integration functions have shifted from battalion or division level to
brigade. Brigade staff operations require a higher level of digital skills, combined arms
knowledge, and service experience stemming from several factors present at the brigade
echelon—a balanced interest in planning and execution, specialized information responsibilities,
and unique combat functions. In essence, the conditions and standards for performing digital
tasks and skills vary somewhat between brigade and battalion echelons.

The team was able to identify many digital activities likely to warrant the attention of
trainers in that they can help to reduce fratricides and/or help a unit gain greater control over
enemy contact variables. For example, digital systems can help a unit make the transition from
movement to maneuver in a variety of ways that include: using terrain analysis tools and
digitally-provided information on enemy location to identify the Probable Line of Deployment
(PLD); digitally sending overlays showing the PLD to higher headquarters and subordinate
elements; ordering subordinate elements to change formation and movement techniques when
digital situation awareness displays show the unit is approaching the PLD; and using digital
situation displays to make sure orders for changing formations and movement techniques are
being followed.

The team identified a number of digital activities likely to warrant measurement and the
attention of trainers because they appear to be unique to brigade operations, help to reduce
fratricides, and/or help a unit gain greater control over enemy contact variables. These activities
do not represent an exhaustive list of all digital activities that, for example, help a unit gain
greater control over enemy contact variables.

The team developed information with the potential to enable measurement of digital
proficiency levels. While most of the activities contributing to fratricide reduction were
considered appropriate for all or none assessments, many of the activities supporting contro] over
contact variables were considered appropriate for graded measures of performance. Graded
measures of performance can be important in defining proficiency levels. Finally, in looking
across the various activities supporting fratricide reduction and helping to control contact
variables, it is clear that certain digital activities tend to show up repeatedly across various
analyses (e.g., the use of digital capabilities to predict where and when contact is likely to occur
supports the transition from movement to maneuver and helps to consider terrain variables
important in fire support planning and execution). Proficiencies in these supportive activities
should be considered when developing digital proficiency level concepts.

Utilization of Findings:
The findings are providing input for an U.S. Army Armor School and Center effort to
document TTPs for digitized units. Findings are being used as input for the program of

instruction for digitized units within the III Corps Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) at
Fort Hood, TX.

viii


The volume of information and the number of information sources that support a brigade
commander and staff are significantly greater than those of the battalions (with some
exceptions). Brigade personnel must be more practiced and more capable in the basic staff
coordination functions and processes. They must be masters of the military decision making
process (MDMP) because so much of their energy and time is spent in planning. Table 2
captures one example of the emerging skill level and task condition differences between brigade
and battalion.

The differences in skill level between the two echelons are related to several factors:
focus of effort (planning vs. execution), information responsibilities (combat power generation
vs. combat power management), and unique combat responsibilities. The battalion is becoming
mainly execution-focused, while the brigade focuses increasingly on planning, integration, and
synchronization. The battalion is simultaneously a provider and consumer of information
(internally generated first, externally generated second), while the brigade is primarily a manager

and consumer. Finally, certain key combat tasks have migrated from battalion to brigade

echelon.

In the emerging network-centric framework, the battalion tends to focus more on
execution and less on planning. The battalion is a capabilities-based organization that is
becoming less involved in planning and more occupied with synchronizing near-term effects for
decisive operations. In a sense, this represents a return to earlier practice (1940s to 1970s)
whereby the Army regarded battalions as single function maneuver formations.

Table 2

Sample Brigade and Battalion Differences in Standards and Conditions

Task Level Standard Conditions
© 90% available broadcast across Given 3 companies, 140
FBCB2 (lower TI) FBCB2 platforms, 4 ATCCS
Battalion | e 100% ATCCS connectivity within | systems, Tactical Internet
TF TOC, adjacent TFs, and Manager, and trained
Brigade operators
Establish © 90% broadcast across FBCB2 Given 3 combat, 2 combat
Common (lower TI) support, and 1 combat
Operating © 100% connectivity across ATCCS | service support
Picture with subordinate battalion/TFs, FBCB2/ATCCS equipped
Brigade adjacent brigades, division battalions; 4 ATCCS
TAC/Main/Rear systems and 4 special
© 100% functionality of non-ATCCS | components; upper and
systems, to include echelons above | lower TI; S6, and trained
division systems operators

The brigade, with its COP, rapid information sharing, and the proliferation of division

and higher echelon information, bears a greater burden of setting conditions for the decisive,

12

coordinated, fully supported operations of its battalions. Brigade responsibilities for detailed



RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS TO THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Digitization is undoubtedly an essential element of FCS. In addition, FCS will involve the
use of robotic sensors and weapons platforms controlled by the users of digital systems. While
users of current digital systems are concerned, for example, with tracking their location and that
of manned subordinate elements, users of FCS digital systems may be equally or more focused
on the location of the robotic platforms for which they are responsible. In many respects, the
users of digital systems in the FCS environment are more likely to be overwhelmed by job
requirements than their counterparts in the current digital environment, unless digital systems
evolve to aid the system user.

This report describes how users can employ current digital systems to meet the
subobjectives appropriate to reducing fratricides and gaining greater control over how and when
contact is made with the enemy. For example, supporting a unit’s transition from movement to
maneuver is an important subobjective for the objective of gaining greater control over how and
when contact is made.

As digital systems evolve as part of FCS development, specific digital system capabilities
will change, but most of the desired outcomes (in terms of objectives and subobjectives) will
remain the same. Table 6 attempts to illustrate this point by focusing on two desired outcomes
for digitization (i.e., subobjectives) deduced from the contents of this report. For the current
digital system, the location of minefields is made available to systems collocated with
information users (commanders, crews, and dismounted soldiers), in a manner that allows the
information to be automatically displayed for the user. Systems alert a user when a minefield is
approached. What users in current digitized units must do to make sure alerts are provided is
described under the column entitled “Diagnostics for User Employment of Current Digital
Systems.” If the disseminating and alerting outcomes are not obtained, this is likely to be due to
a failure of users to take these actions. The column labeled “Diagnostics for User Employment
of Hypothetical FCS” assumes that FCS will employ a greater degree of automation to reduce
the workload of users. In this hypothetical example, FCS digital systems might automatically
display geo-referenced icons for minefields if the user (or a robotic system monitored by the
user) comes within 500 meters of a minefield or if the minefield blocks the planned route of the

user (or robotic system). The digital system might alert the user by stimulating a pocket
vibrator.

The hypothetical FCS capabilities would reduce the work users must do to receive the alert
as well as reduce the measurement workload required to apply diagnostics. The ability of digital
system users to gain the desired outcomes would improve in three ways. First, more of the close
approaches to threats would be associated with successful receipt of threat alerts, because there is
less the user must do to insure receipt of the alert. Second, the system can alert the user to the
probable need to change routes in time to avoid having to backtrack at a later point. Third, the
digital systems help “protect” robotic systems as well as the digital system user. The first two
columns in Table 6 help to define measurable goals for designing digital system concepts for
FCS. Does the new concept offer the potential for improving performance relative to the
desired outcome, and does it reduce the work users must do to obtain the desired outcome? An
ongoing effort is focused on identifying desired outcomes stated or implied in this report and

49



56


Weapons control discipline. Long-existing doctrine for weapons control status and air
threat assists in reducing the potential for fratricide of aircraft. Scoring: Go/No Go

FM warning of friendly aircraft. An FM warning on unit nets and a change in weapons
control status should precede ingress and egress of friendly aircraft. Scoring: Go/No Go

Target marking. Clearly defined target descriptions and target marking procedures
contribute significantly to reducing fratricide by aircraft. Scoring: Go/No Go

Marking friendly positions and formations. Similarly, friendly positions and formations
or vehicles may be marked as a means of reducing the risk of air-to-ground fratricide. Scoring:
Graduated T, P, U

NBC Contact

NBC contact is a critical form of contact that can result in friendly casualties. Whether
casualties from failure to disseminate information about NBC hazards are classified as fratricide
or not is academic. Distributing that information is a critical aspect of preventing casualties.

Planning. Planning considers likely areas for enemy NBC attacks, establishes
ways/means to monitor those areas, and identifies resources and locations for decontamination
and medical support. Digital systems, particularly MCS and FBCB2, are utilized to transmit
written and graphic information, including areas to monitor and location of support sites.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Hazardous area determination. When NBC attacks occur, the hazardous areas are
appropriately reconnoitered to determine the type of hazard and the area contaminated. The
results are reported and overlay information is created and disseminated via FM, MCS, and/or
FBCB2. The FBCB2 also provides the capability to report hazardous areas created directly by
enemy or friendly action or by incidental hazards created by combat (e.g., destruction of enemy
ammunition by friendly artillery or inadvertent release of caustic chemicals from civilian storage
facilities). Such reporting is accomplished via the NBC1 combat message. In the FBCB2
system the NBC1 report function creates an icon for the hazardous area that is disseminated
network wide and displayed on all FBCB2 screens. Additionally, FBCB2 will provide an audio
and/or visual warning when the platform comes within 500 meters of a reported chemical or
biological hazard area and 1000 meters of a nuclear hazard area. Scoring: Go/No Go

Downwind message creation. For contamination that can be further spread by wind or
water, a Downwind Hazard Message with overlay is created and disseminated via FM, MCS
and/or FBCB2. Scoring: Go/No Go

Hazardous area marking. The limits of a contaminated area are physically marked to
reduce the risk of platforms and personnel entering them. Scoring: Go/No Go

29



FCS

FDD

FFIR

FISTV

FM

FOS

FSCM

FSO

GPS

HUMINT
IFF

IFV

IP
JSTARS
LOGPAC
LOGSTAT
LOS
LRAS3
MCS
MDMP
MEDD

MELIOS

Future Combat System

First Digital Division

Friendly Forces Information Requirements
Fire Support Team Vehicle

Frequency Modulated

Forward Observer System

Fire Support Control Measures

Fire Support Officer

Global Positioning System

High Payoff Targets

Human Intelligence

Identification Friend or Foe

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Intervention Point

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Logistics Package

Logistics Status

Line of Sight

Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
Maneuver Control System

Military Decision Making Process

Measuring the Evolution of Unit Digitization and Digital Skills Proficiency

Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation System

C-3



Summary of Findings for Preventing Fratricide

For the various doctrinal forms of contact with the enemy, preventing fratricide involves
a few sub-tasks that revolve around digital tools and many sub-tasks that benefit directly from
digital capabilities. Table 4 lists the sub-tasks for preventing fratricide. In the majority of the
cases the recommended scoring approach is go/no go—reflecting mainly the critical importance
of the various sub-tasks.

Table 4

Measurement Framework for Fratricide Prevention

Form of Contact Sub-Task Scoring
‘arget identification Go/no go
Fire discipline Go/no go
Visual &Direct Fire [Use of friendly identification systems Go/no go
[Direct fire planning and control Graduated
aintaining situational awareness (FBCB2) Go/no go
[Fire support planning Graduated
Maintaining situational understanding Graduated
Positive clearance of fires Go/no go
[Use of AFATDS basic capabilities Go/no go
Indirect Fire [Use of AFATDS intervention point settings Go/no go
[Establishing and enforcing safety zones Go/no go
(Control of non-broadcasting FBCB2 systems Go/no go
ISA monitoring on co-hosted systems Go/no go
[Verification of target locations Go/no go
Protection against jamming of friendly systems Go/no go
Electronic [UAV target identification Graduated
[Validation of electronic targeting information Graduated
(Obstacle planning and execution Graduated
Obstacle (Use of FBCB2 for reporting and warnings Graduated
Marking breach and bypass lanes Graduated
[Airspace command and control procedures Graduated
|Use of maneuver/fire support control measures Graduated
|Use of Identification Friend or Foe systems Go/no go
Air (Training in aircraft recognition Graduated
[Weapons control discipline Go/no go
IFM warning of friendly aircraft ingress/egress Go/no go
Marking targets for aircraft Go/no go
[Marking friendly positions and formations Graduated
INBC planning Graduated
NBC [Hazardous area determination Go/no go
Downwind hazard message procedures Go/no go
Marking hazardous areas Go/no go

30


contact with rapidly distributed reports and control measures. Reserve unit commanders should
still expect to fight more meeting engagements than commanders of initially committed units.

Filter settings are important here. As part of the commander’s pre-combat inspection,
filter settings should be checked to ensure they comply with the SOP and that aural warnings are
set to alert the proximity of reported enemy elements. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Updating fire support plans. Throughout execution, fire support plans and graphics must
be adjusted based on battle conditions. Targets and triggers are adjusted based on intelligence,
enemy actions, and friendly maneuver. During execution, this task starts with updates to the
COP from top-down (EAB) and bottom-up (FBCB2 equipped platforms) sources. Planned
priority fire support targets can be updated for location or changed as enemy high payoff targets
(HPTs) are identified. The AFATDS is the primary system for fire support targeting at both
brigade and battalion level. As with CCIR, the planned HPT list must be posted and viewed. In
the case of AFATDS, the HPT list is an input to the system, thus speeding the recognition and
servicing of appropriate fire support missions. The same basic process for establishing the PLD
can be used to establish fire support triggers. These control measures can also be transmitted to
FBCB2 equipped platforms in the same fashion. Though digital C4I systems are available,
commanders still bear the responsibility for clearing fires. Digital C41 systems can provide rapid
information for denying a fire mission, but must never be the sole means of clearing fires.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Updating maneuver plans. Maneuver plans and graphics also must be updated to reflect
changes in the enemy and friendly situation. The maneuver of forces, monitored through digital
systems, is adjusted to keep forces synchronized and to make or maintain contact under the best
possible conditions. (Spot reports of scouts or observation posts in contact and reports from
Army attack aircraft and CAS missions are often the last visually based reports available before
leading companies make direct fire contact.) Boundaries, support by fire (SBF) positions, attack
by fire (ABF) positions, and routes are adjusted based on these observations. As required, RFLs
are implemented. Main supply routes (MSRs) are altered or activated and support nodes are
emplaced/displaced based on battlefield events that can largely be tracked through digital
systems. The key systems affecting success are the hundreds of FBCB2 equipped platforms,
SINCGARS/EPLRS, MCS, ASAS, Mobile Subscriber Equipment and Near Term Digital Radio
(NTDR). These are the systems that link to each other and store and pass Red and Blue SA
information. However, once the picture is displayed on an FBCB2 screen or Large Screen
Display in the TOC, the commander must still be able to rapidly analyze spatial relationships,
current combat power status, and mission objectives to arrive at the appropriate decision.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Updating obstacles and hazardous areas. Obstacles are adjusted and executed based on
the enemy situation, time, and events. Overlays are updated accordingly. Modular pack mine
systems (MOPMS), Raptor, Gator, and VOLCANO provide the brigade commander the ability
to shape the battlefield. He can integrate obstacles and fire support to disrupt the enemy before
direct fire contact is made.

45



normally fulfill these duties. Experience at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) shows that
during the battle, the battle captain should focus his efforts on supervising the soldiers within the
S3 operations cell rather than synchronizing the efforts of other staff members.

At brigade (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999b) the battle captain is the current
operations information sharer for the unit. His emphasis is on transmission of information rather
than integration or analysis. He is probably an Officer Advanced Course graduate who may or
may not have commanded at the company level. He must be familiar with the FBCB2 displays
and screens to accomplish his duties. He is usually a resourceful young officer selected for the
position because of greater than average tactical competence.

At the battalion (U.S. Department of the Army, 1999a), this officer probably is a senior
lieutenant who has not commanded and probably has only been to his Officer Basic Course. He
is not BOS savvy beyond his own branch. His focus is more operational, on the current fight.
His integration capabilities and requirements are minimal.

Personnel Officer (S1). There is no notable difference between brigade and battalion $1
tools, digital tasks, skills, functions, or knowledge requirements.

Intelligence Officer (S2). The brigade S2 section has far more information flowing into it
than its battalion counterpart. The brigade S2 will have to process more reports, create more
situational overlays and disseminate more information. The brigade S2 has the internal UAV,
BRT, and ASAS responsibilities plus the external ACT, CGS, JSTARS, and divisional
coordination requirements. Because of this, prior digital $2 experience is essential.

Plans and Operations Officer (S3). The battalion and brigade S3 have the same basic
tasks. The brigade S3, however, has access to more information systems, employs more types of
supporting units, and plans more complex and closely synchronized operations than his battalion
counterpart does.

Logistics Officer (S4). There is no significant difference between brigade and battalion
S4 tools, digital tasks, skills, functions, or knowledge requirements. However, brigade S4s must
organize the support of a larger variety of units and anticipate requirements over a longer period.

Signal Officer (S6): The battalion and brigade S6 officers and sections both receive the
same training and have the same skills requirements. However, only the brigade S6 can execute
many of the tasks. Even though both are responsible for network management in the TOC, only
the brigade S6 has the authority/capability to execute a Unit Task Organization (UTO), to set or
change network passwords, and issue new internet protocol addresses. Executing a UTO change
is the most critical task. Although the execution of a UTO change is not difficult, dealing with
any problems arising out of the change may be challenging.

Fire Support Officer. The digital skills required by the brigade and battalion fire support
officers are similar. They both must be experts in the capabilities and limitations of the artillery
specific systems as well as how these systems interface and link with the other digital systems
located in their respective TOCs. However, like other staff positions their duties and

18


Table 5

Measurement Framework for Control of Enemy Contact

Activity Sub-Task Scoring
Maintaining digital connectivity Graduated
General Establishing and maintaining the COP Graduated
Military Decision Making Process Graduated
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield Graduated
Terrain analysis in IPB Graduated
Mission Planning Terrain analysis in fire support planning Graduated
Terrain analysis in maneuver planning Graduated
Terrain analysis in obstacle planning Graduated
CSS operations Graduated
Echeloned reconnaissance Graduated
Shaping the battlefield Graduated
Conventional rehearsal Graduated
Mission Preparation _| Digital rehearsal Graduated
Logistics operations Graduated
Implementing UTO change Graduated
Tracking and updating CCIR Graduated
Shaping operations Graduated
Company/battery/troop acquisition of enemy Graduated
Monitoring pending enemy contact Graduated
Updating intelligence picture and ISR plan Graduated
Transitioning from movement to maneuver Graduated
Mission Execution Updating fire support plans Graduated
Updating maneuver plans Graduated
Updating obstacles and hazardous areas Graduated
Updating airspace control measures Graduated
Initiating friendly contact with the enemy Graduated
Transitioning to subsequent operations Graduated

48



REFERENCES

Barnett, J. S., Meliza, L. L., & McCluskey, M. R. (2001). Defining digital proficiency
measurement targets for US Army units (ARI Technical Report 1117). Alexandria, VA:
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A387 108)

BDM Federal, Inc. (1997). 15t BCT, 4ID “Do Differents” (Annotated Briefing). Killeen, TX:
Author.

Brown, B.R., Anderson, L., Begley II, LJ. & Meliza, L.L. (1999). Cognitive requirements for
information operations training (CRIOT). (ARI Study Report 99-02). Alexandria, VA.
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A365 483)
Center for Army Lessons Learned (1995). Tactical operations center (TOC) (CALL Newsletter |
No. 95-7). Leavenworth, KS: Author. |

Center for Army Lessons Learned (1998). Closing with the enemy: Company team maneuver
(CALL Special Study). Leavenworth, KS: Author.

Dudley, M. G., Johnston, J. C., Jones, W. S., Strauss, C. P., & Meliza, L. L. (2001). Making the
transition from analog to digital warfighting: Changes in unit behavior and knowledge
(ARI Research Report 1785). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A397 575)

Ford, L. A., Campbell, R., & Cobb, R. (1998). Analysis of emerging digital and back-up
training requirements (ARI Study Report 98-07). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A354 190)

Gerlock, D. & Meliza, L. (1999). Supporting exercise control and feedback in the digital domain
for virtual simulations. Presented at the 1999 Interservice/Industry Training Systems and
Education Conference.

Meliza, L.L. (1999, Fall). Exercise control and feedback challenges for the digitized battlefield .
ARI Newsletter 9(3), 1-4.

Sanders, W. R., & Elliott, G. S. (1996). Development of a battle staff guide for selected digital
information systems (ARI Research Product 96-03). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research
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Shinseki, E. K. (2000, October). The Army transformation: A historic opportunity. Army,
50(10), 21-30.

TRW Inc. (1999). Digital operator’s guide: Company and platoon level (FBCB2 version 3.1).
Killeen, TX: Author.

s7



Research Report 1791

MEASURING DIGITAL PROFICIENCY:
ASSESSMENT APPROACHES AND ECHELON CONSIDERATIONS

Marcus G. Dudley, Randall Hill, John C. Johnston, William S. Jones,
Marc LeGare, Bruce C. Leibrecht, and Karen Longoria
TRW Inc.

Larry L. Meliza
U.S. Army Research Institute

Simulator Systems Research Unit
Stephen L. Goldberg, Chief

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

June 2002
Army Project Number Personnel Performance and
202627854790 Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

iii



Terrain analysis. Terrain analysis provides the brigade and its subordinate units critical
information for setting conditions to control friendly force contact with the enemy. This
typically includes information on avenues of approach; cross-country and on-road trafficability;
terrain effects on observation, cover, and concealment; natural obstacles; and inter-visibility
factors.

The digital tools most commonly used for this purpose are DTSS (brigade level), Terra-
Base (battalion-level) and FBCB2 (company and below). The DTSS and Terra-Base systems
provide information on slope and soil conditions, route analysis, and inter-visibility. The DTSS
will soon be linked with ATCCS.

A similar capability exists in the FBCB2’s navigational tool and line of sight (LOS) tool.
The navigational tool provides route information. The LOS tool supports direct fire planning by
depicting dead space from specific points. It can also show weapons effects range fans so that
leaders can ensure interlocking fields of fire. Units can now build a consolidated fire plan from
each platform up through company level by using the range card overlay in FBCB2. Each
vehicle builds a range card overlay that can be consolidated at platoon level. The platoon
overlays can then be forwarded and consolidated at company level. This is much quicker and
more accurate than the analog counterpart.

The role of terrain analysis in specific planning activities is discussed in the following
paragraphs.

Terrain analysis in IPB. The terrain analysis information from FBCB2, Terra-Base, and
DTSS, in conjunction with longer-range communications, contributes to the IPB process. They
give the brigade new means of avoiding enemy fires and obstacles. Using the intelligence
estimate in combination with the terrain information provides friendly commanders with two
distinct advantages in controlling contact with that enemy. First, these tools allow the
commander to disperse and position his forces across the AO so that they are more difficult for
the enemy to locate and hit. Second, these terrain analysis tools provide the commander with a
better understanding of friendly and enemy movement (time-distance) factors. They provide the
commander insights concerning which routes to use, which routes to avoid, and when to start
repositioning forces in order to bring overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the time
and place of his choosing. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Terrain analysis in fire support planning. Digital terrain analysis tools are critical in fire
support planning. When combined with AFATDS, Forward Observer System (FOS), FBCB2,
and counter mortar/counter battery radars, the commander can use the digital tools to determine
where to position his assets in order to take maximum advantage of their capabilities while at the
same time reducing their vulnerabilities. The terrain analysis tools help the fire support planners
identify screening crest, soil conditions, slope (which affects the cant of the weapon systems),
and range fans for the various charges and projectiles available. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Terrain analysis in maneuver planning. The terrain analysis tools play an important role
in identifying maneuver corridors and evaluating them in terms of speed, maneuver space, and
cover and concealment. They also help in determining relational advantages of terrain positions

37



individual ATCCS operators, TOC battle captains/NCOICs, and FBCB2-equipped commanders.
Each unit SOP should specify the procedures for ensuring that digital information continues to
flow properly throughout all phases of the mission. Insight into the standard for this task can be
gained from Table 2.

As part of staging/assembly area procedures, units power up digital C4I systems and
establish connectivity. This task can occur before or during planning or preparation or after task
organization link-up. In either case, the task is critical. Each unit and command post (CP) must
power up, test certain message functions, view out-of-unit friendly SA (i.e., determine that out-
of-unit links are in place), and link to intra-, inter-, and subordinate TOC ATCCS. A
recommended procedure is to run a mini-connectivity “exercise” at battalion level (to include the
CPs) and report the status of FBCB2 and ATCCS connectivity to the brigade. One battalion
commander’s standard was to achieve 90 percent FBCB2 operational rate, receive SA from
outside the battalion on FBCB2, link the TOC’s ATCCS systems and ensure they are sharing
information, send and receive information between FBCB2 and ATCCS (MCS, ASAS,
AFATDS, and CSSCS, plus AMDWS at the brigade level), and link specific ATCCS systems to
adjacent and higher echelons (e.g., MCS from 1-22 IN to 3-66 AR and to the brigade).

The battalion and brigade battle captains, as well as BOS managers, must routinely check
their respective C4I systems to ensure timely information updates. If updates do not occur or if
connectivity is lost within a particular BOS function, “analog safety nets” must be employed
while connectivity is reestablished. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Establish and maintain the COP. Ensuring that commanders/leaders are looking at the
same picture and have a common understanding is critical to battle command. The ability to
share the same visualization of the battlefield allows for better risk assessments and timelier,
better coordinated decisions. However, performing this task to standard requires completing a
myriad of sub-tasks. Filter settings on FBCB2 must be correctly set and checked (see TRW Inc.,
2000a for recommended Own Platform and Friendly SA filter settings). Intra-TOC and inter-
TOC connectivity must be established and maintained. Data sharing must be validated and
periodically checked. Battle staffs must routinely check for information updates. In other
words, they must have SA of their own systems and know how to maintain system stability.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The MDMP is performed basically the
same way at battalion and higher levels. Commanders and staffs may abbreviate the process
depending on the maturity of the staff, the available time and the involvement of the commander.
The MDMP can be executed sequentially by echelon (consumes more time) or in parallel
(preferred method). Digital tools expedite the MDMP and allow for all echelons to plan,
prepare, and execute more effectively. Doctrinally, the division is planning 72 hours out for
future operations, while brigades look out 48 to 60 hours. With the information that digital tools
provide, brigade staffs can more effectively conduct continuous planning further out in time.

The effects of digitization on specific limits for planning remain to be decided.

While the brigade and battalion commanders are concermed with the synchronization of
separately controlled elements of combat power, the company commander is concerned with

35



4. Team Training Tasks and Skills:

a.

After “knobology,” what are the primary/basic digital training tasks for various teams?
e Staff integration management

TOC battle command management

Platoon

Company

Battalion

Brigade

What different/unique skills are required to be successful performing with digital
information as opposed to analog at various levels?

¢ Platoon

¢ Company

¢ Battalion

e Brigade

What new knowledge, skills, and abilities are required to accomplish the digital
infrastructure management, operations, and maintenance tasks?

5. Exploiting Digitization:

a.

Describe the differences between digital and analog mission accomplishment and how
you ensure success at your team level. What must you do differently now to exploit
digitization?

e Management of time and resources

¢ Decision making

¢ Understanding the Commander’s intent (objectives, key information needs,

empowerment)
¢ Communications and information management

What specific digital leader skills are necessary to exploit the advantages of digitization?
How do you know a unit is ‘digitally’ better? How do you assess progress?

What changes have you noticed, due to digitization, in terms of what you have to do or
what you can do for mission planning?

Do you think that digitization gives you greater access or less access to the commander,
other BOS, and higher and lower echelons, or do you think it has no effect on access?

Does digitization help you do your job, or does it add to the variety of activities/tasks you
have to attend to?

If you could have a tool that automatically tracked digital planning activities and alerted
you to problems, what activities or problems would you want the tool to track?

A-2


METHOD

This phase of the MEDD project pursued two primary goals: (1) to determine whether a
brigade staff needs digital skills not found at the battalion level, and (2) to analyze the digital
proficiency assessment needs associated with representative combat tasks. The research team
initially reviewed pertinent Army documents to discern what the current training literature said
about echelon differences and performance assessment. Multiple interviews then were
conducted with current and recently retired 41D leaders in order to capture the essence of the
division’s digital experiences. A panel of retired experts then convened to apply their own
insights and experiences with digital tasks/skills and performance assessment to expand the
knowledge base.

Analysts proceeded by deliberate steps toward the goal of exploring digital skills
proficiency assessment. The team identified high-priority combat tasks, based largely on their
importance for combat success and their potential for being positively influenced by digital
capabilities. Key factors in judging the potential extent of digital contributions included the
advantages that C4] systems bring to the commander’s visualization of the battlefield and
situational understanding. Near the project’s outset, the team targeted three high-priority tasks:
(1) preventing fratricide; (2) controlling contact with the enemy; and (3) maintaining tactical
adaptability. Following the collection of primary data, the team narrowed the set of tasks to the
first two.

Data Collection Procedures
Review of Documents

The team conducted an extensive review of relevant literature and programs, all of which
offered potentially valuable input to this effort. The selected literature (listed in Appendix B)
dealt with Force XXI training requirements, conventional training doctrine, digital battle staff
performance, and system operator guidelines. The research team’s SMEs analyzed their
assigned references, distilled digital tasks and skills, and synthesized ideas and common threads
pertaining to digital skills proficiency. The resulting lists of common digital tasks and skills
were combined with the interview findings to form a preliminary database.

Interviews

Interview participants. The research team interviewed the 1* BCT, 41D leadership at
Fort Hood during umbrella week (April 2-6, 2001). The participants included a brigade and a
battalion Commander, Executive Officer, primary staff (S1, $2, S3, S4, S6), special staff (Fire
Support Officer [FSO], Engineer, Air Defense Artillery [ADA] Officer, Analysis and Control
Team [ACT] Chief), and selected maneuver company commanders, platoon leaders, and ABCS
operators. In addition, the team interviewed four recently retired digital operations SMEs, all
with command experience plus service with the 41D, and a reserve officer formerly assigned to
the 41D. Finally, informal interviews were held with several retired senior non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) having recent active duty experience in the 41D.



contact give the battalion commander his last—and one of his best—opportunities to adjust
details and timing of his plan before his other companies make direct fire contact. In addition to
correctly selecting, validating, or modifying time, location, array, and action the commander
must also generate FBCB2 Spot reports that accurately portray the enemy he "sees." Successful
initiation of contact with the enemy is seen in the seamless transition from observing digital
screen displays to acquiring the enemy with weapon system optics. Scoring: Graduated T, P,

Transitioning to subsequent operations. Digital tools provide the potential for
significantly reducing the time required for transition to subsequent operations. With a common
picture of the battlefield, commanders can rapidly confer, determine a COA, and begin the
transition to the next operation as staffs put the plan into writing/graphics and disseminate the
information. Under some conditions, the benefits of the COP enable staffs to “skip echelon” as
they plan, saving further time. For example, the brigade commander may see that he has a
narrow window of opportunity to capitalize on battlefield conditions as a mission reaches its
projected end. Having a clear picture of the enemy (top-down, integrated with bottom-up) and
friendly situation, he may quickly formulate a plan, disseminate it via FBCB2, collectively brief
his battalion and company commanders at a forward location, and conduct back briefs (a form of
rehearsal). Subordinate units can begin posturing forces early and leveraging FBCB2 to move
sooner and faster, especially during limited visibility. Company commanders can use the
planning time normally taken by the battalion (even for parallel planning) to conduct preparation
and perhaps execution for certain companies/batteries/troops. The battalion staff conducts
critical BOS synchronization (mission dependent) and disseminates the plan via FBCB2 down to
company level and via MCS to the brigade. While this is not the routine method of operating, it
is a technique for increasing operational tempo, maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy,
and taking advantage of battlefield opportunities. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Summary of Findings for Controlling Contact with the Enemy

For the several phases involved in combat missions, controlling friendly contact with the
enemy entails a variety of sub-tasks that benefit directly from digital capabilities. Table 5 lists
this project’s limited set of sub-tasks for controlling friendly contact with the enemy. In all cases
the recommended scoring approach is graduated—reflecting the relative complexity of the
various sub-tasks and the long time spans over which they typically are executed. As noted
previously, these findings are preliminary and require further study.

47



of own unit relative to threats.” Whether a unit employs FBCB2 structured message formats for
reporting minefield/obstacles, contaminated areas, breach points, and the location of dismounts is
an important target measurement target, because it addresses a mechanism whereby digitization
can help address a major problem. If a unit is known to employ these message formats in a
reliable manner, then the unit’s proficiency level allows the trainer to devote his/her attention to
other activities.

Similarly, one finds repeating activities when looking across actions whereby digital
systems can help a unit gain control over enemy contact variables. Using FBCB2 terrain
analysis tools and enemy situation templates to decide where and when a moving company/team
is likely to become intervisible with the enemy provides information that can be used to select
advantageous routes, plan for use of smoke and supporting fires, and trigger changes in
formation and movement techniques. Using FBCB2 to check the intervisibility situation is an
activity that sets the stage for performing many tasks that help give a unit more control over
contact variables. Again, this activity warrants measurement and the attention of trainers. A unit
that has mastered this activity may be expected to have a level of digital proficiency that should
influence measurement efforts.

The many activities that appear to warrant graded measurement also suggests that it may
be possible to implement proficiency level concepts that can be used to tailor measurement
objectives to fit proficiency levels. The findings of this effort provide raw material that can be
used to design and defend concepts for digital proficiency levels.

Barnett et al., (2001) described problems in the performance of analog units at CTCs that
might be addressed by the effective application of digital systems, mechanisms whereby
digitization can address problems, and digital skills required to apply these mechanisms. Many
of the two hundred high-profile problems described in the Barnett report concern fratricides (as
broadly defined in the current report) or a lack of control over contact variables. Relating the
activities defined in current report to high-profile problems in the Barnett et al. report may be
one means of validating these activities. The current report contains selected examples of cases
where the application of digitization helps to address performance problems of units at CTCs
(e.g., use of digital systems to support the transition from movement to maneuver).

Examples of how the findings in this report can be used by units, trainers, training
developers, training strategy developers, training device developers, digital system developers,
and the research/development community are listed below.

e Training developers can identify digital activities that need to be addressed by programs of
instruction (e.g., use of digital systems to support the transition from movement to
maneuver).

e Training developers can identify processes or outcomes that need to be addressed by
performance standards (e.g., company commanders identify the probable line of deployment
and communicate the results to subordinates).

53



controlling contact with the enemy; and (3) distinguishing digital skills between battalion and
brigade echelons.

During each half-day session the panel discussed the questions of interest and the data
gathered from the interviews and document reviews. Panel members articulated issues and
considerations from their own perspective, and applied their own experiences and knowledge
regarding digital task performance and assessment. A panel member (recorder) for each session
took notes and subsequently prepared a thematic summary of the panel’s deliberations and
outcomes. The panel summaries substantially extended the database being assembled by the
research team.

Data Reduction |

The interview and document review data was organized into two distinct domains: (1)
battalion versus brigade differences in tasks, skills, and knowledge, and (2) insights on
preventing fratricide and controlling contact with the enemy. A lead SME combed through the
accumulated interview transcripts plus the document-based notes to extract pertinent data
elements and transfer them to an integrated file. The dual-domain compilation was then
circulated for review by all the SMEs, with a focus on sufficiency of the assembled data.

The team’s SMEs independently prepared battalion and brigade lists of digital tasks and
skills, relying heavily on the data compiled from the document reviews. The independent lists
were then consolidated by one SME. The integrating SME next refined the consolidated lists by
incorporating tasks/skills from the Warrior-T battle staff task maps to create a master listing of
common staff skills. These products were then reviewed by the various SMEs and revised as
necessary. The resulting products were limited by the scarcity of specific digital tasks in the
available documentation.

By consensus the team judged that the useful data gained from the interviews and Army
documents was insufficient to meet the information needs of the phase’s technical objectives.
This led to the decision to convene the SME panel. The integrating SME shaped the data
summaries resulting from the panel sessions to become the primary data compilations, into
which the interview and document-based data were integrated.

Analytical Procedures

The compiled data contained qualitative information originating from training-related
documents (see Appendix B), interview transcripts, and summaries of SME panel sessions.
Separate but parallel procedures were used for analyzing and integrating the data related to (1)
echelon differences in digital tasks/skills and (2) digital skill proficiency considerations. Given
the qualitative nature of the data, strictly non-quantitative techniques were used for analysis.

Echelon Differences

The original plan called for comparing digital task lists for battalion and brigade echelons
to determine differences in warfighter tasks and skills. Because of the lack of specific digital



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1, REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)
June 2002

2. REPORT TYPE
Final

3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)
Jan 01- Jan 02

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Measuring Digital Proficiency: Assessment Approaches and
Echelon Considerations

Sa. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
DASW01-99-D-0013

Sb. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER:

20262785
6. AUTHOR(S) Sc. PROJECT NUMBER
Marcus G. Dudley (TRW Inc.), Randall Hill (TRW Inc.), John C. | A790
Johnston (TRW Inc.), William S. Jones (TRW Inc.), Marc 5d. TASK NUMBER
LeGare (TRW Inc.), Bruce C. Leibrecht (TRW Inc.), Karen 234
Longoria (TRW Inc.), and Larry L. Meliza (ARI) Se. WORK UNIT NUMBER.
COl

7, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

TRW Inc. USS. Army Research Institute for the
TRW Systems Behavioral and Social Sciences
One Federal Park Drive Simulator Systems Research Unit
Fairfax, VA 22033-4411 12350 Research Parkway

Orlando, FL 32826

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. MONITOR ACRONYM,

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences ARI

5001 Eisenhower Avenue
‘Alexandria, VA 22333-3600 11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER,

ARI Research Report 1791

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Delivery Order Contracting Officer’s Representative, Larry L. Meliza.

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

Digitization threatens to overwhelm trainers with observation requirements, making it crucial to identify aspects of
unit performance likely to warrant the attention of trainers and others with a need to measure unit digital proficiency.
This report encompasses two approaches used to target high-payoff measurement objectives. First, the research team
described differences between brigade and battalion echelons in terms of how digital systems are employed. This
approach assumed that a high priority for brigade exercises is to address brigade-unique aspects of digital proficiency.
Second, the team described how units can use digital systems to gain two of the major advertised benefits of
digitization, reducing fratricides and gaining greater control over how and when contact is made with the enemy. In
addition to describing unit actions that can be supported by effective use of digital systems (e.g., supporting unit
transition from movement to maneuver), the team considered whether it is better to measure digital support of each
action using an all-or-none approach or a graded approach. This latter consideration provides input for efforts to
define digital proficiency levels.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Digitization Transformation Digital Performance Echelon Effects
Performance Assessment Measures of Performance First Digital Division Future Combat Systems (FCS)
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF. 19. LIMITATION OF | 20. NUMBER. | 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF PAGES (Name and Telephone Number)
16. REPORT 17. ABSTRACT 18. THIS PAGE Dr. Larry Meliza
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 8 (407) 384-3992



can also set their filters to turn on or off audible alert messages. If not turned on, they will not
hear warnings that sound when they are dangerously close to a minefield. If the operator does
not have his obstacle overlay posted, warnings and alerts will not be seen or heard. Scoring:
Graduated T, P, U

Breach lane and bypass marking. Probably the most complex and challenging task in a
direct firefight is to breach an obstacle covered by enemy fire. A critical aspect of that task is
marking the breach lane (or a bypass lane) and disseminating the information to following
elements. The FBCB2 can significantly assist by means of the Bridge report function that
creates a geo-referenced icon for a lane location. Additionally, posting an FBCB2 equipped
platform at the entrance to the lane or bypass and disseminating via FM the icon title of that
vehicle will help units navigate to the lane location. The FBCB2 navigation and “steer-to”
capabilities further aid in getting units to the lane entrance. The utilization of the FBCB2
capabilities does not remove the requirements for the traditional marking of lane entrance and
exit points, lane marking, and posting of escorts. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Air Contact

This area addresses both the potential of fratricide from aircraft and against aircraft.
Preventing aircraft fratricide is predominantly done through planning, using airspace control
coordination measures and ground control measures, and monitoring the employment of friendly
and enemy aircraft. Planning and coordination is similar to and integrated with the planning of
indirect fires. Monitoring is conducted with the assistance of supporting aviation and air defense
artillery elements and by air component liaison teams.

Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) measures. Air corridors and times are
determined, synchronized, and rehearsed with the maneuver and fire plans to assist in preventing
ground-to-air fratricide. Digital systems including MCS, AFATDS, AMDWS, and FBCB2 are
all utilized for disseminating air corridor overlays. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Ground maneuver and fire support control measures. Standard ground force maneuver
control measures (e.g., boundaries, limits of advance, phase lines, and objectives) and FSCMs
(e.g., fire support coordination line, NFA, free fire areas, aviation attack boxes) are primary
means of preventing air-to-ground fratricide. Disseminating these measures to Army and air
component aircraft is essential to gaining protection from them. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Use of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems. Existing IFF systems are significant
factors in reducing fratricide of aircraft. Proper coordination and dissemination of system codes
is critical. Scoring: Go/No Go

Training in aircraft recognition. Troop knowledge of friendly and enemy aircraft is basic
to prevention of ground-to-air fratricide and affects prevention of air-to-ground fratricide (since
aircraft are apt to return fire from any source). Assessing troop proficiency in aircraft
recognition should be part of any evaluation of fratricide risk. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

28


MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

MOPMS Modular Pack Mine Systems

MSR Main Supply Route

MTP Mission Training Plan

NAI Named Areas of Interest

NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NCOIC Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge
NTC National Training Center.

NTDR Near Term Digital Radio

O/C Observer/Controller

OPFOR Opposing Force

PERSTAT Personnel Status

PLD Probable Line of Deployment
R&S Reconnaissance & Surveillance
RFL Restricted Fire Lines

SA Situational Awareness

SBF Support by Fire

SINCGARS _ Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

SITREP Situation Report

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOP Standing Operating Procedures
SSRU Simulator Systems Research Unit

C-4


constantly connected and integrated. Maintenance of service links has become a critical task for
the brigade TIM. The brigade TIM must manage both higher and lower levels of the
communication architecture.

Bringing a TOC online is a time-consuming, intense, and precise process. Failure to do
this properly can result in system crashes, loss of valuable time, and disruption of the entire
brigade operation. The brigade staff soldier must not only receive and pass information but also
must know what is important, what needs to be refined, what needs to be passed, and with whom
the information needs to be shared. He must know the screen displays available at his level and
at subordinate levels to quickly disseminate the COP and help the commanders retain battlefield
visualization. He must have a basic understanding across all BOSs to successfully accomplish
his job.

At battalion level, the corresponding process is normally a vertical exchange of
information. The CSSCS operator passes logistics information to his next higher logistician who
reacts and “plans” a response, if required. At brigade, information must simultaneously go in
multiple directions. Integration and connectivity across systems have become an FFIR function
at the brigade level. The ATCCS systems are the focus at brigade. These are key for
synchronization and visualization by the commanders at all levels.

Obstacle Breaching. The conduct of the breaching operation exemplifies task migration
to the brigade from the battalion. The Force XXI brigade has nine maneuver companies
compared to its legacy counterpart’s twelve companies. Battalions cannot now accomplish
breach operations by themselves without additional resources. This requires the digital brigade
to participate in the breaching operation to a greater extent than previously. The brigade must
either plan and orchestrate the breach using resources from across the brigade or allocate added
resources to individual battalion task forces so that they can accomplish the breaching by
themselves. Both methods involve the brigade staff in obstacle breaching operations. Both
solutions involve maneuver or engineer resources from across the brigade to successfully breach.
Both methods require increased external synchronization to accomplish a collective task that
used to be a task force battle drill. (Incidentally, this greater involvement in the details of tactical
execution does not relieve the brigade staff from any of its responsibilities for facilitating the
larger operations of its own forces or those of the division.)

Fratricide Risk. The risk for fratricide remains considerable in digital units. There are
more resources in the AO that must be integrated in building and maintaining a COP. The BRT
is one example. The previous need to follow the location of Colt Teams and dismounted infantry
elements has now expanded to include Strikers, dismounted scouts, Sentinel radars, divisional
military intelligence assets and forward arming and refueling points, and potentially a division
Teconnaissance element. Such forces may not be under the control of the leading battalion
commander or the security force company commander. There is growing confidence in FBCB2
platforms to report the location of all Blue (friendly) forces. Leaders implement TTP to confirm
the identification of “icons” in their AO. This effort is complicated by the proliferation of
echelons above division (EAD) assets in the battalion and brigade AO. The relationship of those
assets to the battalion, brigade, or even the division may be questionable at best. Are they
attached, in direct support, or simply positioned in the AO? The best tactical positions tend to

16


U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Acting Director

Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army

TRW, Inc.
Technical review by

Richard Brown, TRADOC Program Integration Office
Kathleen A. Quinkert, ARI

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence conceming distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.



his likely courses of action (COAs) are and taking steps to deny one or more of those COAs. To
shape the battlefield the commander must establish observation of his AO in depth, dispose his
force for maximum flexibility and speed of action, and gain control of decisive terrain that limits
the enemy’s options.

As an example, consider the brigade’s early employment of dismounted infantry to seize
a piece of key terrain that causes the enemy to fight for it or to take an action that will facilitate
decisive operations by the main maneuver forces. Another example of a shaping action is the
execution of the brigade’s deep battle with its indirect fire and electronic warfare assets. The
objective here could be to disrupt the enemy’s movement, separate his forces, or strip away
logistical assets.

Shaping the battlefield takes place in conjunction with and supports the R&S plan. The
impact of these operations must be determined and provided back to the leadership in the brigade
to enable decisions about future enemy contact. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Rehearsals. All command levels from platoon through brigade conduct rehearsals.
These rehearsals are guided by doctrine/TTP/SOP in terms of type, content, focus, and timing.
According to battle staff doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 1997), the purpose of the
rehearsal is three-fold. First, rehearsals allow participants to practice, to one degree or another, a
selected battlefield activity and synchronize combat, combat support and combat service support
assets for maximum battlefield effect. Second, the rehearsal affords participants a means to
visualize the battlefield and better understand the commander’s intent. The final purpose is for
participants to discuss as yet unplanned responses to enemy actions or battlefield opportunities.

Doctrine gives no insight into what digital C2 aspects should be addressed during the
rehearsal nor does it specify any task, conditions, or standards for a digital rehearsal. To
maintain digital connectivity, commanders must understand lower TI architecture and know the
tools required to establish and maintain connectivity throughout their operations. These
elements should be included in rehearsals.

Two examples provide insight. First, EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location Reporting
System) generally out-ranges SINCGARS, even though both are line-of-sight systems. The
SINCGARS is an FM radio system, while EPLRS is a linked digital communication system. At
certain stages of the fight, commanders may lose voice (SINCGARS) contact with each other.
By transmitting FBCB2 free text messages over EPLRS, the range limitations of SINCGARS
can be offset. Positioning retransmission elements is another way to compensate for movement
of the force and should be discussed as part of the rehearsal. In any case, brigade rehearsals
should address the method to be used to preserve voice communications and the switch from FM
to pure digital messaging if necessary.

The second example of how to maintain connectivity is the use of “Radio Net Join.”
Once units pass beyond the SINCGARS and EPLRS line-of-sight range, connectivity with their
parent unit is broken. This condition can be overcome through understanding the TI architecture
and using the FBCB2 Radio Net Join function. This function allows a unit to transparently join a
SINCGARS net or EPLRS architecture for the purposes of passing data (SA and C2 messages).

40


movement of elements using digital systems and providing alerts of potential fratricide
conditions to units coming into close proximity to each other.

Indirect Fire Contact

Indirect fire is one of the largest causes of fratricide. While indirect fire and close air
support operations are complex, there are several techniques and procedures that can be
employed to reduce the potential for fratricide.

Fire support planning. The brigade will build the over-arching fire support plan in
conjunction and synchronized with the maneuver and R&S plans. While there are several key
elements of the plan, the proper use of fire support control measures (FSCMs), identification of
observer positions, and planned targets are key elements which can be disseminated and updated
during execution using digital systems, primarily AFATDS and FBCB2. Ensuring full
dissemination to subordinate units, scouts, and mortar platoons is critical. Scoring: Graduated
T,P,U

Maintenance of situational understanding. Digital systems can provide information to
assist in positive clearance of fires. Key digital sub-tasks contribute to building the COP and
making it relevant—setting system filters, maintaining network connectivity, ensuring systems
are operational, and knowing what units might not be displayed. Assuring clear, complete
understanding of analog unit locations throughout a brigade AO requires meticulous, repeated
messaging and checking. Digitized staffs must have SOPs that assign responsibility for
distributing analog unit information and confirming its understanding between staff elements and
units. A particularly critical sub-task is using the Spot Report function in FBCB2 to create icons
for dismounted elements. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Positive clearance of fires. Positive clearance of fires by commanders, observers, staffs,
and fire direction elements is critical. Digital systems can aid in the process by showing both
targets and friendly unit positions, but digital systems alone cannot be used for clearing fires for
a variety of reasons (not all friendly elements are equipped with digital systems, not all systems
are working, etc.). Digital systems can be used to deny fires, but not to clear fires. Scoring:
Go/No Go

Use of AFATDS basic capabilities. After AFATDS determines that a target is suitable
for attack, it will review the target for coordination requirements. It automatically checks each
fire mission against established FSCMs and unit boundaries and notifies the operator of any
violations. If violations occur, the AFATDS will automatically submit a digital request for
coordination to the unit that established the measure. That unit must then either approve or deny
the coordination request.

The AFATDS also considers operator-specified System Buffer Distances around FSCMs
and unit zones. These weapon buffer distances (field artillery, mortar, air) ensure that the effects
area for each weapon system does not violate the control or boundary/zone. The operator
specified system buffer distances can be established by SOP or as part of the commander’s

24


Brigade

Phan ;

Battalion

Plan ,

Prep ;

Company/Team
Plan , Prep , ~

v Line of { Line of

Departure

SA

Selected Cbt Fn effects

Departure
a 4 4
H H i
1 H 1
Set Conditions Shape Battlefield Decisive Operations
PB Echeloned Recon Seamless transition
EstablishCOP _—Rehearse (COP to in/direct fire optics)

Cbt Fn Posturing

Figure 1. The continuous nature of operations.

Setting conditions occurs more or less constantly in brigades. Positioning units for future
action, accomplishing assembly area activities, maneuvering to create advantageous battlefield
geometry, distributing ammunition and other critical supplies, and marshalling combat support
and combat service support all help set conditions. Some of this is done prior to crossing the line
of departure in attack or before the security force fight in defense. Some setting of conditions
(mostly adjustments to circumstances) occurs after combat commences and more is known about
the enemy. It depends on the initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and on
maintaining the COP, both of which are more precise and complete with digital capabilities.

Shaping the battlefield also begins before the main body crosses the line of departure and
continues through decisive operations. It includes conducting echeloned reconnaissance,
fighting to secure positional advantage and to destroy key elements of the enemy force,
maneuvering to force enemy withdrawal from key terrain, interdicting enemy movement with
deep fires and dynamic minefields, collecting critical information, and attacking enemy battle
command. Even pre-combat tasks such as rehearsing the actions of reserves, re-arming,
refueling and restoring inoperative equipment for committed units helps shape the battlefield.
The essence of shaping the battlefield, however, is isolating and weakening targeted enemy units
or positions while massing friendly combat potential to gain advantages in the decisive
operation.

Decisive operations lead to the destruction of the enemy. In brigades they may occur in
simultaneous engagements involving the entire brigade or in a series of smaller engagements in

33



responsibilities are quite different. Although they both play important roles in planning and
execution, the brigade fire support officer’s scope of responsibility goes well beyond those of the
fire support officer at the battalion level.

The brigade plays a vital role in task force fire support planning and execution. With the
exception of the battalion task force mortars, the brigade is the “provider of indirect fires.”
Therefore, any discussion of fire support planning and execution at the task force level must first
start with the role of the brigade. The brigade develops a synchronized brigade scheme of
maneuver and brigade concept of fires translating that concept into a scheme of fires—assigning
fire support tasks and allocating assets and/or effects to subordinates. As part of that concept, it
is the brigade’s responsibility to set conditions for and provide indirect fires to the task force for
the close/direct firefight. Fires in support of the task force close fight are provided for a specific
period of time or a specific purpose. The brigade must clearly specify when fires will transition
to the task force and when the task force will lose them. Refinements to the brigade scheme of
fires from subordinate units must also be integrated. Finally, the brigade views the COP
displayed in the TOC and integrates the movement of artillery units with the scheme of
maneuver.

The battalion task force is the “executor” of their portion of the brigade scheme of fires.
With the exception of the battalion mortars, the brigade commander controls all indirect fire
assets supporting the brigade combat team. The artillery is normally in direct support (DS) of
the brigade. Therefore, the battalion task force must clearly understand both the brigade concept
of fires and how it is synchronized to support the brigade scheme of maneuver, and the task
force’s role in the execution of its portion of the brigade scheme of fires. Understanding this, the
task force must develop its own concept fires. This concept normally involves assigned tasks
from the brigade scheme of fires and targets to support the battalion task force close fight.
Additionally, the task force must plan the synchronization of mortar fires with the scheme of
maneuver, integrate the mortars into the scheme of fires, and synchronize their movement with
the scheme of maneuver.

Engineer. Depending on how the Engineer Battalion orchestrates its workload, the
engineers operating in the maneuver battalion command posts may have a greater digital
workload than their counterparts at brigade. This is because the brigade may deal with obstacle
planning and execution by defining the general belts for obstacles, then tracking progress of
obstacle installation and engineer company employment. At the maneuver battalion level, the
supporting engineers deal with the specifics of each obstacle based on terrain analysis, scheme of
fires and maneuver, and the commander’s intent. The engineers supporting the maneuver
battalion and executing the obstacles are responsible for creating and updating the appropriate
overlays and submitting digital obstacle reports.

Summary of Brigade versus Battalion Differences
To summarize, although there is not a substantial difference in the digital skills or

training required to operate the ABCS systems between battalion and brigade echelons, there are
differences in the digital maturity and knowledge required. There are also differences in the way

19



(NTC), with the latter spearheading the Division Capstone Exercise (DCX), Phase I. The
Division, with BCT participation, recently completed the simulation-based DCX Phase II at Fort
Hood. As the 41D reaches maturity and stability in digital operations, it provides a repository of
experience and insights regarding digital tasks, skills, and knowledge essential for soldiers and
leaders. In the meantime, a second division has begun the transition process. The 1* Cavalry
Division (1CD) is now transitioning the first of three brigades to new digital platforms and C4I
systems.

An uncharted dimension of Force XXI transition relates to the progression of digital tasks
and skills as a leader’s career takes him/her from one echelon to the next. It seems axiomatic
that the digital skills acquired as a platoon leader will apply throughout a leader’s career.
However, it also seems clear that those skills will not remain sufficient over time and that
leaders will have to acquire additional digital skills as they graduate to higher levels of
responsibility. It is likely that new skill requirements arise at higher echelons, especially when
staff elements and functions enter the picture. If new skills are needed, what are they and when
do they first appear? Even if essential digital skills do not change across echelons, how might
performance conditions and standards change from one echelon to the next? Answers to these
questions are important for developing effective training programs with meaningful measures of
performance.

Performance assessment tools are as important in digital units as they are in conventional
units. Assessment of skill proficiency levels enables leaders and trainers to identify shortfalls in
unit performance and plan training programs accordingly. In the case of digitized units,
proficiency assessments must consider how well leaders and soldiers use digital information as
well as considering operation of digital systems (U.S. Army, 2000). Proficiency assessment
tools also play a key role in determining when a unit is ready to proceed to a more challenging
level of training. The most common performance measurement approach in the tactical
environment involves all-or-none scoring of prescribed tasks. The training unit receives a “go”
or “no go” for a specific task based on established performance standards. In the case of a “no
go,” the score says nothing about how close the unit came to meeting the standards—it could be
close or far off. For many digital tasks pass-fail scoring may be fully satisfactory. However,
some digital tasks might benefit from a scoring approach that provides graduated feedback on the
level of proficiency. An example of graduated scoring is the Trained-Practice-Untrained (T-P-
U) scale used in most Army training arenas. In terms of digital skills training, little is known
about proficiency levels and how they relate to training effectiveness. A major exception to this
statement is that we know that proficiency operating digital systems is of limited value if leaders
lack tactical skills (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998).

Problem Definition

Information age warfare is inducing changes in unit performance requirements and in the
expected warfighting environment. Tomorrow’s digital warfighters need realistic training that
enables them to exploit the benefits of advanced C4I systems during digital operations. Effective
training requires specification of digital tasks and skills in doctrinal/training publications plus
tools for measuring task/skill performance. But little solid information is available to support
assessment of digital proficiency and development of high-payoff training programs. The impact



important step for optimizing the warfighting proficiency of the future force. Three lines of
research will build upon the current work. First, concepts for digital proficiency levels will be
designed and tested in terms of their value in tailoring measurement objectives. Second,
measurement procedures needed to assess the digital user tasks/skills described in this and other
related reports will be developed. Third, additional information will be developed that will be
used to identify events that most warrant the attention of trainers. This line of work will focus
mainly on FBCB2, and it will include:

¢ identifying those FBCB2 information applications (e.g., decide when and where moving
unit will become intervisible with the enemy) and software capabilities (e.g., terrain
analysis) that are least and most frequently used by leaders, as a function of experience
and echelon:

¢ finding out why applications and software capabilities are/are not being employed;

¢ identifying problems in using FBCB2 information applications and software capabilities
as a function of experience using FBCB2; and

@ identifying gaps in feedback regarding use of application and software capabilities.

55



STRICOM
TAI

TF

TI

TIM
TIMS
TIRS
TOC
T-P-U
TRADOC
TTP
UAV
UTO
UTR
VTC
WIN-T

xO

U.S. Army Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command
Targeted Areas of Interest

Task Force

Tactical Internet

Tactical Information Manager

Tactical Information Management System
Terrain Index Reference System

Tactical Operations Center

Trained — Practice - Untrained

US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Unit Task Organization

Unit Task Reorganization

Video Teleconferencing

Warrior Information Network-Terrestrial

Executive Officer

C-5



For example, the task force scouts can Radio Net Join to the BRT to maintain connectivity with
the task force. Bringing this out at the rehearsal alerts commanders to the need to maintain
connectivity and watch for “transient” elements. Essentially, this is nothing more than extending
the signal officer’s C2 rehearsal script to element commanders. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Digital rehearsal. Commanders may opt to conduct a digital rehearsal in place of a
regular rehearsal under certain conditions (e.g., when forces in contact prevent a commander's
withdrawal to a terrain model rehearsal site). Currently digital rehearsal tools are only available
at the brigade level in the form of the BPV. At the battalion level and below, a digital rehearsal
is a combination of map and radio rehearsal, with the FBCB2/MCS screen taking the place of the
map. The staff (or commander) builds overlays depicting selected critical battlefield events. At
the appropriate time, elements bring up the overlays and respond per unit SOP to the displayed
situation. The same script used in a “normal” terrain model rehearsal can be used during the
digital rehearsal (i.e., enemy capability, intent and location, task organization, current combat
power, movement formation/techniques, task and purpose, direct fire control measures, fire
support observation status, etc.). This type of rehearsal should at least be planned for and
addressed in the unit SOP. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Logistics operations. From a CSS point of view, logistical resupply is an ongoing and
continuous operation across all mission phases. However, CSS functions come into special
focus during mission preparation, especially when the operation requires special levels or types
of supplies (most commonly ammunition or barrier materials or unusually larger fuel stocks).
Units build or update the electronic database of on-hand supplies by sending/rolling up FBCB2
LOGSTAT reports. In the same fashion, the FBCB2 PERSTAT report is built and sent up the
chain of command. From these initial reports, staff estimates are confirmed or updated and
actions taken to adjust the plan and logistical priorities, which will drive post-operation changes.
Information will be gathered to aid in logistics tracking and preparation of the battlefield. As
part of the plan and the disposition of friendly forces, the brigade may also position resources
where they best facilitate the anticipated maneuver. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Key digital tasks. Some key preparation tasks that help the brigade staff address current
and future operations are noted below.

Effect UTO change. The brigade task organization is implemented physically and
digitally. Physically, units must link up, exchange status information, and be briefed on
associated tasks. Digitally, units must effect linkup to ensure that affiliations reflect the
commander’s plan. Of key importance is the tracking of accepting the unit task reorganization
(UTR) change in FBCB2, and the associated UTO changes in ATCCS. To achieve the fullest
battlefield utility, the UTO must be the same across all ABCS systems. Otherwise, linked/rolled
up reports generated by the lowest level—FBCB2 equipped platforms—will be discarded by the
associated battlefield functional area control system. An example is the interaction between
FBCB2 and CSSCS, with respect to LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reports. Both reports are
generated by individual platforms and rolled up at platoon and then company levels. If the
company rollup (reflecting the initial UTO) does not match the digital UTO reflected in CSSCS,
the CSSCS system will not accept the report. The result would be a company’s worth of
logistical and personnel data lost. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

41



echelon) represents a key difference and advantage for the digitized force. The capabilities of
ATCCS and FBCB2 also enable commanders to monitor unit execution of decisive operations or
any other type operations/tasks and to visualize battlefield opportunities and risks. Scoring:
Graduated T, P, U

Company/battery/troop acquisition of the enemy. Digital C4I systems are of great
importance to maneuver companies/troops and field artillery batteries in controlling contact with
the enemy. During decisive operations company/battery/troop commanders plan (on the move if
necessary) and execute direct and indirect fire actions that result in the destruction of the enemy
and achieve mission objectives. Their ability to view the current COP—including locations of
any division, brigade, and battalion elements operating in their zones or sectors—assures their
unobstructed movement, encourages close cooperation, reduces risks of fratricide and improves
cross-talk and timely updates on enemy actions.

For this analysis, success in moving from SA through situational understanding to
situational dominance can be measured by the ability of the company commander to receive Blue
and Red SA and quickly translate that information into acquisition of enemy targets by weapon
systems (tank, IFV, individual arms, etc.). To do so most effectively, the maneuver companies
must move safely and quickly to the vicinity of the enemy, dispose and maneuver their units for
positional advantage without effective enemy interference, and obtain direct observation of the
enemy where, when, and in the general configuration they expected. If the previous preparatory
efforts of the brigade and battalion do not assist company commanders in transitioning from
preliminary maneuver to visual/direct fire contact on favorable terms, then higher level support
will not assist meaningfully in controlling contact with the enemy. If the company commanders
must fight to establish situational understanding and to achieve situational dominance, the
benefits of digitization will not be reaped and the friendly force will be at risk of mission failure.
Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

Monitoring pending enemy contact. Digital C4I systems and the digital skills required at
battalion and brigade levels directly support gathering information about the enemy from the
COP’s portrayal of “computer screen contact.” Units in ever-closer proximity to the enemy must
tefine this information. This leads to the company/battery/troop actions described in the
preceding paragraph. The digital skill of building the COP requires a high level of competence.
The critical information provided by different battlefield observers, whether digital or analog,
must be gathered in time, evaluated and sent to commanders about to make contact. To date,
fundamental warfighting principles have not been usurped by a new set of “digital” principles.
However, a new skill set (maintaining TOC and unit connectivity, setting filters and warnings
properly, etc.) is required to exploit the C4I systems in order to achieve situational dominance at
the tip of the spear. This involves employing every resource that is useful in a compressed time
period, melding reports from various sources and assuring the best use of time in monitoring and
reporting. As contact becomes imminent for the companies, most of the time-sensitive enemy
information will be transmitted by voice rather than digitally. Commanders and staff leaders
must develop the skill of determining when the transition between digital communications and
voice communications takes place. Scoring: Graduated T, P, U

43



Interview procedures. The interview team generally consisted of two SMEs serving as
facilitators and one note-taker at each interview session. In order to structure the interviews, the
facilitators used an interview guide containing general instructions and questions of interest
(Appendix A). Most interviews were tape recorded for later transcription. Each session lasted
approximately 2 hours, whether one-on-one or group interview.

The interview process probed for knowledge of digital tasks and their supporting digital
skills, in a project-wide context addressing all technical objectives. Interviews were designed to
capture objective, behavior-based evidence of unit transformation to digital operations and
insights of leaders and soldiers. The intent was to garner a reflective view of digital
transformation, gather data based on actual NTC experience, and identify specific digital tasks
that merit further study.

Interviewees were instructed to answer questions using their areas of expertise as a
reference point. For instance, the $2 answered questions relating to intelligence tasks and issues
as they pertained to digital skills proficiency in the intelligence area. Similarly, company
commanders spoke to specific tasks and issues relating to company and platoon level
requirements.

A transcript of each 41D interview session was prepared from the tape recordings, with
the aid of notes taken during the session. Each transcript was reviewed and edited by the
interview team to produce an accurate record. For the interviews with the retired SMEs, a
thematic summary of each session was prepared.

Interview questions. Appendix A contains the interview questions which include items
addressing both phases of the project. The queries targeted the unit’s digital performance and
training requirements with emphasis on high-value skills, abilities, and task proficiencies. For
the purposes of this phase of the project, the questions of interest were those that focused on:

¢ Digital skills identified by unit leaders and soldiers, especially those that are
independent of specific system software versions.

¢ Unit needs for better feedback on individual or collective progress.

Potential emergence of new digital skills at brigade level.

¢ Practical needs regarding assessment of digital skills proficiency.

Panel of Experts

The document review and interview stages of data collection yielded disconnected bits of
information about differentiating echelons and assessing proficiency in regards to digital skills.
As a result, the team organized a panel of contractor personnel with expertise on digital
operations and training. The panel of eight experts included field grade and general officers
whose collective experience spanned multiple BOSs as well as command and staff assignments
through brigade and division level. Each of the experts had either supported digitized units (e.g.,
by developing digital operator’s guides) or served as a leader of a digitized unit. Three
“brainstorming” sessions were organized to consider, in sequence, the following subjects: (1)
proficiency concepts related to preventing fratricide; (2) proficiency concepts related to