An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1270

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 6 May 2014

IN THE MATTER OF: Guilford County

No. 12 JA 532

K.F.

Appeal by respondent-mother and respondent-father from 

order entered 30 August 2013 by Judge H. Thomas Jarrell in 

Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 

April 2014.

Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County 

Department of Social Services.

Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.

Michael E. Casterline for respondent-appellant father.

Donna Michelle Wright for guardian ad litem.

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.

Respondent-mother and respondent-father (collectively, 

“respondents”) appeal from an order concluding that K.F. 
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(“Kendrick”)

1 was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. 

After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Background

On or about 28 November 2012, the Guilford County 

Department of Social Services (“DSS”) took fourteen-month-old 

Kendrick into nonsecure custody and filed a juvenile petition 

alleging that he was abused, neglected, and dependent. The 

petition alleged that respondent-father had confessed to killing 

Kendrick’s infant brother, Keith, on 27 November 2012. Law 

enforcement officers responded to the home, and also noted that 

Kendrick had a bruise on his abdomen, had a diaper rash that was 

bleeding, and appeared to be dehydrated. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on 1 August 2013 and 

entered an order on 30 August 2013 concluding that Kendrick was 

an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile within the 

definition of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1), (9), and (15). The 

trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact in the 

adjudicatory portion of its order:

8. The juvenile’s infant sibling, [Keith], 

. . . was killed by the juvenile’s 

father[.] [Respondent-father] 

confessed to killing [Keith] to High 

Point Police. [Respondent-father] 

 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles 

involved and for ease of reading.
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indicated that he “snapped” around 5:00 

a.m. and reached in and strangled the 

baby and began hitting the baby with 

his fists. The autopsy report 

indicated that [Keith] died as a result 

of blunt force trauma to the head and 

abdomen. 

9. The mother, [], was also in the bedroom 

at the time the infant was killed. 

Neither parent called 911 until after 

3:00 p.m. Both the mother and the 

father have been indicted with First 

Degree Murder in the death of [Keith] 

and are currently in the custody of the 

Guilford County Jail.

10. On the night of the murder, [Kendrick] 

was left in a car seat from 9:00 p.m. 

until 1:00 p.m. the following day. 

When officers arrived at the house, 

[Kendrick] was bleeding from his 

buttocks, had several bruises on his 

abdomen, and appeared dehydrated. The 

bleeding appeared to be the result of 

severe diaper rash.

In the dispositional portion of the order, the trial court 

maintained custody of Kendrick with DSS, concluded that 

reunification efforts would be futile and inconsistent with 

Kendrick’s safety and need for a safe, permanent home within a 

reasonable period of time, and changed the permanent plan for 

Kendrick to adoption. Respondents timely appealed. 

Discussion

On appeal, both respondents challenge the trial court’s 

adjudication of dependency, and respondent-mother also 
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challenges the adjudication of abuse. “The role of this Court 

in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication . . . is to determine 

(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and 

convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are 

supported by the findings of fact[.]” In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. 

App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), aff’d as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 

(2008). “If such evidence exists, the findings of the trial 

court are binding on appeal, even if the evidence would support 

a finding to the contrary.” Id. Neither respondent challenges 

any of the trial court’s findings of fact. Therefore, the 

findings are binding on appeal. See In re M.D., 200 N.C. App. 

35, 43, 682 S.E.2d 780, 785 (2009).

I.

First, we turn to respondents’ arguments that the trial 

court’s adjudication of dependency is not supported by its 

findings of fact. Our juvenile code defines a dependent 

juvenile as one “in need of assistance or placement because the 

juvenile has no parent, guardian, or custodian responsible for 

the juvenile’s care or supervision or whose parent, guardian, or 

custodian is unable to provide for the care or supervision and 

lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” N.C. 
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Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2011). In determining whether a 

juvenile is dependent, the trial court is required to “address 

both[:] (1) the parent’s ability to provide care or supervision, 

and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care 

arrangements.” In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 

403, 406 (2005). “Findings of fact addressing both prongs must 

be made before a juvenile may be adjudicated as dependent, and 

the court’s failure to make these findings will result in 

reversal of the court.” In re B.M., 183 N.C. App. 84, 90, 643 

S.E.2d 644, 648 (2007). Respondents both argue that the trial 

court failed to make findings of fact establishing that they 

lacked an alternative child care arrangement. Respondent-mother 

additionally argues that the court failed to make findings of 

fact establishing that she was unable to provide care and 

supervision for Kendrick.

We agree with respondents’ argument that the trial court 

failed to make findings of fact regarding the availability of an 

alternative child care arrangement. None of the trial court’s 

adjudicatory findings of fact addresses this prong, and DSS 

failed to present any evidence on it at the hearing. Yet, at 

the conclusion of the adjudicatory portion of the hearing, and 

in the order’s conclusions of law, the trial court concluded 
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that DSS proved abuse, neglect, and dependency by clear and 

convincing evidence. Without the necessary findings in support 

of it, this conclusion is in error. See id. (reversing the 

trial court’s order where it failed to make any findings 

regarding the availability of alternative child care 

arrangements). 

DSS and the GAL argue that the second prong of the 

dependency ground is supported by dispositional finding of fact 

number 17, in which the trial court found that “[t]here are no 

known or suitable relatives with whom [Kendrick] could be 

placed[.]” We disagree. While the trial court did touch on the 

availability of alternative child care arrangements in this 

finding, it was a dispositional finding of fact and cannot 

support the trial court’s adjudication for several reasons. 

To begin, a proceeding to adjudicate a juvenile neglected, 

abused, or dependent involves a two-stage process: the 

adjudication stage governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 and the 

disposition stage governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901. See In 

re O.W., 164 N.C. App. 699, 701, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004).

Although this Court has held there is no requirement that the 

two hearings be conducted at two separate times, see id., the 

trial court is required to apply different standards of proof at 
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the two stages. Id. At the adjudication stage, “[t]he 

allegations in a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused, 

neglected, or dependent shall be proved by clear and convincing 

evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 (2011). However, the

dispositional hearing “may be informal,” the court “may consider 

any evidence, including hearsay evidence . . . that the court 

finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the 

needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition,” and 

the court’s placement determination at disposition is 

discretionary. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-901 (2011); see O.W., 164 

N.C. App. at 701, 596 S.E.2d at 853. Thus, a dispositional 

finding of fact does not satisfy the statutory requirement that 

the adjudication order “contain appropriate findings of fact and 

conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–807(b) (2011).

Furthermore, the nature of the trial court’s hearing in 

this particular matter makes it difficult for this Court to 

simply “relabel” a dispositional finding of fact, as DSS 

suggests we do. Only one DSS social worker testified at the 

adjudicatory hearing, and her testimony did not address the lack 

of an alternative child care arrangement. Nonetheless, the 

trial court adjudicated Kendrick neglected, abused, and 

dependent. The trial court then proceeded to disposition, where 
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the GAL and another DSS social worker testified. Again, none of 

the testimony addressed lack of an alternative child care 

arrangement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

adopted DSS’s court summary; however, the court summary was for 

dispositional purposes, and it is not clear that the trial court 

admitted it into evidence. Based on the foregoing, it is 

apparent that the trial court adjudicated Kendrick dependent 

without considering any evidence pertaining to the availability 

of an alternative child care arrangement. And, to the extent 

that the trial court considered any such evidence, the incorrect 

standard of proof was employed for the purpose of adjudicating 

Kendrick dependent. 

Based on the foregoing, we are compelled to reverse the 

trial court’s adjudication of dependency and remand for further 

proceedings. See In re K.D., 178 N.C. App. 322, 329, 631 S.E.2d 

150, 155 (2006) (“[T]he trial court’s language in the 

adjudication order tracks the first prong of the definition of 

dependency, but ignores the second. We, therefore, reverse as 

to K.D.’s dependency, and remand to the trial court for further 

findings as to whether K.D. lacks ‘an appropriate alternative 

child care arrangement.’”). Because we reverse based on the 

lack of findings pertaining to the second prong of dependency, 
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we need not address respondent-mother’s challenge to the first 

prong. 

II.

Next, we turn to respondent-mother’s argument that the 

trial court erred in adjudicating Kendrick to be an abused 

juvenile. Our juvenile code defines an abused juvenile as, 

inter alia, “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose 

parent . . . [i]nflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the 

juvenile a serious physical injury by other than accidental 

means” or “[c]reates or allows to be created a substantial risk 

of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than 

accidental means[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(a), (b)

(2011). Respondent-mother argues that the only evidence of any 

alleged abuse against Kendrick is the fact that he was left in a 

car seat for sixteen hours. Respondent-mother contends that 

this does not amount to serious physical injury, and, therefore, 

the evidence cannot sustain a conclusion that Kendrick was 

abused. 

Respondent-mother’s argument fails for several reasons. 

First, we note that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) does not define 

“serious physical injury.” And, we have stated that “the nature 

of an injury is dependent upon the facts of each case and, based 
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on the evidence before us in [each] case.” In re L.T.R., 181 

N.C. App. 376, 383, 639 S.E.2d 122, 126 (2007). Second, 

respondent-mother appears to overlook the fact that the 

statutory definition of abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B101(1)(b) does not require actual injury. Under this 

subsection, “a substantial risk of serious physical injury” is 

sufficient. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(b) (emphasis added). 

This Court has sustained an adjudication of abuse where the 

parent was aware of the existence of a risk to the child but 

failed to “take the necessary steps to protect the minor 

[child].” In re M.G., 187 N.C. App. 536, 549, 653 S.E.2d 581, 

589 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 363 N.C. 570, 681 S.E.2d 290 (2009). Indeed, 

DSS’s petition alleges abuse based on substantial risk of 

physical injury. 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial 

court’s findings were sufficient to establish that respondentmother, at minimum, subjected Kendrick to substantial risk of 

physical injury. The findings establish that fourteen-month-old 

Kendrick was left in a car seat for sixteen hours, which 

resulted in bruising to Kendrick’s abdomen. During this time, 

respondents failed to change his diaper or feed him, which 
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resulted in severe diaper rash and dehydration. In fact, his 

diaper rash was so severe that Kendrick’s bottom was bleeding.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err 

in concluding that Kendrick was an abused juvenile pursuant to 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and 

reverse in part the trial court’s order, and we remand for 

further proceedings as to dependency.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Judges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).