AIRPOWER

IN THREE WARS

GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER

USAF, RET.

Reprint Edition

EDITORS:

MANAGING EDITOR - LT COL A. J. C. LAVALLE, MS 

TEXTUAL EDITOR - MAJOR JAMES C. GASTON, PHD

ILLUSTRATED BY:

LT COL A. J. C. LAVALLE

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2003
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sol

of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, th

States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government 

Cleared for public release.

ii

Momyer, William W.

Airpower in three wars / William W. Momyer ; managing editor, A

Lavalle ; textual editor, James C. Gaston ; illustrated by A. J. C. L

Reprinted.

p. ; cm.

With a new preface.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-116-3

1. Airpower. 2. World War, 1939–1945––Aerial operations. 3. Kore

1950–1953––Aerial operations. 4. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975––Aeri

ations. 5. Momyer, William W. 6. Aeronautics, Military––United States. 

II. Lavalle, A. J. C. (Arthur J. C.), 1940– III. Gaston, James C.

358.4/009/04––dc21

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TO . . . 

all those brave airmen who

fought their battles in the

skies for command of the

air in World War II, Korea,

and Vietnam.
PREFACE 2003

When I received the request to update my 1978 foreword 

book, I thought it might be useful to give my perspective o

aspects on the employment of airpower in the Persian Gulf W

Air War over Serbia (Operation Allied Force), and the w

Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). It is not my in

analyze air operations in these wars but to see if there are 

that might be appropriate for another war. I was particularly 

ested in the application of established airpower doctrine sinc

deeply involved with it throughout my career.

The Gulf War, in many respects, had many features of 

War II. The first requirement in World War II was to gai

maintain air superiority to have freedom of action to car

the destruction of Germany’s ability to wage war and to 

the most favorable conditions for the invasion of Europe (Ope

Overlord). It was mandatory to establish air superiority s

the German air force wouldn’t be able to attack the high

nerable landing force and the subsequent breakout. A vig

interdiction campaign was initiated 60 days prior to the in

to seal off the landing areas. Just prior to the assault, a

power was turned to direct support of the landing force. A

tory records, air superiority was established and maintaine

area was successfully sealed off from German forces trying 

at the landing force; and all Allied airpower was directed to 

air support until the main force had landed and operation

underway to engage the main forces of the Germans. It is o

cial interest that the German air force was able to fly only 

sorties, and those had no significant effect.

The Gulf War followed the same general pattern. Fir

destroyed the air defense system and gained control of the ai

to the introduction of ground forces. We exploited that air s

ority by systematic attacks on the command and control s

the governmental supporting structure, and the deployed m

forces. Particular attention was given to the mechanized fo
II, were intended to pave the way for our ground forces. As th

sion approached, the major effort was devoted to attacks a

the lines of communication that would be used by the r

forces. As the assault on enemy defense lines began, all of t

power was devoted to helping our ground force breach the d

and begin the exploitation. Airpower was a dominant 

throughout the campaign, in which there were fewer cas

than in all of our previous wars.

Every war has its own characteristics, but a common 

on the employment of airpower seems to emerge. As indica

this brief review of World War II and the Gulf War, there su

a common operational doctrine. To be sure, the tactics we

alike but the results obtained appear very similar. Air sup

ity made it possible to sustain attacks against the core 

enemy’s strength and ability to wage war and, at the same 

to support attacks against enemy forces in the field.

In the Air War over Serbia, the first requirement again 

neutralize the Yugoslavian Air Force and render the air d

system ineffective. In many ways, the air defense system w

more sophisticated than the one in Operation Desert S

Although the number of enemy aircraft was not large, i

sessed some state-of-the-art jet fighters. The elimination 

flying force was quickly accomplished, but the air defens

tem, with its large numbers of radar, presented a much mo

ficult problem. The problem was made more complicated 

large number of antiaircraft artillery and air-to-surface mi

including the man-pack infrared ones. The air defense s

was never wholly eliminated, but it was neutralized to the 

that Allied airpower could carry out its mission without 

ceptable losses or interference. Significantly, however, the en

multifaceted defenses forced operations above 15,000 feet 

the threat of their weapons was minimized.

With air superiority, the Allied Air Force could devote a 

effort to the strategic objective of destroying the capabilit

will of the Yugoslavian government to continue the war. Th

much like the objective of the Strategic Air Force in World W

Although Germany didn’t sue for peace as a result of air

attacks, airpower did weaken the German economy and 

structure to the extent that the country could no longer s

its military forces in the field at a strength needed to defe

opposing Allied force. Some evidence indicated the same tr

Yugoslavia, even though support of military forces was n

vi
combat. Consequently, the airpower attack there should b

ceived as a strategic attack on the nation’s ability to funct

Since no Allied ground forces were involved, most of t

attacks were against ground force bases and routes used to 

units from the northern part of the country into the c

areas of Kosovo. Hence, there was no interdiction effort 

traditional sense since there were not that many ta

However, significant effort was devoted to small engage

throughout the area. Many of these attacks were in close 

imity to civilians, and, therefore, required a forward air con

to control strikes. With only a small portion of the Yugos

army in the field, only a small number of tanks, armore

sonnel vehicles, and supply trucks were destroyed. But th

attacks were of such precision that any large-scale deploym

Yugoslavian ground force clearly would have met the sam

as befell the Iraqi army. Airpower, in my view, was the comp

force that brought the war to a close. Airpower did in Yugo

what airmen had hoped it would be able to do against Ge

in World War II—avoid a ground war.

The Afghanistan War, Operation Allied Force, exhibited s

the features of previous wars, but in many ways it was entir

ferent. Control of the air was the first requirement, but air 

tions were made difficult by the long distances to bases a

location of the Navy carrier task force. Fortunately, the Talib

force consisted of only a few fighters, which were destroyed, a

air defense system—in no way integrated—was rapidly neutr

The man-pack infrared missiles posed a threat throughout th

again forcing Allied air forces to fly above the effective altitu

these weapons. But in a real sense, there were no restrai

Allied use of the airspace over the country.

With such complete control of the air, the objective of de

ing the Taliban government and elimination of the te

organization and its leader were pursued with minimum 

sure. The primary ground battle was fought between Taliba

Northern Alliance forces, both of which consisted of a num

indigenous forces. These forces were deployed along a def

line of trenches, bunkers, and other obstacles that the No

Alliance was unable to break through. Without airpowe

questionable whether the Northern Alliance would even 

been able to hold its position. To complicate matters, v

warlords were fighting among themselves and with Taliba

ments throughout the rest of the country.
Special Forces teams were placed in the country. Their tas

not only the production of intelligence, but also the establ

of friendly relations with the various warlords. It was these 

that identified targets suitable for attack. These team

established relations with the Northern Alliance leader an

vinced him what airpower could be to support his forces.

In Afghanistan, a new level of close air support was dev

compared to all previous wars. With precision weapons, pa

larly the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and its 

Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation, strikes 

be made extremely close to friendly troops. With all ty

strike aircraft circling overhead, weapons could be on a ta

a matter of a few minutes. Also new was the use of unm

aerial vehicles (UAV) to deliver weapons and to generate rea

targets. This was manifested in UAVs sending target data 

HC-130 overhead, which could engage without delay.

I would like to conclude these new perspectives with the 

vation that the fundamentals that airmen have held onto 

employment of airpower were demonstrated in our recen

without qualification. Airpower accomplished what it was 

ble of doing, and what many of us thought it could do—in

what many of us had hoped it would do in World War II. 

were abbreviated wars—abbreviated by the wedding of 

lished airpower doctrine with dramatically new technologi

be sure, we would have achieved success without the new 

nologies, but it would have taken more time and precious h

resources. But the doctrine that has guided airpower em

ment, it seems to me, remains an enduring foundation 

bodes well for the integration of air and space assets in

cohesive force.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER

General, US Air Force (retired)

December 2002

viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many colleagues who have encourag

during the writing of this book. On numerous occasions 

sought their views on their perspective of airpower from 

tours of duty in command and staff in peace and war. It s

be understood that the views herein expressed are solely th

the author and are not those of the Department of the Air 

Without the use of the extensive materials from the 

Archives and the close assistance of the Office of Histor

story of airpower in three wars would have been seriously i

plete. The CORONA HARVEST reports were particularly va

in documenting many of the operational aspects of the Vi

War. Additionally, the services of the USAF photo deposito

the English and History departments at the Air Force Ac

were welcomed participants in the production of this boo

special thanks to Major James C. Gaston, professor of Eng

the Academy, for his extensive assistance in the textual e

of the manuscript. Of course, there were others—my tha

them also.

Finally, I wish to express special appreciation to my ass

and managing editor, Lt Col A. J. C. Lavalle, for his un

efforts in every phase of the preparation of this book, and t

Donna Caldwell for her patience in typing the many drafts 

to reach the final product.

WILLIAM W. MOMYER 

General, USAF (Retired) 

1 January 1978
FOREWORD

I began working on this book some months ago when a 

ber of colleagues asked me to record my thoughts abo

employment of airpower, especially tactical airpower, af

years in the profession. I hadn’t any illusions of being b

with special wisdom, but, as they said, no one else s

exactly my perspective on tactical airpower, and other p

sional airmen might find it useful to know how I saw thing

ticularly during the Vietnam years, whether they happen

approve of my perceptions or not. Very soon I realized th

perspective was in fact several perspectives, and none of 

could be maintained in perfect isolation from the others. 

watched strategy, tactics, and technology evolve, and all th

these evolutions fascinated me in recollection. I had seen t

airpower from the viewpoints of the greenest fighter pi

1939), the senior air commander in our longest war, and a

every position in between: dozens of perspectives there, and 

them seemed valid and important to me. So my problem b

one of choosing from among my many perspectives the fe

seemed likely to offer the most to other airmen.

Although I take most delight in recalling my experience

young fighter pilot, I had to admit that there’s probably n

unique about that perspective. Hundreds of others shared 

the same experiences and could describe them as well or 

than I. Thus I turned away (fellow fighter pilots will unde

how difficult this was) from the temptation to spin stories 

those days.

On the other hand, if there’s little justification for m

cussing many of the things I do recall from World War II, t

little point, either, in attempting to analyze what I didn’t kn

knew only by reading about it later) about airpower in Wor

II. My experience was in North Africa and Italy; I didn’t p

pate in, for instance, the combined bomber offensive a

Germany or the B-29 offensive against Japan. I have 
paigns, opinions which I’ll share with other airmen in p

but I don’t want those judgments lying around in a book lik

one where future airmen might see them and suppose the

based on authoritative, firsthand observation.

I examined and discarded many other approaches usin

same filtering process—avoid discussing what I don’t know 

my own experience and the experiences of my companion

consider telling what I do know only if future airmen might 

from seeing how those events looked from a perspective th

uniquely, or almost uniquely, mine. This filtering proces

me away from perspectives that would include such large 

as our employment of the atomic bomb in World War II (no 

hand knowledge of the decision process), and such person

ics as the ways in which President Johnson seemed to hav

between December 1967 when I talked with him at length 

the bombing campaign and the defense of Khe Sahn as w

from Korat to Cam Ranh Bay and October 1968 when I 

with him for the last time at the White House (not likely to 

professional interest to future airmen).

What the filtering left me with were the perspectives yo

in this book, the major preoccupations of my years as a 

commander: strategy, command and control, counter air 

tions, interdiction, and close air support. Most of my u

opportunities to perceive airpower occurred during my ten

Commander of 7th Air Force in Vietnam from July 1966 

August 1968, and you’ll see here mostly what I saw the

some of my perceptions from earlier and later years mu

recorded, too, to place my observations from the Vietnam 

in context. My perspective on command and control when 

7th Air Force was certainly affected by my earlier observati

1942–1944 when I was a fighter group commander in 

Africa and those in 1944–1946 when I was Chief of the Ar

Forces Board for Combined Operations. While I was Ass

Chief of Staff at Tactical Air Command headquarters be

1946–1949, I undoubtedly picked up many of the ideas re

in my approach to close air support in Vietnam. Also, as a 

ber of the faculty of the Air War College from 1950–1953, 

ideally situated to observe the command and control re

ships and the complexities of the interdiction, close air su

and counter air missions during the Korean War. After a se

tours in which I commanded the 8th Fighter-Bomber Win

the 314th Air Division in Korea, and the 312th Fighter-B

xii
of Plans, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, from 1958 

1961. There I saw firsthand the effects on our tactical air 

of both the Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on n

weapons and the Kennedy administration’s enthusiasm f

weapons and techniques of sub-limited war. During my t

the Air Staff from 1961–1964 I was directly involved in th

cussion of counterinsurgency and the forces that were need

the developing war in Vietnam. My assignment in Vietnam 

preceded by a two-year tour as Commander of Air Tr

Command. As Commander of Tactical Air Command fro

time I returned from Vietnam in 1968 until I retired in 1

remained intimately involved in the planning for all of our 

cal air operations in Vietnam.

What I offer in this book, as fairly and as clearly as I can

account of the way airpower looked to me from the perspec

think will matter most to airmen. I don’t record these views 

hope that airmen, even my friends, will approve them. In fact 

that all of our airmen who examine them will do so critica

mustn’t rely entirely upon yesterday’s ideas to fight tomo

wars, after all, but I hope our airmen won’t pay the price in c

again for what some of us have already purchased.
PREFACE 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER I: STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Nuclear Weapons and Tactical Air Forces . . . . . . 

Korean War––A Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Yalu—Containment of MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Impact of Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The French In Indochina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SEATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Wars of Liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

“Jungle Jim”—First Combat Deployment . . . . . . . 

Joint Task Force 116—Response to Crisis in Laos 

A Changing Role—The U.S. To Fight . . . . . . . . . . 

Bomb the North?—No Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Gulf of Tonkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Strategy—Retaliatory Attacks in North Vietnam . . 

Gradual Escalation Replaces Retaliation . . . . . . . 

Air Campaign Plan—Proposed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Ground Forces Deployed––Priority Set . . . . . . . . . 

Request To Strike Airfields Continues . . . . . . . . . 

Strategy Slowly Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TET—Strategy Changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A New Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Strategy Adopted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER II: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER 

Prior to Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

North Africa—The Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

OVERLORD—The Arguments About Command . . 

Airman—Deputy Theater Commander . . . . . . . . . 

Component Commands—Continuing Issue . . . . . 

Korea—Structure of a Theater of Operations . . . . 

Targeting—Jurisdictional Question . . . . . . . . . . . 

Operational Control Within FEAF . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control of Strategic Air Forces in a

Theater of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control of Naval Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Control of Marine Aviation In A Theater

of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER III: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER

IN THE VIETNAM WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Command Structure—The Beginning . . . . . . . . . 

2nd Air Division ADVON—The Beginning of an

Air Component . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MACV—A Sub-Unified Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PACAF View Of Command Organization . . . . . . . 

JTF-116—A New Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2nd Air Division—Expanded Authority . . . . . . . . 

Airman As Deputy MACV Proposed . . . . . . . . . . . 

MACV As Unified Command Under

JCS––A Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Deputy Commander For Air Operations . . . . . . . . 

Role of CINCPAC Component Commands . . . . . . 

Air Deputy Position Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control of Army Helicopters and Marine Aircraft . 

Further Definition of 2nd Air Division

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control Arrangements For Operations In Laos . . . 

Control of Navy Strike Aircraft Diverted

From North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Controlling The Strikes Up North . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Coordinating Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Route Packages—A Control Arrangement . . . . . . 

Command of Bomber Force—Continuing

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER IV: THE COUNTER AIR BATTLE (AIR

SUPERIORITY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Superiority, World War II––8th & 9th

Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Superiority Korea—5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Superiority—North Vietnam—A New

Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The North Vietnamese Air Defense System . . . . . 

xvi
North Vietnamese Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Anti-Aircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Wild Weasel—Iron Hand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

SAM Operators’ Countertactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Rules of Engagement—A Continuing SAM

Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Losses to SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MIGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MIG Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MIG Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Seventh Air Force Deals With the MIGs . . . . . . . . 

BOLO—A Fighter Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Battle Changes—Missiles And

“Hit-and-Run” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Control In The Target Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Considerations Affecting Kill Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER V: INTERDICTION (World War II, Korea,

CHAPTER V: and Vietnam 1964–1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

OVERLORD And Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

OVERLORD’s Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Retreat to Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chinese Cross the Yalu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Interdiction Begins––Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

North Vietnamese Logistical System . . . . . . . . . . 

Variables Influencing the Interdiction Campaign . 

All-Weather Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Early Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

F-111 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Railroad System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Road Network—Key Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Interdiction Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Sortie Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Some Tactical Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Night Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER VI: INTERDICTION (Vietnam 1968–1972) . . . . 

Laser & AC-130s—New Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1968 Bombing Halt—Impact on Interdiction . . . . 

Strikes Below The 20th Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bombing In Route Package VI A (Hanoi Area) . . . 

Strike Force Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Penetrating The Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Importance of Tanker Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Weather Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lack of Surprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Reconnaissance—Covering The Targets . . . . . . . . 

Reconnaissance Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Final Days—1972 Bombing Offensive . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER VII: AIRPOWER AND THE GROUND BATTLE . 

Increased U.S. Involvement in Vietnam . . . . . . . . 

Developing The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FARM GATE—A Force For Counterinsurgency . . . 

Tactical Air Control System Builds . . . . . . . . . . . 

Evolution Of System For Air Support . . . . . . . . . . 

North Africa—The Classroom For Vietnam . . . . . . 

Europe—Refinement Of The System . . . . . . . . . . 

Adapting The Air-Ground Operations System To

Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Battle Changes—New Demands . . . . . . . . . . 

No Battle Lines—FACs Come Of Age . . . . . . . . . . 

Jets Are Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Air-Ground Operations System Expands . . . 

2nd Air Division Becomes 7th Air Force . . . . . . . 

Employing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Advantages Of Aircraft Ordnance Over Artillery . . 

Daylight Fighter Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Night and Bad Weather—Special Techniques . . . . 

B-52s And The Ground Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Navy and Marine Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

xviii
CHAPTER VIII: BLUNTING THE ATTACK WITH AIRPOWER

CHAPTER VIII: (JUNCTION CITY, Khe Sanh, Tet, Easter

CHAPTER VIII: Offensive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Operation—JUNCTION CITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Enemy Probes For An Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

KHE SANH––Airpower in the Forefront . . . . . . . . 

Prelude To Tet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Tet—The Offensive Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preparing For Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Excursion Into Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Withdrawal—An Uneasy Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Easter Offensive—A Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1. North Korean Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Dien Bien Phu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Air Commando and His Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. 94-Target Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. P-40s In North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. Northwest Africa Air Force After Casablanca

6. Conference (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Proposed Organization For The Invasion of Europe . . 

8. B-17s With Their Fighter Escort Enroute To Europe . 

9. Organization For “OVERLORD” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10. Final Organization After Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11. Command Organization—Korea (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . 

12. Far East Air Force Command (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13. NAVFE View Of Areas Of Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . 

14. Joint Policy Agreement For Control Of

14. Aircraft—Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

15. Military Assistance Advisory Group

14. (Air Element)—1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

16. MAAG To MACV (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

17. Proposed Organization For Vietnam And

14. Thailand (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

18. CINCPAC Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

19. Target Request And Approval Net For North

14. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

20. Air Command Arrangements Southeast Asia

14. (1966–1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

21. Heavy Traffic Along Ho Chi Minh Trail . . . . . . . . . . . 

22. U.S. Navy A4-C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

23. U.S.S. Coral Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

24. U.S. Navy A-7 Bombing Bridge In North Vietnam . . . 

25. Route Package System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

26. Target Request System to White House . . . . . . . . . . 

27. MACV Proposal For Control Of Route

14. Package II (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

xx
28. Command and Control Of Air Operations (1972) . . . 

29. MIG-15 Being Shot Down Over North Korea . . . . . . 

30. F-86s Patrolling The Skies of North Korea . . . . . . . . 

31. Yalu River Fighter Sweeps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

32. “Gaggle” Of F-86s Entering “MIG Alley” . . . . . . . . . . 

33. North Vietnamese Radar Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

34. Status/AAA In North Vietnam (March 1968) . . . . . . 

35. North Vietnamese 57mm AAA Battery (1965) . . . . . . 

36. Sophisticated AAA Emplacement (1967) . . . . . . . . . . 

37. SAM Sites And Coverage, North Vietnam (1969) . . . . 

38. Enemy SAM Site Near Hanoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

39. Close-Up Of Early North Vietnamese SAM

14. Site (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

40. Typical Strike Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

41. Chaff Corridor––Linebacker I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

42. Chaff Cloud––Linebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

43. Air-To-Ground Missile Streaking For Target . . . . . . . 

44. AAA Emplacements On Dike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

44. [Sic] SA-2 Missile Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

45. North Vietnamese SAM Effectiveness (1965–1972) . . 

46. USAF F-4 Being Hit By SA-2 Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . 

47. MIG 21 Over North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

48. MIGs In Revetments At Phuc Yen Airfield . . . . . . . . . 

49. North Vietnamese Airfields (1966 & 1972) . . . . . . . . 

50. North Vietnamese Air Force Combat Inventory

14. (1964–1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

51. F-105s In Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

52. F-4s In Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

53. MIG-17 Making Firing Pass at USAF F-105 . . . . . . . 

54. Radar Coverage––ITACS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

55. Southeast Asia Strike Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

56. “WATERBOY” At Dong Ha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

57. EC-121 “College Eye” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

58. F-4 Returning To Home Base In Thailand

14. After Mission Over North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . 

59. USAF Air-To-Air Weapons Kills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

60. Bomb Damaged Railroad Yards In France . . . . . . . . 

61. Bomb Damaged Marshalling Yard, Folligny,

14. France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

62. The “Transportation Plan”––Interdiction In Europe . 

63. Results Of AAF Fighter Attacks On Retreating

14. German Columns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
64. North Korean Supplies Burn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

65. Stabilized Line Of Contact––Korea (Dec 1950) . . . . . 

66. F-51s From the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing,

14. 5th Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

67. Smoke Billows From Bombing Of Targets In

14. Pyongyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

68. Results of Strikes On Machine Factory––Pyongyang . 

69. Smoke Billows From Bombing Of Kep Marshalling

14. Yard––April 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

70. North Vietnam’s Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

71. Restricted Zones Around Hanoi And Haiphong . . . . 

72. Portions Of Paul Doumer Bridge Destroyed . . . . . . . 

73. Rebuilding Of Several Spans Of Doumer Bridge . . . . 

74. The Key Bridges In North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

75. Direct Hits On Thai Nguyen Steel Mill . . . . . . . . . . . 

76. Enemy Traffic Flow (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

77. Ban Laboy Interdiction Point, Ban Karai Pass . . . . . 

78. Close-up Of Ban Laboy Interdiction Point . . . . . . . . 

79. Southwest Monsoon Enemy Traffic Flow . . . . . . . . . 

80. Enemy Road Network Through Laos And

14. South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

81. Truck Convoy On Route 137, Ban Karai Pass . . . . . 

82. Areas Of Operation In Laos (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

83. Areas of Operation In Laos (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

84. Areas of Operation In Laos (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

85. USAF C-130 Airborne Command Post (ABCCC) . . . . 

86. Stations Inside ABCCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

87. B-57 On Bomb Run In South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . 

88. AC-130 “Spectre” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

89. Close-up Of AC-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

90. Enemy Supply Areas Developed After Bombing

14. Halt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

91. USAF EB-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

92. EB-66 Radar (ECM) Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

93. Typical Strike Penetration And Egress . . . . . . . . . . . 

94. F-105s Bombing Under Radar Control . . . . . . . . . . . 

95. Basic Mission Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

96. Air Refueling Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

97. F-105s Refueling From KC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

98. F-4s Approaching Refueling Boom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

99. North Vietnamese Early Warning System . . . . . . . . . 

xxii
100. Reconnaissance Close-up Of 57mm AAA Site . . . . . 

101. RF-4 Being Readied For Recce Mission . . . . . . . . . 

102. Momyer’s Interdiction Funnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

103. 20th Parallel Interdiction Funnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

104. Major Target Area––Linebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

105. Close-up Of Hanoi Rail Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

106. Bomb Damage––Gia Lam Rail Yard And Shops . . . 

107. U-10 Psychological Warfare Aircraft Over South

14.7 Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

108. USAF A-26 Awaiting Day’s Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . 

109. C-47 Used By The Air Commando Units . . . . . . . . 

110. USAF T-28––Early Mainstay Of Air Commando

14.7 Fighter Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

111. Monkey Mountain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

112. Organization For Air Operations, North Africa . . . . 

113. Joint Operations Center, Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

114. USAF A-lE Loaded To The Hilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

115. USAF A-lE Enroute To Support Ground

14.7 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

116. South Vietnam’s Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

117. O-1 “Bird Dog” Watching Over U.S. Army

14.7 Special Forces Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

118. Air-Ground System, U.S. And Vietnamese (1968) . . 

119. P-40s Taxiing Into Position, North Africa . . . . . . . . 

120. B-24s Bombing German Positions In France . . . . . 

121. USAF AC-47 And Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

122. B-52s Bombing Suspected Viet Cong Positions . . . 

123. U.S. Marine A-6 “Intruder” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

124. War Zone “C” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

125. F-100 Delivering “Iron Bombs” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

126. JUNCTION CITY, Phase I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

127. JUNCTION CITY, Phase II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

128. The Battle For Ap Soui Tre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

129. Operations TALLY HO And NEUTRALIZE . . . . . . . . 

130. USAF C-130 Landing At Khe Sanh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

131. Khe Sanh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

132. U.S. Organization (In I Corps) For TET Offensive . . 

133. 1968 TET Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

134. Lam Son 719 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

135. 1972 Spring Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

136. USAF A-37 Bombing Viet Cong Positions . . . . . . . . 
137. USAF C-130 Delivering Supplies to Vietnamese

14.7 Troops At An Loc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

xxiv
Chapter I

STRATEGY

My vantage point in World War II, as Commander of th

Fighter Group in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, gave me a goo

of more German and Italian Fighters than I really cared to se

not many opportunities to witness the making of Allied air st

However, every pilot knew that our strategy embraced two 

mental features: attacks against the enemy heartland (with w

had little to do, either in Europe or the Pacific) and partici

with surface forces to destroy the opposing forces or cause th

surrender. The first priority of our air strategy was to gain c

of the air. Then we concentrated our efforts on isolating the 

field and providing close air support. This air strategy provide

ibility to the Allied armies in their ground campaigns and gu

teed a minimum of interference from the German Air Force. 

time I returned to the U.S. in 1944 to become Chief of Com

Operations on the Army Air Forces Board, our Airpower had 

ally destroyed the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean through air

engagements and attacks on airfields and logistical bases; a

had repeatedly cut the enemy’s air, sea, and land lines of co

nication, enabling our armies to capture North Africa and Sic

to invade southern Italy.

At about the time I was leaving Europe, our B-29s in the 

were beginning their attacks against Japan from bases in Ch

November 1944, B–29s from China and the Marianas raided 

and in March 1945, Major General Curtis E. Lemay began th

sive campaign of night, low-level incendiary attacks. The air 

the Pacific culminated with the dropping of atomic bombs on 

9 August, events which profoundly affected U.S. air strategy

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TACTICAL AIR FORCES

With nuclear weapons a reality in the late forties and early 

many strategists urged that we evaluate all military forces i

of their ability to contribute to a general nuclear war.1 But 

planners disagreed. A reduction in the size of U.S. armed 
prompted a debate which brought out basic differences amo

service chiefs and within the Air Force itself, I was uniquel

ated to view this debate. Having been assigned as Assistan

of Staff of Tactical Air Command in 1946, I was at Hq TAC 

the Air Force separated from the Army in 1947, and I rem

with TAC until going to the Air War College in 1949.

The Army maintained that substantial conventional forces 

be needed to fight limited wars. To evaluate all forces on the 

of their contribution to a general nuclear war with the Soviet 

would be imprudent, they said. Several air strategists replie

with nuclear weapons, it no longer made sense to maintain 

conventional forces since such forces couldn’t survive in a n

war. Furthermore, Airpower’s capacity to eliminate the com

centers of an enemy made extensive surface campaigns un

sary. Airmen conceded that some conventional forces wo

needed for limited wars, but said that these forces need o

large enough to force the enemy into tactics that would pro

target for our nuclear weapons. They doubted, too, that a l

war could remain limited indefinitely. Either the employment 

threat of nuclear weapons would halt the conflict, or the c

would rapidly expand to a general war.

But even within the Air Force during the late 1940s and 

1950s, there was fundamental difference of views on limite

Many tactical airmen, including Lieutenant General Elwo

Quesada and Major General Otto P. Weyland, believed tha

nuclear war was the most probable type of future conflict. 

airmen argued that limited wars of the future would be 

without nuclear weapons because national leaders would 

that once nuclear weapons were introduced, it would b

impossible to prevent the escalation of any conflict into g

nuclear war: If the initial employment of small nuclear we

didn’t produce the desired effects, commanders would 

strike additional targets with more and larger weapons. W

explosion of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union in 1949, 

clear that nuclear weapons were no longer a U.S. monopol

tactical airmen argued that we had to prepare for limited w

which both sides would voluntarily refrain from using n

weapons. We had to maintain sizeable tactical forces capa

fighting with conventional weapons.

At a time when the Air Force was shrinking and fund

short, though, it wasn’t easy to find money for convention

tical weapon systems. Understandably, most of the Air 

2
have to deter or win a general nuclear war with the 

Union.2 Strategic forces received most of the Air Force d

and only those tactical forces that had a nuclear capability 

demand and get substantial funding. Other elements of th

tical force had to forego modernization.

Despite our national emphasis on strategic nuclear force

tical airmen continued to press for the restoration of a 

nuclear capability such as we had possessed during Worl

II. They stressed that the type of command and control s

needed in a theater nuclear war was the same as that need

non-nuclear war. If the tactical air force were to conduct 

ater nuclear campaign, it would require a modernized com

and control system and procedures for close coordinatio

ground forces, irrespective of the intensity and duration 

conflict. To carry out a theater nuclear strategy, precise c

of Airpower would be essential to prevent fallout and casu

to our own air and ground forces.

It seemed to these airmen that the essential elements of 

tical air force would be the same whether the force were de

for a nuclear or non-nuclear situation. They believed, fu

that although additional aircrew training would be necess

some aspects of nuclear operations, basic tactical skills 

remain the same. Tactical training would simply omit c

aspects of non-nuclear weapons delivery and emphasize 

basic techniques such as dive bombing and low altitude 

ing which were common to tactical nuclear and non-n

weapons delivery. Thus it would be feasible to maintain 

nuclear proficiency without degrading an aircrew’s abi

deliver tactical nuclear weapons.

In the years preceding the Korean War, tactical air force

being cut back in accordance with the overall national poli

lowing World War II. Even with these reduced forces an

emphasis on nuclear operations, however, there remained 

residuum of experience in non-nuclear operations from 

War II. Despite a shortage of equipment, the high level of e

ence permitted expansion and modernization of the tacti

forces when they were needed in Korea.

KOREAN WAR—A DILEMMA

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea on 25 

1950,3 U.S. defense planners carefully evaluated our strate
Would it be acceptable to our allies? On both counts the st

was deficient. There were few attractive targets for tactical n

weapons because of the lack of concentration of North K

forces and the many alternative routes of advance afford

enemy by the Korean terrain. Further, the Allied forces 

retreating in such disarray that it was unrealistic to suppos

we could promptly turn them around for a counterattack in 

nuclear weapons could provide the basic firepower.

By the time the Allied forces had withdrawn into the 

perimeter, the employment of nuclear weapons was not a 

tic option because of the poor targets and the attitude 

allies toward these weapons. Air strategy, then, was bas

non-nuclear weapons, and it comprehended the same mi

that tactical air forces had performed in World War II. Wi

North Korean Air Force neither a significant threat nor 

range of the retreating Allied forces, air strategy focused in

on chopping off the supply lines to the North Korean g

forces, making it impossible for these divisions to mount 

tained offensive against the Pusan perimeter. Also a part 

strategy, of course, was a direct attack against assaulting g

forces. American airmen maintained complete control of t

for the Inchon invasion and the subsequent advance into 

Korea. Air strategy was an essential part of the joint strate

When the Chinese communists invaded Korea in O

1950,4 however, the Allies had to make major revisions in 

strategy. As the enemy forces moved across the bord

appeared that Airpower would have to be employed much 

broadly to reduce the numerical superiority of the Ch

MacArthur proposed that the bridges and lines of comm

tion used by Chinese entering North Korea be subjected t

tained air attack. He felt it imperative to deny these forc

sanctuary they then enjoyed.

Among airmen the question of how Chinese and Sovi

power could be contained along the Yalu was debated with 

Some airmen, including Majors General Emmett O’Donne

believed it would be necessary to strike the airfields and e

the fighters deep in the rear areas if control of the air were 

established. (All agreed that such control was absolutely 

tial to our retreating ground forces, who were so badly ou

bered that many Americans were questioning whether the 

could hold any position in Korea.)5 O’Donnell and others in

4

attack the Allied air forces and our forward bases.

After considerable deliberation, the Joint Chiefs recomm

that Far East Command’s air offensive not be extended b

the Yalu into Manchuria unless the enemy launched mass

attacks against our forces, in which event American a

would destroy the airfields from which the attacks origin

For airmen in Korea, the recognition of an enemy san

across the Yalu posed a terrific problem: How were we to c

a numerically superior enemy fighter force when all of ou

ward bases and lines of communication were open to atta

YALU—CONTAINMENT OF MIGS

Clearly we had to shift from an air strategy oriented pri

toward close support of our ground forces to a new strategy 

ing (1) offensive fighter patrols along the Yalu, (2) attacks a

forward staging bases from which MIGS might strike 5th Air 

airfields and the 8th Army, and (3) intensive attacks again

main supply lines of the advancing Chinese army. These air 

tions became the primary means of preventing the enemy’s a

ground forces from pushing the Allied army out of Korea. T

Army’s objective was to hold, rather than to defeat or destro

opposing ground forces. This objective evolved from the pra

observation that a much larger ground force would be nee

defeat the enemy. Such a ground campaign would be too lon

too costly.

Maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy’s rear ar

lines of communication, and his engaged troops, Airpower 

persuade the enemy to cut his losses. The North Koreans 

finally persuaded that they should seek an end to the war 

conference table rather than on the battlefield, and negot

ended the conflict on 27 July 1953 after three years of fighti

IMPACT OF KOREAN WAR

With the end of the Korean War, defense planners reeva

our strategy for employing Airpower. Perhaps the para

question of the time was whether we should prepare to figh

ited as well as general wars. After the agony and expe

Korea, an understandably popular position was that we 

never fight, nor should we prepare to fight, another wa

Korea. Adding to the popularity of this position was the fa

it could be used to justify a reduction in defense force

6
nuclear weapons could end it quickly. But the way to p

such wars would be to maintain military and political pr

against potential instigators. If the outside support for a l

conflict were neutralized, the conflict itself would soon d

lack of weapons and other resources. Most airmen consen

the idea that nuclear weapons should be the basis of our d

strategies, but the Army and Navy maintained that limite

flict was most likely and that limited wars would, at lea

tially, be fought with conventional weapons.

Once again nuclear forces were accepted as the domina

ment of our national defense, and all forces were evaluated i

of their usefulness in the event of nuclear conflict. Resource

cated to nonnuclear forces were sufficient only to fight a brie

limited war. Throughout the mid-fifties, all of the services ac

the nuclear war premise in their yearly budget argument

Army, however, continued to press for sizeable forces capa

fighting a limited non-nuclear conflict. Army spokesmen 

that the dominant concern about nuclear war was overshad

the need for ground forces capable of fighting in situations 

than nuclear battlefields in Europe. Nevertheless, the surviv

of forces on a nuclear battlefield continued to be a major co

of most strategists during the period.

THE FRENCH IN INDOCHINA

In 1953 on the eve of Dien Bien Phu, U.S. defense planne

fered widely in their opinions about the appropriate role of Air

in low scale conflict. Several Army planners felt that Airpower 

operate only as a supporting force. The main role of Airpowe

in their view, the delivery of supplies, equipment, and pers

and the support of civic action measures. Whatever firepow

required to deal with guerrilla actions wouldn’t demand the s

ticated weapons of our Airpower arsenal. Based on these vi

Airpower, and the experience of ground warfare in Korea, th

vailing view in the U.S. military establishment was that U.S. 

should not become engaged in Vietnam and Laos; rather, we s

continue to support the French in their expansion of Vietn

forces to counterbalance the Viet Minh threat.

However, some elements of the U.S. military were no

vinced the French were making sufficient progress in bu

self-sufficiency into the Vietnamese armed forces. They fe

the French were placing too much emphasis on training 
views were based largely on Britain’s experience in Malaya 

there were no large, conventional ground actions. Alm

engagements were small, brief counter-guerrilla actions

success of the British in containing and eventually elimi

the insurgents in this conflict convinced many in the U.S

tary that this was the strategy the French should pursue i

taining the Viet Minh. Airpower had played a limited role 

Malayan insurgency, and this fact was used as evidence th

power would not be critical for the success of the Fren

Indochina.

We should have learned from the French defeat at Dien 

Phu on 7 May 1954, however, that the French were figh

much different foe than the British had faced in Malaya. F

British, it was relatively simple to shut off most of the ex

support to the Malayan insurgents.8 On the other hand, th

Minh were a much larger force and were equipped wi

weapons of an organized army rather than those of a gu

band. The tactics and strategy required to defeat the Viet 

therefore, were closer to those of conventional warfare th

those of counterinsurgency operations. Militarily, the loss o

Bien Phu was not disastrous. Many battles have been l

campaigns that were eventually successful, and the F

strength in Southeast Asia was still formidable after the 

Dien Bien Phu. The battle was, however, a crushing b

French morale. In France, news of the loss further inf

those who already deeply resented the fact that their count

been in a constant state of war since World War II. Thus

Bien Phu set the stage for the total disengagement of the F

and for the involvement of the United States.

SEATO

Having failed to achieve collective participation in an ef

save Dien Bien Phu, the United States sought a regional ar

ment that would provide a basis for future collective actio

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) came into exi

in February 1955, following the signing of the Geneva Acc

July 1954.* Although this treaty did not obligate the U.S. to 

8

*The United States did not sign the 1954 Geneva Accord, but did sign the 

Agreement. See Senate Foreign Relations Committee Print, Background I

tion Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (7th Revised Edition), De

1974.

such an action. In one respect, the treaty was essentially a 

ing to the North Vietnamese that if they attempted military 

in South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, the members of the 

organization might respond with military force. U.S. policy 

point, therefore, was to provide assistance to the French 

threatening to use greater force if the North Vietnamese con

their effort to undermine the governments of South Vietna

Laos by covert and overt military actions. Our strategy was 

on the hope that the insurgency would be contained by the 

Vietnamese and Laotian forces and that these countries of S

east Asia would eventually achieve a peaceful political acco

dation among themselves.

Contrary to our hopes, it soon became clear that the S

Chinese, and North Vietnamese were not about to discontinu

support of the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. Military suppli

weapons from the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet 

made their way through North Vietnam into Laos and Sout

nam with increased frequency. By the beginning of 1961, th

ation in Laos and South Vietnam had become so critica

deployment of U.S. forces was under serious consideration

level of logistical and training support was no longer adequ

halt the enemy’s advances in Laos and South Vietnam, an

threat of retaliation contained in the SEATO treaty was h

little influence on the North Vietnamese-backed insurgents.

WARS OF LIBERATION

In 1961, Khrushchev’s speech proclaiming “wars of liber

as the wars of the future and President Kennedy’s confronta

Vienna with the Soviet leader led to a vigorous re-examina

U.S. military strategy.10 President Kennedy then directed the 

ditious development of U.S. forces with special skills in th

duct of counterinsurgency or sub-limited wars. The inten

his planners was that indigenous forces would suppress gu

activities while our specialists did the training and assis

“nation building.”

This reorientation of our defense priorities toward smalle

flicts prompted considerable debate about how best to cop

these wars. In the Army, most believed that it was necessary 

ate Special Forces (Green Berets) specifically trained and org

for counterinsurgency activities. In the Air Force, many b

that existing tactical forces could adjust to counterinsurgenc

10
surgency was the combat of the future and that the Air 

should build a special force for such conflicts.

To most Department of Defense (DOD) analysts, the arg

of those who favored specialized forces seemed to be sup

by the circumstances in Southeast Asia. These circums

apparently didn’t demand sophisticated equipment or m

firepower, but rather called for weapons consistent with th

ities of the Laotian and South Vietnamese forces who 

operate them. Further, our employment of sophisticated a

would raise the level of violence and could promote a large

But appearances in 1961 were deceptive. There was li

remind us that the North Vietnamese who conquered Dien 

Phu were a highly trained, conventional army employing 

tively sophisticated weapons and tactics. In fact, while w

sidered the merits of various approaches to counterinsu

warfare, the fighting in parts of Southeast Asia had a

passed through that stage of conflict. Soon we would confr

enemy who was trained and ready to employ sophist

weapons and to fight in large, highly organized units.

In the U.S. in 1961, however, the training of special for

counterinsurgency operations was proceeding with the u

speed. On 4 May 1961, Secretary of State Rusk said tha

forces would not then be sent to Vietnam in a combat role, 

made no promises about the future.11 In the meantime, the 

tion in South Vietnam was deteriorating rapidly. By the end o

the Joint Chiefs were telling the Secretary of Defense that if 

Vietnam were to remain free, it would be necessary to deplo

combat forces. So far, the South Vietnamese had not demons

an ability to stop the Viet Cong in the countryside. The large

were relatively free of the Viet Cong, but the countryside, to 

extent, was under enemy control. Thus the plan to assist w

actively participating was proving unsuccessful.

“JUNGLE JIM” FIRST COMBAT DEPLOYMENT

With the deployment of U.S. Army Special Forces to train 

Vietnamese late in 1961, the direct involvement of U.S. for

combat was virtually assured.12 Even though our forces wer

primarily to teach, they were sure to become involved in figh

their isolated camps deep in territory dominated by the Viet 

While the Army was sending the first of its Special For

Vietnam, we in the Air Force were activating our first speci
questioned the wisdom of investing in such units, but Sec

McNamara stated that the Vietnamese conflict should be 

oratory for the development of organizations and procedu

the conduct of sub-limited war,”13 and we responded with 

out effort to put together a unit of World War II aircraft c

of fighting sub-limited wars. Our efforts were spurred, too, 

visit of Walt W. Rostow and General Maxwell D. Taylor to 

Vietnam in October 1961. They recommended more aid for 

Vietnam and supported the decision made earlier in the 

to deploy U.S. troops for logistical support and trainin

November, we were ready to deploy a combat unit of “Air 

mandos” equipped with T28s, 1J-26s, and other vintage ai

JUNGLE JIM was the nickname given this unit, and the d

ment that deployed to South Vietnam was dubbed FARM 

FARM GATE’s purpose was to train South Vietnamese 

but our crews soon found themselves flying combat missi

response to emergency requests. The South Vietname

Force (VNAF) simply could not provide all of the help tha

urgently needed by the South Vietnamese Army. FARM 

therefore, was engaged in combat operations before the c

1962, and U.S. forces passed from the gray area of trainin

a limited combat role in a “sub-limited war.”

JOINT TASK FORCE 116—RESPONSE TO CRISIS IN LAOS

Most U.S. defense planners considered Laos to be an a

strategic importance because of its location between Chin

Thailand. In the event of war between the U.S. and China

could delay Chinese forces seeking to overrun Thailand. R

tically, we could not expect Laos to be our ally, but Laotian 

trality, at least, was essential to the security of Thailand. 

ever, by the spring of 1962, the North Vietnamese sup

Pathet Lao appeared about to capture most of the imp

areas of the country. Threats of U.S. intervention, implicit 

SEATO Treaty, had no significant impact on the conflict or 

peace negotiations then taking place in Geneva.

The Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) had develope

ious contingency plans for Southeast Asia, one of which add

precisely the situation then existing in Laos. Increasingly al

by events in Laos, President Kennedy activated the plan, th

directing the deployment of a Joint Task Force to Thailand

116 consisted mostly of air units, and the possibility that thi

12
might be employed against the Pathet Lao was, and was int

to be, apparent to all. Whether a causal relationship or mer

cidence was at work, the Communist negotiators in Geneva 

the proffered peace agreement increasingly attractive as JT

moved into Thailand. An agreement to abide by the 1954 A

was signed on 23 July 1962. The U.S. had not been a signa

the Accord, but we agreed to accept its provisions.

Unfortunately, the North Vietnamese willingness to avoid 

116 far exceeded their willingness to comply with the Geneva 

ment. Our own efforts to comply now seem almost pathe

naive in comparison with the open contempt for the agre

demonstrated by the North Vietnamese. While we began with

ing our advisors from Southeast Asia in accordance with the 

ment, the North Vietnamese were withdrawing none of their 

Furthermore, based on our interpretation of Articles 17-19 

original accord, we deferred the modernizing of FARM GATE 

in South Vietnam with jet aircraft. Basically, the articles res

the replacement of worn-out equipment with new types of arm

materiel to a piece-by-piece basis. These articles were partic

troublesome to our Air Force planners, but much less so 

North Vietnamese who simply ignored them from the outset

An Air Commando poses in front of his U-10 “Psywar” aircraft somewhere 

heart of South Vietnam.
uation in Southeast Asia was not improving. By mid-1962, 

other senior airmen and I were of the opinion that air s

against the North Vietnamese homeland would be neces

the war in South Vietnam were to be ended. The only altern

in our view, would be the deployment of numerous Am

ground forces. But even as early as 1962, opinion was s

divided on the issue of Airpower’s ability to stop the fight

South Vietnam. Among those who disagreed with our po

was Secretary McNamara, who said that “while naval a

support are desirable, they won’t win the war.”14 Paradoxic

figure who offered considerable support to our contention 

the importance of the revolutionary base in North Vietna

General Vo Nguyen Giap, the architect of the victory at Die

Phu and in 1962 Commander of the North Vietnamese Arm

was always clear about the facts that North Vietnam was th

olutionary base and that the success of communist military 

ations in Laos and South Vietnam depended directly up

support and employment of North Vietnamese forces. In 

however, relatively few senior DOD officials thought ser

about a strategic air offensive against North Vietnam. F

time being, our efforts and our strategy were limited to 

Vietnam.

Throughout 1963, the North Vietnamese continued to 

trate personnel and equipment. Furthermore, the imp

quality of their weapons indicated that more modern 

were being shipped from China and the Soviet Union. 

senior U.S. commanders with whom I talked in 1963 fel

that the war in South Vietnam was rapidly expanding 

conventional conflict, although a number of DOD planne

believed the war was primarily an insurgency that cou

brought under control within South Vietnam if we traine

equipped the South Vietnamese properly. Secretary McN

said that “South Vietnam is a test case for the new Comm

strategy,”15 by which he seemed to mean that South Vi

would be a test case, too, for his strategy of grad

response to provocation.

A CHANGING ROLE—THE U.S. TO FIGHT

Early in 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended th

U.S. take over the fighting in South Vietnam. They had 

ously directed Admiral Harry D. Felt, CINCPAC, to updat

14
against North Vietnam. Felt proposed a series of mea

designed to seal off North Vietnam by mining harbor

attacking shipping and selected lines of communication.16 

airmen agreed with Felt’s proposals but added that it wou

be necessary to cut off the infiltration of men and equipme

South Vietnam by attacking the North Vietnamese hom

Cutting lines of communication (LOCs) would be relativel

fective because most of them were hidden by jungle growt

because the North Vietnamese could multiply them almost 

initely simply by pressing more porters into service. In 

dance with DOD policy, however, Felt’s strategy was requ

be one of graduated response: Air strikes would begin on t

close to the DMZ, gradually working toward the North Vie

ese heartland with an increasing sortie rate.

Although the Joint Chiefs agreed that the U.S. would h

intervene if South Vietnam were to be saved, they were 

complete agreement on precisely how we should intervene

eral Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, argued for a co

trated attack against targets in the heart of North Vietnam

rect attacks in South Vietnam and Laos, in his judgment

not apt to be decisive.17 He recommended that a minimum 

ber of troops be deployed to South Vietnam immediat

secure the main airfields and other strategic areas. Th

should conduct a swift, devastating air offensive against 

Vietnam’s strategic targets. All of his experience had taugh

that such a campaign would end the war. If this strategy 

he said, we should then have to consider whether we wer

ing to deploy a large ground force to Southeast Asia.

On the other hand, General Earle G. Wheeler, Army C

Staff, thought it necessary for U.S. troops in South Vietn

take on more of the combat role. An air campaign, he be

should be directed at the lines of communication near the 

of South Vietnam, but not at the heartland of North Vietnam

main emphasis should be on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the 

tical network south of Vinh. Most senior Army officials be

that the war had to be won in South Vietnam and that t

campaign should support the in-country war chiefly th

close air support.18

The Army view was essentially that of Secretary McNama

believed that the war should be fought in South Vietnam an

the main roles of Airpower should be close air support and 

diction of lines of communication south of the 20th parallel 
and industrial targets could influence the North Vietnam

restrain their support of the Viet Cong, but he disagreed 

LeMay and other senior airmen who insisted that the only 

end the North Vietnamese pressure on South Vietnam w

destroy the war-related installations in North Vietnam.

On 1 June 1964 a top-level strategy conference conve

CINCPAC Headquarters in Honolulu. Those in attendance in

General William C. Westmoreland who was about to replac

eral Paul D. Harkins as Chief of Military Assistance Com

Vietnam (MACV); General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of th

Chiefs of Staff; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; Secretary o

Dean Rusk; and Secretary McNamara. Before the confe

LeMay and General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Commandant 

Marine Corps, had been pressing the view that air attacks a

the North Vietnamese were essential to halting the war in 

Vietnam.19 Admiral David L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Oper

agreed essentially with LeMay’s and Greene’s view, but he 

have placed more emphasis on sealing off North Vietnam 

external support, and less emphasis on attacks against ind

targets. At the conference, however, Taylor questioned whet

should attack North Vietnam at all. He agreed with the Secre

Defense that our main efforts should be designed to bolst

forces of South Vietnam and to cut the lines of communica

Laos. If attacks were to be made against North Vietnam, 

believed they should be near the DMZ, using U.S. and Sout

namese aircraft to demonstrate our joint resolve to expand th

flict if it continued in Laos and South Vietnam.

BOMB THE NORTH?—NO AGREEMENT

The U.S. strategy that emerged from the June 1964 Ho

Conference differed in no important way from our pre-Conf

strategy: We would build the South Vietnamese armed force

vide combat support when the South Vietnamese were una

handle the situation; and, if air attacks against North Vietn

targets should be necessary, we would select only targets ne

DMZ and would use both U.S. and South Vietnamese aircra

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, who replaced Admiral F

CINCPAC shortly after the Honolulu Conference, believe

this strategy would not force the North Vietnamese to st

fighting in South Vietnam and Laos. Thus he added his v

those of LeMay and Greene, urging that Airpower and 

16
differed from theirs only in his preference for a more g

application of power.

THE GULF OF TONKIN

At the direction of the JCS, the Defense Intelligence A

(DIA) had developed a list of strategic targets in North Vietn

the 94 targets, 82 were fixed, and 12 were railroad routes.20 

94 targets were considered to have a most direct relations

the North Vietnamese war-making capacity and will to fight

Staff planners had also designed an air campaign plan bas

the 94-target list.

On 2 August 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats at

the U.S. destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, and on 4 A

they attacked both the Maddox and the destroyer C. Turne

After these attacks, LeMay argued that now was the time t

cute at least part of the 94–target plan.21 However, the Joint 

decided that a more limited retaliation would be suffici

demonstrate the serious consequences of continued aggr

acts by North Vietnam.

STRATEGY—RETALIATORY ATTACKS IN NORTH VIETNAM

On 5 August 1964, U.S. carrier aircraft retaliated again

North Vietnamese torpedo boat anchorages and oil dump

above the 17th parallel in a strike that set the pattern for our 

air strategy. Until the bombing halt of 1968, our overall air st

was one of “tit for tat,” or graduated escalation, with targets 

released for attack a few at a time depending upon the activ

the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, the rationale for selecti

gets was oriented toward achieving some particular effect up

ground war in South Vietnam, not toward destroying the will 

North Vietnamese to fight.

*For the view of Admiral U.S.G. Sharp (CINCPAC) on strategy and the o

tion for command of forces in the Vietnam War, see Strategic Direction 

Armed Forces by Adm U.S.G. Sharp, U.S. Navy (Ret), Naval War College, N

R.I., 1977.

**By 1967, the list had grown to 244 active and 265 contingency targets. A

mander of 7th Air Force in 1967, I believed that there were about 165 espec

nificant targets on the list, with over 90% of them above the 20th parallel.
strikes of 5 August (known as PIERCE ARROW) had caus

North Vietnamese to discard their aggressive intentions. I

thing, the strikes seemed to have had the opposite effect

August, the North Vietnamese responded by moving 30 

from China into Phuc Yen airfield, indicating thereby tha

intended to continue fighting and to challenge our air at

Rather than shocking their leaders and disrupting war m

ery with a concentrated, strategic air offensive, we had m

alerted them to start work on what would become a supe

defense system of MIGs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), an

aircraft-artillery (AAA).

With the air moving toward higher levels of violence, the t

air forces in the United States were rapidly being traine

equipped for conventional operations. Since the Korean Wa

tively little attention had been given to refining or buildin

nuclear weapons or to training aircrews for delivery of non-n

weapons. Consequently, weapons for the initial bombing atta

Southeast Asia would have to come from the stockpiles 

Korean War. However, a hard core of combat experience still e

in the Air Force from the Korean War and in some cases from 

War II, and it was only a matter of months until fighter unit

thoroughly proficient in the delivery of non-nuclear weapons

By November 1964, the situation in South Vietnam had b

so alarming that Taylor (who had replaced Lodge as Amba

shortly before the Tonkin Gulf attacks) proposed “graduate

tary response against the lines of communication in Laos 

means of increasing the morale of the South Vietnames

reducing the flow of materiel to the Viet Cong forces.”22 Ho

there was not enough Airpower in the theater to take care 

increasing demands for close air support and at the sam

carry out an interdiction campaign against the LOCs in 

Although T-28s from both the lst Air Commando Squadron

VNAF were directed to attack the trail network below Tchep

Laos, they were too few to significantly reduce the flow of m

to the Viet Cong. Major General Joseph H. Moore, Comman

the 2nd Air Division (Second Air Division controlled USAF 

tions in Vietnam from 8 October 1962 until it was replac

18

*FARM GATE was inactivated in June 1963, and the 34th Tactical 

absorbed its aircraft and personnel. The squadrons of the 34th were ca

Commando Squadrons.
Seventh Air Force on 1 April 1966.) requested more forces, 

the same time he advised that the only way to stop the flow of 

Vietnamese men and supplies into South Vietnam was to op

the targets in North Vietnam. He agreed with LeMay that t

target list should be authorized for attack.
Responding to the gradually increasing threat of our Air

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong stepped up attacks a

airfields throughout South Vietnam late in 1964. The in

mortar and sapper attack on Bien Hoa Air Base in Nove

resulting in the loss of five B-57s, was an indication th

strategy of limited retaliatory strikes was not reducin

enemy’s desire to fight. Further, the South Vietnamese Arm

unable to cope with the increasingly aggressive thrusts 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. It was apparent 

change in strategy had to be made, and soon, if South Vi

were to be held.

Immediately after the attack on Bien Hoa, the Joint 

proposed a series of strikes against North Vietnam based 

94-target list. These attacks would be expanded to include 

of the targets if the enemy’s attacks in South Vietnam cont

President Johnson declined to accept the proposal, but it 

to put all of the JCS on record in favor of more aggressive s

against targets in North Vietnam.

Early in December 1964, the President decided to take 

deliberate action to convince the North Vietnamese th

United States would not let South Vietnam be taken o

force. In doing so, he altered the policy of exchanging “tit f

retaliatory strikes and moved toward a strategy of st

increasing pressure. As a part of this new strategy, Americ

strikes were authorized against the LOCs in Laos. Also, w

to begin striking targets just above the DMZ in North Vi

and would move gradually northward if the North Vietn

continued their aggressive activities.

The first of these strikes, termed FLAMING DART, wer

ducted in February 1965 against targets above the D

response to a series of attacks by the North Vietnamese an

Cong during that month.23 The enemy’s February attacks o

fields, headquarters, and advisory compounds throughout 

Vietnam made it apparent that they were making an all-ou

to collapse the military and political structure, convinced th

U.S. would not be able to halt their advance. Although the 

ING DART strikes were essentially reprisals for attacks on 

can installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon (and thus appea

resemble our reprisals after the Tonkin Gulf attacks), these 

ary raids were followed on 2 March by the first strikes of a c

uing, systematic air campaign termed ROLLING THUNDER.

20
Laos and North Vietnam below the 19th parallel, although 

understood that some targets in the Hanoi area would a

released from time to time. General LeMay, General Jo

McConnell (who succeeded LeMay on 1 February) and othe

ior airmen felt strongly that the initial conception of RO

THUNDER was too restrictive. They agreed that the LOCs 

the 19th parallel were important parts of the North Vietn

logistical network, but the vital elements of the system were 

Vietnam’s ports, railroads, marshalling yards, bridges, and 

centers; there were relatively few of these in the southern 

North Vietnam. Furthermore, as supplies funneled southw

became increasingly difficult to destroy them in large qua

because of the absence of open terrain and natural choke p

The dissemination of supplies among hundreds of jungle tra

thousands of porters guaranteed that air attacks in the 

would be less efficient than attacks against the Kep Marsh

Yard, the Paul Doumer Bridge, or the ports at Haiphong. Thu

ior airmen pressed for the expansion of ROLLING THUNDE

an air strategy focused upon the heart of North Vietnam.

But neither the President, the Secretary of State, nor the 

tary of Defense yet conceived of ROLLING THUNDER as a st

air offensive. The Secretary of Defense continued to maintai

the primary role for Airpower should be to support ground fo

South Vietnam, as it was here that the enemy must be de

military victory.24 On the eve of the April 1965 Honolulu Conf

attended by the Secretary of Defense, the Ambassador to Vie

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, CINCPAC, and others, Sec

McNamara still believed that ROLLING THUNDER should be 

ited application of Airpower against logistics targets relativel

to the DMZ. Further, the size and frequency of these strikes, 

as the targets, should be selected in Washington.

AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN—PROPOSED

When McConnell succeeded LeMay on 1 February, h

already familiar with JCS requests for a brief, intense bo

campaign, since he had been Vice Chief of Staff for the six m

preceding his assignment as Chief.25 Thus McConnell was re

propose, little more than one month after becoming Chief, th

JCS recommend a 28-day air campaign against the 94 tar

Like LeMay and Greene, he felt that the only way to end th

was to employ Airpower intensively against strategic targ
Vietnamese troops needed direct air support, and they 

receive it. But among the alternatives of a prolonged war of at

in South Vietnam, an invasion of North Vietnam, and a c

trated strategic air offensive, the most sensible strategy s

clearly to be the third.

Before submitting McConnell’s proposal to the Secret

Defense, the JCS expanded it into a four-phase plan: In Ph

attacks would be conducted below the 20th parallel for three 

at the discretion of the field commanders. The objectives of P

were to reduce the flow of logistics by battering the LOC

almost continuous attacks and to provide a clear indication 

North Vietnamese that we would increase the scope and in

of the war if they continued their efforts to overthrow the g

ment of South Vietnam. Phase II would be a six-week campa

sever the northeast and northwest railroads to China. Most 

tics coming from China (except for large bulk goods which tr

by ship) were carried on these lines. By cutting these rail lin

would be hitting the logistical system at its most vulnerable p

and would be bringing the war closer to the people and the g

ment, thereby attacking both the means and the will of the 

Vietnamese to fight. Phase III would last two weeks. We 

destroy the ports, mine the seaward approaches, and destr

ammunition and supply areas in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. D

Phase III, we would expect the North Vietnamese to decid

South Vietnam was no longer worth the price. By the end of 

III, most of the targets on the 94-target list would have been s

Phase IV, also lasting two weeks, would focus on industrial t

outside populated areas and on any earlier targets that h

been fully destroyed or had been repaired.27

The JCS sought at least limited approval for those portions 

plan which involved strikes north of the 20th parallel, but th

ident and Secretary of Defense elected only to increase the pr

on LOCs below the 20th parallel. This continued prohibit

strikes above the 20th parallel was a cause for increasing co

among McConnell and other senior airmen. As they watch

rapid improvements in North Vietnamese SAMs and AAA, the

ized that it would be much more difficult and costly to pen

these defenses in the future if targets above the 20th p

should then be cleared for attack. In addition, by mid-19

North Vietnamese Air Force had acquired five or six I1-28 li

bombers and based them at Phuc Yen airfield within range of 

targets in South Vietnam. McConnell thought it only prud

22
could still do so without losing many of our own men and p

By the summer of 1965, the air defense system above th

parallel was rapidly becoming quite formidable. Phuc Yen a

had become a major jet base; Kep and other airfields were 

expanded; and new airfields were being started. Because 

expansion, the JCS again requested authority to neutrali

airfields and SAMs, but the request was denied. Then on 2

an F-4C was shot down, and three other aircraft were dam

As a consequence of this enemy action, the President auth

strikes against those SAM sites that were actually firing 

aircraft. However, this authority did not extend to targets 

the 20th parallel or to the main defense systems which ext

outward from Hanoi and Haiphong for approximately 100 

and were heavily concentrated with a 30-mile belt around 

Having received approval to strike SAMs, the JCS contin

request approval for more of their proposed air campaign. Th

retary of Defense cited two principal reasons for his disapp

First, he doubted that the campaign would make much diff

to U.S. operations in South Vietnam. Second, and more 

tantly, he believed that the risk of a U.S. Chinese confron

could well be increased by a major air offensive.28 Parenthe

I should observe here that Secretary McNamara’s misgiving

shared by many outside the military who opposed the ide

strategic air offensive against North Vietnam. Fear that 

frontation with the Chinese would result from our expandi

war, and doubt about the ability of Airpower to destroy th

making capacity of the North Vietnamese led many to con

that the war had to be won in South Vietnam. For thos

accepted this position, it seemed apparent that Airpower 

contribute most by concentrating its efforts in South Vietna

along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and the coastal rail an

systems below the 20th parallel in North Vietnam.

GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED—PRIORITY SET

The first U.S. ground combat units arrived in Vietnam in 

1965 when 3,500 Marines waded ashore to defend Dana

April, the President authorized a substantial increase in g

forces to defend base areas and to reinforce South Vietn

Army units where they were incapable of coping with the e

The Secretary of Defense decided, further, to support the de

army forces with B-52 strikes in South Vietnam. Although 
bombers against the enemy’s major target systems and to 

used them for close support only in emergencies, the use of 

for in-country missions was in consonance with the Secr

view that the place to destroy the enemy was in South Vie

According to his strategy, the mission of in-country suppor

priority over all other missions in Laos or North Vietnam.

By July 1965, the buildup of U.S. ground forces was m

forward rapidly. At the same time, air units were com

South Vietnam and Thailand, and the Navy’s Task Force

the Gulf of Tonkin had been expanded to include three ca

In fact U.S. Airpower in Southeast Asia had virtually ac

the strength to apply any desired level of pressure on a

ments of the North Vietnamese military structure. Ami

rapid deployment of air, sea, and ground forces, the deb

strategy continued with airmen maintaining that the buil

ground forces should be held at a level sufficient to defen

fields and the major logistical and population centers un

air campaign had been tried. If this campaign didn’t per

the North Vietnamese to end the war, then and only then s

we proceed with a buildup of ground forces and accept a 

paign of attrition. General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of S

the Army, believed it would take approximately five and on

divisions to seal off the DMZ, and General Green thought it 

eventually be necessary to move 500,000 troops into South 

nam to stop the North Vietnamese.29 General McConnell

ported by his commanders in the field, strongly insisted 

strategic air campaign was the only way to end the war su

fully and soon. In a prolonged conflict we would risk losi

support of our allies and the public, he feared, even thou

could eventually win if our country maintained the will to 

REQUEST TO STRIKE AIRFIELDS CONTINUES

As our air strikes hit more and more targets in North Vi

below the 20th parallel, the North Vietnamese Air Force was 

ing in numbers and capability. MIG-21s at Phuc Yen wer

ducting limited sweeps south of Thanh Hoa, and on occasio

were using Thanh Hoa as a forward staging base for sweeps f

south. In the eyes of the 2nd Air Division commander, the 

mander of TF-77, and the JCS, the increasing MIG activity 

soon represent a challenge to our control of the air. The JC

posed, as they had on previous occasions, that Phuc Yen a

24
brought under attack and kept unusable. They pointed ou

control of the air was essential to the security of U.S. and 

Vietnamese forces. And with the massive deployments o

forces, all of the ports and adjacent supply dumps in South 

nam were congested and highly vulnerable to air attacks by 

We could not afford to ignore the growing capability of the 

Vietnamese Air Force to mount attacks against our aircra

these points of concentration.

The increasing strength of the North Vietnamese Air For

demonstrated on 24 and 25 August when seven of our plan

one drone reconnaissance aircraft were shot down.30 As a re

these losses, McConnell and Wheeler (who had become Cha

of the Joint Chiefs when Taylor replaced Lodge as Ambas

vigorously sought permission to strike Phuc Yen airfield. Sec

McNamara again disapproved the request on the ground

attacks on North Vietnamese airfields might cause the Chin

Force to assume the air defense mission in North Vietnam

an expansion of the war could easily result from the vi

inevitable confrontations between U.S. and Chinese pilot

Secretary left the door open, however, for a reexamination 

decision depending upon the actions of the North Vietname

the threat of their air force to our interdiction flights.

Through the remainder of 1965, however, our strate

mained unchanged, with the ground war in South Vi

receiving first priority for air strikes and with attacks in 

Vietnam being limited to targets south of the 20th para

fact most sorties into North Vietnam were flown against t

within forty to sixty miles of the DMZ.

At the January 1966 Honolulu Conference, Admiral 

again insisted that air and naval power had to be employed 

aggressively against North Vietnam if the war were to be 

soon. Since becoming CINCPAC, Sharp had often adv

attacking targets near Hanoi and mining the Haiphong h

Although he believed a vigorous ground action was nee

South Vietnam to contain the North Vietnamese, he felt t

use of Airpower against all suitable military targets throu

North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be the basis 

strategy. Lacking any evidence of North Vietnamese willin

to negotiate a settlement, the Joint Chiefs supported Sharp 

proposals for an expanded air war.

On 3 February 1966, Secretary McNamara stated tha

“objectives are not to destroy or to overthrow the Communi
They are limited to the destruction of the insurrection and a

sion directed by North Vietnam against the political institut

South Vietnam. This is a very, very limited political objec

Implicit in the Secretary’s statement was his belief that the w

still essentially an insurrection to be dealt with in South Vie

His concept differed importantly from the JCS view that thi

flict was no longer an insurrection but a conventional war r

ing a combined air and ground campaign that couldn’t be co

to South Vietnam. CINCPAC and the JCS agreed that th

aspect of the war in which we had the initiative was our ai

paign against the North Vietnamese heartland. We could cont

intensity and scope of air attacks while the North Vietnamese 

only attempt to blunt them when they came. On the grou

South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had the initiative sinc

forces could fight when they wanted and retreat into the jun

into sanctuaries in Laos or Cambodia when they didn’t. A

Sharp and the JCS believed, therefore, that this war could 

treated as an insurgency.

STRATEGY SLOWLY CHANGES

These differences in concept notwithstanding, U.S. strateg

in 1966 was moving slowly in the direction advocated by LeM

McConnell since 1964. More authority was being delega

Sharp and his field commanders for the conduct of air oper

Whereas the number and frequency of strikes into North Vi

had been controlled from Washington during the first h

ROLLING THUNDER, now Sharp was allowed, within c

restraints, to determine how much force would be applied an

often the targets could be struck. Sharp then delegated this a

ity to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force (CINCPACA

the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), subj

additional restraints included in his weekly operational inten

In spite of the operational retraints, Airpower was beginn

have an effect on the enemy’s logistics system. The LOCs alo

coast from the DMZ to the 20th parallel, although not as vu

ble as those above the 20th parallel, were better targets th

roads through the Mu Gia Pass and the jungle of the Laotia

handle. Although still not satisfied with the changing st

other senior airmen and I believed that Airpower was beginn

affect the enemy’s logistical system as it had in Korea. We d

believe, however, that our Airpower could be as effective as 

26
range of interdiction targets.

The authorization to attack oil storage facilities in the c

days of June 1966 was the beginning of a new phase in the 

egy of gradually increasing pressure on the North Vietnam

attacking targets closer and closer to the vital power cen

their government. But this piecemeal application of Airpow

relatively ineffective because it still avoided many of the t

that were of most value to the North Vietnamese. Consequ

the message conveyed by these strikes on the oil facilities 

the necessary ring of authority. Though harsh, the tone s

also hesitant and uncertain to the North Vietnamese.

Throughout the remainder of 1966, additional targets 

the 20th parallel were released one by one. Although th

quency of the strikes and the size of the striking forces we

very closely controlled in Washington, some change in st

was becoming evident; and it was expected by most comma

from Sharp on down that it was only a matter of time un

most important targets would be released.

President Johnson, in his State of the Union address 

January 1967, endorsed the strategy of increasing pr

when he said, “Our adversary still believes . . . that he can 

fighting longer than we can. I must say to you that our pre

must be sustained . . . until he realizes that the war he s

is costing more than he can ever gain. I know of no strategy 

likely to attain that end than the strategy of accumulating s

but inexorably, every kind of material resource . . . tha

patience—and I mean a great deal of patience.”32 Althou

President clearly meant to increase the pressure, and alt

the only real pressure on the North was being applied b

power, the ground campaign in South Vietnam remained th

mary element in U.S. strategy. Thus in Southeast Asia in 

Airpower was relegated to the role it had played in the K

War prior to 1952 when the 8th Army was given the t

defeating the Chinese and North Korean armies and f

negotiations. In Korea, this strategy was changed early in 

because of the high casualty rates. In Vietnam the strategy 

eventually change, too. But this time the change would be 

slower in coming, chiefly, I think, because our national 

makers in the mid-1960s believed that air strikes in the 

would have little effect on the fighting in the South, and be

the predictably inconclusive results of our piecemeal atta

the North did nothing to persuade them otherwise.
had three objectives: Reduce the flow and increase the c

infiltration; raise the morale of the South Vietnamese; an

vince the North that it must pay a very high price, in the 

for its aggression in the South.33 With these objectives in 

the President released more targets for attack above the 

parallel and authorized a campaign against the northeas

northwest rail lines. These intensified attacks against th

system deep in North Vietnam were intended to make it mo

ficult for the North Vietnamese to support their forces 

South, but the most important elements in the system, th

ments within 30 miles of Hanoi, were not released for attac

ing this early part of 1967.

By late spring, as the weather in North Vietnam improve

more targets were released within the 30-mile circle a

Hanoi, our air campaign began to exact a heavy toll on the 

portation system. As Commander of 7th Air Force, I wa

vinced that this was the time to release all the major targ

attack, and I was optimistic that the effects we had produ

the Korean War would be achievable in Vietnam. Admiral S

too, felt strongly that this was the time to discard our stra

gradual escalation in favor of an all-out effort to be sustain

long as necessary to end the war in South Vietnam.

While many of us in the military were encouraged b

progress being made against the North Vietnamese, Sec

McNamara and a number of his staff were concerned that w

getting deeper and deeper into the war with no end in sig

their view, a drastic change in strategy was needed to get n

tions started. Thus at the very time that Admiral Sharp, I, an

ers were urging an all-out air offensive, proposals to ha

bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward initiating negot

with the North Vietnamese were being considered by the Pres

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others.

Those who favored a bombing halt argued, first, that such 

ture might lead to peace negotiations and, second, that the ai

paign was not apt to be conclusive in any case. This latter arg

was based on interpretations of the Strategic Bombing Surve

28

*Strategic Bombing Survey: “Established by the Secretary of War on 3 

pursuant to a directive from President Roosevelt, for the purpose of con

an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germ

Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating Airpower as an instrument 

tary strategy.”
North Korean armies continued fighting for three years in s

the bombing of North Korea. From this reasoning, three alter

air strategies emerged: (1) We could stop all bombing in Nort

nam, or (2) we could stop the bombing at the 20th parallel

we could continue the bombing without change.34 Of cou

those who favored a bombing halt, the only real questio

whether we should stop all the bombing at once or phase b

the 20th parallel and see how negotiations progressed before 

ing the bombing further.

On the eve of the Saigon Conference, 7–8 July 1967, Sec

McNamara had tentatively concluded that we should sto

bombing above the 20th parallel. In preparation for this c

ence, General Wheeler, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

informed Admiral Sharp and his subordinate commander

this meeting might well determine the future of the bombing 

paign. If we failed to persuade the Secretary of Defense th

bombing campaign was worthwhile, the Secretary would 

recommend to the President that we halt the bombing abo

20th parallel. Wheeler and the JCS believed not only th

bombing should be continued, but that all of the 94 targets s

be released and that the President should consider blockad

mining the port of Haiphong. Wheeler believed, further, th

Secretary would be more attentive to the observations of h

commanders because of their intimate involvement in the c

than he would to the arguments of the Joint Chiefs, with 

opinions he was already well acquainted.

Admiral Sharp, Vice Admiral John Joseph Hyland (7th 

commander) and I all discussed the importance of the bo

campaign with the Secretary, apparently with some effect. 

not approve Sharp’s proposal to release the full target list, b

ther did he urge the President to stop the bombing above th

parallel at that time. He summarized his air strategy on 25 A

1967 in testimony to the Senate Preparedness Investigation 

committee: “The bombing of North Vietnam has always bee

sidered a supplement to and not a substitute for an ef

counter-insurgency land and air campaign in South Vietnam

The bombing campaign has been aimed at selected targets o

tary significance, primarily the routes of infiltration.”35

Wheeler and McConnell continued to seek authority to 

all the airfields in North Vietnam, especially Phuc Yen, the 

operational site of the North Vietnamese Air Force. As our 

to the MIGs and SAMs increased, McConnell, support
Navy pilots, we had to destroy the North Vietnamese air def

We needed a determined campaign of air-to-air engagem

attacks on airfields, and strikes against anti-aircraft and 

installations. If the entire air defense system were not br

under attack, we would continue to lose pilots and planes u

essarily, and we would continue to jettison many of our b

because of actual or threatened MIG attacks.

The President finally responded to these arguments by r

ing Phuc Yen for attack by 7th Air Force and TF-77 aircraft 

October 1967.36 There were, however, limitations imposed 

number of aircraft that could make the strike and the tim

ing which the attacks could be made. These restraints h

significant effect on the execution of the strike, but they 

firmed that the application of Airpower against the North 

namese homeland was not expected to be the decisive fac

halting the war. Thus, the air strategy had not changed s

cantly, nor did it change during the remainder of the 

although more targets were released.

TET—STRATEGY CHANGED

With the Tet offensive in January of 1968, McConnell, 

other airmen again sought a reconsideration of the air st

From the scope and intensity of the offensive, it was eviden

the North Vietnamese had no thought of negotiating an end 

war on terms that would be acceptable to the U.S. Their st

was designed to focus on the American home front as 

focused on public opinion in France in 1954. They hoped to 

the impression in America that the U.S. and South Vietname

itary were losing and that the only sensible course for th

would be to accept their terms and withdraw from the war.

Reaction in the U.S. to the Tet offensive was all that the 

Vietnamese had hoped it would be. Public opinion was 

split on the issue of what the U.S. should do in Southeas

and the President, convinced that he didn’t have the 

behind him for continued prosecution of the war, ear

sought to bring the North Vietnamese into serious peace n

ations. One possible means of inducement was to cut ba

bombing campaign as a sign of our sincere desire to negot

good faith. If we stopped the bombing, he hoped, the North 

namese would reciprocate by halting attacks on village

cities throughout South Vietnam.

30
military effect of halting all bombing above the 20th pa

They agreed that the bombing could be stopped for a shor

to determine whether the North Vietnamese wished to neg

seriously,37 but they strongly suspected that the North 

namese would continue to fight until we applied enough fo

threaten destruction of the power base in North Vietnam.

While the President considered the bombing halt, weat

Vietnam was changing from the northeast to the southwest 

soon. This meant that weather conditions over North Vi

would be poor for another month, during April, and woul

improve markedly. Thus, although I had no confidence th

would achieve a negotiated settlement at that time, I sup

the proposal for a bombing halt because I realized th

weather alone would probably cause us to cancel all but 

hundred sorties and because we were not being permit

strike the most valuable targets in any case. I felt that sto

the bombing above the 20th parallel to test the intentions 

North Vietnamese would have a minimum effect on the ai

paign if the bombing halt took place in the month of 

Wheeler, McConnell, Sharp, Ryan (General John D. Ryan, 

PACAF), and I with most of the other military leaders r

mended, however, that if the North Vietnamese didn’t st

shelling of South Vietnamese cities and the assassination 

lage chiefs, and didn’t show positive signs of de-escalati

fighting by withdrawing their regular divisions back acro

DMZ, we should resume bombing with no restriction

should mine the harbor at Haiphong. We further urged the 

ident to set a time by which substantive discussions must 

We believed that the U.S. should avoid long “fight and talk” 

tiations such as those that developed in the Korean War, n

ations that would almost certainly be used as a propa

forum by the enemy.

With these caveats, most of the top military comma

thought a halt to the bombing above the 20th parallel wo

militarily acceptable. Thus on 31 March 1968, President 

son said in a speech to the nation, “I am taking the first s

de-escalate the conflict . . . . Tonight I have ordered our a

and naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam 

in the area north of the demilitarized zone . . . . Our purp

this action is to bring about a reduction in the level of vi

that exists.”38
the restoration of all the railroad network above the 20th 

lel. The marshalling yards at Thai Nguyen and Kep, and s

ones along the northeast railroad were soon repaired, and 

from the Chinese border to Hanoi and points south wa

normal. In the CINCPAC Report on the War in Vietnam 

1968), Admiral Sharp observed that “almost 1300 trucks 

noted during Christmas and about 1800 during the s

longer New Year stand-down. This compared with a daily a

of about 170 for other days between 22 December 1967 

January 1968.”39 These frantic efforts by the North Vietn

to move as much materiel to South Vietnam as the system 

take were indicative of their intention to settle the fut

South Vietnam on the battlefield, not at the negotiating ta

By the time of the April 1968 bombing halt, defense an

in the U.S. were already anticipating withdrawal of U.S. t

Although the President had not announced such a mov

apparent lack of popular support for the war led many t

clude that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam was 

accompli. It would begin as soon as the South Vietnamese

our financial help and with our Airpower (to interdict supp

Laos and support the troops in South Vietnam), were a

carry the responsibility for the fighting.

As many of us had expected, the level of violence in Sout

nam remained about the same despite the bombing hal

North Vietnamese political assassinations and attacks a

isolated villages and camps continued. And in Paris, the n

ations started very slowly amid indications that procedura

ters would be employed to frustrate and delay. Neverthel

appeared that the trend of U.S. policy was toward less, not 

bombing as a means to advance the negotiations.

In July, the new Secretary of Defense, Clark M. Clifford, 

a visit throughout Southeast Asia to determine firsthand 

his field commanders thought of the combat situation.40 In 

he had been a strong supporter of the war, but in mid-19

was dubious that the war could be won militarily. Based 

observations of our allies, he was convinced that they wou

support us if the war continued. He didn’t believe that th

ited bombing campaign of July 1968 was effective, and 

that resumption of attacks above the 20th parallel was not 

sible course of action. Lacking concrete evidence that we 

end the war through military means by any specific date 

near future, he proposed to recommend to the President th

32
U.S. ground forces with the South Vietnamese assuming 

responsibility for the conduct of the war.

President Johnson, confronted with dissension throu

the country, asked senior officials to tell him in detail what 

be the most likely results if we should stop all bombing 

North but continue our reconnaissance flights and our in

tion of the supply lines in Laos. The other field commande

I advised against further curtailment of the bombing cam

We felt sure that the North Vietnamese would take advant

such a halt to move their fighters, SAMs, AAA, and logistica

ters closer to the DMZ.

Not long after I returned from Vietnam in August to b

Commander of Tactical Air Command, the President called 

of the Joint Chiefs and me to give him our views separately

of us assured the President that the North Vietnamese 

take advantage of the bombing halt to improve their posit

a future offensive. Furthermore, we said, it would be unre

to suppose that Airpower could control the enemy’s flow o

plies into South Vietnam by striking the LOCs in Laos if 

alternative routes in North Vietnam were immune to a

Each of us advised that if the President were convinced th

North Vietnamese sincerely wanted substantive negotiatio

might try a brief bombing halt without unduly jeopardizin

forces in South Vietnam. But if the North Vietnamese ma

prompt, visible effort to stop the fighting in South Vietn

they continued the infiltration of troops, if they failed to 

withdrawal of regular divisions, and if they showed no s

interest in the negotiations, then the bombing campaign s

be resumed against all military targets throughout North 

nam, and such a campaign should continue with no let-up 

our demands for a cease-fire were satisfied.41

On 31 October 1968 the President announced his decis

stop all bombing of North Vietnam but to continue reco

sance flights and interdiction of supplies moving through 

Just as the North Vietnamese had taken advantage of t

March bombing halt above the 20th parallel, they began 

diately to take advantage of this one. Soon our reconnais

flights showed a heavy flow of military traffic along all the 

coastal routes to the DMZ. Most of the small harbors u

down the coastline were crowded with small boats being u

shuttle supplies. From these early observations, senior m

officials concluded that the North Vietnamese would even
power were not used to attack these supply centers an

LOCs feeding them. Even if a decision were made to stri

supply dumps, we realized that destroying them would 

simple task because camouflage would make them unu

difficult to locate.

A NEW STRATEGY

As President Nixon took office, the conflict in Vietnam 

sented him with the need for some hard decisions on mat

strategy.* Given the national commitment to a gradual 

drawal of American ground troops, Airpower was his only 

of protecting our departing troops, and providing time f

South Vietnamese to improve their fighting ability. The ci

stances seemed to call more than ever for a new strateg

recognized and employed Airpower’s total capabilities.

As the North Vietnamese watched us prepare to withdraw 

Vietnam, they hurriedly shipped materiel south for wha

hoped would be their final offensive. We were able to de

greater effort to interdiction in Laos because of the shift

forces from targets in North Vietnam, but the North Vietn

put more war materials into their supply lines than they 

any other period of the war.42 As the North Vietnamese con

to expand their supply systems in Laos and the no

provinces of South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs pressed 

resumption of bombing below the 20th parallel. Other seni

men and I believed, of course, that an unrestricted cam

would have a much better chance of ending the war on fav

terms, but we understood that public opinion in the U.S. a

time would not support the President in such a decision. 

ever, the President did adopt a more aggressive tone towa

North Vietnamese, conveying a sense that our Airpower 

well be employed against the North Vietnamese homeland 

the infiltration stopped and there were productive negotia

In preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, it was c

that the supply centers in Cambodia and Laos be reduc

much as possible so that the North Vietnamese could n

these stockpiles of ammunition and other materiel to mo

34

*For a detailed discussion on the difference of views on strategy dur

period, see Congressional Record (House), vol. 118, part 13, 4–11 May 1
South Vietnamese. In 1965, General William C. Westmo

(Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietna

COMUSMACV, 1964-1968) had requested authority for B-

strike the supply bases in Cambodia from which the Viet 

and North Vietnamese were staging attacks into Military R

III. Permission had been gained from Prince Sihanouk in 1

attack these base camps provided that the U.S. made no 

announcements of the attacks.43 In accordance with this u

standing, B-52s began bombing the camps on 19 March 1

reduce the threat to Military Region III.

By the end of the year, the U.S. withdrawal from South 

nam was well underway. For the protection of our rem

troops and the South Vietnamese, there was no alterna

Airpower. Public opinion in this country would have st

opposed the return of U.S. ground forces, and the South 

namese Army and Air Force were incapable of holding o

North Vietnamese without the backing of U.S. Airpowe

North Vietnamese responded to the situation by stepping 

construction of airfields south of the 20th parallel and by 

ing SAM defenses further south until they covered all 

major passes and were actually a threat as far south as Do

in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese recognized th

success of our national strategy and the survival of South 

nam depended upon U.S. Airpower. To frustrate our str

they would have to bring U.S. aircraft under attack by 

AAA, and SAMs in these southern areas in the same mann

intensity as they had earlier near Hanoi.

In November 1968, President Johnson had decided to p

fighter escorts for our reconnaissance flights going into 

Vietnam.44 Initially, the escorting fighters were authori

attack only AAA and SAMs that were firing at the reconnais

aircraft. The escorts were known as protective reaction f

Their importance and their authorizations to strike def

installations increased through 1969 and 1970. By the 

1970, the size of the escorting forces had been expanded, a

fighters were armed with special munitions for their strike

Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese continued to increase 

SAM coverage above the DMZ and flew frequent missions a

our strike forces bombing in the Mu Gia and Ban Karai Pas

At the same time, MIGs were attempting to shoot down B-52

were being employed more frequently against the Laotian 

lines.
S. McCain, who succeeded Admiral Sharp as CINCPAC, 

the JCS to get authority to hit the airfields below the 20th 

lel. These were the fields from which the MIGs were threa

our flights below Vinh and in Laos. By keeping these fo

bases out of action, we could eliminate the MIG threat 

interdiction program. (And the importance of our interd

program was growing daily as departing U.S. ground 

shifted more and more of the combat responsibility to the 

Vietnamese.) Thus Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, who had re

General Wheeler as Chairman of the JCS, pushed vigorou

authority to hit not only the airfields but also the supply c

above Mu Gia Pass and those near Bat Lake some 30–40 

above the DMZ. He wanted U.S. Airpower to have a more 

presence in North Vietnam as positive evidence that all of 

Vietnam could come under attack if the ominous build

North Vietnamese forces in the south didn’t cease.

AIR STRATEGY ADOPTED

Throughout 1971 there was a slow but continuous expa

of air strikes in North Vietnam below the 20th parallel. Wh

our protective reaction strikes had originally been limi

active SAM and AAA sites, in 1971 special strike mission

directed against many of the same supply points that had 

struck before the 1968 bombing halt. President Nixon’s po

was that the security of our troops in South Vietnam dem

these protective strikes.

Many of us airmen contended, however, that these sma

infrequent strikes were too limited to reduce the flow of lo

along the coastal routes in North Vietnam. Although we we

orously pressing our interdiction program in Laos, we we

under stringent limitations as to the size and duration 

missions in North Vietnam. To reduce the flow of logistics 

icantly, we would have to make sustained attacks on all 

LOCs. Consequently, we felt that the greatest value of thes

ited strikes would be a signal to the North Vietnamese th

could still intensify the conflict terrifically if we were forced 

so. But it soon became apparent that the North Vietnamese 

paid much attention to these strikes or to the greater threa

represented, for shortly after the first of the year, they in

South Vietnam with more than 40,000 men.

36
DMZ and into Military Region I with some 400 armored ve

anti-tank missiles, shoulder-fired infrared missiles, and 1

and 130mm artillery, our hopes of reaching a negotiated 

ment on acceptable terms grew exceedingly slim.45 Their 

egy, it appeared, was to sever the northern two province

South Vietnam, push a salient deeply toward Pleiku, and 

the way for a future assault on Saigon. We faced the rapidly 

riorating situation in South Vietnam with virtually all 

ground forces gone and with our air force down to some 50

craft (as compared to more than 1000 combat aircraft tha

in 7th Air Force at the time of the bombing halt in 1968.)

President saw that the threat of bombing North Vietnam wo

dissuade the North Vietnamese and that the South Vietn

Army (ARVN) couldn’t contain the offensive without a heavy 

mitment of U.S. Airpower.

The North Vietnamese had extended their air defense syste

most of the northern two provinces. They also covered Khe 

Pleiku, and the Cambodian border in Military Region III. 

defenses, consisting of heavy AAA concentrations, SA-7s an

2s, made it impossible to operate the low performing aircraft 

Vietnamese Air Force in the northern areas without high lo

The high performing fighters and SAM-killing F-105s and F

7th Air Force were needed to suppress the defenses and 

close air support strikes to halt the advance. After the colla

the ARVN 3rd Division, in fact, it was only the extensive em

ment of U.S. Airpower that was able to bring the offensive to 

Our Airpower’s first priority was to support the South 

namese ground forces so that the ground battle could be stab

This was done by staging fighters from Thailand into airfie

South Vietnam, running a sortie, and then recovering back in 

land. By using this staging program and air refueling, and 

upon the combined efforts of 7th Air Force, TF-77, and the 

able Marine aircraft, we stopped the offensive after the loss 

northern half of Military Region I. In all the other areas, the 

sive was ground to a halt by the extensive employment of B-5

the magnificent performance of the tactical airlift force in del

arms, ammunition, and food under intensive fire from AA

SAMs.

While 7th Air Force was flying many extra sorties per 

contain the offensive, the JCS recommended and the Pre

approved both the return of flying units previously deplo

the U.S. and a buildup of B-52s and carriers. These mea
offensive but also to prepare for a major air offensive a

North Vietnam, the air offensive that LeMay and others ha

seen as early as 1964.48

The President on 7 May directed the mining of Haiphon

other coastal ports. Code named POCKET MONEY, this m

was the first in a series of actions designed to isolate Hano

the rest of Vietnam. On the 10th of May, the President a

ized the bombing of most of the targets in North Vietnam 

had made up the original JCS 94-target list. The strategy 

point was first to isolate North Vietnam from external supp

mining the harbors and destroying the marshalling yard

key choke points along the northeast and northwest rail

and then to strike all the major supply areas around Hai

and Hanoi. Restricted zones were established around and 

these two cities as in the 1965–1968 campaign; however, th

was given much greater freedom in choice of targets, freq

of attacks, and weight of effort; and restricted zones were 

from time to time. For the first time in the long struggle, Air

was being employed as airmen had advocated. Questions 

the effectiveness of a determined application of Airpower 

soon be answered.

The resumption of bombing in May was known by th

name of LINEBACKER I. Strategy for this campaign differe

the strategy for the original bombing program, ROLLING T

DER, mainly in that a gradual increase of pressure fro

south of North Vietnam to the Hanoi area was no longer the 

inating idea. The assumption now was that only the a

above the 20th parallel would force North Vietnam to real

futility of trying to conquer South Vietnam by force.

This campaign’s objectives could be stated as follows: (1) R

resupply of North Vietnam from external sources; (2) destroy 

nal stockpiles of military supplies and equipment; (3) restri

of forces and supplies to the battlefield.49 Although these 

objectives governed our activities in the North during this p

the purpose underlying the entire campaign was to brea

enemy’s will and ability to continue fighting.

LINEBACKER I and the Airpower employed against the g

offensive in South Vietnam apparently had the desired effe

the President on 23 October halted the bombing above th

parallel with the expectation that negotiations would move fo

Within a couple of months after the bombing halt above th

parallel, however, the North Vietnamese were again protracti

38
ent that they were not seriously interested in a negotiated 

ment of the war. As for the suspension of the bombing cam

the North Vietnamese evidently interpreted it (as they had 

preted earlier suspensions) to be an indication of weaknes

lack of resolve. The President determined that a further cha

strategy was in order.

On 18 December 1972 he directed an all-out air cam

against North Vietnam’s heartland to force a settlement 

war. For the first time, B-52s were used in large numb

bring the full weight of Airpower to bear. What airmen ha

advocated as the proper employment of Airpower was no

President’s strategy—concentrated use of all forms of Airpo

strike at the vital power centers, causing maximum disrup

the economic, military, and political life of the country. T

strategy was translated into an 11-day air campaign kno

LINEBACKER II which included strikes against point targ

tactical aircraft using laser weapons; neutralization of are

gets by B-52s using radar bombing; and suppression of 

AAA, and MIGs by 7th Air Force and TF-77 fighters. Af

days, the North Vietnamese sought a cease-fire.

The development of air strategy in World War II, Korea, an

nam was a repetitious process. In each case, planners firs

ceived Airpower as a subordinate part of a joint strategy that 

employ an extensive ground campaign to end the war on fav

terms. On the other hand, airmen came increasingly to believ

Airpower, in its own right, could produce decisive results. The 

ity of such a view was suggested by results of the Allies’ com

bomber offensive in Europe and by the surrender of Japan 

1940s. Additional evidence came from the skies over Ha

December 1972. In a concentrated 11-day test, our air strateg

suaded a determined adversary with a remarkably elabor

defense system that overt aggression could not be sustained 

presence of unrestricted U.S. Airpower.
CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Ha

Brothers, 1950, pp. 47–51.

2. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History o

Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1964 (Air Uni

Maxwell AFB, AL, 1971), p. 152.

3. United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict

Historical Study No. 71, 25 June–1 November 1950; USAF His

Study No. 72, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952; USAF Historica

No. 127, 1 July 1952–27 July 1953; 3 studies (Washington

Department of the Air Force, 1952–1956), No. 71, p. 1.

4. Korean Conflict, No. 72, p. 9.

5. Ibid., p. 43.

6. Futrell, History of Basic Thinking, p. 152.

7. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: D

day & Company, 1967), p. 258.

8. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 69.

9. Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in South Vi

1961–1963 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, June 

pp. 14–19.

10. Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York

McKay Company, 1969), p. 13.

11. The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XLIV, No. 1143, 2

1961 (Secretary Rusk’s News Conference of 4 May 1961), p. 761

12. Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies, U.S. Army Special 

1961–1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), p

13. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activ

Southeast Asia, 1954–1964, Vol. 2, book 1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: A

versity, January 1973) p. 4–54.

14. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Comman

Control of Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1 January 1965–31 

1968, vol 1, book 1, p. 1-1-22.

15. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, p. 1-

16. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activities, 1954–1964, 

263–28.

17. Curtis E. LeMay, General, USAF (Ret.) interview held at th

tagon, Washington, D.C., February 1976. NOTE: General LeMay w

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, from July 1961 to January 

See, also, Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in Sout

nam and Laos, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force H

December 1965), p. 30.

40
121 and book 5, part VIII, p. VII-3-2.

19. LeMay, interview, February 1976.

20. Department of Defense Study, United States-Vietnam Re

1945–1967, book 4 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

1971) pp. iv, 7.

21. LeMay, interview, February 1976.

22. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 79.

23. United States–Vietnam Relations, book 3, p. a-14.

24. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, p. 1-

25. Jacob Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in Sou

Asia, 1965, pp. 8-22.

26. United States—Vietnam Relations, book 4, p. 77.

27. John P. McConnell, General, USAF (Ret.), interview held 

tagon, Washington, D.C., March 1976. NOTE: General McConn

the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, from February 1965 

1969.

28. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965–31 March 1968, 

pp. 5-75.

29. McConnell, interview, March 1976.

30. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Air Operations, 

31. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, book 

III, p. III-3-2.

32. Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address, Wash

D.C., 10 January 1967.

33. Summary Report by Preparedness Investigating Subcomm

the Senate Armed Services Committee, on the Air War Against 

Vietnam, 90th Cong., 1st. sess., August 1967, p. 9.

34. For a detailed discussion of the options considered, see L

B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Popular Library, 197

399–421.

35. Hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee, 90: 1-1967, 

part 1, p. 275.

36. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Air Operations, 

37. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 366–368.

38. Ibid., p. 435.

39. U.S.G. Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on t

in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

1968), p. 41.

40. Johnson, Vintage Point, p. 511. 

41. Ibid., p. 368.

42. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Air Operations, 

43. Westmoreland, Soldier Reports, pp. 183 & 389.

44. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Air 

tions Against North Vietnam, 1 July 1971–30 June 1972, p. 9.

45. William W. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–19

Analysis of Its Role in Combat, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph 

vol. 3, monograph 4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), p. 45.

46. John A. Doglione, et al, Airpower and the 1972 Spring In

USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol 2, Monograph 3, p. 
48. LeMay, interview, February 1976.

49. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, book 

1–9,1-1-24.

42
Chapter II

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER

PRIOR TO VIETNAM WAR

In wars involving two or more services on the same side

mand and control of assigned forces has been controversia

controversy was prevalent in World War II from the early d

North Africa to the invasion of Europe, and it persisted throu

the Korean War. In Vietnam, U.S. politics—because of its g

impact than in other wars, even at the lower levels—aggravat

controversy, making it much more complex and difficult to r

The reason for the controversy is fairly straightforwar

flexibility of Airpower and its capacity to concentrate large 

tities of firepower in a short time make it a most desirable 

tion to an army or navy. As a consequence, these two force

sought the division of Airpower, placing it under their c

when needed for their own mission.

Airmen, on the other hand, have argued that Airpower is 

sive element of war in its own right and that the full effects 

power can only be achieved when it is centrally controlle

directed against the most vital part of the enemy, whether th

be the industrial base or the military forces deployed to a the

war. They contend that the fundamentals for directing and 

Airpower are the same regardless of the strategy for the prose

of the war. Thus, for Airpower to be employed for the greates

of the combined forces in a theater of war, there must be a 

mand structure to control the assigned Airpower coherent

consistenly and to ensure that the Airpower is not frittered aw

dividing it among army and navy commands.

NORTH AFRICA—THE FOUNDATION

Although World War I provided some indication, the 

African campaign of World War II really helped hammer o

doctrine for organizing and employing Airpower in theat

war. Many of the problems associated with these early b
in Vietnam on how to control and employ Airpower.

After the invasion of North Africa, it became apparent th

organization of air and ground forces was not successful. 

in the campaign, planners hoped that the Allied armies wo

able to reach the Cap Bon peninsula by Christmas of 194

trap Rommel between the North African forces and G

Bernard Montgomery’s advancing 8th Army. But the 

African offensive bogged down in the Atlas Mountains, an

until the following spring, after some very tough fighting

the troops of Colonel General Jurgen von Arnim surrounde

off from support from the Italian mainland, and captured.

As the fighting developed in southern Tunisia, the relati

between air and ground forces became a matter of concern 

Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, then serv

the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northwest Africa. 

was no centralized control of either the tactical or strate

forces. These forces were operating almost independently, w

American Air Force more badly split than the Royal Air Force 

The doctrine at the time (as set forth in Army Field Man

5) provided that an air support command was attached 

army formation and directed by that ground force comm

who had the more important mission. Airpower, in other w

was adopted to the demands of the ground force comm

fighting the battle.

As a result of this doctrine, there was no concerted effort f

power to gain air superiority over the theater of operatio

example, consider the Airpower assigned to the XII Air S

Command (XII ASC, primarily employed in the mission assig

Corps and the French XIX Corps) and the British RAF 242 

(located to the north and committed to the support of the 

1st Army). Both of these air forces were trying to provide cl

support before obtaining air superiority. Consequently, the G

Air Force (GAF) controlled the air in northern and sou

Tunisia. Friendly losses were so high that the mission of t

forces and the structure of the command and control syste

to change drastically. Ironically—but naturally—not only had 

Airpower failed to achieve air superiority, but they had failed 

vide the close air support that the Commanding General of t

Army and II Corps had desired. The German fighters, by c

trating against small formations of U.S. and British fighters 

to maintain umbrellas over ground forces throughout th

made Allied air losses prohibitive.2

44
The German Air Force in North Africa therefore posed a ver

ous obstacle. If we were to provide our forces air support, w

to destroy the German fighters both on the ground and in t

Not until we in the XII ASC and the 242 Group had gained air 

riority (i.e., when we could conduct missions without undue 

and interference from the enemy) could we concentrate on p

ing close air support.

Air Chief Marshal Tedder expressed the new doctrine: 

centralized control of air forces, this flexibility brings with 

immense power of concentration which is unequalled i

other form of warfare. In other words, if properly used, the 

bility of air force allows it to be highly economical. . . . The i

tant words in my previous sentences are ‘if properly use

‘given centralized control.’”3

The need to establish a centralized theater air and g

organization was also vividly brought home during the bat

Kasserine Pass. Rommel made one last bold and desperate 

to slice through the rear of the Allied armies to the M

ranean coast. Had Airpower been more concentrated, Ro

would have stopped much sooner.

At this time the reorganization of Airpower as approved 

Casablanca Conference in January was finally put into effe

Marshal Tedder explains:

The proposals for the new air command were finally approv

by Roosevelt and Churchill on 26 January (1943). An Air Co

mander-in-Chief for the whole Mediterranean theater would 

up his headquarters at Algiers; under him would serve the 

Officers Commanding Northwest Africa, the Middle East, a

Malta. He would be surbordinate to the Commander-in-Ch

Allied Expeditionary Force in Northwest Africa. . . . In retu

the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces would g

U.S. P-40s taxiing at Maison Blanche, North Africa, 1943.
operation of Mediterranean air forces.4

Air Marshal Tedder commanded this new organization. 

him as the Commander of the Northwest African Air Forc

General Carl A. Spaatz, whose command consisted of fo

forces: the Strategic Air Force, Tactical Air Force, Coas

Force, and Troop Carrier Command. With this air organiz

Eisenhower had all air elements within a single structure 

ble of being concentrated on our greatest challenge: to gai

trol of the air and stop the advance of the German Army.

The Tactical Air Force was commanded by Air Vice Mars

Arthur Coningham. Coningham, who had commanded the 

Desert Air Force and supported Montgomery’s 8th Army, w

experienced airman. Tedder writes in his memoirs that “As i

spired, I had no need to be worried about Montgomery’s view 

exercise of Airpower. He had indeed produced a pamph

instructions for the troops which, I told Portal, it would be d

to improve upon; this was not surprising, in view of the fact th

original document had been prepared by ‘Mary’ Coningham.

46
the methods for supporting the army. His air force had defeat

GAF on the western desert and had provided the close air s

for the breakout at El Alamein. Further, Coningham was fa

with an independent air force: the RAF, unlike the U.S. air 

had enjoyed equality with ground forces. In the RAF, equali

a fundamental concept which recognized that although groun

air forces have separate missions, those separate missions 

blend for the good of the total mission, defeat of the enemy

crucial time in North Africa when Airpower had been so badly 

the selection of Coningham, a proven commander with ext

combat experience, was indeed wise.

Coningham’s headquarters stated as a first order of bu

that all his forces would concentrate on gaining air super

This effort would involve air-to-air combat as well as attacks 

German landing grounds in the area. As soon as they had 

nated the German Air Force, they would provide close air su

shifting the 242 Group, Desert Air Force, or XII Air Support 

mand to wherever the German Army was most vulnerable t

centrated air attacks.*

Concurrent with Coningham’s battle for air superiority, G

Carl Spaatz, with centralized control of strategic Airpowe

directing his forces against the threat that concerned Eisen

most, the German attempts to reinforce their Afrika Korps. H

the Northwest Strategic Air Force working against airfields in 

and Italy so that the Germans would be unable to replac

losses in the battle area. In addition, B-17s, B-25s, B-26

Wellingtons were pounding the ports and enemy shipping at 

Bizerte, Palermo and Naples to prevent the movement of su

and replacements to Rommel and von Arnim. From this cam

airmen derived basic concepts about how best to organize all 

and to employ Airpower within a theater of operations.

When the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the air org

tion, they also approved the restructuring of the ground 

General Harold L. Alexander remained in his post as dep

Eisenhower and also became head of the 18th Army Group 

February 1943. Within his Army Group were the British 1st 

British 8th Army, American II Corps, and French XIX Corp

*Under Coningham’s Northwest Tactical Air Force, the XII Air Support Co

worked with the American II and French XIX Corps; the Desert Air Force 

with the British 8th Army; and 242 Group with the British 1st Army.
army component commander. Alexander’s counterpar

Spaatz. However, Spaatz delegated most of the detailed coo

tion on air-ground matters to Coningham’s Tactical Air 

which located its advance headquarters next to Alexa

advance headquarters.

Despite the streamlining improvements made by the Ch

Staff, a few organizational problems remained. Alexander’

role as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces and 

manding General of the 18th Army Group became a matter 

cern among airmen. Many of my American and British co

parts believed that the Commander-in-Chief, or Deputy, s

not simultaneously be a component commander. We felt th

theater commander should not be immersed in the detailed 

cal problems of any one component force. Battlefield situ

often demand the full time and attention of a component 

mander, yet the theater commander’s job of determining the 

egy for combined air, ground, and sea forces can scarcely af

be neglected. We felt, too, that a dual-hatted theater comm

would tend to be less objective about theater decisions af

his own component because he would be conscious of hav

implement the decisions himself. Since the theater comman

the representative of all the forces, we believed, he should n

special allegiance to any single component.

It is especially significant that the North African command 

ture provided Spaatz, the air component commander, with c

uous operational control of all the air elements. The bombe

was actually divided into a tactical bomber force under C

ham’s Tactical Air Force and a strategic bomber force under 

General James H. Doolittle. The important point, however, (an

was an issue in Operation OVERLORD and in Vietnam), wa

the theater air component commander had these air res

under his direct control. He decided how to use them accord

Eisenhower’s guidance. Also, the air reconnaissance force 

theater-wide mission came under the direct control of the ai

ponent commander, although the Tactical Air Force had it

reconnaissance units for its particular mission. The air comp

commander, Spaatz, therefore, could gather intelligence for b

and ground battles, and for the strategic campaign against th

of communication and the rear base areas in Sicily and Italy

In the Mediterranean, the naval component commander, 

ral Sir Andrew Cunningham, sought control of part of t

resources to protect the fleet when it was within range of G

48
this issue on numerous occasions during the siege of Tobru

the campaign on the western desert.) Admiral Cunningham w

fighters when the Middle East forces were having difficulty 

ting supplies through because German Airpower dominat

eastern Mediterranean. Convoys to Malta and beyond su

heavy losses during 1942, and the sea lines of communicatio

tenuous.

However, Tedder refused to parcel his Airpower to the 

tional control of the Royal Navy. He said that because of co

ing demands for his Airpower, he had to employ it from t

task as the nature and intensity of the threat required. He n

to gain air superiority; support the army; defend Alexandria, 

and the desert bases; interdict the land and sea lines of co

nication that supported Rommel; and protect the fleet, partic

from air attacks. To meet all of those tasks, he had to hav

tralized control.

Tedder, therefore, couldn’t parcel out his Airpower to the 

any more than he could for Montgomery. The only way he 

reconcile the needs of both commanders was to shift Airpowe

and forth. If, for instance, the German Air Force, were to at

convoy trying to run from Malta to Alexandria, he would shif

ers from the counter air task to cover the movement of the c

meanwhile, other parts of the Desert Air Force would strike G

fighter bases along the African coast to keep them from att

the convoy.

Naval aviation, when operating against target systems as

the tactical or strategic forces, also came under the control 

theater air component commander. During the invasion of 

and Italy, the Tactical Air Force commander controlled all Air

used to isolate the objective, provide air defense for the are

support the troops during their landing and their mov

inland.8 He was responsible for targeting and controlling nav

ation that participated in these campaigns. Even carrier forc

directly involved in the air defense of the fleet and the c

enroute to the landing area were under his operational cont

targeting against airfields and lines of communication lead

the objective area and for covering the landing forces.

The unity of Airpower was not only sound in theory, b

theory stood the test of battle and proved to be the most ef

method for the command and control of Airpower in a the

operations.
Even though the North African and Mediterranean expe

demonstrated the kind of command structure needed for t

war, preparations for OVERLORD, the forthcoming invas

Europe, raised some fundamental issues about the comm

the tactical air forces and strategic bombers. Churchill an

sevelt had decided at Quebec in August 1943 that a U.S

mander would be Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 

Expeditionary Forces. Before the naming of the commander, 

supported General George C. Marshall. Roosevelt, however, fe

keenly the need of keeping Marshall as Chief of Staff of the 

because of the rapid expansion of the Army ground and air 

He considered Marshall almost indispensable to this treme

task if the forces were to be ready by the invasion date. On the 

hand, the British Chiefs of Staff were pressing for a British 

to be the Supreme Commander. After all, they had been in t

from the beginning, had suffered the most casualties and los

the home front, and until that time had more forces in battl

haps their most telling argument was the number of high 

commanders who had been tested in battle compared to the 

ber of American commanders. Only with some misgivings di

accept Churchill’s decision that an American would b

Supreme Commander.

With this concession, the British expected to have the t

men’s jobs. Although our Army Air Force was rapidly g

strength, the British Air Force had more aircraft and per

in units fighting the enemy. Air Chief Marshal Portal had a

been designated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as their d

for coordinating the British and American bomber forces f

combined bomber offensive. Although this didn’t involve 

tional command of these forces, it did provide for coordina

targets to be struck, timing of the attacks, and mutual su

required from both forces. In a real sense, Portal was the t

man in the Allied air forces even though Spaatz had wide la

in choosing specific targets within the established priority l

At a meeting in Quebec in August 1943, the Combined 

of Staff agreed that there would be a combined command 

air and navy forces, but they did not settle the question on 

a command for ground forces. This issue was raised many 

throughout the European campaign, particularly followin

invasion. Montgomery, who had overall command of the g

forces for the invasion, was not happy about relinquishing 

50
Bradley’s 12th Army Group.

The selection of the air commander also presented some 

lems. Portal nominated Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory as the ai

mander for the invasion, surprising some American airme

expected Coningham to be nominated for the job. Coningha

the most combat-experienced tactical air force officer in th

having fought across the western desert and into North Africa

thermore, he had worked with Montgomery and had consid

experience in working with the American 9th Air Force in the 

campaign and as commander of the Northwest Africa Tacti

Force. His selection, therefore, appeared most logical. On the 

hand, Leigh-Mallory had considerable experience as a fighter 

commander during the Battle of Britain and had the job of 

oping the RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force which would be the co

part to the 21st Army Group to be commanded by Montg

Furthermore, Leigh-Mallory enjoyed the confidence of Portal, 

was probably the most significant factor in his nomination. 

his own service, however, Leigh-Mallory evoked considerable 

ences of opinion, a problem that became even more prono

among American airmen in the months ahead.

By mid-summer, plans for OVERLORD were taking shap

the question of the air commander for the invasion was still 

tled. The Americans were opposed to a single air commander, 

seemed to be inconsistent with the doctrine developed in th

cerned Mediterranean. Actually they were concerned abo

implications of giving British airmen all the top jobs, esp

since, as the buildup continued, the American air forces 

European war would outnumber the British.10 American a

felt that they knew more about strategic bombing than the B

and the Americans feared that if all of the Airpower for the in

were put under Leigh-Mallory, the American bomber forces 

be diverted from the air offensive and used on tactical target

The bomber force was still growing, and not until the wi

1943–44 would there be sufficient forces to fly 1,000-plane 

But if Leigh-Mallory commanded all the forces, the bomber 

sive might be prematurely diverted to targets in France d

related to the invasion. American airmen were further conc

that the British would use the bomber force for the British B

Command’s “city busting” campaign. Even though Major G

Ira C. Eaker, Commander, 8th Air Force, had succe

defended daylight bombing at the Casablanca Conference i
tion with Roosevelt.

All these issues led the Americans to propose both a tactic

a strategic air command for the invasion.11 The tactical ai

mander would have operational control of the American 9

Force and the British 2nd Tactical Air Force. These two tacti

forces would work with 12th and 21st Army Groups in the 

manner as the Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force worke

18th Army Group. The air-ground team would, therefo

designed around this proven concept. The strategic air comm

would operate as Doolittle had with his Northwest Africa St

Air Force and would report to Eisenhower. This solution wou

vide an argument for an American to command the strate

forces for the invasion since a British airman, Leigh-Mallory, 

be commanding the tactical air forces. Further, this com

arrangement would make it easier to retain the bombers on 

gic targets because Eisenhower was more sympathetic than 

Mallory to the strategic bomber offensive.

Leigh-Mallory had originally proposed the turn-over of 

tional control of 9th Air Force by mid-December since he a

had control of the RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force. However, 

time of the Cairo Conference, 5 December 1943, the con

the bombers for support of the invasion was still not settled

52
a decision on the air command structure became urgent.

Eisenhower wanted Spaatz to head up American Airpo

Europe as he had in North Africa. When Spaatz heard th

would be moving from Africa to take over the American b

forces, he proposed a United States Strategic Air Force (US

composed of 8th Air Force in England and 15th Air Force in 

USSAFE would be primarily committed to the strategic air 

sive, but under emergency conditions it would support Eisen

in Europe or General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Command

Chief, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Neither of thes

ater commanders would have control of the Strategic Air Forc

arrangement would continue in which Portal, as deputy f

Combined Chiefs of Staff, would coordinate the targetin

strikes of USSAFE and RAF Bomber Command.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the reorganization 

American strategic bomber forces and the arrangement w

15th Air Force in Italy would support an emergency in the M

ranean theater. Then Spaatz and Harris spoke out against p

the strategic bomber forces under Eisenhower for the invasio

both adamantly opposed placing their forces under Leigh-Ma

Spaatz felt the bombers should support the invasion on a ca

case basis rather than being under Eisenhower for a specified 

Harris held essentially the same view and was even more o

ken than Spaatz on the diversion of RAF Bomber Comman

the strategic air offensive. At one point, he informed Portal t

was ready to resign his command, but Portal convinced him t

was needed to carry on the offensive. Portal also said that Ch

and Roosevelt, as a condition for Eisenhower’s selecti

Supreme Commander, had already agreed to the diversion 

bombers.

Spaatz had appealed independently to General Hap Arn

prevent the placing of his forces under Eisenhower’s opera

control for the invasion. The Supreme Headquarters, 

Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) planning had proposed th

interdiction campaign start at least three to four mon

advance of the invasion, and in Spaatz’s opinion this mean

the bombers would be pulled off the strategic air offensiv

decisive time. Spaatz may have been right: 85% of the 2,70

tons of bombs dropped on Europe in WWII were dropped 

January 1944;14 Spaatz’s Strategic Air Force was rapidly 

ing to reach its full strength in June; and the ability to sus

thousand-plane raid was at hand. Furthermore, the surp
the German war economy had been depleted and the capa

the industrial base to support the war effort was rapidly d

ing. The Strategic Bombing Survey states, “If the bombing o

many had little effect on production prior to July 1944, it 

only because she had idle resources upon which to draw

because the major weight of the air offensive against her h

been brought to bear.”15 Hence, any who assess Airpower’s 

tiveness in Europe must consider carefully Spaatz’s argu

in favor of extending the strategic air campaign until the la

weeks before the invasion.

In response to Spaatz’s arguments, Arnold told much the 

story that Portal told Harris. A commitment had been m

Eisenhower to place the bombers under his operational cont

the invasion, and Arnold did not intend to raise the issue agai

the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Both Spaatz and Harris were 

resigned to the fact that the bombers were going to be div

Their question then was who would control their forces.

AIRMAN––DEPUTY THEATER COMMANDER

When Eisenhower was selected as the Supreme Command

asked that Tedder be the Deputy Supreme Commander. The 

ciation the two had developed in the African campaign was 

mutual respect and confidence. For example, when Lieu

General George S. Patton had bitterly complained becau

wasn’t getting air support while his forces were under co

attack from the German Air Force in the El Guettar ba

Tunisia, Eisenhower sent Tedder to Patton’s headquarters at 

54

B-17s and their fighter escorts enroute to the European mainland.
were at an impasse: Patton wanted close air support, but C

ham wanted to sacrifice close air support in favor of attacki

German Air Force directly. So Tedder had a ticklish problem 

more difficult by the differences in nationality and service. S

handled the disagreement with considerable tact and ave

potentially serious international incident between allies.

Eisenhower’s request for Tedder was honored, and T

became the Deputy Commander, Supreme Headquarters 

Expeditionary Force, in 1944. After considerable debate, 

agreed that he would handle the bombers for Eisenhowe

Leigh-Mallory would control only the tactical air forces. 

Mallory’s headquarters, however, did get to plan—in large 

the rail interdiction campaign and the campaign against 

Luftwaffe’s forward staging airfields in France.

The command structure for the invasion was complete, 

was far from clear what the organization would be after the 

were on the continent. As it turned out, Tedder coordinat

American and British bombers during the invasion and aft

forces were established ashore. Leigh-Mallory’s headqu

accomplished all the detailed planning including the coordi

of the fighters with the bombers. For the invasion and duri

first months of the war on the continent, there was a single ai

mander, Leigh-Mallory, for all air operations directly asso
resolve a conflict or to iron out a problem for Spaatz or H

Leigh-Mallory actually directed the air campaign except for 

forces attacking strategic targets far beyond the ground batt

COMPONENT COMMANDS—CONTINUING ISSUE

With the establishment of 12th Army Group on 1 A

1944, Eisenhower had to decide whether to create a ground 

SHAEF component command to control the operatio

Bradley’s 12th Army Group and Montgomery’s 21st Army G

The precedent had been established in the North Africa 

paign where Alexander, as 18th Army Group commander, 

tioned as the theater ground force commander controllin

coordinating the efforts of two armies and two corps. If 

hower made Montgomery the component commander, he 

offend the Americans who were furnishing the most g

forces and, furthermore, were not entirely convinced that 

gomery was a bold, imaginative commander who would r

exploit an opportunity for a decisive victory. On the other 

the British would consider it an affront if Montgomery, th

of El Alamein and the greatest British general of the war, a

21st Army Group were placed under the operational con

Bradley as the ground force component commander.

Eisenhower was under considerable pressure from 

gomery to continue the arrangement that existed durin

invasion, in which all the American ground forces were 

under Montgomery. As the debates developed over the best 

egy for breaking out of the Cherbourg peninsula, this com

issue was in the forefront. Eisenhower, however, elected to 

his own ground force component commander; and thoug

arrangement was criticized during subsequent campaign

never altered the command structure. The wearing of tw

imposed very heavy demands on Eisenhower, and it appear

political rather than military considerations persuaded him 

both Supreme Commander and ground force component 

mander. Otherwise, he probably would have made Bradl

ground force component commander and Patton the 12th 

Group commander. These two were the most experienced c

commanders in the American forces, and Eisenhower knew 

they could do from their performances in North Africa and 

When 12th Army Group was activated and Eisenhower e

not to create a ground force component command, America

56
Force (AEAF) should continue as the theater air componen

mand. They especially desired to eliminate the AEAF beca

was an obstacle to returning the strategic air forces to the 

ing campaign. As long as the AEAF existed, it would conti

exert pressure to employ bombers in extensive support 

ground campaign, allowing only an occasional use o

bombers for major strategic offensives. The ground camp

need for heavy bombers was not continuous, however, an

eral coordination among commanders could meet the occa

needs without AEAF’s organizational machinery.

The most telling argument for eliminating the AEAF wa

the U.S. tactical bombers and fighters in the 9th Air 

already worked closely with Bradley’s 12th U.S. Army G

AEAF wasn’t needed to coordinate between them. The 9

Force commander, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, could an

coordinate with his British counterpart, Air Marshal Conin

Commander of 2nd Tactical Air Force; and there was ade

direction from Eisenhower’s headquarters on the indi

responsibilities of the British and American tactical air 

commanders. Also, Tedder, as Eisenhower’s deputy, alread

the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the U.S. 9

Force and the British 2nd Tactical Air Force and for arra

support from Spaatz’s U.S. Strategic Air Force and H

Bomber Command. Since Tedder wasn’t an air deput

Deputy Commander-in-Chief, SHAEF, he had the full aut

and staff support afforded the Commander-in-Chief.

When the AEAF was dissolved on 15 October 1944,17 n

resembling a theater air component command was left. Th

for such a command, however, was most apparent: D

coordination of the tactical and strategic air forces deman

component command whose staff was primarily concerne

such matters hour by hour. This level of detailed plannin

left to SHAEF. Unfortunately, the SHAEF staff wasn’t equip

handle both the long range strategic planning and the tr

dous job of tactical planning for all air and ground forces.

Thus Eisenhower’s decision to sidestep the problem of ch

either an American or British ground force component comm

resulted indirectly in the unfortunate lack of an air comp

command. Even though Leigh-Mallory was not the most acce

commander to either Coningham or Vandenberg, the AEAF 

probably have been retained if Eisenhower had designa

ground force component commander. By electing to be hi
ground force commander, Eisenhower strengthened the arg

that an air component wasn’t necessary either since Tedder 

function for the air forces in the same manner as Eisenhow

for the ground forces. For a number of reasons, then, Eisenh

air organization was not a model for the future.

As they do in every war, personalities played a major p

the way the air and ground organizations developed. Man

men concluded from the Mediterranean and European e

ence, however, that in a theater of war an air component 

mander should continuously control the theater air force

advantages of this doctrine seemed clear for tactical and 

air forces, but the issue was somewhat debatable in the c

strategic air forces. The question of control of strategic air 

when employed in a theater air campaign became even 

debatable as nuclear weapons became the dominant elem

our defense policies in the fifties.

KOREA—STRUCTURE OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

In Korea, command and control again became a major pr

General MacArthur, as the United Nations Commander, con

58
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff), his title was Command

Chief, Far East. The Far East Command (FECOM) was a u

command reporting to the JCS.

Since it was a unified command, staff representation fro

components was to be equitably divided so that each of th

ices would have appropriate authority and rank in the de

process. A unified staff, since it does represent all of the se

is expected to function with a minimum of service paroch

although it is never feasible or even desirable to erase all th

of an officer who has spent 20 or more years in his service. 

ful selection of officers and balancing of rank and pos

within the staff, however, produce a minimum of service 

and that bias is tempered by the common mission of the t

headquarters. When a headquarters that is supposed to c

multiservice forces is not structured with a balanced staff, 

service problems tend to become magnified since there is 

quate consideration of at least one service’s view at the ou

balanced staff will tend to resolve or at least minimize 

problems before viewpoints become hardened.
structure because of MacArthur’s failure to establish an arm

ponent command. He reserved to himself the roles of the Fa

Commander and the Commander of Army Forces, Far East. 

other hand, the Air Force and Navy established componen

mands designated the Far East Air Force and Naval Forc

East. These component headquarters had staffs manned to 

the forces throughout the area of MacArthur’s responsibility

With MacArthur as his own Army component command

Far East Command staff was weighted excessively with Arm

sonnel since it had to do the work of a component command 

as that of theater staff. This imbalance resulted in the staff 

into problems that should have been worked out by the field 

mands. Air Force targeting, which should have been done by 

component commander, with Far East Command generally c

ing itself to policy and adjustments of priorities, is a good ex

of the problems created by an improperly organized staff.

TARGETING—JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION

Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, the Far Ea

Force (FEAF) commander, urged in 1950 that FEAF should pl

targeting of air missions for MacArthur’s Far East Comman

contended that FEAF was the only agency with the profes

ability to determine the best air targets and the best way of de

ing them. Despite Stratemeyer’s arguments, though, MacA

chief of staff elected to establish a General Headquarters 

Target Group.18 This group, made up of officers within the Fa

Command staff, lacked the experience and depth of knowled

targeting an air force. Compared to the European operat

World War II in which a joint British and American staff r

mended targets for the U.S. Strategic Air Force and RAF B

Command, the FECOM effort was inadequate.

After this inauspicious beginning, though, FECOM activ

GHQ Target Selection Committee with a much higher level 

resentation, including the Vice Commander for Operations 

Far East Air Force and a senior representative of the 

Forces Far East. This committee continued throughout th

although the Far East Air Force assumed most of the tas

targeting USAF and carrier-based aircraft.

By 1952, FEAF’s own targeting committee was compo

representatives from 5th Air Force, Far East Bomber Com

and Naval Forces Far East. The FEAF committee met eve

60
After his approval, the Far East Commander considered th

ommendations, which then became basic guidance for the 

opment of the air campaign plan. Thus by the summer o

the FEAF commander was performing the targeting fun

appropriate for an air component commander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITHIN FEAF

On 8 October 1950, Stratemeyer requested Far East Com

to assign him operational control of all the air units engaged 

war over North and South Korea. (Operational control mean

dinating air activities with the activities of other forces and s

ing the amount of forces to be employed, the type of munition

time on and off target, and the controlling agencies.) He b

successful integration of the efforts of all assigned air forces 

only be accomplished by a single air commander directly res

ble to MacArthur.

Stratemeyer had already made considerable progress in g

command and operational control of units deployed from St

Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC). SAC, 

direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assigned three B-29 gro

the operational control of Stratemeyer. This new Far East B

Command was on a command level with the fighters of the 5

Force, and both organizations reported to FEAF.

FEAF eventually chose all targets through its targeting co

tee, as I have explained, then developed air campaign plan

sent them to 5th Air Force and Far East Bomber Comma

implementation. Fifth Air Force assumed responsibility for c

nating the fighter escort. Route planning and approaches 

target, though, were joint concerns of 5th Air Force and Fa

Bomber Command. After considering enemy fighter defense

Air Force usually accepted Bomber Command’s proposed r

Disagreements, if any, were resolved by FEAF. Bomber Com

also generally chose how the target would be struck if the 

were not associated with Allied ground activities. When bo

(other than B-29s) were used for close air support, however, 5

Force was primarily responsible for the details of the mission

methods used for directing fighters and B-26 light bombe

close air support were not used for B-29s because of the 

enormous firepower. For them, special control arrange

helped avoid injuring friendly ground forces. The 5th Air 

combat operations officer in the name of the 5th Air Force 
mander had final control over these missions, and a Joint O

tions Center with representatives from the Army and Navy c

nated the strikes at the major decision level.

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN A

THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Placing the bombers under the operational control of t

component commander was a return to the arrangemen

succeeded in North Africa. In Europe, however, the bomber

not under operational control of the air component comm

(Leigh-Mallory) for the Normandy invasion. For close air su

after the invasion and after the Allied Expeditionary Air 

was inactivated, the bombers came under the control of 

2nd Tactical Air Force for specific missions in support of g

operations. For the most part, however, strategic bomb

Europe remained outside the control of the air componen

mander. The rationale, as we recall, was that the primar

sion of the theater was to destroy Germany’s industry, eco

and will to fight, a mission essentially beyond the theater m

of defeating the German forces deployed in the field.

The situation in Korea seemed to call for a command and c

arrangement more like the one used in North Africa because 

Korea did not have an industrial base comparable to Germ

62
or neutralize; most of them were associated with airfields, l

communication, and the logistical structure directly supporti

Chinese and North Korean forces. These types of targets wou

erally have been assigned to tactical air forces in Europe. 

opinion, it is fundamentally sound under such conditions to 

the strategic forces under the operational control of the tacti

force or air component commander for as long as the air cam

may last. 

The FEAF commander used the B-29s in Korea against a

along the Yalu, against interdiction targets, against industria

ties, and at times for close air support. Only on rare occasion

the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved with the targets assigned 

forces, and then usually only to prescribe broad policy for an 

target system.

With this kind of guidance, the FEAF commander had con

able freedom. He could plan campaigns to cover several mon

operations with little fear that major changes would be dicta

Washington. The only restrictions established by Washingto

on targets along the Yalu, particularly airfields, bridges, 

plants, and logistical centers. These restrictions, however, we

applied to targets within North Korea. A more general rest

intended to limit the war was the prohibition of attacks a

China. “Hot pursuit” under some conditions was authorize

attacks against aircraft taking off from bases across the Yal

not.

The important prohibition of flights into China notwithsta

both Stratemeyer and his successor, Lieutenant General O

Weyland, were largely successful in their urging that all of th

power in the Korean War should be controlled by the air comp

commander. FEAF controlled the bombers, as requested, an

the Allied fighters. (They employed Allied fighters just as th

those from the United States except for fighter assignments 

the Yalu. Because relatively low-performance Allied fi

couldn’t cope with the MIG-15s, USAF F-86s were given th

patrols.) Except in China, Stratemeyer and Weyland could 

Allied Airpower wherever it could most damage the enemy.

CONTROL OF NAVAL AVIATION

Stratemeyer had a more difficult time, however, wh

insisted that the principle of centralized control of Airpow

theater also applied to naval aviation. Even though nava
battlefield, and provide close air support, Naval Forces Fa

(NAVFE) opposed placing this force under the operational c

of the air component commander.

An earlier attempt to eliminate this sort of problem 

resulted in the Key West Agreement of 1948* which stip

that air campaigns would be the business of the air comm

and sea campaigns would be the business of the naval 

mander. Consistent with this Joint Chiefs of Staff agreemen

more fundamentally consistent with the overpowering expe

in the air campaigns of World War II, Stratemeyer and W

argued that FEAF should control naval aviation since 

clearly an augmentation of the forces assigned to FEAF f

theater air mission.19

NAVFE’s arguments were essentially the same as those 

by Admiral Cunningham in the Mediterranean in World W

The Navy argued that their primary mission was to gai

maintain control of the sea and to secure the sea lines o

munication. If they were to carry out this mission, their 

could not be restricted to the control of a theater comm

but had to be free to engage opposing naval forces.

The Navy maintained that although its forces would su

the theater commander, he should not control them––an 

mously important distinction because Joint Chiefs of Staf

lications allow supporting force commanders great freedom

JCS defines the relationship of “supported/supporting” 

lows: “The commander of the supported force indicates in 

to the supporting commander the support missions he wis

have fulfilled and provides such information as is necessa

The commander of the supporting force . . . takes such ac

fulfill them within his capabilities. . . . The supporting 

mander prescribes the tactics, method and procedures 

employed by his forces.”20 While this definition provides a l

basis for integrating the naval air effort, it doesn’t go far e

for the air component commander to construct a campaig

in which the targets are shifted as priorities change. The su

arrangement is essentially tailored for a highly planned ope

64

*Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal assembled the Joint Chiefs of 

Key West, Florida, on 11 March 1948, to decide “who will do what.” The K

Agreement is the basis of the current roles and missions of the services.
effectively harmonize the efforts of two or more forces. Ho

large operations extending over a long time require the 

dependable, authoritative relationship of operational con

command. Thus with naval forces committed to the cont

air campaign in Korea, and with no threat from an opposin

FEAF’s argument for operational control made sense.

In response to Stratemeyer’s request for operational contro

aircraft operating in the Korean campaign, the FECOM chief 

replied on 8 July 1950 that the Commander, FEAF, would 

command or operational control of all aircraft in the execu

the FEAF mission as assigned by the Commander-in-Chi

East (CINCFE). He went on to say that the Commander, N

would have command or operational control of all aircraft 

execution of the NAVFE mission as assigned by CINCFE.2

reply had stopped at this point, the issue would probably hav

settled. FEAF was responsible for the air campaign, and all ai

having a capability to participate in that campaign would 

come under the operational control of the air component 

mander. Since there was no naval campaign of note, all na

was in fact committed to the campaign.

However, in the same directive the Chief of Staff state

when both NAVFE and FEAF were assigned missions in 

“coordination control, a Commander-in-Chief, Far East, pr

tive,” was delegated to the Commander, FEAF. This portion 

directive reopened and obscured the question. Weren’t t

resources of NAVFE, when committed for strikes in either No

South Korea, operating in an area of responsibility already 

lished as the prerogative of the air component commander

what did the term coordination control mean? The FEAF 

mander construed it to be another way of expressing “opera

control,” while NAVFE assumed it referred to the aforemen

support relationship. Further, for the first two years of the w

Commander, NAVFE, considered his forces to be in supp

FECOM, not FEAF Thus NAVFE looked to the targeting com

at FECOM to provide the targets and the time to strike them

receiving these targets from FECOM, NAVFE did coordinat

FEAF and 5th Air Force, but only a naval liaison officer in t

Air Force Joint Operations Center had contact with Task Fo

(TF-77), the carrier force off the east coast of Korea.

NAVFE initially requested that all of its targets come 

exclusive naval air areas of operation. These areas were to 

the east coast of Korea, which was closer to TF-77; the
FEAF objected to assigning an area of operation to NAVFE 

grounds that all air forces had to be employed whereve

could confront the enemy air force and the main lines o

munication.22 Naval aviation had to be employed along th

and against the airfields around Pyongyang since these we

places where the enemy was trying to establish control of t

The east coast had some important rail lines, but since the 

LOCs were through the west coast and central region, the 

diction campaign had to be concentrated there. Thus the c

bution of naval aviation to the air campaign would be app

bly reduced if naval air were confined to an area of ope

along the east coast.

NAVFE further argued that for close air support, naval av

should be used on a specific sector of the front; again, be

of proximity to the carriers, the area should be on the e

part of the front. FEAF again contended that we shou

shackle our own Airpower with such arbitrary geographic

itations. Airpower should not be committed to a specific p

the front unless the divisions in that area were heavily en

offensively or defensively. Airpower should be used acro

front wherever the ground action justified a diversion of 

from the air superiority or interdiction campaigns. Weylan

ther argued that air support was much more effective w

was massed than when it was spread out in small increm

Even though Far East Command didn’t modify its o

directive on coordination control, FEAF and NAVFE came 

arrangement by mid-1952 which, in fact, recognized that 

was the controlling authority for all air operations. By tha

most of the detailed air operations were concentrated in the 

Operations Center (JOC) of 5th Air Force. TF-77 placed a 

section in the JOC, and the combat operations officer as

missions to TF-77, through the naval section, just as he 

Air Force units. At the same time that TF-77 established a 

section in the JOC, it also assigned an officer to the FEA

geting committee, which had assumed most of the respons

for selecting and recommending targets. Also, by 1952 c

were providing close air support using the control proce

long established for 5th Air Force and Allied aircraft. At la

full weight of Air Force and Navy Airpower was being app

a concerted manner.

66
OF OPERATIONS

Control of Marine aviation, when the Marines are commi

a land campaign, has also been a difficult and emotional 

lem. Marine aviation has been justified on the basis of its 

to support an amphibious operation, which the Marin

assigned as a primary mission. Since amphibious forc

without the artillery support normally organic to an Arm

sion constituted for sustained land warfare, Marine la

forces are dependent upon naval gunfire, carrier base

Marine air, and Air Force air (if within range) for fire su

After the forces hit the beach, Marine air augments the l

organic artillery. Then, since the Army is responsible for th

duct of prompt and sustained combat operations on la

accordance with the Key West Agreement of 1948), 23 Army 

replace Marines after the objective area is secure an

Marines either withdraw or become a part of the Army for

Marine Airpower is thus basically tailored to the needs 

landing force, including some fighters for local air defens

interdicting the landing area and gaining control of the a

Marines are dependent upon carrier-based air and land-

air. Thus, these high priority missions are outside the 

responsibility of Marine aviation, which is close air suppo

After the introduction of the Marines into Korea, FEAF 

tained that Marine aviation should come under the opera

control of 5th Air Force since Marine air had the task of p

ing close air support to 8th Army. In addition, FEAF argue

Marine aviation came under the Chief of Staff FECOM di

of 8 July 1950, which provided for FEAF having comma

operational control of all aircraft in the execution of the 

mission assigned by CINCFE. According to this directive, M

aviation should come under the operational control of FEA

Marines, however, wanted all of their air employed in direc

port of Marine ground forces, or more explicitly, they, li

Navy, wanted a section of the 8th Army front assigned 

exclusive area of operation.

FEAF opposed this employment of Marine aviation usi

same fundamental arguments Tedder had used in World 

to avoid parceling Allied Airpower to the Royal Navy. Fif

Force did concede that whenever the tactical situation perm

Marine aviation would support Marine ground forces; ho
the Airpower would still be used where it could do the mos

age to the enemy.

With the Inchon landing, Marine air was assigned 

Army’s X Corps for the amphibious assault. General Edwa

68
Almond, the X Corps commander, argued for retaining M

aviation as organic to the Corps for close air support. He f

proposed the continued operation of X Corps as separat

8th Army.24 But with X Corps assigned to 8th Army after e
control of 5th Air Force and was used across the 8th Army 

or on interdiction according to the tactical situation. Ho

Marine fighters did not participate in the counter air cam

along the Yalu because of the superior performance of the 

15 and the need to have a greater portion of the force o

interdiction campaign. Also, with a stable front there were 

requirements for close air support and consequently mor

for the Marine air units in the interdiction campaign. As a 

of the integration of Marine air operations with 5th Air 

operations, centralized control of all the Airpower assigned 

Far East Theater of operation provided the flexibility that 

in the campaigns of World War II.

With the conclusion of the Korean War, Airpower had 

demonstrated the need for a command structure that didn

trarily divide forces between mission areas. The command 

ture had to be capable of using Airpower in a variety of 

simultaneously or in sequence. The fundamental point, th

was that the theater air component commander had to con

the Airpower in the theater so that he could support gr

naval, or air operations—wherever the enemy was weak.

70
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds. The Army Air Fo

World War II, vol. 2: Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago: The U

sity of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 200–205.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

3. The Lord Tedder, Airpower In War, The Lees Knowles Lectu

1947 (London: Hodder and Stroughton, n.d.), p. 89.

4. The Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, the War Memoirs of Mar

the Royal Air Force (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 

5. Ibid., p. 396.

6. Craven and Cate, Torch to Pointblank, p. 496. 

7. Tedder, With Predudice, p. 114.

8. Craven and Cate, Torch to Pointblank, p. 493. 

9. Ibid., p. 748.

10. Ibid., pp. 735–739.

11. Ibid., pp. 738–742. 

12. Ibid., p. 741.

13. Ibid., pp. 735–740.

14. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall 

(European War) (Washington, D.C., 1945), pp. 1, 6.

15. Ibid., p. 71.

16. Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 410–411.

17. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 

Argument to V-E Day, p. 622. 

18. United States Air Force Operations In the Korean Conflict

Historical Study No. 71, 25 June–1 November 1950 (Washington

Department of the Air Force, 1952), pp. 11–13.

19. Korean Conflict, Study No. 71, p. 11.

20. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Chiefs o

Publication 2 (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 56.

21. Korean Conflict, Study No. 71, p. 12.

22. Korean Conflict, Study No. 72 (1 November 1950–30 June 

pp. 77–78.

23. Armed Forces Bulletin #1, Department of the Air Force, 

ington, D.C., 21 May 48, p. 5. (This bulletin reproduced the Secre

Defense staff paper on the functions of the Armed Forces and t

which were determined at the Key West Conference, Florida, 

11–14, 1948.)

24. Korean Conflict, Study No. 72, p. 75.
Chapter III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIRPOWER

IN THE VIETNAM WAR

With the onset of the Vietnam War, the command structur

theater air component command was fairly well establishe

experiences of World War II and Korea had been translate

publications, and field exercises and maneuvers to some exte

lowed these doctrinal principles. As Strike Command (STRI

to be redesignated Readiness Command or REDCOM on 1 Ja

1972) became more active in the conduct of joint force tr

exercises such as SWIFT STRIKE, DESERT STRIKE, and G

FIRE early in the 1960s, however, a trend developed that de

from the lessons of World War II and Korea.

STRICOM exercises featured considerable concentrat

authority within the Joint Staff for the detailed direction o

ordinate forces. This assigning of detailed operational res

bilities to the Joint Staff elevated the level of control of c

nent forces while at the same time reducing the t

competency at that level of control. Most of us involved in 

cal air operations in World War II and Korea felt that the t

staff should not be involved in the detailed tactical direc

forces. These responsibilities should be left with the comp

forces where there is the highest competency in dealin

daily tactical operations.

A Joint Task Force headquarters, even though it is fa

being a theater headquarters in size and scope of operation

tains all the activities of such a headquarters and does p

the basis for expansion into a theater headquarters if the 

of operations increases. Thus by increasing Joint Staff co

the STRICOM field exercises tended to reduce the autho

*A Unified Command established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961 

duct joint exercises, to deploy forces based in the United States to esta

theaters of operations or contingencies, and to recommend joint doctri

Navy and Marines have no forces assigned to REDCOM.
was inevitably felt in contingency planning in which Joint 

deployments were projected to have roughly the same com

structures employed in the field exercises.

The Joint Force headquarters employed in the STRICOM 

cises were never large enough to include provisions for 

various air missions that an air component commander 

direct in an active theater of war. Further, marine and nav

ation were not brought into play because STRICOM includ

Navy or Marine forces. Thus the same difficulties that pl

the command structure in World War II and Korea preva

the STRICOM field exercises. Even though these com

issues were eventually settled in combat, I doubt that the

really been resolved, since individual service doctrine w

altered to conform to the realities of combat.

Unfortunately, there is never enough money in peaceti

large exercises in which the forces and command structure 

evaluated in conditions like those of a real theater of oper

where an entire tactical air force of some 1,200 aircraft a

army of six divisions are put into the field. Such exercises 

provide a better understanding of how marine and naval a

are controlled by the theater air component commander in m

mission requirements. Because of budgetary restraints, th

current field exercises do not achieve this objective. Although 

exercises are useful for some purposes, they may make it mo

ficult in some ways for the forces to adjust to a theater com

organization when they enter combat. Thus command pro

which troubled us in World War II and again in Korea surviv

STRICOM exercises to appear yet again in Vietnam, wher

were compounded anew by national and international politic

cerns.

COMMAND STRUCTURE—THE BEGINNING

The beginning command structure for the Vietnam War 

from the Military Advisory Group (MAG). This advisory grou

established on 17 September 1950 when the French gra

degree of autonomy to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia with

French union.1 With the MAG the United States began direc

tary aid to the forces of these three countries through the F

The role of U.S. advisors was very limited, and both the Air 

and Army sections of the MAG wanted to become more d

involved in the use of American equipment. After the fall o

74
On 1 November 1955, the MAG was redesignated the M

Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG). This title reflect

change in relationship between France and the United Sta

the training of the Vietnamese. In the same year, the F

granted autonomy to the Vietnamese armed forces, which 

the way for the U.S. to provide direct assistance.

From 1955, the United States was directly involved 

organizing and training of Vietnamese units. The Vietname

Force (VNAF) was a very small element of their armed force

its organization had to be built from the bottom up. What 

ization the VNAF possessed was inherited from the Frenc

was considerably different from the USAF arrangement for 

ing a theater war. With the introduction of FARM GATE* 

and B-26s, it became increasingly apparent that we had t

a USAF command structure to control our flying units. 

though FARM GATE units were restricted to combat tr

missions, it was inevitable that such missions would i

actual combat, and in fact combat provided the best cond

for the training.2 Furthermore, FARM GATE was providing 

and more close air support and air cover for convoys which 

being ambushed with increasing frequency. The VNAF 

couldn’t meet all these requirements, and mission direct

FARM GATE provided for its employment in emergency 

tions that the VNAF was unable to handle.

2ND AIR DIVISION ADVON—THE BEGINNING OF AN

AIR COMPONENT

On 15 November 1961, 13th Air Force in the Philippine

vated an advanced echelon (ADVON) headquarters of its 2

Division at Tan Son Nhut airfield on the outskirts of Sa

Detachments at Danang and Nha Trang were created und

ADVON to control the expanding air force. Senior officials 

to designate the headquarters an ADVON rather than an a

sion headquarters because U.S. policy at the time wa

American forces in Vietnam were there only to train the 

Vietnamese. The title of air division headquarters seem

exaggerate the extent of combat operations by USAF units

*See chapter 1
tional aircraft for reconnaissance and airlift, and a 

squadron, the inadequacies of the small ADVON headqu

soon became apparent. Further, senior U.S. officials wer

sidering expanding the MAAG in light of their decisions to 

duce Special Forces to train Army of Vietnam (ARVN) ra

and to separate advisory and training functions from 

administration and logistical functions of the MAAG. Techn

expanding the MAAG would not necessarily mean expandi

ADVON headquarters because the 2nd Air Division ADVO

not identified as the air section of the MAAG. The ADVON 

a peculiar command position: It was an element of the 13

Force, but 13th Air Force had no responsibility for its ac

in Vietnam. During this initial period the MAAG, in fact, w

controlling agency for the combat activities of the 2nd Ai

sion ADVON; the commander of the ADVON reported 

MAAG chief on the activities of his assigned forces. Althoug

was not a clear command arrangement, its very obscurity h

underscore the need to restructure the MAAG to configure 

the control of combat operations and to lay the foundati

future expansion.

76
ber 1961, President Kennedy decided to expand the trainin

advisory forces in Vietnam.4 There was to be a significant in

in the size of the Air Force: The airlift force would be increas

RANCH HAND (defoliation unit) detachment would be exp

and additional control facilities and more forward air cont

with liaison aircraft would be added. General Taylor further r

mended, and the President agreed, that the MAAG should b

ganized and expanded to control the rapidly growing United 

commitment. On 8 February 1962, Military Assistance Com

Vietnam (MACV) was formed with General Paul D. Harkins as 

mander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (CO

MACV). With the establishment of MACV, advisory activitie

formally separated from training and operational activiti

essence, MACV was an operational headquarters with the n

of a staff that could direct expanded combat operations.

Most of the planning for a war in the Far East had assume

China would intervene, and the projected combat command 

tures were also based on that assumption. Whether CIN

would exercise control through a theater sub-unified com

though, was an unanswered question. The Army and Air 

believed that a theater unified command would be needed an

it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Far East 

mand did in the Korean War. Under the theater unified com

would be an Army, Navy, and Air Force component, each c

of expanding to match the scope of the conflict. Most senior 

ners believed that any small war in the Far East could well e

into a major war and that the command structures projected 

contingency plans should be able to accommodate such an e

sion. In anticipation of the need for a rapidly expandable t

unified command, Korat, Thailand, had been selected as the 

quarters for Commander, United States Southeast Asia (C

SSEA).

But senior Navy spokesmen opposed the idea of a separa

ater command reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They sup

CINCPAC in his view that the initial organization in Southea

should be a sub-unified command under CINCPAC and that 

evaluation of the level of combat should be used to dete

whether a separate theater command reporting to the Joint 

*At this time, Rostow was serving as Deputy Special Assistant to the P

for National Security Affairs, and General Taylor had the position of “

Representative” to the President.
existing command structure which gave CINCPAC, as a u

commander, control of all forces in the Pacific.

MACV—A SUB-UNIFIED COMMAND

MACV began its life as a sub-unified command under 

PAC in 1962 with debate continuing about what its str

would be in the future. The composition of the MACV staff

ever, was a matter of immediate concern to the Joint Chief

men argued that the staff should be balanced in accordanc

the principles of a tri-service command and should prov

equitable representation and equal rank in the key staf

tions. They argued, then, for the organization that had op

successfully in the North African theater headquarter

Mediterranean theater headquarters, and the European t

headquarters of World War II. In Vietnam, airmen wer

cerned that the MACV staff would be weighted in favor of 

officers as the Far East Command had been. Such an imb

had created a lack of understanding of Airpower in the K

War, and if the staff in MACV were to be dominated by the 

imbalance, the result would be the same.

78
terinsurgency was primarily a land war and that the Arm

responsible for such wars. Hence the command structure s

reflect this relationship, and assigned Airpower should 

under the control of the Army commander responsible f

campaign. Harkins was one of those who felt that the w

South Vietnam was essentially a ground war and that the 

mand structure of an Army specified command would be 

appropriate. Although he did not express this view in a 

proposal to CINCPAC until 1964,5 his thinking had a d

influence on the composition of the initial MACV staff.

Of the primary staff agencies, airmen held the J-2 an

positions, while Army officers held the J-1, J-3, and J-4 

tions. The head of the Combat Operations Center, a key po

was given to a Marine officer, as well as that of Chief of 

Thus from the outset the MACV staff was heavily weigh

favor of ground officers, but even at this early date Airpow

become fundamental to all combat and civic action opera

Strong Airpower would be essential to the South Vietnam

they were ever to stand off the enemy alone.

PACAF VIEW OF COMMAND ORGANIZATION

While others were trying to devise a workable command 

ture for MACV, CINCPACAF, the air component comm

under CINCPAC, was working to establish an appropria

command structure for our forces in South Vietnam and 

land. General Jacob E. Smart, CINCPACAF, and the Air Sta

held the view that the main threat to U.S. interests in th

East was China and that PACAF’s command structure sho

designed to meet that threat. Consequently, Smart believe

the air command structure in Southeast Asia should prov

direct control from PACAF headquarters to the number

force (in this case 13th Air Force) for the execution of t

campaign. The air forces assigned to South Vietnam sho

limited to those absolutely needed by COMUSMACV to a

plish his mission.6 If many air units were assigned to 

solely for in-country use, the forces available to CINCPAC

the conduct of any larger air campaign would be limited 

ceptably, since forces assigned to MACV could only be with

for missions outside of South Vietnam with the approval of 

PAC. Smart assumed that if combat became widespre

Southeast Asia it would be difficult to get Harkins to r
understandably reluctant to overrule Harkins in such mat

It was these concerns about our wider responsibilities 

Far East that shaped the early thinking of General LeMay 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force), General Smart, and the key 

bers of the Air Staff. Smart was probably the most express

the need to keep the main elements of the Pacific Air Force 

a single air command structure. He pointed to the struct

CINCPACFLT in which naval forces were held under a Navy 

mand structure and placed in support of a theater comm

for specific missions. This would be the most appropriate m

of providing air support for MACV. That is, most of the Air 

units in Southeast Asia would continue to be assigned to 

Air Force. When COMUSMACV needed more air effort th

assigned air units could deliver, all or part of 13th Air 

would be placed in support of MACV for a specified per

time. In this manner, Smart contended, PACAF could su

MACV and also preserve its flexibility for dealing with b

conflict or even war with China.

JTF-116—A NEW ELEMENT

As MACV was beginning to expand, the situation in Lao

deteriorating, and our hopes for North Vietnamese comp

with the 1954 cease-fire agreement were rapidly disappear

order to display U.S. concerns about Laos and the status 

cease-fire agreement, the President decided to send a Joint 

to Thailand. Composed of Marine, Army, and Air Force 

Joint Task Force 116 deployed on 12 May 1962.7 Wit

deployment of JTF-116, new questions about command re

ships had to be answered: What should be the relations

JTF-I16 with MACV? What headquarters should be respo

for JTF-116 air operations outside of South Vietnam?

The Air Force’s situation was especially troubling becau

forces in Southeast Asia were fragmented among three 

mands. The units in South Vietnam were under the comm

the 2nd Air Division ADVON; the units in Thailand were 

the command of 13th Air Force; and those recently de

from Tactical Air Command belonged to Joint Task Forc

Obviously, this arrangement forfeited all the important a

tages of centralized control of Airpower.

General Harkins’ recommendation for a command ar

ment was that MACV should control all U.S. forces in Vi

80
and Thailand. This arrangement would be consistent with 

ous planning for the contingency of an expanded war in wh

U.S. forces in Southeast Asia would be controlled from a 

headquarters at Korat. But Admiral Felt didn’t approve th

of a single command under Harkins; he preferred to ma

separate headquarters in Vietnam and Thailand for the 

based in those countries.

Felt proposed to the Joint Chiefs that Harkins be give

deputies, one for Thailand and one for South Vietnam. H

would command both MACV and the Military Assistance 

mand Thailand (MACTHAI). Harkins’ deputy for MACTHAI 

be an Air Force lieutenant general who would have, in tu

Army major general as his deputy. After some debate, the 

Chiefs accepted the proposal, and JTF-116 was deactiva

the 13th of May 1962 with its forces being assigned to MAC

Shortly afterward the Air Force, too, was compelled to fa

to the need for a better command structure in Southeas

After some sharp differences of opinion among his subordi

LeMay decided that the 2nd Air Division ADVON should b

a reinforced air division. On 8 October 1962, 2nd Air D

was activated, and all the Air Force units that had deploye

part of JTF-116 were placed under its command.8 These t
tical Air Command, but it was understood that other units 

replace them periodically to sustain a highly visible military 

ence in Thailand until the situation in Laos improved.

2ND AIR DIVISION—EXPANDED AUTHORITY

The 2nd Air Division commander, from the outset, was ex

to perform two roles: air component commander for MACV, a

ward commander for 13th Air Force, in the latter of which h

responsible for all USAF operations in Southeast Asia. CO

MACV would have operational control through 2nd Air Divi

USAF units flying in South Vietnam. But the 2nd Air Division 

mander would be performing as a forward commander for 13

Force when he controlled air operations in Laos or anywhe

outside South Vietnam. If the war should expand against 

13th Air Force would become the air component for COMU

and the 2nd Air Division commander’s role as a forward 

mander would dissolve. With this unorthodox command ar

ment, PACAF preserved its control over most of the air u

Southeast Asia.

Although the arrangement seemed improbable, it was de

with an eye to the future. For there were those in 1962 who do

that the insurgency could be brought under control in Sout

nam by ground action and who strongly suspected that the 

Airpower against the North Vietnamese homeland would even

be necessary. If that should happen, it would be essential t

the air campaign controlled by airmen through a central, th

wide command structure. MACV seemed unlikely to provide 

able structure for such a campaign, given MACV’s thoroug

commitment to treating the conflict as an insurgency which 

be settled in-country and on the ground. Thus PACAF and t

Staff were most anxious that control of the main elements of 

Force in the Pacific remain under the CINCPAC componen

mand structure and not under MACV as a sub-unified comm

Early in 1962, General LeMay recognized that the insurge

South Vietnam was demanding a more imaginative employm

Airpower. On a visit to South Vietnam on 23 April 1962, he 

with General Harkins about the need to make Airpower 

responsive.9 The command system was too cumbersome; the 

cal air control system (TAGS) was not being allowed to oper

efficiently as it had during World War II and the Korean 

Requests for air cover and for strikes against the ambush 

82
much too slowly. LeMay emphasized that Airpower could 

such ambushes very costly if it were called in quickly en

Proper use of the TACS and a more direct method of proc

requests would eliminate much of the delay. LeMay also p

out that more airmen were needed on the MACV staff t

improve the effectiveness of FARM GATE units and to create 

ter understanding among Vietnamese officers and Army advi

how to use Airpower’s capabilities. Airpower was available, 

could offer significant protection to convoys, support for c

irregular defense groups, and close air support for major g

operations; but to do these things, it would have to be centra

efficiently controlled by an Air Operations Center (AOC) usi

facilities of the already established TACS.

Harkins agreed that the Air Operations Center should c

nate all air activities including helicopters, but he decide

operational control of the helicopters should remain und

corps advisors. The AOC of 2nd Air Division would be res

ble for the overall coordination of air assault operation

Army would locate an Army air element within the AOC to 

itate the coordination and to expedite requests for immedi

missions to cover convoys and to respond to an enemy am

or attack against an isolated garrison.

AIRMAN AS DEPUTY MACV PROPOSED

From the experience in the European war of having an a

as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of SHAEF, LeMay believe

making an airman the Deputy Commander of MACV would 

a clearer understanding and a better employment of Airpo

the expanding war. LeMay proposed to Harkins that he des

an Air Force lieutenant general as his deputy, similar to th

der-Eisenhower relationship. The Deputy Commander woul

vide the command direction often missing when an air dep

restricted to advising and coordinating. With the Deputy Com

der an airman, a better balance of experience would prevail 

ing in a more effective use of forces. Furthermore, the Comm

and Deputy Commander, MACV, were positions requiring 

tactical experience; it was immaterial whether COMUSMACV 

soldier or an airman as long as he could direct the forces as

him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whatever the military ser

COMUSMACV, his deputy should be of another branch 

large forces assigned. Since Harkins, as COMUSMACV, was 
power and the projected buildup in it.

Harkins was opposed to assigning an airman as his dep

He again stated that the war was primarily a ground wa

that his deputy should be a soldier. He considered Airpo

significant factor in campaign strategy but saw the wa

counterinsurgency conflict in which the Army had the dom

interest. The situation did not require an airman as deputy 

mander; neither was there a need for an airman in the po

of air deputy at this time. Harkins believed his command 

ture satisfactory—Major General Rollen H. Anthis, the 2

Division commander, was his air component command

such, Anthis had direct daily access to Harkins. Calling An

deputy commander or an air deputy would not produce a 

understanding or closer working relationship.

Since General Anthis was air component commander, a

thought MACV should be organized as a theater of operation

an Army component command in which COMUSMACV wou

be the component commander. Army planners, remem

MacArthur’s command organization in the Korean War, thou

Army component would be redundant; the MACV staff could 

tion in both capacities. This arrangement also existed in th

namese command structure, and it would be easier workin

the Vietnamese if MACV were similarly organized. Neverth

Harkins established an Army component command in Aug

1963.11 He served as the component commander with Majo

eral Joseph W. Stilwell as his deputy. Stilwell was primarily r

sible for U.S. Army Support Command activities involving ad

tration and logistics. Harkins reserved all operational matt

the MACV staff which functioned in a dual role as theater and 

component commander’s staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to discuss the questio

Deputy Commander, MACV. They were divided on the issu

were still considering it when Secretary of Defense McNama

ited South Vietnam in December 1963. McNamara discuss

deputy question with Harkins and agreed that a soldier sho

appointed as Harkins’ deputy, effective 27 January 1964.12

Early in 1964 Harkins proposed that Anthis be given 

tional duty as the Deputy Commander, MACV, for Air Oper

(or Air Deputy) although only a few months earlier Harkin

rejected the idea of a Deputy Commander for Air. The Ai

did not support his request for an Air Deputy; in fact, LeMa

rejected the proposal prior to December 1963. In rejectin

84
airman should be appointed as Deputy Commander, MAC

just Deputy for Air.13 Harkins was due to leave Vietnam in 

and Westmoreland, the current deputy, was in line for h

Thus the deputy position would soon be vacant again.

MACV AS UNIFIED COMMAND UNDER JCS—A PROPOSAL

The issue of making MACV a unified command reporting 

JCS came up again early in 1964. There were some cogent 

ments why MACV should report to the JCS and not to CIN

with the most important point being that basic decisions were 

by the JCS; it would be a more effective arrangement for them 

directly to MACV which would carry out those decisions. Fu

more, experience in World War II and Korea indicated the n

place control close to the scene of action—a fundamental pr

of command. CINCPAC was only a reviewing authority and 

only slow down the decision process between Washingto

MACV. He had to go to the JCS for guidance since strateg

political matters were beyond the scope of his authority. An

if matters were within the scope of his authority, he would sti

to go to the JCS for guidance because of the political overto

most of the military decisions. From these considerations, 

argued that MACV should be separated from CINCPAC and 

under the JCS as a unified command.

Support for the idea of MACV being a unified command 

the JCS came also from some elements within the State D

ment. Admiral Felt, however, was opposed to the proposal be

it could split South Vietnam from the rest of Asia. In his view, 

necessary that one headquarters be responsible for the 

Pacific theater, with subcommands established as necess

handle operations in particular areas. He further argued that 

PAC needed control over all Pacific forces so he could use th

he saw fit to meet any threat. The Chinese threat remained 

nant, and CINCPAC wanted to be able to direct forces to c

that threat without debating their use with the JCS. In

Harkins and the JCS agreed with Felt that MACV should rem

a sub-unified commander under CINCPAC.

DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR AIR OPERATIONS

Then in May 1964, Harkins submitted a proposal to make 

a specified command reporting to the JCS. The difference be
a specified and a unified command is fundamental. A sp

command recognizes the dominance of one service in military 

ations. Other forces come under its direction, and the exe

staff is weighted in favor of the dominant service. On the 

hand, a unified command represents a multi-service activit

interests of the participating services are equally divided, 

balanced staff of representatives from the participating se

The mission of the unified command recognizes no one serv

dominant, but requires the integration of all participating s

in an equitable relationship.

Harkins, in submitting his proposal for a specified com

with the Army as executive agent, based his argument on th

being a counterinsurgency operation, the primary respons

of the Army. This was the same argument that had 

advanced in early 1961 on the control of air units assig

South Vietnam. But Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp (the new 

PAC as of 1 July 1964), opposed the establishment of a sp

command and stated that the unified effort needed stren

ing, not diluting. The JCS agreed with Sharp, and the issu

specified command never again arose. The issue of a theate

fied command, however, remained active.

The air organization of MACV remained a concern for t

Staff. They were worried that much of the Airpower assig

CINCPACAF would be placed under the operational con

2nd Air Division as the air component of MACV. By maint

2nd Air Division under 13th Air Force, PACAF retaine

86
forces were assigned to MACV, however, the Commander 

Air Division would have to persuade COMUSMACV to r

them. If COMUSMACV objected, which was likely since mo

fied commanders are not particularly happy about releasin

forces to another command, PACAF would have to ask CIN

to release the forces. This could be a delicate request 

CINCPAC were concerned about the same areas as CINCP

The assignment of Westmoreland as COMUSMACV on 20 

1964 forced the issue on the question of an airman as his d

LeMay had not given up on the idea; he felt Airpower was cru

the success of our policy in Vietnam. The JCS again consider

question of an airman as Deputy COMUSMACV, but w

divided as when the question was previously considered. To r

the split, McNamara sided with the Chairman, General Ea

Wheeler; and Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton

Army, was appointed Deputy on 2 August 1964.

Before long, Westmoreland again raised the question of 

Deputy. Uncertain how the North Vietnamese would react 

strikes above the DMZ, he argued against bombing North 

nam in late 1964 because he didn’t feel he had enough tro

stop an invasion by the remaining regular divisions of the 

Vietnamese Army.14 If such an invasion did come, howeve

power would be the critical factor in stopping it. Thus in 

tember 1964, Westmoreland proposed that the comman

2nd Air Division be appointed the Deputy Commander, M

for Air Operations as an additional duty. Sharp agreed wi

proposal in light of the continuing buildup of air activity 

South Vietnam. But the Air Staff maintained their origina

tion on an Air Deputy for MACV. Their feeling persisted th

air organization within South Vietnam should be limited an

2nd Air Division was adequate. The main organization for 

tions in Laos and North Vietnam should be 13th Air Forc

an advanced headquarters in Thailand located at Ko

Udorn. Westmoreland’s proposal for an Air Deputy in Sept

1964 was not approved although almost a year later the po

would be created.

Thus at the end of 1964 the organization for the conduct 

war was still not settled. At the higher levels, discussion

tinued on the merits of establishing a separate theater 

those of maintaining MACV as a sub-unified command of 

PAC. With increasing air activity along the lines of comm

tion in Laos, and PIERCE ARROW air strikes in North Vie
ously needed.

ROLE OF CINCPAC COMPONENT COMMANDS

Admiral Sharp was opposed to any basic change 

PACOM command structure. He initially believed the air 

North Vietnam and Laos should be fought by his two comp

commanders, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, while the w

South Vietnam should be fought with forces assigned to 

but supported by PACAF and PACFLT forces located o

South Vietnam. He believed this organization provided flex

for concentrating his forces in the Pacific against the C

should that contingency develop. Further it gave him 

direction of the air war, which was a divided respons

between CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. When he was 

authority for strikes in North Vietnam and Laos, Sharp 

mined which missions would be assigned to PACAF and wh

PACFLT. Each component commander then detailed the 

sions to his subordinate commands. PACAF directed 13

Force to carry out the specified strikes, and 13th Air Fo

turn directed its subordinate command, 2nd Air Division, t

88
relayed to the 7th Fleet. Seventh Fleet then assigned th

sions to a subordinate task force, Task Force 77 (TF-77) l

in the Gulf of Tonkin above the 17th parallel.

The commanders of 2nd Air Division and TF-77 coord

their strikes in accordance with CINCPAC’s designation of 

PACAF or PACFLT as the coordinating authority for a s

strike. Although no formal PACOM procedure existed for 

coordination, it is a principle of all military operations tha

manders have an inherent responsibility to coordinate 

operations with lateral or adjacent commanders when such 

ations affect the other’s forces. Although the 2nd Air D

commander and the commander of TF-77 coordinated on 

initial strikes, with the establishment of ROLLING THUND

March 1965 it was apparent the command arrangement f

conduct of the air war was inadequate. Many airmen adv

establishing a single air commander for the command an

trol of all air operations––Air Force, Navy, and Marine.

The control of naval aviation in an air campaign was a 

lem during the Korean War, and now it again needed 

resolved. There was a distinct difference, however, betwe

command problems in Vietnam and those in Korea. In the 

war, Far East Command was given total responsibility an

no subordinate sub-unified commands. Far East Com

approached, at least after 1952, the command structure of 

War II in the Mediterranean and European theaters. 

1960s, though, PACOM existed as a theater above a t

(MACV) with the total U.S. war effort divided between two 

quarters. To further complicate the command problem, PA

as the theater command headquarters, was some 7,000 

from the scene of the air and ground battles. By contrast, 

World War II and Korea, theater headquarters were only 

hundred miles from combat. Not only was the command 

ture in Vietnam a problem, but with headquarters so d

from combatant forces, the decision process became even 

difficult. Nevertheless, CINCPAC continued to believe a t

command in Southeast Asia reporting directly to the Joint 

of Staff would be a mistake; and Air Force, Navy, and Marin

resentatives to the JCS supported his view.

Within the complex PACOM-MACV arrangement, if Air 

and Navy Airpower were to be centrally controlled for RO

THUNDER, PACAF as the air component of PACOM was 

the appropriate controlling organization. Thus CINCP
North Vietnam and Laos to include the selection of targets

on and off target, control agencies, coordination, and we

effort. (This degree of control conforms to the definition o

ational control used in World War II and Korea.) However, 

PAC did not see the necessity of placing carrier forces in th

of Tonkin under the operational control of CINCPACAF.

General John P. McConnell, who succeeded LeMay as C

Staff on 1 February 1965, was principally concerned abo

air command structure below the PACAF level.15 He didn’t b

there would be any major changes in the PACOM structur

would affect the Southeast Asia Theater. But McConnell did 

an adequate theater command structure for the rapid buil

USAF Airpower in South Vietnam in response to the Pres

decision to expand all U.S. forces there. Base constructio

to be hurried to take care of the wings arriving almost mo

in a few short months the fighter force based in South Vi

would number close to 400 aircraft. Faced with such expa

McConnell urged reopening the issue of an airman as dep

MACV.

Second Air Division was not large enough to assume the 

tional task of building an air force in combat. An air divis

usually a small operational headquarters of 20 to 30 peopl

as a sub-unit of a numbered air force, it is dependent upo

air force for administration, logistics, and other support

teenth Air Force, higher headquarters for 2nd Air Division

having difficulty supervising the large construction progr

Thailand, which was growing at the same time as the expa

in South Vietnam. Consequently, 2nd Air Division had to a

logistical and engineering responsibilities in addition to i

mary operational function.

Major General Joe H. Moore, Commander of 2nd Air D

since 31 January 1964, had recommended expansion 

numbered air force reporting directly to CINCPACAF.16 B

air division was still subordinate to 13th Air Force for stri

Laos and North Vietnam, and to MACV for operations in 

Vietnam. Moore was in a most difficult position: 13th Air 

and MACV often presented him with conflicting demand

2nd Air Division, though inadequately staffed, had respons

for building bases and logistical facilities. PACAF alleviated 

of the construction problems by temporarily assigning peo

the 2nd Air Division staff from units in the Pacific and the U

States.

90
In mid-1965, the Deputy Commander MACV issu

reopened by the pending reassignment of Lieutenant G

Throckmorton. McConnell proposed that a three-star a

replace Throckmorton for the same reasons advanced by L

But this proposal was no more successful than previous 

Westmoreland believed as Harkins that the major task in 

Vietnam was the ground battle and that he needed a sold

his deputy to help share the burden. Airpower was impo

but the main task was that of the soldier “finding and fixin

enemy, then bringing in Airpower to help artillery destro

Based on this strategy, Airpower was a supporting el

rather than a dictating consideration. Thus Westmo

argued that Throckmorton’s replacement should be anoth

dier just as when he was deputy to Harkins in 1964.*

Westmoreland’s counterproposal was, again, that a thre

airman be the Deputy for Air Operations and simultan

commander of 2nd Air Division. Unsuccessful in getting ap

for the Deputy Commander, MACV position, McConnel

agreed with Westmoreland, and the JCS approved the Air D

position on 25 June 1965.

CONTROL OF ARMY HELICOPTERS & MARINE AIRCRAFT

Moore, as the Air Deputy, requested control of Army h

ters just as Anthis had done in 1962. In Moore’s opinion, 

control would require locating an Army aviation element 

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) where joint planning 

include helicopter assault operations. Further, the tactic

control system would control helicopters the same as oth

craft; the Combat Operations Officer at the TACC would 

mine if any mission could proceed based on the amount of 

ground fire and upon other air operations that had develo

a result of unforeseen enemy action. If a diversion or dela

necessary, the Operations Officer would consult with the 

Army representative at the TACC. If there were a differe

opinion, the 2nd Air Division commander, acting as eith

component commander or Air Deputy, could present the m

*According to Westmoreland’s Report on the War in Vietnam (1968), 

Throckmorton replaced Heintges on 5 November 1965. Heintges replaced 

on 1 June 1967, two years after the events being discussed here.
quarters to 2nd Air Division headquarters would expedi

decision process. 

In spite of arguments advanced by Moore and his staff

ever, the directive establishing the Air Deputy position exc

any reference to his controlling Army helicopters. This ab

of control was a problem throughout the war, for the large 

ber of aircraft sorties and the absolute necessity to c

enemy ground fire during helicopter assaults demanded u

planning and control. In fact the demands for air suppo

greater during a helicopter assault than for a traditional air

operation. In an airborne assault the force is traveling at a 

higher penetration speed with minimum exposure, and it 

higher degree of survivability compared to a helicopter as

Both types of operations require close coordination betwe

military forces, and for this reason an airman in previous 

had control of such operations until the troops landed

landing, the ground force commander took over. The air 

mander in earlier wars decided whether defenses in the 

area would permit the assault to proceed, but this was no

the case in helicopter assault operations in South Vietnam

The Air Deputy’s authority was further restricted by 

Directive 95-4 on 6 May 1965. Among other things, this di

prescribed the relationship of Marine air and its control.

Marine Corps aviation resources are organic to III MAF and 

commanded and directed in support of tactical operations as 

ignated by the Commanding General III MAF. The Marine C

tactical air control system will exercise positive control ove

USMC aircraft in support of Marine Corps operations and 

other aircraft as may be in support of such operations. In the e

COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, 2nd Air Division 

assume operational control of certain air resources designate

COMUSMACV.17

Under this directive Airpower was further fragmented b

establishing of all elements of two separate tactical air for

the theater, one controlled by the theater air component 

mander and the other by the equivalent of a corps comm

This fragmentation grew unworkable as the war progresse

by the time of Khe Sanh (January 1968), it was apparent M

Airpower had to be controlled by the air component comm

as it had been in Korea. In the years before this change occ

92
issue with COMUSMACV.

FURTHER DEFINITION OF 2ND AIR DIVISION

RESPONSIBILITIES

In November 1965, McConnell directed that 2nd Air D

be separated from 13th Air Force. It would report to PAC

air operations outside South Vietnam and on all Air Force 

ice matters within South Vietnam. (Air operations in South 

nam were the prerogative of COMUSMACV as the sub-u

commander.) General Hunter Harris, Jr., who replaced Sm

Commander of PACAF, wanted to keep 2nd Air Division 

13th Air Force since such a structure would have kept 13

Force in control of all air operations outside South Vietnam

the expansion of 2nd Air Division (it was in rapidly approa

the size of 5th Air Force in the Korean War) made such a 

tionship with 13th Air Force impractical. But now, what 

quarters would control Airpower located in Thailand? 

When MACV was organized in 1964, COMUSMACV wa

designated COMUSMACTHAI and was made responsib

planning United States military participation in SEATO. 

ever, the Thai military expressed concern over this arrange

Their concern was probably that the dual-hatted comm

would link them directly to the actual fighting in South Vie

Further, the Thais may have feared they would exercis

influence in the U.S. military structure if the dual com

arrangement prevailed. At the request of the Thai govern

the two positions were separated on 30 April 1965.

The Thai government requested, further, that a comm

based in Thailand direct all USAF units based in their co

Presumably the same reasons advanced for not having CO

MACV command forces based in Thailand motivated this s

request. The U.S. Ambassador, however, had a significant 

determining the command of U.S. Airpower based in Thail

the air commander remained in South Vietnam, the A

sador’s influence would be reduced; if the commander 

based in Thailand, however, the Ambassador would have 

control since he was the senior U.S. official in the country

Various proposals treated the air command structure fo

trolling Thailand based units. It had become accepted fact

ever, that the control of air operations in South Vietnam 

differ from the control of those in North Vietnam. Shar
war against North Vietnam while MACV would control Air

employed in South Vietnam. Confronted with the conf

needs to have all Airpower under a single air commander 

meet the request of the Thai government, McConnell prop

unique arrangement: He would appoint one airman as d

commander for 2nd Air Division and for 13th Air Force in 

land.18 This unique arrangement satisfied the Thais’ requ

have the forces based in Thailand under a commander l

there; the arrangement also provided centralized direction 

total air effort under the commander of 2nd Air Division.

The Deputy Commander, 2nd Air Division/13th Air Forc

logistical and administrative responsibility for all units loca

Thailand, and he reported to the 13th Air Force comman

both these matters. However, the commander of 2nd Air D

in Saigon did not pass operational control of the forces in 

land to the deputy. Moore, like all subsequent command

7th Air Force, elected to control all of these forces from his 

quarters. This was the most efficient way to use them fo

sions in North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam. Alt

Thailand based units could not be used for missions in 

Vietnam except during emergencies, South Vietnam base

craft could be used in all three areas. Thus there was g

flexibility in retaining control at 2nd Air Division headqua

It was soon evident that the 2nd Air Division staff was 

sufficient size to direct the units coming into South Vie

Normally, six or more wings need a tactical air force structu

operations. This provides a command and control system 

other support activities for about a thousand airplanes. S

Air Division reached the size of a numbered air force in 

1966; however, considering the airfield construction pr

alone, 2nd Air Division needed the staff of a numbered ai

as early as 1964.

On 14 March 1966, 2nd Air Division was inactivated, a

7th Air Force of World War II fame was reestablished to dire

air war in North and South Vietnam. Activating 7th Air For

assigning an air deputy to COMUSMACV completed the t

command structure for the rest of the war except for th

phase-out of MACV headquarters in Spring 1972. The 2

Division/13th Air Force position was redesignated Deputy 

mander, 7th Air Force/13th Air Force.

The deputy position in Thailand was a source of increasin

cern since the 7th Air Force commander had not given the d

94
operational control of any forces. It was not feasible to give c

of forces to the deputy commander without increasing his s

supervise the execution of the mission. But the increase

would have entailed a considerable duplication of resources, 

were limited by the maximum number of people who were a

ized to be based in South Vietnam and Thailand. More fund

tal, however, was the need to control all air operations from 

gle point. The conflicting requirements and the shifting of fo

continually cover competing demands from MACV, PACAF, a

Ambassador in Laos necessitated centralized control in 7

Force. And with about 1100 combat aircraft, the force wa

within the span of control of a numbered air force headquar

CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

The Deputy Commander, 7th/13th Air Force, was prima

son for the 7th Air Force commander in dealing with the A

sadors in Thailand and Laos. Since the Ambassador in Th

was responsible for all activities of U.S. forces based the

requested a daily report of missions flown by units in Tha

The Deputy Commander, 7th/13th Air Force, met wit

Ambassador frequently and kept him briefed on potentia
sions and those already underway. The Ambassador then 

these reports to keep the Thai government informed. If m

required special attention, the 7th Air Force commander m

sonally with the Ambassador. Also, as 7th Air Force comm

from 1966–1968, I provided a monthly resume of missions

ever, the Ambassador in Thailand exercised no control ov

operations of the force. His responsibilities were to keep th

government informed on the air war and to obtain fa

needed for basing our forces.

Command relationships with the Ambassador in Laos wer

plex and difficult. The Ambassador, as the senior United Stat

cial, was responsible for all U.S. military activities; consequen

air operations came under the detailed surveillance and con

the embassy. In effect the embassy air attaché functioned as 

commander since he could determine 7th Air Force emplo

through the authority of the Ambassador.

COMUSMACV had responsibility for air operations in 

ern Laos (the two principal areas here were called TIGER H

and STEEL TIGER), and under the unified command prin

he further delegated this responsibility to the 7th Air Force 

mander. Since there were no U.S. troops in the area, exc

96

Heavy North Vietnamese traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in L
activities were air missions: interdiction, reconnaissance, a

superiority sorties. Command of the forces followed pres

military channels, and the Ambassador in Laos could appr

disapprove certain targets. Approval was a continuing pr

because senior Laotian Commander, Vang Pao, at the emb

direction, maintained road patrols along the Ho Chi Min

work. The 7th Air Force commanders thought these team

duced questionable information about enemy movements 

the trail; yet concern for the safety of the teams, whose loc

could never be pinpointed, denied large areas to our 

forces. In fact our planners urged that the teams be with

so any target in the area controlled by North Vietnamese 

be cleared for attack. Because of these teams and fear of 

friendly villages, the Ambassador insisted upon limiting a

to 200 yards either side of the road network unless strike 

were under the control of a forward air controller (FAC), 

the Laotians approved the strike.

These restrictions finally led to the assignment of a Lao

the airborne command, control, and communications (AB

aircraft. He represented the military region commander’s 

quarters and had the authority to clear targets for attack

a typical strike in Laos started with a forward air controller 

O-2 or OV-10 aircraft locating a target and requesting 

approval from the ABCCC. The Combat Operations Office

the Laotian officer’s approval, would then release the tar

the FAC. This process took only a few minutes and follow

pattern for a normal mission in which strike aircraft repor

the ABCCC, which passed them to the FAC’s control. If the 

ian officer didn’t believe he could clear a target because 

proximity to a village, the ABCCC radioed either the near

Operations Center colocated with a military region headqu

or the Air Operations Center at Vientiane for approva

process took time, and if North Vietnamese forces were m

near a village, the delay could be too long. However, most 

targets were within the approval authority of the Laotian o

BARREL ROLL (the operations in northern Laos) created 

command problems not experienced in STEEL TIGER or 

HOUND. The latter two areas had no significant ground ac

except along the Bolovens Plateau, and control of strike 

involved relatively little coordination. The 7th Air Force comm

as the air component commander, exercised operational con

all Airpower employed in these areas whether Navy, Mari
extent in the same manner as it did in South Vietnam.

In BARREL ROLL, Vang Pao’s forces operated under 

control of the embassy. The U.S, air attaché in Laos pla

major role on the embassy staff in selecting targets and p

ing the size of forces employed daily. In essence, the a

sealed off a geographical area, and Airpower was fragmen

that area. The embassy constantly sought the dedication 

tain amounts of Airpower to the support of Vang Pao’s force

a number of reasons, 7th Air Force vigorously resisted ass

such control to the embassy. The most significant reaso

that fragmenting the force prevented its use where it woul

vide the greatest potential for decisive action. The embass

wanted a wing of propeller aircraft at Nakon Phanom un

operational control, but Moore and I (as Seventh Air Force 

manders in 1965 and 1966) contended that enemy de

would preclude employing propeller aircraft against the t

the embassy proposed. We were sure that it would be nec

to employ high performance jet aircraft.

Aircraft use was a continuing problem with the emba

problem that abated only when the North Vietnamese inc

their forces in the Plain of Jars and began a systematic a

on Vang Pao’s troops and his base at Long Tieng. By this tim

sortie requirements were so many that a single wing dedica

Vang Pao’s support would obviously have been inadequate. 

B-52s and all fighters used in North Vietnam were 

employed in Laos in increasing quantities by the middle of 

BARREL ROLL needed the same arrangement that exis

South Vietnam for control of Airpower. The embassy’s s

staff was not the ones to control sophisticated air oper

required to hold a country with inadequate ground forces 

stop an enemy who introduced more troops and weapons.

Still, the Ambassador never felt that enough Airpower was 

devoted to the war in Laos, and he raised the issue through 

matic and military channels on several occasions. His arg

was one frequently heard from an organization wanting sole c

of Airpower to support its missions. But if Airpower had 

divided as the Ambassador proposed, there would have been 

ficient forces for the other missions in South Vietnam, sou

Laos, and North Vietnam. CINCPAC considered the war in 

Vietnam a priority commitment; COMUSMACV considered h

sion in South Vietnam dominant; and the Ambassador in La

convinced the preservation of the status quo in Laos de

98
could be satisfied was through 7th Air Force’s centralized con

Airpower. The 7th Air Force commander finally had to decide 

each request based upon the criticality of the situation an

amount and type of Airpower available.

Each time Moore, I, or a later commander decided to reass

support from one area to another, we provoked an en

response from the losing activity. JCS pressure on CINCP

eliminate a target released for attack carried priority, often 

ing in reduced support for BARREL ROLL or for interdiction 

in STEEL TIGER or TIGER HOUND. Priorities shifted frequ

and whenever a situation developed constituting a grave th

the security of forces or facilities, we diverted Airpower to st

the situation. Invariably our decisions displeased other hea

ters because they, removed from the scene of action, were bo

assess the situation somewhat differently.

With the bombing halt of 1968, our efforts focused increa

on the war in Laos. Our control of Airpower then resembl

control in South Vietnam although it never reached the sam

degree of efficiency and effectiveness. The embassy in Laos

ever, placed fewer restraints on targets since the North Vietn

advance had to be stopped. As restraints lifted, the rather el

tary AOCs could direct Airpower to the control of FACs and 

range navigation (LORAN) bombing much more efficiently. 

lent bombing by F-111s, F-4s, and A-7s made the defense o

Tieng, Vang Pao’s headquarters, possible. The enemy’s 1

artillery pieces located on high terrain above Long Tieng coul

been removed by Vang Pao’s infantry, perhaps, but such an 

ground attack would have been extremely costly. However, o

power kept the enemy gun positions under constant attack 

all-weather bombing techniques since clouds obscured the 

much of the time. We processed target requests and con

strikes in this campaign with the same general proc

employed in South Vietnam.

CONTROL OF NAVY STRIKE AIRCRAFT DIVERTED

FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Arrangements for the control of strikes in North Vietnam d

importantly from the arrangements in Laos and South Vie

Navy aircraft employed in South Vietnam and Laos came und

control as 7th Air Force commander, which permitted me to 

the time on and off target, and the controlling agency. Most 
them the ABCCC assigned targets and FACs according to it

eral attack plan. Often the scant notice received before a 

diversion required the ABCCC to make rapid decisions and a

ments. Thus if the weather forecast for North Vietnam was 

ginal, I always had contingency targets given to the ABCCC.

Diversions into South Vietnam were less frequent, but 

they happened, most aircraft were used in one of the two 

ernmost Military Regions (MR-I and MR-II). Both target 

stretched the range limits of Navy aircraft, so the Navy s

that diverted into these areas sometimes had to be suppl

refueling. Also, it was difficult to accommodate diversion

South Vietnam because of the nature of the fixed targets. 

targets directly associated with ground force contacts re

strikes to occur at a precise time. Of course the ABCCC 

know when Navy aircraft would be diverted, so at best 

would be only a very short time to arrange the strike. Sinc

sorties couldn’t be as effective in South Vietnam as they 

against selected targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail netw

Laos, most Navy “diverts” were sent to Laos.

As set forth in MACV Directive 9511, I, as the Deputy Com

der for Air, could assume control of all Airpower supporting 

at the direction of COMUSMACV. During the Tet offensive e

1968, Westmoreland requested CINCPAC to authorize the co

ment of carrier air to my control. CINCPAC approved 

amounted to an extended diversion of TF-77 carrier air fro

bombing campaign in North Vietnam. The TF-77 commande

mitted daily sorties for my use, and we controlled these a

using the same procedures established for all other aircraft 

7th Air Force jurisdiction. The arrangement worked.

I should mention here my concern in 1968 about div

either Air Force or Navy fighters to targets in South Vie

thereby taking the pressure off North Vietnam at a time 

psychologically and militarily, an intensive air campaign 

north was needed to help counter the Tet offensive. Und

circumstances, I was most anxious not to hold forces for th

in the south unless absolutely essential.

CONTROLLING THE STRIKES UP NORTH

Perhaps the toughest question facing Admiral Sharp 

PAC) early in 1965 dealt with who would control strikes in 

Vietnam and how they would be coordinated. The a

100
arrangement for FLAMING DART (February 1965), in which 

dination was delegated on a mission-by-mission basis

totally inadequate for ROLLING THUNDER (beginning 

March). A formal command arrangement had been estab

for forces in South Vietnam and Laos, but the question 

operations in North Vietnam was unsettled.

The Air Force, based on experience with a similar situa

Korea, advocated placing carrier air under the control of 

PACAF as the theater air component commander. PACAF 

then delegate control to 2nd Air Division (7th Air For

U.S. Navy A4-C “Skyhawk” drops 250lb “iron bombs” on a suspected Viet 

stronghold in South Vietnam.
Korean War and World War II, strikes in North Vietnam had 

closely integrated, which could be assured by having all Air

under the air component commander.

However, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet 

PACFLT) contended that naval Airpower was an inherent p

the fleet, and its mission and could not be separated. MacA

had used the term “coordinating authority” to harmonize 

and NAVFE air forces in Korea; the same arrangement s

suitable for the Vietnam situation. Therefore it was appro

to designate one of the components the “coordinating auth

with that authority limited to such things as exchanging 

mation on strike plans, requesting support for a particular 

ation, and establishing procedures to prevent conflicting 

ties. Essentially, CINCPACFLT wanted TF-77 in the Tonki

to have the same relationship to 2nd Air Division/7th Air 

that it had initially with 5th Air Force in the Korean War. 

air officials feared that this arrangement would create the 

problems it had created in the Korean War; it was not the 

mand relationship needed to adequately direct both force

common objective.

COORDINATING AUTHORITY

CINCPAC agreed with CINCPACFLT. In March 1965, P

was designated the coordinating authority for ROLLING T

DER,19 but the directive clearly stated that such author

not involve the operational control of the carrier forces. The 

ter also established the ROLLING THUNDER Armed Reco

sance Coordinating Committee (later changed to the RO

THUNDER Coordinating Committee) to coordinate and r

items of mutual interest to the Navy and Air Force. The co

tee was to eliminate overlapping areas of interest, reduce 

cation of effort against targets in North Vietnam, and prom

effective ROLLING THUNDER program.

CINCPAC would assign targets released by the JCS to P

and PACFLT. PACAF would then ensure that strike forces 

conflict with one another in approaching attacking, and 

drawing from the target. CINCPAC expected PACAF to de

coordinating authority to 2nd Air Division, and Moore did r

that authority.

Moore’s experiences with 5th Air Force in the Korean Wa

vinced him that a commander needed something other than 

102
he faced up to the problem of how to convert the arrangeme

some workable relationship with TF-77. Missions were bec

more complex, so both forces needed specific guidelines to ca

their assignments. Yet, it was not feasible to exchange pla

every mission with the many variables and communication 

lems that inevitably develop during intensive operations.

Moore formed a working committee with TF-77 to formu

proposal for controlling the two forces within the guideli

CINCPAC’s directive. The initial proposal by 2nd Air Division 

establish a time-sharing arrangement of three-hour interv

striking North Vietnamese LOCs south of the 20th parallel. V

segments of the routes would be assigned to either TF-77 or 2

Division for three-hour periods. Assignments would be plan

week in advance to cover all lines of communication and wou

mit one force to operate in the other force’s area should the 

not elect to use its three-hour period.

TF-77 didn’t like the arrangement because the range 

tions of Navy strike forces wouldn’t allow them to reach d

targets. Without air refueling, they couldn’t attack the p

and roads along North Vietnam’s western border. As a c

proposal, TF-77 recommended North Vietnam be divided 

north-south axis with TF-77 responsible for the coastal 

However, most of the targets and lines of communication 

within 25 to 30 miles of the Tonkin Gulf, except for the p

leading into Laos, which were bottlenecks in the road ne

At the head of these passes, the North Vietnamese stored 

quantities of war material awaiting shipment further 

Except for these supplies, almost all targets below the 20t

allel were along the coastal highway (Highway #1) and ne

many small ports used to stage supplies for movement 

Although the north-south division would have helped the 

range problem, it would not have promoted the effective 

forces assigned to 2nd Air Division; areas without significa

gets would have had high coverage while areas with many t

would not have received enough effort.

After considering different methods for coordinating air su

the 2nd Air Division/TF-77 ROLLING THUNDER Coordi

Committee proposed to divide North Vietnam into a series o

packages beginning at the DMZ.20 There were six route pa

with the sixth divided into two parts, VI A (Air Force) and 

(Navy). Dividing North Vietnam into route packages gave t

Force three areas and the Navy four; however, the Air Force 
basic point, though, wasn’t exposure over enemy territory bu

the division of Airpower into geographical areas was imprope

ROUTE PACKAGES—A CONTROL ARRANGEMENT

The Committee assigned Route Package I to 2nd Air Divis

covered an area from the DMZ to just above the 18th p

MACV had initially considered this area an extension of the g

battle zone, and our operations in Route Package I were direc

MACV rather than by PACAF. If this logic had prevailed wh

route packages were being designed, the same argument 

have led the Committee to place all route packages under 

since the entire air campaign against the LOCs was meant to 

the battle in South Vietnam. In any case, the assignment of 

Packages I and II would be reexamined later.

TF-77 controlled Route Package II, covering an area fro

18th parallel to just below the 19th parallel, and from the c

the Laotian border. The most significant target in Package II w

Vinh area and the logistical activities surrounding it. Coasta

ping and traffic on the coastal highway were also major targ

104

U.S. Navy strike aircraft were launched from TF-77 carriers cruising in the 

Tonkin.
into southern Laos were on the southern edge of Route Pac

there were no passes in Route Package II.

The Navy also controlled Route Package III, the larges

graphical area but with less significant targets except f

coastal rail and road network. Barthelemy Pass was a maj

get, however, since most of the supplies supporting the 

Lao and North Vietnamese forces in the Plain of Jars move

Route Seven. Seventh Air Force covered this pass and most 

movements leading into it, while the Navy covered the e

end of Route Seven.

Except for Route Package VI B, Package IV was the most 

area assigned the Navy, and few of the targets in Package IV 

restricted. The most important targets were the rail and 

U.S. Navy A-7 pulls off target after destroying a span of the Hai Dong (we

way bridge.
was a major rail yard and marshalling area for logistics. 

time Bai Thuong was the only all-weather airfield in the 

and enemy fighters used it as a staging field for patrols so

The Air Force was responsible for Route Package V—twi

size of any other area. It contained most of the railroads 

northwest and the LOCs supporting North Vietnamese for

northern Laos. Package V was bounded on the east by 

along the 150°30’ longitude, on the west by the Laotian b

on the north by the Chinese border, and on the south 

imaginary extension of the northeast rail line until it inter

the Laotian border.

By far the most important of all route packages was 

Package VI. Most of the targets were in this area, and 

defenses there were the strongest. Package VI was d

between the Air Force and Navy along the northeast ra

Using the railroad as a dividing line gave the least chan

error were pilots from either 7th Air Force or TF-77 to stra

be assumed hostile. The package was bounded on the w

150°30’ longitude and on the south by a line just to the no

Nam Dinh.

Most of the original 94 targets on the JCS list were in 

Package VI. Some targets were actually so close together 

was no clear way of separating them. The Paul Doumer b

for example, was only a couple of miles from the Hanoi R

Repair Shop and five miles from the Canal Des Rapides b

With fighters traveling at speeds over 500 knots, it made lit

ference which targets were assigned since exposure t

defenses was already maximum. Thirty miles beyond 

however, the defenses thinned out and the number of imp

targets decreased.

Dividing North Vietnam into route packages compartmen

our Airpower and reduced its capabilities. One result was th

Air Force diverted too many sorties into Route Package I 

weather prevented strikes in Route Package V or VI and the A

was fully committed with aircraft along the LOCs in Laos. O

other hand, TF-77 had an inadequate number of aircraft f

hour coverage of its assigned route packages. The situation r

bled the one in World War II which led Air Marshal Tedder to 

“There were so many cooks that wanted to stir the bombers

that, had there been no centralized control, no head cook 

firm hand, there would have been a very real danger of flexib

itself resulting, not in concentration and economy of effort, 

106
dispersal and waste of effort. . . . Air warfare cannot be sep

into little packets; it knows no boundaries on land or sea othe

those imposed by the radius of action of the aircraft; it is a 

and demands unity of command.”21

CINCPAC allocated Navy targets to the Commander of 

through CINCPACFLT and the Commander of 7th Fleet. C
ones they received from TF-77. Each of the four route pac

was divided into two sectors with a carrier responsible f

sector in each package. Within these sectors, task group 

manders had maximum freedom in their daily planning 

for those targets controlled by the JCS and released for 

only when approved by the President.

The route package system was valuable to TF-77 in cycl

forces and providing localized control in a single area. Howev

route package system was fundamentally wrong for the best 

cation of all U.S. Airpower. Certainly the Navy needed a solu

its range problem, but a fragmented command structure is n

best way to accommodate a mixed force of fighters, bomber

attack aircraft with varying ranges. In fact, theater air comp

commanders in previous wars adjusted force employment pla

widely differing aircraft capabilities. In the European campa

World War II, for example, 9th Air Force controlled P-47s, P-5

61s, B-25s, and B-26s. A single consolidated plan provided fo

employment according to differences in range, speed, and pa

The net effect was a unified action that shifted attacks as re

against airfields, vehicles, marshalling yards, troop concentr

and enemy ground forces.

The route package system was a compromise approac

tough command and control decision, an approach which, ho

understandable, inevitably prevented a unified, concentrat

effort. Within 7th Air Force and TF-77, aircrew ability to car

assignments against heavily defended targets was outstandi

the disagreement wasn’t over the training and capabilities of 

but over how best to control two air forces from two differen

ices. The same issue arose in the Korean War, and my prese

is that our continuing failure to settle this issue may be excee

costly in some future conflict such as, for instance, a NAT

Any arrangement arbitrarily assigning air forces to exclusive 

of operation will significantly reduce Airpower’s unique ab

quickly concentrate overwhelming firepower wherever it is n

most.

In 1966, when it appeared the coordination authority agre

would not be revised to permit my control of carrier air, I pro

establishing in the Gulf of Tonkin an ABCCC to control all 

forces against lines of communication in Route Packages I th

IV. This ABCCC would use the same techniques used in La

the control of strikes on the Laotian road network. The syste

virtually perfected after almost two years of operation and 

108
diverted to Laos, the ABCCC handled as many as 300 unpl

sorties a day in addition to the 200–250 sorties normally un

control. When Navy diverts were available, the ABCCC cal

additional FACs to augment existing FACs in various parts 

network. Couldn’t this flexible system improve our efforts 

lower route packages as well?

My proposal, which was not adopted, would have ha

ABCCC located over the Gulf in contact with TF-77 and the 

Force command center at all times. Naval air representatives 

have augmented the Air Force staff of the ABCCC. Prior to A

takeoff, its on-board combat commander would have receiv

daily mission plans of 7th Air Force and TF-77 or the ind

carrier task group commanders. With these missions befor

he could have reassigned incoming strike aircraft to differen

packages should better targets have appeared. The ability of 

scene commander to shift Airpower over the four route pa

would have permitted us to destroy more time-critical target

as trucks, trains, and boats. If a strike uncovered a supply a

other lucrative target, the ABCCC commander would have re

to the 7th Air Force and TF-77 operations centers that dive

would be made and would continue as long as the new targ

more valuable than the preplanned targets. If I judged the 

sions too disruptive to the planned interdiction effort for the 

could have denied the diversions, limited their number, or lau

additional forces under ABCCC control. The responsibility 

have been mine for the overall decision affecting both 7th Air 

and TF-77 strike forces.

Strike aircraft taking off from our bases in Thailand and fro

carriers would have routinely checked in with the ABCCC

ABCCC could either reaffirm their targets or assign other t

At the same time, the ABCCC would have notified high speed 

(because of defenses, low speed FACs couldn’t work the LO

North Vietnam) that strike aircraft would report to their c

From then on, the mission would have resembled any othe

controlled strike.

This arrangement for force control below the 20th parallel 

not have been suitable for attacks in Route Packages V, VI 

VI B, however, because of the strong defenses in the no

areas. Almost all missions into these areas required extensiv

planning to minimize exposure and to achieve a high degree o

dination among supporting forces. The more complex the def

the greater was the need for preplanning.
strikes against targets in North Vietnam. I believed the RO

THUNDER Coordinating Committee was not promoting m

support. Although the committee was acting under its cha

couldn’t direct either force to modify its operations or to s

ule strikes at different times.

I should point out that even if my request had been app

which it wasn’t, TF-77 would have had relatively little flex

in launching and recovering strikes because of the time re

by the carrier task groups to position themselves and tur

the wind for recovery and launch. The carrier force worke

twelve-hour operational cycle, and their schedules could 

modified quickly. On the other hand, we in 7th Air Forc

almost no limitations on launch or recovery times. A singl

imposed limitation came from the fact that daylight was n

for the rescue of downed crews. Thus we launched afte

strikes early enough to permit a few hours of daylight aft

forces left the target area. We were especially careful abou

timing for strikes near Hanoi where some of our aircraft 

probably go down.

The difficulties with the coordinating authority and route 

age system surfaced when the JCS released for attack a targ

Phuc Yen, as they did in October 1967. Although planning fo

an attack was complete, defenses kept changing, and the n

of aircraft on the field varied. Surprise was an important con

ation in this first attack if we were to destroy the five or si

Beagle light bombers. These were the only enemy aircraft 

without staging, posed a threat to Danang and other logistic

operational facilities, so our planners monitored the locat

these aircraft closely. Earlier, the North Vietnamese had mov

Il-28 into China whenever a raid developed. But when the a

was not released for destruction during the first half of 196

North Vietnamese evidently decided to leave their IL-28s in 

confident that we would not attack for fear of escalating the 

When the JCS released Phuc Yen for attack on 24 Octobe

7th Air Force and TF-77 received only a few hours advanced 

Although our strike forces had been in Route Package VI 

morning and were just coming back, I decided to change the 

noon mission for a strike on Phuc Yen, and I notified my 

manders just before noon. This mission necessitated changi

bomb loads and briefing the pilots on the attack since they we

familiar with the target. Under normal circumstances a pilot 

have a couple of days to study such a target in greater deta

110
cation of targets within the airfield complex were most impo

As 7th Air Force redirected its attack force, the complex p

of coordination with TF-77 was under way. Detailed arrange

were necessary since congestion over the target might lead t

sions, and clusters of aircraft would certainly provide excelle

gets for North Vietnamese gunners. Thus, concentrating the 

for maximum effect was desirable, but having strike forces h

on the periphery of the target area waiting their turn was not

we needed to distribute the targets so that all of them would 

if for any reason one force didn’t penetrate and others did. Th

ond force in an attack like this one should reinforce the str

the first force and cover the high value targets a second time

TF-77’s role was critical, and of course the Navy comma

and pilots cooperated fully; but the important point is that ou

plex “coordination” relationship was obviously inade

Although we hit Phuc Yen successfully on 24 and 25 O

1967,22 the command structure did not give me sufficient au

to guarantee that I could respond immediately with the full 

of Air Force and Navy Airpower in any similar situation. I 

respond immediately with Air Force Airpower, and I could c

nate with the Navy. Coordinating authority is simply inad

when operations must be changed rapidly and when in

details must be quickly resolved.

Throughout the remainder of the 1965–1968 air offensive 

1972, 7th Air Force periodically raised the issue of com

arrangements for air operations in North Vietnam. But A

Sharp (CINCPAC) remained convinced that coordinating au

was the best arrangement,* and Sharp’s successor, Admira

S. McCain, Jr., took the same position. The issue was not 

cant between 1968 and 1972 because there were few pro

reaction strikes in North Vietnam, and the 7th Air Force 

mander had operational control of all air efforts in South Vie

Laos, and Cambodia.

In May 1972, with the decision to begin bombing North Vie

the route package issue was raised again. General Lucius B

CINCPACAF, didn’t think route packaging and coordinating a

ity were satisfactory methods for controlling the air effor

expressed the same view held by all the commanders of 7

Force—operational control of naval air by the air componen

*See previous reference for Sharp’s view of coordinating committee.
an appropriate place for committee decisions. Admiral Noel G

who replaced McCain as CINCPAC on 6 October, stated th

route package boundaries as outlined in the basic 

BACKER/BLUE TREE operations order would continue to r

in effect. However . . . to improve efficient use of resources 

attain mass application of force where indicated, the geogra

area, which includes the NE/NW rail line and Hanoi enviro

be designated an integrated strike zone. This is the most vit

in North Vietnam. To bring the necessary weight to bear, 

PACAF and CINCPACFLT will schedule strike missions in

another’s geographical area.”24 The war only lasted a couple o

months, and force employment didn’t change enough to per

evaluation of the proposed “integrated strike zone.” Had th

continued beyond December, it’s likely Gayler would have 

compelled to discard the route package system because of t

ficult command and control problems that developed in th

11-day air offensive with the B-52s.

COMMAND OF BOMBER FORCE—CONTINUING PROBLEM

Command and control of the B-52s was a continuing pr

throughout the war. When they were introduced into South 

nam in 1965, the Air Force was most anxious that the bo

not come under the operational control of MACV or h

Deputy. Air Force leaders believed that the air war wou

fought outside South Vietnam; therefore, the bombers sho

kept outside the command structure of MACV.

While operational control of the bombers was withheld 

COMUSMACV, it was also withheld from CINCPAC, the t

commander. The Air Force argument prevailed that becau

B-52s also had a nuclear mission for general war, they s

remain under the control of SAC, a specified command rep

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of course CINCPAC also repor

the JCS, and any of SAC’s forces under the operational c

of CINCPAC could be withdrawn at any time. But the Air 

argued that in an emergency valuable time could be l

debate over pulling the forces from CINCPAC’s control. No 

mander voluntarily gives up forces, particularly in a war w

burden for success or failure on his shoulders, but any de

SAC’s regaining control of the forces from CINCPAC could b

ical in a general nuclear war.

112

114

control of the bombers as long as he had a say in selecti

targets. Since the aircraft would be used in South Vietna

least initially, the Air Force had no objection to COMUSMA

a sub-unified commander having the authority to nomina

gets. He could not approve strikes, but he would be the pri

source of target selection.

The 2nd Air Division/7th Air Force commander and a

ground force commanders nominated targets to MACV. 

consolidated the list and established an order of priority 

sending it to CINCPAC. CINCPAC reviewed the list but 

made any significant changes before forwarding it to the 

Chiefs of Staff. The JCS thoroughly reviewed the list befor

mitting it to the Secretary of Defense, who coordinated wi

Secretary of State before submitting it to the President. Th

a long and involved process, considering the nature of targ

South Vietnam. The coordination process was simply not 

tive for employing bombers against suspected enemy area

drawbacks were soon recognized, though, and by early 19

system changed to permit JCS approval of targets within 

Vietnam. Soon B-52s were being used selectively against t

on the LOCs in Laos, with approval for those strikes comin

the Secretary of Defense after coordination with the Presid

SAC established a liaison section in MACV headquart

coordinate air strikes requested by MACV. This liaison s

reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at SAC 

quarters, but dealt mostly with SAC’s 8th Air Force headqu

in Guam. Eighth Air Force commanded all the B-52s, ta

and strategic reconnaissance aircraft in Southeast Asia. A

Air Force commander, I had no control over the targeting, t

or attack profile of the bombers. Basically, I provided ad

assistance through the tactical air control system, prestrik

post-strike reconnaissance of the target area, fighter cover 

vicinity of the DMZ and in Laos, and ECM support with 

Weasels and EB-66s. Seventh Air Force adjusted its oper

so all these supporting arrangements were accommodated 

attack times MACV and the SAC liaison section agreed on

of the time coordination of our own strikes with the b

strikes was not a problem since the B-52s bombed from 

30,000 feet while tactical air operations were usually 

10,000 feet.

When the B-52s were used against the LOCs in Laos 

the early and middle months of 1966, 7th Air Force was th
into the interdiction campaign plan for a continuity in a

from bombers and fighters. Since 7th Air Force’s use of B-

this role competed with MACV’s proposed use of the bomb

targets in South Vietnam, and since COMUSMACV was re

sible for the LOCs in Laos from STEEL TIGER south, he ma

final decision on whether interdiction strikes or strikes 

South Vietnam would have priority. At the weekly strategy 

ings, the 7th Air Force commander proposed the number 

ties to be flown by the B-52s in the interdiction cam

COMUSMACV then decided how to apportion B-52 s

between the out country interdiction program and in co

attacks. Between these weekly meetings, of course, COMUS

occasionally diverted additional strikes into South Vietna

unanticipated high priority targets.

In July of 1966, I proposed to Westmoreland a change 

command arrangement for B-52s.25 Experiences in North 

Europe, and Korea had underscored the importance of givi

tactical air commander control of the bombers committed 

mission. And it seemed logical that the B-52s should be 

under the operational control of the 7th Air Force comm

who was responsible for the total air effort in South Vietna

Laos and for the coordination of strikes in North Vietnam.

In September 1966, I again raised the issue with West

land. I didn’t propose to assume MACV’s final authority fo

targeting, but I did propose that 7th Air Force compile th

gets, plan the missions, and control their execution. If the 

inated targets exceeded the allocated B-52 sorties, MACV 

still establish priorities.

After some discussion and further clarification of the pro

Westmoreland agreed that the B-52s would come under th

trol of 7th Air Force and that the SAC liaison section wo

attached to 7th Air Force headquarters. It was understood 

would continue to control the final target and priority lis

mitted to CINCPAC and the JCS. Since MACV had no res

bility for targets in North Vietnam other than those in 

Package I, 7th Air Force would continue to nominate targ

the other route packages to CINCPACAF who would fo

them to CINCPAC.

After Westmoreland had agreed in principle to placing 

under control of 7th Air Force, he proposed to discus

assignment of Route Package II with CINCPAC. In his o

Route Package II, like Package I, was an extension of the 
sible for the control of air operations in this area. Sharp

ever, did not react favorably to the proposal. He felt MAC

enough responsibilities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Route 

age I. Further, TF-77 was covering the area with ade

strikes, and Sharp could see nothing to be gained by alteri

assignment of route packages. PACAF supported Sharp’s 

tion, and the matter rested. However, the targeting proble

not resolved, and it became a critical issue with the resum

of bombing below the 20th parallel in May of 1972.

McConnell, then USAF Chief of Staff, agreed we needed 

ter organization to coordinate the B-52 effort, but he w

prepared to place the B-52s under the control of the MA

component commander. He did agree, however, that a sma

advanced headquarters responsible for the targeting, pla

and control of B-52 strikes could be attached to 7th Air 

MACV was not the proper level for planning and conductin

operations, although COMUSMACV should continue to est

target priorities for areas under his jurisdiction.

General Joseph J. Nazzaro, Commander of SAC, voici

opinions of McConnell and Harris, proposed that the SAC 

section located at MACV headquarters be merged with 

SAC ADVON, and that the ADVON be attached to the Air D

MACV, in his role as the component commander. Again I 

this arrangement didn’t solve the problem; the real questio

operational control, and a SAC ADVON was not the solu

further pointed out that the Air Deputy had no staff an

sessed no operational functions except that of advising. Se

Air Force was really the air component command, and th

ADVON should be assigned to it.

We airmen couldn’t agree on the operational control of 

52s. Although subsequent commanders of 7th Air Force 

the issue, particularly during the 11-day offensive in 19

52s stayed under SAC’s control for the remainder of the wa

SAC ADVON was attached to the Air Deputy MACV, on 1

uary 1967, but it actually functioned as part of the 7th Air 

headquarters for the reasons I’ve discussed. SAC and t

Staff believed MACV or the theater headquarters level w

proper place for policy and planning on B-52 operation

same concept that 7th Fleet held on naval support, and th

Marines held in coordinating their air support with 7th Air 

In contrast, 7th Air Force commanders believed the Air D

position to be redundant and held that 7th Air Force was th

116
air component of MACV. Hence, the control of all Air

including B-52 operations, should be vested in that organiz

In May 1972 when the President decided to resume bo

below the 20th parallel, the control of B-52s posed a co

problem because of the assignment of route packages a

MACV, 7th Air Force, and TF-77.26 Until this time, 7th Air 

had been largely controlling B-52s through the SAC ADVON 
ities of the situation—the increasing use of B-52s outside 

Vietnam and the removal of U.S. ground troops––had left 7

Force the dominating headquarters and made it necessa

7th Air Force to control the bomber strikes.

With divided responsibilities for targeting in the route pac

there was no single agency except PACOM with the autho

adjust priorities. For Route Packages II, III, and IV, TF-77 

nated B-52 targets through 7th Fleet and PACFLT to PACO

the case of Route Package I, 7th Air Force nominated t

through MACV to PACOM. In both cases, CINCPAC made th

determination of priorities before forwarding the list to the 

This long and involved process was too slow to meet th

requirements for targets released by the JCS.

During this time, COMUSMACV returned to the earlier vie

the lower route packages were really an extension of the g

battle area since they contained the logistical base of enemy 

fighting in South Vietnam. Although MACV had been turned 

on the assignment of Route Package II to its jurisdiction, 

requested that the Air Deputy as the representative of CO

MACV control all B-52 operations below the 20th parallel.2

request, made in September 1972, was also disapproved.

In the meantime, CINCPAC requested the JCS gran

authority to approve B-52 targets below the 20th parallel. 

ously the JCS needed to delegate control of targeting to the 

mand level responsible for the day-to-day fighting of the 

believe this control should have gone to the 7th Air Force 

mander, since the Air Force was charged with the mission o

ducting the air campaign and interdicting the ground batt

Nevertheless, the JCS approved CINCPAC’s request on 4 O

1972, but only for 10 days. The ten days covered a per

intensive bombing against LOCs and other targets in 

Packages I, II, III and IV. When CINCPAC received ap

authority, he delegated B-52 targeting to his two comp

commands as he had done with the JCS targets. He del

responsibility in Route Packages II, III, and IV to CINCPA

who in turn delegated responsibilities to the commander 

77. Thus TF-77 became the prime agency for selecting t

and coordinating strikes by the B-52s in these three routes 

ages. Furthermore, since PACAF had no responsibility for 

Package I, MACV continued to target this area.

MACV took exception to the assignment of targeting res

bilities to TF-77 for reasons previously cited, recommendin

118
strikes in South Vietnam.28 The issue actually involved a 

deal more than targeting since the B-52s flying over these 

required extensive fighter cover, ECM support, and reco

sance forces from 7th Air Force. The real question was w

a single air commander should control the forces of TF-7

SAC. Missions in the high threat areas required the ca

integrated planning characteristic of 7th Air Force strike

Hanoi. However CINCPAC decided not to change the assig

of geographical areas, expressing the view that the Coordi

Committee, chaired by 7th Air Force, was the proper age

coordinate the efforts of the B-52s, 7th Air Force, and TF-

also proposed that the Coordinating Committee include 

sentatives from MACV and the SAC ADVON. With this en

membership, the Committee would have representatives fr

air activities. SAC supported CINCPAC in this proposal.

The ROLLING THUNDER Coordinating Committee ha

been an effective instrument for controlling air operations 

the 1965–1968 bombing campaign. It was now being pla

the more difficult position of trying to resolve the conf

demands of three different forces in a highly complex ope

involving SAM suppression, extensive ECM activities, 

screens, protection of reconnaissance platforms, and air 

ing of a large portion of the force. The limited number of s

in October indicated to 7th Air Force that a single air 

mander, not a committee, was the only real solution to the 

lem; the ROLLING THUNDER Coordinating Committee cou

do the job. However, bombing above the 20th parallel was 

on 23 October, and no significant changes were made in 

mand and control arrangements prior to the resumption 

Hanoi bombing on 18 December 1972.

With the breakdown in negotiations, the President deci

conduct a major air offensive against the greater Hanoi are

planning for this campaign was tightly guarded, and few m

people were even aware that such plans existed. Staffs tha

mally would have done the planning for such missions we

cleared. Security instructions were so severe, in fact, that 

difficult to assemble the minimum number of people to e

all aspects of the mission were covered.29

The initial instructions from the JCS on the 15th of Dec

called for a three-day campaign with planning for pro

operations. The JCS approved 31 targets, most of them in 

Package VI A, for attack. The campaign would employ 
strikes throughout the night and tactical air strikes duri

day, thus placing a heavy load on 7th Air Force to su

around-the-clock operations.

Although CINCPAC was responsible for all air operati

North Vietnam, SAC had made plans for such a campaign i

it should be directed to execute an attack on short notice

specified command, it had direct communication with th

and used it to plan the targets for the B-52s. The JCS targ

was disseminated to CINCPAC, SAC, MACV, PACAF, PA

7th Air Force, and TF-77. Based on the location of the ta

either 7th Air Force or TF-77 would be responsible for par

strikes as long as CINCPAC remained firm on the route pa

assignment. But which targets would the B-52s strike, an

would select those targets? If the route package structur

vailed, 7th Air Force would select the targets in VI A, and 

in VI B. SAC, however, opposed target selection by thes

commands. Complicating matters further, CINCPAC had 

cated in an earlier message that SAC would determine th

ties and targets for the B-52s. Obviously an agreement on t

was needed to eliminate duplication of day and night strik

120
were established in 1965 for the air war, the need for a sin

authority was never clearer. The arrangement for the first 

days of the campaign gave SAC the dominant voice in the se

of targets for the B-52s. Once these targets had been info

coordinated with the JCS, General John C. Meyer, Comman

SAC, discussed support arrangements with Gayler and G

John W. Vogt, Jr., Deputy Commander, MACV, and comman

7th Air Force. Vogt, as Chairman of the Coordinating Grou

responsible for detailed coordination with representatives fro

ADVON, TF-77, and MACV. Vogt was not satisfied with the ar

ment because SAC presented the targets so late that ther

inadequate time for the detailed planning of fighter cover, ECM

Wild Weasel support. He felt SAC should notify him at le

hours before a planned mission. Further, Vogt felt his force

being spread too thin by trying to support both day and nigh

ations, and he understood that his priority was to support da

strikes near Hanoi.30

After the first three days of the offensive, the initial coo

tion problems were resolved although target selection rem

split among three levels of command. Gayler, on 21 Dece

modified his earlier view on the targeting of B-52s and now 

the position that his headquarters and SAC headquarters 

jointly determine the targets in accordance with guidanc

the JCS. Once SAC and PACOM agreed on the projected ta

and after JCS approval, the Coordinating Committee at S

would work out the details of the mission and plan 7th Air 

and TF-77 support.

Gayler further revised the targeting procedure after the C

mas stand down. After reviewing the coordination problem a

many messages on details of conducting strikes in the 

Haiphong area, Gayler issued a new directive restating the a

ity of CINCPAC to conduct the air campaign in North Vietna

now took the position that all requests for target validation 

SAC, 7th Air Force, and TF-77 should be sent to his headqu

His headquarters would then approve or disapprove the t

and those that were beyond his authority would be sent to th

for approval. Once the list was approved, all mission details 

be worked out by the Coordinating Committee. Gayler didn’t 

his headquarters was the proper level of command to work th

mission, which involved many operational details on specific 

selection, ECM support, and suppression of North Vietnam
combat theater.31

This then was the final arrangement for the control of force

ing the 11-day offensive. It was a return to the original pro

established for 2nd Air Division and TF-77 in the fall of 

Although the arrangement worked and coordination was ach

the fundamental issue of the unity of Airpower was not clari

SUMMARY

Throughout the three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vie

the command and control of Airpower has been a major 

Airpower has great flexibility to perform many tasks in wa

its ability to respond with varying levels of firepower to a v

of targets has led Army and Navy commanders to seek con

Airpower as part of their forces. But to give in to these u

standable wishes of surface commanders is to destroy th

thing that gives Airpower its strength––the ability to 

quickly upon whatever situation has the most potential f

tory or for defeat. Airmen know the centralized control 

power in a theater of war can best serve armies and nav

fragment Airpower is to court defeat. In North Africa, E

Korea, and Vietnam this principle has been proven tim

again. As Air Marshal Tedder writes, “Air warfare cannot b

arated into little packets; it knows no boundaries on land 

other than those imposed by the radius of action of the ai

it is a unity and demands unity of command.”32

122
CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950–1969

Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

1974), p. 7.

2. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), pp. 110–111.

3. Official History of the 2nd ADVON, 15 Nov 1961–8 Oct 196

torical Division, 2nd Air Division, vol. 1, p. 17.

4. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: P

Library, 1971), pp. 55–58.

5. Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 42.

6. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Comman

Control of Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1 Jan 1965–31 Mar 

book 1 (Maxwell AFB, Al: Department of the Air Force, 1971), p. I

7. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activities in Southeas

1954–1964, book 1, p. 4–32.

8. Official History of the 2nd ADVON, 15 Nov 1961–8 Oct 196

torical Division, 2nd Air Division, vol. 1, p. 17.

9. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activities in Southeas

1954–1964, book 1, p. 4–44.

10. Ibid. See also, Westmoreland, Soldier, p. 75. 

11. Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 36.

12. Westmoreland, Soldier, p. 41.

13. Curtis E. LeMay, General, USAF (Ret.), interview held at 

gon, Wash. D.C., February 1976. See also, CORONA HARVEST 

USAF Activities in Southeast Asia, 1954–1964, book 1, p. 4-44.

14. Westmoreland, Reports, pp. 105, 109–112.

15. John P. McConnell, General, USAF (Ret.), interview held 

tagon, Wash. D.C., March 1976.

16. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, book 

I–34.

17. MACV Directive 95-4, U.S. Air Operations in RVN, 28 June 

para 3.e.

18. McConnell, interview, Mar 1976. See also, CORONA HA

Report, Command and Control, book 1. p. II-1-34.

19. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 1965–31 Mar 1968, book 1, p

20. Ibid., p. 53.

21. The Lord Tedder, Airpower in War, The Lees Knowles Lectu

1947 (London: Hodder and Stroughton, n.d.), p. 91

22. 22. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Air Oper

book 1, p. 156.
Asia, 1 Jul 1972–15 Aug 1973, vol. 2 (Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Depa

of the Air Force, HQ Pacific Air Force, 1973), p. IV-38.

24. Ibid., p. IV-34.

25. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, boo

VIII-6-3.

26. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Air Operations, SEA, vo

IV-24.

27. Ibid., p. IV-25. Also, John W. Vogt, Jr., General, USAF, 

interview.

28. Ibid., p. IV–27.

29. John W. Vogt, Jr., and Glen W. Martin, General, USAF, 

interview.

30. Ibid.

31. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Air Operations, SEA, vo

IV–320.

32. Tedder, Airpower, p. 91.

124
Chapter IV

THE COUNTER AIR BATTLE

(AIR SUPERIORITY)

The first task of Airpower is to gain and maintain air supe

Air superiority is essential to sustained air, ground, and sea 

tions. As defined in JCS Publication 1, it is “that degree of 

nance in the air battle of one force over another which perm

conduct of operations by the former and its related land, se

air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interf

by the opposing force.”1 Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General 

hower’s deputy, said after the war, “We were to find out in th

school of war that without air supremacy, or as we now sa

superiority,’ sea power could no longer be exercised; and w

air superiority, Airpower itself could not be exercised. . . . B

outstanding lesson of the late war was that air superiority 

prerequisite to all war winning operations, whether at sea, on 

or in the air.”2 For a very short operation, an air commande

be willing to accept relatively high losses by conducting othe

sions before having attained at least local air superiority. Ho

for sustained operations air superiority is essential.

AIR SUPERIORITY, WORLD WAR II—8TH & 9TH AIR FORCES

To achieve air superiority in the combat theaters of World 

we brought all elements of the enemy air forces under attack. 

tion of our tactical air force was devoted to offensive air s

another part was devoted to the destruction of airfields

another part was continually devoted to the destruction of an

craft installations. By attacking all elements of the enemy air 

we achieved a position of superiority which allowed us to tu

full strength of the Air Force to helping the ground forces. 

much of our air effort had been diverted to the ground battle 

control of the air was established, our losses, first in the a

then on the ground, would have increased sharply.

In North Africa we destroyed the German fighter force 

ground and in the air. Our attacks had to be repeated co
fields could be repaired in a matter of twelve to eighteen 

Thus, the first task of our tactical air force was to go aft

entire structure of the German Air Force in North Afric

keep it under attack.

In North Africa, as in other theaters of World War II, ther

no limitations on attacks against the enemy air forces. No 

ter where the fighters were, no matter where the airfields 

and no matter where the anti-aircraft guns were, all were s

to attack; and the enemy knew it. There was no real escap

our Airpower. By pulling back from combat they could r

losses temporarily, but when that happened, we gained lo

superiority without a fight.

Prior to the Normandy invasion, General Eisenhower re

that air superiority would have to be obtained if the eno

amphibious operation were to succeed.3 Air Chief Marsha

der says that Eisenhower “might have added that it was no

ply a question of air superiority but of Airpower, which c

exercised in its full form only after air superiority has 

gained.”4 Because of his great concern for the invasion, 

hower wanted the full weight of the U.S. Strategic Air Forc

RAF Bomber Command devoted to neutralizing the Germa

fields in France and the transportation system that wou

used by the Panzer divisions in their attempt to push the 

forces back into the Channel.

General Carl Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Strateg

Force, recommended against too early diversion of the bo

to these targets. He pointed out that the best way to ensu

superiority for the invasion was to continue the attacks a

synthetic fuel plants as long as possible, drawing the G

fighters up to defend these plants. His argument was found

the knowledge that the Luftwaffe was badly short of fuel to 

fighters that were still operational and to train replac

pilots.* Thus, Spaatz reasoned, the fighters wouldn’t come 

defend the airfields and rail system in France since they we

considered vital. On the other hand, the GAF would have to 

up in force to protect the synthetic oil plants since the l

these plants would ground them; and with this loss, the w

126

*It was not learned until after the war that the average German fighter p

receiving only 35 hours of specialized training as compared to at least 8

in 1940.5 This lack of training was a direct result of the shortage of fuel.
bombers be kept on the synthetic oil and aircraft prod

facilities and the airfields deep in the German homeland u

few weeks before the invasion. Then the total effort of 8

Force and RAF Bomber Command would be shifted to th

fields and lines of communication within France.

The combined efforts of the Allied air forces during the 9

prior to the invasion were concentrated on targets in F

Destruction of the GAF was the primary objective. Our fi

struck airfields that might be used by the Germans as adv

staging bases for attacks on the Allied landing force. Mediu

heavy bombers were scheduled night and day against the ra

bridges, marshalling yards, and staging areas that could b

by the German armored forces to mass for attack again

beachhead. We estimated that this all-out effort would weak

GAF to the point that it could mount only 700 sorties a day a

the beachhead. On the day of the invasion, however, the GA

only about 200 sorties, and the effect of these sorties was n

ble. Of the 160 German fighters in commission in France, o

were able to take to the air. Allied planes, on the other han

some 14,000 sorties on the first day of the invasion. Not a 

aircraft was lost to German fighters. As Lord Tedder 

“despite operation ‘Pointblank,’ German production of fight

craft rose steadily, indeed swiftly, in 1944. After the war 

(Albert Speer, German Minister of Munitions) was asked to e

how it was that the Luftwaffe nevertheless grew weak

replied: “The answer to that was simple—the Allies destroy

aircraft as soon as they were made.6 The total neutralization 

German Air Force before the Normandy landing on 6 June 

was a superb performance, a classical case of gaining and 

taining air superiority.

During the last few months of the European war, the Ge

introduced the ME-163, a single engine rocket aircraft, a

ME-262, a twin engine jet. It is interesting to speculate on 

might have been the outcome of the combined bomber off

if the Germans had converted more of their production to 

jet fighters and had devoted less effort to the V-1 and V-

siles. Certainly our P-51s and P-47s would have had grea

culties combating large formations of these fighters, for th

262’s top speed was at least 100 knots faster than that 

P-51. Also, with their better performance at high alt

around 25,000 feet, these fighters would have been a

engage and disengage the B-17s and B-24s with greater 
duction was a perfect example of a remedy that was too litt

late. By the time ME-262s took to the air, the Luftwaffe was 

whelmed. Consequently, 8th Air Force was able to claim 14

262s destroyed against the loss of 10 fighters and 52 bo

during the last ten months of the war.7

AIR SUPERIORITY—KOREA––5TH AIR FORCE

Seven years later in another part of the world, the need 

superiority was again apparent. During the Korean War, th

sion of 5th Air Force was to gain and maintain air super

interdict the battlefield, and provide close air support 

Army. Just as achieving air superiority was the first conc

World War II, it also became the top priority mission 

Korean War. In fact, air superiority was perhaps even 

important in Korea because of the superiority in numbers 

Chinese ground forces over the ground forces of the U

Nations Command.8 The ground war could have been a di

if the Allied air forces had not been able to control the ai

control permitted better than 39% of the daily sorties 

turned to interdicting the battlefield, preventing the C

from being able to mount a sustained offensive.

Our 5th Air Force contained the North Korean Air 

(NKAF). Of course the NKAF was not all Korean, but ba

Chinese with Russian and Polish pilots as well. Further, th

substantial reason to believe that most of the fighter squa

actively engaging the F-86’s were Soviet squadrons being r

through the front at about six-week intervals.9

General Otto Weyland, Commander of FEAF, stated th

first priority of his air force was to keep the air force in 

Korea neutralized so that the NKAF could not attack 

ground forces.10 There were 75 airfields in North Kore

could have supported MIG-15s. During the course of th

these airfields were suppressed by the combined efforts 

Air Force and FEAF Bomber Command.

The enemy’s sanctuary in China greatly compounde

problems in maintaining air superiority, of course, for we 

neither destroy the MIGs on the ground at their Chinese 

nor follow them into Chinese airspace to destroy them in t

We dealt with the situation primarily through the use of 

sweeps and screens. Fighter sweeps were commonly us

they had been in World War II, to entice the enemy to co

128
for battle. These sweeps were made in areas such as “MIG 

where the probability of engagement was high. The freq

and size of the sweeps depended on the availability of our 

ers, the probability of enemy reaction, and the supporting 

such flights would have on other operations. Other F-86 p

along the Yalu screened the fighter-bombers conducting a

against the rail network and other targets associated wi

enemy’s logistical system. The F86s, by interposing them

between the fighter-bombers and the MIG-15s based 

Antung area, allowed the F-84s, F-80s, and F-51 s to car

their missions with almost complete security.

Sequence shows MIG-15 pilot leaving his aircraft after it has been disable

F-86.
Engagements between the MIGs and our F-86s were fre

In December 1952, over 3,997 MIGs were observed, 

engaged, and 27 destroyed.* But though the MIG-15s wer

to penetrate the F-86 screen now and then, it was only 

the second communist offensive in the spring of 1952 tha

posed a significant threat to the fighter bombers. Even then

a few MIG-15s were successful in attacking the F-84s and 

As a result of the F-86 patrols and the attacks on airfie

North Korea, then, the NKAF was not able to mount any sign

air attacks against the fighter-bombers, nor were there any 

cant attacks against United Nations’ ground forces. Additiona

airfields of 5th Air Force were struck except by a small biplan

named “Bedcheck Charlie.” Attesting to the effectiveness 

screening-out of the NKAF, Lt General Nam II, chief North K

delegate to the negotiations at Kaesong, stated in August of 

I would like to tell you frankly that in fact without direct sup

your tactical aerial bombing alone your ground forces woul

been completely unable to hold their present positions. It is 

130

Close-up of F-86 flight patrolling “MIG Alley” in northwest Korea.

*The overall exchange rate of enemy to friendly losses for the Korean War 

to 1.11 Almost all of these kills were without benefit of on-board rad

though the F-86 had a forward ranging radar. Most of the pilots used a fix

setting and got their kills from the 6 o’clock position with the six fift

machine guns. Most of the fighter kills in World War II were also from 

o’clock position.
to your strategic air effort of indiscriminate bombing of ou

rather than to your tactical air effort of direct support to th

line, that your ground forces are able to maintain barely an
strategic bombing of railroad lines, bridges, marshalling yard

power plants is hardly “indiscriminate,” the critical importa

our air superiority was obviously a point on which both sides 

negotiating table could agree.

At the conclusion of the Korean War, the missions tha

maintaining our air superiority were those that had succee

World War II. In both wars it was necessary to hit the ene

force on the ground and in the air. Our attacks had to be k

day-in and day-out so that the enemy air force never 

chance to recover. The success of these missions dedicated 

superiority gave us the freedom to employ our Airpower 

other missions needed to bring hostilities to an end.

AIR SUPERIORITY—NORTH VIETNAM—A NEW DIMENSION

In the air campaign against North Vietnam, air supe

permitted us to conduct the interdiction campaign, provide 

support to ground forces in South Vietnam and Laos, an

tect the vital logistical and population centers in South Viet

Operations in Southeast Asia demonstrated again that air 

132

“Gaggle” of F-86s approaches “MIG Alley” in search of MIG-15s

*The concentration of logistics in South Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay, Dana

Nhon and Saigon made these installations exceedingly vulnerable to air 

Consequently, preventing the North Vietnamese from bringing these area

air attack was one of the especially important missions of 7th Air Force.
must be won continually as long as the enemy has any ai

missiles, or guns left. His entire air defense system mu

attacked repeatedly if we are to use the enemy’s airspace 

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

The air defense system* in North Vietnam was a thoroughl

grated combination of radars, AAA, SAMs, and MIGs. It was 

in design and operation. During the early days of 1965, it wa

embryonic state and could have been destroyed with no sign

losses to our force. However, the policy of the U.S. at the tim

not to destroy this system because such an action might b

sidered an escalation of the conflict. General Westmo

recorded this response to this situation in his book A S

Reports: “Some of McNaughton’s [John T. McNaughtoi, As

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964

views, in particular, were incredible. On a visit to Saigon at 

when my air commander, Joe Moore, and I were trying 

authority to bomb SAM-2 (a Soviet-made missile) sites unde

struction in North Vietnam, McNaughton ridiculed the need

don’t think the North Vietnamese are going to use them!’ he s

to General Moore. ‘Putting them in is just a political ploy 

Russians to appease Hanoi.’ “ Westmoreland the North Vietn

not to use them. Had it not been so serious, it would hav

amusing.”13 Because of our restraint, the system was a

expand without any significant interference until the spr

1966, at which time systematic attacks were permitted again

ments of the system. We were never allowed to attack the enti

tem.

NORTH VIETNAMESE RADAR

The Soviet air defense system relies upon many more 

than does the U.S. system. There were about 200 radars 

North Vietnamese air defense system with three major groun

trol intercept (CGI) sites: Bac Mai, Phuc Yen and Kep. Bac M

Phuc Yen normally controlled most of the air defense mis

although for missions staged into the southern portion of 

*air defense system: A combination of fighters, surface-to-air missiles, 

craft artillery, radars, and a command and control organization thorough

grated to destroy aircraft and other vehicles penetrating a given air spac
site was not capable of handling a large number of aircraft. 

The NVN radar system was effective in detecting our flig

vectoring MIGs for attack, and in coordinating SAM an

engagements. With so many radars located in such a small a

was impossible for us to jam all of them at once. In fact, we 

try; we jammed only those specific GCI radars at any par

time that were vectoring interceptors toward our aircraft. 

radar coverage included so many redundancies that it was 

always sufficient to provide good GCI control during an engag

regardless of our countermeasures.

After 1965, the MIGs were under GCI control from takeof

landing. And the control was excruciatingly positive througho

mission. Controllers vectored the MIGs into position for attac

surprisingly detailed instructions, even to the point of tell

individual pilot when to arm his weapon and when he was “c

for attack.” If the situation didn’t look favorable, the con

would direct the pilot out of the area of the potential engage

North Vietnamese radar control was so thorough and so d

that MIG pilots had very few opportunities to exercise their ow

tiative in deciding whether to engage or not.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (AAA)

By the summer of 1966, the AAA defenses had become 

dable. We estimated at that time that there were some 

guns of all caliber in North Vietnam”14 About 3,500 of thes

located in Route Packages V, VI A, and VI B. The largest co

tration was around Hanoi and Haiphong. During the earl

of 1966, improvements were made in the North Vietnames

trol system, resulting in better integration of 57mm and 

gun defenses with SAMs and fighters.

The AAA defenses within 30 miles of Hanoi and 10 m

Haiphong were comparable to those found in World War II a

key industrial areas and in the Korean War around the a

along the Yalu and near Pyongyang. Many experienced pilo

the Hanoi flak was the heaviest in the history of aerial warfar

it may well have been. In fact, though, our heaviest losses 

Hanoi area rarely exceeded four percent with an overall loss r

attack sorties from 1965–1968 of 4.10.15 By comparison, b

losses to anti-aircraft fire and fighters while we were attackin

gets in the Ruhr valley in August of 1943 were near ten per

Our reduced loss rate notwithstanding, the point defenses a

134
mill, Viet Tri thermal power plant, and many others were as 

as one could possibly imagine.

There were pockets of AAA around Thanh Hoa and Vin

resembled those around Hanoi and Haiphong. However, 

Thanh Hoa and Vinh are located along the coast, strike a

had no prolonged gauntlet of fire to run when approachin
struck by the Navy; to get to them, carrier pilots had to pen

an average of less than fifteen to twenty-five miles of def

airspace. On the other hand, the targets in the Hanoi 

assigned to the Air Force required the penetration of ove

miles of defended airspace.

Although total time of exposure to AAA was importan

few seconds spent directly over the target were the time 

the 37mm and 57mm guns took their heaviest toll. Our 

forces delivering conventional ordnance (in North Vietna

didn’t use “smart” laser-guided bombs capable of being 

ered accurately from a much higher altitude until May 

had to start their dive toward the target at about 12,00

and pull out above 4,500 feet. During the moments of 

flight between roll-in and pull-out, our aircraft were the 

predictable and therefore the most vulnerable. And it wa

ing these moments that the enemy would open fire with 

thing they had. Because of the value of the targets, bu

because of this vulnerability of our aircraft during a

most targets of any significance were heavily defended 

interlocking AAA.

AAA defenses didn’t change much after 1968. Our crews 

1972 air offensive faced about the same quality of AAA, alt

they did encounter more radar-directed fire from 85mm 

100mm guns. “Smart bombs” permitted us to strike from 

altitude in 1972, and our higher altitude of operation br

more of these bigger guns into action.

Since there were no SAMs in Korea, it isn’t surprisin

AAA accounted for most of our aircraft losses there. B

Vietnam, too, about 68% of our losses were to anti-aircra

AAA did the major damage to our strike forces and caus

most problems in selecting routes of penetration and e

These facts seem highly improbable today as I look bac

contemporary accounts of the war, for most of the rep

who discussed air operations in North Vietnam were u

standably less interested in AAA than in the newer t

SAMs.

SAMs

The first loss of an aircraft (an Air Force F-4C) to a SAM oc

on 24 July 1965.17 After that date, SAM defenses expanded r

During 1966 and 1967, these defenses continued to gr

136
response to our increasing air effort. In all of 1965, the enem

180 SAMs and destroyed 11 aircraft.18 This compares with t

day offensive in 1972 when more than 1,000 SAMs were fire

the resulting loss of 15 B-52s and three other aircraft.

The SAMs were initially deployed in a 30- to 40-mile circ

tered on Hanoi. Extensions of the initial SAM network str

along the northeast railroad and to some extent the nort

railroad. A Chinese AAA regiment also covered most of the 

west rail line with particularly heavy defenses around Ye
138

North Vietnamese 57mm anti-aircraft battery firing at USAF jet. This photo

was taken in 1965.

More sophisticated gun emplacements. This photo was taken in 196
SAM system. Apparently the SAMs at all locations were op

almost entirely by the Russians and North Vietnamese, wi

Russians acting as technical advisors most of the time.

The number of SAM sites remained fairly constant after 

there were about 200. But the equipment could be moved 

one location to another to reduce vulnerability to air attack

despite our intense reconnaissance activity, it was prac

impossible to determine precisely where the SAMs would 

advance of any given mission. Our response, as I shall d

later, was to send special flights ahead of strike forces to 

the SAM radars to come on the air in preparation for a la

When the SAM radars came on, the strike flights, which 

about five minutes behind, could determine the location 

SAMs and take evasive action.

No mobile SAMs were deployed throughout the war, the 

SAMs being the SA-4s and 6s which are mounted on tracked 

cles, but SAMs were deployed on transporters into Laos and 

Package I. Usually, these deployments included only one 

launchers. The missile would be fired from a concealed po

and then its launcher would be shifted immediately to a new 

tion. Most of these deployments were made during 1967 and 

when the North Vietnamese tried repeatedly to shoot down a 

Fortunately, not a single B-52 was lost during this period to 

Near Hanoi, the enemy had about twenty to thirty activ

battalions, each having four to six launchers. This represe

high of about 180 launchers during 1967 and an estimate

or more during the 1972 offensive. The 30 battalions main

about 100 ready missiles-on-launchers at any given tim

total inventory of missiles in North Vietnam was about f

five hundred, with about two hundred missiles at launch 

and another two to three hundred in the supply system

rather limited inventory was inadequate at times, as we 

discern from the sharp decrease in the firing rate after th

four days of intensive operations. The inventory problem 

especially evident in December 1967 when an unexpected 

of good weather allowed us to fly an all-out effort in the 1

offensive in December of 1972.

COUNTERMEASURES

During World War II, bombers used Electronic Counte

sures (ECM) and chaff extensively in jamming German GC
fire control radars. Most of the effort, however, was devo

jamming the AAA radars. The 88mm AAA was the most 

weapon of the time, and by jamming its tracking and acqu

radar we could force the gunner to depend on a visual si

device which was not very effective for the altitudes (25,

140
29,000 feet) at which the B-17s and B-24s were flying. An

estimated that our attrition rate was reduced by at least 2

these countermeasures.19

But the anti-aircraft threat in World War II and Korea w

considered severe enough to warrant ECM equipment for 

ers. In addition, most fighter pilots believed that their a

had sufficient maneuverability to avoid the most menacin

centrations of anti-aircraft fire. They preferred not to trad

formance for ECM equipment. For these reasons there wa

advancement in fighter ECM technology for many years.

It was not until the fall of 1961 that a research and develo

program was undertaken to obtain ECM for fighters. SA

extensive ECM equipment, but even though SAMs had been 

Soviet air defense system for a number of years, we fighter 

were slow to accept the fact that it would take more than m

verability and speed to defeat a SAM defense system. Initial

North Vietnamese SAM site 25 miles northwest of Hanoi. Note five of six 

poised on their launchers.
decision was made to put ECM equipment in a pod that co

carried on an external station; we would then be able to c

whether to carry the pod or not depending upon the threat.

Development of the first operational pods was slow, and 

we finally received them, we encountered more difficulties

were introduced into the war in 1966, but they worked so 

mittently that operational commanders had little confide

them. As the SAM threat continued to increase, a new se

urgency was created to get the pods corrected. In Nov

1966, pods were reintroduced into combat and were soon 

nized as the most important new development in enhanci

fighting potential of 7th Air Force.20 Although the SAM 

remained serious throughout the war, the pods gave us ou

effective means of managing the threat.

We began experimenting at once to find the flight form

that would give us the best ECM protection against SAM

would also give us the best placement of aircraft for coun

or launching an attack against MIGs. The formation fo

ECM protection was too tight to handle a MIG attack. Yet

wingmen, elements, and flights were spread too far, there w

142

Early North Vietnamese SAM site with its distinctive road network.
flight of four was the smallest group that could be adeq

protected by pods. Breaking a flight down into individu

ments of two wouldn’t give the needed protection, but wit

aircraft appropriately spaced, the protection among aircra

satisfactory. Based on this knowledge, we developed a 

force of sixteen aircraft. This arrangement provided max

protection among flights, and if a flight became separat

members could still count on adequate coverage so long a

maintained a specified spacing between aircraft.

The evidence is clear that ECM pods had a profound eff

our vulnerability to SAMs. Many SAMs “went ballistic” (l

their guidance) because of the jamming and missed their ta

Invariably, though, if a formation of four aircraft broke up 

in the SAM belt, missiles became extremely accurate, an

rule losses went up.

Once a SAM had been fired, a flight leader had to rely 

visual sighting of the missile to decide whether to retain th

protection by keeping his flight together or to break up the 

and take individual evasive action. This was one of the rou

decisions a flight leader had to make. There usually wasn’t 

ond chance, so his decision had to be right. Even if he deci

take evasive action, any delay in executing the maneuver 

be fatal. Most flight leaders retained the pod formation u

appeared that there was no alternative to a last-minute br

The best way to escape a SAM was to turn into it with a ha

ing turn, then make an abrupt four-G rolling pull-up keepi

speed up throughout the maneuver. If this maneuver was ex

at the proper time, the SAM would not be able to follow. W

pilot could see a SAM coming at him, he could outmaneuve

either the F-4 or the F-105, but since so much altitude was n

for these maneuvers, weather conditions became a critical c

eration in our planning for all missions into SAM-defended a

Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) equipment, like 

ECM, had a profound effect on both the counter air an

interdiction missions. RHAW provided the pilot an indi

that a SAM radar was activated and that a missile launch 

be expected shortly. From the indication of an electronic s

the pilot could tell the direction from which the SAM wo

launched, and from the intensity of the signal he could 

mine whether the SAM would be within range of his ai

Also, by a series of lights the pilot could tell when the missi

in preparation for launch and when it had been launched
they could roam over areas that they would have had to a

there had been no RHAW. But even with this equipment, 

near Hanoi would often have difficulty in determining which 

site was the immediate threat to him because the SAM sites 

were so numerous. Many pilots said they sometimes had so 

lights illuminated on the panel that it looked like a Christma

Although it was obviously unsettling at times for the pilots to 

144
nerability to SAMs, and I permitted no aircraft to be sent on 

sion without an operational RHAW set.

Another defensive measure used quite effectively towa

end of the war was chaff. Chaff played a major role in the 

offensive, but it was used very little in the 1966–1968 cam

because we lacked a suitable dispenser. Some F-4s and 

dispensed chaff from the speed brake well, and chaff cart

were ejected from the RF-1 in the earlier campaign; ho

these techniques failed to significantly affect the enemy

control and acquisition radars.

With the 1972 LINEBACKER I and II campaigns, chaff bec

major device for reducing the effectiveness of the Fan Song 

sition and tracking radars. Separate F-4 flights were given t

mary mission of dispensing the chaff, and they tried a num

different tactics before devising the most effective method fo

ing it down.” The first plan, used during LINEBACKER I, cal

the F-4s to establish a “chaff corridor.” Disadvantages of thi

were that the corridor tended to break down rather rapidl

that the striking aircraft often strayed outside its protection. 

circumstance would allow the planes to be spotlighted by 

and a firing could be expected shortly thereafter.

Because of the difficulties with the chaff corridor, that pla

abandoned in favor of the more intricate but more effective 

cloud.” During the LINEBACKER II operations, chaff cloud

dispensed between 25,000 and 35,000 feet to protect the 

strike forces and the B-52s. Especially important with this 

nique was the timing of the chaff release for maximum targ

erage while the strike forces were in the target area. Win

another critical factor since it could rapidly dissipate or create 

within the chaff cloud. Neither method was perfect, of cours

the chaff cloud was preferred during LINEBACKER II beca

provided the best protection for a striking aircraft in the fin

onds of weapons delivery. Effective as the later chaff oper

were, though, they didn’t reduce the need for organic ECM.

WILD WEASEL––IRON HAND

Another device that was used to counter the SAMs was k

affectionately as the “Wild Weasel.” The first Wild Weas

used against a SAM site in North Vietnam in 1965. To ma

Weasel, we had modified the back seat of an F-100F to p

an operator with special equipment for determining the lo
of an active SAM site.21 With this equipment, the back-seat 

ator would give directions to the front-seat pilot to positi

aircraft for launching an air-to-ground missile that would 

on the beams emitted by the SAM radar. 

Unfortunately, the F-100 was too vulnerable for operati

high threat areas, so a replacement was urgently neede

two-placed version of the F-105 strike fighter was selecte

designated the F-105G. These aircraft were employed 

SAM-busting role throughout the war, with the F-4C also 

ing an appearance in this role in 1971. 

The mission was complicated and challenging, but most 

tive. A Wild Weasel formation consisted of four aircraft: tw

Weasels (F-105Gs or F-4Cs) carrying air-to-ground missile

two wingmen (F-105s or F-4s) loaded with conventional b

During the early days of this mission, the Wild Weasels c

four SHRIKE missiles; later, these were replaced with nine 

dard Arm missiles having a longer range and larger warhea

Standard Arm permitted a stand-off launch from as far aw

30 miles from the SAM or the early warning radar site.

146
The Wild Weasel flights of four aircraft were code-named 

Hand,” and Iron Hand flights required the top pilots in the 

mand. They had the most demanding job and the mos

ardous, for these flights were the first into the target area a

last out. It was their task to attack any active SAM site th

a threat io the strike forces. To successfully carry out this a

ment, the pilots had to have a detailed understanding of bo

tactics employed by SAM crews and the mission and tactic

employed by the strike forces. With the strike forces and e

ing fighters flying at 500 knots and higher, seconds becam

ical. If a Weasel’s timing were off, it could well mean that a 

ber of the strike force would be shot down or that the en

defenses would force unacceptable bombing errors.

Usually the Iron Hand flights were ahead of the strike fo

about five minutes. If the Weasels arrived in the target ar

early, the SAMs would stay off the air to avoid revealing thei

tion. The challenge was to draw out the SAM just before the 
speed “cat and mouse” game. As soon as the SAM site activa

Weasel would attack it with a SHRIKE or Standard Arm. Th

sile attack was followed immediately with an attack by F-4s 

105s loaded with conventional weapons. This combination 

tics provided the highest probability of keeping the 

suppressed throughout the strike mission. Since the strike 

were extremely vulnerable during withdrawal as well as attac

Hand flights also covered the egress routes and caught many 

SAM launches that were directed at the strike fighters.

The Iron Hand missions and tactics remained about the 

during the 1965–1968 campaign and the 1972 offensive, t

the effectiveness of the flights was often debated. It was partic

difficult to confirm the destruction of a SAM, and some 

claimed that the Weasels were not effective since a relatively 

number of destroyed SAM sites could be attributed with ce

to these flights. However, as much as we wanted to destr

sites, the effectiveness of the Iron Hand flights must be mea

against a criterion of suppression as well as one of one of de

tion. If a SAM site could be suppressed so that it couldn

against strike aircraft, the mission of the Iron Hand flight 

complete success. With better air-to-ground missiles, the W

could probably have destroyed, rather than merely suppr

more of the SAMs. Because the terminal guidance of our m

was limited, though, suppression of SAM sites became the re

objective for Iron Hand flights, and they did this superbly i

the 1966–68 and the 1972 campaigns.

SAM OPERATORS’ COUNTERTACTICS

The enemy’s SAM tactics changed during the course of th

in response to our countermeasures. Against fighters, ther

always a tendency to use more barrage fire because our 

maneuverable fighters could usually avoid a single launc

enemy constantly sought better ways of dealing with our 

pods. Frequently, fighter formations would encounter barra

until there was a split, at which time aimed fire was more 

lent. When we were out of formation, our vulnerability inc

appreciably because the pods then provided ineffective cov

Even with two pods per fighter, individual protection was 

quate. Another of the enemy’s favorite techniques was to l

one missile as a feint, hoping to entice the flight to turn into a

where three or four SAMs could be launched in rapid succes

148
SAM tactics were closely coordinated with those of the 

fighters and the AAA. The MIGs usually operated on the per

of a thirty- to forty-mile circle around Hanoi, attempting to int

our fighter escorts some sixty to seventy miles from the targe

When our fighters penetrated the MIG defenses and moved in

target area, they usually encountered heavy anti-aircra

Sometimes this fire was aimed, while at other times it was 

barraged. Irrespective of the type of AAA fire, it was always c

nated with the SAMs for maximum intensity over the targ

along our most probable routes of entry and departure. A

such targets as the Doumer bridge, for instance, AAA had fir

ority for engaging us until one of our aircraft rolled in for atta

a strike aircraft rolled in, his ECM coverage was temp

degraded, and the SAMs had their best chance to score a ki

Pilots in the 1966–1968 campaigns couldn’t do much to 

the SAMs with erratic flight (or “jinking”) if they wished t

any hope of getting the bombs on target. But our later bo

systems which compensated automatically for speed, al

and a moderate amount of jinking provided pilots much 

protection. Also, with the laser weapons used in the 1972 

Launched from a USAF F-105, an air-to-ground missile streaks toward a 

Vietnamese SAM site.
release their weapons from a much higher altitude.

Against the B-52s in LINEBACKER II, SAMs were most ef

during the aircraft’s final turn off target. On the night of 26 D

ber 1972, SAMs did considerable damage by firing a barrage j

the attacking aircraft made its break to depart the target area

ing these turns, the maximum profile of the aircraft was expo

acquisition radar. However, after the first two nights we ch

our tactics to permit the B-52s to operate their ECM equipm

peak effectiveness throughout the mission. After this chang

effectiveness of the SAMs against B-52s was no longer suffic

influence the conduct of the 11-day offensive.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT––A CONTINUING SAM PROBLEM

Knowing that U.S. rules of engagement prevented us from 

ing certain kinds of targets, the North Vietnamese placed the

sites within these protected zones whenever possible to giv

SAMs immunity from attack. Within 10 miles of Hanoi, a d

populated area that was safe from attack except for specific t

from time to time, numerous SAM sites were located. Thes

tected SAMs, with an effective firing range of 17 nautical 

could engage targets out to 27 miles from Hanoi. And most 

targets related to the transportation and supply system tha

ported the North Vietnamese troops fighting in South Vietnam 

within 30 miles of Hanoi. Thus the SAMs could hit us whene

came after one of the more significant targets near Hanoi, b

rules of engagement prevented us, in most cases, from hitting 

Outside the 10-mile zone, but within 30 miles of Hanoi, we 

hit SAM sites only if they were preparing to fire on us and 

were not located in a populated area. If they were located in 

ulated area between 10 and 30 miles from Hanoi, we could hi

only if they were actually firing.

Similar restrictions prevailed near Haiphong. There was 

mile restricted area around the city with an inner four-mile 

in which all flight was prohibited except as specifically auth

Thus SAMs defending Haiphong had even greater freedom 

attack than those near Hanoi. By approaching and departin

the sea, however, aircraft hitting targets near Haiphong could 

prolonged exposure to SAMs.

One of the best known humanitarian policies of the U.S

that we would not destroy the dikes associated with the 

Vietnamese irrigation system. If these dikes had been s

150
been flooded, killing innocent civilians and destroying m

the rice crops. The North Vietnamese took advantage of ou

icy and located SAMs and AAA on a number of the dikes. 

ally these sites were authorized for attack if they were firin

our pilots exercised considerable restraint about hitting 

Whenever a pilot hit one of these sites, the North Vietn

invariably alleged that we were attacking the dikes. Usually

allegations were followed by investigations into the legitimacy 

attacks, and with so many higher headquarters involved, 

Reconnaissance photo taken 22 July 1972 shows a series of anti-aircraft e

ments along a dike near Thai Binh, some 30 miles south of Haiphong
our strike forces were directly threatened.

LOSSES TO SAMS

The argument that aircraft could not operate in an en

ment with surface-to-air missiles was advanced with incr

frequency after exercise DESERT STRIKE was held in 

Conducted in the California desert, this exercise involved m

our army and air forces than any previous exercise. Army 

missile battalions played a significant role in the defense 

of the opposing forces. Afterward, many who weren’t acqu

with the details of the exercise insisted that tactical aircraft 

no longer survive in a SAM environment. The Vietnam War

ever, produced no evidence to support such a view. The w

demonstrate the need for special equipment and tact

counter SAMs, but with such measures our fighters bre

the SAM defenses as effectively as they had penetrated 

defenses in World War II and Korea.

In 1967 the loss rate to SAMs was one aircraft lost for fif

missiles fired. This eventually went up to one aircraft los

hundred missiles fired. During the 1972 offensive when 

was used extensively, more than 150 missiles were fired fo

aircraft shot down.22

Although the loss rate to SAMs was not excessive, th

should not lead us to conclude that the weapon was ineffectiv

SAM’s effectiveness must be evaluated within the context of i

tribution to the overall North Vietnamese air defense s

Because of the SAM threat alone, we had to change the pre

altitudes of operations for our strike forces significantly. To st

of range of the medium altitude AAA systems, we wanted to 

ate between 25,000 and 35,000 feet. However, aircraft ope

between 20 and 40 thousand feet without extensive counte

sures were too vulnerable to SAMs. From 1966 until the 

bombing halt, we compromised by conducting most mi

between 12,000 and 15,000 feet. SAM effectiveness was re

considerably because a SAM is still accelerating at 12,000 fe

doesn’t reach its ultimate speed of 2.4 mach until about 2

feet. But at the medium altitudes our vulnerability to AAA p

larly the 57mm, was significantly greater. So even though the 

didn’t get many direct kills, they contributed importantly 

overall defense system by forcing our operations down to a

tude at which another part of the system was more effective

152
MIGs

The North Vietnamese Air Force was small, as air forc

and patterned after the Soviet Air Defense Force. Many of th

tures of the force were the same as those we had seen 

North Korean Air Force during the Korean War. Basic pilot 

ing took place in the Soviet Union, and final training for c

was accomplished in China. The quality of pilots, although 

was never up to the standards of our Air Force and Navy. 

were, however, some individual pilots who would have bee

standing in any air force.

On 7 August 1964, just a few days after the Tonkin Gu

dent, 30 MIGs flew into North Vietnam from China and lan

Phuc Yen.23 Soon other MIG units were outfitted in Chin

moved to one of nine airfields in North Vietnam. The MIG st

in July 1966 numbered about 65 aircraft. There were abou

15 MIG-21s and the remainders were MIG-17s. Losses wer

idly replaced so that the operating inventory was kept fairly 

By mid-1967 the North Vietnamese Air Force numbered ov

SA-2 missile site along river bank. All launch pads are occupied. Radar an

porting electronic equipment located in revetted area at center of sit
aircraft. Of this number, about 40 to 50 were MIG-21s an

remainder MIG-15s and 17s. With the onset of LINEBACKE

May of 1972, the force numbered about 200. Of this total, 9

MIG-21s, and 33 were MIG-19s. The MIG-19 was the only C

fighter introduced into the war by the North Vietnames

remainder of the force totaled about 80 MIG-15s and 17s. Su

ingly, although the size of the NVAF doubled between 196

1972, the total number of MIGs up for battle didn’t change 

icantly. During the period from April to June 1967, 42 MIG

destroyed.24 During a similar period in 1972, 30 were dest

The number of fighters in 7th Air Force was not much differ

the two periods either, although two wings of F-105s had 

replaced with F-4s and A-7s for the strike role. The numbe

4s for purely fighter activities, however, remained approxi

the same.

The MIG-21 was updated during various periods of the w

late 1965 and 1966, its primary armament was 23mm and 

cannon. By mid-1967 the primary armament was a canno

two Atoll heat-seeking missiles. These missiles had about the 

performance as our Sidewinder. By the time of the resump

the bombing in May of 1972, the standard armament for th

21 was a 23mm cannon and four Atoll missiles.

154
The MIG-17 was never considered the primary fighte

changes to this aircraft were never evident. It remained 

tially a gun aircraft and was employed most of the time 

altitudes where the gun could be used to advantage in a tu

fight in which the MIG-17 excelled.

The MIG-19s appeared only after the 1968 bombing halt. 

aircraft were supplied by the Chinese, and we assumed th

Chinese trained the North Vietnamese pilots. The MIG-19 c

three 30mm cannon and two Atoll missiles. It didn’t have the 

and maneuverability of the MIG-21, and it was easier to defe

dog fight. Whereas the MIG-21 had a top speed of about m

the MIG-19 could reach only about mach 1.3 at 25,000 feet

During the Korean War our best fighter, the F-86 was supe

the enemy’s best fighter, the MIG-15, in level flight below 3

feet and definitely superior at diving speeds greater than mac

The MIG-15 was superior in maneuverability at all altitudes 

An SA-2 missile explodes just under a USAF RF-4C somewhere over the 

River area of Hanoi.
acceleration and level flight above 30,000 feet. In Vietnam, t

and the MIG-21 compared in much the same way. The F-4 

slightly higher top speed, much better zoom quality, better m

verability at the higher supersonic speeds, and general supe

in level flight below 20,000 feet. The MIG-21 was superior in 

eration and maneuverability at all altitudes at low air speeds 

high supersonic speeds above 25,000 feet.

Because Soviet fighters from the MIG-15 through the M

were intended for relatively short missions in defense of the 

land, their designers kept them small and highly maneuv

U.S. strategists, on the other hand, assumed that our fi

would have to go long distances and penetrate the defenses 

enemy. Our designers therefore envisioned larger aircraft cap

great range and speed with some sacrifice in maneuverability

our tactical fighters were either designed or extensively mod

perform all three of the tactical air missions: air superiority, 

diction, and close air support. In the jet age, the F-86, F-10

F-4 have all been products of this multimission concept.

The F-4 was by far the most versatile fighter in the war. 

ability to perform all three classical missions of tactical Airp

156

North Vietnamese MIG-21 “Fishbed” near Hanoi.
Force commanders a ready capability to meet a sudden incre

the MIG threat or a concentration of North Vietnamese g

forces for an all-out assault.

The F-105 was probably the fastest aircraft in the war 

10,000 feet. It was designed primarily for low altitude nuclea

sions in which speed is essential. An ideal situation for the m

of an F-105 and a MIG occurred when an F-105 had bombe

was coming off the target above mach one. With the F-105’s 

advantage, it could make a single pass and then termina

fight. Its limited maneuverability in comparison to the MIG

MIG-17 made it a very poor plane in a dogfight, however, an

tics were employed to avoid such engagements wherever pos

MIG AIRFIELDS

As the war progressed, the North Vietnamese expand

number of jet-capable airfields from nine to thirteen. M

these fields were in the vicinity of Hanoi. The North Vietn

were able to expand and develop new airfields without any 

teraction on our part until April 1967 when we hit Hoa Loc 

western part of the country and followed with attacks a

Kep. The main fighter base, Phuc Yen, was not struck until 

ber of the same year. Gia Lam remained free from attack th

out the war because U.S. officials decided to permit tra

aircraft from China, the Soviet Union, and the Internationa

trol Commission to have safe access to North Vietnam. The 

Vietnamese, of course, used Gia Lam as an active MIG ba

An argument frequently advanced for not striking airfield

that our aircraft losses would be disproportionate to the d

we could inflict upon the North Vietnamese Air Force.25 B

strike forces were already penetrating the areas where ai

were located, and there were no major changes in the de

the enemy could have employed that would have made our 

greater than they already were against other targets in the 

The southern-most airfields in North Vietnam were dev

after the bombing halt in 1968 and were used to a limited ext

the Easter offensive in 1972. During the 1975 final offensive

southern airfields were in excellent operational condition t

port MIGs in a fighter bomber role in the event such suppo

needed. For the final offensive, the airfields at Khe Sanh and 

Ha were fully developed to handle MIGs, although there w

reported MIG flights from either one. These forward airfields 
there had been a containment of the assault at Pleiku and H

By not permitting hot pursuit of the enemy into Chin

rules of engagement provided a sanctuary for MIGs tha

blocked from returning to their home bases. When our fi

established a barrier patrol between Phuc Yen and the b

MIGs often recovered in China rather than confront t

fighter screen. Thus when the North Vietnamese wanted t

attrition rates down, they withheld fighters from combat by 

ing them into China until our raid was completed. Even t

this tactic saved their fighters, it provided local air superior

our strike forces by default.

MIG TACTICS

The MIGs were used sparingly at first, and throughout th

reactions to strike missions varied according to the losse

158

North Vietnamese Air Force’s Phuc Yen airfield. Note dispersed and bunke

craft parking locations.
of heavy losses. They did this late in 1966, in the summ

1967, in December 1967, and during the final offens

December 1972. During these standdowns, which in some 

lasted two or three months, the enemy developed new tact

Regardless of the tactics employed, though, the MIGs 

always under GCI control during the entire intercept missio

major advantage enjoyed by the MIGs was their integrat

defense radar system that completely covered North Vie

Because of the system’s redundancy, we were unable to dec

surprise it. The system knew where our fighters were, and be

of the limited number of targets and the small area in which t

gets were located, it had a very precise idea of which targets 

be under attack. North Vietnamese ground controllers mus

found it rather easy to position MIGs for an engagement and t

attacks on our strike force, causing it to jettison its weapons

Compared to the dogfights of the Korean War, those over 

Vietnam were relatively small. In the Korean War, the Comm

Chinese Air Force sometimes launched as many as two hu

MIGs against our F-86s and fighter-bombers. MIG formati

that war were loosely controlled, at least until 1952, and wer

in high orbits of 30 or 40 aircraft above the F-86s. When th

appeared right, four to six fighters would make a high spe

and-run attack coming from out of the sun. Formations of M

and MIG-21s over North Vietnam were always much smalle

MIG-17 and the MIG-21 employed different tactics, but both 

of aircraft were controlled much more closely by ground rada

their MIG-15 counterparts had been over Korea.

The MIG-17s generally defended North Vietnamese ai

and patrolled at low altitude along our approach and dep

routes. We believed that North Korean pilots flew most 

MIG-17s, particularly those that covered the airfields 

takeoff and landing of the MIG-21s. Most of the MIG-17 f

tions had only two aircraft, and their favorite tactic was t

the F-4s into a low altitude dogfight when the F-4s were l

fuel. The MIG-17s were heavily concentrated in the Navy’

of responsibility east of the northeast rail line, and most 

Navy kills were against the MIG-17.

The greatest concern of the 7th Air Force pilots througho

war was the MIG-21. In early and mid-1966, most of the M

attacks were made by formations of four to six aircraft. Dog

were characteristic of the period since MIG-21s were n

armed with Atoll missile, but the average dogfight laste
perfected and that coordination with AAA and SAMs was 

Most of these MIGs patrolled near Thud Ridge,* near 

160

*Thud Ridge—A line of hills to the northwest of Phuc Yen airfield that the 

(Thuds) used as a shield against North Vietnamese radars as they mad

altitude penetration to targets within the 30-mile Hanoi circle. This low 

tactic changed with the introduction of pods in 1967.
to pick off aircraft that had received battle damage and we

completely covered by an escort.

By the end of 1966, MIG pilots were beginning to 

increasing signs of aggressiveness. From the earlier flig

which losses were running heavily against them, in some 

as high as four to one, they had learned how to improve the

tics. Formations became more flexible and employed th

that control had developed in the last quarter of the year

thermore, the new Atoll missile allowed them to attack wit

risk using very high speed hit-and-run tactics.*

By the end of February 1967, MIG tactics had become 

much set. Operating in elements of two, they were vectored b

*It is of interest that Soviet fighter tactics as flown by the Koreans and 

in the Korean War developed in the same pattern. Initially, there was a t

to fight in large formations of sixteen or more aircraft. But as more exp

was gained, the formations broke down into flights of eight to twelve from 

elements of two would break off for a high speed firing pass. The two 

would not return to the fight unless the same tactic could be employed ag

tactic provided an opportunity to exploit the better maneuverability and 

ation qualities of the MIG-15.
speed attack with Atoll missiles. During the attack and break

they attained speeds above mach 1.4; then they used th

speed to zoom above and away from the strike force. Sometim

element of two MIG-21s would act as a decoy to draw off t

screen, and then another two MIGs would follow with a 

attack. In all cases, the primary weapon was the missile with 

being used only when necessary for close-in fighting.

During the same period, MIG-17s, usually protecting the 

Vietnamese airfields, were often vectored away to attack the b

the strike forces. If this tactic succeeded in disorganizing the 

force, MIG-21s from above would drop down on any elemen

had split away from its cover. These tactics had limited su

however, because of the disparity in speed between our fighte

the MIG-17s. Because of the MIG-17s’ slower speeds, they we

dom able to split up our formations. But the tactic did s

degree of sophistication in the coordination of high and low a

flights with AAA and SAMs. These tactics complicated our 

missions and thereby represented a decided improvement in 

Vietnamese air defense operations.

SEVENTH AIR FORCE DEALS WITH THE MIGS

Since the MIG threat was relatively low in 1965 and 

1966, and since our authorization to hit any particular 

was often withdrawn after a short time, our plan was 

strike aircraft to carry bombs. We meant to destroy as m

the target as possible with each strike. Consequently, inst

establishing a separate fighter escort, we simply instruct

pilots to jettison their bombs if they had to engage MIGs 

attacking the target. After jettisoning their bombs, the F-4s 

as escort for the attacking F-105s.

Many of the F-4 pilots weren’t happy with these tactic

tactics were defensive in nature and cast them in the unpl

role of targets waiting to be hit. They wanted to go aft

enemy fighters from the outset, but the mission priorities 

lished by CINCPAC and JCS for Southeast Asia provided 

opportunity for free-lance operations or fighter sweeps 

North Vietnam. Usually the requirement to attack certain t

within a specified period demanded the full effort of all the 

able forces. There weren’t enough fighters available to co

random fighter sweeps and also protect the strike forces 

their specified times in the target area.

162
shortage of tankers would have precluded such a tactic. 

1966 through 1968, it took about 27 tankers twice a day to 

the attacking force. With the additional requirements for 

ing B-52s and for maintaining an ability to support th

phase of the SIOP,* SAC’s tankers simply couldn’t suppo

additional fighter operations in Southeast Asia. We couldn’

from the strategic tanker fleet any further since it was impe

that our general war forces be able to carry out their as

missions regardless of the demands of the war in Vietnam

BOLO—A FIGHTER SWEEP

From our observations of fighter engagements in 196

determined that a properly designed fighter sweep might d

a number of MIGs. Since airfields could not be struck durin

period, a large air battle, or series of battles, was the only 

reduce the MIG force appreciably. We began planning in 

December 1966 for a large fighter sweep which would take 

immediately after the expected Christmas and New Year 

down. Previous experience showed that the MIGs would p

a substantial effort after a standdown; their in-commissio

would be high, their tactics refined, and their skills polish

training sorties accomplished with little fear of attack.

The fighter sweep was designed to appear as a normal 

strike force with escorting fighters. Call signs of the form

and all other indicators were designed to give the impressio

the penetrating force was just another daily strike forc

sweep was to consist of F-4s and F-105 Wild Weasels pen

ing simultaneously from Laos and the Tonkin Gulf. Our pla

to create a pincer to close off any MIG flights attempt

recover at Chinese bases. We assigned the F-4s specific ar

sweep, areas where the MIG-21s normally orbited before la

ing attacks against our entering and departing strike force

F-4s coming in from Laos were to handle the MIGs at the 

altitudes while those coming in from the Gulf of Tonkin 

take care of the MIGs at the lower altitudes.

*SIOP—Strategic Integrated Operational Plan: SAC is the executive agen

JCS in maintaining an integrated plan for the employment of SAC and Na

marine forces in a strategic air offensive in case of general nuclear war.
of 2 January 1967. It appeared good enough for our m

however, so we launched 20 flights of F-4s and F-105s. 

after our planes were launched, the weather became wors

expected; the flights coming from Laos were able to swe

assigned areas, but those coming from the Gulf of Tonkin 

turn back after repeated attempts to get into their as

areas. The MIGs reacted as we had anticipated: in eleme

two, they popped up through the overcast to jump what s

to be a normal strike force. MIG pilots were caught comple

surprise when they encountered not heavily laden F-105s 

4s with tanks jettisoned, ready for a fight. After a few brie

utes the battle ended with seven MIGs shot down.26

BOLO gave us the largest single MIG battle of the war; 

air battles go, it was a small one. In the Korean War, by co

ison, our largest air battle took place on 4 September 1952

39 F-86s engaged 73 MIG-15s in seventeen separate en

ments. In that series of dogfights, thirteen MIGs were shot 

and four F-86s were lost.

THE BATTLE CHANGES—MISSILES AND “HIT-AND-RUN”

After January 1967 we had to stop giving F-4s the dual m

of carrying bombs as part of the strike force and providing 

cover if a MIG attack developed. With the increased MIG a

and the MIGs’ high speed hit-and-run tactics, our F-4s could

tison bombs and get in position quickly enough to defeat all o

attacks. If we had had better radar coverage of North Vietna

if our rules of engagement hadn’t required our pilots to v

identify the enemy aircraft before firing, it would have been fe

to employ the F-4 in the dual role on some missions where 

was little probability of significant MIG reaction. Given the r

engagement and the limitations of our radar coverage, thou

had to protect our strike forces by assigning an increasing p

tion as escorts throughout the year.

Seeking other ways to provide better protection for our 

forces, we experimented with a number of different tactic

formations in 1967 and 1968. One of our favorite form

consisted of 16 F-105s and two flights of F-11 escorts, one 

positioned ahead of the lead strike flight and the other posi

to the immediate rear of the force. These escort flights w

back and forth across the path of the F-105s, protecting a

attacks from either front or rear. This weaving used consid

164
fuel, of course, and meant that fuel consumption was alw

critical factor. Initially, we instructed these flights to stay c

the strike force and to turn MIGs away rather than engage 

As the MIGs continued to improve their hit-and-run t

though, we gave the F-4 escorts freedom to pursue and e

the MIGs on their own initiative. This tactic proved to be 

effective in breaking up the MIG attacks.

Formation of F-105s from the 355th TFW returning from a mission over 

Vietnam.

Formation of F-4s (Es & Ds) heading for a tanker somewhere over Southea
best tactics for escorting a strike force had not changed 

since 1944. In Europe, Korea, and Vietnam aggressive 

fighters always had a decided advantage; if they got close e

to press the attack, they were extremely difficult to stop. D

the bombing raids in Europe early in 1944 we soon learne

the best way to stop the ME-109 and FW-190 attacks was 

the escorting fighters roam on the flanks and above the b

formations, seeking out the enemy fighters before they 

assemble for an attack. In Korea the best tactics were mu

same although the escort problem there was made much 

difficult by the disparity between the performances of the n

fighters and the older B-29s. The relatively high spee

maneuverability of the MIG-15s (not to mention their sheer 

bers, which varied from 40 to 80 or more against our strike

the Yalu) helped them to penetrate our fighter screens, an

brief loiter time of our F-86s (only 25 minutes in the targe

limited our freedom to seek out the MIGs. Although these 

vantages caused us to lose as many as five B-29s to the M

a single month (October 1951), our experience demons

conclusively that a roaming fighter escort was the best d

against interceptors.27 

Our experience with the F-86s in Korea taught us sever

sons about achieving air superiority against enemy interce

but in the 11-day offensive of December 1972 the B-52s’ ne

fighter escort confronted our fighter force with some toug

problems. Prior to these bombing raids, it wasn’t necess

provide extensive fighter cover for the B-52s since they 

bombing in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the lowe

of North Vietnam. Although there was usually at least one 

of F-4s providing area coverage for these missions, the MI

not pose a significant threat. It was only when they s

bombing around Vinh in North Vietnam that fighter 

became essential.

All of the B-52 strikes in North Vietnam in December 

were flown during the hours of darkness. Three flights o

were assigned various areas of patrol to support each of 

night strikes. Patrol locations were based on predictio

where the MIGs would most probably launch attacks a

the bomber stream. In addition to these screens, four flig

F-4s (16 aircraft) were responsible for close escort 

bomber cells.

166
The problem of protecting the B-52s in such a narrow air 

at night was quite difficult. We had only limited GCI covera

radar in the EC-121 was unable to see airborne targets at lo

tudes over land. Also, CROWN, a Navy ship providing radar 

mation in the Gulf of Tonkin, had limited capability to see MI

fic in the Hanoi area. Thus our fighters were forced to d

largely on information from their own radar in making a fina

sion as to whether an enemy attack was developing.

The difficulty of ascertaining which of the many aircraft on 

radar screen belonged to the enemy prompted considerable 

A MIG-17 jumps an F-105 right after the USAF fighter has struck the Do

Bridge. Another F-105, firing at the MIG-17, records the action with his gu

camera. Action took place on 19 December 1967.
IFF transponders on, our pilots knew each other’s radar po

clearly, but the enemy GCI controllers also received a brillian

display of our positions. If we “strangled” our IFFs, the 

radars only received a much less distinct “skin paint” of o

craft, but then we had much more difficulty identifying each 

position. Obviously neither solution was completely satisf

However, given the small amount of airspace involved, the 

dancy in the enemy’s coverage, and the small number of 

fighters up for any one battle, I would choose to prevent in

ence between elements of our force by leaving the IFF on duri

last phase of the penetration into and the first phase of the 

drawal from the target area. Disagreements continued abo

IFF issue, but the important fact is that despite the difficult 

lem of identification, our escorts did prevent the MIGs from 

any real threat to our strike forces.

Technology affected our escort operations in yet anothe

in 1972. Because of the effectiveness of newly introduced 

weapons (with a combat CEP** of approximately 30 feet, as 

pared to the dive bomb CEP of 420 feet in the 1960–1968 p

fewer strike aircraft were needed for point targets such 

Canal Des Rapides bridge or the Hanoi Railcar Repair 

However, with a strike force consisting of only three flights of 

carrying laser weapons, the loss of one aircraft weaken

force much more, proportionately, than had the loss of an 

in earlier years. For this reason, if for no other, good t

judgment required that the fighter cover be greater than 

been. Additionally, MIG caps were given much more freed

action to screen ahead of the laser flights and to establish 

ers along the flanks where an attack could be expected.

CONTROL IN THE TARGET AREA

The avoidance of a border violation with Communist 

was always a factor in our planning of fighter and strik

sions. Throughout the war, a buffer zone approximately 25 

168

*IFF: “Identification, Friend or Foe.” An electronic device first used by t

during the Korean War which would transmit from our aircraft coded el

signals.

**CEP: Circular Error Probable. “The radius of a circle within which ha

missiles/projectiles are expected to fall.” JCS Pub. 1, DOD Dictionary of 

and Associated Terms.
1967, our aircraft were permitted to maneuver in this are

when positioning for attacks against targets outside the 

zone. Specific operations were scheduled from time to 

within the buffer zone, but armed reconnaissance or 

sweeps were prohibited. Aircraft in hot pursuit of the MIG

expected to break off their attack upon entering this zone

To further ensure against border violations, an elaborat

tem was established to warn aircraft approaching the C

border. But when these calls were coupled with numerou

and SAM calls, pilots had difficulty determining just wh

about to violate the border. When the situation was comp

further by reduced visibility and a pilot’s temporary disor

tion as a result of a dogfight, it wasn’t surprising for a p

come close to violating the border. However, because of th

igational equipment in both the strike and fighter aircra

excellent warnings given by MOTEL, TEABALL, CROWN

the EC-121s, and a great deal of command emphasis, ther

only a few violations throughout the war.

The ground based radar system in Thailand and South 

nam didn’t have the range to provide control of air oper

much above the nineteenth parallel. It was a fairly complex 

control system and worked well within the performance ex

tion of the equipment. But each radar site had only partia

erage of North Vietnam, leaving gaps in many target areas. 

gaps in coverage, dictated by available geographical locatio

radar sites, limited positive control in an engagement.

Our most northern radar was the control and reportin

(CRP) located at Dong Ha, called WATERBOY. Fighters com

the east side of Vietnam would come under the control of a

radar, the control and reporting center (CRC) at Danang. This 

had good coverage to the south and to the east but had blank 

looking to the north. As a result, the CRP at Dong Ha becam

primary ground based radar for controlling aircraft enro

Route Package VI (RP VI) from the Gulf of Tonkin. It was abo

miles from WATERBOY to the primary target area in RP VI. W

*MOTEL—Command headquarters of 7th Air Force that controlled air op

in North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.

TEABALL—Command headquarters of 7th Air Force that controlled air 

tions in North Vietnam during 1972 air offensive (LINEBACKER I 

CROWN—Navy early warning vessel in Gulf of Tonkin above 18th paralle
radar limited to about 180 miles, WATERBOY could only h

fighter engagements against MIGs that came as far south as 

Hoa, NVN, and rarely during our extended operations in th

did the MIGs come this far south. WATERBOY also functio

the primary radar for effecting rendezvous of the fighters w

KC-135 tankers over the Gulf of Tonkin. Additionally, it tied i

the Navy radar system in Task Force 77 (TF-77) operating 

vicinity of the seventeenth parallel in the Gulf of Tonkin

exchange of tracks provided a consolidated picture of the air 

tion as seen by the surface based radars.

Once the fighters passed out of the control of WATE

they were picked up by the airborne radar of the EC-121

aircraft served as an airborne command and control 

(ABCCC) and operated under the code name COLLEGE 

During all operations above the twentieth parallel, an E

was on station. It had excellent coverage over the wate

when its radar looked down over land, “land clutter” block

aircraft movements. The EC-121, therefore, had to depend 

other sources of information for directing MIG intercepts.

Despite its limitations, the EC-121 was the closest com

post to the Air Force’s operations in RP VIA. It had the res

170
alerts, warning pilots of potential border violations, and, 

other measures were not adequate, issuing SAM warnings
these command posts played a very important role in searc

rescue missions for downed pilots. One of the things the E

airborne controller could not do, however, was call off a 

172

“WATERBOY” site at Dong Ha Air Base, South Vietnam, September 19

USAF EC-121 “COLLEGE EYE” in flight over South Vietnam.
rested solely with the mission commander, who normally 

the lead aircraft of the strike force. He made the decision 

entire force. The ABCCC acted as an information center t

the strike force commander completely informed of the c

friendly and enemy air situation and of any weather or s

intelligence reports that he might need to know. In effec

ABCCC had all the responsibilities of any other operationa

mand post except for the limitation regarding decisions abo

conduct of the mission. 

For assistance in the detection of MIGs threatening the 

forces, COLLEGE EYE was tied into the Navy’s early w

ship, Piraz, which was located in the vicinity of the eigh

parallel. This vessel provided early warning to the carrie

force and MIG information for Navy fighters operating in 

and VIB. Normally, the Navy didn’t delegate control of inte

to Piraz code named CROWN. Instead, CROWN provided 

mation to the Combat Information Center (CIC), which con

the intercept from its location on board one of the carriers’ 

task force. During the 1972 offensive, CROWN was given l

GCI control for both Air Force and Navy fighters. Ho

CROWN was limited in its capability to control Air Force fi

over Hanoi. Because of its distance from the battle area, it 

only see traffic above 10,000 feet, and even then it could

more than about 50 miles inland. As a consequence, it was 

valuable in providing information on potential intercepts o

the most southern part of RP VIA.

Located near Danang on Monkey Mountain was the pr

CRC for all air operations in the northern part of South Vi

and RP I in North Vietnam. Adjacent to the CRC was a s

advanced operational headquarters of 7th Air Force. This 

quarters was known as the TACC, North, code named M

MOTEL did only limited mission planning; most of the m

planning was done at 7th Air Force in Saigon and then d

uted as fragmentary orders to all the units. But MOTEL h

responsibility for controlling the missions entering North 

nam. Orders were issued from 7th Air Force to MOTEL, 

then executed through the ABCCC over the Gulf of Tonkin

Regardless of whether the forces were coming into the 

area from Laos or the Gulf of Tonkin, MOTEL, during the 

1968 period, was the controlling agency. All intelligence w

lated at MOTEL for ongoing missions and then made availa

the EC-121 COLLEGE EYE in contact with the strike and 
to the 7th Air Force out-of-country command post. In or

have communications with the forces throughout a mission

135 relay platform was maintained over the Gulf of Tonkin 

to and during scheduled missions. MOTEL was in constan

tact with the strike forces, relaying messages either th

COLLEGE EYE or through the C-135. With this system, 7

Force was able to follow a mission from takeoff to landing

The ground based radar system in Thailand was organi

the traditional manner. There was a CRP at Udorn, BRIG

which provided navigational assistance to the forces going 

and was the primary radar facility for affecting a rendezv

tankers and fighters. Because of terrain masking, it wa

capable of control over North Vietnam, but it was kept bus

handling the tanker rendezvous and taking care of a

requiring refueling coming back from a mission. 

The radar station in Thailand closest to operations in NV

a CRP located in Nakon Phanom, INVERT. This site had a 

tion similar to that of WATERBOY, the CRP at Dong Ha. IN

exercised control of the strike forces to the limit of its 

which was about 150 miles. Thus it was not possible to c

the strike forces through this facility once they approach

western border of North Vietnam.

In the 1972 air offensive, EC-121Ts were stationed ove

and functioned in the same role as COLLEGE EYE C-121D

in previous years. This radar was called DISCO; although 

what improved, it had limitations similar to those of COL

EYE when operating over land. Fortunately, these limit

have been eliminated in the new radars going into the 

AWACS (airborne warning and control system). DISCO 

control fighter intercepts at the higher altitudes, but was l

in the medium altitudes where most of the fighting was 

place. It was dependent upon other sources of information 

out its knowledge of the air situation.

With the resumption of air operations over North Vietn

May of 1972, a new control facility was developed at the C

Nakom Phanom. This facility became known as TEABALL, 

performed the same function during this campaign that M

did in the 1965-1968 campaign. However, TEABALL was 

better equipped to act as the primary advanced headquart

control of ongoing operations over North Vietnam. TEABAL

a very effective control headquarters for the 1972 off

thanks to the integration of all radar and intelligence inform

174
control of our fighters in intercepting MIGs. The kill rates 

reflect this improvement, but the 1972 campaign was o

short duration that there was insufficient time for this imp

headquarters to have full effect.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING KILL RATIO

Given the advanced fighter weapons available to us in 

nam, we might have expected to achieve much higher air

kill rates than we had in World War II and Korea. In the 

wars, the only armament was the 50-caliber machine gu

in Vietnam, the F-4E, for example, had a standard air-to-a

figuration consisting of 630 rounds of 20mm, four AIM-7 

guided Sparrow missiles and four AIM-9 heat seeking Sidew

missiles. With this variety of weapons, our F-4s were capa

bringing an enemy aircraft under fire at distances rangin

five to ten miles down to a thousand feet. The diversity of 

opportunities provided by these weapons should have giv

pilots a chance to shoot for a kill under most conditions 

to-air combat. But the increased opportunities offered b

advanced weapons were largely canceled by other factors.

The necessity for a visual identification of the enemy hin

successful shoot-downs by reducing the frequency of oppo

ties for employing, for example, the Sparrow. Referred to 

“all-aspect” missile, the Sparrow could be fired from any 

tion relative to the target aircraft. But the fact that visual 

fication was required meant that we forfeited our initial a

tage of being able to detect a MIG at thirty to thirty-fiv

range and launch such a missile “in the blind” with a rada

on from three to five miles. Many kills were lost because 

restriction, particularly during periods of reduced visibility

times when so few of our fighters were in the area that a

anything on the radar was an enemy aircraft.

History suggests that this rule might have had less imp

the exchange rate if we had had good GCI coverage of th

River delta area. In the Korean War our kill rate went up s

when a Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) was establis

Cho-Do Island to provide complete coverage of the MIG bas

along the Yalu. With the establishment of this direction cen

June 1952, F-86s could be vectored into a position wher

had the option of initiating the attack rather than reacting 

MIGs. Having neither precise GCI control such as the 
using our on-board radar, we regularly conceded the init

probably the most important factor in air-to-air combat.

Nevertheless, most of our kills were made with missiles, 

fact 57.5 percent were made with Sparrows. Navy fighters, 

other hand, made almost all of their kills with the Sidewinde

difference between the kill ratios of the two forces can proba

accounted for by differences in the areas they covered, the 

MIGs up for battle in those areas, and the type of engage

encountered. The Navy kills were predominantly MIG-17s, an

were made in close-in engagements. Such engagements re

more frequent employment of short-range weapons, and sin

Navy F-4s had no guns, the Sidewinder missile was their p

weapon. Their F-8s, however, did make a significant number 

with guns.

The Air Force F-4E with an internal gun didn’t make its 

in the war until 1968. Consequently, most of the kills by t

Force were made with Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles a

MIG-17s and MIG-21s. During the 1972 campaign, howev

percent of the kills were made with guns.

176

USAF F-4E still carrying air-to-air missiles after bombing mission over N

Vietnam.
A surprisingly large number of missiles were fired for the 

ber of enemy aircraft downed. The numbers don’t fairly rep

the kill rates of the missiles, however, for it was a standar

tic to fire missiles as a deterrent, even though the pilot kn

was out of range. Obviously this tactic tended to corrupt th

tistical base on the relative effectiveness of missiles.

The low kill rates for missiles may also be explained in p

the fact that the AIM-7 was designed as an anti-bomber w

and didn’t have the broad envelope for firing or the man

ability that are needed in a fighter-versus-fighter engagem

bomber has limited maneuverability, which makes it a fairl

target for a fighter; extremes of position aren’t needed 

most firing passes. On the other hand in fighter-versus-

engagements, the opportunities for a level shot are very few

most shots, even those from the 6 o’clock position, inv

abrupt maneuvering. Thus our fighter pilots fired the Sp

out of its envelope very frequently and many times intentio

The net result was an 11 to 12 percent kill rate. It was an u

standably frustrating experience for a pilot to work into a 

position and then have such a low probability for a kill. B

AIM-9 kill rate was somewhat better, about 20 percent, 

the latter part of the 1965–1968 campaign.28

Another problem that stemmed from the complexity 

weapons had to do with the apparently mundane matter 
setting up the gun and missile switches in the F-4E, we imp

both the pilot procedures and the switch panel. The sw

were rearranged so that the pilot could go from the long ra

the Sparrow to the short range of the gun with minimum 

movement. Although these changes helped reduce pilot e

there was no real change in the rather disappointing kill r

the AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles.

During the campaign of 1965–1967, the ratio of e

fighter losses to USAF fighter losses was between 3 1/2 

to 1. From late 1967 until the bombing halt in October 

the rate was about 2 to 1. Although this is a very acce

rate, it is not as high as either the USAF rate durin

Korean War (10 to 1) or the Israeli rate in the 197

(approximately 50 to 1). But the different circumstances 

wars in Korea and the Middle East prevent us from m

responsible judgments about the relative quality of pil

equipment. For one important consideration, there we

political constraints in those two wars that required p

visual identification before the pilot could open fire. Alt

this restriction was lifted from our pilots to some exten

ing the 1972 campaign, this freedom came too late to h

significant effect on the overall exchange rate. In add

radar coverage of the battle areas in both Korea and th

dle East was much more complete than our coverage of 

Vietnam, and good radar coverage equates directly to fav

shooting positions. Thus both political and technologic

tors tended to depress our kill ratio in Vietnam, with po

constraints being probably the most significant factor.

SUMMARY

The most precious thing an air force can provide to an 

or navy is air superiority, since this gives to surface forc

ability to carry out their own plan of action without interf

from an enemy air force. Without air superiority, tactical fl

ity is lost. Our Army and Navy enjoyed complete immunit

attacks by the North Vietnamese Air Force. Our deployme

troops, locations of supply points, and concentrations of sh

ports were never restrained because of a threat from the 

Vietnamese Air Force. Thus the air superiority that was 

lished and maintained in World War II and Korea was even 

pronounced in Vietnam.29

178
ing over enemy territory was demonstrated many times. W

aircraft operating at such high speeds and with missiles p

ting a greater variety of firing opportunities, control of the 

is more critical, complex, and demanding than ever.

Through pilot skill, improvisation, and training, the air 

over the skies of North Vietnam was fought and won. 

though the exploitation of our superiority was limited by p

decisions, the end result for the North Vietnamese Air Forc

that we could use their air space to perform combat mis

and they couldn’t use ours. That is what air superiority m
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs 

Publication I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974)

2. The Lord Tedder, Airpower in War, The Lees Knowles Lectu

1947 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.), p. 32.

3. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1948), p. 29.

4. The Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, The War Memoirs of Mars

the Royal Air Force (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 

5. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall 

(European War) (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 21.

6. The Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 638.

7. Trevor J. Constable and Raymond F. Toliver, Horrido: Fight

of the Luftwaffe and (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1968), p. 

8. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: D

day & Company, 1967), pp. 75–76.

9. United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict

Historical Study No. 72, 1 November 1950-30 June 1952 (Wash

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1955), p. 107.

10. Ibid., p. 129.

11. Korean Conflict, No. 127 (1 July 1952–27 July 1953), p. 

12. Korean Conflict, No. 72, p. 69.

13. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 85.

14. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965–31 March 1968, boo

34.

15. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Operations, p. 

16. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air 

in World War II, vol 2: Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago: Th

versity of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 682.

17. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Operations, pp. 14

18. Ibid., p. 181.

19. Ibid., p. 227. 

20. Ibid., p. 259.

21. Ibid., p. 210. 

22. Ibid., p. 285A. 

23. Illustrated History of the United States Air Force in Southea

Office of Air Force History, Hq U.S. Air Force, July 1974, p. 24. (dr

24. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Operations, p. 

25. John P. McConnell, General, USAF (Ret), interview held 

tagon, Washington, D.C., March 1976.

180
USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol. 1, monograph 2 (Wa

ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 145.

27. Korean Conflict, No. 72, p. 115.

28. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Air Operations in Sou

Asia, 1 July 1972–15 August 1973, vol. 2 (Hickam AFB HI: Depa

of the Air Force, Hq Pacific Air Forces, 1973), p. IV-351.

29. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Operations, p. 1
Chapter V

INTERDICTION

(WORLD WAR II, KOREA AND VIETNAM 1964–19

From World War II emerged the three basic missions of 

cal airpower: counter air, interdiction, and close air su

Although their priority depended upon the battle area an

stage of the war, it was generally in the order listed, becau

superiority allowed the other missions to be conducted w

interference from the enemy air force.

Once control of the air could be maintained, interd

proved to be the most effective mission for tactical airpo

World War II and Korea. During World War II, 80 to 85 perc

the tactical air effort was devoted to counter air and interd

In Korea, almost 48 percent of Air Force sorties in 1952–5

allocated to interdiction and armed reconnaissance.1

The interdiction campaign begins with attacks against th

duction sources of war materiel. It continues to brin

materiel under attack as it moves through the air, sea, an

lines of communication to the battle area. Although in

attacks at the source of production have the highest poten

long-term decisive effects, such attacks do not immediately 

the fighting ability of the forces already in the field. Conseq

many attacks concentrate on vulnerable supply lines and s

areas to destroy materiel before it reaches the combat are

Once forces and supplies arrive in the forward area, th

difficult to destroy except during a major ground action by 

enemy or friendly forces. With such action, supplies and 

are concentrated in the battle area, where their vulnerab

air attacks increases sharply.

“OVERLORD” AND INTERDICTION

In World War II the destruction of the synthetic oil plan

related war goods had such a deleterious effect on the fightin

ity of the German armed forces that Reichsminister Albert 

said the oil attacks of 1944 brought about the decision of th
have ground to a halt for lack of supplies for its armored and 

anized divisions. The Allies, thus, had placed the German A

serious logistical problems before the invasion.

The object of the initial phase of the interdiction campaig

to reduce the supplies available to the German armed for

drastically that they would be unable to contain an Allied 

ing; furthermore, if a counteroffensive developed, insuf

fuel, ammunition, and vehicles would limit that counteroff

to only a few days.

As Operation OVERLORD (the Normandy invasion) n

most of the Allied bombers and fighters were diverted 

strategic bombing to interdicting the transportation system 

was essential for moving Wehrmacht reserves to the F

beaches where Allied ground forces were to be landed.

The commanders of the American and British bomber 

agreed, some of them reluctantly, to redirect the total air eff

the last three months before the invasion to the destruction 

transportation system in France. Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory, 

Expeditionary Air Force commander, developed the plan with 

all guidance from Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Eisenh

deputy. As might be expected, both General Spaatz and Air 

Marshal Harris, the bomber commanders, vigorously objec

184

Results of AAF bombing attacks on railroad yard somewhere in Franc
compromise, Tedder acted for Eisenhower as the operationa

mander for overall planning of the air war. For the invasio

bomber forces came under the operational control of Eisenh

Leigh-Mallory’s staff developed a detailed interdiction plan 

on about 80 targets along the Seine and Loire Rivers and 

Orleans Gap. These targets created an arc of 100 to 150 mile

the beachhead. The bridges across the two rivers and the ra

through Orleans provided a natural barrier through whic

major reserves of Von Rundstedt’s army group would have to 

Air Vice Marshal Kingston-McCloughry makes clear the 

cance of the interdiction mission: “The success of the in

would clearly depend upon two factors: first, upon elimina

the enemy’s power to interfere with the Allied landing, rein

ment and supply; and secondly, upon ability to ensure th

enemy forces attacking the bridgehead did not increase at a 

rapid rate than the Allied forces defending and extending it.”

In March 1944, attacks began against these targets. All ele

of the German logistical system were brought under attack 

either the RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force or the American 9th Air 

The B-17s and B-24s of Spaatz’s strategic air force pounded 

during the day, and Harris’ Lancasters picked up the task 

the night. Fighters of the 9th Air Force were scheduled agai

Bomb damage to Folligny Marshalling Yards, France, 8 August 1944
roads and railroads throughout the area knocking out trucks

motives, and freight cars. The end result, according to Kin

McCloughry, was that “during the first four weeks after D-D

enemy was able to dispatch to the Normandy bridgehead an 

age of only four troop trains per day; and even of these, the 

ity never reached their destination.”4

Because of this campaign, the Germans were unable to 

sufficient troops to overwhelm the Allied landing forces

reserves that did arrive were so weakened that they lack

fighting stamina demanded by the intensity of the battle. N

there sufficient equipment to re-outfit and prepare them for 

Von Rundstedt, overall commander of German forces, stated

It was all a question of air force, air force and again air force. T

main difficulties that arose for us at the time of the invasion w

the systematic preparations by your air force; the smashing of 

main lines of communications, particularly the railway junctio

We had prepared for various eventualities . . . that all came 

nothing or was rendered impossible by the destruction of railw

communications, railway stations, etc. The second thing was 

attack on the roads, on marching columns, etc., so that it w

impossible to move anyone at all by day, whether a column or 

individual, that is to say, carry fuel or ammunition. That a

meant that the bringing up of the armoured divisions was also 

of the question, quite impossible. And the third thing was this c

186
eral collapse.5

OVERLORD’S LESSONS

Every major ground campaign through the remainder of 

War II was coordinated with an interdiction campaign. Aft

landings, the primary interdiction campaign fell to the fi

and bombers of the U.S. 9th Air Force and the RAF 2nd T

Air Force, but strategic bombers also were used extensiv

the beginning of major offensives. From these interdiction 

paigns, commanders learned that heavy pressure had to 

on the Wehrmacht, forcing it to consume supplies at an a

ated rate. With the interdiction campaign destroying cr

needed supplies, the Wehrmacht was then forced to fall ba

if units stood and fought, their positions could be ov

because of the logistics failure. Regardless of their will to 

the lack of needed weapons, food, and ammunition made it 

sible for German units to stay in the battle.

From these lessons of World War II, the concepts of in

tion developed: (a) Strike the source of the war material; (b

centrate the attacks against the weak elements of the log

system; (c) continuously attack, night and day, the major l

communication supporting the army in the field; (d) inflict 

Retreating Nazi forces found AAF tactical fighters a constant menace. An 

can jeep drives through the twisted wreckage of what used to be the tran

tion of a German Panzer division.
battlefield where the difficulty of successful interdiction is 

est; (e) keep continuous ground pressure on the enemy to 

him to consume large quantities of logistics.

RETREAT TO PUSAN

With the outbreak of the Korean War, many of these le

had to be learned again. When the North Koreans cross

38th parallel on 25 June 1950, there were insufficient for

stop the penetration. South Korean forces fell back in dis

no one knew whether the advance could be stopped. No s

cant natural barriers stood between retreating South Korea

U.S. forces and the Pusan stronghold. However, as the 

Korean logistical lines extended, 5th Air Force fighter

bombers already in control of the air began to impose a hea

on the enemy forces and supplies.

At the point in an offensive movement or retreat when s

lines are expanded, airpower can have the most profound 

on an enemy ground force. As the ground force becomes in

ingly exposed on open roads, at bottlenecks at bridges, 

and defiles, fighters can destroy a significant part of the 

with repeated bombing and strafing attacks.

As the Allied forces withdrew into the Pusan bridgehea

Air Force inflicted such high losses on North Korean per

and equipment that the enemy ground forces had neith

strength nor supplies to crack the perimeter. Airpower ga

Allied army time to bring in enough reinforcements and lo

to begin a breakout and pursuit. When the Allies began th

suit north, and after the Inchon landing, the North Korean 

was near defeat. Airpower was crucial in preparing for the 

offensive; massive close air support at Pusan, interdiction 

the major LOCs, and isolation of the area around Inchon 

enemy ground forces all took place under the complete air 

riority established earlier by 5th Air Force.

A major factor in the effectiveness and success of any in

tion effort is careful planning. At the direction of FEAF, 5

Force early developed an interdiction plan in four phases. Th

phase, designed to slow the enemy advance, covered the 

retreat and involved the destruction of 60 rail bridges no

Seoul. These attacks were coupled with armed reconnaissa

all major roads used by the advancing enemy army. Later, th

ond phase prepared the objective area for the 8th Army driv

188
Pyongyang and Wonsan were targeted. Because the 8th 

advanced rapidly, air commanders considerably modifie

phase. When the Inchon landing ended any significant resis

the interdiction moved further north. The third phase of th

required B-29s to strike 34 additional bridges on the east an

coasts. The fourth phase, for December 1950, was not implem

because of the intervention of the Chinese Communists.6

CHINESE CROSS THE YALU

While the buildup of Chinese forces took place across the 

the Allies differed as to whether the Chinese would invade 

Korea. The answer was not long in coming. The Chinese c

into North Korea on 1 November 1950, with some 200,000 tr

Almost immediately Macarthur changed the mission prio

FEAF; he directed maximum effort to close air support of g

forces now under heavy attack. MacArthur requested author

only to destroy the bridges the Chinese used to cross the Ya

also to attack military targets and airfields in Manchur

thought it might be necessary to give up all of Korea if the a

ity were not given. As the United Nations forces began withd

on 1 December 1950, the JCS denied the request and directe

MacArthur establish a series of defense lines. He was to use 

North Korean supplies burning. Box cars were strafed by USAF F-80
when the 8th Army, “committed to action without a long

campaign plan, found itself retreating southward in a ‘critica

ation, FEAF was directed to employ its aerial predominance in 

support of ground units to the exclusion of all else. This abs

precluded a proper interdiction program. Had FEAF not final

suaded the CINCFE staff that curtailing the forward flow o

munist troops and materiel was essential to the war effort, t

Army might never have recovered from its ‘critical’ position.”

The combined efforts of 8th Army and 5th Air Force 

stopped the enemy and stabilized the line of contact 

December 1950. Except for some limited adjustments, th

remained essentially the same throughout the remainder 

war. Stratemeyer, the commander of FEAF, turned his ai

to exert maximum interdiction pressure on the enemy log

structure plus key targets supporting military forces de

along the battle line. This shift was an attempt to convin

Chinese that they could not win the campaign. It support

changed United Nations objective: rather than unificat

North and South Korea by political and military action, t

sought a negotiated settlement along the 38th parallel.

190
More than 600 miles of North Korean rail lines support

combined and reconstituted North Korean and Chinese A

Planners estimated that, because of the interdiction cam

the enemy would be able to fight offensively for only two or 

weeks before lack of supplies would force him to give u

offensive. If the 8th Army, then, could contain the attack f

period, attrition would compel the enemy to give up the offe

Weyland, Stratemeyer’s successor, observed, “although clo

support contributed, the major effect upon the enemy wa

duced by airpower applied in the rear of his front line c

zone.”9 Once again the lesson that emerged from World 

was relearned; it would later emerge from the Vietnam Wa

As the Korean War turned into a stalemate on the groun

JCS turned to airpower to break the impasse and compel the 

Koreans and Chinese to negotiate a settlement. Talks at Ka

were suspended indefinitely on 25 September. All offensive g

force actions stopped after October 1952. Airpower was th

force sufficient to convince the Chinese that they couldn’t w

war and that their only alternative was to reach a settlement a

posed by the United Nations negotiators. In November 1952

eral Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, reflected the JCS view wh

stated that United Nations Command airpower “constitut

most potent means, at present available to UNC, of maintaini

degree of military pressure which might impel the commun

agree, finally, to acceptable armistice terms.”10

F-51s from the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing “Truckbusters” being readied 

another day of interdicting the enemy’s LOCs.
inflict maximum destruction at key points. Pyongyang, no

capital of North Korea, but also psychological symbol of co

nist strength, was subjected to a two-day maximum attac

Sui Ho power plant, largest in North Korea, was target

attack. These air attacks culminated in the North Korean

the Chinese agreeing to the essential terms proposed b

United Nations Command.

For what was to come later, it is significant to note that 

were few restraints on FEAF’s employment of forces or sel

of targets. FEAF was limited in attacks only along the Yal

192

Smoke from bombs delivered by Fifth Air Force aircraft clouds a portion 

city of Pyongyang during heavy all-day attacks the summer of 1952 (abov

Navy and Marine carrier-based aircraft joined USAF fighter-bombers in des

a machine factory in the heart of Pyongyang the same summer (below
the North Korean border with Russia. The decision 

whether to bomb the Korean dams was left to the United N

commander. Weyland, who was given the authority for th

recommendation, “felt himself morally compelled to rul

these dams could not be attacked for the purpose of dest

the North Korean rice crops, and he permitted air strikes a

only those dams whose released flood waters would wash 

rails and military supplies.”11 Except for the dam syste

other targets of significance were restricted from attack

freedom to target and to use airpower brought the war 

acceptable conclusion. Interdiction was the fundamental m

that pressured a settlement.

INTERDICTION BEGINS—VIETNAM

The aims of airpower in the Vietnam War were much like 

of the Korean War; however, the very severe restraints on t
This similarity of objective appears also in Presidential 

ments about each war. President Truman stated on 10 

1951 that the U.S. military objective is “to repel attack . 

restore peace [and] . . . to avoid the spread of the conf

About Vietnam, President Johnson, on 23 February 

stated, “Some ask if this is a war for unlimited objective

answer is plain. It is ‘NO.’ Our purpose in Vietnam is to p

the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not emp

is not foreign bases; it is not domination; it is to preve

forceful conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam.”13

From the statements of Truman and Johnson, it is e

that both Presidents saw the two wars in much the sam

spective. Both wars’ purposes were to halt the spread o

munism, stop the aggression, negotiate a settlement, and 

Korea and South Vietnam to determine their own futures 

out external interference. But, where President Truman p

ted latitude to his field commanders in prosecuting th

President Johnson narrowly limited the latitude of the 

manders’ decisions about the air war over North Vietnam

consequence of this difference between the two President

air war in North Vietnam was directed and prosecuted mu

ferently from the air war in North Korea. This difference e

even though the capabilities of the forces were similar 

except for the SAMs, the target conditions were remarkably 

The objectives of the air campaign in North Vietnam 

never changed significantly throughout the war. Thoug

quently restated in different words, they all added up to the 

thing. As stated by Department of Defense representative

by then Secretary of Defense McNamara in Congressiona

mony, the objectives of the bombing campaign were:

(1) To reduce the flow and/or increase the cost of infilt

of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam

(2) To make it clear to the North Vietnamese leadership t

long as they continued their aggression against the South

would have to pay a price in the North;

(3) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese people.

Of these three, only the first is a military objective. The oth

are psychological; they result from gaining or failing to ga

military objective.

The interdiction campaign, thus, was the heart of the air 

egy. Its purpose was to destroy equipment and supplies, and 

rupt, delay, and harass the movement of men, equipment, an

194
that the level of destruction of all the war-related activities in 

Vietnam would be so extensive and debilitating that the Nort

namese would negotiate rather than continue to pursue th

militarily. Thus, the interdiction campaign in the Vietnam W

objectives much like those of the interdiction campaign 

Korean War: “to interfere with and disrupt the enemy’s li

communication to such an extent that he will be unable to c

a determined offensive by friendly forces or be unable to m

sustained major offensive himself.”15

A further likeness between the two wars was the destr

of key psychological and military targets to drive home the 

lessness of continuing the military campaign. Attacks a

Pyongyang of 5 July 1952 and periodically thereafter un

armistice was signed paralleled our later all-out bombing 

greater Hanoi area in May and December 1972. These a

had the same psychological objectives as those in Korea: t

vince the enemy by such overwhelming destruction of the 

of their country that the best way out of war was at the c

ence table and not on the battlefield.

NORTH VIETNAMESE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM

The complex political factors and the equally complex 

mand organization in Vietnam led to many misconceptions 

the interdiction campaign. Some observers viewed the cam

as four separate but somewhat interrelated operation

bombing campaign in North Vietnam, the interdiction of t

Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, the attacks against the LO

northeastern Laos, and the attacks against the roads and 

in South Vietnam. We had, however, only one interdiction 

paign and it embraced all these areas. We used different ru

engagement and different tactics in each area, but all of the 

made up the total campaign. Because of the confusion abo

totality of the campaign, few observers appreciate how eac

ment of the campaign had an effect on the others.

The campaign, to be effective, had to begin with attacks 

head of the system in North Vietnam. At that point the li

communications were most vulnerable to an attack, and 

the supplies and repair and support facilities for the entire 

tics system were located. Sortie for sortie, there the most 

tating attrition on supplies could be achieved, and there th

vulnerable bottlenecks were located. Interruptions in the f
materiel moving through the rest of the network. Approxim

30% of the important transportation targets were in Route 

ages IV, V, and VI. If we were significantly to reduce the lo

flowing to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the sou

had to deal that part of the system, with its high density o

ical items, the most damaging blow.

As the transportation system threaded its way south in 

Vietnam, we found fewer vulnerable segments that cou

blocked for any length of time. Furthermore, the nature 

terrain allowed the North Vietnamese to relieve backed up 

with by-pass routes. In the southern part of the system, 

dispersed and moved in such small segments that we cou

achieve a satisfactory destruction rate per attack. As the su

moved closer to the battlefield in South Vietnam, less so

cated forms of transportation reduced further their vulner

to air attacks. While freight trains of 40 or more cars trans

the northeast railroad leading from China to Hanoi in 

Package VI, supplies made their way across the DMZ in t

during 1966–1968, many supplies were delivered into 

Vietnam on bicycles and by porters with “A” frames. The les

nerable means of transporting supplies required intensive 

naissance, even to locate the trails. It was yet more diffic

attack such movements at night.

Materiel moving through the system in southern Laos p

different problem. The Hanoi delta and the LOCs along the c

the DMZ were in open terrain. We could more readily detect 

ment and use air attacks to halt the flow in such areas. Ho

the roads in Laos were concealed in many places by triple c

trees,* which, along with clever camouflage, helped hide 

movements. When attacked, trucks moved off the road into th

rounding jungle. Because of the jungle cover, successful in

tion in Laos was extremely difficult. Hence, failure to stop th

ply flow at the head of the system (in North Vietnam) made i

difficult to pinch off supplies for the enemy’s army in South 

nam. Unlike other parts of the transportation system, the 

Vietnamese section used no major road systems. From 1

1972 most of the materiel was moved by porters and some l

number of vehicles. (However, in the 1972 Easter offensiv

196

*The trees in this area grew to basically 3 heights. 50’, 100’, and 150’, cr

separate canopies of foliage that barely permitted even sunlight to re

ground.
support forces in Military Regions (MR) I, II, and III.) By the ti

logistics had moved into base areas within South Vietnam, 

diction was not a productive effort.

Because of the relationship of the parts of the LOCs, the 

to put pressure on the system was in the heart of North Vie

Blockading or bombing the ports was essential for a d

campaign. Without eliminating the ports where the bulk 

entered, reducing the flow to South Vietnam was again 

more difficult.

Even without eliminating the ports, the interdiction cam

was able to limit the number of forces the North Vietnamese 

support in the south. Not until the interdiction campaign 

with the termination of U.S. involvement could the North 

namese logistically support and deploy their full strength o

20 divisions. Before the 1975 offensive, they never deployed 

than 11 or 12 divisions, apparently for fear of the destructio

would suffer by exposure to our airpower. A similar thing hap

in the Korean War when the Chinese Communist Army was 

mated with more than 1,000,000 reserve troops who could 

been thrust into the battle to break the stalemate. The destr

toll of the 5th Air Force interdiction campaign probably led 

decision by Chinese leaders that UNC airpower would m

unfeasible to sustain such a deployment without air supe

There was no evidence that the Chinese lacked Russian supp

deployment of larger ground forces. Nor was there any ev

that the North Vietnamese lacked Russian support if the

elected to deploy another 100,000 troops.

VARIABLES INFLUENCING THE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN

As much as terrain or political restraints, weather was 

factor in planning and executing the air campaign. The 

altered logistics movement according to the weather. From 

until September, during the southwest monsoon season, 

rain showers and thunderstorms reduced visibility as they 

southern Florida in the summer. Though never halting air 

ations during these times, the weather did require some a

ments. The heavy rains also flooded the roads to Laos, th

curtailing the enemy’s use of these roads to move supplies 

northern two military regions.

Rather unexpectedly, the best weather for air operations in 

Vietnam occurred during this southwest monsoon. On rel
low visibility during the early morning and late afternoon. Sin

roads were dry as far south as the DMZ, the enemy moved m

his traffic during these times, thus offering us lucrative targe

southwest monsoons did offer some problems for the rendezv

tankers and fighters because it was necessary to maneuver a

thunderstorms. Such maneuvers were critical at those times 

strike forces were coming back from a fight and were short o

there was little time to delay an air refueling. Likewise, recov

home base could be a problem if a thunderstorm were p

through when a strike package of 40 or more aircraft were e

get on the ground, or worse, were having to land as quickly a

sible because of low fuel or battle damage.

Perhaps the most direct effects of the weather on the reco

the force were the pools of water on the runway. They resu

aircraft planing* with all the accompanying problems of dire

control. In some cases, it was necessary for the pilot to mak

amounted to a carrier landing by engaging a cable acro

approach end of the runway. When this happened, the entire 

of recovery and staging for subsequent operations slowed do

The northeast monsoon, on the other hand, caused the 

problems for air operations over North Vietnam. When this w

moved in, flight conditions for a visual attack on the upper 

areas were very restrictive. Thus, when the weather was 

North Vietnam, from September to May, it was good over 

Vietnam and Laos. The weather would have been less a pr

had it not been for restraints imposed upon our forces for p

visual identification of targets. However, even when these res

were eased, pressure to hold down collateral damage to c

areas on the fringes of a target demanded that fighters have 

itive visual identification of the target before attacking. 

restraints made the task much more difficult for our pilots.

Westmoreland recounts in his book A Soldier Reports, “

case of Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, a staunch sup

of the war, what he saw changed his views. Visiting an aircra

rier, he was shocked by the extreme precautions impos

attacking aircraft crews in an effort to avoid civilian casu

198

*Planing: On a wet runway the water can create a separation between 

craft’s tires and the runway. When this happens, the aircraft “planes” 

water much like a motor boat “gets up on the plane.” Directional control b

extremely difficult.
circuitous routes that exposed them much longer than nec

to enemy anti-aircraft fire. While sympathizing with the objec

avoiding civilian losses, Senator Symington resented the add

danger that the policy imposed on American airmen.”16 This 

however, did not apply for radar bombing attacks. In those 

the radar return from the target and the capability of the air

radar were the determining factors in executing the mission

During the northeast monsoon, we could expect that we 

have only about four to six days when visual attacks co

made in the greater Hanoi area. During 1965–1968, we so

10,000 foot ceiling and no more than 5/10 to 6/10 cloud 

age so that our pilots had both sufficient visibility to see 

launch and adequate ceiling for maneuvering to avoid the 

We were able to operate in adverse weather because of LO

and radar. When LORAN was introduced in March 19

became feasible to strike into most areas of North Vi

regardless of the weather. However, range limitations deter

by the sitting of LORAN stations restricted full coverage of 

target areas, particularly those in Route Package VI A. 

BACKER I operations, therefore, had some of the sam

weather restraints as ROLLING THUNDER, especially for 

operations. For the B-52s in LINEBACKER II, the “11-day 

sive,” weather was not a major consideration since that ope

was scheduled against targets, which provided sufficient 

return. There was no difficulty in identifying and bombing 

radar-significant targets under all weather conditions.

While the B-52s attacked radar targets during LINEBA

II, the tactical forces hit pinpoint targets like the Canal Des 

des bridge, the Paul Doumer bridge, and the smaller ra

yards and spurs in the buffer zone around Hanoi. These t

were most difficult to strike under weather conditions beca

the threat of unwanted damage to adjacent areas and, 

quently, were never scheduled for attack under poor w

conditions. Nevertheless, though the tactical forces struc

during good weather, they were able to keep such target

tralized during ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER.

*LORAN––A long range radio navigation system for fixing a position by u

time difference when receiving pulse transmissions from two or more fi

tions.
The most profound difference between the interdiction cam

of 1965–1968 and that of 1972 was our use of B-52s at nig

during marginal weather conditions in 1972. This mass conc

tion of airpower around-the-clock made a major difference 

psychological impact of the bombing. Earlier in 1965–1968, 

were withheld from bombing in the Hanoi delta; a void tactic

power alone could not fill. The F-4s and F-105s were able to 

major movements in the rail and supporting logistical system 

day attacks and some limited night attacks. But when the 

east monsoons began, tactical aircraft could operate only f

five days a month against the high value targets such as the 

Railcar Repair Shop. Therefore, during such weather, the 

pressure on the logistical system came at the periphery of th

value targets since ground control radar, LORAN, and to 

extent, aircraft radar could be used against these targets.

By filling the gap that was apparent in the 1965–1968 

paigns, the B-52s allowed the full force of the air campaign 

driven home to the North Vietnamese day and night. Th

1972 campaign had all the elements of airpower that had 

present in World War II and Korea. Around-the-clock bo

gave the North Vietnamese little opportunity to repair dam

the logistical system, thereby limiting their ability to me

needs of their forces in South Vietnam. We knew from the 

ing campaign in World War II that highly organized labor 

could return a damaged target to partial productivity in a 

tively short time if that target were not struck repeatedly.17 

in the Vietnam campaign, we scheduled the targets for re

about the time repairs had been completed. With B-52s st

during bad weather and at night, we kept most elements 

important targets neutralized during the 1972 campaign. 

EARLY DEVELOPMENT 

In 1967, a radar bomb facility was established at Site 

Laos. The equipment, the AN-MSQ-77 Radar Bomb Directin

tral (MSQ), was like that in South Vietnam used for directi

craft to preselected targets in bad weather. Site 85, deep in 

200

*Locations of airstrips, navigational facilities, and other military bases 

were identified by number.
foot mountain top 160 miles west of Hanoi; its equipment ha

moved in by helicopter. A detachment of skilled Air Force per

manned the radar, which provided guidance to targets wit

miles of Hanoi. Strike aircraft were equipped with beac

enhance the radar’s tracking ability. 

World War II had provided the initial development for th

of radar bombing. SCR-584 gun-laying radar was modifi

bombing during the Italian campaign. This basic techniq

bombing in bad weather and at night became standard 

dure during the European campaign of World War II an

Korean War. It was used as well in South Vietnam, Lao

Cambodia. This same system was also used durin

1965–1968 campaigns in the area below the 18th parallel 

Package I). Most of the targets in this area, however, we

suitable for the kind of blind area bombing the s

demanded. Vehicles, artillery, and watercraft were the mo

quent kind of targets; they required visual attacks to d

them. In Route Package VI, though, the marshalling yards

tary barracks, Thai Nguyen steel mill, depots, and transshi

points were suitable targets for MSQ bombing. With a C

approximately 500 feet for the bombing aircraft, these larg

targets were good candidates for attack during bad weathe

MSQ at Site 85, which directed those attacks, was u

because of certain political problems. Ambassador Willi

Sullivan was reluctant to permit the site in Laos to provid

trol of aircraft over North Vietnam. His position was that to 

air strikes over North Vietnam from Laos would appear an 

lation of the war, in that Laos could be viewed as a base o

ations for attacks against North Vietnam. A unique tech

was devised to satisfy this political objection; a C-135 rel

craft, positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin near the 19th pa

would relay instructions from the MSQ site in Laos to the 

aircraft. The short time delay in the relay operation was a

modated in timing the instructions to release the bombs.

But MSQ bombing had other problems. Strike aircraf

extremely vulnerable to SAMs during this type of attack. Th

60 miles into the target had to be a steady bomb run with 

and altitude held very precisely. Variations in heading, spe

altitude would produce gross errors in bombing. With such 

bilized run, the force was easily brought under intense barra

from SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery. However, to keep the pr

on the enemy during bad weather, the Air Force tried this tech
were unsatisfactory because the MSQ was unreliable at its 

limits. Because of these limitations of the MSQ, further attem

bomb by MSQ in the high threat area were cancelled. Ho

MSQ bombing continued throughout the war as the main m

of all weather bombing in Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, a

lower route packages of North Vietnam. 

Many attempts were made during the 1965–1968 cam

to adapt some of the techniques of World War II and Korea 

weather problem. Because of the pinpoint targets su

bridges, airfields, power plants, or repair facilities, most of 

measures were not satisfactory. The pressure to hold down 

age to civilian targets prevented missions that would hav

run in World War II and Korea. These restrictions made it 

tial to limit the probability that bombs would impact outsi

prime target area. Although North Vietnamese propaganda 

mered the theme that U.S. bombing was directed at civilia

gets, never in the course of the war was a target selected f

reason other than its military significance. Inevitably, in c

some bombs are dropped out of the target area. These 

however, result from improper release, jettisoning beca

enemy fighters, malfunctioning bomb racks, or, in some 

from releasing ordnance when the aircraft is in an imprope

tude, thereby causing gross errors. Many of the North 

namese claims of civilian damage came about because the

anti-aircraft rounds and SAMs missed their mark and imp

the ground. As far as we know, the North Vietnamese h

restriction on where SAMs or AAA could fire. They were si

the best defense of a target; irrespective of the effect 

weapons would have on their own civilians, despite the fac

a SAM that didn’t detonate in the air was potentially a live 

when it hit the ground. Unfortunately, we were unable to 

ure the self-inflicted damage from such firings. 

Because of the MSQ deficiencies and the target restric

we tried alternative weapons and methods. The F-105, ori

designed for the nuclear low-level mission, was an ex

fighter-bomber for the day strikes over North Vietnam. Its 

however, had insufficient discrimination to make it suita

night and weather bombing missions. Nevertheless, during 

and 1967, some all-weather missions were run against Ye

a railroad marshalling yard on the northwest railroad. Ho

202
ficient to be effective.

Similar missions were tried with the F-4, which had 

designed for air-to-air fighting. It lacked the needed targe

nition for air-to-ground radar bombing. Furthermore, de

in the Hanoi delta demanded the same suppression for a 

raid as for a day raid. The fighter simply wasn’t accurate e

to sustain the campaign at night. 

In the Korean War, it had been feasible to use pathfinde

niques developed during World War II by Bomber Comma

those procedures, a highly select crew was scheduled into th

get area ahead of the main bombing force. The pathfinder l

the target and marked it with varied colored flares for the bo

force. In Korea, hunter-killer teams of B-26s were sim

employed against key parts of the LOCs. A lead B-26 would 

identify, and mark the target. Another B-26 or a flight of f

bombers would attack the target under the flares laid down 

B-26. This tactic, suitable for a lightly defended area, could 

a standard procedure for missions north of Pyongyang and 

the Yalu where flak was extremely heavy. For those mis

SHORAN* bombing was used with B-26s or, later, with B-29

In Vietnam, missions to bomb the northeast rail line in 196

1967 used the same hunter-killer concept. F-4s flew as 

hunters and killers against prime targets like the Kep Mars

Yard. A lead F-4 illuminated the target; then a flight of F-4s 

ing five 750-pound bombs each followed up with an a

Although these techniques had been refined in a test series a

AFB, the problem of running such missions against a SAM 

ronment hadn’t been thoroughly explored. Once the flare a

ejected its first flare, the enemy had a good prediction of the 

path over the target and was then able to put up a very hig

ume of fire. Because these missions were run at 6,000 to 7,00

aircraft were highly vulnerable. By mid-1967, recognizin

equipment limitations, we altered such missions to ones of h

ment rather than destruction. This change, however, was 

substitute for a more concentrated night effort. 

*SHORAN––A precise short-range electronic navigation system which u

time of travel of pulse transmissions from two or more fixed stations to m

slant range distance from the stations.
The next solution to the all-weather problem was the 

Because of the need to get an airplane into operation 

Hanoi area that could fly when the weather was bad an

deliver munitions with a low CEP, the F-111 was move

combat on a compressed schedule. When the F-111s deplo

Thailand in March 1968,19 we planned to use them again

gets within the 30-mile circle almost exclusively. Its ex

radar and high speed at low altitude made this weapon sys

prime candidate for these missions, the most demanding 

At the time the F-111 was introduced into the theater, 

been in tactical units only a limited time, and operational 

dures had not yet been tested in combat. Also, there we

usual equipment problems, which occur with all new a

entering the active inventory. Nevertheless, the F-111 low

bombing system (below 200 feet if needed) was a revolut

breakthrough in an all-weather delivery system.

To determine the operational performance of the system 

less stringent target conditions, the initial flights were flow

Route Package I. Although these targets were not as h

defended as those in the Hanoi area, the route to the 

required flight over rough terrain in Laos and gave the te

avoidance radar a good test. The flight path out of Takhl

first to Nakon Phanom and then to Mu Gia Pass and on to 

Hoi, the target, using terrain following at altitudes under 50

for the last leg. Climb to altitude was made over the G

Tonkin before returning to home base south of the DMZ

flight path had all the attributes of an attack into the Red 

delta except for the SAMs. The light to moderate anti-aircra

however, provided a basis for examining the tactics tha

finally adopted. 

In the course of the missions, three F-111s were lost, 

March and one in April.20 Technicians determined that the 

ity of the terrain and the high concentration of moisture 

the monsoon period caused false indications in the radar 

entation to the pilots. As a result of this very limited comb

(only 55 missions), the F-111 returned to the U.S. for f

work on the radar system. Some modified F-105s were 

brought in to determine their suitability for the task. 

These aircraft, THUNDERSTICK II, received a very l

evaluation. They required extensive radar modification and

modified, required a high level of maintenance skill to r

204
operational. The system had to be at peak performan

achieve the sought-after CEPs of less than 500 feet. The m

F-105s, nevertheless, showed promise against marshalling 

and did make a number of attacks against the northwes

road. However, they were never used against the northeas

road before the President decided to halt the bombing no

the 20th parallel on 31 March 1968. 

Smoke billows from secondary explosions caused by the bombing attack o

F-105s on the Kep Marshalling/Railroad Yard, 39 miles northeast of Hano

strike took place 20 April 1967.
1965–1968 campaign because of the administration’s co

that the North Vietnamese would view employment of this 

gic weapon as an escalation in the conflict. An additional 

ment for not using the B-52 on these raids was the co

about the effect losing even a single aircraft would have 

image of our strategic deterrent. Airmen have long known 

penalty must be paid to penetrate any defense system, an

eral of us commanders felt that the loss of some B-52s to 

tively small defense system (as compared to that of the 

would not bring into question the ability of our strategic fo

perform its mission against the Soviet Union in the ev

nuclear war. Nevertheless, officials within the Departm

Defense and the State Department maintained that such 

could have a negative impact on the image of our strategic 

For these reasons, the B-52s were not to go into the Red 

delta until 15 April 1972. 

RAILROAD SYSTEM

The North Vietnamese railroad system consisted of nin

ments, the most important parts of which were north of th

parallel. Almost 80% of the major targets were in this area 

together by the rail system. The most important contribu

the system was to move the main fighting weapons from 

to redistribution points at Kep, Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Din

Thanh Hoa. They were then further distributed by truc

watercraft to the intransit base areas whence porters carri

weapons, food, and ammunition on the final leg into comb

The northeast rail line, termed RR #2, ran from the sou

border of China to Hanoi. Because it was the most importan

ment of the system, the North Vietnamese exerted the most 

to keep it open. Eighty-two nautical miles long with a capa

about 27,000 short tons daily, this line was near almost 

major targets in North Vietnam. If the interdiction were to su

it had to embrace systematic attacks on this line from the C

border to the heart of downtown Hanoi. Besides the repair 

the North Vietnamese demonstrated the importance of this se

of the system by concentrating SAMs and AAA along the f

miles of the line and then gradually thinning them out near

buffer zone. The 25-mile buffer zone was a self-imposed rest

to minimize possible U.S. violation of Chinese territory. The 

Vietnamese took advantage of this sanctuary to stage and m

206
trains during the day for night runs into Hanoi. They realize

we would strike in the buffer zone only for a particular targ

didn’t permit armed reconnaissance in the buffer zone exc

specific limited periods.
Paul Doumer bridges. For supplies to move through the 

ern part of the system, they had to pass over these bridges. 

destroying the bridges and keeping them from repair was 

to slowing down the movement of war goods to troops in 

and South Vietnam. When pilots struck these targets

expected and received the maximum firepower the enemy 

put up. The bridges were defended with the highest SAM 

AAA concentration of any targets in the war. While most 

defense was trusted to SAMs and AAA, the MIGs loitered 

periphery of the SAM ring. These conditions held true 

both the 1965–1968 and 1972 campaigns.

Though the Canal Des Rapides bridge was released for att

April 1967, the Paul Doumer bridge was not released until A

1967.* Thus, for the first two years of the bombing campaign

key bottlenecks were not brought under attack. As a result

mid-summer 1967 the logistics flowed with relative freedom 

northeast rail line, even though most of the other smaller b

had been struck. Because these small bridges could be repa

relatively short time, we gained no significant reduction in lo

capability, with North Vietnamese repair teams working arou

clock. But with the Canal des Rapides and Paul Doumer b

the Vietnamese faced a different problem. The Paul Doumer b

for example, was 5,532 feet long and 38 feet wide. When 

bridges were dropped, to work around them with a by-pass 

major effort. Even though the North Vietnamese tried the 

ruses the Koreans had earlier, photographic evidence showed 

was happening. They commonly attempted to give the appe

that a bridge was not being repaired; however, during the n

floating span would be moved to fill the place of the downed 

Traffic could then flow over the bridge throughout the nigh

the span was floated to an adjoining bank some yards up or 

stream before sunup. The photo interpreter faced a significan

lenge to locate these well-hidden and camouflaged spans. On

confirmed this technique, though, our aircraft attacked the f

spans and the heavy cranes used to move them.

Another segment of the rail system from Kep to Thai N

was important for the movement of finished steel from th

Nguyen steel mill into the main transportation system. Wh

208

*See USAF SEA Monograph Series, Vol. I, for complete story of the Paul 

and Thanh Hoa bridges.
mill was struck on 17 January 1967, however, this rail lin

less significance to the North Vietnamese war effort.

The Kep-Thai Nguyen line remained blocked during bo

1965–1968 and 1972 campaigns from repeated attacks a

marshalling yards at various points. These yards were the l

the Vietnamese had except for the Yen Vien and Hanoi cl

cation yards. Immediately after each attack, the North 

namese always made a major effort, particularly at Kep, to 

through-line open. This work was little different from th

man and Chinese attempts to restore traffic on main arte
Europe and Korea. The fact that the line was blocked on

didn’t mean we could write it off for even a week.

Because of the frequency of repair, reconnaissance mission

reattacks were all-important considerations. Reconnaissanc

essential to establish the condition of the target, for it wasn

dent to run a strike into a high threat area, even when clea

the JCS, until we knew the strike would have a worthwhile 

Another rail line segment, the Haiphong-Hanoi line, w

quently attacked along its forty miles. Task Force 77 was re

sible to keep this line interdicted, especially at Hai Duon

key choke point on this line. Since most of the bulk pro

such as food, clothing, fuel, and essential civilian comm

entered through Haiphong, interdiction of this line put str

the distribution system centered in Hanoi.

The longest segment of the overall rail system ran from Ha

Vinh; from Vinh to the DMZ the line was unusable. From Ha

Vinh the line was 165 miles long, parallel to the coast, and in 

terrain most of the way. It was, therefore, vulnerable to att

210

Reconnaissance photo shows five of the original spans of the Paul Doume

destroyed. Over 1,900 feet of the eastern portion of the bridge were destro

crews from the 355th and 388th TFWs. The lower photo shows partial rebu

the western portion of the bridge, which was damaged by attacks in Octo

the same year (1967).
air and from naval gunfire. Generally, we kept the line inter

so extensively below Thanh Hoa that the enemy resorted to a 

tle operation between the cuts. Trucks bridged the ga

destroyed track, and, as everywhere except during the bo
tains were about 25 miles from the rail line, moving suppli

the excellent cover along the karsts was a relatively safe ope

The North Vietnamese unloaded supplies and armamen

the cities along the entire railroad and road network. Sinc

of these cities, particularly those in the northern area, wer

hibited from attack (even though we had reconnaissance 

graphs showing large concentrations of supplies and vehi

these cities, towns, and villages), we had to destroy the su

before they could be stored and dispersed in these sanctu

All residential areas of Hanoi and Haiphong were filled wit

plies stacked on each side of the street. Photos showed ve

lined up bumper to bumper. My feeling was that since 

material could be deployed by the enemy to inflict casualt

our forces, it should constitute a legitimate target. Such t

in World War II and Korea would have been cleared for 

without having to query higher headquarters. In Korea rest

were placed on attacks against Pyongyang on separate 

sions, but these restraints did not apply to targets of m

value within Pyongyang proper.

The concern for civilian casualties in bombing raids a

many legitimate military targets to go free. By stockpiling su

in the sanctuaries of towns and cities, the North Vietnames

pensated for the time lost in bypassing a downed bridge or 

porarily blocked marshalling yard. Furthermore, the enemy 

tled supplies at night from one sanctuary to another, a stra

that made interdiction more difficult because of the lower eff

ness of night attacks.

ROAD NETWORK—KEY ELEMENTS

Part of the interdiction campaign was to attack key road 

tions to cause bottlenecks in the truck flow. The blocking o

point on Route #1 or Route #15 leading into Mu Gia Pa

example, was to force the trucks into the open so that a se

strikes could take a large toll of the trucks and supplie

intent of the interdiction campaigns from 1965–1972 was 

“strangle” the flow of traffic. This misconception led so

believe that the interdiction campaign was not succ

because the flow of traffic wasn’t stopped. Traffic wasn’t st

in the European or Korean campaigns, either, but it was re

to such an extent that the enemy couldn’t get enough su

for sustained operations. This, too, was the objective for th

212
paign in Vietnam; by slowing the traffic with a series of 

lated choke points in the rail and road system, we could d

trucks and supplies piled up by the blockage.

By striking the most vulnerable part of the logistical sys

Route Package VI, we could begin the attrition of supplie

relatively high rate. As remaining supplies moved throug

southern route package and into Laos, further attrition 

movement very costly. The North Vietnamese couldn

enough supplies into the system to get enough supplies to 

a war of much greater sophistication and size than they 

the Tet offensive of 1968.

The existing road network had been developed by the F

over a number of years. The North Vietnamese continued to e

USAF F-105s make direct hits on blast furnaces and boiler plant facilities 

an attack on the Thai Nguyen Steel Mill on 18 April 1967.
this net to accommodate traffic moving materiel to South Vie

Estimates put the system at 5,800 miles of motorable ro

1964, about 1,070 of which were all weather. This figure incr

however, throughout the war until by the 1972 cease-fire, al

roads were in the all-weather category.

Roads, per se, have never been a good target because th

be repaired in a short time, or alternate routes can be deve

These conditions were particularly true in North Vietnam and 

for roads were continually repaired and even improved. W

immense labor force available 24 hours a day, most of the 

roads were reopened within a day and in some cases, only 

ter of hours after attack. In many places alternate routes c

routed a blockage so effectively that the blockage delayed tra

only a short time. Nevertheless, the enemy continued to u

same basic road structure throughout the war.

Interdiction had an added benefit: It reduced the av

enemy manpower. The labor force devoted to the maintena

both rail and road systems included an estimated 50

214

*Other estimates put this figure around 300,000.
Two photographs of the Ban Laboy interdiction point in the Ban Karai Pas

up is of the bend in the river at the center-left of the overall shot (arro
country’s air defense system.21 These were troops who 

have been in combat units if not diverted to this task. Th

nificance of diverting troops for air defense was re

expressed by Albert Speer, the former Reichminister of 

ments and War Production in Hitler’s Germany. In his boo

Secret Diaries, he says,

The real importance of the air war consisted in the fact tha

opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe. Th

front was the skies over Germany. The fleets of bombers mi

appear at any time over any large German city or important f

tory. The unpredictability of the attacks made this front giga

tic; every square meter of the territory we controlled was a k

of front line. Defense against air attacks required the produ

tion of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling 

tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country a

holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who 

addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally in

tive, for months at a time.

As far as I can judge from the accounts I have read, no one h

yet seen that this was the greatest lost battle on the Germ

side. The losses from the retreats in Russia or from the surr

der of Stalingrad were considerably less. Moreover, the nea

20,000 anti-aircraft guns stationed in the homeland cou

almost have doubled the anti-tank defenses on the Easte

front.22

The number of civilians and troops maintaining LOCs in 

rose from 15,000 to 20,000 in 1966 to more than 35,000 

time of the bombing halt above the 20th parallel in 1968. D

one of his visits to Vietnam, President Johnson recogniz

effect of the interdiction campaign in reducing the enemy’s 

bat capability:

Through the use of Airpower, a mere handful of you men—

military forces are really reckoned—are pinning down seve

hundred thousand—more than half a million-North Vietna

ese. You are increasing the cost of infiltration. You are impos

a very high rate of attrition when the enemy is engaged, and y

are giving him no rest when he withdraws.23

During the southwest monsoon (May-October), most 

traffic moved down Route I to Vinh. From Vinh, supplies de

for northern Laos (BARREL ROLL) were routed over Rou

and through Barthelemy Pass. The logistics moving ove

216
road supported the Pathet Lao as well as more than a divis

North Vietnamese troops fighting in and around the Pl

Jars. However, this route was not heavily used during the 

season, since a large portion of the North Vietnamese 

withdrew into North Vietnam. With the dry season (Oc

May), however, this route became the prime one for supplyi

troops. Towards the end of 1971, requirements in the 
increased, and the North Vietnamese kept their troops in L

combat even during the rainy season. At that time, Rou

became a prime target during the rainy season as well.

Vinh was the hub of the road and supply system supp

troops in Laos and South Vietnam. Route #15 was the 

supply route leading from Vinh into Mu Gia Pass, at the h

which were a number of natural caves where supplies co

218
stockpiled safe from air attack. This route was an all-w

road, and, as the war progressed, was used heavily durin

the dry and rainy season.

South from Vinh, the main supply route was #lA durin

seasons. During the southwest monsoon when the Laotian 

were under water, the flow of traffic was very heavy o

coastal route. In addition, coastal shipping discharged su

at Ron and Quang Khe where they were loaded on trucks f

ther movement into South Vietnam,

Until the spring of 1968, most of the traffic going into 

during the southwest monsoon moved over Route #137, th

the Ban Karai Pass and then into the Laotian network. D

the continued bombing by 7th Air Force for almost a year, 

road into Laos south of Dong Hoi was constructed. This tor

route through the mountains, designated #1036, joined w

Laotian roads at Tchepone. Thus, during the southwest 

soons this new route avoided much of the Laotian road ne

that was subject to flooding. Although the major roads wer

ously of primary importance, during the 1965–1968 cam

some supplies filtered through the DMZ on a series of 

roads such as #103.

Truck convoy moving Route #137 In the Ban Karai Pass.
supplies moved over secure routes all the way from Hanoi 

DMZ. This security was possible only because of the bo

halt of 31 October 1968. It provided the North Vietnames

relatively secure lines of communication for an offensive bu

The heavy traffic on these secure routes resulted in a se

limited strikes, termed “protective reaction,”* designed to 

continued buildup for a future large-scale offensive. 

strikes, however, were of such limited strength and duratio

they had only a very temporary effect. Thus, by 1972 the 

Vietnamese had so improved the road network that it coul

port the main offensive—the invasion of South Vietna

40,000 troops on 30 March 1972. Unfortunately, at the t

the invasion we could not limit the amount of supplies f

into Haiphong and then down the railroad to Vinh.

Before President Johnson’s partial bombing halt, 31 

1968,24 most of the support for troops in South Vietnam 

the northeast monsoon was routed through the Laotian pa

dle. It came through the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban R

passes, which fed the major north south artery in Laos. T

called Ho Chi Minh Trail was not simply a trail but a well-

oped series of roads that supported major base camps in M

Regions I and II, and joined with river and other road n

Cambodia to support Military Regions III and IV. The tra

consisted of a number of paths with well-conceived rest 

along the way for porters and infiltration groups.

The main road through Laos changed designations in re

to the three passes. It was designated Route #23 in the 

#911 in the center, and #92–96 in the south. Three other 

roads connected to this route. The junction of each of 

roads was a key interdiction point. One of our more effectiv

tics was to put in heavy strikes at day’s last light using d

action bombs, and to follow up with attacks througho

night. During the interdiction campaign these and other 

tactics remained essentially the same with slight modifica

take advantage of new equipment or weapons.

220

*“Protective reaction strikes” were originally authorized to counter the inc

SAM and MIG attacks against air reconnaissance flights over North V

These strikes, however, were expanded to include attacks on the buildup 

plies above the DMZ.
On 3 April 1965, Laos was divided into a series of zones 

of Mu Gia Pass to clarify primary interdiction responsibilit

U.S. embassy in Vientiane was the civilian agency to est

policies for the conduct of air operations in Laos, while 7

Force was the air headquarters to conduct and provide m

the aircraft for missions in the area. The embassy, howeve

certain air assets that it controlled for the direct support o

Pao’s operations; many of these resources such as helic

and forward air controllers came from 7th Air Force. Ho

when 7th Air Force conducted operations in BARREL RO

example, it did so at the request of the air attaché acting 

Ambassador.

Not until the latter part of 1971, when the ground sit

around the Plain of Jars had deteriorated so badly, were 

quantities of strikes devoted to interdiction on other th

individual request basis. Until that time, most of the suppo

Air Force provided was to defend an outpost, suppress 

escort a helicopter assault, destroy supply caches, neu

artillery positions, or fly armed reconnaissance of selected 

The area south of Mu Gia Pass to Route #9 or the 17th 

lel was designated STEEL TIGER. Although 7th Air Forc

responsibility for determining the targets along the LOCs 

zone, the embassy in Vientiane established the rules of en

ment for any targets more than 200 yards off the road. Thi

responsibility caused many problems, because when 

parks, for example, were discovered some distance fro

road, the target couldn’t be struck unless the U.S. emba

Vientiane approved. All strikes within Laos, as in South Vie

were under the control of a Forward Air Controller (FAC

control system accelerated target approval, especially w

Laotian representative was on the ABCCC controlling the 

The Laotian could validate a target for attack immediately 

had been discovered by a FAC.

The area from the 17th parallel or Tchepone south to the 

bodian border was designated TIGER HOUND. The Comm

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV

sidered this area an extension of the battlefield in South Vi

and requested that it come under his jurisdiction. CIN

approved this arrangement, accepting COMUSMACV’s arg

that the area was of more immediate interest to the war in 

Vietnam than was the air campaign to the north being direc
CINCPAC.25 Actually, the entire interdiction campaign w

immediate interest to COMUSMACV for the simple reason th

222
effectiveness of the air attacks against the enemy’s logistical s

largely determined the quality and size of enemy forces facin
Inescapably, TIGER HOUND, STEEL TIGER, and BARREL 

were as much a fundamental part of the interdiction campa

were ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER.

In December 1965, a TIGER HOUND task force from 7

Force was established to plan and control strikes again

southern routes into MR I and MR II. During the short life 

TIGER HOUND task force the trucks destroyed or damage

ing daylight movement totaled 1,430.26 By the beginning 

dry season (October 1966), however, 7th Air Force absorb

TIGER HOUND task force into its regular staff. At the sam

the quality of the enemy weapons defending the LOCs end

use of low speed FACs (0-1s), and most of the movement s

to Route Package I where the roads were dry because of the 

liar qualities of the monsoons. When the 1966 dry s

returned to Laos, TIGER HOUND and STEEL TIGER were t

as simply another element of the interdiction campaign an

as separate entities. Even though COMUSMACV retained 

tional command authority, the commander of 7th Air 

decided on employment of airpower in the area.

In mid-1966, COMUSMACV became concerned abou

increase in artillery rounds and rockets fired against U.S. M

and ARVN forces in I Corps (eventually redesigned Military 

1). As with TIGER HOUND, he viewed the area above the D

an extension of the South Vietnam battlefield and wanted to 

air strikes there. Although the area was already receiving ab

much attention as the availability of forces would permit, CIN

agreed to assign Route Package I to the operational comm

COMUSMACV. In reality, only the southern half of the pa

about 30 miles, was of immediate concern to MACV.

A special task force concentrated on this 30-mile zone, 

HO, above the DMZ during the 1966–67 dry season in 

Vietnam. Because of heavy defenses, the tactics used in 

were not suitable for North Vietnam. For a short period 0

later 0-2 FACs could be used to locate targets, but as the 

increased his use of the LOCs (because of the flooded LO

Laos) he drove the FACs out of the area with AAA fire and

few isolated cases, SAM firings. TALLY HO ceased to exis

separate entity by the winter of 1967; strikes were hand

that area as in other parts of the interdiction campaign.

After the 1965–1966 dry seasons, the North Vietnamese, 

occasionally, stopped moving logistics along the LOCs in da

The ever-increasing effectiveness of our air strikes made 

224
fighters to patrol the roads in Laos was reminiscent of simila

ations in World War II and Korea. In the Korean War, the 

stopped moving in daylight because of the high kill rate a

trucks by our F-51s, F-80s, F-84s, and F-86s. Knowing the w

limited our kill rate, the North Vietnamese would watch the w

very closely; if flying weather were bad enough, a large con

trucks and other vehicles would venture forth during dayligh

of their favorite tactics was to try to run a large convoy throu

Gia or Ban Karai passes in daylight if they thought the w

would force 7th Air Force to bomb by MSQ. MSQ coverage 

pass areas was good, but for pinpoint destruction of a convoy

vidual attacks were the only way. On numerous occasions d

the weather, fighters caught such convoys in the ope

destroyed most of the vehicles.

SORTIE FREQUENCY

In Labs, about 200 sorties daily flew against the route 

ture, most of them during darkness. During the day we 

number of armed reconnaissance missions to locate truck 

and other targets suitable for attack, and to develop s

information about the conditions of the choke points. M

these missions were flown at night with some aircraft held 

alert to verify truck kills and to provide current informat

activities around the choke points.

The comparatively low level of anti-aircraft defenses an

absence of SAMs until 1967 along the major passes per

much greater freedom of action than in the upper route pa

of North Vietnam. Pilots could fly at lower altitudes with a ve

ited threat from the antiaircraft defenses, particularly 

1965–1967. As a result, the large support forces required to 

trate a target in North Vietnam were not needed for most oper

in Laos, although some support forces such as Wild Weasel

66s for ECM missions, F-4s for flak suppression, and a few F

fighter patrols were scheduled on all missions. The high l

defenses in North Vietnam dictated an entirely different met

operation; these defenses restrained night operations in Nort

nam as compared to the extensive night operations in Laos.

During the dry season in Laos, the scheduled day effor

was augmented by strike forces diverted out of Route Pack

because of adverse target weather there. Through dive

from their primary to secondary or tertiary target, add
strikes could be put into BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER, 

HOUND, and Route Package I. Since there was very little v

226
choke points and supply points. This situation was mos

trating for the pilots bombing these selected areas, but it w

only way we could keep hammering away at the logistical sy

The restraints of weather and policy in the northern area g

no choice.

COMMAND & CONTROL

All flights except armed reconnaissance were under th

trol of FACs. Because the FACs worked the network day 

day out, they became expert in detecting a change in the 

tion of a by-pass or in the enemy’s success in restoring an u

water ford, a damaged road, or bridge. The FAC was a co

source of intelligence, which was funneled into the ABCCC 

cially configured C-130s that commanded all aircraft ope

against the lines of communication in Laos). Becaus

ABCCC was acting for the 7th Air Force commander, 

authorized to decide what targets would be struck.

The strike forces under the ABCCC throughout the w

lowed the same basic procedures whether they came from 

land, South Vietnam, or Task Force 77. Aircraft taking of

their home base would report to the appropriate CRC or 

these radar facilities would vector the strike aircraft in

vicinity of the FAC with whom the pilot would work the m

Upon entering the area, the strike pilot would call the ABCC

C-130 “Hercules” Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC)
central and southern Laos called HILLSBORO).* Since th

borne command post had no radar, it depended upon the 

to report his position. HILLSBORO would then assign the 

aircraft to a FAC who was working a given sector of the roa

work. The FAC would control the specific strike and repo

results to the ABCCC. Seventh Air Force always maintaine

tact with the ABCCC by direct communication or throug

tactical air control system.

If 7th Air Force intelligence developed a target of oppor

or if reconnaissance produced a “perishable” target, that 

mation was immediately passed to the ABCCC for exec

Sometimes, however, depending upon the other missio

progress, the ABCCC had insufficient forces for the target. 

7th Air Force maintained a running status of strike aircra

cated to the ABCCC, 7th Air Force might then divert add

aircraft directly to the ABCCC.

228

*HILLSBORO––Call sign of C-130 ABCCC in Southern Laos, which ope

the daytime.

Some of the operating stations inside the C-130 ABCCC.
rule Navy aircraft were used in the interdiction campaign i

only as a result of a divert* because of weather in North Vie

These aircraft would report to the CRC (Panama) at Da

which then vectored them to the area in Laos where they 

work. As they reached a designated point before entering 

they notified HILLSBORO who would assign a FAC to the 

leader. The same methods were applied to Marine aircra

forming the interdiction mission or to VNAF aircraft in Lao

remainder of the procedure was identical to that of an Air 

strike. However, the VNAF was so hard-pressed durin

1965–1968 period to meet close air support demands in 

Vietnam that they flew only in the southernmost part of 

HOUND, Route #110, for a short time. Daily planners d

include VNAF resources in planning interdiction missions

SOME TACTICAL INNOVATIONS

The 1968 halt to the bombing of North Vietnam did not c

our tactics in Laos; it actually resulted in a more intense e

more than four hundred sorties a day against the road and 

cal network. Even with stand-downs for Christmas and T

interdiction campaign in Laos continued. This campaign con

even during the periodic stand downs from attacks on Nort

nam when the various diplomatic overtures were being made 

negotiations started. This apparent anomaly was another pe

ity of the war, but it derived from the refusal by both the U.

North Vietnam to admit to engaging in active combat operat

Laos. The typical response to the question of whether the U.

carrying out air operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in La

that armed reconnaissance missions were being conducted 

request of the Laotian government. The North Vietnamese 

admitted that they had troops in Laos, although estimates 

time of Lam Son 719 in February 1971 put more than 3

troops maintaining the logistical routes and another 30,000 

ing General Vang Pao in the Plain of Jars and the Long Tien

NIGHT TACTICS

During the interdiction campaign approximately 90% 

trucks that we destroyed or damaged were hit at night when 

*divert: Controlling authority would divert airborne aircraft.
remarkable in view of the terrain. Even in the more open ter

Europe, the night mission was very difficult. There, the path

area bombing techniques of RAF Bomber Command against 

get such as Cologne, or the illumination of the Port of Biz

North Africa, were effective against a large, well defined and im

able target. Of course, striking a small moving target at n

mountains or jungle was a much different challenge.

The tactics used in the Vietnam War had their origins 

Korean War. When that war broke out, the Air Force react

a large project at Eglin AFB to develop new techniques for a

ing vehicles and trains at night. This project develope

hunter-killer team we used in the Korean War. Basicall

team consisted of two A-26s, one illuminating the target w

the other attacked. As long as the AAA was relatively ligh

technique was fairly effective, although the number of 

destroyed per pass was low. Because both hunter and kille

vulnerable, we had to choose carefully the areas where we 

use these teams. After the Korean War this tactic remain

basic technique for tactical forces except that fighters work

pairs alternated illuminating and attacking, the shift occ

when the first fighter had expended its ammunition.

With this technique we could use low speed aircraft in 1

1966, when the flak was relatively light on the road networ

most important innovation of this period was to install a st

scope in a C-123. The starlight scope, an adaptation 

infantrymen’s sniper scope for night vision, was mounted 

C-123’s belly; an operator stretched out on a mattress in 

uncomfortable position scanned the road through the sco

about 3,500 feet the C-123 cruised along at about 140 kno

keep the aircraft over the road was difficult since the road 

disappear from time to time as it passed under the jungle

to emerge in a different direction. Working with the C-123 

killer aircraft––the old B-26 of World War II and Korean 

these two aircraft worked very efficiently during this time. 

the enemy moved more AAA weapons into Laos, this low 

combination could no longer overcome the defenses. Thou

assigned this team to the more lightly defended target are

had to pull the B-26s out of the theater altogether.

As the AAA continued to increase in late 1966, the Air 

devised new techniques for the interdiction problem in Lao

ABCCC continued as the command element for strike

reconnaissance along the road network. The FACs, becaus

230
against increased enemy fire than the C-123. They were ai

hand-held starlight scopes the Air Force Systems Comman

developed. FACs operating in Laos with these instruments 

patrol assigned segments of the roads, and when they loc

target, they would report it to MOONBEAM.* MOONBEAM 

then alert a pair of F-4s or a B-57. As these strike a

approached the FAC’s position, the FAC would mark the 

and tail of the convoy with a ground-burning flare. With t

a reference, the FAC then would bring the strike aircraft in

target. Because visibility was bad a large part of the time

these missions demanded the highest degree of profession

and coordination. During a night attack, regardless of vis

the recovery was made on instruments, a very difficult man

because of the steep attitude of the aircraft pulling up. In 

the back seat pilot stayed on instruments throughout the 

and recovery, permitting the front seat pilot to concentr

attacking and destroying the target. Because of the weath

recovery procedures, pilots often compared flying conditi

Laos to flying in a milk bottle—they couldn’t tell up or down 

out reference to instruments.

By mid-1967, it became necessary to cover strike for

Laos with EB-66 ECM aircraft and Wild Weasel F-105s. Th

ture was changing dramatically from what it had been in 

1966. Then a pilot could fly a mission in Laos with a s

higher vulnerability than a mission in South Vietnam. But 

enemy moved more forces and more sophisticated weapon

South Vietnam, the threat in Laos increased markedly. Th

ancing of demands for support aircraft became a major fa

composing the forces that would strike in Laos, Route Pack

V, and VI A. Priority went to those forces going into Route 

age VI A because of the number of SAMs and AAA. At the 

time, we had to provide some ECM support to the other 

forces. Because we couldn’t get enough ECM pods to equ

the force, many of the fighters going into Laos depended 

the EB-66 and Wild Weasels to provide SAM warning and 

termeasures. Fortunately SAMs were not the threat in mid

that they were during the 1972 Easter offensive.

*MOONBEAM––Call sign of C-130 ABCCC in southern Laos operated at 
The Mark 35 incendiary bomb carried by the B-57 w

best truck killer in 1966 and early 1967, when the B-57 re

the B-26. This was a surprise, since the tacticians had th

a combination of general-purpose bombs with a high angle 

ing attack using incendiary ammunition would produce th

results. The incendiary bombs, however, set the cargo as w

the trucks on fire. Before pipelines were laid through Laos, 

nificant part of the essential fuel was carried by truck to 

bution points, and in some cases even floated in 50 gallon 

to various pickup points along the rivers. Fuel trucks 

therefore, a very productive target during this period. Ho

as time passed the North Vietnamese supply system b

more sophisticated. As more enemy forces deployed to 

Vietnam, after the pull-out of U.S. troops, most of the fue

by pipeline from Haiphong to a point near Tchepone; it wa

moved by truck to MR II, by water or truck into Cambodi

then trucked the final miles into MR III and MR IV.

We became more and more adept at hitting the fuel sup

our experience and imagination increased. Sometimes, pa

larly at night when the F-4s were the primary strike ai

either a FAC or another pilot would locate the target an

ABCCC would call in a special C-130 (LAMPLIGHTER) to 

nate the target with flares. As more sophisticated techn

were developed, the combination of LAMPLIGHTER with 

designator aircraft became a routine procedure.

232

USAF B-57 “Canberra” attacking enemy supply lines.
Techniques for interdicting the flow of enemy materi

supplies in Vietnam changed somewhat from those of Wor

II and Korea. The introduction of new and different weapon

mitted these changed tactics. The fundamental objective

ever, of the interdiction campaign remained essentially the 

throughout all three wars. Restraints imposed on attacks a

the heartland of North Vietnam and the long delay in seal

the ports undercut the full effectiveness of the interdiction 

paign during this time. Even though the campaign limit

number of troops the North Vietnamese could support in 

Vietnam, and therefore restricted the size of the war, the 

the North Vietnamese to continue the war was not broke

until the 1972 campaign were we given the targets that ch

the enemy’s will to fight.

The beginning of 1968 saw the introduction of a new fam

precision weapons. But just when these weapons could s

cantly increase the ratio of targets destroyed per w

expended, the President halted the bombing of North Vie

As a result of this decision, the interdiction campaign unde

significant changes in targets and tactics. The following c

discusses the changing campaign and the events leading 

the final offensive in December 1972.
CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict

Historical Study No. 71, 25 June–1 November 1950; USAF His

Study No. 72, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952; USAF Historica

No. 127, 1 July 1952–27 July 1953; 3 studies (Washington

Department of the Air Force, 1952–1956), No. 127, p. 192.

2. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Fo

World War II, vol. III: Argument to V-E Day (Chicago The Unive

Chicago Press, 1949), p. 179. See also The United States St

Bombing Survey, Overall Report (European War) Washington

1945), p. 41.

3. E. J. Kingston McCloughry, The Direction of War (New York

erick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 85.

4. Ibid., p. 86.

5. The Lord Tedder, Airpower in War, the Lees Knowles Lectu

1947 (London: Hodder and Stroughton, n.d.), p. 113.

6. Korean Conflict, No. 71, p. 140.

7. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 195

(New York: Deull, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 224.

8. Korean Conflict, No. 72, p. 115.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. Korean Conflict, No. 127, p. 9

11. Ibid., p. 37.

12. Ibid., p. 10,

13. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 2, par

8, the President’s remarks upon receiving the National Freedom 

from Freedom House, 23 February 1966 (Washington, D.C.: G

ment Printing Office, 28 February 1966), p. 253.

14. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 1965–31 Mar 1968, book l (M

AFB, AL: Department of the Air Force, 1971), p. 17.

15. Korean Conflict, No. 72, p. 139.

16. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 220.

17. Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report (European W

108.

18. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country Operations, bo

137.

19. The Air Force in Southeast Asia; Toward a Bombing Halt 

of Air Force History, Sep 1970), p. 58.

234
_Southeast Asia, 1 April 1968–31 December 1969 (Maxwell AF

Department of the Air Force, 1972), p. 3–15.

21. Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York

McKay Company, 1969), p. 101.

22. Albert Speer, Spandau, The Secret Diaries (New York: Ma

and Company, 1976), pp. 339–340.

23. Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, p. 301.

24. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 301.

25. CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activities in Southeas

1954–1964, vol. 2, book 1, p. 4–78.

26. Illustrated History of the United States Air Force in Sou

Asia (Department of the Air Force, Office of Air Force Histor

1974), p. 57, (draft).
Chapter VI

INTERDICTION

(VIETNAM 1968–1972)

Each succeeding interdiction campaign from 1968 on was 

COMMANDO HUNT. They followed the pattern of earlier 

though more forces were available in 1968 and 1969 because 

bombing halt. But in 1970 and 1971, forces started to phase 

as U.S. ground forces withdrew. There was a temporary su

forces from the United States in 1972 to counter the buildu

subsequent offensive of North Vietnamese forces into South 

nam when an estimated 200,000 enemy troops attempted t

over large parts of South Vietnam.1

LASER & AC-130s—NEW SYSTEMS

Among the new developments in our interdiction efforts 

this time was the AC–130 gunship, which made its debut i

nam in 1967. At first, I was quite skeptical about the adv

capability of the aircraft to kill trucks. Not long after these a

were in combat, however, the results more than confirm

advertised potential. The initial AC-130 gunship, equipped wi

7.62mm and four 20mm guns, were used in the lower p

TIGER HOUND where the flak was light. Later models 

equipped with 40mm guns, and one version (Pave Aegis) ca

105mm gun. The on-board sensors made the aircraft a 

weapon, for it was equipped with low light television (LLTV), 

red (IR), and radar. Later models also had a laser design

device to pinpoint a target and direct a bomb to it.

With these capabilities, the AC-130 became the best 

killing weapon in the war. The variety of sensors allow

operator to select the best presentation and direct his fire b

picture. Normally radar was used first because of its 

acquisition range; then, as the target came into closer rang

LLTV or IR was employed. By COMMANDO HUNT V, 

started in October 1970, the truck kill rate per sortie wa

for the AC-130 as compared to 2.30 for the B-57G.2
This increase reflects the fact that tactics changed consid

in the 1968–1972 period. Although laser weapons had been 

duced before the 1968 bombing halt, they were not emplo

238

Side view of AC-130 parked at Ubon AB, Thailand.

Miniguns and 20mm Vulcan cannons protrude from the side of an AC-130 g

This weapon system became the king of the truck killers along the Ho Ch

Trail.
May 1972. However, in 1968 we began to use laser bombs a

truck traffic on the routes in Laos. The system worked thi

The AC-130 acquired the target with its sensor and then desi

the target with its laser; two F-4s in a predetermined positio

respect to the AC-130 would toss a laser bomb into the laser 

or “basket.” This technique was very difficult in that coordi

between the AC-130 and the F-4 to identify the target wa

exacting. The AC-130 had to describe the target to the figh

order that the bomb, when tossed, would follow the proper p

intersect the laser beam. To bring off a successful mission 

these techniques required extensive conversation between th

and the AC-130.

Although the AC-130 was a tremendous boost to the 

killing effort, it still wasn’t enough. Later on, some F-4s 

equipped to designate targets with laser beams and to l

laser bombs from the same aircraft. These F-4s could also 

nate for other fighters carrying laser bombs. With these adv

techniques, F-4s became much more successful in the de

tion of trucks. The experience gained in Laos with delivery 

niques and use of laser bombs stood the strike forces in 

stead when operations resumed in the Hanoi delta. The C

these weapons with laser designation truly brought a 

dimension to the employment of airpower.

Because of the success of laser designation, the equi

was installed in other aircraft. The OV-10, next to be m

with the laser gun, became the primary vehicle to designa

gets for the F-4s, thereby allowing the AC-130s to act inde

ently. However, as the flak continued to increase, a larger p

of the F-4 force worked to suppress flak so that the AC-130

AC-119s could devote their full attention to destroying t

Because the truck routes were heavily defended, these con

transports found working alone difficult. When anti-aircra

came from a given area, either the AC-130 or OV-10 

acquire it with the infra-red sensor. After the guns had bee

cisely located, a laser beam was laid on the site and an F-4 

deliver a laser bomb against the position. This was the 

effective technique developed for the suppression of 37m

57mm anti-aircraft fire.

While the enemy moved increased quantities of supp

support an offensive in early 1972, the lines of communica

Laos filled with the heaviest traffic of the war. In the 1966

campaign some 49,371 truck sightings were reported with 
rate through this early period averaged from 15-18%.3 Th

increased to about 20% for COMMANDO HUNT VII, which 

in October 1971 and concluded with the signing of the cea

agreement in January 1973. The rate would have probabl

above 20% if the campaign had continued for the rem

three months of the dry season in Laos. The truck-sightin

then was 1,000 per night, which reflected the extensive 

Vietnamese effort to build up stocks for the coming Easter 

sive. The pattern of buildup for that offensive followed 

closely the pattern of buildup for the 1952 spring offensive 

North Korean and Chinese communists.

Seventh Air Force estimated that the North Vietname

approximately 60,000 tons in the logistical system in Lao

ing the 1970–1971 dry season; about 10,000 tons actually 

their way to the troops in South Vietnam.4 This repre

about 16% arrival rate. Nevertheless, these supplies were 

to support an offensive for a short time, especially when co

with logistics that moved through the transportation netw

North Vietnam free from sustained attacks because of the 

bombing halt. At this arrival rate, the North Vietnamese t

least six months to accumulate supplies for the Easter offe

Although the main offensive in Quang Tri province groun

halt within 30 days, the balance of the offensive lost its m

tum after less than 30 days, even though the siege of An Lo

tinued until late summer. A combination of shortage of su

stiffened resistance by the ARVN after an initial setback, a

overwhelming air support by U.S. air units and the VNAF 

the North Vietnamese to abort the offensive.

Though the AC-130s and AC-119s had the best truck-killin

during the early phases of COMMANDO HUNT VII, October 

they encountered increasing difficulty with the AAA and the 

As early as 1 January 1971, a B-52 strike in the vicinity 

Karai Pass was subjected to a SAM launch. The SAMs bec

continuous threat in Laos by the time of the 1971–1972 dry s

More than 160 SAMs were launched in the course of the cam

240

*Trucks destroyed/damaged—the statistics were and are subject to differ

interpretation. The difficulty in confirming a truck destroyed plagued t

manders of 7th AF throughout the war. The North Vietnamese were able 

trucks struck during the night into the heavy jungle. Reconnaissance 

able, therefore, to provide the desired evidence on many missions as to th

ber of trucks destroyed/damaged.
SAM in Laos occurred ten miles southwest of Tchepone 

March 1972.5

In the face of such a threat, we moved the AC-130s to th

defended areas and increased their altitude of operation

result was a sharp drop in the AC-130’s effectiveness as a 

killer. Though it had earlier achieved an average rate 

trucks per sortie, high performing fighters had to take its 

because of the fighters’ ability to survive in a SAM environ

The AC-130 had been an exceptional weapon system in a 

permissive defense environment, but it had to give w

become extinct when the enemy brought the full weight 

best defensive weapons against it. The AC-130 operated 

longer than many of us expected; we had foreseen that SAM

AAA would make it prohibitive to try to operate such a lo

forming aircraft, regardless of the protective and suppr

measures devoted to its security on interdiction missions.

1968 BOMBING HALT—IMPACT ON INTERDICTION

In March 1968, I concluded that we could not stop the 

Vietnamese from building up supplies and forces just abo

DMZ for their eventual offensive into South Vietnam if the 

ing were stopped in North Vietnam. With a partial halt 

bombing, the North Vietnamese repaired all the main b

and marshalling yards above the 20th parallel. This repai

allowed rapid movement of supplies and replacements by 

as far south as Thanh Hoa with no interference from air

These repairs to the transportation system increased the 

ity beyond pre-war levels.

When the President stopped all bombing in North Vietn

31 March 1968, the North Vietnamese accelerated the mov

of logistics to forward depots near each of the major passe

the Bat Lake area only 20 miles above the DMZ. This fo

placement of logistics provided them the capability to laun

offensive in April 1972, an offensive to test the will of the 

Vietnamese to fight without the aid of U.S. troops, then 

final phases of withdrawal. Although U.S. ground forces 

scarce, the North Vietnamese again underestimated the 

airpower as they had done earlier at Khe Sanh. One would 

thought after their failure at Khe Sanh because of airpowe

would have pursued a different strategy, one that would 
namese ignored broke the back of the 1972 offensive.

With the 1968 bombing halt, the President had stipulate

reconnaissance aircraft would continue to fly over North 

nam. These reconnaissance aircraft were authorized to 

fighter protection to defend them against the MIGs. But d

the surveillance, the North Vietnamese violated the agre

with an unprecedented movement of men, equipment, an

plies into South Vietnam. They protected these moveme

expanding the air defense system to the outer limits of Da

New MIG airfields were developed at Dong Suong and Q

Lang; the one at Vinh was restored to full operational con

Dong Hoi was brought up to a limited operational conditio

SAM coverage gradually extended to all the passes and in

northern half of Quang Tri province in South Vietnam.

Expanded SAMs and airfields, however, weren’t the 

threat. For the first time, MIG-21s became a real threat t

the airfield and port of Danang. Early in the war, MIGs had 

a potential threat to MR I by staging out of Vinh, but such 

ations had been limited. Besides, 7th Air Force and TF-7

subsequently kept all the potential staging bases under 

scrutiny and had attacked whenever it appeared the bases 

support MIG operations. The real threat during that perio

been from the Il-28 Beagle light bomber based at Phu

Though they numbered but half a dozen, these aircraft ha

ficient range to bring Cam Ranh Bay under attack. Thus

were a number one target when Phuc Yen was finally clear

attack in October 1967. To escape attack the North Vietn

then shuttled the Beagles back and forth to Chinese bases 

the raids began.

Even earlier, in the last part of 1966, the MIC-21s had p

ically trailed the last element of our homeward-bound fligh

Laos. However, they never penetrated very deeply and we

much of a threat. The MIGs would occasionally ventur

northern Laos along Route 7 in an attempt to shoot down 

of the armed reconnaissance aircraft. These forays were 

successful and had no real impact on operations.

With the 1968 bombing halt, however, the MIGs inc

their excursions into Laos against aircraft working the H

Minh Trail. These flights reached as far south as the Ban R

Pass, both in daylight and at night. Although most 

attempted intercepts were made at night by a single aircra

lack of proficiency of MIG pilots in night interception and th

242
ited operating range of their GCI prevented them from effe

interfering with our air operations.

Less than a month after the bombing halt, the increase

ligerency against our armed reconnaissance flights resul

an RF-4 being shot down by anti-aircraft fire on 23 Nov

1968 after we had said that reconnaissance aircraft woul

tinue to fly over North Vietnam.6 After the loss of the RF-

Air Force was authorized to suppress SAMs and AAA tha
strikes took on a much broader perspective than merely p

tion from the MIGs. From then on, protective reaction s

were periodically directed against all elements of the air d

system that threatened air operations in Laos and reco

sance missions over all of North Vietnam.

As the North Vietnamese continued to pour forces in

area above the DMZ, special strikes, which began in a ver

ited way, expanded until 1,000 sorties were flown against 4

gets above the DMZ on 30 December 1971. From January 

until March 1972, we made more than 300 strikes south 

20th parallel.7 Besides striking SAMs, AAA, and MIG air

many missions went against supply concentrations, partic

those above the DMZ and in the central part of Route Pack

and II. By the size of these concentrations of supplies, we 

that we had to reduce them or the South Vietnamese co

overrun by a superiority of forces in the northern province

these special strikes became principally a political tactic 

than a military maneuver. As a military action, these strike

insufficient to substantially reduce the buildup. They wer

instead to threaten the North Vietnamese with resumed bo

above the 20th parallel if they did not desist from their o

preparations to mount a major offensive.

STRIKES BELOW THE 20th PARALLEL

Our techniques for operating below the 20th parallel wer

much the same during both the 1965–1968 and the 1972 

paigns. In TALLY HO, the southern part of Route Package I, 0

craft were the primary source of information about the disp

and strength of enemy forces above the DMZ. As more anti-a

weapons were moved into the area in the summer of 1966 a

of 1967, the 0-1 FACs were forced off the major lines of com

cations into the western part of the route package. Even 

area, the altitude at which the 0-1s was forced to fly was s

they could no longer provide detailed information about rou

enemy was using. With the loss of the low speed FAC cover

had to devise different techniques to get the information we n

For some time before, 7th Air Force had been consideri

idea of putting a FAC in the back seat of an F-100F or F-

shortage of F-4s led to the first combat test of a high speed FA

ing place in an F-100F in Route Package I. After a number 

missions, the high speed FAC became standard where ther

244
below the 18th parallel to uncover targets either for sch

strike missions or for diverted missions from Route Package 

flying over the same area day in and day out, these MISTY* 

came to know their area in great detail. Because they coul

targets that the strike fighters would normally not see, they u

ered many targets of opportunity. If the FAC suspected a 

area, he would request a low altitude reconnaissance missio

After a photo interpreter had analyzed the reconnaissanc

tos and found a good probability that there was a SAM, we 

schedule a flight of fighters armed with 750-pound bomb

MISTY FAC, on station before the fighters arrived, would le

first element into the target area. He would then circle abo

target to see the results. Sometimes the 750-pound bombs 

blast off the camouflage and reveal parts of a mobile site. Whe

happened the FAC would call HILLSBORO, the ABCCC

request a maximum effort against the discovered target. (H

BORO had authority to divert scheduled missions for a prior

get such as a SAM site, tank staging area, artillery position, o

tical dump.) If HILLSBORO had no aircraft under control w

in Laos, or on a diversion from preplanned targets in Route 

age VI, the TACC at 7th Air Force headquarters in Saigon 

scramble aircraft for HILLSBORO to control.

These techniques became increasingly sophisticated wit

period of the war. To maintain an FAC in position longer, 

not uncommon to air refuel him two or even three times. 

so meant he could spend as much as four hours over enem

ritory, of course, always subject to SAMs and AAA. Theirs 

tough mission; these high speeds FACs, like their counte

in Laos, were among the most courageous pilots of the wa

Targets for all-weather strikes during the northeast mo

were selected from reconnaissance during a break i

weather. We laid the groundwork for bad-weather strikes 

series of missions run in these target areas during good we

The MSQ radar site at Hue Phu Bai would plot the flight 

and the pilot would verify his position. When the weather t

bad, flights under MSQ control could then strike these 

with a high degree of confidence that their bombs wou

within 400 feet of the target. Good radar coverage of Route 

*MISTY FACS––FACs was given different call signs by areas in which th

ated. High speed FACs were known as MISTY FACs.
during the 1965–1968 campaign. However, during the 

1972 campaign a new system, LORAN, became the pre

technique for all weather bombing in Laos and RP I.

LORAN techniques offered two advantages: The accurac

better, and a formation could bomb at the same time as th

aircraft with better bomb spacing than with MSQ. Usually s

below the 20th parallel, a formation of four to eight aircraft 

bomb with the lead F-4, with only one or two aircraft having L

equipment. The deputy lead, which would take over in the e

an abort by the flight lead, was also equipped with LORAN. T

bad weather on 21 September 1971, 196 F-4s in two waves 

five targets 35 miles above the DMZ using LORAN to guide th

the targets. More than 2,000 five hundred pound bombs and 

CBUs* dropped on petroleum and logistical storage areas an

itary barracks.8 This strike was a significant advance in the 

a large number of fighters against targets that would norma

be struck because of the lack of visual flight conditions. Seven

Force reported excellent target coverage with major damage 

target area. PACAF, however, did not share the enthusiasm 

Air Force about the degree of target damage. Despite these 

ences in interpretation, this mission developed and confirm

all-weather technique that was to be used against targets in 

Package VI in May 1972.

BOMBING IN ROUTE PACKAGE VI A (HANOI AREA)

The tactics for operations in the Hanoi area evolved over 

siderable period of time. Optimum tactics had to be adjus

accommodate the political restraints prevalent througho

strike missions. Many of the tactics developed in World 

and Korea were tried, modified, and adopted. Probably the 

significant factor affecting the type of tactics devised w

SAM, coupled with widespread use of electronic counte

sures by both sides.

In many respects, the strike missions in RP VI had all 

fundamentals of some bombing missions of World W

Although the size of the force and the quality of the targe

246

*CBU––cluster bomb unit: A CBU consists of a number of bomblets that 

ried in a dispenser that is burst open at a predetermined height above the 

dispersing the bomblets in a desired pattern. Bomblets are designed f

tank, materiel, personnel, and mines.
Regensburg, the fundamentals did. Routing the force in

target, designating the aiming points within the target, rec

tering to determine the condition of the target before and 

the strike, using weather scouts to report in advance th

vailing weather conditions, employing fighter forces as 

cover to the formation, mounting corollary strikes agains

rounding airfields to reduce the number of enemy fighter

could get airborne, and protecting the strike unit with 

through on-board jammers and chaff––all of these facets 

mission were common. At the same time, however, tactic

constantly changing within these fundamentals to me

changing political and military situation.

The mission on 29 June 1966 against petroleum, oi

lubricant (POL) tank farms within four miles of Hanoi m

the beginning of highly complex air operations that contin

increase in sophistication with the introduction o

weapons.9 The large-scale attack against the POL complex

executed without each aircraft having its own ECM; some 

also lacked RHAW equipment for all aircraft. These earl

sions were planned with great detail and less freedom of 

for the strike forces because of the initial uncertainty abou

best to operate in a SAM environment with acceptable los

During the 1965–1968 period, the force was flown at abo

rate––that is, a sortie rate of .8 of the aircraft assigned. This 

operation was derived from planning factors based on f

bomber experience in World War II and Korea. Two primary 

fighter-bomber wings of about 55 aircraft each, the 355th l

at Takhli and the 388th at Korat, constituted the major stri

ment for operations in the Hanoi area. From many years of e

ence, the Air Force estimated that a combat unit would a

about 75-80% of its assigned aircraft ready for operations o

given day except when either heavy or light losses put the in

mission rate above or below this figure. Thus, for any given da

ing the campaign, there were approximately 80-85 F-105s av

for combat operations in North Vietnam and Laos.10

STRIKE FORCE COMPOSITION

Because the nature of the targets demanded individual 

ing, the number of aircraft that we could use effectively 

given target was limited––smoke and debris would q

obscure the target. As a consequence of these target limita
able at a given time, a strike force of 16 F-105s composin

flights of four aircraft each provided the best balance that 

gle strike force commander could handle. From early c

experiments a basic force was built around this strike pack

16 aircraft with additional strike packages being added 

size of the target, number of targets, and availability of a

dictated.

To give this force the best opportunity to get into the targ

used a fighter cover that usually consisted of two flights o

aircraft. The cover aircraft were F-4s, which flew to the fro

rear of the strike force. Additionally, two flights of Wild W

with four aircraft in each flight provided most of the SAM 

pression. One flight would precede the force by about fiv

utes, and the other flight would cover the withdrawal.

For jamming Fan Song SAM acquisition radar and the 

warning radars of the GCl fighter intercept net, EB-66s wer

tioned on the outer limit of the 30-mile restricted area to cov

approach to the target and the withdrawal route. By being s

to the major target area, these EB-66s could provide effective 

ing of acquisition radars. Two EB-66s in the northwest qu

and two in the southwest quadrant provided, in effect, a jam

beam into and out of Hanoi for the F-105s. During late 196

until mid-1967, it was feasible to position the EB-66 at 25,0

for EB-66s had their own F-4 fighter cover with others avail

reinforce if MIGs became a threat.

As the SAM and MIG threat expanded, the closeness of co

became too risky. One of the EB-66s was shot down by a fl

two MIGs on 14 January 1968.11 The difficulty of fending o

248

USAF EB-66E in flight over North Vietnam.
attack was fully understood from the extensive air battles 

Korean War along the Yalu. With the warning that was ava

the risk of having the EB-66s as close as possible to the targ

was acceptable as long as the threat came only from MIGs. W

loss of the EB-66, however, and with the increase in SAM

moved the EB-66s much further from the target area, eith

Laos or over the Gulf of Tonkin. As a consequence, the effecti

of the EB-66 declined, since the effectiveness of jamming de

upon the power that the jamming aircraft can emit compared 

radiating source. Hence, the farther the jammer is from the 

the less the effective power.
the EB-66 had to be used in more permissive areas and 

forces had to rely more upon their own jammers to block o

enemy acquisition radars. An aircraft with higher spee

needed to penetrate with the strike forces and have the ab

function where firing of SAMs was frequent. During this p

however, the EB-66 continued to be effective for penetr

from the Gulf of Tonkin and for all operations in the other 

packages and Laos.

PENETRATING THE DEFENSES

Until the first of 1967, the strike forces penetrated at 4,50

a compromise between the threat of anti-aircraft fire and the 

Because ECM pods were not available until January 196

thought that 4,500 feet would avoid much of the light aut

weapons while giving some protection against the SAMs. At th

altitude the SA-2, the only radar-directed, surface-to-air m

employed in North Vietnam during the war, was still gaining 

and consequently pilots had a better chance of evading it. Ho

the low altitude penetration had some undesirable feature

made it only an interim tactic. At these lower altitudes, 

acquisition was particularly difficult because of the reduced 

ity, rough terrain, and the speed of penetration. Further, t

craft had to pull up rapidly to a predetermined altitude to b

dive bomb run so that the 750-pound general-purpose 

would be released at the right altitude. These early missions 

high threat areas were very demanding, and the losses were a

ingly higher than they were later.

Usually, two packages of 16 strike aircraft each were s

uled in the morning and the same in the afternoon. This t

operation for tactical aircraft differed from that of the 9

Force in World War II and 5th Air Force in Korea. In both 

wars, the aircraft were scheduled continuously througho

day with lesser coverage at night. Fighters normally opera

sections of eight or squadrons of twelve, but most of th

there was considerable freedom for flights of four whe

enemy fighters were a threat. These extensive operatio

World War II and Korea did not plan on air refueling, ECM 

tection, and target restrictions as we did in Vietnam. As a 

quence, in the earlier wars we could keep the enemy under 

sure from some elements in the force at all times.

250
with the large requirement for support forces, we weren’t a

mount such an operation. The maximum effort we could sta

four strike packages* a day. With the strict controls on targe

wanted to have the most flexibility within the strike force o

reached the target area. Since most of the targets were within 

miles of one another, we used a central penetration route an

broke a flight off against a particular target. Sometimes the 

would require the entire force; at other times, particularly alo

northeast rail line, each flight of four aircraft would be assi

specific target. Yet, all of the aircraft were in such close pro

to one another that they shared support from the fighter cov

the ECM aircraft. An exception to the normal strike level w

Thai Nguyen steel mill. Because of the mill’s area and the n

a high number of bombs to achieve the desired level of damag

packages were scheduled in the morning and two in the afte

Each aircraft, however, had an individual aiming point with

target.

After January 1967, when ECM pods were finally available 

strike aircraft, penetration altitude was moved up to 15,000 

This altitude permitted better target acquisition and allow

strike leader to position the force better. At the higher altitud

loss rate to AAA dropped considerably, even though AA

responsible for about 65% of all the aircraft lost during the 

North Vietnam. The fighter cover at the higher altitude als

more freedom to handle the low altitude threat from the M

forcing it to climb up to the strike force as it was leaving the 

Throughout the war the MIGs used GCI holding points 

west and southwest of Hanoi. These points were best for 

cepting both inbound and outbound flights. Their most s

ous effort came when the strike force was inbound, forci

F-105s to jettison their bombs to evade the MIG attack. T

the F-105s a higher degree of probability of evading a M

SAM and still get to the target, each F-105 carried seven 

pound bombs, far less than the capability of the aircraf

that reduction allowed the aircraft to retain a high deg

maneuverability.

*A strike package contained 16 strike aircraft carrying air-to-ground w

with supporting fighter escort, Iron Hand, ECM, refueling tankers, comm

control aircraft and intelligence platforms.
As the strike force entered the high threat area, approxim

40 miles from Hanoi, airspeed increased from 480 knots to 

252
540 knots. These speeds required the highest degree of p

sionalism in handling a force of 32 strike aircraft under int

AAA and SAM fire with MIGs lurking above and to the side

force commander had a minimum of time to decide whet

abort the mission because of poor weather or to shift to th

ondary target. Many times during the northeast monsoo

weather would appear satisfactory when the force was les

30 miles from the target, yet in the immediate vicinity of th

get, a broken condition with 7/8 cloud cover was presen

had no way of predicting these rapid changes in conditio

counted on my strike force commanders to make the righ

sion when they saw the actual weather in the target area.

USAF F-105 Thunder chiefs deliver their bombs under radar control
position toward the outside of the turn that they would 

popping up to bombing altitude. Subsequently, they made 

roll for a good look at the target as they maneuvered in

bombing run. The bomb release altitude was about 7,00

with a pullout around 4,500 feet. At the time of pullout, the 

speed was often above mach one as they headed for the sh

route out of the target area.

The pilots would not attempt to recover the formation un

flight had escaped the defenses. Then the flight lead woul

down and the other members of his flight would close on 

Unless a wingman had received battle damage, the crews wou

attempt a rendezvous until 30 miles from the target. If a m

received battle damage, the flight leader automatically circle

to cover the crippled aircraft, and the F-4 fighter screen woul

a flight back to provide close protection to the cripple.

Usually the fighter cover did not fly directly over the 

with the strike aircraft. They would cover the strike force u

was within the area usually assigned to SAMs and AAA

would then screen approaches into the target and take up a 

tion to the rear of the strike force as it withdrew. Howeve

appeared that MIGs would attack the strike force in the 

area, the F-4s would fly through the target area with the F

As a rule, the MIGs patrolled on the perimeter of the major 

areas and broke off pursuit as the strike forces came unde

and AAA fire.

During all strike missions; specific flights within the pa

were designated for flak suppression. We found this techniqu

better than that used in World War II and Korea when a fla

pression force often preceded the main bombing force. In Vie

the relatively small target area and the density of defenses 

that area required us to compress the time our forces were ex

Furthermore, the lack of continuity in the target assignment

higher authority made it mandatory that the maximum num

penetrating aircraft delivers firepower on target. Thus, the n

two and four aircraft in the second flight might be the fla

pression element. They carried a maximum load of CBU-2

excellent weapon for covering an AAA battery site. The loca

the flak suppression element varied, as each wing comm

determined the need for such protection. Seventh Air Force

ever, specified the number of bombing aircraft and the load 

aircraft would carry. This specification was necessary to achie

precalculated probability that the target would be destroy

254
study of target characteristics.

Whenever targets on the northwest and northeast rai

were cleared for attack on the same day, we often pene

from Laos and the Tonkin Gulf simultaneously. This tact

an attempt to split the defenses and make coordination 

SAM and AAA fire more difficult. Our concern was not f

MIGs, since they were manageable with the fighter scree

for the SAM and AAA, constant sources of difficulty. Suc

sions usually required more tankers; and then weather b

a significant factor, since tanker tracks had to clear ove

Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin. Nevertheless, to get as much 

tion in the attack pattern as possible, these penetrations 

made as often as the assigned targets permitted.

The average mission length, three to three and a half hour

a major impact on the number of missions we could run. Th

tor alone dictated the limit of two strike missions per day. G

crews needed about three hours to rearm, reserve, and prepa

force for the second mission. But it wasn’t only the time to loa

rearm the strike aircraft; we needed time to service and laun

tankers, reposition the intelligence platforms, move fresh bar 

into position for protection of forces in the Gulf of Tonkin, 

for target changes made while the first mission was airborn

reposition rescue forces if they had been used during the m

mission. These time factors, of course, were in addition to 

considerations such as target, rescue, and weather. 

Compounding the difficulties of the time constraints was t

of the weather; usually the best weather occurred between 

and 1500 during the northeast monsoon. Because comma

emphasized continually the need to avoid collateral damage, 

imperative that pilots have the best possible conditions for a

ing positive identification of the target. In many cases, dir

specified that a target would not be struck without positive 

identification. For example, it was not sufficient that the Ye

marshalling yard be identified; the pilot had to see the par

segment of the yard that was to be struck. This demand ma

problem for strike crews very difficult when weather was a

marginal, for pressures were strong at all command levels t

target once it was released for attack.

*A term used by the Navy for USAF fighter patrols stationed over water 

the shore and the fleet for fleet cover.
target area was from east to west. The haze and sun ma

target difficult to see; however, making the bomb run from 

to east placed the aircraft over the most heavily defended 

longer and during a vulnerable part of the recovery when t

craft was within optimum range of 37mm and 57mm guns. 

bombing targets within the ten-mile circle was best in the 

ing when better visibility allowed more latitude in approac

withdrawal. Many times, though, this choice was not with

prerogative as 7th Air Force commander; the release of targ

close to Hanoi was controlled from Washington, and the m

was laid on for a strike as soon after release as possible

mally, we had already planned for such missions, and we n

only a release date. Release of targets was closely controlle

Washington throughout the war and was not relaxed un

1972 campaign, when some target restrictions were lessen

IMPORTANCE OF TANKER SUPPORT

Because all missions going into Route Package VI were ai

eled, the KC-135 refueling tankers were positioned over Laos 

Gulf of Tonkin, depending upon the penetration routes for th

Four fighters, refueled by a single tanker, took on 10,000 to 

pounds of fuel each. This amount required careful scheduling 

all the forces on and off the tankers in the limited time ava

Since the entire mission was based on a precise time over 

(TOT), each element of the force had to meet that time. As a 

quence, aircraft were concentrated in the refueling area wher

than 60 aircraft would take on fuel within a few minutes 

another. Refueling altitude, like time, was limited; most re

took place at about 15,000 feet because that was as high as 

105 could refuel with the bomb load it was carrying.

We used two tanker tracks over the Gulf of Tonkin an

over Laos. In Laos we were limited on the optimum location 

tracks because the U.S. Ambassador was concerned that 

ing combat aircraft in the vicinity of Vientiane would sho

high a level of U.S. air operations in Laotian airspace for s

against North Vietnam.13 We therefore routed the refueling 

around Vientiane to avoid this political issue. On the other 

we needed to press the tanker tracks as far north as poss

the fighters would have more fuel for extended fights with 

The fighters needed afterburner, for it gave them increase

formance for bombing, evading SAMs, and pursuing or ev

256
At best, most of the strike and fighter aircraft had sufficie

for only about 15 to 20 minutes without afterburner in th

get area before having to head home.

Coming back from a mission, most of the fighters re

another air refueling. If they had not engaged the MIGs o

ated from the strike plan, they usually took on 5,000 pou

fuel from the KC-135. This amount provided sufficient rese

a traffic delay brought about by a barrier engagement or a 

damaged aircraft. But if not for the initiative of many 

pilots, who actually went into the western part of North Vi

to refuel fighters that were nearly empty, many more aircra

pilots would have been lost. Tankers in the Gulf of Tonkin 

went as far north as 19°30’ and sometimes even furt

respond to the frantic call of a fighter in distress, regard

instructions as to how far north they could go. 

WEATHER INFORMATION

Always on the day of scheduled strikes in the north, a w

scout went into the fringes of Route Package VI at least 

three hours before the first strike mission of the day. No

they would fly around the periphery of the high threat are

report the existing weather to the ABCCC, or to one of ou

trolling radar facilities. Their reports, coupled with the n

forecasts and satellite pictures of the cloud coverage form

basis for a commander’s decision to launch the force.

The satellite picture was particularly useful in decidin

launch of the afternoon mission. The morning launch wa

ally made without satellite information for it wasn’t av

until about 1100 hours. When satellite pictures were ava

however, they became the primary source of determinin

cloud condition in the target area.14 Without them and wit

the traditional forecast, many missions would not have 

launched. The satellite picture allowed us to launch a m

with a reasonable probability that favorable cloud cond

would prevail at the time the strike forces arrived. Before 

lite information was available, sometimes we launched 

based on the assumption that the hole in the clouds over th

get area would hold. Many times, however, when the strik

reached the area the hole had closed. Thus, the satellite p

was a major advance in providing the commander with rea
information about the weather his forces would pro

encounter.

258
LACK OF SURPRISE

We had little opportunity to surprise or deceive the North 

namese about strike force targets and times. They fully u

stood the creeping release of targets, and therefore could p

KC-135 tanker refuels F-105s over Southeast Asia. One “Thud” is on the 

while others in the flight await their turn.

F-4s refueling on their way to hit targets in North Vietnam.
gets were so close together it made little difference tac

whether the target was Phuc Yen airfield or the Hanoi R

Repair Shop. The 42 or so SAM battalions were so distr

that they needed little adjustment to give one or the other 

a better coverage. Thus, the North Vietnamese defense

about the same alert conditions, regardless of the target

they determined our forces were headed for Route Packag

The excellent radar coverage of their air defense system 

mitted the North Vietnamese to gain positive information on 

size while it was refueling. Early warning radars, code n

BAR LOCK, covered all of the western and southwestern p

Laos; those located at Thanh Hoa and Vinh covered all air 

ities over the Gulf of Tonkin. From this information, the 

could compute the time before our forces would be on targ

a result, their entire system was alerted, and usually their 

ers were airborne minutes before our forces started their 

tration. Because the target area was limited, we could not 

deception to the extent we had in World War II and to a 

extent in the Korean War. Feints could be made to a di

part of North Vietnam, but the short distances between t

gave lie to the deception.

We assumed that the North Vietnamese intelligence ne

was active around all launch bases and that takeoff time

force sizes were relayed back to the operational command

Bac Mai or Phuc Yen. Even if one assumes that there w

such network, active DF* sites in North Vietnam could p

much the same information. All air forces depend upon 

measures to fill out their knowledge about the activities 

opposing air force. For example, in North Africa on 18 Apri

information from this type of intelligence activity permitt

Northwest African Tactical Air Force’s P-40s and Spitfi

shoot down 50–70 JU-52 transports out of a flight of 100.

Luftwaffe was desperately trying to get von Arnim’s de

Afrika Korps out of the clutches of the advancing U.S

British Army in Tunisia and back to safety in Italy.

260

*Direction Finding––A procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequen

ters with the use of a highly directional antenna and a display unit.
RECONNAISSANCE—COVERING THE TARGETS

Tactical air reconnaissance provided the detailed target 

mation for scheduling strikes and evaluating their r

Although SR-71s and other reconnaissance platforms pr

considerable information, their information usually wa

timely or pertinent to the targets planned for a particula
by national intelligence agencies for detailed evaluation 

effects of air attacks on the military, political, and econom

of the country. Further, this intelligence analysis led to the 

ination of targets to the JCS that the President approve

then sent to CINCPAC for strike.

For day-to-day operations, I depended upon the tactical 

naissance force. Although details on specific targets often 

from national intelligence agencies, this information was s

reaching the field and had little influence on the hourly dec

of how best to strike the targets. For the weekly project

strike operations, however, national intelligence informatio

used extensively.

For tactical reconnaissance during the early part of the 

1968 campaigns we relied on RF-101s for photographic cove

targets in North Vietnam. In 1967, RF-4s took over most of t

and in the 1972 campaign the task was exclusively the R

Throughout the war there was unusual interest in having 

graphs of the day’s strikes in Washington. High-level inte

each bombing mission resulted in photographs being flown b

Washington on scheduled courier flights before field agenci

fully interpreted strike results. This procedure led to consid

difference of opinion about strike results, differences that ha

ironed out before the next list of targets was released.

A basic source of information was the Q-34 drone, whic

duced outstanding photographs. These drones flew at bot

and low altitude. The low altitude flights, particularly va

during periods of marginal weather when the RF-4s could

in, produced details not provided from the medium altitud

erage of the RF-101s and RF-4s. But a combination 

manned and unmanned sources provided us the best view 

effects of the bombing campaign.

Again, each weapon system had its strengths and weakn

For this reason a combination of systems usually gets the d

results. The drones had to be programmed, and they therefo

vided limited flexibility once the mission was launched. If we 

oped a higher priority target, which required immediate upd

we could not change the flight profile of the drone. Furth

drone’s low altitude photography was more suitable for point 

than area coverage because of the swath of the camera. O

other hand, the RF-4 was the most flexible tool for reconnai

that I had. We could change missions while airborne and 

transitory target information more readily. Medium altitude 

262
diate value in making decisions for restrike.

RECONNAISSANCE TACTICS

Neither in World War II nor Korea was the debate settled 

employing tactical reconnaissance in elements of two aircraf

a “lone wolf.” The same arguments cropped up during both p

of the air campaign in Vietnam. As in World War II and Kore

ponents tried each technique. The argument for two aircra

that the wingman was needed as a lookout for MIGs and SA

that the leader could concentrate on the target. Also, in the 

the leader’s camera malfunctioned, the wingman could tak

the mission without exposing additional aircraft to enemy def

Finally, the two-aircraft proponents argued, reconnaissanc

sions into the high threat area involved such risks that we n

additional backup to be sure we got the job done on the fir

the wingman’s cameras would cover the target just as the le

did, even though the wingman’s primary task was to be a lo

The lone wolf advocates maintained that a single aircra

a better probability of getting into the target area unde

and, therefore, was less vulnerable to SAMs, AAA, and MIG

was an element. One aircraft, they argued, had more flexib

maneuvering, evading, and escaping a MIG than two a

when the leader had to worry about his wingman’s po

Those arguing for the lone wolf system were hardcore tra

alists of the school that maintained the reconnaissance 

lived by his wits in out-foxing the enemy and he did so 

with a single aircraft. The argument was no more settled 

Vietnam War than it was in World War II and Korea. We 

both techniques, and each time the losses changed we a

the technique as we had done in Korea.

In covering heavily defended targets along the Yalu 

Korean War, RF-86s went separately or as a part of the 

formation covering them. Because of the MIG threat, as m

18 fighters sometimes covered two RF-86s.16 A variation 

tactic was to make the leader of a flight of fighters an RF-

effect, the reconnaissance aircraft then became a part 

fighter formation, thus hiding the identity of the reconnais

aircraft and providing close fighter protection.

In Vietnam, the MIG threat to the reconnaissance missio

not as great as in Korea, but SAMs and AAA were sign

threats. Because of the pressure to get results against targets 
reconnaissance pilots endured a high degree of exposure. Th

technique was to schedule the reconnaissance aircraft into t

get as close as possible to the strike aircraft to take advan

the shock of the attack and of its ECM and fighter prot

Although this seemed the best method of gaining increased 

rity for the reconnaissance aircraft, it didn’t necessarily prov

best photo coverage because of smoke in the target area. 

reconnaissance pilot delayed until smoke cleared the targ

faced loss of fighter and ECM protection. Therefore the tim

reconnaissance missions was a compromise. In general we w

to cover as many targets as possible in the ten- or four-mile 

on a single mission. For strikes in these areas, the reconnai

aircraft was often broken out separately to make a series o

independent of the strike force, thus relying on the general p

tion rather than being buried in the pack. If we had high-leve

est in the results of a specific strike, the reconnaissance flig

lowed the strike flight within five to seven minutes. This 

provided fairly good protection for the reconnaissance aircra

reasonable target coverage if the wind was right.

264

USAF RF-101 flies over 57mm anti-aircraft gun emplacements.
By mid-1967, fighters began to be equipped with strike 

eras to record their own results. Although the photograph

duced by these cameras were not as good as those in the 

naissance aircraft, we could determine within a few hour

landing whether the target would need to be restruck. 

cameras shot to the rear of the aircraft so that as the pilot 

off, the cameras could photograph the bombs impacting th

get area. A quick examination of the developed print deter

the general level of damage or lack of damage to the target 

out our having to wait for results of the reconnaissance m

From these strike-camera pictures, each unit not only 

good tool to analyze individual bombing techniques and 

mine where additional training might be required, but it als

an invaluable asset when priority targets were subject to 

drawal if we did not destroy them within a particular time 

The operating techniques of the 1965–1968 campaign f

the basis for employing the force when we resumed bomb

the Hanoi delta in May 1972 although some systems used 

later campaign, the laser weapons and extensive use of 

either were not available or were used on a very limited sc

the earlier campaign.

Maintenance men scramble down from an RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft a

take off on a photo mission over North Vietnam.
With the resumption of bombing, 7th Air Force initially u

single strike force once a day rather than the two we had use

ing the 1965–1968 campaign. The reason for this change w

increase in the ratio of support forces to strike forces-approxi

four to one––and the small number of laser weapons needed 

out the bridges. Of a total of about 80 aircraft in a single m

only 12 to 16 were strike aircraft delivering laser weapons. Fo

targets and in good weather conditions, these weapons had 

a single shot kill probability. If the target could be seen and t

get was vulnerable to the explosive power of the weapon, the 

ability of damage with a single weapon was 80-90%. On 2

1972, eight F-4s carrying 16 laser bombs destroyed five bridg

damaged a sixth.17 During the 1965–1968 campaign, such de

tion would have required a much larger number of sorties.

As additional targets were assigned, the single force packa

augmented with 32 strike aircraft carrying conventional bom

hit area targets such as marshalling yards, railroad repair 

logistical depots, and troop training centers. For a large targe

the pattern of a large number of conventional bombs provid

best coverage. For this reason, LINEBACKER I relied upon the 

general techniques that we had used in ROLLING THUNDER 

striking such targets.

An event we had long sought occurred on 9 May 1972—th

ing of Haiphong harbor.18 We had argued from the outset 

bombing campaign that a blockade of Haiphong was essen

maximum stress were to be put on the North Vietnamese log

system through interdiction. Not only was such a blockade 

tial to reduce the North’s ability to support their fighting forc

also to strain the economic, social, and political structures 

nation. The blockade of Haiphong was an intrinsic and fund

tal part of the air campaign; its absence during 1965–1968 

our task much more difficult and our effects on the enemy’s 

fight less conclusive.

Once the missing part of the interdiction campaign wa

rected, additional targets, earlier off limits, were clear

attack. Further, the 30-mile restricted zone around Han

reduced to 10 miles and the 10-mile zone around Haiph

five. With these new guidelines, the weight of airpower 

closer to the heart of the country, and its effects we

throughout all of North Vietnam.

266
employ its airpower decisively. The consequence of this em

ment would be the paralysis of North Vietnam’s ability to fee

protect its citizens. Evidence of the strain the North Vietn

nation was under came from a number of independent so

Basically, the same situation had existed in the earlier camp

Wheeler, Sharp, McConnell, Ryan, and I had argued 

summer of 1967 that the air campaign was on the verge o

ing the North Vietnamese to negotiate a settlement; if Hai

and the other targets in the 30-mile circle were cleared fo

tained attacks, the settlement would come quickly. We h

capability and the bombing attacks had reached the sam

of effectiveness against the LOCs as LINEBACKER I ac

later on. The interdiction argument centered on the is

where to concentrate the effort. We argued that the cam

should be focused in Route Package VI, the top of the “fu

whereas those who favored halting the bombing above th

parallel felt it should be directed at the lower route packag

retary of Defense McNamara and his staff contended th

20th parallel restriction would be inconsequential and tha

centrating the interdiction effort in the lower route pa

would have just as much effect on the enemy.

During the visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union fr

May to 5 June, strikes were not permitted inside the 1

zone around Hanoi.19 Such a restriction was imposed an

there were high level political contacts or visits by Soviet o

to Hanoi, but this time the visit of the President to the 

Union coincided with a new airpower posture and a new w

ness to use the power to force negotiations.

As negotiations became stalled, rules of engagement were a

to permit strikes against more targets near Hanoi. Flights 

aircraft carrying laser bombs struck power plants, comman

control centers at Bac Mai, and all the key bridges hit in RO

THUNDER. By 13 July, the North Vietnamese were prepa

resume negotiations. The constant pounding of targets in the 

delta and the halting of the North Vietnamese ground offen

South Vietnam were key factors in this change in attitude.

B-52s were then being used on a continuing basis again

gets in North Vietnam. Tactics for the B-52 were altered 

those in South Vietnam where no threat of SAMs, MIGs, o

existed. There it had been feasible to take more time in th

get area, and the spacing between bomber cells was not a 

cal factor. From the heavy SAM firing against the B-52 
time in the target area needed to be compressed to mi

exposure. Tactical forces had learned the same lesson whe

cleared into Route Package VI in 1965. Regardless 

effectiveness of on-board ECM equipment, the shorter the 

268
down. Obviously, a B-52 doesn’t have the speed of an F-4; 

fore, it must depend upon its on-board ECM equipmen

supporting tactical forces to create the most favorable cond

for penetrating the defenses. It was particularly difficult fo
52s rather than a fighter strike force.

The F-111s returned to combat on 28 September 1972

then played a major role in the night attacks against air

SAM sites, marshalling yards, and power plants. Befor

returned, the terrain-following radar had all the bugs 

proved to be a significant new factor in the ever-changing 

of air combat. The low altitude attacks (below the effectiv

tudes of the SAMs), and the high speed (above Mach .9) ma

aircraft almost immune to the anti-aircraft fire that had c

the heaviest loss in the 1965–1968 campaign. As a rule, the 

is preceded the B-52s to the target to suppress the fighte

reduce the ability of the command system to employ SAM

AAA in a cohesive manner. Because the F-111 with th

fighter screen and the Wild Weasels did their job well, the 

were never a very important factor in the night attacks. S

cantly, the ratio of SAMs launched per aircraft destroye

approximately 70-1; the ratio in the 1965–1968 campaig

55 to 1.20

On 23 October, because of progress in the peace talk

President directed the suspension of bombing above the 

parallel.21 However, as the peace negotiations dragged o

accelerated our planning for a three-day maximum eff

Route Package VI using B-52s, F-111s, F-4s, EB-66s, an

rier-based aircraft. Weather soon became a major conside

in the planning, for the northeast monsoon was in full forc

fact alone meant ceilings would run about 1,000 to 3,00

with visibility approximately one mile. Based on experienc

the 1965–1968 campaign, we could make visual attack

four to six days a month. Thus, our planning was based 

assumption that all-weather bombing would necessarily 

primary means of attack. That meant using B-52s.

Prior to this time, B-52s had not been employed abo

20th parallel, and had been used sparingly north of the 17t

allel until the resumption of the bombing in April 1972. Th

sonal conditions that required all-weather attacks and th

to confront the North Vietnamese with total application 

airpower for the first time led to the decision to employ B-

The plan was based on a proposed three-day effort, with 

in three waves attacking throughout the night and tactical 

striking targets in the day under visual flight conditions, 

weather permitted; if not, they would use LORAN. In planni

campaign, now known as LINEBACKER II, instructions were 

270
to be prepared to follow the three-day effort with a phase of 

nite duration. The planners, therefore, had to pace the atta

the assumption that the high level of effort could extend 

longer time and would require a sustained in commission 

better than 70%. Even though it might have been tactical

strategically sound to bunch the force and go for an all-out 

this possibility could be disastrous if the campaign were to s

out. For this reason, we decided to put up initially about 30 

a night and spread the attack over seven to nine hours.

To support these attacks required a major effort from th

tical forces of 7th Air Force. The demands for chaff, ECM

fighter cover exceeded the assigned resources; 7th Air 

could not sustain night support and full day operations. T

strikes actually required even heavier support than did the 

striking at night. Night operations limited the MIG threat, 

some extent, curtailed the anti-aircraft threat. The smalle

aircraft guns (37mm and 57mm) were of little concern sinc

were mostly visually directed, particularly during perio

heavy jamming. However, the 85mm and 100mm guns 

radar directed and posed a definite threat even at night.

The weather for the operation was about as expected—

to 3,000 feet—but the five-mile visibility below the cloud

somewhat better than predicted. About 60% of the target
associated with the transportation and logistical system 

the remaining 40% covered power plants, airfields, SAM 

communications installations, and command and control 

ties. The B-52s used radar exclusively to bomb their target

marshalling yards near Hanoi, airfields, and storage area

F-4s carrying laser bombs were employed against the 

power plant, railroad classification yard, and radio statio

272
A-7s led by LORAN-equipped F-4s bombed the Yen Bai a

using a combination of visual and LORAN attacks. The F

bombed airfields, SAM sites, and marshalling yards.

During the 11-day campaign, tactical forces flew 2,123 s

of which 1,082 were at night. B-52s flew 729, all at night.2

tical support forces such as the chaff flights, fighter cover

Weasel, and ECM comprised nearly 70% of the total sorties 

Pinpoint bombing by B-52s destroys much of the Gia Lam Railroad Yard 

Repair Shops.
weapons against the en

?>,mxzemy, and thus destroyed targets besides suppr

enemy =/* for the B-52 and fighter strike forces. If the cam

had continued, more tactical forces would have return

active strikes, for the enemy defenses continued to dete

from the unrestricted attacks. The proportion of support to 

forces, as seen here, is a sensitive balance and varies as th

of forces, the quality of enemy defenses, and the priority 

targets change.

SUMMARY

The 11-day campaign came to a close on the 29th of D

ber 1972 when the North Vietnamese responded to the po

threat of continued air attacks to the economic, political, 

and military life of their country. It was apparent that air

was the decisive factor leading to the peace agreement of 1

uary 1973.* The concentrated application of airpower pro

the disruption, shock, and disorganization that can be re

only by compressing the attack and striking at the heart wi

tually no restraints on military targets which influenc

enemy’s will to fight.

274

*Although the North Vietnamese would not admit that it was, in fact, th

ing, comments by Henry Kissinger at a January news conference strongly 

that it had been the coup de grace. See State Department Bulletin, LXV

750, Jan. 8, 1973, pp. 33–41.
CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. William W. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–19

Analysis of Its Role in Combat, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph 

vol. 3, monograph 4 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 

1977), p. 44.

2. CORONA HARVEST Final Report, USAF Operations in Laos

1970–30 Jun 1971 (Hickam AFB, HI: Department of the Air For

Pacific Air Forces, 1972), p. 68.

3. Trucks destroyed/damaged figures vary greatly depending 

source. Reporting criteria for aircrews were changed several 

throughout the war to make reporting as accurate as possible

thorough discussion, see CORONA HARVEST Reports, Out-Coun

Operations, 1 Jan 1965–3 May 1968, book 1, chapter 2, and 

Operations in Laos, 1 Jan 1970–30 June 1971, pp. 74–84.

4. CORONA HARVEST Final Report, USAF Operations in Laos

1970–30 Jun 1971, p. 74.

5. Momyer, Vietnamese Air Force, p. 39.

6. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia, Directo

Management Analysis, 29 Nov 1968, p. 40.

7. CORONA HARVEST Final Report, USAF Air Operations A

North Vietnam, 1 Jul 1971–30 Jun 1972 (Hickman AFB, HI: D

ment of the Air Force, Hq Pacific Air Forces, 1973), pp. 42–43.

8. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Air 

tions Against North Vietnam, 1 Jul 1971–30 Jun 1972, pp. 28–2

9. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 1965–31 Mar 1968, pp. 91–9

10. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Lo

Activities In Support of Operations In Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 1

Dec 1969, part 2, p. II-2-81-94.

11. CORONA HARVEST, Out-Country Operations, Book I, p. 

12. Ibid., p. 116.

13. Ibid., book 2, pp. 27, 29.

14. Ibid., p. 158.

15. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air 

in World War II, vol. 2: Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago: Th

versity of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 191.

16. United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict

Historical Study No. 72, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952 (Wash

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1955), pp. 113–14.

17. CORONA HARVEST, Air Operations North Vietnam, p. 15
President’s Address to the Nation, 8 May 1972 (Washington

Government Printing Office, 15 May 1972), p. 840.

19. CORONA HARVEST, Air Operations North Vietnam, p. 10

20. CORONA HARVEST Final Report, USAF Air Operations in 

east Asia, 1 July 1972–15 August 1973, vol. 2, book 4, p. 298.

21. Ibid., p. 44.

22. Ibid., pp. 249, 252.

276
Chapter VII

AIRPOWER AND THE GROUND BATTLE

INCREASED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

With the Ely-Collins agreement* and the fall of Dien Bie

the U.S. began to assume more responsibility for equippin

training the South Vietnamese forces.1 By early 1958, th

had assumed complete responsibility, and the French gra

withdrew from all parts of the advisory program.

As a part of the peace agreement of 1954, there was to b

within a period of two years, a countrywide election, which 

provide for the peaceful joining together of North and South 

nam. President Diem, in 1956, abrogated this provision 

agreement because of the infiltration of North Vietnamese 

into South Vietnam and the fact that North Vietnam was a 

munist society in which there was no freedom of choic

therefore maintained that to hold a countrywide election 

time would be tantamount to turning over all of Vietnam 

communists.

From 1956 to 1959 guerrilla activity in South Vietnam rem

at a fairly low level. There were indications that the insu

was under control and that with time South Vietnam wo

able to stand on its own feet without the detailed and ext

support it was receiving from the U.S. The U.S. took he

these developments and likened them to the developmen

strong and independent South Korea after the conclusion 

war.

The North Vietnamese were not long in establishing 

intent to take over South Vietnam both politically and mil

In September 1959 this intent was reflected in the ambu

*General Paul Ely, Commanding General of French forces in Indochina, a

eral J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower’s special envoy to Saigon, s

formal agreement on 13 December 1954, which marked the beginning o

role for the U.S. in Indochina.
ing in an area southwest of Saigon.2 This was the first large

engagement by the Viet Cong. Until this time most of the m

action had been by small bands of guerrillas attacking is

villages, harassing vehicle traffic in the countryside, assas

ing local officials, and disrupting tax collectors.

As the guerrilla action expanded, requests for U.S. tr

missions increased. The advisory group had doubled by th

of 1960. Most of the increase was in U.S. Army Special F

which provided training for Army of Vietnam (ARVN) ranger

patrolled the border areas and infiltration routes into 

Vietnam.

As early as 1958, it was suspected that the Ho Chi Minh T

Laos had become the main infiltration route for forces into 

Vietnam. Furthermore, the Russians were providing the Path

the communist insurgent force in Laos, with supplies and 

ment in 1960. These deliveries were made by IL-14 transpo

aircraft similar to our C-47. By 1961 there was evidence th

Russians were delivering armament as far south as Tch

Laos, and it is probable that some unidentified flights into 

Corps area of South Vietnam along the Laotian border were 

made by Russian AN-2 Colts. These are the same aircraft the 

Vietnamese modified and used on 12 January 1968 to bom

85 where the U.S. had a radar and a tactical aid to nav

(TACAN) facility.

With the expanding war, it was apparent that the Vietn

Air Force (VNAF) would have to gain a capability for supp

its ground forces without having the time to develop and tr

pilots in a normal manner. Unfortunately, the French ha

given the VNAF the opportunity to develop as an independ

force. Only a limited number of proven combat leaders 

available to handle the needed expansion, and very few of it

ple were trained in air-ground operations. The French Air 

had performed these tasks through its own system, and th

of the VNAF—one fighter squadron, two liaison squadron

transport squadrons and one helicopter squadron––was no 

than a reinforced wing, much less an air force.

Krushchev’s speech of January 1961, indicating that w

liberation were just and the way of the future, was instrum

in prompting the incoming President, John F. Kennedy, to 

a directive to the Secretary of Defense to develop a capab

deter and, if deterrence failed, to defeat such aggression.3 

dent Kennedy’s chief military advisor, the former Chief of S

278
agreed with current military strategy and its emphasis o

eral war. In his book The Uncertain Trumpet, he stated hi

for limited war, particularly low scale, non-nuclear, limited 

During the 1950’s, the U.S Air Force had espoused the st

that forces equipped for general war would deter most for

aggression; if deterrence failed, those forces could fight a l

war. The Air Force felt that nuclear weapons were the para

means of fighting war; and limited war, even if begun as 

nuclear war, would rapidly reach the point where nuclear we

would be required. Based on this position, USAF tactical 

were trained primarily for nuclear war. Since the close of the K

War, the U.S. capability for non-nuclear conflict had steadily 

riorated. Little money had been devoted to the development o

nuclear weapons, and existing stocks were those remainin

the Korean War.

In early 1961, as the emphasis shifted to developing 

nuclear forces for limited war, the lower part of the spectr

conflict began to receive the most attention. Initially the 

was on “counterinsurgency.” This focus was too far dow

spectrum for many elements of our tactical air forces. T

airmen had serious reservations about putting so much 

tion on counterinsurgency when there was a need to resto

nonnuclear capability of our tactical forces.

As aggression increased in Vietnam, the Air Force argue

additional resources should be devoted to the tactical air 

to regain the size and capability that existed at the end 

Korean War. The Air Force maintained that these forces wo

more suitable as a hedge against a counterinsurgency war 

such a war would probably escalate into a non-nuclear, l

war if it continued for any length of time. The fact that the 

ical situation in such conflicts was so unstable as to l

breakdown in control, with the resultant use of organized 

forces, indicated that the war was already above the coun

surgency level and demanded a more comprehensive use 

itary power.

Within President Kennedy’s administration, however, 

was deep concern over the lack of imagination shown b

services in developing innovative ideas, organizations, and 

ment to cope with counterinsurgency. Therefore, the Adv

Research Project Agency (ARPA) within the Office of the Sec

of Defense (OSD) responded to the President’s directive for 

oping new equipment for low scale conflicts.5 By June 
Group Vietnam) in Vietnam to test the combat suitability 

equipment. This testing created considerable tension be

the Army and Air Force because the Army had stated that 

terinsurgency was primarily ground combat, and the Arm

responsible for land warfare.6 The emphasis on counter

gency was further exemplified by the expansion of the S

Forces (Green Berets) and the attention this organizatio

received including President Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg, 

Carolina, the home of these forces.

Concurrent with the emphasis on counterinsurgency w

Army’s desire to use the helicopter to increase battlefield 

ity. Studies done by the Army showed that in all future 

mobility would be even more important than in the pas

that the helicopter would give the soldier greater mobility

Air Force considered helicopter forces to be extremely vuln

to enemy ground fire, and, therefore, such forces could o

employed under very restricted conditions. Thus, only a 

tively small helicopter force should be developed, one de

for counterinsurgency.

These differing views on the forces necessary for coun

surgency and the differing perceptions of such wars were 

overtaken by events in Vietnam. As the U.S. support f

South Vietnamese and determination to prevent the spr

communism continued to grow, most requests for expans

the Vietnamese armed forces received favorable consider

However, the lack of equipment necessary to moderni

VNAF was a major problem. By 1961, there were no pro

driven combat aircraft in the USAF inventory. All fighter 

had converted to jets following World War II, and the only 

bat propeller aircraft were in the Navy and in storage.

DEVELOPING THE FORCE

The Air Force submitted proposals to the Secretary of Defe

modify the T-37 jet trainer into a fighter-bomber for U.S. and 

units. However, there was considerable opposition to this cou

action since the introduction of jets into South Vietnam 

appear to violate the Geneva agreement. Furthermore, th

staff argued that it would be easier for the Vietnamese to ma

propeller aircraft and that these aircraft were better suited fo

air support in a jungle environment than jets.

280
being made with counterinsurgency forces, the Secret

Defense went all out to gain a capability without further d

The Army Special Forces, then being deployed to train the 

Vietnamese rangers, knew the value of air support and re

that the ARVN was in danger of being annihilated unle

VNAF could provide reliable and constant air support. The 

confronted with these demands, was not able to fight, trai

expand at the same time. By mid-1961, it was apparent th

ther help was necessary to train and expand its forces.

A few months earlier, the VNAF had been provided fu

increase its fighter force to two squadrons. Additionally, a d

ment of the 507th Tactical Control Group (TCG) was move

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, to Tan Son Nhut AB in January 

The VNAF had little capability to operate such a facility; t

Advisory Group planned from the outset to use people from 

cal Air Command to operate the system. The deployment 

507th was prompted by reports of unidentified aircraft 

Saigon area. (We were to be plagued with periodic repo

unidentified aircraft in South Vietnam throughout the war

the potential for Soviet aircraft to airdrop supplies to Viet 

forces in the delta, it was prudent to get radar into Tan Son 

to monitor such traffic as well as deploy the fighters necess

deal with intruders. With a Control and Reporting Post 

established, a command and control structure for the emplo

of the forces to follow was begun.

The Air Staff had conducted a number of technical stud

determine what propeller aircraft could be put in a combat 

condition as quickly as possible. These studies showed that 

28, a trainer, could be modified as a fighter-bomber. Even t

these aircraft were 12 years old, they still had a few usefu

left. A modification line was established and the aircraft str

was modified for delivery of bombs.

Another vintage aircraft was the B-26. It had had a usef

in the Korean War and there were a number of these aircra

in storage. Considerable modification, however, was nee

restore them to an operational condition. It was ori

*CRP—control and reporting post: An element of the United States Air Fo

tical air control system, subordinate to the control and reporting center

provides radar control and surveillance within its area of responsibility.
designed as an attack aircraft, and delivery of weapons wa

straight and level or in a slight dive. It was not stressed f

form of dive-bombing where three or more “Gs” are com

Nevertheless, it was decided to modify a limited number of 

World War II aircraft for counterinsurgency missions.

The final elements of the counterinsurgency force we

tried and proven C-47, of which a number were still aroun

in good condition, and the U-10 Heliocourier. These aircraf

modified for psychological warfare roles, which called f

delivery of leaflets and the broadcasting of taped me

through a loudspeaker system. In addition, a flare disp

rack was installed in the C-47 to provide illumination of ar

night as a deterrent or for strike aircraft.

FARM GATE––A FORCE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

In April 1961, the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squ

was activated at Eglin AFB. This unit had as one of its mi

the development of tactics, techniques, and equipment for 

terinsurgency. It was also to be prepared to deploy detach

to such conflicts. The initial strength of the unit was 16 C-

B-26s, and 8 T-28s. With the pressures building to dev

force for such low scale conflicts, the unit had a minim

time to prepare itself. Fortunately, the Air Force had expe

with unconventional warfare from World War II and Korea

ing World War II, there was an extensive effort in dropping 

282

U-10 returning home after leaflet mission near Lac Thien Special Forces 

Note leaflets caught on horizontal stabilizer.
drops. These missions were conducted by highly trained 

who had developed air drop techniques for supporting irr

or guerrilla forces. After the war they were gradually p

down until there was only a minimum capability for this t

conflict by the time of the Korean War.

During the Burma campaign in World War II, a unit wa

vated to operate behind Japanese lines. The force was compo

British soldiers supported by an American air task force. Th

was led by British Brigadier Orde Wingate, and was call

“Wingate Force.”10 The air units consisted of P-51s, C-47s, an

ers. The air units became known as air commandos, the 

adopted by the initial units that deployed to South Vietnam. 

the 4400th CCTS came to be known as JUNGLE JIM.

As the Army continued to press for the expansion of s

forces for counterinsurgency, the joint testing in Vietnam t

added significance. The Air Force was eager to establish i

in this type of conflict and pushed for the deploymen

detachment of the 4400th to South Vietnam to train the 

Vietnamese in the techniques of air-ground operations a

devise new techniques for incorporation into our own ai

trine. 

On 11 October 1961, Detachment 2A of the 4400t

deployed to Bien Hoa Air Base. It was code named FARM 

and became the first USAF unit to conduct combat missi

the Vietnam War. This detachment consisted of 8 T-28s, 

47s, and 4 B-26s. The 151 men of the detachment rotated 

odically to the parent organization.

USAF A-26 parked on the flight line at Korat AB, Thailand. The aircraft, use

rily along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, is “loaded for bear” and awaiting the d

mission.
The mission of this unit from the outset was ambiguous. T

craft had VNAF markings, and the unit was not authorized t

duct combat missions without a Vietnamese crew member.1

then, the missions were training missions although c

weapons were delivered. The missions were designed to trai

namese pilots to bomb and shoot, and since there were real t

the situation provided maximum training.

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM BUILDS

With the limited capability of the VNAF, FARM GATE be

fly more of the missions in which close coordination with g

units was required. As the requirement for close air su

exceeded the capability of the VNAF, requests were made 

FARM GATE function in the same manner as were U.S. 

and Marine helicopter units which carried U.S. markings. 

284

The versatile C-47 “Gooney Bird.”

T-28 taking off from Nakon Phanom AB, Thailand.
unit was maintained.

As additional units were deployed, primarily C-123s, t

section of the Military Advisory Group was not adequate to 

FARM GATE activities and the expanded air control sy

Detachment 7 of 13th Air Force was therefore activa

November of 1961 and became the operational headquart

the control of air activities. Nevertheless, the rapid grow

forces created other problems.

The CRP at Tan Son Nhut was not able to regulate and c

the increased air activity. To alleviate this deficiency, in Dec

1962 all the main elements of a tactical control system were 

to Vietnam. The CRP at Tan Son Nhut was expanded to a ful

which gave a vastly increased capability to control the movem

all aircraft in III and IV Corps. The CRC was operated by USA

sonnel with VNAF personnel in a training status.

A CRP was established in the highlands at Pleiku. This s

was operated by the VNAF with USAF personnel providing o

job assistance. With VNAF exclusively operating this site, we 

to learn how quickly the VNAF would be able to operate the 

tactical air control system without direct USAF support.

A CRC was also installed at Danang. “Monkey Mounta

the site was called, was operated by the USAF with Vietn

Air Force people again in a training status. This station pr

coverage to all of I Corps and linked with the CRP at Pleik

the end of the year, aircraft for the first time could be rada

trolled in all areas of South Vietnam. This radar system rem

throughout the war and was later enlarged by the establis

of two additional CRPs.

The Army had resisted establishing the tactical air contr

tem because of the argument about the control and employm

helicopters.12 At the time, U.S. Army and Marine helicopters 

ating in the four corps areas were assigned to the operationa

trol of the U.S. Army advisor of the respective ARVN corps 

mander. The missions were conducted in the corps areas w

reference to VNAF and FARM GATE. The Air Force had argu

need for bringing all air operations in South Vietnam under 

tralized control system. Establishing the air control system 

*CRC––control and reporting center: A subordinate air control element of 

tical air control center from which radar control and warning operations 

ducted.
vided the mechanism for directing and controlling air oper

regardless of the type of aircraft and the service to which tho

craft belonged.

In 1962, the Howze Board (named after Lieutenant G

Hamilton H. Howze, who chaired the Board) was crea

response to Secretary McNamara’s directive of 19 April 1

develop “a plan for implementing fresh and perhaps unort

concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobi

This Army board proposed the creation of a number 

assault divisions with organic helicopters for airlift, fire su

and reconnaissance. Fixed wing assault transports wer

proposed as part of the force structure. The Army was mos

ious to test these new units in South Vietnam. Since 

argued that these units were in direct support of the groun

tle, they shouldn’t come under the control of the Air Forc

theater of operation.

Shortly thereafter, the Air Force established the Disosway 

(named after Lieutenant General Gabriel P. Disosway, chairm

the Board) as a counterpart to the Howze Board, and its m

was to explore established doctrine and techniques as a me

increasing the mobility of Army forces. This board concluded 

combination of C-130s, fighters, and a limited number of h

ters for the movement of combat troops and supplies forward 

C-130 assault airstrips was a better solution to the problem

286

Aerial view of Monkey Mountain near Danang Air Base, South Vietna
force so that it had the capability to fight across the spectr

limited, non-nuclear war. The assault helicopter force propo

the Howze Board had limited utility in the opinion of the Dis

Board, since it couldn’t function in a high threat enviro

because of vulnerability to enemy fighters, AAA, and SAMs. 

further contended that limited funds wouldn’t allow the de

ment of such highly specialized forces that could be used onl

particular type of war.

EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM FOR AIR SUPPORT

This background had a direct influence in the early pro

of air-ground operations in Vietnam. Even though oper

were relatively small during the 1962–1964 period as com

to the later campaigns, the problems were aggravated b

inability of the South Vietnamese to stop the take-over 

country by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. The loss 

helicopters and damage to nine others during a heli

assault at Ap Bac in January 1963 drove home the need fo

ter coordination between air and ground forces. Becau

another operation directed by the Vietnamese Joint G

Staff, there were no fixed wing aircraft available to suppo

helicopter assault. The ARVN 7th Division commander, as w

the U.S. advisor, decided to go ahead with the operations 

employ helicopter gun ships to suppress ground fire in the 

ing zone. The Viet Cong had reconnoitered the probable la

sites and had a battalion of troops dug in waiting for the as

The helicopters were brought under intense ground fire wi

attendant losses. Fixed wing aircraft were brought into the 

later, but too late. The operation failed with 65 ARVN and 

advisors killed. Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, stated the ope

should not have been conducted without fixed wing aircraf

port, and he directed that all future helicopter assaults 

supported.15 Later, the point was made again by G

Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, that helicopter gunships we

a substitute for fixed wing aircraft.

NORTH AFRICA—THE CLASSROOM FOR VIETNAM

The organization for air-ground operations in Vietnam h

genesis in North Africa and was modified in the battle for E

Essentially, the interface between air-ground fighting force

at the tactical air force field army level. It was at this lev
changes in the battle. Above this level, commanders conc

themselves with longer-range issues and the general strate

the campaign. It was at the tactical air force/army level th

campaign plans were translated into specific actions to a

the objectives of the campaign.

In North Africa, an air support command was the initial o

zation that functioned with an army formation, either a field 

or a corps. In the fall of 1942, the XII Air Support Comman

the air organization that worked with II Corps. Followin

Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General Eisenhow

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northwest Africa, estab

the Northwest African Tactical Air Force. It worked with the 

18th Army Group which controlled British forces in the 

French corps in the center, and the U.S. II Corps on the sou

flank.16 The XII Air Support Command was unique durin

period of development of air commands designed to wor

ground units.

By the time of the Normandy invasion, numbered tacti

commands had been created to work with each of th

armies, and numbered air forces with army groups. As the 

forces became established on the continent, the 9th U.

Force, commanded by General Vandenberg, worked with th

12th Army Group that General Bradley commanded. G

Vandenberg had three tactical air commands (TACs), the IX

and XXIX. Each of these commands worked with the field a

under General Bradley, the 1st, 3rd, and 9th. Thus, the I

was a partner of the 1st Army; XIX TAC of the 3rd Army; a

XXIX TAC of the 9th Army.

EUROPE—REFINEMENT OF THE SYSTEM

General Vandenberg shifted forces among the tactical ai

mands as the campaign changed. When General Patton

Army had the mission of driving to the Rhine, Vandenber

mented Weyland’s XIX TAC with forces from Quesada’s I

and Nugent’s XXIX TAC. The flexibility of the command an

trol system allowed Vandenberg to be responsive to str

decisions.

The British had a similar relationship between the 21st 

Group and the 2nd Tactical Air Force commanded by Ai

shal Coningham. Below the tactical air force level, the B

had an air group which was approximately the size of a U.

288
tical air command. Each of the British and Canadian field a

had an air group partner. These similar organizations m

easier to pass operational control of air units between th

9th Air Force and the British 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF

example, during the period when Montgomery had priorit

drive on the northern flank, units of the IX TAC were tem

ily under the control of the 2nd TAF.

Each tactical air command operated a Joint Operations 

ter (JOC) to provide command and control. The JOC w

operational heart of the command where the staff schedu

missions, selected weapons loads, and determined level of 

The JOC was run by the Combat Operations Officer. He w

experienced combat fighter pilot who usually was a group 

mander before being assigned to the JOC. The JOC usual

a senior Army officer, Naval liaison officer (if the tactical sit

so required), and various intelligence officers who close

lowed and posted the current air and ground situation. Alt

the other services were represented, the JOC was the com

facility of the tactical air commander––it was not a joint f

in the sense of being jointly directed by an air and ground 

mander.
within seeing and hearing of the Combat Operations Office

center executed the JOC decisions, controlling all aircraft 

target. The TACC had sub-elements whose number dep

upon the geographical area and the density of the air traffic

mally, the TACC had two CRCs and three CRPs with an 

nite number of forward director posts (FDPs) deployed to 

the spaces in the high and low altitude radar coverage. Th

tical control system was conceived, designed, and operat

both offensive and defensive air operations. Each tactic

command was responsible for all offensive and defensive a

sions within its geographical area to the range of its radars

organization was also used during the Korean conflict.

Fifth Air Force was responsible for air operations in Kore

made only minor changes to the system. Instead of having 

tical air command parallel to a field army, a numbered ai

now performed that function. Actually, except for the cha

name, there was no difference between the WWII and Korea

organizations. Fifth Air Force provided the same support f

Army in Korea as IX TAC did for 1st Army in Europe.

ADAPTING THE AIR—GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM

TO VIETNAM

As the ARVN forces expanded, the need for an air organ

similar to that at the close of the Korean War was obvious. 

difficult to create the necessary organization because of U.S. 

which did not allow our forces to fight, but the command an

trol organization had to be tailored to the Vietnamese situati

In Vietnam the Air Force added a new element to the sy

the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), later redesign

Direct Air Support Center (DASC). DASCs were non-exist

the Army corps level during World War II and Korea, b

functions performed by the DASC were handled by an air 

officer who maintained contact with the JOC. These air 

officers did not have as much authority as the DASCs 

South Vietnam. They represented the tactical air force 

mander at the corps level and advised the Army corps 

290

*TACC—Tactical Air Control Center: The principal center from which ai

tions are controlled. It is the senior radar control facility in the tactical 

trol system.
mander on the employment of airpower. Because the air 

officer acted in an “advisory” capacity only, the Army pro

all field requests for “immediate” and “pre-planned” air s

Each request had to be laboriously channeled and app

through each higher echelon of the command structure u

reached the field army level. So, a battalion request had 
warded to the field army. During this process, the air liaiso

cer, at division level, would directly notify the JOC through h

communications net that an “immediate” was on its way

allowed the JOC enough lead time to divert aircraft from othe

sions or launch those on ground alert. This, of course, wa

with the assumption that the request would be approved.

During the Italian campaign in World War II, Brigadier G

Gordon P. Saville, Commander, XII Air Support Com

experimented at corps level with an organization similar 

DASC.17 For various reasons, however, the Air Force d

adopt the organization for the subsequent campaigns in E

nor did it appear as part of air doctrine during or immediat

lowing the Korean War. It wasn’t until the early ’60s th

DASC began to take shape.

South Vietnam was divided into four corps areas, and 

corps commander had almost absolute authority within his 

Even though the corps was technically under the direction 

Joint General Staff (JGS), the highest military body in the 

Vietnamese armed forces, corps commanders reported dire

the President and were responsive to the JGS only when 

considered it desirable.

The Vietnamese assigned all military forces in a corps zone 

the command authority of the corps commander. Even air u

each of the corps zones came under the control of the corps 

mander; he considered these units as being his and not for t

of adjacent corps commanders. USAF air doctrine, on the 

hand, placed air units under the command and control of th

ior air headquarters in a theater of war.

In establishing the air-ground control system, repeated att

were made to create the system in accordance with U.S. Air 

doctrine. Experience in North Africa showed that parceling 

forces to ground commanders is ineffective. Centralized contr

vides the most efficient use of air resources.

The Vietnamese organization’s complete inflexibility c

additional problems. On the other hand, FARM GATE forces 

the control of the 2nd Air Division commander responded 

corps areas. Even with a force of only two fighter squadron

2nd Air Division commander was able to deploy a Direct Air 

Team (DAST) to any corps area in which a battle was pla

These small forces responded to directions from the 2nd Ai

sion Operations Center at Tan Son Nhut. Because VNAF 

were under the operational control of the corps commande

292
prevailed throughout the war, even during the final offen

1975.

The shortage of air units in 1963–1964 demanded more f

ity, not less, yet the Vietnamese organization denied this flex

This Vietnamese organization corresponded to the U.S. Arm

tion on the control of helicopters in which they were under th

corps advisor who employed them in accordance with the des

the corps commander. In effect, this compartmented operati

each corps area and was contrary to all fundamental princi

the employment of airpower. The need to integrate air doctrin

ground doctrine was again shown in 1964 during Ope

DESERT STRIKE, a joint Army/Air Force exercise conduc

southern California. It was the largest joint military exercis

ducted since World War II and second in size only to the Nort

olina maneuvers in November 1941.

Out of DESERT STRIKE evolved the Air Support Operation

ter (ASOC)* at Army corps level. Introduced into Vietnam s

thereafter, the ASOC closely followed the functions develope

ing the exercise. Essentially, the ASOC enlarged the duties 

air liaison officer by providing him with specialists for the f

reconnaissance, airlift, and intelligence roles. Instead of bein

an advisor to the corps commander, he now had more of an 

tional responsibility for the employment of air sorties alloca

the corps. This role represented a significant change in the p

tion of how airpower should be employed in support of g

forces.

In World War II and Korea there had been very l

decentralization of authority below the tactical air force lev

decisions were made at the field army/tactical air force lev

not at the corps level. The air liaison officer had no autho

divert aircraft, nor was he given an allocation of sorties 

used by the corps commander. The corps commander re

his air support through “preplanned” requests approved 

field army commander. It wasn’t until Operation DE

STRIKE that the need for more flexibility in the use of clo

support at corps level was fully appreciated.

*ASOC—air support operations center: A facility of the tactical air for

mander located near an Army corps headquarters to advise and assist th

commander in requesting and using air support.
to this need. The fluidity of the ground battle within a corp

often made it necessary for the ASOC to divert strike a

from preplanned targets in support of ground units. Thi

the corps commander some flexibility to change the impo

of targets at any given time or to support the ground unit, 

needed direct air support the most.

Early in Vietnam we helped the VNAF establish an AS

each corps headquarters. A VNAF officer ran the ASOC 

USAF officer assisting and advising him. The ASOC w

with the corps Tactical Operations Center (TOC) respo

for the ground effort. On preplanned missions the ASOC 

estimate the air forces required to support the planned g

operations. This was done independently of the TOC. 

meantime, ARVN divisions within the corps areas would 

mit to the TOC what they thought would be required 

way of air support. These requests were then consolida

the TOC, which would then validate the requested air su

with the ASOC. After the two agencies had completed 

review the corps commander approved or disapprove

sent the request to the JGS. Usually the VNAF represen

had very little impact since the senior TOC officer cons

VNAF air units to be merely another element of the corp

Joint Operations Center was located at JGS. Only a fe

men were assigned to this facility, and because of the 

size of the VNAF, there was a lack of experienced office

assignment. As a consequence, airmen had limited infl

in the decision process. The JOC determined how man

craft would be assigned to the mission and what the arm

load would be. In almost all cases the JOC followed the re

submitted by the corps commander. The JOC sent 

request to the Air Operations Center for execution.

The Air Operations Center was jointly manned with USA

VNAF personnel. The director was a VNAF officer with a 

officer as his deputy. Again, at this stage of the war U.S. 

were not overtly involved, and their role was that of traini

VNAF. The Air Operations Center developed the fragm

(frag) order that directed the units to fly the mission. A c

the frag order went to the ASOCs and all elements of the t

air control system. The senior element of the control syste

the Tactical Air Control Center located within the Air Oper

Center. This was consistent with the organization develo

World War II and used in Korea, since the Air Operations C

294
There was, however, one very fundamental difference: 

JOC, the senior Army representative presented Army re

for air support after they had been evaluated by the 

army––the combat operations officer then determined 

forces and armament would be needed to produce the d

effect requested by the field army commander. This was ce

ized control of air resources. Hence, the USAF/Army sys

air-ground operations was fundamentally different from th

namese system. In the Vietnamese system, the division 

power into corps areas was a serious error that limited the 

bility of the VNAF to support its army. Without a centr

combined command structure, there was no way to adeq

employ the very limited resources of the VNAF.

THE BATTLE CHANGES—NEW DEMANDS

By the end of 1964, the North Vietnamese had made a 

sion to escalate the war in South Vietnam.18 Engagement

now approaching that of a battalion size. Heretofore, most 

contacts were at platoon and company levels with some a

on strategic hamlets above company size. The hostile troop

armed with better weapons, and for the first time regular 

Vietnamese troops were identified from battalion and in 

cases larger units. From these activities, it was evident th

North Vietnamese had embarked on a sustained military ef

capture South Vietnam.19

With the appearance of regular North Vietnamese tro

South Vietnam, aircraft encountered heavier ground fire 

corps areas with a sharp increase in I and II Corps. Wh

most of the ground fire had been 30 calibers, 50 calibers b

more frequent. This added firepower required a change to 

operating altitudes for most aircraft, because the effective 

of 30 caliber weapons was about 1,400 feet while that of 5

ibers was approximately 3,500 feet. Aircraft operating 

2,000 feet expected to encounter some ground fire. In app

ing most of the advanced or assault airfields, aircraft 

expect spasmodic ground fire while on final approach. Th

also true after dark on the approaches to most of the larg

fields such as Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Danang.

Aircraft losses increased significantly during this time. Th

had reached the end of its useful life and was difficult to o

where ground fire was present. Structural failures and losses 
squadrons and A-1Hs for the VNAF. The shortage of A-1s m

imperative that we obtain a replacement aircraft. The U.S. Air 

was pressing, again, for the introduction of jet aircraft sinc

survivability was better and they could be logistically suppo

a more efficient manner.

The B-26, which had done a good job, was no longer struc

sound. When a wing buckled on a B-26 during a glide bom

the Air Force decided to pull the remaining B-26s out of com

The Air Force made a number of studies to determine what 

be done to increase the life of the B-26 and concluded th

price was prohibitive for the few years of added life expectan

the few aircraft available. With the withdrawal of the B-26 

Vietnam, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Air Forces 

proposed the introduction of two squadrons of B-57s. The

craft were based in the Philippines and were scheduled to 

to the states to be assigned to the reserve forces. The reque

again turned down for the same reason—it would be an ap

violation of the Geneva Accord. The Air Force hoped to get 

tional A-1Hs from the Navy, although that service was havin

ilar difficulties maintaining its inventory.

296

*A-1E was a multiplaced model whereas the A-11-1 was a single seat ve

The A-1E became the workhorse of the Air Commando fighter force, replac

T-28. It carried a large payload and could stay over a target area for ho
During this period, the frequency of ground contacts incr

and the number of helicopter assaults increased significantl

Army aircraft in South Vietnam constituted 47% of all aircra

2nd Air Division had 117 aircraft of which approximately 5

combat aircraft, the remainder being O-ls, SC-47s, and C

The VNAF had about 170 aircraft. With so many U.S. Arm

copters conducting missions throughout most of the corps 

the issue of who would control these helicopters became c

The increased ground fire, probability of collision, and likelih

mutual interference required more positive control of these a

In previous wars, all combat aircraft in a theater came und

control of the air component commander. In Unified Action 

Forces, the Air Force is charged with “the preparation of t

forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war . . . for th

duct of sustained combat operations in the air . . . to ga

maintain general air supremacy, to defeat enemy air forces, t

trol vital air areas, and to establish local air superiority.”

precedent and this directive didn’t seem to answer all of the 

tions about what to do with helicopters in Vietnam. The issu

control of U.S. Army helicopters since VNAF helicopters 

already under the control of the tactical air control system 

though they were assigned to the various corps and emplo

the corps commanders.

The Army declined to place helicopters under control 

2nd Air Division commander, again arguing that these a

were essentially part of the ground forces, like jeep

artillery, and therefore operational control should remai
Force replied that it was not trying to dictate how the he

ters would be employed, but it felt obligated to preven

copter missions from going into areas already under 

attack by other aircraft and to provide adequate cove

suppression of ground fire for helicopter air assaults. T

Force component commander had the responsibility for 

dinating all air operations including helicopter assaults. 

essential, therefore, that helicopters be controlled by t

Operations Center.

Realizing the necessity of a coordinated effort, Military 

tance Command Vietnam (MACV) headquarters directed th

U.S. Army Aviation Operations Center collocate with the com

USAF/VNAF AOC and that the commander of Army aviation 

dinate all helicopter assault operations with the 2nd Air D

commander.22 Based on extensive experience from previous 

the Air Force knew the vulnerability of airborne assaults, an

copters were even more vulnerable to ground fire than the 

transports used for airborne assaults in World War II and 

Thus, Harkins’ directive of 18 August 1962 resolved that a

borne assaults would be escorted by fixed wing aircraft an

concentrated air attack would be conducted prior to the assa

suppress any ground fire or to prepare areas where it was 

probable.

NO BATTLE LINES—FACS COME OF AGE

With the enemy infiltrating throughout the country, 

for certain areas where there were few civilians the prob

preventing or, minimizing civilian casualties was extr

critical. Obviously the bombing of innocent civilians, 

from being inhumanly wrong, would quite defeat our pu

to convince the civilian population to help the gover

eradicate the NVA and VC. The enemy was aware of the 

able propaganda he could generate by enticing attac

areas where civilian casualties were bound to happen; 

virtually impossible to root the enemy out of villages and 

areas, particularly in the delta, if attacks were not mad

great precision.

Because there were no front lines except for the 17th pa

which arbitrarily separated South Vietnam from North Vie

the enemy was apt to be anywhere; this was a distingu

characteristic of the war as compared to World War II and 

298
could assume that anything that moved was directly asso

with support of the enemy’s fighting force and was a legi

target. Towns and villages were struck when the enemy 

them for bivouac of troops, supply points, or staging for f

attacks. When Intelligence indicated military activities in 

villages, they were brought under attack. Civilians were n

targets, of course, and if civilian casualties did occur, the

a collateral effect of the attacks against the military target

In Vietnam, though, all villages and towns were in the c

zone. We had no way of telling whether there were enemy fo

the villages unless the villagers were willing to come forwar

report their presence. In some hard core North Vietnamese 

(NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) areas like War Zones C and D, the U 

Forest, and Bong Son Plain, civilians were warned to stay out

who remained or filtered in were considered hostile and 

brought under attack by ground or air firepower.

To minimize attacks against civilians, Forward Air Cont

became the fundamental means by which all strikes wer

trolled. With the deployment of the first FARM GATE detac

in 1961, the policy that strike aircraft would be under th

trol of a Forward Air Controller became firm.23 All FARM 

aircraft were controlled by VNAF FACs. The shortage of 

pilots and the lack of trained FACs, however, created an 

isfactory condition.

As FARM GATE aircraft assumed more missions and 

demand for close air support increased, the need for USAF 

was apparent. The USAF had phased down some of its forw

control structure at the end of the Korean War; FAC dutie

handled by periodically rotating fighter pilots from squadr

Army divisions. These FACs were on duty with Army division

ing field exercises and maneuvers. Considering the freque

exercise, this was a satisfactory method of training air and g

forces. Such a program, however, did not have a broad enoug

to meet a large wartime requirement. For conventional war w

sidered that there would be sufficient time to expand the inv

of FACs to correspond with the number of Army divisions 

deployed.

*bomb line: Imaginary line beyond which aircraft could deliver ordnance 

coordinating with the ground forces.
supposed they would be needed for the control of all strike

spective of target location. Close air support doctrine di

that these pilots would be needed only for the control of s

that were in close proximity to friendly troops. Once strike

scheduled beyond a line in advance of ground forces suc

bomb line, there would be no need for a FAC except to lo

target. The basic requirement in World War lI and Korea 

employ FACs in the close air support role.

With no formal line of engagement of troops in South Vie

the role of the Forward Air Controller took on a vastly di

character. With the requirement to have a FAC control 

strikes, an expanded force was needed and time was 

essence. The inability of VNAF to satisfactorily do th

resulted in the deployment of the USAF 19th Tactical Air Su

Squadron in June 1963.24 This unit had 22 L-19s and 44 

its role from the outset was not only control of air strike

also development of information about the enemy through 

visual reconnaissance (VR).

During the period 1963–1964, Forward Air Controllers 

prime source of intelligence about the enemy. FAC proce

closely followed a RAND* study which suggested that the a

ment of FACs to each of the 44 provinces would provide a 

source of current intelligence that could be used for a

ground action.

By April of 1965, with the introduction of major U.S. g

and air units, the FAC structure was expanded to fou

squadrons. Our policy then assigned a FAC to each pr

headquarters and major ground force unit down to ba

level. All Tactical Air Support Squadrons (TASSs) were as

to the 507th Tactical Air Control Group.

Two categories of FACs met the expanded demand. Th

category was fighter pilots who served in fighter units for th

six months of their tour in Vietnam. After this period, the

given a short course in the functions and duties of a FA

then checked out in a 0-1, 0-2, or OV-10 depending up

type of aircraft assigned to a given TASS. Upon completion 

course, these fighter pilots were assigned to U.S., Korean

ARVN ground force combat units. 

300

*RAND––A California corporation that has had a contract with USAF sin

to undertake a variety of studies concerning strategy, force development, 

ment, and design of weapon systems.
These pilots were familiar with the conduct of close air s

strikes. Since they worked with ground combat units, it was 

tial also that they have a good rapport with the ground com

ers and that these commanders have confidence in them. T

Force assumed that this relationship could come about mor

ily if a fighter pilot who had been flying close air support mi

were selected for FAC duty with Army units. Since the FAC w
resentative of the tactical air force commander, he advise

assisted the ground forces commanders in determining thei

for air support requirements. This policy prevailed througho

war.

The second category of FACs included those assigned t

of the province headquarters and to special units. These 

came from all types of organizations in the Air Force. Some 

from Air Training Command, Air Staff, Military Airlift Com

Air Defense Command, as well as all the other commands 

Air Force. They were given FAC training at Hurlburt 

Florida, and then assigned to a Tactical Air Support Squad

South Vietnam.

These pilots worked daily with the province chiefs. By 

over the province day after day, the pilot got to know the pr

in detail and easily noticed changes in the activities of v

which would often indicate the presence of enemy elem

Based on this information, patrols were dispatched to co

the intelligence. The FAC was usually overhead to provide 

assistance or request air support. Many times the provinc

would recommend targets to the province chief who would 

the corps headquarters to get a strike approved.

As in Korea, the Vietnamese terrain seriously restricted th

ity of FACs on the ground. The airborne FAC was the only ef

way of controlling a strike. In Korea the T-6 was used for th

sion. These FACs were called MOSQUITOES, and flew close 

ground battle line.25 They received their missions from the 

and were in contact with the ground units receiving the cl

support. Targets were marked with 2.75-inch rockets, an

MOSQUITO pilot controlled the fighters making the strike.

We had a similar system in South Vietnam. The Air Forc

assigned to an Army battalion would be over the target are

to the scheduled time of the mission. Being familiar w

aspects of the battalion’s current operation, he didn’t requi

entation once the action started. After taking off from their 

base, the fighters would contact the nearest tactical air c

facility which would direct them to the location of the FAC. 

the fighters established radio contact, the FAC would pro

description of the target, attack heading, artillery inform

and location of a recovery area in the event a fighter was 

aged. The fighters then reported their armament on boar

the flight was ready to begin the attack.

302
Before he allowed the fighters to attack, the FAC had to 

mine the exact position of friendly forces. H e would reque

ground commander to indicate the forward line of U.S. 

with smoke markers. Once this line was identified and the 

ers confirmed visual contact with the smoke, the FAC 

make his run into the target, mark it with a smoke rocke

clear the fighters for attack. Using the smoke as a ref

point, the FAC would relay adjustments to the fighters unt

had expended their ordnance on the target.

Depending on the type and amount of ground fire being re

and the position of friendly troops, the FAC called for m

passes on the target from appropriate directions. Circling n

over the target and keeping it and the fighters in sight at all 

he would often hold up the attack and mark remaining areas 

target. The greatest percentage of targets in South Vietnam w

visible to the fighter pilot because of terrain, jungle cover, or 

of the aircraft; usually it was a combination of all three. In 

instances the fighter pilots never actually saw the specific 

because it was hidden in the dense vegetation of the jungle. 

men had to rely almost entirely on the eyes of the FAC to ge

ordnance on the target. At all times, the FAC was the fin

O-1 “Bird Dog” over a Special Forces camp in South Vietnam.
fact, the local air commander for the conduct of air operation

his authority was recognized by the ground force command

flight leader alike.

JETS ARE APPROVED

As 1964 came to a close, the military and political situatio

deteriorated to the point that a major decision to introduc

combat forces had to be made if South Vietnam were to s

North Vietnam had embarked on a full scale military campa

eliminate all South Vietnamese resistance. Instead of isolated 

scale actions by VC troops, battalion size engagements were 

place, and North Vietnamese troops were more in evidence, 

ularly in I and III Corps and along the tri-border area in II 

More airpower was needed to cover these areas, but the VNA

unable to meet the increasing requests. The graduated incre

the use of airpower was ineffective against enemy forces an

of communication in Laos and did not convince the North 

namese that further military actions against South Vietnam 

lead to larger scale military action by U.S. forces. With the 

attacks on Pleiku in early February 1965, 2nd Air Divisio

given authority to employ B-57s in South Vietnam.26 It had 

long uphill struggle to get a modern jet aircraft into South Vi

to replace the worn out T-28s and B-26s. Although the A-1

in relatively good condition, there were insufficient numb

them to support the enlarged war. Furthermore, these aircra

n’t have the performance to cope with the increase in anti-a

fire, nor the range to operate between corps areas when 

loaded. As the North Vietnamese expanded ground operation

quality and quantity of their automatic weapons went up sh

Although not comparable to ground fire experienced in the 

route packages in North Vietnam, it had greatly increased ov

in 1961–1963.

With the introduction of the B-57s, some other restri

were lifted. These aircraft could operate in support of tro

contact with the enemy without the requirement to have 

namese observer on board. Additionally, for the first tim

markings were authorized on combat aircraft delivering 

ground munitions. Until this time, FARM GATE aircraft ha

ried VNAF markings even though they were flown exclusiv

USAF pilots.

304
major expansion of airfields and runways was needed. Only 

airfields in South Vietnam were capable of handling jet a

and these were badly in need of major repair and runway 

sion. Danang had been a major French airfield for I Corp

although it needed majors expansion, it could support F

Bien Hoa was marginal, and to support sustained jet ope

concrete runways were needed to replace the asphalt strip 

by T-28s, B-26s, and A-1s. The third airfield, Ton Son Nh

in Saigon, was already handling jet commercial traffic. Ho

the hard wear and tear of the heavy commercial traffic mea

runway would soon have to be replaced if combat jet a

were to be located there.

The decision in March 1965 to deploy U.S. Marine and 

units to Vietnam accelerated the engineering effort to in

the capability of the three major airfields.27 Furthermo

started plans to build new airfields at Cam Ranh Bay, 

Rang, Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, and Chu Lai, as well as to expa

strip at Pleiku for the emergency recovery of F-100s and 

With the expected buildup of forces, we decided to constru

10,000-foot runways for each of the major jet airfields. In 

ing to this objective, temporary runways of 10,000 feet wer

structed first to meet the operational ready dates of the inc

units. As the temporary runways were finished, along with 

porting structures, work was immediately started on the p

nent, parallel 10,000-foot concrete runways. When the firs

crete runways were finished, traffic was shifted from 

temporary runways to the new ones, and work was star

the second concrete runways. Before the end of 1967, th

way construction program was completed. 

By the end of 1965, U.S. strength had built to more 

184,000 men.28 The forces under the control of 2nd Air D

had been expanding at a rapid rate, and by now the head

ters should have equaled that of a numbered air force. No

ing sufficient staff officers, the Air Division had to depe

13th Air Force in the Philippines to provide temporary per

to help handle the workload. This was certainly not a satisf

arrangement, but was consistent with the policy at the t

not building up headquarters in Vietnam. 

All forces assigned to South Vietnam came under MACV 

quarters which was now established as a sub-unified com

under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). Unde

arrangement, MACV could not employ its air units in are
CINCPAC. Thus, CINCPAC was directly responsible for th

effort north of Route Package I and in northern Laos. 

THE AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS SYSTEM EXPANDS

By November 1965, the need for a complete tactical ai

command and control system was recognized. With 500 c

aircraft now under the control of 2nd Air Division, an air-g

system like the one developed in World War II and Kore

needed. The South Vietnamese Air Force was no longer the 

agency for air operations; the USAF had taken over the mai

of supporting all ground operations. Even though comman

control facilities were jointly manned, USAF personnel ra

activities with the VNAF members controlling only a limited 

the operation.

As U.S. ground forces were introduced into II and III Cor

organization analogous to a corps headquarters was nee

direct the subordinate divisions. Normally, each three div

would require a corps headquarters, but a corps headqu

would have been confused with the four South Vietnamese 

corps, and since there was no combined command, separate 

Vietnamese and U.S. headquarters were dictated. This situat

to the creation of I and II Field Force Vietnam (FFV) headqu

These headquarters were equivalent to a standard U.S. Army 

and had the same functions. In addition, each of these hea

ters had the flexibility to expand to accommodate a field arm

Inasmuch as South Vietnamese and U.S. forces did not 

ate under a combined command structure, separate air-g

networks were also necessary. To support South Vietn

forces, a DASC was collocated with each of the ARVN 

headquarters. The DASCs were jointly manned. Althoug

director was a VNAF officer who had a USAF officer as d

the DASC was essentially run by the USAF. The DASC, ha

all requests for air support generated within the ARVN 

area. Missions allocated to the DASC were employed again

planned targets, but they could be altered at the direction 

corps TOC. Throughout the war this system never chang

DASC always coordinated USAF close air support of 

ground forces. Close air support of U.S. troops was ma

through a separate system. II FFV was collocated with the 

III Corps headquarters, and the DASC serving the corp

served II FFV; however, all U.S. air requests were handled 

306
rately. Poor Vietnamese security made it necessary to func

this manner. I FFV was located at Nha Trang and was res

ble for all U.S. Army divisions operating in the II Corps are

DASC for ARVN forces in II Corps was located at Pleiku wi

corps headquarters. This arrangement, therefore, separat

U.S. I FFV headquarters from ARVN II Corps by some 150 

making it necessary, as well as prudent for security reaso

have separate DASCs.
tions since allocation decisions were made at a higher 

COMUSMACV and the commander of 7th Air Force establish

priority of the various corps and field force requests for air su

2ND AIR DIVISION BECOMES 7th AIR FORCE.

As more U.S. units moved into Vietnam, 2nd Air D

expanded to become a numbered air force on 1 April 1

Three months later, on 1 July, I replaced Lieutenant G

Moore as the unit’s commander.

Until the Tet offensive of 1968, all of the air operations 

South Vietnam were flown by units based in South Vietn

on carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although I had operationa

trol of all USAF units in Thailand, I didn’t employ them in 

Vietnam until January 1968 because Thai leaders wer

cerned about the international political implications of al

U.S. aircraft based in Thailand to provide regular close ai

port to ARVN divisions in South Vietnam. I did have autho

use Thailand based units if I considered the situation in 

Vietnam critical, but I could do so only after coordinatin

the U.S. Ambassador in Thailand. Beginning with the Tet 

sive, I and other 7th Air Force commanders used Thailand 

units as needed throughout the remainder of the war.

The command and control system, as designed during 

War II and Korea and refined for Vietnam operations, faci

the employment of airpower wherever it was needed. The 7

Force commander’s available aircraft in South Vietnam 

Thailand were based throughout the theater so that no 

was ever more than a few minutes away from strike airc

Additionally, KC-135 tankers made it feasible to use fi

from one end of the country to the other. It was this flex

within the command and control system which permitted 

ers from Cam Ranh Bay, for instance, to fly close air su

missions in I, II, or III Corps, or if necessary to strike targ

the lower portion of North Vietnam. Also, the tankers pr

even greater flexibility to shift the fighter force from clo

support missions in South Vietnam to counter air missi

North Vietnam if the situation demanded it.

By early 1967, there were hundreds of thousands of tro

country. The 7th Air Force was well established by this time t

port these U.S., ARVN, Korean, and Australian ground force

of the four corps areas. Centralized control of airpower was th

308
support when it needed it. If the air had been divided-up 

these various forces, COMUSMACV would have been una

concentrate the airpower of 7th AF where he wanted and nee

With the control centralized, he was able to move around any

within his area of responsibility, concentrating firepower as n

General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff in the m

enties, and a previous COMUSMACV, put it this way:

I’m talking about sheer power in terms of tonnage, bombs 

the target, and that sort of thing, and rockets, because high p

formance fixed-wing aircraft carry a much greater payload. A

you can focus that very quickly.... I don’t mean from the fi

brigade to the second brigade. I’m talking about going an

where, instead of putting it in MR-4, you go to MR-1. You swi

the whole faucet, and you do it in about 45 minutes. The wh

control system and base system that supports that, there 

nothing in the Army like it. There is nothing anywhere in 

world like it.32

EMPLOYING THE FORCE

Because a formal line between two opposing ground forc

not exist, the techniques of applying airpower were unde

stant revision. In World War II and Korea only a small frac

the sorties were devoted to immediate air strikes, althou

fighters could be diverted to these missions from prepl

ones in a matter of minutes. The most effective use of air

in close air support in both World War II and Korea was in 

planned mission designed to break through enemy defense

stop a penetration. In these missions airpower could be m

P-40s taxiing up to the take-off line at an airfield near Surg-El-Arab in Nort
get reorganized.

It was at El Almein on 23 October 1942, that Montgo

8th Army launched an offensive to break the defenses of Ro

and roll up the Afrika Korps.33 The Western Desert Air 

having gained control of the air, concentrated on destroyin

plies badly needed by Rommel. He had supplies for only a l

offensive and depended on capturing stocks to susta

Panzer forces in a final thrust to take Cairo and the 

needed oil of the Middle East. As Rommel’s drive halted 

marshes of El Almein, airpower was turned to a series o

tained attacks against the dug-in forces. Montgomery lau

his ground offensive on 24 October 1942 with more than 

aircraft creating a way for his armor to move through th

man defenses. Although Rommel was able to elude the 8th 

and withdraw his battered forces into Libya, the Western 

Air Force took a heavy toll of his retreating forces.

The use of massed airpower to support a breakthrough 

became a standard procedure. Massed air support was inva

on 6 May 1943 when a combined air and ground offensive de

von Armin’s army, which was trying to make its final stand 

Tunis in North Africa.34 Later, more than 3,000 aircraft, the 

number used in World War II, supported the breakout of P

3rd Army from the Brittany peninsula. Periodically throu

World War II, airpower was massed in a similar manner: at 

Eschweiler, Aachen, and all major offensives by Allied a

When concentrated in this way, tactical airpower had the g

potential for helping to break the back of the enemy.

The Korean War produced few circumstances in whic

power could be used in concentrated close air support. O

Pusan and during the stabilization of the line in 1952 wa

power employed in such a manner. The absence of open t

for tank warfare and the strong defensive positions provid

the mountains tended to reduce the potential for a decisive 

sive by either force. Further, the United Nations objec

accepting a return to the pre-hostility positions along th

parallel made a decisive offensive unnecessary. As a 

United Nations forces conducted spoiling attacks, and 

these attacks had such limited objectives, there wasn’t th

for massed close air support.

Close air support in Korea set the pattern for South Vietnam

FAC was the key element in Korea, as he was in Vietnam, be

the targets were relatively small and very close to the posi

310
friendly forces. The demand for close air support in both 

tended to be scattered across the front with some targets 

active than others. With these small targets, the number of a

in a strike was usually from four to eight unless the strik

revealed an enemy concentration requiring more aircraft.

Preplanned missions historically have been the most p

tive since there is better integration of the air and ground 

in accordance with a specific plan of action. In addition

briefed pilots have a better understanding of the target are

the scheme of maneuver to be employed by the ground 

Other advantages stem from the opportunity to select th

timing and the best weapon for the target, and the least v

able approach and withdrawal routes from the target. The

tors have always meant that preplanned missions were b

both the air and ground commanders.

In the 1965–1968 period, about 65% to 70% of the 7

Force strength was employed on preplanned missions. The 

conducted search and destroy operations like ATTLEB

JUNCTION CITY, and CEDAR FALLS, and the air supp

these operations had to be planned in detail. Planning fo

division and multi-division operations covered a period of w

B-24 “Liberators” of the 467th Bomb Group dropping tons of bombs on e

installations in France.
worked into the scheme of maneuver.

Once the operation started, fighters were scheduled aga

number of preselected targets in the assault area such as 

enemy troops, suspected concentrations of troops, rou

approach and withdrawal, and areas in which suspected aut

weapons posed a threat to helicopter assaults and the subse

support of the troops. The destruction of these preselected t

provided maximum security for the assault force during the 

phases of landing, consolidation, and movement from the ob

area. Additionally, fighters were scheduled into the area at fre

intervals to take care of targets of opportunity. These prepl

strikes provided air support for all aspects of the operatio

ensured airpower was available to handle those parts of the 

in which artillery and organic weapons were insufficient.

The remaining 30% of the air effort, not committed to prepl

missions, was used for “immediate” or troops-in-contact situ

All ground operations were designed to seek out the North 

namese and VC and to force an engagement in which our su

firepower, particularly airpower, could be employed. It was o

icy that after contact with the enemy was established, our g

forces would pull back a sufficient distance to allow artille

airpower to be used without restraint. Then the Army would 

up these attacks with reaction forces.

When the ground forces made contact, we diverted fi

from preplanned missions of lesser priority, or aircraft h

ground alert were scrambled. COMUSMACV had the flexib

divert fighters from any part of the country to a troops-in-c

situation. He, therefore, had at his disposal the forces nec

to mount a superiority of firepower against the enemy no m

where the enemy elected to stand and fight.

On any given day in South Vietnam, 7th Air Force flew 

300 preplanned sorties, the Marines in I Corps another 20

the VNAF 100. The number of aircraft on ground alert 

according to the number of ground contacts expected thr

out the country. On an average, 40 aircraft were held on 

and were scrambled approximately three to four times a d

the end of a typical day, we had flown between 750 and 80

ties in support of the ground forces. This effort was sus

day in and day out. We also had the potential to surge to a 

higher rate for short periods. During the 1968 Tet offensiv

the peak period of the assault at Khe Sanh, for example, th

tie rate jumped from 1.2 per day per aircraft to 1.8.

312
combat aircraft were under positive control. The TACC 

minute-by-minute display of all missions, including the ord

of any given formation. If a ground contact suddenly develop

combat operations officer could immediately divert fighters 

scene. The TACC, which controlled the fighters through su

nate elements of the system, directed the new mission and pr

vectors for the fighters to the target area.

While the TACC issued these instructions, ground alert 

were being launched and backup forces brought to alert 

to replace those launched. In a matter of minutes, we could 

a major air effort to any battle area. For a divert, it took an 

age of 15 to 20 minutes to get fighters into the area and i

tact with the FAC. Then the time it took to put munitions 

target was determined by the speed with which the FAC cou

clearance from the ground force commander and set up th

tern for attack. If the FAC had received prior clearan

required only a matter of minutes to mark the target. T

time, the FAC began briefing the fighter pilots while they 

still some distance from the target. All that remained f

fighters to do was to visually acquire the target.

Ground alert aircraft normally took 35 to 40 minutes 

bombs on the target.35 This compares with 40 minutes 

Korean War and about 45 minutes in World War II. When a 

reaction time was needed, either diverted aircraft or air

alert aircraft would provide it, but most targets could wa

40-45 minutes necessary to get alert aircraft to the target

ally a ground force commander took longer than this to de

call for air support rather than handle the situation with o

weapons or artillery.

ADVANTAGES OF AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE OVER ARTILLERY

When a contact was in the jungle, air strikes were more 

tive than artillery or mortars because the latter two mun

didn’t have enough penetrating power to get below the 

These shells frequently detonated prior to hitting the gr

Delayed action rounds helped, but these munitions simply 

have enough destructive power for the heavy rain forest.

Fighters with 500- or 750-pound bombs, on the other hand

effective against troop concentrations in the jungle and in fo

bunkers. Bombs had the capacity to penetrate the jungle 

and have the desired destructive effect. Understandably, 
weapons for the target. A fighter diverted from a preplanned 

and carrying general-purpose bombs, for instance, may hav

more effective had it been carrying a load of CBUs (cluster 

units). We recognized this loss of effectiveness, but the need 

munitions on the target quickly often outweighed our wish 

each target with the optimum munitions. Follow-on strike a

then carried the munitions most suitable for the target.

Alert aircraft, usually in flights of two to four, were loaded 

combination of general purpose bombs, CBUs, rockets

napalm. Not all aircraft in the flight had the same mixt

weapons, but in the formation there would be sufficient fle

to take care of any type of target. Many targets required a n

of different munitions. For example, for assaulting a fortified 

tion, general-purpose bombs were needed to break open the 

cation. However, once the enemy troops were in the open, 

CBUs or napalm was more effective. Thus, alert flights n

mixed loads.

Air alerts are the most expensive missions. Aircraft dispa

without a target loiter in the vicinity of the ground force u

target appears. While waiting for a target the fighter con

fuel, and after a time he may have to depart without expe

ordnance. We used air alerts in situations in which the vu

bility of the ground operation was so great that aerial fire

had to be available immediately. Although providing air al

an established procedure for airborne or amphibious opera

they were not used extensively in Vietnam since there we

circumstances that demanded them. Where there was a ne

airpower in such situations, fighters were held for a sp

time, and if a target had not developed they were passed 

control of a FAC who either gave them a target or cleared 

for a strike into hard core Viet Cong areas not requiring 

for control. Alternate targets in these areas were assigned 

TACC and passed to the fighters by the CRC or CRP, whic

monitoring the progress of the fighters in the area.

DAYLIGHT FIGHTER TACTICS

Most day missions were flown by flights of two to four ai

We always had the ability to increase the size of the forc

most targets didn’t require it. Furthermore, the enemy’s de

were limited during the 1965–1968 period, allowing for m

passes on the target. Multiple passes provided max

314
just the opposite of target conditions in North Vietnam in 

anti-aircraft defenses limited the number of passes to on

all munitions were delivered on that single pass. When tar

South Vietnam required more than four aircraft, another 

would be scheduled some 10-15 minutes later.

In South Vietnam most of the anti-aircraft fire came from 

matic weapons, which meant that most of our aircraft 

occurred below 2,000 feet. When ground forces were involve

needed the support, pilots pressed their attacks as low as p

to get the job done. There were, however, occasions when fr

ground forces were not actively involved in the target area o

scheduled to enter the area after an air attack. In those cas

minimum pull-out altitude for the fighters was raised to 3,50

We simply did not want to risk the life of a pilot and the loss 

aircraft by over-exposure in the danger zone when no fr

ground forces were involved. The pilots, of course, didn’t lik

always wanting to go as low as possible for better accuracy. 

Korean War, we had a similar policy once the battle lines ha

bilized. U.S. ground forces in Korea were directed not to eng

offensive operations that could produce high casualty figur

those that resulted from the battles for Triangle Hill and 

Ridge. Because of this policy, minimum pull-out altitudes in 

were set at 3,000 feet.36

I enforced the altitude limitations in Vietnam most vigorou

IV Corps because the enemy had relatively unrestricted fields 

there and pilots were tempted by the flat rice fields to go lowe

thermore, ground contacts in IV Corps were not pursued 

same extent as in the other corps areas. Terrain was a major 

cle to the exploiting of a contact; the many canals and sw

made it difficult to get our troops into the desired tactical pos

Additionally, enemy gunners in IV Corps used spider hole

were hard to detect. They would hide in these holes and pop 

fire at the fighters pulling off a target. The gunners were such 

targets that they didn’t warrant risking the loss of a fighter 

friendly troops were sweeping the area. Thus for several rea

was quite uncompromising with my pilots about the a

restrictions in IV Corps.

NIGHT AND BAD WEATHER—SPECIAL TECHNIQUES

The North Vietnamese did much of their fighting at night, 

tic which tended to reduce the effectiveness of our airpower 
had. We found it difficult to pinpoint the attacking troops an

more difficult to use large numbers of aircraft. To offset this 

vantage, we developed techniques using AC-47s and AC-1

illuminate the target. These aircraft patrolled each of the 

areas throughout the night. They were in contact with the 

the DASC, and various isolated outposts along the Cambodia

Laotian borders, always ready to provide support at a mo

notice.

During the 1962–1965 period, the AC-47 was used to 

as well as illuminate, attacking enemy forces. For example

attack started against a Civil Irregular Defense Group 

316

The aging Gooney Bird has been used for just about everything. Here, me

of the 4th ACS load their AC-47 in preparation for a night mission over S

Vietnam.
mation on the direction of the attack and the estimated di

of enemy troops from the camp’s perimeter. Since the AC-4

not equipped with electronic sensors and had to depend 

eyes of the crew, camp personnel would light smoke pots 

form of a “T” with its base pointing in the direction of the a

Crossbars were placed across the stem of the “T” to indica

distance to the attackers. Based on this information, the 

would illuminate the appropriate area and fire on the enem

its side-firing machine guns. During these preliminary step

crew contacted the nearest radar facility to request fight

follow-up strikes.

When approaching the target area and in contact with th

47, the fighters would request illumination of their target. 

time they reached the target, it would be lit up like a ballp

Friday night—the fighters would then make their firing 

fighters would then make their firing runs until the flares r

or the enemy ceased to attack. If the enemy persisted, a s

AC-47 would be scrambled to keep the target illuminated. 

tactics were very effective in beating off attacks against is

villages and outposts throughout South Vietnam. In fac

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong frequently broke off 

attacks as soon as the AC-47 began dropping flares.

With the introduction of the AC-130 and its sophisticated 

system late in 1968,* nighttime air support improved measur

The aircraft proved the best weapon system we had for target 

sition. With its low light TV or infrared sensor, the AC-130 

precisely detect enemy movements and immediately put fire

on the enemy. Also, the AC-130 was able to mark targets 

accurately than the AC-47 for follow-on attacks by fighters. 

time of the 1972 offensive, AC-130s were delivering dire

against enemy tanks at Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc. Fu

more, using laser designators, these aircraft illuminated targ

our fighters to attack with laser bombs. Enemy night attac

longer posed the serious threat they had during the early 19

Air cover of outlying areas during bad weather required di

measures than night attacks using flares. During periods o

weather, fighters under the control of MSQ radars located i

of the corps areas were flown over all the outposts and 

*Actual combat evaluation of the prototype was flown in late 1967 and aga

February-November 1968.
full coverage of all South Vietnam and most of the panhan

Laos and Route Package I. Radar beacons were installed 

fighters to facilitate tracking by the MSQ. The fighter would f

constant altitude and speed, and the MSQ operator would p

track and determine the bomb release point for the specific 

and type of bomb. This procedure helped our night an

weather operations. Each MSQ site had on file all the presu

targets within range of the site. With this information the si

able to control fighters or B-52s without any appreciable ad

notice regardless of atmospheric conditions. If the enemy lau

an attack against one of the surveyed targets during night 

weather, the TACC would launch the fighter directly to the c

of the MSQ. A stream of fighters could be directed to the targ

to deliver ordnance as directed by the MSQ controllers. Duri

southwest monsoon (May to October), MSQ was the only way 

of the border camps could get timely air support because 

weather.

The use of MSQ was also the primary means for direct

52 attacks after 1965. Most of the B-52 strikes were mad

high altitude, and most targets could not be seen on the 

radar. Since MSQ equipment provided greater accuracy th

could obtain by having the B-52s use offset aim points, th

was used almost exclusively.

B-52s AND THE GROUND BATTLE

As I explained in the preceding chapter, we targeted B-5

ferently from the tactical forces. Each of the field forces a

ARVN corps nominated targets to MACV. Seventh Air Forc

nominated targets based on intelligence from FACs, reco

sance, and reports from the DASCs and air liaison officers

COMUSMACV selected the targets using the recommend

submitted by the two field forces and 7th Air Force.38 As 

sequence; we applied the B-52 effort on a priority basis to 

air support targets within South Vietnam. This departur

fundamental air doctrine reflected the primary inter

COMUSMACV in the ground war and the Secretary of Def

guidance that gave priority to the war in South Vietnam.

In the Korean War we observed different priorities f

employment of the B-29 bomber force. For the most part, 

29s were used in the counter-air and interdiction roles. On 

sion, however, during critical situations we used the full fo

318
Army’s withdrawal from North Korea. Pounding the adva

enemy forces, the bombers made a significant contribut

finally stabilizing the front.

From the beginning of B-52 bombing on 18 June 1965, the 

ber of sorties continued to climb until the Tet offensive o

when the number reached 60 sorties per day in South Vie

This was double the rate that these aircraft were flying in 

COMUSMACV used these sorties to strike suspected conc

tions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops.

Because of the extremely rugged terrain in many area

ground forces were either not available or incapable of m

vering. B-52 strikes in some respects, then, became a sub

for ground force operations.

The tactical air control system controlled all B-52 s

against targets in South Vietnam. Because of the lack o

and MIG threats in South Vietnam during this period, it 

necessary to provide ECM and fighter support for the 

However, when strikes were scheduled into the northern p

I Corps where there was an active SAM and a latent MIG t

EB-66s, F-105s, Wild Weasels and fighter cover were pro

These missions placed a strain on the supporting forces be

of their concurrent commitment to all strikes going into 

Vietnam. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these tactics w

dent in that not a single B-52 was lost to enemy action 

this time period. It must be recognized, however, that th

threat near the DMZ was very limited during this time 

compared to the deployments the North Vietnamese ma

support of the 1972 Easter offensive.

Many times the enemy tried to place a SAM near the DM

could be brought to bear against the B-52s. Most of the 

however, these movements were noticed by reconnaissan

craft and high speed F-4 FACs. Once a site was detected, 7

Force would saturate the target with as many as 30 or 40 

strikes, continuing as long as new targets were discovered 

surrounding area. This fast reaction had the effect of det

the North Vietnamese from establishing a SAM ring in the 

similar to that around Vinh in 1968. Whether SAMs were 

ally fired against B-52s near the DMZ is an open questio

North Vietnamese fired some rockets, which had a trail lik

of a SAM, making it easy to mistake such a rocket for a SA

the other hand, B-52 ECM operators and and Wild Weasel 

near the DMZ reported electronic signals from Fan Song tr
radars, so it must be presumed that some SAMs were pr

fired at B-52s. However, never were such missiles closer t

few miles to the B-52.

At that time in the war, the downing of a B-52 would hav

a psychological plum for the propaganda machine of the 

Vietnamese. The JCS and all other headquarters were esp

sensitive to this possibility. For this reason, protection of 

52s had the highest priority in the commitment of the tacti

force. There was a constant shortage of Wild Weasel forces

cially when the weather allowed the F-105s to fly two strik

sions a day in the Hanoi delta. During the northeast mon

the demands on these forces abated, and protecting B-52 s

was no problem.

NAVY AND MARINE AIR

Of course, USAF fighters and bombers were not the on

craft employed in South Vietnam. Until July of 1966, th

Navy maintained a carrier off the coast of IV Corps. Kno

DIXIE Station, its aircraft were employed in III and IV 

Unlike the B-52s, these aircraft came under the control 

7th Air Force commander, and therefore operated und

320

Before they entered the air effort over North Vietnam, B-52 Stratofortresse

bombing suspected and known enemy concentrations along the Ho Chi M

and in South Vietnam.
1966, because the demands for operations against North 

nam were increasing rapidly, the Navy at the direction of 

PAC moved the DIXIE Station carrier north to join the carr

YANKEE Station in the Gulf of Tonkin.39 From that time 

Navy missions were directed against targets in North Vietn

along the road networks in Laos. On occasion, however, w

Navy aircraft in South Vietnam to augment the 7th Air 

effort. They flew predominantly in I Corps since it was clo

YANKEE Station and because I Corps had a greater dema

close air support.

We used a large number of the Navy’s sorties just abo

demilitarized zone where the enemy’s entrenched artillery 

problem for U.S. bases and outposts along the southern e

the DMZ. From YANKEE Station these aircraft would ch

with the CRC at Danang for assignment of tentative targe

FACs. As the fighters approached the target area, our A

aircraft, HILLSBORO, would assume control of the flight

make the final target selection and FAC assignment.

With the introduction of Marine ground units into South 

nam in March 1965, elements of a Marine air wing (MAW

also deployed.40 The Third Marine Amphibious Force (III 

reached full strength by early 1966. The 1st MAW provide

port for its divisions. Until the decision in February 19

make the Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV, th

gle manager for the employment of airpower in South Vie

Marine air was used almost entirely in I Corps in direct su

of the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions.

The Marines established their own tactical air control sys

I Corps, which controlled all of their air operations. The 

located with each of the divisions, and the requirements fo

air support missions for the following day were sent from the 

to the Marine Air Wing TACC. III MAF did not evaluate the re

for the air support, nor determine what the priority for s

would be. Instead, the Marine tactical air control system sch

all in-commission aircraft into each of the division areas 

planned flow, a costly way to manage air resources for sus

operations of an air-ground campaign. The Marine system 

designed for amphibious operations where the lack of supp

artillery required airpower overhead at all times. In this ope

where attaining a beachhead is critical, the use of airpower 

manner can be justified. However, it is highly expensive to ke

craft overhead at all times throughout the day and during 
Marine ground situation does not require the aircraft that are 

alert, they are already committed and it is difficult to move th

where they might be needed more.

Marine divisions are not designed for sustained ground 

tions and therefore do not have heavy or numerous artillery. 

the Marines depend upon planes and naval guns to provide 

firepower for the amphibious assault. In the normal scheme o

operational plans, once the Marines have secured a beach

Army units take over the ground campaign and press the offe

In Vietnam, the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions in I Corps 

down to sustained ground combat, with the Army providing 

the heavy artillery augmentation. Even so, the Marines em

aviation as though they were still conducting an amphibious 

ation. The 1st Marine Air Wing divided its aircraft between t

Marine divisions and, irrespective of the ground situation, 

uled these aircraft into their areas in a steady stream. In the 

of a major engagement by one division, the air wing would “

to meet the additional requirements rather than change to a

nificant degree the number of aircraft and sorties committed 

other division.

This type of arrangement for sustained land warfare preven

application of airpower where it can have the greatest effect 

ground battle. Dividing the available airpower between g

units does not allow it to be concentrated on a decisive part 

overall theater campaign. This concept of employing air

caused us to suffer terrific losses during 1942–1943 in the 

African campaign. The same issue surfaced in the Korea

when, at the conclusion of the Inchon landing in September 

General Almond, Commanding General of the X Corps, pro

the permanent assignment of the 1st Marine Air Wing to the 

ational control of the corps.41 Stratemeyer and Weyland re

such an assignment, articulating again the arguments that 

prevailed in World War II. And I used the same rationale again

arrangements in Vietnam during the 1965–1968 campaign

ther, the debacle of the South Vietnamese defeat during the 

North Vietnamese offensive was rooted to some extent in the 

fundamental problem: VNAF resources were divided betwe

corps commanders, and no single air authority looked at the 

of the battle to determine where massed airpower could do th

good in disrupting and breaking the offensive.

Seventh Air Force, during 1965–1967, had little influence o

much of the Marine air capability could be used to support 
ground force units. The Marine Air Wing made available daily 

Air Force that sortie not used for support of the Marine div

The Marine Air Wing decided the number of sorties to be 

available. Released sorties usually consisted of A-6s and som

for interdiction in Route Package I or Laos. The Marines pr

no significant amount of sorties for use by 7th Air Force fo

air support in South Vietnam during this period. 

Besides the Marine units, there were three ARVN division

one U.S. Army division in I Corps prior to the 1968 Tet offe

All of these divisions normally required air support 

engagements with the enemy, and it was essential that we 

the available airpower to the divisions doing the fighting. It 

have been much more effective, when there was no sign

ground action, to use aircraft on the lines of communicati

Laos or the lower Route Packages where there were some 

icant targets.

This issue of efficient centralized control of airpower resu

the decision to give the Deputy Commander for Air Oper

MACV, and responsibility for “single management” of the fixe

aircraft in South Vietnam. With the buildup of enemy forc

Corps in 1968 and the movement of more U.S. Army units in

area, a change in the control of an air operation was inevitab

demands of the situation were such that COMUSMACV had 

able to turn to a single air commander for advice on whe

where to apply the assigned airpower. Thus, the Marine syst

amphibious operations gave way to the Air Force system o

tralized control for supporting a sustained air-ground camp

U.S. Marine A-6 “Intruder” loaded to the hilt and ready for take off from Dan

Base, South Vietnam.
Whereas the war in South Vietnam was initially viewed 

counterinsurgency, it was soon apparent that the North 

namese were employing forces similar in firepower, mobilit

strength to the units that assaulted Dien Bien Phu. The air

conceived for “wars of liberation” was totally inadequate fo

level of conflict. Thus, we introduced a tactical air force with 

plete tactical air control system and an air ground operation

tem to blunt the enemy’s attacks and halt his offensive oper

In expanding the air-ground operations system in Vietna

encountered the same arguments about control of airpowe

came up in World War II and Korea. The absence of a unifie

ater command and the Vietnamese command relation

aggravated the problem and initially had a significant eff

the employment of the force. With the experiences gained in 

bat, these issues began to fade and by the time of the su

Khe Sanh, General Westmoreland decided to support my po

on the control of all tactical aviation including Marine av

The employment of airpower in furtherance of the ground 

paign assumed a role more consistent with the experien

World War II and Korea.

324
CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

1. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950–1969

Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

1974), p. 12.

2. Illustrated History of the United States Air Force in Sou

Asia, Office of Air Force History, July 1974, p. 5.

3. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities in 

east Asia, 1954–1964 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, January 

p. 5.

4. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York: Ha

Brothers, 1959), p. 63.

5. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, USAF Activ

Southeast Asia, 1954–1964, vol. 2, book 1 (Maxwell AFB, AL: D

ment of the Air Force, 1970), p. 4–54.

6. CORONA HARVEST, Command and Control, book 1, p. 1–

7. John J. Tolson, Airmobility, U.S. Army Vietnam Studies 

ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 5.

8. CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities, book 1, p. 4–62.

9. CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities, book 2, p. 6–23.

10. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air 

in World War II, vol. 3: Europe: Argument to V-E Day (Chicago: Th

versity of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 460.

11. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 86.

12. CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities, book 1, pp. 4–63, 4

13. Tolson, Airmobility, p. 19.

14. Memoranda, Lieutenant General Gabriel P. Disosway, for C

Staff, U.S. Air Force, subject: Comments on Report of Army T

Mobility Requirements Board, 14 August 1962, and attachments

15. CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities, book 1, pp. 4–67.

16. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, vol 2: E

Torch to Pointblank, pp. 157–165.

17. Ibid., p. 161.

18. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965–31 March 1968, boo

16.

19. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: P

Library, 1971), p. 121.

20. CORONA HARVEST, USAF Activities, book 1, p. 1–21.

21. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Chiefs o

Publication 2 (JCS Pub 2) (Washington, D.C., 1974), p. 28.

22. Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 38.
24. Ibid., vol. 2, book 2, p. 6–34.

25. United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 

1952–27 July 1953, No. 127 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

Force, 1956), p. 215.

26. U.S.G. Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on t

in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968)

27. Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 138.

28. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 100.

29. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 155. 

30. Eckhardt, Command and Control, p. 64.

31. William W. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951–19

Analysis of Its Role in Combat, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph 

vol. 3, monograph 4 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

1977), p. 33.

32. Creighton W. Abrams, Hearings Before the Committee on 

Services, House of Representatives, on Cost Escalation in Defen

curement Contracts and Military Posture, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 

p. 967.

33. The Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, The War Memoirs of Mar

the Royal Air Force (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966) p

34. The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: T

Pointblank, p. 204.

35. CORONA HARVEST, Command and Control, book 2, pa

III-4–20.

36. Korean Conflicts, no 127, p. 152.

37. Jack S. Ballard, “The United States Air Force in Southeas

Development and Employment of Fixed-Wing Gunships, 1962–

Office of Air Force History, January 1974, p. 135.

38. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 76.

39. CORONA HARVEST, Out-Country, book 1, p. 31. 

40. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 109.

41. Korean Conflicts, No. 72, p. 202.

326
Chapter VIII

BLUNTING THE ATTACK WITH AIRPOWER

(JUNCTION CITY, KHE SANH, TET, EASTER OFFEN

Once a week COMUSMACV reviewed the past week’s c

actions and projected operations for the weeks ahead. 

reviews used intelligence reports as bases for studying the 

forces’ locations and capabilities, and produced the best st

for drawing the enemy into an extended engagement. Atte

these meetings were COMUSMACV staff officers, the D

Commanding General of USARV, and the 7th Air Force 

mander. Field commanders and the Commanding Gene

MAF, came to these strategy sessions when a particular 

tion was under review for their commands.

Routinely, I would present a review of air operations in 

and South Vietnam. Although COMUSMACV had no respo

ities for operations in North Vietnam above the 18th paral

of us needed to know what the North Vietnamese and Viet 

were up to on the ground and in the air. I would also asse

out-of-country operations, including Laos, and then det

recommendations for the coming week’s interdiction. Alt

allocations varied widely, we usually put about 60% of o

effort into the interdiction task. The remainder would go t

planned close air support missions.

“Immediate”* would get thirty percent of our effort. These a

gets we found out about through ground troop contact. The

usually very productive missions since there was no question 

the location of the enemy. We would even shift part of ou

planned air effort to worthwhile targets coming to us as imm

air requests. The important consideration here is the need to 

a ground force contact that forces the enemy into the open 

airpower can be most effective. This, of course, was not alway

*immediates: A request for an air strike on a target that could not be id

sufficiently in advance to permit detailed mission coordination and plan
could disperse and avoid most of our munitions.

AIR OPERATION—JUNCTION CITY

All “search and destroy” operations were designed to fi

enemy, fix his position, and destroy him. This fundamenta

of ground warfare is a tactic with one objective-to dra

enemy into a position where superiority in artillery and air

can inflict a high rate of casualties. Search and destroy 

tions ranged from small company engagements to large 

division actions.

Operation JUNCTION CITY represented a multi-di

action. It took place in War Zone C, approximately 30 

north-northwest of Saigon, embracing an area of some 

square miles. The French did not penetrate this area duri

Indochina War. It had become the most impenetrable enem

area in South Vietnam. In late October 1966, three regime

the Viet Cong 9th Division and the 101st North Vietnames

iment deployed into Tay Ninh province.1 The 9th was pr

the best unit in the Viet Cong Army and compared favorabl

battle-tested divisions in the North Vietnamese Army. Wa

C was considered the site of COSVN, the political and m

headquarters for all enemy activities in South Vietnam. Fo

ious reasons, the French did not attempt to clear the enem

this zone during the Indochina War and until JUNCTION 

neither had we.

Over the years, having been left alone, the Viet Cong b

this dense jungle area a self-contained base complete with 

ply depot, hospital unit, troop housing, and training fac

Most of the base, except for the training area, was underg

in a well-developed bunker system. Some of their bunker

fortified with concrete. Because of the heavy jungle, it was 

ally secure from aerial reconnaissance. The only way to 

mine the extent of the enemy supplies and forces was to 

trate on the ground. However, because of the size of the are

the number of troops there, a reconnaissance-size force 

surely be annihilated. Something on a much larger sca

necessary.

Most of the area along the Cambodian border was hos

South Vietnamese forces, and, except for outposts, the 

controlled much of the terrain. North of Tay Ninh City an

of An Loc, which was to be the site of a major battle in the 

328
Easter offensive, the jungle and large rubber plantation

vided excellent cover for the undetected movement of 

Ambushes were frequent in the area because of the nearn

the roads to the jungle. Furthermore, intelligence abou

enemy was difficult to obtain. People in the area wer

dependable. Although rubber plantations in the region con

to operate throughout the war, their owners paid taxes t

the enemy and the South Vietnamese. So they did not he

either.

A large amount of enemy supplies for III and IV Corps 

period, 1967, came by boat to Sihanoukville and were 

transported by trucks to base areas along the South Vietna

Cambodian border. From there, the supplies were filtere

other base areas within South Vietnam. War Zone C was 

the principal destinations of supplies.
evidence was convincing that a Chinese trucking firm in P

Penh moved the North Vietnamese supplies to base camps 

the border. Ostensibly, supplies coming into Sihanoukville w

the Cambodian Army, but it was evident even to the untrain

that such quantities of arms were far above the requiremen

Cambodian Army that was not engaged in neither combat no

beginning its later expansion.

JUNCTION CITY was in the planning stage for many m

It would be a multi-division operation to find, engage

destroy the enemy along with his supplies and equipment. 

was no intent to hold the area. Once War Zone C was cleare

enemy would see that similar attacks could make the 

untenable. Also, by neutralizing the area, a major thr

Saigon would be eliminated. The main objective, however, a

the case in all of the operations, was to force the enemy t

where we could inflict such high casualties that he couldn

tinue military means to take over South Vietnam. Our sup

ity in firepower, particularly airpower, gave us a great po

to withstand heavier combat than the enemy could tolerat

We concluded that most of the 9th VC Division was curre

the zone. February was selected as the month for the ope

because of the dry season; if the enemy could be provoked 

series of decisive battles, there would remain three good m

before the southwest monsoon. Of course, the monsoon 

make operations in the area very difficult because of th

ground and flooding––negating much of the effectiveness of 

The operation began on 22 February, employing the 1st, 4t

25th Infantry Divisions; the 173rd Airborne Brigade; the 

Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 196th Light Infantry Brigad

several South Vietnamese units.2 Also, three South Vietn

divisions and other elements of Vietnamese forces were pos

near Tay Ninh City, An Loc, and other cities to keep enemy 

from reinforcing. The 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted th

parachute assault of the war. The concept of the operation 

drop the 2nd Battalion of the Airborne Brigade along the C

dian border as a blocking force, while the 1st and 25th Div

drove up from the south. Air support was planned on a large

than it had been for any previous operation.

The general scheme of employment was to force the 

into pockets where airpower and artillery could be concent

From what we expected our ground forces to do and our es

of the enemy’s reaction, we decided to have about 200 clo

330
support sorties a day. We were already flying over 300 so

day throughout Vietnam. Thus, with a requirement for 

than 300 sorties, we would employ aircraft from Thailand 

an agreement was reached with the Ambassador). As a 

measure, we would direct aircraft from TF-77 to the battle

We didn’t need to augment the FACs; each battalion ha

plus the brigade and division FACs. Most of the pre-planned 

missions were flights of two aircraft with control being exerci

PARIS CRC, located in Saigon next to the 7th Air Force hea

ters. If an engagement developed elsewhere, pre-planned mi

would be diverted to handle requirements over and above th

force, which numbered about 40 to 50 aircraft.

Prior to D-Day, B-52s would bomb COSVN’s probable lo

(which was to remain elusive throughout the war). Many 

F-100 delivering its ordnance in support of ground operations during Ope

“JUNCTION CITY.”
tion of COSVN, and on a few occasions he personally schedu

B-52s against these suspected sites. Before scheduling 

strikes, because of difficulty in locating the suspected area 

headquarters, RF-4s were dispatched to reconnoiter the po

Most of the time the intelligence information was very scant

reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, failed to reve

location of COSVN. Nevertheless, such information could 

dismissed since even an outside chance of knocking out C

was worth the effort.

Even though JUNCTION CITY continued until May, it a

was a series of three distinct operations. The first phase, 

went to the middle of March, was very disappointing. The 

avoided battle, and the more than 35,000 ground troops ha

to show for their effort. Very few of the enemy were killed, alt

considerable quantities of rice were taken by Major General W

E. DePuy’s “Big Red One” (1st Infantry Division). We also ca

large quantities of ammunition and small arms.

The enemy apparently had advance intelligence of the 

tion and elected not to make a fight during the initial ph

the assault. After the first day, when 7th Air Force flew 

than 180 sorties, we recommended the effort be phased b

approximately 100 sorties, with the understanding that s

would be increased to the pre-planned level if an enemy c

developed.

The airborne assault went off without a problem, with 

the paratroopers hitting within the landing zone. We dr

845 paratroopers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Our F-100

attacked the area prior to the jump to suppress potential g

fire. Even with this effort, the enemy continued to fire spa

ically at the C-130s air-dropping supplies throughout th

Although there was no 50-caliber ground fire reported, s

caliber fire was encountered throughout the day. It was ve

ficult to eliminate this type of fire, for it came from troops 

ally strapped in trees and other protected areas.

In addition to the large close air support effort, a major 

the airlift force was engaged in the positioning of troo

advanced airfields that had been constructed for the oper

The C-130s and C-123s became the lifeline for the support 

troops deployed in the operation. On the first day, more th

C-130s were committed to drop paratroopers and resupp

forces. This represented about 45% of the C-130 force in 

Vietnam. Our fighters suppressed ground fire directed at 

332
transports. FACs, who was overhead throughout the da

night, called in strikes as required. 

As the operation moved into the second phase, we had 

more than 1,500 pre-planned sorties and over 400 immediat

seems a large number of immediate, but these were the mi

we were after––to provoke the enemy to fight so we could u

firepower of the fighter rather than expose troops on the gro

In phase two of the operation, which continued through 15 

the enemy elected to fight in regiment-size forces. The Army’s 

tice was to establish a series of interlocking fire support ba
of the operational area they were patrolling. In advan

patrolling, a number of landing zones were selected and d

surveys made of probable enemy gunners’ locations. Then h

ters and the artillery pieces were brought in to expand the 

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had also reconnoitered 

of the potential helicopter landing zones and were partic

adroit at attacking us from hidden positions. Some of the sh

334
on tops of hills where the jungle was cleared to make room f

icopter landings and a defense perimeter.

One of the largest battles of JUNCTION CITY took place 

March in the rubber plantation country 18 miles northeast 

Ninh City. The battle of Suoi Tre involved more than 2,500 

of the Viet Cong’s 272nd Regiment. On the 20th of March, 45

troops were flown into the Suoi Tre fire support base (FSB)

tional forces had been lifted in earlier and were deployed a ha

south to protect the base. An additional force of two compa

armor and mechanized infantry was located a couple of miles 

separated from the FSB by heavy jungle.

At 0631 on the morning of the 21st, an enemy force of so

battalions assaulted the FSB.3 They penetrated the outer de

and were threatening the inner lines; the need for air suppo

immediate. An 0-1 FAC aircraft with two pilots was scramble

Dau Tieng, only a few minutes flying time away. As the FAC 

the first strikes along the tree line, the enemy opened up with 

machine gun fire, knocking down the 0-1 and killing the pilo

this time the situation on the ground had become desperat

the FSB about to be completely overrun.

Two additional FACs were scrambled while 7th Air 

launched more F-100s from Bien Hoa and F-4s from Cam 

Bay, both bases only a few minutes flying time from the bat

0900 more than 85 fighters had been committed, delivering 

ety of munitions from 750- pound bombs to 20mm cannon 

combination of air support and the timely arrival of armor bro

attack. Captain Sager, one of the FACs, reported:

By that time, the ceiling was so low that we were picking 

intense fire. We only had about a thousand-foot clearance 

the ground, and I’d run out of smoke rockets. I had a flight 

F-4Cs come in three F-4Cs––talked them in underneath 

overcast. In fact, one time I had to go up above the overcast a

pick up the fighters and bring them back down on my wi

which is pretty hard to do in an aircraft like mine. We got the 

4s under and had them orbiting down there. Visibility was o

about two miles and, boy, I thought it was an outstanding j

just maintaining contact. As I said, I was out of smoke rock

by this time, so I pulled the grenades mounted under the wi

which ejected white smoke, and I circled over the target. I t

the fighters to strafe beneath me and try not to pull up into m

They did, and it was a fine job. More than 600 enemy troo

were killed in the battle.4
JUNCTION CITY came to a close by the middle of May

than 5,000 sorties had been flown in support of the operat

100s and F-4Cs provided most of the close air support s

AC-47s kept the area illuminated at night and controll

fighter strikes. During the day, FACs did a superlative job o

trolling air strikes in an area filled with helicopters, C-130

strike aircraft. Along with the FACs and fighter strikes, fo

logistics support by C-130s and C-123s, air resupply by 

helicopters, and determined fighting by troops on the g

inflicted a major defeat on the VC’s 9th Division. Th

retreated into the Cambodian sanctuary, no longer an ef

336
killed, approximately 500 weapons captured, and 800 t

rice taken.5 The operation was not without loss to U.S

South Vietnamese forces––289 killed.

JUNCTION CITY was the largest operation of the war in 

Vietnam. During this period, 1967, a series of operations acro

country had left the North Vietnamese forces seriously wea

Wherever the enemy had elected to fight, the combined a

infantry, artillery, and airpower had inflicted on him a d

defeat. If the war continued in this vein, it was apparent 

would be only a matter of time until the enemy threat wo

longer be a significant factor in the future of South Vietnam

ENEMY PROBES FOR AN ATTACK

But the enemy’s strategy began to change by the end of the 

mer. Intelligence indicated that he was building toward a d

victory in 1968, yet any assessment of the relative capab

ground forces indicated that U.S. and South Vietnamese 

backed up with airpower had sufficient strength to defeat any 

the North Vietnamese might make to take over large pop

areas, particularly the northern part of the country.

With the airpower available to MACV, the potential 

North Vietnamese to turn the tide of battle was indeed 

Wherever there was a concentration of troops to assault a 

let, outpost, CIDG camp, battalion fire support base, key 

defense point, or provincial headquarters, the rapid appli

of airpower, both day and night, invariably defeated or re

the enemy. To weaken the impact of our airpower as mu

possible, the enemy consistently tried to stage his atta

night or in bad weather. When he couldn’t follow this strate

would try to make contact with our forces, fighting as clos

possible so that our airpower couldn’t be used for fear of ca

casualties to our own forces.

Neither of the enemy’s tactics was very successful. The 

light-producing aircraft and radar-controlled strikes pr

the needed capability to accurately strike the enemy in dar

and bad weather. Furthermore, in some cases fighters s

within 75 feet of friendly troops. With cluster bomb units (C

strikes were often delivered within 100 feet; with bom

depended upon the size of the blast. During one engagem

JUNCTION CITY when the enemy had ambushed a column 

ing up to an assault position, CBU strikes were put in so c
division commander was advised that strikes this close 

unsafe, he opted to have them anyway. Without our air s

his column would be overrun before relief could be broug

and the casualties inflicted by the enemy would far exceed 

of the “short rounds” from our own air strike. The air strik

delivered and the enemy assault was broken, permitting th

umn to continue its advance.

With the movement of large bodies of troops into I Corps i

tember 1967, and the shelling of all the northern bases alo

DMZ, the enemy strategy was starting to unfold. From ca

documents, the Allies learned that the coming offensive was 

divided into three phases. The first phase would consist of 

but intensive attacks, mounted from sanctuaries, to draw 

troops away from population centers. The second phase was t

sist of attacks throughout the country so ARVN would lose c

of the people and the people would rise to the support 

National Liberation Front. The third phase would be a groun

tle in a northern province favorable to a major victory.

The opening phase of the strategy was soon felt by the M

and ARVN in I Corps. During 1967, a series of fire support 

manned by Marine and South Vietnamese troops had 

established below the DMZ. These 175mm-equipped a

bases were capable of bringing interlocking fire against 

troops moving through the DMZ deploying for an attack a

the main line of resistance at Dong Ha. At the same tim

exposed position of these fire support bases––especially a

Thien and Gio Linh––made them vulnerable to artillery fir

north of the Ben Hai River. Realizing their vulnerabilit

Marines had requested all the assistance they could get fro

Air Force to destroy these enemy artillery positions.

Concurrent with the mounting threat to these forward 

the enemy began the movement of the 304th and 325C Div

into the vicinity of Khe Sanh. The terrain around Khe San

favorable for concealing large numbers of troops. From 

movements, it appeared that the enemy was positionin

forces for a frontal assault against Dong Ha, Quang Tri, an

with a flanking movement through Khe Sanh. To execute 

an attack, the enemy was thought to believe it necessary t

tralize Gio Linh, Con Thien, and Khe Sanh. By doing 

would protect his rear positions and extended logistics lin

As the threat developed across most of I Corps, I propo

COMUSMACV that an intensified air campaign be initiated 

338
rupt and suppress the artillery attacks north of the DMZ 

locate enemy troops that would be staging for the expected a

He agreed, and the operation, named NEUTRALIZE, would em

Khe Sanh, all of the remainder of I Corps, and the area abo

DMZ formerly called TALLY HO.6

We formed a combined intelligence center at 7th Air Fo

oversee operation NEUTRALIZE. The center was augmente

intelligence specialists from the United States and from M

The center’s product was a compilation of targets that wo

struck by the 7th Air Force, Marine, and Navy aircraft und

control for the duration of the operation. High-level intere

generating in Washington as to what airpower could do to 

up the intensive shellings. By September, for exampl

Marines were taking over 1,000 rounds per day again

northern fire support bases.7

To make the strike effort as effective as possible, targets 

be pinpointed and carefully analyzed. Because of excellent c

flaging and well dug-in positions, the enemy guns were ver

cult to locate. In some cases, they were actually kept in caves

out to be fired, and then rolled back in. For these types of t

counter-mortar radar and other electronic intelligence gat

techniques were not proving very effective. Our best results 

from the photo interpreters, and we photographed on a large 

The RF-4s had to make repeated runs at two to three hundr
guns were always active, and from time to time a SAM was sn

into firing position. The reconnaissance pilots flew their ru

about 580 knots without being able to jink the aircraft. Jinki

torted the photographic image, so the run over target had to b

ticularly stable.

Using the intelligence data, we struck suspected artiller

troop positions day and night. We located an ABCCC belo

DMZ to control all strikes in the area. Aircraft reported to PAN

the CRC at Danang. From there they were turned over 

ABCCC. The massing of airpower (fighters, bombers, and 

naissance) finally broke the siege of these northern bases, 

had been under intensive attack for more than 49 days. It w

constant pounding of airpower that the enemy had not fo

when planning this offensive to resemble his successful a

against Dien Bien Phu. The French Air Force had been de

and totally incapable of mounting an effort in any way comp

to that in NEUTRALIZE.

During NEUTRALIZE, we flew more than 3,000 tactic

820 B-52 sorties.8 It was, indeed, a massive effort, and it re

pressure on the northern two provinces. Consequently, 

areas were in much better shape to withstand the assault

were to develop during the Tet offensive. If the regular Nort

namese troops had been able to roll up Con Thien, Gio Lin

Dong Ha, there would have been little to stop them before 

ing Hue. The enemy’s strategy for the Tet offensive in

appeared to call for a decisive battle in Quang Tri provinc

follow-up to a breakdown in the South Vietnamese gover

and its ability to effectually continue the war.

As the battle for the outposts subsided—even though the a

failed––the enemy continued to occupy U.S. and ARVN troops

attacks intensified around Khe Sanh where two enemy div

the 304th and the 325C, were positively identified.

KHE SANH—AIRPOWER IN THE FOREFRONT

Khe Sanh was significant only as a political symbol. Situa

a remote part of I Corps near the Laotian border, Khe San

surrounded by rugged mountains blanketed by dense jun

controlled no major line of communication, except for the 

dicted Highway #9, nor did its terrain hold any advanta

ground warfare. Over the years, the CIDG camp at Khe San

become a jumping off point for long-range patrols. These p

340
into I Corps and the northern part of II Corps. Tchepone w

hub of lines of communication in southern Laos, and from th

men and supplies were filtered into the Khe Sanh area an

into Quang Tri, Hue, and the A Shau valley. Thus, we sa

Sanh as useful principally for intelligence gathering.

To support the CIDG patrols in 1961 and 1962, a detachm

0-1s was stationed at Khe Sanh. Two FACs provided most 

support for ground patrols. Patrols reported their observati

the FACs who relayed the information to the CIDG command 

The command post would then request air strikes from I 

headquarters at Danang. Those activities provided subs

intelligence on the enemy’s movement both in the western 

South Vietnam and along the trail network leading into the 

The major land route to Khe Sanh began at Dong Ha, p

through Tchepone, and terminated at Savannakhet. The Vie

had kept most of the road’s bridges blown, and U.S. forces th

it too costly to maintain the bridges because the VC and Nort

namese could knock them out at will. We held out no hope o

forcing the Khe Sanh overland movement.

For all practical purposes, Khe Sanh was totally dependen

air support for its existence. By the fall of 1967, enemy a

around Khe Sanh forced us to decide whether the base sho

evacuated or defended. We thought of Dien Bien Phu and its 

tion but decided we could do the job with intensive air supp

Defending Khe Sanh would not be easy, for this part of Vi

suffers from both the southwest and northeast monsoons. D

January and February, normally good weather months in 

Khe Sanh can expect low clouds in the morning with visib

one to two miles and a ceiling of 500 to 1,000 feet. By 1,

1,100 hours, visibility increases to a couple of miles and the 

start to break; over the next four hours, conditions impro

1,600 hours in the afternoon, however, the weather again d

rates.

With these weather conditions, air operations take plac

ing a relatively short period daily when visibility is good e

for air strikes and parachute deliveries. Too, we knew the a

wouldn’t remain operational because of the large amo

artillery and rockets the enemy could deliver from conceal

ing positions on all sides of Khe Sanh. We planned to u

runway as long as we could. We would fly a large number 

ties during the good weather periods and use MSQ to dro

plies during bad weather. Because of Khe Sanh’s restricte
way approach, incoming aircraft were vulnerable to anti-a

weapons that could actually be fired downward at them 

they were approaching or taking off. When the enemy’s sh

made landing too dangerous, we would parachute supplie

The enemy had in the Khe Sanh area two divisions of 1

to 20,000 troops, with another division in the vicinity.9 Th

couldn’t support a sufficient amount of artillery for it

defense because of the additional load that would be plac

the airlift force to bring in ammunition. The only artillery 

that could cover Khe Sanh were the Army’s 175mm guns l

at the Rock Pile Camp Carroll. So the enemy held every a

tage save airpower—shades of Dien Bien Phu.

In early January the Marines increased their forces at Khe 

to two battalions of the 26th Marine Regiment. A third ba

was flown into the base on the 16th of January.10 By this tim

ident Johnson had taken a personal interest in the build

enemy forces around Khe Sanh and was concerned about ou

ity to hold the base. Obviously, he had Dien Bien Phu on his 

and the political consequences the French suffered from th

tary defeat. During his Christmas visit to Cam Ranh Bay, th

ident brought up the question of defending Khe Sanh, and 

sured him that with the massive use of airpower, the base co

defended.

Seventh Air Force was authorized to use whatever aircraft 

sidered necessary for the task. We would use aircraft from 

and Thailand along with all of our available aircraft in Sout

342

Supporting the Marines at Khe Sanh, a USAF C-130 lands at the battered 

bringing much-needed supplies.
Given the unfavorable weather conditions, we would have 

radar control extensively to prevent mutual interference a

enhance safety among the many aircraft.

HILLSBORO, the ABCCC we used for controlling strikes 

the LOCs in Laos, would be our main control agency. We 

forced the ABCCC crews with command personnel from 7

Force, giving us a balanced airborne command post able to 

decisions without clearance from other headquarters. Th

surrounding Khe Sanh was divided into sectors with 

assigned to each one. The FACs gave us continuity of intell

and detailed familiarity with the terrain and enemy loca

Khe Sanh couldn’t be viewed in isolation to the interdiction 

paign, for most of the enemy’s logistics would flow throu

Laotian network. With the enemy’s large expenditure of 

which reached 1,307 rounds of mortar, rocket, and artille

on 23 February,11 replacement supplies had to move throu

Laotian road network. To put as much pressure on the log

system as feasible, 7th Air Force stepped up its offensive a

these roads. The enemy’s need of greater quantities of m

came from several influences. He supplied North Vietn

divisions now operating in South Vietnam; he introduced 

conventional artillery; he suffered heavy losses in CEDAR F

JUNCTION CITY, and other engagements. So we saw more 

than ever in the resupply network.

During December, January, and February, we flew 

20,000 sorties against the LOCs in Laos and destroyed 

than 3,000 trucks.12 We felt that any reduction in enemy 

tics at this time would have not only an effect on the bat

Khe Sanh, but also an influence on the strategy of the fort

ing Tet offensive. Khe Sanh was as much a psychological 

as a military engagement. All of these complications of Khe 

made it imperative that the enemy not only be defeated m

ily, but psychologically: An unequivocal setback was essen

neutralize the political offensive against the South Vietn

and U.S. home fronts. 

The final defenses at Khe Sanh were the main base: Hill

558, 881 south, and 950.* All patrols ceased to operate aft

21st of January. An additional Marine and Vietnamese Rang

talion was flown in to complete the buildup for the expected 

*See Nalty, Airpower and The Fight for Khe Sanh, and Office of Air Force 

1973, for detailed discussion.
mand post that was developed for the FACs in 1962 becam

command post for the 26th Marine Regiment. Fighting bu

and a trench network surrounded the base. Because of the p

on which the airfield was located, the trench network was ver

to the runway on three sides. The fourth side was not tre

because the approach end of the runway was at the edge of a 

drop to the river valley below, making an enemy assault fro

direction unlikely.

For our air strikes to be effective, we would have to make 

as close to our own trenches as possible. Since there w

troops outside of the base or the hill outposts, air strikes 

be brought in very close to the defended positions w

endangering our own forces. We planned to deliver mos

nance close to the base perimeter and make selected s

against the primary approaches to the base. These appro

were seeded with seismic and acoustic sensors that had 

proven on the road network in Laos. An EC-121 was airbo

relay the sensor information to Dong Ha. The information 

went to the ABCCC who would direct strike aircraft into the 

The problem of air controlling became acute. The Marin

maintained that this was a Marine air-ground team ope

344
their control. Furthermore, a circle had been drawn aroun

Sanh, and the command post of the 26th Regiment, and th

DASC was linked to the DASC with the 3rd Marine Divis

Dong Ha. Communications were then established wit

Marine TACC at Danang. With the magnitude of air 

around Khe Sanh, the system was totally inadequate. 

Because of these problems I told Westmoreland that ce

ized control of the air had become absolutely essential.13 W

it, Khe Sanh could well be lost. Our discussion led Westmo

to designate me, as the Deputy Commander for Air Opera

MACV, the single manager for all fixed wing aircraft in th

ater. 

On 18 January 1968, Westmoreland sent a message to 

which read as follows:

The changing situation places a demand for greater organi

tion and control of air resources and a premium on the need 

rapid decision-making. It is no longer feasible or prudent 

restrict the employment of the total tactical air resources 

given areas. I feel the utmost need for a more flexible posture 

shift my air effort where it can best be used in the coming b

tles. Consequently, I am proposing to give my Air Deputy op

ational control of the 1st Marine Air Wing, less the helicopters

Sharp concurred after being briefed by Major General Gor

Blood, Deputy for Operations of 7th Air Force, and disc

the matter with Wheeler.

In addition to the fighter strikes, B-52s also made a sign

impact on the enemy’s efforts. The bombers were employed 

the outer range of the main defenses where the enemy 

were expected to stage. The purpose of these raids was to p

the enemy from organizing the attack as he had at Dien Bie

and at base camps in other parts of South Vietnam. We ex

the enemy to dig tunnels up to the perimeter of defenses 

his assault forces would attempt to force an opening that 

be immediately exploited by troops advancing with heavy a

support.

The tactics used at Dien Bien Phu were much in evide

Khe Sanh: intensive artillery barrages followed by a prob

strength. Tanks had made an appearance for the first time 

war at Lang Vei, which was the last Special Forces cam

Route #9 before it entered Laos. As a prelude to the 

assault on Khe Sanh, the North Vietnamese overran La
Lang Vei, we assumed that significant numbers of tanks 

be used to pave the way for the infantry in breaching Khe 

defenses. The use of B-52s against these suspected staging 

surrounding Khe Sanh was for the purpose of destroying 

forces before they could move out. The fact that such an 

ized attack never developed against Khe Sanh can proba

attributed to the effectiveness of these missions coupled w

the other air strikes from the tactical air force.

Because of weather, 50% to 60% of the air attacks were 

the control of MSQ. All B-52 attacks were controlled in this 

ner. With the vast experience 7th Air Force had acquired in 

attacks, there was a high level of confidence that these s

could be delivered within 400 to 500 feet of friendly troo

fighters and within 1,000 to 1,500 feet by B-52s. Ther

much controversy on this issue when I proposed that the 

strike within 1,000 feet of the perimeter. III MAF was op

because of the possibility of short rounds.16 Westmoreland

ever, felt the B-52s could be employed as I suggested. SA

the attacks should come no closer than 3,000 feet for the 

reasons advanced by Lieutenant General Robert E. Cus

Jr., Commanding General of III MAF. MACV finally sett

3,000 feet with the understanding that if the enemy attack 

oped in force, the B-52s would bomb within 1,000 feet of fr

positions. The enemy attacks never developed to more t

large scale-probing maneuver, so no urgent tactical requir

developed for moving the B-52 attack closer than 3,000 fee

the dug-in Marines.

The AC-47 also contributed to the air effort. These a

were used throughout the night to keep the area illuminat

was the case with other outposts, this tactic helped to 

attack. If the attack developed anyway, enemy losses wo

comparable to a daylight assault because of the absence o

cealment that darkness provides. Aircraft were perio

directed to the AC-47, which acted as a FAC for controlli

strike. By striking within the area throughout the night, w

ated a further deterrent to a night assault.

On any given day after the siege began, 7th Air Force ma

approximately 350 tactical fighters, 60 B-52s (even though 

was responsible for targeting, the 7th Air Force command an

trol system actually controlled the strike and the decision to s

12 to 15 C-123s/ C-130s, 10 RF-4s and 30 0-1/0-2s.17 Num

346
craft.

There is little doubt that airpower was decisive at Khe 

although the Marines and ARVN Rangers fought courag

under trying conditions. The enemy at Dien Bien Phu wa

to move without much fear of the French Air Force, but ci

stances differed at Khe Sanh. Airpower was pounding hi

and night. We never let up through the long siege from Ja

through March. We flew more than 22,000 sorties and dr

82,000 tons of bombs. General Wheeler, Chairman of the 

estimated the number of enemy casualties to be 10,000. 

over, the 304th and 325C Divisions were left unfit for f

combat.18

Khe Sanh was probably the turning point in the enemy’s 

egy for Tet. If Khe Sanh had fallen, the regular N VA troops 

have moved against the major cities that were initially ass

by VC local forces. The fact that there were no significant a

by regular forces indicated the enemy backed away from a 

bined military-political offensive and settled primarily on a 

ical offensive designed to undermine the South Vietnames

fidence in their government and to create more dissension 

U.S. home front.

PRELUDE TO TET

By the time of the Tet offensive in January of 1968, the a

in the North had scored a major victory over the North 

namese Air Force. It was essentially a defeated air force an

withdrawn from battle to be retrofitted and prepared to r

the fight at a later date. The airfields of China provided a 

tuary for the recuperation of the force.

Along with the counter-air campaign, interdiction of the 

LOCs in the northern routes also had been effective. All the 

bridges were down, and most of the marshalling yards 

blocked. A single through line was kept open at great expe

repair crews. Troops trying to get to the front took three mon

compared to the earlier periods when it took only three o

weeks. The traffic on the LOCs in Laos was the heaviest of t

with the number of trucks destroyed or damaged averaging 

50 per night.19 Logistical requirements were spiraling upwar

entire enemy logistical structure was under severe strain to s

the increased level of the major engagements in the south. Th

evident by the increasing amount of supplies that had to en
enemy’s increased combat operations. At no previous time 

war had the enemy expended such large quantities of rockets

tars, and artillery ammunition as he did at Cam Lo, Con Thie

Linh, Khe Sanh, and Dak To.

Stocks for these operations had been accumulated over 

period of time, perhaps a year. The enemy’s low level of a

until late summer of 1967 may have been a deliberate stra

avoid consuming precious stocks for the Tet offensive. Ho

these stocks were not enough and had to be replenishe

level of fighting early in the Tet offensive caused rapid con

tion of the stocks. The relatively short length of the offensiv

probably attributable to a combination of the resistance en

tered from the U.S. and ARVN ground forces and airpowe

the rapidly dwindling supplies.

The critical year for the North Vietnamese was 1968. If th

continued, it would be only a matter of time until the air 

sive expanded, and with this expansion the price for cont

the conflict would become prohibitive. Furthermore, the 

Vietnamese armed forces, under the umbrella of U.S. and 

airpower, would enjoy superiority in battle throughout a

ners of the country. Time was not running in the enemy’s 

He needed to create a dramatic change in the political sit

in South Vietnam, which would lead to United States disen

ment because of lack of support on the home front. Wides

demonstrations against the war were taking place throu

the U.S., and a major military and political offensive could 

force those arguing that the U.S. should get out of the wa

While the pressure against Khe Sanh increased, the NV

Division launched an attack against Dak To in the centra

lands. These actions were designed to pin down ARVN an

main forces. The same strategy was implemented in the no

provinces with sustained attacks against the fire support 

north of Dong Ha. Only in III and IV Corps was the enemy rel

quiet. The large operations, CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION 

had probably persuaded him to withhold the 7th Division, 

cially since the 9th NVA Division had been practically decima

JUNCTION CITY and was probably in Cambodia being refor

The enemy was taking a severe beating from each of 

actions. His operation at Khe Sanh hadn’t developed as pla

the northern FSBs hadn’t fallen to open the way to a f

assault on Dong Ha, Quang Tri City, Hue, and even

Danang; and Dak To had held off a sustained attack by 

348
objective of attaining a major military victory like Dien Bie

seemed remote.

On the other hand, the opportunity for a major political 

was still at hand, although it would be costly in human life. 

long term, however, it could provide the ingredient for an ev

military defeat of South Vietnam. The evidence seems to in

that the Tet offensive was designed for its political effect, with 

ever military successes it realized being only a by-product.

The basis for this assessment is the fact that the loca

Cong forces launched the offensive against all the major p

tion centers of South Vietnam. Only in the case of the att

Hue were regular main force units employed. Accompanyi

local forces were political cadres who were to take ov

administration of the cities and villages. The regular force

held in reserve and apparently were to be committed only i

were a disintegration in ARVN regular, RF, and PF* org

tions. If the defenders didn’t stand and fight, and the NVA 

ipated they wouldn’t, the ARVN regular divisions would r

against the U.S. and their own government and deman

withdrawal of all U.S. forces.

The North Vietnamese had planned the Tet offensive for 

months. Men and equipment had been infiltrated into all 

major cities over a long period of time. Uniforms, ammu

and weapons were sneaked in with all types of disg

Weapons were hidden in cemeteries, and small arms am

tion was hidden in produce that came from the delta and 

Trojan horses were everywhere.

As in previous years, a stand down of U.S. and South 

namese forces was being discussed for the coming Tet ho

Seventh Air Force had always opposed the Christmas

Years, and Tet stand downs because of the conclusive ev

that the enemy took advantage of them. Large amounts of 

and supplies had been brought south during these pe

Shortly before Tet, North Vietnam proposed a truce coveri

period 27 January to 3 February; the U.S. and South Vi

announced a 36-hour truce to be in effect from 29–31 Ja

Although the interdiction of the LOCs in Laos continu

*RF-PF: Regional Forces and Popular Forces. The Popular Forces were p

soldiers for local defense of hamlets and villages, while the Regional Force

be employed throughout a province.
age I. The enemy selected and rushed his war materials 

ward. Because of the unrestricted movement allowed the 

during these “truces,” the net result was a reduction in the 

tiveness of the interdiction campaign. During the six-day 

down for Tet in 1967, the enemy moved an estimated 4

tons into Route Package I.20

Just prior to the New Year MACV alerted all forces 

enemy buildup but did not specify the magnitude or inten

the expected offensive. The forces in Vietnam were not pla

alert but on an increased readiness posture. I put 7th Air 

on alert, 21 however, because my staff believed that major a

were imminent throughout the country and that the forces 

air bases and installations in Southeast Asia should be a

battle stations. Consequently, we were already in “conditio

when the Tet offensive began.

TET—THE OFFENSIVE BEGINS

Duplicity of the enemy at Tet had occurred in 1953 duri

French Indochina War, so the tactic was not a new on

attack was uncoordinated during the initial phase. Danan

Pleiku were among other cities that were struck 24 hours 

of the main offensive. Then on the evening of the 30th an

early morning hours of the 31st, simultaneous mortar, r

and sapper attacks were made against 36 of the 44 pro

capitals, 64 of 242 district capitals, and 23 airfields; they 

followed by the main assault forces.

The burden of defending the district and provincial capit

on the shoulders of the local RF and PF forces. A significan

tion of ARVN forces were on leave, and it was some time 

regular South Vietnamese Army troops were effective. T

and PF militia stood and fought gallantly. If these forces h

held, the outcome of the battle might have been much dif

When assaulting these population centers, the enemy’s 

was to get into the heart of the city so that airpower could

used without destroying homes and churches, thus killing 

cent civilians. If we did bomb in support of friendly force

resultant effect on the civilians would tend to make them jo

VC in the uprising. Air support was, therefore, a delicate m

Although the attacks spread throughout the country, t

Air Force base structure remained secure, and operation

suspended at only two bases-Tan Son Nhut and Bien Ho

350
barrages of mortars and rockets were laid down against ai

flight line facilities, and housing. Some aircraft were destro

damaged. Because of the red alert condition, howeve

defense of these two bases was greatly enhanced. All ou

had been reinforced, and all fighting positions were ma

Thus, when the enemy followed-up the mortar and rock

with assault troops, the base security forces were ready. 

men held off the enemy at both bases through the night 

31st and into the next day when U.S. and ARVN ground 

entered the battle. Army helicopter gunships in conjunctio

the AC-47s provided the fire support. Helicopters de

attacks within a few feet of the bunkers where security 

were fighting for their lives. The attacks at both bases wer

tained, and enemy sapper teams never reached the flight 

Aircraft were flying missions the following day.

The flexibility of centralized control was never more dr

cally demonstrated than when fighters and airlift forces 

shifted from area to area to meet the enemy. Througho

offensive the command and control system remained intac

no unit was out of contact with the headquarters. As the 

developed, FACs was launched all over Vietnam to cover th

tle areas. Already airborne AC-47s, while illuminating the 

fields for the fighters, were also providing valuable informa

the tactical air control system. In a short time, follow-up 

through the normal command and control network.

Except for the area around Hue and Saigon, the offensiv

run its course within a few days. In these two cities, howev

enemy fought from house to house making it very difficult 

in air strikes without destroying a considerable number of 

tures. It was 7th Air Force policy not to approve strikes 

Saigon area unless there was a desperate situation. Even t

FACs controlled the strikes, there was no way to avoid a

reaction from the South Vietnamese people to our bombing 

holed-up in houses and other buildings. Strikes in Saigon, 

fore, were conducted mostly on the periphery of the city a

the infiltration points. When it was necessary to suppor

tanks and APCs, as in the Phu Tho race track area; we 

strafing attacks because they gave us better accuracy.

As the Tet offensive mounted in intensity and the thre

Corps became more pronounced, Westmoreland elected to re

the area with the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 101st Airborne Di

elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 11th Ar
352

Cavalry Regiment. We needed a new organization to contro

units. The III MAF, up until this time, had functioned basic

a corps of two divisions, but with the battle for I Corps reac

peak, Westmoreland activated a MACV forward headquarter

February and moved Abrams, his deputy, to Hue Phu 

assume command of this new headquarters.
of ARVN I Corps, Abrams was functioning as a field army 

mander. Because of the earlier decision not to establish a com

command of U.S. and Vietnamese units under a single U.S

mander, ARVN I Corps was technically not under the opera

control of Abrams. However, Abrams exercised decisive inf

with his advice to the I Corps commander on how best to e

the ARVN divisions in the combined counteroffensive.

Abrams’ headquarters was augmented with an advanced 

mand element of 7th Air Force. This command element was 

discretionary authority for the employment of all airpower 

mitted in the northern two provinces. It had no authority

ever, with respect to operations in Route Package I and 

since these areas were still controlled from the 7th Air 

headquarters in Saigon. The 7th Air Force ADVON coord

all air activities in the northern provinces, including I 

DASC, and remained the paramount air organization w

with ARVN and the Marine DASC.

The system in I Corps by mid-February 1968 appeare

similar to a field army-tactical air force relationship, excep

the 7th Air Force ADVON was not staffed to perform as a 

bered air force headquarters. The ADVON commander did
most effective. Also, he had the power to make commitme

the name of the Commander of 7th Air Force, who was th

authority for the northern area in accordance with the 

priority established by Westmoreland for all of the combat 

ities within South Vietnam.

With the new organization established, procedure

requesting and approving air support were revised. The 

commander, located in 7th Air Force headquarters, coord

with MACV and established a priority between the tw

forces and III MAF on requests for close air support. These 

quarters were then notified of the decisions, and mission

laid on for the next day’s operations. Each of the DASCs, i

ing the Marine TACC and DASC, was notified of the missio

7th Air Force, and the fragmentary order was issued to all 

units except the Marines. The order for them went to the M

TACC, which issued the order to the air group.

For the first time in the war, all of the fixed wing aircraft 

under the control of the air component commander, making 

sible for him to respond with airpower anywhere in the theat

to whatever priority COMUSMACV established. Helicopters, 

other hand, were not brought under the control of the air c

nent commander except during the invasion of and subse

operations in Cambodia in April 1971. In South Vietnam, th

copters assigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade were further all

to the control of the field force commanders based on the re

submitted to MACV. The decision as to which field force 

receive the most helicopter support was dependent upon th

sion for the week assigned that field force commander. Th

force did the basic planning for the helicopter employmen

when U.S. helicopters were employed in support of oper

within the ARVN corps, passed control to the senior Army 

officer to the ARVN corps.

The helicopters assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry and 101

borne Divisions were used according to the planning guida

the field force commander. However, the complexity of heli

assaults demanded greater centralization of control as th

continued. Furthermore, the increase in the intensity and 

ity of enemy ground fire made coordination between the Air 

and Army even more important. Little of the planning co

done below the field force level because of the number of 

involved and the need for close integration of all elements 

assault forces. If SA-7s had been used in the 1965–1968 p

354
Air Force would have been essential to suppress such def

Whether the helicopter assault operations conduct

1965–1968 would have been feasible in the 1975 offensiv

basic question for the future of such forces. In a war in 

large numbers of SAMs, radar directed AAA, and high pe

ing fighter aircraft are used, it is doubtful that such air a

operations can be conducted without excessive losses.*

Hue presented a most difficult problem. The enemy made 

certed effort to capture the city using regular NVA forces. The 

apparently staged in the A Shau valley and moved into posit

the attack during a period of bad weather. The initial assaul

was estimated to be eight battalions of NVA/VC troops. The 

was reminiscent of the house-to-house fighting in World War 

the related problems of providing close air support. Additi

the weather was very poor at this time of year, being the pe

the northeast monsoon. Most of the time it was quite similar 

weather experienced at Khe Sanh, except there were more ext

periods of heavy fog. This made it extremely difficult to use fi

and armed helicopters. Furthermore, MSQ was not a so

because the enemy was imbedded in the city and even more 

criminate damage would have been done by these attacks. 

tionally, we had learned from experience at Casino during th

ian campaign in World War II that heavy bombing could a

enhance the enemy’s defenses by creating rubble that woul

the advance of friendly forces. Although the situation differed

were some examples of this problem as the enemy retreate

the inner fortress of the city. As the battle mounted, the 

brought in the 5th NVA Division and the VC 416th Battalion. 

apparent that he was trying to salvage at least one military 

out of the offensive. Between breaks in the weather, hundr

sorties were flown in support of the Marines and the 1st Ai

alry Division.

Finally, on the 25th of February the battle for the inn

was over. Tet was an extremely costly offensive in terms 

men that were lost by the enemy. The enemy had lost 

troops at Hue and another 3,000 in northern I Corps.22 

84,000 of the 200,000 troops in South Vietnam at the on

*See my testimony (1973) to the Senate Armed Services Subcomimttee o

cal Airpower for a detailed discussion of this matter.
ruary 45,000 troops were killed and another 24,000 woun

By any standard of measurement this was a major m

defeat. The North Vietnamese would need almost three ye

prepare for another offensive of such magnitude, and they 

do it then only because of the bombing halt in North Vi

that provided secure supply points above the DMZ.

The expected effect on the South Vietnamese people 

materialize. They, in fact, stood behind the governmen

instead of collapsing, the government actually became str

There were none of the uprisings that the North Vietn

expected, and not a single province fell to the enemy. Polit

although the offensive failed in its effect upon the South 

namese people, it succeeded in the effect that the North 

namese hoped to achieve on the U.S. home front.

Disillusionment with the war was rife in the United State

confidence in the policy of continuing the war was sh

Instead of being able to follow-up the Tet offensive with a 

military effort in South Vietnam and an all-out bombing 

paign in the north, which would have been consistent wit

damental principles for employing military power, the Pre

was compelled to suspend the bombing and step down as 

didate for reelection. Although the North Vietnamese cou

win on the field of battle, they had won a resounding psyc

ical victory.

Airpower met all expectations throughout the offensive

than 16,000 sorties were flown from 30 January to 25 Feb

1968 in support of U.S., ARVN, Australian, and Korean g

forces. Close air support was flown under demanding cond

of weather and troop location. The airlift forces of some 28

craft moved over 12,200 troops at crucial periods of the ba

these troops had not been deployed to reinforce threa

areas, some cities might have been temporarily lost to the e

Centralized control made airpower responsive to the threa

As the crisis in I Corps abated, COMUSMACV decided to 

tivate MACV Forward on 10 March 1968, and he assigned 

those forces to III MAF.24 This entailed adding more Army o

to the III MAF staff. III MAF now functioned in the same m

as MACV Forward, controlling the employment of all U.S. g

forces located in I Corps. The Provisional Corps (V), whic

activated on 10 March 1968 (redesignated XXIV Corps 

August 1968), assumed operational control of the U.S. 

356
sions in the other parts of I Corps reporting to III MAF.25

When Westmoreland made the decision to inactivate 

Forward and activate PROV Corps (V), I determined that a 7

Force advanced headquarters was no longer needed and a 

appropriate organization to work with the new corps 

DASC. Consequently, DASC(V) was activated 10 March 19

take care of the air support needs of the Corps, and 7th Air 

Advance was inactivated that same date. With these chan

organization, the control of air operations, however, contin

be centralized in 7th Air Force headquarters, and the basic 

ciples for coordinating the air effort with that of the g

forces remained intact.

I continued to be the single manager for air. The pre-pl

air requests were consolidated at III MAF and then forwar

the TASE. The system from that point on functioned the sa

prior to the reorganization. An attempt was made to com

Corps DASC and a new DASC adjacent to the III MAF HQ

lar to the arrangement of II FFV and ARVN III Corps at Bie

However, the ARVN corps commander opposed the consoli

fearing he would lose control of the VNAF units under his 

mand. As a consequence, the split location and assignm

the two DASCs created problems of coordination. Still we 

all of the decisions on where the next day’s air effort would 

the 7th Air Force-MACV (TASE) level.

With the conclusion of the Tet offensive and the halt 

bombing, the war in South Vietnam became one of l

engagements somewhat analogous to the campaigns in 

1966. Probing operations were conducted throughout the 

try with a few sharp engagements in the highlands. For th

part, the North Vietnamese were fully committed to a p

offensive to force the withdrawal of U.S. forces and to ach

temporary settlement that would provide the best possibl

ture for resumption of a full military and political offensive 

future.

PREPARING FOR WITHDRAWAL

On the U.S. home front, President Nixon announced a s

ule of planned withdrawals of ground forces as the talks in 

proceeded. By the spring of 1969, it was apparent, howeve

the North Vietnamese had no real intent of ceasing military 

ations in South Vietnam. Their objective, stated many tim
whatever force was required to achieve this objective wo

used. The evidence of the continued buildup of military 

was reflected in the traffic on the lines of communication in 

At a time when the U.S. was withdrawing forces as annou

the flow of trucks and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh networ

reaching a new high. Some of the flow can be attributed 

need to replace the losses in the Tet offensive, but the mag

was over and above such an explanation. If there had been 

cere interest in bringing military operations to a standstill

would not have been a requirement for such large amou

materiel. In October of 1970, it was estimated that 60,00

of supplies would be put into the system in Laos and South 

nam during the 1970-1971 dry seasons.

Our excursion into Cambodia in the spring and summ

1970, and the invasion of Laos in February 1971, were de

to reduce the stocks that were flowing to enemy base 

along the borders. For future operations, these base cam

they had done since 1965, would support the main off

from I to IV Corps. With more sophisticated weapons on 

sides and the higher consumption rates of munitions, it 

take a much longer time to buildup the level of stocks need

an offensive by the 200,000 (13 divisions) troops now in 

Vietnam. Following the bombing halt, the bulk of the North 

namese Army had been deployed into and along the bord

South Vietnam.

The invasion by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces into C

dia in 1970 and by South Vietnamese forces into Laos in 197

vided the South Vietnamese government additional time to d

its military forces. Large quantities of supplies were destroye

the concentration of enemy forces along the borders was tem

ily disrupted. These operations also facilitated the withdra

U.S. ground forces without undue exposure when the fi

strength was constantly going down, a time of maximum dan

our troops. The invasion of Laos, however, was a disappointm

many respects. It was hoped that ARVN would be able to st

the main junction of Highways #9 and #92, which was the 

the enemy’s logistical system for all of the northern provinc

central highlands, and the northern part of III Corps. This ju

had long been a strategic target for strangling the logistical flo

South Vietnam.

358
The planning for LAM SON 719* had been under way 

number of months. There were divided opinions within th

military and political structure as to the capability of AR

march into the teeth of hard-core North Vietnamese 

securing the Laotian panhandle. The strength of this enem

had been estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 with considerabl

aircraft defenses and some evidence of SAMs in the vicinit

lowing the bombing halt, anti-aircraft fire had continu

expanded in southern and central Laos. Whereas it had bee

sible to operate FACs and strike aircraft at two to three tho

feet, it would be necessary to move air operations up to 

altitudes. FACs could not function in some areas along the 

unless they were in high-speed aircraft. The AC-130s had 

under increasing fire and were now reaching the upper a

limitation of their on-board weapons. In many cases, thes

130s were moved to safer zones, and laser-bombing F4

over the tasks where heavy anti-aircraft fire was suspecte

It was against this background that considerable differen

opinion existed concerning the conduct of LAM SON 719. 

had made significant progress, but there would be no U.S. 

fighting alongside them when they met the North Vietnamese

would be fighting in very difficult terrain against well-entre

troops and some heavy firepower. Furthermore, it cou

expected that the enemy would use tanks against the ARVN 

moving along Route #9 to join up with the forces lifted in b

copter. Seventh Air Force plans provided for the extensive 

airpower to “soften” the landing zones and to support the 

quent landings. We believed that helicopters would be ext

vulnerable to the heavy anti-aircraft fire and that the only wa

could survive would be to use large quantities of fighters, bo

and strafing the target area before and during the hel

assault. Even then, it would be most difficult to prevent deter

fire from being brought to bear against the helicopter forces a

hovered over the landing zones.

Based on experience in South Vietnam, the XXIV Corps 

expect the anti-aircraft fire to be as heavy as predicted by 7

Force and believed supporting the FSBs both north and so

Route #9 leading to Tchepone would not be unduly hazard

*LAM SON 719—ARVN code name for the invasion of Laos. LAM SON w

as a common designation for all ARVN operations.
XXIV Corps felt that the 15 fire support bases to be estab

would protect the armored forces moving along Route #9, 

the road for logistical support of the troops to be deployed a

Tchepone, deny the high ground to the North Vietnames

interlock artillery support for all the troops in Laos. 

Because of the disagreements over the vulnerability of h

ters, XXIV Corps decided that most of the fire support for the 

lifting helicopters would be provided by Army helicopter gun 

Seventh Air Force would provide some limited support, but th

of the air firepower was to come from these gun ships. Seven

Force objected to giving so little close air support and stated 

prepared to provide large quantities of fighters wherever the 

tion demanded.27 Further complicating the erroneous asses

of the ability of helicopters to function in a moderately 

defense (no fighters or SAMs employed by North Vietnam) w

command structure. The operation was a South Vietnamese 

with the U.S. providing only support. No U.S. troops wo

allowed to accompany ARVN, and as a result the flow of battle 

mation, requests for support, and rapid command decisions 

be lacking. There would be no single authority in the comba

to make decisions, and it would be sometime after the initia

360
at Khe Sanh to thrash out decisions.

The entire air assault and continued air operations s

have been under a single commander, 7th Air Force. The v

ability of the helicopters, difficulties of support, and the ne

thorough integration of all aspects of air operations dem

such a structure. In all previous wars, an airborne assau

been under the direction of an air commander until the 

were on the ground, and even then a single air commande

vided the detailed air support (firepower and logistical) fo

ground commander. A helicopter assault is still an airborne 

ation. To make it succeed demands a continuous stre

fighter cover taking the place of artillery. To deliver suc

power, there must be the ability to shoot and bomb regard

the weapons used by the enemy. Helicopters were not a

cope with the firepower the North Vietnamese brought t

against the landing zones.

As the enemy brought the fire support bases under intensi

the losses became prohibitive and the ability to reinforce was 

ficient. As the armored forces bogged down on Route #9, so

kilometers inside of Laos, the pressure against the northe

support bases became too much for ARVN rangers with th

tanks making their appearance, the entire ARVN force was in 

ardy. Even with the use of B-52s and the extensive use of fig

the situation deteriorated rapidly. It was only through the e

FACs, bringing in a stream of fighters that the North Vietn

tanks were stopped some five kilometers from the retreatin

umn of ARVN armor trying to make it back into South Vietn

LAM SON 719 was indeed a costly operation to the South 

namese and U.S. helicopter forces. It brought home quit

vincingly that helicopter assaults have the same limitation

vulnerabilities as did the airborne assaults conducted in 

War II and Korea.* From U.S. and British experience in 

Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Europe, we know these operation

costly in men and equipment. The employment of such 

requires almost complete air superiority and the ability to 

tain a stream of fighters overhead throughout the initial p

and until such forces can linkup with an advancing colu

the ground. Until such a linkup, the force is vulnerable 

armor attack. For airborne troops to survive such an as

*See Vietnam Studies, Airmobility 1961–1971, by Lt Gen John J. Tolson, 

ment of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1973, for a different point of view.
has his own organic support.

During the South Vietnamese assault at Landing Zone 

which was about half way to Tchepone, the enemy made an 

effort to defeat the landing. The assault began on the 2nd of 

with eight B-52s striking south of the landing zone. Most of t

tial suppression of enemy fire around the landing zone, ho

was attempted with helicopter gun ships. For fighter strike

ward air controllers were dependent upon the ground for

determine where the ordnance should be delivered. These re

were slow developing. On the morning of the 3rd, only six 

strikes were put in around the landing zone and the alternate 

ing zone. Additional sorties that dropped anti-personnel we

were used around the perimeter of the landing zone. After 

nineteen helicopters were shot down and many others h

assault was suspended. We sent in more fighters and the 

fought off another landing attempt. We flew still more 

strikes. By 1600 hours, enemy positions were beaten down t

an extent that the operation was resumed. All troops were 

ground by 1830 hours. More than 40 helicopters were emplo

this one assault. Almost all of them took hits––20 were shot 

and seven more were totally destroyed.29

The enemy’s efforts against Lolo were characteristic of th

tics he used against the other fire support bases, which led 

eventual abandonment of the objective to take Tchepon

plan was to remain in Laos until the wet season in late Ap

destroy large stocks of supplies the North Vietnamese had 

building for the future. With the withdrawal of U.S. force

rupting the enemy’s supply system in Laos would provide 

needed time for the South Vietnamese to improve its m

economic, and political systems.

Even with the early withdrawal from Laos, both side

heavily in men and equipment. Over 100 enemy tanks 

destroyed, mostly by fighters. For the first time laser we

were used against tanks in combat. ARVN entered Laos w

tanks and 127 armored personnel carriers (ADCs) and wer

to get out with only 22 tanks and 54 ADCs. The enemy los

13,000 men while ARVN lost more than 2,500. Becau

accountability procedures, the exact number of helic

destroyed is difficult to determine. We estimated the los

200 of more than 600 helicopters used.30 The Army conten

losses were much less. Seventh Air Force flew more than 

tactical sorties with a loss of seven aircraft.

362
operations. The problem is the amount of airpower that m

employed to create a favorable environment for the use o

assault forces as LAM SON 719. Up to this time the South 

nam Theater of operations hadn’t tested air assault opera

In LAM SON 719, the ground fire was not as intense as 

1972 offensive, nor had the SA-7 Strella* been employed y

with any new weapon, however, a countermeasure is a

developed; SAMs were neutralized in North Vietnam, s

could also have been managed when employed in the 

against helicopters and other slow flying aircraft.) Still, LAM 

719 was too costly because of weak planning that produced 

equate tactical air support.

WITHDRAWAL—AN UNEASY TIME

In 1971, in spite of the intransigence of the North Vietna

the United States was disengaging from the war. There w

longer any desire to make the sacrifices required to bring 

a military solution. Within South Vietnam, most of the m

bases had been turned over to VNAF. They had been r

expanded in anticipation of continued fighting before a 

peace agreement was reached. The number of aircraft th

Air Force had in South Vietnam was down to a squadron 

37s at Bien Hoa and a detachment of F-4s at Danang. Th

strength of the force was 350 aircraft, mostly at bases in 

land. Air strikes were still being conducted against logistic

gets in North Vietnam, mainly Route Packages I and II, bu

limited basis. They were insufficient to reduce or even imp

rapid enemy buildup taking place above the DMZ. In view 

total disregard of the bombing halt being demonstrated 

North Vietnamese, 7th Air Force made repeated requests f

air campaign against all of North Vietnam to be resumed at 

The North Vietnamese were thought to have 13 divisio

South Vietnam. They were the best of the enemy’s total 

Seven other divisions were held in reserve in the centra

northern part of the homeland. The road network, all th

from the Chinese border to the DMZ, was in a good state of 

and able to support heavy truck traffic during all weather 

tions. And the rail network had been repaired and all majo

*SA-7 Strella: Russia made, hand-held, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft miss
were in a position to employ large tank forces backed 

artillery and protected by a SAM blanket.

Never had the enemy been in a more favorable posit

employ the modern weapons provided by the Soviet Union. 

AAA regiments of their Soviet-built anti-aircraft defenses 

deployed in South Vietnam, with another eight regi

deployed along the borders ready to move as needed. Three 

SAM regiments were located along the DMZ and Laos. SAM

never been positioned so far south. These weapons’ fire

closely compared to some of the heavily defended targets 

Hanoi delta.

With the bombing halt in 1968, we expected the ene

move their defenses farther south to complement the 

being readied to invade South Vietnam. The northern fir

port bases at Con Thien and Gio Linh would probably fa

major offensive were launched to take Quang Tri. Our m

employment of airpower prior to the 1968 Tet offensive ha

rupted their plans to take these northern provinces, bu

most of the U.S. airpower now gone and with the carrier 

down to two, the North Vietnamese could test the South 

namese Army’s will to fight without U.S. troops beside 

Further, the enemy apparently believed riots would occur 

home front if we sent our troops back into battle and ou

planes back into North Vietnam.

Given the upper hand, the North Vietnamese thought they 

take Quang Tri and Thuy Thien provinces in the north, o

most of Kontum in the highlands, and place their troops i

skirts of Tay Ninh City. Based on what was happening back 

theirs was a reasonable assessment of our situation. If the off

developed as expected, the North Vietnamese would be in an 

lent position to sue for a ceasefire; if they were exceptionall

cessful, they could push on to a complete military victory.

EASTER OFFENSIVE—A TEST

On 30 March 1972, the enemy launched the offensive in 

of the four Corps. The main thrust was in I Corps with the 

ent objective of capturing the two northern provinces. Mor

40,000 troops spearheaded the assault that was suppor

artillery and rocket regiments, 400 armored vehicles, and 

and SA-2s.31 As expected, the main thrust was against th

ward fire support bases at Gio Linh and Con Thien. The 

364
would not be capable of fighting for months. As the 

advanced toward Quang Tri, the U.S. began redeploying air 

back to Thailand. Seventh Air Force was being rapidly inc

to a thousand aircraft, and the carrier force was reachin

highest level of the war––five on the line at YANKEE Statio

SA-7s took their first toll of U.S. and Vietnamese aircra

May. No longer was it feasible to operate below 10,000 feet 

out using countermeasures. Fighters with their high speed

little problem with the SA-7s, but 0-2s, OV-10s, A-1s, C

and helicopters were severely restricted even with the 

countermeasures.

As the FACs were forced to the higher altitudes, their ab

locate targets and control strikes became more restricted

ditions were even more severe than in Korea when the 

QUITO FACs in T-6s were forced to fly above 6,000 feet t

out of the anti-aircraft fire protecting Chinese ground force

technique of using high speed FACs, first used with F-100

employed at Quang Tri with the FACs in the back seats of F

Because of the speed and maneuverability of the F-4, it 

operate within the enemy’s defenses without unacceptabl

FACs operating around Quang Tri used the same techniqu

procedures developed in the air campaigns of the 1960

bombing altitude of the fighters was about the same as for 

earlier operations in North Vietnam, as opposed to earlier 

in South Vietnam when bombs were being released at four 

thousand feet.

For the first time, the enemy employed tanks (T-54s an

76s) in South Vietnam in quantity. The only tanks w

encountered before were PT-76s at Lang Vei, where onl

were used to lead the enemy’s assault. Now they were bein

in quantity. As the tanks moved into the open, our fighte

AC-130s rapidly knocked them out of action. Two hundred 

seven tanks were destroyed in the course of the offensive. T

raphy played an important role in our successes. Eastern Q

Tri is flat land, so the enemy’s tanks were exposed when m

through there. Additionally, the flat land made easier our 

ery of laser and general-purpose bombs.

LAM SON 719 was quite another matter. We found get

their tanks extremely difficult there. They enjoyed much 

concealment. Exposing themselves for only brief periods

hardly gave our fighters the time needed to find and destr

tanks. Lasers were sometimes effective against concealed 
but more of the tanks were destroyed with 500-pound b

used in conventional attacks.

The North Vietnamese used 122mm and 130mm guns t

port tanks in the DMZ. These long-range guns were diffic

locate. They were dug in, firing from concealed positions. 

we located them, however, the laser weapons were ac

366
enough to destroy these positions with a minimum num

passes. Contrary to the popular notion that concen

artillery barrages came from guns placed side by side, the 

Vietnamese shot at their targets from widely dispersed pos

By timing their shots, they could get the results they w

without putting their artillery in one vulnerable mass. We h

more success locating their artillery positions north of th

Hai River than we had during the Tet offensive.

When the 3rd ARVN Division broke and retreated, we co

hold Dong Ha. As the enemy moved forward in Quang T

increased air sorties hoping to blunt the attack. By this tim

Air Force was flying 207 sorties a day in Military Region I. 

ers from Thailand staged at Danang and flew another 

before returning to base. We used tankers for fighters stag

the more distant Bien Hoa. B-52s were flying around the 

The VNAF averaged 45 sorties a day in support of ARVN. 

sorties were scheduled by 7th Air Force in the same man

before the phase down. Enemy ground fire remained 

throughout the offensive; we lost ten U.S. and six VNAF a

to SA-7s.

Quang Tri fell by the 30th of April, and the Allies left 

quantities of supplies for the enemy. With the loss of Quan

on 8 May the President announced his decision to increa

bombing of North Vietnam and to mine Haiphong. The com

tion of this announcement plus the constant pounding th

A USAF A-37 supporting ground operations in South Vietnam. Aircraft is f

604th Special Operations Squadron.
enemy’s offensive to a temporary halt.

In June the ARVN moved to break the stalemate. Suppor

around-the-clock bombing, they counterattacked and gra

moved back into Quang Tri. The Allied victory in Quang T

complete on the 16th of September.33 Strategists credit air

with the decisive role in recapturing Quang Tri. Reinforcin

Air Force were 162 F-4s, 12 F-105s, and Task Force 77’s c

planes to do the tactical job. Too, the B-52s flew more than 

sorties from 30 March to 30 June.

When the attack developed in MR I, the enemy had alread

probing the approaches to Kontum. Intelligence sources de

the 320th Division in the area around Dak To. We were to 

familiar pattern of attack against Kontum. They used tank

heavy shelling prior to the infantry assault. If the enemy mad

Pleiku, he would cut across the waist of Vietnam along Hi

#19. Already, sapper attacks had effectively cut this principa

ply route from the port city of Qui Nhon. Indeed, the enem

interdicted Highway #19 throughout the war. Even at the he

U.S. activity in Vietnam, supply convoys had to be esc

Although Highway #14 from Ban Me Thuot was an alternate 

Qui Nhon was the major supply center for all of the centra

lands, and Route #19 was the key for the support of forces 

end of the line––Pleiku and Kontum.

As the logistics stopped moving on Route #19, the 7th Air 

airlift force picked up the task of supporting these beleag

ARVN forces. Landings were made under hazardous cond

The VNAF had insufficient airlift capability to meet the ne

more than two divisions of troops deployed in defense of th

Our C-130s had to airdrop more than 2,000 tons of ammu

and food to ARVN troops after most of the airfield at Kontu

been overrun. Fortunately, the Allies recaptured the airfield 

8th of June, and we resumed landing to offload supplies.

The weather around Kontum during this time of the y

changing from the northeast to the southwest monsoon. C

quently, many of the air strikes had to be delivered unde

control. Although no losses were reported to missiles, the 

used SA-7s against strike and airlift aircraft.

Our F-4s used the LORAN method to bomb targets aroun

tum. A LORAN F-4 would lead a flight of four aircraft in whi

wingmen and element leader not having LORAN would dro

bombs on a signal from the lead F-4. This method is similar t

formation bombing, and even though the preferred techniqu

368
racy, the F-4s using LORAN did drop bombs at Kontum with

feet of friendly troops.34 In fact, aerial photographs of LORAN 

ing in Route Package I against the Quang Khe ferry showed 

bomb plots within 125 feet of the aiming point.

In defense of Kontum, 7th Air Force averaged 137 so

day, and the VNAF 33. Kontum held. Even so, as the 

defenses had driven helicopters and lower performing a

out of the Quang Tri battle, the same conditions preva

Kontum. These lower performing aircraft were severely res

in the missions that could be performed and the conditi

the target areas. By the time Kontum and Pleiku came 

attack, however, the enemy had increased the level of an

craft defenses from those that prevailed in the 1968 Tet 

sive. SA-7s coupled with 37mm and 57mm made speeds g

than 400 knots essential for survival. Although our aircraf

countermeasures, rapid maneuvers and high speeds we

best defense against the SA-7s.

With battles raging at Quang Tri and Kontum, the enemy 

out the third prong of the offensive at a little district capital 

middle of the rubber plantations near the Cambodian bord

Loc. On 9 April the assault began with 25 tanks leading the 

The area surrounding An Loc provided excellent cover for the 

Supporting the assault were large quantities of artillery, SA-7

anti-aircraft guns. Again, the tactics were similar to those u

Kontum and Quang Tri. The enemy’s apparent objective was 

siege to An Loc, capture it, seal off Tay Ninh City, and then 

against Saigon. For years the enemy had used base camps 

the border in Cambodia to supply and support forces in III 

Corps. The support for the forces assaulting An Loc appa

came from these same base camps.

As the assault proceeded, Highway #13, the main l

communication to Tay Ninh City and Saigon, was interdicte

ARVN attempted to reinforce An Loc with armored forces bu

beaten back. Each time an attempt was made to push throu

armored column, the North Vietnamese, from ambush po

along the rubber plantations and heavy jungle, were able t

the column to give up the advance. Close air support strike

not effective because of jungle concealment. The enemy d

expose his forces where a direct attack could be made with fig

We saw the enemy tighten his ring around An Loc, mak

supply the only way to support ARVN defenders. At first w

using CH-47 helicopters to deliver supplies, but anti-aircr
the enemy’s firing positions were along the tree line, it wa

cult to attack them. Experienced tacticians knew the V

North Vietnamese liked to place gunners with light, hand

automatic weapons high in the trees where they would ha

unobstructed field of fire covering helicopter landing areas

With the supply situation becoming severe, VNAF C-123s 

low altitude parachute drops. But enemy fire was so intense 

aircraft had to be pulled out after the first three weeks of the 

With the withdrawal of the C-123s, 7th Air Force took over 

resupply of the troops at An Loc using one of the most ef

methods of dropping supplies into a small area––the con

delivery system (CDS).* This system had been used by C-12

C-130s for the support of troops where there were no airfie

where the airfield was of insufficient length. We at first ma

drops from 500–600 feet, but the ground fire was so heavy, 

damage to the C-130s was unacceptable. Consequently, w

high altitude drops under radar control. (Most all of the air 

at Khe Sanh were made at the lower altitude in spite of the g

fire.) On 18 April, the enemy shot down a C-130 making a CD

drop. Shortly thereafter, daylight C-130 missions were 

pended.37 Still another C-130 was shot down, and more th

aircraft were damaged. Furthermore, because of rigging pro

delivery accuracies were not up to standards. After the 

improved the rigging and packing of chutes, MSQ drops ac

a recovery rate of about 85%. Because of the close proximity 

enemy to the drop zone, troops recovering bundles were ofte

jected to a heavy barrage of mortars and automatic weapon

and any bundles that landed outside the drop zone were 

grabs by either side.

With countermeasures installed in the C-130s to defe

SA-7s, MSQ control was the best way to drop supplies from 

tudes above 10,000 feet. The drops used high velocity 

chutes that had a rate of descent of 105 to 120 feet per s

With these high velocity chutes, friendly forces began to r

96% of the bundles. The airlift force demonstrated a magn

determination to keep the garrison supplied with food, am

tion, and weapons.

370

*CDS––container delivery system: Supplies were not actually para-dropped 

tainers. The items dropped were bundles––a ton of food, fuel, or ammunitio

ered with a shroud and lashed to a wooden pallet. For details, see Nalty, A

and the Fight for Khe Sanh (Office of Air Force History, 1973), pp. 46–47.
In all, three C-130s were lost, but An Loc was saved be

the men on the ground were kept supplied to continue the 

Because of the SA-7s and the very small drop zone, the o

Where there’s a will there’s a way. Coming in low and pulling up hard, a U

130 delivers its much-needed cargo to isolated ARVN forces engaged in th

of An Loc, July 1972.
jungle gave the enemy better coverage at An Loc than Khe 

During the campaign from 9 April through 10 May, the 

force flew 448 missions and air dropped almost 3,700 t

supplies.38 Early in the campaign, the drop zone was on

feet by 200 feet. By the end of the battle, however, the dro

had been enlarged to 800 feet by 1,600 feet. The enlarged 

zone represented the improved condition of the defending 

who were successfully pushing the enemy back into the ju

Close air support, as it had been a decisive factor in h

the northern two provinces and Kontum, played an equally 

sive role at An Loc. There is little doubt that the battle 

have been lost without the day and night support flown by 

ers and the AC-130 and AC-119 gun ships. However, the s

tion of the target area with so many aircraft caused pro

similar to those at Khe Sanh. The target area was so sma

so close to friendly troops FACs had to direct strikes with 

exactness. Even though there was sufficient FACs to cont

strikes, only so many aircraft could be controlled at a tim

area at Khe Sanh was by contrast much larger, so it was fe

to have two or three strikes going on there simultaneously

On a typical day, 185 strikes were flown in defense of A

There sorties were flown for the most part by the aircraft a

Hoa and those that staged through the bases from Thailand, 

F-4s. The VNAF flew 41 sorties per day. SA-7s and anti-aircr

forced the A-37s to operate at a much higher altitude than 

4s. Consequently, the burden fell on the 7th Air Force high

forming fighters to provide most of the support. B-52s avera

sorties a day, and they were primarily targeted to areas w

was thought the enemy was staging and reforming for attack

Although the siege was broken by the end of June, the 

made one final effort to overrun the village with an attack 

the airfield. Fighters caught the troops in the open and 

mated most of the attacking force. With this last assau

enemy withdrew most of his forces into base camps in Cam

and along the border, bringing the siege and most of the 

offensive except in Quang Tri Province to a close.

THE ASSESSMENT

The North Vietnamese were probably surprised at the re

the Easter offensive produced. With the U.S. withdrawing

probably thought the U.S. public wouldn’t permit a bo

372
pended the peace talks on 4 May as the offensive was 

swing must have also been cause for concern among the 

Vietnamese leadership. Surely their miscalculations o

employment of U.S. airpower, both in South Vietnam and a

the homeland, were two most significant factors in their 

around in attitude about the negotiations.

The fight put up by ARVN was probably assessed with 

mixed emotions. The First Division had fought tenacious

with considerable professionalism at Quang Tri. Even thou

upper third of Quang Tri province was lost, the enemy’s 

ent objective of capturing Quang Tri and Thua Thien pro

had failed. The ARVN 3rd Division’s ineffectiveness tells u

only a portion of the 12 ARVN divisions were battle-read

the stiff defenses at An Loc and Kontum still came as a su

to the North Vietnamese. From previous probing operati

the highlands and along the Cambodian border, the North 

namese thought these two points would fall, particularly 

large amount of artillery fire and the wide use of tanks. At A

alone, there were between 1,000 and 2,000 artillery round

from 25 April to 1 May.39 The holding of these two str

points stabilized the relative positions of Allied forces in the 

a cease-fire took place. Only in Quang Tri, therefore, d

North Vietnamese help themselves significantly toward w

the politico-military struggle for Vietnam.

The U.S. continued withdrawing ground forces, and by A

there were no U.S. ground combat forces in Vietnam for th

time in seven years. Our aircraft continued bombing North 

nam while the President intensified efforts to reach a ceas

When on 23 October we were making progress at the peace 

we stopped bombing above the 20th parallel. Hopes wer

that a cease-fire was at hand, but again, a cease-fire was 

be. On the 18th of December, the 11-day, all-out bombing 

sive was launched against the enemy to bring about th

agreement for a cease-fire on 23 January 1973.
CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

1. U.S.G. Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, Report on the 

Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 

1968), p. 129.

2. Ibid., p. 284.

3. Bernard W. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning 

U.S. Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D. C.: Government P

Office, 1974), p. 137.

4. Project CHECO Report, Operation Junction City (Hq P

Hickam AFB, HI, 1967), p. 26.

5. Rogers, Junction City, pp. 149–151.

6. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 143.

7. Bernard C. Nalty, Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh 

ington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 38.

8. Illustrated History of USAF in Southeast Asia, Office of Ai

History (Conf.), p. 34. (draft).

9. Nalty, Khe Sanh, p. 14.

10. Ibid., p. 15.

11. Sharp and Westmoreland, War in Vietnam, p. 164.

12. Working Paper for CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Coun

Operations, Southeast Asia, 1 January 1965–31 March 1968, 

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Department of the Air Force, 1971), p. 60.

13. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City

Doubleday & Company, 1976), p. 343.

14. CORONA HARVEST Report, Command and Control, book 

2–25.

15. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 184.

16. Nalty, Khe Sanh, p. 86.

17. Ibid., p. 103.

18. Congressional Testimony by General W. W. Momyer bef

Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Close Air Support, O

November 1971.

19. CORONA HARVEST Report Out-Country, book 2, p. 60. 

20. CORONA HARVEST Report, Out-Country, book l, p. 83. 

21. Illustrated History, p. 144.

22. Sharp and Westmoreland, Report, p. 160.

23. Ibid., p. 161.

24.George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950–1969

Army Vietnam Studies (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 

1974), pp. 74–75. 

25. Ibid., p. 74.

374
January 1970-30 June 1971, pp. 205–206.

27. Ibid., pp. 11–12. 

28. Ibid., p. 14.

29. Ibid., p. 12.

30. Ibid., pp. 206–214.

31. John A. Doglione, et al., Airpower and the 1972 Spring In

USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, vol. 2, monograph 3, p. 

also William W. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951-19

Analysis of its Role in Combat, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph 

vol. 3, monograph 4, p. 45.

32. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, p. 67. 

33. Ibid., p. 46.

34. Ibid., p. 4. 

35. Ibid.

36. Doglione, Airpower, p. 86.

37. Ibid.

38. Momyer, The Vietnamese Air Force, pp. 49–50.

39. Ibid., p. 47.
Chapter IX

CONCLUSION

The war in South Vietnam presented difficult challenges 

men at all levels. I’ve explained the perspectives that were 

tant to me, as Seventh Air Force commander from 1 July 196

1 August 1968, as I attempted to meet those challenges. Str

Our air strategy before 1972 was, of course, severely limite

within the slight freedom allowed us we attempted to raise th

of the enemy’s aggression unacceptably high and to confron

with overwhelming firepower whenever he elected to join in 

External restraints greatly reduced our ability to achieve the 

those objectives, but we did achieve the second. Command an

trol: I observed that for efficient command and control, a t

component commander must be in charge of his portion of th

If the employment of an air force is to be sharply attuned 

realities of combat, the controlling headquarters should be w

few hundred miles of the battles. The further removed a hea

ters is from the scene of combat, the greater the tendency 

contact with hour-by-hour developments, to become exce

involved in the political chessboard aspects of the war 

neglecting the realities upon which success in combat de

Counter air: The contest for air superiority is the most imp

contest of all, for no other operations can be sustained if th

tle is lost. To win it, we must have the best equipment, the be

tics, the freedom to use them, and the best pilots. We had th

pilots. Our experiences suggest that superiority in equipme

superiority in tactics must be viewed as two elusive goals to b

stantly pursued, not as assumed conditions. We are not apt t

marked superiority in both equipment and tactics for an ext

period; neither side is likely to corner the market on ingenu

long. Because so much depends on this battle, because i

fiercely contested, and because it is so readily affected by te

ogy, tactics, and rules of engagement, this is the battle in whi

airpower can most easily be crippled by external restraints

diction: It’s easy for laymen to build exaggerated conceptions 
conducting interdiction campaigns; to reduce the flow throu

enemy’s supply line to zero is virtually impossible so long a

willing and able to pay an extravagant price in lost men an

plies. To reduce the flow as much as possible and to make hi

painfully high, though, we must focus our campaign upon th

vital supply targets: factories, power plants, refineries, mars

yards, and the transportation lines that carry bulk goods. T

until he has disseminated his supplies among thousands of t

sampans, rafts, and bicycles, and then to send our multim

dollar aircraft after those individual vehicles––this is how to 

mize our cost, not his. Close air support: The tactical air contr

tem was surely one of the unquestioned successes of our air

in Vietnam. We continually refined our air-ground operation

by the end of 1968 we had become so responsive to ground 

manders’ needs that the characteristic engagement was 

which our ground forces located the enemy and kept him in 

while waiting 30–40 minutes for the fighters to arrive. This k

support was made possible by our central control of all in c

tactical air forces.

Finally, I want to end this book as I began it, by mentio

few of the perspectives that didn’t meet my criteria for ext

discussion.

I have deliberately avoided the perspectives from whic

would make judgments about the wisdom of our nationa

mitment to maintaining an independent government in 

Vietnam. I’m aware that future airmen could infer from th

ceding pages that the fighting in Vietnam ended in 1972 an

side won. It didn’t and they didn’t. But U.S. airpower a

plished what the President asked of it in 1972. Beyond th

the professional airman can say little without exceeding th

its of his professional expertise.

Another perspective I have avoided is the one, which 

allow me to protest the many restraints we imposed on ou

airpower in Korea and Vietnam. Of course my bias in this m

has been clear: I deeply resented the proscription of attac

North Vietnamese airfields, SAM and AAA sites, and oth

gets. Airmen are bound to resent such restraints; it is a

and bitter thing to hold a hand voluntarily behind one’s 

while being beaten or while watching one’s friend being b

But self-imposed restraint has been a fact in all U.S. c

since World War II, and obviously our hope in the age of n

and thermonuclear weapons is that some restraint will be 

378
the airman may feel about restraints, and I know how h

feel, his professional responsibility is to articulate the pr

consequences of his alternative courses of action to his s

ors and then to act as effectively as possible within the in

tions he is given. For future airmen it’s worth stressing her

that as technological advances make warfare ever more co

and tempt political leaders to exercise direct control at low

lower levels of command (disturbing as this may be to su

nate commanders), an extremely high premium must be 

on the airman’s ability to articulate options thoroughl

clearly for those leaders.

A final viewpoint deserving of mention is one oriented t

the future. I said in the Foreword that I wouldn’t have u

entirely on yesterday’s ideas to fight tomorrow’s wars. Iron

that is what our airmen are most apt to do if they are no

oughly conversant with airpower history. Our air leaders 

look closely at their history to prepare themselves for the f

I will mention here only two of the kinds of trends that see

sonable to extrapolate from my experiences and my stu

other airmen’s experiences in World War II, Korea, and Vie

First, theater commanders will attach increasing value 

power’s flexibility if, as seems likely, political restraints conti

reduce their combat options. Airpower in Vietnam constit

uniquely switchable faucet of firepower (to borrow a metapho

General Creighton Abrams); its point of application could be 

450 miles and more in less than an hour. By the end of 19

could strike point targets in heavily defended zones, using 

few aircraft, with very high probability of success and ve

probability of collateral damage. Technological developmen

bring further improvements in speed of response, range, an

ity to apply enormous amounts of firepower with great precis

of these improvements can help airpower compensate for th

tations imposed upon combat commanders by economic

graphical, and political considerations.

Second, my sense of history leads me to expect another 

that may be seen as a corollary of the first: The increasing 

plexity of international politics and the unique flexibility o

by airpower will entice us again toward parceling our air 

for the winning of battles rather than unifying and focusing 

for the winning of wars. Aware that our every move in a c

theater today sends ripples around the world, we are reluct

act decisively. We prefer to make smaller decisions, win b
permit us to win most battles. But that way leads to a se

Khe Sanhs and eventually in a free society to war-wearine

dissent. As an alternative to this approach, airpower offe

possibility of an early LINEBACKER II campaign (with the e

ing threat of subsequent LINEBACKERs, a threat that wa

spicuously missing in 1975). Airpower can be strategically 

sive if its application is intense, continuous, and focused 

enemy’s vital systems.

In short, airpower can win battles, or it can win wars. Al

manders since Pyrrhus have been tempted at one ti

another to confuse the two, but few distinctions in war are 

important. The future airman’s right to insist that such d

tions be made is, I believe, one of the things our airmen 

chased so dearly in Vietnam.

380
INDEX

Aachen, 310

Abrams, General Creighton, 309, 379

acoustic sensors, 344

Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), 279

advisor program, 277

advisors, 13, 74, 83, 139, 287

advisory group: See Air Advisory Group

Afrika Korps, 47, 260, 310

agreement violations, 242

AIM-7, 175, 177–78

AIM-9, 175, 177–78

Air Advisory Group, 281

air alert, 225, 322

air attaché, 96, 98, 221

airborne assault: See airborne operation

airborne command and control center (ABCCC), 170, 227

airborne operation, 92, 361

air commando, 13, 18, 296

air commando squadron, 18

air component commander, 48–49, 58, 60–65, 70, 74, 79, 82, 84, 91–92

101–2, 116, 297, 354

air cover, 75, 82, 317

aircraft:

A-lE, 296

A-1H, 296

A-6, 323

A-7, 99, 105

A-26, 283

A-37, 367

AC-47, 316–17, 346

AC-119, 372

AC-130, 237–39, 241, 317, 372

AN-2, 278

B-17, 47, 127, 141, 185

B-24, 127, 141, 185

B-25, 47, 108

B-26, 61, 203, 230, 232, 281, 296

B-29, 61, 203, 318

B-52, 23, 98, 115–19, 139, 166, 206, 240, 267, 269–74, 318–20, 346

B-57, 231–32

C-47, 278, 282, 284, 298

C-123, 230–31
C-135, 174, 201

CH–47, 369

E–3A, 174

EB–66, 231, 248–50

EC–121, 167, 170, 172–73, 344

F–4, 99, 143, 145, 156–57, 162, 164–65, 176, 203, 225, 239, 244, 24

254, 269–70, 319, 365, 368

F–8, 176

F–51, 129, 225

F–80, 129–30, 225

F–84, 129–30, 225

F–86, 128–30, 155–56, 225

F–100, 146, 156, 331

F–105, 143, 146, 149, 157, 163, 167–68, 202, 204–5, 247, 251, 253–

F–111, 99, 204, 270

FW–190, 166

IL–14, 278

IL–28, 110, 242

Ju–52, 260

KC–135, 170, 256–57, 259, 308

Lancaster, 185

L–19, 300

ME–109, 166

ME–163, 127

ME–262, 127–28

MIG–15, 70, 128–29, 155–56, 159, 161

MIG–17, 155, 157, 159, 167, 176, 251

MIG–19, 154–55

MIG–21, 154–57, 159, 176

0–1, 224, 244, 297, 300, 335, 347

0–2, 224, 300

OV–10, 97, 239, 300

P–40, 260

P–47, 108, 127

P–51, 108, 127, 283

P–61, 108

RF–4, 243, 262

RF–86, 263

RF–101, 262, 264

SC–47, 297

Spitfire, 260

SR–71, 261

T–6, 302

T–28, 281, 284, 295–96

T–37, 280

U–10, 13, 282

Wellington, 47

Air Defense Command (ADC), 302

air defense system, 18, 23, 30, 37, 39, 133, 141, 152, 216, 242, 244, 26

air defense system (Soviet): See Soviet air defense system

382
air doctrine, 283, 292–93, 300, 318

air drops, 370

airfield construction, 94

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), 231

air-ground operations, 278, 283, 287, 295, 306, 324, 378

air-ground operations system, 306, 324

air liaison officer (ALO), 290–93

airlift, 37, 76–77, 82, 286, 293, 302, 332, 342, 351, 356, 368, 370, 372

air mobile operations, 363

air offensive, 6, 14–15, 18, 21–23, 28, 38, 51, 53–54, 111–12, 119, 125, 

163, 169, 174, 322, 348

Air Operations Center (AOC), 83, 97, 294, 298

air refueling, 37, 100, 103, 119, 198, 250, 257

Air Staff, 17, 79–80, 82, 84, 86–87, 90, 94, 109, 116, 281, 302

air superiority, 44–45, 47, 49, 64, 66, 97, 125–28, 132, 156, 158, 166, 1

183, 188, 197, 297, 361, 377

air support, 1, 14–15, 18, 22, 37, 44–45, 47, 49, 54–55, 61–64, 66–67, 6

75, 80, 83, 90, 92, 99, 103, 116, 128, 156, 183, 188–89, 191, 221, 2

240, 280–81, 284, 287–88, 290, 292–95, 299–302, 306, 308–13, 317–

321, 323, 327, 330, 332, 335–36, 341, 345, 350, 354–57, 360–61, 36

372, 378

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), 290, 293

air supremacy, 125, 297

air sweeps: See fighter sweeps

air-to-air, 1, 30, 47, 175–76, 203

Air Training Command (ATC), 302

Air War College (AWC), 2

Alexander, General Harold L., 47

Alexandria, 49

Allied armies, 1, 44–45, 310

Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), 57, 62, 184

Allied invasion Normandy: See OVERLORD

all–weather operations: See weather operations

Almond, General Edward M., 68

ambassador U.S., 93, 256, 308

amphibious operations, 314, 321, 323

An Loc, 240, 317, 328, 330, 369–73

Anthis, Major General Rollen H., 84

anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA), 18, 22, 33, 37, 39, 133–37, 140, 149, 151–5

202, 206, 208, 224, 230–31, 240-41, 243-45, 251, 253-55, 263, 267, 

287, 355, 364, 378

anti-tank defenses, 216

anti-tank missile, 37

anti-war demonstrations, 348

Ap Bac, 287

Ap Soui Tre, 335

armed reconnaissance, 102, 169, 183, 188, 207, 221, 225, 227, 229, 24

armor, 310, 330, 335, 359, 361

armored personnel carriers, 362

Army Air Forces Board, 1
Army Aviation Operations Center, 298

Army, U.S., 11, 57, 84, 87, 278, 284–85, 288, 293, 297–98, 306–7, 323, 

Arnold, General “Hap,” 53

Articles 17 and 19, 13

artillery, 37, 67, 91, 99, 133–34, 201, 221, 224, 245, 297, 302, 312–13, 

321–22, 328, 330, 334, 337–43, 345, 348, 360–61, 364, 367, 369, 37

ARVN: See South Vietnamese Army

A Shau Valley, 341, 355

Atlas mountains, 44

Atoll missile, 159, 161

atomic bomb, viii 

ATTLEBORO Operation, 311

attrition, 22, 24, 141, 158, 191, 195, 213, 216

Australian forces, 308

Bac Mai, 133, 260, 267

Bai Thuong, 106

Ban Karai Pass, 35, 215, 219, 240

Ban Me Thuot, 368

Ban Raving Pass, 242

“bar caps,” 255

BAR LOCK, 260

barrage firing, 150

BARREL ROLL, 97–99, 216, 221, 224, 226

barrier engagements, 288

Barthelemy Pass, 105, 216

base construction, 90

base security force, 351

Bat Lake, 36, 241

battle damage, 161, 198, 254, 370

Battle of Britain, 51

“Bedcheck Charlie,” 130

Ben Hai River, 338, 367

bicycles, 196, 378

Bien Hoa AB, 20, 283, 295, 305, 335, 350, 357, 363, 367, 372

“Big Red One,” 332

Bizerte, 47, 230

blockade: See mining Haiphong Harbor

Blood, Major General Gordon F., 345

BOLO Operation, Bolovens Plateau, 163-64

bomb line, 299–300

bombing halt (1968), 17, 28–29, 31–33, 36–38, 99, 152, 155, 157, 178, 

205, 211, 216, 220, 237–38, 240–43, 356, 358–59, 363–64

Bong Son Plain, 299

border violations, 169, 171

Bradley, General Omar N., 51, 191

bridges, 4, 21, 63, 127, 132, 185, 188–89, 202, 208, 241, 266–67, 341, 

BRIGHAM, 174

British Desert Air Force, 46

Brittany peninsula, 310

384
bunkers, 313, 328, 344, 351

Burma, 283

Caen, 310

Cairo, 49, 52, 310

Cairo Conference, 52

Cambodia, 10, 25–26, 34–35, 74, 111, 166, 201–2, 220, 232, 330, 348, 

358, 369, 372

Cambodian Army, 330

Cam Lo, 348

camouflage, 34, 196, 245

Camp Carroll, 342

Canal des Rapides bridge, 106, 168, 199, 208

Cap Bon peninsula, 44

captured documents, 338, 358

carrier, 17, 46, 49, 65–67, 90, 100–2, 107–10, 136, 173, 198, 320–21, 3

carrier aircraft, 17, 66, 198

carrier task force (CTF), 173

Casino, 355

Casablanca Conference, 45, 51, 288

casualties: See losses

caves, 218, 339

ceasefire agreement, 33, 80, 240, 373

CEDAR FALLS Operation, 311, 343, 348

centralized control, 44–45, 47, 49, 63, 70, 80, 95, 99, 106, 122, 285, 29

308–9, 323, 345, 351, 356

CEP, 168, 201, 204, 239

chaff, 139, 145, 152, 265, 271, 273

Chairman (JCS), 16, 21, 25, 29, 36, 87, 121, 191, 286–87, 347

Cherbourg peninsula, 56

Chief of Naval Operations, 16

Chief of Staff U.S.A.F., 2, 15, 21, 24, 50, 60, 65, 67, 79–80, 90, 114, 116

309

Chief of Staff U.S. Army, 15, 24, 50, 278-79

Chiefs of Staff British, 50

China, 1, 10, 12, 14, 18, 22, 26, 63, 77, 79–80, 82, 110, 128, 153, 157–

168, 196, 206, 347

Chinese Air Force, 25, 159

Chinese Army, 6, 197

Chinese ground forces: See Chinese Army

Cho-Do Island, 175

Christmas stand–down: See stand–downs

Chu Lai, 305

Churchhill, Sir Winston, 45, 50–53

CINCPAC, 12, 14, 16–17, 21, 25–26, 32, 36, 77–80, 82, 85–90, 98–100, 

107, 111–12, 114–15, 118–21, 162, 221–22, 224, 262, 287, 305–6, 3

CINCPACAF, 31, 79, 86–90, 101, 111–12, 115

CINCPACFLT, 26, 80, 88, 102, 107, 112, 118

“city busting,” 51

civic action, 7, 79
Civil Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 316

Clay, General Lucius B., 111

Clifford, Clark M., 32

close air support, 1, 15, 18, 37, 44–45, 47, 55, 61–64, 66–67, 69–70, 75

128, 156, 183, 188–89, 191, 229, 280, 284, 293, 299–302, 306, 308–

318–19, 321, 323, 327, 332, 336, 345, 354–56, 360, 369, 372, 378

cluster bomb unit (CBU), 246, 254, 314, 337

Coastal Air Force (N. Africa), 46

collateral damage, 198, 255, 379

COLLEGE EYE, 170, 172–74

Collins, General J. Lawton, 277

Cologne, 230

Combat Information Center (CIC), 173

Combat Reporting Center (CRC), 169, 173, 227, 285, 290, 314, 321, 331

Combat Reporting Point (CRP), 169, 174, 227, 281, 285, 290, 314

combined bomber offensive, 39, 50, 127

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 44, 47, 50, 53–54

command and control, 3, 43–44, 49, 58, 62, 73, 89, 94, 97–98, 108, 112

122, 133, 170, 227, 251, 267, 272, 281, 288–90, 292, 306, 308, 346

377

Commandant Marine Corps, 16

Commander Army Forces Far East, 60

Commander–In–Chief Allied Forces Northwest Africa, 44, 288

Commander–In–Chief Far East (CINCFE), 59, 65

Commander–In–Chief Mediterranean Theater: See Wilson

Commander–In–Chief Pacific: See CINCPAC

Commander–In–Chief Pacific Air Forces: See CINCPACAF

Commander–In–Chief Pacific Fleet: See CINCPACFLT

Commander U.S. Forces Southeast Asia (COMUSSEA), 77, 82

Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam: See COMUSMA

Commanding General 18th Army Group: See Alexander

COMMANDO HUNT, 237, 240

COMUSMACV, 35, 77, 79–80, 82–84, 87, 92–94, 96, 98, 100, 112, 114–

118, 221–22, 224, 306, 308–9, 312, 318–19, 323, 327, 338, 354, 356

“condition red,” 350–51

conference table, 6

Congress, U.S., 10

Coningham, Air Vice Marshal “Mary,” 46-47, 51-55

container delivery system (CDS), 370

Con Thien, 370

control of the air: See air superiority

control of the sea, 64

conventional war, 26, 299

convoy: See truck convoys

coordinating authority, 89, 102, 110–11

“coordination control,” 65–66, 90

COSVN, 328, 331–32

counter air, 49, 70, 125, 143, 183, 308, 377

counterattack, 4

counterinsurgency, 8, 10–11, 79, 84, 86, 279–83, 324

386
CROWN, 167, 169, 173

C. Turner Joy, USS Destroyer, 17

Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew, 48

Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E., 346

Dak To, 348–49, 368

Dalat, 349

dams, 193

Danang, 23, 75, 110, 132, 169, 173, 229, 242, 285–86, 295, 305, 321, 3

340–41, 345, 349–50, 363, 367

Dau Tieng, 335

daylight bombing, 46

D–Day, 51

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 17

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 31, 321

Department of Defense (DOD), 11, 194, 206

Deputy Commander for Air Operations MACV, 84, 87, 321, 323, 345

Deputy Commander MACV, 83–85, 87, 91, 121

Deputy Commander 2 AD/13 AF, 94

Deputy Commander 7 AF/13 AF, 95

DePuy, Maj. Gen. William E., 332

DESERT STRIKE Operation, 293

Diem, President Ngo Van, 277

Dien Bien Phu 6–8, 11, 14, 74, 277, 324, 340–42, 345, 347, 349

dikes, 150–52

Direct Air Strike Team (DAST), 292

Direct Air Support Center (DASC), 290

DISCO, 174

Disosway Board, 286–87

Disosway, Lt. Gen. Gabriel P., 286

dive bombing, 3

divert mission, 100, 229, 312-14

DIXIE Station, 320–21

doctrine, 43–45, 51, 58, 73–74, 283, 286, 292–93, 300, 318

dogfight, 157, 159, 169

Dong Ha, 35, 157, 169, 174, 338, 340–41, 344–45, 348, 367

Dong Hoi, 204, 219, 242

Dong Suong, 242

Doolittle, Maj. Gen. James H., 48, 52

Doumer Bridge: See Paul Doumer

drone, 25, 262

dry season, 217, 224–25, 240, 330

Eaker, Maj. Gen. Ira C., 51

Easter offensive (1972), 38, 157, 196, 231, 240, 319, 327, 329, 355, 364

ECM: See electronic countermeasures

ECM pods, 143, 148, 231, 250–51

Eglin AFB, Fla., 203, 230, 282

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 44, 46-48, 52-58, 83, 125-26, 184-85

El Alamein, 47, 56
“Eleven Day War”: See LINEBACKER II

El Guettar, 54

Ely–Collins Agreement, 277

Ely, General Paul, 277

Embassy U.S., 98, 221

escalation, 2, 17, 20, 28, 133, 201, 206

Eschweiler, 310

evasive action, 139, 143

Fan Song radar, 145, 248, 319

Far East Air Force (FEAF), 60

Far East Bomber Command, 60–61

Far East Command (FECOM), 6, 59–61, 66, 77–78, 89

FARM GATE, 12–13, 18, 75, 83, 283–85, 292, 299, 304

Felt, Admiral Harry D., 14, 80

Field Force I, 287, 306, 308, 327, 354

Field Force II (FFV), 306, 354

fighter cover, 114, 119, 121, 164, 166, 168, 248, 251, 254, 271, 273, 31

fighter sweeps, 128

fire support base (FSB), 335, 337

flak, 203, 221, 237

flak suppression: See defense suppression

FLAMING DART, 20, 101

flares: See target illumination

Forrestal, James V., 64

Fort Bragg, N.C., 280

Forward Air Controller (FAC), 97, 221, 299–300

fragmentary (“frag”), 173, 294, 354

France, 75

French Air Force, 278, 340, 347

French Indochina War: See Indochina War

fuel consumption, 165, 257

Gafsa, 54

Gayler, Admiral Noel, 112

general purpose bombs, 314

general war, 1–3, 112, 163, 279

Geneva Accord (1954), 8, 296

Geneva Agreement, 8, 13–14, 280

German Air Force: See Luftwaffe

German Army, 46–47, 184

GHQ Target Group, 60

Gia Lam, 157, 273

Giap, General Vo Nguyen, 14

Gio Linh, 338, 340, 348, 364

gliders, 283

GOLDFIRE Operation, 73

graduated escalation: See graduated response

graduated response, 14–15, 18

388
Green, General Wallace M., 16

ground alert, 292, 312–13

ground crews, 255

ground control intercept (GCI), 133-34, 159-61, 167-68, 173, 175, 243, 

ground control intercept (German), 139

ground fire, 91–92, 280, 287, 295, 297–98, 303–4, 332, 354, 363, 367, 3

ground war, 17, 25, 79, 84, 128, 169, 318

Guam, 114

guerrillas, 7-8, 10, 12, 277-78

Gulf of Tonkin, 17, 24, 89–90, 104, 108, 163–64, 167, 169–70, 173–74, 

204, 249–50, 255–57, 260, 308, 321

gunship: See AC–47

gun (strike) camera, 265

Hai Duong, 210

Haiphong, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 38, 134–35, 150–51, 206, 210, 212, 220, 

266–67, 367

Haiphong Harbor: See mining Haiphong Harbor

Hanoi, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32, 35, 38–39, 106, 110, 112, 119, 121, 133–37, 

141, 144, 149–51, 155–57, 160–61, 167–68, 173, 195–96, 199–207, 2

212, 220, 239, 246–48, 251–52, 256, 260, 265–67, 272, 320, 364

Hanoi delta, 136, 151, 196, 200, 203, 239, 265, 267, 320, 364

Hanoi Railcar Repair Shop, 106, 135, 168, 200, 260

Harkins, General Paul D., 16, 77

Harris, General Hunter, Jr., 93

Hawk missile, 152

heliborne assault: See helicopter assault

helicopter, 91–92, 201, 221, 278, 280, 284, 287, 297–98, 312, 334–35, 3

351, 354–55, 359–62, 370

helicopter assault, 91–92, 221, 287, 298, 355, 359, 361

helicopter gunship, 287

helicopters, control of, 293

high speed FAC, 244

highways, 358

Hills––#558, #861, #881, #950, 160, 335, 343

HILLSBORO, 228–29, 245, 321, 343

Hoa Loc, 157

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 15, 23, 96, 100, 195, 220, 229, 238, 242, 278, 283, 

Honolulu Conference (1964), 16, 21, 25

Honolulu Conference (1965), 21

Honolulu Conference (1966), 25

“hot pursuit,” 63, 158, 169

Howze Board, 286–87

Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H., 286

Hue, 158, 245, 338, 340–41, 348–49, 351–52, 355

Hue Phu Bai, 245, 352

“hunter–killer” teams, 203

Hurlburt Field, Fla., 302

Hyland, Vice Admiral John J., 29
ll, Lt. Gen. Nam, 130

“immediate” missions, 83, 327

incendiary attacks, 1

incendiary bomb, 232

Inchon landing, 68, 188–89, 322

Indochina, 7–8, 277, 328, 350

Indochina War, 328, 350

industrial targets, 16, 22, 63

infiltration, 15, 28–29, 33–34, 194, 216, 220, 277–78, 318, 351

infra–red (IR), 237, 239

infrared missiles, 37

“. . . in support of . . .,” 55, 57, 62, 65, 67, 80, 92, 190, 286, 293–94, 30

319, 321, 331, 336, 350, 354–56, 367

insurgency, 8, 10, 14, 26, 82, 277

intelligence, 17, 48, 97, 173–74, 227–28, 251, 255, 260, 262, 289, 293,

299–300, 302, 318, 327, 329, 332, 337, 339–41, 343, 368

intercept mission, 159

interdiction, 15, 18, 25, 27, 33–34, 36, 53, 55, 63, 66, 70, 97, 99, 109, 

132, 143, 156, 183–85, 187–91, 193–97, 200, 206, 210, 212, 214–16

220–22, 224, 229–30, 233, 237, 241, 266–67, 318, 323, 327, 343, 34

377–78

International Control Commission (ICC), 157

intervention, 12, 189

introduction of jet aircraft, Vietnam, 13, 296, 304-5

invasions: See:

––Allied invasion Normandy: See OVERLORD

––Communist Chinese Offensive

––North Korean Invasion

––North Vietnamese offensives: See TET offensive

Invasion 1975, 4, 22, 43–44, 49–56, 62, 70, 87, 126–27, 184–86, 216, 2

288, 354, 358–59

invasion of Europe: See OVERLORD

invasion of N. Africa, 44

INVERT, 174

Iron Hand, 147–48, 251

ITALY, 1, 47–49, 53, 260, 361

jamming., 139–40, 143, 248–49, 271

Japan, 1, 28, 39

“jinking,” 149, 340

Johnson, General Harold K., 24

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 14, 287, 320, 325

Joint Evaluation Group Vietnam, 280

Joint General Staff (JGS), 287, 292

Joint Staff, 73, 84, 287, 292

Joint Task Force (JTF), 12, 73, 80

Joint Task Force 116 (JTF–116), 12, 80

Joint Operations Center (JOC), 62, 65–66, 289, 294

JUNCTION CITY Operation, 328, 331

JUNGLE JIM Operation, 11–12, 283

390
Kasserine Pass, 45

Kennedy, John F., 278

Kep, 21, 23, 32, 133, 157, 203, 205–6, 208–9

Key West Agreement of 1948, 64, 67

Khe Sanh, 37, 92, 157, 241, 312, 324, 327, 338–43, 345–48, 355, 361, 

372

kill ratio, 175, 178

Kingston–McGloughry, Air Vice Marshal, 185-86

Kissinger, Henry, 274

Kontum, 317, 349, 364, 368–69, 372–73

Korat AB, Thailand, 283

Korean forces (in Vietnam), 4, 63, 188, 356

Korean War, 3, 6, 18, 27–28, 31, 43, 63, 70, 77–78, 82, 84, 89, 93, 102, 

128, 130, 132, 134, 153, 155, 159, 161, 164, 168, 175, 178, 188, 19

195, 197, 201, 203, 225, 230, 249, 260, 263, 279, 281, 283, 290, 29

310, 313, 315, 318, 322

Krushchev, Nikita, 278

labor forces, 200

LAMPLIGHTER, 232

Lam Son #719, 229, 359, 363, 365

Lancaster: See aircraft

landing zone LOLO, 362

Lang Vei, 345–46, 365

Laos, 7, 10, 12, 14–16, 18, 20–21, 23–26, 32–34, 36, 74, 80, 82, 87–88, 

94–101, 103, 105–6, 108–9, 111, 114–16, 132, 139, 163–64, 166, 17

195–98, 200–202, 204, 208, 213–14, 216, 218–21, 224–25, 227–32, 2

244–47, 249–50, 255–56, 260, 278, 304, 306, 318, 321, 323, 327, 34

343–44, 346–47, 350, 353, 358–62, 364

Laotian panhandle, 26, 220, 359

laser: See laser weapons

laser “basket,” 239

laser bomb: See laser weapons

laser designator, 233, 237

laser weapons, 39, 149, 168, 238–39, 265–66, 362, 366

Leigh–Mallory, Air Marshal, 51–53, 55–57, 62, 184–85

Lemay, General Curtis E., 1, 15

Libya, 310

limited war, 2, 4, 7, 279, 287

LINEBACKER, 38–39, 112, 145, 150, 154, 169, 199, 224, 266–67, 270, 

LINEBACKER/BLUETREE Operations Order, 112

lines of communication, 1, 4, 6, 15–16, 18, 48–49, 63–64, 66, 87, 103, 1

127, 183, 187, 195, 220, 227, 239, 304, 341, 358

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 16

logistics, 21–22, 26, 36, 84, 90, 106, 132, 187–88, 195–97, 208, 216, 22

240–41, 336, 338, 343, 368

long range patrols, 57, 178, 199

Long Thieng, 98-99

Loire River, 185

“lone wolf,” 263
LORAN bombing, 99, 369

loss rates, 134, 152

low–level bombing, 204

low–light television (LLTV), 237, 317

low speed FAC, 244

Luftwaffe, 1, 55, 126–28

MacArthur, General Douglas, 4, 58, 60-61, 84, 102, 189

MACV, 16, 77–95, 100, 104, 112, 114–21, 224, 298, 305, 318, 321, 323

339, 345–46, 350, 352, 354, 356–57

MACV Forward, 82, 352, 356–57

Maddox, U.S. Destroyer, 17

Malaya, 8

Malta, 45, 49

Manchuria, 6, 189

Marianas, 1

Marine Air Wing (MAW), 321–23, 345

Marine aviation, 67, 69–70, 92, 324

Marine Corps U.S., 16, 306, 329, 338-41, 348

Marine Landing Force, 67, 127

Marine TACS, 83, 288

Marshall, General George C., 50

marshalling yards, 21, 32, 38, 108, 127, 132, 185, 201, 205, 209, 241, 

270, 272–73, 347, 378

McCain, Admiral John S., Jr., 111

McConnell, General John P., 21, 90

McDonald, Admiral David L., 16

McNamara, Robert C., 12, 14, 16, 21-23, 25, 28, 84, 87, 194, 267, 286

McNaughton, John P., 133

Mediterranean, 1, 45–46, 48–51, 53, 58, 64, 78, 89

Meyer, General John C., 121

“MIG Alley,” 129–30, 132

MIGS, 6, 18, 29, 35–36, 39, 128, 130, 133–34, 142, 149, 153–54, 157–6

162–66, 168–70, 173, 175–76, 208, 242, 244–45, 248–49, 251, 253–5

267, 270

MIG tactics, 158, 161

Military Advisory Group (MAG), 74, 285

military aid, 74

Military Airlift Command (MAC), 302

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 75

Military Assistance Command Thailand (MACTHAI), 81

Military Assistance Command Vietnam: See MACV

Minister of Munitions: See Speer

“mini DASC,” 345

mining Haiphong Harbor, 25, 31, 266

MISTY FAC, 245

mobile SAMS (SA–4 & SA–6), 139

mobility, 280, 286, 324

Monkey Mountain, 173, 285–86

monsoon northeast, 198–99, 220, 245, 253, 255, 270, 320, 355

392
Montgomery, General Bernard, 44

MOONBEAM, 231

Moore, Maj. Gen. Joseph H., 18

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., 36

Mosquito FAC, 302, 365

MOTEL, 169, 173–74

MSQ bombing: See radar bombing

MSQ radar, 245, 318

Mu Gia Pass, 26, 36, 204, 212, 218, 221, 246

Nakom Phanom, 174

Nam Dinh railyard, 106, 206

napalm, 314

Naples, 47

nation building, 10

National Liberation Front (NLF), 338

national policy, 3, 27

NATO, 108

naval aviation, 49, 63–64, 66, 74, 89

naval gunfire, 67, 211

Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE), 60, 64

Navy fighters, 100, 173, 176, 225

Navy U.S., 17, 101, 104–5, 192, 320

Nazzaro, General Joseph J., 116

negotiated settlement, 31, 37, 39, 190

negotiations, 6, 12, 27–34, 38–39, 119, 130, 229, 267, 270, 373

NEUTRALIZE Operation, 339

Nha Trang, 75, 307

night operations, 121, 225, 271

Nixon, Richard M., 34, 36, 118-19, 267, 357

Normandy: See OVERLORD

North Africa, 1, 43–45, 47, 51, 53, 56, 62, 115, 122, 125–26, 230, 260, 

292, 309–10, 361

northeast railroad, 32, 137, 196, 205

North Korean Air Force, 4, 128, 153

North Korean Army, 188

North Korean invasion, 3, 189

North Vietnamese air defense system, 133, 152

North Vietnamese Air Force (NVNAF), 22, 24–25, 29, 153, 157–58, 178–7

North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 14, 87, 299, 328, 358

North Vietnamese offensives:

1968: See TET

1972: See Easter

1975: See Invasion 1975

Northwest Africa Strategic Air Force, 52

Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force, 51–52

northwest railroad, 137, 202, 205

nuclear weapons, 1–4, 7, 58, 279

Nugent, Gen., 288

NVA: See North Vietnamese Army
offensives: See invasions

oil storage facilities, 27

operational command, 50, 61, 65, 67, 173, 224

operational control, 48–49, 52–54, 56, 61–65, 67, 70, 82–83, 86, 90, 92, 

97–98, 102, 110–12, 114–16, 185, 285, 289, 292, 297, 308, 322, 345

356

organizations:

1st Air Cavalry Division, 351, 355

1st Air Commando Squadron, 18

1st Army (British), 44, 47, 288, 290

1st Aviation Brigade, 354

1st Division (ARVN), 332, 348

1st Division (NVA), 348

1st Field Army, 288, 289

1st Infantry, 332

1st Marine Air Wing, 322, 345

1st Marine Division, 321-22

2nd Air Division, 18, 24, 75–76, 80–84, 86–94, 101–4, 114, 122, 292

297–98, 304–6, 308

2nd Air Division (ADVON), 18, 24, 75-76, 292

2nd Tactical Air Force (British), 51–52, 57, 62, 185, 187, 288–89

3rd Division (ARVN), 37, 345, 365, 367, 373

3rd Field Army, 288, 310

3rd Marine Division, 321–22, 345

5th Air Force, 6, 60–61, 65–67, 70, 93, 102, 128, 130, 188, 190, 197

5th Division (NVA), 355

7th Air Force, 17, 28, 30, 37, 39, 94–102, 106, 108–11, 114–21, 132, 

154, 157, 159, 169, 173–74, 219, 221, 224–25, 227–28, 242–46, 2

266, 271, 308, 311–12, 318–21, 323, 327, 331–32, 335, 338–39, 3

345–46, 350–51, 353–55, 357, 359, 361, 363, 367–70, 372

7th Air Force (ADVON), 353, 357

7th Division (ARVN), 287

7th Division (NVA), 348

7th Fleet, 29, 89, 107, 116, 118

8th Air Force, 51, 53, 114, 127–28

8th Army (British), 6, 27, 44, 46–47, 67, 69–70, 128, 188–91, 290, 3

8th Army (U.S.), 128, 290

9th Air Force, 51–52, 57, 108, 185, 187, 250, 289

9th Field Army, 288

9th Division (VC), 328, 330, 336, 348

11th Armored Cavalry, 330, 352

12th Army Group, 51, 56, 288

13th Air Force, 75–76, 79–80, 82, 86–88, 90, 93–95, 285, 305

15th Air Force, 53

18th Army Group, 47–48, 52, 56, 288

19th Tactical Air Support Squadron, 300

21st Army Group, 51, 56, 288

25th Infantry, 330

33rd Fighter Group, 1

34th Tactical Group, 18

394
101st Airborne Division, 351

101st Regiment (NVA), 328

173rd Airborne Brigade, 330, 332

196th Light Infantry Brigade, 330

242 Group (RAF), 44, 47

272nd Regiment (VC), 335

304th Division (NVA), 338, 340, 347

320th Division (NVA), 368

325th Division (NVA), 338, 340, 347

355th Tactical Fighter Wing, 247

388th Tactical Fighter Wing, 247

416th Battalion (VC), 355

507th Tactical Air Control Group, 300

4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, 282

I Corps (ARVN), 224, 285, 305, 312, 319, 321–23, 338–41, 351–53, 3

364

II Corps (ARVN), 44, 47, 278, 288, 295, 304, 307, 341

II Corps (U.S.), 47, 278, 288

III Corps (ARVN), 304, 306, 308, 357–58

III MAF, 92, 321, 327, 346, 352, 354, 356–57

IV Corps (ARVN), 285, 315, 320, 329, 348, 358, 369

IX Tactical Air Command, 288

X Corps (U.S.), 68–69, 322

XII Air Support Command, 44, 47, 288, 292

XIX Corps (French), 44, 47

XIX Tactical Air Command, 288

XXIV Corps (Vietnam), 356, 359–60

XXIX Tactical Air Command, 288

French Corps, 44, 47, 288

Provisional Corps (Vietnam), 356

Orleans Gap, 185

OSD, 279–80

OVERLORD Operation, 48, 184

PACAF, 79–80, 82, 86–90, 93, 95, 101–2, 104, 116, 118, 120, 246

Pacific Air Forces: See PACAF

Pacific Theater, 85

Palermo, 47

PANAMA, 229, 340

Panzers, 126, 310

Paris: See Paris peace talks

PARIS CRC, 331

Paris peace talks, 32, 270, 357, 373

Pathet Lao, 10, 12–13, 105, 217, 278

“pathfinder,” 203, 230

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., 54

Paul Doumer bridge, 21, 106, 199, 208, 210

Pave Aegis Project, 237

peace agreement (1954), 13, 274, 277, 363

peace agreement (1973), 363, 373
Phang Rang AB, 305

phasedown: See withdrawal U.S.

Philippines, 75, 296, 305

Phnom Penh, 330

photo interpreter, 208, 245

Phu Cat AB, 305

Phuc Yen, 18, 22–25, 29–30, 110–11, 133, 153, 157–58, 160, 242, 260

Phu Tho race track, 351

PIERCE ARROW, 18, 87

Piraz, 173

pipelines, 232

Plain de Jars, 98, 105, 217, 221, 229

Pleiku, 20, 37, 158, 285, 304–5, 307, 349–50, 368–69

POCKET MONEY, 38

POINTBLANK Operation, 127

policy U.S.: See national policy

Polish pilots, 128

political factors, 195

political restraints: See rules of engagements

POL tank farms, 247

Portal, 46, 50–51, 53–54

porters, 15, 21, 196, 206, 220

ports, 21–22, 25, 38, 47, 103, 178, 197, 233

positive control, 92, 169, 179, 297, 313

“preplanned missions,” 294, 309, 311–12

probability of kill (PK), 177, 266

prohibited zones, 38, 150, 264

propaganda, 31, 202, 298, 320

propeller driven aircraft, 280-81

protective reaction strike, 35-36, 220, 244

Provisional Corps (V), 356

psychological warfare, 282

public opinion, 30, 34–35

Pusan, 4, 188, 310

Pusan perimeter, 4

Pyongyang, 66, 134, 189, 192, 195, 203, 212

Pyrrhus, 380

Quang Khe, 219, 369

Quang Khe Ferry, 369

Quang Lang, 242

Quang Tri, 240, 242, 317, 338, 340–41, 348, 357, 364–65, 367–69, 372

Quang Tri Province, 240, 242, 340, 372–73

Quebec, 50

Quesada, Lt. Gen. Elwood R., 2, 288

Qui Nhon, 20, 132, 368

Q–34: See drone

radar beacons, 318

radar bombing, 39, 199, 201, 203

396
radar system U.S. (Vietnam), 134, 159, 169–70, 174, 204, 285

radar homing and warning (RHAW), 143-44, 247

RAF, 44, 47, 51–53, 60, 126–27, 185, 187, 230

RAF Bomber Command, 53, 60, 126–27, 230

railroads, 21–22, 38, 106, 186

rainy season 192. See also monsoon

RANCH HAND, 77

RAND, 300

Readiness Command (REDCOM), 73

reconnaissance, 25, 32–33, 35, 48, 76, 97, 102, 114, 119, 139, 151, 169

188, 196, 207, 210, 212, 220–21, 225, 227–30, 240, 242–45, 261–65

293, 300, 318–19, 328, 332, 340

reconnaissance photos, 32, 245

recovery rates, 370

Red River delta, 175, 204, 206

refueling: See air refueling

Regensburg, 247

Regional and Popular Forces (RF–PF), 349

repair teams, 208

rescue: See search and rescue

restricted zones, 38

restrictions: See rules of engagement

resumption of bombing, 34, 38, 116, 266

retaliatory strikes, 18, 20

retreat, 26, 188

road network, 97, 103, 105, 108, 142, 212–13, 219–20, 228, 230, 343–4

rockets (V1 & V2), 224, 302, 309, 314, 319, 335, 341, 348, 351

Rock Pile, 342

ROLLING THUNDER, 20–21, 26, 38, 89, 101–3, 110, 119, 199, 224, 266

ROLLING THUNDER Armed Reconnaissance Coordinating Committee, 1

Rommel, General, 44–45, 47, 49, 310

RON, 219

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28, 45, 50, 52-53

Rostow, Walter W., 12, 77

routes: See highways

route packages, 103–4, 106, 108–9, 115–18, 134, 196, 202, 225, 244, 2

304, 323, 363

Royal Air Force: See RAF

Royal Navy, 49, 67

rubber plantations, 329, 369

rules of engagement, 150, 158, 164, 195, 221, 267, 377

Rusk, Dean, 16

Russian pilots, 128

Ryan, General John D., 31

SAC ADVON, 116–17, 119, 121

Sager Captain, 335

Saigon, 29, 37, 75, 94, 102, 121, 132–33, 173, 245, 277–78, 281, 305, 3

330–31, 351, 353, 369

Saigon Conference (1967), 29
201–3, 208, 220, 224, 231, 240–42, 245–48, 251, 253–55, 260, 267, 

272–73, 319, 340, 364, 378

Sam Neua, 201

SAM radar, 143, 146, 248

sanctuary, 4, 6, 128, 158, 206, 212, 336, 347

sapper attacks, 350, 368

satellite operations, 257

Savannakhet, 341

Saville, Brig. Gen. Gordon P., 292

SA–2, 153, 155, 250

SA–7 “Strella,” 363

Schweinfurt, 247

search and destroy operations, 311, 328

search and rescue, 172

SEATO, 8, 10, 12, 93

Secretary of Defense, 11, 16, 21–23, 28–29, 32, 64, 84, 114, 133, 194, 2

278–81, 318

Secretary of State, 11, 16, 21, 28, 114

Seine River, 185

seismic sensors, 344

Senate Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee, 29

Sharp, Admiral U.S. Grant, 16, 86

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, 281

SHORAN, 203

“short rounds,” 338, 346

SHRIKE missile, 146, 148

Sicily, 1, 47-49, 56, 361

SIDEWINDER missile, 176

Sihanouk, Prince Noradom, 35

Sihanoukville, 329–30

single air commander, 51, 55, 61, 89, 94, 119, 323, 361

single air manager: See single air commander

SIOP, 163

Site 85, 29, 134, 141–42, 144–49, 153, 169, 172, 174, 200–1, 239, 245, 

278, 285, 318–19, 328

“smart bomb”: See laser weapons

Smart, General Jacob E., 79

Sniper Ridge, 315

sortie rate, 15, 237, 247, 312

Soui Tre: See Ap Soui Tre

South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), 12, 306

South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), 12, 20, 23, 35, 37, 306, 350, 364

South Vietnamese Rangers, 281

Southwest monsoon: See monsoon Soviet aircraft

Soviet Air Defense Force, 153

Soviet air defense system, 133, 141

Soviet Union, 2–3, 10, 14, 153, 157, 206, 267, 364

Spaatz, General Carl A., 46

SPARROW missile, 175–78

Special Forces U.S. Army, 11, 278

398
Speer, Albert, 127, 183, 216

spider hole, 315

Spring Offensive Korea (1953), 192

Spring Offensive Vietnam (1972): See Easter stalemate

Stalingrad, 216

Standard Arm missile, 146, 148

standdowns–Christmas & New Year, 121, 163, 229, 349

standoff jammers, 250

starlight scope, 230

State Department, 85, 206, 274

STEEL TIGER, 96–97, 99, 115, 221, 224, 226

Stilwell, Maj. Gen. Joseph W., 84

Strategic Air Command (SAC), 52, 61

Strategic Air Force Europe U.S. (USSAFE), 46, 53, 62

strategic air offensive, 14, 18, 21–23, 53, 163

strategic airpower, 47

strategic bombing, 28, 51, 54, 132, 184

strategic reconnaissance, 114

strategy (enemy), 1, 3–4, 6, 8, 10, 14–17, 20–22, 24–30, 34–39, 43, 48, 5

91, 115, 192, 194, 241, 279, 288, 300, 327, 337–38, 340, 343, 347–4

Stratemeyer, Lt. Gen. George E., 60

Strike Command (STRICOM), 73

sub–limited war, 12

sub–unified command, 77–78, 82, 87, 305

Sui Ho power plant, 192

Sullivan, William A., 201

supply centers enemy, 21, 34, 36

supply lines: See lines of communication

Supreme Commander–In–Chief of Allied Expeditionary Forces, 50

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, 53

surface–to–air missile: See SAM

surrender (Japan), 1, 39, 216

suspension of bombing: See bombing halt

SWIFT STRIKE, Operation, 73

Symington, Stewart, 198–99

synthetic oil plants, 126, 183

TACAN, 278

Tactical Air Command (TAC), 2, 33, 61, 80, 82, 281, 289–90

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 91, 285, 290, 294

Tactical Air Control System (TACS), 76, 82, 91–92, 114, 228, 281, 284–8

294, 297, 313, 319, 321, 324, 351, 378

Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 175

tactical airlift, 37

Tactical Air Support Element (TASE), 354, 357

Tactical Operations Center (TOC), 294

Takhli AB, Thailand, 12–13, 24, 37, 77, 79–82, 87, 90, 93–96, 109, 169, 

204, 227, 238, 283–84, 308, 331, 342, 363, 365, 367, 372

TALLY HO 217 tankers: See air refueling

tanks, 164, 317, 345–46, 351, 359, 361–62, 365–66, 368–69, 373
target illumination, 230, 282, 317

targeting, 49, 53, 60–61, 65–66, 114–16, 118–19, 121, 346

target list, 29, 120

targets of opportunity, 245, 312

Task Force 77 (TF–77), 12, 73, 80, 89, 170, 173, 210, 224, 227, 283, 36

Taylor, General Maxwell, 12, 16, 279

Tay Ninh City, 328, 330, 335, 364, 369

Tay Ninh Province, 328

Tchepone, 18, 219, 221, 232, 241, 278, 341, 359–60, 362

TEABALL, 169, 174

Tedder, Air Chief Marshal, 45–46, 49, 54–58, 67, 106, 122, 125–27, 184

TET (January 1968), 30, 100, 213, 229, 308, 312, 319, 323, 327, 340, 3

347–51, 355–58, 364, 367, 369

Thailand, 12–13, 24, 37, 77, 79–82, 87, 90, 93–96, 109, 169, 174, 204, 

238, 283–84, 308, 331, 342, 363, 365, 367, 372

Thai Nguyen Steel Mill, 135, 201, 208, 213, 251

Thanh Hoa, 24, 106, 135, 170, 206, 208, 211, 241, 260, 268

Thanh Hoa bridge, 21, 105–6, 135, 149, 167–68, 199, 208, 210, 212, 22

theater of operations, 47, 49, 53, 58, 62, 67, 74, 84, 363

theater unified command, 77, 86, 324

Third Marine Amphibious Force: See organizations: III MAF

Throckmorton, Lt. Gen. John L., 87

Thud Ridge, 160

THUNDERSTICK, 204

Thuy Thien Province, 357

TIGER HOUND, 96–97, 99, 221, 224, 226, 229, 237

“tit for tat” policy, 17, 20

Tobruk, 49

Tokyo, 1

Tonkin Gulf incident, 153

training–pilots, 126, 278, 284, 288-300

transportation system, 28, 126, 184, 196, 208, 241

trench networks, 344

Triangle Hill, 315

Troop Carrier Command, 46

“truces,” 350

truck convoy, 219

truck parks, 221, 225

trucks (destroyed), 32, 109, 186, 196, 211–13, 219, 224–25, 229–30, 23

239–41, 329, 343, 347, 358, 378

truck sightings, 239

trucks (kill rate), 186, 237, 239

Truman, Harry S., 194

Tunis, 47, 310

Tunisia, 44, 54, 260

Tuy Hoa, 305

Udorn AB Thailand, 87, 174

U Minh Forest, 299

unified command, 59, 73, 77, 85–86, 96, 324

400
United Nations ground forces, 130

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., 57

Vang Pao, General, 229

Vienna, 10

Vientiane, 97, 221, 256

Viet Cong (VC), 10–11, 16, 18, 20, 35, 101, 196, 278, 281, 287, 299, 31

319, 327–28, 334–35, 341, 349

Viet Minh, 7–8

Vietnamese Armed Forces, 7, 16, 75, 280, 292, 348

Viet Tri thermal power plant, 135

Vinh, 15, 36, 104, 134–35, 166, 210, 216, 218–20, 242, 260, 319

visual reconnaissance (VR), 300, 332

Vogt, General John W. Jr., 121

“wars of liberation,” 10, 278, 324

War Zone “C,” 328–30

War Zone “D,” 328–30

“Washington,” 21, 26–27, 63, 85, 256, 262, 339, 361

WATERBOY, 169–70, 172, 174

weather operations, 318

Wehrmacht, 184, 187

Western Desert Air Force, 47, 49, 51, 103, 157, 174, 210, 244, 257, 260

341

Westmoreland, General William C., 16, 35

wet season 324. See also monsoon

Weyland, Maj. Gen. Otto P., 2, 63, 128

Wheeler, General Earl G., 15, 25, 29-31, 36, 87, 267, 287, 345, 347

Wild Weasel, 121, 145–47, 231, 273, 319–20

Wilson, General Sir Henry Maitland, 53

Wingate, Brig. Gen. Orde, 283

“Wingate’s Force,” 283

withdrawal U.S., 32–35, 241, 357–58, 362

Wonsan, 189

Yalu River, 4, 6, 63, 66, 70, 129, 134, 166, 175, 189, 192, 203, 249, 263

YANKEE Station, 321, 365

Yen Bai, 137, 202, 273

Yen Vien, 209, 255

Yugoslavia, 283