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REVIEW OF THE NRC’S NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAR AIR 

AND NUCLEAR SAFETY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AUGUST 2, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BENARD SANDERS, Vermont 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex officio) 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

AUGUST 2, 2011 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Inhofe, Hon. James, U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .......................... 3 

Carper, Hon. Thomas, U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ........................ 10 

Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 12 

Sanders, Hon. Bernard, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont ....................... 14 

Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee ................... 15 

Udall, Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ............................ 16 

Johanns, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska .......................... 17 

Hon. Frank Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ................ 18 

Hon. John Boozman, U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas .......................... 19 

Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .............................. 20 

WITNESSES 

Jaczko, Hon. Gregory B., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission .............. 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 33 

Senator Caper ............................................................................................ 47 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Cardin ............................... 52 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 53 

Svinicki, Hon. Kristine L., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ..... 65 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 66 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 67 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 69 

Apostolakis, Hon. George, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission n .. 71 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 72 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 73 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 75 

Magwood, Hon. William D., Iv, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ........................................................................................................................ 76

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 77 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 79 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 81 

Ostendorff, Hon. William C., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission . 82 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 83 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 86 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 89 

(1) 

REVIEW OF THE NRC’S NEAR-TERM TASK 

FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 2, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR

AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 406, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer (chairman of 

the full committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Inhofe, Sessions, Carper, Lautenberg, 

Alexander, Sanders, Barrasso, Udall, Johanns and Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning. 

Senator Carper is the Chair of the Subcommittee. I am delighted 

that he is here, and, of course, we have a good turnout considering 

at noon we have a crucial vote. So we are going to move forward. 

Today is the fourth time the Members of this Committee have 

gathered in this room to discuss nuclear safety following the disaster in Japan. Since our first briefing on March 16th, I have asked 

the NRC to heed the wake-up call and reevaluate our current safety and security measures that are at our nuclear power plants. I 

especially wanted them to look at our power plants that are located 

in areas that face the possibility of natural disasters such as earthquakes and flooding. 

California’s two nuclear power plants at Diablo and San Onofre 

are located in seismically active areas, and I want to repeat that 

any task force recommendations be implemented as soon as possible since millions of people live close to those plants, millions and 

millions of people. 

The NRC has begun to act. First, NRC ordered inspections on 

the 104 operating nuclear reactors and issued reports on their 

readiness to address power losses and damage following extreme 

events. More recently, NRC issued the results of its near-term 90- 

day task force review. I understand that the six-person task force 

that conducted the review was made up of senior NRC staff with 

more than 135 years of combined expertise, but they did not rely 

on their experience alone. 

2 

The task force also had full access to all NRC staff and to all experts as they prepared their report. The task force found ‘‘continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.’‘ That means that the task 

force found that no plants needed to be immediately shut down, but 

problems were identified. 

The task force has highlighted some issues that should be addressed right now as we speak, while further study and analysis 

is needed before other recommendations can be implemented. Last 

month, I sent a letter to Chairman Jaczko in which I urged the 

commission to act promptly on the near-term task force recommendations. Their near-term recommendations, they need to be 

implemented now in the near term. 

I support the Chairman’s road map for action within 90 days and 

I will ask the commission to move forward expeditiously. It took 90 

days for the task force to make their recommendations. It should 

not longer than 90 days for the NRC to accept or reject them and 

move toward implementation. Any stalling will not be viewed favorably by the American people I can assure you. Their confidence 

in nuclear power is waning. 

The task force concluded that the NRC ‘‘The NRC’s safety approach is incomplete without a strong program for dealing the unexpected, including severe accidents. Continued reliance on industry initiatives for a fundamental level of defense in depth similarly 

would leave gaps in the NRC regulatory approach.’‘ 

These findings are important. Although the task force stated that 

an accident like what happened in Japan is unlikely in the U.S., 

they did conclude changes should be made to our regulatory system 

to improve safety. They further concluded we cannot count on voluntary industry initiatives to provide the necessary level of safety. 

The Japanese were not prepared for the disaster that hit them 

on March 11 th. That is the lesson learned from Fukushima. We 

can’t afford to make the same mistake. We should make improvements that will enhance safety and preparedness for unforeseen 

disasters. 

To that end, the NRC’s 90-day review includes important recommendations. They should move quickly to implement the safety 

recommendations contained in the report or we are wasting taxpayer dollars and money. In addition, I believe more work should 

be done as part of the longer-term review to address moving spent 

fuel to dry cask storage and other issues that were not fully addressed. 

Today, I call on the commission to announce a plan for adopting 

the task force recommendations, and I am not alone in my call for 

action. A July 23d New York Times editorial stated, ‘‘If nuclear 

power is to have a future in this Country, Americans have to have 

confidence that regulators and the industry are learning the lessons of Fukushima and taking all steps necessary to ensure safety. 

They went on to say, ‘‘This month, NRC’s near-term task force 

issued thoughtful and common sense recommendations. The five 

commissioners should quickly adopt them.’‘ 

A July 17th editorial in The Washington Post stated, ‘‘The NRC 

should use this review not merely to respond to a single event, but 

3 

to ensure that it is actively assessing low probability but high consequence risks.’‘ 

On July 19th, 15 nongovernmental organizations, including the 

Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense 

Council, sent a letter to the NRC urging them to act to implement 

the recommendations. And more recently, on July 28th, my colleague, Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois was reported as saying, ‘‘The 

bottom line is we cannot let the lessons learned from Fukushima 

become a forgotten story by dragging our feet on some of these critical short-and long-term improvements that can be made now.’‘ I 

couldn’t agree with him more. 

For both the safety and confidence of the American public, the 

NRC must act without delay. It is not acceptable now that we have 

the results of the task force review to merely call for more study 

and further delay. And I look forward to hearing each of you make 

a commitment that you are ready to move on their recommendations. You must act now that you know what some of the problems 

are. It is your moral and your legal responsibility, and I consider 

it mine as well. 

I now call on Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First, I would like to put into the record the letter from Marvin 

Fertel, the President of the Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI. I will 

just read one sentence, the second paragraph. It says, ‘‘The task 

force report lacks the rigorous analysis of issues that traditionally 

accompanies regulatory requirements proposed by the NRC.’‘ I 

would like to put it into the record. 

Senator BOXER. Absolutely, in the record. 

[The referenced document follows:] 

4 


23823.067

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSlllUlE 

July 15, 2011 

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko 

Chairman 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

11555 Rockville Pike 

Mail Stop 016 C1 

Rockville, MD 20852 

Subject: NRC Near-Term Task Force Report 

Project Number: 689 

Dear Chairman Jaczko: 

Marvin S. Fertel 

PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 

The nuclear energy industry is reviewing the NRC Near-Term Task Force's Recommendations for 

Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century and we look forward to providing comments to the 

staff on the recommendations. In general, the industry agrees with many of the issues identified by 

the task force. While there are some near-term actions that are clear from the available information, 

the basis for many of the recommendations clearly was disadvantaged by the fact that detailed 

information from the accident was, as the task force noted, "unavailable, unreliable and ambiguous." 

The task force report lacks the rigorous analysis of issues that traditionally accompanies regulatory 

requirements proposed by the NRC. Better information from Japan and more robust analysis is 

necessary to ensure the effectiveness of actions taken by the NRC and avoid unintended 

consequences at America's nuclear energy facilities. The report also discusses at length proposals to 

modify the existing regulatory framework for nuclear energy facilities. If the commission decides to 

pursue some or all of the task force proposals related to the regulatory framework, these activities 

should be separated from the specific Fukushima Daiichi lessons learned recommendations. 

The nuclear energy industry has taken seriously the accident at Fukushima Daiichi and continues to 

compile lessons learned that can be applied at U.S. reactors. As the NRC task force has concluded 

throughout the 90-day review, U.S. nuclear energy facilities are safe. Since the March accident, the 

industry has conducted detailed inspections at our facilities and taken steps necessary to enhance 

safety as well as responded to NRC-mandated actions at the facilities. As the NRC confirmed, every 

17761 Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC l 20006·3708 P: 202.739.8125 F: 202.293.3451 i msf@nei.org www.nei.org 
5 


23823.068

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko 

July 15, 2011 

Page 2 

company operating a nuclear plant has verified its ability to safely manage the facility even in an 

extreme event, regardless of its cause. 

We will continue to work with the NRC to identify potential enhancements in safety that should be 

made. In this regard, the continued assessment of information from Japan and the sharing of 

information compiled by the NRC, the industry and others that are assessing the accident will be 

critical to reaching the correct lessons learned for identifying the appropriate regulatory and industry 

action. 

In that respect, it is incumbent upon the commission to move forward both expeditiously and 

responsibly in identifying the lessons learned from the accident. The competent, professional NRC 

staff should analyze the lessons learned and obtain broad stakeholder input in the most meaningful 

way. The industry is fully committed to participate in stakeholder forums on this report, beginning at 

the July 28 public meeting at the NRC. 

NEI and our industry partners are coordinating the industry's Fukushima response activities and are 

developing recommendations for the industry in seven "building blocks"-integrated organizations 

created to develop and execute action plans in specified areas of focus. The industry has already 

taken measures to enhance safety and preparedness. Nonetheless, the industry will ensure that no 

gaps exist in our response activities and that there is no duplication of effort among the industry 

organizations and companies. We recognize that to maintain the highest standard of safety and 

security, we must continually evolve and improve the industry's standards of practice, and adapt to 

events and new information that affect our industry. 

The industry is concerned that the task force's use of phrases such as "patchwork of regulatory 

requirements" undermines the comprehensive body of regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC, 

the agency's extensive inspection and oversight process, and the excellent safety performance at 

the industry's 104 reactors. As the task force report notes, operation of U.S. nuclear energy 

facilities does not pose a risk to public safety. In fact, the NRC has not identified any significant 

adverse trends in safety at U.S. reactors in its last 10 years of reporting. 

The industry certainly agrees that the safety benefits of new requirements should be used to 

prioritize and integrate any new requirements with those currently being considered by the agency, 

such as work hours for plant workers, cyber security and fire protection. In doing so, the NRC 

should use its formal process for evaluating the resource implications of new or revised regulatory 

requirements both on the agency staff and nuclear energy facility staff. It might be useful if the NRC 

prioritized activities in an integrated schedule that includes all new requirements being developed or 

implemented over the next five years. 
6 


23823.069

The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko 

July 15, 2011 

Page 3 

The task force report stated that all of its recommendations should be considered within the 

"adequate protection" standard. However, the basis for the recommendations contained in the task 

force report requires more expansive and detailed analyses to ensure that they actually address the 

lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. After the necessary and appropriate analyses are 

conducted by the NRC staff, the commission should expect the staff to justify the value of any new 

or revised requirements consistent with NRC standard practice. If any proposed new requirements 

are justified within the adequate protection standard, the commission should review these on a 

case-by-case basis. 

The industry is fully committed to enhancing safety at America's nuclear energy facilities. NEI and its 

members look forward to participating in the rigorous and systematic process for public comment 

and review of the task force recommendations. There are differences between the Japanese and 

U.S. approaches both in operation of nuclear energy facilities and the regulatory oversight of these 

facilities. The agency should recognize these as well as still-emerging information from Japan as we 

move forward to address the lessons learned. 

Sincerely, 

Marvin S. Fertel 

c: The Honorable Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

The Honorable William D. Magwood, IV, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

The Honorable George Apostolakis, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

The Honorable William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Mr. R. William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission 
7 


23823.070

~EI 

NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE 

August 1, 2011 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chairwoman 

Committee on Environment & Public Works 

United States Senate 

410 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairwoman Boxer and Ranking Member Inhofe: 

Marvin S. Fertel 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 

The Honorable James Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Environment & Public Works 

United States Senate 

456 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

I understand that, in advance of tomorrow's hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 90-

Day Report, that some have alleged that operators of U.S. nuclear power plants oppose the 

recommendations in the report. That is absolutely untrue. 

The U.S. nuclear power industry welcomes the 90-Day Report. Although we do not yet know with 

certainty all that happened at the Fukushima-Daiichi plants, we believe the report raises the right set 

of issues that need to be examined with regard to U.S. plants. 

Further, as Commissioner Ostendorff has detailed and other Commissioners have also made clear in 

their votes on the 90-Day Report, we believe there are some actions that should be taken in the 

near-term. Industry immediately took some of those actions in the days after the events in Japan 

and is fully prepared to implement a number of others in the next 6 to 12 months. 

All four Commissioners that have voted on the Task Force Report also indicated that they believe the 

report raises additional issues that will need to be addressed through rulemaking or other processes 

that will require more time. It is important that the Commission proceed with deliberate speed to 

issue a staff requirements memorandum to the Commission staff laying out the process to consider 

and disposition the task force recommendations. 

17761 Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708 I P: 202.739.8125 f: 202.785.1498 msf@nei.org www.nei.org 
8 


23823.071

The Honorable Barbara Boxer & The Honorable James Inhofe 

August 1, 2011 

Page 2 

I encourage the Committee to use tomorrow's hearing to stress the importance of the Commission 

acting quickly to issue the staff requirements memorandum so that the Commission staff, industry, 

and other stakeholders can engage and proceed expeditiously. 

Sincerely, 

Marv Fertel 

c: Members of the Committee 

Members of the Commission 

William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations 
9 

Senator INHOFE. And I think on this report of the full commission, actually we have this as a joint Committee. It is the full Committee and the Nuclear Subcommittee, which I used to Chair a few 

years ago. 

Chairman Jaczko relayed in our June hearing how as a part of 

the review, and I am going to quote him at this time, he said, ‘‘We 

always ask ourselves the question: Are the plants still safe? Is 

there anything we need to do today to address that? And the answer continues to be no, that we want to get good information. We 

have time to do that.’‘ 

And I agree. It might be a while until we have an adequate assessment of the event, but we have time. And frankly, we need to 

take time to ensure that we learn the right lessons; that any regulatory changes have the maximum benefit to safety. 

In that spirit, the task force describes how following the Three 

Mile Island event, the NRC took a number of actions which were 

not subjected to structured review and which were ‘‘subsequently 

not found to be of substantial safety benefit and removed.’‘ 

I am pleased to see that a majority of the Commissioners are 

committed to ensuring that the task force recommendations proceed through a structured review process that incorporates the 

views of a wide range of agency staff, the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, industry and other stakeholders. 

Meanwhile, a full commission can take action at any time should 

new safety information warrant. 

There are many facts that we still don’t know about the accident, 

not just about the technical aspects, but also emergency preparedness and the impact of external influences on decisionmaking. It is 

important to remember that the Japanese regulatory system is 

very different from our own. I believe it is crucial for the NRC to 

understand those differences in order to assess whether proposed 

regulatory changes will accurately and adequately address the actual problems highlighted by the Fukushima accident. 

Accordingly, I have sent a letter to each of you and look forward 

to receiving your responses. I was pleased to see Commissioner 

Svinicki endorse that concept. I was also disappointed to hear from 

the Chairman that he considers it too ‘‘difficult and time-consuming.’‘ 

I don’t believe that an accident in a country with different regulatory systems and practices means that ours are broken. I think 

the NRC must take time to learn not just the technical lesson from 

Fukushima, but also the regulatory and policy lessons, and I hope 

the NRC will focus on solving specific safety weaknesses highlighted by the Fukushima event, rather than allowing itself to become distracted by redesigning a regulatory framework that has 

served our Country very well. 

The NRC’s efficiency principle and good regulatory practice 

states, ‘‘regulatory action should be consistent with the degree of 

risk reduction they achieve.’‘ A structured process akin to the comments of Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki and Ostendorff goes a 

long way toward doing that. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

10 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you for holding this hearing today with the full Commission to review the 

Near-Term Task Force’s report—this is a good first step toward understanding the 

implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident. The Commission directed the Task 

Force to identify near-term or immediate operational and regulatory issues, and 

their report concludes that the Fukushima scenario is unlikely to happen here and 

that continued nuclear power plant operation and licensing activities do not pose an 

imminent risk to the public. 

Chairman Jaczko relayed in our June hearing how, as part of the review, ‘‘we’ve 

always asked ourselves the question: Are the plants still safe? Is there anything we 

need to do today to address that? And the answer continues to be no. That we want 

to get good information, we have time to do that.’’ I agree. It may be a while until 

we have an adequate assessment of the event but we have the time, and frankly 

need to take the time, to ensure we learn the right lessons and that any regulatory 

changes have the maximum benefit to safety. 

In that spirit, the Task Force describes how, following the Three Mile Island 

event, the NRC took a number of actions which were not subjected to a structured 

review, and which ‘‘were subsequently not found to be of substantial safety benefit 

and were removed.’’ I am pleased to see that a majority of the commissioners are 

committed to ensuring that the Task Force’s recommendations proceed through a 

structured review process that incorporates the views of a wide range of agency 

staff, the NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, industry, and other 

stakeholders. Meanwhile, the full Commission can take actions at any time should 

new safety information warrant. 

There are many facts that we still don’t know about the accident, not just about 

the technical aspects but also emergency preparedness and the impact of external 

influences on decisionmaking. It is important to remember that the Japanese regulatory system is very different from our own. I believe it is crucial for the NRC to 

understand those differences in order to assess whether proposed regulatory 

changes will accurately and adequately address actual problems highlighted by the 

Fukushima accident. Accordingly, I have sent a letter to each of you and look forward to receiving your responses. I was pleased to see Commissioner Svinicki endorse that concept. I was also disappointed to hear from the Chairman that he considers it too ‘‘difficult and time-consuming’’. 

I don’t believe that an accident in a country with different regulatory systems and 

practices means that ours are broken. I think the NRC must take the time to learn, 

not just the technical lessons from Fukushima, but also the regulatory and policy 

lessons. I hope the NRC will focus on solving specific safety weaknesses highlighted 

by the Fukushima event rather than allowing itself to become distracted by redesigning a regulatory framework that has served this country well. As the NRC’s Efficiency Principle of Good Regulation States: ‘‘Regulatory actions should be consistent with the degree of risk reduction they achieve.’’ A structured process akin 

to the comments of Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki, and Ostendorff goes a long 

way toward ensuring that. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

I am going to call on the Subcommittee Chair and then the 

Ranking Member, and then the rest of our colleagues. 

Senator Carper, Subcommittee Chair. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Commissioners, welcome. Nice to see all of you today. This is a 

day that the economy could have melted down, and it looks we are 

going to be able to avoid that. And we want to make sure that the 

recommendations that these smart people at work at the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, that we can somehow seize the opportunity, seize the day and ensure that we don’t have a meltdown in 

any our 104 nuclear power plants. But I am happy that you are 

here and look forward to this testimony. 

These are challenging times for the NRC. They have been, frankly, challenging times for my colleagues and me as well. And we are 

11 

going to get through this day and hopefully we will get through to 

your recommendations and you will pick some that are the winners 

and the ones that we ought to implement sooner, rather than later, 

and we can get this show on the road. 

As many of you know, my interest in nuclear energy comes from 

a clean air and energy security perspective. It also comes from a 

perspective of 23 years as a Naval Flight Officer chasing nuclear 

submarines. And a lot of my buddies in the Navy lived on nuclear 

power plants on submarines and aircraft carriers and ships. So I 

have a lot of interest from that perspective as well. 

But nuclear power has helped this Nation curb our reliance on 

dirty fossil fuel. Nuclear power has also helped to reduce air pollution that damages our health and causes global warming. However, 

as we saw the crisis unfold at Fukushima facility, one wrong step 

at a nuclear power plant can have big and bad consequences. This 

crisis is a strong reminder that with nuclear energy, we never be 

complacent. Safety must always be our top priority. 

Today, I look forward to hearing an update from our Commissioners regarding their reviews of our Nation’s nuclear power fleet 

in light of the crisis at Fukushima. I especially look forward to 

hearing more about the recent task force recommendations and 

hope to learn today how the Commissioners expect to move forward 

on them. 

I was relieved that the task force concluded that an accident like 

Fukushima is unlikely to happen in the United States and the nuclear fleet posed no imminent risk to public safety, which is due in 

part to the due diligence of the NRC to protect public safety. 

But as our colleagues have heard me say once or twice, I believe 

it is not perfect and we need to make it better. And I believe the 

task force took this thing to heart that we can do better. And I believe we can all agree some of the task force recommendations are 

common sense and should be implemented soon, maybe sooner 

than others. 

I would liken these recommendations to patching up a hole in a 

boat that is slowly leaking. There are easy no-brainers and it can 

be done with relative ease. Some of the recommendations are going 

to need more time, maybe much more time, and a fair amount of 

vetting. These recommendations are more like taking the boat 

apart and putting it back together. Definitely, more time is needed 

and more thought is needed on some of those and how we ought 

to go about doing them. 

I sincerely hope the commission will take time to talk to stakeholders and get public reaction from all sides of this issue before 

moving forward with these recommendations. However, I will be 

disappointed if we are 6 months or a year from now down the road 

and have not seen any action from the NRC on any of these recommendations. That would not sit well with me and I would urge 

you to keep that in mind. 

We need to all work together. I would like to say we are all in 

this together and we need to make sure that we incorporate the 

right lessons learned to keep our nuclear fleet safe into the future 

because, in the end, we are all in the same boat when it comes to 

nuclear safety. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, and again welcome. 

12 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS CARPER, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

‘‘Let me begin by welcoming back the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 

Commissioners to our Committee. I know these are trying times for the NRC, and 

I appreciate you taking the time to be before us today. 

‘‘As many of you know, my interest in nuclear energy comes from a clean air and 

energy security perspective. Nuclear power has helped this nation curb our reliance 

on dirty fossil fuels. Nuclear power has also helped reduce our air pollution that 

damages our health and causes global warming. 

‘‘However, as we saw the crisis unfold at the Fukushima Daiichi facility, one 

wrong step at a nuclear power plant could have big consequences. This crisis is a 

strong reminder that with nuclear energy, we can never be complacent. Safety must 

always be our top priority. 

‘‘Today, I look forward hearing an update from the NRC Commissioners regarding 

their review of our nation’s nuclear power fleet in light of the crisis at Fukushima. 

I especially look forward to hearing more about the recent Task Force recommendations. I hope to learn today how the Commissioners expect to move forward on those 

recommendations. 

‘‘I was relieved that the task force concluded that an accident like Fukushima is 

unlikely to happen in the United States and that our nuclear fleet poses no imminent risk to public safety. This is due in part to the due diligence of the NRC to 

public safety. But as my colleagues have heard me say over and over, I believe if 

it is not perfect, make it better. And I believe the task force took this saying to 

heart. We can do better. 

‘‘I believe we can all agree that some of the task force recommendations are common sense and should be implemented soon. I liken these recommendations to 

patching up a hole in a boat that is slowly leaking—these are no brainers and can 

be done easily. And some of the recommendations are going to need much more time 

and vetting. These recommendations are more like taking the boat apart and building it back together. We definitely need more time and more thought on this issue. 

‘‘I sincerely hope the Commission will take time to talk to stakeholders and get 

public reaction—from all sides of this issue—before moving forward with any of the 

recommendations. However, I will be very disappointed if we are 6 months or a year 

down the road and have not seen any action from the NRC on any of the recommendations. 

‘‘We all need to work together to make sure we incorporate the right lessons 

learned to keep our nuclear fleet safe into the future, because in the end, we are 

all in the same boat when it comes to nuclear safety.’’ 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

It is my pleasure to introduce John Barrasso, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

appreciate that. I thank you. I thank Chairman Carper as well for 

holding the hearing today on the near-term task force report entitled Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st 

Century. 

In reviewing the report, there are a couple of points that I believe need to be stated that come from the report itself. And first, 

our regulatory framework to protect our nuclear plants is working. 

It is working. As the task force concludes, although complex, the 

current regulatory approach has served the commission and the 

public well, and allows the task force to conclude that a sequence 

of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and could be mitigated, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. 

13 

As Commissioner Ostendorff, who is before us today, stated on 

July 19th, ‘‘I do not believe that our existing regulatory framework 

is broken.’‘ I agree. I do not believe that our existing regulatory 

framework is broken. 

Second, our regulatory system is quite different than Japan’s. I 

agree with Commissioner Ostendorff’s opinion with regard to the 

conclusions in the task force report that the Fukushima tragedy occurred in another country whose regulatory structure is quite different from that found in the United States and that ‘‘there is still 

a great deal that we do not know about Fukushima concerning the 

sequence of events, the failure of modes of equipment, functionality 

and execution procedures.’‘ 

Because of the reasons that I have just mentioned, with so much 

uncertainty still remaining, I find the report to be light on suggested recommendations directly tied to the events at Fukushima. 

Instead, this report appears to be loaded with recommendations to 

overhaul our entire system of oversight and safety. 

I agree with Commissioner Svinicki, who commented in her recent vote that the task force report recommendations are surprisingly specific and detailed for what was to be an initial 90-day review. In fact, the document is 82 pages long. 

I am not surprised, however, if you put six career regulators in 

a room for 90 days, that you are going to get a lot of suggestions 

for more Washington red tape, recommendations that appear to be 

based on old agendas. This is what I believe we have here before 

us today. Some of these recommendations may be good and worth 

pursuing. Some may not be. 

But as Commissioner Svinicki stated about the recommendations 

in the report, ‘‘Lacking the NRC technical and programmatic staff’s 

evaluation, beyond that of the six NRC staff members who produced the task force report, I do not have a sufficient basis to accept or reject the recommendations of the near-term task force. 

There is no immediate threat that needs to be addressed, according 

to the task force, so we do have time.’‘ 

There is no need to rush to regulate. Before we move forward 

with more red tape for America’s nuclear industry, perhaps we 

need to look at these suggestions more closely. I am not advocating 

for a few NRC public meetings to simply check a box. I am talking 

about real NRC staff and stakeholder input through an open and 

transparent process where recommendations can be reviewed, 

prioritized and eventually either approved or rejected, which is essentially what Commissioner Magwood has said in his letter of 

July 29th to Congressman Markey. 

This is the type of review that I believe four of the NRC Commissioners before us today are advocating. 

So I thank you, Madam Chairman, and look forward to the testimony. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Sanders. 

14 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD SANDERS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator SANDERS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for holding this important hearing, and thank you to the members of the 

NRC for being here. 

The first and I think most important point that I want to make 

is the function of the NRC is not to represent the nuclear power 

industry. That is not your job. Whether we have more nuclear 

power plants or fewer is not your job. Your job foremost is to make 

sure that the nuclear power plants that we have in this Country 

are as safe as humanly possible. 

My friend from Wyoming, Senator Barrasso, mentioned, he 

quoted the report and the report said it is unlikely that we are 

going to have a Fukushima disaster in this Country. Well, you 

know what? For the people of Vermont, and I think most people in 

this Country, unlikely is really not quite good enough. We want to 

make sure that everything humanly possible that can be done is 

done to make sure that nuclear power and the nuclear power 

plants in this Country are as safe as possible. 

Madam Chair, to the Commissioners here today, it seems to me 

we should take note of the Associated Press, this very disturbing 

report that recently found that the NRC and the nuclear industry 

have worked ‘‘in tandem to weaken safety standards to keep aging 

reactors within the rules.’‘ In that regard, I have joined with the 

Chair of our Committee, Senator Boxer, to call for a GAO investigation of these allegations. 

Americans are concerned about nuclear safety not just because of 

the AP investigations, but because of what happened in Japan. We 

have 23 reactors in this Country that are Mark I models, the same 

as the Fukushima plant. The President asked the NRC for a safety 

review after Japan and the NRC’s task force of senior staff did a 

90-day review and laid our recommendations to improve safety. 

They did what they were asked to do. 

A New York Times editorial summarized, ‘‘The group’s most important finding is that our Nation’s oversight of nuclear power 

plants is a less than rigorous patchwork of mandatory and voluntary provisions.’‘ The task force recommendations include nobrainer measures to test earthquake and flood resiliency and to install hardened vents to reduce the risk of hydrogen explosion. 

We are here today to find out what the NRC is going to do about 

these 12 common sense recommendations. Some people may think 

that this is ‘‘government red tape.’‘ Some of us believe that in fact 

we have got to do everything we can to make sure that the impossible does not happen and that a major nuclear accident occurs in 

the United States. 

The answer, from what I am hearing up to this point, from a majority of the members of the NRC is that nothing is going to happen with regard to these recommendations. The Chairman has 

asked the NRC to begin to move forward on all 12 recommendations within 3 months in order to fully implement new postFukushima regulations by 2016, and I applaud him for doing that. 

This does not sound very ambitious to me, yet the media reports 

that this timeframe is apparently too ambitious for three of our 

Commissioners, and I hope they dispel what I read in the media, 

15 

and that is Commissioners Svinicki, Magwood and Ostendorff apparently, as I understand it, they want more study and review and 

delay. 

And I happen to know, have been here long enough to know 

what happens in this town when we ‘‘delay,’‘ when we want to postpone a study. It means that the issue is going to be swept under 

the rug, that nothing is going to happen. And to me, that is unacceptable. 

We need a commission focused on safety and acting on the task 

force recommendations in a swift and transparent manner. I believe we should all demand that the NRC commissioners today 

commit to start action on the safety recommendations within 3 

months. Delay is not an acceptable option, and I look forward to 

hearing from the Commissioners. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Alexander. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank 

you for this hearing. 

Thanks to the Commissioners for their service. 

I think it is always useful since safety is our concern to begin 

with the safety records: no deaths at any commercial nuclear reactor; no deaths on any Navy reactor; and no one was even hurt at 

our most celebrated nuclear accident, Three Mile Island. That is an 

enviable record which we should always try to improve. 

And I would like to approach it a little differently today. I would 

like to ask this question: What if we didn’t have nuclear power? 

What if we didn’t have it at all in the United States? It is 20 percent of all of our electricity; 70 percent of all our clean electricity. 

We use about a quarter of all the electricity in the world to power 

this County. What if we didn’t have nuclear power? 

Well, we can look at Japan, which is the third-largest economy, 

and get an idea of that. There were a couple of articles last week, 

one in The Wall Street Journal, one in Bloomberg, which gave us 

a picture of it. The Wall Street Journal article did say the Japanese 

are very patient people, so they have turned their air conditioners 

up to 82 degrees. The reason all this is true is because since the 

earthquake, most of their reactors are out. They have closed them 

down for maintenance and to check them. 

And so they have lost about 20 percent of all their electricity in 

Japan, about the same amount that nuclear power provides to us. 

So their air conditioners are at 82 degrees. The car-makers are operating on weekends to avoid sucking up electricity during the 

week. The Emperor and the Empress are wandering around the 

Imperial Palace at night with flashlights and candles. Emergency 

responders have brought 22,000 people to the hospitals with heat 

stroke. It is about the same weather over there as here. 

They are expecting electric bills to go up because as they use 

more renewable power, that is higher cost. Bloomberg was even 

more graphic. It quotes the Chairman of Sharp, a company that 

has a plant in Tennessee making solar panels, that the issue of the 

16 

power supply could be the end of manufacturing in Japan, an exodus of Japanese manufacturers, he sees. ‘‘If we don’t keep these reactors operating,’‘ he said, ‘‘Japan’s economy will wither. Our young 

people will move abroad leaving the country with only grandpas 

and grandmas.’‘ 

The Japanese Chamber of Commerce, estimates that Japan’s 

gross domestic product will fall by 3.6 percent, lose 200,000 jobs if 

all of the reactors close by next spring as scheduled maintenance 

takes them offline. 

So there is a little snapshot of what would happen if you lose 20 

percent of your electricity, which is what nuclear power provides 

us. Why do I raise that? Because, as was said, we have an aging 

nuclear fleet. We haven’t built a new reactor in 30 years; 25 or 30 

years from now, this commission will have to decide whether to extend the life of a lot of the older reactors. I have advocated building 

100 new nuclear reactors over the next 20 years, and even if we 

did that, we would still barely replace the reactors that we have 

and the need for electricity in this Country because the EIA, the 

Energy Information Administration, estimates that the increase in 

the need for electricity will be up by 31 percent. 

So we are going to need a lot of clean, reliable electricity in this 

Country. And we can’t afford, if we want to have a high standard 

of living and good jobs, to lose 20 percent or 10 percent of our electricity. And if we don’t have nuclear power, we will have to rely on 

coal that is dirtier; on gas that is dirtier; and who knows what the 

price of gas will be. And the idea of relying on windmills to power 

the United States of America is the energy equivalent of going to 

war in sailboats. 

So we are going to need lots of nuclear power. And as long as 

we are having eloquent testimony about delays here, which I just 

heard, I would like to recommend we have no delay in one of the 

other recommendations of the Committee, which is to complete 

without delay the design for the AP 1000 and the economically simplified boiling water reactor design. 

In other words, complete without delay this commission’s approval of those two designs so that we can move ahead building a 

sufficient number of nuclear reactors to give us the kind of clean, 

reliable electricity that will permit us to have the low-cost energy 

to have good jobs in the United States and not experience the kind 

of exodus of manufacturing overseas that the Japanese are afraid 

might happen to them if they are not able to bring their reactors 

back online. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Senator Udall. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 

calling this hearing. 

I think many others have said it already that I think safety is 

the key here and I am going to want to hear from each of you as 

to how you believe we should move forward on the safety issue. I 

think it is unacceptable if we have the kind of thing happen in the 

17 

United States that happened in Japan, and I hope that you are on 

a wavelength, that you are going to move in the direction of taking 

seriously what this task force said. 

I mean, my understanding is that this is a task force with a 139 

years of experience in this area. They are substantial. They are 

people that really know what they are talking about. We talk about 

recommendations that fall into five categories. These categories 

seem very common sense to me, clarifying the regulatory framework. You have to take a hard look every now and then at regulatory frameworks and how they work. 

Ensuring protection, the task force recommends under that category as part of a longer-term review, the NRC evaluate potential 

enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically 

induced fires and floods. We have seen in New Mexico those kinds 

of fires and floods. I know they are seeing them across the Midwest. We need you to take a hard look at that. 

The third category, enhancing mitigation, the task force recommends the NRC strengthen station blackout mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design basis and beyond 

design basis external events. I hope that we will have time to discuss that with you. I intend to ask a question about that. 

Strengthening emergency preparedness, the fourth category, 

seems very common sense to me and something we could move forward with on this front. And the fifth, improving the efficiency of 

NRC programs, I mean, we always want to be doing things like 

that. 

So I am not going to use all my time. I want to get to the questions, Madam Chair, and I yield back at this point. 

Senator BOXER. Next is Senator Johanns. 

Thank you so much for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 

Senator JOHANNS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

To the Commissioners, let me just start out and tell you we appreciate your being here with us today. So many things were said 

by Senator Alexander that I concur with that it would almost be 

sufficient to say that I adopt his statement, but let me offer a 

thought or two, if I might. 

I am very anxious to hear about the safety concerns. We have 

nuclear power, as you know, in the State of Nebraska. It has been 

a good neighbor in our State. We feel it runs sufficiently smartly. 

We feel that the folks who are operating the facilities in our State 

are responsive to the community. I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the quality jobs that go with the facilities. All of that has 

worked very well for us. 

The second thing I would say about that is, as you know, for 

many months now we have been in the throes of a historic flooding 

event with the Missouri River in Nebraska, and that has implicated our nuclear facilities. We have found you folks to be responsive, the staff to be responsive, and it has been an experience that 

although difficult and trying, because so much land has been under 

water for so long, we feel in terms of the nuclear facility that people have responded and not overreacted, but worked with us. 

18 

Therefore, I am very anxious to hear about the safety recommendations. I don’t think there is any doubt, wherever you sit 

on this dais, we want to make sure that our facilities are safe. 

But I would also offer a thought that there is a reason why we 

are not building nuclear power plants these days in any kind of 

numbers. When I talk to folks in this industry, they say it is complicated. It is very difficult to get through the process. It is enormously expensive and there is no guarantee that you are going to 

get anything at the other end for that massive, massive investment. 

There seems to me a better way of doing this. Now, this is not 

an area of expertise for me. I have no nuclear background whatsoever in my life. But having said that, what I am anxious to hear 

about today is the economic of what you are recommending just because I want a full picture. Sometimes you have to make hard decisions, do the things that you need to do from a safety standpoint, 

even though you know that the cost is there, but there is just no 

other choice. 

But for me, I always like to weigh the decisions made against the 

cost that is incurred and try to get an understanding of whether 

we have benefited the situation in any significant way for the investment. This industry, I worry, is literally at a point where it 

could shut down over time if we can’t somehow free up the ability 

to approve plants and approve construction and deal with the safety issues in a cost-marked sort of way. 

So those are the kinds of things I am interested in. But I don’t 

say those things to criticize you. Like I said, our experience in 

working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been a good 

experience. People have worked with us and the staff has worked 

with us. I am just interested in how do we do this in a way that 

is safe, but economically viable. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And thank you, members of the NRC. I think you do a very good 

job, I will start off with that, and then I will get more critical, but 

we do thank you. 

Since Japan’s nuclear crisis began unfolding 5 months ago, 

Americans have wondered, could it happen here? The NRC’s task 

force studied the situation closely and determined our nuclear facilities pose no imminent threat to the American people. 

While this is reassuring news, our work is just beginning. The 

NRC task force issued 12 recommendations to strengthen nuclear 

safety and ensure reactors remain safe, including long-term steps 

to improve emergency preparedness and protect facilities when 

earthquakes or other natural disasters occur. 

Now, it is critically important for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to act on these recommendations quickly. The five Commissioners will hear today are from among our Country’s most imporVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
19 

tant guardians, and we are relying on you to keep our Country’s 

nuclear facilities safe and secure. 

Prompt action on the recommendations to the NRC is particularly important to the people of my State of New Jersey, where four 

nuclear power reactors provide our State with half of its electricity. 

Just last month, the NRC renewed the license to operate the reactor at Hope Creek which shares the same design as the damaged 

reactors in Japan. 

Now, in its renewal, the NRC included conditions intended to 

make Hope Creek safer and we have to continue to take every precaution to make sure this facility and others like it are as safe as 

we can make them. The fact is, nuclear power plays a great role, 

a critical role in our Country and it is an emissions-free energy 

source that provides one-fifth of our Nation’s electricity. 

So nuclear power can continue to be a part of our energy future, 

but the disaster in Japan has taught us nothing can be taken for 

granted where nuclear power is concerned. Japan is a world leader 

in technology and its leaders believed that Fukushima, the plant, 

was very strong, strong enough to withstand a worst-case scenario. 

But as we now know, it wasn’t. 

Likewise, the Chernobyl tragedy 25 years ago taught us that the 

effects of a single nuclear accident can linger for generations and 

we have to pay attention to these questions and learn from others’ 

mistakes. This means continually revisiting the laws intended to 

keep nuclear plants safe, strengthening the NRC’s regulations, and 

ensuring plants are in compliance at all times. 

The NRC has got to ask the hard questions and make sure the 

American people get the answers that they deserve, and I urge you 

Commissioners to act quickly, to take the next steps to make sure 

that nuclear facilities are prepared and that the public is fully protected. 

Thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Boozman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 

Senator BOOZMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member Inhofe for having this really important hearing on the task 

force review. 

The task force has produced a report that is a good first step to 

help make sure our nuclear industry continues to be the safest in 

the world. Nuclear energy provides an affordable, reliable, emissions-free supply of energy to power our economy and create jobs, 

especially industrial and manufacturing jobs that are power-intensive. 

We need to learn and implement both short-term and long-term 

lessons from the event in Japan. Safety must remain our highest 

priority, and I think that all of us agree with that. American nuclear energy is produced with oversight from a strong, independent 

regulatory agency within a robust culture of safety. Our industry 

is truly the gold standard and we need to keep it that way. 

The task force review confirmed that appropriate mitigation 

measures have already been put in place and that continued operVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
20 

ation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. I would very much like to encourage the commission that as they move forward that they do so with speed, but 

more importantly, or as importantly that they do this very, very 

thoughtfully. We need a process that allows the commission, the 

NRC staff, the industry and other stakeholders to be fully engaged. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

Now, Senator Sessions, you are our last, but certainly not least. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

We spend a good deal of time on this Committee and other Committees in rightly considering the events at Fukushima. The report 

of the near-term task force provides a good starting point to thinking about potential improvements that can be made on our nuclear 

fleet. 

But I do think it is important to keep in mind, as Senator Alexander noted, that we have not had one single event at an American 

nuclear power generating plant where an individual has lost their 

life or sustained a serious injury as a result of nuclear effects. 

So I think that is a significant thing that we need to remember 

since over 20 percent of our electricity is coming from nuclear 

power. It is a big part of our economy and it has been very safe. 

I really think we need to remember that. How many lives have 

been lost in the process of creating coal plants and providing the 

fuel? And how many problems have we had with natural gas and 

difficulties and lives have been lost? And most provide CO2 and 

other pollutants into the atmosphere. 

I am interested, as Senator Inhofe is, in looking at the Japanese 

system to see if theirs was less effective than ours. NEI, Nuclear 

Energy Institute, says that we have the gold standard for nuclear 

regulation and I hope that is true, and we would like it to be true. 

And we need to know if perhaps our regulations would have prevented this. 

Certainly, nuclear plants already must demonstrate to the satisfaction of you, the NRC, that the plants can continue to operate 

safely even during a blackout scenario. And I do believe, as Senator 

Alexander noted, the AP 1000, for example, would have gravity-fed 

fuel or water processes that would shut down a plant even if there 

was complete loss of power and the backup failed. 

So those would be even safer plants, it seems to me, and those 

ought not to be unnecessarily delayed. Delays are costs. And you 

delay and create uncertainty, and pretty soon people are afraid to 

invest what would need to be invested for us to create a cleaner, 

more productive form of energy that is safer, in bottom line, than 

other forms of energy for the United States. 

My goal has always been that we should have cleaner energy. We 

want American energy, not imported, wherever possible. We want 

safe energy. We want cost-efficient energy, energy that does not 

place an unnecessary burden on our people and our economy. 

Nuclear power fits all of those, it seems to me. It may not be the 

total solution, but it fits all of those policies and I hope and pray 

21 

and urge that you do your job to make sure we are safe, make sure 

it is operating safely, but do not be a burden on our ability to meet 

the need for increased electricity in the future by blocking a reasonable development of new sources of nuclear power. 

I notice in Alabama we had a shutdown of power. We had power 

failures to our nuclear plant at Brown’s Ferry, the TVA plant. The 

backup systems responded just as expected, just as required, just 

as you have monitored and required, and there was no dangerous 

scenario that occurred. 

I also appreciate the fact that your committee has found that 

there is no reason to doubt the safety of our nuclear power facilities. Your task force report concludes that a sequence of events like 

the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States. 

Continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose 

an imminent risk to public health and safety. 

So Madam Chairman, thank you for having the hearing. I think 

it is something that we need to move forward with. Hopefully, we 

can be able to effectively allow a new generation of even more efficient, more safe nuclear power plants to come online, plants that 

produce tremendous amounts of baseload electricity without pollution of our atmosphere and that provide safety to all concerned. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Senator. 

So under the agreement that we have reached, the Chairman 

will have 5 minutes and each of his colleagues will have three. Is 

that your understanding? OK, excellent. 

Chairman, go right ahead. 

I am going to ask everyone to stick with their time because we 

are so close to a vote and we want to conclude before then. 

So go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. JACZKO. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, and Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the 

Committee, on behalf of the commission I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the NRC’s near-term task 

force recommendations and their potential implementation. 

In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, the commission established the task force to spearhead our systematic and methodical review of the NRC’s Nuclear Reactor Safety Program. Its members include some of the agency’s most experienced and expert 

staff, collectively having more than 135 years of regulatory experience. 

In conducting their review, the task force’s efforts were independent, but by no means isolated or solitary. In developing their 

report and recommendations, the task force had access to the entire NRC staff with more than 100 hours of briefings. 

They also spent thousands of hours reviewing agency products 

and information and consulted with the NRC site team in Japan. 

In its report, the task force outlined a comprehensive set of 12 recommendations, many with short-and long-term elements that touch 

on a broad range of important issues, including the loss of electrical 

power, earthquakes, flooding, spent fuel pools, venting and emergency preparedness. 

22 

I provided a detailed overview of the recommendations in the 

written testimony I submitted on behalf of the commission. As 

their report makes clear, the task force has done an outstanding 

job of helping us better understand what nuclear safety requires in 

a post-Fukushima Dai-ichi world. 

Now that the task force has completed its review, it is up to the 

commission to decide how to move forward. A wide range of stakeholders have called upon the commission to act promptly. At this 

point, the commission has not yet reached a decision on how to proceed. 

And although my colleagues may hold differing viewpoints, I believe our goal remains for the commission to come to an agreement 

on an open and transparent way for us to make a merit-based decision on the 12 recommendations in a finite period of time. 

In considering the task force recommendations, the commission 

must move forward with the urgency called for by these real safety 

issues. Although the task force did not find imminent risk to public 

health and safety, they identified significant concerns with specific 

issues and they recommended improving the agency’s regulatory 

framework. 

Fukushima clearly demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances can challenge plants in unexpected ways and we must 

commit to a strong and timely response. I believe that the American people expect no less. 

So to all the Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I would be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:] 

23 


23823.001

WRITTEN STATEMENT 

BY GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN 

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

TO THE 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE 

AND THE 

CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

August 2, 2011 

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member lnhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

to provide a summary of the findings of the NRC's Near-Term Task Force review of the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. 

I first want to thank, on behalf of the Commission, Dr. Charles Miller and the other 

members of the Task Force for all of their work in conducting the 90-day review. I also want to 

acknowledge the numerous other NRC staff who were available to the Task Force as a 

resource in conducting its review, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

which engaged the Task Force in discussions of offsite emergency preparedness and provided 

insights on the U.S. National Response Framework, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operationswhich shared information on the industry's post-Fukushima actions, and other groups and 

individuals who shared their views with the Task Force. 
24 


23823.002

In my testimony today, I would like to provide you with a summary of the Task Force 

findings and recommendations. My colleagues and I are in the process of developing the 

Commission's direction to the NRC staff on addressing the Task Force recommendations. 

Overview 

The Near-Term Task Force was established in response to unanimous Commission 

direction to conduct a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations to 

determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. 

The six-member Task Force, who collectively have over 135 years of regulatory experience, 

was responsible for making recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction in light 

of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. With its 90-day review 

completed, the Task Force issued its report to the Commission on July 12, 2011. The 

Commission made the report publicly available on July 13, 2011. The Task Force briefed the 

Commission on its findings on July 19, 2011. 

Overall, the Task Force found that continued operation and continued licensing activities 

do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. The Task Force concluded that a 

sequence of events like the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United 

States, and that some appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented, reducing the 

likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. The Task Force was clear, however, that 

any accident involving core damage and uncontrolled radioactive releases of the magnitude of 

Fukushima Dai-ichi-even one without significant health consequences-is inherently 

unacceptable. 

The Task Force also concluded that a more balanced application of the Commission's 

defense-in-depth philosophy using risk insights would provide an enhanced regulatory 
25 


23823.003

framework. Such a framework would support appropriate requirements for increased capability 

to address events of low likelihood and high consequence, such as prolonged station blackout 

resulting from severe natural phenomena. This concept is the basis for the Task Force's 

proposal to redefine the level of protection regarded as adequate and provides the foundation 

for the Task Force's recommendations. 

The Task Force report included a comprehensive set of twelve overarching 

recommendations. The Task Force recommendations are intended to clarify and strengthen the 

regulatory framework for nuclear power plants. and are structured around the focus areas of the 

NRC's defense-in-depth philosophy as applied to protection from natural phenomena; mitigation 

of prolonged station blackout events; and emergency preparedness. The Task Force also 

provided recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the NRC's programs. 

In addition to these overarching recommendations, the Task Force report also includes a 

number of detailed recommendations that provide an integrated implementation strategy. The 

detailed recommendations are grouped into five categories: 1) a policy statement; 2) 

rulemakings; 3) orders; 4) staff actions; and 5) long-term evaluation topics. The longer-term 

evaluation topics are those issues about which sufficient information was not yet available for 

the near-term Task Force to make specific recommendations, and these topics were therefore 

deferred for possible consideration as part of the longer-term review. 

Recognizing that conducting a rulemaking and the subsequent implementation typically 

takes several years to accomplish, the Task Force recommended interim actions to be taken in 

the near-term. The recommended orders are intended to provide those interim safety 

enhancements for protection, mitigation, and preparedness while the rulemaking activities are 

conducted. 
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23823.004

Regulatory Framework 

The Task Force's first recommendation is for the Commission to establish a logical, 

systematic and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately 

balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations. In the Task Force's view. the NRC's 

existing regulatory framework does not apply defense-in-depth and risk insights consistently. 

For example, beyond design basis events and severe accident issues have sometimes been 

addressed with new requirements such as the station blackout rule and in other cases have 

been addressed by voluntary industry initiatives such as severe accident management 

guidelines (SAMGs) which were not included in NRC requirements. The Task Force concluded 

that the proposed regulatory framework would serve all stakeholders well to facilitate staff and 

Commission decision-making, provide transparency and clarity for public stakeholders, and 

provide stability and predictability for the industry's business decisions on meeting regulatory 

requirements. 

Protection Recommendations 

With regard to protection of equipment from natural phenomena, the Task Force 

concluded that protection of important plant equipment from the appropriate external hazards is 

a key foundation of safety and that it is essential for nuclear plants to be protected against the 

appropriate design basis external events. 

Design basis external hazards were established during the construction permit phase for 

operating U.S. plants, and they are not typically revisited through the life of the plant The last 

construction permit for an operating U.S. plant was issued in 1978, and for many plants. this 

was completed in the 1960s. Since that time, there have been significant advancements in the 

state of knowledge and state of analysis methods for seismic and flooding hazards. 
27 


23823.005

Through the years, various NRC programs have been initiated to evaluate the risk from 

external hazards, and actions were taken to address plant vulnerabilities that were identified. 

However, the hazards were not comprehensively reevaluated for all sites and the design basis 

was not necessarily updated. The Task Force concluded that the state of knowledge of seismic 

and flooding hazards has evolved to the point that it is appropriate for licensees to reevaluate 

the designs of existing nuclear power reactors to ensure that structures, systems and 

components important to safety will withstand such events without loss of capability to perform 

their intended safety function. 

On this basis, the Task Force made its second recommendation, which is for the 

Commission to require licensees to reevaluate the design basis seismic and flooding hazards 

and as necessary, upgrade the protection of plant structures, systems and components. In its 

third recommendation, the Task Force also recommended, as part of the longer-term review, 

that the NRC evaluate potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate 

seismically- induced fires and floods. 

The Task Force recognized that the proposed analysis and potential modifications would 

take time to implement. Therefore, as an interim action, the Task Force recommended seismic 

and flooding protection walkdowns be completed over the next several months to identify and 

address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance for 

protection features such as watertight barriers and seals. 

Mitigation Recommendations 

The Task Force also provided recommendations covering several aspects of mitigation 

of low frequency events. These include mitigation of prolonged station blackout events, 
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23823.006

containment overpressure prevention. hydrogen control, spent fuel pool cooling, and onsite 

emergency response capabilities. 

Station Blackout 

In order to strengthen the ability of nuclear power plants to deal with the effects of 

prolonged station blackout events, the Task Force made its fourth recommendation: the 

development of a comprehensive integrated approach to provide uninterrupted core and spent 

fuel cooling. and provide integrity of the reactor coolant system and containment The proposed 

approach is divided into three phases: (1) an eight hour minimum coping phase: (2) a 72-hour 

extended coping phase; (3) and an offsite support phase. As an interim measure, the Task 

Force recommended that licensees be ordered to take reasonable action to protect existing 

mitigation equipment and to ensure that adequate capability is available to mitigate multiunit 

accidents. 

Containment Overpressure 

All boiling water reactors with Mark I containments voluntarily installed hardened wetwell 

vents in the early 1990's. The wetwell vents are intended to ensure containment integrity is 

maintained by preventing containment overpressure. The Task Force recommended that Mark I 

wetwell vents be a requirement and that the wetwell vent designs be enhanced to provide 

capability to open and to reclose as needed during prolonged station blackout scenarios. Eight 

boiling water reactor units in the United States have Mark II containment designs. Three of 

these units have installed hardened vents, and the remaining five units at Columbia, Limerick 

and Susquehanna have not installed hardened vents. The Task Force concluded that a Mark II 

under similar circumstances as Fukushima Dai-ichi units 1, 2 and 3, would have suffered similar 

consequences. Therefore, in its fifth recommendation, the Task Force recommended that 

reliable hardened wetwell vents be required at all boiling water reactors with Mark II 

containments. Additionally, the Task Force also recommended that the NRC staff reevaluate 
29 


23823.007

other containment designs as part of the long-term review to ensure that hardened vents are not 

necessary to mitigate beyond design basis accidents at other facilities. 

Hydrogen Control 

With regard to hydrogen control, the Task Force recommendation regarding enhanced 

mitigation of prolonged station blackout would, if implemented, reduce the likelihood of core 

damage and hydrogen production. This recommendation also includes provisions for backup 

power for hydrogen igniters in containment designs that require those features. In addition, 

while primarily aimed at containment overpressure prevention, enhanced wetwell vents for Mark 

I and Mark If containments designs would provide a reliable means for venting hydrogen to the 

atmosphere. These steps would greatly reduce the likelihood of hydrogen explosions from a 

severe accident. 

Sufficient information from the detailed sequence of events and cause of hydrogen 

explosions at the Fukushima Dai-·lchi plants was not available, however, for the Task Force to 

reasonably formulate any further specific recommendations related to combustible gas control. 

Therefore, in its sixth recommendation, the Task Force recommended that the NRC staff 

identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation in primary containment and other 

buildings as part of the longer-term review. 

Spent Fuel Safety 

In the area of spent fuel pool safety, the Task Force concluded that the two most 

important insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident relate to instrumentation to provide 

information about the condition of the pool and the spent fuel and the plant's capability for spent 

fuel cooling. To address both of these insights, the Task Force made its seventh 

recommendation to enhance spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation for the 

spent fuel pool. Specifically, the Task Force recommended that spent fuel pool instrumentation 

be required to provide reliable information on the conditions in the spent fuel pool. Additionally, 
30 


23823.008

the Task Force recommended a requirement for spent fuel makeup to have safety-related 

backup power, and lastly, the Task Force recommended a requirement for a seismically 

qualified flow path to spray water into the spent fuel pools. 

Onsite Emergency Response 

The Task Force's eighth and final recommendation for enhanced mitigation capability is 

in the area of onsite emergency response. The Task Force recommended that the onsite 

emergency response capabilities be strengthened and integrated for a seamless response to 

severe accidents. 

Emergency Response Recommendations 

In addition to protection and mitigation measures, the Task Force examined how the 

insights from the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi might inform both onsite and offsite emergency 

planning in the U S. While the Task Force believes that the emergency planning basis in the 

U.S. provides radiological protection to members of the public, the Task Force identified two 

aspects of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident that it concluded warrant additional consideration in 

the U.S. These two aspects are emergency planning for prolonged station blackout events and 

emergency planning for multiple unit events. In its ninth recommendation, the Task Force 

recommended that licensees be required to address prolonged station blackout and multiunit 

events in their facility's emergency plans. Examples of the proposed requirements include 

backup power supplies for communications equipment, and ensuring adequate staffing is 

available to respond to an event affecting more than one unit on a multiunit site. 

In its tenth and eleventh recommendations, the Task Force proposed several topics that 

it believes warrant further evaluation during the longer-term review. These topics include 

protective equipment for emergency responders. qualifications for emergency decisionmakers, 
31 


23823.009

off-site radiation monitoring capability, and training for decisionmakers and the public on 

radiation safety and the appropriate use of potassium iodide. 

NRC Programs 

Finally, the Task Force identified one recommendation to enhance NRC programs. The 

Task Force concluded that enhancements to the NRC inspection program would improve its 

focus on safety. Specifically, in its twelfth recommendation, the Task Force recommended that 

the NRC strengthen regulatory oversight of licensee safety performance by balancing the use of 

risk by providing additional emphasis on defense-in-depth requirements. 

Conclusion 

In summary, the Task Force identified a number of important recommendations that 

touch on a broad range of issues. These recommendations seek to clarify the NRC's regulatory 

framework, to enhance safety through interim actions, orders, and rulemakings, and lastly, to 

provide recommended topics for long-term evaluation. 

With the Task Force report now in hand, the Commission is considering the 

recommendations and deliberating on the path forward. We have a shared interest in 

stakeholder participation, including questions and feedback received at the Task Force's public 

meeting on July 281

h. I look forward to ongoing dialogue and exchange of ideas among my 

colleagues and me in the coming weeks. 

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member lnhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member 

Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my formal testimony today. On 

behalf of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. We look forward 
32 


23823.010

to continuing to work with you to advance the NRC's important safety mission. We would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 
33 


23823.011

Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer 

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER: 

Questions have been raised at two recent EPW hearings about the 

"emergency authority" provided to you as Chairman, and how you used 

it following the disaster in Japan. Can you describe the authority 

provided to you under NRC regulations, including the Reorganization 

plan of 1980, and whether your actions have been consistent with that 

authority? 

My actions have been consistent with the Chairman's emergency authority. Prompted by 

lessons learned after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, Reorganization Plan No. 1 or 1980 

section 3 "transfer[s]" to the Chairman all authority the Commission would otherwise possess 

pertaining to a particular nuclear emergency involving NRC-licensed facilities and materials. 

This Reorganization Plan emergency authority has been interpreted as not limited solely to 

emergencies involving specific NRC-regulated facilities or materials, and the Commission's 

Internal Procedures reflect this broad interpretation. 

While the function of "declaring" an emergency is described as being included in this 

Reorganization Plan transfer of authority to the Chairman, the Reorganization Plan nowhere 

requires that a declaration of emergency occur prior to the Chairman's exercise of emergency 

authority. This is because the transfer of authority has already occurred by operation of the 

Reorganization Plan, and is not reliant on a formal Chairman declaration. Nonetheless, after 

the Japan earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, prompt and frequent notice was given to 

Commissioners as well as the agency in general that the NRC was in emergency response 

mode, and I frequently briefed my Commission colleagues on the actions we were taking to 
34 


23823.012

respond to the crisis. I have also provided my Commission colleagues a summary on NRC 

actions taken in response to the Japan emergency. The NRC General Counsel has advised me 

that my actions have been consistent with applicable law. 
35 


23823.013

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER: 

I share your strong commitment to ensuring safety at our nation's 

nuclear power facilities. In a recent letter to you, I urged the 

Commission to act transparently and expeditiously on the Task Force's 

recommendations. It is important that we not leave necessary safety 

improvements on the shelf while we wait for further study. Can you 

elaborate on what progress has been made by the Commission since 

our hearing on August 2nd to develop a plan of action for considering 

the Task Force recommendations and obtain stakeholder input? 

The NRC staff sought external stakeholder feedback in a public meeting on August 31, 2011, 

regarding the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations that stakeholders consider to be 

most important and that the NRC should undertake in the near-term. These recommendations 

were identified in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken 

Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report") dated September 9, 2011. A 

Commission meeting was conducted on September 14, 2011, during which representatives 

from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and interested non-governmental 

organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's proposed near-term actions. On 

October 18, 2011, the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with action on these 

recommendations. The NRC staff is currently developing plans and schedules to implement the 

Commission's direction. 

To further inform the prioritization of the balance of the NTTF recommendations, the NRC staff 

conducted a public meeting with representatives of the nuclear industry on September 21, 2011, 

in order to better understand their current plans and actions to address the lessons learned from 

the Fukushima Dai-ichi event. The NRC staff's proposed prioritization of all of the NTTF 
36 


23823.014

recommendations was submitted in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of 

Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned") on 

October 3, 2011. A Commission meeting was conducted on October 11, 2011, during which 

representatives from other Federal and state agencies, the nuclear industry, and interested nongovernmental organizations provided their views on the NRC staff's proposed prioritization. 

SECY -11-0137 is currently under review by the Commission. 
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23823.015

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER: 

The Task Force said a "patchwork of regulatory requirements" 

developed "piece-by-piece over the decades" should be replaced with a 

"logical, systematic and coherent regulatory framework" to bolster 

reactor safety. How do you reconcile these facts with the Task Force's 

statement that "continued operation and continued licensing activities 

do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety?" 

It is important to note that the Near-Term Task Force's (NTTF's) work reinforces the NRC's 

confidence in the continued safe operation of, and emergency planning for, U.S. nuclear power 

plants. The NTTF found that operating nuclear power plants are protected against low likelihood 

severe natural phenomena and have accident mitigation capabilities such that continued 

operation poses no imminent risk to public health and safety. 

The phrase "patchwork of regulatory requirements" was not meant to imply that a gap in the 

regulations was identified. Rather, the NTTF found that, over the years, the NRC has 

addressed beyond-design-basis events on a case-by-case basis, with some elements being 

addressed by voluntary industry initiatives and others by specific regulations, thereby creating a 

"patchwork" regulatory framework. To ensure a consistent regulatory approach for these types 

of events, the NTTF recommended that the Commission establish a policy for balanced layers 

of defense against severe accidents, including protection, mitigation, and emergency 

preparedness, and, where appropriate, enhance the Commission's regulatory requirements 

within the new framework. 
38 


23823.016

QUESTION4. 

ANSWER: 

I understand that the Natural Resources Defense Council has filed 18 

petitions for Commission rulemakings or orders based on 

recommendations from the NRC Task Force. I also understand that 

NRC staff ordinarily responds on the sufficiency of such petitions for 

rulemaking or orders within 30 days of receiving the petitions. Do you 

think NRC staff has sufficient information to docket the petitions and 

move forward with rulemakings and orders? If not, how will the 

Commission proceed? 

The NRC has received twelve petitions for enforcement action (under Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) Section 2.206) and six petitions for rulemaking (under 

10 CFR 2.802) from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), related to the NRC NearTerm Task Force (NTTF) recommendations. NRDC recently submitted a seventh petition for 

rulemaking addressing combustible gases. Because the different types of petitions are 

governed by different processes, separate responses are provided below for the two different 

types of petitions. 

Petitions for Enforcement Action Filed Under 10 CFR 2.206: The NRC is processing the twelve 

petitions from NRDC (the petitioner) as a single action requesting that the NRC order licensees 

to take actions corresponding to recommendations by the NTIF to enhance plant safety after 

Fukushima. The NRDC cites the NTIF Report as the sole rationale and basis for the requests; 

no new information was provided. Under NRC Management Directive 8.11, "Review Process 

for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions," the petitioner is offered the opportunity for a public meeting to 

address the NRC's Petition Review Board (PRB) prior to the PRB making an initial 
39 


23823.017

recommendation regarding acceptance of the petition. Having scheduled a public meeting with 

the petitioner for September yth, NRDC asked to reschedule the meeting because of a desire to 

review the NRC staff recommendations to the Commission on the NTTF Report (see SECY-11-

0124, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force 

Report," and SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response 

to Fukushima Lessons Learned") prior to meeting with the PRB. Since, per Management 

Directive 8.11, the PRB would normally meet with a petitioner within two weeks of receipt of the 

petition, the NRC staff informed the petitioner that unless NRDC would like to have the public 

meeting by the end of October, the PRB would meet in November to decide on an initial 

recommendation, but would engage with the petitioner prior to developing its final 

recommendation. The petitioner's latest response, by email on October 26, 2011, stated that 

NRDC would like to meet with the PRB in December. The petitioner further stated that the 

Commission has taken up most of the issues in this petition and those issues are currently 

before the NRC staff. Hence, the PRB intends to meet in November to decide on an initial 

recommendation and meet with the petitioner in mid-December per NRDC's request before 

preparing its final recommendation regarding acceptance of the petition. 

Petitions for Rulemaking Filed Under 10 CFR 2.802: The NRC has accepted, docketed, and 

noticed in the Federal Register the first six NRDC petitions for rulemaking (PRMs) related to the 

NTTF recommendations. These PRMs request the NRC to undertake the specific rulemaking 

activities recommended by the NTTF and cite the NTTF report as the sole rationale and basis 

for the rulemaking requests; no new information was provided. Because the Commission has 

already directed the NRC staff to proceed with rulemaking regarding station blackout events, the 

NRC is proceeding to evaluate the NRDC petition (PRM-50-101) that is associated with the 

station blackout rule. The other five PRMs will be held in abeyance until the Commission has 
40 


23823.018

given direction to the NRC staff on how to proceed with the NTTF topics associated with each of 

the PRMs. 

The seventh NRDC PRM related to the Fukushima events was submitted on October 14, 2011, 

and requests that the NRC add requirements for the control of combustible gases (hydrogen) 

during accidents (NTTF Recommendation 6). The NRC is in the process of determining the 

sufficiency of this petition for docketing. The NRC will strive to issue the Notice of Receipt for 

this PRM within the 30-day goal stated in 10 CFR 2.802. 
41 


23823.019

QUESTION 5. 

ANSWER: 

The NRC took decisive actions after the tragedy of [September 11, 

2001], ordering U.S. nuclear power plants to take a series of improved 

security measures. The NRC later codified those orders in regulations, 

with compliance required by March 31, 2010. In what ways is the 

process recommended by the Task Force parallel to what was used 

after 9/11? What assurance do we have that it will not take the 

Commission nearly a decade to implement the Task Force's 

recommendations to improve the safety of nuclear power reactors in 

the United States? 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Commission established new security 

requirements on the basis of adequate protection. These new requirements were not the result 

of immediate or imminent threats to NRC-licensed facilities, but rather resulted from new 

insights regarding potential security events. Similarly, after Japan's recent earthquake and 

tsunami and the resulting accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, the 

Commission established a senior level task force known as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 

to conduct both a short- and long-term analysis of potential lessons learned. The report 

produced by the NTTF identified twelve major recommendations with the potential to improve 

the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities. 

The NRC is taking action on the Task Force recommendations. In the Staff Requirements 

Memorandum (SRM) dated October 18, 2011, "Recommended Actions to be taken Without 

Delay from the Near Term Task Force Report," the Commission directed the NRC staff to begin 

action without delay on those Near-Term Task Force recommendations with the greatest 

potential for safety improvement in the near term. In that SRM, the Commission directed that 
42 


23823.020

the NRC should strive to complete and implement the lessons learned from the Fukushima 

accident within 5 years- by 2016. In addition, the Commission directed that the staff should 

designate the station blackout (SBO) rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking with a goal of 

completion within 24 to 30 months of the October 18, 2011 SRM. 

The NRC staff developed a framework to methodically and systematically review the NTTF 

recommendations. The NRC staff's proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations was 

submitted in a notation vote paper (SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to 

be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned") on October 3, 2011. The NRC staff 

has proposed to implement the recommendations, as appropriate, in accordance with 

established regulatory vehicles (i.e., Orders or Rulemaking). SECY-11-0137 is currently under 

review by the Commission. 

In addition, the NRC staff also continues to evaluate approaches to implement all of the other 

recommendations that have resulted from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. 
43 


23823.021

QUESTION 6. 

ANSWER: 

It is my understanding that none of the spent fuel in dry cask storage at 

Fukushima was damaged or released radiation. If a facility transfers its 

spent fuel from pools to dry cask storage, wouldn't the consequences 

of an accident be lessened due to the reduced amount of fuel in its 

pool? If so, why doesn't the NRC reduce this risk in communities 

across the Nation by compelling spent fuel to be transferred to dry 

casks? 

The NRC believes spent fuel pools and dry casks both provide adequate protection of public 

health and safety. Regarding the event at Fukushima, the information the NRC has to date 

indicates there was no significant offsite radioactive release from spent fuel stored in either the 

spent fuel pools or the dry casks. Although the NRC had some early concern with loss of water 

from the pools during the event, it now appears that the pools may have maintained an 

adequate inventory of water during the event, and the addition of water to the pools has 

maintained cooling of the stored fuel. We have not learned anything so far in our review of the 

Fukushima event that would indicate there is a safety or security reason to mandate accelerated 

transfer of spent fuel from pool storage to casks. 

Consistent with the NRC mission of ensuring the protection of public health and safety, the NRC 

is continuing research regarding the behavior of spent fuel pools following a loss of cooling 

water. This effort includes an ongoing study of the effect of removing older fuel from the pool in 

an expedited manner and placing it in dry storage. The NRC recognizes that there are 

numerous details to consider when moving spent fuel to dry cask storage and plans to explore 

issues to ensure the safety of spent fuel storage. 
44 


23823.022

QUESTION 7. 

ANSWER: 

The Task Force concluded that a sequence of events like what occurred 

in Japan is unlikely to occur in the United States. Yet, the Task Force 

still recommended numerous safety improvements for nuclear power 

facilities around the country. In your view, what is the primary lesson 

learned from the accident in Japan thus far? 

The primary lesson learned from the accident in Japan is a reinforcement of the importance of 

defense in depth in providing protection for public health and safety. This lesson has three 

important aspects. The first aspect is that each of the three fundamental defense in depth 

strategies (protection, mitigation, and emergency planning) is essential. The second aspect is 

that each strategy needs to be robust in itself and complementary to the other strategies, but 

independent from other strategies to the extent possible. The third aspect is that each strategy 

needs to seek out in a timely manner new information (e.g., updated seismic hazards 

information) that is necessary to maintain its level of effectiveness. 
45 


23823.023

QUESTION 8. 

ANSWER: 

The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued a response to the NRC 

Task Force's report, in which it urged the NRC to modify current 

emergency planning requirements. UCS urged the NRC to require 

plants to develop such plans based on a scientific assessment of the 

populations at risk for each site, rather than artificially limiting plans to 

areas within the current 10-mile planning zone. Do you agree that the 

NRC should re-evaluate current requirements for emergency 

preparedness and evacuation plans in light of what happened in Japan. 

The Near-Term Task Force provided several recommendations that are intended to clarify and 

strengthen the current emergency preparedness regulatory framework. These 

recommendations may lead to the identification of issues that will warrant further study and 

longer term actions. As such, the NRC will continue to evaluate all of its current regulatory 

requirements to ensure that adequate protection of the public's health and safety will be 

maintained. In addition, the NRC staff in SECY 11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended 

Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned," identified re-evaluation of 

the basis of emergency planning zone sizes as an additional recommendation warranting further 

consideration and potential prioritization. 
46 


23823.024

QUESTION 9. 

ANSWER: 

California's two nuclear power plants are located in areas of high 

seismic activity and I am concerned about their ability to withstand 

earthquakes. The Task Force has recommended requiring nuclear 

plants to confirm their seismic flooding hazards every 1 0 years and to 

address any new and significant information with safety upgrades. Do 

you agree that nuclear power plants in the United States should 

periodically re-evaluate seismic and flooding hazards in light of what 

has occurred in Japan? 

The NRC staff identified the ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards as an item 

for long-term evaluation in SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken 

in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned." The NRC staff is in the process of developing 

additional information regarding an approach and schedule for addressing this issue. However, 

the NRC staff also recommended near-term regulatory activities to interact with stakeholders 

and develop information requests. Licensees will be requested to: (1) re-evaluate site-specific 

seismic and flooding hazards, (2) perform seismic and flood protection plant walk-downs, and 

(3) identify actions that have been taken or planned to address plant-specific issues associated 

with the updated hazards or identified during the plant walk-downs. Information received from 

these near-term actions will be used to further inform the Commission's position regarding the 

periodic re-evaluation of seismic and flooding hazards. 
47 


23823.025

Questions from Senator Thomas R. Carper 

Question 1. 

ANSWER: 

Can you explain how the NRC uses a mix of voluntary and mandatory 

regulations to ensure safety? How does the NRC ensure voluntary 

regulations are being enacted? 

The NRC does not rely on voluntary measures to ensure safety. The agency affords adequate 

protection (safety) through the use of mandatory measures such as regulations, Orders and 

license conditions. 

Regulatory commitments and voluntary programs can be useful since often they can be 

implemented more quickly than NRC requirements and they typically afford the licensee more 

flexibility to address the given situation. A licensee's implementation of a voluntary program 

may stem from the NRC encouraging the licensee to take additional actions beyond what is 

necessary to ensure adequate protection, but which provide added margin with respect to the 

overall safety of the facility. Under this scenario, there can be significantly reduced controls, 

and NRC typically does not inspect the voluntary program as part of its normal reactor oversight 

program. 
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QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER: 

I can see a role for voluntary regulations -they can be quickly 

implemented without waiting on the federal government. However, they 

are meaningless if they are never enacted or not sustained over time. 

was disappointed to see that when the NRC did a review of the 

voluntary severe accident management guidelines -very few plants 

were implementing all of the guidelines. Some plants were 

implementing very few of the guidelines at all. Can the NRC enforce 

voluntary programs without codifying them into law? What are the 

advantages and disadvantages of codifying voluntary programs? 

Should there be a time period after which all voluntary programs should 

become regulatory statute? 

NRC regulations address specific safety, technical, or operational issues. By statute, NRC is 

required to put in place those regulations needed to ensure adequate protection of public health 

and safety, and the environment. For safety, technical, or operational issues that do not rise to 

the level of adequate protection, the NRC may pursue regulations in those areas if they provide 

a substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety. Alternatively, for 

those issues that do not rise to the level of adequate protection, the nuclear industry could 

voluntary develop and adopt an initiative to address a particular issue. However, the NRC does 

not routinely inspect the implementation of the voluntary industry initiatives, and cannot enforce 

them. 

A voluntary program could be advantageous in allowing the NRC to focus resources on those 

issues of the highest safety importance, while allowing issues of low safety or risk importance to 
49 


23823.027

be addressed through voluntary programs. The NRC would not expend resources on the 

development of regulations and oversight of the residual issues. The disadvantages of a 

voluntary program is that if the issue of concern has a nexus to safety and, NRC determined 

that the issue was not being sufficiently addressed, we would be delayed in our ability to take 

effective action. 

The NRC would not codify a voluntary industry initiative. Rather, if needed, the NRC would put 

in place regulations that address the particular safety, technical, or operational issue of concern. 

There is no time period associated with putting in place regulations for an issue that is being 

addressed through a voluntary industry initiative. Rather, the decision to put in place 

regulations would be dependent upon the safety significance of the issue. 
50 


23823.028

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER: 

What we do know about the Fukushima [event] is that the Japanese 

underestimated the risk of that great of a tsunami and earthquake for 

that facility. I want to be sure that we are not underestimating our risks 

here at home. Please list the last time the NRC evaluated the seismic 

and flooding hazards for each of the 104 nuclear power plants. 

The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components at U.S. nuclear 

power plants be designed to take into account even rare and extreme seismic and tsunami 

events. All104 U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external hazards, including 

earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Each plant's capability to withstand 

external hazards relevant to its site is reviewed by the NRC during its initial licensing. 

The NRC has also made substantial effort over time to ensure that vulnerabilities to both 

internal and external hazards are considered and mitigated in the current design and licensing 

basis of its regulated facilities. The NRC routinely inspects the licensee's policies and 

procedures associated with responding to seismic and flooding hazards; as well as inspecting 

the licensee's structures, systems, and components used to mitigate the hazards. The NRC 

has also conducted two reviews of its regulated facilities over the last 25 years to ensure that 

they have included both internal and external hazards in their current plant design and licensing 

basis. These reviews are as follows: 

(1) In 1988, the NRC's Generic Letter No. 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe 

Accident Vulnerabilities," requested plant owners to perform a systematic evaluation of 

plant-specific vulnerabilities and report the results to the Commission. 
51 


23823.029

(2) In the mid to late 1990s, the NRC staff reviewed the potential for ground motions beyond 

the design basis as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events. From 

this review, the NRC staff determined that seismic designs of operating nuclear plants in 

the U.S. have adequate safety margins for withstanding earthquakes. 

In addition, the NRC was in the process of performing a generic review of seismic hazards for 

existing plants before the Fukushima event occurred. This effort, knows as Generic lssue-199, 

"Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Estimates in Central and Eastern United States 

on Existing Plants," will be incorporated into the NRC effort to re-evaluate the seismic hazards 

at U.S. nuclear plants in light of the Fukushima event, as outlined in SECY-11-0137, 

"Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons 

Learned." 
52 


23823.030

Questions from Senator Benjamin Cardin 

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER: 

If the Commission delays action on Task Force recommendations on 

the grounds that you do not have enough information yet about what 

happened at Fukushima to move forward, does that suggest that the 

NRC also does not have enough information to move forward with relicensing existing reactors or licensing new reactors? 

The NRC is not delaying action on Task Force recommendations. Rather, the Commission is 

prioritizing the Task Force recommendations based on their potential level of safety 

significance. In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated October 18, 2011, 

"Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay From The Near-Term Task Force Report," 

the Commission directed the NRC staff to begin action without delay on those Near-Term Task 

Force recommendations with the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near-term. 

The NRC continues to believe that its regulatory framework and requirements provide for a 

rigorous and comprehensive license review process that examines the full extent of design, 

siting, and operation of nuclear power plants. Therefore, the agency is continuing to process 

existing applications for new reactors and license renewal applications in accordance with the 

schedules that have been established. The NRC has the necessary regulatory tools to require 

changes to existing licenses or certified designs should the agency determine that such 

changes are necessary. 
53 


23823.031

Questions from Senator James M. lnhofe 

QUESTION 1. 

ANSWER: 

Commissioner Apostolakis cited in his opening statement that "there is 

growing evidence that the historical record of tsunamis had not been 

used properly to determine the design basis of Fukushima Daiichi and 

consequently the protection of the plant was not sufficient." He added 

that "it was not unthinkable or unforeseen." 

• Please explain how an accident triggered by a design basis 

improperly calculated in a different regulatory system provides a 

basis for concluding that our existing regulatory framework is no 

longer acceptable, especially without having analyzed the 

comparative differences in regulatory requirements. 

Please describe any evidence from the Fukushima event that 

indicates our regulations would not have been adequate. 

The NRC places an emphasis on learning from operating experience, both foreign and 

domestic, in order to ensure that the operation of U.S. nuclear facilities does not pose an 

unacceptable risk to public health and safety. The event at Fukushima Dai-ichi is a prime 

example of operating experience from which both the NRC and the U.S. nuclear industry can 

potentially learn a great deal. Although the outcome of the event may have been influenced by 

the approach taken in Japan to determining the facility's design basis tsunami and/or by the 

particular characteristics of the Japanese regulatory system, it reinforces the importance of 

ensuring that U.S. nuclear facilities are adequately protected from similar extreme external 

events. As with any piece of operating experience, the NRC proposes to learn as much as 
54 


23823.032

possible from the event at Fukushima and apply that knowledge to further the NRC's safety 

mission here in the U.S. 
55 


23823.033

QUESTION 2. 

ANSWER: 

You have repeatedly stated that U.S. plants are safe and the task force 

says there is no imminent risk, yet you continuously refer to the 

"urgency of these safety issues" and the need to proceed 

"expeditiously." What specific evidence from the Fukushima accident 

supports your sense of urgency? 

The NRC has been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing all available 

information associated with the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The 

NRC's urgency to proceed with a subset of NTTF recommendations is based upon its 

consideration of the relative safety benefit to be derived from each recommendation as it would 

contribute to maintaining the NRC's defense-in-depth philosophy. The NRC's urgency to begin 

the process of stakeholder interaction on this subset of NTTF recommendations is related to its 

desire to provide ample opportunity for all NRC stakeholders to inform the NRC of their views 

regarding these important topics and to assist the NRC in formulating the correct course of 

action for U.S. nuclear facilities. 
56 


23823.034

QUESTION 3. 

ANSWER: 

Your colleagues voted on this matter on July 19, July 27, and July 29. 

You did not vote until August 9. Please indicate how many times you 

requested an extension of voting time, the length of those extensions, 

and why you were unable to vote in a timely manner considering the 

importance of the matter and your stated desire to move forward 

expeditiously. 

This question refers to SECY-11-0093, "Near Term Report and Recommendations for Agency 

Actions following the Events in Japan," dated July 12, 2011. I filed my initial, timely comments 

on August 91

h, which was during the period of a single Commission-endorsed 5-day extension to 

vote that followed all of the Commission's established processes. Rather than focusing my vote 

on process issues, my seven-page vote offered my policy views on each of the twelve nuclear 

safety recommendations made by the Commission's task force. Leading up to my vote, I 

proposed a detailed plan for collegial Commission review of the task force report that included 

Commission meetings with stakeholders, a federal register notice seeking public comment, and 

additional staff input. 
57 


23823.035

QUESTION4. 

ANSWER: 

In your speech at the Press Club, you stated: "As Chairman, I'm 

committed to ensuring that the Commission has all the information it 

needs to make timely decisions and take decisive actions in response to 

the task force recommendations." Yet you directed the Executive 

Director for Operations (EDO) to withdraw his recommendations to the 

Commission on how to proceed with the task force recommendations. 

Do you believe your direction to the EDO is consistent with your Press 

Club statement? 

My actions were consistent with my statutory responsibilities and are in the best interests of 

nuclear safety. 
58 


23823.036

QUESTION 5. 

ANSWER: 

Do you believe it is appropriate in your role as Chairman to screen 

materials before agency staff provides them to the Commission? 

As Chairman, I am responsible for the day-to-day administration of the agency, managing the 

staff, executing Commission decisions, keeping the Commission informed on matters within the 

Commission's functions, and for developing policy planning and guidance for consideration by 

the Commission. 
59 


23823.037

QUESTION 6: 

ANSWER: 

The Commission provides direction to the EDO to carry out staff 

actions. Do you believe it is within your authority as the agency's 

principal executive officer to interpret the Commission's direction? 

As a general matter, yes, that is within my direction. Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 

§ 2(b), the Chairman is specifically responsible "for assuring that the Executive Director for 

Operations and the staff of the Commission. . . are responsible to the requirements of the 

Commission in the performance of its functions." Thus, the Chairman is ultimately responsible 

and accountable for the EDO's response to Commission direction and any necessary 

interpretation of such direction. In addition, § 4(b) of the Reorganization Plan states that "[t]he 

Executive Director for Operations shall report for all matters to the Chairman," thereby further 

confirming the Chairman's supervisory role vis-a-vis the EDO. The Commission does, however, 

have the ability to clarify any direction it has given to agency staff if it believes that 

implementation is not consistent with the Commission's intent. Additionally, under the 

Commission's Internal Procedures, the Chairman shares draft tasking memoranda with the 

Commission before issuing the memoranda to agency staff, which further promotes consistency 

between Commission direction and staff response. 
60 


23823.038

QUESTION 7. 

ANSWER: 

Is the Japanese nuclear safety regulator independent, as the NRC is in 

the U.S.? 

Currently, Japan has a nuclear regulatory structure that involves multiple organizations 

collaborating with an overarching "double check" by a Diet-appointed Commission. The Nuclear 

and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) is responsible for approximately 85% of the regulatory 

program; NISA is a subdivision of Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, an 

organization with a broad portfolio that includes both regulatory and promotional aspects of 

nuclear energy. The Japanese Government is preparing to separate the regulatory portion from 

the promotional portion, by assigning the new regulatory body to Japan's Ministry of the 

Environment. This reorganization is scheduled to take place in April 2012. 
61 


23823.039

QUESTION 8. 

ANSWER: 

Does the Japanese nuclear safety regulator calculate tsunami risk the 

same way the NRC does? 

We believe the Japanese regulator and the NRC determine tsunami risk differently. Our current 

understanding is that the Japanese regulator uses a deterministic method to verify the design 

tsunami by using criteria based on historical records. 

The NRC uses a hierarchical three step approach to determine tsunami risk at U.S. nuclear 

facilities. The first two steps eliminate regions and plants having no tsunami risk. The third step 

assesses risk at facilities where the elevation of safety significant structures, systems and 

components cannot be conclusively shown to exceed the calculated tsunami run-up. The 

assessment is based on numerical modeling of elements including source modeling, wave 

propagation and shoreline inundation. Tsunami heights determined by modeling must exceed all 

known historical tsunami heights. 

Regardless of approach used, it is important to make correct assumptions and to use all 

available information, including information on uncertainty. 
62 


23823.040

QUESTION 9. 

ANSWER: 

Do Japanese nuclear plants provide a similar level of protection for their 

emergency generators and fuel tanks as US plants do? 

In Japan and the U.S., all safety equipment, including emergency diesel generators and fuel 

tanks, is designed and maintained to specifications that ensure, with a margin of safety, that the 

equipment will work when needed. Correctly anticipating conditions that may occur during an 

event is critical to ensuring the emergency equipment is sufficiently designed and protected. 

Based on the lessons learned from Fukushima, the United States, Japan, and other countries 

are taking steps to ensure that design assumptions at all nuclear plants are sufficient to ensure 

the protection of emergency equipment. 
63 


23823.041

QUESTION 10. Is the licensing process for Japanese reactor operators administered by 

an independent regulator with a comparable level of rigor to the NRC's 

process? 

ANSWER: 

NRC requirements for reactor operator licensing are found in 10 CFR Part 55. In Japan, the 

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) administers the licensing of reactor operators. 

NISA has responsibility over licensees for safety examination, licensing, inspection, and 

hearings on incidents and events. NISA exists as a part of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 

Industry (MET!). MET!, through the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), also 

promotes nuclear power. The Japanese Government is preparing to separate the regulatory 

portion from the promotional portion, by assigning the new regulatory body to Japan's Ministry 

of the Environment, this reorganization is scheduled to take place in April 2012. Japan's 

Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) provides oversight of NISA's licensing and inspection 

activities. 

Beyond this structure, the NRC does not currently have sufficient information to make a more 

detailed comparison. 
64 


23823.042

QUESTION 11. Are Japanese reactor operators authorized to take any and all actions 

necessary to protect public health and safety the way we do, without 

seeking corporate or political input? 

ANSWER: 

The licensed operators of United States nuclear facilities are authorized and expected to take 

any and all actions necessary to protect public health and safety without seeking corporate or 

political input. In addition, U.S. regulations provide that a licensee may take reasonable action 

that departs from a license condition or a technical specification in an emergency, when this 

action is immediately needed to protect public health and safety and no action consistent with 

license conditions and technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent 

protection is immediately apparent. NRC does not have information on the requirements for 

reactor operators in Japan. 

The NRC, other U.S. government agencies, and the U.S. nuclear industry remain actively 

involved in the process of developing an understanding of the precise sequence of events which 

occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi in the wake of the March 11, 2011 tsunami. 
65 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Commissioner Svinicki. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KRISTINE L. SVINICKI, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chairman 

Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper and Ranking 

Member Barrasso and other Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

The members of NRC’s near-term task force covered tremendous 

ground in the conduct of their 90-day review. After a more extensive examination than earlier NRC efforts were able to undertake, 

the task force concluded that a sequence of events like the 

Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and 

that continued operation and continued licensing activities do not 

pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. 

In providing this safety reassurance to the commission and the 

public, the task force’s work, conducted with some urgency given 

their mission of finding any near-term deficiencies or confirming 

the safety of continued operations, now allows the NRC the opportunity to proceed with the systematic and methodical review of lessons learned that the commission established early on. 

I believe that wise regulatory decisions depend on public participation and on careful analysis of the likely consequences of regulation. The NRC is now in a position to conduct activities that the 

task force’s short timeframe did not allow them to undertake, 

namely a more extensive public stakeholder engagement on these 

issues and others that will likely emerge, and opportunities to consider a comprehensive set of facts regarding the events in Japan, 

and to receive the expert views of the commission’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

In that vein, I view the near-term task force report as an important first step in the process of learning from the events at 

Fukushima. The conclusions drawn by the six individual members 

of the near-term task force must now be open to challenge by our 

many public stakeholders and tested by the scrutiny of a wider 

body of experts, including the NRC’s technical staff who would be 

responsible for carrying out the changes the commission might 

adopt prior to final commission decisionmaking on those changes. 

I support acting with the appropriate dispatch and urgency, but 

without short-changing the thoroughness, inclusiveness and deliberation of our response. 

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Svinicki follows:] 

66 


23823.062

Commissioner Kristine l. Svinicki's Responses to Questions for the Record 

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

1. The Task Force concluded that a sequence of events like what occurred in Japan is 

unlikely to occur in the United States. Yet, the Task Force still recommended numerous 

safety improvements for nuclear power facilities around the country. In your view, what 

is the primary lesson learned from the accident in Japan thus far? 

In my view. the primary lesson learned from the accident in Japan is the need to ensure that we 

maintain a willingness to question and examine the bases of our regulatory action in light of any 

new information. We must also use this tragic event to advance the goals of nuclear safetyboth domestically and within the international cooperative framework. Fukushima reminds us to 

challenge our current assumptions regarding fundamental preparedness to respond to the 

unlikely or unexpected. 

2. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued a response to the NRC Task Force's 

report, in which it urged the NRC to modify current emergency planning requirements. 

UCS urged the NRC to require plants to develop such plans based on a scientific 

assessment of the populations at risk for each site, rather than artificially limiting plans 

to areas within the current 10-mile planning zone. Do you agree that the NRC should reevaluate current requirements for emergency preparedness and evacuation plans in light 

of what happened in Japan? 

The NRC's Near-Term Task Force provided several recommendations that are intended to 

clarify and strengthen the current emergency preparedness regulatory framework. These 

recommendations may lead to the identification of additional issues that will warrant further 

study and longer term actions. As such, the NRC will continue to evaluate all of its current 

regulatory requirements to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety will be 

maintained. In my view, this evaluation should also assess the facts as we are able to gather 

them regarding the Japanese experience with evacuation and relocation of the affected 

population, as well as any differences between the Japanese and U.S. regulatory systems. 

3. California's two nuclear power plants are located in areas of high seismic activity and I 

am concerned about their ability to withstand earthquakes. The Task Force has 

recommended requiring nuclear plants to confirm their seismic flooding hazards every 

10 years and to address any new and significant information with safety upgrades. Do 

you agree that nuclear power plants in the United States should periodically re-evaluate 

seismic and flooding hazards in light of what has occurred in Japan? 

Yes. The NRC staff is in the process of developing additional information regarding an 

approach and schedule for addressing this issue. Licensees will be requested to: (1) reevaluate site-specific seismic and flooding hazards, (2) perform seismic and flood protection 

plant walk-downs, and (3) identify actions that have been taken or planned to address plantspecific issues associated with the updated hazards or identified during the plant walk-downs. 

Information received from these near-term actions will be used to further inform potential 

regulatory actions going forward. 

Enclosure 
67 


23823.063

Senator Thomas R. Carper 

1. Can you explain how the NRC uses a mix of voluntary and mandatory regulations to 

ensure safety? How does the NRC ensure voluntary regulations are being enacted? 

The NRC does not rely on voluntary measures to ensure adequate protection of public health 

and safety. The agency ensures adequate protection through the use of mandatory measures 

such as regulations, license conditions, and orders. These measures are supported by 

regulatory guides, standard review plans, and other similar tools. 

For issues that are above and beyond what is needed to provide reasonable assurance of 

public health and safety, voluntary initiatives can be an optimal vehicle to achieve desired 

outcomes. The manner in which a regulatory commitment or voluntary program is treated by 

the licensee and by the NRC staff can vary, depending on the nature of the regulatory 

commitment or voluntary program and its relation to a regulatory requirement. For example, the 

NRC may use a licensee's regulatory commitments to help decide if further regulatory actions 

need to be taken. Under such circumstances, the NRC would typically perform an inspection to 

determine if the licensee is implementing the regulatory commitment, if the regulatory 

commitment is being managed through the licensee's commitment tracking system, and 

whether the regulatory commitment should be placed into a controlled document such as the 

final safety analysis report. Altematively, the licensee's implementation of a voluntary program 

may stem from the NRC encouraging the licensee to take additional actions that may not be 

necessary to ensure adequate protection, but which provide added margin with respect to the 

overall safety of the facility. Inspection of the implementation of voluntary industry initiatives is 

done on a case-by-case basis. 

2. I can see a role for voluntary regulations -they can be quickly implemented without 

waiting on the federal government. However, they are meaningless if they are never 

enacted or not sustained over time. I was disappointed to see that when the NRC did a 

review of the voluntary severe accident management guidelines - very few plants were 

implementing all of the guidelines. Some plants were implementing very few of the 

guidelines at all. Can the NRC enforce voluntary programs without codifying them into 

law? What are the advantages and disadvantages of codifying voluntary programs? 

Should there be a time period after which all voluntary programs should become 

regulatory statute? 

By statute, NRC is required to put in place those regulations needed to ensure adequate 

protection of public health and safety. For safety, technical, or operational issues that do not 

rise to the level of adequate protection, the NRC may pursue regulations in those areas if they 

provide a substantial increase in the overall protection of public health and safety and are costjustified. Alternatively, for those issues that do not rise to the level of adequate protection, the 

nuclear industry could voluntarily develop and adopt an initiative to address a particular issue. 

The NRC does not enforce voluntary industry programs because they are not regulatory 

requirements necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. 

Voluntary programs are advantageous when they allow the NRC to focus resources on those 

issues of the highest safety importance, while allowing issues of low safety or risk importance to 

be addressed voluntarily by licensees. There is no time period associated with putting in place 

regulations for an issue that is being addressed through a voluntary industry initiative. 
68 


23823.064

What we do know about Fukushima is that the Japanese underestimated the risk of that 

great of a tsunami and earthquake for that facility. I want to be sure that we are not 

underestimating our risks here at home. Please list the last time the NRC evaluated the 

seismic and flooding hazards for each of the 104 nuclear power plants. 

The NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems. and components at U.S. nuclear 

power plants be designed to take into account even rare and extreme seismic and tsunami 

events. All104 U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external hazards, including 

earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Each plant's capability to withstand 

external hazards relevant to its site is reviewed by the NRC during its initial licensing. 

The NRC has also made substantial effort over time to ensure that vulnerabilities to both 

internal and external hazards are considered and mitigated in the current design and licensing 

basis of its regulated facilities. The NRC routinely inspects the licensee's policies and 

procedures associated with responding to seismic and flooding hazards; as well as inspecting 

the licensee's structures, systems, and components used to mitigate the hazards. The NRC 

has also conducted two reviews of its regulated facilities over the last 25 years to ensure that 

they have included both internal and external hazards in their current plant design and licensing 

basis. These reviews are as follows: 

(1) In 1988, the NRC's Generic Letter No. 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe 

Accident Vulnerabilittes," requested plant owners to perform a systematic evaluation of 

plant-specific vulnerabilities and report the results to the Commission. 

(2) In the mid to late 1990s, the NRC staff reviewed the potential for ground motions beyond 

the design basis as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events. From 

this review, the NRC staff determined that seismic designs of operating nuclear plants in 

the U.S. have adequate safety margins for withstanding earthquakes. 

In addition, the NRC was in the process of performing a generic review of seismic hazards for 

existing plants before the Fukushima event occurred. This effort, known as Generic lssue-199, 

"Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Estimates in Central and Eastern United States 

on Existing Plants," will be incorporated into the NRC effort to re-evaluate the seismic hazards 

at U.S. nuclear plants in light of the Fukushima event, as outlined in SECY-11-0137, 

"Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons 

Learned." 

Through these substantial efforts, the NRC has ensured that the risk associated with seismic 

and flooding hazards is not underestimated at nuclear power plants in the U.S. The NRC 

remains convinced that U.S. nuclear power plants are designed and operated in a manner that 

protects public health and safety. 
69 


23823.065

Senator James M. lnhofe 

1. Why do you think a more rigorous process is important to the objective of nuclear 

safety? 

The NRC's Near-Term Task Force found that a sequence of events like the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident is unlikely to occur in the United States, and that continued operation and continued 

licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety. Therefore, we are 

in a position to take deliberate, yet expeditious, action commensurate with our level of 

understanding of the events in Japan. We expect that the set of facts regarding the sequence 

of events and accident progression at Fukushima Dai-ichi will continue to grow, and our level of 

understanding will continue to evolve over the next several years. A comprehensive set of facts 

regarding what transpired in Japan is crucial to ensuring that we correctly identify and diagnose 

issues that may require NRC action for continued assurance of adequate protection of public 

health and safety. 

2. You urge scrutiny of the task force proposal by the ACRS. How will their expert 

testimony serve the objective of ensuring public health and safety? Do you believe that 

Chairman Jaczko's March 23 tasking memorandum adequately harnessed their 

expertise? 

Statutorily mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reviews and reports on safety studies and reactor facility 

license and license renewal applications; advises the Commission on the hazards of proposed 

and existing production and utilization facilities and the adequacy of proposed safety standards; 

initiates reviews of specific generic matters or nuclear facility safety-related items; and provides 

advice in the areas of health physics and radiation protection. Throughout my tenure on the 

Commission, I have found that the ACRS provides valuable insights and advice to the 

Commission. The Committee's advice reflects the breadth and depth of the collective 

knowledge and experience of the Committee's members, as well as the diversity of their views. 

The Task Force's recommendations span a wide variety of complex issues with varying safety 

implications and potentially significant regulatory impacts. This calls for regular ACRS 

engagement on the longer term review. The March 23 tasking memorandum's direction to have 

the ACRS review the Near-Term Task Force report was an appropriate first step. The ACRS's 

continued engagement will be essential as the agency moves forward. 

3. The Chairman has repeatedly commented that failure to implement the task force 

recommendations may delay new plant applications. Do you agree with that 

assessment? 

No, I do not. The NRC has the regulatory mechanisms to apply any new requirements the 

Commission may adopt in response to the lessons-learned arising from the events at 

Fukushima to licensees of both currently operating and future plants. 
70 


23823.066

4. How will you, as a Commissioner, work to ensure that the agency does not slip into a 

malaise and that regulatory decisions and actions, whether connected to issues 

stemming from Fukushima or not, take longer and longer to resolve? 

During my service as a Commissioner, I have found the NRC to be an organization of dedicated 

safety professionals who are mindful of the importance of their work to the Nation. Their 

dedication, coupled with disciplined adherence to NRC's Principles of Good Regulation by both 

the agency's staff and the Commission itself, will keep our efforts focused. 
71 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The Honorable George Apostolakis. 

How did I do on that one? We met in California so I had a chance 

to practice that. 

Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso and members of the 

Committee, good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to appear 

before you today. My views regarding the way forward with the 

near-term task force recommendations are summarized as follows. 

First, it is important to bear in mind the significant task force 

conclusion that the current regulatory system has served the commission and the public well, and that a sequence of events like 

those that occurred in Fukushima is unlikely to occur in the United 

States. 

Second, many people have referred to the events at Fukushima 

as unthinkable or unforeseen and imply that we should focus on 

protecting nuclear plants from unimaginable events. However, 

there is growing evidence that the historical record of tsunamis had 

not been used properly to determine the design basis of Fukushima 

Dai-ichi and consequently the protection of the plant was not sufficient. 

In addition, the location of safety significant equipment was less 

than optimal with respect to protection against flooding. The accident was not of extremely low probability. That is, it was not unthinkable or unforeseen. These observations suggest that we should 

be mindful of striking a proper balance between confirming the correctness of the design basis and expanding the design basis of U.S. 

plants. 

Third, the timely disposition by the commission of the near-term 

task force recommendations is important. It is also important to do 

this in an open and transparent manner. Three months should be 

sufficient time to achieve these objectives. 

Fourth, our process for reaching decisions should be methodical 

and systematic. The Three Mile Island experience is relevant here. 

As the task force states, ‘‘Some of the actions taken by the NRC 

after TMI were not subjected to a structured review. Subsequently, 

some of the resulting requirements were found not to be of substantial safety benefit and were removed.’‘ 

Fifth, with these recommendations in mind, I believe that the 

commission’s deliberations would benefit from an evaluation of the 

task force recommendations by NRC management, the views of external stakeholders, and an independent evaluation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. These reviews may in fact 

result in additional or different recommendations. 

I will be working with my fellow Commissioners to reach a timely resolution of the lessons learned from Fukushima. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Apostolakis follows:] 

72 


23823.043

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Apostolakis 

Questions from Senator Barbara Boxer 

1. The Task Force concluded that a sequence of events like what occurred in Japan is 

unlikely to occur in the United States. Yet, the Task Force still recommended numerous safety 

improvements for nuclear power facilities around the country. In your view, what is the primary 

lesson learned from the accident in Japan thus far? 

Answer: In my view, the primary lesson learned from !he accident in Japan is that we 

should reevaluate the correctness of the design basis for major natural events on a 

periodic basis. 

2. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued a response to the NRC Task Force's 

report, in which it urged the NRC to modify current emergency planning requirements. UCS 

urged the NRC to require plants to develop such plans based on a scientific assessment of the 

populations at risk for each site, rather than artificially limiting plans to areas within the current 

1 0-mile planning zone. Do you agree that the NRC should reevaluate current requirements for 

emergency preparedness and evacuation plans in light of what happened in Japan? 

Answer: Yes. We should reevaluate current requirements for the emergency planning 

zone (EPZ) using site-specific Level3 probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) which, in 

addition to considering the populations at risk, also take into account potential accident 

sequences, local geography, and other relevant factors. A Level3 PRA that is updated 

periodically would allow for a better informed evaluation of emergency planning using 

current site-specific conditions. 

3. California's two nuclear power plants are located in areas of high seismic activity and I 

am concerned about their ability to withstand earthquakes. The Task Force has recommended 

requiring nuclear power plants to confirm their seismic and flooding hazards every 10 years and 

to address any new and significant information with safety upgrades. Do you agree that nuclear 

power plants in the United States should periodically re-evaluate seismic and flooding hazards 

in light of what occurred in Japan? 

Answer: Yes. I agree with the Task Force that seismic and flooding hazards should be 

reevaluated at appropriate intervals throughout the life of the nuclear power plant 
73 


23823.044

Questions from Senator Thomas R. Carper 

1. Can you explain how the NRC uses a mix of voluntary and mandatory regulations to 

ensure safety? How does the NRC ensure voluntary regulations are being enacted? 

Answer: The NRCs regulations provide requirements that are necessary for a finding of 

reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety and common 

defense and security. The NRC does not rely on industry voluntary initiatives to ensure 

adequate protection. Voluntary initiatives can, however, enhance safety in areas which 

go beyond the NRC's regulatory requirements. The NRC sometimes looks at voluntary 

initiatives during our inspections. However, the NRC does not routinely ensure that 

voluntary initiatives are implemented appropriately. 

2. I can see a role for voluntary regulations -they can be quickly implemented without 

waiting on the federal government. However, they are meaningless if they are never enacted or 

not sustained over time. I was disappointed to see that when the NRC did a review of the 

voluntary severe accident management guidelines -very few plants were implementing all of the 

guidelines. Some plants were implementing very few of the guidelines at all. Can the NRC 

enforce voluntary programs without codifying them into law? What are the advantages and 

disadvantages of codifying voluntary programs? Should there be a time period after which all 

voluntary programs should become regulatory statute? 

Answer: Shortly after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the NRC issued inspection 

guidance to look at severe accident mitigation guidelines (SAMGs) at operating plants. 

These guidelines were put in place in the 1990s and were voluntary industry initiatives. 

The NRC reviewed the adequacy of these SAMGs and how they've been maintained 

over the years. Inspections confirmed that every site has SAMGs, but revealed 

inconsistent implementation, inconsistencies in procedure availability and control, and 

some issues with training and use of SAMGs in emergency response exercises. 

NRC's assurance of adequate protection does not rely on voluntary industry initiatives. 

The NRC does not enforce compliance with voluntary programs because they are not 

required for adequate protection. However, some voluntary initiatives could be codified 

if the NRC determined, based on new information, that they are necessary for adequate 

protection or they increase safety substantially and are cost justified. The Fukushima 

accident is certainly prompting the NRC to reconsider the voluntary nature of some 

industry initiatives. 

3. What we do know about the Fukushima is that the Japanese underestimated the risk of 

that great of a tsunami and earthquake for that facility. I want to be sure we are not 

underestimating our risks here at home. Please list the last time the NRC evaluated the seismic 

and flooding hazards for each of the 104 nuclear power plants. 

Answer: The NRC evaluated the seismic and flooding hazards for each site during the 

initial licensing review for each reactor at the site. In the mid to late 1990's, the NRC 

requested that each licensee identify and report all plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe 

accidents caused by seismic events; internal fires; and high winds, floods, and other 

external initiating events. All licensees reviewed the potential for earthquake ground 

motions beyond the design basis. As a result of this review, several plants made plant 

modifications to improve protection against these external events. 

The NRC is currently in the process of conducting a generic review (i.e., Generic 
74 


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lssue-199 (Gl-199), Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in 

the Central and Eastern U.S. on Existing Plants), to re-assess the resistance of U.S. 

nuclear plants to earthquakes. This is an ongoing effort and a draft Generic letter has 

been developed to move the process into the regulatory assessment stage. The 

Generic Letter was available for public comment until October 31, 2011. The NRC staff 

will consider the comments before finalizing the Generic letter, which the staff expects to 

issue near the end of this year. The approach outlined in the Generic Letter would have 

U.S. nuclear power plants perform their analysis within either one or two years, 

depending on the analysis method used, and deliver their results to the NRC. The 

agency will then determine whether additional actions are necessary. 

In addition, the Commission is considering whether and how to implement seismic and 

flood hazard reevaluation recommendations resulting from the Near-Term Task Force 

review of insights from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 
75 


23823.046

Questions from Senator James M. lnhofe 

1. You cited in your opening statement that "there is growing evidence that the historical 

record of tsunamis had not been used properly to determine the design basis of Fukushima 

Daiichi and consequently the protection of the plant was not sufficient" You also mentioned that 

the accident "was not unthinkable or unforeseen." Please describe in more detail the information 

that informed your conclusion. 

Answer: My judgment is based on discussions with technical experts, both within and 

outside of the U.S., and reports written about the event This includes the government 

of Japan's report to the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which it states that "the 

assumption on the frequency and scale of tsunamis was insufficient." One tsunami 

expert told me that there were 10 earthquakes in the last 10 years worldwide of 

magnitude 8.4 or less on the Richter scale which had generated tsunamis higher than 1 0 

meters. It does not appear that this information was taken into account. Furthermore, 

the design basis did not include data on a major tsunami that occurred more than 1000 

years earlier. In a New York Times article (March 26, 2011 ). a tsunami expert referred 

to Japan's underestimation of the tsunami risk as "a cascade of stupid errors·. 

In addition, critical equipment at Fukushima Daiichi was located in low elevations of the 

plant. A risk assessment for flooding would have revealed these vulnerabilities. In 

light of the above. I concluded that the accident was not unthinkable or unforeseen. 

2. The Chairman has repeatedly commented that failure to implement the task force 

recommendations may delay new plant applications. Do you agree with that assessment? 

Answer: The Commission has already decided to implement several of the Task Force 

recommendations. At this point, I do not see the necessity for delay. New reactor 

license applications are judged against current regulatory requirements. These 

licenses could be issued, if approved by the Commission, without the need for any new 

license conditions associated with the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force 

recommendations. If the Commission approves issuance of these licenses, it can use 

existing regulatory approaches to implement those approved recommendations 

applicable to new reactor licensees just as it will for operating reactor licensees. This 

approach provides adequate mechanisms to address regulatory changes that the 

Commission determines are necessary. However, the Commission is currently 

deliberating on aspects of the Task Force recommendations as well as the issuance of 

the first new reactor licenses. 

3. How will you, as a commissioner, work to ensure that the agency does not slip into a 

malaise and that regulatory decisions and actions, whether connected to issues stemming from 

Fukushima or not, take longer and longer to resolve? 

Answer: As an individual Commissioner, I will continue to do my part and work with my 

colleagues to ensure that timely decisions are made. If there is a potential delay 

associated with an agency decision, I will scrutinize the cause of the delay and only 

support it when there are compelling reasons for it. 
76 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

And now we look to Commission member William Magwood. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD, IV, 

COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Soon after the seriousness of the events at Fukushima became 

evident, the commission created a task force to study this and 

apply any lessons learned. After nearly 4 months of work, this task 

force has provided us with the recommendations we have discussed 

this morning. 

I congratulate the six-person team for its impressive work and I 

also want to just sort of point out that Dr. Charles Miller, who 

chaired the task force, is with us in the audience today somewhere 

back there, and I wanted to just make mention of the fact that I 

think tomorrow is his retirement date. So this is his opportunity 

to observe his work. 

Senator CARPER. Can we ask him to raise his hand? 

Thanks for your service. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you, Charlie. 

Nevertheless, while the task force found that U.S. plants are safe 

and they say that quite clearly. Their conclusion that the U.S. 

plants are safe is not a license for complacency. There are very 

clearly some important lessons learned from Fukushima that can 

be used to further improve our regulatory framework, and the task 

force has made the 12 recommendations we have spoken of this 

morning. 

Obviously, the task force was limited in its time and scope and 

its ability to reach out to stakeholders and the Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards. Fortunately, since the task force found no 

imminent risk to public health or safety, we have the opportunity 

to apply our resources and processes to best effect and deal with 

issues such as the potassium iodide and other issues which were 

not covered by the task force in open and transparent manner. 

We must work quickly and effectively to engage our stakeholders 

in consideration of the task force’s recommendations, as well as 

consideration of approaches which the task force did not have time 

or resources to analyze. 

I also believe that while there are many who believe that we 

should move very quickly on every recommendations, I think what 

Senator Carper said this morning is actually quite apropos. There 

are some recommendations which I believe can be implemented almost right away, and I think the votes of the commission so far 

have indicated that that is possible. 

There are others that may take some more time, and I think we 

should take that time to do this the right way and not repeat the 

mistakes of the post-Three Mile Island era. 

So with that, I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Magwood follows:] 

77 


23823.047

Senator Barbara Boxer 

Questions for Commissioner Magwood 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-up Questions for Written Submission 

1. The Task Force concluded that a sequence of events like what occurred in Japan 

is unlikely to occur in the United States. Yet, the Task force still recommended 

numerous safety improvements for nuclear power facilities around the country. In 

your view, what is the primary lesson learned from the accident in Japan thus far? 

In my view, the primary lesson we must learn from the accident in Japan is that we must 

be prepared to deal with the unexpected. We must assure that if an unlikely or 

unforeseen event occurs that challenges the safety of a nuclear plant, we have 

appropriate mitigating measures in place that will allow plant operators to recover from 

the initiating event and prevent damage to the core and releases that could threaten the 

environment and the public. For example, we need to be prepared for the loss of on-site 

and off-site electric power. We also need to review preparedness at multi-unit sites. I 

believe a central aspect of our regulatory response to Fukushima will be to assure that 

licensees have the equipment, procedures, and training to recover from the unexpected. 

2. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued a response to the NRC Task 

Force's report, in which it urged the NRC to modify current emergency planning 

requirements. UCS urged the NRC to require plants to develop such plans based 

on a scientific assessment of the populations at risk for each site, rather than 

artificially limiting plans to areas within the current 10-mile planning zone. Do you 

agree that the NRC should re-evaluate current requirements for emergency 

preparedness and evacuation plans in light of what happened in Japan? 

I believe the ten-mile emergency planning zone is still an appropriate basis for 

emergency preparedness. Fukushima demonstrated the significant amount of time 

which authorities have to take appropriate protective measures when responding to an 

emergency situation occurring at a U.S.·style light water reactor. Still, it is appropriate to 

examine all lessons from the Fukushima event. The NRC staff has recommended a 

longer-term effort to review current emergency planning requirements, including the 10 

mile emergency planning zone, and I support this initiative. 
78 


23823.048

3. California's two nuclear power plants are located in areas of high seismic activity 

and I am concerned about their ability to withstand earthquakes, The Task Force 

has recommended requiring nuclear power plants to confirm their seismic and 

flooding hazards every 10 years and to address any new and significant 

information with safety upgrades. Do you agree that nuclear power plants in the 

United States should periodically re-evaluate seismic and flooding hazards in light 

of what occurred in Japan? 

I recently visited California's nuclear power plants and learned a great deal about the 

operation of Diablo Canyon Power Plant and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 

(SONGS) and the external hazards against which we must protect. 

As a part of its effort to complete an application to renew the operating license for Diablo 

Canyon, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) has conducted a complete safety evaluation 

report. The NRC has made clear that it will not finalize a decision on this license 

renewal application until the company completes 3-D seismic studies forced on the 

nearby Shoreline Fault which was discovered in 2008. PG&E must also obtain a coastal 

consistency certification before its application can be approved. Similarly, Southern 

California Edison (SCE) has proposed a multimillion dollar study that would use a new 

technology including 3-D reflecting mapping offshore that would be used to detect 

hidden earthquake faults to better assess seismic conditions near SONGS. 

I believe these efforts are appropriate measures to address uncertainties associated with 

the seismic risks facing these facilities. This work responds to new information and 

applies new technology. In these specific cases and as a general matter, I believe it 

would place the public at greater risk to wait ten years to respond to new information 

regarding seismic, flooding or any other external hazard. The Commission currently has 

before it staff's recommendation to have licensees reevaluate the seismic and flooding 

hazards at their sites against current NRC requirements and guidance, and if necessary, 

update the design basis and structures, systems and components important to safety 

and to protect against the updated hazards. The Commission has approved a staff 

recommendation to interact with stakeholders and develop information requests under 

10 CFR 50.54(f). As a result, we will ask all nuclear plant licensees to reevaluate sitespecific seismic and flooding hazards, perform seismic and flood protection walk-downs 

and identify actions that have been taken or are planned to address plant specific issues 

associated with the hazards or identified during the plant walk downs. 

I believe that this approach is the best way to assure licensees understand the seismic 

and flooding risks faced by their plants and respond appropriately to address themwithout waiting for a decadal review. 
79 


23823.049

Senator Thomas R. Carper 

1. Can you explain how the NRC uses a mix of voluntary and mandatory regulations 

to ensure safety? How does the NRC ensure voluntary regulations are being 

enacted? 

It is my belief that if something is of safety significance, it is best to make it part of our 

regulatory requirements. However, there are some areas of interest which involve safety 

risks of relatively low significance. NRC's ability under existing law to regulate areas that 

do not impact human health is very limited. In such cases, voluntary efforts may be 

appropriate and may be implemented more quickly. 

Industry's Groundwater Protection Initiative is a prime example of a voluntary initiative 

that advances the protection of public health and addresses public concerns. The NRC 

has fostered an environment which encourages industry to take actions of this nature 

and continually monitors and periodically assesses the effectiveness of these initiatives. 

If the agency finds that voluntary efforts are not being conducted in a committed fashion, 

this information will be presented to the Commission, and the Commission can consider 

other measures. 

2. I can see a role for voluntary regulations- they can be quickly implemented 

without waiting on the federal government However, they are meaningless if they 

are never enacted or not sustained over time. I was disappointed to see that when 

the NRC did a review of the voluntary severe accident management guidelines 

very few plants were implementing all of the guidelines. Some plants were 

implementing very few of the guidelines at all. Can the NRC enforce voluntary 

programs without codifying them into law? What are the advantages and 

disadvantages of codifying voluntary programs? Should there be a time period 

after which ali voluntary programs should become regulatory statute? 

I believe the ongoing evaluation of performance of voluntary initiatives is preferable to a 

broadly applied time limit. The NRC assesses all voluntary initiatives and if they are 

found to not have widespread implementation or that the voluntary efforts are not being 

conducted in an effective fashion, then the issue can be revisited. If the Commission 

finds that regulatory action is needed, it can make a voluntary initiative a mandatory 

requirement through the issuance of an order: initiation of a rulemaking; or by 

incorporating the program into the licensee's operating license as a license condition. 

The matter of severe accidents management guidelines (SAMGs) is an important 

example. The accidents at Fukushima demonstrated the importance of having plant 

operators who are well prepared and well supported by technically sound and practical 

procedures and guidelines. It is clear that a planned approach to command and control 

during decision making during an emergency is vital. SAMGs are an important aspect to 
80 


23823.050

emergency response capability. Following the Fukushima accident the NRC issued 

Temporary Instruction 2515/183 to its resident inspectors to ensure licensee compliance 

with existing requirements related to SAMGs and extensive damage mitigation 

guidelines and to collect information on the readiness of these measures for use under 

various external challenges. As you noted in your question, our inspectors observed 

inconsistent implementation of SAMGs and attributed it to the voluntary nature of this 

initiative. 

As a result, the Commission is currently considering a staff recommendation to require 

licensees to strengthen and integrate emergency operating procedures, severe accident 

management guidelines, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines. Our evaluation of 

this effort is now underway and I anticipate this work will result in a more aggressive 

NRC stance with regard to these procedures. 

3. What we do know about the Fukushima is that the Japanese underestimated the 

risk of that great of a tsunami and earthquake for that facility. I want to be sure we 

are not underestimating our risks here at home. Please list the last time the NRC 

evaluated the seismic and flooding hazards for each of the 104 nuclear power 

plants. 

The NRC requires that safety-significant structures. systems, and components at U.S. 

nuclear power plants be designed to take into account even rare and extreme seismic 

and tsunami events. All104 U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand external 

hazards, including earthquakes, flooding, and tsunamis, as appropriate. Each plant's 

capability to withstand external hazards relevant to its site is reviewed by the NRC 

during its initial licensing. 

The NRC has also made substantial efforts over time to ensure the vulnerabilities from 

both internal and external hazards are considered and mitigated in the current design 

and licensing basis of its regulated facilities. The NRC routinely inspects each licensee's 

policies and procedures associated with responding to seismic and flooding hazards. 

Additionally NRC inspects the licensee's structures, systems, and components used to 

mitigate the hazards. The NRC has also conducted two reviews of its regulated facilities 

over the last 25 years to ensure that they have included both internal and external 

hazards in their current plant design and licensing basis. These reviews are as follows: 

(1) In 1988, the NRC's Generic Letter No. 88-20, Individual Plant Examination for 

Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," requested plant owners to perform a systematic 

evaluation of plant-specific vulnerabilities and report the results to the 

Commission. 
81 


23823.051

(2) In the mid to late 1990s, the NRC staff reviewed the potential for ground motions 

beyond the design basis as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External 

Events. From this review, the staff determined that seismic designs of operating 

nuclear plants in the U.S. have adequate safety margins for withstanding 

earthquakes. 

The NRC was preparing to perform a generic review of seismic hazards for existing 

plants before the Fukushima event occurred. This effort, knows as Generic lssue-199, 

"Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Estimates in Central and Eastern United 

States on Existing Plants," will be incorporated into the NRC effort to re-evaluate the 

seismic hazards at U.S. nuclear plants in light of the Fukushima event, as outlined in 

SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned." 

Through these substantial efforts, the NRC has ensured that the risk associated with 

seismic and flooding hazards is not underestimated at nuclear power plants in the U.S. 

The NRC remains convinced that U.S nuclear power plants are designed and operated 

in a manner that protects public health and safety. 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

1. You have mentioned that the task force didn't consider some issues in its report 

and cite the use of potassium iodide as one example. What other issues did the 

task force overlook that you believe would benefit from a more methodical 

review? 

While the Task Force was staffed with highly-experienced experts, it was a very small 

group that, by necessity, was allowed a very short period of time in which to complete its 

work. The report the Task Force produced is insightful and impressive, but I do believe 

there are areas not covered by the report that require further considerations. As you 

note, I believe that NRC should review our approach to the use of potassium iodide (Kl) 

in the aftermath of a multi-unit accident. I am hopeful that we will obtain actionable 

information from Japan regarding that nation's experience with Kl distribution in the days 

after Fukushima. 

! also believe that Fukushima demonstrated the vital importance of ensuring access to 

ultimate heat sinks. Ultimate heat sinks are sources of water necessary to operate, shut 

down, and cool down a nuclear plant safely following an accident. Water for ultimate 

heat sinks is frequently supplied directly from large-surface water bodies, such as rivers, 

lakes, or oceans. If those sources of water were to become unavailable as a function of 

an external event such as an earthquake or tsunami, any efforts to mitigate the 

consequences of an accident would be hobbled. 
82 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Mr. Ostendorff, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, 

COMMISSIONER, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, Members of the 

Committee, thank you for the chance to be before you today. 

I highly commend the NRC’s near-term task force for its dedication, thoughtfulness and professionalism in conducting its review. 

Given a very short period of time, the task force has provided a 

very significant product that will serve us well. 

Before forming my position on the task force report, I carefully 

studied the report. I met with the task force in a public meeting. 

I sought input from NRC staff. And I listened to the views of my 

colleagues at this table. I cast my vote on the task force report last 

Wednesday and made that vote publicly available. 

Serving, in my view, as the anchor for this report are findings 

related to the safety of commercial reactors in the United States. 

The task force noted that the current regulatory approach has 

served the commission and the public well, and the continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose imminent risk 

to public health and safety. 

As I stated at the commission’s July 19th public meeting on the 

task force report, while I support thoughtful consideration of potential safety enhancements in a systematic and holistic manner, at 

the same time I do not believe that our existing regulatory framework is broken. 

My vote is centered on three key principles. First, the need to ensure that we have an integrated, prioritized approach based on recommendations by the NRC’s Executive Director for Operations. The 

failure to have such an approach was a key lesson learned from 

NRC’s response to the events at Three Mile Island and was stated 

by the EDO, Bill Borchardt, who is here today as a concern that 

he had going forward with Fukushima when we had our public 

meeting March 21st. 

Not all the 12 task force recommendations that have 35 subparts 

are equal, neither in safety enhancement or urgency perspective. 

Second, some actions should be taken sooner than others. My 

vote cast last week supports the EDO coming back within 30 days 

with a list of recommendations warranting short-term actions. I 

specifically called out in my vote from last week six discrete actions 

that I think should happen now. There are perhaps others. I look 

forward to hearing from the EDO as to what those recommendations might be from an integrated prioritization standpoint. 

Third and finally, I join with my colleagues at the table in supporting the full engagement by our stakeholders. That is absolutely 

critical. 

I appreciate the Committee’s oversight and interest in this area 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ostendorff follows:] 

83 


23823.053

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

ENCLOSURE 

1. The Task Force concluded that a sequence of events like what occurred in Japan is unlikely 

to occur in the United States. Yet, the Task Force still recommended numerous safety 

improvements for nuclear power facilities around the country. In your view, what is the primary 

lesson learned from the accident in Japan thus far? 

In my view, the primary lesson learned from the accident in Japan thus far is that nuclear power 

plants must have sufficient capability to cope with an extended loss of all alternating current 

power or what is referred to as a "station blackout.' In my vote on the Near Term Task Force 

report (SECY-11-0093), I expressed support for the initiation of rulemaking to strengthen station 

blackout mitigation capability at nuclear power plants. Moreover, in my vote on the staff's 

recommended actions to be taken without delay (SECY-11-0124), I proposed to designate the 

station blackout rulemaking as a high-priority rulemaking to be completed within 24 months of 

the date of the associated Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY -11-0124. In the 

final SRM, the Commission directed the staff to designate the rulemaking as a high-priority with 

a goal of completion within 24 to 30 months of October 18, 2011. 

In addition to dealing with an extended station blackout event, I also took away other important 

lessons learned. These lessons include the importance of reliable venting systems for certain 

boiling water reactor containments; the importance of severe accident management procedures; 

assessment of protection from external hazards such as seismic and flooding; the value of 

having reliable spent fuel pool instrumentation; and emergency preparedness for multi-unit 

events. 
84 


23823.054

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

ENCLOSURE 

2. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) issued a response to the NRC Task Force's report, 

in which it urged the NRC to modify current emergency planning requirements. UCS urged the 

NRC to require plants to develop such plans based on a scientific assessment of the 

populations at risk for each site, rather than artificially limiting plans to areas within the current 

10-mile planning zone. Do you agree that the NRC should reevaluate current requirements for 

emergency preparedness and evacuation plans in light of what happened in Japan? 

In SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned," the NRC staff identified emergency planning zone (EPZ) size as 

an additional issue with a nexus to the Fukushima accident that may warrant further regulatory 

action. While the NRC staff's assessment of this issue is incomplete, the staff has judged that 

this issue, among others, warrants further consideration and potential prioritization. A 

determination of whether any regulatory actions are necessary will be made after the staff 

completes further evaluation of the issue. As this further evaluation is conducted, l believe that 

the existing framework for a 10-mile EPZ along with the flexibility to expand the EPZ, if 

circumstances warrant, will continue to provide for the protection of the public during a nuclear 

accident. 
85 


23823.055

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Barbara Boxer 

ENCLOSURE 

3. California's two nuclear power plants are located in areas of high seismic activity and I am 

concerned about their ability to withstand earthquakes. The Task Force has recommended 

requiring nuclear power plants to confirm their seismic and flooding hazards every 10 years and 

to address any new and significant information with safety upgrades. Do you agree that nuclear 

power plants in the United States should periodically re-evaluate seismic and flooding hazards 

in light of what occurred in Japan? 

I agree that nuclear power plants in the United States should re-evaluate the safety implications 

of hazards, such as seismic and flooding, when new and significant information becomes 

available. In this regard, I voted to support the NRC staffs recommendation in SECY-11-0124, 

"Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the Near Term Task Force Report," to 

initiate regulatory activities aimed at conducting re-evaluations and walkdowns of site-specific 

seismic and flooding hazards. I believe that what we learn from these near-term regulatory 

activities will help inform whether the NRC should require a periodic re-evaluation, such as the 

10-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards recommended by the Task Force. 

As an aside, I had the opportunity with Commissioner Magwood to visit California's two nuclear 

power plants-San Onofre on October 25 and Diablo Canyon on October 26 (Dr. Horner from 

your staff joined us). During both plant visits, we had significant discussions on seismic hazards 

analysis. 
86 


23823.056

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Thomas R Carper 

ENCLOSURE 

1. Can you explain how the NRC uses a mix of voluntary and mandatory regulations to ensure 

safety? How does the NRC ensure voluntary regulations are being enacted? 

The NRC does not rely on voluntary measures to ensure safety; by statute, the NRC is required 

to put in place those regulations needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and 

safety. For safety, technical, or operational issues that do not rise to the level of adequate 

protection, the nuclear industry could voluntarily develop and adopt initiatives to address a 

particular issue. 

Regulatory commitments and voluntary programs are useful since they can often be 

implemented more quickly than the development of formal NRC requirements. Furthermore, 

they typically enable more flexibility to address the given situation. The manner in which a 

regulatory commitment or voluntary program is treated by the licensee and by the NRC can 

vary, depending on the nature of the regulatory commitment or voluntary program and its 

relation to a regulatory requirement For example, the NRC may use a licensee's regulatory 

commitments to help decide if further regulatory actions need to be taken. Under such 

circumstances, the NRC would typically perform an inspection to determine if the licensee is 

implementing the regulatory commitment, if the regulatory commitment is being managed 

through the licensee's commitment tracking system, and whether the regulatory commitment 

should be placed into a controlled document such as the final safety analysis report. The NRC 

staff currently performs periodic audits of licensee commitments at operating nuclear power 

plants on a triennial basis. 

Alternatively, a licensee's implementation of a voluntary program may stem from the NRC 

encouraging the licensee to take additional actions that, while not necessary to ensure 

adequate protection, provide added margins with respect to the overall safety of the facility. 

Under this scenario, the NRC may choose to inspect the voluntary program as part of its reactor 

oversight program depending on the specific circumstance. 
87 


23823.057

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Thomas R. Carper 

ENCLOSURE 

2. I can see a role for voluntary regulations- they can be quickly implemented without waiting on 

the federal government. However, they are meaningless if they are never enacted or not 

sustained over time. I was disappointed to see that when the NRC did a review of the voluntary 

severe accident management guidelines - very few plants were implementing all of the 

guidelines. Some plants were implementing very few of the guidelines at all. Can the NRC 

enforce voluntary programs without codifying them into law? What are the advantages and 

disadvantages of codifying voluntary programs? Should there be a time period after which all 

voluntary programs should become regulatory statute? 

The NRC does not routinely inspect the implementation of voluntary industry initiatives, and 

cannot enforce them. Further, regulatory commitments made by licensees are generally not 

enforceable NRC requirements. 

Voluntary programs can be advantageous in allowing the NRC to focus resources on those 

issues of the highest safety importance, while allowing issues of low safety or risk importance to 

be addressed through voluntary programs. The disadvantages of a voluntary programs is that if 

the issue of concern has a nexus to safety and the NRC determined that the issue was not 

being sufficiently addressed, we would be limited in our ability to take effective action because 

of the lack of enforceability. 

If the NRC concludes that a regulatory requirement is needed to address a particular safety, 

technical, or operational issue of concern, then the NRC would take action in one of several 

ways including: 1) issuing an order, 2) initiating rulemaking, or 3) incorporating a licensee's 

commitment or voluntary program into its operating license as a license condition 

There is no time period associated with putting in place regulations for an issue that is being 

addressed through a voluntary industry initiative. Rather, the decision to put in place regulations 

would be dependent upon the safety significance of the issue. 
88 


23823.058

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator Thomas R Carper 

ENCLOSURE 

3. What we do know about the Fukushima is that the Japanese underestimated the risk of that 

great of a tsunami and earthquake for that facility. I want to be sure we are not underestimating 

our risks here at home. Please list the last time the NRC evaluated the seismic and flooding 

hazards for each of the 104 nuclear power plants. 

The NRC takes steps to ensure that vulnerabilities to both internal and external hazards are 

considered and mitigated in the current design and licensing basis of its regulated facilities. For 

example, the NRC requires that safety-significant structures, systems, and components at U.S. 

nuclear power plants be designed for protection against natural phenomena, including seismic 

and tsunami events. All104 U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand such external 

hazards, and each plant's capability to withstand external hazards relevant to its site 

characteristics is reviewed by the NRC during its initial licensing. 

In addition, the NRC routinely inspects licensee procedures and systems, structures, and 

components associated with mitigating the consequences of internal and external hazards. The 

NRC has also conducted two reviews of its regulated facilities over the last 25 years to ensure 

that they have included both internal and external hazards in their current plant design and 

licensing basis. These reviews are as follows: 

(1) In 1988, the NRC's Generic Letter No. 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe 

Accident Vulnerabilities," requested plant owners to perform a systematic evaluation of 

plant-specific vulnerabilities and report the results to the Commission. 

(2) In the mid to late 1990s, the NRC staff reviewed the potential for ground motions beyond 

the design basis as part of the Individual Plant Examination of External Events. From 

this review, the staff determined that seismic designs of operating nuclear plants in the 

U.S. have adequate safety margins for withstanding earthquakes. 

The NRC was preparing to perform a generic review of seismic hazards for existing plants 

before the Fukushima event occurred. This effort, knows as Generic !ssue-199, "Implications of 

Updated Probabilistic Seismic Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing 

Plants," will be considered in the NRC's effort to re-evaluate the seismic hazards at U.S. nuclear 

plants in light of the Fukushima event, as outlined in SECY-11-0137, "Prioritization of 

Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned." 

Through these efforts, the NRC can help ensure that the risk associated with seismic and 

flooding hazards is not underestimated at nuclear power plants in the U.S. 
89 


23823.059

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

ENCLOSURE 

1. The Chairman has repeatedly commented that failure to implement the task force 

recommendations may delay new plant applications. Do you agree with that assessment? 

No, I do not agree with that assessment 

In a September 9, 2011 Order (CLI-11-05), the Commission declined to suspend adjudicatory, 

licensing, and rulemaking activities in light of the recent events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plant As stated in the Order, the Commission noted that "whether we adopt the Task 

Force recommendations or require more, or different, actions associated with certified designs 

or COL applications, we have the authority to ensure that certified designs and combined 

licenses include appropriate Commission-directed changes before operation." 

We further noted that "we find no imminent risk to public health and safety if we allow our 

regulatory processes to continue. Instead of finding obstacles to fair and efficient decisionmaking, we see benefits from allowing our processes to continue so that issues unrelated to the 

Task Force's review can be resolved. We have well-established processes for imposing any 

new requirements necessary to protect public health and safety and the common defense and 

security. Moving forward with our decisions and proceedings will have no effect on the NRC's 

ability to implement necessary rule or policy changes that might come out of our review of the 

Fukushima Daiichi events." 

As I described in my August 18, 2011 responses to your follow-up questions from the June 16, 

2011 hearing, the Commission can apply lessons learned from Japan to new plant activities in a 

variety of different ways using existing regulatory processes. 
90 


23823.060

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

ENCLOSURE 

2. How wilt you, as a commissioner, work to ensure that the agency does not slip into a malaise 

and that regulatory decisions and actions, whether connected to issues stemming from 

Fukushima or not, take longer and longer to resolve? 

I believe in applying the NRC's Principles of Good Regulation in carrying out my responsibilities 

as an NRC Commissioner. In my view, three principles--efficiency, clarity, and openness-are 

of particular importance to avoid the malaise you have expressed concern over. In my tenure, I 

believe that my decisions have been made without undue delay and have sought to promote 

efficiency, clarity, and openness in the NRC's regulatory activities. For example, I have 

supported expedited rulemaking where it has been appropriate for the circumstance. I also 

strive to ensure that there is clarity of direction from the Commission to the NRC staff, clarity of 

our regulations to those that must implement them, and clarity of our communications with our 

external stakeholders. lastly, l have undertaken initiatives to enhance the NRC's engagement 

with external stakeholders to best inform our regulatory decisions. 
91 


23823.061

Environment and Public Works Committee Hearing 

August 2, 2011 

Follow-Up Questions for Written Submission 

Questions for Commissioner Ostendorff 

Senator James M. lnhofe 

ENCLOSURE 

3. You commented in the hearing about the NRC's lack of understanding of whether or not the 

Fukushima operators actually used their hardened vents. At this time, do you believe the NRC 

knows enough about the Fukushima hardened vents to fix it right the first time? 

I believe that while all of the details of what happened with the hardened vents during the 

Fukushima accident are not yet fully understood, we do know enough to recommend a 

requirement for reliable hardened vents. In particular, several reactor units at the Fukushima 

Daiichi site experienced containment pressure increases during the accident that substantially 

exceeded the design pressure. I agree with the NRC's Near Term Task Force's evaluation that 

having a reliable hardened vent system would significantly enhance the capability to mitigate 

serious beyond design basis accidents. As such, I have voted to support the development of 

regulatory requirements through orders for reliable hardened vents at certain boiling water 

reactor facilities. 
92 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

Each of us will have 5 minutes. 

We are not dealing here with safety issues that are relatively 

straightforward like seatbelts. We know it is essential people buckle up. We know they save lives. What we are dealing with here is 

potentially fatal doses of radiation if you don’t do your job right 

and we don’t do our jobs right. 

And today, the New York Times had a story here, Fatal Radiation Level Found At Japanese Plant. They said the operator at 

Tokyo Electric Power said that workers on Monday afternoon found 

an area near reactors numbers one and two where radiation levels 

exceeded their measuring device’s maximum reading of 10 sieverts 

per hour, a fatal dose for humans. 

So when I hear colleagues call, and this is my interpretation of 

what they said, not far off, recommendations for safety, more 

Washington red tape, I believe that is what the Ranking Member 

said, more Washington red tape. I can tell the people in Japan 

would have got down on their knees and prayed God that they had 

more safety measures in place. 

So I want to ask some questions here. The task force recommends requiring hardened vent designed in Mark I and Mark 

II reactors. Now, the reason is that what happened in Japan is the 

fuel in the reactors of units one, two and three became partially 

uncovered which led to a buildup of hydrogen gas. Japanese tried 

to vent the gas, but because the vents were not working, explosions 

occurred in all three units. Those units were Mark I reactors, and 

we know some of the Mark II reactors have made some safety improvements. 

But the task force recommends requiring hardened vent designs 

in Mark I and Mark II reactors. It is important to note only three 

reactors in America have installed hardened vents. There are five 

remaining reactors who have. Now, why do we have to wait before 

we implement that recommendation? 

So I am going to ask each of you: Do you think we ought to move 

on that recommendation to harden, to move forward with this recommendation of the hardened vent designs? 

I just want a yes or know or don’t know. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, I think that is a fine recommendation. 

Senator BOXER. OK, I don’t want any editorial comment, yes or 

no or don’t know. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I don’t know at this time. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Next? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Sounds reasonable. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I can’t answer at this point. 

Senator BOXER. OK. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I support assessing our venting capability and 

accessibility. The task force report noted that they did not have a 

clear understanding of whether the operators were able to actually 

operate the vents. So there is more information to be gleaned here. 

Senator BOXER. I take it as a no. 

It is not good news from this commission. Can I ask each of you, 

what is your purpose that when you became a commission, what 

was your highest duty, in a word? 

93 

Mr. JACZKO. Public health and safety protection. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Ms. SVINICKI. The safety and security of nuclear material. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Public health and safety. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Protect health and safety. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Public health and safety. 

Senator BOXER. Good. Well, then I would like you to consider 

looking at what happened in Japan and looking at the similarities 

that we see in some of our plants and move on it. 

And let me tell you why I am concerned. After 9/11, the NRC 

took seemingly decisive action, I want you to listen to this. I hope 

the public is listening to this. You ordered U.S. nuclear power 

plants to take a series of improved security measures because we 

worried about a terrorist attack. And in my home State, they were 

handing out iodine pills. That is how worried they were about it 

because we had millions of people that live within 50 miles of 

power plants. 

The NRC later codified those orders in regulations. You know 

when? With compliance required by March 31st, 2010, from 2001 

to 2010. 

Now, I want assurances from each of you that you will not allow 

that to happen. And I want to hear from you as to whether or not 

you believe we can move on these recommendations and put them 

in place within a year. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, I believe we can move on them within 90 days 

and have full implementation with potentially long-term recommendations in 5 years. 

Senator BOXER. OK. So let’s ask 90 days if we can move on these, 

most of these recommendations and put them in place in 90 days. 

There is a yes from the Chairman. 

Yes. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I don’t believe that all can be acted on in 90 days. 

Senator BOXER. How many? How many do you think could? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I am not certain. I have proposed that we receive 

an evaluation. 

Senator BOXER. So you don’t know. 

Next. 

I am sorry. My time is over. Go ahead. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I agree with the Chairman that we should disposition all of them within 90 days. 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. 

Sir. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I certainly think some of them could be 

dispositioned within 90 days. It is hard to say that all of them 

could, but some of them certainly could. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Sir. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I agree with Commissioner Magwood. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

OK. My time is up. 

Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

94 

You might recall when we had our June meeting, I had an 

Armed Services commitment that kept me from being here, so I 

asked Senator Barrasso if he would ask Chairman Jaczko to provide a full account of the actions he took while exercising his emergency authority as provided in Section 3 of the NRC’s reorganization plan of 1980. To date, I have not received such a report. 

Section 3 states, ‘‘Following the conclusion of the emergency, the 

Chairman shall render a complete and timely report to the commission on the actions taken during that emergency.’‘ Let me start by 

asking each one of you, except for Chairman Jaczko, the question: 

Has Chairman Jaczko provided such a report? 

Let’s start with you. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I have not received a report. 

Senator INHOFE. You have not. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I have not. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I have never seen a report. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I have not. 

Senator INHOFE. The second thing I would ask you is: Has he informed you that he has ceased using his emergency authority? 

Ms. SVINICKI. He has not informed me of that. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. He has not. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. He has not. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. He has not. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. Then I would have to assume that he is 

still using the emergency. You know, this is kind of very confusing. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator Inhofe, would you like a response? 

Senator INHOFE. Not yet. 

Well, if you want to extend my time, that is fine. Go ahead. 

Senator BOXER. Sure, I will extend your time. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

Mr. JACZKO. My colleagues have all been informed. 

Senator INHOFE. It might be better if I finish then he can. 

Senator BOXER. Fair enough. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. So I have to assume that he is still 

using, I mean since they haven’t received, and I do want to do this 

because I think it needs to be in the record. None of us were 

around at that time, but in 1980 when this emergency provision 

was passed by law, and it was Toby Moffett. He was a Democratic 

Congressman from Connecticut. 

And I am going to read this because I think it is important to 

have this in the record. This is from over 30 years ago: ‘‘There will 

be two situations in the future, those where the Chairman is in 

basic agreement with the majority and those where he or she is 

not. In those cases where the Chairman has a majority of Commissioners with him or her, it is obvious that the Chairman will not 

need the extraordinary powers tucked away in this plan to work 

his or her will. The Chairman and the commission can move in unison toward their chosen regulatory policy.’‘ 

‘‘But what about the other situation, where the Chairman is in 

the minority, regardless of party affiliation, within the commission, 

when the majority of the commissioners oppose the Chairman? 

Isn’t it equally obvious that if will be at that moment that these 

special powers will be most appealing to the Chairman? Isn’t it 

clear that if these powers are ever to be needed and utilized at all, 

95 

it is precisely by the Chairman bent on going against a majority 

of the commissioners. And if that be the case, is this plan not clearly constructed to gut the commission form of regulation and would 

it not be subject to the basest sort of partisan political manipulation?’‘ 

That was over 30 years ago. And I would just have to say, before 

you make your comments, Chairman Jaczko, I would like to get a 

commitment from you that you will respect the will of the commission majority on this report and all other issues and that you will 

not attempt to act unilaterally to implement any of these task force 

recommendations. 

Do you feel comfortable making that commitment here in this 

hearing? 

Mr. JACZKO. Of course, everything I do I do consistent with that. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. 

Mr. JACZKO. With regard to the emergency powers, the commissioners personally have been briefed by me on ths status of our situation. We no longer have our emergency operation center activated, which is a clear signal that there would be no emergency 

powers. 

Senator INHOFE. But Chairman Jaczko, that is not what they 

said. They said they have not been notified by you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Which is a true statement. But for one to infer that 

they are not aware of the status of the agency and whether or not, 

as I believe you indicated, you were therefore assuming that I am 

continuing to use emergency powers, I don’t believe that that is a 

fair assumption. The commission is fully aware. Their staff is 

briefed on a weekly basis on our response activities related to 

Japan. They were provided situation reports throughout the entire 

activity of everything that was going on. 

Moreover, they have received a report that you have all received, 

the task force report which summarizes and looks at the actions 

that were taken following the Fukushima incident. 

So to somehow infer that the commission is being kept in the 

dark about what is going on at the agency is simply not true. They 

have been receiving multiple briefings, many briefings, including 

public commission meetings. 

Senator INHOFE. So all four of them were not telling the truth 

when they answered the question, have they received a report. 

Mr. JACZKO. I simply can’t speak for them, but they certainly 

have received many reports about what we have done following 

Fukushima, including the report that you see in front of you. If 

that is not a report summarizing actions and recommendations 

going forward, I don’t know what would be. And that is one of the 

clear requirements of the report in the statute. So their response 

I cannot explain. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I think I can. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. 

OK. How about a smile from everybody here. Can you do that? 

Not quite. 

Senator. 

Senator CARPER. We don’t always smile either up here. 

Senator BOXER. We try to. The Chairman and I do. 

96 

Senator INHOFE. We do. 

Senator BOXER. We do. 

Senator CARPER. I am sitting here listening to this and I am reminded of something my mother used to say with respect to moving 

along expeditiously on these recommendations or not. My mother 

used to say, haste makes waste. My father, on the other hand, 

would say that work expands to fill the amount of time we allocate 

to a job. And so I had like one parent pushing on the accelerator 

and one parent tapping on the brakes, which is not a bad combination. 

It sounds to me like that is a little bit like what we want to do 

here, or what the commission thinks we ought to do here. In some 

cases, some of the recommendations we can push on the accelerator, and with some others we can tap on the brakes. 

I think one of the things I like to do around here is try to encourage consensus across the aisle, and I am going to try and see if we 

can get some consensus here with respect to some of these recommendations. 

Mr. Magwood, you mentioned that you thought there were some 

of these recommendations that could be implemented pretty much 

right away, and there are others that would take some time. Would 

you mention a couple of the ones that fall into the implement right 

away category for us please? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, I have generally tried not to point out specific recommendations because I would like to let the process work 

its way. But just to anticipate, a clear example I think are what 

we call the walk down inspections to confirm that the plants are 

prepared to deal with a flood and seismic events. I think that is 

an obvious one that can be done very quickly. 

Commissioner Ostendorff in his vote highlighted I think about a 

half dozen. I am in general agreement with what he recommended. 

There are others. I think ultimate action on events, for example, 

are ones we have to study and understand very carefully before 

those are implemented, but that doesn’t mean it has to take years 

to do it. It simply may not be possible in a few weeks. 

So I think many of these could be implemented very quickly. And 

let me just share just personally because I have talked with other 

members of the commission. I have absolutely no sense that there 

is anyone on the commission that wants to delay this unnecessarily. I think everyone is looking at this very seriously and wants 

to move forward as quickly as practical, but we want to make sure 

the process is done correctly. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Good. Well, that is encouraging. 

Mr. Ostendorff, did I hear Commissioner Magwood say the 

Ostendorff half dozen? Is that what he said? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Real quick, I will just summarize some of 

those. There are six things that I think could be done very quickly 

here and decided on in a matter of weeks. I put those in my vote 

from last week. 

The first is reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at all 

sites against current NRC requirements; second, perform, as Commissioner Magwood mentioned, seismic and flood protection walkVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
97 

downs to look at any plant-specific vulnerabilities; third, issue an 

advance notice of rulemaking to address long loss of A.C. power, 

this is the station blackout rule we discussed at the last hearing. 

Fourth, review what is called B(5)(b), our fire and flooding protection equipment to ensure that they can withstand a seismic 

event or flooding, and also we have additional equipment in the 

event of a multi-unit accident; fifth, review the venting capability 

and accessibility of vents on Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactors; and sixth, maintain and train on severe accident management guidelines. 

Those are examples of things I think can be done right away. 

Senator CARPER. What was the sixth one? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We have severe accident management guidelines that guide our licensees as to how to deal with a catastrophic 

event. Making sure that those are in good order and the people are 

fully trained in those is a high priority. 

Senator CARPER. OK. All right. 

Let me just go right down the line here. We will start with you, 

Mr. Chairman, if you will. 

Would you want to kind of react to the Ostendorff half dozen 

please? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I certainly don’t have any disagreement. I 

would note that I think beyond that, there really aren’t that many 

recommendations that the task force recommended for near-term 

action. So I think some of this discussion is really about semantics. 

But four of the 12 recommendations themselves were long-term 

recommendations. Two of them were specifically targeted toward 

NRC action in and of itself. So there are actually only six recommendations that are actually directed toward licensees in the 

short term. 

Senator CARPER. And were those six the ones that Commissioner 

Ostendorff mentioned? 

Mr. JACZKO. They were a subset of that. They are smaller. The 

ones that appear to be missing were recommendations related to 

spent fuel pools and the need to have reliable monitoring and capability to deal with spent fuel pools, which I think is one that most 

people would agree is an action that we would want to address in 

the near term. 

I don’t think there are that many left once we take those particular issues that we can’t get all this work done in 90 days. 

Senator CARPER. OK. My time is expired. 

Just really quickly, Commissioner Svinicki and Commissioner 

Apostolakis, would you like to just give me some indication of 

whether you are pretty much in agreement that Commission 

Ostendorff’s list of half dozen is easily on the money there or has 

he overstated the case? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I would just add quickly that I did not have any 

negative reaction to the task force’s recommendations. I agree that 

they are of varying complexity. And I think that my proposal was 

to hear from those NRC staff who would be responsible for carrying 

out such actions, and I think the recommendations when shaped 

through the NRC programmatic offices may come back to us slightly different. I would like to do it maybe once and do it right, as 

98 

opposed to continually iterating. I think prolonged uncertainty 

about these recommendation is very undesirable. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Dr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Well, all I am saying in my vote is that I 

would like to have the opinion and judgment of the senior management before we go ahead. That doesn’t mean it is going to take forever to get that, but this sounds like a reasonable list, but I would 

like to have this additional input before we make a decision. 

Plus, senior management may come up with additional recommendations that can be implemented immediately. I don’t think 

we should limit ourselves to what the task force said. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Thanks very much. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman Jaczko, how involved were you in the selection of the 

six members of the six members of this near-term task force? 

Mr. JACZKO. I was not involved. 

Senator BARRASSO. Not involved? 

Mr. JACZKO. I mean, I believe the EDO may have told me the 

list of people that would be on it and I think I OKed it. 

Senator BARRASSO. Were you involved in any way or shape or 

form in the deliberations of the task force? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, not at all. I spoke to them before they began 

their work and told them they had a tremendous responsibility to 

do and they should do it the best they could. 

Senator BARRASSO. The task force report talked about a patchwork of requirements flowing from the current regulatory program. 

Do you agree with the implication that our current regulatory program of nuclear safety in the United States is defective or not 

working? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t believe that is what the task force said. The 

task force said we have a patchwork. I think the inference that it 

is defective therefore is not true. It is true that we have a patchwork of regulations. That is what the task force indicated. We have 

some things that, for instance if you just look at emergency procedures. We have emergency procedures that fall into three classes, 

the standard emergency procedures that we call emergency operating procedures. We then have procedures for severe accidents. 

And then we have procedures dealing with what we call essentially 

the September 11th actions. 

Each one of those has a different regulatory treatment, but all 

three of them are likely comparable in their importance and should 

be integrated into a whole process of procedures. So that was the 

patchwork that existed. Each of those came out of a particular incident. The severe accidents came out of the 1980’s and when we recognized that there was a need to have a better preparation for severe accidents. The last, the extensive damage mitigation guidelines came out of September 11th. 

So there was never an effort to look at those in a holistic way 

as part of a unified set of procedures. That is simply what the task 

force is recommending. And in some cases, some would get greater 

99 

regulatory treatment than they get right now, in particular the severe accident management guidelines. 

Senator BARRASSO. Commissioner Ostendorff, you stated in your 

notation vote response sheet that the NRC is an agency that 

‘‘prides itself on openness and transparency.’‘ You also referenced 

that the NRC has principles of good regulation that you use in your 

decisionmaking. 

If the NRC simply has a couple of public meetings on these task 

force recommendations, would that suffice to meet the goals of 

openness and transparency and meet the standard of the NRC 

principles that you referenced? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, thank you for the question. I think 

public meetings are a very key component of that effort. We had 

a public meeting just last Thursday at the NRC which I think is 

a very good start. I think all the Commissioners here support the 

Chairman’s call for open and public meetings as being a very key 

component. 

There is also the discussions that will happen outside of public 

meetings that will help inform the prioritization that these individual recommendations should receive. 

Senator BARRASSO. OK. And you said that you didn’t believe that 

the existing regulatory framework is broken. Is this 82-page report 

larger in scope than maybe you expected, given that statement? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. If I can, Senator, address that comment. I 

agree with all of what the Chairman said just a few minutes ago 

on his characterization of the patchwork comment. I think there 

has been a dynamic evolving buildup of regulations in response to 

events. And so I don’t think that the patchwork is a fair characterization itself, but I think the Chairman’s explanation is correct 

here. 

I think it is something that we ought to look at, but I don’t think 

it is something that is an immediate concern that would suggest 

our existing regulations are not safe and proper. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much. 

And then Commissioner Svinicki, if I could, you said in your vote 

‘‘lacking the NRC technical and programmatic staff’s evaluation’‘ 

beyond that of the six NRC staff members. You said ‘‘I do not have 

a sufficient basis to accept or reject the recommendations of the 

near-term task force.’‘ 

In your opinion, how can we achieve a sufficient basis of knowledge to then make that decision about accepting or rejecting these 

recommendations? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I had made a proposal to my colleagues which is 

not yet decided upon, but it would be that the NRC programmatic 

staff would take these recommendations and within 45 days come 

back to the commission with a prioritization and a plan for how the 

agency might move forward to get that more complete evaluation. 

They could also at that time identify the more straightforward recommendations and how they would propose to move forward on 

those more quickly. 

So I did not think it needed to take an excessive amount of time. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

100 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. I will just start again by telling you how I 

begin my thinking. I am going back to the AP article, June 20th, 

2011. Federal regulators have been working closely with the nuclear power industry to keep the Nation’s aging reactors operating 

within safety standards by repeatedly weakening those standards 

or simply failing to enforce them, an investigation by the AP has 

found. 

Now, throughout this discussion, I probably a half dozen times 

Members of the Committee have quoted the statement in the task 

force which says that the task force which says that the task force 

concludes that a sequence of events like the Fukushima accident is 

unlikely to occur in the United States. 

We have heard that a half dozen times, but we haven’t heard the 

paragraph before that. And the paragraph before that says, this 

regulatory approach established and supplemented piece by piece 

over the decades, has addressed many safety returns and issues 

using the best information and techniques available at the time. 

The result is a patchwork of regulatory requirements and other 

safety initiatives, all important, but not all given equivalent consideration and treatment by licensees or during NRC technical review 

and inspection. Consistent with the NRC’s organizational value of 

excellence, the task force believes that improving the NRC’s regulatory framework is an appropriate, realistic and achievable goal. 

Chairman Jaczko, what is the problem? I think again my friend 

from Wyoming talked about somebody saying that they were defective. I didn’t hear the word defective, that the regulatory system 

is defective. What I hear here is they want to improve it. Do we 

have a problem of improving the regulatory framework? 

Second of all, let’s be clear what we are talking about. You have 

highly knowledgeable people who have made 12 recommendations. 

They want you to go forward. No one is saying that you have to 

accept all 12 recommendations tomorrow. What they are saying is 

look at them, analyze them, tell us what you like. I think Mr. 

Ostendorff has said he likes some of them. He is ready to go on 

some of them. Some of them he has concerns about. Fine. 

What is the problem, Mr. Chairman, in your judgment, about 

taking these recommendations and starting an immediate discussion to see what we like or don’t like? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think that is something that we can do. And as 

I said, I think it is something we should be able to get done in 90 

days. 

Senator SANDERS. Ms. Svinicki, what is the problem with starting this discussion? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I voted within days of receiving the task force report to respectfully, I believe, begin that discussion. So I don’t see 

that my proposal is to take an inordinate amount of time to evaluate them. 

Senator SANDERS. So you are ready to get going, then, on taking 

a hard look at these 12 recommendations? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, I am. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, the process has started, Senator. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, I think I was actually the first one to vote. 

101 

Senator SANDERS. So you are ready now to begin immediately to 

start a discussion on these 12 recommendations? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Absolutely. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Sanders, I think we are all ready. 

Senator SANDERS. I am glad to hear that. 

Chairman Jaczko, is the process now ready to go? Where has the 

confusion been? What am I missing here? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think there is a bit of, or we are kind of 

stuck I think in developing the process, rather than just moving 

forward to actually begin the discussion and the dialog on the recommendations. Right now, what we are talking about is the process to have that discussion. And unfortunately, certainly with the 

exception of Commissioner Ostendorff, most of my colleagues have 

weighed in about the process, not about specific recommendations. 

Senator SANDERS. And what are the differences of opinion with 

regard to process? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think they are not severe. They are minor, 

but I think a big difference is setting an expectation for when we 

can get completed. I have suggested that we work to get completed 

our decisions about all 12 recommendations in 90 days. I think that 

is a reasonable timeframe. I think that is perhaps what I hear is 

the biggest point. 

Senator SANDERS. Ms. Svinicki, do you think we could do it in 

90 days? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with the Chairman’s characterization. 

Senator SANDERS. Do you think we can? Well, do you agree with 

him that we can get these recommendations done in 90 days? 

Ms. SVINICKI. No, I believe that some of them are complex 

enough that it would not be possible to make a final decision on 

all 12 in 90 days. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I believe we can do it in 90 days. I think the 

major difference, Senator, process-wise is that the Chairman’s 

original road map would go directly to public meetings of the commission. Some of the members feel that we should get senior management evaluation first of the recommendations. 

Senator SANDERS. OK. 

Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. As I see the votes being cast so far, I see a great 

deal of commonality. So I think there is actually a consensus coming here quite quickly on the commission to move forward with 

this. And as I stated earlier, I do think some of these recommendations can very likely be implemented very quickly. 

Senator SANDERS. Do you agree with the Chairman that we can 

get moving on this? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think we can launch some of them sooner than 

90 days. Others may take longer. 

Senator SANDERS. Mr. Ostendorff. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I believe that we can act on most of these recommendations within 90 days, perhaps not all. I think unfortunately in the press there has been a perception created there is 

great dissension among the commissioners on this topic, which I 

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sensus. Everybody is ready to move forward. I think there is a lot 

of agreement on the need for us to place this at the highest priority. And I think it clearly is. 

Senator SANDERS. OK. 

Madam Chair, thank you. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Let’s see, Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Jaczko, a traffic policeman’s job would be to keep the traffic 

safe, and all five of you said public health and safety was your job. 

But if the traffic cop just stopped all the cars from going anywhere, 

his supervisor might come down and say, hey, wait a minute, that 

is not very creative of you. 

Is there anything within the charge of the commission to make 

it possible for a power plant to create an environment in which a 

nuclear power plant can actually operate and in which a new one 

could actually be built? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t think there is a charge specifically for that 

motivation for what we do. 

Senator ALEXANDER. That is not a part of your charge, to create 

an environment in which a power plant—if you only charge is public health and safety, you would shut them all down. 

Mr. JACZKO. No, I think our charge is reasonable assurance of 

public health and safety. So the charge is that we are providing an 

level of assurance that is reasonable. 

Senator ALEXANDER. So there is no economic responsibility? No 

responsibility you have to make sure that a power plant can also 

be operated economically at the same time? 

Mr. JACZKO. No. Our requirements really fall into two categories, 

those things which are kind of the basic tenets of safety based on 

court decisions. The commission is required to make those safety 

decisions irrespective of the economic considerations of that decision. 

Certainly, when it goes to the implementation of requirements, 

we can consider the economic impact and look to see which is the 

most cost-beneficial. 

Senator ALEXANDER. You can consider that? 

Mr. JACZKO. At that stage, but not at the basis of determining 

whether something is a fundamental safety requirement. At that 

point, we are bound by a court decision from considering economic 

matters. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, is it your objective to create an environment in which nuclear power plants could be built? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, my goal is to continue to ensure that we have 

an environment in which nuclear power plants are safe, and if new 

plants are to be built that they will be as safe as our requirement 

dictate. 

Senator ALEXANDER. So you don’t have any—what about the recommendation of the commission that recommended that you complete without delay the design certification of the AP 1000 and the 

economically simplified boiling water reactor design? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think that was a recommendation not to encourage 

the commission to take action, but it was a recommendation indiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
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cating that there was no reason to specifically delay action as a result of these recommendations. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, that sounds like action to me. Are you 

planning to do it without delay? Does that mean within 90 days? 

Mr. JACZKO. We are continuing to move forward. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Can you do it within 90 days? 

Mr. JACZKO. We will be fairly close to receiving a final rule on 

the AP 1000 in October, which again is part of the reason for us 

to look at these recommendations in 90 days because when we go 

into the decision of looking at a final design for, for instance, the 

AP 1000, I think it is important that we have dispositioned the recommendation so we know what, if any, changes would impact those 

new reactors. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Will considering all of the recommendations, all 12, delay your consideration of the design certification for 

the AP 1000 and the new boiling water reactor design? 

Mr. JACZKO. Not in my opinion. However, I believe if we don’t 

consider the recommendations in a timely way, it could have the 

potential impact of delaying the action on the new reactor licensing. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But there is a lot of talk here about delay. 

This report said you should do this without delay. I mean, why did 

they say that? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t know. That is probably something better to 

task the task force. But again, I think the information that is relevant there is that it was useful information for the commission to 

know that there were no immediate issues with the design certification. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But let me press you a little further. You 

said you think everything could be done in 90 days. Does that include these two designs? 

Mr. JACZKO. What I said is that it is important for the commission to disposition the 12 recommendations. I would note that the 

statements related to new reactors are not any of the 12 recommendations of the task force. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But they are in the report. 

Mr. JACZKO. That is correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Yes. And they say without delay, right? 

Mr. JACZKO. That is correct, and we are currently not delaying 

any of the new reactor work. However, as I said, if we don’t 

promptly act on these recommendations, it will create uncertainty 

for what actions would be applicable to those new reactors, which 

in my opinion could actually lead to a potential delay in that work 

if we don’t disposition these recommendations promptly. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, as you can tell, my hope is that you 

if you are going to take the Committee’s advice to do the task force 

recommendations within 90 days, that you will take the task force’s 

advice to complete these design certifications without delay. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator, I would just call your attention to the mission of the 

NRC, which is clearly stated. The U.S. NRC is an independent 

agency created by Congress. The mission of the NRC is to license 

and regulate the Nation’s civilian use of byproduct source and speVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
104 

cial nuclear materials in order to protect public health and safety, 

promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, Madam Chair, I would think that it 

is still a legitimate question whether a traffic stop should stop all 

the traffic. That is one way to have safety. His supervisor still 

might ask him if he couldn’t be a little more creative and at least 

people drive in a safe way. 

Senator BOXER. I don’t think that is the right analogy, because 

there is really no analogy when you are dealing with nuclear energy. 

Senator ALEXANDER. We have had a lot more death in traffic. We 

tolerate 38,000 traffic deaths every year. We have never had one 

with a nuclear reactor in the United States. 

Senator BOXER. That says a lot for the fact that we have an independent agency protecting the health and safety. They said the 

same thing in Japan until recently. 

But in any event, let’s move on. 

Obviously, we have differences here just like you have differences 

there. But I want to make the point, and I really do want to make 

this point because I have made it to you before. As many differences as we have here, we are friends. And we differ. We argue. 

We debate. I am sensing with you that maybe there needs to be 

a little bit more friendship. Just a point spoken as a human being, 

not as a Senator. 

I think it is important that these differences not become personal. If Inhofe and I can do it, we are really good friends, then 

anybody could do it. 

Anyway, here we go. We are moving on and we are going now 

to Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

This is beginning to look like a glee club here, everybody happy 

faces. What you see isn’t really what you get. 

Mr. Jaczko, the NRC recently renewed the operating license for 

Hope Creek nuclear plant in New Jersey through 2046. Now, what 

did we learn from the incidents in Japan that you would take into 

account when deciding to grant the extension? And which conditions would that influence you to place on it? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, for any reactor, whether it is a reactor that 

has been operating for 35 years or 45 years, if we adopt any of 

these recommendations, they would likely apply to every reactor in 

the Country, with the exception of some of the recommendations 

like the hardened vent, which would only apply to boiling water reactor design. 

So the license renewal process is really about ensuring that they 

have a program in place to deal with the aging of components and 

systems. And nothing that came out of the task force specifically 

touched on those issues, but called, for instance, for a number of 

recommendations dealing with earthquakes and those kinds of 

things that we would expect that any plant, Hope Creek being one 

of them, would be required then to implement along with the others. 

105 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So not too much specific information came 

from the Fukushima failure that influenced your granting of the 

extension of the license? 

Mr. JACZKO. Right. Not at this point, nothing that affected the 

extension, but ultimately if these recommendations are adopted, 

some of them would apply to Hope Creek as an operating plant, 

just like any other plant in the Country. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. The Mark I containment system that was 

used at Fukushima is also used at U.S. plants including two reactors in New Jersey. And you said in June that we didn’t know what 

went wrong with the containment system at Fukushima. Now, 

what did this uncertainty factor bring into the recent NRC task 

force recommendations? When do you think we will know all we 

can about what went wrong at the Japanese plant? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, that could take possibly years. What will need 

to happen is that they will have to decontaminate the facility, decontaminate the reactor itself to be able to get in and actually analyze and really look at the equipment and try and, almost like a 

criminologist, to try and recover and reconstruct what happened in 

the accident. 

But as the task force laid out, there are some things we can do 

in the short term, in particular with the hardened vents. This is 

an area where the task force recommended an NRC requirement. 

The Mark I containment system, which is similar to what they had 

in Japan, are containment designs that do have hardened vents, 

but they have never been done as a formal regulatory requirement. 

So the task force recommended that we do that. 

The advantage of that is that it brings it under our inspections 

and our oversight and all those kinds of things so we can monitor 

it and make sure it is being used effectively. So that is something 

specifically for the Mark I’s that has been recommended that we 

take action on. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. But it would take years, you say, to fully 

understand what took place there? 

Mr. JACZKO. It may. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It is hard to imagine because there were 

specific events. We are not talking about the influence on the people who were in the area, that kind of thing, but the specific trigger 

for this collapse is pretty much obvious. 

Mr. JACZKO. And that is certainly why you see a number of recommendations from the task force. They acknowledge that there 

were some things we don’t yet know, and those things will need additional study. But clearly, there were at least six recommendations they believe we had sufficient information to take action on 

right now. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Looking ahead a little bit, you said in a 

2008 speech that ‘‘I believe that the NRC should develop new regulations which require spent fuel to be moved to dry cask storage 

after it has been allowed to cool for 5 years.’‘ The task force recommended enhancements to spent fuel pools, but did not advocate 

requiring dry cask storage. 

Now, given that it falls short of your 2008 proposal, how can we 

be sure that the task force approach here will ensure the safest 

form of storage for spent fuel? 

106 

Mr. JACZKO. I think the task force recommendation is really a 

short-term recommendation, which is precisely to ensure that if an 

event like Fukushima were to happen, the challenges we saw 

there, namely knowing how much water is in the pool and making 

sure that there is sufficient capability to put water into the pool 

to keep it cool, that those things would be addressed. That is what 

they have asked for in the short term. 

And then over the longer term, we can analyze this issue more 

importantly of whether we should have more fuel in pools versus 

in dry cask storage. But they really went at that short-term issue 

of making sure that the fuel that is in pools is going to be in an 

enhanced configuration and safer that way. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I am being ruled out, so thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. I answered a little long, I think. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Jaczko, there have been some complaints about your leadership at the commission, as you are aware, in the media. I do believe it is important that you reflect the proper role of the Chairman, which has I am sure some administrative responsibilities. 

But we have a commission and the commission was established to 

decide as a commission important issues. 

With regard to this emergency power, did you file an official document assuming emergency powers of any kind? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. How did you announce that you were assuming emergency power? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is not something which we have procedures in 

which that is formally done. About three or 4 days into the incident, I was made aware that my colleagues on the commission had 

inquired about that. I spoke with the General Counsel. I actually 

asked members of the staff should I make a formal declaration of 

use of emergency powers. And in all honesty, I got one or two people who said no, that would just distract you from the work that 

we are doing. And frankly, I got distracted by dealing with the 

emergency response and didn’t turn back to it until several weeks 

later. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, did you seek a formal opinion from counsel as to whether an event on the other side of the world would 

give the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the commission chairman, the power to assume emergency powers that would 

in some ways diminish, obviously, the influence of the other members of the commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. I did seek that and the general counsel advised me 

that it was perfectly appropriate. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you have a written opinion to that effect? 

Mr. JACZKO. I do have a written opinion. I believe that has been 

provided to the Committee. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to this Committee, well, are you 

still assuming those powers? 

Mr. JACZKO. No, I ceased that weeks or ago or perhaps months. 

Senator SESSIONS. Have you issued a report of what you did during the course of that time? 

107 

Mr. JACZKO. As I indicated, we provided situation reports to the 

commission at the beginning of the incident. Those situation reports were issued multiple times a day. 

Senator SESSIONS. No, the Reorganization Act, the statute of 

1980 said following the conclusion of the emergency, the Chairman 

or member of the commission delegated emergency functions under 

the subsection shall render a complete and timely report to the 

commission on the actions taken during the emergency. 

Have you done that? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe that I have. 

Senator SESSIONS. Is that available to us? 

Mr. JACZKO. We can provide you with the boxes of situation reports which detail the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, no, that is not what the statute requires, 

would you not agree, Mr. Jaczko? Why would you hesitate to do a 

complete and timely report of the actions taken during the emergency? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have conferred with the General Counsel and I believe that I have more than satisfied the requirements of that particular provision. Tremendous information was provided to the 

commission about actions that were taken during the response. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I am not arguing about that. 

Mr. JACZKO. In the form of reports. 

Senator SESSIONS. You have given a lot of information. I believe 

the statute under which you serve requires that the Chairman or 

the emergency official render a complete and timely report, not a 

series of situation reports in a box somewhere. Wouldn’t you agree 

that that is what it seems to say plainly? 

Mr. JACZKO. As I read the statute, it is clear that they envision 

one piece of information. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, why wouldn’t you do that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Because I think we provided much of that information already to the commission and I have heard nothing from my 

colleagues on the commission that they have any interest in that 

particular report. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I have an interest in it. The people of 

the United States have an interest in the Chairman of the NRC following the plain statutory requirement. So I will ask you, what 

hesitation do you have to put a formal report together that says 

what you did while you assumed emergency powers? 

Mr. JACZKO. I will be happy to put that together, and I believe 

I have more provided information to the American people through 

testimony, through a variety of different reports that have provided 

significant information about the actions that were taken during 

this event. But I would be more than happy to summarize those 

in a single report. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you should comply with the statute. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, I would just like to comment that I have 

conferred with the General Counsel and we believe that I have 

more than complied with the statute in that particular provision 

and we can provide you with analysis of that as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. I believe it requires a single report after the 

conclusion and it is pretty obvious you have not done that. 

108 

With regard to this committee, the six members that were appointed, you said you didn’t select them, but EDO did. Who is 

EDO? 

Mr. JACZKO. The Executive Director for Operations. 

Senator SESSIONS. And who does that person work for? 

Mr. JACZKO. Nominally to the Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. And so did you know who was being selected 

and were those members discussed with you before they were selected? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe he gave the names to me and I said that 

they were appropriate and I thought they were good selections. 

Senator SESSIONS. Did you make any suggestions to him about 

names that might be on that list? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t recall whether I did or I didn’t. 

Senator SESSIONS. You don’t recall? 

Mr. JACZKO. It was not something that was formally presented 

to me. It was presented to me verbally and I believe I signed off 

on it verbally. I believe that they were a good selection, the people 

that he selected were excellent people. And I don’t recall if there 

was at a time a smaller group or a larger group. I could check my 

records, but it was not for me a significant decision for me and I 

trusted the EDO to appoint the appropriate people to that task 

force. 

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will submit a written question 

concerning how it was that the mission plan that stakeholders 

would be invited to submit suggestions was eliminated from the 

staff effort. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Senator. 

The last hearing we had here, we did ask the Chairman about 

this in depth about his taking over emergency powers. 

Do not start the clock yet because I have another thing to do. 

Senator Cardin, I am just going to put this out here. And he 

would like this in writing, this answer. If the commission delays 

action on task force recommendations on the grounds you don’t 

have enough information yet about what happened at Fukushima 

to move forward, does that suggest the NRC also doesn’t have 

enough information to move forward with relicensing existing reactors or licensing new reactors? 

So that is a question he wants answered. 

We are going to have a second round here. I think Senator Carper is coming back and we will have a second round. 

Senator SANDERS. I just have one brief question. 

Senator BOXER. I go first. 

Senator SANDERS. I am sorry. 

Senator BOXER. And you go after. 

Senator SANDERS. You are the Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you for noticing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. OK. Here is where we are. I want all of you to 

know we are going to have you back every 90 days until I know 

what you are doing. And we will take all the answers you gave, 

how much you are going to work to make this happen, a half 

109 

dozen, a dozen, a baker’s dozen, whatever it is, and we are going 

to stay on this. 

I will tell you why. After 9/11, we had all these great ideas. Everybody thought great, the NRC took decisive action. And 9 years 

later, some of these things went into effect. That is not going to 

happen. Of it is happens, the American people are going to know. 

And here is the point. Whether you love nuclear energy, don’t 

like it or you are agnostic, it ain’t going anywhere if it isn’t safe. 

And it is not going anywhere if the public doesn’t have faith in you. 

If the public thinks that you are somehow not independent, not 

doing their business, let me tell you they won’t be happy. 

So I have a question for you Commissioner Svinicki, in your July 

19th vote on the task force report, you stated, ‘‘The NRC finds 

itself at the appropriate point now to move away from small group 

taskings, including the commission itself attempting to labor in isolation.’‘ 

This is very disturbing to me, very disturbing, the commission 

itself attempting to labor in isolation. You are an independent entity. What are you talking about? Isolated from who? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I meant that term to reinforce the importance of 

having public meetings and stakeholder outreach, meaning that 

the commission ought to have the benefit of—— 

Senator BOXER. But you don’t think that it is up to stakeholders 

to decide what we should approve? You are an independent commissioner, are you not? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, I meant that the process should be informed 

by those public—— 

Senator BOXER. OK. And Chairman Jaczko has laid out a plan. 

He proposes a process to move forward over the next 90 days to 

receive broad input from NRC staff and external stakeholders and 

to have votes by October 7th, 2011. Do you agree with that? 

Ms. SVINICKI. As I indicated in response to your earlier question—— 

Senator BOXER. I am not asking you an earlier question. I am 

asking you this question. Chairman Jaczko has proposed a process 

to move forward over the next 90 days to address your concerns, 

to receive broad input from NRC staff and external stakeholders 

and to have votes on specific recommendations by October 7th, 

2011. Do you agree? It seems to match what you called for. Now 

he has put it out there. It echoes what you want. Do you agree? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I support commission meetings. As I have indicated, I am not sure that all the task force recommendations could 

be decided in 90 days. 

Senator BOXER. How many do you think could be decided on in 

90 days? Commissioner Ostendorff has pointed out six. Do you 

agree with him? Can they be decided in 90 days? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I had proposed in my July 19th—— 

Senator BOXER. Yes or no? Yes or no? Do you agree with him, 

that six of these could be decided in 90 days? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I don’t have a specific count. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well let me just say your responses disturb 

me. When you say that the commission isolated. Your role by statute is to be independent. Chairman Jaczko has laid this out. I want 

you to know I have 7 million people who live within 50 miles of 

110 

San Onofre. I went there with the wonderful friend sitting next to 

you, Commissioner Apostolakis. 

And you know what they told me? I said, what is your plan if 

there is an emergency. They said, we have to go out on the highway. That is all we can do is escape that way. 

Do you ever go to those freeways? You probably may not have. 

You can’t even move an inch on some of those freeways. And I have 

7 million people there. And you are sitting here and basically saying you can’t move forward. 

And I want to compliment the members of this special task force. 

It is not red tape at all. It is 12 recommendations. They make 

sense. And I am stunned to hear that you—is there one that you 

could say we can move forward before you hear from the industry? 

Anybody? Any one of these you can recommend? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree that the task force identified the correct 

areas, but I would like the NRC staff that would be responsible for 

carrying out the recommendations, I would like to have, respectfully, their input prior to deciding on the final form. 

Senator BOXER. That is right. And Chairman Jaczko has laid out 

a path to do just that, but you say you won’t be ready in October. 

What is the date you will be ready? What date do you think is good 

to be ready to vote on perhaps a half dozen simple ones that everyone else seems to think we could move on? What is the date? Give 

me a date? 

Ms. SVINICKI. My objective would be, if some are less complex, 

to move on them before 90 days. 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. Which ones do you think those would 

be? What is less complex? I looked at all of these. Most of them 

don’t seem too complex, especially the ones that deal with making 

sure that the plants undertake more safety precautions, emergency 

preparedness and all the rest. 

Which ones do you think are less complex than the others? Give 

me a couple out of the 12. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I think that the re-looking at the flooding and seismic requirements to make sure that we are using state-of-the-art 

knowledge there is a very straightforward recommendation. 

Senator BOXER. So you like the recommendation that every 10 

years, the operators of these plants have to come up with new assessments as to the safety. That is the recommendation. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I was referring to the recommendation that tasked 

the staff to re-look at our basis on seismic. 

Senator BOXER. Well, how about that one? The one I just said. 

It is very clear. They say every 10 years, the operator of a plant 

that is located near flooding and seismic has to do a re-look at the 

problems. Because with science moving forward, Commissioner, we 

have new information all the time as to whether the seismic was 

worse, less harsh. Right now, we are very concerned because 

science shows us that it is moving in the wrong direction, more 

tsunamis, more earthquakes. Harder, deeper. What do you think 

about that? Every 10 years the operators there ought to look at 

that. That is one of the recommendations. 

Do you think that is complex? Is that complex? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I think that we as a agency constantly look at our 

State of knowledge in those areas, as you suggest. 

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Senator BOXER. Do you think it is complex to ask the operator 

who is operating a plant on or near an earthquake fault or near 

a possible tsunami zone to ask them every 10 years to reassess the 

safety of their plant? Is that a complex recommendation? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I would assess that we actually require them to be 

looking at that constantly if there is any new information that 

comes forward as is the case in California with faultlines off the 

coast. We require it even in advance of a 10-year period we require 

it. 

Senator BOXER. Good. So you would support, then, a every time 

there is new science an overall new look at the safety of these 

plants. Is that correct? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, I believe we require that now. 

Senator BOXER. Excellent. Well, are you ready to vote on that in 

the next 90 days? What you say you support, are you ready to go 

for that in the next 90 days? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Respectfully, my proposal asks that the NRC staff 

come back and provide us with the implementation on these recommendations. And I wanted, before I made a final decision, to be 

informed by that input from the NRC. 

Senator BOXER. Well, all I can say is if I am the people of California and I am watching this, right now I am not so sure about 

whether I want that plant to operate, because it is very simple. 

And we have our plants there coming in to get relicensed. And I 

urge them not to do that, not even to issue, not to move forward 

until they have studied it. 

You seem to be on my side, but then you have to hear from everybody else. I would submit to you it is common sense. There are 

certain things, you should have more belief in what you say because it is common sense. 

And I am just saying we have oversight over the work you do. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment you. And I want to say to the 

commissioners who are ready and willing and able to act in a timeframe of 90 days, thank you. Because if we don’t do that, we are 

not going to see people supporting nuclear power. 

I mean, I take an opposite view of my friends on the other side 

today. The more you convince the people that you are doing your 

job, the more they are going to be comfortable with nuclear power. 

If you give me answers like I have to wait and I can’t tell, and then 

you have a situation where it took 9 years to put into place the last 

safety measures, that is ridiculous. 

So as long as I am sitting over here, and I have a voice, I am 

going to continue to call you before us. I mean, I really could get 

used to this because I think you need to know how important the 

work you do is to the safety of the people, first and foremost, and 

to the future of nuclear energy, second. 

Senator Sanders. 

Senator SANDERS. Just a few questions. 

Chairman Jaczko, some of my Republican colleagues have kind 

of suggested that you have initiated a Bolshevik coup on the NRC. 

You are running a dictatorship to undermine American democratic 

values. So I just wanted to ask you once again, to be clear. Do you 

believe and does the nonpartisan General Counsel of the NRC beVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
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lieve that you have fulfilled the statute in terms of your utilization 

of the emergency powers? 

And in terms of emergency powers, as I understand it, quite appropriately after Fukushima, you wanted to make sure that, was 

it 13 plants that we have in this Country that are similar design 

to the Fukushima plants? You quite appropriately wanted to make 

sure that something similar to what happened in Japan does not 

happen in the United States. Is that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, it certainly was a piece of it. The primary 

focus was really on American citizens in Japan and ensuring that 

we were doing everything we could to protect them as they were 

there. And that was in many ways the prime focus. 

Most of the issues related to how we dealt with U.S. plants were 

really dealt with by the commission when it established this task 

force. So that was how we decided to go forward in that way. So 

I didn’t really exercise any authorities with regard to domestic facilities. 

Senator SANDERS. So it was just to protect the interests of American citizens in Japan? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 

Senator SANDERS. And does the nonpartisan General Counsel believe that you acted appropriately within the statute? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe that is the case and he is somewhere he, 

so he can probably—— 

Senator SANDERS. Madam Chair, can we ask the gentleman? 

Senator BOXER. I am sorry. I was distracted by my staff. Say 

again? 

Senator SANDERS. May ask the General Counsel, did he act within the law? 

Senator BOXER. Yes, you can. 

Please, sir. Please join us. 

Mr. BURNS. Senator, my name is Stephen Burns. I am General 

Counsel of the NRC, a career Federal employee. 

The simple answer to your question is I believe the Chairman’s 

actions were consistent with the powers that he has under the statute. I received an inquiry from his office fairly early on in the 

event. And based on my view and actually an assessment of my 

predecessor’s view of actions taken in response to 9/11, when there 

also was not a specific event at a U.S. facility, although a threat 

environment obviously to U.S. facilities, my view was that given 

the intentions of President Carter and congressional essentially endorsement under the reorganization plan, that his actions were 

consistent with those responsibilities. 

Senator SANDERS. And you are, as I understand it, a nonpartisan 

official. 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, I am a career official. I am appointed by the 

commission. 

Senator SANDERS. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

And I appreciate you coming up here. I would hope that puts an 

end to this consistent attack against the Chairman. 

Let me ask Mr. Ostendorff, if I could, a question. 

Mr. Ostendorff, my understanding is that you are prepared to 

move pretty quickly on a number of the recommendations of the 

task force. Let me ask you about their first recommendation, and 

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that is that the task force recommends establishing a logical, systematic regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense in depth and risk considerations. 

That is an important recommendation. Are you prepared to move 

rapidly on that one? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, thank you for the question. I addressed that specific recommendation in my vote in some detail. I 

think it needs to be looked at. I have some concerns that trying to 

embark upon that right now will distract us from taking other actions that can and should be taken in the short term. But I do support us taking a look at trying to improve the framework we currently have. 

Senator SANDERS. I just don’t quite get that answer. You see his 

as an important recommendation. No one is suggesting that you 

have to swallow hook, line and sinker what people recommend. 

What is the problem with beginning that discussion right now? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I have been around nuclear propulsion in the Navy for many, many years and I have seen a lot of 

different efforts taken in the Naval Sea Systems Command to improve reactor safety on our nuclear-powered submarines and carriers. I have seen how corrective actions are implemented. 

I think this is one that is going to take a few years to go, recommendation one. I support moving forward as a separate effort to 

look at recommendation one. But I don’t think that should hold us 

up in trying to take shorter-term actions. 

Senator SANDERS. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I would yield the floor then. 

Senator CARPER. [Presiding] All right. We are going to close it out and have a couple of questions to ask of our commissioners, and then I think we 

are going to vote here pretty soon. 

This is a question for Commissioner Magwood and Commissioner 

Ostendorff, if I could. It is my understanding that the majority of 

you have asked senior staff to take a second look at these recommendations. And you have asked the senior staff folks to provide 

suggestions to the commissions on how to proceed with these recommendations. 

Here is my question. And we have talked around this already, 

but I am going to ask you just directly. Since senior NRC staff 

made these recommendations in the first place and now you are 

asking other senior staff to come in and to provide suggestions, 

why is this next step needed? And just explain that to me. Why is 

it needed? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I will start. First, I think that, well, I will speak 

for myself here, certainly. My perspective is that it isn’t simply another assessment by NRC staff, although I do look forward to seeing what the senior staff thinks about the recommendations. For 

me, the most important thing is to have the staff interact with 

stakeholders in a direct and comprehensive fashion to understand 

what stakeholders’ responses are to the various recommendations 

and then see what their suggestions are. And then think about that 

and feed that information to the commission. 

So I don’t look at it as simply the NRC staff looking at what the 

NRC staff has already said. I think of it as NRC staff using the 

114 

mechanisms we have in place, public meetings, across-the-table discussions in public venue, of course, to hear details about the reaction to the recommendations, and then get that back to the commission. That is really the normal in large respect what we do 

every day. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Ostendorff? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Carper, thank you. 

I would agree with Senator Magwood’s comment. I will just make 

two points here in addition. One is when I asked our Executive Director for Operations, Bill Borchardt, how he thought we should 

proceed, he supported having his office, EDO’s office and those that 

work for him, come back and give us an integrated prioritized list. 

As I said in my opening statement, that was a key lesson learned 

from Three Mile Island when the agency did not do that. I think 

we will get more bang for the buck implementing those safety enhancements that will make a real difference sooner by having this 

prioritized list. We have called for that within 30 days. 

The second piece is that not all these recommendations are 

equal. And there are some that should be done right now and there 

are some that require a little bit more information. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Chairman Jaczko, a question in orders versus regulatory process. 

Some of the regulatory tools at the commission’s disposal are the 

rulemaking process and apparently the issuance of orders. Could 

you just describe or compare both processes for us? And for each, 

what kind of opportunities are there for public comment and for 

input from stakeholders? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, generally, the orders have more limited opportunity for public involvement. They are usually activities that either we believe need to be taken in a very prompt period of time 

for safety reasons, or are responses to violations of our regulations. 

So they are not a preferred tool because they don’t provide for 

the more in-depth public engagement that a regulation would. One 

of the activities that I have challenged the staff with since I have 

been Chairman is to better streamline our rulemaking process so 

that we can use that as a more viable tool and get things done in 

a more timely way, but still have that stakeholder input. 

So generally, the orders have less involvement, but it is usually 

a situation in which we feel there is a clear safety need that requires prompt action. In most cases when it is relating to a specific 

issue, we usually initiate a rulemaking process as well, so that 

eventually that same content of the order gets captured in a regulation. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Let me just followup with that, if I 

could. Stakeholders in industry and the environmental community 

have shared and discussed concerns with my own staff about moving these recommendations through your order process. And what 

has been the NRC’s experience with expedited rulemaking and 

might it have a role to play with some of the recommendations 

adopted by the commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think everyone that comes in as Chairman 

of the NRC, and probably every commissioner that comes to the 

NRC, wants the rulemaking process to go forward faster. We have 

115 

mixed success with that, and a lot of it, I think, comes down the 

usual challenges of resources and focus and prioritization. 

But we did recently complete a regulation from start to finish in 

about 4 months, having to do with an issue related to how we deal 

with fatigue and workers who may get tired at a nuclear power 

plant. 

So I think there are ways to do it. It would cause us to change 

how we do our regulations, but I think it is doable. In my mind, 

that would be the most preferable way for some of these things is 

to do them in expedited rulemaking that can be done in four or 5 

months, or something like that, rather than the two to 3 years that 

it typically takes. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Well, the vote hasn’t started yet and so we 

have it looks like another hour or two. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. All right. Not that long. 

But what I would like to do is just do something—it is my mother calling in to say haste makes waste. Not really. 

What I want to do is, sometimes I like to at the close of a hearing 

ask, you know, we always ask for an opening statement. We ask 

you to respond to our questions. Sometimes, I find it is helpful to 

have a closing statement. I am not going ask for a lengthy closing 

statement, but just maybe something like given the conversation 

we have today or questions that have been asked and responses 

that have been given, this may be a closing thought as we prepare 

to go vote to save the Republic. 

Captain Ostendorff, Chairman Ostendorff, or Commissioner 

Ostendorff, why don’t you go first? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you, Senator. 

I would say that we talk all the time. We meet each week when 

we are in town. 

Senator CARPER. How often are you all in town? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I would say we probably are all together to 

meet at least 3 weeks out of four. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. In individual periods, consistent with the Government in the Sunshine Act. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. And I would say that it is clearly my perception based on discussion with all my colleagues here that we all 

want to move forward quickly; that we all want to do the right 

thing. And I don’t think we are as far apart as maybe some of the 

questioning might have suggested. I really think we want to do 

those things, but not all of these are longer-term actions. Some are 

short term. Some are intermediate. And some of those will require 

more information. 

I used the one example on the hardened vents that was asked 

about. I asked the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations on July 

15th, a senior executive there, do you have sufficient information 

on the hardened vents in order right now to support the order recommended by the task force to install those. And he said no. 

The task force report itself said that we do not understand 

whether or not the operators at Fukushima actually operated these 

vents. 

116 

I am using that just as a discrete example we can all understand. I think we need to explore this area. It could be a month 

from now we have sufficient information to make a disposition of 

that one in a smart manner. But that is just one example. There 

are some things that do require more information, more granularity. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks. 

Commissioner Magwood, a closing thought or two, please. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think Commissioner Ostendorff actually covered 

it. I think he said it quite well. 

The only thing I would add is I believe that we will move forward 

quickly. There is a lot of willingness on the commission to get this 

done. We are taking this very seriously. I think we all were talking 

to each other during the event. I think almost immediately, we 

began to think about what lessons were being learned as were 

watching it unfold on television. 

So I see this as just the conclusion of what started back in 

March. And I feel very positive that we will get this done quickly 

and do the right thing. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Good. 

Dr. Apostolakis. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I agree with my colleagues. I think the commission will act in a timely manner. It is just the details that we 

have to work out. So I don’t see any problem at all. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Commissioner Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with what my colleagues have said thus 

far. In summary remarks, I think that there is a lot of overlap and 

commonality in the approach here. And I think that want to and 

can, I believe it is possible to strike the appropriate balance between urgency and moving forward, and also being thoughtful and 

getting it right. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

The last word, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would say I appreciate all the comments of 

my colleagues and I think there are far more areas of agreement 

than disagreement. But I do believe strongly that it is important 

for us to disposition these recommendations in 90 days. And I 

think that is something that is doable and from what I have heard 

from my colleagues, I think there is perhaps more agreement than 

there is disagreement about that. 

Senator CARPER. Good. 

In closing, one of my favorite people to work here with here in 

the Senate is a Republican from Wyoming. His name is Mike Enzi. 

A lot of people in other places don’t know him. I knew him when 

I was Governor. We worked on a couple of things together then. 

Mike Enzi is the Senior Republican on the Health, Education, 

Labor, Pension Committee. And the Senior Democrat for many 

years was a guy named Kennedy, Ted Kennedy. And they were remarkably effective. The Committee was remarkably productive. 

And I would say to Mike Enzi, how does one of the most conservative Republicans around here work so productively with one of the 

most liberal Democrats? And you guys just get so much done, reVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:54 Mar 13, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\23823.TXT VERN
117 

gardless of who is the Chairman, whether it is Kennedy or whether 

it is Enzi. 

And he said, Ted Kennedy and I subscribe to the 80/20 rule. I 

said: What is that? And he said, the 80/20 rule says we agree on 

about 80 percent of the stuff. We disagree on maybe 20 percent of 

the stuff. And what we have decided to do is focus on the 80 percent that we agree on. And as a result, we get a lot done. 

More times than I can count I call on my colleagues on this said 

of the dais in the Senate to subscribe to the 80/20 rule, and if we 

did that on a consistent basis, I think it would be not just a better 

place to work, but actually probably a better Country. 

And I would just urge as it seems like we have about, I don’t 

know if it is 80 percent agreement on this stuff, but pretty broad 

agreement on what needs to be acted on more quickly, more 

promptly, and that which needs a little more scrubbing. 

And so in deference to my mother, haste does make waste, but 

remembering the words of my father, work does expand to fill the 

amount of time we allocate to a job. So I would ask that we move 

forward on the stuff that we can move forward on, and do it as a 

team. And the stuff that needs a little more time, let’s take a little 

more time, but not more time than we really need. 

All right. With that having been said, I think we are going to 

wrap this up and you guys go have lunch maybe, and I am going 

to go vote. You all take care. 

This hearing is adjourned. Thank you all for coming. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the committees were adjourned.] 

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