FRONT COVER: Flare, Front Line, Champagne, by Col John W. Thomason. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

BACK COVER: Firefight by Capt Charles G. Grow.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
The Legacy of Belleau Wood

belleau

wood

The Legacy of

100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles

AN ANTHOLOGY

Edited by

Paul Westermeyer

Art Editor

Breanne Robertson, PhD

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2018
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Names: Westermeyer, Paul W., editor. | Robertson, Breanne, editor. | Marine

 Corps University (U.S.). History Division, issuing body.

Title: The Legacy of Belleau Wood : 100 years of making Marines and winning

 battles, an anthology / edited by Paul Westermeyer ; art editor: Breanne Robertson.

Other titles: 100 years of making Marines and winning battles, an anthology

Description: Quantico, Virginia : History Division, United States Marine

 Corps, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018000255 | ISBN 9780997317480 (paperback)

Subjects: LCSH: United States. Marine Corps. | United States. Marine Corps—History.

Classification: LCC VE23 .L39 2018 | DDC 359.9/60973—dc23 | SUDOC D 214.511:M 33

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018000255

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect 

the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine 

Corps, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. The information contained in this book 

was accurate at the time of printing. Every effort has been made to secure copyright permission on 

excerpts and artworks reproduced in this volume. Please contact the editors to rectify an inadvertent 

errors or omissions.

Published by

Marine Corps History Division

2044 Broadway Drive

Quantico, VA 22134

www.mcu.usmcu.edu/historydivision

1st Printing, 2018

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v

Contents

FOREWORD IX

PREFACE XI

CHAPTER ONE

The Rise of the Early Modern Marine Corps and World War I 1

Paul Westermeyer

Military Professionalism: 3

The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880 –1898

Jack Shulimson

Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Sea-Going Mission 15

Jack Shulimson and Graham A. Cosmas

Defining the Duties of the United States Marine Corps 29

President Theodore Roosevelt

Marine Corps Officers’ Physical Fitness 30

President Theodore Roosevelt

A Plea for a Mission and Doctrine 32

Major John H. Russell

Barnett Letter to Oliver 46

Major General Commandant George Barnett
vi contents

Authorization to Enroll Women Marines 51

Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy

The Great War Crucible 52

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons

Through the Wheat to the Beaches Beyond: The Lasting Impact 62

of the Battle for Belleau Wood

General Charles C. Krulak

Clifton Bledsoe Cates Biography 72

CHAPTER TWO

The Lessons of World War II and Korea 75

Paul Westermeyer

Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps 77

Major Alfred A. Cunningham 

Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, FMFRP 12-46 90

Major Earl H. Ellis

The U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Capabilities, 98

and Preparations for War with Japan

David J. Ulbrich, PhD

The Role of Marine and Shore-based Naval Air at Guadalcanal: 124

Some Lessons for Today

Major Philip F. Shutler

Letter from Smith to Cates on Chosin Reservoir 132

Major General Oliver P. Smith

Equitatus Caeli 146

Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon
contents vii

The “Afloat-Ready Battalion”: 154

The Development of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps 

Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1898–1978

Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr.

Merritt Austin Edson Biography 185

CHAPTER THREE

The Manpower Renaissance 189

Paul Westermeyer

The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps 191

Captain David A. Dawson

Pathbreakers: Dealing with Race–The 1970s 203

Fred H. Allison, PhD, and Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler

Truly a “New Corps” 228

Larry James

Your Forever Experience 235

Robert Church

Emphasis on Professionalism for a New Generation of Marines 243

General Louis H. Wilson 

The Personnel Campaign Issue Is No Longer in Doubt 251

Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor

Frank E. Petersen Jr. Biography 272

CHAPTER FOUR

The Operational and Educational Renaissance 277

Paul Westermeyer
viii contents

General Alfred M. Gray’s Training and Education Letter 279

on Professional Military Education

Warfighting, Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1 287

Philosophy of Command

The NCO and Maneuver Warfare 290

Captains William H. Weber IV and David J. Furness

Expeditionary Airfields 297

Major General Terrence R. Dake

It’s Not Nice and Neat 303

Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni

The Crucible: Building Warriors for the 21st Century 313

General Charles C. Krulak

Preparing the Marine Corps for War 319

General Charles C. Krulak

Up to the Challenge: Women’s Training in Today’s Marine Corps 326

Colonel Nancy P. Anderson

1st Marine Division (Rein) Commanding General’s Message to All Hands 333

Major General James N. Mattis

An Open Letter to the “Young Turks” 334

Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller

Anthony C. Zinni Biography 337

APPENDIX

Historiography for Marines: How Marines Should Read and Understand History 341

Paul Westermeyer

About the Editors 349
ix

foreword

The title of this work, The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines 

and Winning Battles, is a bit of a misnomer. Certainly, the U.S. Marines of today benefit 

from the legacy of the Corps’ initial, legendary 

battle in the First World War, but today’s Marines also have inherited the legacy of ChâteauThierry, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne, 

not to mention those who served in the Corps’ 

first aerial units, behind the lines, and aboard 

U.S. Navy ships throughout the conflict. The 

Corps emerged from the First World War as an 

elite, modern fighting organization capable of 

transferring the determination and skill of its 

prewar professionals to the mass of enthusiastic 

volunteers who flocked to proudly wear the eagle, globe, and anchor. Beyond that, its officers 

were consummate professionals capable of command and organization at the tactical and operational levels of war.

In the century since Belleau Wood, the 

Corps has continued to make Marines and win 

battles, maintaining the highest standards while 

continuing to innovate across the spectrum of 

conflict. Marines developed the techniques of 

amphibious warfare that enabled success during 

the drive across the Pacific during World War II 

and instilled the esprit de corps that allowed the 

1st Marine Division to overcome adversity despite all odds during the battle at Chosin Reservoir. The same legacy was at work as Marines 

responded to the challenges of the all-volunteer 

force in the 1970s and fought conventional, 

counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism conflicts in the three decades since the end of the 

Cold War. 

At the heart of our Corps’ effectiveness is 

its commitment to the basics of infantry tactics 

and small unit leadership. As General Alfred M. 

Gray Jr. said, “Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman. All other conditions are secondary.” The legacy of Belleau Wood is what 

makes Marines who are dedicated to no single 

method or concept of warfare and committed 

to no specific strategy or technological advance. 

Marines are devoted to the idea of being Marines, willing and able to adapt to new technologies and strategies as required, while maintaining fidelity to our core beliefs. 

I would like to personally thank our university for putting this piece together. We must 

never forget our history and always strive to 

learn more about the legacy of the Marines who 

have gone before us. The fight for Belleau Wood 
x foreword

was the birthplace of the modern day Marine 

Corps. The lessons learned from that fight, most 

importantly that we must continue to adapt to 

change, still resonates with our Corps today. As 

we train for each mission, we must remember 

to educate for the future—Belleau Wood, and 

the Marines who fought there, are an everlasting 

memory pointing us in the right direction as we 

march toward the future.

General Robert B. Neller

Commandant

United States Marine Corps
xi

preface

I

n the summer of 2017, the newly arrived 

president of Marine Corps University, Brigadier General William J. Bowers, ordered 

a lecture series, “The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 

100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles.” The series would include four lectures, 

and it was to be supported by an anthology produced by History Division, providing readings 

to the students on the topics each lecture would 

cover. The intent was to produce an anthology 

of lasting worth to Marines, broadly depicting 

keystone moments in the history of the Corps 

during the century following the Battle of Belleau Wood. 

This volume presents a collection of 35 extracts, articles, letters, orders, interviews, and 

biographies. The work is intended to serve as a 

general overview and provisional reference to 

inform both Marines and the general public of 

the broad outlines of notable trends and controversies in Marine Corps history. 

Additional support for this work came from 

the Journal of Military History, Naval History, MCU 

Journal, SEAPOWER, Proceedings, Leatherneck Magazine, and the Marine Corps Gazette, all of whom 

gave permission to reprint their articles. Their 

cooperation made this anthology possible.

The Legacy of Belleau Wood could not have 

been published without the professional efforts of the History Division staff. The editors 

would like to thank the former director of Marine Corps History, Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, 

and Deputy Director Paul J. Weber. Colleagues 

Douglas E. Nash, Dr. Fred H. Allison, Dr. Alexandra Kindell, Joan C. Thomas, Alisa M. Whitley, Kara Newcomer, and Annette D. Amerman 

provided unflagging professional advice and 

support. Our Editing and Design Branch, led by 

Angela J. Anderson, was instrumental in transforming the manuscript into a finished product, 

editing the manuscript, and overseeing the production process.

This anthology is organized into four chapters covering the rise of the modern Marine 

Corps, the lessons of the Second World War 

and the Korean War, the Wilson/Barrow renaissance of the 1970s and 1980s, the modern 

Marine Corps and the future, and an appendix 

detailing military historiography as a subject of 

professional study for Marines. This work is not 

meant to be an authoritative history, but rather 

it is intended to be used as a starting point for 

Marines, the general public, and academic researchers.

The Legacy of Belleau Wood
American illustrator N. C. Wyeth’s painting, It was 

after this attack that the High Command published to 

the German army: “The moral effect of our own gunfire 

can not seriously impede the advance of the American 

Infantry,” appeared in Redbook magazine in the early 

1930s. 

Brandywine River Museum of Art
1

Chapter One

The Rise of the 

Early Modern 

Marine Corps and 

World War I

by Paul Westermeyer

As the twentieth century approached, 

thoughtful Marines had cause to be 

concerned for the future of their 

Corps. Founded in 1775 during the American 

War of Independence almost as an afterthought, 

the Corps’ served throughout the nineteenth 

century in the traditional Marine role of ships 

detachments, maintaining shipboard discipline 

and providing trained soldiery for boarding and 

landing parties. In addition, the budget conscious American government added naval yard 

security to the traditional duties of Marines in 

the Age of Sail (ca. 1570–1860). The early Corps 

performed these duties honorably, occasionally 

with distinction, and also often served ashore 

to augment the small United States Army, most 

notably in the Seminole Wars, the Mexican War, 

and the Civil War. 

Despite the Corps’ demonstrated usefulness, obsolescence threatened at the end of 

the nineteenth century. Naval technology and 

changing demographics were quickly rendering 

the Corps’ traditional duties moot. Its future as 
2 chapter one

a combat organization was bleak; it seemed likely its ranks would be absorbed by the Army or 

reduced to the ceremonial band in the capital 

and to watchmen at various naval yards along 

the coasts. 

Instead, during the next decades, the Marine Corps transformed itself, increasing dramatically the professionalism of its officers and 

finding a raison d’etre as the nation’s expeditionary force in being. The hard realities of wind and 

sail had provided the need for Marines in the 

Age of Sail, and the technological necessities of 

the Age of Steam provided the same impetus for 

Marines. Navies required overseas bases to project their power, and the Corps would (occasionally over its own objections) take the mission of 

seizing and defending advanced naval bases. 

The Spanish-American War foreshadowed 

this future when a battalion of Marines seized 

Guantánamo Bay as a forward base from which 

the U.S. Navy could blockade the island of 

Cuba. The Corps’ success at Guantánamo compared favorably to the more haphazard embarkation and ship of the Army expedition, as did 

the deployment of Marines in the Far East as 

“colonial infantry.” The Army’s own increased 

professionalism and sense of purpose added another danger to the Corps’ existence, however. 

Army officers saw the volunteer regiments and 

state militias that comprised a large percentage 

of American ground forces through the SpanishAmerican War as a primary cause for the chaos and unprofessionalism of mobilization in 

that conflict, and lobbied to formalize the state 

forces into the “National Guard.” This put the 

Corps’ secondary purpose as an augmentation 

to American land forces at risk. 

America’s entry into World War I provided 

an opportunity for the Corps to prove its increased professionalism and its value as a 

military Service, but there were significant difficulties. The Army was equally determined to 

prove it was a modern, professional organization 

on par with European armies; as such, it was not 

eager to grant the Navy Department’s land forces a chance to show it up. Organizationally, the 

Corps would have to field regiments and brigades to act on the western front, and the Army 

questioned whether the Corps had any officers 

capable of commanding and staffing large land 

forces of that nature. And like the Army, the Marine Corps would be forced to expand rapidly, 

going from 10,397 officers and men in 1916 to 

75,101 in 1918.

The Corps responded to these challenges with vigor, producing an enviable battlefield 

record in the war despite its relatively tiny size. 

Meanwhile, General John A. Lejeune proved Marine officers were just as professionally capable as 

their Army and Navy counterparts, rising to command the Army’s 2d Division. And in the Corps’ 

first major action in the Great War, the Battle of 

Belleau Wood, Marine tenacity and media savvy catapulted the Corps into even greater public consciousness, cementing the Marine Corps’ 

self-proclaimed reputation as an elite force into 

reality. 
3

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 

1880–1898

by Jack Shulimson

Journal of Military History, 1996

I

n December 1880, Marine Captain Henry 

Clay Cochrane, recently promoted after 18 

years of military service, caustically entered 

in his diary, “a great year in the M.C. [Marine 

Corps].”1

 He then recorded a litany of misfortunes that had befallen the officer corps: one 

lieutenant had died in a riding accident; another 

had been sent “home insane;” while still another 

was dismissed for cause. A Navy court-martial 

convicted a senior Marine colonel for behavior unbecoming an officer and the Philadelphia 

police arrested a Marine major for drunkenly 

accosting women in the street. Reform legislation that would modestly expand the officer 

corps and open up promotions remained stalled 

in Congress. The president’s appointment of a 

well-connected junior lieutenant to a plump staff 

position of assistant quartermaster over more 

than 30 of his seniors caused even more rancor. 

There was little to encourage that “small band 

1

 The original article came from Jack Shulimson, “Military Professionalism: The Case of the U.S. Marine Officer Corps, 1880–

1898,” Journal of Military History 60, no. 2 (1996): 231–42. Minor 

revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

of officers” who desired to reform the Corps.2

The Marine Corps was an organizational 

anomaly and in some disarray. Dispersed into 

small ship’s detachments and navy yard guards 

of usually 100 men or less, the Marine Corps 

had no formal company, battalion, or regimental 

structure. Marine reformers among the younger 

officers, called for either a “funeral or a resuscitation” for the Corps.3

During the three decades following the 

Civil War, the officers of the U.S. Marine Corps 

underwent a metamorphosis from an almost 

moribund state to a near professional status. At 

the beginning of the period, influence was the 

2

 Henry Clay Cochrane Diary, General Entry, 1880, Henry 

Clay Cochrane Papers, PCS 1, Marine Corps Historical Center 

(MCHC); Commandant of the Marine Corps, Annual Report, 1880, 

529; Capt Woodhull S. Schenck to SecNav, 10 March 1880, Letters Received, 1880, RG 80, General Records of the Department 

of the Navy, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (NARA); New York Times, 12 February 1880, 5; and 

Army and Navy Journal, 3 July 1880, 978. 3

 Henry Clay Cochrane, “A Resuscitation or a Funeral,” 1 October 1875, Cochrane Papers, MCHC; New York Times, 29 December 

1875, 5; and Maj James Forney, “The Marines: With an Account of 

Life at a Marine Post,” in United Service: A Monthly Review of Military 

and Naval Affairs, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: L. R. Hamersly, April 1889), 

89, 94–95.
4 chapter one

usual avenue of entry. Older officers were apathetic while junior and company grade officers 

faced long frustrating years with little prospect 

for promotion. By the turn of the century, nevertheless, a complete reversal had nearly occurred. Both entry into and promotion in the 

officer corps depended upon passing relatively 

stringent examinations. Many officers were 

graduates of the [United States] Naval Academy, 

and still others had attended advanced schools of 

both the Army and Navy. The Spanish-American 

War and internal reform account only in part 

for this transformation.

My study of the Marine officer corps would 

confirm [American political scientist] Samuel P. 

Huntington’s periodization of military professionalism but differs markedly with his concept 

of the “isolation” of the American military. While 

accepting Huntington’s general definition of the 

military professional: “expertise in the management of violence, responsibility, and corporateness,” I would maintain that such descriptive 

traits are much less important than “professional 

jurisdiction.”4

The Marine officer experience was a result 

of the several larger trends that altered all aspects 

of American life during this period. Among the 

most important of these impulses were technological change, advances in formal knowledge, 

an expanding industrialism, a restructuring both 

of private and public organizations, and a per4

 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and 

Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 7–10, 

19–54.

Group of Marine officers, 1st Battalion Marines, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, NH, 1898.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH119980
jack shulimson 5

vasive professionalization of American society. 

Whether called a “search for order,” the “visible 

hand,” or the “organizational revolution,” the 

dominant feature of this entire process was its 

avowed emphasis upon rationality and control.5

It was in the industrialization and urbanization processes of the late nineteenth century 

5

 Daniel Beaver, “The American Military and the ‘New’ Institutional History” (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Indianapolis, IN, May 1985), 2–4; 

James L. Abrahamson, American Arms for a New Century: The Making

of a Great Military Power (New York: Free Press, 1981), xii; Kenneth 

E. Boulding, The Organizational Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of 

Economic Organization (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 49, 

202; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: 

Hill and Wang, 1967), vii–ix, xiii–xiv, 11–43; Alfred D. Chandler 

Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business 

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 1–14; and 

Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The 

American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of 

Authority (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 3–4, 234.

that the professions, like other aspects of American life, took on their modern cast. There was 

a virtual explosion of professional groups and 

organizations. Of the 58 professional organizations formed during the nineteenth century, 37 

or more than 60 percent came into existence 

between 1870 and 1900. These newer associations reflected an increasing specialization and 

tendency toward technology in response to the 

needs of the new age.6

While there is general agreement about 

the centrality of the professions to the social 

and economic structure of modern civilization, 

there are wide differences in the scholarly com6

 Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class 

and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: Norton, 1976), 80; and Ralph S. Bates, Scientific Societies in the United 

States (Cambridge, MA: Pergamon Press, 1965), 85, 105, 121.

Typical tent quarters for Marines at Camp Sampson, Key West, FL.

Marine Corps History Division
6 chapter one

munity about the nature of professionalism. 

Some would restrict the discussion to such professions as the law and medicine, while others 

write articles about the professionalization of 

nearly everyone. There is even disagreement 

over whether there is a standard definition of 

professionalism, or whether there is even a need 

for such a definition. As one author observed, 

the debate has resulted in a “confusion so profound that there are even disagreements about 

the existence of the confusion.”7

While much of the discussion of professionalism remains mired in disputation about traits, 

functions, and power, sociologist Andrew Abbott has suggested that scholars have left unexamined the actual work that professions do.8

 For 

7

 A. P. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, The Professions (Oxford, 

UK: Clarendon Press, 1933), 3; Harold L. Wilensky, “The Professionalization of Everyone?,” American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 

2 (1964): 137–58; Terence J. Johnson, ed., Professions and Power 

(London: Routledge, 1972), 23; Eliot Freidson, Professional Powers: 

A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (Chicago, IL: 

University of Chicago Press, 1986), 30–32; Geoffrey Millerson, 

The Qualifying Associations: A Study in Professionalization (London: 

Routledge, 1964), 4–5; Geoffrey Millerson, “Dilemmas of Professionalism,” New Society (June 1964): 15–16; and W. J. Goode, 

“The Theoretical Limits of Professionalization,” in A. Etzioni, ed., 

The Semi-professions and Their Organization (New York: Free Press, 

1969), 266–313. The quotation is from Johnson, Professions and 

Power, 22. 8

 Among sociologists, who have written most extensively on the 

subject, there are at least three identifiable schools on the subject 

of professionalism. For convenience, they can be designated the 

functionalists, the structuralists or “traitists,” and the “monopolists” or power theorists. The functionalists, largely associated with 

[American sociologist] Talcott Parsons, submit that the professions 

provide the vital functions of society. With an emphasis on “cognitive rationality” and the social responsibility of the professions, 

Parsons and his adherents focused largely on the expert-client 

relationship. For discussion of the functionalist perspective in the 

literature, see Talcott Parsons, “Professions,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 12, 536–47; Johnson, Professions and Power, 23, 

32–47; Bernard Barber, “Some Problems in the Sociology of the 

Professions,” Daedalus (Fall 1963): 669–88; Michael F. Winter, The 

Culture and Control of Expertise: Toward a Sociological Understanding 

of Librarianship (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 42–44; 

Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division 

of Expert Labor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 

15; and Andrew Abbott, “Perspectives on Professionalism” (paper 

delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American 

Historians, Indianapolis, IN, May 1985), 2–3. In contrast to the 

functionalists, the structuralists concentrated on the structure or 

attributes of the professions. They attempted to identify the defining characteristics of any given profession. The difficulty, however, was that there were probably more differences among the 

structuralists than there were between the structuralists and the 

functionalists. For discussion on the literature of the structuralists, 

see Abbott, The System of Professions, 15; Abbott, “Perspectives on 

Professionalism,” 2–3; Johnson, Professions and Power, 23–30; Winter, Culture and Control of Expertise, 21–23, 26–27, 37, 119; Millerson, “Dilemmas of Professionalism,” 15; Bengt Abrahamsson, 

Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 

Publications, 1972), 14–15; and Wilensky, “The Professionalization of Everyone?,” 137–58. Beginning in the 1960s, more recent 

writers have questioned the validity of both the structuralist and 

functionalist positions. With such scholars as Eliot Freidson, Magali S. Larson, and Terence Johnson in the forefront, they contended 

that both schools emphasized the positive while ignoring the negative aspects of professionalism. Criticizing the older scholarship 

for its over concern with form and structure, Freidson, Johnson, 

and Larson argued that the new scholarship should concentrate 

upon the concept of professions as ideologies to control the work 

place. Rather than accepting the older view of collegiality and 

mutual trust as the trademark of professional life, they insisted 

U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster showing Marines firing artillery from the deck of a ship, 1914. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
jack Shulimson 7

Abbott, it is not the characteristic or structure 

of professionalism that is significant but rather 

the work the profession performs, how it controls that work, and its relationship with similar 

or competing professions. The essential element 

is the link between the profession and its work, 

which Abbott labels “jurisdiction.” From the 

perspective of intersecting professional jurisdictions, he argues, one can determine how profesthat “dominance and autonomy” were its chief characteristics. For 

extended discussion of the power theorists, see Eliot Freidson, 

“Professions and the Occupational Principle,” in Freidson, ed., The 

Professions and Their Prospects (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 

1973), 19–38, 29–31; Freidson, Professional Powers, 28–29, 211; 

Abbott, The System of Professions, 5; Johnson, Professions and Power, 

32, 37–39; Larson, Rise of Professionalism, xvi–xviii; and Winter, 

Culture and Control, 44 – 45, 50.

sions develop, how they relate to one another, 

and what is the basis of the work they do.9

From this perspective, professions neither 

stand alone nor are encompassed by any overarching theory of professionalism: “They exist in a 

system.” The system, however, is a complex one. 

Changes in one area may work their way through 

the entire system of professions, but more likely this “ripple effect” is confined to “one general 

task area, through the rearrangement of jurisdictions, the strengthening of some, the weakening 

of others.” Thus, the interaction of professions 

in any given instance is usually limited to such 

general task areas. Assuming that the profession 

of military officer is one such task area or system 

within the general system of professionalism, in 

effect a system within a system, Abbott’s construct provides a most useful framework.10

Some scholars have questioned whether 

military officership, itself, is a profession. As 

[historian] Allan R. Millett suggests, the viewpoint depends somewhat upon one’s concept 

about the morality of war and the need of society for military force. In the early 1930s, 

British sociologists A. M. Carr-Saunders and 

P. A. Wilson dismissed discussion of the military 

officer “because the service which soldiers are 

trained to render is one which it is hoped they 

will never be called upon to perform.”11 Yet, by 

the end of the nineteenth century, both the U.S. 

Army and the Navy officer corps had taken on 

attributes of professionalism common to all the 

modern professions.12

9

 Abbott, “Perspectives on Professionalism,” 10; and Abbott, System 

of Professions, 8–9,18–20, 86–91, 318, 320–21.

10 Abbott, “Perspectives on Professionalism,” 13–15; and Abbott, 

System of Professions, 2–3, 33, 35, 59, 69, 86–91, 111–12. 11 Allan Millett, Military Professionalism and Officership in America 

(Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1977), 

12–13; and Carr-Saunders and Wilson, The Professions, 3. 12 Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military 

Establishment, 3d ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1974), 

U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Service broadside, 

1866.

Official U.S. Marine Corps image
8 chapter one

The literature on military professionalism 

has largely concentrated on such attributes as 

education, inculcation of military ethics, and 

socialization of the officer corps. Much of the 

discussion has dealt with the professionalization 

of both the individual officer and of the officer 

corps in general. A large concern is the correlation of the professionalization of the military officer corps to its relationship, both political and 

professional, to the civilian community.13

Military professionalism did not evolve 

127; William B. Skelton, “Professionalization in the U.S. Army Officer Corps during the Age of Jackson,” Armed Forces and Society 1, 

no. 4 (August 1975): 443–71; William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 361–62; Timothy K. Nenninger, 

“The Fort Leavenworth Schools: Post-Graduate Military Education and Professionalization in the U.S. Army, 1880–1920” (PhD 

dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974 ), 2–3; and Timothy 

K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, 

Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–

1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 6. Skelton would 

argue that the actual professionalization of the Army officer corps 

occurred much earlier, during the antebellum period, and that the 

Civil War and its aftermath only disrupted this process.

13 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 1–10, 19–54; Abrahamsson, 

Military Professionalism, 12–13, 15–17, 19, 36, 59–60, 69; Millett, 

Military Professionalism, 2, 4–5, 12–13, 18–22; Allan R. Millett, 

“Professional Military Education and Marine Officers,” Marine 

Corps Gazette, November 1989, 46–56; Janowitz and Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 123–24, 127, 142; Skelton, “Professionalization in the U.S. Army,” 443–71; Skelton, An American 

Profession of Arms, 359–60; Nenninger, Leavenworth Schools, 3–20; 

Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century, xiii–xv, 33–36, 40, 

48, 147–48, 150; John Gates, “The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army 

Officers in the Late 19th Century,” Parameters 10, no. 3 (September 

1980): 32–45; John Gates, “The ‘New’ Military Professionalism,” 

Armed Forces and Society 11, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 427–36; Edward 

M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 96, 

270; Sam C. Sarkesian, “Moral and Ethical Foundations of Military 

Professionalism,” in Military Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection 

of Essays, ed. James Brown and Michael J. Collins (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University, 1981), 1–22; Sam C. Sarkesian, 

Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism (Cambridge, 

MA: Pergamon Press, 1981), ix–xi, 7, 9–13, 42, 254; Ronald H. 

Spector, The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1977), 1–26; and Carol 

Ann Reardon, “The Study of Military History and the Growth of 

Professionalism in the U.S. Army before World War I” (PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1987), 1–5, 11, 15, 40. Like 

this author, most of the above would accept Huntington’s definition of the military professional, but would reject the concept of 

his alleged isolation from the rest of society.

in a single line. Both the Navy and Army were 

complex, multifaceted organizations. The broad 

rubric of military officer contained various 

specialties with varied interests and ambitions. 

Within the Navy, for example, there were line 

officers, engineers, surgeons, paymasters, and 

naval constructors, not to mention the Marines, each with his own specific skills and each 

competing for part of the naval budget. Large 

independent bureaus, mostly made up of staff 

officers, wielded great power within both the 

Army and Navy and especially with Congress. In 

both Services, often divisive differences existed 

between line and staff. This occasionally acrimonious debate between staff and line was more 

than a simple struggle for power; it was in actuality a struggle for recognition and the establishment of jurisdictions by competing military 

professionals. Both Navy and Army line officers 

interpreted military officership in the narrow 

sense of command on the battlefield or on board 

ship. They viewed other officers and the bureaus 

as merely support to their own activities. Although not differing with the line officers over 

the general functions of the Army and Navy, the 

bureau and staff officers wanted to retain control of their own discrete organizations. While 

willing to cooperate and consult with the line, 

the bureaus and staffs “used all their resources at 

the intersects of power” within the Services and 

with Congress “to gain acceptance as valuable 

soldiers of the Republic.”14

As part of the federal government, the 

military could not hope to escape the political 

realities of the time. Political considerations 

permeated the entire military structure. The 

president appointed his secretaries of Army and 

Navy for their political strengths, not because of 

14 Beaver, “The American Military and the ‘New’ Institutional History,” 12–14.
jack shulimson 9

their military expertise. Military officers were 

dependent upon the patronage system for their 

initial appointments to West Point or Annapolis 

or for their direct commissions into the Service. 

Political sponsorship often assured officers of 

career-enhancing positions and assignments. 

Individual congressmen and senators generally 

were not especially interested in broad questions of military policy and organization, but 

were very concerned with questions of patronage. As one writer observed, “Perhaps nothing 

caused so many irritations to so many members 

of the House and Senate as their failure to have 

their way in the thousands of small appointments that were required across the country 

from year to year.” Military professionals, such 

as Emory Upton, who challenged the political 

system directly, often ended up defeated and 

frustrated. Most successful military officers became adept at bureaucratic politics. Remarking 

on the political adroitness of the military, one 

historian concluded, “military services acted 

much as pressure groups, exploiting their contacts with those in positions of influence and using public-relations techniques to create general 

support for military reform.”15

Using Abbott’s construct and carrying it 

one step further, one can make the case that for 

the military profession, jurisdiction is where the 

outside forces of society, the individual military 

organization or Service, and professionalism all 

come together. During the nineteenth century, 

the outside driving societal force was the new 

technology and industrialism, which revolutionized warfare on both land and sea. For the naval 

15 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 163–92; Gates, “New Military 

Professionalism,” 432–33; Leonard D. White, The Republican Era: A 

Study in Administrative History, 1861–1901 (New York: Macmillan, 

1958), 26–27; Ambrose, Upton, 135; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 256–58; and Abrahamsson, America Arms for a

New Century, 150. The first quote is from White while the second 

is from Abrahamsson.

officer, it resulted in a professional jurisdiction 

based upon organization, technology, and the 

strategic concept of sea power; for the Army 

officer, it created a jurisdiction based upon organization, new weaponry, and the study of land 

warfare. In contrast to both the Navy and Army 

officer, the Marine officer had no such clear demarcation of jurisdictional responsibility. While 

sharing many of the attributes of both the Army 

and Navy officer, the Marine officer’s jurisdiction revolved around organization and mission.16

The Marine officers of the last decades of the 

nineteenth century accommodated slowly and 

with difficulty to the sudden challenges in organization and mission that the modern era posed. 

In the decade following the Civil War, despite 

the appearance of a nascent reform movement, 

Marine officers failed to agree among themselves 

about their own role or that of their Service.17

During the 1880s, naval reformers and professionals inaugurated an intellectual ferment 

16 Much of the examination of military professionalization has ignored the question of professional military jurisdictions, except 

for the differences between line and staff officers in the Army and 

line and engineers in the Navy. Historian Peter Karsten perhaps 

skirts the fringes of professional jurisdictions when he argues that 

it was “career anxiety” that accounted for the professionalization 

of the so-called “naval aristocracy.” Carol Ann Reardon touches 

upon a jurisdictional dispute, not between rival groups of military 

officers, but between professional historians and Army officers in 

the use and understanding of military history. For the most part, 

however, most writers on military professionalization have largely ignored the jurisdictional areas that both differentiate and link 

together the various military professionals. See Peter Karsten, 

The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence 

of Modern American Navalism (New York, 1972), 292–93; and Reardon, “Growth of Professionalism in the U.S. Army before World 

War I,” 8, 34–36, 38. It is interesting to contrast the confrontation between Army officers and historians to the accommodation 

reached by naval officers and the profession of history. RAdm 

Alfred Thayer Mahan, the proponent of history and seapower, 

served a term as president of the American Historical Association, 

and RAdm French E. Chadwick, the chronicler of the SpanishAmerican War, was also a respected member of the historical community.

17 This and the following paragraphs are based on Jack Shulimson, 

The Marines’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898 (Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1993).
10 chapter one

within the Navy that led to new thinking about 

naval warfare that tied the Marine Corps and 

its officers closer to the Navy. Curiously, Marine officers and Marine Commandant Colonel 

Charles G. McCawley played only a peripheral 

role in these developments. The Marine Commandant saw reform in much narrower terms. 

He and other Marine reformers sought to make 

the Marine Corps an elite guard force for the 

Navy, concentrating on raising officer standards, 

improving military discipline, and cutting desertion rates. Their efforts to push reform measures 

through Congress, however, proved fruitless. It 

was only a legislative fluke resulting from the 

efforts of certain naval progressives that finally 

led to new Marine officers coming from the Naval Academy, the only major innovation during 

this period. While these naval professionals had 

no great love for the Marine Corps, they were 

willing to use the Marine Corps to further their 

own interests. It was only a few Marine nonconformists, such as Captain Daniel Pratt Mannix, 

who established a school of application in China, 

who sought out new directions for their Corps.

The years from 1885 to 1889 continued to 

be a transitional period for Marine officer professionalism. Although the 1885 U.S. intervention in Panama foreshadowed the employment 

of future Marine expeditionary forces, it resulted in the first rift between the Navy progressives 

and the Marine leadership. The Marine Commandant rejected any change in Marine structure, including the establishment of a permanent 

Marine landing force. Still, naval professionals in 

their literature continued to discuss landing operations and at the same time hinted at limiting 

the role of Marine officers on board ship. On the 

other hand, Marine officers demonstrated little 

initiative, although the new second lieutenants, 

graduates of the Naval Academy, infused some 

fresh blood and a certain elan into the Marine 

officer corps.

During the tumultuous years from 1889 to 

1893 for the Marine Corps, the new battleship 

Navy became a reality and the United States 

shifted to a naval policy of control of the seas, 

at least in American coastal waters and in the 

Caribbean. These developments led to new opportunities for Marine officer professionalism as 

well as new hazards. A Navy board recommended the removal of Marines from naval warships, 

while on the other hand, in the Navy’s first contingency planning effort, Captain Alfred Thayer 

Mahan called for Marines to “constitute a most 

important re-enforcement, nay, backbone, to 

any force landing on the enemy’s coast.”18

A new Marine Commandant, Colonel Charles 

18 “Contingency Plan of Operations in Case of War with Great 

Britain, New York, December 1890,” reprinted in Letters and Papers 

of Alfred Thayer Mahan, ed. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, 3 vols. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 3, 559–82.

Richard N. Brooke, Col Charles G. McCawley, Eighth 

Commandant of the Marine Corps (1876–91). 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
jack shulimson 11

Heywood, influenced by Captain Mannix and 

other Marine reformers, introduced several 

measures to raise Marine officer professionalism. Among other reforms, these included more 

stringent promotion standards, including examinations and the establishment of a School of 

Application. At the same time, the retirement of 

several senior officers opened up promotion opportunities. Some Naval Academy cadets sought 

out the Marine Corps because it actually offered 

faster immediate promotion than the Navy.

Heywood also attempted to identify the 

mission of the Marine Corps with that of the 

Navy. He tried to assign Marine ship detachments under their own officers to the secondary 

gun batteries of the new steel armored ships. In 

a sense, this endeavor backfired in that it brought 

the Marines into conflict with the Navy progressives. In what amounted to a jurisdictional dispute, younger naval professionals pushed openly 

to remove Marine detachments from warships. 

This issue about the secondary battery and the 

Marine ship detachments would continue to 

color and blur all Marine and Navy professional 

relationships.

From 1893 to the Spanish-American War, 

minor skirmishes continued to revolve around 

the secondary battery and Marine ship detachment issues. An aborted attempt by Army 

artillery officers to form Marine artillery organization under the Navy complicated the situation even further. At the same time, the Marine 

Corps School of Application flourished, Marine 

officer standards continued to be raised, and 

Marine officers attended the Naval War College 

and served on the faculty of that institution.

During these years, reform merged with 

officer professionalism and institutional and individual self-interest. These factors combined 

with patronage politics in Congress and in the 

Navy Department to provide the background 

for the playing out of the Marine and Navy officer relationships during this period. The criticism of the naval progressives, however, had 

little to do with the quality of the Marine officer 

or enlisted men, but rather with the relevance of 

the Marine Corps to the Navy. They simply did 

not want Marines on board Navy warships. At 

the end of 1897, the secretary of the Navy created a Navy Personnel Board, headed by Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, to 

study the complete reorganization of officers in 

the Navy Department. When the Navy Personnel Board examined the possible amalgamation 

of the Marine officer corps with the Navy, doubt 

and confusion shook the Marine officer corps. 

Many Marine officers wondered aloud whether 

they had any role with the Navy and even suggested half-seriously the incorporation of the 

Richard N. Brooke, MajGen Charles Heywood, Ninth 

Commandant of the Marine Corps (1891–1903). 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
12 chapter one

Marine Corps into the coast artillery regiments 

of the Army. Obviously, despite the advances in 

the attainment of the outward professional attributes of the military officer, the Marine officer 

had failed to achieve a clear jurisdictional link 

as a professional in the Navy. In a sense, it was a 

period of missed connections.

The Spanish-American War proved to be a 

defining period for the Marine Corps. While not 

fully knowing how they would use it, naval authorities immediately ordered the establishment 

of a Marine battalion with its own transport. Although numbering less than a quarter of the active Marine Corps, this battalion’s activities not 

only received public approbation, but also had 

implications for the future relationship of the 

Marine Corps with the Navy. Despite a somewhat rocky start at Guantánamo, the Marine 1st 

Battalion proved itself in combat. By seizing the 

heights on Guantánamo, it provided a safe anchorage for Navy ships. In effect, the Marines 

seized and protected an advanced base for the 

fleet blockading Santiago.

Navy strategists and planners also learned 

another lesson from the war. They quickly realized that Army and Navy officers may have very 

different and even possibly conflicting goals in 

a military campaign. The dispute between the 

Army and Navy at Santiago reflected the separate approaches of professional Army and Navy 

officers. For the Army, the vital objective was 

the capture of the Spanish garrison and the city 

of Santiago. On the other hand, the Navy’s aim 

was the destruction of the Spanish fleet. For its 

part, the Army designed an overland campaign 

to capture the city and was unwilling to sacrifice 

men to take the heights overlooking the narrow 

channel into Santiago Bay. At the same time, the 

Navy refused to chance the loss of any of its ships 

by running the channel. Although both attained 

their desired ends, their basic conflict remained 

unresolved. For the Navy, the message was that 

it could not depend upon the Army to secure 

land-based sites for naval purposes. The Navy 

required its own land force. It had this in the 

Marine Corps.

In 1900, the newly formed Navy General 

Board assigned to the Marine Corps the establishment of advanced bases in support of the 

fleet. This advanced base mission finally gave 

This drawing by Col John W. Thomason Jr. depicts a 

Marine company commander in World War I. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
jack shulimson 13

the Marine officer that clear connection to the 

Navy that had eluded him over the previous two 

decades. The resulting dynamics created a tension that influenced both the professionalization 

of the Marine officer corps and the institutional 

survival of the Marine Corps itself.

As important, however, as all of this may 

have been for Marine professionalism, the basic 

factor that stands out was the inherent insecurity of the Marine officer. Throughout this entire period, it seemed that no matter how much 

the Marine officer tried to improve himself, he 

was rebuffed by his naval colleagues. Although a 

small minority of naval officers may have looked 

to the Marine Corps as a possible landing force 

for the Navy, most looked upon it largely as a 

relic of the Age of Sail. The circumstances of the 

Spanish-American War and its consequences, 

however, forced the Navy progressives to reexamine their views about the Marine Corps. 

This still left the Marine officer in an innocuous position and resulted in a certain amount of 

institutional and professional schizophrenia and 

paranoia. For example, although Colonel Heywood and other Marine officers accepted the 

new advanced base mission in 1900, they continued to resist abandoning any of their traditional relationships with the Navy. Heywood and 

his successors continued to argue the viability of 

the assignment of Marines on board Navy warships. They constantly defined, redefined, and 

justified their roles and missions both to themselves and to everyone else.

What then can be concluded about Marine 

officer professionalism? From one aspect, it was 

self-directed and simulated the features of any 

other professional military officer group. In 

a very real way, the Marine officer’s concerns 

with military discipline, tactics, and questions of 

enlisted morale and desertion rates were very 

similar to those of Army officers. These resulted in a certain elitism and esprit de corps. They 

had almost nothing, however, to do with mission 

and, most important, with the establishment of 

an area of professional jurisdiction. If the Marine 

officer had to depend only on these acquired professional traits, he and his Corps would have disappeared entirely or been absorbed completely 

by the Army. The intersection of the jurisdiction 

and responsibilities of the Marine officer with 

those of his naval counterpart, therefore, provides the best approach for the analysis of Marine officer professionalism.

Marine officer professionalism, thus, consisted of two separate but related strains. In the 

first instance, it consisted of the outward traits 

that characterized most professionals. The second strain related to the professional jurisdiction that the Marine officer had to carve out 

for himself within the Navy. After the SpanishAmerican War, while the rhetoric of the secondary battery and Marine guards on board 

Navy warships occasionally ruffled the Marine 

and Navy connection, there developed during 

the next decades a “continuity and consensus” 

about the Marine mission with the Navy. The 

consensus centered around the advanced base 

and expeditionary roles of the Marine Corps.19

The Marine officer participated in, affected, and was affected by the society and forces 

around him. This included the basic search for 

structure that characterized much of American 

life during the last decades of the nineteenth 

century. As shown here, this search for structure 

19 Graham A. Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, “Continuity and Consensus: The Evolution of the Marine Advance Base Force, 1900–

1922,” in Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, 

1977, ed. David II. White and John W. Gordon (Charleston, SC: 

Citadel Academy, 1979), 31–36.
14 chapter one

took place in a confused arena where the old 

forms continued to have full play, and competed 

with the new. The new professionalism coexisted with partisan politics, competing interest 

groups, personal and institutional self-interest, 

advancing technology, and an America beginning to look outward.

Col Donald L. Dickson produced this drawing as part of a series illustrating U.S. Marine Corps uniforms 

throughout history. This scene, created in 1936, depicts two majors in full dress, a first lieutenant, and a private at the turn of the twentieth century. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
15

President Theodore Roosevelt’s attempt 

in November 1908 to remove Marine 

guards from the warships of the U.S. 

Navy resulted in a noisy congressional and public controversy.1

 This episode is often depicted as 

a simple melodrama in which Marines heroically 

and effectively rose to save their Corps from a 

cabal of naval officers bent on its destruction. 

In fact, the issues were more complex and were 

related to the effort to redefine Marine Corps 

roles and missions in the twentieth century 

steam-and-steel Navy. In the larger context, 

the controversy illustrates both the complex 

bureaucratic infighting that shaped so much of 

Progressive Era reform and the growing estrangement between the lame duck Roosevelt 

and the Old Guard Republican congressional 

leadership.

In November 1908, the Marine Corps consisted of 267 officers and 9,100 enlisted men. 

1

 The original article came from Jack Shulimson and Graham A. 

Cosmas, “Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Sea-Going Mission,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 65, no. 11 (1981): 54–61. Minor revisions 

were made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

TEDDY ROOSEVELT

AND THE CORPS’ SEA-GOING MISSION

by Jack Shulimson and Graham A. Cosmas

Marine Corps Gazette, 1981

Approximately one-third of this force was stationed afloat, mostly as guard detachments on 

warships. Another third was on shore duty outside the continental United States with the largest contingent in the Philippines. The remaining 

one-third served within the United States as 

navy yard guards and constituted a reserve from 

which expeditionary forces could be organized. 

Since the Spanish-American War, Marine Corps 

strength had expanded threefold. In the latest 

increase, in 1908, Congress had added almost 

800 officers and men and had advanced the 

Commandant of the Corps to the rank of major 

general.

While operating under the Navy Department, the Marine Corps enjoyed the legal status of a separate Service. Its staff in Washington, 

headed by the Commandant, was closely allied 

with the powerful Navy Department bureaus 

and had a reputation for skillful and effective 

congressional lobbying. Despite this reputation, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, in the words of 

one Marine officer, was “not altogether a happy family.” Major General Commandant George 
16 chapter one

F. Elliott, known for his blunt and often hasty 

speech, was partially deaf and rumored to be 

overly fond of the bottle. His staff was riddled 

with intrigue as ambitious, politically connected officers pursued their own bureaucratic aggrandizement. Field Marines often regarded 

the Washington staff with suspicion. Lieutenant 

Colonel John A. Lejeune denounced “the politicians stationed at Headquarters” and declared, 

“Fortunately the real Marine Corps is elsewhere 

and consists of the 10,000 officers and men who 

are scattered around the world.”

Within the Navy, sharp divisions had emerged 

between the so-called progressive reformers 

and the largely conservative bureau chiefs. The 

reformers, mostly young commanders and captains, favored establishing a Navy general staff, 

modeled on that recently created for the Army. 

President Roosevelt generally sympathized with 

the reformers and had as his personal naval aide 

one of the most aggressive of them, Commander William S. Sims, yet the reformers usually 

met frustration at the hands of the bureau chiefs 

who enjoyed strong congressional support. The 

reformers generally viewed the Marine Corps, 

or at least its Washington headquarters, which 

usually sided with the bureau chiefs, as an obstacle to their plans. One of the more vociferous 

Navy progressives, Commander William F. Fullam, claimed that “the Marines and the bureau 

Editorial cartoon by John L. De Mar addressing the controversy over Marines on Navy ships. 

The Washington Post, 26 February 1909
shulimson and cosmas 17

system are twins. Both must go before our Navy 

. . . can be properly prepared for war.”

Since the early 1890s, Fullam had been in 

the forefront of a movement among naval officers to take Marine guard detachments off the 

Navy’s fighting ships. Fullam and his cohorts especially objected to the use of Marines as ships’ 

policemen, on the grounds that it was an anachronistic holdover from the days of the press gang 

and was detrimental to the training, discipline, 

and status of the modern bluejacket.

The Fullamites envisioned a new mission 

for the Marine Corps within the Navy, once the 

Corps was freed from its obsolete tasks and was 

properly organized. The reformers urged that 

the Marines be formed into permanent battalions and given their own transports, so that they 

could accompany the fleet either as an expeditionary force or to seize and fortify advance 

bases. While many Marine officers eagerly embraced the advance base mission, all Marines 

insisted that the ships’ guards be retained. They 

claimed that service on board warships kept 

Marines in close day-to-day association with 

the Navy and provided them with many of the 

skills needed for expeditionary and advance 

base duty. By 1908, Fullam’s position had gained 

many adherents among Navy line officers, but 

Headquarters Marine Corps, with its allies in 

Congress and the bureaus had defeated repeated 

efforts to remove the detachments from capital 

ships.

By mid-1908, naval reform was in the air. 

The reformers proposed to a sympathetic President Roosevelt the formation of an independent 

civilian-military commission to study Navy Department reorganization, specifically the breakup of the bureau system. As key instigators of the 

commission proposal, Fullam, in command of 

the Navy training station at Newport, and Commander Sims tried to use Sims’ influence with 

the resident to have the Marines removed from 

ships. Fullam saw success on the Marine question as “an entering wedge” to break the power 

of the bureaus. “No legislation and no Congressional action are needed,” he told Sims, “but it 

prepares the way for the new gospel that the men 

and officers who go to sea and make the ship—

the Navy—efficient must control the ship.”

On 16 September, Sims, in a long memorandum to the president, outlined the case 

against the Marines. He reviewed the 20-year 

history of the issue, emphasizing Fullam’s arguments that the use of Marines as ships’ policemen undermined the discipline and morale 

of the bluejackets. Sims cited the fact that the 

Bureau of Navigation had twice recommended 

the removal of the Marines, but that “General 

Elliott goes to the Secretary and successfully 

combats the proposition.” Sims urged Roosevelt 

to cut through this political tangle by using his 

executive authority to order the Marines off the 

ships. He stated: “The effect of removing the 

Marines from the ships would be electrical, because the demand is universal.”

Besides Sims, Fullam used a number of other formal and informal channels to reach the 

president and [the] secretary of the Navy. On 31 

August, W. D. Walker, editor of Army and Navy 

Life and a close associate of the naval reformers, 

urged Roosevelt to remove the Marine guards, 

employing essentially the same arguments as 

Fullam and Sims. More important, a close Fullam associate, Commander William R. Shoemaker, in the Bureau of Navigation, convinced 

the bureau chief, Rear Admiral John E. Pillsbury, to revive the bureau’s earlier removal recommendation. On 16 October, Pillsbury wrote 

to Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf that 

“the time has arrived when all marine detach-
18 chapter one

ments should be removed from . . . naval vessels.” Secretary Metcalf brought up the proposal 

at a cabinet meeting, and President Roosevelt 

approved it. On 23 October, Metcalf formally 

concurred in Pillsbury’s recommendation and 

directed that it be carried out.

Up to this point, all those involved in making the decision had carefully avoided consulting 

or informing General Elliott. Elliott, however, 

had received hints that the Marines’ shipboard 

position again was under attack. Earlier in October, Admiral Pillsbury had issued an order reducing the size of the Marine guard on one of 

the battleships. Although Elliott had persuaded 

Metcalf to rescind this order, he realized that the 

struggle was far from over. On 30 October, he 

discussed the issue with Sims and stated that he 

planned to ask Roosevelt directly to “have the 

pressure stopped.” Before Elliott could meet 

with the president, however, Secretary Metcalf 

informed the Commandant that the Marines 

were to come off the ships. Elliott at once counterattacked. After an unsatisfactory meeting 

with Admiral Pillsbury, Elliott, on 7 November, 

made a final appeal to Metcalf. He presented the 

secretary a long memorandum, prepared by his 

staff, which declared that:

The proposed removal of Marines from vessels of the Navy is . . . contrary to the long 

established and uninterrupted custom of the 

service, contrary to all precedents and rulings . . . contrary to the wishes of Congress, 

and is based upon no argument which is cogent or potent.

Metcalf rejected the Marine plea and informed 

“Inspection of Marines of the United States Man-of-War ‘Chicago’,” wood-engraved plate after Thure 

de Thulstrup, from Harper’s Weekly, 15 March 1890. 

Prints, Drawings, and Watercolors from the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown Digital Repository, 

Brown University Library
shulimson and cosmas 19

the Commandant that the president already had 

decided on removal. Elliott then requested permission to take his case directly to Roosevelt.

On 9 November, in his meeting with the 

president, Elliott found Roosevelt sympathetic 

to the Marines but firmly committed to their removal. In the course of the conversation, Elliott 

emphasized that many Marine officers viewed 

abolition of the ships’ guards as the “death knell” 

of the Corps. Roosevelt asked whether Elliott 

shared this opinion. Candidly, the Commandant 

replied that he did not. Roosevelt then instructed the general to draw up a statement of the 

Marine Corps mission once the guards were removed from the ships.

Elliott entrusted the preparation of the 

proposed order to three officers of his personal 

staff: Lieutenant Colonel James [E.] Mahoney, 

Lieutenant Colonel Eli K. Cole, and Major 

Charles G. Long. All three were Naval Academy 

graduates who had been closely associated with 

the emerging advance base mission. Their draft 

order avoided mention of the ships’ guards and 

provided that Marines were to garrison navy 

yards and naval stations within and beyond the 

continental limits of the United States. Marines 

were to “furnish the first line of . . . mobile defense” for overseas naval stations, and they were 

to help man the fortifications of such bases. 

The Corps was to garrison the Panama Canal 

Zone and furnish other such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as 

necessary. In an enclosure to the memorandum, 

the three officers recommended organization 

of the Marine Corps, once the ships’ guards 

were withdrawn, into nine permanent 1,100-

man regiments. Elliott and his staff obviously 

were making a virtue out of necessity by trying to stake a firm claim to the advanced base 

and expeditionary role, as well as making an expandable expeditionary organization, while conceding the loss of the ships’ detachments.

On 12 November, President Roosevelt incorporated the exact wording of Elliott’s memorandum in his executive order. The order did 

not mention ships’ guards or call for their removal, although all those concerned understood 

that to be its intent. During the next several 

months, the Bureau of Navigation gradually began the removal of the ships’ detachments. By 

early 1909, about 800 of the 2,700 ships’ guards 

had come off.

The immediate reaction to the executive 

order was predictable. Naval officers generally 

approved. Upon hearing the news of Roosevelt’s 

decision, Fullam exclaimed: “Hurrah for the 

President! God Bless him!” and compared the 

executive order to [Abraham] Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation.

Marine officers looked upon the executive 

order with misgivings at best, and most saw it as 

a first step toward the elimination of their Corps. 

One Marine officer stated: “The President’s order . . . in effect reduces the Marine Corps to 

the status of watchmen.” Rumors circulated in 

Washington that Marine officers were organizing to lobby Congress for reversal of Roosevelt’s 

decision. Despite the unhappiness among his 

officers, General Elliott loyally supported the 

executive order in public, claiming that it would 

be “the making of the Marine Corps.” On 16 

November, in response to the reported Marine 

lobbying efforts, Elliott issued a special order 

forbidding such activity as “contrary to the motto of the Corps—for ‘Semper Fidelis’ would be 

but a meaningless term if it shone only on the 

sunny side of life or duty.”

Even as Elliott publicly looked toward a 

new role for the Marine Corps within the Navy, 

Major General Leonard Wood, a confidant of 
20 chapter one

Roosevelt and a leading Army progressive, saw 

the removal of Marines from ships as an opportunity to incorporate the Corps into the Army. 

Wood and most other senior Army officers were 

looking for a way to expand the Army’s infantry. The Marine Corps had a prominent place 

in Army proposals for achieving this objective. 

During 1907, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J. Franklin Bell, floated as a trial 

balloon a plan to transfer the Army’s large coast 

artillery corps to the Navy (and incorporate it 

in the Marine Corps). This would leave room in 

the Army for more infantry regiments. Wood, 

then commanding general, Division of the Philippines, offered as a counterproposal the simple incorporation of the Marines into the Army. 

Wood, who had a wide circle of acquaintances 

within the Navy and Marine Corps, respected 

Marine military efficiency but had gained the 

impression that the Navy no longer needed the 

Corps. Late in 1907, he wrote in a letter intended for Roosevelt’s eye that the Marine Corps:

is an able body, but its desire for enlargement 

is productive of unrest. A large portion of the 

navy are in favor of dispensing with Marines 

on board ship. . . . Their numbers are . . . far 

in excess of the actual needs of the navy. We 

need them in the army.

Neither of these plans had gone beyond the 

talking stage when Roosevelt’s executive order 

reopened the entire issue of the Marines’ future. 

Wood had just returned to the United States 

to take over the Department of the East. He 

Marine Guard, War College at Coasters Harbor, Newport, RI, between 1890–1891. 

Detroit Publishing Company Photograph Collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
shulimson and cosmas 21

was already regarded as the leading candidate 

to succeed Bell as Army chief of staff. At Roosevelt’s invitation, Wood spent several days in 

mid-November as a houseguest at the Executive 

Mansion. During this visit, Wood pressed upon 

Roosevelt this view that the Marines should be 

incorporated into the Army. He argued that Elliott, through the executive order, was aiming 

to establish an expanded Marine infantry under 

the Navy Department. Wood pointed out that 

the president, under his executive authority, 

could order the Marines to duty with the Army, 

as had been done temporarily several times in 

the past. Having established such a fait accompli, 

Roosevelt, at a later time, could work out with 

Congress and the Service departments the legal 

details of the transfer. Roosevelt was receptive 

to Wood’s proposal. Already irritated with Marine lobbying, he told his military aide, Captain 

Archibald [W.] Butt, that the Marines “should be 

absorbed into the Army, and no vestige of their 

organization should be allowed to remain.”

While in Washington, Wood informally 

discussed his ideas with General Bell and other high-ranking Army officers. He also made an 

ill-fated overture to two key Marine Corps staff 

officers, Colonel Frank L. Denny and Lieutenant 

Colonel Charles L. McCawley. Both officers 

were well known in Washington social circles, 

and both had strong political connections. Denny, the son of a prominent Indiana Republican, 

had many Army acquaintances and nursed ambitions to become Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. McCawley was the son of a former Commandant and had been the military social aide to 

Presidents [William] McKinley and [Theodore] 

Roosevelt. In a chance encounter with the two 

men on the street in front of the White House, 

Wood told them that he personally favored 

transfer of the Marine Corps to the Army and 

confided that the president was inclined to such 

a course of action. He asked Denny and McCawley to sound out Marine officer sentiment.

On 23 November, Denny and McCawley 

told the Commandant, who had just returned 

to Washington, about the proposed merger with 

the Army and the president’s tentative support 

for the idea. Much to their surprise, General 

Elliott angrily denounced such a move. In a letter of protest to General Wood, Elliott claimed 

that neither he nor the secretary of the Navy had 

been told of this proposal and declared: “I would 

as soon believe there was a lost chord in Heaven” as to believe the president, after redefining 

the Corps’ mission, would contemplate separating the Marines from the Navy. Replying to 

Elliott, Wood reiterated his own support for [an] 

Army-Marine amalgamation but denied that he 

spoke for the president.

In a further exchange of letters, Elliott declared that Wood, as an Army general, had no 

right to discuss disposition of the Marine Corps, 

which was a separate Service. The Commandant 

insisted that “the entire Army and Marine Corps, 

with the exception of the general officers, would 

be bitterly opposed to such amalgamation.” 

Wood apologized to Roosevelt for bringing 

his name into the discussion and forwarded all 

his correspondence on the subject. On 28 November, Roosevelt, in a letter addressed “Dear 

Leonard,” committed himself on the amalgamation issue. He wrote, “You are quite welcome 

to quote me on that matter. I think the Marines 

should be incorporated with the Army.” Wood, 

on 2 December, flatly informed Elliott that the 

president supported the transfer. The entire incident convinced Elliott, who up to now had 

publicly defended removal of the Marine guards, 

that he and the Marine Corps were being 

double-crossed. As he later stated, “While we 
22 chapter one

had been following quietly our duties, elimination and absorption were casting unknown to us 

their shadows at our heels.”

Elliott was among the last to learn about 

Wood’s scheme. Almost as soon as Wood had 

arrived in Washington, the future of the Marine Corps had become a matter of public and 

private speculation. Fairly accurate accounts of 

Wood’s proposals and Roosevelt’s reaction appeared in newspapers and journals. While few 

Marines expressed any enthusiasm about going 

into the Army, many thought such a course of 

action inevitable as a result of the removal of 

ships’ guards. In an extreme expression of this 

point of view, one officer declared: “It is imperative that we immediately sever every possible 

connection with the Navy by transfer to some 

branch of the Army.”

The regular House Naval Affairs Committee hearings on the annual Navy Department 

appropriation provided the scene for the first 

political skirmish over both removal of the Marine detachments and the merger of the Marines with the Army. On 9 December, in his 

testimony, Admiral Pillsbury flatly stated the 

Navy Department position: “I think that it will 

be a very great mistake to put them [the Marines] in the Army. We want them in the Navy. 

We do not want them on board ship.” Although 

the Marine officers, including General Elliott, 

made no mention of the subject in their public 

testimony, Elliott informed the committee off 

the record that he now opposed removal of the 

ships’ detachments. In perhaps the shrewdest 

maneuver of the hearing, Lieutenant Colonel 

George E. Richards, assistant paymaster of the 

Corps, responding to a prearranged question 

from a committee member, presented a memorandum estimating that it would cost the Navy 

Department an additional $425,000 to replace 

Marines with sailors on board ships. At the end 

of the session, the committee voted to hold supplementary hearings by a subcommittee on the 

entire Marine issue.

In the period between the conclusion of the 

full House committee hearings in December 

and the opening of the subcommittee hearings 

in January, the Marine Corps and its allies mobilized for the struggle. Marine staff officers prepared several detailed memoranda supporting 

their position. On 20 December, a group of Marine officers from several East Coast navy yards 

met privately [in] Boston to discuss “the new 

status of the Marine Corps.” While they publicly denied that their meeting had anything to do 

with attempts to reverse the president’s executive order, few observers believed they met for 

any other purpose. Sims and Fullam exchanged 

rumors and warnings about the Marines’ organizing and lobbying efforts. The Army question, meanwhile, faded into the background. 

Although Wood continued to discuss the subject privately, neither he nor Roosevelt took 

any overt action. They and the War Department 

were apparently unwilling to directly challenge 

Navy control of the Marines if the Navy wanted 

to retain the Corps.

When the subcommittee began its hearings on 9 January 1909, it was obvious that proMarine forces were in control. Representative 

Thomas H. Butler, who presided over most of 

the sessions, had a son in the Marine Corps and 

was on the record as opposing Roosevelt’s executive order. The clerk of the subcommittee 

was a former Marine officer. General Elliott 

and his staff attended almost the entire hearing, 

and the subcommittee permitted them to crossexamine witnesses. Commander Fullam described the atmosphere of the proceedings: “The 

Marine colonels were ever present. A stranger 
shulimson and cosmas 23

could not have distinguished them from members of the Committee. They rose at will to 

exhort, object, and cross-examine.” Although 

one-sided, Fullam’s observations were in the 

main correct. He and the other reformers faced 

a rigged jury and a hanging judge.

Before the hearings ended on 15 January, 

a parade of 34 witnesses testified. All of the 

Adrian Lamb, Theodore Roosevelt, 1967. Copy of 1908 original by Philiop Alexius de László.

National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, gift of the Theodore Roosevelt Association
24 chapter one

Marines opposed withdrawal of the guard detachments from ships, while the Navy officers 

split evenly for and against. Both sides reiterated their traditional arguments for and against 

keeping Marines on warships. Using rudimentary cost-effectiveness analysis, they presented 

conflicting estimates of the expense involved in 

replacing Marines with sailors.

While the subcommittee focused on the 

cost issue, the question of transferring the Marine Corps to the Army was never far from the 

surface. Several Marine and Navy opponents of 

the executive order warned that removal of the 

guard detachments might lead to the Navy losing the Marine Corps, while supporters of the 

order affirmed their desire to keep the Marines 

in the Navy. Fullam, for example, declared: “If 

I were king here tomorrow, I would preserve 

the Marine Corps . . . as a splendidly organized 

mobile force, to serve with the Navy.” Secretary 

[Truman H.] Newberry testified that if it were 

a choice between losing the Marines and putting them back on ship, “I would rather put them 

back aboard ship.” The prospect of absorption of 

the Marines by the Army was also a stumbling 

block to congressional supporters of Roosevelt. 

Representative John W. Weeks wrote to Fullam: 

“My mind now inclines to leave in the hands of 

the Executive the question of where the Marines 

shall serve, but takes a positive stand against action which will tend to amalgamate the Corps 

with the Army.”

When the full Naval Affairs Committee reported the naval appropriation bill to the House 

Editorial cartoon by Arthur N. Edrop.

Philadelphia Daily Evening Telegraph, 30 March 1909
shulimson and cosmas 25

on 16 January, it was clear that the Marine point 

of view had prevailed. The committee recommended insertion in the bill of a provision that:

Hereafter officers and enlisted men of the 

Marine Corps shall serve . . . on board all 

battleships and armored cruisers . . . in detachments of not less than eight per centum 

of the strength of the enlisted men of the 

Navy on said vessels.

When the appropriation bill came up for 

consideration before the House, administration 

forces, assisted by vigorous Navy Department 

and White House lobbying, turned the tables on 

the Marines. On 21 January, the House passed 

the bill without the proposed amendment to 

keep Marines on board ships.

The fight now shifted to the Senate Naval 

Affairs Committee, where the Marine Corps 

could depend on the support of the powerful 

chairman, Senator Eugene Hale of Maine. Hale, 

a staunch Roosevelt opponent, was at loggerheads with the president over Navy Department 

reorganization in general and specifically had 

come out against taking the Marines off ships. 

Without bothering to hold hearings on the question of Marine removal, Kale’s committee on 

10 February reported the appropriation bill to 

the Senate with numerous amendments, including reinsertion of the House committee’s original provision overturning Roosevelt’s executive 

order.

On the Senate floor, the administration 

made a major effort to defeat the amendment. 

Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a 

personal friend of Roosevelt and long-time supporter of a big Navy, led the fight, liberally supplied with argument and documents by Sims and 

Fullam. During the Senate debate on 16 and 17 

February, Lodge restated the reformers’ arguments about the need to restructure the Marine 

Corps, but significantly disavowed any intention 

to put the Marines into the Army and stated that 

he himself would oppose any such effort. Senator Hale, on the other hand, kept hammering 

at the point that Congress had equal authority 

with the president over the Navy Department 

and warned that “the underlying purpose [of 

removal] is to take these people away from the 

navy and in the end turn them over to the army.” 

When the amendment came up for final approval on the 17th [of February], it passed by 

a vote of 51 to 12. This result reflected more 

personal and political hostility to Roosevelt than 

conviction about the status of the Marine Corps. 

Among the supporters of the amendment were 

most of the Democrats and a strong contingent 

of conservative Republicans. All of the opponents of the amendment were either Roosevelt 

loyalists, such as Lodge, or Republican progressives, including William E. Borah and Robert M. 

LaFollette.

After Senate passage of the entire bill on 

the 17th [of February], the legislation went to a 

conference committee headed by Senator Hale 

and Representative George E. Foss, chairman 

of the House Naval Affairs Committee. As 

part of the complex bargaining over dozens of 

amendments, the House initially refused to accept the Senate provision on the Marines. Roosevelt, however, now was willing to surrender 

on the Marine issue in order to obtain favorable consideration on the other naval issues. On 

18 February, he wrote to Representative Foss: 

“The bill as it passed the Senate will, as regards 

this point, do a little damage [but] it does not 

do very much.” Roosevelt made no mention of 

putting the Marines in the Army and declared 

that he had issued his executive order “with 

the explicit object of retaining the marines for 
26 chapter one

the purpose of an expeditionary force.” With 

this signal from the president, the House conferees gave way on the Marine issue. On 1 

March, both houses passed the naval appropriation bill with the amendment requiring return 

of the Marine guards to the ships of the fleet.

During the remaining days of his administration, Roosevelt and Secretary Newberry attempted to find loopholes in the language of the 

appropriation act, which would permit the president to keep the Marines off the ships. Newberry 

declared: “I have issued no orders about the return of Marines to the ships and will not do so.”

The new president, William Howard Taft, 

was not about to challenge Congress and immediately took steps to reverse Roosevelt’s final 

measures. As early as 25 January, the presidentelect had taken a conciliatory tone, writing to 

Senator Hale:

I intend, so far as possible, to do nothing 

without full consultation with you managers of the Senate, and while of course it is 

not expected that we may always agree, it 

may be asserted that we shall never surprise 

each other.

On 5 April, Taft’s attorney general, at the 

Navy Department’s request, declared that in his 

opinion the congressional requirement that Marines make up 8 percent of a ship’s crew was 

constitutional. Very soon thereafter, Marines 

began marching up the gangplanks of Navy warships, and the controversy was over.

The participants reacted predictably to the 

outcome. For the Army, it was a case of very little ventured and nothing gained, since Wood’s 

negotiations had been entirely confidential and 

informal, although quite serious in intent. Some 

Army officers, nevertheless, believed that “a 

great opportunity has been lost by the restoration of the Marines to the ships.” Navy reformers such as Fullam railed against the decision, 

denouncing the “parlor and club colonels” of 

the Marine Corps and grumbling that the entire Navy was “at the mercy of the shore-staying 

staff and their political friends.” More moderate 

reformers, for example the respected Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, founder of the Navy War 

College, warned that withdrawal of the ships’ 

guards would have led to the “obliteration” of 

the Marine Corps. Taking Luce’s lead, the Navy’s General Board in later years would refuse to 

support the Fullamites in their agitation for removal of the Marine guards on the grounds that 

such action would lead to the loss of the Corps 

to the Army. Marines breathed a sigh of relief 

over what they considered their narrow escape 

and would cling ever more tenaciously to what 

was in effect a relatively minor mission. They 

viewed Fullam and his henchmen with suspicion 

and often outright hostility and believed they 

were continually vulnerable to power grabs by 

ambitious Army and Navy officers. On the occasion of renewed agitation by Fullam in 1913, 

Major Smedley D. Butler exploded in a letter 

to his Quaker father, Representative Thomas 

Butler, who had chaired the special subcommittee in 1909: “I wish somebody would beat the 

S.O.B. to death. Please try to help us, Father,” 

he pleaded, “for the Lord only knows what will 

become of our little Corps.”

Despite Butler’s alone-against-the-world 

outlook, the Marines in 1908–9 owed their 

success against Roosevelt’s executive order only 

partially to their own political action. The Marine Corps approached the removal issue with 

divided councils. General Elliott, obviously influenced by the advance base-oriented members 

of his informal staff, initially tried to trade acquiescence in the removal of the detachments 
shulimson and cosmas 27

for a reinforced and expanded Corps designed 

around the advance base and expeditionary missions. There was much justice in the accusation, 

made by both Admiral Luce and General Wood, 

that the Major General Commandant was trying 

to take advantage of Roosevelt’s order to establish an army of his own. Probably a majority of 

Marine officers in the field, as well as key members of the Headquarters staff, adamantly opposed removal of the guards from the beginning. 

Still other Marines, typified by Denny and McCawley, simply sought to turn the situation to 

their own personal advantage and flirted, more 

or less seriously, with amalgamation into the 

Army. Whether Elliott was simply swayed by the 

conflicting currents within the Corps or acting 

from firm conviction is not entirely clear from 

the evidence. What is certain is that he swung 

into active opposition to removal of the Marine 

guards only after becoming convinced that the 

president had betrayed him.

President Roosevelt did a great deal to frustrate his own order by, in effect, double-crossing 

both the Marine Corps and the Navy reformers through his dealings with Wood. Even these 

factors and the Marine lobbying would not have 

been enough to reverse Roosevelt’s order, had 

it not been for the general anti-Roosevelt hostility of the conservative Republican Senate 

leadership and the particular enmity of Senator 

Hale for all manifestations of naval reform. Taft’s 

retreat from Roosevelt’s policy toward the Marines foreshadowed the new President’s gradual 

drift into alliance with the conservative faction 

of the Republican Party. In the end, then, the 

ships’ detachments owed their salvation at least 

as much to the cross-purposes of their enemies 

as to the efforts of their friends. Perhaps a newspaper’s amateur poet had the last word:

The guard they stood at attention,

Like they didn’t give a damn,

To hear the word of the overlord

The original great I am

And he tells us we ain’t wanted,

That the jackies will go it alone.

But I thought I heard an under word

From a power behind the throne.
28 chapter one

Join the U.S. Marine Corps – Soldiers of the Sea! U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster showing a soldier holding 

a Lewis machine gun and standing in the bow of a small boat, ca. 1914–18. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
29

DEFINING THE DUTIES OF THE 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

by President Theodore Roosevelt

12 November 1908

I

n accordance with the power vested in me by section 1619, Revised Statutes of the United States, 

the following duties are assigned to the United States Marine Corps:

(1) To garrison the different navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(2) To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the 

continental limits of the United States.

(3) To man such naval defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses, as 

may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental 

limits of the United States.

(4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama.

(5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be 

necessary in time of peace.

Theodore Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE

12 November 1908

(No. 969)1

1

 The original content came from Exec. Order No. 969, 3 C.F.R. (12 November 1908). Minor revisions were made to the text based on 

current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
30

MARINE CORPS OFFICERS’

PHYSICAL FITNESS

by President Theodore Roosevelt

EXECUTIVE ORDER1

1. Officers of the United States Marine 

Corps, of whatever rank, will be examined physically and undergo the tests 

herein prescribed at least once in every 

two years; the time of such examinations 

to be designated by the Commandant of 

the Corps so as to interfere as little as 

possible with their regular duties, and 

the tests to be carried out in the United 

States between May 1st and July 1st, as 

the Commandant of the Corps may direct, and on foreign stations between December 1st and February 1st.

2. All field officers will be required to take 

a riding test of 90 miles, this distance to 

be covered in three days. Physical examinations before and after riding, and 

the riding tests, to be the same as those 

1

 The original content came from Executive Order No. 989, 3 

C.F.R. (9 December 1908). Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.

prescribed for the United States Army by 

General Orders, No. 79 (paragraph 3), 

War Department, May 14, 1908.

3. Line officers of the Marine Corps in the 

grade of captain or lieutenant will be required to walk 50 miles, this distance to 

be divided into three days, actual marching time, including rests, 20 hours. In 

battle, time is essential and ground may 

have to be covered on the run; if these 

officers are not equal to the average 

physical strength of their companies the 

men will be held back, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and probably defeat. 

Company officers will, therefore, be required, during one of the marching periods, to double-time 200 yards, with a 

half minute’s rest; then 300 yards, with 

one minute’s rest; and then complete the 

test in a 200 yard dash, making in all 700 

yards on the double-time, with one-andone-half minutes’ rest. The physical examinations before and after the tests to 
president theodore roosevelt 31

be the same as provided for in paragraph 

2 of this order.

4. The Commandant of the Marine Corps 

will be required to make such of the 

above tests as the Secretary of the Navy 

shall direct.

5. Field officers of the permanent staff of 

the Marine Corps who have arrived at an 

age and rank, which renders it highly improbable that they will ever be assigned 

to any duty requiring participation in active military operations in the field, may, 

upon their own application, be excused 

from the physical test, but not from the 

physical examination, prescribed above. 

Such a request, however, if granted, will 

be regarded by the executive authority as conclusive reason for not selecting 

the applicant for any future promotion in 

volunteer rank, or for assignment, selection or promotion to a position involving participation in operations of the line 

of the Marine Corps, or in competition 

with officers of the line of the Marine 

Corps for any position.

Theodore Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE

9 December 1908

(No. 989.)

Pvt C. LeRoy Baldridge, With the Second Division, 

ca. 1918. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
32

A PLEA FOR A 

MISSION AND DOCTRINE

by Major John H. Russell

As information from war-torn Europe 

gradually drifts across the Atlantic, we 

learn of the use of new implements 

of war and the consequent changes to modern 

tactics. In all of this intelligence, the one point 

that stands out clearly is the high degree of “efficiency” of the opposing armies of Germany and 

France. These forces serve as a “standard of efficiency” to which military organizations can and 

should be trained.1

It is therefore but natural that we, of the 

Marine Corps, should turn to our own organization and compare its efficiency, as we know 

or believe it to be, with the standard set for 

us. Such a comparison shows that, while in 

recent years great strides have been made in 

improving the efficiency of the Corps, there 

are some factors that go to make efficiency that 

have been overlooked or a sufficient amount of 

stress not laid on them. It is for the purpose of 

succinctly pointing out these deficiencies and 

1

 The original article came from Maj John H. Russell, USMC, 

“A Plea for a Mission and Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette 1, no. 

2 (June 1916). Minor revisions were made to the text based on 

current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

suggesting remedies that this article has been 

undertaken.

Efficiency

Efficiency is often defined as “the quality of 

producing results.” It is of high or low standard 

according to the results produced. To reach its 

maximum all the factors that enter into it must 

be developed to their maximum and thoroughly 

harmonized. Then, and only then, can an organization, either public or private, be said to be 

efficient.

While the necessity for a high degree of 

efficiency in a private organization is great and 

is usually stimulated by competition and money 

greed; in a public organization, especially in a 

military or naval organization, the necessity for 

the maximum efficiency becomes peremptory, 

while the suscitating influences [that] assist the 

private concern are lost.

To be truly efficient, a military or naval 

organization must be prepared to place at the 

command of its government and in the shortest 

possible time, all its power.
major john h. russell 33

The governing factors of such efficiency 

may be stated as follows:

(a) Organization

(b) Materiel

(c) Personnel

(d) Policy

(e) Leadership

(f) Discipline

(g) Morale

(h) Doctrine

The value of some of these factors is not as great 

as the value of others, but each and every factor is 

important. Lacking any one [of these,] the maximum degree of efficiency can never be attained.

It is, accordingly, of the utmost consequence 

that every military organization carefully develop each factor and include the coordination of 

all. Such an organization then would become 

a multiple of the factors or an organic mass. A 

healthy, sound organization that is capable, in 

the shortest possible time, of placing all its power behind its blow.

Organization

To accomplish the exchange of commodities 

private business organizations are necessary. The 

transfer of goods from producer to consumer is 

thus affected. Formerly, it was the custom for 

business to create the demand for goods but a 

scientific investigation of the subject induced, in 

part, by numerous failures, soon established the 

general principle that the demand or necessity 

creates business. This is the only logical assumption and, at the present time, no great business 

is undertaken without a careful and exhaustive 

study that clearly demonstrates the necessity for 

its establishment. Such an investigation conducted along modern lines, ensures as well as can 

be ensured, a lucrative profit [that] is the final 

object of all private enterprises. In other words 

it may be said that “business, like Government, is 

an evolution and grows out of general economic 

conditions.”

The necessity for a certain undertaking having once been shown the next step is to outline, 

Color drawing by Col Donald L. Dickson.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
34 chapter one

in general terms, the “task” to be accomplished. 

For example, wheat raised in the [Midwest] may 

ultimately be destined for England or some other nonwheat-producing area but the definite 

task of the fanner is to raise the largest possible 

amount of wheat in the most economical manner. His work is then accomplished. The transporting to the mill, the milling, the storing in 

elevators and the final shipment form separate 

and complete tasks with which the farmer is 

only indirectly concerned. The above principle 

of the division of labor applies, equally well, to 

nearly every form of human activity.

Public or governmental business, like private business, is created by demand. It is a fact 

that the final object is not the same, for while 

in private business it is financial gain, in public 

business it is social betterment. The underlying 

principles, however, are the same and the analogy may be carried to many points of similarity in 

both organization and methods.

As already stated the determination of the 

task or “mission” is the second step. What is to 

be accomplished must be clearly and definitely 

understood by everyone charged with the direction of a business, either public or private. 

In many cases, especially in public undertakings, 

the mission can only be stated in very general 

terms and in the accomplishment of it many 

“special” or “sub-missions” may be found necessary, but the “general mission” will always be 

found to stand out clearly above them all. It represents the purpose for which the organization 

was created and exists and never, for a moment, 

must it be permitted to become smothered by 

the introduction of “minor missions.” The trail 

once lost is hard to regain.

Organization may be defined as the act of 

bringing together related or interdependent 

parts into one organic whole so that each part is, 

at once, [an] end and [a] means. In other words 

the cooperation between the various units must 

be perfect.

It is generally asserted that the success of 

certain private undertakings, over others, is due 

to their more efficient organization. The fact 

that German business firms have been successful 

competitors with those of other nations, in all 

parts of the world, has been stated to be due to 

their more perfect organization.

The analogy between a great business and a 

military organization is especially close. Each has 

its mission, each is divided into various branches 

or units, which must be separately officered and 

united into a perfectly disciplined, controlled, 

and efficient organization. In each case, the organization must be such as will best suit the fulJohn A. Coughlin, First in France, ca. 1917. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major john h. russell 35

fillment of the general mission. This is the prime 

factor of organization for which all others must 

be laid aside. Furthermore, it is a fact that a military organization must be perfected in time of 

“peace” for after “war” has been decided on it 

will be too late.

The writer believes that the general mission 

of the Marine Corps is: to cooperate with the 

Navy in peace and war to the end that in the 

event of a war the Marine Corps could be of 

greatest value to the Navy.

But is this the general mission? How many 

officers of the Marine Corps, if interrogated 

separately, would give the same answer? What 

then is our “great work”? No matter how well an 

organization is organized, if it does not know its 

mission how can it reach the highest degree of 

efficiency? It must necessarily lack a concerted 

action to accomplish its work.

In performing its task the Marine Corps 

will, naturally, have many special missions presented to it, in fact in years of peace, they are 

apt to become so numerous that the impression 

is likely to prevail that such subsidiary work is 

not at all subsidiary but is, in reality, the master 

work of the Marine Corps. Such an impression 

is worse than misleading, it is dangerously false, 

and if allowed to permeate the Service would 

result in its failure to properly prepare itself for 

the real issue and cause it to fight at an enormous and perhaps decisive disadvantage.

It is believed that the general mission of the 

Marine Corps should be drawn up by a board of 

Marine officers appointed for that purpose. The 

result of this board’s work to be submitted to 

a conference of the field officers of the Corps, 

or as many as might be available, for discussion, 

amendment, if necessary, and ratification. The 

conference to be presided over by the Major 

General Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Every officer on entering the Corps would be 

at once instructed in the mission of the Marine 

U.S. Marines – First to Fight for Democracy. U.S. 

Marine Corps recruitment poster designed by Leon 

Alaric Shafer, 1917. 

Art Collection, U.S. Navy

This recruitment photograph shows a group of U.S. 

Marines as the “first to fight” in France during WWI.

American Unofficial Collection of World War I Photographs, compiled 1917–1918 (Record Group 165), Still 

Picture Records Section, National Archives and Records 

Administration
36 chapter one

Corps and commanding officers would preach it 

to all their subordinates.

Personnel

The importance of this factor is paramount with 

poor personnel, no matter how well organized 

and equipped, an organization will, in short order, deteriorate. In fact, in general terms, the 

efficiency of an organization may be gauged by 

its personnel.

Materiel

This factor depends, to a large extent, on the 

organization and personnel. If the organization 

is excellent and the personnel alert to its necessities the materiel should, in a well-governed 

nation, be brought to a standard equal to or better than a similar organization belonging to any 

other power.

If, on the other hand, the organization is 

defective and the personnel of poor quality the 

materiel is certain to be correspondingly in poor 

condition and obsolete.

Policy

After the organization of a public or private 

undertaking has been perfected management 

begins.

The “policy” of an organization may be defined as the system of management necessary to 

accomplish the mission. It is the conduct of the 

affairs of the organization. For governmental organizations, to a great extent, policy is governed 

by regulations but nevertheless a great deal is 

left and must necessarily be left to commanding 

officers permitting them to initiate a policy of 

their own covering their particular commands.

Leadership

The qualities that go to make a leader of a military organization are: willpower, intelligence, 

resourcefulness, health, and last, but not least, 

professional knowledge and training.

It is a mistaken idea that leaders are born 

and not made. It is true that a certain amount 

of personal magnetism may be of assistance in 

the making of a leader, but if an officer cultivates 

and develops the factors enumerated above, he 

will necessarily develop into a leader. Of prime 

importance is a study of psychology and its relation to discipline and morale.

Leadership may be either actual or directive. Actual in the lower grades of the commisFirst in the Fight – Always Faithful – Be a U.S. Marine! 

U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster designed by 

James Montgomery Flagg. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
Major john h. russell 37

sioned personnel of a military organization and 

directive in the higher commands. It is, however, 

just as important in the one case as the other and 

the same factors are applicable in each.

While the preparation for leadership must 

be left to the individual the Marine Corps could 

materially assist its officers by pointing out the 

road and by establishing and maintaining schools 

where officers could receive the best theoretical 

and practical training.

Discipline

Years ago, [British Rear Admiral Richard] Kempenfelt wrote: “The men who are the best disciplined, of whatever country they are, will always 

fight the best.”

In some countries, the form of government 

naturally tends to promote discipline among all 

classes and the recruit, when called to the “colors,” enters the Service already more or less 

inculcated with the habit of subordination. In 

other countries, however, where the method of 

living is more free, the recruit is not as susceptible to discipline and it is for this very reason that 

discipline in the military and naval organizations 

of such a nation assumes great importance.

It may be said that the [more] lax the rule, 

order, method of action, or living in a country 

the stricter should be the discipline in the military and naval organizations of such a country.

A study of the best method to be employed 

in obtaining excellent military discipline implies 

a study of the psychology of suggestion and its 

application to military life.

The recruit who has matured under certain 

free conditions of city or country life is suddenly placed in an entirely new atmosphere, and it 

is to overcome the perhaps bad impressions of 

such a sudden change of environment and to 

direct the mental attitude of the recruit along 

proper lines that psychology must be employed.

The study of this important subject by all 

commissioned officers of the Marine Corps 

should be made imperative, a proper course of 

study being outlined in general orders.

Morale

The necessity for maintaining the “morale” of an 

organization at a high pitch, during both peace 

and war, is well recognized. This subject has been 

dealt with most thoroughly, in recent years, by 

students of psychology and in the present European war great attention is being devoted, on all 

sides, to this important factor.

It would therefore seem proper that special 

attention should be given by the Marine Corps 

to this subject, such, for example, as the appointFirst to Fight – “Democracy’s Vanguard” – U.S. Marine 

Corps. U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster designed by Sidney H. Riesenberg, 1917. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
38 chapter one

ing of a board of officers to study the subject and 

draw up a concise manual outlining a method, 

applicable to the Marine Corps, for increasing 

the morale of this organization and maintaining 

it at its maximum during peace and war. Such 

a method if properly enforced would result in 

the study of this important subject by all officers 

and tend to greatly strengthen the organization 

as a whole.

Doctrine

During the past few years, a number of articles 

that have become classics have been published 

on the subject of doctrine and its relation to 

war. The writer, therefore, feels a decided hesitancy in even touching on this subject, but he 

believes its importance to the Marine Corps to 

be so vital that he cannot refrain from a general 

discussion of it in the hope that the seed once 

sown will quickly germinate and develop into 

the strong branch of action, and that the day is 

at hand when the Marine Corps will be indoctrinated.

It is well understood by military men of the 

present time that the art of war has its theories 

and its principles; otherwise, it would not be an 

art. It follows that it also has the application of 

its principles or doctrine.

The common acceptation of the word doctrine makes it synonymous with principle. This 

is not true. A principle is a fundamental truth. A 

military principle is a fundamental truth arrived 

Sidney H. Riesenberg, Flag Raising, Marines in the 

Caribbean, 1913. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps

U.S. Marine Corps – Service on Land and Sea. U.S. 

Marine Corps recruitment poster showing a Marine 

in dress uniform, marching along a dock, with ship, 

fort, and city skyline in the background by Sidney 

H. Riesenberg, 1917. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
Major john h. russell 39

at by a study of the military history of wars and 

adapted to the circumstances and characteristics 

not only of the military organization but of the 

nation it represents. Napoleon [Bonaparte] aptly 

said: “The principles of war are those which have 

directed the great leaders and of which history 

has transmitted to us the main facts.”

The word doctrine, as applied to military 

life, means a teaching that provides for a “mutual understanding” among the commissioned personnel of a military organization. In plain words 

“teamwork.”

Military doctrine is born of military principle. It is the application of principle. A principle 

cannot be wrong; it is a fact. A doctrine, on the 

other hand, may be wrong. As it becomes ripened by experience or to suit new conditions, it 

is altered. It is thus, at first, tentative and gradually built up by a process of evolution.

The historical study from which we derive 

certain principles is nothing more or less than an 

estimate of the situation. The principles deduced 

represent our decision. Having once made a decision, it becomes necessary to put it into execution, in other words, to apply the principles. 

This is true military doctrine.

In the preparation of a doctrine the general 

mission of the organization must never be lost 

sight of. Let the doctrine be clear, concise, and 

founded on the accomplishment of the general 

mission in the shortest possible time. With doctrines covering sub-missions, confusion is certain to arise and we would have some officers 

indoctrinated for one situation and some for another—a grave error.

Such a work as the formulation of a doctrine, however, is not the task for one man but 

is rather a labor for a general staff, or lacking a 

general staff for a conference, a reflective body.

All the great powers of the world, except 

the United States, have instilled into their armies 

and navies doctrines of war [that] have inspired 

them with new life.

Without a doctrine, all the drill regulations, 

all the field service regulations, all the text 

books are as one writer puts it: “But dead bones 

and dry rust.”

General [Hippolyte] Langlois, one of France’s 

most astute generals and foremost military writers, has well said: “Sans doctrine, les textes ne sont 

rien: a des textes sans doctrine, serait beaucoup preferable um.: doctrine sans textes, ce qui etait le cas a 

l’epoque napoleonienne.”2

General [Aleksey] Kuropatkin, in his book 

on the Russian campaign in Manchuria, tells us: 

“Although the same drill books and manuals are 

used by the whole army, there is considerable 

variety in the way the tactical instruction is imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the 

District Commanders.”

The first phase of the British campaign in 

South Africa resulted, as a clever British writer puts it, in “the unforeseen [sic] spectacle of a 

highly trained and well-disciplined regular army, 

whose armament and equipment were abreast 

of the requirements of modern war, checked at 

all points by the levies of two insignificant Republics whose forces were but loose gatherings 

of armed farmers.”

During the period of Frederick the Great 

[King of Prussia], military forces were maintained in mass formations and maneuvered in 

combat by commands.

During the Napoleonic age, conditions 

changed, the rigidity of the mass formation was 

replaced by open and flexible formations, resulting in a consequent separation of units. This 

2

 French translation: “Without doctrine, texts are nothing: texts 

without doctrine, would be much preferable to doctrine without 

texts, which was the case in the Napoleonic era.”
40 chapter one

gain in flexibility and ability to maneuver was 

obtained only by a corresponding loss of control 

or command. No longer could one man directly 

control the entire force. For example, Napoleon 

had to depend on the ability of his subordinates to 

interpret the meaning of his orders and instructions. But few of these had been trained in the 

same school of thought. There existed no common bond to assure a unity of mind and action. 

A link in the chain of command was missing; there 

was nothing to unite command and execution.

When that great German student of the art 

of war, [Helmuth von] Moltke, became chief of 

staff, he at once started to forge the missing link 

in the chain of command of the Prussian Army.

The successes of the Prussian campaign in 

Austria were soon followed by the victories of 

the Franco-Prussian War and clearly demonstrated the wisdom of Moltke’s policy. The 

doctrineless armies of France lost the war, but 

thanks to their many able military students and 

writers, the lessons learned were clearly set 

forth; and at the present moment, the indoctrinated armies of France are holding at bay the 

indoctrinated German troops.

Flexibility of command spells “initiative.” 

Initiative may be either reliable or unreliable. The 

introduction of doctrine means reliable initiative.

Moltke, the great exponent of doctrine, 

required of detachment commanders “a high 

degree of technical skill with minds trained to 

work in unison with that of the higher command, even when separated from Headquarters 

by a distance which made control impossible.”

It was the inculcating of doctrine into the 

Prussian Army, which permitted the introduction of the “cult” of the offensive, which now 

permeates the German Army.

Even with the modern systems of communication [that] bind together the various units of 

an organization the need is as great, if not greater, for a unity of thought and action permitting 

of a reliable initiative.

The usual illustration for the necessity of 

a doctrine is that of a number of separate columns advancing on a broad front. Each column 

commander knows that, on making contact with 

the enemy, he can boldly take the offensive with 

the full assurance of the absolute support of the 

columns to his right and left and the knowledge 

that their interpretation of the various situations 

that may arise will be the same as his own.

Consider the well-worn simile of the football team. Let us take two teams, A and B. The 

first has been indoctrinated; the second has not. 

When a certain signal is given by the captain of 

A team, all the members of that team know that 

the ball is to be kicked, they know that the fullback will fall back, each member of the team on 

the line knows that he must hold his man at all 

cost (the strong defensive), the ends know that 

they must take a strong offensive, break through 

the opposing line and get down the field as the 

ball is snapped back.

On the other hand, B team has no doctrine. 

There exists no mutual understanding as to what 

is expected of each and every member of the 

team. The end knows that he should get down 

the field, but the man next to him does not 

know it and permits an opponent to block him. 

The line does not realize the necessity for putting up a strong defensive, and consequently, A 

team succeeds in breaking through and blocking 

the kick. On which team would you bet to win?

In this case, the units are in touch with each 

other. How much more difficult is the situation 

in the case of a military organization where the 

units, or some of them, are separated?
Major john h. russell 41

Leon Alaric Shafer, Spirit of 1917 Marine Corps, 1917. 

Art Collection, U.S. Navy
42 chapter one

Let us examine, for a moment, our Field 

Service Regulations (1914), the sacred book of every officer.

Under Articles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, we find 

at the beginning of each article certain “general 

principles” to which in most cases many pages 

are devoted. As a matter of fact, a casual reading 

of these pages will show that principles, doctrine, instructions, regulations, and customs are 

all jumbled together in one almost intangible 

mass, which many officers no doubt take at their 

heading value—general principles.

Military principles and doctrine should 

form a creed for every officer, but when we obscure them by mixing them in with numerous 

regulations, instructions, customs of the Service 

and other data, they at once lose all force, if they 

do not become unrecognizable.

Why not cull out the principles and doctrine? Add to them what is deemed necessary, 

place all in clear and concise language, and make 

it form the military creed of our officers.

For example, in Article IV, under the heading “General Principles,” we find the following: 

“The march is habitually at route order.” This 

is certainly not a military principle; it is essentially a doctrine. There is a military principle of 

the conservation of energy. From this principle 

flows the doctrine: in campaigns the march is 

habitually at route order.

Other sentences in the above-mentioned 

article and under the same heading are: “When 

possible, ample notice is given so that preparations can be made without haste. Troops are 

informed of the length of halts so that they can 

take full advantage of the same. The men are 

kept under arms no longer than necessary, nor 

required to carry burdens when transportation 

is available. As a rule troops on the march pay 

no compliments; individual salutes, etc.” All of 

this and much more in this paragraph consists 

of neither principles nor doctrine. It is purely 

administrative.

Again, the first sentence of Article IV reads: 

“A successful march, whether in peace or war, 

is one that places the troops at their destination 

at the proper moment and in the best possible 

condition.” The first part of this doctrine, for 

doctrine it is, flows from the principle of the 

economy of forces and the second part from the 

principle of the conservation of energy.

Under Article VI, [Field Service Regulations,] 

we find under the heading “General Principles” 

no principles but definitions, administration, instructions, etc. The military principle covering 

all of these, but which is not stated in the text, is 

the principle of the conservation of energy. Turning to Article I we likewise find no principles.

The second paragraph of Article V under 

“Combat,” placed in the text in the nature of a 

comment, reads as follows: “Decisive results are 

obtained only by the offensive. Aggressiveness wins 

battles. The purely passive defense is adopted 

only when the mission can be fully accomplished 

by this method of warfare. In all other cases, if a 

force be obliged by uncontrollable circumstances to adopt the defensive, it must be considered 

as a temporary expedient and a change to the offensive with all or part of the forces will be made 

as soon as conditions warrant such change.” The 

underscoring is not in the text.

If we cut out of this paragraph all except 

the underscored words, we have a military principle, not stated as such in the text, from which 

naturally would flow the doctrine of the offensive except when the defensive is adopted as a 

temporary expedient. As a corollary, we would 

have, the defensive is a method of creating opportunity for offensive action. In the same article, under the heading “Combat Principles,” we 
Major john h. russell 43

find few if any military principles, [but] much 

doctrine and instructions. For example, “Avoid 

putting troops into action in driblets” is not a 

principle; it is pure doctrine. Again, “flank protection is the duty of the commanders of all 

flank units down to the lowest, whether specifically enjoined in orders or not.” This is pure 

doctrine and cannot in any way be construed as 

a military principle.

In Article II, the service of security is covered by the military principle that a command 

protects itself from observation, annoyance, 

or surprise by an enemy. From this principle 

springs the doctrine that the “primary duty of 

an Advance Guard is to insure [sic] the safe and 

uninterrupted advance of the main body.” The 

greater part of the information contained in 

the paragraphs in this article under the heading 

“General Principles” are definitions or instructions.

Turning now to Article III. This article 

deals with the subject of orders, and contained 

in the paragraphs under the heading “General 

Principles,” we find definitions, information, instructions, but little doctrine and few military 

principles.

An examination of our Drill Regulations 

(1915) shows a similar condition to prevail. We 

find, for example, “Combat Principles” for the 

battalion, regiment, and brigade (pp. 209–18). 

A careful reading fails to disclose a single principle under these headings.

[For] a military organization to be efficient 

and powerful, [it] must be so indoctrinated as 

to acquire a uniformity of mind and action on 

fundamental military truths. Would not a commander in the field be reassured if he knew that 

an unsuccessful attack by the enemy would be 

a signal for a strong counterattack by all parts 

of the line attacked or that the offensive, once 

begun, would be carried on by all parts of the 

line with great vigor until order to cease? All the 

German military teaching is based on the cult of 

the offensive. Their teachings say: “It is not even 

necessary to delay looking for too many advices 

about the enemy; the time for research is being 

wasted from the operations; it allows the adversary to do as he pleases and to impose his plan 

on us when we should impose our plan on him.” 

This is part of the doctrine with which every 

German officer is indoctrinated. The offensive, 

in spite of everything, has permeated their very 

blood and marrow. But to permit of the placing in the hands of subordinates so powerful a 

weapon as “initiative” the subordinates must one 

and all be carefully trained to a uniformity of 

thought and action. It has been well said: “IniTravel? Adventure? U.S. Marine Corps recruitment 

poster designed by James Montgomery Flagg, 1917. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
44 chapter one

tiative is a double edged weapon, dangerous to 

trust in the hands of subordinates who are liable 

to misconceive the mind of the Chief and are 

unable to read a situation as he would read it.”

We demand initiative of subordinates and 

yet fail to train them for an intelligent initiative. 

What then can we expect?

In our Field Orders, the first paragraph is the 

information paragraph. The second contains the 

“General Plan” and the third the details of the 

plan, etc. A subordinate officer of an indoctrinated force serving with a detached command 

receiving the order reads the information paragraph and “understands the train of thought to 

which the information paragraph has given rise. 

The information being so and so, naturally, the 

Commander wishes to do this, therefore, I must 

do that. Obedience at once becomes intelligent 

because the purpose of the superior is understood and unconsciously approved.”

Colonel (now General) [Ferdinand] Foch 

in his conference lectures at L’École Supérieure 

de Guerre, puts it as follows: “An activity of the 

mind to comprehend the views of the Superior Commander and to enter into his views. An 

activity of the mind to find the material means 

of realizing them. An activity of the mind for realizing, in spite of the methods of the adversary, 

the conserving of freedom of action.”

If an organization is doctrineless, a subordinate cannot arrive at an intelligent understanding of orders as now written in the Moltke 

style. For a doctrineless force, detailed orders 

are necessary with a consequent absence of initiative and poor results. Since we have gone halfway and adopted the modern system of writing 

orders, why should we not adopt the modern 

method of inculcating a doctrine? The one is dependent on the other.

Our Drill Regulations tell us that “in extended order the Company is the largest unit to execute movements by prescribed commands or 

means,” and further, “in every disposition of the 

battalion for combat the orders of the [battalion 

commander] should give subordinates sufficient 

information of the enemy, of the position of 

supporting and neighboring troops, and of the 

object sought to enable them to conform intelligently to the General Plan.”

How can they conform intelligently if they 

have no military doctrine, no interpretation of 

the military principles to act as a guide for them? 

It is as impossible as the command of the famous 

king that all clocks and watches in his kingdom 

should keep the same time. He established no 

method of regulating them and yet he ordered 

that they must all synchronize.

The mind of the subordinate must be 

“tuned” by the introduction of doctrine to work 

in harmony with the mind of the commander.

The Marine Corps has no doctrine and the 

lack of this important factor must necessarily 

greatly reduce the efficiency of the Corps. It 

is possible, some say probable, that the Marine 

Corps may be called on in the near future to face 

trained, seasoned, highly disciplined, and indoctrinated troops. Lacking a doctrine, no matter 

how good our organization, equipment, personnel, discipline and morale, we would unquestionably be badly handicapped, perhaps fatally. 

We have no creed to bind us together, to help us 

to understand one another, to guide us to assist 

one another, to concentrate all our effort; we 

are as helpless as a ship without a rudder.

The formulation of a doctrine rests with the 

Marine Corps. It does not require congressional 

action or outside advice. It would require but 

slight expense and little effort.

For the purpose of formulating a doctrine, 

it is suggested that a similar course be employed 
Major john h. russell 45

as to that suggested for determining on the general mission. Field officers of the Marine Corps, 

or as many as are available, should be assembled, 

under the direction of the Major General Commandant of the Corps, for a conference. The 

result of the work of such an experienced reflective body would be a tentative doctrine or 

creed for the Marine Corps to be preached by 

every commanding officer and taught to young 

officers on entry. It would thus soon permeate 

the very blood and marrow of the commissioned 

personnel.

Such a doctrine, or at least the results of 

the first conference, would only be tentative and 

might require changes in it as we became more 

experienced, but it would certainly be a start in 

the right direction and establish a bond of sympathy among the officers of the Corps.

Why should we not, in terse language, lay 

down certain military principles that we believe 

are applicable to the Marine Corps? Why should 

we not formulate a concise and clear doctrine 

to bind us together? Why should we not formulate our traditions and incorporate them in our 

doctrine? Why should we not have a cult of the 

offensive?

Such action would greatly increase the usefulness, efficiency, and prestige of the Marine 

Corps and tend to unite this organization into 

one organic whole.

Let us remember the words of General Langlois: “Without doctrine, text books amount to 

nothing; a doctrine without text books would be 

much better than text books without doctrine, 

as was the case in the Napoleonic age.”
46

BARNETT LETTER TO OLIVER

by Major General Commandant George Barnett

HEADQUARTERS 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,

COMMANDANT’S OFFICE,

Washington, DC, 9 February 19171

MY DEAR MR. OLIVER: In connection with your telephonic communication with me this date, requesting 

information as to how young men designated 

as second lieutenants, graduates of certain colleges, were appointed, I have to state as follows:

When the naval appropriation bill passed on 

August 29 last, I took the question of filling the 

vacancies (255 in number) up with the secretary of the Navy. This matter was brought up at 

a council meeting with the secretary and fully 

discussed. I proposed at this meeting that I be 

authorized to fill certain vacancies in the Marine 

Corps by the appointment of graduates of the 

1

 The original content came from MajGen Commandant George 

Barnett letter to Congressman William B. Oliver (D-AL) 9 February 1917, Congressional Record 54. Minor revisions were made 

to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

military colleges designated by the president in 

general orders each year as “distinguished colleges.” After a full discussion of this matter, the 

secretary and the whole council decided that, as 

only a very few graduates of the Naval Academy could be spared, it would be a good thing 

to fill a reasonable number of the vacancies by 

the appointment of graduates of these distinguished military colleges. The secretary of the 

Navy then authorized me to communicate with 

the presidents of these colleges and to designate 

not to exceed 60 of the graduates recommended 

by the presidents of the colleges. From many of 

the colleges, we received no recommendations 

whatever, having heard that a great many of their 

graduates had gone into the Army. 

Each graduate authorized to appear for 

physical examination was required to present 

his graduating diploma together with a letter of 

recommendation from the president of the institution, and also numerous letters as to moral 

character and general standing in the community from which he came. Most of the applications came from the Virginia Military Institute, 
major general commandant george barnett 47

Louis H. Gebhardt, Major General Commandant George Barnett, 12th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1914–20). 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
48 chapter one

Lexington, Virginia; the Citadel, Charleston, 

South Carolina; some from St. John’s College, 

Annapolis, Maryland: and some from Norwich 

University, Northfield, Vermont. I am appending herewith a complete list of the colleges 

from which responses were received and also 

the number of appointments made from the 

colleges from which recommendations were received. 

Some of the young men who appeared for 

physical examination failed to pass the required 

test. As I think I stated to you over the telephone, quite a number of the institutions had no 

recommendations to make; in fact, the majority 

of the institutions are on this list. In the selection 

of these young men, no influence whatever was 

used by any human being. The only recommendations made were made by the presidents of the 

institutions referred to and the Army officers 

on duty at said institutions. As I stated to you, 

I would gladly have taken a great many more of 

the graduates than I was able to get, because, 

as stated above, I only secured 39 in toto from 

these institutions. 

Before presenting this question to the Secretary of the Navy, I had heard so much of the 

good qualities of the Virginia Military Institute 

that I visited that institution last June and spent 

several days in going over their curriculum and 

witnessing drills of all kinds and talking with the 

superintendent and officers on duty there and 

with many of the cadets. In fact, this visit was the 

deciding factor [that] led me to make the proposition to the secretary of the Navy. In selecting 

any graduates from one of these institutions the 

state he came from was never considered. Since 

these young men were designated, we have held 

examinations all over the United States, at which 

any young man who made application or made 

known his desire to appear before the board was 

allowed to appear; and out of the total number 

examined (86 in all), only 29 successfully passed 

for entry into the Marine Corps from civil life. 

In this connection, I sent over 1,400 letters to 

young men all over the country who had in any 

manner requested information as to how he 

might get a commission in the Marine Corps. 

This 1,400 included the names of all young 

men recommended for appointment from any 

source. 

Of the young men who have already been 

commissioned from these designated military 

schools, they have been ordered to duty at once 

in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and a late inspection of the Marine Corps posts in these countries developed the fact that these young men 

are doing unusually well and their commanding 

officers speak in the highest terms of them. Candidates from civil life, without such preliminary 

training at a military school, have to be sent to 

our school at Norfolk for 18 months before they 

can be assigned any military duty. Therefore, it 

may be seen that appointments from these designated colleges give far better returns to the 

government than would be possible without the 

military training they have received. 

I wish to reiterate here what I stated above, 

that in the selection or in the attempt to get 

designations from the different colleges, every 

college in the United States designated as a “distinguished college” by the president was given 

no favoritism of any kind, and no influence of 

any kind by word or letter was ever used or presented by any individual, nor was the slightest 

attention paid to the section of the country from 

which these young men came, the only requisite being that they should be graduates of these 

well-known distinguished colleges; and I wish to 
major general commandant george barnett 49

unhesitatingly state that in my opinion it is the 

best possible means of procuring second lieutenants, excepting graduates of Annapolis and 

West Point. 

In accordance with the above procedure, 

we have secured altogether 39 graduates of 

these institutions, but so far have been unable to 

obtain the authorized number, which, as I stated 

above, is 60.

Thanking you for your interest in this matter, and with kindest regards in this matter, I am,

Sincerely, yours,

GEORGE BARNETT

Major General, Commandant

Hon. WILLIAM B. OLIVER,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC

MILITARY COLLEGES DESIGNATED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT 

IN ITS GENERAL ORDER OF 16 JUNE 1916 AS “DISTINGUISHED COLLEGES”

University of California, none

University of Illinois, none

Kansas State Agricultural College, 1

St. John’s, Annapolis, Maryland, 3

University of Minnesota, none

University of Missouri, none

Cornell University, none

The Citadel, South Carolina, 20; 1 since killed in action

Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, none

University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, none

Virginia Military Institute, 12

Norwich University, Vermont, 3

University of Wisconsin, none
50 chapter one

This Marine trio shows early enlisters in the first Women’s Reserve during World War I. PFC Marry Kelly 

(left) of New Jersey was secretary to Col Alfred S. McLemore, who headed the Reserve. PFCs May O’Keefe 

(center) and Ruth Spike (right) of New York City, the youngest of 305 enlistees, served as messengers for 

MajGen George Barnett. 

Marine Corps History Division
51

AUTHORIZATION TO ENROLL

WOMEN MARINES

by Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, DC

8 August 19181

To: Major General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Subj: Enrollment of women in the Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty

Reference: Letter of Major General Commandant, USMC, dated 2 August 1918

1. Referring to [the] letter of the Major General Commandant, USMC, as per above reference and in particular to the statement contained in the second paragraph thereof, that it 

is thought that about 40 percent of the work at the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, can 

be performed as well by women as by men; authority is granted to enroll women in the 

Marine Corps Reserve for clerical duty at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, 

DC, and at other Marine Corps offices in the United States where their services may be 

utilized to replace men who may be qualified for active field service with the understanding that such enrollment shall be gradual.

Josephus Daniels

1

 The original content came from Josephus Daniels, secretary of the Navy, letter to MajGen Commandant George Barnett, “Authorization 

to Enroll Women Marines,” 8 August 1918, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. Minor revisions were made to the text based on 

current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
52

THE GREAT WAR CRUCIBLE

by Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons

Naval History, 2005

The First World War has been so overshadowed by the second that it seems largely 

forgotten. Arguably, however, it was the 

defining event of the twentieth century. Certainly, it was for the U.S. Marine Corps. Before the 

war, the Marines had been popularly regarded as 

a kind of colonial era infantry given over to exotic 

adventures in the Caribbean and Far East. Their 

role in World War I earned them recognition as a 

strategically important fighting force.1

When the fighting began in 1914, the prospects of the United States entering a European 

war appeared unlikely. America was a very isolationist country. Europe seemed far away—five 

days by fast steamer. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson 

won reelection as president in 1916 largely on 

the slogan “He Kept Us Out of War.”

But events were pushing the United States 

into the conflict. In early 1917, the Germans 

resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, and 

suddenly American ships were being sunk. Then, 

1

 The original content came from Edwin H. Simmons, “The Great 

War Crucible,” Naval History 19, no. 6 (2005): 16–23. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

the British intercepted a cable that indicated that 

the Germans were trying to spur Mexico into 

invading the United States. In exchange, Germany promised to help Mexico regain its lost 

territories in the U.S. Southwest. That notion 

was not as absurd as it may sound; U.S. forces, 

including a brigade of Marines, had landed at Veracruz in 1914, and in response to cross-border 

bandit raids, an Army punitive expedition had 

entered Mexico in March 1916 and was there 

until February 1917. Such German provocations 

prompted Wilson to reverse his stance. At his request, Congress declared war against Germany 

on 6 April 1917.

Almost immediately, military missions from 

Britain and France arrived to tell Wilson’s government how American manpower should be 

used. The French suggested sending small U.S. 

units, perhaps up to regimental size, that could 

be melded into brigades with veteran French 

units. The British had an even simpler plan: send 

American youths to England, where they would 

be channeled through British regimental depots 

and used to replenish British battalions.
brigadier general Edwin H. simmons 53

To the United States, both [concepts] were 

out of the question. Wilson wanted a powerful 

American army for political reasons—so the 

country would later have more influence in 

peace negotiations. U.S. Army Major General John J. Pershing, named commander of the 

American Expeditionary Forces [AEF], was adamant that U.S. troops be deployed under an 

American command for military reasons.

The mobilization of American manpower and industry for war was remarkably rapid, 

achieving in days or weeks what today would require months or years. The Army had to expand 

to 30 times its peacetime strength; it went from 

130,000 men at the outbreak of the war to more 

than four million by the Armistice, 11 November 1918. [Approximately] two million of those 

soldiers went to France, and a million fought 

in the Meuse-Argonne, the last great battle of 

the war.

By comparison, the Marine Corps grew 

fivefold, from 14,000 to more than 75,000.2

2

 Officially, Marine Corps strength on 6 April 1917 was 462 commissioned officers, 49 warrant officers, and 13,214 enlisted men. 

At the time of the Armistice, it totaled 63,714. A peak of 75,101 

officers and men was reached on 11 December 1918. Maj EdThe less-dramatic expansion carried some advantages for the Marines; it left them with a 

higher percentage of trained officers and [noncommissioned officers] NCOs, many of whom 

were veterans of expeditionary service in China, 

the Philippines, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and 

Santo Domingo.

In line with the Marine motto, “First to 

Fight,” George Barnett, the Corps’ Major General Commandant, insisted that a Marine regiment be in the first convoy to sail for France. 

Political strings were pulled, and Barnett got 

his way. A new regiment, the 5th Marines, was 

hurriedly activated—one battalion at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and two at the new Marine 

Corps base at Quantico, Virginia, which had 

been erected at breakneck speed near a fishing 

village on the Potomac River. Small companies 

of Marines were brought in from all over the 

United States and overseas, mainly the Caribbean, and filled to war strength with recruits. 

The 5th Marines, under command of Colonel 

Charles A. Doyen, sailed from New York on 14 

June 1917 in the first convoy of troops bound 

for France.

Pershing did not quite know what to do 

with his Marines. Nominally, they were to be a 

regiment in the 1st Infantry Division, which was 

just being formed. At first, they were parceled 

out by companies as line-of-communications 

troops, that is, military police, guard units, and 

port companies. Not until the late summer of 

1917 were they brought together as a regiment. 

By then, another regiment, the 6th Marines, was 

being formed at Quantico. It would be sent to 

France battalion by battalion during the fall and 

winter. Pershing decided that the two regiments 

win N. McClellan, The United States Marine Corps in the World War 

(Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps 

1920), 9, 13.

In a posed photograph taken in early September 

1918, MajGen John A. Lejeune (center) “plans” with 

key members of his staff for the employment of the 

2d Infantry Division at Saint-Mihiel. 

George Eastman Museum, gift of Kodak Pathe, courtesy 

Charles Chusseau-Flaviens
54 chapter one

should be brought together as a brigade in the 

2d Infantry Division then being formed. The 

4th Brigade (Marines) was activated in October 

1917, with Doyen, newly promoted to brigadier 

general, commanding.

The numbering of brigades and divisions 

in Pershing’s AEF was a very orderly business. 

These were “square” divisions; that is [to say], 

each had two infantry brigades of two regiments. 

Each division also had a brigade of artillery, a 

regiment of engineers, and many other supporting troops. The square American divisions were 

very large—28,000 men at full strength, two 

or three times the size of the average war-worn 

British, French, or German divisions. General 

Pershing had two good reasons for their size: 

first, it gave them staying power; and second, 

he did not have enough field-grade and general 

officers to staff a multitude of smaller divisions. 

The size would prove both an advantage and a 

disadvantage.

In the 1st Infantry Division, the two infantry brigades were designated as the 1st and 2d 

Brigades of Infantry. In the 2d Infantry Division, 

the two brigades were the 3d Brigade of infantry and the 4th Brigade of Marines. The latter 

was quickly shortened in everyday use to 4th 

Brigade. There were three kinds of divisions in 

the AEF: Regular Army, National Guard, and 

National Army divisions. But that did not mean 

there were many “Regulars” in the Regular Army 

divisions nor even a preponderance of National 

Guardsmen in the National Guard divisions. Increasingly all three types of divisions were filled 

with draftees. By contrast, the Marine Corps 

continued to recruit volunteers.3

3

 Another division that would attract a great deal of early attention 

was the 42d Infantry Division or “Rainbow Division,” nominally a 

National Guard division, but with men and units from all over the 

United States. The Rainbow Division made the reputation of Gen 

Douglas MacArthur. He modestly claimed that it was his idea to 

In addition to the two infantry regiments, 

the 4th Marine Brigade included the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Eventually, each infantry 

battalion would have a machine gun company 

armed with French Hotchkiss heavy machine 

guns, reliable but clumsy weapons. Previously, the Marines had Lewis light machine guns. 

The British used these guns throughout the war 

and liked them, but for mysterious reasons, the 

Lewis guns were taken away from the Marines. 

In their place, the leathernecks were issued 

Chauchat [light machine guns] (or Sho-shos), 

rather odd-looking and temperamental French 

automatic rifles. Not until after the Armistice 

would the Marines be rearmed with superb 

Browning M1917 water-cooled machine guns 

and well-regarded Browning M1918 automatic 

rifles. It was said that Pershing had not wanted 

these weapons issued prematurely for fear the 

Germans would copy them.4

General Pershing still was intent on building an American army, which he planned to have 

ready to use in 1919 as the instrument that would 

win the war. Events caused him to change his 

mind, but only slightly. The 1917 Russian Revolution led to the collapse of the Russian Army, 

which in turn enabled the Germans to transfer 

a large number of seasoned divisions from the 

eastern front to the western in early 1918. In 

the calculus of war, this gave the Germans the 

advantage of having 200 divisions in France—a 

form the division. As a colonel, he was the division’s chief of staff. 

Then, with a promotion to brigadier general, the youngest in the 

U.S. Army, he commanded the 84th Brigade. (The two brigades of 

infantry in the 42d Division, in accordance with systematic numbering, were the 83d and 84th.) In the closing days of the war, 

MacArthur briefly commanded the division.

4

 The 5th Brigade, under command of BrigGen Eli K. Cole, arrived in France in September 1918. Assigned to port duties at 

Brest, it would see no combat. In April 1919, command passed to 

the colorful BrigGen Smedley D. Butler. In addition to the 4th and 

5th Brigades, the Corps also sent a “1st Marine Aviation Force” of 

four light bomber squadrons to France, which will be the subject 

of an article in a forthcoming issue of Naval History.
brigadier general Edwin H. simmons 55

full 20 more than the Allies. With the divisions 

came the powerful team of Field Marshal Paul 

von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff 

to direct the German effort in the west. They 

calculated that Germany could win the war—or 

at least a favorable peace—by launching an offensive against the French and British before the 

Americans could arrive in sufficient numbers to 

make a difference.

By early 1918, the 4th Brigade had come 

together in a training area near Bourmont in 

eastern France. It numbered almost 10,000 

men, the same size as many of the French and 

British divisions, but it was not yet combatready. Pershing was insistent on training in long 

marches and open warfare; the French were 

equally insistent that training concentrate on 

trench warfare. By March 1918, however, the 

2d Infantry Division, under command of [Army] 

Major General Omar Bundy, was ready for some 

“on the-job” training.

The division deployed to a quiet sector of 

trenches near Verdun, where the American battalions were paired off with French battalions. In 

theory, the process was to be gradual. As soon as 

the Americans were considered combat-ready, 

the French battalions were to depart and American regiments—and later American brigades—

would take over. But it did not turn out quite 

that way.

During the third week of March, the Germans, in the first of their five 1918 offensives, 

came close to driving a decisive wedge between 

the French and British armies near Amiens. In 

desperation, the British and French agreed to 

a joint western front command. General Ferdinand Foch became the overall commander, 

but with limited powers. Pershing agreed to the 

With “tin hats” and stripped for action down to light marching order packs, leathernecks of the 55th Company, 5th Marines, form up in a village street for the march to the front. A French poilu (WWI infantryman), 

who has seen it all many times before, watches insouciantly with hands in pockets.

Still Picture Records Section (Record Group 128), National Archives and Records Administration
56 chapter one

temporary assignment of American divisions 

and regiments to the British and French armies.

The French thinned out their lines near 

Verdun, and briefly the Marines held a sector 

vacated by a French division. In early May, Brigadier General Doyen was sent home because of 

illness—he would be dead in five months—and 

Pershing gave command of the 4th Brigade to an 

Army officer, James G. Harbord, who had been 

a close friend since the two men served together 

in the U.S. 10th Cavalry. As chief of staff of the 

AEF, Harbord had jumped from major to brigadier general in a year.

Within a couple of weeks, the brigade was 

withdrawn from the front and moved with the 

rest of the 2d Division to an assembly area near 

Paris. Most of these long-distance moves were 

carried out using the French military railway 

system, which was much ridiculed by the Marines for its dinky boxcars, the “40-and-8s” that 

could carry 40 men or eight horses. The division had very few trucks of its own for motor 

marches. The French furnished trucks (camions). 

Many of the drivers were “Annamites.”5

 A later generation of Marines would know them as 

Vietnamese.

By this time the German onslaught seemed 

to have halted, but on 27 May, the Germans jolted the Allies with their third big 1918 offensive, 

breaking through the French lines on the Cham5

 Term comes from the mountain range across Vietnam and Laos.

In The 5th Marines at Champagne, France, 1918, Col John W. Thomason represented his firsthand experience as a 

captain in the bitter fighting for Blanc Mont.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
brigadier general Edwin H. simmons 57

pagne front. This sector had been quiet since a 

failed French attack the previous year that had 

been so disastrous much of the French Army 

mutinied. After 1917, the French Army, now 

under General Philippe Pétain, was reliable only 

for defense. Even then, the French had authorized a so-called “flexible defense”—essentially 

permitting their commanders to give up ground 

at their discretion.

For the Germans, their success on the Champagne front was unexpected. They drove toward 

the crossing of the Marne River at ChâteauThierry, which, in turn, opened a route to Paris, only 40 miles away. On Memorial Day, 30 

May, the 2d Division prepared to move to the 

front. It arrived west of Château-Thierry on 1 

June, posting itself astride the Paris-Metz road. 

The Germans, meanwhile, poured through a 

four-kilometer gap torn in the French lines to 

their north. From 1 to 5 June, the Marine brigade fought a defensive battle. On 6 June, the 

Marines attacked. Their principal objective was 

a small wooded area about a kilometer and a 

half wide and three kilometers long called the 

Bois de Belleau, which was the hunting preserve 

of the comte de Belleau. The battle for Belleau 

Wood lasted almost until the end of June. Nearly 90 years later, the forest remains an eerie 

place, seemingly filled with ghosts.

The battle was not well fought. It was a confused crisscrossing of battalions and companies 

stumbling blindly through gas-choked woods 

and suffering horrendous losses from German 

machines guns and field artillery. The Marines 

Capt Harvey Dunn, one of eight artists commissioned by the Army in 1917, captured this high point of the 

German advance on Paris, as the Germans came through wheat fields from Lucy-le-Bocage toward Mares 

Farm on 4 June 1918.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
58 chapter one

lost almost half their men, but they beat the best 

the Germans had to offer.

After Belleau Wood, the battered Marine 

brigade had only two weeks to prepare for the 

next major battle. During the brief interlude, 

Pershing sacked Major General Bundy, the 2d 

Division commander, and gave command of the 

division along with a second star to James Harbord. Colonel Wendell Neville, commander of 

the 5th Marines, got the Marine brigade and a 

star.

The Germans launched their fifth and final 

offensive—the last throw of the dice—on Bastille Day, 14 July 1918. Anticipating the attack, 

General Foch had already prepared a counteroffensive. Attacking southwest of Soissons, the 

U.S. 1st and 2d Divisions and the French 1st 

Moroccan Division would be the spearhead. 

For the Marine brigade, it was a two-day battle. 

On 18 July, the 5th Marines, led by Lieutenant 

Colonel Logan Feland, attacked, coming out of 

the Forêt de Retz. The next day, the 6th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry 

Lee, passed through the 5th [Brigade] and continued the assault. It was a very violent battle, 

more violent than Belleau Wood had been. The 

casualties were half those of Belleau Wood, but 

they were incurred in just two days of fighting. 

By comparison, however, it was a well-fought 

attack, heavily supported by French, as well as 

American, artillery; by French tanks; and by 

French aircraft. French cavalry waited to gallop 

through any gap in the German lines in the best 

Napoleonic style. Such a gap did not open, but 

after Soissons, the Germans never again mounted an offensive.

By the summer of 1918, the Germans 

were short of infantry, but they had enormous 

numbers of machine guns and quick-firing field 

guns. Moreover, half of the shells the German 

artillery was firing contained deadly gas, mostly 

mustard gas. Attacks had to be carefully planned 

with very fixed schedules. Most artillery fire 

was prearranged from map data; very little was 

controlled by forward observers. Unfortunately, these carefully planned attacks almost always 

broke down into kind of a shapeless melee.

After Soissons, the 2d Division went into a 

rest area near Nancy to rebuild and refit. Marine 

Brigadier General John A. Lejeune had arrived 

in France at the end of June. He paid a call on 

Pershing, telling him he was authorized to propose the build-up of the Marine brigade to a 

“Devil Dog” is a motivational nickname for a U.S. 

Marine. According to lore, it is based on the alleged 

use of “teufel hunde” by German soldiers to describe 

Marines fighting in WWI. German historians dispute this claim, as the correct translation of “devil 

dog” would be “Höllenhunde.”

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
brigadier general Edwin H. simmons 59

division. Another brigade and an artillery regiment were in training at Quantico, the command 

of which Lejeune had just left. Pershing said he 

would accept another Marine brigade, but he did 

not want the artillery regiment. As for deploying 

a Marine division, he reported to the secretary 

of war: “While Marines are splendid troops, their 

use as a separate division is inadvisable.” In fairness to Pershing, he knew that forming a Marine 

division would require pulling the Marine brigade out of the 2d Division, where it was functioning very well. Moreover, a Marine division 

could not be combat-ready until 1919.

Lejeune was initially assigned temporary 

command of the 32d Division’s 64th Brigade. 

Cross-Service assignments were not unusual. 

Harbord, an Army brigadier, had commanded the Marine brigade, and numerous Marine 

field-grade officers had been assigned to the 

Army for duty; at least two commanded Army 

regiments. A number of new Army second lieutenants—90-day wonders—were detailed to 

duty with the Marines.6

 Quantico also had been 

turning out second lieutenants, but by 1918, the 

brigade preferred to commission its own lieutenants from its sergeants, many of whom were 

then sent to Army schools in France.

Lejeune, after a short stint with the 64th 

Brigade, was transferred to the 2d Division. He 

briefly led the Marine brigade, and then Harbord left to take over the troubled Services of 

Supply.7

 With a promotion to major general, 

Lejeune became the commander of the 2d Infantry Division in late July, the first Marine to 

command a division.

Assistant secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 

Roosevelt visited the brigade at Nancy. Back in 

January, General Pershing had ordered the leathernecks out of the green Marine uniforms they 

had worn to France and into Army olive-drab 

uniforms. As a mark of distinction, Roosevelt 

now authorized enlisted Marines to wear Marine Corps collar emblems, [which were] until 

then, an officer’s privilege. The emblems took 

the form of round disks with embossed eagle, 

globe, and anchor. To further distinguish themselves, some Marines also had eagle, globe, 

and anchor devices affixed to the front of their 

British-style helmets.

During the first week in August, the 2d Division moved to the Marbache sector, a quiet 12-

mile stretch of front south of the southern tip of 

what was called the Saint-Mihiel salient, a deep 

6

 The term 90-day wonders comes from the reference for how long 

it takes lower ranking officers to be turned into lieutenants at Fort 

Benning, GA.

7

 Harbord had become a great favorite of the Marines. A portrait of 

him hangs in the ballroom of the Army-Navy Club in Washington, 

DC, paid for by subscription by his Marine officers.

S. J. Wolff’s portrait catches the indifference, intelligence, and war weariness of an unidentified Marine 

of the 4th Brigade.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
60 chapter one

penetration the Germans had held since 1915. 

The Marines had a rather pleasant time there, 

but something big was coming; Pershing was 

ready to take command of an American army 

in the field. He had organized his best divisions 

into two corps, and their objective would be the 

reduction of the Saint-Mihiel salient. The attack 

began on 12 September. Lejeune’s 2d Division 

went into action the next day, and by the 15th 

[of September], the Marine brigade had met its 

objectives. It was an easy victory for Pershing’s 

army, helped considerably by the fact that the 

Germans had already begun to withdraw from 

the sector.

All along the western front, the Germans 

were falling back to a line of prepared positions that the Allies called the Hindenburg Line. 

Foch, now a full-fledged marshal, ordered a 

general offensive in which the AEF was given the 

Meuse-Argonne sector. Americans were coming 

to France at the rate of a quarter-million men 

a month. In the haste to build up rifle strength, 

the new divisions were arriving without their 

artillery or combat support units. With his most 

experienced troops still at Saint-Mihiel, Pershing had to begin the Meuse-Argonne offensive 

with half-trained divisions and soon found that 

commanding both the AEF and a giant field 

army was too much for his headquarters. The 

field army was divided into the First, Second, 

and eventually Third Armies. In effect, Pershing 

had become an army group commander.

The 2d Division, meanwhile, was detached 

for service with the French Fourth Army. By the 

end of September, the French had been stopped 

near Somme-Py in the Champagne sector. The 

The Last Night of the War, by Frederick Yohn in 1920, portrays the Marines’ crossing of the Meuse River, a 

senseless and costly attack ordered by the high command in spite of the fact that the Armistice was imminent.

Art Collection, U.S. Navy
brigadier general Edwin H. simmons 61

key terrain there was Blanc Mont—the “White 

Mountain” [was] a low ridgeline held by the Germans since 1914. The Fourth Army’s commander, General Henri Gouraud, wanted to break 

up the 2d Division into brigades or regiments 

to support his weakened French divisions—or 

so he said. Or perhaps he tricked Lejeune into 

saying the 2d Division could take Blanc Mont if 

it remained intact. The 2d [Division’s] attack began on 3 October. The Marine brigade made a 

frontal assault against the ominous ridgeline; the 

3d Infantry Brigade came up on the right flank. 

It was costly, but it worked. By 6 October, the 

2d Division had taken the ridge and the Marines 

had moved on to the village of Saint-Étienne.

After Blanc Mont, the 2d Division returned 

to the U.S. First Army and was assigned to the V 

Corps, commanded by Major General Charles P. 

Summerall. Lejeune got along well with most of 

his Army peers and seniors; he was a graduate of 

the Army War College, and many of the ranking 

generals were his classmates and friends. Summerall, however, was the exception.

The 2d Division was given a narrow front, 

just two kilometers wide, and the mission of 

driving a wedge into the German lines. By now, 

the division knew its business well. It attacked 

on 1 November, with the Marine brigade out 

front. The offensive went like clockwork, and 

the Germans retired behind the Meuse River.

Elsewhere, the German Army was in full retreat, but in front of the Americans it exhibited 

a streak of stubbornness. And then Lejeune was 

ordered to make a night crossing of the Meuse.

He protested; everyone knew that an armistice 

was imminent. Summerall nevertheless ordered 

that the attack be carried out on the night of 

10 November. Footbridges were thrown across 

the Meuse, and the crossing was made under 

heavy German fire. The Armistice came at 1100 

the next day. Some Marines were still fighting at 

1400, and a patient German officer had to tell 

them that the war was over. The Marines blamed 

the costly attack on Summerall, but it was not 

really his fault. Pershing had ordered his field 

armies to capture the best possible defensive 

positions in case the Germans continued to fight 

after the scheduled Armistice. And Pershing, in 

turn, had received his orders from Foch.

So the war ended, and the Marine brigade 

marched into Germany as part of the Army of 

Occupation.8

 During the war, the strength of 

the Corps had grown to just over 75,000, about 

32,000 of whom served in France. Casualties 

there, nearly all of them in the 4th Marine Brigade, totaled 11,366. Of these, 2,459 were 

killed or missing in action.9

 Only 25 Marines 

were taken prisoner. The Corps had made its 

mark.

8

 John A. Lejeune would succeed Barnett as Major General Commandant in 1920. He was enormously proud of the Marine brigade and the 2d Infantry Division and their record in France. But 

he and some other thinkers saw that the future of the Corps did 

not lie in being simply a reinforcement for the Army. They foresaw that the next war would be against Japan in the Pacific and 

that there would be an amphibious role for the Marines. Charles 

Summerall became chief of staff of the Army in 1926 and after 

retirement became president of the Citadel. In a curious parallel, 

Lejeune, after his retirement, became superintendent of Virginia 

Military Institute.

9

 Officially, Marine Corps deaths were 1,465 killed in action, 991 

died of wounds, 27 died from accidents, 269 died of disease, and 

12 died of other causes, for a total of 2,764. McClellan, The United 

States Marines in the World War, 65.
62

THROUGH THE WHEAT 

TO THE BEACHES BEYOND

The Lasting Impact of the Battle for Belleau Wood

by General Charles C. Krulak

Marine Corps Gazette, 1998

On the 31st of May 1998, I delivered 

the Memorial Day address at the 

American Cemetery at Belleau Wood, 

France. It has become a tradition for the Commandant to visit this historic battlefield on Memorial Day to join with Marines from all over 

Europe, veterans groups, and the French people to pay tribute to the Marines who sacrificed 

their lives in the epic battle that raged for over 

20 days in June of 1918. Of all the traditions 

associated with the commandancy, this is one 

of my favorites. It certainly causes me to think 

deeply about the legacy of the Corps and, equally important, our preparations for the future.1

The battle for Belleau Wood, and the ex1

 The original content came from Charles C. Krulak, “Through the 

Wheat to the Beaches Beyond: The Lasting Impact of the Battle 

for Belleau Wood,” Marine Corps Gazette 82, no. 7 (1998): 12–17. 

Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards 

for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

ploits of the 4th Brigade during the First World 

War, have fascinated me since I was a child. In 

my formative years, I met and was influenced 

by Marines such as Clifton [B.] Cates, Lemuel 

[C.] Shepherd, [Gerald C.] Thomas, and my 

godfather [Holland] M. (“Howling Mad”) Smith. 

Their reputation as leaders, innovators, and tacticians is legendary. In the 1920s and 1930s, they 

played a pivotal role in transforming the Corps 

from what it had become during the First World 

War—a second land army—into the world’s 

finest amphibious power projection force. In 

the 1940s and 1950s, these men planned and 

led amphibious assaults on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Guam, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Inchon, and 

many others. Over the course of their careers, 

they tenaciously strove to ensure that the Corps 

would be the nation’s force in readiness—the 

air-ground striking force that was most ready 

“It was a hell of a mess . . .”

~General Gerald C. Thomas, 

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

reflecting on his experience as a sergeant during the fight for Belleau Wood, 6–26 June 1918
general Charles C. Krulak 63

when the nation was least ready. All of them had 

one thing in common. They all participated in 

the battle for Belleau Wood. Throughout their 

careers, in every decision they made, their experience in the assault and conquest of Belleau 

Wood factored very heavily. In fact, I believe 

that the fight for Belleau Wood was the birthplace of the modern day Marine Corps. Let me 

explain why. 

The First World War had been raging for 

four years by the time the Marines got into the 

fight. The face of warfare had changed dramatically over those years. In weaponry alone, the 

rate of technological advance was staggering. 

Innovations such as large caliber, high velocity 

artillery, machine guns, poison gas, and aircraft had exponentially increased the tempo 

and lethality of the battlefield. Even though the 

Corps began to prepare in earnest for combat 

in Europe in 1917, we were too late—we had 

not kept up with the technological and tactical 

advances unfolding in the World War. As a result, in June of 1918, the Corps found itself on 

a futuristic battlefield it had not prepared for, 

one that it did not anticipate, and the Marines 

who fought there paid the price in blood. Those 

who survived never forgot, and to a man they 

vowed never again—never again. The story of 

the battle for Belleau Wood is well known to all 

Marines. But to prepare for my Memorial Day 

speech, I researched the oral histories of the 

Marines who fought there who eventually went 

on to become the future leaders of the Corps. I 

read the after action reports of the division, and 

the regimental and battalion commanders. Then 

I reread three books, [John W.] Thomason’s Fix 

Bayonets, [Elton E.] Mackin’s Suddenly We Didn’t 

Want to Die, and [Robert B.] Asprey’s At Belleau 

United States Marines in France during World War I.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo (Record Group 128 G), Still Picture Records Section, National Archives and 

Records Administration
64 chapter one

Wood. In the process, I gained a new appreciation 

of the importance of this battle in the transformation of the Corps in the 1920s and 1930s. I 

gained additional perspective on why the veterans of this battle fought so tenaciously for organic air and artillery for the Corps. It also became 

very clear to me why they could see the incredible potential in amphibious assault when all the 

self-proclaimed “experts” considered it futile in 

light of the 1915 debacle at Gallipoli.

Barry Faulkner painted this large decorative map of Belleau Wood from actual air maps and documents gathered by the Marine Corps for their official records. It was designed to hang above the fireplace in the Memorial Room to Capt Phillips Brooks Robinson, designed by Murphy and Dana, Architects, at Quantico, VA.

Official U.S. Marine Corps image
general Charles C. Krulak 65

This year, after the Memorial Day speech, 

the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and I 

walked the battlefield and retraced the battle as 

fought by the 4th Brigade. Today, the battlefield 

looks much as it did on the 6th of June 1918—

the day the Marines initiated their attack. It was 

easy to see how the Germans were so successful 

in turning Belleau Wood into a natural fortress. 

The forest is surrounded on all sides by wideopen, and relatively flat, wheat fields. The foliage 

in the forest is incredibly thick, making it difficult to see more than 50 meters in any direction. 

Glaciers deposited huge slabs of rock in such a 

way that they form superb natural pillboxes. The 

remains of the old trenches and fighting positions give credence to the veterans’ accounts of 

how the Germans took full advantage of what 

Mother Nature had given them. The after acTypical uniforms and equipment of Marines on the western front, by Col Donald L. Dickson. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
66 chapter one

tion reports describe how the Germans had 

positioned observation balloons on the ridge 

to the north of the town of Belleau, registered 

their artillery on the approaches to the forest, 

and emplaced machine gun and trench mortar 

positions so that every square inch of the wheat 

fields and the forest was covered by murderous 

interlocking fires. 

Sergeant Major Lee and I started off in the 

wheat fields where the 4th Brigade would lose 

over 1,000 men on the first day of the attack. In 

fact, more Marines were lost on the 6th of June 

in 1918 than in the previous 142 years of Marine 

Corps history. The senior commanders wanted 

to achieve an element of surprise in the attack, 

so they only gave the forest a short preliminary 

artillery barrage, followed by a rolling barrage 

to support the attack. Neither proved adequate. 

After the initial barrage, the Germans quickly remanned their machine gun positions and 

waited for the Marines. As soon as the assault 

began, it became readily apparent that some 

of the units had not made it to their assigned 

positions in time for the attack. Those that did 

immediately came under a withering barrage of 

artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. Huge 

gaps opened up in the attack formations as the 

German gunners mowed the Marines down. 

One veteran described it, “as if a huge scythe had 

been swept across the field at boot-top height.” 

The attack faltered, and many Marines went to 

ground seeking cover. Luckily, combat veterans 

from the Corps’ numerous small wars, such as 

Gunnery Sergeant [Daniel J.] Daly, stood tall 

and rallied the young Marines to rise up and 

press on with the attack. Throughout their 800-

yard assault, the Marines were raked by machine 

gun fire and high explosive artillery. The wheat 

field still bears witness to the carnage that raged 

there 80 years ago. As Sergeant Major Lee and I 

walked that field, I found a freshly plowed sector. I picked up a handful of soil and found several pieces of shrapnel. I picked up another handful 

and found even more. After all those years, long 

after the flesh and blood disappeared, the soil 

tells the story of the price the 4th Brigade paid 

crossing that now-hallowed ground.

Once they got into the forest, the Marines’ 

problems intensified. The foliage was so thick 

that units became disoriented. Some of the officers’ land navigation skills broke down and entire units collided. Units started to report that 

they had reached objectives that, in fact, they 

were nowhere close to. Artillery strikes were 

called in on the wrong coordinates. To top it off, 

the Marines had to rely on runners to pass the 

word because the communication wires were 

continually broken by enemy artillery. It was a 

command and control nightmare. As a result, 

the fighting degraded to small unit actions. But, 

it was in these small unit actions that the 4th 

Brigade distinguished itself. In fact, the Marines’ 

initiative, tenacity, and endurance surprised the 

German defenders. Those three factors proved 

critical in the 4th Brigade’s ultimate victory. 

The high intensity and duration of the combat taxed the logistics system beyond its abilities to cope. Compounding the problem was 

the German local air superiority. To sustain the 

Marines in Belleau Wood, the resupply effort 

had to cross exposed wheat fields. Every time 

the Marines attempted to move supplies across 

those fields, they came under observation of 

the German balloons to the north of Belleau. 

Shortly thereafter, they would be engaged by intense artillery and machine gun fire. The Marine 

commanders asked the French for air support to 

shoot down the balloons, but the French could 

not spare enough sorties to get the job done. As 

one commander reported, “A number of Ger-
general Charles C. Krulak 67

man planes over this morning, and they have 

been busy all day. It is almost impossible to make 

a move in this area without coming under the 

eye of a balloon observer. Our aviation is either 

passive or non-existent.” Throughout the battle, 

the balloons continued to wreak havoc on the 

4th Brigade. The Marines in the forest were reduced to scavenging food, water, weapons, and 

ammunition off dead Germans and fellow Marines to continue the fight. Wounded Marines 

had little hope of evacuation. In fact, many of 

the Marines who died in Belleau Wood fought 

until they succumbed from their second or third 

wound. 

Sergeant Gerald Thomas was right—the 

fight for Belleau Wood was a mess. Yet the Marines carried the day. The cost was staggering. 

Of the 8,000 Marines who participated in the 

battle, over 4,700 were casualties: 1,035 were 

killed. Unfortunately, many who survived the 

fight for Belleau Wood would lose their lives in 

the following four months of combat. 

When the 4th Brigade returned home after the war, the nation demobilized, and, as is 

our nation’s tradition, we shifted money and resources away from the military. While the money may have been in short supply, ideas certainly 

were not. In many ways, the 1920s and 1930s 

were some of the most productive years for innovative military thought in American history. 

The Marine Corps led the way. 

In the 1920s, Army and Navy planners 

looked to the Pacific and saw a growing threat 

from Japan. In response, they developed a plan 

by which the United States would fight its way 

across the Pacific to defeat the air, land, and sea 

forces of the empire of Japan. The plan hinged 

on access to key islands for refueling, resupply, 

and air and sea control of sea lanes. Most of the 

planners believed that Japan would attempt to 

Frank E. Schoonover, Marines at Belleau Wood, 1919. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
68 chapter one

deny us access to these islands by invading them 

and then turning them into defensive fortresses. 

War Plan Orange encouraged visionaries such 

as Lejeune and [Earl H.] Ellis, both veterans of 

land combat in France, to foresee a new mission for the Marine Corps—amphibious assault. 

They knew that if war came in the Pacific, the 

Marine Corps would be called upon to take 

those islands from the Japanese defenders. They 

also realized how difficult it would be to create 

a Marine Corps capable of doing it. To attack a 

fortified island in the Pacific, one surrounded 

by coral reefs, posed seemingly insurmountable 

problems. But, the Corps’ young officers, many 

of whom were veterans of the battle for Belleau 

Wood, believed it could be done. After all, to 

them Belleau Wood was much like an island 

surrounded by wheat instead of water. They felt 

that if they could rectify the problems associated 

with the attack on that forest, they could build 

the amphibious force General Lejeune envisioned. 

Transforming the 

Corps —Amphibious 

Assault

They started at Newport and Quantico—the 

school houses. In 1920, Major H. M. Smith, who 

many consider the father of amphibious warfare 

in the Corps, was sent to the Naval War College, 

where he challenged the status quo, relentlessly advocating the employment of Marines in an 

amphibious strike role. At Quantico, the Corps 

began to restructure the Field Officers Course 

to stress amphibious operations. In 1924, the 

curriculum featured only two hours of classes 

on amphibious operations. By 1927, that time 

had grown to 100 hours, and by the end of 1939, 

more than 155 hours. Students such as Smith, 

Cates, Shepherd, Thomas, [Graves B.] Erskine, 

[Keller E.] Rockey, and [Roy S.] Geiger studied 

amphibious operation ranging from Alexander 

[the Great] at Tyre to [Sir Ian] Hamilton at Gallipoli. They wargamed the amphibious assaults 

they believed necessary for War Plan Orange to 

succeed. These wargames were used to model 

the fleet landing exercises that experimented 

with new amphibious assault doctrine, tactics, 

and equipment. During the course of 20 years, 

they not only discovered where the problem areas were and what to do about them, but also 

uncovered new opportunities resident in projecting Marine combat power from the sea.

The students looked at amphibious assault 

force’s exposed transit from ship-to-shore as 

they did the wheat fields surrounding Belleau 

Wood. They knew that they had to make the 

transit as quickly as possible, transported in 

landing craft that offered protection from enemy fires. Additionally, they needed a landing 

craft that would not get hung up on the coral 

reefs associated with the Pacific Islands, especially Guam, which was a critical objective in 

War Plan Orange. These requirements, and 20 

years of experimentation and study, led to the 

development and procurement of the Higgins 

boat and the amphibious tractor, two innovations that proved critical to victory during the 

Second World War. 

The veterans of the fight for Belleau Wood 

all remembered the poor state of logistics resupply during the battle. German air and artillery made it almost impossible to resupply the 

Marines inside the forest. If the enemy had the 

opportunity to destroy the logistics resupply 

during an amphibious operations ship-to-shore 

phase—the Marines could be thrown back into 

the sea. They knew that they needed to build 

up combat power ashore as quickly as possible. 

Through wargaming and experimentation they 
general Charles C. Krulak 69

discovered that they had to load the ships in such 

as way that they could be unloaded quickly and, 

more importantly, in the sequence needed by 

the landing force. They drafted requirements for 

ships that could proceed directly to the beachhead and then unload heavy vehicles and supplies. They experimented with several types of 

landing craft to transport materials ashore. They 

looked at tracked armored vehicles that could 

take the materials in the heat of battle directly 

from the ships to objectives well inland. They 

believed that an opposed amphibious assault on 

a Pacific island would consume supplies at a very 

high rate, and they were correct. Luckily they 

developed a robust sea-based logistics system 

tailor-made to support amphibious operations. 

In so doing they revolutionized the art of war. 

The Marines knew that they would need 

massive preinvasion fire support from the Navy. 

They knew what is was like to storm a welldefended fortress without it. As such, they 

strove to convince the Navy to rethink how they 

would use naval gunfire to support an amphibious assault. They brought Navy officers, such as 

Lieutenant Walter [C. W.] Ansel, onto their team 

to help. In the course of their experimentation 

and wargaming, they discovered that naval gunfire could not address all of their fire support 

needs. Thus, the Marines looked to organic aviation to provide the overhead observation, fire 

support, and protection they needed during 

the preparation and amphibious assault phases. 

Once phased ashore, they thought they could 

use a combination of air, naval gunfire, and organic artillery to provide the firepower superiority they needed to consolidate the objective. 

Reading the oral histories of the veterans of 

the battle, I found each of them talked about the 

effect the German observation balloons had on 

the fight. To a man, they were furious that they 

remained in place, unmolested by allied air. This 

is why these infantry officers proved to be such 

vocal and passionate supporters of Marine aviation in the interwar years. If the Corps had its 

own aircraft as part of its amphibious force, Marines would never again be put in that position. 

They believed the Marine commander on the 

scene should be able to establish the priorities 

for air support, not some detached headquarters. Amphibious landings and the subsequent 

dynamic land campaigns that followed, did not 

lend themselves to preplanned and scripted air 

support plans. The most critical phase of the 

landing operation was the initial assault and 

breakout from the beachhead. With no artillery ashore, the Marines needed their aircraft to 

provide highly responsive fire support. This requirement led to the development of the Marine 

air ground, combined arms philosophy. 

From the First World War on, the Marine 

Corps would fight as an integrated air-ground 

team. Throughout the interwar years they experimented with Marine aviation in support of 

expeditionary operations. Wherever the grunts 

went, the air went too. When the team was assembled to crate the Tentative Manual for Landing 

Operations [1935], the “bible” of amphibious assault doctrine, the room was filled with ground 

and air Marines. They developed it as a team—a 

combined-arms team. 

On 19 February 1945, V Corps, a Marine 

amphibious assault force three divisions strong, 

landed on the black sand of the Japanese island 

fortress known as Iwo Jima. The landing and the 

36-day battle that followed proved to be one of 

the most significant feats in the annals of military history. It was the epitome of amphibious 

excellence. Fittingly, V Corps was commanded 

by a Marine who probably did more than anyone else to create the Corps’ amphibious assault 
70 chapter one

capability, Lieutenant General H. M. Smith. His 

three divisions were commanded by Clifton 

Cates, Graves Erskine, and Keller Rockey, all of 

whom fought as junior officers in the battle for 

Belleau Wood. 

The Legacy 

of Belleau Wood

Perhaps the most enduring impact that flowed 

from the battle for Belleau Wood was an attitudinal one—our institutional commitment to 

change. Belleau Wood, in many ways, constituted a strategic inflection point for the Marine 

Corps. In the business world, a strategic inflection point occurs when your competition develops a new product or your market changes so 

that what you produced in the past is no longer 

desired. At Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps discovered that warfare had changed, and we had 

failed to adapt to those changes. The 4th Brigade 

paid the price in blood. Those who survived never forgot that lesson, and they vowed that the 

Corps would never again be caught unprepared. 

They became the innovators, risk takers, and visionaries who championed amphibious assault in 

the 1920s, close air support in the 1930s, and 

vertical envelopment in the 1950s. They were 

the architects that built the force-in-readiness 

that we are the proud stewards of today.

As I walked through Belleau Wood and the 

wheat fields that surround it, I tried to distill 

what lessons the current generation of Marines 

Built of brick and masonry and often octagonal in shape, shelters for hunting parties were a common feature 

in many French forests. The remains of this hunting lodge lie in the northwest corner of Belleau Wood on a 

hillside behind the cemetery chapel, as seen here in Bois de Belleau, by Jean F. Boucher, ca. 1918. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
general Charles C. Krulak 71

could glean from the veterans of Belleau Wood. 

In my mind the most important one is that we 

can never rest upon our laurels. Yes, we are the 

world’s finest naval air-ground, combined-arms 

fighting force. Without doubt, the Marine Corps 

performed brilliantly in Desert Storm. In many 

ways, we are still basking in the warm glow 

of that victory, much like the Marine veterans 

of the First World War were tempted to do in 

the 1920s. But, those veterans knew they must 

change. They knew that they needed to accept 

the risks associated with developing new concepts for the ever-changing battlefield. They 

weathered the failures and the setbacks. They 

sparred with the naysayers. But, they never rested upon their laurels. As a result, instead of being the victim of a strategic inflection point as 

they were at Belleau Wood, they caused one in 

the Second World War.

That is exactly what today’s Corps must 

do. That is exactly why we are pushing ahead, 

breaking new ground, developing our new warfighting concept, Operational Maneuver from the 

Sea (OMFTS, 1996), a concept tailor-made for 

the twenty-first century battlefield. OMFTS 

promises to once again revolutionize the art 

of war. Like amphibious assault, it will require 

the efforts of each and every Marine to discover 

and maximize the opportunities resident within 

this new concept, while sealing any exploitable 

seams. It is up to us, the current generation of 

Marines, to make OMFTS a reality.

Among the fog-shrouded trees at Belleau 

Wood stands a sentinel—a monolith—a statue designed and erected by the Marines of the 

4th Brigade. It features a Marine rifleman, the 

shirt ripped from his back, rifle in hand, advancing, his face pointing toward the tree line that 

was the 4th Brigade’s objective. You cannot see 

his face—why? Because he is not looking back 

toward the past—his face is pointing away—

toward the future. That face and that simple statue contains a message for all of us—and for all 

those who will follow us. That Marine shows us 

the penalty that he and 4,700 of his fellow Marines paid because the Corps failed to recognize 

and adapt to change. That Marine knows the 

only way to avoid that fate is to advance toward 

the future—to steal a march on change—to be 

the cause of strategic inflection points, not the 

other way around. That Marine is showing the 

rest of us our course for the future. 

Felix de Weldon’s Belleau Wood memorial plaque 

dedicated on 18 November 1955. 

American Battle Monuments Commission
72

General Clifton Bledsoe Cates was born 

in 1893 and reported for active duty 

from the Marine Corps Reserves on 

13 June 1917. As a lieutenant, he served in the 

6th Marines; fighting in Verdun, at Bouresches 

and Belleau Wood, at Soissons, in the SaintMihiel offensive and in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. He was awarded the Navy Cross, Army 

Distinguished Service Cross, and an Oak Leaf 

Cluster in lieu of a second Distinguished Service 

Cross for heroism in the Bouresches and Belleau 

Wood fighting, in which he was both gassed and 

wounded. He earned the Silver Star Medal at 

Soissons, where he was wounded a second time, 

and an Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a second Silver Star Medal in the Blanc Mont fighting of the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Interviewed in 1973, he described one of 

his earliest engagements, at Bouresches during 

the Battle of Belleau Wood:

We were deployed across this wheat field and 

taking very heavy fire—my platoon was. 

We received word that Captain Duncan had 

been killed, the company commander. So 

CLIFTON BLEDSOE CATES

BIOGRAPHY

with that I yelled to this Lieutenant Robertson, I said, “Come on, Robertson, let’s go.” 

And with that we jumped up and swarmed 

across that wheat field towards Bouresches. 

About two-thirds of the way I caught a machine gun round flush on my helmet. It put 

a great big dent in my helmet and knocked 

me unconscious. So Robertson with the remainder of my platoon entered the west part 

of Bouresches. Evidently I must have been 

out for five or ten minutes. When I came to, 

I remember trying to put my helmet on and 

the doggone thing wouldn’t go on. There 

was a great big dent in it as big as your fist.

The machine guns were hitting all 

around and it looked like hail. My first 

thought was to run to the rear. I hate to admit it, but that was it. Then I looked over 

to the right of the ravine and I saw four 

Marines in this ravine. So I went staggering 

over there—I fell two or three times, so they 

told me—and ran in and got these four 

Marines, and then about that time I saw 

Lieutenant Robertson who, with the remain-

“I have only two out of my company and 20 out of some other company. We need support, but it is almost 

suicide to try to get it here as we are swept by machine gun fire and a constant barrage is on us. I have 

no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold.”

~First Lieutenant Clifton B. Cates

96th Company, Soissons, 19 July 1918
clifton bledsoe cates 73

der of my platoon, was leaving the western 

end of the town. By that time, we were right 

on the edge of the center of town. I yelled 

at him and I blew my whistle and he came 

over and he said, “All right, you take your 

platoon in and clean out the town and I’ll 

get reinforcements.” Which I thought was a 

hell of a thing. 

Well, anyway we did. We went on in 

and after getting into the town, we took 

heavy fire going down the streets. In fact, 

one clipped my helmet again and another 

hit me in the shoulder. We cleaned out most 

of the town, but by that time I had, I think 

it was, twenty-one men left.1

1

 Gen Clifton B. Cates, intvw with Mr. Benis M. Frank, Historical Division, HQMC, 28 March 1973, Oral History Collection, 

Simmons Center for Marine Corps History, Quantico, VA, 18–19.

Clifton B. Cates in World War I. The inscription on 

the photograph reads: “Taken at Verdun Apr 1918.” 

Collection of Clifton B. Cates/COLL3157, Archives 

Branch, Marine Corps History Division

Following the Great War, he remained in 

the Marine Corps advancing steadily, attending 

schools and writing doctrine in between assignments with the 4th and 6th Marines. In May 

1942, he took command of the 1st Marines, 

commanding the regiment throughout the Guadalcanal campaign. He later commanded the 4th 

Marine Division in the Marianas operation, the 

Tinian campaign, and the seizure of Iwo Jima. 

In 1948, General Cates became Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, holding that position 

throughout most of the Korean War. 

A true three-war Marine, General Cates’s 

career illustrates the Corps’ transformation from 

a purely colonial infantry force into the large, 

professional Fleet Marine Force of the latter half 

of the twentieth century. 

Bjorn Egeli, Clifton B. Cates, 19th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps (1948–51). 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
74 chapter number

Sgt Tom Lovell, Tarawa, 1943. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
75

Chapter Two

The Lessons of World 

War II and Korea

by Paul Westermeyer

The performance of the Corps in the 

First World War had established its bona 

fides as a modern, professional fighting organization. It was no longer in search of 

a mission; the officer corps had embraced the 

idea of Marines as the Navy’s landing force that 

was intended to seize and defend advanced naval 

bases. Marine zeal for this mission, which promised the Corps a specific role in the strategic 

calculus of America’s defense, coincided with 

the growing realization of the American military 

that Japanese aggression in the Pacific was the 

most likely future threat to the interests of the 

United States.

Directed and supported by legendary Commandant Major General John A. Lejeune, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis produced the 

first doctrinal look at amphibious warfare and 

how it would fit into a Pacific campaign. Other 

Marines continued Ellis’s work, notably future 

Commandant General Thomas Holcomb and 

General Holland M. Smith, long considered 

the “father” of modern U.S. amphibious warfare. These Marines took the lessons in modern 

warfare they learned fighting a positional war of 

attrition in the mud of France and applied them 
76 chapter two

to land forces supporting a naval campaign in 

the Pacific. Reducing the Saint-Mihiel salient, 

for example, seems to have little in common 

with securing a coral island such as Midway 

from powerful enemy land, sea, and air forces. 

However, Marines recognized the underlying 

fundamentals of supply, training, and organization that modern warfare required for success 

in either field. 

In Coral and Brass, General Smith said, “If the 

Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields 

of Eaton, the Japanese bases in the Pacific were 

captured on the beaches of the Caribbean.”1

 The 

Corps did not merely create a doctrine for fighting its expected amphibious war in the Pacific; 

it experimented and trained for two decades. 

In the process, the Corps developed specialized 

equipment and techniques for every aspect of 

amphibious assaults and landings. 

Simultaneously, the Corps continued its 

traditional missions as colonial infantry, with 

service in Latin America and China. But even 

those Marines traditionally associated with colonial warfare, such as Major General Smedley 

Butler, advanced amphibious capabilities. Butler 

encouraged the development of the Christie amphibious tank for the 1924 Fleet exercises and 

commanded a combined arms Marine brigade 

in China in the late 1920s, which was a useful 

experience for Marines working with armor and 

aircraft while on expeditionary duty in a harsh 

environment. As the Marines’ colonial infantry 

role slowly faded, the Corps produced the remarkable Small Wars Manual in 1940, capturing 

the lessons of such conflicts for later Marines. 

When World War II finally arrived, the Marines Corps was ready, putting its plans for defending advanced naval bases to the test early at 

1

 Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass (New 

York: Scribner, 1948), 19.

Wake Island and Midway. In August 1942, the 

Corps put the entire concept to the test, seizing 

and then defending Guadalcanal from Japanese 

counterattacks. Throughout the remainder of 

the war, the Marines earned accolades as they 

refined and employed their amphibious warfare 

doctrine supporting a highly successful naval 

campaign that won the war against Japan. 

Though the broad outlines of the war followed predictions first made by Ellis and other 

prewar thinkers, technological changes altered 

geographic realities of operations in the Pacific, 

particularly increased steaming ranges and the 

development of underway replenishment by the 

U.S. Navy, which reduced the need for advanced 

naval bases. But the dramatically increased value 

of airpower required airfields, and the Corps’ 

techniques worked as well to seize and defend 

islands for airfields as they did naval bases. 

The dramatic opening of the Atomic Age 

put the Corps’ future in doubt, especially for 

those who believed its usefulness was limited to 

dramatic amphibious assaults against heavily fortified beaches. The Korean War would soon put 

the Corps’ concepts to the test again. A Marine 

brigade was in Korea by August 1950, supported 

by a Marine air group and illustrating the power 

and flexibility of the Marine air-ground team. 

The 1st Marine Division would demonstrate the 

continued relevance of amphibious warfare at 

Inchon, and the indomitable spirit of the Corps 

at Chosin. 

A helicopter troop landing during the Korean War pointed the way toward the Corps’ increased relevance as a strategically mobile naval 

infantry force, capable of responding to a wide 

variety of situations as needed by the nation at 

short notice. Working closely with the Navy, the 

Corps remained ready to provide power projection ashore for the Fleet. 
77

VALUE OF AVIATION 

TO THE MARINE CORPS

by Major Alfred A. Cunningham

Marine Corps Gazette, September 1920

I

n common with every new weapon introduced to the military Service, Marine Corps 

aviation has traveled a rocky and uphill 

road.2

 Its small size has tended to make the jolts 

more frequent and severe. Nothing short of the 

firm conviction that it would ultimately become 

of great service to the Corps sustained the enthusiasm of the small number of officers who 

have worked to make it a success. The past year 

has seen the completion of the first of the stages 

through which our aviation must pass. Prior to 

this, we had practically no official status or recognition. While we sent 182 officers and 1,030 

men to the front in France, and they made a 

splendid record under severe conditions, we had 

no aerodromes at home, no shops, or other facilities; in fact, nothing permanent [existed] and 

could very readily have been disbanded entirely. When it was realized that the Marine Corps’ 

permanent strength of 17,000 was entirely inadequate and that a larger permanent strength 

2

 The original article came from Alfred A. Cunningham, “Value of 

Aviation to the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 

1920). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

must be requested, the figure decided upon was 

approximately one-fifth the authorized strength 

of the Navy, or about 26,380. It was desired to 

utilize this number for ground duties; therefore, 

Congress was asked to authorize an additional 

1,020 men for aviation duty, making the total 

27,400. This gave us permanently our aviation 

personnel. The next task was to secure wellequipped home stations for our personnel, and 

it required the surmounting of many discouraging obstacles before the Navy Department, 

which handles the expenditure of all aviation 

funds, approved the construction of flying fields 

at Quantico, Parris Island [South Carolina], and 

San Diego. With this much accomplished and 

our men and pilots well trained, we feel that the 

time has arrived when we can demonstrate our 

usefulness to the Corps, which I am confident 

will be great.

One of the greatest handicaps that Marine 

Corps Aviation must now overcome is a combination of doubt as to usefulness, lack of sympathy, and a feeling on the part of some line 

officers that aviators and aviation enlisted men 
78 chapter two

are not real Marines. We look upon the first 

two criticisms complacently, knowing that we 

can abundantly prove our usefulness even to the 

most skeptical, and that when we have done so, 

we will receive the sympathy and hearty support 

of all Marine officers. The last criticism we resent vehemently as an injustice, so far as it applies to loyalty, supreme pride in the Corps, and 

a desire to do what is assigned to us as quickly 

and as well as it can be done. Conditions arising 

from the necessity of organizing and training in 

a short time an aviation section, with practically 

nothing to start with and the nature of the duty, 

which does not allow the older officers to keep 

their juniors continually under their observation 

and guidance as is allowed in ground work, may 

have prevented the instillation in the younger 

pilots of all the qualities necessary in a Marine 

officer to the same degree as is done in infantry 

work. We have realized this difficulty and have 

made an earnest effort to overcome it and believe, with some few exceptions, that we have 

been successful. Now, since the rush of organizing for war service is over, this difficulty will be 

easily and simply overcome and the task of aviation officers made much more simple by taking 

into aviation only those young officers who have 

had enough service with infantry troops to be 

thoroughly indoctrinated with Marine Corps 

discipline and spirit.

It is fully realized that the only excuse for 

aviation in any Service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully 

carry out their operations. Having in mind their 

experience with aviation activities in France, 

a great many Marine officers have expressed 

themselves as being unfriendly to aviation and 

as doubting its full value. I am confident that this 

must have been caused by some local condition, 

as the French, British, and Belgian troops in the 

sector in which the First Marine Aviation Force 

and the British squadrons operated were enthusiastically “full out” for aviation. In our own aviation section we intend, before asking a vote of 

confidence from the remainder of the Corps, to 

demonstrate to their complete satisfaction that 

we can contribute in a surprising degree to the 

success of all their operations, save many hours 

of weary, fruitless “hiking” and materially shorten each campaign. Previous to now, we have had 

no opportunity to do this. During the war, we 

were unfortunately not allowed to serve with 

the 4th Brigade, but were placed in a sector containing only British, French, and Belgian troops. 

Since the war, all our effort has been required 

On 22 May 1912, 1stLt Alfred A. Cunningham 

reported to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, MD, 

for duty in connection with aviation. As a captain, 

Cunningham was ordered by MajGen Commandant 

George Barnett to form a “Marine Corps Aviation 

Company” in early 1917 in anticipation of the entry 

of the United States into World War I. 

U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archives 9875656
major alfred A. cunningham 79

to secure flying fields and the construction of 

buildings and hangars on them. We would have 

been hopelessly handicapped without these facilities. Now, since they are nearing completion, 

we are looking forward with enthusiasm to our 

real work of cooperating helpfully with the remainder of the Corps. All we ask is a spirit of 

cooperation and encouragement, and that judgment be reserved until the proper time.

Judging from the unfamiliarity of the average 

Marine officer with what has been accomplished 

by Marine aviation, we have failed woefully to advertise. A short résumé of what has been accomplished will perhaps be of interest.

In May 1912, when the [author] was detailed for aviation, the Marine Corps took very 

little interest in the subject. In those days, it 

was looked upon more as a crazy sport than as 

anything useful, and when I look back on the 

old original Wright [Model A] 35-horsepower 

planes I flew, where one sat on a board projecting 

out into atmosphere, I am inclined to agree with 

that view. About eight months later, another Marine officer was assigned to aviation, and during 

the next year, we accumulated six Marine enlisted men. There was very little increase in personnel until the World War began. On 6 April 

1917, Marine aviation amounted to four officers 

and 30 men, all part of the complement of the 

Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. From this 

time, we began to work energetically for expansion. Our ambition was to organize a first-class 

aviation force to operate with the Marine forces 

we hoped would be sent to the front. During 

the next few months we secured a flying field at 

Philadelphia, organized a full squadron of land 

planes, and began intensive training, so that we 

would be ready to go to France with the other 

Marine Corps forces. In order to have the latest 

aviation information, the commanding officer of 

this squadron was sent to France to serve with 

the French aviation forces for three months. This 

officer made every possible effort, both with the 

War Department in Washington [DC] and the 

American Expeditionary Forces authorities in 

France, to secure authority for our Marine aviation squadron to serve with the Marine brigade 

in France. No success whatever attended these 

efforts. [U.S.] Army aviation authorities stated 

candidly that, if the squadron ever got to France, 

it would be used to furnish personnel to run one 

of their training fields, but that this was as near 

the front as it would ever get. Confronted with 

this discouraging outlook, the squadron commander set about to find some other way of getting his squadron into the fight. The only aviation 

operations abroad planned by the Navy at that 

time were antisubmarine patrols in flying boats. 

After visiting the Navy flying station at Dunkirk, 

France, and talking with officers of the British 

destroyer patrol, it was realized that Marine aviation’s opportunity to get into the fight lay right 

here. The situation was as follows: submarines 

were causing enormous losses to shipping; their 

main operating bases and repair shops were at 

Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges [Belgium], all 

within easy reach by plane from Dunkirk; and 

the water for 10–15 miles off these bases is so 

shallow that a submarine cannot safely negotiate 

it submerged. If these waters could be patrolled 

continuously during daylight with planes carrying heavy bombs, submarines attempting to enter these bases could be destroyed. Destroyers 

were prevented from patrolling these shallows 

efficiently in daylight by the heavy shore batteries, but could, under the cover of darkness and 

with mines, close the channels at night. This was 

evidently such an effective plan that inquiries 

were made as to why it was not put into effect. 

These inquiries developed that the Germans re-
80 chapter two

alized the danger of such a plan and energetically suppressed any attempts of the British Navy 

to patrol these waters with seaplanes, sending 

out their best land pursuit planes to shoot them 

down. An inquiry as to why the British did not 

patrol this area with bombing planes protected 

by fighting land planes developed the fact that 

they were so hard pressed on the front in Flanders and northern France that they could not 

spare the planes for this work.

Why could not the Marine Corps man 

the necessary number of planes to allow this 

operation to be carried out? Jubilant at having 

discovered a prospective field of usefulness for 

Marine Corps aviation, our squadron commander hurried home and placed the whole scheme 

before the Major General Commandant, had a 

hearing before the General Board and the Secretary [of the Navy], and as a result orders were 

issued soon afterward to organize four Marine 

land squadrons as quickly as possible and secure 

from the Army the necessary planes to carry out the operation. It may well be imagined 

that, with the prospect of getting into some real 

thick fighting, all hands turned to with a rush, 

and by May 1918, we had our planes and four 

of the best-trained fighting squadrons that ever 

went to war. A short time before going overseas, 

a British ace and all-round aviation expert was 

ordered to spend a week with these squadrons 

to give them their finishing touches. After three 

days, he stated that they were the most thoroughly trained squadrons he had seen away from 

the front, and that he could offer no suggestions 

for improvement—that they were then ready to 

go over the front lines.

In April 1918, the First Marine Aviation Force trained on Curtis Jennies to accompany British bombers flying 

an antisubmarine patrol over the North Sea and English Channel. World War I-era aircraft were not particularly sleek or fast, but what they lacked in performance was compensated for by individual daring in the 

execution of aerial maneuvers. 

Defense Department photo 518425
major alfred A. cunningham 81

Before the Marine squadron arrived in 

France, the Navy decided to make the main 

objective the destruction of the bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Bruges, and to increase 

the number of land squadrons by manning the 

additional squadrons with Navy personnel and 

assigning a naval officer to command the whole 

operation. It was somewhat of a disappointment 

that the status of this operation, which was originated and organized by the Marine Corps as a 

Marine operation, should have been changed. 

But with the prospect of getting into the fight, 

nothing could discourage the squadrons.

The Northern Bombing Group, which was 

the title given the combined Navy and Marine 

Corps land plane bombing operation in Belgium 

and northern France, although supposedly operating under the British, was in reality almost an 

independent body. It was composed of four Marine squadrons of 18 [Airco] DH4 biplanes each, 

known as the Day Wing, and was to have had 

four Navy squadrons of six Caproni night bombing planes each, known as the Night Wing. Only 

one Navy squadron was organized and it got into 

difficulties and sent, prior to the Armistice, only 

one plane over the front on one raid. Although 

handicapped on account of the inability of the 

naval bases at Pauillac, France, and Eastleigh,

England, to furnish us our planes, spare parts, 

and tools, the four Marine squadrons accomplished a great deal. The results of one of our 

raids, verified after the enemy had evacuated 

Belgium, showed that we totally destroyed a 

troop train, killing about 60 officers and 300 

men. The Marine aviators also introduced an 

innovation at the front. A French regiment was 

isolated during an offensive near Stadenburg 

[Germany], and it was decided to feed them by 

plane. Sacks of food were bundled into planes 

and they flew low over the isolated regiment 

and made good deliveries of much-needed subsistence. This necessarily had to be done at a low 

altitude and under a heavy fire from every weapon the enemy could bring to bear. It is believed 

to have been the first instance of its kind. This 

organization participated in the Ypres-Lys offensive and the first and second Belgian offensives.

The following is a table of what was accomplished over the front lines. The objectives 

of some of these raids were 75 miles from our 

aerodromes, nearly all of the distance over German territory:

Number of raids with French and British 43

Number of independent raids 14

Pounds of bombs dropped 52,000

Number of food-dropping raids 5

Pounds of food dropped 2,600

Number of enemy planes shot down 12

Pilots and observers cited for decorations 

(two for the Medal of Honor) 25

John Englehardt. AEF France – First Marine Aviation 

Force, ca. 1918. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
82 chapter two

The recruitment poster Aviation Fly with the U.S. Marines, designed by Howard Chandler Christy for the U.S. 

Marine Corps in 1919, depicts a giant-size eagle in flight through a cloudy sky with a smiling Marine seated 

on his back. Below them is a biplane in flight with Marine insignia and a white plane in the background with a 

red, white, and blue tail. 

National Air and Space Museum Poster Collection
major alfred A. cunningham 83

Two Marine aviators earned the Medal of Honor flying a de Haviland DH-4 during their very first bombing 

raid on Thielt, Belgium, depicted here in Raid on Thielt, 14 October 1918, by James Butcher in 1985. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps, gift of British Aero Space

De Havilland DH-4B, one of five stationed at Santo Domingo with a Lewis .30-caliber machine gun on the 

scarf mount, ca. 1919. 

Marine Corps History Division
84 chapter two

In the meantime, other activities were being worked out by Marine Aviation. An organization of 12 officers and 133 men was organized 

and sent to the Naval Base at Punta Delgada, 

Azores, where they carried on an antisubmarine 

patrol with seaplanes and flying boats until the 

Armistice. A temporary flying field was secured 

at Miami, Florida, where approximately 282 

pilots and 2,180 aviation mechanics were completely trained, including advanced and acrobatic flying, gunnery, bombing, photography, and 

radio. A Marine aviation unit of six officers and 

46 men was organized and attached to the Naval 

Air Station Miami and performed practically all 

the long overseas patrols for that station.

In March 1919, a squadron of six land 

planes and six flying boats was organized and 

attached for duty to the 1st Brigade in Haiti, 

and in February 1919, a flight of six land planes 

was organized and attached to the 2d Brigade in 

Santo Domingo. These organizations have been 

seriously but unavoidably handicapped by a lack 

of suitable planes and not enough personnel to 

properly carry on the work. These handicaps 

will be removed in the near future. However, 

both brigade commanders have requested that 

the number of planes be increased, and very 

complimentary reports as to the value of the 

aviators’ work have been received. They patrol 

regularly the whole island and have saved many 

long, hot, and fruitless “hikes.” They have located 

bands of cacos, [or guerrilla fighters,] dispersed 

them with machine gun fire, and performed 

many useful services that will be explained later.

Naturally, our first and most important 

peace-time duty was to secure permanent wellequipped flying fields as close as possible to 

large Marine Corps posts, so that we could by 

actual demonstration prove our usefulness. The 

difficulty of accomplishing this was greater than 

all our previous endeavors. We received abundant proof that, whether the government wastes 

money or not—as is claimed by the public—

it certainly does not waste it on the Marine 

Corps. It was finally accomplished, however, and 

we now have nearing completion well-equipped 

stations at Quantico and Parris Island, and the 

establishment of a similar station at San Diego 

is approved and work on it will begin when the 

ground at the Marine base is in condition.

The question regarding aviation that is of 

most interest to the Marine Corps is: of what 

practical use is it to us? We see the planes flying around and they seem to be enjoying themselves, but how will they help us perform our 

LtCol John J. Capolino, Capt BF Johnson and Bandits. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major alfred A. cunningham 85

mission? It is confidently believed that this question can be answered to your satisfaction. This 

article will mention some of the ways aviation 

will be helpful to the Marine Corps. These suggestions will not attempt to cover every use 

aviation can be put to or to mention anything 

which is not practical with the present development of planes and the art of flying them. No 

one can more than prophesy what the future development of aviation will allow it to do.

It is my opinion that a great part of the 

evident lack of belief in aviation shown by officers serving with ground troops is caused by 

the entirely unnecessary amount of flying that is 

done with no specific object in view, except the 

practice the pilot gets in handling his plane. This 

naturally creates an impression that the only use 

the planes have is to give their pilots practice in 

handling them. This impression should and will 

be removed. There are many important military 

problems which must be worked out by aviation 

and so many interesting opportunities to work 

in cooperation with troops on the ground that 

flights should rarely be made in future except 

with some useful military purpose in view.

The following paragraphs give some of the 

duties we believe we can perform satisfactorily, 

provided always that suitable equipment is furnished. They require no equipment impossible 

to secure with the present state of development.

Every officer who served at the front in 

the World War was given a rather impressive 

demonstration of the damage and demoralizing 

effect of bombs dropped from the air, and was 

perhaps extremely annoyed by being shot up 

by a machine gun in an airplane that it seemed 

impossible to hit from the ground. It will be remembered that troops in this war were, for the 

most part, well protected in trenches and dugouts from aerial attack as well as from attacks 

on the ground, and that both bombing and gunnery from airplanes will be much more effective 

against guerrillas and troops with less permanent protection. During the late war, proper 

advantage was not taken of the possibilities of 

radio and radio-telephonic communication between planes and between ground troops and 

planes.

Let us assume that the commanding general of a Marine expeditionary or advanced base 

force with his troops on board transports is 

approaching a port at which he is supposed to 

land in the face of enemy opposition. Would it 

be of value to him if one or more of his Marine 

aviators left his ship a hundred or more miles 

off shore, flew over the port, photographed the 

harbor, and returned in time to have the finished photographs in the hands of all subordinate commanders before land was sighted? This 

would allow the commander to plan his operation, not with inaccurate maps, but with actual 

photographs showing every detail of any effective plan of resistance. Pilots would hardly be 

available at an enemy port. The photographs of 

the harbor in practically all tropical waters show 

clearly the channels, buoys, reefs, sandbars, and 

minefields, if any exist, allowing the ship to be 

navigated into the harbor without a local pilot.

If the commanding general desired to prevent the removal from any locality of enemy 

stores, railway equipment, and locomotives, 

would it not be of service to him if the aviator 

left the ship before the enemy was aware of its 

presence and destroyed the railway tracks or 

bridges and made the highways impassable by 

bombing? During the actual landing, the planes 

could, with machine gun fire and small fragmentation bombs, so demoralize resistance as to 

make the task of landing much easier and safer.

After having landed, the following are a 
86 chapter two

few of the ways the planes can be useful to the 

troops:

They can locate quickly bodies of the enemy 

and communicate instantly their approximate strength, location, disposition, and 

actions. The enemy can be watched and any 

movement instantly reported. In this connection, there has been developed a portable 

radio and radio-telephony ground set that 

is so small and easily set up that one can be 

carried by two or three men or on the back 

of a mule, horse, or donkey. In future operations, every unit that has one of these—

and every unit should have one—will be in 

instant communication with the planes and 

through them with any other station.

Photographs of enemy defenses, proposed battle terrain, or any other object or 

area of reasonable size within a radius of 

50 miles can be taken, developed, and the 

desired number of prints delivered to the 

troops in time to use them in the plan of 

attack or defense. I have personally seen 

photographs distributed to the various organizations 45 minutes after the plane that 

took them had landed.

Planes continuously in communication 

with headquarters can patrol wide areas 

daily or hourly, which duty would require 

large bodies of troops and much fatigue to 

accomplish otherwise.

By bombing and machine gunnery, the 

enemy can be harassed and prevented from 

making orderly dispositions.

Enemy troops and population well in 

rear of the line of resistance can be kept in 

a demoralized condition, and enemy ammunition and supply depots and other military 

objects destroyed.

Any railways, bridges, and roads within 

a radius of 100 miles can be quickly made 

impassable.

Rapid communication can be furnished 

between detached bodies of our troops in 

difficult country, and officers can be quickly 

transported anywhere on urgent missions.

In thick and rough country, the planes 

can keep headquarters informed at all times 

of the disposition, progress, and needs of our 

troops.

In the event the enemy has planes, we 

can protect our troops from observation and 

annoyance and prevent the enemy from securing benefit from his planes.

For the field artillery, the following are some of 

the ways in which we can be helpful:

Difficult and temporary targets can be located quickly, accurately described and changes 

in targets promptly reported.

The bursts of our shell can be accurately spotted and corrections for the next shot 

instantly reported.

Targets invisible from the ground can 

be kept under accurate fire by corrections 

given by the planes.

Photographs of targets can be furnished showing progressively the results of 

artillery fire.

The location of hidden artillery batteries causing damage can be discovered and 

reported.

At night, designated areas can be kept 

lighted by parachute flares, etc.

Through its speed and remarkable visibility, and by the use of its radio and radiotelephone, together with visual signals that 

must be developed, the airplane will coop-
major alfred A. cunningham 87

erate with the signal and communication 

troops so as to greatly increase their effectiveness.

For advanced base work:

In addition to the duties mentioned above 

that aviation will perform—and nearly all 

these will enter into advanced base work as 

well—the planes will cooperate in the following ways:

Offshore patrols to prevent surprise 

raids by enemy light forces.

Antisubmarine patrols.

Spotting for shore batteries in attacks 

by enemy ships.

Communication between the base and 

our vessels offshore.

Photographing, bombing, and torpedoing enemy craft and bases within reach.

On account of the aviator’s ability in 

most localities to pick up and chart enemy 

mine fields, airplanes should furnish valuable assistance in countermining and mine 

sweeping.

A large part of the work performed by the 

Marine Corps is to combat guerrilla and bandit warfare, usually in tropical countries where 

roads are few and ground communications almost nil. We must not overlook the valuable 

LtCol Albert Michael Leahy’s Managua Tri-Motors depicts a Marine Atlantic-Fokker TA-2 tri-motor transport 

aircraft arriving at Managua, Nicaragua, in December 1927 to support the 5th Brigade to quell a civil war 

there—the first sustained tactical airlift operation by any American military service branch. The TA-2 could 

transport a load in two hours that would have taken a mule train three weeks to deliver. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
88 chapter two

assistance aviation can render in this kind of 

fighting or fail to realize its many helpful possibilities in the occupation of such territories 

whether fighting is in progress or not. The enemy encountered under these conditions are 

usually unstable and cannot withstand punishment. They are nearly always superstitious and 

easily stampeded or cowed by methods of warfare with which they are unfamiliar. They base 

their hope for success on their ability to make 

raids and get away before the necessary number 

of our troops arrive. When an attempt to round 

them up is made, their knowledge of the country and their ability to travel light and fast allow 

them to lead our troops an exhausting chase for 

some time before they are dispersed if that is accomplished. The work of the Marine Corps aviators in Haiti and Santo Domingo has abundantly 

shown the possibilities in this class of operations. 

Difficult country can be patrolled so completely 

and frequently that it is impossible for bands to 

form without being discovered. To cover an area 

as thoroughly and frequently as can be done by 

airplanes would require a prohibitive number 

of troops and a weary amount of “hiking.” The 

planes in Haiti have already proved that they can, 

without assistance from the ground, disperse 

and almost destroy bands of cacos with gunnery 

and small bombs. When these insurrectos [rebels] 

realize that they cannot congregate without being attacked within a very short time thereafter 

by our planes, their enthusiasm quickly disappears and the unfamiliar form of attack from the 

air greatly assists in their discouragement. If the 

planes could perform no other service for our 

expeditionary troops than to make unnecessary 

the long marches formerly required in searching for cacos they would be worth their keep, 

but a little imagination will suggest to any experienced Marine officer numerous duties the 

planes, on account of their special abilities, can 

perform for them.

It is believed that enough has been said to 

show those who are students of Marine Corps 

operations that an intelligent development of 

aviation and an encouraging spirit of cooperation between it and our troops can only result 

in enabling the Corps to perform its function 

much more quickly and efficiently. Marine officers very properly “like to be shown,” and nothing is more desired by Marine Corps Aviation 

than a chance to work out with our troops the 

problems suggested above, as they feel assured 

that such an opportunity can result only in mutual respect and confidence.

Before closing this article, I would like to 

mention something that might interest prospective pilots. Above all, aviation is a young man’s 

game. It requires a young heart, nerves, lungs, 

eyes, and reflexes. It has been said that, after a 

man reaches a certain age, he has too much sense 

to do what an aviator is required to do. There are 

exceptions, of course, and older men have been 

good fliers, but I believe they are exceptions, and 

my eight years’ experience and observation has 

shown me that, provided they have the necessary 

amount of judgment, the younger the pilots are 

the better. I believe it is good policy to set the 

maximum age for applicants for pilot’s duties at 

around 25 years. I am also led to believe that the 

average term of usefulness for a pilot flying regularly is not more than five years. At the end of 

that time, they know the work thoroughly, but 

those who are still alive have lost the “pep” and 

enthusiasm that is essential.

The established policy regarding pilots is 

that they will not be ordered to aviation duty 

until they have had enough experience with 
major alfred A. cunningham 89

troops to have become thoroughly qualified Marine officers. The ordinary length of the detail 

will be five years, after which they will return to 

duty with troops.

Aviation is probably the most highly technical branch of the military Service. It differs from 

other arms in the unusually fast development of 

its equipment, planes, motors, etc. The administrative and technical part of it is really a profession that requires long experience and constant 

study to fit one to properly make decisions, 

which decisions must necessarily be correct, as 

the life of the pilot, even in peace times, depends 

upon their soundness. For self-evident reasons, 

it is necessary for any aviation organization to 

have enough old experienced aviation officers to 

run the technical part of it on sound principles 

proved by experience and to prevent the enthusiasm and inexperience of younger pilots from 

causing harm. This necessity for officers of long 

experience is recognized and unquestioned, and 

for this reason, a very small number of pilots 

who show special aptitude will be continued in 

aviation duty indefinitely to furnish the number 

of expert and experienced officers required.

The men in aviation are enlisted especially 

for aviation duty, and are sent through the regular recruit course at Parris Island or Mare Island [California], after which they are given a 

thorough education in gasoline motors, as shop 

machinists, and in practical and theoretical airplane repair and upkeep. Our main trouble with 

enlisted men has been that, after giving them an 

excellent education, they discover that men performing identically the same duties in the Army 

and Navy draw much more pay than they. As a 

result, they become dissatisfied and do not reenlist. It is hoped and believed that this will be 

remedied shortly and their pay put on a par with 

men doing similar work in the Army and Navy.

For fear that, by mentioning in this article, 

the skeptical feeling regarding aviation that is 

supposed to exist among some officers, I have 

given an erroneous impression, I would like to 

state that I believe the number of officers who 

hold this attitude constitutes a small minority 

of the officers of the Corps. The subject is only 

mentioned here because the whole article is an 

effort to show Marine Corps officers that, with 

encouragement and cooperation, we can be of 

real service to them, and to show commanding 

officers what parts of their problems they can 

use aviation to perform. Naturally, the ones we 

wish most to convert are those who at present 

do not fully believe in us.
90

ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS 

IN MICRONESIA, 

FMFRP 12-46

by Major Earl H. Ellis

Major Earl H. Ellis was a brilliant 

Marine officer whose superb skills 

as a planner helped forge the modern Marine Corps and its Fleet Marine Force.3

Though Major General Commandant John A. 

Lejeune was the guiding light, he trusted Ellis 

with the job of translating concepts into concrete plans.

Ellis’s brilliance in planning was only one 

aspect of a complex personality. He served the 

Marine Corps with a single-mindedness that 

left no time for marriage and that damaged 

his health and ultimately cost him his life. Ellis 

frequently worked on assignments around the 

clock, without sleep, until physically and mentally exhausted. This proclivity, plus alcoholism, 

put him in the hospital with mental breakdowns 

on more than one occasion. (In an era of promotions by seniority, these problems did not end 

his career as they would today.) His death in the 

3

 The original Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 

came from Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, FMFRP-46 

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), 77–82. 

Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards 

for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

Japanese-controlled Caroline Islands probably 

resulted from the effects of excessive drinking.

Ellis, who was not a college graduate, enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1900. His 

talents earned him a commission just more than 

a year later. His service prior to World War I 

involved the assignments typical for officers of 

the era. He became a first lieutenant in 1903, 

a captain in 1908, and a major in 1916. During 

World War I, Ellis received a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel, but reverted to his 

permanent rank after the war. During the war, 

he served as a principal staff officer to Lejeune 

when the latter commanded the 4th Brigade and 

then the 2d Division in France. The close relationship, which actually began in the Philippines 

in 1908, continued after Major General Lejeune 

became Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Service at the Naval War College as a student and faculty member (1911–13) was a turning point in Ellis’s career. This tour of duty came 

during the period when the Naval War College 

was a major participant in the development of 

the Navy’s war plans. One of these was War Plan 
major earl h. ellis 91

Orange, which grew out of the need to defend 

the recently acquired Philippines and from the 

perception that Japan was the most likely enemy 

in a future war in the Pacific. War Plan Orange 

served as the basis for a groundbreaking paper 

by Ellis on the theoretical basis for doctrine covering the defense of advanced bases.

After World War I, the naval Services again 

turned their attention to War Plan Orange and 

the problems of a naval campaign against Japan. 

Study was necessary because the strategic situation had changed radically. Japan, which was 

on the Allied side in World War I, had captured 

islands previously occupied by Germany. These 

islands provided Japan with bases suitable for 

launching attacks on the Philippines and other 

American possessions in the Pacific. The altered 

strategic situation meant that a war with Japan would have to include amphibious assaults 

for capturing island bases for subsequent fleet 

actions. This reality served as the basis for the 

Marines’ development of amphibious warfare 

doctrine and for the formation in 1933 of the 

Fleet Marine Force.

The first tangible step by the Marines came 

from Ellis. Working virtually around the clock 

during early 1921, he developed Operation Plan 

712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. This 

plan stood the test of time; 20 years later, during 

World War II, the actual American campaign for 

Micronesia diverged from Ellis’s plan only in areas affected by technological advances.

The effort to develop Operation Plan 712 

was not without cost to Ellis. He suffered several reoccurrences of his earlier mental and physical problems. He was under medical supervision 

and treatment for much of the time he worked 

on the plan.

At the completion of his plan, Major Ellis 

received permission to travel to Japanese-held 

Micronesia in the guise of a civilian. En route, he 

had to be hospitalized in Japan for alcohol poisoning and nephritis, a disease of the kidneys. 

He managed to get to Micronesia but was under close Japanese surveillance. In May 1923, 

the Japanese authorities announced that Ellis 

had died on the Micronesia island of Korror 

[now in Palau]. While there was some speculation that the Japanese had killed him, the most 

likely cause of death was alcohol poisoning and 

nephritis.

Major Earl Ellis’s writings and plans made 

him a major architect in the development of the 

modern Marine Corp. Ellis Hall, the home of 

Earl Hancock “Pete” Ellis was a U.S. Marine Corps 

Intelligence Officer and author of Advanced Base 

Operations in Micronesia, which became the basis for 

the American campaign of amphibious assault that 

defeated the Japanese in World War II. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
92 chapter two

The Marines Have Landed, a Marine Corps recruitment poster designed by James Montgomery Flagg in 1942, 

shows three Marines landing on a beach with ships in the background.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major earl h. ellis 93

the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff College 

at Quantico, Virginia, pays tribute to his memory and contributions.

Summary from 

Operation Plan 712, 

Advanced Base 

Operations 

in Micronesia

Strategy

Governing Factors:

A. A main fleet action will decide the war 

in the Pacific. 

B. Our fleet, on taking the offensive, will 

be at least 25 percent superior to that 

of the enemy.

C. The enemy will hold his main fleet 

within his defensive line and endeavor, 

during preliminary operations, with 

his lesser craft (old gun ships and torpedo, mine, and bomb craft) and land 

forces to “wear down” our fleet to an 

extent where he believes he may reasonably risk a main fleet action.

D. Fleet fighting units, being comparatively irreplaceable in war, must be 

husbanded for action against enemy 

fleet units.

E. Operations preliminary to a fleet action must be carried out by (as far as 

possible) the minimum naval forces 

and those of least fleet value in fleet 

action.

F. Marine forces of reduction, occupation 

and defense must be of such strength 

and composition (so far as maybe 

compatible with the conditions under 

which they must operate) as to require 

the least possible naval support.

G. An offensive projection into the enemy’s strategic front must be made in a 

series of well-defined and rapid moves 

(sea objectives) in order to afford the 

battle fleet the greatest protection 

for the greatest portion of the time. 

(Long-drawn-out operations, with the 

fleet and its base subject to close attack 

by the enemy light forces, are to be 

avoided).

H. A sea objective must be more or less 

isolated and include an area that can be 

reduced practically simultaneously.

I. The sea objective should include an anchorage suitable for the fleet, so situated as to facilitate offensive operations 

against further sea objectives.

J. Subobjectives in any sea objective will 

be as follows, in order of importance:

1. Reduction of a base for the fleet;

2. Reduction of enemy bases;

3. Reduction of any anchorages that 

may be used as enemy emergency 

bases;

4. Reduction of other areas.

Tactics

Governing Factors:

A. The enemy will use land forces freely and by a universal shore resistance 

in strategic areas gain time and create 

opportunities for his “wearing down” 

operations.

B. The enemy defense of land areas will 

consist, in general, of a mobile land 

defense and a mine defense, thus enforcing extensive landing and sweeping 

operations for their reduction.

C. The enemy will have ample time in 

which to prepare his defense.

D. The main points of enemy resistance 
94 chapter two

will be his own bases and those of 

greatest value to us.

E. In the reduction of any island position 

(island or group) the immediate mission may be any of the following, depending upon the particular strategic 

situation:

1. Reduce land masses necessary to 

control anchorages and landing 

fields, thus preventing their use by 

the enemy;

2. Reduce land masses necessary to 

control anchorages, landing fields 

and the passages thereto, thus permitting of their use by our forces;

3. Reduce entire island or group, for 

our unrestricted use and entire 

denial to the enemy for any purpose whatsoever, including observation.

F. Depending upon weather and sea conditions and enemy resistance, the procedure in the execution of the mission 

may be:

U.S. Marines go ashore from Navy motor-sailers in the prewar era before the advent of Andrew Higgins’s 

landing craft. 

Defense Department photo (U.S. Navy) 58920
major earl h. ellis 95

1. Land direct on objective from 

open sea;

2. Land on land masses controlling 

a reef passage, thus securing entrance for effecting a landing on 

objective from reef bound waters.

G. In landing on any land mass the immediate mission must be to secure and 

consolidate a “boat head.”

H. The choice of boat heads must depend 

upon the ease and rapidity with which 

it can be obtained and its position relative to the objectives.

I. Owing to the restricted area of land 

masses, the jungle terrain that generally obtains, and the paucity of existing communications, the enemy’s main 

line of resistance and the bulk of his resistance will be practically on the seacoast in all cases.

J. As a decision is to be reached by a 

very short advance inland, the enemy 

defense will consist of a closely linked 

and intricate obstacle and strongpoint 

system in the back beach jungle.

K. The greatest effort of our troops must 

be put forth at the time of landing.

L. The forces and weapons provided 

should be those best suited to beach and 

jungle combat’s close, rapid fighting.

M. In order to effect a concentration on 

the enemy, operations must be carried 

out with surprise and rapidity.

N. In the defense of bases, the primary 

object of the defense forces will be 

to prevent the enemy from damaging 

property within a certain area (anchorages, port facilities, etc.), not necessarily to destroy enemy craft. The defense 

required is only that necessary to render an enemy attack so dangerous as to 

be unreasonable, taking into consideration the conditions under which the 

enemy is operating.

O. The base fixed defense must concentrate on good observation, quick 

communication, and rapid, accurate 

gunfire: the best fixed defense against 

all types of sea and air forces.

Materiel

Governing Factors:

A. Owing to the restricted ship space 

available, only articles of the widest use 

should be included. Articles of special, 

limited use have no place, provided the 

necessary service can otherwise be obtained approximately.

Marines landing under fire at Santo Domingo City. 

Copy of illustration by Dickson, ca. 1916. 

Records of the U.S. Marine Corps (Record Group 127), 

National Archives and Records Administration
96 chapter two

B. Delicate or complicated materiel that 

cannot reasonably be depended upon 

to withstand rough handling, exposure 

to the elements and service by ordinarily trained personnel, should not be 

included.

C. Whenever the addition of special materiel is effected, its weight, timesaving qualities, and reliability in service 

should always be considered. 

D. All materiel should be of sizes and dimensions favoring rapid transportation 

between ship and shore and quick installation on the latter.

E. Owing to the lack of local resources 

in the theatre of operations, practically all materiel absolutely necessary for 

the installation and maintenance of the 

military forces on shore must be carried on transports.

F. Owing to the fact that the bulk of 

troops will be located near the seacoast, that ample small boat transport 

will be available and that land communications are few and poor, not more 

than 50 percent of the land transport 

usually required need be furnished.

G. In order to simplify training and supply, the materiel provided should be 

standard Army, Navy, or Marine Corps.

H. The materiel considered for the advanced base force must be that which 

we now have or may reasonably be expected to have at the outbreak of hostilities.

Personnel

Governing Factors:

A. The greatest fighting (and losses) will 

occur in the ship-shore belt, and troops 

suitable and trained for combat in that 

area must be provided.

B. In sea operations, where vulnerable, 

floating troop centers are necessary, specialist organizations (employed only as 

such) must be cut to the limit. Wherever it is possible, troops must be given 

specialized training for emergencies 

without withdrawing them from the 

necessary fighting organizations.

C. Owing to the conditions obtaining in 

the theatre of operations, the following specialized training among fighting 

personnel is particularly necessary:

1. Field Engineering: dock, road and 

shelter construction; obstacle and 

trench work; pioneer work; transportation of heavy materiel.

2. Communications: all types for 

linking up isolated and dispersed 

forces.

3. Water Transportation: motor, sail, 

or car.

Organization

Governing Factors:

A. The number of transports must be cut 

to the efficient minimum in order to 

reduce as far as possible the activity of 

fleet fighting units for their protection.

B. The loss of one-third of any particular 

floating force should not prevent the 

complete functioning of the remainder 

of the force in the performance of its 

normal task.

C. Personnel should not be subjected to 

such conditions on board as would 

tend to prevent their putting forth 

their highest effort at the moment of 

landing.
major earl h. ellis 97

D. There must be no wastage in the employment of transports or of troops.

E. No shifting of troops or materiel between ships on blue water is practicable.

F. Task forces must be formed before 

leaving base port and must be embarked as such.

G. Personnel and materiel best adapted to 

perform the normal tasks must be provided.

H. A task unit (in its necessary elements) 

should not be split up between transports, but an economical use of space 

obtained by the subtraction or addition 

of infantry units.

I. All training in the performance of tasks 

must be carried out prior to leaving 

home ports.
98

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS, 

AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES, AND 

PREPARATIONS 

FOR WAR WITH JAPAN

by David J. Ulbrich, PhD

MCU Journal, Spring 2015

nations vied for influence in East Asia and the 

western Pacific. Acquiring the Philippines, Guam, 

and Wake islands after winning the SpanishAmerican War gave the United States a presence 

in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. China especially represented an important commercial 

resource for the United States. Americans 

wanted expanded markets in China and hoped 

to maintain an “Open-Door” trade policy with 

that nation’s large population. These commercial interests required sufficient forces to protect them. A few years later in 1905, victory in 

the Russo-Japanese War turned Japan into the 

dominant nation in the region. Due to severe 

deficiencies in natural resources, the Japanese 

leaders coveted the raw materials and agricultural production of the Asian mainland. Any 

southward or westward expansion would inevitably bring this rising power into conflict with 

America’s strategic and commercial interests in 

that region. 

As early as 1900, the senior admirals in the 

U.S. Navy argued that the new strategic situation 

required American power to be projected across 

The U.S. Marine Corps’ amphibious 

mission had its genesis at the dawn of 

the twentieth century.4

 Following the 

Spanish-American War in 1898, American strategists worried about the possibility of war between the United States and Japan because both 

4

 This article grew out of a presentation titled “Marine Corps Doctrine and the War with Japan” at the 2013 Chief of Army History 

Conference in Canberra, NSW. A longer version with this same 

title was published in the conference’s proceedings Peter Dennis, 

ed., Armies and Maritime Strategy (Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing, 2014). This article is reprinted by permission of the Army 

History Unit. Portions of this article have also been drawn from 

Ulbrich’s award-winning “Clarifying the Origins and Strategic 

Mission of the U.S. Marine Corps Defense Battalion, 1898–1941,” 

War and Society 17, no. 2 (October 1999): 81–109; “Document of 

Note: The Long-Lost Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936),” Journal of Military History 71, no. 3 (October 2007): 

889–901; the award-winning Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb 

and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011); and as coauthor with Matthew S. 

Muehlbauer, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial 

Era to the Twenty-First Century (London and New York: Routledge, 

2014). Ulbrich gratefully acknowledges assistance from the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation and the Marine Corps University’s History Division, Reference Branch, and Archives Branch. 

Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 168–210; and Jack 

Shulimson, “The Influence of the Spanish-American War on the 

U.S. Marine Corps,” in Theodore Roosevelt, the U.S. Navy, and the 

Spanish-American War, ed. Edward J. Marolda (New York: Palgrave, 

2001), 81–93.
david j. ulbrich 99

the vast Pacific Ocean. American strategists prepared a number of scenarios with potential allies and enemies designated by colors. The U.S. 

Navy’s planners focused their attention on the 

Pacific Ocean and on Japan, otherwise known 

by the color designation “Orange” in American 

war plans. This potential threat gave the Marine 

Corps two new roles: amphibious assault and island defense. Marines would no longer expect 

to subsist in nineteenth-century duties as shipboard police, legation guards, and constabulary 

troops. Doing so would only relegate the Corps 

to insignificance and eventual extinction.5

As the plan to defeat Japan, War Plan Orange spanned the next several decades until 

1938. All its variations shared several tenets. 

American strategists expected that the Japa5

 For the seminal works, see David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, 

Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 

1887–1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997); and Edward 

S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–

1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991).

nese would launch a preemptive strike, likely 

without a formal declaration of war. That attack 

would presumably be directed against American bases on the Philippines and Guam. Following the initial Japanese onslaught, the U.S. 

Fleet would sortie from Hawaii and sail across 

the Pacific. During this offensive campaign, the 

Marines would seize and hold “temporary advanced bases in cooperation with the Fleet and 

. . . defend such bases until relieved by the Army.”6

 These roles constituted a new dual mission 

for the Marine Corps. The newly captured bases 

would subsequently function as coaling stations, 

safe anchorages, repair facilities, supply depots, 

and eventually aircraft bases. The U.S. Fleet 

would either relieve besieged American forces 

in the Philippines or liberate the archipelago if 

it already had fallen. As the U.S. Fleet menaced 

6

 Gen Holland M. Smith, The Development of Amphibious Tactics in 

the U.S. Navy (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), 22. 

Map of War Plan Orange in the 1920s–30s. 

Map courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute
100 chapter two

the Japanese home islands, American planners 

hoped that the Imperial Japanese Navy would 

contest the American offensive. This ensuing naval battle, as was unquestioningly assumed in every iteration of War Plan Orange, would result 

in a decisive American victory. If the Japanese 

chose not to fight, then the U.S. Fleet would 

blockade their home islands. Regardless, the 

American victory would consign Japan to the 

status of a diminished, isolated regional power.7

This article traces the progression from 

America’s strategic plans to the doctrine formulation phase, to the force structure development 

phase, and to the equipment procurement phase 

in the decades leading up to the Second World 

War. During the planning process behind War 

Plan Orange and subsequent plans, missions 

were dispensed downward from Navy to the 

Marine Corps. Once strategic priorities were 

set for offensive or defensive portions of the 

Marines’ dual mission, the Corps’ own planners 

worked to fulfill those needs.8

 The doctrines for 

advanced base defense and amphibious assault 

7

 James O. Richardson, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson as Told by George C. Dyer (Washington, DC: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 

1973), 256–68; George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The 

U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1994), 44, 51–53, 90–92, 119–28; Steven T. Ross, ed., American 

War Plans, 1890–1939 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 7–9, 

49, 80, 137, 167–74; and Miller, War Plan Orange, 202–3, 226. 8

 S. L. Howard, “The Marine Corps in War Plans” lecture, 3 May 

1929, Box 7, Strategic Plans War Plans Division (SPWPD), Series 

I, Record Group 38 Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (RG 38), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NACP); Memo for the Officer in Charge, 

War Plans Section, Headquarters Marine Corps, 4 May 1936, 

Box 22, Division of Plans and Policies War Plans Section General Correspondence 1926–1942 (DPPWPGC 1926–42), Record 

Group 127 General Records of the U.S. Marine Corps (RG 127), 

National Archives, Washington, DC (NADC); Donald F. Bittner, 

“Taking the Right Fork in the Road: The Transition of the U.S. 

Marine Corps from an ‘Expeditionary’ to an ‘Amphibious’ Corps, 

1918–1941,” in Battles Near and Far: A Century of Overseas Deployment–The Chief of Army Military History Conference 2004, ed. Peter 

Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra, Australia: Army History Unit, 

2005), 116–40; and Miller, War Plan Orange, 181, 197–99, 226.

formed the pivot point for the Marine Corps to 

match operational, force structure, and material capabilities to the Navy’s strategic needs in 

the Pacific Ocean. It should also be noted that 

the Marines embraced amphibious capabilities 

as a means of institutional survival during the 

resource-poor interwar years. Lastly, this article also highlights a few of the personalities that 

helped drive this process. 

Among the personalities was Thomas Holcomb, whose career spanned more than four 

decades from his commissioning as an officer 

in 1900 to completing a seven-year term of 

command of the U.S. Marine Corps in 1943. 

As much as any other Marine, Holcomb can be 

considered a touchstone because he influenced 

so heavily the strategic, doctrinal, technological, and organizational evolution of the Corps’ 

amphibious capabilities. Even so, other Marine 

officers like Earl Ellis, Holland Smith, Robert 

H. Dunlap, and John Lejeune also played critical 

roles in preparing the Corps for this amphibious 

mission. This article will highlight their contributions. Ultimately, the efforts by Holcomb and 

the others, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, 

would bear much fruit in the Second World War. 

Their habits of mind, as well as their actual ideas 

about amphibious warfare, likewise provide examples that can be applied in the twenty-first 

century.

Establishing 

the Corps’ Place 

in American Strategy, 

1900–33

The U.S. Marine Corps made positive strides 

in developing its amphibious capabilities from 

1900 to 1915. Marines specializing in this new 

type of warfare could attend their own Advanced 

Base School, where they studied operational is-
david j. ulbrich 101

sues important to any base defense, such as artillery placement, communications, logistics, and 

staff organization. Academic study and practical 

experience coalesced in 1914 with a simulated 

assault on Culebra, a small island near Puerto 

Rico in the Caribbean. Warships from the U.S. 

Atlantic Fleet attacked 1,700 Marines defending 

the island. The Marine Advanced Base Brigade 

succeeded beyond expectations by quickly fortifying the island, harassing the Navy warships, 

and repulsing amphibious assaults.9

In 1915, the Marine Corps’ Assistant Commandant Colonel John A. Lejeune created an ad 

hoc war plans committee comprised of himself 

and three promising Marine captains assigned 

at Headquarters Marine Corps: Ralph S. Keyser, Earl “Pete” Ellis, and Thomas Holcomb. Of 

these, Ellis emerged as the premier amphibious assault theorist until his untimely death in 

1923. However, Holcomb and another rising 

officer, Holland M. Smith, provided the Corps 

9

 Graham A. Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, “The Culebra Maneuver and the Formation of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Advanced Base 

Force, 1913–1914,” in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in 

Naval History: Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy History 

Symposium, ed. Robert William Love Jr. (New York: Garland Press, 

1980), 293, 299–306.

with the continuity of purpose and the baseline 

of knowledge from 1915 through 1943 as they 

rose through ranks. 

Among other issues, Lejeune’s war plans 

committee set to work examining the Navy’s 

evolving strategic needs and determining how 

the Marine Corps could best fulfill them. By 

1916, however, it was not the specter of a war 

with Japan or the possibility of amphibious operations in the Pacific that absorbed the Marines’ 

energies. Instead, it was the bloody conflict raging in Europe. Lejeune and his war plans committee worked diligently to determine how new 

weapons technology and battlefield tactics might 

affect their Service’s combat capabilities. Mobilizing and fighting the First World War in France 

demanded the Corps’ entire attention. Although 

Marines acquired the nickname “Teufel Hunden” 

(Devil Dogs in English) and gained invaluable 

combat experience, the Great War did little to 

help the Corps as an amphibious assault or base 

defense force. Indeed, Marines worried that 

their Service might be seen as a second American land army that could be disbanded during 

postwar demobilization.10

Indeed, similar soul-searching is occurring 

as the present-day Marine Corps attempts to return to its roots as the United States’ premier 

amphibious force, after having served as a second land army in Iraq and Afghanistan for more 

than a decade. There is a generation of midcareer Marines who have limited knowledge or 

experience of amphibious operations.

Returning to the postwar anxieties in the 

1920s, the Marine Corps did not disband after 

the conflict’s end. Instead, recently promoted 

Major General John A. Lejeune helped solidi10 See David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the 

Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1935–1943 (Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 2011), 14–27.

Process to dispense an amphibious mission downward to the Marine Corps. Marines then formulated 

the doctrine, created the force structure, and procured equipment necessary to fulfill the amphibious 

mission. 

Chart courtesy of MCU Press
102 chapter two

fy its place in American naval strategy when he 

became Commandant in 1920. At his behest, 

then-Major Pete Ellis authored two definitive 

reports on amphibious operations that very next 

year. His Navy Bases: Their Location, Resources, and 

Security (1921) and Advanced Base Operations in 

Micronesia served as primers on how advanced 

bases could support Fleet operations. Two decades before the American entrance into the 

Second World War, Ellis predicted with uncanny 

accuracy the base defense and amphibious assault operations that characterized that conflict 

in the Pacific.11

 Because Japan was “the only purely Pacific 

world power,” Ellis saw it as the only principal 

threat to the United States. His report, Navy Bases, anticipated that Japan would take the offensive and try to capture outlying American island 

bases. These bases would then form a strategic 

defense-in-depth.12 Ellis’s other report, Advanced 

Base Operations, stood as a companion work to 

Navy Bases. It outlined a strategy for seizing and 

defending various Pacific islands, including the 

Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines, which the 

Japanese already controlled. Imagining a potential campaign in the Pacific, Ellis outlined targets 

for amphibious assaults and anticipated certain 

sea battles. He suggested that Marines receive simultaneous training for the offensive and defensive components of their mission. Knowledge of 

how to defend an island against an enemy am11 Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia; Earl H. Ellis, Navy Bases: 

Their Location, Resources, and Security (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992, 1921); LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj 

Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw Jr., History of U.S. Marines Corps 

Operations in World War II, vol. I, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1958), 8–10, 459–61, hereafter Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal; and Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United 

States Marine Corps, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1991). For the 

best biography of Ellis, see Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and Merrill L. 

Bartlett, Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880–1923 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997). 

12 Ellis, Navy Bases, 3–6, 10–23, 30, 48.

phibious assault could only improve the attackers’ abilities to make a successful assault in the 

future, and vice versa.13

Both of Ellis’s seminal reports cast the Marine Corps in roles mandated by War Plan Orange. Later in 1926, the inter-Service report, 

Joint Action of the Army and Navy, similarly called 

for training, supply, and maintenance of Marine 

units for the following priorities: “For land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such 

limited auxiliary land operations as are essential 

to the prosecution of the Naval campaign.”14 A 

dual mission was now the Marine Corps’ strategic raison d’être, as well as the ongoing key to 

survival during an era of restricted resources. In 

this way, military necessity blended with institutional pragmatism.

Ellis was hardly alone in his advocacy of an 

amphibious focus for the Corps in the interwar 

years. Other ardent supporters included Lejeune, Holcomb, James C. Breckinridge, John 

H. Russell Jr., Ben H. Fuller, Robert H. Dunlap, and Holland M. Smith. Naval officers such 

as Rear Admiral Clarence Stewart Williams, in 

his role as head of the Navy’s War Plan Division, 

also recognized the Corps’ potential as an amphibious force in the early 1920s.15

Although the Corps’ new mission was 

clearly distilled, two obstacles remained. First 

was the continued emphasis and commitment to 

“Banana Wars” in Latin America. A power clique 

among Marine officers remained dedicated to 

13 Ellis, Advanced Base Operations, 39–50. 14 Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan–ORANGE, 6 October 1920, 

quoted in Frank J. Infusino, “U.S. Marines and War Planning, 

1940–1941” (masters thesis, San Diego State University, 1974), 

145.

15 See relevant chapters in Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, 

eds., Commandant of the Marine Corps (Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 2004); and Leo J. Daugherty III, Pioneers in Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945: Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009).
david j. ulbrich 103

constabulary security as the Corps’ primary 

role. Lejeune, Russell, Holcomb, and others 

needed to overcome this internal resistance 

against amphibious development. External to 

the Corps, obtaining the resources and writing 

the doctrine to fulfill that mandate became Lejeune’s primary goals in the final years as Commandant. Reductions in budgets and personnel, 

however, persisted throughout the 1920s, despite his best efforts. The Corps was not alone 

in experiencing these years of famine. The U.S. 

Army and Navy also saw declining budgets.16

Meanwhile, Lejeune decided to maximize 

the resources and expertise within the Corps. 

He put a premium on military education for 

his Marines and founded the Marine Corps 

Schools in the 1920s. The next Commandant, 

Major General Wendell C. Neville, followed in 

Lejeune’s footsteps. He ensured that Marines 

would receive advanced training in all aspects 

16 See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 38–42; and Keith B. Bickel, 

Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 

1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 205–8, 211–13. 

of warfare at schools in the Marine Corps, the 

Navy, the Army, and at the prestigious institutions like the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, 

France. These opportunities afforded Marine 

officers to consider warmaking in systematic 

ways, as well as to interact with peers from other Services.17

One Marine who took advantage of advanced military education was then-Colonel 

Thomas Holcomb. As a highly decorated veteran 

of Belleau Wood in 1918 and a member of Lejeune’s war plans committee two years earlier, 

Holcomb applied past experiences to his studies 

at the Naval War College from 1930 to 1931. 

He exemplified the type of professional development advocated by Neville and Lejeune. Holcomb’s year at the Army War College from June 

1931 to June 1932 proved to be still more fer17 W. C. Neville, “The Marine Corps,” Proceedings of the United States 

Naval Institute 55, no. 10 (October 1929): 863–66; and Donald F. 

Bittner, “Foreign Military Officer Training in Reverse: U.S. Marine 

Corps Officers in the French Professional Military Education System in the Interwar Years,” Journal of Military History 57, no. 3 (July 

1993), 481–510.

Tom Lea, First Wave: Going In, Peleliu, 1944. 

Life Collection of Art WWII, U.S. Army Center of Military History, courtesy of the Tom Lea Institute
104 chapter two

tile time in his development as a senior officer. 

He worked with other students to formulate 

plans for attacking enemy nations and defeating 

enemy forces. Some scenarios were fabricated, while others were realistic. In one course 

project, Holcomb played the role of naval commander of an American force conducting an 

amphibious assault on Halifax, Nova Scotia. This 

assignment reinforced his conviction that planning down to the minutest details was necessary 

for a successful landing operation. Another career officer, the Army’s Major George S. Patton Jr., also worked on this group project with 

Holcomb. These academic exercises doubtlessly 

helped Patton during his amphibious operations 

a decade later.18

18 “Report of Committee No 6. Subject: Plans and Orders for the 

Additionally, while working independently at the Army War College in 1932, Holcomb 

wrote a special report titled The Marine Corps’ 

Mission in National Defense, and Its Organization 

for a Major Emergency. He asked an important 

question about the Corps: What should be the 

most suitable organization for a major emergency? His lengthy answer outlined the principles 

of seizing and defending advanced bases, and 

he discussed all aspects of training and supplying Marine units. Amphibious operations represented the Corps’ future role in the nation’s 

war plans. No longer did Holcomb see the MaSeizure of Halifax,” 29 March 1932, File Number 386-6, and “Analytical Studies, Synopsis of Report, Committee No. 5,” 2 March 

1932, File Number 388-5, Army War College (AWC), U.S. Army 

Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA (AHEC); 

and Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 359–99.

Albin Henning, untitled. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
david j. ulbrich 105

rine Corps as a constabulary force fighting small 

wars, or “other minor operations” as he called 

them.19 

Although Holcomb’s report drew on existing ideas and documents, its significance as an 

original endeavor should not be discounted. In 

19 Thomas Holcomb, “The Marine Corps’ Mission in National 

Defense, and Its Organization for a Major Emergency,” 30 January 

1932, File 387-30, AWC, AHEC, 1–4. 

an appendix, he also anticipated the creation of 

the Fleet Marine Force that next year in 1933, 

the end of the Corps’ constabulary duties in 

Central America in 1934, the creation of a triangular Marine division-size unit, and lastly the 

publication of doctrinal manuals on amphibious assault operations in 1934 and base defense 

operations in 1936. The degree to which Holcomb’s report circulated beyond the confines 

of the Army War College is not clear. This report, however, did constitute a blueprint for 

the Corps’ future that Marines could follow and 

that he himself did follow later in the 1930s and 

during the war years.20

After graduating from the Army War College in 1932, Holcomb’s critical academic study 

and practical experiences prepared him for 

his next duty station in the Navy Department, 

where he served at the Navy’s War Plans Division and offered advice on amphibious operations and strategic planning relating to War Plan 

Orange. In this position, Holcomb advocated 

what military historian Edward S. Miller calls 

a “cautionary” strategy.21 The U.S. Navy would 

strike at the Japanese forces across the Pacific 

using island bases seized and held by Marine 

Corps units as stepping stones, rather than seeking a single climactic battle between Japanese 

and American fleets as a primary goal. Japan’s 

acquisition of the Micronesia Islands in the Pacific from the Germans after the First World 

War necessitated this more realistic and cautious 

strategic mind-set.22

Thomas Holcomb has been overshadowed 

by John Lejeune, Earl Ellis, and Holland Smith, 

all of who became household names in Marine 

20 Holcomb, “The Marine Corps’ Mission in National Defense, and 

Its Organization for a Major Emergency,” 13. 

21 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 

1897–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991). 22 Miller, War Plan Orange, 36, 181, 183, 329, 377–78.

Men of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, debark from 

the USS Zeilin (APA 3) into medium landing 

craft on D-Day in Col Richard Gibney’s Down the 

Nets, Tarawa. Amid confusion in the preassault 

darkness, hundreds of Marines had to cross-deck 

from landing boats into tracked landing vehicles, 

climbing across the gunwales of the two pitching 

craft.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
106 chapter two

Corps lore and history. These giants certainly 

played integral roles in the 1910s–20s in the 

case of Lejeune and Ellis, and from the 1920s 

through the Second World War in Smith’s case. 

However, none of them transcended the years 

between the 1910s and 1940s as Holcomb did, 

nor did they exert so much influence as a student, educator, strategic planner, staff officer, 

and Commandant during these years.

Codifying Doctrine, 

Creating Force 

Structure, and 

Procuring Equipment, 

1933–38 

Despite the best efforts of President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt and his prodefense allies in Congress, 

the U.S. military’s funding slipped to low levels. 

The Marines also felt this crunch in which the 

Corps’ annual expenditures ran between $15 

and $25 million from 1935 to 1939 (in 1930s 

dollars). To put this in perspective, these figures 

amounted to between 3 and 4 percent of the 

U.S. Navy’s annual expenditures. Nevertheless, 

the decade of famine also saw the flourishing of 

force structure improvements, doctrinal developments, and technological adaptations that easily surpassed any decade before or since in the 

history of the Corps, if not the entirety of American military history. In 1933, for example, the 

creation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) gave 

the Corps a platform, albeit modest in size, to 

Col Richard Gibney’s Kamikazi Attack, Okinawa, 1 April 1945, is a tribute to the Marines and sailors at the guns 

on board offshore ships. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
david j. ulbrich 107

support amphibious assault and base defense 

units.23

With an amphibious force structure on paper, the Marine Corps needed to codify the amphibious doctrines to be employed by the FMF 

in future conflicts. Much work had already been 

underway at the Marine Corps Schools in the 

mid-1920s when Brigadier General Robert H. 

Dunlap was the schools’ commandant. His ideas 

and efforts, as well as the ideas outlined by Ellis, 

formed the foundations for the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) and the Tentative 

23 MGC to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), “Expeditionary 

Force,” 17 August 1933, File 1975-10, PDGC 1933–38, Box 135, 

RG 127, NADC; William J. Van Ryzin, intvw with Benis M. Frank 

and Graham A. Cosmas, 1975, transcript, Marine Corps University Archives (MCUA), 74–76; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 319, 330–37; 

and Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1951), 74–75.

Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936) produced by the Marine Corps Schools faculty and 

students.24 The two “tentative” surveys looked to 

the future, while a separate doctrinal survey titled the Small Wars Manual (1935 and 1940) enumerated past lessons from Marine deployments 

as constabulary units in Latin America. Taken 

together, these three manuals constitute what 

24 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, 1934, History Amphibious File (HAF) 39, MCUA; and Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases, 1936, War Plans and Related Material 1931–1944, 

Box 7, Entry 246, RG 127, NADC; Isely and Crowl, The U.S. 

Marines and Amphibious War, 36–44; LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, 

Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps, 

1900–1970 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1973), 139–43; Allan R. Millett, 

“Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare 

between the Wars—The American, British, and Japanese Experiences,” in Military Innovations in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson 

Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 1996), 74–75; and Daugherty, Pioneer of Amphibious Warfare, 194–212.

Col Donna J. Neary’s Fourth Marine Division Landing on Iwo Jima depicts elements of the 4th Marine Division’s 

eighth wave landing on Yellow Beach 1 into intensive artillery and small arms fire. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
108 chapter two

Marine Corps Chief Historian Charles D. Melson has called the “holy trinity” of Marine Corps 

doctrine.25

Classes at the Marine Corps Schools were 

suspended from November 1933 to May 1934, 

so that faculty and students could compile the 

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations. They 

completed their work in June 1934. Not only 

did this resulting document outline lessons 

learned from past amphibious operations, but it 

also anticipated challenges in future operations. 

Despite the British amphibious fiasco at Gallipoli during the First World War, for example, 

American Marines postulated that careful planning, adequate training, and proper equipment 

could overcome the tactical advantages enjoyed 

by an enemy defending a shoreline. This document created a rational framework that would 

25 Charles D. Melson, intvw with author, July 2003, cited in Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 36.

facilitate American amphibious assault operations in the Second World War. This process of 

systematic analysis regarding practical lessons of 

the past likewise demonstrated the institutional adaptability that has been the hallmark of the 

Marine Corps.26

Nevertheless, this landing operation manual made no detailed examination of the complexities of advanced base defense, the other 

half of the Corps’ new dual mission. Two years 

later in 1936, the Tentative Manual for Defense of 

Advanced Bases filled that void by providing a doctrinal foundation for advanced base defense that 

26 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 

1.8, 1.22, 3.120; James C. Breckinridge to John H. Russell, 6 November 1934, Holcomb Papers, Box 11, MCUA; Isely and Crowl, 

The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare, 5, 36–44; Hough, Ludwig, 

and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 14–22; Bittner, “Taking the 

Right Fork in the Road,” 124–25; Gunther E. Rothenberg, “From 

Gallipoli to Guadalcanal: The Development of U.S. Marine Corps 

Amphibious Assault Doctrine, 1915–1942,” in Assault from the Sea: 

Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, ed. Merrill L. Bartlett 

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 177–82.

Marines wade ashore on Tinian from landing barges, which could not make the beach. The amphibious tractors in the assault wave came all the way onto the beach and then crossed the island.

Official Marine Corps photo 88088, Marine Corps History Division
david j. ulbrich 109

had been so intrinsically tied to the Corps’ roles 

since 1898.

In the meantime, Thomas Holcomb received his first star and became commandant 

of the Marine Corps Schools in February 1935. 

During the next 22 months of his tenure, the 

schools made various revisions to the Tentative 

Manual for Landing Operations that would subsequently be folded into the U.S. Navy’s Landing Operations Doctrine: United States Navy, 1938, 

Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 

1938. Holcomb also supervised the completion 

of manuals on base defense and small wars. Because of his previous work on war plans and his 

military studies, Holcomb brought especially 

significant knowledge about amphibious warfare 

to the writing of the Corps’ new base defense 

manual. Just as he routinely conducted spot inspections in classrooms and on parade grounds 

at Quantico, it is reasonable to infer that he sat 

in on discussions about artillery placement, unit 

deployments, or other topics, as well as read 

drafts of the manual.27

27 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 45–48, 58–59, 139–42; Bittner, 

“Taking the Right Fork in the Road,” 125–26; and Ulbrich, “The 

Although no documents cite Holcomb by 

name, his tacit influence can be seen in the following lines from the Tentative Manual for Defense 

of Advanced Bases: “Defense of advanced bases will 

involve the combined employment of land, air, 

and sea forces. Depending on the nature of the 

hostile attacks against a base, one arm or service may play the major role, but in the event 

of a general landing attack, the land forces will 

constitute the basic element of the defense. In 

any case, the ultimate success of the defense will 

depend upon the closest cooperation and coordination between the naval defense forces, the 

shore defense forces, and the aviation forces.”28

This quote highlighted the need to utilize coordinated combined air, naval, and ground forces 

to mount a successful defense that was reminiscent of the report penned in 1932 by Holcomb 

at the Army War College. In summary, the Marines looked up from the operational and tactical levels to the U.S. Navy’s strategic needs and 

then formulated operational and tactical doctrines to fulfill those needs.

In 1936, Thomas Holcomb was promoted to Commandant of the Marine Corps. He 

jumped over several more senior Marine generals for several reasons. He maintained a friendship with President Roosevelt dating back to the 

First World War. Holcomb also fit a particular 

political profile inside the Corps that placed him 

in the ascendant clique. He favored the new dual 

mission of amphibious assault and base defense 

over the outmoded mission of constabulary security in small wars. Indeed, Holcomb’s interest 

in amphibious doctrine and strategic planning 

dated back 20 years to his membership on Lejeune’s ad hoc war plans committee in 1916. 

Long-Lost Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936),” 

889–901.

28 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases, preface, no pagination.

Sgt John Fabian, LST’s Off Tinian. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
110 chapter two

This made Holcomb an ideal candidate for the 

sitting Commandant, John H. Russell, who was 

one of the most fervent amphibious warfare advocates in the Corps.

Holcomb’s career track provides other concrete justifications for his promotion. In the first 

36 exemplary years of his career, he climbed 

steadily through the commissioned ranks, 

gained valuable experience in the First World 

War, distinguished himself in the military’s education system, demonstrated administrative 

skills in performing staff duties, supervised significant doctrinal developments at the Marine 

Corps Schools, and maintained cordial contacts 

with civilian and naval officials alike. He enjoyed 

high levels of prestige as a “China Hand” and 

one of the “Old Breed” of the First World War.29

Holcomb benefited from such high-ranking 

patrons as Lejeune and Russell, both of whom 

helped him into many key postings. Holcomb was 

the right person, in the right place, at the right 

time to become Marine Corps Commandant in 

1936, just as he always seemed to be the right 

person for a given post throughout his career.

With the Fleet Marine Force established and 

amphibious doctrines codified, the next stage of 

readying the Corps for amphibious operations 

29 The term China Hand refers to those with expert knowledge of 

the Chinese culture, people, and language, particularly soldiers, 

journalists, and diplomats before, during, and after World War II. 

The term Old Breed refers to Marines with 5–10 years of service.

Harry Jackson, Dawn Beachhead. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
david j. ulbrich 111

entailed conducting several Fleet Landing Exercises between 1934 and 1941. When Holcomb 

became Commandant, he continued these efforts despite facing severe budget constraints. 

Known as FLEXs, these simulated amphibious 

assaults and base defenses gave the Marine 

Corps and Navy several opportunities to experiment with doctrine, troubleshoot problems, and 

field test equipment. The Navy performed several types of long-range shore bombardments, 

including counterbattery and interdiction fire. 

The Marines tested existing weapons and vehicles that they might employ in an actual amphibious assault, and they established a defensive 

position against possible counterattacks from 

land or sea. In so doing, the Marines discovered 

deficiencies in the Navy’s landing craft. Only 

with great difficulty could Navy whaleboats or 

motor launches transport troops from ships 

through the surf to the beach. These craft offered little protection to their occupants, moved 

too slowly, lacked seaworthiness in rough surf, 

and failed to traverse coral reefs. The Marines 

also found such weaknesses as combat loading, 

which would need careful consideration to ensure that transport vessels might be packed so 

that equipment could be off-loaded more efficiently. It became abundantly clear that existing 

Navy warships, although absolutely necessary as 

weapons platforms, were not ideal for moving 

Cpl Richard Gibney, Tarawa Landing, sketch. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
112 chapter two

men or equipment. It took several years before 

the Corps found suitable landing craft and the 

money to pay for them in part because the Navy 

would not fund these efforts. Eventually, however, the Marines identified two ideal civilian 

designs for landing craft: Andrew Jackson Higgins’ “Eureka” boat and Daniel Roebling’s “Alligator” amphibian tractor. Both could be adapted 

to military use, and both surpassed anything in 

the Navy or Marine Corps’ existing inventory.30

Meanwhile, tensions in East Asia grew 

more acute. The year 1937 represented a watershed because Japanese forces invaded China. By 

year’s end, Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing fell to 

Japanese control. This did not, however, bring 

Japan victory in this Sino-Japanese conflict in 

1938 or thereafter. Instead, the fighting dragged 

on with no end in sight. In Europe, Nazi Germany steadily expanded its territory by annexing 

Austria and occupying the Sudetenland in 1938. 

The fluid situations in East Asia and Europe reduced the utility of War Plan Orange. The new 

set of threats dictated that the United States prepare for several scenarios.31

The Japanese, for their part, also planned 

for a possible war with the United States. Military historians Mark R. Peattie and David C. Evans argue that the Japanese had long followed a 

30 B. W. Galley, “A History of the U.S. Fleet Landing Exercises,” 3 

July 1939, HAF 73, MCUA; Thomas Holcomb to Harold Stark, 26 

May 1941, Box 50, SPWPD, Series III, NACP; Smith, The Development of Amphibious Tactics, 25–38; Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines 

and Amphibious War, 45–58; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, 339–40. 31 Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and the Japan’s Confrontation 

with the West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 

295–308; Saburo Hayashi with Alvin D. Coox, Kōgun: The Japanese 

Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 

1951, 1959), 9; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in 

Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman Press, 1987), 41–51; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic 

Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 

18–20, 84–90, 116, 131; D. Clayton James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy 

from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1986), 710, 717; Ross, American War 

“wait-and-react” strategy. The Japanese anticipated three phases for naval operations during the 

conflict: “first, searching operations designed to 

seek out and annihilate the lesser American naval forces . . . in the western Pacific; second, attritional operations against a westward-moving 

American main battle force coming to assist in 

the relief or reconquest of American territories 

there; and third, a decisive encounter in which 

the American force would be crushed and the 

Americans forced to negotiate.”32 It was a given 

that the Japanese would capture American-held 

advanced island bases in the western Pacific. 

The Japanese expected to use their own bases 

Plans, 177–83; and “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan–Orange 

(1938),” Joint Board No 325, Serial 618, p. 1, Microfilm 1421, 

Reel 10, NACP. 

32 Peattie and Evans, Kaigun, 464. For an excellent study of Japanese amphibious capabilities, see the chapter titled “The Development of Imperial Japanese Army Amphibious Warfare Doctrine” in 

Edward J. Drea, In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 14–25.

Cpl Richard Gibney, Run for the Beach, Saipan. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
david j. ulbrich 113

in the Marshalls, Marianas, and other Micronesian islands in offensive and defensive operations. Construction of airfields began on these 

islands as early as 1934 and accelerated military 

building programs thereafter. The Japanese plan 

to defeat the U.S. Fleet mirrored the American 

Orange Plan. It seems that each side was playing 

into the other’s hands. Japan’s wait-and-react 

strategy remained intact until 1940, when such 

priorities as natural resources and such realities 

as American naval expansion caused the Japanese to shift toward an offensive mind-set.33

In the United States, the outmoded War 

Plan Orange did not affect the Marine Corps, 

which continued to play an important role in 

33 Peattie and Evans, Kaigun, 465–73; Ross, American War Plans, 

168–69; Specter, Eagle Against the Sun, 43–45; and James, “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” 705–7.

the last iteration as well as in subsequent war 

plans. Because the Corps’ contributions were 

tactical and operational rather than strategic, the 

Marines kept their focus squarely on defending 

friendly bases or attacking enemy-held bases. 

They adapted to the evolving situations in 1938 

and thereafter.34

Two important measures bore witness in 

1938 to the U. S. Navy’s acceptance of the Marine Corps as its amphibious assault and base 

defense force. First, the Navy adopted the Fleet 

Training Publication 167 (FTP-167) as its blueprint for amphibious operations. Commandant 

Holcomb had ordered a committee to modify 

34 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (CINCUS) to CNO, 27 July 

1937, Marine Corps Budget Estimate (MCBE) FY 1936–43, Box 

1, Entry 248, RG 127, NADC; and Gerald C. Thomas to Alexander A. Vandegrift, 9 August 1945, HAF 204, MCUA.

Marines wading ashore on D-Day at Bougainville, as seen from a beached LCVP. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 54384, Marine Corps History Division
114 chapter two

the Corps’ own Tentative Manual for Landing Operations of 1934 according to the Navy’s needs. 

The resulting revision added broad strategic and 

naval perspectives to the Marines’ tactical and 

operational focuses.35

Second, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Claude 

A. Swanson appointed Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn to head a board of naval officers to assess 

the strategic roles of bases on Guam, Wake, Midway, and other islands in light of Japanese threats 

in the Pacific. In December 1938, the so-called 

“Hepburn Board” prioritized the advanced bases in the Pacific, according to strategic needs 

dictated by a given base’s possible benefits for 

35 Alexander A. Vandegrift and Robert B. Asprey, Once a Marine: 

The Memoirs of A. A. Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps (New York: 

Norton, 1964), 93, 118; Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass, 60–62; 

and Millett, Assault from the Sea, 76–77.

aircraft, submarines, and surface warships in a 

war with Japan. The board argued that Guam 

should become a “Major Advanced Fleet Base” 

for operations in support of American forces on 

the Philippines and in the western Pacific. Wake 

and Midway Islands should become patrol plane 

bases for reconnaissance or supply bases for 

defensive and offensive actions. The Hepburn 

Board members believed that construction 

should be started as quickly as possible on those 

islands. Apart from recommendations regarding the bases proper, the board’s final report 

instructed the Marine Corps to organize “defense detachments” to hold those island bases 

against possible Japanese attacks in the opening 

stages of a conflict. This decision drew on ideas 

outlined in the Marine Corps School’s Tentative 

As supporting naval and air units pave the way with high explosives, Marine-laden assault craft form the first 

wave and move in for the attack on Peleliu in the Palau Islands. The leathernecks hacked out a mile and onehalf long beachhead, and after bitter fighting, began the advance on the Japanese airfield. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 94875, Marine Corps History Division, courtesy of Sgt William A. McBride
david j. ulbrich 115

Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases of 1936.36

Other important steps toward operational 

readiness occurred in 1938. American entrepreneurialism provided the technological means for 

effective ship-to-shore transportation during an 

amphibious operation. The American military 

possessed no landing craft capable of providing speed, durability, and seaworthiness during 

this transit. Furthermore, any craft needed to 

be able to land on a beach and extract itself 

from that beach with relative ease. Ironically, 

the commercial designs of Roebling’s Alligator 

amphibian tractor and Higgins’s Eureka boat 

provided vessels to meet performance specifications. Both found enthusiastic supporters among 

Marine officers. Nevertheless, subsistence-level 

budgets restricted the Marines from supporting the two boat builders. To their great credit, 

Higgins and Roebling spent their own money to 

modify their civilian designs to fit the amphibious assault applications.37

The fast-rising tide of Nazi Germany in 

Western Europe and Militarist Japanese in East 

Asia made War Plan Orange obsolete by 1939.

American strategists reacted by formulating the 

36 “Report of the Board to Investigate and Report upon the Need, 

for Purposes of National Defense, for the Establishment of Additional SubMarine, Destroyers, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on 

the Coasts of the United States, its Territories and Possessions,” 1 

December 1938, Strategic Plans Division War Plans Division (SPDWPD), Series III, Misc. Subject File, Box 50, RG 38, NACP, 1–6, 

62–70, 87–89, hereafter Hepburn Board Report; Miller, War Plan 

Orange, 241–43, 250–53; Gregory J. W. Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds: 

The Siege of Wake Island (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 

1997), 48–52; and Ulbrich, “Clarifying the Origins and Strategic 

Mission of the U.S. Marine Corps Defense Battalion,” 81–107.

37 Unreferenced quotation in Austin R. Brunelli, intvw with Norman J. Anderson, 1984, transcript, MCUA, 25; William Upshur 

to Holcomb, 26 February 1939, Holcomb Papers, Box 6, MCUA; 

Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 88–92, 100–2; Timothy Moy, War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 

1920–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 

117–18, 150–57; and Jerry E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins and 

the Boats that Won World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 24–39.

more realistic Rainbow Plans with five versions 

addressing several possible wartime circumstances that might confront the United States. 

The versions ranged from Rainbow Plan 1, 

which entailed a unilateral American defense of 

the Western Hemisphere and no involvement 

with conflicts in Europe or East Asia; to Rainbow Plan 5, which envisioned combined American, British, and French offensives to vanquish 

Germany as quickly as possible. The United 

States, meanwhile, would remain on the strategic defensive in the Pacific against Japan. Once 

Germany was defeated, all available American 

and Allied forces would be redirected to crush 

Japan. As a result of these new scenarios, the 

U.S. Army reoriented its strategic emphasis towards defense of the Western Hemisphere and 

war in Europe and away from Japan and the Pacific Ocean. East Asia held little or no interest 

among most Army planners, except for those 

who agreed with General Douglas MacArthur’s 

delusional belief in the defensive viability of the 

Philippines in a war with Japan.38

All the Rainbow Plans expected the Corps 

to play active operational roles in the Pacific. It 

mattered little what the Navy did at the strategic level. If the U.S. Fleet launched an offensive 

campaign against the Japanese, then the Marines 

would capture enemy bases in support of the 

fleet and defend them against possible counterattack. Or, if the U.S. Fleet stood on the defen38 “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 

and 5,” 9 April 1940, JB 325, Serial 642, M1421, Reel 11, NACP; 

Alexander Kiralfy, “Japanese Naval Strategy,” in Makers of Modern 

Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward 

Meade Earle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 

457–61, 480–84; Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

2003), 108–9, 177–81; and Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of 

Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 177–82, 244–46; James, 

“American and Japanese Strategies,” 708–11; Ross, American War 

Plans, 164–78; and Miller, War Plan Orange, 83–4, 214–29, 324.
116 chapter two

sive, then the Marines would also be called upon 

to hold American bases and recapture any bases 

taken by the Japanese.39

As American strategies shifted to meet new 

threats, the Marines honed their amphibious assault techniques and improved their landing craft 

in additional FLEXs in 1939. The force structure 

for the other half of the Corps’ dual mission also 

began to take shape during that summer with 

the unveiling the Marine Corps’ “defense battalion.”40 As envisioned on paper, this 1,000-man 

unit boasted an impressive array of weapons: 12 

Navy 5-inch artillery pieces for coastal defense, 

12 3-inch antiaircraft artillery guns for air defense, 48 .50-caliber machine guns for either 

antiaircraft or beach defense, and 48 .30-caliber 

machine guns for beach defense. All units would 

also receive high-intensity searchlights and radar 

systems. Some defense battalions might even receive larger 7-inch artillery pieces. The proportion of Marines per heavy weapon far exceeded 

the Corps’ typical light infantry unit. Indeed, 

the defense battalion’s firepower rivaled that of 

an U.S. Navy light cruiser.41

Once ensconced on a fortified island, defense battalions provided the American naval or 

aviation forces with self-sufficient bases of operations. Nevertheless, the Marines did depend on 

the Navy for logistical support and eventually relief during a campaign. They could not hold out 

indefinitely against determined enemy assaults. 

The defense battalions became part of the 

39 “The Idea of the Fleet Marine Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 23, 

no. 6 (June 1939): 61; Miller, War Plan Orange, 227; and Ulbrich, 

“Clarifying the Origins and Strategic Mission of the U.S. Marine 

Corps Defense Battalion,” 93. 

40 Hepburn Board Report, 1–6, 62–70, 87–89; and CNO to 

MGC, 16 February 1939, Holcomb Papers, Box 6, MCUA, 1–2.

41 Holcomb to Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force 

(FMF), 28 March 1939; Robert D. Heinl, “Defense Battalions,” 

15 August 1939; and unsigned memorandum, “Material Requirements for four Defense Battalions,” 15 August 1939, all in DPPWPSGC 1926–1942, Box 4, RG 127, NACP.

FMF and complemented the amphibious assault units therein. The defense battalions represented the reincarnation of the Marine Corps 

Advanced Base Force of the early twentieth 

century, as well as the realization of the Tentative 

Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases in 1936. The 

defense battalions thus fit strategic and doctrinal 

molds perfectly.42

Despite the fact that global war appeared 

ever more likely, the United States’ armed forces remained ill-prepared for any conflict. Isolationism maintained its hold on an American 

public who did not wish to get entangled in the 

conflicts in Europe or Asia. Instead, they turned 

their attention to feeding their families during 

the last years of the Great Depression.

During the summer of 1939, the Navy conducted a detailed self-assessment to answer the 

question, “Are We Ready?” A negative answer 

came out in the final report. Both seaborne Services, according to Chief of Naval Operation 

Admiral Harold R. Stark, suffered from numerous and “critical deficiencies” in manpower 

and equipment. Of relevance to the Corps was 

“the lack of Pacific bases west of Hawaii.” Stark 

further cited the inability of the Navy and the 

Marine Corps to seize any island bases or protect those bases once they had been captured. 

The CNO saw it as his major task to alleviate 

these deficiencies, and he spent the next 30 

months in office trying to do so. Rarely did the 

Marine Corps enjoy a better advocate than Admiral Stark, who began deploying Marines to island bases in the Pacific. He subsequently asked 

42 Annual Report of the MGC to the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) for FY 1940, 27 August 1940, MCUA, 24, 38–40; Col Robert Debs Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 

1775–1962 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation, 1991, 1962), 

306–7; Urwin, Facing Fearful Odds, 192; and Maj Charles D. Melson, Condition Red: Marine Defense Battalions in World War II (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 1996), 2–5.
david j. ulbrich 117

the Corps to organize four fully manned and 

equipped defense battalions. This task, however, 

caused severe strains in the thinly stretched and 

underfunded Marines.43

Shifting American 

Strategies, Consistent 

Marine Missions, 

1938–41

When German forces rolled over the Polish border on 1 September 1939, the governments of 

France and Britain promptly declared war on 

Germany. That same month, President Roosevelt reacted by declaring a “limited national 

43 Ernest J. King, The U.S. Navy at War, 1941–1945: Official Reports 

to the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Navy, 1946), 37; Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 152–53; and 

Millett, Semper Fidelis, 342–43.

emergency” with two goals in mind: “safeguarding” American neutrality and “strengthening our 

national defense within the limits of peacetime 

authorizations.”44 War in Europe likewise affected American strategic planning and caused 

a rapid succession from War Plan Rainbow 2 

with its focus on Japan, to War Plan 3 with its 

focus on Germany, and finally to War Plan 4. 

This last change occurred when France surrendered to Germany in June 1940. The strategic 

situation degenerated to a point that the United 

States stood only with beleaguered Great Britain against the Axis powers. War Plan Rainbow 

4 reduced the United States to defending the 

Western Hemisphere against potential Axis incursions. American forces in the Pacific would 

set up a defensive parameter from the Panama 

Canal Zone to Hawaii to Alaska. 

No more was there question of whether 

the United States would enter the Second World 

War. The new seminal questions concerned how 

much and how fast the nation could mobilize 

and prepare itself for conflict. President Roosevelt adopted a short-of-war strategy.45

The Marine Corps exercised little influence 

over the changes in strategic planning process, 

so the Marines focused on fielding a force adequate to meet those expectations of fighting on 

one and maybe even two oceans. Making mat44 F. Roosevelt, “The Five Hundred and Seventy-Seventh Press 

Conference (Excerpts),” 8 September 1939, in The Public Papers 

and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939, vol. 8, War and Neutrality

(New York: Macmillan, 1941), 483–84. 

45 “Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow Nos. 1, 2, 3, 

4, and 5”; Stetson Conn, “Changing Concepts of National Defense in the United States, 1937–1947,” Military Affairs 28, no. 2 

(Spring 1964): 1–4; Miller, War Plan Orange, 260–61, 270; James, 

“American and Japanese Strategies,” 705–6, 710–11; Calvin L. 

Christman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Craft of Strategic Assessment,” in Calculations: Net Assessment and the Coming of World War 

II, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (New York: Free 

Press, 1992), 243–45; Linn, Guardians of Empire, 180–82; Peattie 

and Evans, Kaigun, 464–67; and Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against 

the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 

63–65.

Marines go down cargo nets into landing craft, 

August 1944. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 94712, Marine 

Corps History Division, courtesy of Bailey
118 chapter two

ters worse, the Corps could not hope to mobilize quickly enough to keep up with any of the 

Rainbow Plans’ timetables.46 The Marines did 

their best to augment their amphibious assault 

and base defense capabilities between the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the end of 

1940. Marine units participated in FLEX 6 in 

January to March 1940. The simulated attacks 

showed the greatest improvements and achieved 

the highest level of realism to date, though 

limitations and deficiencies in equipment and 

manpower still plagued the Americans. Doctrine intersected with practice as the Marines 

recognized the following principles as essential 

to successful assaults: naval gunfire and aviation close air support could be combined with 

Marine forces to effect an amphibious assault; 

logistical capabilities could be expanded to supply those troops on shore; and specially trained 

and equipped defense battalions could secure 

islands against counterattack by enemy forces. 

The Eureka boats and Alligator tractors proved 

themselves as superior to all competitors. Their 

respective designers, Higgins and Roebling, finally received large contracts for the Eureka and 

Alligator, and would become officially known 

as the Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personal (LCVP) 

and the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT-1).47 Even 

so, funds took a long time to get disbursed to 

46 Memo for MGC, 16 June 1940, DPPWPSGC 1921–43, Box 34, 

RG 127, NACP; RAdm Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy 

Department in World War II (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 

1959), 34–35, 587; and Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: 

The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 

38–40.

47 VAdm George C. Dyer, Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of 

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (Washington, DC: Navy Department, 

1972), 206–8; Robert D. Heinl Jr., “The U.S. Marine Corps: Author of Modern Amphibious Warfare,” in Assault from the Sea, 189; 

Memo for Director of Plans and Policies, 3 July 1940, MCBE FY 

1936–43, Entry 248, Box 1, RG 127, NADC; Annual Report of 

the MGC to the SecNav FY 1940, 15 August 1939, MCUA, 61-

63; Krulak, First to Fight, 93–95, 101–4; Smith, Development of Amphibious Tactics, 29–33; Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins, 42–50; and 

Moy, War Machines, 159–60.

contractors, and the manufacturers procured 

new materials at an interminably slow pace. This 

sluggishness vexed senior Marine leaders like 

Holcomb and Holland Smith.48

The final months of 1940 brought into clear 

view the fact that the United States could expect 

only Britain to be an ally. In the Pacific, token 

resistance by British and Dutch forces could not 

hope to halt the determined Japanese expansion. Not even Rainbow Plan 5 accounted for 

the complexity or flexibility of the new circumstances.49

Consequently, the United States adopted a 

“Germany First” strategy. In so doing, the Navy’s 

Chief of Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark 

conceded to what the Army’s strategic planners 

wanted when he formulated Plan Dog. In this 

newest scheme, the war in Europe would be 

dominated by the Army, leaving the Navy in a 

subordinate role. The seaborne Services would 

play a larger, albeit defensive, role in the Pacific 

against Japan. Plan Dog formed the nucleus for 

America’s wartime strategy.50

Although the Marines remained observers 

of the process surrounding Plan Dog and successive war plans, this did not mean that the Corps 

48 J. B. Earle to CNO, 8 September 1939, Stark to SecWar, 24 

October 1939, Director of Division of Plans and Policies to MGC, 

12 October 1939, and H. B. Sayler to Holcomb, 3 October 1940, 

all in DPPWPSGC 1926–1942, Box 4, RG 127, NACP; and Holcomb to Robert L. Denig, 5 November 1939, Holcomb Papers, 

Box 6, MCUA.

49 Conn, “Changing Concepts of National Defense,” 5–6; and 

Jonathan G. Utley, “Franklin Roosevelt and Naval Strategy, 1933–

1941,” in FDR and the U.S. Navy, ed. Edward J. Marolda (New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 53–57.

50 Harold R. Stark, memo to SecNav, 12 November 1940, in Stark, 

summary notes, Box 142, MCOHC, MCUA, hereafter Stark 

memorandum. Various drafts of the Stark memorandum can be 

found in Ross, American War Plans, 225–30; Mark M. Lowenthal, 

“The Stark Memorandum and the American National Security 

Process, 1940,” in Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval 

History, 358–59; B. Mitchell Simpson III, Admiral Harold R. Stark: 

Architect of Victory, 1939–1945 (Columbia: University of South 

Carolina Press, 1989), 70–75; Gole, Road to Rainbow, 102–21; and 

Linn, Guardians of Empire, 177–83.
david j. ulbrich 119

was ignored as irrelevant. Stark and the Navy 

concentrated on strategic and national goals, 

which only concerned the Corps in terms of 

mobilization timetables and resource allocation, 

but mattered very little to it in terms of its dual 

missions. Both base defense and amphibious assault fit into operational requirements of Plan 

Dog, because they concerned the prosecution of 

the war. With help from the Marines, the U.S. 

Fleet would hold the defensive perimeter from 

Alaska to Hawaii to Central America against 

Japanese incursions. American forces were 

also expected to preserve the logistical lifeline 

through Australia to British-held Malaysia. Stark 

hoped that advanced bases on Wake, Midway, 

and other islands could be maintained as American for future operations. Japanese-held island 

bases would have to be assaulted and defended 

in turn. Any American islands taken by the Japanese would need to be recaptured by American 

forces. In sum, the Navy would conduct limited 

operations utilizing its air, surface, and amphibious forces to maintain the strategic status quo 

in the Pacific. Once Germany was eliminated as 

an enemy, the United States could turn its full 

weight against Japan. Herein lay the significance 

of Plan Dog and its successive plans for the 

Corps: Marines could expect to play active roles 

in both base defense and amphibious assault, 

whether in operations supporting defensive or 

offensive operations.51

Because naval campaigns outlined in the 

51 Stark Memorandum; Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 154–

57; and Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 64.

Senior American leaders observing a joint Marine Corps-Army amphibious exercise at New River, NC, in 

July 1941. From left: MajGen Holland M. Smith; MajGen Commandant Thomas Holcomb; Secretary of the 

Navy Franklin Knox (looking through binoculars); and then-Col Teddy Roosevelt Jr., U.S. Army 1st Infantry 

Division. It is worth noting that Roosevelt’s division was the only major unit in the U.S. Army with amphibious experience before the outbreak of war later that December.

Marine Corps History Division
120 chapter two

war plans would require larger amphibious assault units, the Corps received authorization to 

create more viable, larger division-size units of 

approximately 18,000 Marines capable of seizing enemy-held islands. The creation of two 

paper divisions in the FMF occurred in early 

February 1941. Later in July that summer, elements of the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division, 

the 1st Marine Division, and the U.S. Atlantic 

Fleet made simulated amphibious landings in 

the Caribbean and at New River, North Carolina. The new force structures and exercises followed the doctrinal principles laid down in the 

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations from 1934 

and the FTP-167 from 1938. Although these 

exercises suffered some setbacks, the participating Marines, soldiers, and sailors learned what 

NOT to do.52 This Marine Corps’ emphasis on 

amphibious warfare took on another element as 

well—institutional survival. 

From Prewar 

Doctrine to Wartime 

Application

The last few months of peace in late 1941 passed 

very quickly. The Marines struggled to ready 

themselves on far-flung Pacific islands as well as 

mobilize back in the United States. Commandant Holcomb’s efforts to meet expectations 

resembled robbing Peter to pay Paul as he ordered units with full complements to be split 

apart to create cadres for two separate units. 

The U.S. Navy and Army’s senior leaders expe52 “Training of Units of the FMF,” n.d. [ca. February 1941], GBSF, 

GB 425, Box 135, RG 80, NACP; H. Smith to CNO via MGC, 10 

September 1941, Holland M. Smith to King, 14 November 1941, 

and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to CNO, 10 October 1941, all in Holcomb Papers, Box 27, MCUA; Holcomb to 

Marston, 22 November 1941, Holcomb Papers, Box 4, MCUA; 

Smith, Development of Amphibious Tactics, 36–38; Isely and Crowl, 

The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 63–65; and Millett, Semper 

Fidelis, 348–49.

rienced similar problems in matching resources 

to needs.53

While American strategic planners anticipated Japanese attacks on the Philippines, 

Guam, or Wake, the idea of a massive air attack 

against the main U.S. Navy and Army bases at 

Pearl Harbor seemed too far-fetched to be plausible. Sadly, underestimating the skill and audacity of the Japanese had dire consequences on the 

Sunday morning of 7 December 1941. On that 

infamous day, the Japanese caught the Americans 

unawares and launched preemptive strike that 

destroyed the U.S. Fleet’s battleship component 

and laid waste to the ground-based aircraft on 

Oahu in Hawaii.54

In the hours, days, and months thereafter, 

the Japanese launched attacks against Wake, 

Guam, the Philippines, and Midway. Those were 

consistent with the anticipated Japanese actions. 

Elements of a defense battalion on Wake Island 

proved its mettle for more than a fortnight before succumbing to overwhelming Japanese 

force in late December. The few Marines on 

Guam surrendered without a fight in December. The Philippines fell five months later after 

American and Filipino forces fought desperate 

holding actions, as waiting for the relief force 

envisioned in War Plan Orange would take nearly three years to arrive. 

Although attacked, Midway was not secured 

by the Japanese. It would later be the scene of a 

decisive naval battle in 1942. Indeed, Marines 

in two defense battalions held Midway against 

Japanese aerial attacks. Their antiaircraft fire 

downed 10 Japanese planes during their aerial 

assault, which did not destroy the ground defenses on Midway in anticipation of an amphib53 See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 92–102. 54 The best single volume survey of the Pacific War remains Spector, Eagle Against the Sun. See also relevant chapter in Millett, Semper Fidelis.
david j. ulbrich 121

ious assault in the coming days. It is also worth 

noting that a defense battalion opposed daily 

Japanese aerial bombing raids and frequent Japanese Navy bombardments on Guadalcanal from 

August 1942 to February 1942. The Midway and 

Guadalcanal Marines’ tactics and unit structure 

followed the doctrines laid down in the Tentative 

Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936).55

During the War in the Pacific, the doctrines 

in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations were 

successfully applied in the island-hopping and

leapfrogging campaigns, though not without 

halting progress and severe casualties. At Gua55 The more thorough examination of Wake Island is Urwin, Facing 

Fearful Odds. For an overview of defense battalions in the Pacific 

War, see Melson, Condition Red.

dalcanal, the 1st Marines made an unopposed 

landing on 7 August 1942. The real challenge 

came not in defending their tenuous beachhead 

and all-important airfield against Japanese air, 

land, and sea incursions, but only in the Navy’s 

maintaining the supply lines to the American 

units on the island. Although suffering severe 

losses in men, aircraft, and ships, the U.S. Navy 

succeeded in this logistical mission and also destroyed the Japanese supply system.56

More than a year after the amphibious operation on Guadalcanal, the long-anticipated 

drive across the Central Pacific began in Novem56 Aptly titled is Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (New York: Random House, 1990). See 

also David J. Ulbrich, “Thomas Holcomb, Alexander Vandegrift 

Marines aboard a Navy transport study a relief model of Tarawa Atoll a few days prior to the famed 76-hour 

battle by the 2d Marine Division for the former Japanese stronghold. Many of these relief models were made 

by the Relief Mapping Section of the 2d Division, so each Marine would be familiar with detailed terrain 

features of the island. The same system was used for the Saipan operation. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 101807, Marine Corps History Division, courtesy of Sgt Porter
122 chapter two

ber 1943. The Marines’ bloody assault against 

Tarawa was one example of how, even with 

the most sound doctrines, the fog and friction 

of war can conspire to bring about near defeat. 

The Marines and their Navy counterparts used a 

feedback loop that created a learning curve. The 

Americans adapted doctrines, equipment, and 

force structure to overcome the Japanese corresponding evolution of tactics in their defensive 

efforts on the likes of Peleliu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, 

and Okinawa.57

The value of the Marine Corps’ doctrines 

extended beyond the Central Pacific into the 

Southwest Pacific and European theaters of operations, where the U.S. Army and Navy conducted several large-scale amphibious assaults.58

The principles outlined the Tentative Manual for 

Landing Operations found their way into the Navy’s FTP-167 (1938) and subsequently on to the 

War Department and Army in Landing Operations 

on Hostile Shores, FM 31-5 (1941). This document’s preface stated that it “is based to large extent on the Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. 

Navy, 1938. The arrangement of subject matter 

is similar to the Navy publication and many illustrations are taken from it.” The Army’s Chief 

of Staff General George C. Marshall’s name 

appeared on the signature block “by order the 

Secretary of War.”59 Perusals of the tables of contents of the 1941 FM 31-5 and later revisions as 

well as wartime revisions of FTP-167 reveal that 

and Reforms in Amphibious Command Relations in 1942,” War 

and Society 28, no. 1 (May 2009): 113–47. 57 Even after more than 60 years since publication, the seminal 

work on amphibious operations in the Pacific War remains Isely 

and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare. For the latest 

study, see Sharon Tois Lacy, Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2013). 58 See chapters on Gen George S. Patton Jr, LtGen Arthur G. 

Trudeau, and RAdm Walter C. Ansel in Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 298–400. 59 Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, FM 31-5 (Washington, DC: 

War Department, 1941), II.

the U.S. Army and Navy continued to borrow 

and adapt the Marines’ doctrines. 

Conclusions

The operational and tactical applications of 

amphibious assault and base defense in the Pacific and European theaters remained a means 

to a strategic end as determined by the senior 

Allied leaders. Although untested in the 1920s 

and 1930s, the Marine Corps amphibious doctrines laid out in the tentative manuals, in ideas 

presented by the likes of Pete Ellis, Holland 

Smith, John Lejeune, and Thomas Holcomb, in 

simulated amphibious assaults, and in equipment procurement, proved to be remarkably 

forward-looking in fulfilling strategic needs in 

the Pacific and Europe. They took their doctrine, force structure, and equipment procurement cues from the American strategic plans 

and missions. The late military historian Russell 

F. Weigley saw great value in this process: “Simply by defining the specific problems into which 

amphibious operations divided themselves, the 

Marine Corps made it evident that the problems 

most likely were not insoluble; and the Corps 

went on to delineate many of the solutions.”60

Such problem-solving efforts are needed as 

much in the twenty-first century as they were in 

the Second World War. In 2013, the new term 

is Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2/D2).61 The new 

operational challenges to successful assaults can 

be seen in accurate long-rang rockets, advanced 

underwater obstacles, fast jet aircraft, and even 

tactical nuclear weapons. Overcoming these requires the amphibious assault forces to have plans 

60 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United 

States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University 

Press, 1977, 1973), 264.

61 For a recent analysis of the implications of A2/AD for amphibious warfare, see Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/

D2 Strategies (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 
david j. ulbrich 123

and preparations to breach obstacles, establish 

beachheads, and maintain logistical networks. 

All these missions can only be achieved under 

an umbrella of air superiority and a cordon of 

naval (surface and underwater) superiority that 

reach several hundred miles in all directions. 

These require truly “joint” operational capabilities.62 From the defensive perspective, the key 

elements include disruption of enemy assault 

forces and logistical support efforts. Indeed, so 

effective have improvised explosive devices been 

on land, that they will doubtlessly be utilized to 

impede ship-to-shore transit and on-shore maneuver by amphibious assault forces. Just as was 

the case in the 1920s and 1930s, so too it is evident in 2015 that mastering the offensive side of 

amphibious warfare necessitates an equally clear 

understanding of the defensive side.63

The author of this article believes that the 

need for projecting military force and humanitarian assistance from the sea will not diminish, especially the fact that the majority of the 

world’s population lives within a couple of 

hundred miles of major bodies of water. This 

statement is all the more relevant because of 

the pivot toward the Pacific Rim by the United States military now and in the future. The 

twenty-first century amphibious operational 

environment certainly requires the type of doctrine, force structure, and equipment that only 

the Marine Corps is in any position to develop. 

The Corps’ amphibious mission—whether executing an assault under fire, landing to support 

humanitarian efforts, or defending a shoreline 

62 See, for example, Amphibious Operations, Joint Publication 

3-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

63 The December 2012 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette contains 

several articles on the current state and future prospects for the 

Corps’ amphibious missions. More recently, see Trevor Howell, 

“Traditional Amphibious Warfare: Wrong for Decades, Wrong for 

the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette 98 (September 2014): 18–22.

against enemy invasion—are different from 

the Second World War or even Gallipoli in degree, but not in kind. Indeed, it is arguable that 

the Marine Corps is in better shape now in the 

twenty-first century than in the previous century because the Corps possesses an integrated and 

tested force structure platform, albeit in ground 

combat deployments conducting counterinsurgency operations, in the Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force concept. Admittedly, it remains to be 

seen whether new, effective amphibious assault 

vehicles will keep pace with the requirements 

for speed, capacity, and agility in the contemporary operating environment. It is also uncertain 

how the amphibious mission should best be balanced against the Corps’ other missions such as 

in counterinsurgency operations. Nevertheless, 

some 80 years hence, the foundational doctrines 

still ring true in Tentative Manual for Landing 

Operations (1934) and the Tentative Manual for 

Defense of Advanced Bases (1936) that helped the 

Corps prepare to fight the Pacific War. 

Finally, the habits of mind of Thomas Holcomb, John Lejeune, Earl Ellis, Holland Smith, 

and others like them were needed to drive doctrinal development, equipment procurement, 

and force structure creation for meet challenges of amphibious operations during the Second 

World War. Their habits of mind included not 

only solving problems in the amphibious lane, 

but also ensuring institutional survival and 

maintaining strategic relevance during times of 

constricted resources in interwar periods.
124

THE ROLE OF MARINE AND 

SHORE-BASED NAVAL AIR 

AT GUADALCANAL

Some Lessons for Today

by Major Philip F. Shutler

Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989

most a thousand 14-inch shells, destroying more 

than half of the aircraft, and almost all of the aviation fuel.

The next day a Marine colonel briefed some 

pilots from the Army’s 67th Pursuit Squadron:

We don’t know whether we’ll be able to hold 

the field or not there’s a Japanese task force 

of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports 

headed this way. We have enough gasoline 

left for one mission against them. . . . After 

the gas is gone we’ll have to let the ground 

troops take over. Then your officers and men 

will attach themselves to some infantry outfit good luck and goodbye.65

Today, of course, we know that the Marines held, but we sometimes forget how close 

the struggle for Guadalcanal really was. We also 

sometimes forget the crucial role that Marine 

and Navy carrier aircraft based at Henderson 

Field played in the campaign. William S. Lind, 

for example, has argued that:

65 Pacific Counterblow, Wings at War Series no. 3 (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL: Center for Air Force History, 1992).

By mid-October 1942, the situation of 

the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal 

had gone from miserable to desperate.64

The Marines had come ashore on 7 August to 

seize the partially completed Japanese airfield 

on the island. Within two days, Japanese air and 

surface attacks had forced the U.S. transports to 

withdraw with half of their supplies still aboard. 

Since then, Marines had lived on two meals per 

day of captured Japanese food supplies. They had 

managed to complete the airstrip using captured 

Japanese equipment and had named it Henderson Field after a Marine killed at Midway. As 

soon as it was ready, a makeshift contingent of 

Marine, Navy, and Army Air Corps squadrons 

flew in to help defend it. They had repulsed one 

major counteroffensive in September, but another one was clearly on the way. On the night 

of 12–13 October, two Japanese battleships 

stood offshore and pounded the field with al64 The original article came from Philip F. Shutler, “The Role of 

Marine and Shore-based Naval Air at Guadalcanal: Some Lessons 

for Today,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 5 (May 1989). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
major philip f. shutler 125

[if] Marine aviation is truly to focus on 

supporting the Marines on the ground, it 

needs to be reorganized to emphasize [close 

air support] at the expense of air-to-air and 

deep interdiction capabilities.

Other Gazette authors have argued that (1) 

the [Northrup Grumman] EA-6B Prowler, with 

its sophisticated electronic warfare system, is 

admirably suited for defending ships against missile attack or supporting “war-at-sea” strikes but 

ill-suited to the needs of the Marine Corps; and 

(2) that while the [McDonnell Douglas] AV-8B 

Harrier II is ideal for close air support it offers 

little advantage in a naval campaign. Essentially, all of these arguments assume a dichotomy 

between the roles of Marine Corps aviation and 

naval aviation and conclude that, in order to 

meet future fiscal constraints, we should reduce 

interoperability between the two communities.

A reexamination of the Guadalcanal campaign leads to a much more comprehensive 

understanding of the role of Marine Corps aviation. It suggests that, in order to fully support 

the Marine on the ground in an amphibious 

campaign, Marine air must remain shore-based naval 

air, capable of both striking ships and defending them 

against air strikes. To explain this apparent paradox, we should first review the broad outlines 

of the struggle for Guadalcanal chronologically 

and analyze them in a functional perspective. We 

can then draw some conclusions for future amphibious operations.

Chronologically, the struggle for GuadalCombat artist Dwight Shepler depicts the Cactus Air Force on Henderson Field, with a parked Army Air Forces Lockheed P-38 Lightning in the foreground and Marine Grumman FRF-3 Wildcats swarming overhead. 

Art Collection, U.S. Navy
126 chapter two

canal developed in three phases that ended in 

September, October, and November 1942. (The 

island was not completely secured until 9 February 1943, but after November the campaign was 

primarily an Army land offensive.) Neither the 

American theater commanders nor their Japanese adversaries had planned for the battle to 

develop as it did. Instead, the Japanese belatedly 

realized the threat that Henderson Field posed 

to their stronghold at Rabaul [New Guinea] and 

gradually shifted the focus of their main effort 

from New Guinea to Guadalcanal. They mounted three major counteroffensives to recapture 

the airfield, each more powerful than the one 

before. The first two of these counteroffensives 

culminated in massed infantry attacks on the 

Marine perimeter: the Battle of Edson’s Ridge in 

September and the Battles of the Matanikau and 

Bloody Ridge in October. But the overwhelming 

infantry attack that the Japanese planned for November never materialized, thanks in part to the 

Henderson Field flyers.

From a functional perspective, the opposing theater commanders fought the battle for 

Guadalcanal by mounting a series of tactical 

“shields;” Marine, and later Army, ground forces 

shielded the airfield against Japanese infantry attacks. In a continuous battle of attrition, American flyers attempted to shield ground and naval 

forces against Japanese air strikes from Rabaul. 

1stLt Hugh Laidman, At the Edge of Henderson Field. When it became known that the Japanese were constructing a new airfield on Guadalcanal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive calling for the capture of one or 

more locations in the southern Solomons. Landings were made at Tulagi and Guadalcanal on 7 August. One of 

the first objectives was the partially completed airfield, which was quickly named Henderson Field in honor 

of Maj Lofton R. Henderson, a Marine dive-bomber pilot shot down at the Battle of Midway. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major philip f. shutler 127

Because there were no all-weather attack aircraft in those days, it was up to U.S. Navy surface gunfire ships to shield the Marine ground 

forces against Japanese naval gunfire bombardments during the night. Initially, they were 

unsuccessful. Carrier task forces on both sides 

attempted to shield transports with inbound 

reinforcements. The epic “symmetric” battles of 

carriers against carriers, aircraft against aircraft, 

and infantry against infantry have received most 

of the historians’ attention during the years. 

But it was the cross-functional or asymmetrical attacks by shore-based naval aircraft against 

Japanese transports that provided the margin of 

victory for American forces.66

It was clear even before the campaign began 

that U.S. carrier task forces would be unable to 

provide the air shield for Guadalcanal. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, commander of the 

South Pacific theater, wrote to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on 8 July, “The Carrier Task Groups will 

be themselves exposed to land based air [from 

Rabaul] while unprotected by our land based 

aviation, and it is extremely doubtful that they 

will be able to retain fighter escort to the transport area.” Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, 

overall commander of the Guadalcanal operation, echoed this grim assessment when his 

forces assembled in late July. Japanese air attacks 

against the transports on 8 August confirmed 

this expectation, and Fletcher promptly withdrew the carriers that night with Ghormley’s 

approval. The withdrawal of the carriers and the 

stunning Japanese victory against the naval gunfire shield that same night forced the withdrawal of the American transports, which we noted 

earlier.

Admiral Fletcher has been much criticized 

over the years for his decision to withdraw the 

carriers. Certainly the Marines on Guadalcanal 

must have had unkind words for him as they 

watched their supplies disappear over the horizon. But much of this criticism misses the point.

The United States had entered the war with 

six battle line carriers. By August 1942, Fletcher 

had already lost two of them at the battles of the 

Coral Sea and Midway. Before November, three 

66 For a discussion of shield and symmetrical and asymmetrical 

forces, see the 1987 Schulze Memorial Essay, MCG, November 

1987.

By 1943, Marine pilots were flying aircraft that 

were equal or superior to the planes being flown by 

the Japanese. This growing technological advantage, 

however, would have been far less significant had it 

not been for the tireless efforts of Marine maintenance personnel who worked around the clock 

to keep the new aircraft operationally ready. In 

Henderson Field, Night, 1stLt Hugh Laidman depicts 

mechanics working through the night to service a 

Vought F4U Corsair. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
128 chapter two

of the remaining four—[USS] Saratoga [CV 3], 

Wasp [CV 7], and Hornet [CV 8]—would be sunk 

or knocked out of the war for several months. 

The point is that carriers were both valuable 

and vulnerable, just as they are today. Fletcher 

should be criticized not for husbanding scarce 

combat assets but for failing to aggressively exploit the operational advantage offered by Henderson Field in the ensuing campaign.

However, Admiral Fletcher was not alone in 

his failure to grasp the opportunity presented by 

Henderson Field. In fact, only a handful of the 

senior commanders realized that the airfield was 

not only the prize to be won but also the means 

to win it.

Foremost among those who pushed to increase the air contingent at the beleaguered field 

were Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, 

commanding the Marines, and Rear Admiral 

John S. McCain, commander of shore-based naval air in the South Pacific and later one of the 

Navy’s great carrier commanders. In a message 

to Admiral [Chester W.] Nimitz, Commander 

in Chief of the Pacific theater, on 1 September, 

McCain requested reinforcements and replacements for the aircraft at Henderson Field. He 

went on to say:

No help can or should be expected of carrier 

fighters unless based ashore. With substantially the reinforcement requested Cactus 

[Guadalcanal] can be a sinkhole for enemy 

air power and can be consolidated, expanded 

and exploited to enemy’s mortal hurt. The 

reverse is true if we lose Cactus. If the reinforcement requested is not made available, 

Cactus cannot be supplied and hence cannot 

be held.

Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the commander of the amphibious task force, also saw 

the operational significance of the airfield. In a 

letter to Ghormley in early September, he described it as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

More by default than by design, Henderson Field eventually received the reinforcements that Vandegrift, McCain, and Turner had 

argued for. After Saratoga was torpedoed and 

Wasp and Hornet were sunk, many of their surviving aircraft were transferred to Guadalcanal. 

As Japanese transports approached the island in 

November, bearing troops for the third major 

counteroffensive, the damaged Enterprise [CV 6] 

deployed its entire air wing to Henderson Field 

while the carrier retired.

The continuous transfer of aircraft from 

ship to shore during the campaign was easy because Navy and Marine squadrons flew identical 

aircraft. When Navy aircraft landed at Henderson Field, they were met by maintenance crews 

that had the skills, tools, parts, and ordnance 

to keep them flying. Thus, for example, when 

a flight of Navy dive bombers diverted ashore 

from Enterprise in August, they were able to stay 

and fight for more than a month, although the 

F4F Wildcat planes parked on the fighter strip at 

Henderson Field.

Official U.S. Navy photo, Naval Aviations News, 

January–February 1943
major philip f. shutler 129

crews brought nothing with them except the 

flight suits they were wearing.

Once they arrived, Navy and Marine aircraft 

proved to be a decisive factor during each of the 

three phases of the struggle. On 24 August, Japanese and American carriers dueled in the Battle 

of the Eastern Solomons, but it was dive bombers from Henderson Field that turned back the 

Japanese transport group the next day. Forced 

to operate only at night after that, the Japanese 

could send in only a trickle of reinforcements. 

Even after they were bombarded by the Japanese 

battleships in mid-October, Henderson’s flyers 

were able to attack six enemy transports that 

next day, forcing the Japanese to beach three 

of them and withdraw the others. Consequently, the Japanese ground forces that hit the perimeter 10 days later were greatly reduced in 

numbers and effectiveness. In the titanic surface 

gunfire battle of 12–14 November, U.S. Navy 

battleships prevented the Japanese from shelling 

the airfield as they had in October. As a result, a 

full contingent of Henderson-based dive bombers, supported by the entire Enterprise air wing, 

was able to sink 7 of the 11 Japanese transports 

bound for Guadalcanal on 14 November. The 

remaining four were bombed and destroyed 

while unloading the next day. Only 2,000 Japanese reinforcements got through. Consequently, 

the Japanese were never able to mount a maRunning a gauntlet of antiaircraft fire, four Rising Sun bombers come in low at Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 

to attack U.S. transports, extreme left. Black bursts show the intensity of the American antiaircraft assault, 

8 August 1942. 

Collection of Clifton B. Cates (COLL/3157), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
130 chapter two

jor ground attack to complete the third major 

counteroffensive in November. Henderson Field 

was finally secured.

Clearly, shore-based naval air power provided the margin of victory during the Guadalcanal campaign. Nevertheless, it is reasonable 

to ask whether innovations in technology have 

made the lessons of Guadalcanal irrelevant for 

future amphibious operations.

In fact, advances in technology have made 

those lessons even more relevant. With the introduction of tilt-rotor aircraft and air cushion landing craft, amphibious assaults can be 

conducted from much greater ranges than in 

the past. The landing force will depend upon 

fixed-wing air more than ever for the bulk of 

its fire support. The AV-8B and short airfields 

for tactical support (SATS) allow an amphibious 

task force commander to establish an air shield 

ashore in a much shorter time than it took to 

build Henderson Field.

At the same time, carriers are no less vulnerable to long-range bombers and submarines 

than they were in 1942. Reconnaissance satellites 

make it more difficult for carrier battle groups to 

evade detection, especially if they must remain 

within supporting range of a beachhead for long. 

Soviet naval aviation includes a substantial force 

of long-range bombers, including 140 [Tupolev 

TU-22M] “Backfires,” whose primary mission is 

This hand-drawn map of Guadalcanal, dated 6 March 1944, features locations on the island including Henderson Field, Kaukau Bay, Tenaru, and the Coral Sea. 

Guadalcanal Map (2010-2070), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
major philip f. shutler 131

the destruction of U.S. carriers. According to 

unclassified sources, the Backfire has an operating radius of 2,160 nautical miles and can fire 

supersonic antiship missiles at targets 240 nautical miles away. Soviet Oscar I-class attack submarines and Kirov-class cruisers can fire antiship 

missiles from ranges up to 300 nautical miles. 

As early as 10 years ago, the Department of Defense Annual had concluded that the Soviets “can 

concentrate aircraft, coordinate attacks with air, 

surface, or submarine launched missiles, and use 

new technology to find our fleet units, jam our 

defenses, and screen their approach.”

Of course, to counter the antiship missile 

threat, U.S. carrier battle groups will employ 

air defense systems like the AEGIS [ballistic 

missile defense] system on Ticonderoga-class 

cruisers, combat air patrols of fighters like the 

[Grumman] F-14 Tomcat, and multiple layers 

of electronic countermeasures. But how successful these measures will be against a cunning 

and determined attack cannot be predicted with 

certainty. It is safe to conclude that as long as 

we need aircraft carriers, we will also need the 

ability to establish “unsinkable carriers” ashore.

The lessons of Guadalcanal remain valid 

today. Theater commanders must have the capability to fight a campaign using carrier-based 

and shore-based naval aircraft in cooperation. 

The Marine Corps should not restrict its strike 

capability to close air support. Instead, it should 

continue to procure systems and develop tactics 

that will enable the landing force commander to 

conduct “war-at-sea” strikes. If we fail to maintain operational flexibility and interoperability 

between Navy and Marine aircraft, we may one 

day arrive at a situation like the one that almost 

developed during that desperate October on 

Guadalcanal when the most useful thing for the 

aviators to do will be to draw rifles and take up 

positions on the perimeter.
132

LETTER FROM SMITH TO CATES 

ON CHOSIN RESERVOIR

by Major General Oliver P. Smith

become a part of the 8th Army. [General] Lemuel C. Shepherd has made representations to 

Corps regarding the need for a period of time in 

which the division can integrate replacements, 

repair equipment, and be resupplied. The Corps 

is aware of this need, not only for us but also for 

the 7th Division, which lost practically en toto 

[sic] two infantry battalions and a field artillery 

battalion. However, Corps will not be calling 

the turns here.

You have probably read a lot of misinformation in the newspapers and it might be well to 

give you a factual account of what we have been 

doing for the past two weeks.

When I last wrote you, the 8th Army had 

not yet launched its attack. At that time, my 

mission was to establish a blocking position at 

Yudam-ni and with the remainder of the division 

to push north to the Manchurian border. As I 

explained to you, I did not press the 5th and 7th 

Marines, which had reached the Chosin Reservoir, to make any rapid advances. I wanted to 

proceed cautiously for two reasons. First, I had 

back of me 50 miles of MSR [main supply route], 

FROM THE COMMANDING 

GENERAL, 1st MARINE DIVISION 

TO THE COMMANDANT 

OF THE MARINE CORPS

17 December 195067

At the present moment, I am in Masan. 

I sailed on the USS Bayfield [APA 33] 

from Hungnam on 15 December for 

Pusan. With the exception of certain shore party 

elements, elements of the AmphTrac [Landing 

Vehicle, Tracked] battalion, and NGF [naval gunfire] teams and TAC [tactical air control] parties, 

which are being retained by Corps at Hungnam 

for the time being, the entire division should 

close Masan today.68 What our mission will be 

I do not know. When the remainder of the X 

Corps arrives in the Pusan area, the Corps will 

67 The original content came from Commanding General, 1st 

Marine Division ltr to Commandant of the Marine Corps, subj 

Chosin, 17 December 1950 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for style, 

grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

68 Masan was the former capital city of South Gyeongsang Province, South Korea.
major general oliver p. smith 133

14 miles of which was a tortuous mountain road 

which could be blocked by bad weather, and I 

wanted to accumulate at Hagaru-ri at the southern end of the reservoir a few days supply of ammunition and rations before proceeding further 

[sic]. Second, I wanted to move [Colonel Lewis 

B. “Chesty”] Puller up behind me to protect the 

MSR and he had not yet been entirely released 

from other commitments.

By 23 November, both the 5th and 7th 

Marines were in contact with the CCF [Chinese Communist forces], the 5th to the east of 

the Chosin Reservoir and the 7th to the west 

thereof. The 7th was advancing to the blocking 

position assigned by Corps at Yudam-ni. In the 

15-mile stretch of road between Hagaru-ri and 

Yudam-ni, the 7th had to traverse a 4,000-foot 

mountain pass and was impeded by the enemy, 

roadblocks, and snow drifts. Patrols of the 5th 

pushed to the north end of the reservoir.

On 24 November, the 8th Army’s attack 

jumped off. With the attack came General 

MacArthur’s communiqué, which explained the 

“massive compression envelopment” that was 

to take place. I learned for the first time that 

the 1st Marine Division was to be the northern “pincers” of this envelopment. At a briefing 

on 25 November, the details were explained. I 

was to make the main effort of the Corps in a 

zone of action oriented to the westward. I was 

In front of the commanding general’s quarters at Masan, 1950. From left: LtCol Raymond L. Murray, commanding officer, 5th Marines; Gen Oliver P. Smith; Col Lewis B. Puller, commanding officer, 1st Marines. 

Oliver P. Smith Collection (COLL/213), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
134 chapter two

to advance along the load from Yudam-ni toward 

Mupyong-ni, cut the road and railroad there, 

send one column on to the Manchurian border at Kuup-tong, and another column north to 

Kanggyeo. The 7th Infantry Division was to take 

over my former mission of advancing north up 

the east side of the reservoir and thence to the 

Manchurian border. The 3d Infantry Division 

was to take over the protection of the MSR up 

to Hagaru-ri. (This never transpired; and to the 

end of the operation, I had to retain one battalion of the 1st Marines at Chinhung-ni at the foot 

of the mountain and another battalion of the 1st 

Marines at Koto-ri at the top of the mountain. 

Otherwise, there would have been no protection 

for this vital part of the MSR). Under the plan, 

the Corps assumed responsibility for engineer 

maintenance of the MSR to Hagaru-ri. It also 

agreed to stock 10-days supplies at Hagaru-ri. 

I doubt if the Corps would have been able to 

do this. In any event, the enemy gave us no opportunity to prove whether or not it could be 

done.

D-day, H-hour for the attack to the westward was fixed by Corps as 27 November, 0800. 

By 26 November, [General Homer L.] Litzenberg, with all of the 7th, was at Yudam-ni. I decided to have him remain in the Yudam-ni area 

and pass the 5th through him for the attack to 

the westward. The 5th had not been in a serious 

engagement since the attack on Seoul.

The attack jumped off on schedule, but it 

was not long before both the 5th and 7th were 

hit in strength by the CCF. By 28 November, 

Commissioned by the Chosin Few Association to mark the dedication of the missile cruiser USS Chosin (CG 

65), Col Charles H. Waterhouse’s painting Eternal Band of Brothers, Korea depicts the U.S. military winding its 

way down Funchilin Pass.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major general oliver p. smith 135

reports of casualties left no doubt as to the seriousness of the attack. At the same time, the 

8th Army front was crumbling. No word was 

received from Corps regarding discontinuance 

of the attack or withdrawal. Under the circumstances, I felt it was rash to have [General 

Raymond L.] Murray attempt to push on and I 

directed him to consolidate on the positions he 

then held west of Yudam-ni. At the same time, 

I directed Litzenberg to open up the MSR between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, which had been 

blocked by the Chinese, as had also the stretch 

of road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. On this 

same day, 28 November, I moved my operational CP [command post] to Hagaru-ri. The movement was made by helicopter, the only feasible 

method in view of the cutting of the MSR. Fortunately, we had been able to get some vehicles 

and working personnel into Hagaru-ri before 

the road was cut.

Litzenberg’s efforts to clear the MSR between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri were unsuccessful on the twenty-eighth. He reported he would 

make another effort with a battalion the following day, 29 November.

On 28 November, Puller organized Task 

Force Drysdale to open up the MSR between 

Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri. This force was under 

command of Lieutenant Colonel [Douglas B.] 

Drysdale of the RM [Royal Marine] Commandos. It consisted of the RM Commandos, 235 

strong, G Company of 3/1 [3d Battalion, 1st 

Marines] coming north to join its parent unit at 

Hagaru-ri, and a rifle company of the 31st Infantry, which was moving north to join its parent 

unit east of the Chosin Reservoir. (The 7th Infantry Division had pushed north a battalion of 

the 31st, a battalion of the 32d, and a field artillery battalion to relieve the 5th Marines on the 

east side of the Chosin Reservoir.) In addition 

to the units enumerated, the Drysdale column 

included two companies of our M26 [Pershing] 

tanks, each less a platoon, and a truck convoy. 

The column was to move out on the twentyninth. I will cover its operations later.

During the night of 28–29 November, the 

enemy attacked Hagaru-ri in force. The attack 

started at 2130 and lasted all night. First the attack came in from the south, then shifted to the 

west, and then to the east. Our defense force 

consisted of 3/1, less G Company, and personnel of our Headquarters and Service units. Our 

casualties were 500, of whom about 300 were 

from the infantry and 200 from Headquarters 

and Service units. The Headquarters Battalion 

alone had 60 casualties.

Tank convoy of 1st Tank Battalion cross mountains 

on the way to Chosin Reservoir from Hamhung, 

Korea, 19 November 1950. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A5343, Marine 

Corps History Division, courtesy of TSgt J. W. Helms Jr.
136 chapter two

We had at an early date realized the importance of Hagaru-ri as a base. On 16 November, 

[Lieutenant General] Field Harris and I had tentatively approved a site for a [Douglas] C-47 [Skytrain] strip at Hagaru-ri. Work was begun by our 

1st Engineer Battalion on 19 November and the 

strip was first used by C-47s on 1 December, 

although at the time it was only 40 percent completed. This strip was essential for the evacuation of wounded and air supply in case our road 

went out either due to weather or enemy action. 

Hagaru-ri had to be held to protect this strip and 

the supplies that we were accumulating there. 

The movement of the Drysdale column from 

Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri would not only open the 

road, but would also furnish us needed reinforcements for the defense of Hagaru-ri.

The Drysdale column started north from 

Koto-ri on the morning of 29 November. About 

halfway to Hagaru-ri, it became engaged in 

a heavy firefight. Embarrassed as he was by a 

truck convoy, Drysdale was on the point of turning back to Koto-ri, but I sent him a message 

to push on through if at all possible. He started 

the truck convoy back toward Koto-ri under the 

protection of a company of tanks and some infantry, while the remainder of the column continued to fight its way toward Hagaru-ri. The 

truck convoy returning to Koto-ri was jumped 

by the Chinese, who had closed in on the MSR 

again. There was considerable mortar fire and 

tanks as well as trucks were pretty badly shot up 

before they got back to Koto-ri. There were also 

a considerable number of personnel casualties. 

Drysdale continued to fight on toward Hagaruri and toward evening arrived with about 150 

Troops of Regimental Combat Team 7 held up just south of Hagaru-ri while Marine and naval close air support work over enemy positions with napalm, 6 December 1950. 

Oliver P. Smith Collection (COLL/213), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
major general oliver p. smith 137

of his Commandos and G Company of the 1st 

Marines. The Army company never arrived, although some stragglers came in to Koto-ri. The 

conclusion was inescapable that a considerable 

force would be required to open up the MSR 

between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri. We would not 

have any such force until the 5th and 7th Marines joined us at Hagaru-ri.

On 29 November, the 7th Marines started 

a battalion back along the MSR to open up it, 

but the battalion got nowhere. I then ordered 

Litzenberg to employ the entire 7th Marines on 

the following day, 30 November, to open up the 

MSR. At the same time, I ordered Murray to 

pull back his regiment to Yudam-nio. Late in the 

day of 29 November, I received a telephone call 

(radio link) from Corps stating that the whole 

scheme of maneuver was changed, that the 

Army battalions on the east side of the Chosin 

Reservoir, who were now cut off from us were 

attached to me and I was to extricate them, and 

that I was to withdraw the 5th and 7th Marines 

and consolidate around Hagaru-ri.

On 30 November, the Corps turned over 

to me command of all troops as far south as Sudong, which is four or five miles below the foot 

of the mountain. These comprised a battalion of 

the 31st Infantry, which was on its way up the 

mountain and miscellaneous engineer and service units.

During the day of 30 November, Puller was 

attacked rather heavily at Koto-ri but kept his 

perimeter intact.

On the afternoon of 30 November, General 

John A. Groth’s Village near Hagaru shows three Marines heavily clothed against the bitter Korean cold in 

November 1950.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
138 chapter two

[Edward M.] Almond flew up to see me. By this 

time, he had given up any idea of consolidating 

positions in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri. He wanted us to fall back in the direction of Hamhung 

and stressed the necessity for speed. He authorized me to burn or destroy equipment and supplies, stating that I would be supplied by airdrop 

as I withdrew. I told him that my movements 

would be governed by my ability to evacuate 

the wounded, that I would have to fight my way 

back and could not afford to discard equipment, 

and that, therefore, I intended to bring out the 

bulk of my equipment.

The problems of the 5th and 7th Marines 

could not be separated. By 30 November, between them, they had accumulated about 450 

wounded who had to be protected. The only 

feasible thing to do was to pool their resources. The two regimental commanders drew up a 

joint plan (an ADC [assistant division commander] would have come in handy at this point) 

which was flown to me by helicopter and which 

I approved. Briefly, the 7th was to lead out from 

Yudam-ni and the 5th was to cover the rear. Artillery and trains were in the middle. The walking wounded were given weapons and marched 

in column on the road. Other wounded were 

loaded in trucks. The route these two regiments 

had to traverse was tortuous. From Yudam-ni, 

the road first led south up a narrow mountain 

valley and then turned eastward toward Hagaruri. At about the halfway point, the road crossed 

a 4,000-foot mountain pass and then descended 

toward Hagaru-ri. This last section of the road 

more or less followed the ridgelines and did not 

offer the same opportunities to the enemy to 

Col Charles H. Waterhouse, Road to Hagaru, North Korea, acrylic on canvas. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major general oliver p. smith 139

block the road as did the first part of the road 

out of Yudam-ni. As events transpired, the 7th 

and 5th did have a hard fight to get up to the 

pass, but the descent to Hagaru-ri, although opposed, was relatively easier.

During these operations, one company of 

the 7th Marines had a unique and remarkable 

experience. This was F Company. In his initial advance to Yudam-ni, Litzenberg had left E 

and F Companies in occupancy of high ground 

along the road to the rear. Litzenberg was able 

to extricate E Company, but could not reach F 

Company, which was in position at the top of 

the mountain. It was completely surrounded but 

held excellent positions. By pinpoint airdrops, 

we were able to keep the company supplied with 

ammunition and rations. It had 18 killed and 60 

wounded but held out for more than three days 

when it was relieved by 1/7 [1st Battalion, 7th 

Marines] pushing back up the mountain from 

Yudam-ni.

During the night of 30 November–1 December, Hagaru-ri was again heavily attacked 

but the perimeter held. We were stronger this 

time as G Company of 3/1 and the Commandos 

had joined our defense force. The attacks were 

from the southwest and the east. The attack from 

the east fell on the sector manned by the Service Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel [Charles L.] 

Banks, an ex-[Edson] Raider, was in command 

of the Service Battalion. He did an excellent job 

in beating back the attack.

By 1 December, the situation with regard 

to care of casualties was becoming serious. 

Dr. [Navy Captain Eugene R.] Hering had at 

Hagaru-ri 600 casualties awaiting evacuation. 

These were being cared for by C and E Medical Companies. It was estimated 400 casualties 

would be brought in if the Army battalions east 

of the reservoir broke out. (Actually, we eventually evacuated more than 900 men from these 

battalions). We estimated the 5th and 7th would 

bring in 500 casualties. (Actually, they brought 

in 1,500.)

It was manifest that the only solution to our 

casualty problem was completion of the C-47 

strip. (OYs [light observation planes] and helicopters could not make a dent in our casualty 

load.) Our engineers had worked night and day 

on the C-47 strip. On two nights, work had to 

be interrupted because of enemy attacks and the 

engineers manned their part of the perimeter 

near the field. The front lines were only 300 

yards from the end of the runway. The strip was 

rather crude; 3,800 feet long, 50 feet wide, no 

taxiways, and a 2-percent grade to the north. 

The soil was black loam but it was frozen. Our 

equipment had considerable difficulty with the 

frozen ground. On 1 December, the strip, as I 

have described it, was considered to be 40 percent completed. 

On the advice of the aviators, it was decided 

to bring in a C-47 for a trial run on the afternoon of 1 December. The plane landed successfully at about 1500 and took off 24 wounded. 

It takes about a half hour to load a plane with 

litter patients. Ambulatory patients go very 

much faster. At first, we could accommodate 

only two planes on the ground simultaneously. 

Eventually, as the field was improved, we were 

able to accommodate six planes on the ground 

without blocking the runway. Hours of daylight 

were from about 0700 to 1745 and use of the 

strip was limited to those hours. After the first 

plane landed, more planes came in. Five additional plane loads of wounded were taken out 

that afternoon. We would have gotten out more 

but an incoming plane, loaded with 105mm ammunition, collapsed its landing gear. The plane 

was too heavy with its load to push off the run-
140 chapter two

way and we had to unload it, thus losing valuable 

time. (We attempted to have incoming planes 

loaded with ammunition and other needed supplies to supplement airdrops.)

I will complete the story of evacuation of 

casualties from Hagaru-ri out of chronology, as 

it is all one story and a very remarkable accomplishment when viewed as a whole. On the evening of 1 December, stragglers from the breakup 

of the Army battalions east of the lake began to 

drift in. During the day of 2 December, we evacuated 919 casualties by air, the majority of them 

from the Army battalions. During the morning 

of 3 December, the doctor cleaned out by air 

evacuation all his remaining casualties. This gave 

us an opportunity to fly out our accumulation of 

dead. The estimate of casualties of the 5th and 

7th Marines had now risen to 900. At 1935, 3 

December, the advance guard of the 7th Marines 

arrived at the perimeter. It was closely followed 

by the column of walking wounded. The column 

continued the movement during the night and 

each vehicle brought in more wounded, some 

on the hoods of jeeps. By morning, the doctor’s 

hospital installations were full. On the day of 4 

December, 1,000 casualties were evacuated by 

air. On the day of 5 December, 1,400 more casualties were evacuated by air. When we moved 

out from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri on 6 December, 

we had no remaining casualties to evacuate.

I believe the story of this evacuation is without parallel. Credit must go to the troop commanders whose determination and self-sacrifice 

made it possible to get the wounded out, to the 

medical personnel whose devotion to duty and 

untiring efforts saved many lives, and to the Marine and Air Force [air crews] (including fatal 

accident[s] in spite of the hazards of the weather 

and a rudimentary landing strip.)

To get back to the story of the operation 

in its proper chronological sequence. At 1335, 

1 December, we got our first airdrop from Japan. These drops were known as “Baldwins.” 

Each Baldwin contained a prearranged quantity 

of small arms ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies. Artillery ammunition had to be requested separately. A Baldwin 

could be dropped by about six [Fairchild] C-119 

[Flying Boxcar] planes. We were required to 

make request on Corps for the number of Baldwins desired, modified as desired. We usually 

requested Baldwins less weapons and water and 

plus given quantities of artillery ammunition.

Airdrop did not have the capability of supplying a Marine division in combat. When the 

drops were started, the total capability of the 

Breakthrough to Fox Hill, by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, portrays LtCol Raymond Gilbert Davis 

during the action for which he was awarded a Medal 

of Honor. Davis leads his battalion in the fourth attempt to rescue the beleaguered 1st Marine Division 

at Toktong Pass, who for six days and nights held off 

the sudden emerging forces of the Chinese armies. 

On the main supply route, adjacent to the Chosin 

Reservoir, the Toktong Pass was a lifeline. Davis led 

his battalion over three successive ridges in the dark 

and in blizzard snow at close to minus 75 windchill 

and in continuous attacks against the enemy. 

Courtesy Waterhouse estate
major general oliver p. smith 141

Far East Air Force was 70 tons a day. This was 

stepped up to 100 tons a day. But to support an 

RCT [regimental combat team] in combat requires 105 tons a day. What gave us some cushion 

was the fact that, with our own transportation, 

before the roads were cut, we had built up at 

Hagaru-ri a level of six days rations and two 

units of fire. The airdrops continued until we left 

Hagaru-ri and were also made at Koto-ri, where 

Puller had to be supplied and where we had to 

accumulate supplies in anticipation of the arrival of the bulk of the division there. The drops 

were not always accurate, and we had personnel 

and materiel casualties as a result of inaccurate 

drops; however, we owe a considerable debt of 

gratitude to the Air Force for their efforts.

During the afternoon of 1 December, a 

deputy chief of staff of the Corps arrived and 

gave me the outline of the latest plan. Under 

this plan, the 3d Infantry Division was to move 

elements to Majong-dong (about 10 miles south 

of the foot of the mountain) and establish a covering force through which I would withdraw. 

Upon withdrawal, I was to occupy a defensive 

sector west and southwest of Hungnam and the 

7th Division was to occupy a sector northeast 

and north of Hungnam.

Toward evening on 1 December, some 300 

stragglers of the cutoff Army battalions up the 

reservoir drifted into camp, having made their 

way in over the frozen surface of the reservoir. 

They continued to drift in during the night and 

for three or four days thereafter. I have never found out exactly what happened. Apparently, the two battalions that had holed up at 

Sinhung-ni started south and had made some 

progress, with the support of a considerable 

amount of Marine aviation (10 planes on either 

side of the road). Then the acting regimental 

commander was killed and the column must 

have fallen apart and men made the best of their 

way out to the lake and thence down the lake to 

our perimeter. For some unknown reason, the 

Chinese did not do much firing at people on the 

surface of the lake. We evacuated some 900 men 

of the two infantry battalions and artillery battalion. There remained with us some 385 more 

or less able-bodied men whom I had the senior 

Army officer present form into a provisional 

battalion. We brought these out with us.

During the day of 2 December, Lieutenant 

Colonel [Olin] Beall and other volunteers conducted a remarkable rescue operation on the 

lake. Air cover was provided. They drove jeeps, 

often towing improvised sleds, as far as four 

miles over the surface of the reservoir, and 

picked up wounded and frostbitten men. Although the Chinese did not often fire on the 

wounded on the lake, they did fire at the jeeps. 

During the day, 250 men were rescued by these 

jeeps. Operations were continued the following 

day, but a lesser number were found. Beall was 

awarded the DSC [Distinguished Service Cross] 

by the Corps commander.

The 5th and 7th made some progress up the 

mountain during 2 December. Enemy opposition was still strong.

On 3 December, Litzenberg reached the 

top of the mountain between Yudam-ni and 

Hagaru-ri. However, there was still a buildup of 

enemy between him and us and he was running 

short of gasoline. In a slow-moving column, 

there is considerable idling of motors and in any 

event, in cold weather, motors have to be started 

up frequently. All this consumes a large quantity of gasoline. At Litzenberg’s request, we made 

a pinpoint drop of gasoline to the head of the 

truck column. Unfortunately, he did not request 

diesel fuel, a lack of which later was responsible 

for the loss of several artillery pieces.
142 chapter two

During the day of 3 December, Litzenberg 

continued to push over and down the mountain. 

At 1630, we sent out tanks with the Commandos to clean out the Chinese who were on the 

road near camp. At 1935, the advance guard of 

the 7th Marines arrived at the perimeter. Movement continued during the night, the 5th Marines following in after the 7th. In the darkness, 

it takes a long time to get units in from covering 

positions and on to the road. When they were 

only a few miles from Hagaru-ri, some of the 

tractors drawing the 155mm howitzers ran out 

of diesel fuel. This stopped the column. The Chinese closed in with mortar and automatic weapon fire. Some of the tractors were disabled. We 

later sent a column back with diesel fuel, but 

not all the guns could be gotten out because of 

disabled tractors. We lost 10 out of 18 155mm 

howitzers and 4 out of 30 105mm howitzers. 

The guns were spiked and later an air strike was 

put down on them. Despite the losses, it was 

still a remarkable feat to bring out three battalions of artillery minus these guns.

The last elements of the 5th and 7th Marines 

did not arrive at Hagaru-ri until about noon of 

4 December. I was considerably relieved to have 

these two regiments rejoin. I considered that the 

critical part of the operation had been completed. Even with two depleted RCTs, I felt confident we could fight our way to Koto-ri where 

we would gain additional strength. The terrain 

was not as difficult, it lent itself well to air support, and we were able to lay down preparatory 

artillery fires all the way to Koto-ri. Artillery 

emplaced at Hagaru-ri could reach halfway to 

Koto-ri and Puller’s artillery at Koto-ri could 

reach back to meet our fires.

After their grueling experience, the regiments were not in condition to continue the 

advance on 5 December. Also, we wanted to be 

sure that all our casualties were evacuated. Our 

order, therefore, provided for an advance on 

Koto-ri at first light on 6 December. 

The order for the advance on Koto-ri provided for an advance in two RCT [regimental 

combat team] columns. RCT 7 led out. The 

RCT was normal as to combat troops, with the 

provisional Army battalion attached. In addition, 

Litzenberg had within his column his own regimental train and Division Train No. l. RCT 5 

was to follow RCT 7. Its composition was normal except for the attachment of 3/1. Murray 

also had within his column his own regimental 

train and Division Train No. 2. He was to hold 

the perimeter until RCT 7 had gained sufficient 

distance to permit him to move out on the road.

The embarrassing part of this move was 

the trains. More than a thousand vehicles were 

involved. We carried two-days rations and two 

units of fire. We brought out all usable equipThis blown bridge at Funchilin Pass blocks the only 

way out for U.S. and British forces withdrawing 

from the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea during 

the Korean War. Air Force C-119 Flying Boxcars 

dropped portable bridge sections to span the chasm 

in December 1950, allowing men and equipment to 

reach safety. 

Official U.S. Air Force photo
major general oliver p. smith 143

ment and supplies, including tentage and stoves. 

Even the engineer pans were used as trucks to 

carry tentage.

Litzenberg had not advanced more than 

two miles before he ran into trouble. Using 

maximum air and artillery support, it required 

until 1400 to break through. Peculiarly enough, 

all the opposition came from the east side of the 

road.

At 1420, I moved my operational CP by 

OY plane and helicopter to Koto-ri. My radios, 

vans, and working personnel were mostly in Division Train No. l.

By 1800, 6 December, Litzenberg had 

reached the halfway point and was progressing 

satisfactorily. However, during the night, the 

Chinese cut into the train in two places. There 

was confused and close range fighting. We lost 

men and vehicles but remarkably few vehicles.

The column continued to move during the 

night and by 0590, 7 December, the leading 

elements of the 7th Marines began to arrive at 

Koto-ri.

The 5th Marines did not clear Hagaru-ri 

until 7 December. Murray had quite a rear guard 

action at that place, but came off with 200 prisoners. His last elements did not close Koto-ri 

until 2135, 7 December.

The advance from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri cost 

us more than 500 casualties. Puller had an OY 

strip only. However, Field Harris agreed to land 

TBM [turboprop] planes, of which he had three, 

on this strip. During the day of 7 December, 

between OYs and TBMs, 200 casualties were 

evacuated. However, there were still 300 more 

casualties to evacuate. The aviators stated that, if 

400 feet [were] added to the strip, it would be 

possible for C-47s to land. Therefore, during the 

night of 7–8 December, our engineers lengthened the strip by 400 feet. Unfortunately, the 

strip was periodically under enemy fire. On 8 

December,, C-47s began to land and we soon 

completed evacuation of our casualties.

Koto-ri is about two miles north of the lip 

of the mountain. From the lip of the mountain 

the road descends tortuously to Chinhung-ni 

about 10 road miles distant. At Chinhung-ni 

was Puller’s 1st Battalion. On 7 December, the 

Corps had moved an Army battalion to Chinhung-ni in order to free 1/1 [1st Battalion, 1st 

Marines]. Theoretically, the road was open from 

Chinhung-ni to the south.

Our plan for getting down the mountain 

was simple. (However, it must be borne in mind 

that the enemy surrounded Koto-ri as they had 

closed in behind our columns.) The 5th and 7th 

Marines were to seize and hold the commanding ground to about the halfway point. 1/1 was 

to push up from Chinhung-ni and seize and 

hold commanding ground about halfway up the 

mountain. The 1st Marines, which had regained 

3/1 from Hagaru-ri and additionally had a battalion of the 31st Infantry attached, was to hold 

the perimeter at Koto-ri until the trains cleared 

when it was to follow out (We now had 1,400 

vehicles as a result of the addition of Puller’s 

train and Army vehicles.) Once the commanding ground was seized, it was our intention to 

push the trains down the mountain. As the trains 

cleared, infantry would leave the high ground 

and move down the road. The last vehicles in 

the column were the tanks. We realized that if 

an M-26 ever stalled or threw a tread on a oneway mountain road, it would be very difficult to 

clear it out of the way.

In all this planning, there was one serious 

catch. The Chinese had blown out a 24-foot 

section of a bridge about one-third of the way 

down the mountain. They could not have picked 

a better spot to cause us serious trouble. At this 
144 chapter two

point, four large pipes, carrying water to the 

turbines of the power plant in the valley below, 

crossed the road. A sort of concrete substation 

was built over the pipes on the uphill side of the 

road. A one-way concrete bridge went around 

the substation. The drop down the mountainside 

was sheer. It was a section of this bridge, which 

was blown. There was no possibility of a bypass.

[Lieutenant Colonel John H.] Partridge, 

our engineer, got together with the commanding officer of a Treadway Bridge unit, which was 

stranded at Koto-ri, and they devised a plan. 

This involved dropping by parachute at Koto-ri 

the necessary Treadway Bridge sections. These 

were dropped on 7 December. As a precaution, 

additional sections were spotted at Chinhung-ni 

at the foot of the mountain.

At 0800 on 8 December, the 7th Marines 

jumped off to seize Objectives A and B at the 

lip of the mountain; then it pushed on to Objective C further along. The 5th moved out and 

captured Objective D above the bridge site. 1/1 

moved up the mountain and captured Objective 

E. All this was not accomplished as easily as it is 

described. There were delays and casualties. The 

bridging material did not get to the bridge site 

until 9 December. The bridge was completed at 

1615 that date. In anticipation of completion of 

the bridge, the truck column had been moved 

forward and the leading truck was ready to cross 

as soon as the bridge was completed. Unfortunately, another block developed farther down 

the mountain where the road passed under the 

cableway. This block was caused partly by enemy fire and partly by additional demolition. This 

block was not opened until 0600, 10 December.

What we had feared regarding the tanks occurred. As I explained previously, we had placed 

them last in the column. As they were proceeding down the mountain, the brake on the seventh 

tank from the tail of the column locked. The 

tank jammed into the bank. Efforts to bypass the 

tank or push it out of the way were fruitless. To 

complicate matters, the Chinese closed in with 

mortar fire and thermite grenades and mingled 

with the crowds of refugees following the column. The tankers dismounted and fought on 

foot with the Reconnaissance Company, which 

was covering the tail of the column. There were 

casualties. Finally, the tankers did their best to 

disable the seven tanks and moved down the 

mountain. Next morning, an air strike was put 

in on the tanks as well as the bridge, which we 

had laboriously constructed.

During the day of 10 December, both Division Trains Nos. 1 and 2 cleared Chinhung-ni at 

the foot of the mountain and leading elements of 

the trains began arriving at Hamhung that afternoon. After the trains cleared the road, empty 

trucks were sent up for troops.

At 1300, 11 December, the last elements of 

the division cleared Chinhung-ni. The 3d Division was supposed to keep the road open south 

Marines on the road between Funchilin Pass and 

Chin-hung-ni, 1950. The weather was a constant 

enemy. 

Oliver P. Smith Collection (COLL/213), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
major general oliver p. smith 145

of Chinhung-ni, but Puller’s regimental train 

was ambushed near Sudong. He lost a couple of 

trucks and had some casualties. However, Puller 

arrived at his assembly area with more vehicles 

than he had started down the mountain with. He 

had picked up and towed in some vehicles he had 

found at the scene of a previous ambush of Army 

trucks. Puller’s last elements arrived in the assembly area at 2100, 11 December. This completed the move of the division from the Chosin 

Reservoir area.

Our rear echelon had set up 150 tents with 

stoves for each regiment. Hot food was available 

when the troops arrived.

While Puller was closing his assembly area 

on 11 December, the 7th Marines was embarking in the MSTS Daniel I. Sultan [T-AP 120]. The 

5th Marines embarked 12 December and the 1st 

Marines on 13 December. Loading out of the 

division was completed about midnight 14 December, and the last ship of the convoy sailed at 

1030, 15 December.

An approximation of the casualties from the 

date (27 November) we jumped off in the attack 

to the westward until we returned to Hungnam 

(11 December) is as follows:

KIA [killed in action] 400

WIA [wounded in action] 2,265

MIA [missing in action] 90

Total Battle 2,755

Non-Battle 1,395 

(mostly frostbite)

Grand Total 4,150

This is not the complete picture as there are 

many more frostbite cases, which are now being 

screened.

I am understandably proud of the performance of this division. The officers and men 

were magnificent. They came down the mountains bearded, footsore, and physically exhausted, but their spirits were high. They were still a 

fighting division.
146

EQUITATUS CAELI

by Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon

Marine Corps Gazette, February 1954

cally the concept of amphibious operations. Not 

that the bomb made such operations obsolete. 

Not at all. In fact, the Corps and the Navy developed the doctrine for amphibious operations 

with the reverses at Gallipoli still fresh in their 

minds. Now, it was time to study them again in 

the light of lessons learned at Bikini [Atoll].

These planners reasoned that an amphibious task force of World War II proportions 

would constitute a profitable target for an enemy with an atomic bomb capability. A method 

was needed to reduce that profit. Dispersion, 

mobility, and speed needed to be injected into 

the task force and one solution seemed to lie in 

the use of helicopters.

With that in mind, the Marine Corps commissioned Marine Helicopter Squadron One 

(HMX-I) at the Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico, Virginia, in December 1947. The primary 

mission of the squadron was to develop tactics 

and techniques for the use of helicopters in 

an amphibious operation—a responsibility assigned to the Corps by the National Defense Act 

of 1947.

The first of 12 helicopters descended 

steeply to the sharp ridge near the top 

of the mountain, hovered momentarily, and landed.69 Five fully equipped Marines 

jumped out. The time, 20 September 1951. 

The place, Korea. Thus began the first airborne 

assault by helicopter in the history of warfare. 

Operation Summit—it was called by the men 

of the 1st Marine Division who planned and executed it.

Helicopters were not exactly new to Korea; 

they had been used from the beginning [of the 

conflict], but not in this way and definitely not 

on this scale. Craft of the required size had not 

been available in sufficient numbers. It had taken time to plan, prepare, and get ready for this 

particular operation. In fact, it took more than 

five years.

The first atomic bomb tests at Eniwetok 

[Atoll, Marshall Islands,] had caused forwardlooking Marine Corps planners to analyze criti69 The original article came from Col Keith B. McCutcheon, “Equitatus Caeli,” Marine Corps Gazette 38, no. 2 (February 1954). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
colonel keith b. mccutcheon 147

For most of the next three years, the squadron busied itself with experiments. Utilizing the 

Sikorsky HO3S helicopter and the Piasecki HRP 

[Rescuer], the unit experimented with wire laying, cargo hauling, troop lifts, carrier operations, communications, maintenance, and all the 

other aspects of the overall problem. It was not 

a large squadron; helicopters were not plentiful 

and there were a lot of bugs to be worked out. 

But the program did succeed in training a small 

group of pilots and maintenance personnel and 

it did pioneer the use of rotary-wing aircraft in 

large-scale military operations.

Then came Korea. When the 1st Marine 

Brigade landed at Pusan on 2 August 1950, it had 

attached a small number of Sikorsky HO3S helicopters and a handful of pilots and mechanics 

from HMX-1. In the next few months, that unit 

made a name for itself. So successful were they 

in their operations that they completely sold all 

military men on their usefulness and necessity. 

Demands for helicopters far exceeded the supply. Expansion of production facilities followed 

and so did the interest of all potential military 

and civilian users. The Marine Corps not only 

accelerated its existing plans, but it also succeedLanding Zone, Korea, by Col H. Avery Chenoweth, depicts Sikorsky HRS-1 Chickasaw helicopters of HMR-161 

ferrying Marines to the front. The artist served as an infantry platoon leader in Korea in 1951. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
148 chapter two

ed in getting approval for an expanded program.

One of the types of squadrons to come out 

of the new funds was the Marine helicopter 

transport squadron [HMR]; and the first such 

unit was HMR-161, which was commissioned 

at the Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California, in January 1951.

Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, the squadron began the 

time-consuming process of organizing. Personnel were joined, equipment procured, aircraft 

accepted, pilots trained, and the whole unit was 

prepared for a prospective movement overseas.

On 7 April, the first helicopter arrived—a 

Sikorsky HRS-1. It was a three-bladed, single 

main rotor configuration with a single tail rotor 

to compensate for torque. Theoretically, it could 

carry 10 passengers in addition to the two pilots, but only for short distances.

Except for four pilots who had experience 

at HMX, the remainder had just received transition flight training to helicopters within the past 

five months. Most of the mechanics were new at 

the game too. Due to foresight, however, quite 

a number had been given on-the-job training at 

HMX pending arrival of the squadron’s own helicopters. Pilots likewise had been trained either 

at Quantico or at the Navy’s school at [Naval Air 

Station] Pensacola, Florida.

An intensive syllabus was conducted to introduce all the pilots to the types of operations 

that were expected to be conducted in Korea. 

Emphasis was placed on mountain flying up to 

6,000 feet altitude. This in itself was a totally 

A Sikorski HRS-1 helicopter of HMR-161 provides foxhole relief with a fresh load of replacements for the 

1st Marine Division at an advance base in Korea, 22 November 1951. The troop drop was into the front lines, 

while Marine Corsair fighter-bombers furnished air support to keep enemy guns quiet on a nearby hill 

position. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo NH 97100, All Hands Collection, Naval History and Heritage Command
colonel keith b. mccutcheon 149

new experience for all pilots as practically all of 

their previous experience had been at sea level.

Finally, in August 1951, the squadron loaded aboard ship and departed for Korea.

Upon arrival, it was attached operationally 

to the 1st Marine Division commanded by Major General Gerald C. Thomas. Camp was set up 

in a few days and the squadron was eager to go 

to work.

On 13 September, Colonel Herring attended a conference with the division chief of 

staff, Colonel Victor H. Krulak. At that morning conference were members of the division 

staff. The purpose of the meeting was to tee up 

a helicopter mission for the supply of a frontline 

battalion that afternoon. Operation Windmill I 

was born.70

It was a coordinated effort on the part of 

all arms-infantry, artillery, and air. It went off 

smoothly from the initial reconnaissance flight 

to the last supply run. Landing spots had to 

be developed in the rough terrain so the helicopters could land, communications had to be 

maintained between the various units and surveillance had to be maintained over the area to 

see what, if any, reaction the enemy would have.

Six days later, a similar mission was executed. The pilots gained invaluable experience in 

terrain appreciation, low-level navigation in unfamiliar terrain, and flying with external loads.

The flying crane, external hoist technique 

was used in these operations. It was a technique 

developed back in the early days of HMX and 

was now paying dividends under combat conditions. Cargo nets were loaded with the badly 

needed supplies and slung by means of hooks 

beneath the helicopters. This method permitted 

the aircraft to deliver the loads rapidly to small 

areas and cut down the loading and unloading 

time. It also reduced the time the helicopters 

would be vulnerable to enemy fire in the forward areas and provided a means for jettisoning 

the load quickly in the event of an emergency.

But it was Operation Summit that the 

squadron was looking forward to—the first 

trooplift. It was not long in coming, only one 

week after Windmill.

A reinforced reconnaissance company was 

to be airlifted to the front to relieve a unit of 

the ROK [Republic of Korea]. From the outset, 

70 The operation focused on getting one day’s supplies to 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, more than seven miles away. In two-and-a-half 

hours, the helicopter crews delivered 18,848 pounds of cargo and 

evacuated 74 casualties. 

Col Keith B. McCutcheon, commanding officer of 

HMR-161 in Korea, prepares for a reconnaissance 

flight in an HRS helicopter. McCutcheon was an 

innovator and theoretician as well as a doer, and like 

his hero MajGen Roy S. Geiger, he commanded both 

air and ground units in combat. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 127-N-A132705, 

Still Pictures Division, National Archives and Records 

Administration
150 chapter two

it was obvious that landing sites were nonexistent in that razorback-like terrain that rose up 

to 3,000 feet above sea level. There were places, 

however, below the crest of the highest hill that 

could be developed into suitable landing sites 

within a reasonable period of time.

It was accomplished by hovering the helicopters over the selected points and letting specially equipped Marines climb down from them 

hand over hand by the use of knotted ropes, another technique dreamed up back on the banks 

of the Potomac [River]. In about an hour, the 

vegetation had been cut down and the razorlike ridge excavated, built-up, and flattened 

into an area 50 feet by 50 feet so that one HRS 

could land comfortably and the troops could 

disembark. Then, in a continuous column, the 

reinforced company was shuttled from the rear 

to the front. They were placed on high ground 

fresh and ready to fight. A new technique in the 

book of warfare had been demonstrated and 

successfully executed. To provide communications between the company and other units to 

the rear, two wire lines were laid by helicopter. 

In a matter of minutes, the wire was laid over 

terrain that would have required a patrol on foot 

hours to accomplish.

It was not all easy pickings. On one occasion, a pilot took off with a man still on the rope, 

and when the crew chief called up and said, “Sir, 

the man is still on the rope,” the pilot recovered 

his momentary loss of balance, made another 

approach, and let the man down. The squadron 

later preserved the incident for history in its 

squadron song:

They were hovering on the slope

While the man came down the rope.

They still had lots of power to spare.

So before he reached the ground

They took off and flew around

While the man was dangling freely in the air.

As he hung there in the breeze

From his thousand-foot trapeze,

He knew his chances must be pretty slim;

But they made another pass

And dropped him __ ___ __.

There were still skeptics of these new twirly 

birds though. They said the helicopters were too 

vulnerable, they could not fly at night or under 

conditions of low visibility.

Sure helicopters are vulnerable. But so is a 

tank, a ship, or an infantryman. All combat units 

expect to and do take losses. Techniques must be 

worked out to reduce the vulnerability. So far 

A helicopter approaches the landing zone on Hill 

812 with part of the Reconnaissance Company of 

the 1st Marine Division, as seen from another helicopter, 20 September 1951. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH 97101
colonel keith b. mccutcheon 151

1st Marine Division leathernecks move out after disembarking from an HRS-1 helicopter in a Korean War 

painting by combat artist Col H. Avery Chenoweth. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
152 chapter two

the rotary-wing aircraft have proved that they 

can operate in and forward of the front lines if 

they are employed intelligently.

And they can operate at night.

Operation Blackbird proved that. The squadron was ordered to lift a reinforced company of 

the division reserve from its assembly area to a 

position near the division’s left flank at night.

But there was a lot to do before the event 

came off. Liaison was established with the parent battalion; reconnaissance flights between the 

embarkation point and landing sites were made 

in an effort to determine compass headings, 

landmarks, time and distance checks, and altitudes; the engineers had to clear the prospective 

landing zones of mines; and night indoctrination 

and familiarization flights were made to ensure 

that all the pilots who were to participate were 

thoroughly checked out and oriented with the 

terrain.

In order to fly the designated route, the 

pilots took off initially from a dry streambed, 

climbed and cruised through two mountain 

passes, and let down into a valley to the landing 

spot. The return trip over a different route to 

ease the traffic problem required that three passes be negotiated with a final letdown of 1,000 

feet to the streambed loading site. Just to keep 

the pilots on their toes, they were ordered to 

avoid several friendly artillery positions. To further complicate matters, there was no moon and 

the sky had a high, thin overcast that reduced 

visibility.

Blackbird proved that helicopters can operate at night even under adverse conditions, 

provided certain other conditions exist, such as 

daylight reconnaissance of the area, familiarity 

of the pilots with the locality, and the existence 

of some prominent terrain landmarks to guide 

the pilots. There is a great deal of development 

to be done yet before operations such as this become routine.

Perhaps one of the most publicized helicopter missions in Korea has been the evacuation 

of wounded from the front lines to rear areas 

where prompt, adequate medical attention was 

assured, including lifesaving surgery if required. 

HMR-161 came in for its share of such flights 

also, although this was not the primary mission 

of the squadron. There were other helicopters 

available from another unit for this purpose. Occasionally, however, the number of casualties required the use of a larger aircraft or the presence 

of a medical officer with the patient in the craft 

was deemed necessary, so HRSs were assigned 

to the mission.

In its first six months of operations overseas, 

the squadron evacuated a couple of hundred casualties, many of them from frontline company 

positions. Quite a few of them were flown to the 

coast and landed aboard the Navy’s hospital ship 

USS Consolation [AH 15], the first hospital ship 

to have a helicopter landing platform installed. 

This ship provided a floating hospital.

During the period of her stay, the squadron made a number of landings aboard by day 

and night in weather that often prevented the 

operation of small boats between the ship and 

the beach. The ship believed that the HRS was 

very useful for this purpose because of the load 

it could carry and the fact that it could and did 

operate by day or night, seemingly without regard to weather.

All helicopter pilots received a great deal of 

satisfaction in transporting evacuees, as they realized the importance of this most humane mission. Literally thousands of American boys owe 

their very lives to these “flying angels of mercy.”

HMR-161 has continued on with the pioneering efforts in the field of rotary-wing air-
colonel keith b. mccutcheon 153

craft. Perhaps as a symbol of the future, they 

chose as their squadron slogan the Latin phrase 

Equitatus Caeli, Cavalry from the Sky. To date, 

they have performed many of the missions of 

the old horse cavalry and then some for full 

measure. They can very well become the eyes of 

the ground commander and provide him with 

visual protection of his front, flanks, and rear. 

In addition, they can move his battle elements 

to positions where they can do the most good. 

They can give the force, the speed, mobility and 

dispersion that are essential in this modern age 

of warfare. The techniques may be new, but the 

tactics are still those of the Confederate cavalry 

leader [Nathan Bedford] Forrest, who reputedly 

said, “Git there fustest with the mostest.”

Equitatus Caeli!
154

THE “AFLOAT-READY BATTALION”

The Development of the U.S. Navy-Marine 

Corps Amphibious Ready Group/Marine 

Expeditionary Unit, 1898–1978

by Colonel Douglas E. Nash Sr.

Marine Corps History, Summer 2017

rine Corps’ Amphibious Ready Group/Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), a force that is 

increasingly relevant in today’s complex operating environment. Understanding how the ARG/

MEU concept evolved is an excellent example 

of how the Marine Corps has successfully adapted throughout its history to changing political 

and military circumstances. 

Whenever a Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) consisting of a battalion landing team, 

composite air squadron, and combat logistics 

battalion is embarked aboard a Navy Amphibious 

Squadron (PhibRon), an ARG/MEU is created. 

Up to three can operate continuously in the areas of responsibility assigned to the Geographic 

Combatant Commanders (GCC), including the 

Pacific, Central, African, and European commands. These versatile units provide the president of the United States, acting in his capacity 

as the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed 

Services, and the GCC commanders with credible deterrence and response capability across 

the range of military operations. ARG/MEUs 

serve as forward-deployed, flexible sea-based 

As any student of naval and maritime 

history knows, sea power is the ability of 

a nation to use and control the sea and 

to prevent an opponent from using it.71 Merely having a fleet is not enough; any nation that 

wishes to control the sea must be able to project 

its power in real or concrete form. According to 

current U.S. Navy doctrine, power projection in 

and from the sea includes a broad spectrum of offensive operations to destroy enemy forces or to 

prevent enemy forces from approaching within 

range of friendly forces. History shows that there 

are generally three ways to accomplish this goal: 

amphibious assault, attack of targets ashore, or 

support of sea control operations.72 The United 

States is, of course, the world’s leading maritime 

power; a key component of its maritime power 

projection capability is the U.S. Navy and Ma71 The original article came from Col Douglas E. Nash Sr., “The 

‘Afloat-Ready Battalion’: The Development of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary 

Unit, 1898–1978,” Marine Corps History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 

62–88. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

72 Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2010), 51.
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 155

MAGTFs—an afloat-ready force—a force capable 

of conducting amphibious operations to respond 

to a crisis, conduct limited contingency operations, introduce follow-on forces, or support 

designated special operations forces at a moment’s notice. ARG/MEUs are characterized by 

their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary 

nature, ability to plan for and respond to crises, 

combined arms integration, and interoperability with joint, combined, and special operations 

forces in support of theater requirements.73

However, the ARG/MEU concept did not 

simply spring into existence overnight. Its inception as an afloat-ready force dates back to the 

late 1800s and reflects a confluence of three factors: policy (i.e., the political-military need for 

afloat-ready forces by the U.S. government, and 

by extension, the U.S. Navy); the maturation of 

the Marine Corps’ expeditionary doctrine that 

featured the ARG/MEU as its centerpiece; and 

the technological development of aircraft and 

amphibious assault shipping that enabled the 

MAGTF to operate in its maritime environment. 

This article will lay out the historical milestones 

of this concept, including its early origins, and 

show how policy, doctrine, and technology have 

contributed to the evolution during the past 118 

years of the force deployed around the globe 

today.

Historical Origins 

of the Afloat-Ready 

Force

Since its inception in 1775, the U.S. Marine 

Corps has contributed a detachment of Marines, 

numbering anywhere from 6 to 60 Marines, to 

nearly every major warship’s complement, from 

sloop to frigate, until the turn of the nineteenth 

73 Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit: Overview

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2013), 1.

century. Serving as “naval infantry” when needed, as marksmen in the “fighting tops” of sailing 

ships during sea battles, and as the ship’s guard, 

they also were ready to enforce shipboard discipline when necessary. Should a landing party 

be ordered to go ashore to fight or land for less 

warlike purposes as part of a naval expedition, 

Marines would make up a portion of the party, but would usually be outnumbered by Navy 

bluejackets, who were part of the ship’s normal 

complement. 

As a rule, large numbers of Marines would 

not normally be embarked on a Navy ship, especially in cases where a fleet or flotilla might sail 

on missions lasting weeks or even months. There 

was simply no reason for them to do so, unless 

embarked on a troopship where they would be 

landed as part of a land campaign led by the U.S. 

Army. Exceptions were made should a largescale amphibious landing be contemplated, such 

as at Veracruz, Mexico, in 1847, or Fort Fisher, 

North Carolina, in 1864, but Marines did not 

ordinarily embark to serve as a fleet’s contingency landing force to be landed if and when a 

commodore saw fit. There was simply no room 

aboard contemporary warships for anything 

larger than a detachment of 10 to 50 men. 

Despite this record, at least one naval officer 

during this period advanced the idea of having an 

embarked landing force sailing with the fleet at 

all times. The officer, Navy Commander Bowman H. McCalla, had recorded his suggestion in 

an after action report about the U.S. Navy and 

Marine Corps expedition of April 1885 to the 

Isthmus of Panama, then still part of Columbia. Noting how readily the brigade of Marines 

restored peace and prevented an insurrection 

once ashore, McCalla wrote that “in future naval operations an additional number of seamen 

and marines, organized in naval brigades, will 
156 chapter two

be carried in transports accompanying the battle ships.” Though the seeds of an idea had been 

sown, the Navy Department did not concur and 

would continue to adhere to existing practice of 

forming ad hoc landing forces when needed.74

That policy changed in 1898, when the 

United States declared war on Spain. Confronted by a maritime enemy with naval and land 

forces stationed around the globe defending 

various overseas colonies, such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the U.S. Navy was 

challenged by the enormous distances involved 

in simply closing the distance to do battle. Another aspect of naval warfare that had changed 

since the Marine Corps’ inception was the introduction of steam powered warships, which had 

completely replaced wooden sailing ships by the 

end of the nineteenth century. Instead of being 

driven by inexhaustible wind power, ships were 

now dependent upon coal to fire their steam 

plants, which enabled them to travel faster and 

at a steadier pace than with sail power. However, 

steel-hulled steam-powered warships could not 

carry enough coal, the fuel of choice, to travel 

8,000 miles or more to reach some of Spain’s 

far-flung possessions, where they presumably 

would do battle with the Spanish fleet once 

they arrived. Therefore, coaling stations and advanced bases located along the way were necessary and in fact became of strategic importance 

to the Navy. 

While ships could and often did take on coal 

at sea, this was a slow and hazardous process that 

exposed a warship to danger while it had come 

to a complete stop and “hove to” alongside a 

fleet collier, unlike in today’s Navy, where underway replenishment is a common procedure. 

74 Bowman H. McCalla, Report of Commander McCalla upon the Naval 

Expedition to the Isthmus of Panama, April 1885 (Washington, DC: 

Navy Department, 1885), 43–81.

A coaling station in a protected harbor or port 

was thought to be far more preferable. However, a protected harbor would most likely have to 

be taken from the enemy, who might be using 

it for the same purpose. While, in theory, sailors could (and occasionally did) fight as part of a 

landing party, the only infantry the Navy had of 

any strength was the fleet’s few embarked Marines who actually had trained for ground combat as their stock-in-trade. To be effective, such 

an expeditionary landing force would have to be 

at least of battalion size (several hundred men), 

including artillery, which could embark and remain on board as an afloat-ready battalion and 

land whenever the naval commander deemed 

the situation required boots on the ground (in 

modern parlance) or when U.S. foreign policy dictated that they land. And therein lies the 

true genesis of the fleet’s “ready reserve” force, 

the forerunner of today’s Amphibious Ready 

Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Huntington’s 

Battalion

The Marine Corps’ first ready reserve force or 

afloat battalion was “Huntington’s Battalion,” 

which was activated for expeditionary service 

during the Spanish-American War on 16 April 

1898. Composed of Marines recruited from 

nearly every shipyard and naval installation detachment on the East Coast of the United States, 

it was created by the Colonel Commandant of 

the Marine Corps, Colonel Charles Heywood, 

in anticipation that the Navy would ask for 

such a force, but without knowing exactly how, 

when, or where it would be employed. This ad 

hoc organization, known officially as the 1st Marine Battalion (Reinforced), consisted of 654 

Marines and one Navy surgeon. 

It was organized into five infantry com-
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 157

panies and one artillery battery equipped with 

four 3-inch rapid-fire guns and a battery of four 

Colt-Browning M1895 machine guns.75 There 

was, of course, no aircraft to support this modest force, since the Wright brothers’ pioneering 

flight was still five years out. Having received no 

definite mission from the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, 

the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel 

Robert W. Huntington, was ordered to have his 

men board the converted transport USS Panther (1889) in New York City on 22 April 1898. 

While underway, they learned that they were 

bound for the naval blockade of Cuba.

The Panther was hardly suited as an attack 

transport. It was old and crowded, having been 

purchased with the intent of carrying only 

half the number of Marines that were actually 

embarked. A former South American banana 

75 John J. Reber, “Huntington’s Battalion Was the Forerunner of 

Today’s FMF,” Marine Corps Gazette 63, no. 11 (November 1979).

Col Robert W. Huntington as a major in the 1870s.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH48984

Marine officers who landed with 1st Marine 

Battalion (Reinforced) at Guantánamo, Cuba, on 

10 June 1898. From left: 1stLt Herbert L. Draper, 

adjutant; Col Robert W. Huntington, battalion 

commander; and Capt Charles L. McCawley, assistant quartermaster.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 514827

Marching off to war in the late afternoon on 

Friday, 22 April 1898, the battalion, preceded by 

the New York Navy Yard band playing the popular 

“The Girl I Left behind Me,” is led down Navy 

Street in Brooklyn, NY, under the command of 

LtCol Huntington astride Old Tom (Capt George 

F. Elliot’s charger). 

Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
158 chapter two

freighter, its hasty conversion to a troopship 

failed to address many of the amenities taken for 

granted today, such as adequate ventilation and 

heads (toilets) and galley (kitchen) spaces. Given 

the time constraints, it was the best the Navy 

could do. After nearly two months in limbo, 

half of the time being spent ashore at Key West, 

Florida, and the other half afloat, Huntington 

and his battalion finally landed at Guantánamo 

Bay, Cuba, on 10 June 1898 at the site the Atlantic Fleet had selected for a protected coaling 

station.76

For Huntington and his Marines, the landing could not have come soon enough. Besides 

having to cope with crowded and uncomfortably 

hot living conditions aboard the Panther, a variety 

76 Incidentally, the same bay is still in use by the U.S. Navy 118 

years later.

of command-related issues had arisen between 

Huntington and the ship’s captain, Commander 

George C. Ritter, since embarking in April. One 

well-known example involved Ritter’s order 

forbidding his crew to assist the Marines in landing their supplies and equipment, forcing the 

Marines to do it by themselves, thus prolonging 

the landing operation. Additionally, the Marines 

were not allowed to land all of their rifle ammunition, since Commander Ritter claimed he 

needed it kept aboard to serve as ship’s ballast. 

Moreover, Ritter, following Navy custom, 

insisted on establishing his authority over the 

Marines on every matter, large or small. While 

this certainly was his prerogative in regard to a 

normal Marine Corps ship’s detachment, Huntington believed that this authority was overstated in regard to an embarked Marine battalion, 

USS Panther, ca. 1902–3.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH68336
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 159

which was under the command of its duly appointed commander. Timely intervention at one 

point by the overall flotilla commander, Commander McCalla of the warship USS Marblehead 

(CL 12), ensured the cooperation of both the 

ship’s captain and commander of the landing 

force for the duration of the operation.

Nevertheless, Huntington’s Battalion was 

successfully landed on 10 June with all of his 

men, guns, tents, and equipage and they immediately went about securing the heights surrounding the bay. The Spanish defending force 

was resoundingly defeated at the Battle of Cuzco 

Wells on 14 June, leaving the battlefield to the 

Marines. Not only did the Marines fight ashore 

as an independent, all-arms force for the first 

time, new techniques in ship-to-shore communication, fire support, and inter-Service cooperation also were established, if not perfected. 

With the heights secure and the Spanish bottled 

Cdr Bowman H. McCalla, captain of the USS Marblehead at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH72745

The USS Marblehead steams ahead on its way to Guantánamo, Cuba.

Official U.S. Navy photo
160 chapter two

up safely in the town of Caimanera, McCalla’s 

flotilla sailed into the excellent harbor and used 

it continuously for the next several months, 

which was finally established as a permanent 

U.S. naval base by treaty when the war was over. 

Following the war’s conclusion, Huntington and 

his Marines sailed back to the United States, arriving at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 26 

August 1898.77

77 Surprisingly, 98 percent of the men had been unaffected by any 

tropical disease, compared to the Army contingent in the Cuban 

campaign, which suffered inordinately from diseases such as yellow fever. Their good fortune was attributed to the fact that, for 

most of the campaign, the Marines had been embarked aboard a 

ship away from the swampy lowlands, and while they were ashore 

had practiced rigorous field sanitation procedures. 

The first bloody engagement of U.S. troops on Cuban soil. U.S. Marines going ashore at Guantánamo with 

their Krag–Jørgensen rifles in June 1898. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

Group of Marine officers at Portsmouth, NH, immediately after the Spanish-American War and their return from Cuba. Col Huntington (front row, fifth from right) with his line and staff officers, August 1898.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 515613
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 161

Back on American soil on 19 September 

1898, Colonel Commandant Heywood ordered 

the battalion paraded and then had it disbanded, 

with its Marines being sent back to the various 

East Coast barracks and naval installations from 

whence they had come.78 Although Huntington’s Battalion had successfully accomplished its 

mission, Heywood did not contemplate this expeditionary adventure becoming a standing requirement. Instead, the Colonel Commandant 

saw it as a distraction from the Marine Corps’ 

traditional role, which he felt was continuing 

to serve as ship’s detachments and guarding 

78 The origination of military parades harkens back to military formations during close-order maneuvers. More recently, the actions 

became strictly ceremonial in nature, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when military units were returning 

from deployments or as a means to demonstrate the military might 

of a nation.

the various naval installations throughout the 

United States. Whether he or the Marine Corps 

cared for the concept or not, the afloat-ready 

battalion had proven itself in practice, and the 

U.S. Navy took notice.

The Afloat-Ready 

Battalion Concept 

Revived by the Navy

The next incarnation of the afloat-ready battalion came four years later in the form of Russell’s, Haines’s, Pope’s, and Lejeune’s Battalions. 

At the beginning of September 1902, the USS 

Panther once again embarked a Marine battalion 

(16 officers and 325 enlisted men) at the request 

of Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody, 

who had stated his desire the previous July to 

have such a battalion ready for training with 

the fleet, as well as to be on hand to serve in 

an expeditionary capacity and ready to land anywhere the fleet deemed it desirable to do so.79

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Russell, this first afloat-ready battalion 

was composed of men from the Marine Barracks 

Brooklyn Navy Yard and Philadelphia Navy Yard. 

Hastily formed for service in what they were 

told would be Western Caribbean waters, the 

battalion sailed on 14 September 1902. Upon 

arrival off the coast of Columbia, the Panther 

would serve as a station ship, able to launch an 

expeditionary battalion-size landing force anywhere in the region at a moment’s notice. It 

and its three successor battalions would protect 

American interests during ongoing unrest in 

Honduras and Panama for the next 16 months, 

serving as an important tool of U.S. national 

policy in the region.

The Marines did not have to wait long. On 

79 Allan R. Millett and Jack Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine 

Corps (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2004), 140.

Col John H. Russell Jr., commander of Russell’s 

Battalion, shown here as a major in 1902, U.S. 

Naval Academy Class of 1892 and future Major 

General Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History 

Division
162 chapter two

23 September, on orders from Rear Admiral 

Silas Casey III, commander of naval forces in 

the Caribbean, Russell and his Marines landed 

at Colón, in what is now modern-day Panama, 

to protect U.S. interests during a period of civil 

unrest between Colombia and the United States, 

which exercised governmental authority over 

the region where the Panama Canal was being 

built. The landing of a disciplined battalion of 

well-armed and -equipped Marines, and its visible presence throughout the city, was enough to 

convince the warring parties—loyalists and separatists—to stand down and cease their violent 

acts against the local government in Colón and 

American businesses. 

After two uneventful months of patrolling 

and supporting the local police, the battalion 

once again embarked on board the Panther on 

18 November and sailed for the advanced naval 

base at Culebra, an island off the coast of Puerto Rico, where the Marines disembarked and 

conducted training ashore.80 By 30 November 

1902, most of Russell’s men had become sick 

from various tropical diseases incurred after two 

and a half months of service in the Caribbean, 

forcing the weakened battalion to return to the 

United States, where it was immediately dis80 Millett and Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine Corps.

banded. Despite the lingering effects of the various tropical illnesses, the presence of an armed 

and well-trained battalion of Marines embarked 

aboard a station ship had proved its worth.

Meanwhile, once again at the behest of the 

Navy, another Marine battalion was formed on 

5 November that same year in Norfolk, also 

for service in the Caribbean. This battalion, 

commanded by Colonel Percival C. Pope, was 

sent directly to Culebra aboard the transport 

USS Prairie (AD 5) to train with Russell’s battalion, since the immediate need for troops in 

Panama had seemingly passed. Discovering that 

Russell’s battalion had been forced to return to 

the United States for health reasons, the flotilla 

commander decided to keep Pope’s battalion on 

station aboard the Prairie instead. 

Pope was no stranger to service afloat. He 

had served on the staff of Huntington’s Battalion 

USS Prairie in a harbor, while she was fitted with 

sailing rig for training ship service, ca. 1901–5. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH105835

Col Percival C. Pope (shown here as a major in 

1890), commander of Pope’s Battalion, 1902. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH85788
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 163

at Guantánamo Bay and was a good choice to 

lead the new battalion, which was nearly twice 

as large as Russell’s. It was a balanced force, 

consisting of 600 men organized into six companies, along with artillery, machine guns, and 

rudimentary signal equipment. However, in 

fleshing out this battalion, the East Coast was 

effectively denuded of nearly every able-bodied 

Marine who had not deployed with Russell five 

months earlier. It also forced the Colonel Commandant to delay his plans to create an advanced 

base defense force, which had become the 

Marine Corps’ primary focus since the SpanishAmerican War. 

Emphasis Shifts to 

Advanced Base Force

With its traditional role of serving as ship’s detachments threatened by the increasing modernization of the Navy, which felt that it no 

longer needed such a seemingly anachronistic 

body of troops on board its ships, Marine Corps 

leaders belatedly realized that the advanced base 

force was where its future lay.81 After its victory in 1898, the United States had acquired a 

far-flung overseas empire with coaling stations 

located all around the globe that needed to be 

defended or seized if the president deemed it 

necessary. The ensuing deployments of not only 

Pope’s battalion in an expeditionary capacity, 

but of two subsequent ones, forced Heywood 

to delay his plans for creating such a force for 

at least two more years, since it was patently 

obvious that nothing could be done until the 

Navy overcame its desire to keep large numbers 

of Marines embarked on station ships or un81 At the time, an advanced base force was understood to be a coastal 

and/or naval base defense force designed to establish mobile and 

fixed bases in the event major landing operations would be necessary beyond U.S. shores.

til it became impractical to continue doing so. 

Nevertheless, Admiral George Dewey, 

commander of the Atlantic Fleet and hero of 

the Battle of Manila Bay, remained enthusiastic 

about the utility of an embarked ready battalion. Shortly after the Spanish-American War 

had concluded, he commented that “If there had 

been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me 

on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly 

garrisoned.”82

The further utility of the Marines for service in the Caribbean was evinced by Dewey’s 

deputy, Rear Admiral H. C. Taylor, in a letter to 

the secretary of the Navy, in which he asserted that the Marines served two purposes: one 

of “being ready for service anywhere,” and the 

other “that of improving the base and harbor” of 

Culebra as “a most valuable adjunct.”83 It was not 

an entirely negative development for Pope’s Marines, who gained valuable experience in constructing and defending an advanced base during 

a lengthy exercise carried out by the Navy that 

ended on 3 January 1903. 

That same month, Colonel Pope handed 

over command of his battalion in Culebra to 

Major Henry C. Haines, who then was ordered 

to transfer his Marines back aboard the creaking Panther later that month. They would serve 

aboard this station ship as part of the Atlantic 

Fleet’s newly activated “Caribbean Squadron” 

until late July 1903. Finally landed in Maine 

to take part in Army-Navy joint maneuvers at 

the end of that month, Haines and his battalion 

sailed to the Philadelphia Navy Yard in August 

1903, where he was relieved of command by 

Major John A. Lejeune in October. 

82 James D. Hittle, “Sea Power and the Balanced Fleet,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 32, no. 2 (February 1948): 57. 83 Millett and Shulimson, Commandants of the Marine Corps, 141.
164 chapter two

The Floating 

Battalion of the 

Atlantic Fleet

Lejeune’s Battalion, now known by the Navy 

as the “Floating Battalion of the Atlantic Fleet,” 

then embarked aboard the transport USS Dixie

(1893) and sailed once more to the Caribbean to 

take part in the upcoming 1903–4 winter maneuvers.84 That exercise never came to pass because Lejeune and his men were diverted from 

Culebra to Panama instead, where they went 

ashore at Colón on 5 November to discourage 

Colombian forces from invading. Joined two 

months later by Brigadier General George F. Elliott’s provisional Marine brigade, Lejeune and 

his men participated in the Panama Canal crisis 

of 1903–4, but did not see combat. After Colombia backed down from its threats to invade 

Panama, mainly due to the presence of Elliott’s 

brigade, peace was restored and Panamanian independence was formally recognized. No longer needed, Lejeune’s Battalion returned to the 

United States in February 1904, where it was 

finally disbanded.85

Though Pope’s, Russel’s, Haines’s, and 

Lejeune’s battalions had satisfactorily served 

as precursors for the Navy’s forces afloat concept, the Marine Corps recorded its objections 

to the overall concept, feeling that it was a diversion from what it saw as its evolving primary mission of serving as the fleet’s nascent base 

defense force. In addition to this objection, 

Colonel Commandant Heywood complained in 

1903 that this unfunded program came out of 

the Marine Corps’ thinly stretched budget and 

was not compensated for by the Navy, that it 

84 Spencer C. Tucker, Almanac of American Military History: 1000–

1830, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 1210. 85 Tucker, Almanac of American Military History, 1213.

used “borrowed” manpower needed elsewhere, 

and that the proper onboard equipment and 

small boats needed to receive, store, and land 

supplies were lacking on the ships used to carry the Marines. There was also the issue of the 

ships themselves—the USS Panther, Prairie, and 

Dixie—which were never intended to serve as 

troopships and had undergone inadequate conversion to prepare them for that role. They were 

cramped, poorly ventilated, and lacked adequate 

space for the embarked Marines to exercise or 

perform any sort of drill.

Another issue that continually raised its 

head was the never-ending conflict of authority 

between the successive Marine battalion commanders and each ship’s captain. In many cases, 

not only did the ship’s captain insist on enforcing 

BGen George F. Elliot (shown here as a major general while serving as the 10th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, 1903–10), commander of Elliott’s 

Brigade.

Marine Corps History Division
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 165

his writ upon every Marine on board, circumventing the Marine Corps chain of command, 

but some ship’s captains also attempted to give 

precise instructions on the employment of the 

Marines once they had gone ashore. However it 

might vex Colonel Commandant Heywood and 

his successor Brigadier General Commandant 

Elliott, there was little either of them could do 

about it, since they had no authority over their 

Marines from Washington, DC, once they were 

sailing as part of the fleet, unless, like Elliott, 

he sailed with his Marines to command them in 

person as commander of the provisional brigade 

sent to Panama. 

While Heywood or Elliott could complain 

to the Navy about this practice, both had to 

confront the admiral’s belief, deeply rooted in 

tradition, that anyone embarked on a U.S. Navy 

warship was subject to the captain’s authority. 

Heywood, when he first confronted this assertion, countered that this was nonsense, given 

that the Panther, Prairie, and Dixie were mere 

troopships, which by naval custom gave the 

commander of the landing force authority over 

his own men. Unfortunately for Heywood, the 

Navy’s counterargument that the presence of a 

few small-caliber cannon on board these converted freighters buttressed its contention that 

these were indeed warships, which practically 

ended all discussion of the matter during the 

rest of his and Elliott’s tenure.

Despite the ineffective resistance of the 

Marine Corps, which was in any case subordinate to the Navy, the latter Service still wanted to continue the practice. After the success in 

Panama and elsewhere, the Navy believed that 

an embarked battalion of Marines enhanced 

the Navy’s expeditionary capability. However, 

events conspired to end the practice altogether 

for nearly 43 years. During the first decade of 

the twentieth century, the United States quickly 

discovered that its new overseas empire needed to be policed and that the numbers of troops 

on hand, both Army and Marine Corps, were 

insufficient for the purpose. The Marine Corps 

especially found itself pulled in every direction, 

having to send detachments to protect new naval bases in the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, 

and Cuba, as well as the American legation in 

China. While the authorized size of the Marine 

Corps had increased, it still had not attained 

the minimum number of Marines that Colonel 

Commandant Heywood felt adequate—a total 

of 10,000 men—to meet all of the Corps’ commitments, most especially when it was focused 

on the evolving advanced base defense force 

concept.

The dichotomy between the desires of the 

Navy, which wanted an expeditionary afloatready battalion, and the Marines Corps, which 

wanted an advanced base defense force, would 

continue unresolved until 1947. During the 

interval, both Services were consumed by a 

variety of challenges, including modernizing 

the fleet, fighting World War I, participating 

in a series of protracted counterguerrilla and 

nation-building operations in the Caribbean 

during the 1920s and ’30s (the Banana Wars), 

experimenting with air-ground cooperation, 

and—most important from the Marine Corps’ 

perspective—developing and maturing the advanced base force concept that included the 

concept of amphibious assault against a defended beachhead. These and other events, including 

successfully waging World War II, required the 

complete dedication and cooperation of both 

sea Services to achieve their goals.
166 chapter two

Afloat-Ready 

Battalion Concept 

Rediscovered by State 

Department

This is where things stood until December 

1947, when the concept was resurrected at the 

beginning of the Cold War. On this occasion, it 

was not the Navy that called for an afloat-ready 

force, but the U.S. Department of State, which 

felt that the United States needed a variety of 

policy options to employ as a counter to what 

had become an increasingly belligerent and 

assertive Soviet Union. In April and again in 

December of that year, Ambassador George F. 

Kennan called for a scalable, highly mobile amphibious reaction force that could be based at 

sea and prepared to conduct a landing operation 

anywhere in the Mediterranean Sea to assist U.S. 

allies threatened by Communist expansion.86 Instead of seeking a military confrontation with 

the Soviet Union, which was engaged in destabilizing several Western European nations and 

consolidating its control over Eastern Europe, 

Kennan believed that U.S. goals would best be 

achieved by containing the Soviet threat over a 

long period by using political, military, informational, and economic levers of power.

Kennan was serving at the time as Secretary of State George C. Marshall Jr.’s influential director of policy planning and was highly 

86 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949, vol. 2 (Washington, 

DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 6.

Ambassador George F. Kennan in 1947. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

RAdm Bernhard H. Bieri, U.S. Navy.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH80-G-701987
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 167

respected throughout the U.S. government for 

his depth of understanding of the growing Soviet menace. When the Soviet Union began to 

exert diplomatic and military pressure upon 

Greece and Italy throughout the summer and 

fall of 1947, the State Department was able to 

convince President Harry S. Truman that to assist these democratic governments, both threatened by Communist agitation, the Navy could 

help further the nascent “containment policy” 

and Truman Doctrine against the Soviet Union 

by conducting a variety of fleet exercises and 

amphibious demonstrations that would send a 

signal to Josef Stalin of the inadvisability of continuing his destabilizing actions.87

 Consequently, in addition to sending additional ships of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern 

87 Allan K. Henrikson, “The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance: 1948–1952,” Naval War College Review 32, no. 3 (May/June 

1980): 12. Editor’s note: the May/June 1980 issue of Navy War 

College Review was published bearing the incorrect volume number 

(32); the correct volume number for all 1980 issues was 33. 

Mediterranean as ordered by the president, the 

commander of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri, also 

requested that a battalion-size Marine Corps 

amphibious task force be deployed to bolster 

the fleet’s striking power, which up to that point 

did not include any battalion landing teams. The 

request was duly approved and a chief of naval 

operations order dated 20 December 1947 directed the temporary assignment of a reinforced 

Marine battalion to augment existing Marine 

detachments on Sixth Fleet warships and to provide a ready landing force.88 This order brought 

about the actual resurrection and implementation of the afloat-ready battalion concept, the 

first time since Pope’s, Haines’s, Russel’s, and 

Lejeune’s Battalions of 1902–4 that an amphibious expeditionary force would embark aboard 

Navy ships and remain on station, awaiting a 

88 John G. Norris, “Navy Places Its Top Strategist in Command of 

Area,” Washington Post, 6 January 1948.

USS Bexar (APA 237) underway off San Diego, CA, ca. 1954.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH66834
168 chapter two

possible contingency order that could result in 

their landing on a foreign shore at a moment’s 

notice. 

Within days of receiving this order, a battalion landing team of 1,000 Marines from the 

2d Marine Regiment (Reinforced), along with 

vehicles, tanks, artillery, and supplies, formed 

up and began loading on board the World War 

II-vintage U.S. Navy attack transports USS Bexar (APA 237) and USS Montague (AKA 98) in 

Morehead City, North Carolina.89 Sailing from 

the East Coast on 5 January 1948, this force 

remained afloat with the Sixth Fleet for three 

months in the eastern Mediterranean, returning on 12 March 1948 after being replaced by 

a similar battalion from Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina, a move that initiated a series of cruises 

that would normally last six months.

Unlike its lukewarm acceptance of the 

concept in 1903, the Marine Corps embraced 

this new mission enthusiastically. Embroiled as 

it was in the 1947–48 military roles and missions debate, which involved nothing less than 

the continuing survival of the Marine Corps as 

a Service, this type of mission was tailor-made 

for what it specialized in—expeditionary operations and amphibious assault—as part of 

the Navy’s “balanced fleet.”90 Having proven its 

ability to carry out these kinds of assignments 

in the Pacific during World War II, the Marine 

Corps felt that it was uniquely suited for the 

afloat-ready battalion mission in the Mediterranean, as compared to the U.S. Army, which was 

almost fully committed to occupation duties in 

Germany, Japan, China, and Italy. The greatest 

obstacle to filling the Navy’s requirement was 

that the number of existing battalion landing 

teams had been reduced to six, of which only 

89 Norris, “Navy Places Its Top Strategist in Command of Area.”

90 Hittle, “Sea Power and the Balanced Fleet,” 59.

half were considered to be available for service 

with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the 

Caribbean, and elsewhere.91

Though it never fired a shot in anger, the 

first afloat-ready battalion to deploy to the Mediterranean participated in several amphibious 

exercises within close proximity of Greece and 

Italy, a move that the Soviets could not fail to notice. Combined with other political and military 

signals being sent by the U.S. government at the 

time, the presence of the amphibious force and 

the national resolve that it signified were enough 

to influence the Soviet Union to decrease its 

support to the Communist rebel movements in 

Greece, Italy, and Turkey, granting the governments of these countries the breathing space 

they needed to renew efforts to bolster their 

defenses against their respective insurgencies.92

Evolution of the 

Mediterranean Afloat 

Battalion 1948–60

This first afloat-ready battalion, though still a 

powerful unit by today’s standards, was not a 

true combined Marine air-ground organization 

in the modern sense. The battalion landing team 

was not paired with an aviation component and 

lacked a commander and staff to exercise command and control of any Marine Corps air and 

ground units that might operate together. It was 

completely dependent on its troop transports 

for logistical support, having none of its own, 

rendering it unable to operate independently 

ashore for more than a few days. To compound 

command and control issues, neither the Bexar 

nor the Montague was equipped with the communications gear that would have allowed the 

91 Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 150. 92 George F. Kennan, Report by the Policy Planning Staff: Review of 

Current Trends—U.S. Foreign Policy, Policy Planning Staff Paper no. 

23 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1948).
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 169

battalion commander to exercise control over 

his forces while afloat. It was a stopgap, expedient solution but it was enough to send the right 

message of political will.

Though Marine fixed-wing aircraft were 

operating aboard aircraft carriers of the Sixth 

Fleet at the time, they fell under the Navy’s control and were not considered to be part of the 

afloat-ready battalion’s “force package” or authorized temporary organizational structure. The 

battalion and its equipment were not configured 

for an amphibious assault either, since neither 

of the two attack transports were accompanied 

by the necessary landing ships, tank (LSTs) nor 

did they carry any landing vehicles, tracked 

(LVTs) like those recently used during the war 

with Japan with such great effect. It also had no 

helicopters of its own, a newly introduced aerial system that had not yet gone far beyond the 

experimental stage but one that showed great 

future promise as a means of landing troops in 

support of an amphibious assault.

Nevertheless, this move initiated the Marine Corps’ practice of maintaining an air and 

landing force with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean on a recurring basis, a practice which, 

except for short-term breaks in continuity due 

to overwhelming requirements for troops elsewhere (e.g., the Korean and Vietnam Wars), has 

continued from 1948 to the present day. That 

same year, this afloat-ready battalion also was 

given its first name—the Naval Forces, Eastern 

Atlantic and Mediterranean Battalion, or NELM 

Battalion.93 In 1960, the Sixth Fleet redesignated 

93 “Marines Are on Their Way,” Sunday Star-News (Wilmington, 

NC), 13 January 1957, 8-A.

U.S. Marines and Lebanese Army personnel debark 

from LCTs with one of the Marine Corps’ new 

M50 Ontos, light armored antitank vehicle. This 

unit was from the NELM Battalion assigned to the 

Navy’s Sixth Fleet.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A17399

Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, 20th Commandant 

of the Marine Corps (1952–55).

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps 

History Division
170 chapter two

it as the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed, but little else changed. 

The Doctrinal 

Revolution 

of the 1950s

Except for the existing battalion landing team 

doctrine dating back to the late 1940s, the Marine Corps had yet to devise a tactical system or 

a way of thinking about how to incorporate all 

of the disparate elements needed to make such 

an air-ground force capable of operating in a 

nuclear environment complete. Even had there 

been doctrine, or helicopters advanced enough 

to carry troops and cargo, in 1948 there was as 

yet no ship suitable enough to serve as a floating 

base, though aircraft carriers did hold promise. 

Unfortunately, the Navy was reluctant to allocate its large fleet carriers or the funding for 

such a project, not convinced yet that the helicopter would prove itself as the panacea that the 

Marine Corps thought it was. Fixed-wing aviation continued to operate from aircraft carriers 

assigned to the various fleets.

Between January 1948 and early 1960, a 

succession of NELM Battalions continued sailing 

with the Sixth Fleet throughout the Mediterranean. However, a portent of the future gradually 

began to take shape upon the publication of a 

bulletin on 9 November 1954 written by General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commandant of 

the Marine Corps.94 Weighing the increasing capability of the Marine Corps’ rotary- and fixedwing aviation elements, and foreseeing how 

they might work in concert with ground combat 

elements, Shepherd decreed that a new organizational structure—what he termed a Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force, or MAGTF—would be 

94 Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1954).

needed in the future to enable the Marine Corps 

to continue its amphibious warfare mission 

while at the same time leveraging new technology to make it a more lethal and agile force.

Shepherd stated that the “future employment of Fleet Marine Force elements will normally involve organization as air-ground task 

forces in which air and ground units will habitually operate as a single operational command” 

and that this Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

should consist of a balanced all-arms team.95

Shepherd was not prescriptive in the bulletin as 

to the actual makeup of the force, but he was 

clearly influenced by the all-helicopter amphibious assault concept, commonly referred to 

as vertical envelopment, which foresaw an even 

greater employment of the helicopter than was 

possible at the time. More importantly, Shepherd stressed the importance of all arms—air, 

ground, and logistics—being placed under the 

command of a single Marine commander not 

tasked with the additional duty of commanding 

one of the MAGTF’s components.96

While Shepherd’s bulletin was important, it 

was not yet settled as doctrine and commanders 

of Marine Corps units in service with the various fleets were not bound to follow it. A year 

later, however, Shepherd’s thoughts were reinforced by Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, 

Landing Force Bulletin 17 (LFB-17), which 

did have the force of doctrine behind it.97 This 

bulletin stressed that the MAGTF concept was 

uniquely suited toward the conduct of vertical 

95 While the development of MAGTF doctrine did have some influence on the continuing evolution of the afloat-ready battalion 

concept, particularly in regard to the integration of the aviation 

element, it is a separate concept that evolved along parallel lines 

and will be covered in greater detail in a future volume of this 

publication.

96 Shepherd, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept, 2. 97 Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, LFB-17 (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1955).
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 171

envelopment as part of amphibious operations 

in a nuclear environment and that MAGTFs 

must leverage all of its elements to achieve 

success. However, the bulletin did not actually provide much guidance concerning how the 

doctrine was to be put into practice, leaving it 

up to the commanders to decide what a MAGTF 

actually was and what it would look like. Additionally, the Marine Corps was still without a 

suitable seagoing platform to carry such a force, 

even had there been a consensus with the Navy 

as to what it was to be. Though smaller escort 

carriers had been temporarily made available 

to the Marine Corps for training exercises and 

experimental purposes since 1948, no dedicated or purpose-built Navy ships yet existed that 

could transport and support the kind of MAGTF 

that Shepherd envisioned.

Impact of New 

Doctrine on the 

Fleet Marine Force

Armed with the knowledge that incorporating 

helicopters into the afloat-ready battalion concept was now expected to become standard 

practice, beginning in 1956, all three Marine 

Expeditionary Forces, or MEFs (I MEF, II MEF, 

and III MEF), began to experiment using the 

forces assigned to them; however, each MEF 

headquarters, faced with different challenges 

posed by its area of operations and the availability of amphibious shipping, approached the 

matter differently. One of the first prototype 

MAGTFs that deployed consisted of 6th Marine 

Regiment Headquarters, with one battalion 

landing team, joined by two Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadrons (HMM)—HMM-261 and 

Marines landing in Lebanon, 15 July 1958. These were the first and second waves of Marines to hit the 

beach at the airport in Beirut. These Marines were from Golf Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A17497, courtesy of TSgt Ed Scullin 
172 chapter two

HMM-262. This force left Morehead City for 

NELM Battalion duty with the Sixth Fleet in 

the Mediterranean on 20 August 1957, making it the first standing MAGTF to serve in that 

capacity on a rotating basis.98 The regimental 

headquarters served as the overall command 

and control element of the MAGTF, but the limitations of existing amphibious shipping meant 

that its helicopters had to embark aboard fleet 

carriers, leaving the MAGTF commander with 

little authority over their employment until they 

could be landed and joined with the rest of the 

MAGTF ashore, the same procedure that governed employment of fixed-wing aircraft.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, 

there were many examples of the NELM Battalion/LanForMed being used to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations and to support 

98 Ralph W. Donnelly, Gabrielle M. Neufeld, and Carolyn A. Tyson, 

A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps, 1947–1964, vol. III, 

Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet (Washington, DC: 

Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1971), 34.

humanitarian assistance operations, such as the 

Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, 

and the Cyprus Crisis of 1965, among others. 

On 14 July 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the NELM Battalion, along with 

two additional battalion landing teams, to land 

in Lebanon to evacuate American citizens and 

to forestall a coup of the democratically elected government. Joined by elements from the 2d 

Marine Division that were already afloat in the 

Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet for an exercise, the NELM Battalion was quickly landed 

and began conducting operations nearly a week 

before the U.S. Army’s airborne task force, entirely dependent on airlift, arrived from Germany.99 The ability of the afloat-ready battalion 

with its associated aviation element to land and 

begin conducting operations within 48 hours 

of notification was a powerful testament to the 

99 Donnelly, Neufeld, and Tyson, A Chronology of the United 

States Marine Corps, 36.

USS Thetis Bay (LPH 6), the first Marine Corps landing platform, helicopter.

Naval History and Heritage Command, 19-N-69574
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 173

utility of the concept, once again proving the 

usefulness it first demonstrated in 1898. 

New and Modified 

Ships Make Their 

Appearance

Meanwhile, a new class of Navy ships pointed 

toward the possibilities of the modern MAGTF. 

On 20 July 1956, the USS Thetis Bay (CVE 90), 

a converted World War II escort carrier, was 

recommissioned by the Navy as a landing platform, helicopter (LPH) ship, which was the 

Marine Corps’ first amphibious assault ship able 

to embark both the troops from the battalion 

landing team and 12 aircraft from a composite 

helicopter squadron, combining the functions 

of both an aircraft carrier and attack transport, 

changing the way afloat-ready battalions would 

operate forever.100 Though the Thetis Bay primarily served as a training platform, it saw many 

operational deployments as the Marine Corps 

worked out the technical details of the vertical 

envelopment concept. On 10 November 1958, 

the first permanent Marine aviation detachment 

afloat was activated for service and would ulti100 “’Copter Carrier Commissioned,” Naval Aviation News, September 1956; and “Fuji Feels Marine Assault,” Naval Aviation News, 

December 1957, 36.

U.S. Marine Corps HUS-1 Seahorse helicopters lift off the USS Boxer’s (LPH 4) flight deck during operations off Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, with the 10th Provisional Marine Brigade on 8 March 1959. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH97288, courtesy of Grantham 
174 chapter two

mately serve on board the USS Boxer (LPH 4), a 

converted World War II Essex-class fleet carrier, 

then undergoing conversion at Norfolk, Virginia.101 The unit was activated to provide supply, 

maintenance, and flight deck control to Marine 

helicopter squadrons and troops assigned to 

the Boxer once the ship was placed back into 

service. 

This trend accelerated in 1959, when the 

USS Boxer was finally recommissioned on 30 January. Twice as large as the Thetis Bay, the Boxer 

carried up to 30 helicopters (21 on deck and 9 

in the hangar deck) as well as nearly 2,000 Marines of an embarked battalion landing team.102

Two other converted Essex-class carriers, the 

USS Princeton (LPH 5) and USS Valley Forge (LPH 

8), soon followed, joining the Boxer and the USS 

Thetis Bay. 

Finally, the Marine Corps had the major pieces of what would constitute the future 

amphibious force, but these converted carriers 

had their limitations. For example, while they 

could embark troops via helicopters, they had 

no surface landing craft of their own, forcing 

the Navy and Marine Corps to continue to 

rely on LSTs and landing ship, docks (LSDs) to 

carry the ship-to-shore craft that would transport the bulk of the battalion landing team 

and the logistics elements ashore. These vessels 

were much slower than the Essex-class ships, often requiring the LPHs to sail separately.

With four LPHs on hand between 1959 and 

1964, the Marine Corps focused on merging the 

MAGTF concept with the afloat-ready battalion 

concept. The half-formed doctrine still lagged 

101 Like many of the ships from this period, the Boxer saw a great 

deal of change during its service. Originally classified as an aircraft 

carrier (CV 21) in 1945, it was repeatedly reclassified, first as an 

attack carrier (CVA 21) then as an antisubmarine carrier (CVS 21).

102 LtCol Eugene W. Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962, 

ed. Maj William J. Sambito (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1976), 87–88.

behind the evolution of landing craft and helicopters. Realizing this, the Navy and the Marine 

Corps began working closely together in both 

the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets as their experimentation progressed, though again each fleet 

approached the challenge differently. For example, in 1960, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea announced the initiation of the Fast 

Amphibious Force (FAF) concept. 

According to an article in the Marine Corps 

Gazette, which represented the unofficial voice 

of the Marine Corps’ leadership, the FAF consisted of an afloat-ready battalion, a composite 

helicopter squadron, and a small logistics element embarked aboard the ships of a Navy amphibious squadron, consisting of fast amphibious 

ships (including an LPH) capable of steaming at 

20 knots that would allow them to avoid slower Soviet submarines. The concept stressed that 

both the Marine and Navy elements of the FAF 

must train and operate in concert with one another to boost proficiency and overall effectiveness. Although the FAF concept was intended to 

be implemented in both Pacific (with the Seventh) and Atlantic (with the Sixth) Fleets, it only 

seems to have been put into effect under that 

title in the Atlantic.103

The Fleets Experiment 

with New Concepts

As the outlines of future amphibious doctrine 

began to take hold, the concepts for Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Force 

(MEF), and Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC) 

had become common usage within the Marine 

Corps by 1960, though they had not yet been 

103 R. A. Stephens, “Fast Amphibious Force,” Marine Corps Gazette

45, no. 1 (January 1961): 46–47.
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 175

encapsulated in doctrine.104 This led to misunderstandings throughout the Marine Corps 

regarding their exact usage and composition, 

whether it applied to the NELM Battalion (redesignated in 1960 as the Landing Force, Mediterranean, or LanForMed) or the FAF. 

For example, the 24th MEU (the first recorded use of that designation) was activated 

at Cherry Point, North Carolina, on 15 November 1960. It consisted of a brigade headquarters, a battalion landing team from the 

2d Marine Division, and a provisional Marine 

Aviation Group consisting of a light helicopter transport squadron and an ordnance-laden 

attack or jet fighter squadron embarked separately on an aircraft carrier with the Sixth 

104 “Fleet Marine Force,” Marine Corps Gazette 44, no. 7 (July 

1960): A-1.

Fleet.105 Technically speaking, it was a MAGTF, 

but not quite like the MEU as they are known 

today, and it did not deploy to the Mediterranean for LanForMed Battalion duty, but deployed only for a series of training exercises. 

One possible reason is that the Sixth Fleet did 

not perceive the FAF as a permanent organization; its primary purpose appears to have been 

to serve as a means to train and familiarize Marines with the emerging doctrinal concepts. 

The Sixth Fleet’s FAF went through a number of permutations over the next several years, 

as different units rotated in and out within its 

structure, but the FAF itself, which at one point 

included the provisional 16th MEB, never existed for more than three months at a time.106

105 Donnelly, Neufeld, and Tyson, A Chronology of the United States 

Marine Corps, 43. 106 “Marine Expeditionary Brigade Returns from Mediterranean Area 

Maneuvers,” Camp Lejeune Globe (Jacksonville, NC), 8 June 1961, 6.

U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group underway in March 1965 (from left): USS Bexar (APA 

237), USS Princeton (LPH 5), USS Thomaston (LSD 28), and USS O’Bannon (DD 450). Sikorsky UH-34D 

Seahorse helicopters of HMM-365 fly above the ships while Princeton’s crew spells out the task group designations, “TG 76.5/79.5,” on the flight deck.

Official U.S. Navy photo, 1142349
176 chapter two

By the time the Vietnam War began in 1965, it 

appears to have disappeared altogether, as the 

demands for ships and battalion landing teams 

outweighed all other considerations, though 

the LanForMed Battalion deployments appear 

to have continued unabated throughout the 

1960s.

The introduction of the FAF concept 

evolved along similar lines with the Seventh 

Fleet during the early 1960s, but with some typical differences in the operational style between 

the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. In 1961, the 

Seventh Fleet, under the guidance of its commander, Admiral Harry D. Felt, designated its 

FAF equivalent as the Amphibious Ready Group 

or ARG. Felt, with Marine Corps support, first 

proposed the organization of such task forces to 

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. 

Burke, who concurred. This force, the Navy and 

Marine Corps’ first ARG, was designated Task 

Force 76.5 and based out of the U.S. Naval Base 

Subic Bay in the Philippines.107

The prototype ARG consisted of an amphibious squadron with three to four “fast” ships 

(one LPH, one LSD, and/or an attack cargo ship 

or AKA) and a Special Landing Force (SLF) instead of a MEU, consisting of a battalion landing team from the 3d Marine Division based in 

Okinawa and a composite helicopter squadron 

that included both utility and heavy-lift aircraft. 

Thus combined, the ARG/SLF would rotate its 

embarked Marine units every six months, remaining at sea “on station” in support of various Southeast Asia contingencies involving Laos, 

Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam between 

1960 and 1964, but was not deployed ashore. 

107 Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States 

Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 

1959–1965, vol. II (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 

Department of the Navy, 1986), 42.

That would change during the summer of 

1965, when the United States stepped up its involvement in South Vietnam.108

The first MAGTF to sail the Atlantic with 

its own aviation element was built around battalion landing teams from 3d Battalion, 8th Marine 

Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, in February 1961 and included aviation 

elements from the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. 

With an 83-man headquarters element provided 

by 2d Marine Division, this force was designated 

as 4th MEB. It was joined shortly thereafter by 

the 24th MEU, which was already at sea sailing 

108 Marolda and Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam 

Conflict, 474, 529.

Gen David M. Shoup, 22d Commandant of the 

Marine Corps (1960–63).

Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps 

History Division
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 177

as part of the aforementioned FAF. Combined, 

the 4th MEB included the USS Boxer and the fast 

attack transports from the Navy’s Amphibious 

Squadrons 2 and 8.109

This was the first time that a balanced, 

self-contained, brigade-size MAGTF had participated in a routine afloat mission in the Atlantic and Caribbean. It had not been activated 

for any specifically designated contingency, such 

as those brigade-size task forces that had been 

quickly created or stood up for the Lebanon or 

Cyprus crises. Instead, like the FAF before it, 

the MEB served as an enormous sea-going laboratory for amphibious warfare. Though much 

larger than a MEU, the 4th MEB allowed the 

109 “Marines at Work: 4th MEB,” Marine Corps Gazette 45, no. 4 

(April 1961): 4–5.

Marines from the Pacific Fleet’s ARG/SLF wade ashore near Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam, ca. 1965.

Defense Department photo (U.S. Navy) 1110983

Marine Corps to experiment with both its new 

ships and doctrinal concepts during Exercise 

LantPhibEx 1-61 before the brigade was deactivated after three months at sea.

A cursory examination reveals that both the 

Pacific and Atlantic Fleets composited or assembled their afloat-ready forces differently. Those 

activated for service in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, or in the Mediterranean as LanForMed, 

tended to be somewhat larger than the special 

landing force in the Pacific, usually approaching a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (as shown 

above in the case of the 4th MEB) in size versus that of a battalion landing team-size Marine 

Expeditionary Unit. Thus, even as late as 1962, 

it appears that the Marine Corps had still not 

completely settled the argument about what ex-
178 chapter two

actly a MAGTF or a MEU was and what were its 

constituent elements. 

Marine Corps 

Order Settles the 

Doctrine Debate

While the evidence indicates that nearly every 

senior-level Marine (e.g., lieutenant colonel 

and above) were in general agreement about 

the overall MAGTF concept, opinions differed 

widely as to their size, mission, composition, 

and other important topics. On 27 December 

1962, the MAGTF debate was settled once and 

for all when Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.3

was issued by Headquarters Marine Corps after 

extensive consultation with the Navy, which, 

after all, would be providing the amphibious 

warfare ships to carry them. This order, signed 

by Commandant of the Marine Corps General 

David M. Shoup, formally codified a MAGTF’s 

composition in doctrine and specifically enumerated the four types of MAGTFs based on the 

size of the command.110

The order stated that a MAGTF, regardless 

of size, would henceforth consist of a ground 

combat element (GCE), a command element 

(CE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a 

combat service support element or CSSE (now 

called logistics combat element, or LCE). Additionally, the order specified that a MEU would 

be based on a battalion landing team, just as the 

first battalion landing team had been in 1898, 

110 MCO 3120.3, The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces

(Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1962).

USS Okinawa (LPH 3) underway in the South China Sea in January 1969 with several CH-34 Seahorse helicopters parked on her flight deck.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH107670, courtesy of PHC A. L. Smith 
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 179

and would be augmented by a composite helicopter squadron and a dedicated logistics battalion. Though the doctrine was quickly accepted 

and the terminology agreed upon, the Seventh 

Fleet, demonstrating its independent streak, 

continued to use the term special landing force for 

the MEU sailing with the ARG in the Pacific.111

In line with the declaration laying out the 

composition of a MEU, the order further stated 

that a MEB was to be based on a reinforced regimental combat team, a composite air group, and 

a logistics regiment. The MEF would be based 

on a Marine division, air wing, and appropriately sized logistics elements. The MEC, though the 

term was never used in practice due to the U.S. 

Army’s objections, was to be based on two or 

more Marine divisions, with an appropriately 

sized air wing and logistics element. In practice, 

however, the MEF has effectively functioned as 

a corps-size headquarters, demonstrated by the 

performance of I MEF during Operation Desert 

Storm in 1991 and during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 

The Marine Corps 

Internalizes 

the Concept

Simply stating “Let there be MEUs, MEBs, 

MEFs, and MECs” was not the same as creating 

these organizations. A great deal of learning had 

to be accomplished and many different subordinate doctrinal publications, tables of organization, tables of equipment, and reams of Service 

regulations had to be written. The best way to 

try out new doctrine was through actual practice using real Marines and real ships, where lessons could be learned and modifications made. 

New organizations had to be created out of thin 

air, so to speak, since they may not have existed 

111 MCO 3120.3, enclosures 1–2.

before or even been contemplated in the original 1961 order. 

For instance, MEU headquarters generally 

did not exist in the early 1960s. The usual practice was to take a Marine division or regimental 

headquarters and either increase its capability 

with more staff and equipment to make a MEU 

headquarters or strip down a division headquarters to the bare essentials to create a MEB headquarters. For a more permanent solution, MEU 

headquarters had to be designed and built into 

future budgets so the manpower spaces could 

be allocated, equipment purchased, and funding 

for training programmed.

An excellent example of how each MEF 

worked through the task of incorporating the 

new doctrine can be seen in how the Pacific Fleet’s SLF evolved. The first SLF created in 

1960 lacked a separate command element. Instead, the commander of the battalion landing 

team served in a dual capacity as both battalion 

commander and SLF commander. With the addition of an aviation element consisting of a mixed 

rotary-wing squadron, this quickly proved to be 

an unworkable arrangement, since the battalion 

landing team commander lacked the expertise 

and communications means to command and 

control it. Consequently, III MEF in Okinawa 

authorized the activation of a small permanent 

SLF command element in 1965.112 A year later, 

this staff had evolved into a true MAGTF headquarters approximately the size and capability of 

an infantry regiment’s staff.113

As the demand for more troops to support 

the Marines in Vietnam increased, the ARG/

112 Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in 

Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: History and Museum Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1978), 

196, 200–1.

113 Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966

(Washington, DC: History and Museum Division, Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 1982), 297.
180 chapter two

SLF was increasingly employed ashore, where it 

took part in numerous ground combat operations, so much so that the Navy decided it needed another ARG/SLF activated just to ensure 

that the Seventh Fleet still had a reserve landing 

capability should other emergencies arise in the 

Pacific Rim not involving Vietnam. Accordingly, 

a second ARG/SLF, or ARG-B, was created to 

complement the original ARG, now designated 

ARG-A. From 1965 to 1969, both ARGs rotated between service with the fleet and ashore in 

support of III MAF in South Vietnam. During this 

period, both ARGs carried out 62 amphibious 

landing operations in Vietnam while taking part 

in dozens of cruises with the Seventh Fleet.114

The only change that occurred during this 

114 Benis M. Frank and Ralph F. Moody, “SLF Operations in Vietnam” (unpublished paper, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1972), Section VII, 4.

period worth noting involved the renaming of 

Marine Expeditionary Units, which, due to perceived South Vietnamese sensitivity to the term 

expeditionary (with the attendant negative connotations of French Colonial rule), were redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units or MAUs 

in 1965. Between 1965 and 1990, a variety of 

former MEUs carried over this term until all 

existing MAUs reverted to their former naming 

convention of MEU. Except for name change, 

everything else remained the same. Finally, even 

the Seventh Fleet’s special landing force was redesignated as a MAU in 1969, then once again as 

a MEU by 1988.115

115 Jonathan D. Geithner, Historical ARG/MEU Employment (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015), 3–4; and All Marines Message 023/88, Change 

of Marine Corps Task Unit Designations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 5 February 1988).

USS Raleigh (LPD 1) underway at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, on 1 February 1963. The ship carries two CH34 Seahorse helicopters parked on her afterdeck.

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH107694, courtesy of PH3 Houchins 
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 181

U.S. Navy Support to 

the ARG/MEU Concept

The final piece of the afloat-ready battalion concept involved related activities of the U.S. Navy, 

which had continuously coordinated its ship design initiative with the Marine Corps. While the 

ARG/MEU concept had become embedded in 

Navy practice, if not in doctrine, purpose-built 

ships to replace the World War II-vintage ships 

did not arrive in the fleet until 26 August 1961, 

when the first LPH was built as such from the 

keel up, and the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) was commissioned. Six others of its class soon followed. 

These ships were capable of carrying 26 helicopters and nearly 2,000 Marines of a reinforced 

battalion landing team, equating to 193 officers 

and 1,806 men.116

However, as impressive as these vessels 

116 “Iwo Jima (LPH-2), 1961–1993,” Naval History and Heritage 

Command, 10 November 2015. 

were in terms of their vertical envelopment 

capability, they lacked a well deck, thus forcing 

the ARG/MEU to rely on older LSTs and LSDs 

to carry the ship-to-shore “connectors” (LVTs, 

LCVPs, LCUs, etc.) for over-the-beach amphibious capability. Fortunately, by 1962, a new type 

of amphibious warship, the landing platform, 

dock or LPD (known today as amphibious transport docks), entered service, easing the reliance 

on the World War II-era vessels. It had both a 

well deck and purpose-built helicopter landing 

platforms, giving it a versatility that the older 

ships lacked.

By 1970, composition of ARGs, at least as 

far as the Navy was concerned, had become a 

settled issue due to the retirement of the rest of 

the few remaining World War II-era amphibious 

ships and the construction of enough new ones 

to replace them. The “standardized” ARG/MEU 

was now composed of an amphibious squadron 

USS Tarawa (LHA 1) underway in the Pacific Ocean in March 1979. Note the light-colored Douglas A-4 

Skyhawk parked between two AV-8 Harriers on the ship’s starboard after flight deck. 

Naval History and Heritage Command, NH107654
182 chapter two

(PhibRon) consisting of one LPH (later replaced 

by the amphibious assault ship, general purpose, 

or LHA), one LPD, and one LSD combined with 

a MEU of 2,200 Marines. However, fixed-wing 

aircraft were still embarked aboard Navy fleet 

carriers, which were not part of the ARG/MEU 

combination. War plans directed that, once a 

beachhead had been taken, airstrips would then 

be seized or constructed, allowing fixed-wing 

aircraft to land, where they would then revert 

to ARG/MEU control. This unsatisfactory situation would not change until 1979. 

The slower Newport-class LSTs and attack 

cargo ships, or AKAs, were relegated to other 

amphibious squadrons before they were phased 

out entirely by 2000, being superseded by the 

new classes of ships being commissioned. Attack 

transports (APAs), the last vestige of the World 

War II-type attack transport, also were completely phased out by 1980. Though the ARG/

MEU composition had been settled for nearly 

40 years, it was not until 2010 that it was finally 

codified in the U.S. Navy’s Operational Instruction OPNAV 3501.316B on 21 October.117

117 OPNAV 3501.316B, Policy for Baseline Composition and Basic Mission 

Capabilities of Major Afloat Navy and Naval Groups (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Navy, 2010).

An AV-8B Harrier, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 (VMM-163) (Rein), hovers above 

the flight deck during a vertical takeoff from the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) on 23 

August 2016. As the flagship of the Makin Island ARG, the ship is deployed with the embarked 11th MEU 

to support maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. Navy’s Fifth 

Fleet area of operations. 

Official U.S. Navy photo, courtesy of PO3 Devin M. Langer 
colonel douglas e. nash sr. 183

Evolution into 

Today’s ARG/MEU

The last significant development occurred on 29 

May 1976, when the first Tarawa-class LHA was 

commissioned. The USS Tarawa (LHA 1) was 

the first LHA with a well deck for carrying and 

launching landing craft, utility (LCU), amphibious assault vehicles-personnel 7 (AAV-P7), and 

landing craft, air cushion (LCAC). There were 

five of these enormous ships built, each capable 

of carrying as many as 41 helicopters or a balanced mix of Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights, 

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions, Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1 Iroquois, as well as 

1,903 troops.118 The USS Tarawa deployed on its 

first Western Pacific cruise in March 1979 and 

for the first time operated with a McDonnell 

Douglas AV-8B Harrier vertical short takeoff 

and landing (VSTOL) jet squadron, in addition 

to an embarked helicopter squadron in a successful experiment to determine the feasibility 

of VSTOL aircraft operating from an LHA. 

With the addition of the AV-8B Harrier, 

the ARG/MEU combination finally had its own 

organic fixed-wing aircraft squadron, capable 

of providing combat air patrol coverage as well 

as close air support to the MEU. Today, ARG/

MEUs often deploy as part of an Expeditionary 

Strike Group (ESG) consisting of an aircraft carrier or other surface warfare combatants. Since 

2015, the more-capable USS Wasp-class LHDs 

and the new USS America-class LHAs have completely replaced the Tarawa-class LHAs. Both 

classes of ships now operate with the new Bell 

Boeing MV-22 Osprey and will soon host the 

newly introduced Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II VSTOL aircraft, which is replacing the 

118 Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-31B (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 2001), 3–5.

AV-8B. One thing has not changed, however. 

Conventional Marine fixed-wing aviation assets, 

such as the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, still operate from the decks of Navy fleet 

carriers. Once suitable airfields are constructed ashore, they will deploy as part of the ARG/

MEU, though the Naval Task Group commander 

still retains the option of having them operate 

under his control.

Introduction 

of the MEU (Special 

Operations Capable) 

Concept

Another change to the ARG/MEU concept occurred in December 1985, when the 26th MAU 

(redesignated as a MEU in 1988) received the 

special operations capable, or SOC, designation, 

becoming the 26th MAU(SOC). Though the 

actual organization of the MAU itself did not 

change, its mission profile did, based upon an 

increasing awareness within the Department of 

Defense that the growth of terrorism around the 

world required an effective military response 

that went beyond traditional capabilities, bordering on those ordinarily possessed by special 

operations forces (SOF). The addition of a SOC 

designation to its title signified that a MAU had 

been issued certain equipment “enhancements” 

and had trained to a rigid standard prior to deploying. Once it had arrived on station, a MAU 

(SOC) might be called upon to accomplish special operations-like missions, such as in extremis

hostage rescue or noncombatant rescue operations and antiterrorist operations.119 By 1987, all 

deploying MAUs were required to train to MAU 

(SOC) status.

Marine Amphibious Units from that point 

119 Report of Examination of Marine Corps Special Operations Enhancements (Norfolk, VA: Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 1985).
184 chapter two

onward would only receive the MAU(SOC) designation prior to deployment after they had met 

special operations certification requirements; 

otherwise, when not deployed, they would retain the normal MAU title (in 1988, they were 

once again redesignated MEUs and became MEU 

[SOCs]). This concept remained in effect from 

1985 until 2005, when the newly activated special operations companies of Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) began to 

assume the mission and MEUs finally dropped 

the SOC appellation.120 Currently, MEUs can 

only use the SOC designation if a Marine Corps 

special operations component is attached to carry out specific special operations-related missions, though in practice this rarely occurs due 

to the high demand for their services within the 

U.S. Special Operations Command.

Conclusion

While current operational concepts such as a 

disaggregated or split-based ARG/MEU have 

recently been put into practice, the core con120 Frank L. Kalesnik, “MARSOC: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, The First Decade, 2006–2016” (PhD 

dissertation, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, 2016), 

6–7. According to MCO 3120.9B, the MEU(SOC) was required 

to demonstrate interoperability with the embarked Naval Special 

Warfare Task Unit (SEALs) prior to deploying. Other sources suggest that the SEALs stopped deploying with MEUs shortly before 

2001.

cept of the ARG/MEU remains unchanged and 

will probably stay that way for the foreseeable 

future. As this article has shown, during the past 

118 years, a progression of changes in national 

security policy, Service doctrine, and technology have combined to provide today’s afloat-ready 

force the capability that Lieutenant Colonel 

Huntington could only dream about. Though 

the modern expeditionary amphibious force, 

with its warships, aircraft, and landing craft, is 

far removed from the afloat-ready battalion that 

saw its debut during the Spanish-American War, 

the concept itself—that of having an embarked 

self-sustaining battalion-size force ready to be 

landed anytime, anywhere at the order of the 

U.S. government—has hardly changed at all. 

Though debate may swirl around the notion that 

amphibious warfare has become obsolete, one 

thing is certain—as long as there is a U.S. Marine Corps, there will be an ARG/MEU at sea 

somewhere, ready for the call to carry out the 

nation’s bidding.
185

Merritt Austin Edson 

Biography

sault. On the night of 13–14 September 1942, 

he led his battalion and the 1st Parachute Battalion in the defense of Lunga “Bloody” Ridge. He 

was awarded the Medal of Honor for that action. 

Following the conclusion of the Solomons 

campaign, he served as chief of staff for the 2d 

Marine Division during the Battle of Tarawa, for 

which he was awarded the Legion of Merit. He 

was promoted to assistant division commander 

for the landings on Saipan and Tinian, for which 

he was awarded the Silver Star. He went on to 

serve as chief of staff and then commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. 

The President of the United States takes 

pleasure in presenting 

the MEDAL OF HONOR to

COLONEL MERRITT A. EDSON

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism and conspicuous intrepidity above and beyond the call 

“There it is. It is useless to ask ourselves why it is we who are here. We are here. There is only us between 

the airfield and the Japs. If we don’t hold, we will lose Guadalcanal.”

~Lieutenant Colonel Edson Merritt A. Edson, 

Lunga Ridge, September 1942

Major General Merritt Austin Edson was born in 1897, he joined 

the Marine Corps Reserve on 26 

June 1916, and was commissioned on 9 October 1917. He served with the 11th Marines in 

France and the occupation army of Germany. 

After the war he became a Marine Corps pilot, serving in the Pacific until physical reasons 

forced him to give up his flying status. He saw 

extensive action in Nicaragua in 1928–29, and 

was awarded his first Navy Cross. He returned 

to the states for several training assignments; in 

1935 and 1936, he led the Marine Corps national rifle and pistol teams as they won the national 

trophies both years. He served in Shanghai, China, from 1937 to 1939, observing the Japanese 

military at firsthand.

He took command of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in June 1941 and in January 1942, began 

the process of transforming into the 1st Raider 

Battalion. Edson led his battalion through the 

landings on Tulagi, Solomon Islands, and the 

subsequent fighting on Guadalcanal. He was 

awarded his second Navy Cross for the Tulagi as-
186 chapter two

William H. V. Guinness, BGen Merritt Austin Edson, oil on panel. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
merritt austin edson 187

of duty as Commanding Officer of the 1st 

Marine Raider Battalion, with Parachute 

Battalion attached, during action against 

enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands on the night of 13–14 September 

1942. After the airfield on Guadalcanal 

had been seized from the enemy on August 

8, Col. Edson, with a force of 800 men, was 

assigned to the occupation and defense of a 

ridge dominating the jungle on either side 

of the airport. Facing a formidable Japanese 

attack which, augmented by infiltration, 

had crashed through our front lines, he, by 

skillful handling of his troops, successfully 

withdrew his forward units to a reserve line 

with minimum casualties. When the enemy, 

in a subsequent series of violent assaults, engaged our force in desperate hand-to-hand 

combat with bayonets, rifles, pistols, grenades, and knives, Col. Edson, although continuously exposed to hostile fire throughout 

the night, personally directed defense of the 

reserve position against a fanatical foe of 

greatly superior numbers. By his astute leadership and gallant devotion to duty, he enabled his men, despite severe losses, to cling 

tenaciously to their position on the vital 

ridge, thereby retaining command not only 

of the Guadalcanal airfield, but also of the 

1st Division’s entire offensive installations 

in the surrounding area.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

LtGen Thomas A. Holcomb, Col Merritt A. Edson, 

and MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift caught in a 

candid shot during the lieutenant general’s inspection on Guadalcanal, December 1942. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 50891, courtesy 

Koepplinger

A superb combat commander and staff officer, 

Major General Edson epitomized the Old Breed 

Marines who fought through the Banana Wars, 

brought the Corps’ amphibious doctrine to life, 

and led the young Marines of the Second World 

War across the coral and sand to victory in the 

Pacific.
188 chapter number

Sgt Richard L. Yaco, Beyond the Rice Paddies, acrylic 

on board.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
189

Chapter Three

The Manpower 

Renaissance

by Paul Westermeyer

World War II and the Korean War 

established the Marine Corps as 

one of the world’s elite fighting 

forces. Dedicated to its amphibious warfare mission as well as being the nation’s “First to Fight,” 

it had unquestionably become the preferred 

“ready force” available for deployment by the 

president at a moment’s notice. Additionally, the 

National Security Act of 1947 provided the Marine Corps with a long-needed statutory protection; its existence had finally been enshrined in 

law. However, this could not protect the Corps 

from budget cuts or the possibility of operational irrelevance in the nuclear age. 

The Cold War, which began in earnest after 

1948, introduced new geopolitical realities that 

required the Marine Corps to rethink its doctrines and concepts. On the one hand, the Corps 

needed to be prepared to support the global 

needs of the Navy with ready amphibious forces, while on the other it need to find a place for 

itself within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s war plans. Doctrinally, 

this demanded the continual refinement of airground task force organization developed over 

the decades and the hurried adoption of evolv-
190 chapter three

ing technologies that would allow the Corps’ 

to maintain its expeditionary edge and naval 

mind-set. 

This steady evolution continued during 

one of the most dynamic periods of the Marine 

Corps’ history, even as it supported the Army 

in the decade-long Vietnam War, which spanned 

the spectrum from traditional counterinsurgency warfare to large-scale conventional operations. To successfully fight this increasingly 

unpopular kind of war, the Corps drew on its 

experiences from World War II and the Banana 

Wars, testimony to its flexibility and willingness 

to adapt to arising challenges. 

As its techniques and tactics evolved to ensure that the Corps would remain relevant and 

effective in the changing military-technological 

environment of the twentieth century, it was 

also perfecting its ability to make Marines. Following “a form of unfailing alchemy,” as Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak describes it 

in his polemic, First to Fight: An Inside View of the 

U.S. Marine Corps, drill instructors transform the 

young men and women of character who arrive 

at Parris Island, San Diego, or Quantico into 

Marines, “whose hands the nation’s affairs may 

safely be entrusted.”1

 Despite this fabled alchemy, making Marines has never been easy for the 

Corps. Incidents such as the notorious Ribbon 

Creek, South Carolina, tragedy in 1956 illustrate that the Service can never take the process 

of making Marines for granted. Doing so requires constant refinement and attention. With 

the end of Selective Service and rising racial tensions in the wake of the Vietnam War, the decade 

of the 1970s introduced new challenges into 

the process of making Marines. Nevertheless, 

the veterans of Korea and Vietnam faced these 

challenges with the same fortitude and flexibility they had demonstrated during these complex 

conflicts and were able to preserve the character 

of the Corps, something their predecessors had 

done unfailingly since 1775.

1

 Krulak, First to Fight, xv.
191

THE IMPACT 

OF PROJECT 100,000 

ON THE MARINE CORPS

by Captain David A. Dawson

every year thereafter, hence the name “Project 

100,000.” McNamara dubbed the previously 

ineligible men accepted under Project 100,000 

“New Standards” men. He also required the military Services to accept a minimum portion of 

their new recruits from men with low, but previously acceptable, test scores. Project 100,000 

lasted until December 1971, bringing roughly 

38,000 New Standards men into the Marine 

Corps.

A Confluence of Interests

McNamara’s proposal to use the military for 

social purposes resulted from the confluence of 

two separate approaches to military manpower. Army officers were interested in developing 

effective ways to train “marginal” men, so they 

could be used effectively if a major war required 

the full mobilization of the nation’s manpower. 

Many political leaders, noting that the armed 

forces trained and cared for millions of men, 

saw the military as an excellent tool for correcting social problems. Both of these views grew 

out of the military’s experience during World 

War II.

Impressed by the military’s ability to train 

and care for millions of men during the war, 

Introduction2

On 23 August 1966, Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara announced that, starting 1 October 

1966, the military would begin accepting men 

previously rejected for military service.3

 McNamara wanted to “salvage tens of thousands 

of these men each year, first to productive military careers and later for productive roles in 

society.” He held out the hope that these men 

would “return to civilian life with skills and aptitudes which for them and their families will 

reverse the downward spiral of human decay.”4

The armed forces would take in 40,000 of these 

disadvantaged youths the first year, and 100,000 

2

 The original content came from Capt David A. Dawson, The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1995), 

1–8, 181–95. Minor revisions were made to the text based on 

current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. 

3

 Although McNamara’s plan included both low-score men and 

men with minor physical defects, the medical remedial program 

made up a very minor part of Project 100,000 and medical remedials are therefore ignored in this paper. Medical remedials, 

all volunteers, accounted for less than 9 percent of all Project 

100,000 men. Of the medical remedials, 65 percent consisted of 

overweight men and underweight men made up another 20 percent. Generally, once these under and overweight men achieved a 

normal weight, they were indistinguishable from other recruits.

4

 Homer Bigart, “McNamara Plans to ‘Salvage’ 40,000 Rejected in 

Draft,” New York Times, 24 August 1966, 18.
192 chapter three

many political leaders began to view the armed 

forces as a potential tool for correcting social problems. The belief that military service 

fostered a variety of virtues, usually including 

strength, courage, and a sense of loyalty and 

responsibility to the appropriate political body, 

dated back to classical times. After World War 

II, President [Harry S.] Truman argued that universal military training, in addition to achieving 

the aforementioned goals, could correct the educational, intellectual, or physical deficiencies 

of disadvantaged Americans. President Truman 

was unable to implement universal training, but 

his vision of using the military to train the most 

disadvantaged members of society persisted.

Military officers opposed efforts to use the 

military for social purposes. Many officers were, 

however, interested in training men with poor 

academic skills. During World War II, manpower shortages forced the Armed Services to accept large numbers of men with low test scores. 

All of the Services provided remedial academic 

instruction to bring these men up to a minimum 

standard. After the war, the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force, realizing that future mobilizations would 

again force them to accept low score men, conducted experiments to develop better remedial 

training programs. The Army, which expected 

to experience the largest increase in the event 

of mobilization, showed the greatest interest in 

finding methods for training low score men.

Marine Corps Opposition 

to Project 100,000

The Marine Corps did not share the Army’s interest in the problem of mobilizing men with 

low test scores and opposed Project 100,000 

from the start. Initially, the Marine Corps objected to Project 100,000 on the grounds that 

Recruits engage in swimming exercises at the 

Weapons Training Battalion area at Marine Corps 

Recruit Depot Parris Island, SC. All recruits were 

afforded an opportunity to qualify as a swimmer. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, 

courtesy of Hans Knopf

2dLt Gayle W. Hanley reloads a magazine with ammunition during a lull in action while participating 

in The Basic School Exercise, 20 April 1977. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A454019, 

courtesy of SSgt Jan E. Fauteck
captain david a. dawson 193

this program forced recruiters to turn away 

better qualified volunteers. When massive racial 

and disciplinary problems swept through the 

Marine Corps at the end of the Vietnam War, 

senior officers, including former Commandant 

General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., blamed them 

on Project 100,000.5

General Chapman’s opinion is still widely 

shared throughout the Marine Corps. When the 

subject of Project 100,000 comes up, serving 

Marines familiar with “McNamara’s Morons” almost invariably condemn the Marines enlisted 

5

 Gen Chapman was the 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps 

from 1 July 1968 to 31 December 1971. Gen Leonard H. Chapman intvw with Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC) historians, 28 March 1979, 87; see also MajGen Lowell E. English 

intvw with Benis M. Frank, 13 June 1974, 74; MajGen Rathvon 

M. Tompkins intvw with Benis M. Frank, 13 April 1973, 93–94; 

and LtGen John E. McLaughlin intvw with Benis M. Frank, 19 

October 1978, 149; all in MCHC Oral History collection.

under Project 100,000 as nothing but untrainable troublemakers.6

Marines condemning Project 100,000 

thought that men with low test scores created 

the most disciplinary problems. Since Project 

100,000 was forced on an unwilling Marine 

Corps by unpopular civilian Defense Department officials, this program provided a convenient way for Marines to blame the Corps’ 

troubles on an outside influence beyond their 

control. Because the disciplinary problems experienced by the Marine Corps appeared shortly 

after the start of Project 100,000, many Marines 

simply assumed a cause-and-effect relationship. 

Their assumption was wrong.

The lowering of standards also raises ques6 McNamara’s Morons was a term that many officers and sergeants 

used to refer to low-IQ men who were taken into the military 

under the new program.

Sgt Eulas Talley Jr. observes recruits firing pistols in the mid-1970s. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
194 chapter three

tions about the combat performance of New 

Standards men. Although many professional soldiers fail to grasp this point, tactics are partly 

determined by the capabilities of the troops in 

a unit. If soldiers cannot master certain skills, 

leaders have to simplify their tactics. On the surface, then, it would seem that New Standards 

men might have hampered Marine units fighting 

in Vietnam by forcing leaders to modify their 

tactics. They did not.

The Impact of Project 100,000

Critics of Project 100,000 ignore the Marine 

Corps’ previous experience with low score men. 

During World War II and Korea, the Marine 

Corps accepted far more low score men than it 

did during Project 100,000. Many of these men 

had lower scores than the New Standards Marines. Yet there are no reports of rampant disciplinary problems in 1945 or 1953. Nor did the 

presence of low score men keep Marine units 

from earning a reputation as one of the world’s 

finest fighting forces in both wars.

The Marine Corps’ experience with New 

Standards Marines matched its experience with 

low score men in earlier wars. New Standards 

Marines were somewhat more likely to be punished for minor infractions, but only slightly 

so. There were not enough of them to account 

for more than a fraction of the discipline problems experienced by the Marine Corps at the 

end of the Vietnam War. In fact, the low point 

for Marine Corps discipline seems to have occurred sometime around 1974 or 1975, well 

after the last Project 100,000 Marine had been 

discharged or reenlisted.

In combat, their record is less clear. Some 

performed poorly, some performed well. In a 

few instances, the failures of New Standards 

men probably cost their lives and the lives of 

other Marines. But New Standards Marines did 

not force leaders to alter their tactics, nor do 

they seem to have lowered the overall fighting 

power of Marine units. 

New Standards Marines did place an additional burden on the Marine Corps’ training 

system. By 1965, the need to send a constant 

stream of replacements to Vietnam forced the 

Marine Corps to drastically reduce the length of 

training given to recruits. New Standards Marines were much more likely to need additional 

training to complete, or to fail, their basic training. Additional training required additional time, 

effort, and money. Failure wasted the Marine 

Corps’ investment to that point. Both placed 

another strain on a system already stretched to 

the limit.

The Marine Corps, however, had no viable 

alternative. Marines condemning McNamara’s 

Morons assume that the Marine Corps passed 

up better-qualified men to take New Standards 

Men. But even with Project 100,000, by the 

beginning of 1967, the Marine Corps had great 

difficulty finding qualified volunteers. By late 

1967, the Marines were consistently exceeding 

its quotas for low score men. By late 1968, the 

Marine Corps needed draftees to fill its ranks. 

Barring a major change in draft deferment policy, the Marine Corps almost certainly would 

have lowered standards anyway and probably 

would have accepted about the same proportion 

of men in Mental Group IV that it took under 

Project 100,000.7

 If anything, Project 100,000 

may have helped the Marine Corps by preventing the Air Force and Navy from taking only the 

highest scoring volunteers.

In the end, Project 100,000 had almost no 

7

 Recruits in Mental Group IV scored between the 10th and 30th 

percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test and were required to complete additional aptitude tests. 
captain david a. dawson 195

impact on the Marine Corps. Project 100,000 

did not significantly contribute to the Marine 

Corps’ disciplinary problems or hamper combat operations in Vietnam. New Standards men 

placed a burden on the training system, but this 

was a burden that the Marine Corps would have 

had to bear anyway. Given the Marine Corps’ 

inability to attract better qualified recruits, not 

long after McNamara’s announcement, the Marine Corps would probably have followed the 

precedent of World War II and Korea, lowering 

standards to fill its ranks.

During Project 100,000 the armed forces, 

including the Marine Corps, followed the practice of previous wars. As in World War II and 

Korea, the increased need for recruits led to a 

lowering of standards. Vietnam differed from 

earlier wars in that the shortage was artificially created by a generous draft deferment policy. But if standards had been quietly lowered 

to meet end strength without Secretary McNamara’s “Great Society” rhetoric, in all likelihood no one would have noticed it at the time 

or remember it today.8

The Impact 

of Project 100,000

In a very real sense, Project 100,000 had little 

impact on the Marine Corps. The New Standards men created problems, but compared to 

the other problems faced by the Marine Corps, 

the burden created by New Standards men was 

slight. And this was a burden the Marine Corps 

would almost certainly have borne without 

Project 100,000. During this program, the percentage of low-score Marines increased dramatically, but it would have increased to about the 

same degree anyway due to the demands of the 

Vietnam War. 

Project 100,000 had an equally limited impact on the New Standards Marines. Of course, 

military service undoubtedly had a profound effect on all of the New Standards Marines. Even 

two years of peacetime service has a profound 

impact on a person, immersing that person into 

a world that is more controlled, disciplined, and 

organized than anything found in civilian life. 

Many of the New Standards Marines served in 

combat, one of the most powerful human experiences. But the vast majority of the New Standards Marines were volunteers; if we accept that 

the Marine Corps would have lowered its standards without Project 100,000, it is reasonable 

to assume that most of these men would have 

volunteered to serve without Project 100,000. 

8

 The concept for the “Great Society” came from Lyndon B. Johnson, “The Great Society” (speech, Ann Arbor, MI, 22 May 1964).

Students of the 15th Officer Candidate Course, 

Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, VA, engage in 

mass calisthenics with rifles, 21 March 1956. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A40273
196 chapter three

And Project 100,000 had almost no impact on 

the conditions of their service.

The Impact of Military Service 

on the New Standards Marines

Few New Standards Marines received any kind 

of training that might be considered vocational. 

McNamara admitted this after the fact, but still 

maintained that the military taught “discipline, 

self-reliance, and promptness . . . exactly the 

skills employers need.”9

A study published in 1987, conducted by 

persons involved with Project 100,000, backed 

McNamara’s assertion, finding that military service benefited the New Standards men. The authors of this study found that by 1974 two-thirds 

of the former New Standards men had used their 

GI Bill educational benefits, and that they were 

more likely to try to complete their high school 

education than similar nonveterans. Compared 

to their peers who did not serve, New Standards 

men had a lower rate of unemployment, better 

jobs, and earned more.10

The most recent study, published in 1989, 

reached the opposite conclusion. The authors of 

this study found that New Standards men were 

more likely to be unemployed, generally earned 

less if employed, had less education, were less 

likely to have received vocational training, and 

were more likely to be divorced than similar 

men who did not serve.11

Both of these studies had great difficulty 

tracking down New Standards veterans, and 

9

 Robert S. McNamara intvw with Capt David A. Dawson, 4 June 

1991, hereafter McNamara intvw.

10 Thomas G. Sticht et al., Cast-off Youth: Policy Training Methods from 

the Military Experience (New York: Praeger, 1987), 62–64. 11 Janice H. Laurence, Peter F. Ramsberger, and Monica A. 

Gribben, Effects of Military Experience on the Post Service Lives of 

Low-Aptitude Recruits: Project 100,000 and the ASVAB Misnorming, 

Final Report 89-29 (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research 

Organization, 1989), 161–63.

even more difficulty finding a suitable group 

of nonveterans for comparison, making their 

conclusions doubtful. Secretary McNamara was 

probably correct when he observed that, since 

the careful follow-up of these men he envisaged 

was never carried out, we will probably never 

know the real truth.12

It is still possible, however, to reflect on the 

probable benefits of military service. To do this, 

it might be instructive to consider the progress 

of a New Standards Marine. Of course, the experience of each one of the 38,000 New Standards Marines was unique, but these Marines 

also shared many experiences. A useful device 

for examining the experience of these Marines, 

therefore, might be to follow the career of a hypothetical “typical” Marine, which included the 

most common elements.

More than 90 percent of all of the New 

Standards Marines were volunteers, not draftees, and so let us make this hypothetical Marine 

a volunteer. Nearly half of all New Standards 

men were Southerners. Almost 60 percent of 

New Standards Marines were white, and 40 

percent were black. The average age upon enlisting of black New Standards Marines was 19.3 

years, of white New Standards Marines 18.1. 

This made him the same age as other Marine recruits and, like other Marine recruits, more than 

a year younger than recruits in other Services.

Only one-third of the New Standards Marines had finished high school, the lowest percentage of any Service. Sixty percent of other 

Marine recruits had completed high school, 

also the lowest percentage of any Service. Only 

a quarter of the white New Standards Marines 

had finished high school, compared to half the 

black New Standards Marines. The white New 

Standards Marines had completed an average 

12 McNamara intvw.
captain david a. dawson 197

of 10 years of school, the blacks 11.1 years of 

school. Both blacks and whites, however, read 

below the sixth-grade level, and could compute 

at just above the sixth-grade level. Other Marine 

recruits had completed 11.4 years of school and 

could perform at roughly the 10th grade level.13

Our imaginary “typical” Marine then was a 

white, Southern, 18 year old, who completed 

the 10th grade but could only perform at a 6th13 Data from this section is taken from, “Project One Hundred 

Thousand: Characteristics and Performance of ‘New Standards’ 

Men: Final Report” (unpublished paper, Assistant Secretary of 

Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 1971), tables B-1–B-10.

grade level. He was the same age as his peers, 

but had less schooling and considerably poorer 

academic skills.

He was a volunteer, and probably would 

have volunteered without any draft pressure. 
198 chapter three

He almost certainly had never heard of Project 

100,000, and probably did not expect to learn 

any skills that would carry over into civilian life.

The Marine Corps considered New Standards Marines poor candidates for rank and 

responsibility. After 1 October 1967, all New 

Standards Marines were limited to two-year enlistments, so our imaginary Marine also entered 

on a two-year enlistment.

Like all Marines, he went to boot camp. 

There was no special literacy training, or any 

other special training, for New Standards men 

in the Marine Corps. Like all recruits, he was 

told exactly what to do every minute of the day. 

Only one-third of the New Standards Marines 

needed remedial training in boot camp, so our 

imaginary Marine probably graduated with his 

platoon. His fellow recruits, however, probably 

helped him keep up. Before 1970, his drill instructors were under considerable pressure to 

graduate 90 percent of their recruits. His drill 

instructors were very good at making sure his 

entire platoon suffered if individuals lagged.

After boot camp, our new Marine went to 

a brief school to learn a military specialty. He 

probably became an infantryman; almost half 

of all Marine New Standards men did. Even 

if his test scores had not precluded his assignment to the more advanced technical courses, 

his two-year enlistment barred him from all but 

the shortest courses. Even those New Standards 

Marines assigned to technical sounding fields, 

such as combat engineers or supply, almost invariably were assigned to jobs that required far 

more brawn than brains. In fact, the job most 

frequently held by New Standards men in the 

supply field was and is referred to as box kicker by other Marines; today’s Marine Corps does 

not bother with any formal schooling for this assignment. But three-quarters of New Standards 

Marines went into combat arms assignments, 

and half went into the infantry, so let us make 

this Marine an infantryman.

After he completed a few weeks of infantry 

training, this young Marine was granted around 

10 days leave. His recruiter, following a common practice, dropped in on him, in part, to 

ensure that he understood his orders. When it 

came time to leave for his next assignment, his 

recruiter took him to the station, just as he had 

when sending our Marine to boot camp. The recruiter was not worried that the Marine might 

try to desert; rather, he was worried that this 

new Marine might have some difficulty dealing 

with ticket windows, or getting on the right bus, 

or any task that involved reading or writing.14

Almost all Marines who joined the Marine 

Corps before the end of 1969 went to Vietnam 

for their first assignment. Almost none of those 

who enlisted after 1969 went to Vietnam. Since 

three-quarters of the New Standards Marines 

joined before 1970, our “typical” Marine should 

be a combat veteran. After a three-week train14 Conversations with former recruiters indicate that this was a 

common practice.

A platoon of recruits stands at attention during 

Women Marines training at Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot Parris Island, SC, 24 April 1974. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 0160843674
captain david a. dawson 199

ing period at the aptly named Staging Battalion 

at Camp Pendleton, California, and probably 

no more than five months from the day he first 

stood in the yellow footprints at boot camp, our 

Marine boarded an airplane and went to war.

In Vietnam, he did the things the Marine 

Corps expected of him. Although formal discipline was far more relaxed than any thing he had 

experienced so far, there was still a clear chain 

of command telling him what to do and when 

to do it.

After 13 months in Vietnam, he returned 

to the states. At this point, he had less than six 

months left to serve. He might have tried to reenlist, but his low scores on the entry tests probably made him ineligible. Like most Marines on 

two-year enlistments, the Marine Corps probably offered him an early release, and he probably 

took it. If he had stayed in the extra six months, 

he would have been eligible for a program called 

“Project Transition,” [which] arranged training 

in civilian occupations for servicemen nearing 

their discharge date. But like almost every New 

Standards Marine, he did not avail himself of this 

opportunity.

So he became a civilian again. He had been 

a Marine for less than 20 months. His military 

experience consisted of boot camp, a few weeks 

additional training in a purely military skill, and 

then a year in Vietnam. Throughout the entire 

time, someone was responsible for him, and 

someone constantly checked on him to make 

sure he did everything he was supposed to, including bathing, eating, and getting up in the 

morning.

Before passing judgment, consider this story from the perspective of Headquarters Marine 

Corps. There was a war on. The Marine Corps 

recruited our young man, trained him in a skill 

the Marine Corps needed, and sent him to play 

his part in a job the Marine Corps was assigned 

to do. When he returned, the Marine Corps 

needed to make room for another man to do 

the same job, so it offered him a chance to leave 

early. He eagerly accepted this offer. Throughout 

his time on active duty, the Marine Corps made 

sure that he was housed, clothed, fed, paid, and 

generally cared for. This was the story not only 

of the New Standards Marine, but of most Marines who served during the Vietnam War.

The Impact of New Standards Men 

on the Marine Corps

New Standards Marines did not hamper combat operations in Vietnam. Nor did they significantly add to the massive disciplinary problems 

experienced by the Marine Corps at the end of 

the war. New Standards Marines did strain the 

Marine Corps training system. By late 1965, 

the demand of the Vietnam War had already 

stretched the training establishment to its limits. 

Men with low test scores, by needing additional 

instruction, recycling, or failing, stretched the 

training establishment further.

This strain, however, cannot be blamed on 

Project 100,000. Despite the Commandant’s 

repeated complaints about the Marine Corps’ 

Mental Group IV quotas, the Marine Corps 

needed these men. By late 1967, the Marine 

Corps could not attract enough high score volunteers to fill its ranks. It would almost certainly 

have lowered standards even if McNamara had 

not instituted Project 100,000.

New Standards Men in Combat

New Standards Marines did not hurt the war 

effort in Vietnam. A small minority of Marines 

recalled serious problems with slow learners in 

combat. A larger number recalled that some of 

their best Marines had low test scores. Others 
200 chapter three

noted that Marines who could not master more 

complex tasks could perform mundane but necessary tasks, such as “ammo humper.”15

There is no way to determine if New Standards men caused additional casualties. The foolish mistakes of some Marines unnecessarily cost 

lives, but foolish behavior has never been confined to the poorly educated or those with low 

test scores. Nor was it usually possible, given the 

chaotic, confusing nature of combat, to differentiate between mistakes and bad luck. And often the distinction between foolish behavior and 

heroism was equally blurry. In any case, New 

Standards Marines could not have been exceptionally foolish, since they were no more likely 

to be killed than other Marines.

Attempts to decide if a New Standards Marine caused an “unnecessary” death are inherently futile. Every death is a tragedy, but death is a 

part of war. The best that can be said is that the 

presence of New Standards men did not significantly increase the overall casualty count.

The Impact of Project 100,000 

on Discipline

Persons regarding New Standards men as inherently unfit for service ignored the fact that 

hundreds of thousands of men with test scores 

below those of most New Standards men served 

during World War II and tens of thousands with 

scores as low served during Korea. During these 

wars, men with low test scores or poor educations were somewhat more likely to be formally disciplined or rated as poor performers, but 

their presence did not create a disciplinary crisis, nor did they receive large numbers of unfavorable discharges.

The service of the New Standards Marines 

15 Ammo humper is military slang for a Marine who carries ammunition.

followed the same pattern. They were more 

likely to be formally punished, receive poor performance ratings, and receive less than honorable discharges, but only to a small degree. New 

Standards men accounted for only a tiny part of 

a huge disciplinary problem.

The Added Cost of Low-Score Men

Despite McNamara’s claim that New Standards 

men could be trained at no additional cost, these 

Marines did cost more. In June 1969, Irving M. 

Greenberg, the director of Project 100,000, 

estimated that New Standards men cost the 

military about $200 more than other men. The 

added costs came from remedial training, higher 

attrition, hospitalization for physical marginals, 

and requirements for data collection.16 The additional $200 might not seem a large sum, but in 

June 1969, the typical first-term Marine, a lance 

corporal (paygrade E-3) with less than two years 

of service, was paid $137.70 a month.17

16 I. M. Greenberg, “Project 100,000: The Training of Former Rejectees,” Phi Delta Kappan 50, no. 10 (June 1969): 574. 17 A History of Armed Services Pay Scales (Camp Lejeune, NC: Disbursing Instructional Section, Marine Corps Support School, 1981), 8.

Thomas O’Hara, Bivouac, Elliots Beach, Parris Island, 

acrylic on board.

Art Collection, U.S. Navy
captain david a. dawson 201

Desperately short of Marines due to budgetdriven limits on end strength and forced to drastically shorten its basic training program, during 

the Vietnam War the Marine Corps could not afford even a slight drain of its resources.

During the first few months of [the project], Project 100,000 created a drain, as recruiters turned away men with higher scores to meet 

their Mental Group IV quotas.

By late 1967, however, Project 100,000 

could no longer be counted as a burden. New 

Standards men still cost more to train, but the 

Marine Corps could no longer truthfully blame 

their presence on the Defense Department 

quotas. Unable to attract recruits with higher 

scores, the Marine Corps needed these men 

to fill the ranks. Recruiters, desperate for volunteers, consistently exceeded their Project 

100,000 quotas. By late 1968, the Marine Corps 

could not find enough volunteers, even by exceeding their Project 100,000 quotas, forcing 

the Marine Corps to resort to the draft for recruits. When Congress finally abolished Mental 

Group IV quotas, the Marine Corps continued 

to sacrifice recruit quality to meet end strength. 

The New Standards Marines’ added cost would 

have been incurred if there had been no Project 

100,000.

Criticism: 

Based on a False Assumption

At the heart of the criticism of Project 100,000 

was the belief that an absolute standard for military service existed, and that no one falling 

below that standard should have been allowed 

to serve. Many Marines agreed with the assessment of Louise B. Ransom, a counselor for imprisoned veterans: “these guys should never have 

been in the military.”18

This belief was false. Standards for military entry were not absolute. For all military 

specialty courses, a certain portion of the persons achieving a given score would fail. Higher 

entry standards resulted in a smaller portion 

of those accepted for training failing to complete any given course of instruction; lower 

standards resulted in a larger portion failing. To 

minimize the number of failures, the military 

tried to set minimum scores at the highest level 

that would still allow enough people to pass to 

fill the ranks.

If the number of persons needed increased 

or the pool of applicants decreased, the only 

way to get more graduates was to lower the cutoff score. This would produce more graduates, 

since many of the individuals previously rejected were always capable of passing the course. 

18 Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted 

Generation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 643.

The 300-yard line on “B” Range at Camp Matthews 

with Platoons 13 and 156, 14 February 1952. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A219081
202 chapter three

At the same time, the proportion of persons 

beginning training who failed to complete the 

course would increase. Thus, military recruiting 

obeyed the economic law of supply and demand, 

with test scores substituting for cost. As demand 

(willing applicants) decreased in proportion to 

recruits needed, recruiters were forced to lower 

the price (test scores). Marine Corps manpower experts understood this principle well before 

Project 100,000 began.19

The Marine Corps’ experience in Vietnam 

followed this economic law. Unable to attract 

enough volunteers, the Marine Corps was forced 

to lower standards. The low score men brought in 

did not perform as well. A higher proportion of 

New Standards men required additional training or failed basic training. In general, the New 

Standards Marines who passed basic training did 

not perform as well as other Marines.

Most New Standards Marines, however, 

graduated from boot camp and rendered useful service. As a group, they may not have been 

19 Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, LtGen Samuel Jaskilka to 

Deputy Manpower Coordinator for Research and Information 

Systems, 9 May 1967, file 1510 HQMC Central Files 1967. See 

also the G-1 comments at the General Officer’s Symposium, 1964, 

discussing the Marine Corps’ ability to lower the proportion of 

Mental Group IV recruits due to the favorable recruiting climate.

as good, but the Marine Corps needed them to 

perform its mission.

The Legacy of Project 100,000

Critics of Project 100,000 forget that the Marine Corps of the Vietnam era contained the 

best-educated Marines, with the highest average 

test scores, that ever fought a major war. Project 100,000 did not hurt the Marine Corps. In 

the absence of McNamara’s program, the Marine Corps would almost certainly have lowered 

standards to roughly the same level to fill its 

ranks. Nor did the presence of low score men 

create or significantly exacerbate disciplinary 

problems.

Project 100,000 had its greatest impact on 

the Marine Corps after it ended. It taught the 

Marine Corps a false lesson. By coinciding with 

one of the Marine Corps’ darkest hours, Project 

100,000 convinced a generation of career Marines that men with low test scores should not 

be enlisted under any circumstances.
203

PATHBREAKERS

Dealing with Race–The 1970s

by Fred H. Allison and Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, USMCR

Corps. The wave of black officers that entered 

the Marines as a result of the big push during 

the decade served across the Marine Corps landscape in different specialties, rising through the 

ranks into positions of increasing importance. 

As young officers in the 1970s, they faced 

different challenges. There were many black enlisted men, and as noted, racial tension at the 

time was prevalent. As African Americans, they 

naturally could identify and sympathize, but the 

challenge was determining how far they could 

carry the empathy while also trying to remain 

unbiased and maintain good order and discipline. They also faced issues off base as well.

Frank E. Petersen Jr.

We weren’t dealing with an organized prejudicial system within the Corps. We were dealing 

with individuals in command and authoritarian 

positions who were prejudiced. Only 30 years 

before, blacks were just entering the Corps. 

. . . We were looking at officers trained some 

20 years before, and others with significant rank 

trained no less than 10 years before. There were 

no officers who could exude even a modicum 

of understanding when managing black troopers. Beyond that, even when some black officers 

The Vietnam War had a range of effects on race relations in the Marine 

Corps.20 On one hand, African American Marines served with great distinction, valor, 

and heroism in combat, and more black officers 

served in leadership positions than before. On 

the other, racial tensions escalated to unprecedented levels. Black troops defied authority 

figures they believed were racist and struggled 

to project their racial identity through afro 

hairstyles and special greetings like the “dap.”21

Racial tension that originated during the 1960s 

continued and, in some ways, intensified during 

the early 1970s. 

The Marine Corps in the 1970s undertook 

measures that significantly increased the number of African American officers in its ranks. 

Because there was a larger group of them than 

there had been of their predecessors, these officers, on a broader level, cleared the way to make 

the presence of black officers a norm in the 

20 The original content came from Fred H. Allison and Col Kurtis 

P. Wheeler, Pathbreakers: U.S. Marine African American Officers in Their 

Own Words (Washington, DC: History Division, 2013), 115–43. 

Minor revisions were made to the text based on current standards 

for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

21 The term dap refers to a physical form of greeting, which can 

include a whole series of hand motions besides just the fist bump.
204 chapter three

came on board, some of [them] refused to become involved. It was a put-down to speak out, 

they thought. Some acquiesced, caught between 

pride and the demands of some commanders 

that problems with blacks be solved in the old, 

traditional ways.

These officers, both white and black, represented the focal points, I felt, at which to begin corrective action. Not many jumped on my 

bandwagon, some preferring to pinpoint the 

“problem” as a reflection of what was going on 

in civilian arenas, where black social consciousness and civil rights activity were on the rise. 

. . . I prefer[red] saying, unlike the civilian community, that we have a strong but small, highly 

disciplined microcosm of the civilian community, and because of that, we can solve the problems if they are present. It’s a little tricky when 

you get into this stuff to say that we have the 

same problems or that our problems are a “reflection” of the civilian community, because they 

are really two different communities.

We’d blown it badly when it came to our 

decrees about the approved length of a trooper’s 

haircut—failing to account for what Caucasian 

hair versus black hair looked like at two or three 

inches in length. . . . We went a little ballistic in 

the way we regarded the “dap”—the special way 

that black troopers greeted one another during 

Vietnam—probably one of the biggest mistakes 

we ever made. We couldn’t understand, or 

did not know, when we demanded the closely 

shaved head that some black men suffered from 

a condition in which, if they shaved too closely, 

the hairs curled on themselves, grew back into 

the skin, and caused painful pimples, pustules, 

cysts, scars, keloids, and infection if not addressed properly. . . . In lieu of medical attention 

and researched methodology for a solution, we 

simply discharged black Marines with this condition, saying they were unfit to serve—not the 

greatest of morale boosters.

To some, these were small things indeed. 

However, add to them all those other things 

involving prejudicial attitudes, misinformation, 

or just plain ignorance on the part of many in 

authority, and little human engineering time 

bombs were set to go off all around the Corps.

The point was to disarm them by conducting as many open discussions about cultural 

differences as we could. To try to make whites 

understand that there were blacks who hated 

whites; it wasn’t just whites who hated blacks. 

It was to make them understand that the officers who were leading at the unit levels were 

not equipped to understand the culture and mores of blacks and the Hispanics and their cultural 

differences. To help them understand the fact 

that country and western music at the enlisted 

club may not be the choice of some of the minority troops, that the regulation that decreed 

length of hair needed to be amended to allow 

2dLt Frank E. Petersen Jr. flew with Marine 

Fighter Squadron 212 in Korea in 1953, one of only 

two African American Marine officers to serve in 

combat during that conflict. This photograph was 

taken in November 1963 just after his promotion 

to major. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A42086
allison and wheeler 205

for cultural input, that the inability to swim like 

a fish hinged on the absence of facility, not because minorities simply couldn’t swim.22

[Petersen later turned to discuss the impact 

of racial issues on recruitment, training, and retention.]

A major cause of the Marine Corps’ problems was the need to satisfy manpower requirements during the Vietnam conflict, which 

brought into the Corps floods of black youth 

who had been exposed to the rising hue and 

cry of militancy and nationalism in the ghettos. 

. . . Our self-congratulation on our handling of 

racial problems within the Corps had begun to 

wane. A major riot had erupted at Camp Lejeune in July 1969. Marine enlisted men fought 

one another in San Diego, Hawaii, and Camp 

Pendleton, not to mention tension between the 

forces still remaining in Vietnam.

By now, the Marine Corps had firmly implanted a human relations program, which went 

a long way toward convincing officers and NCOs 

[noncommissioned officers] that they would 

have to take positive action to stop interracial 

tension and allay the fears of black Marines that 

they would be victimized by “The Man.” White 

Marines had to be convinced that not all black 

Marines were potential thieves and muggers and 

that violence among Marines would not be tolerated. . . .

There needed to be, in my view, selection of 

blacks for more accelerated promotions. A policy was needed that required the Corps to look 

at the career patterns of selected black officers 

to ensure that they were on track and getting the 

right assignments. Something needed to be done 

regarding interpretation of fitness reports, not 

22 Frank E. Petersen Jr. with J. Alfred Phelps, Into the Tiger’s Jaw: 

America’s First Black Marine Aviator (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 

1998), 197–99.

only for minorities, but for all officers. At that 

time, it was still a problem.

Another look at The Basic School needed to 

be taken. Why, for example, were so many black 

officers coming out of Basic School with supply, transport, and service military occupational 

specialty (MOS) designations? I still remember 

an old survey we ran in which we wanted to discover how many blacks were in command billets. The answer was that, of the 300 or so black 

officers, only 7 were in command billets. That 

was a pretty grim statistic. The black Marines 

knew the score, and they were becoming more 

and more verbal about it. . . .

I didn’t want to become a general officer 

because I thought I was going to solve the problems all alone. I knew I couldn’t do that. But 

perhaps I could make a positive impact on the 

problem. So the decision was to stick around 

and make a try for general officer rank if only 

because there was a grave need for a show of 

faith on the part of the Marine Corps.23

Brigadier General George H. Walls Jr.

Hutson: Can you discuss your experiences as 

Marine detachment commander in 1970–71 on 

the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA 42)?24

Walls: That was quite an interesting experience 

for me because it was the first time I had served 

with the Navy. I remember reporting to the ship 

and walking up to the quarterdeck. The officer 

of the day is there, and there is another officer 

kind of in my peripheral view who looks like he 

slept in his uniform and had maybe five or six 

days’ worth of beard. It was the captain of Marines I was relieving. . . .

The Marines aboard that ship had the worst 

23 Petersen and Phelps, Into the Tiger’s Jaw, 227–28. 24 This oral history interview was completed by CWO-3 William 

E. Hutson on 17 February 2012.
206 chapter three

reputation for discipline and personal appearance, and it was a bad situation I went to, but it 

was a good situation for me because there was 

nowhere to go but up. I met the captain of the 

ship. . . . We sat and talked, and he was very candid about what had happened with the Marine 

detachment and what he expected me to do 

with the Marine detachment. That was my welcome to the Roosevelt. . . .

Hutson: Were any of the problems with the 

detachment racially oriented, or was it just bad 

Marines?

Walls: It was a combination. There were some 

young Marines there who would go on liberty 

and get drunk out of their minds. . . . The other 

situation that we had on that ship, and I’m sure 

it was true on other Navy ships, went on after 

the “Z-grams” [or directives] came out. Admiral 

[Elmo R.] Zumwalt [Jr.] liberalized dress codes. 

Sailors could grow beards, they could do all sorts 

of things that they weren’t allowed to do before. 

And there were a significant number of black 

sailors on the ship. I probably had half a dozen 

black Marines or more in the detachment. And 

again, the civil rights thing was still going on. 

There was a group of black sailors led by a petty 

officer first class whose name I don’t remember. They were constantly demanding to change 

things, to do things, to the point that a couple 

of times it got where the captain was concerned 

about unrest on the ship. I’m talking about physical kinds of things happening where he called 

out the Marine detachment to be on standby in 

case these kinds of things happened. Fortunately, 

it never got to the point where it boiled over to 

where the Marines had to engage with the sailors. But it came close on a couple of times. And 

really, the only way that it got quelled was that 

the chaplain on the ship was black. His name was 

Carroll [R.] Chambliss. He retired as a captain. 

His son, Chris Chambliss, played baseball for the 

New York Yankees and some other teams. But 

between Carroll Chambliss and I, we were able 

BGen George H. Walls Jr. served for more than 28 

years, retiring in 1993. 

Courtesy of BGen George H. Walls Jr.

BGen Walls in Cuba with Haitian refugees while 

he commanded the joint task force for Operation 

Guantánamo in 1991–92.

Courtesy of BGen George H. Walls Jr.
allison and wheeler 207

to, in most cases, calm these young sailors down 

to the point where it didn’t become a confrontation other than a lot of talk.

So there were those kinds of situations, and 

then there were just young people going ashore 

doing stupid stuff that got them in trouble. But 

after we kind of weeded out the problem children in the detachment, at least from my standpoint, things got [better].

Major General Charles F. Bolden Jr.

Allison: In 1970, you received your wings as 

a naval aviator and were assigned to Marine 

Attack Squadron 121 [VMA-121]. What were 

your experiences as a new aviator joining a gun 

squadron? There could not have been many other black aviators in the squadron.25

Bolden: When I got to VMA-121, I was fortunate because I was not the first black. [Richard] 

Dick Harris was a former enlisted BN [bombardier-navigator]. Dick had flown [Douglas] 

C-117s [Skytrains] as an air crewman. He and 

another aviator, Brewster, were running buddies. 

Brewster was about as close to being a redneck 

you could be, but they loved each other. They 

were like brothers. I think Brewster was from 

Tennessee or somewhere. He and Dick Harris 

had enlisted in the Marine Corps at the same 

time, they’d come through the ranks together, 

had both gone through ECP [Enlisted Commissioning Program] or something and had gone to 

flight school. They had been in [Douglas] EF-10s 

[Skyknights], then gone into flying [McDonnellDouglas] RF-4s [Phantoms], and then they 

had transitioned to [Grumman] A-6s [Intruders]. So Harris was in 121 when I checked in.

Allison: What did that mean to you to have a 

fellow black officer as an aviator?

25 This oral history interview was completed by Dr. Fred Allison 

on 7 May 2008 and 27 February 2012.

Bolden: It was phenomenal because we actually lived near each other at Cherry Point [North 

Carolina]. We all lived in what was called MOQ 

[married officer’s quarters], and we did a lot of 

stuff together. I want to say there were three or 

four black aviators on the base—total—a couple of [Lockheed] C-130 [Hercules] guys, Dick, 

me, and a [Douglas] A-4 [Skyhawk] guy named 

[Clarence L.] Clancy Davis. Before he retired, 

he was the second black commander of a squadron in the Marine Corps. Clancy took VMA214; incidentally, the call sign of that squadron 

was the Black Sheep. Clancy was interesting. For 

his change of command, when he came out, they 

played the theme song from the movie Shaft as 

an introduction before he came out. That’s the 

Following his final shuttle flight in 1994, Charles 

F. Bolden left NASA and returned to active duty 

as the Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen at the 

U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. In July 1998, he 

was promoted to his final rank of major general.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Marine Corps History 

Division
208 chapter three

kind of guy Clancy was. Clancy was very controversial.

But Dick Harris and all those guys, they 

were tough in that day. Dick had been through 

a lot, so he didn’t take a lot of crap. He wore 

his feelings on his shoulder, and you better have 

your act together if you said something to him. 

Segregation wasn’t very long ended down there 

in Cherry Point, and it didn’t make any difference to him. He’d just as soon fight as anything. 

So he was sort of a revolutionary black officer; 

but that’s who I came in the squadron behind, so 

I didn’t have to do anything.

Because Dick was a senior BN, we flew together quite a bit because I’m the new guy. He 

got the new guy. I got a chance just to see how 

he handled himself and stuff like that. We did a 

lot of cross countries together, which brought a 

lot of stares when we rolled into an air base, particularly because most places we flew into were 

below the Mason-Dixon Line. I can remember 

how it worked: you’d land at an air base, and 

a guy would come over from the transient line 

and look at me and then go around to the other 

side to see who was in charge of the airplane. 

He looked at Dick, who was darker than I was, 

and the guy would be just baffled: “This airplane 

must be stolen because there is no way in the 

world that that there are going to be two black 

guys in this Marine Corps airplane!” We enjoyed it whenever we went on cross countries. 

So I didn’t have any trouble when I got into the 

squadron.

Allison: Then you were assigned to VMA-533 

MajGen Bolden’s 34-year career with the Marine Corps included 14 years as a member of NASA’s Astronaut Office. He traveled in orbit four times around the space shuttle between 1986 and 1994, commanding 

two of the missions and piloting two others. His flights included deployment of the Hubble Space Telescope 

and the first joint U.S.-Russian shuttle mission, which featured a cosmonaut as a member of his crew. 

Official NASA photo, Marine Corps History Division
allison and wheeler 209

[Marine Attack Squadron 533] and went to the 

western Pacific. This was in 1972; these were 

dark times for the Marine Corps. What was the 

situation in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at that 

time?

Bolden: That was a real bottoming out time, 

whether it was drugs, race riots, and stuff. It 

was probably the worst time in the history of 

the Marine Corps. But General Petersen, I think 

he was a lieutenant colonel at that time, he was 

the first African American to command a fighter 

squadron. He came to Iwakuni [Japan] and down 

to where we were flying from, Nam Phong, 

Thailand, with several of what they call human 

relations teams. So I had a chance to meet him, 

and talk to him, and get to know him a little bit. 

From then on, I stayed in touch with him, and he 

sort of became a mentor and a role model.

Major General Clifford L. Stanley

Andrasi: Tell us about your experiences once 

you got out of Officer Candidates School in 

1969. Then it was to The Basic School [TBS]. 

What did you experience there?26

Stanley: When I got to TBS, we actually started at Camp Upshur, which is pretty spartan. We 

were all tight. I mean, my classmates, when we 

would go home from OCS [Officer Candidates 

School], even Camp Upshur [Quantico] initially, I had white classmates going home with me. 

I still get letters from some of them. So these 

weren’t issues for me, personally, right then. But 

then folks started making it an issue, particularly 

in The Basic School. I remember the first time 

it came up. The photographer came to take a 

picture of, you guessed it, how many black students are there. I didn’t ask the photographer 

to come. I’m sitting in class like everybody else, 

26 This oral history interview was completed by LtCol Mark D. 

Andrasi on 28 February 2012.

trying to stay awake, and the guy zooms in on 

me, and he zooms in on somebody else. There 

were folks upset about that; they were mad. 

But they weren’t mad at the photographer, they 

were mad at me. Not that I was new to race issues, but it was just that I’m experiencing, now, 

classmates mad at me for having my picture 

taken and an article was done on folks. I said, 

“This is messed up,” because I didn’t ask for this. 

I’m sitting here, minding my business, doing the 

same thing they’re doing, and that kind of stuff 

happens.

Before I joined the Marine Corps, though 

. . . [I was] the only one in my class [at South 

Carolina State] that joined the Corps. Then afMajGen Clifford L. Stanley served in numerous 

command and staff positions during his 33-year 

career. In 1993, he assumed command of the 1st 

Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, making him 

the first African American to command a U.S. 

Marine Corps infantry regiment. He is pictured 

here at the rank of brigadier general.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Marine Corps History 

Division
210 chapter three

ter I joined the Corps, at Officer Candidates 

School, as I’m graduating, I ran across another 

guy who later became a general, Arnie [Arnold] 

Fields. He and I went to the same school, and 

he finished like a semester before me. I had no 

idea . . .

But again, my experience in OCS and The 

Basic School, it didn’t seem overly traumatic.

I guess the other thing was MOS selection. 

I didn’t know that much about the Corps, just 

being a Marine, that’s it. I chose it, but I think 

it might have been my first choice. I was a supply officer initially, but I wanted to be a Marine. 

. . . I saw something I wasn’t too comfortable 

with. There were a couple other black officers 

over there [when assigned to Okinawa], and 

they were in supply and things like that. I made 

a decision that if I was going to stay in, if I even 

thought about staying in, I was going to be infantry. And so, fast forward as I finished with 

the tour at Okinawa, I came back to the states, 

was at Quantico, applied for augmentation, and 

I also applied for an MOS change. Unheard of. 

I had no idea. I just said, “I want to be a Marine 

officer, I want to stay in. I’d like to be an infantry 

battalion commander one day. I don’t see how I 

can get there with a 3002 MOS.” And believe it 

or not, I was augmented, and a small group of 

people were augmented, and they changed my 

MOS to 0302, and I was transferred to Camp 

Lejeune [North Carolina]. I was still young 

enough in this to be a platoon commander. Actually, in that case, because I’d already been a platoon commander up at Quantico . . . I went to 

Lejeune, had a company—Mike Company 3/8 

[Company M, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines].

A breakthrough assignment was that of then-Maj Stanley to the prestigious Marine Barracks Washington, 

DC, known for its evening parades and ceremonies. Stanley and his parade staff are pictured in front of the 

Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington, VA.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
allison and wheeler 211

The issue of race, though, was never that far 

away. But for me, it was less of an issue than a lot 

of folks because I was very comfortable with my 

skin, who I was and who I am.

Andrasi: As that infantry platoon commander, 

what was the relationship between you and your 

Marines? Was there any type of racial tension 

there from any of your subordinates?

Stanley: I wasn’t naïve, but not that I know of. 

I mean, the tensions came from maybe officers, 

and not necessarily senior officers. . . . I found 

there were times in the Corps where there were 

people with hang-ups, and I saw it, but I was actually focused on being a Marine. . . .

When I went to the Naval Academy, I was 

a captain. This was after my MOS was changed. 

I’m an 03, I’m at Camp Lejeune in Mike Company 3/8. They moved me to the four [S-4] 

shop, and then I had orders to the Naval Academy. Then shortly after that, my wife was shot, 

and it was a racially motivated shooting. She’s 

paralyzed. And today she’s living it, and that’s 

what happened.

Andrasi: Where did that happen?

Stanley: That happened in Wheaton, Maryland, 

and I was a captain stationed at the academy. I’d 

been at the academy for a few months. You’ve got 

to keep in mind [that] we’re still, even though 

you’re serving in the Marine Corps, you’re still 

living in a world that’s still a little mixed up. This 

guy was shooting black targets of opportunity. 

. . . He killed two people and wounded five, all 

black in a white area. He was walking around, 

and we just happened to be driving down the 

street. We weren’t even walking. He killed my 

uncle, who was in the car in front of us, maybe a 

block separated, because we were separated by 

light. . . . My wife was shot, and she was the 

most seriously wounded of those who survived. 

There were, like I said, four other people shot 

and wounded. Two killed and five wounded.

I was stationed at the Naval Academy then, 

and I was with a lot of folks who were real pros. 

Even the Commandant at that time just took 

good care of us and reached out. The Marine 

Corps, that’s when my relationship with the Marine Corps took a different bend because I saw 

how the Marine Corps took care of its own.

Major General Arnold Fields

Fields: I reported into 1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1/6 at Camp Lejeune in 1970] . . . . I was 

the only black lieutenant in the battalion.27 I 

may have been the only black lieutenant in the 

regiment back then. But I was welcomed as a 

fellow officer and Marine by my fellow platoon 

commanders and my company commander. In 

fact, one such gentleman and I are the closest of 

friends and have maintained that friendship over 

all of the years subsequent to the experience at 

Camp Lejeune [and] 1/6. So I had a good relationship with my fellow platoon commanders.

I had a good relationship with the staff 

NCOs. My first staff NCO was a black staff 

NCO, Staff Sergeant Harris. And all of these 

folks, all of the staff NCOs and almost all the 

NCOs, had already had at least a tour, if not two 

tours, in Vietnam under their belts. So I thought 

they responded to me well, given the fact that I 

had not been to Vietnam, I was a brand-new second lieutenant, and I was black, which probably 

was an experience that they did not have in any 

of their previous contributions to the Marine 

Corps.

But again, I don’t feel that there were any 

issues race-wise that were significantly outstanding above and beyond what one might 

expect from a group of Marines who are now 

27 This oral history interview was completed by LtCol Mark E. 

Wood on 16 February 2012.
212 chapter three

under the leadership of this brand-new, inexperienced second lieutenant. I was treated well by 

the battalion commander. I don’t think I was not 

given any opportunities that I was not due as a 

lieutenant. So it was a good experience.

Wood: Following that assignment, where did 

you go?

Fields: After I left 1/6, I reported directly into 

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, where I was assigned 

duties as the 81mm platoon commander. I was 

very proud of that, because back then the mortar platoon consisted of 96 Marines, the largest 

platoon in the infantry regiment. Because we 

had the big tubes, I felt a little macho about that. 

I was really proud to be commander of that platoon, and I had great Marines working for me. 

No racial issues per se in that platoon to the best 

I can recall.

But there was a race issue all around. This, 

again, is the early ’70s. We’re now talking 1971, 

where strife, racially, was almost omnipresent 

within the Marine Corps and certainly in the 

organizations of which I was a part. Okinawa 

was particularly an area in which race was very 

much a polarizing aspect of the Marine Corps 

society. It was a considerable challenge. I wound 

up in the midst of an expectation on behalf of 

my black colleagues, expecting that I would be 

doing and acting like some of the black community would act, not all badly, but there were certain things that were done, such as we called it 

“passing the key.” . . . It has to do with a greeting. 

There was a thing that was done with the fist, 

which was a means of communicating friendship 

and brotherhood with a fellow black person. 

Those kinds of things were frowned upon if not 

against the expectation of the Marine Corps. I 

did see some of my black colleagues doing it, officer and enlisted, but it was not something that 

I did because it was not an expectation, I believe, 

being an officer, and being a part of the whole of 

the Marine Corps.

But race was very much an issue, and it 

was not uncommon for there to be fights and 

so forth breaking out with a race connotation to 

them. The mess hall was one such environment 

or venue within which there was a very high 

probability that something was going to happen 

in that regard.

Wood: How did you . . . how did the battalion deal with these issues? How did the Marine 

Corps deal with it in a bigger sense?

Fields: Well, the Marine Corps once again was 

An early product of the Marine Corps’ push to recruit African American officers, Arnold Fields was 

commissioned in 1969 and was a series commander 

as a first lieutenant at the Drill Instructor School, 

Parris Island, SC, at the time of this photograph, 

ca. 1972.

Courtesy of MajGen Arnold Fields
allison and wheeler 213

still at that time trying to align its present and future with the mood of the nation and the mood 

of the Department of Defense when it came to 

race relations. Some formal race relation programs had already gotten underway, and some of 

those programs were having a general impact on 

the Marine Corps. I felt really that the Marine 

Corps was trying to be serious about being as 

much of a leader in race relations as it was on 

the battlefield. . . .

I felt the Marine Corps dealt pretty well 

with it, but probably not at as fast a pace that 

the environment, I felt, demanded at the time. 

To put what I just said into perspective, when I 

reported into 2d Marine Division, I recall the 

density, if you will, of black lieutenants or officers in that division to be seven black officers in 

the division that consisted of about 20,000 Marines in general. So I think the [African American] officer population back then was something 

like one point something percent in the Marine 

Corps, if that high. . . . No black officer immediately comes to mind with whom I associated 

in 2d Marine Division, and similarly, when I arrived at 2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2/4]. However, one of the company commanders in 2/4 

was a black captain, and a very good one. . . . 

So I was pleased by that. But I do feel that the 

Marine Corps was trying to make a concerted 

effort to turn things around. . . .

I only spent one year and maybe a couple 

months or two as deputy director of the DI [drill 

instructor] school because [I was picked] to go 

to Quantico because the Marine Corps had put 

together what it referred to back then as a leadership training branch. . . . The essence of this 

leadership branch was to be the Marine Corps’ 

way of focusing on race relations. The Marine 

Corps was reluctant to refer to cleaning up our 

act as anything but cleaning up our leadership. 

The Marine Corps felt that race relations had 

more to do with the quality of leadership than 

it did with any other characterization one might 

wish to apply to race relations. So we didn’t really call it race relations training; we called it 

leadership training. I was picked to go to Quantico to be on that leadership team. I did that for 

a full three years as an instructor. I instructed 

in all the schools—Command and Staff College, 

Amphibious Warfare School, The Basic School, 

the MP [military police] School—all of them, 

on leadership, with a reasonably heavy emphasis 

on a human relations component. It was, in fact, 

the principal leadership package that the Marine 

Corps was offering to the schools, but especially 

The Basic School.

Wood: Was that program stood up around the 

time that you joined the unit? Or was this already in motion when you came to the leadership branch?

MajGen Fields (left) visits peacekeeping forces in 

Sierra Leone during his time as deputy commander 

of Marine Forces Europe (2001–3).

Courtesy of MajGen Arnold Fields
214 chapter three

Fields: Yes, It was brand new. I was on the 

ground floor, and we kind of put the thing together and developed the curriculum and the 

whole package. It was under the leadership of 

a Marine colonel. [We had] a couple of them 

during my tenure of the three years, one of 

whom had previously been a regimental commander, and the other had been the CO [commanding officer] of The Basic School. So the 

Marine Corps was putting a high value on the 

quality of leadership training that this branch 

would otherwise provide. . . .

Wood: What kind of impact do you think the 

leadership branch had?

Fields: Well, the appearance at the time was 

not a very positive appearance. Why? I feel that 

there was still a considerable rejection, for one 

reason or another, of the approach that the Marine Corps and the defense establishment had in 

dealing with race relations. So it was a challenge, 

actually, to instruct in that branch.

Major General Leo V. Williams III

Andrasi: Can you relate your experiences early 

in your Marine Corps career? You were commissioned in 1970, I believe.28

L. Williams: Being in the Marine Corps was 

very much like being at the Naval Academy. The 

numbers of black officers in the Marine Corps, 

we thought we could count them on one hand. 

There were very, very seldom more than two or 

three or four of us in any major command. In my 

Basic School company, there were four of us—

three from the Naval Academy and one other 

guy. So the Marine Corps, especially the officer 

corps, has always been challenged in terms of 

the numbers of black officers they were able to 

both bring into the Marine Corps, and retain in 

28 This oral history interview was completed by LtCol Andrasi on 

5 March 2012.

the Marine Corps. It’s always been a substantial 

challenge.

I could see that right from the beginning 

of my Marine Corps career, just looking at my 

Basic School class. But I did have a number of 

mentors right from the beginning. My company 

commander somehow took a special interest in 

me. He was an artillery officer, and we maintained a really close relationship for the next 

20 years. I don’t remember any racial incidents 

when I was in The Basic School. It was just the 

numbers were small, and we all thought that we 

were headed to Vietnam, and it was a time to 

pull together, not pull apart. My Basic School 

experience was really a pretty pleasant memory.

After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1970, 

Leo V. Williams III was commissioned in the Marine Corps. Following two tours in artillery units 

with the FMF, a tour on staff at The Basic School, 

and a tour at Manpower, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, he transferred to the Reserve and began a 

career at Ford Motor Company. He was promoted 

to brigadier general in 1997 and to major general 

in 2000. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, Marine Corps History 

Division
allison and wheeler 215

I was in an artillery firing battery initially 

at [Camp] Pendleton [California] when there 

was a very, very tense racial time because we 

had lots of guys who were draftees, black and 

white, who did not want to be in the Marine 

Corps. A lot of these guys were Vietnam vets. 

A lot of them were disgruntled. A lot of them 

were really racially sensitive on both sides. And 

the tension level was sky high. I mean it was a 

powder keg most of the time. What I found, 

though, was that because I was one of the few 

that the black enlisted Marines could relate to, 

I was able to calm a lot of situations that otherwise might have been explosive. What it speaks 

to is the importance of diversity in maintaining 

good order and discipline. . . . In a lot of cases 

in the Marine Corps, troops did not have access 

to someone who looked like them, who shared 

a common experience, and who could talk them 

down from some explosive situation. . . . I was 

the only black officer in the regiment at that 

time, in the entire 11th Marines.

Andrasi: Were you called upon by that regimental CO to act in the capacity that you just 

described? Or [is] that was something that just 

kind of happened?

L. Williams: No, it just happened. I was never 

called on by . . . [I was] occasionally by the comPride, progress, and prospects in the form of four Marine general officers with a common heritage, and diverse Marine Corps backgrounds. From left: BGen Clifford L. Stanley, MajGen Charles F. Bolden Jr., BGen 

Leo V. Williams III, and BGen Arnold Fields. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
216 chapter three

pany commander. He would say, “Hey, we’ve got 

a situation building here. Let’s go in.” Often we 

would go in together, and once again, you can’t 

account for stupidity. You get a young lieutenant 

who thinks that because he’s got a sidearm that 

he’s got all the power. And there were a couple 

of times when one of these young second lieutenants in particular nearly got himself killed 

because he got into a situation that quickly got 

over his head. He was confrontational when confrontation was not the right position to take. He 

should have been in an advisory or a negotiating 

position, and he decided that he’s the baddest 

mother in the valley. So a couple of times, the 

captain and I had to go in and defuse a situation 

. . . that never really needed to get out of hand 

in the first place.

But it really does speak to how important it 

is to have sufficient diversity that people, no matter who they are in the unit, feel both culturally 

comfortable and environmentally comfortable, 

if that makes sense. When you are in a situation, 

when you look around and you’re the only guy 

who looks like you do, it can sometimes be intimidating. As I think back, that’s been my experience through most of my professional career, 

both in the Marine Corps and in the 25 years 

that I spent with Ford Motor Company. Most of 

the time, for whatever the department was that 

I was in, I was the only [black] guy there. A couple of times there were one or two others, but I 

think I was always the senior.

I had the great opportunity to be a headquarters battery commander at Camp Pendleton. I 

really appreciated the battalion commander for 

having confidence in me, as a first lieutenant, 

to take that job. . . . Then I got selected to go 

back to Headquarters Marine Corps as the first 

black in officer assignments in the history of the 

Marine Corps. That was in June 1974. Interestingly enough, the mentor who was able to put 

me in that assignment was now-Lieutenant Colonel [Edward L.] Ed Green, the same Ed Green 

who was the major at the Naval Academy who 

brought in Colonel Petersen and Colonel [Kenneth H.] Berthoud [Jr.] to influence half of my 

black midshipmen Naval Academy class to go 

into the Marine Corps. So Ed Green has been 

looking over my shoulder for all of my adult 

life. Still does. But I came back to officer assignments, and it took me a little while to understand and appreciate, first of all, how significant 

an assignment that is, but also it took me a little 

bit of time to appreciate the caliber of the officers who were there.

Lieutenant General Ronald 

S. Coleman

Wheeler: Can you describe how you came to 

join the Marine Corps?29

Coleman: I was in Vietnam [in the U.S. Navy 

29 This oral history interview was completed by LtCol Wheeler on 

12 August 2011.

A drill instructor corrects the posture of a Marine 

during personnel inspection. 

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
allison and wheeler 217

from] ’69 to ’70. When I came out of Vietnam in 

’70, if you were coming out of Vietnam and you 

had nine months or less to do, you were released 

from active duty. So I got home in July and immediately got out of the [U.S. Navy]. I came 

out, by this time I’m married . . . [and I] wasn’t 

sure what I was going to do. I had a mentor that 

said—I was going to go to school at night—and 

he said, “You’ll never finish, just go to school 

during the day.” So I used the GI Bill and went to 

then Cheyney State College, a historically black 

college in Cheyney, Pennsylvania, to be a teacher. . . . I went all summer every summer, took 15 

hours every summer, so in three years, I graduated in ’73. I taught school for a year and then it 

just, I wanted more. . . .

I went down to the Philadelphia Navy Yard 

and met my OSO [officer selection officer], 

Pierce [R.] King, who I still know today. His 

assistant was just a picture-poster Marine—

that was him. I mean he had on his “mod blues” 

[modified dress uniform] and was just as sharp as 

he could be. They knew I was a college grad, and 

I told them I was interested. . . . I lived in Darby, 

and about two towns over was Drexel Hill, and 

that’s where Pierce King lived. He was a white 

officer. He pointed toward my name and said, 

“Are you one of the Colemans from Darby?”

And I said, “I am.”

He said, “Are you the football player?”

I said, well, I played football. He sat me 

down to take the test . . . and he did the background check, and everything was good. And I 

remember going home, a couple days later, going home, and my wife was in the kitchen fixing 

dinner, and . . . she said, “How did your day go?”

And I said, “Well, I joined the Marine 

Corps.”

And she said, “What?”

I said, “I joined the Marine Corps . . . and in 

September, I’ll go to Quantico for three months, 

and if that all works out, then we’ll come home 

and we’ll go back to Quantico, we’ll all go to 

Quantico for six months, and then we’ll go 

somewhere else.” She didn’t take it all that well.

Wheeler: So you head down to Camp Lejeune. 

What did you experience in that first duty station?

Coleman: Camp Lejeune was different. I’d 

never been down there, and just before, we 

were at TBS, and I remember one of the instructors talking about the Marine Corps, and the 

ethos, and how we take care of each other, and 

all those sorts of things. And there are things you 

can do and things you can’t do, but the Marine 

Corps takes care of you. Whoever the instructor 

was talked about Camp Lejeune. He said there 

was an apartment complex down there, I’ll never forget, Beacham’s Apartments. And Mr. Beacham would not allow black people to rent from 

him. So the Marine Corps said, okay, no Marine 

can rent from you. So immediately, the rule got 

changed.

And I thought, okay, that’s pretty good, I 

mean, the Marine Corps is progressive, so you 

thought. . . .

I ended up being a regimental supply officer, so the regimental commander knew me. 

. . . This is where the mentorship came in. My 

regimental commander was a person by the 

name of Colonel [Harold L.] Cy Blanton [Jr.]. 

And you would’ve thought I was Cy Blanton’s 

son. He was from Plains, Georgia, or somewhere down there where [James Earl] Jimmy 

Carter [Jr.] was from. But he was just as honest and clear as you possibly could be, treated 

me like a son, he really did. Then the next one 

was [Gerald H.] Jerry Turley, from the Easter 

Offensive [in Vietnam in 1972]. Jerry Turley, 

whenever he would go anywhere, he would 
218 chapter three

say, “Come here, son.” And he called me “son,” 

he always called me “son,” knew me by name, 

whereas Colonel Blanton the regimental commander—and Turley was the XO [executive officer]—but Colonel Blanton would say, “Ron, I 

want you to do this.” But the other lieutenants 

were “Lieutenant Smith” and “Lieutenant Jones,” 

or whatever. I moved to be the regimental Four 

Alpha [S4A, assistant logistics officer], and the 

regimental Four [S4] was [James L.] Jim McClung, then-Captain McClung. And those three 

gentlemen—all three white—they mentored 

me as well as you could be mentored.

The amazing [thing] was that I didn’t know 

very many black officers in the 2d Marine Regiment . . . senior officers; I don’t know that I saw 

a captain, major, or anything like that—a higher 

ranking officer—in the 2d Marine Regiment. 

But the mentorship was there. We lived in “TT” 

[Tarawa Terrace housing area], and there was a 

captain by the name [Willie J.] Will Oler. He 

had been prior enlisted, a really good Marine. 

I was a second lieutenant, and Captain Oler (I 

always called him “Captain”) invited me to his 

house, set me down, and he said, “I’m going to 

mentor you, and we’re going to map out your 

career, and this is what you need to do.” So as 

a second lieutenant, Will Oler mentored me. 

It was a great upbringing, and the Turleys, and 

the Blantons, and the McClungs, and [John B.] 

“Black Jack” Matthews, and folks like that just 

took great care. You say, “Ah, that’s hogwash 

when you say there’s no color.” If there was 

color in those folks, they didn’t show it. They 

just treated me like Ron Coleman. It was one of 

those things where you say, okay, these gentlemen have such respect for you, you can’t let ’em 

down. My tour as a second and first lieutenant 

was a great tour.

Wheeler: What happened next? You were 

planning on a short career. Obviously, at some 

point that changed.

Coleman: I remember I got augmented, which 

was good. . . . Once you got augmented, you 

knew you were going to Okinawa. So I go to 

Okinawa, started off as the supply officer for 3d 

Med [medical] Battalion, and then we got to deploy as a battalion supply officer [with] LSU [logistics support unit] Foxtrot. That was my first 

real deployment. I had fun with that.

At this point I’m still thinking, “I’ve augmented now, so now I can get out when I want 

to get out. I want to make captain and then I’ll 

get out when I make captain.” Well, while I was 

over there, I got selected for captain, so that 

was good. I’m about to come home, and Captain Oler was in Okinawa, and so was Captain 

Cliff Stanley. We bumped into each other in the 

airport in San Diego. I was at Camp Hansen, 

and I was walking up to the officers’ club, and 

I saw this black, obviously Marine, but not in 

uniform. . . . He introduced himself and said he 

was Captain Cliff Stanley. And he’s black, and I 

said, “Wow.” I said I was going to go by and look 

for Captain Oler. And he said, “Oh, he’s my best 

friend.” So Cliff Stanley and Will Oler were best 

friends. So now Cliff Stanley mentors me, and 

he takes me around and introduces me to people 

and tells me what the do’s and don’ts of being a 

young black officer are. So I’m really impressed 

now.

I’m in Okinawa, I know I’m coming back to 

Quantico, and Captain Oler says, “You need to 

go to The Basic School, and I want you to write 

a note to [Dennis] D. J. Murphy, Colonel Murphy,” [who] at this point is the CO of The Basic 

School. He said, “We’re going to try and get you 

there.”

And I said, “Okay.” So I think, “Okay, that’s 

a done deal.” So I come in, I report to Quantico, 
allison and wheeler 219

and the personnel officer . . . says, “You’re going to go to Officer Candidates School.” I said, 

“Captain Oler told me I was going to go to The 

Basic School.”

He said, “Who’s Captain Oler?”

I said, “He’s in Okinawa.”

And he said, “Yes, he’s in Okinawa, he’s 

not here, you’re going to Officer Candidates 

School.” So he gets on the phone, and he says, 

“Hey, I’ve got this young captain here.” I’m reporting in my Alphas [service uniform], and he 

said, “You’ve got a couple rows of ribbons, and I 

think you’d be a good person [to have at Officers 

Candidate School].”

So I said, “Okay.” So I go out to Officer Candidates School, and Lieutenant Colonel Solomon [P.] Hill, black officer, first black lieutenant 

colonel I’d ever seen, is there. And I report in, 

and I tell him about Captain Oler, and he knows 

Captain Oler, and he says, “Well, The Basic 

School has all they need, and we need you here.” 

Lieutenant Colonel Hill and Captain [Henry] 

Napoleon [Jr.] were the only black officers [at 

Officer Candidates School] at the time, Hank 

Napoleon. He said, “No, we need you here.”

Colonel Alphonse G. Davis

Allison: You attended Officer Candidates 

School in 1973. What stands out in your mind as 

you recall that experience?30

Davis: In OCS, there was a big guy, looked like 

a cross between a cowboy and a football player, 

a blond-headed guy with a buzz cut. We were 

eating in the mess hall at OCS, and I’ll never 

forget, another black candidate, [Theodore] Ted 

Lambert—he eventually became a helicopter 

pilot—he’s in the line, and this guy, for whatever 

reason, he hits Lambert in the head with a cup, 

30 This oral history interview was completed by Dr. Allison on 16 

February 2012.

and blood’s spewing. All of a sudden, the 11 or 13 

of us that were black candidates, we didn’t start a 

fight or anything, but we kind of banded together to say something’s got to be done about it.

Allison: Because you thought it was a white on 

black attack?

Davis: That’s right. We took it as a racial incident. The benefit that we had back then was that 

in the OCS company was a black, First Lieutenant Cliff Stanley, who eventually became a 

general, and our company first sergeant, named 

Rogers, and the company gunny [gunnery sergeant], Crawford, also. They were black. They 

called us in one weekend, all the black candidates, and just read us the riot act and said, 

“Remember why you’re here. Remember why 

Commanding officer Col Alphonse G. Davis 

inspects Marines at the Officer Candidates School 

at Quantico. 

Courtesy of Col Alphonse G. Davis
220 chapter three

you’re here. Focus on why you’re here.” Their 

words weren’t so kind and choice, but they invoked the Montford Point Marine folks. They 

talked about that. That was my first time hearing of them, about what they went through. So 

I said, “Okay, great.” Then we focused on graduating. We did that.

I would see Lieutenant Stanley on the 

weekends out in town, Quantico. He’d see us in 

the bowling alley, and he’d just come over there 

quietly, he and his wife Roz, and they’d be bowling, and he’d say, “You candidates studying this 

weekend? Getting your laundry done?”

“Yes sir.”

He was good at that. He was the guy who 

was first in this, first in that, first in what have 

you. But if you check his academic record, the 

guy just worked hard. And he was giving us those 

hints. So I said, “Okay, man, this is serious stuff.”

Allison: How did you come to select infantry 

for a military occupational specialty?

Davis: When it came to picking an MOS, a lot 

of young black lieutenants were pushed into 

those we call now combat service support or 

supply. That’s when I think the institutional racism comes in, similar to the situation with the 

Montford Point Marines. Those guys were in 

support companies, transport companies, truck 

companies, supply companies, and longshoremen. I think it’s an institutional thing because 

that’s where the Marine Corps was comfortable 

having people of color. Now whether the folks 

in The Basic School Class 3-73 really had it in 

their hearts that these guys are not as good, or 

is it in their heads because that’s what they’re 

accustomed to seeing?

When it came time to select the MOSs, 

I talked to Captain Stanley. He actually was a 

supply officer but later changed to infantry. He 

told me to choose infantry. I said, “Why would I 

want to sleep out with the bugs? Why in the hell 

would I want to do that instead of just kicking 

back behind a desk?”

He said, “Well, you’re going to see a lot of 

young black Marines there that need your leadership.”

And I said, “Okay.” So I selected infantry. 

Most of the other guys are selecting supply and 

all that. I think I was the only black guy in our 

company at TBS [The Basic School] who went 

infantry.

Allison: It sounds like you benefited from 

mentoring early on.

Davis: Yes, but it was unofficial mentoring. 

There’s a difference. They had “official” mentoring that I didn’t think was so effective. It was like 

“All black officers report to room . . .” For what?! 

There was something, a concept I came up with 

called the “Godfather concept.” The Godfather 

at that time was Frank Petersen; they called him 

the Godfather. When I first met him, I was a first 

lieutenant in Puerto Rico, 1975–76, at Roosevelt Roads. I had heard about this guy. He was 

in a jeep, just sitting behind the wheel licking an 

ice cream cone. I was like, “Damn, I’ve seen his 

picture.” So I go up to him, I salute, “Sir, how you 

doing? My name is First Lieutenant Davis. I saw 

your pictures and read about you.”

I extended my hand, and he said, “Hey, how 

you doing, brother? Are things going okay?” 

Again, a very forthcoming guy. He was an aviator, and aviators are laid back and cool. . . .

Going back to the mentoring thing, when 

I talk about this Godfather concept thing, I was 

thinking, you’ve got to have a way that if a young 

black officer reports in to a new command, then 

there’s a senior black officer, captain or better, 

hopefully, there. And they contact you, invite 
allison and wheeler 221

you to dinner at their quarters or what have you, 

talk to you, tell you what you’re getting ready to 

embark on in your career because the transition 

is a little bit different. For example, I would see 

young black lieutenants wanting to date enlisted 

Marines. Not smart, dude. Or young black guys 

back in the early 1970s wanting to date white 

women. Not smart, dude. The times are not 

ready for that yet. Like the indelible impact that 

Cliff Stanley or General Petersen made—it was 

because of their personalities. . . .

That shaped me on how I became as a leader, to not be a traditional, textbook type of 

leader. For example later, when I commanded 

OCS—the first and the only black officer as 

far as I know to command OCS—I had several 

black candidates come to my home for dinner 

one weekend. One of them is a lieutenant colonel selectee now.

Allison: After The Basic School, you went to 

Camp Lejeune I believe, and took command of 

a platoon of Marines. What was that experience 

like?

Davis: I go in as an infantry platoon leader to 2d 

Marine Division, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. My 

first company commander is a Naval Academy 

graduate, blond-haired guy, [James L.] Jim Clark 

[Jr.]. I had my hair cut short. I realized I’d be setting an example to black Marines because they 

put the stocking caps on and all of that.

Allison: Was that allowed, the stocking caps?

Davis: It wasn’t.

Allison: This was a big issue in those days, the 

three inches for hair length and problems with 

the afro haircuts.

Davis: That’s right, the three inches. But I asked 

Captain Clark if my hair was short enough. The 

key was, most of the leaders were white, so 

they were afraid to address that. You know how 

troops are—if you give them an inch, they’re 

going to take six inches. So I asked him if my hair 

was cut short enough. His eyes lit up. He said, 

“Yes, thanks for asking, because you are going to 

be an example.”

Another pivotal thing happened. I discovered that the regimental commander’s driver 

was a guy that grew up across the street from 

me by the name of George Stewart, a sergeant. 

I asked the company commander where I might 

find Sergeant Stewart. So again, going untextbook. “What are you looking for this sergeant 

for?” 

I said, “Well, sir, I think I grew up with him.”

He said, “Well, you’ll eventually find him.” 

Like that. He never told me where he lived. So 

I kind of do my own thing and find out where 

he is. At the end of the day, I get in my civvies, 

I drive over to the barracks where the enlisted 

A Marine recruit receives a haircut after arriving at 

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, SC.

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
222 chapter three

are. I ask Marines, and they said, “Hey, Stew, you 

got some ‘butter bar’ out here looking for you.” 

When I go in his room he says, “Damn, boy, 

what are you doing here?”

I said, “Man, how are you doing?” We just 

started talking. Again, we grew up across the 

street, and we used to fight together, we played 

the dozens together and all that stuff, played 

football together. And he told me, he says, 

“Two things. Young black Marines are not going to want to salute you because they’re going to think you’re their ‘brother.’ The first one 

that does that, you grab their ass.” That’s what 

he said, “You grab them by the damn stacking 

swivel.”

And I said, “But man, you can’t do that; they 

told me in Basic School.”

He said, “Forget what they taught in Basic 

School.” Because we’re just coming out of Vietnam and these are bad times. “Forget what they 

told you. That’s what you need to do.”

“Okay, man.”

So one day I’m walking from my company office, India Company, and I passed H&S 

[headquarters and service company], which was 

called “hide and slide” back then, or “heat and 

steam,” or what have you, and they had the casual company. There were four black Marines on 

the steps out there. They had the black power 

bracelets on and their covers, they didn’t starch 

them, they’d be flat across. The hair was packed 

down, and you could tell where the stocking 

cap went around. They were unshaven, they 

had the no-shaving chit thing. And that’s another thing—I would show black Marines how to 

shave. I said, “You want to be pretty like me? 

Let me show you how you shave.” I would teach 

them this stuff. But these four guys, I passed 

them, and they’re kneeling down, but they don’t 

salute. And so I walked two steps past the steps 

of H&S. Then I remembered what George Stewart told me. I turned around, and I said, “Gentlemen, we don’t salute officers?”

One of them looked at me and said, “We 

don’t need to salute you. You’re our brother.”

And I stepped to the tallest one, and I 

grabbed him by the collar, and I said, “What’s 

your last name?” He told me. I said, “Mine is 

Davis. I’m not your brother. Salute.” I let him 

go. They all stood up at this time and gave me 

one of those really slow salutes. My knees were 

shaking. And then I just went about my business. 

Then the word became, “Don’t screw with that 

lieutenant, man, he’s crazy.” So that was really 

just kind of like proving myself, not whether or 

not you know me enough to respect me as a person—that will come later—but I’m a Marine 

officer. Respect that.

Allison: This was a turbulent time for racial 

issues. What was the situation in your platoon?

Davis: With my Marines, I had Puerto Rican 

kids out of New York, I had a lot of black kids out 

of North Carolina. I had white kids out of North 

Carolina; the drugs, the alcohol, all that. I just 

remembered that I needed to be everybody’s 

lieutenant, period—the need to be fair, balanced. That doesn’t mean that there wasn’t racism or that there weren’t hostilities, or that you 

didn’t hear “Uncle Tom” or you didn’t hear the 

“N” word. That was going on. But I would use 

those instances to say, “Okay, we’re a team.” So I 

became a beacon, and they would watch whether or not I would be more favored towards this 

one or that one. So that was important. I remember this kid, Joe Jefferson. I’ll never forget 

this kid. He always wanted to wear an afro, and 

I used to always tell him, “Go get a flipping haircut.” When I did my inspections, I used to keep 

a comb in my pocket, and I’d tell the black kid 

to take off his hat and comb it out. That way you 
allison and wheeler 223

could see how long it was. So there were certain 

things like that that I had to do to send the message that I’m not going to have double standards.

Lieutenant General Walter 

E. Gaskin Sr.

Allison: What do you recall of your first assignment as a Marine infantry platoon commander 

at Camp Lejeune at a time when racial tensions 

were high?31

Gaskin: The night before graduation from The 

Basic School, we were just sitting around talking 

to the platoon commander, Captain [Edward F.] 

“Fast Eddie” McCann. I had just gotten assigned 

to Camp Lejeune. I’m anxious, I’m ready to go. 

He said, “I want you to remember this. If your 

white Marines can’t come to you and talk to you 

about what black Marines are doing or not doing, then you have failed as a lieutenant and a 

Marine, and I want that title back if you can’t do 

that.” He said, “The second thing is that you’re 

going to have tremendous pressure from your 

African American Marines when you get there 

for special favors, to see things their way, knuckle knocking and all,” which was very prevalent 

at the time.

Allison: Are you talking about the dap?

Gaskin: The dap, exactly. He said, “All of that 

will happen to you when you get there. But what 

you should say is that you are here for them to 

have equal opportunity at proving that they are 

good Marines; nothing more, nothing less. Are 

you proud of your heritage? Absolutely. And 

they should be proud that you are there, but 

that’s all. They’re all Marines. If you can’t handle 

that, don’t go.” And I always remember that, because sure as hell when I got there, the first thing 

I had was OOD [officer of the day] duty, and I 

31 This oral history interview was completed by Dr. Allison on 10 

May 2012.

go to the chow hall, and the whole damn line is 

held up because you’ve got those Marines going 

through the dap, you know, it takes them two or 

three minutes. The law was no dapping in the 

chow hall. I engage. And there are a few Marines 

that went to the brig that day because I was an 

“Uncle Tom,” or “I didn’t understand,” you know, 

“you think you’re white,” or “this is bull s——t.” 

They were right. I called the MPs [military police], they’re gone. But also what that said to my 

white Marines is that I am not a black lieutenant, 

I am a lieutenant and a Marine, period. If you 

want to impress me, perform.

Everybody is going to apply to the rules. I 

am not going to shortchange you because you’re 

black, but I’m not going to give you special faMajGen Walter E. Gaskin, commanding general, 

Marine Corps Recruiting Command, received his 

two-star rank insignia on 7 October 2005. Gen 

Michael W. Hagee, then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, oversaw the frocking and reaffirmed 

Gaskin’s commitment as a leader of Marines.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
224 chapter three

vors because you’re black, either. If you perform, you’ll get just that. And that has been my 

philosophy in the Marine Corps. What got me 

there were my experiences, and I am a firm believer that performance trumps everything. I am 

a part of the performance trumps everything. I 

remember my first fitness report. I was scared 

s——tless that day. Lieutenant Colonel Richard 

[C.] Raines was my battalion commander. He 

had 19 lieutenants in the battalion and did handwritten fitness reports. We had to go in there 

and sit in front of him like the Spanish Inquisition. He would sit down, and he would give 

us counseling on our fitness reports. Colonel 

Raines said to me, “I didn’t think blacks could 

be officers. I had some damn good black staff 

NCOs in Vietnam.” He said, “You know, I just 

didn’t think they had the mental ability to be 

officers.” I’m sitting there thinking, “This is not 

going good.” I mean, I haven’t even seen the report, but I’m afraid. So then he hands me my 

report to read, and I looked down there, and 

[it said]: “My number-one lieutenant. The best 

lieutenant I’ve seen in 15, 17 years,” whatever 

time was he had in the Marine Corps. “I like 

his leadership style,” you know, “command potential;” “I’m considering him being a company 

commander as a first lieutenant.” It was unbelievable. And I looked at him, and he said, “You 

changed my mind. Don’t you change. You just 

keep doing what you’re doing.” And I walked out 

of there saying that performance counts.

I tell all the young officers. They always ask 

you when they come up to you, “What did you 

do?” I always say, “Performance.” If I have my 

job down cold, it relieves all the other issues 

and thoughts and stereotyping and everything 

else that comes with any prejudice or bias that 

they may have. But I can tell you this, I can almost guarantee if you don’t perform, if you 

are average, you can’t break out of the pack, 

you are just barely making it, [then] everything 

else wrong, or every other bias they have will 

suddenly surface. They don’t like the way you 

dress. They don’t like the fact you have that 

loud-ass car, you got crazy music, you didn’t 

come to country-western night. Everything 

else that was there would then fall on the fact 

that you were not ready because you did not 

perform. So you have got to be good. You have 

no option in this.

Colonel Gail E. Jennings

Jennings: One day in 1973, I was walking 

through the student union at University of Dayton, and they had the contact booth set up for the 

armed forces.32 They had the Air Force, Marine 

Corps; I don’t remember the Army being there. 

I went over to the Air Force, and I got their little 

contact card and filled out everything. I went to 

the Marine Corps, liked the uniform, filled out 

my little contact card. Well, Air Force never got 

in touch with me, but Marine Corps did. And 

not only did Marine Corps get in touch with me, 

Marine Corps stayed in touch with me. About 

10 days before I graduated from University of 

Dayton, I had to let them know one way or the 

other [whether] I was going with the Corps or 

not. I nodded my head and said, “Yes, I’ll go with 

the Corps.” I didn’t get to go to OCS right away 

because there weren’t enough women to make 

up a class. So I worked during the summer at 

one of the factories, the auto factories, on one 

of the assembly lines, and I made my money to 

buy my uniforms. So I started at OCS, well, in 

fact . . . I started at TBS after that, but during 

my junior and senior year of college, I went to 

OCS . . . and I had an eight-week session that 

32 This oral history interview was completed by Maj Beth M. 

Wolny on 7 April 2012.
allison and wheeler 225

I went to Quantico. OCS was a really positive 

experience for me.

Wolny: In what sense?

Jennings: In that you get indoctrinated into all 

the tradition of the Marine Corps, all the history of the Marine Corps. That’s at a time when, 

for the women, we even had makeup classes. 

We had an instructor, some highfalutin someone 

that had the nice cosmetic bag, out of New York. 

We had our application. I went home with this 

big leather kind of suitcase thing with all this 

makeup in it and whatnot. It was just how it was 

ingrained in that short period of time, sort of 

a teamwork and camaraderie that the Marine 

Corps was all about. I definitely took that back 

with me. I thought I was leaving a small family 

in that short eight-week period, and I liked the 

idea of being associated with something greater 

than me. I had that experience as I played sports 

in college, but it was a much more significant 

kind of attachment, I felt, in that eight-week period. So I had that to carry me through that last 

10 months of school before I made the decision 

that I was going to go with the Marine Corps 

or not.

Wolny: So that was a very positive experience 

for you?

Jennings: Very positive experience, even 

though OCS was not physically challenging for 

me at all. . . . The women’s physical program I 

Senior Marine female African American officers gathered at Headquarters Marine Corps on 7 April 2012. 

From left: Col Sheila Bryant, LtCol Doris A. Daniels, Col Stephanie C. Smith, Col Gail E. Jennings, LtCol 

Denise T. Williams, Col Adele E. Hodges, LtCol Reina M. Du Val, and LtCol Debra W. Deloney

Courtesy of LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko
226 chapter three

don’t think was nearly as challenging. I was an 

athlete going in, but I liked the other things that 

were involved in the training environment for 

that eight-week period.

Wolny: How about The Basic School. You went 

through in 1976. Did that go well also?

Jennings: I didn’t enjoy The Basic School nearly as much as I did OCS. When I came through, 

we were the first company that was integrated 

with women. We were administratively segregated, like we had a women’s platoon, but tactically, we were integrated with the men.

Wolny: Can you explain a little bit more what 

that looked like?

Jennings: Administratively, we were segregated. We had a women’s platoon, so to speak. All 

the women were set up in Graves Hall. Our platoon commander was female, [Beverly A.] Bev 

Short. I’ll never forget who she was. So in that 

sense, we were all women a far as that platoon 

was concerned. But when we went into a tactical environment, when we did all of our field 

ops [operations], when we did our land nav [navigation], when we did squad tactics, [for] all of 

those things we were integrated with the men. 

You’d have women sprinkled in with the men. 

So when we’re coming in from the field and 

they do port arms, we knew the next thing we 

were going to be double timing. If it was one of 

those really long ones, you might have someone 

behind you that might lift your pack a little bit 

for you so it wasn’t quite as heavy on your hips 

when you’re running in, that kind of thing. But 

again, you were given tactical assignments out in 

the field just like the males were. . . .

Wolny: Had you noticed that at OCS or TBS, 

were there other African American women, or 

were there other African Americans?

Jennings: At OCS, there was only one other 

black female officer.

Wolny: Candidates?

Jennings: At OCS . . . [Denise T.] Williams was 

in my class as well. That’s when I first met her. 

So I think it was just the two of us.

Wolny: But it didn’t strike you as odd at the 

time?

Jennings: No. I mean, I didn’t think about it 

one way or the other. I really didn’t. That wasn’t 

my focus, that wasn’t my concern.

Wolny: Did you experience situations that 

were unique to you as a black female officer, discrimination or whatnot?

Jennings: When I got to Cherry Point [North 

Carolina], I don’t think me being a minority or 

being a female, early in my career—and I qualify 

that, early in my career—worked to my disadvantage at all. I don’t think it was a detriment; it 

probably was a more positive thing than not, to 

be perfectly honest. I feel that I got opportunity, especially when I was at Cherry Point, that I 

didn’t see other people getting, maybe because 

there weren’t a lot of women, but I definitely 

was the only black face running around as a female officer. And I happened to be good at what 

I did. So again, like I said, that worked well. 

I think as I got to be more senior, and again, 

when I was at Camp Lejeune, I was the disbursing officer, and then I ended up being the 

comptroller for the FSSG [force service support 

group]. [This was a] great experience with not 

only leading within the MOS, but also the credibility I had with the command because I was one 

of the special officers to the CG [commanding 

general]. And not only was my expertise for financial management key, but also being a senior 

female for the command was very key.

We happened to have had a couple of challenges with two different female officers who 

happened to be minority. Because people sometimes get afraid to misstep, they did ask my 
allison and wheeler 227

opinion in regards to certain things. And I had 

to call a spade a spade with the CG [commanding general] and the chief of staff one day. Loved 

them both, thought they were great officers, but 

I said, “Hey, you put these two officers in the 

same basket and they’re totally different. One 

individual does have challenges; one individual 

probably should not be in the Marine Corps now 

because of this, this, this, and this and has not 

done those things that she needs to do.” And I 

had no qualms about saying, “This is an individual that is deficient and is trying to use race in 

order to throw that as a distracter for her lack 

of competency.” This other individual, however, 

they had two different stories. But they happened to both be female single parents. I said, 

“But you didn’t ask the question on this individual. You just see that that’s a single female black 

officer, and you automatically thought that she 

had not been married before. I’ve got a senior 

colonel over here, colonel, battalion commander—he’s a single parent, he’s divorced, has a 

child. But when you look at her, you don’t see a 

single parent that is divorced and, oh by the way, 

sir, you didn’t know she was divorced, did you? 

You just thought she had a child that happens to 

be four years old. She’s divorced just like that 

colonel is over there.”

They turned red in the face because they 

knew I had them dead to rights because that 

stereotype of these two officers. On the surface, their conditions seemed similar, but they 

weren’t. And I knew both of their stories because I had taken the time and talked to both 

of those officers, not because they told me to, 

meaning my leadership told me to, but because I 

was a leader and that’s what I needed to do.
228

TRULY A “NEW CORPS”

by Larry James

Leatherneck, April 1975

fire the “B” course from the 200[-yard line].35

And, do not be surprised the next time you 

spot a woman Marine sporting a qualification 

badge. Certain women Marines will be required 

to requalify annually.

Today’s truly “New Corps” training also deemphasizes rigid classroom hours for essential 

subjects—and less importance will be placed on 

written tests.

A further revision cuts the number of essential subjects from 12 to 10. At the same time, 

the mandatory requirement to be retested annually on all subjects is gone. However, performance “tests” will continue in marksmanship 

and physical fitness.

With all of the cuts and deemphasizing, 

the question has to be: Just when are Marines 

trained? There are two keys to the Marine 

Corps’ updated overall training picture. Considering the needs of the Corps, the individual 

Marine receives recruit training as either a “basic 

Marine rifleman” or “basic woman Marine.” Following the selection of a military occupational 

specialty [MOS] for which the Marine is suited, 

the next step beyond the recruit depot is Skill 

35 This refers to a modified course of fire for select MOS.

You know it is a whole new ball game 

when all Marines no longer receive advanced infantry training before going 

to their first duty station or being assigned to 

a school.33

Marine Corps training has not been revamped. It has become more of a polishing 

process. Corps old-timers—and today that 

probably includes Marines who enlisted anytime 

from ’74 on back—will find that some dramatic 

changes are under way. The end result is still the 

same professional Marine. The means to achieve 

that goal merely have been altered.

An indication of the shift in training emphasis includes the fact that Marines in the future 

will not all be required to spend two weeks annually on “range details,” with one week devoted 

to “snapping in.”34

In further marksmanship training developments, the Marines assigned to aviation 

units will only need to sight-in from the 500-

yard line every three years. In other years, they 

33 The original article came from Larry James, “Truly a ‘New 

Corps’,” Leatherneck, April 1975. Minor revisions were made to 

the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

34 In military parlance, the term snapping in refers to dry-firing a 

weapon.
larry james 229

Qualification Training. In other words, MOS 

training.

This may sound similar to the old procedure, but the big difference is that, after boot 

camp, our 1975 Marine goes directly to a formal 

school or to a unit. The Marine may receive that 

skill training to be MOS-qualified from either 

an on-the-job training program or from a unit 

training setup. This actually pulls the Marine off 

the “training line” (the length of time spent in 

initial or entry-level training) much earlier and 

makes him available to a unit sooner.

This also saves money by eliminating instructor billets. The in-unit skill training is 

accomplished by T/O [table of organization] assigned Marines.

The second updated key to training concerns the Marines’ instruction after his assignment to a unit. Headquarters Marine Corps has 

divided this post entry-level training into four 

main areas: career, mission-oriented, essential 

subjects testing/training, and related training.

Under old training schedules, units sometimes found it difficult to accomplish all phases. 

Now, unit commanders have been given priorities for training. The unit’s mission emphasized 

in the mission-oriented phase has top priority. 

If other training cannot be reasonably accomplished, it can be delayed until time is available.

Marksmanship, too, has a new look. If a Marine has been a qualified shooter several times, 

does he really need to spend two full weeks 

Sgt Jeanne E. Jacko fires a Remington 870 pump action shotgun equipped with a riot control canister, 

16 July 1979. LCpl Julie Ann Williams (left) waits to fire the shotgun. Shotgun familiarization was part of 

the training for Marine security guard students at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command 

in Quantico. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo DM-SN- 82-03056, courtesy of PFC E. Marshall
230 chapter three

each year in the requalification phase? In fact, 

is it necessary for an accomplished shooter to 

fire for five days? Not any more. A shooter who 

has established a reputation for high scores can 

arrange ahead of time to fire for record on the 

second or third day.

Instead of annual essential subjects testing 

for all 10 subjects, time for training and testing is devoted only to those who have problems 

mastering certain subjects. These individuals 

will be tested on only the subjects with which 

they have had difficulty.

While written exams are to be used if the 

commander feels they are necessary, the real 

test in all categories is performance. 

Marine Corps Order 15110.2H (Individual 

Training of Enlisted Marines—the new ITEM 

order) stresses: “Performance tests and observation will be the primary means of determining 

individual proficiency, supplemented when necessary by written or oral tests.”

The new training concept is a far cry from 

the days when Marines crammed for their TT 

and GMS tests, which required passing for promotion. The old technical test [TT] (an indication of a Marines’ MOS knowledge) and the 

GMS (the general military subjects test, a forerunner of today’s EST [enlisted screening test]) 

were all geared to reading and comprehending 

the questions. Now there is peer instruction—

innovative or imaginative training—and job/

performance aids. They may be new descriptions, but they are all factors in the improved 

and updated training.

How do individual Marines “see” the new 

training trends?

While Brigadier General Maurice C. Ashley 

Jr. served as director of Training and Education 

at Headquarters Marine Corps, he spoke of training as “the father of each generation of Marines.”

“The recruits definitely heard about boot 

camp before arriving,” the general said. “The image is there. He knows recruit training is a tough 

test of the individual. And, understandably. 

When the young Marine gets to a depot, recruit 

training lives up to everything he believes about 

that image. And the training is set up to ensure 

there is no letdown.”

Even during recruit training, there is a new 

look about measuring a boot’s advancement. 

Recognizing that written tests place huge demands on reading, writing, and interpreting the 

questions, performance-oriented training (now 

referred to as “hands-on” training throughout 

the Marine Corps) and peer instruction are taking over.

Simply, peer instruction employs students 

to train other students in a controlled environment. Broken into four steps, the student (recruit) observes a skill being performed and then 

receives instruction in this skill. In the third step, 

the Marine is required to demonstrate the skill. 

At this point, another Marine entering the first 

phase may observe. During the fourth step, our 

In Parris Island, artist Thomas O’Hara shows recruits at Parris Island training with a pugil stick or 

padded pole to simulate rifle combat.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
larry james 231

original Marine can instruct, which provides the 

second step for the follow-on Marine.

General Ashley saw this approach as both 

interesting and challenging. Additionally, it supports “a hallmark of Marines,” he said, “assuming 

he can do it after instruction.” A written test did 

not necessarily prove that.

Recently, Staff Sergeant Michael E. Moro, 

a drill instructor at Parris Island, told Leatherneck’s Tom Bartlett, “This new program is better 

than the old package. It teaches a recruit quickly. 

With the new program, the privates pay closer 

attention, knowing that they’re going to be doing your act next.”

However, Staff Sergeant Moro believes 

that the success of the new instruction can be 

attributed to the actual handling of the training 

aids by the recruits. The training session becomes little more than a lecture.

Gunnery Sergeant Joseph Gates, academics 

chief of the Parris Island Recruit Training Regiment, had been a drill instructor for a year and a 

half before joining the academics section.

“The new training program really impressed 

me,” he said, running a tanned hand through a 

graying crew cut. “I’m a grunt, and . . . I learn 

by doing.

“The new program means fewer written 

tests. We’ve only been working with it here for 

about six months, but we find that it permits us 

to go into more detail.”

Another Parris Island Marine, Gunnery 

Sergeant Bobby Dixon, NCOIC [noncommissioned officer in charge] of the Field Training 

Unit, which instructs and supervises the training 

of recruits at Elliot’s Beach, [Parris Island] has 

17 years in the Marine Corps, and two tours as 

a drill instructor.

“I’ve seen many programs tested and tried,” 

he grinned, “but I believe in this one. They come 

out here, and they either know or they don’t 

know. There’s no way they can fake an envelopment or first aid problem.

“As a result of this new application program, the recruits know more about what’s going on, and they know how to react.”

The training change is probably more noticeable in the period following boot camp. 

Many Marines wonder whatever happened to 

ITR. The infantry training requirement for all 

Marines after boot camp is gone, but for some 

there is a new training program called field skills 

training.

On the surface, Marines at Camp Lejeune 

[North Carolina] seem to be getting the same 

infantry indoctrination as before. They fire 

With a caption that reads “One good man 6 weeks 

better,” this Marine Corps recruitment poster 

purports to show the physical transformation of a 

recruit from arrival at boot camp to its successful 

completion six weeks later.

Official U.S. Marine Recruiting poster
232 chapter three

crew-served weapons, receive instructions on 

tactics, and begin to learn the fine points of being a grunt. But a closer check reveals that only 

four MOSs are involved. There are Marines being trained as 0311 (riflemen), 0331 (machine 

gunners), 0341 (mortarmen), and 0351 (antitank assaultmen). The field skills training (FST) 

schedule resembles the ITR package, but it applies to only the four MOSs.

And, the Marines already belong to a unit. 

Using the 2d Marine Regiment as an example, 

the FST instruction unit consists of one officer 

and 12 enlisted Marines. But, in place of the 

cadre of special instructors and troop handlers 

that was necessary for ITR, all of the guidance is 

provided by these members of the 2d Marines.

The regimental commander, Colonel John 

E. Greenwood, believes his [MOS] 03 Marines 

are “better trained than when there was ITR.” 

And he thinks the sergeants and staff sergeants 

involved in the instruction are also benefiting. The enlisted leaders come from his infantry units. After instructing with the FST for a 

planned 12–18 months, they return to a company. At this point, the colonel believes he has a 

better leader.

The evolution of today’s FST in the 2d Marines has been polished and changed slightly, 

since the last ITR in mid-1972.

Initially, a division-level infantry training 

program was tried. But, it was decided a stateside regiment was a better answer for training 

the Corps’ grunts. The 2d Marines began the 

field skills training in late 1972. At that time, 

the young Marines reporting in from boot camp 

were assigned to a company, went through training in the daytime, and were billeted with the 

company at night.

Colonel Greenwood said this proved to be 

a little too much for the young troops to handle. “Things got a little out of limbo for some 

of the Marines right out of recruit training,” he 

said, “and then listening to those ‘old salts’ of six 

months in the barracks at night didn’t help.

“Now that we have gone to centralized billeting for the FST Marines, we believe the problem has been solved,” the colonel commented.

Captain John Gaieski, a former company 

commander in the regiment, is in charge of the 

2d Marines’ FST unit. Of the six weeks—30 

training days—about 70 percent is practical application instruction, he stated. Most classes are 

geared for 25–40 Marines but entire companies 

do go through, particularly when a company 

with a deployment scheduled in the near future 

is being formed. The equivalent of one battalion 

a year goes through the second FST.

The first phase of FST includes five days of 

assembly, welcoming aboard, unit assignments, 

personnel processing, equipment issue, and an 

actual base orientation. The basic Marine infantryman is shown where Disbursing, Special Services, Red Cross, and other important offices 

are located. It is not the case of a check-in sheet 

with a list of building numbers.

And, from the beginning, there are troop 

handlers. These are not T/O assignments like 

the old ITR. They are squad leaders from units 

to which the Marines are assigned. This way, a 

corporal from a line company gets six weeks to 

know his men before they become an intricate 

part of the company.

“We started with only one troop handler,” 

Captain Gaieski said. “Now we have up to 25, 

particularly when we have men from the 2d Recon Battalion going through our FST.”

Corporal Walter Haas of I/3/2 [Company 

I, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines] is typical of the caliber of Marine assigned as a troop handler by the 

2d Marines. Last year, he was the second rifle-
larry james 233

man for the third fire team in K/3/2 [Company 

K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines]. This unit was selected as tops in the annual Corps-wide squad 

competition. Haas, who has three years in the 

Marine Corps and had gone through ITR about 

two months before it was phased out, said the 

FST Marines are really motivated.

“This hands-on training really appeals,” he 

said.

Staff Sergeant Charles Dedmond, an 0311 

tactics instructor from C/1/2 [Company C, 1st 

Battalion, 2d Marines], believes the FST is “just 

outstanding.”

“Personally, I believe the experience the instructor gets here is valuable when he goes back 

to the company,” Dedmond said.

Staff Sergeant Kenneth Browne, a 38-yearold mortar instructor with 19 years in the 

Corps, definitely has the perspective to discuss 

FST. Browne has been a member of the FST unit 

since March 1973. A couple years before that, 

he spent 18 months as an instructor at Lejeune’s 

Camp Geiger. Prior to that duty he spent a year 

as a troop handler. He claims the specialized FST 

instruction is not as thorough as when he was 

at ITR.

“But one advantage is that I work with 

smaller groups than at Geiger,” Browne said. 

“The largest number I have had was 43 Marines 

versus 150 to 200 in ITR.

“The biggest problem the FST instructor 

has is to counter the scuttlebutt the young Marines pick up at night in the area. Some of the 

six-month ‘salts’ pass out bum dope. At Geiger, 

they were isolated.”

Although most of the 12 instructors favored 

Air traffic controllers at both El Toro and Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Stations guide Marine aviators to 

landings and takeoffs, 1965. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A412173, Marine Corps History Division
234 chapter three

the old ITR since it could accommodate more 

Marines for the advanced infantry training, 

much of the original ITR material is now taught 

during recruit training. FST is not intended to 

replace ITR. It is strictly meant to qualify Marines in the four infantry MOS’s.

The one thing that all of the 2d [Marines] 

FSTU [field skills training unit] instructors agree 

about is the leadership value for the enlisted 

Marines, who will be rotated as instructors or 

troop handlers.

The Marines have 10 days of MOS qualification in the second phase [of] basic skill training. Following this, everything is put together 

in organizational/mission training. The individual Marines discover how their particular skill 

blends into the overall infantry picture.

Duty and training with the 2d Marines’ 

FSTU is not an eight-to-four proposition.

“All of my instructors pull duty with the 

night study halls,” Captain Gaieski said. And 

the troop handlers have a lot more to do than 

merely seeing that their men move from class to 

class. Corporal Haas said his day starts at 0500 

with the Marines in the barracks. At the end of 

the training day at 1700, the troop handler often 

spends until 2100 or 2200 talking and reviewing 

with the troops.

This personal interest, along with the centralized billeting, has greatly lessened disciplinary problems for the 2d Marines.

This relationship of small unit leaders and 

the new Marines was one of the points General 

Ashley stressed from the Headquarters Marine 

Corps level. It ensures there is no letdown of 

that Marine image with which the recruit arrived at boot camp.

While still director of Training and Education, the general cited the 2d Marines as “biting 

the bullet” to accomplish the needed training. At 

the same time, the regiment was able to maintain its combat readiness.

General Ashley also said that he believes the 

Marine Corps concept in training new Marines 

will carry its advantages over to career men. Beyond the improved leadership derived by Marine NCOs involved with FST, the possibility of 

establishing “adventure training” is being considered.

As part of the “no-letdown” idea, a career 

Marine who is in supply or administration might 

be able to put in for something like jump training. This would apply to a Marine who desires 

to continue in his MOS, but has always wanted 

to attend what he envisions [as] more glamorous 

training. The general felt that if the Corps makes 

“adventure training” available, the individual will 

probably have to contribute his share of off-duty 

time while undergoing the training.

Someday, the clerk who always wondered 

what it would be like to drive an M60 [Patton] 

tank may get the chance.

It is also believed that MOS training for 

many fields does not have to take a formal 

school approach. Job/performance aids will allow precise step-by-step directions for Marines 

to work on equipment or weapons. With very 

little experience or knowledge of the item, Marines can efficiently perform both simple and 

complex maintenance and repair activities. Simply, a Marine will be able to accomplish work 

while actually learning a skill.

Today’s Marine training still produces the 

same professionals who were on Hills 861 and 

881 at Khe Sanh eight years ago. But the new 

look on individual training is now giving the Marine unit’s primary mission even greater consideration and significance.
235

YOUR FOREVER EXPERIENCE

by Robert Church

Leatherneck, November 1975

Your forever experience! You sail away from 

the monotonous gray of commonplace existence 

into the exciting blue of life extraordinary! Your 

odyssey will span all the years, places, men, 

women, and events of your life in the Marine 

Corps. You would not trade it for a king’s crown, 

and you will never forget it. It will be your forever experience, and it started the moment you 

stepped aboard boot camp.

Of course, right now, in your first few days 

of training, your experience consists of trying 

to keep up with everything your drill instructor 

keeps throwing at you: push-ups, double-time, 

drill, and all the other little exertions that leave 

you with quivering muscles, heaving lungs, and 

rivers of sweat! There may be times when you 

wonder if you will make it—and you want with 

all your heart to make it! Many Marine boots 

know that feeling. Well, do not worry, you will 

make it. You will go all the way to graduation, 

and you will come out grinning with the joy and 

pride of knowing you have earned your place 

among the elite!

Yes, Private Church, I know just how tough 

boot camp is. In memory, I can still feel the 

blisters that made you limp in your stiff new field 

On this 200th anniversary of our beloved Marine Corps, I would like to 

write a letter and (if I could) send it 

back through time to a certain young Marine 

who marched in the green legions of the Corps 

more than 30 years ago.36 Strangely enough, his 

name happens to be the same as the writer’s . . .

Private Robert Church, 10 November 1975

Platoon 400, 7th Reconnaissance Training Battalion

Marine Corps Recruit Depot

Parris Island, South Carolina

Dear Private Church:

It is May 1943, and you are in boot camp, the 

threshold to glory! For you (my younger self) 

and your buddies of Platoon 400, this is where 

it all starts—your training, your salty pride, 

your service to Corps and country, your Marine 

memories. Here in the sweat and toil of boot 

camp, you begin the greatest adventure of your 

life. This is the birthplace of your forever experience.

36 The original article came from Robert Church, “Your Forever 

Experience,” Leatherneck, November 1975. Minor revisions were 

made to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, 

punctuation, and spelling.
236 chapter three

shoes so many years ago! (You were a mighty 

hard DI [drill instructor] back then, Platoon 

Sergeant Koons . . . and a first-rate Marine!)

It is hard training, indeed, but it is all part 

of a carefully planned and tested program that 

is transforming you into a highly efficient fighting machine. No, not a robot. A man. But a very 

special kind of a man with a toughened body and 

a trained, alert mind, able to function equally 

well with others under command, or on your 

own initiative—like a single bolt of lightning!

At the same time, you are learning the 

techniques of survival, so you will have the best 

chance possible of coming safely through whatever battles may lie ahead. You are learning to 

hit the deck with enthusiasm. You are learning 

to “keep that big, bouncing butt down, Church!” 

You are learning to go over an obstacle faster 

than a man can aim and fire a rifle at you. You 

are also learning that often the best defense is a 

swift, overwhelming offense. And you are learning that, in battle, the Marines take care of their 

own, by covering fire and other tactics, and by 

buddy helping buddy.

No, not all Marines survive their battles. 

Many fall—but not without meaning or purpose, no matter what the armchair critics may 

say! They fall doing their duty for their country—and with the greatest of honor! And they 

lie asleep with their fallen buddies until the final 

reveille calls them forth forever.

Is that such a bad way to go?

Think about it.

Meanwhile, Private Church, you are learning a lot, and you are learning it well. And, as 

time goes by, you will also discover that, along 

with everything else—or perhaps because of everything else—something unique is happening 

inside you. It began your first day in boot camp, 

and it will grow as you grow in the Corps. It is 

the very heartbeat of your forever experience, 

and you will have it all the days of your life. They 

call it esprit de Corps.

Esprit de Corps. The Marine mystique—

the intangible but very real spirit that makes the 

qualitative difference between a U.S. Marine 

and any other military man in the world. It is 

love. It is pride. It is devotion. It is all that and 

more too. You cannot fully explain it. To understand it, you have to experience it yourself. And 

to do that, you have to be a Marine.

Look at any Marine when he hears a band 

playing his own hymn. Look at any Marine when 

he is saluting his country’s flag. Look at his face, 

and you know he will go all the way for his country and his Corps. All the way to kingdom come 

if he has to!

U.S. Marine Corps recruitment poster U.S. Marines, Uncle Sam’s Right Hand, designed by 

R. McBride, ca. 1917. 

Willard and Dorothy Straight Collection, Library 

of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
robert church 237

That is just a hint of what esprit de Corps 

is, Private Church. It is why you will honor your 

Corps—second only to the flag you defend.

Which brings us to the moment of truth. 

The defense of that flag, and the country it represents, has been the primary mission of the 

Featured on the cover of Marine Corps Gazette in November 1953, Cpl Tony Kokinos’s painting Heritage was 

later discovered hanging in the supply office at the Marine Barracks and brought up to record in May 1975. 

It now resides in the permanent collection of the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
238 chapter three

Sgt Tom Lovell, Flag Raising, Mt. Suribachi Iwo Jima, oil on canvas. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
robert church 239

Marine Corps for 200 years of magnificent heroism, and it is still our primary mission!

And what of the flag? What is there about it 

that makes men willing to lay down their lives to 

keep it flying? What makes young men actually 

eager to climb a hell on earth like Mount Suribachi to plant the Stars and Stripes at the summit?

Simply this: that flag, that Old Glory, that 

beautiful Star-Spangled Banner, symbolizes the 

very highest principles of human decency ever 

conceived in the hearts and minds of men!

And your primary mission, Private Church, 

is to help your Corps defend that flag with all 

your might! It is as simple as that. And as worthy!

You see, Uncle Sam and his “few Marines” 

have come down a long road of years shoulder 

to shoulder. The road began as a narrow, cobblestone street in Philadelphia; it extends down to 

today; and stretches on into all our tomorrows.

The milestones along this road have the 

names of places that are shrines to the courage 

of the Marines who fought there: the Bahamas 

(where Marines made their first amphibious 

landing, led by none other than our old friend, 

Captain Samuel Nicholas, formerly of Tun’s Tavern); Tripoli (source of the Mameluke sword); 

Chapultepec (and the halls of the Montezuma); Guantánamo Bay; Cavite; Samar; Peking 

and Tientsin (Boxer Rebellion); Belleau Wood; 

Mont Blanc Ridge; Meuse-Argonne; Guadalcanal; Tarawa; Guam; Iwo Jima; Okinawa; Tokyo; 

Chosin Reservoir; Con Thien; Chu Lai; Hue—

and many, many other milestones, including the 

decks and rigging of countless ships, in naval 

engagements starting with the American Revolution and continuing today.

And the 200-year road is paved with the 

valor of men whose names, coming one after 

the other, sound like the measured thunder of 

a mighty bell, tolling liberty through the centuries: Samuel Nicholas, Presley N. O’Bannon, 

Archibald Henderson, Archibald Summers, 

Smedley D. Butler, Daniel J. Daly, John Quick, 

John A. Lejeune, Alexander A. Vandegrift, Evans 

F. Carlson, Merritt A. Edson, Gregory Boyington, Leland Diamond, and Lewis B. Puller . . . 

And so many others their names would fill 

an honor roll reaching from here to eternity. 

And in a very special place on the honor roll 

would go the legendary Private First Class G. I. 

Grunt and his buddies, those heroes of heroes, 

the tired, dirty, sweating, shooting, unsung sons 

of the rifle companies!

We salute them, every one!

Marines like these know what every thoughtful American knows, that freedom is not free. 

The price is high, but we Americans pay it because we happen to think freedom is worth it. 

And the Marines always pay a lion’s share of the 

bill. Gladly. Proudly. The first Marines thought 

America had something worth fighting for. Today’s Marines still think so.

Nobody likes to fight a war. But until somebody figures out how to establish a permanent 

peace with freedom for all, somebody has to be 

able and ready to guard the rights and lives of 

free people. The Marines have that capability, 

and use it whenever Uncle Sam calls them into 

action.

Private Church, the Marines of your generation won your war in the islands of the Pacific, 

and you won it heroically. But there have been 

other costly battles between your point in time 

and the present—Korea, Vietnam—and special 

missions such as the Cuban missile incident, the 

Lebanon landing, and the Mayaguez rescue.

Now, in the year 1975, 200 years since the 

Marine Corps was established, we live in a world 

that seems more troubled than ever. There are 
240 chapter three

those who would take away our freedom today, 

if they could. (But they damned well cannot!)

And there are others, sitting on a so-called 

“neutral” fence, who snipe at us verbally. We 

Americans are “decadent,” they say. “Immoral.”

It seems they can see the speck in our eye, 

without being aware of the plank in their own.

Sure, we have our “lunatic fringe.” What 

country has not?

But when there is disaster anywhere in 

the world, who is the first in with help? Who 

is the first to land with food, medical supplies, 

blankets, shelters—planeload after planeload of 

help—without ever counting the cost? The decadent Americans, that is who!

And when innocent people in danger of 

mass slaughter call out for help—who is the 

first (and sometimes the only) to go in and guard 

them, feed them, evacuate them without ever 

counting the cost? The “immoral” Americans, 

that is who! With the United States Marines 

leading the way in!

Uncle Sam and his “few Marines” are 

ready—as they have been for 200 years—to go 

anywhere, anytime, in the cause of justice, honor, and simple human mercy.

These missions have the wholehearted approval and support of the American people. Not 

the oddballs, of course, who would not support 

anything, including themselves. Not the cynics 

who look on from afar with delicately raised 

eyebrows. No, our strength comes from the 

vast center of our population, which is as solidly 

American as it ever was.

We have many millions of decent, patriotic 

citizens who love our country as much as ever. 

Gutsy Americans who are not ashamed of a teardrop in the eye when they see Old Glory still 

proudly waving. They know what she stands for, 

and what it has cost to keep her flying.

And we have millions of strong, reverent 

Americans who are not ashamed to ask God’s 

blessing and guidance for our country, our leaders, our men and women in uniform.

There is a famous painting of General 

George Washington before a battle, kneeling on 

one knee in the snow, praying for his men and 

his country.

That spirit of faith and reverence still prevails in the great heart of America. We are still 

“one nation under God.”

Thank God that we are!

No godless nation or group of nations in 

the world can prevail against that spirit! And as 

for the godless cynics in our midst—they can go 

plumb to hell, which no doubt they will!

Well, Private Church, as you can see, you 

have got a lot going for you, and a lot to live up 

to, as you join the elite in the front ranks of our 

country’s defense forces. Your life as a U.S. Marine stretches like a shining road before you, and 

whether you stay on that road for one tour of 

The Prayer at Valley Forge depicts Gen George Washington kneeling in prayer under trees at Valley 

Forge during the American Revolutionary War. 

Engraver John C. McRae and publisher Joseph 

Laing generated this popular print after an original 

painting by Henry Brueckner, ca. 1889. 

Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
robert church 241

duty, or 30 years, you will find it the high road 

of your whole life. You will never have a greater 

opportunity to reach so high a level of service 

and personal fulfillment.

So there is something you should know, 

something you should be aware of at all times. 

It is one of the most important things anyone 

could be aware of—but very few are! It is something I should have been aware of, but was not.

This is it: be aware that you are always 

building memories! Wherever you may be, 

whatever you may be doing, you’re also building 

memories.

Now you will be building memories of 

men, women, duty stations, voyages, islands, 

the rattle of gunfire, the coppery taste of fear, 

the sound of laughter, the many details of life in 

the Corps.

But most importantly, you will be building 

memories of your own performance from moment to moment, and day to day. Some of these 

will be the big memories that will come winging 

home to you . . . either like golden eagles or 

like vultures. They will bring you satisfaction, or 

regret, as long as you live.

Once an action has been completed, once a 

moment has passed, once today has become yesterday—you cannot call it back and change it, or 

erase a line of it, no matter how much you wish 

you could! Each moment is a segment of eternity that becomes part of your forever experience.

That is why it is so important—to both you 

and the Corps—to live the kind of life that produces good memories, ones that will bring joy 

and pride whenever they come to mind. Private 

Church, live so the Corps will always say, “We 

are glad he was one of us.” And you will always 

say, “Me too!”

There are two simple guidelines that can 

help you build good memories. One is this: do 

not take anything or anyone for granted! Everything, and especially every person—and your 

personal involvement—is a potential memory, 

treasured or tragic.

And the second guideline: when you are going to do something, always ask yourself, “Will 

this deed be worthy of 200 years of Marine 

Corps honor? Would a really first-rate Marine 

do this?”

If the answer is “no”—then by all means do 

not do it! Because if you do, the memory of it 

will cast a shadow on your forever experience 

that will haunt you all the days of your life!

To sum up: the quality of your own service 

to your Corps and country will determine the 

quality of your memories, and thereby the quality of your forever experience.

So you see, Private Church, you will want 

to be the very best Marine you possibly can 

so that, 32 years from now (way up in 1975), 

SSgt Ermelinda Salazar, a woman Marine, was 

nominated for the 1970 Unsung Heroine Award 

presented annually by the Ladies Auxiliary to the 

Veterans of Foreign Wars. SSgt Salazar, determined to help the children of the St. Vincent 

de Paul Orphanage in Saigon, Vietnam, in her 

off-duty hours, holds two of the youngsters in this 

painting by artist Alex Young. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
242 chapter three

you will be able to look back at a forever experience that gleams like purest gold in your 

memories—and in your Marine Corps record!

Well, Private Church, this letter will not 

reach you in boot camp because you graduated many years ago, and marched away into the 

mists of time . . . 

. . . and now you are an old-timer who has 

lived his forever experience. An old-timer full 

of memories, of both sunlight and shadows. But 

an old-timer with the fierce love and pride of 

the Marine Corps still surging through his veins!

I am wearing civvies now—but just inside 

lives a young Marine in dress blues . . . forever!

As for this letter, I guess the best thing we 

can do is make it an open letter to all Marines, 

everywhere. And we salute you all!

We often think of our own old buddies—the 

Marines of the World War II generation—and to 

them we say, “Thank you for the unforgettable 

camaraderie.”

We think of the generations of Marines who 

served before our time, and we say, “Thanks for 

what you built, and guarded through 200 years, 

and passed on to us.”

We think of all the Marines of the future, 

and we say, “You will have a lot to live up to. But 

you will do it. Marines always have.”

We look at the magnificent Marines of today, and we say, “You are doing just fine! You are 

as good as we were, and better! We wish you 

Godspeed, a happy voyage, and a treasured forever experience!”

And you women Marines of yesterday and 

today—did you think we would forget you? So 

trim and chic? The prettiest, proudest sight in 

all of God’s green earth! Forget? Ah, no. Love 

is the word! And respect! We wish you a golden 

shower of bright memories always!

And now to our beloved Marine Corps in 

your 200th year of glory—we are overflowing 

with pride and devotion as we present to you 

the smartest, most heartfelt salute a Marine can 

give!

Finally, to the flag of our country—the 

basic reason for our existence as Marines—we 

pledge our allegiance, and our lives, forever!

Semper Fidelis!
243

EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALISM 

FOR A NEW GENERATION 

OF MARINES

by General Louis H. Wilson 

Sea Power, January 1976

level, there is, to be sure, a stability based upon 

essential equilibrium among the nuclear nations. 

But, beneath the umbrella of the nuclear standoff, a broad spectrum of behavior is possible, not 

all of it friendly to the United States. Provided 

that we maintain the necessary strategic deterrence, the most likely challenges that we shall 

have to face in the future will be on the level of 

conventional military confrontation.

In order to meet those challenges, the Marine 

Corps must remain ready, strong, and flexible.

A Review 

of Basic Concepts

In examining our nation’s defense needs, we 

should reexamine our basic concepts to rid ourselves of that which is outmoded and revitalize 

that which remains valid. Doubts have been 

raised in the past about the viability of amphibious warfare, and those doubts tend to resurrect 

themselves from time to time. In order to ensure the soundness of our future planning, we 

might, then, dwell for a moment on the basis for 

our amphibious structure.

Future employment of the Marine Corps 

could take place in a wide range of circumWe in the naval Service often talk 

about the uses of sea power in 

matter-of-fact terms because we 

accept without question the need for strong 

naval forces.37 We understand that to keep our 

place in the international order means we must 

maintain the means to protect our sea lines of 

communication. Occasionally we forget that, 

in today’s society, virtually nothing is accepted 

without question. We discuss maritime defense 

issues in journals such as this, but very often we 

fail to examine the assumptions and premises on 

which the need for such defense is based. It is 

important that we do so from time to time, for 

others will certainly do it for us if we fail.

To that end, I would like to review some of 

the philosophy upon which our plans are based. 

With that background, we can then discuss 

some of the details of our ideas for 1976 and on 

into the future. 

The world is changing rapidly, and the pervasiveness of change is apparent to most observers of the international scene. At the strategic 

37 The original article came from Gen Louis H. Wilson, “Emphasis 

on Professionalism for a New Generation of Marines,” Sea Power, 

January 1976. Minor revisions were made to the text based on 

current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
244 chapter three

stances in any theatre on the globe, from fullscale war, with or without nuclear weapons, to 

making a show of force at some remote spot. 

The toughest scenario is, of course, the former. 

Whatever the scenario, the Navy-Marine Corps 

team will have a vital role to play. Those who 

doubt the efficacy of an amphibious landing in a 

total war environment may have a point: such a 

landing would be extremely difficult. The most 

likely circumstances, however, would probably 

involve U.S. and NATO or other allied forces 

attempting to hold the line against an advancing 

aggressor somewhere on the Eurasian landmass.

In that case, or in other similar circumstances, friendly forces holding a line or conducting a 

delaying action might need reinforcement. A mobile, ready, general purpose force integrated with 

air is ready-made for such a task. If the line were 

holding, or if a counteroffensive were planned, an 

action on the flanks of an advancing or retreating 

enemy might have the same effect as at Inchon 

[South Korea], though probably less dramatic.

There is no way to execute such a flanking 

move unless a forcible entry into enemy controlled territory is possible. It would most certainly be conducted from the sea, if one imagines 

the battle lines reaching from coast to coast. 

If the enemy withdrew forces to resist such a 

landing, his front line would be weakened accordingly. Regardless of his reaction, the threat 

of amphibious attack would seriously limit his 

options. Given a powerful amphibious force, we 

would have several viable options, which in turn 

would seriously hamper the enemy’s freedom of 

action. The crucial question is whether a large 

successful amphibious landing would be possible 

under the circumstances. If not, then it would 

be postponed until conditions favored the amphibious attack.

But, whether or not such an attack would 

be possible at a given point in time, the possession of a major amphibious capability is an extremely valuable asset. An enemy could never be 

sure whether it would come or not—we have 

been known to attempt the “impossible” before. 

In other words, in the most difficult of all possible circumstances, there is every reason to have 

an amphibious capability, and no reason for not 

having it.

Outside the circumstances described above

—and they can be translated into any locale or 

time frame—other possible actions by those 

hostile to U.S. interests are forever limited by 

our ability to put a major force ashore on short 

notice and sustain it there for as long as it is 

necessary to prepare for additional options. The 

U.S. amphibious capability is unique, it is respected by friend and potential foe, it remains 

a viable, important form of response to a broad 

Training—of the body, of the mind, of the total 

man—was a hallmark of the Wilson Commandancy (1975–79). Gen Louis H. Wilson by Albert K. 

Murray, oil on canvas, 1976.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
general louis h. wilson 245

spectrum of actions. And the potential for employment of amphibious forces is worldwide; 

our focus remains similarly wide.

Because of the broad-based nature of our 

possible time, place, and degree of deployment, 

we have to maintain maximum flexibility and 

maximum readiness. All the good things one 

may say about the Marine Corps fades to platitudes if we cannot instantly react as we are paid 

to do. We emphasize our readiness over and 

over, for it is the sine qua non of our existence. 

And our focus in the Marine Corps will not waver from that lasting goal of complete readiness.

To that end, we are constantly examining 

our policies, personnel, and equipment, to ensure that they meet the needs of the mobility 

necessary for our amphibious mission.

One of the vehicles for testing ourselves 

is training. There is no guarantee that methods 

proven successful in training will stand up in 

combat, but it is obvious that those who fail in 

the training environment will not survive on 

the battlefield. And, although proof of guaranteed success is elusive, history shows that welltrained units have a much higher probability of 

success than others, regardless of circumstances. So we are placing great importance on training at all levels, being aware that it serves two 

ends—testing and preparation.

Nuclear and 

High-Armor Threats

Our training must reflect the most difficult circumstances we might encounter. We must train 

“A forcible entry into enemy-controlled territory...” in any future conflict, Wilson points out, “would most 

certainly be conducted from the sea,” and that is the reason, he notes, for the Corps’ continuing emphasis 

on amphibious training and doctrine. Col Peter Michael Gish, Onslow Beach, watercolor on paper. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
246 chapter three

for defense against nuclear weapons, for we dare 

not assume they will not be used.

The next most critical problem is the 

high-armor threat. We are planning to meet 

this threat by expanding our deployment of the 

[M47] Dragon and TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided] missile systems and 

by adding the M60A1 tank to our arsenal as a 

replacement for older models.

It used to be a cliché that “the best weapon 

against a tank is a tank,” the implication being 

that it was the only weapon. Recent advances 

in hand-held infantry antitank weapons have 

modified that idea. Better tanks are vital for 

our armored support needs, but the rifleman 

is no longer helpless against the tank. Further, 

we have no plans to build “heavy” divisions; such 

would be inconsistent with our mission. We are 

uniquely dedicated to the concept that integrated air and ground weapons are our best means 

of defeating enemy armor.

A very important step in improving our 

combat readiness has been the establishment of 

an air-ground combat training program at the 

Marine Corps Base Twentynine Palms, California. A certain amount of time will be spent in 

preparing to move entire units through a combat arms training program. The concept of such 

training is very important for two reasons:

• First, the training will, as far as consistent with safety, be realistic. Ground 

unit commanders and support weapons 

controllers will be using live ordnance 

to refine their skills in the coordination 

of all the assets that an infantry commander has at his disposal to support 

him in the execution of his mission. 

For the artillery, tank, aircraft, and 

other support units, the training will 

be realistic since they will actually be 

conducting live-fire missions. The infantry units will get an opportunity to 

observe the effects of supporting arms 

on the ground and will gain greater 

confidence in their use. By conducting 

live training in direct support of the infantry unit, the support units will become more proficient in their primary 

task.

• Second, the training program will allow for innovative thinking and improvement on existing techniques. The 

program cycle will be repeated for different units that pass through, so that 

those conducting the program will be 

able to make refinements and try new 

ideas incrementally, without jeopardizing an entire training exercise. New 

weapons and equipment items will be 

introduced as they appear, at first in 

the form of demonstrations and later 

as an integral part of the exercises. In 

keeping with our policy of concurrent 

testing and training, commanders and 

their staffs will be expected during 

the full unit phase of each exercise to 

demonstrate that they can effectively 

coordinate and use supporting arms. 

The possibilities of the program are exciting, and the benefits that will accrue 

enormous. Our combat power will be 

substantially improved. By coordinating the entire program at Twentynine 

Palms, we will be able to support the 

program from our existing training 

budget. We will train and test both 

Regular and Reserve units, and we will 

include electronic warfare as part of 

the exercises we conduct to create as 

realistic an atmosphere as possible.
general louis h. wilson 247

Air Support 

for the Front Line

To further enhance our frontline Marines’ ability to do his job, we are looking hard at our aviation requirements for the future. Whatever form 

our air support takes, it has but one purpose: 

to support the ground trooper. All our aviation 

problems must be addressed from that perspective. One of the biggest problems is money, and 

financial constraints will be a permanent reality 

in procurement of all items. Aircraft are particularly vulnerable to monetary limitations because 

of, among other things, long lead time and the 

need for sophisticated equipment.

Aircraft also make considerable demands 

on our personnel. It takes highly qualified men 

and women to maintain and support modern 

airplanes. They require schooling of weeks or 

months duration as well as on-the-job training 

before they are fully effective. Those factors lead 

inevitably to the fact that we must seek the simplest aircraft consistent with our needs, and we 

must try to procure as few different aircraft as 

we can.

Consistent with those goals, we anticipate 

that by the 1980s our aviation assets will be a 

combination of V/STOL [vertical/short takeoff 

and landing] craft for light attack and the [McDonnell Douglas] F18 [Hornet] for fighter/attack missions, as a gradual replacement for the 

Two of the new weapons systems that figured prominently in the Marine Corps’ plans for the future were 

the F-18 and the LHA. Col H. Avery Chenoweth, F/A-18 Hornet, oil on canvas. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
248 chapter three

[McDonnell Douglas] F4 [Phantom II]. We are 

monitoring all aviation developments closely 

and are working in close harmony with the Navy 

in the aircraft field.

We are looking as well at rotary wing requirements, and [we] are planning now for aircraft to replace those in our present inventory. 

Of course, the new [Sikorsky] CH-53E [Super 

Stallion] will enhance our lift capability. Beyond 

that, we must realize that we cannot always afford to design a new aircraft from scratch when 

an existing model becomes obsolete. On the 

other hand, we are not prepared to completely 

reorganize our ground elements to maintain the 

principle of tactical integrity, if such reorganization is necessary solely to take advantage of “onthe-shelf ” items.

In all our aviation requirements, both rotary and fixed wing, we intend to take advantage 

of modern electro-optical systems, sophisticated weapons, and other technological advances 

to provide the best possible support for the Marine in the rifle squad on the ground.

New Technology 

for Amphibious 

Operations

Because of our unique seaborne role, we are 

constantly concerned with developments in 

amphibious shipping. The LHAs [landing helicopter assault, or multipurpose amphibious assault ships] that are coming along will enhance 

our lift capability, and we are vitally interested 

in follow-on technology to the work, which has 

already been done in hydrofoils and surface effect vehicles.

Much of the doubt that some observers 

have recently expressed about our capacity to 

conduct an amphibious landing is based on the 

assumption that 30-year old techniques and 

equipment will be used indefinitely into the future. Although we will still land from ships onto 

a hostile shore, there will be great differences in 

landings of the future from those of Tarawa and 

Okinawa. The basic problems will remain the 

same; methods of solving them will continue to 

change dramatically.

There also will be occasions when Marines 

are needed very rapidly in areas that cannot be 

reached by ship, or at least not fast enough. We 

have worked with the Air Force in the past to 

help move Marines to trouble spots. We will 

continue to do so, and our cooperative efforts 

with the Air Force will be part of our training 

plans as well. We must ensure that we are prepared to meet our legal mission of “such other 

duties as the President may direct.”38

To be ready to fulfill our primary and secondary missions, our divisions and wings must 

be adapted to the most likely place and method 

of employment for each. By law, we have three 

active divisions and aircraft wings, and one of 

each in reserve. They do not necessarily all have 

to be the same size and shape, as long as they are 

flexible, ready, and mobile. We will make any 

necessary shifts of personnel or equipment to 

ensure the constant readiness of our FMF [Fleet 

Marine Force] elements for the most likely contingencies.

We will continue to keep smaller units 

from the three active divisions positioned where 

they are most needed generally, afloat with Navy 

fleets. Circumstances may arise, however, where 

the prepositioning of an amphibious force in a 

threatened area might give a potential aggressor 

pause, and reduce his range of options considerably. But, however our divisions, wings, Marine 

Amphibious Brigades, and Marine Amphibious 

38 Title 10, U.S. Code § 5063, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1043 

(1986).
general louis h. wilson 249

Units are structured, and wherever they are located, they will be specifically designed for their 

amphibious role. If we are again committed to 

sustained land combat, we will make whatever 

adjustments are necessary to carry out that assignment.

Within the Department of Defense, we 

are fitted under the category “General Purpose 

Forces.” Considering the missions assigned to 

the Corps, we think of ourselves as a ready, 

mobile general purpose force with amphibious 

expertise.

“We Will Not 

Sacrifice Quality”

Our personnel are, of course, our most important asset. Whatever plans and concepts for the 

future, they will have to begin with the individual Marine. A division of 18,000 men is built one 

man at a time, both on paper and in practice. 

And we look to every man in each division to 

carry his share of the responsibility for that division’s readiness, from the commanding general 

to the rifleman.

Our recruiting initiatives are an attempt to 

assure that every man who comes into the Corps 

will be able to fill a position in that division or 

wing and have the potential to move up through 

the ranks and assume greater responsibilities as 

his knowledge and experience grow. To that end, 

we will continue to have a goal of 75 percent 

high school graduates among our enlistees. We 

will not sacrifice quality for quantity.

We will continue to recruit women for 

our ranks, although we do not contemplate any 

combat role for them, in accordance with existing law. We now have approximately 350 women 

officers and about 3,000 women in the enlisted 

ranks. Current plans are to raise those figures to 

about 480 officers and 3,700 enlisted by 1980.

Those figures are not very large, but, as 

long as the legal restrictions against placing 

women in combat units exist, we are limited in 

the billets in which we can use women. We have 

women in many varied assignments, and all but 

the combat military occupational specialties are 

open to women Marines.

Regardless of how women serve in our 

ranks or in what capacity, they are Marines, and 

the standards we impose on Marines apply to 

all. Naturally, in such areas as physical fitness, 

we use different methods of measurement, but 

no one is exempt from being fit and ready. We 

have always believed that Marines are Marines 

and, except for the differences over which we 

have no control, we do not try to differentiate 

between the sexes.

The slogan “If everybody could get in the Marines, 

it wouldn’t be the Marines” played heavily in the 

recruiting campaign that ran from 1971 to 1984. 

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
250 chapter three

Leadership: The Most 

Important Function

If people are our most important asset, then 

leadership must be our most important function. We are constantly evaluating our leadership programs, recognizing that, as our society 

changes, our leadership needs change. Young 

men and women who enter the Marine Corps 

today are experiencing pressures that did not 

exist 20 years ago. On the other hand, they are 

better educated and more sophisticated than the 

18- and 19-year olds of the 1950s.

Society is emphasizing individual awareness, and our programs emphasize self-respect 

and respect for others as part of our fundamental approach. Old leadership ideas have not disappeared; they are merely taking a new form to 

meet the needs of a new generation of Marines. 

I emphasize that they are still Marines in every 

sense of the word. They respond to good leadership as always.

In return for the favorable reaction we are 

getting from our Marines on our recent initiatives to emphasize personal responsibility and 

individual quality, we are trying to pay more attention to our good Marines—the overwhelming majority—and provide them with additional 

reasons to stay on the team. We are reducing 

personnel turbulence by stabilizing the length 

of tours and eliminating unnecessary permanent 

moves. We are looking for ways to provide better educational opportunities for our Marines 

who want to improve themselves and increase 

their chances of promotion. There are certain 

expenses involved, but the rewards to the Marine Corps and to society as a whole are manifold, whether the Marine stays on in the Corps 

or returns to the civilian world. In summary, we 

are emphasizing professionalism in the Marine 

Corps for the coming years, and our emphasis 

is on the individual Marine as part of our airground team. I have reiterated here our philosophy is based upon our maritime role and our 

all-important partnership with the Navy.

The vitality of our nation is linked to the 

sea, and our focus will continue to be there, as 

our name implies. We perceive that we have a 

job to do, that the American people trust in us 

to be prepared to do that job, and that we are 

and will continue to be ready. We shall not betray that trust.

Wilson identified leadership as the most important 

function of the Marine Corps. His philosophy is 

reflected in the recruiting slogan: “Marines. To 

lead is our tradition.”

Official U.S. Marine Recruiting poster
251

THE PERSONNEL CAMPAIGN 

ISSUE IS NO LONGER 

IN DOUBT

by Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor

Marine Corps Gazette, January 1978

cord, a rejection of authority and established 

values, cynicism, and a philosophical commitment to rights without responsibilities.

In this climate, the Marine Corps came 

home from Vietnam, its banner held high, proud 

of the professional manner in which it had acquitted itself in that unpopular war. The Corps 

settled down in a business-as-usual fashion and 

resumed peacetime training as though nothing 

unusual had happened or was happening. The order of the day was continue the march, no compromises, no short cuts. In this regard, we can 

be thankful for our steadfastness, because in the 

difficult days that followed, the discipline of the 

Corps sustained it. But to think that the Corps 

would be unaffected by the changes in society 

was unrealistic. We were drawing our recruits 

from that society. Good and the bad aspects 

would be reflected. Though reluctant to admit 

it, the Marine Corps, like the other Services in 

the early ’70s, was having serious disciplinary 

problems.

On top of this, the draft ended. The era of 

the all-volunteer force was ushered in. In the 

following pages, I would like to tell the story 

that ensued. One aspect deals with recruiting, 

F

ew campaigns in Marine Corps history 

have been as difficult and critical.39 Few 

campaigns have been so dramatically 

marked by defeats and victories. In no other 

campaign was the future of our Corps so threatened.

The campaign was not fought on some far 

offshore, but in the cities and towns of America 

and on the drill fields of Parris Island and San 

Diego. The campaign can be called the Personnel Campaign, 1973–77. It dealt with recruiting 

and recruit training. While there are still pockets 

of resistance, it is probably safe to say that the 

campaign has ended, and the issue is no longer 

in doubt.

The precarious struggle began sometime 

after the public attitude turned against the war 

in Vietnam. Coincidentally, a social upheaval had 

taken place in the United States, which was particularly manifest among the youth of the land. 

Its most negative aspects were marked by a drug 

culture, a climate of permissiveness, racial dis39 The original article came from LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, “The 

Personnel Campaign Issue Is No Longer in Doubt,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 62, no. 1 (January 1978). Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.
252 chapter three

the other recruit training, but at all times the 

two were inextricably mixed.

Recruiting

There were three basic errors made in the 

post-Vietnam recruiting situation, which bore 

bitter fruit for the Corps for years thereafter. 

The first error dealt with the subject of education. The Marine Corps had always encouraged 

young men to remain in high school before enlisting. A standing recruiting goal of 65 percent 

high school graduates existed. From a practical standpoint, however, it did not appear that 

the market could support this goal. As a result, 

greater dependence was being placed on mental testing of the IQ variety, the sort of test that 

measures the trainability of an enlistee. To many, 

this index of quality was superior to the mere 

possession of a high school diploma.

There was a deceptive logic behind this 

thinking, which recognized that the nationwide 

variance in educational quality made it almost 

impossible to use a high school diploma as an 

accurate measure of intelligence and ability on 

the part of the recipient. As some were quick 

to point out, frequently diplomas were nothing 

more than social certificates, indicating that a 

student had vegetated in a school for four years. 

It seemed to make sense that a test for trainability was a more useful instrument to measure an 

enlistee’s potential for useful service, regardless 

of whether the enlistee had finished high school 

or not. So testing soon became a primary index 

for quality measurement. The 65 percent high 

school graduate goal remained on the books, but 

it also remained unachieved, as the actual numbers enlisted dipped for a time below 50 percent.40 Further, given the recruiting conditions 

40 The issue of high school diplomas was raised in January 1974 

when the House Appropriations Committee report pressed for a 

at the time, a mandatory high school percentage would sorely narrow the recruiting market 

and could threaten the Corps’ total personnel 

strength.

For a period of years, the Marine Corps had 

been filling its ranks largely with high school 

dropouts. In retrospect, it is clear that we had 

erred. It is one thing for a young man to be 

trainable, as measured by a validated testing 

system. It is quite another for him to be receptive to training. The very factors that prompted 

many enlistees to drop out of high school also 

retroactive 55 percent high school graduate requirement on the 

Marine Corps for that fiscal year. As the year was half over, this 

was a clearly impossible task. It did, however, signal a concern over 

the number of non-high school graduates coming into the Corps.

I’m Looking for a Few Good Marines to Help Me Find a 

Few Good Recruits, Marine Corps Recruiting poster.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 253

compelled many of them to resist training both 

at the recruit depots and in subsequent Service 

schools and assignments.

In short, the Marine Corps, by taking a 

large number of dropouts, had been taking a 

large percentage of losers. Our ranks were being infiltrated by too many nonachievers whose 

only real potential was trouble. What the Corps 

had failed to fully appreciate was that the high 

school diploma, notwithstanding its value as 

an index of mental capability, was indeed a social document. It told us some things about the 

young man. It told us that he had the perseverance to stick to a job for four years, and it also 

told us that he exhibited acceptable social behavior, or else he would have been invited to leave 

school before completion. Most importantly, it 

gave us a clue as to the influence of his home life. 

The high school diploma with the testing system 

was the proper combination to ensure quality, 

but we suffered through a trying period before 

this was properly recognized. In the meantime, 

the problems appeared to grow almost geometrically.

The second recruiting error was an error 

of assumption. Throughout the draft years, the 

Marine Corps did reasonably well in recruiting. 

Prospects were not knocking down the doors 

to the recruiting office, but on the whole, adequate numbers of applicants came to enlist. 

The assumption was made, therefore, that because we were a volunteer organization, the end 

of the draft would not impact adversely on our 

recruiting effort. As it turned out, the recruiting service soon came to the chilly realization 

that a large percentage of our so-called volunteers were volunteering to avoid being drafted 

into the Army, or as the result of an undefined 

awareness of some form of military obligation 

to the country. Our enlistment success was, in 

fact, draft-motivated. Without that motivation, 

success soon went out the window.

Not having foreseen that recruiting in an 

all-volunteer environment was a brand new ball 

game, the recruiting service was ill-prepared 

to cope with selling the Corps in a competitive 

market. The results were dramatic and bad. Recruiters were still held to quotas, but they had 

not been given the skills, tools, or management 

techniques necessary to survive in what can be 

best described as a sales world. On top of this, 

Marine Corps publicity was almost wholly dependent upon public service advertising. Only 

after a long struggle was money authorized for 

paid-print advertising to make the Corps competitive in the manpower market.

While “management” at district and Headquarters Marine Corps levels desperately sought 

to gear up for the new situation, the “salesmen,” 

Photographic print after the classic Marine Corps 

recruiting poster We Don’t Promise You a Rose Garden. 

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
254 chapter three

like good Marines, did the best they could. They 

were mission-oriented. For each of them, the 

mission was numbers or quota. In retrospect, 

it is a marvel that the recruiters did as good a 

job as they in fact did. Many a marriage went 

on the rocks, and many a nervous stomach disorder developed, as recruiting sergeants expended superhuman efforts and man-killing 

hours trying to find “a few good men”—particularly when they could not promise a prospect 

a “rose garden.” Nonetheless, given the lack of 

draft pressure, the unpreparedness of the recruiting service to compete in the recruiting 

market place and the propensity to enlist high 

school dropouts who scored acceptably on the 

trainability tests, it was inevitable that the quality of the recruits would drop. Add to this the 

pressure of monthly quotas, and it was equally inevitable that the percentage of recruiting errors and downright cheating would rise.

A final error in the recruiting equation resulted from another false assumption, that drill 

instructors were miracle workers and could 

make a Marine out of anyone. This belief was a 

convenient one for the recruiter who was having difficulty making quota. It was enhanced by 

a wartime Department of Defense requirement 

that called for the enlistment of 20 percent Mental Group IVs. The recruiter could rationalize 

that he should not stand in judgment over what 

seemed to be a poorly qualified prospect’s potential for success in training. Making Marines, 

Life in the Marine Corps, Marine Corps recruiting booklet, ca. 1978. 

Marine Corps Recruiting Collection (COLL/636), Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 255

after all, was the job of the people at the recruit 

depots. Besides, if the prospect had any potential at all, the drill instructor could bring it out 

and make him a good Marine. Thus evolved the 

insidious principle of “when in doubt, ship him.”

This combination of factors soon pumped 

far too many poor quality recruits into the recruit depots on either coast. The ingredients for 

mischief were present and working.

Recruit Training

Marine Corps boot camp has always been a mysterious thing. Raw, callow youth, fresh from city, 

town, and farm by some almost magical feat are 

turned into smartly disciplined Marines capable 

of smiling in the face of death, and prepared to 

storm the “Halls of Montezuma and the Shores 

of Tripoli.” All this is done in less than 90 days. 

The master craftsmen who turn out these spirited wonders are the legendary drill instructors 

[DIs]. But like the recruiters, fate conspired 

against the DIs in the early ’70s. Seeds of later 

trouble were sown at the recruit depots.

Again, trouble stemmed from related causes. In the first instance, the DI was being overworked. He worked on a rigid and tight training 

schedule. To aggravate matters, the recruit training schedule had grown a bit like Topsy.41 A new 

requirement added here and there seemed insignificant, but the cumulative effect was to put the 

drill instructor on a treadmill where he had to 

run just to keep from losing ground. On top of 

this, recruit platoons had grown to unmanageable size. Given the task facing the DI, it was an 

exceptional NCO, indeed, who could maintain 

the training pace and his composure at all times.

A primary cause for later anguish, however, was the introduction of the declining quality 

recruits. Overwork and a percentage of inferior 

quality material spelled trouble for the DI and 

the Corps. Being proud Marines, the DIs, again 

like the recruiters, were mission-oriented. If 

the goal was to turn out Marines, that is exactly 

what they would do, regardless of the incoming 

quality. The DI would force them into a mold, 

push and pull them through training, pop them 

out of the mold at the other end, and hope that 

they would have benefited from the experience 

and perform as acceptable Marines. In too many 

instances though, it was a case of trying to make 

something out of nothing. Anybody who served 

in the operating forces during the dark ages of 

41 Topsy was a trained circus elephant who made headlines in 1903. 

See Kat Eschner, “Topsy the Elephant Was a Victim of Her Captors, 

Not Thomas Edison,” Smithsonian, 4 January 2017.

Pvt Leroy D. Curry of Dayton, ND, scores his shot 

on prequalification day during week five of the 

nine-week training cycle at Edson Range, Camp 

Pendleton, CA, on 12 April 1978. His final qualification score was 190.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 03510878, 

courtesy of MSgt C.H. McCormic
256 chapter three

the early ’70s knows that, far too frequently, it 

did not work. There were no miracle workers. 

The computer adage of “garbage in–garbage out” 

applied to the recruiting and recruit training 

processes. Many ill-adjusted, antisocial young 

men ended up in our ranks. They caused great 

damage to our Corps before the pendulum began its return swing to quality.

In the process of meeting a demanding 

schedule, trying to train recruits while coping 

with a percentage of misfits found in every platoon, the frustration factor for the DI began to 

tell. Certain improper practices began to creep 

onto the drill field in the name of discipline and 

motivation. At best, these could be described as 

petty harassment: the screaming, the gratuitous 

profanity, the order/counterorder. At worst, 

they can be defined as debasement, maltreatment, and abuse, to include the laying-on of 

the hands. The roots of these unhappy practices 

went well back into recruit training history, but 

for the most part, past incidents of real abuse 

had been aberrations. Unfortunately, in the ’70s, 

the process became institutionalized. Supervisory safeguards against it, while present, proved 

inadequate. They were inadequate because they 

were geared to what could be considered a normal cycle of training with a normal body of recruits. The conditions of the ’70s were neither.

By 1974, we hit our low point. The Fleet 

Marine Forces were complaining about the 

product given them by the recruit depots. Drill 

instructors were complaining about the poor 

quality of recruits they were receiving, and reA recruit receives mandatory vaccination at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, SC.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 016033722
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 257

cruiters were complaining about quotas and the 

quality of the recruit market place. There was 

a certain degree of finger-pointing, as all Marines experienced the exasperation of a decline 

in quality in our Corps. Fortunately, a new day 

was about to dawn. Marine leadership faced the 

problem squarely and started actions in the recruiting service, at the recruit depots, and in the 

operating forces to set the situation straight.

Unfortunately, however, time had run out 

on the Corps. The public eye focused on the 

Marines shortly after the renaissance began, but 

before it became visible. One has only to look at 

media coverage of recruiting and recruit training abuse and the commentaries upon the disciplinary statistics within the Corps to appreciate 

how badly shaken public confidence became. It 

was an experience that scarred those involved, 

and one that no Marine should ever forget.

Emerging 

from the Darkness

The first and most essential step out of the darkness had to start with the recruiting service. 

Only by shutting off the alarmingly high input of 

inferior recruits could the Corps return to normal. The damage done by these poor performers cannot be overemphasized. Not only did 

they create problems at the recruit depots, but 

those who made it through boot camp created 

such trouble in the operating forces that many 

young Marines of admirable quality became disillusioned with the Corps. Reenlistment rates 

dropped. More than a few good Marines went 

UA [unauthorized absence] just to get out of the 

growing unwholesomeness of garrison life. The 

crisis of public confidence in the Corps that was 

later to emerge in 1976 was preceded by a crisis 

of spirit in the Corps itself. It permeated every 

level. Duty with the FMF had its appeal replaced 

with apprehension for officer and enlisted alike.

It was obvious, therefore, that action had 

to be taken to ensure that only quality recruits 

were enlisted. To do this, drastic action had to be 

taken in three areas:

• Criteria for enlistment

• Quality and training of recruiters

• Recruiting management and quality 

control measures

Upgrading in these areas was neither easy 

nor amenable to overnight achievement, if for 

no other reason than all were interrelated. For 

example, if the enlistment criteria were raised, 

it meant that the recruiting market was narrowed, which meant that it was more difficult to 

recruit, a fundamental problem in the original 

As part of the “Few Good Men” recruitment 

campaign, the Marine Corps issued a poster that 

assured potential recruits with the slogan: “We still 

make ’em like we used to.” 

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
258 chapter three

equation; that is, when quantity became hard 

to get, cheating became an attractive near-term 

solution. If this was to be avoided, it called for 

recruiters who could recruit effectively in a narrow market. In turn, those recruiters had to be 

trained to a level commensurate with the job. 

On the management level, it called for developing these resources and controlling them—no 

easy task. Nonetheless, the recruiting comeback 

was undertaken with a vengeance with actions 

in the three areas occurring unevenly, but concurrently.

A general officer was put in charge of recruiting. Recruiting guidebooks were developed. The selection process for recruiters was 

tightened up. The syllabus at recruiter school 

was revamped. Industry was searched for sales 

and market management techniques. Sales and 

self-confidence programs ranging from Dale 

Carnegie to Xerox courses were introduced in 

search of means to improve recruiter capabilities. Statistics, reports, and data of all sorts were 

analyzed to improve performance in what was 

to become a tight market, because it was to be 

a quality market. The Marine Corps’ advertising 

program took on a new look with reemphasis 

on a “few good men.” Enlistment criteria were 

reexamined, and standards for enlistments were 

raised. As already noted, the House Appropriations Committee had sought a mandatory high 

school percentage in 1974. By the end of the fiscal year, the Marine Corps had no doubt about 

the efficacy of that congressional move, but 

more importantly, it had also become convinced 

that quality recruiting goals could be achieved 

and maintained by skilled Marine recruiters in 

the all-volunteer environment. Thereafter, the 

requirement for high school graduates and the 

qualifying scores on the enlistment test batteries 

were incrementally raised.

As standards were raised and the ability of 

the recruiters improved, various recruiting systems began to emerge. These were the results of 

trial and error and adaptation from business and 

sales-world expertise. While each varied in one 

or more respects, there were certain common 

elements, which were in large measure designed 

to make maximum use of minimum resources. 

The systems permitted the recruiter to analyze 

his market and to program his time and activities 

profitably. It showed him how to make use of 

natural recruiting vehicles within his locale (e.g., 

radio, TV, newspapers, patriotic and Marineaffiliated organizations, etc.). It prompted him 

to establish required standards of performance 

to achieve specific goals. For example, in using 

the telephone, the recruiter could formulate 

how many calls he had to make to get the reqThe drill instructor has been called “a Marine’s 

Marine.” The DI instructs, guides, and molds 

recruits into basic Marines, where discipline is the 

difference between success and failure, whether on 

the battlefield or in garrison. 

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 259

uisite number of appointments to achieve the 

necessary number of applicants to result in the 

number of enlistees desired.

The disorganization and the sense of futility that plagued the recruiter at the onset of 

the all-volunteer era and frequently drove the 

weak recruiter to recruiting malpractice slowly 

disappeared. What began to emerge was a truly 

professional recruiting force which, given the 

training and assets, could do the job regardless 

of a narrowing market occasioned by tougher 

enlistment standards and fluctuating unemployment.

There were many setbacks in the process. 

It is a truism within the recruiting service that 

recruiters will recruit to the lowest common 

denominator. This tendency required that strict 

and stern controls be implemented and enforced 

to ensure that recruiters were adhering to the 

quality standards set down by the Commandant. 

Corollary to this is the fact that a recruiter’s productivity will suffer whenever a “change” takes 

place. This is an interesting phenomenon that, 

while purely psychological, is nevertheless real 

in its impact. So it was that every time criteria changes were made, recruiter performance 

would go into temporary decline. At times, 

also, during the get-well period, other events, 

not psychological, put a real crimp on recruiting. Two of the most damaging were the Roth 

Amendment at the beginning of 1975, which 

put a freeze on travel funds, sorely restricting 

the mobility of recruiters, and a congressionally 

directed reduction in recruiters and recruit advertising funds in the spring of 1976.

It is ironic that the Congress, which has 

been so concerned about the quality of Marine 

Corps recruiting, has the propensity to occasionally make that job all the more difficult. 

The cuts have been substantially restored for FY 

1978, although the desired monies for recruit 

advertising are still below adequate levels.

As recruiting was revitalized, it was often a 

case of two steps forward, one step back. But it 

became apparent that progress was being made. 

Quotas were being met and, more importantly, quality was on the rise. During this ongoing 

revitalization period when it was still uncertain 

whether the recruiting service was going to 

achieve both quality and quantity, the Commandant made it clear to all involved in the recruiting business that quotas were to be considered 

goals but that quality was a requirement. The 

message of quality over quantity came through 

loudly and clearly.

In 1975, the Commandant made another 

decision, which was to enhance recruiting management, but more importantly, assured a quantum jump in quality control. Effective in June 

1976, operational control for recruiting shifted 

from Headquarters Marine Corps to the commanding generals of the two recruit depots: San 

Diego and Parris Island. Henceforth, recruiting 

west of the Mississippi (8th, 9th, and 12th Marine Corps Districts) with roughly 50 percent 

of the annual quota, became the responsibility of [the] CG [commanding general], MCRD 

San Diego, while the other half from the eastern United States (1st, 4th, and 6th Districts) 

became Parris Island’s responsibility. In effect, 

the Commandant charged the two depot commanders with sole responsibility for providing 

the operating forces with basic Marines in requisite numbers and of requisite quality. If the 

operating forces were not happy with the product, one did not have to look far to fix blame. 

If the field was happy with what they were getting, credit could also be quickly acknowledged. 

This action, together with judicious use of the 

expeditious discharge program throughout the 
260 chapter three

Corps, crowned with success the long, tough 

fight along the comeback trail. The bad blood 

was being pumped out and new, good blood was 

being pumped in.

By the end of calendar year 1976, it was 

clear that the Corps was well along the way in its 

quest for quality. All the indices of performance 

reflected improved health. Recruit attrition was 

down; physical and mental categories and high 

school graduates were up. In the field, expeditious discharges began tapering off. UA, desertion, and crime went down dramatically. A sense 

of spiritual rejuvenation was evident throughout 

the Corps.

In spite of clear improvement in recruiting, 

the task of getting good recruits remained difficult. The shocking fact was that only two out of 

every five young men within the target population of 17–21 years of age met the qualifications 

for service. If a recruiter was to be successful 

he had to work hard for those two in competition with the other Services, the private and 

public sectors of the economy, all of whom were 

looking for the same caliber person. The task 

proved manageable, however, in proportion to 

the skills, organization, and determination of 

the recruiter and the support he received from 

the recruiting hierarchy.

As indicated earlier, a recruiter has to approach his task systematically to achieve success. 

As high school graduates prove to be the best 

bet for successful service, it is obvious that the 

successful recruiter targets this population and 

places high value on lists of high school seniors 

and graduates within his area. This allows him 

to concentrate his efforts on the quality market. 

Armed with such lists, the recruiter systematically attempts to contact and gain an appointment with as many prospects as he can. In this 

endeavor, he will use the mail, telephone, home 

visits, personal referrals, and high school visits 

to make initial contact. The key axiom in this 

process is the golden rule of the sales world: 

activity equals productivity, which translates 

as the more you do, the greater your success.

To understand the dimensions of activity 

involved in recruiting just one qualified enlistee, 

the following statistics are helpful. The recruiter, 

using the means cited above, must generate sufficient activity to contact 181 potential enlistees 

in order to secure 18 appointments to realize 

a show rate of 9 of whom 4 will actually apply 

for enlistment, 2 of whom will qualify for enlistment yielding the 1 who will actually enlist. This 

effort means 108 working hours for the recruiter 

and a cost of approximately $1,500 per recruit.

It might be appropriate to note at this point 

that the recruiting service, like its business 

world counterparts, is constantly striving to increase productivity while lowering costs. Aside 

from internal management improvements, one 

valuable technique to recruit economically is to 

make use of new enlistees to generate help in 

the recruiting business by providing referrals to 

the recruiter. This is done while the enlistee is 

waiting to ship to boot camp and again when he 

is home on leave. Command recruiting is also 

vital and cost-effective in the recruiting effort, 

although it has not yet been exploited to its 

full potential. Consider this: 192,000 Marines 

take 30 days annual leave, which equates to 

5,760,000 man-days of exclusive Marine contact with the civilian community. If only 1 percent of those on leave subscribed to the adage 

“every Marine gets a Marine,” the Corps would 

realize a free recruiting gain of almost 2,000. A 

fledgling pilot program conducted this past year 

actually demonstrated that, with appropriate 

command attention and emphasis, the command 

recruiting rate can be in excess of 2 percent. 
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 261

Corps-wide this means that we have a built-in 

capability to achieve 10 percent of 1978’s recruiting goals by use of fellow Marines on leave. 

The message to commanders should be obvious: 

Marines can play a powerful part in regenerating 

their Marine Corps.

As the consolidation of recruiting and recruit training under the depot commanders 

went forward, quality control measures were 

being refined at each recruiting level from the 

substation up. The underlying philosophy of 

quality control was in keeping with the “whole 

man” concept and helped to provide an answer 

to the question: “Will this man make a good Marine?” In other words, the prospective enlistee 

not only had to meet the stiffening standards 

for enlistment as they existed in regulations, 

but also had to pass muster as the type of man 

mature Marine NCO’s and officers on recruiting duty wanted to see in the Corps. This meant 

delving into the background of the man to include work record, character, and reputation.42

Frequently, this was difficult to do because of 

community institutions’ misconception of the 

intent of the Privacy Act. Nonetheless, if we 

were to ensure quality, the recruiter had to do 

his best to overcome local obstacles so he could 

look at the “whole man” and learn as much about 

him as possible before he enlisted him. Where 

feasible, this evaluation process was extended to 

include interviews by an officer or senior NCO 

at the recruiting-station level.

To ensure that recruiters did not take the requirement for quality in the “whole man” lightly, the recruiter’s social security number was 

included on the enlistment papers of each man 

he brought into the Corps. Thereafter, throughout a man’s first enlistment, we had immediate 

knowledge of who enlisted him. The recruiter’s 

SSN [Social Security number] became, in effect, 

a personal stamp of approval and attestation 

to the quality he was putting into the Corps. 

Additional quality control measures were introduced to ensure that recruiters who were 

doing a good job could be quickly identified and 

recognized. Needless to say, it also illuminated 

the marginal or poor recruiter and immediately 

identified any recruiter who was foolish enough 

to cut corners. Some of these measures included a printout comparing the success of a local 

recruiter, in both quality and quantity, with his 

Army, Navy, and Air Force competitors. Another reflected the record of a recruiter’s input at 

the depots and identified his attrition and the 

reasons therefof.

42 The whole man concept has been particularly valuable in assessing the potential for success of the 25 percent non-high school 

graduate enlistees. Such an applicant needs a minimum of 10 years 

of school, higher test scores than the high school graduate, and 

demonstrable potential for achievement.

New arrivals at Parris Island, SC, await classroom 

instruction on their first night of basic training.

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
262 chapter three

Other quality control programs identified

variances in such things as enlistment test scores, 

numbers of dependents, and educational background. Unusual or unexplained variances could 

then be double-checked. With the establishment 

of an assistant chief of staff for recruiting at each 

depot, any aberration, administrative or otherwise, could be spotted and checked out almost 

as soon as a recruit arrived for training. The system identified the good recruiter and the poor 

recruiter and permitted each to enjoy or regret 

the consequences of his actions. The “when in 

doubt, ship” syndrome became a thing of the past.

The Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations (AFEES), through which all Service 

enlistees process, also have contributed to improved quality by tightening their procedures 

thereby screening out the unqualified.43 Various 

versions of the basic entrance test have been 

introduced for random use in testing enlistees. 

Identification procedures for the test applicant 

have also been made stricter. This minimizes the 

likelihood of test cheating and use of substitutes 

on tests. Likewise, a new system called exclusive jurisdiction limits an applicant to a single 

AFEES, thus preventing an unqualified applicant 

from shopping around from AFEES to AFEES 

until he found one where he could beat the system and enlist. A third improvement has done 

much to counteract the difficulty in obtaining 

background information as the result of the 

Privacy Act. This has been the introduction of 

trained interviewers to screen the candidate in 

a one-on-one interview during the process of 

initiating a National Agency Check.44

43 In January 1982, AFEES became the Military Enlistment Processing Station (MEPS).

44 National Agency Check (NAC) is the minimum investigative requirement for final clearance up to secret and for interim 

clearance up to top secret for certain categories of personnel. 

A NAC is also an integral part of a background investigation.

All of these quality control measures are 

paying off. Like any system, however, somebody who has the determination to do so can 

beat it. But the fact remains, it is tough to beat 

this system and, more importantly, if somebody 

does beat it, the chances of being caught are high 

indeed. In short, the present quality control 

procedures keep the honest, honest and go far 

in ensuring that only quality enlistees join our 

ranks.

At this writing, Marine Corps recruiting in 

the all-volunteer environment is working. The 

goals for FY 1977 have been met. We move into 

FY 1978 with confidence that we can get our 

share of the quality market. But make no mistake, it is hard work. It is also resource-sensitive, 

in that we can meet whatever goals are set for 

quality and quantity, but only as long as we have 

a realistic level of assets to do the job.

It is no secret, however, that as the national 

demographic trend turns downward, recruiting 

will become increasingly difficult. Theoretically, 

at least, we can reach a point in the mid-1980s 

where the market will no longer produce results 

as a function of assets employed. It is too early to 

determine how we will fare as we move toward 

the low demographic era. But in the meantime, 

by ensuring a quality input and by ensuring an 

interesting and challenging lifestyle for our new 

Marines, we will reduce attrition and increase 

first-term reenlistments. The two achievements, 

in turn, will lower the manpower demands and 

make the recruiter’s task both manageable and 

attainable.

Reforms 

on the Drill Field

In 1974, as the improvements were getting underway in recruiting, it became apparent at the 

two recruit depots that major readjustments in 
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 263

recruit training were also in order. It was obvious that it was going to take awhile before the effects of higher recruiting standards were felt on 

the drill field. In the meantime, however, steps 

had to be taken at the depots to reverse the soaring attrition rates and to minimize the potential 

for abuse that, in large part, were by-products 

of low quality recruit input. Positive leadership 

and command attention were the two most 

readily available prescriptions for action. Both 

depots tightened supervision and reemphasized 

positive leadership at all levels.

However, a formidable, unique, and most 

unusual problem complicating this prescription 

came onto the drill field: attitude. As a group, 

drill instructors believed that given their rigid 

schedule and the questionable caliber of some 

of their recruits, a heavy-handed, high-stress approach was the only way to ensure that the system produced a good Marine. The DIs, as good 

and as dedicated as they were, failed to see that 

some of the practices that had crept onto the 

drill field were not only counterproductive, but 

also dangerous to the well-being of the Corps.

Too many potentially good Marines were 

being turned off by the periodic absurdities 

that they saw in training and ended up being 

discharged in the process. On the other hand, 

many who should have been sent home made 

it through training. By looking at the disciplinary problems plaguing the Corps, it was 

obvious that a great number who did graduate 

A platoon marches in formation during basic training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, SC, 

23 November 1979.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 016354179
264 chapter three

from boot camp were not necessarily the stellar 

leathernecks their DIs thought them to be. The 

robot-like response to authority on the drill 

field did not extend beyond the main gate. Conformity was being confused with discipline and 

respect for authority.

Unfortunately, the DI’s conviction as to 

how good Marines were made was reinforced by 

a perception that the practices followed on the 

field were time-honored and an integral part of 

“old Corps” success. Translated, this meant that 

the DI perceived that what he was practicing 

was practiced successfully on him as a recruit. 

In some cases this was true, unfortunately. But 

for the most part, it was myth caused by recollections colored by the passage of time. Prompted by an absolute conviction that they were the 

only ones who knew how to make Marines, the 

DIs as a group resisted, and in some measure, 

defied the early actions aimed at eliminating the 

artificial stress and downright foolishness that 

had become part of the recruit training process.

Drill instructor attitudes, therefore, constituted a distinct obstacle to the reforms that were 

getting underway. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that a lot of Marines throughout 

the Corps shared the views of the DIs. To this 

collective group, boot camp was viewed as an 

initiation rite rather than as a training, testing, 

and development process.

Aside from ensuring an input of better 

quality recruits, three major tasks had to be initially accomplished, if corrective action was to 

be successful at the recruit depots:

• Reduce the institutional potential for 

abuse

• Provide for adequate supervision and 

enforcement of command policy

• Change the attitude of drill instructors 

The first essential step in reducing the 

potential for abuse was to reduce some of the 

pressure on the DI and on the recruits. The DI 

was operating in a tense, shrill environment. Everything and everybody connected with the drill 

field was wound tight. If there was any humor at 

Parris Island and San Diego, it was well hidden. 

Everyone went about his tasks tensely and grim 

of visage.

As for the recruits, it was an atmosphere of 

fear compounded by terror from the moment 

they stepped off the bus at the depots. The cultural shock of passing from permissive middleclass America into a highly structured and 

demanding military environment is traumatic 

in itself. But this was not considered anywhere 

near sufficient stress by many DIs. So screaming, 

shouting, and institutional hysteria enveloped 

the Marine aspirants from the moment of their 

arrival.

Common sense and our own personal experiences tell us that one cannot learn in a condition of stark fear. Yet that was the situation into 

which we thrust the new recruits. Then when 

they reacted poorly, indignity was heaped upon 

them, which made the condition worse, which 

in turn invited more indignity ad nauseam. All 

this was supposedly designed to condition the 

recruit to the stress of combat, instill in him 

immediate response to orders (often contradictory), and to cull out the weak. In fact, it was 

asinine on all counts, totally contrary to the 

philosophy and principles of traditional Marine 

Corps leadership in combat and in garrison.

As bad as this business was for the recruit, it 

had an even worse impact on the DI. There was 

no such thing as a relaxed moment. He had to 

keep the recruits under strain at all times. In the 

process, he succeeded in winding himself tighter 

and tighter. This situation was compounded by 

the length and busyness of the DI’s day, which 
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 265

permitted virtually no breathing room or flexibility. It was full speed ahead from 0500 to 2100 

for 11 weeks. Woe unto the recruit who accidentally or deliberately disturbed the headlong 

rush of events, for he was the stuff of which maltreatment was made.

A series of steps were taken, over time, 

to reduce the surrealistic pressure cooker aspect of training while retaining that which has 

been time-tested and proven good in the recruit 

training process. Training was to remain personally demanding, but it was to be conducted 

with firmness, fairness and dignity and, when 

necessary, with compassion. The traditional 

leadership philosophy of the Marine Corps was 

to be reaffirmed: teacher to student, father to 

son. The recruit would have to give 100 percent 

of himself daily in his quest to be a Marine. The 

drill instructor, however, was there to help him 

in this quest, not to harass him.

One of the early steps taken to ease the 

pressure on the DIs was to reduce the number 

of recruits they had to train. Platoons that had 

been running as high as 90 men were limited 

to a more manageable 75. Concomitant was a 

decision to eliminate the artificial stress; that 

is, the screaming, shouting, and exaggerated 

convict-like conformity being enforced between reveille and taps. A buddy system within 

platoons was also introduced so that the slow 

could learn from the fast, thus easing some of 

the DI’s burden. Recruit leaders were designated, through whom the DI could work, to assist 

in the accomplishment of simple and mundane 

tasks. This also tended to identify recruits with 

leadership potential. Recruits were allowed to 

talk in the mess halls. One hour of free time was 

allotted to recruits at the end of the day. Limited to his squad bay, the recruit was permitted 

during this period to use his own time constructively. Letters could be written, equipment prepared for the next day, instructional TV could be 

viewed, etc.

Although the reduction in platoon size was 

universally endorsed, the DI’s reaction to these 

other changes varied. Many applauded what they 

viewed as a return to reality. Others viewed it as 

the beginning of the end for the Marine Corps. 

The majority, however, suspended judgment and 

did what they were told to do.

In March 1976, Parris Island hosted a recruit training conference with representatives 

from San Diego and Headquarters Marine 

Corps attending. There was a free exchange of 

views to include those of experienced DIs and 

sergeants major aimed at validating what had 

been done thus far and to set the course for 

the future. It was clear at this conference that 

additional changes were needed. Among other 

things, the conferees recognized that the DI was 

still over-committed in his daily tasks and, in 

large measure, was still on a treadmill.

As a result of the conference, some 68 hours 

of less-essential training were removed from the 

program of instruction. While reveille and taps 

would still go at 0500 and 2100, respectively, 

scheduled training was set for 0700–1700, six 

Arthur J. Barbour, USMC Instructor on Firing Line, 

ink wash.

Art Collection, U.S. Navy
266 chapter three

days a week. A significant increase in commander’s time was thus made available. This gave both 

drill instructors and series commanders breathing room to accomplish the many nonscheduled 

tasks attendant to running a unit. It also provided flexibility in adjusting to unforeseen schedule 

changes and like vagaries. Sundays, for the most 

part, were to be reserved for divine services in 

the morning and organized athletics in the afternoon.

Another major step resulting from the 

conference was the addition of a second officer to the series team, which had the actual job 

of training recruits. Until then, one lieutenant 

commanded a series of four recruit platoons. 

He, like the DIs, was clearly overworked. The 

addition of an assistant series commander to the 

team eased the burden of the series commander 

and allowed him to exercise command over the 

training of the platoons.

The additional officer was also of value to 

the drill instructor. The assistant series commander could handle much of the administrative and coordination responsibilities of training. 

Likewise, problem recruits need not plague the 

DI. They could be more readily referred to the 

officers for counseling or other action deemed 

appropriate. The additional officer, therefore, 

signaled a reemphasis of the officer’s role in the 

recruit training process. The business of making 

a Marine became less the personal preserve of 

the DI and more the responsibility of the series 

team under the positive command of an experienced officer.45

The addition of an executive officer at com45 The current series team consists of a series commander, assistant 

series commander, a series gunnery sergeant, a senior DI, and the 

two DIs for each of the four platoons in a series.

Recruits stand at attention at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA, in 1983.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 017109883, Marine Corps History Division
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 267

pany level likewise enhanced training, for it enabled company commanders to free themselves 

from their desks to take a more active command 

role on the company level. This increase in officers at the company and series level will probably prove to be the greatest single assurance 

over the long haul for continued firm, fair, and 

dignified treatment of the recruit. It provides 

for clear, adequate, and positive command at the 

working level.

A variety of other changes and reforms took 

place as the result of the conference. All of them 

were designed to eliminate the hysterical aspects 

of recruit training and stress positive leadership 

based upon the fact that incoming recruits were 

volunteers to our ranks who genuinely wanted 

to be Marines. They would be given the opportunity to become Marines with all the help 

necessary; but if they were not willing or able 

to measure up, they would be discharged. This, 

however, could and would be done without a 

lot of superfluous nonsense. The days of trying 

to make a Marine out of just anybody through 

force, fear, and humiliation were over. Gone 

also were the various “motivation” techniques, 

which may have motivated a recruit to get out 

of boot camp as quickly as possible, but did not 

necessarily motivate him to be a good and proud 

Marine.

The elimination of the negative aspects of 

recruit training was not universally welcomed 

by the DIs. The concept of positive leadership and the development of self-discipline as 

both the means and the end of recruit training were viewed in some cases with suspicion 

and submerged hostility. Some continued to 

believe that high stress and abusively imposed 

discipline were the only ways to make a Marine. Those who felt that way were given a 

single opportunity to leave the drill field without prejudice. After that, they would be expected to carry out their orders to the letter.

To add unequivocal emphasis to the permanency of the changes taking place, the Commandant made it clear that he was the senior 

DI in the Marine Corps. If any Marine, officer 

or enlisted, could not adjust to and support the 

changes taking place, it was time he looked outside of the Corps for gainful employment. The 

Commandant further expressed his personal 

command over the recruit training process by 

directing that the two recruit depots become 

mirror images, excepting those circumstances occasioned by geographic, facility, or acute 

climatological differences. In line with this order, the two recruit depots developed common 

SOPs [standard operating procedures], POIs 

[programs of instruction] for recruits, a DI 

School, and a Series Officer School. Near mirror T/Os were developed.

The Commandant also directed maximum 

supervision of the recruit training process by 

depot officers; a capability that was greatly enhanced by the doubling of series officers, the addition of company executive officers, and by the 

establishment of a billet for an assistant depot 

commander incident to the recruiting-recruit 

training consolidation. In addition, the Commandant directed that individual, confidential 

counseling sessions with recruits be conducted 

by a series officer to identify unspoken recruit 

problems at home or in training, including any 

perceived maltreatment. These sessions also 

served to apprise the recruit of his performance 

in training and to motivate him to improve that 

performance.

It should be remembered that, while the 

recruiting and recruit training improvements 

were taking hold, the Marine Corps was under 

heavy fire from the news media, the Congress, 
268 chapter three

and vocal elements of the public. The [Private 

Lynn] McClure case in San Diego and the [Private Harry W.] Hiscock incident at Parris Island 

had become the embodiment of the problems 

that had come to plague the Corps during the 

dark period of the early ’70s.46 But, it is at least 

comforting to know that the improvements in 

both recruiting and recruit training were initiated by the Marine Corps prior to the public outcry about the legacy of past errors. The 

problem, therefore, was one of convincing an 

outraged public that we were truthful when we 

said that the weaknesses had already been spotted and the necessary corrective action had been 

initiated on both fronts.

The year that followed the drill field reforms was an incubation period. The DIs adjusted to the changes and carried out their orders, 

but for months people appeared to be working 

with extreme caution. There was great anxiety 

over doing something wrong no matter how innocent of intent. This uncertainty was in large 

measure due to the increased supervision and 

the many detailed proscriptions contained in 

the revised recruit training SOP, which governed every facet of recruit and drill instructor 

existence. Initially, morale on the field took a 

nosedive. But during the summer of 1976, the 

irrepressible optimism of the Marine NCO began to assert itself. Happily, at that point, the 

improved quality of the recruit also began to 

show clearly.

There were many statistical and intuitive 

indicators of the rise in quality. The newly arriving recruits were brighter and in better physical 

shape. Their attitude was one of eagerness. They 

displayed more common sense. Even the den46 Everett R. Holles, “Marines Continue Abuse of Recruits,” New 

York Times, 18 July 1976; and James P. Sterba, “Marine Recruit 

Abuse Continues,” New York Times, 7 March 1976.

tal clinic reported evidence of better preservice 

dental care, from a dentist’s point of view, a sure 

sign of quality. As quality improved, so did morale.

Coincidentally, some of the dire predictions that reduced discipline would result from 

change were proven false. For example, one 

simple change in the new regimen permitted recruits, on the Sunday before graduation, 

to have base liberty in service uniform until 

1800. The Cassandras predicted all manner of 

dire consequences attendant to unsupervised 

recruits wandering around the depots.47 They 

were proven wrong. The recruits wore their 

uniforms proudly. For the most part, they savored their mini-independence in the company 

of their equally proud families who had come 

for graduation.

As the year progressed, no indications of a 

47 The term Cassandra refers to Greek mythology, where the daughter of Priam was endowed with the gift of prophecy but fated never to be believed, or a harbinger of misfortune and disaster.

A crop of Marine recruits arrives at the Recruit 

Receiving Section at Marine Corps Recruit Depot 

Parris Island, SC, 22 October 1961.

Richard Spencer Papers (COLL/5233), Archives Branch, 

Marine Corps History Division
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 269

decline in the equality of the training or of the 

product of the training surfaced. On the contrary, all the local indicators were positive. Attrition was down. So were disciplinary problems. 

Scores in academics went up as did rifle range 

qualifications. Medical problems in the three 

bugaboos of recruit training—stress fractures, 

cellulitis, and heat casualties—took a decided 

drop. Post-recruit training behavior and performance were also encouraging. Close monitoring 

of field commands indicated increased satisfaction with the product received from the depots.

During the year, one additional event took 

place, which also marked a significant milestone 

in the evolution within recruit training. This was 

the introduction of transition training. It was a 

well-known fact that a recruit experienced cultural shock upon entry into the Service. It was a 

new and strangely structured life. It took some 

getting used to. What was not fully appreciated 

was the fact that a graduating recruit also experienced cultural shock when he left training 

for his new duty station. After 11 weeks of rigid 

regimentation and supervision over most of his 

waking hours, he had to readjust mentally to the 

less-structured existence of normal garrison and 

field life. In short, he had to cope with being his 

own master in a communal living setting where 

there was no DI to govern his every move.

To prepare recruits for this transition, a test 

program was introduced to reduce drill instructor supervision during the nontraining hours of 

the last week of boot camp. Recruits holding 

supervisory billets were given responsibility for 

unit movement and activities. The individual recruit was responsible for planning and using the 

remainder of nontraining time in the barracks. 

In the evening of the last week of boot camp, 

the DI virtually disappeared from the scene by 

going into what can best be described as a duty 

NCO status. The magnitude of this step, in the 

context of recruit training, can be seen in the 

fact that unit and individual preparation for the 

final and all important command inspection was 

left entirely up to the individual recruit and the 

recruit billet holders. The test program was a 

huge success. The recruits cooperated with each 

other and respected the authority of their peer 

leaders who, in turn, exercised their authority 

with a mature sense of responsibility. Recruit 

performance was exemplary. There was a clear 

determination not to betray a trust, not to let 

the DIs down by anything less than perfect performance. The test program was validated and 

finally adopted by both depots.

While this program did much to better 

prepare a recruit for life beyond the depot, it is 

particularly noteworthy for another reason. Until it was instituted, all other changes in recruit 

training emanated from the top. The idea of 

transition training originated on the drill field. It 

was supported by the DIs and battalion officers 

before it ever reached the command level as a 

recommendation. In short, it was a sign that the 

drill field community was accepting the fact that 

recruit training procedures were not set forth 

in holy writ, that improvements could, in fact, 

be made.

As the trauma of change faded into the past 

and life on the drill field stabilized, the two depot commanders undertook another important project. They constituted a joint task force 

headed by the assistant depot commander at 

San Diego to evaluate the entire recruit training process. The task force’s objectives were to 

find out what the field wanted the depots to 

produce by way of a basic Marine, to research 

the latest techniques and aides to training, and 

to come up with a validated program of training, which would be both responsive to the field 
270 chapter three

and accomplished in the most effective manner.

This unprecedented project took the task 

force members throughout the Marine Corps to 

commands of every size and variety. Marines at 

every level were systematically questioned and 

interviewed. In all, there were almost 4,000 

questionnaires administered and 450 in-depth 

interviews conducted. The task force also included in its labors discussion at the Marine 

Corps Development and Education Command 

concerning the future environment and requirements of the Corps in the context of current 

projections. In addition, use was made of studies and projections of sister Services on a wide 

range of topics, which might have a bearing on 

the Corps’ recruits and their training. Teams of 

the task force also visited major commands and 

recruit training centers of the other Services to 

study their concepts, techniques, and hardware. 

When the strings were all pulled together, both 

commanding generals sat down with the team 

to examine the results and to develop a recommended course of action for future training.

It was clear from the task force’s findings 

that the current recruit training program was 

almost fully responsive to the needs of the field. 

No dramatic changes or departures in philosophy or content appeared necessary. In general, 

the operating forces were getting what they 

wanted from the recruit depots: a new Marine 

who was self-reliant, responsible, physically fit, 

proud, and competent in basic military skills. 

Generic requirements, which did emerge from 

the task force work, were broken down into 

specifics and matched against a matrix of training activities and techniques to finely tune the 

existing program for both efficiency and effectiveness. The report of the task force was then 

presented at the General Officers Symposium 

in July 1977. The next step in the days to come 

is to translate the recommendations of the task 

force into specific packages of instruction to test 

and validate the revised elements.

With the completion of the task force’s 

effort, the story of the Personnel Campaign 

1973–77 comes to a logical conclusion. It might 

be useful to sum up exactly where we stand at 

this juncture.

For recruiter and trainer alike, the bitter 

memories of the past are ever-present. So they 

must always remain, if we are to prevent a repetition of past misfortunes. Institutionalization of 

safeguards against backsliding in either recruiting or recruit training have been established. 

They should work as well in the future as they 

appear to be working now. With this in mind, recruiting and recruit training are in good health.

On the recruiting side, a skilled sales force 

In this classic recruiting poster, the Marine Corps 

suggests that the Service is an exclusive club that 

only a select few can enter. Special Duty . . . Can You 

Measure Up?, Marine Corps Recruiting poster

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
lieutenant general bernard e. trainor 271

is hard at work using the most advanced advertising, sales, and management techniques to get 

the “few good men” the Corps needs. Monitoring the effort is a quality control system designed 

to identify and filter out the unqualified. The 

market is small. Continued attainment of 75 

percent high school graduates and 25 percent 

high-caliber nonhigh school graduates during 

the coming year will challenge the recruiter. 

The techniques that have evolved in the past few 

years, however, are geared to meet this challenge. It can be met.

On the drill field, the process of making a 

young man into a Marine remains impressive. At 

the two recruit depots, the incoming recruit is 

indoctrinated to Service life, taught basic skills, 

and made physically fit. But these achievements 

the Marine Corps shares in common with the 

other Services. Where the difference comes is in 

the spirit. Marine Corps recruit training is extremely tough, challenging, and demanding.

While each recruit is treated with the respect due as a human being and citizen, he must 

work hard to earn the title of Marine. Each 

day, he must excel. Each day, he must accomplish that which he felt himself incapable of 

the day before. Each day, demands are made of 

him, which in their doing, add a level of selfconfidence and pride. He grows stronger with 

a sense of invincibility based not upon bravado 

but upon real achievement. The imposed discipline of his novitiate days are replaced by the 

end of training with self-discipline and a sense 

of loyalty to his fellow Marines. He knows he has 

earned his emblem and would rather die than let 

the Corps down.

Those who are intimately involved in the 

recruiting and training process know that a spirited, self-disciplined, physically fit, and highly 

motivated Marine is being shipped to the operating forces. What happens when he leaves the 

main gate is a continuing function of leadership 

at all levels. If he joins a well-led unit, his performance will be superb. If he joins a poorly 

led one, he may become disillusioned and view 

his achievement as a mockery and the Corps as 

a sham. His performance and the future wellbeing of the Corps, therefore, depends, as it always has, on the leadership he receives as the 

newest member of a very old Corps.
272

FRANK E. PETERSEN JR. 

BIOGRAPHY

I was not unaware of my new role as the 

commander of a Marine fighter squadron. 

Of first import, of course, was the squadron 

itself. It was a live entity, overpoweringly 

energized. It was equipment, skills, goals, assignments, personalities—all to be melded 

into a writhing, searing thing with a constant edge that could slash and cut as the 

ultimate arm that accomplished an assigned 

mission, whatever the call. It was noise, confusion, smoke, sorted into the attainment of 

air superiority and support of troops in desperate firefights down there on the ground 

or the accomplishment of any other kind of 

missions that Marine aviators may be asked 

to perform. And all of it was ultimately my 

call. As commander, I set the tone. How I 

acted and the rules I decreed help define 

how all of it would jell so that we’d be a 

living, effective part of the air group. A kind 

of pinnacle had been reached, one I consider 

a definite correct step in an overall career as 

a Marine Corps officer and aviator.

I knew that I would be running a tight 

“Once I found out what being a United States Marine was all about, jumping into the tiger’s jaw was 

just something to do. We’d been trained for combat. That’s our reason for being. When the time comes, 

hell, stick out your can. Let’s go. Let’s see what that old tiger’s got. Let’s jump right into his big, old jaw.”

~Lieutenant General Frank E. Petersen Jr.

Into the Tiger’s Jaws

Lieutenant General Frank E. Petersen 

was born in 1932, and he enlisted in the 

Navy in 1950. Inspired by the death of 

Navy Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the first African 

American naval aviator, in Korea, Petersen entered the Naval Aviation Cadet Program in 1951 

and was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 

1952. He was the first African American Marine 

aviator. 

He flew Vought F4U Corsairs with Marine 

Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212) during the 

Korean War and F4 Phantoms as the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) during the Vietnam War. 

He was shot down by ground fire in 1968 but 

quickly returned to duty. He received numerous awards, including the Legion of Merit with 

combat “V”, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and 

Purple Heart. 

When he took command of VMFA-314 in 

1968, Petersen was the first African American 

to command a Marine squadron. He reflected 

on his philosophy of command in his autobiography:
frank e. petersen jr. 273

ship. One reason was obvious. The first black 

commander of a Marine fighter squadron 

had better run a tight ship. I shouldn’t have 

had to think this way, but I did. I felt that 

I always had to look over my shoulder, to 

be certain that something or someone wasn’t 

creeping up to snatch what I’d attained. In 

the final analysis, though, the color of my 

skin and my concern about what was about 

to happen “over my shoulder” had to be 

shelved. I was the commander of a Marine 

fighter squadron flying 20 fighter airplanes 

that were technologically light years away 

from those in which I first began flying. I 

was the kind of skipper who would never ask 

subordinates to do something I wouldn’t, so 

early on, I resolved to set the example by flying missions, leading my men in combat, on 

regular strikes and pulling my time on hot 

pad as well.48

After the Vietnam War, Lieutenant General 

Petersen commanded a Marine Aircraft Group, 

a Marine Amphibious Brigade, and a Marine 

Aircraft Wing. When he retired in 1988, he was 

commanding general, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command. He was the “Silver 

Hawk” of Marine aviation and the “Grey Eagle” 

of naval aviation as the senior designated aviator.49 His designation as an aviator preceded all 

48 Petersen and Phelps, Into the Tiger’s Jaw, 156–57. 49 The terms Silver Hawk and Grey Eagle refer to the Marine and 

naval aviator, respectively, whose date of designation as an aviator 

predates that of all other aviators on active duty in the respective 

Services. Marine Aviators are also considered naval aviators. 

LtGen Frank E. Petersen commanded the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, VA, the “Crossroads of the Corps.” 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt M. G. 

Lindee

Then-2dLt Petersen climbs from his Corsair fighter 

bomber at a base of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 

in Korea, 19 April 1953. 

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) A347177, 

courtesy of SSgt Slatto
274 chapter three

This aviation-focused recruitment poster, Be a Leader of Men . . . Be an Officer of Marines, encouraged recruits 

to consider becoming an officer.

Official U.S. Marine Recruiting poster
frank e. petersen jr. 275

aviators in the Army and Air Force then as well. 

A true pathbreaker, Lieutenant General Petersen’s career as a pilot progressed from 

piston-engine, propeller-driven aircraft to jetpropelled, supersonic aircraft. As a leader, he 

eased the transformation of the Marine Corps 

into an integrated force that maintained its elite 

status and preserved the legacy of the Corps. 
276 chapter number

22d MAU Assault by LtCol Albert Michael Leahy. 

Marines land just south of Pearls Airport, Grenada, 

during Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion 

of Grenada.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
277

Chapter Four

The Operational 

and Educational 

Renaissance

by Paul Westermeyer

I

n the 1980s, the Marine Corps continued 

the process of reinventing itself begun in 

the previous decade, bringing new weapons 

systems and doctrines into operation while continuing to demonstrate the Corps’ continued 

relevance to the national command authority. 

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

was fully integrated into American strategic 

thinking, while Marine Expeditionary Units 

serving in the Pacific and the Mediterranean 

aboard Amphibious Ready Groups served as a 

strategic reserve that the president could call 

on quickly to respond to various types of international crises. MAGTFs were called upon 

to intervene militarily in Panama and Grenada, 

participated in numerous humanitarian missions, and acted as peacekeepers in Beirut and 

Somalia. They proved particularly adept at one 

of the Corps’ oldest responsibilities: protecting 

Americans caught overseas during a disaster. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 combined the warfighting forces of the United States 

more closely than ever before, creating new theater combatant commands alongside the traditional European and Pacific theater commands.1

1

 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 

of 1986, H.R. 3662, 99th Cong. (1986). 
278 chapter four

At the same time, increased emphasis on the 

dangers of Soviet aggression against the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization under President 

Ronald W. Reagan pushed the Corps to training 

in mountain and arctic environments and joint 

training with the Norwegians. The creation of 

the Maritime Prepositioning Program expanded the Corps’ ability to project power globally 

more quickly than ever before. 

In 1991, the Corps mobilized more than 

two-thirds of its forces for the Gulf War under 

the umbrella of the I Marine Expeditionary 

Force. The new weapons systems and doctrine 

were tried under battle conditions as the new 

training systems and the Marines of the postdraft Corps were put to the test. The Iraqi military was far from a first-class opponent, but the 

performance of the Corps in the Gulf remained 

impressive, and all of the major new systems 

worked as expected or better.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Corps was better equipped, educated, and trained, riding high on the operational 

and tactical successes of the Gulf War. Taking 

inspiration from early Marine thinkers, such as 

Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis and Major General Smedley D. Butler, visionary Commandant General Alfred M. Gray Jr. created 

Marine Corps University at Quantico in 1989 as 

a center for military excellence and education. 

He also ordered the publication of Warfighting

(FMFM-1), creating a doctrinal publication 

that immediately joined the Small Wars Manual

(1940) and Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia

(1921) as the “Holy Trinity” of legendary Marine 

doctrinal works. 

The attacks on 9/11 initiated the Global 

War on Terrorism; a series of conflicts varying 

in intensity from the massive conventional invasion of Iraq in 2003 to advise-and-assist missions across the globe. Serving alongside the 

U.S. Army in counterinsurgency campaigns in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps faced 

a myriad and ever-changing roster of evolving 

foes alongside the other Services in an increasingly joint operational environment. 

Throughout these conflicts, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps thrived. Five Marine 

generals have commanded U.S. Central Command (the most active theater of the last three 

decades) since it was founded in 1983. One of 

those Marines, General James N. Mattis, became 

secretary of defense in 2017. For the first time 

since the Joint Staff was created, two Marines 

served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Peter Pace (2005–7) and General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (2015–present). The Marine 

Corps’ influence on the making of grand strategy of the United States has never been greater.

A hundred years after the Battle of Belleau 

Wood, the Corps continues to benefit from and 

honor the legacy of the Marines who fought 

there. Those Marines would recognize the esprit 

de corps and determination of Marines today. The 

technology has changed dramatically, and the 

missions have only become more complicated 

during the past century. But across the years, 

the Belleau Wood Marines can see the Corps has 

stayed true to its motto, Semper Fidelis. 
279

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY’S

Training and Education Letter on Professional 

Military Education

by General Alfred M. Gray Jr.

d. Develop and implement our 

training and education process throughout the Corps.

2. We are off and running—you and the 

members of your command have made 

significant progress and—we have momentum! Now, let us make it happen and institutionalize as we 

implement!

3. My HASC [House Armed Services 

Committee] testimony on 12 July 

1988 regarding professional military 

education [PME] was designed to 

conceptualize our training and

education process of the future. 

As my commander for Combat

Development, I want you to develop and implement a concept 

for PME within the total Marine 

Corps training and education 

process. My intentions were clearly 

stated during my testimony and during 

numerous meetings with you and others 

during the past year. This further amplifying guidance includes a philosophical direction for schools, 

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

To: Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command 

[MCCDC], Quantico, VA 

Subj: Training and Education2

1. The full establishment at Quantico of 

our Marine Air-Ground Training and 

Education Center last fall marked the 

completion of the center’s reorganization and relocation efforts. This particular reorganization and relocation was 

designed to achieve our overall objective of:

a. Improved operational capability and warfighting effectiveness.3

b. Upgrade our high standards 

of excellence in training and 

education.

c. Focus and revitalize the 

training of our trainers.

2

 The original letter was written by Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. to 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Command, “Training and Education,” 1 July 1989. Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.

3

 Emphasis (bold) found in the original document.
280 chapter four

which are key players in the training 

and education process, and specific 

guidance regarding the training needs 

associated with concurrent actions.

4. My intent in PME is to teach 

military judgment rather than 

knowledge. Knowledge is, of course, 

important for developing judgment, 

On 1 August 1989, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1987–91), Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr., established Marine Corps University in Quantico, VA.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
general alfred m. gray jr. 281

but should be taught in the context 

of teaching military judgment not as 

material to be memorized. I want 

Marine NCOs and officers who 

know how to think about and in 

war, who know how to conceptualize 

an engagement, a battle, and a campaign and then execute the concept. 

The focus of effort should be 

teaching through doing, through 

case studies, historical and present-day, 

real and hypothetical, presented in

war games, map exercises, sandtable 

exercises, free-play, force-on-force 

“three day wars,” and the like. As education progresses, from The Basic 

School through Command and Staff 

College, the material should grow 

more complex, but the essence should 

remain the same: teaching officers 

and NCOs how to win in combat 

by out-thinking as well as outfighting their opponents. In order

to implement this order, the following 

should be considered:

a. The selection, preparation, and 

subsequent professional evolution 

of instructors, especially at [the] 

Amphibious Warfare School and 

Command and Staff College. Consideration should be given to 

forming a small permanent faculty 

of perhaps half a dozen worldclass scholars on the military 

Warner Hall, named in honor of Senator John Warner, is home to the Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College and School of Advance Warfighting, and is connected to the BGen Edwin H. Simmons Marine 

Corps History Center. It was completed in 2015.

Marine Corps University Foundation
282 chapter four

art. Incoming instructors would 

spend a period of time, perhaps 

as much as one year, studying this 

faculty in preparation for teaching. 

This period of time should also 

be used to draw on intellectual 

resources available in the QuanticoWashington [DC] area. The objective is to develop instructors who 

are truly expert in the areas they 

teach.

b. The prerequisites required of individual officers and SNCOs [senior 

noncommissioned officers] for 

selection to the next higher grade 

and for attendance at appropriate 

level schools. Such areas as tests, 

individualized professional development, prior self-study, and 

experience are some examples of 

prerequisites.

c. The mission of each Marine Corps 

school in preparing Marines for 

leadership demands and for assignments of increasing responsibility.

d. The current evaluation process, 

based on lesson plans, ELOs [enabling learning objectives] and 

TLOs [terminal learning objectives], is inappropriate for education, although it may have use 

for training in techniques. A new 

evaluation process must be devised that recognizes the inherent 

impossibility of “objectively” or 

quantitatively measuring an art.

5. Concurrent actions in the training 

and education environment may have 

an impact on the development of a 

PME concept and present areas, which 

should be examined and validated. 

These include:

a. Examine the relationship of the 

transients and trainees portion of 

patients, prisoners, transients, and 

trainees to the training days prescribed in POIs and the efficiency 

of movement to and from training 

and education opportunities. Provide a plan to this Headquarters 

to reduce, streamline, and more 

efficiently control the process of 

conducting training and education.

b. Training must be focused on 

winning in combat. This requires recreating the conditions of 

combat as realistically as possible 

in peacetime field exercises at all 

levels, from squad through MEF. 

The uncertainty, confusion, fog, 

and friction that characterize combat must be essential elements of 

the training environment. Usually, 

this can best be done through freeplay, force-on-force exercises.

c. We must institutionalize this kind 

of training by improving our ability to structure, umpire, and critique field exercises. I consider 

this a high priority.

d. Examine the procedures (i.e., 

command, maintenance, development) employed regarding our 

training ranges to include range 

improvements; develop a Marine 

Corps Training Range Master Plan 

(to include a Range Improvement 

Plan); provide the Master Plan to 

me for approval.
general alfred m. gray jr. 283

e. Examine the education programs 

associated with command and 

control (i.e., Communication Officers School, Computer Science 

School); assess the requirement 

for a specific, dedicated C4 [command, control, communications, 

computer] Systems School; and, if 

appropriate, develop a plan to create a C4 Systems School in lieu of 

our existing schools. We need to 

develop a philosophy of command 

and control, and not simply define 

it in terms of systems.

f. Examine the current process for 

the development of MAGTF tactics and techniques; create an organization, procedures, etc., for 

the development of MAGTF tactics and techniques and the method of introduction into training 

and education programs.

g. Examine the current process for 

incorporating doctrine and changes to doctrine into our training 

and education system; and, if appropriate, institutionalize this process or methodology (i.e., a better 

understanding of doctrine as it applies to strategic, operational, and 

tactical level of operations).

h. Develop the plan for a Marine 

Corps University at MCCDC: a 

focal point for planning, doctrine, 

training, education, etc.; it should 

provide insight and guidance on 

Recruits from Company H, 2d Recruit Training Battalion, read about Col Chesty Puller during a history 

class aboard Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, CA, on 28 June 2013. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt Liz Gleason
284 chapter four

naval strategy, national strategy, 

etc.; it should not be a consolidation effort, but a strengthening of 

our process.

i. Examine the contribution an upgraded library and research facility will have on training, education, 

and warfighting.

j. Examine the increased incorporation of history in our training and 

education process. History should 

be used to teach officers military 

judgment, not to make academic 

historians or simply teach facts.

k. Examine our methods of training the trainers; determine what 

standardization and upgrades are 

needed and institutionalize the 

process.

l. Examine marksmanship training 

from the perspective of warfighting. Determine the changes needed to ensure:

(1) emphasis on basic marksmanship training, and field and requalification training;

(2) enhanced training for missionunique requirements; and

(3) enhanced MOS training for 

marksmanship instructors and 

range officers.

6. Philosophical direction regarding 

our officer/SNCO/NCO schools:

a. Training and education will emphasize the dictums I consider 

important to win: maneuver warfare; combined arms; deception 

and surprise; electronic warfare; 

fully developed communications 

capability (C3 [command, control, communication] superiority); 

flexible mobile logistics; stressed 

NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] (tactical nuclear planning and 

offensive/defensive chemical capability); exploitation of existing 

mobility; active/passive groundbased air defense; and operational 

security.

b. The education process will emphasize how to think, and 

stress the development of a logical 

thought process.

c. The training and education environment should challenge all 

officers, SNCOs, and NCOs to 

bring out their best.

d. Formal process of feedback 

from graduates will be institutionalized and shared by all educational staffs.

e. The environment of training 

and education should emphasize the use of mission-type orders, history, battle studies, and 

low-intensity conflict.

f. Emphasize a generalist perspective among our career force.

g. The focus of all training and education for officers should be at 

least two grades beyond their current grade, deal in a balanced way 

with joint requirements, and challenge the student.

h. The focus of PME for SNCOs 

will be centered on the preparation of assuming duties of greater 

responsibility. This will encompass 

the basic, career, advanced, and 

senior levels.
general alfred m. gray jr. 285

i. The SNCO Academy will focus on a continual strengthening 

of the leadership development/

professional warrior environment 

addressing battle skills in a platoon/section through battalion/

squadron level. An added emphasis will be toward professional 

self-study/reading program.

j. The Basic School will focus 

on “basics” and the emphasis will 

be on leadership of a rifle platoon. 

The basics should not be defined 

simply as techniques. They include 

the basic concept of a Marine officer as someone who is a vital part 

of a corporative, not a bureaucratic 

officer corps and who, therefore, 

is an active, contributing member of the total team, someone 

who takes initiative in furthering 

the goals and values of the Marine Corps and its ability to win 

in combat. He is a thinker as well 

as a leader. A professional warrior 

environment will be the focus 

with sufficient emphasis to ensure 

continued influence throughout 

the company-grade assignment. 

An important residual will be the 

continued need and importance 

to professional development of a 

self-study/reading program.

k. Amphibious Warfare School 

Marines conduct a military education exercise at Antietam National Battlefield in Sharpsburg, MD.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of PFC David Staten
286 chapter four

should focus on MEB level of 

operations and the conduct of 

such operations in a joint environment. An important adjunct to the 

course will be the development of 

professional study/reading programs.

1. Command and Staff College 

[C&SC] will focus primarily 

on MEF-level operations in the 

sense of operational art and 

the conduct of such operations 

in a joint environment. Joint/

combined operations and exercises, global wargames, national/

international strategy, and associated thought processes and orientation will also be emphasized. 

Self-study/reading programs will 

be focused on matters pertinent 

to the high level/joint staffs, international strategy and high-level 

command. Provide for a portion 

of C&SC to receive joint accreditation.

7. We are close to getting the education 

system to where it must be as we round 

out this decade and enter the new century. To get there, the following must 

happen:

a. Do not staff or examine these issues to death; let us get on with 

it—you have the charter.

b. Keep me and the force commanders informed.

c. Not later than 15 September 1989, 

I will expect the first of what 

should be a quarterly in-progress 

review (IPR) on all aspects of our 

effort.

d. IPR meetings will be at Quantico. 

Any roadblocks should be identified with COAs [courses of action] 

for removal. Decisions will be 

made!

8. Use the philosophy expressed in 

FMFM 1, Warfighting

A. M. GRAY
287

WARFIGHTING

Philosophy of Command

Warfighting, Fleet Marine Forces Manual 1

philosophy of command must be based on human characteristics rather than on equipment 

or procedures. Communications equipment and 

command and staff procedures can enhance our 

ability to command, but they must not be used 

to lessen the human element of command. Our 

philosophy must not only accommodate but 

must exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination.

Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly.

5

 We believe that implicit communication—to 

communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases 

or even anticipating each other’s thoughts—is a 

faster, more effective way to communicate than 

through the use of detailed, explicit instructions. We develop this ability through familiarity 

and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience.

This concept has several practical implications. First, we should establish long-term 

working relationships to develop the necessary 

5

 John Boyd introduces the idea of implicit communication as a 

command tool in “A Discourse on Winning and Losing: An Organic Design for Command and Control” (briefing, May 1987).

I

t is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight.4

 First and 

foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and 

control must be decentralized. That is, subordinate 

commanders must make decisions on their own 

initiative, based on their understanding of their 

senior’s intent, rather than passing information 

up the chain of command and waiting for the 

decision to be passed down. Further, a competent subordinate commander who is at the point 

of decision will naturally better appreciate the 

true situation than a senior commander some 

distance removed. Individual initiative and responsibility are of paramount importance. The 

principal means by which we implement decentralized command and control is through the use 

of mission tactics, which we will discuss in detail 

later.

Second, since we have concluded that war 

is a human enterprise and no amount of technology can reduce the human dimension, our 

4

 The original manual came from Warfighting, FMFM-1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1989), chapter 4. Minor 

revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. Emphasis (italics) found 

in original document.
288 chapter four

familiarity and trust. Second, key people—

“actuals”—should talk directly to one another 

when possible, rather than through communicators or messengers. Third, we should communicate orally when possible, because we 

communicate also in how we talk—our inflections and tone of voice. Fourth, we should 

communicate in person when possible because 

we communicate also through our gestures and 

bearing.

Commanders should command from where 

they can best influence the action, normally well 

forward. This allows them to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat, to gain an intuitive appreciation for the situation that they 

cannot obtain from reports. It allows them to exert personal influence at decisive points during 

the action. It also allows them to locate themselves closer to the events that will influence the 

situation so that they can observe them directly 

and circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that 

result from passing information up and down 

the chain of command. Finally, we recognize 

the importance of personal leadership. Only by 

their physical presence—by demonstrating the 

willingness to share danger and privation—can 

commanders fully gain the trust and confidence 

of subordinates. We must remember that command 

from the front should not equate to oversupervision of 

subordinates. At the same time, it is important to 

balance the need for forward situation, which is 

often best done from a central location such as a 

combat operation center. Commanders cannot 

become so focused on one aspect of the situation 

that they lose overall situational awareness.

As part of our philosophy of command, we 

must recognize that war is inherently disorderly, 

uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction. 

Moreover, maneuver warfare, with its emphasis 

on speed and initiative, is by nature a particularly disorderly style of war. The conditions ripe 

for exploitation are normally also very disorderly. For commanders to try to gain certainty as 

a basis for actions, maintain positive control of 

events at all times, or dictate events to fit their 

plans is to deny the nature of war. We must 

therefore be prepared to cope—even better, to 

thrive—in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, 

constant change, and friction. If we can come to 

terms with those conditions and thereby limit 

their debilitating effects, we can use them as a 

weapon against a foe who does not cope as well.

In practical terms, this means that we must 

not strive for certainty before we act, for in so 

doing we will surrender the initiative and pass 

up opportunities. We must not try to maintain 

excessive control over subordinates, since this 

A Marine student in the Infantry Officers Course 

armed with a Colt 5.56mm M16A2 Rifle, waits on 

one knee during an assault on the Delta Prospect 

Range at the Marine Air Ground Task Force Combat Center training area at Twentynine Palms, CA.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Joey 

Chavez
warfighting 289

will necessarily slow our tempo and inhibit initiative. We must not attempt to impose precise 

order on the events of combat since this leads to 

a formulistic approach to war. We must be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances and 

exploit opportunities as they arise, rather than 

adhering insistently to predetermined plans that 

have outlived their usefulness.

There are several points worth remembering about our command philosophy. First, while 

it is based on our warfighting style, this does not 

mean it applies only during war. We must put 

it into practice during the preparation for war 

as well. We cannot rightly expect our subordinates to exercise boldness and initiative in the 

field when they are accustomed to being oversupervised in garrison. Whether the mission is 

training, procuring equipment, administration, 

or police call, this philosophy should apply.

Next, our philosophy requires competent 

leadership at all levels. A centralized system theoretically needs only one competent person, the 

senior commander, who is the sole authority. 

A decentralized system requires leaders at all 

levels to demonstrate sound and timely judgment. Initiative becomes an essential condition 

of competence among commanders.

Our philosophy also requires familiarity 

among comrades because only through a shared 

understanding can we develop the implicit communication necessary for unity of effort. Perhaps most important, our philosophy demands 

confidence among seniors and subordinates. 

G-1, Task Force Ripper CP reconnoitering at Umm Huul, by Col Avery Chenowith, shows Marines preparing to 

breach the Saddam line during the 1991 Gulf War.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
290

THE NCO AND 

MANEUVER WARFARE

by Captains William H. Weber IV and David J. Furness

Marine Corps Gazette, April 1993

by any friendly forces, the vehicle commander found 

a route that would allow the battalion to bypass the 

strongpoint and continue its mission. The corporal 

called his platoon commander: “Red 1 this is Red 6, 

I’ve got a way around over here on the right. We can 

get on a trail under those power lines on the 68 grid 

line and continue moving.” The platoon commander acknowledged the transmission and immediately 

changed his direction, moving his platoon and the 

rest of the battalion around the obstacle and onto 

the route blazed by the corporal. The battalion accomplished its mission, arriving in its blocking position an hour early, ensuring that other units could 

seize the airport without concern about possible Iraqi 

reinforcements descending from the north. A junior 

NCO, using initiative and making decisions, allowed 

the battalion to accomplish its mission. His platoon 

commander listened to him and was willing to commit the battalion to a route chosen by a corporal. 

This is maneuver warfare.

Understanding maneuver warfare is difficult. Executing it is even harder. Our current 

warfighting doctrine, as set forth in [Warfighting] 

FMFM-1 and [Tactics] FMFM-1-3, fails to address 

the key to maneuver warfare execution—creating a command environment that empowers our 

“As leaders, we must push power downward 

to the young Marines who hunger and thirst 

for more responsibility—and are quite capable of handling it. . . . In combat, NCOs 

carry battle. Is it fair to expect them to do 

this in war if we have not trained them in 

peacetime—by allowing them significant 

responsibility and authority?”

~General Walter E. Boomer

On the third day of the ground war during Operation Desert Storm, a platoon of Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 

moved north toward Kuwait International Airport as 

the point element of the battalion’s drive, conducting 

an aggressive forward reconnaissance with the battalion moving up quickly behind them to assume blocking positions north of the airport.6

 At 1700, an Iraqi 

strongpoint halted the battalion’s movement, and the 

point platoon came under sporadic machine gun fire. 

Far over on the right flank, a light armored vehicle, 

commanded by a corporal, pushed out on its own to 

try and find a way around this obstacle. Unsupported 

6

 The original article came from Capt William H. Weber IV and 

Capt David J. Furness, “The NCO and Maneuver Warfare,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 77, no. 4 (April 1993). Minor revisions were made 

to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
weber and furness 291

NCOs. Without NCOs who are willing and able 

to make decisions on their own, and without officers who will support those decisions, we will 

surely fail. Our doctrine of maneuver warfare 

“applies equally to the Marine expeditionary 

force commander and the fire team leader.” It is 

a decentralized system that “requires leaders at 

all levels to display sound and timely judgment.” 

How do we make our Marines into the warfighters our doctrine demands? The answer is simple. 

If we are going to fight the way our doctrine dictates, we must empower our NCOs so that decisions are made and executed at the lowest level.

Empowering our NCOs is critical for many 

reasons. In Men Against Fire, S. L. A. Marshall observes: 

that no commander is capable of the actual leading of an entire company in combat, 

that the spread of strength and the great 

variety of the commander’s problems are 

together beyond any one man’s compass, 

and that therefore a part of the problem in 

combat is to determine which are the moral 

leaders among his men when under fire, and 

having found them, give all support and encouragement to their effort.7

If a commander cannot control all of his 

people, then how can he ensure unity of effort 

and reliable action by subordinates? The solution 

lies in proper leadership, and commanders must 

take notice. If we, as an institution, fail to develop our NCOs so that they are the tactical equals 

of junior officers, we risk slowing our physical 

and mental speed at the point of contact and 

throwing away many valuable opportunities for 

battlefield success. Our NCOs must make and 

execute decisions.

The empowerment of the NCO starts with 

the leadership of the unit commander and the 

command environment he fosters. He must personally take an interest in his NCOs’ professional development and give them the responsibility 

and knowledge to train junior Marines. FMFM1 describes this command environment:

All commanders should consider the professional development of their subordinates a 

principal responsibility of command. Commanders should foster a personal teacherstudent relationship with their subordinates. 

. . . [and] should see the development of 

their subordinates as a direct reflection on 

themselves.

Besides our doctrinal emphasis on junior 

leaders who make decisions, we also stress the 

use of mission tactics as the best way to take ad7

 S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command

(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 62.

Campaigns to increase NCO retention, such as the 

poster You Can Count on the Corps, Stay Marine, recognized the value of NCOs to maneuver warfare.

Official U.S. Marine Recruiting poster
292 chapter four

vantage of these junior decision makers. Mission 

tactics require units that can quickly execute basic and advanced techniques and are led down 

to the lowest level, by men who make timely 

decisions. This decentralized decision authority 

must include the NCO. In his book On Infantry, 

John A. English concluded his discussion of the 

subject by saying:

the decentralization of tactical control 

forced on land forces has been one of the 

most significant features of modern war. In 

the confused and often chaotic environment 

of today, only the smallest groups are likely 

to keep together, particularly during critical 

moments.8

The noncommissioned officer therefore 

holds the key to the execution level of maneu8

 John A. English, On Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1984).

ver warfare, the level where we translate our 

doctrine into action. The Marine Corps must 

acknowledge this. Many company grade officers 

do not regard the NCO as a leader, trainer, and 

decision maker. They are not comfortable with 

young corporals and sergeants training their Marines or having the freedom of action necessary 

to grow as leaders and decision makers. Hampered by the need to clear all decisions before 

executing, the junior leaders atrophy. Action at 

the point of contact slows to a crawl. Opportunities and battles are lost.

But we can solve these problems. Our 

company grade officers must force our NCOs 

to accept more responsibility, while simultaneously focusing their junior officers and staff 

NCOs on improving the abilities of NCOs to 

lead, think, and fight—added responsibility 

should be accompanied by the training that will 

allow NCOs to succeed. This is empowerment. 

M1A1 Abrams of 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, stage for the assault on Red Beach aboard Camp 

Pendleton, CA. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Giles M. Isham
weber and furness 293

The command environment we foster and the 

schools we send our NCOs to must work together toward this end if we expect to create 

true warfighters.

Conversations we have had with several of 

our contemporaries convince us that we were 

truly fortunate as new lieutenants to be sent to 

units that viewed the tactical expertise of NCOs 

as their number one priority. One of our company commanders explained his priorities to all 

of his new lieutenants and staff NCOs in these 

terms:

• The NCOs would be the principal 

trainers of Marines.

• Our responsibility was to ensure that 

the NCOs were tactically proficient 

and could conduct effective training.

• Our focus of training would be at the 

individual, team, and squad level.

He understood that expertise at the small 

unit level is essential to the execution of our 

warfighting doctrine. He believed that by focusing the efforts of the company on building 

strong NCOs and strong teams and squads, the 

company as a whole would succeed. He realized that limiting the NCOs participation in the 

planning and execution of small unit training negated their responsibility for ensuring that their 

unit was prepared for combat. It also diminished 

their credibility in the eyes of their Marines. By 

clearly defining the NCOs’ proper role in the 

conduct of training, we began to give them the 

power they needed to succeed.

We believed that, for the NCOs to train 

their Marines, they had to become unquestioned experts in techniques and procedures, 

battle drills, and tactics. They needed to understand completely our warfighting doctrine and 

what their role was in it. To reach these goals, 

we established a program at the company level 

that should be a part of every unit in the Marine 

Corps. The program began with an examination 

to test the basic skills of the NCOs. Then, using 

existing publications, such as The Essential Subjects; The Marine Battle Drill Guide and Command 

Tasks; Soldier Skill Level 1, 2, 3, 4 for MOS 11B and 

11C, the company began to train the NCOs 

while simultaneously conducting basic individual training. Once our NCOs mastered the 

basic skills, we began to teach them advanced 

warfighting techniques and concepts. We conA Marine from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, fast ropes 

out of a CH-46E Sea Knight onto a rooftop at the 

Military Operations in Urban Terrain facility at 

Camp Lejeune, NC. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt Brandon E. Vancise
294 chapter four

ducted sandtable and map exercises designed 

to illustrate the fundamental maneuver warfare 

principles. These exercises forced the NCOs 

to develop their own courses of action and express them in a standard five-paragraph order 

format.9

 We stressed the ability of the NCO 

to communicate his plan to his Marines. There 

were no right and wrong answers, but unsound 

tactical thinking was thoroughly critiqued. The 

intent of this training was to develop the thought 

process that we could later expect the NCO to 

employ in combat. We tried to train the NCO to 

become the tactical equal of the junior officer.

Initially, the transition from troop handler 

to small unit leader was difficult. Many junior 

NCOs lacked the technical and tactical expertise to educate and train their Marines, and they 

were reluctant to assume their new role. They 

quickly overcame this initial reluctance when 

they realized that we meant to give them real 

power. They then became eager to learn about 

their profession. They understood that their 

increased role brought additional responsibilities, and they rose to the challenge. After several months of intensive training, augmented by 

many quotas to NCO school and the division’s 

squad leader’s course, the technical and tactical 

proficiency of the NCOs skyrocketed. These 

corporals and sergeants were hungry for additional tactical expertise—they were becoming 

professionals. As they began to instruct their 

Marines, some astonishing things happened:

• The NCOs’ status as leaders increased 

dramatically.

• A clear teacher-scholar relationship 

grew between the NCOs and their 

Marines. The NCOs’ focus became 

training. They became inquisitive and 

9

 The five-paragraph order format covers SMEAC: situation, mission, execution, administration (logistics), and command (signal).

interested in professional reading, Marine Corps Institute courses, and tactical decision games.

• The example set by the NCOs constantly reinforced critical skills and 

techniques throughout the company. 

A strong bond developed between the 

NCO and his men, leading the Marines 

to an almost unquestioned faith in their 

junior leaders.

• The entire company’s growing competence in battle drills, techniques, and 

procedures allowed the NCOs to adapt 

easily to rapidly changing tactical environments. They became much more 

aggressive and willing to make significant decisions. During free-play exercises, the NCOs’ newfound freedom 

translated to dramatically improved 

physical and mental speed at the small 

unit level.

The company became a warfighting machine driven by a desire to learn and become 

more competent. The worth of an NCO rested 

not only on how well he could drill or prepare 

for an inspection, but also on how he could think 

and execute on the battlefield. The officers were 

constantly challenged professionally because 

even the most junior leaders in the company 

clamored for knowledge. Morale was never a 

problem because the command environment 

bred professionalism.

This is what a Marine Corps rifle company 

should be.

The second element in our drive to create 

true warfighting NCOs is formal education. To 

get a better understanding of the importance 

of education in our present situation, it is wise 

to look to the experience of the German Army 
weber and furness 295

between the two World Wars. The treaty ending World War I dramatically limited the size of 

the German officer corps. Given their reduced 

officer strength, they realized that they would 

have to rely more heavily on their NCOs. The 

Germans moved quickly to raise the competence level of their troops. During the 1920s 

and 1930s—while the American enlisted man 

was wasting away—the Germans began sending 

their NCOs to a new school, a school dramatically different from any other in the world.

The Germans designed their NCO schools 

to create decision makers. They believed that a 

man could be trained to make decisions quickly 

by getting him in the habit of making decisions. 

Once that habit was in place, all that remained 

was to give him the experience necessary to 

make good decisions. They were, in essence, 

attempting to teach intuition, an effort which 

modern research suggests was not in vain. Recent research also suggests that the best way to 

do this was embodied by the structure of the 

German NCO school: force men to make decisions again and again, punishing only timidity, 

while gradually giving them the experience and 

knowledge needed for the development of battlefield intuition. They will become battlefield 

leaders.

This school was very different from our 

current NCO schools, where much of a Marine’s time is focused on garrison skills that, 

although admittedly important subjects for the 

NCO, are of limited value in the face of the enemy. Our educational system makes the considered point that drill is but a means to an end, but 

there is a demonstrably superior way of reaching 

Sgt Jeff Seabaugh, squad leader with the 15th MEU(SOC), moves his Marines in Zubayr, Iraq, on 23 March 

2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Brian L. Wickliffe
296 chapter four

our goal of NCOs who crave responsibility and 

consider themselves as elite professionals in the 

U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically:

• NCO schools should be lengthened 

from their present 38 days to at least 

four months. The schools should devote 

this additional time to two things—

decision-making exercises and directed 

study on the art of war, study aimed at 

making the NCO both knowledgeable 

and hungry for more learning.

• Attendance at NCO schools should be 

an absolute requirement for promotion to sergeant.

• Because NCO schools would be truly 

professional schools, we would expect to be paid back by the Marines 

who attend it: any Marine graduating 

would serve at least two additional 

years in the Fleet Marine Force before 

he could leave the Corps. Attendance 

at an NCO school would therefore be 

voluntary, and any Marine refusing to 

attend would not be promoted past the 

rank of lance corporal. Failure at NCO 

school would mean reverting to lance 

corporal for the remainder of the enlistment or immediate release from the 

Corps.

Making these changes would be costly. The 

future success of our Corps, however, depends 

on producing Marines who can fight our doctrine on a decentralized battlefield. Institutionally, we are not doing this, and we must. The 

money must be spent, and the NCOs must get 

the power they need. We must force our future 

company commanders to let their NCOs do 

their jobs. We must educate our company grade 

officers at Amphibious Warfare School on the 

real role of the NCO in warfighting and on how 

to train him to fill that role. We must also change 

the expectations of the NCOs by changing our 

NCO schools—the NCO should leave these 

vital schools fully expecting to be challenged 

professionally by his officers. He should return 

to his company with a burning desire to take 

charge on the battlefield and, by doing so, force 

the Marine Corps to execute what we spend so 

much time talking about—our doctrine.
297

EXPEDITIONARY AIRFIELDS

by Major General Terrence R. Dake

Marine Corps Gazette, August 1994 

is in direct support of the ground component. 

When we are integrated, we are in direct support of the carrier that, if we are true to the 

focus of littoral warfare, will fly sorties in support of Marines ashore. When the carrier is in 

a direct-support role, the early sorties flown in 

front of the ground forces would be flown by 

both Navy and Marine pilots.

What has been lost in the fanfare of Marines again going aboard ship is the role that 

expeditionary airfields (EAFs) can and will play 

in the projection of power by naval expeditionary forces. This capability, which exists only in 

the Marine Corps, is the natural extension of 

carrier aviation. The expeditionary airfield is a 

system that was designed to allow Marine aircraft to phase ashore in areas where a suitable 

airfield may not be available. Once ashore and 

unfettered by the limitations that are inherent in 

carrier operations, Marine aircraft are capable 

of high sortie rates and continuous operations. 

The same characteristics that allow Marines 

to operate from these austere fields also allow 

common Navy aircraft, such as the [McDonnell 

Douglas] F/A-18 [Hornet], to do the same. In 

other words, it is a two-way street from the 

F

rom the Sea” has been the naval strategy 

for more than a year now.10 Coincidental 

with this new focus for naval forces, we 

have been involved in the fastest decline in defense resources since the end of World War II. 

This combination of powerful forces has moved 

the Navy and the Marine Corps to undertake 

actions to make the most of the resources available. The most visible of these moves to date is 

the integration of Marine Corps fighter attack 

squadrons aboard aircraft carriers as integral 

parts of carrier air wings. Not only do Marine 

Corps squadrons aid in filling shortfalls in the 

number of naval squadrons, they bring the combined arms expertise of the Marine air-ground 

team to the deck of the carrier. The resultant 

team is very capable of supporting Marines 

ashore. These shipborne Marines are fully integrated members of the resident carrier air wing. 

This is an important point to remember. When 

Marines are in their usual Marine air-ground 

task force (MAGTF) configuration, Marine air 

10 The original article came from MajGen Terrence R. Dake, 

“Expeditionary Airfields,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 8 (August 

1994). Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
298 chapter four

shore to the carrier and from the carrier to the 

expeditionary airfield.

The expeditionary airfield opens up options 

for the projection of airpower that do not exist with carrier-based aviation alone. Whether 

used as a forward arming and refueling point 

(FARP) for carrier-based aircraft or as an alternate basing site, the expeditionary airfield can 

increase sortie rates. It can act as a divert field 

for strike-damaged aircraft that cannot make the 

trip to the carrier or are unsafe to bring aboard. 

It provides an intermediate fueling point to extend the combat radius, both range and timeon-station, of carrier aircraft when tankers are 

not available. Perhaps most important, the expeditionary airfield allows more naval aircraft, 

either Navy or Marine, to be forward based, 

which equates to more combat power in the face 

of the enemy.

In Vietnam and [Operation] Desert Storm, 

expeditionary airfields were the primary basing 

sites for the majority of Marine aircraft, both 

fixed-wing and helicopters. My point on EAFs is 

this: expeditionary airfields provide a capability 

that has been used frequently in the past and a 

capability the nation needs in the future. Even in 

Desert Storm, where ports and airfields were in 

better condition than in any other region except 

Europe, the airfields had good runways but little 

parking space and usually no parallel taxiways. 

One of the first tasks of the Marine Corps was 

to create airfields capable of supporting our aircraft. The rapid flow of tactical aircraft into the 

theater of operations quickly filled all air bases 

to overflow capacity. More than 4 million square 

feet of AM2 mat, with its associated accessories, were used to augment existing airfields in 

Southwest Asia.

During [Operation] Desert Shield, a sports 

complex at King Abdulaziz Naval Base was 

Two Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopters on the ground, being refueled during Operation Restore Hope.

Defense Imagery DD-SD-00-00796
major general terrence r. dake 299

turned into a full-service airfield from which 

66 [McDonnell Douglas] AV-8B Harrier attack 

aircraft and 12 [North American Rockwell] 

OV-10 [Bronco] aerial reconnaissance aircraft 

carried the fight to the Iraqis. These valuable aircraft would not have had a home if it were not 

for this remarkable capability; there simply was 

not room anywhere else.

Using the fuel and ordnance from maritime 

prepositioned ships, these aircraft flew sustained 

operations during the early phases of Desert 

Storm, preparing the battlefield for the ground 

attack. When the ground attack into Kuwait began, these aircraft surged from that base, as well 

as from forward-operating sites, for quick turnaround of combat aircraft.

The standard mission began at King Abdulaziz, near the port city of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, about 140 miles from the southern border 

of Kuwait. After dropping bombs on targets 

in Kuwait, the aircraft rearmed and refueled 

at Tanajib, a small strip 27 miles south of the 

Kuwaiti border. After flying a second bombing 

mission into Kuwait, typically only an hour after the first, the aircraft recovered back at King 

Abdulaziz. The use of Tanajib cut more than 200 

miles from the mission profile, increasing the 

sortie rate, but most important, increasing the 

amount of ordnance on target. To put flexible 

basing into perspective, consider this: in Desert 

Storm, 86 Harriers generated 3,342 strike sorties while their carrier-based cousins, 209 F/A18s, [Grumman] A-6s [Intruders], and [LTV] 

A-7s [Corsair IIs], flew 6,109 strike sorties. The 

strike sortie “box score” breaks out like this: 

Harriers, around 39 strike sorties per aircraft; 

carrier air, about 29 strike sorties per aircraft. 

The Harriers had one additional advantage in 

that all of their sorties were accomplished without aerial refueling. This expeditionary effect, 

which boosted the sortie rate at King Abdulaziz 

and Tanajib, can also exist between an expeditionary airfield and an aircraft carrier.

The naval Services have used expeditionary 

airfields often in past conflicts. In Italy, during 

World War II, expeditionary airfields provided 

en route staging bases for Navy aircraft. During 

the Pacific Islands campaign, a Marine aircraft 

group operated from a planked runway, using a 

catapult and arresting gear. The constant search 

for improved flexibility in the rapid deployment 

of Marine aviation led to the development of the 

expeditionary airfield concept. Development 

ensued throughout the postwar years and, in 

1956, the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

formally established an operational requirement 

An AV-8B Harrier jet with VMA-513 takes off 

from Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. The Harrier is 

carrying a Guided Bomb Unit 16 and an AN/AAQ28(V) Targeting Pod. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl 

Andrew Williams
300 chapter four

for the system. Specific time and space parameters were defined as follows:

• Small, quickly constructed tactical 

support airfields of a temporary nature 

to accommodate at least one squadron 

(24 aircraft).

• Ready to use in the first three to five 

days of an amphibious assault.

• Usable for 30 days to support the landing force in tactical operations ashore.

In 1958, the expeditionary airfield concept 

was approved, and the system was designated 

“short airfield for tactical support” or SATS. 

While the time and space parameters have been 

expanded to support the increased performance 

characteristics of today’s aircraft, the premise of 

“small, quickly constructed tactical support airfields of a temporary nature” is as valid today as 

it was in 1958.

What an expeditionary airfield actually 

Osprey Number 7 of VMM-263 taxis on flight line at Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina by Sgt 

Kristopher Battles. 

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
major general terrence r. dake 301

consists of is frequently not well understood. 

Too often, it is thought to be only matting and 

arresting gear. In fact, it is a system that can be as 

simple as placing arresting gear on a captured/

abandoned runway or as robust as any full system airfield, to include weather services and 

aircraft maintenance. Full-service EAFs are operated routinely at Marine Corps Base (MCB) 

Twentynine Palms, California, and Marine 

Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue, North 

Carolina.

The flexibility of the expeditionary airfield 

system allows a variety of airfield configurations 

to be constructed, tailored to the specific needs 

of the aircraft and mission. On the upper end 

of the expeditionary airfield system, 8,000-foot 

airfield complexes can be built to accommodate 

heavy transport aircraft. Air Force [Lockheed] 

C-141s [Starlifters] routinely operate from the 

Strategic Expeditionary Landing Field at Twentynine Palms. The Naval Air Systems Command 

is working closely with the Air Force and Marine 

Corps on EAF compatibility with the [Boeing] 

C-17A [Globemaster] transport aircraft. On the 

lower end expeditionary airfields, 96-by-96-

foot vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) pads 

can be constructed to accommodate rotary- and 

fixed-wing VTOL aircraft. The most common 

size is a 3,850-foot runway from which F/A18s and AV-SBs can operate. The expeditionary 

airfield system is uniquely suited to this purpose and plays a key role in the close air support 

mission.

The basic components of the expeditionary airfield system are the AM2 matting and its 

associated accessories. AM2 matting consists of 

2-by-12-foot and 2-by-6-foot aluminum panels 

coated with an epoxy nonskid surface. These 

mats have four interlocking edges permitting 

easy assembly into rectangular patterns of virtually any size and proportion. AM2 mat can be 

used to form runways, taxiways, parking areas, 

or ramp space for efficient aircraft operations 

and maintenance. In addition to AM2 matting, 

expeditionary airfields provide a variety of lighting components for night operations. Future 

lighting will include man-portable, infrared-capable, battery-operated systems with remote 

control, which can be installed in minutes with 

minimal personnel. Thus, we will be able to rapidly light a facility after an attack or light a forward operating base during covert operations.

An integral concept in the expeditionary 

airfield program is the aircraft recovery system. 

The M21 aircraft recovery system will stop 

a tailhook aircraft in 600 feet of rollout at an 

expeditionary field or on an existing runway, 

thereby greatly increasing the basing flexibility of naval aviation. Under development is the 

M29 transportable system, a more mobile and 

versatile system, that will allow for expanded 

operations.

Getting EAF matting and equipment to 

where it is needed is an important consideration. Weight and cube are critical logistic 

commodities. Efforts are under way to reduce 

EAF footprints and to find alternative methods 

of transporting them. Both Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 2 and 3 have enough AM2 

matting to build either a 1,000-by-72-foot or a 

1,500-by-54-foot runway with 11 tactical parking spaces. Concurrent to setting up the matting, the associated Marine Air Traffic Control 

and Landing System, in this case probably consisting of a tower, tactical air navigation system, 

radio, and other equipment, would be flown in 

on two C-141s. Larger EAFs, like the full service 

3,850-foot field with 75 tactical parking spaces, 

are usually shipped via break-bulk vessels and 

married with more robust air traffic control lo-
302 chapter four

gistics including radar. Approximately six C-141 

loads are required to deliver a full package.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are committed to making the best use of dwindling 

resources. It is not always obvious how best to 

invest so that readiness, force structure, and 

modernization are kept in balance. However, 

innovative use of existing assets is always a winner. In that regard, the alliance of the expeditionary airfield and carrier aviation will result 

in mutual benefit. Joint exercises and wargames 

are opportunities that we should use to explore 

and to advertise this capability. A good start is 

already being planned for carrier aircraft to operate from the Strategic Expeditionary Landing 

Field at Twentynine Palms. I expect the future 

will bring more operations where Marines fly 

from carriers and Navy aircraft operate from 

austere fields operated by Marines. Naval expeditionary forces, with the capability to operate 

from afloat and ashore, confront the enemy with 

combat power that extends along a continuum 

from the early strategic strikes to ground operations ashore. Only the naval Service contains all 

of these capabilities in one integrated package.

A C-130 Hercules practices takeoff and landing from one of three different runways aboard the island of 

Tinian, Northern Mariana Islands. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Eugene E. Clarke
303

IT’S NOT NICE AND NEAT

by Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni

Proceedings, August 1995

with the largest force contributions coming 

from Italy—but all wanted U.S. leadership and 

involvement.

The situation required that the withdrawal be amphibious. There was no other way that 

the rear-guard forces of the United Nations—

the Pakistani and the Bangladeshi units—could 

have been extracted safely. The threat to the 

airfield—not only from the militias of the warlords, but also from the bandits who roam the 

streets of Mogadishu and fight each other and 

anybody else in their way—was too high.

The planning began in New York City. We 

sent a planning team from the U.S. Central 

Command, which worked with the contributing 

nations, with the United Nations headquarters, 

and the United Nations forces in the field. A 

planning team also went into Mogadishu in January 1995 to work directly with General Aboo 

[Samah bin-Aboo Bakar], the four-star Malaysian 

commander of the UNOSOM [United Nations 

Operation in Somalia] forces.

Our task force took station off the Somali 

coast near Mogadishu on 8 February. We were 

in position three weeks before we landed to set 

up the final protective perimeter for the UN 

Today’s military operations are not like those 

the Services have traditionally trained to execute.11 But when “something” has to be done, 

U.S. Marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen answer the 

call. General Zinni, the commanding general, I Marine 

Expeditionary Force, who led a seven-nation combined 

task force during Operation United Shield—the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia—provided insights 

to this new world in his address at the most recent Naval Institute Annual Meeting and Annapolis Seminar.

First, I would like to talk a little bit about 

Operation United Shield, which should interest 

you because it primarily involved a naval force, 

and its success stemmed both from the training 

and the capabilities that naval forces bring to 

these kinds of operations. Then I would like to 

expand a bit more into the nature of these operations and what I think that means for the future.

United Shield was born sometime around 

last August, when the United Nations realized 

it was going to have a hard time extracting itself from Somalia and asked the United States 

to help. Several nations agreed to participate—

11 The original article came from LtGen Anthony C. Zinni, “It’s 

Not Nice and Neat,” Proceedings 121, no. 8 (August 1995). Minor 

revisions were made to the text based on current standards for 

style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
304 chapter four

forces. Before the landing, I went into Mogadishu and met with the warlords—five of them, 

including [General] Mohammed Farah Hassan 

Aidid. I think you may have read about him. I 

have known General Aidid for years.

General Aidid, Ali Madi, and several others 

owned the militias and the turf around the port 

and airfield. I was interested in several things:

• To find out what their intentions were.

• To secure their cooperation, if possible.

• To warn them of what would happen if 

they did not cooperate—making sure 

they understood that what was coming 

in was not just another UN force, but 

this time a U.S.-led Coalition, and that 

the rules of engagement would allow 

us to protect ourselves and take care of 

any threats.

• To make sure that they were not deluded by any notion that anything less 

than an overpowering force was over 

the horizon, ready to come in.

In meeting with them, I found mixed feelings about the operation. Many of the faction 

leaders were feeling good about the U.S. forces 

returning; some even wanted us to stay longer. 

Obviously, that was not in the cards. General Aidid, on the other hand, felt this was not 

good—that the return of U.S. or other foreign 

troops would not be well received by his people 

and would present difficulties for him. But he 

promised me that he would cooperate, and there 

would not be any interference.

All the time I had known General Aidid, he 

had never lied to me; my dealings with him always had been straightforward. I was confident 

that he would not interfere—nor would any of 

his militia. But I was not as confident that he 

could prevent bandits and rogue elements from 

interfering on the turf that he controlled. On 

the other hand, I was certain that the other faction leaders would police their neighborhoods.

As things turned out, all the faction leaders 

cooperated, even to the point of helping control some of the looters and bandits as best they 

could while we were ashore. We felt that our 

worst problem would be looters, demonstrators, and the bandits who roamed the streets—

who are much like street gangs here, but far 

more heavily armed and much more aggressive. 

And they, in fact, turned out to be the problem.

We spent a lot of time in the first three 

weeks there preparing the battlefield—not only 

in the physical sense of the engineers preparing 

our positions and our barbed wire but also in 

working with the UN units that I would have 

under my tactical control. We cooperated in 

developing a plan for some very tricky tactical 

movements.

We conducted nine tactical evolutions or 

operations ashore. These are the most complex 

of operations—amphibious landings, relief in 

Sgt Gardi and Kurdish Elder, by Col Peter M. Gish, 

shows a young Marine conversing with a Kurdish 

elder in northern Iraq. Kurdish elders, known as 

mullahs, are revered for their wisdom and their 

opinions carry much weight.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
lieutenant general anthony c. zinni 305

place of one force by another from a different 

country, withdrawal under pressure, and amphibious withdrawal under pressure.

We did seven of these totally at night; two 

were a mix of day and night. We made two landings at night; we withdrew under fire at night 

back to our ships. The Pakistanis withdrew back 

through our lines in the middle of the night. We 

relieved the Bangladeshi force at the port, and 

we relieved the Italians in place on the nextto-the-last night during the hours of darkness. 

We conducted a noncombatant evacuation of 

UNOSOM civilian employees, media personnel, and refugees—some Ethiopian Christians 

who had stowed away on a ship and were left 

at the port, living in tetrahedrons at the water’s 

edge, made themselves known to us as we were 

getting ready to leave. They would have been 

goners if the Somalis—their ancient enemies—

had caught them. So we took them out of there 

and back to Mombasa.

We also provided a day-and-night defense 

of the airfield and the port.

Originally, the plan said that we would be 

ashore for 7 to 10 days, but we completed the 

job in 73 hours. We could have done it in 48 

hours, if the ships that the United Nations contracted had been there in a more timely way and 

had been operated more professionally. Dealing 

with a drunk master and his crew when he came 

in to pick up UN forces made life interesting 

during the last day and the last night ashore.

In those 73 hours, we experienced 27 firefights, everything from snipers to individuals 

with rocket-propelled grenades firing at our positions. On the last night on the last beach—a 

place we called “the Alamo”—we were being hit 

by heavier fire, and we had small groups of Somalis, 12–15 strong, coming at our wire.

I have never appreciated an amphibious 

tractor any more than that final night, when we 

were able to continue fighting on the beach with 

our troops protected, then turn and hit the water in our armored amphibians to get back to 

the ship.

My own tractor did not quite make it all 

the way on its own power. It caught fire about 

1,000 yards out and began to drift back toward 

the beach and take on water. Then the tractor 

that came out to tow us also lost power and if 

you are a three-star general, stuck in the bottom 

of a tractor drifting back toward a beach full of a 

lot of bad guys, you begin to feel a little queasy. 

You are trying to act very bravely, and what you 

need right then and there is just what I got from 

the “trac” commander, Corporal Deskins. He 

stuck his head down in the troop compartment 

and said, “General, our trac is on fire. We’ve shut 

down the engine. We’re taking on some water. 

We’re drifting back to the beach, and we can see 

the bad guys. The tractor that’s trying to tow us 

has lost power and is drifting back with us. The 

ship is getting farther away.”

“But,” he added, “don’t worry—everything’s going to be okay.”

Two Marine armored amphibious vehicles from the 

15th MEU emerge from the surf onto the beach at 

Mogadishu Airport, Somalia, as part of Operation 

Restore Hope.

Defense Imagery DD-SD-00-00717
306 chapter four

And I knew that was the time for a general 

to be a good PFC [private first class] and listen 

to the corporal; because with that kind of optimism and professionalism, I could not go wrong. 

It took five and a half hours to get back to the 

ship, but Corporal Deskins finally got me there, 

so I was happy.

Our force consisted of 23 ships. It was 

made up of 16,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

Marines from seven nations. We had 89 aircraft: 

Harrier jump jets; Italian and U.S. attack helos; and U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunships, flying 

out of Mombasa. With that kind of force—90 

percent of which was naval—we were able to 

accomplish the mission without taking a single 

casualty ashore. And, again, that is not for want 

of the Somalis, especially the bandits, trying to 

inflict casualties.

This operation typifies my personal life for 

the past five years. It all started in the hills of 

Northern Iraq, with the Kurds. Next, I spent 

time in the 12 republics of the former Soviet Union in an operation called Provide Hope 

[1992], where we provided humanitarian assistance, bringing food and medicine into those 

areas. I also was involved in the planning for 

Operation Provide Promise [1992–96] in Bosnia, and I provided relief for the initial airlift of 

food and supplies into Somalia in Operation Restore Hope [1993], then went back again with 

the special envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, on 

6 October 1993, to get the prisoners out and 

LAV on Patrol by Col Peter M. Gish shows a Marine LAV patrolling in Mogadishu, Somalia, during Operation Restore Hope.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
lieutenant general anthony c. zinni 307

rehabilitate General Aidid, and then back again 

for Operation United Shield [Somalia, 1995].

My command, the I Marine Expeditionary 

Force, has done some things in the past five years 

that I am sure you have heard about—things like 

Desert Storm and Vigilant Warrior [Kuwait, 

1994], which was an alert to go back because 

the Iraqis were moving again. And, of course, 

we have gotten energized a couple of times over 

Korea. In the past five years, we have conducted 

a total of 20 real-world operations.

We have been to places like Bangladesh, 

Rwanda, and Somalia. We have also been to Ecuador, helping build schoolhouses and providing 

medical and dental care in some of the remote 

areas of that country.

And we have not only been doing these 

kinds of things on foreign shores; we have also 

been doing them within our own borders. We 

have fought forest fires in Montana and Washington [State]. I sent 1,000 Marines there last 

summer to fight the forest fires that were threatening some of our small towns. We sent Marines 

to Los Angeles during the Rodney King episode, to help quell the riots. We sent Marines 

for earthquake relief twice and for flood relief 

in the Southeastern United States. My Marines 

participate every day in counterdrug operations 

throughout the Southwestern United States, and 

we participate in operations dealing with illegal 

immigrants.

The nature of conflict and the level of 

commitment have changed drastically since the 

Berlin Wall came down. We are now immersed 

in these things called [military] operations other than war [MOOTW]. That is a strange title, 

because a lot of these require the application of 

deadly force as a defense against deadly force.

If you talk to my counterpart, Lieutenant 

General [Robert B.] Johnston on the East Coast, 

he can give you the same listing of operations. 

The names may change, and the places may be 

Guantánamo and Haiti, and it may be hurricanes 

instead of floods and earthquakes—but he is doing the same kinds of things.

On the plane coming across country, I read 

something about the nature of conflict and war, 

and some of the changes we are experiencing. 

In World War I, only 5 percent of the fatalities 

were civilian. In World War II, the figure rose to 

50 percent. In wars and conflicts today, civilian 

casualties are moving up to 80–90 percent. We 

have become a lot better at not killing each other in great numbers as soldiers, but a lot worse 

in anticipating and dealing with the aftereffects 

of war.

As seen in the use of land mines and other 

forms of indiscriminate killing, the targeting of 

civilians is something I am seeing more and more 

A Marine corporal helps a Somali woman on 

crutches from a clinic in Mogadishu, Somalia, 

where U.S. Navy doctors conducted a medical 

civic action program in support of Operation 

Restore Hope.

Defense Imagery DD-SD-00-00838
308 chapter four

frequently. War always is messy—even after it 

is over. When Desert Storm ended, everybody 

left, and the Shiites and Kurds were left behind 

in miserable shape. The operation we began in 

the hills of Kurdistan on 11 April 1991, called 

Provide Comfort, still goes on today.

These kinds of operations are consuming our armed forces right now. I get called 

to testify on the [Capitol] Hill every once in a 

while, and the question I will be asked every single time is: Should the military be doing this? 

Whether we should or should not, I will tell 

you this—we are. We recently ran an exercise 

out my way called Emerald Express [1995]. It 

searched for ways we could do these new kinds 

of things better: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace 

enforcement, noncombatant evacuation operaLCpl Brandy L. Guerrero, radio operator, Communications Detachment, MEU Service Support Group 11, 

11th MEU(SOC), kisses an Iraqi baby waiting to be examined during a humanitarian assistance operation 

in the village of ash-Shafiyah, Iraq. This operation provided medical and dental treatments to Iraqis during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of GySgt Chago Zapata
lieutenant general anthony c. zinni 309

tions. All these sorts of things that my Marine 

expeditionary units live with, day in and day out.

On the Hill, I was challenged a few times 

about why we ever get involved in this. Well, we 

get involved with this because we get asked to 

do it. Who else could do it? It is nice to say as 

a Marine or a soldier or a sailor or airman, “We 

don’t want to do it, that’s not what we’re here 

for.”

But I will tell you what—I have walked the 

ground and seen a lot of dead children. I have 

seen a lot of people who have starved to death 

or have been brutally massacred alongside a 

road. And something inside me says, “Maybe I 

shouldn’t be doing this, but dammit, I want to 

do it. I want to change something. I want to be 

part of making this better or trying to fix the 

problem.” 

Now, those kinds of decisions go beyond my 

pay grade, but this is something we have had to 

live with for the last five years. The missions we 

get certainly are nontraditional. I have trained 

and established police forces, judiciary committees and judges, and prison systems; I have 

resettled refugees in massive numbers twice; I 

have negotiated with warlords, tribal leaders, 

and clan elders; I have distributed food, provided medical assistance, worried about well-baby 

care, and put in place obstetrical clinics; I have 

run refugee camps; and I have managed newspapers and run radio stations to counter misinformation attempts.

A lieutenant tests a formation during riot control training. Marines from Echo Company, 2d Battalion, 8th 

Marines, were part of the U.S. Security Detachment Panama, Marine Forces South, providing security 

during the turnover of the Panama Canal and U.S. bases to the Panamanian government. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Michael I. Gonzalez
310 chapter four

I am an infantryman of 30 years standing. 

Nowhere in my infantry training did anybody 

prepare me for all this. I have been seconded 

to ambassadors twice in my career: once in the 

former Soviet Union during Operation Provide 

Hope and once in Somalia during Operation 

Continue Hope, where I put on civilian clothes 

and became an assistant to an ambassadorat-large to promote the policies of our nation in 

that region.

We can say these things are not the matters 

that our armed forces should be involved in, 

but this is the direction the new world disorder 

is going, and there is not anybody else to call 

upon for help. And these are the kinds of operations we have to do better. We need to learn the 

nontraditional tasks required to accomplish our 

mission.

The problem is that today’s operations do 

not go down like the ones that possibly you and I 

have been trained to run. It is not nice and neat. 

For openers, you do not get a clean, hard mission that tells you exactly what you are supposed 

to do. And you do not always get an ideal enemy, another Saddam Hussein, whom you can go 

after because he is mean and evil and backs a 

totally wrong cause. It does not work that way 

anymore. Usually, you are trying not to make enemies today.

And you cannot always go in with a force 

ideally tailored for this operation. What happens 

is that everybody comes running to the scene, 

and not necessarily with the ideal force composition. Coalitions are formed. In Operation 

Provide Comfort, we had the forces of 13 nations; in Restore Hope in Somalia, the forces of 

24 nations made up our combined task force; in 

United Shield, I had the forces, as I mentioned, 

of 7 nations.

Always the best? No. Always exactly configured right for the operation? No. Always there 

to operate with the same objectives as you? No. 

Always completely interoperable with your 

command and your way of doing business and 

your doctrine and your tactics and your techniques? No. Always technically and procedurally 

the same as you? No. 

They come from the Third World; they 

come from a world that grew up in a different doctrinal system; they come with different 

political motivations; they come with different 

rules of engagement, which makes it interesting 

when the shooting begins. And yet you have got 

to pull these kinds of forces together and get a 

mission accomplished and make sure everybody 

goes home feeling good about what they did.

In Somalia the first time around, we had the 

forces of eight nations defending the airfield. 

Was that because that airfield was so big or so 

threatened? No. It was because the forces of 

those eight nations could go no farther than that 

airfield when they got off the airplane. For either political or military reasons, that was about 

it. But they got participation points; and obviously the sense of international legitimacy that is 

given to you is important to someone. It should 

not be discounted. So as a commander you have 

got to take all that into account.

I think that this is in our future for a while. 

We are in an era of transition like those after all 

major wars. In this case, it was a Cold War that 

ended, and I cannot predict whether this will 

settle out with other superpowers emerging or 

with a different kind of world order, but I can

predict a lengthy stay for this period of disorder. And it is not only overseas. There is disorder on the domestic front too. In this country, 

we do a lot of things that turn inward. We are 

very careful, because of the laws—posse comitatus and others—that restrict the employment of 
lieutenant general anthony c. zinni 311

U.S. military forces in these kinds of things.12

But when disasters hit or when disorder is afoot, 

you have got to show up with those who can do 

the job, and we have spent a lot of time involved 

in things that might surprise you.

Before going off for Operation United 

Shield, I asked for nonlethal weapon systems. 

On my first tour in Somalia, I saw that we had 

a hard time dealing with orchestrated demonstrations. They were used against us as a tactic 

12 The term posse comitatus refers to common-law or statute law 

authority of a local law official.

to defeat the Western approach to handling disturbances.

The Somalis knew we could not use deadly force; if we were provoked into using deadly force, it would just serve the ends of one or 

more of the warlords orchestrating the demonstration.

We knew that at times we would be dealing with people who are desperate. Looters, 

thieves, people fighting at food stations who are 

afraid that you will not come tomorrow and they 

will never get another chance in line—they are 

Helo Relief by Col Peter M. Gish depicts a CH-46E from the Black Knights of HMM-264 delivering relief 

supplies to a Kurdish refugee camp in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort. In March 1991, 

more than 760,000 Kurds fled into the rugged Taurus Mountains of eastern Turkey and northern Iraq to 

avoid the wrath of Saddam Hussein.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
312 chapter four

all trying to survive. And when all you have for 

response is a rifle and its bayonet—that is not 

the answer. And I knew we would see that again 

in Somalia during United Shield. That is why I 

wanted to do better than we did the first time.

I wanted something that was more compassionate in the way we could handle them, 

and not lethal—but something that also could 

protect our forces. And we had a whole array 

of technologies out there available to us. Never once did the use of crowd-control agents put 

our Marines in danger, because we had the ability to go right over to deadly force at any time.

This is the way we have to be thinking now. 

There is much more to it than just rifle platoons 

taking hills.

I gave a pitch the other day to the Retired 

Officers Association in Southern California, 

where I am based. One of the well-decorated 

World War II and Korean War vets came up to 

me afterward and said, “You live in a far more 

complex world than I did. Ours may have been 

greater and more vast in the combat and conflict, but it was much simpler in understanding 

who the bad guy was and what we had to do and 

the job we had to get done.”

Well, he was right. We are just as likely to 

need to negotiate our way through something 

as to fight our way through something these 

days. And sometimes one comes right behind 

the other or right before the other, so the world 

of military men and women today is extremely 

complex. Critical to success today are training 

and education, and the depth of knowledge you 

have about cultures, about such nonmilitary 

things as economics and politics and policies and 

the humanitarian aspects of an operation. 

You no longer can be only the pure, narrow, 

military thinker and just worry about fires and 

maneuver. Fires and maneuver are just two relatively simple battlefield activities that underlie a 

vast, ever-increasing number of other battlefield 

activities.

Right now, I worry more about psychological operations and civil affairs than maybe I do 

about fires and about maneuver. When the siren goes off, I do not know if it is going to be 

Desert Storm revisited or something entirely 

different. We answer to the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] in going back to a Desert 

Storm-like engagement but we also answer to 

CENTCOM to form the joint task force for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. I do 

not know if we are going to go back into the 

hills of Korea—because we answer to that unified commander on call in case there is another 

conflict in Korea—or whether it is to be another Bangladesh or another Ecuador, or whether 

we get on buses and go up the road to another 

Los Angeles riot scene or to a forest fire, or to 

a flood.

In looking at the full range of operations today, it is too simple to say, “Just don’t do it,” or 

“We shouldn’t do it.” Somebody has to do it—

that is the problem. And all of today’s problems 

are not outside our borders; sometimes they are 

simmering inside our borders.
313

THE CRUCIBLE 

Building Warriors for the 21st Century

by General Charles C. Krulak

Marine Corps Gazette, July 1997

had to be innovative, resourceful, and capable of 

making the right decision in extremis—in many 

ways, a force of one. More important, though, 

each and every Marine at Belleau Wood had to 

believe in his heart that, although he might seem 

alone and on his own in the darkness of the forest, he was actually fighting as part of an inseparable team—his unit—Marines who he could 

never let down.

While walking in the wheat field through 

which the Marines attacked on the 6th of June 

1918, it dawned on me that the Battle of Belleau 

Wood was won before it was even joined. On 

the eve of their trial by fire, the Marines of the 

4th Brigade were supremely confident in their 

personal abilities to carry the day, and more 

importantly, they felt an incredible allegiance 

to their unit and to their fellow Marines. It was 

these attributes that enabled them to prevail in 

the crucible of Belleau Wood. These same attributes—confidence and allegiance—will be 

necessary for success in the battles that will confront Marines in the twenty-first century. The 

Corps’ Crucible of today is designed to help 

Marines prepare for those future battles through 

the inculcation of these attributes.

On the 26th of May 1997, I delivered 

a Memorial Day address at a solemn ceremony on one of the Marine 

Corps’ most sacred battlefields: Belleau Wood.13

The tenacity, valor, and sacrifice displayed by 

the 4th Brigade during that epic battle forever 

cemented the Corps’ reputation as the world’s 

fighting elite. Since Belleau Wood, Marines have 

been looked upon as professionals, honed to the 

highest standard, sharpened for any challenge, 

warriors without peer.

After the ceremony, I spent the rest of the 

day walking through the wheat fields, forests, 

and villages where the 4th Brigade fought. This 

is hallowed ground. Even to this day, the battlefield bears the scars of vicious combat—fighting 

positions, trenches, shell holes, and shards of 

shrapnel are everywhere. It was a wonder to me 

that anyone could survive, much less prevail, in 

the cauldron that was Belleau Wood. Survival required much more than just courage and exceptional training. The individual Marine rifleman 

13 The original article came from Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The 

Crucible: Building Warriors for the 21st Century,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 81, no. 7 (July 1997). Minor revisions were made to the 

text based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, 

and spelling.
314 chapter four

I know that many of you have already heard 

of the Crucible. Some of you are even beginning 

to receive Crucible-trained Marines into your 

units. Let me share with you our rationale for 

starting the Crucible, identify what this training 

evolution entails, and then discuss the opportunities and the challenges that it poses to us as 

leaders.

Laurel Stern Boeck, Gen Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995–99).

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
general charles c. krulak 315

Why the Crucible?

The Crucible was not implemented because we 

found our tried-and-true methods of recruit 

training to be flawed. Nothing could be further 

from the truth. We developed the Crucible for 

two major reasons. The first reason is that we 

saw a change in the operating environment in 

which our Marines will be employed. Decentralized operations, high technology, increasing weapons lethality, asymmetric threats, the 

mixing of combatants and noncombatants, and 

urban combat will be the order of the day vice 

the exception in the twenty-first century. Our 

Marines must be good decision makers. They 

must be trained to the highest standard. They 

must be self-confident. They must have absolute 

faith in the members of their unit. This is why 

we have instituted the values program for all 

Marines. This is why we have enhanced the way 

we transform America’s sons and daughters into 

U.S. Marines. This is why we have included the 

Crucible as part of the transformation process. 

We must ensure that our newest Marines fully understand and appreciate what the Marine 

Corps represents, and that, as members of the 

world’s fighting elite, they must uphold the sacred trust we have with our great nation—and 

the sacred trust that we have with each other. 

The Crucible is designed specifically to contribute to the making of this kind of Marine. Preparing our young Marines for battle is the genesis 

for the Crucible.

The second reason for the Crucible was derived from subtle changes in the societal norms 

and expectations of America’s youth. We have all 

heard the term generation X, a term often associated with a negative connotation. Yet, it is from 

this generation that we recruit the Marines who 

will be our future. It is, therefore, important for 

us to understand just how the young people of 

today view the world, to understand what motivates them. Almost two years ago, we brought 

in a team of psychologists to tell us about generation X. From them, we learned that young 

people today are looking for standards, and they 

want to be held accountable. They, for the most 

part, do not mind following, but they can lead 

and want to lead. Most want to be part of something bigger than themselves. They want to be 

something special. Most believe in God. Many 

do not fully recognize it as such, but they want 

to have faith. These traits manifest themselves 

in a tendency to join—join gangs, join fraternities and clubs, join causes. These are exactly 

the same attributes and attitudes that offer the 

Marine Corps a tremendous opportunity. Generation X does not want to be “babied.” These 

young Americans are looking for a real challenge. They desperately want to be part of a winThe Crucible was part of the Corps’ focus on 

values under Krulak as seen in the recruitement 

poster Our Core Values. Honor, Courage, Commitment.

Official U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting poster
316 chapter four

ning team; they crave the stature associated with 

being one of the best. These are the Marines of 

the future, the warriors of the twenty-first century. The Crucible is giving them exactly what 

they want—and exactly what we need.

What Is the Crucible?

Remember that transformation is a four-step 

process: recruiting, recruit training, cohesion, 

and sustainment. The Crucible is the centerpiece of the recruit training phase. It is a threeday training evolution that has been added to the 

end of basic recruit training, designed specifically to make Marines better warriors. It features 

little food, little sleep, more than 40 miles of 

forced marches, and 32 stations that test physical toughness and mental agility. The events are 

designed to focus primarily on two areas: shared 

hardship and teamwork. We wanted to create a 

challenge so difficult and arduous that it would 

be the closest thing possible to actual combat. 

We wanted to create for the recruits a Crucible that, once experienced, would be a personal 

touchstone and would demonstrate for each and 

every recruit and candidate the limitless nature 

of what they could achieve individually and, 

more importantly, what they could accomplish 

when they worked as a team. To accommodate 

this culminating event, we lengthened recruit 

training to 12 full weeks. The Crucible has been 

strategically placed in the 11th week of training, a week we have designated “Transformation 

Week.”

The drill instructor is still the backbone of 

the recruit training process. The drill instructor’s role in the first 10 weeks of recruit training 

Marine recruits drag a fellow recruit through an obstacle during the Crucible at the Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot Parris Island, SC, on 3 December 2015. 

Official U.S. Air Force photo, courtesy of SSgt Kenneth Norman
general charles c. krulak 317

remains as it always has been. However, during 

Transformation Week, the drill instructor trades 

his or her traditional campaign cover for a soft 

cover or a helmet, and transitions to the role 

of a team leader and mentor for the Crucible 

process. The drill instructor guides the recruits, 

seeking to build confidence in their individual 

abilities and to emphasize the importance of the 

team. The objective is to build a sense of unit 

cohesion so that, by the end of the Crucible, the 

individual recruits see the value of working together in a common cause to overcome the most 

arduous tasks and conditions.

The drill instructor’s job is not over, however, when his or her recruits complete the Crucible. There is a week remaining—Transition 

Week. It is the time when our newest members 

have the opportunity—and the responsibility—

to increase their knowledge and confidence so 

that they are fully prepared for what lies ahead. 

It is during this last week that the drill instructors debrief the recruits’ Crucible experience, 

identifying and reinforcing the teamwork and 

values that allowed them to prevail in times of 

duress and hardship.

The Opportunity 

and the Challenge

The results of the first iterations of the Crucible have been impressive, not only in the increased sense of pride and maturity in our new 

Marines, but in other, more tangible, ways 

as well. For example, liberty incidents of the 

Crucible-trained companies going through infantry training battalions at the schools of infantry have decreased dramatically. Both schools 

Marine recruits provide security while another exits a tunnel during the Crucible at Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot Parris Island, SC, on 14 July 2016. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl John-Paul Imbody
318 chapter four

report that companies composed of Marines 

who have completed the Crucible are performing better than Marines who underwent the syllabus prior to implementation of the Crucible. 

Recruiters report that these new Marines, when 

assigned to the Recruiters Assistance Program, 

are more responsible and more confident. These 

are preliminary results, but clearly we have hit 

the mark. We have taken a proven process that 

produces the finest fighting men and women in 

the world and actually improved it!

Now as these Marines—tempered in the 

Crucible—enter our ranks, it is up to every 

leader in the Corps to combine the strengths 

of our experienced Marines with the intensity 

of our new Marines. This amalgamation will increase unit warfighting capabilities. As always, 

Marine leaders must capitalize on the strength 

that every Marine brings to the team.

You have great Marines now. Your new Marines will be the same in many ways yet will be 

different for their Crucible experience. Think 

about how you will capitalize on that difference. 

Think about how you will meet this challenge. 

While it is true that leadership fundamentals are 

timeless, the method of application varies with 

every scenario and with each individual. I have 

complete confidence that in this organization of 

leaders you will find the methods to maximize 

this opportunity wherever you are—in your fire 

team or shop, in your battalion or squadron, in 

your Marine air-ground task force, or on your 

staff.

The battles ahead will be violent, chaotic, 

and lethal. It is our responsibility to prepare our 

Marines for these future trials. They, like their 

forefathers at Belleau Wood, must have complete confidence in their individual abilities and 

in those of their unit. The Crucible helps instill 

that confidence. But, it only helps. It is up to us 

to do the rest with good, old-fashioned, Marine 

Corps leadership.

Semper Fidelis. USMC
319

PREPARING THE 

MARINE CORPS FOR WAR

by General Charles C. Krulak

Marine Corps Gazette, September 1997

ready Marine Corps. Two years ago, we published the CPG—a comprehensive document 

that serves as the schematic for how we make 

Marines and win battles for the nation. Now, 

at the halfway mark of this commandancy, it is 

time to revisit the CPG and remind ourselves 

that our priority must always be maintaining our 

focus on preparing the Marine Corps for war.

Unique Contributions

We have made significant contributions to the 

nation’s defense in several new and very unique 

ways. Identifying a gap in our nation’s ability to 

rapidly respond to chemical and biological attacks, a Chemical Biological Incident Response 

Force (CBIRF) was created. This unit is ready for 

use in the fight against those who would attack 

our nation asymmetrically. It has been deployed 

to several real-world contingencies, making our 

population and leadership safer—at the Olympic Games in Atlanta, at the president’s inauguration in Washington, and at the economic summit 

in Denver. It is ready for worldwide deployment 

and is improving on ways in which it can be 

used to “train the trainers” in organizations and 

agencies preparing for similar contingencies.

I

n 1993, we took a major step forward in ensuring that our Corps would always be “The 

most ready when the Nation is least ready.”14

In that year, we published Marine Corps Order 

(MCO) P3900.15, which defines the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Process (CDP), 

now called the Marine Corps Combat Development System (CDS). In that order, we codified 

an integrated process by which we identify, obtain, and support necessary combat capabilities 

for the Marine Corps. The CDS is not about the 

procurement of things. It is about the procurement of capabilities. Things do not win battles. 

Marines win battles . . . Marines who can outthink, outmaneuver, and who have the capabilities to overwhelm their foes.

As part of the CDS, the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps is responsible for publishing 

a document called the Commandant’s Planning 

Guidance (CPG). The CPG is intended to be the 

foundation of Marine Corps planning, the cornerstone of our efforts to maintain a combat 

14 The original article came from Gen Charles C. Krulak, “Preparing the Marine Corps for War,” Marine Corps Gazette 81, no. 9 

(September 1997). Minor revisions were made to the text based 

on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.
320 chapter four

A Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters 

(SJTFHQ) has also been created. Recognizing 

the ad hoc nature in which Joint Task Force 

(JTF) headquarters are usually created and the 

inefficiencies incurred in such activations, the 

SJTFHQ was developed to address those inefficiencies. Resourced by the Marine Corps, 

it is ready for use by any theater commander. 

The SJTFHQ has participated in numerous joint 

exercises and most recently honed its skills in 

the European Command’s Exercise Agile Lion 

[Lithuania, 1997].

The special operations capable Marine expeditionary unit, or MEU(SOC), deployments 

offer our nation the quintessential crisis response force. Our country’s reliance on their 

capabilities during the last several years has dramatically increased. But, rare are the occasions 

when any Service or Service department conducts operations solely with its own resources. 

Because of this, and because the MEU(SOC)s 

are often the first on scene, we have increased 

their command-and-control capabilities so that 

they might be better prepared to serve as JTF 

enablers.

The enhanced MEU(SOC) capability to 

serve as a JTF enabler, the chemical and biological crisis management capability, and the 

SJTFHQ all provide unique capabilities to our 

national defense. By anticipating and filling the 

nation’s warfighting requirements, we are preparing the Marine Corps for war.

Traditional 

Capabilities

While adding and enhancing some capabilities, 

our stock-in-trade remains being able to field 

well-trained and capable Marine air-ground 

task forces (MAGTFs). Whether a small, special 

purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) organized for a 

contained response, or a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) employed in a major theater 

war, the Marines we send to battle must be well 

trained, properly organized, and ably led. Necessary combat power will be provided to the 

MAGTF, particularly at the MEF level, through 

global sourcing from the Total Force: one force 

consisting of Marines, both Active and Reserve.

The Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning 

Force (MPF) remains one of the cornerstones of 

our ability to quickly insert a sustainable and capable force in a time of significant crisis or challenge to our national interests. While offloading 

operations may take advantage of benign port 

facilities, it is our ability to offload unassisted by 

such infrastructure that makes MPF such a versatile means of force introduction. Congress has 

provided the funding, and we have contracted 

for an additional ship in each of our three MPF 

squadrons. This enhanced MPF capability will 

mean an added expeditionary airfield, field hosMarines receive a class in winter warfare during a 

snow storm while training at Bridgeport, CA, in 

the Sierra Nevadas in 1992.

Courtesy of Paul Westermeyer
general charles c. krulak 321

pital, and additional sustainment for our committed forces.

But forcible entry from the sea remains 

the Marines’ forte. We continue to work with 

our Navy shipmates to ensure we reach our 

resource-constrained, programmatic goal of 

enough amphibious shipping to lift the equivalent of 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades. The 

requirement—the capability which we strive to 

provide to our nation—remains at 3.0 brigade 

equivalents. The goal of the naval Services is to 

ensure a credible amphibious capability is ready 

when the nation says, “land the Marines.”

Once landed, our ability to maneuver effectively is directly tied to our tactical mobility. 

The [Bell Boeing] V-22 [Osprey], the advanced 

assault amphibian vehicle (AAAV), and the procurement of the lightweight 155mm howitzer 

are all part of an overarching architecture designed to make sure we have the mobility to support our doctrine of maneuver warfare. But, we 

must explore advanced technologies, not just 

for ship-to-shore movement or for enhanced air 

and ground mobility, but also for technologies 

that support the individual Marine’s mobility. 

Their clothing and equipment have a direct and 

immediate impact on survivability, lethality, and 

mission accomplishment.

Marine Corps operational forces will continue to be organized as MAGTFs, with the 

MEF as the principal warfighting organization. 

We will maintain the amphibious forcible entry 

option for the National Command Authority.15

We are enhancing our ability to move significant 

15 National Command Authority is a DOD term for the ultimate 

source for lawful military orders.

A Marine rushes toward an objective during a combined arms exercise at Camp Lejeune, NC, on 15 December 2017. The exercise allowed riflemen and machine gunners to work together assaulting objectives 

while covered by live fire. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Sgt James Skelton
322 chapter four

warfighting capabilities to a point of crisis, and 

we are aggressively working at increasing our 

tactical mobility. We are focused on preparing 

the Marine Corps for war.

Doctrine

We are forging ahead with our doctrine efforts, 

ensuring that concepts and doctrine are synchronized, covering the gaps, and coordinating 

materials at every level. New doctrinal publications are coming off the presses. And most important, the doctrine is sound.

To ensure that Marine Corps capabilities are 

understood and properly employed, we are fully 

participating in the joint doctrine development 

process. Having our capabilities fully inculcated 

in the nation’s quiver of warfighting techniques 

is vital to her defense. Ensuring that our Marines 

and our fellow joint warriors have a fundamental understanding of warfighting principles is of 

inestimable importance. We are focused on preparing the Marine Corps for war.

Harnessing 

Our Assets

No organization can be truly efficient until it 

harnesses all of its resources, especially its people. This is particularly true if your business is 

warfighting. The Corps recognizes that every 

Marine has something to contribute. We are a 

diverse institution comprised of men and women representing the cultural and ethnic diversity 

of our nation. These Marines are our warfighters 

and race, creed, and gender make no difference. 

It is paramount that we, as an institution, foster an environment of dignity and respect for 

all Marines, an environment where all Marines 

feel proud to be part of something bigger than 

themselves. Those who cannot act with dignity 

and respect toward their fellow Marines in garrison certainly have not properly prepared their 

character for the stresses of war.

Often large organizations fail to take full 

advantage of their people because there is no 

mechanism by which good ideas can be surfaced to the top. Recognizing that good ideas 

come from individuals of all experience levels 

and from throughout our rank structure, we 

created Marine Mail.16 When we started, we 

asked for answers to three questions: What are 

we not doing that we should be doing? What are 

we doing that we should be doing differently? 

What are we doing that we should not be doing? 

Since then, we have also come to appreciate just 

how many good ideas are out there with respect 

to new concepts, tactics, and equipment that 

might improve our warfighting capability. The 

response from Marines across our Corps has 

been tremendous. We are a stronger warfighting organization for the contributions received 

through Marine Mail.

Just as we have empowered the ranks of 

our Corps, we must ensure that we are making maximum use of the talents resident in our 

most seasoned leaders. An Executive Steering 

Committee has been created to make better use 

of the knowledge and experience of our senior 

leadership at the lieutenant general level. This 

more formalized process of coalescing ideas and 

tracking progress has been very helpful in the 

decision-making process that guides our Corps. 

Capitalizing on our diversity, emplacing a mechanism to encourage the free flow of new ideas, 

and maximizing the talents of our senior leaders 

are all measures designed to prepare the Marine 

Corps for war.

16 ALMAR 001/07, Marine Mail (Washington, DC: Headquarters 

Marine Corps, 2007). The Commandant created Marine Mail “to 

encourage creativity and innovation by providing each Marine, 

sailor, or civilian Marine, regardless of grade, a method by which 

their positive and professional ideas could be heard.”
general charles c. krulak 323

Innovation

Innovation is our key to ensuring that we provide the nation with a Marine Corps that is organized and equipped to fill our role as the nation’s 

expeditionary force-in-readiness . . . ready not 

just for the battles of today but of tomorrow and 

the day after tomorrow. The Quadrennial Defense 

Review just finished, and the National Defense 

Panel underway, seek to define our place in the 

national defense.17 It is up to us to develop the 

operational concepts through which we will affect that role.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMITS) 

is our operational concept.18 Using the quantum 

leap in capabilities of the V-22, the air cushioned 

landing craft, and the AAAV, we will be able to 

take maneuver warfare to a new level. We will 

not be constrained by traditional beach landing 

sites. We will avoid enemy defenses where he 

is strong and attack through his weaknesses to 

17 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: DOD, 1997, 2001, 

2006, 2010, 2014).

18 Operational Maneuver from the Sea, MCCP-1 (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1999).

destroy his ability and desire to resist. Through 

an unprecedented ability to generate tempo, we 

will overwhelm our enemies and protect our 

force.

We are conducting a series of advanced 

warfighting experiments to determine, among 

many things, the best configuration of the force 

that will execute OMFTS. The Marine Corps 

Warfighting Laboratory will gather the data 

from these experiments. Based partly on this 

data, we will then conduct a comprehensive 

Force Structure Planning Group to evaluate the 

structure of our Corps. It is through experimentation that we will we find the recipe for success 

on tomorrow’s battlefield.

Just as we have done in other interwar periods, we are using experimentation and innovation to ensure we are ready for war as it will 

be, not as it was. Innovation is one of the keys to 

preparing the Marine Corps for war.

Professional 

Military Education

Professional military education (PME) is crucial 

to our development as warriors. There are few 

dilemmas that will face our Marines on the field 

of battle that have not been faced before. Even 

as the nature of war evolves, the challenges associated with it contain a number of reoccurring 

themes. The Marine who has not availed himself 

of the opportunity to learn from the mistakes 

and successes of others is ill prepared for war. 

He or she stands a higher chance of needlessly becoming a casualty, endangering other Marines, and failing to accomplish the mission. But, 

Marines do not fail in battle. We prepare ourselves for it. We ensure we are technically and 

tactically proficient. We study our trade.

We have placed great emphasis on PME. 

We want all Marines to receive top-grade edLCpl Nathan Long, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, scouts for enemy 

contact during a military operation on urban 

terrain exercise during his Sapper Leaders Course 

at Camp Pendleton on 2 November 2017. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
324 chapter four

ucation at every level, education that will make 

them better warfighters. Having said that, we 

have received considerable input that says some 

of our correspondence course PME may be too 

time-consuming, that it is detracting from the 

accomplishment of our day-to-day mission. We 

are examining that. The goal is a continuous and 

incremental increase in the ability and education 

of every Marine as he or she progresses in rank.

Formal, residence courses are valuable experiences for those Marines who get an opportunity to attend them. We have not always done 

as good a job as we could have in filling school 

quotas. This is an area that requires constant 

monitoring. These courses are where we accrue 

the skills necessary to allow us to conduct decentralized operations—to fight and win.

The Commandant’s Reading Program is designed to help steer our Marines toward books 

with good lessons.19 The MAGTF Staff Training 

19 The Commandant’s Reading Program has since evolved into the 

Program provides professional education for our 

staffs. All of our correspondence and resident 

PME courses cultivate our Marines as warriors 

and prepare them for additional responsibilities. 

PME is an essential ingredient in preparing the 

Marine Corps for war.

Developing 

the Warrior

We have already spoken of the preparation of our 

warriors’ minds through education, but there 

is more to being mentally prepared for combat than being well schooled in the art of war. 

Our Marines must be mentally tough as well. 

Commandants Professional Reading List (CPRL), which is accessible through the Library of the Marine Corps. The Commandant 

believes the CPRL is necessary for professional development and 

critical thinking at each level. It is arranged into two sections: 

Commandants Choice and by grade levels (entry, primary, career, 

intermediate, and senior). Each Marine is required to read a minimum of five books from the Commandants Choice or grade-level 

sections each year. These levels coincide with specific ranks and 

Marines should attempt to read all titles within their level prior to 

proceeding to a higher level. 

A McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet over the South China Sea.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl John McGarity
general charles c. krulak 325

The Transformation Process helps make Marines 

with the depth of character to do the right thing, 

in the right way, for the right reasons. Marines 

full of conviction and with strong minds, Marines who have been made to look within for the 

answers they seek, will be a powerful force on 

any battlefield to which the nation sends them. 

The Marine Corps values program is designed 

to reinforce and help sustain the hardening—

the Transformation.

Of all the things we do as an institution, 

none is so crucial as preparing our Marines for 

the rigors of combat. Tough physical training 

hardens our warriors, makes them equal to the 

challenges ahead. The Physical Fitness Test has 

been made tougher. We will continue to emphasis fitness as a way of life for Marines.

But Marines are more than body and mind. 

To be a United States Marine, one must prepare the body, the mind, and the spirit. The 

experiences of the Crucible are the gateway 

for the development of the Marine spirit. The 

cohesion-building phase of the Transformation 

Process is designed to strengthen the bonds between us as warriors. Being a Marine has always 

been a mystical association of spirit with one’s 

fellow Marines. Capitalizing on this esprit, we 

have become the band of warriors we are today, 

feared by our foes, and respected throughout 

the world.

We make Marines—body, mind, and spirit. 

Making Marines is all about preparing the Marine Corps for war.

You the Marine

The last paragraph of the CPG states:

In the final analysis, my guidance simply 

is to be prepared to fight, on the shortest 

notice, under any circumstances of weather 

or resistance, in conflicts large or small. Be 

prepared to integrate Marine combat power smoothly into the overall matrix of other 

U.S. Services or other nations. Be prepared, 

in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, to project power from the sea for as far and as long 

as necessary. Be ever mindful of technological opportunities to enhance combat proficiency and to promote logistic economy. Be 

also mindful of the deep meaning in Title 

10 of the U.S. Code of the requirement that 

Marines shall be prepared to discharge “such 

other duties as the President may direct,” 

whatever those duties may be. But, most of 

all, be prepared to fight and win.

We, as an institution, are preparing the Marine Corps to fight. This preparation is reflected 

in everything we do. From revamping the fitness 

report system so that we are sure to promote 

our most qualified warriors, to our aggressive 

efforts in seeking funding for the tools we need 

to enhance our warfighting capabilities, it is all 

about preparing the Marine Corps for war. But 

we cannot achieve our goals as an institution 

without participation from all Marines—from 

you. Look for ways to contribute to the readiness of your Corps. Make training for your 

Marines tough and demanding. Reaffirm your 

commitment to principle and make a check of 

your personal character. Conduct or participate 

in the daily warfighting discussions mandated 

in the CPG. Send in a Marine Mail, write your 

ideas in an article for the Gazette, or share a lesson learned with a peer. Together, we shoulder 

the awesome responsibility of preparing the Marine Corps for war.
326

UP TO THE CHALLENGE

Women’s Training in Today’s Marine Corps

by Colonel Nancy P. Anderson

Leatherneck, February 2002

General Louis H. Wilson Jr. authorized the routine assignment of women to 526 nondeployable 

continental United States operational billets and 

tasked commanders to review both stateside 

and overseas billets with a view to substantially expand assignment options for women. Female accessions were monitored to ensure force 

commanders had sufficient male Marines to preserve a 5-to-1 deployment rotation base and still 

provide fair career progressions for all Marines. 

“Fair” would begin at entry-level training.

In 1976, Major Barbara E. Dolyak assumed 

command of Company L, the all-female officer 

basic class at Camp Barrett, The Basic School 

(TBS), Quantico, Virginia. Major Dolyak questioned why it was essential for the 82 percent 

noninfantry male lieutenants to attend a 26-

week TBS while female lieutenants received 

only 12 weeks of training. The resulting buzz 

made its way to the halls of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). Separately, plans were 

underway to shorten TBS to 21 weeks and to 

create a follow-on Infantry Officer Course for 

lieutenants assigned the 03 (infantry) military 

occupational specialty.

The stars—director of Training, commandLike all fulfilling achievements, the acceptance of women into the Marine Corps 

was hard-won.20 “The American tradition is that a woman’s place is in the home,” said 

Brigadier General Gerald C. Thomas, director, 

Headquarters Marine Corps Plans and Policies 

Division in October 1945.

That comment seemed to reflect the attitude of Marine Corps leadership on restricting 

female accessions. In the years between the end 

of the Korean and Vietnam wars, the percentage 

of women serving in the Regular component of 

the Marine Corps remained fairly constant, approximately 1.3 percent, even though the 1948 

law limiting women to 2 percent had been repealed in 1967.

Winds of social change began to blow in the 

1970s. Following Vietnam, the military Services 

actively recruited women to fill anticipated 

all-volunteer force personnel shortfalls. In early 

1975, in response to requests from operational commanders, Marine Corps Commandant, 

20 The original article came from Col Nancy P. Anderson, “Up To 

the Challenge: Women’s Training in Today’s Marine Corps,” Leatherneck, February 2002. Minor revisions were made to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and 

spelling.
colonel nancy p. anderson 327

ing general, Marine Corps Development and 

Education Command, and the Commandant—

aligned. White Letter no. 5-76, “Women Marines,” was published on 23 June 1976. In it 

General Wilson stressed the fact that increased 

opportunities for women demanded positive 

leadership and management by commanders. 

He directed that “commanders who are responsible for the conduct of professional schools 

should review curricula to ensure that the training offered prepares Marines to lead, irrespective of sex.”

Twenty-two female and 243 male lieutenants reported to Company C, basic class 3-77, on 

4 January 1977. The women formed 2d Platoon, 

led by Captain Robin L. Austin. That summer, 

the Corps’ leadership realized the importance 

of physically and mentally preparing women 

before TBS, and the decision was made to 

gender-integrate Officer Candidates School 

(OCS).

By 1979, five consolidated TBS companies 

had graduated, including some that had men and 

women assigned to the same platoon. The women received the same tactics training, although 

they assumed only defensive roles in field problems. The women were assigned to all-female 

platoons between 1980 and 1992 due to “physiological differences and legal limitations set 

forth concerning application of phases of offensive combat.” The women’s training expanded 

as combat exclusion was less rigidly defined. 

Male and female TBS lieutenants have been assigned platoons alphabetically by their last name 

since 1992 and undergo the same training.

For enlisted women, too, change was in 

Women are integrated now more than ever into the Corps.

Official U.S. Marine Recruiting poster
328 chapter four

the air. Beginning January 1976, female drill 

instructors were authorized to attend, and required to complete, Drill Instructor School. 

The drill instructor is the first Marine a recruit 

meets when reporting for active duty and the 

last Marine a recruit will ever forget. Sending to 

Drill Instructor School all Marines charged with 

transforming young adults into Marines ensured 

men and women could be trained to the same 

high standard.

In November 1980, General Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

announced a pilot defensive combat training program for female recruits. Training included field 

exercises, some combat training, and weapons 

familiarization. Women would fire with the 

M16A1 but not for qualification score. However, only three days into the first field exercise, 

the Parris Island, South Carolina, deputy commanding general, Brigadier General William 

Weise, observed the training and did not like 

what he saw. He stated that, while the female 

recruits were being trained to learn how to defend themselves, “Women do not have the physical or emotional stamina to handle the rigors 

of the battlefield. I would not want to see my 

daughters or female friends of mine in a combat 

situation if I could avoid it.” Their training was 

scaled back.

Teaching field tactics to women was a sensitive issue from Parris Island and Quantico to 

the halls of HQMC. There was as much concern 

about public perception of women receiving 

combat training as with the need to teach all 

Marines how to stay alive.

Between 1978 and 1981, the number of enlisted female Marines rose from 4,652 to 7,091, 

and female officers increased from 433 to 526. 

At this point, in order to achieve training goals, 

female drill instructors were averaging 340 

workdays annually compared to 230 to 250 days 

by male drill instructors. To better train and lead 

more female recruits and officer candidates, the 

number of female drill instructors was slowly 

increased.

Marine Corps Order 1500.24D, Training Policy 

for Women Marines, published on 20 May 1985, 

recognized that even combat service support 

billets removed from the forward line of troops 

did not guarantee safety. The Commandant, 

General Paul X. Kelley, directed that female Marines receive the same training as male counterparts in the same units and billet, less offensive 

combat training.

GySgt Watson, USMCR, by Maj Alex Durr.

Art Collection, National Museum of the Marine Corps
colonel nancy p. anderson 329

Recruit training was again modified to include instruction in day and night tactics, rappelling, the confidence course, and defensive 

field training. Female recruit training was extended from 8 to 11 weeks, mirroring that given 

to male recruits, and included a three-night field 

training exercise. Female recruits were tested 

in close order drill with rifles for the first time 

in July 1985, while the female drill instructors 

made their debut with noncommissioned officers’ swords.

Private Anita Lobo, in the first female series to fire for score at the rifle range that year, 

raised a few eyebrows by setting a new Parris 

Island range record, firing 246 of a possible 

250. On 1 November 1986, the commanding 

general, Parris Island, Major General Harold G. 

Glasgow, redesignated Woman Recruit Training 

Command as the 4th Recruit Training Battalion, 

Recruit Training Regiment. Female drill instructors were qualified as swimming and marksman 

coaches and drill masters. Senior women were 

increasingly visible in training and command billets, although male and female recruit training 

remained separate.

The appointment of General Alfred M. 

Gray Jr. as 29th Commandant brought the mantra “Basic Warrior” to the Corps. Basic Warrior 

Training was initiated at the recruit depots and 

enhanced at the School of Infantry, producing a 

LCpl Stephanie Robertson, a member of the female engagement team assigned to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 

Regimental Combat Team 7, speaks with locals during an engagement mission in Marjah, Afghanistan, on 

18 August 2010.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of LCpl Marionne T. Mangrum
330 chapter four

basically trained, combat-ready Marine, male or 

female.

The repeal of Title 10 U.S. Code combat 

restrictions and new secretary of defense policy defining combat risk made Service chiefs 

responsible for ground combat policies with respect to the employment of women.

In January 1988, training days for female 

recruits were extended from 57 to 64, while 

male training remained at 56 days. The increase 

provided women a condensed version of basic warrior training, as they did not attend the 

School of Infantry. That December, Company 

O, Series 4000, became the first female series 

to execute the entire Combat Assault Course as 

an offensive exercise. In January 1989, female 

recruits began to run in boots and utilities and 

with the rifle.

By 1994, male and female recruit training 

programs were nearly identical. By October 

1996, men and women were undergoing 12 

weeks of recruit training. The traditional three 

phases of recruit training—basic military skills, 

marksmanship/combat skills and advanced 

skills—were replaced with a building block 

approach to forge individuals into an effective 

team. The 54-hour Crucible would be their 

toughest challenge.

Female accession quotas continued to rise, 

and women continued to enlist. A third company was added to 4th Recruit Training Battalion, 

allowing for a sixth series and putting all series 

into more efficient training phases.

Following graduation, female recruits were 

assigned to Marine Combat Training, initially at 

Weapons Battalion, Parris Island, and then to 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Male and female recruit training was identical.

The increasing number of women completing recruit training or OCS is more striking 

when injury attrition numbers are examined. 

The annual attrition of female recruits and officer candidates for medical reasons is nearly 

twice as high as among men, more than 12.5 

percent in 2000. Musculoskeletal injuries associated with vigorous physical training are the 

leading cause of female attrition. Commanding officers and staff of the Recruit Training 

Regiment, OCS, and TBS have focused on this 

particular gender discriminator during the last 

decade.

The chief attributing factor is that women 

arrive for entry-level training in poor physical 

condition and with weak bones. Neither recruit 

training nor OCS last long enough to develop the 

bone density and lean muscle mass that are principal safeguards against these injuries. Strength 

conditioning programs were initiated at Parris 

Island and Quantico, using stronger muscles to 

compensate for weaker bones. Female recruits 

and officer candidates were taught to run and 

hike more efficiently and to develop a shorter, 

faster stride to minimize lower leg injuries. In 

trying to reduce injuries, female officer candidates would hike different routes, hike different 

paces, or begin ahead of male candidates. Each 

commanding officer worked to find a solution.

As perception is reality, it also was necessary to explain the reasons behind the training 

differences to the male candidates. Men and 

women worked equally hard, but it is easy to 

acquire a “second class” moniker when the perception was that women are not working as hard 

as men. The different physical fitness standards 

were less a readiness issue than a morale issue. 

To further manage the perception of fairness, 

savvy trainers or team leaders would have a female carry the first and last loads during a coed 

problem if she could not carry as much per load.

Women do not learn in the same way as 
colonel nancy p. anderson 331

men. Live grenade toss was stopped between 

1986 and 1992 for female recruits when an evaluation showed that 60 percent could not throw 

a dud grenade the 15 meters required to escape the bursting radius. For the leadership, the 

solution was to halt training, yet all the women 

needed was instruction on how to throw. Most 

women faced the target rather than rotating 

their shoulders and hips 90 degrees away from 

it and then swinging around in order to accelerate the grenade. A similar problem occurred at 

OCS when women were initially not shown how 

to wrap the rope between their boots to form 

a step for the rope climb, drawing far less on 

upper body strength. The women learned, and 

the instructors found more effective teaching 

methods.

Personality profiling and educational studies have shown that women are more visual and 

learn better by seeing than by hearing or telling. At Parris Island, when female recruits were 

taught about the rifle before learning to fire it, 

rifle qualification percentages went way up. A 

change as simple as posting the series training 

schedule enabled women to see how each class 

linked into the big picture. Women were not 

asking to be shown an easier path; rather, they 

wanted to be taught how to succeed.

Meanwhile, the number of women completing initial training and serving proudly as 

United States Marines continues to rise and continues to exceed planning estimates. Women in 

today’s Corps represent 6 percent of the active 

and 4.6 percent of the Reserve force. Women 

Capt Elizabeth A. Okoreeh-Baah, the first female MV-22 Osprey pilot, stands on the flight line after a combat operation on 12 March 2008. Capt Okoreeh-Baah spent five years flying the CH-46E Sea Knight before 

transitioning to the Osprey.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Jessica Aranda
332 chapter four

choose to be Marines for the same reasons as 

men: duty to country, money for education, an 

escape from a bad situation, growth as a person.

The issue of meaningful military service 

does not involve gender but, instead, the 

strength and defense of the United States in 

general and the most efficient use of personnel 

in particular. Today’s Marines, male or female, 

know their stuff and have earned the eagle, 

globe, and anchor.
333

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) 

COMMANDING GENERAL’S 

MESSAGE TO ALL HANDS

March 2003

endured a lifetime under Saddam’s oppression.

Chemical attack, treachery, and use of innocent human shields can be expected, as can other unethical tactics. Take it all in stride. Be the 

hunter, not the hunted; never allow your unit to 

be caught with its guard down. Use good judgment and act in the best interests of our nation.

You are part of the world’s most feared and 

trusted force. Engage your brain before you 

engage your weapon. Share your courage with 

each other as we enter the uncertain terrain 

north of the line of departure. Keep faith in your 

comrades on your left and right and Marine Air 

overhead. Fight with a happy heart and a strong 

spirit.

For the mission’s sake, our country’s sake, 

and the sake of the men who carried the division’s colors in past battles—who fought for life 

and never lost their nerve—carry out your mission 

and keep your honor clean. Demonstrate to the 

world there is “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy” than a U.S. Marine.

J. N. Mattis

Major General, U.S. Marines

Commanding

Just prior to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

General James N. Mattis, commanding the 1st Marine 

Division, sent the following message to all of the sailors and Marines of his division.21

F

or decades, Saddam Hussein has tortured, imprisoned, raped, and murdered 

the Iraqi people; invaded neighboring 

countries without provocation; and threatened 

the world with weapons of mass destruction. 

The time has come to end his reign of terror. 

On your young shoulders rest the hopes of mankind.

When I give you the word, together we 

will cross the line of departure, close with those 

forces that choose to fight, and destroy them. 

Our fight is [neither] with the Iraqi people, nor 

is it with members of the Iraqi Army who choose 

to surrender. While we will move swiftly and aggressively against those who resist, we will treat 

all others with decency, demonstrating chivalry 

and soldierly compassion for people who have 

21 The original letter came from Gen James N. Mattis to 1st Marine 

Division, “Commanding General’s Message To All Hands,” March 

2003. Minor revisions were made to the text based on current 

standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. Emphasis 

(italics) found in original document.
334

AN OPEN LETTER 

TO THE “YOUNG TURKS”

by Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller

Marine Corps Gazette, November 2011

Although my initial reaction to both the 

major’s and captain’s letter and article was to 

push back—whiny, do not get it, just pointing 

out problems without offering concrete solutions, spoiled by a resource rich environment 

where there is little accountability and a lack of 

supply discipline, think higher direction means a 

lack of trust, and on and on. The more I thought 

about our conversations, Major Munson’s article, and the conversations I have had with his 

peers around the Corps, I came to the conclusion that this officer, like the authors of “The 

Attritionist Letters,” is trying to tell leadership 

something about where “middle management” 

is mentally on their perceptions of the current 

state of the Corps and, more importantly, their 

expectations for the future. What I think I am 

hearing them say is:

We are tired of trying to fight this war with a 

supporting establishment—especially manpower and a process for equipping/training 

being the most consistently named examples

—that is not responsive or attuned to the 

needs of the warfighter. In short, the operating forces are at war and the supporting 

establishment is not.

We are given great freedom of action 

I want to take the opportunity to thank the 

Gazette for putting me in contact with Major 

Peter J. Munson.22 As a result of his letter in 

the April issue and my response, we had a conversation on the phone. He also sent me his article, “Back to Our Roots,” published in the April 

2011 online version of the Gazette, and we discussed that as well. As I mentioned in my commentary printed in the June Gazette in response 

to “The Attritionist Letters,” I believe it is better 

to talk and get things out in the open.23 Consequently, though I have not changed my view as 

articulated in the “Rebuttal,” I have considered 

the views of the good major, along with the captain (Captain Joseph Steinfels), who responded 

to me in the August Gazette, and many of their 

peers. I have personally listened to the views 

of these “Young Turks” in long and sometimes 

heated discussions during the past few years.24

The following paragraphs are my view of their 

views.

22 The original letter came from LtGen Robert B. Neller, “An 

Open Letter to ‘Young Turks’,” Marine Corps Gazette 100, no. 3 

(November 2011). Minor revisions were made to the text based 

on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling.

23 “The Attritionist Letters #1–#14,” Marine Corps Gazette, 

2010–13.

24 The term young Turk refers to those focused on making radical 

change in the face of tradition.
lieutenant general robert b. neller 335

and responsibility for the lives and welfare 

of those in our charge while deployed to the 

fight, but when we return to the “world” we 

are treated like we do not know anything or, 

worse, like we are not trusted.

You can trust me back in the “world,” 

like you do in combat. Just tell me what you 

want done, resource me, and let me lead. If 

I get it wrong then get in my business, but 

allow leaders to lead and on occasion kick 

one into the stands. At the same time, stop 

levying tasks on me that waste the time of 

the unit and the Marines/sailors.

We “get” the importance of safety and 

of taking care of the Marines in our charge, 

but this whole process has gotten out of 

hand. The great majority are paying for the 

sins of a very small minority, making all, 

regardless of rank, experience, and established performance, fill out forms for leave/

liberty and be subjected to mandatory and 

poorly organized group training—suicide, 

safety, diversity, etc. This is where I feel you 

do not trust me, and this approach is not 

going to create the change in behavior and 

conditions that leadership is looking for. In 

fact, it may go the other way.

Our inadequate and precious predeCommandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Robert B. Neller (2015–present), gets water from the Devil Dog 

fountain after the American Memorial Day ceremony at the Aisne-Marne American Memorial Cemetery, 

Belleau Wood, France, on 29 May 2016. U.S. Marines, French servicemembers, family members, and 

locals gather each year to honor the memory of the Marines killed during the Battle of Belleau Wood. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of SSgt Gabriela Garcia
336 chapter four

ployment training program (PTP) time is 

wasted on noncombat-related training, 

which—to add insult to injury—is in 

many cases not well presented and not focused, in addition to being irrelevant. Be 

more concerned about the quality of the 

training than about the reporting of the 

results.

Now these thoughts probably sound like 

any conversation any group of peer officers has 

had about their higher during the last 234 years, 

but the fact that we have been in this war now 

for almost 10 years makes these concerns, in 

my mind, both more legitimate and valid. I say 

this because I believe today’s Corps, based on all 

measures of performance and effectiveness, is a 

pretty good outfit. Without question, it is exponentially better than the Corps I joined back 

in the mid-1970s. But we are at a similar point 

in the cycle of sustained combat—war winding 

down, the budget knives out, and the nation, 

although it continues to be supportive, is tired 

both mentally and fiscally of the cost of war. My 

own greatest personal concern is that, once this 

fight ends, with the cuts we know are coming, 

unless we have a plan to address the issues the 

future leadership is raising and other long-term 

problems we know are institutional, this group/

generation of officers is not likely to be satisfied 

(read stick around). I would submit that if we 

think we can simply go back to the “old Corps” 

pre-11 September 2001, and the bureaucracy is 

not tamed/changed/reformed, we will be sadly 

mistaken and dissatisfied with the results.

Although I think “The Attritionist Letters” 

and the thoughts of the Major Munsons of the 

world are a bit overstated, especially the inexplicable correlation between centralized, directed training executed in a decentralized manner 

equating to a lack of trust, it is done, I believe, 

for effect. These Marines are trying to tell us 

what they see and feel after 10 years of war. We 

now have majors who have never known any 

other Corps—PTP, deploy, fight, redeploy, PTP, 

and do it again and again. We have women who 

have seen more combat than most of us ever did 

growing up, which is another factor we must 

consider. The combat exclusion policy for women is insulting to them. I digress.

We would do well to heed and reflect on 

their “canary in the mineshaft” thoughts, engage 

them head-on in frank and candid discussion, 

look for ways to remediate those concerns that 

are legitimate, and explain our logic for those 

with which we do not concur. Of critical importance, we must not think that when this fight 

is over we can/should go back to operations as 

normal. Fewer and fewer Marines know what 

that is anymore. We will have to create a “new 

normal.” We all know that coming out of a long 

conflict is fraught with risk, with historical issues 

of budget cuts, poor retention, and discipline 

issues. We have, I believe, begun the process to 

craft a plan to address these and other issues we 

have yet to wrestle with in order to keep the 

Corps the “middleweight force-in-readiness” 

the nation expects and needs. As important, the 

Corps must be a place where the best of the best 

want to stick around to be a part of what lies 

ahead.
337

ANTHONY C. ZINNI 

BIOGRAPHY

“Moral courage is often more difficult than physical courage. There are times when you disagree and you have to suck it in and say, “Yes, sir,” and go do what you’re told. There are also 

times when you disagree and you have to speak out, even at the cost of your career. If you’re a 

general, you might have to throw your stars on the table, as they say, and resign for the sake 

of some principle or truth from which you can’t back away.”

~General Anthony C. Zinni25

Watts, would organize a squad from the headquarters staff for security. In Battle Ready, General Zinni described one memorable encounter 

with Aidid:

Inside the compound, the buildings were all 

layered with the porches that are typical in 

tropical countries. Dozens of heavily armed 

men always swanned about, staring brazenly 

at my Marines from every level of the buildings. During my meetings, the Marines stood 

beside the vehicles returning the stares of the 

cocky Somali gunmen.

Our entrances and exits to and from 

the compound were normally without incident, which was just as well, considering the 

possibilities. But one of our entrances proved 

to be deliciously memorable. As we were stepping out of our Humvees on this particular 

occasion, I was greeted by shocked faces on 

Aideed’s men. I turned to the second Humvee 

in line, which seemed to be the source of all 

the excitement: An African American woman Marine was standing there in her battle 

General Anthony C. Zinni was born in 

1943, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in 

1965. He served two tours in Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1967, 

and as a company commander with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. In between those tours, he 

served as an instructor at The Basic School. He 

was wounded in Vietnam during his 1970 tour, 

and was awarded the Purple Heart. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, he commanded the 

2d Battalion, 8th Marines, the 9th Marines, and 

the 35th Marine Expeditionary Unit. In 1991, 

he served as the chief of staff and deputy commanding general of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort during the Kurdish relief effort in 

Turkey and Iraq.

In 1992, General Zinni was serving as director of operations for Unified Task Force 

Somalia. In that capacity, he often met with Mohammed Farah Aidid, then the leading Somali 

warlord; for these visits his driver, a Corporal 

25 Tom Clancy with Gen Tony Zinni (Ret) and Tony Koltz, Battle 

Ready (New York: Berkley, 2004), 425–26.
338 chapter four

gear, with her M-16 at the ready, looking 

tough as hell.

I left to conduct my business. Fortyfive minutes later, when I came back out, the 

stir was still at high pitch. It was obvious 

the Somalis couldn’t believe their eyes—an 

armed woman in Marine battle dress.

On the way back, I turned to Corporal 

Gen Anthony Zinni’s official photograph.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo
anthony c. zinni biography 339

Watts. “You brought a woman Marine, huh,” 

I said; I knew he’d set this scene up.

He smiled. “She’ll kill you just as dead 

as any man,” he said.

I laughed. He loved jerking the Somali 

tough guys’ chains. Back to our headquarters, I drew the woman Marine aside for a 

quick chat. Corporal Watts was right. She’d 

kill you just as dead as any man could.26

From 1994 to 1996, he served as the commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force. 

During this period, General Zinni served as 

commander of the Combined Task Force for 

Operation United Shield, protecting the with26 Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 261.

drawal of UN forces from Somalia. He took 

command of U.S. Central Command in 1997; 

he oversaw Operation Desert Fox, the 1998 airstrikes against Iraq. In 2000, he retired from the 

Marine Corps.

General Zinni’s career has epitomized the 

complex difficulties the modern Corps faces; he 

has been called upon to act as an armed diplomat and peacekeeper as often as he has led his 

Marines in combat against an enemy. Combining 

traditional Marine aggressiveness with cultural 

sensitivity, he showed the way for today’s Marines facing diverse, unexpected, operational, 

and strategic challenges. 

341

HISTORIOGRAPHY 

FOR MARINES

How Marines Should Read 

and Understand Histories

by Paul Westermeyer

Historiography, noun

1 a : the writing of history; b : the principles, theory, and history of historical writing 

2 : the product of historical writing1

The Marine Corps is devoted to the idea 

of its history. At recruit training and 

Officer Candidate School, classes on 

the history and legends of the Marine Corps are 

taught to those aspiring to be Marines, and the 

Corps celebrates its birthday every year with a 

ceremony and ball. At the National Museum of 

the Marine Corps, in the Making Marines Gallery, a panel puts a twist on the Corps’ hoary 

“Every Marine a Rifleman” shibboleth and declares “Every Marine a Historian” as it describes 

the classes taught at recruit training. 

Of course, the concept of “Every Marine a 

Rifleman” does not suggest that all Marines carry rifles, it means that all Marines are trained 

in basic marksmanship and infantry tactics and 

techniques and they must complete annual rifle 

1 Merriam–Webster, s.v. “historiography (n.),” accessed 5 January 

2018.

marksmanship qualifications. Similarly, “Every 

Marine a Historian” should go beyond merely 

providing Marines with a list of books to read; 

they should also develop the skills and tools required to evaluate and comprehend historical 

works. They should do this not with the intent 

to become professional historians, but rather for 

basic historical literacy. To understand history, 

Marines must have a basic understanding of historiography, “When you study ‘historiography’ 

you do not study the events of the past directly, 

but the changing interpretations of those events 

in the works of individual historians.”2

The first question that historiography asks 

is the same question Marines need to ask when 

looking at any given historical work: What is history? It may seem obvious on its face; history 

is the story of mankind’s past. Why then do we 

bother, beyond mere entertainment value, to 

study history; and how is history different from 

legend, mythology, or fiction?

Primarily, the difference lies in the meth2

 Conal Furay and Michael J. Salevouris, The Methods and Skills of 

History: A Practical Guide (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1988), 

223.

APPENDIX
342 appendix

odology and intent. Historians base their interpretations on carefully collected historical facts 

with the intent to illuminate the past, not invent 

it. Thucydides, whose work on the Peloponnesian War is one of the oldest histories we have, 

said, “On the whole, however, the conclusions I 

have drawn from the proofs quoted may, I believe, be safely relied on. Assuredly they will not 

be disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggerations of his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at 

truth’s expense; the subjects they treat of being 

out of reach of evidence, and time having robbed 

most of them of historical value by enthroning 

them in the region of legend.”3

 In other words, 

Thucydides claims he did not base his work on 

legend nor did he employ poetic license; rather, 

he based his work on the facts as he could best 

ascertain them. 

This is the basic form of the historical 

method; as the Father of History, Herodotus of 

Halicarnassus, wrote: “I am bound to tell what I 

am told, but not in every case to believe it.”4

 Historians examine a great many sources, compare 

them to each other, and then from these they 

tease the truth or come as close as they can to it. 

Thucydides explained in more detail: 

With reference to the narrative of events, far 

from permitting myself to derive it from the 

first source that came to hand, I did not even 

trust my own impressions, but it rests partly 

on what I saw myself, partly on what others 

saw for me, the accuracy of the report being 

always tried by the most severe and detailed 

tests possible. My conclusions have cost me 

some labor from the want of coincidence 

3

 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley (New 

York: Random House, 1982), 1.21.

4

 Herodotus, The History, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 1987), 7.152.

between accounts of the same occurrences 

by different eyewitnesses, arising sometimes 

from imperfect memory, sometimes from 

undue partiality for one side or the other. 

The absence of romance in my history will, I 

fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but 

I shall be content if it is judged useful by 

those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of 

human things must resemble if it does not 

reflect it. My history has been composed to 

be an everlasting possession, not the showpiece of an hour.5

Not every work telling a story from the past 

is a history, which is based on interpretations of 

facts from multiple sources. It is important to 

know when one is reading history and when one 

is reading something else. Many works look like 

a history but actually fit more readily into other 

disciplines, such as political science or journalism. More commonly, memoirs or autobiographies are mistaken for history, when they serve 

rather as sources that historians work from. 

Such first-person accounts have value, but the 

reader should understand their provenance and 

intent and not accept them as history. 

The Commandant’s Professional Reading 

List, for example, includes memoirs, biographies, polemics, and military fiction as well as 

histories. The easiest way to distinguish these 

works is to take them at their word. In First to 

Fight, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak tells 

the reader bluntly that his book is “a series of 

simple vignettes, part history, part legend, and 

part opinion.”6

 Do not stretch a work beyond 

5

 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.22. 6

 LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret), First to Fight: An Inside View 

of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), xvi.
paul westermeyer 343

its author’s intent. Other works make the task 

more difficult, as the author intentionally or unintentionally leaves the book’s category unclear. 

For example, Bing West’s The Wrong War superficially has the look of a history, describing the 

war in Afghanistan, but the methodology and 

intent makes it clear it is a journalistic polemic, 

advocating policy for the Afghan conflict. It is 

well worth reading, but not as a history.7

Historians generally classify sources as 

secondary and primary. Secondary sources are 

histories themselves, they do not purport to 

be current with the event; they analyze and interpret historical data. These are often used to 

place a work in context, providing background. 

Primary sources have direct knowledge of the 

event, unfiltered by others. These can be contemporary documents, memoirs, oral history 

interviews, newspaper interviews, photographs, 

or even archaeological finds.8

 Moreover, the 

viewpoint and limits of the source must be considered. For example, Colonel Gregory Boyington’s memoir, Baa Baa Black Sheep, presents 

his view of World War II, but it was published a 

decade after the war ended. It is only one man’s 

viewpoint; a more complete understanding of 

Marine Fighter Squadron 214’s war comes from 

comparing his memoir with interviews and 

memoirs from the rest of his squadron and commanders, as well as the official records produced 

during the war itself.9

Drawing conclusions from these facts is 

the primary task of the historian, and historians 

7

 Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan (New York: Random House, 2011). 8

 But always consider photographs with caution. Photographs provide an illusion of objective reality, but they are in truth composed, 

filtered recordings of the past. A photograph often obscures as 

much about an event as it reveals. 

9

 Col Gregory Boyington, USMC (Ret), Baa Baa Black Sheep (New 

York: Bantam Books, 1958).

differ over how they should do this; whether 

they should accept the past on its own terms, or 

judge it according to present values and mores. 

One of the pioneers of modern critical history, 

Leopold von Ranke, famously rejected the idea 

that history’s job is to judge the past, stating that 

“History has had assigned to it the office of judging the past and of instructing the present for the 

benefit of future ages. To such high offices the 

present work does not presume; it seeks only 

to show the past as it actually was.”10 Other historians have concluded that history is memory 

of a particular kind; or as Edward Hallett Carr 

says in What Is History?, history is “a continuous 

process of interaction between the historian and 

his facts, an unending dialogue between the past 

and present.”11 In other words, historians should 

accept the past on its own terms and judge it as 

well, constantly reconsidering their conclusions 

about the past.

The next question is, why do Marines study 

history? Most famous military thinkers have 

espoused the need for professional soldiers to 

study the past. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote in The 

Influence of Sea Power upon History that “the study 

of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”12 General James 

N. Mattis laid it out more plainly in an email defending the value of intense reading to Marine 

officers: “By reading, you learn through others’ 

experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the 

10 Leopold von Ranke, Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen 

Völker von 1494 bis 1514 [History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations 

from 1494 to 1514] (Leipzig, Germany: Duncker & Humblot, 

1824), preface; and Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, 3d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

2007), 233.

11 Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (New York: Random 

House, 1961), 35.

12 Capt A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Boston, 

MA: Little, Brown, 1890).
344 appendix

consequences of incompetence are so final for 

young men.”13 Indeed, when he founded the Marine Corps University, General Alfred M. Gray 

Jr. said, “History should be used to teach officers 

military judgment, not to make academic historians or simply teach facts.”14

Gray, Mahan, and Mattis make a sound plea 

for studying military history as a practical measure, learning lessons from history. The wisdom 

of such an approach is apparent on its face, but 

less apparent are the dangers of studying history, 

which are quite real, especially for the unwary. 

History lends itself to trite sayings and shibboleths, which in turn lead to dogmatic thinking 

and rote, uncritical analysis; the only antidote 

for these is careful, critical study. For example, 

many have heard that those who do not study 

history are doomed to repeat it. But history cannot repeat itself as each event is unique, springing from specific individuals and conditions and 

therefore the study of history cannot prevent 

mistakes. As Geoffrey Megargee explains, “To 

look back at one historical development and try 

to draw specific policy conclusions from it is 

misguided. Such an approach is a leap of faith; it 

depends on the belief that the historical account 

is absolutely accurate, and that present circumstances mirror the past exactly.”15

Moreover, there is a natural tendency for 

historians to divide and categorize history into 

different subfields or categories. While understandable, these are essentially false: “There is no 

military history, political history, social history, 

African American history, Scots Irish American 

13 Jill R. Russell, “With Rifle and Bibliography: General Mattis on 

Professional Reading,” Strife (blog), 7 May 2013. 14 Gen Alfred M. Gray Jr. letter to Commanding General, Marine 

Corps Combat Command, “Training and Education,” 1 July 1989, 

Archives Branch, History Division, Quantico, VA.

15 Dr. Geoffrey Megargee, “History Cannot Repeat Itself,” Facebook, 3 December 2013.

history, or women’s history. While those are 

useful categories for use in studying ourselves 

through specific lenses, and for planning conferences, they are, when all is said and done, all 

history and should be taught as such.”16 Excessive focus on subfields of historical study creates 

artificial barriers, compartmentalizing historical 

thought, limiting context, and reducing productive study of history as a whole. 

Earlier, the dangers of subdividing history 

into different fields was mentioned; for our purposes, these topical subdivisions remain useful. 

When you have identified that a given work lies 

within one of these categories, it helps to identify 

the viewpoint of the author, thus providing useful information for analyzing the work. Beyond 

topical fields (i.e., French, nineteenth century, 

military, women’s, or labor histories), however, 

histories also can be divided by the author’s analytical method and focus. Some historians view 

history as objective, while acknowledging that 

the sources, and the historians themselves, are 

inherently biased and thus subjective. They believe the historian’s duty is to strive to be objective, while acknowledging bias. Others view 

this as an impossible task, arguing that history is 

inherently subjective and that historians have no 

duty to objectivity. Some go so far as to argue 

that historians should be activists, writing histories that support their cause. Not all activist 

historians openly acknowledge their subjectivity; indeed, many reject the label, claiming to 

be objective while presenting a subjective historical viewpoint. The history’s structure is also 

important when evaluating the reliability and 

value of the text. Is it a narrative, tracing the 

development of the story within a conventional chronological framework? Or is it thematic, 

16 Dr. Glenn T. Johnson, “Subcategories of History,” Facebook, 10 

July 2016.
paul westermeyer 345

covering different concepts in a chronological 

manner? Is the topic institutional or cultural? 

Or, if it is a military history, is it operational? 

Historians whose work shares an analytical 

method and focus as well as structure are generally grouped into schools of historical thought. 

Identifying which school of thought a work falls 

into is a useful shorthand for evaluating a work.

Examining a small sample of various schools 

of historical thought illustrates how an author’s 

identification with these schools aids the reader’s understanding. Marxist historians posit that 

all history is economically driven; the most rigid 

Marxist historians present a deterministic view 

of history that explains the past and predicts the 

future. They write from a relativist, often activist, point of view. People’s history is a school 

that generally looks at history from below, attempting to give voice to the voiceless. Because 

it seeks to examine the history of those who left 

relatively little in the historical record, people’s 

history is seldom narrative-driven and usually focuses on cultural and institutional topics. 

Military history often tends toward the “great 

man” historical school of thought. Often considered old-fashioned and rejected by modern 

scholars, it focuses attention on the decisions 

and actions of a few influential individuals and 

focuses on a narrative view. The French Annales 

school focuses on long-term change and social 

rather than political themes. It makes great use 

of quantification and geographic evidence to 

examine history from different directions. Recognizing when a given work falls under these 

schools helps the reader correct for the biases 

and viewpoints each brings to history. 

The history of the Marine Corps specifically 

has been told in ways that require careful study 

by the reader. In his seminal work, Semper Fidelis: 

The History of the United States Marine Corps, Allan 

R. Millet presented an essay on his sources that 

adroitly summarizes works on Marine Corps 

history to date: 

For more than a hundred years, the writing 

of Marine Corps history has been shaped by 

internal organizational interest, political 

controversy, and a perceived public interest 

in the Corps, the last normally coinciding 

with the heroics of Marines in wartime. Like 

most of the writing on military institutions, 

Marine Corps histories have improved in 

their scholarly quality, but reflect a bias toward operational narratives and a distaste 

for either external relationships or internal 

difficulties. Marine Corps historical writing, 

which has been largely dominated by Marine enthusiasts in and out of uniform, has 

had a distinct utilitarian quality, that is, to 

build loyalty and dedication on the part of 

serving Marines, create public sympathy and 

support, present [the] Corps’s perspectives 

on policy issues past and present, and honor 

the service of former Marines. These characteristics are not unique to the Corps.17

The subcategory of military history can 

be further divided into differing types. Since 

at least 1979, Millett has categorized military 

history into five distinct types. Since most of 

the history a Marine will read in their career is 

military history, learning to recognize these five 

types is an important part of historical literacy: 

• Inspirational

• Nationalistic

• Antiquarian/hobby

17 Allan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 1991), 768. Millet’s summary 

of Marine Corps historiography remains essentially true 25 years 

later, though many fine historical works have been published since.
346 appendix

• Military utilitarian

• Civilian utilitarian18

Inspirational military histories are designed to highlight military virtues, especially heroism, generally, and for specific military 

units. Many biographies and unit histories fall 

into this category. The Lineage and Honors and 

Commemorative Naming programs run by the 

Marine Corps History Division’s Historical Reference Branch fall under this category, as do 

many of the exhibits and programs at the National Museum of the Marine Corps. Most of 

what is taught in the history classes at recruit 

training and Officer Candidate School fits neatly 

in this type as well. General Sir William Francis 

Patrick Napier, who wrote a massive history of 

the Peninsular War (1808–14), believed all military history should fall within this category: “It 

is the business of the historian . . . to bring the 

exploits of the hero into broad daylight. . . . The 

multitude must be told where to stop and wonder and to make them do so, the historian must 

have recourse to all the power of words.”19

Nationalistic military history is very 

similar to inspirational, but is focused on patriotic or nationalistic themes rather than individual or unit heroism. Perhaps the most widely 

known example of this type of history is Winston S. Churchill’s multivolume magnum opus 

The Second World War, which further proves that 

nationalistic military history can be quite eloquently written.20 Other examples include Hans 

Delbrück’s History of the Art of War (1920) or R. 

Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Depuy’s Military 

18 Mark Grimsley, “The Types of Military History,” WarHistorian

.org, Blog Them Out of the Stone Age (blog), 6 January 2012. 19 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 

1976), 39.

20 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (London: Reprint Society, 1948–53).

Heritage of America (1956). In the last century, 

much of the history taught in American high 

schools fell within this type.

Antiquarian military history is focused 

on historical minutia, such as uniform details 

or weapon statistics. This type of military history is concerned with the color of a man’s 

jackboots or the type of rivets used on a Panzer VI Tiger tank, but less concerned with the 

whys and wherefores of warfare and its causes. 

Model builders, war gamers, and reenactors 

are typically considered antiquarians, and are 

often the primary target audience of museums and authors for specialist publishers. The 

published works produced by enthusiastic antiquarians far exceeds the output of other types 

of military historians; additionally, the massive 

amount of data they accumulate is a great boon 

for historians producing other types of military 

history. 

Military utilitarian histories are usually written by and for professional militaries to 

educate policy makers and military officers. The 

primary function of the Marine Corps History 

Division or the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, for example, is to produce military 

utilitarian histories. The Army’s famous Green 

Books and the Corps’ Red Books produced on 

World War II represent these types of history.21

This style is most often narrative, operational history that establishes the basic facts and 

chronology of an event. The key point is facts 

not models. Though most government historians are trained professionals, these programs are 

closely associated with military officers who are 

21 The Green Books are the U.S. Army in World War II, 78 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1946–92); and 

the Red Books are the History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World 

War II, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1958–68). 
paul westermeyer 347

usually devoted to one type of military doctrine 

or another. Government historians have to be 

particularly vigilant against institutional forces 

that strive to fit historical events into preferred 

doctrinal models. 

Many academic historians view all official 

history (the most common form of military 

utilitarian history) as inherently biased, activist 

history.22 Concerning this, Brigadier General 

Edwin H. Simmons, who led the Marine Corps 

History Division for more than two decades 

once said:

I frequently use the word “advocacy” and 

that sometimes puts the academic person’s 

teeth on edge. My point is that anyone 

working for the Marine Corps Historical 

22 The term official history refers to a work of history that is sponsored, authorized, or endorsed by its subject. For example, Marine Corps History Division, as a function of higher headquarters, 

writes and publishes the official history of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Program should believe in the Marine Corps. 

By the same token, anyone working for the 

Army, Navy, or Air Force historical programs 

should be advocates of their respective services. Advocacy does not mean bias, prejudice, or distortion. An advocate can still 

write objective history.

I would indeed argue that official 

history can be more accurate and objective 

than that of an independent scholar. The 

independent scholar is able to first form his 

hypothesis or premise and then marshal his 

facts selectively to support that hypothesis or 

premise. We are not permitted this degree of 

latitude. We must tell the whole story as best 

and as completely as we can.23

Civilian utilitarian is the final type, 

which is defined as academic military history 

written to help the educated citizen understand 

war and conflict. It is studied by civilian academics for the same reasons any other historical field 

is studied—to illuminate our understanding of 

mankind. John Keegan’s The Face of Battle is one 

example, as is Gerhard L. Weinberg’s A World 

at Arms: A Global History of World War II (1994). 

Many of these works examine military institutions, including Millett’s Semper Fidelis and Aaron B. O’Connell’s Underdogs: The Making of the 

Modern Marine Corps (2012). All of these types 

of history can merge into one another—for 

example, when a work that is military utilitarian in overall intent includes a sidebar that is 

clearly antiquarian or inspirational; further, the 

same historian can produce during their lifetime 

works of different types. 

The Marine Corps determined long ago 

23 BGen Edwin H. Simmons, as quoted by Charles R. Smith, group 

email to Col Nathan S. Lowrey, Wanda J. Renfrow, and the author, 

15 May 2007.

Gen Edwin Simmons often used a bull’s-eye diagram 

to explain the intended audience for History Division’s work. Replace “Marine Corps” with “military” 

and this diagram also neatly illustrates the intended 

audience of military utilitarian history works.

Marine Corps History Division
348 appendix

that Marines must study military history, their 

own most especially, to function more efficiently and effectively. It is not enough to simply read 

history books; they must be educated readers, 

understanding the fundamentals of historical 

method and able to identify different schools of 

historical thought as outlined above. By attaining 

this basic historical literacy and understanding 

historiography, Marines will get the most out of 

their historical studies.
349

ABOUT THE EDITORS

PAUL WESTERMEYER is a historian who 

joined Marine Corps History Division in 2005. 

He earned a bachelors degree in history and a 

masters degree in military history from The 

Ohio State University. He was the recipient of 

the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation’s Brigadier General Edwin Simmons-Henry I. Shaw 

Award in 2015 for his book U.S. Marines in the 

Gulf War, 1990–1991: Liberating Kuwait. He is 

the author of U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Khafji, 28 

January–1 February 1991 and the editor of Desert 

Voices: Oral Histories of Marines in the Gulf War and 

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010–2014: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Westermeyer also 

serves as the series historian for the Marines in 

the Vietnam War Commemorative Series. His 

current projects include a monograph on the 

Battle of Marjah and an anthology on Marines in 

the Frigate Navy.

BREANNE ROBERTSON joined Marine 

Corps History Division in 2015. She earned a 

bachelors degree in art history from the University of Missouri, a masters degree in art history from the University of Texas, and a PhD 

in art history from the University of Maryland. 

Essays drawn from her research appear in Marine Corps History, American Art, The Annals of Iowa, 

and Hemisphere: Visual Cultures of the Americas. She 

recently authored Camp Pendleton: The Historic 

Rancho Santa Margarita y Las Flores and the Marine Corps in Southern California, A Shared History 

(2017) in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of that military base. Her current projects 

include a monograph on Marine Corps activities 

in the Dominican Republic between 1916 and 

1924 and an edited volume examining the history and cultural meaning of the Iwo Jima flagraisings entitled Investigating Iwo: The Flag-Raisings 

in Myth, Memory and Esprit de Corps (2018). 
The Legacy of Belleau Wood: 100 Years of Making Marines and Winning Battles

examines the Marine Corps during the last century, doing two things 

it does best: making Marines out of civilians and winning battles in defense of the United States. This anthology of articles demonstrates how Marines 

continue to follow in the footsteps of their Great War forebears, who fought the 

wars at hand while planning for the wars to come, refining and innovating tactics 

and organization so that the Corps remained relevant and effective in a rapidly 

changing technological environment.

MARINE CORPS HISTORY DIVISION

2044 BROADWAY STREET

QUANTICO, VA 22134

https://usmcu.edu/historydivision

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ISBN 978-0-16-094412-3

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