Deliberate Force

A Case Study in

Effective Air Campaigning

Final Report of the Air University

Balkans Air Campaign Study

Edited by

Col Robert C. Owen, USAF

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

January 2000
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of th

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Forc

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public releas

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Deliberate force a case study in effective air campaigning : final report of the A

University Balkans air campaign study / edited by Robert C. Owen.

 p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-076-0

1. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Aerial operations. 2. Yugoslav War, 1991

1995—Campaigns—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Foreig

participation. 4. Peacekeeping forces—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 5. North Atlant

Treaty Organization—Armed Forces—Aviation. 6. Bosnia and Hercegovina— Histor

Military. I. Owen, Robert C., 1951–

DR1313.7.A47 D45 2000

949.703—dc21 99-08709

ii
Contents

Chapter Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

ABOUT THE EDITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the

 Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes,

Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dr. Karl Mueller

 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Lt Col Bradley S. Davis

 3 US and NATO Doctrine for

Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Col Maris McCrabb

 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . . . . 8

Col Christopher M. Campbell

 5 Executing Deliberate Force,

30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 13

Lt Col Mark J. Conversino

 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s

 Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force:

Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . 18

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 19

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

iii
Chapter Pag

 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 25

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

 12 Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments . . . 33

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

 13 Aspects of Leading and Following:

The Human Factors of Deliberate Force . . . . . 35

Lt Col John C. Orndorff

 14 Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement

in Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . 38

Lt Col Ronald M. Reed

 15 Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches

 to Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . 43

Lt Col Robert D. Pollock

 16 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Col Robert C. Owen

CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Illustrations

 Figure

 2.1 UNSCRs and NAC Decisions Leading

to Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

 2.2 NATO Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

 2.3 UN/ NATO Command Relationships . . . . . . . 4

iv
 Figure Pag

 2.4 Air Strategy to Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 2.5 Deliberate Force Operational Locations . . . . . 5

 4.1 Operation Deadeye Key Nodes . . . . . . . . . 10

 4.2 Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 4.3 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . . . . . . . 10

 8.1 Assigned Aircraft by Nationality

(30 August 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 8.2 Assigned Forces by Nationality

(14 September 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

10.1 Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10.2 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . . . . . . . 28

11.1 BSA Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

11.2 Deliberate Force Concept of Operations . . . . . 30

12.1 National Sortie Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 33

12.2 Overall Sortie Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 33

12.3 Distribution of Penetrating Sorties . . . . . . . 33

12.4 Distribution of Support Sorties . . . . . . . . . 33

12.5 Deliberate Force Missions . . . . . . . . . . . 33

12.6 Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment . . . . 33

12.7 US Joint Sortie Distribution . . . . . . . . . . 33

12.8 Ground- and Air-Abort Summary . . . . . . . . 33

12.9 Poststrike Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

12.10 Deadeye Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

v
Figure Pag

12.11 Targets Remaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

12.12 DMPIs Remaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

14.1 ROE Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

14.2 Development of ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

14.3 NATO and UN Chains of Command . . . . . . . 40

14.4 Zones of Action for Deliberate Force . . . . . . 40

15.1 Warden’s Five Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

15.2 The Campaign-Planning Model . . . . . . . . . 44

Photo

Richard Holbrooke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Adm Leighton W. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Gen Michael E. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Lt Gen Michael C. Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

F-16s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Mirage 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

F-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

F-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

EA-6B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

A-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

F-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

vi
Photo Pag

AC-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

KC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

KC-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

U-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Predator UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

S-3 Viking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

P-3 Orion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

RC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

EF-111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

E-3 airborne warning and control system aircraft . . . . 23

E-2 Hawkeye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

MH-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

C-17s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

C-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

F-15C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

B-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

F-117s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

AGM-65 Maverick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

GBU-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

AGM-88 HARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.75-inch rocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

vii
Photo Pag

Loading an A-10’s cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Serb artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Bridge damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

F-18 with HARMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Gen James Jamerson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Tables

 2.1 NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 5

 4.1 OPLAN 40101 “Deny Flight” Phases

and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

 4.2 Example Target Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 8.1 Players Available at Onset . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 8.2 End-State Force Structure

(Assigned Aircraft Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 8.3 Shooter Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 8.4 Supporter-Mission Sorties . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 8.5 Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft

 in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 9.1 Deliberate Force’s Precision Munitions . . . . . 25

 9.2 Deliberate Force’s Nonprecision Bombs . . . . . 26

10.1 Safe-Area Target Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10.2 Onset Target and DMPI Data . . . . . . . . . . 29

viii
Table Pag

11.1 Obscurant Effects on Sensor Performance . . . 30

11.2 SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 31

12.1 Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment . . . . 33

12.2 Deliberate Force Sortie Summary . . . . . . . . 33

12.3 Ground- and Air-Abort Summary . . . . . . . . 33

12.4 US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis . . . 33

12.5 Individual Targets Attacked/Destroyed . . . . . 34

12.6 Sarajevo ZOA Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

12.7 Deadeye Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

ix

Foreword

Every airman or person interested in the art and science o

air and space warfare should read this book. True to th

direction of Gen James Jamerson, former deputy commande

in chief of US European Command, and me, the Air Universit

Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) has emerged as a ba

anced and wide-ranging discussion of the Deliberate Force ai

campaign, which occurred during the fall of 1995. Exploitin

the sources and resources available to them, the BACS team

members have laid out a mile-wide and foot-deep exploration

of the context, theoretical foundations, planning, execution

leadership, and effects of this milestone event. In so doing

they have contributed significantly to our knowledge about th

political, military, technical, and human elements that shap

air campaigns and influence their outcomes. Moreover, th

BACS offers insights into persistent questions of military plan

ners, such as the relationship of diplomacy and war; the syn 

ergy of land power, space power, and airpower; and the role o

chance and “fog” in the conduct and outcome of air and spac

warfare. Finally, because the BACS team from the start wrot

this report for immediate declassification, virtually the entir

report and all of its substantive elements are available here a

an open source, only four years after the event. Given it

scope, this book should contain material of interest to al

aerospace-warfare practitioners and/or thinkers, regardless o

their area of expertise.

The following are core implications of the BACS:

• Deliberate Force was a decisive element in shaping th

outcome of the allied intervention into the Bosnian con

flict, but its full effect must be understood in the contex

of the other political and military developments also un

der way at the time.

• The characteristics and weaponry of air and space warfar

gave the diplomats and soldiers of the intervention a usabl

xi
tool of great power and flexibility with which to influenc

events in the Balkans region.

• For all of the capabilities of modern information technol

ogy, the scale, pace, human factors (such as leadership

culture, and conceptualization), and other nontechnica

elements of Deliberate Force ensured that Clausewitz’

trilogy of fog, friction, and chance remained important in

shaping its ultimate outcome.

• If Deliberate Force is considered a new form of intervention 

ism on behalf of peace, then the experience gained from

that operation suggests the need for a review of our concep 

tions about the nature of military and diplomatic leadership

in such circumstances.

• If it is to be useful, doctrine—as formalized advice on wha 

military leaders should do when faced by certain kinds o

problems—must be read and understood. But it als

must be understood as a guide for thinking through prob 

lems ahead of time, rather than a recipe for their solution

after the fact.

The study makes other important points, of course, and an

given reader likely will find things with which to agree an

disagree. However, these core implications of the BACS serv

to illustrate its value, both as a historical document and as 

spark for debate and thought—its real purpose.

I would be remiss if I did not commend the dedication an

persistence of all the members of the BACS team. When the

volunteered to participate in this study, we all understood tha

it would be a focused effort to capture the most importan

political and operational events of Deliberate Force and t

start an archive of related materials to support further re

search. As they pursued their research, however, the team

members soon realized that they had a hold on the tail of 

much bigger “elephant” than anyone at Air University origi

nally had expected. Deliberate Force turns out to have been 

very complex event, composed of layered political, military

and human elements that all bore some level of examination

Despite its growing scale and complexity, every team membe

elected to stay with the study, even though it definitely was 

“voluntary society” and even though their work on it was in

xii
addition to their assigned duties as faculty and staff at Ai

University. After most of the BACS team members dispersed t

new assignments as far away as Germany and Hawaii, the

continued to work the project and to meet all of the deadline

imposed on them by the editorial and declassification proc

esses. The result of their dedication is this fine report, on

that certainly benefited from the wide-ranging experiences an

intellectual capabilities of the people who wrote it.

JAY W. KELLEY

Lieutenant General, USAF, Retired

Colorado Springs, Colorado

June 1999

xiii

About the

Editor

Col Robert C. Owen is chief of the Policy and Doctrine Divi

sion, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. In that pos itio

he supervises the development and articulation of air-mobili t

concepts and doctrine and special projects, such as the com

mand ’s involvement in the Expeditionary Air Force and Futur

Total Force Unit. At the time he directed the Balkans Ai

Campaign Study, Colonel Owen was dean of the School o

Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Whil

he served as chief of the Joint Doctrine Branch of the Doctrin

Division at Headquarters United States Air Force, he wrote th

Chronology volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. He als

has published a number of journal articles and has a book

The Rise of Global Airlift in the USAF, in final editorial review

A command pilot with over three thousand hours of opera

tional flying in the C-130 and T-41 aircraft, Colonel Owen

holds an MA in African studies from UCLA and a PhD in

military history from Duke University.

xv

Preface

Operation Deliberate Force was the North Atlantic Treat

Organization (NATO) air campaign conducted between 30 Au 

gust and 20 September 1995 to advance the cause of peace in

the Balkans region. Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, commander of Ai

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and Gen Jame

L. Jamerson, deputy commander in chief of United State

European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, jointly chartere

the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) in October 1995

They directed the BACS team to “capture” the planning an

operational experience of Deliberate Force on behalf of Ai

University students preparing for future responsibilities a

air-warfare planners and leaders, and on behalf of the broade

community of air-warfare thinkers. Their specific direction en

tailed (1) writing a “mile-wide-and-foot-deep” report laying ou

the salient events, causal relationships, and implications o

this important air campaign and (2) assembling a comprehen

sive archive of relevant oral and documentary evidence to sup

port future research into the planning, execution, and diplo 

matic exploitation of Deliberate Force.1

To highlight this study’s focus on the planning and execu 

tion of an air campaign, the BACS team adopted the followin

as its core research question: How and with what considera

tions did the planners and executors of Deliberate Force lin

military operations with the strategic, political, and diplomati

goals they were charged to attain? To make the report usefu

to a potentially broad audience, team members set out t

answer this question through a wide-ranging examination o

the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, an

operational factors that shaped the characteristics and out

come of this particular air campaign. Thus, the chapters o

this report deal broadly with (1) the political and institutiona

context of Deliberate Force planning, (2) the actual planning o

the campaign, (3) the execution of the campaign, and (4) th

implications of those experiences. An important initial sub

theme of the study was an effort to determine to what exten

xvii
the planners and executors of Deliberate Force were cognizan

of and/or wielded influence over factors that most signifi

cantly shaped the operation and determined its outcome. In

other words, to what extent were they in charge of events an

to what extent were events in charge of them? The team ex

pected that the answer to those and other questions raised b

the study would carry significant implications for theories an

doctrines of airpower strategy and planning.

Assembling a comprehensive database on Deliberate Forc

proved more challenging than the campaign’s relatively com

pact dimensions of scale and time first suggested. In contras

to their counterparts during the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91

the non-US coalition partners in Deliberate Force played 

more independent and nearly coequal political and, to a lesse

extent, military role with their American counterparts in th

planning and conduct of the campaign. This level and conse

quence of non-US participation obliged BACS researchers t

look far afield for data and perspectives on Deliberate Force

Their search was complicated by the return of many non-US

midlevel planners and flying personnel involved in Deliberat

Force to their home countries shortly after the campaign

ended. Diplomatic circumstances further obliged the team t

cast a wide net for data. Conducted as a step in a long effor

to maintain peace in or at least contain the violence of th

Balkans region, Deliberate Force was shaped and exploited b

the often conflicting interests of numerous regional and globa

actors, including the United Nations (UN), NATO political an

military agencies, diplomatic and military agencies of numer

ous European states, and, of course, the warring regiona

groups themselves. To the extent that barriers of secrecy, na

tional sensitivities, and the limits of its charter allowed, th

BACS team at least asked many of these sources for informa

tion and comments—with limited results.

Given the breadth of available sources and the constraint

of time and resources, the BACS team focused on analyzin

and describing Deliberate Force as a distinct military cam

paign. The team members did this in full awareness that th

operation was a complex event—one that could be understood

only in its full political and military context. The team als

remained cognizant of the reluctance within some US militar

xviii
circles to use the word campaign to label the activities of 

specific military component of a multiservice (joint) or multi

national (combined) command. This reluctance is buttresse

by fundamental US joint doctrine, which reserves the plan

ning of campaigns for joint force commanders (JFC) an

which relegates their component commanders to plannin

“operations” or annexes to the JFC’s campaign plan.2

Nevertheless, describing Deliberate Force as a campaign

makes good analytical sense. As a consciously connected serie 

of air actions aimed at coercing the Bosnian Serbs to mak

military and political concessions, what happened over the skie

of Bosnia in August and September 1995 essentially coincide

with the US joint doctrinal definition of a campaign as “a

series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing 

strategic or operational objective within a given time an

space.”3 Moreover, labeling Deliberate Force as a campaign fit

authoritative usage by senior US defense leaders such as Sec

retary of Defense William Perry, who described it as a “mas

sive air campaign” that “stunned” the Serbs with its “powe

and effectiveness.”4 Still, given the importance of definitions in

the development and articulation of doctrine, the choice o

campaign in this case will carry uncomfortable policy an

budgetary implications for some readers. But that discomfor

should not block an open-minded reading of this report.

For similar reasons of focus and conciseness, most mem

bers of the BACS team did not set out on their research in th

expectation that Deliberate Force would fit neatly into som

niche of the so-called continuum of war articulated in US

doctrine. 5 As a method of articulating the types of conflict an

war that might exist between the extremes of absolute peac

and absolute war, the continuum-of-war concept usefully pre

dicts the broad causes and political objectives of various kind

of conflict and, by implication, the sacrifices combatants wil

make. But the concept is not particularly useful as a predicto

of the likely intensity, tactics, strategies, political ramifica

tions, or many other specific details of such conflicts an

wars. For example, for the United States and most UN membe 

states, Deliberate Force was a campaign of limited importanc

to tangible vital interests. For the Balkan states, howeve r, it 

outcome carried grave importance for their foreseeable political

xix
social, and cultural destinies. Similarly, at the strategic level

Deliberate Force was a constrained exercise in power and ris

management. At the tactical level, though, NATO airmen expe

rienced the campaign as a microcosm of the operating tempos

tactics, weapons, and threats they would have expected t

face in a high-intensity conflict in central Europe had the cold

war gone hot.

Deliberate Force also does not fit neatly into the militar

operations other than war (MOOTW) subcategory of the con

tinuum of war. Perhaps the campaign fit the MOOTW categor

politically since the UN and NATO launched it as a “peac

operation,” without any formal declarations of war. However

even in secondary research materials available to the team a

the beginning of the study, Deliberate Force clearly had a spli

personality in terms of where it fit into the MOOTW concept

To the extent that NATO initiated the bombing to help the UN

force Bosnian Serb military forces to cease shelling the UN

declared technical exclusion zones or “safe areas” around sev

eral large Bosnian cities, Deliberate Force was an exercise in

“peacemaking.” But to the extent that the bombing also un

derpinned ongoing efforts by the UN and the five-nation Con

tact Group to force the Serbs to enter into serious peace nego

tiations, the operation involved “peace enforcement.” Th

operational complexity of Deliberate Force reinforced th

sense that the real-world boundaries of this campaign would

not conform to the theoretical boundaries delineated in

MOOTW theory. Deliberate Force may have been a restraine

peace operation strategically, but tactically it was an energeti

operation characterized by the employment of technologically

cutting-edge air forces.

As a consequence of these definitional ambiguities, th

BACS report was never intended to fix Deliberate Force’s plac

in an existing conflict taxonomy. Instead, as director of th

report, I wanted it to describe the event as accurately and in

as much detail as practical at the time. Even at the beginning

it was obvious to most—probably all—BACS team member

t hat this particular air campaign had distinctive characteristics

the description of which would in itself justify the report

Several of these features stood out already, in outline at leas

in the fall of 1995. First, Deliberate Force was strategically mor

xx
of a match than might have first appeared. The countervailin

commitments and objectives of the combatants tended to re

duce the advantage of NATO’s overwhelming military power

Second, the air campaign was tactically one-sided. The de

ployed land- and sea-based air forces of the NATO partner

dwarfed the “air force” and ground-based air defenses of th

Bosnian Serbs. Third, Deliberate Force was not a politically o

militarily isolated event. It was, after all, conducted in suppor

of—or at least in the context of—the political activities of sev

eral organizations and nations intervening in the Bosnian

conflict. For that reason, by the fall of 1995, the air command

ers had already stated their belief that, in the politically

charged circumstances of the campaign, every tactical event o

the operation potentially carried significant and immediat

strategic political importance. Also, at the time of the air cam

paign, Croatia and the Bosnian Federation were conducting 

coordinated ground offensive that successfully pushed Croa 

tian Serb and Bosnian Serb military forces out of areas the

had conquered previously. The BACS team understood tha

any useful assessment of the shape and influence of Deliber

ate Force eventually would have to consider the simultaneou

impact of the ground campaign.

Given these salient elements, Deliberate Force’s theoretica

“survey mark,” upon which most aspects of this study are ori

ented, is its unique identity as an air campaign conducted

against an airpower-weak opponent, under conditions of politi

cal subtlety and limited time, in which every tactical event ha

great potential importance. This description of the charac

teristics and context of Operation Deliberate Force facilitates th

effort of placing it in the existing body of theory and doctrine. A

propositions, respectively, of how things work and of what ac

tions will most likely produce desired results under anticipated

circumstances, theories and doctrines are contextually depend

ent in their meaning and application. One must present an

theoretical proposition about the forces of human affairs, cause

and-effect relationships, and so on, in the context of an accurat

description of the circumstances under which such observed

events and processes happened. Likewise, effective doctrin

must reflect both a solid foundatio n of relevant theories, based

on experience, and a carefully constructed description of th

xxi
circumstances under which one expects an anticipated action

to produce desired results. To become credible, an air plan

ner’s implicitly doctrinal statement that a new strike plan

should incorporate an element of surprise, for example, mus

meet two criteria:

1. It must be related, even if only subconsciously in the min d 

of the people involved, to a theoretical understandin

that a direct rlationship may exist between surprise an

mission success.

2. It also must show—again, even if only subliminally—tha

a direct relationship exists between the circumstances o

the action proposed and those underpinning the genera

theory relating surprise and success.

Likewise, future air commanders and their advisors can ex

tract the wisdom of the Deliberate Force commander’s deci

sion to make all weapon aim-point selections himself, only i

they have a clear understanding of the theoretical rationale fo

the decision, the criteria under which it was made, and th

relation of these two things to the circumstances in which

they contemplate making similar decisions themselves.

The ultimate goal of this study—to identify the implication

of the Deliberate Force experience for the future—thus calle

for a precise description of the event against the backdrop o

the theoretical and doctrinal expectations of the participant

for the planning and execution of air campaigns, particularly

under circumstances similar to those surrounding the actua

event. This requirement, in turn, raised two research ques

tions corollary to the core one about the matching of mean

and ends:

1. To what extent did the planning, execution, and outcom

of Deliberate Force reflect the expectations of the exist

ing body of airpower theory and doctrine?

2. Given the outcome of Deliberate Force and the relation

ship of theory and practice in its planning, execution

and effect, what are its implications for the body of fu 

ture airpower theory, doctrine, and policy?

Team members believed that the answers to these and the cor 

research question would extract a great deal of benefit from

xxii
the BACS for its intended 

audiences. They expected tha

those answers would be loaded with theoretical and doctrina

implications for future air-warfare thinkers, planners, an

leaders. They were not disappointed.

Notes

1. This archive, held at the Air Force Historical Research Agency a

Maxwell AFB, Ala., consists of over 10,000 pages of documents, about on

hundred hours of oral interviews on audiotape, and a number of compute

disc files.

2. Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Februar

1995, chap. 3, throughout.

3. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military an

Associated Terms, 1994, 60.

4. William H. Perry, remarks to Adjutant General Association of th

United States, National Guard Association Building, Washington, D.C., 

February 1996.

5. Joint Pub 3-0, I-2 and I-3.

ROBERT C. OWEN, Colonel, USAF

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

June 1999

xxiii
Chapter 1

The Demise of Yugoslavia

and the Destruction of Bosnia:

Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses

Dr. Karl Mueller

To understand United States and Western policy in Bosnia

Herzegovina and the surrounding states in general, and Op

eration Deliberate Force in particular, one must place thes

policies in strategic context. The sequence of events that led t

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign o

August and September 1995 did not really begin in the four

teenth century, as some writers have suggested, but it doe

predate the breakup of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Bosnia

that began in 1992.

This chapter lays the groundwork for those that follow b

describing the actors, relationships, and conditions at th

strategic level that not only caused but shaped and con 

strained Western actions in and around Bosnia in 1992–95

Most of the chapter is in narrative form, with occasional ana

lytical interruptions, but it does not purport to be a history o

its subject. It can provide no more than a superficial accoun

of Yugoslavian and Bosnian history, and the reader who seek

a reasonably complete understanding of these complex mat

ters would be well advised to consult some of the excellen

accounts and analyses cited in the notes.1

The Yugoslavian Prologue

The state of Yugoslavia was constructed after the Firs

World War from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empir

and the independent Allied states of Serbia and Montenegro

themselves calved off the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in

t he late nineteenth century. The Great War had been triggered

by the July Crisis of 1914, which began when a member of 

1
Serbian-supported Bosnian separatist organization assassi

nated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungar

ian throne, and his consort during a visit to the Bosnia

provincial capital of Sarajevo. Encouraged by Germany, Aus

tria blamed Serbia for the killing, leading to a confrontation

with Russia , Serbia ’s Pan-Slavic great-power ally, and eventu 

ally to a general European conflagration.2 In redrawing th

map of central and eastern Europe after the war, the victori

ous Allies broke up the Austrian empire, combining its Sout

Slavic provinces with the ethnically related Serbian and Mon 

tenegrin states to form Yugoslavia .

3

The Allies intended the creation of Yugoslavia and the othe

post-Versailles multinational states of Eastern Europ

(Czechoslovakia, Poland, and an expanded Romania) to help

stabilize the continent. France in particular strove during th

1920s to create a network of alliances with these state

against the possibility of expansionism by the defeated centra

powers. 4 The most successful aspect of this effort was th

establishment of an alliance between Czechoslovakia , Yugo

slavia , and Romania directed mainly against Hungary, whic

became known as “the Little Entente .” Although it deteriorate

in the 1930s as its members’ security concerns began to di

verge, during the early years of the League of Nations, som

statesmen optimistically viewed the Little Entente as the func

tional equivalent of a sixth major European power, at least in

the diplomatic sphere. 5

On the domestic political plane, Yugoslavia was dominated

by Serbs, who were not only on the winning side in the wa

but were the most numerous of its ethnic groups, comprisin

about 38 percent of the population; the Serbian king an

capital became those of the new Yugoslavian state. Interwa

Yugoslavia was never a paragon of political stability, and it

troubled democracy was replaced by a troubled dictatorship in

1928. Belgrade’s various efforts to overcome the country’s eth 

nic divisions and forge a politically united state during th

interwar years met with considerably less success than did

those of the postwar Yugoslavian government. 6

As the power of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany grew in th

1930s, Belgrade’s ties to France weakened, and it sought in 

creasingly to appease the looming Italian threat. Finally, in

2
April 1941, while the Italian invasion of Greece was flounder

ing, the Yugoslavian government’s efforts to reach a modu

vivendi with the Axis—like the one Sweden was developin

with Germany—led to a pro-Allied military coup. Germany an

its allies responded by invading Yugoslavia , conquering th

country in short order before going on to defeat Greece an

then to invade the Soviet Union .

7

 Under brutal Axis control

parts of Yugoslavia were annexed by Germany, Italy, Hungary

and Bulgaria , and the rest was divided into German and Ital

ian zones of occupation and a nominally independent Croa 

tian fascist state (including part of present-day Croatia and al

of Bosnia-Herzegovina), which was in practice an Italo-Ger 

man condominium.8 The Fascist Ustasas, who ran wartim

Croatia , set out to kill a third of their state’s Serb population

and expel another third, prior to converting the remainder t

Catholicism.9

Yugoslavia was one of the few Axis-occupied countries tha

saw significant resistance-fighting during the war. This fight

ing involved two main guerrilla groups: the royalist Chetnik

and the communist partisans led by the Croat-Slovene leade

of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Josip Broz, known by th

pseudonym Tito.

1 0 The resistance forces fought a grisly wa

against the Axis occupiers and their Croatian allies and, mor

often, against each other. The Chetniks grew increasingly col

laborationist under German pressure, and their campaign o

violence against Croats and Muslims prevented the Yugoslav

ian government-in-exile in London from gaining substantia

support from non-Serbs. Tito ’s partisans received Soviet sup 

port (although Tito rejected Moscow’s instructions to cooper 

ate with the Chetniks and other anticommunist forces), and

ultimately, the Western Allies decided to back Tito as wel

They did so since he seemed far more willing than the Chet

niks to prosecute the war against the Axis in spite of horrifi

German reprisals against the civilian populace. Over a million

Yugoslavs died at the hands of their various domestic an

foreign enemies during the Second World War; this numbe

represented more than 6 percent of the country’s prewa

population—a greater proportional loss than was suffered b

any other state in the war except for Germany, Poland, an

the Soviet Union .

3
Tito became premier and later president of postwar Yugosla 

via , as well as Communist Party general secretary. He estab

lished a political system based on a strong federal governmen

but with significant powers and perquisites reserved for eac

of the six Yugoslav republics and protections for the variou

official ethnic groups.1 1 This system underwent several round

of revision over the years, most notably in 1971, when Mus

lims received full recognition as an ethnic nation, and in th

1974 constitution, which increased federal decentralization

and gave virtual republic status to the autonomous Serbia

regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina .

Yugoslavia emerged from the war as a leading member o

the communist movement in Eastern Europe, but Tito and hi

Soviet allies soon parted ways; Yugoslavia was expelled from

the Cominform in 1948 for its disobediently militant foreign

policies and for Tito’s criticism of Stalin , although Yugoslavia

relations with Moscow improved somewhat following Stalin 

death. 1 2 The United States provided arms to Yugoslavia unde

the Mutual Assistance Pact during the 1950s, along with larg

amounts of other foreign aid, and for a while Yugoslavia eve

appeared to be a potential candidate for eventual NATO mem 

bership. In the 1960s relations between Belgrade and Moscow

improved, and Yugoslavia became one of the solidly neutra

states of Europe, enjoying the attentions of both East an

West as the superpowers vied for influence over it.1 3

Together with neutral Austria —and Albania after its brea

with Moscow—Yugoslavia was a buffer between the souther

flanks of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during most of the cold

war, largely insulating Italy from external military threat.1 

Yugoslavia based its defensive strategy upon a national arm

(the JNA) supported by territorial defense forces organized in

each republic. 15 In the event of invasion (most likely from th

Soviet Union ), the JNA would delay the aggressor long enough

for the mobilization of territorial forces, after which nationa

defense would increasingly fall back upon a strategy of guer 

rilla warfare, especially in the mountainous regions of Bosnia

Herzegovina (where Belgrade concentrated Yugoslavia ’s devel

oping defense industries), Montenegro, and Kosovo . Th

prospect of fighting a long and bloody guerrilla war in th

Yugoslavian mountains would likely deter any prospectiv

4
conqueror of the country. The leadership of the JNA included

disproportionate numbers of Serbian officers—especially Bos 

nian Serbs —due to factors relating to historical tradition an

to the limited economic opportunities available in rural Bos 

nia . The multinational army, however, was probably the Yugo 

slavian institution that contributed the most to federal unity. 1 

On the international political scene, Yugoslavia rose to addi

tional prominence in the 1960s and 1970s as a principa

leader of the nonaligned nations movement. The post-Stalinis

Yugoslav experiment of an economic middle course betwee

capitalism and Soviet communism seemed to be, if not a roar

ing success, at least a modest one, especially compared t

some of its neighbors. However, during the 1970s, speculation

abounded about the likely results of Tito ’s presumably im 

pending death. An impression widely held in the West wa

that Yugoslavia had an intrinsic tendency towards disintegra 

tion and interethnic conflict held off only by Tito ’s persona

prestige and power. Yet, after Tito did finally die in 1980, hi

political creation survived. Defying many expectations, Yugo 

slavia seemed to continue inertially along its decentralized

socialist path between East and West more or less as before

Other leaders peacefully succeeded Tito, although without hi

leadership, making any new changes in the federal system

would prove difficult. The 1984 Winter Olympics showcased

the apparent success of the Yugoslav experiment; they wer

held in Sarajevo , where, as Olympic television viewers wer

reminded almost nightly, the spark that ignited the Firs

World War had been struck 70 years earlier.

Beneath the superficial level, however, the Yugoslavian sys 

tem came under acute economic pressure in the 1980s.1 7 A

Yugoslavia ’s political system ossified, its economic fortune

declined due to a variety of factors, including rising energ

prices. Both the state and the republics increasingly turned t

foreign borrowing to sustain themselves. In the 1980s, th

International Monetary Fund required Belgrade to institut

increasingly stringent austerity measures as a condition fo

further loans. Despite efforts to reduce them, income dispari

ties between the richest and poorest republics continued t

grow. The evaporation of the cold war reduced the superpow 

ers’ interest in buying Yugoslavia ’s friendship, and Wester

5
investment heading east found more and more alternativ

places to land. These forces combined to undermine Tito

elaborate spoils-distribution system among the republics an

regions, thus weakening the adhesive that held the countr

together. Between 1982 and 1989, the Yugoslavian standard

of living fell by 40 percent.1 8 When newly elected Yugosla

prime minister Ante Markovic launched an economic and po

litical reform program in 1989, little interest or support wa

forthcoming from a US government that was preoccupied wit

developments in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact .

1 9 A

economic conditions grew more difficult, support for the feder a

structure eroded, especially in the wealthiest republics, so tha

when domestic revolution and international realignment swep

Eastern Europe in 1989, the stage was set for the breakup o

Yugoslavia .

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

It is not unusual to hear Western observers characterize th

explosive decompression of Yugoslavia as the inevitable resul

of ancient and enduring hatreds among the country’s con 

stituent ethnic groups. They suggest that only Tito’s program

of repression was able to keep the state together during th

cold war, and after his death no one else could hold back th

mighty centrifugal forces of age-old interethnic animosity. Im 

plicit, and occasionally explicit, in this argument is a sugges

tion that the Yugoslavian populace is primitive and even sav

age in a way that full-fledged, civilized Westerners are not.2 

Although Americans manage to live in relative peace in multi

ethnic communities,2 1 Serbs and Croats (like Rwandans, Cyp 

riots, and Kashmiris) cannot forget the wrongs their ancestor

did to each other. Therefore, we should not have been sur

prised by Yugoslavia ’s breakup, and we should not feel guilt

about it.2 2

This explanation for the catastrophe is attractively simple

but it is too ad hoc to be satisfying—and it is at odds with th

facts. Many peoples recall ancient (and twentieth-century

wrongs done by their traditional enemies but live peacefull

with each other anyway. Moreover, although Tito did use a

6
iron fist to repress antifederal nationalism, progress toward

the creation of a pan-Yugoslav identity proceeded by man

means, only some of them coercive.2 3 Forces similar to thos

that lay behind classical social revolutions caused the revolu 

tionary changes in Yugoslavia :

2 4 demand for political chang

from below, triggered in this case primarily by economic hard

ship, combined with the weakening of the state’s capacity t

resist these pressures—attributable here not only to Tito

death but also to the collapse of the bipolar European orde

and the wave of revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe i

1989–91. As these revolutionary forces strengthened, leader

(and national media) who recognized the potential power o

ethnic and religious pride and hatred eagerly kindled thos

emotions, as wartime and warmongering leaders have ofte

done before. 2 5 In short, ethnic relationships in Yugoslavia did

not simply burst into flames; rather, incendiary ethnic fue

was thrown onto the fires of regional and class conflict.2 6

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was unusually fertile ground fo

the growth of ethnic conflict . Serbs did recall the Battle o

Kosovo Polje in 1389, in which Serbia ’s army was gloriously

defeated by Ottoman forces, and considered it relevant t

themselves five hundred years later. It was much more impor

tant that memories of the Second World War were far from

distant and even farther from pleasant, especially since con 

flict between Serbs and Croats was in fact quite unusual be

fore the twentieth century. 2 7 Such factors did a great deal t

make the slope towards warfare and atrocity in Yugoslavia

much steeper and more slippery than it otherwise would hav

been. To describe postwar Yugoslavia as a powder keg or 

house of cards implies far too much determinism, but it wa

certainly a complex system with many serious instabilities. I

did not simply fail; it tore itself apart—as a result of bein

vandalized.

The first major cracks in the Yugoslavian federation bega

in Kosovo following Tito’s death. Local Serbs, who were be

coming an ever smaller minority in the region known as th

historical heart of Yugoslavia ,

2 8 began to complain of persecu 

tion and injury by the poorer Albanian majority in Kosovo—

accounts widely reported and believed elsewhere in Serbia . In

1987, as a popular groundswell of Serb resentment agains

7
the Kosovan Albanians grew, Slobodan Milosevic , the ambi

tious president of the Serbian League of Communists, capital

ized upon the potential power base and established himself a

leader of a new nationalist Serbian political movement.2 

Milosevic’s party rebuked him for his deviation from its feder

alist principles, but in the ensuing power struggle, Milosevi

gained an overwhelming victory and expelled his key oppo

nents from the party. He then set out to build his and Serbia 

power within Yugoslavia : in rapid succession, he and his sup 

porters took control of communist parties in Vojvodina, Mon 

tenegro, and then Kosovo, installing pro-Milosevic president

in each region or republic. 3 0 When the Albanian majority in

Kosovo objected, Milosevic used the threat of Serbian mob

violence in Belgrade to coerce the federal government int

granting him emergency powers to use the JNA against them

and declared that this showed that Serbia had regained it

former power. 3 1

Kosovans’ resistance to Belgrade’s recision of their regiona

autonomy found widespread support from Slovenia , th

wealthiest and most Westernized of the Yugoslav republics

Relaxation of Slovenian press controls in recent years ha

resulted in the prominent display of antifederal and anti

Milosevic opinion there; Serbia ’s apparent bid for hegemony in

Yugoslavia increased this sentiment. Belgrade’s efforts to sup 

press this dissent further fanned the flames of resentmen

and when Milosevic responded by calling an extraordinar

Yugoslav Party Congress in which the Serbian bloc consis 

tently defeated reforms proposed by Slovenia , the Slovenia

delegation walked out. Faced with the possibility of a poten 

tially catastrophic split in the federation, Milosevic tried t

persuade the Croatian delegation not to follow suit, but th

Croatians departed after deciding they could not accept a fed

erated Yugoslavia that excluded the Slovenes. Later, Milosevi

would blame Slovenia for causing the breakup of Yugoslavia

and all that followed.3 2

Milosevic’s nationalism contributed substantially to th

election of Franjo Tudjman as president of Croatia in Apri

1990. 3 3 Tudjman’s nationalism and his invocation of symbol

from Croatia ’s brief heyday of independent Fascism in tur

caused fear and alarm among Croatian Serbs, who made u

8
local majorities in parts of the impoverished, so-called Croa 

tian Krajina and of Eastern Slavonia , regions along the repub

lic’s borders with Bosnia and Serbia . Croatian Serb resistanc

to the election of Tudjman and his nationalists was centered

in the town of Knin , where local authorities refused to accep

the authority of the new government in Zagreb . They asked fo

support from Belgrade and received Serbian encouragemen

and advice for their budding rebellion. Croatian leaders wer

keen to move against the Serbs, especially since key transpor

routes to the Dalmatian coast passed through the Knin area

but they feared that this might trigger intervention by th

JNA. When the confrontation escalated and Zagreb sent sev

eral helicopters carrying special forces to Knin , they were in 

tercepted and turned back by MiG fighters of the Yugoslav ai

force. The Croatian government began secretly to import arm

for use against the Serbs and potentially the JNA.

3 4 Croati

approached the United States as a potential arms supplier

but the US government rebuffed the inquiries, still hoping t

keep Yugoslavia united and thereby minimize instability in th

Balkans. Croatia found other vendors, however.

Milosevic favored sending the JNA against the Croats, bu

this required a majority vote within the Yugoslav State Coun

cil. On 12 March 1991, State Council chairman Borisav Jovi

of Serbia called a meeting of the council to consider a proposa

by the minister of defense to establish a national state o

emergency to stop the civil war that he accused the Croats o

planning. The Croats and Macedonians opposed the plan, an

the Slovenian delegation was absent, fearing arrest by th

Serbs. With the Serbian, Vojvodinan, Kosovan, and Montene

grin representatives supporting martial law, Bosnia-Herze 

govina held the deciding vote. Although Bosnia seemed t

have the most to lose in an intra-Yugoslavian civil war, th

Bosnian representative surprised Milosevic by opposing th

motion. In response, Milosevic announced that Serbia and it

allies would withdraw from the State Council , calculating tha

with civilian authority over the JNA eliminated, the arm

would be free to act on its own against those who threatened

the federation.

The United States ambassador warned Belgrade not to us

force against Croatia , causing considerable concern amon

9
the Serbian leadership. Therefore, the minister of defense se

cretly traveled to Moscow to meet Soviet defense officials an

asked for a promise of Soviet assistance in the event of West

ern intervention in Yugoslavia .

3 5 The Soviets provided him

with intelligence information indicating that the United State

would not intervene, and Milosevic concluded that the wa

now lay clear for federal forces to reassert Belgrade’s contro

over Croatia . However, Milosevic ’s plan ultimately foundered

because the commander of the JNA could not bring himself t

establish military rule in Yugoslavia .

In May 1991 Croatians overwhelmingly voted to declare thei

republic’s independence effective in late June, coordinating with

the date a similar Slovene independence declaration was alread

set to take effect. Slovene and Croat representatives lobbied th

European Community (EC), which they aspired to join, to rec

ognize their independence, but the EC had no desire to se

Yugoslavia break up. Instead, the West set about exertin

pressure on Slovenia and Croatia to remain within Yugoslavia 

culminating in a visit to Belgrade by James Baker, US secretar

of state. Baker declared that the United States would not recog

nize Croatia and Slovenia under any circumstances, which al

sides took as a signal that Washington would not object to th

use of force to hold the federation together.3 6

The two republics decided to press ahead anyway, an

when the independence date came on 25 June, Slovenia ex

pelled Yugoslavian customs officials from their posts on th

Italian and Austrian frontiers. Slovene president Milan Kuca

and his government resolved to fight the JNA if necessary

When the JNA sent some two thousand predominantly con 

script troops to retake the various border posts, expecting n

serious resistance, these units soon found themselves sur

rounded by 35,000 Slovene militia forces who used the territo 

rial-defense tactics designed to defend Yugoslavia against So 

viet invasion. Slovene troops blocked all major roads in th

republic, trapping unprepared and stunned JNA forces in

their barracks. JNA efforts to break through the barricade

and resupply their besieged bases by air met with fire from th

Slovene militia, and the first of a number of its helicopters wa

shot down. Croatia was not so eager as Slovenia to brea

10
away from the federation but was more reluctant yet to remain

behind without Slovenia in a Serbian-dominated state.

The European Community sent envoys to Zagreb to encour

age Slovenia and Croatia to de-escalate the crisis in return fo

eventual political recognition by the EC. Although the Slo 

venes agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations, fighting contin 

ued in Slovenia , with the Slovene militia continuing to far

better then its opponents. In Belgrade, the federal Ministry o

Defense proposed a massive military attack against Slovenia 

predicting high casualties on both sides, but Milosevic sur

prised the State Council by opposing the scheme. Slovenia

contained virtually none of the Serbs whom Milosevic wanted

to include in his Yugoslavia . He calculated that afte

Slovenia ’s secession, Serbia would have a sufficient prepon 

derance of power to do as it liked about—or to—Croatia . Serbi

agreed to withdraw the JNA from Slovenia , and the war in th

republic ended after 10 days of fighting and some 62 deaths.

A much larger war would soon begin in Croatia .

3 7 Tudjman

ruling party became increasingly assertive and nationalistic

and the Krajina Serbs grew increasingly threatened and defi

ant, asking for and receiving arms from Belgrade. The loca

chief of the Croatian national police, who tried to de-escalat

the conflict instead of moving to crush the Serbs, was assassi

nated by members of Tudjman ’s inner circle, who also launche

a rocket attack against a Serb suburb of Vukovar.

3 8 Each killing

sensationalized by either the Serbian or the Croatian media

escalated the crisis; as the violence intensified, JNA forces unde

Col Ratko Mladic went to the Krajina as “peacekeepers” to pro

tect the Serbs and seized many Croat towns.

Because widespread desertions, not limited to its Sloven

and Croatian troops, weakened the JNA, the forces sent t

Croatia were bolstered by Serbian paramilitary units rangin

from ultranationalist extremist groups to criminal gangs

These units soon began a pattern of massacres and othe

terrorism designed to drive Croats out of areas they con 

quered, and ethnic cleansing, also practiced on a smaller scal

by their enemies, entered the international lexicon. 3 9 Serb

shelling of the medieval Dalmatian city of Dubrovnik als

stimulated Western concern with the conflict, and the E

11
called representatives of the six Yugoslav republics to th

Hague to meet with mediator Lord Peter Carrington .

Milosevic agreed to a proposal by Carrington that Croatia b

allowed to secede from Yugoslavia , provided the rights of th

Serb minority were protected. However, he subsequently re

jected the formal plan that Carrington proposed, which ex 

panded this principle to allow the independence of all six

Yugoslav republics with similar guarantees. The Croatian

Bosnian, and Macedonian presidents all agreed to the Car 

rington plan, as did Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic 

who did not entirely share Milosevic ’s zeal for building 

Greater Serbia . Shocked and chagrined by this betrayal by hi

protégé, Milosevic walked out of the negotiations and finall

forced Bulatovic to retract his agreement to the plan, thu

killing it.4 0

In Croatia the JNA had gained control over all of the terri

tory it sought—approximately one-third of the republic—ex 

cept for the city of Vukovar, which it besieged. With Vukovar

fall an obvious inevitability, Germany granted diplomatic rec

ognition to Croatia and Slovenia , and the rest of the Europea

Community followed suit, effective 15 January 1992. Britain 

the least inclined of the major EC members to become entan

gled in Yugoslavia , felt very much dragged along by a degree o

German political assertiveness not seen before in the postwa

era. The Croatian fighting ended in January 1992, and in

March the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) be

gan deploying as peacekeepers in the Serb-held areas of Croa 

tia , which had declared themselves the independent Republi

of Serbian Krajina (RSK).

The Bosnian Civil War

Analyses of the nature of the war that began in Bosnia

Herzegovin a in 1992 tend to lean towards one of two majo

schools of thought, although many intermediate perspective

lie between the two polar extremes. One school sees the Bos 

nian war as primarily the result of Serbian aggression an

expansionism, and its proponents point out the close an

active ties between the Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs. The U

12
government has generally adopted something close to this per 

spective, often associated with support for outside militar

intervention or aid to assist the Bosnian government agains

the Serbs. (A variant of this view would add Croatia to the lis

of external aggressors and fomenters of conflict, although thi

refinement is not typical of official US views.) The opposit

school holds that the Bosnian war is essentially internal in

nature, in spite of the involvement of outside states, and tha

no side in the conflict is an innocent victim. This civil-wa

perspective has been associated in particular with the Britis

government (and to a lesser extent the French), and it is usu

ally held by people who argue that any external intervention in

the conflict ought to be based on an impartial peacekeeping o

peace-enforcement approach. As described in the followin

sections, the truth lies somewhere between these two charac

terizations, and this multifaceted nature of the war in Bosnia

was one of the major obstacles to Western efforts to deal wit

the crisis.

As the fighting wound down in Croatia , Bosnia-Herzegovin

headed towards the most catastrophic post-Yugoslav war t

date.4 1 Within Yugoslavia , Bosnia-Herzegovina had been th

most multiethnic of all the republics, both in aggregate and t

a considerable extent on the local level, although the Bosnia

Serb population was relatively rural while the Bosnian Mus

lims tended to live in and around Sarajevo and other relatively

affluent urban areas. As the Yugoslav federation disintegrated

the non-Serb populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina feared dom

nation by Serbia , while the large Bosnian Serb minority feare

domination by the more numerous Bosnian Muslims, should

the republic become independent. The leaderships of both th

Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs considered thei

two positions irreconcilable.

The European Community’s decision in December 1991 t

recognize Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992 included es

tablishment of a panel to consider applications for recognition

which other Yugoslav republics might submit by 20 January

This placed considerable pressure on Bosnia-Herzegovina an

Macedonia to move quickly towards independence, and bot

made their applications to the EC by the deadline. The E

panel approved the Macedonian application and rejected on

13
from Kosovar Albanians, but in Bosnia the panel decided tha

a referendum on independence should be held.

Bosnian Serbs led by Montenegrin psychiatrist Dr. Radova

Karadzic declared their independence from Bosnia in Januar

1992, calling themselves the “Republika Srpska” and estab 

lishing their capital at Pale , near Sarajevo. At the end of Feb 

ruary, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic held a republicwid

plebiscite on whether Bosnia-Herzegovina should declare it

independence from Yugoslavia . Muslims and Croats voted a

most unanimously in favor of independence, while most Serb

boycotted the referendum. Interethnic violence escalated dur

ing March, and large-scale fighting began on 2 April. Th

United States had not initially joined the Europeans in recog

nizing Croatia and Slovenia , still seeing their secession a

destabilizing, but did recognize them on 6 April, simultane

ously joining the EC in recognizing the independence of Bos 

nia-Herzegovina.

4 2 The West’s rather forlorn hope that recogni

tion might help stop the violence in Bosnia went unfulfilled.

Milosevic and Tudjman, each with plans for enlargement o

his country to include its extraterritorial ethnic brethren, ha

already met secretly to discuss carving up Bosnia betwee

them, leaving little if any territory for the Bosnian Muslims

Izetbegovic had made few preparations for a war that seemed

too horrible to contemplate;4 3 however, Belgrade had prepared

for Bosnian secession by posting Bosnian Serbs to JNA unit

in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There they would be in place to join

Karadzic’s fight against the Bosnian government without re

quiring the JNA to mount an overt invasion, with all the inter 

national criticism that would generate, and Serbia arranged t

bankroll the Bosnian Serbs. Once the war was under way

Milosevic also sent Serbian paramilitary groups, often armed

by the Serbian secret police, to assist in the fight. These force

included political extremist groups, profit-seeking criminals

and eventually even young Serbians looking for fun and plun

der, who would spend their weekends fighting or pillaging in

Bosnia and then return home. These groups took a leadin

role in the campaign of civilian massacres, rape, and othe

atrocities that soon horrified the West.

Enjoying the advantage of ex-JNA military equipment an

other forms of assistance from Belgrade, the Bosnian Serb

14
made rapid gains in the April fighting and soon held som

two-thirds of Bosnia . Artillery units in Serbia shelled defend

ers of the Bosnian border city of Zornik ; when it fell, tw

thousand Muslims were executed or sent to concentratio

camps, and all others were expelled. By May 1992, the Bos 

nian Serbs were able to mount a major offensive against Sara 

jevo along multiple axes, almost overwhelming the governmen

defenders until the Serb armor was knocked out in street-to

street fighting. A Bosnian army (BiH) counterattack estab 

lished a local stalemate that would endure for three years, an

the Serb siege and bombardment of the city continued. 4 4 Th

E C, which had just recognized Bosnia ’s sovereignty, now sen

Lord Carrington to Bosnia with a plan for the partition of th

republic into separate ethnic provinces, which Izetbegovic re

jected. The JNA sent Ratko Mladic to Bosnia to become th

new commander of the Bosnian Serb army (BSA).

In spring 1993, Mladic launched a major offensive agains

the eastern Bosnian city of Srebrenica, which had filled wit

Muslim refugees from surrounding areas already conquered

and cleansed by the Serbs. Under pressure from the defender

(who would not let him leave after a visit to Srebrenica), Ge

Philippe Morillon , UNPROFOR commander, promised that th

UN would protect them, alarming the UN leadership in New

York. In the General Assembly, a large bloc of nonaligned

states proposed the establishment of UN-protected safe ha

vens in eastern Bosnia . Although the UN military staf

strongly criticized this proposal as unworkable, 4 5 the Securit

Council adopted it on 16 April, after the European power

succeeded in watering it down to a designation of six citie

(Sarajevo , Srebrenica , Gorazde, Tuzla , Zepa, and Bihac) a

“safe areas ” that both sides would be asked to respect. UN

PROFOR’s mandate was expanded to include deterring but no

defending against attacks on the safe areas, and Mladi

agreed to leave Srebrenica alone only on the condition that th

defenders disarm. This they did, making it possible for th

Serbs to take the city whenever they chose to do so.

The war in Bosnia resembled the 1941–45 war in Yugoslavia

not only in its brutality but also in its complexity. The Bos 

nian Croats were nominal allies of the Bosnian governmen

early in the war, but at various times, each of the three side

15
made war against the other, sometimes fighting an enemy a

one location while simultaneously cooperating with tha

army’s forces against the third side in another.4 6 This ten 

dency towards chaos was further exacerbated by the fact tha

each army had only a limited ability to control the actions o

many of its component units, especially—but not only—thos

consisting of paramilitary thugs. As a result, forces in the field

often ignored cease-fire or safe-passage agreements made b

senior commanders, and although many atrocities were car

ried out with the approval or knowledge of central authorities

many others probably were not. 4 7

While the Bosnian Serb spring offensive of 1993 was unde

way in the east, Bosnian Croat (HVO) forces under Mate Bo 

ban turned against their nominal Bosnian government allie

in the southwest and began carving out their own state within

Bosnia (which they named “Herceg-Bosna ”). Boban had pre

viously been seen in Austria holding meetings with Karadzi

about possible partitions of Bosnia . Now Tudjman sent sub 

stantial numbers of Croatian regular forces into Bosnia t

support Boban’s troops as they began rounding up their for

mer Muslim comrades and placing them in concentratio

camps, and Bosnian government forces fought to contain th

Croat offensive.

On the diplomatic front, a new peace plan had been pro 

posed in January 1993. The [Cyrus] Vance-[Lord David] Owe

plan called for a federated Bosnia divided into ethnic prov

inces that would have considerable local autonomy but would

be distributed so that the Serbs could not easily secede an

join a greater Serbia . As in previous peace plans, the Bosnia

Serbs would have to withdraw from much of the territory the

had conquered; however, Milosevic, under pressure from

Western economic sanctions against Serbia , agreed to suppor

the plan and tried to persuade Karadzic to sign on. Karadzi

proved extremely reluctant to do so. Although Milosevic ar

gued that the Vance -Owen plan could not work and therefor

would not endanger the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic was loathe t

give up the required territory and feared that several thousan

NATO troops on the ground in Bosnia could cripple his logis 

tics and make future operations by the BSA impossible. Fi

nally, Karadzic signed the agreement, pending its ratification

16
by the Bosnian Serbs, and the West became cautiously opti

mistic. But in a referendum held in May, 96 percent of Bos 

nian Serb voters rejected the plan, killing it.

Western Reactions

The course of Western military responses to the conflicts in

the ruins of Yugoslavia was one of gradual but inconstan

escalation. A definite lack of consensus existed within th

ranks of the Western powers regarding ultimate strategic ob

jectives in the region, due in part to differing analyses of th

nature of the wars, especially in Bosnia . Moreover, differen

NATO allies were differently disposed towards the various par

ties in the conflict,4 8 the most visible examples of which wer

the amity of Germany towards Croatia , of Greece towards Ser 

bia , and of Turkey towards the Bosnian Muslims. This led t

policies directed towards achieving those objectives on whic

existed a reasonable amount of agreement, complicated by al

of the major NATO powers’ desires to do something—or a

least to be seen to be doing something—about the problem

without suffering substantial losses in the defense of interest

less than vital to them. In general, among NATO’s leadin

nations, the United States was usually the most “hawkish

regarding the use of force in Bosnia , while the United Kingdom

was the least inclined to take actions that seemed to represent 

departure from the path of impartial peacekeeping.

4 9 French

views tended to correspond with those of the British, although

this was not always true, and when it was, it was not always fo

the same reasons. Germany consistently supported the Unite

States in discussions of intervention policy, but since it did no

contribute forces either to UNPROFOR or to Operation Den

Flight (discussed below), its opinions carried less weight tha

those of the three alliance leaders.

The possibility of Western military intervention was of spe

cial concern to Izetbegovic and the Bosnian Muslims, wh

were eager for the West to step in and stop their enemies. A

times the Bosnian government pursued this goal by having it

forces stage attacks against its own civilian population in or

der to outrage the Western press and turn popular opinion

17
against the Serbs, although the Bosnian Serbs and the Croa 

tian government were not above doing the same thing. As th

war in Bosnia continued, Western negotiators found them 

selves alternately—even simultaneously—trying to convinc

the Serbs that the West might intervene in the conflict if n

progress occurred in the peace negotiations, and trying t

persuade the Bosnian government that the West would no

intervene and save it in the absence of such progress.

Aside from humanitarian aid to the region, sent almost from

the outset of the fighting, 5 0 the incremental process of inter 

vention may be said to have begun with the July 1992 deploy

ment of naval forces under NATO and Western European Un 

ion auspices to the Adriatic Sea to monitor shipping to th

former Yugoslav republics. This began after the UN imposed

an embargo against arms shipments to all states in the forme

Yugoslavia in September 1991, followed by imposition of a

economic blockade on Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992.5 

In November 1992, these forces were empowered not only t

monitor shipping but actually to enforce the embargo an

sanctions.5 2 As the conflicts progressed, the arms embarg

quickly fell into disrepute since it worked to the advantage o

the Serbs, who had inherited most of the JNA’s arsenal. Brit 

ain and France consistently opposed lifting the arms embarg

for Croatia and Bosnia , however, fearing the effects of an

escalation of the conflict upon their peacekeeping troops

Eventually, the embargo lost some of its effectiveness as th

Bosnians, Croats, and foreign supporters became more skilled

at evading it. In contrast, economic sanctions against Serbia

slowly grew more effective as some of the many obstacles t

enforcing them were addressed.

United Nations peace-enforcement efforts in the region be

gan with the deployment of UNPROFOR to Croatia in sprin

1992. With its headquarters imprudently placed in Sarajevo

(over the objections of the force’s commanders), it was inevita 

ble that UNPROFOR would find itself entangled in the Bosnia

war, and a decision made in September 1992 called for dra 

matic expansion of UNPROFOR’s presence in Bosnia in orde

to protect shipments of humanitarian aid under the auspice

of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees .

5 3 As describe

above, UNPROFOR rapidly became a key player in the Bos nia

18
conflict, and all sides consistently damned it for allegedly fa 

voring their enemies.

NATO began patrolling the skies over Bosnia on 16 Octobe

1992 in Operation Sky Monitor, following a UN resolution

banning flights by any aircraft without approval from UNPRO

FOR. On 12 April 1993, this operation was renamed Den

Flight after UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 81

granted it authority to intercept and, if necessary, shoot dow

aircraft violating the prohibition.5 4 Its mandate was furthe

expanded from 22 July to include providing close air suppor

(CAS) as necessary to protect UN peacekeepers. NATO’s 5th

Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) controlled the operation, an

a combined air operations center near Vicenza , Italy, managed

it. 5 5 The United States, United Kingdom , France , Italy, th

Netherlands, Spain , Turkey, and the multinational NATO air 

borne early warning force eventually provided aircraft for Den

Flight. Most were based in Italy or on US, British, and Frenc

aircraft carriers in the Adriatic, although some tankers, air 

borne-warning and other support aircraft operated directl

from bases in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom .

Although UN resolutions prohibited all flights over Bosnia , 

decision made at Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH

and approved at higher levels limited Deny Flight to intercept

ing fixed-wing aircraft. All sides in the conflict continued t

use helicopters in a variety of roles, often painting red crosse

on helicopters actually being used for tactical resupply an

other missions. Although US and NATO officials claime

rather implausibly that the helicopter flights were not militar

ily significant, they were allowed to continue because of th

very plausible fear that if one were shot down, its owner

would rapidly fabricate evidence that it had been on a hu

manitarian mission loaded with noncombatants, potentially

causing a public-relations disaster for NATO .

In August 1993 the Deny Flight mandate further expanded

to include the possibility of launching non-CAS air strikes t

deter or retaliate for attacks against peacekeeping forces in

Bosnia . Following a meeting of NATO leaders in London, on 

August the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s governin

body, approved a contingency plan for air strikes in Bosnia 

which laid out three general options for targeting.

5 6 The firs

19
and most limited involved attacking only forces that posed 

direct and immediate threat to friendly forces. The secon

expanded the target set to include potentially, but not immedi

ately, threatening forces and assets. The third—and most ex 

pansive—added to the set a wide range of targets that would

contribute to the adversary’s ability to pose such threats ove

the long term. This strategic blueprint for NATO air strike

would ultimately form the basis for Operation Deliberate Forc

two years later.

Starting in late 1993, the US government began to take a

increasingly active role in the Bosnian crisis, driven by th

rising domestic political costs of appearing to be doing nothin

to stop it, and by the growing realization that the European

did not appear to be making progress towards a solution.5 

The first order of business for the United States was a projec

to end the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and the Bos 

nian government, which would simplify the Bosnian situation

considerably and do much to even the local balance of power

The United States pressured Zagreb by pointing out tha

Croatia would have little chance of ever regaining its Serb-held

territories without American support. On 18 March 1994, th

BiH -HVO alliance was restored with the announcement of 

new federation between the Bosnian government and the Bos 

nian Croats, marking a key turning point in the conflict.

Within NATO, the United States advocated more forcefu

action against the Bosnian Serbs. Following a mortar shel

explosion in a Sarajevo marketplace on 4 February 1994 tha

killed 68 Bosnian civilians, the United States proposed retali

atory air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. London and Pari

continued to oppose exacerbating the conflict between th

BSA and the West, especially (though not solely) because th

British and French had thousands of peacekeeping troops in

harm’s way on the ground in Bosnia . However, in an 8 Febru 

ary meeting of the British cabinet, Foreign Minister Dougla

Hurd argued to his colleagues that the future not just o

Bosnia but also of NATO was at stake, and that the survival o

the alliance needed to be their foremost concern. The followin

day, the NAC demanded that the BSA withdraw its heav

weapons from a 20-kilometer-wide exclusion zone aroun

20
Sarajevo within 10 days or NATO would bomb them. The Bos 

nian Serbs refused to comply.

The NATO ultimatum met with strong opposition from th

Russian government. Serbia had been an important ally o

pan-Slavist Russia in the early years of the century, and th

Russian nationalist right, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, argued

that it was time for Russia to stand up against NATO i

defense of its traditional interests. Russian envoy Vital

Churkin traveled to Serbia to meet Karadzic and brokered 

deal under which BSA artillery would withdraw from the ex 

clusion zone and Russian peacekeepers would deploy there t

prevent the Serbs’ enemies from taking advantage of the with 

drawal to attack them. The presence of Russian peacekeeper

would also prevent NATO from easily launching air attacks a

targets in the exclusion zone.

NATO’s Deny Flight aircraft soon drew first blood (and th

alliance’s first ever) on 28 February 1994, when two pairs o

US Air Force F-16 fighters intercepted six Yugoslav air forc

Super Galeb light attack aircraft on a bombing missio

against Bosnian government forces and shot down four o

them. This was followed on 12 March by the first launch of 

CAS mission to support UN peacekeepers, although no at

tacks actually occurred. The first CAS strikes took place on 1

and 11 April, when UN troops came under fire during a Bos 

nian Serb offensive against the newly designated safe area o

Gorazde, in response to which the Serbs took 150 UN

peacekeepers hostage to deter further air attacks.5 8 Durin

subsequent missions over Gorazde, ground fire damaged 

French navy Etendard IVP on 15 April, and the following day 

British Sea Harrier was shot down. The pilot ejected, and UN

forces rescued him.

The BSA offensive against Gorazde led the United States t

advocate punitive air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, whom

President Bill Clinton declared to be the “complete aggressors

in the action. On 22 April, the United States persuaded th

NAC to demand that the BSA withdraw its heavy weapon

from the front line around Gorazde and to threaten tha

strikes would also be launched against any heavy weapon

that might be used to attack the other safe areas. Seeking t

21
avert this escalation of the fighting, UN envoy Yasushi Akash

negotiated a new cease-fire.

On 20 July 1994, the Bosnian Serb Assembly considered

yet another partition plan for Bosnia that required significan

territorial concessions from them. Even though it received

support from Slobodan Milosevic, whose country had by thi

time been suffering from two years of UN economic sanctions

the assembly rejected it. Milosevic reacted by announcing in

August that he was breaking Serbia ’s ties with the Bosnia

Serbs and closing their common border. The UN responded

with an easing of the sanctions against Serbia in September

Meanwhile, on 5 August, BSA forces broke into a UN weap

ons-collection site near Sarajevo and removed several armored

vehicles and artillery pieces they had previously turned over t

UN custody. In response, several US A-10s strafed and de

stroyed a BSA 1945-vintage M18 tank destroyer, and th

Serbs returned the other weapons they had seized. NATO air 

craft struck again on 22 September, when another A-10 an

two Royal Air Force (RAF) Jaguars attacked a tank near Sara 

jevo that had fired on an armored vehicle belonging to Frenc

UNPROFOR forces and wounded one of its crew.

Starting in late October, the Bosnian government–Croat fed

eration launched its largest offensive so far in the war in

western Bosnia , defeating the antigovernment Muslim force

of Fikret Abdic near Bihac. During the heavy fighting in thi

region, the BSA received air support from aircraft based in th

Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia , which NATO could no

intercept due to the short flight time between their bases an

the battlefield, and the UN Security Council expanded th

Deny Flight mandate to permit attacks against territory in

Croatia to prevent such flights. On 21 November, some 3

NATO aircraft from four countries attacked the airfield at Ud 

bina , cratering the runway but sparing the aircraft based

there at the request of the UN.

5 9 Two days later, US jet

launched high-speed antiradiation missile attacks agains

BSA surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries in western Bosni

that had fired on two British aircraft the day before. A mas

sive poststrike reconnaissance-in-force mission against thes

site s was planned but canceled at the demand of the British

and French governments, which wanted to prevent furthe

22
escalation.6 0 The year ended with negotiation efforts by forme

US president Jimmy Carter producing a four-month cease-fir

between the BSA and the Bosnian-Croat federation force

effective 31 December.

Final Approach to Intervention

By the end of the cease-fire in April 1995,6 1 significan

changes had occurred in the balance of power in and aroun

Bosnia , although they were widely recognized only in retro 

spect. The Bosnian army had continued to grow in strength

through reorganization and an increased flow of arms an

equipment, much of which came from Muslim states in th

Middle and Far East.6 2 Croatia had steadily rearmed, in par

by keeping a portion of the arms shipments to Bosnia that i

allowed to cross its territory after they penetrated the rathe

leaky international blockade. Organizational advice for th

Croatian military had come from a team of former US militar

officers in the nongovernmental guise of Military Professiona

Resources, Incorporated. The BSA and the RSK army re

mained in a powerful strategic position in spite of receivin

reduced material support from Serbia , but the local balance o

power was shifting in favor of their opponents. Perhaps a

significant, as would soon be revealed, years of war and depri

vation had apparently begun to take a toll on the Serb armies

morale and political cohesion. 6 3

Dramatic signs of this weakness came when the Croatia

army launched an invasion of Serb-held Western Slavonia

(Sector West in UNPROFOR parlance) on 1 May 1995. Called

Operation Flash , the Croatian offensive conquered the terri

tory in less than two days, surprising most observers—includ

ing Western officials—who had expected the RSK forces t

resist any Croatian attack with far greater determination an

effectiveness.6 4 Elsewhere in the Krajina, planning began for 

military reorganization, and a new commander was appointed

for the RSK army.

However, a key weakness of the Western powers soo

emerged as well. In response to renewed shelling of safe area

and the continued presence of Serb artillery in the exclusion

23
zone around Sarajevo, the UN requested punitive air strike

against the Bosnian Serbs. On 25 and 26 May, NATO aircraf

attacked ammunition storage sites in Pale , the Bosnian Serb

capital. 6 5 The Serbs responded as they had to previous ai

strikes, by taking 370 UN peacekeepers hostage, and placed

many of them at strategic locations as human shields to dete

further NATO air strikes. The bombing ceased, and by 1

June the Serbs had released all of the hostages. UNPROFOR

redeployed the rest of its outlying units to protect them from

capture by the BSA in similar circumstances in the future.

Shortly after the Pale raids, American domestic attention

focused on Bosnia as never before, when a Bosnian Serb SA-

Kub SAM shot down a US Air Force F-16 near Banja Luka i

western Bosnia on 2 June. The pilot ejected safely, and hi

fate became the subject of intense speculation until a U

Marine Corps combat search-and-rescue mission rescued him

six days later. Popular American concern about Bosni

quickly subsided to its original level of relative indifference

and even at the height of Operation Deliberate Force, Bosnia

received less US media attention than it did during this inci

dent.6 6 In the wake of the loss, Deny Flight operations wer

adjusted to keep patrolling aircraft farther out of harm’s way

over the Adriatic , in spite of British and French insistence tha

occasional casualties were to be expected in such an opera 

tion. The allies argued that Deny Flight aircraft should con 

tinue to patrol the skies over Bosnia , at least until it becam

clear that the F-16 shootdown was not a fluke. However, AF 

SOUTH commanders maintained that since relatively few air 

planes were violating the no-flight zone and since NATO would

not allow the preemptive destruction of the BSA integrated ai

defense system (IADS),

6 7 the risks involved in further over

flights were not worthwhile. 6 8

In July the BSA seized the long-isolated Muslim enclave o

Srebrenica after several days of heavy fighting, during whic

US Navy and Dutch air force fighters flew CAS missions t

support Dutch UNPROFOR peacekeepers when they came un

der attack. After occupying the city on 11 July, the BSA ex

pelled its Muslim population and bused them to Tuzla , excep

for some seven thousand men who remain unaccounted for

Almost immediately, the BSA began shelling and then launch in

24
ground attacks against Zepa and threatened to attack

Gorazde. Galvanized by the seizure of Srebrenica and facin

growing domestic pressure to act, especially in Europe, West

ern leaders increasingly advocated major military action

French president Jacques Chirac called for Western interven 

tion on 14 July, and although the British government urged

caution, British, French, and American defense officials met in

London, and preparations were made to deploy a Rapid Reac

tion Force (RRF) of French, British, and Dutch combat troops

including heavy artillery, to Sarajevo . American officials, le

by Secretary of Defense William Perry, advocated widesprea

air strikes against the BSA.

On 21 July, as RRF artillery units arrived in Sarajevo an

prepared to deploy on Mount Igman, overlooking Sarajevo

officials from all the NATO allies held a summit meeting in

London and agreed to launch large-scale air strikes if the BS

either attacked Gorazde or concentrated forces or weapon

that posed a direct threat to it.6 9 Although this was a dramati

political action, on a strategic level the decision was not con 

ceived as a departure from past policy so much as a continu

ation of it, since the members had agreed on the possibility o

such a course of action two years earlier. At NATO the cam

paign that became known as Deliberate Force was seen simpl

as a further phase of Deny Flight, and AFSOUTH’s name fo

the air campaign came into use in Brussels only after the fac

However, the London conference did add several noteworth

aspects to the air strike plan of 1993. First was the estab

lishment of two “zones of action ” in Bosnia —one covering th

southeast, including Sarajevo and Gorazde, and the other th

northwest, including Bihac. Instead of AFSOUTH aircraft bein

limited to striking targets in the close vicinity of whichever saf

area(s) came under attack, the entire zone of action containin

the safe area(s) in question would be subject to air attack. Sec 

ond, at least in theory, once a campaign began, on ly mutua

agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR would stop it. As on

official characterized the arrangement, both of the dual key

were required to turn off the bombing, instead of just one. 7 0

The North Atlantic Council approved the air strike plan on

25 July, the same day that Zepa fell to the BSA and the sam

day that the UN War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague indicted

25
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic . One week later, the NAC

extended the deterrent threats to cover attacks against th

other remaining safe areas (Sarajevo, Tuzla , and Bihac) a

well, while the US Congress sent a resolution to Presiden

Clinton calling for the lifting of the UN arms embargo agains

the Bosnian government.7 1

Immediately after the London conference, a delegation o

NATO air force generals traveled to Serbia to deliver the alli

ance’s ultimatum to General Mladic in person and to war

him further about the consequences that would follow from 

BSA violation of the remaining safe areas. Delegation leade

Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten reported that Mladi

seemed not to have expected the ultimatum. Mladic did no

question NATO’s ability to strike, as promised, when an

where it chose, but he rejected NATO’s demands followin

what Western diplomats had by then discovered to be a typi

cal, lengthy soliloquy on injustices the Serbs had suffered

through history. 7 2 Soon NATO and UNPROFOR officers wer

working out coordination arrangements to prevent RRF artil

lery fire from endangering aircraft in the event of air strike

around Sarajevo, and Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, UNPROFOR

commander, agreed with NATO air campaign planners on 

joint target list for a possible air campaign.

If the military strategy for Operation Deliberate Force wa

principally laid out in the London conference of August 1993

the London meeting of July 1995 was its pivotal moment in

political terms. The sacking of Srebrenica in spite of its UN

protection and the ensuing carnage catalyzed Western deter 

mination to do something decisive about the war in Bosnia 

Moreover, this occurred at the same time that the Britis

government was reaching the conclusion that the peacekeep

ing approach to the problem embodied in UNPROFOR ha

accomplished as much as it was likely to do. This belief ma

have been encouraged by AFSOUTH ’s decision to stop Den

Flight patrols over Bosnia in the absence of permission fo

preemptive suppression of enemy air defenses.

7 3 The Frenc

were also growing tired of the unremitting crisis, and the elec

tion of President Chirac may have contributed significantly t

French movement towards the American position regardin

intervention. Finally, the Europeans widely viewed airpower a

26
an option of last resort, and few European leaders were confi 

dent that it could be used both with decisive effect and at low

physical and political cost in Bosnia until after the very lim 

ited air strikes launched in 1994 and 1995 had produced

some equally limited results.7 4 Overall, it is reasonable to sa

that US leadership was a necessary but not a sufficient condi

tion for NATO to decide to intervene in Bosnia with extensiv

air strikes in 1995.

In western Bosnia , intense fighting had developed in th

Bihac pocket in late July. Ten thousand Croatian army (HV

troops crossed the Bosnian border to assist BiH and HVO

forces in their offensive against BSA forces in the Livno valley

while Croatian air force (HRZ) fighters and helicopters pro 

vided air support. Then on 3 August, the HV and HRZ

launched Operation Storm, a massive offensive against th

Krajina Serbs, who collapsed or fled before the onslaught wit

a speed that shocked observers, including US and Britis

government officials. 7 5 The skill with which the operation wa

organized led to speculation that nongovernmental America

advisors had been actively involved in its planning. 7 6 Knin fe

to the Croatian forces on 5 August, and by the end of the nex

day, virtually all of the Serb-held Krajina had been taken an

HV forces had linked up with the BiH at Bihac.

7 7 Twent

thousand RSK troops fled their imploding political entity t

join BSA forces around Bihac, while over two hundred thou 

sand Serb civilian refugees ultimately took to the roads to th

east. At the time, many analysts believed that the influx o

troops from the Krajina would bolster the Serb forces in west

ern Bosnia ; later it would appear that these bitterly demoral

ized military refugees had actually helped to weaken th

BSA.

7 8 Fighting continued in western and southern Bosnia 

and the situations of the BiH , HVO, and HV forces graduall

improved. Karadzic declared that Milosevic was a traitor fo

allowing the collapse of the Krajina, while Milosevic responded

that Karadzic was a warmonger for refusing to accept th

West’s peace proposals.

On 17 August Slobodan Milosevic reiterated his 1994 agree 

ment to the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia presented t

him by US assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke, which

Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic had already approved. Th

27
Bosnian Serbs remained defian

however. Holbrooke turned u

the heat further on 27 Augus

when he appeared on the televi

sion news program Meet th

Press and threatened a six- t

12-month campaign of air strike

against the Bosnian Serbs t

“level the playing field” in th

conflict.7 9 He further prophesied

that “if the Bosnian Serbs don’

want to negotiate, then the gam

will basically just be to wait fo

the trigger for air strikes.”8 0

The objectives of leveling th

playing field or of bombing th

Bosnian Serbs to the bargainin

table were not ones upon which NATO had agreed, and th

overt goal of Operation Deliberate Force always remained se

curing the safe areas from Bosnian Serb attacks. However, U

policy, at least since late 1993, appears to have been oriented

consistently towards shifting the regional balance of power in

favor of Croatia and the Bosnian government. Perhaps th

most obvious indication of this is that blatant Croatian inter 

vention in the war in Bosnia was never criticized by Washing

ton in the way that Serbian involvement in the war was, le

alone seen as a reason to use airpower against Croatia

forces.8 1 Somewhat ironically, it is at least conceivable that th

US-engineered federation between the Bosnian Croats and th

Bosnian government, the improvement in Croatian and BiH

military power, and the success of economic sanctions and othe

international pressures in persuading Milosevic to withdraw hi

support from the Bosnian Serbs had finally combined by mid

1995 to make a Croatian-Bosnian victory over the BSA possible

even without direct involvement by NATO.

8 2 It is noteworthy tha

the developing capabilities and possible actions of the Croatia

and BiH forces did not figure prominently in US and NATO

campaign planning, as some of the following chapters discuss.8 3

The trigger for NATO air strikes that Holbrooke had foretold

was provided the very next day when two mortar shells fell in

Richard Holbrooke

28
a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 37 people and wounding 85

The Bosnian government threatened to withdraw from the on 

going Paris peace talks if the Serbs were not punished, whil

Karadzic accused the BiH of launching the attack itself. O

29 August, UNPROFOR announced that it had confirmed “be

yond all reasonable doubt” that the shells had been fired from

a Serb-held area. In spite of the Bosnian Serb parliament’

a nnouncement that it now accepted the Western peace plan in

principle (and a Russian statement that NATO should no

retaliate for the shelling, even if the Serbs were responsible fo

it), NATO decided to execute its air campaign plan against th

BSA.

8 4 On 30 August, US, British, Spanish, and French air 

craft began launching air strikes against Bosnian Serb target

in the southeast zone of action , while French and Britis

gunners on Mount Igman shelled BSA targets around Sara 

jevo, as Operation Deliberate Force began.

Notes

1. Among the recent accounts of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and its con 

sequences, perhaps the best and most accessible is Christopher Bennet

Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995

Also worthy of examination, among others, are Susan L. Woodward, Balka

Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); Laura Silber an

Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books/ Pengui

USA, 1996); Miron Rezun, Europe and War in the Balkans (Westport, Conn

Praeger, 1995); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegratio

and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995

James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pin 

ter, 1991); Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1992

Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Verno, 1993); an

Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univer

sity Press, 1994). Focusing on Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular are Noe

Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Pres

1994); and Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: 

Tradition Betrayed (London: Hurst, 1994). Many of these works also provid

useful summaries of earlier (and pre-) Yugoslav history.

2. On the July Crisis see, among many others, L. C. F. Turner, Origins o

the First World War (New York: Norton, 1970), which also describes th

preceding Balkan Wars; and James Joll, The Origins of the First World Wa

2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1992).

3. Bulgaria was the only South Slavic nation not included in Yugoslavi

which means “Land of the South Slavs” in Serbo-Croatian. General historie

of Yugoslavia that predate the 1980s include Stephen Clissold, ed., A Sho

29
History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); an

Stevan Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London: Ernest Benn, 1971). On the formatio

of Yugoslavia in particular, see Dimitrije Djordjevic, ed., The Creation of Yugo 

slavia, 1914–1918 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio, 1980); and Ivo Banac, Th

National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 198 4).

4. See Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925 (Min

neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962); and The Twilight of th

French Eastern Alliances, 1926–1936 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universit

Press, 1988).

5. Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbi

University Press, 1968), 128–70.

6. On interwar and wartime Yugoslavia, see Bennett, chap. 3; J. B

Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941 (New York: Columbia Universi

Press, 1962); Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity an

Communist Revolution, 1919–1953 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universit

Press, 1991); and Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came (New York: Pan

theon, 1989), chap. 17.

7. On the invasion and occupation of Yugoslavia, see also Iliva Juki

The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974); Joz

Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Chetniks (Stanford

Stanford University Press, 1975); Elizabeth Wiskemann, “The Subjugatio

of South-Eastern Europe,” in Survey of International Affairs, 1939–194

The Initial Triumph of the Axis, ed. Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbe

(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 319–63; and idem, “Partitione

Yugoslavia,” in Toynbee and Toynbee, 648–73.

8. For geographic details of the Axis partition, see The Times Atlas of th

Second World War, ed. John Keegan (Avenel, N.J.: Crescent Books, 1995).

9. Bennett, 43–46.

10. Among many biographical studies of Tito, see especially Steva

Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia’s Great Dictator: Tito, a Reassessment (Londo

Hurst, 1992).

11. See Bennett, chap. 4; and Woodward, chap. 2. On postwar Yugosla 

via’s economic system, see also Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Exper

ment, 1948–1974 (London: Hurst, 1977).

12. Although the West welcomed Tito’s withdrawal from the Soviet blo

until (and in some cases even after) the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, man

American policy makers (in spite of the contrary advice of George Kenna

continued to view the communist world as a united monolith and argue

that the West would waste its efforts by trying to foment further splits in th

international communist movement.

13. On Yugoslavia’s foreign relations during the cold war, see also David L

Larson, United States Foreign Policy toward Yugoslavia, 1943–1963 (Wash

ington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979).

14. On the other hand, Italian domestic politics were a long-standin

hotbed of East-West competition, with the United States and the USS

30
providing extensive covert assistance to Italian political parties on the righ

and left.

15. See Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice o

Territorial Defense, 2d ed. (New York: Saint Martin’s, 1986), chaps. 5–6; an

Douglas A. Fraze, “The Yugoslav All-People’s Defense System: A Pessimisti

Appraisal” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1981).

16. See Woodward, chap. 2.

17. See ibid., chaps. 3–4; and Bennett, chap. 5.

18. Bennett, 69.

19. Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and It

Destroyers—America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Wh

(New York: Times Books, 1996), 42–48.

20. Presumably Slovaks, Ukrainians, Quebecois, and other relativel

peaceful secessionists would occupy some intermediate rung on this hy

pothesized civilizational ladder.

21. It may or may not be significant that, as some observers have noted

d uring most of the Bosnian civil war, Sarajevans have faced a lower risk o

violent death than do residents of some cities and towns in the United States.

22. And, usually most important in such arguments, therefore w

should not get involved. Of course, the same noninterventionist policy pre 

scription could also follow from a number of very different analyses of th

problem. For an elegantly scathing critique of one prominent example o

this perspective (Robert D. Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through His 

tory [New York: Saint Martin’s, 1993]), see Noel Malcolm, “Seeing Ghosts

The National Interest, Summer 1993, 83–88.

23. One indicator of this trend was the rising number of people identify 

ing themselves in censuses as ethnic Yugoslavs rather than as members o

one of the subnational ethnic groups. Not the least of the factors working t

erode traditional ethnic boundaries (and to create most of the self-identifie

Yugoslavs) was the substantial and rising number of marriages betwee

members of different ethnic groups.

24. See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cam 

bridge University Press, 1979).

25. See V. P. Gagnon Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Con 

flict,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–95): 130–66.

26. Many scholars and observers have argued that this trend is effec 

tively irreversible, at least for the foreseeable future, and that memories o

the latest wave of internal wars in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, now leav

no alternative to ethnic partition. See, for example, John J. Mearsheime

and Stephen Van Evera, “When Peace Means War,” The New Republic, 1

December 1995, 16–21.

27. See, among others, Bennett, chap. 2.

28. Kosovo is also the spiritual home of the Serbian Orthodox church

See ibid., 86–87.

29. On Milosevic’s rise to power, see V. P. Gagnon Jr., “Serbia’s Road 

War,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 2 (April 1994): 117–31.

31
30. Although comparing lesser dictators to Adolf Hitler has become 

troublingly popular cottage industry in recent years, Christopher Bennet

in Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, offers the following, unusually worthwhil

example of the art form: “Contemporary Yugoslav commentators were im 

mediately struck by the similarities [with] . . . the tactics Adolph Hitler ha

employed . . . during the 1930s. Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhinelan

and the failure of the international community to react in 1936 corre 

sponded to Milosevic’s assault against Serbia’s autonomous provinces an

the inertia of Yugoslavia’s federal authorities in 1988 and 1989. Anschlus

with Austria in 1937 was akin to the Milosevic coup d’état in Montenegro

Similarly the Serb communities of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina serve

the same purpose as the German minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland

(page 116).

31. Milosevic himself was finally elected president of Serbia in Decembe

1990, following a campaign in which he enjoyed complete control over th

media and was able to finance his effort by having the main Serbian ban

print the $1.7 billion he deemed necessary to ensure his election (ibid

121–22).

32. Television documentary Discovery Journal, “Yugoslavia: The Death o

a Nation,” episode 2 (1995).

33. His election also benefited from campaign financing from expatriat

Croats abroad (Bennett, 124). For detailed discussion of elections in Yugo

slavia, see Cohen.

34. Unlike the Croatian government, the Slovenian government had fore 

knowledge of the JNA’s plan to disarm the two republics’ territorial defens

forces in late 1990 and thus was able to retain control of a significan

portion of its arms (Bennett, 144).

35. “Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation,” episode 2.

36. Bennett, 154–56.

37. For a detailed analysis, see Norman Cigar, “The Serbo-Croatian Wa

1991: Political and Military Dimensions,” Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no

3 (September 1993): 297–338.

38. “Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation,” episode 3.

39. See Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleans

ing” (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1995).

40. Milosevic threatened to destroy Bulatovic by revealing that the Ita

ian government had offered him an attractive package of foreign aid an

personal enrichment in return for acceptance of the EC plan.

41. In addition to the broader accounts of Yugoslavia’s breakup and th

resulting wars, see Edward O’Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia, 1992–94 (Ne

York: Saint Martin’s, 1995).

42. The sixth of April was also the anniversary of the German terro

bombing of Belgrade and invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941.

43. Bennett, 184–85.

32
44. As O

Ballance repeatedly observes, the siege of Sarajevo was neve

quite as impermeable as the Bosnian government and many journalist

portrayed it to be—and sometimes was much less so (ibid.).

45. Senior UN official, interviewed by author, spring 1996.

46. Moreover, not only were the Bosnian government’s forces not exclu 

sively Muslim, in western Bosnia the Muslim militia force led by Fikre

Abdic was an important ally of the Bosnian Serbs in the Bihac area.

47. The incendiary question of which side(s) committed the most atrocitie

in Bosnia cannot be addressed adequately here—nor need it be. As a fir

approximation, all but the most partisan analysts generally agree that in th

wars in Croatia and Bosnia, all sides committed ethnic cleansing and eve

more vile acts, and that in both conflicts, Serbs committed by far the most.

48. Vice Adm Norman W. Ray and United Kingdom delegation, Head

quarters NATO, interviewed by author, 9 February 1996.

49. Headquarters NATO, various interviews by author, 7–9 Februar

1996. One US diplomat suggested it was relevant that in 1995 the Britis

military was finalizing official doctrine regarding peace operations, whic

held that peacekeeping and peace enforcement (“Chapter VI” and “Chapte

VII” operations in UN parlance) are fundamentally different from each othe

and ought to be kept separate.

50. Of course, humanitarian aid was far from irrelevant to the militar

dimension of the conflict since shipments of food and other supplies ofte

played a key role in sustaining the various belligerent forces. For details o

various humanitarian aid efforts, see O’Ballance.

51. In UN Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757, respectively.

52. With the granting of enforcement powers on 22 November, the Wes

ern European Union’s Operation Sharp Vigilance and NATO’s Operatio

Maritime Monitor were renamed Sharp Fence and Maritime Guard, respec 

tively. They were consolidated into a combined operation called Shar

Guard in June 1993.

53. A vivid and disturbing account of UNPROFOR’s deployment an

early days in Sarajevo and of what peacekeeping is like more generall

appears in the memoirs of Lt Gen Lewis MacKenzie, a Canadian who origi 

nally commanded the UN force in Sarajevo. See Peacekeeper: The Road t

Sarajevo (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993).

54. Four hundred sixty-five flights over Bosnia had been monitored b

the time the Security Council adopted UNSCR 816.

55. Senior military command of Deny Flight lay with US admira

Leighton Smith, the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, an

below him, day-to-day operational command resided with US Air Forc

lieutenant general Michael Ryan, commander of Allied Air Forces Souther

Europe.

56. Memorandum for the NATO secretary-general, NAC Decision State 

ment, MCM-KAD-084-93, subject: Operational Options for Air Strikes i

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8 August 1993.

33
57. Some segments of the US administration, such as the National Se

curity Council staff, had long favored strong Western intervention in th

Bosnian crisis but had been outweighed by those who argued that interven 

tion would produce little gain but involve potentially high political costs.

58. Air Force F-16s and Marine Corps F/A-18s flew the April CA

strikes. The UN hostages were subsequently released.

59. The NAC had anticipated a far more substantial air attack when 

approved the strike against Udbina (US Mission officials, Headquarter

NATO, interviewed by author, 8 February 1996).

60. Various interviews at Headquarters NATO, 8–9 February 1996.

61. The cease-fire did not actually last out its fourth month, as BiH

forces launched a number of successful local offensives during April.

62. Jane’s Sentinel: The Balkans Newsletter 1, no. 10 (October 1994): 2

and vol. 2, no. 7 (n.d.): 1–3. On the growth of the HZS and apparen

German involvement therein, see Georg Mader, “Hrvatske Zrance Snag

Croatia’s Embargoed Air Force,” World Air Power Journal 24 (Spring 1996

140–47.

63. Strains in the Bosnian Serb leadership between President Karadzi

and General Mladic would soon become apparent as well. See Robert Block

“The Madness of General Mladic,” The New York Review, 5 October 1995

7–9.

64. US mission and British delegation officials, Headquarters NATO, in 

terviewed by author, 8–9 February 1996.

65. NATO identified the attacking forces as including four US Air Forc

F-16s and one Dutch F-16, two US and two Spanish F-18s, and one Frenc

Mirage, in addition to tanker, electronic warfare, and search-and-rescu

aircraft.

66. According to Vanderbilt University Television News Archive statis 

tics, the three major US television networks together devoted a total o

almost 45 minutes of coverage to stories about Bosnia on 2 and 3 Jun

1995, compared to just over 33 minutes on 30 and 31 August, the first tw

days of bombing in Operation Deliberate Force. One should note that on th

first day of Deliberate Force, a Bosnian Serb SA-16 shot down a Frenc

Mirage 2000D, and the fate of its two-man non-American crew remaine

unknown for several weeks.

67. The United States had long been lobbying for such permission from

NATO, even to the point of revealing previously unshared intelligence infor 

mation about the Bosnian Serb IADS with its allies, but differences betwee

American and European attitudes towards proportionality and definitions o

hostile intent led the NAC consistently to reject these requests. AFSOUTH

did not have sufficient defense-suppression aircraft available to provid

routine protection from SAMs for Deny Flight patrols over Bosnia (Ra

interview).

68. The same difference of opinion between the United States and it

European allies about the tolerability of friendly losses also characterize

some aspects of the planning and execution of NATO air strikes in Septem 

34
ber 1995 (Group Capt Trevor Murray and British UN delegation official

RAF Uxbridge and Headquarters NATO, interviewed by author, 6–9 Febru 

ary 1996).

69. During this time, one of the stranger incidents of the conflict oc 

curred when it was widely reported that an explosion heard in Pale on 2

July had been a unilateral French bombing attack against the home of 

relative of Radovan Karadzic in retaliation for the killing of two Frenc

peacekeepers the day before. The French Defense Ministry denied this, an

subsequently it appeared that the noise had actually been a sonic boom

(Jane’s Sentinel: The Balkans Newsletter 2, no. 7 [n.d.]: 6). However, th

mystery has been fueled by a comment from French defense minister Millo

that if such an attack had been launched, “it would obviously be part of a

appropriate response to the logic of war chosen by the Serbs,” and by 

comment from President Chirac that he had ordered unspecified retaliatio

for the deaths of the peacekeepers (“French Revenge Strike in Bosnia?

World Air Power Journal 24 [Spring 1996]: 5).

70. US and British delegation, Headquarters NATO, interviewed b

author, 7–8 February 1996. In practice, either of the key holders woul

probably have been able to halt the bombing unilaterally if sufficiently se

on doing so (Ray interview).

71. President Clinton vetoed this resolution on 11 August.

72. Air Chief Marshal William Wratten, RAF High Wycombe, interviewe

by author, 5 February 1996. In addition to Air Chief Marshal Wratten

commander in chief of RAF Strike Command, the NATO delegation include

Air Force general James Jamerson, deputy commander in chief of US Euro

pean Command, and an Armée de l’Air major general. Wratten ended th

visit when a heated argument began between Mladic and the French gen 

eral.

73. Several diplomats in the US NATO mission retrospectively assesse

the military decision to discontinue routine overflights after the loss of th

F-16 in June as having been a powerful political lever to encourage th

British to support new measures in Bosnia (interviews, 8 February 1996).

74. Various interviews by author, 7–9 February 1996.

75. Ibid. For details of the offensive, see Tim Ripley and Paul Beave

“Analysis: Operation Storm,” Jane’s Sentinel: The Balkans Newsletter 2, no

8 (n.d.): 2–3.

76. Ripley and Beaver, 2.

77. During the fighting, US Navy EA-6Bs and F/A-18s fired high-spee

antiradiation missiles at Serb SAM sites near Knin and Udbina that ha

locked on to them.

78. On 13 August, RSK troops who had fled to Yugoslavia were ordere

to return to Bosnia; soon Belgrade began sending Krajina Serb refugees t

find new homes in Kosovo, leading to rising ethnic tensions there (Jane’

Sentinel: The Balkans Newsletter 2, no. 8 [n.d.]: 3).

79. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO

Attacks If Talks Stall,” New York Times, 28 August 1995, A1, A6.

35
80. Ibid., A6.

81. On 4 August 1995, NATO aircraft were in fact sent to provide 

deterrent overhead presence for Canadian UNPROFOR peacekeepers wh

were under fire from HV forces during Operation Storm. However, RS

forces illuminated the flight with their radars, and the aircraft responded b

firing antiradiation missiles, which seemed likely to have emboldened rathe

than deterred the Croatian forces (Capt Chip Pringle, Ramstein Air Bas

interviewed by Lt Col Chris Campbell, 14 February 1996).

82. This study cannot—and will not try to—answer the question of wha

might have happened if Operation Deliberate Force had not been launched

but the question deserves further study and consideration. In light of th

rapid successes that Croatia scored against the RSK in mid-1995 and th

slower progress made against the BSA in late August, it must fall to thos

who argue that NATO bombing not only accelerated but determined th

outcome of the war in Bosnia to prove their case.

83. Given the splendid synergy between the air campaign an

HV/HVO/BiH operations, it is not surprising that there has been wide 

spread speculation about whether this was the result of accident or design

The US government has consistently maintained that no strategic coordina

tion existed between Washington and the belligerents, pointing to the fac

that US diplomats in Zagreb tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Croatia

government not to launch its major offensives in 1995. Ambassador Richar

Holbrooke, interviewed by author, 24 May 1996.

If any such collaboration occurred—and for that matter, if the Unite

States were even aware of the extent to which Croatia and the BiH ha

improved their capabilities relative to the RSK army and the BSA—it re 

mains a closely held secret.

84. The day after the air strikes began, Russia switched to blaming th

Bosnian Serbs for provoking NATO.

36
Chapter 2

The Planning Background

Lt Col Bradley S. Davis

In the aftermath of the deadly mortar attack on the crowded

Mrkale marketplace in Sarajevo in August 1995, Adm

Leighton W. Smith , commander in chief of Allied Force

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), called British lieutenant gen 

eral Rupert Smith , commander of the United Nations Protec

tion Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia ,

1

 to tell him

that if the Bosnian Serbs were responsible, he would recom 

mend retaliatory air strikes by the North Atlantic Treaty Or 

ganization (NATO). At 2300 (local time) that same night, Adm

ral Smith and General Smith agreed to “turn the key” (th

prevailing metaphor for strike authority), thus setting in mo

tion NATO’s intense offensive air action—Operation Deliberat

Force, the culmination of events and related planning effort

by the UN and NATO over a long period of time. Although b

the standards of modern warfare, Deliberate Force was a mod

est operation, it nonetheless served as a significant example o

the efficient use of military force in pursuit of internationa

stability in the post-cold-war era.

In this unique operation, NATO military forces fulfilled

United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) an

NATO political mandates by assisting UN political and militar

efforts to bring peace to the region of the former Yugoslavia 

Parallel UN and NATO command and control (C 2) structure

used for the previous two years provided less than optimum

political and military coordination and guidance during Delib 

erate Force. As one might expect, tensions existed between UN

and NATO commanders, and the system occasionally proved

less than timely in applying NATO airpower in response to UN

requests; nonetheless, it seems to have worked. This chapte

describes the UN and NATO political and military structure

and their unusual interrelationships, and discusses the an

ticipated flow of planning they provided for Deliberate Force

37
Following chapters address the planning process as it actually

occurred and the execution of the operation.

United Nations and NATO Political Structures

The UN has been politically and militarily involved in the forme

Yugoslavia since the civil war spread to Bosnia in 1992. One ca

trace the UN’s political and military intervention activities to th

UN Charter and the Security Council resolutions concernin

civil strife in the former Yugoslavia . The UN evoked the Charte

to provide the basis of its actions and to meet its primary re

sponsibility of maintaining international peace and security

Chapter 7, Article 39 of the Charter allows the Security Counci

to survey the world for any threat to the peace, breach of th

peace, or act of aggression; make recommendations for action in

accordance with Articles 39, 41, and 42 of chapter seven; an

then maintain or restore international peace and security. Thes

three articles specifically allow the UN to employ military force

Adm Leighton W. Smith holds a poster of alleged war criminals.

38
volunteered by member nations to intervene within the sover 

eign territory of another member nation to maintain or restor

the peace. 2 Article 48 allows member states to carry out Securit

Council decisions directly and through appropriate internationa

agencies of which they are members.

Based on recommendations and resolutions of the UN Secu 

rity Council, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali directe

the UN’s political efforts and military forces in the war-ravage

former Yugoslavia throughout the Bosnian crisis prior to mid

1995. Yasushi Akashi, the secretary-general’s special repre

sentative for that country, headed the political and military forces

UNPROFOR, there for the period leading up to and includin

Operation Deliberate Force. UNPROFOR, headquartered in Za 

greb, Croatia, included military, civil affairs, civilian police, publi

information, and administrative components. Akashi was directl

responsible to Boutros-Ghali for coordination of political initia 

tives with the warring parties, UN humanitarian relief efforts, an

in-theater civilian control of UN military peacekeeping forces.

UN Security Council resolutions 781, 816, and 836 had 

direct and far-reaching impact upon the ultimate plannin

structure for Deliberate Force. Through UNSCR 781 (1992)

the UN requested member states to assist UNPROFOR i

monitoring the UN ban on any military flights over Bosnia

Herzegovina . NATO military forces began their monitoring ac

tivities in support of this resolution in October 1992.3 On 3

March 1993, UNSCR 816 (1993) extended the ban to cover al

flights not authorized by UNPROFOR and directed membe

states to take all necessary measures to ensure complianc

with the ban.4 The North Atlantic Council (NAC , the day-to

day political arm of NATO)

5

 approved NATO’s plans for th

enforcement of this extended ban on 8 April 1993 and the

notified the UN of NATO’s willingness to undertake the opera 

tion. NATO’s Operation Deny Flight began at noon Greenwic

mean time on Monday, 12 April 1993, with aircraft from th

air forces of France , the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 

and the United States flying what would eventually become 

24-hour, around-the-clock air patrol over the skies of Bosnia

Herzegovina . (For a succinct review of the applicable UNSCR

and NAC decisions that led to Operation Deliberate Force, se

fig. 2.1.)

39
40
Paragraph 10 of UNSCR 836 (1993) had the greatest impac

on the planning for Operation Deliberate Force. It stated tha

“member states, acting nationally or through regional organi

zations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of th

Security Council and subject to close coordination with th

Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures

through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina , to support UNPRO

FOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraph

5 and 9.”6 In response to this resolution, NATO foreign minis

ters agreed on 10 June 1993 that NATO would provide protec

tive airpower in case of attacks against UNPROFOR in Bosnia

Herzegovina . The alliance’s aircraft began this coverage on 2

July 1993.

The Bosnian Serb army’s (BSA) shelling of the same Mrkal

marketplace in Sarajevo in February 1994 precipitated th

enforcement of UNSCR 836. In accordance with that resolu 

tion, the UN secretary-general requested preparations for ai

strikes to deter further attacks. He also informed the Securit

Council that he had requested Willy Claes , secretary-genera

of NATO, to obtain “a decision by the North Atlantic Council t

authorize the Commander in Chief of NATO’s Southern Com 

mand to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Na 

tions, against BSA artillery or mortar positions in and aroun

Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsi

ble for attacks against civilian targets in that city.”7

The NAC accepted Boutros-Ghali’s request and authorized

CINCSOUTH to launch air strikes in close coordination wit

the secretary-general on behalf of UNPROFOR. Boutros-Ghal

then instructed Akashi to finalize detailed procedures for th

initiation, conduct, and termination of requested air strike

with CINCSOUTH. He also delegated to Akashi the specifi

authority to approve a request from the force commander o

UNPROFOR for close air support in defense of UN personne

anywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina . Prior to this delegation, onl

the UN secretary-general approved UNPROFOR’s requests fo

NATO air support—a time-consuming, inefficient process

Even with Akashi’s newly delegated authority, delays still oc 

curred. For example, in March 1994, a request to attack 

40-millimeter gun firing on UN forces in the Bihac area took

41
over six hours for approval. Ironically, two AC-130 gunship

over the area had the offending gun in their sights, but by th

time they received clearance, the gun had moved back unde

camouflage and escaped.8

Earlier, at a meeting of the NAC in Oslo , Norway, in Jun

1992, NATO foreign ministers announced their readiness t

support the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina by making availabl

NATO resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations on

a case-by-case basis; thus they laid the political foundation

for NATO’s role in the former Yugoslavia . In December 1992

the NAC reiterated its readiness to support peacekeeping op 

erations under authority of the UN Security Council, whic

has primary responsibility for international peace and secu 

rity. The foreign ministers reviewed peacekeeping and sanc

tions-enforcement measures already undertaken by NATO

countries, individually and as an alliance, to support the im 

plementation of Security Council resolutions relating to th

conflict. Upon the recommendations of the Defense Plannin

Committee (DPC),

9

 the foreign ministers indicated that NATO

stood ready to respond favorably to further initiatives that th

UN secretary-general might take in seeking alliance assistanc

in this endeavor (fig. 2.2).

Fig. 2.2. NATO Organization

42
The first military engagement undertaken by the allianc

since the inception of the organization10 occurred on 28 Febru 

ary 1994, when NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes vio 

lating the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina 

One finds the next evolutionary step in the cooperative effort

between UN and NATO military forces in the NAC ’s an 

nouncement on 22 April 1994 of far stricter protection of th

safe areas during Deny Flight. The council asserted that if an

BSA heavy-weapons attacks occurred on the UN-designated

safe areas of Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla , and Zepa 

these weapons and other BSA military assets, as well as thei

direct and essential military-support facilities such as fue

installations and munitions sites, would be subject to NATO

air strikes in accordance with the procedural arrangement

worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR.

1 1

Specifically, the NAC declared that, consistent with its deci

sions of 2 and 9 August 1993, any violation of the provision

of those decisions would constitute grounds for the NATO

military command to begin air attacks on targets preapproved

by UN/ NATO without further approval by the council. Thes

targets included any military assets directly related to th

violation and located in the vicinity of the area concerned

Under all circumstances, NATO forces would carry out suc

attacks in close coordination with UNPROFOR. Based upon it

view of the violation, the NATO military command could rec

ommend additional air attacks in coordination with UNPRO

FOR. However, such recommendations required conveyance t

the NATO secretary-general through the NATO chain of com 

mand for NAC approval. These attacks could continue unti

the NATO military command judged the mission accom 

plished. The NAC also reaffirmed its earlier decision of Febru 

ary 1994 that authorized the NATO military command to initi

ate air attacks to suppress BSA air defenses representing 

direct threat to NATO aircraft operating under the agreed

UN/ NATO coordination procedures, and to take all necessar

and appropriate action for their self-defense. The final NAC

direction instructed US Army general George A. Joulwan, Su 

preme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), to delegate t

CINCSOUTH the necessary authority to implement the council’

43
decisions, coordinating with UNPROFOR in accordance wit

the relevant operations plan .

Over the next 17 months, the political and military situation

slowly worsened in Bosnia-Herzegovina . Following the interna 

tional meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina held in London in Jul

1995, the NAC authorized NATO commanders to deter a BS

attack on the safe area of Gorazde and to ensure the timely an

effective use of NATO airpower if this area were threatened o

attacked. 1 2 On 1 August the council announced similar deci

sions regarding the use of NATO airpower aimed at deterrin

attacks on the safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla . The NAC

decisions following the London conference of July 1995 specifie

that NATO meet further Bosnian Serb offensive action with 

firm and rapid response designed to deter attacks on the saf

areas and authorized the timely and effective use of airpower, i

necessary. Through both the UN and the NATO political appara 

tus, the coordination of military actions by both CINCSOUTH

and the force commander of UN Peace Forces (UNPF)1 3 wa

always a strategic and operational necessity.

United Nations and NATO Military Structures

Before discussing the UN and NATO military structures in

the former Yugoslavia , one should note the strategic politica

objectives of Operation Deliberate Force as agreed upon by th

UN and NATO communities in the summer of 1995: (1) reduc

the threat to the Sarajevo safe area and deter further attack

there or on any other safe area, (2) force the withdrawal o

Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the 20-kilometer total-ex 

clusion zone around Sarajevo , (3) ensure complete freedom o

movement for UN forces and personnel as well as nongovern 

mental organizations, and (4) ensure unrestricted use of th

Sarajevo airport.1 4

The UN originally established its military forces—UNPROFOR—

in the former Yugoslavia in February 1992 and redesignated

them UNPF in the spring of 1995, the latter organization com 

manded by a senior military officer from one of the UN’s mem 

ber states. From 1 March 1995 until after Operation Deliberat

Force, Lt Gen Bernard Janvier of France, headquartered in

44
Zagreb with Yasushi Akashi, commanded UNPF, which in 

cluded three subordinate commands: the UN Confidence Res

toration Operation in Croatia , also headquartered in Zagreb

UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina, headquartered in Sarajevo

and UN Preventive Deployment Forces in the former Yugosla

Republic of Macedonia , headquartered in Skopje. The thre

commanders reported to the force commander of UNPF , who

together with the civilian diplomatic and humanitarian relie

components, acted under the overall direction of Special Rep

resentative Akashi.

1 5 As of September 1995, about 35,000 UN

military personnel were deployed in-theater. Combined wit

civilian police and civilian personnel, UNPF totaled nearl

50,000 people. 1 6

The initial mandate for UNPROFOR called for ensuring th

demilitarization of the UN-protected areas by withdrawing o

disbanding all armed forces in them, as well as protecting al

persons residing in them from attack. Outside these areas

UNPROFOR military observers were to verify the withdrawal o

all Yugoslav national army and irregular forces from Croatia 

Finally, UNPROFOR was to facilitate the safe, secure return o

displaced civilians to their homes within the protected areas

In May and June 1993, the Security Council adopted resolu 

tions 824 and 836, respectively, the former expanding UN

PROFOR’s mandate to protect the safe areas of Sarajevo

Tuzla , Zepa , Gorazde, and Bihac. This included deterring at

tacks against them, monitoring cease-fire arrangements, pro 

moting the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units othe

than those of the Bosnian government, and occupying ke

points. Resolution 836 authorized the use of airpower in an

around the declared safe areas to support UNPROFOR.

1 7

In an attempt to convey the delicate interrelationship of th

UNPROFOR and NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina , Akash

sent a letter in December 1994 to Dr. Radovan Karadzic , leade

of the Bosnian Serbs , explaining the role assigned by the UN

Security Council to NATO in support of UNPROFOR’s mandate

He described the four missions of NATO in the airspace ove

Bosnia and how/why NATO would be employed, placing specia

emphasis on the restraint of using NATO airpower and the im 

partiality of UNPROFOR and NATO:

45
Except for self-defense, NATO aircraft will not conduct air-to-ground

operations without advance authorization from the Special Repre -

sentative of the Secretary-General. If the armed forces in conflict re -

spect the terms of the Security Council resolutions and the NAC decisions, do not attack UNPROFOR, and do not threaten NATO aircraft,

they will have nothing to fear from NATO. In conclusion, I wish to

reiterate that NATO operates over Bosnia only in support of the United

Nations mission. Its aircraft provide essential support to UNPROFOR

in the impartial and effective discharge of its Security Council man -

dates, and are neither the enemy nor the ally of any combatant.1 8

The issuance of UNSCR 836 made it necessary to allow then

UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to request both NATO

airpower within their area of responsibility and the means t

coordinate it. This led the UN to create the air operations contro

center (AOCC) at Kiseljak in July 1993. The center requeste

and coordinated NATO air assets on behalf of the UNPROFOR

ground commander. As a UN organization, the AOCC had n

controlling authority over NATO air assets. In addition to AOCC

staff, UNPROFOR member nations pr ovided tactical air contro

parties (TACP) for terminal guidance of aircraft.

British, Canadian, Dutch, French, and Spanish forces pro 

vided more than 20 TACPs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Often lo 

cated in the areas of greatest tension, solitary, and withou

support, they were tasked by the AOCC but remained unde

the command of their country’s parent battalion. If deployed

by the local battalion to an area of fighting, the TACP, in clos

consultation with the ground-incident commander, would

make a request for air support to the AOCC, which initiated

action to request that aircraft be scrambled by NATO; it als

started the air-request assessment for the UN secretary-gen 

eral. The request proceeded through the UN’s C2 chain to th

Security Council or, subsequently, the special representativ

for approval or refusal. If the request was approved, the AOCC

simultaneously coordinated aircraft through NATO ’s airborn

battlefield command and control center aircraft and the com 

bined air operations center (CAOC) of NATO’s 5th Allied Tacti

cal Air Force (5 ATAF) at Vicenza , Italy. The AOCC then issued

necessary clearances to the battalion and TACP for attack. A

times, UN forces would request air support despite knowing tha

clearance would not be forthcoming, simply because they real

ized NATO aircraft would be overhead quickly. This esta blished

46
a presence that often suppressed

the BSA’s offensive activities without the need for actually using direct attacks from the air.1 9

The separation of the UN/ NATO

C

2

 structures required close liaison between the operational arms

of both elements, best achieved

not only by having NATO and UN

liaison officers assigned to each

organization’s command posts but

also by establishing a close rela -

tionship between the AOCC staff

and the staff at 5 ATAF ’s CAOC.

This enabled the direct and fo -

cused passage of tactical information without the attenuation

or amplification associated with additional layers of unneede

bureaucracy. Such close cooperation was vital for the success

ful attainment of political and military objectives.

The Military Committee (MC), the supreme military author 

ity in NATO, falls under the political authority of the NAC an

the Defense Planning Committee. It provides for maximum

consultation and cooperation between member nations o

military matters and serves as the primary source of militar

advice on alliance matters to the secretary-general, NAC , an

DPC. Its members include the chiefs of staff of member na

tions—except France, which maintains contact through it

military mission at NATO, and Iceland, which has civilia n 

observer status only. The MC also gives military guidance t

the major NATO commanders, the NAC , and DPC as required

and acts as the critical pivot between the political and militar

bodies of NATO.

The MC provided instructions to SACEUR, by direction of th

NAC and DPC, to delegate authority and operational control fo

the development, coordination, and implementation of Operation

Deliberate Force to Adm Leighton Smith, CINCSOUTH

headquartered in Naples , Italy. Admiral Smith , in turn, dele 

gated control of air operations to the Air Force’s Michael E

Ryan , then a lieutenant general and commander of Allied Ai

Gen Michael E. Ryan

47
Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also headquarter ed i

Naples.

2 0 Italian air force lieutenant general Andrea Fornasie ro

commander of 5 ATAF at Dal Molin Air Base, Vicenza , Italy, ha

responsibility for the day-to-day mission tasking and operationa

control of all NATO air assets over the former Yugoslavia .

The original mission of 5 ATAF was the coordination an

control of peacetime and combat air defense of NATO’s Southern

Region for COMAIRSOUTH. Since it was not able to adequatel

com mand and control the added responsibility for Operation

Deny Flight, this fell to the CAOC, specifically established fo

such a mission. Technically a multinational organization as

signed to 5 ATAF under the command of General Fornasiero, in

reality the CAOC worked directly for COMAIRSOUTH.

An exchange of representatives between 5 ATAF and UNP

headquarters in Zagreb and UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovin

headquarters in Sarajevo provided coordination between NATO

and the UN. These liaison officers ensured a continuous ex 

chan ge of information between NATO and UNPF (fig. 2.3). Th

headquarters of General Janvier and Lt Gen Rupert Smith , a

well as the UN AOCC, housed the NATO liaison officers, whil

CINCSOUTH ’s headquarters and the CAOC included the UNP

liaison officers. These officers proved essential to the detaile

coordination of airpower requests, approval, mission planning

force application, and bomb damage assessment. Although Adm

ral Smith and Mr. Akashi (and, later, General Janvier ) approve

the use of airpower, the liaison officers, in close cooperation with

the in-place UN and NATO air staffs, got the aircraft to thei

targets. The separate UN and NATO military organizations di

not represent the first tenet of warfare—unity of command—bu

their coordination from the top down, including the liaison offi 

cers, did eventually facilitate a rudimentary unity of effort.

The CAOC was the focal point of all NATO air activity in th

former Yugoslavia . Located at Vicenza since the spring o

1993, when NATO air forces embarked upon Operation Den

Flight, the CAOC was to be a six-month temporary operation

and was not originated for Operation Deliberate Force. 2 1 Directe

by the US Air Force’s Hal M. Hornburg, then a major general

the CAOC included personnel drawn from all the countries par

ticipating in Deny Flight, but most of them were Americans. Th

CAOC followed a conventional air-staff structure, with a NATO

48
flavor for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans

and communications branches. Also based at Vicenza were sen 

ior national representatives from the United Kingdom , France 

Germany, the Netherlands, Spain , and Turkey—countries tha

had assigned aircraft to Deny Flight. The UN, US Navy, an

NATO’s airborne early warning force also maintained liaison

cells at the CAOC. The center maintained close links with th

Italian Ministry of Defense.

Fig. 2.3. UN/NATO Command Relationships

49
The CAOC ensured safe decon 

fliction of airspace usage over th

theater of operations. The dail

production of air tasking mes 

sages (ATM), which translated th

intention of NATO commander

into orders, achieved these objec

tives. ATMs , which included

routes, call signs, weapons loads

and other information, provide

aircrews with the taskings and co 

ordinating instructions the

needed to carry out their dail

missions. Although members o

the NAC had to unanimously ap

prove all rules of engagement, th

CAOC served as the sole com 

mand element for issuing these rules to aircraft flying in th

area of operation. A satellite-communications network, cen 

tered on Vicenza , allowed the CAOC operations staff to main 

tain strict control over all aircraft in the area of operation .

The ATM was a time-phased management of air resources

and its production cycle accounted for all the factors neces

sary to conduct a high-intensity air campaign. Although th

ATM provided information on mission type, times, and con 

figuration to assigned units, the units themselves accom 

plished specific mission planning. The process (just prior t

Operation Deliberate Force) began with the NAC’s decision

which were transmitted through SACEUR, along with Admira

Smith’s and General Ryan ’s guidance, to the CAOC (fig. 2.4). A

spreadsheet dubbed the “Gucci,” which projected events six

weeks into the future, considered all the various taskings

Each senior national representative received the Gucci ever

Monday, and unit representatives received it at their dail

meeting. The latter representatives then scoured the Gucci t

ensure that their unit’s aircraft could meet the tasking re

quirements. This process fostered long-term planning, and b

the time the plan came to the week-in-progress, those require

ments were well defined. The ATM then rolled into a 72-hou

cycle before the current operations day.

Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg

50
Each day, unit representatives received 72-hour, 48-hour

and 24-hour flows showing what their aircraft needed to d

over the upcoming days. These flows—graphic illustrations o

what the Gucci indicated—described aircraft, type, and coun

try and might differ from the Gucci since aircraft broke, pilot

got sick, or units were simply unable to perform a mission

The last stage in the process involved presenting the finalized

ATM for the next 24 hours to the CAOC ’s director. If h

authorized the ATM , the full 12- to 16-page document wa

published by early afternoon, and the taskings took effect a

0300 the following morning.

When a crisis developed, planners quickly broke into thei

ATM cycle and provided the required forces. If UNPF called a

0900 saying it was going to request NATO air strikes agains

some location not currently in the 24-hour flow, the CAOC

incorporated that request into the ATM cycle. If the request fo

airpower support occurred after publication of the ATM , th

CAOC’s current-operations cell manipulated the schedule t

meet the request, or, if that did not prove feasible, the cel

published a change message. At times, COMAIRSOUTH or th

CAOC director rejected the ATM, and the CAOC team started

over again. The entire ATM cycle was normally 18 hours from

start to finish but was known to take less time. 2 2

Development of the ATM was not just a problem of air-traffi

scheduling. Planners matched aircraft weapons loads to likel

threats and targets; they also considered the ground situation

Fig. 2.4. Air Strategy to Execution

51
General Hornburg, all the cell chiefs, and the senior nationa

representatives received two intelligence briefs a day. Based on

this information, General Hornburg could heighten the readi

ness posture of NATO air forces in the planning cycle, puttin

extra aircraft on ground-alert lines or more aircraft in the air

CAOC planners also provided contingency plans to respond t

new missions or requirements, such as air supp ly to besiege

enclaves or air cover for any UN withdrawal. During the summe

of 1995, the CAOC developed a concept of operations to provid

air support for the new UN Rapid Reaction Force.

From the CAOC, the ATM and orders to execute air operation

went to the various tactical units of the combined NATO ai

forces spread across the European continent (table 2.1 and fig

2.5). Aviano Air Base, Italy, home of the American 31st Fighte

Wing and other deployed NATO and US units, exemplified th

manner in which the ATM was transmitted. Th e CAOC sent th

ATM by multiple, secure-communication systems to the Den

Flight/Deliberate Force operations center at Aviano. The cente

then passed it along to the wing mission-planning cell fo

weaponeering and issuance of “frag” orders. The various flyin

units stationed at Aviano used the ATM ’s guidance to plan th

mission from takeoff to recovery back at Aviano and then finall

carried through with the actual mission s .

As a result of the increasing number of units tasked to fly

missions over Bosnia-Herzegovina, C2 of these forces becam

increasingly difficult. On 1 July 1995, Headquarters United

States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), established the 7490t

Wing (Provisional)2 3 at Aviano to exercise operational and ad 

ministrative control of the Deny Flight forces assigned to tha

base. These forces, consisting of both home-station and de

ployed personnel, represented not only the active duty US Ai

Force but also elements of the Air Force Reserve , US Navy

Marine Corps, and two NATO member nations—Spain and th

United Kingdom .

2 4 The commander and operations group com 

mander of the 31st Fighter Wing assumed the same position

in the new wing. One of the most important aspects of thi

organizational readjustment was that the increased personne

it brought to Aviano allowed around-the-clock manning of th

provisional wing’s operations center. This permitted Avian

forces to be more responsive to late-breaking or changin

52
Table 2.1

NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force

Nation Number Aircraft Type Location

France 8 Mirage F-1 Istrana

 8 Jaguar Istrana

18 Mirage 2000 Cervia

 6 Super Etendard Foch*

 1 E-3 Avord

 1 C-135 Istres

 8 Puma Brindisi

Germany 14 Tornado Piacenza

Italy 8 Tornado Ghedi

 6 AMX Istrana

 1 KC-135 Pisa

 1 C-130 Pisa

 4 G-222 Pisa

NATO 4 E-3A Geilenkirchen

 4 E-3A Trapani

 4 E-3A Preveza

Netherlands 18 F-16 Villafranca

Spain 1 CASA C-212 Dal Molin

 8 EF-18 Aviano

 2 KC-130 Aviano

Turkey 16 F-16 Ghedi

United Kingdom 6 Tornado Gioia del Colle

17 Harrier Gioia del Colle

 6 Sea Harrier HMS Invincible*

 2 K-1 Tristar L-1011 Palermo

 2 E-3D Aviano

United States 20 F-16 Aviano

12 O/A-10 Aviano

 7 EC-130 Aviano

 4 AC-130 Aviano

 6 EF-111A Aviano

12 KC-135 Pisa

12 KC-135 Istres

10 EA-6B Aviano

24 FA-18 USS America*

 5 KC-10 Genoa

 8 E-3A Geilenkirchen,

Trapani, Preveza

 *When the aircraft carrier is in the Adriatic Sea

53
ATMs during sustained operations. Along with the Deny Fligh

operations center, created in conjunction with the 7490th an

fully operational only days before Deliberate Force, the mili

tary planning structure was now in place from the highes

political echelons of both the UN and NATO down to each o

the tactical military units.

The Planning Process: The Shakedown

Up to the early part of 1995, NATO had accomplished smal

“tit-for-tat” air operations. Anticipating a greatly expanded rol

for NATO airpower, given the deteriorating situation in Bosnia

Herzegovina, General Ryan decided to collocate his Sixteenth Ai

Force staff with that of the CAOC. Most of his strategic plan 

ning staff assigned to Headquarters AIRSOUTH stayed in Naple

under the direction of Col Daniel Zoerb , while the operationa

Fig. 2.5. Deliberate Force Operational Locations

54
and tactical experts of Sixteenth Air Force moved with Genera

Ryan to the CAOC. There, the general realized that Operation

Plan 40101, which governed AIRSOUTH air operations ove

Bosnia , had not been updated to cover a full-scale operation

over Bosnia-Herzegovina .

2 5 Thus, in April 1995 he initiated 

planning process—without direct UN/NATO political guid 

ance—to develop a plan of action outlining some strategic an

operational assumptions, a framework, and a concept of op

erations. During the early phases of its development, he kep

this new plan on close hold but did brief the chairman of Join

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on his conceptual plan. The JCS ’s intelli

gence directorate and the Air Staff’s Checkmate divisio

(AF/ XOOC) evaluated the plan.2 6

In late May 1995, COMAIRSOUTH’s strategy cell, headed b

Colonel Zoerb at Headquarters AIRSOUTH in Naples , nom

nated target lists covering broad categories of targets for tw

zones of action in Bosnia-Herzegovina (one northwest and on

southeast) to General Ryan. At the same time, General Rya

requested assistance for air campaign planning from the dep

uty chief of staff for plans and operations at Headquarter

USAF, who in turn tasked Checkmate to provide any re

quested help. A Checkmate planner sent to Vicenza in earl

June provided invaluable insights for the initial feasibility as

sessment and campaign phasing. General Ryan, Genera

Hornburg, and the tactical-unit representatives completed th

feasibility assessment in late May/early June and identified

the nominal forces to be tasked in the yet-unnamed opera 

tional plan. General Ryan forwarded this plan to Admira

Smith for his recommendations and coordination.2 7

While Admiral Smith reviewed the plan, the CAOC under 

went a renaissance. Col John R. Baker from Headquarter

USAF, Director of Operations, led a US joint-service assess

ment team to the CAOC on 24–31 July 1995. Specifically

COMAIRSOUTH wanted the Baker team to identify improve 

ments and capabilities needed for the CAOC to perform cur

rent Deny Flight/5 ATAF missions and to develop a fused

intelligence -operations organization able to plan and execute 

robust, sustained air campaign of two simultaneous air opera 

tions in support of the safe areas. Colonel Baker investigated

manning, stability, and equipment to determine what asset

55
the CAOC needed to improve the short-term and long-term

planning process.2 8 The team strongly recommended that ad 

ditional manpower and equipment immediately be sent to th

CAOC, and the JCS and NATO took these recommendation

seriously. Consequently, beginning in mid-August, additiona

hardware/software capabilities such as the Air Campaign

Planning Tool (now known as the JFACC [Joint Force Ai

Component Commander ] Planning Tool), the Joint Situationa

Awareness System , and the Contingency Theater Air Plannin

System , along with increased manpower (planners from

USAFE’s 32d Air Operations Group) arrived daily to augmen

the operation. On the negative side, Colonel Baker’s repor

stepped on the toes of a few of our NATO partners. That is

most of the NATO contingent thought that the report an

subsequent large-scale infusion of US military personnel an

equipment further isolated them from the operation. This rein 

forced their underlying feeling that this operation was going t

be an American show.2 9

On 10 August 1995, Admiral Smith and General Janvie

signed a memorandum of understanding that contained th

joint UN/ NATO arrangements for implementing the action

specified in the NAC and UN Security Council decisions. Thes

arrangements aimed to deter attacks or threats of attack

against the safe areas and, should deterrence fail, to prepar

to conduct operations to eliminate the threat or defeat an

force engaged in an attack on a safe area . The memorandum

described the authority each man possessed (euphemisticall

called “dual-key” authority) to launch broad retaliatory coun

terattacks in Bosnia . In an earlier letter to NATO secretary

general Claes, UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali agreed tha

this was a prudent decision: “I have decided to delegate th

necessary authority in this respect to the UN military com 

manders in the field. I have accordingly delegated authority in

respect of air strikes, which I had hitherto retained, to Genera

Janvier, the Commander of United Nations Peace Forces, wit

immediate effect. As regards close air support , my Specia

Representative, Mr. Akashi, has today delegated the necessar

authority to General Janvier, who is authorized to delegate i

further to the UNPROFOR Force Commander when opera 

tional circumstances so require.”3 0 Both men (Admiral Smit

56
and General Janvier or Lt Gen Rupert Smith ) had to agree t

turn their “keys ” to approve air strikes before the first bom

could fall.3 1

Consistent with the memorandum of understanding, Adm

ral Smith took General Ryan ’s plan to the NATO/ UNPF Join

Targeting Board on 14 August 1995 for coordination and ini

tiation of the process for United Nations approval.3 2 He ob 

tained agreement, in principle, from the force commander o

UNPF for both the operation and associated targets. The pla

moved through UN political and military structures at th

same time it moved through the NATO approval process. Ad 

miral Smith presented the plan to Secretary-General Clae

and General Joulwan, who in turn took it to the NATO Militar

Committee. Both the UN and NATO political structures ap 

proved the plan, accepting a broad set of three target catego 

ries or options. They delegated final approval for target-lis

selections to General Ryan, overseen by the Military Commit 

tee , General Joulwan, and Admiral Smith .

With this tentative approval, General Ryan again tasked hi

strategy cell to perform target selection and prioritization

keeping in mind and harmonizing the political objectives out

lined by UNSCRs and NAC decisions—a strategy-to-task pro

cess. General Hornburg ensured that the CAOC planners als

closely followed this construct and monitored the process s

that each mission matched and was linked directly to th

strategy and objectives. 3 3 General Ryan wanted targets tha

would influence the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs—their cen 

ters of gravity.

3 4

These various requirements led General Ryan to develop 

unique blend of strategy and operational concepts for the forth 

coming campaign. In this situation he considered himself the ai

campaign planner.

3 5 As far as he was concerned, he could no

and would not delegate target-selection responsibility to anyon

else because of the political implications: “If we had committe

one atrocity from the air, NATO would forever be blamed fo

crimes, and the military threat would be lessened. Henceforth

the air commander will be—must be—a pplying the overarchin

air strategy at the tactical level. You cannot delegate the selec 

tion. The commander must ask all of the detailed questions

There will be no time in the future when he will have the option

57
to say, 

I delegated that responsibility. The commander mus

be accountable for all actions taken by his forces.”3 6 Genera

Ryan ’s personal perspective for the campaign on how best t

meet the objectives set forth by the political leadership was t

take away what the Bosnians Serbs held dear and drive them t

parity with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. He also believed i

vital that the Bosnian Serbs understand and know what wa

happening to their forces and how the balance of power wa

ebbing away from them. If they wanted this surgical reduction

from the air halted, they had to comply with the objective

outlined to them by the UN.

General Ryan further instructed his AIRSOUTH strategy cel

and the CAOC operational planners to limit collateral damag

as much as possible (no civilian casualties or undue militar

casualties) and to ensure the protection of NATO forces to th

highest degree. He strongly believed, as did Admiral Smit

and General Janvier , that any NATO air operation of this siz

must ensure that attacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina struck only

military targets and inflicted only the absolute minimum o

military casualties. The UN and NATO were not trying to de

stroy the BSA but strongly move it toward the UN/ NATO ob 

jectives. Civilian casualties would have precluded this en

state. The use of NATO military power in support of the UN

mandates was a critical issue in all of the participating NATO

countries. General Ryan correctly understood the politica

ramifications in those countries if NATO casualties sustained

during the operation became excessive. Thus, his second re

striction—ensuring force protection—permeated the entir

planning process.

The strategy cell briefed General Ryan on suggested targe

categories: integrated air defense systems; command, control

and communications; lines of communication ; and ammuni

tion storage sites. After General Ryan approved this targetin

plan, General Hornburg—together with the unit and senio

NATO representatives—began the target-sequencing an

force-packaging process. On 22 August 1995, at the end of 

grueling four-to-five-month planning process, the tactica

units received the first ATM of what would eventually becom

Operation Deliberate Force. No one could have guessed that i

58
would be implemented almost without major change only on

week later.

On the morning of 30 August 1995, NATO secretary-genera

Willy Claes stated that

NATO aircraft commenced attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in

Bosnia . The air operations were initiated after the UN military com -

manders concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that Monday’s brutal

mortar attack in Sarajevo came from Bosnian Serb positions. The

operations were jointly decided by the Commander in Chief, Allied

Forces Southern Europe and the Force Commander, UN Peace Forces

under UN Security Council Resolution 836 and in accordance with the

North Atlantic Council’s decisions of 25 July and 1 August, which

were endorsed by the UN Secretary-General. Our objective is to reduce

the threat to the Sarajevo safe area and to deter further attacks there

or on any other safe area . We hope that this operation will also dem -

onstrate to the Bosnian Serbs the futility of further military actions

and convince all parties of the determination of the Alliance to imple -

ment its decisions. NATO remains strongly committed to the contin -

ued efforts of the international community to bring peace to the former

Yugoslavia through the diplomatic process. It is my fervent hope that

our decisive response to Monday’s mortar attack will contribute to

attaining a peaceful settlement. 3 7

Conclusions

The unusual, parallel NATO and UN C2 structures were fer

tile ground for problems, especially in the planning and coor

dination functions. Differing NATO and UN C2 systems wit

Band-Aid connections would not have lasted forever; neithe

were they necessarily time sensitive to the needs of all con 

cerned—especially the on-scene tactical forces. However, 

great deal of determination by the men and women of bot

organizations and the ceaseless efforts of key people in senio

positions of authority as well as those in the UN and NATO

tactical units made the process work. Nonetheless, despite th

obvious success of Deliberate Force, the operational effective 

ness of the planning process was lower than it could have been .

Some people have called into question the concept of th

dual-key command-authorization system uneasily developed

between the UN and NATO. Undoubtedly, this process violated

the principle of unity of command, especially in cases of tacti

cal-level close air support operations that demand a suitabl

59
structure to relay near-real-time information and comman

decisions. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke flatly stated tha

“the dual key system was an unmitigated disaster. It did grea

damage to both the UN and NATO.”3 8 Because of the differ

ences between the two organizations and their mandates, h

believed that NATO and the UN never should have been re

lated in this fashion. Ultimately, though, a modified version o

this process could have—perhaps should have—been devised.

The authorized air strikes of Deliberate Force to relieve th

strangulation of Sarajevo and other threatened safe areas con 

stituted a series of decisive military actions by NATO in sup 

port of the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia . Together wit

a determined diplomatic effort , the surgical application o

NATO’s airpower stopped the Bosnian Serb army’s siege o

Sarajevo and strongly encouraged the negotiated solution t

the conflict in the fall of 1995.

The UN and NATO had developed a cooperation, at time

tenuous, that when forcibly applied during Deliberate Force

highlighted the ability of separate political and military organiza 

tions to work together. In hindsight, critics can declare that th

arrangements could have been much better, and to some exten

that viewpoint has validity. However, the bottom line is tha

cooperation in military planning between the UN and NATO

worked and successfully fulfilled political and military objectives

This experience shows that NATO can adapt its militar

forces and policies to the European requirements of the post

cold-war world and continue to provide collective security an

defense for all allies. It offers tangible proof that, in addition t

carrying out the core functions of defending the alliance

NATO can use its military forces outside their normal area o

responsibility (e.g., in operations under the authority of th

UN Security Council and with political objectives that defin

the required military tasks). NATO ’s military capabilities an

its adaptability to include forces of non-NATO countries ar

decisive factors in the alliance’s role in implementing the Day

ton Peace Agreement. Deliberate Force marked the successfu

end to a less-than-successful peacekeeping operation and al

lowed UNPROFOR to withdraw in favor of a force unified in

both mission and command.

60
Notes

1. Admiral Smith first attempted to contact Lt Gen Bernard Janvie

force commander of United Nations Peace Forces and General Smith’s com 

manding officer. General Janvier was on leave in France at the time.

2. Charter of the United Nations; on-line, Internet, 18 December 1998, avai

able from http://www.tamilnation.org/humanrights/uncharter/contents.html.

3. UN Security Council Resolution 781, 9 October 1992, adopted by th

Security Council at its 3122d meeting on 9 October 1992.

4. UN Security Council Resolution 816, 3 March 1993, adopted by th

Security Council at its 3191st meeting on 3 March 1993.

5. The NAC, consisting of permanent representatives of the 16 membe

countries and chaired by the NATO secretary-general (the council’s princ

pal spokesperson), meets twice a year at the ministerial level and weekly a

the ambassador level. It has effective political authority and powers o

decision over the daily operations of NATO and is the only body withi

NATO to derive its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. Th

council provides a unique forum for wide-ranging consultation betwee

member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the mo

important decision-making body in the alliance. All other committees i

NATO derive their authority from NAC. Decisions reflect the collective will o

member governments arrived at by common consent and must be unan

mous.

6. UN Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, adopted by th

Security Council at its 3228th meeting on 4 June 1993.

7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, to the president of th

UN Security Council, letter, subject: Air Strikes against the BSA, 6 Februar

1994, United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwe

AFB, Ala.

8. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., AIRSOUTH Plans, Headquarters AIR 

SOUTH, Naples, Italy, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, 6 December 199

AFHRA.

9. Composed of representatives from all NATO member states excep

France, the DPC focuses on collective defense planning and provides guid 

ance to NATO’s military authorities. Within the area of its responsibilitie

and competence, it has the same functions, attributes, and authority as th

NAC. Although France withdrew from the NATO integrated military struc

ture in 1966, it still interacts with the DPC and other NATO military organ

zations through its military mission to the alliance.

10. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no. 4, March 1997; on-line, Internet, 1

December 1998, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs4.htm.

11. Headquarters NATO, press release, “Decision on the Protection of th

Safe Areas Taken at the Meeting of the NAC on 22 April 1994.”

12. General Ryan, commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europ

believed that the UN Security Council would be unwilling to approve offen 

sive military operations because of the expected opposition of Russia. H

further believed that the London Conference of NATO Defense Minister

61
(basically from the same countries on the Security Council, minus Russi

in July 1995 was a political expedient to allow military operations under th

guise of NATO. Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by authors of the Air Univer

sity Balkans Air Campaign Study at Air Command and Staff College, Max

well AFB, Ala., 7 February 1996, AFHRA.

13. The UN military command structure was reorganized in the spring o

1995. The previous command structure remained in place but now had new

names and a modified mandate. UN Protection Force, the overall comman

organization in the former Yugoslavia, was redesignated UN Peace Force

Subordinate command maintained the designation of UNPROFOR in Bos 

nia-Herzegovina.

14. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no. 4.

15. The following countries currently provide military and/or civilia

police personnel for UNPROFOR: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazi

Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Franc

Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherland

New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federa

tion, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, Unite

Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. During its existence, UNPRO

FOR/UNPF has incurred sixteen hundred casualties, including 198 fatal

ties.

16. UN Peace Forces Fact Sheet, UN Peace Forces Division of Inform

tion, September 1995.

17. UN Security Council Resolution 824, 6 May 1993, adopted by th

Security Council at its 3208th meeting on 6 May 1993; and UN Securit

Council Resolution 836.

18. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN secretary-gener

for the former Yugoslavia, to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, letter, subject: NATO

Airpower in Bosnia, 10 December 1994, AFHRA.

19. Boyd interview.

20. General Ryan has dual responsibility as commander of Sixteenth Ai

Force, headquartered at Aviano Air Base, Italy (Sixteenth Air Force is 

subordinate command to United States Air Forces Europe [USAFE]

headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany), and as COMAIRSOUTH. A

such, he simultaneously wears the hats of a NATO and US Air Force com 

mander.

21. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, interviewed by Dr. Wayne Thompson an

Maj Tim Reagan, 16 October 1995, AFHRA.

22. Col Steve Teske, director for plans, CAOC, Headquarters USAFE

interviewed by author, 14 February 1996, AFHRA.

23. Headquarters USAFE Special Order GD-19, Activation of the 7490t

Wing (Provisional) at Aviano Air Base, Italy, 30 June 1995, AFHRA.

24. Briefing, 7490th Wing (Provisional), subject: Deny Flight Sup

port—“Aircraft Status Snapshot Slide,” 24 August 1995, AFHRA.

25. Briefing, Major General Hornburg to Joint Doctrine Air Campaig

Course, class 96D, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Deliberate Force, 14 Marc

62
1996, AFHRA. Planning had actually begun in February 1995 for Deadey

the suppression of enemy air defenses portion of what was to becom

Operation Deliberate Force.

26. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by Dr. Wayne Thompson and M

Tim Reagan, 18 October 1995, AFHRA.

27. Ibid.

28. Briefing slides (unclassified), Col John R. Baker to General Rya

subject: CAOC Assessment, 30 July 1995, AFHRA.

29. Ibid.

30. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, to Willy Claes, NATO

secretary-general, letter, subject: Delegation of Authority, 25 July 199

AFHRA.

31. Under intense pressure from NATO and US officials, who believe

that military commanders should determine when Serb transgressions war

ranted reprisals, UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali took the ke

from Mr. Akashi and gave it to General Janvier on 25 July 1995. But NATO

hoped to push it even further down the UN chain of command to Gener

Smith, known to be more inclined to martial action than the cautiou

Janvier. The secretary-general declined and, supported by France, kept th

key with Janvier. Ironically, General Janvier was on vacation when Admir

Smith called on 28 August, and General Smith actually had the key. Afte

consultation with Janvier, General Smith and Admiral Smith made th

initial decision to launch the attacks. General Janvier returned before th

attacks commenced, reclaimed the key from General Smith, and reaffirme

the decision to attack the Bosnian Serbs.

32. The NATO/UNPF Joint Targeting Board was a high-level coordina

ing body established by the UN and NATO to jointly validate targets and lin

them to mandated UN/NATO mission objectives. The board included CINC 

SOUTH and the force commander of UNPF.

33. Hornburg briefing.

34. Ryan interview, 18 October 1995.

35. Ryan interview, 7 February 1996. General Ryan was convinced tha

the Serbs knew when NATO was flying and even who was flying—right dow

to knowing that Capt Scott O’Grady was the pilot of Basher 52, the F-1

shot down in the summer of 1995.

36. Ibid.

37. Press statement (95)73 by NATO secretary-general Willy Claes, 3

August 1995.

38. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, New York City, interviewed by M

Mark McLaughlin and Dr. Karl Mueller, 24 May 1996, AFHRA.

63
Chapter 3

US and NATO Doctrine

for Campaign Planning

Col Maris McCrabb

Operation Deny Flight/Deliberate Force provided a uniqu

challenge for campaign planners, especially those reared in

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) environmen

Since the founding of the alliance, it had focused on large

scale, conventional war. But Deny Flight possessed charac

teristics best described as operations other than war (OOTW)

such as the pivotal role of the United Nations (UN) and th

lack of clear-cut, militarily achievable objectives. Furthermore

this action in the former Yugoslavia constituted an out-of-are

operation for NATO, something prohibited under the Washing

ton Treaty of 1949. Because of these differences, NATO ai

doctrine offered planners limited guidance on planning an

executing an air operation in Bosnia .

Likewise, although US joint doctrine offers considerably

more guidance on OOTW, that guidance generally focuses on

US-only operations, and it relegates multilateral and coalition

considerations to separate sections in the applicable publica 

tions. 1 Thus, NATO possesses air-planning doctrine that fo 

cuses on coalition considerations but remains largely silent on

OOTW, while US joint doctrine features greater emphasis on

the unique aspects of OOTW but does not fully consider coali

tion considerations. An additional issue that bedevils bot

sets of doctrine is the role of airpower in either OOTW o

conventional war.

Since the first use of airpower 2 in a military campaign, com 

manders have struggled with the question of how best to em 

ploy this capability. Was airpower just another means of fir

support planned into land operations, much like artillery, t

strike at an enemy army’s most important “operational cen 

ters,” those targets most affecting its ability to resist the ad 

vance of friendly surface forces? Or was airpower somehow

65
unique in that it could operate well beyond the range of sur

face battles and strike an enemy nation’s “vital” or “strategi

centers,” those that most affected its ability and will to con 

tinue fighting? Although the latter provided a strategic option

previously denied to operational commanders, it also intro 

duced a unique tension in airpower strategy: the choice o

striking either of two distinct target sets, each with distinctl

different relationships to surface-combat operations and wit

different physical and temporal effects on the will and abilit

of an enemy nation to continue resisting the political will of it

opponent. Choosing the best or most remunerative targets fo

air attack became a critical decision for air planners, on

requiring new categories of military intelligence to locate them

and assess their absolute and relative importance to an en 

emy’s will and ability to continue fighting.

Given all these relationships and tensions associated wit

airpower campaign planning,

3

 the essence of air strategy i

captured in an aphorism: “airpower is targeting, targeting i

intelligence , and intelligence is analyzing the effects of ai

operations on chosen strategic and operational centers.”4 Thi

formula, however, omits two important questions: (1) Wha

constitutes a vital center ? (2) Since scarce resources preven

one from attacking all centers at once, what are the priori

ties? 5 A related question deals with who makes the choices

but airpower theorists almost dogmatically insist that airme

not only choose the relevant targets, using the overall com 

mander’s intent as their guide, but also command all airpowe

resources available to the operation. 6

This essay examines US joint and NATO doctrine for plan

ning and conducting air operations with an emphasis o

OOTW considerations, as well as strategy development from

the national or alliance level down to the operational leve

Further, it explores, in some detail, the process of air-operatio n 

planning and addresses guidance offered when this proces

involves other players, such as the UN. It does all this with th

aim of determining whether an adequate body of written doc 

trine was available to the planners of Deliberate Force to guid

their efforts to set objectives, develop strategies, and assign

tasks appropriate to the objectives of higher political and mili

tary leaders.

66
US Doctrine

US doctrine outlines a very specific process for makin

strategy that ties national political strategy down to every tar

get struck in a campaign. National security strategy7 lays ou

broad political guidance, while national military strategy8 pro 

vides general guidance for the military instrument of power

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan provides classified guid 

ance to the commanders in chief of joint unified commands fo

developing plans to meet potential threats.9 For both contin 

gencies and crises, the commanders in chief develop theate

campaign plans largely composed of operations plans (OPLAN

from the various components—land, sea, air, and special op

erations. The joint air operations plan (JAOP) provides th

foundation to build the daily air tasking order (ATO). As thi

flow implies, the entire process ideally progresses from the top

down through levels of increasing but logically connected lev

els of refinement and specificity. The ATO, therefore, is not 

stand-alone document. Rather, it is a small slice (normall

delimited by time—usually 24 hours) of a chain of guidanc

and planning documents that extends from the level of na

tional strategy right down to the level of tactical operations

Therefore, an “ATO-only” focus is too narrow a view for an

useful explication of the body of theories and doctrines avail

able to guide the planners of Deliberate Force. Likewise, 

focus only on an air “campaign” is too narrow a view fo

analyzing a theater campaign .

Together, these documents provide important guidance t

campaign planners. First, although the US armed forces mus

prepare for a wide variety of contingencies, the most importan

are the two postulated major regional contingencies . Second

the United States will use force decisively and with clear objec 

tives. Third, the United States might fight unilaterally, but fo

the most part it will fight as part of a coalition. Fourth, th

United States must retain the capability to project power over 

seas. Finally, US forces must train and prepare to fight in bot

combined and joint environments, with clear vision regardin

the use of land, maritime, air, space, and special forces.

1 0

This formal US strategy process also produces so-called

strategic-concept documents at the national and theater level

67
and concept of operations (CONOPS) documents at the compo

nent level. 11 Working in concert with other components, theater 

level air component commanders develop CONOPS as basi

expressions of their air strategies—the foundations of thei

JAOPs. The latter, in turn, provide daily guidance—refined a

conditions warrant—for master air attack plans that guid

development of the ATO in the final step of strategic an

operational planning.

The primary duties and responsibilities of joint force com 

manders (JFC) entail exercising command and control ove

assigned forces in the accomplishment of missions assigned t

them by higher command authorities. Fundamentally, JFC

must understand their missions and assigned objectives, a

well as the intent and “end state” or outcome envisioned b

their commander. Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine fo

Joint Operations, lists eight ways in which commanders exer 

cise their command responsibilities: (1) assigning missions, (2

designating priorities of effort, (3) designating and allocatin

priorities for resources, (4) assessing risks, (5) deciding whe

adjustments need to be made, (6) committing reserves, (7

understanding the needs of senior and subordinate command

ers, and (8) guiding and motivating the organization toward

the desired end. 1 2 These command prerogatives are inherent in

JFC campaign plans that provide the bases for subordinat

component plans.

At their heart, these component plans epitomize the opera 

tional art , defined by US joint doctrine as “the employment o

military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objective

through the design, organization, integration, and conduct o

strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Opera 

tional art translates the joint force commander’s strategy int

operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by inte 

grating key activities at all levels of war.”1 3 Further, it “deter 

mines when, where, and why the joint force will be employed

and “provides a framework for the efficient use of resources t

achieve objectives and a means for planning campaigns an

major operations.”1 4 Some of the more important facets of op 

erational art include synergy, simultaneity and depth, an

anticipation. Synergy prompts the JFC to consider the com 

plementary capabilities of the various parts of the joint force

68
Simultaneity and depth deny the enemy sanctuary or respit

by imposing competing and simultaneous demands on enem

commanders. And anticipation makes the JFC alert to th

unexpected and to opportunities for exploiting rapidly chang

ing situations.1 5

In US Air Force doctrine, operational art consists of fou

tasks. The first involves creating a concept for aerospace op

erations to determine “when, where, or even if air and surfac

engagements should be sought, based on how they might con 

tribute to the combatant commander’s intent.” The secon

task entails orchestrating aerospace forces “so they can help

provide advantages (e.g., concentration, position, and sur

prise) to aerospace and surface forces that will give thos

forces the best chance of tactical success.”1 6 Third, the ai

commander must make adjustments based on mission result

and/or changes in the JFC’s operational intent. Finally, th

air commander must be able to exploit fleeting opportunities

Air Force basic doctrine emphasizes the key role airpower ca

play in directly attacking the enemy’s sources of power: “On

way a commander can exercise operational art is through 

strategic air campaign that directly attacks an enemy’s cen 

ters of gravity [COG]. . . . If a strategic air campaign is no

feasible, achieving a campaign’s objective can depend on com 

bining aerospace and surface operations in a way that create

powerful synergies.”1 7

Joint doctrine offers a conceptual model for planners t

develop JAOPs in a war or OOTW situations. 1 8 According t

joint doctrine, “though missions vary widely across the rang

of military operations from war to [OOTW], the framework an

processes for [command and control] of joint air operations ar

consistent.”1 9 However, “the key difference . . . is that in opera 

tions other than war, other US Government agencies and hos

nations have a preeminent role and the military contribution

to the strategic objective is likely to be indirect. . . . Therefore

the major challenge is joint, combined, and interagency con 

sensus building.”2 0 Furthermore, “settlement, not victory” ma

be the ultimate measure of success.2 1

The model of joint planning so far described is iterative, no

linear. Each phase occurs simultaneously, and no one phas

is ever complete because each is influenced by unfoldin 

69
developments in the other phases. Still, in practice, the plan

ning process should begin with the articulation of the JFC

objectives. As the process continues, however, even funda 

mental objectives may be altered by developments in othe

phases of planning. Feedback mechanisms imbedded in th

planning process may require changes in earlier ideas. Fo

example, detailed analysis of COGs may reveal that the origi

nal strategy is inadequate and that the change in strateg

may require a modification of the objective. As outlined in

Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Opera 

tions, this planning model has five phases.

Phase One: Operational-Environment Research

During this phase, one gains information about “friendl

and adversary capabilities and intentions, doctrine, and th

environment in which the operations will take place.”2 2 An 

swering the key question of this planning phase—what is th

nature of the war or conflict? 2 3—entails incorporation and syn 

thesis of information taken from sources as diverse as news 

paper articles, novels, and satellite imagery. Order-of-battl

data alone decidedly will not provide the answer. Likewise

this phase of planning must synthesize inputs from individu 

als and agencies with expertise in such areas as intelligence 

operations, national strategy, economics, anthropology, and 

host of other specialties.

This question of conflict identity is particularly crucial an

generally more difficult to answer for OOTW situations tha

for more conventional conflicts. Limitations in US intelligence 

coupled with a current focus on major regional threats i

specific global areas, increase the difficulty by limiting intelli

gence coverage of other areas. For military leaders, OOTW als

requires a somewhat unconventional strategic outlook

whereby enemy military forces may prove less a concern t

planners than political, economic, or sociocultural factors. Fi

nally, OOTW usually includes non–Department of Defens

government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or in 

ternational organizations.

70
Phase Two: Objective Determination

This is the crucial planning phase because it results in a

articulation of the end state that leaders want from militar

action. Often, however, higher-level guidance (e.g., from na

tional leaders to theater commanders) can be imprecise. In

that case, subordinate planners must determine their ow

objectives, based on whatever sources are available, and the

pass them to the next higher level of authority for approval. 2 

Just as importantly, the end state sought (the ultimate mili 

tary objective) represents only the set of conditions necessar

to resolve the immediate crisis and move from the predom

nant use of military force to the predominant use of othe

instruments of national power (e.g., diplomacy or economics)

In OOTW, however, military terms cannot solely define thes

conditions. In many cases, “conditions which need to be cre

ated can only occur with emphasis on political/diplomatic

economic, or social activities.”2 5 This does not mean they do no

exist. As joint doctrine warns, “an essential consideration . . . i

an understanding, regardless of the nature and extent of mili

ta ry involvement, of the parameters which spell success, failure

or conflict termination.”2 6 Finally, multiple objectives—often no

prioritized—may conflict. Of most importance, however, is tha

“the objectives of each level must support the objectives of th

higher level to ensure unity of effort.”2 7

Other considerations in objective determination includ

constraints, restraints, and rules of engagement. Constraint

are items planners must do; restraints are things they mus

not do. The latter may include prohibited targets, restriction

on the use of certain weapons or tactics, or buffer zones be

tween enemy territory and neutral countries. Rules of engage 

ment—based on international law, operational requirements

capabilities of the force, host-nation law and agreements, th

threat, and US policy2 8—are directives issued by competen

authorities that delineate the circumstances and limitation

on the use of force.

Phase Three: Strategy Identification

US joint doctrine defines strategy as “the art and science o

developing and using political, psychological, and militar

71
forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maxi

mum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilitie

and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen th

chances of defeat.”2 9 Thus, in practice, separating strateg

from objectives can prove difficult in some ways. The objectiv

sought implies some notion of how one can achieve it. On

rule of thumb is that higher-level strategies become the objec

tives of the next lower level. If a JFC, for instance, promu

gates a strategic objective of “undermining the military powe

of the palace guard,” then theater component commander

must develop strategies for their forces that will undermin

the palace guard in some way. The advantage of subordinate

linking their strategies to the objectives of their superiors i

that it allows the more senior commanders to pick the strateg

most likely to produce the desired result. In a more relevan

example to the issue at hand, “the joint air operations plan i

how the JFACC [joint force air component commander] com 

municates, promulgates, and articulates strategy,” in suppor

of the JFC’s objectives.30

As in the case of other planning phases, several items com 

plicate strategy making in OOTW, compared to strategy mak

ing in war. First, as noted in phase two, OOTW objectives ar

generally less clear cut than those for war, especially in term

of desired end states. Second, OOTW lends itself more toward

a preventive strategy than a positive strategy. 3 1 In other words

the goals of OOTW are more likely to involve stopping thing

from occurring, such as keeping safe areas in Bosnia from

being overrun, rather than making something happen, suc

as militarily defeating the Bosnian Serb army.

Phase Four: Identification of Centers of Gravity

US doctrine defines COGs as “those characteristics, capa 

bilities, or localities from which a military force derives it

freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”3 2 Th

need to identify the COGs correctly is clear: they are th

“things” or concepts that strategy “targets ” to accomplish it

positive or negative objectives. As Joint Pub 3-0 states, “Th

essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effect

against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy o

72
neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of en

emy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory ” (em

phasis in original). 3 3

Again, identifying COGs in an OOTW situation can prove ex

tremely challenging, given their ephemeral nature as compare

to those in war. For example, a friendly COG (one to protec

may be the legitimacy of the supported host nation’s govern 

ment, while the enemy’s COG may be ideology. In this case

directly attacking or influencing the enemy’s COG in OOTW

could prove difficult. US doctrine stresses decisive points in

indirectly attacking COGs. But these points generally are geo

graphic in nature and, although in themselves not COGs, “the

are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity.”3 4

Phase Five: Development of Joint Air Operations

This phase is the most difficult part of air campaign plan

ning. One method of organizing JAOP development calls fo

categorizing operations by function or task (e.g., by air supe

riority). Another involves categorizing operations by time o

event (e.g., by phase or by operations occurring after a par

ticular event). Particularly for OOTW, with its many intangibl

strategic issues, event-based planning offers important advan

tages over function-based planning. The former forces plan

ners to outline a desired operational sequence from the start

ing set of conditions down to the final conditions that defin

the end state. This technique focuses intelligence -collectio

assets and sharply identifies key decision points in antici

pated operations and strategies. These, in turn, help othe

planning functions, such as logistics , to ascertain suppor

requirements. Event-based planning also describes the priori

ties of effort and resources. For example, air superiority—th

prerequisite for the success of further operations—is usuall

the JFC’s first priority. The JFACC is the supported com 

mander for air superiority operations. An event-oriented ap

proach, therefore, describes the series of related unified o

joint operations that lead to air superiority, and it should

describe the amount of air superiority needed to open sub 

sequent operational phases.

73
Identifying planning branches and sequels is especially

critical in putting the JAOP together. Branches are option

that anticipate situations that could change the basic plan

while “sequels are subsequent operations based on the possi

ble outcomes of the current operation.”3 5 Together, they form

the phases, sequenced together, that lead from the startin

condition down to the desired end state. Thus, branches an

sequels build flexibility into plans and preserve freedom o

action under rapidly changing conditions.

For each phase of the JAOP, including its branches an

sequels, planners must develop measures of merit to assist in

determining how well the plan achieves its goals. These mea

sures must not limit themselves to mere sortie counting o

accounting of physical damage done to enemy materiel bu

should focus on effects achieved in terms of the JAOP and it

branches and sequels, and in relation to the effects planned

Naturally, too, the planning ambiguities of OOTW increase th

difficulty of this part of JAOP development.

The center of JAOP development in the joint air operation

center (JAOC) is the strategy cell. Although some curren

JAOCs formally establish this cell within their Combat Plan

divisions, all have functional strategy cells somewhere in thei

organization. Fundamentally, the strategy cell is responsibl

for translating JFC and JFACC guidance into an air strategy

Strategy-cell planners, in conjunction with other componen

planners, determine the best use of the JFC’s airpower asset

to achieve operational objectives. Based on their determination

these planners then propose air CONOPS to their JFACCs tha

underpin the advice of these air commanders to their JFCs.

3 6

The other sections of the JAOC produce and execute th

daily ATO. All components (i.e., land, sea, air, and specia

operations) nominate targets to accomplish their assigned

mission on any specific ATO. The joint guidance, apportion 

ment, and targeting (JGAT) cell, composed of representative

from these components, prioritizes those requests into a join

integrated, prioritized target list for force application. The driv 

ing principle is guidance provided by the JFC/JFACC, foun

in the JFACC’s CONOPS. The most common model used i

strategy-to-tasks because it connects each supported objectiv

to an individual target.

3 7 From this process also comes th

74
apportionment recommendation—the determination and as

signment of the total expected air effort by percentage, prior

ity, or weight of effort devoted to counterair, strategic attack

interdiction, or close air support .

Emerging joint doctrine rightly emphasizes that “forwardin

desired effects rather than strict target nominations give

those responsible for conducting joint interdiction maximum

flexibility to exploit their capabilities.” Further, “supported

commanders should provide supporting commanders as muc

latitude as possible in planning and executing their opera 

tions. . . . Supported commanders should clearly state how

they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneu 

ver operations and what they want to accomplish with inter 

diction (as well as those actions they want to avoid).”38 Thi

target list goes to the JFC for approval.

The joint, integrated, prioritized target list forms the basis o

the master air attack plan, which—using the Contingenc

Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS)—matches tar 

gets, along with weaponeering data, weather information, in 

telligence , and so forth, to available resources, according t

the principle of economy of force. The master air attack pla

turns into the ATO and goes to the appropriate units, nor 

mally 12 hours before execution.

Although commanders want to know how well the executed

missions have accomplished the desired effects, combat as

sessment remains an often-overlooked aspect of JAOP plan

ning. Traditional battle damage assessment can provide bot

quick looks and detailed examination of the damage done

Weapons effects determine the correctness of the weaponeer 

ing and establish data on the performance of munitions. Fur

ther, based upon the objective sought, overall mission effec

tiveness recommends whether or not to restrike the target.

NATO Doctrine

As with US doctrine, the key to understanding how NATO

plans air operations starts with an understanding of how th

alliance develops strategic guidance. This process has its root

in the origins of the alliance and in its fundamental principle

75
of policy making: defensive orientation, consensus, cohesion

and an initial prohibition on out-of-area operations. Since th

end of the cold war and the demise of NATO’s raiso

d’être—the Warsaw Pact—NATO reaffirmed some of thes

principles and modified others. At the Rome Summit of 1991

NATO put forth a new strategic concept that softened th

Washington Treaty’s prohibition on out-of-area operations. Ac 

cording to this concept, NATO must be capable of responding t

instability arising from “the serious economic, social and politi

cal difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes

which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern

Europe.”3 9 In 1994 NATO affirmed this expanded orientatio

when it declared its “offer to support, on a case by cas e basis in

accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and othe

operations under the authority of the UN Security Council . . 

including making available Alliance resources and expertis e.”4 0

Structurally, NATO’s grand-strategy process starts with th

North Atlantic Council (NAC) and its military arm, the Militar

Committee (MC). The NAC includes all the heads of state an

government from the 16 member states, represented in th

council’s day-to-day business by permanent ambassadorial

level ministers. The secretary-general chairs the NAC , and th

International Staff supports it. The MC, composed of th

chiefs of staff of the member nations or their military repre

sentatives, reports to the council on the military affairs of th

alliance. An elected chair heads the MC, and the Internationa

Military Staff supports it. This staff, which has no inde

pendent intelligence -gathering function but only collates an

distributes intelligence provided by the nations, receives scan

attention in most discussions of NATO operations. Neverthe

less, it can play an important role. The plans and policy divi

sion and the operations division provide independent advice t

the MC on proposed policy matters, including plans put fort

by the operational commands.

The NATO strategy process continues from the NAC and MC

down through the alliance’s integrated command structure

which is divided at the top into two major NATO comman ds: (1

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (not addressed here) an

(2) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The latter command

three major subordinate commands: Allied Forces Northwes

76
Europe , Allied Forces Central Europe, and Allied Force

Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), which had responsibility for th

Balkans area during Deliberate Force. Allied Air Forces South 

ern Europe (AIRSOUTH), one of AFSOUTH’s six principal sub

ordinate commands, is collocated with AFSOUTH in Naples

Italy. 4 1 According to NATO doctrine, AIRSOUTH’s principa

planning organization is the combined air operations cente

(CAOC) located at Vicenza , Italy, with the 5th Allied Tactica

Air Force (5 ATAF).

Two operational-level issues also influenced the NATO strat

egy process at the time of Deliberate Force. First, in the post

cold-war era, NATO significantly strengthened its Rapid Reac

tion Forces (RRF) by dividing them into immediate reaction

forces, consisting of land, air, and maritime components, an

an RRF consisting of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reac

tion Corps and supporting air and maritime components. O

the one hand, this enhancement of NATO ’s reaction force

gave the alliance greater flexibility in dealing with problem

like the Bosnian conflict; on the other hand, these reaction

forces operated under an important limitation: NATO does no

task member nations for forces. Each nation assigns “opera 

tional command or operational control, as distinct from ful

command over all aspects of the operations and administra 

tion of those forces.”42 In effect, each nation determines wha

forces it will provide and the conditions under which thos

forces may be employed. Thus, NATO commanders had t

make their plans for land and air operations with the under 

standing that, if any participating state disagreed with them

it had the option of withdrawing its forces at any time.

Second, although emerging NATO doctrine emphasizes th

need for interoperability between forces and the overarchin

need to have a common doctrine for joint planning and execu 

tion,43 NATO tactical doctrine actually provides only scan

guidance concerning air operations planning. For example

Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-33(B), NATO Tactical Air Doc

trine,4 4 the functional equivalent of Joint Pub 3-56.1, does no

offer a model for campaign planning, as is found in US doc 

trine. It does, however, offer some brief guidance on how a

air commander should allot, apportion, and allocate air re

s ources.4 5 The first factor is the objective to be achieved, fo llowe

77
by the nature of the conflict, strategy employed, operationa

capabilities of the forces assigned, terrain, weather, logistic

support available, and political restraints in effect.4 6 Anothe

limitation on NATO tactical air doctrine is the absence of an

detailed discussion of OOTW, which reflects the fact that mos

of NATO doctrine still predates the end of the cold war. Thus

at least to the extent that they looked to NATO’s air doctrine t

guide planning for Deliberate Force, AFSOUTH planner

largely were on their own.

Although not directly relevant to this essay, one might not

(since it in part reflects the experiences of Deny Flight an

Deliberate Force) that Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-1(A), “Al

lied Joint Operations Doctrine” (draft), addresses peace-suppor 

operations. This doctrinal guidance foresees events startin

with requests from the UN Security Council for assistanc

from NATO. The draft publication emphasizes NATO militar

involvement in planning activities from the earliest stages

Once the NAC authorizes peace-support operations, the majo

NATO command develops “appropriate contingency plans t

include the recommended size, composition, operational con 

cept and command structure of the Alliance contribution, th

tasks for the Force Commander/COMAJF [Commander, Allied

Joint Force ], and anticipated timelines for mission execu 

tion.”4 7 Importantly, this publication gives explicit guidance on

interposition force operations, which seek to keep opposin

military forces apart following a cease-fire agreement through

placing an impartial force between the belligerents and estab

lishing a buffer zone with continuous monitoring. However, thi

draft NATO doctrine still offers no guidance on the use of force t

facilitate achieving an agreement between opposing forces.

Three ATPs provided procedural guidance to Deliberat

Force planners, although they dealt primarily with tactica

employment and included little discussion about how on

should develop overall air strategy or CONOPS. ATP-40 an

ATP-42, neither of which are discussed here, dealt with airspac

control procedures and counterair operations, respectively. 4 

Presently, no ATP deals exclusively with interdiction or strate

gic attack, although ATP-33(B) discusses the former and AJP

1(A) mentions the latter.4 9 In NATO parlance, air support t

land operations consists of counterair, air interdiction , tactica

78
air transport, and offensive air support (OAS), the last cate

gory consisting of tactical air reconnaissance , battlefield ai

interdiction (no longer a recognized air mission in US doc 

trine), 5 0 and close air support . OAS is specifically tied to th

land battle, in that it involves “doctrine and procedures [that

permit air forces to assist directly in achieving the immediat

and short-term objectives of land forces.”5 1

Despite the paucity of detailed air-planning guidance in

NATO doctrine manuals, some NATO plans do address a

ends-ways-means formula that has some similarity to US doc 

trine. For example, the Deny Flight OPLAN of the commande

in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) start

with the mission assigned to a particular phase of an opera 

tion.52 Within that mission, one finds two measures: one deal

with the deployment of forces, listing timing of the deploy

ment, objectives sought, and required actions; the other deal

with employment operations during the phase, starting wit

the objectives, actions, and results expected from the actions

Missing from this formula, and from the US ends-ways-mean

formula, is any discussion of how actions taken produce ex 

pected results—in other words, the mechanism, which out

lines the “why” part. That is, “if the strategy occurs, then th

end likely occurs because of a certain mechanism.” It specifie

the theoretical foundation for the strategy. For example, th

mechanism for Operation Deliberate Force may have taken th

following form: “If force is applied to critical communication

facilities of the Bosnian Serbs, then they will accede to UN

demands because the loss of those communication facilitie

will result in a loss of central control over their forces.”

ATO air doctrine emphasizes that planning must be joint a

all levels of command. For OAS operations, the land-forc

commander establishes target priorities based on the JFC

daily apportionment decision. Army request nets forward pre

planned OAS missions to the air force headquarters responsi

ble for the allocation of air resources, normally an ATAF . Th

joint command operations center, normally collocated with 

CAOC, allocates resources to meet the requests. Land-forc

channels let the requesting units know whether their request

have been accepted or rejected. An air support operation

center (ASOC), subordinate to the CAOC and normally wit

79
the highest land-force formation deployed (e.g., a corps), ma

have tasking authority for OAS . Any combat unit may sen

requests for immediate OAS missions directly over dedicated

communication links to the ASOC. Any intermediate arm

command may disapprove a request. If not, the ASOC at

tempts to fill the request out of available assets. If none ar

available, based upon the ASOC’s delegated authority, it ma

divert lower-priority missions to fill the immediate request. 5 3

NATO doctrine for the organization and planning processe

of the CAOC parallels US doctrine for a JAOC. For example

the CAOC under 5 ATAF at Vicenza , Italy, has a plans elemen

charged with utilizing guidance from higher headquarters

along with the commander’s intent and unit inputs, to develop

the plan for the daily air tasking message (ATM). Plan develop

ment may cover up to 30 days, 48 to 72 hours, or 24 hours

Along with the ATM, affected units also receive special in 

structions and an airspace control order . An operations ele 

ment in 5 ATAF executes the published ATM and exercise

command and control through regional operations center

and their subordinate sector operations centers. The CAOC

airborne elements may include airborne warning and contro

system as well as airborne command, control, and communi

cation aircraft . As in US doctrine, liaison elements play 

crucial role. In the multinational environment of NATO, na 

tional representatives to the CAOC are especially important.

Conclusion

US and NATO doctrines share many characteristics. The

both emphasize that planning—at all levels—must include in 

puts from every relevant participant. Further, these doctrine

point out that although flexibility is one of airpower’s greates

assets, it can also be its worst dilemma since every comba

arm seeks as much airpower support as it can get, generall

exceeding the amount available.

Because airpower is best employed in mass, these competin

demands may inadvertently lead to “penny packeting” amon

several forces, to the detriment of the total fo rce. Therefore, bot

NATO and US doctrines argue for centralized control of al

80
assets under an airman charged with the responsibility t

plan and conduct air operations in support of the JFC’s objec

tives. Finally, since US national security strategy states tha

the purpose of armed forces is to win wars, each body o

doctrine tends to emphasize conventional state-versus-stat

conflict rather than OOTW. However, to the extent that peace

support operations become more the norm than the exception

doctrinal guidance needs expanding.

Despite their similarities, the differences between the tw

sets of doctrine remain substantial. Most importantly, NATO

doctrine provides little guidance on how to develop an ai

operations strategy. Beyond a brief discussion of the princi

ples of war in ATP-33(B) and a single page in AJP-1(A), th

other manuals focus exclusively on tactical events. US doc 

trine, both joint and service, pays a great deal of attention t

operational art and the making of operational strategy. Like

wise, Joint Pub 3-56.1 offers an excellent model to guide ai

operation planners through a process of turning strategic-leve

guidance into an ATO . NATO air doctrine is disturbingly mute

OOTWs or peace-support operations present the most difficul

problem to military planners because the very nature of th

task—preventing conflict—is almost the exact opposite from

the traditional military role of concluding conflict on term

favorable to the political leadership. Therefore, for the plan

ners of Operation Deliberate Force, NATO doctrine provide

virtually no guidance for building conventional air strategy

and it proved even less useful—if such were possible—as 

guide for developing strategy for the OOTWs with which the

were concerned. The question, therefore, of whether thes

planners consulted the existing body of doctrine or jus

“winged it” is largely moot—they had almost nothing to whic

they could refer.

Notes

1. For example, in Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera 

tions, 1 February 1995—the keystone document of joint doctrine—“Multina

tional Operations” is a separate chapter. Nevertheless, this chapter doe

provide useful guidance on several key considerations that planners mu

bear in mind when planning and conducting multinational operations.

81
2. As used in this essay, airpower means the ability to do something i

or through the air—the definition used by William “Billy” Mitchell, an air 

power pioneer, in Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities o

Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (1925; reprint, New York: Dove

Publications, 1988), 3–4.

3. For most of its history, air operations conducted against the enemy

whether or not in direct support of surface operations, were called cam 

paigns. Examples included “air superiority” or “counterair” campaigns, “ai

interdiction” campaigns, and the like. In the 1990s, the term air operation

has replaced air campaign in the US armed forces’ joint doctrine, emphasiz

ing the existence of a single theater campaign consisting of supportin

operations. This essay follows that convention.

4. See Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Powe

(Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 20–2

Meilinger writes that “selecting objectives to strike or influence is the es 

sence of air strategy. Virtually all the air theorists recognized this; unfortu 

nately, they were frustratingly vague on the subject” (page 21).

5. The classic air theorist Giulio Douhet wrote that “objectives vary con 

siderably in war, and the choice of them depends chiefly upon the aim

sought, whether the command of the air, paralyzing the enemy’s army an

navy, or shattering the morale of civilians behind the lines.” Such varianc

led him to conclude that “no hard and fast rules can be laid down on thi

aspect of aerial warfare. It is impossible even to outline general standard

because the choice of enemy targets will depend upon a number of circum 

stances, material, moral, and psychological, the importance of which

though real, is not easily estimated.” See his The Command of the Air, tran

Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Forc

History, 1983), 50, 59–60. Operation Desert Storm is often touted as a

example of “parallel” or “simultaneous” warfare, which involves strikin

every key target at once, made possible by advances in precision attack an

stealth aircraft. Leaving aside the question of whether US and allied force

will always have the overwhelming numbers of aircraft they had in that wa

even then they did not strike every target the very first night. Therefor

some prioritization occurred. For a discussion of parallel attack, see Co

John A. Warden III, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century,” in Challeng

and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Karl P. Magya

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994), 311–32.

6. Meilinger, 49–55.

7. See William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagemen

and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1995).

8. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United State

of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washing

ton, D.C.: [Joint Chiefs of Staff,] 1995).

9. For a discussion of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, see Joint Pu

5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, II-10–12.

10 . National Military Strategy, 14–15.

82
11. These are 

statements of intent as to what, where, and how opera 

tions are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms.” They provide for unity o

effort and achieve strategic advantage that is the “favorable overall powe

relationship that enables one group of nations to effectively control th

course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objective

through national, international, and theater efforts” (emphasis in original

See Joint Pub 3-0, III-4. A concept of operations is “a verbal or graphi

statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent i

regard to an operation or series of operations.” See Joint Pub 1-02, Depar

ment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 1994.

12. Joint Pub 3-0, II-16–17.

13. Joint Pub 1-02.

14. Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures fo

Campaign Planning,” 2d draft, 18 May 1995, II-1.

15. Joint Pub 3-0, III-9–13.

16. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 129.

17. Ibid.

18. For a complete discussion of this model, see the author’s “Air Cam 

paign Planning,” Airpower Journal 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11–22.

19. Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 1

November 1994, I-2.

20. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other tha

War,” final draft, April 1993, VII-2–3.

21. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handboo

for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 Febru 

ary 1995), 6. The Joint Warfighting Center issued this handbook as 

resource tool for commanders even though it is not US joint doctrine.

22. Joint Pub 3-56.1, III-4.

23. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howar

and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

24. Handbook for Peace Operations, 11.

25. Joint Pub 3-07, VII-3.

26. Ibid., I-7. However, the doctrine goes on to say that “the paradox . . 

is that . . . policy is often developmental and contingent on the results o

preceding actions. As such, planning for [OOTW] should be an open-ende

and interactive process adaptive to the political and policy drivers of the U

Government and its foreign policy at any stage of the process.”

27. Joint Pub 3-56.1, III-4.

28. Handbook for Peace Operations, 74–75.

29. Joint Pub 1-02.

30. Joint Pub 3-56.1, III-5.

31. Joint Pub 3-07, I-10.

32. Joint Pub 1-02.

33. Joint Pub 3-0, III-20.

34. Ibid., III-21.

83
35. Ibid., III-20.

36. For a recommended JAOP format, see JFACC Primer, 2d ed. (Wash

ington, D.C.: US Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operation

February 1994), 46–50.

37. David E. Thaler, Strategies-to-Tasks: A Framework for Linking Mean

and Ends (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993).

38. Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations,” draf

n.d., II-13–14.

39. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” in NATO Handbook (Brussel

NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 237.

40. “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating i

the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarter

Brussels, on 10–11 January 1994,” in NATO Handbook, 271.

41. The others include Allied Land Forces Southern Europe, Allied Lan

Forces South Central Europe (not activated), Allied Land Forces Southeas

ern Europe, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, and Naval Striking an

Support Forces Southern Europe. AFSOUTH has six principal subordinat

commands as opposed to the three found in Allied Forces Central Europ

and Allied Forces Northwestern Europe because of the continuing animosit

between Greece (host to Allied Land Forces South Central Europe and 

ATAF, when they are activated) and Turkey (home of Allied Land Force

Southeastern Europe and 6 ATAF).

42. NATO Handbook, 167.

43. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-1(A), “Allied Joint Operations Doc 

trine,” draft, 1995. Also noteworthy in this publication is the discussion o

operational art. It generally follows US doctrine but with a clear examina

tion of the military conditions required to achieve the strategic objective

the events that will likely produce those conditions, the way military re 

sources should be applied to accomplish those events, and the risks in 

volved. See chap. 2, sec. 3, par. 0206.

44. ATP-33(B), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, November 1986.

45. NATO defines allotment as the temporary change of assignment o

tactical air forces between subordinate commands. Apportionment is the dete

mination and assignment of the total expected air effort devoted to various ai

operations, normally by percentage and/or priority. Allocation is the transla 

tion of apportionment into numbers of sorties by aircraft type. Ibid., 3-5.

46. Ibid., 3-6.

47. AJP-1(A), par. 2231.

48. ATP-40, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Comba

Zone, January 1977; and ATP-42, Counter Air Operations, March 1981.

49. See ATP-33(B), chap. 5, sec. 2; and AJP-1(A), chap. 18, sec. 2.

50. For an extended discussion of the origin of battlefield air interdictio

in NATO, see David J. Stern, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrin

1970–1985 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December 1987).

51. ATP-27(B), Offensive Air Support Operations, May 1980, 1-3.

84
52. Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, CINCSOUTH OPLA

40101, “Deny Flight,” 3 May 1995. (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

53. Ibid., chaps. 5 and 6. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted i

unclassified.

85
Chapter 4

The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan

Col Christopher M. Campbell

The first bomb impact of Operation Deliberate Force, a

0012Z on the morning of 30 August 1995, did not occur b

happenstance or without considerable deliberation and soul

searching on the part of many individuals. NATO ’s first tru

“air campaign,” Deliberate Force was in fact the product o

years of planning. The alliance’s focus on an expected Warsaw

Pact adversary preceded that planning effort by decades, an

the doctrine that developed as a result of that focus shaped

those plans.

Many people planned and executed Deliberate Force t

achieve narrowly defined military objectives that emanated

from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the United Nation

(UN) Security Council. These objectives underwent revision

over more than three years of military operations in the Bal

kans and finally became militarily viable. Simply put, the de

clared Deliberate Force air objective was to “execute a robus

NATO air operation that adversely alters the BSA’s [Bosnia

Serb army’s] advantage in conducting successful military op

erations against the BiH [Bosnian army].” This objective re

flected a desired end state which envisaged that the Bosnia

Serbs would “sue for cessation of military operations, compl

with UN mandates, and negotiate.”1 A tactical objective of “lev

eling the playing field” bolstered this overt objective. Suc

leveling ensured that the Bosnian government forces could

adequately defend themselves. Implied objectives included th

minimizing of casualties, collateral damage, and political an

military costs. The combined force air component commande

(CFACC) adopted these objectives, both for humanitarian rea 

sons and to ensure that NATO conducted the air campaign in

a manner politically acceptable to the intervening countries

The requirement to achieve consensus on all alliance decision

87
was critically important to maintain in the background of al

operational decisions.

Given the generally recognized success of Deliberate Force

one should seek to understand the planning of this air cam

paign and compare it to available doctrine and procedure. To

be effective, a body of doctrine must be relevant, accepted

and used. Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., US Air Force Reserv

(USAFR), Retired, defines doctrine as “officially approved pre

scriptions of the best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should

be, the product of experience. Doctrine is what experience ha

shown usually works best.”2

The success of Deliberate Force should drive us to discove

important insights that might assist air campaign planners

Toward that end, this essay addresses several questions

First, it seeks to determine whether the success of the opera 

tion was premeditated or serendipitous. Just as plans often g

awry because of unforeseen developments of war, so can the

go better than expected. Second, did the planning and out

come of Deliberate Force reflect the provisions of existing doc 

trines? If not, did air campaign planners deviate from doc 

trinal norms due to the inadequacy or inappropriateness o

the existing doctrine or because they did not refer to tha

doctrine in the heat of events? Or was a deviation inspired b

some combination of reasons?

Answering those questions depends on the answers to a

least three corollary questions. First, how did the planner

and leaders of this campaign actually go about developin

such a successful plan? Of concern here are the institutiona

and physical environments under which these planner

worked, the factors they considered, and the way they deliber 

ated and “processed” the plan . Second, what constituted th

actual Deliberate Force air campaign plan, and how did NATO

ensure that it would work at the time of execution? Of particu 

lar interest is the linkage that existed between the objective

pursued and the strategies employed—the so-called ends ver 

sus means as the plan changed over time before the operation

began. If one accepts the truth of the adage that “no pla

survives first contact with the enemy,” the third corollar

question becomes understanding how the executors of th

Deliberate Force plan altered it to reflect unfolding events an

88
what success they enjoyed. Finally, the essay examines th

relationship of the planning and outcome of the operation t

doctrinal planning norms. Chapter 3 demonstrated the limita 

tions of the existing body of doctrine. These observation

should have broad future implications for future air campaign

planners. Thus, this chapter sets out to examine the develop

ment process of the air campaign plan for Deliberate Force

show the key components of the plan itself, emphasizing how

it was modified over time; compare the “starting” plan to th

conduct of the operation and describe adaptations to the pla

in the heat of battle; and compare the Deliberate Force experi

ence to doctrinal air campaign planning norms.

The Planning Effort

During the more than two and one-half years of air opera 

tions leading to Deliberate Force, a wide array of political an

military factors influenced NATO air action in the Balkans

Competing interests constrained air campaign planning an

decision making into forms that did not always coincide wit

current airpower doctrine. This section examines some o

those factors as they related to the planning process tha

culminated in Deliberate Force.

NATO and UN Institutional Factors

A review of NATO’s historical planning process leading up t

Deliberate Force helps one understand what NATO planned

and executed—and why. Deliberate Force did not fit NATO 

traditional planning focus, historically oriented on a defensiv

strategy. That strategy accepted the premise that the enem

(i.e., the Warsaw Pact) would attack first. NATO, bloodied bu

not bowed, would withstand the initial onslaught, regain

whatever territory it might have lost, and at least restore th

borders of NATO member nations. That strategy envisioned n

requirement to project force beyond the territory of membe

nations, except to reestablish alliance borders. Thus, involve 

ment in Deny Flight and Deliberate Force—both of which wer

out-of-area, proactive operations—compelled NATO to rethin

its historical planning focus.

89
For its part, the UN had never been involved in an operation

on the scale of Deny Flight or in one with the projected mis 

sion of Deliberate Force. Because the UN has no standin

military department and relies on troop-contributing nation

to provide forces to conduct its operations, very little corporat

memory exists within the institution other than for quite lim 

ited missions.

A disparity existed between UN and NATO institutional per

ceptions of the capabilities and limitations of airpower. Tha

disparity stemmed from de facto differences in their histori

roles in conflict resolution in general and in Bosnia-Herze 

govina in particular. On the one hand, the UN—focused on

humanitarian relief and peacekeeping—emphasized stric

neutrality and impartiality, no matter the provocation. NATO 

on the other hand, sought to protect UN troops and other

under the UN umbrella, eventually arraying the allianc

against the Bosnian Serbs. These institutional differences in

viewpoint created a dilemma for NATO air campaign planners

Their accumulated military experience and wisdom argued fo

aggressive, robust operations to coerce an adversary to acced

to NATO’s will (i.e., to “win the war”). The UN’s logic o

peacekeeping, however, spoke for careful, measured, minimal

ist operations to preserve the dialogue—not to militarily “de

feat” one group or the other.

Throughout the years of NATO ’s involvement in Bosnia , UN

leaders—both military and civilian—had proven much mor

reluctant than NATO leaders to authorize employment of sig

nificant force against the region’s combatants. Despite numer 

ous atrocities perpetrated against one or the other faction

and despite countless provocations committed against UN an

NATO forces, the UN leadership steadfastly refused to author 

ize air strikes for other than retaliatory demonstration events.

Key Players

Although individuals and organizations from many nation

influenced the planning and execution of Deliberate Force, th

pronounced “US” hue of its core planning and command func

tions was a fact of life. Ironically, the fact that virtually all senio

commanders and many of the key planning-staff director

90
involved in the Deliberate Force chain of command wer

American was largely a quirk of fate. Since NATO’s founding

its members have sought to ensure that leadership through 

out the military command structure closely mirrors the forc

contribution of the member states. The national identity o

commanders positioned throughout the alliance is a carefull

crafted political decision, usually requiring years of dialogu

and negotiation to change. Lt Gen Mike Ryan, US Air Forc

(USAF), was commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europ

(COMAIRSOUTH) and was designated the CFACC. Lt Gen An 

drea Fornasiero , Italian air force , was commander of the 5t

Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) at Dal Molin Air Base (AB

Vicenza , Italy. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, USAF, director of the 

ATAF combined air operations center (CAOC) at Vicenza , Italy

worked directly for General Ryan . Brig Gen David A. Sawyer 

USAF, was both deputy commander of 5 ATAF and deput

director of the CAOC. Most of the senior leadership in th

CAOC consisted of USAF colonels. The collegial relationship

between the AIRSOUTH and CAOC staffs eased Genera

Ryan ’s task of planning and executing the Deny Flight—and

later, Deliberate Force—air operations.

Recognizing the lack of sensitivity and undesirability of a

all-US chain of command for Operation Deny Flight, General

Ryan and Hornburg asked all participating NATO nations t

provide senior staff members for the CAOC—with limited suc

cess.3 Although each nation (except the United States ) had 

senior national representative at the CAOC, US officers provide

the bulk of air operations planning and leadership there.4

Adm Leighton W. Smith, US Navy, commander in chief of Allie

Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)—the combined forc

commander in the region—ensured that a direct line of commu

nications existed between his headquarters and that of his ai

component commander, General Ryan. The two commander

could thus share an understanding of the Bosnia situation

Admiral Smith provided General Ryan appropriate guidance an

direction, ensuring that he had the forces to accomplish th

mission. Admiral Smith saw to it that the air operations pla

was in harmony with the strategic directio n forthcoming from

his boss, Gen George Joulwan, US Army, Supreme Allied Com 

mander Europe (SACEUR). Thus, a de facto all-American chain

91
of NATO air command existed for Bosnia operations—clearl

anomalous to the international nature of NATO.

NATO commanders (and, by extension, their staffs) coordi

nated their actions at several levels with their opposite num

bers in the UN hierarchy. Admiral Smith worked closely wit

Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, French army, force commander (FC

of the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF , previously know

as United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR]), headquar 

tered in Zagreb , Croatia .

5

 Subordinate to General Janvier wa

Lt Gen Rupert Smith , British army, commander of UNPRO

FOR in Bosnia , headquartered in Sarajevo. General Smith an

General Ryan coordinated their tactical and operational deci

sions directly, just as General Janvier and Admiral Smith did

at the strategic levels.

Both the NATO and UN military commands were responsiv

to their respective civilian political masters. The NAC , the high 

est civilian body of the alliance, and Willy Claes, NATO secre

tary-general, exercised command authority over NATO militar

forces through General Joulwan . The UN Security Council ex

ercised its authority through Boutros Boutros-Ghali , UN secre

tary-general. Yasushi Akashi, special representative to the UN

secretary-general, exercised day-to-day civilian authority ove

the UN-assigned forces through General Janvier .

The “Contact Group” of nations and its negotiating team, led

by US ambassador Richard Holbrooke, also served as ke

players prior to and during Deliberate Force. Although no

formally in the chain of command of either the UN or NATO

the Contact Group exercised considerable sway over the mili

tary actions taken. The focus of concern for Ambassador Hol

brooke and his team was the political negotiations in whic

they were involved. However, they were quite familiar with th

air operation as it unfolded and were in the best place t

witness firsthand its impact on the leadership of the warrin

factions. As time wore on and the start of Deliberate Forc

approached, this negotiating team became much less respon 

sive to the Contact Group and much more directed from th

US leadership.

Despite the heavy American flavor of the NATO comman

structure, international concerns and relationships helped

shape the planning for Deny Flight and, later, Deliberat

92
Force. Because many of the individuals wearing UN blue be

rets on the UNPF/ UNPROFOR staffs and in the units wer

from NATO member nations, they were quite familiar wit

NATO tactical and operational planning methods and proce 

dures. However, they operated within a political system ver

different than that of NATO—one, as mentioned above, tha

did not have the same depth of experience or knowledge o

military capabilities and limitations. Thus, although most po

litical leaders of the NATO nations were familiar with militar

air operations on the scale being contemplated for Bosnia

Herzegovina , UN leadership had little experience in planning 

coercive operation on this scale. But because of the increasin

importance of “offensive” air operations in Deny Flight/Delib 

erate Force planning, considerable debate resulted within bot

the UN and the NATO nations.

The Planning Trail Begins

The roots of what would become Deliberate Force stem from

late 1992. The Serbs (of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

and Bosnian Serbs were flying combat missions in support o

ground operations in the newly recognized Bosnia-Herze 

govina. Deciding to monitor the situation in an effort to carr

out its mandate, the UN Security Council in October 199

asked NATO to provide air surveillance in support of UNPRO

FOR. Consequently, NATO began Operation Sky Monitor late

that month. In December 1992, as the United States prepared

to support humanitarian airdrop and airlift operations int

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen Robert C. Oaks, then commander in

chief of US Air Forces Europe (CINCUSAFE),

6

 appointed Ma

Gen James E. Chambers (then commander of Seventeenth Ai

Force) joint force air component commander (JFACC) for U

Joint Task Force Provide Promise. The joint task force com 

mander at that time was Adm Jeremy M. Boorda , US Navy

Admiral Smith’s predecessor as CINCSOUTH and (as was Ad 

miral Smith ) commander in chief of US Naval Forces Europe

General Chambers operated for the first four months from

Ramstein AB, Germany, building his staff and conducting op 

erations in coordination with the UN on a bilateral basis.

93
In March 1993 the UN Security Council voted to establish 

no-fly zone over Bosnia , and NATO began enforcement of tha

exclusionary zone in April. NATO activated the CAOC, an

General Oaks dispatched General Chambers to form its core

The established command relationships placed the CAOC

technically under command of General Fornasiero yet als

subordinate to COMAIRSOUTH ; General Chambers becam

the director of the CAOC. Lt Gen Joseph W. Ashy, then COM

AIRSOUTH, assumed duties as the CFACC. The CAOC re

mained responsive to the commander of 5 ATAF yet becam

the de facto command post for COMAIRSOUTH as the CFACC

From the start of Deny Flight in April 1993, Generals Ash

and Chambers worked closely, their two staffs essentially be

coming the long-range planning and operations elements of 

single organization.

From the beginning of the no-fly-zone enforcement in th

spring of 1993 through the completion of Deliberate Force

military commanders and their staffs on both sides of th

Adriatic developed close working relationships that resulted in

unity of effort, if not unity of command and control (C2). Th

primary tool used by NATO to effect this coordination and t

lay out its plan for support of the political decisions was CINC

SOUTH Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101 “Deny Flight.” Al

though the plan was NATO’s theater plan and thus bore th

logo of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), AIRSOUTH

contributed considerable time and talent to its developmen

Indeed, the UNPROFOR staff in Zagreb also played a role in

formulating the plan to ensure that it truly supported the UN

forces and achievement of their mandate. 7 This plan becam

the “off-the-shelf” plan for implementation or revision as nec

essary and later formed the backbone for Deliberate Force.

OPLAN 40101 had its political roots in UN Security Counci

resolutions (UNSCR) and decisions of the NAC . The developin

plan incorporated the constraints and restraints imposed b

the political authorities. During the summer of 1993, adoption

of UNSCR 836 initiated the planning for and deployment o

forces to support the first-ever provision of offensive air sup

port to a UN effort.8 Admiral Boorda and General Ashy over 

saw the planning process although the respective staffs ha

responsibility for day-to-day refinement of the plan. Genera

94
Ashy formed a small core of air planners—the Deny Flight ai

operations center (AOC) at COMAIRSOUTH’s Naples head

quart ers—charging them to think more broadly than the AIR

SOUTH staff did. This cell served as a strategy-developmen

team upon which General Ashy and, later, General Ryan de

pended to develop the air operations plans to pursue NATO

objectives in the Balkans. This strategy cell functioned sim

larly to the “Black Hole” of Operation Desert Storm notoriety

Even during the early stages of Deny Flight, it became appar 

ent to General Ashy that much more might be required in th

end. As a result he took steps to ensure the identification o

significant targets and the maintenance of target folders tha

would support a more involved mission than the one envi

sioned early on. Col Daniel “Doc” Zoerb assumed leadership o

this strategy cell in early 1994.

The operational environment within which the AIRSOUTH

and CAOC planners had to operate differed in many aspect

from any they had previously experienced. The political com 

plexities, even the difficulty in identifying the “enemy,” guar

anteed that NATO’s first large-scale operation would be ver

different from America’s last large-scale operation—Deser

Storm. Bosnia contains extremes of geography and weathe

not found in Southwest Asia; mountainous and heavily fo 

liaged terrain render the gathering of target intelligence an

the precise delivery of weapons more problematic than ove

flat, open deserts. Dug-in troops and dispersed field equip 

ment would prove relatively difficult to locate and accuratel

target. The presence of friendlies (not to mention the pres

and nongovernmental organizations) in the vicinity of target

posed another concern not faced to the same extent in Deser

Storm . The airspace was constrained both in shape and size

comprising a virtual triangle of 150 nautical miles on a side

The presence of “neutral” countries on two sides and extensiv

civil air traffic transiting all sides of the triangle greatly com 

plicated the airspace-control problem. The rules of engage 

ment (ROE), therefore, were crafted very carefully to rende

mistakes in employment a very remote possibility.

From its inception in 1993, OPLAN 40101 contained provi

sions to go beyond the strict enforcement of a no-fly zone ove

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the issuance of UNSCR 836 in

95
June 1993, NATO revised the draft of OPLAN 40101 to includ

provisions for taking offensive action in support of UN objec

tives, if and when that should ever be approved.

Each provocation of the UN or new attack on a safe are

prompted a response—always political or occasionally militar

(see chaps. 2 and 3 for a detailed treatment of the background t

the actual operation). The large number of provocations indi

cated that the offending party ignored the political responses

Suffice it to say that in response to the changing situation in

Bosnia and to the world community’s reaction to it, the pla

underwent continuous revision from early 1993 onward—mos

recently in May 1995, only four months before Deliberate Forc

began. The core of OPLAN 40101, the concept of operation

(CONOPS), established five phases for the air operation, extend

ing from initial planning through final redeployment upon mis 

sion completion (table 4.1). Construction of the phases wa

closely linked to the ROE that were established and continu

ously modified (see chap. 14 for a detailed discussion of ROE).

Within phases three and four, steps and measures furthe

delineated specific actions that the commander could take t

respond to a changing operational environment. These step

and measures allowed NATO and the UN to gradually increas

the level of force applied to any warring faction in response t

noncompliance with terms of the UNSCRs . This planned gradu 

alism served to place checkpoints (some would say roadblocks

Table 4.1

OPLAN 40101 “Deny Flight” Phases and Objectives

Phase Objective(s)

 1 Compliance

 2 Show Presence

 3 Air-to-Air Enforcement and Close Air

Support (CAS) Operations

 4 Offensive Air Operations

 5 Termination and Redeployment

Source: Condensed from Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, “Den

Flight,” change 4, 3 May 1993.

96
to unrestrained escalation by the NATO commanders. Th

NAC required those checkpoints to account for the ver

complex political influences weighing on the military com 

manders. Until the initiation of Deliberate Force, the air-to

air and CAS steps of phase three were authorized only in

direct support of UN forces. Additionally, the UN on occa 

sion had authorized the offensive air operations of phas

four—the so-called first-strike option one. These strike

were derisively known as “pinpricks,” an accurate descrip 

tion of the level of damage inflicted on the target. Other tha

these, the UN had authorized no subsequent air operations

Any further actions would require both UN and NATO com 

manders’ approval for any air attacks, which became know

as the “dual-key” mechanism (see chap. 2).

Facilities and Processes

NATO C2 facilities are not known for being state-of-the-ar

or, in some cases, even for being adequate to the task at hand

Historically, NATO’s Southern Region has received system an

facility upgrades only after the other regions received theirs

Therefore, 5 ATAF and AFSOUTH/ AIRSOUTH had long existed

with less-than-optimal facilities and equipment. Communica 

tions and computers constituted obvious weaknesses, and th

lack of adequate office or command-center space proved prob

lematic. Thus, in the summer of 1995, as events in Bosnia

heated up—sparked specifically by vulnerabilities identified af

ter the downing of a US Air Force F-16 that June—the United

States took unilateral action. At General Ryan ’s request, 

Headquarters USAF team conducted the so-called Bake

Study in late July, which sparked numerous improvements t

operational conditions at the CAOC and put in motion man

personnel and equipment enhancements. The US 32d Air Op

erations Group from Ramstein AB, Germany, among others

provided direct support to planning and tasking in the form o

computers, communications, and personnel.

Although the United States initiated the Baker Study an

resultant C2 systems improvements, NATO should have pur

chased the improvements to its systems under normal condi

tions. However, the question of who would pay the bill

97
r emained a nonissue set aside for settlement at a later date

As the US national force provider for the NATO Europea

theater, Gen Richard E. Hawley, then CINCUSAFE, did no

concern himself with the idea that NATO planning and pro 

curement processes were being usurped. He was more inter 

ested in getting the job done. When General Ryan identified 

requirement, therefore, USAFE (or even Headquarters USAF

provided it as completely and quickly as possible. In fact b

the time Deliberate Force began, the opposite problem oc 

curred, with equipment virtually flooding the CAOC.

9

During July 1995, in an effort to improve the air campaign

planning process, the CAOC invited Col Dave Deptula , one o

the architects of the Desert Storm air campaign, to assist th

CAOC and the AOC planners in thinking through the develop 

ment of their air operations plan. 10 Checkmate planners a

Headquarters USAF/XOCC provided more help—in terms o

both intellect and equipment. The assistance provided by thes

and other individuals markedly improved the planning proces

itself, helping the staff focus on the essentials of the plan.

This effort to improve the processes and products of th

CAOC became quite intense by late August 1995, as NATO

and the UN made the necessary political decisions to author

ize the employment of airpower. Not only would the impendin

action be NATO’s first sustained employment of aircraft in th

air-to-ground mission, but also it would be the UN’s first us

of offensive airpower to coerce belligerent parties to resolve 

conflict. The precedent-setting importance of that fact was no

lost on the CFACC or his planning staff.

The Air Campaign Plan

The Deliberate Force air campaign plan eventually reflected

several elements of OPLAN 40101 but also differed from it in

many ways. To fully understand the plan as NATO eventuall

executed it, as well as the rationale for it, one needs to exam

ine the progression of the various related and supportin

plans that resulted in the first weapon delivery on 30 Augus

1995. This involves examining the framework established b

OPLAN 40101 as described above and then moving through

98
several key events in the development of the Deliberate Forc

air campaign plan. The metamorphosis of the military objec

tives and the strategies employed to achieve them are of par

ticular importance.

Early Plan Development

Antecedents of the initial planning for what would becom

Deliberate Force date from the decisions made by the NAC i

August 1993. In response to UNSCR 836, which authorized

the use of force to protect UNPROFOR and the safe areas

NATO planners developed the so-called operational options fo

air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1 1 Those options looked ver

much like the skeleton of a CONOPS for an air campaign pla

and did, in fact, become the touchstone for all future plans

The document essentially established options or progressiv

phases that NATO could implement to support varying level

of need from the UN:

Option One: First-Strike Phase

• limited in scope and duration

• aimed against militarily significant targets that impede o

prevent implementation of UNSCRs

• low chance of collateral damage , high chance of success

• attack conducted by more than one nation—ideally a

many as possible

• example: artillery batteries participating in the siege o

Sarajevo

Option Two: Initial Follow-on Phase

• limited to immediate environs of safe area

• relief of siege; later expanded to support of UNPROFOR

• examples: artillery and heavy weapons; supply points an

munitions sites; C2 facilities; early warning (EW) rada

and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites

Option Three: Expanded Operations Phase

• expanded outside immediate area under siege

• reattacks approved against previous targets as necessary

• required additional political approval

99
• examples: same as option two plus military-related petro 

leum, oil, and lubricants; counterair threats; and CAS

The two main differences between options two and three wer

geographic linkage and infrastructure. Whereas option two wa

closely tied to particular safe areas and targets immediatel

affecting the warring factions there, option three permitted mor

robust attack without specific linkage to a safe area and coul

affect the infrastructure of the belligerent. The differentiation

between option-two and -three targets was muddled, however, in

that option-three strikes might well result in increased collatera

damage and were seen as a huge political step to take.

In conjunction with this skeleton planning effort, in the fal

of 1993 NATO and the UN began to coordinate lists of poten 

tial targets that might be struck in the event the UN requested

“air support.” Although planners did considerable work on th

target lists over the intervening two years, few people outsid

the AOC at AIRSOUTH in Naples seem to have considered th

targets part of a theaterwide campaign plan. From time t

time, in response to some sort of provocation, the UN would

request—and NATO would fly—limited strikes against selected

targets. One such strike took place in early 1994 against th

Bosnian Serb airfield at Udbina in the Krajina region of Croa 

tia . NATO hit the airfield in response to flagrant violations o

the no-fly zone, yet without having a clear operational objec

tive. The UN prevented NATO from destroying significant tar

gets and putting the airfield out of business, intending th

attack merely as a signal of the “resolve” of the world commu

nity to enforce the provisions of UNSCRs to end the fighting

Such pinprick attacks—disconnected events with no real link

age to one another—accomplished little in the end.

Throughout 1994 NATO military and civilian leaders contin 

ued to encourage their counterparts in the UN to take a broa de

view of the potential impact of an air campaign and such 

campaign’s ability to achieve theater objectives. Detailed coor

dination of a list of targets began in earnest. More impor

tantly, the military objectives and, specifically, the air objec

tives began to come into much better focus. This increasingl

clear direction allowed planners at the AOC and the CAOC i

Vicenza to plan the prosecution of target sets systematicall

100
with the intent of affecting the BSA

s center of gravity (COG)

The list of targets became more than simply an à la cart

menu from which to choose one or two items.

Following a series of incidents in late 1994 involving th

targeting of NATO aircraft by the Bosnian Serb integrated ai

defense system (IADS), and with UN Security Council concur

rence, the NAC approved the planning and conduct of sup

pression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) apart from the CAS o

other targeting of option two. In response to this broadened

planning authorization, the CAOC developed a plan to system 

atically attack EW, SAM , and C2 sites that posed a threa

within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of the potential targets ex

isted in Bosnian Serb–held territory. The plan later becam

known as Operation Deadeye. Throughout the spring of 1995

the CAOC conducted extensive nodal analysis and completed

initial work on the plan.

1 2 It focused on force protectio

through the elimination, or at least degradation, of the Bos 

nian Serb army’s IADS (fig. 4.1). For political reasons, thi

operation was later split into two halves, Deadeye Southeas

and Deadeye Northwest.

Figure 4.1. Operation Deadeye Key Nodes (Extracted from briefing, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force, to U

Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, Februa

1996. [Secret] Information extracted is unclassified)

101
Summer 1995: The Situation Intensifies

NATO aircraft attacked the Pale ammunition depot on

24–25 May 1995 in response to escalating Bosnian Serb

threats to the eastern safe areas. In response, the Bosnia

Serbs took UN personnel hostage, a situation that persisted

for weeks and spurred development of yet another plan whic

finally began to draw together the disparate elements of pre

vious planning efforts. This plan, “NATO Air Operations in

Bosnia-Herzegovina,” existed in the form of briefing slides an

memos only and was the immediate precursor to Deliberat

Force. A two-step and time-sequenced campaign plan, it pro 

vided for escalatory measures should the UN and NATO com 

manders agree that they were not meeting earlier objectives

The CAOC requested and received assistance from Checkmat

in reviewing the plan; this helped further refine the objective

and associated tasks and measures of merit for achieving eac

objective.1 3 Planning for Deadeye , which had not yet been imple 

mented, continued to percolate on a separate but parallel track.

On 2 June 1995, Basher 52, a US F-16 flying a Deny Fligh

mission, was shot down near the Bosnian Serb stronghold o

Banja Luka. Consequently, COMAIRSOUTH briefed Operation

Deadeye for the first time and spurred intensified work on it

provisions. 1 4 The objective of Deadeye was to provide suppor

to ongoing Deny Flight operations and ensure freedom o

movement throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina by NATO aircraf

enforcing the no-fly zone. With the shootdown of Basher 52

the Deny Flight operational concept was revised and refocused

with a stronger emphasis on force protection. The revised

CONOPS, therefore, sought to reduce friendly force exposur

yet continued to support UN mandates.15 Interestingly, plan

ners made no formal modifications to OPLAN 40101 at thi

time but revised the guidance and direction to account for th

change in policy.

During late June and July, events in-theater escalated th

pace of work at a number of locations. At national, NATO , an

UN headquarters, officials formulated plans to respond to th

changing nature of the conflict. The UN safe areas of Zepa an

Srebrenica fell, and Gorazde came under increased threa

Although NATO employed CAS around Srebrenica in an attemp

102
to forestall its being overrun, a broad application of force on 

wider scale that would noticeably affect the Bosnian Serb

was lacking. Escalating violence and threats of violenc

against the remaining safe areas made it appear likely tha

NATO would have to use sustained offensive military force.

AIRSOUTH and CAOC planners had already begun develop 

ing a plan to provide CAS or battlefield air interdiction t

prevent Gorazde from being overrun. Although of a scal

larger than that previously employed, the plan would fall shor

of an air “campaign” plan. Shortly after the July summit in

London and the subsequent NAC decision to get tough, plan

ners developed similar documents for the defense of Sarajevo

Tuzla , and Bihac. The plans existed principally in the form o

briefing slides with little supporting material. All of them wer

safe-area-specific and not part of an operational-level theate

air campaign.

The Deliberate Force Plan Takes Shape

Each of the safe-area-specific plans focused on militarily

significant targets in the immediate vicinity of that safe area 

Concentrations of forces, heavy weapons, and lines of commu

nications constituted typical target sets. These plans sought t

defend their respective populations from Bosnian Serb attack

Deadeye Southeast and Northwest would provide SEAD fo

any of those area plans.

The chance of the UN’s approving sustained, large-scale ai

strikes had seemed quite remote before, but the decision

taken at the London summit solidified NATO resolve and em 

boldened the UN.

1 6 The earlier CONOPS , “NATO Air Operation

to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina,” again underwent revision.

A key modification to the plan, resulting from activit

among warring factions in July, was the UN’s adoption of th

NATO view of wider zones of action (ZOA), which entailed a

increase in radius of the total-exclusion zone around each saf

area from 20 kilometers (km) to 25 km. The ZOAs proposed b

AIRSOUTH, however, coincided with the subdivision of th

Deadeye plan, partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina into southeas

a nd northwest ZOAs . An area of overlap existed in the northeas

corner of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the vicinity of the Posavin

103
Corridor (fig. 4.2). The southeast ZOA contained the safe area

of Sarajevo and Gorazde, while Bihac lay in the northwes

ZOA. The Tuzla safe area was in both ZOAs . The UN ulti

mately accepted this ZOA subdivision of Bosnia and the impli

cation that targets well away from the safe areas could b

attacked. This change in UN thinking was important to th

eventual approval of the relatively wide-scale Deliberate Force

Adoption of the wider ZOAs permitted the application o

systematic air-to-ground targeting to effect the desired out

come in the safe areas. Although the ZOA concept did no

allow unfettered application of airpower by NATO throughou

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the concept was a significant step in th

direction of a “strategic” air campaign. The UN finally under

stood that activities occurring outside the safe areas by th

warring factions had a significant impact on more than on

safe area—indeed, on the entire country.

Figure 4.2. Zones of Action (Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan

COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force, to US Air Forc

Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996

[Secret] Information extracted is unclassified)

104
Planning for Deliberate Force continued simultaneously

with planning for the protection of individual safe areas an

for the conduct of Deadeye throughout July and August. An 

other intermediate plan developed by AIRSOUTH and CAOC

planners was for Operation Vulcan, designed to bring togethe

the constituent parts of other area plans’ elements into 

cohesive air operation in the southeast ZOA—especially th

Sarajevo area. This plan consisted of a master attack pla

(MAP),

1 7 which existed in the form of briefing slides. The Vu

can plan primarily targeted radio relays (RADREL), SAMs, am

munition depots, and military repair facilities.

At about the same time as the development of Vulcan an

the updates to the other individual safe-area plans, anothe

AFSOUTH plan/briefing entitled “Graduated Air Operations”1 

showed the connectedness of targets in the various safe-are

zones and ways they might be attacked in a progressive an

systematic manner. The plan suggested expanding operation

into neighboring safe areas or across the entire country, if nec 

essary. As a precursor, the plan assumed freedom of action o

NATO air forces, and its assurance remained a key element o

all planning efforts.

Even as these several plans evolved, the NATO Militar

Committee provided guidance and direction for the application

of a “graduated” strategy “to assess possible reactions of th

parties in conflict” following its meeting of 31 July 1995

“First, the objective of deterrence and, thereafter the two ob

jectives of providing CAS to defend Friendly Forces . . . and th

wider application [of] airpower in a wider context. . . . Finally, i

approved, the application of airpower on a greater scale.”1 9

Following that guidance, AIRSOUTH planners devised a se

quence of operations to represent the “building block” natur

of planned operations and phased an escalation of attacks on

targets near the safe areas. Implementation of the phase

depended upon the response by the Bosnian Serbs to the pre

vious phase. The planners also proposed other so-called non 

phased targets, but these largely fell into the option-three cate 

gory (OPLAN 40101 was still operative during this time).2 0 Th

London summit had authorized incorporation of only option

one and option-two targets into air-strike operational plans .

105
Also in August a key memorandum of understanding know

as the Air/Land Operations Coordination Document emerged

That memorandum established the basis for coordination be

tween AIRSOUTH (and by extension, the CAOC) and the UN

Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) operating under UNPROFOR

in the event that offensive air-strike operations began. Th

resultant draft plan2 1 called for close cooperation between

the air and land components of the overall operation (AIR 

SOUTH and RRF , respectively) although they technically

served different masters. This plan foresaw the need to coor 

dinate CAS and battlefield air interdiction missions with

RRF artillery fires. More than that, coordination mecha 

nisms evolved to minimize the chance of fratricide, limi

collateral damage, and give the RRF maximum opportunit

to jointly effect the desired outcome. In addition, one should

note that the fourth and most violent phase carried th

descriptor air/land operations rather than air operations, a

used in the CINCSOUTH/ FC UNPF memorandum. This

seemingly minor modification reflects the nature of th

document’s dominant land-operations theme.

By mid August, therefore, NATO had developed a patch 

work of air operations plans to deal with a variety of contin 

gencies and taskings.2 2 The plans themselves existed in th

form of briefing slides only, not as formal written document

like OPLAN 40101. Each briefing—therefore each plan—wa

refined to greater fidelity with each presentation and as th

situation in the area of responsibility changed. The nam

Deliberate Force surfaced about this time as a label for th

collection of plans. Deliberate Force brought several com 

mon characteristics to these plans: common understandin

of events that could trigger NATO action, planning assump 

tions, objective (or end state), and summary of the phase

sequences of attack:

Triggers

• killing of UN hostages

• attack on UN forces

• concentration of forces or heavy weapons deemed to be 

direct threat to a safe area

• shelling of civilian population areas or safe areas

106
• opposition to UN withdrawal (preemptive or reactive re

sponse contemplated)

Air Campaign Plan Assumptions

• international recognition of Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors

• necessary mandates provided by UN and NATO

• no opposition by Croatia to necessary air strikes on Krajin a

• neutrality of Serbia

• availability of assets from NATO contributing nations

• agreement of basing nations to operations from their ter 

ritories

• Bosnian Serb COG: historic fear of domination

• Bosnian Serb military advantage with respect to BiH 

ability to swing more capable but less numerous force

equipped with heavy weapons to places of their need o

choosing

• attacking Bosnian Serb advantages leads to changing th

balance of power to their disadvantage

• Bosnian Serb realization of a shift in advantage eventu 

ates in their suing for termination of hostilities

• only robust attack leads Bosnian Serbs to that realization

Military [Air] Objective

• a robust NATO air campaign that adversely alters th

BSA’s advantage in conducting successful military opera

tions against the BiH ; desired end state: Bosnian Serb

sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN

mandates, and negotiate

Phased Sequence of Attack

• isolate leadership and attack concentrated, time-sensitiv

targets

• isolate fielded forces and attack supply/logistics base

• attack fielded forces and selected infrastructure

• maintain nonphased sensitive target options 2 3

Deliberate Force: The Plan

As a result of the UN/ NATO Joint Targeting Board2 4 of 1

August 1995, COMAIRSOUTH distilled the approved list o

151 targets to 87 mission-specific targets for inclusion in th

107
Deliberate Force plan. These targets were of the option-on

and -two variety—and Bosnian Serb only. 2 5 The few target

grouped in the “demonstration” category consisted of only op

tion-one targets and were subsumed within the broader plan

Option-two targets fell into the “air operations” category. Th

“IADS” target set was not originally part of the Deliberat

Force concept but constituted the Deadeye piece of the overal

operation (fig. 4.3). 2 6

Fielded forces consisted mainly of heavy weapons rathe

than the personnel who manned them. Direct and essentia

targets included munitions depots and storage facilities a

well as supply depots and storage facilities. Command, control

and communications (C3) consisted largely of RADRELs , othe

Figure 4.3. Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept (Extracted from briefing, 

Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Forc

to US Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Forc

February 1996. [Secret] Information extracted is unclassified. Although th

depiction is substantially the same as the Deliberate Force briefings 

August 1995, those earlier briefings had divided communications into 

separate category from C2/Leadership, and “IADS” was called “EW/AI

DEF.” See AIRSOUTH briefing, subject: NATO Operations in Bosni

Herzegovina—Deliberate Force, c. August 1995 [NATO Secret], US A

Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)

108
communications nodes, and a few select command facilities

The IADS targets consisted of EW and SAM sites primarily

initially in the southeast and then into the northwest as nec

essary. Targets in the infrastructure category actually looked

more like lines of communications: transportation chok

points, bridges, and tunnels. Most true infrastructure target

were contained in option three. Planners closely examined th

linkage of all targets in an attempt to achieve paralysis of th

BSA with minimal effort and loss of life on both sides.

Obviously, one doesn’t drop bombs on target sets or COG

but on things—hopefully those things the adversary consider

valuable. CAOC intelligence personnel had aggressively sough

to identify as many potential targets as possible. They evalu 

ated targets within the categories as to their potential militar

value and the possibility for collateral damage associated wit

each desired mean point of impact (DMPI). Intelligence spe 

cialists then devised a target matrix to aid the CFACC an

planners in selecting targets for attack (table 4.2).

Table 4.2

Example Target Matrix

Target Category Demonstration Value Moderate Value High Value

Air Defense EW Site Radar East SAM Storage

Facility, DMPI: I-3

Electricity

Plant

C

3 Station Military C3

RADREL Bunker

Military C3 RADREL

Bunker, DMPI: I-6

Leadership Brigade Headquarters Division

Headquarters

Ground-Forces

Headquarters

Direct and

Essential

Military Facilities

Explosives Storage

Facility

DMPI: 12, 15

Vehicle Storage

Depot

Military Repair

Depot

Lines of

Communications Highway Bridge Highway Bridge Highway Tunnel

Infrastructure Petroleum Storage Ammo, Metal

Parts Plant

DMPI: 8, 11, 12

Military Plant

Source: Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Forc

to US Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996. (Secret) Informati

extracted is unclassified.

109
As one may accurately surmise from the foregoing discus

sion of planning efforts that preceded the actual start of air

strike operations, no single plan contained all componen

pieces of an air campaign plan. Because the safe areas wer

under constant and increasing threat from the Bosnian Serb

faction and because of shifting strategic guidance from bot

UN and higher NATO commands, the CAOC and AIRSOUTH

planners were prepared to implement any one of the series o

air operations plans. As it happened, an exercise of the Vulca

operation plan was scheduled for 29 August to 1 Septembe

1995. The C2 capabilities of the NATO forces and coordination

arrangements with the UN were set for evaluation. The impac

of a Bosnian Serb mortar round in Sarajevo, however, would

change those plans.

The Deliberate Force Plan in Action

With the completion of the various contingency plans fo

protection of the safe areas and the formation of the over 

arching Deliberate Force plan, the implementation of any o

them now awaited two events that had to occur before ai

strikes could begin. One of the warring factions had to pul

one of the so-called triggers, and NATO and the UN had t

turn the keys . Before the latter event could occur, the UNPF

commander decided that he had to completely redeploy hi

forces within Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to minimize th

possibility of a repeat of the earlier hostage taking of UN

peacekeepers (following the May attack on Pale ). UNPROFOR

completed its redeployment, and General Janvier, UNPF forc

commander, was prepared to turn his key after 25 August.2 

The marketplace mortaring on 28 August served to pull th

required trigger. Admiral Smith turned the NATO key immedi

ately, and Lt Gen Rupert Smith —commander of UNPROFOR

in Bosnia-Herzegovina and General Janvier’s subordinate—

turned the UN key2 8 on 29 August. NATO aircraft flew thei

first missions at the end of that tasking day. 2 9

At 0600Z on 29 August, COMAIRSOUTH and his staff from

Naples arrived at the CAOC. Colonel Zoerb , AOC director, an

Col Steve Teske, CAOC Plans director, jointly oversaw th

110
planning, tasking, and targeteering process from that poin

on. Involved in these processes were several special-purpos

cells, each with its own area of expertise or responsibility an

staffed mostly by US Air Force personnel on temporary duty.

The first day’s planned operations derived mostly from Op

erations Vulcan and Deadeye Southeast. Initial SEAD and ai

strikes targeted Bosnian Serb IADS, C

2

, and fielded forces

Five additional waves of strikes were planned against target

in the southeast ZOA. Pre- and poststrike reconnaissance

tanker, airborne early warning, electronic intelligence, air 

borne battlefield command and control, and combat air patro

were integrated to provide 24-hour coverage. This heavy reli

ance on support assets continued for the duration of the op

eration. The actual sortie rate was nearly double that antici

pated prior to Deliberate Force, requiring the rapid deploym en

of additional SEAD , tanker, and other support assets to th

theater, most from the United States.

3 0 The F-16CJ with th

high-speed antiradiation missile targeting system, for in 

stance, was in great demand, as was the airborne battlefield

command and control center aircraft. The latter provided no

only critical radio linkage between the CAOC and air force

that flew “feet dry” (i.e., over land) but also much-needed C

capability. The high demand for such supporting players wa

a lesson learned for air planners at all levels.

Because COMAIRSOUTH was extremely concerned with th

possibility of fratricide and collateral damage resulting from

the bombing, he personally selected each target and DMP

that the aircrews used throughout Deliberate Force. His direc

involvement, however, introduced another element of dela

into the air tasking message (ATM) process. For example

rapid retargeting of “shooter” missions required revision of th

tanker flow plan. Each time a change was introduced into th

ATM cycle, the planning-time clock would reset, which mean

that planners were constantly trying to respond to new com 

mand guidance and bomb damage assessment or otherwise b

responsive to the UN.

According to doctrine and practice prior to Deliberate Force

the MAP was a single-source targeteering, weaponeering, an

strike-package construction tool that should have contributed

to production of the ATM. The latter should have been produced

111
by 1600Z of the day preceding the start of tasking (i.e., 1

hours before the start of the tasked day). During the course o

Deliberate Force, however, the MAP evolved from a working

level tool to a vital input to the ATM during the first week o

so. By the second week of operations, the MAP nearly took on

a life of its own and was issued, along with its often numerou

daily changes, as the concise authority on taskings. The ATM

was essentially relegated to the status of a “cookie-cutter

style of planning document subject to any number of change

implemented by MAP alterations or other real-time tasking

from CAOC current operations.

The crisis action team produced the MAP after receipt o

commander’s guidance, newly approved targets, and DMPIs 

as well as any other specific guidance as to types of aircraft o

ordnance to use. Although pre–Deliberate Force planning pro 

cedures generally approximated those of Joint Publicatio

(Pub) 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

actual procedures after the first couple of days did not. Usin

cookie-cutter ATMs and tanker plans, faxing the MAP and it

numerous changes to units in lieu of adhering strictly to 

planning cycle, and employing similar work-arounds were de

vised to account for the dynamic and politically sensitive na

ture of the operation.

Given the abundance of forces available and the rather lim 

ited target set, someone outside the operation might b

tempted to ask why it was so difficult to adhere to a taskin

cycle with a minimal number of changes and turbulence. An

example may serve to show the pressures on COMAIRSOUTH

and the CAOC staff. During the first week of the operation

planners targeted an ammunition-storage depot, wrote tha

attack into the ATM , and tasked a mission of eight strik

aircraft plus all the necessary support to destroy the depo

Shortly before mission takeoff, the CAOC received word that 

company of French peacekeepers was close to the targe

Rather than canceling the mission outright, planners retasked

it within the same planning cycle for a different target. Tha

change then rippled into the tanker-flow plan as well as int

the tasking for all other assets planned to support the strik

mission. These types of mission changes were relatively com 

monplace and affected the entire day’s schedule.

112
The reason for canceling the original mission in the abov

example is fairly straightforward: to avoid the potential for frat

ricide in the mission area. The rationale for dynamically re

tasking the mission, rather than rolling the target into the nex

ATM cycle, is more complex. An undercurrent of apprehension

existed within the CAOC senior leadership that the politica

leadership of the UN and NATO might halt the operation befor

the military deemed the job accomplished and objective

achieved. Thus, the CAOC felt pressure to prosecute all poten 

tial targets as rapidly as possible just in case that occurred.

Constantly changing the tasking for so many of th

CFACC’s assets had the effect of substantially compressin

the original 24-hour planning/tasking cycle. The ATM an

MAP underwent major modifications, but because of commu

nications deficiencies, the CAOC had to fax the changes t

units; the latter often did not have the latest message. Thi

compression of the cycle was also evident in a subcycle called

the reconnaissance attack cycle (RAC). During the RAC , plan

ners identify reconnaissance requirements and assign aircraf

based on the ground commander’s needs. Those aircraft the

attack the targets and (if necessary) fly poststrike reconnais 

sance. Having to respond to the UNPROFOR commander’s

stated needs and those of the RRF commander at one poin

compressed the RAC to six hours. 3 1

As should be apparent, the theater strategy to achieve NATO

and UN objectives in the Balkans was essentially an air strategy

Since the objective was to coerce an enemy into a particula

pattern of behavior rather than destroy or defeat him, com 

manders maintained a very short leash on employment meas

ures in order to stop the operation rapidly at any time.

The ability to measure the effectiveness of an air campaign

is often elusive. Moreover, in an operation in which one can

not quantify the success or lack thereof in traditional term

(e.g., body counts, enemy-unit combat-effectiveness ratings

aircraft shot down, etc.), establishing measures of meri

proves particularly difficult. In addition, subdivision of th

campaign into phases allowed prosecution of the various es

tablished target sets to be measured. Although not explicitl

defined by beginning and end points, the phases corresponded

to the target sets that supported the identified Bosnian Serb

113
COG. Analysts measured the overall progress of the air cam

paign primarily against the desired end state.

The air campaign began with an intense pounding of th

Bosnian Serb IADS on 30 August. Targets were selecte

throughout southeast Bosnia to ensure freedom of movemen

for NATO aircraft operating there. Strike targets included ke

communications nodes and large ammunition-storage facili 

ties. On 1 September the UN requested that NATO “pause

the operation.

The turning off of the UN “key” had been anticipated bu

was not warmly greeted. The pause permitted intensified dip 

lomatic efforts by both the UN and Ambassador Holbrooke

team. During the pause the UN and NATO spelled out term

the Bosnian Serbs would have to meet in order to forestal

resumption of the Deliberate Force campaign. Poor weathe

hampered NATO monitoring of compliance, but by the morn 

ing of 5 September, it was obvious that the Bosnian Serb

were not meeting the UN-NATO demands, so Deliberate Forc

resumed. The very fact that NATO restarted the air operation

was in all likelihood the single most important decision mad

during the entire course of Deliberate Force.3 2 Ambassado

Holbrooke observed that the resumption of the operation wa

the “most critical moment of the bombing” and that “if th

bombing had not resumed that day, the negotiations would

have been very adversely affected.”3 3

When the campaign resumed on 5 September, COMAIR

SOUTH was determined to intensify the pace as much as prac

tical. Although the target list was not long, very poor weathe

diminished the success of many missions or forced them t

abort. The ROE required positive identification of the assigne

DMPI before dropping bombs, and that was not always possi

ble because of bad weather. Despite the problems encountered

the operation proceeded so smoothly that by 7 Septembe

CINCSOUTH apprised SACEUR of substantial progress:

a . Attack of the IADS in the southeastern ZOA had been largely successful. Its robustness and redundancy, however, made continued

suppression necessary.

b. Responsive CAS and RRF artillery continued to pound targets in

and around the Sarajevo area. The synergism of this coordinated

air-land response had proven very successful in suppressing Bos -

nian Serb shelling of Sarajevo .

114
c. A systematic attack of fielded forces continued, including C

 as well

as direct and essential military support.

d. Targeting of multiple choke points and bridges had begun. NATO

closely coordinated with UNPROFOR to achieve the desired effect

yet preserve routes that could sustain resupply and humanitarian

relief of Sarajevo .

3 4

At the same time, COMAIRSOUTH realized that he wa

quickly facing a targeting dilemma. Even with the forced slow 

down in operations due to poor weather, the approved targe

list from the 14 August Joint Targeting Board was almos

exhausted. On the one hand, General Ryan wanted to prose

cute the targets as rapidly as possible in case of another hal

On the other hand, he became very concerned about reachin

the end of the approved option-two targets before achievin

the end state.

Some of the temporary personnel that had arrived to aug

ment the CAOC came equipped with both a good ability t

think “outside the box” (using a fresh approach to the sam

problem) and a computer system called the JFACC Plannin

Tool.

3 5 At about this time, using the JFACC Planning Tool an

working apart from the ongoing Deliberate Force plannin

process, a small team developed options for attacking target

in the option-three category. Although the likelihood of eve

receiving clearance to prosecute those targets was remote be

cause of the likelihood of collateral damage , planning for tha

contingency continued nonetheless. COMAIRSOUTH had al

ready identified his targeting predicament to CINCSOUTH ; for

tunately, the team never had to pursue option three. As 

consequence, AIRSOUTH became even more selective abou

the targets it would strike. The planners hoped to wear dow

the Bosnian Serbs by continuing to strike those few remainin

targets to ensure their total destruction.

On 14 September Admiral Smith and General Janvie

agreed that NATO had substantially achieved the military ob

jectives and that they needed another pause to determine th

actual compliance of the Bosnian Serbs with their agree

ments. 3 6 At that time only eight targets of the original 56 ha

escaped destruction. Following an extension of the origina

72-hour pause for another 72 hours, the two commander

115
issued a joint statement on 20 September, declaring succes

of the operation and achievement of the end state.

Conformity to and Deviation from

Planning Doctrine and Practice

Many similarities existed between planning doctrine and th

practical experience of Deliberate Force due to the credibilit

and influence of existing US (Air Force and joint) doctrine

Experience diverged from doctrine, however, as a result o

conflicts between the underlying assumptions of existing doc 

trine and those that framed Deliberate Force.

Of particular importance to the commander fighting the bat

tle is clarity of the objective. Without a clearly defined objectiv

for operations and a desired end state, the military commande

may flounder in uncertainty. Numerous periods of uncertaint

about strategic objectives existed throughout the two and one

half years of NATO involvement in the Balkans leading up t

Deliberate Force. The CINCSOUTH/ FC UNPF memorandum o

understanding of 14 August 1995 clearly established condi

tions for the initiation of hostilities and strategic objective

However, the evolution of operational objectives during th

weeks preceding the operation does indicate significan

changes in the desired end state. For example, compelling th

Bosnian Serbs to negotiate was added to those objectives.3 7

Another similarity between Deliberate Force experience an

US doctrine is the asymmetric nature of the strategy tha

NATO employed. Without effective air opposition from th

BSA, NATO established air superiority quickly and was threat

ened only by ground-based air-defense systems. Having char

acteristics sharply asymmetric from those of the faction unde

attack, the NATO air armada remained free to strike at target

of its choosing. For example, although the BSA enjoyed signifi

cant advantages in (ground-based) heavy weapons over th

federation forces, those weapons were of little use agains

NATO airpower. Although attacking individual artillery tube

proved too difficult for NATO to conduct economically, in directly

attacking those weapons through strikes on ammunition

storage, repair, and weapon-storage facilities largely negated

116
the BSA advantage. The supremacy of space and information

capabilities on NATO’s part likewise overwhelmed the Bosnia

Serbs, denying them any security of operations or information

about their enemy.

The selection of target sets by AIRSOUTH planners indi

cated a clear understanding of direct- and indirect-targetin

strategies. Few option-one and -two targets directly affecte

the Bosnian Serb COG, thus requiring an indirect strategy

For example, AIRSOUTH had assessed that the BSA’s advan

tage in heavy weapons hinged on its ability to shift a smal

number of highly trained personnel from one battle to an

other, using equipment stored in dispersed locations. Wit

devastating air attacks on the means of C2 of those personne

rather than direct attacks on the equipment or personnel, th

BSA could no longer effectively command and control them

and respond to rapid changes on the battlefield. Thus, indi

rectly attacking that strength by attacking the supporting C

nodes greatly reduced its effectiveness.

The topography and weather in the mission area militated

against successfully attacking individual artillery pieces o

tanks. Moreover, it made little sense to attack the tubes tha

the UN demanded the Serbs remove from the total-exclusion

zones. The Serbs could have claimed, with some justification

that they were being prohibited from withdrawing their artil

lery by NATO air strikes. This example of asymmetric an

indirect attack served to neutralize the strength of the BSA.

Although Deliberate Force incorporated many of the doc 

trinal concepts found in US joint doctrine and NATO proce

dures (such as they were), the operation diverged in signifi 

cant areas as well. Of special concern was the “friendly” C

arrangement. Although the military forces assigned to NATO

and the UN had worked together for nearly three years, ther

was never a single commander over all air and land forces

Yet, even after the UN turned its key and Deliberate Forc

began, CINCSOUTH had to coordinate with the force com 

mander of UNPF (as a de facto “land component commander”

and RRF and respond to their concerns. The initial 24-hou

“pause” on 1 September that stretched into four days is 

prime example of the fragility of that C

2

 arrangement. Th

pause had emanated from outside CINCSOUTH’s change o

117
command and required intensive coordination to ensure tha

no operational military problems developed. Yet another ex 

ample of fragile C2 occurred between the CAOC and RRF . The

essentially revalidated the targets each night during the plan

ning process.3 8 Although the August Joint Targeting Board

had given explicit approval to prosecute the option-two tar

gets, the UN reviewed and approved them anew each day.

Even within the NATO command structure, significant chal

lenges existed. For instance, a simple yet telling change had t

be made in terminology and procedure. For years, the United

States and NATO have issued to flying units an air taskin

order , the directive coordinating all flying activities of the com 

mand. One of the coalition partners, however, refused to ac

cept “orders” from NATO, thus necessitating a name change t

“air tasking message.” Although not significant at first glance

the distinction highlights a potential area for exploitation by 

future adversary. Of more significance, however, is the seem 

ing lack of adequate authority, planning, and integration o

search-and-rescue assets of the member nations. When 

French Mirage 2000 (call sign Ebro 33) was shot down (th

only NATO aircraft lost during Deliberate Force), NATO mad

rather faltering attempts to locate and rescue the aircrew

Both US Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) force

and Navy rescue teams participated but not in coordination.3 9

Another doctrinal area from which Deliberate Force signifi 

cantly deviated had to do with the concept of synergy—a ke

tenet of aerospace power. Although AIRSOUTH achieved cer 

tain internal synergies at the tactical level, it realized littl

planned external synergy. Internal synergy, through use o

composite force packages that contained all elements neces

sary to accomplish the strike mission, ensured force securit

by utilizing the full range of capabilities of airpower platforms

On the other hand, although the Air/Land Operations Coordi

nation Document set forth operating procedures for land an

air forces, it merely provided deconfliction of operations. Th

primary purpose of the agreement was to avoid collocating a

artillery round and an aircraft in the same piece of sky. I

neither established nor fostered synergistic effects of the RRF

and NATO air forces.

118
Airpower, however, did achieve one unintended synergy with

land forces. Because of the simultaneous nature of Deliberat

Force and the BiH /Croatian Defense Council (HVO) federatio

ground offensive, both operations seem to have benefited from

the battlefield successes of the other. COMAIRSOUTH took grea

pains to avoid even the appearance that NATO had somehow

coordinated operations with the federation. The fact remained

however, that the BSA was severely pressed from the western

offensive, was being hurt by the bombing, and was unable t

exercise effective C2 over its forces as a result. NATO determine

that it had been so successful in this regard that at one poin

General Hornburg suggested providing Gen Ratko Mladic (th

BSA commander) with a cellular phone and some satellite pho

tos, thinking that Mladic did not have a clue as to what wa

happening to his forces. 4 0 Thus, ground and air forces achieve

de facto synergies with each other’s operations that undoubtedl

propelled both toward achievement of their respective objectives

Whereas political and military strategic objectives durin

the cold war focused on the war-winning nature of militar

operations, planners and commanders have experienced

something of a vacuum when it comes to clear strategic guid 

ance in operations other than war (OOTW). Even the definition

of OOTW and the differentiation between it and “war” hav

proven difficult to establish. To strategic-level planners an

decision makers (e.g., at NATO headquarters and the UN i

New York), Deliberate Force was an OOTW. But to aircrew

dropping bombs and dodging SAMs over Bosnia-Herzegovina 

the operation looked every bit like a war. Not having a clear

warlike focus from strategic decision makers placed opera 

tional- and tactical-level warriors in a tenuous position. Th

pressure to implement warlike air actions while receivin

OOTW-like political and military guidance seemed to culm

nate at the CAOC. As our nation’s history has shown, militar

and political pressures often compete during US unilatera

action. The problems can (and likely will) be exacerbated in 

coalition endeavor such as Deliberate Force in which membe

nations have different agendas to advance and in which na

tional military doctrine and practice may not coincide. 

number of factors, such as lack of coalition consensus, activ

involvement of the UN, or diffused influence of other bodie

119
(e.g., the Contact Group) can further complicate the effectiv

employment of airpower.

Clearly, existing NATO military doctrine—specifically, air 

power doctrine—is woefully inadequate to give proper guid 

ance to NATO military commanders engaged in UN-sponsored

NATO missions. Because of NATO’s historic focus on self-de

fense rather than any out-of-area employment, little in th

way of useful doctrine has arisen to support such “new world

order” activities. Each member nation’s citizenry and leader 

ship must wrestle with the question of whether or not NATO

should involve itself in out-of-area activities. The question re

mains important for military leaders because of the potentia

uncertainty it can lend to their impending mission and th

political will supporting it. Although several member nations

including the United States, have brought recent operationa

experience to the alliance, the NATO bureaucracy still seem

mired in a historical rut.

Grasping the differences in the relative sophistication of U

and NATO planning processes and mechanisms is key to un

derstanding why Deliberate Force looked so much like a U

effort. Due in large measure to its relatively large military forc

structure, the United States was best suited for the leadership

role in the operation. Many allies had taken part in US train 

ing of one sort or another, giving them a basic understandin

of the US method of planning, tasking, and—in some cases—

campaign planning. 4 1 Yet, even with that very significan

cross-flow of information and expertise, COMAIRSOUTH foun

himself with a limited number of planners in whom he ha

confidence to conduct the important planning for Deliberat

Force. General Ryan also knew that he had the option at an

time of asking higher US headquarters for support if h

needed it—and he exercised that option. Although Den

Flight/Deliberate Force most definitely remained a NATO ef

fort, no one hesitated to request unilateral assistance from th

United States —which did not hesitate to provide it.

Even with its long history of peacekeeping involvemen

around the world, the UN has no doctrine of airpower employ

ment. Until Deny Flight enforcement actions began in Ap ril 1993

the UN had not had any significant air force at its disposal—

certainly not one with a “shooter” capability. Correspondingly

120
prior UN operations typically had been commanded and con 

trolled by land-force commanders, some with little experienc

or familiarity with airpower theory and doctrine. The resultin

lack of detailed understanding of airpower missions and capa 

bilities, therefore, is not surprising. Throughout the early day

of peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia , smal

cells of air force personnel at the in-theater headquarter

managed to bring some “air sense” to the UN operation. Bu

because the UN secretary-general, his special representative

and the UNPF force commander made most of the critica

decisions driving the UN operation, their collective lack of un

derstanding of airpower often resulted in constraints that ef

fectively hobbled its potential impact.

During the height of the cold war, SACEUR’s General De

fense Plan sought to defend NATO against attack into th

alliance’s territory, meet force with force, reestablish the bor

ders, and force the Warsaw Pact to desist in its military opera 

tions. Such war planning engendered an attitude of steadi

ness—a sense that nothing would ever change and that th

correlation of forces contributed stability to the European con 

tinent. In the past, what people have considered NATO “doc

trine” has actually been little more than procedure. In th

Jominian tradition, the defense of Central Europe would b

rather mechanistic—from both the ground and air perspec

tives. Decision processes could afford to be slow and meas

ured. However, the inherent instability and requirement fo

rapid responsiveness in OOTW put stress on the NATO civilia

and military bureaucracy, forcing it to shift its operationa

focus toward a much more fluid “maneuver warfare” strategy

Further, competing national interests of NATO member na 

tions can sometimes negatively affect the achievement of alli

ance goals. No longer can member nations focus on defeatin

a common enemy; now they must strive to achieve somewha

less defined objectives against less clearly identified adversarie s

Due to the lack of solid NATO, UN, or other coalition doc 

trine for the operational environment of the Balkans, com 

manders and planners had to fall back on their national doc 

trine and personal experience. Yet, even that doctrine wa

incomplete, so they had to deviate from it when the situation

demanded. The unique circumstances of the theater required

121
CAOC and AIRSOUTH planners to exercise considerable origi

nal thinking in devising a workable and acceptable strateg

for implementation.

Of first priority in Air Force doctrine is control of the air. 

Some modern airpower advocates, such as Col Phillip Meilinger

have gone so far as to equate air superiority with victory.4 3 Colo

nel Meilinger calls into question the usefulness of air superiority

however, if the enemy believes that his opponent will not exploi

it or if there is nothing that air superiority can effectively exploi

NATO unequivocally achieved air superiority almost immediatel

on 30 August, yet overall success remained in question even

after the final bomb fell on 14 September. The nature of th

operation did not lend itself to final solution through the appli

cation of airpower although such application absolutely facili

tated success. Perhaps a redefinition of victory in the OOTW

context would be appropriate for the future.

In contrast, prior to Deliberate Force some people main 

tained that airpower could not be decisive. In an interview

Ambassador Holbrooke pointed this out, saying that man

people believed, “almost as a Mantra, that you cannot us

airpower unless it’s backed up by ground troops.”4 4 He be

lieved that an ambivalence existed concerning the capability o

airpower to achieve the objective without the introduction o

significant ground forces. Airpower, however, overcame tha

skepticism in the end.

Although the impact of existing doctrine was substantial

deviations from it ensured success in this nontextbook opera 

tion. Because doctrine has evolved over the decades to enabl

air forces to contribute to war winning, it is less than opti

mally suited for OOTWs. But if one views doctrine as guidanc

rather than as “Holy Writ,” the tenets of flexibility and versatil

ity can extend beyond the machines themselves to the Ai

Force planners and commanders who direct their employmen t.

As described in the previous chapter, US joint-doctrine pub 

lications have sought to lay common foundations upon whic

the individual services can build their doctrine. Such com 

monality has advantages but can drive inappropriate deci

sions if one follows it too rigidly. For example, Joint Pub 1-02

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associate

Terms, associates a COG with a “military force.” That is cer 

122
tainly true in most scenarios, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina th

COG was the Bosnian Serbs’ mental attitude—their fear o

domination. That attitude extended well beyond the force t

the populace and civilian leadership.

Although AIRSOUTH determined that the “historic Bosnia

Serb fear of domination” was the COG to attack, it was equall

important to defend the Bosnian-government COG—the city o

Sarajevo. More than any other location in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

that city symbolizes the core issue for Bosnian Muslims. Los

of Sarajevo would have led to the fall of the federation and th

end of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary, sovereign nation

Thus, protection of the “friendly” COG was every bit as impor

tant to the overall success of the operation as was attack o

the “enemy” COG. Current doctrine is virtually silent abou

the issue of defending friendly COGs.

On a more practical level, the “standard” 24-hour taskin

cycle has given military planners a schedule tied to the su

and their circadian rhythms. However, rigid adherence t

such a cycle may detract from the very flexibility that airpowe

affords the commander. The need to respond rapidly to chang

ing situations required massive daily changes to current op

erations tasked by the CAOC. More responsive systems, bot

hardware and management, would contribute to breaking tha

reliance on a 24-hour cycle and getting inside an adversary’s

observe -orient-decide-act loop4 5 or his tasking cycle.

Joint Pub 3-56.1 provides joint air campaign planners a

excellent tool to help them organize an air operations plan

AIRSOUTH and the CAOC planners used elements of the five

phase air campaign planning process described in section

three of that publication (and chap. 3 of this book) prior t

and during Deliberate Force. That process, not linear but it 

erative in nature, has excellent applicability across the spec

trum of war and OOTW. The first phase, “Operational Envi

ronment Research,” which was conducted continuously

affected the other four phases. The tool, having no fixed

length, can be customized for the contingency; it is also re

sults-oriented and responsive to the fog and friction of warfar

(or of OOTW). Too few planners in the CAOC and AIRSOUTH

were familiar with either this doctrinal tool or the trainin

available in its application.4 6

123
The physical and organizational layout of the CAOC, a

previously described, did not adequately support planning re

quirements for a dynamic operation such as Deliberate Force

The CAOC lacked a central command facility, and a sense o

unit cohesion did not exist because of the short-duration

temporary-duty assignments of personnel. Further, it lacked

adequate communications means, and competing nationa

and parochial service interests were abundant.

For example, because the physical layout of the CAOC

buildings and lack of office space prevented collocation of th

command’s various cells, they had to work very hard to coor

dinate their work. The JSOTF , headquartered at San Vito de

Normanni AB , Italy (the joint US Special Operations Force

[SOF] contingent), had posted liaison officers in three separat

locations at the CAOC: the combined rescue coordination cen 

ter, the CAS cell, and intelligence (C-2). These liaison officer

had different reporting chains for their SOF specialty area. 

special-operations liaison element did not exist in the CAOC

thus ensuring a piecemeal approach to the provision of U

SOF to the CFACC. JSOTF did not have a strong advocate fo

its capabilities and, therefore, was underutilized—or, in a

least one instance, utilized incorrectly. The CAOC’s strategi

plans were formulated at “Fort Apache,” nickname for th

temporary facility outside the main building. Most decision

about tasking were worked between Fort Apache and the com 

mander’s office. Thus, inadequate facilities and competing pri

orities resulted in less-than-optimal SOF employment.

In at least one instance, the use of AC-130 gunships in 

purely reconnaissance role nearly resulted in the loss of 1

aircrew members.4 7 During the first week of the campaign

gunships were tasked to conduct reconnaissance of road

around Sarajevo, looking for movements of Bosnian Serb

heavy weapons. The gunships were retasked and flew fiv

successive nights following the same general flight profile. O

the fifth night, the aircraft came under antiaircraft artiller

(AAA) and SAM fire. After the AAA exploded above the aircraf

and flares defeated the SAMs, the AC-130 recovered withou

further incident. Although gunships have an armed-recon 

naissance role, the CAOC decided time and again to use th

AC-130 in a purely reconnaissance role, rather than emplo

124
other special-operations assets tailored to the tasking. Thi

highlights the lack of a viable special-operations advocate on

the CAOC planning and operations staff. Because SOF repre

sentatives, such as a special-operations liaison element, wer

not involved in initial targeting decisions, very scarce an

high-value assets suffered from less-than-optimal employmen t .

The practical outgrowth of the planning process—the Delib 

erate Force air campaign plan—and the way in which it wa

executed at the operational level dramatically altered the tacti

cal conduct of the operation. In most wars and OOTWs , th

reaction of the enemy will dictate changes to operations, bu

three major external factors influenced the conduct of Deliber 

ate Force even more profoundly. First, force protection was o

paramount importance to COMAIRSOUTH, CINCSOUTH, an

the UN commanders. On the NATO side of the Adriatic , th

opinion that not a single target was worth the life of on

aircrew member typified the concern for force protection. A

for the UN, it was unwilling to turn its key until all UN force

redeployed to more defensible cantonments. After Deliberat

Force started, any UN movement usually affected NATO tar 

geting and often resulted in mission cancellations or changes

The second major external factor, the avoidance of fratricide

proved nearly as important as force protection. Planners mad

every effort to prevent striking targets in proximity to know

UN or other friendly personnel. Third, because of NATO ’s ex

treme concern for collateral damage, planners viewed the se

lection of each DMPI through the filter of potential collatera

damage. Commanders were extremely concerned that eve

one stray bomb might kill innocent civilians and thereby un

dermine world support for the operation. Rather than extend

ing to the politicians and Contact Group negotiators, this con 

cern for collateral damage appears to have been a constrain

self-imposed by NATO.

4 8

Conclusion

As we have seen, the Deliberate Force air campaign wa

carefully planned and executed to achieve both explicit an

implicit objectives that emanated from the NAC and the UN

125
Security Council over the course of years of involvement in th

Balkans. The air objective established by COMAIRSOUTH fo

his command would cause the Bosnian Serbs, as noted above

to “sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN

mandates, and negotiate.”

This chapter has endeavored to examine the nature of De

liberate Force’s remarkable success, which was largely unpre

meditated and resulted from the unforeseen impact of th

stopping and restarting of the air campaign. The restart of 

September shocked the Bosnian Serb leadership and for th

first time convinced General Mladic of NATO’s resolve. Th

chapter also examined the relationship of airpower doctrine t

the planning and conduct of Deliberate Force. Clearly, th

operation both deviated from established airpower doctrine i

certain key areas and adhered to it in others. A vacuum exist

in the area of good doctrine for OOTW in US joint and servic

doctrine.

When Admiral Smith and General Janvier issued their join

statement from Zagreb on 20 September 1995 declarin

achievement of the end state, Deliberate Force ended. 49 Th

operation realized all theater and air objectives and estab

lished preconditions for the eventual Dayton Peace Accord

talks. Although airpower had not operated in isolation from

other components, it was decisive. Perhaps future contingen 

cies will feature naval or land forces more prominently tha

air forces. As Gen Ronald Fogleman , former chief of staff of th

US Air Force observed, “Joint warfighting is not necessarily a

equal opportunity enterprise.”5 0 Airpower doctrine and plan 

ning must support the full range of aerospace operations a

well as support and complement the capabilities of other com 

ponents. But such doctrine and planning must enable th

strategic and independent employment of airpower.

Notes

1. Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH an

commander, Sixteenth Air Force, to US Air Force Corona Conference, sub

ject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996. [Secret] Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

2. Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, “Of Saber Charges, Escor

Fighters, and Spacecraft,” Air University Review, September 1983, 4.

126
3. Briefing, Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director, 5 ATAF CAOC, Vicenz

Italy, to study team, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Operation Deliberate Forc

14 March 1996.

4. The senior national representative maintained an understandabl

“national” view of the operation. This representative would conduct liaiso

with his nation, and any objections to the operation would come throug

him. Nations would get information directly from those representatives fo

their own decision-making bodies to act on. Curiously, the United State

did not have such a representative. Although it might seem obvious that th

United States did not need a senior national representative since the opera

tion used US commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others felt tha

other nations sometimes had better information than they did. For th

purposes of Deliberate Force and with only limited exceptions, the com 

manders diligently maintained their identification as NATO commander

rather than US commanders.

5. UNPROFOR reorganized in the spring of 1995, which changed th

overall body to UN Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia; the former Bosni

Herzegovina Command changed to UNPROFOR.

6. CINCUSAFE also serves as the NATO commander of Allied Air Force

Central Europe (COMAIRCENT). Thus, he has the unique ability to cros

over between national and NATO responsibilities—and often does so. Ge

Richard Hawley replaced General Oaks prior to Deliberate Force.

7. Author’s experience as commander of UNPROFOR’s Monitoring an

Close Air Support Coordination Center, Zagreb, Croatia, May–October 1993

8. Within two weeks of passage of UNSCR 836 in June 1993, the pos

tion of force commander of UNPROFOR changed hands to Lt Gen Jean Co

of the French army. Speculation at the time linked those two events.

9. Gen Richard Hawley, CINCUSAFE and COMAIRCENT, interviewed b

author, Ramstein AB, Germany, 12 February 1996.

10. Col Steve Teske, executive to Headquarters AIRCENT/Deputy Chi

of Staff for Plans and Policy, and CAOC Plans (served on temporary duty

interviewed by author, Ramstein AB, Germany, 14 February 1996.

11. North Atlantic Council, memorandum to the secretary-general, Nort

Atlantic Treaty Organization, subject: NAC Decision Statement MCM-KAD-084

93, Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8 August 1993

12. Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, “Deliberate Force Factual Re 

view,” draft, 14 November 1995, 2-2. (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

13. Deputy chief, Checkmate Division, Headquarters USAF/XOOC

memorandum to director, CAOC Plans, 28 May 1995.

14. Ibid., 2-3.

15. Briefing, Gen George Joulwan, SACEUR, to the NAC, 21 June 1995.

16. Notice C-N (95) 65, “Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the [Nort

Atlantic] Council on Tuesday, 25th July 1995 at 2:30 p.m.”

127
17. As used here, the MAP is roughly equivalent to the master air attac

plan (MAAP) as specified in Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command and Contro

for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994.

18. The term graduated air operations may sound vaguely familiar an

unpleasant. The policy of gradual escalation during Operation Rollin

Thunder of 1965–68 sought to achieve success through the sending o

“signals” to the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. Political restraints place

on the operation and many other factors mitigated against success. Deliber 

ate Force had quite different goals and perhaps even more sensitive politic

ramifications.

19. Military Committee, memorandum to the secretary-general, NAC

MCM-KAD-057-95, 31 July 1995. (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

20. In his letter to the UN secretary-general to convey C-N (95) 6

“Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the [North Atlantic] Council on Tuesday

25th July 1995 at 2:30 p.m.,” NATO secretary-general Willy Claes states th

NAC’s willingness to authorize option three or elements thereof. In re 

sponse, Boutros Boutros-Ghali “notes” that the option-three question re 

mains open, but he is obviously unenthusiastic about prosecuting a bellig 

erent that severely.

21. “Air/Land Operations Coordination Document,” draft, Rapid Reac

tion Forces (RRFOS) 1000-12, August 1995.

22. The US Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Ala

maintains electronic and paper copies of these plans.

23. AIRSOUTH briefing, subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herze 

govina—Deliberate Force, c. 1 August 1995, US Air Force Historical Re 

search Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

24. The Joint Targeting Board, whose key members included CINC 

SOUTH and the force commander of UNPROFOR/UNPF, was the high-leve

coordination body that reviewed the target listing.

25. “Deliberate Force Factual Review,” 2-6. (NATO Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

26. Naming of the separate safe-area air-strike operations and determin 

ing where one ended and another began are difficult tasks. Operation

Vulcan and Deadeye were separate but closely linked, in that the first woul

not happen without the second. During the conduct of the operation, COM

AIRSOUTH directed that the overall operation be named Deliberate Force, 

convention used throughout the remainder of the discussion.

27. Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, deputy commander, Implementation Forc

(earlier, the force commander of UNPF), interviewed by author, Sarajevo

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 9 February 1996.

28. Although the authority for key turning had been delegated to Gen

eral Janvier, he was out of the country on leave this day and had delegate

“key control” to General Smith. According to his own account, Janvie

learned about the situation and agreed fully with Smith’s decision. H

128
immediately returned to his headquarters in Zagreb prior to initiation of th

air campaign on the 29th/30th.

29. The 24-hour tasking day extended, for example, from 0300 29 Au 

gust to 0259 30 August. Dispatch of the air tasking message (ATM)—th

planning/tasking document—was planned to (theoretically) allow adequat

time for executing units to receive the ATM, complete mission planning an

coordination, and complete mission-crew briefings.

30. After reevaluation of the Deny Flight mission earlier in the summe

of 1995, many aircraft redeployed to their home bases with the under 

standing that they were on a relatively short “string” for recall in the even

they were needed in-theater.

31. Hornburg briefing.

32. Diplomatic channels indicated that General Janvier fully intended t

make the pause a halt. Yugoslav president Milosevic was truly shocke

when the bombing resumed. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, interviewe

by Maj Mark McLaughlin and Dr. Karl Mueller, New York, N.Y., 24 Ma

1996.

33. Ibid.

34. Message, 070800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH to SACEUR, 7 Septembe

1995. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

35. Headquarters USAF/XOOC (Checkmate) sent Maj John Riggin

along with the JFACC Planning Tool. Checkmate had maintained a pres 

ence in the CAOC for many months and was well acquainted with th

situation. The “home office” had also provided much help.

36. Exchange of letters between Admiral Smith (CINCSOUTH) and Gen

eral Janvier (FC UNPF), 14 September 1995.

37. Briefing slides, CAOC, Vicenza, Italy, subject: Deliberate Force, 

early August 1995.

38. Brig Gen David Sawyer, deputy director, 5 ATAF CAOC, interviewe

by Maj Tim Reagan, Vicenza, Italy, 16 October 1995.

39. Lt Col Randy P. Durham, chief, Strategy and Doctrine Branch, Ai

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Hurlburt Field, Fla., “Tri

Report, JSOTF2, San Vito dei Normanni AB, IT, 5 Aug–11 Oct 95.” Colone

Durham served as the JSOTF2/J-3 (Operations) during Deliberate Force.

40. Hornburg briefing.

41. Headquarters AIRCENT at Ramstein AB, Germany, has recently de 

veloped an air campaign planning course for presentation to NATO cam 

paign planners. The course is patterned closely after the USAF’s Join

Doctrine Air Campaign Course taught at Maxwell AFB, Ala. (see also not

44). The AIRCENT course is the only one of its kind in NATO and ha

recently moved to the NATO School (Supreme Headquarters Allied Power

Europe [SHAPE]) at Oberammergau, Germany.

42. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 10.

43. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Wash

ington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), 6.

129
44. Holbrooke interview.

45. Col John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” briefin

slides, August 1987, available at Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

46. Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educa

tion at Maxwell AFB, Ala., conducts a course appropriately named the Join

Doctrine Air Campaign Course.

47. Durham, trip report.

48. Ambassador Christopher Hill, US State Department deputy chi

negotiator, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, Washington, D.C., 27 Februar

1996.

49. Joint Statement by Adm Leighton W. Smith, CINCSOUTH, and L

Gen Bernard Janvier, FC UNPF, Zagreb, Croatia, 20 September 1995.

50. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, US Air Force chief of staff, speech to th

Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 30 April 1996.

130
Chapter 5

Executing Deliberate Force,

30 August–14 September 1995

Lt Col Mark J. Conversino

News of the mortar attack on the Mrkale marketplace i

Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 finally moved the West to ac

Since French general Bernard Janvier, United Nations Protec

tion Force (UNPROFOR) commander, was on vacation in

France to attend his son’s wedding, Adm Leighton W. Smith 

commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC

SOUTH), contacted British lieutenant general Rupert Smith 

the acting UN commander. Admiral Smith confirmed in a let

ter to General Smith that, in their “common judgment,” th

Mrkale shelling represented an attack against a safe area an

that air strikes would commence as soon as United States Ai

Force (USAF) lieutenant general Michael E. Ryan , commande

of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH)

deemed the conditions suitable. Admiral Smith also wrote tha

Ryan would delay the start of his air campaign until midnigh

29 August, to allow UN forces on the ground to withdraw from

their more isolated outposts and thus preclude another em 

barrassing rash of hostage taking by the Serbs, as had oc 

curred during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO

bombing of Pale the preceding May. Nevertheless, the UN an

NATO had turned their “keys ,” and the most intense militar

operation in the history of NATO was about to get under way. 1

Indeed, Admiral Smith had already taken several actions t

ready his forces. Specifically, he had allowed units belongin

to participating NATO countries under the alliance’s opera 

tional control to return home on an “on-call” status and re

quested additional aircraft, including F-16C/Ds and F-4G

“Wild Weasels” armed with high-speed antiradiation missile

(HARM), to counter the Serb integrated air defense system

(IADS). Upon issuing the order to initiate Deliberate Force

Admiral Smith also recalled his on-call tactical forces, inclu din

131
t hree Mirage F1-CTs, one Mirage F1-CR, two Jaguars, four Mi

rage 2000Cs, and six Mirage 2000D/Ks from France; four F

16As and two F-16Rs (reconnaissance ) from the Netherlands; 1

F-16C/Ds from Turkey; four GR-7 Harriers from the Unite

Kingdom ; and six F-4G Wild Weasels, four EA-6Bs, five KC-10s

two C-21s, two MC/HC-130s, two airborne command an

control center (ABCCC) EC-130Es, and two EC-130H Com 

pass Call electronic-warfare (EW) aircraft from the United

States. As a result of the initial success of the operation

CINCSOUTH would cancel the requests for the F-4Gs, the tw

EC-130Hs, and one of the EC-130Es.

2

The sudden intensification and expansion of air operation

actually required few substantive organizational changes from

those already established for the ongoing Deny Flight opera 

tion, of which Deliberate Force actually constituted a particu 

larly intense phase. As he had for Deny Flight, US genera

George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europ

(SACEUR), delegated operational control of the impending De

liberate Force activity to Admiral Smith , who in turn delegated

operational control for all theater-level air forces to Genera

Ryan . Lt Gen Andrea Fornasiero of the Italian air force, com 

mander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), would

exercise command and control (C2) of Deliberate Force opera 

tions through the combined air operations center (CAOC) a

Dal Molin Air Base (AB), Vicenza, Italy . US Air Force majo

general Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC, oversaw both th

center’s day-to-day operations and—through US Air Forc

colonel Douglas J. Richardson , his chief of current operation

(C-3)—those of Deliberate Force as well. As the CAOC director

General Hornburg used the call sign Chariot to identify him 

self to NATO aircrews. Since both Deliberate Force and Den

Flight were coalition efforts, representatives from the NATO

nations were also assigned to the CAOC.

3

As was the case with Deny Flight, NATO’s Deliberate Forc

operations and command structure remained wedded to th

UN’s. As the commander of UNPROFOR, General Janvie

served as Admiral Smith’s counterpart. General Smith als

would work closely with General Ryan. The course eventually

taken by Deliberate Force resulted from the coordination an

planning among these men in particular. Liaison officers from

132
NATO and 5 ATAF served with the UN headquarters in Zagreb

Croatia . Further, a NATO liaison officer was attached to UN

PROFOR’s air operations control center (AOCC) in Kiselja

(near Sarajevo) as well as to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

4

In the meantime, upon hearing of the Serb attack, Genera

Janvier hurried back to his post in Zagreb, taking the ke

from General Smith’s hands and settling final strategy wit

Admiral Smith , who pressed for an “indirect” use of his air 

power to take out the “anthill” of Serbian logistics and C

facilities, rather than the “ants” of the offending artillery an

other heavy weapons themselves. UN intelligence estimated

that the 240-square-mile zone around Sarajevo contained

some 250 Serb heavy weapons. Finding and destroying thes

targets with any consistency would be well-nigh impossible

General Janvier agreed that the Serbs should be punished

but he was anxious to keep Deliberate Force on a shor

leash—he wanted to “inflict pain but not death.” After som

tense haggling, the American admiral and the French genera

came to an agreement by 2130 on 29 August. Deliberate Forc

would start with the Operation Deadeye target list, which in 

cluded 25 air-to-ground targets and 15 others on Mount Ig 

man outside Sarajevo designated for shelling by guns of th

Anglo-French-Dutch RRF . The attack would begin in roughly

five hours—at 0200 on 30 August. In the waning moments o

calm, UN peacekeepers blew up their bunkers and slipped

away to safety. 5

The air fleet at General Ryan ’s disposal represented a form

dable collection of NATO air assets. At the outset of Deliberat

Force, he would have available more than 280 aircraft from

the United States (Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy), France 

Britain , Turkey, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain , and Germany

NATO also provided eight E-3A airborne warning and contro

system (AWACS) aircraft. With the arrival of on-call aircraf

and the inclusion of additional non-NATO assets, COMAIR

SOUTH would ultimately have nearly 350 aircraft at his dis 

posal. Although most of the units flew from bases in Italy

Deliberate Force sorties also launched from bases as far awa

as Britain , Germany, and France .

6

By far, the single largest concentration of allied aircraft wa

at Aviano AB, north of Venice, Italy . To accommodate th

133
influx of people and aircraft as tensions rose over the summer

Col Charles F. Wald , the newly arrived commander of Aviano

31st Fighter Wing, assumed command of a new provisiona

outfit—the 7490th Wing. On an installation designed for 4

F-16s and 16 CH-47 helicopters, Wald ’s staff eventually ha

to bed down a total of 140 aircraft, including 52 F-16s, 1

CH-47s, 12 US Marine Corps F/ A-18s, 12 A-10s, three Britis

E-3Ds , 10 Spanish EF-18s, 10 F-15Es, 10 EA-6Bs from th

carrier USS Roosevelt, nine C-130s of various types, and six

EF-111s. Of these, 114 were in place when Deliberate Forc

opened on the night of 29–30 August. Nevertheless, as com 

mander of the 7490th Wing (Provisional), Wald did not exer

cise command authority over the non-USAF units.7

Overseeing this varied array of air assets was the Den

Flight operations center, which stood up in conjunction wit

the provisional wing and superseded a sparsely manned Den

Flight coordination cell already operated by the 31st Wing

Becoming fully operational just days before the initiation o

Deliberate Force, the center served as Aviano’s primary C

center for the impending aerial activity. Manned by aviator

on temporary duty to Aviano and combined with the 31s

Fighter Wing’s logistics and munitions personnel in the logis 

tics control center, the operations center worked directly wit

the CAOC in Vicenza . Despite sporadic lines of communica 

tions between Vicenza and Aviano, senior officers at Avian

believed that their air operations center was instrumental in

the wing’s ability to meet its taskings.8

Against NATO airpower, the Bosnian Serbs could count on

an efficient and well-developed IADS. The Bosnia Serb arm

(BSA) also possessed a small air force , estimated at a couple o

dozen combat aircraft of limited military capability. Bosnia

Serb aircraft had flown against Croatian forces earlier in Au 

gust in a desperate attempt to halt Zagreb ’s spectacular five

day campaign to reclaim the Serb-held Krajina region of Croa 

tia . Using cluster munitions, five Serb aircraft killed fou

civilians and wounded 14 in Slavonia . During the attack, th

Serbs lost two aircraft to Croat air defenses and did nothin

more than further enrage the Croatians.

9

The real threat to NATO airpower lay in the BSA’s inventor

of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

134
NATO air planners estimated that in late August the BS

possessed seven SA-2 , six SA-6, and 12 SA-9 SAM batteries

unknown numbers of man-portable missiles, and nearly

eleven hundred pieces of AAA ranging in caliber from 20 milli

meters (mm) to 76 mm. Air planners also considered the pos 

sibility that the Bosnian Serbs could count on information

from the Republic of Yugoslavia ’s air defense network, th

main target of the Deadeye portion of the Deliberate Forc

plan. In the region of Sarajevo , the area of most immediat

concern to General Ryan and his staff, the BSA mustered

three corps—the Romanja, Drina, and Herzegovina—number 

ing some 15–20,000 personnel backed by an estimated 25

heavy weapons, including more than 50 tanks. As mentioned

previously, however, Deliberate Force would not seek to en 

gage and destroy these weapons unless necessary. 1 0

Bosnian Serb leaders made crude attempts to counter th

perceptibly growing international outrage at the mortar attack

on Sarajevo. Radovan Karadzic , for example, blamed the Mus

lim government of Bosnia for the attack, stating that he hoped

the “international community would no longer buy that kin

of story,” and called for an international investigation. Likely

he was heartened by Moscow’s open skepticism regardin

Serb culpability for the attack. Momcilo Krajisnik , chairman o

the Serb Republic Assembly, personally condemned the at

tack, stating that “it means no good for Serbs, Muslims, o

Croats, and it is not good for the continuation of the peac

process either.”1 1 Yet, the cries of “foul” by the Serb leadership

fell on deaf ears—at least outside of Russia . Armed with th

earlier UN assessment of Serb responsibility for the Mrkale at

tack and convinced of the need to back NATO’s threats with

force, the Western alliance finally moved toward decisive actio n.

A warning order of 29 August defined the combine

land/air operation and set the CAOC into motion. NATO plan

ners and commanders had no idea how long the NATO an

UN authorization keys , particularly the UN’s, would remain

turned on and thus planned to hit as many targets as possi

ble, as quickly as possible. As a preparatory step, Genera

Hornburg canceled most of the preplanned Deny Flight mis 

sions scheduled after 1400 central European time (CET). Th

air tasking message (ATM) for the remainder of that day, a

135
well as for the next, was changed to implement the air-strik

plan, initially code-named Vulcan but soon changed to Delib 

erate Force. As planned, the initial attack included Deadey

targets and those around Sarajevo included in Bouton

D’or—an earlier plan. On the morning of 29 August, Genera

Ryan arrived at Vicenza to take a more direct role in th

execution of the impending operation. Particularly concerned

that even a single incident of collateral damage could under 

mine or even halt the air campaign and convinced that com 

manders were ultimately responsible for all the actions of thei

forces, Ryan intended to personally select all targets and desire

mean points of impact (DMPI) (i.e., aiming points) for attack. I

anything went wrong, he wanted to accept the bla me. 1 2

Still, even for many NATO personnel, the notion that some

thing big was about to happen did not strike home until ver

late. Indeed, upon landing at Aviano late in the evening of 2

August, US Navy captain Ken Calise, a CAOC staff office

found Col Jim Turner, commander of the 31st Operation

Group, incredulous that Deliberate Force was really about t

begin. Moreover, many of the people at the CAOC envisione

Deliberate Force lasting no more than 48 to 72 hours. Th

doubts of some of his subordinates aside, at 0140 CET Gen 

eral Hornburg cleared the first strike package into Bosnia

Herzegovina from the Adriatic . The first NATO bombs struck

their targets roughly half an hour later. 13

Bombs Away: Deliberate Force Begins

The first aircraft bound for Bosnia launched from Avian

and the carrier Roosevelt shortly before midnight. Onc

cleared by Chariot, 43 strike aircraft escorted by 14 aircraf

performing suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) struck

targets on the Deadeye Southeast list. Four F-16Cs of Aviano

510th Fighter Squadron , each carrying two GBU-10 two-thou 

sand-pound laser-guided bombs, struck the Han Pijesak ra 

dio-relay station near the Bosnian Serb “capital” of Pale , a ke

communications node in the region, all weapons hitting thei

targets.

1 4 Other aircraft struck at the Jahorina communica 

tions complex near Pale , an SA-6 site at Sokolac, and target

136
as far away as the Tuzla region in the north-central part of th

country. Five strike packages, Alpha through Echo, hammered

at targets in the Sarajevo region throughout the day. Mor

SEAD packages, as well as day-and-night close air suppor

(CAS) missions rounded out the day’s activity. The CAOC co

ordinated all aerial sorties to allow the RRF a firing window

early on the morning of 30 August. Numerous reconnaissanc

missions flown by both manned aircraft and Predator un

manned aerial vehicles augmented pilot mission reports an

weapons film for bomb damage assessment (BDA).

1 5 By th

end of ATM Day Two, 0259 31 August, Deliberate Force ha

logged 364 sorties, including support missions such as aeria

refueling, airborne early warning (AEW), and C 2.

1 6

Despite a great deal of success during this critical first day

not all went well. A US Air Force U-2R reconnaissance aircraf

tasked to support Deliberate Force crashed on takeoff from it

base in the United Kingdom . The pilot ejected but died severa

hours later in the hospital from his injuries. 1 7 Over Bosni

itself a Serb man-portable missile brought down a Frenc

Mirage 2000K. Although observers on the ground reported tw

good chutes, attempts to establish radio contact with th

downed airmen proved unsuccessful. The loss of the Mirage

call sign Ebro 33, was a sobering reminder of the dangers t

all allied airmen. Indeed, Serb gunners and SAMs engaged

other aircraft, including US A-10s, Dutch NF-16s, and Britis

Tornadoes, but did not inflict additional friendly losses.1 8

Ebro 33’s shootdown launched a series of ad hoc and preor 

ganized combat search and rescue (CSAR) activities. Upo

hearing of the shootdown, an EF-111—Nikon 24—volunteered

to stay on station to continue suppressing Serb radar. AWAC

controllers retasked an F-15E whose target was obscured b

clouds to serve as the on-scene commander for the initia

recovery effort. Again, aircraft overhead could not establis

contact with the French pilots. In an effort to reach the crew o

Ebro 33 before the Serbs did, the CAOC ordered a CSAR

package of two MH-53 Pave Low helicopters and one HC-13

put on airborne alert off the coast of Croatia . So as to enhanc

the CSAR activity, the CAOC redirected a scheduled flight o

fighters to hit targets in the rescue area that bad weather ha

137
obscured earlier in the day. Despite these efforts, rescuer

could not locate the French pilots.1 9

The third ATM day of Deliberate Force began at 0300 on

31 August with three strike packages hitting targets in th

Sarajevo area. As on the day before, the CAOC schedu le

CAS and SEAD sorties to provide more or less continuous cover

age. Aviano-based aircraft struck Bosnian Serb ammunitio n 

storage facilities as well as depots near Sarajevo—some for th

second time. Poor weather delayed two additional package

that were added to the schedule later in the day, but both stil

managed to strike at depots, storage sites, and comman

posts with varying degrees of success. Indeed, on this da

numerous missions were canceled or rated noneffective due t

the characteristically adverse weather conditions in the region

at that time of the year.2 0

While bombs fell across the Bosnian Serb Republic , UN an

NATO representatives mounted a diplomatic blitz to keep th

onus of responsibility for the air attacks on the Serbs

Karadzic remained defiant, calling the air operation “black

mail” and insisting that Serbs could not be “bribed wit

money” or “frightened by bombs.” He warned darkly that De

liberate Force was setting a precedent for Western meddling in

other civil conflicts in both China and Russia . Undeterred b

such talk, UN envoy Yasushi Akashi announced that a deci

sion to end the bombing depended on “the attitudes and poli

cies of the Bosnian Serb party.” NATO secretary-general Will

Claes called on the Serbs to stop “provoking” the West and t

observe the “most basic rules of civilized society.”2 1

Nevertheless, Serb efforts to halt the bombing by offering t

talk were not completely in vain. Yugoslav president Sloboda

Milosevic contacted Akashi in Zagreb on the afternoon of 3

August. Earlier, General Janvier had sent a fax to Gen Ratk

Mladic, Bosnian Serb commander, informing him that the ai

strikes would continue until Janvier was convinced that th

BSA no longer posed a threat to the safe areas. Milosevic now

told Akashi that if General Janvier would send Mladic anothe

letter outlining his conditions for a cessation of the bombing

the Bosnian Serb general was likely to give in. Akashi an

General Janvier wrote such a letter in which they demanded

an end to BSA attacks, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from

138
around Sarajevo, and an immediate and complete end to hos 

tilities throughout Bosnia . The letter went out at 1600. Realiz

ing that the last demand might prove unattainable without th

assent of the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, both the UN

and NATO backed away from it. Still, contacts continued be

tween Pale and Zagreb throughout 31 August. Shortly afte

midnight on 1 September, the CAOC in Vicenza received 

copy of a message from General Smith ’s headquarters tha

suspended all air strikes for the next 24 hours, effective 020

Greenwich mean time (GMT), pending negotiations with th

Serbs. The UNPROFOR commander did promise to allow at

tacks to counter any BSA offensive and to permit attacks on

heavy weapons moving into or manned in the Sarajevo sector

The general emphasized that this was only a pause and tha

NATO should prepare to resume air strikes no later than 020

GMT on 2 September. All ATM Day Three missions were of

their targets before the suspension took effect. Roughly 4

hours into the operation, Deliberate Force was on hold. 2 2

Key leaders differed over the utility of the operational pause

Richard C. Holbrooke, the US assistant secretary of stat

tasked with finding a diplomatic solution to the Balkan mess

initially endorsed the idea of a bombing pause. General Jan

vier seemed ready for a break as well. In contrast, both NATO

secretary-general Claes and General Joulwan were not con 

vinced of the Serbs’ sincerity and thought that the allianc

would forfeit whatever initiative it had only recently gained

Nevertheless, Janvier and Mladic met for nearly 14 hours in 

hotel in the town of Mali Zvornik , attempting to reach a

understanding. Mladic , however, showed no signs of accedin

to the earlier UN ultimatum. When he produced a letter out

lining his own conditions for a cease-fire, Joulwan was out

raged. Sensing Serb intransigence, Admiral Smith , who ha

also initially agreed to the bombing pause, sought guarantee

from General Janvier that if the operation resumed, it would

do so in a significant fashion.2 3 While Claes wondered i

NATO’s unity and credibility would survive and while US Ai

Force officers entertained visions of the ill-fated, on-again-off

again Rolling Thunder campaign of the Vietnam War, US an

NATO air units used the pause to assess their own situations.

139
At Aviano AB , senior officers of the 31st Fighter Wing viewe

the bombing halt as a mixed blessing. Anxious to get on wit

the operation, they realized that with their human and mate 

rial resources stretched taut by increases in the tempo o

operations, the pause would allow people to get a much

needed rest. As the first true combat test of an Air Force win

organized according to the “objective wing” concept, Deliberat

Force uncovered the consequences of the personnel reduc

tions entailed in the concept. Reductions in authorized field

grade positions forced many supervisors to work extended

hours. Aircrews often flew missions and then proceeded t

work 12-hour shifts afterwards. Compounding the problem

units that had deployed to Aviano usually had not brough

along adequate supervisory “overhead.” Thus, the burden fo

overseeing a vastly expanded combat wing fell on the shou

ders of permanent-party personnel.2 4

A critical part of the objective-wing reorganization involve

placing organizational—flight-line—maintenance under th

commander of the operations group. Colonel Turner, com 

mander of both the 31st Operations Group and the 7490t

Operations Group (Provisional), after the first night, found i

physically impossible to oversee both flying and flight-lin

maintenance operations. Thus, after the first night of Deliber 

ate Force, Col David Stringer , commander of the 31st Logistic

Group, took control of flight-line maintenance and weapon

loading—an arrangement reminiscent of the “trideputative

wing concept recently replaced by the newer concept.2 5

Members of Aviano’s logistics group had indeed planned fo

an increase in operations, but no amount of planning in th

summer of 1995 could remedy some of the problems that la

ahead. Colonel Stringer and his staff, for example, planned fo

a sortie rate at Aviano of 175 per day. At that rate, the de

mand for fuel would top nearly 388,000 gallons every 2

hours. By working with their Italian hosts, Stringer’s staff wa

able to ensure a daily flow of four hundred thousand gallons

With the actual peak sortie rate at Aviano at just over 12

sorties and roughly three hundred thousand gallons in fuel

the advanced planning paid off; an inadequate supply of fue

at the outset likely would have resulted in lost sorties. 2 6

140
Other problems, however, were not so easily overcome. Avi

ano consists of a main operational area, including the runway

key service facilities, and several support areas, all separated

from one another by farmland or small settlements and vil

lages. Moving munitions from the storage area to the fligh

line required coordination with the local Italian carabinieri t

get weapons convoys across a major local highway. The Ital

ians cooperated closely with US security personnel, but th

arrangement made a munitions stockpile on the flight lin

mandatory if sorties were to be turned in an adequate amoun

of time. Munitions were first built up and then moved to 

flight-line holding area—Aviano’s normal “hot-cargo” pad. Be

cause the wing did not have sufficient security police availabl

to guard this new bomb dump and maintain adequate protec 

tion of the air fleet now crammed onto every available squar

foot of pavement, it used maintenance and munitions person 

nel to safeguard weapons thus stored. By the second day

base civil engineers constructed from concrete slabs a 30,000

square-foot revetted pad within the storage area to help han

dle the increase in munitions buildup. Without such mea

sures, Aviano’s sortie-generation capabilities would have bee

greatly diminished.2 7

Yet, finding adequate weapons storage was only part of Avi

ano’s challenge. With so many aircraft on the base, maintainin

safe intermagazine distances between aircraft proved virtuall

impossible. This situation put added stress on supervis ors an

further highlighted the dangers of both chronic and acut

fatigue for all personnel involved in handling weapons. Usin

commonsense safety and coordinating closely with the Span

ish and marines (each of whom maintained their own weapon

account at the base), the wing prevented a potentially danger 

ous situation from arising. Still, the use of the hot-cargo pa

as a storage site increased hazards in other ways. Transpor

aircraft actually delivering hot cargo (mainly munitions) to th

base had to do so in alternate and less-than-optimal locations

The need to maintain safe clearances at these alternate loca 

tions forced numerous support agencies periodically to ceas

operating and evacuate their areas.2 8

Two potential “showstoppers” emerged both at the outset o

Deliberate Force and as the operation expanded. In the word

141
of Colonel Stringer, the depots at Warner Robins, Georgia , an

Ogden, Utah , “didn’t know there was a war on.” The Ai

Force’s “lean logistics” philosophy precludes large stockpiles o

parts and equipment at operating bases, making resuppl

from stateside air-logistics centers vital. The first weekend o

the campaign coincided with the three-day Labor Day holiday

so the depots were closed. Stringer ’s staff contacted manager

at both centers who then reacted quickly, recalling worker

and moving orders out as soon as possible. Unfortunately

that represented only half the battle. Unaware that part

could be sent via Federal Express directly to Aviano, Defens

Logistics Agency personnel shipped items by this means onl

to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Delaware, where the shipment

then sat, awaiting airlift through the standard military chan

nel. Even from Dover the parts would then travel to Ramstein

AB, Germany—not Aviano. The 86th Airlift Wing offered in 

tratheater airlift to Aviano as a means of expediting the deliv 

ery of parts. Unfortunately, members of the staff at Aviano

not anticipating a slowdown in the movement of supplies

turned down the offer.2 9

The second potential showstopper for Aviano was rathe

mundane. On the typical flight line, nothing gets done withou

MB-4 and “Bobtail” tow vehicles to move aircraft and thei

supporting heavy aerospace ground equipment. Despite th

rapid influx of aircraft, Aviano’s Bobtail inventory remained

unchanged, and the wing found itself short 47 Bobtails an

25 MB-4s relative to the number of aircraft it had to suppor

Moreover, usage of the available tow vehicles increased dra 

matically. Bobtails—small, odd-looking vehicles that look lik

truck cabs with a tow (or “pintle”) hook attached—have a

extremely tight turning radius that allows drivers to safe ly posi

tion or remove equipment close to aircraft. These tight turn

wear tires quickly—a problem increased at Aviano by the ac

celerated use of its Bobtail fleet. The logistics group com 

mander, although able to procure additional tires through Ai

Force sources in both Europe and stateside and thus allow

the wing to maintain its accelerated sortie-generation rate

must have pondered some version of the addage that “for wan

of a nail. . . .”3 0

142
Aviano

s leadership faced another challenge as well. As on

post–Deliberate Force report noted, not since the use of Ameri

can bombers stationed on Guam during the Vietnam War did

a “peacetime” base community of airmen and their familie

face extended combat operations together. Although the jar

gon surrounding Deliberate Force labeled it a peacemaking o

peace-enforcement operation, the fact of the matter remained

that airmen kissed their spouses and children good-bye, lef

their homes, and headed off to fly over a hostile and poten 

tially deadly theater. Several officers expressed concern tha

their families might fall prey to terrorists. Others commented

on the stressful effects created by the sudden change from 

peacetime environment to combat. 3 1 Lt Col Steve Hoog, com 

mander of the 555th Fighter Squadron , believed that if Delib 

erate Force had gone on much longer or entered an indefinit

period of operations, spouses and families should have bee

moved out of the area to eliminate a potential distraction fo

his crews and better ensure the safety of families. As event

unfolded, however, such action proved unnecessary. 3 2

But many officers at Aviano appreciated having their fam

lies with them to provide support. Spouses provided meals in

the squadrons every evening as a way of supporting the uni

and providing comfort to one another. Lt Col Gary West, com 

mander of the 510th Fighter Squadron , noted that although

he and his wife parted each day with a bit of apprehension

she was better able to follow events at Aviano than during hi

combat flying in Operation Desert Storm .

3 3

Thus, Aviano made a rapid transition from peacetime t

combat operations in a relatively short period of time. Th

wing went to war with the manning, facilities, and equipmen

allotted it under normal conditions. The base served as 

deployed location for numerous units but retained all the bag

gage of a fully functioning peacetime wing. Swamped by a

influx of people and aircraft and still required to see to th

needs of the wing’s dependent population, Colonel Wald an

his staff orchestrated with aplomb and determination the ac

tivities of what became the world’s largest composite wing

Aviano’s experience, however, should prompt a review of th

capabilities and limitations of the objective wing in combat.

143
Who should determine the requirements of units deploying t

such locations to carry on extended, high-tempo operatio ns

The Air Force commands task units to deploy people an

equipment based on preplanned packages known as unit typ

codes (UTC). Units have the option to tailor UTCs in certain

situations. If Deliberate Force is a harbinger of future opera 

tions, arriving packages may augment existing organization

that must consider maintaining day-to-day taskings as well a

provide the backbone for contingency activities. Is an alto 

gether separate UTC appropriate for this kind of deployment

Certainly, a review of manning—particularly field-grade level

facilities, and equipment—is in order for those wings tha

might find themselves the hub of radically expanded activities

Assessing the First Strikes

By the end of ATM Day Three, 0259 on 1 September, th

CAOC recorded 635 sorties of all types flown. Of that tota

318 were strike sorties—CAS or battlefield air interdiction

(BAI). At the request of UNPROFOR, NATO actually flew 1

CAS missions, the first of Deliberate Force, on 30 Augus

largely against artillery and mortar positions. Despite the gen 

eral difficulty of finding heavy weapons in the rugged terrain

of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CAS missions carried out agains

clearly defined targets that day were largely successful an

caused little, if any, collateral damage. As the operation pro 

gressed, though, bad weather often precluded additional CAS

missions, as did a simple lack of requests for such strikes b

UNPROFOR.

3 4

In the first two days of operations, NATO air strikes, in

COMAIRSOUTH’s estimation, eliminated 48 DMPIs , leavin

nearly three hundred on the target list. Of the targets (no

DMPIs) tasked in the ATMs and attacked through the early

hours of 1 September, CAOC intelligence considered 1

nonoperational, three probably nonoperational, two capable o

minimal operations, and six probably-to-fully operational. Fo

example, by dawn on 1 September, the Cajnice and Tuzla

Mountain radio-relay targets remained operational, while mos

of the other IADS and communications targets —together wit

144
several significant ammunition depots—were out of busines

or damaged to varying degrees. 3 5

National imagery and signals intelligence painted a pictur

of mixed success for the first few days of Deliberate Force

Initial BDA showed the BSA communications network severel

damaged; however, further analysis revealed the BSA’s com 

munications capability degraded but still functioning. 3 6

Damage to major BSA air defense sites also left the Bosnia

Serbs with a degraded but effective system. Important target

such as the Sokolac SA-6 site had sustained considerabl

damage, and the BSA IADS was not as integrated as it was on

29 August. But Deliberate Force’s opening blows had not ren 

dered it impotent.3 7

Nevertheless, Ryan ’s staff determined that initial attack

against direct and essential support facilities had severely de

graded the BSA’s ability to manufacture, store, and distribut

ammunition. In particular, the Vogosca ammunition depot, 

major source of production of large-caliber munitions for th

Serbs, had been hit hard. Although analysts still deemed th

facility operational, the strikes had severely reduced its pro 

duction of ammunition. 3 8

Still, intelligence analysts at Aviano were not totally impresse

with the first days’ results against the BSA. They also deter 

mined that strikes against the BSA’s IADS had only a minima

“blinding” effect. Additionally, the Serbs were well aware of U

capabilities and often refused to turn on their target-acquisition

radars and thereby invite HARM strikes. Although this action

degraded their effectiveness tremendously, it also meant tha

much of the Serbs’ air defense network remained capable o

fighting back and would require reattack for continued suppres 

sion. The Serbs had also relocated and dispersed much of thei

stock of ammunition to temporary sites. 3 9

Despite the halt in air strikes, NATO air units were hardly

idle. Planners in the CAOC and the field units continued t

develop notional strike packages and to assign backup tar 

gets and DMPIs to aircraft on CAS alert. Reconnaissance mis

sions blanketed the country to determine Serb complianc

with the UN ultim atum to withdraw heavy weapons from th

20-kilometer total-exclusion zone around Sarajevo. C-13

ABCCC aircraft continued to direct aircraft from refuelin

145
tracks over the Adriatic through the area of responsibilit

(AOR) and to receive immediate in-flight reports of any hostil

activity. German aircraft flew reconnaissance sorties in sup

port of the RRF. Importantly, although no bombs fell durin

the pause, RRF artillery continued to fire on BSA positions

Continuous daylight CAS , area SEAD , combat air patrol

(CAP), and various other support missions rounded out thes

daily activities.4 0

As the diplomats attempted to find a solution to the conflic

planners in the CAOC fine-tuned operations during the bomb

ing pause. During ATM Day Five, 2 September, planners de

veloped BAI packages and placed them in a “floating-alert

status when the suspension was extended. Uncertainty ove

the status of the air campaign drove the CAOC to update an

change the packages continuously, causing some frustration

and confusion at Aviano. The following day, planners reverte

to packages tasked via the ATM as BAI packages that were on

alert for specific periods. Thus, changes to one package did

not drive changes to the others. The size of the package

varied from eight to 12 aircraft on ATM Day Six to four to 3

on ATM Day Seven. In the meantime, CAS assets assisted th

RRF by locating and relaying information on BSA firing posi

tions. NATO aircraft flew roughly 180 sorties each day of th

suspension. To no one’s surprise, weather continued to ad 

versely affect all sorties, especially reconnaissance flights an

attempts to locate the crew of Ebro 33.

4 1

As the bombing pause stretched through 2 September

some crews reported Serb movement on the ground, possibly

away from the safe areas. Still, NATO and UN officials becam

increasingly convinced that General Mladic was playing 

shell game with his heavy weapons to give only the appear

ance of compliance with UN and NATO demands. Stormy talk

between General Janvier and Mladic had threatened to brea

down repeatedly in the face of Serb intransigence. Early on

Sunday, 3 September, NATO secretary-general Claes gav

Mladic until 2300 the following day to halt all attacks on

Sarajevo and the other three safe areas, withdraw his heav

weapons from the Sarajevo total-exclusion zone, and guaran 

tee freedom of movement for the UN. General Janvier sent 

146
letter to Mladic incorporating these terms. The Serb genera

responded with a five-page harangue of his own. 4 2

Aerial reconnaissance continued to paint a confusing pic 

ture of Serb activity. Monday’s deadline passed with no firm

indication from the Serbs that they had agreed to Genera

Janvier’s conditions. In the absence of an extension of th

pause, Admiral Smith did not want to risk an immediate re

sumption of air strikes in the middle of the night that migh

result in attacks on Serb units actually withdrawing from th

safe areas. Shortly after dawn on 5 September, when un

manned aerial vehicles confirmed Admiral Smith ’s suspicion

that the Serbs were not pulling back, he told Janvier tha

“there’s no intent being demonstrated. Let’s get on with it.”4 

At 1000 CET on 5 September, Admiral Smith directed Genera

Ryan to recommence air strikes with a time on target no earlie

t han 1300 CET. That afternoon, Secretary-General Claes an 

nounced to the world that, because of the BSA’s failure t

comply with UN demands, NATO had resumed Deliberat

Force. Shortly after 1300 CET, the bombs began falling aga in.4 

Resumption

The operation resumed with a major effort in the air. In 

itially, planners had scheduled 191 operational sorties, bu

with the resumption of air strikes, they added 84. Four pack

ages struck with mixed success throughout the afternoon. In

the first strike package, F-16s from the 555th Fighter Squad 

ron struck at Jahorina and the Hadzici ammunition depot. 

second package hit military command, control, and communi

cations bunkers at Han Pijesak. The third package—F-15Es o

the 494th Fighter Squadron, carrying four GBU-12s each—

made a highly successful strike on DMPIs within the Ha

Pijesak storage facility. As the day progressed, the fourt

package of Marine F/A-18Ds of VMFA 533, F-16Cs of th

510th Fighter Squadron , and F-15Es hit communications tar 

gets with varying degrees of success. 4 5

In order to cope with the rapidly changing situation on th

ground, CAOC planners abandoned efforts to produce a ful

ATM each day and resorted to a novel “cookie-cutter” approac

147
to scheduling strike packages. The cookie-cutter specified

times-on-target windows into which packages would be in 

serted using available aircraft. Planners then published thi

rough ATM with the intent that change messages would reflec

the latest master-attack-plan target /DMPI assignments. Gen 

eral Ryan and his staff wanted to ensure that the unfolding ai

campaign remained sufficiently flexible to hit targets whos

destruction or degradation would hurt the BSA in a way tha

would speed up political developments in NATO ’s direction

This extreme Clausewitzian approach of using military force t

foster political ends was correct in theory. 4 6

Implementing cookie-cutter ATMs had its problems. O

more than a few occasions, the CAOC did not release ap 

proved targets and DMPIs (crews were constantly reminded t

strike only these) until late in the day, sometimes less than a

hour before the beginning of a new ATM cycle. Even then

DMPIs might change right up to takeoff and thereafter. A

times, this technique of executing the campaign led to less

than-optimum missions, crew frustration, and confusion. Fo

example, one day’s ATM tasked pilots of four F-16s from th

510th Fighter Squadron to hit DMPIs within the Hadzici am

munition-depot target area, only to have the CAOC chang

their assigned DMPIs shortly after they arrived at their air 

craft. Moreover, information contained in the target folde

misidentified one DMPI for one already hit and destroyed; th

other DMPI was “not found.” Pilots described yet anothe

DMPI as “a crater,” evidently one previously destroyed. Fight

ers missed the remaining DMPI, the bombs impacting on

hundred meters east of it. Technically, then, all ordnance ex 

pended for this mission was “off target.”4 7

Searching for Ebro 33

As the flow of strike packages going into Bosnia continued

on 6 September, efforts to locate the crew of Ebro 33 intensi

fied. On the day before, German reconnaissance aircraft re

ported visual signals in the region of the downed aircraft, an

the USS Roosevelt launched a CSAR mission that aborted

because of bad weather in the region. Responding to con tinued

148
intercepts of weak beacon signals, the CAOC ordered anothe

CSAR package of four MH-53s and four HC-130s launched on

7 September from Brindisi, in southern Italy . Although i

penetrated to the objective area, ground fog prevented thi

package from conducting a search.4 8

A third CSAR package mounted out of Brindisi on 8 Sep 

tember. This time, the weather was good, and the aircraf

conducted a thorough search of the area. Bosnian Serb troop

in the area fired on the helicopters with heavy machine guns

wounding two crew members and damaging one of the air 

craft. Escort aircraft, including two A-10s from the 104t

Fighter Group, returned fire, destroying one of five Serb veh

cles observed on a road below. The failure of this mission

marked the last active CSAR effort to locate the Ebro 33 crew

although passive efforts to locate the French crewmen contin 

ued while CSAR forces stood by on alert. Not until 27 Septem 

ber did the Serbs confirm to the rest of the world that the

had indeed captured and were holding the two French pilots.4 

Choke Points

Meanwhile, the evolving nature of the overall situation in

Bosnia-Herzegovina began to influence Deliberate Force tar

geting. As previously agreed, General Ryan worked closely

with General Smith to ensure that aircraft hit the proper tar 

gets. Initially, AIRSOUTH planners were reluctant to targe

bridges for fear of inflicting civilian losses. General Smith 

however, suspected that the Serbs would begin reinforcin

units around Sarajevo and wanted bridges in the southeas

zone of action (ZOA) attacked to preclude such a move. A

time went on, General Smith also wanted to channel th

movements of the Serbs’ heavy weapons so that his men could

count them more easily.

As in previous wars, the bridges in Bosnia proved difficul

targets. From its long axis, a bridge presents a narrow targe

and, from its lateral axis, a small target—with a great deal o

empty space beneath for guided or unguided bombs to pas

through harmlessly. Thus, bridges are hard to hit, and even 

near miss usually has little effect on strongly built structures

149
Consequently, the campaign against bridges was only partiall

successful. Of the 12 bridges attacked, five remained standin

at the end of the operation, albeit with varying degrees o

damage. 5 0

The bridges in Bosnia also heightened concerns in th

minds of General Ryan and others that attacks against them

would produce collateral damage . Indeed, responding to a

instance of collateral damage during a bridge attack, Genera

Ryan mandated on 11 September that pilots not release thei

weapons on the first pass over the target. After several com 

plaints from commanders in the field, the general lifted th

restriction the next day. However, he still restricted aircrew

to dropping a single weapon on the first “hot” pass in a

ongoing effort to reduce collateral damage. Regardless, air 

crews could mount subsequent attacks if necessary. 5 1

Widening the Attack: Deadeye Northwest

During the pause in operations, COMAIRSOUTH contem 

plated strikes in the northwest ZOA, should the Serbs fail t

meet UN and NATO demands. The Serb IADS in that sector o

the country had remained untouched thus far, posing a threa

to NATO aircraft striking targets in the southeast ZOA. From

the outset—and in accordance with agreements betwee

NATO planners and UN representatives—COMAIRSOUTH 

plans for Deliberate Force did not link IADS to either of th

ZOAs . Thus, since it appeared likely that air operations would

have to continue, COMAIRSOUTH had to address the IADS i

the northwest part of Bosnia . Refinement of plans for Deadey

Northwest got under way. 5 2

Believing that the Serbs had redeployed their entire SAM

system into the northwest zone, air planners expected th

region to pose formidable risks to NATO aircraft. On 5 Sep

tember, General Ryan requested the use of Tomahawk lan

attack missiles (TLAM) against IADS targets near the Serb

stronghold of Banja Luka. Because the general and his staf

recognized the danger that Serb air defenses posed to NATO

aircraft in this area, he wanted to soften the area before send

ing in manned aircraft in large numbers. The reliability an

150
accuracy of TLAMs also meshed well with the operation

s em 

phasis on minimal collateral damage . Furthermore, use o

TLAMs and stealth , in General Ryan ’s opinion, would reduc

the risk to crews substantially. 5 3

General Ryan broached the topic of expanding the campaign

to Admiral Smith on 7 September. In the general’s plan

Deadeye Northwest would unfold in three parts over th

course of several days. The various parts would involve a

intricate combination of SEAD assets, TLAMs, and F-117A

stealth fighters against the BSA IADS. Through Admira

Smith, COMAIRSOUTH immediately requested the deploymen

of six F-117s, which, along with crews and support personnel

would bed down at Aviano. General Ryan expected to keep

them there for approximately two weeks.5 4

In its military essentials, the planning for Deadeye North 

west was sound. No authoritative individual in the US o

NATO command structure argued against the use of high

value assets such as F-117s and TLAMs against such a hard

target as the Banja Luka IADS. Accordingly, on 9 Septembe

William J. Perry, the US secretary of defense, approve

SACEUR’s request to bring six F-117s to Aviano, stipulatin

their return to national control no later than 30 October—wel

beyond the period during which Ryan envisioned using them

On the same day of Secretary Perry’s approval, an advanced

echelon of nearly 190 people of the 49th Fighter Wing’s 9th

Fighter Squadron deployed to Aviano from Holloman AFB

New Mexico. Apparently, the US Air Force ’s most advanced

operational aircraft was about to enter the fray. 5 5

Ryan ’s plan did run into political obstacles, however, mainly

because the government of Italy was not yet on board with i

On 9 September the US Embassy in Rome reported that th

Italian government was upset at being excluded from the mu

tinational Contact Group formed to deal with problems in th

former Yugoslavia . Although the request for the aircraft ha

been made through NATO channels and they were urgentl

needed, the Italian Foreign Ministry remained unmoved. Ap 

parently, the Italian prime minister had informed Ambassado

Holbrooke that they would review further requests for suppor

of operations in Bosnia beyond those currently approved a

“political levels in terms of the responsiveness of others t

151
Italy

s participation in the Contact Group. The Italians wer

“tired of always saying yes to others while others always sa

no to Italy .” That afternoon the US Embassy informed Ryan o

this state of affairs. 5 6

While the diplomats attempted to find a settlement to thi

latest tangle, Ryan’s staff forged ahead with Deadeye North 

west. COMAIRSOUTH delayed the start of the operation, in 

itially scheduled to start in the early hours of 8 September, b

24 hours in order to better align the required assets. He als

wanted to validate targets along the active front and minimiz

the impact of the weather . Part One thus began early on 

September with a package of 30 SEAD aircraft, which fired 3

HARMs at seven SAM sites, including those at Majikici, Donj

Vakuf, Sipovo, and Kolonija , with less than optimal results. 5 7

The following night, Deadeye Northwest Part Two struck a

targets on Lisina Mountain . Delayed three hours because o

bad weather, this package, consisting of 42 aircraft, enjoyed

only moderate success. For the first time, F-15Es launched

three GBU-15s, one of which struck the Prnjavor radio-rela

site. In another first combat use of a weapon, Navy F-18

launched standoff land attack missiles (SLAM). Still, analyst

at the CAOC deemed the overall results disappointing, par

ticularly of this second Deadeye package. 5 8

TLAM strikes proposed for the night of 10–11 Septembe

promised to strengthen the attacks on the Banja Luka IAD

but not before planners overcame some substantial barriers

Planners from the Navy’s Sixth Fleet initially expressed con 

cerns about the suitability of their weapons against COMAIR

SOUTH’s requested targets: the Lisina Mountain military ra 

dio-relay station and the Lisina EW site. Eventually, imager

for the Lisina targets became available on the afternoon of 

September, which permitted Navy targeteers to complete th

full mission plans required. Some confusion also arose be

tween the Sixth Fleet and the CAOC over the availability o

existing target coordinates. The CAOC had a set of coordinate

for both Lisina targets. Nevertheless, the two staffs worked

together to overcome the previous “fog,” and the TLAMs hit th

Lisina targets.

5 9

COMAIRSOUTH pressed ahead with the third strike o

Deadeye Northwest, undeterred by the absence of the F-117s

152
Viewing this package as a variation of Deadeye Two, planner

scheduled 30 SEAD aircraft, 18 strike aircraft, and 13 TLAM

to hit not only Lisina but also sites at Mrkonjic and Glamoc 

as well as the Prnjavor radio-relay station at Mount Svinjar

The aircraft assigned to the latter target struck before mid 

night during the evening of 10 September. Four F-15Es carry

ing GBU-15s scored hits on three of four assigned DMPIs 

Unfortunately, F/A-18Cs armed with SLAMs did not enjoy th

same success as their Air Force brethren. Seven SLAMs fire

at the radio-relay site at Glamoc as well as both Lisina Moun

tain targets suffered weapons-datalink-control anomalies, re

sulting in poor target acquisition and the inability of the pilot

to transmit commands to the weapons. Because of these tech 

nical problems, intelligence analysts reviewing poststrike dat

deemed all SLAMs to have missed their targets.

6 0

The TLAMs, however, proved remarkably accurate. Launche

from the USS Normandy , seven TLAMs hit the Lisina EW sit

while others struck the radio-relay station. Poststrike reconnais 

sance showed the latter completely destroyed, with debris scat

tered throughout the site. The operations building and bunker

at the Lisina EW site also suffered direct hits. The impact o

three missiles south of the site’s radar position rendered i

nonoperational. Tactically successful, the use of TLAMs demon 

strated to the Serbs that the Americans in particular were will

ing to use some of their most advanced weapons.6 1

Overall, this heretofore most significant Deadeye strike wa

relatively successful. In addition to the damage noted above

images provided by unmanned aerial vehicles showed heav

damage to the Prnjavor military radio-relay site. Only at th

Lisina Mountain radio-relay and TV transmitter site—one of th

SLAM targets—did reconnaissance show no apparent damage.6 2

But Deadeye was not over. Another strike planned for th

night of 11–12 September, Deadeye Part Three, was to hav

included the long-awaited F-117s. Unfortunately, on 11 Sep

tember the Italian government officially disapproved the bed

down of these aircraft at Aviano. Nevertheless, targets an

DMPIs remained, and General Ryan wanted them attacked

with the best means available. With the F-117s out of th

picture, planners moved the upcoming mission to the daytime

thus reducing the opening blow of Deadeye Part Three to 

153
SEAD package and two F-15Es carrying GBU-15s, one o

which hit its target at the Mrkonjic radio-relay station.6 3

Still, General Ryan pressed the attack on the Serb IAD

forward. On 13 September planners added a Deadeye Par

Three strike for targets at the Lisina EW site and the Lisin

radio-relay/TV transmitter. Two SLAMs found their targets o

this occasion, scoring hits on the Lisina targets. Analysts said

that damage to these targets ranged from “severe” to “de

stroyed.” This turned out to be the last Deadeye strike sinc

another package scheduled for 14 September failed to fly be

cause of bad weather.

6 4 As a result of Deadeye Northwest an

Deadeye Southeast operations, the SEAD campaign achieved

the goal of degrading and neutralizing the Serb IADS through 

out the country. 6 5

Closing Out Option Two

In addition to Deadeye , NATO aircraft continued to hamme

the rapidly diminishing number of targets and DMPIs stil

available under option two (see chap. 4) of Deliberate Force

The CAOC staff sought to maximize the effectiveness of al

available assets. For example, at the outset of the operation

Brig Gen David Sawyer, deputy director of the CAOC, ordered

CAS aircraft held over water until a tactical air control part

(TACP) requested support. In the absence of such request

since 30 August, however, CAOC planners assigned CAS sor

ties “hip-pocket” (alternate) targets in an effort to make use o

otherwise wasted assets. 6 6 The CAOC battle-staff director as

signed all secondary targets from a preapproved target list. A

before, CAS sorties required Chariot’s approval both to go ove

land and to release their weapons against BAI hip-pocket tar

gets because the military situation in Bosnia remained fluid. 6 7

Close coordination among the NATO and UN units in an

over Bosnia was indeed crucial. In theory, CAOC staff officer

notified the AOCC in Kiseljak of any impending strikes agains

target complexes in proximity so as to give the UN soldier

time to take shelter in their bunkers. Only after the AOCC

confirmed that the peacekeepers were out of harm’s way wa

an aircraft to drop ordnance.6 8

154
Still, the rapid pace of air operations and the fog of wa

often conspired to upset carefully laid plans. During the earl

afternoon of 8 September, CAOC staff officers learned that 

British GR-7 , properly reroled from reconnaissance to BAI an

cleared to drop its weapons, nevertheless struck a DMPI clos

to Russian peacekeepers, seemingly without warning. Upo

investigating the matter, the CAOC staff discovered other GR

7s added to an upcoming strike with a time on target of 163

CET. The CAS desk officer, battle-staff director, and controlle

aboard the ABCCC had no information, including assigned

targets, for these sorties. Working quickly, battle-staff person 

nel assigned the aircraft proper targets, precluding furthe

surprises for UN troops on the ground.6 9

Problems within C2 were amenable to swift and competen

fixes, but poor weather remained the greatest obstacle t

NATO air strikes. On 9 September, for example, the first two o

five strike packages were unable to expend their ordnance du

to deteriorating weather conditions in the target area. Th

remaining three packages had to delay their times by two t

three hours although they did fly. Foul weather limited ATM

Day 16, 13–14 September, to 140 sorties, and only 20 sortie

flew on ATM Day 17. 7 0

Nevertheless, the list of targets and DMPIs became appre

ciably shorter with each passing day, and diplomatic talk

held in Geneva on 8 September did nothing to slow the ai

campaign. As planned, strikes continued against support fa 

cilities, bridges, and communications targets.

The situation on the ground remained volatile despite allied

air activity. On 10 September NATO aircraft flew CAS mission

for only the second time in the operation. In response to th

shelling of the Tuzla airport, which wounded a UN soldier, th

CAOC tasked a flight of F/ A-18Ds to contact the Tuzl

TACP—Hamlet 02. The F/A-18s dropped one GBU-16 each

while other aircraft—including GR-7s—joined in the fray. Th

air strikes destroyed two bunkers at the top of a nearby hil

and a large-caliber artillery piece. Additional flights main 

tained an air presence in the area for the following two an

one-half hours until the ground commander determined tha

the situation had stabilized. 7 1

155
As a result of the shelling of Tuzla airport, UNPROFOR

requested that NATO planners develop BAI boxes, similar t

the “kill boxes ” used during the Gulf War. CAOC planner

designated one box each for Sarajevo, Tuzla , and Gorazde

The CAOC would employ the box system whenever UN com 

manders requested CAS but could not provide a TACP. In

turn, the ground commander would accept full responsibil

ity for control of air activity within the boxes. Over the nex

few days, the plans began to take more definite shape a

CAS / forward air controller –A assets reconnoitered the ar

eas. Deliberate Force would end, however, before NATO ai

units employed the system.7 2

Despite myriad challenges, Deliberate Force operation

made rapid progress. By 10 September only nine targets an

33 DMPIs remained on the Deadeye list, with 16 targets an

128 DMPIs left in the southeast zone. Still, with the possibilit

of a political settlement nearing, the execution of Deliberat

Force operations took on added significance. On 11 Septembe

General Ryan and his staff conducted a careful review of th

status of remaining option-two targets and DMPIs to ensur

that air strikes maintained sufficient pressure on the Serbs t

meet both military and political objectives.

7 3

In the absence of a political settlement, NATO pressed for

ward with the air campaign. In order to strike targets pre

cluded by bad weather over the last few days, the CAOC added

a strike package of 44 aircraft and 12 targets to the day’s fiv

other scheduled packages on 11 September. Strike package

hit ammunition depots and storage facilities at Hadzici, Ustik 

olina, and Sarajevo on several occasions throughout the day

The Vogosca ammunition-loading plant, already heavily dam

aged, received additional attention. On 12 September strik

aircraft attacked ammunition depots and supply facilitie

around Doboj, near the Tuzla safe area .

7 4

As the number of approved option-two targets and DMPI

dwindled, the CAOC began to reduce the number of actua

sorties. Planners placed BAI packages on an alert posture on

12 September. The Current Operations Division at the CAOC

then tasked four of the packages real-time against targets i

the Doboj area. By the end of the day, however, a lack o

suitable targets for the weapons loaded on the tasked aircraf

156
resulted in a cancellation of the last package. The only othe

notable event for the day was midday reports of fixed-win

aircraft operating out of Banja Luka. With designated CAP

sorties in the midst of refueling from tankers over the Adriatic 

the CAOC battle staff simply reroled CAS aircraft to fly CAP

over Tuzla and provide both visual and radar coverage o

Banja Luka. This ad hoc CAP encountered no hostile aircraft .

7 5

Concurrent with the reduction of available targets, weathe

in the region deteriorated rapidly. On 13 September the day’s

first strike package failed to engage half its assigned DMPI

because of conditions in the target area. The second packag

canceled, and the third, a Deadeye mission, was delayed unti

midafternoon. The fourth package, containing eight aircraf

tasked against the Sarajevo armor-training area and ammuni

tion-storage facility, flew as planned late in the afternoon. I

achieved only mixed success, again due to inclement weather 

By early evening the only assets over land included SEAD

packages and an AC-130 that was searching for signs of th

crew of Ebro 33. Forty percent of the day’s scheduled sortie

did not fly. 7 6

The bad weather , however, may have been a blessing in

disguise. By 13 September only two approved targets with 1

DMPIs remained on the Deadeye list. Seven targets and 4

DMPIs were still available in the southeast ZOA. As a result o

that day’s activity, these numbers dropped to 1/11 and 7/32

respectively. On 14 September poor weather caused the can

cellation of all but airborne-early-warning, U-2 , and air-refuel

ing sorties. The CAOC placed all other packages on hold pend

ing better weather .

7 7

Meanwhile, Croat and Bosnian army (BiH) units continued

to advance against the faltering BSA. Donji Vakuf fell into th

hands of the Muslim -led government, and the Croats took

Jajce . BiH and Croat advances in the west-central part of th

country posed a menace to Banja Luka itself. Perhaps th

perceived collapse of their field army and the punishment i

had endured from the sky drove the Bosnian Serb leaders t

signal their acceptance on 14 September of UN and NATO

demands. Admiral Smith agreed to institute another bombin

pause , this one of 72 hours, beginning at 2200 CET on 1

September. The NATO chain of command authorized him t

157
agree in principle with General Janvier

s assessment tha

General Mladic’s willingness to halt all attacks on safe areas

allow the UN freedom of movement and the use of the Sarajevo

airport, and withdraw his heavy weapons from around Sara 

jevo constituted compliance with Janvier’s letter of 3 Septem

ber. Thus, Deliberate Force went on hold once again. However

Admiral Smith asked Janvier to inform Mladic that NATO

would continue to fly normal Deny Flight missions, includin

tactical reconnaissance, CAS , CAP, SEAD , and—if required—

CSAR. NATO intended to exercise full freedom of action ove

all of Bosnia-Herzegovina . These flights, the admiral wrote

would be nonprovocative in nature, but aircrews would re

spond, within existing rules of engagement, “to any hostile ac

or hostile intent.”7 8

The pause came at an opportune moment for General Rya

and his staff. NATO planners realized that if Deliberate Forc

continued, they would be hard-pressed to find additional suit 

able targets without going into option three, a move mos

officers in the CAOC felt would not receive political approva

Nevertheless, after combing the list of option-two targets, COM

AIRSOUTH forwarded to Admiral Smith a list of nine to 1

additional targets: equipment-storage facilities, communica 

tions targets, and a handful of bridges, tunnels, and chok

points in the southeast ZOA.

Fortunately for NATO and COMAIRSOUTH, the need to re

start what was sure to be a brief and politically charged third

wave of attacks never arose. Initial BSA compliance with Gen 

eral Janvier ’s demands led to a 72-hour extension of th

bombing pause. NATO convoys began moving, with air pres

ence, on 15 September. A French C-130 landed at the Sara 

jevo airport that afternoon. By the following day, NATO aircraf

reported BSA tanks and vehicles moving away from Sarajevo

On 20 September both Admiral Smith and General Janvie

agreed that Deliberate Force had indeed met its objectives

They agreed to inform the world that, as of 20 September, “th

resumption of air strikes is currently not necessary.” Fightin

between Bosnian and Croat units and those of the BSA would

continue for some weeks. The creation of a lasting peace in

Bosnia now rested in the hands of the statesmen and diplo 

mats, and Deliberate Force passed into history. 7 9

158
Deliberate Force: Effective But Not Efficient?

One of the oldest clichés regarding military operations i

that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. This notion

applies with some qualification to Deliberate Force as wel

With the exception of the politically driven bombing paus

from 1 to 5 September, NATO air units executed the operation

in a fashion that closely mirrored the planning. There were n

sudden shifts in targeting, rules of engagement, or prioritie

COMAIRSOUTH and his staff factored in political constraint

during the planning process, designing a campaign capable o

gradual escalation that nevertheless sought to destroy thing

rather than kill people. To that end, the execution of Deliber 

ate Force clearly reflected the intentions of its planners. Stil

as with any large and complex operation, problems existed

The leadership provided at all levels to the units employed in

the operation, as well as the discipline of the crews involved

prevented these problems from thwarting the successful exe 

cution of the campaign.

Collateral Damage and the Targeting Process

General Ryan ’s desire to limit collateral damage and Serb

casualties to the lowest possible level reflected the politica

realities of the Balkans. Should NATO be responsible for th

killing and maiming of even relatively limited numbers of Serb

military personnel and civilians, Pale , Belgrade, and, indeed

Moscow might view (on Cable News Network) the allies a

belligerents fighting on the side of the Croats and Bosnia

Muslims. Adding yet another level of grievances to those a

ready existing in the Balkans would have been counterproduc

tive to the peace process that NATO and the UN intended

Deliberate Force to help move forward. 8 0

This desire to avoid collateral damage, together with th

rapidly changing ground and political situation, drove th

CAOC to tightly manage the conduct of the air campaign. Fo

example, special instructions (SPINS) issued by the CAOC di

rected pilots to attack only their assigned DMPI, even if tha

meant dropping a weapon in a crater. This requiremen

proved particularly frustrating to a number of airmen.8 1

159
Officers at Aviano and with American naval units involved

in Deliberate Force also expressed dissatisfaction with th

CAOC’s apparent involvement in tactics. Although a detailed

discussion of tactics is treated elsewhere in this study (se

chap. 11), one should note here that by dictating things suc

as the number of passes and weapons-release pulses, Genera

Ryan and his staff sought to minimize the likelihood of collat

eral damage . Crews recognized this imperative, but many o

them agreed with one Aviano pilot that a low tolerance fo

misses and mistakes also seemed to take “the judgment out o

the cockpit.” Repeated passes over a target increased th

crews’ exposure to enemy fire. Coupled with their inability t

strike alternate targets or DMPIs, some aviators believed tha

COMAIRSOUTH’s intolerance for collateral damage ofte

placed them in harm’s way with little to gain.

Although this view might be somewhat overblown, unit-leve

planners and weaponeers seemed to share it as well. For ex 

ample, members of the 7490th viewed the standard configura 

tion loads specified in the daily ATMs as gospel, therefor

limiting the unit’s ability to determine the most appropriat

munitions for the assigned target. But the CAOC did not al

ways dictate weapon loads; often the ATM simply referred t

the “best available.” As an example, General Ryan pointed t

an Aviano-based unit making its own interpretation of thi

term by using two CBU-87 cluster munitions. Fortunately, th

weapons were expended on a SAM site and evidently did no

cause any collateral damage . These munitions were the only

ordnance of this type employed throughout the campaign. I

anything, such an incident reinforced the importance of 

tightly executed campaign in Bosnia .

8 2

The compressed ATM cycle also rankled many people out

side the CAOC. General Ryan’s tight control over BDA dat

placed him in the position of determining whether a targe

required a second strike. The fluid political situation and th

ongoing Croat/BiH offensive often resulted in the CAOC’s add 

ing strikes against previously withheld targets while removin

others from the approved list. Thus, as noted above, the CAOC

resorted to cookie-cutter ATMs that simply specified times on

target. From the perspective of the 7490th, however, the accel

erated planning cycle also drove a maddening number o

160
changes, right up to takeoff. In one instance, officers at Avian

protested to the CAOC that they could not meet the time on

target and rolled it back by one hour.8 3

But the CAOC staff had a clear understanding of the situ 

ation driving the ATM cycle, derived in part from their proxim 

ity to Generals Ryan and Hornburg. Colonel Richardson 

CAOC chief of current operations during Deliberate Force, re

alized that the ATM process had to address emerging target

as well as put airpower against the targets most critical t

achieving a political settlement in the least amount of time

Navy captain Calise, deputy chief of plans, agreed that plan

ning inside the ATM cycle, together with hardware problem

associated with disseminating the final product, presented 

challenge to everyone involved. Nevertheless, he could see n

other way to react to the commander’s guidance and believed

that if the operation were to resume, ATM production would

continue in this fashion. 8 4

Changes to the ATM, however, did interfere with mission

planning efficiency in the field. As mission or flight leader

attempted to coordinate with other units involved in a strik

package, they sometimes found that each was working from 

different version of the ATM.

8 5

Despite the ever-present potential for confusion, given th

existing state of affairs, proactive leadership at Aviano and in

the CAOC—together with disciplined crews—ensured tha

packages struck only approved targets. Collateral damage wa

indeed minimal; Serbian leader Milosevic admitted to Ambas

sador Holbrooke that only 25 Serbs died as a result of th

campaign.8 6 Although the Bosnian Serbs made a few crud

attempts at portraying widespread collateral damage, Deliber 

ate Force’s heavy reliance on precision munitions and tightly

controlled execution probably made it the cleanest militar

operation ever.

Tactical Command and Control

Chariot and his CAOC staff had several means at their dis 

posal to ensure that subordinate units executed each day’s ATM

in a manner that conformed to the commander’s intent. ABCCC

Compass Call aircraft served as a conduit of informat ion to th

161
CAOC from units entering, flying in, and exiting the AOR

Aviano-based NATO E-3 AWACS aircraft also flew tracks ove

the Adriatic while other NATO assets orbited over Hungary

Navy air-control units, ground-based controllers, and th

AOCC in Kiseljak—call sign Longbow—rounded out the con 

stellation of C2 assets linking all elements of Deliberate Force.

Although the assets listed above allowed the CAOC battl

staff to retain control over the course of events in the skie

above Bosnia , problems inevitably developed. On the very firs

night of Deliberate Force, a mechanical malfunction forced th

on-station ABCCC aircraft, call sign Bookshelf, to return t

base. At 2317 CET, as aircraft began arriving on station, th

CAOC decided to proceed without Bookshelf. The E-3 , call sig

Magic, advised all aircraft of the problem, and Chariot cleare

the first package over land at 2340. Half an hour later, Book 

shelf arrived on station—not an auspicious beginning, but th

existing SPINS had considered this possibility. The redundanc

and flexibility of NATO C2 assets proved instrumental in ensur

ing that the CAOC maintained control over the operation.8 7

What Clausewitz aptly termed the “fog and friction” of wa

however, would still bedevil Deliberate Force despite advanced

communications technology. At times, confusion reigned ove

proper backup targets, and on several occasions NATO air 

borne early warning (NAEW) controllers were sometimes no

abreast of certain situations. On 30 August, for example, th

SEAD commander, Nikon-23, detected threat emissions an

made the appropriate call. Neither the E-3 on station no

HARM assets acknowledged the call. Apparently, the las

HARM shooters had failed to check out with either the SEAD

commander or the E-3 . Neither ABCCC nor NAEW could de

termine when any HARM assets would return to the AOR

With the SEAD window closing, mass confusion set in a

multiple packages began calling for vectors to their tanker

from ground controllers. At least one element returned to bas

due to lack of fuel.8 8

Problems maintaining “the big picture” were not limited t

airborne control centers. On several occasions confusion amon

CAOC staff members resulted in near pandemonium in the sky

At approximately 2000 on 1 September, the CAOC, via Book

shelf, ordered three aircraft to go over land. Ten minutes later

162
ABCCC ordered them to return over water. Fifteen minute

after that, Bookshelf told them to go over land, again on or

ders from the CAOC. When controllers aboard Magic sough

confirmation for the counterorder, the CAOC informed them

that it had issued no such orders. The aircraft held ove

water. An hour later the CAOC ordered another sortie, Sleep

11, to return to base. Ten minutes later, the CAOC apparentl

ordered Sleepy 11 over land. It turned out that CAS cell offi

cers were coordinating directly with Bookshelf rather tha

going through the senior operations officer on the battle staff

who also evidently issued contradictory instructions. Such con 

fusing incidents diminished as personnel gained experience. 8 9

Technical problems and poor radio discipline also dogged

the NATO C2 network. Extraneous chatter as well as mission

related transmissions crowded the various radio frequencies

Other aircraft entering the area sometimes failed to contac

Magic or Bookshelf, confusing an already difficult air picture.9 

As regards force protection, the SPINS of August 1995 pro 

hibited aircraft from operating over land without SEAD cover 

age. Given a limited number of available SEAD assets at an

one time, planners scheduled SEAD packages to provide win 

dows during which time other aircraft could enter the are

and carry out their missions. In theory the SEAD mission

commander informed NAEW of his estimated time of arrival a

the ingress corridor. NAEW, in turn, transmitted the window

open time over all relevant frequencies. Ten minutes prior t

departure, the SEAD commander again advised NAEW of hi

estimated arrival time at the egress corridor so that controller

could announce the time the window would close. 91

As in any conflict, the fog and friction of war, includin

human error, confusion, conflicting orders, and poor weathe

often led to the breakdown of even the most meticulousl

planned mission. SEAD packages were just as vulnerable t

such factors, thereby complicating C2 during Deliberate Force

The apparent lack of coordination between penetrating sortie

and SEAD packages proved frustrating to many aircrews and

in turn, led to a fair amount of wasted effort.

Clearly, with the safety of NATO crews paramount, one can

not overstate the importance of SEAD assets. Furthermore

CAOC intelligence analysts knew that Serb SAMs had gon

163
into hiding, as General Ryan pointed out to Admiral Smith i

his letter of 16 September outlining his plan to resume ai

strikes if so directed. With a very real threat still present an

Serb tactics blunting the efficacy of HARMs, the proper man

agement and control of SEAD packages became vital. Fortu 

nately, the incidents related above represent only a portion o

the total picture, albeit a portion most crews will tend t

remember. Of greater importance, however, is what thes

scenes of confusion can teach. For the foreseeable future

human failings will continue to serve as the limiting factor

behind our increasingly complex and sophisticated technol

ogy. A shortage of critical assets, regardless of the overal

strength and numbers of an entire force, can thwart or at leas

slow the tempo of any air campaign. When the fog of wa

exacerbates this shortage, missions are wasted and lives po

tentially placed in danger. Fortunately, Ebro 33 remained De

liberate Force’s first and only loss—a tribute to the ultimatel

successful suppression and neutralization of the Serbs’ IADS.

Coalition Effort or American Show?

From the beginning, Deliberate Force was a NATO opera 

tion. The air campaign involved US Air Force, Navy, and Ma 

rine Corps aircraft together with units from Great Britain 

France, Spain , the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, and Germany

The United States flew approximately two-thirds of all sor

ties—not surprising considering that roughly two-thirds of th

aircraft employed were American. US aircraft dropped 622 o

the 708 precision munitions employed but only 12 of 31

nonprecision weapons. French, Spanish, and British units ex 

pended the remaining precision weapons.

9 2

Outwardly, Deliberate Force gave the appearance of a tru

coalition effort. Indeed, although journalist Rick Atkinso

noted “bickering allies” as one of General Ryan ’s challenges

he described the operation as a “coming of age party for 

Western alliance that in more than four decades had fired few

shots in anger and had never fought an extended campaign.”9 

Still, perceptions of just how much Deliberate Force was 

coalition effort varied among the NATO allies.

164
For example, several senior officers at the CAOC saw th

operation as a means of forging closer ties between the United

States and its allies. In particular, Colonel Richardson be

lieved that Italian general Andrea Fornasiero, commander of 

ATAF, was largely responsible for the many positive change

and improvements in CAOC facilities and capabilities. Th

American leadership, in turn, realized that the CAOC wa

subordinate to Fornasiero. Evidently, however, Fornasiero rec

ognized the dominant role played by the Americans in Deliber 

ate Force. 9 4

Both Colonel Richardson and Navy captain Calise also rec

ognized the personal nature of allied relations forged at th

CAOC. Richardson believed that the face-to-face interaction

between American and allied officers laid a foundation fo

future cooperation and increased levels of trust among th

NATO allies. Calise, as deputy of plans, was particularly sensi

tive to international feelings. On more than a few occasions

he worked quickly to smooth over any misunderstandings an

was responsible for keeping national representatives at th

CAOC in the planning loop.9 5

Even in the absence of open enmity between NATO partici

pants, views of the combined nature of Deliberate Force varied

considerably among America’s allies. Many non-US NATO offi

cers complained that the operation was little more than a

American-run air campaign and that they were just along fo

the ride. General Ryan’s decision to move from Naples t

Vicenza served to reinforce that perception. Wing Commande

Andy Batchelor, a Royal Air Force officer working in the BDA

cell at the CAOC, noted that the absence of non-America

officers in key positions on General Hornburg’s staff created

the impression that the Americans had taken over the entir

operation. Others remarked that only the United States lacked

a national representative at the CAOC, relying instead on liai

son officers from individual units. 9 6

The Americans took a far different view than their allies a

to why US personnel occupied so many key positions. Genera

Hornburg, for example, stated that he had offered to fill ke

positions with allied officers but that no one had stepped

forward to accept the offer. The CAOC director also cited 

difference in work habits among the various allied air force

165
that seemed to cause them to shun the day-to-day operation

of the CAOC but then demand the option to become mor

involved when something important was about to happen. In 

deed, American officers shared the belief that allied officer

were only selectively involved in the air campaign. Thus, al

though the CAOC was technically under General Fornasiero

General Sawyer—Hornburg’s deputy—was a US Air Force offi

cer, as were the directors of operations, plans, intelligence , com 

munications, and personnel. A handful of US Navy officers fille

a few other key positions. The director of logistics, an Italia

colonel, was the only non-US officer to hold a critical position.97

Still, American officers operating at lower levels of plannin

and execution saw the allied coalition as functionin

smoothly. Maj Keith Kiger, a key member of the team tha

built the plans for Deliberate Force, did not detect any allied

resentment at his level toward US leadership. Working with 

British officer as they built the target list, Kiger also felt tha

members from other NATO countries were deeply involved in

the planning process. 9 8

Technical capabilities rather than national prejudices ofte

drove the air role played by each member of the alliance

Other than those from the United States, only British, French

and Spanish units possessed the equipment to deliver preci

sion-guided munitions. The Dutch and Italians did not hav

such capabilities, and, as previously mentioned, both th

Turkish and German contingents were limited in their partici

pation for various reasons. Still, only the United States ex

pended an overwhelming percentage of precision munitions

The French dropped 73 nonprecision weapons, more than fiv

times the number of precision weapons they employed. Like

wise, the British dropped 47 Mk-83 nonprecision bombs bu

expended only 48 laser-guided munitions. Considering NATO 

desire to limit collateral damage , most coalition officers thu

recognized that their ability to employ precision-guided weap

onry relative to that of American units dictated their place in

the campaign.99

Nevertheless, allied cooperation proved absolutely essentia

to the success of Deliberate Force. On the ground inside Bos 

nia , for example, an international UN force—composed to 

significant degree of units from NATO countries—work ed closel

166
with COMAIRSOUTH and his staff. The RRF, made up of Brit 

ish, French, and Dutch units, coordinated its activity wit

that of Ryan’s air units. UNPROFOR could—and did—reques

CAS when necessary. NATO and 5 ATAF liaison officers serve

with all critical UN C2 elements. Of those, possibly the mos

important to the CAOC was the UNPROFOR/NATO partner 

ship represented in the AOCC at Kiseljak . NATO officers work

ing there passed on vital weather and ground information and

as noted above, ensured that NATO bombs did not catch UN

peacekeepers unaware and in the open. On the one hand

officers of the CAOC’s CAS cell worked closely with the AOCC

to deconflict the RRF’s artillery fire with planned sorties; o

the other hand, the RRF’s guns often fired on suspected Serb

positions in an effort to drive them to the ground and reduc

the threat to aircraft from hostile fire. 100

The Exception or the Rule?

Whatever else may be said about it, Deliberate Forc

marked a turning point for NATO and the course of events in

Bosnia . As a coalition effort, the air campaign had its prob

lems. American air planners assumed that basing nation

would agree to operations from their territories. By and larg

they did—with the notable exception of Italy, which refused t

allow the beddown of the F-117s. Still, America’s NATO allie

came to realize that without US participation in the form o

military muscle and diplomatic influence, a meaningful solu 

tion to the Bosnian crisis would come only in the form of 

victor’s peace of the worst kind. Although some peopl

doubted the efficiency of Deliberate Force, few could overlook

its effectiveness. Planners of the air campaign sought to en

the threat from the Bosnian Serb army to government saf

areas, bring about the cessation of military operations, an

force Serbian compliance with UN mandates. In meeting thes

goals, they were generally successful. To what extent Deliber 

ate Force proved responsible for the accords reached in No 

vember 1995 in Dayton, Ohio , however, is beyond the scope o

this chapter.

167
Although problems abounded, Deliberate Force demon 

strated the inherent flexibility of airpower in the most circum

scribed of settings. NATO air units flew 3,535 sorties an

dropped more than eleven hundred bombs, losing only a sin 

gle aircraft. As intended, collateral damage was minimal—Serb

deaths numbered slightly more than two dozen.101 Precision

munitions accounted for nearly three-quarters of those ex 

pended. General Ryan’s air campaign, carefully planned an

tightly executed, benefited from the discipline of NATO air 

crews and their high state of training, as well as the availabil

ity of superior weaponry. Crafted to respond to a potentiall

explosive and complex situation, Deliberate Force may not b

the template for all future operations. Considering the goal

sought and the restrictions present, however, the employmen

of airpower over Bosnia from 30 August to 14 September 199

achieved much more than most people thought possible just 

few short months before.

Notes

1. Adm Leighton W. Smith, US Navy, to Lt Gen Rupert Smith, com 

mander, UN Protection Force, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, letter, 28 Au 

gust 1995, Deliberate Force Collection, Air Force Historical Research Agenc

(AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., NPL-15; and briefing slides (U), Lt Gen Micha

E. Ryan, subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberat

Force, 29 August–14 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-16.

2. Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, “Operation Deliberate Force, 2

Sep 95–14 Oct 95 [sic] Factual Review,” 14 November 1995, 2-7 throug

2-8. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

3. Ibid., 1-5, 3-1 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassifie

and briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Command Relationships.

4. “Operation Deliberate Force, 29 Sep 95–14 Oct 95 [sic] Factual Re 

view,” 1-5, 3-1; and Ryan briefing, subject: Command Relationships.

5. Rick Atkinson, “Air Assault Sets Stage for Broader Role,” Washingto

Post, 15 November 1995.

6. Briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Deliberate Force Structur

and fact sheet (U), “Deliberate Force,” CAOC/Historian (HO), n.d., AFHRA

CAOC-13.

7. Message (U), 061402Z JUL 95, commander, US Air Forces Europe, t

commander, Third Air Force et al., subject: Activation of the 7490th Win

(Provisional), 6 July 1995; briefing (U), Col Jim Turner, commander, 31

Operations Group and 7490th Operations Group (Provisional), and Co

David Stringer, commander, 31st Logistics Group, subject: Deliberate Forc

168
Lessons Learned: The Objective Wing in Combat, to members of the USAF

staff, 5 October 1995; and Col David Stringer, commander, 31st Logistic

Group, interviewed by the author and Maj Ronald M. Reed, Aviano AB

Italy, 18 January 1996.

8. Turner/Stringer briefing; Stringer interview; and SMSgt Richard R

Morris, 31st Fighter Wing/HO, “Operation Deliberate Force,” n.d., AFHRA

AVI-02-01. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

9. Roderick de Normann, “Operation Storm: Attack on the Krajina

Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1995, 495–98.

10. Briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Air Defense Threat, Sarajev

Fielded Forces.

11. “Karadzic, Krajisnik Comment on Sarajevo ‘Massacre,’” Banja Luk

Srpski Radio Network, 1700 GMT, 28 August 1995, in Foreign Broadca

Information Service [FBIS], Eastern Europe, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” FBIS

EEU-95-168, 30 August 1995, 27; and Atkinson.

12. Briefing (U), Lt Gen Michael D. Ryan, to students of the School o

Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Deliberat

Force, 7 February 1996.

13. Capt Ken Calise, US Navy, CAOC battle-staff director, interviewed b

the author and Maj Ronald M. Reed, Dal Molin AB, Vicenza, Italy, 1

January 1996 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; Col Jim

Turner, 31st Fighter Wing/Operations Group et al., interviewed by th

author and Maj Ronald M. Reed, Aviano AB, Italy, 19 January 1996 (Secre

Information extracted is unclassified; and fact sheet, “Deliberate Force.”

14. “Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status, 29 Oct [sic]–14 Sep 95

package flow, 29–30 August 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15; target folder/graphics, target no. D093, Ha

Pijesak military radio-relay station, n.d. (NATO Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43; and 7490th Wing (Provisional) mis 

sion results, 14 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-40-01, 1.

15. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-1 through 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and “Deliberate Forc

Summary of Daily Status.” (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

16. Deny Flight, commander’s daily report, 290300Z–300259Z an

300300Z–310259Z, August 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified; CAOC daily mission summary from 300300Z to 310259Z Au 

gust 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15; and “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-2 (NATO

Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

17. Commander’s daily report, 290300Z–300259Z August 1995 (NATO

Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and “U-2 Crashes in England

Aviation Week and Space Technology 143 (4 September 1995): 24.

18. Commander’s daily report, 300300Z–310259Z August 1995. (NATO

Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

169
19. 

Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-1 through 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and message, missio

report from 494th Fighter Squadron/deployed to commander, 5 ATAF/CAOC

Intelligence (INT), mission no. 5C3099, 30 August 1995 (Confidential) Informa

tion extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-46.

20. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-2. (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified.

21. “Karadzic Defiant Following NATO Air Attacks,” Belgrade SNRA

1438 GMT, 30 August 1995, in FBIS-EEU-95-168, 30 August 1995, 26

“Akashi: Halt in Air Operations Depends on Serbs,” Paris AFP, 0857 GMT

31 August 1995, and “Claes Warns Serbs to Stop ‘Provoking Us,’” Brussel

La Une Radio Network, 1600 GMT, 30 August 1995, both in FBIS-EEU-169

31 August 1995, 2.

22. Atkinson; message (U), 010001B SEP 95, Office of the Commande

UNPROFOR, to Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff (RRFOS) et al., sub

ject: Warning Order—Suspension of Air Strikes, 1 September 1995, AFHRA

NPL-15; and “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-2 (NATO

Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

23. Rick Atkinson, “Put to the Test, NATO Shows Its Mettle,” Interna 

tional Herald Tribune, 20 November 1995; and Bruce W. Nelan, “More Talk 

ing, More Bombing,” Time, 18 September 1995, 76–77.

24. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record (U), subject: Delib 

erate Force Lessons Learned, 11 October 1995, AFHRA, AVI-35; an

Stringer interview.

25. Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

26. Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

27. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record, attachment 2-2

Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

28. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record, attachment 2-2

Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

29. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record, attachment 2-2

Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

30. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record, attachment 2-2

Turner/Stringer briefing; and Stringer interview.

31. Capt Todd Gentry, 510th Fighter Squadron, interviewed by Lt Co

Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996.

32. Ibid.; and Turner interview. Colonel Hoog took part in a group dis 

cussion about Deliberate Force chaired by Colonel Turner.

33. Dr. Wayne Thompson and Maj Tim Reagan, “Deliberate Force: 

Distinctive Campaign,” Washington, D.C., December 1995, 17–18 (Secre

Information extracted is unclassified; and Lt Col Gary West, commande

510th Fighter Squadron, interviewed by Lt Col Brad Davis and Maj Chri

Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996.

34. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 5-2 through 5-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; AOCC/Ops/1, to L

Gen Michael Ryan, memorandum, subject: Effectiveness of CAS, 12 Sep 

170
tember 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AF 

HRA, NPL-18.

35. BDA summary spreadsheet, 9 April 1995 (NATO Secret), in “Excerp

Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” Combined Air Operations Cente

Vicenza, Italy, 29 August–16 September 1995. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

36. Briefing, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Intelligence Directorate, to vic

chairman, JCS, subject: Impact of Air Strikes on BSA Communication

copy faxed from Headquarters European Command (EUCOM) to Gener

Ryan and General Hornburg, n.d. (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-19.

37. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

38. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

39. Message, 070800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to SACEUR, subject: Op 

eration Deliberate Force, 7 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15.

40. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-2 through 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; message, 031600Z SE

95, Headquarters 5 ATAF, subject: Air Task, reference message, com 

mander, 5 ATAF, 3 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-18; and “BSA Weapons Withdraw Recce” (U

n.d., AFHRA, CAOC-18.

41. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-2 through 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and “Deliberate Forc

Summary of Daily Status,” package flows, 1 through 5 September 199

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

42. Atkinson, “Put to the Test”; and Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, Headquar

ters, United Nations Peace Forces, to Gen Ratko Mladic, letter (U), 3 Sep 

tember 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15.

43. Adm Leighton Smith, quoted in Atkinson, “Put to the Test”; an

transcript of press conference, Adm Leighton W. Smith, commander i

chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, “NATO Recommences Air Strike

against Bosnian Serbs,” NATO Club, Headquarters AFSOUTH, Naples, Italy

6 September 1995.

44. Message, 050800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to COMAIRSOUTH, sub

ject: Air Strike Execution, 5 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Inform

tion extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15; and statement by the NATO

secretary-general, press release (95)79, 5 September 1995.

45. “Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status,” package flow, 5 Sep 

tember 1995 and 5–6 September 1995; and 7490th Wing (Provisional) mis 

sion results, 5 September 1995.

46. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 3-2 through 3-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

47. Mission report, 5C0654/Seagull 11, 062332Z SEP 95, 6 Septembe

1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-57; an

171
Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 3-4 (NATO Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

48. Commander’s daily report, 060300Z–070259Z September 199

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; Deliberate Force fac

sheet, 6 and 7 September 1995; “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factu

Review,” 4-5 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and brie

ing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: CSAR Time Line.

49. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-5 (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified; commander’s daily repor

070300Z–080259Z September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified; and mission report, MRP1, 8 September 1995, from 104t

Fighter Group, deployed to commander, 5 ATAF/CAOC/INT (Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

50. Thompson and Reagan, 9; and Deliberate Force BDA tracking shee

31 OSS/OST, 19 September 1995, 11 (Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-40-01.

51. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, interviewed by Lt Col Rober

Owen et al., Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 Marc

1996; 7490th Wing (Provisional) results; ATM, 110300Z to 120259Z Sep 

tember 1995, 1 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, C-!a

and ATM, 130300Z to 140259Z September 1995, 4 (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, C-!a3.

52. Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996; and message, 070001Z SEP 95

COMAIRSOUTH, to CINCSOUTH, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, 

September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AF 

HRA, NPL-15-01.

53. Message, 051100Z SEP 95, COMAIRSOUTH, to commander in chie

European Command (USCINCEUR), subject: Tomahawk Operations, 5 Sep 

tember 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-1

and Hornburg interview.

54. Message, 081100Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to SACEUR, subject: IAD

West, 8 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified, AFHRA, NPL-17.

55. Message, 091053Z SEP 95, from USCINCEUR, to Supreme Head

quarters Allied Powers Europe et al., subject: Change to ACEORBAT TOA

Air, 9 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is un

classified, AFHRA, NPL-15.

56. Message, American Embassy, Rome, to US secretary of state et al

subject: Government of Italy’s Delay in Approving NATO F-117A Deploy

ments to Italy, 9 September 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified, AFHRA, NPL-16.

57. Commander’s daily report, 080300Z–090259Z September 1995 (NATO

Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15; “Operatio

Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-5 (NATO Secret) Information extracte

is unclassified; and briefing, Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Deadeye Results.

172
58. 

Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-6 (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified; and commander’s daily repor

090300Z–100259Z September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

59. Calise interview; commander, Sixth Fleet, “Tomahawk Operations i

Support of Operation Deliberate Force,” 5 September 1995 (Secret) Inform

tion extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-16; and Captain Hlavka, memo

randum to General Ryan via General Hornburg, subject: TLAM Update, 

September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

60. Report, “CAOC C-2 Assessment of Operation DEADEYE Par

III—10/11 Sep 95” (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassifie

AFHRA, EUCOM-14.

61. Ibid.; Hornburg interview; and Calise interview.

62. “CAOC C-2 Assessment.”

63. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-7 (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified; message, 111125Z SEP 95, Ministr

of Defense, Italy, to AIRSOUTH plans cell, subject: Beddown Request fo

F-117A Aircraft, 11 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-16; 7490th Wing (Provisional) missio

results; and “Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status,” package flow

11–12 September 1995.

64. “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-8 through 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and Deliberate Forc

BDA tracking sheet, 19 September 1995.

65. “CAOC C-2 Assessment.”

66. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 7 September 1995.

67. Ibid., 8 September 1995; and “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Fac

tual Review,” 4-6 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

68. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 6–9 September 1995.

69. Ibid., 11 September 1995.

70. Commander’s daily report, 130300Z–140259Z September 1995 an

140300Z–150259Z September 1995; and “Operation Deliberate Force . . 

Factual Review,” 4-8 through 4-9 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

71. Commander’s daily report, 100300Z–110259Z September 1995

“Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 10 September 1995; AOCC/Ops

memorandum; and “Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

72. Ibid., 4-8 through 4-9; “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 11–1

September 1995; and Calise interview.

73. Ambassador Christopher Hill, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen

Washington, D.C., 27 February 1996; Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996; an

“Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-7 (NATO Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

74. “Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status,” package flow, 11–1

September 1995; target folder no. C005, Vogosca ammunition-loading plan

173
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43; an

target folder no. C026, Doboj ordnance depot, (NATO Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43.

75. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 12 September 1995; and “Opera

tion Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-8 (NATO Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

76. Commander’s daily report, 130300Z–130259Z September 199

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; “Operation Deliberat

Force . . . Factual Review,” 4-9 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified; and “Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status,” packag

flow, 12–13 September 1995.

77. Briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Deliberate Force, Air Opera

tion: Targets Remaining, DMPIs Remaining; and commander’s daily repor

140300Z–150259Z September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

78. Janvier letter to Mladic; and Adm Leighton W. Smith, commander i

chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, to Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, letter (U

14 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15.

79. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 14–15 September 1995.

80. Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996; Calise interview; and Col Douglas 

Richardson, CAOC C-3 and chief of staff, interviewed by the autho

Vicenza, Italy, 16 January 1996.

81. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR memorandum for record, 3.

82. Ibid., 4; Capt Scott MacQueen, 510th Fighter Squadron, interviewe

by Lt Col Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 Februar

1996; and Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996.

83. Turner/Stringer briefing; and 31st Fighter Wing/CVR memorandum

for record, 3.

84. Richardson interview; and Calise interview.

85. Richardson interview; and Calise interview.

86. Hill interview.

87. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 29–30 August; and Deny Fligh

SPINS, commander, 5 ATAF CAOC SPINS/028, effective 260300 Augu

1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

88. Mission report, Mission ID/05/7C3007, 429 ECS, 300858Z Augu

1995, AFHRA, AVI-46. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

89. “Close Air Support Cell Daily Log,” 3 September 1995.

90. Mission report, Mission ID I8M942, Magic 80, 9 September 199

(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-52; an

mission report, Mission ID/05/7C0842, 429 ECS, 081602Z Septembe

1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-51.

91. Deny Flight SPINS, 4; Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996; an

Thompson and Reagan, 18.

92. Ryan briefing, 7 February 1996.

93. Atkinson, “Put to the Test.”

94. Richardson interview; and Calise interview.

174
95. Calise interview.

96. Wing Commander Andy Batchelor, BDA cell, interviewed by Lt Co

Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Ramstein, Germany, 14 February 1996

97. Hornburg interview; and Thompson and Reagan, 11.

98. Maj Keith Kiger, Sixteenth Air Force, interviewed by the author an

Maj Ronald M. Reed, Aviano AB, Italy, 18 January 1996, and by Lt Col Bra

Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 21 February 1996; an

Calise interview.

99. Calise interview; and Col Arjen Koopmans, Netherlands air forc

interviewed by Lt Col Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Vicenza, Italy, 2

February 1996.

100. Thompson and Reagan.

101. Hill interview.

175
Chapter 6

Combat Assessment:

A Commander’s Responsibility

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

This chapter examines the combat-assessment process in

Operation Deliberate Force, placing particular emphasis on

battle damage assessment (BDA). During combat assessmen

intelligence and operational communities analyze strike re

sults and weapons effects to refine strategies, operationa

plans, and target lists, as well as select weapons for sub

sequent strikes. Because of the multinational nature of th

planning, command, and execution of this air campaign an

as a result of decisions by senior leaders, combat assessmen

experienced problems with the cohesion, completeness, an

distribution of battle-damage information. Although thes

problems were obvious at the time and have been well docu 

mented since then, the issue for future air planners and com 

manders remains whether they were avoidable or somehow

inherent to air warfare. In other words, were these problem

the consequence of inappropriate doctrine and policies (whic

one can change), or were they the consequence of the particu 

lar circumstances of Deliberate Force, which may or may no

be relevant to future air campaigns (and thereby probabl

beyond the power of airmen to change)? Clearly, implication

of the assessment are important for the future planning an

execution of airpower.

Combat Assessment in Theory

From a US doctrinal standpoint, combat assessment include

three elements: BDA, munitions effectiveness assessmen

(MEA), and reattack recommendations. 1 BDA, “the subjectiv

estimate of damage to enemy forces resulting from the appli

cation of force to achieve operational and tactical objectives,”

177
is based on the physical damage to a target, the effect on tha

target system’s functional or operational capability, and th

overall impact on the enemy’s operational capability. Normally

the chief intelligence officers in US joint or coalition com 

mands—J-2s or C-2s, respectively—are responsible for BDA. A

chief of operations, the J-3 is responsible for MEA—the effective 

ness of friendly weapons systems and munitio ns. A reattac

recommendation—determining what needs to be done next—fol

lows directly from BDA and MEA. The joint/ combined force ai

component commander determines future courses of action

based on inputs from the J-2/C-2 and J-3/C-3. As the sum o

these elements, combat assessment “closes the loop” in th

targeting process and seeks to determine if strategic objective

are being—or have been—met.

Combat assessment involves both science and art. Intelli

gence personnel begin by collecting information from all avail

able sources—mainly from communications and electronic in 

tercepts (i.e., signals intelligence), imagery, and huma

reporting. Analysts assess or “fuse” this information to esti

mate the direct physical and functional damage to a target o

targets and to determine the overall impact of that damage t

the functional and operational effectiveness of the target sys 

tem . The integration of BDA and MEA underpins decisions o

whether and how one should reattack the target(s) or add new

targets. To the extent that the degree of an attack’s destruc

tion or disruption of a target determines physical and func

tional damage, measuring such damage is a science. Bu

judging whether such attacks have met strategic and opera 

tional objectives remains more of an art, since this determina

tion rests on factors that one cannot easily quantify. The latte

include the enemy’s psychological state or valuation of th

targets under attack.

Effective combat assessment requires substantial invest

ment in command attention and physical resources. Accord

ing to US military doctrine, joint force commanders are re

sponsible for providing guidance and adequate resources t

conduct combat assessment in support of their operations

This guidance should include clear instructions on how sub

ordinates should measure damage and convert those meas

urements into assessments of the effectiveness of attacks in

178
terms of the command

s operational and strategic objectives

Joint force commanders should provide enough resources t

establish an intelligence architecture capable of supportin

information collection, conversion of that information into us

able intelligence, and dissemination of appropriately detailed

intelligence “products” (imagery, BDA reports, etc.) to valid

users. The latter may range from tactical squadrons plannin

strikes to the National Command Authorities assessing th

strategic progress of the campaign.

Similarly, in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) op

erations, senior commanders should ensure that a proces

and architecture exist to carry out combat assessment. An

established doctrine accompanied by training is necessary fo

allied forces to know what combat assessment is and how t

perform it. Operations and exercises allow personnel to prac

tice combat assessment, gain proficiency, and refine the doc 

trine according to lessons learned. Thus, at the theoretical leve

at least, successful combat assessment includes adequat

physical resources, properly trained providers and users of intel

ligence data, clear and rapid communication among all con 

nected elements, and mutual trust among leaders and followers

Combat Assessment in Reality

In the specific case of planning and executing Deliberat

Force, the people responsible for establishing and runnin

effective combat assessment faced daunting guidance and re

source challenges from the start. Preparations for providin

combat-assessment support to Deliberate Force resided in th

combined air operations center (CAOC) at Headquarters 5t

Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) just outside Vicenza , Italy

Following the Bosnian Serb attack on a Sarajevo market in

February 1994 and the subsequent NATO ultimatum to th

Bosnian Serb army to withdraw its heavy weapons outside th

20-kilometer total-exclusion zone around Sarajevo , CAO

planners, working with little formal guidance, began to set u

BDA procedures to support possible air attacks on heav

weapons in the zone. No published NATO standard agree 

ments on BDA or combat assessment existed, and the forma

179
guidance available did little to make up for the shortfall in

doctrinal guidance. For instance, Allied Air Forces Souther

Europe (AIRSOUTH) Directive 80-50, vol. 2, AIRSOUTH Report

ing Directive, established time lines for moving information

from subordinate units to higher headquarters (which would

prove unrealistically short)4 but said or implied nothing abou

the actual art and science of using that information to mak

usable and timely assessments.

Lacking sufficient NATO guidance, US personnel use

American doctrine from joint publications. CAOC targeteer

produced a CAOC BDA guide 5 in March 1994 based on 

Defense Intelligence Agency guide developed from the lesson

of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. Moreover, MSgt Mark Swea

a targeteer for 20 years who worked in the CAOC, pinpointed

NATO’s shortcomings: “There is no BDA career field. A target

eer does not make one a BDA expert. There is no school, an

it [BDA] is never done the same way twice.”6 Maj Dave Min 

ster, who helped write the CAOC’s BDA guide, added that th

NATO targeting school, which he attended, is only a basi

course designed to convey the lowest common understandin

of targeting and fails to address BDA at all. 7

Throughout Operation Deny Flight, which involved the moni

toring and subsequent enforcement of the no-fly zone ove

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CAOC BDA cell stood up as offensiv

missions (e.g., attacks on the Krajina Serb airfield at Udbina 

Croatia , in November 1994 and the Pale ammunition-storag

facilities outside Sarajevo in May 1995) took place and the

stood down as operations returned to normal levels. As th

security situation in Bosnia deteriorated throughout the sum

mer of 1995, the challenge increased for CAOC personnel to se

up a NATO combat assessment capable of supporting a con 

certed air offensive. The shootdown of Capt Scott O’Grady b

the Bosnian Serbs on 2 June 1995 provided additional impe

tus to bring the CAOC up to a level required to execute 

robust air campaign. 8

In order to do that as quickly as possible, the Joint Chiefs o

Staff (JCS) and other agencies—mainly the Air Staff and U

European Command—circumvented the slower funding proces

of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) an

provided additional money, people, and equipment to the CAOC

180
Many of the high-tech systems were still in the final stages o

test and evaluation, and NATO had not purchased most of them

for coalition operations. Augmentees from the 32d Air Opera 

tions Group (AOG) at Ramstein Air Base, Germany; Headquar

ters AIRSOUTH at Naples; and elsewhere raised the BDA cell’

manning from four people at the start of Deliberate Force to 10

More computers, printers, and other equipment used to proces

and communicate BDA data, such as Linked Operations-Intelli

gence Centers Europe (LOCE), arrived in-theater prior to th

start of the operation, and more arrived as it progressed.

Despite these improvements in materiel, the multinationa

character of Deliberate Force infused combat assessment with

problems of cohesion, completeness, and distribution of infor 

mation. Combat assessment is a cumbersome and murky pro

cess in any operation, but several challenges made it particu 

larly so in Deliberate Force. According to Maj Gen Hal Hornburg

the CAOC director, the policy of sending personnel on temporar

duty to the CAOC for three to six months, sometimes less

meant that “approximately 90 percent of the positions ar

manned by temporary personnel [who] rotate at a rate of 2

percent or more a month.”9 This lack of fully trained personne

and continuity by an experienced staff undermined the smooth

functioning of the BDA cell. Consequently, some CAOC BD

representatives, including some US personnel but particularl

many of the European allies, needed training in computer soft 

ware as well as in target-coordinate mensuration.1 0 Training lev

els differed considerably among individuals from the variou

nations, especially in computer automation, as did their experi

ence in actual BDA methodology. Thus, training posed a signifi 

cant problem—at least in the campaign’s early stages.

Another issue of cohesion concerned the releasability of in 

telligence to NATO allies, which caused some European offi

cers to question whether Deliberate Force was a NATO opera 

tion or a “US and NATO” operation.1 1 Adm Leighton Smith 

commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, re

marked that the biggest problem of combined operations wa

the “ability to share intelligence [with the allies]” but added

that this was overcome when “we got national agencies t

share intelligence .”1 2 This decision helped foster trust within

the multinational CAOC.

181
In light of lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm, NATO

assign ed responsibility for BDA to the CAOC, although othe

organizations—mainly the joint analysis center at Royal Ai

Force Molesworth , United Kingdom, which provided theater-leve

intelligence support, and national-level intelligence agencies

such as JCS/J-2T (Targets), the Central Intelligence Agency

and the National Security Agency—provided battle-damage in 

puts to support the CAOC’s deliberations. The CAOC BDA ce

produced spreadsheets, among other things, to track targe

names; assigned basic-encyclopedic numbers to newly identifie

targets as a cross-reference to the target name; and identified an

described desired mean points of impact (DMPI [aiming points fo

each target]) and tracked their status during the campaig n.

The scope and scale of the air campaign during its first few

days overwhelmed the CAOC BDA cell.1 3 For several reasons

the BDA cycle of poststrike analysis took up to 48 hours t

feed back into the air tasking message (ATM) cycle. The need

to train so many personnel in computers and BDA methodol

ogy caused some delay, as did the slow arrival and poor qual

ity of critical elements of information. As one CAOC membe

complained, “[mission reports] were slow to arrive, and th

quality and resolution of gun camera imagery was too poor fo

BDA purposes.”1 4 Other delays resulted from the fact that dif

ferent services and nations used a variety of video formats in

their aircraft recorders and that LOCE, the main dissemina 

tion system, had limited bandwidth to transmit the large vol

umes of imagery data required for timely BDA. At the begin 

ning of Deliberate Force, the target cell shared the LOCE

terminal used by the collection, coordination, and intelligence

requirements management cell. It did not receive a dedicated

LOCE until 17 September—after the air strikes had stopped

Poor weather over the targets also contributed to delays in th

BDA cycle, although the intelligence community partly over

came this problem by using multiple sensors.

BDA improved during the operation as more equipment an

support personnel arrived and as the latter received on-the

job training. Despite the hard work of well-intentioned an

dedicated personnel, imperfect communication down the chain

of command made combat assessment difficult. Michael Short

then a major general and AIRSOUTH chief of staff, noted tha

182
BDA success criteria and meth -

odology were not conceptually

determined before the cam -

paign.”1 5 Within the first few days,

however, Lt Gen Michael Ryan,

commander of Allied Air Forces

Southern Europe, who personally

retained authority to add and remove targets from the master attack plan, authorized removal of

a target from this plan when it was

“two-thirds destroyed.”1 6 At least,

the proximity of the BDA specialists and General Ryan eased the

physical act of communicating

BDA. The BDA team chief, Wing

Comdr Andrew Batchelor, briefed

General Ryan and/or other CAOC leaders twice a day—

som etimes more often—and General Ryan or his deputies regu 

larly briefed Admiral Smith on BDA. The admiral, in turn, re

tained sole authority for releasing BDA to non-CAOC organiza 

tions, including field units, national intelligence centers, SHAPE

and the US State Department.

1 7

Although the CAOC BDA team knew the location of eac

DMPI and could determine physical damage to the targets

linking the apparent physical damage to functional damag

and to the theater objective of compelling the Bosnian Serbs t

withdraw equipment from the total-exclusion zone proved dif

ficult.1 8 Given the limited training of the BDA personnel an

the rapid pace of the air campaign, the 32d AOG, which aug

mented the CAOC, highlighted one aspect of the combat

a ssessment problem: “The CAOC . . . did not close the ATM

loop (cycle) with a unified assessment of operational results

BDA focused on target status as a result of bomb damage

Partially attributable to a ‘lack’ of detailed campaign objectiv es

the BDA effort measured the ‘lower teir’ [sic] results of planned

strikes to the exclusion of ‘higher teir’ [sic] task-achievemen

objective-attainment, and strategy implementation.”1 9 As a re

sult, the group noted that “senior leaders and strategists per 

formed their own analysis of operational results vis-à-vis th

Lt Gen Michael C. Short

183
chosen strategy. . . . Leaders had to pull the information

analyze the data, and determine a course of action, without 

fully supporting staff effort.”2 0

General Ryan , however, exercised his prerogative by inten 

tionally reserving for himself the responsibility for overall com 

bat assessment. Consequently, the BDA cell briefed him on

the physical damage inflicted on targets. As noted by Lt Co

Robert Wallace , the CAOC’s chief of targets, “No one wa

slated to perform functional or target system analysis becaus

with air supremacy and the ability to perform what amounted

to saturation bombing, albeit with smart bombs, it was easie

to continue to hit known, approved targets than identify new

targets that might function as backups for the destroyed tar 

gets.”2 1 General Ryan then discussed the results with his sen 

ior staff and Admiral Smith to assess overall progress an

plan future attacks because, as Col Daniel Zoerb, director o

the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight air-operations cell, pointed ou

“Only commanders held accountable/responsible for execu 

tion (CINC & COMAIRSOUTH) were fully aware of all consid 

erations and implications, and in proper position to judge th

extent to which attacks achieved [the] desired result.”2 2

However, the decision not to disseminate BDA outside th

CAOC (except to Admiral Smith ) was a contentious issue, par 

ticularly for aircrews flying the missions. Aviano pilots com 

plained of the lateness and incompleteness of the BDA reach 

ing them. Because planners often ordered restrikes withou

much explanation about BDA, many pilots suspected that, in

some cases, they had restruck already-destroyed targets. Als

tending to strengthen this suspicion was the CAOC ’s practic

of sending down target photos showing all DMPIs associated

with a target but not distinguishing between those alread

destroyed and those to be attacked.

Given the limitations of their prestrike information and rigid

rules of engagement, pilots generally had to identify the as

signed DMPI during an initial pass over the targets—a require

ment that further increased their risks. Aviano’s intelligenc

unit tried to mitigate this problem by coming up with its ow

BDA, using gun-camera footage, mission reports, and any im 

agery available.2 3 In the final analysis, pilots flew a few redun

dant strikes in the first days of Deliberate Force, but as BD

184
caught up with the ATM cycle, the problem of redundan

strikes seemed to disappear, although knowledge of bom

damage remained clouded in the field.

Colonel Zoerb acknowledged the frustration of the Avian

pilots over the imperfect communication of BDA to the unit

but stressed that the established BDA system served a broade

agenda than simply telling field units how well they were do 

ing. He later explained that “internal release of BDA informa

tion was restricted to prevent this information from being mis 

represented (unintentionally) to NATO and the nations,” whil

“external release [outside the CAOC] was restricted to avoid

compromise and to avoid divulging strategic and tactical plans

Widespread release (media ) would have given the warring fac

tions insight into targeting strategy, increasing aircrew ris

and making objective attainment more difficult.”2 4

Conclusions

Combat assessment in Deliberate Force reflected the prefer 

ences of General Ryan and Admiral Smith . Overall, both me

were pleased with the process.2 5 Due to the relatively smal

number of targets (56) and DMPIs (346), General Ryan and hi

senior staff were able to gauge the progress in meeting theate

and strategic objectives by examining the physical-damage as

sessments. However, had the operation been broader, longer

or without pauses, the burden on the senior staff would hav

been much greater. Moreover, the debate over the releasabilit

of BDA outside the CAOC continues.

From a US perspective, BDA has improved since Deser

Storm , and it worked relatively well during Deliberate Force

In general, the CAOC had the difficult task of transitionin

from a small-scale operation in a largely benign environmen

(Deny Flight) to an offensive posture in a short amount of time

After the necessity for air strikes became more apparent, CAOC

personnel adapted as best as they could to the changed circum

stances, and resources poured into the CAOC. In terms of spe

cific progress, the theater is now the focal point for BDA, with

intelligence inputs from various systems and agencies. Further 

more, US systems are more interoperable, communication

185
have improved between shipborne and land-based units, an

personnel have acquired training through operations such a

Deny Flight and Deliberate Force.

However, NATO as a whole remains relatively backward an

unpracticed in combat assessment. It lacks sufficient doctrin

on how to perform BDA, let alone combat assessment, and th

NATO targeting school does not address even the first step o

combat assessment—BDA. This lack of doctrine and the dispar 

ity in training and experience among member nations mani

fested itself during the rapid expansion of the CAOC BDA ce

just prior to and during Deliberate Force. Successful combine

operations require additional improvements since future opera 

tions likely will involve US forces operating as part of a coalition

Although the United States and NATO differ in their institu 

tional capabilities to practice BDA, both lack formal doctrina

guidance for the actual assessments phase of combat assess

ment, particularly for Deliberate Force, in which political indi

cators proved critical to assessing bombing effects. US doc 

trine provides some guidance for measuring and describin

physical and functional damage. However, neither body o

doctrine explains how to link physical and functional damag

to desired political end states. Perhaps this deficiency is du

to the uniqueness of each operation, but one can preview in

doctrine a conceptual framework for measuring progress to 

wards political goals so that commanders need not rely on

their instincts alone. The small scale of Deliberate Force, it

short duration, and the leadership of General Ryan and Adm

ral Smith mitigated the lack of specific doctrine to some de

gree, but these special circumstances may not always be pre

sent or relevant in future applications of airpower.

This is not to say that Deliberate Force had no genera

applications for the employment of airpower. Indeed, one ca

anticipate many of the campaign’s features as elements o

future campaigns, which likely will be characterized by a re

quirement for the rapid expansion of operational and intelli

gence capabilities, the blending of multinational personne

with differing levels of theoretical and practical training an

experience, and a high pace of operations. In addition, the larg

number of targets hit in every air tasking order (ATO) cycle wi

require robust computer systems capable of transmitting high

186
volumes of data from the continental United States and acros

a theater of operations, as well as timely assessments in sup

port of subsequent ATO planning.

Thus, while combat-assessment practice and infrastruc

tures always have room for improvement, the most compellin

area for future resource investment lies in developing a bod

of doctrine that permits the efficient blending of multinationa

personnel and provides combined assessments and recom 

mendations to air commanders on all aspects of combat as

sessment—from sensor-data interpretation to political advice

This doctrine can guide education and training, as well a

provide ready-made staff manuals suitable for quick modifica 

tion to reflect idiosyncratic circumstances. Airmen must pus

doctrine as far into the strategic levels of political-militar

connections as possible. This effort may require closer coordi

nation with political advisors, both from within NATO—if ap

propriate—and from the US Department of State and/or ap 

propriate foreign ministries. But we should welcome suc

connectivity, given the close and continual military and diplo 

matic interactions of operations such as Deliberate Force.

Notes

1. Joint Pub 2-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for In 

telligence Support to Targeting,” third draft, April 1995, III-23–III-32.

2. Ibid., III-26.

3. Ibid.

4. Lt Col Robert Wallace, JCS/J-2T, previously CAOC chief of targets an

deputy C-2, telephone interview by the author, 6 March 1996.

5. “Battle Damage Assessment Guide,” 5th ed., 5 ATAF CAOC, 1 Octobe

1995, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Bas

(AFB), Ala., NPL-03. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassifie d.

6. MSgt Mark Sweat, CAOC, telephone interview by the author, 6 Marc

1996.

7. Maj Dave Minster, JCS/J-2T, telephone interview by the author, 

March 1996.

8. Col John R. Baker, Headquarters USAF/XOO, interviewed by Lt Co

Chris Campbell and the author, 11–12 December 1995, AFHRA, Misc-13.

9. “Quick Look at the CAOC Ops/Intel Architecture Needs,” Headquar

ters USAF/XOO, n.d. (created 28 July 1995), 3, AFHRA, SAGC-01-05. (Se 

cret) Information extracted is unclassified.

187
10. Wallace interview. Colonel Wallace had to train some Europeans i

converting degrees, minutes, and seconds to degrees, minutes, and hun

dredths of minutes.

11. Wing Comdr Andrew Batchelor, Royal Air Force, interviewed by M

Chris Orndorff, 14 February 1996, AFHRA, Misc-18.

12. Adm Leighton Smith, videotaped presentation to Air War Colleg

students, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9 November 1995, AFHRA, Misc-19.

13. Batchelor interview.

14. History, 5 ATAF Combined Air Operations Center Organization an

Function from April 1993, 18, AFHRA, SAGC-10. (NATO Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

15. Maj Gen Michael Short, vice commander, AIRSOUTH, interviewed b

Lt Col Robert C. Owen and Lt Col Richard L. Sargent, 4 December 1995.

16. Batchelor interview.

17. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] air operations center, memorandum to Lt Co

Robert C. Owen, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Deliberate Forc

BDA Process, 25 March 1996.

18. History, 5 ATAF Combined Air Operations Center. (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified.

19. “32 Air Operations Group (AOG) After Action Report,” Ramstein Ai

Base, Germany, n.d., 10.

20. Ibid., 11.

21. Wallace interview. Col Daniel Zoerb, director of the AIRSOUTH Den

Flight air-operations cell, contends that “AIRSOUTH/CAOC intelligence per

sonnel and targeteers accomplished what analysis was possible given con 

straints of time, qualification and training, and made requests for analytic

support to appropriate national agencies. Shortfalls in internal capabilit

and lack of timeliness and coherence on the part of national support agen 

cies were significant limitations in this regard.” Faxed comments on 2

draft of Balkans Air Campaign Study to Col Robert C. Owen, Air Comman

and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 16 July 1997.

22. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] air operations center memorandum.

23. Pilots who flew in Desert Storm also had difficulty getting BDA. Se

Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summar

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 29 March 1993), 139.

24. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] air operations center memorandum.

25. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, “NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovin

‘Deliberate Force,’ ” After Action Report, n.d. (NATO Secret), information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-13; and Smith presentation. Colone

Zoerb, another key participant in the combat-assessment process, pointe

out that “the Combat Assessment process was made to work and accom 

plished basic objectives . . . but nobody was pleased with it. This is anothe

traditional lesson that U.S. and NATO forces must take as a priority.” Faxe

comments.

188
Chapter 7

Assessing the Effectiveness

of Deliberate Force:

Harnessing the Political-Military

Connection

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

This chapter assesses whether and to what extent Opera 

tion Deliberate Force achieved its military and political ob 

jectives . No military operation ever takes place in isolation

consequently, any study of whether and how Deliberat

Force achieved its goals must take into account not only th

air strikes themselves but also other dynamic forces tha

may have influenced the Bosnian Serbs’ eventual decision t

meet NATO’s demands. In addition, one must judge the op 

eration’s effectiveness from the perspective of the intende

target—the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership

In this context, one should judge NATO air operations in

light of their direct impact as well as the concurrent victo

ries by Croatian and Muslim (federation) ground forces

American-sponsored diplomatic initiatives, and Serbia ’s po 

litical pressure on its Bosnian Serb cousins.

In Operation Desert Storm , the number of Iraqi division

destroyed was a key measure of progress toward the objec

tive of ejecting the Iraqis from Kuwait. During Deliberat

Force, in addition to the tangible effects of the air attacks

nonquantifiable measures of progress emerged because U

diplomats met face-to-face with the Serbs even as air strike

took place. These diplomats had the unique opportunity t

judge firsthand the impact of the air strikes on the Serbia

leaders’ faces and by the political movement on the part o

the Serbs . Moreover, the diplomats were ideally positione

to advise the military on the campaign’s effectiveness.

189
Identifying the Objectives

Chapter 4 of this volume noted that Deliberate Force con 

tained both overt, limited objectives as well as implicit, strate 

gic objectives. From the beginning, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, com 

mander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe and th

operational commander of the campaign, said the operation

was “not intended to defeat the BSA [Bosnian Serb army] bu

to convince the BSA to stop attacking Sarajevo—to take awa

military capability, not lives.”1 The military objective entaile

“execut[ing] a robust NATO air campaign that adversely alter

the BSA’s advantage in conducting successful military opera 

tions against the BIH [Federation forces].” The desired en

state of the campaign for NATO commanders, therefore, called

for the “Bosnian Serbs [to] sue for cessation of military opera 

tions, comply with UN [United Nations] mandates, and negoti

ate.”2 This articulation of the desired end state tied the mili

tary objectives of the operation to the UN’s declared goal o

securing the safe areas—particularly Sarajevo —and to US as

sistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke’s more circum

spectly announced objective of “leveling the playing field” in

order to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table

Nonetheless, Holbrooke emphasized that the “bombing wa

not planned as a part of the negotiating track. . . . It [the ai

campaign] was a result of the Bosnian Serbs’ decision to mor

tar the [Sarajevo] marketplace.”4

The Cycle of Strike, Pause, and Negotiation

Air operations began at 0200Z on 30 August 1995, and late

that day Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, force commander of United

Nations Peace Forces in the Balkans, sent a letter to Ge

Ratko Mladic , BSA commander, setting the conditions for end 

ing the air strikes. These included removing heavy weapon

from inside Sarajevo’s 20-kilometer (km) total-exclusion zon

(TEZ), ceasing attacks against the other remaining safe areas

and accepting a cease-fire throughout all of Bosnia .

5

Meanwhile, Ambassador Holbrooke, lead negotiator of th

five-nation Contact Group representing the United States

190
France, Britain , Germany, and Russia , shuttled between Bel

grade and Zagreb from 30 August to 1 September and urged

Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian presiden

Franjo Tudjman to accept a comprehensive peace plan. On 3

August, as NATO air strikes continued a second day, Presi

dent Milosevic , representing the Bosnian Serbs, accepted th

principle that would divide Bosnia in a 51/49 percent spli

between the Muslim-Croat federation and Bosnian Serbs.

6

 Al

though representing the Bosnian Serbs politically, Presiden

Milosevic had not yet convinced General Mladic to accede t

NATO’s demands.

After two days of air strikes, NATO paused at 0200Z on 

September. While NATO leaders assessed the effects of thei

bombing campaign, diplomatic contacts continued. Genera

Janvier met General Mladic at the Serb border town of Mal

Zvornik , where Mladic harangued Janvier and handed him 

letter filled with conditions of his own. During this time, Am 

bassador Holbrooke’s delegation was able to measure the po

litical impact of the air strikes by observing the faces of th

Serbs. Christopher Hill, who assisted Holbrooke, noted tha

President Milosevic welcomed the pause on 1 September be

cause it would make restarting the campaign difficult. 7 Ac

cording to Hill, the Serbian president finally realized the tru

power of the air campaign when, during a meeting with Am 

bassador Holbrooke later on 1 September, he tried to contac

General Mladic , only to learn from an aide that NATO force

had severed the communications links between Pale —the Bos 

nian Serb headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and Belgrade

It dawned on Milosevic, to his chagrin, that the air strike

would, of course, target telecommunications systems.

The bombing pause gave UN and NATO leaders direct an

indirect opportunities to tighten the screws on the Serbs. Re

sponding to General Mladic ’s tirade of the day before, Genera

Janvier sent him a letter on 3 September, informing him tha

his conditions were unacceptable and warning him that ai

strikes would resume if by 5 September the Serbs did no

remove heavy weapons from Sarajevo’s 20 km TEZ, cease at

tacks against the other safe areas, allow freedom of movemen

for humanitarian relief workers and the United Nations Pro 

tection Force (UNPROFOR), and allow unrestricted use of th

191
Sarajevo airport. Janvier hoped that the pause would allow

Mladic to see just how damaging the air strikes had been. Ma

Gen Hal Hornburg, the combined air operations center (CAOC

director, even wanted to send photos and a cellular phone t

Mladic so he could see the extent of the damage and stay in

better contact with UN and NATO leaders. 8

However, the pause also allowed doubts to fester amon

some military leaders about the efficacy of resuming th

bombing. During his shuttle diplomacy, Ambassador Hol

brooke received reports of the existence of “great ambivalenc

in Washington about resumption of the bombing and abou

the bombing itself. . . . Senior American military personne

were sharply divided on whether to resume or not, wherea

the diplomats were not.” Holbrooke aptly summed up som

military leaders’ unease by noting that “the same people wh

had doubts about it ran it so brilliantly.”9

When imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles indicated n

withdrawal from the TEZ, NATO air strikes resumed on 

September. In retrospect, Hill noted that resuming the ai

campaign had an unforeseen and perhaps even more stun

ning effect on the Serbian leaders than had the initia

strikes. 1 0 The resumption of air strikes dashed Presiden

Milosevic’s hopes that NATO once again had spent its politica

energy in a halfhearted air campaign and that the predictabl

pattern of protracted negotiations would follow.

While the NATO air strikes continued, diplomats made pro 

gress on 8 September when the foreign ministers of Bosnia 

Croatia , and “Yugoslavia ” (Serbia and Montenegro) agreed t

abide by basic principles that would govern future peace nego 

tiations. The agreement called for two entities—the existin

Bosnian federation (of Croat and Muslim-controlled territory

and a Serb republic (Republika Srpska)—to form a federation

of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina would

remain a single country, the accord called for two autonomou

parts and a “central connecting structure.”1 1 The agreemen

also allowed the entities to “establish parallel special relation

with neighboring countries,” a concession that permitted link

between Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia .

1 2

On 14 September diplomatic and military pressure came t

a climax. Hill did not need up-to-the-minute bomb damag

192
assessments to tell him the effectiveness of the air campaign

he could see the impact on President Milosevic’s face. Hil

recalled that when the delegation met with Milosevic that da

in Belgrade, the Serbian president looked “very worried.”1 

Milosevic implored Ambassador Holbrooke to call a halt to th

air strikes but without offering any assurances that the BS

would remove the weapons from around Sarajevo or compl

with NATO’s other demands. When Holbrooke responded tha

the BSA leadership knew what it must do to stop the bomb 

ing, President Milosevic asked if Holbrooke would talk directly

with the BSA leaders. Holbrooke consented, and, to hi

astonishment, Milosevic had General Mladic and Bosnia

Serb “president” Radovan Karadzic driven over from a nearb

villa. Because Mladic reluctantly agreed to withdraw the heavy

weapons and acceded to other demands, NATO suspended

offensive air operations for 72 hours. At the end of that period

NATO suspended those operations another 72 hours, and on

20 September NATO and UNPROFOR announced that a “re

sumption of airstrikes is currently not necessary.”1 4

A Propitious Convergence of Events

Hill remarked that on 14 September, when General Mladi

reluctantly agreed to NATO’s terms, “this was a guy who reall

looked like he’d been through a bombing campaign.” He con 

cluded that “the use of airpower and our ability to . . . sustain i

for a couple of weeks was really the signal the Bosnian Serb

needed to get to understand that they had to reach a peac

agreement. . . . They basically had to surrender some major wa

aims. I think the way it was done was with this air campaign.”1 5

From a ground perspective, Hill concluded that the federa 

tion offensive in western Bosnia would not have been as suc

cessful without the air campaign.1 6 Croatian and Muslim (fed

eration) forces, which had begun operations against the BS

in western Bosnia by mid-August, capitalized on the BSA

difficulty in bringing its forces to bear when and where the

were needed. By 13 September the military balance in Bosnia

had tilted in the federation’s favor against the Bosnian Serbs

just as it had tilted in Croatia ’s favor against the separatis

193
Krajina Serbs earlier, from May to August. Press reports indi

cated up to 50,000 Bosnian Serbs in western Bosnia fled t

the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka during the fight

ing. This number was in addition to the 160,000 Krajin

Serbs who had fled to Banja Luka in the wake of Croatia 

swift reconquest of Sector West in early May and Sector

North and South in early August. (See chap. 1 for more on

Croatia ’s recapture of the Krajina, which Krajina Serbs ha

held for four years.) The rout in the west continued, and by 1

September the federation offensive had recaptured over thre

thousand square kilometers from the Bosnian Serbs, trim 

ming the area they controlled from 70 percent to about 4

percent. This area matched what the Contact Group had of

fered them.

In assessing the air campaign’s effectiveness, Adm Leighton

Smith, commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe

concluded that the federation ground offensive in the wes

“helped dramatically,” although NATO air and federation groun

operations did not integrate intentionally. 1 7 General Ryan als

pointed out the value of the federation ground operations in

western Bosnia by noting that “it took both—airpower naile

down the forces,” hamstringing the BSA’s ability to commun

cate and respond to the western offensive.1 8 General Hornbur

observed that “without the territorial loss, the air campaign

would not have been as effective. . . . One without the othe

would not have been as effective.”1 9 Similarly, Holbrooke de

scribed the federation ground offensive as “extremely important

but concluded that the air campaign remained the “most impor 

tant single factor” influencing the Serb s.

2 0

From a political standpoint, Ambassador Holbrooke’s diplo 

macy benefited from the bombings, which allowed him t

maintain pressure on President Milosevic to convince the Bos 

nian Serbs to comply with NATO’s ultimatum. He concluded

that “never has airpower been so effective in terms of a politi

cal result.”2 1 For his part, Milosevic knew that the UN would

not lift the ongoing sanctions against Serbia —in effect sinc

the summer of 1992 due to Serbia ’s support of the BSA—unti

the factions reached a peace agreement on Bosnia . The eco 

nomic sanctions had put the Serbian economy on its back

Moreover, because Milosevic realized the UN would not remov

194
the sanctions without US approval, this gave Holbrooke addi

tional leverage with the Serbian president. As a result, Milosevi

had little choice other than agreeing to pressure the Bosnia

Serb leadership to withdraw its weapons from around Sarajevo.

Conclusions

The BSA had to deal with foes fighting on the ground an

attacking from the air. The overall military balance in th

region had begun to shift with Croatia ’s recapture of three o

the four UN sectors in Croatia from May to early August 1995

The tide in Bosnia began to shift in mid-August as Croatian

Bosnian Croat, and Muslim forces began an offensive to re

take territory from the BSA in western Bosnia . The air cam

paign unintentionally aided that offensive. The federation’s re

capture of territory from the BSA tidied up the map, bringin

proportional distribution of territory between the faction

more into line with what the Contact Group offered the Bos 

nian Serbs. The territorial losses also meant that the Bosnia

Serbs ceded at the negotiating table at Wright-Patterson Ai

Force Base (AFB) in Dayton, Ohio, only what had been take

from them on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the balance o

power had shifted perceptibly from the BSA to the federation

If General Mladic continued to resist NATO ’s demands, h

risked losing more territory and combat capability.

NATO air strikes, coupled with the federation offensive ou

west, confronted the BSA with a military challenge it had no

experienced during the previous three-plus years of fighting

Moreover, Ambassador Holbrooke’s just-in-time diplomacy—

the prospect of getting economic sanctions against Serbia re

moved and the recognition of a Serb republic within Bosnia

with “special links” to Serbia —provided President Milosevi

with everything he needed to pressure the Bosnian Serbs.

By the end of Deliberate Force, the air strikes not only ha

achieved the objective of compelling the Bosnian Serbs t

comply with NATO’s demands but also, when combined wit

the federation ground offensive, had contributed to the shift in

the military balance in the region. This military reality, in turn 

helped influence the warring factions’ decision to negotiate 

195
final peace agreement at Dayton. Hill reported that the ai

campaign had a lingering effect at Dayton by “establishing 

record of compliance.”2 2 Through Deliberate Force, NATO ha

proven its willingness to enforce an agreement.

In the end, the combination of military power and diplo 

macy made a difference in Bosnia . Ambassador Holbrooke

diplomatic initiatives capitalized on the federation offensive in

the west and the NATO air strikes to pressure the Serbs an

Bosnian Serbs. Diplomacy without military leverage would

have proved insufficient to persuade the Bosnian Serbs—a

previous attempts to bring peace to the Balkans had ampl

demonstrated—while military operations without diplomac

would have proved unsustainable.

Notes

1. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by Maj Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayn

Thompson, 18 October 1995, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA

Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-30.

2. Briefing slides (U), Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, subject: NATO Air Opera

tions in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberate Force, 29 August–14 Septembe

1995, AFHRA, NPL-16.

3. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO

Attack If Talks Stall,” New York Times, 28 August 1995.

4. Richard Holbrooke, interviewed by Dr. Karl Mueller and the autho

24 May 1996.

5. Rick Atkinson, “The Anatomy of NATO’s Decision to Bomb Bosnia

International Herald Tribune, 17 November 1995, 2.

6. Roger Cohen, “Serb Shift Opens Chance for Peace, a U.S. Envo

Says,” New York Times, 1 September 1995.

7. Christopher Hill, director, Office of South Central European Affair

Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, inter 

viewed by Lt Col Robert Owen and the author, 27 February 1996.

8. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, presentation to Joint Doctrine Air Cam 

paign Course students, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educa

tion, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996.

9. Holbrooke interview.

10. Hill interview.

11. Chris Hedges, “Three Enemies Agree to Serbian State as Part o

Bosnia,” New York Times, 9 September 1995.

12. Ibid.

13. Hill interview.

14. “Joint Statement by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander, Allie

Forces Southern Command and Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, Force Com 

196
mander, United Nations Peace Forces,

 Headquarters, United Nations Peac

Forces Zagreb, 20 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-06-13.

15. Hill interview.

16. Ibid.

17. Adm Leighton Smith, “NATO Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: De 

liberate Force, 29 August–14 September 1995,” videotaped presentation t

Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9 November 1995, AFHRA, Misc-19.

18. Ryan interview.

19. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, interviewed by the Air University Balkan

Air Campaign Study Group, 12 March 1996, AFHRA, Misc-20.

20. Holbrooke interview.

21. Ibid.

22. Hill interview.

197
Chapter 8

Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

Operation Deliberate Force was a robust 17-day air campaign

conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) t

adversely alter the advantages of the Bosnian Serb army (BSA

in conducting successful military attacks against Sarajevo an

other safe areas. By conducting active bombing operations be

tween 29 August 1995 and 14 September 1995, NATO launche

its first sustained air-strike operation, one that included severa

operations and weapons-employment highlights:

• first air campaign to predominantly employ precision

guided weapons (69 percent);

• first employment of Tomahawk missiles in the Europea

Command theater—the Balkans area of responsibilit

(AOR);

• first sustained use by United States Air Force (USAF

F-16s of both 500 lb (GBU-12) and 2,000 lb (GBU-10

laser-guided bombs (LGB) in combat;

• first sustained use by USAF F-15Es of the 2,000 lb GBU

15 electro-optical guided bomb in combat;

• first use by USAF F-16s of the high-speed antiradiation

missile (HARM) Targeting System (HTS) and first firing o

the AGM-88 HARM in combat;

• first time in combat that strafing passes by USAF A-10

exceeded 15,000 feet+ slant range;

• first employment of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicl

(UAV) in combat;

• first deployment of the German Luftwaffe into comba

since World War II;

• first deployment of modern Spanish air force units int

combat;

• first contribution by Italian air force units to NATO /Den

Flight operations; and

199
• first delivery by the French Mirage 2000D/K and Sepeca

Jaguar of Matra 1,000 lb LGBs and US GBU-12s in combat .

This chapter and its four companion chapters (9–12) take 

tactical-level look at the use, performance, and effectiveness o

the individual weapon systems, support systems, and tactic

employed against the BSA during Deliberate Force. Primarily

they deal with fundamental war-fighting elements (forces, weap

ons, targets, and tactics) and the way they interlink—from initia

conception, to employment, to their effects on the BSA. To

gether, they translate air combat power into success in air-strik

operations.

This chapter, together with chapters 9, 10, and 12, review

the military “science” of Deliberate Force, its physical aspect

(such as force structure, military hardware, and technologica

tools), and other quantifiable subjects. 1 Chapter 11 provide

insight into the operational “art” of the campaign—the em 

ployment of platforms, weapons, and tools against the targe

array. Each chapter examines its subject in light of one basi

question: What effect(s) did politico-military constraints an

limitations (e.g., the rules of engagement and the tight, cen 

tralized control exercised by the combined force air componen

commander [CFACC]) have on the forces, weapons, targets

and tactics in pursuit of Deliberate Force’s objectives?

Deliberate Force’s multinational force composition included

• over five thousand personnel from 15 nations;

• over four hundred aircraft (including 222 fighters) avail

able at any one time;

• approximately 260 land-based aircraft—40 percent based

at Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy;

• 18 air bases in five countries across Europe; and

• up to three aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea .

What follows is an examination of NATO air platforms use

during Deliberate Force, including fixed- and rotary-wing air 

craft as well as UAVs. These platforms consist of both “shooters

(lethal-weapon platforms) and “supporters” (nonlethal, although

some are capable of self-defense). Further, one can distinguis

these platforms by a variety of operating characteristics an

capabilities that give them unique flexibility and versatility t

200
perform various roles and missions. Thus, for purposes of differ 

entiation, this discussion matches the players with their primar

role and mission even though some platforms are not limited t

particular roles or missions.

The Players

After Deny Flight launched its first sorties in April 1993, th

force structure grew proportionally to mission tasking. The pace o

growth accelerated after 2 June 1995 with the shootdown o

Basher 52, a USAF F-16 patrolling Bosnian airspace, by a Ser

bia n SA-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM). Gen Michael Ryan, com 

mander of NATO’s Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIR 

SOUTH), began to augment his force structure with additiona

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) assets over Bosnia

Herzegovina. COMAIRSOUTH’s other requests included extensio 

of the assignment of Spanish EF-18s to Aviano AB and a new re

quest for an additional 12 “jammers” and 24 “HARM shooters.”2

By mid-July two Compass Call EC-130Hs arrived at Avian

to support SEAD against the Bosnian Serb integrated air de

fense system (IADS). By the end of July, Adm Leighton Smith 

commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC

SOUTH), requested additional forces for possible air strikes in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. He also requested that F-16 HTS aircraf

F-4G Wild Weasels , and additional support aircraft be placed

on alert for recall. 3

On 13 August 1995, in response to activity in Iraq, the US

Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) departed the Adriatic Sea , creat

ing a requirement to deploy electronic combat (EC) an

HARM-capable aircraft previously placed on alert to fill th

SEAD gaps. In addition CINCSOUTH requested an extension

of the deployment of EF-111s already based at Aviano.

4

By 18 August 1995, COMAIRSOUTH requested a recall pos 

turing of Deny Flight assets: seven Mirage F-1s, eight Jaguars

and 17 Mirage 2000s from France; 18 NF-16s from the Neth 

erlands; 18 TF-16s from Turkey; and 12 Jaguars and eigh

Tornados from the United Kingdom . At the same time, thes

aircraft received approval for deployment from their aler

bases to their respective beddown bases in Italy .

5

201
By the end of August, as tensions mounted, CINCSOUTH

increased the alert posture of all “on call” aircraft. On 29 Au 

gust, with the concurrence of Lt Gen Bernard Janvier, forc

commander of United Nations Peace Forces (FC UNPF), CINC

SOUTH issued the order to initiate Operation Deliberate Forc

and recalled 61 aircraft to their respective beddown bases. Thes

recalled air assets included three Mirage F1-CTs, one Mirag

F1-CR, two Jaguars, four Mirage 2000Cs, and six Mirag

2000Ds/Ks from France; four NF-16As and two NF-16Rs from

the Netherlands; four GR-7s from the United Kingdom ; 10 TF

16Cs from Turkey; two AC-130Hs, two EC-130Es, five KC-10s

six F-4Gs, four EF-111As /EA-6Bs, two C-21s, two EC-130Hs

and two MC/HC-130s from the United States.

6

Onset Force Structure

After the shootdown of Basher 52 in June, air assets assigne

to Deny Flight grew nearly 20 percent. Of these, land-base

aircraft increased nearly 30 percent, and aircraft assigned to th

7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano nearly double

to 114.7 The largest gain came in the increase of overall ai

platforms available (assigned plus nonassigned) to 385, a 2

percent increase in assigned aircraft and a 22 percent increas

in aircraft available to fly missions. This is an overall chang

of 57 percent from Deny Flight numbers (see table 8.1 and fig

8.1). Additionally, 14 support assets not assigned to NATO wer

available day-to-day, and another 80 such assets—62 carrie

aircraft and 18 aircraft based at Aviano—were available imme

diately if needed.

As a result of the initial success of Deliberate Force’s firs

day air strikes against the Serbian IADS and communication

infrastructure, CINCSOUTH canceled the requirement for tw

Compass Calls, one airborne battlefield command and contro

center (ABCCC) aircraft, and six Wild Weasels. In addition th

return of the Theodore Roosevelt to the Adriatic Sea and Avi

ano’s dedication of a second squadron of 18 F-16Cs increased

the number of platforms available to conduct NATO ai

strikes.8 This initial force structure remained in place for th

remainder of Deliberate Force. On the second day of operations

CINCSOUTH requested an additional three KC-135 tankers t

202
support the increased tempo in the AOR until the KC-10 de

tachment became fully operational.9

By 5 September 1995, the SAM threat to NATO aircraft in

Bosnia-Herzegovina remained high, and the need for precision

munitions-capable aircraft to attack radar sites and SAM

launchers increased. As a result, CINCSOUTH requested tw

additional F-16 HTS aircraft and two additional F-15Es.

1 0 O

the same day, Greece turned down Turkey’s request to fly 1

recalled TF-16s through Greek airspace. 1 1 Nevertheless, th

Turkish aircraft circumvented Greece and eventually arrived a

their beddown base in Ghedi, Italy .

Figure 8.1. Assigned Aircraft by Nationality (30 August 1995)

Table 8.1

Players Available at Onset

Category Assigned Available* On Call

Shooters 193 166 15

Supporters 76 74 2

Total 269 240 17

*Assigned aircraft available to fly missions at the start of the air campaign.

203
On 8 September 1995, the continued increase in operation

tempo resulted in CINCSOUTH’s request to increase the temp

of tankers based in the United Kingdom to support the surge in

refueling requirements. 12 In addition the robust sortie rate bega

to take its toll on aircraft availability, leading to a request for on

additional Raven and one Compass Call aircraft. Before the EF

111 and EC-130H could be deployed, “the conditions which le

to the requests for these aircraft were overcome by additiona

logistics support from the US and the request for these aircraf

was canceled.”1 3 This day would see another force-structur

change when CINCSOUTH requested six F-117A Stealth fight

ers, to be based at Aviano, to conduct air strikes against th

high-threat air defenses around Banja Luka in support o

Deadeye Northwest operations. Italian leaders, however, did no

cooperate (discussed later in this chapter). 1 4

End-State Force Structure

At the close of Deliberate Force on 14 September 1995, th

forces available to conduct operations had reached 414 tota

aircraft (NATO assigned plus NATO nonassigned)—an 8.1 per 

cent increase over the onset numbers (see fig. 8.2 and tabl

8.2). Remarkably, this includes a net gain of only 36 aircraf

assigned to NATO—an increase of only 13.4 percent.

Figure 8.2. Assigned Forces by Nationality (14 September 1995)

204
205
The Shooters

As mentioned above, shooters comprise lethal air plat

forms—weapon systems capable of expending (shooting) mu 

nitions on air or ground targets to effect a kill. The primar

roles of these aircraft are aerospace control and force appli

cation, the former typically including missions such as of

fensive counterair (OCA), defensive counterair (DCA), an

SEAD , and the latter typically including missions such as ai

interdiction (AI), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and clos

air support (CAS). During Deliberate Force, AI, BAI, and CAS

were grouped into a catchall NATO mission category referre

to as offensive air operations (OAS).

1 5

Typically, air-to-air platforms perform OCA and DCA mis

sions, primarily with a tasking to conduct air sweeps, ai

escort, and combat air patrol (CAP); however, OCA mission

can involve air strikes against the enemy’s air bases an

aircraft on the ground. Air-to-ground players perform SEAD

and OAS missions. During Deliberate Force, aircraft flew al

of these missions in one form or another (see table 8.3).

F-16s

206
Only a third of these sorties, which involved HARM shooter

and OAS missions, actually dropped or fired ordnance durin

operations. The other two-thirds did not shoot for several rea 

sons: (1) the CAP missions did not engage and shoot an

aircraft, (2) the SEAD shooters did not always fire HARMs o

every mission, and (3) not all of the shooters actually ex 

pended munitions on every target/sortie (e.g., some mission

jettisoned ordnance in the Adriatic Sea due to bad weather).

Regardless of what constituted a “true” shooter, the variou

Deliberate Force shooter platforms could perform more tha

one mission and could use different tactics to perform a mis 

sion (e.g., the swing-capable F-15Es, F-16s, and F-18s). Give

the shooters’ roles and missions, the following review exam

ines how and why these lethal platforms were actuall

used—as well as who used which ones.

Combat Air Patrol. Since the early days of enforcing th

no-fly zones during Deny Flight, the skies over Bosnia-Herze 

govina have been controlled and dominated by multinationa

forces. Prior to Deliberate Force, the only fixed-wing air-to-ai

challenge resulted in the “splashing” of four Galebs on 28 Feb

ruary 1994. However, identifying, intercepting, and controllin

rotary-wing aircraft became such a confusing and difficult prob 

lem that the helicopters had to be written off by the rules o

engagement. Rotary-wing aircraft were given a sanctuary at o

below three thousand feet while Deny Flight aircraft were at fou

thousand feet and above to deconflict traffic, thereby not affect

ing Deliberate Force air operations as a whole. The bottom lin

is that Deny Flight operations established and maintained ai

supremacy, which continued throughout Deliberate Force. 

Table 8.3

Shooter Missions

Mission Sorties % of Total

Sorties

% of Shooter

Sorties

CAP 294 08.3 12.1

SEAD 785 22.2 32.2

OAS 1,365 38.6 55.7

Total 2,444 69.1 100.0

207
This aerospace control was a prerequisite to accomplishin

Deliberate Force’s roles and missions as well as a requiremen

for the effectiveness of the roles and missions of the Unite

Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

During Deliberate Force, France , the Netherlands, Turkey

and the United Kingdom provided the primary CAP shooters

with US aircraft filling in as required. Their missions include

roving and barrier CAPs , the former providing enforcement o

the no-fly zones and the latter providing DCA for high-value ai

assets. The following aircraft flew CAP during Deliberate Force:

• Dassault Mirage 2000C (M2000C)—a French single-sea

air-superiority aircraft capable of Mach 2, a ceiling o

59,000 feet, and a combat range of 920+ miles with drop

tanks. It has a postulated “look-down/shoot-down” capabil

ity with a Doppler radar optimized for interception of low

altitude opposing aircraft. The M2000C has an air-to-ai

ordnance load of Matra Super 530D semiactive radar mis

siles, two Magic infrared missiles, and two 30 mm Def

554 guns with 125 rounds per gun.1 7 Six M2000Cs wer

assigned and deployed to Cervia, Italy , with another thre

on call. Cervia launched and recovered four M2000Cs 

day, on the average, for a total of 60 sorties or 20 percen

of all Deliberate Force CAP.

1 8

• Netherlands/ General Dynamics NF-16A Fighting Falcon—a

American-export, single-seat, air combat, and multirol

fighter capable of Mach 2+ and a combat ceiling of 50,00

Mirage 2000

208
feet. The NF-16A has a combat radius of 575+ miles with

an air-to-air weapons load of Sidewinders and a 20 mm

M61A1 Vulcan cannon. 19 Based at Villafranca, Italy, with

six aircraft assigned, NF-16As launched and recovered, on

the average, four sorties a day through the first 15 days bu

did not fly the last two days of the campaign for a total of 5

sorties—19 percent of the Deliberate Force CAP sorties. 2 0

• Turkey / General Dynamics TF-16C Fighting Falcon—basi

cally a standard USAF F-16C purchased by the Turkis

government, which allowed its aircraft to fly only CAP

and, if required, to support the NATO Rapid Reaction Forc

(RRF). Operating out of Ghedi, Italy , the 18 assigned TF

16Cs flew four to six sorties per day for a total of 7

sorties—24 percent of the Deliberate Force CAP sorties. 2 1

• British Aerospace (Hawker Siddeley) FMK-3 Harrier—th

Royal Air Force ’s (RAF) single-seat, vertical/short takeof

and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, with a maximum speed o

737 MPH at low altitude, a 55,000-foot ceiling, and 

414-mile combat radius with a basic fuel load. 2 2 Although

the Harrier is primarily a CAS and reconnaissance (recce

platform, the RAF designated and assigned six air-to-air

dedicated FMK-3s to Gioia del Colle, Italy . Their weapon

include four heat-seeking missiles (“heaters”) and two 3

mm Aden guns. The FMK-3s launched and recovered any

where from four to eight sorties per day for the first 1

days of the campaign for a total of 68 sorties—23 percen

of the Deliberate Force CAP sorties.2 3

• British Aerospace FRS.MK2 alias FA-2 Sea Harrier—th

Royal Navy’s shipborne, single-seat, V/STOL, multirol

aircraft. Like the other Harrier , it is primarily a tactical

strike and recce platform, but six of them flew 12 CAP

sorties from HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea .

2 4 The Se

Harrier patrolled with a weapons load of four AIM-12

advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM)

two or four heaters, and two 30 mm Aden cannons.

• Grumman F-14D Super Tomcat—the US Navy’s F-14A up

grade, including engines, fire control, and cockpit redes

ign to make a “more capable air machine.” This Tomca

variant carries improved Phoenix air-to-air missiles (AAM

209
four AIM-7 Sparrows, four AIM-9 Sidewinders, and an in 

ternal 20 mm gun. 25 The F-14D launched and recovere

from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, located in the Adriati

Sea. The Super Tomcat flew CAP on only three days—th

first night and 8–9 September—for a total of 16 sorties.

As for the remaining 12 CAP sorties, USAF F-16s based a

Aviano flew eight, and US Navy F-18Cs based on the Theodor

Roosevelt flew four. These multirole fighters primarily flew

OAS missions.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. SEAD assets neutral

ize, degrade, or destroy ground-based emitters such as earl

warning/ground controlled intercept; command, control, an

communications (C3) systems; and SAM /antiaircraft artiller

(AAA) fire-control systems and their associated surface-to-ai

weapons. Aircraft accomplish the SEAD mission either by dis 

ruptive or destructive means. 26 Examples of electronic comba

assets used for disruption include EF-111s and Compass Cal

aircraft. (Because these assets are non-HARM shooters, they ar

included in the discussion of supporters.) HARM shooters ac

complish SEAD by destructive means. Deliberate Force used si

different platforms as HARM shooters (four US and two NATO):

• McDonnell Douglas F-18C Hornet—the Navy’s single-sea

carrie r b orne, multirole fighter, capable of Mach 1.8+ spee

F-14

210
at altitude with a ceiling of 50,000 feet and a comba

radius of 662 miles. The Hornet’s normal SEAD configu 

ration includes two or four HARMs .

27 Launching and re

covering from the USS Roosevelt (29 August–12 Septem

ber 1995) and the USS America (13 September 1995), th

Hornet took top billing by flying 210 SEAD sorties. 2 8

• Grumman EA-6B Prowler—the Navy’s land- or carrier-base

electronic combat platform, capable of 530 knots at se

level, a combat ceiling of 38,000 feet, and an unrefuele

combat range of 1,099 miles. Equipped with five ALQ-9

tactical jammer pods, the Prowler can detect, sort, classify

and deal with electronic threats across a broad spectrum o

frequency bands. The E-6’s SEAD weapons load consists o

four to six HARMs.

2 9 The Prowler flew 183 SEAD sorties, 5

from the USS Roosevelt and 125 from Aviano AB. VAG

(carrier air group) 141/209 “Tacelrons” flew land-based sor

ties from Aviano.

3 0

• General Dynamics F-16 HTS—the USAF’s new single-sea

“Wild Weasel,” incorporating an ASQ-213 HTS. The standar

F-16 HTS configuration consists of two HARMs , two AIM

120 AMRAAMs, and two AIM-9 L/ M infrared missiles .

3 1 Th

F-18

211
F-16 HTS made its debut in Deliberate Force and fire

HARMs for the first time in combat. The 23d Fighter Squad

ron from Spangdahlem AB, Germany, deployed 10 F-1

HTS aircraft to Aviano AB, Italy, where they flew a total o

176 SEAD sorties.

• McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Night Attack Hornet—the U

Marine Corps ’s two-seat, multirole fighter with night-attac

and HARM capabilities. The aircraft is capable of a maxi

mum speed of 1,000+ knots at 40,000 feet, a ceiling o

50,000 feet, and a combat radius of 635 miles. 3 2 A doze

F/ A-18D Hornets (call sign “Hawks”) from the 2d Wing

31st Group, 533d Fighter Air Squadron , Beaufort, South

Carolina, were assigned to the 7490th Composite Win

(Provisional) at Aviano and flew 66 SEAD sorties durin

Deliberate Force.3 3

• McDonnell Douglas/Spain (España) EF-18A Hornet—th

Spanish single-seat, land-based, multirole fighter is 

HARM-capable variant of the F/A-18A, with performanc

similar to that of the F/A-18D (above). Spain deployed eigh

Hornets from its 31st Group to the 7490th Composit

Wing (Provisional) at Aviano; they flew 52 SEAD sortie

in all.

3 4

• Panavia ECR-Tornado (ECRT)—Germany’s two-seat, tan

dem, electronic combat and reconnaissance (ECR) versio

EA-6B

212
of the interceptor air defense and air strike (IDS) Tornado

capable of a maximum speed of Mach 2.2 and a ceiling o

over 50,000 feet. The ECRT’s normal combat load in 

cludes two AGM-88s, two AIM-9s, as well as an electroni

countermeasures (ECM) pod, chaff/ flares, and two drop

tanks. 3 5 Germany based eight ECRTs at Piacenza, Italy

they flew 28 SEAD missions during Deliberate Force.3 6

The Navy ’s S-3B (described under electronic intelligenc

[ELINT] platforms, below) and the Air Force’s EF-111A Rave

(described under electronic support measures [ESM] plat

forms, below) both contributed SEAD missions to Deliberat

Force. The S-3B flew two missions, and the Raven logged 6

dedicated SEAD missions.

The United States flew 89 percent of Deliberate Force’s 78

SEAD sorties, with the remainder split between Spain (7 per

cent) and Germany (4 percent). Of the 705 US SEAD sorties

56 percent (395) were the Navy ’s, 35 percent (244) were th

Air Force’s, and 9 percent (66) belonged to the Marines.

3 7

Offensive Air Operations. As mentioned previously, durin

Deliberate Force, force-application or “striker” aircraft performe

three basic missions: AI, BAI, and CAS . Rather than bein

linked to any particular types of aircraft, these mission catego

ries were defined by the effects that General Ryan expected them

to have on the Serbs.

3 8 Specifically, AI involves “air operation

conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s militar

potential before it can be brought to bear effectively agains

friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detaile

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement o

friendly forces is not required.”39 BAI refers to “air operation

conducted against enemy forces near enough to friendly force

to require coordination, though not necessarily integration, with

the fire and maneuver of those friendly forces.”4 0 And CAS in 

volves “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hos 

tile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces an

which require detailed integration of each air mission with th

fire and movement of those forces.”4 1 Deliberate Force air opera 

tions accomplished all of these types of missions while flyin

1,365 OAS sorties utilizing 19 different strike platforms from

eight different nations:

213
• General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon—the USAF

s sin 

gle-seat, air combat, multirole fighter capable of a maxi

mum speed of over Mach 2, a combat ceiling of 50,000

feet, and a combat radius of over 575 nautical miles wit

in-flight refueling. The aircraft can carry over 20,00

pounds of ordnance, although a maximum of abou

12,000 pounds is the normal limit for sorties requirin

nine-G maneuvering. 42 During Deliberate Force an F-16C

standard combat load consisted of two or four LGBs, tw

AIM-120 AMRAAMs, two AIM-9Ms, five hundred round

of 20 mm for the M61A1 Vulcan nose cannon, an ALQ

131 ECM pod, ALE-40 or -47 chaff/ flares, and the LAN

TIRN navigation and targeting pod. During Deliberat

Force the 31st Fighter Wing/7490th Composite Win

(Provisional) at Aviano provided 12 F-16Cs rotatin

through day and night shifts between the 510th Fighte

Squadron “Dimes” and the 555th Fighter Squadron “Tripl

Nickels.” Both combined to fly 340 strike missions. 4 3

• Fairchild Republic OA/A-10A Thunderbolt II—the USAF’

single-seat CAS and BAI aircraft, capable of a maximum

speed of 380 knots at sea level and a combat radius o

250 miles, which allows for a two-hour loiter over a targe

area with a full weapons load plus 750 rounds of nose

gun ammunition. The “Warthog” can carry up to 16,00

pounds of ordnance on 11 hard points, including conven

tional bombs, cluster bomb units (CBU), Rockeye, Maver

ick air-to-surface missiles (ASM), LGBs, and 750 to 1,35

rounds of 30 mm for its GAU 8/A cannon.4 4 In support o

Deliberate Force, the 104th Fighter Group’s 131st Fighte

Squadron , the “Death Vipers” from Barnes Air Nationa

Guard Base, Massachusetts, deployed 12 A-10s to th

7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano AB, Italy

They flew 142 CAS / BAI missions. 4 5

• McDonnell Douglas F-15E Eagle —the USAF’s two-sea

dual-role fighter, capable of a maximum speed of Mac

2.5, a combat ceiling of 60,000 feet, and a maximum

unrefueled range of 3,570 miles. The “Strike Eagle” is a

adverse-weather and night deep-penetration strike air 

craft equipped with a LANTIRN navigation/targeting pod

214
A-10

F-15

215
which allows it to provide laser designation for its own

guided bombs , including GBU-10s , -12s, and -24s. The air

craft’s AXQ-14 data-link pod provides electro-optical guid

ance for the GBU-15 bomb. Normally, the aircraft also car

ries two AIM-7 F/ M Sparrows , two or four AIM-9 L/M

Sidewinder missiles, and a 20 mm M61A1 Vulcan six-barre

cannon.4 6 During Deliberate Force, the 48th Fighter Wing

494th Fighter Squadron deployed 10 F-15Es from Laken 

heath, England, to Aviano AB. They flew 94 strike sortie

against key targets, particularly bridges.4 7

• Lockheed AC-130H Spectre—the USAF’s multisenso

ground-attack gunship capable of a maximum speed of ove

330 knots and an endurance of over five hours. Armamen

includes a 105 mm howitzer, two 40 mm Bofors cannons

two 20 mm Vulcan cannons, and four 7.62 mm miniguns. 

During Deliberate Force the 16th Special Operation

Squadron of the 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurlbur

Field, Florida, deployed four AC-130Hs to Brindisi, Italy , a

part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF

The Spectre flew 32 missions, including BAI, CAS, recce

and combat search and rescue (CSAR).

4 9

AC-130

216
• McDonnell Douglas F-18C Hornet—the US Navy

s carrier

based, single-seat, multirole fighter, with performanc

similar to that of the SEAD -configured aircraft. This air

craft flew 178 strike missions, providing additional LGB

precision-weapon deliveries during Deliberate Force. In

addition the sister variant F/A-18C Hornet (also a carrier

borne night-attack fighter) is an improved F/A-18A wit

data-bus-linked small computers; it is reconnaissanc

equipped and has AIM-120 AMRAAM and AGM-65F capa

bility. During Deliberate Force the F/A-18C flew a total o

10 missions—four strike, four CAP , and two recce.

5 0

• Grumman Super Tomcat F-14D—the US Navy’s two-sea

multirole fighter capable of carrying 14,500 pounds o

various ordnance loads of free-fall weapons.5 1 (For othe

specifications see the discussion under CAP platforms

These Super Tomcats flew 47 strike missions during De

liberate Force. 5 2

• McDonnell Douglas F/ A-18D Hornet—the US Marin

Corps’s night-attack, two-seat, multirole fighter (see de

scription under SEAD platforms). The Hawks provided

another 94 strike sorties for Deliberate Force, flying out o

Aviano AB.5 3

• Sepecat Jaguar A (JAGA)—the French single-seat, CAS 

tactical strike, tactical reconnaissance fighter/bomber

capable of a maximum airspeed of Mach 1.5, a comba

ceiling of 40,000+ feet, and a combat radius of 357 mile

on a low-altitude mission profile on internal fuel, or eigh

hundred+ miles on a medium-altitude mission profil

with full internal and external fuel. Armament combina

tions include two 30 mm Defa cannons with 150 round

per gun, air-to-air missiles , bombs, rocket-launcher pods

laser-guided air-to-ground missiles, and drop tanks o

five external hard points.5 4 In support of Deliberate Force

the French air force deployed six Jaguars to Istrana, Italy

from which they flew 63 strike missions. 5 5

• Dassault Mirage 2000D/K—the French single-seat, delta

wing, CAS , tactical strike, and tactical reconnaissanc

fighter. (See the discussion of the M2000C, above, for per

formance characteristics). The strike Mirages in Deliberat

217
Force were night/laser capable and could carry nearl

14,000 pounds of external stores, including AAMs , ASMs

bombs, rockets, ECM and recce pods, and two drop tanks

Like the 2000Cs, they have two 30 mm Defa 554 cannon

with 125 rounds per gun. 56 Operating out of Cervia, Italy 

Mirage 2000Ds flew 10 strike missions, and M2000Ks flew

36 missions. One Mirage 2000K was lost to an infrare

man-portable missile on the first day of operations, the onl

NATO aircraft lost during the campaign.5 7

• Panavia GR.MK1/Italy Tornado IDS (ITORN)—the Italia

all-weather fighter, capable of a maximum speed of Mac

2.2, a service ceiling of 50,000 feet, and a combat radiu

of 865 miles with a heavy weapons load on a medium-to

low-altitude mission. The aircraft can carry nearly 20,00

pounds of ordnance on seven hard points, includin

Hunting JP 233 weapon packs, ALARM antiradiation mis

siles, AAMs, ASMs, free-fall and guided bombs, CBUs

ECM pods, and drop tanks. The aircraft also carries inter

nally two 27 mm IWKA-Mauser cannons with 180 round

per gun. 5 8 During Deliberate Force, the ITORNs flew 2

strike sorties out of Ghedi, Italy.

5 9 Unfortunately, durin

operations the Italian pilots’ lack of proficiency in refue

ing from US KC-135 drogue tankers minimized the air 

craft’s surge capability, since they were restricted to usin

only the Italian air force’s IB707 tanker.6 0

• General Dynamics/Netherlands NF-16A—the Netherlands

single-seat, multirole fighter (see CAP discussion fo

specifications). For strike operations, the NF-16A ca

carry 15,000 pounds of ordnance, including AAMs; ASMs

rockets; conventional bombs; smart-weapon kits, includ

ing laser-guidance systems; ECM pods; and externa

tanks. Flying out of Villafranca, Italy, Dutch F-16s flew 8

OAS sorties in support of Deliberate Force.6 1

• McDonnell Douglas/Spain EF-18A—the Spanish single

seat, multirole fighter (see SEAD discussion). EF-18s con 

tributed 46 strike missions during Deliberate Force.

• McDonnell Douglas/BAe GR-7 Harrier II—the RAF ’s single

seat, V/STOL, CAS, tactical strike, and tactical reconnais

sance aircraft. Capable of carrying up to nine thousan

218
pounds of ordnance, the GR-7 has a maximum speed o

575 knots at sea level and a combat ceiling of 50,000 fee

With a 6,000 lb payload, its combat radius is 172 miles. It

normal armament load consists of two 25 mm Aden 2

cannons with 125 rounds per gun, AAMs , ASMs, general

purpose and guided bombs , CBUs, rocket launchers, an

an ECM pod carried on six external hard points.6 2 Based a

Gioia del Colle, Italy, the RAF’s GR-7 Harrier II flew 12

strike sorties during Deliberate Force. 6 3

• British Aerospace FRS.MK2 (FA-2) Sea Harrier—the Roya

Navy’s all-weather , single-seat, V/STOL, carrierborne

multirole (tactical strike, tactical reconnaissance , and an

tiship) aircraft. (See CAP discussion for specifications). In

the strike mission, the FA-2 is equipped with two 30 mm

Aden cannons plus eight thousand pounds of stores car

ried on five pylons.6 4 In addition to the Sea Harrier’s CAP

support, the aircraft flew a total of 30 strike sorties from

the HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea in support of Delib 

erate Force. 6 5

• Other—the few remaining Deliberate Force strike mission

were flown by German ECRTs (three), Turkish TF-16

(four), and US Navy EA-6Bs (four). (See previous discus

sions for specifications.)

The Supporters

The shooters could not perform their missions effectivel

and efficiently without support from aircraft that fulfilled vari

ous force-enhancement roles. Force enhancement, which mu

tiplies the combat effectiveness of fighting forces and enable

and improves operations, may be the major contribution ai

forces make to a campaign such as Deliberate Force. 6 6 Forc

supporters, better known as “force multipliers,” contributed

over 30 percent (1,091) of the sorties flown in Deliberat

Force. Supporter missions include air-to-air refueling (AAR

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Th

latter includes ELINT, airborne early warning (AEW), recce 

ABCCC, electronic warfare (EW)/ESM, and CSAR . Other sup 

port came from intratheater airlift provided by the Spanis

CASA 212 (see table 8.4).

219
Air-to-Air Refueling. For the 17 days of the campaign

tanker aircraft from several NATO member states provided

aerial refueling support. Operating mainly from two station

over the Adriatic —“Speedy” and “Sonny”—these tankers flew

383 (35.1 percent) of all Deliberate Force support sorties. Th

United States provided the majority of the AAR platforms an

310 (80.9 percent) of the refueling sorties, with the United

Kingdom providing 32 (8.4 percent), France 18 (4.7 percent)

Spain 17 (4.4 percent), and Italy six (1.6 percent). These na

tions operated six different types of AAR aircraft.

• US/Boeing KC-135R Stratotanker—the USAF upgrade of th

KC-135E with four large, high-bypass-ratio CFM F-108 tur

bofans, capable of a speed of 460 MPH and a mission ra

dius of 2,875 miles. The KC-135R has a maximum takeof

weight of 322,500 pounds with a maximum fuel load o

203,288 pounds.6 7 During Deliberate Force, 12 US Strato

tankers (an even mix of KC-135Es and Rs) flew 265 (69.

percent) of the AAR sorties and over 85 percent of the U

tanker sorties from bases at Pisa, Italy; Sigonella, Sicily

Istres, France ; and RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom . T

make up for an initial unavailability of larger KC-10 aircraf

the Stratotankers from Mildenhall flew 108 missions down

to the Balkans area of operations.6 8

• US/Douglas Aircraft Company KC-10A Extender—th

USAF’s long-range, aerial tanker/transport, capable of 

Table 8.4

Supporter-Mission Sorties

Mission Sorties % of Total

Sorties

% of Supporter

Sorties

AAR 383 10.8 35.1

Recce 312 08.8 28.6

ELINT 169 04.8 15.5

AEW 166 04.7 15.2

ABCCC 32 01.0 03.0

CSAR 19 00.5 01.7

Other 10 00.3 00.9

Total 1,091 30.9 100.0

220
cruise speed of 520 MPH at a ceiling of 42,000 feet. Th

Extender can provide boom and drogue pod refueling an

can transfer almost twice as much fuel as the KC-135—

360,000 pounds. 69 KC-10As did not fly their first Deliberat

KC-10

KC-135

221
Force missions until 2 September 1995. Based at Genoa

Italy, these Extenders flew 45 AAR missions.7 0

• United Kingdom/Lockheed K.MK1 L-1011K Tri-Star—th

RAF’s tanker, capable of a maximum speed of 520 knots a

35,000 feet, a service ceiling of 43,000 feet, and a range o

4,836 miles with a maximum payload.7 1 In support of De

liberate Force, the RAF deployed two Tri-Stars to Palermo

Italy; from there they flew 32 AAR sorties.7 2

• France/Boeing C-135FR Stratotanker—the French ai

force’s equivalent to the USAF KC-135R. Unlike the refu 

eling boom of the USAF version of this aircraft, th

French KC-135’s ended in a drogue instead of a probe

which made it compatible with many NATO aircraft tha

the American version could not service without temporar

modification. 7 3 The French deployed one of their C

135FRs to Istres, France , in support of Deliberate Force

The aircraft flew every day except on the first and las

days, for a total of 18 sorties. 7 4

• Spain/Lockheed KC-130H Dumbo—a rough-field, all

weather, tactical, in-flight-refueling tanker, capable of 

refueling speed of 308 knots and an operating radius o

one thousand miles to offload 31,000 pounds of fuel.7 

Spain deployed two KC-130Hs of the 31st Group, 12t

Wing to Aviano; from there they launched and recovered

17 sorties.7 6

• Italy/Boeing IB-707—the Italian air force’s modified Boe 

ing 707 tanker with drogue-refueling capability. Operat

ing out of Pisa, this aircraft flew six missions. Primarily i

refueled Italian Tornados , whose pilots had not bee

trained to refuel from US tankers.7 7

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. ISR air 

craft are tasked primarily for combat-information suppor

When ISR assets are properly integrated, their synergism ca

produce results greater than the total of their individual ef

forts. The situational awareness provided by ISR enables th

CFACC to exploit the capabilities of forces more fully by warn 

ing of enemy actions and threats.7 8

Many theater organic, service, Department of Defense, an

national ground-, air-, sea-, and space-based sensor system

222
collect combat information. In turn, these sensors have vari

ous processing, analysis, and production centers and nodes

from theater field locations to national agencies and joint in 

telligence centers. Their “products” are usually disseminated

to users at all levels via dedicated and common-use communi

cations links and architectures, including ground-air-spac

systems and their relays, direct downlinks, and even “run

ners” or “shuttles” to other locations. Military and civilia

satellite communications systems play a critical role in dis 

tributing combat information where and when it is needed.7 

Other ISR sources include pilots’ postmission reports, theater

controlled U-2s, Rivet Joint, tactical recce aircraft, and satel

lite systems of the United States and other nations.

The recce priorities of NATO air commanders in relation t

Bosnia-Herzegovina focused on heavy-weapons sites, SAMs 

fixed targets, weapons-collection points, and the airfields a

Udbina and Banja Luka . The general UN and NATO require

ment to minimize both the risk to NATO aircrews and the ris

of conflict escalation was best fulfilled by the use of pre

planned recce by strategic and national assets, including U-2

flights, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and UAVs. U-2 mis 

sions were tasked primarily against heavy weapons, Udbin

airfield, fixed targets, and weapons-collection points. Gener 

ally, national assets were tasked against SAM sites and Banj

Luka airfield. Using these assets to gather information on

those targets allowed NATO commanders to minimize the us

of manned and unmanned theater platforms and thus reduc

their exposure to enemy threats. Tactical reconnaissance as

s ets, therefore, were used mainly for tactical, often short

notice, missions. AIRSOUTH kept them at various levels o

alert to maintain their readiness for such scramble missions.8 

During Deliberate Force, five nations employed 13 differen

manned or unmanned recce platforms for purposes that in 

cluded monitoring the movement of heavy weapons out of th

Sarajevo total-exclusion zone (TEZ) towards the weapons

collection points, as well as making assessments of directed

targets and battle damage.

• French Dassault Mirage F-1CR—the French air force’s tac

t ical and strategic all-weather reconnaissance aircraf

223
assigned to the 33d Reconnaissance Squadron based a

Strasboling, France. This aircraft is capable of a maximum

speed of Mach 1.8 and a combat radius of 863 miles on 

medium-altitude mission.8 1 During Deliberate Force, fiv

F-1CRs based in Istrana, Italy , were listed as ELINT asset

but actually flew 66 tactical reconnaissance sorties.8 2

• French Dassault Mirage M2000D—the French air force’

multirole fighter. This aircraft can fly reconnaissanc

when equipped with a recce pod. During Deliberate Force

M2000Ds flew 12 tactical reconnaissance sorties from

Cervia, Italy, in support of the RRF .

8 3

• French Sepecat Jaguar A (JAGA)—a French air force strik

fighter. Jaguars operating from Istrana, Italy , also flew

three recce missions in support of the RRF.

8 4

• German Panavia Tornado GR.Mk1(TORNR)/1a (GTORN)—

the German air force’s tactical reconnaissance aircraf

with variants from the Tornado IDS/ECR. Restricted t

support of the RRF only, six TORNRs operating from

Piacenza, Italy , flew 32 tactical reconnaissance sortie

during Deliberate Force. Also operating from Piacenza 

GTORN aircraft flew four recce sorties in support of th

RRF in addition to performing their normal electroni

combat and reconnaissance roles. 8 5

• Netherlands General Dynamics NF-16R “Recce Falcon”—

modified F-16A recce aircraft. Five NF-16Rs, based at Vil

lafranca, Italy, flew 52 tactical reconnaissance sortie

during Deliberate Force.8 6

• United Kingdom McDonnell Douglas/BAe GR.Mk7 Harrie

II—recce version of the RAF ’s close-support aircraft. Tw

of them flew 49 sorties during Deliberate Force. 8 7

• United Kingdom British Aerospace FRS.Mk2 (FA-2) Sea Ha

rier—Royal Navy multirole aircraft. Flying from the Invinc

ble and equipped with camera pods, these aircraft flew 1

tactical reconnaissance sorties during the air campaign. 88

• US Navy Grumman F-14A TARPS —US Navy fleet defens

fighters. Equipped with the tactical air reconnaissanc

pod system (TARPS), these aircraft flew 32 tactical recon 

naissance sorties from the Roosevelt and the America .

8 

The F-14As were capable of a maximum speed of Mac

224
2.37, a service ceiling of 56,000 feet, and a range of ove

two thousand miles. Reflecting their primary air comba

role, TARPS F-14As also carried a war load of missile

and an internal cannon.9 0

• USAF Lockheed U-2R Dragon Lady—US high-altitude re

connaiss ance aircraft, capable of a cruising speed of 43

MPH, an operational ceiling of 90,000 feet, and a maxi

mum range of 6,250 miles. 9 1 U-2Rs have a variety o

sensors for performing all ISR missions, including ELINT 

surveillance , and recce . ELINT U-2s have large “farm s

of gathering antennas or windows for optical sensors

Battlefield-surveillance U-2s have high-resolution rada

such as the Hughes Advanced Synthetic Aperture Rada

System Type 2. Also, the precision location strike system

was developed for use with the Dragon Ladies to locat

hostile radar emitters. Flying out of RAF Fairford or RAF

Alconbury, U-2Rs attempted 44 launches in support o

Deliberate Force. Fifteen recce and 10 ELINT sorties wer

successful, while 13 and five were ground or air aborted

respectively. On 29 August 1995, a U-2R crashed o

takeoff at RAF Fairford, and the pilot died of injuries.9 2

• US Army Schweizer RG-8 Lofty View and RG-8A Condor—

single-engine, two-seat, fixed-wing reconnaissance air

craft. Lofty View has an endurance of at least four hour

U-2

225
and a cruise speed of less than 80 knots. RG-8 Condor

have two engines, three seats, an endurance of six hours

and a cruise speed of one hundred knots. During Deliber 

ate Force, Lofty View and Condor aircraft based at Dezn ey

Turkey, flew nine sorties, logging more than 52 hours o

recce and surveillance time.

Two aircraft previously mentioned flew weather reconnais sanc

missions. On two different weather days, a pair of F/A-18Cs an

a pair of F-16Cs logged a total of four reconnaissance sortie

as collateral missions.

By May 1994 the military commanders of Deny Flight wer

looking for ways to improve their ability to monitor the TEZ

or safe areas established around certain Bosnian cities. B

that time it was clear that UNPROFOR would not be able t

fully monitor the safe areas, particularly if more were acti

vated. Air recce offered a vital complement to ground-forc

capabilities in this area, but it too had limitations, mainly du

to bad weather, roughness of the Bosnian terrain, camouflag

skill of the Serbs, and limited availability and flexibility o

manned aircraft available to do the mission. Unmanned aeria

vehicles, therefore, became a third potential source of valuabl

information, both in relation to TEZ monitoring and to th

situation in Bosnia in general.9 3

UAVs date back to World War I. Prior to Deliberate Force

they were employed in combat during the Persian Gulf War

These included the Pioneer , Pointer, and Exdrone, operated b

the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, respectively. In Operation

Desert Storm , these UAVs showed that they could provid

near-real-time battlefield surveillance and detection—ideal ca 

pabilities for Deny Flight’s TEZ monitoring. 9 4 Moreover, UN

commanders on the scene recognized that during Deny Flight

“if employed overtly, the RPV [remotely piloted vehicle ] acts a

yet another deterrent to potential violators of the TEZ rules

The system can track/follow weapon systems that violate th

TEZ, whether during the day or at night.”95 Consequently, the

believed that in the event of additional TEZ tasking, UAV

would enhance their surveillance resources at low risk. Tw

UAV systems subsequently deployed to the Balkans region:

226
• General Atomics 

Gnat 750 (UAV-2)—the US Army

modified RG-8A Condor with control and data relay, late

named an interim medium-altitude endurance, surveil

lance , and reconnaissance drone. Prior to Deliberat

Force, the Gnat had seen service during Deny Flight op

erations, unlike Predator. During Deliberate Force, th

Gnat launched and recovered from Dezney, Turkey, an

inside Croatia . In all, the Gnat 750 attempted 1

launches and flew seven successful flights. 9 6

• General Atomics Predator (UAV-1)—the USAF’s mediu m 

altitude-endurance UAV for surveillance, reconnaissance

and target acquisition. This air platform cruises at speed 

less than 250 knots and carries electro-optical, infrared

and synthetic aperture radar sensors. Images captured b

the sensors go from the aircraft to the ground-control cel

an d then by satellite to video units throughout the theate

or even the world. NATO planners and peace-implementatio 

force commanders at several levels used images from th

Predator. These included UNPROFOR in Bosnia ; the com 

bined air operations center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy ; th

allied RRF; and the European Command Joint Analysi

Center at RAF Molesworth, England. Commanders watchin

Predator UAV

227
the video downlink screens see pictures less than tw

seconds old—what the military calls near real time. Th

ability to pull still photo images from the video is a popu

lar feature, but the resolution still needs work.9 7 Durin

Deliberate Force a US Army unit launched and recovered

Predator from Gjader, Albania . It launched 15 flights (1

were attempted), 12 of which were effective, logging ove

150 hours of coverage over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 8 A prim

demonstration of Predator’s value occurred on 5 Septem

ber 1995, as Admiral Smith and General Janvier pon 

dered whether or not to resume bombing. Their decisio

hinged on whether the Serbs were withdrawing, or a

least demonstrating an intention to withdraw, their heavy

weapons from the Sarajevo safe area . Based on a Predato

sortie launched just before dawn, Admiral Smith advise

Janvier that “there were no intents being demonstrated

let’s get on with it!”9 9

During Deny Flight the United States , Great Britain , an

France routinely provided airborne signals intelligenc

(SIGINT) and electronic intelligence by using five differen

types of aircraft—Rivet Joints, U-2Rs, and EP-3s from th

United States ; Nimrods from Great Britain ; and C-160s from

France. Flying roughly 75 sorties per month and averagin

seven to eight hours of coverage per day, these platform

added to the total information available to the CAOC. Durin

Deliberate Force, airborne intelligence missions increase

nearly fivefold. The same three nations added four more ELINT

platforms to increase around-the-clock coverage of the area o

operations with an average of 11 sorties per day. 100

• US Navy/Lockheed ES-3A/S-3B Viking—the Navy’s carrier 

borne electronic warfare aircraft, capable of a maximum

speed of 450 knots at 25,000 feet, a service ceiling o

35,000 feet, and a combat range of more than twenty-thre

hundred miles. The Viking’s passive ELINT configuratio

wasn’t known at the time of this writing. During Deliber

ate Force, Vikings launched and recovered from the US

Theodore Roosevelt or the USS America in the Adriati

Sea . ES-3As flew 38 ELINT sorties, and S-3Bs flew 33.101

228
• US Navy/Lockheed EP-3E Orion—a Navy ELINT platform

Also known as Aries II, this aircraft has a maximum

cruise speed of 380 knots at 15,000 feet, a service ceilin

of 28,000 feet, and a maximum mission radius of 2,53

miles. During Deliberate Force, four EP-3Es supported

CAOC operations, normally patrolling off the coast of Bos

nia “feet wet” over the Adriatic Sea in a northwest/south 

east orbit. Based at Sigonella Naval Air Station, Sicily , th

Orions flew 18 ELINT missions.102

• USAF/Boeing RC-135W “Rivet Joint”—the Air Force’s elec

tronic reconnaissance platform featuring a side-lookin

airborne radar capability. The aircraft’s direct-threa

warning system can provide a broadcast “heads-up

threat warning to friendly airborne aircraft. The RC-135W

flies at a maximum speed of 535 knots at 25,000 feet, 

service ceiling of 40,600 feet, and an operational radius o

2,675 miles. The aircraft has no armament and limited

ECM.

103 During Deliberate Force, Rivet Joint aircraf

“commuted” from RAF Mildenhall. They flew 21 ELINT

S-3 Viking

229
missions feet wet over the Adriatic Sea, orbiting northwes

to southeast, like the Orion , but at a higher altitude.104

• RAF/British Aerospace Nimrod R.Mk1—the RAF’s electroni

intelligence platform, capable of a maximum speed of fiv

hundred knots, a service ceiling of 42,000 feet, and a ferr

range of 5,755 miles on internal fuel without in-fligh

refueling. The main visible sensors are three very larg

spiral-helix receiver domes—one facing ahead on the fron

of each wing and one facing aft on top of the vertical fin. I

P-3 Orion

RC-135

230
carries no armament. 105 During Deliberate Force, Nimrod

flew seven ELINT missions—one mission on each of th

first three days and one on each of the last four days

averaging six hours of coverage time. Like the othe

ELINT assets, it orbited northwest to southeast over th

Adriatic Sea, just off the coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

106

• France/Transall C-160NG Gabriel—a French medium

range SIGINT aircraft that flies at a maximum speed o

277 knots at 16,000 feet. It has a service ceiling of 27,00

feet, a typical range of 1,151 miles, and no armament.10

Based at Avord, France , Gabriels flew four SIGINT mis

sions in support of Deliberate Force—one mission on eac

the first two days and one on each the last two days. 108

• France/DC-8 —a SIGINT-modified DC-8 . During Deliberat

Force, these aircraft flew three ELINT support sorties. 109

Electronic warfare/electronic support measures aircraft en 

hanced the effectiveness of Deliberate Force’s penetrating air 

craft when these EW/ESM systems operated in mutually sup

portive roles at opportune times and places within the AOR

These systems proved essential to the process of detecting

identifying, and fixing the exact locations of enemy air defens

systems—the first steps in the process of deciding whether t

avoid, degrade, or destroy particular systems. NATO con 

ducted these EW operations in a combined environment.110

Because electronic combat assets have a broader field o

influence than surface-based assets, the EC mission both in 

creases the lethality of combined forces and improves thei

survivability. Throughout Deliberate Force the whole range o

E C missions, including SEAD , EW, or ESM, coordinated wit

other missions to control the EC environment by denying it

use to the BSA while preserving its use by the multinationa

force. During Deliberate Force the following nonlethal, force

enhancer EW/ESM platforms conducted EC missions agains

ground-based electromagnetic emitters such as C3, earl

warning, and SAM/ AAA fire-control systems, as well as thei

associated surface-to-air weapons:

• USAF/ Grumman (General Dynamics) EF-111A Raven—th

USAF’s ESM tactical jammer. The Raven combines low

231
altitude, high-speed, night, all-weather capabilities with 

modern, tactical, radar-jamming system. Capable of 

maximum speed of 2.14 Mach at high altitude, a servic

ceiling of 45,000 feet, and an unrefueled endurance o

more than four hours, the EF-111A has no armament.11

The Raven has three operational modes: (1) standing of

in its own airspace to screen the routes of attack aircraf

(2) escorting packages that are penetrating the enemy’s

defenses, and (3) neutralizing enemy radars in the force

pro tection role. The EF-111A’s primary-role equipment i

the Eaton Corporation’s ALQ-99E tactical jamming subsys

tem (JSS), housed in the weapons bay; the sensitive JS

emission receiver system is in its fin-top fairing. System

inputs activate the aircraft’s 10 powerful jammers. Th

ALQ-99E JSS has proven to have sufficient power to allow

the aircraft to penetrate the most concentrated electroni

defenses.

112 During Deliberate Force, Ravens of the 429t

Electronic Combat Squadron flew a total of 68 EC sortie

in support of both SEAD and ESM missions. 113

EF-111

232
• USAF/ Lockheed EC-130H Compass Call—a USAF aircraf

featuring a computer-assisted, operator-controlled, selectiv

jamming system. When supporting offensive operations, th

EC-130H can become part of a SEAD effort. Capable of 

maximum speed of 325 knots at 30,000 feet, a service ceil

ing of 33,000 feet, and a range of 2,356 miles, this specia

ized aircraft can also support ground, sea, amphibious, an

special forces. It carries no armament. The 43d Electroni

Combat Squadron flew four Compass Call aircraft for a tota

of 35 EW/ESM missions in support of Deliberate Force

these were logged as ELINT missions. 114

In addition to flying its primary SEAD role, the US Navy

EA-6B Prowler performed ESM missions as well. This aircraft’s

jamming capability is similar to the EF-111’s, but, unlike th

Raven, the Prowler can also destroy enemy radars.

All-weather surveillance performed by space-based platform

and/or aircraft in the Balkans AOR provided NATO commander

information to plan and direct combat air operations. In addi

tion, air surveillance platforms provided C3 to enhance the situ 

ational awareness of NATO units and commanders.

• NATO/Boeing Aerospace E-3A/D/F Sentry —an airborn

warning and control system aircraft. The large rotodom

on NATO’s E-3A/ D and France’s E-3F Sentry aircraf

houses a 24-foot-diameter antenna that permits surveil

lance from the Earth’s surface up into the stratosphere

over land and water. The radar has a range of more tha

two hundred miles for low-flying targets and farther fo

air platforms flying at medium to high altitudes. As an ai

defense system, the E-3 can look down to detect, identify

and track enemy and friendly low-flying aircraft by elim

nating ground-clutter returns that confuse other rada

systems. In its tactical role, the Sentry can provide infor

mation needed for interdiction , reconnaissance , airlift 

and CAS for NATO forces. This high-value air asset i

capable of a maximum speed of 530 MPH at altitude, 

service ceiling of 40,000 feet, and an endurance of six

hours at a distance of one thousand miles from its home

plate. The Sentry has no armament.115 During Deliberat

233
Force, NATO Sentries flew a total of 99 AEW missions (7

by E-3As and 25 by E-3Ds). The French E-3Fs flew a

additional five missions. 116

• US Navy/Grumman E-2C Hawkeye—the US Navy’s carrier 

borne and land-based AEW and C3 aircraft. The Hawkeye i

equipped with a General Electric APS-125 radar and a Lit

ton L-304 general-purpose computer capable of automat

ically tracking 250 targets and controlling 30 intercept

simultaneously up to 250 miles away. Also, the aircraft’

systems allow for an ABCCC role. Operationally, th

Hawkeye has a maximum speed of 325 knots, a servic

ceiling of 30,800 feet, and a patrol endurance of up to six

hours. During Deliberate Force, Hawkeyes launched an

recovered 62 AEW sorties from the USS Theodore Roosevel

and USS America in the Adriatic Sea.

117

By obtaining needed combat information, ISR platform

played a key role in the planning, execution, and combat assess

ment phases of Deliberate Force. Overall, NATO flew 647 ISR

sorties during the operation, accounting for 59.3 percent of th

support sorties and 18.3 percent of the total sorties flown.

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center. A

an airborne battle staff’s command post, the ABCCC function

E-3 airborne warning and control system aircraft

234
as a direct extension of the CAOC. By flying near the scene o

air operations, ABCCC aircraft and crews ensured continuou

command and control over NATO aircraft by linking them an

the CAOC by radio or by exercising some direct-control func

tions themselves.

• USAF/ Lockheed-Georgia EC-130E—USAF C-130Es config

ured to accept a battlefield command and control cente

capsule in their cargo bays. They were the only dedicated

ABCCC aircraft flying during Deliberate Force. With 1

battle-staff members in their capsule, these aircraft could

communicate via UHF, VHF, HF, and FM radios; secur

teletype and voice communications systems; and auto

matic radio relay. The aircraft have a maximum speed o

318 knots, an unrefueled range of twenty-three hundred

miles, and long endurance through air-to-air refueling

USAF ABCCCs are unarmed. 118 During the operation, fou

EC-130Es flew 32 sorties from Aviano AB, each usually

E-2 Hawkeye

235
involving a 12-hour shift on patrol station for 24-hou

coverage. One sortie was aborted and then relaunched

the first day of operations. The only other time ABCCC

did not fly occurred on the last day of Deliberate Forc

because of extremely bad weather conditions at Avian

and within the Balkans AOR.

119

Combat Search and Rescue. During Deliberate Force, spe

cial operations forces assigned to the JSOTF at Brindisi, Italy

had primary responsibility for CSAR operations. These force

plus three French air force Puma helicopters and several U

Navy carrierborne sea-rescue assets remained on call fo

CSAR missions. On 30 August 1995, Ebro 33, a French Mi 

rage 2000, was hit by a man-portable infrared SAM , and th

aircrew ejected. With mission reports of “two good chutes” an

various intermittent, unidentified radio transmissions, U

JSOTF air assets attempted three different CSAR missions on

three different days, totaling 19 sorties: three on 30 Augus

eight on 6 September, and eight on 7 September. Unfortu 

nately, rescuers could not reach the downed Frenchmen be

fore Bosnian Serb forces captured them.

• USAF/Sikorsky MH-53J Pave Low III—a heavy-duty, mu

tirole helicopter equipped with a forward-looking infrared

sensor; high-resolution, terrain-avoidance radar; an iner

tial navigation system; and a Global Positioning System

for low-level flight and precision navigation in all weathe

conditions. The aircraft also has a radar warning system

dispensers for flares and chaff, and three .50-caliber ma

chine guns for self-defense. The Pave Low III is air refu 

elable and has a maximum speed of 170 knots, a servic

ceiling of 18,500 feet, and an unrefueled range of 1,29

miles. During Deliberate Force, six assigned MH-53J

based at Brindisi, Italy , flew a total of 10 CSAR sorties

During the mission of 7 September to find the downed Ebr

33 crew, some Pave Low IIIs took battle damage, and som

helicopter aircrews received wounds from ground fire in th

vicinity of the crash site. The aircraft recovered safely.120

• USAF/ Lockheed HC-130P Hercules—the USAF’s fixed-wing

rescue-and-recovery aircraft equipped with outer wing pod

236
for refueling helicopters in flight. The CSAR Hercules ha

a maximum speed of 325 knots, a service ceiling of 33,00

feet, and a range of 2,356 miles. 121 During Deliberate Force

four HC-130Ps flew nine CSAR sorties in concert wit

MH-53J s, searching for the Ebro 33 aircrew. 122

Airlift. Prior to Deliberate Force, Deny Flight had alread

established routine, scheduled strategic and theater airlift t

sustain its normal level of operations. Since the establishment o

the 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano AB, Italy

and the force-structure changes following the shootdown of a U

F-16 in early June 1995, the gradual tempo of needed airlift fo

force enhancement and support increased substantially. By th

onset of Deliberate Force, C-5 Galaxies, C-17 Globemasters, an

C-141 Starlifters were providing daily strategic airlift flights int

air bases in and around Italy. A limited number of C-21s , C

130s , G-222s , and CASA C-212s provided intratheater airlif

capability within the AOR to sustain operations.

MH-53

237
Two USAF C-21s from Capodichino Airport in Naples, Italy

made daily ferry flights of tactical-reconnaissance and cockpi

videotapes in support of the battle damage assessment pro

cess. In addition they provided senior leadership with in 

tratheater transportation, particularly between AIRSOUTH i

Naples and the CAOC at Vicenza .

123 The Italian air force pro 

vided one C-130 and four Aeritalia G-222 general-purpos

transport aircraft, which operated from Pisa, Italy .

124 Spain

assigned one CASA C-212 Aviocar as a utility transport fo

CAOC use at Vicenza . The only theater-airlift aircraft to appea

C-17s

C-21

238
on the daily mission summaries, the CASA C-212 logged 1

airlift missions during Deliberate Force. 125

Throughout Deliberate Force, supporters fulfilled an impor 

tant role in multiplying the combat effectiveness of the shooters

The force-supporter missions previously discussed enhanced th

mobility, lethality, survivability, and/ or accuracy of the land

sea, and air force missions during the operation. However, non

of the missions within their respective roles—aerospace control

force application, or force enhancement—could be effectivel

performed without the surface activities of force support to sus

tain and maintain all the players.

Although a discussion of Deliberate Force logistics is be

yond the scope of this chapter, all platforms performing thei

air roles depended on the availability of secure, functiona

bases to provide needed materiel and facilities to the entir

force structure. In all, 18 bases across eight nations sup

ported the air campaign. In particular, Aviano AB was a bee

hive of activity, supporting 40 percent of all Deliberate Forc

platforms and the majority of US platforms.

The Nonplayers

For all of the technological sophistication and power of th

fleet of aircraft employed by NATO during Deliberate Force

the operation did not utilize every type of aircraft potentiall

useful and available to the participating air forces. The aircraf

left out of Deliberate Force comprise an interesting issue be

cause the reasons for their absence reveal much about th

operational, logistical, and political forces that shaped an

galvanized this particular air campaign. A brief examination o

why certain systems did not participate in or were removed

from the fight provides a window into the nature of this kin

of warfare—one that complements the preceding discussion o

systems that did fly in the skies over Bosnia . At the core o

that examination is the question of whether commanders o

governments withheld or withdrew systems as a result of mili

tary or political considerations. The answer to that question

will indicate just how limited or expansive was the militar

239
challenge and political significance of Deliberate Force in th

eyes of the governments contributing to it.

Absent from the Deliberate Force air order of battle were 

number of US aircraft types whose inclusion one would hav

expected, given their important contributions to the coalition

air effort during the Gulf War of 1990–91. These aircraft, all o

which remained operational in the US inventory, included B-52

or other heavy bombers; fighter aircraft such as the F-4E

F-111, F-15C, F-117, A-6, and AV-8 ; and the RF-4C manned

reconnaissance aircraft. The United States also did not brin

in the MC-130 special-operations aircraft or the F-4G elec

tronic-combat and defense-suppression aircraft. Each of thes

offered capabilities to Deliberate Force planners that would

have or could have filled or mitigated important capabilit

gaps or weaknesses in their order of battle .

For the most part, explanations for the absence of thes

aircraft from Deliberate Force are straightforward, dealin

with the routine and prudent management of military forc

structure. NATO commanders likely did not bring in som

aircraft, such as the F-111F, A-6E, and F-4G, because the

were nearing retirement, logistically unique and costly to sup

port, and functionally replicated to an adequate degree b

other, newer aircraft. Others, like the US Marine Corps’s AV-

F-15C

240
vertical-takeoff aircraft, were in-theater but not assigned an

simply did not participate in Deliberate Force. The operation

did not require RF-4Cs since the French and other NATO ai

forces provided or could provide manned reconnaissance air 

craft as needed. The absence of these aircraft, therefore, wa

the consequence of purely military calculations of mission re

quirements and logistics.

Military considerations also restrained NATO commander

from requesting deployment of the E-8C joint surveillance

target attack radar system (JSTARS) aircraft, capable of elec

tronically observing an area of the Earth’s surface approxi

mately 180 kilometers wide and extending up to 160 kilome

ters beyond the forward line of troops under observation.12

Appropriate to its designer’s intentions, prototypes of the air 

craft proved very successful during the Gulf War in locatin

Iraqi equipment, supply dumps, and field formations. JSTAR

also cooperated with aircraft such as the F-15E in strikin

those targets. Given those capabilities, it was only natural fo

military commanders to examine the aircraft’s utility for op

erations over Bosnia . As early as July 1994, US military lead 

ers at the Pentagon examined the possibility of deployin

JSTARS to English and German bases as well as one Euro 

pean southern-tier base. They were particularly interested in

deploying the aircraft to Aviano AB or elsewhere in Italy i

support of a Bosnian flight and ground demonstration. But 

Pentagon talking paper of 22 September concluded that “limite

facilities, increased logistical problems, added costs/program

impacts and increased risk combine to make a Joint STARS

demonstration in NATO ’s Southern Tier undesirable.”127

At that time, the tactical situation also did not lend itself t

employing JSTARS in Bosnia . Unlike the desert terrain in th

Gulf War, the mountainous local terrain would mask man

ground-target movements. To find them would require flyin

E-8s directly over Bosnia —at unacceptably high political an

military risk to these high-value aircraft. 128 In any event, E-8

did not enter the Balkans theater until after Deliberate Force

under military and political conditions vastly changed from

those that prevailed before.

The absence of heavy bombers from Deliberate Force opera 

tions reflected more of a mix of military practicality and politica

241
calculation. Heavy bombers, particularly the B-52, had tw

distinct roles at the time of this operation. Either they could

act as “bomb trucks,” dropping massive patterns of unguided

bombs against area targets, or as cruise-missile carriers

launching standoff attacks against point targets. Although

NATO air planners might have seen opportunities to emplo

pattern bombing against some Deliberate Force targets suc

as ammunition dumps, political restraints on collateral dam

age absolutely precluded such attacks. Moreover, there wa

no getting around the fact that the shorter-range strike air 

craft already available in-theater were capable of “servicing” al

planned targets within all of the applicable constraints of tim

and precision. This was also true in relation to the B-52

precision-strike capabilities. Whatever the B-52’s conventiona

air-launched cruise missiles could do in terms of performin

precision strikes and minimizing risks from Serbian air de

fenses , other aircraft weapon-systems combinations and th

US Navy’s Tomahawk missiles could do also. Even had a sig

nificant military reason existed to bring heavy bombers int

the fight, Deliberate Force commanders likely would have ha

second thoughts, given the big airplane’s inherent politica

liability of signaling escalation. Because of the lack of compellin

military reasons to bring heavy bombers into the fight, there

fore, the potential political liabilities of the aircraft remained

B-52

242
dominant in the calculations of NATO air commanders. A

estimated by Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC a

Vicenza , employing heavy bombers would have meant “goin

beyond the psychological threshold” of the campaign an

could have had an adverse effect on the Bosnian Serb peac

process.

129

The fate of NATO’s effort to bring the Lockheed F-117A

Nighthawk into Deliberate Force, mentioned previously, wa

more clearly the outcome of the background political forces a

play during the air campaign. This single-seat fighter wa

designed to exploit low-observable stealth technology in orde

to penetrate high-threat enemy airspace under the cover o

darkness and attack high-value targets from medium or high

altitudes with pinpoint accuracy. These two attributes mad

the Nighthawk a particularly valuable weapon for the SEAD

mission. Consequently, midway through the campaign, Gen 

eral Ryan requested six F-117As to employ against the Bos 

nian Serb IADS. Ryan based his request on information tha

the Serbs had relocated virtually their entire SAM system in 

F-117s

243
protective ring in and around Banja Luka , the logical focus o

subsequent NATO air attacks. In Ryan ’s assessment the ris

of going against this “formidable array of SAMs is very high

and therefore justified the use of stealth fighters to reduce th

risks to aircrews. 130 Ryan ’s boss, Admiral Smith, supported hi

request, stating that “we should therefore pit our strength

against BSA weakness and that means [using the] F-117.”13

On the same day, Admiral Smith approved and forwarded hi

request to Gen George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commande

Europe (SACEUR), for immediate action.132 Smith also sent 

message that day to the Italian Ministry of Defense (MOD

requesting permission to bed down six F-117A aircraft at Avi

ano AB for at least a 30-day period. 133

US secretary of defense William Perry approved the F-11

deployment at 0051Z on 9 September for a period not to ex 

ceed 60 days. The aircraft and their associated crews an

support equipment were to deploy to Aviano immediately. Th

secretary further directed that General Joulwan, who was als

commander in chief of US European Command (USCINCEUR)

take the lead in obtaining diplomatic clearances for all dep loyin

aircraft.134 Given the potential diplomatic sensitivity of th

pending deployment, General Joulwan sent a message to th

commander in chief of US Atlantic Command, whose com 

mand would be releasing the F-117s to European Comman

(EUCOM), emphasizing the proper procedures for clearing th

deployment with the appropriate governments: “HQ USEU

COM is the single-point facilitator for obtaining host nation

approvals of all country clearances. Requests should be mad

[in accordance with] foreign clearance guide instructions. . . 

No US personnel are authorized to enter any host nation unti

specifically cleared by the country team.”135

On that same day—9 September—F-117 maintenance per 

sonnel and support equipment began arriving at Aviano t

support the F-117 beddown. But the Italian government ha

yet to give formal approval for the deployment. In pressing th

matter with the Italians, US ambassador Reginald Bartholomew

discovered that the holdup apparently was due to Italia

prime minister Lamberto Dini’s absence from the country

This left the diplomatic initiative in the hands of Italian foreign

minister Susanna Agnelli, whose communications on the issu

244
had already impressed Bartholomew with their 

vehemence

She evidently failed to see any sense of urgency about th

matter that would require her to contact Dini about the re

quest. Bartholomew also conveyed in his message that th

prime minister had told him and US ambassador Richard

Holbrooke on 7 September that “requests for support of Bos 

nia operations beyond the support currently approved would

be reviewed at political levels in terms of the responsiveness o

others to Italy’s participation in the contact group.”136 Later

Foreign Minister Agnelli emphatically told Bartholomew tha

Italy was “tired of always saying yes to others while other

always say no to Italy !”137

The US ambassador felt that the Italians were in a “high

political spin” on the issue, mainly as a consequence of th

slight they felt from not having been made a member of th

Contact Group conducting negotiations with the Serbs, an

from their relations with other members of the European Un 

ion. While acknowledging their concerns, Bartholomew told

the Italians that there were limits on what the United State

could do for them in these areas. Two days later, on 11 Sep

tember 1995, the Italian MOD advised NATO that the F-11

deployment was “not authorized.”138

Force Issues

Eight participating nations comprised the Deliberate Forc

multinational alliance: France, Germany, Italy, the Nether

lands, Spain , Turkey, the United Kingdom , and the United

States. Although the multinational effort successfully accom 

plished mission objectives, alliance relationships sometime

became strained and affected the forces.

For example, long-standing intra-NATO diplomatic tension

hampered the deployment of 10 Turkish TF-16s to participat

in Deliberate Force, mentioned previously. On 30 August, a

CINCSOUTH’s request, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power

Europe—NATO’s military headquarters—recalled the Turkis

fighters in support of the operation. Turkey responded posi

tively to the request and asked permission to overfly Greek

airspace on the way to Italy .

139 Acting consistently with a lon

245
history of strained relations with Turkey and NATO on suc

issues, Greece rejected the Turkish request. 140 Despite the ur

gency of the situation, the Greek authorities stated that “th

overflight request should have been made on a weekday an

five days prior to the flight,” the normal procedure for routin

operations. 141 The TF-16s did deploy to Italy but arrived lat

after circumnavigating Greek national airspace.

Differing political assessments of the situation in Bosnia b

the governments of the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, an

Italy, in part, led them to restrict the kinds of operations thei

air forces could perform. Dutch aircraft , for instance, flew onl

CAP, OAS , and recce missions, and the Germans’ restriction

on NATO’s use of their ECR and IDS Tornados became 

significant limitation. Because Germany would not authoriz

missions in direct support of the RRF , the latter had to re

quest support in order for the CAOC to schedule either o

these types of aircraft. The CAOC met the RRF’s recce re

quests by using German IDS recce escorted by ECRs. Also

the Turkish government limited its aircraft to CAP missions in

protection of the UN ground forces. Lastly, political pressure

within the Italian government and postconflict relationship

with neighbors across the Adriatic Sea resulted in the Italia

air force’s coming into the fight about a week late, and it

aircraft flew only OAS , aerial refueling, and airlift missions

The political background to these decisions to limit participa 

tion is complex and beyond the scope of this chapter. Never 

theless, the limitations had a direct effect on the planning an

execution of the air campaign. Most importantly, they shifted

the burden of flying most of the more dangerous strike sortie

onto the air forces whose governments left them free to con 

duct offensive operations. Clearly, the domestic political dy

namics of coalition partners is an important area of though

for future air leaders and planners.

In general the CFACC had adequate numbers and types o

aircraft to perform missions and maintain the requisite opera 

tional tempo of Deliberate Force. Still, an examination of th

mix of aircraft available to him and of the mission loads the

carried indicates some force-structure imbalances (see tabl

8.5). Some mission areas enjoyed a relative abundance o

a ir craft and platforms, while others could have used som

246
a ugmentation. For example, once operations were under way

tactical reconnaissance, early warning, ELINT, and other sup

port units flew almost double the sortie rate originally antici

pated for them by NATO air planners. This increased rat

required the deployment of augmentation forces into the thea 

ter, mostly from the USAF .

One also notes a possible surplus of aircraft allocated t

perform CAP. A little over one-fifth of the platforms flew les

than 10 percent of the mission tasking. Perhaps the CFACC

could have reassigned some of these aircraft to other mission

categories without compromising the OCA mission. However

because some of the allies deployed with a predetermined mis 

sion, especially in the air-to-air role, General Ryan’s flexibilit

was probably more restricted than it appears.

The SEAD allocation also bears closer examination. Al

t hough, in raw numbers, assets allocated to SEAD represente

about one-fifth of the total aircraft employed in Deliberat

Force, differential capabilities existed in the mix of assets pro 

vided. Of the 56 SEAD platforms available, 50 were capable o

firing HARMs while 22 were jammers, and 16 could both jam

and shoot HARMs. Because of this mixed capability, Deliberat

Force planners resorted to creating SEAD “windows” over Bos 

nia , whereby jammers and shooters provided common-us

support to a cluster of strike packages rather than remainin

tied to a particular package.

Table 8.5

Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft in Deliberate Force

Mission Allocation Apportionment

No. of Assets % No. of Sorties %

CAP 64 22.3 294 08.3

SEAD 56 19.5 785 22.2

CAS/BAI 87 30.3 1,365 38.6

Recce 18 06.3 312 08.8

Support 62 21.6 779 22.1

Total 287 100.0 3,535 100.0

247
A subtle imbalance also existed in the structure of force

allocated to the CAS and AI missions. At one level the allo 

cated mix of CAS and AI aircraft was adequate to accomplis

the mission tasking of Deliberate Force. Indeed, informal in 

terviews conducted by the Balkans Air Campaign Study team

members with F-15E, F-16, F/ A-18, and A-10 pilots indicated

that some felt underutilized during the campaign. Still, from

the start of operations, the demand for precision-weapon s 

capable aircraft pressed the capacity of the available flee

more than the number of available precision and nonprecision

aircraft would indicate. The great pressure on NATO com 

manders to minimize casualties and collateral damage mean

that precision weapons had to be used in the majority of al

strikes. Fortunately for the intervention, the Spanish, French 

British , and American air forces fielded enough precision

strike aircraft to do the job, and they likely would have de

ployed more into the fray had combat requirements increased

Thus, the real conclusion about precision strikers in Deliber 

ate Force is that the political circumstances of the campaign

created a greater demand for precision than for nonprecision

strike aircraft. Given the availability of adequate types an

numbers of precision weapons, the suitable uses of nonpreci

sion weapons are decreasing.

The allocation of aircraft to on-call CAS during Deliberat

Force also bears close examination. Tying air forces to directl

supporting ground-component combat operations on a pro 

longed or routine basis reduces their flexibility. But unde

many circumstances, CAS is an extremely important mission

both militarily and emotionally, given its ability to underpin

the success of ground operations and to reduce near-term

casualties . Historically, CAS allocations have often been in 

flated, compared to the number of missions actually flown. A

a case in point, over 30 percent of the sorties were tasked on

Deliberate Force air tasking messages for CAS ; just over 

percent actually flew such missions. Under the circumstances

of course, plenty of aircraft were available to stand CAS aler

But under circumstances in which the requirements of th

overall air campaign are more demanding in relation to th

forces available, the practice of designating CAS alert mission

demands review. This is particularly true, given the availabilit

248
of other techniques of providing responsive CAS —such a

maintaining ground-alert windows or redirecting interdiction

missions to answer critical but sporadic calls for help.

In the main, the support aircraft available for Deliberat

Force met mission requirements. Early or transient shortage

did occur in a few areas, such as tanker support and th

availability of ABCCC aircraft , but force transfers from outsid

the theater quickly rectified these incipient problems. Give

the small scale and short duration of Deliberate Force, suc

augmentations did not challenge the capabilities of the US Ai

Force. But because worldwide shortages of some types of air 

craft do exist, as is the case with tactical reconnaissance 

SEAD , and ABCCC platforms, future air planners should look

carefully at plans that depend on their ready availability.

Notes

1. See Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of th

United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, essay D, 27.

2. COMAIRSOUTH, Operation Deliberate Force “Factual Review,” 14 Oc 

tober 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, US Air Force His 

torical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., NPL-07.

3. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

4. Message, 131338Z Aug 95, commander in chief of US European Com 

mand (USCINCEUR) to CINCSOUTH, 13 August 1995 (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-14-02.

5. Message, 180930Z Aug 95, Italian Ministry of Defense to CINC 

SOUTH, 18 August 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AF 

HRA, Balkans Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

6. Message, 281817Z Aug 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 2

August 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Balkan

Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

7. Deny Flight Logistics Report, 282100Z Aug 95 (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-05/06.

8. Message, 301726Z Aug 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 3

August 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Balkan

Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

9. Message, 311914Z Aug 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 3

August 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Balkan

Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

10. Message, 051534Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 

September 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Ba

kans Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

249
11. Message, 050815Z Sep 95, TGS [Turkish government sends] to AIR

SOUTH plans cell (information only), 5 September 1995 (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Balkans Air Campaign Study special co

lections archive.

12. Message, 081418Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 

September 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

Balkans Air Campaign Study special collections archive.

13. “Factual Review,” 2-8. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

14. Message, 081639Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 

September 1995. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

15. The term offensive air operations (OAS) is derived from CINCSOUTH

Operations Plan 40101 “Deny Flight” Concept of Operations, annex D

change 4, 3 May 1995.

16. In fact, none of the enemy MiGs ever challenged the coalition; thus, n

air-to-air engagements and/or shootdowns occurred during Deliberate Force.

17. The Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes (New York: Aerospace Pub

lishing, Ltd., 1995), 104.

18. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

19. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 123.

20. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

21. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

22. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 78.

23. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

24. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

25. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 131.

26. Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, vol. 1, Tactical Employmen

General Planning & Employment Considerations, attachment 6, Guide t

Aircraft Combat Capabilities, 17 March 1995, 8-6. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

27. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 179.

28. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

29. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 127.

30. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

31. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, 8-14. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassifie

See also Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 123.

32. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 180.

250
33. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

34. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

35. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 225.

36. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

37. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

38. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 106.

39. Joint Publication (Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary o

Military and Associated Terms; on-line, Internet, 12 August 1999, availabl

from http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/a/00265.html. This i

both the US and NATO definition.

40. No US joint definition exists for BAI. It remains, however, a NATO

term covered in NATO Pub AAP-6 and is now termed “indirect air suppor

(NATO): “support given to land or sea forces by air action against objective

other than enemy forces engaged in tactical battle. It includes the gainin

and maintaining of air superiority, interdiction, and harassing.” Joint Pu

1-02; on-line, Internet, 12 August 1999, available from

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/natoterm/i/00403.html.

41. This is the US definition. The NATO definition is similar but woul

be included under the general definition of “close support.” Joint Pub 1-02

on-line, Internet, 12 August 1999, available from

http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01182.html.

42. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 123.

43. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

44. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 119.

45. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

46. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 178.

47. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

48. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 154.

49. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

50. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1 4 Sep

t ember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

51. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 131.

251
52. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

53. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

54. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 242.

55. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

56. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 104.

57. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

58. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 223.

59. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-1 5 .

60. Colonel Paladini, ITAF/DO, memorandum to Col Daniel R. Zoerb

director of the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight operations cell, subject: Lack of Pilo

Proficiency on Tankers, 7 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-14-02.

61. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-1 5 .

62. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 182.

63. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

64. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 78.

65. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

66. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, p. 3-6.

67. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 62.

68. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

69. USAF fact sheet, no. 88-28, December 1988, Office of the Secretar

of the Air Force/Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

70. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

71. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 160.

72. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

73. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 62.

252
74. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

75. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 156.

76. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995; and unit mission logs (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15.

77. Unit mission logs. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

78. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, p. 14.

79. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, 7-24. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

80. CMC (I,) AIRSOUTH, memorandum to CINCSOUTH chief of staf

subject: The Way Ahead with Air Recce, 5 June 1995, AFHRA, NPL-22-01.

81. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 102.

82. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

83. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

84. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

85. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

86. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

87. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

88. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

89. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

90. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 130.

91. Ibid., 169.

92. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

93. In the evolution of unmanned aircraft platforms, earlier schools re 

ferred to them as remotely piloted vehicles. Presently, the term applied t

these aircraft is unmanned aerial vehicles . Regardless of the semantics, the

are both unmanned, remotely controlled, data-linked airframes.

94. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Surve

vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Govern

ment Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1, 231.

95. Facsimile, “TEZ Monitoring with RPV,” routine correspondence from

Headquarters Bosnia-Herzegovina Command to Headquarters UNPROFOR

5 May 1994, AFHRA, NPL-23-05.

96. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

97. MSgt Dale Warman, “Air Force Squadron Takes Over Predator Op 

erations,” United States Air Forces in Europe/Public Affairs, Air Force New

Service, 5 September 1996.

98. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

253
CAOC-15; and Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, 5 Decembe

1995, AFHRA, CAOC-13.

99. Message, CINCSOUTH to COMUNPROFOR, subject: BSA Noncompl

ance and Resumption of Air Strikes, 6 September 1995 (Confidential) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

100. See the previous discussion about recce platforms for informatio

about the U-2R’s contribution of 10 sorties to the ELINT mission. EC-130H

flew 35 ELINT missions, but that platform is described in the electronic

combat section of this chapter.

101. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

102. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

103. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 63.

104. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

105. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 75.

106. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

107. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 269.

108. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1 4 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

109. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

110. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, 8-6. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

111. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 129.

112. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, 8-7. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

113. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

114. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified. Note tha

the 35 Compass Call missions were logged as ELINT missions and not a

electronic-combat or electronic-support missions.

115. Christopher Chant, ed., The Presidio Concise Guide to Military Ai

craft of the World (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981), 36–38.

116. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAOC-15.

117. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

118. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 157.

119. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

120. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

254
121. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 155.

122. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

123. CAOC records indicate that the aircraft flew, but the flights wer

not logged. Because one cannot determine the total number of sorties flown

they are not included in support-sortie totals.

124. Ibid.

125. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 Sep 

tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

CAO C-15.

126. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, attachment 6, A6-33, through -34. (Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

127. Major Rincon, “Talking Paper on Joint STARS Demonstration i

NATO’s Southern Tier,” Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/IASW, 2

September 1994, AFHRA, NPL-23-06.

128. Ibid.

129. Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, videotaped interview by mem 

bers of the Balkans Air Campaign Study, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 199

(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Misc-20.

130. Message, 081100Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to SACEUR, subject: IAD

West, 8 September 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA

NPL-15-01.

131. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

132. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. See also mes 

sage, 081639Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to Supreme Headquarters Allied Pow 

ers Europe, subject: Request for Aircraft, 8 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL

15-01.

133. Message, 081706Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to RIFD/Italian Ministry o

Defense, DGS, subject: Beddown Request for F-117A Aircraft, 8 Septembe

1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

134. Message, 090051Z Sep 95, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

Washington, D.C., to USCINCEUR, subject: Deployment of Fighter Aircraf

for Deny Flight, 9 September 1995. (Secret) Information extracted is un

classified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

135. Message, 090935Z Sep 95, USCINCEUR to CINCUSACOM, subjec

Command Relationships, 9 September 1995 (Secret) Information extracte

is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

136. Message, ambassador, United States Embassy, Rome, to CINC 

SOUTH, subject: Government of Italy’s Delay in Approving NATO F-117

Deployments to Italy, 9 September 1995 (Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

137. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

138. Message, 111125Z Sep 95, Italian Ministry of Defense, Rome, to CINC

SOUTH, subject: Beddown Request for F-117A Aircraft, 11 September 199

(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

255
139. Message, 050815Z Sep 95, TGS (Turkey) to Supreme Headquarter

Allied Powers Europe, subject: Greek Rejection of Turkish Overflight Re 

quest, 5 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is un

classified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.

140. Ibid. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

141. Ibid. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

256
Chapter 9

Weapons Used in Deliberate Force

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

With respect to combat airpower, “weapons should be selecte

based on their ability to influence an adversary’s capabilit

and will.”1 With regard to Deliberate Force’s mission-e xecution

issues, the constraints on force application entailed avoidin

collateral effects and unintended consequences that would b

counterproductive to the political peace process. This effort t

avoid collateral and unintended damage extended not only t

the surrounding physical targets but also to concerns abou

fratricide, refugees, and noncombatant civilian casualties .

2

 Th

need for precision offensive air operations (OAS) platforms an

weapons to limit collateral damage while accomplishing mis 

sion objectives became an overriding concern during the Bal

kans air campaign. Thus, precision-guided munitions (PGM

became the overwhelming weapons of choice during air strik

operations. Indeed, Deliberate Force became the first air cam

paign in history to employ more precision-guided bombs an

missiles than unguided ones.

Described as “revolutionary” in Operation Desert Storm 

PGMs came to fruition during Deliberate Force. The multina 

tional effort expended 1,026 bombs and missiles (excluding can 

non shells, rockets, and high-speed antiradiation missile

[HARM]), of which 708 (69 percent) were precision guided b

laser, electro-optical (EO), or infrared (IR) sensors.3 Although th

total bomb tonnage amounted to fewer than five hundred tons—

less than 1 percent of the 70,000 tons dropped in Deser

Storm ,

4—the proportion of precision-guided ordnance employed in

Deliberate Force was more than eight times greater than th

percentage of PGMs used in the Gulf War air campaign (8 percen t).

This chapter discusses the abundance of air-to-surface weap

ons, both precision and nonprecision , available to North Atlanti

Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during Deliberate Force. I

also notes some precision weapons not used by the combined

257
forces and concludes by addressing weapons issues that aros

as a result of the air campaign.

Precision-Guided Munitions

With respect to force and weapons capabilities, “weapons se

lection comprises one of the highest-leverage means of tailorin

forces to accomplish missions.”6 Precision capability drove th

OAS mission roles of coalition platforms; only the United States

United Kingdom, France, and Spain had fighter-bombers capa 

ble of employing PGMs. Of the 708 PGMs dropped or fired dur

ing Deliberate Force, the United States expended 622 (87.8 per 

cent), followed by the United Kingdom with 48 (6.8 percent)

Spain with 24 (3.4 percent), and France with 14 (2 percen

(table 9.1). Given their visual-attack capability, Dutch, German

Table 9.1

Deliberate Force’s Precision Munitions

France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain United

Kingdom

United

States

Total

LaserGuided:

GBU-10 303 303

GBU-12 10 115 125

GBU-16 24 48 143 215

GBU-24 6 6

AS-30L 4 4

 Totals 14 0 0 0 24 48 567 653

EO/IR:

SLAM 10 10

GBU-15 9 9

AGM-65 23 23

 Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 42

TLAM

 13 13

 Total 14 0 0 0 24 48 622 708

Source: Extracted from Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Ita

subject: Munitions (left-side slide no. 44), 5 December 1995, United States Air Force Historical Resear

Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3.

258
Italian , or Turkish aircraft employed nonprecision munitions o

area targets in which collateral-damage risks were minimal o

not a concern.

Laser-Guided Bombs

Laser-guided bombs (LGB) are ballistic warheads equipped

with electronic and mechanical assemblies designed to provid

laser terminal guidance. One can attach such laser-guidanc

kits to a variety of warheads, including but not limited t

general-purpose (GP) bombs, special-purpose bombs, an

warheads developed and produced by other allied countries

Such a kit consists of a computer-control group and win

assembly, the former mounted at the front of the warhead an

made up of a detector unit, computer section, and contro

unit. The wing assembly is attached both to a GP warhea

and to the rear of the bomb body to provide stability an

increased lift.7 The laser-guidance system directs the bom

towards a laser “spot” reflected from the target and received b

the bomb’s detector. This spot may be projected by the deliv 

ery aircraft or, more commonly, by another aircraft equipped

with a laser designator (referred to as “buddy designation”) o

by a ground unit.

• GBU-10/10I—a MK-84 2,000 lb GP bomb modified fo

laser guidance. A Paveway II variant, the GBU-10I i

based on the I-2000 (BLU-109) penetration bomb, whil

the GBU-10 comes in both the earlier Paveway I and th

Paveway II variants. 8 During the Gulf War, F-15Es an

F-111s used GBU-10/10Is extensively, mainly agains

bridges; Scud missiles; and hardened command, control

communications, and intelligence (C3I) nodes and bun

kers. During Deliberate Force only US aircraft used GBU

10/10Is , with most of the 303 bombs (46 percent of al

LGBs used) dropped by F-15Es and F-16Cs from Avian

Air Base (AB), Italy. The F-16Cs’ first combat use of LGB

came with their employment of the GBU-10. NATO air

craft released only 252 GBU-10s over Bosnia-Herzegovin

against bridges, bunkers, and C3I nodes; F-16s jettisoned

the remaining 51 in the Adriatic Sea because weathe

259
obscuration in the target area prevented the aircraft from

dropping them. The aircraft also had to jettison to lighte

gross weight for divert fuel if the Aviano AB runway hap

pened to close.

• GBU-12—a US 500 lb MK-82 GP bomb with an added

GBU/ Paveway I or II laser-guidance package. 9 During Des

ert Storm , F-111Fs, F-15Es, and A-6s employed GBU

12s, mostly against armored vehicles. During Deliberat

Force both the French and the Americans dropped thes

bombs. Of the 125 GBU-12s expended, French Mirag

2000D/Ks dropped 10 (their first combat use of LGBs

and US aircraft dropped the remaining 115 against vari

ous soft-point targets and some artillery tubes.

• GBU-16—a 1,000 lb MK-83 GP bomb fitted with a Pave 

way II laser-guidance kit. The GBU-16 is normally associ

ated with the US Navy, US Marine Corps, and some NATO

countries; the US Air Force (USAF) does not carry a 1,00

lb GP bomb in its inventory. In Deliberate Force, Spanish

British , and US aircraft dropped a total of 215 GBU-16s

Spanish EF-18s dropped 24 of these bombs; British Har

rier GR-7s expended 48, typically in flights of two accom

panied by a Jaguar GR-1 as the buddy designator; an

US Navy and Marine F/ A-18C and D Hornets dropped th

remaining 143.

• GBU-24—a 2,000 lb GP bomb, either an MK-84 or 

BLU-109, modified with a GBU/Paveway III low-leve

laser-guided bomb (LLLGB) package, with improve

guidance and flight-control systems. The LLLGB wa

designed for employment at high speed and very low

altitudes to increase standoff range and reduce th

launching aircraft’s exposure in high-threat target ar

eas. Although aircraft in the Gulf War employed nearly

twelve hundred GBU-24s,

1 0 Deliberate Force aircraft re

leased only six, all by F-15Es and primarily agains

bridges. Despite the F-15E aircrews’ preference for em

ploying GBU-24s, the decision to use them came late in

the campaign after encountering problems with the ef

fectiveness of GBU-10/10Is against bridges.

260
Laser-Guided Missile

Laser-guided missiles use guidance systems similar to thos

on LGBs but attached to air-to-surface missiles instead o

unpowered bombs. The only laser-guided missile used durin

Deliberate Force was the French AS-30L. Mirage 2000/D/K

fitted with laser pods for self-designation fired four of them.

Electro-Optical/Infrared-Sensor-Guided Munitions

• AGM-65 Maverick—a US-made 500 lb or 650 lb air-to-sur

face missile with a shaped-charge warhead designed fo

attacking armored vehicles or other hardened targets. Prio

to launch, an EO- or IR-guided variant of the Maveric

missile must acquire its target, after which the missil

guides autonomously, providing tactical-standoff “launc

and leave” capability at beyond-visual ranges. The USAF

uses four AGM-65 variants: the EO (TV-sensor) AGM-65

and B models as well as the IR-sensor AGM-65D and large

G models.1 1 The IR Mavericks can be slaved to onboar

aircraft sensors, permitting more rapid target acquisition

improved target identification, and increased launc

ranges. The IR sensor also allows use of the AGM-65 durin

darkness, against camouflaged targets, and in some ad

verse weather conditions. During Deliberate Force, A-10

fired all 23 of the Mavericks that were expended.1 2

• AGM-84E standoff land-attack missile (SLAM)—a 1,385 lb

variant of the US Navy’s Harpoon antiship missile de

signed for standoff strikes against heavily defended lan

targets and ships in harbor. Developed with “off-the-shelf 

technology, the SLAM uses the airframe, engine, and 48

lb warhead of the Harpoon missile, the imaging IR terminal

guidance unit of the AGM-65D Maverick , the datalin

capability of the AGM-62 Walleye glide bomb, and 

Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The SLAM ha

EO and IR variants. In the primary mode of operation

technicians load the target location into the missile prio

to launch, GPS provides midcourse guidance updates

and seeker IR video images provide terminal target acqu

sition.1 3 This specialized PGM has a long-range standof

261
capability with pinpoint accuracy. In Deliberate Force, carrie r

based US Navy F/A-18s fired 10 AGM-84Es against Bos

nian Serb army (BSA) defenses around Banja Luka.

• GBU-15 modular guided-weapon system —a USAF glid

bomb with interchangeable guidance (EO or IR), fuzing

and control systems selected according to the needs of 

particular mission and fitted to either an MK-84 2,000 lb

GP bomb or a BLU-109 I-2000 penetrator bomb. Thi

AGM-65 Maverick

262
munition is designed for use against highly defended

hardened, high-value fixed targets by providing greate

standoff range than a conventional LGB but with th

same accuracy. After the aircraft releases the bomb to

wards the target area, it transmits datalinked TV or IR

images that locate and identify the target and specifi

aiming point. During Deliberate Force, airlifters delivered

25 GBU-15s to Aviano AB, and USAF F-15Es dropped

nine IR variants (five BLU-109 and four MK-84s) on sev

eral key air-defense targets around Banja Luka .

Cruise Missile

The BMG-109 Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM), the U

Navy’s conventionally armed cruise missile for attacking lan

targets, is carried aboard cruisers, destroyers, an d subma 

rines.1 4 With a nominal range of six hundred nautical miles an

powered by a turbofan engine following launch by a disposabl

rocket booster, the TLAM is a highly accurate, autonomousl

guided weapon that navigates using a terrain-contour-matchin

GBU-15

263
system. This system compares stored digital ground image

with actual terrain-following radar images to determine th

missile’s position and make necessary course corrections. Afte

identifying the target, the missile flies over it or initiates 

vertical dive and attacks with its 1,000 lb high-explosiv

(TLAM-C) or cluster-munition warhead (TLAM-D). On 10 Sep

tember 1995, in support of NATO air operations in northwes

Bosnia , the cruiser USS Normandy, afloat in the Adriatic Sea

fired 13 TLAMs against integrated air defense system (IADS

targets in and around Banja Luka. Although TLAMs represente

only 1.9 percent of all PGMs , their employment in support o

Deliberate Force represented several firsts: the first Tomahawk

used on European Command theater targets; the first used in

an integrated suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mis 

sion with coordination of tactical air operations; and the firs

used in direct support of NATO operatio n s. 1 5

Nonprecision Bombs

Nonprecision bombs fly unguided ballistic flight trajectorie

(free fall) after release from an aircraft. They include GP

bombs with high-explosive warheads and cluster bomb unit

(CBU), which contain a large number of small submunition

or “bomblets.” Their accuracy depends on the skill of an air 

crewman who uses an onboard sighting cue to release th

weapon at the proper point so that the trajectory carries it t

the target or aiming point. Since the weapon falls withou

further guidance after release, unguided munitions are gener 

ally less accurate than guided ones. Nonprecision munition

accounted for more than 90 percent of the ordnance delivered

in Desert Storm , but in Deliberate Force, NATO aircraf

dropped 318 nonprecision munitions—less than half th

number of PGMs (table 9.2).

General-Purpose Bombs

• MK-82—a US-made 500 lb GP bomb containing 19

pounds of Tritonal high-explosive filler.1 6 The Dutch 

French, and Italian air forces dropped 175 MK-82s durin

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Deliberate Force, accounting for 55 percent of all the un

guided bombs used.

• MK-83—a 1,000 lb GP bomb containing 416 pounds o

explosive.1 7 Aircraft from Britain , Italy, the United States 

and France dropped a total of 99 MK-83 iron bombs dur

ing Deliberate Force, accounting for 31 percent of all un

guided bombs.

• MK-84—a 2,000 lb bomb, the largest used in the campaign

containing 945 pounds of explosive. F-16As of the Nether

lands air force dropped 42 MK-84s during Deliberate Force

accounting for 13 percent of all unguided bombs.

Cluster Bomb Units

Cluster-munition dispensers carry a large number of smal

submunitions that distribute across a relatively wide area to fa 

cilitate attacks on targets such as infantry units; groups of veh

cles; antiaircraft artillery (AAA) or surface-to-air missile (SAM

sites; and petroleum, oil, and lubricant facilities. The 960 lb CBU

87B/ B consists of an SUU-65/B tactical-munitions dispenser plu

202 BLU-97A/B fragmentation and antiarmor submunition s.1 8

Planners decided not to use CBUs during Deliberate Forc

because their inaccuracy and wide dispersion pattern mad

them likely to cause collateral damage. However, a USAF A-10

Table 9.2

Deliberate Force’s Nonprecision Bombs

Nation GP Bombs CBUs Total/Natio

MK-82 MK-83 MK-84 Total GPs

France 71 2 73 73

Germany 0 0

Italy 10 40 50 50

Netherlands 94 42 136 136

Spain 0 0

United Kingdom 47 47 47

United States 10 10 2 12

Total 175 99 42 316 2 318

Source: Extracted from Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Ita

subject: Munitions (right-side slide no. 45), 5 December 1995, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3.

265
dropped two CBU-87s during the first day of the campaign as 

result of a miscommunication with the combined air operation

center (CAOC). Evidently, on 30 August 1995, an A-10 (call sign

Speedy 37) conducting a close air support mission requeste

clearance from the CAOC to drop ordnance on a BSA artil

lery/ m ortar position. Without regard to the aircraft’s weapon

load, CAOC gave approval to expend the ordnance, so Speedy 3

dropped all of its weapons, including a pair of CBU-87s. The

scored a hit on the target but inflicted no collateral damage .

Other Munitions

In addition to guided and unguided bombs and missiles

several other types of air-to-surface munitions were used in

Deliberate Force, including antiradiation missiles, rockets

and gun ammunition.

• AGM-88 HARM—the principal antiradiation missile used

by the United States and several other allied air forces fo

SEAD missions. The HARM is designed to detect, home in on

and destroy radar emitters such as early warning, a cqu isition

AGM-88 HARM

266
and tracking radars operating throughout a wide range o

frequency bands. During Deliberate Force, NATO HARM

equipped aircraft included US Navy F/ A-18Cs and EA

6Bs, US Marine Corps F/A-18Ds, USAF F-16 HARM Tar

geting System (HTS) aircraft, and Spanish EF-18s. A tota

of 56 HARMs were fired, 48 by US Navy and Marine air

craft, six by the F-16 HTS (their first combat use by F

16s), and the remaining two by Spain ’s EF-18s.

• 2.75-inch (70 mm) rockets—unguided rockets carried in

underwing pods and mainly used in Deliberate Force b

USAF OA-10 airborne forward air controllers. These air

craft used two types in the campaign: (1) white phospho

rous (WP) rockets for marking targets with smoke for in 

coming strikers and (2) high-explosive (HE) rockets fo

destroying light targets. A total of 187 WP1 9 and 20 HE

rockets 2 0 were fired during the course of the air campaign

• Guns—internally mounted cannons for air combat or straf

ing. The A-10 and AC-130 gunships normally use thei

guns as primary air-to-ground weapons; only these aircraf

made significant use of guns during Deliberate Force. Th

A-10 carries a GAU-8/A Avenger—a 30 mm, seven-barrel

Gatling-type cannon designed for attacking tanks and othe

2.75-inch rocket

267
armored vehicles. The Avenger magazine holds up t

1,350 rounds of ammunition, normally a mix of armor

piercing incendiary and HE incendiary shells. Unfortu 

nately, during the first day of the campaign, two A-10

experienced GAU-8 jams while strafing ground targets. An

inspection revealed ammunition jammed in the gun cham

bers. Suspecting a bad lot of ammunition, crews replaced al

of the A-10s’ ammunition with new ammunition, eliminatin

any further incidents. 21 A-10s fired a total 10,086 rounds

strafing such targets as armored vehicles, trucks, and bun

kers with remarkable precision.2 2 The AC-130 Spectre gun

ship carries a variety of 20 mm and 40 mm rapid-fire can

nons and a 105 mm M-102 howitzer that fires from the lef

side of the aircraft. During Deliberate Force, AC-130s at

tacked a variety of targets with impressive accuracy, firing 5

rounds of 40 mm and 350 rounds of 105 mm ammunition.

Nonmunition Items of Interest

The tactical air-launched decoy (TALD), an expendable U

Navy and Marine unpowered-drone glide vehicle, usually i

Loading an A-10’s cannon

268
launched by an F-14 Tomcat, F/ A-18 Hornet, or EA-6B

Prowler to confuse enemy radars. The drone has a radar

cross-section-enhancement payload and/or an electronic

countermeasures-enhancement payload. Both enhancement

create multiple false targets for threat radars while the TALD

flies a wide spectrum of mission profiles, including variation

in speed, range, and altitude. 2 3 During Deliberate Force, U

Navy aircraft launched a total of 47 TALDs against the Bos 

nian Serb IADS.

2 4

US aircraft that penetrated and operated in Bosnian airspac

had to have an operable chaff-and-flare dispenser sys t em fo

self-defense. Chaff bundles, dispensed manually or accordin

to a preset program, enhance deception when aircraft penetrat

a radar network and provide electronic-countermeasures self

protection when a radar-homing, air-to-air missile or SAM

tracks or attacks the aircraft. 25 During Deliberate Force, Aviano

based US aircraft equipped with AN/ALE dispensers used

10,922 RR-170/A chaff cartridges. 2 6 The two most commo

US decoy flares are the MJU-7/B, used on fighters, and th

MJU-10/B, used by larger aircraft such as the AC-130 o

B-52.

2 7 During the operation, 1,591 MJU-7s and 89 MJU-10

lit the skies over Bosnia .

28

Munitions Not Used

Although the demand for precision munitions remained

high during Deliberate Force, not all PGMs in-theater or other 

wise available to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH

were used. Most of these have ties with a particular weapon

platform. For example, a hundred GBU-27 2,000 lb LGBs de

signed for the F-117 Nighthawk sat idle in Aviano’s bom

dumps because the Italian government denied permission fo

F-117 basing. Similarly, USAF B-52s did not employ air

launched cruise missiles and Have Nap air-to-surface mis 

siles. Further, the US Navy had additional PGM capability in

the form of AGM-62B Walleye EO-guided bombs, AGM-65E/

laser-guided Mavericks, and AGM-123A Skipper laser-guided

glide bombs but chose not to employ them.

269
If all the combined NATO forces had possessed PGM capa 

bility, Gen Michael Ryan , commander of Allied Air Force

Southern Europe, and his staff would not have planned to us

any GP bombs or cluster munitions in the campaign. Thus, i

is not surprising that many nonprecision munitions went un 

used. However, NATO aircraft without PGM capability had th

task of striking visual-attack-area targets (those with a low

probability of collateral damage) with GP bombs. Later, t

ensure target destruction, a PGM mission followed up o

these strikes because of the less-than-optimal accuracy of un

guided bombing. The only nonprecision munition considered

for use towards the end of Deliberate Force (around 13 Sep

tember 1995) was the CBU-89 Gator mine for area denial an

funneling of troops and equipment during BSA withdrawals

Planners decided not to employ the munition, however, be

cause of the cease-fire and the desire to avoid noncombatan

casualties , fratricide, and damage to civilian vehicles.

Finally, because of Deny Flight’s air supremacy and in th

absence of any challenge from Bosnian Serb MiGs, allied air 

craft fired no air-to-air missiles during Deliberate Force. Sim

larly, although most coalition fighters carried 20 mm to 3

mm cannons, they did not use them for strafing.

Weapons Issues

The preponderant usage of PGMs in Deliberate Force indi

cates that accuracy played a key role in the employment o

combat airpower by the combined forces—especially by U

joint air forces. Precision weaponry allowed for a robust opera 

tions tempo, reduction of risks to aircrews, and degradation o

BSA capability with minimal collateral damage . PGMs mad

the Balkans air campaign possible, allowing a relatively smal

force with limited objectives to have operational and strategi

effects in a limited time.

Precision versus Nonprecision Weapons

Overall, the PGM to non-PGM ratio in Deliberate Force was 

relatively high 2.3:1, compared to a ratio of only 1:11.5 durin

the Gulf War air campaign. The heavy reliance on PGMs reflect

270
the concern of General Ryan and his staff for precision accu 

racy and avoidance of collateral damage , whereas in the Gul

War, collateral damage became a concern only in attacking 

limited number of targets, particularly around Baghdad. More

over, in Desert Storm the strike mix became an issue of tactical

bombing accuracy between “smart” platforms employin

“dumb” bombs as opposed to dumb platforms employing smar

bombs. 2 9 Learning from PGM use in Desert Storm, Deliberat

Force planners tried to take the “dumb” out of the equation a

much as possible, relying on smart platforms employing smar

bombs to provide pinpoint accuracy. As mentioned above, how 

ever, some smart platforms with dumb bombs or vice vers

attacked low-risk, visual-attack-area targets where collatera

damage was not a concern.

Most of the allied platforms and weapons in Deliberat

Force enjoyed the benefits of advanced technologies that be

gan in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Since the Gul

War, the number of smart aircraft that can drop and term

nally guide laser and IR weapons has increased. Most notably

the F-15E, F-16C Blocks 40 and 50, F-16 HTS , F/ A-18D, an

F-14D can all designate their own PGMs. Although these air 

craft, with their digital-electronic navigation, weapon-deliver

systems, and sensors, have grown smarter, the weapons an

interface with the aircraft have not kept pace. As discussed

above, smart platforms interfacing with smart weapons stil

have their share of problems: (1) most aircraft can deliver al

munitions, but only certain aircraft can provide terminal guid 

ance; (2) dedicating PGMs to particular aircraft limits thei

utility; (3) retrofitting precision munitions to existing airframe

causes various anomalies in software and airframe interoper 

ability; and (4) the cost of smart technologies limits thei

quantity. Needless to say, these constraints tie certain aircraf

to specific roles, creating difficulties in a 24-hour air-taskin

cycle, as well as complicating tactical considerations for thei

employment.

Despite the problems of PGMs, their high probability of hit 

ting the target, compared to the performance of nonprecision

weapons, creates important results at the operational an

strategic levels. Force-multiplier benefits derived from PGM

usage include better probability of kill; more target damag

271
with fewer bombs; fewer sorties and less fuel consumption

and, most importantly, enhancement of survivability by pro 

viding some standoff capability, thereby reducing the risk t

aircrews and platforms.

Clearly, PGMs are the wave of the future, reflecting th

principles of Joint Vision 2010. “Precision engagement is 

core competency that directly links the core competencies o

the Air Force to joint military operations. In ‘Joint Vision

2010,’ [former] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen

John Shalikashvili terms precision engagement one of fou

operational concepts that joint forces will need to dominate a

adversary in any conflict during the next century.” Accordin

to Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Force chief of staff

“the essence of precision engagement is the ability to appl

selective force against specific targets and achieve discret

and discriminant effects.”3 0 On applying this concept through

the medium of air and space today and in the future, Fogle 

man noted that “our forces will be more precise and mor

effective, at day or night, in good weather or bad, whethe

delivering food or lethal ordnance. Technology has driven eac

military era’s definition of precision. . . . In the 21st century, i

will be possible to find, fix or track and target anything tha

moves on the surface of the earth. . . . This is an emergin

reality that will dramatically change the conduct of warfare an

the role of air and space power.”31 In reference to future globa

conflicts, former secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnal

observed that “the Air Force of the 21st century must offe

options for the employment of force in measured but effectiv

doses. To do so, the Air Force will rely on global awarenes

capabilities to support national decision-making and joint op 

erations to determine military objectives and enable precise tar

geting. . . . Air and space forces will then apply power that is n

less overwhelming because it is also discriminating.”3 2

Because precision engagement will save the lives of friend

foes, and civilians by limiting collateral damage , the Air Forc

core competency of precision engagement, identified as such in

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, wi

remain a top priority in the next century. “It joins air an

space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, informa

272
tion superiority and agile combat support as one of the funda 

mental capabilities that the Air Force provides the nation.”3 3

If Deliberate Force indeed set a precedent for the use o

PGMs in future conflicts, what about the fate of nonprecision

weapons delivered by aircraft? Given a limited conflict that i

anything short of another “real” war like the one with Iraq

General Ryan, Deliberate Force’s combined force air compo

nent commander , answered that question by opining tha

“dumb bombs are dead!” 3 4

Shortage of 24-Hour, All-Weather Standoff Weapons

Reiterating the concern of Gen Buster Glosson, US air com 

ponent commander in the Gulf War, General Ryan expressed

genuine concern for his airmen, believing that no target i

worth a loss of life. Just as the obsession to negate collatera

damage drove the usage of PGMs, so did concern for the sur

vival of aircrews and aircraft against an ever present BS

threat drive the need for standoff PGM capability to ensur

that strike aircraft remained outside of harm’s way when the

attacked their targets. Air supremacy and ingress/egress alti

tudes above 10,000 feet minimized much of the risk to air 

crews by avoiding fire from small arms and most AAA an

man-portable SAMs . However, even at medium altitudes, th

threat of highly defended targets required a change in tactic

for existing munitions and drove the desire for standoff weap

ons to avoid overflight of the target area. Tactics evolved

around existing aircraft systems and weapons capability.

To avoid direct overflight, tacticians devised dynamic ma

neuvers with some degree of standoff to accomplish the mis 

sion with PGMs . For example, F-16s employing GBU-10

would “miniloft” (climb five to 10 degrees) at the release poin

four to five nautical miles from the target, and “crank” (tur

40 degrees off the attack heading) away from the target whil

lasing during the bomb’s time of fall. These employment tac

tics offered some standoff from short-range SAMs and radar

directed AAA. Aircraft could counter long-range SAM threat

by popping up from terrain masking to place the release poin

inside the SAM’s minimum engagement range. However, be

cause aircraft in Deliberate Force operated at medium rathe

273
than low altitudes, they would find themselves in the SAM

engagement envelope unless they used electronic countermea 

sures or, better yet, stayed outside the SAM ’s range.

Generically considering SAM threats for medium-altitud

ingress, some SAM systems can engage tactical aircraft a

ranges of more than 40 nautical miles. The majority of preci

sion bombs and missiles offer limited standoff capabilit

against a sophisticated and redundant IADS. The problem

with the USAF ’s GBU-15 modular guided-weapon system an

the US Navy’s AGM-84 SLAM extended-standoff capability i

that only a few aircraft are capable of employing them. Also

because their cost limits the size of inventories, combat an

training experience on their employment is relatively con 

strained. In an attempt to overcome the lack of all-weather 

tactical standoff weapons, we now use strategic assets em 

ploying long-range conventional cruise missiles such as th

B-52’s Have Naps, air-launched cruise missiles , and AGM

130s as well as the US Navy ’s TLAMs. Unfortunately, thes

precision weapons are expensive, require long cycle times, an

have small payloads.

Because of the high cost and limited numbers of cruis

missiles, low-observable-technology or stealth platforms lik

the F-117 Nighthawk with its GBU-27s became a solution t

the problem of “surgically” attacking IADS and strategic tar 

gets at medium to high altitudes. Stealth offers survivabilit

while overflying the target(s) and employing PGMs with pin 

point accuracy. As a national asset, the F-117 requires ap 

proval from the National Command Authorities for deploymen

around the world, necessitating advanced planning to inte 

grate the aircraft into an air campaign in a timely manner. A

mentioned above, the Italian government thwarted the use o

F-117s in Deliberate Force, so General Ryan’s only alterna

tives were GBU-15s, SLAMs, and TLAMs.

Although we learned about the limited availability of 24

hour, all-weather standoff weapons from the Gulf War, we ha

to relearn the lesson nearly five years later in Deliberate Force

Fortunately, F-15Es are on-line, F-117s and B-2s are stil

available, and F-22s are in the near future; somewhat furthe

out lies the possibility of the joint strike fighter. Additionally

as the twenty-first century approaches, new standoff weapon

274
look promising. Since Desert Storm we have begun the join

development or operational test and evaluation of several new

standoff weapon systems, including the joint direct-attack

munition , the joint standoff weapon , the joint air-to-surfac

standoff missile, and the low-cost autonomous attack system 

The former two are currently contracted and undergoing op

erational test and evaluation, while the latter two are proto 

types under consideration for acquisition in the near future

This new generation of standoff-weapon technologies will hav

flexibility within a 24-hour air-tasking schedule; adaptabilit

to existing platforms; true all-weather , day/night capability

autonomous control and navigation to the target after releas

from high, medium, or low altitudes; increased standoff

enough accuracy to minimize collateral damage; and the capa 

bility to hit both fixed and mobile targets.

These new standoff weapons will support the joint capabilit

of precision engagement worldwide. However, like most preci

sion weaponry, standoff munitions require effective comman

and control as well as precise intelligence , surveillance, an

reconnaissance measures to ensure accurate employmen

against targets and to provide discrimination for minimizin

collateral damage. In the meantime we must maintain an

upgrade present aircraft, continue to use stealth assets, an

use all available cruise missiles (not just TLAMs). Further 

more, cruise missiles used in an autonomous single-attac

mode offer effectiveness against both critical point targets and 

widely dispersed target set (i.e., a large number of aimin

points)—perhaps an important consideration for future air op 

erations. Until the new generation of weapons becomes avail

able, combined/joint air component commanders faced wit

overcoming a complex IADS must seriously consider all availabl

standoff weapons and plan well ahead for their employment.

Notes

1. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 6.

2. Briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, commander of Allied Air Force

Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosn ia

Herzegovina, “Deliberate Force,” October 1995, US Air Force Historical Re 

search Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-13.

275
3. Ibid.

4. Maj Tim Reagan, USAF/SAA (Studies and Analyses Agency), “Charac

teristics of Deliberate Force,” draft report, n.d., 4, AFHRA, SAGC-03.

5. “Evaluation of the Air War,” 96-10, US Government Accounting O

fice/PEMD (Program Evaluation and Methodology Division) report to con 

gressional requesters, Operation Desert Storm, July 1996, 4, AFHRA

K168.310-120. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

6. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 92.

7. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34, Aircrew Weapons Deliver

Manual Non-Nuclear, 31 May 1991, 1-29. (Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

8. Ibid., 1-25. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

9. The two generations of GBU-10/12 LGBs include the Paveway I wit

fixed wings and the Paveway II with folding wings. Paveway II variants hav

the following improvements over Paveway I: 30 percent greater field of view

increased detector sensitivity, reduced thermal battery delay after releas

increased maximum canard deflection, and additional laser-coding options

10. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Surve

vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (Washington, D.C.: Depart 

ment of the Air Force, 1993), table 201, “Desert Shield/Storm: USAF Weap

ons Cost and Utilization, June 1993,” 578.

11. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34, 1-46. (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

12. Although only 23 Maverick shots were reported, Deny Flight logistic

reports of the 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) from 28 August to 1

September 1995 showed a decrease of 60 Maverick missiles in their mun

tions inventory—a difference of 37 missiles, AFHRA, AVI-05/06. The Maver

ick breakout from the reports is as follows: 49 AGM-65A/Bs, eight AGM

65Ds, and three AGM-65Gs. See also 7490th Composite Win

(Provisional)/DFOC (Deny Flight Operations Center), memorandum to com 

mander, 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional), subject: Deliberate Force, 2

September 1995, for listed munition expenditures of 14 AGM-65Gs an

seven AGM-65Ds for a total of 21, not 23, Mavericks shot. At the time o

this writing, no record exists of how many Mavericks of what type wer

actually expended or returned for maintenance.

13. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, and Spac

Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1, 80.

14. Science Applications International Corporation, “Tomahawk Effec 

tiveness in the War with Iraq,” 22 April 1991, 3, AFHRA, Gulf War Airpowe

Survey (GWAPS) Archives, NA-28.

15. Message, 111946Z Sep 95, commander, US Sixth Fleet to com 

mander in chief, European Command, subject: Deliberate Force Post-TLAM

Strike Report, 11 September 1995, 4. (Secret) Information extracted is un

classified.

16. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34, 1-13, 1-14. (Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

276
17. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

18. Ibid., 1-86. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

19. This figure represents the difference between the 7490th Composit

Wing (Provisional) unit logistics reports of 28 August 1995 and the un

logistics reports inventories of 13 September 1995, AFHRA, AVI-05/06.

20. Extracted from Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Head

quarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Munitions (right-side slide no

45), 5 December 1995, AFHRA, H-3.

21. Message, 301245Z Aug 95, 31st Fighter Wing to United States Ai

Forces in Europe AOS (Air Operations Support), 30 August 1995, 2.

22. Corona briefing slides.

23. Capt Jeff Hodgon, “Drones,” AFHRA GWAPS Archives, TF2-64-60

3-4. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

24. Corona briefing slides.

25. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

26. This figure represents the difference between the 7490th Composit

Wing (Provisional) unit logistics reports of 28 August 1995 and the un

logistics reports inventories of 13 September 1995, AFHRA, AVI-05/06.

27. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

28. These figures represent the difference between the 7490th Compos 

ite Wing (Provisional) unit logistics reports of 28 August 1995 and the un

logistics reports inventories of 13 September 1995, AFHRA, AVI-05/06.

29. A “smart” platform contains the digital-electronic hardware and th

software required to identify a three-dimensional munitions release point i

space from which a ballistic “dumb” bomb will free-fall and hit the intende

impact point. A smart bomb/missile is capable of internal or external sen 

sor guidance to the impact point; therefore, in the case of a dumb bomb

the desired release point need not be satisfied. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 4

pt. 1, pp. 85–86.

30. “Precision Engagement Reflects Joint Vision 2010,” Air Force New

Service, 22 January 1997; on-line, Internet, 23 January 1997, availabl

from http://www.af.mil/news/Jan1997/n19970122_970075.html.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by Lt Col Chris Campbell and M

Mark McLaughlin, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educatio

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 7 February 1996.

277
Chapter 10

Deliberate Force Targeting

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

This chapter reviews the evolution of Deliberate Force targe

lists from conception to execution. It summarizes the histor

of targeting during the operation, discusses targeting option

against the Bosnian Serb army (BSA), examines the desired

mean point of impact (DMPI) methodology, and considers cer 

tain targeting issues.

History of Deliberate Force Targeting

In the two years prior to Deliberate Force, planners at Allie

Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) produced numerou

target sets in relation to various plans for intervention in th

Bosnian conflict. The most important of these products wer

the Deliberate Force master target base, the Joint Targe

Board (JTB) approved target list, and the Deadeye and Delib 

erate Force target lists.

Master Target Base

With the establishment of the United Nations (UN) safe area

on 8 August 1993, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO

air planners began a continuous air-planning process to cove

a wide variety of actions against any Bosnian group that migh

attack one of these areas. For most of that period, targetin

was a piecemeal process driven by functional categories con 

nected to the safe areas. AIRSOUTH planners divided target

identified by this evolutionary process into six categories :

• Category One—preliminary preparation (suppression o

enemy air defenses [SEAD]).

• Category Two—military units, positions, and equipmen

such as gun positions and troop concentrations in th

safe area (later, zone of action [ZOA]).

279
• Category Three—military-unit positions and equipmen

not in the safe area / ZOA (e.g., logistics resupply an

command and control [C 2] at the tactical and operationa

levels).

• Category Four—military infrastructure/installations tha

provide support outside the safe area /ZOA (e.g., amm

depots, base-supply depots, airfields, etc.).

• Category Five—civilian infrastructure/installations tha

provide support in the safe area/ZOA (e.g., armamen

factories, electricity stations, bridges, etc.).

• Category Six —command, control, and communication

(C3) infrastructure at the strategic level. 1

AIRSOUTH designated the targets assigned to these catego 

ries as the master target base, which eventually included 44

targets. In the event of actual air operations, AIRSOUTH plan

ners intended to draw targets out of this base, depending on

the circumstances, and strike them in order of priority unti

the campaign ended or the subject of those attacks fell back

into line. The master target base also provided the foundation

for the JTB’s approved target list and the Deadeye and Delib 

erate Force lists.

Joint Target Board Target List

Following the NATO air strikes against Udbina Airfield i

November 1994, NATO and UN political leaders authorized

Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) to develop plan

for “retrospective” SEAD strikes in retaliation for attacks b

Bosnian factions on interventionist aircraft. Prior to that time

the standing rules of engagement allowed only reactive strike

against air defense systems actually in the act of attackin

NATO air units.2 In December 1995 the North Atlantic Counci

authorized AFSOUTH to begin planning a “stand-alone” SEAD

campaign in addition to planning for SEAD operations in di

rect support of Operation Deny Flight.

3

 This stand-alone pla

became Deadeye, an air campaign against the Bosnian Serb

Republic ’s integrated air defense system (IADS). It also pro 

vided an important element of the planning that went int

Deliberate Force itself.

280
Planning for a robust, graduated air campaign against th

Bosnian Serbs, supported by Deadeye , began in earnest in th

summer of 1995. On 2 June, the day of the shootdown o

Basher 52, a US Air Force F-16 patrolling Bosnian airspace

Col Daniel Zoerb , director of the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight op 

erations cell, and his planning staff briefed their targetin

plan for the air campaign to Lt Gen Michael Ryan , the com 

mander of AIRSOUTH (COMAIRSOUTH). Zoerb stated that th

campaign objective was to “adversely alter BSA advantage t

conduct military operations against the BiH [Bosnian army],

with a phase-one objective of “isolat[ing] leadership.”4 Zoerb

advocated targeting the BSA’s heavy weapons (artillery greate

than 100 mm, mortars greater than 82 mm, and tanks), C

and C3 networks and facilities, early warning (EW) networks

and key lines of communications (LOC), as well as isolatin

the leadership.

As June progressed, planners also refined AIRSOUTH 

master target list for a possible air campaign in the summer o

1995, reviewed the SEAD plan, and studied the LOCs used b

the BSA to move forces around the front. Meanwhile, a Penta 

gon planning think-tank staff called Checkmate at Headquar 

ters US Air Force assisted in this process by providing a

outside review and refinement of AIRSOUTH’s plans.5

The JTB list evolved from these planning events in th

heated atmosphere that preceded Deliberate Force. On 1 Au 

gust 1995, the North Atlantic Council authorized safe-area 

protection air attacks against targets throughout the wide

ZOAs identified previously to guide Deadeye planning. AIR

SOUTH immediately developed a target grid that identified

overlapping target sets to be struck in protection of specifi

safe areas.

6

 On 10 August 1995, at a meeting in Zagreb, Croa 

tia , Colonel Zoerb briefed the JTB on all the targets identifie

for all four safe areas within the ZOAs (table 10.1). 7 The board

which consisted of General Ryan ; Lt Gen Rupert Smith , com 

mander of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); an

other senior NATO air commanders, approved 155 of the 16

targets nominated by Zoerb. The JTB then forwarded this rec

ommended list to Adm Leighton W. Smith , commander in

chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and L

Gen Bernard Janvier, the UN military commander, for fina

281
approval and coordination with Gen George Joulwan, Su 

preme Allied Commander Europe.

8

 On 14 August 1995, th

JTB target list received formal approval.

The decision of 14 August also delineated the boundaries o

ZOAs covering all of Bosnia and the safe areas or total exclu 

sion zones (TEZ) assigned to them (fig. 10.1). The northwes

ZOA included Bihac and the Banja Luka airfield. The south 

east ZOA included Sarajevo , Gorazde, Zepa , and Pale . Th

Tuzla TEZ, which NATO air planners viewed as a “swing” ZOA

encompassed SEAD targets that would be hit in the event o

attacks in either of the other two ZOAs . Despite the delineation

of ZOA boundaries, which mainly guided preplanned strikes

NATO planners expected to strike any air defense system tha

actively threatened or attacked interventionist aircraft. 9

The ZOA targets were driven by functional categories con necte

to the TEZs. NATO would attack functional target categories onl

to the depth required to achieve the desired results—and n

more (proportional response). The only exception to the ZO

t argeting rule was IADS attack. Since SEAD was not con nected

Table 10.1

Safe-Area Target Sets

Gorazde Sarajevo Tuzla Bihac Totals

C

2

 3 3 3 3 12

Supporting

LOCs

 8 11 10 5 34

Direct and

Essential

Support

12 17 13 8 50

Fielded Forces * * * * *

Subtotals 23 31 26 16 96

First Priority

(Deadeye)

17 17 17 21 72

Total 40 48 43 37 168

*Fielded forces (heavy weapons and troop concentrations) changed daily.

Source: Briefing, Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, to JTB, subject: NATO Air Operations to Stabili

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 August 1995, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Al

NPL-02-23. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

282
to the ZOAs , NATO could neutralize any threat of attack b

the warring factions. In defense of the safe areas, the Militar

Committee Memorandum of 8 August 1993 also defined op

erational options for air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Give

the target options, TEZs, and ZOAs , AIRSOUTH created an

modified three target options encompassing the six targe

categories, together with priorities that would have a low-to

high range of military significance. Each of these had latera

links that one could eventually associate with achieving th

military objective (fig. 10.2). More importantly, the target

were linked to a degree of risk of collateral damage and t

infrastructure targets that, if destroyed, would cause undu

hardship on the civilian populace.1 0

As had been the case since the summer of 1993, planner

couched all of AIRSOUTH’s targeting plans in the context o

general options prescribed by the UN and NATO:

• Option One—First-Strike Phase. Air strikes would hav

demonstration value and limited scope and duration

Targets would represent low risk and low collatera

Figure 10.1. Zones of Action (From Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michae

Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

283
damage and would include only those elements partici

pating in a safe-area siege, such as mortar or artillery

battery positions.

• Option Two—Initial Follow-on Phase. Air strikes would b

limited to the immediate environment of the affected TEZ

Objectives called for relieving the siege and supportin

UNPROFOR. The targets would carry medium risk an

medium collateral damage and would have military valu

(e.g., heavy weapons, supply points/ammo sites close t

the area of hostilities, C2 facilities, and EW radar/surface

to-air missile [SAM] sites).

• Option Three—Extended-Operations Phase. Air strike

would expand outside the immediate area under siege

The targets would have military value and could influenc

the sustainability of siege forces (e.g., heavy weapons, C

facilities, supply-point/munition sites, and EW radar an

SAM sites throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina; military petro

leum, oil, and lubricants; and counterair targets [aircraf

and repair facilities]). 1 1

Figure 10.2. Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept (From Corona briefin

slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 

December 1995)

284
Geographic proximity to a safe area determined whether 

given target fell under option two or three. For example, optio n 

two targets in the Tuzla TEZ would become option-three tar

gets for planners working the defense of Sarajevo . Signifi

cantly, no option included infrastructure targets of the sor

proposed by Colonel Zoerb in his June targeting brief.

Deadeye Target List

By mid-August 1995, as tensions mounted from the warrin

factions within the Balkans, AIRSOUTH continued to develop

and refine air-operation and targeting plans for the Bosnia

region. In anticipation of graduated air operations, two plan

emerged: the Deadeye air-protection plan and Deliberat

Force, an expanded air-strike plan. Developed in the earl

spring of 1995, Deadeye delineated AIRSOUTH’s SEAD cam

paign to protect NATO air forces from the BSA’s IADS, a

mentioned above. The campaign aimed to ensure that th

“BSA will no longer have an IADS for central direction of ai

defenses” by striking key BSA air defense communication

nodes, electronic-warfare sites, C2 facilities, missile-launc

units, and missile-reconstitution capabilities. 1 2 AIRSOUTH ex

tracted 36 targets from the master target list to form th

foundation of Deadeye .

Deliberate Force Target List

The foundations of the Deliberate Force target list were laid

in late 1994, when AIRSOUTH began planning for a wid

range of offensive air operations in defense of UN safe area

and enforcement of the no-fly ban. By early August 1995

these plans comprised a body of options that an AIRSOUTH

briefing referred to as “Deliberate Force.” The mission of thi

operation entailed “execut[ing] robust NATO air operation

that adversely alter the BSA’s advantage in conducting suc

cessful military operations against the BiH ,” with the aim o

getting the Bosnian Serbs to “sue for cessation of militar

operations, comply with UN mandates, and negotiate.”1 3 T

achieve these objectives, AIRSOUTH extracted 87 targets from

the JTB list—primarily option-two targets, consisting mainl

285
of direct and essential support and equipment and a few sup

porting LOCs to isolate the BSA threat. 1 4

Targeting the Bosnian Serb Army

A straightforward strategy-to-task matrix guided AIR

SOUTH’s process of selecting targets for the Deliberate Forc

list. Beginning with the basic strategic goal of degrading th

BSA’s military capabilities, the AIRSOUTH matrix identified

the appropriate center of gravity (COG) for attack and appro 

priate targets whose destruction would most threaten tha

COG.

1 5 The matrix included the following principles:

• The Bosnian Serbs’ COG is their historic fear of domina

tion.

• The Bosnian Serbs’ military advantage with respect to th

BiH is their ability to swing more capable but less numer

ous forces equipped with heavy weapons to places of thei

need or choosing.

• Attacking the Bosnian Serbs’ advantages would lead t

changing the balance of power to their disadvantage.

• The Bosnian Serbs’ realization of a shift in advantage woul

eventuate in their suing for termination of hostilities.

• The Bosnian Serbs would not come to that realization

unless they are subjected to robust attack.

The next step involved determining whether the best way t

degrade the ability of the BSA to swing its more capable unit

was through attacks on its heavy weapons, troops, or key LOCs

According to Colonel Zoerb, AIRSOUTH ’s preferred option calle

for attacking the BSA’s C2 structure, infantry, and prime LOC

all at the same time.1 6 However, political considerations, particu 

larly the presumed sensitivity of the intervening states to collat

eral damage, made the targeting issue more involved than 

simple question of directly tearing the BSA apart.

To jump ahead of the targeting discussion somewhat, th

issue of collateral damage influenced the selection and attack

of Deliberate Force targets across the board. In general, AIR

SOUTH planners under General Ryan ’s close supervision se

lected each target for incorporation into a target list with a

286
eye to maximiz ing effect while minimizing the possibility o

collateral damage . Consequently, everything from rules of en 

gagement to aircraft, weapons, and tactics selections wa

driven to some degree by concerns about collateral damage. In

the case of targets, AIRSOUTH planners “scrubbed” them tim

and again, only to see them rejected or reexamined by senio

leaders. This laborious selection-and-approval process rested

on detailed imagery and endless discussions of DMPIs, weap 

ons, blast and rubble patterns, and a host of other issues tha

related to whether or not given target/weapon/DMPI combina 

tions would cause collateral damage or casualties.

During the execution of Deliberate Force, these concern

carried over and were reaffirmed by several ad hoc operationa

rules of engagement also aimed at limiting damage: (1) target

required positive visual identification before munitions re

lease; (2) sometimes aircraft could expend only one bomb at 

time on a target; (3) aircraft had to attack certain target

during different times of the day or night to negate possibl

noncombatant casualties; (4) oftentimes the DMPIs were s

close together that aircraft formations had to take spacin

and/or loiter over the target area until the debris/smok

cleared to hit their aiming points; and (5) planners restricted

attack axes for certain targets such as bridges to minimize th

danger that “long” or “short” weapons would cause casualtie

or damage property. Before exercising these procedures, o

course, AIRSOUTH planners had to settle the question o

which target sets and specific targets NATO forces would

hit—heavy weapons, infantry, or LOCs ?

Heavy Weapons

UN resolutions required the BSA to withdraw its heavy

weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone, defined in th

summer of 1995 as an area of 20 kilometers radius from th

center of Sarajevo . The UN defined heavy weapons as

1. all armored vehicles, including tanks and armore

personnel carriers

2. all antiaircraft weapons (except hand-held) of calibe

12.7 mm or greater

287
3. all antiaircraft and antitank rocket and missile systems

whether hand-held, towed, mounted, or self-propelled

4. all surface-to-air rockets and missiles as well as thei

launch systems and launch vehicles

5. rocket-assisted rail-launch bombs (e.g., Krema) an

their launch systems1 7

Despite its simplicity, this list presented two daunting prob

lems for air planners. First, it included over 350 heavy weap

ons (tanks, artillery greater than 100 mm, and rocket launch 

ers) and hundreds of other weapons, including mortar

greater than 82 mm and other “tubes” below 100 mm. Findin

and “servicing” so many weapons certainly would degrade th

BSA’s military capability, but the process also might tak

more time than the political constraints of the intervention

allowed. Second, targeting those weapons might actually un

dermine the intervention’s objective of having them moved ou

of the exclusion zones. As General Smith observed, “If we ar

asking the BSA to move these guns out of this area, the

bombing those guns is not healthy, and maybe we ought no

to do that. Maybe we ought to stay away from the heav

weapons. That way, they won’t have the excuses—‘Can’t mov

the guns!’ or ‘You’re destroying them!’ or ‘We can’t move them

because we are under attack.’ They will use whatever excus

they can.”1 8

As a result, Generals Smith and Ryan agreed that, unles

the BSA fired these heavy weapons at cities or peacekeepin

forces, they would not be targeted or struck. This would be th

case particularly for weapons discovered on designated heavy

weapon withdrawal routes. Secondarily, NATO commander

did not want to engage Serbian heavy weapons because the

felt there was no strategic need to destroy Serb military capa 

bilities, and they saw a real danger in appearing to operate in

coordination with Bosnian government and Croatian forces. 1 9

Infantry

The BSA’s best infantry brigades were a valid and, when the

were in their barracks, an attractive target. But based on thei

desire to minimize casualties of any kind and despite th e su g

gestion of some air planners, senior NATO and UN commander

288
elected not to target Bosnian Serb infantry or other troop

unless they engaged in offensive operations against interven 

tionist military units or the safe areas.

2 0

Lines of Communications

Because the North Atlantic Council’s air strike guidance o

1993 did not include infrastructure targets, LOCs were no

addressed in most of the Deny Flight targeting sets excep

option three. However, in early August 1995, General Rya

and Colonel Zoerb briefed Admiral Smith on targeting plan

that included a notional set of LOCs important to the move 

ment and supply of BSA forces around the safe areas.

2 1 Spe 

cific targets on these LOCs included selected bridges and roa

choke points susceptible to closure by bombing. After a dis 

cussion with General Smith , who initially expressed concer

about the usefulness of striking LOC targets, General Rya

agreed to coordinate strikes against such targets on a day-to

day basis. The two commanders would determine which tar 

gets to strike in order to block all routes into or out of Sara 

jevo, except the one designated as a heavy-weapon withdrawa

route.2 2 Accordingly, by early July, planners completed target

ing schemes to drop key bridges and block other choke point

necessary to degrade or block BSA mobility and supply opera 

tions into, out of, and among the safe areas. Recognizing th

sudden ascendancy of LOC targets in importance and th

coordination problems between the UN and NATO, Colone

Zoerb commented that “LOC targeting was a strange one.

Despite the fact that official guidance never really specified

LOCs and that no lists other than option three addressed

them, the ground-force commander approved LOCs as option

two targets for a specific purpose in this case. 2 3

Targeting Priorities

By mid August 1995, the Deliberate Force and Deadey

target lists were firmly established in numbers and priorities:

• IADS (17 targets)—EW/acquisition radars (four), SAM sys 

tem (one), control reporting posts/control reporting center

communications (microwave towers, radio relays, etc.) (12).

289
• fielded forces—heavy weapons, troop concentrations, an

transportation.

• C

2

 (seven)—communications (three), command facilitie

and headquarters (four).

• supporting LOCs (15)—transportation choke points, bridges

and tunnels.

• direct and essential military support (17)—ammo depo

and storage (one), supply depot and storage (one), sup

porting garrison areas (five), military logistics areas (10). 2 

Of these targets, planners had selected 36 for attack prior t

the start of Deliberate Force, as well as 20 other Deadey

targets. Most were linked to the Sarajevo TEZ, and all reflected

AIRSOUTH’s determination to minimize the likelihood of col

lateral damage and casualties (table 10.2).

DMPI Methodology

Since General Ryan handled the process for selecting DMPI

for each target, it was subject to frequent and sudden change

After operations began, the combined air operations center’s

(CAOC) guidance, apportionment, and targeting (GAT) cel

nominated targets for strike. Initially, this cell consisted o

General Ryan , Colonel Zoerb , two experienced air-operation

officers, and two intelligence targeteers. Sitting at a table in

the office of Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, Genera

Ryan and the target team picked the DMPIs one by one. Afte

a daily review of the best battle damage assessment (BDA) o

the targets, the GAT team would nominate DMPIs to Genera

Ryan on the basis of providing “militarily significant target

Table 10.2

Onset Target and DMPI Data

Deliberate

Force

Deadeye

Southeast

Deadeye

Northwest

Supporting

LOCs

Total

Target Date

(no. tasked)

 21 15 5 15 56

DMPI Data

(no. tasked)

261 53 17 15 346

290
meaningful targets, and the right targets from a narrow per 

spective of force application without being absurd.”2 5 The team

considered collateral-damage issues when selecting targets

but it usually relied on General Ryan to make final determina

tions about which DMPIs posed acceptable or unacceptabl

risks. Upon receiving each list of nominated targets, Rya

would pass judgement and, if necessary, direct the rest of th

GAT team to come up with more. Overall, most observers fel

that General Ryan was notably more conservative in his ap

proach to targeting than the rest of the team.2 6

Despite some mild initial frustration with his boss’s conser 

vatism, Colonel Zoerb, his chief planner , ultimately praised

Ryan’s judgement: “His sensitivity to the political and militar

guidance and constraints that he needed to work within wer

clear to him, and he applied those effectively to screen thos

sharp edges that I was beating.”2 7 His final picks then went t

the master air attack plans cell for input into the daily air

tasking message .

Following up their initial DMPI selections, General Rya

and Colonel Zoerb would review BDA imagery to determine i

the target DMPI(s) had been destroyed; if not, they examined

the target(s) as candidates for retargeting. Ryan approached

such restrike decisions with great care—so much so that h

kept a personal BDA tracking notebook that was “hands off 

to everyone else. He established important criteria for deter 

mining whether a target had been destroyed:

• individual target (DMPI)—nonfunctional, moderate to se

vere damage, or destroyed.

• target complex (multiple DMPIs )—nonfunctional or two

thirds of the individual targets (DMPIs) within that com 

plex destroyed.2 8

Targeting Issues

Also underlying General Ryan’s targeting decisions was hi

concern that political pressures might bring an end to th

bombing campaign before it destroyed enough targets to hav

a significant effect on the Bosnian Serbs. According to Colo 

nel Zoerb,

291
Our concern was that after the first bomb drop that everybody would

lose their spine. The knock-it-off would happen at 8:00 a.m. in the

morning after the first night. As soon as [Cable News Network ] got

there with their film and saw the destruction at some of these isolated

places, they [UN/NATO ] would say, “That’s enough!” So, we were interested in wanting to make our initial employment as effective as we

could. The IADS were nice, operating in the southeast where we could

. . . suppress that piece of the IADS that we needed to suppress to do

a job. We needed to get bombs on targets. We needed to get something

meaningful early-on because our fear was that when they [UN/NATO ]

saw what bombs did, we would have to turn it off. 2 9

Importantly, this concern led General Ryan to break wit

the classic airpower targeting tenet of thoroughly taking dow

an enemy’s air defenses before shifting the weight of the ai

effort to ground attacks. Instead, he chose to strike the mini

mal number of the BSA’s IADS targets necessary at any tim

to allow him to conduct the maximum number of groun

strikes at the lowest risk to his aircrews. For example, he did

not initially target the air defense stronghold at Banja Luka i

the northwest ZOA. Instead, he focused early attacks on th

air defenses and associated BSA targets in the lower-ris

southeast ZOA, which included the Sarajevo area.

Targeting Heavy Weapons

Despite the importance of the BSA’s heavy weapons in th

exclusion zones, AIRSOUTH ultimately rejected them as a pri

mary target set for Deliberate Force. In the first place, thes

weapons often proved difficult to find in the broken terrain

and urban areas in which the Bosnian Serbs generally hid

them.3 0 That factor, in turn, likely meant that it would tak

longer to service those weapons than the political circum

stances of the air campaign would allow. Thus, in pursuit o

the quickest possible results, NATO commanders and politica

leaders eschewed a strategy of directly attacking BSA militar

capabilities in favor of a less direct strategy aimed at the C

logistical, and mobility underpinnings of the BSA’s strength

Also, after 3 September 1995, NATO commanders decided t

lay off attacks on the Serbs’ heavy weapons in order to den

them an excuse for not moving them out of the exclusion

zones in compliance with UN directives, mentioned above. 3 1

292
Bridges Revisited

Bridges presented their own peculiar targeting problems

Until the eve of Deliberate Force, AIRSOUTH generally rele 

gated bridges to the option-three category, mainly becaus

they were important economic factors in the region and be

cause they carried a significant risk of collateral damage . Thi

situation changed when General Smith requested attacks on

some key bridges in order to channel and hinder the BSA

efforts to send reinforcements into the exclusion zones.

Accordingly, AIRSOUTH conducted numerous bridge at

tacks, but they generally did not produce General Smith 

desired effects. The bridges were strong structures, and th

tactics employed to attack them worked to minimize the dan

ger of collateral damage and to reduce the effectiveness o

individual strikes. Initial tactical restrictions placed on bridg

Serb artillery

293
attacks included single-bomb releases, off-axis attack run

down riverbeds to minimize the unwanted consequences o

inaccurate weapons releases or bombs “going stupid,” an

night scheduling to reduce the likelihood of the presence o

civilians when the bombs hit. Because of the durability of th

targets and the various tactical constraints placed on the at

tacking forces, allied bombing brought down only seven of th

12 bridges targeted by AIRSOUTH by the end of the campaign

The targeting history of Deliberate Force reveals an evolution 

ary as well as a centralized and flexible process. The use of 

master target list from which to build individual plans worke

well, giving NATO air planners the ability to generate new ai

plans and adjust priorities almost on demand. The division o

targets into options contributed to this flexibility, both in plan 

ning and practice, as evidenced by the apparent ease with which

AIRSOUTH moved bridges from option three to option two in

response to the request of General Smith . In reality this buildin g

block approach to targeting was an essential accommoda 

tion to the political and diplomatic dynamism of the Balkan

conflict and the intervention. Whether AIRSOUTH’s approach t

Bridge damage

294
targeting becomes a model for the future remains to be seen

At the time, however, it seems to have facilitated target plan

ning nicely.

Notes

1. “Target Categories,” OPLAN 40101, “Deny Flight,” 3 May 1995, anne

H, p. H-1, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA

Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-01. (Confidential) Information extracted is un

classified.

2. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

3. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

4. Briefing, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Air Cam 

paign Targeting, 2 June 1995. (Confidential) Information extracted is un

classified.

5. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, chief, Plans Division, Headquarters AIRSOUTH

Naples, Italy, transcript of oral history interview by Dr. Wayne Thompso

and Maj Tim Reagan, 20 October 1995. (Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-33(T).

6. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

7. Briefing, Col Daniel R. Zoerb, chief of plans, AFSOUTH, subjec

NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 August 199

AFHRA, NPL-02-23.

8. Briefing to CAOC staff, Gen Michael Ryan, CAOC, 5th Allied Tactic

Air Force, Vicenza, Italy, subject: Deliberate Force, 29 August–14 Septembe

1995, 15 October 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-13.

9. Maj Tim Reagan, “Impact of NATO Air Campaign,” position paper o

Royal Air Force (RAF) visit, Force Application Directorate, Air Force Studie

and Analyses Agency, 21 December 1995. (Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

10. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

11. The examples of targets cited in these options are for illustrativ

purposes; they do not represent a specific or all-inclusive list of targets.

12. Briefing, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Graduate

Air Operations, 12 August 1995, AFHRA, NPL-02-24. (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

13. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

14. Briefing slide, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Ta

get List Evolution, n.d. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

15. Corona briefing, Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, subjec

NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberate Force, 29 Au 

gust–14 September 1995, November 1995.

16. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

17. Gen Rupert Smith to Gen Ratko Mladic, draft letter, subject: With

drawal of Heavy Weapons from the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, 3 Septembe

1995, AFHRA, NPL 15-02-13. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

295
18. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

19. “Discussion of the Air Strategy in Bosnia,” talking paper, Skunk

works, USAF/XOXS, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 17 September 1995, 4.

20. Ibid.

21. Actually, AIRSOUTH used the term supporting LOCs as a cavea

when talking about notional target sets. That is, once the battle began

AIRSOUTH would look at the situation and take out only those choke point

that were absolutely necessary to defend the safe area.

22. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

23. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

24. Corona briefing.

25. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

26. Reagan position paper.

27. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

28. Corona briefing.

29. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

30. “Discussion of the Air Strategy in Bosnia,” 4.

31. Maj Tim Reagan, “Characteristics of Deliberate Force,” draft pape

Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, n.d., 6. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

296
Chapter 11

Deliberate Force Tactics

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

Tactics are concerned with doing the job “right,” and higher

levels of strategy are concerned with doing the “right” job.

—Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow

Making Strategy: An Introduction to National 

Security Processes and Problems 

Strategy wins wars; tactics wins battles.

—Carl R. Oliver 

Plane Talk: Aviators’ and

Astronauts’ Own Stories 

Broadly put, tactics is the art or skill of employing availabl

forces in combat to achieve specific goals and is practiced b

commanders and warriors at both the operational and tactica

levels of war. At the operational level, tactics mainly involve

the orchestration of forces and combat events or battles t

achieve the strategic goals of theater and national command

ers. That orchestration involves making decisions about th

most suitable centers of gravity and targets to strike, as wel

as the best forces, weapons, and combat methods to mak

those strikes. This last set of considerations—forces, weapons

and combat methods—marks the usual interface between op

erational and tactical levels of air war. After operational-leve

commanders assign targets and allocate forces, unit-leve

leaders and planners usually make tactical decisions abou

the number of aircraft to send against specific targets, types o

weapons to use, attack and weapons-release procedures, an

equivalent issues of detail. In practice, both operational- an

tactical-level tactics are extremely complex, time-consumin

processes. Achieving success in both areas is critical to th

outcome of a campaign.

297
This chapter describes the dynamics of the operational- an

tactical-level tactics of Deliberate Force. It includes both gen 

eral and specific discussions of various factors that influ 

enced, or should have influenced, the development and execu 

tion of tactics during that campaign. It then addresse

mission tactics actually utilized by North Atlantic Treaty Or 

ganization (NATO) airmen. The record of these mission tactic

is an interesting and useful legacy of Deliberate Force, as i

the embedded discussion of how NATO airmen developed

them. Of particular note in this case, institutional boundarie

between operational- and tactical-level tactics were blurred, a

least in relation to general experience. During Deliberate Forc

Lt Gen Michael Ryan , the combined force air component com 

mander (CFACC) and commander of Allied Air Forces South 

ern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), and his staff at the combined

air operations center (CAOC) often made determinations abou

weapons and tactics that in other conflicts would have bee

left to tactical planners in field units. Because this blurring o

institutional boundaries reflected the complex political an

diplomatic circumstances of Deliberate Force and becaus

other peace operations also will be politically and diplomati

cally complex, it is one of the more salient features of th

campaign for study.

Tactical Planning and Employment Factors

In many past air campaigns, operational-level commander

and planning staffs (General Ryan and his CAOC staff in De

liberate Force) focused their tactical planning on doing th

“right” job. Tactical planners, in concert, usually worrie

about how to do the job “right,” once operational planner

determined what the job was. This chapter takes the position

that, regardless of how operational and tactical planners i

this operation divided their responsibilities, their ultimate de

cisions had to and did reflect the effects of certain key factor

of threat and environment. Their practice of the practical ar

of getting the right iron on the right target at the right tim

depended for its success on accurate assessments and accom 

modation of the nature of Bosnian Serb defenses, the Bosnia

298
climate and topography, and the characteristics of air plat

forms and weapons available to the interventionist coalition.

Bosnian Serb Defenses

Deny Flight operations commenced on 12 April 1993 in 

high-threat environment1 that reflected confusion over the ex 

act status of Serbian and Bosnian Serb air defenses after th

breakup of Yugoslavia . Prior to the breakup, a single air-defens

operations center in Belgrade controlled four sector operation

centers, each of which received data from other such center

as well as subordinate control and reporting posts; it als

controlled subordinate surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalion

and fighters. All of these elements provided integrated air de

fense system (IADS) coverage for the entire country. Followin

the breakup, a portion of the Yugoslavian IADS fell into Bos

nian Serb hands. Parts of the system remained operational

but to what extent and with what degree of residual linkage t

the national IADS remained unclear to United Nations (UN

and NATO planners.

As Operation Deny Flight progressed, NATO airmen learned

more about the real capabilities of the Bosnian Serb army’s

(BSA) IADS. From Yugoslavia the BSA inherited a substantia

array of air defense surveillance, communications, and com 

bat equipment. BSA radar systems provided overlappin

search, tracking, and targeting capabilities backed up by 

tiny air force; a substantial force of large, radar-guided mis 

siles (SAMs); man-portable air defense (MANPAD) missiles 

and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) of various calibers (fig. 11.1)

The Bosnian Serb air arm ultimately proved to be a mino

threat to NATO airmen, particularly after NATO jets shot dow

four of its Galeb/Jastreb strike aircraft in November 1994

Ground-based weapons posed more of a threat, evidenced b

the shootdown of a British Sea Harrier on 16 April 1994 in th

vicinity of Gorazde and by the shootdown of a US Air Forc

F-16C by a radar-guided SAM on 2 June 1995 over wester

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in net, at the onset of Deliberat

Force on 29 August 1995, the BSA’s IADS posed a formidable

though uneven, threat to NATO air forces.

299
SAMs present in the region included SA-2f Guidelines, SA

6b Gainfuls , SA-9 Gaskins (or SA-13 Gophers), and an un 

known number of infrared (IR) MANPADs —SA-7b Strellas (o

SA-14 Gremlins):

• SA-2f Guideline (MOD 5 [fifth in a series of missile-system

modifications])— missile with primary mission of low- t

high-altitude, medium-range air defense from fixed o

semifixed sites. These missiles are best employed agains

targets at medium and high altitudes, but they have lim 

ited low-altitude capabilities. Their Fan Song F acquisi

tion and tracking radars can track fighters out to medium

ranges, and their electro-optical tracker can guide th

missile down to a low altitude. Fighter aircraft can usu

ally evade the old and not particularly agile “Fox” if the

receive warnings of its approach. Evasion tactics includ

avoidance of the missile or its supporting radar system

and, if engaged by the missile, execution of mid-G or

thogonal breaks into and over the missile at medium alti

tude. 3 During Deliberate Force, NATO jets avoided or sup

pressed all known SA-2 SAM sites, indicated by th

apparent absence of any SA-2 launches by the BSA.

Figure 11.1. BSA Order of Battle (From Corona briefing slides, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

300
• SA-6b Gainful—a highly mobile, tracked air-defense sys 

tem designed to defend against high-performance aircraf

operating at low to medium altitudes. Supported by ac

quisition radars and a backup electro-optical trackin

system, the SA-6b system can engage targets from me

dium altitudes to very low altitudes. An SA-6b battery ca

handle two targets at once with quick reaction time be

tween initial acquisition of a target and missile launch

The BSA used an SA-6b to shoot down the US Air Forc

F-16C on 2 June 1995, mentioned above. Despite fre

quent evidence of SA-6 radar activity, the Bosnian Serb

launched no missiles, probably reflecting the effectivenes

of NATO’s suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) cam

paign, particularly in its use of high-speed antiradiatio

missiles (HARM).

• SA-9 Gaskin /SA-13 Gopher—mobile SAM systems organi

to many BSA combat units. These point-defense, highl

mobile, tracked, short-range SAMs use IR seekers to ac

quire, track, and engage fixed-wing as well as rotary-win

aircraft. They can be effective against unaware, low-flyin

aircraft that transit their short engagement zones. Although

these missiles were present around many potential NATO

targets, they proved highly susceptible to countermeasures

• MANPADs—shoulder- or tripod-launched, short-range, IR

guided missiles present throughout the Deliberate Forc

area of operations. The primary systems available to th

BSA were the SA-7b Strella or the SA-14 Gremlin .

5

 Con 

sisting of a simple launch tube, gripstock, and therma

battery, the Strella features a very short engagement rang

at very low to lower-mid altitudes against slow to fas

targets. If a high-performance target aircraft sees the mis

sile, it can usually defeat it with IR countermeasures o

high-speed escapes.6 Boasting slightly better performanc

than the SA-7b and a better seeker head, the Grem li

can track an aircraft from any angle, unlike the SA-7b

which is a “tail chaser.” As in the case of the SA-7b

h igh-performance aircraft can evade a detected Gremli

t hrough high-speed maneuvering and IR countermea

sures. 7 On the first day of Deliberate Force, a MANPAD

301
shot down a French Mirage 2000C 20 nautical mile

southeast of Pale, probably at an altitude at or below

three thousand feet. This was the only aircraft shot dow

during the campaign, although on 16 April 1994 a MAN

PAD downed a Deny Flight Sea Harrier, and other suc

missiles damaged several NATO aircraft at different times

• AAA—significant numbers of light and medium system

fielded by the BSA. Light AAA included automatic weap

ons from 20 mm through 60 mm characterized by auto

matic fire; timed and impact-fuzed, high-explosive projec

tiles; and vertical ranges up to four thousand meters

Medium AAA included guns larger than 60 mm charac

terized by single-shot, battery-controlled fire; timed an

proximity-fuzed, high-explosive projectiles; and vertica

ranges up to eight thousand meters. During Deliberat

Force the CFACC largely avoided these weapons by re

stricting his aircraft to flight above 10,000 feet or, b

exception, five thousand feet.

Climate and Topography

Bosnia ’s Mediterranean climate is characterized by long, ho

summers and mild winters along the coastal region and in th

extreme south, and by harsh winters (November–January) an

milder summers in the interior highlands. Deliberate Forc

occurred during the early autumn, experiencing a typical

moderate climate for that time of year. The term moderate

however, belied the generally poor flying weather over Bosnia

during the operation. On most days fog covered much of th

land, particularly in the mornings, and tactical aircraft en 

countered multiple cloud layers throughout their flight regime

Often, surface visibility was between one-half to one and one

half miles. Sun angle, clouds, visibility, contrail levels, an

wind influenced decisions about flight altitudes, navigation

routes and checkpoints, target-area ingress and egress routes

weapons and sensor selections and employment, flight alti

tudes, and so forth (table 11.1).

Weather had far-ranging effects on Deliberate Force’s opera 

tions and tactics. Because the rules of engagement (ROE) an

special instructions (SPINS) required aircrews to identify thei

302
assigned targets visually before releasing ordnance to avoid an

chance of collateral damage, weather obscurations cause

nearly 30 percent of the “no drops” by NATO aircraft over Bosnia

Herzegovina. With no alternate target on which to expend ord 

nance, some aircraft, like the US Air Force’s F-16s and the U

Navy’s F/ A-18s, jettisoned theirs in the Adriatic Sea . Just be 

tween the two types of aircraft, a total of 65 precision-guide

munitions (PGM)—10 percent of the total expenditures of thes

weapons—had to be jettisoned. The F-16s jettisoned 56 GBU

10s because of safety precautions to avoid runway closure a

Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy, and as a requirement for gross

weight considerations for divert fuel. F/A-18s jettisoned eigh

GBU-10s and one GBU-24 because of carrier-landing/arresting

cable weight limitations. Other coalition aircraft returned t

their assigned bases with their weapons loads because the

could not visually identify their assigned targets, primarily du

to cloud coverage in the target area. Additionally, poor weathe

delayed attack packages on a number of days, particularly thos

scheduled for morning strikes.

Bosnia-Herzegovina covers an area of 19,741 square miles

most of which lies in the mountains of the Dinaric Alps. Ha

the region is forested, with another 25 percent arable. Th

Table 11.1

Obscurant Effects on Sensor Performance

Weather

Element

Day

Sight

Image

Intensifier

Laser

Designator/

Range Finder

Thermal

Imagery

Contrast

IR

Transmission

surface wind none moderate none major none

absolute humidity none moderate moderate minor major

clouds/fog major major major major extreme

rain/snow major major major moderate extreme

dust/haze major major major moderate major

visual smoke major major major minor minor

Wily Pete smoke major major major moderate major

IR smoke major major major major extreme

Source: Adapted from Multi-Command Manual 3-1, vol. 1, Tactical Employment Considerations, 17 Mar

1995, table 3-1, “Weather Elements Which Affect IR Systems Performance”; and “Obscurant Effect Table

handout, Texas Instruments, Dallas, Texas, n.d.

303
coastal region supports a Mediterranean flora of palms, olives

cypress, and many vineyards. Otherwise, deciduous fores

predominates, but the higher reaches of the interior contain

numerous conifers. These forested conditions greatly influ 

enced the tactics of Deliberate Force, mainly by making diffi 

cult the acquisition of tactical targets such as artillery an

combat vehicles. 8 Early attempts by NATO to locate, targe

and destroy SA-6 transporter-erector launchers and radar

(TELAR) (platforms that house and guide the missile) an

heavy weapons proved daunting in the rough terrain and poo

weather that prevailed. Rugged terrain and foliation also ham

pered operations because foliage absorbed the energy of tar

geting lasers for guided weapons or because the terrain an

trees prevented attacking aircraft from maintaining line-of

sight contact with their weapons.

Night operations during Deliberate Force offered NATO air 

men the advantages of concealment, the disadvantages of mor

difficult target acquisition, and the possibility that using after 

burners or dispensing countermeasures might highlight them

to enemy gunners. During the operation, 260 of the over nin

hundred air-strike missions were flown at night—about three

quarters by land-based US Air Force fighters and a quarte

from US Navy carrier-based fighters. All but four of the attack

missions on bridges were flown at night, when traffic was at 

minimum, to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties . Ai

planners deconflicted most night missions by operating them

at different altitudes and by spacing them in trail.

Weaponeering and the Joint

Munitions-Effectiveness Manuals

Given the pressure from commanders to achieve maximum

results from air strikes while simultaneously minimizing th

likelihood of collateral damage , “weaponeering”—the matchin

of aircraft and weapons to achieve desired target effects—wa

more critical to the execution of Deliberate Force than to man

other air campaigns. 9 The available guides to weaponeerin

decisions, the joint munitions-effectiveness manuals (JMEM)

proved generally adequate to the problem of calculating th

required number of weapons and aircraft sorties required t

304
destroy a target. However, for the purposes of Deliberate Forc

planning, some mission planners found the JMEMs not flex

ible enough to encompass all the targeting criteria imposed on

them by the special nature of the operation. This shortfal

sprang from the complex nature of weaponeering and the con 

ceptual underpinnings of the manuals themselves.

The weaponeering process includes several steps, the first o

which entails analysis of an assigned target. Weaponeers ex 

amine the nature of the target, seeking to identify its mos

critical and/or vulnerable parts, and assess the desired leve

of destruction. Different targets have different critical and vu

nerable points. For example, a bomb hit on any part of a tan

likely will destroy it, while efficiently taking out a factory re

quires careful placement of weapons on particular parts of i

Logically, then, the next step in the weaponeering proces

involves identifying the particular weapons effect needed t

destroy the target or its various parts. Weapons destroy thing

in different ways, mainly through blast, heat, or penetration

by fragments or shrapnel. Their ability to do so depends upon

the weight, construction, and delivery accuracy of the war

heads. Accuracy, in turn, depends upon such factors a

method of release, design characteristics, distance from poin

of release to target, weather and wind, and guidance from

release to target. JMEMs describe the accuracy of weapon

along with many other elements of the weaponeering process.

Perhaps the main “accuracy” message of JMEMs is the obvi

ous one: because precision weapons have a drastically smalle

circular error of probability than unguided weapons, the

greatly reduce the number of weapons and sorties required t

achieve a given effect on a target or aiming point. Given th

demonstrably greater accuracy of PGMs , therefore, Deliberat

Force weaponeers and operators utilized them to the maxi

mum extent possible. In light of the proscription on unnecessar

collateral damage , they had little choice. The accuracy of PGM

is reflected in General Ryan’s declaration that any impact be

yond a weapon’s circular error of probability from an aimin

point constituted a miss. Despite the general utility of th

JMEMs , planners in the 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional

found the manuals difficult to use, particularly in making rapid

305
weapon and fuzing decisions driven by the fast pace and po

litical sensitivities of the bombing campaign.

However, the 31st Fighter Wing’s Intelligence Group acquire

a technological tool designed to assist in mission planning tw

weeks prior to Deliberate Force. It became a great success story

In a joint venture, Virginia Cambridge Research and the Defens

Mapping Agency developed the Power Scene Mission Plannin

System , a hybrid of a mission-rehearsal system, intelligence sys 

tem, and operation system. This operations and intelligenc

model overlays spot satellite imagery on a terrain-elevation data 

base, providing a three-dimensional perspective of navigation

routes, target run-ins, and threat bubbles. Remarkably, pilot

could view Bosnia-Herzegovina’s database imagery in 10-, five

two-, and one-meter-square resolution.

Power Scene flies like an aircraft or a helicopter in eithe

cruise or hover mode but with very limited displays. The mov

ing map display on a large TV screen gives the sensation o

movement as it pitches and rolls via a little joystick. The view

resembles one from a cockpit, allowing for an exceptional view

of the attack axis. Red and green bubbles display threats

showing the maximum engagement range (or rings) of a par

ticular SAM system. Outside the threat dome, the bubble i

red but changes to green after one enters the bubble. Th

system can also provide navigation/targeting pod views (e.g

for a five-nautical-mile release with a 30-degree “crank” [hard

turn]). The screen can capture the flight profile on photos a

well as videotape (8 mm and VHS) for mission briefings an

target folders; thus, Power Scene enhances situational aware 

ness prior to flying the mission.

Additionally, the system has a unique way of mensuratin

target coordinates. In the hover mode, a 90-degree pitch dow

with the grommet (flight-path vector marker) on the aimin

point provides coordinates in Universal Transverse Mercato

or latitude/longitude within 75 feet laterally and one hundred

to two hundred feet vertically. The ability to mensurate coordi

nates allows for targeting verification, an advantage that be

came ever apparent during Deliberate Force. On several occa 

sions Power Scene resolved ambiguities between targe

coordinates fragged by the CAOC. In one case a bridge’s coor

dinates were fifteen hundred feet in error. The pictures an

306
mensurated coordinates provided by Power Scene checked th

accuracy and flagged the mistake. Power Scene was a hug

success with aircrews of the 7490th Wing, who cycled on an

off the system 24 hours a day, seven days a week durin

Deliberate Force. The preview of situational awareness proved

extremely valuable and greatly assisted mission planning a

the unit and force levels, making Power Scene a welcomed

planning and preparation tool. 1 0

In the fog and friction of Deliberate Force, one of the majo

factors of mission preparation and execution was the uniqu

requirements and restrictions of the tactical area of operation

(TAOO)—the CFACC’s area of responsibility. Theater require

ments and airspace procedures were addressed in the ROE

and commander’s guidance provided to the units and mission

planners via SPINS. In order to prevent any unacceptable out

comes to the politico-military situation in the theater, person 

nel had to follow the ROE (see chap. 14 of this volume) no

only throughout mission planning but also during execution

of the mission tactics.

Mission Tactics in Deliberate Force

After April 1993 Deny Flight evolved from an operation

that used combat air patrols (CAP) to enforce the no-fly

zones (NFZ) to a complex mission encompassing close ai

support (CAS) of the United Nations Protection Force (UN 

PROFOR), stand-alone SEAD , offensive air operations (OAS

and associated support missions such as tactical reconnais

sance and combat search and rescue. Deny Flight’s revise

concept of operations (CONOPS), contained in Operation

Plan (OPLAN) 40101, “Deny Flight,” change four, 3 Ma

1995, established these combat air missions. This OPLAN

was in effect during Deliberate Force.

The CONOPS , a broad flow plan that underlies the specific

guidance of the SPINS , provided general guidance for estab 

lishing the operational level of effort required to conduc

deployment, employment, and logistics support in the Ba

kans area of responsibility. Given the politico-military con 

straints in effect, the SPINS controlled and directed much o

307
the air op erations in and out of the TAOO. In light of th

SPINS and tactical mission-planning factors previously men 

tioned (e.g., threats, targets, etc.), the general CONOPS deter

mined the means of tactical employment (ingress/egress high

medium, or low); location of forces; ways of flowing penetrat

ing forces in and out of the target area; and command, con 

trol, and coordination of, as well as communication with, th

forces (fig. 11.2).

Deliberate Force air operations were an extension of th

Deny Flight CONOPS. High-value air assets such as airborn

battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) EC-130E

aircraft (Bookshelf), NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) E-3

aircraft, and air-to-air refueling tankers established medium

altitude orbits over the Adriatic Sea (“feet wet”). For area de 

confliction over the Adriatic , ABCCC was anchored north

NAEW was anchored south; and the tankers were stationed

centrally in the “Sonny” and “Speedy” air-to-air refuelin

Figure 11.2. Deliberate Force Concept of Operations (From Coron

briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naple

Italy, 5 December 1995)

308
tracks. Land- and sea-based tactical air assets would take off

check in with the CAOC and/or ABCCC, and go feet wet t

rendezvous with their assigned tankers for pre-mission refuelin

prior to penetrating Bosnia-Herzegovina’s airspace (“feet dry”).

Aircraft were procedurally rather than positively controlled t

and from the area because of the identification-friend-or-fo

transponder restrictions when they operated feet dry. However

when operating feet wet, the aircraft transmitted their normall

assigned modes and codes. Regardless, the aircraft were pri

marily deconflicted in the airspace by altitudes, time, specia

corridors, and gates/drop points. Tactical aircraft generall

flowed and operated in the medium-altitude blocks, enterin

between five thousand and 10,000 feet (light AAA and small

arms threats) and exiting above 10,000 feet, while rotary-win

Rapid Reaction Force helicopters always operated below thre

thousand feet in the TAOO.

The aircraft entered and exited the TAOO via special transi

corridors that had established gates/drop points (defined b

latitude/longitude coordinates), altitude blocks, and corrido

widths. From flight to flight, controllers told aircraft to deviat

within the limits of the special corridors to avoid being to

predictable at the arrival and departure points. If operating 

CAS/battlefield air interdiction (BAI) mission, strike aircraf

had a tactical air control point (TACP), defined by a Bosnia

Herzegovina geographical reference and its associated coordi

nates. Additionally, all aircraft/aircrews were responsible fo

following SPINS inside the TAOO.

1 1

Within the framework of the Deliberate Force CONOPS an

SPINS, planners conducted and orchestrated combat air mis 

sions, including support missions, to meet and counter th

threat, seize the initiative, gain the offensive, and meet tactica

objectives. For example, the CONOPS for Bouton D’or, the air

strike plan for protecting the Sarajevo area, might includ

SEAD against the BSA’s IADS; CAS /BAI against BSA fielde

forces; and air interdiction (AI) against BSA command an

control (C 2), direct and essential support, and supporting line

of communications. Thus, given the combined force mix

weapons, and targets, combat mission tactics sought to ac

complish the mission accomplishment yet enhance survivabilit y

309
Combat Air Patrol

Operating in the role of offensive counterair and under clos

control of NAEW (call sign Magic) or another air control uni

(ACU) such as a US Navy E-2C Skyhawk (call sign Cricket)

CAP missions sought to detect, identify, and engage any fixed

wing or rotary-wing aircraft that violated the NFZs . The pri

mary CAP players included the British (FMK-3 ), Frenc

(M2000C), Dutch (NF-16A), and Turks (TF-16). Working in th

medium-block altitudes, they were routinely assigned time-on

stations in their sectored areas of responsibility to provide 24

hour force protection, all the while observing TAOO boundarie

and borders of the former Republic of Yugoslavia . NAEW/ ACU

approved altitude variations, but Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC

director (call sign Chariot), had to approve CAP flights below

10,000 feet or into SAM rings. The NATO fighters utilized two

and four-ship roving, racetrack, or bar CAPs, usually over air 

fields in Bosnia-Herzegovina , and any tasked CAS /BAI suppor

control points, always anchored feet wet over the Adriatic Se

in particular CAP stations (forward and rear/north and south)

to protect high-value air assets. Although these assets sup

ported OAS, they functioned in a defensive counterair role

Additionally, aircraft flying CAP obtained pilot in-flight report

on the weather when so requested by the CAOC; during poo

weather the fighters did this every hour on the hour durin

daylight missions and periodically at night.

Operating in the TAOO, CAP aircraft had their orbits ad 

justed to prevent spillouts into internationally controlled air 

space, taking care to remain well clear of the former Republi

of Yugoslavia ’s airspace. When necessary, the fighters maneu 

vered to facilitate early detection and timely intercepts of un

authorized flight activity in the NFZs while informin

NAEW/ ACU of their intentions. After committing to an inter

cept, they had to abide by SPINS and air-to-air ROE.

The primary tactic of the CAP fighters was a visual identifi 

cation (VID) intercept or pass to a position behind or besid

the target and within weapons range. After identifying NFZ

violations, the fighters reported the latitude/longitude of th

contact; course, speed, and altitude; VID or unknown mark

ings; intercept status; and time to the appropriate controllin

310
agency. During Deliberate Force the NAEW/ ACU and CAP air 

craft detected 46 NFZ violations. Remarkably, no intercep

engagements or employment of air-to-air weaponry occurred

during that time.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Prior to Deliberate Force, SEAD missions protected friendl

forces from enemy air defenses on the ground. They did so b

neutralizing, degrading, or destroying ground-based electro 

magnetic emitters such as early warning/ground-controlled

intercept; command, control, and communications systems

SAM/ AAA fire-control systems; and associated surface-to-ai

weapons. Commanders authorized stand-alone SEAD as 

separate mission when they needed continued airborne opera 

tions within the range of SAM systems and when NATO /UN

PROFOR aircraft operating within the danger zone (SAM en 

gagement ring) found themselves at risk. Because o

politico-military constraints, SEAD engagements had to b

proportional to the threat. By the time Deliberate Force com 

menced, planners had designed air operations plans Deadey

Southeast and Deadeye Northwest to neutralize, disrupt, o

destroy the BSA’s IADS.

In the early morning hours of 30 August 1995, Deliberat

Force kicked off with a SEAD strike aimed at neutralizin

the BSA’s defense network in southeast Bosnia . Under Dead

eye Southeast, a package of 17 aircraft—F-18C Hornets an

EA-6B Prowlers from the USS Theodore Roosevelt—struc

SAM sites, command posts, early warning radar sites, an

communications nodes to the north, east, and south o

Sarajevo . SEAD tactics, which included the use of AGM-8

HARMs, tactical air-launched drones, and laser-guided

bombs (LGB), opened the way for follow-on air strikes b

other NATO aircraft at BSA ammunition dumps aroun

Sarajevo . After the first SEAD air strike around Sarajevo

Deliberate Force initiated a series of SEAD strikes spreadin

out from that city, eventually hitting early warning and com 

munications facilities around the heavily defended Banj

Luka area in northwest Bosnia . Toward the end of the ai

campaign, SEAD strikes used such standoff weapons a

311
Tomahawk land-attack missiles, standoff land-attack missile

(SLAM), and GBU-15s.

Daily SEAD operations generally consisted of eight to 12 as

sets supporting three to five strike packages of anywhere from

12 to 20 aircraft penetrating overland in Bosnia-He rzegovina

Because no NATO aircraft could operate feet dry over Bosnia

Herzegovina without SEAD support, the CAOC spread th

limited SEAD assets over a coverage window that started a

the arrival of the first SEAD platforms on station and closed

when the last ones departed (table 11.2). During Deliberat

Force the 785 SEAD sorties (including both shooter an

jammer missions) averaged seven windows per day with 

duration of 13.5 hours per day and an average window tim

of two hours.

SEAD tactics had HARM shooters (F-16 HARM Targetin

System [HTS] aircraft , F-18s, and EA-6s) and jammers (EF

111s and EA-6s) getting situation updates from Magic, Book

shelf, and Rivet Joint electronic-intelligence aircraft on thei

F-18 with HARMs

312
way into the TAOO—or a handoff situation report from th

SEAD players they replaced. SEAD mission commanders wer

to inform NAEW/ ACU on estimated time of arrival at the in 

gress corridor. They, in turn, would transmit the window-ope

time; prior to departure from the station, the SEAD com 

mander would advise NAEW/ ACU about closing the window

time. As the OAS and tactical reconnaissance assets flowed

into their various orbits and working areas, SEAD player

adjusted their positions to electronically attack threats tha

came up. If the fighters penetrating Bosnia-Herzegovina over 

land were in several different areas, the SEAD package an 

chored in a central orbit could “flex” (switch) in any direction

required. The key point was to allow SEAD assets to flow int

the optimum location for support rather than remaining tied

to one fragged location. Controllers deconflicted SEAD asset

Table 11.2

SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force

Air Tasking

Message Day

 Dates

 (1995)

Window

Opportunities

Time on Station

(hours)

SEAD

Probes

 1 29–30 Aug 3 3.2 1

 2 30–31 Aug 9 16.6 9

 3 31 Aug–1 Sep 6 14.6 6

 4 1–2 Sep 7 16.1 4

 5 2–3 Sep 5 18.8 3

 6 3–4 Sep 4 7.6 0

 7 4–5 Sep 2 19.5 0

 8 5–6 Sep 4 16.8 0

 9 6–7 Sep 4 21.0 0

10 7–8 Sep 4 22.8 0

11 8–9 Sep 12 13.4 0

12 9–10 Sep 15 16.6 0

13 10–11 Sep 12 14.1 0

14 11–12 Sep 13 14.9 0

15 12–13 Sep 8 8.5 0

16 13–14 Sep 7 5.4 0

17 14–15 Sep 0 0.0 0

115 229.9 23

Source: Extracted from CAOC daily summaries, 29 August–14 September 1995. (Confidential) Informa ti

extracted is unclassified.

Total

313
by assigning optimum employment altitudes for the particula

platform systems.

All SEAD players monitored a specific frequency for re

quests from penetrating fighters, usually strike primary—als

monitored by Magic. Any fighter requesting assistance pushed

that frequency and gave his request for support directly to th

SEAD package, which responded according to current ROE

and in coordination with Magic and Chariot. For preplanned

OAS and tactical reconnaissance missions that penetrated

known SAM threat rings, direct-support SEAD packages pro 

vided optimum HARM and jamming coverage tied to that mis 

sion. All SEAD mission commanders had the responsibility t

ensure that the planning and positioning of SEAD aircraf

included consideration of methods to engage the desired tar

get(s), minimize the chances of engaging unintended targets

and mitigate the impact of possible HARM ambiguities. 1 2

SEAD aircraft accomplish their missions by either destruc

tive or disruptive means, the former by shooters such as U

Air Force F-16 HTS aircraft , F-117s with PGMs, or U

Navy/ US Marine Corps F-18s with HARMs and tactical air

launched drones, and the latter by jammers such as US Ai

Force EF-111s and Compass Call aircraft or US Navy EA-6B

(which can also employ HARMs). Common to all destructiv

SEAD platforms is the HARM, which can be employed in on

of several missile modes: range known, range unknown/self

protect, target of opportunity, or HARM -as-sensor. 1 3

The success of HARM employment depends primarily on th

accuracy of threat location provided by intelligence sources

ability of the pilot to achieve HARM-launch parameters, an

emission-control tactics employed by the enemy. The employ

ment range for range known is approximately twice that o

range-unknown launches, given the same firing parameters. In

addition, range-known launches provide an increased prob 

ability that the HARM will acquire the specific targeted rada

site, especially if employed “smartly” from the F-16 HTS. Thi

smart-shooter mode can be critical for corridor suppression

and target-area-suppression tactics. Also, one can emplo

hunter/killer tactics by using an F-16 HTS element as th

hunter, which passes target information to the killer (attack

ing) element. 1 4

314
These medium-altitude tactics were employed during De 

liberate Force with mixed results. After the first few days o

the air campaign, the CAOC had to impose HARM-employmen 

restrictions on preemptive shots, requiring approval from

Chariot or higher to execute. While performing SEAD mis

sions, US Navy F-18s fired a total of 33 preemptive HARMs

Additionally, aircraft could employ reactive HARMs onl

if aircraft were operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Croa 

tia Restricted Operating Zone (CROROZ) and one of the fol

lowing conditions existed: (1) positive indication of a hostil

act (e.g., confirmation of fired missiles or projectiles) or (2

dual correlation of hostile intent. 1 5 A total of 27 reactiv

HARMs were employed (what aircrews termed “magnum

shots) by EA-6s (10), F/A-18Cs (two), F/A-18Ds (four), F-1

HTS (nine), and EF-18As (two) during the course of Deliber

ate Force.

With regard to SEAD disruption, the primary concepts o

employing jammers—Ravens, Prowlers, and Compass Call air 

craft—are area-suppression operations, corridor-suppressio n

operations, and target-area suppression. Area suppressio

disrupts and confuses the enemy’s IADS over a relatively

large area. Corridor suppression supports specific mission

within a more localized area and usually employs tactics tai

lored for the mission package being supported. Target-are

suppression suppresses enemy defenses protecting a specifi

high-priority target or target area.

The jammers’ mission profiles or tactics include standof

jamming, close-in jamming, and direct support. In Deliberat

Force, EF-111s primarily performed standoff jamming. Thes

aircraft featured a crew of two and 10 jamming transmitters bu

had no armament, whereas the EA-6B featured a crew of four

eight jamming transmitters, and HARMs and surface-attac

weapons. The EF-111A used the ALQ-99E platform jammer

based upon the system used by the Navy ’s EA-6B—the ALQ-99

Although similar, these systems differ somewhat, as does th

employment of the two aircraft. Both platforms were tasked t

preemptively or reactively jam the BSA’s IADS over areas in

Bosnia-Herzegovina and CROROZ commensurate with mission

and anticipated threats. The Ravens primarily flew standoff jam

ming and sometimes detached direct support, whereas th

315
Prowlers flew more direct support since they were equipped with

HARMs. The EF-111A retains the speed and range of the F-11

Aardvark . The EA-6B has narrower output beams than the EF

111A, thereby producing higher effective radiated power. Th

Raven jams off its wings, while the Prowler jams to the front o

the aircraft. 16 In Deliberate Force the CAOC learned to coordinat

the two aircraft to complement each other’s strengths and weak

nesses in a concerted effort.

Compass Call, another important SEAD asset, is an EC

130H aircraft with a computer-assisted, operator-controlled

selective-jamming system designed to support tactical ai

operations. During Deliberate Force, Compass Call sup 

ported offensive air operations as part of the SEAD effort

orbiting along the coast from its target area and outsid

lethal SAM rings. At loiter airspeeds the EC-130H could

remain on station up to eight hours. Coordinating with

NAEW/ ACU and continually checking on each mission fo

threat warnings, Compass Call flew 35 SEAD support mis

sions during Deliberate Force.

Offensive Air Operations

OAS employed air forces to execute CAS , BAI, and AI com 

bat air missions in close coordination with UNPROFOR

against targets to relieve sieges of cities and areas in Bosnia

Herzegovina , and to respond to attacks/forces that threatened

the UN safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These proportiona

air-strike missions sought to show resolve and capability a

well as discourage retaliation by the warring factions. Al

though limited in time and scope, OAS proved robust enough

to achieve the desired effect. 1 7

Close Air Support. In Deliberate Force, CAS provided 24

hour responsiveness, as required, to UNPROFOR groun

units. By OPLAN 40101’s definition, a CAS mission entails liv

air action against designated targets that require detailed co 

ordination with friendly ground forces. The proximity o

friendly forces 1 8 to the engaged targets necessitated positiv

control to integrate each mission with the fire and movemen

of those forces. CAS aircraft engaged targets of immediat

concern to the ground commander that his forces could no

316
engage or that proved unsuitable targets for his ground-forc

weapons. To be effective, CAS should fulfill the needs of th

supported commander.

The signing of the NATO-UN Air/ Land Coordination Docu 

ment on 23 August 1995 provided General Ryan and Lt Ge

Bernard Janvier , force commander of United Nations Peac

Forces (FC UNPF), with an operational-level document to con 

duct joint air-land operations. In phase four of the air-lan

operations, SEAD is followed by near-simultaneous CAS , BAI

and AI missions. Air-land coordination occurred in terms o

close or near-ground battles. The battles coordinated by th

local commander required both a TACP to control CAS mis 

sions and deconfliction of the Rapid Reaction Force’s direc

and indirect fire with NATO air (the fire-support commander)

The effectiveness of CAS depended upon the TACP’s capabilit

and weather conditions. The near battle coordinated by F

UNPF required coordination and communication among th

fire-support coordination line, outer defensible zones, an

fixed targets; the forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC-A)

controlled engagement zones; and the free-fire areas.1 9

Because of Deny Flight’s CAS exercise, all OA/ A-10, F/A

18D, AC-130, and certain F-16C, A-6E, or F-14 missions wer

FAC-A capable. CAS /BAI missions with overlapping time-on

target (TOT) could have been tasked to work with one of thes

FAC-A fighters. Chariot had the responsibility to ensure th

deconfliction of all assigned targets within the CAS FAC

boxes.2 0 Aircraft engaging targets within 10 nautical miles o

each other were controlled by the same TACP /FAC-A on 

single frequency; however, aircraft engaging targets greate

than 10 but less than 20 nautical miles of each other wer

controlled by TACP on separate frequencies. In this case th

tasking authority made both flights aware of adjacent mis 

sions. Normally, all CAS missions occurred at or above 10,00

feet to stay above light AAA and small-arms fire and to allow

reaction time to MANPADs.

The fact that NATO aircraft flew over one hundred Blu

Swords—CAS requests from FC UNPF or the Rapid Reaction

Force—demonstrates the responsiveness of CAS missions. Af

ter establishment of the CAS request net, such requests took

over six hours for approval—eventually reduced to two hours

317
CAS assets, usually A-10s, were scrambled to launch or wer

diverted from airborne holding orbits. The air tasking messag

(ATM) usually allocated one-hour alert (A-60) or three-hou

alert (A-180) for requests from friendly ground units.2 1

Aircrews thought that CAS missions should have had BA

backup or vice versa to prevent ineffective missions with n

drops. In retrospect, however, most of the CAS request

sought to show that airpower was responsive and ready t

strike. Only four requests, two during Deny Flight and tw

during Deliberate Force, led to live-fire CAS missions. Th

Deliberate Force missions occurred on 30 August and 10 Sep

tember 1995, the former involving seven A-10s, two F-16s

and one Mirage 2000, which employed Mk-82s, CBU-87s

2.75-inch rockets, and 30 mm guns to hit 12 of 16 assigned

targets, destroying four of them. Tactics varied from working 

wheel (circling the targets) and maneuvering a figure eight (fo

the A-10s’ gun employment) to restricted run-ins controlled b

the FAC-A (an OA-10). A US Air Force F-16 dropped the onl

bomb—a laser-guided, self-designated GBU-12. On 10 Sep

tember, in the last “true” CAS mission of Deliberate Force

three aircraft (an NF-16, a US Air Force F-16, and a Royal Ai

Force GR-7) responded to a CAS request, employing Mk-82s an

a GBU-12 to destroy two bunkers and hit an artillery position.

Battlefield Air Interdiction. BAI, a NATO distinction, de

fined attacks that amounted to a cross between AI and CAS

but did not need a FAC-A. Most strike sorties flown in Deliber 

ate Force fell into this category. Like CAS aircraft, BAI aircraf

targeted fielded forces but received target assignments primar

ily through the ATM and target information from the Linked

Operations Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE). Aircrew

would work up preplanned strikes or raids that, unfortu 

nately, became a nuisance because the ATM cycle constantl

changed taskings and/or targets and because LOCE did no

generate the necessary imagery in a timely manner. For exam

ple, aircrews would show for a three-hour alert window an

prepare a flight plan for the targets, but in an hour and one

half, the ATM tasking changed, placing them on standb

status awaiting a TOT. Having only 20 minutes to step time

they would receive the tasking information. With 10 minute

to coordinate, five minutes to plan, and five minutes to brie

318
the attack, they would step to the jets to start engines. How 

ever, while in the jets with engines running, they would re

ceive word of a one-hour postponement of the flight—and on

and on, one hour to the next. These line-of-sight, inconsisten

changes frustrated aircrews, who failed to see the rational

behind such target changes.

In the air, BAI aircraft maintained communications wit

Bookshelf or Cricket from initial check-in to mission comple 

tion. C2 differentiation on a BAI alert versus a packaged BA

created many in-flight coordination and deconfliction difficu

ties. After resolving these, the aircraft would join up with thei

assigned tankers, feet wet, awaiting the word to enter Bosnia

Herzegovina . After receiving clearance, controllers deconflicte

BAI aircraft by four quadrants (northeast, southeast, south 

west, and northwest) or engagement zones (EZ). During BA

execution, aircraft not specifically tasked into an EZ were t

remain clear. BAI aircraft tasked into an EZ remained outsid

until their assigned target-attack time or window. Any reat

tacks on targets inside the EZ were to be made from outsid

the EZ whenever practical. Prior to reattack, ABCCC resolve

conflicts between reattacks outside of scheduled TOT window

and other BAI missions. On one occasion, an A-10 passed

through the field of view of an F-16’s forward-looking infrare

radar when the F-16 was about to laze the target 10 second

prior to impact. Despite this close call, every BAI mission ha

instructions to make every reasonable effort to limit collatera

damage as much as possible, commensurate with the need t

protect friendly forces. Thus, BAI would require a ground com 

mander’s TACP/ FAC-A coordination on free-fire zones to limi

collateral damage, fratricide, and casualties among refugees

noncombatants.

Because the ROE required VID of a target prior to releasin

ordnance, BAI flights often cleared and identified the targe

area by having the flight lead do a low-altitude, high-speed

pass—much like a clearing pass on a Class C conventional o

tactics range—while the remainder of the flight “wheeled

overhead. Given the threat environment, the VID target pas

was a “sporty” event but a necessary evil, leading some t

argue in favor of generating killer scouts or “fast FACs” from

CAS/BAI lines (a “push-CAS ” concept).2 2

319
The killer-scout aircraft (an F-16) located targets and con 

trolled attacks on them in a specific operating area—in thi

case, the EZ. The primary mission of the fast FAC, usuall

performed beyond the fire-support coordination line withou

operating as a FAC-A, entailed validating targets listed in th

ATM and ensuring that no friendly forces had moved into a

operating EZ or FAC box. Secondarily, this aircraft provided

close control, area deconfliction, and visual lookout. If th

ATM target was valid—that is, a confirmed “live” target—th

fast FAC would mark the target and clear the assigned fighter

to attack it under flight-lead control. In a low-threat environ 

ment, a flight of four would use curvilinear tactics from

15,000 to 25,000 feet and would sequentially attack the tar 

gets from random-attack headings. The combinations o

weather , terrain, medium altitudes, C2 delays, and fielded BS

targets (especially heavy weapons) made BAI and fast FAC

very challenging missions.

Air Interdiction. During Deliberate Force, AI missions de

stroyed, disrupted, delayed, and funneled BSA movement

throughout Bosnia . AI target sets included C2, direct and essen 

tial support, and supporting lines of communications (brid ges)

Combined forces using PGMs struck most of these targets

Like BAI, AI missions employed two-ship tactics utilizing LGB

delivery profiles. The tactics employed by US Air Force F-15E

and F-16s reflected the typical tactical profiles exhibited b

the Navy ’s F-18s, Marine F/ A-18s, and British GR-7s, whic

also expended LGBs.

The 492d Fighter Squadron’s F-15E Strike Eagles from

Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, employed two-ship, me

dium-altitude, self-designation LGB tactics. Utilizing their in 

ertial navigation system, LANTIRN navigation, targeting pod

and radar bit-mapping capability en route, the F-15E would

update target-area features because the desired mean point

of impact (DMPI) were too small to acquire visually at standof

ranges. Attacking from 20,000 feet at 0.9 Mach, the aircraf

would release the LGB approximately five nautical miles from

the target and check away 30–45 degrees from the attack

heading. The weapon system officer (WSO) would “capture

(i.e., acquire) the target aiming point and ensure that th

targeting pod was tracking the target. Just prior to the end o

320
the LGB

s time of flight (TOF), the WSO would fire the lase

and self-designate his own weapon to impact. Initially, th

F-15Es used a terminal-delay lazing technique (final portion o

TOF), but after a few misses, possibly due to high-wind (abou

75 knots!) corrections at end game, aircrews adopted a con 

tinuous lazing technique to allow the weapon to make mor

constant adjustments from the wind effects, thus improvin

their hit rates.

By far, the most difficult targets for the Strike Eagles wer

bridges. Although no problems existed with attack avenue

and laser line of sight, they needed several trial-and-erro

missions to drop the bombs effectively. Despite using GBU

10Is with mixed fusing on different stations, the restrictiv

attack axis and laser-spot diffusion resulted in some misse

on small tracks. The F-15E’s weapon of choice for bridge bust

ing is the GBU-24 Paveway III LGB, but problems with th

weapon carriage precluded use of this bomb until the very en

of the air campaign.

Another problem the F-15s experienced, together with poo

weather , was maintaining line of sight until weapons impac

while targeting bridges in deep valleys. During a bridge attac

on 1 September 1995, an LGB went “stupid” (i.e., ballistic with 

out guidance), missing the bridge, impacting the far-side em 

bankment, and damaging a house. This incident led to restricte

run-in headings and single-release ROE for a short time.

During Deliberate Force, F-15Es also expended their firs

GBU-15s in combat. Because of orders prohibiting penetration

of SAM rings during missions in northwest Bosnia , the Strik

Eagles used the GBU-15, an excellent standoff weapon, to hi

targets inside those rings. Unfortunately, inexperience, lack o

training, and bad weather tainted their debut with the weapon

system. Of the nine GBU-15s employed during Deliberat

Force, only four found their targets. Of the five misses, fou

failed to acquire the target, and one malfunctioned.

F-16s of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano AB, Italy, used

similar tactics and LGB-delivery profiles but experienced thei

own unique problems because they were employing LGBs fo

the first time in combat. Although the tactics of F-16 pilot

from the 555th Fighter Squadron and the 510th Fighte

Squadron initially differed because they flew opposing day/nigh

321
shifts, cross talk among the pilots in both squadrons led t

more uniformity. Like that of the F-15E, the F-16’s typica

LGB delivery profile entailed two-to-four-ship, medium-altitude

delayed-lazing tactics. From a 40,000-foot slant range from

the target, the F-16 released the LGB and cranked for 

split/offset away from the target. After acquiring the targe

with help from the targeting pod, the pilot fired the laser prio

to the end TOF of the weapon. The LGB would travel nearl

five nautical miles before impact.

Early on in the air campaign, the F-16s experienced less

than-optimum results from their GBU-10 (2,000 lb) deliverie

Given their limited experience in employing this weapon, eve

the best of the pilots still missed about 50 percent of th

drops. Like their counterparts in the F-15Es, F-16 pilots wer

not allowing enough time for their GBU-10s to acquire th

laser energy and make upwind corrections. Consequently, th

31st Fighter Wing changed from GBU-10s to GBU-12s (500 lb

where weaponeering allowed. In addition, the use of GBU-12

allowed the F-16s to return to Aviano without jettisoning thei

bombs in the Adriatic Sea .

After consulting with the Fighter Weapons School at Nelli

Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, fighter-weapons personnel o

the 31st Fighter Wing decided not to change to continuou

lazing with GBU-10s, as had the F-15 pilots, because th

school was teaching end-game delayed lazing. Instead, the

opted to substitute weapons that might have compromised

weaponeering at times because the probability of kill was les

with the GBU-12s. What could they have learned from LGB

employment history? For one, delayed lazing developed from

high-speed, low-altitude, loft-delivery techniques—not a me

dium-altitude technique (in which low ballistic energy an

premature LGB pitchovers were concerns). For another, th

rule of thumb for lazing ever since the days of the F-4 Phan

tom called for continuous lazing if the weapon’s TOF lasted

less than 20 seconds and delayed lazing for at least half of th

TOF if the latter exceeded 20 seconds. For example, if a GBU

10’s TOF is 40 seconds, the WSO should fire the laser to gain

range acceptance for delivery parameters, and after weapon

release, the WSO should delay laze until the last 20 seconds o

the TOF. Lastly, less end-game, delayed-lazing time was no

322
the answer for F-111E/Fs and F-15Es that faced the sam

medium-altitude, high-wind delivery conditions in Operation

Desert Storm , employing thousands of LGBs. We should no

have had to relearn this lesson in Deliberate Force.

Another tactical-employment dilemma for the F-16s involve

self-designating versus buddy-lazing techniques. Normally, in 

high-threat scenario, F-16s prefer to employ two-ship LGB tac

tics by splitting the target and lazing for each other. This tech 

nique allows mutually supportive deliveries and keeps the sin 

gle-seat pilot’s head up after weapons release, especially in poo

weather, thereby enhancing situational awareness and surviv 

ability. If buddy lazing was the preferred method of delivery, wh

did the F-16s end up self-designating? Unfortunately, because o

night-employment conditions (spacing) and the need to emplo

four-ship tactics on proximity targeting of DMPIs, buddy-lazin

techniques took a backseat to self-designating. With four-shi

tactics, the lateral and vertical impact effects of a GBU-10 (2,00

lb bomb) at five-thousand-feet mean sea level obscure othe

targets. At medium altitude above the fragmentation of th

weapon, t he four-ship flight would have to deconflict over th

target area by taking spacing (equal to the frag TOF) because th

DMPI separation is less than the lateral-distance effects of th

munition. Unfortunately, the CAOC did this routinely, especiall

with last-minute target changes .

The answer for the F-16s called for employing two-ship tactic 

with spacing of 10–15 nautical miles to ensure that the leader’s

bomb fragmentation would not interfere with the wingman’s tar

get acquisition and LGB guidance. Because of weather prob 

lems, reattack options posed other tactical problems. By the en

of the air campaign, the F-16s had adopted a “shooter/cover

tactic for buddy lazing to allow at least one good laser pod on 

pass. If the buddy could not capture, he would call “goalie

and the pilot on the bomb pass would designate himself—an

vice versa. In hindsight the F-16s wished they could hav

employed more fighting-wing, buddy-lazing techniques, espe

cially from the beginning; instead, they planned for single-ship

employment, expecting good weather and low threats. However

night profiles and tight DMPI spacing complicated that gam

plan. The lack of a sound backup plan and slow adaptation t

323
changing combat conditions resulted in the late implementa 

tion of better buddy-lazing tactic s—a lesson learned.

With regard to one other AI tactical highlight, joint employ

ment of the GBU-15 and SLAM in proximity (same sector

produced data-linked interference problems that surprised

everyone concerned. The interference resulted in the electro

optical presentation of the GBU-15 picture, normally pre

sented on the F-15E, intruding on the F/A-18’s video scree

when the Hornet was attempting to guide its SLAM . This prob

lem trashed seven SLAMs because of command-guidance fail

ures. The costly joint-employment lesson learned here is tha

in future conflicts one should write SPINS to coordinate an

deconflict platforms and standoff weapons in the area, alon

with their respective electro-optical frequency spectrums.

Tactical Issues

Despite adverse weather, C2 problems, and ROE constraints

the combined tactics used in Deliberate Force got the job don

with minimal collateral damage. The successful employment o

the combat air missions resulted directly from the multinationa

aircrews’ strong leadership, mutual support, and air discipline

which remain essential to the effective employment of tactica

aircraft. In retrospect several tactical issues became apparen

during or by the end of the air campaign.

Adverse Weather

The aircraft of the combined forces may have been all

weather capable (i.e., able to launch and recover in ba

weather ), but they were not all-weather employable becaus

they failed to accomplish mission tasking nearly a third of th

time because of poor weather . Given the VID target restric 

tions, pilots could not drop their bombs if the aircraft’s sen 

sors could not acquire targets. Concerns about collateral dam

age prevented the employment of such aircraft as the F-15E

with its synthetic-aperture, bit-mapping feature because o

unacceptable risks involving delivery accuracy. At times thi

situation forced aircrews to attempt to fly through holes in th

clouds to drop their bombs, only to lose sight of the target in

324
the last few seconds. Adverse weather combined with the rugge

Bosnian terrain to affect all aspects of air operations, tactics

and mission effectiveness. Because many CAS missions had n

BAI backup with alternate targets, NATO aircraft “pickled” 6

LGBs in the Adriatic Sea . The dismal weather conditions create

high divert fuels, which affected air-to-air refueling operations

fighter aircraft’s combat loiter times, and the gross weight o

weapons carriages for landing. The weather was so “doggy” tha

one F-16 pilot jettisoned his ordnance in the Adriatic four night

in a row! In addition, aircraft using GBU-15s could not acquir

their assigned targets because of cloud obscuration.

The Gulf War was a wake-up call to war planners. Durin

Desert Storm, weather /environmental factors affected 37 per 

cent of the sorties flown over Iraq. But somehow the CAOC wen

to sleep at the wheel during Deliberate Force in terms of dealin

with the weather. The ATM cycle “pushed” the weather to

much, resulting in many delays, cancellations, and reschedul

ings, especially in the early morning and late evening. Force-mi

capabilities should have been adjusted to accommodate th

weather/night conditions. Although the ATM cycle usually has 

20 percent weather-attrition factor built in, perhaps that shoul

be adjusted upwards—say, to 30 percent. The desire for robus

air operations drove the schedule, regardless of weather condi

tions—and this sometimes replaced common sense. If the CAOC

had authorized down days caused by bad weather , personne

could have regrouped and exchanged a “how goes it” with othe

players. Until we have the technology to permit all

weather/night-attack aircraft and precision-weapons capabilit

within an acceptable circular error of probability, a “cookie

cutte r” ATM approach, perhaps on a rotating four-to-six-hou

cycle, would be considerably more advantageous than a 24-hou

cycle that changes constantly. Because the weather present

challenges to all facets of air operations, war planners shoul

act rather than react, stay informed, plan ahead, and anticipat

its effect on the tempo of air operations and aircrew morale.

Single-Strike Mentality

The fight-the-way-we-train philosophy in a high-threat envi

ronment implies ingressing quickly at low altitude, with mas

325
and economy of force, moving across a target complex in mini

mum time, and egressing just as quickly to enhance surviv 

ability. All of the services’ air-to-ground schools have incorpo

rated this single-strike mentality, especially the Air Force

Fighter Weapons School. Massing firepower while surviving 

highly defended target is affectionately known as “one pass

haul ass!”—a concept ever present on the minds of Deliberat

Force strikers. After all, past European threat scenarios hav

us training with that mind-set. However, aircrews have com

to realize—unlike the people who write the training syl

labi—that in combat, elements of fog, friction, and chanc

(e.g., ROE, different threat conditions, poor targeting, and ad 

verse weather) prevent them from implementing the single

strike mentality. As a result, pilots may have to perform multi

ple passes to accomplish mission objectives.

The early establishment of air supremacy in the Gulf Wa

and Deliberate Force negated or minimized the threat from

light AAA, small arms, and some MANPADs, so medium-altitud

employment has become the way to go to war. With good

intelligence , surveillance, and reconnaissance in-theater, SAM

threats can be isolated and plotted to enhance avoidance an

situational awareness; thus, the threat environment (high

medium, or low) changes, depending on the location of th

assigned target. This rebuffs the notion of “once high-threa

always high-threat.” Tactics have to be flexible enough t

adapt to changing conditions of the threat locations—the battle 

field as well as the TAOO.

So why not adopt a more flexible and fluid tactical respons

to the TAOO? The problem lies not only with peacetime train 

ing scenarios but also with the operational-level concepts o

planning an air campaign. The air tasking comes down t

mission commanders in strike packages of 60 to 80 aircraf

that usually attack a target array in geographic proximity. Th

objective is to hit assigned targets with all these assets within

a compressed TOT window and saturate defenses with man

aircraft from different directions in the minimum amount o

time. Such “gorilla” packages reflect the single-strike mental

ity, but in the real world—in this case the low-to-medium

threat in southeast Bosnia —the situation does not demand 

326
single-strike approach. However, large strike packages suc

as Bouton D’or employed one-pass-haul-ass tactics.

In many cases the tasking involved eight to 12 aircraft goin

across a single target complex within a two-to-five-minute TOT

window—which works well if the fighters/ bombers do not hav

to worry about collateral damage . But within the real politico

military constraints of Deliberate Force, the actual attack too

20 minutes because the aircraft had to VID the target, deconflic

bomb impacts because of the DMPIs’ proximity, and circumnavi

gate each other or the weather by reattacking. The massing an

concentration of force packages in this type of environment i

counterproductive, needlessly risks lives, and negates effectiv

mission tactics. Although conditions warranted smart platform

and smart weapons, somehow the gorilla concept was not s

smart here. Perhaps a more efficient and effective means o

employment in this type of environment would entail turnin

the gorillas into “chimps”—specifically, a tailored, missio n 

specific strike package with 18 to 24 aircraft split into highl

tactical chimps (two, four, or six ships) deconflicted late rally wit

adequate time (20–30 minutes) to hit several target areas.

The key to airpower is its inherent versatility, flexibility, an

responsiveness. In future limited conflicts, with the exception

of a SEAD campaign against sophisticated IADS or highly de

fended target complexes, we must alter the single-strike men 

tality of war planners to a more adaptive employment of tacti

cal assets engaging in multiple-target attacks. The principles o

mass and economy of force are important truths in employin

combat forces but are not mandatory in every situation. Some

times, maneuver and simplicity are great force multipliers. W

should think in terms of chimps as well as gorillas.

Notes

1. Within surface-to-air missile (SAM)-ring radar coverage, a high-threa

situation existed, characterized by a radar-intensive environment includin

a sophisticated surface-to-air threat (SAMs and antiaircraft artillery [AAA

and/or an air-to-air threat. Outside the SAM-ring coverage, a low-threa

environment existed, including a small-arms threat, nonradar AAA up t

and including 57 mm, and some infrared (IR) man-portable air defens

missiles.

327
2. 

Electronic Warfare, OPLAN 40101, Deny Flight, annex F, chang

4, 3 May 1995, F-1, F-2. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified

3. Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, vol. 2, Threat Reference Guid

and Countertactics (U), 21 October 1994, 5-38 through -44. (Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

4. “Combat Information,” 29 June 1995, in MCM 3-1, vol. 2, 5-5

through -62. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

5. MCM 3-1, vol. 2, 21 October 1994, 5-94 through -96. (Secret) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

6. Ibid., 5-109 through -11. (Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified.

7. Ibid., 5-112, -14. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

8. “Discussion of the Air Strategy in Bosnia,” talking paper, Skunk

works, USAF/XOXS, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 17 September 1995, 4.

9. Weaponeering “is the process of determining the quantity of a specifi

type weapon required to achieve a specified level of damage to a give

target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effects, munitions deliver

errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, etc. When th

objective of force employment is to employ lethal force against a targe

targeteers use a variety of weaponeering methodologies to determine ex

pected damage levels. These weaponeering methodologies include both nu 

clear and non-nuclear weaponeering techniques. Common to both method

is aimpoint selection and weapon effects analysis.” Thomas A. Keaney an

Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1, fn. 9, p. 13.

10. Powerscene demonstration; and Capt Mark Hallisey and SSgt Jo

Galliano, 31st Fighter Wing/IN, interviewed by author, December 1995.

11. Deny Flight SPINS 028, 26 August 1995, 2-4. (Confidential) Inform

tion extracted is unclassified.

12. Ibid., 9. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

13. Ibid., 8-17. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

14. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

15. Ibid., 9. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

16. “Operation Desert Storm Electronic Combat Effectiveness Analysi

(Kelly AFB, Tex.: Air Force Intelligence Command, Air Force Electronic Wa

fare Center, January 1992), 10-14. (Secret) Information extracted is un

classified.

17. OPLAN 40101, “Deny Flight,” annex D, appendix 4, change 4, 3 Ma

1995, D-4-1 through -2. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. Ai

Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala

CAOC-01.

18. Friendly forces include NATO forces; national forces of NATO na

tions; UNPROFOR; Western European Union forces; and participating force

of non-NATO nations, nongovernmental organizations, and private/volun

tary organizations.

328
19. Briefing, COMAIRSOUTH, subject: NATO/UN Air-Land Coordinatio

23 August 1995, slides 1, 3.

20. Unlike the “kill-box” divisions of the Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina i

divided into eight FAC boxes approximately 30 nautical miles square, alon

with three additional areas covering the remainder of the country. Withi

the boxes, FAC-A and CAS/BAI aircraft operate from five thousand fee

above ground level to a flight level of 20,000 feet.

21. CAS alert procedures included the following: (1) A-60 aircraft pro

vided a two-hour response capability to the CAOC for AOCC Sarajevo re 

quests (these aircraft were to be airborne one hour after notification o

launch by the CAOC) and (2) A-180 aircraft were required on target withi

four hours of a CAS request from the AOCC (these aircraft were to b

airborne three hours after notification, with one hour allowed for transit

Deny Flight SPINS 028, 26 August 1995, 12, AFHRA, NPL-09-02. (Confiden 

tial) Information extracted is unclassified.

22. The Marine Corps adapted the push-CAS system to ensure adequat

air support to Marine ground forces. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing bega

surge operations using the system on 22 February, two days before th

start of the ground assault during Operation Desert Storm. The push-CA

system called for aircraft to launch according to a specific schedule bu

without a specific mission or target. If the aircraft were not used for a CA

mission within a specified period of time, they were handed off to the direc

airborne support center for further handoff to a fast FAC for deep ai

support. The goals of the procedures were to maintain and continue t

“push” aircraft to effective missions. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 4, Weapon

Tactics, and Training, and Space Operations (Washington, D.C.: Governmen

Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1, “US Marine Corps Push CAS.”

329
Chapter 12

Deliberate Force Combat Air Assessments

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

Despite the politico-military constraints and sensitivities t

collateral damage in the Balkans region, Deliberate Force wa

a successful air campaign because of very careful plannin

and execution that remained within the rules of engagemen

and combined multiroled “smart” platforms, weapons, target

ing, and employment tactics. That is, the operation was 

smartly run, robust air campaign—not just a “hit ’em harde

with more” aerial campaign. Tying together the air campaign’s

platforms, weapons, targets, and tactics , this chapter graphi

cally and statistically captures Deliberate Force by examinin

combat air assessments in the following areas: air operation

summaries, weapon impacts, poststrike results, and tactical

employment effectiveness.

Air Operations Summaries

During Deliberate Force, aircraft from eight North Atlanti

Treaty Organization (NATO) nations plus the alliance’s ow

assets combined to fly a total of 3,535 sorties (fig. 12.1), clas

sified as either penetrating or support (fig. 12.2). The 2,47

penetrating missions (70 percent of all sorties), which flew

“feet dry” into Bosnia-Herzegovina’s airspace, included clos

air support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), suppres

sion of enemy air defenses (SEAD), reconnaissance , and com 

bat search and rescue (CSAR). The 1,065 support mission

(30 percent of all sorties) included NATO airborne early warn 

ing, airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC

electronic intelligence/electronic support mission , air-to-ai

refueling, and search and rescue. The ratio of penetrating t

support sorties was 2.3:1. The United States led all nations in

the number of both penetrating and support sorties flow

(figs. 12.3 and 12.4).

331
Figure 12.1. National Sortie Distribution

Figure 12.2. Overall Sortie Distribution

Figure 12.3. Distribution of Penetrating Sorties

332
Prior to Deliberate Force, the force structure of Operation

Deny Flight was divided into two tracking categories—striker

and supporters. At some undetermined time during Deliberat

Force, however, the combined air operations center (CAOC)/ L

Gen Michael Ryan, combined force air component commande

(CFACC), changed the strikers category to penetrators, includin

not only strikers but also supporters. Although penetrators ma

be a convenient term to track sorties in and out of the area o

responsibility (AOR), the lumping of attackers (fighters/bombers

with supporters (passive platforms) makes for a distorted pictur

when one tries to examine aerospace platforms under their re

spective roles and missions (figs. 12.5 and 12.6, table 12.1). Fo

instance, offensive counterair missions might have penetrated

Figure 12.4. Distribution of Support Sorties

Figure 12.5. Deliberate Force Missions

333
Figure 12.6. Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment

Table 12.1

Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment

Nation CAP SEAD CAS/BAI Reconnaissance Support Total

France 60 0 109 81 30 280

Germany 0 28 3 36 0 67

Italy 0 0 26 0 6 32

Netherlands 56 0 86 52 0 194

Spain 0 52 46 0 27 125

Turkey 70 0 4 0 0 74

United

Kingdom

 80 0 156 61 39 336

United

States

 28 705 935 82 578 2,328

NATO 0 0 0 0 99 99

Flown 294 785 1,365 312 779 3,535

Scheduled 298 858 1,173 368 788 3,485

Source: Operation Deliberate Force “Factual Review,” vol. 2 of 7, annex A, appendices 2–6, AIRS OUT

Naples, Italy, 14 October 1995, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AF

Ala., NPL-09. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

334
Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace, but they were not included in

the penetrating-aircraft totals.

Joint Operations

Aircraft of the US Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corp

flew 2,087 air-strike and air-support missions (fig. 12.7)

1,499 or 71.8 percent of which were air strikes, includin

SEAD , CAS, BAI, and AI feet dry over Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ai

Force (774 or 51.6 percent), Navy (583 or 38.9 percent), an

Marine Corps (142 or 9.5 percent). The Army replaced th

Marine Corps in flying support sorties (588 or 28.2 percent)

including reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling, ABCCC, elec

tronic intelligence, airborne early warning (AEW), and CSAR 

Air Force (392 or 66.7 percent), Navy (165 or 28.1 percent)

and the Army (31 or 5.2 percent—primarily reconnaissanc

flights by unmanned aerial vehicles ).

Some people heralded Deliberate Force as a model of inter

service cooperation, while others quickly pointed out that th

air-strike operations were still punctuated by rivalries an

misunderstandings among the services. Some of the growin

pains of jointness that occurred over the 17-day US/NATO ai

campaign against the Bosnian Serbs included

Figure 12.7. US Joint Sortie Distribution

335
• Navy frustration with the Air Force

s centralized control o

the mission tasking, especially with an air tasking mes

sage (ATM) specifying the type of ordnance to be used o

particular targets.

• Rivalry over which service and aircraft should fly bombin

missions because everyone wanted a piece of the action.

• Communications interoperability (getting through to th

ships in the Adriatic was a big problem, especially whe

two carriers operated together, which put a heavy load o

the limited satellite line available).

• Unfamiliarity of Marine aircrews with Air Force flight-lin

rules, especially entry-controlled points.

• Desire voiced by Air Force aircrews in the aftermath o

Deliberate Force for augmenting the service’s inventory with

a 1,000 lb laser-guided bomb (LGB)—the weapon of choic

with respect to joint/combined weapons interoperability.

Fortunately, none of these “cultural differences” seriousl

affected the air campaign. But despite more than a decade o

“purple” experience, joint operations are far from seamles

and need further attention prior to future conflicts.

Combined Sortie Summary

On the average, the combined forces had a daily mission

capable rate of over 90 percent in support of Deliberate Forc

(table 12.2), with the lowest number of sorties flown on ATM

day 17 and the highest number on day 10, along with th

highest number of targets tasked (27). The highest number o

tasked desired mean points of impact (DMPI) (116) occurred

on ATM day eight. The first cease-fire totals occurred on ATM

days four through seven, numbering 737 sorties. As a mino

point, one might note that the total number of penetratin

sorties excludes penetrating missions flown by unmanned aeria 

vehicles (28) and CSAR aircraft (19).

CAOC operations, poor weather, technical (avionic) prob

lems, or mechanical (aircraft) problems resulted in 74

ground- or air-aborted sorties (over 21 percent of the tota

number flown) (fig. 12.8 and table 12.3). Aborts caused b

such CAOC operations as mission-scheduled line changes o

336
Table 12.2

Deliberate Force Sortie Summary

Date

(1995)

ATM

Day

Scheduled Added Ground

Aborted

Flown Air

Aborted

Penetrated

29–30 Aug 1 124 1 3 122 0 85

30–31 Aug 2 244 24 26 242 4 170

31 Aug–1 Sep 3 237 52 16 273 23 202

1–2 Sep 4 206 5 32 179 6 118

2–3 Sep 5 272 2 91 183 8 103

3–4 Sep 6 183 11 5 189 10 122

4–5 Sep 7 185 20 19 186 3 122

5–6 Sep 8 191 84 10 265 3 176

6–7 Sep 9 193 119 25 287 43 213

7–8 Sep 10 245 103 54 294 0 232

8–9 Sep 11 226 42 11 257 17 171

9–10 Sep 12 229 13 31 211 10 145

10–11 Sep 13 223 25 26 222 1 152

11–12 Sep 14 216 48 9 255 5 180

12–13 Sep 15 162 54 6 210 0 151

13–14 Sep 16 178 44 82 140 14 81

14–15 Sep 17 171 0 151 20 1 0

Total 3,485 647 597 3,535 148 2,423

Source: Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–14 September 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-1

(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

Figure 12.8. Ground- and Air-Abort Summary

337
ground cancellations had the greatest impact on air operation

(46.7 percent), while adverse weather accounted for 43.2 percen

of all aborts (affecting nearly one out of every 10 sorties).

Weapon Impacts

Deliberate Force’s offensive air operations—SEAD, CAS, BAI

and AI—accounted for a total of 1,026 munition expenditure

(excluding high-speed antiradiation missiles [HARM], rockets, an 

guns). This number included 708 (69 percent) precision muni

tions and 318 (31 percent) nonprecision munitions, the forme

including LGBs /guided-bomb units (GBU) (-10 , -12, -16, -24

and AS30L), electro-optical/infrared weapons (standoff lan d 

attack missile [SLAM], GBU-15, and AGM-65), and Tomahaw

land-attack missiles (TLAM). Aircraft expended a total of 63

precision-guided munitions (PGM) primarily on three target sets

(1) air defense sites and command, control, and communica 

tions (C 3) (215); (2) ammo and supply depots/facilities (351); an

(3) bridges and lines of communications (LOC) (64). Nonpreci

sion weapons included general-purpose (GP) bombs (Mk-82, -83

and -84) and cluster-bomb unit (CBU)-87s. Aircraft expended 

total of 54 GP bombs against two target sets: (1) ammo an

supply depots/facilities (32) and (2) C3 and air defense sites (22)

Ordnance expenditures by US joint forces—Air Force, Navy

and Marine Corps—for both Deliberate Force and Deadeye re

sulted in approximately 406 target hits (374 PGMs and 32 G

bombs). Of the 374 PGM target hits out of 618 attempts, the Ai

Force hit 282 of 407 (69 percent) (table 12.4), the Navy hit 65 o

Table 12.3

Ground- and Air-Abort Summary

Ground % Air % Totals %

Operations 343 57.50 5 3.40 348 46.70

Weather 245 41.00 77 52.00 322 43.20

Technical 5 0.80 33 22.30 38 5.10

Mechanical 4 0.70 33 22.30 37 5.00

Total 597 100.00 148 100.00 745 100.00

% 80.1 19.9 100

338
166 (39 percent), and the Marines 27 of 45 (60 percent), for 

joint PGM effectiveness total of approximately 60 percent (374 o

618). The hit/miss analysis of PGMs was based on a 15-foo

circular error of probability. Among the standoff-weapon PGM

expenditures, the GBU-15, SLAM, and TLAM results were les

than ideal, the GBU-15 hitting four of nine (44 percent) with

four misses due to faulty target acquisition, the SLAM hittin

only two of 10 (20 percent) with seven of eight misses resultin

from command-guidance failure due to GBU-15 data-link inter 

ference, and the TLAM hitting nine of 13 (69 percent). On th

nonprecision side, the Air Force hit 28 of 32 GP bombs (8

percent), and the Navy four of 10 (40 percent), for a joint nonpre

cision hit percentage of 76 percent (32 of 42). The Marines di

Table 12.4

US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis

Aircraft Munition Released Hit % Hit

F-15E GBU-10

GBU-12

GBU-15

 72

 18

 9

 48

 18

 5

 67

100

 56

Totals 99 71 72

F-16 GBU-10

GBU-12

204

 81

132

 58

 65

 72

Totals 285 190 67

A-10 AGM-65 23 21 91

Total 407 282 69

No. Misses Munition Reasons:

Aircraft

Crew Weather Weapon

 96 GBU-10 4 (4%) 26 (27%) 32 (33%) 34 (36%) 

 23 GBU-12 0 5 (22%) 10 (43%) 8 (35%) 

 4 GBU-15 0 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 

 2 AGM-65 0 0 0 2 (100%)

Total 125 4 (3%) 32 (26%) 44 (35%) 45 (36%) 

Source: Briefing slides, Col Chuck Wald, commander, 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional), Aviano AB, Ita

subject: Operation Deliberate Force Update, 15 September 1995 (unclassified), AFHRA, AVI-04.

339
not expend any 

dumb (unguided) bombs. Thus, the join

combined-munition (precision/nonprecision) hit percentage wa

61.5 percent (406 of 660).

Poststrike Results

The most basic possible targets of airpower are will and

capability. Will is the determination of an actor to resist

influence; Clausewitz’s trinity of the leadership, the people,

and the military represent [sic] the will of the nation. Will is the

ultimate target—not capability. . . . Capability is the ability to

resist influence. Will can be indirectly targeted by destroying

capability. If a leader believes he cannot effect his military

strategy (offense or defense) because his military capability is

being destroyed, he will often cede to enemy influence,

especially when his enemy’s demands are limited.

—Skunkworks, “Discussion of the

Air Strategy in Bosnia” 

As an instrument of United Nations (UN)/NATO policy an

objectives in Bosnia , a major part of the air strategy involved

the application of airpower to degrade the combat capability o

the Bosnian Serbs, which would jeopardize their ability t

sustain combat operations. Because of the manner in whic

alliance forces would employ airpower, the Bosnian Serb

would be hard pressed to make additional territorial gains an

might be unable to defend currently held territories. As 

result, the possibility of a successful Croatian or Muslim

ground offensive would increase. Thus, the Bosnian Serb

would be more likely to negotiate in good faith.1

By the time of the second call for a cease-fire during Delib 

erate Force at 2200Z on 14 September 1995, the air strateg

had paid off. The will of the Bosnian Serbs ceded to the effi 

cacy of the bombing: the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) ceased

hostilities, complied with requirements to withdraw heav

weapons from the total-exclusion zones, and began negotia 

tions for a peaceful settlement. The demonstrated resolve o

airpower in carrying out an effective targeting plan, along wit

some limited NATO ground-force artillery efforts, led to th

degradation of the Bosnian Serbs’ military capability.

340
With respect to air-strike missions, the combined air cam

paign destroyed nearly 87 percent of the target sets within th

range of military significance that had lateral links to the over 

all military objective (fig. 12.9). BSA target sets included direc

and essential military support, C3, integrated air defense sys 

tems (IADS), infrastructure (supporting LOCs ), and fielde

forces (table 12.5). Aircraft attacked a total of 357 individua

targets or DMPIs, 290 of which (81 percent) met damage crite 

ria, while 67 (19 percent) did not. During two days of CAS

missions, 30 August and 10 September 1995, alliance aircraf

attacked 19 targets in the BSA’s fielded forces: seven artiller

tubes, five bunkers, three antiaircraft artillery sites, three mor

tar sites, and one small warehouse. Overall, an impressive tw

out of three individual targets were totally destroyed.

Fixed targets and their respective aiming points (DMPIs ) fo

the Sarajevo zone of action (ZOA) and for Deadeye Northwes

and Southeast (tables 12.6 and 12.7) met damage criteria when

two-thirds of the DMPIs had been destroyed. Mission reports

ground reports, cockpit videos, tactical reconnaissance, nationa

imagery, and signal intelligence verified the bomb damage as

sessments (BDA) . By the time Deliberate Force came to a close

308 of the 346 DMPIs had been attacked, and 305 of them me

Figure 12.9. Poststrike Results (From Corona briefing slide no. 49, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

341
BDA criteria, obviating the need for reattack—thus, only 4

required return visits (fig. 12.10). 2

By the end of Operation Deliberate Force on 14 Septembe

1995, only seven Sarajevo ZOA targets and one Deadeye targe

remained, as well as 32 Sarajevo DMPIs and 11 Deadeye DMPI

(figs. 12.11 and 12.12). The remaining option-two targets coul

Table 12.5

Individual Targets Attacked/Destroyed

Did Not Meet

Damage Criteria

Met Damage

Criteria

Target

Categories

Targets 

Attacked

No Damage Light Damage Moderate 

to Severe

Damage 

Destroyed

C

3

 9 0 1 0 8

Infrastructure

(Supporting

LOCs)

 13 1 3 0 9

Direct and

Essential

246 7 40 42 157

Fielded

Forces

 19 4 unknown 9 6

IADS 70 1 10 7 52

Total 357 13

(4%)

54

(15%)

58

(16%)

232

(65%)

Source: Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995

Table 12.6

Sarajevo ZOA Targets

Total Fixed

Targets

Total Aiming

Points

Damage

Criteria Met

Targets

Remaining

Command and

Control

 4 9 4 of 4 0

Supporting

LOCs

15 15 9 of 15 6 of 15

Direct and

Essential

17 258 16 of 17 1 of 17

Ammo Storage

Area

10 190 10 of 10 0

Total 46 472 39 of 46 7 of 32

Source: Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 Decemb

1995.

342
have lasted another two or three days before planners woul

have had to nominate option-three targets, which carried mod 

erate to high risks for collateral damage. Fortunately, ba

weather and the second cease-fire abated an otherwise diffi

cult near-term targeting situation.

Table 12.7

Deadeye Targets

Total Fixed

Targets

Total Aiming

Points

Damage

Criteria Met

Targets

Remaining

Command and

Control

 3 14 3 of 3 0

Early

Warning

 4 24 4 of 4 0

Radio Relay 12 38 11 of 12 1 of 12

Surface-to-Air

Missiles

 1 1 1 of 1 0

Total 20 77 19 of 20 1 of 12

Figure 12.10. Deadeye Results (From Corona briefing slide no. 22, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

343
Figure 12.11. Targets Remaining (From Corona briefing slide no. 46, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

Figure 12.12. DMPIs Remaining (From Corona briefing slide no. 47, Lt Ge

Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)

344
Tactical-Employment Effectiveness

According to Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospac

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Deliberate Force was 

medium-intensity, combined air operation that employed con 

ventional smart weapons with limited resources to achiev

limited, lower-level objectives in a situation in which nuclea

chemical, or biological warfare was not an issue. 3 By Gulf Wa

standards, the intensity of the Balkans air campaign was ver

modest. In two-fifths the time, Deliberate Force involved onl

one-fourth the assets, one-twenty-fifth the sorties, and les

than one-hundredth the bomb tonnage compared to Operation

Desert Storm . Nevertheless, the two operations were both suc

cessful coalition air campaigns, aided by an intricate combi

nation of weapon systems, support systems, and tactics

Thus, Deliberate Force provides a “snapshot” opportunity fo

reviewing the performance of the multinational air show o

weapons and tactics used in achieving General Ryan’s tactica

objective of leveling the playing field in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although the CFACC usually works at the operational level o

war, the politico-military environment and constraints of Delib 

erate Force drove General Ryan to focus his attention at al

levels, leading to his tight control of the air campaign and or 

chestration of the combined NATO forces to accomplish mission

objectives within the Balkans AOR. This entailed effective con 

ception, organization, and conduct of the major air operation

that guided successful tactical events against Bosnian Ser

ground forces. Here, the focus is on those tactical missions tha

applied combat power as military leverage to alter the advan 

tages gained by the BSA from violating UN resolutions.

Combat Air Patrol/Offensive Counterair

All told, the multinationals flew 294 CAP sorties, providin

continuous air cover and protection 88 percent of the tim

over the course of the campaign. Remarkably, during the 1

days of the operation, the only CAP gaps (on-station losses

amounted to 39 hours and 45 minutes. Eighty-eight percen

of the gap time stemmed from aborts or cancellations becaus

of poor weather ; the rest air-aborted for mechanical reason

345
and one for lack of an available tanker. NATO airborne earl

warning/air control unit and CAP aircraft detected 46 no-fly

zone violations during the course of the air campaign. N

intercept engagements or employment of air-to-air weaponr

occurred. Overall, the multinational air patrols accomplished

their assigned mission—to deny the warring factions the capa 

bility to fight in the air and to protect the United Nation

Protection Force from air attacks.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

During Deliberate Force, SEAD assets (both shooters an

jammers) flew 785 sorties, providing 115 SEAD window oppor

tunities (e.g., SEAD protection) for ingressing and egressin

aircraft flying feet dry over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The window

(on-station protection) totaled 229 hours and 39 minutes—a

average of 13.5 hours per day and a typical window time of tw

hours. 4 Conducting 23 probe attacks, SEAD aircraft employed

65 AGM-88 HARMs, the United States firing 63 of them—3

preemptive and 27 reactive. Spain ’s EF-18 Hornets fired onl

two. 5 The United States flew 89 percent of the SEAD mission

with the remainder split between Spain (7 percent) and Ger 

many (4 percent). Among the 705 US SEAD sorties, the Nav

flew 56 percent (395), the Air Force 35 percent (244), and th

Marine Corps 9 percent (66). 6 During the Deadeye campaigns

not one multinational aircraft was lost to the BSA’s radar

guided surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery.

Offensive Air Operations

US joint forces accounted for nearly half the strike plat

forms used in Deliberate Force and flew 68.5 percent of the ai

strikes, outflying the allies 2.2:1. The Air Force flew the major

ity of the strikes (44.5 percent), with F-16s flying the mos

strike missions (25 percent) of all platforms. The Fighting Fal

con outflew its closest competitor—the Hornet—nearly 2:1

The Royal Air Force flew 36.3 percent of the strike sorties no

flown by the United States , followed by the French air forc

(25 percent) and the Dutch air force (20 percent). The GR-7

Harrier II and the NF-16A led all allied aircraft in total strik

346
sorties. The following statistics suggest the effectiveness of th

tactical employment of strike aircraft during Deliberate Force:

• Average number of PGMs per destroyed DMPI—2.8

• Average number of GP bombs per destroyed DMPI—6.6

• Average number of attack sorties per destroyed DMPI—

1.5

• Combined precision bombing (GBU/LGB) per destroyed

DMPI—3.7

• Precision munitions (other than GBU/LGB ) per destroyed

DMPI—3.9

• Total combined precision weapons (all PGM) per DMPI (hi

effectiveness)—2.9

• Total combined bombing (all types) per DMPI (hit effec

tiveness)—3.5 (nearly half that of the Gulf War)

Support missions flown in Deliberate Force also proved quit

effective.

Air-to-Air Refueling

Multinational tankers provided more than sufficient air

refueling capability for fighter missions 24 hours a day ove

the Adriatic Sea. The only tanker problems involved an inflexi

bility in changing track altitudes to get clear of clouds t

enhance visual rejoins, as well as a lack of entry/exit gates t

the tanker tracks to accommodate a vast number of aircraf

needing fuel before and after missions.

Reconnaissance

Using infrared, electronic, radar, or optical sensors, recon 

naissance assets flew 312 sorties, which amounted to nearl

half (48.2 percent) of all intelligence, surveillance, and recon 

naissance (ISR) sorties and less than a third (28.6 percent) o

all Deliberate Force support sorties. Tactical-reconnaissanc

assets averaged 18 sorties and approximately 35 target re

quests per day—nearly two targets per sortie. 7

347
Electronic Intelligence, Electronic

Warfare/Electronic Support Measures

By the end of Deliberate Force, airborne intelligence , includin

Compass Call aircraft , accounted for 169 (26.1 percent) of th

ISR sorties and 15.5 percent of the campaign’s support sorties

Not surprisingly, the United States led all NATO nations with

155 sorties (92 percent), with the United Kingdom and Franc

each flying seven of the remaining 14 sorties. The US Nav

provided 89 electronic warfare/ electronic support measures sor 

ties (57.4 percent) versus the Air Force ’s 66 (42.6 percent).

Airborne Early Warning

By the end of Deliberate Force, NATO E-3A/D airborn

warning and control system aircraft and US Navy E-2C

Hawkeyes had provided continuous surveillance coverage ove

the Balkans AOR, flying a total of 165 missions 8 that ac 

counted for 25.7 percent of the ISR sorties and 15.2 percent o

the campaign sorties. Of the total airborne early warning sor

ties, the E-3A/D Sentries flew 99 (60 percent), the US Navy

Hawkeyes flew 61 (37 percent), and the French air force’s

E-3F flew five (3 percent). 9

By obtaining needed combat information, ISR platform

played a key role in the planning, execution, and comb at

assessment phases of Deliberate Force. Overall, ISR sortie

accounted for 647 (59.3 percent) of the total support sortie

and 18.3 percent of the total campaign sorties.

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

Four EC-130Es, which had deployed to the 7490th Compos 

ite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano Air Base, Italy, flew a total o

32 sorties, providing around-the-clock command and contro

with limited gaps in coverage. Although ABCCC aircraft ac

counted for only 3 percent of Deliberate Force’s support sor

ties, this highly dependable aircraft enhanced 24-hour air op

erations by averaging two sorties per day, each flight coverin

a 12-hour window with refueling. Although one sortie wa

aborted and relaunched later on ATM day one, the only othe

time an ABCCC did not get airborne occurred on the last da

348
of the campaign because of extremely bad weather condition

at Aviano and within the Balkans AOR.

10

Combat Search and Rescue

Four US HC-130Ps assigned to the joint special operation

task force based at Brindisi, Italy , worked in concert with MH

53Js during CSAR missions. The rescue Hercules flew a total o

nine CSAR sorties in a coordinated effort with the Pave Low II

helicopters, but both were unable to locate and recover th

aircrew of Ebro 33, a French Mirage 2000 hit by a man-portable

infrared surface-to-air missile .

1 1 In his Corona briefing, Genera

Ryan said that CSAR was broken and needed fixing.

Thus, Deliberate Force players performed a variety of mis 

sions while fulfilling various air roles in support of th

CFAAC’s air campaign. General Ryan controlled the comba

environment with air supremacy assets, applied firepowe

through offensive air strikes, multiplied combat effectivenes

with specialized supporters and high-value air assets, an

sustained forces through allied bases. No one role stood alon

during Deliberate Force; rather, roles and missions were inter 

dependently applied in a concerted effort throughout the plan

ning and execution of this air campaign.

Deliberate Force was NATO ’s first sustained air-strike op

eration and the first to use more precision than nonprecisio

munitions. Its multinational force consisted of over five thou 

sand personnel from 15 nations and over four hundred air 

craft (nearly 260 land-based) from eight nations, beddin

down at 18 air bases in five countries as well as on as man

as four aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea at any one time

The combined NATO forces flew a total of 3,535 sorties, aver 

aging more than 207 sorties per day over the 17-day air cam

paign. Of the total sorties, 2,470 flights penetrated airspac

over Bosnia-Herzegovina while another 1,065 provided sup 

port outside that country’s airspace. Over a third (36 percent

of the penetrating sorties were of the fighter/attack variet

that released 1,026 bombs and missiles (excluding HARMs 

rockets, and guns), of which 708 (69 percent) were precisio

munitions and the remaining 318 (31 percent) were nonpreci

sion . Eleven of the 17 days of the air campaign saw combined

349
air strikes hitting 48 target complexes, including 338 individ 

ual DMPIs within those complexes. Precision bombing effec

tively limited collateral damage and allowed Deliberate Forc

to accomplish its objectives: protecting the safe areas from

t hreats or attacks, removing heavy weapons from the tot al

exclusion zones , opening the Sarajevo airport, and providin

unhindered road access to Sarajevo. In short, Deliberate Forc

was not only a determined force but also a decisive force. Th

air campaign met its objectives by persuading the warrin

factions to cease hostilities and agree to conditions set out in

the UN-brokered framework agreement, the latter eventually

leading to the Dayton Peace Accords, which contributed to th

overall peace process in the Balkans.

Notes

1. “Discussion of the Air Strategy in Bosnia,” talking paper, Skunk

works, USAF/XOXS, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 17 September 1995, 

United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA

Maxwell AFB, Ala., Misc-01.

2. Extracted from “Target and DMPI Summary Statistics,” BDA trac

sheet, crisis action team cell, CAOC, C-5, 5th Allied Tactical Air Forc

Vicenza, Italy, 29 September 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-19. (Secret) Informatio

extracted is unclassified.

3. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 2.

4. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

5. Briefing slide (munitions summary), Col Chuck Wald, commande

31st Fighter Wing, Aviano AB, Italy, subject: 7490th Lessons Learned, 1

October 1995 (unclassified), AFHRA, AVI-77.

6. Ibid.

7. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 199 5. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

8. A total of 166 airborne early warning sorties were logged. A Nav

ES-3A flew the extra sortie on ATM day 12 as a backfill to the E-2C whe

the Navy carriers were swapping out in the Adriatic Sea.

9. Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August–1

September 1995. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

350
Chapter 13

Aspects of Leading and Following:

The Human Factors of Deliberate Force

Lt Col John C. Orndorff

The military art is deeply concerned with the performance of

the human group under stress.

—Gen Sir John W. Hackett

Operation Deliberate Force presents an interesting and in 

structive view of the relationships among the nature of war

leadership style, and victory. A notable aspect of this air cam

paign was the strong and comprehensive leadership exercise

by Lt Gen Michael Ryan , commander of Air Forces Southern

Europe (AIRSOUTH), from his combined air operations cente

(CAOC) with regard to strategy making, operational planning

and even tactical actions. In his cognizance of and direct in 

volvement with such a full range of campaign details, Genera

Ryan exhibited a style of leadership more reminiscent o

Napoléon Bonaparte’s personalized “great captainship ” than th

generalship model given the modern world through the ground

breaking reforms of the Prussian military leaders of the nine

teenth century, ending with Helmuth von Moltke (the elder).

Although great captains up to and including Napoléon em 

braced every detail of war, the Prussian staff system accommo

dated the industrialization and democratization of Western war

fare that began during Napoléon ’s reign by distributing an

compartmentalizing information processing and decision mak

ing in ways that allowed a group of ordinary men to embrac

and control somewhat the expanding scope and duration o

modern war. Given the fact that industrial war became th

norm, at least in the West, after Napoléon exhausted himsel

trying to fight in the old way, the Moltkian staff system becam

the accepted mechanism for controlling military forces.

Thus, General Ryan ’s apparent reversion to a highly centra

ized and personal direction of such a broad range of militar

351
activities during Deliberate Force raises intriguing questions

First, why did he adopt the leadership style of Napoléon in 

Moltkian age, and, second, did this apparent reversion help o

undermine the campaign? Answering these questions begin

with clarification of the differences between the Napoleoni

and Moltkian styles of leadership.

The Napoleonic Model

Napoléon , as had countless military leaders before him

commanded in a style appropriate to the demands of prein 

dustrialized war. Such wars were characterized by small ar 

mies of rarely more than 80,000 soldiers and battles that wer

simultaneously conducted on battlefields of a few mile

breadth at most. Often, these battles proved crucially decisiv

to the outcome of a given campaign and even to the politica

destiny of a state. One individual could manage and comman

such battles, assuming he had the experience and genius t

miss few details, anticipate events at least better than hi

counterpart in the opposing army, and exploit the rudimen 

tary command and control (C2) systems (visual signals an

messengers, mainly) of the time. Thus, the style of leadership

called Napoleonic in this study was appropriate to a militar

environment in which individual tactical engagements wer

often strategically important and in which the available C

s ystems adequately embraced the scale and duration of combat 

Napoléon was the master of this particular environment, hi

chief characteristic being his detailed planning and instruc

tions to his troops. He was “his own commander in chief” an

took little council of anyone.1 “Napoleon made all the key deci

sions; he developed his own estimates and usually dictated t

his subordinates. . . . He never used [his staff] for anythin

but for collecting the information he demanded and communi

cating his instructions.”2 The latter were so detailed regardin

where to go and what to do that Martin van Creveld referred t

him as “the most competent human being who ever lived.”

Through his ability to visualize how he wanted the battle t

take place and his capability to maintain control over hi

forces, Napoléon had the flexibility to respond appropriately t

352
each situation. As history bears out, his generalship proved

effective as long as the scope of battle remained within hi

ability to react quickly and maintain control.

Unfortunately for Napoléon , the industrialization and de

mocratization of war, which began in the late eighteenth cen 

tury, created military forces that, by the latter years of hi

reign, outstripped the ability of even the greatest individual t

maintain continual and detailed control. Innovations that be

gan in the mid-seventeenth century with the beginnings o

steam power led to an acceleration in the efficiency and preci

sion of manufacturing and the introduction of interchangeabl

machined parts. 4 These innovations made the production o

cannons, muskets, and supplies to equip large armies bot

easier and cheaper. The expansion of republican and demo

cratic ideals as well as political philosophies during this sam

period created large armies to absorb all this new materiel

Epitomized by the experience of France under Napoléon , thes

industrial and political developments created huge armies, in

relation to those of the previous age, populated by enthusias

tic citizen-soldiers or quasi-citizen-soldiers fired by national o

ideological loyalties rather than fickle mercenary obedience t

a sovereign or aristocrat. These armies (France’s numbered a

least a million at Napoléon ’s zenith) were spread across vas

areas in independent field corps and garrisons. Clearly, the tim

had come for a new method of exercising military comma nd.

The Prussian or Moltkian Model

In the half century following the Napoleonic Wars, whic

ended in 1815, a series of Prussian military reformers devel

oped a philosophy and methodology of command that sough

to “institutionalize” Napoléon ’s genius and control of armie

on a scale suitable to the steadily expanding military force

and conflict boundaries of the age.5 By professionally educat

ing officers in formal schools and rotating them between field

and staff positions, the Prussians anchored their comman

system on a corps of military professionals who could bot

advise senior field commanders on matters of strategy and wh

could themselves undertake the smaller details of supp lying an

353
conducting warfare formerly handled, albeit haphazardly, b

the great captains of the past. Informed by their commander’s

objectives, these officers were trained to take the initiative in

accomplishing their subordinate missions and staff assign 

ments, more or less independently, guided only by broad di

rectives from their superiors. The Prussians called this system

of senior commanders issuing broad orders to subordinat

officers responsible for and capable of acting with independen

initiative Auftragstaktik (mission tactics).

6

Although this system of distributed responsibility and sub

ordinate initiative denied commanders the close, detailed con 

trol of all facets of military affairs exercised by Napoléon , it did

provide modern mass armies with adequate control in genera

and with flexibility in the face of changing circumstances

Moreover, commanders supported by such a system were abl

to orchestrate their campaigns by providing general guidanc

to skilled subordinates rather than by attempting, probabl

with disastrous results, to exercise detailed control over indi

vidual battles. This pattern of centralized guidance and decen 

tralized execution by subordinates became the pattern fo

modern military systems. 7 Its main strength, von Moltke rea 

soned, was that in the uncertainties of war, it protected senio

commanders from suffering the consequences of decision

made obsolete by a changing environment by allowing subor

dinates to react and make decisions of their own. 8 In essence

this system, which the United States also adopted in the latte

nineteenth century, allowed the commanders of great armie

to focus on strategy while their subordinates handled the de

tails of operational planning and tactical engagements.

Leadership Requirements of Deliberate Force

At first examination the operational conditions surroundin

Deliberate Force were hardly different from the main theme

of industrial-age war, which the decentralized or Moltkia

model of command and leadership proved so effective in con 

trolling. On the NATO side at least, military forces were fully

equipped with cutting-edge technology. Corresponding to thes

advanced systems, NATO boasted competent and motivate

354
staff and operational personnel at all levels, especially within

the key CAOC and wing staffs. Moreover, in a military sens

anyway, individual engagements were not likely to have a pro 

found strategic or operational impact since they involved smal

packages of aircraft striking point targets.

Yet, Deliberate Force also manifested some operational an

political similarities of pre-Napoleonic warfare. First, for th

allies the political objectives of the air campaign—bringin

peace to a historically troubled region—were limited. Second

in a way reminiscent of warfare in the Western Age of Enlight

enment, the Balkans conflict was important in the abstract t

NATO governmental leaders because it affected the stability o

Europe and NATO but garnered little popular interest from th

domestic populations of these governments, particularly tha

of the United States . Third, as a consequence of its limited

scope and duration, the command, control, communications

and intelligence (C3I) requirements for directing the campaign

fell well within capabilities available to the allies. Furthe

because General Ryan , the key air commander involved, as

sumed that each tactical engagement could have profoun

strategic political importance, he imposed close control ove

the tactical as well as strategic direction of the campaign.

General Ryan’s Leadership and Its Effects

At the beginning of Deliberate Force, the three senior officer

in the CAOC included Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, the director

Brig Gen David Sawyer, his deputy; and Col Douglas Richard 

son , chief of operations. These officers had led the CAOC durin

the preceding months of Operation Deny Flight. However, Gen 

eral Ryan , the senior air commander, moved to the CAOC from

his headquarters in Naples at the outset of Deliberate Force t

exercise personal control over tactical-level decisions, such a

the selection of targets and aiming poin ts, and to approve sorti

launches. The move gave Ryan—who brought along his closes

staff officers—close, direct control over the air campaign. In 

sense the CAOC provided General Ryan with what Napoléon als

would have sought at the beginning of a battle—a prominen

point for overseeing and controlling events.

355
General Ryan

s move to the CAOC had an immediate effec

on the duties of Maj Gen Michael Short, his principal deput

and AIRSOUTH vice commander. In this instance, Genera

Short worked hard to provide details of the campaign to Adm

Leighton Smith , commander in chief of Allied Forces Souther

Europe , who constantly demanded campaign updates. How 

ever, Short had problems obtaining timely information from

the CAOC; in some cases when he did obtain needed details o

the campaign’s status, the data was overcome by other event

due to the high tempo of the operation. In other instances, b

the time Short had obtained the information, Admiral Smit

had gotten the data directly from the CAOC and moved on t

other things. Thus, by the end of Deliberate Force, Genera

Short noted he was about three cycles of information behin

Admiral Smith ’s requests. With the advantage of hindsigh

one can see that General Short should have positioned a contac

in the CAOC to feed him information when he needed it.9 Thi

experience points out one particular difficulty attendant upon a

operational commander’s move to tactical-level headquarte rs.

As several people reported, General Ryan’s direction of th

campaign from the CAOC at first glance appeared to consti

tute micromanagement, reminiscent of Vietnam.

1 0 Howeve

considering the politically sensitive background of Deliberat

Force (e.g., ethnic and national sensitivities, a concern fo

civilian casualties and collateral damage , etc.), as well as th

joint and combined character of the CAOC, Ryan felt he had t

keep a close hold on operations, including the selection o

targets and personal management of battle damage assess

ment (BDA).

1 1 By centralizing control of the target list and th

selection of desired mean points of impact (DMPI—i.e., aimin

points), Ryan could shape the campaign as he believed appro 

priate, particularly in light of the operation’s political sensitiv 

ity. For example, he especially wished to prevent the type o

collateral damage that might occur with a misdirected bomb

resulting in media coverage of civilian targets accidentally hi

by the allies or sparking a Bosnian Serb attack on United

Nations (UN) troops. Above all else, General Ryan wanted t

remain personally responsible for all major decisions in th

campaign—primarily to take appropriate blame should any

thing go wrong or come under question.1 2

356
Although neither understood nor appreciated by member

of the CAOC at the time, General Ryan’s physical presence a

the CAOC allowed him to buffer the center’s staff, especiall

its senior officers, from direct and possibly distracting interac

tion with more senior commanders interested in the cam

paign—particularly Gen George A. Joulwan , Supreme Allie

Commander Europe, and Admiral Smith .

1 3 Directly in contac

with events, a very senior commander such as Ryan could

provide Smith and others with the real-time, informal summa

ries and details of the campaign they requested without bur

dening CAOC personnel with providing formal answers to th

same question for their less senior commanders to take to th

senior commanders. In that sense, Ryan ’s presence actuall

instilled the CAOC with a more relaxed and free operatin

atmosphere. Whether or not these actions added to the effi 

ciency of the CAOC remains a matter of personal opinion

depending on whom one asks.

Some CAOC members complained of several drawbacks t

General Ryan’s constant and dominating presence in detailed

staff processes. For example, although Ryan ’s inner cir 

cle—consisting mainly of his small coterie from AIR

SOUTH—was generally aware of current iterations to air task

ing messages (ATM) and other planning documents an

actions, people outside that circle in some cases did not know

about changes that the general had made—even though the

depended upon those changes as they planned their ow

parts of the campaign.14 Predictably, other CAOC members fel

that Ryan ’s centralization of so many detailed decision

tended to slow the planning process, leading to numerou

complaints about late target lists and last-minute changes t

ATMs. Still, for the reasons already given, General Ryan be

lieved that his presence—as well as that of familiar an

trusted staff officers and noncommissioned officers—at th

CAOC was essential. 15

Col Daniel “Doc” Zoerb, director of the Deny Flight air op 

erations cell and a key member of General Ryan ’s inner circle

agreed with the general on this matter. If one can liken Rya

to Napoléon as regards direct leadership style and broad cog

nizance of events and planning details, then Doc Zoerb wa

Ryan ’s Marshal Louis-Alexandre Berthier, the brilliant chief o

357
staff who transcribed and transmitted Napoléon 

s orders t

everyone else.1 6 Colonel Zoerb understood the political an

military situation surrounding the campaign, at least from

General Ryan’s perspective, better than anyone other than th

general himself. Like his immediate superior, he noted tha

since Deliberate Force was more about peacemaking tha

making war, “every bomb dropped had to be helpful.”1 7 Famil

iar with working closely with General Ryan, Zoerb develope

most of the plans for the operation from his commander’s

detailed decisions. More than a mere transcriber of orders

however, Zoerb played such a major role in key targeting deci

sions and strategy deliberations that one officer called him th

“Dave Deptula of Deliberate Force,” thus linking him to an

other officer who played a pivotal role in planning the coalition

air offensive against Iraq in 1991. 1 8 Zoerb ’s ability to plan an

communicate General Ryan ’s directions was perhaps vital t

the success of Deliberate Force; thus, the colonel’s enthusi

asm for his boss’s close leadership is hardly surprising.

The combined nature of the CAOC staff has also produced

differing perceptions about the impact of leadership. 

number of US and non-US officers felt that CAOC leader

appropriately included all officers in the organization’s staf

functions. Indeed, General Hornburg noted that he made ef

forts before the start of Deliberate Force to get the allies mor

involved in the CAOC by asking NATO—unsuccessfully—for 

colonel to serve as chief of plans. In his opinion, until Den

Flight actually heated up into Deliberate Force, most NATO

countries had little interest in sending senior officers to 5t

Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) and the CAOC.

1 9 Moreove

Lt Col Bernd Jansen , liaison officer (LNO) for the German ai

force at the CAOC during the operation, noted that command

ers made efforts to ensure participation by all allies—even t

the extent of sacrificing operational effectiveness. 2 0 Col Arje

Koopmans, LNO for the Netherlands air force, was also satis 

fied with the allies’ role in Deliberate Force, noting that al

nations participated as planned. He added that the United

States performed the greatest number of missions because o

its unique capabilities. In this case he did not feel that he an

his air force in any way had been left out of the operation.2 1

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However, countervailing perceptions existed regarding th

degree to which non-US officers participated in the CAOC

planning and control processes. Wing Commander And

Batchelor of the Royal Air Force (RAF), assigned to the CAOC

BDA cell, mentioned that US officers seemed to feel that th

CAOC staff operated as a bifurcated “US and NATO ” entit

rather than a truly combined “NATO ” entity with a fully inte

grated international staff. Several American officers wh

worked at the CAOC also reported that some of the Europea

allied officers felt left out and that the United States had take

over the operation.2 2 An interesting indication of the actua

“Americanization” of the CAOC staff was the fact that it ha

no US LNO since, according to General Hornburg, it was un

necessary in an organization whose senior leaders were al

Americans. In retrospect, therefore, it seems reasonable to sa

that, for several reasons, the CAOC did not function as a fully

integrated, combined staff at the start of Deliberate Force an

that the press of events permitted only a minimal increase in

non-US participation before the operation ended.

General Ryan ’s tight control of targets, DMPIs , and BD

also caused concern for a number of individuals in the CAOC

and at the units. This tight control served Ryan’s desire t

remain personally answerable for anything that might g

wrong and to reduce the chance of collateral damage. How

ever, it also resulted in a frequently changing target list an

delayed mission-release decisions that caused people in th

CAOC and the fighter squadrons to wonder what was goin

on. Speaking of his and Ryan ’s efforts to mitigate such unin 

tentional confusion, General Hornburg stated that “I know w

jerked around the guys in the field, but we tried not to.”2 3 H

also noted that he and his commander tried to avoid change

to the target list by issuing them late, after most of th

changes had been made. In spite of their efforts, the target

still changed several times. Thus, aircrews in particular fel

that they were at the end of a whip.

Lieutenant Commander Michael “Gator” Dunn, of the CAOC

crisis-action team (CAT) cell, said that receiving late targe

lists made it difficult for his office to process the ATM in 

timely manner. At Aviano, some pilots became frustrated—no

with receiving the targets late but with the constantly changin

359
nature of the target list. Several noted that their target

changed as they prepared to launch, compounding the diffi 

culty of that process. Capt Todd Gentry of the 510th Fighte

Squadron described this instability as the most frustratin

part of the operation.2 4 It probably did not help that few, i

any, people in the field knew that delays and changes to th

target list arose from General Ryan’s careful efforts to avoid

collateral damage and to reduce the number of perturbation

in mission planning they actually did experience.

The views of senior commanders and unit-level officers di

verged on the matter of force protection as well. General Rya

held back from wholesale attacks on Serbian surface-to-ai

missile (SAM) sites to minimize both the risk to his crews an

to avoid unnecessary Serbian casualties and collateral dam

age. Understandably, a number of pilots felt that they should

have been allowed to destroy SAM sites at will to remove them

as threats to coalition aircraft, and they expressed frustration

at not being able to do so. Ryan preferred to have his aircrew

fly outside the SAM rings and thus avoid the danger, if possi

ble. Even though Ryan’s policy accepted the continued threa

of the Serbian defenses, most pilots agreed that he did hi

best to keep them out of danger.2 5

General Ryan’s decision to keep BDA on close hold becam

a particularly sensitive leadership-related issue within th

CAOC and at the units. Wing Commander Batchelor said h

was surprised at the importance of BDA to Ryan and hi

restrictive instructions for disseminating it. The latter forbad

the wholesale and unfiltered passing of BDA from the CAOC

even to field units launching missions. Explaining this policy

Colonel Zoerb said that his commander had three reasons fo

jealously guarding BDA: (1) Ryan did not want his judgmen

second-guessed, (2) he did not want outside organization

making assessments of BDA, and (3) he did not want to b

held to his first assessment, should it change. Wing Com 

mander Batchelor agreed with Zoerb ’s assessment, but he stil

questioned a close hold of BDA from field units.2 6

Generally, personnel at Aviano shared Batchelor ’s concerns

Charged with assessing the ongoing status of 31st Fighte

Wing targets and accomplishments, Capt Mark Hallisey an

Capt Pete Ornell from the 31st Wing’s intelligence flight foun

360
the close hold of BDA one of the most frustrating aspects o

Deliberate Force. Given his responsibilities, Captain Ornel

found the CAOC’s frequent response of “you guys don’t need

to know this” to his requests for target and strike imager

particularly galling. 2 7 Captain Hallisey conceded that he un

derstood General Ryan ’s reason for not wanting some pilo

standing in front of Cable News Network (CNN) saying, “Look

what I did,” yet he believed that pilots and tactical-level plan

ners needed to know how they were doing. Although he could

not release actual BDA information, Hallisey reported tha

Wing Commander Batchelor alleviated the friction between th

CAOC and the 31st Wing somewhat by commenting on th

wing’s BDA assessment. Hallisey would fax his assessment t

Batchelor , who, after reviewing the data, would say something t

the effect that “you’re 99 percent correct in your assessmen t.”2 8

Pilots flying combat missions also doubted the wisdom o

General Ryan’s close hold of BDA. Capt Scott MacQueen o

the 510th Fighter Squadron said that sometimes he and hi

fellow pilots had no idea of the real situation on the groun

due to the lack of BDA.

2 9 Not knowing the situation on th

ground had specific meaning for Captain Hallisey: although

the ATM might direct a particular flight to hit DMPIs three an

four at a particular target, the pilots might see those DMPIs a

the first and second aiming points since they had no prestrik

BDA photos showing that previous strikes had obliterated

original DMPIs one and two. Fortunately, after Hallisey ex

plained this problem to the CAOC planners, they released mor

BDA to the wing. 30 Nevertheless, BDA remained a sore issu

among field personnel well after the operation had ended.

Subordinate Leadership and

Followership in the CAOC

The leadership of General Hornburg and General Sawye

nicely complemented that of their commander, General Ryan 

and proved critical to the successful operation of the CAOC

even though their leadership styles differed somewhat. Durin

a postoperation interview, Hornburg indicated that he probabl

would have taken a more decentralized approach to pla nnin

361
than did Ryan. For example, he would have allowed his staf

to present him with DMPIs for his approval, although he als

pointed out that he was not sure whether the targeteers would

have selected the DMPIs as carefully as did Ryan . Hornbur

also stated that he would have spent more time with th

non-US LNOs to let them know what they were doing, largel

in response to their complaints about being left out. 3 1 Sim

larly, Capt Patricia Mauldin , the CAOC squadron section com 

mander, described Sawyer as an “altogether different leader

than his two superiors—more personable and more willing t

“get in and ask questions of people as well as let people know

what was going on.”3 2 Despite these leadership differences

observers in the CAOC generally saw that Hornburg and Saw

yer provided very strong leadership in implementing the cam

paign as Ryan directed. 3 3

Many of these CAOC staff members also saw that the thre

general officers had more or less subconsciously divided re

sponsibilities among themselves in ways that matched thei

duties and leadership styles. General Ryan planned and ra

the air war. General Hornburg “flew cover” for his boss b

attending meetings, hosting visiting dignitaries, and oversee

ing the CAOC staff’s execution of the campaign. General Saw

yer ran the CAOC night shift and spent more time with “th

troops.”3 4 To imply, however, that these officers kept “shifts” i

somewhat misleading since all of them spent over 16 hour

per day in or around the CAOC. Hornburg saw things a littl

differently. He agreed that a division of labor existed amon

the CAOC senior commanders, particularly to the extent tha

he and Sawyer made sure that one of them was always avail 

able at the CAOC. Other than that, he remembered no forma

agreement concerning who would take a particular role. 3 5

Although General Sawyer made efforts to keep people in 

formed about the status of the operation, complaints aros

that the word was not getting out within the CAOC. As note

earlier, part of the problem lay in General Ryan’s tendency t

focus the flow of information on himself and his inner circle

which included only Hornburg, Sawyer, Zoerb , and two o

three other individuals. Thus, the inner circle knew the statu

of events, but other members of the CAOC staff often did no

This failure in communication got to the point that some cell

362
worked with outdated iterations of the ATM and other plan

ning elements.3 6

Despite these problems with the flow of information within th

CAOC, one found no general problem with morale or motivation

among the assigned personnel. For instance, key cell director

such as Colonel Richardson made up the shortfall with thei

own efforts to keep people informed and motivated. Severa

CAOC members cited Richardson not only for carrying out Gen 

eral Hornburg’s instructions but also for keeping people up t

speed 3 7—just one example of the informal leadership efforts b

subordinate CAOC officers that enhanced the overall operation.

Gen Sir John Hackett , in his book The Profession of Arms

stated that “there must be a requirement to be led for th

leader to emerge and discharge leadership.”3 8 Beyond Colone

Richardson , several people in the CAOC emerged to fill th

requirement for intermediate leadership. Lieutenant Com 

mander Dunn, for example, drew praise as “the person wh

made things happen.” Wing Commander Batchelor mentioned

him as one of the best examples of middle-management lead

ership within the CAOC—someone “quite outstanding,” knowl

edgeable, professional, firm, and tactful. Batchelor also noted

that “Lieutenant Commander Dunn was very focused an

knew how to get others to work as well” and that, although

some superior officers seemed to flounder from the inadequat

information flow, Dunn quickly and tirelessly kept a handle on

situations and did effective staff work. 3 9

Lt Col John Gibbons also stood out as a strong leade

within the CAOC. Lieutenant Commander Dunn mentioned

Gibbons as a key player in accomplishing the mission in De

liberate Force. Despite constantly changing target lists, Gib 

bons could match aircraft, munitions, and targets on th

spot. 4 0 Maj Keith Kiger , who augmented the CAOC from Six 

teenth Air Force, described Gibbons as a special asset durin

the operation, noting that, as a permanent assignee to 

ATAF, he knew how to get things done during the long hours

days on end, that he spent on the job. 4 1

Many such people successfully met the leadership challeng

of Deliberate Force. However, key leaders in the CAOC prob 

ably spent most of their time worrying about the technica

demands of their positions as opposed to leadership issues

363
From General Ryan

s attention to detail in the selection o

targets and DMPIs to Lieutenant Commander Dunn’s rigorou

targeteering, most CAOC officers appear to have been mor

concerned about getting the job done than acting as leaders in

the traditional sense. However, this does not imply that the

neglected their leadership responsibilities. The focus an

styles of General Ryan and his subordinates seem to hav

been appropriate, given the generally high quality of the CAOC

staff, the intensity of the campaign and operations within th

CAOC, and the technological ability to exercise control in 

more centralized manner.4 2 Indeed, once they became engaged

in the actual campaign, the professionalism of most or all o

the CAOC members seems to have sustained them in thei

duties without the need for any formal motivation.

Personnel management, however, did suffer from the techni

cal focus of the CAOC leadership in ways that could have under 

mined the organization’s efficiency had the operation gone on

longer. Based on the dictum of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1

Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, tha

“man, not his machines, sets the ultimate limits on battle per 

formance . . . [and] commanders’ effectiveness depends in larg

part on their understanding of the human limitations of thei

subordinates,” CAOC leaders probably should have paid mor

attention to leadership issues such as the distribution of work

length of the workday, and personnel augmentation .

4 3

Most CAOC staffers interviewed for this study indicated tha

personnel were stretched as far as they could go. During th

first few days of the operation, Maj Dave Goldfein , Genera

Ryan’s aide, noted that he and his boss, as well as others in

the CAOC, worked “20-to-30-hour days,”4 4 recognizing that few

people could maintain such a pace for very long. In fact, Chap

lain, Lt Col Bobby Edwards noted that the level of work in th

CAOC was so intense during Deliberate Force that peopl

would have to go out of the building to their cars to catch 

little sleep because they had neither a break area nor time t

go home. Still, he remarked that all personnel remained ver

professional, working closely together and taking pride in wha

they were doing. 4 5 Importantly, both General Hornburg an

subordinate members of the CAOC staff acknowledged tha

these man-breaking workloads were not distributed evenly.

364
For some people, the recruitment of 120 augmentees to th

CAOC during Deliberate Force reinforced the perception tha

the workload was not well balanced. MSgt Steve Wells , th

CAOC first sergeant, said he felt that the personnel system

was mismanaged during the initial spin-up period in the firs

days of the campaign. According to him, colonels in the CAOC

on temporary duty (TDY) would contact their home bases out

side of normal personnel channels to request people, wh

would then unexpectedly arrive saying, “They called and said

for me to show up.”4 6 Many of these late arrivers had little t

do during the operation, while others were overworked. Thi

decision by the CAOC’s American leaders to go outside norma

NATO channels to augment the staff complicated the situation

even further. But Captain Mauldin noted that, had these en 

trepreneurial colonels gone through normal NATO channels t

find help, they would have waited for three to six months t

get needed people.4 7 Nevertheless, the sudden influx of aug

mentees created confusion among many of the personnel in

the CAOC—too many people arrived too quickly for the bus

individuals already there to train them for their new jobs. A

times, some people wondered whether anyone was in contro

of the personnel situation. 4 8

Leadership and Followership at Aviano

The outstanding leadership and followership characteristi

of the CAOC staff was also evident within the 31st Fighte

Wing and 7490th Wing (Provisional) at Aviano Air Base (AB) a

well. Interviews revealed a strong sense of pride and motiva 

tion to accomplish the mission at all levels of both units. Co

Charles Wald , the 7490th commander, said that General Rya

told him the wing belonged to him (Wald ) and that he should

do what he needed to do. Wald added that he had total acces

to Ryan and that he received whatever he needed to accom 

plish his mission.4 9 Col David Moody, 31st Fighter Wing vic

commander, also praised General Ryan ’s leadership, sayin

that the wing implemented whatever higher headquarters di

rected and that the campaign went very smoothly. He men 

tioned that when a wing commander has the time and peac

365
of mind to fly with his wing, as did Wald , it

s a sign that thing

are good. 5 0 Other Aviano personnel indicated that Colone

Wald did an excellent job leading the wing. According to Cap

tain MacQueen, Wald was a take-charge kind of leader who le

people know what to do and then let them do it. Rather tha

micromanage, the wing leadership let people do their jobs

Pilots such as MacQueen stated that they “had the right peo 

ple at the right place at the right time.”5 1

Lt Col Gary West, the 510th Fighter Squadron commander

also had praise for the wing leadership but from a somewha

different perspective, describing Colonel Wald as an “in-your

face kind of guy.”5 2 He went on to state that Wald spent s

much time in the squadron at first that he (West) felt h

should be able to fly more because “a wing commander [ran

the squadron.” However, once the 31st Wing’s Deny Fligh

operations center was up and running, West said that Wald

spent more time there. Overall, personnel at the 31st Fighte

Wing agreed that they enjoyed good leadership which allowed

them to do their jobs.5 3 This assessment seems to underscor

West’s own effectiveness as a leader and a follower, in that hi

squadron seemed unaware of his frustrations over what h

may have perceived as Wald ’s micromanagement.

As far as his own leadership was concerned, Lieutenan

Colonel West said his most important responsibility was to ge

everyone involved in the campaign, 5 4 a sentiment echoed b

other members of his squadron. Captain MacQueen praised

West, saying, “It was good having a squadron commande

with combat experience.” He felt that West, a veteran of Deser

Storm , knew how to fight a war, manage a squadron, an

keep everyone involved. He pointed out that West led by exam

ple, telling the flight leads how to take care of their people an

how to detect indications of emotional stress in their pilots.5 

Many other squadron members expressed the same opinion

about West’s leadership. 5 6

Not only did participants appreciate their leadership bu

also the personnel at Aviano expressed satisfaction with th

joint and combined nature of the campaign. Although som

reports indicated the presence of friction between the Ai

Force and other services, aircrews at Aviano believed that in 

teraction with the Marine Corps and Navy went smoothly

366
Colonel Wald mentioned that he treated the Navy and Marin

TDY crews like any other squadron in the wing family, addin

that Aviano took pains to take care of the TDY folks. 5 7 Captain

MacQueen declared that the marines and Navy personnel “al

ways did well and were never late.” He also commented tha

after communication was established with NATO allies flyin

in combined packages with the Aviano crews, missions ra

very smoothly with them as well.5 8 Pilots also seemed satisfied

with the joint and combined nature of the operation, although

Aviano personnel drew their motivation and enthusiasm from

the Deliberate Force mission itself.

From the CAOC to the Aviano flight line, American partici

pants across the board in Deliberate Force ascribed much o

their motivation to knowing they were doing an important job

In the CAOC, people worked hours on end in an intense an

stressful environment because they knew that their action

would affect the lives of both aircrews and countless civilian

on the ground. Although everyone agreed on the importance o

leadership, people found satisfaction in their jobs and thei

own sense of professionalism, as well as excitement in doin

what they were trained to do. Captain MacQueen compared

his unit’s role in Deliberate Force to an athlete’s getting to d

what he trained for. 5 9 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel West noted

that “a real warrior never wants to kill anybody, but whe

there’s a war going on, there’s no other place he’d want t

be,”6 0 while Capt Tim Stretch commented that “everyone wa

leaning forward in the straps.”6 1

Impact of the Presence

of Dependents at Aviano

The presence of American dependents at Aviano, the main

combat base, during the campaign was a unique aspect of th

operation. People who had combat experience in Desert Storm

preferred to have their families with them, 6 2 while those fo

whom Deliberate Force was their first combat thought the

should have been elsewhere. 6 3

Many members of the 510th Fighter Squadron appreciated

the support and psychological boost provided by the squadron

367
suppers prepared each night by the spouses, 6 4 but younge

pilots favored not having the wives around. Captain Gentry

for instance, found it distracting to have his wife at Aviano

Specifically, he was concerned for her safety since burglar

targeted the easily identifiable American homes in the Avian

area. Further, he feared that terrorists could easily determin

where US families lived and attack them.6 5 Captain Mac

Queen , who shared this fear, felt that combat units should

operate from isolated locations without family distractions.6 

Although he did not know of any pilots who took their frustra 

tions out on their families, he thought it prudent to remin

aircrewmen not to take their work home with them.

Lieutenant Colonel West, however, enjoyed having his fam

ily with him, pointing out that his wife did not worry as muc

about him since, unlike the situation in Desert Storm , sh

saw him every day during Deliberate Force. Also, West’s son

were very interested in his activities during the operation

usually asking “Did you drop?” when he returned from flying 

mission. West thought that other crewmen who had flown in

Desert Storm shared his appreciation of his family’s presence. 6 7

Generally, the spouses of aircrewmen flying combat mis 

sions agreed that they preferred to remain with their hus

bands. Reinforcing her husband’s evaluation, Colette Wes

confirmed the anxiety she felt during Desert Storm, when sh

had no information about what her husband was doing, ex 

cept what she heard on CNN. Addressing other sources o

stress, she commented that saying good-bye in the morning

during Deliberate Force was no different than at other times

since, as the wife of a pilot, she knew that something might g

wrong. Moreover, she said it was important to kiss her hus

band good-bye and tell him she loved him.68

Vickie Jo Ryder, wife of Lt Col Edward Ryder , also preferre

being with her husband. She said that some of the newe

spouses seemed concerned at first, but all the wives eventu 

ally handled the stress of being around ongoing combat opera 

tions very well. She noted that the best thing she could do fo

her husband was provide a stable home for him. Other tha

that, because the spouses wanted to help the effort in any wa

they could, they began preparing meals for the squadron, a

368
mentioned above. She felt that it was important for the wive

to stick together and respond to each other’s needs.6 9

In addition to supporting their husbands during Deliberat

Force, some spouses were directly involved in support opera 

tions. TSgt Janelle Bearden , US Air Force Reserve (USAFR)

wife of Capt Bryan Bearden , and Capt Tami Turner , USAFR

wife of Col James Turner, both served with intelligence durin

the operation—Bearden in the 31st Wing and Turner in Six 

teenth Air Force . They, too, tried not to think about the possi

bility of their husbands not returning. Bearden remarked tha

she tried to stay totally focused on accomplishing the mission

and supporting the pilots. In this respect she said she did no

think of her husband any differently than she thought of an

other pilot flying in Deliberate Force. 7 0

Turner agreed that while she was at work during Deliberat

Force, she focused on the job at hand. However, she did men 

tion that she was in the air operations center when Capt Scot

O’Grady was shot down in June 1995 and wondered whethe

her husband was flying then. In this sense she worried abou

her husband but maintained that she would rather remain

with him in a situation like this. She went on to mention tha

because of crew rest, her husband had more time off durin

the campaign than during normal operations. In Deliberat

Force he would have 12 hours off for crew rest—more fre

time than he normally had. According to Turner, enlisted

families probably shouldered the greatest burden, considerin

they had no crew rest, endured long commutes to work, an

experienced greater financial stress.7 1

Although most wives preferred to be with their husband

during a combat operation, they did concede that their atti

tude might have changed had the wing suffered losses. How 

ever, in the case of families assigned to the 8th Fighter-Bombe

Wing at Itazuke AB, Japan , during the Korean War in 1950

wives wanted to stay with their husbands during combat eve

though the wing experienced casualties. Although the wive

took the first casualties very hard, one wife whose husban

died maintained she still would have wanted to stay at Itazuk

because of the Air Force community’s support and under 

standing. 7 2 Like the pilots in Aviano, though, those in Japa

preferred not having their families with them during wa rtime.7 

369
Still, in both instances spouses supported themselves and th

war fighters in ways that would be difficult to duplicate.

Specific Circumstances

and Leadership Evaluation

In addition to the presence of families at Aviano, Operation

Deliberate Force manifested elements of preindustrial and in 

dustrial-age warfare. Political considerations, the technologica

capabilities of communications, and the scope of the campaign

moved senior leaders to adopt, more or less subconsciously, 

leadership style more akin to the great captaincy of Napoléo

than to the less centralized, Prussian-derived system formalize

under von Moltke. The degree of centralization reached the poin

that, in the words of Captain MacQueen , “it completely took th

judgment out of the cockpit.”7 4

This implies no criticism of the leadership style employed in

Deliberate Force. Although the highly professional followers in

the CAOC and at Aviano clearly would have been more comfort

able with a less centralized, delegating style of leadership, the

were quite capable of functioning under General Ryan’s centra

ized approach. Given the intensity and confusion reported in th

CAOC and, at times, at the wing level, the professional qualitie

of his followers allowed Ryan to command as he did. Less ma 

ture and professional personnel probably could not have en 

dured the stress and performed their duties so well in the face o

such an unprecedented—for them—leadership style.

Time also shaped General Ryan’s leadership style durin

the operation. After the window of opportunity opened to begin

bombing Bosnian Serb positions, he faced the possibility tha

it would quickly close. Ryan felt that he could not take th

chance that collateral damage reported by the ubiquitou

press might terminate the campaign before it accomplished it

military objectives . Thus, he consciously took on the mos

sensitive elements of Deliberate Force—targets and mission

releases—as a personal responsibility. The element of tim

influenced leadership decisions in other ways as well. Lieuten 

ant Colonel West, for one, didn’t know how long the campaign

would last, so he decided to have everyone fly on the firs

370
night so no one would be left out. He maintained that thi

aspect of his leadership was the most important thing he did

or could have done during the operation.7 5

Considerations for Future Commanders

Because a number of factors influenced General Ryan

leadership style in this campaign, one must examine the con 

text of the campaign to benefit from the lessons of Deliberat

Force, a relatively short air campaign conducted in a limited

theater of operations with easily managed resources. Although

not all weapon and support systems were fully functiona

when the operation began, the CAOC was available and ideall

suited for C2 of the campaign. As Major Goldfein observed

Ryan could pick DMPIs the way he did because of the re

stricted scale and scope of the campaign—which was not th

same as Desert Storm. Ryan had the time to pay close atten 

tion to what was going on—something he couldn’t have don

had the campaign gone on any longer. 7 6 Further, as we hav

seen, leaders must not take the development of subordinat

personnel for granted—another reason that context is of criti

cal importance in the consideration of the leadership style.

The issue of centralized control—and, to some degree, de

centralized execution —also warrants consideration. In th

case of Deliberate Force, such control proved an irritant t

aircrews. However, the ability of US pilots to think and exe 

cute independently has always been a great strength. AFM 1-1

notes the risk in placing too much control in one place, whic

can become a problem during a loss of communications. 7 7 B

exercising too much centralized control, a commander risk

losing opportunities that only subordinates can seize at th

tactical level.

One final consideration for future campaigns has to do wit

the presence of dependents in the theater of operations. Genera

Hackett noted that being in the military during peacetime is in

many ways more difficult than during wartime because of th

attention one must pay to families, welfare, education, bar

racks maintenance, and so forth. In war, such concerns go b

the wayside. 7 8 However, to some degree we see the complexitie

371
of both peacetime and wartime mixed in Deliberate Force

creating an added burden, according to some of the younge

pilots. Although the presence of family members provided 

psychological boost, of even more concern was the potentia

disaster associated with their becoming casualties.

Even though spouses preferred remaining with their pilo

husbands, what would have happened had we suffered losses

as in the Korean conflict ? Would wives who were also militar

members have been expected to continue with their dutie

after learning their spouse was missing or dead? In this cas

an adversary could reasonably expect that some shootdown

would affect US operations more than others. Furthermore, a

Captain Gentry feared, what would have happened if terrorist

had targeted the families of aircrews? Fortunately, none o

these problems arose during Deliberate Force, but they war

rant further study.

From the CAOC staff to the wives of aircrew members, th

people involved in Deliberate Force proved themselves ex 

tremely competent and dedicated. By employing a style o

leadership perhaps more centralized than the industrial-ag

norm, General Ryan correctly read the environment and un

derstood the requirements for the type of campaign he di

rected. Like the change in warfare that dictated the shift from

Napoléon ’s generalship to von Moltke’s general staff, Deliber 

ate Force required a reversion to something similar to that o

the great captain . This seems to indicate that, at the presen

time, one should evaluate each campaign on its own merit

and select a method of command accordingly. That is not t

say this will remain the best approach. The real challenge fo

future commanders lies in understanding when this style o

leadership is called for and when it is not.

The key, then, to understanding the impact of leadership in

Deliberate Force resides in the context of the campaign a

General Ryan saw it. First, he understood that the limited

objectives of NATO and the UN were highly sensitive. Second

the use of extreme force could leave one vulnerable to domes

tic and international criticism, particularly if any collatera

damage occurred. Third, because time was short, Ryan se

lected every target for maximum effect in order to achiev

objectives. Finally, abundant resources enabled the servicin

372
of virtually all the targets available to him, at least politically

by 12 September.

Given this context, General Ryan’s leadership style proved

natural and effective, particularly so in light of the availabl

equipment and personnel. Using C2 capabilities that he an

Gen Joseph W. Ashy, his predecessor as AIRSOUTH com 

mander, built up over a period of years, Ryan placed com 

mand attention on critical decisions that would lead to achiev

ing the campaign’s objectives. Furthermore, as mentioned

above, he exploited the leadership and followership of th

uniquely capable subordinates under his command. Thus, in

the context of environment and capabilities, General Ryan

leadership was indeed what Deliberate Force needed at th

time. Still, one must acknowledge the existence of drawback

to this style of leadership although some elements did no

emerge because of the short duration of the campaign.

These drawbacks had to do with personnel issues and th

unusual demands of the situation. First, close attention to tacti

cal details of the campaign tended to rob other important areas

such as manning and morale, although the enthusiasm an

professionalism of subordinates mitigated its impact. Second

the intensity of the campaign pushed key participants to nea

exhaustion, while others remained virtually idle—a situation

that could have undermined later decisions. Third, unusual de

mands (e.g., BDA dissemination and channelization of the infor

mation flow to and from General Ryan ) tended to frustrate junio

and senior staff alike. In the final analysis, however, criticism o

General Ryan’s style of leadership is inappropria te.

General Ryan’s direction of Deliberate Force was appropri

ate for several reasons. Under the circumstances, his clos

direction made sense, fit him in terms of ability to manage th

situation, and made a major contribution to the success of th

campaign. Thus, the issue here is not to make too much of th

Napoleonic and Moltkian styles of leadership but to acknowl

edge the existence of the two options and understand that th

highly centralized style of a great captain may have a new

viability in modern operations other than war, particularl

those whose tactical details have such latent or actual strate 

gic importance. Indeed, future commanders, regardless o

their training or proclivities, may have little choice other tha

373
replicating some of General Ryan 

s arrangements and focus. In

so doing, however, they should be fully aware of the Napoleoni

style’s circumstantial suitability, advantages, and drawbacks.

Notes

1. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvar

University Press, 1985), 65.

2. Albert Sidney Britt III, The Wars of Napoleon, The West Point Militar

Series (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1985), xvi.

3. Van Creveld, 64.

4. Col Owen E. Jensen, “Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wav

War,” Airpower Journal 8, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 36.

5. T. N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff

1807–1945 (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), 18.

6. Ibid., 304, 116.

7. Ibid.

8. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Moltke and the German Military Tradition

His Theories and Legacies,” Parameters 24, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 97.

9. Maj Gen Michael Short, vice commander, AIRSOUTH, interviewed b

Lt Col Robert Owen, Naples, Italy, 4 December 1995.

10. Lt Comdr Michael “Gator” Dunn, CAOC crisis-action cell, telephon

interview with author, 3 January 1996; and Capt Scott MacQueen, 510t

Fighter Squadron, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Avian

Air Base (AB), Italy, 20 February 1996. Interestingly, General Ryan relate

that during a visit with his father—commander in chief of Pacific Ai

Forces—when Ryan was serving in Vietnam, he (the younger Ryan) men 

tioned that it seemed someone was trying to get him and his brother (wh

was also in Vietnam) killed with the type of missions they were flying

Ryan’s father replied, “That’s me.” Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by M

Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, 18 October 1995.

11. Maj Michael Holmes, European Command (EUCOM) Operations D

vision, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Stuttgart-Vaihinge

Germany, 16 February 1996.

12. Ryan interview. General Ryan himself stated that Deliberate Forc

was very different from Operation Rolling Thunder in Vietnam because th

former was a very specific operation for a very specific result—stop th

Bosnian Serbs from shelling Sarajevo. Regarding his tight control over th

campaign, he stated that “you can not delegate the selection [of targets

[The] commander must ask all of the detailed questions. There will be n

time in the future when he will have the option to say, ‘I delegated tha

responsibility.’ . . . The commander must be accountable for all action

taken by his forces. This is particularly notable, given our use of [precision

guided munition] strikes from the air.” Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed b

authors of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study at Air Comman

and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala., 7 February 1996.

374
13. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, meeting with authors of th

Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study at the Air Force Wargamin

Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 12 March 1996.

14. Col Charles Wald, commander, 7490th Wing (Provisional), said tha

the chaotic nature of the CAOC was due to the nature of airpower—specifi 

cally, flexibility and change. At the CAOC, things would change daily. Inter

viewed by Maj Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, Aviano AB, Italy, 

October 1995.

15. Ryan interview, 18 October 1995.

16. See J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War (London: Methuen, 1961), 53

17. Col Daniel “Doc” Zoerb, director, Decisive Endeavor air operation

cell, interviewed by Lt Col Chris Campbell, Headquarters AIRSOUTH

Naples, Italy, 7 February 1996.

18. Holmes interview. Deptula was Gen Buster Glosson’s chief planne

in Desert Storm and is widely recognized for his work on the air campaign

See Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Wash

ington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 153, 209.

19. Hornburg meeting; and Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, interviewed by D

Wayne Thompson and Maj Tim Reagan, Vicenza, Italy, 16 October 199

Royal Air Force wing commander Andy Batchelor, who ran BDA during th

operation, said people felt that this was a US and NATO operation and tha

he had corrected others who remarked that “this is a NATO operation

When asked what could have been done to make it a more combine

operation, he suggested that having a division chief from another NATO

country might have helped. Interviewed by author, Ramstein AB, Germany

14 February 1996.

20. Lt Col Bernd Jansen, German air force, Air Branch action officer, AF 

SOUTH, noted that sometimes commanders did not use the optimum ai

craft/weapons mix to ensure that all the nations got a part of the operatio

Interviewed by Lt Col Christopher Campbell, Sarajevo, 9 February 1996.

21. Col Arjen Koopmans, Netherlands air force, interviewed by Lt Co

Bradley Davis and author, Vicenza AB, Italy, 21 February 1996. The obser 

vations of Colonel Koopmans were confirmed by other NATO officers as wel

Maj Marc Anthony of the Belgian air force stated that he worked in the C-

plans and projects cell during the operation and did not feel excluded at a l

Interviewed by Lt Col Christopher Campbell, Heidelberg, Germany, 13 Feb

ruary 1996.

22. Maj Michael Holmes related that just prior to Deliberate Force, h

went to the Dutch officers to have them review a plan, and they responde

by asking, “Are all the Americans sick?” They then lectured him about thi

being the first time he had consulted them since their arrival. He went on t

add that NATO officers felt they were not included, while US officers felt th

Europeans were never around. Holmes interview. Lieutenant Commande

Dunn said much the same thing. Dunn interview.

23. Hornburg interview.

375
24. Capt Todd Gentry, 510th Fighter Squadron, interviewed by Lt Co

Bradley Davis and author, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996; and Mac

Queen interview.

25. Lt Col Gary West, commander, 510th Fighter Squadron, interviewe

by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996. A

one point the 510th was tasked to use an eight-ship formation to make 

reconnaissance pass over the target to make sure there was no collater

damage, return, drop a single bomb, make another pass to drop a secon

bomb, and then make a final reconnaissance pass. Commander West sai

the order didn’t make sense to him because it put his people in too muc

danger. He called the CAOC for clarification and was told that Gener

Ryan, who was now asleep, had made the decision and that they would no

wake him. In this instance, West felt he did not receive a good answer.

26. Batchelor interview; and Col Daniel Zoerb, memorandum to Lt Co

Robert C. Owen, director, Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study, sub

ject: Deliberate Force BDA Process, 25 March 1996.

27. Capt Pete Ornell, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewed by Lt Col Bradle

Davis and author, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996.

28. Capt Mark Hallisey, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewed by Lt Col Bradle

Davis and author, Aviano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996.

29. MacQueen interview.

30. Hallisey interview.

31. Hornburg meeting.

32. Capt Patricia Mauldin, CAOC, interviewed by author, Ramstein AB

Germany, 14 February 1996; MSgt Steve Wells, CAOC, telephone interview

with author, 24 January 1996; and Chaplain, Lt Col Bobby O. Edward

telephone interview with author, 29 January 1996.

33. Mauldin interview.

34. This observation is based on discussions with the first sergean

squadron section commander, and chaplain. While General Ryan and Gen 

eral Hornburg were consumed with duties relating to the campaign, Gener

Sawyer talked to people about their work and the air campaign.

35. Hornburg meeting; and Col Douglas Richardson, chief of operation

CAOC, interviewed by Maj Ron Reed and Maj Mark Conversino, Vicenz

Italy, 16 January 1996. Richardson noted the tremendous stress durin

Deliberate Force on general officers, who worked 15-to-18-hour days an

got phone calls all night. General Hornburg also noted that he would some

times sleep for two hours, get a phone call, and then return to the CAOC.

36. Lieutenant Commander Dunn noted that no one in the CAO

seemed to have the “big picture” and that he had a hard time finding peopl

to push information to him. Dunn interview. Maj Michael Holmes als

mentioned that getting information down to the “worker bees” was a prob 

lem in the CAOC during his stay there just prior to Deliberate Forc

Holmes interview. Wing Commander Batchelor mentioned that he was no

particularly impressed with the leadership other than General Ryan. Ac 

cording to him, majors and lieutenant colonels, who ran here and ther

376
typing up notes or working on the computer, were doing work better left t

lieutenants and captains. He thought that the CAOC was disorderly

Batchelor interview.

37. Mauldin interview. Captain Mauldin went on to note that Colone

Richardson was deeply involved in the details, wanting to know everythin

that was going on and then ensuring that his people were equipped to d

their jobs.

38. Gen Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmilla

Publishing Co., 1983), 218.

39. Batchelor interview; and Col Steven Teske, CAOC chief of plan

interviewed by Lt Col Christopher Campbell, Lt Col Bradley Davis, an

author, Ramstein AB, Germany, 14 February 1996. Major Holmes als

mentioned that Dunn was an especially good officer, saying that he di

everything, including putting the plan together and monitoring it. The fac

that he had a strong operational background and familiarity with joint forc

air component commander issues helped him on the job. To him, Dunn wa

“essential to the execution of the campaign.” Holmes interview.

40. Dunn interview.

41. Maj Keith Kiger, CAOC crisis-action team cell, interviewed by Lt Co

Bradley Davis and author, Headquarters Sixteenth Air Force, Aviano AB

Italy, 21 February 1996. Major Holmes also said that Colonel Gibbons wa

good at putting the daily schedule together and could do it in his head

Holmes interview. Colonel Teske also mentioned that Gibbons was a stron

leader. Teske interview.

42. General Hornburg mentioned that he wished he could have spen

more time with the NATO liaison officers as well as other personnel so as t

keep them informed. There was just no time for anything other than focusin

on the job at hand. Hornburg meeting. Colonel Teske said that if it had bee

possible, General Ryan would have been out front leading the attack—lik

Alexander the Great. As in ancient times, once the orders were given and th

battle joined, the focus shifted to the technical side of fighting the battle. B

leading the charge, Ryan focused on technical duties. Teske interview.

43. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the Unite

States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 19–20.

44. Maj Dave Goldfein, interviewed by author, Air Force Wargaming In 

stitute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 7 February 1996.

45. Edwards interview.

46. Wells interview.

47. Mauldin interview.

48. Ibid.

49. Wald interview.

50. Col David Moody, vice commander, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewe

by Maj Ron Reed and Maj Mark Conversino, Aviano AB, Italy, 18 Januar

1996. Wald flew with his wing on 30 August 1995.

51. MacQueen interview. Other wing personnel were just as complimen

tary of the leadership at this level.

377
52. West interview.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid. Colonel Wald also said that he did not want anyone left ou

Wald interview.

55. MacQueen interview.

56. Capt Tim Stretch, 510th Fighter Squadron, interviewed by Lt Co

Bradley Davis and author, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996. Stretch sai

that Colonel West kept the “big picture” in mind, constantly watched out fo

his people, and made sure everyone kept a level head. Captain Gentry als

noted that West, a war veteran, was professional, fatherlike, and an exce

lent leader. Gentry interview.

57. Wald interview.

58. MacQueen interview. Captain Gentry and Captain Stretch also ind

cated in their interviews that the joint and combined nature of the operatio

was no problem. However, Jon R. Anderson reported the services’ frustra

tion regarding ordnance, missions, and Air Force flight-line rules. Interes

ingly, as far as the aircrews were concerned, the campaign ran ver

smoothly. “Rivalries on US Side Emerged during Airstrikes,” Air Forc

Times, 9 October 1995, 6.

59. MacQueen interview.

60. West interview.

61. Stretch interview.

62. West interview.

63. MacQueen interview.

64. Ibid.; Stretch interview; Gentry interview; and West interview. Cap

tains Stretch and MacQueen, both single, stated that they survived o

those meals!

65. Gentry interview.

66. MacQueen interview.

67. West interview. Colonel Wald also thought that having families ther

was a good idea. He noted that it was probably harder on the families i

terms of anxiety and at times a distraction for the aircrews, but in th

balance it was probably better having them there, especially since the fam

lies could see what the pilots were going through. Wald interview.

68. Colette West, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Avi

ano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996.

69. Vickie Jo Ryder, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and autho

Aviano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996. In an article, Charles R. Figley liste

several things one could do to deal with stress while a spouse was engage

in a conflict. These included increasing contact with others, avoiding worr

by channeling energy, maintaining contact with the spouse [easy to do in 

situation like Deliberate Force], and focusing on healthy habits. Interes

ingly, Deliberate Force spouses did just these things to cope with stres

“Coping with Stressors on the Home Front,” Journal of Social Issues 49, no

4 (Winter 1993): 61.

378
70. Janelle Bearden, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and autho

Aviano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996.

71. Tami Turner, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Avi

ano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996. An article in Airman magazine reported o

the stresses experienced by families at Aviano during Deny Flight. As wa

the case with some of the people interviewed for this study, the articl

pointed out that life at Aviano is stressful to begin with, mentioning prob 

lems with housing, facilities, and long commutes. The article also noted tha

although families could not have a normal life, they still felt they could hav

a happy one: “I think about what could happen, but I refuse to let 

preoccupy my thoughts.” TSgt Timothy P. Barela, “Calm before the Storm

Airman, October 1995, 3–9.

72. Larry Keighly, “The Wives Wait Out the War,” Saturday Evening Pos

30 September 1950, 116. See also Robert Frank Futrell, The United State

Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His 

tory, 1983), 1–37.

73. Keighly, 116.

74. MacQueen interview.

75. West interview.

76. Goldfein interview.

77. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 115.

78. Hackett, 215–16.

379
Chapter 14

Chariots of Fire:

Rules of Engagement in

Operation Deliberate Force

Lt Col Ronald M. Reed

The title of this chapter doesn’t refer to an Academy-Award

winning Hollywood movie dealing with a race to victory

Rather, it refers to the effective, albeit highly centralized an

restricted, rules of engagement (ROE) that applied to militar

air operations during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s

(NATO) Operation Deny Flight from 1992 to 1995 and it

suboperation, Deliberate Force, in August and Septembe

1995. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, code name Chariot, director o

the combined air operations center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy 

was the lowest-level commander who had the authority to ap

prove weapons release during these two operations. 1 Unless 

superior commander authorized such a release, NATO aircraf

struck nothing in the tactical area of operations without Char

iot’s approval. This fact, combined with some unique provi

sions for close control and coordination with United Nation

(UN) forces (the “dual-key” phenomenon, discussed later)

meant that ROE had to be restrictive enough to satisfy th

political and operational sensitivities of both NATO and UN

political and military authorities. At the same time, ROE

needed to be flexible enough to provide for force protection a

well as the accomplishment of assigned military objectives. Th

Deny Flight/Deliberate Force ROE , which successfully walked

this tightrope of competing influences, offers some insight int

appropriate ROE for coalition peace operations of the future.

Before discussing the implementation of ROE in Deliberat

Force, one must provide a framework for analyzing these rules

This chapter does so by examining the general nature of ROE

particularly its function and importance in military op erations

by presenting several historical examples that illu strate certain

381
issues which have affected military operations; by addressin

the actual ROE for air operations in Deliberate Force an

following the evolution of ROE from the beginning of NATO ai

operations in Bosnia in 1992 until the conclusion of Deliber 

ate Force in September 1995; by identifying several key issue

that highlight the more problematic situations faced by mili

tary planners and operators in the Balkans; and by discussin

implications for the future development of ROE .

Nature and Definition of ROE

Abraham Lincoln said that “force is all-conquering, but it

victories are short-lived.”2 This assertion illustrates the con 

cept that unbridled force may help achieve short-term, tactica l

level success, but without some strategic direction or guid 

ance, the chance of realizing overall objectives is diminished

Carl von Clausewitz recognized this fact in his discussion o

the relationship of policy and war: “At the highest level the ar

of war turns into policy—but a policy conducted by fightin

battles rather than by sending diplomatic notes. . . . Th

assertion that a major military development, or the plan fo

one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unac

ceptable and can be damaging” (emphasis in original). 3 Th

contemporary mechanisms that interconnect the political-polic 

sphere of influence with the military-strategic sphere of influ 

ence and that ensure compliance with national and interna

tional legal constraints are rules of engagement.

By delineating the circumstances and limitations unde

which one may use military force, ROE provides the method t

ensure relevancy and congruency between the means (militar

force) and the ends (political/diplomatic objective) one seeks

while always ensuring compliance with international law an

the law of armed conflict. These political/diplomatic, military

and legal influences converge to form the basis for ROE. Cap

J. Ashley Roach , a judge advocate in the US Navy , notes tha

ROE results from a composite of these three factors (fig

14.1). 4 The relative influences of each of these factors will var

according to the circumstances; therefore, the diameters of th

circles, as well as the degree of convergence, differ accordin

382
to the situation. 5 The political/diplomatic circle represents th

assurance that military operations are conducted in accord

ance with national policy. According to Roach , ROE should b

flexible enough to accommodate changing circumstances an

should be designed to allow military courses of action tha

advance political intentions with little chance for undesired

escalation or reaction.6

The military circle takes into consideration the practica

operational considerations for a particular military situation

ROE represents the upper bounds on the freedom of the com 

mander to use military force toward successful mission ac

complishment. 7 ROE provides guidance to the commander in

balancing the enemy threat (and the concurrent needs fo

self-defense) with the need to avoid conflict escalation. Accord

ing to ROE expert D. P. O’Connell, “the conduct of operation

in tension situations always involves a nice balance of threa

and counter-threat on the part of both sides, and the main

purpose of rules of engagement is to prevent that balanc

[from] being disturbed by thrusting the apparent necessity o

self-defense too obviously upon one player rather than upon

the other.”8 O’Connell would consider a “tension situation” t

be a confrontation between two or more military forces in

Figure 14.1. ROE Influences (Adapted from Capt J. Ashley Roach, “Rule

of Engagement,” Naval War College Review 36, no. 1 [January–Februa

1983]: 46–48)

383
which both the threat of the use of force and the desire t

avoid escalation are present. The military circle, therefore

represents this balance of threat, capability, and intent tha

one must consider when developing appropriate ROE .

The legal circle represents the combined domestic and inter 

national legal considerations that one must adhere to in an

military operation. The laws of war provide the absolute limi

on the use of force in any conflict scenario. Domestic laws an

regulations also provide restrictions on the employment o

force (such as restrictions on the use of certain weapons

including approval requirements of the National Comman

Authorities [NCA] for use of nuclear weapons or chemical an

riot-control agents). Although obligations of US and interna

tional law always influence and limit ROE , the rules normally

operate well within the boundaries of the law. 9

Commanders often limit the use of force by making deci

sions that are more restrictive than legal or ROE constraints

For example, W. Hays Parks cites the freedom-of-navigation

exercise conducted against Libya ’s claim over the Gulf of Sidr

in 1981.1 0 Even though both international law and ROE i

effect at the time allowed the use of force in self-defens

against demonstrated hostile intent, the commander issued

orders that US forces not fire unless first fired upon. In thi

case two Libyan Su-22 Fitters engaged two Navy F-14s on 

head-to-head intercept, clearly demonstrating hostile inten

The F-14s withheld fire until the Su-22s fired air-to-air mis 

siles. In response, the Navy fighters quickly evaded the on 

coming missiles and then downed both Fitters. This exampl

shows the distinction among a commander’s rights under th

law, his or her authority under ROE, and the exercise of his o

her discretion.1 1

The legal circle also represents ROE’s raison d’être: the in 

herent right to self-defense, which is the foundation for U

Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). When considerin

ROE , one normally first thinks of the need to restrict the us

of force and provide guidance to commanders on the con 

straints within which they must operate. In reality, however

written SROE does not exist today because of a need to re

strict military operations politically; rather, SROE resulted

from incidents involving the USS Stark and the US Marin

384
Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, as well as the need t

ensure that commanders understand the right and obligation

to protect themselves and their forces. 1 2 The commander’s

principal task in any military operation is to take all necessar

and reasonable actions to protect his or her forces from attack

or from threat of imminent attack. The legal standard for th

use of armed force in self-defense remains the same whethe

protecting the individual, the unit, the aircraft, or the nation

a situation must require the use of force (necessity) and th

amount of force must correspond to the situation giving rise t

the necessity (proportionality). 1 3

Necessity arises not only when an armed attack occur

(hostile act), but also when one confronts the threat of imm

nent attack (hostile intent). In other words, a commander need

not absorb the first shot before returning fire. The often per 

ceived requirement to fire only if first fired upon is legall

false—an important concept in today’s world of high-speed

and high-lethality weaponry. Waiting to be fired upon ca

have disastrous results. Nevertheless, several nations view th

issue of hostile intent in a different light, especially in militar

peace operations. At a recent legal conference in the Nether

lands, Canadian and British representatives indicated tha

they do not follow ROE based on hostile intent in an

peacekeeping operation, even to the point of suffering casual

ties before using military force. 1 4 In their opinion the need t

maintain impartiality and to avoid becoming a party to th

conflict carries a higher priority than the right of self-defense

They view casualties incurred as a result of this inhibition on

the use of force as the cost of doing business. As discussed

later, international law does not require this restriction, and i

is inconsistent with US SROE .

Joint Publication (Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Diction 

ary of Military and Associated Terms, defines ROE as “direc

tives issued by competent military authority which delineat

the circumstances and limitations under which United State

forces will initiate and/or continue engagement with othe

forces encountered.”15 Although this definition adequately de

fines ROE at the strategic/operational level, one can mor

practically define ROE at the operational and tactical levels a

the commander’s rules for what can be shot and when.1 6

385
Several issues relating to the US definition of ROE becom

apparent immediately. Under the current US SROE, “compe

tent military authority” refers to the NCA.

1 7 Although combat

ant commanders may augment SROE to reflect unique politi

cal and military policies, threats, and missions specific t

their areas of responsibility, one must submit any change

resulting in different rules governing the use of force to th

NCA for approval.1 8 Obviously, political policy makers us

SROE as a mechanism to ensure that military commander

completely understand when and how to use force to suppor

policy objectives. Therefore, policy makers have the fina

authority on ROE for use of force in any given situation.

Next, “delineating the circumstances” under which one ma

use military force relates to the fact that situations often driv

ROE . The amount of force one can use in a given situation

depends upon a variety of political, military, and legal factor

that meld to create the contextual environment for that en 

gagement. The situation may have geographic implications

For example, during the Rolling Thunder campaign in Viet

nam , air commanders could not attack targets within a 30

mile radius from the center of Hanoi, a 10-mile radius from

the center of Haiphong, and within 30 miles of China.1 9 Anothe

type of geographical implication is the exclusion zone. In th

Balkans conflict, the entire area of Bosnia-Herzegovina repre

sented a no-fly zone (NFZ); ROE provided for engagement of an

unauthorized aircraft operating within that zone. 2 0 Similarly

ROE also applied to other geographic zones in the Balkan s.

2 1

Another aspect of the situational nature of ROE relates t

the type of conflict. ROE for peacekeeping differs from ROE fo

peace enforcement or limited war. Peacekeeping generally in 

volves the most restrictive ROE due to the need to maintain

strict impartiality on the part of the peacekeeping force. Be

cause of the need to restrict the use of force, ROE for peacekeep

ing operations typically limits it to self-defense only. Peace en 

forcement and limited war, however, presuppose the use of forc

as a coercive mechanism to change the behavior of a particula

party. ROE for these operations often is less restrictive an

authorizes the use of force in a wider range of situations.

Adam Roberts notes that “peacekeeping is, notoriously, 

very different type of activity from more belligerent or coerciv

386
use of force, and the differences cause serious problems. Th

three principles on which peacekeeping operations have tradi

tionally been based (impartiality, consent of host states, an

avoidance of use of force) are different from the principles on

which other uses of force have been based. Further, the dis 

persion of forces and their lightly armed character, mean tha

they are intensely vulnerable to reprisals in the event force i

used on their behalf.”22 This problem, discussed later, played 

significant role in the development of ROE for NATO militar

operations in the Balkans. The inherent incompatibility be

tween the UN’s role in providing peacekeepers on the groun

and NATO’s role in providing peace enforcers in the air be

came obvious during Deny Flight, which occurred prior to th

execution of Deliberate Force in August 1995.

Additionally, “delineating the circumstances” refers to th

basic purpose of any ROE: the inherent right to self-defense

According to the introduction to the US SROE, the purpose o

these rules is to “implement the inherent right of self defens

and provide guidance for the application of force for mission

accomplishment.”2 3 Further, “these rules do not limit a com 

mander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all neces

sary means available and to take all appropriate action in

self-defense of the commander’s unit and other U.S. forces in

the vicinity.”2 4 The concept of self-defense in SROE cover

situations involving both hostile act and hostile intent. A

mentioned above, SROE defines the elements of self-defens

as (1) necessity (a hostile act occurs or a force or terrorist uni

exhibits hostile intent) and (2) proportionality (the force used

must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude

based on all facts known to the commander at the time, t

decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to en 

sure the continued safety of US forces). 25

SROE’s provisions apply not only to individual self-defens

but also to “national, collective, and unit” self-defense. Na 

tional self-defense is defined as “the act of defending th

United States, U.S. forces and in certain circumstances, U.S

citizens and their property, U.S. commercial assets, and othe

designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their prop

erty, from a hostile act or hostile intent.”26 Collective self-defen se

a subset of national self-defense, authorizes the NCA to provid

387
for the defense of designated non-US forces, personnel, an

their property. Unit self-defense entails the act of defending 

particular unit of US forces, including elements or personne

thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity against hostile ac

or hostile intent. 2 7 In essence, US forces have the authority an

obligation under SROE to use all necessary means available an

to take all appropriate action to defend themselves, their uni

other US forces in the vicinity, and (with NCA approval) non-U

forces against hostile act or hostile intent.

The precise meaning of “all necessary means” depends upon

the unique circumstances of a particular situation. SROE pro 

vides guidelines for self-defense: “(1) Attempt to Control with 

out the Use of Force; (2) Use Proportional Force to Control th

Situation; and (3) Attack to Disable or Destroy,”2 8 each o

which focuses on military necessity and proportionality. Nor

mally, the use of force in a self-defense scenario is a measur

of last resort. When time and circumstances permit, on

should warn a hostile force and give it a chance to withdraw

or cease threatening actions. When one must use force, th

nature, duration, and scope of the engagement should no

exceed whatever is needed to “decisively counter the hostil

act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of U.S

forces or other protected personnel or property.”2 9 Any attack

in the name of self-defense to destroy or disable a hostile forc

are allowed only when they must be used to prevent or term

nate a hostile act or hostile intent. When a force ceases t

pose an imminent threat, one must terminate any engagemen

of that force. Thus, the provisions for self-defense permit n

retaliatory strikes. If a hostile force remains an imminen

threat, however, US forces may pursue and engage it unde

the concept of immediate pursuit of hostile foreign forces.3 

The discussion of self-defense in SROE assumes the commit 

ment of a hostile act or the existence of the threat of force by 

foreign or terrorist unit.

Although it is generally easy to identify and define a hostil

act on the ground and in the air, the elements that constitut

hostile intent vis-à-vis aerial ROE are not easily delineated

For example, at what point does an enemy aircraft or surface

to-air weapon provide sufficient indications of hostile intent t

warrant the use of force in self-defense? Normally, maneuverin

388
into weapons-release position or illuminating friendly aircraf

with fire-control radar indicates hostile intent. The presence o

other factors, however, such as defensive maneuvering capa 

bilities of the friendly aircraft or stealthy characteristics, migh

negate the threat.

To give adequate guidance on what is and is not allowed

one might be tempted to define and legislate every conceivabl

type of threat that a pilot could encounter. However, not onl

is it impossible to predict every eventuality, but also the mor

detailed ROE becomes, the more such rules restrict the flexi

bility and judgment of the person best able to correctly asses

the threat—the pilot in the air. This difficulty illustrates one o

the most troublesome dilemmas in drafting effective ROE —th

desire for clear, unequivocal guidance as to what pilots may o

may not do and for maximum latitude in exercising their judg

ment and discretion.3 1

During the stages leading up to Deliberate Force, the U

Navy on several occasions requested more specific ROE re

garding air-to-air and air-to-ground threats of hostile inten

General Hornburg, sensitive to the need for flexibility an

judgment, responded by stating, “You guys are professiona

pilots; I’m not going to give you a cookbook, and I’m not goin

to tie your hands.”3 2 This guidance is consistent with the con 

clusions of Parks: “In preparing ROE for a particular situation

threat, or operation, less always is better than more, in orde

to allow the individual in the ‘hot seat’ maximum latitude in

making decisions when being confronted with a threat.”3 3 A

mentioned later in this chapter, even though ROE for Deliber 

ate Force extensively restricted the employment of militar

force, the rules never infringed upon the judgment of the pilo

to respond to an immediate and unavoidable threat.

Ultimately, ROE bridges the gap between the policy make

and the military commander. The primary consideration fo

the policy maker is ensuring control over the use of militar

force so it best serves national or alliance objectives. The pri

mary consideration for military commanders is ensuring tha

they can defend their forces and employ them to accomplis

the assigned mission in the most effective manner. Accordin

to a RAND study by Bradd C. Hayes, these two consideration

provide both the foundation and dilemma for people who draf

389
ROE —a dilemma of action versus reaction.3 4 To maintain clos

political control and avoid the escalation of hostilities, ROE i

peacetime (including peacekeeping operations) tends to b

more restrictive. However, as Hayes correctly points out, th

political price for reaction and hesitancy can prove unaccept

ably high—witness the incidents involving the USS Stark an

the Marine barracks in Beirut.

3 5 Conversely, preemptive self

defense can also have high political costs—witness the shoot

down of the Iranian commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes.

3 

Because one must often sacrifice military objectives t

achieve political objectives ,

3 7 writers of ROE must develop an

evaluate these rules within the context of both the politica

and military considerations of a particular operation. Accord

ing to Clausewitz, “war is not merely an act of policy, but 

true political instrument, a continuation of political inter 

course carried on with other means. . . . The political object i

the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means ca

never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”3 8 Consis 

tent with the description of the nature and purpose of rules o

engagement, several historical examples illustrate their influ 

ence and impact on past military operations in ways that buil

on the framework used here to analyze ROE in Deliberate Force

Background/ Historical Examples

The bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, the at

tack on the USS Stark , and the shootdown of the civilia

Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes illustrate several impor

tant matters pertaining to the impact of ROE on military op 

erations. Each of these incidents provides insight into how

ROE can affect military operations and suggests issues on

should consider when drafting ROE.

The bombing of the Marine barracks in 1983, which cos

241 soldiers, sailors, and marines their lives, shows how in 

terpretation of ROE can have disastrous results. Because th

commander of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit considered

his mission to maintain “presence” in a peace operation, h

did not want his troops to look or act like an occupation force.3 

Although the Marines initially faced a permissive environmen

390
in Beirut, it became increasingly hostile the longer US force

remained. 4 0 Neither the immediate commander nor the chain

of command noticed this shift in the threat environment, an

this lack of sensitivity led to ROE , in effect at the time of th

incident, that did not require the sentries on duty to have 

round in the chamber of their weapons or a magazine inserted

into their weapons.4 1

At about 0621 on 23 October 1983, a heavy truck loaded

with explosives entered the parking lot at Beirut Internationa

Airport, made a right-hand turn, crashed through a concer 

tina-wire barrier, drove past two sentries and through an ope

gate, traveled about 450 feet, and passed three large drainag

pipes before ramming into the building that housed the battal

ion landing team. The truck immediately detonated, destroy

ing the building and killing 220 marines, 18 sailors, and thre

soldiers. The Department of Defense (DOD) Commission Re

port indicated that during the few seconds it took the truck t

ram into the team’s building, the sentries could take no action

to stop the truck because their weapons were unloaded.4 

Even though written ROE specifically stated that the marine

could defend themselves against both hostile acts and demon 

strated hostile intent, the commander’s interpretation (or mis 

interpretation) of the mission and the threat environment re

sulted in an overly restrictive application of the rules. Havin

the sentries put their bullets in their pockets violated the firs

rule of any ROE —the inherent right of self-defense.

The crew of the USS Stark found itself operating in th

Persian Gulf in support of reflagging operations for Kuwaiti oi

tankers. On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage launched tw

Exocet missiles at the Stark . The United States accepted Iraq

apology, which claimed that the attack—responsible for th

deaths of 37 sailors and the wounding of 21 others—was un

intentional.4 3 A Navy study chaired by Rear Adm Grant Sharp

concluded that “the rules of engagement that were in exist

ence on May 17, 1987 were sufficient to enable Stark to prop

erly warn the Iraqi aircraft, in a timely manner, of the presenc

of a US warship and if the warning was not heeded, the rules o

engagement were sufficient to enable Stark to defend hersel

against hostile intent and imminent danger without absorbin

the first hit.”4 4 The study determined that the commander of th

391
Stark failed to appreciate the obvious change in the threa

environment in the central Persian Gulf. It also concluded tha

the commander/watch team improperly understood the use o

fire-control radar to illuminate a threatening aircraft as 

measure short of deadly force—an act that could have secured

the ship’s safety. 4 5 Like the Beirut bombing, this incident illus

trates the potential pitfalls of commanding officers failing t

ensure the inherent right to self-defense under ROE in a “non 

combat” environment with a dynamic threat.

In both of the previous examples, the problem did not aris

so much from overly restrictive ROE as from a lack of sensitiv 

ity on the part of the commanders to a changing threat envi 

ronment. Both examples illustrate the tendency in noncomba

situations and peace operations to be overly controlling and t

curtail reaction to the threat. An effective ROE , therefore

should be highly flexible so that one can meet changes in th

threat environment with an effective response. At the sam

time, both examples illustrate that no matter how robustl

one writes ROE, nothing can compensate for the poor judg

ment of a commanding officer, who must ultimately decid

how to react and employ forces in any given situation. Th

underuse or overuse of force in any scenario may negativel

affect mission accomplishment. The “genius” of the com 

mander, as Clausewitz would say, determines the effective 

ness of the use of military force in any military operation.

In contrast to the Beirut and the Stark incidents, the on

involving the USS Vincennes shows how aggressive, preemp 

tive self-defense can be militarily and politically costly. In thi

case misinterpretation of the threat caused a US Navy Aegi

cruiser to shoot down an Iranian civilian airliner. Regardles

of whether the blame lies with an overaggressive, trigger

happy commander or with human and/or mechanical erro

during a confused naval battle, this tragic mistake resulted in

the death of 290 civilians aboard the airliner.

Although the official investigation of the Vincennes inciden

absolved the captain and crew from fault, several question

arose after completion of the investigation. 4 6 Nearly four year

after the incident, Newsweek ran an article that described th

story of “a naval fiasco, of an overeager captain, panicked

crewmen, and the cover-up that followed.”4 7 In response, th

392
director of the Oceans Law and Policy Department at the Na 

val War College drafted a memorandum refuting many o

Newsweek’s claims.4 8 Despite differences in interpretation

everyone agrees upon certain matters of fact.

On the morning of 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes was on

duty in the Persian Gulf, assisting in escort operations fo

reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers. Responding to notification b

the USS Montgomery that approximately 13 Iranian gunboat

might be preparing to attack a merchant ship, the Vincenne

proceeded north to investigate. After one of the Iranian vessel

fired upon a helicopter performing routine morning patro

from the Vincennes, the latter became involved in a surfac

engagement with the gunboats. During this time an Irania

civilian airliner took off from Bandar Abbas (a joint mili

tary/civilian airfield in Iran) on a flight path that would tak

the airliner over the area of the naval engagement. Misidenti

fying the airliner as an Iranian F-14, the Vincennes issued 1

warnings that it should remain clear of the area and then fired

two SM-2 missiles, shooting it down. Approximately thre

minutes and 45 seconds elapsed from initial identification o

the aircraft as possibly hostile until shootdown.4 9

The previously mentioned RAND study of naval ROE noted

that the rules in the Persian Gulf applicable during the Vin 

cennes incident had been changed after incidents involvin

the USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts (the latter ha

struck a mine in the Gulf approximately one month before th

Vincennes arrived) to encourage anticipatory self-defense.5 

This study, however, did not blame “hair-trigger” ROE for th

shootdown of the Iranian airliner. Rather, it concluded tha

the hostile environment and ongoing sea battle played 

prominent role in the decision and that ROE probably did no

significantly affect the decision to use force to deal with th

presumed threat.5 1

The official DOD report concluded that, under ROE, th

primary responsibility of the commanding officer is defense o

the ship from attack or from threat of imminent attack.5 

Based on information he believed to be true at the time, th

captain of the Vincennes shot down the Iranian airliner in

self-defense—a clear case of the “damned if you do, damned i

you don’t” dilemma faced by military commanders operatin

393
in noncombat environments euphemistically called 

opera 

tions other than war.” The best a commander can hope for i

ROE flexible enough to be relevant to a changing threat envi

ronment, information and communications to appreciat

when those changes take place, and experience and judgmen

to make the correct decision when faced with a threat tha

might require forcible response.

The Beirut, Stark , and Vincennes incidents all illustrate th

importance not only of having effective and flexible ROE bu

also of the judgment of the commander in every conflict. O

course the commander’s—or, for that matter, the pi

lot’s—judgment depends on the real-time information avail

able at the point of decision. The fog and friction of war ofte

inhibit or distort the flow of accurate and timely information

ROE , therefore, must provide guidance consistent with th

political and military realities of the conflict to bridge the ga

between military means and political ends in an uncertain

environment. The rest of this essay uses this test of consis 

tency and relevance to explore and evaluate the evolution an

execution of ROE in Operation Deliberate Force.

Evolution of ROE in

Operation Deliberate Force

The rules of engagement for Deliberate Force arose from

various changes and additions in NATO military operationa

tasking in the Balkans brought about by numerous United

Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) relating to Bosnia 

Herzegovina . Consequently, any full analysis of ROE for Delib 

erate Force must begin with an examination of the genesi

and evolution of ROE from the inception of NATO air opera 

tions in Operation Sky Monitor, through Deny Flight, an

culminating in the air strike operations conducted in Augus

and September of 1995. To truly comprehend ROE requires a

understanding of the complex political and military environ 

ment that faced the military planners and operators durin

the entire period of operations. The changing character of thi

political and military environment, in turn, caused ROE t

evolve from a policy of not using force in the simple monitorin

394
of the UN-declared NFZ to a robust use of force in the ai

strike campaign executed in August and September of 1995

The changing environment shaped the intent and purpose o

formal ROE and reflected the impact of multinational/multial

liance influences on its formulation.

A flow of contributions and guidance provided the frame

work for ROE development in Deny Flight/Deliberate Forc

(fig. 14.2). The UNSCRs served as the legal basis under the UN

Charter and international law for use of military force by na

tions and/or regional organizations or arrangements in sup

port of specific provisions outlined in the resolutions. In re

sponse to a UNSCR, a regional organization (in this case

NATO’s North Atlantic Council [NAC]) issues to forces unde

its control a mandate authorizing the use of military force, th

latter limited by the UNSCR and further restricted by an

NATO concerns. The mandate is translated into a militar

operations plan (OPLAN), which includes an annex detailin

ROE to be used in the NATO military operation. For Deliberat

Force the commander in chief of Allied Forces Souther

Europe (CINCSOUTH) promulgated OPLAN 40101, “Operation

Deny Flight,” and the supporting ROE annex. 5 3 An operation

order (OPORD) contains the next level of ROE—in this case

OPORD 45101.5, “Deny Flight,” issued by the commander o

5th Allied Tactical Air Force (COM5ATAF).

5 4 One should not

that each subordinate level of ROE can be no less restrictiv

than the combined ROE for each of the higher levels. Subordi

nate ROE , however, can be more restrictive as long as th

rules remain congruent with the intent of superior command

ers and overall political objectives. Special instruction

(SPINS) provide additional ROE guidance. For Deliberat

Force, COM5ATAF and the CAOC director issued periodi

SPINS that included a section on “ROE and Commander’s

Guidance” (SPINS 028 was in effect during Deliberate Force). 5 

Lastly, each air tasking message (ATM), which provides daily

specific information on targets selected for attack, may con 

tain information regarding special ROE for that particular at

tack. To fully examine ROE for Deliberate Force, one mus

therefore follow the rules’ evolution through each of these step s 

beginning with NATO’s first involvement in October 1992.

395
On 16 October 1992, NATO forces began Operation Sky Mon

tor in response to UNSCR 781, which requested member state

to assist the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) i

monitoring the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia

Herzegovina.

5 6 Although the resolution created an NFZ, it did no

authorize the engagement of unauthorized flights. Rather, i

called upon member states to “nationally or through regiona

agencies or arrangements” [read NATO] provide technical mon

toring and other capabilities to monitor compliance with th

NFZ.

5 7 Accordingly, ROE for Sky Monitor limited the use of forc

to self-defense, with no provisions for engagement of aircraf

based solely upon their violation of the NFZ.

5 8 The rules tha

applied during this period of operations derived from Suprem

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Support Plan 10001D

“NATO Europe Integrated Air Defense,”5 9 which attempted t

balance the desire to limit the possibility of provocation an

escalation with the sovereign right to take action in self-defense. 

Under this ROE , one could engage aircraft only for self-protection

For all other situations, including the protection of other friendl

forces, pilots had to request specific approval. 6 1 The restrictio

on the defense of friendly forces is clearly contrary to the pre

viously discussed US SROE notion of collective and unit self

defense.6 2 However, it illustrates the type of ROE expected in a 

observation/peacekeeping military operation in which any us

of force is extremely circumspect.

Figure 14.2. Development of ROE

396
NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) aircraft already in 

volved in Operation Sharp Guard (the naval monitoring an

subsequent embargo operations in the Adriatic ) carried ou

the monitoring of the NFZ. The addition of an NAEW orbi

established over Hungary with the support of the Hungaria

and Austrian governments in late October 1992 enhanced th

monitoring of the NFZ. The UN noted that more than fiv

hundred flights violated the NFZ from 16 October 1992 to 1

April 1993. 6 3

The numerous violations of the NFZ ban resulted in th

enactment of UNSCR 816, adopted on 31 March 1993, whic

provided an extension of the NFZ ban to include all fixed-win

and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Republic o

Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also included provisions for membe

states, subject to close coordination with UN secretary-genera

Willy Claes and UNPROFOR, to take “all necessary measures

to ensure compliance with the NFZ ban on flights. 6 4 The resolu 

tion led to an NAC decision on 8 April 1993 to enforce the NF

with NATO military aircraft. This decision resulted in the devel

opment and implementation of OPLAN 40101, which began a

noon Greenwich mean time (GMT) on 12 April 1993 with air 

craft from France , the Netherlands, and the United Sta tes.

6 5

Annex E to OPLAN 40101 contained ROE applicable to th

enforcement of the NFZ. The planners who wrote the ROE —

vigorously supervised by UN, NATO, and individual nationa

authorities 6 6—attempted to include the maximum amount o

military flexibility within the politically charged planning envi

ronment. Since the NAC approved all ROE, any one of the 1

sovereign NATO member nations had veto power over th

rules. The military feared that this “lowest common denomina

tor” approach would produce ineffective, “watered down

ROE .

6 7 Fortunately, this fear was never realized, and the re

sulting ROE provided, for the most part, robust rules for self

defense and mission accomplishment. A five- or six-man team

that comprised a small “Black Hole” type of planning grou

led by Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, commander of Allied Air Force

Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), tightly controlled th

whole planning process for ROE at Headquarters Allied Force

Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).

6 8

397
Within the first two weeks of operations, a significant prob

lem arose with enforcement of the NFZ. ROE provided fo

termination of all air use by the parties within Bosnia , makin

no distinction between fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. In fac

the UNSCR specifically addressed the ban of all unauthorized

fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft within Bosnian airspace

Unfortunately, the engagement of helicopters proved problem 

atic. Ultimately, COMAIRSOUTH issued guidance (endorsed

by the UN and NATO) that defined away the problem by deter 

mining that helicopters had no military significance.6 9 Th

thinking was that the risks for accidentally shooting down a UN

helicopter or some other helicopter transporting civilians o

casualties were so great that they outweighed the milita ry sig

nificance of rotary-wing aircraft. The memory of the shootdown

of the US Army Blackhawk helicopter in Iraq by US Air Forc

F-15s in April 1993 had some bearing on this conclusion .

7 0

Even though COMAIRSOUTH decided not to engage helicop

ters, the written ROE remained unchanged. During NATO 

monitoring and reporting of helicopter flights, the authorit

remained in place to engage helicopters under certain circum

stances. 7 1 This situation illustrates the point that writing, in 

terpreting, and implementing ROE are not always coextensive

highlighting the importance of judgment on the part of on-scen

commanders. Since “legislating” the military significance of an

particular item is impossible, a responsible commander—such

as COMAIRSOUTH—must ensure the interpretation and execu 

tion of ROE in accordance with the overall concept of operation

and political sensitivity associated with a given situation.

The next significant change in air operations occurred as 

result of UNSCR 836, 7 2 which responded to threats against th

previously created “safe areas” of Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica

Gorazde , Tuzla , and Zepa .

7 3 It did so by authorizing the use of air

power to support the UNPROFOR mandate of deterring attack

against the safe areas and responding in self-defense to an

attack, incursion, or deliberate obstruction in or around thos

areas that affected the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR

or protected humanitarian convoys. At a meeting on 10 Jun

1993, NATO foreign ministers agreed that NATO would provid

protective airpower in case of attacks against UNPROFOR i

Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the request for UN

398
member-state assistance. 74 A report by the UN secretary-genera

on 14 June 1993 asked NATO to “prepare plans for provisions o

the necessary air support capacity, in close coordination with

me and my Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia 

(emphasis added). 7 5 UNSCR 836 and the request of the UN

sec retary-general led to the deployment of close air suppor

(CAS) aircraft to the Southern Region and NATO’s air cover fo

UNPROFOR.

7 6 The specific requirement for “close coordination

with the UN resulted in the infamous dual-key process.

In addition to the deployment of CAS aircraft, NATO decide

to make immediate preparations for stronger measures, includ

ing air strikes, against the people responsible for the strangu 

lation of Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a

well as those responsible for wide-scale interference with hu

manitarian assistance. At an NAC meeting on 2–3 Augus

1993, NATO military authorities had the task of drawing up

in close coordination with UNPROFOR, operational options fo

air strikes, including appropriate command and control (C 

and decision-making arrangements for their implementation

On 9 August 1993, they produced a memorandum listing op

erational options for air strikes approved by NAC .

7 7 Out of thi

memorandum flowed several crucial ideas and themes tha

ultimately affected both ROE and air operations executed dur

ing Deliberate Force. These included C2 coordination betwee

UN and NATO (the dual key), proportionality of force used in

air strikes, sensitivity to collateral damage, military necessity

phased approach to expanded air strikes, and breakout o

target categories into option-one, -two, and -three targets

OPLAN 40101, change two, annex E, “Rules of Engagement

reflects these issues and themes.7 8

The breakout of potential targets into three categories ha

its basis in the concepts of proportionality, military necessity

and gradual application of force.7 9 The NAC memorandum’s

discussion on the use of force articulated these concepts.8 

The discussion on air strike options noted that the selection o

targets needed to take into consideration proportionality a

well as the importance of showing resolve and capability; th

selection should also discourage retaliation. 8 1 The concept o

operations entailed a phased approach in which the firs

phase commenced with an initial use of airpower, limited in

399
time and scope but robust enough to achieve the desired ef

fect. Thereafter, if required and when authorized by the appro 

priate political authority, NATO would conduct air strikes in

phases that focused first on the immediate environs of Sara 

jevo or other areas. These strikes would have the specifi

purpose of assisting relief of the siege, facilitating the deliver

of humanitarian assistance, and supporting UNPROFOR i

the performance of its mandate. NATO might have to emplo

subsequent phases to expand operations to encompass tar 

gets that influenced the sustainability of the siege forces.8 

Planners, therefore, needed to group and prioritize targets t

show target type and geographic locality to assure congruenc

with political and legal mandates.

As a result of these considerations, NAC decision MCM

KAD-084-93 established option-one, -two, and -three targe

sets to meet these requirements. Option-one targets encom 

passed the first-strike phase and included not only militaril

significant targets but also those—such as specific artiller

batteries participating in a siege—that visibly impeded or pre

vented the implementation of UNSCRs .

83 Option-two target

covered the initial follow-on phase and included direct an

essential support items such as artillery/heavy weapons, sup

ply points and munitions sites, C2 facilities, and early warnin

radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. 8 4 Option-thre

targets covered the expanded operations phase and included

targets of strategic value outside the immediate areas unde

siege. Many of the same types of targets discussed in option

two but not located in the immediate area of the siege fel

in to option three, as well as items such as military-related

petroleum, oil, and lubricants and anything that would ten

to degrade overall military capability throughout Bosnia

Herzegovin a. By breaking out the potential targets into sepa 

rate option sets, military and political authorities could con 

trol the escalation of violence by authorizing attacks in 

phased and gradual approach. For each of the target options

one fact remained constant—no matter the option chosen, n

attack could occur without close coordination with the UN

through UNPROFOR.

The issue regarding C2 coordination between the UN an

NATO resulted in what has come to be known as the dual-ke

400
process. From the very beginning of Deny Flight, an ongoin

dialogue had occurred regarding what the term close coordina

tion meant and who controlled the use of military force within

Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 5 As noted above, the requirement to co 

ordinate closely with the UN before initiating CAS or ai

strikes came from the language in the UNSCR and the repor

of the UN secretary-general. In practice, the dual-key proces

required approval of the appropriate level of authority in th

NATO and UN chains of command (fig. 14.3) before execution

of any weapons release.

The NATO chain of command proceeded directly from

SACEUR through CINCSOUTH to COMAIRSOUTH t

COM5ATAF and finally to the CAOC director. The approva

authority for CAS support on the NATO side was delegated al

the way down to COM5ATAF and the CAOC director. 86 On th

UN side, however, the approval authority proved somewha

problematic. The UN secretary-general himself held approva

authority for the first use of CAS. Thus, if a UNPROFOR groun

unit came under attack, a tactical air control party (TACP) o

forward air controller (FAC) assigned to the unit would initiate 

“Blue Sword” CAS request. The request would go through the ai

operations control center to Sarajevo for evaluation by the UN

PROFOR commander and, if approved, to the force commande

of United Nations Peace Forces (F C UNPF) in Zagreb , where 

Figure 14.3. NATO and UN Chains of Command

401
crisis-action team cell would also evaluate the request. It the

went to Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary-general’s specia

representative (SGSR) to the former Yugoslavia and, finally, t

New York for approval by the UN secretary-general himself.

The first attempted request for CAS by a UNPROFOR

ground unit provides an example of the difficulties associated

with the dual-key approach. On 12 March 1994, a Frenc

TACP in the Bihac area called for CAS to stop a Serbia

40-millimeter antiaircraft artillery (AAA) attack on UNPROFOR

troops. Even though an AC-130 was in the area and had th

offending artillery piece in its sights, approval from the UN

side of the dual key was not forthcoming. Due to problems in

locating Akashi, the request was not approved until six hour

after the TACP’s request. In the meantime, the AC-130 left th

area and came back two or three times. Unfortunately, whe

the approval finally came through, the TACP and the AC-13

could no longer positively identify the target, so the forme

called off the CAS request.8 7

The dual-key process also caused some initial confusion

regarding the distinction between receiving approval to drop

weapons and actual clearance to do so. OPLAN 40101, chang

two, provided ROE conditions required for weapons release.8 

Concerns for collateral damage and the imperative to avoid

fratricide resulted in ROE that not only required approval from

both UN and NATO channels but also required positive identi

fication and clearance from the FAC . Because there was n

requirement to ask the FAC whether he had received prio

approval through the UN chain of command, the pilot could

assume that if the FAC gave clearance for attack, the latte

had requisite approval from the UN to do so. After receivin

Chariot’s approval, the pilot could attack a positively identified

target if the FAC gave clearance to do so.

For the entire period leading up to Deliberate Force, UN

PROFOR ground personnel received approval for CAS a total o

three times. The first use of CAS occurred on 10 April 1994 in

response to a request made by UNPROFOR military observer

in Gorazde . After approval by the SGSR, two US Air Force F

16Cs dropped bombs under the control of a UN FAC . Approva

from the UN chain of command took less than two hours.8 9 Th

next day, UNPROFOR again requested air protection for UN

402
personnel in Gorazde. Two US Marine Corps F/ A-18A aircraft 

also under the control of a UN FAC, bombed and strafed

targets. The last CAS request came in July 1995 during th

siege of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb army (BSA).

9 0 Often

in lieu of an approved CAS mission, NATO aircraft would en 

gage in “air presence” demonstrations, conspicuously showin

themselves to the offending ground forces by flying over th

area at high speed with afterburners to scare the enemy int

stopping the attack. Even though the aircraft released no weap

ons in these passes, the demonstrations often proved effective in

temporarily halting attacks on UNPROFOR positions. 9 1

The ineffectiveness of the dual-key process came under in 

tense fire after the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa safe area

in July 1995. Even though NATO aircraft were available an

present during the Bosnian Serb siege of Srebrenica , the UN

did not turn its key until nearly three days after the attack

had begun. By this time CAS could not save the safe area . 

report presented by the Dutch Ministry of Defense in Decem 

ber 1995 blamed the UN’s misinterpretation of Bosnian Serb

objectives and the UN command structure for withholdin

NATO airpower to deter the BSA attack.9 2 The report stated

that despite repeated requests for CAS from the Dutc

peacekeepers on the ground in Srebrenica —with NATO CA

aircraft on airborne alert over the Adriatic—the UN approved

only one last-minute CAS mission,9 3 which helped th

peacekeepers regroup north of Srebrenica but did not stop th

BSA from taking the town. As a consequence of this inciden

Secretary-General Claes transferred the UN key from Akash

to Gen Bernard Janvier , the FC UNPF. At this point, decision

about how and when to use military force fell to the UN an

NATO military commanders. 9 4

The close coordination and consultation procedures also ap

plied to the use of air strikes in response to violations of th

UNSCRs. Because UNPROFOR, a lightly armed UN peacekeep

ing force, could protect neither itself nor the safe areas from

BSA attacks, NATO airpower became both a mechanism fo

providing force protection (i.e., CAS ) for UN personnel and 

threat to deter the BSA.

9 5 In February 1994 NAC decided t

establish a 20-kilometer (km) exclusion zone around Sarajevo

declaring that 10 days after 2400 GMT on 10 February 1994

403
heavy weapons not removed from this zone or turned over t

UN control would be subject to NATO air strikes.9 6 NAC

authorized CINCSOUTH, in close coordination with the UN, t

launch air strikes against artillery or mortar positions in o

around Sarajevo (including areas outside the exclusion zone

that UNPROFOR considered responsible for attacks agains

civilian targets in that city. 9 7 Because the threat of airpowe

proved successful in forcing effective compliance with th

NATO ultimatums, the air strikes were not required. Ulti

mately, NAC established exclusion zones around each of th

remaining safe areas. The threat of using air strikes against 

limited exclusion zone or a specific piece of military hardwar

influenced military operations throughout Deny Flight an

Deliberate Force.

After Krajina Serbs fired on the Bihac safe area from Croa 

tian territory and in light of the history of problems experi

enced by UN forces in the Krajina area dating back to Septem 

ber 1993, UNSCR 908 extended CAS support to the territor

of the Republic of Croatia on 31 March 1994. Later that yea

UNSCR 958 extended the mandate under UNSCR 836 for CAS

and air strikes to the Republic of Croatia .

9 8 Change four t

OPLAN 40101 reflected these UNSCRs, both of which prompte

subsequent NAC mandates.9 9 The resolutions and mandate

tended to react in a limited and proportional manner to th

nature of the situation in Bosnia and Croatia . Each time the UN

responded to an act of Serbian aggression, it raised th

ante—but never in a proactive or preventive manner .

Throughout the remainder of Deny Flight, NATO conducted

limited air strikes in accordance with the provisions of UNSCR

836 and 958. One such strike occurred in response to attack

by Bosnian Serb aircraft flying out of Udbina airfield in Serb

held Croatia . Although NATO carried out the attack of Udbin

under UNSCR 958, the UN—not wanting to kill anyone—pro 

hibited strikes against aircraft on the ground.100 Although

NATO complied with this restriction, it refused to conduct th

air strike without hitting the enemy air defense system tha

protected the airfield. Although the UN had the same reserva 

tions about killing people who operated the integrated air de

fense system (IADS) equipment, NATO prevailed in the discus

sion by pointing out that it would conduct suppression o

404
enemy air defenses (SEAD) strikes strictly to defend the at

tacking aircrews. 101 This reluctance by the UN to cause an

kind of casualty (whether military or civilian) carried through

to the execution of Deliberate Force.

In addition to CAS and air strikes, air-to-air engagement

also took place prior to Deliberate Force. On 28 Februar

1994, the engagement and shootdown of four fixed-win

Galeb/Jastreb aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovin

demonstrated ROE’s air-to-air procedures. After NAEW air 

craft detected unknown aircraft south of Banja Luka on th

morning of the 28th, two NATO aircraft (US Air Force F-16s

intercepted and identified six Galeb/Jastreb aircraft in th

area. In accordance with this phase of ROE , the NAEW aircraf

issued two warnings to land or exit the NFZ, ignored by th

Galeb/Jastreb pilots. Indeed, during the warnings, the violat

ing aircraft dropped bombs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Followin

the ROE and after receiving Chariot’s approval, the NATO

fighters engaged the planes and shot down three of them. 

second pair of NATO fighters (also US Air Force F-16s) arrive

and shot down a fourth violator. The two remaining enem

aircraft left the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

102

This incident illustrates the phased and stepped nature o

ROE developed for Deny Flight. The political and military sen 

sitivity of operations in the Balkans required flexible ROE abl

to control the use of force as the threat warranted and able t

avoid the escalation of hostilities. ROE drafted for OPLAN

40101, after the enactment of UNSCR 836 and the resultin

NATO Military Committee Memorandum MCM-KAD-084-93

contained basically the same provisions existing at the tim

NATO executed Deliberate Force. Planners linked ROE to 

phased approach to operations that depended upon the situ 

ation at hand.

Each of the ROE phases reflects several of the element

noted earlier in reference to MCM-KAD-084-93. The concept

of proportionality, military necessity, and collateral damag

dominated the thought process surrounding the developmen

and execution of ROE for air strike options. The single mos

defining element of every planning and execution decision wa

the overriding need to avoid collateral damage and escalator

force. Thus, by focusing on the concepts of proportionality

405
military necessity, and collateral damage , NATO planner

hoped to keep military options congruent with political objec

tives. The degree to which NATO adhered to these principles i

likely the ultimate reason for the success of the mission an

the initiation of the peace process in Dayton, Ohio.

After the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, ROE remained basi

cally unchanged and ready for the upcoming execution of De

liberate Force. The fall of these two safe areas precipitated th

discussions and decisions that led to the planning and ulti

mate execution of this operation.

Implementation of ROE

in Operation Deliberate Force

After the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in Jul

1995, initial discussions by NATO and UN officials dealt wit

an appropriate response to the Bosnian Serbs should the

make any moves toward taking Gorazde (later extended t

include Sarajevo , Tuzla , and Bihac). The NATO London Con 

ference on 21 July 1995 decided that “an attack on Gorazd

will be met by substantial and decisive airpower.”103 NAC deci

sions of 25 July and 1 August specified meeting further Bos 

nian Serb action with a firm and rapid response aimed a

deterring attacks on safe areas and employing, if necessary

the timely and effective use of airpower until attacks on o

threats to these areas had ceased. 104 The conference may hav

been a way to finesse the UN and avoid a confrontation in th

UN Security Council , where the Russians probably would hav

vetoed any increased use of force over the Bosnian Serbs.

10

By creating an NAC decision that “interpreted” already exist

ing UNSCR mandates, the conference avoided the possibilit

of a problem with the UN Security Council.

The NAC decision established “trigger” events that would

initiate graduated air operations as determined by the com 

mon judgment of NATO and UN military commanders: “(1) An

concentration of forces and/or heavy weapons, and the conduc

of other military preparations which, in the common judgmen

of the NATO and UN Military Commanders, pr esented a direc

threat to the remaining UN Safe Areas or (2) Direct attacks (e.g

406
ground, artillery or aircraft) on the designated safe-areas.

10

The trigger events applied equally to each of the safe areas

Adm Leighton Smith, CINCSOUTH, pointed out that confirm 

ing the first trigger would have been difficult for each of th

safe areas because the BSA already had a high concentration

of forces and heavy weapons located there. Ultimately, i

would have come down to the difficult matter of gauging th

intent of the BSA (although NATO did have several indicator

for doing so). 107

In accordance with the London agreement, once the UN an

NATO military commanders agreed that a trigger event ha

occurred, NATO authorized the attack of targets associated

with option two from MCM-KAD-084-93, including concentra 

tions of forces. The NATO/UN military commanders could

continue the air strikes as long as they thought they wer

needed to defend a safe area and a wider geographic are

(zone of action [ZOA]). The strikes also could target any con 

centrations of troops deemed to pose a serious threat to th

UN safe area.

108 The NAC decision assigned execution author

ity for air actions to Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH.

109

Because of the negative experience with the dual-key pro

cess and the perceived inability of the UN political structure t

make timely decisions, NAC stressed the importance of th

UN’s transferring execution authority for air actions to it

military commanders.110 In apparent agreement with this re

quest, the UN secretary-general transferred the key from

Akashi to General Janvier, as mentioned above. This action

showed the UN’s trust and confidence in the ability of militar

leaders to ensure that any military use of force would compl

with UN mandates and policy guidance without the need fo

direct political oversight. Although never executed, the NAC

decision also included provisions to authorize expanded op

erations against option three or elements thereof if any of th

warring factions continued offensive operations against th

safe areas in spite of air strikes under option two. 111

Lastly, the NAC decision addressed the use of SEAD aircraf

against the BSA’s IADS.

112 NATO would attack enemy IADS 

and when air strikes in support of a safe area commenced an

would continue to attack only for the duration of that opera 

tion. One can consider attacks on enemy IADS a form o

407
preemptive self-defense since IADS posed a threat to friendl

air forces operating in proximity. This policy proved trouble 

some for many UN political leaders who viewed attacks on

anything not directly located in or around the safe area exclu 

sion zone as verging on option three.

The NAC decision generated a memorandum of under 

standing (MOU) between General Janvier and Admiral Smith 

providing UN interpretation of the NAC decisions discussed

above. 113 This MOU covered the phasing of operations, opera 

tion considerations (including ZOAs , IADS, and air-land coor

dination), targeting arrangements (including targeting board

and approved target lists), and conditions for initiation (trigge

events). The memorandum led to discussions between Genera

Janvier and Admiral Smith regarding the types of targets tha

could be struck and the ZOAs that would apply if a trigge

event occurred.

Initially, the UN wanted the ZOA limited in order to closely

relate to the attacked or threatened safe area; it also felt tha

NATO should direct air strikes only toward those forces tha

committed the trigger offense. According to Admiral Smith 

General Janvier thought that the ZOA should extend the cur

rent exclusion zone to 25 km rather than 20 km. Admira

Smith and NATO, however, thought ZOAs should apply to 

much wider geographic area as long as one could establish 

connection to the threatened safe area and the target.

114 Afte

some debate, the UN proposed two ZOAs dividing Bosnia

Herzegovina in half with overlap in the area around Tuzla (fig

14.4). 115 Accordingly, should a trigger event occur in Sarajevo o

Gorazde , planners would activate the southeast ZOA, and air 

craft would strike targets associated with that zone. Alterna 

tively, if Bihac were the location for the trigger event, air strike

would focus on the northwest ZOA. If Tuzla were attacked o

threatened, either one or both ZOAs could be activated.

Regardless of the location of the trigger event, NATO could

strike IADS wherever it affected friendly air operations. Conse

quently, NATO developed Deadeye Southeast and Deadey

Northwest as two IADS target sets, both of which were tied t

the self-defense needs of the aircrews operating in the tactica

area of operations rather than to ZOAs .

116 For all other targets

408
the ability to target was based upon location of the trigge

event and the active ZOA.

Targeting for Deliberate Force did not amount to an all-ou

strategic bombing campaign designed to destroy the Serbs

industrial infrastructure and capability to wage war. Rather

NATO limited the targets and used force in a graduated man

ner to compel the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs. Genera

types of targets for Deliberate Force included IADS (earl

warning radar/acquisition radar/SAM sites/communications

etc.), fielded forces (heavy weapons/troop concentrations), C

(headquarters/command facilities/communications), direc

and essential support (ammo/supply depot and storage/sup

porting garrison areas/logistics areas), and lines of communi

cations (transportation choke points and bridges). 117 In select

ing specific targets within these categories, the Joint Targetin

Board (UN and NATO) worked hard to find easily hit target

with limited potential for collateral damage.

Figure 14.4. Zones of Action for Deliberate Force (From Corona briefin

slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 

December 1995, United States Air Force Historical Research Agenc

Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3)

409
In addition to the normal concerns about collateral damage 

General Janvier remained extremely sensitive to casualtie

(including BSA casualties). When the general reviewed one o

the initial target lists, he demanded that a target labeled “bar 

racks” be removed because he wanted to avoid killing peo 

ple. 118 Admiral Smith had failed to explain to General Janvie

the distinction between targets and desired mean point o

impact (DMPI). Targets could involve a number of individua

DMPIs within a target complex. The fact that planners de

scribe a target as a barracks does not mean that aircraf

would strike a barracks building. In fact, the same barrack

complex might include a very lucrative ammunition storag

area with a different DMPI than that of the barracks. Under 

standing General Janvier’s concern, Admiral Smith merely re

defined the DMPIs selected for attack, and General Janvie

agreed to the targets.

119

The trigger event for Deliberate Force was the shelling of 

Sarajevo marketplace, presumably by the BSA. When Admira

Smith saw the results of the shelling on Cable News Network

(CNN), he called the NATO liaison to the FC UNPF and told

him to tell General Janvier that if the UN determined that BS

had fired the shell, then NATO requested air strike option

according to the MOU. 120 Once Lt Gen Rupert Smith, com 

mander of UNPROFOR (who was sitting in for the vacationin

General Janvier ), confirmed BSA responsibility, the UN an

NATO turned their keys , and Operation Deliberate Force be

gan. General Janvier later concurred with this decision.

During Deliberate Force several issues relating to the inter 

pretation and execution of ROE arose, the most prominen

being the degree to which concerns over collateral damag

drove the planning and execution of air strikes. The mos

telling indication of the concern over collateral damage wa

the fact that General Ryan personally selected every DMP

because he felt that the political sensitivity of the operation

demanded strict accountability on the part of the air com 

mander. He believed that every bomb dropped or missil

launched not only had a tactical-level effect but a possibl

strategic effect. Accordingly, Ryan directed his staff to evaluat

all proposed targets and DMPIs for their military significanc

and their potential for high, medium, or low assessments o

410
collateral damage. For example, intelligence personnel de 

scribed the Pale army supply depot as a key BSA supply bu

with high potential for collateral damage.

121 Similarly, the

assessed the Pale ammo depot south as having medium po

tential for collateral damage and the Jahorina radio communi

cation (RADCOM) station as having low potential.122 These ex 

amples illustrate the spectrum of collateral-damage probabilitie

for various targets. Based upon the importance of each targe

and its potential for collateral damage , General Ryan selected

the specific DMPIs for attack.

In addition to the actual selection of DMPIs, the concern fo

collateral damage often drove weapons selection and tactic

for weapons release. Clearly, precision-guided munition

(PGM) were the weapons of choice. Of the more than on

thousand munitions dropped during Deliberate Force, nearl

70 percent were precision munitions.123 Of all munition

dropped by US aircraft, more than 98 percent were precision

munitions. 124 Although ROE did not specifically require PGMs 

it did state that “target planning and weapons delivery wil

include considerations to minimize collateral damage .”125

At one point during the operation, an aircraft bombed 

bridge, using the standard profile of attacking along the lengt

of the span, and released two PGMs on the designated DMPI

Unfortunately, the second PGM went long and destroyed 

farmhouse located next to the end of the bridge.126 As a resul

ROE underwent modification via the ATM/SPINS to require 

much more restrictive approach for attacking bridges. 127 Air

crews would now have to make a dry pass over the targeted

bridge, attack on an axis perpendicular to the bridge rathe

than along its length, and release only one bomb per pass.

When first notified of this change in ROE, the commander

and aircrews at Aviano Air Base (AB) became very concerned

feeling that it placed pilots at increased risk. Despite Aviano

initial refusal to fly the mission as directed, pilots eventually flew

the mission successfully. 128 Upon hearing the concerns of th

aircrews over the dry-pass ROE, General Ryan and Genera

Hornburg decided to rescind the ROE restriction in the ATM o

12 September 1995, the next day. 129 This incident illustrate

the difficulty commanders faced in reconciling the competin

411
demands of force protection and minimiza tion of collatera

damage—a balance that shifted as operations progressed.

Every section of ROE included a statement concerning th

need to minimize collateral damage. These included section

dealing with the engagement of air-to-air and surface-to-ai

systems (“take into account the need to minimize collatera

damage”);130 with CAS (“limit collateral damage to the min

mum that is militarily feasible”); 131 and with SEAD (“no unac

ceptable collateral damage”).132 Clearly, concerns about collat

eral damage represented the defining issue for Deliberate Force.

Thirty-five hundred sorties and more than one thousan

dropped munitions produced only two confirmed instances o

any significant collateral damage (the farmhouse inciden

mentioned above and an accidental strike on a water-treatmen 

plant). 133 When questioned by a CNN journalist about report

of significant amounts of collateral damage , Admiral Smit

pointed out that if such damage had indeed occurred, CNN

would be filming the damage instead of interviewing him.13

The careful selection of DMPIs by General Ryan , combined

with careful attacks by NATO aircrews, resulted in one of th

most precise operations ever conducted.

Concern for minimizing collateral damage also resulted in on

of the more controversial ROE issues in Deliberate Force—th

“dual correlation ” requirement for reactive SEAD strikes. SPIN

required all SEAD mission commanders to see that plannin

and positioning of SEAD aircraft included consideration o

methods to ensure engagement of the desired target, minimiz

chances of engaging unintended targets, and mitigate the im 

pact of possible high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM) am 

biguities.135 Due to these concerns, aircraft detecting a possi

ble SAM engagement were directed to depart the immediat

threat area, using an appropriate defensive profile and coun

termeasures as required. Only in extreme situations (e.g., ex 

periencing a threat without reasonable means of escape) wer

aircrews authorized to use any measure for self-defense. 13

Preemptive HARM strikes were not authorized without Char 

iot’s approval, and pilots could employ reactive HARM strike

in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia only if one of the followin

conditions existed:

412
A. Positive indication of a hostile act (confirmed missile or projectiles

fired), or

B. Dual correlation of positive indications of hostile intent, further

defined as aircraft illuminated by surface-to-air (SAM)/anti-air artillery (AAA) fire control radar and/or any air defense system radar

directly related to these SAM / AAA systems.

C. Other instances of demonstrated hostile intent, including other

instances by systems other than those described in para B of this

section, when approved by Chariot .

137

Although the dual-correlation requirement infringed upon

the inherent right to self-defense, it did reduce the likelihood

that reactive and preemptive SEAD operations would caus

otherwise avoidable collateral damage . Dual-correlation ROE

was restrictive, but leadership preferred to err on the conser 

vative side.138 Even though NATO had a limited number o

SEAD aircraft, the chance of HARM ambiguity represented to

great a risk for fratricide or collateral damage to allow mor

extensive use of lethal SEAD by aircraft without dual-correlatio 

capability. 139

Dual correlation potentially reduced collateral damage ; how 

ever, it definitely imposed tactical handicaps on NATO flier

US Navy aircrews, for example, were not pleased by the re

striction the policy placed on their use of preemptiv

HARMs.

140 Most SEAD aircraft had no problems with dua

correlation since both the aircraft and the weapon they car 

ried, typically a HARM, had separate internal capabilities t

achieve correlation. However, for other less capable aircraf

ROE required that unless an off-board platform provided th

second correlation, the aircraft would have to depart the im 

mediate threat area.

The section of ROE dealing with combat search and rescu

(CSAR) also caused some concern. NATO ROE authorizin

search and rescue (SAR) aircraft and naval vessels to us

“self-defense force as necessary” (emphasis added)141 to ensur

the recovery of survivors was inconsistent with US ROE fo

CSAR, which provided for a greater degree of force in recover

ing survivors by allowing “minimum force as necessary” (em

phasis added). 142 Since US ROE applied to Operation Provid

Promise (the humanitarian airlift operation into Bosnia ) mis

sions and NATO ROE applied to Deny Flight and Deliberat

413
Force missions, special operations forces designated to go int

the same threat area to recover survivors could theoreticall

be authorized a different level of force, depending upon wha

the aircraft was doing when it was shot down. For example, i

a special-ops helicopter gunship were approaching the loca 

tion of the survivor of a downed aircraft, the helicopter—unde

NATO ROE—could not fire upon an enemy truck with armed

personnel unless it committed a hostile act or demonstrated

hostile intent toward the helicopter (reactive). Under US ROE 

however, the helicopter could use the minimum force neces

sary to prevent the enemy truck from capturing the pilot o

interfering with the pickup (preemptive).

The difference between the levels of force authorized in th

two ROEs resulted, in part, from the fact that NATO doctrin

does not address the “combat” part of CSAR. Understandably

SAR—without the combat perspective—relates to issues o

self-defense. CSAR, a more robust form of SAR that is uniqu

to the US military, seeks to recover survivors within a hostil

threat environment.

The Navy’s Sixth Fleet made several requests to use U

rather than NATO ROE for CSAR operations. In a NATO con 

ference that addressed the issue of US versus NATO ROE 

NATO members agreed that US ROE would apply to any U

forces engaged in a CSAR mission.143 However, no one mad

changes to the written ROE in OPLAN 40101. During Deliber 

ate Force the actual ROE for a CSAR mission proved “ver

sketchy,” especially considering the political sensitivity of th

operation.144 The Navy continued to press for more specifi

ROE and urged the adoption of US SROE . According to Ma

Dan Bush, legal advisor to the CAOC during Deliberate Force

Generals Ryan and Hornburg decided that because Deliberat

Force was a NATO operation, NATO ROE —in accordance wit

OPLAN 40101—would apply to everyone involved. Anyone no

using NATO ROE would fail to appear on the ATM schedule. 14

Fortunately, ROE for CSAR was not put to the test durin

Deliberate Force.

Targeting and execution differed from ROE in the context o

casualties. Commanders for Deliberate Force repeatedl

stressed that “stuff ” (things) rather than people were the tar

gets for this operation.146 Although the Bosnian Serbs’ lack o

414
personnel, compared to the Bosnian Muslim and Croatia

forces, constituted a potential center of gravity, planners decide

not to target them. In essence, NATO strategy sought to wag

aggressive peace rather than war. Since one of the key strength

of the BSA was its armor and heavy weapons, NATO planned t

take away as much of that strength as quickly as possible.

NATO’s desire to minimize the loss of civilian and militar

life constrained tactics and target selection in other ways. In

the parlance of the CAOC staff, structures associated wit

“soft pudgies” (people) were not intentionally targeted.147 

they were, aircraft often hit them at night, when people wer

less likely to be around. For the same reason, General Rya

decided to move attacks on bridges, originally scheduled fo

the daytime, to night. 148

At the same time ROE and military commanders restricted

targeting options and execution to minimize collateral dam

age, commanders continually stressed the importance of forc

protection. Admiral Smith’s three priorities for Deliberat

Force, in order of precedence, were (1) force protection, (2

minimization of collateral damage , and (3) effective strikes on

targets.

149 Specifically designed to ensure the safety of NATO

forces, ROE maximized force protection by limiting the expo

sure of NATO aircraft to threatening situations and by allow 

ing aircraft to use force in self-defense against both hostil

acts and demonstrated hostile intent. ROE limited the expo

sure of NATO aircraft to threats by prohibiting operation ove

land in Bosnia or Croatia without SEAD protection and b

prohibiting non-SEAD aircraft from operating within know

SAM threat rings. 150 If an aircraft were engaged or threatened

with demonstrated hostile intent without a reasonable mean

of escape (as determined by the pilot at the time), aircrew

could use any measure for self-defense, 151 the latter defined in

OPLAN 40101 as “action taken in consonance with internationa

law to protect oneself, or other Friendly Force in the vicinity.”152

This definition closely tracks the definition of self-defens

found in US SROE discussed earlier in this chapter. ROE

therefore proved robust enough to authorize the use of force t

protect NATO forces from any attack or demonstration of hos 

tile intent. ROE that provided the authority to act and th

flexibility to use sound judgment in determining when an

415
how to use force in self-defense alleviated concerns abou

force protection. The lessons of the USS Stark and the Marin

barracks in Beirut were not forgotten.

The combined concerns of force protection, collateral dam

age, and overall success of the mission resulted in very re

stricted operations. Aircraft could strike only assigne

DMPIs —no targets of opportunity.

153 SPINS contained specifi

reference to these constraints: “For fixed sites, aircrews wil

attack ATM specified DMPIs only, even if these DMPIs hav

previously been hit.”154 In fact, the ATM reinforced the ROE 

“The only valid target DMPIs are those assigned via the ATM

process or directly assigned, real time, by the CAOC battl

staff director. . . . Target DMPIs assigned via the ATM are onl

valid for the period of that ATM.”155

This tight control resulted in what officials at Aviano AB

termed the effective but inefficient use of airpower. From th

tactical perspective, constant changes in targets as well a

interference in weapons and tactics proved frustrating. From

the strategic perspective, however, NATO air planners felt the

could accept a little inefficiency, particularly if that was th

price of avoiding an incident such as the one that occurred in

the Al Firdos bunker during Operation Desert Storm. To ensur

effectiveness, leadership gave supreme importance to the min

mization of collateral damage and ordered the development an

implementation of ROE to translate these concerns into mean 

ingful guidance for the effective prosecution of Deliberate Force.

Implications for the Future

Having explored ROE for Operation Deliberate Force, on

becomes aware of several implications for the use of airpowe

in future peace operations. First, and perhaps the most obvi 

ous, is the degree to which the military restricted its ow

operations in Deliberate Force. The restrictions placed on tar

geting remind one of those used in Vietnam. Unlike the politi

cal restrictions placed on military operations in Vietnam , how

ever, in Deliberate Force the military’s own restraint limited

operations. We may, therefore, be witnessing a 180-degre

s hift in the relationship between political and military infl uence

416
in ROE . Rather than politicians tying the hands of the mili

tary, the military may now be tying its own hands.156 The Ai

Force Studies and Analysis Division came to a similar conclu 

sion in its report on Deliberate Force: “There was nothing in

the upper levels of DELIBERATE FORCE’s command and con 

trol structure to compare with President Lyndon Johnson 

sometimes weekly sessions picking targets for the Rollin

Thunder campaign over North Vietnam in the 1960s. To a

impressive degree, guided bombs had permitted Air Force offi

cers to internalize the kind of restraint Johnson wished t

impose upon them. In DELIBERATE FORCE, it was Genera

Ryan himself who exercised most of the restraint.”157

This internalization of restraint by the military leadership i

due in many respects to the “years of inculcation in the law o

armed conflict .”158 NATO political authorities trusted the abil

ity of their military leadership to take general guidance an

plan and execute military operations consistent with tha

guidance. One can attribute part of this trust to the percep

tion that US and NATO military forces understand and comply

with the laws of war. Since Vietnam, US forces have consis 

tently shown that they conduct military operations in an ex 

tremely professional manner and exercise the utmost restrain

in using force to achieve an objective. The tight control tha

General Ryan placed over military operations likely will rein 

force the perception that, in many respects, the military is 

self-regulating instrument of power. In the future this demon 

stration of restraint may allow the NCA to feel confident tha

given mission-type orders, the military will plan and execut

operations consistent with political objectives and in compli

ance with the laws of armed conflict. The commander on th

scene, cognizant of the political objectives and sensitive to th

unique threat conditions facing forces in the area of opera 

tions, is in the best position to draft effective ROE. The lati

tude given by political authorities and the degree to which th

military controls its operations are key factors in the develop

ment of acceptable and effective ROE.

A related issue is the importance of congruence of contex

objectives, and means in conflicts such as Deliberate Force. 

complete divergence of objectives and means occurred be

tween NATO and UN forces during Deny Flight. On the on

417
hand, UN forces, who sought to keep a peace that did no

exist, operated under very restrictive, self-defensive ROE an

had limited military capability. Despite operating as the UN

Protection Force , they could not even protect themselves. O

the other hand, NATO forces, present under peace-enforcemen 

provisions, sought to deter or compel behavior through th

use of military force. NATO ROE , therefore, provided for 

much more robust use of force to achieve the desired objectives.

Differences in ROE on when and how the UN and NATO

could use military force doomed the dual-key process from th

start. NATO always viewed the use of force in terms of compel

ling the Bosnian Serbs to do or not do something. But the UN

viewed force in the much more limited context of self-defense

Only after Srebrenica and Zepa fell and the UN decided to pul

back its forces to allow NATO to conduct air strikes, did con 

gruence occur among the situation in Bosnia , the politica

objectives, and the use of military force to obtain those objec

tives. Clearly, ROE for a peace operation should relate not t

its title (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc.) but to th

reality of the situation on the ground. If no peace agreemen

exists and fighting continues, then one should write ROE t

provide for the compellent use of military force until the fac

tions agree to a truce. If a UNSCR proves insufficient to war

rant the more aggressive type of ROE , then one should deplo

no military forces until the adoption of such a resolution.

The ROE concept of categories of target options, designed t

keep the level of force to the minimum amount necessary, wa

an excellent method of ensuring maximum control over esca 

lation. However, the use of target-option categories can b

harmful if one exhausts the target list without havin

achieved the political objectives . At that point one either esca 

lates the level of force to the next target-option category or th

use of force loses credibility. Such was the case in Deliberat

Force: negotiators had great concerns that NATO would ru

out of option-two targets before convincing the Bosnian Serb

to accept a truce and join peace talks. An interview with Am 

bassador Christopher Hill revealed that the US State Depart 

ment and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke harbored exactl

these concerns.159

418
The fact that officials at the State Department had concern

about the execution of the air operation highlights the need

for a State Department liaison to the air operations center i

any operation in which one uses airpower as a coercive tool t

achieve diplomatic leverage. Future operations similar to De

liberate Force probably will use airpower to provide an envi

ronment conducive to diplomatic negotiations. To ensure com 

plete congruence between the desires and concerns of th

negotiation team and the execution of the air operation, th

liaison should coordinate these concerns with military person 

nel who plan and execute the air operations. Such a person

would not necessarily exercise political oversight but act as 

conduit to ensure connectivity among diplomatic negotiators

military commanders, and planners.

The last major implication of the implementation of ROE i

Deliberate Force is the high percentage of precision weapon

used in the operation. To reiterate, nearly 70 percent of al

munitions used and more than 98 percent of munition

dropped by the United States were precision weapons. Con 

cerns over the minimization of collateral damage led to thi

unprecedented reliance on PGMs. The issue for ROE i

whether the use of PGMs has minimized the chance for collat

eral damage to the point that one expects zero collateral dam

age and legally requires it for future operations.

The law of armed conflict does not require that one conduc

military operations so as to eliminate the possibility of collat

eral damage . Arguments that the existence of PGMs have in 

creased the standard of care required to conduct military op

erations to this point or that one cannot use “dumb bombs 

because they are indiscriminate remain legally untenable. Th

law of armed conflict requires that the application of force b

in accordance with the tests of military necessity, humanity

and proportionality.

160 Military necessity involves the right t

use any degree or means of force not forbidden by interna

tional law to achieve a military objective. Humanity, related t

necessity, entails the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruc

tion not actually necessary for accomplishing legitimate mili

tary purposes. Proportionality provides the link between th

concepts of military necessity and humanity by balancing th

degree of likely damage to noncombatants with the militar

419
value of the proposed target.161 The general immunity of non 

combatants from attack does not prohibit operations that ma

cause collateral damage (including death, injury, or destruc

tion of property). International law requires only that the mili

tary balance the value of the proposed target with the likeli

hood and degree of collateral damage. Therefore, although

PGMs may actually increase the numbers of targets that on

could justifiably strike by lowering to tolerable levels the col

lateral damage coincident to striking them, international law

includes nothing that requires their use against any target o

military value. Thus, judge advocates should assist in th

drafting of ROE to ensure that no one misinterprets the re

quirements of international law and that no one places restric 

tions based upon erroneous applications of the law on plan

ning and executing air operations.

The expectation of zero collateral damage, however, is an

other matter. The more the military uses PGMs and shows

through the international press media , guided bomb unit

hitting the crosshairs overlaying targets of all kinds, the mor

the public will expect such precision in the future. As dis 

cussed earlier, such expectations create political pressure

that have just as much impact on ROE and military opera 

tions as do legal obligations. The reality of the situation is tha

guided bombs sometimes miss. In fact, US Air Force analysi

of PGMs after Deliberate Force revealed that nearly one-third

missed their individual aiming points on targets (because o

human error, weather problems, and weapon problem

equally).162 The careful DMPI selection process and the profes

sional weapons-employment tactics by aircrews kept th

amount of collateral damage low. Unfortunately, military lead

ership sometimes overstates its case to show the effectivenes

of operations, as did Secretary of Defense William Perry afte

the conclusion of Deliberate Force: “From Aviano and from th

decks of carriers in the Adriatic, we launched one of the mos

effective air campaigns that we’ve ever had. It was over on

thousand sorties. Every target that had been designated wa

destroyed, and there was zero collateral damage. This was 

rare instance where by combination of exclusive use of preci

sion guided ammunitions and very strict rules of engagement

420
we conducted this massive campaign with no damage, n

damage to civilians, no collateral damage of any kind.”163

Although the air operations in Deliberate Force achieved 

high degree of success in minimizing collateral damage, on

cannot say that no collateral damage of any kind occurred

Such overstatement may create unrealistic and potentiall

dangerous expectations for future air operations. Political an

military leaders need to be sensitive to the fact that the mili

tary can minimize but never eliminate collateral damage . Gen 

eral Hornburg stressed that this was the mind-set of person 

nel at the CAOC.

164 Regardless of political pressures t

minimize collateral damage in the future, one should bas

ROE on reality rather than abstract ideals and therefore re

frain from writing rules of engagement under the constraint

of zero collateral damage. Minimizing collateral damage in 

stead of achieving zero collateral damage should become th

political standard for ROE .

In conclusion, ROE drafted and implemented in Deliberat

Force effectively balanced the competing interests of force pro 

tection, minimization of collateral damage , and mission ac

complishment. The CAOC military leaders’ close control ove

operations proved appropriate, considering the political an

military realities of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Al

though the circumstances in Bosnia are unlikely to be repeated

many lessons relating to the evolution and implementation o

ROE will remain applicable to future uses of airpower in suppor

of peace operations. As long as we evaluate these lessons from

the perspective of the context in which they arose, Operation

Deliberate Force offers an example of the value of well-conceive

and masterfully implemented rules of engagemen t.

Notes

1. Commander in chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH

Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101, “Operation Deny Flight,” change four, 

May 1995. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified. (Op 

eration Deliberate Force was a subset of Operation Deny Flight. The OPLA

for the latter contained ROE that applied during Deliberate Force.)

2. Correct Quotes, version 1.0; CD-ROM (Novato, Calif.: Wordstar Inter

national, Inc., 1994).

421
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard an

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 607.

4. Captain Roach uses four circles in his diagram, dividing the politic

and diplomatic influences into two circles. Since these issues are usuall

very closely related, I have combined them into one circle. Each of th

circles comprises a multitude of individual factors that fall under the um 

brella of that particular generic factor. Capt J. Ashley Roach, “Rules o

Engagement,” Naval War College Review 36, no. 1 (January–Februar

1983): 46–48. The three-circle approach is consistent with current doctrin

as expressed in the Joint Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Fo

Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995), 74.

5. Roach, 46.

6. Ibid., 47.

7. Ibid., 48.

8. D. P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Annapolis: Nav

Institute Press, 1975), 180.

9. W. Hays Parks, “Righting the Rules of Engagement,” US Naval Inst

tute Proceedings 115, no. 5 (May 1989): 87.

10. Ibid., 88.

11. Ibid.

12. Col Philip Johnson, chief, International and Operations Law, Head

quarters United States Air Force (USAF)/JAI, interviewed by author, Penta

gon, Washington, D.C., 20 December 1995.

13. Roach, 50.

14. Johnson interview.

15. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militar

and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 329.

16. Scott R. Morris, ed., Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, Va

US Army Judge Advocate General’s School, 1998), 8-1.

17. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.0

Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, 1 October 1994, par. 6.

18. Ibid., par. 6a.

19. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing o

North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 119.

20. Col Roberto Corsini, “The Balkan War: What Role for Airpower

Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 55.

21. These include the 20 km exclusion zone for heavy weapons aroun

each UN-designated safe area, the Croatian restricted-operating zones, an

the zones of action related to trigger events for Deliberate Force, discusse

later in this chapter.

22. Adam Roberts, “From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and th

Use of Force,” Survival: The IISS Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995–1996): 14

23. CJCSI 3121.01, par. 1a.

24. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 2a. To emphasize this passage, the writer

placed it in all-capital letters and boldface.

25. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 5d.

422
26. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 5b.

27. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 5c.

28. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 8.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., enclosure A, par. 8b.

31. Parks, 84.

32. Maj Dan Bush, USAF, interviewed by author, Department of Stat

Washington, D.C., 18 December 1995. Major Bush was the legal advisor t

the CAOC, Vicenza, Italy, from June 1995 until October 1995.

33. Parks, 93.

34. Bradd C. Hayes, Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools fo

Crisis, RAND Note N-2963-CC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, July 1989), 21.

35. Both the Stark and Beirut Marine barracks incidents, as well as th

Vincennes incident, receive more extensive analysis later in this chapter.

36. Hayes, 21.

37. Ibid., 24.

38. Clausewitz, 87.

39. Martha Lynn Craver and Rick Maze, “Reports Criticize Military fo

Beirut Security,” Air Force Times, 2 January 1984, 4.

40. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrori

Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Beirut Interna

tional Airport Terrorist Act, 20 December 1983), 47.

41. Ibid., 89. The commander explained that he decided not to perm

insertion of magazines in weapons on interior posts to preclude accident

discharge and possible injury to innocent civilians.

42. Ibid., 94.

43. Richard C. Gross, “Lessons Learned the Hard Way: The USS Stark,

Defense Science & Electronics 6, no. 12 (December 1987): 9.

44. Ibid., 10.

45. Ibid.

46. Rear Adm William M. Fogarty, “Investigation Report: Formal Invest

gation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Fligh

655 on 3 July 1988” (U) (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 28 Jul

1988).

47. John Barry and Richard Charles, “Sea of Lies,” Newsweek, 13 Jul

1992, 29–39.

48. Richard J. Grunawalt, director, Oceans Law and Policy, Naval Wa

College, memorandum to dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, subjec

USS Vincennes (CG 49) and the Shootdown of Iranian Airbus Flight 655, 1

September 1995.

49. Fogarty, 7.

50. Hayes, 54. The RAND study noted that the definitions of hostile ac

and hostile intent were revised and that one should now consider all aircraf

and ships potentially hostile. All neutral and friendly shipping became eligi 

ble for US assistance.

51. Ibid., 55.

423
52. Fogarty, 13.

53. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four. (NATO Confidential) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

54. COM5ATAF OPORD 45101.5, “Deny Flight,” 30 September 199

(NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

55. COM5ATAF SPINS 028, 241530Z August 1995. (NATO Confidentia

Information extracted is unclassified.

56. UNSCR 781, 9 October 1992. This resolution established the NFZ i

the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to ensure the safety of th

delivery of humanitarian assistance and as a decisive step for the cessatio

of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ban of military flights did not appl

to UNPROFOR flights or others in support of UN operations, includin

humanitarian assistance. The UNSCR did not authorize enforcement of th

ban but requested that UNPROFOR and member states monitor complianc

with the NFZ.

57. Ibid.

58. Operation Deny Flight fact sheet; on-line, Internet, 25 February 1999

available from http://chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/intl/bosnia/denyflt.txt.

59. SACEUR Support Plan 10001D, “NATO Europe Integrated Air De 

fense.” (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

60. Ibid. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified

COM5ATAF OPORD 45101.5, par. 4, incorporates the restrictions of th

NATO Europe Integrated Air Defense ROE.

61. SACEUR Support Plan 10001D. (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

62. CJCSI 3121.01, A-4. These provisions discuss the inherent right t

use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action t

defend one’s self, one’s unit, and other friendly forces, including personne

and their property.

63. Deny Flight fact sheet.

64. UNSCR 816, 31 March 1993. This resolution, which provides th

legal basis to engage violators of the NFZ, specifically indicates that it act

under chapter seven of the United Nations Charter, which provides fo

peace-enforcement powers through a general system of collective security.

65. Deny Flight fact sheet.

66. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr., tape-recorded interview by Lt Col Rober

Owen, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 6 December 1995, Unite

States Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Forc

Base (AFB), Ala.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid. At that time, General Ashy was COMAIRSOUTH, and Lieuten

ant Colonel Corzine worked on the planning staff. The term Black Hole cam

from the nickname of the location where a small cadre of personnel planne

the air operation against Iraq. Personnel in the Black Hole produced all o

the daily taskings for air strikes.

424
69. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, presentation at the School of Advanced Air 

power Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 8 February 1996.

70. Boyd interview.

71. COM5ATAF SPINS 028, par. 3D(2)(B)1. (NATO Confidential) Inform

tion extracted is unclassified.

72. UNSCR 836, 4 June 1993. This resolution provided the basis fo

NATO CAS support of UN ground forces as well as the authority to respon

to attacks, incursions, or obstruction of freedom of movement in or aroun

the safe areas. In essence the seeds for Operation Deliberate Force wer

planted with the enactment of this UNSCR.

73. UNSCR 819, 16 April 1993; and UNSCR 824, 6 May 1993. Thes

resolutions created the listed safe areas within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

74. Deny Flight fact sheet.

75. S/25939, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Coun 

cil Resolution 836 (1993) (New York: United Nations, 14 June 1993), par. 4.

76. North Atlantic Military Committee, memorandum to UN secretary

general, subject: MCM-KAD-084-93, “Operational Options for Air Strikes i

Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 8 August 1993. (NATO Secret) Information extracte

is unclassified. This memorandum led to the deployment of CAS aircraft t

the Southern Region and served as the basis for providing CAS support.

77. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

78. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change two, 13 August 1993. (NATO

Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

79. MCM-KAD-084-93, enclosure, par. 2. (NATO Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

80. Ibid., par. 5. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

81. Ibid., par. 9b. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

82. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

83. Ibid., par. 9b(1). (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

84. Ibid., par. 9b(2). (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

85. Lt Col Chris “Red” Campbell, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB

Ala., 22 March 1996. Stationed in Zagreb during this time, Campbell ind

cated that a lack of understanding existed between NATO and the UN as t

who was really in charge with respect to the enforcement of the UNSCR

specifically concerning the use of airpower in the tactical area of operation

UN personnel generally took the position that they controlled the trigge

mechanism for use of force and that every action had to be coordinated wit

them before execution. The issue of whether ROE allowed air-to-air engage 

ment without the coordination and/or approval of the UN was hotly debat ed.

86. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change two, E-1. (NATO Confidentia

Information extracted is unclassified.

87. Boyd interview.

88. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change two, phase three, step fou

subpar. (6). (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

89. Boyd interview.

90. Deny Flight fact sheet.

425
91. Boyd interview.

92. Joris Janssen Lok, “The Netherlands: Learning the Lessons of Sre 

brenica,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 25, no. 5 (31 January 1996): 35.

93. Ibid.

94. Adm Leighton Smith, CINCSOUTH, “Operation Deliberate Force

videotaped lecture presented at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 

November 1995, AFHRA.

95. Ibid.

96. Deny Flight fact sheet.

97. Ibid.

98. UNSCR 958, 19 November 1994. This resolution extended the provi 

sions of UNSCR 836 to Croatia and was the basis for establishing restricte

operating zones there.

99. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four. (NATO Confidential) Infor 

mation extracted is unclassified.

100. Smith lecture.

101. Ibid.

102. Deny Flight fact sheet.

103. Operation Deliberate Force fact sheet, AFSOUTH/PIO, Naples

Italy, 6 November 1995; on-line, Internet, 4 March 1996, available from

gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/00/yugo/df0 611.

104. NATO NAC Notice C-N(95)65, 26 July 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-0

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and MCM-KAD-057-9

“NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond Gorazde,” 3

July 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-06-03 (NATO Secret) Information extracted i

unclassified.

105. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, lecture, School of Advanced Airpower Stud

ies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 7 February 1996.

106. MCM-KAD-057-95, annex A-1. (NATO Secret) Information extracte

is unclassified.

107. Smith lecture.

108. MCM-KAD-057-95, annex A-2. (NATO Secret) Information extracte

is unclassified.

109. Ibid., annex A-3. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified.

110. Ibid., annex A-4. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified.

111. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

112. Ibid., annex A-6. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclass

ified.

113. CINCSOUTH, memorandum of understanding with FC UNPF, sub

ject: UN Interpretations of NAC Decisions, 10 August 1995. (NATO Secre

Information extracted is unclassified.

114. Smith lecture.

115. From Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarter

AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995, AFHRA, H-3.

426
116. Ibid.

117. CINCSOUTH, memorandum of understanding, par. 14. (NATO Se

cret) Information extracted is unclassified.

118. Smith lecture.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Target description, Pale army supply depot, target no. C0006, Avian

AB, Italy, AFHRA, AVI-43. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified

122. Target description, Pale ammo depot south, target no. C001, Avian

AB, Italy (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and targe

description, Jahorina RADCOM station, target no. D087, Aviano AB, Ital

(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

123. Operation Deliberate Force fact sheet. Of the 1,026 munition

dropped, 708 were precision (including laser-guided bomb/guided bom

unit [GBU] -10, -12, -16, and -24; AS30L; standoff land-attack missil

GBU-15; Maverick; and Tomahawk land-attack missile), and 318 were non 

precision (MK-82, MK-83, MK-84, and cluster-bomb unit [CBU]-87).

124. Ryan interview.

125. COM5ATAF OPORD 45101.5, change one to annex E, par. 6a(3), 

July 1994. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

126. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, videotaped interview by Lt Col Rober

Owen and author, 12 March 1996, Maxwell AFB, Ala., AFHRA.

127. CAOC air tasking message, 11 September 1995, MSGID/AIRTASK

HQ 5ATAF/11/SEP//PERID/110300Z/TO: 120259Z//. (NATO Secret) Info

mation extracted is unclassified.

128. Lt Col Gary West, commander, 510th Fighter Squadron, recorde

interview with Lt Col Bradley Davis and Maj John Orndorff, Aviano AB

Italy, 20 February 1996.

129. CAOC air tasking message, 12 September 1995, MSGID/AIRTASK

HQ 5ATAF/12/SEP//PERID/120300Z/TO: 130259Z//. (NATO Secret) Info

mation extracted is unclassified.

130. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, annex E, par. 5a(6

(NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

131. Ibid., annex E, par. 5d(4). (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

132. Ibid., annex E, par. 6a(1)(d). (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

133. Hornburg interview.

134. Smith lecture.

135. COM5ATAF/CAOC Deny Flight SPINS 028, 241530Z August 1995

par. 3D(2)(D)1 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified; an

Capt Ken Calise, US Navy, C-5 and battle-staff director, CAOC, Vicenza, Italy

interviewed by Maj Mark Conversino and author, 16 January 1996.

136. COM5ATAF/CAOC Deny Flight SPINS 028, par. 3D(3). (NATO Con 

fidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

427
137. Ibid., par. 3D(2)(D)4. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted i

unclassified.

138. Calise interview.

139. Ibid.

140. Bush interview; and Maj Keith Kiger, Sixteenth Air Force, Weapon

and Tactics, interviewed by Maj Mark Conversino and author, Aviano AB

Italy, 19 January 1996.

141. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, annex E, par. 5a(8

(NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

142. Maj Steve Irwin, CAOC legal advisor, tape-recorded interview wit

author, Aviano AB, Italy, 18 January 1996.

143. Ibid.

144. Bush interview.

145. Ibid.

146. Hornburg interview.

147. Kiger interview.

148. Calise interview.

149. Smith lecture.

150. COM5ATAF/CAOC SPINS 028. (NATO Confidential) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

151. Ibid. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.

152. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, appendix one to annex E

par. 11. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified. Note th

changes in the definition of friendly forces that occurred from change two t

change four of the OPLAN.

153. Ryan interview.

154. COM5ATAF/CAOC SPINS 028, par. 3D(2)(C)2. (NATO Confidentia

Information extracted is unclassified.

155. CAOC air tasking message, 8 September 1995, MSGID/AIRTASK

HQ 5ATAF/8/SEP//PERID/80300Z/TO: 90259//. (NATO Secret) Informa

tion extracted is unclassified.

156. Congress, Senate, Senator Thurmond of South Carolina Speaking i

Reference to the Rules of Engagement for the Vietnam War, 94th Cong., 1

sess., Congressional Record, 6 June 1975, vol. 121, pt. 14, 17558. Senato

Thurmond states that “the public would not approve of it. They would no

approve of sending their men into battle with their hands behind thei

backs to fight that way, to make gun fodder, so to speak, out of them. Th

parents would not approve of it; the country did not approve of it.”

157. Dr. Wayne Thompson and Maj Tim Reagan, “Deliberate Force: 

Distinctive Campaign,” Washington, D.C., December 1995. (Secret) Inform

tion extracted is unclassified

158. Lt Col John G. Humphries, “Operations Law and the Rules o

Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Airpower Jou

nal 6, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 38. Humphries discusses the importance of th

trust between the NCA and the military that developed partly due to th

428
military

s intensive efforts after Vietnam to train and inculcate the idea

associated with the law of armed conflict.

159. US Ambassador Christopher Hill, interviewed by Lt Col Rober

Owen, 27 February 1996.

160. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law: The Conduct o

Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 1976, pars. 1-5, 1-6, 5-3, 6-2.

161. Ibid.

162. Ryan interview.

163. William J. Perry, secretary of defense, DOD news briefing, speec

to the Adjutants General Association of the United States, 7 February 1996

164. Hornburg interview. 

429
Chapter 15

Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches

to Operation Deliberate Force

Lt Col Robert D. Pollock

They want war too mechanical, too measured; I would

make it brisk, bold, impetuous, perhaps even audacious.

—Baron Henri Jomini

Historians violate the adage “never second-guess success

at some peril, particularly in the case of the highly successfu

application of airpower during Operation Deliberate Force

From most perspectives, the planners and executors of Delib 

erate Force seem to have assessed the diplomatic and politica

goals of the operation correctly and to have worked an exqu

site match of military operations to those goals. Still, at leas

from the perspective of theoretical opportunities, looking again

at the strategy and operational execution of this important ai

campaign has some value. Indirectly, Gen David Sawyer, dep 

uty commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s

(NATO) combined air operations center (CAOC), which directed

Deliberate Force, suggested the value of such a second look b

pointing out that the campaign might not have been necessar

at all had key political and military leaders understood ai

strategy more completely. In Sawyer ’s opinion, a more forcefu

use of airpower in the earlier phases of Operation Deny Flight

of which Deliberate Force was a phase, might have obviated th

need for the later bombing campaign. Moreover, General Sawye

felt that a fundamental difference of view among many Unite

Nations (UN) and NATO leaders and American air commander

delayed NATO’s and the UN’s approval of Deliberate Force in it

ultimate form. Most NATO and UN leaders expected a “direct

campaign that targeted the actual guns and mortars which thei

political leaders wanted silenced, while American air command 

ers wanted an “indirect” campaign that targeted more easil

431
located things, such as bridges and supply bunkers, to coerc

the Serbians to stop shelling the UN safe areas.

1

General Sawyer ’s comments, although intended to illustrat

the coordination required to win approval of a coalition mili

tary plan, also point out the likely existence of other ways t

conceive, plan, and execute Deliberate Force. The tension be

tween direct and indirect air strategy illustrates this point, bu

it does not encompass all possible approaches. Other recentl

articulated air theories, for example, might have suggested

using different concepts or target lists to win the political an

diplomatic goals of Deliberate Force. Such theories include th

so-called five-ring theory of Col John Warden III, the effects

based concept emanating from the faculty of Air Comman

and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB)

Alabama, and the denial strategy of Dr. Robert A. Pape Jr.

Whether these approaches to air warfare would have en 

joyed more success than the one actually used in the Balkans

of course, lies beyond the scope of responsible historica

analysis. But laying out their differences has value, both t

illustrate and exercise their theoretical construction and t

better understand the circumstances under which one strate 

gic approach might prove more useful than another. Thus

one of the overriding questions to consider here is, What wer

the most important theoretical models available for plannin

this air campaign? And the other is, Were they suitable to it

military, diplomatic, and political environment? This chapte

seeks to answer those questions by briefly describing the cam

paign as planned and executed, examining the three prevailin

strategic concepts in general, and describing what the campaign

would have been like had planners used these other approache

in the Balkans during August and September of 1995.

Context and Operational Restrictions

Before proceeding, one must briefly review the contextua

and operational-art elements that affected the actual plannin

of the campaign, 2 especially the political and military objec

tives of the operation as well as restrictions imposed on th

campaign. These elements capture the constraints of Deliberat

432
Force and provide the notional framework for evaluating vi

able, alternative strategies for action.

All theoretical approaches to air campaign planning ar

founded upon strategic and military objectives provided b

decision makers. NATO resolutions clearly articulated th

strategic objectives: (1) assure freedom of access to the citie

in Bosnia-Herzegovina and (2) remove the heavy weapons from

around Sarajevo . Based on these clear objectives, Gen Michae

Ryan , commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, an

the CAOC distilled the following military objective : “Take awa

what the Bosnian Serbs held dear and drive them to militar

parity with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.”3 To meet thi

objective, CAOC planners designed a campaign that identified

the Bosnian Serb military advantages: command, control

communications, computers, and intelligence (C 4I); weapon

storage infrastructure; direct and essential support; firepower

and mobility. By having NATO forces attack these elements

General Ryan and his staff believed that the UN would achiev

its military objective. The resulting campaign plan relied on

having the Bosnian Serbs understand and recognize the los

of their military advantages and their hold on the region’s

balance of power. If they wanted this surgical reductio

halted, they had to ensure freedom of access to the cities an

remove their weapons from around Sarajevo .

4

Restrictions on the planning for Deliberate Force, includin

methods for selecting and approving targets and the desire t

reduce or even eliminate collateral damage , became limitin

factors in developing potential courses by the CAOC plannin

staff. Deliberate Force targets were approved for plannin

through the Joint Targeting Board process established by th

UN and NATO to permit joint validation of targets and linkag

to mission objectives mandated by the UN and NATO.

5

Due to heightened worldwide political tensions and media

attention on Bosnia , General Ryan personally chose and ap

proved each target and placed certain restraints on deliver

means and methods (read tactics) involving its associated de

sired mean point of impact (DMPI), the actual point at whic

pilots would aim their weapons. 6 He considered himself th

campaign planner and would not delegate the approval pro

cess es because of political implications, feeling that he should

433
be held accountable. Ryan clearly stated his rationale for as

suming such expansive duties: “If we had committed on

atrocity from the air, NATO would forever be blamed fo

crimes, and the military threat would be lessened.”7

Essentially the same planning staff, CAOC, and rules of en 

gagement in place for Deny Flight also applied to Deliberat

Force.8 General Ryan took the reins for overall campaign plan 

ning and target selection , and the rest of the staff supporte

him. 9 According to Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC

air campaign planning started with a desired military end stat

of halting the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) shelling of UN saf

areas. The planners used this end state to determine what the

wanted the campaign to do. 1 0 Planning began in February 199

for Operation Deadeye (the suppression-of-enemy-air-defense

portion of what became Deliberate Force) at the CAOC.

1 1 Genera

Ryan expanded Deadeye ’s scope, transforming it into the pla

that eventually became Deliberate Force .

1 2

Carl von Clausewitz wrote that “war is a continuation o

policy by other means,”1 3 which usually implies that militarie

will receive political direction during the planning and execu 

tion of operations. Deliberate Force, however, lacked forma

national and international political guidance throughout th

planning process. CAOC planners and General Ryan designed

a campaign that primarily targeted perceived centers of gravit

(COG) in the BSA as well as some potential COGs in th

Bosnian and Croatian armies .

1 4 Planners identified thes

COGs and their associated targets by category, putting anti

aircraft weapons and heavy-artillery positions at the top of th

list, followed by the BSA communications system, militar

infrastructure, and military stores. 1 5

Because of his deeply held concern over unnecessary an

unacceptable collateral damage,

1 6 General Ryan placed spe

cific restraints on weapons delivery, aircraft approach pat

terns, number of passes permitted, and number of weapon

released on a single pass. 1 7 These constraints met with som

resistance from theater airmen, but the latter managed t

achieve the desired effects, inflict little ancillary damage, an

leave the world’s perception of the use of airpower untainted

NATO forces conducted Operation Deliberate Force as a day

and-night air campaign from 31 August 1995 to 14 Septembe

434
1995 (halting temporarily for diplomatic negotiations) an

continued it until 21 September 1995, when the Bosnian Serb

government and military agreed to withdraw heavy weapon

from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and to enter int

peace talks with the Bosnian Croats and Muslims.

1 8

The Five-Ring Approach

To achieve strategic objectives, Colonel Warden , author o

The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, and conceptual archi

tect of the strategic air campaign against Iraq in 1991, empha 

sizes the precise application of airpower to cause systemi

paralysis in an opponent’s psychological and physical abilitie

to resist. Warden’s planning approach assumes that the fun 

damental object of warfare is to convince the enemy leader 

ship to do what it otherwise would not do. 1 9 In his view, ai

warfare can exert such an influence by attacking key targe

systems he refers to as rings. Warden argues that one ca

describe all physical things, from nation-states to military or

ganizations to individual soldiers in terms of five such rings

each, in turn, a fractal of the same five rings (fig. 15.1).

Leadership controls, directs, and sets objectives for any given

system. Warden’s model provides a framework for a systemati

analysis of leadership to identify its key elements, vulnerabilities

Figure 15.1. Warden’s Five Rings (Adapted from Richard P. Hallion, Storm

over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War [Washington, D.C.: Smithsonia

Institution Press, 1992], 152)

435
and interrelationships. A systems approach yields links an

nodes that one can exploit to influence the enem y.2 0

System essentials are facilities or processes required by th

system to function—for example, electricity, petroleum, food

water, and information. Degrading critical system essential

places considerable strain on the system and influences it

leadership, thus helping to achieve strategic objectives. 2 1

Traditionally, one often thinks of infrastructure as the en 

emy state’s transportation network, but this is not always th

case. Anything required to support system functions fits int

this category, including the electrical net, political-party head

quarters, religious centers, supermarkets, industry, ports

railroads, highways, bridges, telecommunication networks

and so forth. By its nature, the infrastructure ring has signifi 

cantly more redundancy than do the system-essentials an

leadership rings, thus making it harder to affect with a give

weight of attack. 2 2

Population is a critical category in Warden’s approach. By ana 

lyzing and influencing the social, cultural, and political makeu

of a given population, one can identify critical nodes and poten 

tial COGs that can directly affect the system’s leadership.2 3

Warden views direct attacks on fielded forces as the leas

effective use of airpower. He feels that this form of attack i

useful only as a means of affecting an opponent’s inner rings

instead, one should strike directly at potentially more lucra 

tive and decisive targets in the other rings.2 4

Warden’s approach assumes that (1) the military planne

links military strategy to the task and links military objective

to political objectives and (2) the outer rings protect inne

ones, especially the all-important leadership ring. For Warden 

combat effectiveness—consisting of two equal elements, th

physical and the moral (or psychological)—is the key to mili

tary execution. Thus, one can represent his model as an equa

tion: combat effectiveness = physical x moral. By selectin

physical targets to bring combat effectiveness to zero, th

moral aspects will then suffer. The reverse is also true.

Warden’s approach also reflects his idea that systems an

rings are fractal in nature (i.e., characteristics of lower sub

systems are similar to those of higher systems, though on 

lesser scale). For example, part of a nation’s infrastructur

436
consists of a road system that, in turn, consists of national

state or provincial, county, and local road nets, each with it

own unique set of five rings . Understanding a given system a

a layered congeries of fractals reveals, in Warden ’s opinion

common threads or patterns that, if effectively attacked, ca

produce cascading effects which can paralyze an entire system

with a minimum of force. To use the infrastructure example

by knocking out a critical juncture of a local or regional roa

system, the effects of the new bottleneck could ripple through 

out the entire transportation system, depending largely on tha

system’s ability to work around or compensate for the damage.

Utility of Warden’s Approach

For air planners, Warden’s model offers advantages and po

tential disadvantages, one of the former including its explicitl

holistic picturing of enemies, rings, systems, and subsystems

This view provides a good starting point for detailed campaign

planning and helps planners categorize the elements of a po

tential adversary’s system so they can project a means o

upsetting it in a way that will achieve military objectives. Plan

ners’ knowledge of the adversary’s weaknesses and their per

sonal intuition are key influences that translate the five-ring

model into a campaign plan.

A key disadvantage of Warden ’s approach is its tendency t

assume that other nation-states respond to US attacks in th

same way the United States would respond to a similar attack

Further, given the complexity and robustness of enemy sys 

tems, this strategic approach does not inherently conside

that enemies can react and rapidly adjust to damage from ai

attacks in unexpected ways. This too is left to the intuition o

the campaign planner. Thus, if unimaginatively applied, War

den’s theory seems to promise greater certitude regarding th

strategic effects of air attack than living, reactive enemies wil

actually allow.

Given these advantages and limitations, using the five-rin

approach is most appropriate when one knows a good dea

about the enemy or during crisis-action planning—when tim

is of the essence. Because of its inherent simplicity, one ca

apply the approach to any number of situations. However, 

437
five-ring analysis requires continual updating, revising, an

maintaining during both peace and war.

Warden ’s approach is most useful in determining COGs at th

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the adversary’s sys 

tems. Establishing firm linkages to UN objectives, developing a

effective strategy, and determining an effective means of target

ing these COGs require the planner to go beyond the five-rin

model for guidance. That is, Warden’s approach does not pro

vide an appropriate vehicle for understanding how the broade

concerns of grand strategy, national strategy, and operationa

strategy are linked to form an effective campaign plan designe

to achieve national objectives and the desired end st ate.

Applying Warden’s Approach to Deliberate Force

Warden has long believed that any campaign worth the ex 

penditure of our most precious assets—military men, women

and equipment—is worth considerable advanced research an

detailed planning.

2 5 This research must first provide the politi

cal objective for the campaign and the desired political an

military end state to the crisis. From these he would derive th

military objectives for a campaign.

Given the context of July 1995, the political objective

would call for a halt to the shelling of UN-mandated saf

areas. One can extrapolate the political end state from th

national security strategy of the United States : a peacefu

resolution to the ethnic crisis and a democratically elected

multiethnic government for Bosnia-Herzegovina , free to exer

cise all instruments of power within its internationally recog

nized borders. Having determined these political objective

and the end state, one could derive the military objective 

neutralizing military threats to this vision and driving th

opposing sides to a mutually acceptable, peaceful resolution.

The next logical step would entail identifying the COGs

Since Colonel Warden contends that one can represent mili 

taries and nations as systems, this research would focus on

finding systematic points that could lead the BSA and th

Bosnian Serb government to reconsider their shelling of UN

safe areas and adopt a peaceful solution to the crisis.

438
In The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Warden makes 

strong case that the first objective of any air campaign is t

achieve air superiority, whether total, temporary, or even lo 

calized. Thus, one would logically design a campaign that be

gan with a strong parallel attack against enemy air defense

throughout the zones in which the air campaign would operate.

This analysis would identify (to Warden ’s way of thinking

leadership as the BSA’s principal COG—specifically, the abil

ity of President Radovan Karadzic and Gen Ratko Mladic t

lead their forces. Disrupting the communications that thes

men needed to lead and control their forces and population

would cause a breakdown in the adversary’s system. Th

analysis would also identify the BSA’s inherent strength—it

heavy weaponry and copious supplies—as the secondary, sup

porting COG. Denying these elements would eliminate th

BSA’s strength, place it on par with the Bosnian and Croatia

forces, and thus put it in an untenable situation likely to lea

to overtures for peace.

Thus, a campaign based on Warden’s five-ring approac

would strike enemy air defenses at zero hour and conduct a

immediate, parallel, precision air attack against all military C4

and military-stores targets in and around the Bosnian Serb

capital of Pale. By showing might and conviction and by elim

nating all local support, this attack would directly influenc

Karadzic’s civilian leadership, leaving him isolated, incommu

nicado, unsupported, psychologically shaken, and more will

ing to reconsider his position. At zero plus 10 minutes, NATO

aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions (PGM) would

strike known heavy-weapons sites around Sarajevo to elim

nate the Serbs’ ability to retaliate against civilian and militar

targets in Sarajevo. Elimination of these targets would prob

ably require follow-on strikes. News of the strikes on Pale an

the weapons around Sarajevo would have filtered to the field

commanders by zero plus one hour. Using stealthy aircraft a

the vanguard, coalition air forces would conduct paralle

strikes against outlying BSA C4I targets and military-supply

cassernes known to contain large stockpiles of ammunition

arms, and heavy weapons. This attack would deny the BSA

long-term sustainment and again influence its leadership t

accept our will. At zero plus six hours and onward, follow-o

439
operations would continue the reduction in BSA sustainabilit

and command and control (C 2). Thus, initial strikes would

show coalition capability and might, while follow-on strike

would show the will to carry on until UN mandates are upheld—

perhaps even until parties agree to a negotiated peace.

The Effects-Based Approach

Air Command and Staff College’s effects-based approac

proposes that campaign planning is an integrated process tha

begins with strategic objectives and develops an entire cam

paign which carries through to a clearly articulated and de

fined end state. 2 6 The approach stresses that campaign plan

ning is a top-down process in a world accustomed t

bottom-up operations, stressing the synergistic power behin

a coordinated economic, political, and military campaign. Th

process forms a loop that constantly evaluates strategic an

military objectives and campaign planners’ intended result

against desired economic, political, and military end states. In

linking strategic objectives and military objectives , planner

need to evaluate six contextual elements. In turn, translatin

strategic objectives into successful military campaign

through COG analysis and translating to a practical maste

attack plan require the innovative application of six element

of operational art (fig. 15.2).

In effects-based planning, one cannot consider these con 

textual and operational-art elements in isolation since the

are interlinked in a matrix of relationships. Additionally, eac

of the elements contains two dimensions—the US perspectiv

and an enemy perspective—each of which one must under 

stand both in and of itself and from the other perspective

Thus, Sun Tzu ’s dictum “know the enemy and know yourself

in a hundred battles you will never be in peril” remains a ke

ingredient of planning.

2 7

After ascertaining the political end state, one then deter 

mines the military objective of the campaign plan. This may b

easier said than done for several reasons: (1) strategic objec

tives, defined by political leadership, may be vague and un

clear to military planners, (2) political problems may creat

440
strategic objectives that do not have a clear political, eco 

nomic, and military end state to plan against, and (3) militar

objectives must align with strategic objectives, or the entir

campaign process breaks down or becomes irrelevant. Thes

problems, if not overcome, may confuse and disrupt the plan

ning process and lead to military failure. 2 8

To address these three obstacles, we need to recognize tha

the form of government that created these objectives exerts a

influence on them. The creation of clear strategic objective

can become a difficult process in a democratic/parliamentar

government because of the problems presented by politics an

consensus building. These factors cloud the issue of clea

objectives in the military’s planning process.

The ACSC model’s six contextual elements—which affect po

tential military operations but usually remain beyond the in 

fluence of the military planner and commander—aid militar

planners in deriving military objectives from the strategic ob

jectives provided them. The commander must build upo

these political, international, sociocultural, environmental

leadership, and economic foundations. Each element can hav

either positive or negative effects on the commander’s abilit

to execute his or her mission. A clear understanding of th

Figure 15.2. The Campaign-Planning Model (From Lt Col Larry A. Weave

and Maj Robert D. Pollock, “Campaign Planning for the 21st Century: A

Effected-Based Approach to the Planning Process,” in War Theory, vol. 

[Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, September 1998], 28)

441
contextual elements of campaign planning allows the crucia

and time-consuming process of COG identification to begin.

The operational-art elements of effects-based campaig

planning tell the planner what is possible and when succes

has occurred. The idea is to maximize operational strength

and apply them against an adversary’s weaknesses. Thes

elements—logistics (including personnel and training), 2 9 tech 

nology (including the military technical revolution),3 0 informa

tion (quickly obtaining the right data at the right time t

exploit an enemy’s vulnerabilities), 3 1 targeting science and it

related concept of targeting for effect (identifying effects be

forehand, whether strategic, operational, or psychological), 3 

deception,3 3 and measuring success—become the link betwee

an abstract plan and concrete targeting in the master attack

plan and air tasking order.

An effective element will advance the accomplishment of th

strategic objective. Targeting science categorizes effects in 

number of ways. For example, most effects are either intended

or unintended. Often, the unintended effect of a course o

action causes a planner the most problems during a cam

paign. Key issues for campaign planners become how to accu 

rately predict the effects of actions taken, how to anticipat

unwanted effects, how to select the military option that bes

achieves the desired effects, and how to assess the effective 

ness of cumulative actions. Air-warfare planners face thinkin

and reactive enemies; therefore, they must anticipate likel

enemy courses of action and the potential effects of thos

actions on friendly operations.

Targeting for effect is a two-way street. One must asses

one’s own vulnerabilities, anticipate likely enemy actions, an

understand potential effects of enemy actions on one’s ow

objectives. Although it is impossible to avoid an unintended

effect entirely, planners must recognize the thinking and re

acting powers of an adversary and consider the many way

the adversary could interpret their proposed actions. For in 

tended effects, planners can consider three ways that the pro

posed action might alter the campaign equation: strategic, op 

erational, or psychological.3 4 Any action taken can produce a

three effects simultaneously, and the course of action proposed

442
by campaign planners will constantly change the equilibrium

of these three effects.

In contrast to traditional approaches, targeting for effec

links anticipated physical damage to the broader strategic

operational, and psychological effects anticipated from the at

tack. It matches the desired physical and psychological effect

with the appropriate application of force that will achiev

these effects. A feedback mechanism helps planners recogniz

the effectiveness of their course of action. This strategy con 

siders the effectiveness of given attacks in terms of their ne

influence upon strategic objectives. Targeting science, then

combines traditional targeteering with targeting for effect.

For example, in Deliberate Force, targeting science matched

the desired operational effect (selective destruction of heav

weapons and related storage sites) with carefully selected de

sired mean points of impact and specific weapon platform

delivering precision weapons (F-16s attacking a surface-to-ai

battery’s acquisition-and-tracking radar with high-speed anti

radiation missiles ). All of these actions were designed t

achieve the strategic effect of halting heavy-weapon fire int

UN safe havens. Reconnaissance indicators revealed opera 

tional effects, and diplomacy revealed strategic effects. Thus

targeting for effect recognizes that the core objective of targe

planning entails affecting, changing, modifying, or impedin

an enemy activity—not just maximizing the physical destruc

tion of targets for a given number of sorties and weapons.

Measuring success—an ongoing element best defined a

knowing when one is done—requires planners to know thei

enemy and assess whether they are achieving the desired effect

(developed in targeting science). Planners need to compare ac

tual and predicted results and provide feedback into the ongoin

campaign process. 3 5 Measures-of-merit analysis and effect

cause-effect models 3 6 provide planners an analytical tool fo

evaluating how well the military accomplishes its objectives.

Effects-based planning produces one major output: a pla

for operations, whether a concept of operations or a maste

air-attack plan, both of which convert ideas into targets an

sorties. These documents must concur with the desired en

state. The entire process is useful only if leaders at all level

know what end state they seek. The question becomes, Wha

443
do we want the world to look like politically, militarily, an

economically at the end of the war? The answer must b

specific in terms of political structure, military capacity, an

the economy. For the planner , the end state reintroduces th

issue of the strategic objective. If they match, the nation ha

achieved its war aims.

Utility of the Effects-Based Model

For a campaign planner, the effects-based approach ha

several key advantages over Warden ’s five-ring approach, th

most important of which is its all-encompassing construction

The effects-based model starts with a defined statement of th

desired end state for an operation and cycles the planne

through key steps needed to design a campaign plan tha

acknowledges the needed synergy among the political, mili

tary, and economic instruments of power. Unlike Warden 

approach, which leaves much to the planners’ intuition, th

effects-based approach gives this intuition a boost, providin

planners with a series of memory-jogging contextual an

operation al-art elements to consider while refining the militar

objectives, selecting the COGs, and establishing viable course

of action. The last significant advantage of the effects-based

approach is the concept of targeting for effect and all th

military benefits derived from a logical application of militar

might against a designated COG directly linked to achievin

objectives and the desired end state.

Some limitations of the effects-based approach include th

giant size of the planning task associated with its application

Campaign planners not well versed in the interrelationship o

military, economic, and political power may find this approac

frustrating. Also, planners with limited data available on a

adversary must tailor the approach to use it effectively.

Given these advantages and limitations, the effects-base

approach is most appropriate during deliberate planning, whe

one can spend time on researching a potential adversary, or in

crisis-action planning, when one already knows much abou

the enemy. Because of its thoroughness, one can apply th

approach to any number of analysis situations. As with an

444
analysis, the effects-based approach requires continual updat

ing, revising, and maintaining during both peace and war.

One most appropriately would use effects-based theory t

design an overall joint, operational-level campaign plan. I

would prove equally useful in designing service- or functional

component campaigns that link political objectives with nationa

strategy and operational strategy to form a campaign plan de

signed to achieve national objectives and the desired end state.

Applying the Effects-Based Approach

to Deliberate Force

As mentioned previously, the effects-based approach calls fo

the synergistic employment of all instruments of national powe

(political, economic, informational, and military) in order t

achieve the stated national objectives, and the political objec 

tives and desired end state must serve as the foundation o

the campaign plan. Since Warden’s approach is a subset of th

effects-based approach, one would derive the same objective

and COGs. That is, the political objective of Deliberate Forc

would entail bringing about a halt to the shelling of UN

mandated safe areas, and the political end state would include 

peaceful resolution to the ethnic crisis and a dem ocraticall

elected, multiethnic government in Bosnia-Herzegovin a, free t

exercise all instruments of power within its internationall

recognized borders. Again, one could state that the militar

objective would call for neutralizing the military threats to thi

vision and driving the opposing sides to a mutually accep table

peaceful resolution. The COG would be the BSA—specifically

the ability of President Karadzic and General Mladic to lea

their forces, dependent upon effective communication wit

their troops and the population. The secondary, supportin

COG would be the BSA’s inherent strength—its heavy weap

onry and copious supplies. Preventing the BSA from usin

them would eliminate its strength and place it on an eve

playing field with the Bosnian and Croatian forces—a situ 

ation likely to facilitate the peace process.

Planners would have designed the campaign much as NATO

forces actually prosecuted it. As with the Warden model, th

effects-based plan would call for immediate strikes agains

445
enemy air defenses . However, in this case, strikes would rang

across all BSA-held territory. The remaining target sets would

be similar to Warden’s (supply points, depots, C4I nodes, etc.)

adding some power stations serving the political center at Pal

and the military center at Banja Luka. Planners might targe

other limited military/civilian infrastructure targets (such a

bridges and television/radio stations) for mild damage on th

second and third days in order to drive home to the BSA th

coalition’s determination and will. Coalition forces would

strike in parallel, applying maximum effort on the firs

night/day throughout territory held by the Bosnian Serbs

Diplomatic efforts (backed by air operations specifically aimed

at military targets around Sarajevo and Pale) would continu

throughout the effort until the Bosnian Serbs withdrew thei

heavy weapons from the heights around Sarajevo. Initial ai

strikes would show coalition capability and might, while follow

on strikes would demonstrate the will to carry on until th

Serbs agreed to UN mandates and a peaceful solution.

Coercive Airpower: Denial Theory

As an assistant professor at the School for Advanced Air 

power Studies, Dr. Robert A. Pape Jr. developed an effects

based theory of operational campaigning that focused on co 

ercing the adversary through the employment of airpower

Specifically, Pape’s theory focuses on denying an adversary’

strategic and military goals by destroying his fielded militar

forces. Pape’s steadfast concentration on the destruction o

the adversary’s military to achieve strategic objectives stand

in stark contrast to both the five-ring and effects-based ap

proaches. Military personnel find his inherently purist militar

approach very attractive, compared to ACSC’s more comple

and fusionist effects-based theory. 3 7

To Pape the most effective way to defeat enemies lies in

confounding their strategies by doing the most harm to thei

military forces and the least harm to their civilians.3 8 His pre

ferred instruments of coercion include aerial-delivered, con 

ventional, precision weapons. The coercer must nullify th

enemy’s military strategy and undermine his confidence tha

446
he can achieve his goals. 

According to the Denial theory, th

real key to coercion lies in exploiting military vulnerability a

the means of driving down the enemy’s probability of achiev

ing his desired benefit.”3 9 Quick, hard attacks against an en 

emy’s military deny that enemy the ability to apply his militar

strategy of choice. When the enemy realizes that he has n

effective means to strike back, he is more willing to accept th

coercer’s goals. Put another way, “in conventional disputes

the success of coercion is likely to be a function of militar

vulnerability and will be largely unaffected by civilian vulner 

ability. If hitting military targets in the victim’s homeland dra 

matically impairs his confidence of battlefield success, then h

is likely to change his behavior.”4 0

Dr. Pape assumes that a nation’s leaders are rational actor

who continually calculate the risks and benefits of their ac

tions and respond accordingly. To Pape “coercion is all abou

altering an opposing state’s resolve,” and denial—with it

rapid elimination of military capability—is the best way t

alter that state’s resolve.4 1 Theoretically, the systematic target

ing (and destruction) of an adversary’s military assets wil

make his remaining assets even more vulnerable, thereby con 

vincing the adversary to yield. Failure to yield will result in

military defeat and a total denial of all benefits from the enter 

prise in which he is engaged. By denying the adversary th

ability to respond militarily, the denial strategist makes th

adversary’s planned military strategy ineffective and the ex 

pected costs of his countervailing military action prohibitiv

and not worth the effort. 4 2 Maj Mark Sullivan notes that the

Denial theory argues that in conventional conflicts the most effective

means of coercion is reducing the victim’s expected benefits . . . below

expected costs . . . in his decision calculus. First, specific benefits . . .

may be targeted as a means to reduce expected benefits, but Pape main -

tains that states are incapable of manipulating opponents’ perceived

benefits. “The assailant cannot gain coercive leverage by attempting to

alter the target’s basic interests; it can only hope to persuade th e target

to ignore or stop acting on these interests.” The value of the benefits is

relatively static during conflicts and belligerents can do little to change

their opponent’s perception of the attractiveness of these benefits. . . .

Perceived benefits are relatively constant during conflicts. 4 3

447
Utility of the Coercive-Denial Model

Some advantages of the coercive-denial approach include it

focus on denying an enemy any net benefit from his militar

actions. Campaign planners using Pape’s approach can rap

idly concentrate on destroying the adversary’s military wil

and coercing him to accept a desired position or take a desired

action. Planners need not consider any actions by the adver 

sary in the political or economic arena because these have n

relevance to the approach. Coercive denial maximizes on-the

job military knowledge and intuition by permitting planner

with limited data on an adversary to mirror-image possibl

responses to the coercion. With some knowledge of the adver 

sary, planners can make fairly accurate predictions of th

enemy’s response to an action. Pape’s approach also permit

concentration of forces and application of mass against a sin 

gle target set.

A limitation to the Pape approach is its singular focus an

dependence on denying adversaries effective military re

sponses to the Pape-strategist’s actions. As long as friendly

forces deny an adversary weapons of mass destruction (whic

he might use as a weapon of last choice or as a threat) and a

long as he has no ally or coalition willing to intervene on hi

behalf, the approach remains viable.

Given these advantages and limitations, the coercive-denia

approach is most appropriate during crisis-action planning

when time is of the essence, and in designing an operational

level campaign plan that rapidly emasculates an adversary’

military might and forces the adversary’s leadership to capitu 

late rather than face continued destruction. Because of its nar 

row scope, limited target sets, and concentration on militar

targets, one can apply Pape’s approach to any number o

situations. As with any analysis, it requires continual updat

ing, revising, and maintaining during both peace and war.

Applying the Coercive-Denial Approach

to Deliberate Force

Dr. Pape’s approach relies heavily on prohibiting the opposi

tion unrestricted access to its military forces; it requires n

data beyond the military objective and a knowledge of wha

448
part of the enemy

s military is most important—and therefor

most likely to cause a change of will if denied him. Although

Pape does not explicitly call this vital point a COG, his coer 

cive theory does in fact seek to deny a COG.

A key feature of this approach is the need for the Bosnia

Serb leaders to recognize and acknowledge the military hope

lessness of their situation. Hence, the campaign plan would

attempt to leave clear lines of communications open amon

Pale , Banja Luka , and the forces in the field. In this regard th

coercive-denial theory varies significantly from Warden’s the

ory, the effects-based theory, and the approach chosen by th

CAOC and General Ryan. Conventional wisdom strongly advo 

cates blinding, deafening, and muting the communication

and control networks of one’s opponent, thus denying him

centralized control of his forces. The Pape approach require

that these C2 networks be degraded but left standing (an

working) so that the enemy can understand what is happen 

ing to his forces and react. At this point the campaign planne

must knowingly add the risk of a quickly reacting enemy t

the plan. Of course, the quick reaction that the planner want

from the enemy is an acknowledgment of his reduced capabil 

ity and subsequent capitulation. The campaign would als

seek to deny the BSA’s COG by destroying heavy weapons an

supply depots.

Deliberate Force appears to have closely followed Pape’

coercive-denial approach in its design and execution. Ha

Pape himself designed the campaign, no doubt it would hav

strongly resembled the actual prosecution. Target sets would

have been similar, if not identical, with the exception of re

quiring less damage to C2 networks for the reasons mentioned

above. Further, Pape’s timing of the air campaign would hav

been far more deliberate and much slower, allowing the Bos 

nian Serbs to assimilate damage reports from within. As th

campaign went on, preplanned pauses (unilateral cease-fires

would have allowed diplomats time to entreat the enemy

Through this slower, more deliberate process of coercion, th

Bosnian Serbs eventually would have been driven to withdraw

their remaining heavy weapons from around Sarajevo an

adopt the UN mandates.

449
Conclusion

Assessing alternate approaches to any past campaign ca

verge on second-guessing the people who actually prosecuted

the battle—certainly not the intent of this chapter. Instead, i

examined viable options that could have produced other, per 

haps equally viable, courses of action. It is up to the plannin

staff to decide which of these approaches to use.

A review of the Deliberate Force campaign as designed

shows that planners employed elements of the five-ring mode

to identify the key Bosnian Serb COGs and elements of th

effects-based approach to achieve end-state-based military ob

jectives. In its operational approach, Deliberate Force executed

a coercive-denial air campaign to achieve its objectives. Thus

the CAOC’s planning staff employed all three of the curren

theories discussed above, although it did so subconsciousl

and by happenstance. The bottom line for our Air Force is t

understand the robust and viable options available for plan

ning air campaigns and the planning conditions under whic

they are best applied to the problem of taking down an enemy

We have the ability to vary our planning patterns—and w

should, since applying a variety of campaign styles allows u

to orchestrate unpredictable and synergistic air campaigns tha

will dispatch our enemies with surprise, speed, and might.

Notes

1. Quoted by Col Douglas Richardson, director of operations, CAOC

interviewed by Lt Col Robert C. Owen and Richard L. Sargent, 7 Decembe

1995.

2. Contextual and operational-art elements are key to ACSC’s air 

campaigning framework. See Lt Col Larry A. Weaver and the author, “Cam 

paign Planning for the 21st Century: An Effected-Based Approach to th

Planning Process,” in War Theory (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command an

Staff College, September 1998), 3:27–33.

3. Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by authors of the Air University Ba

kans Air Campaign Study at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB

Ala., 7 February 1996.

4. Ibid.

5. Briefing, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Public Affair

October 1995.

450
6. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, interviewed by Lt Col Rober

Owen et al., Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 Marc

1996.

7. Ryan interview. General Ryan went on to say that “henceforth, the ai

commander will be—must be—applying the overarching air strategy at th

tactical level. You cannot delegate the selection. The commander must as

all of the detailed questions. There will be no time in the future when he wi

have the option to say, ‘I delegated that responsibility.’ The commande

must be accountable for all actions taken by his forces. This is particularl

notable, given our use of [precision-guided munition] strikes from the air.”

8. Lt Col Thomas D. Entwistle, interviewed by Lt Col Robert C. Owe

Washington, D.C., 1 December 1995.

9. Ryan interview.

10. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, presentation to Joint Doctrine Air Cam 

paign Course students, College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educa

tion, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996.

11. Hornburg interview.

12. Ryan interview.

13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard an

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

14. Hornburg interview.

15. Ryan interview.

16. Ibid.

17. Hornburg interview.

18. AFSOUTH briefing.

19. John A. Warden III, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century,” i

Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Ka

P. Magyar et al. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 319.

20. ACSC Teaching Plan, “SS525: Leadership as a Center of Gravity

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 6 October 1995).

21. See Col John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpowe

Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 40–55.

22. Ibid.

23. ACSC Teaching Plan, “SS526: Population as a Center of Gravity

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 24 October 1995).

24. Warden, “Enemy.” In this case Colonel Warden follows in the foot

steps of Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, John Slessor, and Billy Mitchel

all of whom thought that airpower could be used more effectively again

targets other than fielded forces.

25. Briefing, John A. Warden III to ACSC course directors, subjec

ACSC Curriculum Goals for Academic Year 1996, 2 May 1995.

26. For an expanded discussion of the effects-based model, see Weave

and the author.

27. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxfor

University Press, 1971), 84.

451
28. See Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Making Strateg

An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB

Ala.: Air University Press, August 1988), 23.

29. Weaver and the author. Logistics serves as the glue of armies an

societies. In Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World Wa

(New York: Viking, 1990), John Ellis argues that the United States won th

war because its ability to generate war materiel overwhelmed the enemy. I

addition to the traditional notions of equipment, ships, weapons, an

spares, logistics also includes the personnel to use the materiel, training

transportation, communications, and more. This element of operational ar

also considers the factories, laboratories, workers, farmers, and scientists i

the equation. Planning requires that one also examine the opposition’

logistics system for vulnerabilities.

30. Weaver and the author. Technology is not just technological ad

vancement but the military application of technology. It includes the traine

individual who can employ the new technology using new tactics, as well a

new organizations that exploit this new technology.

31. Ibid. Information and its subset—intelligence—are not new prob 

lems. However, growth in the amount of data available makes it critical tha

operators ask the right questions and that intelligence officers learn to tailo

their answers for the intended user. Systematic analysis of our enemy wi

identify vulnerabilities to exploit. The military planner must quickly obtai

the right data at the right time to exploit these vulnerabilities. We mu

train our minds to make the best use of the information provided. Risk wi

always be part and parcel of the planner’s and the commander’s live

Information can help reduce the risk.

32. Ibid. Targeting science is the heart of operational art. For years th

US Air Force concentrated on targeteering—the selection and matching o

the target and the servicing weapon, as well as timing. ACSC emphasize

that this is but one element of the larger concept of targeting science. Th

question today is not how much damage one can inflict but how well on

achieves the desired effect by servicing a target.

33. Ibid.

34. One may define strategic effect as the consequence of an action fe

throughout the entire system. Achieving such effects will impact a nation’

ability to efficiently and effectively apply the political, military, economi

and informational instruments of power. For example, strategic effect ca

range from impairing a nation’s ability to function normally, through para

lyzing key political and economic systems, to rendering the nation unable t

provide the most basic services. It seeks to create systemwide paralysis. Typ

cally, the closer one targets to the center ring, the greater the strategic effe c

One may define operational effect as the consequence of an action tha

impairs one’s ability to use a specific instrument of power (political, mil

tary, economic, and informational) in a given region. Operational effect

typically focus on impairing the ability to apply military power within 

theater of operations. For example, operational effects might range from

452
reducing an enemy

s military capability, through increasing attrition, t

annihilating his forces in an area. Operational effect may also result in th

diversion of military forces from the main effort. Psychological effect is th

consequence of an action that negatively impacts the enemy’s state of min

or positively impacts the mental state of friendly forces or allies. For exam 

ple, psychological effects can range from achieving surprise and confusio

in the mind of the enemy leadership, commanders, population, and/o

troops; through dissuading the enemy from resisting; to inspiring friendl

leadership, commanders, population, and/or troops to hold out again

great odds.

35. This assessment should examine one’s effectiveness in hitting cer 

tain targets. This includes the appropriateness of one’s choice of COGs an

the entire COG-selection process, from the establishment of military objec 

tives, to the selection of COGs, to the prioritization of COG targets. One’

assessment should then analyze the actual effects, their causes, and gap

in the logic chain. Most importantly, it should assess the validity of th

measures and indicators one uses and the validity of one’s assumptions.

36. See ACSC Teaching Plan, “Measuring Success” (Maxwell AFB, Ala

Air Command and Staff College, 9 February 1996) for additional details o

the effect-cause-effect scenario.

37. Purist and fusionist are terms that describe how military member

view their profession. A purist concentrates on the military means availabl

to meet an objective, while the fusionist looks at all applicable instrument

of power (military, political, and economic) and recommends the approac

to apply them synergistically to achieve the desired objective.

38. Robert A. Pape, “Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Work

and Punishment Doesn’t,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 4 (Decembe

1992): 465.

39. Maj Mark P. Sullivan, The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Deni

or Second-Order Change? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, Apr

1995), 18.

40. Pape, 424. This concept dovetails nicely with the effects of PGM

Mary FitzGerald comments on the Russian view that PGMs used again

key command, control, communications, and intelligence systems have th

same effects as a nuclear weapon. If used against a nuclear-capable enemy

PGMs could force an escalation to nuclear war. “Russian Views on Futur

War” (paper presented at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., March 1995).

41. Robert A. Pape, “Coercive Air Power” (PhD diss., University of Ch

cago, December 1988), 57.

42. Sullivan, 11.

43. Ibid., 17. See also Robert A. Pape, “Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam

War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 110. In order to analyz

the denial effect empirically, Pape uses territory as the primary benefit ove

which nations struggle.

453
Chapter 16

Summary

Col Robert C. Owen*

This chapter summarizes and suggests implications of th

final report of the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS).

1

 Th

former deputy commander in chief of United States Europea

Command, Gen James Jamerson , and the former commande

of Air University, Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, chartered this study in

October 1995. The purpose was to “capture” the planning

execution, and results of Operation Deliberate Force, th

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign con 

ducted against the Bosnian Serbs between 30 August and 1

September 1995, as part of a broader international interven 

tion into the Bosnian conflict. The specific charters were t

explore broadly the salient events and implications of thi

brief but unique air campaign and to gather a comprehensiv

documentary and oral archive to support later in-depth re

search. The generals’ intention was that the team would la

out a “mile-wide-and-foot-deep” baseline study of Deliberat

Force, one aimed more at identifying and delineating issue

than at putting them to rest.

The BACS team adopted a core research question that high 

lighted the study’s focus on the planning and execution of a

air campaign: “How and with what considerations did th

planners and executors of Deliberate Force link military op

erations with the strategic, political, and diplomatic goals the

were charged to attain?” To be useful to a potentially broa

audience, the answer to this question required a survey of th

geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and opera 

tional factors influencing this particular air campaign. Thu

the general organization of the study and the chapters of it

report were divided into sections that primarily dealt with (1 ) th

*An earlier version of this essay appeared in the Summer and Fall 1997 issues 

Airpower Journal.

455
political and institutional context of Deliberate Force plan

ning, (2) the actual planning of the campaign, (3) its execu 

tion, and (4) the implications of those experiences. To th

extent that these chapters had a unifying theme, it was a

effort to determine to what extent the planners and executor

of Deliberate Force were cognizant of and/or wielded influenc

over the forces that shaped the form, execution, and effects o

the air campaign. In other words, to what extent were they in

charge of events, and to what extent were events in charge o

them? The answer to that question and others raised—and t

various extents answered by the BACS team—carries signifi 

cant implications for the theories and doctrines of airpowe

strategy and planning.

Political and Institutional Context

In an ideal world, military planners base their work on

concise and clear articulations of the political and diplomati

goals set by their political leaders. If they are to organiz

forces, develop strategies, select intermediate objectives, an

execute operations, they need to know those goals and th

degree and the nature of the force they can employ in thei

attainment. Although the truth of this concept likely would b

Gen James Jamerson Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley

456
transparent to any military thinker, most would also agre

that the inherent complexity, chaos, and obscurations of war

and conflicts often make the clear and lasting articulations o

specific political and diplomatic goals difficult. In the practica

world, as a consequence, military planners usually base thei

work on expressions of goals that are sometimes clear, some

times obscure, and sometimes unknowable or only assumed

This mix of the knowable and the unknowable was particu 

larly evident in the planning context of Deliberate Force. In

the origins and nature of the conflict and in the multicoalition

structure of the outside intervention into it, there lay a com 

plex and changing web of objectives, commitments, and re

straints that shaped military planning, even though the plan

ners involved perceived some of its strands only imperfectly o

had no knowledge of them.

In general terms the Bosnian conflict was a by-product o

the economic and political decline of the Yugoslav Federation

during the 1980s. The net effect of this prolonged crisis on

Yugoslavian national and provincial politics was the breaku

of the country. The republics of Slovenia and Croatia left i

the summer of 1991, while Bosnia and Macedonia pulled ou

in the winter of 1991–92. Left behind in a rump state referred

to as “the former Yugoslavia ” were Serbia , Vojvodina, Mon 

tenegro, and Kosovo—all under the domination of Serbia an

its president, Slobodan Milosevic . The breakup was not peace

ful. The Yugoslavian People’s Army (JNA) fought a 10-day wa

in June and July 1991 to keep Slovenia in the federation, an

it fought a much longer and bitterer war to quash the Croa 

tian secession between August 1991 and January 1992. In

cooperation with the JNA, Serbian minority groups in Croatia

and Bosnia fought to hold those provinces in the federation

and under the pale of Milosevic or, failing that, to carve ou

their own ethnic enclaves (Krajinas) for ultimate unification

with “greater Serbia .” All of these conflicts were characterize

by an appalling viciousness on all sides, including massacre

of civilians and captured soldiers, mass robbery and rape, an

scorched-earth conquests—all encapsulated in a new interna

tional term: ethnic cleansing. Dismay and disgust at that vio 

lence and its implications for regional stability prompted outsid

457
states and international organizations to intervene in the Bal

kans crisis in general and in Bosnia in particular.

From the perspective of the intervening states and the late

planners of Deliberate Force, knowing that the Bosnian con 

flict sprang from the collapse of the Yugoslavian Federation

provided little foundation for strategic planning. Crudely pu

a political breakup, in and of itself, provides few target

against which air strategists may ply their trade. Building ai

strategy in the case of Bosnia required more detailed under 

standing of the conflict, beginning with a clear description o

its sustaining causes. Sustaining causes is a term useful in

this discussion to designate the forces and mechanisms tha

“move” a conflict from its root cause to its ultimate form

These causes drive the evolution of a conflict, sustain it, an

characterize its key features, such as objectives, scope, inten 

sity, and political dynamics. In the present discussion, th

sustaining causes of the Bosnian conflict are the things tha

led the country’s people and leaders to take the course tha

they did in response to the uncertainties and fears engendered

by the collapse of the existing federal political system. The

had choices, after all. To resecure its future, the collectiv

Bosnian polity could have chosen to continue the peacefu

coexistence of its people in a unitary state, to divide into 

Swiss-like confederation of cantons, or to select some othe

option to gross interethnic violence. Instead, Bosnians wen

for each other’s throats, arguably at the instigation of ele 

ments of the Serb community. Explanations as to why the

did so vary, but most identify some combination of three un

derlying forces as the predominant cause of their choice: (1

ethnic tension, (2) inflammation of ethnic tension by nationa

and provincial politicians in pursuit of personal power an

other political ends, and (3) a military imbalance grossly in

favor of one Bosnian ethnic group—namely the Serbs.

2

Ethnic tension may have been historically endemic to Bos 

nian politics, but interethnic violence was episodic. In thei

ancient roots in the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire

the people of Bosnia were all South Slavs . In the latter twenti

eth century, they still looked like each other, and they spok

dialects of the same root language. But, as was the case fo

the South Slavs of the Balkans region in general, centuries o

458
the divide-and-rule policies of their Ottoman and Hapsbur

overlords, internal migration, differing religious experiences

and wars had divided Bosnians into distinct—though geo 

graphically intermixed—communities of faith and, to a lesse

degree, culture. Proportionally in 1991 the three largest ethni

groups in Bosnia were the Muslim Serbs (referred to in th

report as Moslems),3 Orthodox Christian Serbs, and Catholi

Croats, who comprised 44 percent, 31 percent, and 18 percen

of the population, respectively. Nevertheless, following th

creation of Yugoslavia after World War I, these communitie

generally lived in peace and increasingly intermarried, par

ticularly when times were good and the federal governmen

was strong. But when times were tough and the central gov

ernment weakened, as was the case during World War II an

during the economic and political crisis of the 1980s, ethni

loyalties regained preeminent importance for enough Bosnian

to orient political competition and widespread violence alon

communal—rather than ideological, economic, or class—lines

The fact that ethnic chauvinism emerged as a predominan

theme of Bosnian politics in the latter 1980s was to some degre

the consequence of the manipulations of federal and provin 

cial politicians. Indeed, the chronology of the Bosnian conflic

has its tangible beginnings in the demagoguery of Milosevic 

Maneuvering for power, in 1987 he began using his position

as president of the Yugoslavian League of Communists as 

platform to whip up the ethnic pride and paranoia of the Serb

community of Serbia . Milosevic’s rhetoric also helped stir u

Serbian groups living in the Krajina of southwestern Croatia

and in a number of smaller Krajinas in Bosnia . By mid-199

Croatian Serbs were committing acts of defiance and limited

violence against the Croatian government. When Croatia de

clared its independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, Croa 

tian Serbs cooperated with the JNA in an open war to crus

the independence movement or at least to establish Serbia

control over the Krajina. This war ended in January 1992 wit

the establishment of a tense truce in the Krajina and creation

of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to supervis

it. By that time, elements of the Bosnian Serb community

under the general if sometimes very loose leadership of Ra 

dovan Karadzic , were preparing to resist a similar declaration

459
of independence by Bosnia . In the early months of 1991, th

majority of Croats and Muslims, under the leadership of Presi

dent Alija Izetbegovic , had voted for independence. Preemptin

that vote, Karadzic established an independent Serbian Re

public . Bosnia formally withdrew from Yugoslavia in Marc

1992, and heavy fighting followed immediately after. Forces o

the Serb Republic, with overt assistance from the JNA, ad 

vanced to expand its borders, while the relatively weak Bos 

nian army fought to preserve the territorial integrity an

authority of its newly independent state. Within a few weeks

Serbs controlled almost two-thirds of the territory of Bosnia .

The boldness and success of the Bosnian Serbs’ militar

offensive were consequences to some degree of their great mili

tary advantage over the Moslem and Croat factions. Durin

1991 a number of Serb military and paramilitary units formed

in Bosnia and prepared to fight. The JNA, which remained

present in the country until after independence, greatly helped

their preparations. Before and as it withdrew, the JNA opened

arsenals to Serb military units and released sympathetic per 

sonnel to join it. Meanwhile the Bosnian government did littl

to arm itself. In reality, President Izetbegovic had little oppor

tunity to do otherwise. The only significant local source o

arms was the JNA, and it gave willingly only to Serbs. More

over, the United Nations (UN) in September 1991 had imposed

an arms embargo that made it difficult and expensive for th

Bosnian government to import arms and materiel from th

outside. Thus when the country fractionated, the Bosnian Serb 

had the will and overwhelming military power—particularly in

a vast preponderance of aircraft and heavy field weapons—t

advance around the northern and eastern parts of Bosnia 

There they carved out an ethnic state with direct connection

to Serbia proper and to the Serbian Krajina of Croatia . In 

matter of weeks, then, the Bosnian government found itsel

surrounded by unfriendly and mutually supporting Serbia

enclaves and states.

By that time the direct international intervention that even 

tually would have a crescendo in Deliberate Force was unde

way. Concerned with the growing violence and the possibilit

of intervention by Yugoslavia , several European states and th

United States recognized Bosnia in April 1992, and on 20 Ma

460
the UN Security Council recommended Bosnia for admission

to the General Assembly. On 29 June the Security Counci

resolved to provide peacekeeping forces to protect the flow o

humanitarian relief supplies into Sarajevo Airport, under th

protection of UNPROFOR, whose charter was extended to in 

clude peace operations in Bosnia . NATO airpower became in 

volved in the region at about the same time in the form o

airborne warning and control system aircraft flying in suppor

of Sharp Guard , a NATO and Western European Union opera 

tion to enforce the regional arms embargo and economic sanc

tions against the former Yugoslavia . Direct cooperation be

tween the UN and NATO began on 16 October, when b

prearrangement the UN issued United Nations Security Coun

cil Resolution (UNSCR) 781, banning all military flight opera 

tions over Bosnia , and NATO activated Operation Sky Watc

to observe and report violations of that ban. After observin

hundreds of no-fly violations over the next several months

particularly by combat aircraft of the Bosnian Serb faction

the UN and NATO again cooperated to toughen the no-fly ban

On 31 March 1993, the UN issued UNSCR 816, banning a

flights not authorized by the UN and authorizing membe

states to take all necessary actions to enforce that ban. Simu

taneously, NATO replaced Sky Watch with Operation Den

Flight to signify the new element of force. Over subsequen

months NATO and the UN added other missions to Den

Flight, including close air support (CAS) to protect UN person 

nel under attack, offensive air support (OAS) to punish fac

tions violating UNSCRs , and suppression of enemy air de

fenses (SEAD) to protect NATO aircraft flying the othe

missions. To coordinate planning and, particularly, the target

identified for attack in these missions, NATO ’s North Atlanti

Council (NAC) also activated at the start of Deny Flight a join

target coordination board composed of senior NATO and UN

tactical commanders concerned with the use of airpower in

the region and its consequences. These developments and th

planning that went into them constituted an incremental, evo 

lutionary process that laid the foundations of Deliberat

Force, which technically was but a phase of Deny Flight.

Intervention air planning evolved for nearly three years

roughly from the early fall of 1992 to the end of August 1995

461
An important reason for that prolongation was the difficult

experienced by NATO, the UN, and the international commu

nity as a whole in reaching consensus on what the conflic

was about. Observable events made it obvious that the princip a

sustaining elements of the Bosnian war were ethnic tensions

political manipulation of those tensions, and the imbalance o

military power. But which sustaining element or elements ex 

erted the most influence on its shape, scope, and virulence? In

his research for the first chapter of this book, Prof. Karl Muelle

identifies two distinct schools of thought on this issue, par

ticularly among interventionist governments. One school em 

phasized ethnic conflict. Somehow, in this view, Slavs wer

predisposed culturally to slice each other’s throats. Bosnia

was just a case in point—a place where collapse of the Yugo 

slav federal system’s restraints merely unfettered the lon g

restrained-but-never-forgotten ethnic hatreds in a perenniall

unstable and violent region. At the beginning of the Bosnia

conflict, Mueller argues, this was the official view of mos

European interventionist governments—importantly, Britain

and France—which provided most of the peacekeeping troop

for Bosnia . The second school emphasized the political ma

nipulations of Serbian political leaders such as Milosevic an

Karadzic. Whatever the inherent instabilities of the region

this school of thought held that the current round of fightin

had been sparked and sustained by the venal racism of irre

sponsible demagogues. This view of the conflict, which re

flected the predominant, official position of the United State

after the spring of 1993, thus held that violence in the region

was episodic—not perennial.

For air planners these two views of the sustaining element

of the Bosnian war were directly significant because each im 

plied a different strategy of intervention. If the war were th

consequence of endemic cultural forces, then it had no cu

prits. All sides were equally guilty and equally innocent—victim 

of forces beyond their control. If that were the case, then th

proper role of an intervention was that of a neutral mediator

To the extent that one used force in such an intervention, on

should do so only to protect the innocent, separate the war 

ring factions, and encourage communications and confidenc

between them. In current US military usage, then, the view

462
that conflict was perennial to Bosnia led to a peacemakin

strategy aimed at ameliorating suffering and facilitating 

cease-fire and political settlement as soon as possible. In con 

trast, if the war were the consequence of political manipula 

tion, then it had culprits—the politicians exploiting the situ 

ation to sustain war for their own interests and those of thei

constituents. If that were the case, then coercion was also 

legitimate role of military intervention, along with relief an

confidence building. Assuming that one could identify th

risk-benefit calculi of the political culprits, then one might b

able to identify military targets that, if attacked or threatened

would shift the balance of their calculations toward peace

One could also use intervention military force to remediate th

consequences of war crimes and territorial conquest by th

war’s aggressors. In that case an immediate cessation of fight

ing might not be appropriate if it denied the interventionist

the time required to set, or help set, things “right.” In curren

US military usage, then, the view that conflict in Bosnia wa

episodic and opportunistic led in part to a strategy of peac

enforcement aimed at coercing the appropriate warlords t

accept peace and redress wrongs.

These two views of the causes of the war also had indirec

significance for air planners because their contrariety under 

mined the ability of NATO and the UN as corporate organiza 

tions to develop consensus between themselves and amon

their members on what exactly to do about Bosnia . Consensu

was a necessary prelude to action because both organization

are voluntary associations of sovereign states. Once stated

this seems an obvious truth. But in the heat of events, mili

tary planners sometimes forget that, compared to the hierar

chical order of military organizations, these internation a

organizations operate on a basis akin to institutionalized anarchy

No matter how orderly and cooperative the internal processe

of these organizations, their member states are not subordi

nate to them or the majority will of the other members. Eve

small states can block corporate actions simply by withhold 

ing their support from them. As a consequence, most of th

senior diplomats interviewed for the BACS pointed out, explicitl

or implicitly, that no general plans or policies for Bosnia , in 

cluding those related to the use of airpower, had any hope o

463
success unless they were endorsed by all the principal state

in the intervention—particularly those in the Security Counci

and NATO. According to Robert Hunter, the US ambassado

throughout Deny Flight, building such consensus support fo

increasingly robust use of airpower over Bosnia was a difficul

and months-long diplomatic process—but an absolute precur

sor to action. 4 Little wonder that Mueller describes the debat

over the sustaining causes of the war as “one of the majo

obstacles to Western efforts to deal with the crisis.”

The slow pace of policy development had one advantage fo

NATO airmen, including those who eventually put together De 

liberate Force: it gave them time to overcome the institu tiona

and doctrinal impediments they faced in planning and executin

sustained air operations over Bosnia . In the second chapter o

this book, Lt Col Bradley Davis describes the organizationa

structure NATO had in place during Deny Flight. The Bosnia

region fell under the purview of NATO’s 5th Allied Tactical Ai

Force (5 ATAF), with headquarters at the Italian air force’s Da

Molin Air Base (AB), Vicenza , Italy. The Italian general com 

manding 5 ATAF , who at the time of Deliberate Force was Ma

Gen Andrea Fornasiero, reported to the commander of Allied

Air Forces Southern Command (AIRSOUTH). From Decembe

1992 the AIRSOUTH commander was Lt Gen Joseph Ash

until his replacement by Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan in Septembe

1994. These two United States Air Force officers, in turn

reported to United States Navy admirals commanding Allied

Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), headquartered in Naples

Italy. The commander in chief of AFSOUTH (CINCSOUTH) a

the beginning of Deny Flight was Adm Jeremy Boorda unti

his replacement by Adm Leighton W. Smith Jr. To complet

the chain of command, AFSOUTH reported to the Suprem

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), also an American four

star commander. SACEUR took his general guidance from th

ambassadors sitting on the NAC.

The problem, Davis assesses, was that neither 5 ATAF no

AFSOUTH was organized, manned, or equipped to handle th

scale and complexity of an operation like Deny Flight, let alon

Deliberate Force. In late 1992, 5 ATAF was charged to overse

and control indirectly the air defense of Italy . Accordingly it ha

modest communications connections with air defense center

464
and radar sites throughout Italy. But the 5 ATAF headquarter

was small, and its control center was equipped with obsolescen

equipment. It possessed none of the state-of-the-art automate

air-planning and information downlink systems that ha

proven so successful in the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. Sim

larly, AIRSOUTH was a small planning headquarters, charge

with doing air planning for AFSOUTH and overseeing the activi

ties of 5 ATAF and two other ATAFs based in Greece and Turkey

Neither AIRSOUTH nor AFSOUTH had crisis-planning cells t

deal with the rapid onset and fast-paced political and militar

evolution of something like Deny Flight.

5

 Overall, the establishe

strengths and equipment of the two headquarters fell far shor

of the likely demands of continual observation and no-fly en 

forcement operations over Bosnia .

NATO’s formal doctrinal foundations for peace operation

over Bosnia were also uneven. Since most key commander

and staff planners were Americans, Lt Col Robert Pollock ex 

amines in his chapter the formal body of theories that migh

have been relevant to planning Deliberate Force and availabl

to AIRSOUTH planners. He explores three theoretical con 

structs available in open literature at the time: Robert Pape

denial strategy, John Warden ’s five-ring paradigm, and the Ai

Command and Staff College’s “systems” approach to air tar

geting. Despite their markedly different theoretical proposi

tions and planning approaches, Pollock finds that these thre

theories generally produced target sets similar to one anothe

and to the targets actually bombed during Deliberate Force

The differences among them were marginal issues of timin

and focus. For all the potentially useful guidance and reassur

ance these three concepts could have offered, however, neithe

Pollock nor other members of the BACS team uncovered ora

evidence that AIRSOUTH planners had any working knowl

edge of them.

In his examination of written NATO doctrines , Col Mari

McCrabb determines that Deny Flight planners also foun

little guidance in their manuals and publications. That guid 

ance was particularly spotty for operations other than wa

(OOTW), of which peace operations are a subset. Summarizin

his findings, McCrabb notes that “NATO . . . air plannin

doctrine . . . focuses on coalition considerations but remain

465
largely silent on OOTW, while US joint doctrine feature

greater emphasis on the unique aspects of OOTW but does no

fully consider coalition considerations. An additional issu

that bedevils both sets of doctrine is the role of airpower in

either OOTW or conventional war.” These doctrinal shortfall

were glaring in relation to the unique and unprecedented rela 

tionship of NATO, primarily a regional military alliance, actin

in military support of the UN, primarily a global political or

ganization. Notably, established doctrines were largely silen

on how airmen could reconcile, in their plans and target lists

the conflicting objectives and restraints that likely would crop

up between two powerful organizations in a peacemaking situ 

ation in which at least one combatant did not want to mak

peace. Thus, addressing one of the principal corollary researc

questions of the BACS , McCrabb concludes that “the question

. . . of whether these planners consulted the existing body o

doctrine or just ‘winged it’ is largely moot—they had almos

nothing to which they could refer.”

This virtual absence of guidance for conducting multicoali

tion peace operations was understandable, given the unprece

dented nature of the UN-NATO relationship. But it was a

important void in the context of NATO air planning becaus

the overall focus of UN strategy and the operational focus o

NATO air commanders began to diverge almost at the start o

Deny Flight. Under Sky Watch the strategic focus of the inter 

vention and NATO flyers was on peacemaking—observe an

report, but don’t engage. But the decision to activate Den

Flight added peace enforcement as a potential feature of inter 

vention strategy. Though they never challenged the UN’s over

all commitment to maintaining its position as a neutral peace

maker, General Ashy and other senior NATO commander

immediately recognized that their operational focus would b

on peace enforcement.

6

 Moreover, since the Bosnian Serb

possessed far and away the largest air arm in Bosnia , Den

Flight clearly was aimed predominantly at them.7 That focu

sharpened in the spring and summer of 1993, when CAS an

OAS missions were added to the Deny Flight menu; the UN

designated certain cities under the control of the Bosnian gov

ernment as safe areas and committed itself to protect them

With those developments NATO was flying in great part t

466
restrict both the Serb faction

s employment of a key militar

advantage and its ability to assail cities held by its enemies

That hardly was an act of peacemaking impartiality, and it

contrast with the overall UN mission became a source of frus

tration for NATO airmen and of strategic debate, particularl

within NAC.

Given all these elements of their planning context, NATO

airmen seem to have received their planning and operationa

responsibilities for Deny Flight under unenviable circum

stances. The conflict they were engaging was complicated

enough in its origins and convoluted regional politics. Bu

their task was complicated further by the presence of at leas

two broad interpretations of the conflict at play among thei

direct and indirect political leaders, and each one of thos

interpretations spoke to a different approach to the use o

airpower. In their formal chain of command, the American fla

officers in charge of Deny Flight worked for NAC , which wa

acting in support of the UN Security Council. At the beginnin

of Deny Flight, most of the member governments of both or

ganizations were determined to restrict the intervention t

peacemaking operations and, consequently, to avoid any mili

tary operations that would appear to favor one Bosnian faction

over the other. Yet in their informal chain of command, thes

officers were American, and by mid-1993 their governmen

was on record in support of the use of airpower to halt o

punish Serb aggression—a position with which AFSOUTH

leaders were inclined to agree. Compounding this strategi

issue, AFSOUTH was neither materially nor doctrinally read

for Deny Flight. Consequently, while the strategic debat

rolled on and the Bosnian crisis unfolded, these airmen would

have to build up their conceptual understanding of the con 

flict as well as the command infrastructure and force struc

ture required to plan and execute operations. To put it mildly

they faced a great challenge.

Planning

To study the planning of Deliberate Force is to study Den

Flight. Until just a few weeks before the actual execution o

467
the campaign, there existed no plan or plan annex called

Deliberate Force . When the term did appear in text, it seems t

have done so first in the title of an AIRSOUTH briefing given i

early August 1995—“Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina—

Deliberate Force.”8 But the briefing did not delineate th

theaterwide bombing campaign that Deliberate Force became

It mainly listed the various contingency air plans thus fa

developed by AIRSOUTH to execute various aspects of th

Deny Flight mission. As a menu of specialized plans to enforc

UNSCRs, protect specific safe areas, and suppress Bosnia

Serb air defenses, this briefing offered NATO air commander

a foundation for responding to a future crisis, but it did no

propose a specific action for a specific crisis. Accordingly, a few

weeks later when the operation since recognized as Deliberat

Force began, one saw the activation and rapid modification o

several plans originally developed under the aegis of Den

Flight. Despite its obvious differences in focus and intensit

from the main body of Deny Flight, therefore, one can under 

stand Deliberate Force only as an evolutionary outgrowth o

the preparations and planning that went into the more pro 

longed operation. Col Chris Campbell and Lieutenant Colone

Davis detail various aspects of this planning effort in their chap

ters, which form the foundation for much of what follows here.

Deliberate planning for Deny Flight began almost from th

inception of Operation Sky Watch in mid-October 1992. B

mid-November after observing continued no-fly violations b

all Bosnian factions but particularly by Serb combat aircraf

the UN and NATO began developing the details of a mor

robust enforcement plan. Air planners at Supreme Headquar 

ters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium, bega 

developing organizational, operational, and force-structur

concepts for such a plan. Among other issues, they sug

gested that it would be necessary, in accordance with stan

dard NATO practice, to establish a stand-alone combined ai

operations center (CAOC) to control expanded air operation

over the region.9

This suggestion raised an issue of whether such a CAOC, 

established, should be an expansion of the 5 ATAF comman

and control center at Vicenza or a new and separate creation

Responding to a NATO request to look into the issue, Gen Rober

468
C. Oaks, commander of United States Air Forces Europ

(USAFE), dispatched Maj Gen James E. “Bear” Chambers, hi

Seventeenth Air Force commander, to visit and assess 

ATAF’s suitability for taking on the expanded responsibilitie

of the anticipated operation. An experienced air commande

who knew airpower as well as the region and who was alread

running USAFE ’s part of the Provide Promise humanitaria

airlift into Sarajevo, Chambers was a logical choice for th

task. By December, planning to increase AIRSOUTH ’s abilit

to impose a no-fly enforcement regime over Bosnia was pro 

ceeding along several tracks.

General Ashy received command of AIRSOUTH at just tha

time. Literally on the day that he took over, Ashy sat dow

with Admiral Boorda and did “some serious planning for a

air operation in the Balkans . . . to police a no-fly zone.”10 On

of his first concerns was to settle the CAOC organizationa

issue. Holding General Chambers in high regard and wantin

to utilize his familiarity with operations at Vicenza , Ash

elected to set up a stand-alone CAOC under Chambers’s direc

tion.11 On paper this CAOC was to be a subordinate extension

of the existing 5 ATAF command center, but in practice Gen 

eral Chambers would report directly to AIRSOUTH . Ash

chose this arrangement over expanding the 5 ATAF facilit

because he believed it would give him tighter control ove

what he anticipated was going to be a fast-paced and politi

cally hypersensitive situation. Ashy also considered eithe

bringing the CAOC down to Naples or moving his own head

quarters up to Vicenza , to place both the planning and execu 

tion staff functions of the forthcoming operation in one place

After some thought he decided to accept the physical division

of his staff in order to preserve other advantages. Leaving th

CAOC in Vicenza had the advantage of preserving at least th

form of the existing NATO command structure by keeping th

Italian commander of 5 ATAF in the formal chain of command

Keeping his own planning headquarters in Naples would facili

tate the daily, face-to-face contact with Admiral Boorda tha

Ashy felt he needed to do his job. 12

The next order of business was to enhance the staff, plan

ning, and communications capabilities of AIRSOUTH and th

CAOC to match the likely demands of Deny Flight. Finding th

469
CAOC operating with 

ancient equipment, Ashy and his staf

pressed to bring up-to-date communications and intelligenc

data terminals into the CAOC and to connect the center t

AIRSOUTH and to the NATO field units and squadrons tha

had begun deploying to bases around Italy. As part of thi

process, the CAOC received analysts and terminals for NATO 

Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe system. AIR

SOUTH’s intelligence capabilities were strengthened further b

t he transfer of intelligence personnel from Headquarters Six

teenth Air Force at Aviano AB, Italy, to Naples.

13 Recognizin

that the permanently authorized strengths of the AIRSOUTH

and CAOC staffs were still too small for the task at hand, Ash

also began to augment them on a rotating basis with personn e

coming in on 30-to-90-day assignments. These temporary-dut

(TDY) personnel soon comprised the overwhelming majority o

the CAOC staff and a significant portion of the AIRSOUTH force

Meanwhile, AIRSOUTH planners began to lay the documen 

tary foundations for Deny Flight and possible combat opera 

tions. The focus of their work was CINCSOUTH Operation

Plan (OPLAN) 40101, “Deny Flight,” the overall guide for NATO

air operations in support of UN peace operations in Bosnia 

Much of this document and its iterations remains classified

and, consequently, outside the scope of this chapter (see Colo 

nel Campbell’s chapter on the air campaign plan for mor

information). But it is appropriate to say here that OPLAN

40101 started out as a skeletal document laying out rules o

engagement (ROE) and the CINC’s concept of operations, an

then evolved into a more thorough document that laid out th

situation appraisals, strategy choices, coordination proce

dures, logistics issues, ROE, and so on that CINCAFSOUTH

believed were pertinent to the new, complex operation befor

his command. Since Deny Flight was primarily an air opera 

tion, a few members of the AIRSOUTH staff or other parts o

AFSOUTH did most of the work on 40101, with the clos

involvement of General Ashy and his subordinates.1 4

The first two versions of OPLAN 40101 came out in rapid

succession, reflecting the quick expansion of the Deny Fligh

mission in the first half of 1993. The first version, approved b

NAC on 8 April, mainly described how AIRSOUTH would inter 

cept, inspect, and engage aircraft violating the no-fly mandate 

470
The second version came out on 13 August with provision

reflecting the UN’s and NAC’s addition of CAS and OAS to th

menu of possible NATO air missions.

The addition of CAS and OAS to the OPLAN necessitated

that AIRSOUTH create a target list and get NAC ’s approval

the latter obtained through an NAC decision statement issued

on 8 August, just days before the release of the second itera 

tion of OPLAN 40101. This decision statement spelled ou

three targeting options for offensive air strikes. Option on

provided for CAS strikes of limited duration and scope agains

military forces and weapon systems directly violating UN reso

lutions or attacking UN peace forces or other personnel. Op

tion-two targets were mechanisms for lifting sieges. Their fo 

cus remained on military forces and supporting elements, bu

their scope expanded to include targets throughout the imme

diate environs of a besieged safe area. Option-three target

marked out a broader campaign against targets outside th

immediate area of a siege.1 5 Over the coming months, AF 

SOUTH produced many variations of its target lists, but th

essential categorization of these targets into three options re

mained a predominant, perhaps universal, theme in all of them

By the time all these organizational and planning events ha

taken place, the inherent tension between the UN’s peacekeep

in g focus and the peace-enforcement character of Deny Fligh

was affecting operations profoundly. The establishment and

more to the point, the interpretation of ROE for the operation

provided an early indication of that tension. In his chapter on

ROE , Lt Col Ron Reed explains that these rules are a natura

bellwether of problems in a military operation. Their function

is to link objectives, strategy, operations, and internationa

law to establish the methods and limits of force usable in 

conflict. To be viable, coalition ROE must reflect the views o

all members and the realities of the situation. If either of thos

conditions is not met, then disputes will quickly rise over an

around them. In the case of Bosnia , NATO officially endorse

the UN’s strategic vision. So in the absence of overt conflic

General Ashy and his staff worked out and got UN and NAC

approval for an initial set of ROE by February 1993.1 6 The rea

tension came from what proved to be the UN’s greater reluc

tance, at least compared to the inclination of involved ai

471
commanders, actually to act on ROE. 

NATO, Colonel Ree

concludes in his study, “always viewed the use of force in

terms of compelling the Bosnian Serbs. . . . But the UN viewe

force in the much more limited context of self-defense.” In 

deed, despite many opportunities to do so, the UN did no

release a CAS attack in defense of peacekeeping forces on th

ground until 12 March 1994.1 7

The fact that UN political leaders exercised such close contro

of air operations was another manifestation of the interna

peacekeeper/ peace-enforcer posture of the intervention. In Jun

1993 NATO and the UN adopted a so-called dual-key procedur

for releasing CAS and OAS strikes. Drawing metaphorically on

the procedural requirement for two individuals t o “turn keys ” t

release or launch nuclear weapons, the arrangement required

appropriate officials in both the UN and NATO to turn thei

keys before any NATO aircraft could release weapons agains

an air or ground target . For NATO any military commander

from the CAOC director up, could authorize CAS strikes in

response to a UN request. CINCAFSOUTH retained releas

authority for offensive air strikes. For the UN the decision

thresholds were raised one organizational level. Secretary

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali authorized his special repre

sentative, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, to release CAS strikes

while retaining for himself the authority to release offensive ai

strikes. 1 8 Thus the dual-key arrangement was an overt effor

to counterbalance UN and NATO control over air operations

As such, it indicated at least a corporate presumption amon

the member states of each organization that some possibilit

of misunderstanding or irresponsibility existed in the way on

organization or the other might interpret the standing ROE

and the immediate circumstances of a proposed strike.

A question arises here: If the corporate membership of bot

organizations feared the possibility of an irresponsible or ill

advised use of airpower, who did they think would do it? To 

large extent, the evidence available to the BACS suggests tha

the main concern centered around the “Americanization” o

the intervention’s air option. Since the summer of 1993, an

with greater fervor after the following winter, US political lead

ers were the most outspoken advocates of the punitive use o

airpower in the Balkans. From the beginning of Deny Flight

472
NATO airpower in the Balkans was under the control o

American flag officers, albeit ones serving as NATO command

ers. Moreover, most of the alliance’s offensive air strengt

resided in a powerful American composite wing based at Avi

ano AB in northeastern Italy . Several European states, par 

ticularly those with lightly armed peacekeeping forces commit 

ted on the ground, had fears (ill grounded or not) that thes

circumstances could lead to a unilateral, American use of th

air weapon in a manner that might escalate the level of vio 

lence in the region or the intervention’s role in it. Thus, ac

cording to Ambassador Hunter , several members of NAC pro 

posed the dual-key procedure to both NATO and the UN in a

effort to set up an arrangement that most people believed

would preclude any offensive air action.1 9 US ambassado

Richard Holbrooke shared Hunter’s assessment.20 Part of th

dual-key arrangement was about controlling a powerful an

politically sensitive “weapon” in the coalition’s arsenal, an

part of it was about controlling the holders of that weapon.

If ROE and the dual-key arrangement reflected the tensio

between and within the UN and NATO over the proper strateg

of intervention in Bosnia , they also helped to increase thos

tensions on many occasions. This particularly was the cas

whenever the two organizations actually prepared to use air 

power against the Bosnian Serbs. In the press of events, NATO

air commanders and American diplomats generally foun

themselves pushing for aggressive and strong air strikes whil

most other intervention partners and leaders of the UN calle

for caution and restraint.

The air strike against Udbina Airfield on 21 November 199

highlighted this tension. NATO and the UN ordered the strik

to punish recent violations of the no-fly ban by Bosnian Serb

and Krajina Serb aircraft, some of which were based at th

airfield in the Serb-controlled Krajina region of Croatia . Gen 

eral Ryan, who had taken over AIRSOUTH only weeks before

anticipated an active defense of the field and requested a com 

prehensive “takedown” of it, to include strikes against th

offending aircraft themselves, the runway and taxiways, an

the air defense systems and weapons in the area. Echoing hi

air commander’s approach, Admiral Smith said the prope

goal of the attack was “to make a parking lot out of Udbin

473
Airfield.

2 1 Intending to show restraint and to limit Serb casu

alties, however, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali approved at

tacks only against Udbina’s runway and taxiways—not agains

aircraft and local air defense systems, which presumabl

would be manned during the attack. Among other considera 

tions, the secretary-general hoped to avoid provoking the Bos 

nian Serbs into taking UN hostages, as they had done onc

already in retaliation for a NATO CAS strike near Gorazde th

previous April. Viewing the UN’s restrictions as rendering th

proposed air strikes largely ineffective and increasing the risk

to their aircrews, Smith and Ryan pressured the secretary

general and Ambassador Akashi to put aircraft and defens

systems back on the target list . The UN leaders finally agreed

to preapprove attacks against defense systems of immediat

threat to NATO aircraft only. They continued to bar attack

against Serb aircraft.2 2 NATO jets struck several antiaircraf

artillery sites and a surface-to-air site in the immediate vicin 

ity of the airfield, but otherwise they struck only the run

ways.2 3 It was a less-than-convincing demonstration of NATO

airpower or resolve—one that left American air commander

and some diplomats very frustrated. 2 4

The gulf between the views of NATO air commanders an

the UN on the proper use and aggressiveness of airpowe

continued to widen after Udbina. The UN’s reluctance to em 

ploy the weapon came out clearly after the attack, when Am 

bassador Akashi pointedly drew a line between the UN an

the peace-enforcement action just performed by NATO jets. H

wrote to Karadzic that NATO aircraft remained under UN con 

trol but would act only in defense of UNSCRs and UNPRO

FOR. Despite the implications of the air attacks on the Serbs

he reported that NATO aircraft were “neither the enemy no

the ally of any combatant.”2 5 NATO commanders increasingl

became frustrated with the UN’s long decision process in rela 

tion to releasing air strikes. This frustration reached a peak in

the summer of 1995, Admiral Smith recalled, when UN

peacekeepers “protecting” the city of Srebrenica called desper 

ately for CAS. NATO jets were ready for attack within minutes

but the UN refused to turn its key for two days, by which tim

the fall of the city to the Serbs was assured.2 6 Reflecting th

views of many American leaders involved in Bosnia , Ambassado

474
Holbrooke declared the dual-key arrangement an 

unmitigate

disaster” that placed the UN and NATO in a stressful and im 

proper relationship of overlapping responsibility and frictio n . 2 7

The political sensitivity of the airpower issue also influenced

Deny Flight planning activities. Throughout the operatio

Generals Ashy and Ryan took pains to ensure that their plan

ning efforts and operations did not undermine the confidenc

of NATO and UN political leaders in the professionalism an

self-control of their command. To that end, all iterations o

OPLAN 40101, ending with change four in May 1995, carefull

tied anticipated AIRSOUTH operations to the protection of UN

forces and the enforcement of specific UNSCRs, whether the

were air-to-air, SEAD , CAS , or OAS missions. The OPLAN als

admonished NATO airmen to ensure that their strikes, whe

authorized at all, were “proportional” (i.e., that they avoide

unnecessary casualties and collateral damage ).2 8 Also, th

three target options listed in AIRSOUTH attack plans offered

reassurance that NATO forces were a flexible instrument an

tightly under control. According to Ambassador Hunter, th

implicit reassurances of these provisions were essential un

derpinnings of his efforts to garner and maintain suppor

among NAC members for more robust air operations.29

From the inception of Deny Flight, Generals Ashy and Rya

had asked NATO to send non-US colonels and general officer

on a permanent basis to fill key command and staff billets a

AIRSOUTH and the CAOC. Despite their continued requests

on the eve of Deliberate Force, all major staff positions at th

CAOC and most at AIRSOUTH were filled by US Air Forc

colonels.3 0 Most of their subordinates at the CAOC wer

American junior officers and sergeants. This was an anoma

lous situation in the NATO command structure, in which com 

manders and their deputies usually are of different nationali

ties, as are commanders at succeeding levels of organization

The essentially American manning of the CAOC and the ai

command structure may have been as much a product of th

unease some NAC member states felt about the air weapon a

it was a cause of that unease. Several BACS researchers heard

secondary reports that the situation at the CAOC grated th

non-US officers there, but the team’s letters asking such indi

viduals directly about their perceptions and attitudes were no

475
answered. Significantly, however, Ambassador Hunter neve

heard complaints voiced by the national representatives on

the NAC, where such complaints would have necessitated cor 

rective action. In his opinion the willingness of NATO politica

leaders to accept the arrangement may well have reflected

both their unwillingness to have their nationals too closel

associated with what might become a politically explosive em 

ployment of airpower and their recognition that US Air Forc

personnel were best trained and equipped to handle the an

ticipated air operations.3 1 The BACS team found no documen 

tary support for Hunter’s perception, but most senior air com 

manders shared it, according to the interviews. Further, on

cannot escape the fact that other NATO states did not sen

officers to fill key command positions.

NATO’s ambivalence about the potential use of combat air 

power in Bosnia also seems to have undermined whatever will

ingness UN leaders had to allow NATO to use air more freely in

defense of their resolutions. As in the case of the use of an

military force, a halfhearted or incomplete air operation woul

be indecisive, politically and diplomatically vulnerable to globa

criticism, susceptible to breaking up what support existed in th

UN and NATO for continued intervention, and, as a consequenc

of all other effects, more likely to stir up the Bosnian hornet’

nest than calm it. Thus, Ambassador Hunter reported, a larg

measure of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s unwillingness t

authorize CAS operations in defense of UN troops, let alone t

consider a robust OAS campaign against Serb targets through 

out the area, was due to his belie f—through the spring o

1995—that NATO did not have the political cohesion or commit 

ment to carry such operations to a successful conclusion. Th

secretary-general made it clear to Hunter that he would neve

approve such operations unless he was convinced the UN woul

stick them out for their full course. Most of Hunter’s diplomati

efforts in NAC during 1994 and 1995, therefore, focused on

building such cohesion and commitment among the other mem 

ber governments. Until enough or all of them decided to back 

robust air operation, he did not expect the UN to release NATO

jets to pound the Bosnian Serbs.

3 2

Consensus support for offensive air strikes to protect the saf

areas began to build among NATO member states in the sprin

476
and early summer of 1995, as a result of several considera 

tions and events. In general, three years of brazen Serbia

defiance of UN resolutions and the laws of war probably ha

worn the patience of most of the governments intervening in

Bosnia and had infused the intervention with a sense of des 

peration. By mid-May 1995 the international press reporte

that, as a result of the seemingly unstoppable fighting, “th

nearly 40,000 UN peacekeepers in the region are descendin

into a state of ever more irrelevance and danger,” that Ambassa 

dor Akashi had “become a comic figure,” and that there was 

“willingness to declare the Contact Group [see below] dead.”3 3 T

punish the Bosnian Serbs for violating the Sarajevo safe area 

NATO jets struck Serb ammunition depots around the city of Pal

on 24 May 1995. The Serbs responded by taking 370 UN

peacekeepers hostage and ch aining some of them to potentia

targets, thereby paralyzing the intervention. This humiliation, a

it played out, led Secretary of Defense William Perry to declar

that “the credibility of the international community was a

stake.”3 4 It also moved most interventionist governments neare

to the standing US position that only a robust air campaign

would force the Serbs to obey UN resolutions.

Support for forceful action grew through June and into mid

July in the face of continued Serb attacks on the safe areas o

Zepa , Gorazde, and Srebrenica , and with the shootdown of 

US F-16 by the Bosnian Serbs.

3 5 Finally, after the UN rejecte

an AFSOUTH request of 20 June for air strikes to punish Serb

violations of the no-fly edict, after Srebrenica fell to bruta

assault on 11 July, and with Zepa apparently next on the lis

for Serbian conquest, the foreign ministers of 16 intervenin

states met at London during 21–25 July, largely at the prod

ding of Secretary of State Warren Christopher . The purpose o

the meeting was to prepare the way for and lay out the form o

a more forceful intervention in the Bosnian conflict. Th

weapon of necessity, as every diplomat probably understood a

that time, would have to be NATO airpower.

By the time the foreign ministers gathered at London , NATO

air planners had amassed a comprehensive set of plans fo

dealing with specific aspects of the Bosnian conflict, alon

with a clear idea of how they wanted to apply those plans. Al

of these plans were subelements of the basic OPLAN 40101

477
though most had been initiated after General Ryan took ove

AIRSOUTH in October 1994. Standing out among these plan

was Operation Deadeye , the SEAD plan initiated by Genera

Ryan following the strikes on Udbina Airfield . Deadeye’s pur

pose was to protect NATO aircraft from Bosnian Serb air de

fenses as they flew in protection of the safe areas or on othe

missions. A salient feature of the operation, one that set i

apart from the geographic restrictions placed on CAS and OAS

strikes, was its provision for comprehensive attacks agains

integrated air defense system (IADS) targets throughout Bosnia 

if necessary. In early 1995, as the plan evolved in detail, i

incorporated a division of Bosnia into southeast and northwes

zones of action (ZOA), based on the Sarajevo and Banja Luk

a reas, respectively. As described by Col Daniel R. Zoerb , directo

of the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight operations cell, Maj Keith Kige

of his staff proposed these ZOAs “to facilitate deconfliction o

planned simultaneous fighter attacks on the IADS,” but the

did not imply any restrictions on the overall freedom of NATO

airmen to attack elements of the IADS throughout Bosnia t

defend themselves. If his aircraft flew in defense of a city in

either ZOA, General Ryan expected to launch attacks agains

air defenses throughout the embattled country. 3 6

On an ongoing basis, AIRSOUTH planners also created

plans to protect specific safe areas and updated them as nec 

essary. Following the Pale bombings at the end of May 1995

General Ryan’s planners developed a briefing called “NATO Ai

Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina ,” which mainly listed an

described the various attack options available—but no

Deadeye . During July and early August, this briefing ex 

panded to include a concept of operations suggesting tha

ground-attack plans to defend Bosnian cities also be based on

the ZOA boundaries laid out for Deadeye . Under existing ar

rangements, NATO aircraft striking in defense of a safe are

were limited to hitting targets within the 20- or 30-kilomete

exclusion zone around it. AFSOUTH planners called for th

freedom to strike a broader array of targets throughout th

ZOA that included the besieged city. Thus by the time th

London conference convened, NATO air planners in AFSOUTH

were thinking in terms of broad-ranging ground attacks sup

ported by a theaterwide SEAD campaign in defense of Bosnia

478
cities, rather than the halting and piecemeal applications tha

had characterized the use of airpower to that point.

From the American perspective, London began as an effor

to issue a powerful threat of air strikes against the Serbs fo

what Secretary Christopher called their “outrageous aggres

sion.”3 7 At the end of the conference’s first day, Christophe

asserted that the ministers had agreed that “an attack agains

Gorazde will be met by decisive and substantial air power.”3 

Moreover he announced that “existing command-and-contro

arrangements for the use of NATO air power will be adjusted

to ensure that responsiveness and unity are achieved.” By thi

he meant that the United States expected the UN’s role i

tactical decision making to diminish, perhaps by ending th

dual-key procedure.

3 9 Last, Christopher asserted that th

gathered ministers agreed that “the taking of hostages will n

longer be allowed to prevent implementation of our policies

All this, he stated, reflected a general belief that “so long a

the Bosnian Serb aggression continues, any political proces

[for peace] is doomed to failure.”40 In sum, Christopher wa

forecasting an intervention strategy in which airpower would

force the Serbs to halt their attacks on Bosnian cities, thereb

opening the way to productive peace negotiations.

In contrast to Secretary Christopher ’s confident predictions

however, other events at the London conference indicated tha

the gathered ministers were not all fully behind the America

proposal to unleash a determined air assault on the Bosnia

Serbs. British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced

that “although there was strong support for airpower, ther

were also reservations . . . [and] it would be used only if it wa

felt necessary.”4 1 In a similar vein of caution, the French dele 

gation reconfirmed a demand that ground reinforcements pre

cede any bombing operations, particularly regarding the en 

dangered city of Gorazde.

4 2 As a consequence of thes

reservations, the conference’s declaration actually extended

the threat of air strikes only in protection of Gorazde, a limita 

tion that prompted the Bosnian prime minister, Haris Silajdzic

to declare it a “green light” to attacks everywhere else. Publicall

at least, Bosnian Serb leaders also were not intimidated by th

London conference’s threats, as evidenced by the Bosnian Ser

army’s (BSA) continued attacks on UN-protected cities.43

479
Meanwhile at NATO headquarters, Ambassador Hunter 

Secretary-General Willy Claes, and other leaders were orches

trating events in NAC to give some credence to the London

conference’s threat of decisive air action. Following an NAC

meeting on 25 July, the day the conference ended, Claes an 

nounced that NAC had approved “the necessary planning t

ensure that NATO air power would be used in a timely an

effective way should the Bosnian Serbs threaten or attack

Gorazde.” The secretary-general also indicated that plannin

would begin to protect the other safe areas, and he warned

that “such operations, once they are launched will not lightl

be discontinued.”4 4 Not included in Secretary-General Claes

press release were the operational details settled by NAC 

These included adoption of the so-called trigger events tha

would start the bombing. NAC also approved AFSOUTH’s pla

to defend each Bosnian city by striking Serb targets through 

out the ZOA that included the city. 4 5 Finally, NATO sent thre

air commanders to Bosnia to convince the Bosnian Serb mili

tary commander, Gen Ratko Mladic , of the alliance’s determ

nation to carry out its threats.4 6

All of these events were welcome news for General Ryan an

Admiral Smith . They were particularly pleased by NAC ’s clear

ance to strike throughout a given ZOA in defense of a cit

within it. Had they been held to hitting only targets in th

military exclusion zones surrounding the safe areas, they be

lieved that their sorties would be expended against hard-to

find-and-attack tactical targets, such as artillery pieces an

armored vehicles. The two commanders anticipated that ai

attacks against those kinds of “direct” targets would be slow t

inflict enough “pain” on the Serbs to force them to comply

with UN demands. Consequently they welcomed the opportu 

nity to plan against a wider range of “indirect” targets, such a

bridges, command facilities, supply dumps, and so on, that the

also knew would be easier to find and destroy. Moreover, Rya

and Smith anticipated that, sortie-per-sortie, such a campaign

would inflict more coercive pain on the Serbs and at less cos

in blood and time than one focused on direct ta r gets.

4 7 Rya

and Smith believed that blood and time would be their great

est concern because they anticipated that public support fo

480
the campaign would quickly dwindle, particularly if NATO

bombs began to kill civilians—or even Bosnian Serb soldiers .4 8

In addition to broadening AFSOUTH’s planning leeway

NAC’s actions on 25 July also opened the way for UN leader

to drop their resistance to a heavy campaign of offensive ai

strikes. As public and strong statements of intent to punis

Serb attacks on the safe areas, NAC’s decisions went a lon

way toward showing the UN secretary-general that most, if no

all, NATO member states had found the commitment and do

mestic political stamina to initiate and stay with an air cam

paign long enough to have an effect on Serbian actions an

policy. In response, the secretary-general on that same da

transferred the UN keys for approving offensive air strikes an

CAS from his hands and those of Ambassador Akashi, respec

tively, to those of Gen Bernard Janvier , force commander o

United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF , previously known as UN

PROFOR). 4 9 The power to launch strikes against the Serb

now lay in the hands of military commanders on the scene.

As Colonel Campbell describes in his chapter, General Rya

responded to these rapid shifts in the political and diplomati

environment of the intervention by accelerating the ongoin

air-planning effort. His staff continued to refine individua

safe-area plans and Deadeye. Exploiting the freedom to pla

attacks across a ZOA, AIRSOUTH staffers also produced 

plan called Vulcan , which postulated wide-ranging strikes in

the southeastern ZOA to protect Sarajevo. Another new brief

ing titled “Graduated Air Operations” proposed a stepwise es

calation of attacks across a ZOA to force the Serbs to back

away from one or more safe areas. By 3 August these plannin

actions had reached a point that Admiral Smith and Genera

Ryan could brief Secretary-General Claes and Gen Georg

Joulwan, SACEUR, on how they intended to apply offensive ai

strikes in the Balkans. With the endorsements of these leader

in hand, Admiral Smith signed a memorandum on 10 Augus

with General Janvier and British lieutenant general Ruper

Smith, his deputy in Sarajevo , that clarified the “over archin

purpose,” “phasing,” “assumptions,” and so on to guide th

looming air campaign.5 0 At the same time, AIRSOUTH worke

out further air-ground coordination arrangements and target list

with UN ground commanders and with British major genera

481
David Pennyfather, chief of staff of the NATO Rapid Reaction

Force (RRF), which had been deploying into Sarajevo for severa

weeks. 51 By the third week of August, then, at least Genera

Ryan had the plans in place to fight on behalf of the UN.

As the summer passed, General Ryan took advantage of th

relaxed diplomatic restraints on planning large-scale offensiv

operations by expanding the CAOC’s manning and equipmen

as quickly as possible. Guided and underpinned, in part, b

the recommendations of a Pentagon study team that assessed

the CAOC’s readiness for expanded air operations in late July

Ryan drew heavily on US manpower and equipment to expan

the CAOC’s capabilities.5 2 Several hundred TDY augmentee

began flowing in from US bases everywhere, along with a flood

of state-of-the-art communications, intelligence, and automated

planning systems. Perhaps most importantly, elements of 

US Air Force Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS

began to arrive, which, when fully assembled and operating

would vastly enhance the CAOC’s ability to plan, monitor, an

control high-intensity air operations in near real tim e.

Taken together, these actions pretty much completed th

effective “Americanization” of the CAOC, but that was a pric

Ryan and Lt Gen Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC, fel

ready to pay in the rush to get ready. For months, politics ha

restrained their ability to prepare for an enlarged air war, an

now politics had suddenly presented them with the likelihood

of just such a war—much faster than they could adjust thei

forces to accommodate. 5 3 Nevertheless, despite the fact tha

the vast majority of their CAOC personnel had been in Italy fo

less than a few weeks or even days, and despite the piles o

unopened CTAPS equipment boxes lying around, Admira

Smith, General Ryan , General Hornburg, and Brig Gen David

Sawyer —deputy director of the CAOC and deputy commande

of 5 ATAF—were ready for a fight by the third week of Augu st—

about a week before they found themselves in the middle of one

Operations

Given the protracted political and military run up to it, th

actual start of Deliberate Force was almost anticlimactic. Th

482
specific trigger event for the campaign was the explosion of 

mortar bomb in Sarajevo’s Mrkale marketplace that killed 3

people on the morning of 28 August 1995. In the norma

course of events for the unfortunate city, a mortar explosion

was unremarkable, but this one caused exceptional and im 

mediately televised bloodshed. Its timing made an interven 

tionist response virtually certain. Since General Janvier wa

in Paris, Admiral Smith contacted General Smith , Janvier 

deputy in Sarajevo, as soon as he heard the news. The tw

commanders agreed that, while UN investigators worked t

assign certain blame for the attack, Admiral Smith would be

gin preparing for bombing operations, if required. At 0200 on

the 29th, General Smith called Admiral Smith to report tha

he was now certain that Bosnian Serb forces had fired th

shell and that he was turning his key. The UN general, how 

ever, asked Admiral Smith to delay launching attacks for 2

hours to give peacekeeping units in Bosnia time to pull int

positions they could defend, should the Serbs launch retalia

tory attacks against them. Also, General Janvier had to ap 

prove the final list of targets for the initial strikes. After 

number of conversations with Admiral Smith during the day

Janvier finally did approve 10 of 13 initial targets proposed b

Generals Ryan and Smith and already tentatively approved b

Admiral Smith .

5 4

Meanwhile, General Ryan and his staff at the CAOC worke

feverishly to ready the assigned NATO air forces for battle. In

fact, Ryan had come to the CAOC on the morning of the 29t

to lead a preplanned exercise—the Vulcan protection plan fo

Sarajevo. With an actual crisis at hand, the general canceled

Vulcan and focused his staff on activating and modifying a

necessary the operational plans and unit reinforcements tha

comprised what amounted to the Deliberate Force plan. Whil

waiting for orders to start operations and approval of the in 

itial target list by General Janvier and Admiral Smith, th

AIRSOUTH commander concentrated on alerting his units, re

fining the air tasking message that would guide their opera 

tions for the first day of bombing, and bringing additional ai

and support forces into the theater as required. The delay in

starting operations proved useful, in that it provided time t

flow additional US Air Force , Navy, and Marine aircraft int

483
Aviano and to swing the carrier Theodore Roosevelt into th

Adriatic in time to launch aircraft for the first strikes. Rya

also reaffirmed to his staff that he intended to ensure that th

weapons and tactics utilized by NATO would be selected an

flown to accomplish the required levels of destruction at mini

mum risk of unplanned or collateral damage to military an

civilian people and property. Ryan and Admiral Smith full

agreed that the diplomatic sensitivities of the campaign mad

collateral damage an issue of pivotal strategic importance

Ryan believed that a stray bomb causing civilian casualtie

would take the interventionists off the moral high ground

marshal world opinion against the air campaign, and probabl

bring it to a halt before it had its intended effects.55

Ryan ’s command was ready for operations by the end of th

29th. After waiting out the 24-hour delay to allow UN

peacekeepers time to hunker down in their defensive positions

the first NATO jets went “feet dry” over the Bosnian coast a

0140 on the 30th, laden with bombs to make the first strike.

The physical and temporal dimensions of the ensuing cam

paign were fairly compact, particularly when compared to th

scale and scope of a major air campaign, such as Operation

Desert Storm during the Gulf War of 1990–91. Compared t

the vast reaches of Southwest Asia, NATO air attacks in Delib 

erate Force occurred in a triangular area only about 150 nau

tical miles wide on its northern base and stretching about 15

miles to the south. The weight of the NATO attack also wa

relatively limited. Desert Storm lasted 43 days, but during th

22 calendar days of Deliberate Force, NATO aircraft and 

single US Navy ship firing a volley of Tomahawk land attack

missiles (TLAM) actually released weapons against the Serb

on just 12 days. Two days into the campaign, NATO militar

commanders halted offensive air operations against the Serb

for four days to encourage negotiations. When useful negotia 

tions failed to materialize, they resumed bombing on th

morning of 5 September and continued through 13 Septem 

ber. When notified by General Smith on 14 September tha

General Mladic and President Karadzic of the Serb Republi

had accepted the UN’s terms, CINCSOUTH and General Jan

vier jointly suspended offensive operations at 2200. They de

clared the campaign closed on 20 September.

484
The total air forces involved included about 220 fighter air 

craft and 70 support aircraft from three US services, Grea

Britain , Italy, Germany, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Spain , an

France—all directly assigned to AIRSOUTH and based mainly

in Italy—and a steady stream of airlift aircraft bringing for

ward units and supplies. On days when strikes were flown

AIRSOUTH-assigned forces launched an average of four or fiv

air-to-ground “packages” involving perhaps 60 or 70 bomb

dropping sorties and another one hundred to 150 other sortie

to provide combat air patrol, defense suppression , tanker, re

connaissance, and surveillance support to the “shooters.” In

total, Deliberate Force included 3,535 aircraft sorties, of whic

2,470 went feet dry over the Balkans region to deliver 1,02

weapons against 48 targets, including 338 individual desired

mean points of impact (DMPI).

56 These figures equated to jus

about a busy day’s sortie count for coalition air forces durin

the Gulf War—and only a tiny fraction of the 227,340 weapon

those air forces released against the Iraqis in the 43 days o

Desert Storm .

For all of the brevity, limited scale, and operational one-sid 

edness of Deliberate Force, the various researchers of th

BACS all discovered that the execution phase of the operatio

offered many insights into the application and usefulness o

airpower in a complex regional conflict. This summary in 

cludes only those discoveries that seem to have the broades

importance to the general community of airpower thinkers

Some of these discoveries stem from the operational context o

the conflict—others from the continued, even increased, politi

cal and diplomatic complexity of Deliberate Force in its execu 

tion phase.

From the inception of its study, the BACS team anticipated

that leadership would be a broadly interesting area of inquiry

Reports from the field and subsequent interviews highlighted

the exceptionally close control exercised by General Ryan ove

Deliberate Force’s tactical events. Reflecting his and Admira

Smith’s conviction that “every bomb was a political bomb

General Ryan personally oversaw the selection of every DMP

in every target. He also personally scrutinized every selection

or “weaponeering” decision made for the actual weapons to b

used against DMPIs, and he examined or directed many tactica

485
decisions about such things as the strikes

 launch times, th

specific composition of attack formations, and the selection o

bomb-run routes. In his words, Ryan felt obliged to exercis

such close control to minimize the risk of error and, if mis

takes were made, to ensure that they would be attributable t

him—and him alone. 5 7 That is, Ryan consciously chose thi

approach to leadership, which he considered appropriate t

the circumstances as he saw them.

Placing General Ryan ’s acute attention to tactical details in

a broader historical context, Lt Col Chris Orndorff points ou

in his chapter that Ryan’s actions had much in common wit

the great captaincy of field commanders in the period up t

and including the Napoleonic era. Great captains and grea

captaincy, Ordorff explains, were epitomized by Napoléon —th

master practitioner of an art of command characterized b

close attention to the logistical and tactical details of armies

as well as the master of strategic guidance. Great captain

practiced this broad range of intervention because it was vita

to their success and because they had the means to do so

Because armies were small, individual tactical events as

sumed great importance, and contemporary communication

allowed a single commander to monitor and control such de

tails in a timely manner.

But as the industrial revolution progressed through th

nineteenth century, the size of armies and the scope of thei

operations vastly increased. Great captaincy, at least to th

extent that it involved close oversight of logistical and tactica

details, became impractical in wars between large industria

states. In response, the Prussians led the world in developin

a military system based on centralized strategic command

generalized planning by trained staff officers, and decentral

ized execution of operations and logistical support by stan

dardized units in accordance with the guidance of the first tw

groups. Among the many features of this system was a divi

sion of labor that had senior commanders thinking strategi

cally and eschewing close management of tactical details

These cultural arrangements, coupled with a sophisticated ap

proach to military training and education, were, in the sum

mation of one historian, an effort by the Prussians to institu 

tionalize a system whereby ordinary men could replicate th

486
military genius of a great captain , such as Napoléon , on 

sustained basis and on an industrial scale. 5 8 Given that per 

spective, Orndorff suggests that General Ryan ’s close supervi

sion of Deliberate Force’s tactical details merits close exam

nation of the conditions that made it apparently successful in

an age when the staff system seems to have otherwise sup

planted great captaincy in war.

In net, Colonel Orndorff’s conclusions echo the opinion o

everyone interviewed for the BACS that General Ryan’s excep 

tional involvement in the tactical details of Deliberate Forc

reflected both his prerogatives as commander and an appro 

priate response to the political and military circumstances o

the operation. Such was the case, Orndorff believes, becaus

the circumstances of Deliberate Force conformed in importan

ways to circumstances that gave rise to preindustrial com 

mand practices. Tactical events, namely the destruction o

specific targets and the possibility of suffering NATO casual

ties, potentially carried profound strategic implications. Th

NATO air forces involved were small in relation to the capaci

ties of the command, control, communications, and intelli

gence systems available to find targets, monitor and direc

forces, and maintain command linkages. Drawing on the anal

ogy of an earlier commander standing on a hill, Orndorff sug

gests that General Ryan had the sensory and cognitive capa 

bility to embrace the air battle comprehensively, assess th

tactical and strategic flow of events, and direct all of his force

in a timely manner. In the words of one senior US Air Forc

leader, therefore, General Ryan not only could exercise clos

tactical control over his forces but also was obliged to do so. 5 9

Colonel Orndorff and other members of the team did iden 

tify some potential drawbacks of General Ryan’s great cap 

taincy. Most notably it focused a tremendous amount of work

on the general and a few members of his staff. Individual

working closely to Ryan in the CAOC, such as Colonel Zoerb

AIRSOUTH director of plans; Steven R. Teske, CAOC directo

of plans; and Col Douglas J. Richardson , CAOC director o

operations, worked 18-hour days throughout the campaign.6 

By their own accounts, after two weeks they were very tired

At the same time, other members of the CAOC staff wer

underutilized, as the small group of officers working aroun

487
Ryan absorbed some of their corporate tactical responsibili

ties, at least in their culminating steps.

Meanwhile some of the higher responsibilities that migh

have fallen on Ryan in his capacity as the senior operationa

commander devolved on Maj Gen Michael Short , his chief o

staff in Naples . Acting as the rear-echelon commander of AIR

SOUTH, General Short became responsible for, among man

things, aspects of the public affairs, logistical, political, an

military coordination functions of Deliberate Force. In retro 

s pect, although he believed that this division of labor made goo

sense under the circumstances, General Short felt th at he an

General Ryan had not fully anticipated all of the sta ff and com 

munications requirements needed to keep Ryan u p-to-date o

operations and other issues. As a consequence, General Shor

sometimes found it difficult to prepare timely answers t

higher-level inquiries about operations or General Ryan

plans. 6 1 Together with the effect of General Ryan ’s centralized

leadership style on the CAOC’s division of labor, Genera

Short ’s experience indicates a need for airmen to anticipat

that leadership style is an important choice—one that ca

shape staff processes and morale significantly.

Lt Col Mark Conversino’s chapter on Deliberate Force op

erations focuses primarily on the activities of the 31st Fighte

Wing at Aviano AB.6 2 In net, his research reveals that th

wing’s great success in the campaign reflected the profession 

alism and skills of its personnel, ranging from its commande

to individual junior technicians working on the flight line

From July 1995 the 31st Wing formed the core of the 7490t

Wing (Provisional), an organization established to embrace th

numerous US Air Force fighter and support squadrons an

US Navy and Marine air units brought to Aviano for Den

Flight. These units made Aviano a busy place.

At its peak strength, the 7490th Wing included about on

hundred aircraft, all crowded onto a base with only one run

way and designed normally to handle a wing of about 7

fighters. The crowded conditions of the base made the chore

ography of maintaining, servicing, and moving aircraft abou

the field so tight and difficult that many of the people workin

there began calling it the “USS Aviano,” alluding to the condi

tions normally prevailing on the deck of an aircraft carrier

488
Moreover, Col Charles F. Wald , commander of the 7490th, an

his staff were responsible for tactical coordination with othe

NATO squadrons scattered around Italy . Time pressures an

limited communications channels made this task daunting. Ha

the 31st Wing’s permanently and temporarily assigned personne

not performed at such a high level across the board, Deliberat

Force in reasonable probability would have fallen flat on its face.

At the same time, Colonel Conversino’s chapter identifie

several sources of psychological stress at Aviano that, over 

more protracted campaign, might have undermined the provi 

sional wing’s high performance and morale. The presence o

families was one potential source of stress. Because Avian

was the 31st Wing’s permanent base, the families of many o

the wing’s personnel lived in the vicinity. During Deliberat

Force, these families could be both a source of emotiona

strength for combat aircrews and a potential source of worr

and distraction. On the one hand, spouses brought meals an

moral support to the units. On the other hand, they and thei

children were there, complete with their school problems, bro 

ken cars, anxieties, and so on. Although morale generall

stayed high at Aviano, one must realize that the campaign

lasted only two weeks and that the wing took no casualties

Many of the individuals and some commanders interviewed b

Conversino and other BACS members expressed concern a

what would have happened to the emotional tenor of the bas

community and to the concentration of the combat aircrew 

men had the campaign gone on longer, with casualties or wit

the materialization of terrorist threats against families. Durin

operations, one squadron commander even considered evacu 

ating dependents if Deliberate Force dragged on. 6 3

Another source of stress stemmed from the unfamiliar na

ture of the Deliberate Force mission. Actually, at the level o

tactical operations, the operational tempo, tactics, and threat

of the campaign were much like those that 31st Wing airme

would have expected to face in a high-intensity conflict. Dail

flights as elements of “gorillas” of attack, defense suppression 

electronic warfare, escort, and tanker aircraft—potentially in

the face of radar-directed antiaircraft defenses—look prett

much the same tactically, regardless of the “limited” or “con 

ventional” nature of a conflict at the operational and strategi

489
levels. But these conflicts do differ at the operational an

strategic levels, and therein lay a source of confusion an

tension between the field units and the CAOC.

Airmen in the field found themselves fighting a tacticall

conventional campaign at potentially substantial risk from en 

emy action. The CAOC made plans and issued orders tha

reflected the operational- and strategic-level constraints an

restraints inherent in the air campaign’s identity as the mili

tary arm of a limited peace operation . The difference betwee

these perspectives was manifested in the confusion and frus

tration felt by some interviewed airmen over such things a

ROE , outside “interference” with their detailed tactical plan

and decisions, apparent restrictions on the flow of intelligenc

information to the field, and so on. Since these things came t

the field via the CAOC, a number of the BACS interviewee

expressed a sense that they were fighting one war and that th

CAOC was fighting another one, with the CAOC’s version of th

war tending to put the flyers at greater and unnecessary risk.

6 4

Colonel Conversino also identifies several logistical prob

lems that might have undermined the power of the air cam

paign had it gone on longer. Under the US Air Force’s “lea

logistics” concept, air bases normally do not have large stock

of supplies and spare parts on hand. The concept assume

that modern logistics techniques can move supplies and part

from homeland depots quickly enough to meet demands an

thereby reduce the size of the warehouse and maintenanc

operations a base has to maintain to sustain operations. A

Aviano, one manifestation of lean logistics was that the bas

experienced shortages in several areas of supply as soon a

operations began. One of the more critical shortages involved

aircraft tow vehicles (“bobtails”) and their tires. Compoundin

the problem, the “war” began on a Wednesday, meaning tha

stateside depots, which stayed on a peacetime schedule, wer

closed for the weekend—just as urgent requests for supplie

began to flow in from Aviano. Quick calls to supervisors opene

up the depots, but some supply problems, such as bobtail tires

remained unsolved during Deliberate Force operations.

Complementing Colonel Conversino’s broad review of Deliber 

ate Force operations, Lt Col Rick Sargent’s chapters shift th

focus of BACS to a more microscopic assessment of the wea pons

490
tactics, and targeting aspects of the air campaign. After a de

tailed discussion of the types of manned and unmanned aircraf

employed during the operation, Sargent describes the precision

guided munitions (PGM) used and their fundamental impor

tance to the conduct and outcome of Deliberate Force. Becaus

NATO air commanders were concerned with getting the fastes

possible results from their operations while minimizing collatera

damage and casualties, Sargent argues that “precision guide

munitions became the overwhelming weapons of choice durin

air strike operations.” Of the 1,026 bombs and missiles ex

pended during Deliberate Force, 708 were PGMs.

Most of Colonel Sargent’s detailed discussion of specifi

weapons and employment tactics remains classified. In general

however, his work demonstrates that PGM employment ha

become a complex science. Numerous types of PGMs are now

available, each with distinct characteristics of target acquisi

tion, range, terminal effects, and cost. Tacticians and weapon 

eers must know and understand those characteristics to b

able to make suitable decisions about employing PGMs within

the boundaries of time, targets, and ROE . The criticality o

those decisions will only increase for many likely conflicts, fo

as Sargent quotes General Ryan , “Dumb bombs are dead.

Unguided weapons likely will retain their utility in many cir 

cumstances, but in cases in which time and tolerance fo

unwanted effects are in short supply, they are becoming un

necessarily risky to use.

Sargent’s research and that of other members of the BAC

team also highlighted the need for air planners and weapon 

eers to recognize that PGMs not only differ in their technica

characteristics and effects, but also may differ in their politica

and emotional effects. The case in point here was the employ

ment of 13 TLAMs on 10 September. General Ryan requested

and Admiral Smith approved the use of these long-range

ship-launched missiles mainly on the military grounds tha

they were the best weapons available to take out key Bosnia

Serb air defense systems in the Banja Luka area without ris

to NATO aircrews. As it turned out, however, these missile

were more than just another weapon in the context of Bosnia 

TLAMs represented the high-end of PGM technology. Thei

sudden use in Bosnia signaled to many people that NATO wa

491
initiating a significant escalation of the conflict, although suc

was not the intent of the military commanders. Additionally

many NAC members were upset by the fact that they had no

been consulted beforehand on the use of these advanced

weapons. 6 5 At the same time, Admiral Smith reports that h

subsequently learned from an American diplomat in contac

with the Bosnian Serbs that the TLAMs “scared the sh— ou

of the Serbs.” According to Smith the use of the missile

showed the Serbs that NATO was serious and that they “did

not have a clue where we could go next.”6 6 Clearly the term

weaponeering must carry a broad meaning for senior com 

manders and technicians involved in the process.

In a similar vein to Colonel Sargent’s effort, Maj Mark

McLaughlin’s chapter examines the nature of NATO comba

assessment during the air campaign. Beginning at the theo 

retical level, McLaughlin writes that combat assessment is th

process by which air commanders determine how they ar

doing in relation to attaining their objectives. Through a three

step process of battle damage assessment (BDA), munition

effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations

commanders learn if their attacks and weapons are bringin

the enemy closer to defeat at the best possible rate. Effectiv

combat assessment, therefore, remains a vital tool for evaluat

ing and refining tactics and operational concepts.

At the practical level, McLaughlin writes that, while th

CAOC’s combat-assessment process worked well, problem

existed—particularly in the area of BDA. Notable even befor

Deliberate Force were the near absence of NATO BDA doctrin

and the uneven experience and training levels of the variou

national personnel doing BDA in the CAOC. The differen

NATO air forces had different standards and methods for as

sessing damage. For the sake of standardization, CAOC BDA

managers attempted to train their subordinates in US doctrin

and procedures. But the rapid turnover of their staffs, engen 

dered by the practice of manning the CAOC mainly with TD

personnel, undermined that process. The net effect of thes

problems, according to McLaughlin, was a somewhat sluggis

pace in the flow and assessment of BDA data into, within, an

out of the CAOC. In turn, the potentially negative effects of th

slow pace of BDA, at least in terms of avoiding conflictin

492
public assessments of how the bombing campaign was going

were minimized by the compactness of the air campaign an

its target list , by General Ryan ’s decision to make all definitiv

BDA determinations himself, and by Admiral Smith’s clos

hold on the outflow of combat-assessment information to th

press and even to NATO member governments. Whether or no

the flow of the combat-assessment process was painfully slow

neither commander intended to or had to make judgment

under the pressure of public scrutiny and perhaps counter 

vailing analysis.

In another chapter Major McLaughlin offers a succinct as

sessment of the effectiveness of Deliberate Force. Recognizin

that the perspectives of Bosnian Serb leaders had to be th

foundation for assessing the campaign, McLaughlin propose

that “one should judge NATO air operations in light of thei

direct impact as well as the concurrent victories by Croatia

and Muslim (federation) ground forces, American-sponsored

diplomatic initiatives, and Serbia’s political pressure on it

Bosnian Serb cousins.” Following this prescription, McLaugh 

lin illustrates the effects of the bombing on the psyche an

calculations of the Serb leaders through the accounts of vari

ous diplomats who dealt with them. Noting the campaign’s

progression through active bombing, pause, and more bomb

ing, McLaughlin traces a steady deterioration in the will o

President Milosevic, President Karadzic, and General Mladic t

resist NATO and UN demands. Croatian and Muslim (federa 

tion) ground offensives going on at the same time served t

increase pressure on the Serb leaders even further.

In rapid shuttle diplomacy, Ambassador Holbrooke ex

ploited these pressures to coax and bully the Serbs into mak

ing concessions. A major barrier to progress went down on 

September, when regional leaders met with Holbrooke at Ge

neva and agreed that the future Federation of Bosnia would

include Croats and Muslims and a separate and coequal Serb

Republic . The agreement also allowed the two entities to “es

tablish parallel special relations with neighboring countries

and it recognized that the federation and the Serb Republi

would control 51 percent and 49 percent of Bosnia ’s territory

respectively—a division of land long established in the Contac

Group’s proposals.6 7 Thus the Bosnian Serbs had in han

493
what they most wanted—autonomy. Under continuing pres

sure from ground and air attacks, they found it easier t

accept UN demands, and on 14 September Holbrooke an

Milosevic successfully pressured Karadzic and Mladic to en

their active military pressure on Sarajevo.

Diplomacy

Deliberate Force was about diplomacy—getting the Bosnia

Serbs to end their sieges of the safe areas and to enter int

productive negotiations for peace. Consequently several BAC

researchers, Major McLaughlin particularly, examined the in 

terconnections between Deliberate Force and the ongoing dip 

lomatic process.6 8 In general they found that these intercon 

nections were difficult to “package” and describe in a manne

distinct and separate from other events and forces influencin

the course of diplomacy. Despite its brevity and limited mili

tary scope, Deliberate Force turned out to be a complex diplo 

matic event influenced by military operations other than th

air campaign—and by the conduct of diplomatic activities in

several venues. A useful and defensible description of the rela 

tionship between airpower and diplomacy in this case, there

fore, requires a clear understanding of these other operation

and activities.

One of the more immediate effects of the bombing campaign

was that it underscored and, to some degree, mandated 

temporary shift of the intervention’s diplomatic lead from th

UN to the so-called Contact Group. Formed in the summer o

1994, the Contact Group represented the foreign ministries o

the United States, Great Britain , France , Germany, and Rus

sia . The group’s sole purpose was to provide an alternativ

mechanism to the UN for negotiating a peace settlement in th

region. Since it had none of the UN’s humanitarian an

peacekeeping responsibilities to divert its attention or weake

its freedom to negotiate forcefully, the group’s relationship

with the Bosnian Serbs was more overtly confrontational tha

the UN’s. This suited Ambassador Holbrooke, the US repre

sentative to the group, just fine. As the assistant secretary o

state for European and Canadian affairs, he had been involved

494
closely with Balkans diplomacy for some time and was a

outspoken proponent of aggressive action against the Serbs.

6 

Upon hearing of the Mrkale shelling, for example, he sug

gested publicly that the proper response might be a bombin

campaign against the Serbs of up to six months. 7 0 Holbrooke

opinion was important because by the summer of 1995, h

was the de facto lead agent of the Contact Group, and it wa

his small team of American diplomats and military officer

that conducted face-to-face shuttle negotiations with th

Serbs and other belligerent leaders during the bombing cam

paign. These negotiations took the Holbrooke team to Yugosla 

via at the start of the bombing, to Brussels and NAC durin

t he pause, to Geneva for a major face-to-face meeting of th

factional leaders on 8 September, to the United States , back t

Belgrade on the 13th, and to a host of other points in between.

The irony of Holbrooke’s call for robust bombing was tha

the UN and NATO could not and did not initiate Deliberat

Force to influence the peace process. Officially and publicly

NATO initiated the campaign to protect the safe areas. But a

Ambassador Hunter pointed out, it would have been naive t

think that the air attacks would not undermine the Serbs

military power and coerce them diplomatically. Nevertheless

Hunter believed, the bombing had to be “represented” merel

as an effort to protect the safe areas. The consensus within

NAC for air action rested solely on support for the UNSCRs 

There was no overt, general commitment to bomb the Bosnia

Serbs into talking. 7 1

Also during the time of Deliberate Force, the intervention

conducted two military operations of consequence to th

course of diplomacy. UN peacekeeping forces remained in th

region though their role was mainly passive during the period

of offensive air operations. In the weeks prior to the start o

bombing, the UN had quietly drawn its scattered peacekeepin

units in from the field and concentrated them in more defensi

ble positions. This process rushed to conclusion in the fina

hours before bombing actually began. During the bombing

these forces mainly held their positions or conducted limited

patrol operations, but they did not go on the offensive. At th

same time, elements of NATO ’s Rapid Reaction Force took a

active though limited role in the intervention’s offensive. Th

495
RRF deployed into the Sarajevo area, beginning in mid-June

During the first two days of Deliberate Force, its artillery unit

shelled Bosnian Serb military forces in the Sarajevo area

These bombardments certainly had some effect on Serb mili

tary capabilities, and they probably had some effect on thei

diplomatic calculations. Given the lack of emphasis placed on

them by the diplomats interviewed by the BACS teams, how 

ever, the effects of these activities on diplomatic events prob

ably were limited, at least in relation to the effects of the ai

campaign and military operations of regional anti-Serb forces

At the same time, the passive value of the peacekeeping force

to prevent the Serbs from more or less walking into and takin

the remaining safe areas or taking intervention peacekeeper

hostage certainly must have been a factor in their militar

calculations, though one not explored in depth by the BACS .

All diplomats and senior military commanders interviewed

by the BACS attributed great military and diplomatic impor

tance to Croatian and Bosnian offensive operations agains

local Serb forces, which had begun before Deliberate Forc

and which continued parallel to and after the operation. Thes

offensives began in the spring of 1995, and they marked th

end of the overwhelming military advantages of Serbian forces

In May the Croatian army began a successful offensive t

reestablish government control of western Slavonia . In lat

July the Croatian army launched a major offensive—Opera 

tion Storm—to retake the Krajina and to relieve the Serbia

siege of the so-called Bihac Pocket—a small area under Bos 

nian control. In a few days, a Croatian force of nearly on

hundred thousand well-equipped troops penetrated the Kra 

jina at dozens of places and captured Knin—a vital center o

Croatian Serb power. Over the next several weeks, the Croa 

tians systematically cleared the Krajina of Serb resistance

moving generally from west to east. 7 2 At the same time, force

of the Bosnian Federation launched a series of operation

against the Bosnian Serbs. Under pressure from the United

States and other intervening governments, the Bosnian Croa

and Muslim factions had reestablished the federation in

March 1994 and, since that time, had worked to improve th

combat capabilities of their army. By the summer of 1995, th

Bosnian army was ready to go on the offensive, and—as th

496
Croats swept around the northern borders of Serb-held Bos 

nia —it struck west and north to push the Serbs back from th

center of the country. Caught between a hammer and a

anvil, the Serbs retreated precipitously, and by mid-Septem 

ber the Croatian government controlled its territory—and th

portion of Bosnia under Serb control had shrunk from 7

percent to about 51 percent.

The existence of a powerful ground offensive in parallel t

Deliberate Force complicates any determination of the ai

campaign’s distinct influence on diplomacy. Undoubtedly th

Bosnian Croat offensives drastically altered the military pros 

pects not only of the Serb factions in the two countries bu

also those of the Serbian leaders of the former Yugoslavia 

Even before the Croatians launched their Krajina offensive

Slobodan Milosevic offered to act as a peace broker betwee

the Bosnian Serbs and the intervention. At the time, som

observers attributed Milosevic ’s move to his concerns over th

growing strength of non-Serb military forces and over th

worsening economic condition of his country, brought on b

UN sanctions.

7 3 In this light Norman Cigar, a long-time ana

lyst of the Balkans region, argues that the Serbian militar

reverses on the ground were more important than the ai

operations of Deliberate Force in getting the Serbs to accep

UN demands. Ground operations, Cigar argues, confirmed fo

the Serbs that they were losing control of the military situ 

ation and thus had a profound impact on their diplomati

calculations. In his view the air campaign had minimal direc

effect on the Serbs’ military capabilities and consequently ha

little impact on their diplomacy.

7 4

Senior diplomatic and military leaders interviewed by th

BACS, as well as some analysts, generally saw a more syner

gistic relationship between air, ground, and diplomatic opera 

tions in terms of their effects on the calculations of the Serbs

Although most of them emphasized that the simultaneity o

the two campaigns was unplanned, they also recognized tha

their conjunction was important to the ultimate outcome o

negotiations.

7 5 Just as the Bosnian Serbs were facing thei

greatest military challenge on the ground, the air campaign

drastically undermined their ability to command, supply, an

move their forces. The combination of effects placed them in 

497
much more immediate danger of military collapse than would

have been the case with separate land or air offensives. Th

Bosnian Federation offensive also established a division o

territory between it and the Serb faction that almost exactl

equalled the 51/49 percent split called for in intervention

peace plans and reconfirmed at the Geneva peace talks on 

September 1995. Ambassador Holbrooke maintained that thi

event greatly eased the subsequent peace negotiations at Day

ton, Ohio , since it placed the Serbs in the position of merel

acknowledging an existing division of territory rather th a 

giving up hard-won territory that they previously had refused

to relinquish.7 6

Moreover, every diplomat and senior commander inter 

viewed believed that the air campaign distinctly affected th

moral resistance of the Serb leaders and, consequently, th

pace of negotiations. Prior to the bombing, Ambassador Chris 

topher Hill observed that President Milosevic “always had 

rather cocky view of the negotiations, sort of like he’s doing u

a favor,” but after the bombing began, “we found him . . 

totally engaged . . . [with an] attitude of let’s talk seriously.”7 

Not surprisingly, Holbrooke and Ambassador Hunter per 

ceived that Serb diplomats relaxed somewhat when the bomb

ing paused on 1 September. When the bombing resumed on 

September, Holbrooke perceived that Serbian diplomatic resis 

tance weakened rapidly, to the verge of collapse.7 8 This effec

was clear at the meeting between Holbrooke’s negotiatin

team and the Serbs on 13–14 September. At the meeting Hol

brooke found Mladic “in a rush” to end the bombing7 9—s

much so that the meeting had hardly begun when Milosevi

produced President Karadzic and his military commander

General Mladic , to participate directly in the talks. Mladic 

who had the figurative noose of an indicted war crimina

around his neck, arrived at the meeting looking “like he’d bee

through a bombing campaign.”8 0 After six hours of negotia 

tions, the Serbs unilaterally signed an agreement to ceas

their attacks on and remove their heavy weapons from Sara 

jevo, without a quid pro quo from Holbrooke or the UN o

stopping the bombing. Ambassador Hill attributed this capitu 

lation to the threat of further bombing. 8 1 Interestingly, as h

498
left the meeting, Karadzic plaintively asked Holbrooke, 

We ar

ready for peace. Why did you bomb us?”8 2

NAC’s NATO diplomats also recognized the importance an

value of the bombing campaign. Their collective decision t

authorize air operations in the first place was clear evidence o

their expectation that the potential benefits outweighed th

risks. Ambassador Hunter learned the depth of his compa 

triot’s commitment to the bombing operations at the very be

ginning of the bombing pause. On the same afternoon of th

pause, Secretary-General Claes called a meeting of NAC t

confirm that the members remained willing to let operation

resume when the commanders deemed necessary. For his par

Hunter anticipated some resistance to allowing the campaign

to restart. To his surprise all members favored resuming th

bombing if the Serbs failed to show evidence of complying wit

UN demands. Having gotten over the question of restarting th

campaign with unexpected ease, Hunter recalled that the rea

debate—one that consumed “about an hour-and-a-half” of th

council’s time—was over whether to give the Serbs 48 hour

or 72 hours to comply. 8 3 Having taken the international an

domestic political risks of initiating Deliberate Force, th

members of NAC were determined to see it through.

Ambassadors Holbrooke and Hunter offered two distinct bu

interrelated explanations for the profound and immediate in 

fluence of the bombing on Serbian diplomatic resistance. Am 

bassador Holbrooke’s explanation was to the point. Serb lead 

ers, he felt, were “thugs and murderers” who responded wel

to force.8 4 Ambassador Hunter painted a more calculating pic 

ture of the Serbian leaders. In his view they understood in th

late summer of 1995 that their sole remaining diplomatic ad

vantage in the Bosnian conflict lay in their ability to manipu 

late the internal divisions within and among the NATO and UN

member states. The Serbs knew, Hunter believed, that neithe

organization could take decisive action against them unles

consensus existed in the NAC and at least in the UN Securit

Council. For that reason they should have taken NAC’s endorse

ment of the London agreement and the UN secreta ry-general’

transfer of the air-strike keys to his military commander a

disturbing omens. Based on past experience, however, the Serb

also had reason to hope that neither organization was reall

499
serious and would back off after a few halfhearted air strikes

The bombing pause probably rekindled that hope. NAC ’s debat

of 2 September, which Hunter believed the Serbs were privy to

and the resumption of the bombing itself shattered that hope. 

The action offered hard evidence that the UN’s and NAC ’s ex

pressions of unanimity and commitment were real.

Thus, even more than the ongoing advances of the Bosnia

Federation forces and the initial start of the bombing, the knowl

edgeable participants interviewed by the BACS team all agree

that resumption of the bombing became the pivotal moment o

the campaign. In Ambassador Hill’s estimate, the bombing “wa

really the signal the Bosnian Serbs needed to get to understan

that they had to reach a peace agreement.”8 6 Hunter believe

that the decision and the act of resuming the attack clearl

signaled to the Serbs that the UN and NATO were committed t

winning a decision and that their opportunities for military suc

cess and diplomatic maneuver were running out.

An interesting feature of Deliberate Force, given the clos

connection between air operations and diplomacy, was tha

the direct operational commander, General Ryan, and th

principal negotiator, Ambassador Holbrooke, never spoke t

one another during the operation. Holbrooke spoke frequentl

during the campaign with UN commanders and on several occa 

sions with Admiral Smith and General Joulwan, SACEUR. H

even conferred with NAC during the bombing pause but neve

spoke with the individual who made immediate decision

about the sequence, pace, weapons, and other tactical charac

teristics of the air attacks. General Ryan , for his part, thu

never spoke to the individual most directly responsible fo

exploiting the diplomatic effects of his operations. What the

knew of one another’s perceptions, priorities, and intentions

they derived indirectly from information flowing up and dow

their respective chains of command.

From a legalistic perspective, the lack of contact betwee

Holbrooke and Ryan was proper and politically necessary

First, as a US State Department representative and the leade

of the Contact Group, Holbrooke had no formal place in eithe

the UN or the NATO chain of command. Properly, any contac

between him and Ryan should have moved up through Stat

Department channels over to the secretary of defense or t

500
NAC and then down through those chains of command t

Ryan , who acted both as the commander of Sixteenth Ai

Force and as a NATO air commander. Given the circum

stances, the NATO chain of command was really the operativ

one. Second, any direct contact with the air commander possi

bly would have established the perception that the bombin

supported Holbrooke’s diplomacy—something that neither th

UN nor NATO wanted to happen. Ambassador Hunter sug

gested that members of NAC wouldn’t have wanted any direc

contact between Ryan and Holbrooke “other than to keep on

another vaguely informed—that is, to exchange information

All political decisions related to the air campaign, he said, had t

be made at NAC . Hunter believed that any “tactical” cooperation

between the general and the diplomat would have been a “ver

big mistake”; had Ryan adjusted his operations in response t

information passed to him by “any negotiator,” NAC would hav

“had his head”—especially if something went wron g.8 7

During Deliberate Force, consequently, Admiral Smit

wanted no direct contact between his air commander an

Holbrooke. The admiral himself avoided operational or target

ing discussions with Holbrooke or his military deputy, U

Army lieutenant general Wes Clark, because he “did not wan

either of them to even think they had an avenue by which the

could influence me.”8 8 Fully aware of his exclusion from th

NATO and UN command channels, Ambassador Holbrook

never based his pre–Deliberate Force negotiating plans on 

bombing campaign, even though he believed that one would

facilitate their successful outcome greatly. 8 9

Unavoidable as it was under the circumstances, the lack o

contact between Holbrooke and Ryan appears to have allowe

disconnects in their understanding of key issues. Those discon 

nects, in turn, appear to have influenced the way the two indi

viduals pursued their missions. For example, General Ryan

concern over collateral damage probably exceeded that of a

least the US diplomats involved. Although the general was con 

cerned that a significant collateral-damage event, particularl

one causing the deaths of civilians, might rob the air cam

paign of its political support before it had decisive effect, th

US diplomats involved generally believed that the air cam paign

had enough political support to carry it through perhaps eve

501
a serious incident of collateral damage.

9 0 As regards the cli

mate of opinion in NAC , Ambassador Hunter pointed out tha

the member states had invested too much domestic politica

capital in starting bombing operations to bring them to a hal

by the unintended death of civilians and soldiers.91 No on

advocated casual slaughter, but the net focus of the in terven 

tion’s diplomatic community remained on getting res ults from

what may have been NATO’s last bolt in Bosnia , rather than on

preventing or reacting to incidents of collateral damage.

Whether closing this disconnect between NATO air leade rs

m ainly Ryan and Admiral Smith , and their diplomatic cou nter 

parts, mainly Holbrooke and Hunter , would have changed th

flow of events is, of course, speculative. Even had they know

that the diplomats were not poised to end the air campaign a

the first incident of significant collateral damage (whateve

“significant” meant in this case), Smith and Ryan certainly

would not have reduced their efforts to minimize collatera

damage and casualties. For military, legal, and moral reasons

neither leader had any intention of doing more harm to th

Bosnian Serbs than their mission to protect the safe area

required. Likely, Admiral Smith still would have expected

Ryan to make every DMPI, weapon, and other decision wit

the intent of getting maximum effect at minimum collatera

cost. Knowing that the diplomats were not as sensitive t

collateral damage as they thought, however, might have give

the military commanders a sense that they had more time t

conduct their operations. That, in turn, might have let them

slow the pace of the bombing—something that might hav

been desirable, even if just to reduce the wear and tear im 

posed by the actual pace of operations on everyone from Gen 

eral Ryan to the personnel in the flying units in the field

Indeed, at one point during the bombing, some CAOC staffer

briefly discussed slowing the pace of the campaign in th

interest of safety. People, including the aircrews, were begin 

ning to show signs of fatigue. But they rejected the idea in

short order, believing that the diplomatic vulnerability of th

operation required maximum effort to ensure that it had 

decisive effect before political reasons shut it down. 9 2

A disconnect also existed between Ryan’s and Holbrooke

understandings of the dynamics of the bombing campaign an

502
its possible duration. With his jets focusing their attacks a

most exclusively on the targets covered in options one and tw

of OPLAN 40101, around 10 September General Ryan passe

the word to his commanders that he would run out of such

approved targets in a couple of days at the present pace o

operations. For their part, Ryan and his planners did not neces 

sarily equate running out of currently approved targets wit

ending the campaign automatically. Several available targetin

options could have permitted a continuation of the bombing

These options included (1) hitting or rehitting undestroye

DMPIs among the targets already approved, (2) adding and/o

approving new option-one and -two targets to the list, or (3

hitting option-three targets. In fact AIRSOUTH planners wer

already looking at new option-one and -two targets, and Genera

Joulwan had already raised the option-three issue with NAC 

with a negative response. 9 3 Nevertheless, in the second week o

September, AFSOUTH had several options for usefully extendin

the air campaign, should that be politically or militarily required

That was not the information that got to Ambassador Hol

brooke and his boss, Secretary of State Christopher, however

Based on his conversations with Admiral Smith and a repor

to the National Security Council on 11 September by Adm

William Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Ambassador Holbrooke recalls that he and the secretary un

derstood unequivocally that running out the existing targe

list meant the end of bombing operations. Because that new

had such drastic implications for his negotiations, Holbrook

relates, he immediately asked Admiral Owens to see if ther

was some way to extend the campaign.9 4 Interestingly, Genera

Ryan later could not recall ever hearing about the ambassa

dor’s interest in stretching things out. 9 5

Whatever the causes of the informational disconnect be

tween Ryan and Holbrooke, it had an immediate effect on

American and, it follows, Contact Group diplomacy. After th

meeting of the National Security Council , Holbrooke relates

Secretary Christopher directed him to return immediately t

Belgrade to resume negotiations with President Milosevic

Th e two statesmen had planned to wait a week longer befor

ree ngaging the Serbians, in the hope that the continued bomb

ing would further soften their obstinate resistance to meetin

503
both the UN

s and the Contact Groups demands. In othe

words, Holbrooke was determined to get the Serbs to halt thei

attacks on the safe areas and to begin making territorial conces 

sions necessary to give reality to the just completed Genev

Agreement. But with the end of offensive air operations apparentl

imminent, Christopher adjusted his diplomatic plan, and Ho

brooke immediately left for Serbia to get what he cou ld from th

Serbs before the bombing ended. 96 Fortunately, although it wa

already becoming public knowledge that NATO was running ou

of option-two targets and was unlikely to shift to option three

the Serbs were beaten and ready to accept at least the UN

demands.9 7 Consequently, Holbrooke got little for the Contac

Group other than promises to participate in some sort of peac

conference, but he did get a commitment from the Serbs to lif

the sieges and pull their heavy weapons out of the Sarajev

exclusion zone. Attributing his partial success to the need to ge

a settlement before the Serbs became aware of the impendin

halt to the bombing, Holbrooke later related, “I would have been

. . . willing to continue the negotiations if Smith or Joulwan ha

said, ‘Boy, we have a lot of great targets left out there!’ ”9 8

Again, arguing that closing the disconnect between Rya

and Holbrooke on this issue might have reshaped the ai

campaign—even had it been possible to do so—remains 

matter of speculation. After all, Ryan was still functioning as 

NATO commander and Holbrooke was not in his chain o

command; furthermore, for reasons of political sensitivity, h

was not even free to discuss operations openly with the ai

commander. In actual practice, however, the operational an

political boundaries between the UN and NAC , on the on

hand, and the United States and the Contact Group, on th

other, were not as sharp as the formal diplomatic arrange 

ments suggested. To be sure, the bombing was under way t

secure the safe areas and protect peacekeepers, but mos

leaders involved understood that the coalition was not likely t

obtain those objectives unless the Serbs were humbled mili

tarily and agreed to serious negotiations over the political an

territorial proposals of the Contact Group. Similarly, although

the UN officially had the political lead in terms of sanctionin

and benefiting from the bombing, Ambassador Holbrooke ex

ercised the practical diplomatic lead during Deliberate Force

504
It was he, in fact, who extracted concessions from the Serbia

leaders on 14 September that allowed the UN and NATO t

announce success and turn off their keys. He was, therefore

acting as a de facto diplomat for the other international or

ganizations, even if none could say so.

Thus, while the political-military arrangements existin

around Deliberate Force made good formal sense at the time

their artificiality, in terms of what was going on operationally

clearly influenced the course of diplomacy and air operation

in ways that arguably were undesirable. In point of fact, th

indirectness of the flow of information between Ryan and Hol

brooke created a situation whereby the commanders pressed

their operations to get their full diplomatic effect before th

diplomats arbitrarily cut off the bombing, even as the diplo 

mats scrambled to get what diplomatic effect they could befor

the commanders arbitrarily cut off the bombing. The irony o

the situation is notable.

Even after it ended, Deliberate Force—or at least its mem 

ory—remained an active factor in the shape and pace of sub

sequent negotiations for Bosnian peace. Formal talks wer

taken up in November at Wright-Patterson Air Force Bas

(AFB), near Dayton, Ohio. Holbrooke considered it a fortuitou

choice of venue. Arriving Serb diplomats walked from thei

airplanes past operational combat aircraft parked on the ram

nearby. Ambassador Hill arranged to hold the welcoming ban

quet on the floor of the United States Air Force Museum

where the Serbs literally sat surrounded by “an awesome dis 

play of airpower,” including some of the very aircraft an

weapons recently used against them.9 9 According to thei

American escort officer, the Serbs remained tight-lipped abou

their impressions of the event.100 But one cannot doubt th

importance that key interventionist diplomats attached t

keeping airpower before the Serbian diplomats.

Observations and Implications

During the course of their research, the BACS team mem 

bers observed and described a number of things about Delib 

erate Force that carry important implications for the planner

505
of future air campaigns. Once again, this chapter only summa 

rizes those implications that some—though not necessaril

all—of the team members felt had value beyond the specifi

circumstances of Deliberate Force. For all its uniqueness, Delib 

erate Force offers broadly useful implications because one ca 

describe its key characteristics with some precision. For the NATO

airmen involved, it was a strategically limited, tactically intense

high-technology, coalition air campaign conducted under tigh

restraints of time and permissible collateral damage; further, i

was aimed at coercing political and military compliance from 

regional opponent who had no airpower. To the extent tha

military planners will plan future air campaigns in the context o

some or all of these characteristics, they should first understan

what the Deliberate Force experience suggests theoreticall

about how things might work under similar circumstances.

As a first observation, the determined and robust characte

of Deliberate Force was essential to its near-term success. Th

campaign’s objectives were limited, but to achieve them, NATO

airmen had to be free to make their plans and execute thei

operations within the full limits of appropriate boundaries o

political objectives and the laws of war—all of which should

have been, and generally were, encapsulated in ROE . A half

hearted, overly restrained, or incomplete air campaign likel

would have been disastrous to NATO and UN credibility—an

it certainly would have prolonged the war. As RAND re

searcher Stephen Hosmer concludes, a weak air campaign

probably would have “adversely conditioned” the Bosnia

Serbs and other factions to believe that both bombing and th

interventionists were indecisive and, therefore, that the

should fight on. “To reap the psychological benefits of air 

power,” Hosmer writes, “it is also important to avoid advers

conditioning. The enemy must not see your air attacks a

weak or impotent. The hesitant . . . bombing campaign agains

North Vietnam in 1965 is a prime example of adverse condi

tioning. The hesitant use of NATO airpower in the former Yugo

slavia prior to mid-1995 is another example of adverse condi

tioning.”101 In parallel, Ambassador Holbrooke felt that the actua

targets struck during Deliberate Force were less important to th

effect on Bosnian Serb leaders than the fa ct that the NATO

campaign was sustained, effective, and selectiv e. 102

506
As a second observation, precision-guided munitions mad

Deliberate Force possible . Given the campaign’s restraints o

time, forces available, and its political sensitivities, NATO

could not have undertaken it without a relatively abundan

supply of PGMs and air platforms to deliver them. Precision

weapons gave NATO airmen the ability to conceive and execut

a major air campaign that was quick, potent, and unlikely t

kill people or destroy property to an extent that would caus

world opinion to rise against and terminate the operation. Th

BACS team found no substantiated estimates of the numbe

of people killed by Deliberate Force.103 The simple fact tha

Bosnian Serb leaders made no effort to exploit collateral dam

age politically indicates that they had little to exploit. Ha

NATO and UN leaders expected enough collateral damage t

give the Serbs a political lever, they probably would not hav

approved the initiation of Deliberate Force, or if such damag

had begun, they probably could not have sustained the opera 

tion politically for long. Indeed, as Ambassador Hunter re

called, trust in the implied promise of NATO airmen to execut

the air campaign quickly and with minimal collateral damag

permitted members of NAC to approve its initiation in the firs

place. 104 Had those diplomats doubted that promise, therefore

Deliberate Force never would have happened, and if NATO

airmen had failed to deliver on either part of their promise, th

campaign almost certainly would have come to a quick end.

The third observation follows from the first two: NATO’

primary reliance on air-delivered precision weapons during De 

liberate Force shielded the international intervention in Bosnia

from “mission creep.” Had NATO chosen to conduct a joint ai

and ground offensive against the Serbs or to rely on nonpreci

sion aerial weapons in the bombing campaign, Deliberat

Force certainly would have involved greater casualties on bot

sides. Instead of a series of just over one thousand carefull

placed explosions and a few seconds of aircraft cannon fire

Deliberate Force likely would have involved protracted opera 

tions by tens of thousands of troops, systematic air and artil

lery barrages in support of their advance across the land, an

thousands more explosions of not so precisely placed bomb

and artillery shells. Put another way, in any form but a

independent air campaign, Deliberate Force would have give

507
the Serb faction a vastly greater opportunity to fight back an

inflict casualties on NATO and UN forces. Reasonably, th

Serbs would have fought back, at least long enough to see i

killing some number of interventionist troops would break th

will of their political leaders. The problem with such casual

ties, however, is that they could have reshaped the political

normative, and emotional nature of the campaign against th

Serbs. Televised reports of rows of dead Bosnian Serb soldiers

shelled towns, lines of refugees, and NATO body bags likel

would have reshaped every participant’s view of the conflic

and there would have been more time for those changed view

to have political effect. Of course there is no way to tell if 

protracted air-land campaign or nonprecision-bombing cam

paign would have changed NATO ’s “disciplinary” peace-en 

forcement mission into “real war” missions of retreat, con 

quest, or retribution. The very uncertainty of the direction in

which the interventionist mission would have crept under 

scores the value of airpower’s characteristics of precision, con 

trol, and security in this particular peace operation .

The fourth observation is that contacts between militar

leaders and some key diplomats do not seem to have kept u

with the pace of events just before and during Deliberate Force 

Because of limitations of the interview information the BAC

team collected, the width of the gap in the diplomatic an

military discourse is not clear, but it is clear from the evidenc

collected that the gap existed and that it shaped political an

military events to some degree. Perhaps most significantly

Ambassador Holbrooke and General Ryan made plans an

took actions in ignorance of one another’s positions in ke

areas such as preventing collateral damage and extending th

air campaign. Reflecting on the possible diplomatic conse

quences of the disconnect between him and Ryan over th

practicality of the campaign, Holbrooke writes, “I regret greatly

that . . . I did not have direct contact with Ryan ; it might hav

allowed us to follow a different, and perhaps tougher, strat

egy.”105 Moreover, although the bureaucratic distance between

these individuals may have been understandable under th e cir

cumstances of this operation, it may not have needed to exten

to an absolute proscription of contact between them. Speak 

ing from his perspective as a member of NAC , Ambassado

508
Hunter, for one, indicated that a passage of factual informa

tion between the commander and the diplomat probabl

should have happened. At the same time, it is clear from th

context of Hunter ’s statement that he still thought that an

such contact between Ryan and Holbrooke should hav

avoided giving the impression that they were actually coordi

nating their efforts. 106

In contrast to the reflections of the diplomats, Admira

Smith and General Ryan remained convinced, nearly tw

years after the fact, that any direct contact between Holbrook

and AIRSOUTH would have been improper and diplomatically

risky. Both commanders believed that such contact would

have violated the established military chain of command an

the proper interface between the diplomatic and military lead

ership. In Admiral Smith ’s view, had he allowed Holbrook

and Ryan to talk, he would have placed the whole operation a

risk diplomatically, and he would have undermined his boss

General Joulwan .

107 In separate comments, General Ryan ech 

oed that position, maintaining that to “even hint” at direc

coordination between him and Holbrooke was “ludicrous.

Since part of Holbrooke’s sanction to negotiate in the Balkan

came from the UN and since NATO was likewise operating a

the behest of the UN, Ryan argued that the proper level o

coordination between the diplomat and soldier should hav

and could have occurred only at the “strategic level.” Thu

Ryan suggests that the real area of inquiry in this issue ma

lie in the possible inadequacy of the information flow betwee

the NAC and UN leaders.108

The operative point remains, however, that Ryan ’s and Hol

brooke’s activities were intertwined during the bombing, re

gardless of the bureaucratic and diplomatic arrangements an

fictions maintained, and that those arrangements did not ade

quately support their requirements for information. The impli

cation for future architects of politically charged, fast-paced

military interventions is that they must pay close attention t

keeping the formal and informal communications channel

and boundaries between soldiers and diplomats current, coor 

dinated, and flexible. It also will be important to make sur

that the right soldiers and diplomats are talking to each othe

at the right time, within limits and on topics appropriate t

509
the circumstances. This may mean that they remain linked

cleanly and traditionally at the tops of their respective chains o

command. But it also may be that in the close-coupled political

military environments of future peace operations, for example

some linkages at subordinate levels will be appropriate. Thi

observation certainly does not justify diplomats muckin

about with tactics or soldiers hijacking diplomacy. Nor does i

bow to generalized beliefs that diplomats and soldiers operat

in separate realms. In reality, war is about diplomacy, an

diplomacy’s final sanction is war. Diplomats and soldiers wil

always be in each other’s “mess kits.” The real issue is how

both groups can anticipate and educate themselves and on

another on the appropriate boundaries and rules of their rela 

tionship under given circumstances. The political-military ex 

perience of Deliberate Force should prove to be an interestin

case study in that educational process.

Fifth, and in a similar vein, although the focus and style o

General Ryan’s leadership was mandated by and appropriat

to the immediate task of keeping the air campaign politically

viable, they also created stresses within AIRSOUTH staff ele 

ments that may have become problems, had the campaign con 

tinued much longer. Given the necessity of ensuring that th

targets, weapons, and tactics of every attack sortie were se

lected and controlled to minimize the possibility of collatera

damage, General Ryan ’s decision to centralize such decision

(i.e., make them himself) made sense. But making all thos

decisions day-to-day locked the general into 18-hour work

days with minimal time and energy to consider other responsi

bilities that fall to a senior component commander. Part o

this load fell to General Short , Ryan ’s chief of staff, who stayed

in Naples to oversee AIRSOUTH’s administrative, logistics

personnel, and public-relations tasks and to maintain day-to

day liaison with Admiral Smith . Short was up to the task, bu

he did comment to the team that at times he lacked th

continual contact with the CAOC that he needed to fulfill hi

liaison and press responsibilities in a timely manner. From

the CAOC itself, several staffers commented that Ryan’s cen 

tralization of technical decisions of targeting and weapon eerin

created a division within the CAOC staff. On one side of thi

division, they felt, was a small group of a half-dozen officer

510
who also worked unsustainably long days to help the genera

make his tactical decisions. On the other side was the bulk o

the several-hundred-strong CAOC staff who did little mor

than gather and distribute data and who tended to feel under 

utilized in comparison to General Ryan’s arguably overworked

inner core.

Obviously, one can make too much of this issue, particu 

larly since the BACS was not chartered and equipped to col

lect the comprehensive sociological and organizational dat

necessary to credibly describe the real effects of Ryan’s o

anyone else’s leadership. But the patchy evidence collected b

the team does suggest that future air commanders and thei

subordinates should be aware that the stylistic—as well as th

substantive—elements of leadership will have far-reaching ef

fects on the work, morale, and endurance of their staffs. Fur

ther, it suggests a potentially valuable line of inquiry for fu 

ture research.

Sixth, despite the relative smallness of their force structure

NATO commanders chose to conduct operations for operational

and strategic-level effects rather than tactical ones. In US force

planning terms, AFSOUTH conducted Deliberate Force wit

about a two-fighter-wing-equivalent combat force and an ap

propriate support slice of reconnaissance, surveillance, elec

tronic warfare, SEAD , lift , and other aircraft. AIRSOUTH com 

manders had the option of conducting their attacks fo

primarily tactical effects by concentrating on the Serbian ma

teriel targets encompassed in option one. Instead they elected

to focus their attacks on option-two targets to achieve broade

and quicker operational and strategic results—namely, by de

stroying the mobility and command infrastructure of the BS

and thereby coercing its leaders to accede to UN demands. In

other words the NATO air force was not the giant fielded fo

Desert Storm , but it still had a strategic option. This is a

important point for US air planners pondering the problems o

conducting air war in secondary theaters, where they perhap

will be allocated relatively small forces to accomplish big job

in a hurry. It is also important for the planners and com 

manders of smaller air forces. The possession of a strategic o

lead-force option depends less on the size of an air force than on

the military-political circumstances, doctrine, materiel, an

511
available targeting options. It follows then that the leaders an

budget masters of air forces of even moderate size should no

reject the strategic- and operational-level options of air warfar

out of hand. If their anticipated employment opportunities sug

gest the utility of strategic attack, broad-ranging interdiction

operations, or other asymmetric ways of bringing airpower t

bear against their enemies, then they should step up to makin

the appropriate investments in air vehicles, munitions, suppor

infrastructure, command and control systems, and so on.

Seventh, and at a more tactical level, for NATO airmen, th

operational features of this limited conflict differed little from

those of major war. They attacked the Bosnian Serbs in 199

with the aircraft, tactics, weapons, and operational tempo

they would have employed against the Warsaw Pact seve

years before, at the close of the cold war. That observation

suggests several things about the flexibility of airpower. I

implies that airpower’s role in the sphere of low intensity con 

flict continues to expand as new strategies, weapons, an

sensor systems improve the ability of airmen to find and de

stroy important targets of all types under varying conditions

To the extent that a given low intensity conflict or operation

other than war requires military surveillance and attacks (an

most do), the Deliberate Force experience suggests that air 

power is becoming an ever more equal partner with groun

power. Moreover, the fact that ordinary air tactical units flew

in Deliberate Force speaks to the relative ease with which on

may shift such units between conflicts, as compared t

ground forces. Ground units often require months of trainin

to prepare for the differing tactical tasks of various types o

conflicts. Training a battalion for peace operations, therefore

can reduce its capabilities and availability for conventiona

war. That is less often and less extensively the case for ai

units. Squadrons preparing for strike operations in Korea, fo

example, would not find strike operations over Bosnia much

different in concept and basic technique; of course, they migh

find some adjustment for local conditions of geography an

weather. Once again, one should not overstate this point. Fo

example, airmen involved in Deny Flight report that some o

their specific battle skills, such as flying high-performanc

air-combat maneuvers, degraded in the course of patrollin

512
the skies over Bosnia for months on end. Moreover, the rela 

tive flexibility of surface forces, as compared to that of ai

forces, becomes a variable factor as one begins to look a

specific missions and tasks—and at different branches, suc

as infantry and artillery.

This summary of the BACS now turns to a final observation

about the decisiveness of Deliberate Force’s contribution t

ending the conflict in Bosnia . In general, airpower was a deci

sive factor in ending the 1992–95 Bosnian conflict, but on

must understand its specific contribution in relation to th

state of the conflict and to other events unfolding in the re

gion. Like all struggles the Bosnian conflict was going to en

someday. Either exhaustion or the victory of one side or th

other would bring it to a close. Creation of the Bosnian Fed

eration in March 1994 and the sudden successes of its force

in the spring and summer of 1995—in concert with those o

Croatia—suggested that military dominance and victory wer

slipping, perhaps permanently, from the grasp of the Bosnia

Serbs. Norman Cigar convincingly argues that some Bosnia

Serbs and certainly Slobodan Milosevic realized that at th

time. 109 Moreover, for domestic political reasons of his own

Milosevic needed the fighting to stop and, accordingly, tried t

position himself as a peace broker in July. 110

Nevertheless, the long-term outcome of the conflict and it

likely length still were not in sight at the end of August 1995

No one had solid reasons to think that the bloodshed in Bos 

nia would not continue for at least another campaign seaso

or longer. Significantly, the Serbs were still advancing agains

the safe areas in eastern Bosnia , even as they gave up groun

in the western areas. But people in the outside world had see

enough of the butchery and mindless inhumanity in Bosnia 

To put it bluntly, they wanted the war to end or at least get of

Cable News Network. At the London conference in July, th

interventionists announced that they intended to mitigate or

if possible, end the horror—by using airpower.

And that’s what Deliberate Force did. It did what three year

of factional ground fighting, peacekeeping, and internationa

diplomacy had yet to achieve. Almost at the instant of it

application, airpower stopped the attacks on the safe area

and made further large-scale fighting over Bosnian territor

513
largely pointless. In so doing, it drastically altered the militar

situation on the ground, and it gave the UN and NATO contro

of the pace and content of the peace process.

The period of peace that came to Bosnia in the fall of 199

probably emerged in the following way: First, Bosnian Federa 

tion and Croatian ground advances in the spring and summe

of 1995 gave the Serbs a long-term signal that their opportu 

nities for further military gains were coming to an end. Ameri

can diplomats interviewed by the BACS team suggested tha

the federation advance also had the fortunate consequence o

bringing the distribution of land under federation and Serbia

control almost exactly to the 51/49 percent split called for a

the time in UN and Contact Group peace plans.111 This devel

opment probably influenced the peace calculations of severa

Serb leaders, but the diplomats generally agreed that its great

est value may have been to facilitate the final settlement at th

Dayton peace talks in the following November. Second, th

Deliberate Force air campaign “broke” the Serbs and was th

proximal cause of the cessation of large-scale fighting in Bos 

nia and of the Serb agreement to participate in future peac

talks according to a timetable set by the intervention. Third

the provision for a federal government in the peace plan mad

acquiescence to UN and Contact Group demands more palat

able for the Serbs. Since the federation potentially offered

them one of their dearest objectives—a degree of politica

autonomy—it seems reasonable to think that it lowered thei

willingness to fight on in the face of simultaneous NATO ai

attacks and ground offensives by their regional enemies.

This last point requires further research once it become

possible to interview Bosnian Serb leaders on their views o

the linkage between Deliberate Force and their political deci

sions. As one should expect in any conflict, then, the interven 

tionist coalitions achieved their aim of stopping the fighting in

Bosnia by blending diplomacy and military force, by plan an

by happenstance, into a combination that simultaneously co 

erced the Bosnian Serbs and made it easier for them to give in

to UN and Contact Group demands.

Deliberate Force ultimately impressed the BACS team as th

creation of doctrinally and operationally sophisticated diplomats

air leaders, and planners. As they had done in the general cas

514
of Deny Flight, NATO airmen crafted and executed the bombin

campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in an optimal manner tha

accommodated the conflicting political, diplomatic, operational

and technological limitations and constraints of their situation

At the same time, many of the key forces and events that shape

the context and success of Deliberate Force were, in fact, beyon

the control or even the cognizance of the senior planners in 

volved. As in most, if not all, military operations, the outcome o

Deliberate Force was the product of good planning, courage, an

luck. Certainly, the campaign plan was not perfect in its concep

tion and execution. Where possible the BACS team tried to iden 

tify and describe its more important imperfections, all the whil

keeping in mind that hindsight does not guarantee a clear vision

of what was or was not the best way to do something. In th

main, however, the various team members tended to be mor

impressed by the success of the campaign than with possibl

errors of planning and execution.

The conclusion of this report, then, is that airpower deliv 

ered what it promised in Deliberate Force. It was a decisiv

element in bringing a new period of peace to Bosnia —quickly

cleanly, and at minimal cost in blood and treasure to th

intervening states and, indeed, to the Bosnian Serbs. For th

United States , if its national security strategy of global engage 

ment is to last very long, its military forces will have to provid

similar successes at similarly low costs—perhaps many times

It is useful to know, therefore, that in the case of Bosnia i

mid-1995, airpower not only was the lead arm of America

involvement in the region but also was almost certainly th

only politically viable offensive arm available for use by th

United States and any of its partners to end in a controllabl

way an ugly war of indeterminate cause and uncertain future

Notes

1. For all official documents, interviews, and studies, see the BACS fil

at the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA

Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.

2. Some important analysts of this conflict would add a fourth sustain 

ing cause: the misguided intervention of outside states and organizations i

the conflict. In their view, the collapse of Yugoslavia created a constitution

crisis delineated by those who wanted to preserve a multiethnic feder

515
state where individual rights and economic opportunities were protected b

law, and those who sought security and opportunity in the creation o

ethnic-based nation-states carved out of the existing republics of the federa

tion. In this view, individual European states, notably Germany, strength

ened the nationalist position and assured the breakup of Yugoslavia b

recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. Similarly, war be 

came inevitable in Bosnia when the United States successfully pressure

the UN and the European Community into recognizing its independence i

March and April 1992. This is an important argument that relates directl

to the effects of Deliberate Force. But the gross effect of the intervention o

Bosnian politics was not a strategy consideration for NATO air planner

They were not asked if they should intervene—they were simply given th

parameters of their part of the intervention and told to do it. Thus thi

particular issue is not included in the list of sustaining causes in this stud

of air planning, though it no doubt is a critical consideration—particularl

at the level of grand strategy. For the details of this case, see Susan L

Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold Wa

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Christopher Ben 

nett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequence

(New York: New York University Press, 1995).

3. Terminology for describing the Moslem-Serb community is a problem

Some analysts use Bosniaks, apparently to give them a nonreligious labe

like Serbs and Croats . The problem with that term is that it implies a close

link between the Moslem community and the cause of preserving the mult

ethnic unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia than it does for Serbs an

Croats. With many individual exceptions, such may have been the case a

the start of the Bosnian conflict, but in the pressure cooker of war, Moslem

leaders adopted increasingly “ethnic” political objectives and rhetoric. S

this chapter refers to Moslems as such, when appropriate, and refers to th

national government or cause as Bosnian .

4. Robert A. Hunter, tape-recorded interview by author, 23 July 199

side A, index 50.

5. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd, AIRSOUTH planner, Headquarters AIRSOUTH

Naples, Italy, transcript of interview by author, 6 December 1995.

6. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, commander, US Space Command, transcript o

interview by author, 29 April 1996, 10; and Adm Leighton Smith, “NATO

Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberate Force, 29 August–14 Septem 

ber 1995,” presentation to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9 Novembe

1995, AFHRA, videotape, index 1046, BACS file Misc-19.

7. Publicly, however, NATO commanders never wavered from their com 

mitment to support UN peacekeeping. Even with the Deliberate Force bomb

ing under way, Admiral Smith stated, “I do not consider myself to be takin

sides.” Bruce W. Nelan, “More Talking, More Bombing,” Time Magazine, 1

September 1995, 76.

8. Briefing, “NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina—Deliberate Force

(U), c. 1 August 1995. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

516
9. Col Larry Bickel, discussion with author, Ramstein AB, Germany

2 4 August 1996. At the time of this discussion, Bickel was assigned t

H ea dquarters United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), but in the fall o

1992, he served at SHAPE as a Balkans-region air planner. He (probabl

along with others) suggested the initialism CAOC, in conformity with NATO

terminology and practice.

10. Ashy interview, 4.

11. Ibid., 6.

12. Ibid., 25–57.

13. Ibid., 28–32; and Boyd interview, 12–13.

14. Boyd interview, 6. Throughout the period under discussion, Colone

Boyd acted as one of General Ashy’s principal planners, and he was par

ticularly responsible for ROE development. Boyd also mentions that M

Richard Corzine was involved in AFSOUTH ROE development in the earl

phases of Deny Flight.

15. Memorandum for the NATO secretary-general, NAC Decision State 

ment, MCM-KAD-084-93, subject: Operational Options for Air Strikes i

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8 August 1993.

16. Ashy interview, 36.

17. In the course of its research, the BACS team realized that not a

participants understood the boundaries of the dual-key arrangement in th

same way. Some interviewees implicitly or explicitly extended its coverage t

include the release of attacks against aircraft violating the no-fly edict. I

reality the dual key applied only to air-to-ground attacks. What seems fai

to say, however, is that the dual key reflected a pervasive caution in the U

and NATO over the use of any military force that, in turn, made leaders i

both organizations cautious about enforcing the no-fly edict as well. As 

was, therefore, NATO leaders did not release an attack on violating aircraf

until 28 February 1994, when alliance jets downed four Bosnian Ser

aircraft in the act of dropping bombs on facilities controlled by the Bosnia

government. Importantly, the CAOC director released this attack withou

coordination with the UN.

18. Smith presentation, index 865–900.

19. Hunter interview, side A, index 350–450.

20. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, tape-recorded interview by M

Mark McLaughlin and Dr. Karl Mueller, 24 May 1996, side A, index 584

BACS researchers also heard statements that the dual-key setup may hav

been a way of giving the French an indirect veto over NATO air operation

With lightly armed peacekeeping forces on the ground, the French ha

reason to be concerned over any action that might prompt attacks on them

Without a chair on the NAC, however, the French had no direct say in th

use of NATO airpower. But through its permanent seat on the UN Securit

Council, the French government could influence those operations throug

the UN key. The BACS team uncovered no documentary or direct or

evidence that French concerns influenced NATO’s decision to propose th

517
dual-key setup, but the idea seems plausible. Clearly, this is an attractiv

area for further research.

21. Smith presentation, index 1280.

22. Ibid., index 1270–1330.

23. Maj Scott G. Walker, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by author, 2

February 1997. Walker was the deputy mission commander of the Udbin

air attack. See also “NATO Jets Knock Out Base for Serb Planes,” The Star

and Stripes, 22 November 1994, 1–2.

24. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 567.

25. Yasushi Akashi to Radovan Karadzic, letter, 10 December 1994.

26. Smith presentation, index 1080–1105.

27. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 029–040.

28. Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, CINSOUTH OPLA

40101, “Deny Flight,” change four, 3 May 1993. (Secret) Information ex

tracted is unclassified.

29. Hunter interview, side B, index 035; and idem, tape 2, side A, inde

2835.

30. Briefing, Lt Gen Hal Hornburg to BACS team, Air Force Wargamin

Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996. General Hornburg was deput

commander of 5 ATAF and director of the CAOC at the time of Deliberate Force

31. Hunter interview, tape 2, side A, index 949.

32. Ibid., side A, index 1157–1559.

33. James L. Graff, “A Good Season for War,” Time Magazine, 15 May 1995

34. Quoted in “Pity the Peacekeepers,” Time Magazine, 5 June 1995, 39

35. In November 1995 Adm Leighton Smith reported that the brutality o

the Serbian conquest of Srebrenica was the decisive event in bringing th

foreign ministers to London. By 14 July, he later reported, he and Gener

Janvier recognized that the “Serbs could walk in and take Zepa,” so th

focus thereafter and at London was on protecting Gorazde. Smith presenta

tion, index 1570; and Adm Leighton Smith, “Further Comments on 2n

Draft of BACS,” fax transmission, 2 August 1997, 1.

36. Admiral Smith reports that he took the ZOA concept to Gener

Joulwan—his commander—and then to NAC in the period after the fall o

Srebrenica and after the London conference. With NAC approval in earl

August and after some discussion, he convinced General Janvier to sign 

memorandum of understanding in support of the concept. This took som

doing, Smith reported, because the peacekeeping focus of the UN com 

manders limited their understanding of the utility of air strikes to punish 

ment of only the forces actually violating UNSCRs. Eventually, Smith sai

he convinced Janvier that attacks against the “second echelon” of the Ser

forces actually would be the better way to secure the safe areas. For thi

account see Smith’s presentation, index 1700–2100. For details of the actua

plans developed, see Colonel Campbell’s chapter on planning, much o

which, unfortunately, remains classified at this writing.

37. For impressions and reportage on the conference, see Michae

Evans’s two articles in the London Times of 22 July 1995: “Muted Threa

518
Falls Short of Summit Hopes

 and American Deal Sours over Dinner. Se

also text of Secretary Christopher’s speech of 22 July: “The Internation

Conference on Bosnia: Now We Must Act,” U.S. Department of State Dis 

patch, 24 July 1995, 583–84.

38. Christopher, 583.

39. This reflects Michael Evans’s view in “American Deal Sours.”

40 . Christopher, 584.

41. Quoted in Evans, “Muted Threat.”

42. Evans, “American Deal Sours.”

43. Evans, “Muted Threat.”

44. NATO, “Press Statement by the Secretary General Following Nort

Atlantic Meeting on 25 July 1995,” Brussels, 26 July 1995.

45. Gen George Joulwan, SACEUR, tape-recorded interview by Jerr

McGinn, SHAPE, Casteau, Belgium, 24 July 1996, side A, index 832–1128

46. Gen James L. Jamerson, deputy commander in chief, US Europea

Command, interviewed by author, 23 July 1996. General Jamerson was on

of the officers sent, as was Air Marshal William Wratten, CINC of the Roy

Air Force’s Strike Command.

47. Smith presentation, index 1950–2065.

48. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, inter

viewed by Maj Tim Reagan, Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency, and D

Wayne Thompson, Center for Air Force History, 18 October 1995.

49. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, to Willy Claes, NATO

secretary-general, letter, 26 July 1995.

50. Adm Leighton W. Smith Jr., CINCSOUTH, memorandum of under 

standing with Gen Bernard Janvier, force commander, UNPF, subject: NA

Decisions of 25 July and the Direction of the UN Secretary-General, 1

August 1995.

51. AIRSOUTH, Operation Deliberate Force fact sheet, n.d., 2.

52. For the study, see Col John R. Baker, deputy director of curren

operations, Headquarters US Air Force, “Report of Assistance Visit to Op 

eration Deny Flight Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy

24–30 July 1995.”

53. CAOC organization charts exist in several documents collected b

the BACS team. For example, see “USAFE’s Response to the Balkans Crisi

A Brief History of Operations Provide Promise and Deny Flight,” Augu

1995, AFRHA, BACS file CAOC-24, folder B-1b(2)-3.

54. See Rick Atkinson’s “Air Assault Sets Stage for Broader Role,” Wash 

ington Post, 15 November 1995, for an early published account of thes

events, which Admiral Smith expanded upon in his presentation to Air Wa

College on 9 November 1995. See also Smith, “Further Comments,” 2.

55. General Ryan has made these points numerous times, as he did durin

an interview with the author and Colonel Sargent at Naples. See the author’

“Synopsis of Interview of General Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, AFSOUTH

HQ, Naples IT, 1030–1200, Tuesday, 5 Dec 1995,” AFHRA, BACS files.

56. AIRSOUTH fact sheet, 2–8.

519
57. Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, inter

viewed by author and Richard Sargent, 5 December 1995.

58. For this argument, see Col Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: Th

German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice

Hall, 1977).

59. Maj Gen Charles D. Link, assistant deputy chief of staff, plans an

operations, Headquarters USAF, discussion with author on the progress o

the BACS study, 28 February 1996.

60. Richardson was both outspoken in his praise of the leadership of Gen 

erals Ryan and Hornburg, and in his amazement at how they sustained thei

workloads. See Col Douglas J. Richardson, transcript of oral history interview

by Maj Mark Conversino, Vicenza, Italy, 16 January 1996, AFHRA.

61. Maj Gen Michael C. Short, chief of staff, AIRSOUTH, interviewed b

author, Naples, Italy, 4 December 1995.

62. The focus on Aviano was a product of the research time and resource

available to the BACS team. Certainly US naval forces and air units of th

other participating countries also have stories to tell. Because the BACS ha

little time to reach out to those forces, the author decided early on to focus th

team on Aviano and rely on the US Navy and the other countries to report o

their experiences and lessons learned from Deliberate For ce.

63. See Colonel Conversino’s chapter.

64. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director, CAOC, interviewed by author et al

USAF Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996; and Con 

versino.

65. Hunter interview, side A, index 1042–1100.

66. Smith, “Further Comments.”

67. For details, see President William Clinton’s press statement, “Estab

lishing a Basis for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” U.S. Department of Stat

Dispatch, 11 September 1995, 679; and Nelan, 76–77.

68. See Major McLaughlin’s chapter on political-military connections i

Deliberate Force.

69. For an early expression of Holbrooke’s position, see Robert 

Guttman, “Richard Holbrooke,” Europe, December 1994–January 1995, 12

70. Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO

Attack If Talks Stall,” New York Times, 28 August 1995.

71. Hunter interview, side B, index 1114–1300.

72. Kevin Fedarko, “The Guns of August,” Time, 14 August 1995, 44–46

73. Karsten Prager, “Message from Serbia,” Time, 17 July 1995, 24–25.

74. Norman Cigar, “How Wars End: War Termination and Serbian Dec

sionmaking in the Case of Bosnia,” South East European Monitor, Januar

1996, passim.

75. Holbrooke said the relationship between the bombing and diplomac

was an “accident.” Negotiations were already under way when the bombin

began in response to the Mrkale mortar attack. The conjunction of eve nts “jus

happened.” Holbrooke interview, side A, index 064–080. See also “Silence of th

Guns,” Time Magazine, 25 September 1995, 41, for a journalistic discussion o

520
the military dilemma presented to the Bosnian Serbs by the conjunction o

the bombing and the land war.

76. Holbrooke interview, side B, index 1534. See also Bruce W. Nela

“Not-So-Rapid Response,” Time, 19 June 1995, 30.

77. Christopher Hill, transcript of interview by author and Maj Mar

McLaughlin, 27 February 1996, 4–5, AFHRA, BACS files.

78. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 001–028, 135–40.

79. Richard Holbrooke, “Annals of Diplomacy: The Road to Sarajevo

The New Yorker, 21 and 28 October 1996, 100.

80. Hill interview, 9.

81. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 300–360; and Hill interview, 9–10

82. Holbrooke, “Annals of Diplomacy,” 104.

83. Hunter interview, side A, index 2045–2120, 2245–3100.

84. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 400–413; and idem, “Annals o

Diplomacy,” 104.

85. Hunter interview, side A, index 2045–2310.

86. Hill interview, 19.

87. Hunter interview, tape 2, side A, index 030–150.

88. Smith, “Further Comments.”

89. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 051–058.

90. Ibid., index 369–400, 484–500; and Hunter interview, tape 2, side A

index 800. The BACS team did not attempt to interview the domestic lead

ers of the NAC member states to determine if they also were prepared t

ride out the political repercussions of a major collateral-damage incident.

91. Hunter interview, side A, index 1550–1595, 1800–1815, 2830–3000

92. Col Douglas Richardson, director of operations, CAOC, said that thi

deliberation took place as an informal “hallway discussion” between him an

“several” other senior CAOC leaders, perhaps including Generals Sawyer an

Hornburg. Interviewed by author and Richard L. Sargent, 7 December 1995.

93. Admiral Smith reports that all of these options had drawbacks. A

regards adding new option-one and -two targets to the list or revisitin

targets, Smith advised his commanders that there were not many left on th

existing list that would have enough effect to risk aircrews. Consistent wit

the opinion of Ambassador Hunter and his own feedback from Gener

Joulwan, Smith did not believe that any political support existed for strikin

option-three targets. See Smith, “Further Comments”; and Hunter inter 

view, side B, index 1026–1112.

94. Richard Holbrooke, “Comments to 2nd Draft of BACS,” 11 July 1997, 2

95. Gen Michael E. Ryan, discussion during interim briefing of BACS b

the author, USAFE/XO conference room, Ramstein AB, Germany, 24 Augu

1996.

96. Holbrooke, “Comments,” 2.

97. As an example of the permeability of NATO security on this issu

Time Magazine published an article, clearly written before the results of th

13–14 September meeting were known, noting explicitly that “the allies wi

run out of so-called Option 2 targets—as early as next week” and that 

521
decision to move to option three presented NATO with 

a problem. Se

Nelan, “More Talking, More Fighting.”

98. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 306–57; and Hill interview, 8.

99. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 104; and Hill interview, 17.

100. Capt Dave Miller, telephone interview by author, 21 March 199

synopsis in AFHRA, BACS files. The other two liaison officers interviewe

were Maj Keith Yockey, who escorted the Croatians, and Maj Mark Dipadu

who escorted the Bosnian Croats and Muslims during the Dayton talks.

101. Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations i

Four Wars, 1941–1991: Lessons for U.S. Commanders (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 1996), 198.

102. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 078.

103. At the time of this writing, the number of casualties caused by Delib 

erate Force remains uncertain. The BACS team received an unsolicited vid

otape—“US/NATO Bomb Serb Civilians, 9/95”—that purported to show tha

civilian casualties and collateral damage were widespread and intentional. Th

origins of the tape, on file in the BACS archive at AFHRA, are unclear, as is it

usefulness as an indicator either of the truth or of general Bosnian Ser

perceptions of the intent and impact of the air campaign. Ambassador Christo

pher Hill recounted to his BACS interviewers that President Milosevic told him

that his investigation indicated that about 25 people died as a result of th

bombing. Hill interview, 16. This estimate conforms in magnitude with th

findings of an investigation conducted by the Red Cross shortly after th

bombing, which identified 27 civilian deaths and damage to civilian property a

probably caused by the bombing. From the Red Cross’s account, it appear

that all of these deaths and damages were collateral consequences of attack

on other targets of military significance, including bridges, cantonment areas, 

water reservoir, and a former Bosnian Serb field headquarters. Internation

Committee of the Red Cross, “ICRC Report on Certain Aspects of the Conduc

of Hostilities and the Consequences from a Humanitarian Point of View o

NATO Air Strikes,” November 1994, AFHRA, BACS files. What seems reason 

able to say, then, is that the 1,026 weapons released during Deliberate Forc

killed fewer than 30 people.

104. Hunter interview, tape 2, side A, index 2835–2900.

105. Holbrooke, “Comments,” 2. One should note that Holbrooke wa

responding to my initial analysis of this issue, so his assessment rises o

falls on the credibility and accuracy of my information and case. I woul

remain responsible for any error that someone might later prove or attribut

to his position.

106. Hunter interview, tape 2, side A, index 113–75.

107. Smith, “Further Comments.”

108. Gen Michael E. Ryan, “Further Comments on 2nd Draft of BACS

E-mail message, 20 August 1997.

109. Cigar, passim.

110. Ibid.

111. Hill interview, 19.

522
Contributors

Col Christopher M. Campbell is director of academics at th

NATO School (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) a

Oberammergau, Germany. He previously served as an instruc

tor in the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Planning Course an

as director of the Information Warfare Division for the Colleg

of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education at Maxwel

AFB, Alabama; as deputy chief air liaison element to Head

quarters Allied Land Forces Central Europe, in Heidelberg, Ger

many; as a staff member on the United Nations Protection

Force, Zagreb, Croatia; and as chief, War Plans Branch, Head

quarters 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, Heidelberg, Germa ny. He

also has held a number of positions in the F-15A community

A command pilot with over twenty-four hundred flight hours

primarily in the F-15A/C and F-4D/E, Colonel Campbel

holds a BS in international relations from the United State

Air Force Academy and an MBA in management from Golden

Gate University. His military education includes Squadron Of

ficer School, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Force

Staff College, and Air War College.

Lt Col Mark J. Conversino is commander of the 93d Mainte

nance Squadron, 93d Logistics Group, 93d Air Control Win

a t Robins AFB, Georgia. He has served as a flight-line mainte

nan ce officer; an avionics maintenance supervisor; an assistan

professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy; 

maintenance operations officer at Fairchild AFB near Spokane

Washington; director of maintenance at Riyadh Air Base, Saud

Arabia; and professor of airpower theory and employment

School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Colonel Conversino, who holds a bachelor’s degree in history

from Eastern Kentucky University as well as a master’s degre

in US history and a PhD in US political history from Indian

University, is the author of the book Fighting with the Soviets

The Failure of Operation FRANTIC, 1944–1945 and numerou

articles on airpower and defense-related issues.

523
Lt Col Bradley S. Davis is the senior arms-control policy advi

sor, Verification and Compliance Division, Arms Control an

Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. A career missileer an

strategic-policy analyst, he has held a variety of positions a

operational Minuteman missile wings; Headquarters Strategic

Air Command; Headquarters United States Air Force; and re

cently as Academic Department chairman at Air Command and

Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has written extensively

on strategic nuclear and conventional arms control and on

chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. He is als

coeditor of three textbooks on national security matters publish

ed by Macmillan and Air University Press. Colonel Davis holds 

BA in history from UCLA and an MS in organizational behavio

and human-resource management from Chapman University.

Col Maris “Buster” McCrabb, USAF, Retired, taught economic

warfare and campaign planning at Air University’s Joint Doc

trine Air Campaign Course, Air Command and Staff College, an

School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

from 1992 to 1996. A fighter pilot and Fighter Weapons Schoo

graduate, he flew F-4s and F-16s in the United States, United

Kingdom, Philippines, and Spain. He saw combat and served a

the campaign planner for the 7440th Composite Wing (Provi

sional), Joint Task Force Proven Force during the Persian Gul

War. One of the Air Force’s leading experts on campaign plan

ning, he has published extensively on the subject. Since retirin

as chief of the Force Development and Experimentation Division

in the Aerospace Command and Control Agency, where he wa

responsible for the vision, doctrine, education, training, readi

ness, and new technology to support all Air Force command and

control, he has worked for Logicon Advanced Technology, wher

he is chief of the Advanced Concept Development Division. Colo 

nel McCrabb holds a BA from Bowling Green State University

an MS and MPA from Troy State University, and a DPA from th

University of Alabama.

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin is an intelligence officer and chief o

the Subcontinent Division at the Joint Intelligence Center Pa 

cific , Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. When he worked on the Balkan

524
Air Campaign Study, he was chief of Research and Presenta

tions within the College of Aerospace Doctrine Research an

Education at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. During his 16-yea 

m ilitary career, he has held assignments at the unit, major 

comm and, and Air Staff levels, and served as a communication s

electronics officer and a ground launched cruise missil

launch-control officer. Major McLaughlin and his wife, Karen

have a son, Matthew.

Dr. Karl Mueller is assistant professor of comparative military

studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwel

AFB, Alabama, where he teaches international relations, de

fense policy, and strategic airpower theory and application. H

previously taught at the University of Michigan and Kalama

zoo College. He has written articles on a variety of nationa

security topics, including alliance politics, nuclear strategy

deterrence theory, economic sanctions, coercive airpower, an

the implications of space weaponization. He is completing 

book about the deterrence strategies of European small an

middle powers from the 1930s through the cold war. Dr. Muelle

received his BA in political science from the University o

Chicago and his PhD in politics from Princeton University.

Lt Col John C. “Chris” Orndorff is the chief of Requirement

for Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigation

(AFOSI), Andrews AFB, Maryland. He has served as an in 

structor at Squadron Officer School and Air Command an

Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; as an AFOSI specia

agent and detachment commander; and as an administrativ

officer. He has published articles in Airpower Journal, TIG

Brief, Intercom, Global Reliance, and Command. Colonel Orn

dorff holds a BA in religion and an MA in humanities from

Western Kentucky University.

Col Robert C. Owen (see “About the Editor,” p. xv).

Lt Col Robert D. Pollock is deputy program manager fo

wing/unit command and control (C 2) systems, Combat Ai

Forces C2 Systems Program Office, Electronic Systems Center

525
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He is responsible for managin

the research, development, test, and evaluation as well a

supportability of a 31-program portfolio with annual budget

in excess of $60 million annually. He has over 15 years o

acquisition experience in fighters, bombers, transports, weap

ons, missiles, and C2 systems. A former director of war theory a

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Colone

Pollock has published several papers on air campaigning.

Lt Col Ronald M. Reed is staff judge advocate at Pope AFB

North Carolina. He has previously served as an internationa

and operations law attorney with the Office of the Staff Judg

Advocate at United States Pacific Command, Camp H. M

Smith, Hawaii; as a deployed staff judge advocate during Op 

eration Desert Storm; and as an instructor at the Air Forc

Judge Advocate General’s School. Colonel Reed received a BS

in chemistry from the University of Notre Dame, a JD from D

Paul University, and a Master of Airpower Art and Scienc

from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB

Alabama.

Lt Col Richard L. “Hollywood” Sargent is a combat histo

rian at the United States Air Force Historical Research

Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. A master weapon system

officer (WSO) with over twenty-three hundred hours of fighte

time, he is a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School a

Nellis AFB, Nevada. He has written articles on combat ai

operations in the Gulf War and World War II and is currently

working on a monograph dealing with weapons and tactic

used in the Balkans air operations. Colonel Sargent holds 

BS in business from Florida State University and an MBA

from Troy State University.

526
Index

1st Special Operations Wing, 216

2d Wing, 212

5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF),

19, 46–48, 55, 77, 80, 91, 94, 97,

132–33, 165, 167, 179, 358, 363,

464–65, 468–69, 482

8th Fighter-Bomber Wing, 369

9th Fighter Squadron, 151

12th Wing, 222

16th Special Operations Squadron, 216

23d Fighter Squadron, 212

24th Marine Amphibious Unit, 390

31st Fighter Wing, 52, 134, 140, 214,

306, 321–22, 360–61, 365–66, 369,

488–89

31st Group, 212, 222

31st Logistics Group, 140

31st Operations Group, 136, 140

32d Air Operations Group (AOG), 56, 97,

181, 183

33d Reconnaissance Squadron, 224

43d Electronic Combat Squadron, 233

48th Fighter Wing, 216

49th Fighter Wing, 151

86th Airlift Wing, 142

104th Fighter Group, 149, 214

131st Fighter Squadron, 214

429th Electronic Combat Squadron, 232

492d Fighter Squadron, 320

494th Fighter Squadron, 147, 216

510th Fighter Squadron, 136, 143,

147–48, 214, 321, 360–61, 366–67

533d Fighter Air Squadron, 212

555th Fighter Squadron, 143, 147, 214,

321

7490th Composite Wing (Provisional),

160, 202, 212, 214, 237, 305, 307,

348, 489

7490th Operations Group (Provisional),

140

7490th Wing (Provisional), 52, 54, 134,

365, 488

Abdic, Fikret, 22

Adriatic Sea, 18–19, 24, 94, 125, 136,

146, 157, 162, 200–202, 207,

209–10, 219–20, 228–31, 234, 246,

259, 264, 303, 308, 310, 322, 325,

336, 347, 349, 397, 403, 420, 484

Agnelli, Susanna, 244–45

airborne early warning (AEW), 49, 111,

137, 157, 219, 234, 335, 348

Air Campaign Planning Tool, 56

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC),

432, 440–41, 446, 465

air control unit (ACU), 310–11, 313, 316

346

aircraft

A-6, 240, 260, 317

A-10, 22, 134, 137, 149, 199, 214,

248, 261, 265–68, 318–19

AC-130, 42, 124, 157, 202, 216,

267–69, 317, 402

airborne battlefield command and

control center (ABCCC), 46, 80,

111, 132, 145, 155, 161–63, 202,

219, 234–36, 249, 308–9, 319,

331, 335, 348

Aries II, 229

AV-8, 240

B-2, 274

B-52, 240, 242, 269, 274

Blackhawk helicopter, 398

Boeing 707, 222

Bosnian Serb, 134

British, 201–2, 260, 310, 320

C-5, 237

C-17, 237

C-21, 132, 202, 237–38

C-130, 134, 158, 235, 237–38

C-135FR, 222

C-141, 237

C-160, 228, 231

carrier, 202

CASA C-212, 219, 237–39

CH-47, 134

DC-8, 231

Dutch, 218, 246, 258, 310

E-2C, 234, 310, 348

E-3 airborne warning and control

system (AWACS), 80, 133–34, 137

162, 233–34, 308, 348, 461

E-8 joint surveillance, target attack

radar system (JSTARS), 241

EA-6, 132, 134, 202, 211, 219, 233,

267, 269, 311–12, 314–16

EC-130, 132, 201–2, 204, 210, 233,

235, 308, 314–16, 348

527
ECR

Tornado (ECRT), 21213, 219

EF-18, 134, 201, 218, 260, 267, 315,

346

EF-111, 134, 137, 201–2, 204, 210,

213, 231–33, 312, 314–16

electronic combat and

reconnaissance (ECR), 212, 224,

246

EP-3, 228–30

Etendard IVP, 21

F-1CR, 223–24

F-4, 131–32, 201–2, 211, 240, 322

F-14, 209–10, 217, 224–25, 269, 271,

317

F-15, 134, 137, 147, 152–54, 199,

203, 207, 214, 216, 240–41, 248,

259–60, 263, 271, 274, 320–24,

398

F-16, 21, 24, 97, 102, 111, 131–32,

134, 136–37, 147–48, 199, 201–3,

207–10, 214, 218–19, 224, 226,

237, 245–46, 248, 259, 265, 267,

271, 273, 281, 299, 301, 303,

310, 317–23, 325, 346, 402, 405,

443, 477

F-16 HARM Targeting System (HTS),

201, 203, 211–12, 267, 271, 312,

314–15

F-18, 152, 207, 210, 212, 217–18,

311–12, 314–15, 320

F-22, 274

F-111, 240, 259–60, 316, 323

F-117, 151–53, 167, 204, 240,

243–45, 269, 274, 314

FA-2, 21, 209, 219, 224, 299, 302

F/A-18, 134, 147, 153, 155, 211–12,

217, 226, 248, 260, 262, 267,

269, 271, 303, 315, 317, 320,

324, 403

FMK-3, 209, 310

French, 201–2, 217, 310

G-222, 237–38

Galeb, 21, 207, 299, 405

German, 212, 219, 258

GR-7, 132, 155, 202, 218–19, 260,

318, 320, 346

GR.Mk1, 218, 224

GR.Mk7, 224

HC-130, 137, 149, 236–37, 349

IB707, 218, 222

interceptor air defense and air strike

(IDS) Tornado, 246

Italian, 218, 222, 259

Jaguar, 22, 132, 2012, 217, 224, 26

joint strike fighter, 274

KC-10, 132, 202–3, 220–21

KC-130H, 222

KC-135, 202, 218, 220–22

L-1011K, 222

Marine Corps, 212, 217, 267

MC-130, 132, 202, 240

MH-53, 137, 149, 236–37, 349

MiG, 270

Mirage 2000, 118, 132, 137,

200–202, 208, 217–18, 224, 236,

260–61, 302, 310, 318, 349

Mirage F-1, 132, 201–2

Navy, 267, 269

Netherlands, 201–2, 208, 218

OA-10, 267, 317–18

Puma helicopter, 236

RC-135W, 229

remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), 226

RF-4C, 240–41

RG-8, 225–27

Rivet Joint, 223, 228–29, 312

R.Mk1, 228, 230–31

rotary-wing, 207, 301, 309–10

S-3B, 213, 228

Sepecat Jaguar, 200, 217, 224

Serb, 134

Spanish, 201, 212, 218–19, 260, 267

stealth, 244, 439

Tornado, 137, 201, 213, 222

Turkish, 201–3, 209, 219, 245, 259,

310

U-2, 137, 157, 223, 225, 228

unmanned aerial vehicle, 137, 147,

153, 192, 199–200, 223, 226–28,

335–36

US, 202, 208, 240, 260, 267, 269,

299, 301, 304

vertical/short takeoff and landing

(V/STOL), 209, 218–19

aircraft carriers, 19, 349

air defense, 204, 231, 233, 242, 280,

282, 285, 292, 299–301, 311, 338,

446, 478, 491

air-defense operations center, 299

Air Force doctrine, 69, 116, 122

Air Forces Southern Europe

(AIRSOUTH), 54–55, 58, 77, 91,

94–95, 97, 100, 103, 105–6, 110,

115, 117–18, 122–23, 149, 180–84,

190, 223, 238, 270, 279–81, 283,

285–87, 290, 292–94, 351, 356–57,

528
373, 433, 464

65, 46871, 473, 475,

478, 481, 483, 485, 487–88, 503,

509–11

Air Force Studies and Analysis Division,

417

air interdiction (AI), 78, 206, 213, 248,

309, 316–18, 320, 324, 335, 338

air-land coordination, 317

Air/Land Operations Coordination

Document, 106, 118

airlift, 233, 237, 239, 246, 511

air operations cell, 357

air operations center (AOC), 95, 98, 100,

110, 134, 369, 419

air operations control center (AOCC),

46–48, 133, 154, 162, 167, 401

air order of battle, 240

airspace control order, 80

Air Staff, 180

air superiority, 73, 116, 122, 208, 439

air support operations center (ASOC),

79–80

air supremacy, 184, 207, 270, 273, 326,

349

air surveillance, 93

air tasking message (ATM), 50–52, 54,

58, 80, 111–13, 118, 135, 137–39,

144, 146–48, 155, 160–61, 182–83,

185, 248, 291, 318, 320, 336, 348,

357, 359, 361, 363, 411, 414, 416,

395, 483

air tasking order (ATO), 67–68, 74–75,

79, 81, 118, 186–87, 442

air-to-air refueling (AAR), 137, 157, 204,

219–20, 222, 235, 246, 308, 325,

331, 335, 347

Air University, 455

Akashi, Yasushi, 22, 39, 41, 45, 48, 56,

92, 138, 402–3, 407, 472, 474, 477,

481

Albania, 4

allied air forces

British, 248

Dutch, 24, 264, 346

French, 217, 222–24, 236, 248, 264,

346, 348

German, 199, 224, 358

Italian, 91, 132, 199, 218, 222, 238,

246, 264

Netherlands, 265, 358

Spanish, 199, 248

Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction

Corps, 77

Allied Forces Central Europe, 77

Allied Forces Northwest Europe, 77

Allied Forces Southern Europe

(AFSOUTH), 19, 24–26, 59, 77–78,

94, 97, 105, 181, 194, 269, 280, 356,

397, 464–65, 467, 470–71, 477–78,

480–81, 503, 511

antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 124, 134–35,

210, 231, 265, 273, 299, 302, 309,

311, 317, 326, 341, 346, 402, 413,

434, 474

area of operations, 50, 417

area of responsibility (AOR), 60, 106,

146, 162, 199, 203, 231, 233, 237,

307, 310, 333, 386

arms embargo, 18, 26, 460–61

Ashy, Joseph, 94–95, 373, 397, 464,

466, 469–71, 475

atrocities, 14, 16, 90

Auftragstaktik (mission tactics), 354

Austria, 2, 4, 16

autonomous attack system, 275

Aviano Air Base, Italy, 52, 133–34, 136,

138, 140–43, 145–46, 151, 153,

160–62, 184–85, 200–202, 204,

210–12, 214, 216–17, 222, 235–37,

239, 241, 244, 259–60, 263, 269,

303, 321–22, 348–49, 359–60,

365–70, 411, 416, 420, 470, 473,

484, 488–90

Avord, France, 231

Baker, James, 10

Baker, John R., 55–56

Baker Study, 97

Balkans, 9, 77, 87, 89, 95, 113, 116,

121, 126, 159, 190, 196, 226, 285,

294, 331, 350, 355, 382, 386–87,

394, 405, 432, 458, 469, 472–73,

481, 485, 495, 497, 509

Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS),

455–56, 463, 465–66, 472, 475–76,

485, 487, 489–91, 494, 496–97, 500,

505, 507–8, 511, 513–15

Balkans area of responsibility (AOR),

236, 307, 345, 348–49

Banja Luka, Yugoslavia, 24, 102,

150–52, 157, 194, 204, 223, 244,

262–64, 282, 292, 311, 405, 446,

449, 478, 491

Bartholomew, Reginald, 244–45

Basher 52, 102

529
Batchelor, Andrew, 165, 183, 359

61,

363

battle/bomb damage assessment (BDA),

48, 75, 111, 137, 145, 160, 165,

177–86, 193, 238, 290–91, 341–42,

356, 359–61, 373, 492–93

battlefield air interdiction (BAI), 79, 103,

106, 144, 146, 154–56, 206, 213–14,

216, 309–10, 316–20, 325, 331, 335,

338

Battle of Kosovo Polje, 7

Beirut bombing, 385, 390–92, 394, 416

Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 2, 4–5, 8–12, 14,

159, 191, 193, 299, 495, 503

Bihac Pocket, 496

Bihac, Yugoslavia, 15, 22, 25–27, 41,

43–45, 103–4, 282, 398, 402, 404,

406, 408

Black Hole, 95

Blue Sword, 317, 401

Boban, Mate, 16

bombing pause, 140, 146, 157–59

bombs

AGM-62, 261, 269

AGM-123A, 269

AS30L, 338

BLU-109, 262–63

CBU-87, 160, 218–19, 265–66, 318,

338

CBU-89, 270

cluster, 134, 214, 264, 270

conventional, 214, 218

GBU-10, 136, 199, 216, 259–60, 273,

303, 322–23, 338

GBU-10I, 259–60, 321

GBU-12, 147, 199–200, 216, 260,

318, 322, 338

GBU-15, 152–54, 199, 216, 262–63,

274, 312, 321, 324–25, 338–39

GBU-16, 155, 260, 338

GBU-24, 216, 260, 303, 321, 338

GBU-27, 269, 274

general-purpose (GP), 259–60,

264–65, 270, 338–39, 347

guided, 149, 216, 218–19, 264, 304,

417, 420

laser-guided (LGB), 166, 199–200,

214, 217, 259–61, 263, 269, 311,

320–23, 325, 336, 338, 347

low-level laser-guided (LLLGB), 260

MK-82, 264, 338

MK-83, 166, 265, 338

MK-84, 262–63, 265, 338

nonprecision, 166, 248, 257, 259,

264, 270–71, 273, 338, 349

precision, 166, 184, 269, 271, 274

special-purpose, 259

unguided, 149, 242, 257, 265, 270,

305, 340, 419, 491

Boorda, Jeremy M., 93–94, 464, 469

Bosnia, 1, 5, 9, 13–20, 22–28, 38, 41,

45–46, 55–56, 59, 65, 72, 90–92,

94–97, 104, 114, 135–37, 139,

148–51, 154, 158, 160, 162, 166–68,

180, 190–96, 226–27, 229, 239, 241,

245–47, 264, 269, 282, 285, 302,

311, 320–21, 326, 340, 382, 398,

404, 413, 415, 418, 421, 433,

457–66, 469–71, 473–74, 476–78,

480, 483, 491, 493, 497, 502, 507,

512–15

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 3–4, 9, 12–14, 39,

41–46, 48, 52, 54–55, 58, 90, 93, 95,

99, 101–4, 110, 119, 123, 136, 144,

149, 158, 180, 191–92, 201, 203,

207, 223, 228, 231, 259, 283–84,

299, 303, 306, 309–10, 312–13,

315–16, 319, 331, 335, 345–46, 349,

386, 394, 396–401, 405, 408, 412,

421, 433, 438, 445, 468, 478

Bosnian air force, 134

Bosnian army (BiH), 15, 20, 27–29, 87,

107, 119, 157, 160, 190, 281,

285–86, 434, 460, 496

Bosnian Croat forces (HVO), 16, 20, 27,

119

Bosnian Croats, 15, 20, 23, 28, 58, 195,

433, 435, 496–97

Bosnian Federation, 496, 498, 500,

513–14

Bosnian Muslims, 13–14, 17, 123, 139,

159, 415

Bosnian Serb army (BSA), 15–16, 20–29

41, 43–44, 47, 58, 60, 72, 87, 101,

107, 109, 116–17, 119, 134–35,

138–39, 145–48, 151, 157–58, 179,

190, 193–95, 199–200, 231, 244,

262, 266, 270, 273, 279, 281,

285–89, 292–93, 299–302, 309, 311,

315, 320, 340–41, 345–46, 403, 407,

410–11, 415, 434, 438–40, 445–46,

449, 479, 511

Bosnian Serb Assembly, 22

Bosnian Serb Republic, 138, 280

Bosnian Serbs, 5, 12–18, 20–22, 24,

28–29, 37, 44–45, 57–59, 79, 87, 90,

530
93, 100

103, 105, 1078, 11011,

113–17, 123–24, 126, 134–35, 138,

145, 149, 157, 161, 179–80, 183,

189–91, 193–96, 201, 236, 243,

269–70, 281, 285–86, 289, 291–92,

298–99, 301, 335, 340, 345, 356,

370, 403–4, 406, 409, 414, 418, 433,

435, 438–39, 446, 449–50, 455,

459–61, 466, 468, 472–74, 476–81,

483, 491–97, 500, 502, 506–8,

512–15

Bouton D’or, 136, 309, 327

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 39, 41, 56, 92,

472, 474, 476

Brindisi, Italy, 149, 216, 236, 349

British army, 92

Broz, Josip. See Tito

Brussels, Belgium, 25, 495

Bulatovic, Momir, 12

Bulgaria, 3

Bush, Dan, 414

Cable News Network (CNN), 159, 292,

361, 368, 410, 412

Calise, Ken, 136, 161, 165

campaign objectives, 350, 506

Carrington, Peter, 12, 15

Carter, Jimmy, 23

casualties, 248, 257, 270, 287–88, 290,

304, 319, 356, 502

cease-fire, 270, 336, 340, 343, 463

center of gravity (COG), 57, 69–70,

72–73, 101, 107, 109, 114, 117,

122–23, 286, 297, 415, 434, 436,

438–40, 442, 444–45, 449–50

Central Intelligence Agency, 182

centralized control, 80, 371

Cervia, Italy, 208, 218, 224

chaff, 213–14, 236, 269

Chambers, James E., 93–94, 469

Chariot (code name), 132, 136, 154,

161–62, 381, 402, 405, 412–13

Checkmate, 55, 98, 102, 281

Chetniks, 3

China, 138

Chirac, Jacques, 25–26

Christopher, Warren, 477, 479, 503–4

Churkin, Vitaly, 21

circular error of probability, 305, 325,

339

Claes, Willy, 41, 56–57, 59, 92, 138–39,

146–47, 397, 403, 480–81, 499

Clark, Wes, 501

Clausewitz, Carl von, 162, 382, 390,

392, 434

Clinton, Bill, 21, 26

close air support (CAS), 19, 21, 24, 41,

56, 59, 75, 79, 97, 100–103, 105–6,

114, 124, 137–38, 144–46, 154–58,

163, 167, 206, 209, 213–14, 216–18,

233, 248–49, 266, 307, 309–10,

316–19, 325, 331, 335, 338, 341,

399, 401–5, 412, 461, 466, 471–72,

474–76, 478, 481

close control, 472, 485–87

coercive-denial model, 448–49

cold war, 4–6, 76–78, 119, 121, 512

collateral damage, 58, 87, 99–100, 106,

109, 111, 115, 125, 136, 144,

150–51, 159–61, 166, 168, 242, 248,

257, 259, 265–66, 270–73, 275,

283–84, 286–87, 290–91, 293, 303–5,

319, 324, 327, 331, 343, 350, 356,

359–60, 370, 372, 399, 402, 405–6,

409–13, 415–16, 419–21, 433–34,

475, 484, 491, 501–2, 506–8, 510

combat air patrol (CAP), 111, 146,

157–58, 206–10, 217–19, 246–47,

307, 310–11, 345–46, 485

combat search and rescue (CSAR), 24,

137, 148–49, 158, 216, 219, 236–37,

307, 331, 335–36, 349, 413–14

combined air operations center (CAOC),

19, 46–52, 54–58, 77, 79–80, 91,

94–95, 97–98, 100–103, 105–6,

109–13, 115, 118–19, 122–25, 132,

134–39, 144–49, 152, 154–63,

165–67, 179–86, 192, 227–29, 235,

238, 243, 246, 266, 290, 298, 306,

309–10, 312, 315–16, 323, 325, 333,

336, 351, 355–65, 367, 370–72, 381,

395, 401, 414–16, 421, 431, 433–34,

449–50, 468–70, 472, 475, 482–83,

487–88, 490, 492, 502, 510–11

combined force air component

commander (CFACC), 87, 91, 94, 98,

109, 113, 124, 178, 200, 222,

246–47, 273, 298, 302, 307, 333,

345, 349

Cominform, 4

command and control (C2), 37, 46–48,

52, 59, 68–69, 80, 94, 97, 99, 101,

110–11, 117–19, 132–34, 137, 155,

162–63, 167, 235, 275, 280–81,

284–86, 290, 292, 309, 319–20, 324,

531
348, 352, 371, 373, 399

400, 409,

417, 440, 449, 468, 479, 512

command, control, and communications

(C3), 58, 108, 115, 147, 210, 231,

233–34, 280–81, 311, 338, 341

command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence (C 4I),

433, 439, 446

command, control, communications,

and intelligence (C3I), 259, 355, 487

commander, Allied Air Forces Southern

Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), 48, 51, 55,

91, 94–95, 102, 107, 110–12,

114–15, 119–20, 125–26, 131, 133,

144, 150–52, 158–60, 167, 184, 201,

281, 298, 397–98, 401, 407

commander, Allied Joint Force

(COMAJF), 78

commander in chief, Allied Forces

Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), 37,

41, 43–44, 47–48, 79, 91, 93–94,

106, 114–17, 125, 131–32, 201–4,

245, 281, 395, 401, 404, 407, 464,

470, 472, 484

commander in chief, US Air Forces

Europe (CINCUSAFE), 93, 98

commander in chief, US European

Command (USCINCEUR), 244

commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force

(COM5ATAF), 395, 401

Communist Party, 4

concept of operations (CONOPS), 52, 55,

68, 74, 78, 96, 99, 102–3, 307–9,

398–99, 443, 470, 478

confidence building, 463

Contact Group, 27, 92, 120, 125,

151–52, 190, 194–95, 245, 477,

493–95, 500, 503–4, 514

Contingency Theater Air Planning

System (CTAPS), 56, 75, 482

Corona, 349

crisis-action planning/team, 112, 359,

402, 437, 444, 448, 465

Croatia, 3, 8–14, 17–18, 20, 22–23, 28,

45, 92, 100, 107, 134, 137, 180,

192–95, 227, 404, 412, 415, 457,

459–60, 473, 513

Croatian air force (HRZ), 27

Croatian army (HV), 27, 157, 434, 496

Croatia Restricted Operating Zone

(CROROZ), 315

Croats, 3, 69, 1011, 14, 16, 18,

134–35, 139, 157, 159–60, 193,

459–60, 493, 496–97

Czechoslovakia, 2

Dal Molin Air Base, Italy, 48, 91, 132,

464

Dayton Peace Accords, 60, 126, 167,

350, 498, 505, 514

decentralized execution, 371

Defense Intelligence Agency, 180

Defense Logistics Agency, 142

Defense Planning Committee (DPC), 42,

4 7

defense suppression, 485, 489

defensive counterair (DCA), 206, 208,

310

denial strategy, 447, 465

Department of Defense (DOD), 70, 222,

391, 393

Department of State, 183, 187, 418–19,

500

Deptula, Dave, 98, 358

desired mean points of impact (DMPI),

109, 111–12, 114, 125, 136, 144–45,

147–48, 153–57, 159–60, 182–85,

279, 287, 290–91, 320, 323, 327,

336, 341–42, 347, 350, 356, 359,

361–62, 364, 371, 410–12, 416, 420,

433, 443, 485, 502–3

Dezney, Turkey, 226–27

Dinaric Alps, 303

Dini, Lamberto, 244–45

diplomacy, 59–60, 139, 146, 155, 158,

167, 194–96, 419, 431–32, 435, 443,

446, 455–57, 476, 494–95, 497,

500–501, 503, 505, 510, 513–14

Doboj, Yugoslavia, 156

doctrine, 87–89, 111, 116, 119–23, 126,

177–80, 186–87, 414, 465–66, 492,

511

Donji Vakuf, Yugoslavia, 152, 157

Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, 142

dual correlation, 412–13

dual-key system, 25, 37, 56–57, 59–60,

97, 110, 114, 117, 125, 131, 135,

381, 399, 401–3, 407, 410, 418,

472–75, 479, 481, 483, 499

Dubrovnik, Croatia, 11

Dunn, Michael, 359, 363–64

early warning (EW), 99, 231, 247, 281

early warning radar, 311, 400

532
Eastern Europe, 2, 4, 6

7, 76

Eastern Slavonia, 9

Ebro 33, 118, 137, 146, 148–49, 157,

164

economic sanctions, 18, 22, 28, 194–95,

461

effects-based model, 432, 440, 442–46,

449

electronic combat (EC), 10–15, 201,

210–11, 224, 231–32, 240

electronic countermeasures (ECM), 213,

218–19, 229, 269, 274

electronic defenses, 232

electronic intelligence (ELINT), 213, 219,

224–25, 228–29, 230–31, 233, 247,

331, 335

electronic reconnaissance, 229

electronic support measures (ESM), 213,

219, 231–33, 348

electronic warfare (EW), 101, 109, 132,

152–54, 219, 228, 231, 233, 284–85,

289, 348, 511

embargo, 18, 397

engagement zone (EZ), 319

ethnic cleansing, 11, 457

ethnic conflict, 6–7, 445, 458, 462

European Command (EUCOM), 199,

227, 244, 264

European Community (EC), 10–13

European Union, 245

exclusion zone (EZ), 20–21, 24, 292–93,

319–20, 386, 403–4, 408, 478, 480,

504

Ferdinand, Franz, 2

Fighter Weapons School, 322, 326

fire-support coordination line, 317, 320

five-ring theory, 432, 437–39, 444, 446

Fogleman, Ronald R., 126, 272

force commander, United Nations Peace

Forces (FC UNPF), 202, 317

Fornasiero, Andrea, 48, 91, 94, 132,

165–66, 464

forward air controller (airborne) (FAC-A),

317–20

forward air controller (FAC), 156, 317,

319–20, 401–3

forward-looking infrared radar, 319

France, 2, 18–19, 39, 44, 47, 49,

131–33, 164, 191, 208, 220, 228,

233, 245, 258, 265, 348, 353, 397,

462, 485, 494

fratricide, 106, 111, 113, 125, 257, 270,

319, 402, 413

French army, 92

French navy, 21

Geneva Agreement, 504

Geneva, Switzerland, 155, 493, 495, 498

Genoa, Italy, 222

Gentry, Todd, 360, 368, 372

Germany, 2–3, 12, 17, 19, 49, 133, 164,

191, 213, 245–46, 346, 485, 494

Ghedi, Italy, 203, 209, 218

Gibbons, John, 363

Gioia del Colle, Italy, 209, 219

Gjader, Albania, 228

Glamoc, Yugoslavia, 153

Global Positioning System (GPS), 236,

261

Glosson, Buster, 273

Goldfein, Dave, 364, 371

Gorazde, Yugoslavia, 15, 21, 25, 43–45,

102–4, 156, 282, 299, 398, 402–3,

406, 408, 474, 477, 479–80

Great Britain, 12, 18, 133, 164, 191,

228, 265, 462, 485, 494

great captains, 351, 354, 370, 372–73,

486–87

Greece, 3, 17, 203, 246, 465, 485

ground operations, 248, 497

Gucci, 50–51

guerrilla war, 4

guidance, apportionment, and targeting

(GAT), 290–91

Gulf War, 156, 240–41, 257, 259–60,

270–71, 273–74, 325–26, 345, 347,

484–85

Hackett, John, 363, 371

Hallisey, Mark, 360–61

Han Pijesak, Yugoslavia, 136

Hawley, Richard E., 98

heavy weapons, 20–21, 43–44, 99, 103,

106–8, 116–17, 124, 133, 135,

138–39, 144–46, 149, 158, 179,

190–91, 193, 288–90, 292, 304, 320,

340, 350, 400, 404, 406–7, 409, 415,

433–35, 439, 443, 445–46, 449, 460,

498

Herceg-Bosna, 16

high-speed antiradiation missile

targeting system (HTS), 111, 199

Hill, Christopher, 191–93, 196, 418,

498, 500, 505

533
HMS Invincible, 209, 219, 224

Holbrooke, Richard, 27–28, 60, 92, 114,

122, 139, 151, 161, 190–96, 245,

418, 473, 475, 493–95, 498–506,

508–9

Holland, 485

Holley, I. B., Jr., 88

Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico,

151

Hoog, Steve, 143

Hornburg, Hal, 48, 52, 55, 57–58, 91,

119, 132, 135–36, 161, 165–66, 181,

192, 194, 243, 290, 310, 355,

358–59, 361–64, 381, 389, 411, 414,

421, 434, 482

hostages, 106, 110, 131, 474, 477, 479,

496

humanitarian assistance, 18–19, 39, 45,

90, 93, 191, 398–400, 413, 461, 469,

494

Hungary, 2–3, 162, 397

Hunter, Robert, 464, 473, 475–76, 480,

495, 498–502, 507, 509

Hurd, Douglas, 20

Iceland, 47

infrastructure, 109, 436–37, 446

integrated air defense system (IADS), 24,

58, 101, 108–9, 111, 114, 131, 134,

144–45, 150–52, 154, 164, 201–2,

243, 264, 269, 274–75, 280, 282,

285, 289, 292, 299, 309, 311, 315,

327, 341, 404, 407–9, 478

intelligence, 49, 52, 55, 66, 70, 73,

75–76, 95, 109, 111, 124, 133,

144–45, 153, 163, 166, 177–79,

181–86, 223, 228, 275, 290, 306,

312, 314, 326, 341, 348, 360, 369,

411, 470, 482, 490

intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR), 219, 222–23,

225, 234, 347–48

interceptor air defense and air strike

(IDS), 213

interdiction, 233, 249, 512

international law, 382, 384–85, 395,

415, 419–20, 471

International Monetary Fund, 5

international press media, 420

interservice rivalry, 335

Iran, 393

Iraq, 201, 273, 325, 358, 391, 398, 435

Istrana, Italy, 217, 224

Istres, France, 220, 222

Italian Foreign Ministry, 151

Italian Ministry of Defense (MOD),

244–45

Italy, 2–4, 19, 133, 149, 151–52, 164,

167, 201, 220, 241, 245–46, 265,

464–65, 470, 482, 485, 489

Itazuke Air Base, Japan, 369

Izetbegovic, Alija, 14–15, 17, 27, 460

Jahorina, Yugoslavia, 136

Jajce, Yugoslavia, 157

Jamerson, James, 455

Jansen, Bernd, 358

Janvier, Bernard, 26, 44, 48, 56–58, 92,

110, 115, 126, 131–33, 138–39,

146–47, 158, 190–92, 202, 228, 281,

317, 403, 407–8, 410, 481, 483–84

Japan, 369

JNA (Yugoslavia’s national army), 4–5,

8–12, 14–15, 18, 457, 459–60

Johnson, Lyndon, 417

joint air operations center (JAOC), 74, 8

joint air operations plan (JAOP), 67–69,

73–75

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 55–56, 180,

503

joint direct-attack munition, 275

joint doctrine, 65–66, 68–69, 71, 75, 81,

116–17, 122, 126

joint force air component commander

(JFACC), 72–74, 93, 178

joint force air component commander

(JFACC) Planning Tool, 56, 115

joint force commander (JFC), 68–70,

72–75, 79, 81, 178–79

joint forces, 338, 346

joint guidance, apportionment, and

targeting (JGAT), 74

joint munitions-effectiveness manual

(JMEM), 304–5

joint operations, 336

joint planning, 79

Joint Situational Awareness System, 56

Joint Special Operations Task Force

(JSOTF), 118, 124, 216, 236, 349

joint standoff weapon, 275

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 67

Joint Target Board (JTB), 57, 107, 115,

118, 279–82, 285, 409, 433, 461

Joint Task Force Provide Promise, 93

534
Joulwan, George, 43, 57, 91

92, 132,

139, 244, 282, 357, 481, 500, 503–4,

509

Jovic, Borisav, 9

July Crisis of 1914, 1

Karadzic, Radovan, 14, 16, 21, 26–27,

29, 45, 135, 138, 193, 439, 445,

459–60, 462, 474, 484, 493–94,

498–99

Kelley, Jay W., 455

Kiger, Keith, 166, 363, 478

kill boxes, 156

Kiseljak, Yugoslavia, 46, 133, 154, 162,

167

Knin, Yugoslavia, 9, 27, 496

Koopmans, Arjen, 358

Korean War, 369, 372

Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 4, 7–8, 457

Krajina, 9, 11, 22–23, 27, 100, 107, 134,

194, 404, 457, 459–60, 473, 496–97

Krajina Serbs, 11, 27, 180, 194, 404, 473

Krajisnik, Momcilo, 135

Kucan, Milan, 10

law of armed conflict, 382, 384, 417,

419, 477, 506

League of Nations, 2

liaison officer (LNO), 47–48, 132–33,

165, 167, 358–59, 362

Libya, 384

limited war, 386

lines of communications (LOC), 58, 103,

109, 134, 281, 286–87, 289–90, 309,

320, 338, 341, 449

Linked Operations Intelligence Centers

Europe (LOCE), 181–82, 318, 470

Little Entente, 2

Livno valley, 27

logistics, 73, 78, 239, 241, 280, 290,

307, 442

London, 44, 477–80, 499, 513

low intensity conflict, 512

Macedonia, 13, 45, 457

MacQueen, Scott, 361, 366–68, 370

major regional contingencies, 67, 70

Markovic, Ante, 6

master air attack plan, 68, 75, 291

master attack plan (MAP), 105, 111–13,

148, 183, 440, 442–43

master target list, 279–81, 285, 294

Mauldin, Patricia, 362, 365

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 432

media, 185, 493

Meilinger, Phillip, 122

Military Committee, 47, 57, 76, 105,

283, 405

military objectives, 47, 60, 65, 71, 87,

99–100, 113, 115, 156, 189–90, 283,

341, 370, 381, 390, 419, 432–33,

436–38, 440–41, 444–45, 448, 450

military peace operations, 385

Military Professional Resources,

Incorporated, 23

military technical revolution, 442

Milosevic, Slobodan, 8–12, 14, 16, 22,

27–28, 138, 161, 191–95, 457, 459,

462, 493–94, 497–98, 503, 513

Minster, Dave, 180

missiles

AGM-65F, 217, 261, 269

AGM-84, 261–62, 274

AGM-88, 199, 213, 266–67, 311, 346

AGM-130, 274

AIM-7, 210, 216

AIM-9, 210–11, 213–14, 216

AIM-120, 209, 211, 214, 217

air-launched cruise, 242, 269, 274

air-to-air (AAM), 217–19, 269–70

air-to-ground, 217

air-to-surface (ASM), 218–19, 261

ALARM antiradiation, 218

antiradiation, 266

AS-30L, 261

BMG-109, 263–64

cruise, 242, 263, 274–75

Harpoon, 261

Have Nap air-to-surface, 269

high-speed antiradiation (HARM), 22,

131, 145, 152, 162, 164, 201,

207, 210–12, 247, 257, 301, 312,

314–16, 338, 349, 412–13, 443

joint air-to-surface standoff, 275

laser-guided, 261

Magic infrared, 208

man-portable air defense (MANPAD),

135, 137, 218, 299–302, 317, 326

349

Matra Super 530D, 208

Maverick air-to-surface (ASM), 214

Phoenix air-to-air (AAM), 209

SA-2, 135, 300

SA-2f, 300

SA-6, 24, 135–36, 145, 201,

300–301, 304

535
SA

7b, 300301

SA-9, 135, 300–301

SA-13, 300–301

SA-14, 300–301

Scud, 259

Sidewinder, 209

standoff land attack (SLAM), 152–54,

274, 312, 324, 338–39

surface-to-air (SAM), 22, 99, 101,

105, 109, 119, 124, 134, 137,

150, 152, 160, 163, 203, 210,

223, 231, 236, 243–44, 265, 269,

273–74, 284, 289, 299–301, 306,

310–11, 314, 316, 321, 326, 346,

360, 400, 409, 412–13, 415, 474

Tomahawk land attack (TLAM),

150–53, 199, 242, 274–75, 312,

338–39, 484, 491–92

mission objectives, 245, 257, 345

Mladic, Ratko, 11, 15, 26, 119, 126,

138–39, 146–47, 158, 190–93, 195,

439, 445, 480, 484, 493–94, 498

Moltke, Helmuth von, 351, 354, 370, 372

Mons, Belgium, 468

Montenegro, Yugoslavia, 1, 4, 8, 18,

192, 457

Moody, David, 365

Morillon, Philippe, 15

Moscow, 135, 159

Mrkale attack, 37, 41, 131, 135, 483,

495

Mrkonjic, Yugoslavia, 153–54

munitions effectiveness assessment

(MEA), 177–78

Muslims, 3–4, 14–16, 22, 24, 58, 135,

157, 193, 195, 433, 435, 459–60,

493, 496

Mutual Assistance Pact, 4

Naples, Italy, 47–48, 54–55, 77, 95, 100,

110, 165, 181, 238, 355, 464,

469–70, 488, 510

Napoléon, 351–55, 357–58, 370, 372,

486–87

Napoleonic Wars, 353

National Command Authorities, 179,

274, 384, 386–88, 417

national objectives, 438, 445

National Security Agency, 182

national security strategy, 81, 438, 445

NATO airborne early warning (NAEW),

19, 162–63, 308, 310–11, 313, 316,

331, 346, 397, 405

NATO doctrine, 66, 7781

NATO-UN Air/Land Coordination

Document, 317

negotiations, 18, 243, 257, 418, 484,

494–95, 497–98, 501, 503–5, 514

Netherlands, 19, 39, 49, 132–33, 164,

208, 245–46, 397

night operations, 304

no-fly ban, 473, 465, 469–70, 477

no-fly zone (NFZ), 24, 43, 94–95, 100,

102, 180, 207–8, 307, 310–11, 346,

386, 395–98, 405, 469

North Atlantic Council (NAC), 19–21,

25–26, 39, 41–44, 46–47, 50, 56–57,

59, 76, 78, 87, 92, 94, 97, 99, 101,

103, 125, 280–81, 289, 395, 397,

399–400, 403–4, 406–8, 461, 464,

467, 470–71, 473, 475–76, 480–81,

492, 495, 499–504, 507–9

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 1, 4, 16–22, 24–29, 37, 39,

41–52, 54–60, 65, 75–80, 87–107,

110, 113–22, 125–26, 131–36,

138–39, 144–48, 150–51, 154–59,

162–68, 179–82, 185–87, 189–96,

199–204, 206, 209–10, 218, 220,

222–23, 227, 231, 233–35, 239–48,

257, 259–60, 264, 267, 270, 279–83,

285, 287–89, 292, 294, 298–304,

310–12, 317–18, 325, 331, 335, 340,

345, 348–49, 354–55, 358–59, 365,

367, 372, 381–82, 387, 394–410,

412–18, 431, 433–34, 439, 445, 455,

461–84, 487, 489, 491–93, 495,

499–502, 504–9, 511–12, 514–15

North Vietnam, 506

nuclear weapons, 384

Oaks, Robert C., 93–94, 469

objective wing, 140, 143

observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop,

123

O’Connell, D. P., 383

offensive air operations, 79–80, 206–7,

210, 213, 218, 246, 257–58, 307,

310, 313–14, 316, 461, 466, 471–72,

475–76, 478

offensive counterair (OCA), 206, 247,

310, 333

O’Grady, Scott, 180, 369

operational art, 68–69, 72, 81, 432, 440,

442, 444

operational centers, 65–66

536
operational control, 132

operational options, 99

operations

Deadeye, 101–3, 105, 108, 133,

135–36, 152–54, 156–57, 279–81,

285, 289–90, 338, 342, 346, 434,

478, 481

Deadeye Northwest, 101, 103,

150–52, 154, 204, 311, 341, 408

Deadeye Southeast, 101, 103, 111,

136, 311, 341, 408

Deny Flight, 17, 19, 21–22, 24–26,

39, 43, 48–49, 52, 54–55, 65,

78–79, 89–95, 102, 120, 132,

134–35, 158, 180, 184–86, 199,

201–2, 207, 226–28, 237, 270,

280–81, 289, 299, 302, 307–8,

317–18, 333, 355, 357–58, 366,

381, 387, 394–95, 401, 404–5,

413, 417, 431, 434, 461, 464–72,

475, 478, 488, 512, 515

Desert Storm, 95, 98, 143, 182, 189,

226, 185, 257, 260, 264, 271,

275, 323, 325, 345, 366–68, 371,

416, 484–85, 511

Flash, 23

Provide Promise, 413, 469

Rolling Thunder, 139

Sharp Guard, 397, 461

Sky Monitor, 19, 93, 394, 396

Sky Watch, 461, 466

Storm, 27, 496

Vulcan, 105, 110–11, 136

operations order (OPORD), 395

operations other than war (OOTW),

65–66, 69–74, 78, 81, 119, 121–23,

125–26, 373, 394, 465, 512

operations plan (OPLAN), 44, 67, 79,

307, 395, 471

Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101 (“Deny

Flight”), 55, 94–96, 98, 102, 105–6,

316, 307, 395, 397, 399, 402, 404–5,

414–15, 470–71, 475, 477, 503

order of battle, 240

Ornell, Pete, 360–61

out-of-area operations, 65, 76, 89, 120

Owen, David, 16

Owens, William, 503

Pale, Yugoslavia, 14, 24, 102, 110, 131,

136, 139, 159, 180, 191, 282, 302,

411, 439, 446, 449, 477–78

Palermo, Italy, 222

Pape, Robert A., Jr., 432, 44649, 465

parallel attack, 439, 446

Paris, 483

peace enforcement, 13, 18, 143, 386–87

418, 463, 466, 471–72, 474, 508

peacekeeping, 13, 17–21, 24, 26, 39, 42,

60, 76, 90, 110, 112, 120–21, 133,

154–55, 167, 385–87, 390, 396, 403,

418, 461–62, 471–74, 477, 483–84,

494–96, 504, 513

peacemaking, 143, 358, 463, 466–67

peace operations, 390, 392, 416, 418,

421, 461, 465–66, 470, 490, 508, 512

Pennyfather, David, 482

Pentagon, 482

Perry, William J., 25, 151, 244, 420, 477

Persian Gulf, 391–93

Persian Gulf War, 180, 226, 465

petroleum, oil, and lubricants, 265, 284,

400

Piacenza, Italy, 213, 224

Pisa, Italy, 220, 222, 238

planners/planning, 26, 28–29, 37–39,

48, 50–52, 54–60, 65–75, 77–78,

80–81, 87–94, 96–103, 105–6,

109–13, 115–26, 132, 135, 145–54,

156, 158–61, 163, 165–67, 177, 179,

184–85, 187, 227, 234, 240, 242,

246–47, 249, 270–71, 279–83,

285–91, 294–95, 297–99, 304–5,

307–9, 311, 325–27, 331, 343,

348–49, 351–52, 359–61, 363, 382,

394, 397, 400, 405–6, 408, 410–12,

415–16, 419–20, 431–38, 440–46,

448–50, 455–58, 461–63, 464–71,

475, 477–78, 480–82, 486, 491, 503,

505–6, 511, 514–15

Poland, 3

political constraints, 78, 239, 242–43,

286, 288, 291, 294, 306–7, 311, 327,

331, 345

political objectives, 44, 47, 57, 60, 156,

189, 355, 390, 406, 417–18, 431–32,

436, 438, 445, 455–57, 506

Posavina Corridor, 104

Power Scene Mission Planning System,

306–7

precision-guided munitions (PGM), 161,

164, 166, 168, 203, 248, 257–58,

261, 264, 269–74, 303, 305, 314,

320, 325, 338–39, 347, 349, 411,

419–20, 439, 443, 446, 491, 507

Prnjavor, Yugoslavia, 153

537
proportionality, 282, 385, 387

88, 399,

404–5, 419, 475

radar, 203, 233, 267

radio communication (RADCOM), 411

radio relay (RADREL), 105, 108

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 93, 97,

142, 181

RAND, 506

Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), 25–26, 52,

77, 106, 113–14, 117–18, 133, 137,

146, 167, 209, 224, 227, 246, 309,

317, 482, 495–96

reconnaissance, 113, 124, 132, 137,

145–48, 153, 155, 158, 209, 216–19,

223–27, 233, 240–41, 246–47, 249,

275, 307, 313–14, 326, 331, 335,

341, 347, 443, 511

reconnaissance attack cycle (RAC), 113

regional operations centers, 80

Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), 12,

23, 27

Republika Srpska, 14, 192

Richardson, Douglas J., 132, 161, 165,

355, 363, 487

Rifkind, Malcolm, 479

Roach, J. Ashley, 382–83

rockets, 218, 266–67, 288, 318, 338, 349

Romania, 2

Rome, 151

Rome Summit of 1991, 76

Royal Air Force (RAF), 22, 165, 209,

218–19, 222, 224, 230, 318, 320,

346, 359

Alconbury, 225

Fairford, 225

Lakenheath, 216, 320

Mildenhall, 220, 229

Molesworth, 182, 227

Royal Navy, 209, 219, 224

rules of engagement (ROE), 50, 71,

95–96, 114, 158–59, 184, 200, 207,

280, 287, 302, 307, 310, 314, 319,

321, 324, 326, 331, 381–99, 402,

405–6, 410–21, 434, 470–73, 490–91,

506

Russia, 2, 21, 135, 138, 191, 494

Ryan, Michael, 47, 50, 54–55, 57–58,

91–92, 95, 97–98, 115, 120, 131–33,

135–36, 145, 147–54, 156, 158–61,

164–65, 167–68, 183–86, 190, 194,

201, 213, 243–44, 247, 270–71,

273–74, 281, 286, 288–92, 298, 305,

317, 333, 345, 349, 351, 35562,

364–65, 370–74, 407, 410–12,

414–15, 417, 433–34, 449, 464,

473–75, 478, 480–88, 491, 493,

500–5, 508–11

Ryder, Edward, 368

safe areas, 15, 21, 23, 25–26, 28, 43–45

55–56, 59–60, 72, 96, 99–100, 102–6

110, 131, 138, 146–47, 156, 158,

167, 190–91, 199, 226, 228, 279–85,

289, 316, 350, 398, 403–4, 406–8,

432, 434, 438, 443, 445, 466, 468,

471, 476–78, 480–81, 494–96, 502,

504, 513

sanctions, 22, 195, 497

San Vito dei Normanni Air Base, Italy,

124

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2, 5,

13–15, 18, 20–22, 24–26, 29, 37, 41,

44–45, 48, 59–60, 92, 99, 103–5,

110, 114–15, 123–24, 131, 133,

135–39, 145–46, 149, 156–58,

179–80, 190–93, 195, 199, 223, 228,

282, 285, 287, 289–90, 292, 309,

311, 341–42, 350, 398–401, 403–4,

406, 408, 410, 433, 435, 439, 446,

449, 461, 469, 477–78, 481–83, 494,

496, 498, 504

satellites, 223, 336

Sawyer, David, 91, 154, 166, 355,

361–62, 431–32, 482

search and rescue (SAR), 331, 413–14

sector operations center, 80, 299

Serbia, 1–2, 7–9, 11–18, 21–23, 26, 107,

189, 192, 194–95, 457, 459–60, 504

Serbian League of Communists, 8

Serb Republic, 460, 484, 493

Serb Republic Assembly, 135

Serbs, 2–3, 6–7, 9, 11–16, 18, 21–22, 24

26–27, 29, 93, 117, 131, 133–35,

137–39, 145–47, 149–50, 153–54,

156, 159, 161, 163–64, 167–68, 189,

191–92, 194, 196, 213, 226, 228,

243, 245, 292, 409, 439, 446,

458–60, 467–68, 474, 477, 479–81,

483–84, 492–93, 495–500, 503–5,

507–8, 513–14

Seventeenth Air Force, 93, 469

Shalikashvili, John, 272

Sharp, Grant, 391

Short, Michael, 182, 356, 488, 510

538
signals intelligence (SIGINT), 178, 228,

231

Sigonella Naval Air Station, Sicily, 229

Sigonella, Sicily, 220

Silajdzic, Haris, 479

Sipovo, Yugoslavia, 152

Sixteenth Air Force, 54–55, 363, 369,

470, 501

Sixth Fleet, 152, 414

Skopje, Yugoslavia, 45

Slavonia, 23, 134, 496

Slovenia, 8, 10–14, 457

Smith, Leighton, 37, 47–48, 50, 55–58,

91–93, 110, 115, 126, 131–33, 139,

147, 151, 157–58, 164, 181, 183–86,

194, 201, 228, 244, 281, 289,

356–57, 407–8, 410, 412, 415, 464,

473–74, 480–85, 491–93, 500–504,

509–10

Smith, Rupert, 37, 48, 57, 92, 110,

131–33, 139, 149, 281, 288–89,

293–94, 410, 481, 483–84

Sokolac, Yugoslavia, 136

southeast zone of action, 29

Southern Region, 48, 97, 399

Soviet Union, 3–4, 6

Spain, 19, 49, 52, 133, 164, 212–13,

220, 222, 238, 245, 258, 346, 485

Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, 212

special instructions (SPINS), 80, 159,

162–63, 302, 307–10, 324, 395,

411–12, 416

special operations, 74, 240

special operations forces, 124–25, 236,

414

Srebrenica, Yugoslavia, 15, 24–26, 43,

102, 398, 403, 406, 418, 474, 477

Stalin, Joseph, 4

standing rules of engagement (SROE),

384–88, 396, 414–15

standoff capability, 242, 273–75

stealth technology, 151, 204, 243,

274–75

Strasboling, France, 224

strategic centers, 66

strategy cell, 57–58, 74, 95

Stretch, Tim, 367

Stringer, David, 140, 142

suppression of enemy air defenses

(SEAD), 26, 101, 103, 111, 136–38,

146, 151–54, 157–58, 162–64, 201,

206–7, 210–13, 217–18, 231–33, 243,

247, 249, 266, 264, 279–82, 285,

301, 307, 309, 31117, 327, 331,

335, 338, 346, 405, 407, 412–13,

415, 434, 461, 475, 478, 511

Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), 43, 47, 50, 76, 91, 114,

121, 132, 151, 244, 282, 357, 396,

401, 464, 481, 500

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

Europe (SHAPE), 180, 183, 245, 468

surveillance, 225–27, 233, 275, 299,

326, 348, 511–12

Sweat, Mark, 180

Sweden, 3

tactical air control party (TACP), 46,

155–56, 309, 317, 319, 401–2

tactical air-launched decoy (TALD),

268–69

tactical air reconnaissance, 79

tactical air reconnaissance pod system

(TARPS), 224–25

tactical area of operations (TAOO),

307–10, 313, 326, 381, 408

target categories/options, 58, 158, 279,

282–83, 293–94, 342, 418, 471, 475,

503, 512

targeteering/targeteers, 111, 152, 180,

362, 364, 443

targeting, 19, 58, 66, 101, 104, 115,

117, 125, 149, 159, 178, 180,

185–86, 279, 358, 408, 414–16,

442–44, 447, 465, 491, 501, 510

targeting science, 442–43

target lists/sets, 26, 55, 57, 66, 74–75,

100, 103, 108–9, 112–15, 117, 133,

144, 166, 177–78, 279–80, 281–82,

285–87, 289, 292, 320, 338, 341,

356–57, 359–60, 363, 400, 408, 410,

418, 432, 435, 446, 448–49, 465–66,

471, 474, 481, 483, 493, 503

targets, 20–21, 25, 29, 41, 43, 48, 51,

55, 57–59, 65–67, 71–72, 74–75, 79,

95, 99–101, 103–5, 107–9, 111–18,

125, 133, 135–39, 144–45, 147–50,

152–58, 160–62, 178, 182–86, 189,

200, 206, 216, 223, 233–34, 241–43,

257, 259–61, 263–65, 267–68,

271–75, 280–87, 289–92, 294, 297,

300–301, 303–6, 308, 314–21,

323–26, 331, 336, 341–42, 347, 350,

355–56, 359–61, 363–64, 370,

372–73, 395, 399–400, 402–4,

407–12, 414–17, 420, 433–34, 436,

539
439, 443, 446

48, 458, 461, 463,

465, 471–72, 476–78, 480, 483, 485,

487, 491, 503–4, 506, 510–12

technology, 272, 442

terrorism/terrorists, 11, 143, 368, 372,

387–88, 489

Teske, Steve, 110, 487

Tito, 3–7

total-exclusion zone (TEZ), 44, 103, 117,

145–46, 179, 183, 190–92, 223, 226,

282–85, 290, 340, 350

transporter-erector launchers and

radars (TELAR), 304

Tudjman, Franjo, 8–9, 11, 14, 16, 27,

191

Turkey, 17, 19, 49, 132–33, 164, 203,

208, 245–46, 465, 485

Tuzla, Yugoslavia, 15, 24, 26, 43–45,

103–4, 137, 155–57, 282, 285, 398,

406, 408

Tzu, Sun, 440

Udbina, 22, 100, 180, 223, 404, 474

Udbina Airfield, 280, 473–74, 478

United Kingdom, 17, 19, 39, 49, 52,

132, 137, 182, 204, 208, 220, 245,

258, 348

United Nations (UN), 15, 18, 21–22, 24,

26, 37–39, 41–49, 52, 54–60, 65–66,

79, 87, 90, 92–94, 96–100, 102–4,

106–7, 110–11, 113–14, 117–21,

125–26, 131–33, 135, 138–39,

145–47, 150, 154–59, 166–67,

190–92, 194–95, 223, 226, 246,

279–81, 283, 285, 287–89, 292, 299,

316, 340, 345, 350, 356, 372, 381,

387, 395, 397–410, 417–18, 431–34,

438, 440, 443, 445–46, 449, 460–63,

466–68, 470–77, 479–84, 493–95,

497–501, 504–9, 511, 514

United Nations Charter, 38, 395

United Nations Confidence Restoration

Operation, 45

United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, 18

United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF),

44–45, 48, 51, 56–57, 59, 92–93,

106, 110, 116–17, 121, 190, 401,

403, 410, 481

United Nations Preventive Deployment

Forces, 45

United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR),12, 15, 17–19, 22–26,

29, 37, 39, 41, 4346, 48, 56, 60,

92–94, 99, 106, 110, 113, 115,

131–33, 139, 144, 156, 167, 191,

193, 208, 226–27, 284, 307, 311,

316, 346, 396–404, 410, 418, 459,

461, 474, 481

United Nations resolutions, 19, 471, 477

United Nations Security Council, 15, 22,

38–39, 41–42, 45–46, 56, 60, 76, 78,

87, 92–94, 101, 126, 406, 461, 464,

467, 499

United Nations Security Council

resolutions (UNSCR), 19, 37–39, 41,

45–46, 57, 59, 94–96, 99–100,

394–401, 403–6, 418, 461, 468,

474–75, 495

United States, 4, 9–10, 14, 17, 19–21,

39, 67, 91, 93, 97, 111, 118, 120,

132–33, 164–66, 186–87, 190, 213,

220, 223, 228, 240, 245, 258,

265–66, 331, 346, 348, 354–55,

358–59, 385, 387, 391, 397, 419,

437–38, 460, 462, 479, 494–96, 504,

515

United States Air Force, 21, 24, 48, 52,

69, 91, 97, 111, 122, 126, 131, 133,

137, 139–40, 142, 144, 151, 153,

164, 166, 199, 213, 229, 247,

248–49, 260–61, 263, 265, 269, 272,

274, 281, 299, 301, 303–4, 314, 318,

320, 326, 335–36, 338–39, 346, 348,

366, 369, 398, 402, 405, 417, 420,

450, 464, 475–76, 482–83, 487–88,

490, 505

United States Air Force Reserve

(USAFR), 52, 369

United States Air Forces Europe

(USAFE), 52, 56, 98, 469

United States Army, 43, 79, 91, 226–28,

501

United States European Command, 180

455

United States Marine Corps, 24, 52,

133–34, 147, 164, 213, 226, 240,

260, 268, 314, 320, 335–36, 338–39,

346, 366, 385, 390, 403, 483, 488

United States Naval Forces Europe, 93

United States Navy, 24, 49, 52, 91, 93,

118, 133, 136, 152, 162, 164–66,

209–11, 213, 217, 219, 224, 226,

228–29, 233–34, 236, 242, 260–63,

268–69, 274, 303–4, 310, 314–15,

320, 335–36, 338–39, 346, 348,

540
366

67, 382, 384, 389, 39192,

413–14, 464, 483–84, 488

unity of command/effort, 48, 59

USS America, 211, 224, 228, 234

USS Normandy, 153, 264

USS Stark, 384, 390–94, 416

USS Theodore Roosevelt, 134, 136, 148,

201–2, 210–11, 224, 228, 234, 311,

484

USS Vincennes, 390, 392–94

Vance, Cyrus, 16

Venice, Italy, 133

Vicenza, Italy, 19, 46, 48–50, 55, 77, 80,

91, 100, 132, 134, 136, 139, 165,

179, 227, 238, 243, 381, 464, 468–69

Vietnam, 356, 386, 416–17

Vietnam War, 139, 143, 271

Villafranca, Italy, 209, 218, 224

visual identification (VID), 310, 319,

324, 327

Vojvodina, Yugoslavia, 4, 8, 457

Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 11–12

Wald, Charles, 134, 143, 365–67, 489

Wallace, Robert, 184

Warden, John, 432, 435–39, 444–46,

449, 465

Warsaw Pact, 4, 6, 76, 87, 89, 121, 512

Washington Treaty, 65, 76

weaponeering/weaponeers, 52, 111,

160, 304–5, 322, 485, 510

weapons of mass destruction, 448

weapon system officer (WSO), 320–22

weather conditions, 114–15, 117,

137–38, 144, 146, 148–49, 152,

154–57, 163, 167, 182, 207, 214,

219, 223, 226, 232, 236, 259, 261,

272, 274–75, 302–4, 310, 317,

320–21, 323–27, 336, 338, 343, 345,

349, 420

Wells, Steve, 365

Western European Union, 18, 461

West, Gary, 143, 366–68, 370

Widnall, Sheila E., 272

World War I, 1, 5, 459

World War II, 3, 7, 459

Wratten, William, 26

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,

195, 505

Yugoslav air force, 21

Yugoslav Communist Party, 3

Yugoslavia, 1–15, 17–18, 37–39, 42, 44,

48, 59–60, 65, 93, 121, 135, 151,

192, 299, 310, 399, 402, 457–61,

495, 497, 506

Yugoslavian League of Communists, 459

Yugoslavian People’s Army (JNA), 457

Yugoslav Party Congress, 8

Yugoslav State Council, 9, 11

Zagreb, Croatia, 9, 11, 20, 39, 45, 48,

92, 94, 126, 133–34, 138–39, 191,

281, 401

Zepa, Bosnia, 15, 25, 43, 45, 102, 282,

398, 403, 406, 418, 477

Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 21

Zoerb, Daniel “Doc,” 34–55, 95, 110,

184–85, 281, 285–86, 289–91,

357–58, 360, 362, 478, 487

zones of action (ZOA), 25, 55, 103–5,

111, 114, 149–50, 157–58, 279–83,

292, 341–42, 407–9, 478, 480–81

541
DELIBERATE FORCE

A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Marvin Bassett

Copy Editor

Debbie Banker

Cover Art and Book Design

Steven C. Garst

Illustrations

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Linda C. Colson