To Fight or Not

to Fight?

Organizational and Doctrinal Trends 

in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance 

from the Interwar Years to Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM

Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.

Photo

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover photograph courtesy Armor Magazine.
To Fight or Not

to Fight?

Organizational and Doctrinal Trends 

in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance 

from the Interwar Years to Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM

Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cameron, Robert S., 1965-

 To fight or not to fight? : organizational and doctrinal trends in mounted maneuver 

reconnaissance from the interwar years to Operation Iraqi Freedom / Robert S. 

Cameron.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 1. United States. Army. Cavalry--History--20th century. 2. United States. 

Army. Cavalry--History--21st century. 3. United States. Army--Armored 

troops‐‐History‐-20th century. 4. United States. Army--Armored troops--History‐-

21st century. 5. Organizational change--United States--History. 6. Military 

doctrine--United States--History. 7. Maneuver warfare--History. 8. Military 

reconnaissance--History. 9. United States--History, Military--20th century. 10. 

United States--History, Military--21st century. I. Title. 

 UA30.C35 2010

 355.4’13--dc22

 2009051654

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history 

topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication 

are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A 

full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available 

for downloading, can be found at http://www.usacac.army.

mil/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the written permission of the Director 

of CSI.
iii

Foreword

Dr. Robert S. Cameron’s To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational and 

Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar 

Years to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provides a narrative analysis of 

US Army reconnaissance, scout, and cavalry evolution from the postWorld War I era through the Iraqi conflict. It outlines key developments 

in the concepts governing reconnaissance units from the armored cavalry 

regiment down to the maneuver battalion scout platoon. These changes 

are placed in the context of national defense policy decisions and major 

Army initiatives. The title derives from the almost cyclic shifts between 

reconnaissance organizations oriented on information collection and 

those designed for a broader mission set. The text focuses on doctrinal 

and organizational changes, but training, materiel development, and the 

impact of combat operations constitute important supporting themes. This 

study also traces the transition from horse to vehicular reconnaissance, 

later bolstered by air cavalry and more recently with a variety of sensors 

and unmanned systems. The chronicle of this transition highlights another 

persistent theme: the impact of technology on reconnaissance. It addresses 

an issue with which scouts in today’s high-tech world continue to grapple: 

finding the correct balance between man and machine for effective 

reconnaissance.

The trend analysis included in these pages shows how mounted reconnaissance arrived at its current state. The author provides a clear depiction 

of past evolution to guide future reconnaissance development. Given the 

ongoing changes today within the Army generally and the reconnaissance 

community in particular, such an analysis has immediate relevance. The 

insights and information provided help to determine those capabilities 

scouts need on future battlefields and how best to acquire them. In this 

sense, this book is part of a larger effort by the Armor Branch to shape 

future mounted maneuver reconnaissance in a sensible and effective manner. However, it is clear from this text that developing the right doctrine, 

organization, and platform to ensure our reconnaissance Soldiers are configured for success in ever-changing operational environments is a complex process. 

To Fight or Not to Fight? is a must read for those responsible for designing reconnaissance organizations, writing the related doctrine, establishing the materiel requirements, and training scouts. It is also recommended 

for those serving in reconnaissance organizations who every day discover 

new trails for others to follow. Much has been written about cavalry and 
iv

reconnaissance, but this literature generally focuses on a specific era, platform, combat operation, or personal account of service. Missing from 

this body of literature is an overarching analysis of American cavalry and 

reconnaissance development. This book fills that void, providing a single 

source reference for a critical dimension of mounted maneuver history. 

These pages should resonate with anyone who has served in or supported 

a cavalry, reconnaissance, or scout unit. They remind us of the importance 

of what the horse cavalry once called “mental mobility.”

Scouts Out!

James M. Milano

Major General, US Army 

Commanding General

US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox
v

Contents

Page

Foreword .................................................................................................iii

Figures ................................................................................................... vii

Tables ..................................................................................................xiii

Introduction. Past as Prologue ............................................................... xv

Chapter 1. Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era ....................................... 1

In the Beginning .................................................................... 1

Horse Cavalry Doctrine ......................................................... 7

Mechanized Cavalry .............................................................11

Mounted Reconnaissance in Transition ............................... 26

Chapter 2. The Crucible of Combat: World War II ................................ 35

Something Old, Something New, 1940–41 ......................... 35

1941 GHQ Maneuvers ......................................................... 41

Reconnaissance in Transition, 1942 .................................... 45

Combat Operations in North Africa and Italy ...................... 52

	 Refining Reconnaissance, 1943–44 ..................................... 59

European Theater of Operations, 1944–45 .......................... 71

Chapter 3. From Postwar to Korean War ............................................... 91

Analysis of the Wartime Experience .................................... 91

Reconnaissance Restructured .............................................. 96

Doctrinal Revision ............................................................. 101

Training ...............................................................................111

Upgrading Reconnaissance Materiel ..................................113

Reconnaissance in Korea ....................................................117

Organizational and Materiel Lessons Learned .................. 123

The Way Ahead .................................................................. 126

Chapter 4. Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield ....................................... 143

Massive Retaliation ........................................................... 143

Reorganization of the Current Armored Division 

(ROCAD) ...................................................................... 146

ROCAD Revisited ............................................................. 154

Public Release Statement: All material in this manuscript has been cleared 

through responsible authorities for public release. Text based on restricted documentation underwent formal review to ensure its release, although select documents themselves may still remain inaccessible to the general public. All material 

presented is unclassified.
vi

Contents

Page

FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and 

Squadron ....................................................................... 160

Flexible Response and ROAD ........................................... 165

Battalion Reconnaissance ...................................................169

Armored Cavalry Regiment ...............................................178

Chapter 5. Vietnam: Reconnaissance in Counterinsurgency 

Operations ..................................................................................189

Prelude to War ....................................................................189

Nascent Awareness of Counterinsurgency Operations .......191

Training the Basics .............................................................197

A Question of Need ............................................................202

Showing the Way—Initial Operations 1965–67 ................205

Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam 

(MACOV) .....................................................................216

Evolving Doctrine ..............................................................224

Operations 1968–70 ...........................................................233

End Game 1970–72 ............................................................246

Chapter 6. Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory .......................263

Army 86 .............................................................................263

Reconnaissance Refocused ................................................267

Active Defense Reconnaissance Doctrine .........................275

Organizational Flux ............................................................279

The Search for a New Reconnaissance Vehicle .................284

AirLand Battle and the Army of Excellence ......................289

Cavalry at the Crossroads ...................................................292

Whither the Scout? .............................................................298

Reconnaissance Training and Doctrine in the 1980s .........307

Operation DESERT STORM .............................................315

Chapter 7. Force XXI and the Winds of Change .................................335

The Post-Cold War Army ...................................................335

Armor 2000 ........................................................................341

Light Cavalry Emphasis .....................................................343

Heavy Cavalry ....................................................................353

Battalion Scouts—Observers, Killers, or Victims? ............356

Scout Modernization Strategy ............................................360

Reconnaissance Platforms ..................................................364

Reconnaissance Doctrine in the 1990s ...............................371

Reconnaissance at the Combat Training Centers ...............381

Scout Training ....................................................................386
vii

Contents

Page

The Force XXI Division and the Brigade 

Reconnaissance Troop ...................................................390

Regimental Strike Force .....................................................396

Chapter 8. Army Transformation, RSTA Squadrons, and ISR 

Operations .....................................................................................417

Army Transformation .........................................................417

Stryker Brigade Combat Team ...........................................424

Transforming the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment ..............431

ISR Operations and the New Contact Paradigm ................438

Cavalry at the Crossroads—Again .....................................447

Brigade and Battalion Scouts .............................................451

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—Major Combat 

Operations .....................................................................453

Modularity ..........................................................................463

Chapter 9. Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq .........................485

Overview ............................................................................485

Operational Environment ...................................................487

Mounted Reconnaissance ...................................................496

Armored Cavalry ................................................................501

RSTA Squadron Operations ...............................................508

	 Doctrinal Refinement .........................................................514

HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment ...................519

Organizational Limbo ........................................................523

	 The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade .................................526

The Quest for Core Competencies .....................................534

Into the Future.....................................................................541

Conclusion ........................................................................................... 563

Glossary ............................................................................................... 581

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 585

Index .................................................................................................... 617

About the Author .................................................................................. 631

Figures

1. Old Bill ............................................................................................ 2

2. Early armored car used in the interwar period ................................ 3

3.	 Another early armored car showing some refinement in design .... 5
viii

Contents

Page

4. Principal cavalry leaders present at the 1934 Fort Riley 

maneuvers ...................................................................................... 6

5. M1 Scout Car .................................................................................. 7

6. Horse cavalry training at Fort Riley ............................................... 9

7. M3 Scout Car with full crew and weapons ................................... 10

8. The mechanized force on maneuvers ............................................ 12

9. The 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) arriving at Fort 

Knox in 1933 ................................................................................ 13

10. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) in 1934 ..... 14

11. Mechanized cavalry armored car at Fort Riley for the 1934 

maneuvers .................................................................................... 15

12. Combat cars, motorcycles, and halftracks of the 1st 

Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) in 1936 .................................... 16

13. Mechanized cavalry halftracks, 1936 ........................................... 17

14. Mechanized cavalry combat car ................................................... 18

15. Chief of Cavalry Major General John K. Herr and 7th 

Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) Commander Brigadier 

General Adna R. Chaffee Jr. meet at Fort Knox, 1939 ................ 20

16. Armored car of the 13th Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) .......... 22

17. Mechanized cavalry scout car ....................................................... 23

18. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) at the US Military 

Academy, 1939 ............................................................................. 26

19. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) at the 1939 World 

Fair in New York City .................................................................. 27

20. Horse cavalry along the US–Mexican border ............................... 28

21. Horse cavalry during pause in maneuver operations .................... 37

22. Light tank passing horse cavalry during maneuvers in 1941 ........ 40

23. Horse cavalry advancing during the 1941 GHQ maneuvers ........ 44

24. Carrier vehicles to provide horse cavalry strategic mobility ........ 48

25.	 The M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage, which provided fire

support for the mechanized cavalry ............................................. 50

26.	 The Tunisian battlefield ................................................................ 54

27. Reconnaissance column halts for map consultation in 

North Africa ................................................................................. 58

28. Scouts conducting reconnaissance in North Africa, 

February 1943 .............................................................................. 62

29. Mechanized cavalry during the drive to Rome, 1944 ................... 67

30. M8 Armored Car in France, August 1944 ..................................... 73

31. Dismounted mechanized cavalry patrol in the fall of 1944 .......... 76
ix

Contents

Page

32. Constabulary jeep patrol in Occupied Germany ........................... 92

33. Mobile Constabulary winter patrol ............................................... 95

34. The transition of the Constabulary into a tactical force 

through the inclusion of medium tanks ........................................ 99

35. Communist propaganda poster proclaiming the defeat of 

the United States in 1950 ........................................................... 103

36.	 The M41 Light Tank (Walker bulldog) fielded to replace

the M24 (Chaffee) and cope with more heavily armed and 

armored Soviet combat vehicles ................................................ 107

37. The continued danger posed by mines did not trigger the 

rapid development of more efficient methods of mine

detection and clearance ...............................................................111

38. The Korean landscape ..................................................................115

39. A North Korean T34/85 and an SU-76 knocked out by UN 

forces ...........................................................................................119

40. Inspection of a disabled North Korean T34/85, initially 

considered the bane of American mounted troops ..................... 122

41. The M39 Armored Personnel Carrier ......................................... 126

42. Major General Ernest N. Harmon commanded armored 

formations in World War II before establishing the 

Constabulary in postwar Germany ............................................. 130

43. Soldiers in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment receive 

instruction on the M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle ..................... 133

44. Light mobile Davy Crockett system to provide nuclear 

capability to forward units ......................................................... 145

45. M41 light tanks on the assembly line ......................................... 148

46. Tank crew trainer at Fort Knox, 1958 ......................................... 152

47. M41 light tank undergoing fording test ...................................... 156

48. Armed Forces Day display at Fort Knox in 1960 ....................... 159

49. Mounted and dismounted elements of the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment training in Germany in the early 1960s ........ 162

50. Preproduction model of the M151 jeep ...................................... 166

51. While American scouts continued to utilize the jeep, their 

Soviet counterparts began fielding the small, armored

BRDM series in the late 1950s ................................................... 169

52. Battalion scouts from the 37th Armored Regiment training 

in Germany, 1963 ....................................................................... 171

53. The amphibious PT-76 light tank also began to equip 

Soviet reconnaissance units ........................................................ 174
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Contents

Page

54. The M60 tank began to equip mounted formations as the 

Army transitioned to more combat capable formations as 

part of Flexible Response ........................................................... 177

55. Scouts in an M151 jeep practicing stealthy observation ............. 179

56. The M114 intended for command and reconnaissance 

roles and the jeep’s replacement ................................................ 182

57. The M114 Armored Command and Reconnaissance 

Vehicle fielded with great promise as a replacement to the

venerable jeep ............................................................................. 192

58.	 South Vietnamese M113s in the field ......................................... 195

59. Use of an M113 to recover another—a common activity in 

South Vietnam and necessitated by the terrain conditions ......... 199

60. Armored cavalry trainer developed to improve the 

preparation of cavalry leaders through the integrated 

use of radios and movie projectors—the forerunner of 

computer-based simulators ......................................................... 201

61.	 Modified through the addition of machineguns and the

installation of gun shields, the M113 became transformed 

into the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) ................... 204

62. Heavily sandbagged M48 supports a dismounted patrol ............ 206

63. ACAVs halted in herringbone formation .................................... 209

64. The M113’s mobility made it invaluable during the rainy 

season in Vietnam and in crossing the many small waterways .. 212

65.	 Replacing the M48’s engine in the field ..................................... 215

66. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment soldiers handling a 

delivery of fuel ........................................................................... 218

67. M48 tank and crew of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry 

Regiment .................................................................................... 220

68. The meaning of civic action ........................................................ 223

69. Column of M113s moving to contact, 1966 ............................... 226

70. M48 and crew of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment ......... 228

71. M113 behind chain link RPG screen intended to detonate 

prematurely incoming projectiles ............................................... 231

72. The M551 Sheridan .................................................................... 234

73. Sheridan leading column through a rubber plantation ................ 238

74. Sheridan with added protection for the tank commander 

against small arms fire and snipers ............................................. 241

75. Dismounted team working with M48 ......................................... 245

76. Doctrinal depiction of the combined arms platoon in 

operation ..................................................................................... 249
xi

Contents

Page

77. Cavalry platoon in Germany illustrating the mixed 

composition of M60 tanks and M114s ....................................... 264

78. Major General Donn A. Starry .................................................... 265

79. Cavalry M114s prepare for operations, 1973 .............................. 269

80. The M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) .................................. 273

81. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle in Germany during the 1980s ...... 278

82. Group of ITVs in Germany, 1982 ............................................... 282

83. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle of the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment moving at speed, 1985 ............................................... 286

84. Training scouts in dismounted observation and movement 

techniques ................................................................................... 291

85. Scout section on the move—an M113 and an ITV working 

together ....................................................................................... 294

86. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an M113 occupy battle 

positions at the NTC .................................................................. 299

87. Training scouts equipped with HMMWV to operate 

vehicle weapon ........................................................................... 304

88. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle at the NTC ................................... 309

89. HMMWV scouts prepare for their next mission ......................... 313

90. Two Bradley Fighting Vehicles during Operation DESERT 

STORM ...................................................................................... 318

91. Operation DESERT STORM—a Bradley from the 

1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment during a pause 

in the action ................................................................................ 320

92. Scouts of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment ..................... 337

93. The M8 Armored Gun System, ready to enter production 

before its cancellation in 1996 ................................................... 342

94. Elements of the 2d Cavalry Regiment in Haiti ........................... 347

95. Enforcing the peace—Bosnia ..................................................... 352

96. Mounted patrol moves through Bosnian village ......................... 356

97. Scout patrol prepares for next move ........................................... 361

98. The LRAS3 mounted on a HMMWV ......................................... 366

99. Close-up view of the LRAS3, which greatly increased the 

scout’s ability to see the battlefield ............................................ 370

100.	 Well-camouflaged Bradley Fighting Vehicle at the JRTC .......... 374

101. Scouts dismount from the HMMWV .......................................... 379

102. A UAV ready for operations at the NTC ..................................... 385

103.	 The LRAS3-equipped HMMWV was intended for fielding

in the new brigade reconnaissance troop ................................... 391

104. Preproduction Stryker infantry carrier vehicle ........................... 420
xii

Contents

Page

105. The basic components of the FBCB2 ......................................... 425

106.	 Officers confer during a training exercise at Fort Knox ............. 430

107.	 Two M3 cavalry fighting vehicles conducting live fire

exercise ....................................................................................... 435

108. The mounted urban training site built at Fort Knox to 

support the training of heavy forces in built-up areas ................ 439

109. Vehicle road march during the Platform Performance 

Demonstration at Fort Knox in 1999–2000 ............................... 443

110. Downtown Grozny, which became the scene of bitter and 

bloody street fighting between Russians and Chechens in

1994–95 ...................................................................................... 447

111.	 Instruction for officers attending the Armor Captains

Career Course ............................................................................. 449

112. Combined arms elements of 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry in 

the early days of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM ........................ 454

113. An armored task force en route to Baghdad ............................... 457

114. Urban combat on the outskirts of Baghdad ................................ 461

115. A suicide car bomber attacks an American armored column ...... 464

116. The combat power of the Abrams/Bradley team is unleashed .... 467

117. Combat elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in Sadr City ........ 487

118. 1st Cavalry Division HMMWV and crew engaging 

insurgents in An Najaf ................................................................ 490

119.	 The An Najaf battlefield, scene of heavy fighting against

Shiite militia using the urban area and large, ancient 

cemetery for cover ...................................................................... 493

120. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment mounted patrol .......................... 497

121. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment soldiers establishing a 

cordon to prevent the escape of potential terrorists during a 

search operation ......................................................................... 499

122. Dismounted patrols became the norm for armor and cavalry 

soldiers ....................................................................................... 502

123. American trucks burn after an attack on a convoy ..................... 505

124. LRAS3-equipped HMMWV in Iraq ........................................... 506

125. Remains of a HMMWV after an IED attack .............................. 510

126. M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV with improved protection 

for the gunner ............................................................................. 513

127. American checkpoints like this one became a common sight 

throughout Iraq’s towns and cities in an effort to disrupt 

terrorist movement ..................................................................... 515
xiii

Contents

Page

128. The growing sophistication of terrorists became evident in 

the wide variety of electronic devices, including this cell 

phone, used to detonate IEDs ..................................................... 518

129. Personal interaction with the local population proved critical 

to counterinsurgent operations ................................................... 521

130. Potential insurgent being detained and searched ........................ 523

131. Stryker with slat armor installed to provide improved 

protection against RPGs ............................................................. 527

132. A Stryker unit rolls into action .................................................... 529

133. Stryker conducting mounted patrol ............................................. 536

134.	 Dismounted patrol backed up by the heavy firepower of a

Bradley Fighting Vehicle ............................................................ 538

135. Platoon leader training at Fort Knox ........................................... 540

136. Training new scouts at Fort Knox ............................................... 543

Tables

1. Reconnaissance platoon training ................................................ 106

2.	 Vehicle trafficability by corps tactical zone/region ..................... 217

3. Reconnaissance principles and fundamentals ............................. 312

4.	 Operation DESERT STORM scout platoon configurations ........ 320

xv

Introduction

Past as Prologue

In 1999, the annual Armor Conference featured a typical lineup of guest 

speakers, technology demonstrations, and discussion venues intended to 

showcase the Armor Branch and generate new ideas for its future development. The conference included a short information briefing on the status 

of the Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS). At the time, this platform 

was to become the primary mounted reconnaissance vehicle. The presentation proved unremarkable until the speaker mentioned the medium caliber armament intended for the FSCS. Questions quickly arose from the 

officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Army civilians, and Defense 

contractors in attendance regarding the need for this weapon. Before the 

briefer could respond, other audience members rose to the defense of the 

intended armament. The event disintegrated into a verbal fisticuff.

The ensuing argument focused on the scout’s need and usage of a 

powerful weapon. Some felt the scout’s proper role lay in the undetected 

collection of information on the battlefield. Anything that detracted from 

this singular purpose, including combat, undermined the scout’s ability to 

gather information necessary for effective command decisions. A powerful weapon encouraged the scout to engage targets and be drawn into 

firefights that at best compromised its reconnaissance role while increasing the likelihood of its destruction. For this school of thinking, the ability to see the battlefield and report findings constituted the scout’s most 

important assets. Therefore, the scout needed only a small weapon for 

self-defense or, if surprised by an enemy force, to disengage.

The opposing view stressed the importance of possessing the means 

to fight for information and survival. Scouts unable to penetrate a hostile 

security screen or survive a chance contact were not likely to obtain key 

information, particularly regarding the enemy’s morale and willingness 

to fight. Without a combat capability, the scout’s effectiveness would be 

nullified if confronted by a hostile force. Similarly, the scout became vulnerable to ambush. Given the forward nature of the scout’s position on the 

battlefield, contact with the enemy was likely. Hence, the scout required 

the means to fight and survive should combat become necessary. With 

these tools, the scout also became capable of more effective security and 

counterreconnaissance operations. This viewpoint considered combat an 

inherent and unavoidable part of the scout’s primary mission of information collection.

These contradictory perspectives reflect a longstanding debate within 

the mounted maneuver component of the US Army. Should reconnaissance 
xvi

Introduction

organizations fight for information and participate in combat in situations 

other than self-defense? This simple question belies far more complex but 

related doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, and resourcing issues. 

The weapons, platforms, equipment, concepts of employment, and configuration for a reconnaissance unit intended for combat necessarily differed from one intended for stealthy operations. These differences also 

affected the composition of higher organizations controlling scouts. How 

the scouts operated determined the type of support they would require 

from their parent unit and what if any augmentation they would require in 

particular circumstances. Finally, training needed to reflect actual battlefield employment. Combat operations necessitated training in maneuver 

and direct fire engagements—skills not as important for a scout seeking to 

operate undetected via stealth and infiltration.

Whether scouts should fight or not remains a subject of controversy 

today and will remain so in the near future. The related issues continue 

to defy permanent resolution, and, in fact, have been recurring points of 

debate at least since the 1930s. Since then, extensive combat operations 

and the steady march of technology have generated a wealth of operational 

experience coupled with new capabilities. In contrast, the parameters of 

the reconnaissance debate have changed little over time, partly because 

analysis of past experience tends to validate the value of both fighting and 

stealthy reconnaissance. They are complementary with each type offering a set of unique, desirable capabilities for the battlefield commander. 

Still, the trend in American mounted maneuver reconnaissance development since before World War II has been to favor alternatively one reconnaissance style over the other. This fluctuating emphasis contributed to 

the reconnaissance controversy by generating doctrinal and organizational 

turbulence without resolving underlying issues.

This work chronicles the principle developments in mounted maneuver 

reconnaissance from the interwar period to the present. In particular, it 

charts and analyzes doctrinal, organizational, materiel, and training trends 

from the platoon to regiment and division levels. It is in this realm that 

reconnaissance has proven to be the most controversial and, at times, subject 

to radical change. However, this study does not offer significant coverage of 

parallel developments among dismounted or aerial reconnaissance—these 

subjects lie outside the purview of this work.

The analysis begins with the Army’s adoption of a new mechanization policy and the related establishment of the 7th Cavalry Brigade 

(Mechanized) in 1931. This unit revolutionized command and control in 

the Army and developed the fundamental principles that continue to guide 
xvii

Past as Prologue

mounted maneuver operations today. The creation of the mechanized 

cavalry also marked the start of the Army’s transition to a vehicle-based 

force structure. This shift directly influenced reconnaissance. Previously, 

mounted reconnaissance remained the responsibility of the Cavalry Branch, 

whose soldiers relied on the horse for tactical mobility. Thus mounted, the 

rifle-equipped trooper could traverse most terrain, operate mounted or dismounted, and collect information by the most appropriate means. Combat 

power remained necessarily limited to what the horse could carry, encouraging action via stealth. The low-tech nature of the horse cavalry coupled 

with the absence of alternatives to this form of ground reconnaissance 

resulted in noncontroversial reconnaissance principles.

The mechanized cavalry’s emphasis on fast-paced, aggressive operations necessarily required a different style of reconnaissance. The speed of 

operations desired made reliance on stealth or dismounted action unlikely. 

Armored vehicles carrying radios and machineguns provided significantly 

greater combat power than the horse-mounted trooper. Early mechanized 

cavalry doctrine embraced this capability by acknowledging the need to 

fight for information and the likelihood of combat for its reconnaissance 

elements. Hence, the mechanized cavalry favored a more combative and 

aggressive style of reconnaissance based on armored fighting vehicles 

seeking out enemy weaknesses.

The origins of the debate that continues to influence reconnaissance 

development can be seen in the different methods of information collection adopted by the mechanized cavalry and the horse cavalry. The 

horse cavalry favored a more deliberate, stealthy approach that sacrificed 

combat power for mobility and quietness of operations. Even after the 

horse cavalry disappeared from the Army, the trend it established continued to attract support in subsequent decades and influenced platform 

design, organizational configuration, doctrine, and training. Conversely, 

the emphasis on combat power, survivability, and the ability to fight for 

information embraced by the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) found 

validation in combat and prompted subsequent armored cavalry development. Both trends remained in evidence throughout World War II and 

the Cold War, although the mechanized threat posed by the Warsaw Pact 

tended to elevate the prominence of fighting reconnaissance. The stability 

and support missions of the 1990s, coupled with major advances in information technology, marked a major resurgence in stealthy reconnaissance. 

Army Transformation and modularity sustained this emphasis, but combat 

operations in Iraq called into question the wisdom of overreliance on light 

reconnaissance organizations with minimal combat power.
xviii

Introduction

Today stealthy and fighting reconnaissance continue to attract staunch 

advocates and maintain an uneasy coexistence within the mounted maneuver community. Understanding the origins and evolution of these competing schools of thought provides a frame of reference within which to 

approach future development. Given past developments and the inability 

to resolve fundamental differences in how reconnaissance should be conducted, it is certain that the debate will continue. New technologies will 

likely cloud the discussion, but they will not alter the essence of either 

view. For an Army whose doctrine revolves on information dominance 

to overwhelm an enemy through combined arms maneuver and precision effects, the importance of mounted maneuver reconnaissance—and 

the related debate regarding its nature—cannot be understated. It is in the 

Army’s interest to determine the optimal reconnaissance organization, 

principles, materiel, and training programs.

This work is intended to contribute to this goal. It seeks to facilitate 

understanding of what has occurred, inspire insights, and provide a base of 

knowledge applicable to today’s environment. These lofty ambitions are 

made more realizable by the recurring nature of the reconnaissance debate, 

which comprises the central content of the following pages. Combat developers, trainers, doctrine writers, and soldiers constitute the target audience 

for this study. These individuals bear direct responsibility for future reconnaissance developments, and they are thus optimally situated to apply the 

lessons of the past. Their efforts to chart a course for reconnaissance organizations should occur not in darkness and uncertainty but in the afterglow 

and certainty of what has gone before.

Reconnaissance studies have been written before, but they have generally focused on a specific event, timeframe, or platform. This work 

attempts a comprehensive depiction of trends over an 80-year period to 

provide a single source reference. It offers a broad sweep of the salient 

features of the debates regarding reconnaissance during the timeframe 

addressed. Readers will find a degree of repetition as the pages move them 

from the interwar period through World War II and into the Cold War 

and beyond. This effect is intentional, partly because it reflects the cyclic 

nature of reconnaissance developments that actually occurred and because 

it provides a solid context for understanding the current state of affairs. 

The concepts inherent to the battlefield surveillance brigade can be traced 

to the cavalry’s emphasis on stealthy information collection in the interwar 

years. Conversely, the last remaining Active Component armored cavalry 

regiment marks a recurring interest in a general purpose organization that 

reflected dissatisfaction with the mechanized cavalry experience in World 

War II. Similarly, the tactical experience of reconnaissance organizations 
xix

Past as Prologue

in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM bears resemblance to the counterinsurgency operations of armored cavalry and maneuver battalion scouts in 

Vietnam.

The following pages will not satisfy every reader. This work does not 

constitute the definitive study of mounted maneuver reconnaissance. It is 

not, for example, unit oriented. Individuals seeking to find detailed coverage of a particular organization will not find it here. Nor will they find 

the level of narrative detail in the coverage of combat operations found 

in other publications. These pages constitute a trend analysis focused 

on major themes rather than specific people, places, or events. Platform 

development is addressed by linking specific vehicles to the broader context of concept and doctrine development rather than through narration 

of the technical issues surrounding each vehicle. Only those platforms 

that exerted a significant influence on reconnaissance are addressed. In 

this study, technological development constitutes one of several influences shaping the discourse surrounding reconnaissance, and the coverage devoted to it tends to increase in the post-World War II chapters. The 

greater attention reflects the Army’s growing reliance on technology in the 

same period, which came to a climax with the abortive development of the 

Future Combat System (FCS) with its related collection of aerial drones, 

unmanned ground vehicles, and networked platforms.

The source material for this study largely reflects documentation readily available within the Armor Center. The most significant data collections utilized were those within the Armor Branch archives and the Armor 

School Library. The former includes information regarding doctrine, 

combat development, training, and some combat activities. The latter’s 

published materials, field manuals, student papers, and organizational data 

proved invaluable to charting changes over time in unit configurations, 

sensing the evolving views of armor soldiers, and placing reconnaissance 

developments in a broader historical context. Armor Magazine, the branch 

journal, proved invaluable for the insights its writers provided. Letters to 

the editor offered a surprising wealth of detail on activities within units, 

while the range of articles over the years offered a range of perspectives 

from NCOs, junior officers, and commanders. Archival material from the 

National Archives and the Army Heritage and Education Center (which 

includes the services previously provided by the Military History Institute) 

has also been utilized. In general, travel and time constraints precluded an 

exhaustive mining of key document repositories in the private and public sectors. These limitations encouraged the study’s overall emphasis on 

trends. However, many of the sources utilized are readily accessible and 

can provide a springboard for more detailed research.
xx

Introduction

This work is dedicated to mounted maneuver scouts currently serving 

in the Army and those who have preceded them. It is also an acknowledgment of the work performed by teams of soldiers and civilians, laboring 

behind the scenes to generate sensible doctrine, materiel that works, and 

adaptive tactical organizations.

Scouts Out!


Chapter 1

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

The years between the world wars witnessed the transition of the US 

Army from a muscle-powered force into an increasingly mechanized and 

motorized one. New ideas and organizational concepts dominated the era, 

but the full effects of this change did not occur until the mass fielding of 

new equipment and the large-scale expansion of the Army at the onset 

of World War II. Mounted reconnaissance developments reflected the 

impact of mechanization through the emergence of principles developed 

by the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). Mechanized cavalry leaders 

considered combat a likely occurrence for effective reconnaissance. They 

differed from horse cavalry officers in the greater emphasis they placed on 

the need to fight for information. Although the doctrine associated with 

both cavalry types preferred reconnaissance by stealth and the avoidance 

of detection, the mechanized cavalry preferred to equip their scouts with 

the means to survive chance encounters with hostile forces. Horse cavalry 

leaders leaned toward greater use of stealth. The creation of the Armored 

Force decentralized responsibility for reconnaissance development and 

ensured the expression of both viewpoints within the Army.

In the Beginning

Prior to World War I, the Cavalry constituted the Army’s mobile arm. 

Its tactical components utilized the horse for superior mobility over the 

predominantly foot-mobile formations they supported. The cavalry’s 

broad mission set included attack, defend, exploitation, pursuit, reconnaissance, security, delay, raid, and harassment operations. Doctrine required 

the ability to perform these missions either mounted or dismounted. 

Consequently, cavalry organizations proved versatile and flexible, characterized by rapid action and decisiveness. Cavalry units lacked the ability 

for sustained combat, but this did not constitute the primary purpose of the 

mounted arm.

Cavalry units relied on their favorable mobility differential to perform 

reconnaissance and security forward of friendly formations. Moving as 

individuals, small patrols, or entire units, they sought out hostile forces. 

Once the cavalry located the enemy, mounted troopers remained in contact 

and provided a steady flow of information regarding hostile activities. In 

this manner, cavalry organizations shaped the nature and circumstances in 

which battle occurred. Their information drove command decisions at all 

levels, and as a security force, cavalry provided early warning of enemy 

action and protected against surprise.


Chapter 1

In the late 19th century, 

the multidimensional nature of 

American cavalry became exemplified in Frederic Remington’s 

1898 drawing of a trooper in 

the 3d Cavalry Regiment prior 

to the unit’s departure for Cuba 

in the Spanish-American War. 

Better known as Old Bill, the 

drawing became a cavalry icon. 

The image depicts a soldier 

with his rifle sitting astride his 

horse. Old Bill epitomized the 

qualities of firepower, mobility, and shock power associated 

with the cavalry. He also exemplified the ability of the trooper 

to perform reconnaissance on 

demand, relying on the patrolling skills inherent to cavalry 

training and further instilled through experience. The horse provided 

unparalleled tactical mobility and could be easily mounted or dismounted. 

Quiet and readily concealed, the horse moved at a reasonable speed, and 

its height offered the rider good visibility. Through careful, stealthy movement, a horse-mounted scout could remain nearly invisible, relying on his 

weapon primarily to protect himself in an emergency.

Unfortunately, even Old Bill had difficulty practicing his craft on 

the highly lethal battlefields of World War I. The Great War augured in 

a new style of warfare characterized by trenches, barbed wire, mines, 

and a shell-pocked landscape. Lethality increased with widespread use of 

machineguns, mortars, and increasingly accurate artillery and aircraft. In 

this environment, horse cavalry proved especially vulnerable and mounted 

operations became the exception rather than the norm. Consequently, the 

American Expeditionary Forces sent to fight on the Western Front included 

only a small cavalry contingent. Reconnaissance became the responsibility of aircraft and dismounted infantry patrols.

The marginal contribution of US cavalry complicated efforts to 

define the role of the mounted arm after the war. The new technologies 

introduced on the World War I battlefields continued to mature and gain 

in effectiveness. Tanks and motor vehicles became commonplace among 

Army organizations and found inclusion in training and doctrinal guidance. 

Figure 1. Old Bill.

Courtesy Armor Magazine


Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

The expansion of vehicle use challenged the traditional dependence on 

the horse for transport and combat functions. Moreover, the likelihood 

of encounters with armored vehicles on future battlefields also increased. 

As the reliability of tanks and combat vehicles improved, so too did their 

mobility, particularly over developed roads. Horse-based organizations 

became hard-pressed to keep pace with the growing versatility and 

effectiveness of mechanized and motorized combat units.

Reconnaissance organizations required an ability to move faster 

than parent formations. Where the latter moved at the pace of a soldier 

on foot, scouts on horseback possessed a favorable mobility differential. 

This differential shrank in the interwar years as the Army’s use of vehicles 

expanded. Motorization and mechanization trends also benefited from the 

major strides in automotive technology made in the same period. These 

changes occurred slowly, constrained by budgetary concerns and uncertainty about the precise manner in which tactical organizations would integrate vehicles.

Such uncertainty did not afflict the Cavalry. The branch leadership 

remained convinced of the continuing utility of horse cavalry and worked 

diligently to highlight its strengths, particularly in comparison with 

vehicular units. They waged an aggressive campaign to promote their 

branch, drawing unfavorable comparisons between the terrain sensitivity 

of vehicles and the yet unmatched tactical mobility of horse organizations.1

Mounted riders remained much easier to conceal, transitioned easily 

Figure 2. Early armored car used in the interwar period.

Courtesy Armor Magazine


Chapter 1

to dismounted operations, and possessed a minimal noise signature—

important considerations for reconnaissance. Logistical considerations 

favored the horse as well. While horses could live off the land if necessary, 

vehicles could not operate without fuel. The small number of vehicles 

in most combat units made the loss of even one a significant detriment 

to effectiveness, unlike horse organizations that maintained their own 

replacement mounts.2

 In general, mechanized and motorized organizations 

were depicted as brittle and dependent on highly favorable conditions for 

their effective employment in contrast to the versatility and agility of horse 

cavalry.

The Cavalry Journal supported these efforts. It printed articles showcasing cavalry exploits throughout history. Its coverage of World War I 

focused on theaters other than the Western Front to depict effective cavalry employment. British cavalry operations in the Middle East received 

particular emphasis. They incorporated the principal characteristics of 

firepower and mobility associated with American cavalry and demonstrated cavalry’s traditional ability to achieve decisive results, improved 

weaponry notwithstanding.3

 A powerful endorsement came from Field 

Marshal Viscount Edmund H.H. Allenby, who commanded British forces 

in Palestine. In a letter to the Cavalry Journal editor, Allenby acknowledged the attention given to his command and defended the value of horse 

cavalry in all theaters of operation, including Western Europe. However, 

he also advocated experimentation with the use of tanks, armored cars, 

and trucks in cavalry roles and noted that aircraft had largely replaced 

horse cavalry in long-range reconnaissance.4

Allenby’s views found reflection in American cavalry developments 

throughout the interwar years. Increased emphasis on terrain use and 

maneuver to exploit the horse’s mobility complemented a parallel tactical 

emphasis on dispersion to reduce vulnerability. Cavalry organizations in 

general increased their firepower and motorized their trains and support 

services. They also pioneered antitank tactics and by the late 1930s were 

experimenting with “portée cavalry.” This type of cavalry relied on large 

trucks to move men and horses long distances via roads, restoring a degree 

of strategic mobility to the horse cavalry. In the parlance of a later generation, the horse became a battlefield taxi rather than a combat platform. 

Mounted charges remained a part of cavalry doctrine, but not the dominant 

expression of the mounted arm in combat.5

Interest in the use of tanks and motor vehicles in cavalry roles symbolized the branch’s willingness to experiment with new technology, but 

public law limited its ability to do so. The National Defense Act of 1920 
Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

established the guidelines under which the Army was organized and functioned in the interwar period. Section 17 assigned exclusive responsibility 

for tank development, including tactics and organization, to the Infantry. 

Hence, cavalry organizations could do little beyond exploring possibilities 

with armored cars.6

The 1st Cavalry Division served as a test-bed organization for such 

experimentation. It utilized a small number of armored cars to develop 

appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures for their use in reconnaissance and security roles. During maneuvers in 1929, the 1st Cavalry 

Division attached armored cars to one of its cavalry regiments. The vehicles operated 10 miles forward of their parent regiment, updating the latter 

on tactical developments via radio. The cars demonstrated their potential 

value as information gatherers, but the maneuver experience triggered 

interest in a variety of other activities, including antitank operations. The 

armored car’s attractiveness stemmed from its low cost in comparison to 

other combat vehicles and its weight. The 1st Cavalry Division continued 

to formulate principles to guide the use of armored cars in subsequent 

field exercises and maneuvers, stressing the value of radios to coordinate 

operations. The principal limitations to this groundbreaking work in vehicle reconnaissance stemmed from the mechanical frailty and road-bound 

nature of the armored cars in service.7

Parallel efforts occurred at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. 

In the 1934 maneuvers held there, scout car platoons were attached to 

Figure 3. Another early armored car showing some refinement in design.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
Chapter 1

horse cavalry squadrons to perform reconnaissance and track hostile 

mechanized forces. The wheeled, open-topped scout cars carried light 

armor protection and a machinegun armament. Platoons were augmented 

with a .50-caliber machinegun section to provide additional firepower and 

an antitank capability.8

The Cavalry School envisioned the permanent assignment of scout 

cars to cavalry regiments for reconnaissance. They were to penetrate hostile screens and report on enemy dispositions via radio. However, emerging doctrinal guidance discouraged commitment to battle or other actions 

that diverted the scout car from its primary role of information gathering: 

“The sole purpose of the reconnaissance vehicle with horse cavalry is to 

gather information by observation. Its use for combat will be accidental, 

emergency, or self-protective. It is employed in small group which are 

enjoyed to avoid fighting.”9

By 1936, reconnaissance developments at the Cavalry School and in 

the 1st Cavalry Division embraced both scout cars and armored cars. The 

scout car was a “wheeled fighting vehicle designed for reconnaissance 

and limited defensive action, high road speed, fair cross-country mobility, 

Figure 4. Principal cavalry leaders present at the 1934 Fort Riley maneuvers.

Armor Branch Archives
Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

heavy flexible firepower, and limited armor protection.” The armored car 

was “similar to the scout car, operates at greater distance from supporting troops, [and is] more effectively armored.”10

 Armored cars supported 

the cavalry division, while the regiment benefited from the assignment of 

scout cars. The distinct qualities of each car and their intended allotment 

reflected the reconnaissance needs of different command echelons.

Scout cars also supported regimental command and control functions. 

Their radios represented an important boost to the unit’s communications. During the 1934 Cavalry School maneuvers, scout cars provided 

additional radio support and served as radio relay stations.11 This function 

became an accepted role for scout cars, although it diverted them from 

reconnaissance missions. In 1936, the 6th Cavalry formally demonstrated 

this command support role at Fort Benning, Georgia. Subsequently, scout 

cars found themselves employed in similar activities, and regimental command and control became identified in horse cavalry doctrine as an acceptable secondary mission.12

Horse Cavalry Doctrine

The apex of interwar horse cavalry reconnaissance doctrinal thinking emerged with the publication of Cavalry Field Manual, Vol. I: Horse 

Figure 5. M1 Scout Car, distinguishable from armored cars by its open top 

and limited armor protection.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
Chapter 1

Cavalry in 1938. This manual governed the full range of cavalry missions and incorporated lessons learned in preceding years. It provided 

detailed guidance for the conduct of reconnaissance from individual 

scouts to entire units, including the scout car platoon. In the execution of reconnaissance, horse scouts were to avoid detection and hostile 

forces wherever possible, making careful use of terrain and inclement 

weather. Dismounted movement and observations were considered normal activities, particularly in rugged, wooded, or urban terrain. Trained 

to locate obstacles to movement, scouts used wire cutters to clear barbed 

wire—the principal obstacle to horse cavalry mobility. The entire focus of 

reconnaissance effort lay in the timely receipt of information to the unit 

commander. Hence, the timeline for the reconnaissance mission hinged on 

when the commander required the objective information.13

Reconnaissance patrols sought information on the enemy, but strove 

to avoid contact unless required by the mission. Reconnaissance by fire, 

nevertheless, was encouraged when observation alone could not disclose 

an enemy’s presence. In such instances:

After careful observation has failed to disclose the presence of the enemy, the scout leaves his observation point 

and boldly rides or walks in plain view to within 500 or 

600 yards of the area or locality, which he is reconnoitering. Suddenly, as though he had observed a target, he 

opens fire with his rifle on the suspected area. After firing one or more shots he turns and gallops or runs to the 

nearest cover. This procedure will almost invariably draw 

enemy fire if the locality is occupied.14

Security constituted another principal activity for horse cavalry. 

Like reconnaissance, security patrols sought the enemy’s presence. They 

oriented their movement on friendly forces and provided early warning 

of hostile activity. Unlike reconnaissance missions, security details 

bore responsibility for locating and engaging hostile elements. Through 

combat, security forces denied enemy patrols information on friendly 

activities and destroyed them if possible. Security operations entailed a 

degree of counterreconnaissance in addition to preventing surprise attacks. 

In their execution, the cavalry field manual considered combat a likely and 

frequent occurrence.15

Cavalry regiments included scout car platoons of 10 scout cars and 

4 motorcycles. The platoon headquarters consisted of one car and one 

motorcycle. Three scout sections, each with three cars and one motorcycle, completed the platoon. The motorcycle riders served as couriers and 
Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

relied on a professional skill set that included combat intelligence. They 

supplemented radio transmissions and often provided a firsthand description of enemy activity to the regimental command group. The scout car 

platoon possessed considerable firepower, high road mobility, and a long 

radius of action. These qualities permitted it to conduct reconnaissance 

beyond the normal range of horse patrols. The scout cars further achieved 

a degree of self-sufficiency through the delegation of basic maintenance 

tasks to vehicle crews.16

Reconnaissance constituted the scout car platoon’s primary mission. 

Sections generally operated together, with two forward and one in reserve. 

Movement occurred by bounds in which the leading car advanced and the 

rest of the section observed its movements, ready to pinpoint enemy locations or provide support as necessary. The manual outlined simple drills 

to govern movements through defiles, over bridges, and through small 

urban areas. However, dismounted operations were encouraged, particularly in wooded, urban, or rugged terrain. The section leader possessed 

considerable discretion as to the precise manner of executing his mission. 

The manual provided guiding principles only, encouraging commanders 

to make their dispositions according to the tactical situation rather than 

prescribed actions.17

Careful reconnaissance necessitated slow movement and frequent 

dismounted observation. This method provided the most detailed information, but it proved time-consuming. When rapid results were required, 

scout cars performed mounted reconnaissance. They moved quickly by 

Figure 6. Horse cavalry training at Fort Riley.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
10

Chapter 1

bounds until they encountered the enemy, employing reconnaissance by 

fire against suspected enemy positions. Mounted reconnaissance increased 

the possibility of unexpected contact. In the event of an ambush, scout 

cars were to “. . . go around an obstacle, mission permitting, rather than to 

engage in a prolonged fire fight or risk an unfavorable outcome.”18

 Still, 

when action could not be avoided and disengagement proved impossible, 

scout car crews employed basic fire and maneuver principles, fighting dismounted if more likely to generate success.19

Secondary missions for the scout car platoon included security, antitank, command support, seizure of distant objectives, harassment, and delay. 

Security actions followed the same principles as horse patrols and possessed 

an implicit information-gathering mission. The scout car’s firepower and 

ability to operate over long distances permitted it to maintain a screen line 

forward of the regiment. The .50-caliber machinegun arma­ment gave the 

scout car its antitank 

capability. Mobility 

and firepower also 

suited the needs of 

delay and harassment 

missions in which the 

objective lay in the 

disruption of enemy 

movements. By 

1938, the use of scout 

cars for command 

and control functions 

had become common 

enough to identify it 

as an acceptable secondary mission for the 

platoon. In this role, 

scout cars provided 

communications support to the regimental commander and 

performed liaison 

duties.20

In essence, the scout car platoon constituted a valuable asset for the 

regimental commander. With its radio communications, firepower, and 

mobility, the platoon proved multifunctional. Determining how to employ 

Figure 7. M3 Scout Car with full crew and weapons.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
11

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

it at any given moment was a decision for the regimental commander, 

who directed the platoon through his S2 in deference to the platoon’s 

primary information-gathering mission.21 The unit’s capabilities and 

value led to less than clear guidance concerning commitment to combat. 

The manual writers did not want to preclude combat actions nor did they 

wish to encourage the destruction of this highly prized asset in avoidable 

engagements. Therefore, the decision remained the purview of platoon, 

section, and car commanders. These leaders were reminded, “Sections and 

individual cars must never lose their freedom of maneuver by becoming 

too closely engaged. Leaders must be guided by the principal that the cars 

are intended essentially for reconnaissance and security purposes and not 

combat.”22

Mechanized Cavalry

The National Defense Act of 1920 placed primary responsibility for 

tank development with the Infantry. This law effectively discouraged 

experimentation with tactical organizations built around the tank that 

could perform roles other than infantry support. Although interest in such 

experimentation remained high, not until 1928 did the first significant 

deviation in mechanized development occur. In that year, the War 

Department established the Experimental Mechanized Force, patterned 

after a British organization with a similar name. The unit lasted less than 3

months before disbanding.23

In 1930, the Army undertook further experimentation with a mechanized unit through the creation of the Mechanized Force. This organization 

included representative elements from the different branches, but its principal combat power lay in its tanks. The Mechanized Force became a test 

bed to develop the organization and employment concepts of a mechanized 

unit through a series of maneuvers and field tests.24 In 1931, however, the 

budgetary impact of the Great Depression forced the Army leadership to 

choose between personnel retention and continued support for the mechanized force. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur considered 

people more important than machines and disbanded the innovative but 

expensive Mechanized Force.25

MacArthur believed in the value of mechanization for the entire 

Army. He, therefore, decentralized responsibility for further mechanized 

development among the branches. The Cavalry saw in this policy an 

opportunity to expand its work with scout cars and armored cars to include 

a broader range of tactical vehicles, including tanks. The 1st Cavalry 

Regiment replaced its horses with a motley collection of vehicles to 
12

Chapter 1

become the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) and relocated from Marfa, 

Texas, to Fort Knox, Kentucky, in 1933. There it joined remnants of the 

Mechanized Force previously renamed the Detachment for Mechanized 

Cavalry Regiment.26

In its early years, the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) functioned 

as an experimental unit, charged with determining the optimal organization, doctrine, and materiel for a mechanized cavalry regiment. The mission of the latter lay in the performance of independent operations and 

providing reconnaissance and security for a parent corps or army. Initial 

development built on concepts already established for horse cavalry organizations and on the experience of the Mechanized Force. In particular, 

the latter’s armored car troop received considerable attention in the formulation of reconnaissance doctrine for the new mechanized cavalry. The 

troop included 10 vehicles that routinely operated forward of the parent 

organization and reported on tactical and terrain conditions.27 This usage 

reflected similar use of armored cars by the 1st Cavalry Division.

Within the 1st Cavalry Regiment, the covering squadron included an 

armored car troop and a scout car troop with 10 and 7 vehicles, respectively.28

 Together with the rest of the regiment, the squadron made its 

maneuver debut during the 1934 Cavalry School maneuvers, which also 

Figure 8. The mechanized force on maneuvers.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
13

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

served as a field test of emerging mechanized cavalry concepts of employment and organization. In these maneuvers, the armored car and scout car 

troops performed different functions, the former ranging far ahead of the 

regiment while the latter remained just forward of the main body.

The covering squadron bore responsibility for reconnaissance and 

security operations. The armored car troop moved over a broad frontage, 

seeking hostile forces. Once located, the troop maintained contact and 

observed hostile activity until the regiment’s combat elements arrived. 

The armored cars then transitioned to flank security, observing the enemy 

while the regiment attacked, before resuming their forward reconnaissance. The cars often operated beyond the effective reach of friendly support. The troop functioned as a command element and two platoons. Each 

platoon in turn maneuvered as two sections with two armored cars and 

a motorcycle. The cars utilized the same bounding movement technique 

developed by the horse cavalry, while the motorcyclist performed detailed 

reconnaissance of select points. The scout car troop followed in the wake 

of the armored cars. It performed a security role for the regiment by identifying potential threats bypassed or missed by the armored cars. The scout 

cars also served to protect the regiment from ambush or surprise attack.29

Analysis of the maneuvers led to a reorganization of the 1st Cavalry. 

The covering squadron disappeared in favor of a single, expanded armored 

Figure 9. The 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) arriving at 

Fort Knox in 1933.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
14

Chapter 1

car troop. The latter grew to 17 armored cars, organized into 4 platoons. 

Platoon strength remained at four cars, subdivided into two sections. The 

troop headquarters included an armored car and a passenger car for command functions, three trucks for maintenance and supply, and five motorcycles intended for platoon attachment. Expansion of the armored car 

troop effectively streamlined the regiment’s reconnaissance and security 

assets. The replacement of scout cars with armored cars simplified supply 

and maintenance concerns. Tactically, the new troop organization eased 

command and control and provided greater flexibility of employment. 

It also ensured that the primary reconnaissance platforms possessed the 

same level of armored protection.30

The 1st Cavalry’s participation in the 1936 Second Army maneuvers 

provided an opportunity to field test the new armored car troop. In general, 

the armored cars, operating by platoons and sections, maneuvered far 

forward of the regiment to locate enemy positions and keep hostile forces 

encountered under observation. In the course of these activities, the armored 

cars also sought to locate and if possible destroy antitank weapons. These 

posed a threat to the regiment’s ability to maneuver and to its operational 

tempo. Overall, the armored cars did locate enemy concentrations and 

kept them under observation until the regiment’s advance guard arrived. 

The cars then sought routes around the enemy’s flank and continued to 

reconnoiter forward. When the regiment committed to an attack, the 

Figure 10. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) in 1934.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
15

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

armored car platoons assumed the role of flank security and tracked the 

battle’s progress. When combat operations diminished, they again advanced 

and resumed their leading reconnaissance efforts. However, the aggressive 

nature and rapid pace of the armored cars also triggered repeated contact 

with enemy forces and a correspondingly high loss rate. In the worst case, 

the troop lost half its strength in a single scenario.31

Nevertheless, the maneuver experience of the 1st Cavalry’s armored 

car troop demonstrated key principles guiding mechanized reconnaissance. 

The regiment depended on the timely receipt of information concerning 

the location of the enemy’s principal force concentrations. The armored 

car troop secured this information by thrusting its platoons and sections 

far forward of the regiment to aggressively probe for the enemy. Until they 

reached their objective, they bypassed obstacles and hostile patrols. They 

reported the location and size of each obstruction, but continued to press 

forward, relying on the firepower and ballistic protection of the armored 

cars to survive chance contacts. When the reconnaissance teams located 

their target objective, they kept the enemy under observation and reported 

all activity via radio. The regiment’s combat assets advanced to the point 

of contact, orienting their movements on the steady flow of information 

received. When they attacked, the role of the armored cars lay in monitoring the ensuing battle and seeking a favorable opportunity to continue 

their forward probing.

Figure 11. Mechanized cavalry armored car at Fort Riley for the 

1934 maneuvers.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
16

Chapter 1

Often the armored car troop resorted to hasty, mounted reconnaissance 

techniques rather than the more deliberate and stealthy approach preferred 

by the horse cavalry. Mechanized cavalry routinely sought a high operational tempo that placed them inside the enemy’s decision cycle. Hence, 

rapidity of action became a prized quality and permeated the actions of 

all regimental assets, including the armored car troop. The armored cars, 

characterized by their speed, long range, and relative quietness of operation, were suited to rapid forward movements and relied on their armor and 

weapons as security against surprise. However, the aggressive mounted 

reconnaissance practiced by the mechanized cavalry also entailed risk. In 

the Second Army maneuvers, it resulted in the rapid erosion of the 1st 

Cavalry’s information-gathering capability.32

The link between effective reconnaissance and the battlefield 

influence of the regiment became still clearer in 1937 and 1938. By then, 

the mechanized cavalry had expanded through the addition of the 13th 

Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) and the attachment of the 68th Field 

Artillery (Mechanized). The latter was charged with developing artillery 

techniques suited to mechanized units. Together with the 1st Cavalry, this 

grouping constituted the 7th Cavalry Brigade Mechanized, the Army’s 

only combined arms unit in the 1930s. This unit built on the pioneering 

efforts of the 1st Cavalry, including its groundbreaking work in mounted 

Figure 12. Combat cars, motorcycles, and halftracks of the 1st Cavalry 

Regiment (Mechanized) in 1936.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
17

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

reconnaissance. Since the brigade did not possess its own reconnaissance 

organization, the focus of information gathering remained the armored 

car troops within each regiment. Their diversion into secondary roles was 

discouraged. Although the horse cavalry regiments made use of their scout 

cars to support command functions, provide courier services, and act as 

radio relay stations, mechanized cavalry leaders found these practices 

counterproductive. They reduced the regimental commander’s ability to 

see and understand the battlefield.33

Conversely, by integrating air and ground reconnaissance platforms, 

commanders could increase their understanding of the battlefield long 

before they entered it. In 1938, the 7th Cavalry Brigade undertook a road 

march from Fort Knox to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, using aircraft to guide 

their movements. The return march ended in a maneuver on Fort Knox pitting the mechanized cavalry against an infantry brigade using innovative 

antitank tactics. Aircraft and armored cars ranged far ahead of the mechanized cavalry columns to begin identifying and reporting hostile troop 

locations. This information permitted the brigade leadership to plan its 

attack while en route to Fort Knox and then commence operations without 

pause when it reached the installation. The simulated battle ended with the 

mechanized cavalry poised to strike the rear of the infantry brigade despite 

the latter’s antitank measures, which received Army-wide acclaim.34

In these maneuvers, radio communications proved critical to the 

success of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. Radio provided the fastest means 

Figure 13. Mechanized cavalry halftracks, 1936.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
18

Chapter 1

of transmitting data over distance in the interwar era. The mechanized 

cavalry pioneered new techniques to exploit its capabilities, particularly 

the use of radio nets linked to command echelons and tactical functions. 

These nets provided a degree of communications flexibility that 

paralleled equally innovative command developments. These included 

the adoption of techniques similar in principal to those associated with 

mission type and fragmentary orders. The collective impact of state-ofthe-art communications technology and innovative command processes 

was a highly responsive and adaptive organization. It facilitated rapid 

decisionmaking and the transmission of orders, which in turn reduced the 

timelag between a command decision and its execution by subordinate 

leaders. These qualities relied on the timely receipt of accurate information 

from reconnaissance assets, making them the axis around which command 

and combat effectiveness spun.35

Unfortunately, the mechanized cavalry’s widespread reliance on radio 

communications was not reflected throughout the Army. Indeed, questions 

about the reliability of the radios themselves and the potential interception 

Figure 14. Mechanized cavalry combat car.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
19

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

of transmissions triggered a conservative policy toward radio use. The 

mechanized cavalry addressed operational security concerns through the 

adoption of command procedures that did not mandate sending details of 

unit activities over the airwaves. However, maneuver operations of the 7th 

Cavalry Brigade in 1937 and 1938 still incurred criticism for excessive 

radio use. The mechanized cavalry ignored these complaints, because radio 

use saved time otherwise spent writing and distributing orders by hand. It 

also facilitated the coordinated maneuver of dispersed combat elements. 

Consequently, mechanized organizations sustained a steady momentum 

during maneuvers, despite rugged terrain, innovative antitank tactics, and 

the careful use of terrain by opposing forces.36

The year 1938 marked the apex of mechanized reconnaissance doctrine development. The publication of the cavalry field manual included 

a separate volume dedicated to mechanized cavalry that incorporated the 

analysis and maneuver experience accumulated since 1931.

37

 The other 

volumes in the three-volume manual addressed cavalry operations in general and the horse cavalry in particular. Indeed, this manual represented a 

major milestone in cavalry development and its coverage of horse reconnaissance as noted above.

The volume devoted to the mechanized cavalry focused much of its 

guidance for reconnaissance operations on the armored car troop. This 

unit constituted the primary means of reconnaissance for the regiment 

and brigade, because the latter lacked its own information gathering 

organization. Much of the manual’s text confirmed the method of 

operation demonstrated in prior maneuvers. In all movements, the 

armored car troop preceded the regiment, commencing operations up to 2

hours before the main body. The troop functioned either independently or 

semi–independently, ranging far ahead of the parent regiment. It sought to 

gain contact with hostile forces and determine their size, composition, and 

flanks in time to shape regimental actions. The troop’s leadership began 

operations with a clear sense of the parent regiment’s mission, status, and 

orders. This information shaped the context of the reconnaissance mission 

and helped to coordinate the activities of the armored car troop and its 

parent regiment.38

The integration of aerial and ground reconnaissance was strongly 

encouraged, since an almost symbiotic relationship seemed to exist 

between them. Aircraft offered a means to identify advance routes for the 

troop and mark hostile roadblocks and battle positions. The armored cars 

could utilize this information to guide their own movements and retain a 

high speed of operations. Conversely, the cars could operate in weather 
20

Chapter 1

impenetrable from the air. Although experimentation with aircraft had 

been conducted, mechanized cavalry tables of organization included no 

organic airplanes.39

When the armored cars located enemy troop concentrations, they 

reported to regimental headquarters via radio and remained in contact to 

monitor hostile activity. The regimental commander used the information 

from his armored cars to guide the dispatch of combat assets to engage the 

enemy. However, the reconnaissance team remained vulnerable during the 

period between its location of the enemy force and the arrival of friendly 

forces to engage them. Doctrine required maintaining contact once established. Therefore, the reconnaissance team relied on stealth, mobility, and 

the armored car’s firepower and protection for survival.40

Once regimental combat assets advanced to engage the enemy 

concentration, the armored cars transitioned to flank security operations. 

They monitored enemy action and searched for his flanks. Alternatively, 

the regimental commander might employ the armored car troop as his 

reserve during combat. When the battle ended, the armored cars again 

moved forward to resume their reconnaissance, harass a retreating enemy, 

Figure 15. Chief of Cavalry Major General John K. Herr and 7th Cavalry 

Brigade (Mechanized) Commander Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee Jr. 

meet at Fort Knox, 1939.

Courtesy US Army Military History Institute
21

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

or cover the withdrawal of friendly forces. In this progression of activity, 

the armored cars continuously transitioned from one function to another. 

This ability was demonstrated during maneuvers and reinforced in training. 

The result was a versatile reconnaissance team that contributed far more 

to the overall success of the parent regiment than simply the provision of 

information. Indeed, the manual identified the seizure of distant, critical 

objectives as an acceptable special mission, well suited to the armored cars’ 

combination of far-ranging reconnaissance, firepower, and mobility.41

The armored car troop was intended to operate as a collection of 

platoons. The commander’s job lay in managing the separate activities 

of each platoon to satisfy a regimental objective, often oriented on the 

collection of specific information. The troop headquarters possessed few 

assets under its direct control other than one armored car, a passenger car, 

and several trucks for supply and maintenance purposes. Therefore, the 

troop commander was encouraged to retain one of his four platoons as a 

reserve. When available, this unit became the principal means by which he 

could reinforce or influence the action of his other platoons through direct 

action. The troop also included several motorcycles, but these generally 

supported the platoons as scouts and messengers and did not constitute a 

significant tactical force.42

The platoon included four armored cars and their crews divided into 

two two-car sections. The latter constituted the smallest unit considered 

viable for reconnaissance operations. Each platoon received a zone or 

route to reconnoiter. The former included a specified area, while the latter focused on a specific road or avenue of advance. The platoon leader 

often broke down these assignments into section assignments. All platoon 

and section movement occurred by bounds, with either one section or car 

always prepared to support the other. Vehicle crews trained to conduct 

mounted and dismounted operations, but observation and accurate reporting constituted their most important functions, particularly regarding terrain conditions and enemy activity. Such information proved critical for 

the terrain-sensitive mechanized cavalry to sustain a rapid pace of operations. The armored car platoons represented probing fingers, whose efforts 

guided the actions of their parent regiment. In later years, this linkage 

would become more commonly known as “recon-pull.”43

One of the most important decisions facing a platoon or section leader 

lay in whether or not to engage in combat. Doing so advertised the reconnaissance team’s presence and exposed it to possible destruction: “The 

temptation to engage targets of opportunity and fight its way through hostile detourable resistance encountered en route must be guarded against. 
22

Chapter 1

The most effective reconnaissance platoon is the one that sees without 

being seen.”44

This statement reflected a clear logic and the influence of horse cavalry doctrine. Even so, its inherent caution differed from the generally 

aggressive tone found throughout the mechanized cavalry volume of Field 

Manual (FM) 2-10, which emphasized the importance of rapid, decisive 

action. For example, under the discussion of armored car platoon operations, antitank guns were identified as priority targets. When encountered 

as part of a roadblock, the manual recommended their elimination through 

the employment of fire and movement tactics by the entire platoon. 

Techniques for employing armored cars in harassing attacks on enemy 

columns and in impeding hostile attacks through delaying actions relied 

heavily on firepower and mobility. In the case of ambush, armored cars 

were expected to retain their mobility and quickly establish fire supremacy. Clearly, the armored car was intended for something more than just 

stealthy observation.45

In effect, the critical decision to engage in or avoid combat remained 

with the platoon, section, and car commanders, much as it was left to scout 

car leaders in the horse cavalry regiment. The advantages and disadvantages of engagement were identified, but the reader was not bound to a 

particular course of action. This empowerment of junior leaders reflected 

the overall decentralization of command characteristic of the mechanized 

Figure 16. Armored car of the 13th Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized).

Courtesy Armor Magazine
23

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

cavalry. The operation of fast-moving teams over a broad frontage necessitated a flexible command and control structure. Armed with knowledge 

of the troop and regiment’s mission and their own orders, armored car 

platoon leaders were expected to act on their own discretion without waiting for guidance from higher, especially when enemy action jeopardized 

friendly plans: “When on a mission of battle reconnaissance the platoon 

commander upon his own initiative promptly and vigorously employs his 

maximum effectiveness to counter any hostile development which constitutes an immediate threat to the success of the regiment in combat.”46

The platform also influenced the decision to engage or avoid combat. 

The armored car in use was a fully armored vehicle with a machinegun 

armament carried in a revolving turret. Although it could not sustain hits 

from most antitank weapons, it could deflect small arms fire and protect 

the crew from fragmentation. The car could operate effectively on roads 

and hard surfaces, but its cross-country mobility, especially in rugged terrain, proved limited. Nevertheless, its .30-caliber and .50-caliber machineguns were capable of destroying soft targets and neutralizing light tanks 

and other thinly armored vehicles. In addition, the machineguns could be 

removed from the car and used to support dismounted operations. The 

combination of firepower and at least fair mobility made combat a viable, 

Figure 17. Mechanized cavalry scout car.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
24

Chapter 1

if not always the best, course of action. Armor protection “gives the car 

reasonable protection against small arms fire and a sense of security and 

protection to the crew which is conducive to boldness.”47

 It also helped to 

ensure survival during ambushes and chance encounters with the enemy.

The benefits of armor protection also affected the operability of reconnaissance vehicles. In an article published in the Cavalry Journal, these 

detrimental effects became the target of a cavalry officer who questioned 

the wisdom of any armor for armored and scout cars. In his view, armor 

reduced already poor off-road mobility, increased fuel consumption, 

reduced visibility, and raised the silhouette of both vehicles. Armor further 

encouraged the employment of the vehicles as machinegun platforms for 

combat rather than reconnaissance. Armor detracted from the ability of 

either vehicle to gather information, but it could not provide sufficient 

protection to the crew and vehicle without becoming too heavy for its mission. The article also postulated the potential benefits of removing armor 

protection:

In short, if the cavalry reconnaissance cars, by elimination of armor, can:

a. Increase road mobility

b. Reduce silhouette

c. Increase visibility for observers

d. Decrease fuel consumption per mile, thus increasing the range

e. Increase the effectiveness of weapons

f. Increase the speed and ease of replacement

g. Increase cross-country mobility

h. Reduce the temptation to use reconnaissance cars 

as fighting vehicles, why not eliminate armor 

from horse cavalry reconnaissance vehicles?48

This view amounted to heresy within the mechanized cavalry community. Colonel Charles L. Scott considered the article “. . . the most inane, 

asinine proposal that’s ever been submitted. To take such action would be 

the most backward step that the cavalry could possibly take. I am ashamed 

that the Cavalry Journal would even print it.”49

 Scott strongly supported 

some degree of armor protection and combat capability for reconnaissance units. He believed that any organization consistently in contact with 

enemy forces would eventually be required to fight, necessitating armor 

and weapons. He refuted the wisdom of an exclusively stealthy reconnaissance doctrine in which scouts moved in unarmored vehicles and eschewed 

combat. In his view, “One that is not trained and equipped to fight but on 
25

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

the contrary told to avoid combat under all conditions will always be a 

spineless adjunct to the regiment.”50

This difference of views reflected differences in emphasis concerning the nature of mounted reconnaissance. By the late 1930s, the mechanized cavalry embraced reconnaissance organizations with versatility and 

combat power. The horse cavalry favored the use of terrain and stealth to 

ensure survivability on the battlefield. This trend extended to reconnaissance and manifested itself in the preference for a light, mobile platform 

that was easily concealed and provided maximum visibility. While horse 

cavalry doctrine did not exclude combat from reconnaissance activities, it 

was not encouraged. Indeed, Fort Riley became the testing site for a small, 

unarmored wheeled vehicle intended as a possible replacement for motorcycles. Light and fast, early models suffered from insufficient power for 

tactical operations, but design modification and analysis continued. This 

effort led to the award of an Army contract in 1940 and the fielding in 1941 

of a small, lightweight truck better known as the jeep.51

For the mechanized cavalry, development of this platform constituted 

a misstep in the evolution of reconnaissance platforms precisely because 

it lacked armored protection. However, while the jeep remained a design 

concept, the 7th Cavalry Brigade began to receive new vehicles to replace 

its armored cars. The open-topped M3 scout car lacked the all-round armor 

protection of the armored cars, but it carried six men and a radio. It possessed similar armament to the armored car, but a skate ring along the top 

of the vehicle permitted its machineguns to be mounted and moved along 

the ring to fire in any direction. In addition, the weapons could be easily 

removed and fired from the ground to support dismounted operations. The 

open-topped configuration enhanced visibility and simplified passenger 

egress. M3 fielding increased the dismounted strength of the reconnaissance platoons, and it offered a mechanically more robust machine than 

the armored cars it replaced.52

The new scout cars made their debut during the First Army maneuvers in August 1939. This event demonstrated the viability of the reconnaissance principles developed by the 7th Cavalry Brigade in the 1930s. 

Reconnaissance platoons moved 2 hours in advance of their parent regiments and began collecting information on opposing force dispositions. 

They particularly sought to identify strongpoints, roadblocks, and antitank 

weapons, reporting via radio. Equipped with this information, the mechanized cavalry regiments quickly enveloped the opposing force before fanning out across its rear area, destroying one antitank position after another. 

Regimental combat assets moved faster than the opposing force could 
26

Chapter 1

react and with a precision impossible without the steady flow of information provided by the reconnaissance platoons. Once inside the enemy’s 

decision cycle, the 7th Cavalry Brigade remained there and accelerated the 

breakdown of resistance.53

The success of the mechanized cavalry stemmed largely from the 

widespread reliance on rapid communication via radio. At the time of the 

maneuvers, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) utilized 158 radios, 

the greatest concentration of radios throughout the Army. Robust communications complemented the success of the reconnaissance platoons in 

securing key information. However, the platoons often met hostile forces 

and the frequency of encounters increased the further they pushed into the 

enemy rear area. Reflecting on this experience, the brigade commander, 

Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee Jr., concluded, “Reconnaissance from 

unarmored vehicles is of doubtful value and very liable to be most costly 

in men and vehicles.”54

Mounted Reconnaissance in Transition 

Within days of the conclusion of the First Army maneuvers, Germany 

invaded Poland, precipitating the beginning of World War II. Within 

weeks, German mobile formations overran Poland and it ceased to exist as 

Figure 18. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) at the 

US Military Academy, 1939.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
27

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

a national entity. In the US Army, the lightning campaign triggered interest in a large-scale expansion of mechanization, but no consensus emerged 

to govern how this growth would occur. In May 1940, the Third Army 

maneuvers in Louisiana demonstrated the need to establish permanent 

mechanized divisions in lieu of improvised formations in the field. The 

same month marked the German invasion of France and the Lowlands. In 

a 6-week campaign in which German panzer and motorized infantry divisions played a prominent role, the French suffered defeat and occupation. 

These two events spurred the US Army to establish a separate organization to organize and train American formations similar in capability to the 

German panzer division.

Therefore, in July 

the Army created the 

Armored Force. It 

incorporated all tank 

units and the mechanized cavalry. These 

assets were reorganized to form the 

1st and 2d Armored 

Divisions and the 

70th Tank Battalion. 

The Armored Force 

consolidated the 

previously separate 

mechanization efforts 

of the Infantry and 

Cavalry. It focused 

on the fielding of 

armored divisions and 

the related development of doctrine and 

training programs. In 

the process, Armored 

Force leaders borrowed heavily from 

the experiences of 

the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). General Chaffee’s appointment 

as commander of the Armored Force embodied this linkage, because of 

his prior command of the 7th Cavalry Brigade and his prominent role in 

mechanized cavalry development throughout the 1930s.

Figure 19. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) 

at the 1939 World Fair in New York City.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
28

Chapter 1

These changes directly influenced the continued development of 

mounted reconnaissance. The Cavalry branch remained responsible for 

horse cavalry, special mixed horse and mechanized cavalry regiments, 

division cavalry assignments to infantry divisions, and motorcycle units. 

Nevertheless, reconnaissance development became much more constrained. Previously, it had been integral to all mounted doctrine and 

organizations, resulting in general purpose combat units with reconnaissance capabilities and components. The creation of the Armored Force 

severed this link. The Cavalry retained responsibility for reconnaissance 

doctrine, but not mechanized combat units in general. Hence, those 

mechanized assets left to the Cavalry began to transform into specialized 

organizations intended for reconnaissance only.

At first, this change seemed imperceptible. In August 1940, the Cavalry 

published FM 2-5, Horse Cavalry. This manual made few changes to the 

reconnaissance principles already established for horse cavalry, but the 

inclusion of illustrations and detailed guidance for the operation of reconnaissance and security patrols enhanced its training value. The emphasis 

given to the use of cover and concealment increased, reflecting the horse’s 

vulnerability on an increasingly mechanized battlefield. Reconnaissance 

patrols that encountered hostile armored vehicles were directed to scatter, seeking cover in rugged terrain and exploiting the horse’s greater tactical mobility. Whether to engage in combat or not remained the patrol 

leader’s decision—subject to rules of engagement established at the outset 

of a mission. In general, reconnaissance elements sought to avoid combat 

Figure 20. Horse cavalry along the US–Mexican border.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
29

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

except for self-preservation. Even so, the manual continued to acknowledge multiple instances in which combat was not only unavoidable but 

also intended, especially counterreconnaissance, screening, and security 

operations.55

Guidance for the scout car platoon in horse cavalry organizations similarly reflected few changes. The platoon retained its 10-car structure, and 

by 1940 was equipped with the same M3 scout car previously issued to 

the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). Reconnaissance remained the platoon’s primary mission, but additional functions included security, command support, communications, and combat. Each platoon maneuvered 

by section, employing bounding overwatch techniques for both reconnaissance and security operations. The manual replaced earlier requirements 

for soldiers to carry wire cutters to remove wire obstacles with a broader 

requirement for pioneer and demolition work. The platoon did not carry 

the special equipment to perform this action, instead relying on its provision from the parent troop when required. Since the scout cars were 

expected to operate near their troop headquarters, this arrangement was 

not considered a restraint on their activities.56

FM 2-5 proved an effective, well-written update to cavalry doctrine. 

What it could not and did not do was provide an overarching set of 

principles to guide Army reconnaissance. The manual offered little 

guidance for the development and employment of reconnaissance within 

the new armored divisions, which remained the purview of the Armored 

Force. The Army’s shift from horse to armored organizations ensured a 

reduction in the cavalry’s influence on mounted reconnaissance while that 

of the Armored Force grew. Exactly how these two organizations would 

influence reconnaissance development remained uncertain.
30

Chapter 1

Notes

1. US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

War Department Appropriation Bill for 1935 Military Activities, Hearings, Part 

1, 73d Congress, 2d Session, 1934, 302–303; Major General Leon B. Kromer, 

“Cavalry,” Lecture at the US Army War College (AWC), 1 October 1937, AWC 

Curricular Archives, US Army Military History Institute (MHI) Archives, Carlisle, 

PA; Major General John K. Herr, “The Cavalry,” Lecture at AWC, 19 September 

1938, AWC Curricular Archives, MHI Archives.

2. George S. Patton Jr. and Clarence C. Benson, “Mechanization and 

Cavalry,” Cavalry Journal XXXIX, no. 159 (April 1930): 234–240.

3. For examples of the Cavalry Journal’s interest in British cavalry 

operations in Palestine, see George E. Mitchell, “The Rout of the Turks by 

Allenby’s Cavalry,” Cavalry Journal XXIX, no. 119 (April 1920): 28–43; George 

E. Mitchell, “The Rout of the Turks by Allenby’s Cavalry,” Cavalry Journal

XXIX, no. 120 (July 1920): 174–205; Edward Davis, “The British Cavalry in 

Palestine and Syria,” Cavalry Journal XXXI, no. 127 (April 1922): 123–129; 

Edward Davis, “The British Cavalry in Palestine and Syria,” Cavalry Journal

XXXII, no. 130 (January 1923): 56–65; Edward Davis, “The British Cavalry in 

Palestine and Syria,” Cavalry Journal XXXII, no. 132 (July 1923): 286–295; 

Edward Davis, “The British Cavalry in Palestine and Syria,” Cavalry Journal

XXXII, no. 133 (October 1923): 435–444; J.R.H. Cruikshank, “From Acre to 

Aleppo with Allenby,” Cavalry Journal XXXIII, no. 134 (January 1924): 52–62; 

Edward Davis, “The British Cavalry in Palestine and Syria,” Cavalry Journal

XXXIII, no. 134 (January 1924): 47–51.

4. E.H.H. Allenby, “Letter to the Editor,” Cavalry Journal XXX, no. 122

(January 1921): 1–2.

5. US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

War Department Appropriation Bill for 1936 Military Activities, Hearings, Part 

I, 74th Congress, 1st Session, 1935, 355; US Congress, House, Subcommittee of 

the Committee on Appropriations, War Department Appropriation Bill for 1937 

Military Activities, Hearings, Part I, 74th Congress, 2d Session, 1936, 19–20; 

L.W. Cramer, “Portée Cavalry: An Experiment with Commercial Trucks,” Cavalry 

Journal XLIX, no. 3 (May–June 1940): 254–255.

6. US War Department, The National Defense Act Approved June 3, 

1916 as Amended by Act Approved August 29, 1916; Act Approved July 9, 1918; 

Act Approved February 28, 1919; Act Approved July 11, 1919; Act Approved 

September 29, 1919; Act Approved June 4, 1920, 1920, Section 17, 15.

7. The Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army Register (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1931), 1294; E.C. McGuire, “Armored Cars in 

the Cavalry Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XXXIX, no. 160 (July 1930): 386–399; 

George S. Patton Jr., “The 1929 Cavalry Division Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal

XXXIX, no. 158 (January 1930): 9–10; George S. Patton Jr., “Tactical Lessons 

Derived from the Cavalry Division Maneuvers, October, 1929,” 27 November 

1929, in The Patton Papers, Vol. I, ed. Martin Blumenson (Boston, MA: Houghton 

Mifflin Company, 1972), 865.
31

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

8. Major General Leon B. Kromer, Address at Cavalry School, 1934, 5, 

Leon B. Kromer Papers, MHI Archives; Lieutenant Colonel John Milikin, “The 

Fall Maneuvers of the Cavalry School—1934,” Cavalry Journal XLIV, no. 188 

(March–April 1935): 45–52.

9. Colonel Bruce Palmer, “The Cavalry,” Lecture at AWC, 12 October 

1936, 9, AWC Curricular Archives, MHI Archives.

10. Matthew Darlington Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies’: The Interwar 

Development of Mechanized Ground Reconnaissance” (Master of Arts Thesis, 

Florida State University, 2001), 88.

11. Miliken, “The Fall Maneuvers of the Cavalry School—1934,” 45.

12. Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Flynn, “The Part Played by the 6th Cavalry 

in the Infantry School Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XLV (September–October 

1936): 367–368. At this time, the .50-caliber machinegun was considered an 

effective weapon against the armored fighting vehicles then in use by most armies.

13. US War Department, Cavalry Field Manual, Vol. I: Horse Cavalry, 3

vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938), 199–209.

14. Ibid., 201.

15. Ibid., 203–205, 211.

16. Ibid., 273, 279.

17. Ibid., 274–277.

18. Ibid., 277.

19. Ibid., 276–277.

20. Ibid., 277–279.

21. Ibid., 274.

22. Ibid., 278.

23. Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Army Ground Forces Study 

No. 27, “The Armored Force, Command and Center,” 1946, 1–2.

24. Ibid., 2; Major Raymond E. McQuillen, Memorandum to Army War 

College Asst. Commandant, 1 March 1931, 25–26, AWC Curricular Archives, 

MHI Archives; Robert W. Grow, “The Ten Lean Years: From the Mechanized 

Force (1930),” 10, Robert W. Grow Papers, MHI Archives.

25. US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

War Department Appropriation Bill for 1933 Military Activities, Hearings, Part 1, 

72d Congress, 1st Session, 1932, 17–18; S.D. Badsey, “The American Experience 

of Armour,” in Armoured Warfare, ed. J.P. Harris and F.H. Toase (New York, NY: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 128.

26. Army Ground Forces Study No. 27, “The Armored Force, Command 

and Center,” 1946, 3; Major General (Retired) Robert W. Grow, “A Lesson in 

Mobile History,” Armor LXIII, no. 2 (March–April 1954): 3.

27. Grow, “A Lesson in Mobile History,” 3; Arthur Wilson, “With the 

Mechanized Force on Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XL, no. 166 (July–August 

1931): 5–9.

28. Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 64.

29. Major General Leon B. Kromer, Briefing, “The Cavalry Maneuvers, 

Fort Riley, Kansas, May 1934, June 1934,” Leon B. Kromer Papers, MHI 
32

Chapter 1

Archives; US Army Cavalry School, Academic Division, Mechanized Cavalry

(Fort Riley, KS: Cavalry School, 1932–33), 47; “The Cavalry Maneuvers at Fort 

Riley, Kansas, 1934,” Cavalry Journal XLIII (July–August 1934): 5–14.

30. Colonel Bruce Palmer, “Mechanized Cavalry in the Second Army 

Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XLV, no. 6 (November–December 1936): 461; 

Major Willis D. Crittenberger, Memorandum to CG, 7th Cavalry Brigade, Subj: 

Tables of Organization, T/O 423 P (Mecz), 5 July 1935, Office of the Chief of 

Cavalry, General Correspondence, Record Group (RG) 177, National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA); War Department, Cavalry Field Manual

Vol. II, Mechanized Cavalry, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1938), figure 1, 9.

31. Palmer, “Mechanized Cavalry in the Second Army Maneuvers,” 461–

478; Grow, “The Ten Lean Years: From the Mechanized Force (1930) to the 

Armored Force (1940),” 66.

32. Palmer, “The Cavalry,” Lecture at AWC, 12 October 1936, 4–5, 10–11.

33. Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 115.

34. Major General Daniel Van Voorhis, “Mechanization,” Lecture at AWC, 

29 September 1938, 19, in Army War College Lectures, 1938–39, Part 1, AWC 

Curricular Archives, MHI Archives; “The Mechanized Cavalry Takes the Field,” 

Cavalry Journal XLVII, no. 4 (July–August 1938): 291–300.

35. Cavalry Field Manual, Vol. II, Mechanized Cavalry, 133–134, 136–

139, 143–145; War Department, Cavalry Field Manual, Vol. III, Employment of 

Cavalry, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938), 82; Van 

Voorhis, “Mechanization,” Lecture at AWC, 13 October 1937, 9.

36. Discussion notes for lecture of Major General Van Voorhis at AWC titled 

“Mechanization,” 13 October 1937, 8, 9–11; “The Mechanized Cavalry Takes the 

Field,” 291, 296–297, 299, 300.

37. Cavalry Field Manual, Vol. II, Mechanized Cavalry.

38. Ibid., 92, 96, 102–106.

39. Ibid., 92, 94, 102–106.

40. Ibid., 103–104.

41. Ibid., 104–106.

42. Ibid., 102, figure 1.

43. Ibid., 97–102.

44. Ibid., 100.

45. Ibid., 98–99.

46. Ibid., 101.

47. Ibid., 94.

48. Major Clinton A. Pierce, “Armor for Horse Cavalry Reconnaissance 

Vehicles?”Cavalry Journal XLVII, no. 4 (July–August 1938): 327–328.

49. Quoted in Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 162.

50. Colonel Charles L. Scott, “Armor for Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles 

is Essential,” Cavalry Journal XLVII, no. 5 (September–October 1938): 430–

433.

51. “Notes from the Cavalry Board,” Cavalry Journal XLVII, no. 6 
33

Setting the Stage: The Interwar Era

(November–December 1938): 551; Doug Stewart, “Hail to the Jeep! Could We 

Have Won Without It?” Smithsonian (November 1992): 62–64.

52. Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Grow, “New Developments in the 

Organization and Equipment of Cavalry,” Cavalry Journal XLVIII, no. 3 (May–

June 1939): 204–207.

53. Adna R. Chaffee, “The Seventh Cavalry Brigade in the First Army 

Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XLVIII, no. 6 (November–December 1939): 450–

461; Adna R. Chaffee, “Mechanized Cavalry,” AWC Lecture, 29 September 1939, 

6, in “Army War College Lectures 1939–1940,” Part 2, AWC Curricular Archives, 

MHI Archives.

54. Chaffee, “Mechanized Cavalry,” AWC Lecture, 29 September 1939, 17, 

quotation from page 26.

55. War Department, FM 2-5, Cavalry Field Manual Horse Cavalry

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940).

56. Ibid., 255–264.

35

Chapter 2

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

From 1940 to 1945 the Army grew from a small national security force 

into one capable of sustaining a multiyear global conflict. The Armored 

Force expanded to 16 divisions by war’s end. Reconnaissance units similarly proliferated. Their early development marked the dual and sometimes contradictory influences of two competing schools of thought—one 

focused on stealth and the other on aggressive action and fighting for 

information. Operations in North Africa tended to validate both views. By 

early 1944, this duality ended with the adoption of standard organizations 

and materiel coupled with a doctrine that limited the scope of mechanized 

cavalry operations to information collection. This simplification did not 

survive arrival on the battlefields of Europe. Combat experience there led 

to an expansion of the missions associated with mounted reconnaissance 

units and general dissatisfaction with existing organizations. By the end of 

the war, a clear desire for more robust and versatile reconnaissance assets 

had emerged.

Something Old, Something New, 1940–41

The creation of the Armored Force in 1940 concentrated development responsibility for mechanized doctrine, training, organization, and 

materiel. The Armored Force facilitated the rapid creation of armored 

formations similar to those employed by the German Army, but no similar concentration of mounted reconnaissance responsibility occurred. It 

remained split between the Armored Force and the Cavalry. The former 

focused its efforts on the reconnaissance requirements of the armored division and the separate tank battalions. The Cavalry included reconnaissance 

assets in horse cavalry organizations, motorcycle units, the special horsemechanized regiments, and the triangular infantry divisions.

The large number of horse cavalry units in the Regular Army and 

National Guard ensured that the Cavalry retained responsibility for a 

large segment of the Army’s reconnaissance needs.1

 The mounted branch, 

however, considered itself a combat arm in which reconnaissance constituted just one of several missions performed. Field Manual (FM) 2-15, 

Employment of Cavalry, described the branch as “that combatant arm of 

the ground forces organized to perform missions requiring great mobility 

and firepower.” At the time of the manual’s publication in 1941, those missions included both mounted and dismounted attack, pursuit, exploitation, 
36

Chapter 2

defense, delaying action, reconnaissance, security, counterreconnaissance, 

and special operations. The last category included use in a reserve, liaison, 

or screening role.2

The manual categorized reconnaissance operations, drawing on the 

Army field service regulations. Distant reconnaissance sought information 

to influence strategic decisions and occurred at great distance from the parent formation. Close reconnaissance provided information to drive tactical 

decisionmaking and served as the basis for commanders to engage in combat. This reconnaissance began as opposing forces moved to contact. Battle 

reconnaissance included detailed information concerning enemy forces 

and terrain. It entailed continuous observation of the enemy before, during, and after a battle. Both horse and mechanized cavalry were expected 

to perform battle and close reconnaissance, but the ability of mechanized 

cavalry to move further via roads and sustain cross-country operations for 

longer periods made it the preferred agent for distant reconnaissance.3

Typical reconnaissance operations included zone, route, and locality. Zone reconnaissance occurred when enemy dispositions remained 

unknown or covered a broad frontage. Route reconnaissance focused on a 

particular axis of advance, while locality operations addressed a particular 

geographic area or terrain feature. To perform these operations and provide information in a timely manner to the parent formation, reconnaissance assets were expected to operate anywhere from 1 hour to 2 days in 

advance of the main body. This large time differential reflected the variety 

of mounts found in 1941 cavalry organizations and the need for reconnaissance to precede other operations.4

The manual considered zone reconnaissance to be the most frequent 

type of reconnaissance activity performed, and it provided detailed guidance on its conduct. It identified sustained rates of operation that ranged 

from 4 miles per hour for horse cavalry to 15 miles per hour for mechanized cavalry, subject to terrain and road conditions. Units receiving a 

zone mission subdivided geographic responsibility among subordinate 

detachments, coordinating their actions through time-oriented phase lines. 

Once the patrols identified a hostile presence, it became the subject of a 

more detailed locality, or area, reconnaissance. Where possible, mechanized cavalry performed the zone reconnaissance and slower moving but 

less terrain sensitive horse cavalry reconnoitered those specific localities 

occupied by the enemy.5

Detachments constituted the principal instrument of reconnaissance. 

Such elements corresponded to the reconnaissance patrols described in 

earlier manuals. The detachment’s main duty was to “. . . push forward 
37

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

in search of information in accordance with assigned missions. It must 

overcome or avoid hostile resistance encountered in order to obtain the 

information required.”6

 Clearly, detachments were expected to fight as 

necessary to gain the requisite information. Stealth remained the preferred 

method of operation, but “. . . it is frequently necessary for a detachment 

to engage in combat when its patrols are unable to penetrate the hostile 

screen. When combat becomes necessary, the detachment commander 

should employ his maximum combat strength at the time and place and 

under such conditions as appear most advantageous to accomplish the 

mission.” Similarly, counterreconnaissance missions included an implicit 

requirement for combat.7

In addition to FM 2-15, detailed guidance for vehicular reconnaissance emerged with an updated FM 2-10, Mechanized Elements. This 

manual addressed horse, motorcycle, horse-mechanized, and mechanized 

units. Mounted scouting from a vehicle retained the same principles that 

governed horse patrols. Scouts utilized cover and concealment, moved 

by bounds, and focused on information gathering. They were expected to 

conduct much of their work dismounted, because moving vehicles were 

Figure 21. Horse cavalry during pause in maneuver operations.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
38

Chapter 2

considered easier to spot than horses. Similarly, the difficulty of hearing and 

observing from a moving vehicle encouraged dismounted operations.8

The principal means of conducting reconnaissance remained the scout 

car platoon. In the triangular infantry division, the cavalry reconnaissance 

troop included a headquarters and three identical scout car platoons. Each 

platoon possessed 4 scout cars, 4 motorcycles, and 20 men divided into 

2 sections of 2 scouts and 2 motorcycles. The platoon normally operated 

together, but it could maneuver by section. Its principal function remained 

reconnaissance, but secondary missions suited to its firepower and mobility included security, delay, harassment, and counterreconnaissance. Use 

of the platoon for radio relay and command support ceased to be acceptable alternative roles.9

The new manual retained the doctrinal preference for stealthy reconnaissance, but it left the decision to enter combat with the platoon or section commander.

Combat is at times necessary in the accomplishment of 

scout car missions. The platoon leader and the leaders 

of sections and individual cars must decide when combat is necessary. Scout car elements must never lose 

their freedom of maneuver by becoming too closely 

engaged. Leaders must be guided by the rule that the cars 

are intended primarily for reconnaissance purposes, not 

combat, and that generally the best reconnaissance is performed by stealth. Scout cars, however, possess characteristics which make them a valuable agency for carrying 

out missions involving combat.10

In essence, the scout car platoon leader needed to understand his mission 

and intent. Through training and experience, he would develop the judgment necessary to determine whether to engage or avoid the enemy. The 

platoon leader needed to learn caution and restraint to conduct reconnaissance, but he required aggressiveness and decisiveness to execute security 

and counterreconnaissance missions successfully. Clearly, platoon leadership required the mental mobility stressed by the Cavalry throughout the 

interwar period.

This quality proved especially important in the horse-mechanized 

regiments intended for corps reconnaissance. These units tried to capitalize 

on the best traits of horse and mechanized cavalry. Intended to range up 

to 150 miles in advance of their parent corps, these regiments gathered 

information on enemy dispositions and coordinated their activities with 

division reconnaissance units operating closer to their parent formations. 
39

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

The importance attached to these units led to a desire to avoid their 

loss in combat. Therefore, emerging doctrine for their employment in 

reconnaissance operations encouraged the avoidance of combat except for 

self-preservation. In this development lay the foundation for subsequent 

wartime organizations and doctrine that considered reconnaissance and 

combat separate rather than integral functions.11

The Armored Force focused its energies on the organization and training of new armored divisions. These formations included an armored 

reconnaissance battalion. In November 1940, this unit constituted a combined arms team that included a headquarters, two reconnaissance companies, an armored infantry company, and a light tank company. Its vehicle 

complement totaled 13 light tanks, 48 scout cars, and 23 halftracks. This 

robust organization reflected similar organizations in German armored formations, particularly its inclusion of armored infantry to hold key objectives.12 The armored reconnaissance battalion’s role lay in the execution of 

distant and close reconnaissance missions that stemmed directly from the 

division commander’s intent.13

The armored division also included a reconnaissance company in its 

light armored regiment. Manned by 7 officers and 160 men, the company 

possessed a headquarters, three reconnaissance platoons, and a motorcycle 

platoon. Each reconnaissance platoon carried 1 officer and 25 men in four 

halftracks. These vehicles lacked the road mobility of scout cars and did 

not possess the cross-country mobility of a fully tracked vehicle. Nor did 

their light armor and open top constitute improved protection for passengers. However, the halftracks were intended as an interim measure pending the fielding of a suitable replacement to the scout car. Halftrack use 

reflected the challenge of mobilizing and equipping a mass army while the 

associated materiel remained in development.14

Armored reconnaissance doctrine retained the interwar preference for 

stealth. Furthermore, training and field exercises added new dimensions to 

the nature of reconnaissance. Armored leaders placed a premium on their 

reconnaissance assets and concluded that the enemy would do the same. 

Once discovered, he would attempt their destruction to keep their information gathering and transmission ability from enemy hands. This realization 

reinforced the importance of stealthy operations to avoid detection, but 

careful, deliberate reconnaissance required time. When conditions forced 

an acceleration of scouting activities, combat was more likely to occur. 

This conclusion, reinforced by the interwar experience of mechanized cavalry, provided a justification for ensuring reconnaissance units possessed 

armor protection and some degree of combat power.15
40

Chapter 2

While the armored division and regiment possessed organic reconnaissance capabilities, the separate tank battalions did not. These units were 

intended to provide armor support to infantry divisions as necessary. They 

included tanks with a limited maintenance capability. Doctrine assumed 

these battalions would operate in close proximity to the supported formation. However, maneuvers in the spring of 1941 demonstrated the limitations of these battalions. One armor officer found these units, with their 

lack of reconnaissance, fire support, and radios, to be:

. . . nothing more than a herd of elephants, and blind at 

that! In the Tennessee maneuvers, an attempt was made 

by the various high commanders to use them as mechanized troops, on mechanized missions, and it simply 

didn’t work. The tanks, lumbering down the road without 

any reconnaissance in front, would run into one anti-tank 

gun, and there die on the spot!16

When these maneuvers ended, the 2d Armored Division began testing a potential reconnaissance platoon organization for tank and armored 

infantry battalions at Fort Benning. The emerging platoon served to prevent 

the parent battalion’s blind operation. Test personnel and observers soon 

Figure 22. Light tank passing horse cavalry during maneuvers in 1941.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
41

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

found the same direct correlation between time and reconnaissance effectiveness noted in cavalry doctrine. Thorough reconnaissance of an area 

required considerable time to complete, especially given the emphasis on 

dismounted scouting to avoid ambushes in suspect terrain and locations.17

Guidance from the division commander, Major General George S. Patton 

Jr., further underscored the importance of dismounted reconnaissance:

When any of you gets to a place where your experience 

tells you there is apt to be an anti-tank gun or mine or 

some other devilish contrivance of the enemy, don’t ride 

up in your scout car or tank like a fat lady going shopping, 

stop your vehicle, take a walk or crawl and get a look but 

remember that in walking or crawling you must not go 

straight up the road, you must go well off to a flank probably as much as one thousand yards.18

Changes in the armored division’s structure further encouraged the 

development of a battalion reconnaissance element. Throughout 1941, the 

armored division composition underwent continuous change, generally 

increasing the formation’s vehicles and personnel. The armored brigade 

began to transition to a greater proportion of medium to light tanks, and all 

tank units were to include organic reconnaissance and support components. 

These measures made armor battalions more tactically self-sufficient, but 

it required time to develop doctrine for and train battalion reconnaissance 

platoons.19

1941 GHQ Maneuvers

The largest peacetime maneuvers in US Army history occurred in 

1941. These maneuvers, controlled by the General Headquarters (GHQ), 

involved several hundred thousand soldiers conducting operations in different states to test Army combat readiness. Those held in Louisiana and 

the Carolinas provided opportunities to evaluate the new armored formations, assess the relevance of horse cavalry, and determine the viability of 

the tank destroyer concept.20

They also provided an opportunity to review the state of mounted 

ground reconnaissance. Several different reconnaissance organizations participated, including the horse-mechanized cavalry regiment, the 

armored division reconnaissance battalion, the armored regiment reconnaissance company, and the new battalion reconnaissance platoon. More 

traditional horse cavalry organizations also participated together with their 

scout cars. The maneuvers provided the first chance to observe the operations of these units during realistic field army operations.
42

Chapter 2

For the Armored Force in general, the GHQ maneuvers highlighted 

significant deficiencies in training and leadership. The rapid creation and 

expansion of armored formations resulted in leaders at all command echelons still trying to master their responsibilities amidst simulated combat operations resulting in a number of tactical errors. Senior leaders 

possessed little experience and understanding of the correct methods of 

employing armored divisions. Consequently, participating armored divisions and tank battalions suffered a number of reverses and proved unable 

to replicate on simulated battlefields the real war successes of German 

panzer formations.21

Insufficient training and inexperience accounted for many of the 

difficulties experienced by armored units, but faulty reconnaissance also 

played a role. Armored reconnaissance units did not aggressively seek 

enemy weak points and did not effectively integrate their operations with 

attached observation aircraft. They remained excessively road bound and 

failed to perform route reconnaissance or seek alternate paths of advance 

around obstacles. Armored columns, therefore, remained unaware of 

nearby enemy units, blundered into obstacles and ambushes, and suffered 

unnecessary casualties and delays.22 During operations in Louisiana, for 

example, the inability to find a viable off-road route into hostile positions 

resulted in the 69th Armored Regiment becoming dispersed and lost amid 

the swamps and dense woods of the Kisatchie National Forest. Its vehicles 

became mired, dispersed, and fell victim to marauding antitank teams.23

The maneuver experience clearly demonstrated that armored reconnaissance principles and units remained in a learning phase. Tactical failures attributable to reconnaissance proved common. In some instances, the 

eagerness of commanders to attack without any reconnaissance resulted 

in avoidable losses. Frontal assaults by tanks against entrenched antitank 

guns and mad dashes into narrow town streets underscored the importance 

of maneuver units and reconnaissance working together toward common 

objectives. Too often, this type of coordination did not occur.24

Cavalry organizations used the maneuvers to demonstrate their 

continued battlefield relevancy and the effectiveness of changes in 

equipment, organization, and doctrine. Horse cavalry generally performed 

well in both the Louisiana and Carolina phases. They exploited their crosscountry mobility to advantage, unlike many vehicular organizations that 

remained road bound. Unfortunately, some horse cavalry reconnaissance 

proved equally as deficient as armored units, sometimes neglecting 

security missions. Scout car platoons often sought to emulate tanks and 

charge hostile positions, rather than reporting and bypassing opposition. In 

violation of doctrinal principles, scouts became embroiled in engagements 
43

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

that resulted in heavy losses and ended the parent unit’s ability to see and 

understand the battlefield.25

The horse-mechanized cavalry regiments faired poorly during the 

maneuvers. These units lacked sufficient forage and radio equipment, 

mandating the use of relay stations. Rapid strategic movement of the 

horses depended on specially designed trucks, but few of these had been 

delivered. Those available proved difficult to handle even on roads. 

General equipment shortfalls hampered operations, but the intervention of 

senior leaders made it impossible to assess the effectiveness of the horsemechanized mix. At the start of the maneuvers, these regiments were 

split and the horse and mechanized components employed separately. 

This action nullified the entire purpose of the mixed regiments, whose 

subsequent development was halted.26

Ineffective reconnaissance during the maneuvers reflected the state 

of flux surrounding their materiel, doctrine, personnel, and leadership. 

Similar problems characterized the Army as a whole as it struggled with 

large-scale expansion and new equipment fielding. The maneuver experience underscored the direct relation between successful reconnaissance 

and mission success—although too often through negative examples. 

The extended period of field operations identified deficiencies and guided 

subsequent training efforts. Mounted reconnaissance benefited from this 

experience, but remedial measures required time to effect.

The maneuvers marked the apex of Army interest in the motorcycle as 

a reconnaissance platform. Cavalry interest in motorcycles emerged in the 

1930s, inspired by reports of their use by European armies.27 The Cavalry 

incorporated both single and sidecar models into mounted units, including the horse-mechanized regiments. Motorcycle units participated in the 

maneuvers conducted by the Third Army in 1940 and the GHQ in 1941. 

However, the cycle types then available proved too fragile for military use 

and were prone to break down. They could not cope with sand, mud, rough 

terrain, or poor roads. Use by scouts was further hampered by the cycle’s 

tendency to overheat when idling or moving at low speeds.28

In 1941, the jeep (also known as the blitz buggy and peep) began to 

eclipse the motorcycle as a better utility vehicle with multiple applications, including reconnaissance. Design work began in the 1930s, when 

the Army began to pursue a small, lightweight, four-wheel-drive vehicle. 

In 1940, successful field tests led to the jeep’s initial production. With its 

fold-down windshield, 3-foot height, powerful engine, and rugged frame, 

this new vehicle quickly gained popularity throughout the Army. In 1941, 

it entered production and began to equip units in the field.29
44

Chapter 2

The jeep performed roles similar to those of the motorcycle, but it 

required far less maintenance, carried a radio, and attained sustained 

speeds of 60 miles per hour. It handled rough terrain better than the frail 

cycles, and competent drivers could be trained in a much shorter time than 

it took to produce skilled cyclists. These factors resulted in the gradual 

elimination of motorcycles from tactical roles after the GHQ maneuvers, 

but motorcycle units would remain in reconnaissance units throughout 

much of 1942.30

Cavalry experimentation with the jeep led to its adoption in the 

horse-mechanized regiments and division cavalry units. The 1st Cavalry 

Division’s reconnaissance squadron, which participated in the maneuvers, included a headquarters, two scout troops mounted on scout cars and 

motorcycles, a rifle troop mounted on jeeps, and a light tank company. For 

reconnaissance operations, jeeps preceded the movement of scout cars, 

providing the latter early warning of enemy forces, obstacles, and terrain. 

The jeep’s very low silhouette and mobility seemed ideally suited to scouting in which the ability to remain unseen was considered a key quality. The 

jeep’s lack of protection for the crew further encouraged stealth to ensure 

survivability. As it became more commonplace, the jeep’s particular characteristics began to influence the nature of reconnaissance, encouraging 

stealth at the expense of combat. Whereas scout cars offered reconnaissance patrol leaders the option of combat and some chance of survival in 

an ambush situation, the jeep did not.31

Figure 23. Horse cavalry advancing during the 1941 GHQ maneuvers.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
45

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

Reconnaissance in Transition, 1942

Large-scale expansion of the Army continued in the months following 

the GHQ maneuvers. In 1942 alone, the Armored Force grew from 3 to 

12 divisions. Reconnaissance organizations experienced a similar growth. 

Expansion generated new challenges for training and equipment fielding. 

It also led to a reorganization of Army leadership to facilitate management 

of a global war effort. In March 1942, the creation of the Army Ground 

Forces (AGF) centralized responsibility for training, doctrine, materiel 

development, and organization. It replaced the GHQ and triggered the 

abolition of the branch chiefs save the chief of the Armored Force.32

Leadership of the AGF fell to Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, 

who had commanded GHQ. During his tenure as AGF commander, his 

views exerted a dominant influence on tactical organizations and doctrine. McNair believed formations should include only those assets they 

required for routine operations. He undertook to streamline divisions by 

removing components he considered excess. By culling division designs, 

McNair sought to increase their tooth-to-tail ratio. The smaller formations 

that resulted required less shipping space for overseas transport, while 

those elements considered excess became pooled in a central reserve. 

They could then be assigned as needed to other combat organizations for 

select missions, thereby maximizing their employment and providing a 

boost in combat power where required. Pooling appeared to promote both 

efficiency and effectiveness.33

A strong proponent of mechanization, McNair opposed the cavalry’s 

continued reliance on horses. At his direction, all Regular Army separate 

cavalry regiments and the horse-mechanized regiments began to convert 

to mechanized cavalry organizations. The 1st Cavalry Division became 

an infantry formation in all but name, abandoning its horse cavalry heritage. The elimination of National Guard cavalry organizations before they 

could be federalized marked the end of horse cavalry.34

In September 1942, the Army approved McNair’s recommendation to 

convert all nondivision regiments into battalions. Those cavalry regiments 

already undergoing mechanization transitioned into smaller mechanized 

cavalry squadrons to be pooled for possible attachment to corps and army 

formations in place of the horse-mechanized cavalry regiments.35 At the 

division level, McNair disagreed with the need for a special organic reconnaissance unit and had once unsuccessfully fought to prevent its inclusion 

in the triangular division. By 1942, this formation possessed a mechanized 

cavalry troop. McNair did not remove it, but he did reduce its strength by 

one-fourth from 201 to 153 soldiers.36
46

Chapter 2

Despite these actions, the Army retained a tiered reconnaissance structure that included a reconnaissance unit at every echelon from army and 

corps formations down to tank and armored infantry battalions. Equipment 

for these organizations remained problematic throughout 1942. Pending 

the arrival of new materiel, units made do with whatever was available. 

In the armored division, reconnaissance companies assigned at the division and regiment levels proved entirely different in composition. While 

the armored reconnaissance battalion included companies built around a 

mix of motorcycles and scout cars, the reconnaissance company of the 

armored regiment relied on motorcycles and halftracks..37

The motley collection of platforms had a detrimental impact on training. Early doctrine made little distinction among them and did not provide 

specific guidance for the employment of each one. Nor was the distinction between reconnaissance and scout platoons a clear one. Presumably, 

cyclist scouts were vulnerable and dependent on stealth in their operations 

more than the heavily armored scout cars and halftracks, but the implications of this difference remained unclear. In most cases, unit commanders 

were responsible for the application of doctrinal principles resulting in a 

lack of uniformity in training.

Doctrinal and organizational clarity began to emerge in May 1942 

with the publication of FM 17-20, Employment of Armored Units, 

Reconnaissance Platoon and Company. The armored regiment and 

armored reconnaissance battalion now included the same reconnaissance 

company structure. It included a company headquarters and three identical 

reconnaissance platoons. The platoons constituted a combined arms team 

with two armored car sections, one scout section, one assault gun section, 

and a maintenance team.38 At the time of the manual’s publication, the 

armored car remained in development and its specifications could only 

be generalized. In the four-jeep scout section, two carried 60-mm mortars 

and two carried radios. The assault gun section included two halftracks, 

one mounting a 75-mm gun while the other carried ammunition. Each 

reconnaissance platoon was to be further supported by the attachment of a 

maintenance team from the company headquarters.39

The 1942 reconnaissance company was a powerful, self-sufficient 

organization. It reflected the preference for aggressive reconnaissance first 

manifest in the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and later embraced by 

the Armored Force. Within the company, “The armored reconnaissance 

platoon is a small tactical team consisting of mounted scouts capable 

of rapid and effective dismounted action, armored reconnaissance cars 

combining firepower, mobility, and all-around protection, supported by 
47

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

an assault gun section.”40 The scouts exploited the jeep’s low silhouette 

and quietness to provide a stealthy reconnaissance capability for the company. To offset their lack of protection, they relied on the firepower of the 

armored cars and the indirect fires of the assault gun.41

Overall, the reconnaissance platoon offered greater combat power 

than earlier configurations, but it remained weak in antitank measures. 

Plans for the armored cars included a 37-mm main armament.42 Although 

a similar weapon equipped most tanks in the armored division, on battlefields abroad it was proving increasingly ineffective against armored targets. It remained to be seen whether this deficiency would adversely affect 

American reconnaissance units when they operated in the presence of 

German armored and mechanized formations.

Armored car development accelerated in 1940–41 as part of the 

Army’s preparation for war. Light, medium, and heavy car designs were 

pursued, differing principally in the degree of armor protection carried. 

Other related projects included the development of a trackless tank and the 

development of still another armored car to meet British requirements. The 

variety of emerging designs included four-wheel and six-wheel versions 

and different levels of technological sophistication. They also reflected, 

to some degree, combat insights derived from the British and a desire to 

match the characteristics of German armored cars. However, the multiplicity of emerging designs lacked a uniformity of purpose and technical specifications. In 1942, General McNair ended this confusion through 

the establishment of a special board to review the various designs and 

select one for production and fielding. The board sought a cheap, light, and 

reliable platform for reconnaissance, settling on a Ford Motor Company 

design that became standardized as the M8 Light Armored Car. This decision overruled the preference of the Armored Force for a more robust, 

heavy car with a greater combat capability.43

Regardless of the armored car selected, the combat capability of the 

reconnaissance company suited its aggressive employment. According to 

FM 17-20:

The principal mission of all reconnaissance agencies is 

to obtain information required by higher authority and 

get it to the interested party in time to be useful. While 

it is highly desirable to obtain information without being 

detected, time is the important factor. The reconnaissance 

platoon and company must therefore be prepared at all 

times to act both intelligently and aggressively.44
48

Chapter 2

The manual’s authors fully expected such action to include combat, 

observing that “while information should be gathered without fighting, 

it is repeated that this is seldom possible and the reconnaissance platoon 

must be prepared to attack vigorously to accomplish its mission.”45

Reconnaissance operations faced a paradox. A clear preference existed 

for the undetected acquisition of information coupled with the realization 

that the time to do so would probably not be available. Therefore, the 

reconnaissance unit would have to move rapidly, increasing the likelihood of detection and/or combat. A direct correlation existed between the 

time available for reconnaissance and the quality of information obtained: 

“Unless adequate time is allowed reconnaissance agencies, information 

cannot be gathered in great detail.”46

Emerging doctrinal guidance for reconnaissance built on concepts 

developed in the interwar years. Zone, area, and route constituted the principal types of reconnaissance. In zone and route operations, the platoon 

moved via main roads unless forced to maneuver cross-country by the 

presence of hostile screening elements. The platoon leader accompanied 

one armored section and the assault gun element on the main route of 

advance. The scouts and other armored car section advanced along parallel routes. The platoon leader could realistically expect to cover two main 

routes, corresponding to each of his scout squads. He coordinated his platoon activities via radio to ensure the rapid transmission of information, 

and employed dismounted patrols to reconnoiter in the presence of strong 

hostile forces.47

Figure 24. Carrier vehicles to provide horse cavalry strategic mobility.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
49

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

Reconnaissance constituted the principal mission of the company 

and platoon, but doctrine anticipated potential employment in a variety 

of other missions. These included counterreconnaissance, security, attack, 

pursuit, defense, delay, withdrawal, and special operations (e.g., the rapid 

seizure of key objectives).48 Such missions carried a strong association 

with combat. Indeed, in their execution information gathering assumed 

a subordinate role to engaging enemy forces. However, as with earlier 

guidance, the determination as to when and whether to engage in combat 

remained with the platoon or section leader. It was a judgment call that 

would depend on training and experience.

By mid-1942, reconnaissance training had improved considerably 

since the first days of the Armored Force. The emergence of clear 

principles facilitated the training of reconnaissance personnel within 

the armored division and other mounted units. Clarification of concept 

tended to increase the degree of specialization. Basic skills included those 

required of all soldiers coupled with radio operation, map reading, aerial 

photograph interpretation, dismounted patrolling, navigation, armored 

vehicle identification, and the handling of prisoners. Scouts also learned the 

techniques of observation, reporting, and reading signs and tracks—very 

much a cavalry legacy. Uniform guidance improved unit training, providing 

graduated exercises and clear objectives for individual instruction through 

company operations. In FM 17-20, unit commanders received a detailed 

outline to help structure training activities, an invaluable asset for newly 

established reconnaissance organizations.49

Tank battalion reconnaissance platoons differed fundamentally from 

the platoons of the armored reconnaissance companies. The former 

included a halftrack, 4 jeeps, 2 motorcycles, and 26 men. The motorcycles 

acted as messengers rather than scouts, and the halftrack served as the 

platoon’s headquarters platform, carrying the platoon leader and platoon 

sergeant. It provided the principal radio link to the battalion command net. 

This platoon structure served both the separate tank battalions and those 

of the armored divisions.50

FM 17-33, The Armored Battalion, was the principal source of doctrinal guidance for the tank battalion reconnaissance platoon. The platoon 

operated in close proximity to the parent battalion, providing reconnaissance and security within its means. It reconnoitered in advance of the 

battalion, participated in advance guard operations, and helped determine 

assembly area and rallying point locations. During combat operations, the 

reconnaissance platoon trailed the reserve tank company, maintained contact with adjacent units, or provided a flank screen. Ill equipped for combat 

operations, the platoon was expected to remain clear of engagements.51
50

Chapter 2

Reconnaissance platoon activities necessarily focused on information 

gathering and observation. It lacked the combat power to either fight to 

secure intelligence or counter all but the lightest of enemy patrols. When 

the battalion advanced, the reconnaissance platoon preceded it with both 

sections on line and dispersed to cover the greatest frontage. The platoon 

leader and halftrack followed, moving along the main route of advance. 

The platoon’s role lay in reporting all signs of enemy activity. When the 

parent battalion moved as a part of a larger force, the reconnaissance platoon provided flank security by moving parallel to the battalion, its sections 

advancing from one observation point to another. In defensive operations, 

the platoon conducted terrain analysis, assisted the movement of tanks to 

counterattack locations, maintained patrols between battle positions, or 

constituted part of the reserve. When the battalion engaged enemy forces, 

the reconnaissance platoon monitored the battle’s progress.52

In all of these actions, the platoon was expected to perform its mission 

without recourse to combat. It patrolled, observed, and relied on stealth to 

avoid detection. In the presence of hostile forces, FM 17-33 encouraged 

soldiers to operate dismounted, while battalion commanders were cautioned to “not use the reconnaissance platoon as a point.” Such guidance 

reflected the jeep’s vulnerability and the limited combat power of the platoon. Instead, other battalion assets were to conduct those reconnaissance 

Figure 25. The M8 Howitzer Motor Carriage, which provided fire support for 

the mechanized cavalry.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
51

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

and security actions likely to result in combat. Light tanks, for example, 

were to “feel out weak points in enemy resistance.” They screened the 

battalion’s advance when encounters with hostile forces might occur and 

routinely worked with the reconnaissance platoon in the performance of 

flank and rear guard missions.53

Aside from published doctrine, analysis of foreign combat experiences provided insights regarding the actual use of reconnaissance on the 

battlefield. In 1942, Major General Charles L. Scott served as an observer 

with the British Eighth Army in North Africa before assuming command 

of the Armored Force Replacement Training Center. He played a leading role in the development of the interwar mechanized cavalry and similarly helped to guide the Armored Force. Scott, an outspoken advocate of 

armed and armored reconnaissance, considered his views vindicated by 

the nature of operations in North Africa. There, the nonlinear nature of 

the battlefield underscored the importance of security operations by organizations possessing combat power. According to Scott, “This protection 

cannot be afforded by observation alone, but only by elements possessing 

some ‘punch.’”54

He denounced as unrealistic reconnaissance concepts based on avoidance of combat. The prevalence of motorized and mechanized assets effectively eliminated the mobility differential between reconnaissance units 

and combat organizations. Against an opponent who employed combat 

and security units with similar mobility to friendly reconnaissance, the 

ability of the latter to conduct undetected observation and evade contact 

diminished. He concluded:

Weak reconnaissance can get nowhere on its mission 

against this much stronger opposition. On the other hand, 

on many occasions it will be overrun and destroyed before 

it can obtain any information of value. Also, on occasions 

in the desert, it was not even possible for weak reconnaissance to pause long enough to send in valuable information that had been collected, and it was not unusual to see 

light, long distance reconnaissance piling pell mell back 

on the main body just ahead of a strong surprise attack. 

In this day and age, long distance reconnaissance must be 

organized to fight in execution of its mission, to fight for 

time to send information in, and to fight for time for the 

main body to properly utilize the information sent in.

55

Through his observation of reconnaissance operations by German 

and British forces, Scott noted a pattern of transition that underscored the 
52

Chapter 2

importance of multicapable reconnaissance units. Initially, reconnaissance 

ranged ahead of friendly forces, seeking to find the enemy. Speed and 

observation constituted the most important qualities during this phase. 

Once contact was achieved with the enemy, the reconnaissance unit 

needed to continue tracking the hostile presence while friendly combat 

forces advanced to engage them. The reconnaissance unit then shifted to 

a flank security role while observing the flow of battle. Without sufficient 

combat power, reconnaissance organizations could neither sustain contact 

nor provide effective security. Scott reasoned, “A long distance reconnaissance unit, organized only to observe, is not worth its salt, let alone the 

road space it consumes.” The armored division reconnaissance battalion 

appeared to possess the range of qualities he considered essential for successful operations on a fluid, nonlinear battlefield.56

Scott’s views, influential as they were within the Armored Force community, were not the only ones to shape mounted reconnaissance. A collection of ideas and concepts that reflected maneuver experiences, foreign 

developments, training needs, and materiel coalesced to provide a doctrinal 

foundation. By the close of 1942, mounted reconnaissance became characterized by an emerging clarity of doctrine, tactical principles, and organization. Within the tank battalions, the reconnaissance platoons served 

largely as information gathering organizations. At regiment and division 

levels, however, the armored reconnaissance companies constituted more 

robust organizations capable of fighting for information. Related doctrine 

acknowledged the likelihood of combat occurring during reconnaissance 

missions and offered guidance for the junior leaders who had to make the 

decision whether or not to engage. Above the division mounted reconnaissance remained a work in progress. The mechanization of horse cavalry 

units provided a pool of reconnaissance assets, but the precise manner of 

their organization and assignment remained unclear.

Combat Operations in North Africa and Italy

The first application of the reconnaissance principles developed since 

the interwar years occurred in North Africa. In November 1942, American 

forces constituted a large percentage of the Allied forces that invaded the 

Vichy French colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Subsequent operations pitted them against veteran German and Italian formations fighting 

to maintain an Axis presence in North Africa. The campaign ended in 

May 1943 with the surrender of the surviving German and Italian forces 

in Tunisia, but not without significant combat operations that revealed the 

strengths and weaknesses of American reconnaissance.
53

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Armored 

Division and the separate 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron played 

prominent roles throughout the campaign. These units represented mobile, 

general-purpose organizations, capable of a variety of missions. This versatility served them well in North Africa. The 81st Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion secured key objectives, conducted raids, performed advance 

guard operations, collected information on terrain conditions and enemy 

forces, established and maintained observation posts (OPs), and operated 

mounted patrols. It also performed security and economy of force missions. 

Often dispersed over great distances, the subordinate companies did not 

always possess adequate self-sufficiency or combat power. Engagements 

with enemy forces, including German armor, proved frequent. During the 

fighting at Kasserine, the battalion lost an entire company while conducting delaying actions against German combined arms teams.57

The 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron also performed a variety 

of actions. It sustained contact between divisions and spent several weeks 

in a static role, defending a section of the front line. It operated as a dismounted organization, participating in several attacks on foot supported 

by weapons removed from their vehicles. Like the 81st Battalion, the 

reconnaissance squadron had to struggle to overcome German combined 

arms counterreconnaissance teams, since neither organization possessed a 

particularly strong antitank capability.58

The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the 91st Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron constituted the largest reconnaissance units 

employed in North Africa. Their operations, therefore, dominated subsequent analysis, but several cavalry reconnaissance troops also participated 

in the campaign, serving with infantry divisions. Like the larger reconnaissance organizations, these troops often performed a variety of activities other than information collection. They, too, experienced difficulties 

in encounters with German combat reconnaissance teams that possessed 

greater firepower. Therefore, the cavalry reconnaissance troops often relied 

on augmentation from division assets, including attached tank destroyers. 

Nevertheless, the troops proved too small. They could not sustain continuous operations or concentrate sufficient combat power to fight for information. Unlike larger organizations, they could not rotate their subordinate 

reconnaissance elements to prevent excessive wear and fatigue.59

Opinions concerning the effectiveness of the battalion reconnaissance 

platoons proved mixed. Light tanks often performed those functions likely 

to result in combat, while the lighter jeeps observed their action. The commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment employed his jeep 
54

Chapter 2

scouts only when he felt confident they would not encounter hostile antitank weapons. The jeep scouts observed activities and ground conditions, 

reporting directly to the battalion commander. However, their limited 

armament and lack of armor protection minimized their employment. In 

the words of the battalion commander, “I need Rcn [reconnaissance] and 

did not have it and was seriously hampered. I had to use my light tanks for 

reconnaissance.”60

In the 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, the reconnaissance platoon remained close to the main battalion column. Forward of it roved a 

platoon from the regiment’s reconnaissance company. This leading platoon performed distant scouting for the battalion. However, even this layered reconnaissance could not offset the limited protection and firepower 

of the vehicles used: “Whenever they ran into heavy stuff they had to 

turn and come back and could then secure no information.” They proved 

more effective when they could establish observation points and report on 

enemy activity undetected.61

Analysis of reconnaissance operations by 1st and 2d Armored Division 

personnel stressed the importance of maintaining contact with the enemy 

once established. At Kasserine, reconnaissance patrols lacked aggressiveness and failed to maintain contact with the German forces.62 In some 

instances, jeep scouts found the enemy, but lost contact while maneuvering 

to protect themselves. These occurrences led to the following conclusion: 

“It is seldom that the desired information can be obtained without fighting 

for it.” Proposed changes to the organization of the armored reconnaissance battalions focused on increasing combat power and ensuring the 

availability of the right type of weapons. In particular, heavier support 

Figure 26. The Tunisian battlefield.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
55

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

weapons were recommended, capable of firing a heavier high-explosive 

round, and the provision of the light tank company with 75-mm guns.63

The jeep-equipped scout sections possessed minimal protection and 

combat power. They often received augmentation from battalion and 

squadron commanders to boost their survivability and provide them some 

degree of firepower. Light tanks, assault guns, armored cars, and mortars 

proved common attachments, but uniform principles did not govern such 

reinforcement. The type and quantity of attachment varied from unit to 

unit. Ironically, enhanced scout units often departed from stealthy reconnaissance techniques, instead employing the same fire and maneuver concepts common throughout the Army. Support units fired on the objective 

to suppress the enemy or force him to reveal his position while maneuver 

elements moved on to the objective.64 Such practices reflected the frustration encountered by scouts who understood too well that “if reconnaissance units do not overcome enemy reconnaissance units or small forward 

positions, the advance will be held up. Reconnaissance units have no difficulty in determining when they have reached an obstacle beyond their 

capabilities.”65

These observations underscored the importance of configuring reconnaissance units with sufficient combat power to fight for information 

and to overcome German security and counterreconnaissance measures. 

However, battlefield experience also confirmed the value of undetected 

information collection. Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Hoy commanded 

the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. He found the insertion of 

small teams into an enemy-held area to be the most effective means of 

securing information. In his view, 

The best jobs that we have done have been where lieutenants with a small crew, through cunning and daring, 

get an OP deep in the enemy territory, or on his flank, 

and sit there for hours and report vital information. We 

used to say about such things, “OK for maneuvers, but 

not in war.” This is not so. As an example, I had a lieutenant and three men go up on an OP about 4-5000 yards in 

enemy territory, stay there for two days with a radio set 

dismounted from a peep, and send back the information 

necessary.66

In fact, much of the information gathering done by Hoy’s battalion 

occurred through dismounted patrols and extensive use of OPs established 

by stealth. When reconnaissance platoons moving by bounds encountered 

the enemy and began taking fire, the scouts dismounted and sought cover. 
56

Chapter 2

The platoon leader scanned the terrain to locate a good location for an 

observation point. He assembled a small team, removed a radio from one of 

the vehicles, and dispatched the team on foot to the observation point.67

Despite the frequency of combat experienced by his unit, Hoy feared 

the accretion of too much combat power in reconnaissance organizations. 

In his words:

Beware of that misused word “firepower.” Don’t tie a 

reconnaissance unit down with tanks, 81-mm mortars, 

37 SP [self-propelled] guns, because it makes the unit 

too unwieldy, and few officers can take care of all those 

additions and still do the job of gathering information. 

Understand me, I am in complete accord with General 

Scott’s statement that “Reconnaissance capable of only 

observation is not worth the road space it takes.” The 

reconnaissance unit should have sufficient firepower, but 

too much is as bad as too little. Anyone in a reconnaissance unit who is not primarily a reconnaissance man 

must be there for a very good reason. If I get the armored 

car, then I don’t want the light tank.68

The 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron commander considered 

his unit unbalanced. Its personnel strength proved insufficient for the number of vehicles and weapons included in its organization. Command and 

control problems resulted at the platoon level. The platoon leader struggled 

to coordinate the reconnaissance work of his scouts while simultaneously 

managing different types of weapons and vehicles. This difficulty led to 

the recommendation to add a second officer to each platoon responsible 

for effectively employing the unit’s weapons. Freed from these duties, the 

platoon leader could concentrate on the action of his scouts.69

No amount of organizational change, however, could overcome the 

inexperience that plagued American reconnaissance efforts in North 

Africa. Unit commanders too often did not understand the ground on which 

they fought and received little assistance from their scouts, who similarly 

struggled to make sense of their environment. Lacking accurate maps, 

they learned the terrain by moving over it.70 Maneuver units, dependent 

on accurate information of both the enemy and the terrain, suffered. In the 

1st Armored Regiment, one commander noted, “In tank fighting nothing 

is more important than expert reconnaissance of your routes of advance 

and withdrawal. Several times both we and the Germans have moved up 

on what we thought was a good clear route only to find a dry wash nine or 

ten feet high blocking our way, causing us to withdraw.”71
57

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

The inability to read the terrain and understand its implications for 

the movement of armored units endangered combat organizations. During 

the fighting around Faïd Pass, this lack of awareness resulted in American 

tanks blindly advancing along a route dominated by German antitank guns 

that decimated the armored column.72 Similar failures during the retreat of 

the 1st Armored Division during the fighting at Kasserine Pass resulted in 

the loss of nearly 150 vehicles. Poor route reconnaissance resulted in the 

vehicles becoming mired and abandoned.73

Such failures were attributed to training rather than materiel deficiencies. The jeep’s vulnerability led to questions about its battlefield utility, 

but these did not prevent its employment in dangerous environments. 

During tank engagements near Faïd Pass, “Our reconnaissance suffered 

less than anything else, yet they were right in the middle of it, but they 

were in peeps and could skid around.”74 Ironically, the armored halftrack 

became a more maligned platform than the jeep. Despite its better protection, the halftrack lacked effective cross-country mobility. It routinely 

threw its tracks, requiring either the vehicle’s abandonment or the timeconsuming work of replacing the track. Nevertheless, efforts to improve 

the firepower of battalion reconnaissance platoons included recommendations to mount a 37-mm gun on the organic halftrack as a counter to more 

heavily armed German patrols.75

This proposal became one of many surrounding reconnaissance operations to arise from the North African campaign. However, this combat 

experience did not result in a single set of reconnaissance principles. 

Instead, it tended to validate both the armed, aggressive style favored in 

the Armored Force and the stealthy, observation-oriented method promoted by the Cavalry School. These concepts were not mutually exclusive. Advocates of stealthy reconnaissance acknowledged the need for 

combat, and armed reconnaissance proponents similarly stressed the value 

of undetected operations whenever possible.

The Sicilian campaign of July–August 1943 provided additional 

experience for mounted reconnaissance. The Cavalry School considered 

the experiences of the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, 3d Infantry 

Division indicative of the correct manner of employing the division troop. 

Reconnaissance constituted the primary role of this unit. During the initial 

invasion landings, a dismounted platoon from the troop performed route 

reconnaissance, flank security, and sought enemy counterattack forces. 

Once clear of the beaches, the troop moved forward of the division, conducting route reconnaissance. It routinely sought to gain and maintain contact without losing its ability to maneuver through combat. It performed 
58

Chapter 2

a deliberate, dismounted reconnaissance of a fortified position, detected 

and cleared mines, and successfully sought alternate paths around enemy 

opposition. However, the troop also seized key objectives in advance of 

the division, including a bridge that had to be cleared of demolitions. It 

exploited favorable opportunities to ambush enemy columns and provided 

flank security. When reconnaissance platoons encountered the enemy, they 

dismounted and observed. They provided information to the division that 

often led to an infantry assault or artillery strike on the enemy position. 

The troop concluded the campaign by directing artillery fire on Axis forces 

withdrawing by boat to the Italian mainland.76

The 3d Cavalry Troop’s experience in Sicily exemplified the reconnaissance principles embraced by the Cavalry School. Reliance on dismounted patrols, maneuver, and observation constituted the principal 

forms of securing information. The unit clearly followed the basic dictum 

of see the enemy first, report the information, develop a plan of action 

in conjunction with friendly combat elements, and execute the mission. 

Combat occurred but only under favorable conditions or when no alternative existed. It did not constitute the first or even primary means of securing information. Through close coordination with the parent formation, 

the cavalry troop relied on division assets to eliminate obstacles.

The success of the 3d Cavalry Troop stemmed at least in part from 

the disorganized state of Axis defenses in Sicily. On the Italian mainland, 

Figure 27. Reconnaissance column halts for map consultation in North Africa.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
59

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

the rugged terrain and static nature of the operational environment 

precluded similar operations. Unable to operate according to doctrine, 

reconnaissance assets found employment in other roles. Scouts served as 

infantry in mountainous terrain, light tanks guided pack-mule trains and 

provided infantry support, whereas assault guns served as mobile artillery. 

In the 34th Infantry Division, the mechanized reconnaissance troop often 

entered combat as dismounted foot soldiers. Even during periods of limited 

advances, the presence of powerful German forces prevented reconnaissance 

units from forging far in advance of the main body of friendly forces. One 

reconnaissance troop reported its routine inability to advance more than 

500 yards from its parent formation due to determined resistance.77

Opportunities to employ mechanized cavalry aggressively and 

penetrate hostile lines arose only during the pursuit of German forces 

following the fall of Rome and again during the final collapse of resistance 

at the war’s end. In the former case, the 81st Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion advanced as a collection of combined arms teams, each including 

additional infantry, artillery forward observers, tank destroyers, and at 

least one engineer officer. Overhead, spotter aircraft acted as aerial scouts. 

The combat power of these teams was concentrated wherever possible 

to overcome resistance. In these operations, combat and pursuit took 

precedence over reconnaissance.78

Refining Reconnaissance, 1943–44

In the wake of the North African campaign, the Army force structure 

continued to change. The period 1943–44 witnessed the culmination of 

General McNair’s efforts to streamline combat organizations and standardize them. The Army adopted a flexible corps design that included only 

staff and signal elements as organic. All other assets were assigned from 

theater and army headquarters. The corps became a generic command 

whose components varied according to mission and available forces.

Similarly, the emergence of the group headquarters provided a controlling influence for those units pooled together for attachment. Tank 

destroyer and separate tank battalions, for example, could now be attached 

individually to particular corps and divisions, or they could be consolidated under a group headquarters and employed together. Like the corps, 

these groups possessed no permanent tactical units. They facilitated the 

employment of at least two tank or tank destroyer battalions and could 

accommodate attachments of other unit types.

The conversion of separate cavalry regiments into mechanized cavalry squadrons provided a pool of reconnaissance assets for attachment to 
60

Chapter 2

corps and army formations. In this role, the squadrons were subordinated 

to a cavalry group headquarters, which operated under the direct control 

of the corps or army commander. The group headquarters facilitated the 

dispersed operation of at least two cavalry mechanized reconnaissance 

squadrons. Like the tank and tank destroyer groups, the cavalry groups 

lacked permanent troop assignments, but they had no limits on the type 

of units that might be temporarily attached to them. The emergence of the 

flexible cavalry group marked the final step in the provision of a corps 

reconnaissance element to replace the now defunct horse-mechanized cavalry regiments. Together with the tank and tank destroyer groups, the cavalry group constituted the means by which pooled assets supported field 

operations.79

The armored division also underwent a major redesign in 1943 to 

improve organizational flexibility and reduce the tonnage required to 

deploy it overseas. These changes became evident in the September 1943 

table of organization. The division shrank in size from 14,620 soldiers and 

390 tanks to 10,936 soldiers and 263 tanks. Aptly described as a “federation 

of thirteen battalions led by a major general,” it consisted of one engineer, 

one reconnaissance, one maintenance, one medical, three armored, three 

armored infantry, and three field artillery battalions.80 The new structure 

embraced the combat command concept and the desire of armored commanders for self-sufficient battalions. The regiment disappeared, resulting 

in a chain of command that led from the division headquarters to the combat commands to battalions parceled out among task forces.81

The redesign of the armored division resulted in changes to its organic 

reconnaissance assets. The armored reconnaissance battalion gave way to 

a larger mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron. The elimination of 

the armored regiment also resulted in the loss of its subordinate reconnaissance company, leaving the division with no inherent reconnaissance 

capability between the division and the battalion. However, the companies 

lost were reconfigured into mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops and 

became available for other employment, including attachment to a cavalry 

group. Within the armored infantry and armor battalions, the reconnaissance platoons exchanged their motorcycles for an additional jeep.82

The assignment of reconnaissance to divisions was not entirely consistent. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, for example, did not convert 

to the new formation design. They retained their heavier and larger structure, and continued to rely on an armored reconnaissance battalion rather 

than the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron. Infantry divisions included only a single mechanized cavalry troop. These variations 
61

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

reflected the different reconnaissance requirements associated with the 

different formations.

Mechanized cavalry squadron and troop structure underwent two 

major changes in 1943. Early in the year, a new squadron organization 

emerged which reflected lessons learned from North Africa. This configuration constituted a midpoint on the path of squadron development between 

the original concepts in 1942 and the final form adopted at the end of 1943. 

Although oriented toward cavalry and motorized infantry divisions, this 

squadron addressed the desire for reconnaissance capable of both fighting 

for information and stealthy operations. It included a headquarters component, three mechanized reconnaissance troops, and a support troop. Each 

mechanized troop controlled a small headquarters and three platoons. The 

strength of the latter totaled 1 officer and 45 soldiers divided between 2 

sections—a pioneer and demolition squad and a support squad. Each section included an M8 armored car, four jeeps, and a motorcycle. In the first 

section, one of the jeeps was an amphibian, capable of crossing small bodies of water without special equipment. In the support squad, two jeeps 

and a trailer carried an 81-mm mortar, its crew, and ammunition.83

These platoons bore the primary responsibility for conducting operations on the battlefield. The motorcycles served less as scouts than as 

couriers, capable of delivering critical information in person or compensating for radio failure. Jeep-mounted scouts performed much of the actual 

reconnaissance duties. For firepower, the platoon relied on machineguns 

mounted on most jeeps, small arms, a mortar, and the armored car’s 

37‐mm gun, which provided a degree of antitank capability. The pioneer 

and demolition squad offered the means and expertise to conduct limited 

mine clearance or to obstruct enemy movement during delay operations. 

Compared to its 1942 predecessor, this platoon exchanged some of its 

antitank capability for more reconnaissance and an organic ability to cope 

with mines. However, the asymmetrical mix of vehicles within each reconnaissance section complicated operations by smaller increments.84

The troop commander possessed few means with which to reinforce 

his platoons. The only combat assets in the troop headquarters were two 

armored cars and two jeeps intended for command group operations. The 

squadron commander possessed greater flexibility and the means to support subordinate units. At his disposal lay an antitank platoon, a pioneer 

and demolition platoon, and a support troop. The support troop included 

three light tank platoons to provide additional firepower as needed or to 

assume reconnaissance functions in difficult terrain. The antitank platoon 

comprised a headquarters element and three sections similarly capable of 
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Chapter 2

either unified or detached operations under troop control. Each section 

included one reconnaissance jeep and two M8 armored cars. The pioneer 

and demolition platoon contained the men and special equipment necessary for mine clearance and obstacle creation.85

The integration of pioneer and demolition teams at the squadron and 

platoon levels reflected lessons from North Africa. There mines interfered 

with mounted maneuver and posed a particular hazard for reconnaissance 

units ranging forward of friendly forces. Too often discovery of mines 

occurred only when a vehicle’s passage detonated them. The 81st Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron turned this accidental discovery into standard 

practice. Although its platoons carried mine detectors, the pace of operations generally precluded their use. Instead, the unit placed its heavier and 

presumably more survivable vehicles at the head of patrols and advanced 

until a mine exploded. Its presence was reported and marked, while a narrow lane was cleared. The survivors then continued their mission.86

Such measures reflected the absence of an effective means of rapidly 

detecting and clearing mines. One means of addressing this was the inclusion of pioneer and demolition teams in the mechanized cavalry squadron. 

Another lay in making minesweeping a required skill for reconnaissance personnel, paralleling the horse cavalry’s prewar emphasis on wire 

clearance.87 However, the identification and clearance of mines proved a 

time-consuming business, much like stealthy operations. Too often reconnaissance personnel, urged to accelerate the pace of their operations, simply did not have this time available.

The doctrinal guidance for the new squadron structure emerged 

with the March 1943 publication of FM 2-30, Cavalry Mechanized 

Reconnaissance Squadron. This manual identified the squadron’s primary 

mission as the timely acquisition of information to influence decisionmaking. Secondary functions reflected the robust, self-sufficient nature of 

Figure 28. Scouts conducting reconnaissance in North Africa, February 1943.

Courtesy Patton Museum 

of Cavalry and Armor
63

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

the squadron and included security, counterreconnaissance, attack, pursuit, defense, delay, demolition, withdrawal, and special operations. The 

last category included actions associated with amphibious landings, river 

crossings, and operations in jungle and desert terrain. In effect, the squadron provided a broad range of reconnaissance and security operations for 

its parent formations.88

The squadron executed zone, route, and area reconnaissance missions. 

Often operating forward of the parent division, the squadron employed 

two troops abreast to reconnoiter along 10 major roadways or a frontage of 

35 miles. The third troop constituted the reserve, which together with the 

light tanks supported the forward reconnaissance elements as required. On 

occasion, the coverage might be broadened to 50 miles by employing all 

reconnaissance platoons on line. Coordination across this area emphasized 

radio communications, supplemented by motorcycle courier, phase lines, 

and preselected terrain objectives.89

During initial advances, the squadron moved quickly and avoided 

hostile patrols. When hostile resistance prevented further undetected 

activity, the squadron attacked a weak point, penetrated the opposition, 

and continued to gather information on enemy forces. When friendly combat elements arrived, the squadron secured their flank or became part of 

the reserve. Between initial contact and the arrival of friendly forces, the 

squadron was expected to mount an aggressive reconnaissance effort to 

collect more detailed information on the enemy. This information guided 

the maneuver of friendly units, but its acquisition was expected to necessitate combat.90

The squadron possessed the means to “engage in offensive combat as 

an incident in the execution of any mission which it is assigned.” Once 

engaged in battle, the manual expected the support troop to play a central 

role. The squadron employed the same principles applicable throughout 

the Army. Reconnaissance platoons provided the base of fire on which the 

support troop maneuvered. Further details with diagrams and illustrations 

depicted how various types of combat should be performed, clearly highlighting the writers’ anticipation of combat as a regular part of squadron 

activity.91

The reconnaissance troop was identified as the basic component of 

the squadron. To it lay the primary task of gaining information on hostile 

activities. However, the unit was not expected to function by observation 

and stealth alone:

Because of the rapidity with which its parent organization marches and maneuvers, limitations of time will 
64

Chapter 2

frequently necessitate that the squadron abandon stealth 

and fight for information. This is called reconnaissance 

in force. It is imperative that in the tactical training of 

the reconnaissance troop of the reconnaissance squadron 

offensive combat, particularly combined offensive action 

with other reconnaissance troops and with the support 

troop, be stressed.92

The manual encouraged mounted combat. It depicted dismounted 

engagements as a degradation of the squadron’s principal characteristics 

of mobility and firepower. The slower pace of dismounted operations also 

did not fit the fast-moving, time-constrained environment likely to surround reconnaissance operations. Therefore,

The most desirable situation is one wherein the principle 

of fire and movement can be applied by the rapid transfer 

of fire power in vehicles with one unit supporting by fire 

the maneuver of another until a position is reached from 

which hostile opposition can be overcome by coordinated 

fire or overrun in a short, swift assault.93

The organization and concepts depicted in this manual did not remain 

in effect for long. The reorganization of the armored division in September 

1943 coincided with another restructuring of mechanized cavalry reconnaissance. The Army adopted a uniform troop organization that was found 

in the infantry division, the armored division, and the cavalry reconnaissance groups. The number of troops assigned to each of these organizations constituted their principle difference in reconnaissance capability. 

The infantry division contained a single troop, while each of the squadrons 

assigned to the cavalry groups included three. Reflecting the dispersed 

nature of its operations, the redesigned armored division possessed a 

squadron with four troops.

The new troop organization included a headquarters element and three 

reconnaissance platoons. The former possessed administrative, maintenance, and supply components, but no significant assets with which to 

support the subordinate platoons. An armored car section and a scout section constituted each platoon. The scout section included six jeeps, three of 

which carried a 60-mm mortar and three mounting machineguns and radios. 

The section subdivided into three identical squads with a machinegun and 

a mortar jeep. The armored car section included three M8 armored cars, 

intended to work with and provide overwatch for each scout squad.94

The armored division and cavalry group squadrons shared a similar 

organization, varying only in the number of subordinate reconnaissance 
65

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

troops. Both included a headquarters component, an assault gun troop, a 

light tank company, and either three or four reconnaissance troops. The 

tank company included 17 light tanks organized into 3 platoons. The 

assault gun troop comprised four platoons capable of concentrated or 

decentralized fire support.95

Compared to the earlier mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadron, this new one marked a significant reduction in size. The pioneer and 

demolition teams found at the squadron and platoon levels disappeared. 

Similarly, the squadron antitank platoon was eliminated. Reconnaissance 

troop strength fell from 193 to 145 officers and men with similar reductions 

at the squadron level. Despite these reductions, the squadron increased its 

firepower through the addition of the assault gun troop. A similar shift 

occurred in the reconnaissance platoons. Their size fell from 46 officers 

and men to 29 and from 15 vehicles to 9. However, the platoon increased 

its complement of armored cars and mortars. Maintenance eased through 

the reduction of vehicle types from five to two, and the platoon’s ability to 

break readily into identical teams simplified command and control.96

Organizational change triggered a shift in doctrine. Whereas previous 

manuals highlighted the versatility of mechanized cavalry, new guidance 

issued in 1944 narrowed the range of activities to information collection. 

Reconnaissance was separated from other functions and it became the 

primary purpose of mechanized cavalry. Actions involving combat either 

disappeared from doctrinal publications or became de-emphasized. The 

doctrinal debate between advocates of stealthy and aggressive reconnaissance appeared to have been decisively resolved in favor of the former. 

The 1944 field service regulations governing Army operations defined 

mechanized cavalry as units “organized, equipped, and trained to perform 

reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. 

They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the 

assigned mission.”97 Their principal purpose lay in keeping their parent 

formations appraised of evolving tactical situations in a timely fashion.98

The emphasis on pure reconnaissance found expression in FM 2-20,

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized.99 The troop constituted the 

basic building block of the reorganized mechanized cavalry, and its principles of employment shaped the use of the squadron and group elements. 

The troop’s mission statement reflected its singular purpose:

The cavalry reconnaissance troop, mechanized, is organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance 

missions. Other types of missions are given only in the 

furtherance of a reconnaissance mission of the troop or 
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Chapter 2

the squadron of which the troop is a part, unless no other 

troops are available for other types of operations for the 

division or larger unit. Reconnaissance missions are performed by employment of infiltration tactics, fire, and 

maneuver. Combat is engaged in only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.100

The manual offered only limited guidance for combat operations. 

The writers acknowledged that circumstances might trigger engagements, 

but they clearly expected reconnaissance soldiers to avoid combat to the 

extent possible: 

The troop employs infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver to accomplish reconnaissance missions. It engages 

in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the 

assigned mission and to avoid destruction or capture. The 

troop should be reinforced before departing on a mission 

when sustained combat or the crossing of obstacles is 

anticipated. Infantry, field artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, 

and engineers are suitable attachments.101

Within the squadrons, where immediate augmentation was available 

through assault guns and light tanks, the reconnaissance troop “is prepared 

to fight for information if necessary.”102

At the troop level, the platoon constituted the basic reconnaissance 

unit. The troop commander’s job lay in managing the movements of each 

platoon and coordinating their activities with the parent formation. Often 

the troop was to move with two platoons abreast actively reconnoitering 

along a 10-mile-wide front, while one platoon trailed in a reserve capacity. 

Through rotation of the active and reserve platoons, the troop sustained 

continuous operations. The platoons functioned as collections of teams 

that included at least one armored car and one or two jeeps. Each platoon 

could employ a maximum of three reconnaissance teams. The armored 

car used its armor and weapons to overwatch the movement of the jeeps. 

If attacked, the moving vehicles sought cover while the stationary one(s) 

engaged the enemy. Whenever possible, each team sought to avoid enemy 

patrols and find unopposed routes.103

Security missions focused on force protection measures for the troop 

and platoon rather than actions intended to support the parent formation. 

Whereas cavalry doctrine previously expected combat to ensue from 

security operations, it now focused on the use of cover and concealment 

to avoid detection and the establishment of effective OPs from which to 

spot enemy activity. To emphasize the importance of these measures, the 
67

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

chapters governing security included page after page of illustrations. In 

contrast, only four pages addressed employment in a guard or covering 

role.104

Combat operations overall received a similar deemphasis in comparison with earlier manuals. Reconnaissance platoons and teams were 

expected to engage enemy forces, which threatened or obstructed their 

mission, using fire and maneuver tactics common throughout the Army. 

However, they were also expected to minimize their time in action, lest 

the impact on their reconnaissance mission become too great. Defensive 

combat similarly was described within the context of information gathering activities, such as defense of an OP or key objective seized during 

the troop’s advance. Where previous guidance emphasized the importance 

of concentrating combat power to overcome resistance, the new manual 

anticipated combat to occur at the platoon level and not involve the bulk 

of the troop’s assets. The platoon leader’s discretion concerning engagement was limited to small hostile patrols and against enemy forces that 

jeopardized mission success. Otherwise, he reported the situation to the 

troop leader and awaited instructions.105

An updated version of FM 2-30, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 

Mechanized, appeared in August 1944. It constituted the last significant 

doctrinal publication issued for mechanized cavalry during the war. 

Figure 29. Mechanized cavalry during the drive to Rome, 1944.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
68

Chapter 2

This manual applied concepts from the earlier troop publication to the 

squadron. It confirmed the squadron’s primary role of reconnaissance and 

included the same caveats for its use in other roles. The manual similarly 

relegated combat to the performance of reconnaissance missions and 

self-preservation. It did not preclude fighting for information, to reduce 

obstacles, or to defend key objectives, but it anticipated that such action 

would be of short duration and conducted on terms advantageous to the 

squadron. In the face of hostile resistance, the squadron commander 

employed his light tank company and assault gun platoons to reinforce 

subordinate reconnaissance teams. The assault guns were the preferred 

means of eliminating antitank guns and machineguns.106

In the execution of reconnaissance, the squadron typically employed 

two troops abreast (three for the larger squadrons of the armored divisions) 

and retained one as a reserve. The two leading troops spanned a breadth of 

25 miles wide. While actively reconnoitering, the squadron was expected 

to sustain a rate of 10 miles per hour in open terrain and favorable 

conditions. The manual clearly depicted the role of reconnaissance in 

building command situational awareness starting with the establishment 

of contact followed by an intensification of activity to determine specific 

details of the hostile force before transitioning to a reserve status. As 

hostile counterreconnaissance activity rose, the squadron was expected 

to move through it by concentrating its attention on a weak point in the 

enemy screen.107

Compared to previous publications, this one offered more guidance 

for the organization and operation of reconnaissance detachments. It also 

addressed the coordination of squadron assets with tanks, tank destroyers, 

and aerial reconnaissance. An entire chapter devoted to logistics acknowledged the difficulties associated with sustaining subordinate troop commands dispersed over a broad area and moving quickly. Security missions 

focused on the provision of early warning, but they also included guidelines for the employment of squadron assets in a guard role to protect the 

squadron trains and execute counterreconnaissance. However, these subjects received less coverage than reconnaissance.108

Overall, this version of FM 2-30 built on and refined principles previously established. It also limited mechanized cavalry action and provided 

little guidance for the squadron’s operation in the face of aggressive, combined arms opposition. It offered no guidance for the squadron’s use in 

the broader mission set associated with cavalry. At the time of the manual’s publication in August 1944, cavalry reconnaissance squadrons had 

already found themselves performing a variety of activities other than 
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

reconnaissance. In the absence of doctrinal guidance, units improvised 

their own techniques and procedures.

Training paralleled the doctrinal shift toward a narrower definition 

of reconnaissance. In early 1943, training emphasized techniques suited 

to the versatility of mechanized reconnaissance and the incorporation of 

lessons learned from North Africa. Stealthy operations received attention together with the basic principles of fire and movement, bounding 

overwatch, and reconnaissance by fire. Personnel joining newly created 

mechanized reconnaissance units required instruction in their duties and 

responsibilities. Doctrine addressed this need through careful description 

of unit command and staff positions coupled with tips on how to perform 

these responsibilities. The 1943 version of FM 2-30 included guidance for 

unit training from the individual to the entire squadron. It also outlined the 

principles governing supply operations for a fast-moving, dispersed reconnaissance unit. To assist new commanders, it relied heavily on illustrations 

to show what right and wrong looked like.109

Performance of the myriad tasks associated with mounted reconnaissance increasingly required specialized training. Commanders were 

exhorted to apply care in the selection of reconnaissance soldiers, seeking 

only “men of the proper caliber.” Such individuals needed intellect, an 

understanding of what information to obtain and how to do so, physical 

stamina, good judgment, and comprehensive knowledge of terrain, maps, 

military organizations, and weapons. The minimal competencies centered 

on navigation, map reading, acquiring accurate information, and providing 

complete reports.110 This skill set increased with a doctrinal requirement 

for competency in combat intelligence to ensure effective observation and 

reporting. The range of objects to be reported also broadened to include a 

host of terrain and infrastructure-related items that impacted mechanized 

operations. These trends marked a greater emphasis on technical abilities 

commensurate with the greater reliance on motor vehicles.111

Training support for new commanders emerged in many forms. The 

most common included articles written by experienced reconnaissance 

officers. One such piece titled “Vehicular Reconnaissance” appeared in 

Cavalry Journal. Written by a squadron commander, it offered guiding concepts to assist new commanders in operations and unit training. 

It included readily comprehensible guidelines for the planning, preparation, and execution of reconnaissance operations, including their logistical 

underpinning. Published in the midst of the North African campaign, it 

reflected the dual emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance and the need to 

fight for information on occasion. It highlighted the importance of not 
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only establishing but maintaining contact with enemy forces, a concept 

that became axiomatic in all reconnaissance doctrine. Perhaps the most 

important advice rendered lay in the importance of command flexibility 

and the ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances.112

Special training publications supplemented this type of article and 

served a similar purpose. The Cavalry School, for example, issued a series 

of short pamphlets detailing the operations of mechanized cavalry in North 

Africa and Sicily. Each one provided a detailed narrative of combat operations, including task organizations, terrain information, and command 

guidance. A lessons-learned section concluded each narrative. These pamphlets also included references linking particular actions to a specific doctrinal reference. In this manner, they helped to show how doctrine applied 

to the battlefield.113

Literature intended to support training did not reject combat by reconnaissance elements. Reconnaissance units possessed the means necessary to fight for information and perform a variety of missions other than 

information collection. At times, battle proved the only manner to break 

through a hostile security screen or develop an otherwise obscure situation.114 However, combat was not the preferred means of mission accomplishment. Time loss added to the possibility of casualties threatened to 

undermine a unit’s ability to gather perhaps crucial information necessary 

to guide command decisions. Therefore, reconnaissance units “avoid contact except when necessary for the success of their mission. A reconnaissance unit should not engage in combat with an enemy reconnaissance 

unit of similar size if its mobility enables it to sidestep the intervening 

resistance.” Observation and reporting constituted the preferred methods 

of executing reconnaissance.115 Such actions required that “reconnaissance 

forces move by stealth; they fight only in self-defense or to get the required 

information.”116

By early 1944, the skill set associated with reconnaissance covered 

a plethora of subjects. Individual soldiers needed to master mounted and 

dismounted movement techniques in all weather and terrain conditions, 

weapons, maintenance, radio operations, and basic tactics. Added to this 

foundation were combat intelligence, reporting procedures, map skills, 

terrain analysis, and air-ground communications. All reconnaissance personnel were expected to function as forward observers. Their responsibilities further included minefield identification and clearance, handling 

prisoners of war, road and bridge classification, demolition, and roadblock 

creation.117 This diverse skill set mandated a complex and lengthy program 

of instruction.
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

An added difficulty arose through the miscommunication of doctrine 

in training. Although FM 2-20 clearly discouraged combat by reconnaissance units, it nevertheless acknowledged circumstances in which fighting 

the enemy became unavoidable. This caveat disappeared in unit training 

activities that stressed stealth and the complete avoidance of combat. The 

113th Cavalry Group responded to this emphasis through adoption of the 

slogan “Sneak, Peek, and Retreat” to reflect its singular focus on reconnaissance without fighting. Field problems were designed to tempt commanders into firefights with hostile forces that led to severe maneuver 

penalties and a critique critical of the decision to enter combat.118

The combination of restrictive doctrine and training measures 

aligned doctrine, organization, and training. By 1944, mechanized 

cavalry organizations were following a standard process of combat 

readiness. Gone were conflicting references to reconnaissance via stealth 

simultaneous with highlights of unit versatility and combat power. In 

pure reconnaissance missions and the avoidance of battle, mounted 

reconnaissance organizations had found their niche. Unfortunately, this 

emphasis would prove unrealistic on the battlefields of Europe.

European Theater of Operations, 1944–45

The doctrinal and organizational principles embedded in mounted 

reconnaissance units found full expression in the European theater of 

operations. Between June 1944 and May 1945, the Army deployed to this 

theater 13 division cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, 2 armored reconnaissance battalions, and 42 mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops 

with infantry divisions. A further 13 cavalry groups served with corps 

headquarters and 1 squadron remained unattached.119 This unprecedented 

massing of mechanized cavalry made the European theater the focus of 

mounted reconnaissance analysis.

All of these units began operations optimized for reconnaissance missions. However, their actual employment quickly transcended this narrow 

role, and pure reconnaissance missions proved exceptional.120 Mechanized 

cavalry routinely performed a variety of operations in diverse weather and 

terrain conditions, including wooded, urban, and fortified. The squadrons of the 6th Cavalry Group, for example, conducted river crossings, 

exploitation, and deep penetration of German lines in conjunction with 

armored formations; seized key terrain; provided flank security; and pursued enemy forces. An observer visiting the 102d Cavalry Group found 

the unit in a defensive posture dispersed over an 8-mile frontage, manning a series of strongpoints with dismounted troopers.121 The 4th Cavalry 
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Chapter 2

Group squadrons also found themselves holding part of the front line after 

several months of continuous operations that included amphibious assault, 

dismounted attacks, seizing and holding ground, patrolling, eliminating 

pockets of German resistance, screening, covering gaps between formations, and reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. Mechanized cavalry also conducted delaying actions against German armor but incurred 

considerable losses, exemplified by the 2d Cavalry Group at Arracourt and 

the 14th Cavalry Group’s defense of the Losheim Gap at the start of the 

Battle of the Bulge.122

These experiences demonstrated the fallacy of a doctrinal focus on 

information collection. It did not match battlefield reality. Colonel Edward 

M. Fickett, commanding the 6th Cavalry Group, expressed a common sentiment among mechanized cavalry soldiers:

Efforts and doctrine directed towards making the Cavalry 

Squadron exclusively a reconnaissance unit, not participating in combat other than as a necessity of extrication 

from enemy reaction or in the exceptional case of limited 

engagement by fire to obtain information desired, is faulty. 

It is evident that there is no occasion, no opportunity, and 

justification for the maintenance in large commands of 

such an extremely costly, highly trained organization simply for the purpose of executing “reconnaissance.”123

Instead, a clamor arose from the field for the redesignation of mechanized 

units as cavalry rather than reconnaissance. The name change accorded 

with a related desire to adopt the much broader mission set of the mounted 

arm and align doctrine, training, and organization with the operational 

environment. Mechanized cavalry soldiers who had performed extensive 

dismounted operations also wanted recognition for their efforts in the form 

of a combat badge similar to that awarded infantry.124

In some cases, dissatisfaction with reconnaissance doctrine led unit 

commanders to take matters into their own hands and implement training 

that contradicted established doctrine. The 4th Cavalry Group, for example, trained in England on the premise that it would have to fight for information. Combat reconnaissance dominated its activities, complete with 

battle drills and aggressive maneuver. Once the group deployed to France, 

these preparations permitted rapid adjustment to actual battlefield conditions. Its commander noted afterward, “We have had to fight to obtain 

information in practically every case.”125

Analysis of group operations from the Normandy invasion to 

Germany’s surrender found that security, defense, and special operations 
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

constituted their primary employment. The special category included rear 

area security, mobile reserve, and support of the information service in the 

Third Army. Offensive operations ranked fourth in terms of frequency but 

still proved more common than pure reconnaissance, which accounted for 

only 3 percent of missions performed.126

Most operations entailed combat and the groups were suitably augmented by their parent corps. Typical attachments included a field artillery 

battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, and an engineer company, although 

variation occurred among each corps and army.127 Each of the four cavalry 

groups supporting the Third Army included an attached artillery battalion, 

one or two tank destroyer companies, an engineer company, infantry, and 

additional wire communications. The 6th Cavalry Group, for example, 

served as a de facto combat command that controlled its own subordinate 

task forces. At one point it included two mechanized cavalry squadrons, an 

engineer battalion, an infantry regiment, three artillery battalions, two tank 

destroyer companies, and several tank companies.128

Augmentation reflected the desire of senior commanders for powerful army and corps reconnaissance assets more akin to traditional cavalry 

organizations. Strengthening the cavalry groups, however, encouraged 

their use in nondoctrinal roles. In several instances, the reinforced groups 

found employment in economy of force roles thereby relieving infantry 

and armored units for use elsewhere. Indeed, the attachment of tanks, tank 

Figure 30. M8 Armored Car in France, August 1944.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
74

Chapter 2

destroyers, engineers, and infantry to mechanized cavalry transformed the 

reconnaissance organizations into highly versatile, general purpose combat units capable of far more than simply reconnaissance.129

A similar departure from doctrinal intent became manifest among the 

squadrons, reconnaissance battalions, and troops assigned to the armored 

and infantry divisions. Security, rear area operations, and service as a 

mobile reserve consumed much of their time in theater. These activities 

were hardly passive. The rapid drive across France bypassed many German 

pockets of resistance. Security operations assumed vital importance in 

ensuring the steady flow of supplies and often resulted in combat with 

retreating German groups. Mobile reserves found themselves thrust into 

battle during the German counteroffensives in Alsace, Lorraine, and the 

Ardennes. Combat became an integral function of most missions, including reconnaissance, and necessitated the reinforcement of division cavalry, 

often through the attachment of artillery and tanks or tank destroyers.130

The prevalence of security and combat-related operations spurred 

recommendations to restructure the mechanized cavalry squadron and 

troop. Tactical self-sufficiency, improved command and control, and better communications constituted the primary goal of these proposals. The 

value of integrated air and ground reconnaissance also emerged through 

a desire to make observation aircraft organic to the squadron.131 Efforts 

to add pioneers and a heavier antitank capability to the squadron simply 

reflected battlefield reality. Mines slowed the tempo of operations, and 

German armor posed a threat not easily overcome by the light weapons 

of the squadron’s armored cars and light tanks. Ironically, the early 1943 

configuration of the mechanized cavalry squadron included antitank and 

pioneer platoons, but these units disappeared in the winnowing of cavalry 

organizations later that year.132 The most common recommendation, however, lay in the desire for a greater dismounted capability.133

Troop level modifications sought enhanced communications and 

more soldiers for dismounted operations.134 These changes reflected the 

frequent employment of the troop on independent operations that required 

greater self-sufficiency. However, the small size of the infantry division’s 

cavalry component constrained its activities and led to recommendations 

for an organic cavalry squadron identical to that found in the armored 

divisions.135

The platoon constituted the basic unit of reconnaissance. Its effectiveness in Europe, therefore, received considerable scrutiny. The platoon included three M8 armored cars, three jeeps equipped with pedestal 

mounted machineguns, and three jeeps carrying 60-mm mortars. Total 
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

strength included 1 officer and 28 enlisted soldiers. The platoon’s design 

envisioned operation either as a single force or as a collection of three 

reconnaissance teams, each including an armored car, machinegun jeep, 

and mortar jeep. Other variations were also possible but left to the discretion of the platoon leader.136

The platoon leader did not possess a separate headquarters section. 

He shared the vehicles and equipment of the platoon, and his leadership 

functions were interwoven with the unit’s operation. He could not focus on 

managing the platoon without impacting its ability to execute missions.137

Nor could the platoon leader rely on radio communications with every 

vehicle in his charge. The armored cars possessed two radios, permitting communication within the platoon and with troop headquarters. The 

machinegun jeeps also carried one radio for platoon communication, but 

the mortar jeeps had none. Dismounted operations created other problems. 

The pack radios intended for this purpose proved bulky and heavy, rapidly 

fatiguing foot patrols and slowing the pace of operations. These problems 

spurred requests for lighter and more reliable radios and the insertion of a 

separate headquarters element in the platoon organization.138

Fire support proved less than responsive. The 60-mm mortars had their 

greatest effect when employed together as a battery, but the platoon did not 

include a noncommissioned officer (NCO) devoted to mortar operations. 

Poor communications existed between the mortars and the rest of the platoon, while the absence of an observer made rapid accuracy adjustments 

difficult. These problems led commanders to advocate the replacement 

of the platoon’s mortars with a single 81-mm weapon capable of being 

fired from a vehicle.139 Even without a self-propelled mount, the single, 

larger mortar was still the preferred solution, because it made more soldiers available for other actions.140

Most criticism of the platoon concerned its personnel complement. 

Its 29 soldiers were considered wholly inadequate for the range of tasks 

required. Dismounted operations of all types constituted a significant 

part of platoon activities, but vehicle manning and mortar crew requirements left few individuals free to leave their vehicles. Some units facing 

extended dismounted actions removed their weapons and crews, and left 

the vehicles untended under cover. These extreme measures did nothing 

to remedy the lack of personnel qualified for mine detection and removal. 

Consequently, commanders sought more robust platoons with at least one 

rifle squad carried in a halftrack.141

The combat experience in Europe generated a demand for a 

reconnaissance platoon with multiple capabilities. It needed the ability to 
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operate effectively both on roads and cross-country, performing mounted 

or dismounted operations as required. The platoon required the means 

to detect mines and clear a path to prevent the delay of friendly forces. 

The unit remained an important information gathering organization, 

but it needed the capacity to enter combat when the tactical situation 

required. In short, the wartime experience generated a desire for “a strong 

cavalry platoon capable of any cavalry task, but particularly adapted to 

reconnaissance.”142

The frequency of combat by reconnaissance units generated casualties 

who required aid. Organization and doctrine, however, proved deficient. 

Figure 31. Dismounted mechanized cavalry patrol in the fall of 1944.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
77

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

Mechanized cavalry troops did not include organic medical support, 

relying instead on the attachment of medical teams from the squadron. 

Doctrine governing battlefield casualties directed units to leave wounded 

for personnel following to collect. Such a practice not only decreased the 

chances of survival, it also undermined soldier morale. Hence, it was not 

followed. Instead, additional medical support was sought from parent or 

attached units.143

Neither of the principal platforms used by the mechanized cavalry 

platoons proved entirely satisfactory. The wheeled armored car and jeep 

encountered difficulty in rugged terrain, and they “simply could not cope 

with difficult terrain.”144 In addition to mobility limitations, the car-jeep 

team recommended in doctrine was not intended for the routine exposure 

to combat that characterized its operational experience. According to a 

postwar analysis, “In the performance of all missions, divisional reconnaissance units almost without exception found that the armored car, M8 

equipped with a 37-mm gun and its companion 1⁄4-ton truck, 4x4, were 

unable to effectively overcome the type of resistance which platoons normally encountered.”145

The 9-ton, 6x6 M8 armored car possessed limited cross-country mobility and required too large a turning radius for close terrain. Unlike similar 

vehicles in use by other countries, it did not possess the means to move 

quickly in reverse and escape dangerous situations.146 Its mobility was further degraded on soft terrain by a poor power-to-weight ratio and minimal 

flotation. Its 37-mm main armament made it largely ineffective against 

most armored targets encountered in 1944–45, but its armor offered little 

protection against antitank projectiles, including the handheld panzerfaust

and panzerschreck weapons issued to German infantry.147 Indeed, its light 

armor and open top made it vulnerable to most threats except small arms 

fire.148 Its cramped configuration offered little room for stowage, communications gear, or workspace for the platoon leader. The addition of 

a fifth crewman was recommended, though this would have necessitated 

a redesign of the vehicle: “The car commander cannot possibly exercise 

command of this section, platoon or other unit, act as loader for a major 

caliber weapon, operate a voice radio set and follow a map all at one and 

the same time.”149 Dissatisfaction with the M8 led the commander of the 

6th Armored Division to replace the wheeled car with the fully tracked 

assault gun used in the mechanized cavalry squadron.150

Despite the armored car’s limitations, some commanders preferred it 

over other alternatives, particularly light tanks. They valued the car’s relative quietness of operation as a desirable feature for reconnaissance and 
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were prepared to accept the vehicle’s drawbacks to retain this quality.151

Compared to the M8, the M5 and M24 light tanks proved noisy and possessed a shorter radius of action. They were not generally recommended 

for use as reconnaissance platforms.152

The jeep suffered its share of criticism. Although more maneuverable 

than the M8 and easy to conceal, it was not designed as a combat vehicle. 

The machinegun jeeps carried their armament on pedestals. This mounting 

facilitated antiaircraft fire, but hindered engagements with ground targets 

in the vehicle’s frontal arc. Consequently, soldiers modified the vehicle in 

the field often mounting the machinegun on the dashboard where it could 

easily engage ground targets.153 This alteration did nothing to alleviate the 

jeep’s extreme vulnerability stemming from its lack of armor protection. 

Too often reconnaissance personnel proved unable to complete their mission when faced with hostile forces or they had to abandon the vehicle 

when engaged.154 In the words of Brigadier General T.B. Thompson, who 

led a combat command in the 7th Armored Division: 

We lost many vehicles from surprise fire which could 

have been avoided by light armor. Most losses were due 

to machinegun fire. . . . In my opinion, no armor on 1⁄4 

tons caused great delay and destruction of vehicles and 

lowering of morale. . . . We didn’t get the information we 

should have had. This, in my opinion, was due to loss of 

morale because of high losses in men and vehicles.155

Major General Holmes E. Dager, who commanded the 11th Armored 

Division, echoed his views. Referencing the jeep, he noted, 

Only reason we used it [1⁄4-ton] for reconnaissance combat action was because we didn’t have enough light tanks 

or armored cars, but have boys with guts enough to fight 

in even a “baby carriage.” . . . Mobile reconnaissance so 

essential to Armored Units “paid the rent” in World War 

II, but lost too many bodies for lack of armament and 

armor on the jeep.156

Reconnaissance losses on the battlefield underscored this viewpoint 

and found reflection in other theaters. During operations near Manila in 

the Philippines, the 8th Cavalry Regiment routinely employed its reconnaissance platoon as lead element. When resistance was encountered, the 

lead jeep was often destroyed and its crew killed or wounded. Combat 

assets moved forward and destroyed the resistance, but the repetition of 

such incidents sapped the morale and aggressiveness of the platoon and 
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

discouraged rapid movement. The operational tempo of the regiment 

slowed as a result.157

Jeep survivability concerns also influenced assessments of the reconnaissance platoon employed by tank battalions. In 1944, this platoon 

included a halftrack, 5 jeeps, and 21 men. The halftrack and one jeep constituted the headquarters element of the platoon, while the remaining four 

jeeps functioned as two sections, each led by an NCO.158 The battalion 

reconnaissance platoon operated in close proximity to its parent organization. Its primary functions included route and area reconnaissance. Bivouac 

reconnaissance and liaison duties with adjacent units constituted frequent 

secondary missions.159 The platoon’s weaponry included machineguns and 

small arms, which together with the absence of armor protection on its 

jeeps effectively precluded significant combat operations. This minimal 

combat power led to criticism and recommendations for change by battalion commanders. The most common included its redesign as a cavalry 

reconnaissance platoon and the replacement of the halftrack with one or 

two armored cars in addition to improvements in its radio equipment.160

Despite the jeep’s vulnerability, condemnation of the battalion reconnaissance platoon was not universal. Used carefully in the limited roles for 

which it was designed, the platoon often performed effective service to its 

parent battalion. It proved essential for road and bivouac reconnaissance, 

providing the parent unit a sense of what lay immediately in its path. It 

could also be augmented with light tanks for missions likely to trigger 

combat. Hence, several battalion commanders expressed satisfaction with 

their reconnaissance platoons.161

Evaluating the reconnaissance platoon’s effectiveness was complicated by the manner in which tank battalions were employed. Doctrine 

anticipated their use as single entities, providing needed combat power 

for particular missions. In fact, their subordinate tank companies often 

supported different organizations. In the armored divisions, this dispersion occurred among different task forces. For the separate tank battalions 

assigned to infantry divisions, their tanks were detached to different infantry regiments and battalions. The battalion reconnaissance platoon often 

found employment in operations unrelated to its parent unit, complicating 

efforts to assess its effectiveness. When the war ended, extensive analysis 

of mounted reconnaissance operations occurred, but the focus lay on the 

larger mechanized cavalry troops, squadrons, and groups.

Wartime experience tended to encourage more robust reconnaissance 

organizations with greater combat power. The doctrinal emphasis on 
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pure reconnaissance and the avoidance of combat found few advocates 

among the soldiers and leaders who tried to employ it on the battlefield. 

Organizational developments early in the war similarly sought organizations with the ability to participate in combat and survive chance encounters. Consequently, security, counterreconnaissance, economy of force, 

offense, defense, and harassment missions became feasible. General 

McNair’s winnowing of reconnaissance organizations and streamlining 

of their doctrinal focus eroded these broader capabilities. However, his 

actions reflected an effort to identify and provide a viable baseline capability. From the perspective of Army Ground Forces, reconnaissance needs 

constituted only one portion of the entire Army force structure requirements that had to be met. Although McNair’s organizational concepts 

were subsequently discredited, they represented an innovative effort to 

realize reconnaissance needs within the constraints of available resources. 

In World War II, shipping, industrial output, and competing demands from 

all services constituted the principal restraints. In the decades to come, the 

challenge of balancing requirements and resources would be complicated 

by similar limitations.
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The Crucible of Combat: World War II

Notes

1. By late 1941, Regular Army cavalry included 2 horse-mechanized 

regiments and 10 horse regiments, including those in the 1st Cavalry Division 

and recently activated 2d Cavalry Division. National Guard assets included 4 

divisions and 17 regiments. See Shelby L. Stanton, World War II Order of Battle

(New York, NY: Galahad Books, 1991), 21–23.

2. War Department, Cavalry Field Manual (FM) 2-15, Employment of 

Cavalry (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 1, 5, quotation 

from page 1.

3. War Department, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 40–44; FM 2-15 (1941),

87–89.

4. FM 2-15 (1941), 89–90.

5. Ibid., 88, 90.

6. Ibid., 94.

7. Ibid., 97–98, 133, quotation from pages 97–98.

8. War Department, FM 2-10, Cavalry Field Manual Mechanized Elements

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 53–54, 60, 64–65, 70–71.

9. Ibid., 21, 62–63, 68.

10. Ibid., 66–67.

11. Major Thomas J. Heavey, “The Horse-Mechanized Regiment,” Cavalry 

Journal XLIX, no. 5 (September–October 1940): 424–428; “Fourth Cavalry (HMecz) in Fourth Army Maneuvers,” Cavalry Journal XLIX, no. 5 (September–

October 1940): 444; Matthew Darlington Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies’: The 

Interwar Development of Mechanized Ground Reconnaissance” (Masters of Arts 

Thesis, Florida State University, 2001), 218–219.

12. “The Armored Division 1940–1942,” Tactical Notebook, May 1993. 

Monthly publication of the Institute for Tactical Education in Quantico, VA.

13. Major I.D. White, “Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Division,” 

Cavalry Journal L, no. 3 (May–June 1941): 48–49.

14. “The Armored Division 1940–1942,” Tactical Notebook, May 1993; 

“M2 Half Track Car,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M2_Half_Track_Car (accessed 

3 March 2008).

15. White, “Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Division,” 48–52.

16. Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger. Letter to Lieutenant General 

Daniel Van Voorhis, 16 July 1941, US Army Military History Institute (hereafter 

referred to as MHI), Willis D. Crittenberger Papers.

17. Major Paul A. Disney, “Reconnaissance Units Training Test, 2d Armored 

Division,” Cavalry Journal L, no. 5 (September–October 1941): 68–72.

18. Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 247.

19. Brigadier General Alvan C. Gillem Jr., Memorandum to Chief of 

Armored Force, “Report on Reorganization of Armored Division,” 3 June 1941, 

MHI, Alvan C. Gillem Jr. Papers; Major General Bruce Magruder, Memorandum 

to Colonel Unger, “Reorganization of the Armored Division,” 7 June 1941, MHI, 

Willis D. Crittenberger Papers.
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Chapter 2

20. For a comprehensive analysis of the maneuvers, see Christopher R. 

Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1991).

21. Lesley J. McNair, Memorandum to CG, IV Army Corps, “Comments 

on First Army Versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, November 16–30, 1941,” 7 

January 1942, 3, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter referred 

to as NARA), Record Group (hereafter noted as RG) 337, HQ AGF, GHQ; Major 

General Charles L. Scott, Memorandum to Chief of the Armored Force, “Report 

on GHQ Exercises in Which Armored Forces Participated,”10 December 1941, 

1–2, MHI, Henry C. Newton Papers; Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, 128.

22. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Smith Jr., “Comments Concerning Maneuver 

Operations of 2d Armored Division,” 20 September 1941; “Comments by Lt. 

Gen. L.J. McNair, G.S.C., 1st Phase, GHQ-directed Maneuvers, Camp Polk, 

La., September 14–19, 1941,” 6; Lieutenant Colonel Riley F. Ennis, “Report of 

Assistant Armored Force and Antitank Director Concerning Armored Operations 

in First Carolina Maneuver,” undated, 1; Lieutenant Colonel Riley F. Ennis, 

“Report Concerning Armored Operations in Both Phases of Carolina Maneuver,” 

undated, 1, 3; Memorandum, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair to CG, Third 

Army, “Comments on Second Versus Third Army Maneuvers, September 15–

30, 1941,” 10 October 1941, 5; Brigadier General Kenneth P. Lord, “Training 

Memorandum No. 2: Analysis of 1941 Training and Maneuvers,” 26 January 

1942, 6. All sources came from NARA, RG 337, HQ AGF and GHQ files.

23. Gabel, GHQ Maneuvers, 82.

24. Smith, “Comments Concerning Maneuver Operations of 2d Armored 

Division,” 20 September 1941; “Comments on First Phase—First Army Versus 

IV Army Corps Maneuvers, 1941,” 22 November 1941, 9; Lieutenant General 

Lesley J. McNair, Memorandum to CG, First Army, “Comments on First Army 

Versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, November 16–30, 1941,” 22 December 1941, 

6; Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Memorandum to CG, IV Army Corps, 

“Comments on First Army Versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, November 16–30, 

1941,” 7 January 1942, 4; Major F.T. Searcy, “Report Concerning Actions of 13th 

Armored Regiment During First Phase of Carolina Maneuver,” 21 November 

1941, 2. All sources from NARA, RG 337, HQ AGF and GHQ files.

25. Colonel M.J. Conway, “Comments on Second and Third Army Maneuver 

1941,” undated, 4; Lieutenant Colenel Wayland B. Augur, Memorandum to GHQ 

G3 Director, “Report of Cavalry Operations, First Phase Carolina Maneuvers, 

November 16–21, 1941,” 22 November 1941, 2–5; “Comments on First Phase—

First Army Versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, 1941,” 22 November 1941, 8; 

Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Memorandum to CG, First Army, “Comments 

on First Army Versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, November 16–30, 1941,” 22 

December 1941, 8. All sources from NARA, RG 337, HQ AGF, and GHQ files.

26. Major General Robert C. Richardson Jr., “Report of VII Army Corps 

Field Exercises and Maneuvers in Southwestern Arkansas—August 17–28 and 

Participation of VII Army Corps in Second Army and GHQ Maneuvers August 

29–September 30, 1941,” 29 October 1941, appendix 2, 3, 6; appendix 3, 13, MHI, 
83

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

World War II US Army, War Game Maneuvers; Augur, Memorandum, “Report of 

Cavalry Operations, First Phase Carolina Maneuvers, November 16–21, 1941,” 

22 November 1941, 1–3.

27. Chief of Cavalry Major General John K. Herr, Letter to Brigadier 

General Adna R. Chaffee, 1 June 1939; Chief of Cavalry Major General John K. 

Herr, Memorandum to CG, 7th Cav Bde, Subj: Recommendations on Motorcycle 

Troop, 5 June 1939; Chief of Cavalry Major General John K. Herr, Radiogram 

to CG, 7th Cav Bde, 18 September 1939; Chief of Cavalry, Memorandum to CG, 

7th Cav Bde, 5 June 1939; 1st end of same, 23 June 1939; Chief of Cavalry 

Major General John K. Herr, Memorandum to CG, 7th Cav Bde, Subj: Utilization 

of Motorcycles with Mechanized Cavalry for Reconnaissance Purposes, 30 June 

1939. All sources from NARA, RG 177, Office of the Chief of Cavalry General 

Correspondence files.

28. Colonel John Millikin, Memorandum to Chief of Cavalry, “Report 

on Operations of the 6th Cavalry in Maneuvers of IV Corps at Fort Benning, 

Georgia,” 2 May 1940, NARA, Record Group 177, Office of the Chief of Cavalry 

General Correspondence; George A. Lynch, “Final Report of Major General 

George A. Lynch: A Summary of Infantry Developments during His Term of 

Office,” 30 April 1941, 31–32; appendix VI, 9–13, MHI.

29. Doug Stewart, “Hail to the Jeep! Could We Have Won Without It?” 

Smithsonian (November 1992): 61–64; “Jeep,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/systems/ground/jeep.htm (accessed 28 November 2007).

30. Lieutenant George M. White, “Cavalry’s Iron Pony,” Cavalry Journal

L, no. 2 (March–April 1941): 85–86.

31. White, “Cavalry’s Iron Pony,” 85–88; Captain Bruce Palmer, “The 

Bantam in the Scout Car Platoon,” Cavalry Journal L, no. 2 (March–April 1941): 

89–92; Morton, “Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 251–254.

32. Robert R. Palmer, “Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,” in 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, United States Army 

in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat 

Troops (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Historical Section, 1947), 265, 

268–269.

33. Ibid., 272–273.

34. Stanton, World War II Order of Battle, 21–24.

35. Palmer, “Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,” 352, 

356–357.

36. Ibid., 308–309.

37. War Department, FM 17-5, Armored Force Field Manual, Armored 

Force Drill (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1942), 132.

38. War Department, FM 17-20, Employment of Armored Units, 

Reconnaissance Platoon and Company (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1942), 6.

39. Ibid., 6.

40. Ibid., 3.

41. Ibid., 79–80.
84

Chapter 2

42. Ibid., 78.

43. Steven J. Zaloga, Staghound Armored Car 1942–62 (New York, NY: 

Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2009), 7–14.

44. FM 17-20 (1942), 2.

45. Ibid., 78.

46. Ibid., 2.

47. Ibid., 2–3.

48. Ibid., 3.

49. Ibid., 16–24.

50. War Department, FM 17-33, Armored Force Field Manual, The 

Armored Battalion, Light and Medium (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1942), 1, 3.

51. Ibid., 15–17.

52. Ibid., 15–17, 22, 37–39, 49–51, 81–83, 100, 116.

53. Ibid., 4, 44.

54. Major General Charles L. Scott, “Armored Reconnaissance,” Cavalry 

Journal LI, no. 6 (November–December 1942): 20.

55. Ibid., 21.

56. Ibid., 22.

57. Cavalry School, Cavalry Reconnaissance Number One: Operations of 

the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia (Fort Riley, KS: Cavalry 

School, c. 1943); Cavalry School, Cavalry Reconnaissance Number Two: 

Operations of the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia, Part III: 

Kasserine—El Ma El Abiod (Fort Riley, KS: Cavalry School, c. 1943); Matthew 

Darlington Morton, “Men on ‘Iron Ponies,’: The Death and Rebirth of the 

Modern U.S. Cavalry” (Ph.D. Diss., Florida State University, 2004), 266–274. 

Reconnaissance platoons in the 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion included 

four scout cars in lieu of armored cars, four jeeps, and one assault gun.

58. Cavalry School, Cavalry Reconnaissance Number Three: Operations 

of the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, From El Abiod to 

Mateur (Northern Tunisia) (Fort Riley, KS: Cavalry School, c. 1943); Cavalry 

School, Cavalry Reconnaissance Number Four: Operations of the 91st Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, From Mateur to Bizerte (Northern 

Tunisia) (Fort Riley, KS: Cavalry School, c. 1943); Morton, “Men on ‘Iron 

Ponies,’” 274–281, 283, 290. The 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron 

included headquarters and headquarters troop, three reconnaissance troops, and 

one support troop. Headquarters troops included an antitank platoon and a pioneer 

and demolitions platoon.

59. Morton, “Men on ‘Iron Ponies,’” 285–287.

60. Lieutenant Colonel John K. Waters, commanding 1st Battalion, 1st 

Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Hyman 

Bruss, commanding 2d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored 

Division, interview, 29 December 1942, 5–6, George C. Marshall Foundation 

(hereafter referred to as GCM), National Archives Project, Microfilm Reel 375, 

Item 5611.
85

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

61. Ibid., 6.

62. Colonel Stanley J. Grogan, Memorandum to Mr. McCloy, “Report on 

Matters, Other Than Public Relations, During North African Trip, February 10–

March 17, 1943,” 20 March 1943, 3, GCM, National Archives Project, Microfilm 

Reel 375, Item 5612.

63. Major General Alvan C. Gillem Jr., Memorandum to Chief of Staff, 

“Report of Observations at European Theater of Operations and North African 

Theater of Operations,” 1 August 1943, 4–5, GCM, National Archives Project, 

Xerox No. 2300. Not until December 1944 would the Army field a light tank, the 

M-24 (Chaffee) equipped with a 75-mm gun, but this weapon was not intended 

for antitank use.

64. HQ, Armored Command, “Report of Observations at European Theater 

of Operations and North African Theater of Observations,” 1 August 1943, 

in US Army Ground Forces (AGF), Observer Board, “Report of Observers: 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations,” Vol. 2, no. 35, MHI; HQ AGF, “Observers 

Report, Team No. 3,” 22 August 1943, in AGF Observer Board, “Report of 

Observers: Mediterranean Theater of Operations,” Vol. 2, no. 37, MHI.

65. HQ AGF, “Observers Report, Team No. 3,” 22 August 1943, in AGF 

Observer Board, “Report of Observers: Mediterranean Theater of Operations,” 

Vol. 2, no. 37, 2, MHI.

66. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Palmer Jr., “New Battle Lessons on 

Reconnaissance,” Cavalry Journal LII, no. 5 (September–October 1943): 37.

67. Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Hoy, “Reconnaissance Lessons from 

North Africa,” Cavalry Journal LII, no. 6 (November–December 1943): 17.

68. Palmer, “New Battle Lessons,” 37.

69. Palmer, “New Battle Lessons,” 37; Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. 

Candler, “91st Reconnaissance Squadron in Tunisia,” Cavalry Journal LIII, no. 2 

(March–April 1944): 20.

70. Morton, “Men on ‘Iron Ponies,’” 272, 288, 281 footnote 65.

71. Conference with Lieutenant Colonel Louis V. Hightower, 1 March 

1943, 2, attached to memorandum from Brigadier General Lowell W. Rooks to 

War Department Operations Division, 21 March 1943, GCM, National Archives 

Project, Microfilm Reel 375, Item 5612.

72. Conference with First Lieutenant Herbert F. Hillenmeyer, 1 March 

1943, 6, attached to memorandum from Brigadier General Lowell W. Rooks to 

War Department Operations Division, 21 March 1943, GCM, National Archives 

Project, Microfilm Reel 375, Item 5612.

73. Observer report of Lieutenant Colonel William S. Myrick Jr., 27 January 

1943, 20, MHI, United States Army Ground Forces, Observer Board, Report of 

Observers, Mediterranean Theater of Operations; George F. Howe, United States 

Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Northwest 

Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), 332.

74. Conference with Lieutenant Colonel Louis V. Hightower, 1 March 

1943, 4.
86

Chapter 2

75. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Kern, Captain Thomas W. Hoban, and 

Captain Walter R. Geyer, “Proceedings of a Board of Officers for Recommendations 

for Changes and Improvements in Organization, Tactics, and Equipment,” 

21 December 1942, 3, 5, in P.M. Robinett, “CCB, 1st Armored Division: North 

African Operations,” GCM, Paul M. Robinett Collection, Box 12.

76. Cavalry School, Cavalry Reconnaissance Number Five: Operations of 

the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, Part I: Sicily (Fort Riley, KS: 

Cavalry School, c. 1943).

77. HQ AGF, “Lessons Learned in the Battle from the Garigliano to North 

of Rome,” 21 September 1944, in AGF Observer Board, “Report of Observers: 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations,” Vol. 3, 11–12, MHI; Morton, “Men on 

‘Iron Ponies,’” 313–314.

78. HQ AGF, “Lessons Learned in the Battle from the Garigliano,” 10–12; 

Morton, “Men on ‘Iron Ponies,’” 318–322.

79. Palmer, “Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,” 356–357.

80. Ibid., 326, 331, 333.

81. Major General Robert W. Grow, Letter to Colonel Barrows, 12 

September 1945, 2, MHI, Robert W. Grow Papers.

82. Armored Division Organization Charts, T/O 17-26 Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, Tank Battalion; T/O 7-26 Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company, Armored Infantry Battalion, 15 September 1943, 14, US Army Armor 

School Reprint.

83. War Department, Cavalry Field Manual (FM) 2-30, Cavalry Mechanized 

Reconnaissance Squadron (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 

98–100.

84. Ibid., 98–99.

85. Ibid., 13, 96.

86. Hoy, “Reconnaissance Lessons From North Africa,” 20; Morton, 

“Horses for ‘Iron Ponies,’” 263–264.

87. Palmer, “New Battle Lessons on Reconnaissance,” 37.

88. FM 2-30 (1943), 16–17.

89. Ibid., 18–20, 30.

90. Ibid., 32–33.

91. Ibid., 65–84, quotation from page 65.

92. Ibid., 13.

93. Ibid., 65–66.

94. Armored Division Organization Charts, T/O 2-27 Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, 15 September 1943, 11, US Army Armor 

School Reprint.

95. Armored Division Organization Charts, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, 9; T/O 17-17 Light Tank Company, 16; T/O 2-28 Cavalry Assault 

Gun Troop, Mechanized, 12, 15 September 1943, US Army Armor School Reprint.

96. Armored Division Organization Charts, Cavalry Reconnaissance 

Squadron, Mechanized, 9; T/O 2-27 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, 

11; T/O 2-28 Cavalry Assault Gun Troop, Mechanized, 12, 15 September 1943, 

US Army Armor School Reprint; FM 2-30 (1943), 98.
87

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

97. War Department, FM 100–5, Field Service Regulations: Operations

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 9–10.

98. US Forces, European Theater, “General Board, Study No. 49: Tactics, 

Employment, Technique, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry 

Units” (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1945), 5–6 

(hereafter cited as Study No. 49); FM 100–5 (1944), 10.

99. War Department, FM 2-20, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944).

100. Ibid., 2.

101. Ibid., 17–18.

102. Ibid., 94.

103. Ibid., 22–25.

104. Ibid., 36, 38, 50, 69, 70–72, 89–94.

105. Ibid., 72–75, 78, 81–82, 94.

106. FM 2-30 (1943), 20, 23, 45, 47.

107. Ibid., 24, 31–33.

108. Ibid., 19–21, 25–26, 37–41, 44, 64–71.

109. FM 2-30 (1943), 4-15. Typical examples of illustrations intended to 

show correct and incorrect operations can be found on pages 38 to 41.

110. Lieutenant Colonel Brainard S. Cook, “Vehicular Reconnaissance,” 

Cavalry Journal LII, no. 1 (January–February 1943): 51–59.

111. FM 2-30 (1943), 4–5; Cook, “Vehicular Reconnaissance,” 53; Palmer, 

“New Battle Lessons on Reconnaissance,” 36–37.

112. Cook, “Vehicular Reconnaissance,” 51–59.

113. The titles of the first five of these studies are Operations of the 81st

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia; Operations of the 81st Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion in Tunisia, Part III: Kasserine—El Ma El Abiod; 

Operations of the 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, 

From El Abiod to Mateur (Northern Tunisia); Operations of the 91st Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, From Mateur to Bizerte (Northern 

Tunisia); Operations of the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized, Part 

I: Sicily. All of these studies were produced and published by the Cavalry School 

at Fort Riley, KS. They are currently available in the US Army Armor School 

Library.

114. Lieutenant Colonel Allen D. Hulse, “Principles and Modern Methods of 

Reconnaissance,” Cavalry Journal LII, no. 4 (July–August 1943): 69.

115. Cook, “Vehicular Reconnaissance,” 53–54.

116. Hulse, “Principles and Modern Methods of Reconnaissance,” 67.

117. FM 2-20 (1944), 6–8.

118. Captain Stuart J. Seborer, “Modern Cavalry Organization,” Cavalry 

Journal LVI, no. 2 (March–April 1947): 23.

119. US Forces, European Theater, “Study No. 49,” 6.

120. Ibid., 9.

121. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, in AGF Observer Board, 
88

Chapter 2

European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–1945,” Vol. 5, C–1007, 1, 

MHI; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 479: Interview with 

Colonel S.N. Dolph, Commanding 102d Cavalry Group,” 31 December 1944, 

in AGF Observer Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–

1945,” Vol. 3, C–479, 1, MHI; “The General Board, Study No. 49,” 9.

122. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the 

Fourth Cavalry Group,” 29 December 1944, in AGF Observer Board, European 

Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–1945,” Vol. 3, C–483, Exhibit A, 

1, MHI; Hugh M. Cole, U.S. Army in World War II: The Lorraine Campaign

(Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1997), 220–221; Hugh M. 

Cole, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: 

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 

1993), 137–140, 144–151, 164; Morton, “Men on Iron Ponies,’” 371–373.

123. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 1.

124. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 479: Interview 

with Colonel S.N. Dolph, Commanding 102d Cavalry Group,” 31 December 

1944, 4; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 1–2; War Department Observers 

Board, “AGF Report No. 775: Mechanized Cavalry Notes,” 28 March 1945, in 

AGF Observer Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–

1945,” Vol. 4, C–775, MHI; “General Board, Study No. 49,” 13, 20.

125. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the 

Fourth Cavalry Group,” 29 December 1944.

126. “Study No. 49,” appendix 3, table 3a. The statistical breakdown of 

missions performed by cavalry groups was defensive (32.8 percent), security 

(24.9 percent), special operations (28.8 percent), offense (10.2 percent), and 

reconnaissance (3.3 percent).

127. “Study No. 49,” appendix 3, table C.

128. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 385: Cavalry 

and Armored Report,” 27 November 1944, in AGF Observer Board, European 

Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–1945,” Vol. 3, C–385, Exhibit A, 9, 

MHI; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the 

Fourth Cavalry Group,” 29 December 1944, Exhibit A, 1–2; War Department 

Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and 

Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 2.

129. Captain Stephen H. Smith et. al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored 

Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units” (student paper 2/46.102, US Army Armor 

School, Fort Knox, KY, 1952), 25–26, US Army Armor School Library.

130. “Study No. 49,” appendix 4, tables A and B; appendix 5, tables A and 

B. The statistical breakdown of missions performed by cavalry reconnaissance 

squadrons and armored reconnaissance battalions in the armored divisions was 

special operations (48 percent), security (24 percent), reconnaissance (13 percent), 

defensive (11 percent), and offensive (4 percent). For cavalry reconnaissance 

troops assigned to infantry divisions, the breakdown was security (50 percent) 

and special operations (39 percent).
89

The Crucible of Combat: World War II

131. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 10.

132. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 6: Organization, 

Employment, Training, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry,” February 1944, 

2, in AGF Observer Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–

1945,” Vol. 1, C–6, MHI; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 

1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 3–4.

133. “Study No. 49,” 15; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report 

No. 479: Interview with Colonel S.N. Dolph, Commanding 102d Cavalry Group,” 

31 December 1944, 3; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in 

US Reconnaissance Units,” 33–34.

134. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 3–4, 6.

135. “Study No. 49,” 15; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored 

Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units,” 33–34.

136. FM 2-20 (1944), 25; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored 

Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units,” 26; Major Robert F. Cunningham et al., 

“Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon” (student paper 45.4-19, US Army Armor 

School, Fort Knox, KY, 1953), 9, US Army Armor School Library.

137. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 3.

138. Cunningham et al, “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 9; War 

Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 775: Mechanized Cavalry 

Notes,” 28 March 1945, 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 2.

139. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 6: Organization, 

Employment, Training, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry,” February 1944, 

6, in AGF Observer Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–

1945,” Vol. 1, C–6, MHI; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 

1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 4.

140. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 775: Mechanized 

Cavalry Notes,” 28 March 1945, 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 2.

141. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 6: Organization, 

Employment, Training, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry,” February 1944, 

2–3; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 479: Interview with 

Colonel S.N. Dolph, Commanding 102d Cavalry Group,” 31 December 1944, 3; 

War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 775: Mechanized Cavalry 

Notes,” 28 March 1945, 3d Cavalry Group, 2; War Department Observers Board, 

“AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 

1945, 3–4; “Study No. 49,” 15.

142. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 3, quotation from page 19.

143. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 10–11; “Study No. 49,” 8–12, 

20–21; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units,” 33–34.
90

Chapter 2

144. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in US 

Reconnaissance Units,” 26.

145. Ibid., 6.

146. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 6: Organization, 

Employment, Training, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry,” February 1944, 

5; War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 396: Report of Visit with 

the 6th Armored Division,” 23 November 1944, Exhibit A, 1, in AGF Observer 

Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–1945,” Vol. 3, C–

396, MHI.

147. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 5; Smith et al., “The Need for a 

Lightly Armored Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units,” 26.

148. Cunningham et al, “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 9.

149. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized 

Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, 5.

150. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 396: Report of 

Visit with the 6th Armored Division,” 23 November 1944, Exhibit A, 1.

151. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 396: Report of 

Visit with the 6th Armored Division,” 23 November 1944, Exhibit A, 7; War 

Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 479: Interview with Colonel 

S.N. Dolph, Commanding 102d Cavalry Group,” 31 December 1944, 1.

152. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 6: Organization, 

Employment, Training, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry,” February 1944, 6.

153. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 396: Report of 

Visit with the 6th Armored Division,” 23 November 1944, Exhibit A, 6.

154. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in US 

Reconnaissance Units,” 7.

155. Ibid., 7.

156. Ibid., 7.

157. Cunningham et al, “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 67.

158. Major Craig S. Harju, “White Paper—A Study of the Maneuver Battalion 

Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon” (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 

18 September 1989), 6–8. Available through the Defense Technical Information 

Center as Report AD-A214 798.

159. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 385: Cavalry and 

Armored Report,” 27 November 1944, 2, 6, 10.

160. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 385: Cavalry 

and Armored Report,” 27 November 1944, 6; War Department Observers Board, 

“AGF Report No. 693: Armored Notes,” 1 March 1945, 2, 4, 6, in AGF Observer 

Board, European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944–1945,” Vol. 4, 

C‐693, MHI.

161. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 385: Cavalry and 

Armored Report,” 27 November 1944, 6, 10.
91

Chapter 3

From Postwar to Korean War

The years 1945 and 1955 marked a transition period for the Army. The 

end of World War II led to demobilization and downsizing that resulted in 

a much smaller force in the immediate postwar years. Extensive analysis 

of wartime combat experiences shaped the direction of doctrine, organization, and materiel development. Mounted reconnaissance shifted from 

a wartime emphasis on reconnaissance only to a broader mission set oriented on security and combat. Organizational developments, particularly 

the emergence of the armored cavalry regiment and the combined arms 

reconnaissance platoon, reflected this change. The Korean War marked the 

first opportunity to employ the new reconnaissance units and doctrine in 

combat, but the nature of the conflict made it a limited test case. Lessons 

learned tended to focus on the company and platoon. After the war, the 

Army’s focus shifted to operations on an atomic battlefield.

Analysis of the Wartime Experience

The end of World War II triggered a rapid reduction in the Army’s 

size. From a force of 89 divisions in 1945, only 10 remained by 1948. 

The number of armored divisions shrank from 16 to 1 with parallel reductions in the numbers of cavalry groups and cavalry reconnaissance squadrons. The Armored Force, redesignated during the war first as the Armored 

Command and then the Armored Center, inactivated only to reactivate in 

November 1946. In the interim, its functions migrated to the Armored 

School, which remained the center of gravity for armored developments. 

In the late 1940s, the value of armor to the Army was not in question, but 

rather how to integrate responsibility for its development into the existing 

force structure on a permanent basis.1

In Europe, the Army assumed responsibility for the stability of 

Occupied Germany. Plans to establish a large garrison presence there 

evaporated with demobilization. Instead, the Constabulary arose, a special 

force that relied on mobility rather than mass to ensure a secure environment for Germany’s reconstruction. Its components were drawn largely 

from mechanized cavalry, tank destroyer, and armored units, leveraging 

the characteristics of mobility and robust communications associated with 

these mounted units. Established in 1946, the Constabulary’s focus lay on 

stability and security operations rather than combat.2

These developments left the Army few resources for other operations 

or experimentation with new ideas. However, the late 1940s witnessed a 
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Chapter 3

major intellectual effort to capture the lessons learned from World War II 

and incorporate them into tactical organizations, doctrine, and materiel. 

This analysis led to significant changes throughout the Army, although the 

means to implement them were not immediately available. The resultant 

paper changes established a pattern for future developments that guided 

activities into the Korean War.

Reconnaissance operations by mounted units received considerable 

attention. Following Germany’s surrender, the Army convened a General 

Board to gather data on combat operations in Europe. Its report on the 

experience of mechanized cavalry dominated much of the postwar discussion on reconnaissance. Given the large-scale presence of mechanized 

cavalry organizations in the European theater of operations, this emphasis 

made sense.

The General Board’s mechanized cavalry report relied on reports and 

personal input from wartime commanders. From this extensive body of data, 

the Board crafted a final report that summarized the wartime experience, 

Figure 32. Constabulary jeep patrol in Occupied Germany.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
93

From Postwar to Korean War

identified problems, and included a detailed set of recommendations 

for postwar developments. The most important conclusion concerned 

the doctrinal principles that governed the organization and intended 

employment of mechanized cavalry. The Board rejected as “unsound” 

the wartime emphasis on reconnaissance as the principal mission of 

mechanized cavalry, citing the much more varied actual battlefield 

experiences of cavalry groups and cavalry reconnaissance squadrons. 

Security and combat operations were considered routine activities 

for mechanized cavalry and their organization and doctrine required 

appropriate adjustment. Reconnaissance remained a responsibility, but it 

was considered integral to other activities.3

Acknowledging the broad range of activities performed in Europe, 

the Board sought to drop the reconnaissance designation from all 

mechanized cavalry units. Instead, it wanted them renamed as cavalry 

with the wider mission set traditionally associated with mounted units. 

Through nomenclature, cavalry organizations would be distanced from the 

now discredited reconnaissance-only emphasis of the war years. Through 

increases in personnel and combat power, the Board also sought to add 

substance to the name change by boosting the manning level and combat 

power of mechanized cavalry units—at least on paper. Its recommended 

organizational changes effectively transformed the mechanized cavalry 

into general-purpose combat units capable of a broad range of activities 

without reliance on external augmentation. Central to these improvements 

lay an increased capability for dismounted operations and the provision 

of survivability and lethality without sacrificing quietness of operation. A 

clear preference for the better cross-country mobility of tracked vehicles 

was also manifest, particularly if their noise signature could be reduced.4

The General Board’s analysis encouraged widespread changes to the 

structure and mission of all mounted reconnaissance organizations. At the 

army and corps levels, dissatisfaction with the minimized, flexible cavalry 

group led to recommendations for its replacement by a cavalry regiment 

traditionally configured with three battalions and the necessary means to 

perform its mission without reliance on an external attachment. A consensus similarly emerged to replace the single cavalry reconnaissance troop 

of the infantry division with a complete squadron.5

 Armored commanders favored retention of a squadron equivalent in the armored division 

albeit with some modification. They desired a squadron with a headquarters and headquarters service company, four cavalry troops equipped with 

light tanks rather than armored cars, and an assault gun troop for mobile 

fire support. In this proposal, each cavalry troop included a headquarters, 

3 cavalry platoons, and 160 personnel. The platoons relied on the same 
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Chapter 3

armored car/jeep mix used in the war pending development of an improved 

light tank, but overall strength increased to 1 officer and 36 men. Although 

some officers supported inclusion of a rifle squad in each platoon and an 

armored car rather than a light tank, they constituted a minority view. A 

survey of junior officers found widespread support for a mix of armored 

vehicles and jeeps within the platoons, but they divided over whether the 

armored platform should be an armored car or a light tank.6

Although the mechanized cavalry experience overshadowed that of 

the reconnaissance platoons of the tank battalions, these too received at 

least some attention from the General Board. The report on the separate 

tank battalions included opinions and recommended changes from personnel who served in these units. In every case, the respondents recommended 

increasing the size of the reconnaissance platoon. The extent of this expansion varied wildly from a simple increase in the existing strength to the 

addition of a second platoon or even an entire reconnaissance troop. Little 

enthusiasm remained for the halftrack, and recommendations emerged to 

replace this platform with an armored car.7

While the General Board continued its work in Germany, analysis of 

the wartime experience occurred simultaneously throughout the Army. 

The activities of the mechanized cavalry received considerable attention 

at Forts Riley and Knox and within the War Department. The pages of 

Armored Cavalry Journal were filled with articles detailing cavalry operations during the war, providing a wealth of combat accounts, unit activities, assessments by veterans of their activities, and recommendations for 

improvements. Organizational changes often paralleled the findings of the 

General Board. In an article titled “Brief for a Cavalry Combat Platoon,” 

the author drew on his wartime activities in a cavalry reconnaissance troop 

to propose a new platoon. It focused on the inclusion of an organic rifle 

component within the platoon, increasing its strength by 10 men. By reducing the number of vehicles and changing their type, he sought to minimize 

the vehicle crew requirement and generate a more compact unit requiring 

less road space. The resultant platoon could thus field a much greater dismounted capability and could rapidly bring all of its combat power to bear 

if attacked—particularly on roads.8

This emphasis on dismounted capability and increasing the man-tovehicle ratio to permit more effective dismounted operations resonated 

throughout the mounted community. Similar concerns led Major General 

I.D. White in 1945 to conclude, 

The Cavalry mechanized unit must be trained and organized for considerable dismounted action. Our present 
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From Postwar to Korean War

reconnaissance troop . . . does not lend itself to dismounted 

action and . . . there is little time to train them as riflemen 

for dismounted combat.9

A variety of recommendations resulted, including a proposal to include a 

troop of dragoons in each cavalry squadron and increase the platoon rifle 

strength of the desired armored regiment.10

The attention given to the platoon reflected its status as the basic 

building block for cavalry organizations. For the dispersed operations 

associated with reconnaissance activities, the platoon rather than the troop 

or squadron constituted the primary maneuver element—much as the 

platoon had been considered the principal reconnaissance agency in the 

interwar and early World War II years. Because combat operations demonstrated the fallacy of conceiving reconnaissance as a separate function 

from other mission types, the trend in platoon design lay toward increased 

capability. The high level of dismounted operations undertaken in World 

War II resulted in efforts to strengthen the platoon through the addition of 

riflemen.

Similarly, the priority of platoon missions changed from an exclusive 

emphasis on reconnaissance to one that placed security and combat 

activities before reconnaissance. This change fueled the drive to enhance 

Figure 33. Mobile Constabulary winter patrol.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Armor and Cavalry
96

Chapter 3

the combat power of the platoon. Parallel efforts were affecting troop and 

squadron organizations, which would serve as the principal source of 

augmentation for subordinate units rather than external attachments.11

Concern over combat power also stemmed from the wartime employment of mechanized cavalry in covering force and advance guard assignments. This use made sense when information on the enemy proved 

minimal. In situations where hostile forces were pinpointed and battle 

imminent, reconnaissance units had no place forward, since “too often 

reconnaissance type units suffered severe losses when ‘caught’ between 

main opposing elements in heavy meeting engagements.”12 Major General 

Ernest N. Harmon concurred with this view. Reflecting on his experiences 

as an armored division commander, he noted, 

If you are in heavy contact, I think it is absurd to attempt 

to lead your attack with the reconnaissance battalion or 

elements of the reconnaissance battalion. You should lead 

with your medium tanks as to do otherwise will simply 

destroy your lighter reconnaissance vehicles and clog up 

the battlefield.13

In 1946, the Armored School hosted its first armored conference. This 

event brought together armored and cavalry veterans to discuss a wide 

range of issues related to organization and doctrine. Reconnaissance constituted one of these subjects, although the focus overall included proposals for a new armored division, changes to the tank battalion structure, and 

related personnel and materiel items. In preparation, the Armored School 

sought views on the mechanized cavalry squadron, cavalry group, and 

reconnaissance battalion of the armored division. In general, respondents 

found the squadron unsatisfactory and sought to reconfigure it to include 

combined arms troops equipped with jeeps, light tanks, and full-track 

armored personnel carriers supported by self-propelled 105-mm guns. 

Cavalry groups were considered unnecessary and an armored regiment 

preferred. Within the proposed armored division, the reconnaissance battalion included a headquarters and four companies, each equipped with a 

mix of jeeps, light tanks, 105-mm guns, and an armored reconnaissance 

vehicle in lieu of the armored car. Overall strength for each company was 

listed as 5 officers and 155 men.14

Reconnaissance Restructured

By 1948, much of the analysis of wartime experience had been 

translated into new tables of organization for reconnaissance units and 

updated doctrine. Overall, the Army retained the tiered reconnaissance 
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From Postwar to Korean War

developed and employed in World War II. The reconnaissance platoon 

constituted the smallest tier and the basic component of the larger units. 

It underwent significant change from its wartime predecessors. It now 

included a separate headquarters, a scout section, a tank section, a rifle 

squad, and a support squad. Total strength rose to 1 officer and 38 enlisted 

men. Its vehicle mix included the jeep, light tank, and armored personnel 

carrier. Criticism of the fire support offered by three 60-mm mortars was 

addressed by acting on the recommendation to replace them with a single 

81-mm mortar. This weapon constituted the focal point of the support squad, 

which included two jeeps and two trailers. The latter carried ammunition 

for the mortar but at the expense of the jeep’s off-road mobility. The new 

platoon offered a much more robust, combat capable organization with an 

enhanced ability to conduct dismounted operations—very much in line 

with postwar recommendations. In effect, the reconnaissance platoon had 

become the smallest combined arms team within the Army, and it provided 

the foundation on which other reconnaissance units were crafted.15

The new reconnaissance platoon became a standard organization 

intended for inclusion in the armored reconnaissance battalion of the 

armored division, the reconnaissance company of the infantry division, 

and the tank battalion. Its combined arms nature provided tank battalion commanders the ability to conduct aggressive reconnaissance, fight 

for information, and provide security without the perpetual necessity of 

augmentation. It brought similar capabilities to the other organizations in 

which it could be found and generally marked an improvement over the 

wartime reconnaissance platoons.16

A new reconnaissance company included a headquarters and three 

reconnaissance platoons. The platoons were configured as outlined above, 

while the headquarters included a headquarters section; a maintenance 

section; and an administrative, mess, and supply section. Total strength 

included 5 officers and 157 enlisted soldiers, very close to the size recommended at the armored conference. The reconnaissance company replaced 

the cavalry reconnaissance troop in the infantry division, marking the 

demise of cavalry nomenclature in Army functions.17

Within the armored division, the reconnaissance battalion now bore 

responsibility for reconnaissance and security. It was also intended 

to execute light combat missions and operate as an armored task force 

with suitable augmentation. The new battalion configuration included a 

headquarters and headquarters and service company, four reconnaissance 

companies, and a medical detachment. The combined arms nature of 

the platoons obviated the need for light tank and assault gun units under 
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Chapter 3

battalion control for assignment to company and platoon level. Hence, 

these assets disappeared from the organization.18

At corps and army level, a new organization emerged to replace the 

wartime cavalry group—the armored cavalry regiment (light). This unit, 

too, reflected efforts to implement recommendations from wartime operations and found expression in the General Board report on mechanized 

cavalry. However, the regiment also reflected the tactical needs of the 

Army in Europe. Stability and security in the occupied zone of Germany 

had been the responsibility of the Constabulary. As Germany began to 

rebuild and establish a new government with its own capacity to maintain 

internal security, the need for the Constabulary diminished.19

The Berlin Airlift, the creation of the Warsaw Pact, and the onset of the 

Cold War shifted the Army’s focus in Germany from internal to external 

security. With a minimal tactical reserve in Central Europe, Army leaders 

sought to enhance the combat ability of all forces stationed there, including the Constabulary. Consequently, in 1947 Constabulary units began to 

transition into combat organizations, exchanging their jeeps and armored 

cars for medium tanks and emphasizing tactical operations in training. 

The next year, Constabulary units converted into combat units that collectively constituted an armored division equivalent for use in the event of 

hostilities with the Soviet Union. The 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry 

Regiments resulted, paralleled in the United States by the creation of the 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.20

The armored cavalry regiment (light) was intended for assignment at 

the corps and army level. The name reflected the uncertainty surrounding 

the fate of armored organizations within the Army. Although a merger of 

armored and cavalry units into a single branch was anticipated, its final 

form and designation had not yet been determined. The term “armored 

cavalry” found common use throughout the late 1940s. In the case of the 

armored cavalry regiment (light), the name reflected the unresolved branch 

status for armor and cavalry organizations.21

In a deliberate break from the purpose of the wartime cavalry groups, 

the prioritized purpose of the armored cavalry regiment (light) included 

security, light combat, and reconnaissance. Its principal missions included 

pursuit, exploitation, flank security, screening gaps between units, and 

reconnaissance. Reflective of its Constabulary origins, the regi­ment also 

bore responsibility for establishing security in areas captured but occupied 

by a hostile population. Secondary missions included defensive actions, 

offensive combat, urban operations, and securing lines of supply and 
99

From Postwar to Korean War

communication. The new organization bore the characteristics of speed, 

lightness, long- and short-range communications, and both offensive 

and defensive abilities. All of these qualities derived from the General 

Board report on mechanized cavalry and the wartime experiences of the 

same. In short, the armored cavalry regiment (light) emerged as a versatile 

organization capable of performing the full range of activities actually 

conducted by the wartime cavalry groups.22

The regiment possessed a triangular structure to correct the imbalance 

noted by wartime commanders of cavalry groups that included only two 

mechanized cavalry squadrons. The new unit comprised a headquarters 

and headquarters company, three reconnaissance battalions, a service 

company, and a medical detachment. Each battalion in turn included 

three companies with three platoons apiece. Administrative, supply, and 

maintenance functions were concentrated at the regimental level for 

detachment to the battalions. Personnel strength for the regiment totaled 

2,883, with a battalion strength of 37 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 746 

enlisted men.23

The reconnaissance battalions differed in configuration from those 

included in the armored divisions. In the armored cavalry regiment, each 

battalion included a headquarters, three reconnaissance companies, a 

medium tank company, and an assault gun company. The tank and assault 

Figure 34. The transition of the Constabulary into a tactical force through 

the inclusion of medium tanks.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
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Chapter 3

gun companies were intended to be used en masse or parceled out among the 

battalions for specific operations. Overall, the cavalry regiment’s battalions 

possessed greater firepower than their division counterparts, reflecting 

their greater independence of operations. Reconnaissance companies and 

platoons, however, bore the same configuration as those found in other 

organizations, including division reconnaissance elements.24

The armored cavalry regiment (light) constituted a powerful combined 

arms team capable of a broad range of activity. This versatility was deliberate and it marked a return to the type of general-purpose combat organization represented by the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in the 1930s. 

Considerable care went into addressing the problems encountered by the 

mechanized cavalry in World War II. Indeed, the new regiment included 

two light observation aircraft. Integration of ground and aerial reconnaissance, long recommended, now became a routine reality.25

The armored cavalry regiment was not without its critics. The intended 

assignment of one regiment per corps did not facilitate the continuous 

operations anticipated. This fielding mirrored the assignment of one cavalry group per corps, but it did not permit the periodic removal of the 

groups from combat operations for rest and reorganization. One alternative proposal advocated the assignment of one regiment to each corps and 

two to each army. Within the regiment, objections arose over nomenclature. The squadron and troop designations long characteristic of cavalry 

organizations disappeared in favor of battalions and companies. The use of 

the term “reconnaissance” to identify these units also triggered concerns 

lest they become associated with the pure reconnaissance organizations of 

the wartime mechanized cavalry.26

Mechanized cavalry leaders at all echelons in World War II routinely 

found themselves lacking sufficient soldiers to conduct effective dismounted operations. The new armored cavalry regiment addressed this 

problem by increasing available dismounted strength. The number of soldiers required to operate vehicles shrank, and the ratio of men-to-vehicles 

rose, but not to the levels recommended by wartime mechanized cavalry 

commanders. Within the platoons, a single 81-mm mortar replaced the 

60-mm mortars used during the war. While this change reflected recommended actions, the larger weapon, crew, and ammunition were carried 

in two jeeps that towed cargo trailers. Thus burdened, the support squad 

possessed inferior mobility to the rest of the platoon and became more 

vulnerable. The use of M26 medium tanks in the tank company reflected 

available platforms, but a lighter tank with enhanced antitank capability 

was desired.27
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From Postwar to Korean War

Doctrinal Revision

Doctrinal developments paralleled the changes in mounted reconnaissance organizations in the late 1940s. The experience of the mechanized 

cavalry in World War II also found reflection in the emerging doctrinal 

publications. In a change from the pure reconnaissance principles prevalent in wartime training and doctrine, postwar guidance embraced the 

employment of reconnaissance units in all those missions previously associated with both the horse and mechanized cavalry. In the conduct of these 

missions, the likelihood of combat, including fighting for information, 

gained acceptance.28

Ground reconnaissance units included the capability to maintain continuous contact, operate under all weather conditions, and determine the 

details of enemy activity. Armored reconnaissance units were expected to 

include a balance of combat assets, ensuring their ability to conduct distance reconnaissance and operate over an extensive front beyond the effective support range of other units. They were intended to work through gaps 

in enemy lines and around flanks to reach their objectives. Encouraged to 

work closely with air assets, reconnaissance units were not expected to 

achieve a complete sense of enemy activity in the presence of aggressive 

hostile screening elements. In such instances, “frequently, essential information can be obtained only through attack. Reconnaissance units attack 

when their mission requires it.”29

These ideas governing mounted reconnaissance became embedded in 

the updated draft version of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. It provided the basic mission statement of reconnaissance: 

Reconnaissance is usually performed by light armored 

cavalry units which employ rapidity and flexibility of 

movement, communications facilities and firepower. 

Sus­tained offensive or defensive combat is avoided. The 

capabilities of light armored cavalry include both distant 

and close ground reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance, seizing and holding critical terrain features for a 

limited time, march and battlefield security, flank security, combat liaison, and delaying and harassing action. 

Reconnaissance units fight on a relatively broad front 

and in slight depth. In performing any of their missions 

these units customarily contribute to the security of the 

larger command of its elements by reporting locations and 

strengths of enemy forces and by providing timely warning of impending ground and air attacks. Information is 
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Chapter 3

transmitted directly to higher headquarters and to units 

whose security is threatened.30

The May 1950 publication of FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon 

and Reconnaissance Company, provided more detailed guidance for 

reconnaissance operations. This manual reflected the writers’ clarity 

of thought and determination to provide a useful tool to small unit 

commanders. It proved easy to understand and benefited from the effective 

use of diagrams, drawings, and charts. For personnel new to the postwar 

reconnaissance changes, this manual walked them through the principles 

and their application in a sensible manner. Its guidance applied to all 

those organizations that included a reconnaissance company or platoon, 

including tank battalions, divisions, and the armored cavalry regiment 

(light). The manual’s broad applicability conformed to the universal 

nature of the reconnaissance platoon and company organizations. These 

units were expected to:

Provide security and perform reconnaissance or light combat for units to which they are assigned or attached. For 

the successful accomplishment of these missions, both 

the reconnaissance platoon and reconnaissance company 

are organized, equipped, and trained to attack, to defend, 

or to delay. Each will engage in whichever type of action 

its mission and the situation dictate.31

The reconnaissance platoon and company possessed the qualities of 

mobility, balanced firepower, light armor protection, and robust communications. They were considered versatile and capable of a variety of activities, more similar to the interwar mechanized cavalry than the wartime 

cavalry groups, squadrons, and troops. 

Because of their mobility, balanced firepower, light 

armor protection, and multiple means of communication, 

the reconnaissance platoon and company are capable of 

adapting themselves readily to any type of situation and 

of engaging in any type of combat. They are capable of 

regrouping within their own organizations to meet any 

situation which arises.32

Their standard organization and versatility also facilitated their attachment 

and use in task forces tailored to a specific mission or environment.

Within the reconnaissance company, the platoon constituted the basic 

tactical unit. It consisted of a small combined arms team intended to operate as a single force rather than a collection of detached teams. In keeping 
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From Postwar to Korean War

with the deliberate break from the pure reconnaissance doctrine of World 

War II, the chapter on platoon operations opened with coverage of the 

platoon’s employment in security, covering force, rearguard, and counterreconnaissance missions. The early introduction of these subjects subtly 

reminded the reader of the platoon’s versatility and intended roles. Security 

missions, in particular, received considerable coverage, because “security 

is the mission most commonly assigned to the reconnaissance platoon and 

company.”33 Security encompassed operations conducted to protect flanks, 

rear areas, and supply lines, and act against airborne assaults in addition to 

the general purpose of preventing the surprise of the parent unit.34

Despite the deliberate upfront attention given to security, reconnaissance operations consumed much of the chapter devoted to platoon 

Figure 35. Communist propaganda poster proclaiming the 

defeat of the United States in 1950.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
104

Chapter 3

operations. Reconnaissance remained a primary function of this platoon, 

but it was not intended to be a passive information gatherer: “The 

reconnaissance platoon frequently will attack in the execution of its 

mission.”35 Throughout the section on reconnaissance, the reader was 

repeatedly reminded that time often precluded a deliberate, thorough 

pace of operations. Consequently, the platoon leader’s range of operations 

shrank and encouraged greater reliance on hasty, aggressive, and mounted 

operations. Reconnaissance by fire suited these conditions, since it was 

intended to force a suspected enemy to disclose his presence: 

The platoon moves into position to cover the suspected 

position. One of the scout 1⁄4-ton trucks then moves out 

slowly. It suddenly stops, turns, and speeds for cover, firing at the suspected position. This maneuver creates the 

impression that the enemy has been discovered, and may 

draw fire.36

The greater combat power of the platoon made possible more aggressive tactics. The platoon often moved in a column. The scout section led, 

covering the main axis of advance and related lateral routes. The tank section followed to provide covering fire or assume the lead in case of resistance. The rifle and support squads trailed at the column’s end. When an 

attack became necessary, the platoon formed a base of fire built around the 

support squad and at least part of the scout section. The rifle squad joined 

the tanks to provide a combined arms maneuvering force that assaulted 

the enemy.37 In defensive actions, a mobile defense was preferred, and 

the manual provided detailed guidance for conducting delaying actions.38

The platoon leader was not restricted to any particular vehicle or location. 

Instead, he was encouraged to position himself in a manner that provided 

the best means of seeing and controlling the actions of his forward elements. In a change from earlier doctrine, he was not expected to avoid 

combat. Whether or not he committed the platoon to battle hinged solely 

on the likelihood of success.39

Like prior manuals, FM 17-22 categorized reconnaissance operations as zone, route, or area. Route focused on an axis of movement either 

forward or behind friendly lines, depending on whether an advance or 

retrograde movement was planned. Zone reconnaissance focused on the 

principal routes and dominant terrain features within an assigned maneuver 

box. Area reconnaissance targeted a particular locale. In performing these 

types of operations, the platoon relied on the proven techniques of bounding overwatch and dispersion, particularly on roads. Finding the enemy 

and reporting his status and disposition remained the primary objective. 
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From Postwar to Korean War

On gaining contact, the platoon deployed and sought more detailed information, relying on dismounted patrols where necessary. Special guidance 

governed bridges, defiles, and urban areas. The last case emphasized the 

use of dismounted action where time permitted or the use of a staggered 

vehicle column moving by bounds. Although night operations were not 

discounted, they were discouraged due to the difficulty of observation and 

the adverse effect of vehicle noise.40

Company operations mirrored those of the platoon on a larger scale. 

The mission set remained the same, although the greater size of the company provided more flexibility in how such missions were conducted. It 

included a headquarters and three identical platoons. Although each platoon was considered a single team, the manual acknowledged the periodic 

grouping of like elements from the platoons for select missions. In this 

manner, larger concentrations of tanks and infantry might be achieved. 

Generally, however, the company commander focused on coordinating the 

separate actions of his subordinate platoons over a broad area. The company was expected to provide a screen that provided time and space for 

the parent organization to react and maneuver. In general, each platoon 

covered a single route and its laterals, or three routes at the company level. 

By splitting the scout section of each platoon into two parts this coverage 

might be doubled, but at the cost of reduced effectiveness in reporting. 

Similar guidance governed the number of routes on which the company 

could perform delaying actions.41

Reconnaissance missions assigned to the company also included zone 

and route. The company commander then subdivided his assignment into 

platoon areas of responsibility. In coordinating the actions of his platoon, he 

was expected to move frequently, appearing wherever most needed, borne 

by the most appropriate vehicle. The headquarters possessed no tactical 

assets, only administrative, supply, and maintenance support. Therefore, 

the commander influenced platoon activity through his guidance, personal 

intervention, and oversight of subordinate units. His headquarters kept 

the platoons supplied and served as a nexus of information between each 

platoon and higher headquarters. Combat also was considered a normal 

part of the company’s reconnaissance and security functions. The commander’s role lay in determining how many platoons to commit and in 

what configuration. With the exception of the companies in the armored 

cavalry regiment, he was expected to conduct combat operations without 

augmentation.42

The manual also introduced unit training. For the platoon and company, 

it included a listing of tasks to be taught, hours to be devoted to each one, 
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Chapter 3

and a description of principal exercises. In effect, it provided a framework 

for planning, preparation, and execution of training from the squad through 

the company. This guidance emphasized the teamwork at all echelons and 

ensured that the versatility associated with the platoon found reflection 

in training activities. A special appendix included a detailed description 

of tactical problems for the platoon, including the situation, actions to 

be taken drawn from doctrinal principles, and illustrations.43 Individual 

training emphasized the specialization required: “Each individual member 

of the reconnaissance platoon must be a thoroughly trained scout.”44 Skills 

required included techniques for the detection and removal of mines 

without special equipment, route and bridge reconnaissance and repair, 

removal and placement of explosives, ability to perform functions of 

an artillery forward observer, and the provision of emergency medical 

treatment and casualty evacuation. Overall the training guidance ensured 

that the full mission set became part of the training schedule and suited the 

small unit commander’s needs. Drawing from the wartime experience, it 

acknowledged the linkage between training and action on the battlefield: 

“From the beginning of any training program, the procedures employed 

should be the same as those which are employed in combat.”45

The doctrinal changes for the reconnaissance platoon and company 

impacted tank battalions assigned to infantry and armored divisions. Each 

such battalion included an organic reconnaissance platoon identical to that 

found in the armored cavalry regiment and the division reconnaissance 

battalions. The combined arms nature of these platoons marked a major 

increase in versatility and combat power over battalion reconnaissance 

in World War II. However, the primary function of battalion reconnaissance did not change. It continued to focus on local security, liaison with 

adjacent units, and reconnaissance near the parent battalion. The platoon 

scouted those areas and locations into which the battalion intended to move 

and subsequently guided tank units into their bivouac, assembly area, and 

attack positions. It remained close to the battalion and did not generally 

conduct independent operations.47

Within the battalion, the reconnaissance platoon constituted part of 

the headquarters and service company. Coordination of its actions with 

Unit Training Time

Squad and section 40 hours

Platoon 62 hours

Company 128 hours

Table 1. Reconnaissance platoon training46
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From Postwar to Korean War

those of the battalion occurred through the joint efforts of the S3 and S2. 

FM 17-22 contained much of the guidance for the tank battalion reconnaissance platoon. Tank battalion doctrine provided some indication of how 

the platoon might be used, but details proved sparse. The platoon acted 

as one of several sources of information available to the battalion commander that also included aerial photos, pilot reports, information from 

adjacent units, and general intelligence passed down through command 

channels. All battalion assets were expected to conduct reconnaissance in 

the normal course of their missions—this activity was not the exclusive 

purview of the reconnaissance platoon. The most oft cited activity related 

to the facilitation of the battalion’s movement. The platoon was expected 

to play a vital role in locating battle positions and guiding combat assets 

to them in both offensive and defensive engagements. The platoon also 

helped determine where and how delaying actions would be fought and 

sought to retain contact with enemy forces during exploitation operations. 

However, the employment of the reconnaissance team came with a caution 

concerning its survivability: 

When enemy contacts have been frequent but intermittent, and combat with units employing tanks or antitank 

guns can be expected momentarily, it is not advisable to 

employ the reconnaissance platoon as a part of the advance 

guard or covering force, because of the light armor of its 

vehicles. 48

Figure 36. The M41 Light Tank (Walker bulldog) fielded to replace the 

M24 (Chaffee) and cope with more heavily armed and armored Soviet 

combat vehicles.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
108

Chapter 3

Despite the reconnaissance platoon’s increased combat power, it remained 

vulnerable on a battlefield dominated by armor and antiarmor systems.

Doctrinal guidance for the reconnaissance battalion followed in 

March 1951 with the publication of FM 17-35, Reconnaissance Battalion, 

Armored Division. This manual was the first to address this unit in detail 

since 1944. The revised battalion included a headquarters, four identical 

reconnaissance companies, and a medical detachment. It, too, was intended 

for more than pure reconnaissance:

The reconnaissance battalion, armored division, is a selfcontained tactical and administrative unit organized and 

equipped to engage in offensive or defensive combat, 

either mounted, dismounted, or a combination of both, 

primarily in the execution of security and reconnaissance 

missions. The battalion is the security and reconnaissance 

unit of the armored division. The division commander 

will normally use it as an economy force so that he can 

concentrate the bulk of the division on the most important objectives. As a rule, the battalion operates without 

attachments of tanks and armored infantry and without 

direct-support artillery.49

The battalion provided a number of capabilities to its parent division. 

In addition to performing reconnaissance, security, and economy of force 

missions, it also engaged in offensive and defensive combat. It possessed 

the ability to operate mounted or dismounted and was considered capable 

of performing reconnaissance for the division commander in any combat 

situation. The battalion was expected to deploy over a broad area, maneuvering each of its companies in a coordinated manner. It was considered 

an ideal covering force for the division, and the nature of its organization 

permitted it to rapidly change the direction of its advance on short notice. 

It also carried sufficient supplies to conduct continuous operations for a 

72-hour period.50

The reconnaissance battalion remained a division asset. However, its 

employment remained the purview of the formation commander and no 

prescribed method was provided. The entire battalion might be attached 

to a combat command, one or more companies might support other division components, the entire battalion could be retained under the formation commander’s control, or the unit might be divided between the 

division and a subordinate command. The battalion constituted an important, flexible asset whose employment suited the division commander’s 

needs. However, the regular operation of the battalion as a collection of 
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From Postwar to Korean War

detachments was discouraged because it eroded the tactical integrity of 

the unit.51

In the execution of security and reconnaissance operations, doctrinal 

guidance built on the principles established for the company and platoon. 

In many respects, battalion operations resembled those of the company 

on a larger scale. Both the company and battalion often employed their 

subordinate elements over a broad area, but they retained the ability to 

concentrate their efforts when circumstances dictated. When possible, 

the commander sought to retain a reserve under his direct control. Both 

the company and battalion commanders also had few assets within their 

headquarters to influence operations. They channeled medical, supply, 

and maintenance support to component units, but their principal influence 

occurred through their personal leadership and guidance.52

Despite the firepower, mobility, and general versatility of the reconnaissance battalion, it operated under several limitations. It possessed a limited 

number of riflemen, which restricted its capacity for sustained, dismounted 

combat. Its geographic coverage depended on the range of its radios, and 

the mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles within the companies and platoons 

gave the battalion a degree of terrain sensitivity. Mines constituted a particularly dangerous mobility threat, necessitating the placement of personnel 

trained in mine detection and removal in forward scout elements.53

The battalion manual followed the pattern established by FM 17-22 

for training. Guidance outlined the nature and progression of unit training, indicating principal tasks to be addressed at each level. Soldiers were 

imbued with the spirit of the offensive in all activities. All commanders 

were expected to be qualified in calling for and adjusting artillery fire. 

Combat was not shunned. The description for one reconnaissance training 

exercise included:

This exercise should stress the battalion operating as a 

unit on a reconnaissance mission. The situation should 

require the companies to deploy their platoons and to fight 

to obtain information. It should include the proper transmission of information from company to battalion and 

from battalion to the next higher headquarters.54

The reconnaissance battalion was not configured or trained to conduct the 

sneak and peak tactics once favored by mechanized cavalry doctrine.

The last manual related to the restructured reconnaissance organizations governed the armored cavalry regiment. FM 17-95, The Armored 

Cavalry Regiment and the Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion,
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appeared in September 1951. It addressed only those elements specific 

to the regiment, although it, too, leveraged the principles established in 

the reconnaissance company and platoon manual. The regiment performed 

security, reconnaissance, and economy of force operations—missions 

that would become staples for future cavalry organizations. Although not 

intended for combat with enemy armor or strong defenses, it was intended 

for any light combat that did not require the full strength of a division. The 

manual noted the regiment’s characteristics of high mobility, light armor, 

heavy firepower, and robust communications. These qualities reflected the 

concepts behind the regiment’s design, making it “organized, equipped, 

and trained to perform highly mobile operations to seize critical terrain 

features lightly held by the enemy. The regiment is capable of extensive 

use as an independent force in pursuit or exploitation.”55

The regiment included three reconnaissance battalions. These differed 

from their counterparts in the armored division through the addition of a 

medium tank company and a self-propelled howitzer company. With the 

exception of the howitzers and tanks, each battalion was a microcosm 

of the regiment, possessing the ability for self-sufficiency and independent operations. The mission set for each battalion also embraced security, reconnaissance, and combat operations. Reconnaissance operations 

included route, zone, and area, and incorporated principles introduced by 

the horse cavalry and refined in World War II. In a rejection of the wartime 

emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance, the regiment was expected to fight 

for information:

It is frequently necessary for a reconnoitering unit to 

engage in combat when its patrols are unable to penetrate 

the hostile defense; only on rare occasions can patrols 

perform reconnaissance missions by stealth. The commander should avoid becoming seriously engaged with 

a superior enemy and should be prepared to break off an 

engagement when continuing it would jeopardize the success of his primary mission.56

The manual provided detailed guidance for the operation of the 

regiment and its battalions. Well illustrated, it clearly depicted a versatile 

combat organization that had more in common with the interwar 7th 

Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) than it did with the mechanized cavalry 

organizations that fought in World War II. It included 27 combined arms 

reconnaissance platoons and was described as “the composite of all the 

desires of armored cavalrymen who fought in the last war.”57 The armored 

cavalry regiment’s mobility and combat power made it suitable for many 
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From Postwar to Korean War

applications. This versatility was a deliberate objective of its designers and 

was readily manifest throughout FM 17-95.

Training

The publication of new manuals provided the doctrinal underpinning 

for the redesigned reconnaissance units. Dissemination of the principles of 

employment for these units throughout the force occurred through training. 

However, in the late 1940s, Army training remained in turmoil, adversely 

affecting the ability to absorb new ideas.

In the fall of 1945, mounted reconnaissance training shifted from the 

Cavalry School to the Armored Center, consolidating all armor-related 

instruction. At Fort Knox, the Armored Replacement Training Center 

provided this training until absorbed into the 3d Armored Division, an 

umbrella organization that executed all basic and advanced individual 

training. Further instruction occurred after a soldier received his first unit 

assignment. However, the quality of unit training suffered from several 

factors. From 1947 to 1949, most units in the United States experienced 

large-scale personnel turnover and many were understrength. Training 

facilities and staffs shrank in the aftermath of World War II.58

Figure 37. The continued danger posed by mines did not trigger the rapid 

development of more efficient methods of mine detection and clearance.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Chapter 3

The 2d Armored Division constituted the only armored division in this 

period, but its organic reconnaissance battalion had deactivated, eliminating the chance to train this type of unit. The division also became responsible for the sustained training of enlisted reservists, which consumed much 

of its time and energy. Already understrength, the 2d Armored Division 

remained low as late as 1950.59

In 1949, conditions began to improve. The reactivation of the 

2d Armored Division’s reconnaissance battalion made possible its 

participation in training exercises and maneuvers starting in 1950. These 

activities, however, revealed a number of deficiencies and problems 

with reconnaissance personnel. In one instance, scout sections manning 

an outpost line in a wooded area were overrun without notifying higher 

headquarters of the presence of enemy forces. Umpires emphasized the 

vulnerability of jeep-mounted scouts by regularly ruling the vehicle 

destroyed whenever contact with the enemy was made and small arms fire 

received. Their actions created a belief that the lead scout vehicle would 

always be destroyed on contact and the crew killed or wounded: “The 

scouts, protected only by ‘God and OD shirt’ were ‘killed’ with regularity 

during every maneuver.”60 Umpires often accompanied the lead scout 

and directed the crew to abandon the vehicle on contact with the enemy. 

Failure to do so resulted in the soldiers being ruled casualties. Those who 

did abandon the vehicle found themselves unable to report the presence of 

hostile forces because the radio was in the jeep. These occurrences eroded 

scout morale and encouraged soldiers to transfer out of scout sections. 

Some became much more interested in tank units.61

Personnel turnovers in units and the transition to the new reconnaissance organizations generated a high demand for reconnaissance 

crewmen. This demand often resulted in minimally trained soldiers being 

sent overseas to serve in reconnaissance units. Unit training suffered 

not only from the green nature of some soldiers, but also from the lack 

of experienced officers and NCOs. Funding constraints that prevented 

regular maneuvers only exacerbated this situation. Consequently, unit 

commanders found few opportunities to test and become familiar with 

the new reconnaissance organizations. Within the United States, the 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment proved an exception. This unit managed to 

conduct effective unit training and build on it through regular participation in training exercises and maneuvers. In Europe, reconnaissance units 

generally faired better. Personnel turnovers proved less frequent and field 

maneuvers were conducted more frequently. Consequently, the 2d, 6th, and 

14th Armored Cavalry Regiments in Germany conducted more training 
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From Postwar to Korean War

than new organizations.62 All units, however, suffered from an Army 

emphasis on individual career management over unit effectiveness.63

The overall impact of these obstructions to training lay in a low readiness rate for many reconnaissance units. This erosion of readiness was not 

limited to this type of organization. It afflicted the entire Army in the years 

immediately following World War II and directly contributed to the initial 

reverses suffered in the Korean War. Soldiers serving in reconnaissance 

units did gain familiarity with the new organizations and learned to use 

them effectively, but the learning curve proved steep and required more 

time than it should have.

Upgrading Reconnaissance Materiel

Analysis of the World War II experience encouraged efforts to improve 

reconnaissance materiel in addition to doctrine. Before hostilities had 

ended, the Armored Equipment Board, under the leadership of Brigadier 

General Paul M. Robinett, convened in the fall of 1944 to review armored 

equipment and make recommendations. This board reported its findings 

in December. It recommended a new reconnaissance platform capable of 

carrying six men, possessing high cross-country mobility, and weighing 

no more than 6 tons. Other requirements included the ability to protect 

occupants from small arms fire, mount two machineguns, and sustain 

speeds of 40 miles per hour. The Board, however, considered only tracked 

vehicles.64

The following year, the Army Ground Forces Equipment Review 

Board convened under the leadership of Major General Gilbert R. Cook. 

Its focus lay in studying weapons and transportation requirements for the 

postwar years. This board recommended development of several new vehicles, including a light tank, an armored car, a lightly armored personnel 

carrier, and an armored command vehicle. It did not advocate replacement 

of the 1⁄4-ton truck, but the General Board’s findings included suggestions 

to provide this vehicle with an armored windshield and side wings for protection against small arms fire received through the frontal arc.65

In 1946, the War Department Equipment Board refined the conclusions of the General Board. In particular, it rejected the armored car as an 

effective reconnaissance platform and recommended its replacement by 

the light tank:

Whether performed by cavalry or by organic reconnaissance units, a vehicular ground reconnaissance will 

remain a requirement, and such units should utilize the 
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equipment prescribed for mechanized Cavalry. The 

armored car lacks the mobility necessary for use by the 

most advanced patrol elements and the firepower for 

immediate close support of these elements. Development 

should be terminated. The supporting backbone of reconnaissance units should be the light tank. A lightly armored 

1⁄4-ton type vehicle should be provided for use by the most 

advanced patrol elements.66

Related recommendations included development of a full tracked, armored 

personnel carrier and an armored assault gun with a 105-mm howitzer.67

Materiel requirements determination continued throughout the immediate postwar period. By 1949, these requirements had clarified. The doctrinal acknowledgment that reconnaissance units performed a broad range 

of activities led to the following conclusion: “The frequent engagement 

in combat by reconnaissance units in the performance of their normally 

assigned mission necessitates a combat vehicle mounting a gun of considerable power in the reconnaissance company.”68 Less clear was the type of 

platform for this requirement.

In the new armored cavalry regiments responsible for operations over 

a broad area, the armored car remained an attractive platform despite a 

desire for greater firepower. However, the ability to match a heavy armament with a light overall weight proved difficult to achieve, resulting 

in an increased weight requirement of 20 tons.69 Despite the desirability of retaining the mobility of the armored car, the challenge of mounting a heavy gun on a light, wheeled chassis resulted in acceptance of 

the M24 light tank as the principal combat vehicle of the reconnaissance 

platoon.70

This solution was not universally accepted. Officers with combat 

experience in cavalry groups assigned to corps dissented. They believed, 

“The requirement for wheeled mobility (or at least a silent full tracked 

vehicle with the cruising radius of the armored car) was of equal importance 

with the requirement for a gun at the platoon level—that when guns (tanks) 

were required at that level they should be dispatched from the tank troop 

organic to each reconnaissance squadron.”71 Corps reconnaissance entailed 

operations over a broader distance further from the parent formation. The 

armored car’s ease of maintenance, better fuel economy, and ability to 

negotiate low capacity bridges suited their preference for mobility over 

firepower. However, division reconnaissance benefited from the close 

proximity of the parent formation and its ability to provide supplies, 

maintenance, and bridging assets on a regular basis. Therefore, the tank’s 
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From Postwar to Korean War

smaller radius of action and greater supply needs were less of a hindrance. 

Combat power rather than mobility dominated division reconnaissance 

needs.72

This difference of opinion between corps and division reconnaissance needs did not augur well for efforts to build robust, standard units. 

However, it did generate interest in replacing the light tank with a 10-ton 

armored car carrying a gun of at least 76-mm.73 Efforts to build such a 

vehicle proved elusive, largely due to the technical difficulties of matching the requisite mix of firepower, mobility, and protection with a low 

weight limit. Air transport requirements limited the maximum weight to 

16 tons, and no waiver could be obtained to accommodate any increase 

associated with the mounting of a large caliber gun.74 An effort to develop 

a joint design with the United Kingdom failed due to doctrinal differences 

between the two countries.75 In the absence of a viable armored car, the 

light tank continued to equip reconnaissance platoons.

The General Board’s earlier recommendations for improving the protection of the 1⁄4-ton truck also found acceptance provided the jeep’s agility 

remained unimpaired.76 A host of other modifications emerged to improve 

the vehicle, which was to retain its small size and cross-country performance. It was intended for use by commanders, liaison officers, and “for 

Figure 38. The Korean landscape.

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limited reconnaissance use.” The effect of the proposed changes was to 

alter the configuration of the jeep into a six-wheeled vehicle that remained 

in a design stage.77

Similarly, work continued on an armored personnel carrier for use by 

the rifle squad of the reconnaissance platoon. The wartime M3 halftrack 

had proven adequate but received criticism for its open top and limited 

off-road mobility. Experimentation with a full-tracked, fully enclosed 

armored carrier began during the war and resulted in the M44 Armored 

Utility Vehicle. This vehicle proved too large and unwieldy. Postwar 

efforts included a modified M44 and a new design, the T18 Armored 

Utility Vehicle that later became the M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle. These 

vehicles were intended for multiple roles, including ambulance, command 

and control, mortar carrier, maintenance support, and personnel transport. 

Both platforms remained in a developmental state by 1949 and neither 

seemed ideal for their intended uses.78 In the interim, rifle squads in the 

reconnaissance platoons utilized available platforms, including the M39. 

Based on an M18 tank destroyer chassis, the M39 entered limited service 

during World War II. Fully tracked and lightweight, its principal drawback 

was its open top.79 Other reconnaissance platoons continued to rely on the 

older M3 halftrack.

New materiel for reconnaissance units proved slow to arrive in units. 

Despite the extensive analysis of combat experience from World War II 

and related efforts to improve equipment, most concepts remained in a 

developmental state. It proved easier to determine needs than to match 

these requirements with new materiel. Consequently, while new platforms 

remained in varied states of design, the Army continued to utilize equipment designed for World War II.

Unfortunately, the Army faced a new threat in the Soviet Union. 

Although a wartime ally, relations between the United States and the 

Soviets deteriorated in the postwar years. The Berlin Airlift and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) symbolized the 

rise in tension and augured in the Cold War, characterized by the everpresent danger of a new shooting war that might not be constrained to 

Central Europe. In Korea, China, and Greece, Communist activities suggested an orchestrated effort to promote communism worldwide.

The balance of conventional forces favored the Soviet Union. 

Although American forces expected to rely on mobility, firepower, and 

superior technology to offset Soviet numerical superiority, the means to 

do so remained limited. American armored formations retained their aging 

wartime vehicles, while “the USSR has already produced a vast stock of 
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From Postwar to Korean War

modern tanks, which according to all information are superior to any we 

now have.”80 In 1949, the United States implemented a 5-year tank plan 

intended to keep its tank production lines open. It was not intended to support a large-scale war or major mobilization. A Department of the Army 

report summarized the situation: 

No modern armored equipment has been available to 

U.S. forces for field testing or for training since World 

War II. The Soviets, following a well conceived program, 

fully supported by national resources, have succeeded in 

equipping and modernizing a powerful mechanized army 

backed by a reserve and an industrial production capability of some 4,000 tanks per year.81

While the report focused on tanks, it might have applied with equal 

accuracy to reconnaissance vehicles. American reconnaissance platoons 

employed the same jeeps and light tanks used in World War II, while new 

platforms began to appear in Soviet units.

A much more positive development occurred with the creation of the 

Armor Branch. After World War II ended, the temporary Armored Force 

deactivated, leaving only the Armored Center and School at Fort Knox to 

address issues related to armored units. Armored officers were detailed to 

the Cavalry Branch to provide them with a branch identity. This uncertain 

state ended with the Army Organization Act of June 1950, which restructured the military. Through this act, Congress provided a legal foundation for the establishment of the Armor Branch that merged the Cavalry 

Branch with the Armored Center and School.82 The new branch consolidated development responsibility for armored and cavalry units in a single 

headquarters. It also ended the dual and sometimes contradictory development of reconnaissance doctrine and organization between the armored 

cavalry communities. The Armor Branch, headquartered at Fort Knox, 

offered a unity of direction in reconnaissance that had not always been 

present. Developments in Asia, however, eclipsed the significance of the 

Army Organization Act. Just 3 days prior to the passage of this Act on 

25 June 1950, North Korean forces attacked across the 38th parallel. The 

Korean War had begun.

Reconnaissance in Korea

The opening phase of the Korean War began with a series of defeats for 

the Republic of South Korea and its American ally. North Korean forces 

achieved surprise and overran key positions using columns spearheaded 

by tanks. For the United States, the destruction of Task Force Smith by 
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one of these columns later became a reminder of the importance of Army 

readiness. Within weeks of the initial invasion, the North Koreans had 

driven South Korean and American forces into the southeastern corner 

of the Korean peninsula, an area that became known as the Pusan perimeter. United Nations (UN) intervention resulted in the dispatch of military 

forces from several countries, but the United States retained its military 

leadership role and poured reinforcements into Korea.

This buildup of military capability provided the means for a counterstroke. The Inchon landings changed the course of the war. By striking far to the rear of the frontlines, the American forces were poised to 

strike toward the South Korean capital of Seoul and coordinate their 

efforts with a counteroffensive from the Pusan perimeter. By late 1950, 

the North Koreans had been driven back into their own country, where 

they faced defeat. American and UN forces continued to overrun much of 

North Korea, but chances of a complete victory and a quick end to the war 

evaporated with Chinese intervention. American columns, dispersed over 

broad areas to eliminate the last North Korean resistance and seize territory, were unprepared for the avalanche of Chinese forces. Brutal fighting 

in winter conditions ensued as American and UN troops sought to extricate themselves from Chinese pincer operations.

By early 1951, the fighting had returned to South Korea, where Seoul 

again changed hands. Throughout the year, a series of major American and 

UN offensives helped to stabilize the frontline. The military and political 

objectives also became more limited, focused on simply preserving South 

Korea’s national integrity and frontier along the 38th parallel. The following year, combat was characterized by patrols and small unit combat rather 

than major offensives intended to achieve a decisive penetration of Chinese 

and North Korean positions. In 1953, the combatants continued to skirmish 

until a cease-fire went into effect in July, effectively ending the war.

For mounted reconnaissance, the Korean War provided the first test 

of the changes in doctrine, organization, and materiel implemented in the 

aftermath of World War II. However, the scope of this experience remained 

limited to the division reconnaissance companies and battalion reconnaissance platoons. The poor road net and rugged terrain of the Korean peninsula precluded the employment of larger armored formations, including the 

armored divisions and the new armored cavalry regiments.83 One analysis 

of the use of armor in Korea observed, “To an army whose armored doctrine 

is based primarily on the last phases of the European campaign in World 

War II, Korea has been a timely reminder that armor must often operate in 

terrain which does not approach the desirable, let alone the ideal.”84
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From Postwar to Korean War

“Less than ideal” understated the circumstances surrounding the 

arrival of the first American tank units in the Pusan perimeter in 1950. 

The 89th Tank Battalion, for example, included only one company of 

tanks and its reconnaissance platoon. The latter largely provided service 

support for the company rather than information collection. The confused 

and desperate fighting around Pusan often required new tank units to 

enter combat piecemeal, with subordinate companies assigned to support 

different infantry formations. This dispersion of the tank battalions paralleled the experience of the separate tank battalions in World War II and 

resulted in the independent employment of the reconnaissance platoons. 

The most common tasks performed by the latter included road, path, 

and defile reconnaissance within the Pusan perimeter and the conduct of 

related traffic­ability studies. This work fell to the platoon scout section 

and support squad. The tank section and rifle squad often performed a 

separate security action such as the creation and defense of a roadblock. 

This employment suited battlefield conditions, but it violated the doctrinal 

emphasis on employment of the platoon as a single team. The chaotic 

situation characteristic of the Pusan fighting, however, was considered 

exceptional.85

Figure 39. A North Korean T34/85 and an SU-76 knocked out by UN forces.

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The role of the tank battalion reconnaissance platoons changed when 

American and allied forces counterattacked from the Pusan perimeter. The 

collapse of North Korean resistance resulted in rapid gains and transformed 

the overall operation into one of pursuit and exploitation. The reconnaissance platoons provided route reconnaissance, and helped to maintain 

contact between friendly units, and the rifle squads performed extensive 

mine-removal operations. The platoons secured assembly areas and guided 

their parent battalion and supply trucks to them.86 During the advance into 

North Korea, one reconnaissance platoon helped to secure military installations while intelligence teams scoured them for useful information.87

During the initial period of Chinese intervention, reconnaissance platoons often found themselves thrust into combat roles. As American and UN 

columns sought to reestablish coherent lines and escape Chinese encirclements, the platoons performed reconnaissance operations that frequently 

resulted in enemy engagements. Sometimes they were augmented with 

medium tanks to provide additional combat power. In these freewheeling 

battles, at least one battalion reconnaissance platoon abandoned its jeeps, 

instead preferring to rely on attached tanks and the platoon’s armored personnel carrier due to the poor survivability of the jeep in combat.88

By early 1951, American and UN forces had returned to South Korea, 

where they fought to preserve the prewar boundary between the two 

Koreas. The nature of the conflict changed to one of major offensives and 

counteroffensives. Tank battalions performed a variety of roles, and their 

reconnaissance platoons generally supported them. In January 1951, the 

70th Tank Battalion participated in a reconnaissance in force operation 

intended to identify enemy attack preparations and destroy hostile forces. 

The reconnaissance platoon initially served as the battalion reserve, but 

later undertook active patrolling, supported by tanks. In this action, the 

platoon relied on spotter aircraft to identify obstacles, minefields, defiles, 

enemy forces, and potential ambush locations.89 Reconnaissance operations that preceded the UN counteroffensive of early 1951 again underscored the need for an armored reconnaissance vehicle. Reconnaissance 

platoons frequently left their jeeps in the rear when embarking on a mission, because “it was realized that it was folly to advance into the extensive defensive positions of the Chinese in a jeep.”90

In the last year of the war, peace negotiations constrained operations 

to limited objective actions. The frontlines tended to stabilize and UN 

forces remained generally in a defensive posture. One report noted that 

“patrol actions, raids, mass armor and artillery fires set the trend for the 

year’s period.”91 In these circumstances, tanks generally served as infantry 
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From Postwar to Korean War

support weapons and the reconnaissance platoons performed extensive 

patrols. They also participated in vehicle recovery operations and observed 

enemy activities. Overall, the use of tank-infantry teams supported by 

the tank battalion’s reconnaissance platoon predominated. The teams 

moved by bounds and employed extensive reconnaissance by fire. The 

reconnaissance platoon remained in close proximity to the tanks, whose 

firepower provided them additional security.92

The experience of the division reconnaissance companies bore some 

parallel to that of the battalion reconnaissance platoons. However, the 

greater combat power of the companies encouraged their use as maneuver 

assets, particularly in the opening phases of the war. They often covered 

gaps between division combat teams or provided flank security.93 Inside 

the Pusan perimeter, the 7th Infantry Division’s reconnaissance company 

conducted independent operations. Reinforced with two tank platoons, 

it received orders to take and hold a critical terrain objective. It did so 

despite heavy North Korean counterattacks and a freewheeling engagement.94 Following Chinese intervention, the reconnaissance company of 

the 25th Infantry Division joined with a tank-infantry team to form Task 

Force Dolvin, charged with limited objective attacks. The reconnaissance 

company frequently executed economy of force operations to support task 

force maneuver. When Task Force Dolvin disbanded, the reconnaissance 

company transferred to another team responsible for holding a series of 

hilltop positions. Later, the same company assisted in the reduction of 

roadblocks barring the retreat of UN forces from northern Korea. During 

the UN counteroffensive in January 1951, elements of the reconnaissance company entered combat attached to an infantry regimental combat 

team.95

Similarly, in the 1st Cavalry Division, the 16th Reconnaissance 

Company also performed a variety of combat operations. During the 

Pusan perimeter fighting, it received orders to take a key town. The unit 

did so and held it against North Korean counterattacks and mortar shelling. When if finally withdrew, it had lost its commanding officer and many 

casualties. Many of its jeeps were destroyed and the survivors had to be 

evacuated via tanks and armored personnel carriers.96 More commonly, 

the company provided security for the 1st Cavalry Division, and in the 

final phases of the war its subordinate platoons conducted patrolling and 

observation of hostile positions.97

When not performing independent operations, the 25th Infantry 

Division employed its reconnaissance company in a security role. The 

company components often moved in columns that remained largely road 
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bound due to the poor terrain conditions in Korea. In these circumstances, 

the company commander sometimes consolidated all mortar teams in the 

leading platoon. The company maneuvered by platoons, each one leapfrogging forward to successive objectives. The scout squads detached 

themselves to secure key terrain features and observe. Behind the reconnaissance platoons trailed the command group and company trains. After 

an early engagement with Chinese Communist forces in which the company fought in isolation and lost many soldiers and jeeps, the unit routinely established defensive perimeters before nightfall in preparation for 

the nocturnal attacks favored by the Chinese.98

The division reconnaissance companies proved versatile organizations and adapted reasonably well to the Korean environment. They did 

so despite a number of shortcomings at the start of the conflict. Although 

they possessed their full complement of light tanks, many had seen only 

limited use in maneuvers and had not been properly maintained. They also 

continued to employ halftracks and M39 personnel carriers, vehicles that 

dated to World War II.99

The reconnaissance companies benefited from leaders who understood 

small unit combined arms operations. As a result, 

Figure 40. Inspection of a disabled North Korean T34/85, initially 

considered the bane of American mounted troops.

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From Postwar to Korean War

They utilized the fire squad, support squad, and the scout 

section with the tank section organically to the platoon, 

which in reality was a small task force. Platoon leaders 

utilized the scout section as a reconnaissance force, the 

support squad (81-mm mortar) as a base of fire and closein direct artillery support, and the rifle squad as a maneuver force or with the tanks as a combined maneuvering 

force.100

In fact, the general effectiveness of the companies fueled interest in the 

enlargement of the company into a battalion for the infantry division.

Criticism of the reconnaissance companies focused on their small 

size and misuse by commanders unfamiliar with them. The security and 

reconnaissance missions assigned to them encompassed much larger areas 

than they were intended to cover. One company assumed responsibility 

for covering a 24-mile gap between divisions. On more than one occasion, 

senior leaders:

Not knowing the organization and limitations of the reconnaissance company, attempted to order the tank platoon 

(which does not exist in the reconnaissance company) on 

a tank mission. The result was that the commanders of 

the reconnaissance companies pulled the two tanks from 

each of their platoons and with a provisional tank platoon, 

attempted the tank mission with no infantry support. The 

results were not satisfactory.101

Organizational and Materiel Lessons Learned

Analysis of the reconnaissance company and platoon experience in 

Korea identified a number of deficiencies. Although these units performed 

credibly throughout the entire conflict and did not share the same difficulties encountered by the mechanized cavalry in World War II, they 

still proved less than ideal. The reconnaissance platoon proved a versatile team, but the mix of vehicles utilized eroded its effectiveness. The 

light tank possessed excellent mobility even amid the mud, rice paddies, 

and rugged terrain of Korea. The headquarters, support squad, and scout 

section labored in jeeps that proved too road bound. The support squad 

included two jeeps towing cargo trailers. Fully laden, these vehicles could 

not navigate effectively off roads. Hence, the 81-mm mortar and ammunition often had to be dismounted and hand carried into a firing position—a 

time-consuming and laborious process. The disparity in mobility between 

the full tracked and wheeled components of the platoon complicated its 
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employment. It forced the platoon leader to either constrain operations to 

terrain over which the entire unit could traverse or divert his jeep assets 

from the primary advance route. The latter option separated the platoon 

and complicated command and control.102

The scout squad faced a unique problem. It included two jeeps—one 

which carried a machinegun and one which mounted a radio. Using the 

bounding movement techniques encouraged in doctrine posed a dilemma, 

since the radio jeep could not provide support fire. If the radio jeep led, 

however, its loss eliminated communications with the rest of the platoon. 

While many soldiers favored simply mounting a machinegun on the radio 

jeep, this solution posed ammunition stowage problems not easily reconciled with the scouts’ gear and limited vehicle space.103

Survivability issues also plagued jeep use. The vehicle’s lack of 

armor protection made it vulnerable in any contact with enemy forces. 

Given the aggressive nature of reconnaissance doctrine, the likelihood of 

such contact increased, even without consideration of the chaos associated with an actual combat environment. As one reconnaissance platoon 

leader observed, “You very seldom knew when you are going to be hit 

by the enemy and his first burst can ruin your scout section.”104 For platoon leaders expected to lead from the front, the jeep’s vulnerability added 

another command and control problem. In cases where heavy contact was 

expected, platoons simply left their jeeps in the rear and placed their soldiers on tanks and armored personnel carriers. During the retreat from 

North Korea that followed Chinese intervention, many jeeps were simply 

abandoned.105

Jeeps rarely survived their first encounter with enemy fire or mines. In 

the confusing situations in which reconnaissance units sometimes found 

themselves, the inability to survive a surprise contact often resulted in 

loss of life. The 25th Reconnaissance Company discovered this reality 

during operations near Seoul in January 1951. One of its platoons maneuvering in column with its scouts forward as per doctrine worked its way 

through urban streets filled with fleeing refugees. The platoon suddenly 

came under crossfire from automatic weapons and lost nearly every jeep, 

its cargo trailers, and its mortar in the first blast. The survivors continued 

to fight dismounted, supported by the close-range fire of the light tanks 

until directed to withdraw.106 The 3d Reconnaissance Company also suffered an ambush in which enemy fire knocked out every jeep and forced 

the crews to seek cover. Tanks and armored personnel carriers had to be 

used to evacuate the casualties.107
125

From Postwar to Korean War

The 24th Reconnaissance Company commander noted, “Enemy fire is 

normally received by the lead vehicle which is usually a scout jeep. There 

were times when the company had to drive through enemy fire to extricate 

itself from positions which were untenable—the jeeps were very susceptible to this fire.”108 The jeep’s vulnerability led to steady losses and morale 

erosion that unit commanders could not fail to notice. Improvised armor 

protection resulted among some units. According to one platoon leader, 

“My unit placed one sheet of armor in lieu of windshields on the jeep. This 

saved many lives I’m sure, and also achieved the psychological effect of 

some protection.”109 With unit effectiveness impacted, several commanders 

recommended the jeep’s replacement with some type of tracked, armored 

personnel carrier.110 Major General Hobart R. Gay, commander of the 1st 

Cavalry Division, summarized the views of many reconnaissance soldiers 

regarding the jeep: “A very mobile and dependable machine—but affords 

no protection and in no way can be considered a suitable vehicle from 

which to fight.”111 To an NCO in the 7th Reconnaissance Company, the 

issue was simple: “Many of our casualties were in jeep-led columns. . . . 

The best damned fighting men in the world should have the best equipment his tax money, his family’s tax money, and his friends’ tax money can 

buy.”112 Both men wanted an armored vehicle in the scout section.

The jeep’s problems tended to overshadow other shortcomings in the 

reconnaissance platoon. Reconnaissance personnel desired improve­ments 

to the M24 light tank’s firepower through the relocation of the turretmounted .50-caliber machinegun to the front of the tank commander’s 

hatch and the addition of a second machinegun forward of the loader’s 

hatch.113 The M24 did not possess the firepower to combat effectively 

the T34s used by the North Koreans. Its removal from tank units was 

sought, although in Korea the vehicle was still considered suitable for 

reconnaissance purposes.114 For the Inchon landings in which heavy 

resistance was anticipated, the 7th Reconnaissance Company substituted 

medium tanks for its M24s to provide additional firepower and armor 

protection.115 Army field forces further intended to replace the light tank 

in reconnaissance units with the M41 light tank, carrying a 76-mm gun 

designed for antitank use.116 This intended action also reflected conditions 

in Europe. The likelihood of facing a highly mechanized threat there 

encouraged a greater emphasis on antitank capabilities that the M24 did 

not possess. It was considered inadequate for use in the armored cavalry 

regiments that would be among the first in combat in the event of a Soviet 

attack. Efforts to replace M24s in use by Constabulary units were already 

underway.117
126

Chapter 3

Other common deficiencies identified in reconnaissance units included 

the armored utility vehicle and radios. The former transported the rifle 

squad of the reconnaissance platoons. Pending the fielding of the newer 

M44 armored utility vehicle, platoons used the less than satisfactory halftrack and the M39. The halftrack retained the same faults identified in 

World War II, while the M39 possessed a minimal carrying capacity and 

tended to throw its narrow tracks. Both vehicles had open tops.118 Radio 

sets suffered from age, limited maintenance in the years prior to the war, 

and inexperienced personnel. The mountainous terrain further interfered 

with signals. The collective impact lay in the periodic breakdown of radio 

communications. Army field forces sought to provide newer and more 

capable radios, but also stressed the importance of relying on experienced 

radio operators who knew how to exploit terrain to their advantage.119

The Way Ahead

The Korean War intensified efforts to develop and field new equipment. In 1950, the United States made little distinction among Communist 

Figure 41. The M39 Armored Personnel Carrier, initially 

developed at the close of World War II and based on the 

chassis of the M-18 Gun Motor Carriage.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
127

From Postwar to Korean War

movements in different countries. It considered all of them linked and 

working under the direction of the Kremlin in Moscow. Consequently, 

North Korea’s aggression was at first seen as a prelude to larger Soviet 

military action in Central Europe. Given the disparities in readiness and 

materiel between American and Soviet forces in Europe, considerable 

urgency surrounded the rapid development of new materiel. Within the 

armor community, the M48 tank program became one of the most noticeable examples of this effort. A similar threat-driven environment characterized work on new materiel for reconnaissance organizations.

In October 1951, the US Army Policy Conference on Armor 

convened at Fort Monroe, Virginia. This conference reviewed materiel 

development since 1949 and sought to establish objectives for further 

work. The same month the Tripartite Conference on Armor and Bridging 

brought representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, and 

Canada together to discuss areas of mutual interest and the possibilities 

for coordinated development. In 1952, tanks constituted the primary focus 

of the Conference on Medium and Light Gun Tanks. The next year, the 

Army Tank Panel delivered its final report on armor developments. These 

meetings marked the highlights of related research and analysis efforts 

conducted by the Army field forces, the Armor Branch, and the technical 

services.120

These efforts confirmed the need for both a light and a heavy reconnaissance vehicle. For each platform, a set of requirements emerged, 

shaped by the Korean War experience and the looming threat of Soviet 

forces in Europe. The need for reconnaissance units to fight underwrote 

the need for combat power in determining the nature of vehicles desired.121

Doctrine further embraced the value of combat operations and provided 

the rationale for increased firepower and protection on platforms intended 

for reconnaissance organizations.

The light tank constituted the principal heavy reconnaissance vehicle 

studied. In Korea, the M24 proved unable to cope with the more heavily 

armed and armored T34/85s utilized by the North Koreans. The Army recommended its use be restricted to reconnaissance units intended for combat 

against light armor or soft targets. In Europe, however, American forces 

expected to fight the much more mechanized Soviet Army and desired 

increased firepower for all tanks, including those in reconnaissance units. 

The Army preferred a light tank mounting at least a 76-mm gun to cope 

with the growing threat of Soviet armor. To support operations in Korea, 

the Army rushed the M41 light tank through development and began production in 1951. Limited numbers entered combat in Korea, but the war 
128

Chapter 3

served largely as an operational test for the vehicle. Not until the war’s end 

did the M41 begin to equip combat units in large quantities.122

The M41 marked an improvement over the M24, but the Army considered the M41 only marginally acceptable. The 76-mm main gun and 

sophisticated rangefinder provided the new tank a significant increase in 

firepower. It also proved noisy, and its poor fuel economy resulted in a 

short operational radius—qualities undesirable in reconnaissance units.123

The M41’s most redeeming feature lay in its availability. Design work 

had begun in the 1940s, and it could be fielded quickly. However, it did 

not possess the mix of armor protection, agility, fuel economy, fire control 

system, sustainability, cross-country mobility, crew comfort, low noise 

signature, and low silhouette desired. A sense of what the Army desired 

is indicated in this excerpt from a study submitted to Army Field Forces 

in 1952: 

For the present and possibly interim period, a light gun 

tank is required that is distinguished by its exceptional 

agility, its outstanding mobility on roads, cross country 

and over difficult terrain, its quietness of operation, its 

low production cost, economy of fuel consumption, great 

mechanical reliability, simplicity maintenance with easily 

accessible components, long cruising range, and capability for sustained action. The subject tank must be less of a 

burden on the over-all national economy than that of any 

light tank built recently. . . . The weight of the tank combat loaded must not exceed 21 tons; however, every effort 

must be made to lower this weight. The tank must possess armament commensurate to its missions to include 

main armament capable of defeating the frontal armor of 

armored vehicles organic to enemy reconnaissance units. 

Its armor should give the best protection practicable consistent with the more important requirements of weight, 

mobility, and gun performance; however, maximum practicable protection should be provided against artillery 

shell fragments and small arms fire.124

These requirements proved difficult to realize and continued to encourage alternative approaches. The armored car retained support, particularly 

due to its light weight, low noise signature, and fuel economy. This vehicle 

type was also considered easier to maintain and air transport, while its 

wheels permitted greater mobility on roads. Yet the technology of the day 

did not offer an effective means of matching a large caliber gun with a 

wheeled chassis. Research into a more effective armored car continued, 
129

From Postwar to Korean War

but the Army recognized Canada and the United Kingdom as the leaders in 

this effort.125 Some interest emerged in the British FV701 Ferret 4x4 light 

armored car, but this platform plainly could not replace the light tank.126

It could not carry the heavier armament considered necessary. Although 

interest in armored cars continued, the inability to meet Army requirements with a wheeled vehicle, coupled with the latter’s inferior crosscountry mobility, encouraged a trend toward tracked vehicles, particularly 

for the light tank and personnel carrier roles. A survey conducted by the 

Armor School of soldiers in reconnaissance units also found a preference 

for the light tank over the armored car.127

In addition to the light tank, the Army also reviewed its principal 

reconnaissance vehicle—the jeep. Many of the vehicles used in the Korean 

War dated from World War II, but in 1952 the M38A1 1⁄4-ton truck began 

to enter service. It featured a number of improvements, including a new 

engine and strengthened frame.128 These improvements did not eliminate 

the jeep’s primary weaknesses when used for reconnaissance—mobility 

and survivability. Its inability to keep pace with the tracked components 

of the reconnaissance platoon and its lack of any armor protection incurred 

considerable criticism. In scout sections, soldiers found the pedestalmounted machineguns to possess poor accuracy. Sustained firing required 

the entire crew to man the weapon. Surveys of reconnaissance soldiers 

with field experience indicated a general desire for replacing the jeep with 

a light armored vehicle.129

Efforts to provide a more effective scout platform predated the Korean 

War but had not generated any viable concepts. Work begun to prepare a 

light armor package for the jeep were found unsatisfactory and terminated. 

A variety of alternative vehicles received consideration, including the 3⁄4-ton 

truck, the British FV701, the British Bren carrier, and even a tracked jeep. 

The last platform stemmed from World War II efforts to provide a light 

armored, tracked vehicle for use by airborne forces. A more exotic approach 

lay in the use of an M50 (Ontos) reconfigured as a scout vehicle. Designed 

as a light antitank vehicle mounting six 106-mm recoilless rifles, even with 

modification the M50 was considered a worse choice than the jeep. None of 

these efforts resulted in a viable replacement for the 1⁄4-ton truck.130

Part of the problem lay in the clear identification of the requirements 

for a lightly armored reconnaissance vehicle. No viable standard of 

comparison or a commonly accepted set of characteristics for such a 

vehicle existed.

Probably no subject has received more attention with less 

unanimity of opinion than the need for lightly armored 
130

Chapter 3

vehicles in reconnaissance units. The subject is confused 

by the lack of a clear concept as to what is expected of 

the personnel who are to ride in such vehicles. Are they to 

fight or observe from the vehicle, or are they to ride to the 

vicinity and observe on foot?131

An effort in 1953 by the Armor School to identify requirements for this 

vehicle underscored the problem. The requisite vehicle needed to be low 

cost, easy to maintain, air transportable, small, quiet, possess effective 

high cross-country mobility, provide protection from small arms, mount 

a machinegun, and weigh no more than 21⁄2-tons. A further complication 

arose from the general view of soldiers that the same vehicle should be 

used for command and control purposes. Meeting these requirements in a 

single platform proved beyond the technology and production capabilities 

then available.132

Nor was the jeep without its supporters. It met 

many of the Armor School 

requirements, and it had its 

patrons. General Harmon, 

a well-known and outspoken armor commander 

with a distinguished combat record, considered the 

jeep an excellent platform: 

“Now, you have a very 

fine vehicle in the jeep 

and everybody is trying to 

ruin it by loading it up so it 

won’t be worth a damn. . . . 

You put a big plate of 

armor on it and try to fix 

it up so it will protect you 

against mines and you have 

nothing, absolutely nothing.”133 Responding to an 

Armor School survey concerning the optimal scout 

vehicle, one general wrote: 

“Throughout this questionnaire, it is implied that more efficient, aggressive 

and higher morale unit can be produced by providing an over-weighted, 

sluggish, armor-protected 1⁄4-ton truck capable of engaging in a fire fight. A 

Figure 42. Major General Ernest N. Harmon 

commanded armored formations in World 

War II before establishing the Constabulary 

in postwar Germany. He remained influential 

within the Armor community afterward.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
131

From Postwar to Korean War

reconnaissance unit does not depend on a single vehicle. It is composed of 

a number of different types.”134 Compared with the cost of a new vehicle, 

the continued reliance on the jeep appeared to make sense. Soldiers fighting in Korea noted that such financial justification for the jeep’s retention 

did not include the cost of life insurance for men entering combat in unarmored vehicles.135

The jeep continued to equip scout sections, but the rifle and support 

squads benefited from vehicle upgrades. After several years of design and 

development, the Army began fielding the M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle 

in 1952. Intended as an infantry squad carrier, it resembled an armored 

box on tracks. It weighed 21 tons and carried a single machinegun, but 

possessed the limited operational radius of 115 miles on roads. Despite 

the incorporation of components common with the M41 light tank, it 

proved expensive and its air-cooling vents were considered vulnerable 

to small arms. Nevertheless, it marked an improvement over the limited 

mobility and open topped halftrack and the small capacity and open top 

of the M39.136 The M59 Armored Personnel Carrier succeeded the M75. 

Described as “an armed, watertight, self-propelled, armored box,” it 

improved on the design features of the M75. In particular, it incorporated 

features to simplify maintenance and offered a fording capability. It proved 

to be a multipurpose vehicle and remained in service throughout the latter 

1950s.137

In Korea, dissatisfaction with the jeep-equipped mortar section led 

to some units being re-equipped with the M21 mortar carrier. Initially 

developed and fielded in World War II, this vehicle constituted a modified M3 halftrack. It retained the same automotive qualities but added an 

81-mm mortar and ammunition in lieu of infantry passengers. Although it 

shared the drawbacks associated with halftracks, it proved far more effective than the jeep and trailer mix in the reconnaissance platoons. It also 

partially restored the mobility differential between the support squad and 

the tracked elements of the platoon.138

These changes in materiel reflected the Korean War experience, but 

once combat operations ceased, the Army leadership’s focus shifted to future 

battlefields. In particular, it began to consider how to conduct operations 

in a combat arena that included atomic weapons. The destructive power of 

these weapons discouraged the movement and employment of masses of 

men and materiel. Such concentrations were highly vulnerable to atomic 

destruction. Instead, Army concepts of operations focused on highly 

mobile, dispersed organizations that concentrated only at the moment of 

battle, quickly spreading out again afterward.
132

Chapter 3

This vision of future operations necessitated changes in the Army’s 

force structure. Therefore, studies and tests began as the first phase in 

another division redesign that would necessarily impact training, doctrine, and materiel developments. While this work began, training began 

to reorient toward operations over greater width and depth and anticipated 

a nonlinear environment. Combined arms teams with high mobility and 

a great degree of command and organizational flexibility were desired. 

Exactly how the division redesign would affect reconnaissance organizations remained uncertain, but the more dispersed battlespace suggested 

a continued emphasis on security and reconnaissance functions. Another 

Armor luminary, Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, then commanding 

US Army forces in the Pacific, identified the future need: “Reconnaissance 

must be emphasized, and a concerted effort made to provide timely information to units below division level. The Corps and Army must have 

adequate and well-trained reconnaissance units.” Adequacy increasingly 

included the integration of aircraft, including helicopters, and ground 

reconnaissance.139

General Clarke also highlighted the importance of thinking about 

future needs rather than those of the recent past.140 Looking ahead encouraged a vision of combat shaped by high mobility, extreme violence, and 

rapid dispersion. Critical to this conceptualization was the ability to find 

enemy main force elements—the focal point of temporary concentrations 

of combat power. A parallel requirement emerged in the need to prevent 

hostile forces from pinpointing friendly forces. Clearly, reconnaissance 

and counterreconnaissance would prove central to maneuver and security 

on the atomic battlefield just as they had in past conflicts.141

The most important question, therefore, was not the definition of new 

reconnaissance principles, but determination of the best tactics, techniques, and procedures that reflected the new realities of conventional 

force operations in the atomic age. However, old problems remained. 

Ground reconnaissance units needed the ability to move much faster than 

the organizations they supported to provide information in a timely fashion to influence maneuver. They also needed the ability to operate in rugged terrain away from roads.142 Too often reconnaissance units lacked the 

means to do either. With reconnaissance and main body elements possessing similar mobility, the former was hard pressed to remain out front. The 

absence of a mobility differential coupled with frequent time constraints 

resulted in reconnaissance units moving fast with minimal security. These 

conditions all but precluded the use of the bounding overwatch techniques 

stressed in doctrine. They also increased the vulnerability of the unarmored scout jeeps that routinely led reconnaissance platoons. The least 
133

From Postwar to Korean War

survivable element found itself racing from point to point rather than relying on stealth and deliberate movement as intended.143

The dispersion associated with the atomic battlefield and the related 

reconnaissance needs required units with the ability to operate independently and move rapidly over great distances. Reconnaissance platoons 

found themselves increasingly incapable of such action. The fielding of 

the M41 light tank and the M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle boosted survivability and combat power, but at the cost of increased logistical dependency. Both vehicles consumed fuel at a high rate, necessitating frequent 

resupply and limiting their operational radius. Consequently, reconnaissance platoons became tethered to their parent organization on whom they 

depended for fuel. Far-ranging missions of the type seemingly required on 

the atomic battlefield became problematic.144

All of these considerations led some officers to seek an answer through 

air transport. Reliance on aircraft to enhance reconnaissance had been 

common in World War II and Korea. In the future, helicopters offered the 

ability to move reconnaissance units quickly over broad tracts and rugged 

terrain. They could be landed near their objectives, conduct their mission, 

and airlifted to another position. In this manner, they might regain their 

mobility superiority and move rapidly without compromising their security. Such an approach suggested the need for lighter vehicles that could 

be transported by air.145

Figure 43. Soldiers in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment receive 

instruction on the M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
134

Chapter 3

Reliance on aircraft to resolve reconnaissance issues paralleled a much 

greater Army-wide interest in the use of tactical airlifts, particularly via 

helicopter. Air movement met the atomic requirements of rapid movement, 

flexibility, and fast concentrations of men and materiel. Technological and 

budgetary issues remained to be overcome, but interest in a greater integration of aircraft and reconnaissance units proved persistent. In the latter 

1950s, it led to the emergence of a new type of cavalry unit based on the 

helicopter. The bulk of the Army’s mounted reconnaissance assets, however, remained on the ground in vehicles. To them lay the task of how best 

to adapt to the changing conditions of an increasingly lethal battlefield.
135

From Postwar to Korean War

Notes

1. John B. Wilson, Army Lineage Series: Maneuver and Firepower: 

The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: Center 

of Military History, 1998), 208; Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, 

Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve

(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1984), 74.

2. Michael A. Rauer, “Order Out of Chaos: The United States Constabulary in Postwar Germany,” Army History, No. 45 (Summer 1998): 22–35; Robert 

S. Cameron, Briefing, Subj: There and Back Again: Constabulary Training and 

Organization, 1946–1950, 2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Hist/Hist 

Ref/Evolution of Armor/Constabulary.

3. United States Forces, European Theater, “The General Board, Study 

No. 49: Tactics, Employment, Technique, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units,” 1945, 20–22 (hereafter cited as Study No. 49).

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 20–22; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 223.

6. United States Forces, European Theater, “The General Board, Study 

No. 48: Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division,” 1945, appendix 5, 2, appendix 6, 1, appendix 8, chart n.

7. United States Forces, European Theater, “The General Board, Study 

No. 50: Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Separate Tank 

Battalions,” 1945, appendix 3.

8. Captain Stuart J. Seborer, “Brief for a Cavalry Combat Platoon,” Armor

LV, no. 2 (March–April 1946): 55.

9. Quoted in Seborer, “Brief for a Cavalry Combat Platoon,” 24.

10. Captain Stuart J. Seborer, “Modern Cavalry Organization,” Cavalry 

Journal LVI, no. 2 (March–April 1947): 23–25.

11. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of Staff 

of the Army,” Vol. I, 18 February 1949, section V, 5, Armor Branch Archives.

12. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of 

Staff of the Army,” Vol. II, 18 February 1949, tab 2, annex B (Brief of Testimony 

of US Army Reconnaissance Policy Witnesses), 3.

13. Letter draft, Major General Ernest N. Harmon to Lieutenant Colonel 

Hugh M. Exton, 1948, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Hist/Hist Ref/Evolution 

of Armor/Post WWII/Personalities.

14. Armored Conference Memorandum No. 2, Headquarters, US Army 

Armored School, Subj: Organization of and Instructions for Committees of the 

Armored Conference, 26 April 1946, enclosure 5, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Hist/Hist Ref/Evolution of Armor/Post WWII/Conferences. This conference was the first such event for armored developments and issues, and it 

established a precedent that continues to the present day.

15. Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 

17-57N: Reconnaissance Company, 23 January 1948, US Army Armor School 

Library.
136

Chapter 3

16. Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-

26N: Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Medium Tank Battalion, 

5 April 1948, US Army Armor School Library; Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-57N: Reconnaissance Company, 23 January 1948; Major Craig S. 

Harju, “White Paper—A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or 

Scout Platoon,” US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 18 September 1989, 

16–18. Available through the Defense Technical Information Center as Report 

AD-A214 798.

17. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-57N: Reconnaissance 

Company, 23 January 1948.

18. Lieutenant Colonels James I. King and Melvin A. Goers, “Modern 

Armored Cavalry Organization,” Armored Cavalry Journal LVII, no. 4 (July–

August 1948): 49.

19. Rauer, “Order Out of Chaos,” 22–35.

20. Stubbs and Connor, Armor-Cavalry Part I, 76; Rauer, “Order Out of 

Chaos,” 32; Cameron, Briefing, Subj: There and Back Again: Constabulary Training and Organization, 1946–1950.

21. The uncertainty regarding branch status was also evidenced in the naming of the related branch journal, which was renamed during this period Armored 

Cavalry Journal. 

22. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of 

Staff of the Army,” Vol. I, 18 February 1949, section V, 1–2; King and Goers, 

“Modern Armored Cavalry Organization,” 49–50; Colonel C.H. Reed, “Armored 

Cavalry Light: Its Organization as Derived From Its Missions,” Armored Cavalry 

Journal LVIII, no. 1 (January–February 1949): 13–16.

23. King and Goers, “Modern Armored Cavalry Organization,” 49–50; 

Reed, “Armored Cavalry Light: Its Organization as Derived From Its Missions,” 

17; Department of the Army, “Table of Organization and Equipment 17–55, 

Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light),” 7 October 1948, 

US Army Armor School Research Library.

24. King and Goers, “Modern Armored Cavalry Organization,” 49–50; 

Reed, “Armored Cavalry Light: Its Organization as Derived From Its Missions,” 

17; “Table of Organization and Equipment 17–55, Reconnaissance Battalion, 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light),” 7 October 1948.

25. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest T. Barco Jr., “Light Aviation Joins Armored 

Cavalry,” Armored Cavalry Journal LVIII, no. 3 (May–June 1949): 2–5.

26. Reed, “Armored Cavalry Light: Its Organization as Derived From Its 

Missions,” 15, 17, 35.

27. Ibid., 17.

28. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of 

Staff of the Army,” Vol. I, 18 February 1949, section I, 8, 12.

29. Ibid., section II, 2.

30. Ibid., section V, 1.

31. Department of the Army, FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance Company (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 2.
137

From Postwar to Korean War

32. Ibid., 3.

33. Ibid., 67.

34. Ibid., 65–74.

35. Ibid., 97.

36. Ibid., 87, 90, quotation from page 90.

37. Ibid., 81–83, 100–104.

38. Ibid., 105–106, 115–123.

39. Ibid., 83, 97.

40. Ibid., 76–81, 90–96.

41. Ibid, 6, 8–10, 125, 138.

42. Ibid., 6, 125–126, 138, 144, 148.

43. Ibid., 191–203, 241–256.

44. Ibid., 75.

45. Ibid., 11–12, quotation from pages 190–191.

46. Ibid., 191.

47. Ibid., 123–124; Department of the Army, FM 17-33, Tank Battalion

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 9–10.

48. FM 17-33 (1949), 7, 9–10, 22, 31, 139–140, 164, 229–230, 253, 297, 

quotation from page 187.

49. Department of the Army, FM 17-35, Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored 

Division (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 3, 11, quotation 

from page 3.

50. Ibid., 5–6, 97.

51. Ibid., 8–10.

52. Ibid., see chapters 3 and 4.

53. Ibid., 7–8.

54. Ibid., 308, 314, quotation from page 317.

55. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment 

and the Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 1, 3, 7–8, quotation from page 3.

56. Ibid., 19–20, 163, 166, quotation from page 166.

57. Colonel Samuel L. Myers, “The Cavalry Regiment of Today,” Armor

LIX, no. 2 (March–April 1950): 58.

58. Captain Stephen H. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored 

Vehicle in U.S. Reconnaissance Units” (student paper N-2/46.102, US Army 

Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, May 1952), 60–63, US Army Armor School 

Library.

59. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. Reconnaissance Units,” 62–63; Brigadier General Riley F. Ennis, Memorandum, Subj: 

Liaison Visit to Headquarters Fourth Army and Second Armored Division 16–20 

October 1950, 27 October 1950, 1, NARA, RG 337, Entry 55I, Box 169.

60. Major Robert F. Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance 

Platoon” (student paper, 45.4-19, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, May 

1953), 17, US Army Armor School Library.
138

Chapter 3

61. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Amored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 64–66; Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance 

Platoon,” 17.

62. Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 16.

63. Army Field Forces Inspecting Team, “Report of Inspection of European 

Command,” September 1950, 2, NARA, RG 337, Entry 55I, Box 180; Myers, 

“The Cavalry Regiment of Today,” 58–60.

64. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Amored Vehicle in U.S. Reconnaissance Units,” 8–9.

65. Ibid., 8, 10–11.

66. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of 

Staff of the Army,” Vol. II, 18 February 1949, annex C, tab 8, enclosure 1, 1.

67. Ibid., 2.

68. “Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to Chief of 

Staff of the Army,” Vol. I, 18 February 1949, section I, 8.

69. Ibid., section I, 8, 14.

70. Ibid., section V, 5.

71. Ibid., section V, 5.

72. Ibid., section V, 5–6.

73. Ibid., section V, 7.

74. Ibid., Vol. II, annex E, 1–2.

75. Ibid., Vol. I, section IX, 1–2.

76. Ibid., section I, 8.

77. Ibid., Vol. II, annex D, tab 9; annex E, 29.

78. Ibid., Vol. II, 18 February 1949, annex D, tab 10; annex E, 29; R.P. Hunnicutt, Bradley: A History of American Fighting and Support Vehicles (Novato, 

CA: Presidio Press, 1999), 32, 37–39, 43–48; Captains Glenwood W. Flint and 

Lewis B. Tixier, “The M59,” Armor LXIII, no. 2 (March–April 1954): 7.

79. War Department Observers Board, “AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics,” 5 June 1945, in AGF Observer Board, 

European Theater, “Reports of Observers, ETO 1944-1945,” Vol. 5, C-1007, 5, 

MHI Archives; “M-39 Armored Utility Vehicle (AUV),” http://www.olive-drab.

com/idphoto/id_photos_m39auv.php (accessed 17 March 2009).

80. Department of the Army Armored Panel, “The Report of Department 

of the Army Armored Panel,” 1 July 1950, 1, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

Armor I.

81. Ibid., 30–31.

82. Stubbs and Connor, Armor-Cavalry Part I, 74–75.

83. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 70; Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance 

Platoon,” 17.

84. Captain Milton R. Thompson et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea, 

Vol. I: The First Year” (student report 45.3-11, US Army Armor School, Fort 

Knox, KY, May 1952), 20.
139

From Postwar to Korean War

85. Thompson et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea, Vol. I: The First 

Year,” 52–54, 56, 59; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Amored Vehicle in 

U.S. Reconnaissance Units,” 70–71.

86. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 71–72.

87. Thompson et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea, Vol. I: The First 

Year,” 105.

88. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 72–74.

89. Thompson et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea, Vol. I: The First 

Year,” 144, 148, 153, 156.

90. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 74.

91. Captain Harry H. Shields Jr. et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea,” 

Vol. II: The Second Year” (student report No. 45.4-35, US Army Armor School, 

Fort Knox, KY, 1953), 73.

92. Ibid., 51, 60–62, 65, 130.

93. “Report of First OCAFF [Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces] 

Observer Team to the Far East Command,” 16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 2, 

NARA, RG 337, Entry 55I, Box 171.

94. Thompson et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea, Vol. I: The First 

Year,” 96–98.

95. Ibid., 125, 129, 131, 134, 138.

96. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 77–78.

97. Shields et al., “Employment of Armor in Korea,” Vol. II: The Second 

Year,” 26, 31, 33, 35, 60, 62. 26, 31, 33, 35, 60, 62.

98. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 75–77.

99. “Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command,” 

16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 1–2.

100. Ibid., appendix C-4, 2.

101. Ibid., appendix C-4, 2, 5, quotation from page 5.

102. Henry S. Marcantionio, “Some Ideas From a Junior Leader,” Armor

LX, no. 6 (November–December 1951): 17; Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the 

Reconnaissance Platoon,” 16–17; Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored 

Vehicle in U.S. Reconnaissance Units,” 29–30, 73, 82.

103. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 51.

104. Ibid., 73.

105. Ibid., 30, 72–74.

106. Ibid., 73, 79–80.

107. Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 68.
140

Chapter 3

108. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 81.

109. Ibid., 73.

110. Ibid., 30–31, 72–73, 78–81.

111. Ibid., 78.

112. Ibid., 30.

113. “Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command,” 

16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 6.

114. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 30; “Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far 

East Command,” 16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 6.

115. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 74.

116. “Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces on Section II, Conclusions, 

and Section III, Recommendations, of Report of First Office, Chief of Army Field 

Forces’ Observer Team to the Far East Command, 16 August 1950,” 1950, 36, 

NARA, RG 337, Entry 55I, Box 171.

117. “Report of Inspection of European Command,” September 1950, 8–9, 

13, tab E-2, 6.

118. “Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command,” 

16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 6.

119. “Report of First OCAFF Observer Team to the Far East Command,” 

16 August 1950, appendix C-4, 7; “Comments of the Chief of Army Field Forces 

on Section II, Conclusions, and Section III, Recommendations of Report of First 

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces’ Observer Team to the Far East Command, 

16 August 1950,” 1950, 10.

120. Major James F. Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle 

for the Reconnaissance Platoon” (student report N-2/46.87, US Army Armored 

School, Fort Knox, KY, April 1953), 3–4, US Army Armor School Library; Smith 

et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. Reconnaissance Units,” 

19–20; Department of the Army, “Tank Panel Final Report,” May 1953, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, Armor I.

121. Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle for the 

Reconnaissance Platoon,” 12–14.

122. Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle for the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 28–30, 33, 35; Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance 

Platoon,” 7; Steven J. Zaloga and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Loop, Modern 

American Armor: Combat Vehicles of the United States Army Today (Harrisburg, 

PA: Arms and Armour Press, 1982), 29.

123. “Final Report of United States Army Armor Policy Conference, 15–19 

November 1954,” section V, 11, Falkovich Papers, Box 2, Patton Museum of 

Cavalry and Armor; Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle for the 

Reconnaissance Platoon,” 30, 80.

124. Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle for the 

Reconnaissance Platoon,” 19, 60, quotation from page 60.
141

From Postwar to Korean War

125. Ibid., 30, 62–76.

126. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 20.

127. Parkins et al., “The Heavy Reconnaissance Vehicle for the 

Reconnaissance Platoon,” 27, 47.

128. US Army Transportation Museum, “Highway Operations,” http://www.

transchool.eustis.army.mil/museum/KoreaHighway.htm (accessed 24 January 

2008).

129. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 31, 67–68, 81.

130. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 19–20, 86, 89–90, 92, 94, 96, 106; Cunningham et al., 

“Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 81–82.

131. Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 20–21, 

quotation from page 20.

132. Ibid., 22–29.

133. Ibid., 21.

134. Smith et al., “The Need for a Lightly Armored Vehicle in U.S. 

Reconnaissance Units,” 82.

135. Ibid., 38.

136. Hunnicutt, Bradley: A History of American Fighting and Support 

Vehicles, 48, 50, 423; “M-75 Armored Personnel Carrier,” http://www.olive-drab.

com/idphoto/id_photos_m75apc.php (accessed 17 March 2009).

137. Flint and Tixier, “The M59,” 7–9.

138. Cunningham et al., “Ontos in the Reconnaissance Platoon,” 17; R.P. 

Hunnicutt, Half-Track: A History of American Semi-Tracked Vehicles (Novato, 

CA: Presidio Press, 2001), 90, 215.

139. Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, “The Designing of New Divisions 

for Our Army,” Armor LXIV, no. 3 (May–June 1955): 22–25, quotation from page 

25.

140. Ibid., 23.

141. Lieutenant Colonel George B. Pickett Jr., “Eyes and Ears for Tomorrow’s 

Commanders,” Armor LXIV, no. 5 (September–October 1955): 30–31.

142. Captain Howard J. Dager, “A New Deal for Division Reconnaissance,” 

Armor LXIII, no. 6 (November–December 1954): 19.

143. First Lieutenant Ken A. Davis, “Better Security—Better Reconnaissance,” Armor LXIII, no. 4 (July–August 1954): 2.

144. Ibid.

145. Dager, “A New Deal for Division Reconnaissance,” 19–20; Davis, 

“Better Security—Better Reconnaissance,” 2.

143

Chapter 4

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

The years following the Korean War witnessed a general decline in 

Army conventional force capability. Faced with budgetary constraints and 

a national defense policy based on nuclear weapons, the Army struggled 

to sustain readiness. Doctrine and tactics assumed the presence of nuclear 

weapons on the battlefield, triggering major shifts in organization. Against 

this backdrop, reconnaissance incorporated the lessons from Korea and 

adjusted to the nonlinear, dispersed, and highly-fluid environment associated with atomic weapons. By 1960, developments abroad undermined 

the validity of massive retaliation and encouraged the rebuilding of conventional ground forces into more robust, flexible formations. This change 

triggered another round of restructuring for reconnaissance organizations. 

The most contentious issues concerned the maneuver battalion reconnaissance platoon. The overall effectiveness of division reconnaissance and 

the armored cavalry regiment increased, partially through the successful 

incorporation of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Deficient 

areas in reconnaissance development included institutional training and 

delays in the fielding of new materiel.

Massive Retaliation

In the years following the Korean War, President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower’s defense policy focused on the long-term containment of 

Soviet aggression. The cornerstone of this policy lay in possession of an 

arsenal of nuclear weapons coupled with the intent to use them on a large 

scale to thwart Soviet expansionism. The formation of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO) established military alliances to supplement the threat of nuclear 

weapons use with a conventional military deterrent. Less overt measures 

included the application of military and economic aid packages abroad 

to discourage tolerance of a Communist presence and the use of covert 

activities.1

The Eisenhower administration did not have the luxury of wartime 

budget largesse. It faced the challenge of countering Soviet aggression for 

an indefinite period while maintaining the nation’s fiscal solvency. The 

United States could not afford to match Soviet military spending without 

incurring significant economic and political repercussions. Therefore, 

Eisenhower sought to balance desired military strength with financial 

constraints through reliance on nuclear weapons and at the expense of 

conventional forces.2
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Chapter 4

The New Look defense policy resulted. Eisenhower undertook major 

reductions in military manpower and funding to reduce the defense budget. 

By shifting the foundation of national defense from conventional forces 

to nuclear weapons, the New Look eliminated the need for a large and 

costly military force structure with its equally expensive industrial support 

base. Nuclear weapons proved cheaper, required less manpower, and provided unprecedented levels of destructive capability. Moreover, continued 

advances in technology suggested the viability of nuclear weapons with 

greater precision, which might permit the elimination of select military 

targets without the complete destruction of entire cities.3

Under the New Look, the Army became a junior partner to Strategic 

Air Command (SAC) and nuclear missile development. Airpower became 

an integral part of deterrence, since bombers would carry nuclear weapons 

to the Soviet Union. Concerns about the ability of aircraft to penetrate air 

defenses did little to erode support for SAC, but did encourage greater 

attention to missile development. The Army became a low priority and 

suffered accordingly. Between the end of the Korean War and 1961, the 

Army shrank from 20 combat divisions to 14, including 3 training formations. In the same timeframe, the Army budget shrank from $16 to $9.3 

billion. These cuts paralleled personnel reductions and an overall drop in 

readiness.4

The priority given to nuclear weapons coupled with the rising costs 

of new weapons obstructed efforts to modernize conventional forces.5

Armored vehicle procurement lagged and little new materiel reached 

field units. The M113 armored personnel carrier, for example, remained 

in development for much of the 1950s. Consequently, units continued to 

make do with aging equipment.6

 The Army leadership sought to discredit 

massive retaliation. Small wars and lesser threats that did not warrant a 

nuclear counterstrike appeared likely in the future, but the emphasis on 

atomic weapons limited the Army’s ability to respond. A series of events 

in the late 1950s underscored the need for an effective conventional force 

capability. Russia’s brutal suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, disputes over access to Berlin in 1958, unrest in Latin America, and Fidel 

Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba all served as reminders of the 

many dangers short of nuclear war that remained.7

At the same time, the Army sought to gain some of the public and 

budgetary support associated with nuclear weapons. It did so by pursuing 

the development of tactical nuclear missiles and projectiles that could be 

used on the battlefield. Such weapons supplemented conventional force 

capabilities, providing a massive boost in firepower otherwise unobtainable 
145

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

in the budgetary climate of the New Look. The integration of nuclear 

weapons into ground units resulted. It suited an army that traditionally 

placed a premium on firepower and technology.8

The acceptance of nuclear weapons forced the Army to determine 

how best to conduct operations on an atomic battlefield. The high level 

of destruction associated with the new weapons precluded the maneuver 

of massed formations. Instead, military formations needed the ability to 

operate as fast-moving, dispersed components that concentrated only temporarily at a decisive point to inflict massive damage on the enemy before 

again dispersing. The qualities of mobility, dispersion, and organizational 

flexibility thus became the linchpins of formations intending to fight in a 

nuclear environment.9

Building these qualities into a division structure became the objective 

of a division redesign effort. The thrust of this effort focused on achieving greater mobility, less vulnerability to nuclear weapons, more organizational flexibility, and a better tooth-to-tail ratio. These objectives were 

to be achieved through reliance on advanced technologies. The formations 

Figure 44. Light mobile Davy Crockett system to provide nuclear capability 

to forward units.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
146

Chapter 4

that resulted became part of Atomic Field Army-1, intended for implementation in 1956. The infantry and armored division designs relied on 

the proven combat command and task force concepts used in World War 

II. Maintenance, medical, supply, and transport were concentrated in a 

special support command for detachment to tactical headquarters.10

Field tests conducted in 1955 led to minor adjustments and an increase 

in the infantry division’s reconnaissance from a company to a battalion. 

The following year a proposed table of organization and equipment (TOE) 

was issued to the field for comment. Although only minor changes were 

recommended, no implementation occurred. Throughout the development 

process, the divisions tended to increase in size and did not serve to reduce 

overall field strength. Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor 

halted the work in early 1956.11

During the same period, an Army War College study focused on a 

much smaller division design. Intended to be entirely air transportable, it 

included only 8,600 men organized into 5 battle groups, each possessing 

their own artillery support. Honest John rockets provided the division’s 

nuclear capability. Overall, this formation epitomized Army efforts to create an organization capable of great dispersion, high mobility, organizational flexibility, and operations indepth. It influenced subsequent division 

redesign, which built on its five battle group structure and gave rise to the 

term “pentomic” division. The pentomic concept largely applied to the airborne and infantry divisions. The armored division never adopted the five 

battle group structure, because it already possessed a similar configuration 

in its combat commands. However, the pentomic divisions constituted an 

effort to adapt formations to the nuclear battlefield and efforts to modernize the armored division shared this goal.12

Reorganization of the Current Armored Division (ROCAD)

In 1956, an initiative dubbed Reorganization of the Current Armored 

Division (ROCAD) began. ROCAD sought to add atomic weapons, 

increase the formation’s target acquisition capability, and reduce the 

total number of vehicles. On completion, the resultant armored division 

included many changes. It gained a nuclear capability, consolidated all 

aircraft in an aviation company, and added a reconnaissance and surveillance platoon to the reconnaissance battalion. ROCAD eliminated the 

antiaircraft battalion to offset these increases, but no reduction in vehicle 

strength occurred. The division totaled 14,617 men and 360 tanks. The 

organization was approved, and the four Regular Army active armor divisions began their conversion in 1957. Subsequent field testing led to small 

adjustments that did not alter the formation strength, but did move the 
147

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

reconnaissance and surveillance platoon from the reconnaissance battalion 

to the division aviation company.13

Within the Armor community, ROCAD received considerable praise. 

In general, it was seen as improving the ability of armor divisions to operate on a nuclear battlefield. It also reflected Army interest in formations 

suited to multiple roles and possessing great combat power: 

By its tremendous volume of firepower, crushing shock 

action, wide-ranging armor protected mobility, extensive 

and flexible signal communication, and responsiveness 

to the exigencies of battle, this new armored division 

presents a decisive ground weapon of opportunity and 

exploitation.14

ROCAD built on the modular nature of the World War II formations, 

while enhancing communications and strategic mobility. Indeed, part of 

the attraction of ROCAD lay in its retention of those features of the earlier 

formations considered desirable, particularly the organizational flexibility 

inherent to the combat commands. ROCAD offered the ability to function 

on a nuclear or conventional battlefield and possessed its own atomic firepower. It also included a robust aerial component of 50 fixed and rotary 

wing aircraft concentrated in the division aviation company.15

ROCAD anticipated the greater dispersion of forces likely on a nuclear 

battlefield. Intended to operate as a collection of fast moving, combined 

arms teams spread over a large area, the new division strengthened its communications. A signal battalion replaced the previous company, and the 

entire communications framework was redesigned to provide a divisionwide system that complemented the existing radio nets. The high density of 

radio equipment offered flexibility and broader coverage over a wider area. 

The development of more capable communications equipment facilitated 

these changes and helped to retain the armored division’s responsiveness 

to rapidly evolving tactical situations.16

ROCAD produced changes in the organization of reconnaissance 

assets. Each combat command headquarters gained a small scout section 

intended to “furnish valuable assistance in reconnoitering routes and new 

locations for the displacement of the command post, as well as providing 

improved local security for the headquarters.”17 This unit represented a new 

tier of reconnaissance between the division and the battalion, although the 

small size of the section limited its information-gathering ability. Within the 

armored infantry and tank battalions, the combined arms reconnaissance 

platoon disappeared in favor of a scout platoon. This new organization was 

mounted entirely in jeeps that carried radios and machineguns. Its primary 
148

Chapter 4

purpose lay in supporting battalion maneuver through “reconnoitering and 

locating suitable routes, obstacles, and bypasses.” It could provide more 

traditional reconnaissance and security functions, but it possessed minimal 

combat power. The scout platoon was intended to operate in direct support 

of its parent battalion from which it could be augmented as necessary. The 

scout platoon simplified maintenance and supply requirements through the 

removal of tracked and armored vehicles. It resembled the World War II 

era battalion reconnaissance platoons and shared a similar set of qualities, 

including minimal survivability.18

The new scout platoon reflected the growing importance of information gathering on a dispersed battlefield. The battalion constituted the basic 

building block for the division’s task forces. Hence, battalion information 

requirements shifted from a narrow front to a much broader and deeper 

area. The scout platoon’s organization reflected this change. It included 

1 officer and 39 soldiers distributed among a headquarters element and 

3 scout sections. Each section possessed 4 jeeps with machineguns and 

12 men. It could be maneuvered either as two squads or as a single unit. 

The entire platoon carried 17 radios, 2 for use by the headquarters, 7 for 

dismounted operations, and the rest mounted on every other vehicle in the 

section.19

ROCAD also featured a redesigned division reconnaissance unit. 

The armored cavalry squadron replaced the reconnaissance battalion and 

Figure 45. M41 light tanks on the assembly line.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
149

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

marked a return to traditional nomenclature. The squadron included a 

headquarters and four armored cavalry troops. Each troop possessed two 

light tank platoons, one armored infantry platoon, one scout platoon, and 

one section of self-propelled mortars. Unlike prior reconnaissance company organizations, the new troop structure shifted the integration of tactical functions from platoon to troop level. Platoons no longer constituted 

combined arms teams. Instead, the troop commander tailored platoon 

team configurations from the assets available. This arrangement simplified platoon maintenance, supply, and training, and theoretically increased 

the flexibility of the troop. The tank strength of each troop rose to 12 

and that of the squadron to 52, significantly greater than the 32 tanks of 

the replaced reconnaissance battalion. This accretion of combat power 

enhanced the ability to perform reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, 

and security missions.20 It was also unique to the armored division, since 

the infantry division retained a more traditional organization. Its division 

squadron included a headquarters and three troops, each one possessing 

three combined arms platoons.21

The inclusion of a special unit within the squadron headquarters further boosted information collection capabilities. The Reconnaissance and 

Surveillance Platoon provided the means to conduct distant detection of 

enemy troop movements and dispositions. It possessed a variety of assets 

that leveraged new technologies for both aerial and ground operations. The 

platoon’s aerial component included photography, radar, infrared devices, 

and television. It also possessed the ability to conduct the more traditional 

observation from aircraft. The ground components relied on photography 

and radar. The division aviation company provided the aircraft and related 

maintenance support to the platoon.22

Doctrine for the cavalry and reconnaissance elements of ROCAD 

emerged in 1957 with the publication of FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Units, 

Armored and Infantry Divisions. This manual identified reconnaissance, 

security, and economy of force missions as the primary role of armored 

cavalry. Performance of these actions allowed the division commander to 

concentrate the division’s combat power on objectives that are more decisive and provided him the information necessary to do so. Armored cavalry units in the armored division possessed a mix of wheeled and tracked 

vehicles intended to maximize their mobility on roads and trails. They also 

possessed an exceptional degree of flexibility in their organizations and 

communications architectures.23

The armored cavalry squadron served as one of the division’s primary 

information gathering means. It was considered a powerful tool, and it 
150

Chapter 4

constituted a “closely integrated team of combined arms capable of conducting virtually any type of combat action.”24 The division commander 

might decide to employ nuclear weapons based on the squadron’s request 

or as a result of information gained through reconnaissance.25 However, 

the manual cautioned against sustained battle with strong enemy forces, 

because “such units are not organized or equipped to engage and defeat 

heavy armor units, that all personnel do not possess armor protection, and 

that units thus engaged require additional combat support from nonorganic 

agencies.”26

Typical support for the squadron included artillery and related forward 

observers together with tactical air support for long-distance missions. 

Aircraft from the division aviation company were also intended for integrated operations with platoon teams. Such aircraft attachments included 

related maintenance and supply services. Commonly used to support the 

reconnaissance and support platoon or other reconnaissance missions, aircraft supported command and control actions, served as liaison platforms, 

provided courier services, transported scout or rifle elements to distant 

objectives, executed medical evacuations, and conducted resupply operations. This broad range of functions reflected the growing interest in merging ground and air operations, particularly helicopters.27

Communications within the squadron occurred primarily via radio, 

supplemented by wire when conditions permitted. The squadron command 

post served as a nexus for all communications within the squadron and 

for information exchanged with other division components. The extensive 

nature of the varied radio nets paralleled the increased communications 

capability built into ROCAD. The manual included an extensive description of the communications layout, provided examples of net organization, 

and identified principal responsibilities associated with sustaining the flow 

of information. For tactical commanders, the manual stressed command 

and control from tactical platforms rather than fixed headquarters.28

The armored cavalry squadron constituted a flexible organization 

intended to provide maximum responsiveness to the division commander 

and changing tactical situations. Platoons within each subordinate troop 

constituted the basic building blocks for task-organizing reconnaissance 

teams. The platoons no longer constituted combined arms teams with 

a mix of embedded functions. Each one possessed a singular focus in 

organization and function indicated by its name: light tank, armored 

infantry, or scout. Combined arms integration occurred at troop level 

through mixing elements from the different platoons into teams oriented 

on a particular mission or objective. The troop mortar section was also 
151

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

expected to be employed in a similar manner, and teams thus formed might 

benefit from the attachment of all or part of the squadron reconnaissance 

and surveillance platoon.29

The creation of platoon teams received considerable attention in the 

manual. Commanders were reminded, “Each leader must be capable of 

employing his unit as part of a combined-arms team and must understand 

the employment of platoons, sections, and squads with which his unit normally will work.”30 Guidance for the platoon task organization did not 

provide fixed rules. Instead, it emphasized flexibility. Although the mix 

of tank, armored infantry, and scouts was considered a common platoon 

team, the manual cautioned, “The habitual formation of the same type platoon teams reduces the flexibility of organization for combat.”31 Sample 

task organizations showed dissimilar platoon teams. Although the troop 

commander controlled four subordinate platoon headquarters, he was not 

obligated to form four platoon teams. Indeed, he was not required to create 

any and could employ his unit as organized, with separate concentrations 

of scouts, tanks, and infantry. Mission and terrain considerations constituted the dominant influences on the precise employment of the squadron, 

troop, and platoon.32

The use of platoon teams that lacked permanent substance generated 

a significant training challenge for platoon, section, and squad leaders. 

These commanders not only had to understand how their own unit functioned, but also those units with whom they might serve. The pure platoons 

possessed a smaller variety of different weapons and vehicles, but their 

integration with other platoons required a degree of expertise and experience difficult to achieve except through continuous practice. Without the 

attainment of such a skill level, the continuous changes in task organization encouraged by FM 17-35 might result in the erosion of unit cohesion 

and efficiency. Unfortunately, in the financially strained atmosphere of the 

1950s, the ability to provide the level of training necessary for effective 

integrated troop and platoon teams proved problematic.

One set of employment principles governed the operation of platoon 

teams. The manual detailed these principles by describing the planning, 

preparation, and execution of offensive, defensive, delay, reconnaissance, 

and security missions. Reconnaissance occurred via the same techniques 

originally developed in the interwar years. Platoon teams sought to gain 

information through stealth, infiltration, and surveillance. They moved by 

bounds and relied on a combination of mounted and dismounted activities 

to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance missions. On contacting 

enemy forces, reconnaissance elements were to develop the situation, often 
152

Chapter 4

through combat action. The need for rapid, timely information encouraged 

continuous movement to sustain momentum. Obstacles that threatened to 

delay or obstruct reconnaissance efforts were to be bypassed. Light tanks 

moved in support of scouts to help quickly reduce opposition. When time 

constraints precluded detailed reconnoitering, units relied on reconnaissance by fire to determine the enemy’s presence. Mortars were considered 

particularly valuable in this role, because they could fire into suspect positions without revealing friendly force locations.33

The scout platoon constituted the principal agent for ground reconnaissance within the squadron. Organized into a headquarters element and 

three scout sections, the entire platoon relied on jeep transport.34 Section 

detachments to support task-organized platoon teams was considered normal. However, the chapter on unit operations opened with a cautionary note 

highlighting the jeep’s limited cross-country mobility and vulnerability 

to artillery, small arms, and atomic weapons. These limitations hampered 

its interaction with armored tracked vehicles, although the scout sections 

benefited from the jeep’s ease of maintenance and fuel economy.35

The limitations and vulnerabilities associated with the jeep-mounted 

scouts influenced their intended use. They possessed the same mission set 

as the platoon teams, but the manner in which they conducted operations 

Figure 46. Tank crew trainer at Fort Knox, 1958.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
153

Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

differed. They moved by bounds and combined mounted and dismounted 

movement to “ensure stealth, security, observation, and protection against 

enemy observation and fire.” Dismounted attacks were preferred with the 

jeeps secured to the rear with sufficient personnel to move them forward 

when required—a method reminiscent of horse cavalry operations. The 

manual anticipated that other assets would support scouts, who would not 

conduct combat alone. Their limited firepower precluded engagements 

with all but the lightest opposition. Lack of combat power also minimized 

the ability of the scout platoon to conduct delaying actions, a traditional 

function of reconnaissance units.36

Preferably, scouts relied on other forces assigned to support them to 

offset their minimal combat capability. Often light tanks overwatched their 

movements, ready to attack should the scouts become engaged. Another 

method of engagement relied on mortar support to permit the continued 

movement of the scouts: “Efficient coordination and control of fires, coupled with movement, allows the scout section and squad to perform security and reconnaissance missions without becoming decisively engaged.” 

In this manner, the scouts retained their freedom of maneuver, while mortars pinned or eliminated hostile opposition. Smoke offered yet another 

means of covering the scouts while they advanced. Effective use of fires 

mandated the training of every scout as a forward observer.37

Scout survivability often remained linked to the time available for 

reconnaissance. With sufficient time, the scouts could utilize stealth and 

dismounted tactics, but the scout commander did not control his timeline: 

When a scout unit is acting as the leading element for the 

advance guard, speed of movement and aggressive action 

are of primary importance. The scout section leader’s next 

higher commander normally prescribes a rate of advance, 

and it is up to the scout section leader to maintain this rate 

of advance unless the section is stopped by enemy action 

or impassible terrain.”

In those cases requiring speed, the scout unit faced two problems: it lacked 

the cross-country mobility of other platoon team assets and it could not 

rely on the more effective but slower techniques of stealth and dismounted 

operations. Rapidity increased the scout’s already highly vulnerable state 

by increasing the likelihood of sudden, hostile contact.38

The manual offered few solutions to the linked issues of time, mobility, 

and vulnerability, but it did highlight the scout platoon’s enhanced ability 

to observe greater areas. The scout platoon exchanged the firepower of 

the combined arms reconnaissance platoon for more personnel dedicated 
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to observing the battlefield. The principal means of security lay in the 

creation of a string of observation posts (OPs), six to a platoon or one 

per squad. This number could be increased for short periods. Similarly, 

the platoon offered much better coverage of directed zones and areas. In 

addition, its sections could reconnoiter more than one path of advance 

during route reconnaissance missions. The ability to function as sections 

and even squads also made the scout platoon an ideal asset for conducting 

liaison activities with other units, providing quartering parties, guiding the 

movements of large units, and performing limited pioneer work.39

The variety of functions and the specialized nature of the scout platoon directly impacted its training. Like other platoon team elements, the 

platoon had to be able to function with or without attachments and as 

part of a combined arms team. Individual soldiers needed the capability of operating as dismounted riflemen or as machinegun squads. The 

scout platoon’s ability to observe broad areas also mandated competency 

in the establishment of OPs and the execution of patrols, both mounted 

and dismounted. Finally, scouts needed pioneer skills and familiarity with 

air transport for those missions requiring their insertion into hostile rear 

areas. Hence, despite the reduced combat power, the new scout platoon 

required a growing band of expertise, increasing the specialized nature of 

its members.40

ROCAD Revisited

After implementation of the ROCAD organization in 1957, a period of 

testing followed. The armored divisions evaluated the effectiveness of the 

new formation and provided feedback. The Continental Army Command 

(CONARC) then distilled the results into recommended changes for 

Department of the Army (DA) action. Evaluation guidance, however, limited the extent to which the division could be modified. It prohibited any 

increase in personnel strength and sought primarily to increase the formation’s overall combat power. The review also served to identify personnel 

that could be withdrawn from the division without any detrimental impact 

on its battlefield operation.41

Comments from armored division personnel generally supported the 

ROCAD configuration. It retained the best qualities associated with the 

World War II-era formations, including mobility, organizational flexibility, and firepower. No fundamental changes emerged, although a number 

of adjustments were recommended. The DA approved these at the end of 

1958, and revised tables of organization and equipment began to reflect 

the modifications in 1959.42
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The ROCAD revisions left the basic structure of the formation 

untouched. It retained its flexible organization based on the combat commands, and its personnel strength remained the same. The most significant 

changes impacted division reconnaissance, combat surveillance, and target 

acquisition. The armored cavalry squadron still included a headquarters 

and four reconnaissance troops, but combined arms integration reverted 

to the platoon level. Each troop now comprised three combined arms 

platoons. Gone were the separate tank, armored infantry, and scout platoons and the mortar section. The amorphous nature of the previous troop 

structure disappeared in favor of a more rigid organization that relied on 

identically configured platoons. Each of these subordinate units included 

a headquarters, a light tank section, an armored infantry squad, a support 

squad, and a scout section.43

The change in reconnaissance organization resulted in a uniform troop 

structure within the armored division, the armored cavalry regiment, and 

the infantry division. Standardization of equipment and employment followed. Within ROCAD, the change in reconnaissance troop structure 

eliminated the light tank platoons in favor of light tank sections in each 

platoon. The overall tank strength of the squadron shrank by 16, generating personnel savings applied to other desired adjustments to the division 

structure. The removal of the tanks reduced the combat power associated 

with reconnaissance, but the return to combined arms platoons simplified 

training and employment. The platoon remained a complex instrument 

with multiple weapons and vehicles of mixed mobility, but its fixed organization simplified the task of training new commanders how to employ 

it. Hence the rationale behind the new troop structure: “It has been determined that the training of small units and small unit commanders is most 

effective if their unit organizational structure is the same as that to be used 

in combat.”44

The ROCAD revision also altered the organization of combat surveillance and target acquisition. The reconnaissance and surveillance 

platoon within the armored cavalry squadron disappeared. Its short- and 

medium-range ground radars became integral elements of the division’s 

combat units down to company level, while long-range radar became a 

division asset. The aviation company added an aerial surveillance platoon. 

It included aerial radar and cameras in addition to a surveillance drone. 

This change concentrated all aerial assets within the division in one unit, 

which provided administrative, maintenance, and logistical support. For 

tactical operations, however, the aerial surveillance platoon was intended 

for attachment to the armored cavalry squadron. This new configuration 
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of surveillance and target acquisition capabilities proved more functional 

than the reconnaissance and surveillance platoon it replaced. The latter’s 

mix of air and ground assets and reliance on the aviation company for 

support made it an unwieldy organization. The shift of radars to combat 

elements and the routine attachment of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance to the armored cavalry squadron ensured no loss in reconnaissance 

capability, but it did streamline the control and use of this asset.45

The changes in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance paralleled other 

developments intended to improve the integration of ground and air reconnaissance. In 1958, the 2d Armored Division participated in field tests conducted by the Seventh Army in Europe. These tests sought to determine the 

utility of light aircraft to detect reconnaissance targets in varied weather 

and ground conditions, identify the vulnerability of such aircraft, and discover how the use of aircraft affected the speed at which reconnaissance 

missions were completed. The tests offered a side-by-side comparison of 

two ground reconnaissance units, one with and one without aerial assets. 

The results clearly indicated the greater effectiveness of integrated 

ground and air reconnaissance, but they also suggested some methods 

to affect this integration. The attachment of one helicopter to each 

reconnaissance platoon offered the most effective support. More aircraft 

generated too much information for the platoon to process. The tests utilized 

both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, but the helicopter proved more 

Figure 47. M41 light tank undergoing fording test.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
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effective. It provided the platoon with a mobile OP capable of hovering 

over a given location or moving ahead of the ground unit. It also served as 

a radio relay station, an important function given the level of dispersion 

associated with the nuclear battlefield. Helicopters provided early warning 

of enemy forces not yet visible to friendly ground units, guided units 

over secure routes to make surprise attacks, directed fire missions, and 

helped prevent ground troops from becoming surrounded. Although 

weather sensitivity, antiaircraft measures, and maintenance requirements 

remained important drawbacks, the helicopters—or sky cavalry as they 

were becoming known—provided a means to extend reconnaissance into 

the vertical dimension.46

The testing of ROCAD and interest in integrating air and ground 

reconnaissance reflected the findings of a report compiled for the Army 

Chief of Staff. In 1957, General Taylor requested a review of American 

armor developments that a team of Armor Center and CONARC personnel conducted. This study found Armor oriented on Soviet capabilities and 

the nuclear battlefield. To counter expected deep penetrations by armored 

and aerial forces supported by atomic weapons, the Army required ground 

forces characterized by mobility, responsiveness, firepower, protection, 

reconnaissance, and control. Armor satisfied these qualities and was 

believed capable of moving through areas swept by radiation to exploit the 

effects of an atomic weapon before the enemy could reorganize. Similarly, 

armored formations appeared more likely to survive a nuclear attack and 

mount a rapid, mobile defense.47

The study also noted the importance of reconnaissance to highly dispersed, mobile forces. A need existed for future combat organizations to 

possess better and more detailed information about enemy forces:

The increased dimensions of the battlefield and accompanying demands for intensified intelligence effort, target 

acquisition and surveillance of the enemy—emphasize 

reconnaissance. To meet this demand we must have 

reconnaissance, which is improved in penetrating ability, protection, and possesses the facility for fighting for 

information in all conditions of terrain and weather. This 

means armored reconnaissance ground elements in close 

coordination with air-transported reconnaissance and battle surveillance units.48

The study also noted heightened Soviet doctrinal attention to reconnaissance measures and the parallel fielding of a light amphibious tank and an 

amphibious troop carrier.
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Chapter 4

To match the perceived growth in Soviet capabilities and meet the 

requirements of the nuclear battlefield, the study recommended more combat power in reconnaissance units. In particular, the report sought a better 

light tank:

Neither the main battle tank nor the heavy gun tank, however, is able to perform missions with the speed and versatility demanded of units, which have assumed the cavalry 

role in modern war. Reconnaissance operations require the 

ability to fight for positive information, to traverse great 

distances and to maintain combat integrity in the difficult process of finding the enemy, searching out his soft 

spots, and developing target suitability. Reconnaissance 

troops must have firepower so strong that it can enforce 

the object of their mission against enemy reconnaissance 

units and can defend themselves against superior enemy 

forces.49

At the time of the study, the M41A1 light tank equipped most reconnaissance units. With enhancement to its operating range, the study considered it adequate until a better platform became available. The Aircraft 

Armaments Corporation had already begun work on such a design with 

prototypes undergoing engineering tests. This vehicle was intended to satisfy the need for a new light tank in reconnaissance units and support 

airborne units. It would evolve into the M551 Armored Reconnaissance 

Airborne Assault Vehicle, commonly known as the Sheridan. The study, 

however, cast doubt on the ability of any platform to satisfy both roles: “It 

is equally doubtful that this reconnaissance vehicle can or will meet the 

requirement of an airborne assault weapon for airborne or air-transported 

units.”50

The review of armored developments provided the macrocontext for 

revisiting ROCAD, but the scout platoon also elicited comments and concerns from the field. A series of tests and studies preceded implementation 

of ROCAD to determine if the combined arms reconnaissance platoon 

constituted the optimum organization for its mission. This analysis led to 

the earlier integrated troop design and triggered the replacement of the 

combined arms reconnaissance platoons of the armored infantry and tank 

battalions with the new scout platoon.51

Both incurred criticism. The integrated troop was not based on combat experience. Its ability to provide platoon teams more effective than 

the combined arms reconnaissance platoon lacked any operational basis. 

Conversely, the need for reconnaissance units to engage in some level of 
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combat had been one of the principle conclusions to emerge from analysis 

of reconnaissance in World War II and Korea. They also tended to operate 

over broad areas that seemed to preclude the availability of friendly support unless organic to the unit. The scout platoon lacked combat power, 

yet it was expected to perform similar missions to combined arms platoon 

teams. From a field perspective, the combined arms reconnaissance platoon made sense. The adoption of three different reconnaissance organizations to perform an identical mission did not. While tank and armored 

infantry battalions adopted the scout platoon, the division reconnaissance 

squadron of the infantry division retained the combined arms platoon and 

ROCAD emphasized amorphous platoon teams. Using the combined arms 

platoon as the standard for all reconnaissance units offered the benefits of 

uniform equipment, doctrine, and training. In the last case, “Training the 

platoon as a combined arms team through all training phases enhances its 

ability to function as a team under any and all combat conditions.”52

Training scout platoons in the tank and armored infantry battalions 

proved a very real problem. Detailed training or doctrinal guidance did 

not accompany fielding of the new reconnaissance unit. The experience of 

one platoon in Germany underscored the resultant difficulties. The TOE 

Figure 48. Armed Forces Day display at Fort Knox in 1960 clearly indicative of 

the New Look policy and its deemphasis of traditional ground combat power in 

favor of missiles and rockets carrying nuclear warheads.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
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for the new configuration remained classified until the day of implementation, precluding preparation efforts. No publications for training or scout 

platoon operations were available, but the parent battalion was scheduled 

for a major training evaluation within 2 months. Individuals found little time to learn their new responsibilities. While the scout section had 

little difficulty adjusting, members of the tank section, support squad, 

and armored infantry section found themselves removed from armored 

vehicles and thrust into jeeps to perform unrelated functions. Accustomed 

to more spacious platforms, soldiers re-equipped with jeeps found that 

“when bedrolls, packs, and ammo were added to the TO&E [TOE] equipment, there was not enough organic transportation to haul it. The platoon 

was provided one 1⁄4-ton trailer. As a solution, the 1⁄4-ton trailers from the 

battalion motor officer and S3 were added giving each section a trailer.” 

Trailers reduced mobility, but such improvisation characterized the entire 

conversion process.53

Once created, the scout platoons still suffered from the absence of 

training guidance and related publications:

There exist in field manuals and training texts only brief 

outlines of the capabilities and methods of operation of 

the scout platoon. Consequently, scout platoons have had 

to learn almost entirely by experience the best methods 

of operation in accomplishing a given mission. Platoon 

leaders have had to develop their own reconnaissance formations and use the trial and error method in determining 

which ones are suitable for continued use.54

In response to this void, one scout platoon leader developed a set of 

tactics, techniques, and procedures, and published it in Armor Magazine, 

the Armor Branch service journal. The article focused on route reconnaissance, since this mission constituted one of the most commonly assigned 

tasks. The content provided a level of detail and analysis not found in 

published doctrine. Nevertheless, it did not address the full range of missions, including counterreconnaissance and security, expected of the scout 

platoon.55

FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and Squadron

In 1960, publication of an updated FM 17-35 addressed the changes 

in reconnaissance organization and operations related to the revised 

ROCAD.56 Clearly written and well illustrated, the new manual marked 

a major improvement over its predecessor. It consolidated doctrine for 

the armored cavalry platoon, troop, and squadron organizations found in 
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armored and infantry divisions. The manual ended the gap in doctrinal 

guidance for battalion scout platoons and offered employment principles 

for the scout section included in the armored division combat command. It 

reflected the decentralization of ground surveillance assets in the revised 

ROCAD by addressing employment of radar sets by combat battalions and 

the armored cavalry troop and squadron.

The standardization of reconnaissance organizations found expression 

in the new manual. The reconfiguration of the armored cavalry troop into a 

more traditional organization with a headquarters and three identical combined arms platoons led to a streamlining of reconnaissance units. The 

armored cavalry regiment, the infantry division, and the armored division 

all incorporated the same armored cavalry platoon and troop organizations. 

Similarly, armored infantry and tank battalion organizations included identical scout platoons. At the squadron level, the armored division included 

a four-troop organization rather than the three troops found in the infantry 

division’s cavalry squadron. Both division squadrons differed from those 

found in the armored cavalry regiment.

Two primary platoon organizations now existed: the scout platoon 

found in combat battalions and the armored cavalry platoon found in division squadrons. Nomenclature denoted the principal difference between 

these two units. Although both provided reconnaissance and security, the 

manner in which they performed these missions differed. The scout platoon possessed limited combat power, but could cover a broader area or 

multiple routes. The armored cavalry platoon reflected the desire manifest 

after World War II for greater combat power and versatility. These qualities, however, came at the expense of coverage. The armored cavalry platoon possessed an inherent ability to fight for information, but it operated 

over a much narrower front.

The scout platoon included a headquarters, three scout sections, and 

a ground radar section. Each section possessed 4 jeeps, a mix of vehiclemounted and portable radios, and 12 men subdivided into 2 squads. The 

platoon provided reconnaissance and security for its parent battalion either 

alone or as part of a larger force. It was expected to participate in airmobile 

operations, perform traffic control, provide contact and quartering parties, 

execute pioneer and demolition activities, and liaise with adjacent units. 

It also conducted chemical, biological, and radiological monitoring and 

survey operations, and it might support damage control and assessment 

activities. This mission set marked an expanding skill set associated 

with the unit’s personnel and underscored the importance of thorough 

training.57
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The manual’s guidance for scout platoon operations reflected the limited combat ability of the unit. Movement occurred by what had become 

standard bounding overwatch techniques. Dismounted operations were 

also emphasized: “Personnel must not become vehicle-bound. They should 

dismount in order to improve observation, to prevent enemy detection, 

and to provide security.”58 Observation constituted the principal means 

of gathering information, whether conducting reconnaissance or security. 

Security, in particular, relied on OPs, manned by concealed, dismounted 

soldiers. Normal coverage included six posts, each manned by one squad. 

However, the platoon could increase this number to 12 for short periods. 

Mounted patrols assumed responsibility for covering the space between 

OPs. The ground radar section further boosted the ability to monitor enemy 

activities, but the doctrinal guidance suggested that the platoon leader did 

not always control the use of radar, despite its inclusion in the scout platoon. At times it might operate directly under battalion control and locate 

near a combat unit for security.59

The platoon executed screen and guard missions through observation 

and patrols, integrating its action with aircraft when available. When 

confronted by a hostile threat, the platoon relied on supporting tank and 

infantry assets to eliminate the danger. If forced to withdraw, it continued 

to monitor and report enemy activity. In these types of missions, the 

platoon generally operated as part of a larger team and avoided combat 

where possible.60

A similar deemphasis on combat applied to zone, route, or area 

reconnaissance missions. Scouts were expected to eliminate resistance 

Figure 49. Mounted and dismounted elements of the 3d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment training in Germany in the early 1960s.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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considered within their capability to do so, but their limited combat power 

restricted the scope of such action. More often they were expected to 

report the obstacle and seek to bypass it. With each section reconnoitering 

different routes or operating across a broad front, scouts were likely to 

find a detour. If they needed more combat power, it had to be provided 

from another source.61 “In executing reconnaissance missions, the scout 

platoon obtains information by stealth, infiltration, and observation. When 

employed on a reconnaissance mission as part of a larger force, the scout 

platoon often executes its assigned missions while being overwatched and 

supported by other elements of the force.”62

In the event combat became necessary, the scout platoon formed a 

base of fire and maneuver force. The vulnerability of the jeeps underscored the emphasis on dismounted combat, using the small arms carried 

by all personnel and machineguns removed from the jeeps. Organized into 

fire teams, the scouts essentially functioned as infantry. Nevertheless, the 

manual did not consider such actions the norm, but to be conducted as part 

of a defensive engagement or reaction to an ambush.63

Similar principles of employment applied to the scout section assigned 

to the combat command headquarters. This unit included a small command 

element and two scout squads totaling 5 jeeps and 15 men. The section’s 

primary responsibilities focused on the combat command headquarters. 

It did not function as an additional reconnaissance unit that could be sent 

forward to provide information directly to the combat command. Instead, 

it provided route and area reconnaissance to assist the combat command’s 

movement and location of the command post. It also provided local security and liaison. In effect, it functioned less as a combat reconnaissance 

unit than as a headquarters police force.64

In contrast to the battalion scout platoon, the armored cavalry platoon 

included a headquarters, light tank section, scout section, rifle squad, and a 

support squad. These basic elements were identical to the combined arms 

platoon first adopted after World War II. The headquarters and scout section were equipped with jeeps, while tracked armored vehicles were found 

in the other components. Unlike the scout platoon, the armored cavalry 

platoon was expected to fight for information and during security missions 

“engage the enemy, and within its capability delay or defeat the enemy.” 

It was expected to conduct offensive or defensive actions alone or as part 

of a larger team, and unlike the scout platoon, it was considered capable 

of mounting effective delaying actions. For combat, the armored cavalry 

platoon formed a tank-infantry team accompanied by the platoon leader 

for the maneuver force, while the rest of the unit served as the base of fire. 
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This proven ability to subdivide into teams suited the mix of capabilities 

in the platoon. However, in the execution of reconnaissance missions, its 

single scout section limited operations to one primary route.65

The armored cavalry troop performed similar missions to the platoon 

but on a larger scale. The troop commander controlled his unit via a command post for tactical operations and the unit trains for combat service 

support. The troop command post provided an information nexus between 

the parent squadron and the subordinate platoons. It trailed the platoons, 

but the troop commander was expected to move forward among his subordinate units to provide direct leadership where necessary. He might also 

have artillery, engineers, aviation, or tactical air support. Other than these 

attachments, he had few means with which to influence the action of his 

platoons other than a ground radar set. He could task organize his platoons, but unlike the original ROCAD troop organization, the potential 

permutations were limited. He could employ the platoons in their standard 

combined arms configuration, concentrate the like elements from each 

platoon, or create three tank-infantry teams and leave the scouts and support squads directly under his control.66

The armored cavalry squadron performed reconnaissance, security, and 

economy of force operations for the parent division. It could be employed 

directly under division control or subordinated to a combat command. 

Although FM 17-35 considered the unit most effective when employed 

in its entirety, it acknowledged the potential value of detaching a troop to 

support other division components. Intended for use without augmentation, the manual noted that common exceptions included the attachment 

of aircraft and surveillance devices to extend the depth of reconnaissance 

missions. The squadron commander exercised control through his personal presence, the squadron command post, and liaison officers. Together 

with select staff officers, he formed the command group, which moved 

throughout the squadron area to oversee operations. The command post 

constituted the central command and communications node for the squadron. Liaison officers served as human conduits of information with higher 

headquarters and adjacent units. Collectively, these measures provided a 

greater degree of command flexibility.67

On the nuclear battlefield, the armored cavalry squadron played 

a vital role. It was expected to identify potential targets for division 

atomic weapons. This ability could be enhanced through attachment of 

the division’s aerial surveillance platoon. Once a nuclear attack had been 

made, the squadron exploited its disruptive impact on enemy operations. 

Alternatively, squadron elements conducted reconnaissance of areas 
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impacted by atomic weapons to assess the damage and assist affected 

friendly units. Although it was by no means clear that units could operate 

in areas of high radiation or survive a nuclear attack, the manual’s guidance 

reflected broader Army doctrine.68

Flexible Response and ROAD

By 1960, Eisenhower’s massive retaliation had lost much of its earlier 

credibility. The Soviet Union continued to expand its influence through 

the encouragement of small wars, national liberation movements, and 

subversion. Against these measures, the American policy of containment 

through the threat of nuclear attack did not work. In 1961, newly elected 

President John F. Kennedy opted for a new direction in national defense. 

He believed the chance of a nuclear war far less likely than the danger of a 

small war or guerrilla conflict. Containment of the Soviet threat, therefore, 

required different tools. While retaining a powerful nuclear arsenal, he 

simultaneously worked to increase conventional force capability to provide a broader range of responses to Soviet provocation.69

Kennedy’s emphasis on nuclear and conventional forces became 

known as flexible response. It proved a welcome change for Army leaders 

who had labored under the constraint of Eisenhower’s New Look program 

in the previous decade. Implementation of Kennedy’s flexible response 

required more robust and capable ground forces.70 In December 1960, 

CONARC began work on a division redesign effort to improve the mobility, survivability, and combat power of infantry, armored, and mechanized 

divisions. Intended for fielding in the 1961–65 timeframe, these formations 

became known as Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD).71 In 

actuality the conversion of divisions began in 1962 and continued into 

1964.

The new division structure incorporated flexibility and standardization. Each division type included a common base to which combat maneuver battalions were added. The number and ratio of infantry, mechanized 

infantry, and armor battalions determined the overall type of formation. 

The division based included command elements together with military 

police, engineer, signal, aviation, reconnaissance, and artillery assets. 

Maintenance, medical, transport, and supply components were pooled 

into a support command, directly subordinate to the division commander. 

Brigades replaced the combat commands, but this change proved largely 

one of nomenclature. The brigade headquarters possessed no permanent 

troop assignments. Like the combat commands, the brigades formed and 

controlled several task forces from combat assets assigned to them for 

particular missions.72
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Under ROAD, an armored division included six tank battalions and five 

mechanized infantry battalions. A mechanized infantry division contained 

three tank and seven mechanized infantry battalions. The battalion was 

the principal combat element and its basic structure became standard. 

Whether armor, infantry, or mechanized infantry, each battalion comprised 

a headquarters, headquarters and service company, three companies, and a 

reconnaissance platoon. This baseline facilitated task organization.73

The ROAD formations possessed increased combat power that 

depended on the fielding of new equipment, including the M60 tank and 

the M113 armored personnel carrier. The expense of this materiel coupled 

with the time to procure it slowed adoption of the ROAD configuration. 

Many divisions also suffered from personnel shortfalls that proved difficult to overcome. In the meantime, principles of employment related to 

ROAD began to guide schoolhouse training.74

The Armor community welcomed ROAD. Its standard organization 

facilitated training and readiness. The formations could easily accommodate 

materiel as it became available, an important feature given the time and 

cost associated with equipment fielding. ROAD also incorporated many 

Figure 50. Preproduction model of the M151 jeep.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor
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features associated with the World War II armored divisions. The selfsufficient battalions and combat command structure of the latter found 

expression in the flexible brigades and combat maneuver battalions 

of ROAD. The battalions were expected to cross-attach companies to 

form combined arms task forces in a manner reminiscent of the armored 

formations of the 1940s. The organizational flexibility, combat power, and 

mobility of the ROAD had long been qualities associated with armored 

formations.75 Major General (Retired) Robert W. Grow, a well-known 

armor leader with a distinguished World War II combat record extolled 

the virtues of the new division design and urged commanders to structure 

their training to:

. . . emphasize flexibility, that each company or even each 

platoon as well as each battalion be able to join any one 

of the brigades at any moment and carry out its task as if 

it were an organic element. It is a wonderful feeling to 

be able to promptly constitute an appropriate command 

to deal with situation changes. Now, more than ever, we 

cannot afford rigidity.76

Grow’s view constituted the field commander’s perception of flexible 

response—more powerful combat formations with the means and capacity to adjust to evolving tactical environments. Division reconnaissance 

provided the information necessary for the formation to adapt. The ROAD 

reconnaissance squadron included a headquarters, three ground troops, and 

one air cavalry troop.77 The last unit included observation helicopters and 

extended the reconnaissance coverage possible by the squadron. The integration of air and ground assets also helped to make reconnaissance more 

mobile than the formation it supported, a desirable characteristic that had 

become problematic with Army-wide mechanization. The ROAD armored 

cavalry squadron marked an organizational change from the four ground 

reconnaissance troops included in armored divisions since World War II.78

In the 1950s, the integration of aerial and ground reconnaissance 

attracted considerable interest that continued to grow in the next decade. 

This interest was fueled by a number of studies undertaken by the Army, 

including the Mobility Requirements Board of 1962. Also known as the 

Howze Board after its director Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Howze, 

this body reviewed the use of aircraft in land warfare and provided recommendations for further Army development, including the formation of 

an air assault division, an airmobile division, and air cavalry units. The 

board also analyzed and proposed the expanded use of aircraft by ground 

divisions.79
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In the ROAD, the aviation company grew to a battalion. This unit 

included one company of airplanes and helicopters for reconnaissance 

and liaison, and an airmobile company intended to provide aerial 

transport for division assets.80 Ground reconnaissance remained the 

most reliable means of obtaining information about enemy activities, but 

aerial reconnaissance broadened and deepened the area of coverage. The 

principal issue surrounding air reconnaissance was one of organization and 

the precise nature of its working relationship with ground reconnaissance 

units.81 Greater integration of ground and air reconnaissance suggested a 

closer alignment within unit tables of organization. The effective use of 

aerial assets by armor commanders suffered in part because no habitual 

relationship existed between aviation and tactical commanders. In the 

ROCAD, for example, aviation remained pooled in the division aviation 

company for temporary attachment. Many battalion commanders had 

little interaction with these air assets. Interest arose to make observation 

helicopters organic to the maneuver battalions, thereby increasing their 

self-sufficiency and reconnaissance capability.82

This change was not implemented in the combat battalions, but it did 

occur in the division armored cavalry squadron, which replaced one of its 

ground troops with an air cavalry troop. This unit included armed helicopters capable of both reconnaissance and troop transport.83 However, even 

this organization did not constitute the ideal. In the view of one small unit 

commander, the dispersed, fluid, and highly lethal battlefields of the future 

required a multipurpose reconnaissance troop that leveraged advanced 

technology and fully integrated air and ground platforms, including aerial 

surveillance drones that hovered and reported on battlefield developments. 

This futuristic unit possessed both conventional and nuclear capabilities, 

benefited from armed aircraft, possessed a high level of mobility, and 

relied on an advanced communications system to “transmit rapidly great 

volumes of information with maximum resistance to enemy jamming and 

spoofing.”84 The ultimate troop “incorporated a target acquisition capability into the reconnaissance unit to permit rapid delivery of fires on targets detected during reconnaissance and security operations.”85 Although 

reconnaissance sought to avoid detection and engagement, they possessed 

the means to fight for information, fix, and/or destroy hostile forces.86

This futuristic unit was not within the bounds of early 1960s technology, 

but clearly the transition to flexible response was encouraging new ideas 

for reconnaissance units. Other ideas were not so new. The creation of a 

multipurpose organization for reconnaissance, security, and other missions 

certainly dated at least to the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in the 

1930s. Similarly, cavalry doctrine had advocated a close relationship 
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between aircraft and ground reconnaissance since the interwar years, 

but by the 1960s, fixed and rotary wing aircraft were becoming common 

appendages to reconnaissance units. Surveillance drones and ground radar 

offered new methods of monitoring enemy activity and their effectiveness 

could reasonably be expected to grow in tandem with technological 

advances.

Battalion Reconnaissance

ROAD transformed the maneuver battalions into triangular configurations with three companies. For armor battalions, this meant the loss of a 

tank company. At the division level, this loss was more than offset by an 

increase in the total number of battalions. The smaller maneuver units simplified command and control and facilitated attachment into task forces, but 

they also resulted in fewer assets available to the battalion commander.

Part of the ROAD reorganization entailed a common combined arms 

reconnaissance platoon organization for the armored cavalry regiment, 

division cavalry squadrons, and the maneuver battalions. The impact of 

this standardization fell largely on the battalions, since the other organizations already included such a platoon. The maneuver battalions exchanged 

their scout platoons for the combined arms units. The latter resembled the 

armored cavalry platoon with its headquarters, light tank section, scout 

Figure 51. While American scouts continued to utilize the jeep, their 

Soviet counterparts began fielding the small, armored BRDM series in 

the late 1950s.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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section, rifle squad, and support squad. It did not possess a ground radar 

section. The new battalion reconnaissance platoon offered greater combat 

power at the expense of the scout platoon’s ability to cover broad areas and 

multiple routes simultaneously.

The return of the reconnaissance platoon marked the fourth major shift 

between a pure organization and a combined arms unit within the battalion since World War II.87 This almost cyclic change reflected a degree of 

confusion concerning the proper role and use of battalion reconnaissance 

that wavered between combat power and broad coverage via stealth. The 

reconnaissance platoon was not universally welcomed. Not only was its 

information gathering ability limited to a single scout section, but it also 

posed a training challenge. The reconnaissance platoon’s commander was 

the only platoon leader in the Army responsible for directing the actions 

of tanks, infantry, and indirect fires. His unit constituted the smallest combined arms team in the Army, but it also contained four different vehicle 

types, several different radios, and a basic ammunition load that addressed 

eight different weapons.88

An equally intensive training program did not match the complexity of 

the reconnaissance platoon. Consequently, the new platoon leader learned 

much of his craft through experience. Mastery often resulted in promotion to troop commander and replacement by a new platoon leader who 

had to learn from scratch. Reconnaissance soldiers were expected to be 

highly intelligent and capable, but much of their training was left to units. 

Units, however, found it difficult to incorporate the variety of weapons and 

skills associated with the reconnaissance platoon into standard training 

schedules. The platoon possessed four distinct elements that necessitated 

a longer overall training time.89

The scout section proved critical to the overall success of reconnaissance platoon operations, but institutional training proved minimal. One 

officer summarized the problem:

The individual scout is more precisely designated an 

Armor Intelligence Specialist, MOS 133. To receive 

this designation the soldier merely completes Advanced 

Individual Training with the barest essential skill for the 

job he will be expected to perform. In fact a unit commander is fortunate indeed to receive a scout who is 

able to find himself on a map. This situation is no more 

shocking than receiving new platoon leaders from the 

Armor Officer Basic Course who have been designated 

Reconnaissance Unit Commanders, MOS 1204. These 
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officers have received instruction identical to that presented to lieutenants reporting into tank units.90

Other problems afflicted reconnaissance training. Fort Knox possessed 

only limited maneuver space, making it difficult for new platoon leaders to 

comprehend the broad areas over which they were expected to operate. No 

well-established career field existed to grow the expertise associated with 

reconnaissance organizations. Within the Armor School,

The Chief of the Reconnaissance Branch, Command and 

Staff Department, once a billet for a fireball-type lieutenant colonel, was for many months recently a captain. This 

indicates a frightening subordination of the entire subject 

which is borne out by recent graduates of both basic and 

career courses who report that Cavalry and reconnaissance were barely mentioned.91

Corrective measures proved slow to emerge. In Germany, the Seventh 

Army implemented a Reconnaissance Leaders Course in its Combined 

Arms School at Vilseck. The course aimed at providing new platoon 

leaders a thorough grounding in reconnaissance operations, particularly 

those areas cursorily addressed or ignored by the Armor School at Fort 

Figure 52. Battalion scouts from the 37th Armored Regiment training 

in Germany, 1963.

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Knox. This action stimulated the Armor School to increase instructional 

time for armored cavalry, but the change did little for new platoon leaders. 

Most of the additional training focused on the operations of the new air 

cavalry troop in the division squadron. Continued dissatisfaction with 

the training of new reconnaissance leaders led to a recommendation for a 

special reconnaissance school, patterned on ranger training in the Infantry 

Branch.92

To help new platoon leaders overcome the limited training received, 

experienced officers wrote articles based on their own experience. They 

identified common problems and offered suggestions to overcome them. 

One officer wrote, “I believe that successful reconnaissance operations 

depend on a variety of field techniques and training procedures not found 

in any field manual.”93 The same individual provided tips for road marches, 

assembly areas, and troop leading procedures. He also outlined simple 

platoon movement procedures, noting, “The proper movement of a reconnaissance platoon is a symphony of mutual support and can be compared 

to a sort of mechanized accordion.”94

Given the complexity of this “symphony,” battle drills assumed a high 

degree of importance. The members of the platoon team needed to react to 

situations reflexively. They could only do so through repetitive training and 

through the rapid creation of a base of fire and maneuver force. Reporting 

procedures, terrain analysis, and delay operations also proved complex 

tasks that could overwhelm the new platoon leader if he did not practice 

them. Scouts, still equipped with jeeps, received special attention: 

Every scout should be imbued with the idea that his 

vehicle can be eliminated by a forty-five slug through 

the radiator. When he understands this he will understand 

the necessity of rapidly dismounting his machinegun and 

moving his vehicle into a covered position when he is 

taken under fire.95

This procedure had been standard practice in World War II and Korea. 

Years later, it remained valid, largely because the wheeled, unarmored 

jeep continued to equip scouts.

The support squad constituted another area of difficulty for new platoon leaders. The Armor School emphasized the importance of “rapid, 

accurate mortar fire with the minimum of communication.” Unfortunately, 

achieving this goal was left to the platoon leader. One method developed 

in the field focused on training platoon personnel to include fire data automatically in every spot report. The support squad monitored these reports 

and could begin planning a fire solution before receiving a call for fire and 
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without adding to the radio traffic on the platoon net. For it to be most 

effective, each platoon member needed to possess the basic skills of a forward observer. More importantly, the technique and related platoon training helped to integrate support squad actions with those of the platoon.96

The training difficulties associated with the battalion reconnaissance 

platoon encouraged officers with platoon leader experience to recommend 

a simpler organization. The most common involved a pure structure that 

did away with the combined arms mix. With fewer weapons, vehicles, 

and tactical functions, platoon leaders could master its employment in less 

time. Simpler training meant more time executing effective operations 

instead of learning their craft. Retention of the scout platoon, upgraded 

with armored vehicles, constituted a common theme among these recommendations.97 Other suggested organizations included a mix of scouts with 

either a tank section or a rifle squad.98 The most exotic proposal combined 

scouts in armored vehicles with helicopters to leverage the benefits of aviation and ensure it became an organic battalion asset.99

Opponents of the combined arms reconnaissance platoon in the battalion focused much of their criticism on this unit’s minimal scout capability. 

Possessing only a single scout section of 4 jeeps and 12 men, it simply 

could not match the coverage of the scout platoon in route reconnaissance, 

OPs, or area. Reconnaissance effectively became limited to reconnoitering 

a single route, although the battalion might require several potential paths 

of advance. Scouts also performed other roles beyond route reconnaissance. They guided battalion movement; located potential assembly areas; 

reconnoitered attack positions; and conducted chemical, biological, and 

radiological surveys. These actions often necessitated continuous employment for which the single scout section of the reconnaissance platoon 

lacked the manpower. It could not perform multiple functions simultaneously and continuously for the battalion.100

The scout section, overwatched by tanks, normally operated by stealth 

and infiltration. While this employment provided a degree of security to the 

scouts, it also compromised them. The noise of the tanks warned the enemy 

of the scout’s presence, while the tanks themselves complicated platoon 

logistics. Therefore, many scouts preferred tanks to remain well back until 

needed. Proposals to improve scout effectiveness emphasized the need to 

operate away from roads, exploit the cover of darkness, and ensure sufficient time to employ both mounted and dismounted activity.101

The replaced scout platoon, however, incurred its own criticism. Its jeepmounted scouts lacked the cross-country mobility of the parent battalion, 

making it difficult for them to remain forward and gather information to 
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guide the movement of the tank companies. The jeeps remained highly 

vulnerable, but the platoon itself became the subject of misuse by some 

battalion commanders. As a result, “The scout platoon failed to fulfill its 

main purpose because its organization rendered it a ready made taxi cab 

service and palace guard for the battalion headquarters.”102 The experience 

of one battalion on maneuvers was not exceptional. While a tank company 

remained halted at a roadblock during an attack, the reconnaissance unit 

that should have been finding a bypass route instead found itself guarding 

the battalion command post. Such misuse could be dangerous, because 

“there is little doubt that the capabilities of a reconnaissance unit lends 

itself to top performance in the task of command post security, as column 

guards, or as substitutes for other organic units. But every assignment 

that replaces a scouting mission is a hazard to the security of the parent 

unit.”103

The scout platoon had also resurrected longstanding concerns surrounding the need to fight for information. An organization roaming the 

battlefield in unarmored vehicles seemed incapable of overcoming hostile 

screens or surviving chance encounters with artillery fire, mines, or an 

ambush. In a tone reminiscent of the interwar debates on the same issue, 

the case for robust reconnaissance organizations found expression in an 

article written by Major Raymond R. Battreall Jr. He believed: 

Figure 53. The amphibious PT-76 light tank also began to equip Soviet 

reconnaissance units.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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No enemy is going to divulge the type of information we 

seek—the location, composition, and disposition of his 

main force—without a fight. Hence, the word reconnaissance with its misleading connotation of “sneak and peek” 

needs to be refined-or-better-dropped from our title, for 

the unit we are talking about is going to have to go out and 

fight for its information.104

Gaining information necessitated the ability to force a reclusive enemy to 

reveal his presence. 

The characteristics of a unit which can kick up such a 

brawl without committing suicide are those of Cavalry 

from the earliest days; mobility superior to anyone else 

on the battlefield, killing power sufficient to produce 

shock, and communications adequate to pass the word. 

Naturally, a unit with these characteristics will be useful, 

as it has always been, for a wide variety of missions . . . 

it will never fight without seeking information and it will 

rarely, if ever, seek information without fighting.105

Supporters of the combined arms reconnaissance platoon highlighted 

its ability to participate in all operations of the parent battalion. It could 

operate independently and perform offensive, defensive, and retrograde 

operations with its organic assets. In the type of delay actions likely to 

occur in the opening phases of a war in Central Europe, the reconnais­sance 

platoon could retain contact with the enemy, relying on the tank section 

to engage at long range, while the scout section continuously observed 

enemy activity. Nevertheless, by 1964 the Army had begun to plan 

another restructuring of the maneuver battalion reconnaissance platoon. 

Responding to a request for feedback on a platoon proposal, one experienced platoon leader attending the Armor School wrote, “Before making 

any changes to the reconnaissance platoon, our planners should remember 

that this platoon needs sufficient firepower to accomplish its mission and 

must have the capability of independent operations away from its parent 

unit.”106

Once again, the reconnaissance platoon organization became caught 

between two contending views. One favored firepower and combat power 

to ensure survival and the ability to fight for information as necessary. 

The other placed a premium on the performance of multiple tasks and 

maximizing information collection over a broad area. Materiel issues 

influenced this debate. Jeep use by scouts encouraged emphasis on stealth 

and the avoidance of combat. By the early 1960s, this platform had equipped 
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reconnaissance units for 20 years. Its deficiencies were well known and 

interest in procuring a replacement continuous, but minor automotive 

improvements constituted the extent of its change. This inauspicious 

development was characterized as having made the jeep “more expensive, 

less rugged, hard to fix, somewhat more comfortable, and with the M151, 

considerably easier to turn over.”107

Recommendations for a replacement proved common and generally 

sought to retain the best features of the jeep in a small, tracked armored 

platform.108 To junior officers, the new technologies being pursued throughout the Army were not appreciably improving small unit effectiveness. 

Some thought the attention to futuristic weapons unwarranted, especially 

since it appeared to come at the cost of current capabilities: “Part of the 

problem is that in the great hue and cry for technological breakthroughs 

and organizations to exploit them we have been gazing too long into the 

crystal ball since our last good hard look at the present.”109

While the pursuit of new materiel continued, the jeep soldiered on as 

the scout’s workhorse. The need for a change was perhaps best summarized by one officer’s observation: 

How often have you observed a scout jeep fully loaded 

with TA-21, basic load of ammunition, rations for several days, weapons and other gear, its three man crew precariously perched atop this miniature Vesuvius, motoring 

down a road or train with the springs violently jarring 

against the frame at each small bump?110

By late 1963, scouts could finally look forward to a new platform. The 

M114 Armored Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle finally provided 

the reconnaissance platoon headquarters and scout section a full tracked, 

armored vehicle. With its arrival, the reconnaissance platoon possessed 

a uniform mobility. The M114 was built to meet specific requirements 

associated with scouts. It weighed 7.5 tons, carried a three-man crew, and 

mounted a .50-caliber and an M60 7.62-mm machinegun. Its aluminum 

armor provided protection from artillery fragmentation and small arms, 

offering at least a chance of surviving an ambush. Its light weight permitted air transport and air dropping. It possessed an inherent amphibious 

capability that required no special preparations to use. Its height of over 

7 feet compared unfavorably to the jeep, but it proved narrow enough to 

move through narrow defiles and paths.111

In the M114, scouts finally had a vehicle that offered a degree of 

protection and firepower. It certainly improved stowage for scout personnel 

and its M60 machinegun was intended for mounted or dismounted 
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operations. Indeed, the vehicle doubled the firepower available to scouts 

and increased the value of the section to a base of fire. The armored shell 

provided a degree of protection during operations in the wake of a nuclear 

blast. No longer did scouts need to bypass terrain passable to the rest of 

the platoon.112

In many respects, the M114 seemed the ideal scout vehicle and reflected 

views of reconnaissance personnel at least since the Korean War. The principle disadvantages initially associated with the M114 included track and 

engine noise noticeably louder than the relative silence of the jeep. The 

greater complexity of the vehicle increased maintenance requirements, 

and its tracked nature limited its use in training areas with a fragile infrastructure. These drawbacks seemed slight in comparison to the improved 

protection and capabilities offered the scout.113

News of the pending fielding of the M114 encouraged analysis of 

its use in scout units. Proponents of the scout platoon saw in the vehicle 

the means necessary to address the deficiencies of the organization while 

retaining its strengths. With better survivability, firepower, and mobility than jeep scouts, the M114 added desirable qualities to the platoon. 

Figure 54. The M60 tank began to equip mounted formations as the 

Army transitioned to more combat capable formations as part of 

Flexible Response.

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The greater maintenance associated with the vehicle was not considered 

excessive, particularly since it was expected to replace jeeps in most roles 

throughout the battalion.114

By the mid-1960s, the reconnaissance platoon was on the verge of 

another change. Plans to reconfigure the unit back into a scout platoon 

accompanied the fielding of the M114, effectively ending the notion of 

a uniform platoon for use in armored cavalry regiments, division cavalry squadrons, and maneuver battalions. In fact, this objective had never 

entirely been achieved. In the armored cavalry regiment, the platoon’s 

tank section possessed a third light tank. In the battalion reconnaissance 

platoon, the support squad disappeared following the addition of a mortar platoon to the battalion headquarters.115 Consequently, three different 

platoons with three different strengths existed. Moreover, a clear difference of opinion had emerged regarding the role of the maneuver battalion 

reconnaissance platoon versus that of the armored cavalry regiment and 

division squadron.

Armored Cavalry Regiment

In the years following the Korean War, the armored cavalry regiment 

remained a robust, general purpose combat unit charged with providing 

reconnaissance and security at the corps level. Intended to operate independently, its organic assets provided sufficient strength to permit operations as a light armored task force. With augmentation, it became a highly 

mobile armored team. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 3d, 11th, 

and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments provided border security and bore 

responsibility for alerting American and NATO forces in the event of a 

Soviet invasion. They maintained watch over 500 miles of border, which 

ran through mountainous and rugged terrain. In some areas, cultivated 

fields and villages extended to the very border, complicating observation 

and defense. Each regiment covered a section of the border and maintained continuous patrols between OPs on the frontier.116

The dispersed nature of the armored cavalry regiments and their special 

mission resulted in the adoption of a modified TOE for them. Subordinate 

battalions were reorganized to enhance their ability for independent operations through the incorporation of administrative, maintenance, medical, 

and supply services taken from the regimental headquarters. This decentralization of support suited the dispersed nature of the regiments and 

provided more timely responsiveness to each battalion. In addition, the 

reconnaissance companies of each battalion replaced their M41 light tanks 

with M48 medium tanks to provide a longer range and better armor and 

firepower. The removal of the light tanks standardized tank ammunition 
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and supply requirements throughout the regiment. Each battalion also benefited from the addition of one helicopter for aerial observation.117

The operation of each regiment in Germany varied according to their 

circumstances. The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment was stationed very 

close to the border, resulting in the dispatch of border patrols directly from 

its garrison quarters. Home station for the 3d and 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiments was much more distant to the frontier, requiring the movement 

of border patrol personnel first to an intermediate staging camp before dispatch to the East German border. Similarly, overall conduct and management of operations varied. In the 3d and 14th Regiments, each battalion 

handled management of border operations. The 11th Regiment retained 

management within the regimental headquarters, creating a special staff 

section for this function alone. These operations and their related coordination demonstrated the command and control flexibility inherent to the 

armored cavalry regiment.118

In 1957, CONARC undertook a review of the armored cavalry regiment to determine changes required by new equipment and emerging 

concepts. The review occurred with support from the Armor School and 

comments from field units. In general, this feedback endorsed the basic 

Figure 55. Scouts in an M151 jeep practicing stealthy observation.

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regimental structure but offered refinements to particular components. The 

most significant recommendations included provision of the battalions 

for independent operations—an action implemented by the regiments in 

Germany, greater surveillance capability, and increased aerial reconnaissance. CONARC and the Armor School consolidated the recommended 

changes and sought DA approval. This was received in December 1958, 

followed shortly thereafter by the publication of a new TOE. The DA 

also imposed a personnel cap on the regiment to prevent any increase in 

strength.119 Publication of a new regimental manual followed these changes 

in 1960.120

The revised regimental structure dispensed with the battalion/

company nomenclature and replaced it with the more traditional cavalry 

terms squadron and troop. The reconnaissance battalion, for example, 

became the armored cavalry squadron. The application of cavalry 

designations did not fundamentally alter the mission set of the regiment 

or its components. The regiment was expected to function as a light 

armor task force in security and light combat missions and generally 

perform reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations. It 

performed screening and counterreconnaissance operations and operated 

as a mobile armored task force when reinforced. Specific actions also 

included reconnaissance and surveillance over a broad front; chemical, 

biological, and radiological monitoring; flank protection and security 

between formations; and screening the movements of friendly troop 

concentrations. It served as a covering force for offensive, defensive, 

and retrograde actions. The regiment also provided rear area security and 

gathered intelligence for nuclear target acquisition. Its versatility found 

expression in the guidelines for its use in nuclear, nonnuclear, and Cold 

War environments.121

The regiment included a headquarters and headquarters troop, three 

armored cavalry squadrons, and one aviation company. The most significant command and control change lay in the decentralization of logistical 

and medical support to the squadrons. The regimental headquarters strength 

shrank by a third as personnel and equipment migrated to the squadrons 

to increase their self-sufficiency. These changes largely institutionalized 

similar measures already taken by the regiments in Germany.122

Another significant modification to the regiment’s organization lay in 

the addition of an aviation company. This unit included both fixed and 

rotary wing aircraft and increased the regiment’s aircraft complement 

from 8 to 26. The troop was comprised of a general support platoon; 

three combat support sections; an aerial surveillance platoon; and related 
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air traffic, maintenance, and ground control. Helicopter and fixed wing 

aircraft constituted each combat support section that could be detached 

for operations with a ground squadron or troop. The aerial surveillance 

platoon included drones, aerial radars, and aerial cameras. It reflected 

a similar proliferation of surveillance devices found in the ROCAD. 

Overall, the aviation troop served to boost the regiment’s ability to conduct 

reconnaissance and surveillance.123

Among the regiment’s ground components, most modifications 

reflected the changes associated with the ROCAD revision and aimed at 

an increased level of standardization among armored cavalry organizations. Troop organization included three combined arms platoons and a 

headquarters. Additional support could be found at the squadron level, 

which included three armored cavalry troops, a tank troop, and a howitzer battery. The tank troop was configured similarly to the tank company 

found in armor battalions. Each squadron and troop added a radar section 

to improve surveillance capabilities.124

The new TOE permitted the substitution of light tanks with medium 

tanks at the theater commander’s discretion. Although such a change 

already applied to Germany, it now became a standard option. Its effect 

was to greatly increase the regiment’s offensive and antitank capability. 

The reconnaissance troop retained its collection of combined arms platoons, which theoretically were interchangeable with the platoons found in 

the division cavalry squadrons and the maneuver battalions.125

The possibility of incorporating main battle tanks in cavalry organizations down to the platoon did not meet with universal acclaim. The 

increased combat power was a direct response to the likelihood of encountering Soviet armor, particularly in Europe. Heavier tanks permitted a cavalry screen line to operate in the face of Soviet T54s, but opponents noted 

that this strength came at a cost. The heavier vehicles had a detrimental 

impact on the mobility of reconnaissance assets and could not guarantee their ability to traverse lighter bridges, narrow defiles, or forest trails. 

Soviet tank platoons included five main battle tanks, compared to the two 

that might be found in an armored cavalry platoon. Hence, the heavier 

tanks would be outnumbered even if they were able to keep pace with the 

scout section. These concerns led to the conclusion that the main battle 

tank “has emphatically no place in the Cavalry Troop itself, for it becomes 

a millstone about the neck!”126

Despite these concerns, the armored cavalry regiment did not excite 

the controversy associated with reconnaissance in the maneuver battalion 

or the division cavalry squadron. Its basic structure remained similar to 
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its inception in the 1940s. The inclusion of organic aviation constituted 

the most important change and reflected the development of air cavalry in 

the 1950s and 1960s. The aerial component of the regiment grew in this 

period and encompassed surveillance devices. It enhanced the versatility 

of the unit and offered the promise of still more capabilities as helicopter 

development and employment expanded.

The regiment was intended to operate with its squadrons dispersed, 

pursuing separate but coordinated objectives. The commander relied 

on his command post, liaison officers, and extensive radio communications to keep him informed while he moved forward with his command 

group. Speed of action and aggressiveness was encouraged in all operations, whether attacking, reconnoitering, or conducting a mobile defense. 

Unlike the stealth and infiltration expected of scout platoons, “the regiment performs reconnaissance boldly and aggressively, making full use 

of its mobility and firepower.” Although the regiment was not to become 

decisively engaged and diverted from its primary mission, its components 

were clearly expected to fight for information whenever necessary.127 Its 

combat qualities also suited its role as a covering force responsible for:

. . . the early development of the situation, the provision of security for the command, and the prevention of 

unnecessary delay of the main body. The covering force’s 

missions are broad. They may include attacks to destroy 

Figure 56. The M114 intended for command and reconnaissance roles 

and the jeep’s replacement.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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enemy resistance, seizure and holding of key terrain features, or containment of large enemy units.128

By the mid-1960s, the armored cavalry regiment constituted the top 

of a tiered reconnaissance structure among ground forces. The regiment 

supported corps formations, while divisions included a cavalry squadron, 

and each battalion possessed its own reconnaissance platoon. Changes at 

all levels, however, made the years between the Korean and Vietnam Wars 

ones of high adventure for officers serving in reconnaissance units. The 

close of the period finally witnessed the emergence of a replacement to the 

venerable jeep, greater integration of ground and aerial reconnaissance, 

and a viable division design with adequate reconnaissance and security 

assets. Vietnam would provide the testing ground for the reconnaissance 

doctrine, materiel, and organizations that emerged.
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Notes

1. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A 

Military History of the United States of America (New York, NY: The Free Press, 

1984), 508–510.

2. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 511–512; A.J. 

Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), 12–14.

3. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 511–512.

4. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 15–16, 19; Millett and Maslowski, For 

the Common Defense, 515–516; John B. Wilson, Army Lineage Series: Maneuver 

and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 286.

5. Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, Army Lineage Series: 

Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve (Washington, DC: Center 

of Military History, 1984), 76–77.

6. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 100–101.

7. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 525, 527–528; 

Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 25–26, 40–44, 60–61.

8. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 66, 72–74, 94–96; Wilson, Maneuver and 

Firepower, 279.

9. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 68–70.

10. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 264–267.

11. Ibid., 269–270.

12. Ibid., 270–277.

13. Ibid., 277–279, 282, 284.

14. Lieutenant Colonel Duane S. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored 

Division,” Armor LXVI, no. 6 (November–December 1957): 5.

15. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored Division,” 4–5; Major Paul 

M. Fisher and Captain George C. Hoffmaster Jr., “Armored Division Organization 

and Doctrine,” Armor LXVII, no. 5 (September–October 1958): 7, 9, 11.

16. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored Division,” 8–9; Fisher and 

Hoffmaster, “Armored Division Organization and Doctrine,” 9.

17. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored Division,” 5.

18. Ibid., 7.

19. Major (Promotable) Craig S. Harju Sr., “White Paper—A Study of 

the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” Report, US Army 

Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1989, 25–27. Available via the Defense Technical 

Information Center, ADA 214 798.

20. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored Division,” 7; Fisher and 

Hoffmaster, “Armored Division Organization and Doctrine,” 8.

21. Department of the Army, FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Units, Armored 

and Infantry Divisions (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

1957), 14–15.

22. Cason, “Introduction to the New Armored Division,” 7; Fisher and 

Hoffmaster, “Armored Division Organization and Doctrine,” 8–9.
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Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

23. FM 17-35 (1957), 6–7.

24. Ibid., 18.

25. Ibid., 21.

26. Ibid., 17.

27. Ibid., 19–21.

28. Ibid., 22–30.

29. Ibid., 31–32, 40–41.

30. Ibid., 40.

31. Ibid., 41.

32. Ibid., 40–44.

33. Ibid., 45, 63–72, 79.

34. This organization was the same as the scout platoon organic to armored 

infantry and tank battalions.

35. FM 17-35 (1957), 85–86.

36. Ibid., 87, 103, and 107, quotation from page 87.

37. Ibid., 93, 96, and 109–112, quotation from page 96.

38. Ibid., 112–113, quotation from same.

39. Ibid., 99–101,112–113.

40. Ibid., 86.

41. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 282; Colonel John A. Beall Jr., 

“Revisions to ROCAD,” Armor LXVIII, no. 2 (March–April 1959): 48.

42. Beall, “Revisions to ROCAD,” 48–49.

43. Ibid., 49–50.

44. Ibid., 50.

45. Ibid., 49–50; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 282, 284.

46. Major Harry H. Hiestand, “Rapid Reconnaissance, Now!” Armor

LXVIII, no. 1 (January–February 1959): 46–49.

47. “Armor—Where Are We Going?” Armor LXVI, no. 6 (November–

December 1957): 22–23.

48. Ibid., 23–24, quotation from page 23.

49. Ibid., 24.

50. Ibid., 24–25, quotation from page 25.

51. Lieutenant Colonel James T. Burke, “Armored Infantry and Recon Unit 

Organization,” Armor LXV, no. 4 (July–August 1956): 15.

52. Ibid., 15–17, quotation from page 16.

53. Captain Thomas A. Tullar, “From Reconnaissance to Scouts” (student 

paper 45.6-142, Armor Officers Advanced Course, US Army Armor School, Fort 

Knox, KY, c. 1962), 1–4.

54. First Lieutenant William C. Haponski, “Which Method?” Armor

LXVIII, no. 3 (May–June 1959): 10.

55. Ibid., 

56. Department of the Army, FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, 

and Squadron (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1960).

57. Ibid., 10–11.

58. Ibid., 16.
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59. Ibid., 10, 14–16, 19–22, 25–26.

60. Ibid., 30–34.

61. Ibid., 26–29.

62. Ibid., 26.

63. Ibid., 34–42.

64. Ibid., 46–48.

65. Ibid., 54, 61, 65–67, 73, 81–87, quotation from page 62.

66. Ibid., 93–97.

67. Ibid., 159, 168–177.

68. Ibid., 

69. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 530–535, 537–538; 

Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 291.

70. Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 536–537.

71. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 293, 296–297.

72. Ibid., 296–297.

73. Ibid., 297–298, 308.

74. Ibid., 303–308.

75. Editorial, Armor LXX, no. 5 (September–October 1961): 22–23.

76. Major General Robert W. Grow, “ROAD Flexibilty,” editorial, Armor

LXX, no. 6 (November–December 1961): 2.

77. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 296.

78. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Glilkes and Major Rolland V. Heiser, 

“Dynamic 3-Dimensional Mobility,” Armor LXX, no. 1 (January–February 

1961): 7–9.

79. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 314, 316, 318; Lieutenant General 

John J. Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961–1971 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 1973), 20–24.

80. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, 

IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 540–541.

81. Captain Burton S. Boudinot, “Armed Reconnaissance—Tactical 

Integration of Aerial Elements,” Armor LXX, no. 5 (September–October 1961): 

6–10.

82. Glilkes and Heiser, “Dynamic 3-Dimensional Mobility,” 7–9.

83. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 540–541; Wilson, Maneuver 

and Firepower, 296.

84. Glilkes and Heiser, “Dynamic 3-Dimensional Mobility,” 8.

85. Ibid.

86. Captain Peter G. Grasser, “Reconnaissance Future,” Armor LXX, no. 2 

(March–April 1961): 4–8.

87. Harju, “White Paper—A Study of the Maneuver Battalion 

Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” 34.

88. Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Johnson Jr., “One of Our Units is 

Missing,” Armor LXXI, no. 5 (September–October 1962): 19.

89. Ibid., 19–20; Captain Joseph D. Posz, “To Train a Cavalryman,” Armor

LXXIII, no. 4 (July–August 1964): 41.
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Survival on a Nuclear Battlefield

90. Posz, “To Train a Cavalryman,” 41.

91. Major Raymond R. Battreall Jr., “Is Cavalry Really AWOL?” Armor

LXII, no. 3 (May–June 1963): 11–12, quotation from page 11.

92. Posz, “To Train a Cavalryman,” 41–42.

93. Captain Robert E. Wagner, “Cavalry Platoon Operations,” Armor

LXXII, no. 4 (July–August 1963): 32.

94. Ibid., 34.

95. Ibid., 33–37, quotation from page 35.

96. First Lieutenant James K. McCrorey, “One Technique—Support Squad 

of the Armored Cavalry Platoon,” Armor LXXIV, no. 5 (September–October 

1965): 58–61.

97. Johnson, “One of Our Units is Missing,” 21; Captain William A. 

Fitzgerald Jr., “Bring Back the Scout Platoon” (student paper 50-72, Armor 

Officer Advanced Course, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1964), 2–4, 

US Army Armor School Library.

98. Captain Willard Dixon Jr., “Are the Missions the Same?” (student paper 

46-53, Armor Officer Advanced Course, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, c. 

1963), 4–5, US Army Armor School Library; Captain Tom L. Lindholm, “What do 

We Have for Recon?” (student paper 50-113, 5, Armor Officer Advanced Course, 

US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1964), US Army Armor School Library.

99. Captain Gordon L. Stone, “More for Your Money” (student paper 50-

178, Armor Officer Advanced Course, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 

1964), 2–4, US Army Armor School Library.

100. Dixon, “Are the Missions the Same?” 1–4; Captain Gary P. Graves, 

“Ground Reconnaissance for the Tank Battalion—Now” (student paper 46-73, 

Armor Officer Advanced Course, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 1963), 

4, 6–8.

101. Captain Walter H. Nevil, “Scout and Reconnaissance Platoon Tactics,” 

Armor LXXII, no. 1 (January–February 1963): 14–16.

102. Fitzgerald, “Bring Back the Scout Platoon,” 1.

103. Captain John F. Jeszenszky, “Send Out the Scouts,” Armor LXXV, no. 

2 (March–April 1966): 43–44, quotation from page 43.

104. Battreall, “Is Cavalry Really AWOL?” 8.

105. Ibid., 8.

106. Captain Rafael G. Garcia, “The Reconnaissance Platoon—What Will It 

Be Like Tomorrow?” Armor LXXIV, no. 1 (January–February 1965): 57.

107. Ibid., 9.

108. See, for example, First Lieutenant Raymond E. Bell Jr., “Re-Equip the 

Scout Section,” Armor LXX, no. 4 (July–August 1961): 53; Johnson, “One of Our 

Units is Missing,” 21; Nevil, “Scout and Reconnaissance Platoon Tactics,” 16; 

Battreall, “Is Cavalry Really AWOL?” 9.

109. Batreall, “Is Cavalry Really AWOL?” 9.

110. Lindholm, “What Do We Have For Recon?” 

111. Captain William P. Boyle, “M-114 The Scout’s New Vehicle,” Armor

LXXII, no. 6 (November–December 1963): 44.
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Chapter 4

112. Ibid., 44–45.

113. Ibid., 46.

114. Fitzgerald, “Bring Back the Scout Platoon,” 2–4; Stone, “More for Your 

Money,” 2; Lindholm, “What do We Have for Recon?” 8.

115. Fitzgerald, “Bring Back the Scout Platoon,” 2–3; Garcia, “The 

Reconnaissance Platoon—What Will It Be Like Tomorrow?” 55.

116. Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke, “Armored Cavalry Regiments 

Along the Iron Curtain,” Armor LXVII, no. 3 (May–June 1958): 22–23.

117. Ibid., 25–26.

118. Ibid., 27.

119. Colonel John A. Beall Jr., “Revision of the Armored Cavalry Regiment,” 

Armor LXVIII, no. 3 (May–June 1959): 5.

120. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1960).

121. Ibid., 3–6, 21.

122. FM 17-95 (1960), 8, 10–11; Beall, “Revision of the Armored Cavalry 

Regiment,” 7.

123. FM 17-95 (1960), 13–15; Beall, “Revision of the Armored Cavalry 

Regiment,” 7.

124. FM 17-95 (1960), 10-13; Beall, “Revision of the Armored Cavalry 

Regiment,” 7.

125. Beall, “Revision of the Armored Cavalry Regiment,” 7.

126. Batreall, “Is Cavalry Really AWOL?” 9–10, quotation from page 10.

127. FM 17-95 (1960), 22–24, 28, 53, quotation from page 53.

128. Ibid., 56.
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Chapter 5

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in Counterinsurgency Operations

In the early 1960s, mounted reconnaissance remained oriented on 

conventional battlefields. Limited experimentation and analysis resulted 

in general principles applicable to counterinsurgency (COIN), but they 

remained unproven until the commitment of armor and armored cavalry to 

South Vietnam. Through trial and error, these guiding principles evolved 

into effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. In enabling this transition, mounted organizations demonstrated the value of organizational 

flexibility and versatility. By the war’s end, they had accumulated considerable experience in COIN, but it remained unclear how or if this experience should shape Army-wide doctrine. Operations in Southeast Asia 

raised questions about the role of mounted reconnaissance and revealed a 

gap between doctrinal principles and their application to a COIN environment. All mounted units had been employed as maneuver units, resulting 

in the use of armored cavalry as general-purpose combat organizations. 

The need for reconnaissance assets to not only find but also engage and 

destroy the enemy reinforced this trend.

Prelude to War 

Between 1960 and 1964, implementation of the Kennedy administration’s policy of flexible response occupied much of the Army’s focus. The 

adoption of the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) symbolized this policy’s emphasis on a more robust conventional war capability. Conversion to the ROAD configuration made combat formations more 

robust and modular.

New materiel accompanied the change in division structure. The 

M60 main battle tank, the M113 armored personnel carrier, and the M114 

armored command and reconnaissance vehicle constituted the principal 

changes in combat vehicles. The boxy M113 provided a light, armored carrier for a squad of infantry, and possessed excellent mobility. Armed with 

a single .50-caliber machinegun, its job lay in transporting infantry into 

position where they could dismount and attack. Mechanically reliable, it 

possessed good cross-country mobility and a 200-mile operational radius. 

The M113 marked a major improvement over the less versatile M59 and 

M75 platforms it replaced. The M114 offered similar promise as a light, 

armored scout platform in lieu of the venerable but unarmored jeep.1

Materiel and organizational changes drove doctrinal and training 

updates. The focus of these efforts, however, remained rooted in the threat 
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posed to Central Europe by the Warsaw Pact. Flexible response anticipated 

the likelihood of increased small wars outside Europe, but this acknowledgment found little reflection in published doctrine. The tactical implications of unconventional wars found expression largely as a footnote to 

coverage of more traditional conflicts.

In Southeast Asia, French influence in Indochina ended with the 

Geneva Accords of 1954, which partitioned Vietnam into the Republic of 

South Vietnam and the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The 

new South Vietnamese government embarked on an effort to consolidate 

its authority in the face of guerrilla activities encouraged by the Communist 

North. The latter sought to undermine South Vietnamese authority and 

establish a unified nation under Communist leadership. America supported 

the South. In addition to various aid packages and an influx of police and 

economic advisers, the Kennedy administration deployed military advisers. Between 1961 and 1963, the number of such soldiers rose from 900 to 

16,000. Military advisers helped train South Vietnamese units and accompanied them into combat. Control of their operations resided with the 

Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV).2

Such American support did not stop the activities of the Viet Cong 

guerrillas in South Vietnam. With the death of President Kennedy in 

1963, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, pondered the viability of increasing the American ground presence in Southeast Asia. The 1964 Tonkin 

Gulf Resolution gave him the authority to do so, and the following year 

Johnson authorized the commitment of 200,000 American soldiers to 

South Vietnam. This act expanded the scope of US military operations.3

The Army continued to see the escalating conflict as an infantryman’s 

war. Doctrinal references for the use of armor to counterguerrilla activities remained rare. In the 1960 version of FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry 

Platoon, Troop, and Squadron, for example, the mission set for armored 

cavalry included securing “friendly rear areas, routes of communications, 

and installations from enemy airborne, air landed, and guerrilla forces.” 

The coverage amounted to no more than a few pages focused on general 

concepts.4

 The manual offered no special guidance for COIN operations, 

nor did guidance for the armored cavalry regiment offer further details. 

It, too, referenced counterguerrilla actions as part of more conventional 

operations.5

In 1961, the ROAD brigade orientation resulted in FM 17-30, The 

Armored Division Brigade, to govern armored brigade operations. It 

acknowledged the possibility of counterguerrilla actions and provided 

basic tips and principles to govern armor employed in this role. These 
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

included the denial of civilian support to the insurgents, the prevention 

of guerrilla formation, and the importance of secrecy to shroud unit 

movements and achieve surprise. Passive defense measures included 

installation security and protecting lines of communication, while active 

operations entailed seeking enemy guerrillas and attacking them. To 

enhance the effectiveness of these actions, attacks on hostile insurgents 

were to be conducted at night or during inclement weather. Commanders 

were advised to consider brigade administrative and support elements 

vulnerable and likely to draw attacks.6

This manual offered something more than vague generalities concerning COIN operations, but it did not constitute an effective depiction of 

how to employ the armored brigade to defeat guerrillas. Indeed, much of 

its special section addressed operations in conjunction with friendly guerrillas. COIN was included as a “situation short of war,” but in addressing 

this circumstance, the manual almost apologetically noted, “No normal 

employment can be described.” It did not address operations in close, 

complex terrain, despite the tendency of guerrillas to avoid the open areas 

most suited to armored vehicles. A single paragraph constituted the guidance for an armored brigade faced with fighting in woods, swamps, and 

lake areas. Armor was expected to bypass these terrain features, neutralize 

them by fire, and let infantry units clear them.7

The coverage of rear area security missions offered still limited but 

more practical guidance applicable to COIN. Brigades assigned to this 

mission oriented on key terrain, critical installations, the road net, potential 

landing/drop zones, and likely assembly areas. The brigade divided its area 

of operations into battalion task force zones. Integrated use of installation 

security, observation posts, patrols, and centrally located mobile reserves 

were to ensure security and prevent hostile incursions. Yet, the three pages 

devoted to this subject did not detail how to organize and implement these 

measures.8

Nascent Awareness of Counterinsurgency Operations

Applying the general principles outlined in doctrine to an actual field 

environment became the focus of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

(ACR). In October 1961, this unit relocated to the Federal Republic of 

Germany. The regiment assumed responsibility for rear area security. In 

preparation, the unit participated in tactical exercises that provided the 

first opportunities to employ an armored cavalry regiment in this type mission. Within its area of operations, the 3d Armored Cavalry had to protect 

installations and key routes from possible attack by airborne forces, infiltrators, and guerrillas. It needed to establish continuous surveillance over 
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Chapter 5

potential drop/landing zones and likely insurgent base camps. The regiment was expected to find and destroy conventional or irregular forces.9

These exercises provided several lessons for the use of armored cavalry regiments. The most effective use of the armored cavalry regiment 

proved to be as part of an integrated area security network. Outposts, 

installation garrisons, roadblocks, scout patrols, surveillance measures, 

and helicopter flights all provided a continuous stream of information on 

activities. Further insights into the area came from military intelligence 

teams and the civilian populace. An extensive and robust communications 

net ensured the rapid and steady flow of information. In the event of a hostile act, quick reaction forces comprising tank, rifle, and mortar elements 

raced to relieve those locations in the greatest danger. At the squadron 

level, the light tank troop was integrated with an armored cavalry troop 

to provide two organizations with similar capabilities. The armored cavalry troops generally consolidated their like elements and formed mixed 

task forces as needed. Whenever these teams encountered the enemy, they 

sought to maintain contact until the hostile force was destroyed. Against 

an elusive enemy, it was not enough to simply gain and maintain contact. 

The hostile force had to be eliminated to ensure their inability to conduct 

further guerrilla acts.10

Decentralized command and rapid action proved critical to the success of reaction forces. Initial reliance on successive troop, squadron, and 

Figure 57. The M114 Armored Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle (foreground) fielded with great promise as a replacement to the venerable jeep.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

regimental authority to dispatch reaction teams to hostile contacts failed. 

The time lag associated with this process eliminated the chance of actually intercepting the enemy force before it withdrew. Therefore, squadron commanders assumed responsibility for their own areas of operations. 

They determined how to respond to threats without first seeking regimental approval. The regimental commander monitored events and could 

intervene, but the actions of subordinate commanders were not hamstrung 

by mandatory consultation with higher headquarters.11

The least effective use included convoy escort duties. The escorts 

tended to deter only small-scale ambushes, while larger attacks entangled 

the escorts in a series of disjointed engagements that precluded maneuver. 

The escort could not prevent the loss of at least part of the convoy, but it 

incurred significant crew fatigue and vehicle wear regardless of whether a 

hostile attack occurred. Escort duty also diverted combat forces from more 

lucrative operations.12

Route security proved a more efficient method of protecting traffic. 

Outposts along a road provided a means of surveillance and early warning 

of hostile action. Patrols roved at irregular intervals between the outposts 

to preempt or interrupt ambush attempts. Armored cavalry platoons generally used their scouts to perform these patrols and man outposts. The 

tank section, rifle squad, and support squad constituted a centrally located 

strike force to relieve convoys under attack. This technique restored some 

of the armored cavalry’s ability to maneuver and reduced vehicular wear, 

but it still tethered the unit to a single route. Consequently, route security 

was recommended only for particularly vital roads.13

In 1962, the Armor Combat Developments Agency at Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, produced a study outlining the role of armored cavalry in COIN 

operations. This study provided an analytical parallel to the 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment exercise. It drew on lessons learned by several nations 

with COIN experience since World War II, but it was expressly oriented 

toward Vietnam. The study identified several missions suited to armored 

cavalry, including offense, raids, counterattacks, route security, convoy 

escort, reconnaissance, and surveillance. In security operations, armored 

cavalry appeared capable of securing areas, routes, and convoys, thereby 

freeing other friendly forces for combat operations elsewhere. The study 

authors found the armored cavalry regiment’s mix of ground and air 

mobility, firepower, communications, and shock ideal for action against 

comparatively lightly armed but elusive insurgents. However, they did 

acknowledge the primacy of infantry in COIN and the likelihood of terrain constraining mobility.14
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The study urged doctrinal changes to encourage the use of armored 

cavalry in combating guerrillas. Armored cavalry doctrine required greater 

emphasis on flexibility, mobility, and the ability to conduct mounted and 

dismounted operations with equal skill. Small unit training also needed 

to provide greater emphasis on the tactics, techniques, and procedures 

associated with COIN. Specific adjustments included more emphasis on 

support weapons, operations in varied terrain, dismounted operations, and 

battle drills for rapid reaction to ambushes.15

For COIN operations, the study provided a detailed listing of recommended materiel and organizational changes. The danger of ambushes 

mandated all-round armor protection for tactical vehicles. They needed to 

survive the initial attack to maneuver and counterattack. Hence, replacement of the scout’s jeep with the M114 was favored due to the latter’s 

better survivability. 

The reduced armor threat associated with insurgencies reduced the 

need for tanks. The study suggested replacement of some with M113 

armored personnel carriers. Generally, armored vehicles required:

. . . a high probability of surviving an ambush that may 

contain rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. These vehicles must be able to assault enemy positions in the face 

of a large volume of small arms fire, overcoming this 

fire with weapons operated from within the vehicles, or 

give suppressive and supporting fires to assist maneuvering elements to attack the flanks and rear of the enemy 

ambush.16

The publication of FM 17-1, Armor Operations, in 1963 reflected the 

growing awareness of the utility of mounted forces in less conventional 

roles. The manual served to help mounted organizations adjust to the new 

ROAD structure, but it included guidance applicable to COIN. Coverage 

of security operations, for example, included not only screen, guard, and 

covering force; it also addressed area security against a variety of threats, 

including irregular forces, espionage, and sabotage. The objective of area 

security lay in the protection of rear area units, installations, and lines of 

communication. Through reliance on observation posts, air and ground 

patrols, interaction of the civilian population, and creation of an early 

warning system, armored units were expected to establish an intelligence 

network bolstered by mobile combat forces. The manual reflected the earlier experience of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the analysis of 

the Armor Combat Developments Agency.17
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

For the reader, the manual identified the key objectives for area security, and it provided useful concepts for organization and mission execution. However, the manual’s overall focus remained on conventional 

operations anticipated in Central Europe. A section on jungle operations 

simply highlighted the limitations on mounted forces, while just three 

pages addressed COIN. It noted the need to first create bases in areas of 

irregular activity, then establish control over the civilian population, and 

finally destroy the threat through offensive operations. To this simplistic 

approach were added some principles to guide the tailoring of forces to 

execute these measures. Nevertheless, much was left to the reader to figure 

out. The manual acknowledged the likelihood of mounted forces conducting COIN operations, but it considered them a special rather than normal 

activity.18

Ironically, the Army possessed a potential wealth of information 

regarding the use of mounted forces in South Vietnam against insurgents. 

When the Republic of South Vietnam was created, its initial military structure included armored units. To organize and train these forces, the South 

Vietnamese relied on the United States. The configuration of mounted units 

followed American patterns of organization. The Armor School at Fort 

Knox trained South Vietnamese soldiers, while American armor advisers 

Figure 58. South Vietnamese M113s in the field. The South Vietnamese 

became adept at sustaining this vehicle under difficult conditions and pioneered many of the special techniques later adopted by the US Army to 

maximize the effectiveness of this vehicle in Vietnam.

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worked directly with South Vietnamese mounted forces in the field. By 

1965, every South Vietnamese armored cavalry regiment and squadron 

possessed its own American advisory cell.19

These activities should have generated a steady flow of insights, lessons learned, and general information concerning the use of mounted 

forces in COIN operations. Unfortunately, much of the potential value 

of this information was lost to the Army until 1962. Before that year, 

American advisers serving in Vietnam were prohibited from disseminating information about their activities. Their role was cloaked in secrecy 

at a time when the Army began to acknowledge the likelihood of COIN 

operations. Hence, the American Armor community benefited little from 

the accumulated South Vietnamese COIN experience. Assumptions about 

the supposed inability of mounted organizations to operate in Vietnam 

continued to abound.20

South Vietnamese armored units became adept at overcoming mobility challenges and sustaining their vehicles without the massive supply of 

parts and well-equipped workshops available to American tank and cavalry organizations. They introduced the M113 to Southeast Asia through 

the fielding of two companies in 1962. They rejected the American practice of using the vehicle as a battlefield taxi and achieved better results by 

encouraging passengers to fight mounted.21 In fact, “The ultimate tactical 

objective of the Vietnamese trooper is to physically overrun the enemy and 

crush him beneath his tracks. All of his efforts are directed to this end, and 

the psychological—or ‘shock’—effect on the enemy of this armor equivalent to ‘the spirit of the Bayonet’ is very great indeed.”22

This early success led to the fielding of additional units equipped 

with the M113, followed by modifications and new tactics. Additional 

machineguns and gun shields began to adorn the vehicles after heavy 

losses among crew members trying to operate the unprotected machinegun. The additional firepower suited the platform’s growing use as a combat vehicle rather than a transport, and it marked the M113’s transition into 

an armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV). A variety of measures were 

adopted to improve protection, including the use of extra track blocks and 

sandbags. The South Vietnamese developed additional equipment that 

could be carried on the vehicle to assist in crossing waterways, recovery, 

and movement across soft ground. They also employed flamethrowers on 

the vehicle. American combat units later adopted all of these measures.23

The South Vietnamese had less success with the M114. Considered the 

answer to longstanding desires for a small, armored reconnaissance vehicle, 

the M114 entered service in 1961. The South Vietnamese received 80 of 
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

these vehicles for use in their armored cavalry organizations. Vietnamese 

crews discovered the M114’s poor cross-country mobility. It could not negotiate many of the small waterways found throughout Vietnam. Too often, 

the vehicle simply nosed into ditches and stream banks, unable to extricate itself. American observers carefully tracked those South Vietnamese 

units equipped with the M114 and came to similar conclusions regarding 

the vehicle’s poor effectiveness. As one adviser noted: “The major problem was that their front slopes protruded beyond the track and dug into 

dikes and canal banks before the track could get a foothold, thereby preventing the M114’s exiting from paddies or canals.” These vehicles also 

proved underpowered, possessed poor reliability, suffered frequent track 

failures, and lacked adequate interior space. Consequently, the M114 was 

withdrawn from Vietnam, and it did not serve with American units later 

deployed there. However, its difficulties did not prevent retention and use 

by organizations serving in other theaters.24

Training the Basics

The operation of South Vietnamese armor units generally failed to 

attract significant attention among commanders of American mounted 

units. Instead, their focus lay on training and improving combat readiness. Faced with the turmoil associated with the conversion of divisions 

to the ROAD configuration, they struggled to build unit effectiveness. 

Reconnaissance organizations faced some particularly difficult challenges 

related to the restructuring of battalion scout platoons into combined arms 

armored cavalry platoons.

Basic reconnaissance principles found expression in FM 17-1, Armor 

Operations. Reconnaissance served to gather combat information about the 

enemy and the area of operations to generate intelligence and guide planning and command decisions. This basic mission applied to the armored 

cavalry regiments, division cavalry squadrons, and the reconnaissance 

platoons of the maneuver battalions. They were to integrate the actions of 

ground scouts, surveillance radar, and aerial assets whenever available.25

Reconnaissance oriented on the objective. Its value hinged on timely 

and accurate reporting. These fundamentals long predated armored organizations, but the manual clearly rejected the World War II era emphasis 

on pure reconnaissance: “Reconnaissance and security complement each 

other and cannot be readily separated.”26 The elevation of security as a 

parallel and integrated function with reconnaissance did not equate to a 

wholehearted embracement of combat as the principal means of gathering 

information. Instead, reconnaissance units were to “obtain information by 
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stealth whenever possible, but fight when necessary to gain the desired 

information. The reconnaissance mission must not be jeopardized by combat with the enemy when combat is not essential to obtain the information 

desired.”27

The reconnaissance commander on the spot decided whether to 

engage in combat or not. However, a new requirement infringed on this 

prerogative. Having gained contact with a hostile force, the reconnaissance commander was prohibited from breaking it without higher headquarters approval. While contact sustainment had become a standard 

principle of reconnaissance, the requirement to seek permission to break 

it was not. The latter reduced the options available once contact occurred, 

and encouraged reconnaissance assets to remain in close proximity to 

an enemy force, where the likelihood of combat and the risk of decisive 

engagement rose.28

Once contact was established with a hostile force, the reconnaissance 

commander sought to develop the situation. This would occur through 

one of several methods. He had to determine the strength and disposition of the enemy, particularly identifying his flanks. He then needed to 

decide whether to attack or bypass the hostile presence, subject to higher 

headquarters approval. Unlike prior doctrinal guidance that encouraged 

dismounted reconnoitering, this manual limited such actions to terrain unsuited to vehicular movement and nighttime patrols. Otherwise 

mounted reconnaissance became the norm, using appropriate movement 

techniques to minimize the risk of ambush or loss. When time became 

short, movement accelerated and relied on reconnaissance by fire to discover the enemy. Standard reconnaissance operations continued to include 

route, zone, and area.29

The effective implementation of these principles rested on the platoon, 

the basic building block of all ground reconnaissance organizations. Under 

the ROAD configuration, the armored cavalry regiment, division cavalry 

squadron, and maneuver battalion reconnaissance platoons shared the 

same combined arms structure. This uniformity posed significant training 

challenges not easily overcome by organizations faced with simultaneous 

changes in materiel, doctrine, and unit structure above the platoon level. 

Armor units in general already faced serious training and readiness 

issues. Unit training activities in the United States were undermined 

by personnel diversions to perform other activities unrelated to tactical 

effectiveness. These distractions contributed to the inability of several 

units to complete annual training cycles. High personnel turnover, 

insufficiently trained replacement platoon leaders, and too few experienced 
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) all contributed to a generally 

negative assessment of combat readiness. Most commanders expressed 

dissatisfaction with current training programs, stressing the need for more 

field training, platoon exercises, and gunnery. For many units, limited 

maneuver space reduced the value of the few field activities undertaken.30

Commanders serving in armored cavalry regiments noted that officers and NCOs all needed further instruction in reconnaissance principles. 

Replacement personnel proved especially deficient. The differences in the 

employment and materiel of reconnaissance versus tank units underscored 

the importance of specialized training for the former. However, such training was generally not available and not offered by the Armor School, pushing the responsibility for developing effective reconnaissance leaders to 

units in the field. In response, the Seventh Army Combined Arms Training 

Center introduced a basic officers’ reconnaissance course.31

The most significant problems facing the training of armored cavalry 

platoons included a high rate of personnel turnover and training effectiveness. 

Unit training areas proved too small and lacked varied terrain, but access to 

major training facilities with more maneuver space remained limited and 

of short duration due to their large training load. Limited maneuver space 

at home station coupled with frequent administrative details of personnel 

resulted in few opportunities for the training of complete platoons at full 

Figure 59. Use of an M113 to recover another—a common activity in South 

Vietnam and necessitated by the terrain conditions.

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strength. Some units found themselves with as few as 20 percent of their 

authorized establishment on hand. Moreover, terrain restrictions often 

precluded the use of tanks that might damage property. The overall impact 

of these conditions lay in low combat readiness rates, because the platoons 

spent little time in the field building their cohesion and practicing their 

craft.32

New armored cavalry platoon leaders often arrived in their units insufficiently trained and lacking in basic knowledge and skills. The Armor 

Officer Basic Course and Armor Officer Orientation Course offered in 

the Armor School provided only a few days of cursory instruction in the 

armored cavalry platoon, despite the unit’s unique and complex composition. It constituted the smallest combined arms team in the Army and incorporated a mix of weapons, vehicles, and military occupational specialties 

(MOS). New platoon leaders proved ill equipped to handle such units:

The platoon leader 1) commands the smallest combined 

arms team in the army—and does not know how; 2) is 

frightened to his “boot-tops” when he first views his command (the platoon) in the motor park; 3) does not know 

the function of any of the platoon’s elements, except perhaps the tank element; and 4) is therefore unprepared to 

employ three of the elements separately, or the four elements together in coordinated action. In short he is unable 

to command and operate his platoon.33

The unqualified nature of new platoon leaders impacted the entire platoon. Such leaders could not demonstrate the effective employment of a 

particular section or squad, and they did not know the skills associated with 

each of their platoon soldiers. As a result, the unit rather than the schoolhouse assumed and bore the primary burden of training platoon leaders. 

This process required months, after which the platoon leader remained 

with the unit only a short time before leaving for his next duty assignment. 

Experienced NCOs assumed a critical role. They helped develop new platoon leaders in addition to training squad and section elements, and sustaining the overall cohesion of the platoon. Unit commanders appreciated 

the efforts of the Seventh Army to provide special classes to help new 

platoon leaders, but they wanted commanders rather than students. They 

expected the Armor School to assume this responsibility.34

In response to the problems facing armored cavalry platoon training, Continental Army Command (CONARC) sought through the Human 

Resources Research Organization (HUMRRO) office at Fort Knox to 

develop corrective measures. A detailed breakdown of the principal 
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duties and skills followed that was cross-referenced against current training activities. The results of this work then became the foundation for 

establishing training standards to measure both individual performance 

and unit readiness. The final product included a series of formal tests that 

progressed from the individual through the squad and section to platoon. 

Each level addressed key tasks identified in the study. At the individual 

level, the focus lay on basic skills such as weapons use and navigation, 

while the squad and section evaluation addressed vehicle operation and 

crew interaction. The platoon review focused on the platoon leader’s skill, 

the platoon’s responsiveness, and the unit’s ability to perform a variety of 

actions associated with the armored cavalry platoon. Collectively designated the Armored Cavalry Platoon Combat Readiness Check, by 1966 

they were undergoing evaluation in the field and facing a final decision 

regarding their adoption.35

Parallel work addressed the issues of leader training and insufficient 

maneuver space. The solution emerged in the form of a simulator that 

included a motion picture screen, partitioned booths to represent vehicles 

and crews with working radios, and motorized projector units. The screen 

depicted enlarged map transparencies on which the motorized projectors 

displayed images of the platoon’s vehicles and their movement. Other 

Figure 60. Armored cavalry trainer developed to improve the preparation of 

cavalry leaders through the integrated use of radios and movie projectors—

the forerunner of computer-based simulators.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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projectors controlled friendly and opposing force elements. Trainees 

occupied the partitioned booths and communicated with each other via 

radio, seeking to implement the platoon leader’s guidance and track the 

development of each action. Through the execution of free-play scenarios, 

this training device permitted platoon members to practice map reading, 

communications skills, tactics, and command principles under the 

supervision of instructors who controlled the opposition and artillery. 

The entire construct was developed in close cooperation with the Armor 

School, which supported a similar product oriented on tank platoons. After 

an extensive field evaluation in 1965, CONARC approved the adoption of 

the armored cavalry trainer and its use to instruct both Active Component 

and National Guard soldiers.36

The new device provided an important tool for enhancing platoon 

leadership without the expense of acquiring new unit maneuver areas. It 

further permitted repetitive training where appropriate in much less time 

than would be necessary for a field exercise. It was optimally effective for 

training the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, squad leaders, and section 

leaders to work together as a team. In this sense, it proved important to 

developing overall platoon cohesion and in the instruction of new platoon 

leaders. However, lest the new device be considered a replacement to field 

training, a cautionary note accompanied its description: 

Although training on the ACT [armored cavalry trainer] 

will improve the field performance of cavalry platoon 

personnel, by no means should the system be regarded as 

a substitute for all classroom instruction, or for all field 

training and realistic combat exercises.37

These measures improved armored cavalry platoon training, but they 

required time to develop and implement. They were unavailable during the 

years immediately before the United States began its large-scale buildup 

of forces in Southeast Asia. Only after armor and cavalry units began to 

deploy to Vietnam, did noticeable training improvements occur.

A Question of Need

In 1965, 200,000 troops deployed to Vietnam. Initially, these forces 

provided security for American bases. By June, the scope of operations 

had expanded to include combat operations throughout South Vietnam. 

The need for armored organizations, nevertheless, remained unclear. 

Preparations to deploy the 1st Infantry Division with its mechanized 

infantry, tanks, and division cavalry squadron encountered difficulties 

that underscored the reluctance of senior leaders to commit armor units 

to Vietnam.38
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When the 1st Infantry Division deployed, many of its armored assets 

were removed. The Army Chief of Staff considered them too vulnerable to 

mines and too constrained by terrain to be of much use in an infantryman’s 

war. The division lost its mechanized infantry and both tank battalions, 

effectively transforming it into a dismounted formation. The division cavalry squadron, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, remained, but it exchanged its 

M114s for ACAVs.39

Once in Vietnam, the brigades of the division were employed separately. A ground cavalry troop accompanied each one. This fragmentation 

left the cavalry squadron commander with essentially only the air cavalry troop under his direct command until that, too, was detached. On the 

assumption that tanks could not operate in jungle terrain, the squadron’s 

M48s were also removed and employed in a static base security role. These 

actions effectively emasculated the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment 

and precluded its employment in accordance with doctrine.40

Despite these limitations, the squadron troops soon began to demonstrate their potential value. In November one troop used the mobile 

firepower of its ACAVs to break up a Viet Cong assault and mounted an 

effective counterattack. Reports of similar actions by Marine Corps armor 

further encouraged the deployment of more armor to Vietnam. The 11th 

Armored Cavalry and the 25th Infantry Division with its mechanized 

infantry, tank battalion, and division cavalry became the first of several 

more armored cavalry, tank, and mechanized units to enter the conflict.41

These mounted reinforcements generally underwent configuration 

changes before deployment. The most common included a reduction in 

tank strength and the replacement of M114s with M113s, frequently modified as ACAVs. Once in Vietnam, armored cavalry, tank, and mechanized 

units tended to operate as collections of detachments rather than as single 

maneuver elements. Their fragmented status complicated command and 

control.42 The net effect of these actions lay in organizations dissimilar 

to those indicated in tables of organization and doctrinal manuals. They 

required new tactics, techniques, and procedures suited to the particular 

circumstances of Vietnam. American military advisers serving with the 

South Vietnamese armored force helped to make this transition. They provided threat information, terrain familiarization, recommended vehicle 

modifications, and suggested tactics. In doing so they sought to transfer 

to US forces the accumulated lessons learned by South Vietnamese armor 

during 10 years of active operations.43

The advisers also waged a campaign to overcome assumptions about 

the limited mobility of mounted units. In 1966, the senior American 
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armor adviser to the South Vietnamese published an article detailing the 

topography of Vietnam and how it could be overcome by mounted units. 

The Delta region dominated the southern part of the country. Tidal rivers and steep-banked canals crisscrossed nearly half of this region, which 

also possessed few roads and many swamps and forested areas. North of 

Saigon, large forests and rubber plantations predominated. Mountains 

dominated large sections of the northern part of the country and largely 

limited vehicle movement to the few roads and trails present. Along the 

coast lay the heavily populated urban centers linked by a highway and 

railroad. Trafficability proved generally better, but the presence of major 

rivers effectively partitioned this region. The Central Plateau along the 

Cambodian border possessed few urban areas and no significant rivers. 

Instead, forests and tall grass areas abounded. Although roads proved few, 

cross-country mobility proved better in the grassy regions. All of these 

regions posed particular challenges to vehicular movement, but they were 

not insurmountable.44

The M113 constituted the backbone of armored operations, especially 

when modified to enhance mobility, self-recovery, and firepower. Based 

on the South Vietnamese experience, this vehicle was expected to function in a tank-like role rather than a transport. Suitable missions included 

reconnaissance in conjunction with dismounted scouts, reconnaissance in 

Figure 61. Modified through the addition of machineguns and the 

installation of gun shields, the M113 became transformed into the 

Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV).

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

force, encirclement, and as a reaction force. The M113 possessed the best 

cross-country capabilities of any vehicle in a country dotted with rice paddies, marshy bogs, mangrove swamps, forests, canals, irrigation ditches, 

and streams. Nevertheless, the terrain and climate proved harsh on rubber 

components, resulting in the rapid deterioration of seals and the need for 

frequent replacement of track and suspension parts.45

Many of the tools and techniques developed by the South Vietnamese 

to facilitate self-recovery and overcome water obstacles were recommended for use by American units. These measures included pushbars, 

a capstan and anchor kit, and tow cables and pintles on every vehicle. 

These tools and the related techniques of employment permitted mounted 

units to overcome soft ground, canals, and waterways without external 

support. To enhance protection, dummy antennae were recommended 

for all vehicles to remove the unique signature associated with command 

platforms. The use of shields on the sides of vehicles made of plywood 

with a sheet metal covering provided a degree of protection against shaped 

charge weapons.46

Simple land navigation proved a challenge. Advisers noted the problems faced by newly arrived armor soldiers and recommended common 

sense solutions. One adviser noted:

Because of the lack of terrain features, the average 

American has difficulty navigating when he first arrives 

in the Delta. This problem is further complicated by the 

erratic wandering necessary to travel a route suitable for 

the M113’s. By constant reference to his map, frequent use 

of a compass and binoculars, and by utilizing the major 

canals as reference points, he will learn to overcome the 

difficulties of navigation in this flat terrain.47

The recommendations of advisers proved an important source of 

information for newly arrived commanders of mounted units. However, 

many units found themselves learning by trial and error, rather than 

according to a deliberate schedule of activities designed to prepare them 

for operations. Thrust into active missions whether ready or not, the first 

mounted organizations began to accumulate their own experience and 

develop their own solutions to problems encountered. 

Showing the Way—Initial Operations 1965–67

Mounted operations in Vietnam differed significantly from the conventional environment of Central Europe that shaped unit training. The basic 

reconnaissance, security, and economy of force mission set associated 
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with armored cavalry assumed a different meaning in Southeast Asia. 

Reconnaissance included not only discovering hostile forces, but their 

immediate engagement in combat to destroy them. More often than not, 

reconnaissance became a movement to contact with the decision to initiate 

combat resting with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers. Security 

actions included convoy protection, securing lines of communications 

along select routes, and the static defense of installations and firebases. 

The distinction between economy of force and security actions became 

blurred, because mounted forces performing the latter freed infantry and 

airmobile forces for offensive operations elsewhere. 

The period from 1965 to 1967 marked a time of adjustment by mounted 

forces. Most units found themselves fragmented to support different formations, despite the command and control problems this generated. Initial 

reluctance to employ tanks in an aggressive manner resulted in their relegation to base defense. Armored cavalry organizations thus functioned 

as a collection of dispersed detachments, further fragmented through the 

limitations placed on tank use by higher command. The tendency of division commanders to assume direct control over the air cavalry troop of the 

division cavalry squadron precluded the doctrinally encouraged practice 

of integrated air-ground cavalry operations. These developments forced 

mounted reconnaissance organizations to pioneer new tactics, techniques, 

and procedures suited to Vietnam.48

The first operations by American mounted units in Vietnam were 

small-scale affairs surrounded by confusion and uncertainty. It took 

Figure 62. Heavily sandbagged M48 supports a dismounted patrol.

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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

time to overcome the reluctance of MACV headquarters to permit the 

unfettered employment of tanks. This reluctance ended only after the 

arrival of the 25th Infantry Division and its successful employment of 

mechanized infantry, tank, and cavalry in operations against a Viet Cong 

stronghold early in 1966. Subsequent operations began to test the boundaries of mounted actions in general, including missions during the rainy 

season.49

Before 1968, only two American tank battalions served in Vietnam—

the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor 

Regiment. Both organizations experienced the routine detachment of 

companies to provide armor support to other units. In the case of the 2d 

Battalion, 34th Armor, some of its assets served in different regions of 

South Vietnam with little direct contact with the battalion headquarters. 

Rarely did the unit commander directly command more than a single company and in some instances he controlled none. Tank companies experienced similar detachments of platoons with corresponding command, 

control, and supply problems.50

Tank battalions performed missions similar to those of armored cavalry units. They escorted convoys and participated in route security operations. They also supported search and destroy actions. The tank’s bulk 

made it more effective than other vehicles to forge its way through jungle 

terrain. The attachment of battalion scouts improved the ability of tank 

companies to perform these missions. In the jungle, scouts preceded the 

tanks, which followed in either column or wedge formation. On discovery 

of a Viet Cong site, the scouts provided a dismounted capability to conduct 

a detailed search. At night, when the tanks formed a laager, the scouts carried out dismounted night patrols to disrupt any potential hostile attack on 

the vehicles. During convoy escort operations, one tank platoon led while 

another trailed the vehicular column. The company commander hovered 

overhead in a helicopter, while the scout ACAVs positioned themselves in 

the convoy center, ready to react to threats from any direction. In the event 

of contact, the armored vehicles formed a herringbone formation through 

which the soft-skinned vehicles passed. Planning for the convoy’s movement included preplotted fire missions along both sides of the road that 

could be activated if necessary.51

Crews appreciated the firepower and general survivability of the 

M48A3s that equipped the tank battalions, rejecting suggestions that a 

light tank would be more effective. Although it could be mired by steepbanked streams, the M48’s bulk and power permitted some maneuverability in jungle terrain and high vegetation areas away from roads.52 The 

tank’s survivability proved its most popular feature. Even after extensive 
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mine damage, the vehicle usually returned to operations within days. 

Armor protection and instantly available firepower made it likely to survive sudden encounters with hostile forces. Therefore, crews preferred to 

“stick with our M48A3 medium tanks having seen exactly how demoralizing the 90 MM canister round is to an infantryman, whether it be a Viet 

Cong or North Vietnamese soldier.”53

The tank battalions and tank components of armored cavalry units 

serving in Vietnam fielded the M48A3 before deployment. The diesel 

engine of this model provided a longer operational radius than gasoline 

powered versions. Moreover, it eliminated concerns about the volatility of gasoline. Engines and fuel tanks sustained repeated hits from Viet 

Cong equipped with the RPG-2, but resultant fires proved rare. One tank 

received a hit in its fuel tank, but the crew remained unaware of the impact 

until they discovered diesel fuel leaking onto the ground long after the 

engagement ended.54

The initially limited antitank threat faced enhanced confidence in the 

M48A3’s survivability. At least one tank company commander viewed the 

RPG-2 with disdain:

I have found that this particular weapon is poorly designed, 

highly inaccurate, and even after penetration is achieved 

the actual damage to the vehicle is slight. I base this conclusion on the fact that within a period of less than thirty 

days my company had eighteen of these weapons fired at 

it; a fact confirmed by finding the stabilizing assemblies, 

and I had three tanks which received hits. From these 

three hits we had, one penetration that occurred on what 

could be considered a “belly” shot, in that it struck the 

tank well down on the front slope of the driver’s compartment near the point where it turns into the belly of the 

vehicle. Damage amounted to a broken brake pedal. To be 

sure, the driver was wounded, but he has since returned to 

duty and the tank was fought for another three days with a 

new driver and a bit of unplanned air-conditioning.55

Armored cavalry organizations included tanks, but configuration 

changes before deployment to Vietnam reduced their number. In the 11th 

Armored Cavalry, all platoons exchanged their tanks for ACAVs. The 

2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment initially did the same only to have 

its original combined arms platoons restored shortly before leaving the 

United States.56 Generally, division squadrons retained their combined 

arms platoons, although once in Vietnam, early operations were hampered 
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by the restriction of tanks to bases. This policy removed a significant portion of each platoon’s combat power.57 The replacement of M114s with 

ACAVs helped to restore some platoon firepower, but in the case of the 1st 

Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, the vehicles were initially fitted with an 

improperly balanced gun shield for the .50-caliber machinegun. It proved 

exceptionally difficult to turn the turret on any degree of cant. Frustrated 

crews removed the gun shields and operated the weapon without them.58

Modifications in theater to fit the particular circumstances of Vietnam 

became common. At least one division cavalry squadron created an additional combat troop from its headquarters and headquarters troop assets. It 

consolidated the armored vehicles intended for the commander’s use, the 

transports for the ground surveillance radar section, and the flamethrower 

equipped M113s. The resultant 12-vehicle force possessed considerable 

combat power and performed reconnaissance and economy of force missions. The squadron also benefited from periodic attachments that included 

a mechanized infantry company, a tank company, and/or an air defense 

battery. The last organization usually performed base camp security with 

its M42 Dusters employed in an antipersonnel role.59

Division cavalry quickly assumed a pattern of activities that became 

the norm for the remainder of the conflict. They performed cordon and 

search missions, search and destroy missions, assisted in opening roads 

closed by enemy action, defended base camps, and protected convoys and 

Figure 63. ACAVs halted in herringbone formation.

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supply routes. At least a few platoons in each squadron found themselves 

designated as reaction forces or guarded key locations, including bridges. 

At night, armored cavalry relied on Thunder Runs to disrupt enemy 

ambush preparations and mine laying. In these operations, an armored 

column moved along a road conducting reconnaissance by fire and seeking hostile contact.60

Armored cavalry also began to maneuver more frequently off roads, 

demonstrating their ability to carry the fight to the enemy. In early 1966, 

the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry demonstrated this capability by effectively 

escorting an artillery unit through jungle terrain to its new firebase location. Off-road movement permitted more effective search techniques that 

allowed faster coverage of an area. Some degree of security was also 

obtained through continuous movement with the vehicles located in a different area each night. In all of these activities, armored cavalry generally 

served as another maneuver unit rather than one devoted to the more specialized missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force.61

The initial employment of division cavalry occurred with little guidance. Instead, squadrons simply sought the most effective method of using 

their assets, resulting in considerable variations in technique. Jungle operations forced attention to clearing paths, often by relying on tanks leading 

columns and using their bulk to bludgeon their way forward. Once in the 

jungle, the vehicles assumed blocking positions, conducted sweeps, and 

assisted village evacuations in an effort to separate civilians from the Viet 

Cong. The slow pace of such operations had to be factored into planning 

considerations, but they still proved considerably faster than dismounted 

infantry.62

Route security and convoy escort became the most common operations 

performed by division cavalry. These actions protected the supply lines 

that constituted the lifeblood of American military operations in Vietnam.63

Route security generally required the establishment of strongpoints at 

key locations between which mounted patrols roved. When terrain, distance, and threat conditions made reliance on strongpoints impossible, the 

squadrons provided convoy escorts. The Viet Cong responded by increasing mining efforts, particularly targeting likely strongpoint positions. 

They tracked American troop movements and continually adjusted plans 

to exploit perceived weaknesses. Route security became a cat and mouse 

game in which some units excelled. In 1967, the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 

for example, escorted an average of 8,000 vehicles per month both day 

and night over roads in its sector. This success stemmed in part from the 

squadron’s ability to retain its organic air cavalry troop. The helicopters 
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provided an aerial dimension to route security and provided both an early 

warning of enemy activity and a quick reaction to it. The 2d Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry adopted a more aggressive approach, routinely operating mounted 

patrols several kilometers from a protected roadway to disrupt the Viet 

Cong before they could mine or attack.64

Protection of roadways and traffic necessitated the development of 

counterambush tactics as indicated by the experience of the 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry in 1966. Charged with securing a major highway connecting 

Saigon and the Cambodian border, the squadron found itself frequently 

under attack from Viet Cong forces. At first squadron personnel simply 

returned fire. Prolonged firefights and casualties followed without a decisive result. This passive response evolved into a more aggressive one in 

which some elements returned fire to pin the ambushers, while others 

used their mobile firepower to counterattack and block the enemy’s withdrawal. Growing competence in the use of artillery, air support, and helicopters permitted more sophisticated operations aimed at eliminating the 

attacking Viet Cong. The culmination of counterambush tactics occurred 

with deliberate attempts to provoke an ambush that in turn triggered a 

multi­directional counterattack by ground forces supported by helicopter 

gunships, close air support, and fires. The ability of armored vehicles to 

survive initial contact and pin the Viet Cong with return fire proved critical 

to the success of these operations. The vehicles formed a base of fire, while 

airmobile infantry became the maneuver force encircling the enemy.

65

The 11th Armored Cavalry performed similar missions. The regiment 

constituted the largest mounted unit deployed to Vietnam. However, its 

configuration differed from similar regiments stationed in Germany and 

the United States. For service in Vietnam, ACAVs replaced M114s and 

tanks in each armored cavalry platoon and the jeeps of the headquarters 

scout section.66 Regimental tank strength fell from 132 to 52, while the 

number of M113s rose from 83 to 320. The greater reliance on the M113 

mandated increases in personnel to permit both proper manning of the 

vehicle’s weapons and a dismounted capability. Accordingly, the regiment’s personnel strength rose from 3,040 to 4,112. At the platoon level, 

manning requirements were often met by dispersing the infantry squad 

among the other platoon vehicles. The net effect was to transform the combined arms platoon into an all ACAV organization supported by a single 

mortar carrier.67

Arriving in Vietnam in September 1966, the 11th Armored Cavalry’s 

first few months in country were consumed with establishing and secur­ing a 

permanent base camp. In conjunction with airborne and infantry formations, 
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it sought to locate, eliminate, and prevent the return of Viet Cong. Afterward, 

it worked to provide security throughout its area of operations, necessitating 

convoy escort and the protection of supply and communications lines.68

The Viet Cong contested the armored cavalry’s efforts, largely through 

repeated ambushes of regimental assets. These attacks played to American 

strengths, permitting the employment of massed firepower and rapid ground 

maneuver to inflict heavy losses. Viet Cong activity soon dropped, permitting the armored cavalry to focus on road clearance. Potential ambush 

sites were eliminated and the underbrush along major roadways removed 

to a distance of 100 meters on both sides. These measures improved civilian access to major roads, interfered with Viet Cong supply routes, and 

ultimately permitted the regiment to disrupt the ability of the Viet Cong 

to collect taxes. By year’s end, the area became secure enough for local 

elections to be held.69

These operations and their results validated the area security principles 

previously developed by the 3d Armored Cavalry in Germany.70 They also 

stimulated the emergence of standard battle drills for ambush situations 

within the 11th Armored Cavalry. In November 1966, a convoy escorted 

by a single armored cavalry platoon came under attack by two Viet Cong 

battalions. While the convoy struggled to drive through and away from 

the ambush, the escort remained in a firefight. Its squadron commander 

Figure 64. The M113’s mobility made it invaluable during the rainy season 

in Vietnam and in crossing the many small waterways. Here ACAVs 

traverse a flooded area.

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soon arrived overhead in a helicopter, directing airstrikes onto targets and 

coordinating the arrival of gunships and ground reinforcements. The Viet 

Cong sought to escape from the increasing American firepower, but they 

continued to be subjected to attack from the air and ground. This experience demonstrated that:

Relentless pursuit following an ambush yields the best 

results because one can often overrun the base areas and 

communication installations to the rear of the battle site. 

Superior relative mobility allows the cavalry vehicles to 

strike the retreating enemy in the flanks and rear. In most 

cases the VC [Viet Cong] do not blaze trails coming to the 

ambush site. They use existing trails and footpaths so it is 

often possible to run them down.71

This lesson was confirmed a month later during a similar Viet Cong 

ambush on a convoy near the village of Suoi Cat. The escort included 

a helicopter, which began firing into the tree lines along the roadway. 

The armored vehicles also returned fire. Again, the squadron commander 

arrived over the scene and coordinated the fight from his helicopter. The 

rapid escalation of firepower prompted a Viet Cong retreat that was intercepted by the arrival of American reinforcements. The fighting ended 

with 100 Viet Cong killed, underscoring the importance of preparing for 

ambushes through routinely practiced battle drills, rapid reaction, and the 

quick escalation of firepower.72

Unfortunately, the frequency and tedium of route security and convoy escort missions created opportunities for the Viet Cong. Complacency 

sometimes resulted in disaster. In May 1967, an 11th Armored Cavalry platoon became the victim of a sudden and well-planned ambush that made 

casualties of the entire unit and destroyed most of its vehicles. Lax planning 

and the failure to initiate battle drills proved principal causes for the defeat.73

In December, an armored column from the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry drove 

into an ambush corridor that stretched for 2 kilometers. The column came 

under attack from rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), small arms fire, and 

command detonated mines that caused heavy loss among crew and passengers. It also destroyed two tanks and blew up a mortar carrier and its 

ammunition. Amid the confusion, command and control disintegrated and 

a coordinated response became impossible. American soldiers, attempting 

to return fire, became the targets of overwhelming firepower.74

In 1967, mounted units participated in large-scale operations. Operation 

CEDAR FALLS began in January, targeting an area northwest of Saigon 

noted for its insurgent presence. Detailed observation and analysis of 
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Viet Cong activities identified the probable locations of base camps and 

headquarters facilities. Armor, mechanized infantry, and armored cavalry 

helped to seal the area of operations before participating in sweeps of 

assigned locales. Dismounted patrols then searched camps and tunnels. 

Hostile contact proved limited to snipers and mines that did not prevent 

the widespread destruction of Viet Cong supplies and facilities. The most 

significant result was the capture of 500,000 pages of documents detailing 

enemy organizations and operations.75

Operation JUNCTION CITY followed the conclusion of CEDAR 

FALLS. Starting in February and completing in April, it targeted a region 

directly along the Cambodian border. The principal objective lay in the 

destruction of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) combat 

organizations, command cells, and camps. The operation entailed the creation of a cordon around the targeted area that steadily shrank and reduced 

the enemy’s ability to maneuver. Armor and cavalry units supported this 

concept by establishing blocking positions along the Cambodian border to 

prevent the escape of hostile forces. Subsequently, they performed reconnaissance to locate and eliminate insurgents. They also helped to secure 

supply routes, escort convoys, and provide mobile reaction forces.76

The Viet Cong responded with attacks by battalion- and regimentalsize units, sometimes focused on artillery firebase camps. The ensuing firefights favored American forces. Armor and cavalry units were employed 

as battalion task forces or squadrons. Their combined arms nature proved 

capable of delivering large amounts of firepower that shattered enemy formations. Helicopter, air support, and artillery simply amplified the effects 

and increased the casualties among the Viet Cong. Despite the jungle terrain in which many engagements occurred, these mounted teams retained 

a degree of mobility that facilitated pursuit of retreating insurgents and 

enhanced their effectiveness as reaction forces. In the latter role, armored 

cavalry helped prevent firebase camps from being overrun.77

In base camp management and security, the 11th Armored Cavalry faced 

a challenge shared to a lesser extent by the division cavalry squadrons. The 

regimental base camp included a population of 6,000 soldiers performing 

administrative and support functions. It constituted a small town that added 

a host of additional, noncombatant duties to the regimental staff. These 

requirements fueled requests for an expansion of the headquarters to include 

more personnel to handle administrative, historical, public information, 

intelligence, and civil affairs activities. The preferred solution lay in the 

transfer of base camp operations responsibility to another organization, 

but no such resolution occurred.78
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Combat effectiveness of mounted units depended on the status of their 

vehicles. Through continuous attention to vehicle operations and the routine practice of commonsense measures to minimize repairs, most units 

managed to keep their vehicles in running order. They conducted much 

of their maintenance in the field. Crews changed engines, tracks, and road 

wheels in primitive conditions, but they required a steady supply of parts 

that supporting organizations did not always understand.79 Unit commanders adopted their own measures to overcome shortfalls and guarantee 

support. One troop commander administratively dead lined one or two 

vehicles in each platoon on a rotating basis. They were left at the base 

camp where they received a full maintenance check by the crew and maintenance section. To justify this arbitrary reduction in operational readiness, 

“we would make some fictitious reason for it.” In this manner, the unit 

received routine maintenance and support otherwise unavailable.80

Figure 65. Replacing the M48’s engine in the field.

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Parts and supplies had to be transported to the unit’s location in the 

field. Deliveries occurred through ground convoys but more often via airdrops. Vehicle parts, including engines and track, were all delivered in 

this manner, but fuel constituted the most important logistical concern. It 

was the elixir of life for mounted units, and fuel consumption was closely 

monitored. Within armored cavalry organizations, the transition from the 

M113 to the M113A1 eased fuel supply concerns. The M113A1 possessed 

a diesel engine with better mileage and a longer operational radius. This 

change largely reduced the fuel requirement to diesel only. Every vehicle 

in the division cavalry squadrons possessed a diesel engine except the 

M88 recovery vehicle.81

Personnel issues also constituted a source of concern. Losses through 

combat, illness, and leave were not always immediately filled. Therefore, 

it was common for units to operate understrength. One tank company routinely operated with reduced tank crews.82 The 1-year rotation policy for 

soldiers serving in Vietnam posed a different type of problem. The 11th 

Armored Cavalry, for example, suffered a mass exodus of experienced 

personnel when their tours of duty ended at the same time. This event led 

to recommendations for more frequent but smaller and planned personnel 

rotations. Although this solution meant the premature loss of some veteran 

soldiers, “the disorganization resulting from a 50 to 75 percent turnover 

at one time is considerably more crippling to the entire command.” Nor 

did officers prove immune from a high turnover rate. In less than 2 years, 

three different commanders led the regiment, while eight different leaders 

passed through squadron command slots.83

Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in 

Vietnam (MACOV)

The growing number of mounted units successfully operating in 

Vietnam encouraged formal analysis of their experience to identify training, 

doctrinal, and organizational trends. At the Army Chief of Staff’s behest, 

such a study occurred between January and March 1967. It included a 

comprehensive terrain analysis and the collection of operations data from 

units and attached observers. The final report bore the title “Mechanized 

and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV).”84

The MACOV study helped to dispel the persistent myths surrounding 

the supposed inability of mounted units to maneuver in Vietnam. It 

acknowledged the existence of major mobility obstacles, including 

mountains, dense mangrove swamps, jungles, thick forests, and steepbanked streams and canals. Large areas became impassable to vehicles 

during monsoon season, and the country did not possess a highly developed 
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road net. All regions posed particular restrictions and hazards to vehicle 

operations. Hence, the final report included tips to avoid becoming mired 

while moving cross-country. For example, the report cautioned soldiers 

to “Watch the water buffalo. He does not go where he cannot stand on 

the bottom. If the bottom supports him it will usually support an APC.”85

Wheeled vehicles found themselves largely restricted to roads and trails, 

but tracked vehicles proved much more agile and able to overcome 

many terrain features, even during monsoon season. Overall, the M113 

possessed the best mobility. Its lower weight and amphibious capability 

permitted it to cross water obstacles impassable to heavier vehicles. In 

the coastal lowlands, the M113 remained active and effective during the 

monsoon season, because it could navigate flooded streams. The table 

below summarizes the MACOV study mobility assessment.86

The MACOV final report summarized the nature of the military problem in South Vietnam. The nation encompassed some 67,000 square miles, 

including a coastline of 1,500 miles and a 950-mile inland border with 

Cambodia and Laos. Complex terrain features and underdeveloped infrastructure facilitated guerrilla operations. Infiltration into South Vietnam 

from Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam remained a problem throughout 

the war. Collectively, these environmental factors made this conflict an area 

war, characterized as “non-lineal, multi-directional, unconventional.”87

American forces operated from a network of base camps stretching 

from the coast to the interior to permit operations throughout the country. 

The scale of military action varied from platoon to multidivision. In all 

areas, American forces required the ability to engage conventional and 

guerrilla forces, secure lines of supply and communication, and establish 

stability. The inability to distinguish civilians from enemy combatants 

resulted in restrictive rules of engagement intended to minimize civilian 

losses. For the individual soldier, area war meant something different: 

“The elusive nature of the enemy and insufficient friendly intelligence 

regarding the location and activities of the enemy require that units must 

expect contact with the enemy at any time and from any direction.”88

D ry S eas o n W et Seas o n

C o rps Tactical Z o ne T an ks (M 48,

M 551)

A P C (M 113) T an ks (M 48,

M 551)

A P C (M 113)

I (N o rth) 44% 44% 36% 44%

II (C e ntral Platea u) 55% 55% 54% 55%

III (P ie dm o nt,

inclu din g S aig o n) 92% 93% 73% 93%

IV (D elta) 61% 87% 0% 87%

Table 2. Vehicle trafficability by corps tactical zone/region
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The MACOV asserted the validity of existing doctrinal principles, 

but it noted that their application in South Vietnam required considerable 

changes to tactics, techniques, and procedures. American units generally 

made this adaptation through improvisation. Like their South Vietnamese 

counterparts, mounted units employed the M113 in a tank-like role. 

Scouts and mechanized infantry fought mounted, a role traditionally left 

to armored units. Dismounted operations generally occurred to conduct 

detailed searches or when obligated to do so by mines and terrain conditions. In its ACAV configuration, the M113 created new jungle trails for 

infantry use, flattened undergrowth for helicopter landing zones and clear 

fields of fire, and transported confiscated food and materiel. It also served 

as a command platform and a mechanized flamethrower when fitted with 

a flamethrower and fuel cell. Current doctrine, which focused on the vehicle’s infantry transport function, did not address these roles.89

Combat operations witnessed a role reversal for infantry and armored 

organizations. Traditionally, infantry fixed enemy positions and assaulted 

them, while armored elements constituted a maneuver force to encircle or 

envelop hostile positions. In Vietnam, tank and armored cavalry units often 

performed the fixing role, while airmobile infantry became the maneuver 

force. Armored units relied on their ballistic protection to survive enemy 

Figure 66. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment soldiers handling a delivery of fuel.

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attacks long enough to counterattack. They moved faster than dismounted 

infantry in jungle and rice paddies, but they could not match the rapid 

deployment of airmobile forces. Where possible, tanks led attacks into 

jungle terrain, relying on their armor to survive mines, booby traps, and 

ambushes with minimal casualties. Mechanized infantry followed to 

exploit, while dismounted infantry conducted detailed sweeps.90

The Viet Cong avoided engagements with American armor in the 

open. They used forest and jungle terrain to mount close range attacks and 

restrict the employment of aircraft and artillery. Although supporting fires 

were increasingly delivered behind enemy units, the Viet Cong responded 

by periodically targeting the artillery firebase camps to eliminate this support altogether. This necessitated using maneuver units to protect the firebases, diverting them from offensive operations.91

The increased American armored presence led to a growing Viet 

Cong reliance on mines and booby traps. These devices served to disrupt mounted operations and generate casualties. Antitank mines protected 

insurgent base camps and became integral elements of ambushes, capable 

of detonation via vehicle weight, a trip wire, or command from a concealed observer. While these mines tended only to damage the M48, they 

often destroyed the M113.92

Countermine practices were aimed at the disruption of mine-laying activities. Driving tanks along the sides of major roadways helped 

to disrupt connecting wires. Various mechanical devices were also used 

to dig up and break wires, and dismounted sweeping teams worked to 

clear roads protected by armored vehicles, but the pace of such operations proved slow. In Road Runner missions, tanks traveled along a route 

with the express purpose of discovering or detonating mines before other 

traffic used the road. Nighttime mounted patrols sought to disrupt Viet 

Cong mining and ambush preparation. One unit secured its route by sending tanks down the road firing canister and machineguns at every likely 

ambush point. Ironically, the simple saturation of a route with continuous 

traffic proved one of the most effective means of preventing mining activity, since it denied the enemy the ability to act without being observed. 

Over time, soldiers learned to identify mines and booby traps, but countermine capability remained too dependent on detonation discovery.93

The MACOV study found that the operational environment directly 

affected command and control. The slow pace of cross-country movement 

in South Vietnam impacted operational planning and posed a challenge 

for leaders accustomed to fast-moving mounted maneuver. Disorientation 

and navigation problems further undermined the execution of plans, 
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particularly in jungle terrain. Typical expedients included the employment 

of fire missions, illumination, or colored smoke on known locations and 

attempts to mount compasses on vehicles. Many commanders preferred 

to guide unit movements from a helicopter, avoiding altogether the 

disorienting effects of some terrain types.94

The nature of operations in Vietnam tended to merge reconnaissance 

and combat operations. Search and destroy missions necessitated intelligence gathering followed by immediate transition into offensive actions on 

contact. Reconnaissance assets required the ability to engage in combat and 

were frequently employed as maneuver elements rather than specialized 

units. Mounted rather than dismounted operations proved the norm and 

resulted in the emergence of new search techniques to find hostile forces 

in terrain that favored concealment. The cloverleaf pattern, for example, 

entailed the movement of vehicles in circular patterns to cover the same 

area more than once. This technique addressed the tendency of the Viet 

Cong to remain in hiding on hearing the sound of approaching engines 

only to break cover once the vehicle had passed. Cloverleaf offered the 

opportunity to catch them in the open. Less effective was the reliance on 

supporting fires alone to seal a large area. It is difficult to understand how 

such a practice achieved any worthwhile result against an elusive enemy.95

Night operations by mounted units also became more common in 

South Vietnam. Tanks equipped with infrared and xenon searchlights 

Figure 67. M48 tank and crew of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.

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proved effective in countering enemy activity and stimulated a program to 

equip similarly all tanks in-country. Image intensification devices reliant 

on ambient light and intrusion detectors further improved both mounted 

and dismounted night capabilities. Road Runner operations after dark provided clear demonstrations of the disruptive nature of armored columns. 

Image intensification devices also provided an effective complement to 

ground surveillance radars and improved the latter’s effectiveness.96

The cross attachment of infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, and 

armored cavalry proved common and leveraged the organizational flexibility of the ROAD division. All task organizations reflected the mission 

assigned, enemy forces, terrain, and the troops available. No standard pattern of cross attachment emerged, due to the variegated nature of operations undertaken throughout Vietnam. Task organization strove to ensure 

sufficient combat power among all maneuver elements due to the uncertainty surrounding when and where hostile contact might occur. In effect, 

“Units are committed to combat operations with little specific knowledge 

of the enemy location or activity; present practice is to locate him through 

contact and then to destroy him by reacting to his efforts.”97 Operations 

constituted a collection of movements to contact in the hopes of trigging 

combat that could be concluded on terms favorable to American forces. 

This approach necessitated the ability of organizations and platforms to 

survive initial contact.

The MACOV study group considered armored cavalry organizations to be sound. Recommended changes proved minor. In the division 

cavalry squadron, suggested improvements focused on the headquarters 

and headquarters troop. Proposed augmentation included a mechanized 

flamethrower section, an armored ambulance, tracked cargo carriers, and 

an armored vehicle launch bridge (AVLB). Conversely, air defense assets 

were considered unnecessary. At the platoon level, the MACOV report 

supported efforts to replace the 4.2-inch mortar with an 81-mm weapon. 

The former’s minimum range limited its utility in Vietnam and most were 

consolidated under troop control.98

The MACOV study found general satisfaction with the M113 and 

M48A3. While the former benefited from improvements to its survivability, difficulties operating the tank’s .50-caliber machinegun in its cupola 

led to its remounting just forward of the tank commander’s position. The 

90-mm canister round devastated enemy infantry, but it was also used to 

remove foliage and detonate antipersonnel mines. Most tanks carried more 

canister than any other ammunition type, but these rounds required special 

handling. They sometimes separated during handling or when carried in the 
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gun tube. Some M48s also carried a dozer blade mounted across the front 

of the vehicle to assist in cutting paths through the jungle and to create 

landing areas for helicopters. A common feature for most combat vehicles 

was the mounting of dummy antennae to counter Viet Cong targeting of 

command vehicles made distinctive by their multiple antennae.99

The comprehensive nature of the MACOV report did not generate 

sweeping changes to Army doctrine, organization, materiel, or training. 

The US Army Combat Developments Command reflected the official reaction in a review of the study. It acknowledged the utility of the MACOV 

report, but it considered the findings largely a confirmation of published 

doctrinal principles, especially those found in the October 1966 version of 

FM 17-1. MACOV conclusions also seemed to confirm the effectiveness 

of the original ROAD concept: “There do not appear to be any significant 

voids in current doctrine with regard to employment of mechanized and 

armor forces.” While further analysis of how existing principles applied to 

Vietnam seemed useful, there seemed little justification to explore whether 

and how lessons learned from Southeast Asia should influence established 

doctrine.100 Air cavalry constituted the only exception to this viewpoint. 

Its operations in Vietnam greatly exceeded published doctrinal guidance, 

and the MACOV report served to stimulate development of a new manual 

for air cavalry.101

Armor soldiers with experience in Vietnam found the report’s conclusion unsurprising. It did, after all, largely chronicle their experience. In 

1967, however, much of the Army remained focused on potential conflict 

in Central Europe. Among this audience, the MACOV findings did not resonate and generated skepticism.102 Even within the study group, at least one 

member believed its sole purpose lay in justifying the use of mounted units 

in Vietnam.103 Within the Department of the Army, the use of M113s in a 

tank-like role found little acceptance due to concerns about their vulnerability against an opponent well equipped with antitank weapons. Although 

the MACOV findings were distributed among the Army, their application 

was left to unit commanders without senior leadership guidance.104

Despite the Army’s failure as an institution to embrace the MACOV 

recommendations, the work constituted an important effort to understand 

how armor, mechanized infantry, and cavalry functioned in a COIN effort. 

It provided an understanding of tactics, techniques, and procedures rooted 

in actual combat experiences. For unit commanders preparing to deploy 

to South Vietnam, it bridged the gap between doctrinal principles and the 

realities of their new operational environment. MACOV offered a how-to 

guide for the employment of mounted forces in a conflict fundamentally 
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different from the conventional, high-intensity war in Europe that dominated Army readiness throughout the Cold War.105

Perhaps most importantly, the MACOV study provided a clear endorsement of the versatility and adaptability of armored organizations: 

The single most striking feature of the entire survey of 

armor-mechanized operations in this strange war was that 

our armor-mechanized units and their equipment enjoy a 

much greater utility in Vietnam than many thought possible at the outset. This reflects most favorably on the versatility and flexibility of our organizational principles and 

on our equipment. The more so since neither the organizations nor the equipment were designed primarily for the 

Figure 68. The meaning of civic action.

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kind of war which we are fighting. Even more striking, 

however, is that again in this war the prime factor is the 

imagination, the inventive genius and the persistent determination of the American soldier.106

Evolving Doctrine

The next round of field manual updates reflected the expanding role 

of armor in Vietnam. The October 1966 publication of FM 17-1, Armor 

Operations, provided the latest guidance for the employment of armor and 

armored cavalry units. It constituted a significant improvement over the 

1963 version. Clearly written and well illustrated, it stressed the versatility 

associated with the organizational flexibility of the ROAD and the armored 

cavalry regiment. The manual placed particular emphasis on tailored task 

forces, decentralized command, and rapid adjustment to changing tactical 

circumstances. Similar characteristics applied to earlier armored organizations, but they had particular validity for Vietnam, where unit experience 

varied considerably.107

In FM 17-1, reconnaissance and security remained interwoven: 

“Reconnaissance and security complement each other and cannot be readily separated.”108 In the collection of information, reconnaissance units 

were expected to avoid decisive engagements. They were to “obtain information by stealth whenever possible, but fight when necessary to gain 

the desired information. The reconnaissance mission must not be jeopardized by combat with the enemy when combat is not essential to obtain 

the information desired.” This time-honored caution left the local commander considerable discretion. Breaking contact required approval from 

a higher authority, although available aircraft made it possible to monitor 

the hostile force from the air and permit the continuation of the ground 

reconnaissance mission.109 In time-constrained operations, reconnaissance 

in force became the preferred method of information collection. This technique “normally develops information more rapidly and in more detail 

than other reconnaissance methods.”110 However, it increased the chance 

of combat and/or decisive engagement.111

The coverage given to integrated air operations and night reconnaissance reflected prevailing views outside Vietnam. Organic air cavalry 

made the division cavalry squadron and the armored cavalry regiment 

ideally suited to exploit the benefits of coordinated air-ground reconnaissance. In Vietnam, only the 11th Armored Cavalry could routinely expect 

to experience the greater effectiveness of such integration.112 Similarly, the 

manual’s discouragement of nighttime reconnaissance by armored units 
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did not reflect use of nighttime patrols, ambushes, and Road Runner operations regularly employed in Southeast Asia.113

A section on COIN operations offered some of the most detailed tactical guidance yet for mounted forces. It elaborated on the basic principles 

only outlined in previous publications. The manual provided an overview 

of insurgent behavior and outlined the basic COIN strategy of clear, hold, 

and consolidate implemented in South Vietnam. Armed forces first cleared 

an area of an insurgent presence, secured it, and then assisted friendly government actions to cement its authority over the region.114

The manual’s description of those counterinsurgent operations best 

suited to armored units clearly reflected the Vietnam experience. Airmobile 

infantry and air cavalry used their speed to perform encircling movements 

to interdict insurgent movement. Ground units, hampered by their slower 

speed and noise, assisted in the destruction of insurgents once fixed in 

place. The manual addressed techniques for reducing fortified positions, 

engaging insurgents in open terrain, conducting ambushes, performing 

searches, and employing reaction forces. It considered the raid an ideal 

mission for armored cavalry, since it would likely result in the destruction 

of supplies and equipment even if surprise proved unattainable—an apt 

summary of Operation CEDAR FALLS. The inclusion of limited guidance for urban operations reflected the belief that insurgents would ultimately challenge government authority in towns and cities, exactly as they 

did during the 1968 Tet Offensive.115

Armored units were expected to help control borders and hunt insurgents whenever possible. They conducted search and seizure operations, 

cleared areas of enemy activity, provided mobile reaction forces for 

friendly troops, protected installations, and escorted convoys. They also 

played a central role in security, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions 

along designated lines of communications and supply. The manual considered armored cavalry optimally suited for COIN due to its combined 

arms nature and organic aviation. Still, all mounted units were expected to 

benefit from the psychological effect gained through the employment of 

armored combat vehicles against insurgents ill-prepared to combat them. 

Nevertheless, mission planning needed to anticipate the impact of restrictive terrain where insurgents preferred to operate and fully utilize aerial 

reconnaissance.116

Insurgencies were described as a collection of small unit actions 

with the potential to escalate at the insurgent’s discretion. Enemy forces 

were also expected to exploit their ability to blend into the civilian 

population. Therefore, counterinsurgent organizations needed to secure 
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key installations, establish checkpoints, secure routes of communication, 

mount regular presence patrols, and interdict the flow of personnel and 

supplies from nearby borders. Armored units were expected to work 

closely with local government officials and build support among civilians 

by minimizing infrastructure damage and noncombatant casualties. 

However, the manual’s tactical emphasis precluded any significant 

coverage of cultural awareness measures other than the need for extensive 

use of liaison officers.117

Standard COIN security missions included route security, convoy 

escort, and rear areas. Route security was considered best performed by 

armored and air cavalry, using a system of strongpoints along the route, 

connected by irregular air and ground patrol activity. Traffic moved under 

continuous observation. When an ambush occurred, reaction forces raced 

from the strongpoints to counterattack. The manual also added a new 

dimension to route security with its advocacy of herbicides to clear foliage 

along roadways.118

To secure an area, the manual embraced those principles first demonstrated in West Germany in the early 1960s. These included reliance on 

an extensive information network, continuous surveillance, observation of 

locations likely to harbor hostile activity, interaction with installation garrisons, and the establishment of quick reaction forces. Collectively, these 

measures monitored the area, provided early warning of hostile intrusion, 

and facilitated a rapid response. Despite the need for information, the 

manual writers did not consider electronic devices a particularly effective 

source: 

Complex, sophisticated surveillance means are of limited 

value in counterinsurgency operations. Neither human eye, 

infrared, nor radar sensors can penetrate the dense forest 

canopy that conceals many insurgent groups, and no means 

Figure 69. Column of M113s moving to contact, 1966.

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available can differentiate between the armed insurgent 

and the loyal civilian. Photographic coverage or other electronic devices may reveal an area of unusual activity that 

can be useful in determining what trails are in constant use. 

However, insurgents are efficient in the art of camouflage 

and are rarely discovered by a surveillance means.119

A new manual for the armored cavalry regiment also entered publication in 1966. It retained the basic mission set and added surveillance 

and COIN as normal activities. The regiment remained a self-sufficient 

tactical and administrative unit, capable of independent operations over a 

wide area. Characteristics associated with the armored cavalry regiment 

continued to include organizational flexibility, robust communications, 

high mobility, and a combined arms nature. The anticipated fielding of the 

M551 Sheridan led the manual writers to acknowledge the reduced armor 

protection associated with this platform. So equipped, the unit could operate in the presence of small arms, grenades, artillery, and nuclear weapons, 

but not modern antitank weapons.120

Command and control of the regiment centered on the command 

group and the command post. The former included the regimental commander and part of his staff that normally operated forward, overseeing 

squadron activities. The manual accepted as normal the use of helicopters 

for command purposes down to the troop level. Hence, the commander 

could coordinate activities from the air or the ground at his discretion. In 

contrast to the commander’s movement around the battlespace, the command post remained comparatively static. It constituted the central node 

for communications, intelligence, and logistical management. Information 

was shared throughout the regiment largely by tactical radio nets using FM 

sets. AM radios with radioteletype capability provided a secure means of 

transmitting planning, administrative, and logistical reports over long distances. The manual also encouraged the use of wire, messengers, sound, 

and visual signals, because “no one means of communication is completely reliable by itself; all means must be integrated to insure a reliable 

system.”121

The armored cavalry regiment was intended to form teams tailored to 

fit a particular mission. This organizational flexibility extended down to 

the troop level, although the combined arms platoons were intended for 

employment as organized. Team organization included the incorporation 

of organic air cavalry assets, and the manual provided extensive coverage 

of the integrated use of aviation and ground maneuver elements, including 

the aerial transport of riflemen to secure key terrain features. The basic 
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structure of the regiment remained unchanged, although its robust structure 

benefited from the inclusion of an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) 

and a small aviation element within each squadron headquarters.122

Reconnaissance and security guidance similarly underwent minimal alteration. The increased coverage of air cavalry operations and 

an emphasis on aggressive maneuver constituted the most significant 

changes. Reconnaissance by the regiment was to be executed “boldly and 

aggressively, making full use of its mobility and firepower.”123 The unit 

“most frequently engages in offensive action to assist in accomplishing its 

reconnaissance and security missions.”124 Reconnaissance elements were 

expected to engage in combat when otherwise unable to penetrate hostile 

defenses, although they also operated under the caveat of avoiding decisive engagement. Their actions were to be integrated and supplemented by 

air cavalry to increase speed and scope of action.125

Security coverage focused on the employment of the regiment in a 

covering force role. This function constituted a primary mission for the 

regiment in a conventional environment. Guidance for rear area security 

and COIN operations included identical content offered in FM 17-1. The 

regiment was to rely on its flexibility and mobility to find and destroy 

Figure 70. M48 and crew of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.

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insurgents. It did so through the provision of installation security, establishment of checkpoints, mounted patrols, border control, and route security. Air cavalry expanded the scope of these activities and provided one of 

the most effective means of finding and attacking insurgents.126

The manual writers emphasized differences between conventional and 

unconventional conflicts by their separate training requirements. COIN 

operations necessitated greater attention to the use of weapons in mounted 

and dismounted roles in a variety of topographical environments. They 

also mandated knowledge of aerial supply, aviation operations, cross-country night movement, airmobile combat techniques, and the execution of 

deep patrols under primitive conditions. Subjects that clearly reflected the 

Vietnam experience included police-type search and seizure actions, guard 

duties, convoy escort, and reaction to ambush drills.127

New doctrine for combat maneuver battalions reflected a configuration change. The armored cavalry platoon disappeared to be replaced by 

a scout platoon. This unit included a headquarters element and 2 scout 

sections, or 10 armored vehicles and 31 men. With the exception of one 

M113 in the headquarters, every vehicle was an M114 command and 

reconnaissance vehicle, despite the latter’s poor performance and nonuse in Vietnam. The platoon provided reconnaissance and security for the 

parent battalion “within its capabilities.” It assisted battalion movements, 

conducted route reconnaissance, and reconnoitered assembly areas and 

attack positions. Other common operations included liaison with adjacent 

units, pioneer and demolition work, chemical detection and radiological 

monitoring, damage control assessments, and roadblocks.128

The return of the scout platoon to the maneuver battalions was accompanied by more detailed doctrinal guidance than had been true of similar, previous organizations. The 1966 version of FM 17-15, Tank Units, 

Platoon, Company and Battalion, included an entire appendix devoted 

to scout platoon operations.129 The scout platoon lacked the firepower of 

the armored cavalry platoon, but it possessed armored protection, vehicle 

mounted machineguns, and several grenade launchers and light antitank 

weapons (LAW). It was “not organized and equipped to conduct independent offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations. It operates as part of 

the battalion and should be assigned missions that capitalize on its reconnaissance capabilities.” It performed the standard zone, area, and reconnaissance missions. When the parent battalion engaged hostile forces, the 

platoon screened the flank, performed rear area security, protected the battalion command post, or took charge of handling prisoners of war. It generally provided information and early warning to the battalion commander 
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and did not deliberately seek combat. Even when employed as part of a 

defensive or delay action, the platoon’s principal role lay in confusing the 

enemy and monitoring his movements rather than disrupting his activities 

through direct action.130

During reconnaissance missions, each scout “obtains information by 

infiltration, observation, and, when dismounted, by stealth.” Unlike the 

aggressive nature associated with armored cavalry reconnaissance, the 

scout platoons operated with caution and sought to avoid contact with 

enemy forces. In contrast with earlier jeep-based reconnaissance units 

governed by a similar doctrine, the new scout platoons possessed greater 

survivability and firepower. They could fight for information, but scouts 

were still encouraged to dismount to improve observation and avoid detection. They were not to become vehicle-bound despite the prevalence of 

mounted reconnaissance in Vietnam.131

The scout platoon performed security missions as part of a larger force, 

usually a company. In these missions, the platoon employed patrols and 

observation points to provide early alert of enemy activity. The platoon 

normally employed four observation points, one per squad, supplemented 

with patrols to cover dead space and the battalion ground radar section. When 

hostile forces threatened the observation line, the platoon withdrew and 

continued to monitor enemy activity without engaging them in combat.132

Special tasks included pioneering and demolition activity, but the 

minimal equipment carried on the platoon’s vehicles limited this capability. These provided an ability to install or clear small minefields, destroy 

buildings and equipment, and prepare fording sites. However, the unit was 

not equipped nor trained to function in a true engineer role. In COIN operations, the platoon largely followed the principles established in FM 17-1. 

It provided reconnaissance and security, escorted convoys, functioned as a 

quick reaction force, and manned checkpoints to control the movement of 

materiel and civilians. Information collection and a broad range of interaction with the local populace under the term “civic action” constituted 

functions expected of all military units associated with battling insurgents, 

including scouts. Although doctrinal guidance credited insurgent forces 

with minimal antitank capability, it did not call for the platoon to act offensively in the manner of ACAV use in Vietnam.133

Updated doctrine for the division cavalry squadrons did not emerge 

until 1968 with the publication of FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air 

Cavalry Units. It opened with the caveat that its contents were intended 

as a guide only, noting, “Each situation in combat must be resolved by an 

intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine set forth herein.”134
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This cautionary note underscored the problem facing an army with forces 

deployed in theaters with quite different characteristics. It also acknowledged that the principles presented would vary in application from one 

operational environment to another—a reality faced every day by cavalry 

organizations in Vietnam.

Many of the concepts included in the manual proved identical to 

those outlined in FM 17-1 and FM 17-95, Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

The role of division cavalry remained that of reconnaissance, security, and 

economy of force, although in unconventional warfare the squadron might 

function as a maneuver element. The division cavalry squadron included 

a headquarters element, three armored cavalry troops, and an air cavalry 

troop. It did not include a tank company, but each troop headquarters controlled a three-tank armor section. The squadron also possessed the staff 

and communications to accommodate unit attachments from the parent 

division.135

The combined arms armored cavalry platoon remained the basic tactical unit, but the nature of its tank section changed. The new manual 

included a variety of platoon formations and battle drills designed to assist 

training and its employment by commanders unfamiliar with its combined 

arms nature.136 Starting in 1968, cavalry tank sections began fielding the 

M551 Sheridan. This platform carried a powerful main gun capable of 

firing the Shillelagh antitank missile or large-caliber conventional rounds, 

including canister. Mobile and lightweight, the M551 also possessed an 

Figure 71. M113 behind chain link RPG screen intended to detonate 

prematurely incoming projectiles.

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amphibious capability. Within the platoon, it eliminated the mobility differential between the tank section and the faster moving scout vehicles. 

Greater mobility came at the cost of armor protection, mandating careful 

use of terrain by Sheridan crews.137

Coverage of scout reconnaissance operations provided a wealth of 

detail concerning movement, observation, reporting, and target engagement techniques. Scouts were expected to fight for information without 

jeopardizing their primary mission, but for the first time scouts received 

doctrinal criterion to help them determine when to resort to combat. They 

were expected to fight in self-defense and when they could destroy targets without risk of an engagement. Reconnaissance by fire remained 

a viable tool, but scouts were expected to rely on indirect fires to avoid 

detection. The least desirable circumstance for initiating combat lay in the 

use of direct fire systems that revealed the scout’s location and triggered 

a firefight.138

The value of this guidance was undermined by the manual’s simultaneous emphasis on a much more combative stance by scouts. The 

same section that encouraged detection avoidance included the directive: 

“Aggressive conduct of reconnaissance and security presents many targets 

to the scout that he can defeat. These targets are destroyed if possible. 

For targets beyond his capability to defeat, the scout can request additional direct and indirect fires through the platoon leader.”139 Indeed, the 

issue of stealth became almost irrelevant with the observation that “scouts 

moving in tracked, armored vehicles have less capability of moving by 

stealth than do wheel mounted or dismounted scouts. The advantages of 

using the inherent armor protection and cross-country capability of these 

vehicles offset the limitation imposed by loss of stealth.” Subsequent passages underscored the rejection of stealth as the primary modus operandi 

for scouts. Instead, they highlighted the expectation that the scout section 

would fight for information, relying on the entire platoon as necessary to 

overcome opposition.140

The manual’s coverage of COIN operations paralleled the coverage 

provided in FM 17-1. The new publication outlined missions that armored 

cavalry might perform, stressing those best suited to the unit’s firepower, 

mobility, and communications. These missions encompassed the activities 

routinely performed in South Vietnam. Since they all carried the inherent 

risk of sudden contact, the manual emphasized survivability. Dismounted 

patrols were acknowledged as periodically necessary, but they were considered highly susceptible to ambush. Similarly, “units performing route 

security missions must not only have a high probability of surviving 
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ambushes, but must also be able to destroy or disperse ambushing elements.” Reconnaissance, too, required sufficient combat power to fix the 

enemy once found and prevent his escape.141

Doctrinal principles for COIN operations ended with a series of 

training recommendations. The most important lay in the mastery of basic 

fire and maneuver concepts while mounted or dismounted. These core 

competencies proved relevant to both conventional and unconventional 

conflict. Other skills deemed necessary for COIN operations included 

ambush drills; integrated operations with helicopters, artillery, and aircraft; 

aerial supply; and the use of mines, booby traps, and fortifications. To 

assist in controlling civilian movements, soldiers needed to understand 

techniques associated with search and seizure, counterintelligence, guard 

duty, and checkpoint operations. Although not considered an optimum use 

of armored cavalry, convoy escort techniques also made the list, reflective 

of mounted operations in South Vietnam. Operations in difficult terrain 

and far from established base camps underscored the importance of first 

aid knowledge to sustain casualties until they could be evacuated.142

The new doctrinal manuals provided better guidance for COIN, but 

a gap remained between concept and application. Articles compiled by 

soldiers with firsthand experience in Vietnam served as a bridge, exemplified 

by the writing of the senior armor adviser for MACV. In an article written 

for new armored cavalry platoon leaders headed for Southeast Asia, the 

adviser noted the inseparability of reconnaissance from other missions 

and encouraged platoon leaders to be willing to fight for information. He 

provided practical guidance for reporting information and conducting 

platoon movements, and did not share the confusion surrounding scout 

operations manifest in the latest division cavalry squadron doctrine. Scouts 

were to be aggressive, “employing whichever movement technique the 

lieutenant prescribes, boldly and aggressively looking for a fight. Overcaution and timidity have no place in Cavalry operations.”143 The author 

acknowledged the realities of the battlefield: “Of course, occasionally 

there will be such an overriding demand for speed that you can’t even 

afford alternate bounds. There’s nothing to do then but take a deep breath 

and move steadily until the enemy makes you stop. This is obviously the 

most dangerous technique, to be reserved for true emergencies.”144

Operations 1968–70

In January 1968, the Viet Cong and NVA opened the Tet Offensive, 

targeting urban areas. The offensive achieved tactical surprise, and the initial response by American and South Vietnamese forces proved disjointed. 
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They struggled to cope with multiple, simultaneous urban battles. The 2d 

Squadron, 1st Cavalry, for example, had to keep major roadways open to 

traffic and dispatch reaction forces to different attacks. It proved impossible to achieve success everywhere, and hostile forces managed to close 

several routes, requiring subsequent clearing operations to reopen them.145

Mounted units played a pivotal role during Tet as reaction forces. Their 

rapid movement from remote locations to the urban areas under attack 

validated the doctrinal emphasis on organizational flexibility, firepower, 

mobility, and robust communications. Traveling long distances at high 

speed over Vietnam’s limited road net, they fought through ambushes to 

arrive at destinations that had become battlefields. Their actions were often 

movements to contact with little knowledge of enemy dispositions. They 

relied on armor to survive combat entry and firepower to overcome the 

opposition. In a 14-hour period, the 11th Armored Cavalry reoriented from 

an area security mission, consolidated its squadrons, conducted an 80-mile 

road march, and entered combat in the Saigon vicinity.146 Similarly, the 

3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry proved crucial to the recapture of Saigon’s Tan 

San Nhut Air Base. The unit moved to its objective at night, guided by the 

squadron commander flying overhead and dropping flares to assist navigation. The squadron attacked and secured the airfield before redeploying 

against insurgents in Saigon’s northern suburbs.147

Tet proved a major military defeat for the Viet Cong. Its organization 

lay in ruins, and the high losses incurred prevented cadre replacement. The 

Viet Cong remnants withdrew to more secure bases within South Vietnam 

Figure 72. The M551 Sheridan.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

and to sanctuary areas in Laos and Cambodia. The NVA began to shoulder much of the responsibility for sustaining active operations in South 

Vietnam. Although better trained and equipped than the Viet Cong, the 

NVA remained vulnerable to the heavier firepower available to American 

and South Vietnamese troops.

Similarly, American military strategy changed. General Creighton 

W. Abrams replaced General William Westmoreland and directed military efforts to the elimination of remaining base camps in South Vietnam 

and the interdiction of border infiltration.148 These operations forced the 

NVA and surviving Viet Cong to either defend their base camps or leave 

South Vietnam. Significant combat ensued, but by mid-1970 the enemy 

had largely been driven from the country and border security tightened.

The 11th Armored Cavalry played a key role in these activities. For 

much of the period, its squadrons controlled relatively unchanging areas 

of operation. Its organization differed from other armored cavalry regiments through significant augmentation. Additional combat service support included a medical company, a military intelligence detachment, 

and an aviation maintenance detachment. An armored engineer company 

ensured the availability of an engineer platoon for each squadron. The regimental and squadron headquarters also received additional staff personnel to administer civic action programs. Although each squadron included 

an AVLB to assist mobility, its low operational readiness undermined its 

utility. Combat power increased through the addition of a mechanized 

flamethrower unit. The squadron tank companies received their own areas 

of operation and functioned as additional maneuver elements. To facilitate use in this role, each one received an M577 to serve as a command 

post. Similarly, each howitzer battery included an ACAV for use as a command post or fire direction center. When available, additional infantry was 

attached to the regiment to permit dismounted operations without leaving 

vehicle weapons unmanned.149

The organization of division cavalry squadrons remained largely 

unchanged in this period. Most already had added a mechanized flamethrower element, an S5 to assist civic action programs, and reduced the 

size of the ground-surveillance radar teams.150 Squadron configuration 

remained three ground cavalry troops, an air cavalry troop, and a headquarters and headquarters troop. Platoons retained their combined arms 

nature, but squadron detachments to support other commands remained a 

commonplace occurrence.151

Tank battalions also added an S5 and reduced their ground radar sections. All three of the tank battalions generally cross attached with other 
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units. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment detached a tank company in 

exchange for an infantry company. Other attachments included engineers, 

snipers, long-range reconnaissance patrols, and Dusters. The 1st Battalion, 

77th Armor Regiment routinely controlled from two to five maneuver 

companies that included a permanently attached armored cavalry troop. 

However, it never simultaneously controlled all of its tank companies. The 

2d Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment lost two of its tank companies through 

permanent detachment. The remnant battalion retained one tank company 

and created another ad hoc maneuver company from its headquarters and 

combat support assets. Periodic attachments included mechanized infantry 

and South Vietnamese regional forces.152

Mechanized infantry battalions, on paper, possessed a similar basic 

structure to armor battalions. Their primary combat strength derived 

from three mechanized infantry companies that possessed considerable 

mounted and dismounted capabilities. They were the only mounted units 

that included an organic sniper capability, although armored cavalry units 

often improvised their own. Mechanized infantry often supported regular infantry units rather than armor as expected in doctrine. Like armor 

and cavalry organizations, they were also subject to routine attachments 

and detachments.153 Mechanized infantry, lacking their own tank support, 

frequently benefited from the availability of Dusters employed in an antipersonnel mode.154

The change in American strategy did not change the mission set performed by mounted units. They continued to execute reconnaissance, area 

security, and base camp protection. The shift in focus toward the border 

areas did not eliminate threats to lines of communication, necessitating 

a continuing need for convoy escort and reaction forces. Often a single 

unit had to perform several of these missions simultaneously. Cavalry 

squadrons often operated as a collection of troop detachments that in turn 

employed their platoons on separate operations.155

In these operations, armored cavalry functioned as standard maneuver units. They utilized reconnaissance in force to find the enemy before 

attacking him. Tank and mechanized units also sought enemy positions 

of strength to attack directly rather than outmaneuver. While armored 

cavalry relied on combined arms teams to overwhelm opposition, mechanized infantry used their armored personnel carriers to fix the enemy, and 

the infantry conducted a dismounted assault. Similarly, when ambushed, 

mechanized infantry possessed the means to survive the initial attack and 

counterattack with a combination of off-road maneuver by the personnel carriers and dismounted assault by the infantry. The large number 
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of infantry, coupled with the combination of foot and vehicular tactics, 

permitted mechanized infantry to conduct mounted sweeps followed by 

more detailed dismounted searches. In contrast, the absence of an organic 

dismount capability made tank units dependent on cross attachments to 

generate the right mix of combat power.156

The dispersed nature of operations constituted a significant challenge 

to the control of mounted units. Most combat organizations had to maintain 

at least two primary bases in addition to as many as four firebase camps for 

supporting fires. These positions all required security, administrative support, and communications capabilities far above the unit’s normal requirement. In addition, all of these camps required logistical support and secure 

lines of supply. Protecting these installations and routes consumed 10 to 

20 percent of unit strength and fragmented staff operations among the base 

camps.157

A similar fracturing of assets characterized combat operations. All 

mounted units routinely provided detachments to other organizations, 

dividing their remaining assets among several different activities. In the 

tank battalions, some company commanders found themselves left in 

charge of only their two headquarters tanks after detachments to support 

other units. The combined effect of detachments and the need to secure 

multiple command posts and firebases led to the creation of additional ad 

hoc combat units formed from vehicles and personnel assigned to headquarters and combat support functions.158 The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry 

Regiment, for example, established a long-range reconnaissance patrol in 

this manner. Given Special Forces training, this improvised unit complemented the squadron’s information gathering capability.159

Dispersion and fragmentation complicated command and control. 

It necessitated additional radios and long-range communications equipment. Even the robust communications architecture normally found in 

armored units proved insufficient to meet this requirement. Units therefore 

acquired far more radios than authorized. Communications requirements 

also became more complicated by a greater emphasis on signal security, 

mandated by a growing enemy ability to intercept radio transmissions.160

Tactical operations revealed a number of communications issues. Small 

unit commanders found it difficult to monitor and transmit information 

over their tactical net while simultaneously communicating with higher 

headquarters. The cumbersome process of switching between nets proved 

impractical in combat. While leading his unit, “the commander often had to 

communicate with helicopter gunships, medevac helicopters, and his higher 

headquarters. In addition, on occasion the commander personally operated 
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a machinegun.” The fleeting but intense nature of most hostile contacts 

underscored the importance of simplicity in communications. Therefore, 

most unit commanders simply acquired a second radio, setting one to the 

tactical net and the other to the controlling headquarters’ frequency.161

In the maneuver battalion scout platoons, insufficient radios existed 

to permit contact between mounted and dismounted elements. A similar 

communications gap emerged when scout sections operated independent 

of one another. This artificial restraint was often overcome by unauthorized acquisition of additional radios. It proved more difficult to overcome 

problems with communications aboard vehicles. Each crewman received 

a combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet that connected to the vehicle 

intercom and permitted radio monitoring and transmission. Without it, 

crewmen could not communicate over the intercom or the radio. In many 

units, however, nearly half were inoperable and could not be fixed in the 

field due to the unavailability of repair kits.162 Radios that became unserviceable exacerbated communications problems, and at least one division 

cavalry squadron found itself struggling to perform operations with only 

a few operable sets.163

These problems plagued but did not stop tactical operations. For 

mounted units, reconnaissance in force became a common activity in 

which the enemy was sought and then engaged.164 One commander of the 

11th Armored Cavalry noted that efforts to find the enemy 

. . . were plagued by the old problem of where and 

how to conduct reconnaissance against an enemy who 

habitually avoids combat except at times and places of his 

own choice. Intelligence indicators were generally slim; 

Figure 73. Sheridan leading column through a rubber plantation.

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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

seldom was there hard intelligence on which to base a 

reconnaissance plan.165

Mechanized infantry battalions employed two companies and the 

scout platoon as a maneuver force, supported by mortars. The remaining company functioned as a reserve and could be airlifted into a contact area minus its vehicles. The combination of vehicular mobility and a 

strong infantry component made the mechanized infantry among the most 

versatile organizations on the battlefield. The scout platoon, equipped 

with ACAVs, operated as a conventional combat unit and did not avoid 

engagement.166

Tank units relied on their firepower and armor to survive initial contact during reconnaissance in force missions. Their mobility permitted 

them to attack hostile forces once found. Their principal deficiency lay in 

the absence of any dismount capability, which was overcome whenever 

possible through infantry attachments. Operations in the spring of 1969 by 

the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment demonstrated the effectiveness of 

armor units in reconnaissance in force missions. The battalion participated 

in efforts to open a route to Khe Sanh and interdict cross-border infiltration from Laos. The scout platoon ACAVs led and provided security for 

the engineer teams charged with minesweeping and road repairs. After 

reaching Khe Sanh, the battalion continued its interdiction efforts, often 

maneuvering off roads entirely dependent on aerial supply.167

Integrated operations by air and ground cavalry often proved the most 

effective means of finding and eliminating insurgents. Air cavalry helicopters formed an aerial screen, spotting hostile forces and directing friendly 

ground troops into contact. Air cavalry also interdicted enemy troops and 

fixed them in place until ground forces arrived to eliminate them. These 

tactics sometimes generated dramatic successes. In February 1968, the 1st 

Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment used integrated air-ground operations to 

eliminate 200 Viet Cong and NVA soldiers in a single engagement. Less 

dramatic results lay in the squadron’s enhanced ability to find, track, and 

engage elusive insurgents even in difficult terrain.168

The 11th Armored Cavalry relied on its air cavalry to conduct much 

of its reconnaissance in difficult terrain. The helicopters rapidly covered 

large areas and could insert airmobile rifle platoons to conduct dismounted 

sweeps of select locations or bunker complexes. Air cavalry also helped 

to identify enemy infiltration trails and track them to base camps, which 

became the targets for ground attack. Often observation and gunship 

helicopters were paired to provide a degree of ready firepower against 
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targets of opportunity. When reconnaissance flights encountered resistance, 

ground forces quickly responded to engage the enemy before he could 

escape. The air cavalry also supported command and control functions, 

assisted jungle navigation, and provided combat support to ground forces 

in combat.169

Efforts to find elusive Viet Cong and NVA soldiers evolved into the 

technique of “pile-on.” It emphasized the creation of information networks “flexible enough to respond to any fresh intelligence input, and 

aggressive enough to facilitate immediate engagement of the fleeting foe. 

This build-up from sketchy intelligence, to visual contacts, to engaging 

the enemy and simultaneous generation of friendly forces, followed by 

the violent destruction of the enemy unit, whatever its size, was known as 

“pile-on.”170 Contacts with enemy soldiers were exploited immediately in 

an effort to trigger an engagement. Air cavalry bore responsibility for verifying reports of enemy activity. Once confirmed, further reconnaissance 

occurred and the air cavalry sought to force an enemy reaction, sometimes 

through the insertion of airmobile infantry, while ground forces moved to 

contact. According to one regimental commander, “Forces were then literally thrown together on a fragmentary basis in order to overpower, encircle and destroy the located enemy. Planning necessarily was minimized. 

Movement and operations against the enemy had to be paramount.”171 To 

one junior officer, pile-on meant something different: “The mission was 

the same every day. Get up in the morning, go find him and if you find 

him, shoot him up. And the spinoff mission of that was if a buddy gets in 

trouble be prepared to move rapidly to pile onto the fight that was going 

on next door.”172

The shift of operations into remote areas and border regions necessitated reopening roads previously abandoned to the Viet Cong. These 

routes had become infested with mines, booby traps, and ambush sites. 

Clearance entailed removing mines, reducing the ambush threat, and 

preventing further insurgent interference. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry 

Regiment enjoyed some success through the use of seismic sensors to 

detect Viet Cong movement, permitting their interdiction before conducting a roadside attack.173

The 11th Armored Cavalry performed a similar activity along the roads 

from Saigon to the Cambodian border. Mined and flanked by soft ground 

and high vegetation, these routes necessitated a significant engineer presence to clear them. Engineer teams removed mines, repaired culverts and 

bridges, and cleared vegetation from the roads with Rome Plows. Armored 

cavalry provided security and reaction forces. Subsequently, Rome Plows 
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cleared lanes through the surrounding jungle, which became the focus 

of surveillance and interdiction. Discovered enemy infiltration trails 

were destroyed or traced to base camps that the regiment then attacked. 

Clearance operations became a form of offensive action. Often these operations provoked a hostile reaction that simplified locating the enemy and 

played to the firepower superiority of the armored cavalry.174

All mounted units performed security missions. The dispersed nature 

of American operations mandated the use of combat units to protect convoys, roadways, firebases, and command posts. In addition, routine patrols 

along South Vietnam’s borders sought to interdict NVA infiltration. In 

these activities, the 11th Armored Cavalry often benefited from the attachment of Cambodian irregulars who provided an additional dismounted 

capability familiar with the local terrain.175 Armored cavalry commanders, 

however, generally did not believe security missions made the best use of 

the firepower and mobility available: “Whenever possible, reconnaissance 

was used as a technique to accomplish security objectives.”176

Surveillance operations supplemented security. Together with target 

acquisition, it constituted a principal means of intelligence gathering. 

Surveillance equipment monitored camp perimeters, helped generate 

ambush points, and pinpointed enemy infiltration routes. Despite these 

uses, at the battalion and squadron level the employment of surveillance 

equipment suffered from poor training, inadequate maintenance, and 

misuse. It did not receive command emphasis. Interference from terrain 

Figure 74. Sheridan with added protection for the tank commander against 

small arms fire and snipers.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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and vegetation discouraged field use of ground surveillance radars, which 

became relegated to fixed locations. Their fragility and tendency to generate 

false readings eroded user confidence, encouraged underutilization, and led 

to the diversion of their vehicular transport to other purposes. Improvements 

generally occurred when surveillance came under centralized control for 

training, administrative support, and supervision.177

Routes once cleared required continuous security to keep them open. 

The most common method entailed the use of outposts along the length 

of the roadway connected by mounted patrols and bolstered by reaction 

forces in the event of an attack. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry garrisoned 

each outpost with ground surveillance radar, a tank, at least one ACAV, 

and sometimes a mortar carrier. The collective purpose of these measures 

lay in keeping the entire route under observation. Some units worked to 

clear fields of fire along the route, removing concealing vegetation in the 

process. Periodic patrols in areas adjacent to the road served to create 

uncertainty among the enemy. At night, radar helped to acquire targets 

for tanks to engage with infrared and white searchlights. Unit personnel 

continuously practiced ambush reaction drills to ensure rapid response to 

an attack.178

These practices did not eliminate the need for convoy escort. Armored 

cavalry squadrons generally bore responsibility for both route security and 

convoy protection. Convoy duty, however, proved unpopular. It committed 

combat assets and increased vehicle wear, particularly to tanks. Armored 

cars were considered better suited to this role, but those in use by the military police lacked firepower and adequate communications. Increased use 

of air cavalry proved a more effective alternative, because it could fly ahead 

of the convoy, seeking signs of enemy activity.179 Armored cavalry officers 

considered convoy escort “a waste of assets for an armored unit. They were 

not fun and they were generally expensive in terms of mines.”180

Jungle operations posed an altogether different set of challenges. 

Dense vegetation and periodic fog minimized visibility, forcing unit 

commanders to coordinate exclusively via radio. Even this control became 

problematic when antennas were shot away during firefights. Jungle 

operations condensed unit frontages, with armored cavalry platoons 

covering less than 50 meters. The jungle disoriented crews so navigation 

proved difficult. Common solutions included the use of white phosphorous 

marking rounds and reliance on directional assistance from helicopters 

overhead. Movement through the jungle, nevertheless, remained slow. 

Narrow columns led by tanks predominated, because the M48A3’s bulk 

and power permitted it to forge new paths. The attachment of a dozer blade 
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across the vehicle’s front hull improved this ability and allowed the tank 

to cut its way through vegetation. Use of the ACAV in this jungle-busting 

role tended to overstrain its engine. Lacking organic tanks, mechanized 

infantry resorted to dismounted operations in jungle terrain, where the 

infantry proved effective in close range engagements.181

Operations in rubber plantations posed problems similar to those of 

the jungle. Considered vital to South Vietnam’s economy, the plantations were off limits to American combat forces in the years before the 

Tet Offensive. This restriction permitted their unhindered development as 

fortified Viet Cong and NVA base camps. The shift in American strategy 

resulted in these plantations becoming battlegrounds, although restrictions 

still limited the use of artillery and close air support.182

The plantations posed less restrictive visibility and mobility problems 

than those of the jungle. Yet, primitive roads, the presence of civilian workers, vegetation, and mud made the plantations difficult battlefields. For 

this environment, the 11th Armored Cavalry developed a box formation to 

provide all-round security. ACAVs and M551 Sheridans formed the front 

and sides of the box with command and support vehicles in the center. 

This formation permitted a plantation to be swept from one side to another, 

while attached infantry conducted detailed dismounted searches.183

The presence of insurgent camps and supply bases often resulted in 

determined efforts to defend them. It was not uncommon for contact to 

occur within moments of entering the plantation.184 In this environment, 

the beehive round used by the M551 Sheridan proved popular and useful. 

It proved destructive to both vegetation and enemy personnel. It “would 

just shoot hundreds of holes in those rubber trees, and then you had the 

dripping problem where you had rubber dripping all over the tanks and 

really made kind of a mess.”185

Operations in jungles, among rubber plantations, and in difficult terrain along the border posed mobility challenges for armor units. Flooded 

rice paddies proved especially difficult for tanks to traverse, and the NVA 

integrated these obstacles into their defenses. Helicopters proved invaluable as aerial guides, leading armored columns through soft ground without 

getting mired.186 Control from the air mandated the use of clear identification panels and markings to facilitate aerial identification. These markers 

were routinely used, even during the urban fighting of Tet. This practice 

drew criticism from senior commanders concerned that the panels would 

attract enemy attention, but as one mechanized infantry battalion commander noted: “I fail to see where a bright red, cerise or other color attracts 

any more attention than a thundering armored vehicle.”187
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The effectiveness of mounted units depended on operational readiness 

and regular maintenance. The fragmentation and dispersion characteristic 

of most combat organizations, however, reduced the availability of direct 

support maintenance from rear echelons. Vehicle crews assumed the principal responsibility for sustaining their platforms.188 Maintenance became 

a unit training priority: “There was no prophylactic maintenance at all. It 

was entirely a case of drag yourself up by the shorts whenever something 

broke down.”189

The M113 in its various configurations generally required only routine maintenance. Titanium plates fitted under the floor and pierced steel 

planking on the vehicle sides improved survivability against mines and 

RPGs. The M48A3 provided greater protection against most threats, but 

it also required more maintenance. Common problems included dirty 

air filters and suspension damage. Extended use in the jungle resulted in 

engine damage and burned out transmissions. These items could be fixed 

in the field, but larger mines could warp the hull, necessitating removal 

to a proper repair facility. Preventative maintenance checks and services 

received command emphasis, and some units automatically changed out 

power packs every 1,000 miles. Others routinely pulled units out of combat operations to perform maintenance.190 These measures required the 

availability of parts that could not be guaranteed. Controlled cannibalization of vehicles knocked out in combat resulted. In armored cavalry 

organizations, the “on-site repair of vehicles was inhibited by continual 

maintenance problems with the M578—the recovery vehicle assigned to 

reconnaissance troops.”191

The fielding of the M551 Sheridan in January 1969 added a new 

dimension to maintenance operations. It began to equip armored cavalry 

tank sections. The M551’s 152-mm gun offered increased firepower, and 

its robust suspension and amphibious capability facilitated the crossing 

of inland waterways. However, it proved less effective in jungle busting 

than the bulkier M48A3. The M551 Sheridan suffered from engine and 

transmission problems, and it became prone to overheating. Its electric 

turret traverse generated troubleshooting headaches, because most 

maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with it. The devastating firepower 

of the M551 Sheridan was offset by a slow rate of fire. In several recorded 

instances, tank crews spotted RPG teams, but they could not engage them 

fast enough to avoid the destruction of their vehicles. Nor did the M551’s 

armor provide adequate protection against either RPGs or mines.192

Mines constituted the greatest threat to armored vehicles. Between 

November 1967 and March 1970, mines accounted for 73 percent of all 
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vehicle losses.193 In the period June 1969 to June 1970, the 11th Armored 

Cavalry alone encountered 1,000 antitank mines that accounted for 95 

percent of all combat vehicle losses. In the same period, the frequency of 

mine attacks on the unit rose from 20 to 100 per month.194

Chinese or North Vietnamese-manufactured mines constituted those 

most commonly encountered. Encased in a metal container, they carried 

20 to 30 pounds of explosive, and became the NVA’s principal response 

to the arrival of American armor in their area. Many types of mines were 

employed, including plastic devices impossible to detect with available 

mine detectors. Mines had an immobilizing effect on mounted operations, necessitating time-consuming clearance and sweeping operations in 

advance of vehicle movement. Persistent heavy mining effectively closed 

roads, because the manpower to sustain sweeping efforts did not exist.195

Mine detection and clearance proved tedious and laborious. Dismounted 

personnel with handheld detectors moved slowly through an area searching for mines. They also required a security detail. Soldiers, increasingly 

adept at looking for the right signs, could identify some mines, and the rate 

of finding them gradually rose to 60 percent. Efforts to employ vehicleborne mine detection and sweeping devices did not work. Mine rollers 

generated considerable maintenance with no guarantee of success. Indeed, 

“The first roller tested was blown apart by a mine and rendered junk. 

Subsequent models left mines to be detonated by vehicles well back in the 

column.”196 Vehicle mounted detectors proved only marginally successful. 

Mine use did not stop armored cavalry operations, but one 11th Armored 

Figure 75. Dismounted team working with M48.

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Cavalry commander noted, “With an intensified mine program the NVA 

could have virtually immobilized the Regiment.”197 He further observed, 

“There is not in the US Army inventory a satisfactory mine detector for 

clearing extensive road networks in a short period of time, or for sweeping 

on extended frontages. There is no non-metallic mine detector available 

for field use.”198

Mines with their combination of physical danger and psychological 

threat constituted a challenge never really resolved in Vietnam. Instead, 

most units simply coped with them as best they could. On a smaller scale, 

the 11th Armored Cavalry employed the same threat against the NVA. 

Once supply and infiltration routes were identified, soldiers began to place 

claymore mines along them. In 1 month alone, these ambushes killed 100 

enemy fighters, caused an unknown number of wounded, and generated 

confusion among the NVA.199

End Game 1970–72

Military operations after the Tet Offensive helped to drive the NVA 

and remnant Viet Cong across the border into Cambodia and Laos. These 

nations provided sanctuaries for the insurgents, permitting them to reorganize and resupply before infiltrating back into South Vietnam. In the 

spring of 1970, the United States began to reconsider the political restraints 

that barred direct American action against targets in Cambodia. President 

Richard M. Nixon sought to secure “peace with honor.” He intended to 

end the American military presence in Southeast Asia through a combination of diplomacy, expansion of South Vietnamese military capabilities, 

and the elimination of cross-border infiltration by insurgents.

In May 1970, American mounted units participated in a large-scale 

incursion into Cambodia along an 80-mile front to destroy NVA supplies 

and base camps. Initial engagements resulted in heavy casualties to the 

NVA, who withdrew deeper into Cambodia. The 11th Armored Cavalry 

continued to advance, driving to the city of Snoul, where it sought to block 

the retreat of NVA elements. Instead, the regiment became engaged in a 

street fight to secure the city, which it did at cost to the enemy. After this 

battle, NVA contacts became rare, and regimental operations shifted to the 

discovery and destruction of insurgent base camps, supplies, and trails. 

The experience of other American and South Vietnamese units proved 

similar—heavy fighting followed by sporadic contacts that permitted wide 

scale elimination of enemy strongholds and infrastructure.200

Unlike most prior operations, the Cambodian incursion was a conventional operation. The 11th Armored Cavalry commander described the 
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operation as one in which the unit “attacked on an axis, linked up with 

ARVN airmobile infantry, made a forward passage of lines and continued to attack on an axis, attacked a built up area, then took up an area of 

operations for reconnaissance operations.” Air cavalry provided an aerial 

umbrella for the attacking columns, assisting navigation and the location 

of enemy-held positions. Ground units working through the close, jungle 

terrain relied on ingrained battle drills to respond quickly to sudden contacts and launch counterattacks to preempt enemy withdrawal.201

American forces withdrew from Cambodia in June, turning their attention to bolstering the capabilities of South Vietnamese regional and police 

forces. Mounted units conducted civic action projects and continued to 

seek insurgents. Hostile contacts shrank to squads and individual soldiers 

difficult to locate and interdict. Therefore, the 11th Armored Cavalry created a special reconnaissance team. This unit worked to determine enemy 

base camp locations, movement routes, and likely enemy positions. 

It routinely entered difficult terrain that could not be effectively reconnoitered from the air. The reconnaissance team possessed the means to 

either react directly to hostile contact or organize a strike by other combat 

elements.202

The final stages of the war also witnessed an increased use of unattended ground sensors. These devices could be deployed by ground teams 

or air dropped. Once in place, they monitored enemy activity. Analysis of 

sensor data provided clues regarding the location of insurgents and suggested likely trails. The devices proved popular and effective. In the 11th 

Armored Cavalry: 

The maturation of the Regimental sensor program clearly 

indicated the tremendous possibilities of this system for 

extending and maximizing the characteristics and potential of armored cavalry units. Whether in reconnaissance, 

security, or screening operations, the integration of sensors into the scheme of maneuver and plan of supporting 

fires offers very significant advantages for further exploitation. Furthermore, it is apparent that a great economy 

of forces deployed may be realized, particularly in the 

performance of security missions, where air and armored 

cavalry units may be centrally located and be prepared to 

respond to sensor-driven intelligence.203

The emphasis given to locating small bands of insurgents and reliance 

on sensors contrasted with the large-scale military actions undertaken earlier in the war. While NVA and Viet Cong activity had fallen sharply, so 
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too had the American ability to mount major operations. In 1971, the South 

Vietnamese undertook a large-scale incursion into Laos. In this operation, 

American ground forces played only a supporting role. Barred from entering Laos, they secured the lines of communications and supply leading to 

the Laotian border. The South Vietnamese, however, encountered heavy 

NVA resistance and withdrew.204

The Laotian operation marked the last major operation for American 

ground forces. The first significant troop withdrawals back to the United 

States had begun in 1969 and accelerated since. By the end of 1971, 

American troop strength in South Vietnam had fallen to 158,000. Many 

of the remaining units were armor and armored cavalry, but their activities remained limited to local security and civic action. Preparations for 

redeployment to the United States overshadowed combat operations and 

command attention shifted to unit management and administrative actions. 

By April 1972, even these units had left Vietnam. Only a dwindling number of air cavalry troops remained in the country, the last two leaving in 

February 1973.205

Ironically, the drawdown of American forces coincided with the emergence of more effective training literature. In October 1970, the Armor 

School released Special Text 17-1-3, Armor in Vietnam. The text targeted 

the small unit leader and vehicle crews, providing well-illustrated and 

readable descriptions of mounted operations. One chapter focused on 

the terrain and climate conditions in Vietnam, indicating how to survive 

and navigate in them. Route security, reconnaissance of force, and other 

common missions were described in detail amid a Vietnam context. The 

text addressed mission planning, specific techniques found effective in 

Vietnam, formations, and counterambush preparations. The weapons and 

equipment likely to be employed by an armored cavalry platoon leader 

were summarized, photos included, and general information on their use 

provided together with detailed organizational data. An entire section 

described enemy mine techniques and explosive devices.206

In 1973, the Armor School published another special text entitled 

Vietnam Battle Tricks. This text documented lessons learned and special 

techniques used. It addressed mounted, dismounted, air, and artillery operations in addition to offering details related to communications and medical 

support. It summarized specific methods used to find and eliminate an elusive enemy in jungle terrain. The use of stay-behind patrols and cloverleaf 

were offered as proven measures to counter an enemy who hid on hearing 

the noise of approaching combat vehicles. Other subjects included security for mounted mortar teams, dismounted patrols by tank and armored 
249

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

cavalry units, the use of armored vehicles to create landing zones for helicopters, movement to contact in the jungle, and night ambush. Readers 

also learned measures to reduce casualties, improve vehicle survivability, 

conduct trafficability assessments, and perform vehicle recovery. The late 

date of this publication, however, undermined its training utility.207

The year also witnessed the revision of FM 17-36, Armored Cavalry 

Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron. This version 

incorporated improved three-dimensional graphics to better illustrate key 

ideas, and it reflected the presence of the M551 Sheridan in cavalry tank 

units.208 Armored cavalry platoon operations benefited from the inclusion 

of a clear listing of the pros and cons associated with reliance on direct versus indirect fires. Such information provided a frame of reference to assist 

Figure 76. Doctrinal depiction of the combined arms platoon in operation.

FM 17-36, 1973
250

Chapter 5

decisionmaking in the field. Unlike prior doctrine that discouraged night 

reconnaissance, this activity now became a required platoon function. The 

manual provided platoon leaders with guidance for planning and executing night reconnaissance and incorporating ground surveillance radars and 

unattended ground sensors.209

Surveillance operations received expanded coverage, particularly 

in the use of unattended ground sensors. The latter included remotely 

monitored devices that tracked seismic, magnetic, acoustic, or physical 

disturbances associated with the movement of men and materiel. Armored 

cavalry commanders were expected to use these sensors in conjunction 

with ground radar, night observation devices, and infrared sights to create 

a surveillance network that continuously monitored a targeted area. 

Ironically, an organizational change somewhat nullified this emphasis. 

Ground radars ceased to be organic assets. Instead, they were issued only 

when required by the operational environment. Moreover, human analysis 

took precedence over electronic devices: “The primary surveillance assets 

of a unit are the eyes and ears of the individual Soldier and his ability 

to reason—a capability no mechanical or other device can completely 

duplicate.”210

A separate chapter addressed COIN operations, incorporating the 

Vietnam experience. The writers stressed the importance of securing popular support without alienating civilians or destroying their country. All 

military units were exhorted to support the population through a variety of 

civic actions intended to build trust and improve quality of life. The overall purpose of COIN lay in the destruction of insurgent bases and forces 

to provide a secure environment for a wide range of political, social, and 

economic internal developments to occur. The successful employment 

of armored cavalry depended on the cultivation of effective intelligence 

sources, seizing and sustaining the initiative, and rapidly concentrating 

combat power on hostile contacts.211

Despite the lessons learned from Vietnam, armored cavalry organizations continued to experience problems that predated the conflict. Training 

effective platoon leaders remained as much a challenge at the end of the 

war as it did in the beginning. Too many new platoon leaders lacked the 

ability to employ the unit as an integral team: 

The average armored cavalry platoon leader has insufficient basic knowledge of the particular infantry and mortar support capabilities which can and must be furnished 

by his platoon. The program of instruction for the Armor 

Officer Basic Course should provide considerably more 
251

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

instruction on the basic skills required of the armored cavalry platoon leader to enable him to perform his duties as 

the leader of a closely integrated combined arms team.212

Officer instruction at the Armor School continued to focus on conventional combat operations. Given the persistent threat posed by the Warsaw 

Pact, some of this reluctance made sense. Unfortunately, it also reflected 

an unwillingness to embrace the needs and lessons of a conflict many continued to see as a temporary aberration. One tank company commander 

attending the Armor Officers Advanced Course after serving in Vietnam 

found the tactical, leadership, and technical instruction to be of marginal 

use to officers who would soon be fighting in the jungles and rice paddies 

of Southeast Asia. Reflecting on his experience, he noted:

I found a real reluctance on the part of the Armor Officer 

Career Course to discuss Vietnam. To them it was an 

anomaly. Obviously, in a classical sense, it wasn’t the way 

armor should be used or had been used. Therefore, they 

wouldn’t talk about it and avoided trying to assimilate the 

experience, or of seeing what could be extrapolated from 

it, or how it could be incorporated into our doctrine. So, 

rather than learn how to do it, we just accepted that armor 

in Vietnam was doing a mission that was unpleasant and 

was being used improperly. Besides, we had other things 

to do, which was to fight in Europe, or in the desert, or 

wherever else. It was a very poor approach. It made us, in 

the armor community, in many ways ill prepared to go to 

Vietnam and find ways to employ armor despite the fact 

that there were many ways to employ armor in combined 

arms operations, if not alone.213

By the mid-1970s, effective principles for the employment of mounted 

reconnaissance organizations in counterinsurgencies had emerged. Many 

of these concepts built on the early foundations laid by the 3d Armored 

Cavalry field experimentation in 1961 and the firsthand experience of the 

South Vietnamese. Refinement resulted in a wealth of proven tactics, techniques, and procedures whose utility transcended Vietnam. Unfortunately, 

this achievement proved short-lived. The Army’s withdrawal from 

Vietnam triggered a refocusing of military energy on conventional operations against the Warsaw Pact on the more familiar battlefield of Central 

Europe. The expertise and knowledge of COIN operations remained as 

part of the Army’s institutional knowledge, but its relevance soon withered 

through disuse.
252

Chapter 5

Notes

1. “The M113 Armored Personnel Carrier,” Armor LXVIII, no. 3 (May–

June 1959): 8–9.

2. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A 

Military History of the United States of America (New York, NY: The Free Press, 

1984), 546–547.

3. Ibid., 547–550, 552.

4. Department of the Army, FM 17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, 

and Squadron (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1960), 

7, 65, 120–123, 189–191, quotation from page 7.

5. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1960), 4, 67–69.

6. Department of the Army, FM 17-30, The Armored Division Brigade

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961), 83, 116–117, 

119–120.

7. Ibid., 111–112, 116–117, 119.

8. Ibid., 80–82.

9. Major Raymond R. Battreall Jr., “The Regimental Armored Cavalry 

Squadron in Area Security,” Armor LXXIV, no. 1 (January–February 1965): 

42–43.

10. Ibid., 44–46.

11. Ibid., 44.

12. Ibid., 43–44.

13. Ibid., 44.

14. US Army Armor Combat Developments Agency, “The Role of Armored 

Cavalry in Counterinsurgency Operations,” agency report, Fort Knox, KY, 

October 1962, US Army Armor Branch Archives (hereafter referred to as Branch 

Archives), 4–5, 7, and annex E.

15. Ibid., 6.

16. Ibid., 5, 7, 8, and annex G, quotation from page 7.

17. Department of the Army, FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963).

18. Ibid., 155–156, 196–199.

19. General Donn A. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 1989), 17–19.

20. Ibid., 19–20.

21. Ibid., 21, 24.

22. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond R. Battreall Jr., “Armor in Vietnam,” 

Armor LXXV, no. 3 (May–June 1966): 8.

23. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 24–25, 39–43, 45; Battreall, 

“Armor in Vietnam,” 7–8.

24. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 37–38; Captain Michael Moore, 

“Improvement of Armor Employment in Vietnam,” Armor LXXV, no. 5 

(September–October 1966): 6, quotation from Battreall, “Armor in Vietnam,” 7–8.
253

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

25. FM 17-1 (1963), 39.

26. Ibid., 39.

27. Ibid., 40.

28. Ibid., 40.

29. Ibid., 40, 43.

30. Robert A. Baker, “A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training of 

Armor Units,” Human Resources Research Organization Report, Fort Knox, KY, 

December 1961, iii–v, 11, 16–17, 21. Available via Defense Technical Information 

Center (DTIC), Report no. AD327759.

31. Ibid., vi, 33.

32. John G. Cook, “A Survey of Problems in the Tactical Training of 

Armored Cavalry Platoons,” Human Resources Research Organization Report, 

Fort Knox, KY, January 1963, 7–9. Available via DTIC, Report no. AD480776.

33. Ibid., 7, 13–14, quotation from page 15.

34. Ibid., 15–17.

35. William L. Warnick and Robert A. Baker, “Determination of Combat 

Job Requirements for Armored Cavalry Platoon Personnel,” Human Resources 

Research Organization Report, Fort Knox, KY, December 1964. Available via 

DTIC, Report no. AD455302; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John G. Cook and 

Robert A. Baker, “The Armored Cavalry Platoon Combat Readiness Check,” 

Armor LXXVI, no. 1 (January–February 1967): 18–23.

36. Robert A. Baker and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John G. Cook, “ACT 

I, the Armored Cavalry Trainer,” Armor LXXVI, no. 2 (March–April 1967): 38–

43. This system bore many similarities in purpose to the later computer-based 

Simulations Networking (SIMNET) facilities.

37. Ibid., 43.

38. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 54–55.

39. Ibid., 54–57.

40. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 57–58; Major Michael R. Matheny, 

“Armor in Low Intensity Conflict,” Armor XCVII, no. 4 (July–August 1988): 

11.

41. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 52–54, 58, 60, 62–63; for a 

complete listing of armor, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry units 

deployed to South Vietnam see Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle: A 

Complete Illustrated Reference to U.S. Army Combat and Support Forces in 

Vietnam 1961–1973 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1981).

42. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 47; Starry, Mounted Combat in 

Vietnam, 73.

43. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 63–64.

44. Battreall, “Armor in Vietnam,” 4–6.

45. Battreall, “Armor in Vietnam,” 6–8; Moore, “Improvement of Armor 

Employment in Vietnam,” 5–6; Major Servetus T. Ashworth III, “Armor can 

Operate in the Delta,” Armor LXXVI, no. 2 (March–April 1967): 6–8.

46. Moore, “Improvement of Armor Employment in Vietnam,” 4–9; 

Ashworth, “Armor Can Operate in the Delta,” 6–8.
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Chapter 5

47. Ashworth, “Armor Can Operate in the Delta,” 10.

48. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Major John B. Hubard, 2–3, US 

Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA (hereafter referred to as MHI); 

Captain John N. Abrams, Vietnam monograph, unpublished, 37, 2/1 Cavalry File, 

Branch Archives; Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 57.

49. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 64.

50. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Kimerling, 2-34 Armor, 15–16, MHI; 

Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 93.

51. Company Command in Vietnam, Kimerling, 51–52, 57, 59–60.

52. First Lieutenant Donald F. Ullman et. al., Letter to the Editor, Armor

LXXV, no. 5 (September–October 1966): 3; Captain Philip C. Guzman, Letter to 

the Editor, Armor LXXV, no. 5 (September–October 1966): 2–3.

53. Ullman et al., Letter to the Editor, 3.

54. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 13.

55. Guzman, Letter to the Editor, 2.

56. Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Graham, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Annual 

Historical Supplement, Calendar Year 1967, 1 March 1968, 3–4, 2/1 Cavalry File, 

Branch Archives.

57. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 57.

58. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 13. 

59. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Dudley M. Andres, 12–13, 22, MHI; Mechanized 

Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 2–3.

60. Abrams, Vietnam monograph, unpublished, 30; Graham, 2d Squadron, 

1st Cavalry Annual Historical Supplement, 17; Starry, Mounted Combat in 

Vietnam, 71–72.

61. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 2–3; Starry, Mounted 

Combat in Vietnam, 64–66; Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 125.

62. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 4–5, 7–9, 10–11.

63. Graham, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Annual Historical Supplement, 2, 

15–16; Abrams, Vietnam monograph, unpublished, 16; Starry, Mounted Combat 

in Vietnam, 106–107.

64. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 106–107, 111.

65. Ibid., 66–71.

66. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report: Optimum Mix of 

Armored Vehicles for Use in Stability Operations,” 3 volumes, 27 January 1971, 

annex G.

67. Colonel Roy W. Farley, “Blackhorse Report II,” Armor LXXVII, no. 2 

(March–April 1968): 6, 8.

68. Colonel William W. Cobb, “11th Cavalry Report,” Armor LXXVI, no. 

2 (March–April 1967): 30; Farley, “Blackhorse Report II,” 8.

69. Farley, “Blackhorse Report II,” 9–10; Captain Ronald A. Hofmann, 

“The Affray at Slope 30,” Armor LXXVII, no. 1 (January–February 1968): 13–

18.
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

70. Cobb, “11th Cavalry Report,” 31.

71. Captain John F. Votaw, “The Blackhorse Kicks Back,” Armor LXXVI, 

no. 4 (July–August 1967): 38–41, quotation from page 41.

72. Captain George L. Gunderman, “Ambush!” Armor LXXVI, no. 3 

(May–June 1967): 16–19; Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 77.

73. K Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry, After Action Report 21 May 1967, 

http://www.ktroop.com/bandana.htm (accessed July 2008); Starry, Mounted 

Combat in Vietnam, 108

74. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 109–110.

75. Troop F, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Vietnam 

1966–72, “Campaign CEDAR FALLS,” http://www.ftrp17cav196.com/cfalls.

htm (accessed July 2008); Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 91, 95; Matheny, 

“Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict,” 12.

76. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 95–97, 101–102; Matheny, “Armor 

in Low-Intensity Conflict,” 13; Captain Wilbert R. Mennix, “A First Combat 

Experience,” Armor LXXVIII, no. 4 (July–August 1969): 9–10.

77. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 96; Mennix, “A First Combat 

Experience,” 10.

78. Farley, “Blackhorse Report II,” 10–11.

79. Company Command in Vietnam, Andres, 33–35, 39, 40; Company 

Command in Vietnam, Kimerling, 62–63.

80. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Hubard, 11–12.

81. Company Command in Vietnam, Andres, 33–35, 39, 40; Company 

Command in Vietnam, Kimerling, 16, 62–63.

82. Company Command in Vietnam, Kimerling, 17–18.

83. Farley, “Blackhorse Report II,” 5, 10.

84. US Army Vietnam, “Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in 

Vietnam,” Report, 28 March 1967, I, II, 50, Branch Archives; Lieutenant General 

Ben Harrell, “Evaluation of U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations 

in Vietnam (MACOV),” memorandum, 15 May 1967, 2, Branch Archives; US 

Army Combat Developments Command, “Review and Analysis of the U.S. Army 

Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam,” Report, 15 May 1967, 

iii, Branch Archives.

85. “Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam,” 14.

86. Ibid., 13–14, 19, 22–23, 25, 29–32, 36, 38–39, 43–45, 47–48.

87. Ibid., 10, 50.

88. Ibid., 51–52, quotation from page 51.

89. Ibid., 53–54, 60, 66–67, 106, 108.

90. Ibid., 54, 83.

91. Ibid., 55–56.

92. Ibid., 60, 172–173.

93. Ibid., 109–113, 130.

94. Ibid., 55–56, 84–86.

95. Ibid., 133–134.

96. Ibid., 77–80, 82, 120.
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97. Ibid., 68–69, 114–115, quotation from page 115.

98. Ibid., 160–162, 164–165.

99. Ibid., 102–103, 127, 171–172, 177.

100. CDC, “Review and Analysis of the U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor 

Combat Operations in Vietnam,” III-5, III-6, III-7, quotation from page III-7.

101. CDC, “Review and Analysis of the U.S. Army Mechanized and Armor 

Combat Operations in Vietnam,” IV.

102. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 86.

103. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Project No. 239 R-23, Interview of 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Robinson Jr., March 1974, 6-8, MHI.

104. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 89–90; For a listing of those 

MACOV recommendations implemented or rejected, see US Army Concept 

Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” annex D.

105. The full MACOV report constituted multiple volumes, few of which 

remain at the time of this publication. One of these is in the holdings of the Armor 

School Library. A condensed version of some 300 pages was compiled to highlight 

key findings, and it remains far more accessible than the full version.

106. Major General Arthur L. West Jr. and Colonel Donn A. Starry, “Improved 

Organization and Equipment for Vietnam,” Armor LXXVII, no. 3 (May–June 

1968): 51.

107. Department of the Army, FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966), 4, 14–16, 18.

108. Ibid., 44.

109. Ibid., 45.

110. Ibid., 47.

111. Ibid., 44, 45, 47.

112. Ibid., 5–7, 47, 49, 82–87, 126–127,173, Appendix XV, Night Combat 

Techniques.

113. Ibid., 47.

114. Ibid., 218–219.

115. Ibid., 231–233, 235–239.

116. Ibid., 221–223.

117. Ibid., 219–221.

118. Ibid., xxx.

119. Ibid., 240–241, 244–247, quotation from page 241.

120. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966), 3–4, 38, 40.

121. Ibid., 7, 9, 11, 21, 36, 41, quotation from page 21.

122. Ibid., 8, 10–12, 14–15, 38, 40, 45.

123. Ibid., 53.

124. Ibid., 83.

125. Ibid., 53–55, 58, 83.

126. Ibid., 62, 65–75, 125.

127. Ibid., 133–134.
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Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

128. Department of the Army, FM 17-15, Tank Units: Platoon, Company, and 

Battalion (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1966), 8, 175.

129. Ibid., appendix III.

130. Ibid., 175–177, 179, 181, quotation from page 177.

131. Ibid., 179, 180, 183, 184, quotation from page 183.

132. Ibid., 181, 185, 187.

133. Ibid., 188–189.

134. Department of the Army, FM 17-36, Divisional Armored and Air 

Cavalry Units (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1968), 

1-1.

135. Ibid., 1-1, 1-4 to 1-6, 8-1 to 8-2, 8-5 to 8-6.

136. Ibid., see Chapter 4, Employment of the Armored Cavalry Platoon.

137. Ibid., 4-1.

138. Ibid., 4-3.

139. Ibid., 4-3.

140. Ibid., 4-5.

141. Ibid., 16-2 to 16-4, quotation from page 16-4.

142. Ibid., 16-11 to 16-12.

143. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond R. Battreall Jr., “Cavalry Operations IV—

Reconnaissance,” Armor LXXVIII, no. 2 (March–April 1969): 39, 41, quotation 

from page 41.

144. Ibid., 39–41, quotation from page 40.

145. Mechanized Operations in Vietnam, Project No. 34 R-4, Sergeant First 

Class Herman G. Roberts, 22 January 1974, 1–2, 4, MHI.

146. Colonel Wallace H. Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 

5 March 1971, I-57 to I-58, Branch Archives.

147. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 118–119, 122–123.

148. Ibid., 138.

149. Colonel Donn A. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th 

ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 48–52, Branch Archives; US Army 

Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” B-2 to B-3, B-36 to B-37, G-1, G-9, 

G-21 to G-22.

150. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” B-3.

151. Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Moreau, “Operational Report—Lessons 

Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1968,” 2 August 1968, 1-2, 2/1 Cavalry 

Files, Branch Archives; Lieutenant Colonel John M. Fairey, “Operational 

Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1969,” 31 July 1969, 

1-2, 2/1 Cavalry Files, Branch Archives; Captain Snedeker, “Armor in Vietnam 

Questionnaire,” undated, 2/1 Cavalry Files, Branch Archives.

152. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” B-37 to B-39, 

J‐5.

153. Ibid., III-13 to III-14, K-1.

154. First Lieutenant Arthur B. Cook, “Report of Combat Action,” 

1 September 1968, http://www.bobcat.ws/cor1.htm (accessed July 2008).
258

Chapter 5

155. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” G-1, H-1, J-6, 

J-7, K-1; Cook, “Report of Combat Action”; Moreau, “Operational Report—

Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1968,” 1–2; Fairey, “Operational 

Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 July 1969,” 3; Lieutenant 

Colonel John M. Fairey, “Operational Report—Lessons Learned 2d Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1969,” 31 October 1969, 1, 2/1 Cavalry Files, 

Branch Archives; Lieutenant Colonel Eric F. Antila, “Mechanized Operations in 

the Delta,” unpublished manuscript, 14 February 1974, 2/1 Cavalry Files, Branch 

Archives; “Mechanized Operations in Vietnam,” Roberts, 2.

156. Antila, “Mechanized Operations in the Delta”; Lieutenant Colonel Eric 

F. Antila to Lieutenant Colonel George J. Dramis Jr., letter, 2 January 1973, 2/1 

Cavalry Files, Branch Archives; Cook, “Report of Combat Action,” 1 September 

1968; US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” II-14 to II-15, K-6, K‐9.

157. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” III-14 to III-16.

158. Ibid., B-13, B-17, B-18, G-21 to G-22, H-1, H-12.

159. Snedeker, “Armor in Vietnam Questionnaire.”

160. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” III-15, III-18, III20, III-22.

161. Ibid., III-17.

162. Ibid., III-19, III-21.

163. Fairey, “Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 

31 July 1969,” 23; “Mechanized Operations in Vietnam,” Roberts, 5.

164. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” II-14, G-1, G-3, 

G-5, H-1, I-5.

165. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 17.

166. Antila, “Mechanized Operations in the Delta”; Antila to Dramis, letter, 

2 January 1973; Cook, “Report of Combat Action,” 1 September 1968.

167. Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia, “Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh,” 

Armor LXXIX, no. 3 (May–June 1970): 42–46.

168. Captain Charles W. Donaldson, “The Cavalry—Air Cavalry Team,” 

Armor LXXVIII, no. 5 (September–October 1969): 25.

169. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 25, 117; Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 

5 March 1971, C-21 to C-24; Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company 

Command in Vietnam, Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Lemos L. Fulmer Jr., 

1983, 61, MHI; “Mechanized Operations in Vietnam,” 24 January 1974, 1, MHI; 

Colonel George S. Patton, “Pile-On—Part II,” Armor LXXIX, no. 2 (March–April 

1970): 27.

170. Colonel George S. Patton, “Pile On,” Armor LXXIX, no. 1 (January–

February 1970): 26.

171. Ibid., 26.

172. Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 48.

173. Moreau, “Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 

31 July 1968,” 4.
259

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

174. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 

to 7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 20, 115, 117, 118, 120; Nutting, “Senior Officer 

Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, I-59. Rome Plows were armored bulldozers 

used to clear heavy vegetation. They were named for the manufacturer of the 

plow, the Rome Plow Company in Rome, Georgia.

175. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Quinn, 1985, 9; Patton, “Pile On,” 25.

176. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” G-1, H-6.

177. Ibid., III-1 to III-2, III-6, B-21 to B-22, B-37.

178. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel John D. Collins, 1982, 3–9, MHI; Captain 

Franklin Y. Hartline, “Route Security in the Central Highlands,” Armor LXXVIII, 

no. 6 (November–December 1969): 21–24.

179. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Montgomery, 1983, 47–48; Senior 

Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, Interview of 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Davis, 23; Company Command in Vietnam, 

Fulmer, 58; Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 24, 117.

180. Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 58.

181. Brigadier General John C. Bahnsen, Colonel Arthur L. West III, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas H. Starr, “Attacking Dismounted Infantry 

with Armored Cavalry,” Armor XCV, no. 5 (September–October 1986): 8–15; 

Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 38, 61; Company Command in Vietnam, 

Davis, 13; Antila, “Mechanized Operations in the Delta”; Antila to Dramis, letter, 

2 January 1973; Cook, “Report of Combat Action,” 1 September 1968. 

182. Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 40; Company Command in 

Vietnam, Montgomery, 51–52.

183. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” G-5 to G‐8; 

Bahnsen, “Attacking Dismounted Infantry with Armored Cavalry,” 8–15; 

Company Command in Vietnam, 50–51.

184. Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 40; Bahnsen, “Attacking 

Dismounted Infantry with Armored Cavalry,” 8–15.

185. Company Command in Vietnam, Montgomery, 52.

186. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Timothy J. Grogan, 1981, 45, MHI; Antila to 

Dramis, letter, 2 January 1973, 2.

187. Antila to Dramis, letter, 2 January 1973, 2.

188. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” III-29; Mechanized 

Operations in Vietnam, Brookshire, 121.

189. Company Command in Vietnam, Grogan, 18–19, quotation from page 

18.

190. Senior Officer Oral History Program, Company Command in Vietnam, 

Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Edgar B. Morrison, 1983, 20–21, MHI; Company 

Command in Vietnam, Davis, 13, 51; Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 66; 
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Chapter 5

Company Command in Vietnam, Collins, 36; Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing 

Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 39, 43–44; Lieutenant 

Colonel Roy F. Sullivan, “The APC in ARVN,” Armor LXXIX, no. 1 (January–

February 1970): 38.

191. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 39, 43–44, quotation from page 39.

192. Company Command in Vietnam, Fulmer, 66; Starry, “Senior Officer 

Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 54; Nutting, 

“Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, G-42; Starry, Mounted Combat 

in Vietnam, 143–145.

193. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” II-1. The total 

number of combat vehicle losses included 1,342 M113s and 308 M48A3. Total 

tracked combat and support vehicles equaled 1,856.

194. Company Command in Vietnam, Montgomery, 48. The percentage rate 

translated into 427 vehicles.

195. US Army Concept Team in Vietnam, “Final Report,” II-1; Starry, 

“Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 7 JUN 70,” 12 June 

1970, 8; Moreau, “Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 

31 July 1968,” I-1; Fairey, “Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period 

Ending 31 July 1969,” 4, 27.

196. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 9.

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid., 8–9, all quotations from page 9.

199. Ibid., 21.

200. Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, I-59 to I‐60; 

Major Edward J. Chesney, “The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment In Vietnam, 

January 1969 Through June 1970” (master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2002), 

78; Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 171–176.

201. Starry, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report—11th ACR, 7 DEC 69 to 

7 JUN 70,” 12 June 1970, 20.

202. Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, 1-3, A-9, 

C-22 to C-23.

203. Ibid., 4, quotation from pages A-8 and A-9.

204. Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 186–187, 190–197. For a 

description of the US role in this operation, see Keith W. Nolan, Into Laos: The 

Story of Dewey Canyon II/Lam Song 719; Vietnam 1971 (Novato, CA: Presidio 

Press, 1986).

205. Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, 2–3, 6; 

Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, 199–200.

206. US Army Armor School, Special Text 17-1-3, Armor in Vietnam (Fort 

Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 1970).

207. US Army Armor School, Vietnam Battle Tricks (Fort Knox, KY: US 

Army Armor School, 1973), 3-1 to 3-7, quotation from page 1-1.
261

Vietnam: Reconnaissance in COIN Operations

208. Department of the Army, FM 17-36, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, 

and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron (Washington, DC: Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, 1973), 2-2 to 2-4, 3-11. Pages 3-5 through 3-9 provide a 

good example of the improved graphics used to illustrate integrated action at the 

platoon level.

209. Ibid., 1-6, 3-15 to 3-17, 3-29.

210. Ibid., 7-2, 7-4, quotation from page 10-1.

211. Ibid., 15-1 to 15-7.

212. Nutting, “Senior Officer Debriefing Report,” 5 March 1971, D-28 to 

D-29, quotation from page D-29.

213. Company Command in Vietnam, Grogan, 20–21.

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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

Between the Vietnam War and Operation DESERT STORM, mounted 

reconnaissance underwent significant changes in organization, doctrine, 

and training. These developments reflected the Army’s reorientation from 

counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia to conventional battle in Central 

Europe. They left mounted reconnaissance in a state of flux for much of the 

period. Moreover, the slow fielding of new materiel complicated efforts to 

improve training and eliminated uniformity among reconnaissance assets 

at the corps, division, and battalion levels. In the 1980s, budgetary realities 

and experience gained at the National Training Center (NTC) encouraged 

a shift away from robust, versatile reconnaissance organizations toward 

ones with reduced capabilities. This transition became particularly evident 

in the division cavalry squadron and maneuver battalion scout platoon. 

Both units shed combat power and a broad mission set for lighter configurations intended for information collection. This development paralleled 

organizational concepts adopted during World War II but found ineffective 

in combat and discarded after that conflict. Operation DESERT STORM 

similarly demonstrated problems with the new reconnaissance configurations and encouraged a return to more capable units.

Army 86

The 1973 Paris Peace Accords ended American military involvement 

in South Vietnam. There Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army activity 

increased and led to the unification of Vietnam under Communist rule in 

1975. By then the US Army had transitioned to an all-volunteer force, 

and its strength fell from a wartime high of 1,570,343 soldiers to 775,051. 

In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, the popularity of military service 

fell, and the Army soon faced significant personnel shortfalls. It also faced 

the continuous threat of Warsaw Pact forces poised to invade the Federal 

Republic of Germany. The Army responded by manning its forces in 

Europe at full strength and stripping personnel from formations stationed 

in the United States. The latter received Reserve Component “roundout” 

elements to offset their losses, but they still faced significant training and 

readiness problems.1

Army reorganization abolished the Continental Army Command 

(CONARC). This organization oversaw all Army activities in the United 

States, but it had become too large and unwieldy. In July 1973, Forces 

Command (FORSCOM) and the Training and Doctrine Command 
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(TRADOC) replaced it. The former monitored the status of units stationed 

in the country, while the latter assumed responsibility for the development 

of training, doctrine, and materiel. TRADOC became the central influence 

in rebuilding the Army for a conventional war in Central Europe. There, 

the Warsaw Pact posed a persistent threat. Its capabilities had grown during the period of American involvement in Vietnam, eroding whatever 

technological superiority the United States and its NATO allies had possessed. Warsaw Pact forces also retained a significant advantage in numbers of combat personnel and major weapons systems.2

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War underscored the very real danger 

posed by improved Warsaw Pact materiel. In that conflict, Egyptian and 

Syrian forces, lavishly equipped with Soviet-made vehicles and weapons, 

inflicted early defeats on the Israeli Defense Force. Reliance on surfaceto-air missiles negated Israeli air superiority, while the intelligent and 

extensive use of antitank guided missiles (ATGM) and rocket propelled 

grenades (RPGs) dealt tank-heavy Israeli ground units heavy losses. Israel 

won the war, but it did so at a cost in men and materiel that it could ill 

afford.

The Middle East conflict introduced a much more lethal battlefield. New 

antitank weapons eroded the tank’s battlefield supremacy and underscored 

the importance of combined arms teams. Mobile antiaircraft platforms and 

surface-to-air missiles made air supremacy problematic, while the newer 

Soviet vehicles fielded by the Arab armies similarly disproved notions of 

Western technical overmatch. The surprise nature of the Arab attacks called 

into question the traditional American reliance on a lengthy mobilization 

process. Strategic planners were forced to acknowledge that a future 

conflict might occur with little warning and even wars outside Europe 

carried the likelihood of encounters with a heavy mechanized enemy.

3

Figure 77. Cavalry platoon in Germany illustrating the mixed composition of 

M60 tanks and M114s.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

The Army responded by overhauling combat organizations, doctrine, 

materiel, and training. TRADOC and its commander, Lieutenant General 

William E. DePuy, played a central role in this reorientation from counterinsurgency to conventional operations on battlefields dominated by mechanized and antiarmor systems. DePuy worked to improve Army readiness 

to permit its commitment to combat without awaiting the completion of 

national mobilization. He sought a force optimized to employ a variety 

of weapons in a mobile environment. To achieve this objective, “the U.S. 

Army would have to be retrained, starting at the lowest levels and working 

up, to think about combat as a problem of weapons system integration.”4

A doctrinal update followed. In July 1976, the Army published a new 

FM 100-5, Operations. This manual governed the conduct of battle and 

related training principles. It embodied ideas nurtured by the TRADOC 

commander and reflected his emphasis on conventional operations in 

Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Given the likelihood of fighting outnumbered, the new manual stressed the importance of armored firepower and 

mobility to achieve success. Armored formations conducted a defense in 

depth to erode enemy combat power and create the conditions for a decisive counterstrike. In this concept of operations, the tank constituted the 

principal weapon system. Infantry in armored vehicles maneuvered alongside the tanks to eliminate antitank systems, while helicopters provided 

aerial antitank support in a marked departure from their role in Vietnam. 

These ideas formed the essence of Active Defense, a new doctrine intended 

to blunt and destroy a Warsaw Pact invasion.5

Implementing the new doctrine 

in Europe fell to Lieutenant General 

Donn A. Starry. While commanding 

the Armor Center from June 1973 until 

February 1976, he played a central role 

in crafting the new FM 100-5. On his 

promotion and assumption of V Corps 

command, he worked to apply Active 

Defense in the Federal Republic of 

Germany. However, his experience 

soon convinced him of the need to 

extend the battle area to include defeat 

of enemy follow-on echelons rather 

than just the initial wave of attackers. 

Otherwise, the defending forces risked 

winning the first battle only to be overwhelmed by successive attacks.6

Figure 78. Major General 

Donn A. Starry.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Chapter 6

Starry’s concerns coincided with growing criticism of Active Defense. 

The new doctrine was considered too tactical in nature and too defenseoriented. It offered little guidance for operational maneuver at the corps 

level. It also assumed a Warsaw Pact offensive along a single axis on 

which defending measures could be concentrated. Soviet doctrine changed 

to embrace multipronged attacks intended to identify vulnerable areas into 

which follow-on echelons could pour. Active Defense principles seemed 

much less viable against such a multidimensional threat that kept the 

defender off balance and unable to concentrate on a decisive point.7

Critics also questioned the European focus of Active Defense. The 

Warsaw Pact constituted a critical danger, but the Army also faced challenges in other regions. American forces remained deployed on the Korean 

peninsula as a deterrent to possible North Korean aggression. In 1979, 

the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

represented the emergence of new threats abroad. The Army sought a doctrinal base with global applicability that embraced the entire arsenal of 

conventional and unconventional weapons to defeat enemy forward and 

support elements in their entirety.8

Growing concern about Active Defense extended to related organizational studies. In 1976, the Division Restructuring Study reviewed division composition in the context of the new FM 100-5. The study aimed at 

upgrading the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) configuration and ensuring the effective integration of new weapons into tactical 

units. The resultant heavy division organization eliminated a maneuver 

battalion, included smaller battalions, and simplified company command 

through the removal of weapons systems. The division cavalry squadron 

also underwent alteration, primarily through the transfer of its air cavalry 

troop to division control. The proposed formation never evolved from a 

planning stage, but the related study encouraged further work on division 

redesign.9

In 1977, General Starry began a 4-year tenure as TRADOC commander, succeeding General DePuy. Starry implemented a more comprehensive organizational analysis based on intelligence projections through 

1986. The initiative became known as Army 86 and included related studies of army, corps, and division formations. Division reform embraced the 

need for a powerful, self-sufficient design capable of sustained operations 

against a mechanized enemy. It included robust combat service support 

and raised the personnel strength of the division to 20,000 soldiers.10

Such a powerful formation made sense in light of the Warsaw Pact 

threat it was designed to fight. Unfortunately, implementing Army 86 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

initiatives throughout the force required additional funding and an increase 

in the Army’s end strength. Neither could be secured from a Congress 

already supporting burgeoning expenses associated with the procurement 

of an array of new materiel. Therefore, TRADOC struggled to balance its 

Army 86 personnel requirements with the existing end strength cap by 

streamlining division organizations and increasing reliance on the Reserve 

Component. These measures proved expedient, but they did not resolve 

the discrepancy between the desire for powerful combat formations and a 

rigid personnel cap.11

Amid the organizational redesigns, the acquisition of new materiel 

occurred at a slow pace. As the 1970s ended, the Army anticipated the 

fielding of over 40 major equipment items, but cost increases and development problems repeatedly delayed fielding into the future. Hence, units in 

the field made do with a variety of interim configurations using existing 

materiel. This lack of synchronization among doctrine development, fielding of new equipment, and organizational changes introduced a degree 

of confusion into the field forces, including those units charged with 

reconnaissance.12

Reconnaissance Refocused

In the 1970s, mounted reconnaissance development paralleled the 

emergence of Active Defense and the Army’s reorientation toward conventional combat in Europe. General Starry played a central role in this 

shift and embodied it. Having led the 11th Armored Cavalry in Vietnam, 

he commanded the Armor Center from 1973 to 1976 and subsequently V 

Corps and TRADOC. He proved a key influence on the doctrinal developments that led to the 1976 version of FM 100-5 and its later revision. 

Within the armor community, his views directly influenced reconnaissance 

doctrine, training, and organization.13

Analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War convinced Starry of three central points. Long-range, antiarmor systems appeared to play a dominant 

role on the battlefield. Air defense systems directly threatened the availability of close air support. Finally, he noted:

The US Army must learn to fight outnumbered and win. 

The masses of armor and air defense weaponry employed 

by Israel’s foes not only testify to a Soviet ability to supply 

her allies with vast amounts of first line materiel, but portend the masses of such systems the Soviets themselves 

would use. The tank force ratios on the Golan Heights in 

October 1973 were not at all unlike those to be expected 

in Central Europe should war occur there.14
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Chapter 6

Starry believed this battlefield environment required fresh tactics and a 

new understanding of combat operations. Combined arms teams remained 

valid, effective tools. Tanks sought the destruction of hostile armor and 

performed reconnaissance as a secondary role. Infantry maneuvered with 

the tanks to destroy enemy antitank systems and engage hostile armor with 

sophisticated weaponry. Overhead, helicopters provided aerial antitank 

platforms. Cavalry sought to identify enemy weaknesses for the combined 

arms team to attack and screen friendly vulnerabilities. The entire focus 

of the team lay in offensive action to seize and retain the initiative, even 

when the overall strategy proved defensive, as in the Federal Republic of 

Germany.15

Starry considered the nullification of hostile antiarmor weapons through 

active and passive measures vital to tactical success. In addition to direct 

engagement, he expected units to rely on careful terrain use, suppressive 

fires, and operations at night and in low visibility conditions to minimize 

their exposure. To secure reaction time and concentrate friendly forces on 

a particular threat, hostile forces needed to be detected and observed at 

the greatest distance possible. This role constituted one central to cavalry 

organizations, but it raised anew the question of how best to organize and 

equip them. Starry led this discussion and raised new possibilities to consider, including the potential transfer of traditional cavalry responsibilities 

to helicopter organizations.16

To study the role and organization of cavalry, the Cavalry Scout Ad 

Hoc Committee convened at Fort Knox. It analyzed issues related to 

mounted operations in both a Middle Eastern and European environment. 

The committee’s final, classified report affirmed the need for an organization specifically devoted to the conduct of reconnaissance, security to 

include guard and covering force operations, and economy of force missions. The last role assumed greater significance within an Active Defense 

context. Cavalry helped to provide the minimal force necessary to secure 

an area and permit the consolidation of friendly combat assets at the decisive point. In the performance of these missions, cavalry was generally 

expected to fight, necessitating combined arms organization and tactics.17

Starry characterized the study as “the first extensive review and analysis of cavalry doctrine and organization since the Stillwell Board accomplished a similar task in 1948.” Through historical analysis, it provided 

a justification for cavalry organizations in the future and constituted the 

mounted community’s response to any question of the need for cavalry. Its 

organizational assessment served to improve battlefield effectiveness, but 

its emphasis on the use of common unit types also suggested how savings 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

in personnel and funding might be obtained. The study’s outline of the 

role of cavalry provided the conceptual framework necessary to guide further scout vehicle development. More than one armor luminary shared the 

study’s belief that scout functions required special training and a unique 

organization.18

The committee also found cavalry organizations in need of substantial 

strengthening to permit operations against a heavily mechanized threat. 

It recommended changes at the squadron and troop levels, but its most 

important proposals concerned the platoon, which was considered the basic 

organizational building block for cavalry units.19 At the time of the study, 

it included seven M113s for the headquarters, scouts, and rifle squad; a 

M106 mortar carrier; and three M551 Sheridans in its light armor section. 

Despite the platoon’s size, it lacked the combat power and survivability 

considered necessary for either European or Middle Eastern battlefields. 

These concerns encouraged the design of a less complex organization with 

increased combat effectiveness.20

The committee proposed a modified platoon structure. It eliminated 

the mortar and rifle squads while increasing tank strength. Instead of a 

combined arms mix, the new platoon included a command vehicle, a tank 

section with four main battle tanks, and a four-vehicle scout section. Based 

Figure 79. Cavalry M114s prepare for operations, 1973.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
270

Chapter 6

on M113 platforms, the scout section included two vehicles armed with 

a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile launcher 

and two equipped with an automatic cannon. Each scout vehicle was also 

intended to carry a motorcycle for reconnaissance or messenger duties. 

The scouts collected information, created obstacles, employed mines, 

conducted limited demolition, and acquired targets for other weapons 

systems. The tank section provided the platoon backbone of long-range 

antiarmor firepower. The mortars migrated to troop control, but they could 

be detached to platoon control as necessary. Similarly, the new platoon 

structure offset loss of the rifle squad through an increase in scout vehicle 

crews. In Vietnam, the squad had often been dispersed through the platoon 

to offset insufficient crew size. The new platoon configuration formalized 

this field practice.21

Support for the proposed organization came from the 3d Armored 

Cavalry. The regimental commander found it reflective of the views held 

by his subordinate commanders. They supported increasing the number of 

soldiers assigned to each scout vehicle and accepted the loss of the rifle 

squad, since it often became “the replacement center for the rest of the 

platoon’s elements.” The proposed platoon also rationalized maintenance 

support and reduced the number of different military occupational specialties (MOSs) represented. Collectively, these changes reduced the platoon’s 

complexity, which had posed a longstanding challenge to effective training. Moreover, the mix of main battle tanks and armored scouts ensured 

that the platoon possessed “a high degree of probability of arriving intact 

at its designated place on the battlefield.”22

The simplified platoon addressed a number of training concerns. In 

the new volunteer army, training standards fell. Drug abuse and indiscipline undermined readiness at a time when the Army strove to improve 

its ability to enter combat on short notice. At the small unit level, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) managed training and sustained combat 

effectiveness. In armor and cavalry units, they often served as vehicle 

commanders. However, in the 1970s, the Armor Branch experienced significant trouble acquiring and retaining experienced NCOs. This problem 

reflected an Army-wide dearth of NCOs and inadequate training for those 

available. Simpler organizations helped to mitigate the effects of a weakened NCO corps.23

In armor and cavalry units, NCOs played a central role in training 

gunnery skills, which were considered vital to a unit’s ability to fight 

outnumbered and win. The short-range nature of most engagements in 

Vietnam coupled with declining readiness eroded the ability to perform 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

long-range gunnery. In the European operational environment, the 

ability to engage Warsaw Pact combat vehicles from afar could make the 

difference between life and death. The absence of sufficient numbers of 

trained and experienced NCOs only undermined efforts to revitalize this 

core competency. In 1974, FORSCOM responded with a series of actions 

intended to improve gunnery training, including the assignment of master 

gunners to tank battalions and cavalry squadrons. The Armor School 

published a new gunnery manual that standardized procedures and placed 

them in a more realistic operational context.24

Under General Starry’s guidance, the Armor School also issued a series 

of training circulars to help units improve their effectiveness. They further served to encourage the adoption of the doctrinal principles of Active 

Defense without awaiting publication of a new round of manuals. In this 

manner, changes considered critical to tactical operations could be implemented rapidly. The circulars proved prescriptive in nature and included 

greatly simplified tactics and procedures to facilitate rapid improvements 

in readiness and basic skills.25 Collectively, they constituted a doctrinal 

change whose acceptance in the field depended on a clear explanation of 

their purpose and value. Starry understood that “it will not suffice to simply send our training circulars out and trust that they will be acclaimed on 

the basis of their eminent logic.”26

Reaction to the circulars proved less than positive. Despite its support 

for the proposed platoon, the leadership of the 3d Armored Cavalry, for 

example, found them too rigid. The circulars introduced a new tactical 

vocabulary, restrained offensive actions, and prescribed new movement 

techniques. Their collective impact appeared to contradict the organizational and tactical flexibility traditionally associated with cavalry organizations. The circulars particularly impacted platoon operations and reduced 

the platoon leader’s ability to exercise his initiative. Within the regiment, 

fears arose that proven doctrine was being replaced by rigid principles. 

“Again, who, what poll, and what study says that tank or armored cavalry 

platoon formations and battle drills are too numerous, too complex, or so 

restrictive as to mentally emasculate a platoon leader in combat?”27

In fact, the circulars responded to general concerns about the state of 

armor and cavalry readiness, which may not have been valid for all units. 

Nevertheless, serious problems did exist. The cavalry and scout study conducted at Fort Knox suggested that the armored cavalry platoon was too 

complex and posed a command span problem for the platoon leader.28 The 

negative reactions to the training circulars led General Starry to conclude, 

“It takes a great deal to overcome the rigidity of thinking we’ve engrained 
272

Chapter 6

over the years in our service school dogmas about tactical formations and 

related matters.”29

The training circulars and proposed change in platoon organization 

generated considerable concern among junior leaders charged with their 

implementation. They did not always understand or agree with either the 

need for change or the rationale provided. The tank-scout mix proposed 

coupled with the loss of the mortar and rifle squads fed fears of a reduction in the platoon’s effectiveness and versatility.30 These sentiments found 

blunt expression in the comment “before we castrate that platoon let us 

reevaluate all of its functions and proven capabilities.”31

Advocates of stealthy reconnaissance rejected the new platoon’s 

increased combat power. They noted that organizations equipped for battle generally became engaged to the detriment of information gathering. 

The inclusion of main battle tanks and TOW-equipped scout platforms 

increased the likelihood of commanders misusing the platoon as another 

maneuver unit without respect to its unique skills. Already during maneuvers in the Federal Republic of Germany, such a trend had become manifest. Main battle tanks also tended to erode the mobility of the platoon and 

returned a mobility differential long absent from the unit. The M60A1 

tanks intended to replace the Sheridans lacked an amphibious capability, 

could not maneuver on narrow streets or defiles, and proved more limited 

in their ability to traverse bridges. They simply did not possess the same 

mobility as the scout platforms they were intended to support.32

An increase in the equipment issued to scouts indicated a clear trend 

toward more combat power. It fueled concerns that “we may be unduly

influenced by the events of the October War and the antitank, defenseoriented thinking surrounding organization for combat in Central Europe.”33

To one outspoken critic of the new platoon, “Radar sets, mine detectors, 

demolition kits, 55-pound IR alarms, NBC alarms, laser rangefinders, 

laser target designators, and intricate and bulky sights are to be supplied 

the scout, when most scouts want only a good pair of binoculars, a clear 

night vision device, and some small, quiet vehicle to get them as close as 

possible to the enemy.”34

The initial recommendation for the new platoon included two different 

configurations of an M113. This platform changed in favor of the more 

heavily armored Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV). The latter 

originated from an infantry requirement for an armored combat vehicle 

that permitted its passengers to fight mounted or dismounted and carry 

sufficient protection to survive on a battlefield dominated by armored 

systems. Intended to operate alongside main battle tanks, the MICV 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

constituted a response to the Soviet BMP series of vehicles, but it remained 

a work in progress throughout the 1970s.

The trend toward an M60A1/MICV mix in the scout platoon did little to assuage concerns over the organization. With only large armored 

vehicles, the unit seemed unsuited for effective reconnaissance, sacrificing mobility and agility for armor protection and an array of tank-killing 

systems. The combination tempted crews to engage targets at the expense 

of information collection and seemed to promote the platoon’s misuse 

as a conventional maneuver unit.35 This view found support from Major 

General George S. Patton, commanding the 2d Armored Division, who 

considered the scout too heavily armed: “His normal reaction is to become 

a killer of sorts and the historically important reconnaissance and security 

role suffers accordingly.”36

Debate over the 

scout’s role and platform occurred within 

the broader context of 

justifying the need for 

cavalry. Critics outside the armor community suggested that 

armor and mechanized infantry could 

perform much of 

the cavalry mission. 

Providing an effective 

response constituted 

a perpetual duty for 

cavalry commanders. 

Hence, the 1977 Armor Conference included a presentation by the 11th 

Armored Cavalry commander that linked cavalry organizations with the 

effective implementation of Active Defense. Through information gathering and reporting, cavalry facilitated a commander’s ability to see the 

battlefield and concentrate friendly forces on enemy weakness. Conversely, 

through security and economy of force operations, cavalry denied this 

same ability to opposing commanders. These missions required the growing combat power of cavalry organizations and mastery of a much broader 

skill set than required by conventional maneuver units.37

Comparison of a cavalry task force with an equivalent armor or 

mechanized infantry grouping further underscored cavalry’s value. The 

Figure 80. The M901 Improved Tow Vehicle (ITV).

Courtesy Armor Magazine
274

Chapter 6

cavalry task force possessed far more communications devices, which 

directly facilitated command, control, and operational flexibility. Indeed, 

emphasis on a robust communications network had become synonymous 

with cavalry organizations since the interwar years. In a 1970s context, 

the communications advantage translated into a superior ability to share 

information quickly and drive the command decisions necessary to fight 

and win outnumbered on the Active Defense battlefield.38

Yet the very scope of the cavalry mission set necessitated careful attention to training. Each squadron of an armored cavalry regiment included 

soldiers representing 37 different MOSs and over 300 vehicles and trailers. 

The complexity of the organization necessitated simultaneous training of 

different squadron components and decentralized command. The essence 

of all cavalry organizations, however, lay in the individual scout, whose 

training assumed special importance. He required the ability to:

. . . employ all of the firepower available. He must be 

capable of finding the enemy and knowing what he sees. 

He should be able to go forward to find the enemy and 

have the firepower with and behind him to get out of trouble. Most of all he must be capable of semi-independent 

operations on the battlefield. He must be resourceful—he 

must be the most clever of all fellows. He takes individual 

actions that are not dictated by the actions of what other 

squads or platoons are taking; no one is constantly looking over his shoulder.39

The multifaceted nature of cavalry scouts made them different from 

soldiers assigned to noncavalry organizations. Yet their unique nature did 

not prevent recommendations to restructure or reassign them. One recommendation included the elimination of maneuver battalion scout platoons 

and their replacement by a smaller unit at the brigade level. Another proposal called for a transfer of responsibility for mounted scout development 

to the infantry. More radical still was a call to eliminate ground and air 

scouts all together.40

In defense of scouts and cavalry organizations, the armor leadership 

again worked to demonstrate the importance of both. It acknowledged 

the need to improve the air-ground cavalry relationship, but it challenged 

the wisdom of eliminating cavalry organizations. Such a move would not 

improve the ability of maneuver units to function on the battlefield. Instead, 

“commanders would still be required to dedicate elements of their force to 

perform reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions—which 

could cause a 1/3 reduction in the size of their combat power.” Despite 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

improvements in electronic and aerial means of gathering intelligence, a 

persistent need existed for a force capable of continuous, all-weather and 

all-terrain information collection, even against determined opposition.41

Active Defense Reconnaissance Doctrine

In 1977, new field manuals superseded the earlier Armor School training circulars. FM 17-95, Cavalry, addressed cavalry operations in general. This manual addressed most cavalry units from the armored cavalry 

regiment down to the platoon. Platoon actions received the most attention, 

since they constituted the basic cavalry element and the principal agent for 

executing many tactical missions. This small unit orientation helped to foster the growth of a new generation of cavalry soldiers immersed in Active 

Defense. Missing from the manual was guidance for battalion scouts that 

acknowledged their differences from armored cavalry platoons.42

Reconnaissance and security conducted by combined arms teams constituted primary missions. Cavalry embodied economy of force, providing 

commanders maneuver space and reaction time. It located and engaged 

enemy forces, relying on its communications architecture to facilitate the 

actions of movement, observation, suppression, and destruction. Cavalry 

organizations did not passively watch the battlefield. Instead, the manual 

considered them active players on it who “must frequently destroy sufficient enemy forces to convince the enemy to break off an attack, to give up 

a defensive area, or to move toward or away from an area vital to friendly 

forces. Therefore, more often than not, cavalry will have to fight to accomplish its mission.”43

The manual’s aggressive tone reflected the lethal operational environment in which cavalry would operate and incorporated lessons learned from 

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Dominated by long-range antiarmor systems 

supplemented by increasingly effective artillery and air defense weapons, 

the battlefield posed significant challenges to cavalry operations. Mounted 

units not only had to survive; they also needed to achieve kill ratios as high 

as five-to-one. They needed to identify and fire on the enemy first, while 

utilizing mobility, overwatch techniques, terrain, and suppressive fires to 

offset his numerical superiority. Night operations became a normal activity and constituted a continuation of daytime information gathering. The 

extensive coverage given to Soviet vehicles, tactics, and doctrine left little 

doubt as to the manual’s European orientation.44

Reconnaissance guidance included air and ground cavalry operations. 

It provided details of platoon actions from preparation to planning through 

execution. Extensive vignettes walked the reader through a mission from 
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receipt of a warning order to conclusion. They included common events 

that might arise during operations and illustrated how to respond to each. 

These vignettes proved somewhat prescriptive in nature but showed new 

platoon leaders and NCOs how to survive typical battlefield developments. 

In a change from earlier manuals, platoon command and control guidance 

stressed the use of hand, arm, and signal flags rather than radios to avoid 

enemy jamming and interception.45

Basic reconnaissance principles remained unchanged. Information 

collection occurred through a combination of mounted and dismounted 

operations. Ground scouts relied on stealth to move and observe undetected, their actions overwatched at a distance by the platoon’s vehicles. 

Basic reconnaissance missions continued to include zone, area, and route. 

Regardless of the type of reconnaissance performed, scouts sought to reach 

their objective quickly without ignoring any hostile presence discovered 

en route. Instead, “enemy forces found in a platoon’s zone are destroyed, 

neutralized, or bypassed. A platoon does not bypass an enemy force without permission.”46

The inclusion of longstanding guidelines for scout operations did not 

alter the manual’s overall emphasis on aggressive reconnaissance and the 

related need to fight for information. When contact appeared likely, reconnaissance teams concentrated to ensure sufficient combat power. During 

route reconnaissance, for example, an entire troop was assigned to a single 

avenue of advance and platoons were not split to provide broader coverage. In the event of a hostile contact, the manual provided clear criteria to 

help the reconnaissance commander determine whether to attack, seek permission to bypass, or simply observe the enemy. When a firefight ensued, 

the reconnaissance unit developed the situation through fire and maneuver. 

Although stealth techniques served to minimize the frequency of sudden 

combat, clearly the writers expected combat to occur sooner or later.

47

Coverage of troop and squadron reconnaissance operations proved 

much less extensive and largely limited to guiding principles and planning 

concerns. Squadron guidance included the employment of fire support, air 

cavalry, and the use of tank companies either organic to regimental squadrons or sometimes attached to division cavalry. Tanks constituted a strike 

force or a reserve to sustain forward momentum and to prevent subordinate troops and platoons from becoming decisively engaged. Although 

considered less than ideal for reconnaissance, they provided the antitank 

capability deemed necessary under Active Defense.48

Security operations included employment in screen, guard, and covering force roles in addition to offensive and defensive actions. Cavalry units 
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participated in combat down to the platoon level, whose tank sections possessed discretionary authority regarding when to engage the enemy. In general, security operations served to “provide reaction time, maneuver space, 

and information about the enemy to the main body. Security includes all 

measures taken to prevent observation, annoyance, surprise, espionage, 

or sabotage.” Reconnaissance remained an integral part of security as did 

rear area protection, but the latter received far less attention than more 

conventional operations along the forward edge of the battle area.49

In the execution of both reconnaissance and security missions, cavalry 

organizations could expect to benefit from the use of ground surveillance 

radars and remotely employed sensors. These electronic devices had been 

used in Vietnam with some success. Found at the cavalry squadron and 

troop levels, radar helped to monitor select areas, survey distant objectives, 

provide target locations for fire support, and detect targets in low visibility 

conditions. Sensors were attached as necessary and served to monitor a 

particular area. However, specific guidance for the employment of these 

devices proved minimal. In contrast, the appendix devoted to urban operations offered tips regarding the use of cavalry weapons and personnel in 

buildings and on streets. It provided tactical guidance for units expected to 

fight in the industrialized and urbanized Federal Republic of Germany.

50

The 1978 publication of FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations, placed division cavalry squadron actions in the context 

of operations by its parent formation. Like other cavalry organizations, the 

squadron sought to locate enemy forces and prevent the parent division 

from being caught unaware. It served as an economy of force element, 

providing key information about the enemy with the least application of 

combat power. Despite access to a variety of information-gathering means, 

“the division commander will almost always have to make decisions based 

on incomplete data. Therefore, the more he knows about enemy weapons 

and supporting systems, tactics, psychology, and the terrain, the better his 

decision will be.” The division cavalry helped to secure this information 

and helped the commander to understand the battlefield. Reconnaissance 

in force operations constituted the most common method of securing this 

information, although the squadron’s ability to track enemy follow-on 

echelons proved limited.51

In contrast to cavalry organizations, the maneuver battalion scout 

platoons received considerably less doctrinal coverage. Their operations 

were addressed in the 1977 version of FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized 

Infantry Battalion Task Force. Scout platoon activities remained focused 

on direct support of the battalion. Like cavalry organizations, the scouts 
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helped the battalion commander understand the battlefield and avoid surprises sprung by the enemy. In doing so, the platoon could expect the 

attachment of ground surveillance radar teams from the parent battalion. 

Although the platoons possessed some antitank capability, the manual 

warned against their misuse as a maneuver unit at the expense of its primary functions.52

Scout platoon reconnaissance included the traditional zone, area, and 

route orientation. Security missions focused on screen and guard operations, and the related establishment of observation points. The latter provided early warning to the battalion. They were to be established and 

function undetected. In the event of an attack, the scouts withdrew, fighting 

only in self-defense. The platoon conducted guard missions only as part of 

a larger force. Overall, the manual considered reconnaissance and security mission inseparable and the platoon’s primary roles. However, scouts 

also supported the battalion through reconnaissance of assembly areas and 

potential engagement areas, liaison with adjacent units, and the emplacement of limited obstacles and demolitions. They guided the battalion’s 

movement and conducted chemical and radiological surveys. When necessary, the scout platoon eliminated enemy observation posts and executed 

ambushes.53

Figure 81. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle in Germany during the 1980s

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Scout platoon coverage included clear, proven principles. Even so, 

details indicating how to apply these principles proved largely absent. The 

nurturing tone found in FM 17-95 for cavalry organizations found little 

parallel. Instead, the battalion task force manual left the scout platoon’s 

employment to the battalion commander and the platoon leader to determine. This doctrinal gap impacted training and could not promote a sound 

understanding of battalion scout operations. Consequently, commanders 

were left to develop their own techniques for the use of scouts, resulting 

in a lack of uniformity that paralleled similar variations among reconnaissance organizations and equipment. 

Organizational Flux

Army reorientation toward operations in Central Europe against a 

highly mechanized threat triggered a series of changes in mounted reconnaissance organizations. The most significant changes occurred in the 

armored cavalry platoon, evidenced by an array of different vehicle mixes. 

This variation impacted the configuration of division cavalry squadrons 

and armored cavalry regiments, both subject to periodic adjustments to 

their organic combat and service support. By the decade’s end, three different armored cavalry regiment structures existed with similar variety 

among the division squadrons. Procurement decisions constituted the 

principal cause for this organizational hodgepodge. The Army committed 

to the fielding of a new reconnaissance platform, but delays in its development forced reliance on expedient and interim organizations with available vehicles. 

One of the first changes occurred in January 1973, when the platoons 

of armored cavalry regiments in Europe began to exchange the M114s 

of their headquarters and scout sections for M551 Sheridans. The altered 

configuration included a headquarters section and two scout sections, each 

equipped with two Sheridans. The mortar squad and rifle squad remained, 

mounted in M113 platforms, giving a total strength of 38 soldiers and 8 

vehicles. The revised platoon constituted a major increase in firepower, 

while elimination of the gas-powered M114 simplified supply. All platoon 

vehicles now consumed diesel fuel.54

Training issues soon arose, because many scouts were unfamiliar with 

the Sheridan and replacement personnel received no institutional instruction on this vehicle. The platoon now resembled a tank unit, but the first 

regiment to convert opted to retain the scout-orientation of its crews. The 

Sheridan served as a platform to support scout operations, albeit with 

greater mobility and firepower than the M114. Scout squads were trained 

to operate independently and focus on information gathering rather than on 
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becoming tankers. The Sheridan’s weapon system, optics, and smoke laying improved their ability to see and survive on the battlefield. Conversely, 

its larger size and noise signature required special attention to terrain use 

and careful management of the engine to prevent excessive noise or highly 

visible exhaust plumes. These drawbacks encouraged greater reliance on 

dismounted patrols by the rifle squad or individual crewmembers.55

The “Y” formation became the most common formation for the platoon. In this arrangement, the headquarters section, mortar carrier, and 

rifle squad remained in the center of the platoon area, with each scout section forward on the left and right. The platoon leader retained the position 

and means with which to reinforce either scout section. During security 

missions, the platoon expanded its ability to perform screens by employing its headquarters and scout sections to man observation points that they 

could also defend. The Sheridan’s mix of firepower and mobility similarly 

enhanced the platoon’s ability to perform delay missions, but the tendency 

of Sheridan crews to engage targets whenever possible clashed with their 

observation and reporting roles.56

In 1977, regimental cavalry platoons in Europe underwent modification. The headquarters section and rifle squad disappeared, leaving the 

platoon with three reconnaissance sections, a scout section, and a mortar 

squad. Each reconnaissance section included two Sheridans, while two 

M113s comprised the scout section. Total strength for the platoon rose 

slightly to 9 vehicles and 40 soldiers. The reconfiguration rationalized the 

organization. It made all personnel except the mortar team cavalry scouts, 

and the renaming of the headquarters section reflected its routine employment in reconnaissance and security operations.57

Outside Europe, armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry 

squadrons retained the combined arms platoon. It contained a headquarters element, a scout section, a rifle squad, a light armor section, and a 

mortar squad. Total strength equaled 42 men carried in 10 vehicles that 

included a mix of Sheridans and M113s, which gradually replaced M114s. 

This organization retained the advantages of versatility and combat power 

and the drawbacks associated with complexity and reduced coverage.58

A third cavalry platoon configuration emerged in 1977. This one 

included the main battle tank/scout vehicle mix first proposed by 

the Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc Committee. The new platoon included a 

headquarters vehicle, a scout section, and a tank section. A single M113 

constituted the command element, while the scout section comprised 

two M113s and two M901 ITVs. Fielding plans also called for the scout 

section to carry motorcycles for administrative and scouting work. The 
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tank section included four M60A1 main battle tanks, giving the platoon 

a combined strength of 40 men and 9 vehicles. It possessed considerable 

antiarmor capability. Even those scout vehicles not equipped with the TOW 

missile launcher carried hand-held Dragon antitank guided missiles. The 

tanks provided an offensive and defensive capability, but this accretion of 

combat power sacrificed stealth and dismounted operations.59

The ITV was a TOW missile launcher mounted on a M113, but its antiarmor capability came at a cost. Its distinctive appearance made it stand 

out on the battlefield, while its cramped interior and inability to keep pace 

with other scout platforms posed employment challenges. The ITV was 

not suited to sudden, mobile engagements, because it lacked the ability to 

engage targets while moving. Designed for long-range standoff firing, its 

utility diminished when thrust forward in a traditional scout role. Use in an 

overwatch capacity better suited its defensive nature, but also precluded 

its ability to gather information. The vehicle also proved noisy, difficult 

to hide, and lost whatever concealed status it possessed on firing. It also 

suffered from low operational readiness rates due to the complexity of the 

missile launcher, which elevated into a firing position.60

Variation at the platoon level occurred simultaneous with several 

changes in the structure of the armored cavalry regiment in the latter 

1970s. By 1979, the Army had dropped the special European configuration 

in favor of a single regiment organization. It retained a headquarters and 

headquarters troop (HHT), an air cavalry troop, and three armored cavalry squadrons. An engineer company, an attack helicopter company, and 

a Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) company were added to 

this foundation. The last consolidated the functions of combat intelligence, 

electronic warfare, and operations security, but it remained a test organization. It marked the rising importance of both protecting friendly communications and interfering with those of the enemy. The CEWI company 

also centralized control over the ground surveillance radars and remotely 

employed sensors in lieu of previous regiment and squadron assignment. 

Only the troop retained its organic ground surveillance devices. In the organizational shuffling, the regimental headquarters retained its small organic 

scout section, which directly supported command post operations.61

The regimental squadron included a HHT, three armored cavalry 

troops, a tank company, and an artillery battery. The squadron lost 

its organic ground surveillance capability, but it gained an air defense 

component of Redeye handheld air defense missiles and an armored 

vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) section. The missiles reflected the 

growing threat from air attack. Additional teams might be attached 
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from the regimental HHT. The AVLB section constituted a belated 

implementation of a Vietnam War recommendation.62

Regimental troop organization included a headquarters and three 

armored cavalry platoons. However, some variance existed based on 

the platoon configuration in place. Where the combined arms structure 

remained, mortar support lay at the platoon level. In the other arrangements, mortars migrated to troop control. All troop organizations continued to include a small ground surveillance radar section to support platoon 

operations.63

Division cavalry squadron changes tended to mirror those implemented in the armored cavalry regiments. The squadrons included an 

HHT, an air cavalry troop, and three armored cavalry troops. Unlike their 

regimental counterparts, they possessed no organic tanks or fire support. 

By 1979, they no longer controlled their own ground surveillance radars. 

The squadron relied on its parent formation for these and related assets. 

Troop composition varied, dependent on whether the platoon was configured with main battle tanks or as combined arms team. In the former case, 

the troop controlled mortar support. In both instances, air defense support 

came from squadron attachments of Redeye missile teams.64

Those division cavalry squadrons that included main battle tanks in 

their platoons possessed a powerful antitank capability. This increase in 

firepower led some commanders to question whether it was too much. 

Figure 82. Group of ITVs in Germany, 1982.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

With 36 tanks, 18 ITVs, and 18 M113s with Dragons, the squadron constituted one of the most powerful reconnaissance units fielded, rivaling 

even an armor battalion. Consequently, it risked employment as another 

maneuver unit rather than in its intended roles. The squadron’s firepower 

seemed to make it more suited to function as the division’s “Enforcer” at 

the expense of information acquisition.65

The scout platoon of the maneuver battalions similarly experienced 

change throughout the decade. By 1973 control of the platoon had shifted 

from the battalion headquarters to the newly created combat support company. This organization controlled all battalion combat support units, 

including the scouts. Freed from the administrative and service responsibilities of the headquarters, the new company provided support directly 

to the battalion’s combat elements. This arrangement simplified battalion 

command and control, and restructured the battalion headquarters along 

functional lines.66

On paper, the scout platoon’s composition marked a progressive 

change toward greater firepower. Still, planned changes often occurred 

slowly and unevenly throughout the Army, sometimes influenced by theater considerations. A variety of configurations thus resulted, resembling 

the same state of flux associated with the armored cavalry platoon. Doctrine 

acknowledged the diversity, noting that “a modified table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE) is in effect for various units and these changes 

may reflect differences in capabilities.”67

In Korea, the scout platoon included a headquarters, a light armor section, a scout section, and a rifle squad. Its armor element comprised just 

two Sheridans, while its platoon leader and scouts rode in machinegunequipped jeeps. Only the rifle squad rode in an armored personnel carrier.68

However, in the immediate post-Vietnam years, the most common scout 

platoon configuration included a headquarters and two scout sections. 

The headquarters operated two M113s, while the scouts rode in M114s. 

Typical attachments from the combat support company included mortars 

and ground surveillance radar teams. Compared to its Vietnam-era predecessor, this platoon also included 10 vehicles, but its personnel strength 

fell from 50 to 30. This reduction encouraged reliance on mounted operations, since insufficient manpower remained to both man the vehicles and 

conduct dismounted reconnaissance.69

The M114’s poor cross-country mobility precluded its use in Vietnam, 

but it proved no more effective elsewhere. Even before it began to equip 

combat units, its disappointing performance led the Armor and Engineer 

Board, responsible for evaluating new armor materiel, to oppose its 
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fielding. The M114’s service record was summarized by one officer as 

“a disaster from day one.” A later variant added a 20-mm cannon, but 

the added firepower did not improve the vehicle’s effectiveness as a 

reconnaissance platform.70

These deficiencies led to the removal of the M114 from service in 

1973. In the absence of a satisfactory alternative, scout platoons underwent 

reequipment with M113s. This process took time to accomplish throughout 

the force, resulting in the continued use of the M114 long after its official 

retirement. The change in platform did not otherwise alter the scout platoon. 

Its mission and subordination to the combat support company remained 

unchanged. Unfortunately, it also retained its minimal dismounted capability. Despite the switch to the larger M113, a vehicle capable of easily 

accommodating more soldiers, platoon strength did not increase.71

In 1979, the composition of the scout platoon again changed. Pending 

fielding of a new cavalry vehicle for scouts and armored cavalry organizations, the Army adopted an interim organization. The new platoon featured 

improved antitank firepower but fewer vehicles. The headquarters include 

a single M113 from which the platoon leader controlled three identical 

scout sections. Each one included an M113, an ITV, and nine soldiers.72

The Search for a New Reconnaissance Vehicle

Some of the organizational confusion in mounted reconnaissance organizations stemmed from the changing nature of the battlefield and related 

doctrinal adjustments. However, acquisition decisions in the mid-1970s 

also tied the Army to materiel programs that would not generate new vehicles and equipment until the 1980s. In the interim, ad hoc and temporary 

organizations became the norm. Differences among theater requirements 

and materiel availability also encouraged the diversity. For example, the 

incorporation of heavier combat power into cavalry platoons became most 

evident in Europe, where the mechanized threat proved highest. Scout platoons in Korea continued to employ 1⁄4-ton trucks as did similar units in the 

stateside-based 2d Armor Division as late as 1977.73

The variety of reconnaissance organizations also reflected the lack of 

consensus concerning their proper purpose and composition. At the start 

of the 1970s, a general desire for a new scout vehicle reignited an old 

debate over tactical employment. Should the scout focus on information 

collection to the exclusion of combat and rely on stealth, or should he 

possess the ability to act aggressively, fight for information, and carry sufficient protection to survive sudden contact situations? The question raised 

important issues for vehicle design, scout doctrine, and unit organization. 
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No simple solution existed and both schools of thought could marshal historical operational experience in their support. It became further complicated by differences in the mission of armored cavalry versus maneuver 

battalion scout platoons. Hence, a variety of contradictory reconnaissance 

vehicle recommendations emerged.

Concepts for new scout vehicles ranged considerably from an armored 

dune buggy to a more robust, armed vehicle. The former sought to exploit 

emerging off-road, wheeled mobility capabilities emerging in the private 

sector for sport and recreational activities. Approximating the size of the 

jeep, the militarized dune buggy leveraged state-of-the-art automotive 

technology to provide much better cross-country mobility while carrying limited armor and weapons. A test bed vehicle underwent testing at 

Fort Knox in 1971, but it was not adopted.74 Another concept espoused 

a scaled-down Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) on wheels.75

Other recommendations sought to maximize mobility and provide protection against small arms fire for a crew of three on a wheeled chassis.76

Still another approach embraced the need for a “track laying, tank defeating, armored reconnaissance vehicle,” particularly for the armored cavalry 

squadron.77

Most proposals for a new platform sought a balance among the competing qualities of mobility, survivability, and lethality. Vehicle size and 

weight needed to be small to facilitate undetected movement and air transportation. Yet any armor protection boosted weight and the decision to 

rely on wheels or tracks directly impacted the height of the vehicle. Crew 

size and weapons further required space and added weight, complicating efforts to achieve balance.78 All of these considerations proved complex in their own right and the subject of controversy. They could not be 

resolved without a clear statement of the vehicle’s role, itself derived from 

an understanding of the scout’s mission. However, such clear guidance did 

not exist, partly because the answer varied with the unit type.

In this confused state of affairs, many different solutions were explored, 

including the use of motorcycles. Although utilized prior to World War II, 

cyclists did not remain a permanent fixture of reconnaissance organizations. In 1972, an Army review and evaluation of potential scout vehicles 

included motorcycles. Test organizations equipped with cycles conducted 

operations against more traditional scout organizations and found some 

utility. Carried in helicopters or armored personnel carriers, the cyclists 

provided a new dimension to ground reconnaissance, but they were not 

without drawbacks. Their distinctive noise, battlefield vulnerability, lack 

of adequate communications, and the difficulty of carrying a weapon offset 
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their potential value to a reconnaissance unit. Test and evaluation continued for several years, and organizational charts anticipated their fielding 

by including cycles in scout units.79

In 1971, development work began on a successor to the M114, designated the XM800 Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle. This platform 

was intended to be a “small, lightly armored, ground combat vehicle with 

a three-man crew and an inherent swimming capability.”80 In effect, it was 

to possess those characteristics for which the M114 had been designed but 

proved unable to meet. Manufacturers proposed numerous vehicle concepts, and two were developed for testing: one a six-wheel, all-wheel drive 

articulated chassis, and the other a smaller version of a M113 with a turret. 

Neither platform proved sufficiently capable to justify further development. In 1974, the Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc Committee concluded that a new 

scout vehicle was not warranted, and General Starry recommended an end 

to work on the XM800. Program termination followed.81

The Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Task Force constituted 

one of the principal organizations responsible for assessing scout materiel, 

including vehicles, weapons, communications, and optics. Established 

at Fort Knox in 1974, it assisted in efforts to select a new scout vehicle 

and related equipment. It worked closely with the Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc 

Committee, whose analytical work it helped to validate. The task force 

Figure 83. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle of the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment moving at speed, 1985.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

evaluated scout vehicles, ranging from motorcycles and dune buggies 

to more robust armored platforms.82 This assessment did not identify an 

existing vehicle to fit emerging scout requirements under Active Defense. 

This conclusion, coupled with the cancellation of the XM800 program and 

the findings of the Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc Committee led to the decision to 

develop a cavalry variant of the MICV.83

The focus of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Task Force 

accordingly shifted. Instead of seeking a new vehicle, it now sought an 

interim platform with which to equip scout platoons until the fielding of 

the MICV sometime in the 1980s. Once again, the task force evaluated an 

array of vehicles already in production that might suffice with little or no 

modification. Task force members recommended two M113 derivatives: 

one armed with a TOW missile launcher and an armored cavalry cannon 

vehicle equipped with a 20-mm cannon. Development of the former concept resulted in the M901 ITV, but the latter never progressed to production and fielding. The task force further encouraged the inclusion of both 

weapons in an enlarged turret on the final version of the MICV. All of 

these recommendations embraced large vehicles with combat power at the 

expense of the ability to conduct stealthy reconnaissance.84

The MICV offered scouts better protection and the ability to keep 

pace with tanks on the battlefield. Between 1975 and 1977, the program 

underwent considerable scrutiny, restructuring, management change, and 

major design alterations. The resultant vehicle featured a two-man turret, 

25-mm cannon, a TOW missile launcher, and a redesigned hull. It was 

built to operate in conjunction with the XM1 main battle tank then also in 

development and counter the Soviet BMP-series of vehicles. The emerging infantry/cavalry fighting vehicle experienced technical problems and 

rising costs that intensified congressional scrutiny. Skeptics questioned 

its survivability and funding for the program was canceled in fiscal year 

1979. Program supporters reversed the latter decision but only on condition that production began in 1981.85

Between 1979 and 1981, the infantry and cavalry fighting vehicle program overcame numerous technical difficulties. Major concerns continued 

to emerge over the program’s cost, and the testing process also proved 

controversial and prolonged.86 Nevertheless, the Army received its first 

production vehicle in early May 1981. The same year led to the designation of the new platform as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BVF), in honor 

of General Omar N. Bradley. The infantry version became the M2, while 

the cavalry platform became the M3. Further testing and survivability 

improvements followed, including appliqué armor, internal spall liners, 
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redistribution of the ammunition, and the ability to carry reactive armor. 

This enhanced version became the M2A2/M3A2 and began to equip units 

later in the 1980s.87

Related doctrine development built on previous analysis. Between 

1976 and 1978, the Armor Center studied the potential employment of a 

cavalry fighting vehicle in battalion scout platoons. It leveraged wargaming data and the work of the Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc Committee. Scout 

platoon configurations were assessed for their ability to maintain contact 

and conduct screen, reconnaissance, and defensive operations. The study 

concluded that a platoon equipped with 6 cavalry fighting vehicles constituted the optimal organization and was superior to the 10-vehicle M113 

platoons then in service.88

Pending fielding of the cavalry fighting vehicle, the study also recommended an interim organization of three ITVs and four armored cavalry 

cannon vehicles. The failure to develop and field the latter resulted in an 

adopted interim configuration of 3 ITVs, 4 M113s, and 30 men. This platoon offered more antitank firepower and a lower cost, but it provided less 

coverage and a reduced dismounted capability in comparison with the 10-

vehicle structure it replaced.89

This analytical work provided a case for a smaller scout platoon and 

helped justify the infantry and cavalry fighting vehicle. Critics challenged 

the methodology and data used. The wargames modeled a mechanized 

battlefield on which antiarmor systems predominated. The resultant data 

focused on combat and kill ratios rather than the ability to gather information and provide adequate reconnaissance coverage. Given these parameters, the M113-equipped scout platoons could not compete with ITVs and 

cavalry fighting vehicles.90

Other criticism of the cavalry fighting vehicle echoed previous concerns about excessive armament. Too much firepower constituted a potentially dangerous distraction, because “the scout who has the capability to 

kill a tank at 3,000 meters is going to be tempted to shoot instead of report 

enemy tanks. The addition of the TOW system also places another training 

burden on the commander who has little enough time to train his people 

to scout.”91 This view complemented concerns over potential misuse of 

scout platoons as regular maneuver units. An alternate approach lay in the 

adoption of a smaller, light scout vehicle capable of support by a heavier 

platform as necessary.92

In spite of these views, the M3 suited the nature of Active Defense 

and its orientation on combating the highly mechanized Warsaw Pact in 

Europe. It possessed good mobility and a vast improvement in armor and 
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armament over the M113. Unlike the latter, the M3 did not struggle to 

keep pace with the tanks it was designed to support. Its combination of 

TOW missile launcher, stabilized 25-mm cannon, and coaxial machinegun 

permitted it to engage an array of target types, including the BMP. The 

M3 provided an aggressive reconnaissance capability in the face of an 

armored threat. Yet, its 23.5-ton weight made it one of the heaviest cavalry 

vehicles, and its overall size made it difficult to conceal.93

Support for the M3 came from those scouts who wanted a vehicle 

able to survive and engage target types typically encountered. One NCO 

noted, “A scout must be able to defeat all types of targets he can expect 

to encounter. If he can not, then other forces must be brought in to do 

the job and that detracts from the overall picture.” He did not believe 

scouts would always see the enemy first and preferred the ability to fight 

effectively without relying on external support. To him, the problem with 

selecting a scout vehicle lay in the confusion that soldiers sensed with the 

scout mission. It did not appear well defined, thereby complicating efforts 

to field the right platform.94

Supporters of the program acknowledged the veracity of at least some 

of the criticism. The M3 was a large vehicle, but the size was driven by the 

requirement to accommodate a five-man crew, their gear, and ammunition 

for the TOW and 25-mm cannon. The greater survivability of the M3 was 

achieved through the use of laminate, spaced armor that increased weight 

and necessitated a larger, more powerful engine. The vehicle lacked the 

ability to sneak about the battlefield, but the proliferation of sensor use 

made such movement problematic for most platforms. No simple solution 

existed to counter the real risk of scouts opting for firefights over information collection. This issue had to be addressed routinely through training. 

Those individuals who participated in the M3’s development were only 

too aware of a larger threat: “The cavalry is under attack in many places. 

If we don’t clean up our act and start talking with a unified voice, the only 

cavalry we’ll know is what we read about in history books.” This sentiment was clearly understood by the senior Armor leadership, who pushed 

the M3 through development to fielding.95

AirLand Battle and the Army of Excellence

By the early 1980s, the transition to Army 86 was underway. Meeting 

the manning requirements of the more robust division design without 

increasing the Army’s end strength, however, remained an insurmountable 

problem. Worse, dissatisfaction with Active Defense triggered renewed 

debate and analysis over doctrine amid a growing desire for a force capable of operations outside Europe. This belief was fueled by ongoing Soviet 
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military operations in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom’s brief war with 

Argentina over the Falkland Islands, and America’s own 1983 intervention in Grenada. All of these developments encouraged change in how the 

Army expected to fight.96

In Europe, the danger of Warsaw Pact forces remained, but winning 

the first battle no longer seemed a complete solution. Soviet doctrine called 

for the employment of large-scale second echelon forces to exploit initial 

success and target areas of NATO weakness. Defeating these follow-on 

forces thus became just as important as repelling the initial invasion, but 

Active Defense offered few answers. A new approach was needed that 

showed how to defeat simultaneously the first and follow-on echelons. To 

do so required operations over a much broader and deeper area, relying 

on maneuver, offensive action, and a high level of integration between air 

and land assets. The enemy needed to be presented with multiple threats 

at once that created a dilemma and disrupted his response. The resultant 

confusion generated new opportunities to exploit, thereby furthering 

undermining effective resistance. These concepts constituted the essence 

of AirLand Battle doctrine.97

They found expression in an updated FM 100-5 published in 1982. 

Compared to its predecessor, this new manual emphasized the operational 

level of war rather than the tactical. No longer did achieving favorable 

kill ratios in attrition-style battles predominate. Instead, the integrated 

maneuver and employment of a wide range of assets over a broad area 

became the principal focus. Campaign operations received much greater 

emphasis than the first battle. The emphasis given to seizing the initiative 

resonated with critics of Active Defense, who sought a more aggressive and 

offensive-oriented doctrine. The new manual also encouraged subordinate 

commanders to act on their own judgment without awaiting instructions. 

It encouraged flexibility, since AirLand Battle anticipated a faster tempo 

of operations throughout a nonlinear battle area.98

Refinement of the manual occurred with the publication of an updated 

version in 1986. It resolved issues that arose with the 1982 manual and 

provided a clearer representation of the operational level of war, particularly the planning and execution of entire campaigns. The new version 

also helped to resolve problems encountered by forces in Europe attempting to apply AirLand Battle in a NATO context. It provided the clearest 

expression of AirLand Battle concepts yet and guided the Army through 

the remainder of the decade. As a capstone document, the manual became 

“the Army primer on combat operations.”99
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The new doctrine coincided with the fielding of major weapons 

systems, many of which had been under development since the previous 

decade. The M1 Abrams tank, the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and 

the AH-64 Attack Helicopter, for example, provided the tools necessary 

to implement AirLand Battle. However, fielding occurred slowly and 

triggered force structure changes. These focused on improving combat 

power at the expense of service and support elements. Division structures 

were pared again, and assets removed transferred to more robust corps 

organizations better suited to the operational nature of AirLand Battle.100

Transition to the new formations occurred at a slow, uneven pace, 

driven by the availability of new materiel. The change created confusion, 

since many formations had already begun conversion to Army 86 configurations. Units struggled to adapt. While those divisions stationed in 

Europe and Korea were maintained close to full strength and numbered 

among the first to receive new equipment, FORSCOM and reserve elements proved deficient in personnel and overall effectiveness. This trend 

reflected a willingness to accept risk in stateside organizations to maintain 

high readiness overseas. Despite the turbulence that resulted, by the end of 

the decade the Army had become a more effective tool better able to meet 

national defense requirements. The field force emerging from this transitional phase to implement AirLand Battle became known as the Army of 

Excellence.101

Figure 84. Training scouts in dismounted observation and 

movement techniques.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Cavalry at the Crossroads

The transition from Army 86 to the Army of Excellence resulted in significant alteration to cavalry units. The division cavalry squadron underwent the greatest change with the emergence of a new design. Its basic 

composition included an HHT, two cavalry troops, and two air cavalry 

troops. Each troop consisted of a headquarters, a maintenance section, a 

mortar section, and three platoons. Each platoon had 6 M3s and 30 men.102

Compared to its predecessor, the squadron shrank in size. Personnel 

strength dropped from 862 to 613 soldiers, the number of scout vehicles 

fell from 45 to 36, and tanks disappeared completely.103 Plans to include 

a motorcycle platoon, an NBC reconnaissance platoon, and an electronic 

surveillance platoon within the squadron HHT never materialized. Instead, 

a long-range surveillance detachment replaced them before fielding began. 

Within the division, the squadron became part of the aviation brigade, losing its separate identity and status.104

The squadron’s mission similarly narrowed from the full range of 

reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force to primarily information 

gathering. Secondary responsibilities included screen, command and control facilitation, line of communications surveillance, assistance of troop 

movements, operation of remote sensors, and internal surveillance. Other 

activities such as delay, guard, covering force, and offensive and defensive 

operations were no longer part of the squadron’s responsibility, despite the 

importance previously attached to such tasks under Active Defense.105

The reduced scope paralleled the employment of the Soviet division 

reconnaissance battalion, designed principally for information acquisition 

rather than combat.106 The new focus of the American division cavalry 

squadron helped to reverse a trend noted by one analyst, who concluded, 

“The information gathering capability of US reconnaissance units may be 

less than that of their counterparts, and the commander may have little or 

no reconnaissance force left on the ‘second day of the war.’”107

Nevertheless, the American squadron’s reconnaissance orientation 

came at the loss of combat power and versatility—traditional characteristics of armored cavalry organizations. Within the Army of Excellence 

framework, other organizations were expected to assume some of the traditional functions of the division cavalry squadron. The armored cavalry 

regiment assigned at corps level assumed responsibility for economy of 

force missions. The planned inclusion of brigade scout platoons and an 

array of sensors within the division provided significant enhancements to 

reconnaissance and security activities. However, budget constraints soon 
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eliminated the brigade scouts and additional sensors, leaving the division 

with a reduced reconnaissance capability and the brigade with none.108

The planned reliance on corps reconnaissance assets to assume division security and economy of force responsibilities made sense only on 

paper. Corps commanders faced significant reconnaissance and security 

challenges of their own that precluded the routine detachment of all or part 

of their armored cavalry regiment to subordinate formations. Without this 

augmentation, the division commander faced little choice other than to 

reinforce the cavalry squadron from his own assets to permit it to perform 

the broader range of missions he required. This internal restructuring only 

underscored the need for a more robust and permanent reconnaissance 

organization. Similar problems afflicted the World War II mechanized cavalry, and veterans of that conflict would have agreed with a junior officer 

writing in 1982 that “the division reconnaissance squadrons are not operationally independent or fully organized for their true mission.”109

The new squadron was not designed to fight its way through heavily defended sectors nor perform sustained defensive actions against an 

aggressive, armored force. Instead, its configuration anticipated a future 

nonlinear battlefield. In this setting, air and ground reconnaissance sought 

enemy vulnerabilities over a broad area. As in Vietnam, air scouts used 

their superior speed to cover long distances and warn of imminent threats. 

Ground scouts maneuvered in their wake to develop situations and provide more detailed information. In general, the squadron was expected to 

maneuver quickly around a cluttered battle area and provide a continuous 

stream of information to the division commander. In this environment, supporters of the squadron design considered the M3-equipped platoons sufficient to perform their roles and in self-defense defeat enemy armor.

110

The absence of heavier combat vehicles reflected the Army’s inability 

to afford sufficient numbers of M1 tanks to equip both armor and cavalry 

organizations. Moreover, analysis of tanks employed by cavalry organizations indicated their principal use in an overwatch role rather than actual 

combat. Concentrating tanks in armor units seemed the most effective and 

efficient means of assigning them, particularly given the limited numbers 

of the new M1 Abrams. The squadron designers considered the attachment 

of tanks from division assets sufficient to meet the unit’s infrequent need 

for armor. They discounted the likelihood of blind encounters with hostile 

armor, given the increased access to corps, army, and national intelligence 

data.111

The new division cavalry squadron design reflected a cluttered, nonlinear battlefield significantly different from the linear, attrition-oriented one 
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of Active Defense. In the confused atmosphere likely to surround combat operations, the squadron assisted command and control by relaying 

command guidance and information requests directly to subordinate units, 

bypassing pockets of resistance, and avoiding the effects of electronic 

countermeasures on communications. In general, the squadron gathered 

information and facilitated the maneuver of combat, support, and service 

elements as the division alternatively massed and dispersed for battle and 

movement. This employment did not constitute an abdication of all combat activity, but it did mark a significant deviation from the fighting reconnaissance symptomatic of cavalry organizations since World War II.112

This rationale proved unconvincing to many officers who considered 

the removal of tanks from the squadron a flawed decision. In their eyes, 

tanks played a fundamental role: “To protect the reconnaissance elements 

and ensure they are allowed to do the job for which they are trained and 

organized.” Regardless of the intended use of the squadron, these critics 

fully expected it to be assigned missions other than reconnaissance that 

required the combat power of tanks.113

Real concern existed regarding the ability of the squadron to cope 

with Soviet security elements and those reconnaissance units not limited 

to information gathering. Many of these organizations included a mix of 

armor, mechanized, and dismounted capabilities. The M3’s TOW missile 

launcher, while powerful, was not suited to the type of sudden, short-range 

encounters that characterized engagements during reconnaissance operations. Air cavalry support considerably increased the squadron’s lethality, 

but its availability depended on favorable weather, terrain, and tactical 

conditions. Operations via stealth offered a means of penetrating hostile 

Figure 85. Scout section on the move—an M113 and an ITV working together.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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security, but the time necessary for such deliberate reconnaissance could 

not always be guaranteed. Moreover, the size and noise signature of the 

M3 undermined its ability to move about the battlefield undetected.114

As division cavalry squadrons began to transition to the new configuration, opposition increased among senior leaders within the TRADOC, 

FORSCOM, and armor communities. Heavy division commanders questioned the ability of the squadron to perform necessary missions in accordance with AirLand Battle doctrine. The Armor Center and Combined 

Arms Center (CAC) responded with an assessment of the squadron’s 

operational effectiveness in a European environment. This study found 

significant deficiencies with the organization. To correct them, it recommended the addition of a third ground cavalry troop, reconfiguring platoons to include an Abrams tank/M3 mix, and expanding the squadron’s 

mission set to include guard operations. Within the division structure, the 

study recommended the realignment of the squadron from the aviation 

brigade to the formation commander’s direct control and the transfer of 

the long-range surveillance detachment to the military intelligence battalion. The TRADOC commander supported these actions and sought the 

Army Chief of Staff’s approval, noting, “Your approval would show to the 

heavy force that you are aware of a design deficiency and care enough to 

correct it.”115

These proposals became the principal objectives of division cavalry 

redesign for the rest of the decade.116 Major General Thomas H. Tait, commanding the Armor Center from 1986 to 1988, considered it a priority 

“to provide the squadron commander with a third ground cavalry troop. 

Without the third troop, adequate coverage of the division sector, especially during periods of limited visibility, is virtually impossible. . . . Our 

second priority will be to put the tanks back in the divisional cavalry.” 

These additions made possible the ability to perform guard missions and 

fight for information.117 The experiences and insights from senior retired 

cavalry officers tended to support these objectives.118

Concerns within FORSCOM regarding reconnaissance effectiveness 

led its commander, General Joseph T. Palastra Jr., to request an internal 

assessment of reconnaissance organizations. He considered it time to 

restore the division cavalry “to a mission capable wartime organization.”119

Colonel J.J. Robertson, commanding the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

provided the evaluation. With respect to the division cavalry squadron, he 

concluded: 

With two ground troops of scouts and two rather small 

air cav troops, the squadron is a hybrid organization that 
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really doesn’t fit any normal scenarios for employment. 

Given its structure, the squadron is only capable of performing reconnaissance missions either on the ground 

or in the air and on limited axis or with limited staying 

power in a division area of operation. One of the inherent requirements for reconnaissance is, if necessary, to 

fight to complete the mission. Probe the enemy’s position, eliminate enemy reconnaissance and security forces, 

etc. Our current divisional cavalry squadron really can’t 

do that. On the other hand, the other mission of security 

can only be partially met. The squadron can screen for its 

parent unit both offensively and defensively but it cannot 

guard anything. It cannot function as an advance guard 

nor can the squadron guard a division flank. . . . The division cannot use the squadron to occupy a sector or a battle 

position to free maneuver battalions for other things.120

Robertson supported the reintegration of tanks into squadrons, noting the 

cohesion problems experienced in World War II when augmentation was 

relied on for armor support. He recommended the addition of a third ground 

cavalry troop, with each troop including three combined arms platoons.

The experience of the first division cavalry squadron to complete a 

training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) only underscored 

concerns about the unit’s effectiveness. The NTC opened in 1981 and provided a realistic training environment for units up to brigade size. The facility included a resident opposing force that employed Soviet-style units, 

weapons, and tactics. Against this threat, the tankless scout platoons of the 

2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment moved with great caution, seeking to 

avoid detection and combat. Excessive reliance on dismounted operations 

soon reduced the pace of operations to the speed of the foot scout. When 

time constraints necessitated less deliberate movement, losses quickly 

accumulated. Inadequate maintenance made air cavalry support problematic and incapable of sustaining continuous operations.121

The inclusion of the division cavalry squadron in the aviation brigade 

generated fears that it no longer offered the division commander an effective 

reconnaissance tool. Immersed in brigade operations, its training and maintenance requirements suffered, and it risked becoming “lost in the shuffle.” 

To soldiers in the field, the squadron’s removal from direct division control 

disrupted a proven command arrangement without justification.122

Efforts to restore the squadron to its independent status directly responsive to the division commander failed.123 The creation of the Aviation 
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Branch in 1983 eliminated the Armor Center’s proponency for air cavalry. 

Not surprisingly, the new branch supported the existing configuration. In 

1986, after reviewing the case of altering the cavalry squadron’s alignment, the Army Chief of Staff directed its retention within the aviation 

brigade.124 In the face of this opposition, critics could do little other than 

restate their case.125

Nevertheless, the Armor Center developed a master plan at the direction of CAC to address a broad range of cavalry issues. Completed in 

August 1988, it identified deficiencies, posed prioritized solutions, and 

attempted to provide clear mission statements for each type of cavalry 

organization. Its opening pages outlined the need for cavalry in an AirLand 

Battle context. The higher pace, nonlinear nature, and greater breadth and 

width of the battle area mandated a greater reconnaissance presence to 

facilitate information flow and decisionmaking. The evolving capabilities 

of Warsaw Pact forces further necessitated not only additional reconnaissance assets but an enhanced counterreconnaissance capability as well. 

Finally, in a clear reference to the Army 86 and Army of Excellence studies, the plan sought to establish cavalry requirements based on operations 

rather than on an “arbitrary reduction of reconnaissance assets.”126

The Armor Center considered the armored cavalry regiment a sound 

and lethal organization capable of performing its mission set. The master 

plan confirmed the conclusions from an earlier 1985 assessment: “The 

ground and air cavalry troops form the necessary blend to provide the 

commander with a highly mobile reconnaissance capability essential to 

the corps.” Recommended changes proved minor and limited to strengthening the aviation component, increasing the number of mortars, adding 

vehicles for select command personnel, and incorporating motorcycles.127

The regiment suffered the least from the organizational paring that 

accompanied the transition from Army 86 to the Army of Excellence. It 

included an HHT; three armored cavalry squadrons; a combat aviation 

squadron; a support squadron; and air defense, artillery, engineer, NBC, 

and military intelligence elements.128 Regimental squadrons retained 

their traditional configuration with a headquarters, three armored cavalry 

troops, and a tank company. The most significant change occurred at the 

troop level. The various combined arms mixes of the 1970s gave way to 

purified platoons. This restructuring reflected concerns about the ability 

of second lieutenants to control a combined arms platoon that include the 

Abrams tank and the M3. The adoption of a “2x2” troop configuration 

simplified command and increased the leader-to-led ratio. Each cavalry 

troop included a headquarters, mortar element, two tank platoons, and two 
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M3-equipped scout platoons. Responsibility for task organization and fire 

support shifted from the platoon leader to the troop commander.129

The master plan for other cavalry organizations largely paralleled concerns and proposals advocated throughout the decade. The heavy division 

cavalry squadron required another ground cavalry troop, tanks, and a more 

robust aviation section. Indeed, the addition of another ground troop was 

included among the top three priority actions, together with improving the 

battalion scout platoon and reorganizing all air cavalry troops. Second tier 

priorities included the return of tanks to the division cavalry squadron and 

the creation of brigade scout units.130

Identifying deficiencies proved much easier than correcting them. 

Funding and personnel limitations constituted the primary obstacles. The 

high cost of fielding the Abrams tank and M3, for example, contributed 

to the former’s removal from the division cavalry squadron. Restoring 

the tanks required more than an operational justification. Therefore, 

implementation of this action necessitated a parallel resource strategy. 

Recommendations included inactivating select units and transferring those 

soldiers and funds to division cavalry. However, achieving the senior leader 

consensus necessary to confirm these “bill payers” proved impossible.131

In 1988, for example, the Armor School reacted to problems associated 

with the employment of long-range surveillance units with a proposal to 

eliminate them and use the personnel saved to strengthen the division cavalry squadron.132 This suggestion met with a stiff rebuke from the Infantry 

Center, since Armor appeared to be fixing “a cavalry guard problem at the 

expense of infantry combat power.”133

In the field, division commanders supported the concept in principal, 

but proved unwilling to trade a maneuver battalion to achieve it. In effect, 

efforts to strengthen the division cavalry squadron reached a dead end. 

As one Armor School officer noted, “The Div Cav Sqdn needs 3 ground 

troops w/tks. That will not be ‘fixed’ until the ‘bill payers’ are decided and 

the senior leadership directs the change.”134

Whither the Scout?

The debate surrounding the division cavalry squadron coincided 

with growing dissatisfaction with the scout platoon. Fielding of the M3-

equipped platoon and its performance during NTC rotations raised anew 

the issue of how best to organize, equip, and use the scout. At the NTC, 

a pattern emerged of reconnaissance failure and heavy losses. Scouts 

regularly found themselves engaged in combat and destroyed. The direct 

correlation between reconnaissance effectiveness and maneuver battalion 
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success underscored the importance of these results. Scouts unable to 

provide information on the enemy or provide a clear picture of battlefield 

developments left their parent battalion to operate blind.135

Heavy maneuver battalion reconnaissance quickly became the focus 

of attention. Several studies sought to determine the nature of the problem 

and suggest corrective measures. In 1985, the Army Training Board conducted a survey of scout operations at the NTC. In the execution of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, the study found: 

A lack of operational knowledge on the part of TF [task 

force] commanders, which leads to inadequate unit training and improper employment. It also concluded both 

doctrine and training deficiencies exist that are contributing factors. Doctrine was developed for cavalry platoons 

and has been overlaid on the TF Scout Platoon.136

Equipment and organizational issues simply compounded those of training and doctrine, since several different types of scout platoons existed, 

including the transitional M113/ITV mix.137 Recommended improvements 

included an increase in platoon size to permit greater coverage, the provision of more robust communications, and training.138

Figure 86. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an M113 occupy battle 

positions at the NTC.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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At the Army’s behest the RAND Corporation undertook a more detailed 

analysis of task force reconnaissance. A study team reviewed heavy maneuver battalion reconnaissance operations during 17 training rotations between 

1985 and 1986. The team observed battles, collected data from units after 

their rotation, and met directly with NTC observer/controller personnel. 

Not surprisingly, the team found a direct correlation between successful 

reconnaissance and effective offensive action, but reconnaissance successes 

proved rare. The team considered this poor showing the result of insufficient command emphasis on reconnaissance, inadequate doctrinal and 

training support, and poor planning. Despite stringent time constraints on 

operations, poor planning resulted in misuse of the time available. Furthermore, the small size of the scout platoons left them struggling to complete 

mission sets within their assigned sectors. The RAND team recommended 

a larger platoon equipped with radio relay equipment, positional location 

devices, and more binoculars and night vision goggles.139

In 1987, the CAC completed its own assessment of reconnaissance 

at the NTC. A team of subject matter experts drawn from several Army 

schools observed a brigade training rotation. They supplemented their 

observations through interaction with the RAND study team, interviews 

of observer/controller personnel, and analysis of the results of prior unit 

rotations.140

The CAC study found reconnaissance failures at the brigade and battalion levels attributable to a variety of doctrinal, training, organizational, 

and materiel causes in addition to artificial constraints imposed by the 

NTC environment. At the brigade level, the most obvious cause stemmed 

from the lack of organic reconnaissance assets. Since neither division nor 

corps assets that might have been available on an actual battlefield were 

represented during the rotation, the brigade commander could offer little 

additional support to the battalion reconnaissance effort on which he relied 

to understand the tactical situation.141

Battalion scout platoons did not seek enemy vulnerabilities for the 

main body to exploit. Nor did they “pull the main body towards and along 

the path of least resistance.” Instead, task forces found themselves committed to an avenue of advance before operations began and rarely deviated: “Commanders typically push however many forces are needed down 

the axis to make the attack successful. This usually results in the TF pitting its strength against the enemy’s strength and sustaining a devastating 

number of casualties and materiel losses.” This inflexibility stemmed in 

part from NTC scenario constraints that generally mandated a direction of 

attack and forced an assault on a prepared defensive position.142
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Scouts received a set time limit to accomplish their tasks. Generally, 

it proved too short and forced the abandonment of overwatch movement 

techniques and dismounted operations. As a result, “Scouts have no option 

but to abandon secure movement and reconnaissance techniques and 

press forward as rapidly as possible, sacrificing stealth and survivability.” 

Continuous reconnaissance of the task force area proved impossible under 

these conditions, resulting in mounted movements to contact by the scouts. 

In contrast, opposing force (OPFOR) reconnaissance units appeared to 

have much more flexibility to maneuver and observe throughout the battle 

area. The CAC study believed the artificial time and maneuver constraints 

to have contributed to an exaggeration of reconnaissance problems.143

However true, at the platoon level, scouts failed “to accomplish their 

reconnaissance tasks because they seldom survive initial contact with 

enemy forces.”144

The CAC study also found a lack of command emphasis on reconnaissance operations. They were not integral to the battalion’s overall 

scheme of maneuver and often left for the S2 to manage rather than the S3 

and executive officer, who helped craft and execute battalion operations. 

Frequent loss of communications between the battalion and the scout platoon as the latter advanced beyond effective radio range symbolized this 

neglect. In the absence of previously planned relay stations or alternate 

communications means, the battalion commander could not benefit from 

the platoon’s observations nor redirect it to fit his own needs. In supply 

and maintenance, the scout platoon leader lacked the influence to secure 

his needs without command and staff support. Fire support for the scouts 

proved generally absent, limiting the scout’s ability to develop situations. 

Not only did the scout rely on such fires, his platoon constituted a collection of potential forward observers capable of enhancing the overall 

effectiveness of battalion fire support.145

Scout platoons needed to employ proper movement techniques for 

survival. The combination of dismounted scanning of suspect areas followed by the use of overwatch to advance proved effective. Navigation at 

night or in poor visibility conditions, however, posed a problem for many 

scouts and compounded the difficulties associated with locating and surveying minefields and obstacles. Some individuals purchased their own 

magnetic compasses and mounted them on their vehicles—much as crews 

had done in Vietnam. A better solution lay in the development of a simple 

position location device.146

Mounted reconnaissance by scouts proved the least effective but most 

common method employed at the NTC. The CAC report encouraged the 
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use of one or two-man observation posts that remained hidden and continuously observed enemy activity. Indeed, the OPFOR was considered to 

gain the bulk of its information by this method. Hence, the report noted, 

“The most successful scout platoons obtain the majority of detailed combat 

information through stealthy dismounted patrolling and stationary observation. However, most scouts habitually remain mounted and blunder into 

obstacles and fire sacks.”147

During security operations, scout platoons experienced difficulty 

maintaining a screen line. They proved too small to provide sufficient 

cover, although the attachment of ground surveillance radars improved 

their effectiveness. Operations conducted as part of the task force’s 

defense against the OPFOR suffered from circumstances endemic to the 

NTC. According to the CAC assessment: 

The OPFOR reconnaissance elements have the “home 

court advantage.” They know the area where the TF will 

be defending in each scenario. They are intimately familiar with the most covered and concealed routes through 

the TF sector. Their OPs [observation posts] in the hillsides overlooking TF defensive sectors are prepared positions they return to time after time.148

The M3 also received its share of criticism. Its noise and size precluded 

stealthy operations. General Tait quipped: “Reconnaissance in a Bradley 

is like doing reconnaissance in a Winnebago.” His reference to a popular 

recreation vehicle underscored his support for a smaller, quieter platform. 

The M3’s thermal viewer provided the ability to observe and scan areas in 

low visibility, but its use generated other problems. Silent watch, the technique of remaining in place with the engine off while the crew observed 

the surrounding area with the vehicle’s optics, proved impossible. The 

thermal viewer generated noise and masked the ability of the crew to hear 

other sounds in their immediate area. Worse, it drained the vehicle batteries after 30 to 45 minutes of operation, necessitating starting the engine to 

recharge them and thereby disclosing the M3’s presence.149

Platoons equipped with this vehicle found their ability to conduct dismounted operations limited. At full strength, each vehicle carried a twoman scout team and a three-man vehicle crew. Personnel shortfalls often 

reduced available dismounts to one or none. Some platoons sought to 

mitigate this problem by concentrating their dismounts on one vehicle, but 

more often than not scouts simply avoided dismounted operations.150

Given these problems, the report recommended platoons with more 

vehicles. It also suggested a different scout vehicle than the M3, preferably 
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one smaller, quieter, and faster. Its main armament was to include a 

weapon capable of suppressive fire, while the scouts relied on hand-held 

weapons for protection from armor. More important than the armament, 

however, was the requirement for a thermal viewer that could be used 

by dismounted or mounted scouts. In short, “TF scouts envy the OPFOR 

scouts who operate in HMMWVs [high-mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicles]. They move quietly, quickly, with equal or better mobility than 

the M3. In large measure, the HMMWV’s characteristics contribute to the 

renowned success of the OPFOR reconnaissance elements.”151

By the mid-1980s, combat units were receiving HMMWVs in addition 

to the Abrams tank and the M3. This general-purpose platform replaced 

the jeep and the light truck. It featured a powerful engine, robust chassis, 

four-wheel-drive, and a powerful load and pull capacity. Its 25-gallon tank 

gave it an operational radius of 300 miles without refueling. Air-droppable 

and available in a variety of configurations, the HMMWV began to find 

employment in many roles. It proved rugged, reliable, and possessed better mobility than the jeep. At just under 3 tons, the HMMWV outweighed 

the 1⁄4-ton truck, but it offered greater capability.152

At the NTC, the OPFOR employed the HMMWV as a scout vehicle. It 

was the exact opposite of the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV). Where 

the latter proved large, noisy, and heavily armed, the HMMWV proved 

quiet, fast, and more difficult to locate. It carried a weapon for self-defense 

and required minimal maintenance and logistical support. As concern over 

reconnaissance failures mounted, the HMMWV’s attractiveness as a scout 

platform rose. The RAND study, for example, noted the stealthy operation 

of OPFOR scouts in HMMWVs and recommended mounting scouts in 

HMMWVs.153

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) continued to collect 

data on reconnaissance operations at the NTC after the completion of the 

CAC study. It found a 50-percent loss rate among scouts and persistently 

low rates of successful reconnaissance missions. CALL attributed these 

findings largely to training and the absence of stealth in scout platoon 

operations. With the success of battalion task force operations resting on 

reconnaissance activity, these results were worrisome.154 CALL analysis 

further underscored the importance of sufficient time for effective 

reconnaissance, which often resulted from the successful establishment of 

dismounted observation posts. Conversely, “recon elements which remain 

mounted usually die to enemy fire.” Significantly, scout success seemed 

to correlate with the degree of augmentation provided by the task force.155

Yet an organization in need of continuous augmentation was not properly 
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configured in the first place and simply drained combat power from its 

parent organization—a view held by earlier advocates of more robust 

reconnaissance units. 

The NTC for all its realism and value to training, nevertheless, constituted an artificial battlefield with constraints not necessarily present in 

a combat theater. In weighting decisions about reconnaissance on NTC 

rotations, the Army risked giving too much credence to simulated combat 

operations rather than real combat operations. The OPFOR, for example, 

used visually modified HMMWVs to represent the Soviet BRDM-2. This 

vehicle carried armor protection and an armament of one 14.5-mm and 

one 7.62-mm machinegun, supplemented with an RPG for the crew. The 

laser system used to simulate combat engagements represented the weapons and armor protection. Hence, the OPFOR scout employed a platform 

with the mobility and silhouette of the HMMWV and the lethality and survivability of the armored BRDM-2. One OPFOR NCO noted, “This is not

a HMMWV doing the mission: rather, it is an armored recon vehicle.”156

This dual nature was often overlooked amid the growing interest in equipping scout platoons with HMMWVs.

Other aspects of NTC operations encouraged a more cautious analysis 

of trends emerging during training rotations. Lieutenant General Crosby E. 

Saint, commanding the III Corps, found the employment of unsupported 

battalion task forces against the OPFOR unrealistic. 

Battalions are not resourced to accomplish the total 

reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance mission, though 

Figure 87. Training scouts equipped with HMMWV to operate vehicle weapon.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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it is essential. I believe this is an Army-wide structure 

problem and must be fixed. When we originally structured 

battalion scout platoons, we also structured a brigade 

scout platoon. The Army of Excellence took the scouts 

from the brigade, but left the battalion structure as it is. At 

the NTC we are seeing the results of this decision. We see 

non-standard scout teams, (much like an Armored Cav 

Troop) that are taken from within the TF, thus reducing 

the combat power of the TF for the main effort, or we 

see scout organizations that are too under-resourced to 

accomplish the mission. Further, the meager other recon 

and intel assets of the division are not present, though 

the OPFOR has both divisional and regimental recon 

available. At the NTC we essentially have battalions on 

their own with no higher level eyes or assets to kill the 

OPFOR before it reaches the FEBA [forward edge of 

battle area]. The OPFOR then shows up generally intact, 

with no command and control problems, etc. This is 

counter to the concept of ALB [AirLand Battle] and why 

we invented Deep Battle.157

The NTC results were drawing attention to reconnaissance issues and 

bolstering the case for a light, stealthy scout organization. Further support 

came from the use of HMMWVs to equip the reconnaissance squadron of 

the light division.158 Experimentation with alternate scout platoon organizations followed. In 1988, the NTC hosted a demonstration of a 10-vehicle 

platoon that offered greater coverage and the separation of the platoon 

headquarters from the scout sections for better command and control. The 

unit included a two-HMMWV command element; a heavy section of four 

M3s and four motorcycles; and a light section of four HMMWVs. In this 

manner, the platoon benefited from the stealth capability of the HMMWV 

and the combat power of the M3. The mixed vehicle set permitted a degree 

of tailoring to fit varied tactical situations, and found support in an Armor 

School white paper.159

The same year, the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment tested a pure 

HMMWV scout platoon organization at the NTC. The unit achieved 

several successes through reliance on the HMMWV’s quietness and 

small size. Observation teams reached critical observation points undetected and reported on OPFOR activity. The scouts often evaded contact 

through stealth and completed their mission—a refreshing change from 

the steady failure reports that previously characterized NTC reconnaissance. This event encouraged further interest in a HMMWV scout platoon. 
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When encounters with the OPFOR did occur, they tended to result in the 

HMMWV’s destruction—an unpleasant fact lost amid the general enthusiasm generated by the platoon’s apparent success.160

Formal study of alternate scout platoon organizations followed. In 

1989, three platoon configurations underwent testing and comparison. 

They included a baseline organization of 6 M3s, a mixed platoon with 4 

M3s and 6 HMMWVs, and 1 platoon with 10 HMMWVs and 4 motorcycles. All were evaluated in combat training center environments and via 

JANUS modeling. Analysis found the HMMWV platoon to be the most 

effective, least costly, and most sustainable organization. It outperformed 

the other two configurations in the execution of zone, area, and route 

reconnaissance; screen; and passage of lines. Moreover, the report found 

the HMMWV platoon “to be the most survivable and most successful in 

providing the TF commander with information on second echelon threat 

activity.” In terms of providing the battalion task force with advance warning of pending enemy action, these qualities were critical.161

The larger size of the mixed and HMMWV platoons permitted them to 

absorb losses and continue their missions. However, the M3 proved more 

survivable, and the final report noted, “The vulnerability of the HMMWV 

and MILMO [military motorcycle] vice the M3 CFV as a scout vehicle was 

a concern to be resolved.” Nevertheless, this caution received less attention 

than the apparent superiority of the HMMWV platoon over its competitors. 

The HMMWV platoon proved cheaper, more sustainable, easier to deploy, 

and required minimal adjustments to training and doctrine. Therefore, in 

1990 the Army opted to reequip its heavy maneuver battalion scout platoons with 10 HMMWVs, organized into a headquarters section with 2 

HMMWVs and 4 scout sections with 2 HMMWVs each.162

This decision marked a return to the wheeled, unarmored scout vehicle, which had dominated scout units in the 1940s and 1950s. At that 

time, combat experience raised the importance of survivability and led to 

recurring demands for at least a lightly armored platform. In the changed 

environment of the 1980s, survivability lagged behind a desire for stealth 

and mission accomplishment to reverse the negative trends identified at 

the NTC. Stealth itself became equated with survivability. The testing and 

analysis done to support the scout decision did not include cluttered battlefields populated with bypassed enemy forces, unexploded ordnance, urban 

environments, civilian crowds of uncertain disposition, or varied terrain 

considerations. All of these factors had been part of the scout’s experience 

in World War II and every conflict since. In the event of a chance encounter with hostile forces, could the HMMWV scout survive?
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For the 82d Airborne Division, the answer to this question was a 

resounding “no.” At the same time the mounted maneuver community 

began to embrace a HMMWV-equipped scout platoon, this formation 

sought a more robust organization. The subordinate 3d Battalion, 73d 

Armor Regiment included a large (14-vehicle) HMMWV scout platoon, but 

it was considered unable to perform “the more aggressive and traditional 

scout missions inherent to armored battalions.” The division, therefore, 

reequipped the battalion scouts with LAV-25s from the US Marine Corps. 

This wheeled, armored vehicle carried a turret-mounted 25-mm cannon.163

In justifying this replacement, the division outlined many of the same 

issues once associated with the use of the jeep in a reconnaissance role: 

The scout platoon is presently structured with 14 

HMMWVs, manned by 42 troopers. While adequate 

for conducting limited reconnaissance and security missions, the lack of a mobile, survivable and lethal weapons 

platform precludes the platoon from engaging in more 

traditional and aggressive reconnaissance and security 

operations. These include, but are not limited to, convoy 

security, guard missions, deep raids, noncombatant evacuation, and rear area security operations. Missions that 

involve establishing and maintaining contact with mobile 

enemy forces are virtually impossible to accomplish with 

scouts mounted in HMMWVs. Lacking adequate armor 

protection, cross-country mobility across the spectrum of 

terrain, and a gun of sufficient caliber to defeat other light 

armored vehicles, scouts can only accomplish limited 

reconnaissance.164

Reconnaissance Training and Doctrine in the 1980s

The fielding of the M3 and the reconnaissance difficulties encountered 

at the NTC encouraged another round of doctrinal updates. In November 

1985, the Army published FM 17-98, The Army 86 Scout Platoon. This 

manual applied to M3-equipped platoons whether assigned to cavalry 

organizations or maneuver battalions. The primary functions of this platoon 

included reconnaissance and security for the parent unit. Acknowledging 

the temptation for crews and commanders to misuse this unit’s firepower, 

the first page of the manual cautioned against employing the platoon as 

an antitank unit. Other acceptable roles for the platoon included liaison 

with adjacent units, service as a quartering party, traffic control, limited 

pioneer and demolition work, and chemical detection and radiological 
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survey work. It supported area damage control operations, established 

roadblocks, and provided command post security.165

The manual writers sought to instruct and inform their readers. Hence, 

the manual offered a wealth of descriptive detail, diagrams, and annotated 

illustrations intended to enhance its training value. It provided a “how to” 

guide for scout platoon operations and targeted new NCOs, platoon leaders, 

and more senior commanders and staff officers to offset what NTC analysis had identified as ignorance of scout platoon employment. An entire 

chapter focused on command and control issues, including basic troop 

leading procedures and the responsibilities of command personnel.166

The same chapter highlighted those aspects of scout platoon operations 

considered essential. These included movement, communications, and fire 

control. Movement was considered “the essence of all scout platoon operations,” and the manual addressed movement techniques and formations in 

some detail. Platoon personnel were expected to employ a variety of communications means in addition to radio to avoid the effect of hostile jamming or interception. The M3’s varied armament found expression in a 

section similar to that found in tank platoon manuals. It detailed fire control 

measures, fire discipline, engagement priorities, and the creation of engagement areas. The emphasis and level of detail given to weapons employment 

made it difficult to envision the platoon not engaging in combat.

167

Reconnaissance coverage included basic principles found in earlier 

manuals, including an emphasis on dismounted operations. The two-man 

scout team used stealth to secure detailed information and check potential 

ambush sites for enemy activity, while their transport provided overwatch 

from a distance. In the absence of sufficient time or when less information 

was required, the platoon operated mounted, sometimes relying on reconnaissance by fire. The platoon’s size restricted route reconnaissance to a 

single route. Integrated action with aerial assets was encouraged, but in all 

reconnaissance missions, the scouts sought information on their objective 

and related terrain, trafficabiliity, and road conditions.168

Screen operations constituted the principal security function addressed 

by the manual. The platoon possessed sufficient strength to maintain three 

observation posts, but this number could surge to six for short periods. The 

platoon retained responsibility for eliminating hostile patrols seeking to 

penetrate the screen line. Other security missions received minimal coverage, but information collection remained integral to all such operations.

For new platoon leaders one of the most useful chapters detailed a variety of common but difficult activities. These included execution of a relief 

in place, passage of lines, withdrawal, making contact with other friendly 
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forces, and assessing water crossings. To help new personnel understand 

how the M3-equipped scout platoon differed from other reconnaissance 

organizations, an appendix compared it with the transitional M113/ITV 

configuration.

Overall, the scout platoon manual offered a wealth of useful, constructive information to orient personnel to the unit’s capabilities. However, 

critics considered it too reflective of cavalry operations and of less use 

to maneuver battalion scout platoons. The latter could not assume the 

presence of those assets found in divisional or regimental cavalry units, 

particularly air cavalry. Reconnaissance, the primary function of the battalion scout platoons, received roughly the same amount of coverage as 

fire control. While the manual constituted a significant tool to comprehend 

how best to employ the M3-equipped platoon, it still possessed significant 

gaps.169

This criticism, coupled with continued reconnaissance problems at the 

NTC and the needs of maneuver battalion scout platoons led to the publication of a revised manual in 1987. It clearly applied to cavalry and battalion 

scout platoons. Like its predecessor, it targeted platoon leaders and their 

controlling commanders to educate them on proper scout employment. 

The publication of standard operating procedures, a unit training plan, and 

a leader’s handbook focused on scout platoon operations complemented 

the guidance provided by the updated manual.

Figure 88. M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle at the NTC.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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The mission set for the scout platoon shrank. While reconnaissance 

remained a primary function, screening replaced the broader range of 

security operations. Other activities assigned to the scout platoon similarly diminished with the removal of command post security, area damage 

control, and roadblock establishment. The manual opened with a chapter 

detailing the limitations of the platoon, clearly reflective of NTC results. 

In general, the scout unit constituted a reconnaissance force that operated as part of a larger combined arms team. It focused on a single route 

during route reconnaissance and a 3 to 5 kilometer-wide frontage during 

zone reconnaissance. Combat capability was described as limited to the 

destruction of hostile reconnaissance elements. The platoon required augmentation for other combat actions, including counterreconnaissance. To 

ensure access to such support, the platoon was expected to remain within 

communications range of its parent unit.170

The chapter addressing command and control now provided a clear 

orientation toward the maneuver battalion scout platoon. The extensive 

coverage of fire control and gunnery disappeared, replaced by a description of the differences in cavalry organizations versus battalion task forces. 

Similarly, reconnaissance received expanded coverage that included details 

of Warsaw Pact organizations and tactics likely to be encountered. More 

detail appeared in the guidance offered for the execution of zone, area, and 

route reconnaissance. The same chapter also provided additional information for locating and identifying the extent and nature of obstacles. The 

human dimension found more expression through depiction of the scout’s 

senses as the most important sensor available.171

The primary security mission for the scout platoon remained the 

screen. Guard and covering force operations were addressed, but the 

scout performed these as part of a larger team. In the screen mission, the 

scout platoon’s objective lay in gathering information on enemy activity 

and observing the battlefield. It sought the destruction of hostile reconnaissance only in conjunction with other combat units. Scouts generally 

sought to avoid direct fire engagements while performing a screen, instead 

relying on available indirect fires. Counterreconnaissance, another activity 

routinely criticized at the NTC, received special attention. Previous suggestions to rely on the use of dismounted teams received added emphasis in a section devoted to dismounted patrols, supplemented by a more 

detailed appendix. Similarly, a chapter provided expanded coverage of 

common activities, including the selection and preparation of assembly 

areas, road marches, passage of lines, and relief in place.172

The 1987 scout platoon manual proved applicable to both cavalry 

and battalion units. It shifted the focus of scout operations toward 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

reconnaissance and information collection. It also clarified the limitations 

of the platoon, particularly in the execution of combat or security missions. 

In short, the updated manual provided a valid doctrinal fix to many of 

the problems experienced at the NTC while offering comprehensive 

coverage of key tasks associated with both cavalry and battalion scouts. 

Nevertheless, by itself it could not resolve the range of challenges facing 

reconnaissance. Even after its publication, scouts continued to receive 

criticism for being too vehicle-bound, lacking sufficient understanding 

of the threat, and in need of more effective guidance to sustain vehicles 

and crews. Scouts also needed to develop expertise in the employment of 

indirect fires.173

Maneuver battalion scouts required similar skills to those of cavalry 

personnel, but important differences existed in the function and organization of the former. The Army 86 studies affected control of the battalion 

scout platoon. The combat support company disappeared, and its component elements, including the scout platoon, migrated back to the battalion headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). This consolidation 

increased the complexity and workload of the HHC commander, who now 

found himself responsible for managing both combat support and service 

elements. In the words of one officer, “The problems encountered in command and control, maintenance, and supply accountability make taking 

command of a HHC about as desirable as contracting Herpes Simplex 

II.”174

The problem stemmed from the dispersion of assets that occurred during operations, with administrative, service support, staff sections, and 

combat support all moving separately. The same officer recommended 

dividing the HHC into two smaller companies with one responsible for 

staff sections, mortars, and scouts. This proposal effectively reconstituted 

the combat support company. It was not implemented, leaving scout platoons under an HHC commander struggling to manage a collection of 

assets with different functions.175

The 1988 publication of FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry 

Battalion Task Force, offered only limited guidance for the operation of 

the battalion’s primary reconnaissance tool. The scout platoon served as 

the battalion’s eyes before combat and continued to monitor events once 

battle was joined. Its other major roles included assisting the movement of 

its parent battalion and maintaining contact with adjacent units. Screening 

operations comprised its primary security function. The platoon was not 

expected to operate independently, and its actions were always described 

in the context of battalion operations. It could expect support from maneuver companies during screening operations and possibly the attachment 
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of ground surveillance radars and/or remotely employed sensors from its 

parent division. Yet the manual provided only a general sense of how best 

to integrate scouts into battalion operations.176

The publication of FM 17-97, Regimental Armored Cavalry Troop,

that same year offered a sharp contrast. It provided a much better sense of 

how subordinate platoons fit into the cavalry troop scheme of maneuver in 

both armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons. Further 

elucidation of the principles found in the manual came with the related 

publication of a mission training plan and standard operating procedures 

for the armored cavalry troop. This unit constituted a versatile organization 

intended for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations. It 

included a headquarters section, two scout platoons, two tank platoons, a 

mortar section, and a maintenance section. It could operate anywhere terrain permitted heavy forces and, once employed, the primary constraint on 

its activity lay in the strength and size of the enemy.177

Reconnaissance concepts included “recon-pull.” The troop sought to 

locate hostile weaknesses and a path for friendly forces to access or penetrate these vulnerable areas. In this manner, the information gathering of 

the troop pulled friendly combat assets forward, guiding them to enemy 

weak points. Zone, area, and route remained the principal types of reconnaissance, but the manual’s coverage of each increased the attention given 

to reporting on terrain, infrastructure, and obstacles as well as the enemy. 

The reconnaissance principles included in the manual reflected lessons 

learned since the 1930s. Yet, their presentation through clear language, 

effective illustrations, and the use of detailed examples incorporating 

unplanned tactical developments simplified comprehension. Like the 1987 

scout platoon manual, this one included a chapter devoted to common 

activities such as road marches, assembly areas, relief in place, passage of 

lines, and water crossings.178

The new manuals helped to improve comprehension of reconnaissance operations. A parallel effort addressed training to ensure the related 

principles became inherent to the operation of all mounted reconnaissance 

Principles Fundamentals

See but don’t be seen; use stealth Maximum reconnaissance forward 

Report exactly what you see Orient on the objective 

Report as quickly as you can Rapid and accurate reporting 

Retain freedom of maneuver 

Gain and maintain enemy contact 

Develop the situation rapidly 

Table 3.Reconnaissance principles and fundamentals179
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units. NTC reconnaissance studies showed the need for improvements 

in the quality of home station training and the effectiveness of cavalry 

leaders and soldiers. In 1987, the Armor School Assistant Commandant 

acknowledged, “Right now, we don’t have the capability to function effectively in the reconnaissance arena with our cavalry organizations. Part 

of that is equipment, part of that is training, and part of that is probably 

doctrine.”180

The Armor School sought to correct these deficiencies through implementation of new training initiatives. In 1987, it introduced the Cavalry 

Leaders Course (CLC) as an add-on module to the Armor Officer Advanced 

Course, which trained company commanders. Graduates of the advanced 

course slated for cavalry organizations attended the 3-week CLC before 

going to their next assignments. The course familiarized students with 

cavalry vehicles and organizations. Related instruction addressed cavalry 

operations in an AirLand Battle context with emphasis on reconnaissance, 

screen, and defense missions.181

The following year witnessed implementation of the Scout Platoon 

Leaders Course (SPLC). This course targeted graduates of the Armor 

Officer Basic Course (AOBC) assigned to scout platoon command. SPLC 

also spanned 3 weeks and immersed students in classroom instruction, 

computer simulations, and field exercises to foster in them a clear 

Figure 89. HMMWV scouts prepare for their next mission.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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understanding of how a scout platoon operated. Training subjects included 

combat intelligence, Warsaw Pact forces and tactics, reconnaissance, night 

operations, security, bridge classification, and demolition. The course 

challenged junior leaders and benefited from recommendations from units 

that received SPLC graduates. The range of attendees quickly expanded to 

include leaders already serving in cavalry units. The course received high 

praise and requests for attendance soon outstripped available spaces. By 

1989, the Armor School was running 10 iterations per year but still lagged 

behind demand.182

SPLC provided an additional benefit to reconnaissance personnel. 

During field exercises, students used HMMWVs as representative scout 

vehicles, because they cost less to operate than the Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles equipping many platoons in the field. This cost-saving measure 

familiarized students with a vehicle gaining popularity as a reconnaissance 

platform and ultimately selected to replace the M3 in the battalion scout 

platoons.183

NCO training benefited from the creation of the Advanced 

Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC) in 1988. This course 

focused on platoon operations and included computer simulations and 

field exercises. The effectiveness of the instruction benefited from the 

Armor School’s transition from large group to small group instruction. 

In addition, a slightly longer scout version was implemented to boost the 

effectiveness of NCOs in scout and cavalry organizations. Skills trained 

during the course included reconnaissance, screen operations, indirect fire 

use, mounted patrolling, smoke use, and directing close air support.184

Other training improvements reflected the influence of the NTC. By 

the late 1980s, the Armor School possessed its own OPFOR, which supported armor and cavalry training exercises at Fort Knox. This unit participated in NTC exercises, where it helped to train cavalry units. It increased 

awareness of threat tactics, improved field leadership at the junior command level, and promoted the use of stealthy reconnaissance over combat 

operations for scouts. By 1989, the Armor School also ran an observer/ 

controller certification course. This course familiarized NTC observer/

controllers with armor and cavalry operations.185

By the end of the decade, the influence of these doctrine and training improvements were being felt in the field. The establishment of CLC, 

SPLC, and the scout version of ANCOC constituted a solid institutional 

foundation for the development of junior leadership in reconnaissance 

units that had been absent. Coupled with updated field manuals and 

related training support publications, these initiatives migrated some of 
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

the responsibility for training scout platoon leadership skills from field 

units back to the Armor School where it belonged. 

Operation DESERT STORM

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the end of the Cold 

War. Within 2 years, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the threat of a 

Soviet-led invasion of Central Europe disappeared. These developments 

triggered a new round of downsizing, force structure studies, and plans 

to begin withdrawing at least some American combat organizations from 

the Federal Republic of Germany. However, while the Cold War’s end 

largely eliminated the prospect of a major NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict, it 

did not augur in an era of peace. Instead, regional crises and the potential 

for localized conflicts replaced the danger of a war between superpowers. 

American military planning began to focus less on hostilities in Europe 

and more on preparing to respond to potential regional trouble in different 

parts of the globe.

Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, an international crisis 

arose over Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. This action 

posed a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and underscored the danger of Iraq, 

already a regional power, increasing its influence through control of a significant part of the world’s oil supply. The United Nations mandated Iraq’s 

withdrawal from Kuwait, while the United States began to build a military coalition to force compliance. While the coalition formed, the United 

States deployed aircraft and the 82d Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia to 

deter further Iraqi aggression.

The summer and fall of 1990 marked a steady buildup of US and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The Cold War’s end permitted the large-scale 

movement of combat formations from Central Europe to spearhead military operations in Southwest Asia. The American divisions that deployed 

to the Persian Gulf included some of the best equipped and trained available, honed as they were to employ AirLand Battle against a Warsaw Pact 

invasion.

In January 1991, the coalition began military operations to expel Iraqi 

forces from Kuwait. An air campaign targeted Iraq’s ability to fight and 

steadily eroded its combat power. In late February, ground operations 

commenced to envelop and isolate Iraqi forces in Kuwait. A successful 

deception campaign focused Iraq’s attention on the Persian Gulf while 

the main thrust of coalition forces came from the desert, sweeping into 

and through southern Iraq. After 5 days of major combat operations that 

soundly defeated the Iraqi Army and destroyed much of its equipment, 
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Kuwait was liberated and the war ended. The short ground campaign 

proved a test of AirLand Battle doctrine and the related organizational and 

materiel changes implemented in the 1980s. It also provided an opportunity to evaluate mounted reconnaissance organizations in the context of 

real world operations rather than the realistic but still artificial environment of the NTC.

The fighting during Operation DESERT STORM involved a high 

percentage of the Army’s heavy force. Armor and cavalry organizations 

played a prominent role in the defeat of the Iraqi Army and the more capable and better-equipped Republican Guard formations. Against this opposition, the 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments proved highly effective. 

They served as corps reconnaissance assets, performing the full range of 

reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions for their parent 

formations. In these operations, they proved robust and versatile, and after 

action analysis found few problems, confirming a longstanding belief in 

the general utility and effectiveness of the armored cavalry regiment.186

The 2d Armored Cavalry garnered considerable publicity for its role in 

leading the VII Corps advance. The regiment gathered intelligence, guided 

the corps’ movement, screened operations, and served as a covering force. 

In the last capacity, it routinely engaged Iraqi forces encountered and prevented their observation of VII Corps movement. The regiment’s combat 

effectiveness became obvious during the battle of 73 Easting in which it 

moved through a sandstorm and attacked Iraqi forces in prepared positions. 

Despite some initial confusion, elements of the regiment drove into and 

through the Iraqi positions, engaging mechanized and dismounted forces 

without pause. Regimental air cavalry eliminated Iraqi artillery supporting 

the defenders. When the engagement ended, the armored cavalry had left 

a path of destruction in its wake and set the stage for further attacks by the 

VII Corps.187

During the course of the campaign, the 2d Armored Cavalry moved 

nearly 200 kilometers during combat operations. It engaged elements 

from five different Iraqi formations and received credit for the destruction of over 300 armored vehicles and the capture of 2,000 prisoners. It 

benefited from the integrated employment of air cavalry and close air support. However, limited visibility and no-fly weather interfered with air 

operations, including support during the battle of 73 Easting. This reality 

underscored concerns expressed about overreliance on aerial support that 

could never be guaranteed. In contrast, the Abrams tank and M3 teams 

proved their ability to operate continuously against enemy forces and in 

poor weather conditions.188
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

The experience of division cavalry squadrons proved less satisfactory and generated numerous recommendations for changes. Among those 

heavy divisions that transitioned to the Army of Excellence design, a general desire emerged to add tanks to the squadron. Several division commanders attached tanks to the squadron to protect their scouts and provide 

additional firepower. Most felt that their cavalry required the ability to 

destroy any targets encountered and survive hostile contact. In those formations in which tanks were attached to the cavalry, the combination of 

Abrams tanks and M3s proved a winning one. This integration tended to 

occur at the platoon rather than the troop level. In general, the attachment of tanks to division cavalry proved “fundamental to the success of 

the squadrons’ execution of its demanding mission profile.” The increased 

combat power permitted a faster tempo of operations and greater depth in 

security actions.189

The experience of the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment highlighted the extent to which division cavalry squadrons underwent wholesale redesign in the combat theater. Assigned to the 24th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized), the squadron deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1990 with a 

brigade from that formation. Initially, the squadron provided a forward 

screen to help cover the buildup of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. Due to 

its forward and semi-independent role, the squadron received significant 

augmentation to its combat power, including another ground cavalry troop 

and a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery. The squadron also 

temporarily controlled various mechanized and armor teams.190

In preparation for ground operations, the division commander augmented the squadron to permit it to function as another maneuver unit. 

This practice proved common among formations stationed in the Federal 

Republic of Germany, from where the 24th Infantry Division deployed. 

The squadron retained its MLRS battery while gaining an Abrams tank 

company and detachments of engineers, military intelligence, and air 

defense artillery. Chemical personnel provided smoke generation and 

NBC reconnaissance capabilities. Additional supply and maintenance 

assets coupled with the attachment of ground-surveillance radar teams to 

each troop completed the reinforcement. Reminiscent of the Vietnam war, 

the division commander removed the squadron’s air cavalry, consolidating 

it with the rest of the formation’s aerial assets in the aviation brigade.191

These changes made the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry a ground cavalry task 

force with little internal uniformity. Its principal combat elements included 

a tank company and two cavalry troops. One cavalry troop conformed to 

the Army of Excellence configuration with pure M3 platoons, but the other 
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was organized as a regimental cavalry troop with two tank platoons and 

two scout platoons. The tank platoons converted to Abrams tanks before 

combat operations began, but the scout platoons retained their ITV/M113 

mix throughout the conflict. Mortar support remained consolidated at the 

troop level.192

Control of the cavalry task force varied between the division command 

and subordinate brigades. At the start of operations, its two ground cavalry 

troops supported different brigades. Similarly, the missions assigned to the 

squadron frequently changed, ranging from zone and route reconnaissance 

to screen and guard functions. There was no attempt to focus the squadron 

predominantly on information collection. The division commander 

expected it to operate forward of the main body and conduct independent 

security operations. During the course of the ground campaign, the mission 

set performed exceeded the doctrinal emphasis on information collection, 

but it reflected the division commander’s desire for a robust and versatile 

cavalry organization.193

The increase in the squadron’s combat power came at the cost of 

additional planning challenges related to logistical support. The high fuel 

consumption rate of the Abrams tanks necessitated frequent refueling stops 

that threatened to either slow the squadron’s momentum or leave forward 

elements without armor support. Therefore, an impromptu reorganization 

occurred that gave each cavalry troop a mix of tank and scout platoons. 

Each tank platoon refueled according to a staggered rotation schedule to 

Figure 90. Two Bradley Fighting Vehicles during Operation DESERT STORM.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

avoid compromising squadron momentum or temporarily denuding either 

troop of armor support.194

The reinforcement given to the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry made it an 

effective combat force. Such augmentation did not alter the commonly 

held view that squadrons with only two ground cavalry troops lacked 

sufficient force to accomplish the range of missions actually assigned. Most 

division commanders preferred a more traditional squadron configuration 

with three ground and one air cavalry troop, and they were willing to lose 

an air cavalry troop to affect this change. These findings led the Army 

Chief of Staff in June 1991 to approve in concept the addition of tanks 

and a third ground troop to the division cavalry. Pending implementation, 

division cavalry squadrons in Europe began to replace their pure M3 scout 

platoons with a mix of three Abrams tanks and five M3s. Elsewhere, the 

Army considered a smaller interim platoon of two tanks and three M3s. 

All platoons were to transition to the European model by the mid-1990s 

prior to reconfiguration of the squadron with three ground cavalry troops. 

These decisions marked an abandonment of the underlining rationale for 

the Army of Excellence division squadron structure and a return to a more 

robust organization. However, until funded and enacted, they remained 

objectives rather than accomplished facts.195

While division commanders possessed the flexibility to reconfigure 

their cavalry squadrons through the realignment of assets, brigade 

commanders did not. According to one analysis of DESERT STORM 

combat operations, “It is clear that, had the assets been available, a 

number of commanders would have experimented with brigade scouts.” 

The brigade represented the only command echelon between battalion and 

corps that did not possess a reconnaissance unit. Most commanders felt 

that combat operations justified such an organization.196 The Armor Center 

leadership agreed and sought to secure a scout platoon for the brigade 

commander, but this remained a work in progress.197

Heavy maneuver battalions employed a variety of scout platoons, 

reflecting the limited progress made toward conversion to pure HMMWV 

units. The following table shows the mix of different configurations 

assigned to battalion task forces.

Platoons equipped with the M3 found it effective in combat. It kept 

pace with the Abrams tank, and it possessed a desirable mix of firepower, 

mobility, and protection.198 Crews appreciated the weaponry available 

and engaged all types of targets encountered. The M3 benefited from 

modifications made during the 1980s, including the addition of NBC 

protection, the insertion of periscopes to permit better visibility from 
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inside the vehicle, and an improved TOW missile launcher. The fielding 

of the M3A2 in 1988 increased survivability through the addition of more 

armor, a Kevlar spall liner, and related improvements to the engine and 

suspension. The A2 version proved much less vulnerable in combat than 

earlier versions.199 Global positioning systems (GPS) on at least some of 

the vehicles in each platoon ensured few navigational errors as US forces 

swept across the desert.200

The vehicle did experience problems. Its engine periodically clogged 

with sand, but the effect proved less disruptive than that experienced by 

Abrams tank crews. Optics proved less than ideal for scouting, engaging 

targets at longer ranges, and identifying friend from foe. On the M3A2, 

exhaust fumes blew into the vehicle commander’s face obscuring his visibility and causing sickness. The cramped conditions inside the vehicle 

resulted in a variety of different load plans to accommodate both crew and 

Figure 91. Operation DESERT STORM—a Bradley from the 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry Regiment during a pause in the action.

Courtesy Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor

Vehicle Equipment Number of Platoons

M3 CFV 33

HMMWV 6

M113 & ITV 5

M3 CFV & HMMWV 2

LAV 25 1

Table.4. Operation DESERT STORM scout platoon configurations
321

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

personal gear. Observers noted, “Present load plan on BFVs doesn’t take 

into account that crews live in the vehicle as well as fight from it. There is 

not enough internal space for either a nine-man infantry squad or a fiveman Scout squad’s gear.”201 The coaxial machinegun also proved prone 

to malfunction. One cavalry troop engaged in a firefight found that every 

single vehicle experienced coaxial jamming.202

The experience of M3-equipped battalion scout platoons reflected 

doctrinal and training emphasis on avoiding unnecessary combat. One 

platoon in the 1st Infantry Division, for example, facilitated the operations 

of its parent organization without significant combat. When ground combat operations began, the platoon screened its parent task force and maintained contact with supporting artillery. Subsequently, it guided the task 

force through a forward passage of lines and kept its parent unit aligned 

with adjacent friendly units. During these operations, hostile engagements 

by the platoon proved rare and could not be initiated without the task force 

commander’s approval. In recounting his unit’s experience, the platoon 

leader noted, “Although it is unusual for scouts to engage the enemy with 

direct fire, it was necessary to minimize the possibility of fratricide.” 

Clearly, the results of the reconnaissance controversy of the preceding 

decade were influencing combat operations overseas.203

In addition to the pure M3 platoons, two units deployed to Southwest 

Asia in an experimental configuration. It addressed concerns over the lack 

of tanks in division cavalry squadrons by again integrating them at the 

platoon level. The resultant “3x5” structure included three Abrams tanks 

and five M3s. A headquarters section of one tank and one M3 directed 

two scout sections, each possessing one tank and two M3s. This platoon 

structure provided considerable firepower and after the war was adopted 

by division cavalry squadrons in Europe. Its principal drawbacks included 

a limited dismount capability and a narrow breadth of coverage.204

The M113/ITV scout platoon possessed the drawbacks of limited 

mobility and inability to keep pace with the Abrams/M3 team. Readiness 

issues associated with the ITV were well documented by 1990–91, but the 

platoon retained a strong antitank capability adequate to defeating Iraqi 

armor. The scout platoon of the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor Regiment entered 

combat equipped with the LAV-25. This unit was part of the 82d Airborne 

Division, which previously exchanged its HMMWVs for LAV-25s. In the 

desert, the LAV-25 proved quiet and mobile, able to traverse much of the 

same ground as a tracked vehicle. Its off-road movement surpassed that 

of the HMMWV, while its 25-mm cannon permitted it to engage enemy 

reconnaissance and light armor platforms. Its large size constituted its 
322

Chapter 6

principal drawback, which crews were expected to mitigate through careful terrain usage.205

The HMMWV scout platoons garnered considerable interest due 

to the controversy surrounding reconnaissance operations in the 1980s. 

None of the HMMWV platoons that participated in Operation DESERT 

STORM represented an ideal organization. They lacked the optics, motorcycles, and Stinger antiaircraft missiles supposed to be organic to the 

unit.206 Nevertheless, at least one platoon leader favored the HMMWV 

scout unit. He appreciated the mobility, quietness, and small size associated with the HMMWV, and relied on these qualities to move to and 

on the battlefield. While operating as a forward screen, his unit routinely 

identified targets for the parent battalion task force to eliminate. In periods of frequent contact, however, the HMMWV scouts had little option 

other than to hide due to their lack of armor protection. In their stead, the 

battalion employed heavier assets to clear a path, making it safe for the 

HMMWVs to proceed.207

Armor battalion and brigade commanders in the theater proved much 

less sanguine about HMMWV scout platoons. They considered these units 

far too vulnerable, making their active employment on the battlefield too 

risky. Therefore, employed close to their parent battalions, HMMWV platoons were generally used to assist command and control functions and 

facilitate traffic movement. Mechanized infantry or tank platoons temporarily thrust into the role of scouts assumed their role of forward reconnaissance.208 Survivability concerns led some commanders to create ad hoc 

organizations with increased combat power. In one instance, an improvised 

company team was created through the concentration of a scout platoon, a 

tank platoon, a mechanized infantry platoon, and an engineer section.209

The HMMWV shared the difficulty of the M113 and ITV in keeping 

ahead of the Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles that equipped 

parent battalions. These scout platforms advanced less to detect and identify enemy forces than to simply stay in the lead. Of the scout platforms 

employed, however, the HMMWV proved the least likely to survive chance 

encounters with hostile forces or mines. The M3’s firepower and superior 

survivability inspired recommendations to create a mixed M3/HMMWV 

scout platoon with increased numbers of dismounts. This combination 

provided the means to conduct either stealthy operations or a more aggressive reconnaissance likely to trigger hostile contact.210

The war’s end led to further analysis of the proper structure and 

equipment of the scout platoon. The survivability of the M3 in combat 

against Iraqi armor encouraged advocates of better protected scouts 
323

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

who possessed the capability to fight. Indeed, the rationale behind the 

HMMWV seemed in question. Therefore, the Armor Center requested the 

cessation of HMMWV scout platoon fielding, pending further analysis of 

scout operations in Operation DESERT STORM. A formal study began, 

but HMMWV platoon fielding continued.211

The successful conclusion of hostilities in Southwest Asia helped to 

validate the requirement for a more powerful division cavalry squadron, 

establish a brigade scout platoon, and renew concerns over the proper 

scout platoon configuration. It also found reconnaissance organizations of 

all types temporarily immersed in managing prisoners of war and helping 

refugees. It was these postwar activities rather than the desert battles that 

foreshadowed the challenges facing the Army abroad in the next decade. 
324

Chapter 6

Notes

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, 

IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 568–569, 571, 573.

2. Major Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William 

E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 7–8, 31.

3. Ibid., 31, 33.

4. Ibid., 33–36, quotation from page 35.

5. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1976); Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 

41, 46–47, 77–80, 82; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 578–579.

6. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 95–96; John L. Romjue, From 

Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982

(Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 23–25; 

E-mail message, Anne W. Chapman to Robert S. Cameron, 25 July 2005, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic files, Evolution of Armor/Donn Starry.

7. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 96–98; Romjue, From Active 

Defense to AirLand Battle, 14–17, 19–20.

8. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, 30, 33–36, 45.

9. John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s 

Army (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997), 8; 

John B. Wilson, Army Lineage Series: Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution 

of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 

1998), 379–382.

10. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 9–10; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 

383–386; Weigley, History of the United States Army, 575.

11. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 13–14.

12. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 388–389.

13. Richard M. Swain, “AirLand Battle,” in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: 

The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry 

(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 368, 370, 373.

14. Letter, Major General Donn A. Starry to Deputy Under Secretary of 

the Army for Operations Research Wilbur B. Payne, 15 July 1974, 3 (US Army 

Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA) (hereafter referred to as MHI), Donn A. 

Starry Papers.

15. Major General Donn A. Starry, “The Commander’s Hatch,” Armor

LXXXIII, no. 1 (January–February 1974): 4–6.

16. Letter, Starry to Payne, 15 July 1974, 4–5; Starry, “The Commander’s 

Hatch,” 6.

17. Major General Donn A. Starry, “The Commander’s Hatch,” Armor

LXXXIV, no. 2 (March–April 1975): 5.

18. Letter, General Bruce Palmer Jr. to Major General Donn A. Starry, 

26 August 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers; Message, Major General Donn A. 

Starry to Mr. Hunter Woodall, 15 November 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers; 
325

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

Letter, Major General Donn A. Starry to Brigadier General William B. Burdeshaw, 

c. 1975, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

19. Letter, Starry to Burdeshaw, c. 1975.

20. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The Cavalry/Scout Study,” 

Vol. I, 4 July 1974, 54, 57, 58, US Army Armor Branch Archives (hereafter 

referred to as Branch Archives). (SECRET—Info used is UNCLASSIFIED.) At 

this time, the H-series table of organization and equipment was in effect.

21. Starry, “The Commander’s Hatch,” (March–April 1975): 6–8.

22. Letter, Colonel David K. Doyle to Major General Donn A. Starry, c. 

1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

23. Letter, Major General Donn A. Starry to Brigadier General Paul F. 

Gorman, 28 January 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

24. Starry to Gorman, 28 January 1974; Memorandum, General William 

E. DePuy to General Creighton Abrams, 15 March 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry 

Papers; Letter, Major General Marvin D. Fuller to Major General Donn A. 

Starry, 13 December 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers; Letter, Colonel Grail L. 

Brookshire to Major General Donn A. Starry, 12 November 1975, MHI, Donn A. 

Starry Papers.

25. Letter, Major General Donn A. Starry to Lieutenant General Orwin C. 

Talbott, 18 March 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

26. Memorandum, Major General Donn A. Starry to Major General Thomas 

M. Tarpley, 14 May 1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

27. Letter, Colonel David K. Doyle to Colonel Jack W. Nielsen, 16 April 

1974, MHI, Donn A. Starry Papers.

28. “The Cavalry/Scout Study,” Vol. I, 4 July 1974, 58. (SECRET—

Information used is UNCLASSIFIED.)

29. Starry to Tarpley, 14 May 1974.

30. Staff Sergeant Peter L. Bunce, “Cavalry Platoon Organization,” Armor

LXXXIV, no. 4 (July–August 1975): 2; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Dozier, 

“Comments on Commander’s Hatch,” Armor LXXXIV, no. 6 (November–

December 1975): 2.

31. Captain James H. Boschma, “The Case for Ground Scouts,” Armor

LXXXIII, no. 3 (May–June 1974): 4.

32. Bunce, “Cavalry Platoon Organization,” 2.

33. Dozier, “Comments on Commander’s Hatch,” 2.

34. Staff Sergeant Peter L. Bunce, “The Reconnaissance Dilemma,” Armor

LXXXV, no. 2 (March–April 1976): 18.

35. Ibid., 18–20.

36. Major General George S. Patton, “In Support of the Scout,” Armor

LXXXVI, no. 2 (March–April 1977): 5.

37. Colonel Crosbie E. Saint, “Cavalry Today,” Armor LXXXVI, no. 4 

(July–August 1977): 60–61.

38. Memorandum, Major General Glenn K. Otis to Lieutenant General 

Ott, Subj: Cavalry—Economy of Force Role, 6 July 1978, MHI, Donn A. Starry 

Papers.
326

Chapter 6

39. Saint, “Cavalry Today,” 62.

40. Brigadier General David K. Doyle, “The Indispensable Scout,” Armor

LXXXVI, no. 5 (September–October 1977): 10–12.

41. Ibid, 10–12, quotation from page 10.

42. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, Cavalry (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1977).

43. Ibid., i–ii, quotation from page i.

44. Ibid, chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6.

45. Ibid., 5-58.

46. Ibid., 5-2 to 5-3, 5-5, 5-58, quotation from page 5-33.

47. Ibid., 5-3 to 5-4, 5-18 to 5-19, 5-21.

48. Ibid., 3-13, 5-54.

49. Ibid., chapter 6, quotation from page 6-1.

50. Ibid., 7-14 to 7-16, appendix E.

51. Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division 

Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1978), 1-3, 

3-6, 3-10, 4-38, 5-3, quotation from page 5-3.

52. Department of the Army, FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry 

Battalion Task Force (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

1977), 6-2 to 6-3, 6-5, 6-10.

53. Ibid., 6-6, 6-8 to 6-9.

54. US Army Armor School, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US 

Army Armor School, 1974) Vol. II: 424, 427.

55. Captain Paul F. Nagengast Jr. and First Lieutenant Mack B. Gardner, “3 

For 5,” Armor LXXXIII, no. 1 (January–February 1974): 35–39.

56. Ibid.

57. US Army Armor School, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US 

Army Armor School, 1977), Vol. II: 428, 430; US Army Armor School, Armor 

Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 1978–1979), Vol. II: 

492, 495.

58. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. I: 64, 67, Vol. II: 272, 275; US Army 

Armor School, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 

1976), Vol. I: 47–48, Vol. II: 208, 210; Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. 

I: 64, 67, Vol. II: 358, 361; US Army Armor School, Armor Reference Data (Fort 

Knox, KY: US Army Armor School, 1979), Vol. II: 366, 369.

59. Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. I: 51, 54, Vol. II change 2: 312, 

315; Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. I: 68, 71, Vol. II: 362, 365; Armor 

Reference Data (1979), Vol. I: 254, 257, Vol II: 370, 373.

60. Corporal Gary Cheney, “Keeping the Scout Alive,” Armor LXXXVI, 

no. 1 (January–February 1977): 4; Seward Smith, Thomas J. Thompson, and 

Alexander Nicolini, “Human Factors and Training Evaluation of the Improved TOW 

Vehicle (ITV) during OT/DT III,” Report, August 1980, 2–5, Defense Technical 

Information Center (hereafter referred to as DTIC), Report no. ADA 101917; Staff 

Sergeant Craig C. Mosher, “The CFV as a Scout Vehicle is Questioned,” Armor
327

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

XCI, no. 1 (January–February 1982): 3; Major (Promotable) Craig S. Harju Sr., 

“White Paper—A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout 

Platoon,” Report, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 18 September 1989, 

80, DTIC, Report no. AD-A214 798.

61. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. II: 250; Armor Reference Data

(1976), Vol. II: 191; Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. II: change 1: 288, 306; 

Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. II: 326, 334; Armor Reference Data

(1979), Vol. II: 330, 360.

62. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. II: 264, 266; Armor Reference Data

(1976), Vol. II: 202–203, 257–258; Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. II: 304, 

306, 420, 422; Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. II: 350, 484; Armor 

Reference Data (1979), Vol. II: 358, 360.

63. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. II: 272; Armor Reference Data

(1976), Vol. II: 208, 263; Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. II: change 2: 312, 

428; Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. II: 358, 362, 492; Armor Reference 

Data (1979), Vol. II: 366.

64. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. I: 56, 58, 64; Armor Reference Data

(1976), Vol. I: 39, 41, 47; Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. I: change 2: 43, 45, 

51; Armor Reference Data (1978–1979), Vol. I: 56, 58, 64, 68; Armor Reference 

Data (1979), Vol. I: 244, 250, 253–254, 257; FM 17-95 (1977), 3-9.

65. Captain Randy D. Tatum, “Cavalry’s Traditional Role Endangered,” 

Armor XC, no. 1 (January–February 1981): 3.

66. Department of the Army, FM 17-15: Tank Units, Platoon, Company 

and Battalion (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966), 

change 2, 15 December 1972, 8, 10, 11.

67. FM 71-2 (1977), 6-2.

68. US Army Armor School, TC 17-36-2, Armored Cavalry Platoon: 

Organization and Techniques of Movement (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor 

School, 1975), 17

69. Armor Reference Data (1974), Vol. I: 188, 192, 195, 208; Armor 

Reference Data (1976), Vol. I: 119, 127, 129.

70. R.P. Hunnicutt, Bradley: A History of American Fighting and Support 

Vehicles (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), 232–233; Burton S. Boudinot, 

“Stealth in Scouting Requires Small, Quiet Vehicles, Not Guns,” Armor CVIII, 

no. 6 (November–December 1999): 3.

71. Armor Reference Data (1977), Vol. I: 191, 207; Armor Reference Data

(1978–1979), Vol. I: 226, 229, 274, 277; Armor Reference Data (1979), Vol. I: 

214, 226, 230, 242.

72. Armor Reference Data (1979), Vol. I: 278, 281.

73. TC 17-36-2, 17; Patton, “In Support of the Scout,” 5.

74. Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot, “The Case for an Armored 

Dune Buggy,” Armor LXXX, no. 3 (May–June 1971): 22–24.

75. Lieutenant Colonel Burton S. Boudinot, “An Approach to the Scout 

Dilemma,” Armor LXXIX, no. 5 (September–October 1970): 44–45.
328

Chapter 6

76. Captain Harold R. Wager et. al., “Reconnaissance/Scout Vehicle” 

(student report no. 58-25, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, 11 December 

1967), US Army Armor School Library.

77. Captain Roland J. Bratisax, “Reconnaissance Vehicle” (student report 

no. 50-26, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, undated), quotation from 

page 1, US Army Armor School Library.

78. Captain Robert N. White, “A Reconnaissance Vehicle” (student report 

no. 45.60-150, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY), US Army Armor School 

Library.

79. Captain Cecil A. Green, “Motorcycle Scouts,” Armor LXXXIV, no. 2 

(March–April 1975): 22–26.

80. US General Accounting Office, “Staff Study of the Armored 

Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle,” Report, February 1975, 1, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic files, Cavalry Development/1970s.

81. “Staff Study of the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle,” 1; Diane 

L. Urbina, “‘Lethal Beyond All Expectations’: The Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” in 

Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George 

F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 

1999), 411; W. Blair Haworth Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way: 

Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United 

States Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 69–71.

82. Lieutenant Colonel David L. Funk and Captain Donald C. Snedeker, 

“Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Test,” Armor LXXXIV, no. 5 

(September–October 1975): 37–42.

83. Message, Major General Donn A. Starry to Major General Thomas M. 

Tarpley, Subj: MICV, ARSV, TOW, Cannon, 10 January 1975, MHI, Donn A. 

Starry Papers; Lieutenant Colonel David L. Funk, “ARSV Task Force Briefing,” 

Armor LXXXIV, no. 6 (November–December 1975): 26–27.

84. Funk and Snedeker, “Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle Test,” 37–42; 

Funk, “ARSV Task Force Briefing,” 26–28; Starry to Tarpley, 10 January 1975; 

Message, Major General Donn A. Starry to General William E. DePuy, Subj: 

Armored Cavalry Vehicle Development, 8 September 1975, MHI, Donn A. Starry 

Papers.

85. Urbina, “Lethal Beyond All Expectations,” 411–412, 417–421; Haworth, 

The Bradley and How It Got That Way, 78–83.

86. See James G. Burton’s The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the 

Old Guard (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993).

87. Urbina, “Lethal Beyond All Expectations,” 424–427; Haworth, The 

Bradley and How It Got That Way, 88–90.

88. Captain Marc A. King, “The Battalion Scout Platoon is Alive and Well,” 

Armor LXXXVII, no. 5 (September–October 1978): 35–37; Harju, “A Study of 

the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” 72, 75.

89. King, “The Battalion Scout Platoon is Alive and Well,” 35–37; Harju, 

“A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” 75.
329

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

90. Harju, “A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout 

Platoon,” 75.

91. Staff Sergeant Peter L. Bunce, “Appalled,” Armor LXXXVIII, no. 6 

(November–December 1979): 3.

92. Staff Sergeant Thomas P. Currie, “CFV Not For Scouts,” Armor

LXXXIX, no. 2 (March–April 1980): 2; Mosher, “The CFV as a Scout Vehicle is 

Questioned,” 3.

93. “XM2 and 3,” Armor LXXXVIII, no. 3 (May–June 1979): 30–34.

94. Sergeant Christopher F. Schneider, “Define the Scout’s Mission,” Armor

LXXXIX, no. 2 (March–April 1980): 2.

95. Major Marc A. King, “Time to Get on Board,” Armor LXXXIX, no. 2 

(March–April 1980): 3.

96. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 26–28.

97. Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 382–385.

98. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1982); Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 384–

390; Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, 66–73.

99. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986); Swain, “AirLand Battle,” 390–

392, quotation from page 392.

100. Romjue, Army of Excellence, 24–26, 85–87, 111.

101. Ibid., 55, 89–90,108, 126.

102. US Army Armor School, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US 

Army Armor School, 1981), Vol. III: 492, 494, 506, 509.

103. Armor Reference Data (1981), Vol. III: 492, 506, 509; Major Peter 

S. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron—A 

Doctrinal Step Backward?” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies 

(hereafter referred to as SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 1985), 24–

25, Cavalry Branch Archives.

104. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” 

48.

105. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” 

23–25; Harju, “A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout 

Platoon,” 76–77; Major Robert P. Bush, “The Division Commander’s Eyes and 

Ears,” Armor XCII, no. 4 (September–October 1983): 16–17.

106. Colonel William W. Crouch, “Soviet Reconnaissance Operations,” 

Armor XC, no. 6 (November–December 1981): 28–29.

107. Captain Rodney B. Mitchell, “Reconnaissance Revisited,” Armor XC, 

no. 6 (November–December 1981): 25–27.

108. Harju, “A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout 

Platoon,” 76–77; Romjue, Army of Excellence, 95–96; Kindsvatter, “The Armyof-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” 25–26.

109. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” 

25–26, 33–36; Major Thomas A. Dials, “Economy of Force—the Cavalry 
330

Chapter 6

Connection,” Armor XCII, no. 4 (July–August 1983): 45–46; First Lieutenant 

Geoffrey C. Davis, “The Three D’s of Reconnaissance,” Armor XCI, no. 1 

(January–February 1982): 24.

110. Bush, “The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears,” 15–16.

111. Ibid., 16–17.

112. Ibid., 17.

113. Lieutenant Colonel Bob E. Shambarger, “Eyes and Ears Defended,” 

Armor XCIII, no. 1 (January–February 1984): 3.

114. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron,” 

33–36.

115. Memorandum, General William R. Richardson to General John A. 

Wickham Jr., Subj: Heavy Division Cavalry Squadron Design, 2 June 1986, 

Branch Archives; Memorandum, General William R. Richardson to General John 

A. Wickham Jr., Subj: Division Cavalry Study, 2 June 1986, quotation from same, 

Branch Archives.

116. John Cranston, “Assessment by Major General Thomas H. Tait of 

his Tenure as Commanding General, US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, 

June 1986–August 1988, end of tour interview, 18 August 1989, 10–11, Branch 

Archives; John Cranston, “Final Interview, BG Dennis V. Crumley,” end of tour 

interview, 20 June 1989, 12, Branch Archives; US Army Armor School, “Cavalry/

Reconnaissance Net Assessment-Master Plan,” 31 August 1988, 1–9, Branch 

Archives; Major General Robert E. Wagner, “Division Cavalry: The Broken 

Sabre,” Armor XCVIII, no. 5 (September–October 1989): 39–40.

117. Major General Thomas H. Tait, “Commander’s Hatch: Reconnaissance,” 

Armor XCVI, no. 2 (March–April 1987): 5.

118. Major General Thomas H. Tait, “Commander’s Hatch: Remembering 

Some Lessons Learned,” Armor XCVI, no. 4 (July–August 1987): 6–7.

119. Message, General Joseph T. Palastra Jr. to General Maxwell R. Thurman, 

Subj: Cavalry Missions and Structure, 4 April 1988, Branch Archives.

120. Memorandum, Colonel Jarrett J. Robertson to CG, FORSCOM, Subj: 

Cavalry Missions and Structure, 26 February 1988, 3–4, quotation from page 3.

121. “Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment-Master Plan,” 2-40 to 2-41. 

The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment was the division cavalry squadron for the 

2d Armored Division.

122. Robertson to CG, FORSCOM, 26 February 1988, 3; Staff Sergeant 

Junius B. Hammer III, “Ground Cav ‘Lost in the Shuffle’?” Armor SCIV, no. 6 

(November–December 1985): 3; Phillip J. Zeller Jr., “Leave the Cav Where It Is,” 

Armor XCIV, no. 4 (July–August 1985): 2.

123. Richardson to Wickham, Subj: Heavy Division Cavalry Squadron 

Design, 2 June 1986.

124. Memorandum, Major General William A. Roosma to Commanding 

General, Subj: Cavalry Missions and Structure, c. 1988, Branch Archives.

125. Message, Major General E. Parker to Major General Thomas H. Tait, 

Subj: Reconnaissance/Counter Reconnaisance/Surveillance Forces, 23 August 

1988, Branch Archives.
331

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

126. “Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment-Master Plan,” quotation 

from page 1-4.

127. Ibid., 2-68 to 2-70, 2-71 to 2-73, quotation from page 2-68.

128. US Army Armor Center, FKSM 71-8, Close Combat Heavy (CCH) 

Maneuver Organizations (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Center, 1989), Q-1.

129. Major Marc A. King, “2X2: The Regimental Cavalry Troop,” Armor

XC, no. 2 (March–April 1981): 12–13.

130. “Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment-Master Plan,” 1-9 to 1-10.

131. Richardson to Wickham, Subj: Heavy Division Cavalry Squadron 

Design, 2 June 1986.

132. Message, Commander, US Army Armor Center (USAARMC) to 

Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 31 May 

1988, see attached discussion sheet outlining problems associated with the longrange surveillance detachment, Branch Archives.

133. Message, Brigadier General William W. Hartzog to Brigadier General 

Dennis V. Crumley, Subj: Reconnaissance/Counter Reconnaissance/Surveillance 

Forces Study In-Process Review (IPR), 12 July 1988, Branch Archives.

134. Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon E. Sayre Jr. to Commandant, 

US Army Armor School (USAARMS), Subj: Cavalry Missions and Structure, 

25 April 1988, Branch Archives.

135. Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Development of the National 

Training Center 1976–1984 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1997), 

107.

136. Major Terry A. Wolff, “Tactical Reconnaissance and Security for the 

Armor Battalion Commander: Is the Scout Platoon Combat Capable or Combat 

Ineffective?” (student report, SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 December 1990), 

14, DTIC Report no. ADA233108.

137. Wolff, “Tactical Reconnaissance and Security for the Armor Battalion 

Commander,” 14; National Training Center, “National Training Center 

Commander’s Memorandum: Lessons Learned,” Report, 20 November 1985, 

cover page, Branch Archives.

138. Major Christopher M. Hickey, “Heavy Brigade Offensive Reconnaissance Operations: A Systems Perspective” (student report, SAMS, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 18 December 1997), 16, 48 #39.

139. Hickey, “Heavy Brigade Offensive Reconnaissance Operations,” 

18–19; Wolff, “Tactical Reconnaissance and Security for the Armor Battalion 

Commander,” 16–17.

140. Major John D. Rosenberger, “An Assessment of Reconnaissance and 

Counterreconnaissance Operations at the National Training Center,” Report, 

February 1987, 1–2, Branch Archives.

141. Ibid., 3.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., 4.

144. Ibid., 8. 

145. Ibid., 4–8.
332

Chapter 6

146. Ibid., 8–9.

147. Ibid., 8–9, quotation from page 8.

148. Ibid., 10.

149. Ibid., 16; Cranston, “Assessment by Major General Thomas H. Tait of 

his Tenure as Commanding General,” 12, quotation from page 12.

150. Rosenberger, “An Assessment of Reconnaissance and 

Counterreconnaissance Operations,” 16.

151. Ibid.

152. “HMMWV History,” Olive Drab, http://www.olive-drab.com/od_mvy_

hmmwv_history.php (accessed 19 September 2008); “High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/

ground/hmmwv.htm (accessed 19 September 2008).

153. Hickey, “Heavy Brigade Offensive Reconnaissance Operations,” 19.

154. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. McCarthy, “U.S. Army Heavy Brigade 

Reconnaissance During Offensive Operations” (student report, SAMS, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 1994), 18–19.

155. US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Compendium (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1988), Vol. I: Heavy Forces, 

4–6, quotation from page 5.

156. Sergeant Richard G. Johnston, “Flaws Seen in Light Scout Concept,” 

Armor XCVIII, no. 5 (September–October 1989): 3.

157. Message, Lieutenant General Crosby E. Saint to General Joseph T. 

Palastra Jr., Subj: Training at the NTC, c. 1988, 3–4, Branch Archives.

158. Captain Mark B. Chakwin, “Cavalry and the Light Division,” Armor

XCVI, no. 1 (January–February 1987): 36–37.

159. “Cavalry/Reconnaissance Net Assessment—Master Plan,” 2-10 to 2-11; 

Harju, “A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” 

109–113.

160. Major Barry Scribner, “HMMWVs and Scouts: Do They Mix?” Armor

XCVIII, no. 4 (July–August 1989): 33–38.

161. US Army Armor School, “Proponent Evaluation Report for the Concept 

Evaluation of the Maneuver Battalion Scout Platoon,” Fort Knox, KY, 12 March 

1990, 1–3, 13, quotation from page 13, DTIC Report no. ADA224363.

162. Ibid., 16, 32–34, quotation from page 16. 

163. Memorandum for record, Subj: LAV-25 in the XVIII ABN Corps, 

undated, Branch Archives.

164. Memorandum, Colonel F. McFarren to Headquarters, Department of 

the Army, Subj: Operational Needs Statement for Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), 

13 August 1989, 1, Branch Archives.

165. Department of the Army, FM 17-98, The Army 86 Scout Platoon

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1985), 1-1, 1-4.

166. Ibid., chapter 2.

167. Ibid., chapter 2, quotation from page 2-13.

168. Ibid., chapter 3.
333

Change, Controversy, and a Desert Victory

169. Wolff, “Tactical Reconnaissance and Security for the Armor Battalion 

Commander,” 14; Harju, “A Study of the Maneuver Battalion Reconnaissance or 

Scout Platoon,” 80–82.

170. Department of the Army, FM 17-98, Scout Platoon (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1987), 1-4 to 1-5.

171. Ibid., chapters 2 and 3.

172. Ibid., chapters 4 and 5.

173. Captain Bart Howard, “The HMMWV Scout Platoon,” Armor XCVIII, 

no. 4 (July–August 1989): 3, 53.

174. Captain Dale E. Wilson, “Improving the J-Series HHC,” Armor XCIV, 

no. 6 (November–December 1985): 2–3, quotation from page 2.

175. Ibid., 2.

176. Department of the Army, FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry 

Battalion Task Force (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

1988), iv, 1-8 to 1-10, 3-20, 3-29, 3-46, 3-51, 4-25.

177. Department of the Army, FM 17-97, Regimental Armored Cavalry 

Troop (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1988), iii, 1-2, 

1-6 to 1-7.

178. Ibid., chapter 3.

179. Ibid., 3-3 to 3-4.

180. John Cranston, “Final Taped Interview With Brigadier General Paul E. 

Funk,” end of tour interview, 15 October 1987, 31, Branch Archives.

181. John Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual 

Command History CY87,” Fort Knox, KY, 64–65, Branch Archives.

182. Major General Thomas H. Tait, “Evolution of Armor,” Armor 

Conference Report to Force, 10 May 1989, Branch Archives; “Officer Training in 

Reconnaissance,” Armor XCVII, no. 5 (September–October 1988): 51.

183. John Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual 

Command History CY88,” Fort Knox, KY, 38–39, Branch Archives.

184. Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual Command 

History CY87,” 66–67; Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual 

Command History CY88,” 34–35.

185. Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual Command 

History CY88,” 47, 62–63; John Cranston, “US Army Armor Center and 

Fort Knox Annual Command History CY89,” Fort Knox, KY, 27–29, Branch 

Archives.

186. US Army Armor Center, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging 

Observations,” Report, 7 October 1991, 4–14, Branch Archives.

187. Colonel Michael D. Krause, “The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 

1991: A Historical Introduction to a Simulation,” Report, 2 May 1991, Branch 

Archives; First Lieutenant John Hillen, “2d Armored Cavalry: The Campaign to 

Liberate Kuwait,” Armor C, no. 4 (July–August 1991): 8–12.

188. Krause, “The Battle of 73 Easting.”

189. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–5.
334

Chapter 6

190. Major Joseph C. Barto III, Task Force 2-4 Cav—“First In, Last Out”: 

The History of the 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, During Operation Desert 

Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 

1993), 3, 5–7.

191. Ibid., 5, 11–12.

192. Ibid., 5–6, 9, 12, 44.

193. Ibid., 11, 23, 33, 44, 47, 62, 66–67, 72.

194. Ibid., 62, 70, 83.

195. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–5; John 

Cranston, Interview with Major General Thomas C. Foley, 20 July 1991, 2, 

Branch Archives.

196. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–7.

197. Cranston, Interview with Major General Foley, 20 July 1991, 2.

198. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 1-12 to 

1-13.

199. Haworth, The Bradley and How It Got That Way, 103, 137–138, 142, 

143.

200. Captain Douglas C. Robbins, “Operation Desert Storm: Battle of 

Norfolk—Scout Platoon, Task Force 5-16, 1ID,” personal experience monograph, 

April 1991, 1, Branch Archives.

201. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 1-13, 6-27, 

quotation from page 6-28.

202. Haworth, The Bradley and How It Got That Way, 143.

203. Robbins, “Operation Desert Storm: Battle of Norfolk,” entire, quotation 

from page 3.

204. Haworth, The Bradley and How It Got That Way, 141.

205. First Lieutenant John Alan Hyatt, “The LAV-25 in the Scout Role,” 

Armor C, no. 5 (September–October 1991): 32–33.

206. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–7.

207. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 1–4; First 

Lieutenant (Promotable) Charles W. Gameros Jr., “Scout HMMWVs and Bradley 

CFVs: Gulf War Provides a Comparison of Scout Vehicles and MTOEs,” Armor

C, no. 5 (September–October 1991): 21–25.

208. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–7.

209. McCarthy, “U.S. Army Heavy Brigade Reconnaissance During 

Offensive Operations,” 24–25.

210. Ibid., 31.

211. “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” 4–7, 4–8.
335

Chapter 7

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

The 1990s opened with the Cold War’s end, the Gulf War victory, and 

an explosion of new information technology. Harnessing this new technology to combat organizations constituted the essence of Force XXI, which 

occupied much of the Army’s focus and funding. For much of the decade, 

however, most combat organizations struggled to sustain readiness with 

existing equipment while supporting deployments in response to regional 

crises. Operations other than war became a significant influence, necessitating a broadening of doctrine and training measures. Mounted reconnaissance organizations reflected these broad changes through greater emphasis 

on lighter and more deployable units. Doctrine began to reflect a greater 

emphasis on stealth, anticipating the fielding of new materiel to facilitate 

undetected operations. Conversely, a growing willingness to experiment 

with combined arms reconnaissance teams, the return of tanks to the heavy 

division cavalry squadrons, and recurring platform survivability concerns 

reflected a persistent interest in versatile, combat capable units. The coexistence of these two trends mirrored the Army’s transitional state between 

the heavier Army of Excellence organizations and the lighter, high-tech 

Force XXI formations.

The Post-Cold War Army

Operation DESERT STORM showcased the Army of Excellence and 

the related effects of improved doctrine, training, and materiel. The Gulf 

War also constituted the largest massing of American armor and cavalry 

organizations since World War II. Yet shortly after the victory over Iraq, 

the force responsible for it began to evaporate. The Gulf War became 

a footnote to the broader changes triggered by the Cold War’s end and 

the Soviet Union’s collapse. The need for a large standing army disappeared, and deactivation and downsizing followed. Within a few years, 

the number of Active Component divisions fell from 18 to 10, accompanied by installation closings and the removal of some American forces 

from Germany.1

Without a persistent Warsaw Pact threat, the Army began to reassess the 

changed operational environment. Regional crises replaced the danger of 

superpower conflict, and Army policy envisioned the need for a force capable of coping with two such crises simultaneously. This policy encouraged 

the development of a more flexible force, capable of global deployment 

and performing missions ranging from conventional battle to humanitarian 
336

Chapter 7

assistance. The Army’s posture changed from one of forward deployment 

to facilitate early entrance into battle to force projection, necessitating the 

deployment of combat organizations from the United States.

Despite the end of the Cold War, overseas deployments of Army 

personnel rose to unprecedented levels throughout the 1990s. Major 

operations such as those mounted in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo 

captured headlines, but soldiers found themselves serving in many other 

regions as well. Between the eve of Operation DESERT STORM and 1995, 

for example, 42 separate military operations occurred, not including the 

Gulf War. These operations included security and evacuation missions in 

Liberia, humanitarian relief in Rwanda, observer teams along the EcuadorPeru border, evacuation of noncombatants from Sierra Leone, participation 

in multinational observation of the 1976 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 

and supporting the California National Guard to suppress rioting in Los 

Angeles.2

 American ground forces also remained as a deterrent along the 

demilitarized zone on the Korean peninsula and remained in Saudi Arabia 

and Kuwait to protect both countries from further Iraqi aggression.3

These activities increased the visibility given to a broad range of 

actions other than conventional battle. They triggered changes in doctrine 

to ensure that soldiers deploying on humanitarian, stability, peace enforcement, or operations other than war possessed the guidance and training 

necessary to complete their missions. The frequency of these missions 

increased the visibility and importance attached to light forces, including 

light cavalry and armor. They could deploy on short notice and required 

fewer transportation assets to do so.

In addition to rapid deployability, lessons learned from Operation 

DESERT STORM underscored the importance of accelerating the pace of 

information sharing on the battlefield. Disseminating maps and graphics 

electronically, for example, obviated the need for manually marking 

maps, developing overlays, and distributing them. Eliminating this timeconsuming process would hasten planning and decisionmaking. Moreover, 

rapid information sharing might prevent a recurrence of the Gulf War’s 

high fratricide rates.4

An explosion of new information technology in the 1990s made the realization of these goals possible. In addition to rapidly sharing a broad range 

of information, situational awareness could be boosted through comprehensive and partly automated tracking of battlefield activity. Commanders 

able to see the battlefield in detail as it developed, track enemy and friendly 

forces, develop a computer-driven plan of action, and instantly transmit 

it to subordinate leaders could maneuver with a degree of unprecedented 
337

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

precision and speed. Such a style of battle command held revolutionary 

implications that affected nearly every facet of military activity.

Realizing this vision and determining how best to exploit information technologies became the essence of a new Army initiative known as 

Force XXI. It served as the Army’s vehicle for modernization throughout 

the decade. The ability to employ combat assets at a precise moment and 

location to achieve a decisive superiority made it possible for a smaller 

force to achieve a greater effect against an enemy. The AirLand objective 

of defeating the enemy throughout his breadth and depth remained, but the 

manner in which this occurred began to evolve and accelerate.

At the start of the decade, these concepts constituted little more than 

untested theory. In the wake of the Gulf War, they received widespread 

attention among the senior Army leadership and became the focus of a 

sustained analysis and experimentation effort. In 1992, the Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established battle labs to link the analysis 

and experimentation work of each branch with the research and development capabilities of industry. The battle labs combined computer simulations with live training to provide research in support of Force XXI 

activities.5

The complexity of implementing Force XXI 

concepts resulted 

in the creation of a 

mechanism to identify key issues, 

explore them, 

and determine 

which to pursue. 

The name given 

to this process 

was the Louisiana 

Maneuvers, a 

reference to the 

pre-World War II 

maneuvers conducted to assess readiness issues in 1940 and 1941. In 1993, 

the designation applied to the collective efforts of senior leaders, branch 

schools, and battle labs who worked together to plan how the process of 

changing the Army should occur. General officers from across the Army 

recommended subjects to be considered for development. These were then 

Figure 92. Scouts of the 1st Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry Regiment.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
338

Chapter 7

assessed and assigned to particular schools and battle labs for analysis and 

recommendations. Finally, a senior officer board of directors decided on 

which items should be forwarded to the Chief of Staff for final approval 

and funding authority.6

The Louisiana Maneuvers helped to outline the basic course of Force 

XXI development, but determination of specific equipment, tactics, organization, and training measures required more detailed work. In 1993–94, 

the Army established in succession two Digitization Special Task Forces, 

which began the process of matching real soldiers with test organizations 

and materiel in field conditions. These efforts evolved into a series of 

Army Warfighting Experiments conducted at the combat training centers. 

These experiments helped determine how to integrate new technology into 

combat units and how to restructure their organization, doctrine, and training. They served as large-scale concept explorations, offering indicators 

as to which concepts and systems seemed most promising and fed Army 

modernization plans.7

The first such experiment involved a heavy battalion task force conducting a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in 1994. Known 

as Desert Hammer VI, this event illustrated the fallacy of forming a new 

organization, issuing it new and even prototype equipment, and sending it 

into battle with little training. The task force fared poorly, but the experience provided important lessons for the further development of an armored 

task force equipped with digital computers and communications systems. 

It also demonstrated that shared situational awareness throughout the task 

force improved how it fought. Moreover, the digital communications systems and information sharing permitted the task force to see and operate 

over a much greater area.8

The same year witnessed the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 

Military Operations: Force XXI Operations, A Concept for the Evolution 

of Full-Dimension Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early TwentyFirst Century. The TRADOC publication offered a concept and vision 

of future conflict together with guidance to shape future Army development. In effect, it became the blueprint for the redesigned Army of the 

21st century. The expected operational environment constituted the central 

influence on future development. TRADOC expected the acceleration of 

information acquisition, analysis, and sharing to alter fundamentally the 

conduct and pace of battle. It envisioned a period of about 15 years during which the Army would reorient itself from 20th century threats to the 

Information Age of the 21st century through the innovative application 

and employment of emerging technologies.9
339

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

A primary theme throughout the TRADOC publication lay in the 

emphasis given to the flow of information, which would occur faster and 

simultaneously both vertically in the command chain and horizontally 

among tactical components. It permitted a faster decisionmaking process 

over a broader battlespace. A related change lay in a shift from sequential 

to simultaneous tactical operations. In the conduct of battle, the physical massing of men and materiel gave way to an emphasis on managing 

the effects of weapons systems via digital communications and computers without necessarily concentrating them. The integration of all systems 

and their combat power provided the means to execute multiple strikes on 

the enemy throughout his depth to create “massive systemic shock.” In 

this environment, the Army required doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, and the ability to tailor organizations to meet specific operational 

conditions.10

In 1995, the Army created the Force XXI Experimental Force 

(EXFOR) to help determine what systems to develop and how to integrate them into a tactical framework. The EXFOR served to “experiment 

with and test new organization designs, warfighting/operational concepts, 

training, and equipment that produces enhancements in the lethality, survivability, tempo, sustainability, deployability, joint/combined linkages, 

and versatility of the force.” EXFOR became a test bed for Force XXI. 

It replaced the ad hoc organization employed during Desert Hammer VI 

with a permanent force built on a brigade combat team (BCT) from the 4th 

Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Hood, Texas.11

By 1997, Force XXI developments were evolving from concept to 

reality. New materiel, especially in computers and digital communications, made possible the goal of building a combat unit whose components shared a common, automatically updated view of the battlefield. 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment Task Force (TF) XXI in March 1997 

clearly demonstrated this status. Unlike the earlier Desert Hammer VI, TF 

XXI employed an entire brigade trained on more reliable digital equipment at the NTC. It proved capable of conducting continuous operations 

over a much broader area and securing a steady stream of information on 

friendly and enemy actions throughout.12

The TF XXI experience demonstrated that digitization significantly 

increased situational awareness by providing a “Napoleonic view of the 

battlefield.”13 It assisted tactical maneuver and permitted unit tactical 

operations centers to track battlefield events better than previously possible. Therefore, they could direct more attention to analyzing events 

and responding to them. Commanders proved better able to concentrate 
340

Chapter 7

their forces against objectives by exploiting the situational awareness 

provided. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) permitted tracking opposing force 

(OPFOR) elements and providing early warning of their actions. JSTARS 

linked Army command and control nodes with Air Force platforms and 

remote military analysis, while the UAV constituted a pilotless drone 

remotely controlled to fly over the battlefield and collect real-time imagery 

and data on activities and locations.14

TF XXI validated the principles inherent to Force XXI. Digital forces 

were able to practice a degree of precision maneuver through reliance on 

a wide array of intelligence sources that provided a continuous stream 

of information to commanders. The potential for much faster and more 

focused operations clearly existed. It also demonstrated the embryonic 

state of truly digitized combat units. More work was required before a 

digital unit would be ready for an operational deployment.

In November 1997, the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

helped to guide ongoing division redesign efforts by indicating how a 

digital division might operate. In the largely computer-based experiment, 

units maneuvered over greatly extended distances, and brigades operated 

almost independently of division control. The improvement in situational 

awareness that accompanied expanded use of digital equipment permitted a faster operational tempo. The combination of attack helicopters, 

UAVs, and JSTARS also provided the division commander an unprecedented ability to destroy hostile combat power long before it could begin 

tactical engagements. In this sense, the Division Advanced Warfighting 

Experiment marked an evolution in AirLand Battle, with its emphasis on 

destroying enemy initial and follow-on echelons at once. Digital systems 

seemed to increase considerably the ability to do so at a faster rate.15

Transforming these promising concepts into battlefield reality required 

time. Too much of the materiel in use remained in a developmental or prototype stage. Improvements continued throughout the decade, but their 

effects on field units remained marginal. Instead, the EXFOR remained 

the principal beneficiary of new equipment and improvements. For the rest 

of the force, improvements occurred largely through upgrades to existing 

materiel or the fielding of new equipment whose development predated the 

onset of Force XXI. Cavalry units benefited from the fielding of advanced 

versions of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the digital M1A2 Abrams tank, 

and the Apache Longbow helicopter.16

Force XXI development also influenced training, doctrine, and organization. While the EXFOR matured tactical concepts and requirements for 
341

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

a heavy combat force, simultaneous work proceeded on these other areas 

to assist the Army’s future transition to a digital force. The process was a 

slow one that occurred in the midst of routine training activities and overseas deployments. A degree of confusion surrounded the shift toward digital systems and units, leaving soldiers struggling to understand the new 

Force XXI tactical concepts while retaining more traditional skill sets. 

TRADOC worked to balance digital and nondigital training and doctrine 

development, believing firmly that traditional skills would retain their 

importance and utility. In the words of one TRADOC commander, “You 

are not going to rip out a computer and throw it at the enemy.”17

Armor 2000

Despite the growing influence of Force XXI developments in the 

1990s, the most tangible effects would not be seen until the decade’s end. 

Against the backdrop of a shrinking national defense budget and downsizing, Armor planned its own development path that anticipated changing needs and emerging technologies. Armor 2000 provided the objectives 

necessary to guide branch modernization, including mounted reconnaissance. Developed in 1990, this plan incorporated evolving AirLand Battle 

concepts, new technologies, and the nature of the threat facing the nation. 

It identified capability deficiencies, recommended solutions, evaluated 

new technologies, and offered an updated force structure ready for implementation by 2000.18

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful conclusion of 

Operation DESERT STORM did not trigger fundamental changes to the 

plan. If anything, the subsequent downsizing and drop in military expenditures underscored the importance of clear developmental objectives. By 

late 1991, Armor faced the loss of 15 tank battalions, 2 division cavalry 

squadrons, and an armored cavalry regiment, coupled with the expected 

loss of 9,000 soldiers. However, the future battlefield was expected to be 

nonlinear, characterized by more dispersion and the availability of weapons and sensors better suited to the location and destruction of enemy 

forces. Such an environment increased the need and value of mounted 

reconnaissance and security organizations.19

Armor 2000 anticipated the 1990’s trend toward combat organizations 

capable of both traditional combat and operations other than war, including humanitarian relief, stability, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. 

Yet the plan considered armored organizations “woefully unprepared to 

support Light Forces operating in context with the emerging National 

Military Strategy emphasizing rapid projection of CONUS based combat power.”20 Recommendations to overcome this problem centered on 
342

Chapter 7

cavalry organizations. Platoons in the division cavalry squadron and 

armored cavalry regiment would return to the combined arms grouping 

of scouts, tanks, and mortars. The division cavalry squadron would gain 

a third ground cavalry troop while its air cavalry component transferred 

to division control. This action formalized the tendency of division commanders to transfer control of the air cavalry away from the squadron and 

acknowledged a longstanding desire to increase ground cavalry strength. 

The study also called for the creation of a light armored cavalry regiment 

to support the XVIII Airborne Corps, whose rapid deployability made it 

ideal for responding to sudden contingencies.21

Armor 2000 made no changes to the basic reconnaissance, security, and economy of force roles of cavalry organizations. Their ability 

to acquire information by a variety of means and develop tactical situations remained central to a commander’s understanding of the battlefield. 

Symptomatic of the growing size of the battle area, cavalry organizations 

could expect to perform continuous operations day and night, leveraging 

their “unique organizational structure, equipment, training and interface 

with military satellites and electronic data links for position location and 

monitoring of enemy activities over wide and deep areas.” In doing so, 

cavalry organizations expected combat whenever necessary for mission 

accomplishment.22

The Armor 2000 plan also called for the addition of a brigade scout unit 

similar in structure and purpose to the maneuver battalion scout platoon. 

Figure 93. The M8 Armored Gun System, ready to enter production before 

its cancellation in 1996.

Armor Branch Archives
343

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

At both brigade and battalion, however, these scouts were optimized for 

reconnaissance by stealth. Unlike their cavalry counterparts, these units 

retained a pure rather than combined arms configuration. Their focus lay 

in gathering information and providing early warning of hostile action for 

their respective parent organization. Through their own scouts, brigade 

commanders would possess the means to focus attention on a particular 

area or activity on the battlefield, complementing the work of battalion 

reconnaissance.23

Armor 2000 constituted a master plan for the mounted branch and 

many of its salient features remained valid within a Force XXI context.24

Responsibility for this continuity lay with Major General Thomas C. Foley, 

who commanded the Armor Center from 1989 until 1992. He both directed 

the initial study and observed the changes in the Army and the world that 

followed Operation DESERT STORM. Hence, both Armor 2000 and Force 

XXI objectives included improving the versatility and agility of cavalry 

organizations through expanded use of sensors, improved communications, 

and a new reconnaissance platform featuring the latest technology. General 

Foley stressed those developments that improved deployability, reduced 

fratricide, and contributed to advanced fire control systems with automated 

features. He also sought to replace the obsolescent M551 Sheridan with a 

light, air deployable platform that did not compromise lethality and required 

no extensive sustainment efforts. To reduce the workload associated with 

continuous operations in a nonlinear environment and expedite mission 

planning, Foley supported efforts to automate staffing procedures, reporting, and information dissemination, and to rapidly share digital imagery 

and overlays. Robotic organizations, automated staff and reporting functions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and non-line-of-sight weapons further 

underscored the futuristic tilt to the Armor 2000 study.25

Light Cavalry Emphasis

The Armor 2000 study recommended a light armored cavalry regiment 

suited to the Army’s global focus and force projection nature. Interest in 

such an organization emerged in the 1980s, but a formal proposal failed 

to secure the Army Chief of Staff’s approval.26 Nevertheless, the Armor 

Center continued to list the light armored cavalry regiment among branch 

needs, considering it ideally suited for assignment to the XVIII Airborne 

Corps, which lacked a corps reconnaissance asset.27 Similar recommendations also emerged from officers in the field.28

In 1990, at the behest of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, the Armor Center participated in a light cavalry 

regiment design effort together with the Aviation and Infantry Centers. 
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Chapter 7

Study and analysis continued to September 1991. Senior Army leadership guidance then finalized the light armored cavalry regiment’s design 

parameters.29 The emerging mission set included contingency operations, 

training support for the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and provision of a standby component for immediate deployment.30 TRADOC 

also studied regimental designs using different mixes of currently available equipment, seeking a balance between lethality and deployability. The 

favored equipment set included materiel in an early development stage, 

necessitating reliance on an interim solution. The high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV); M3; LAV-25; M113; M1 Abrams 

tank; and M551 Sheridan all found incorporation in the varied proposals 

advanced. Each recommended vehicle set underwent evaluation on the 

basis of deployability, fuel consumption, mobility, survivability, lethality, 

and overall effectiveness.31

Further momentum came with the Army Chief of Staff’s approval of 

the light armored cavalry regiment concept in December 1991. He further directed the redesignation of the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade 

(Motorized) as the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Light, and its relocation from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Polk, Louisiana. There it would 

support JRTC operations and maintain one squadron in readiness for 

immediate deployment.32 This decision resolved two force structure issues. 

The first concerned the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized). 

Throughout the 1980s, this unit comprised part of the 9th Infantry Division 

(Motorized), a high technology light division that served as a test bed for 

a new type of infantry formation. Despite a decade of experimentation, 

the formation underwent inactivation on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War. 

The 199th Brigade was retained as a separate unit, but its future remained 

uncertain. Similarly, after the Gulf War the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

faced inactivation as part of Army downsizing. The motorized infantry brigade provided the initial equipment set to establish a light cavalry unit.33

The reconfigured 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment provided a reconnaissance and security capability for a low intensity environment. Intended 

for service with the XVIII Airborne Corps, the regimental headquarters 

would control that formation’s division light cavalry squadrons and light 

armor battalion. It had to accommodate the separate deployment of at least 

one squadron. At Fort Polk, the 2d Armored Cavalry served as the JRTC 

OPFOR. Further design work continued, however, to maximize effectiveness within a 4,100-man personnel cap and air deployment into theater via 

a total of 400 C-141 sorties.34

Within these parameters, planners sought the most deployable, versatile, and lethal organization possible. They developed a transition plan 
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to realize gradually these qualities. Initially, the regiment would utilize equipment immediately available from the 199th Separate Infantry 

Brigade (Motorized). In this phase, the HMMWV constituted the primary 

platform, configured with either a machinegun, grenade launcher, or tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile launcher. The last 

weapon provided the unit’s principal antiarmor protection. The transition 

from motorized infantry to cavalry was to be completed by 1995 with the 

incorporation of the 4th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry Regiment. The next 

phase upgraded the vehicle set to include the Armored Gun System (AGS) 

and the M113A3. The final platform mix intended for fielding by 2004 

included the AGS, the Future Scout Vehicle, the wheeled High Mobility 

Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and the RAH-66 Comanche armed 

reconnaissance helicopter. This objective state also included UAVs and 

non-line-of-sight (NLOS) weapons.35

These plans marked a steady evolution toward a robust organization, 

but the transition from motorized infantry to armored cavalry regiment 

raised questions. The I Corps leadership, for example, questioned the viability of an organization with dual responsibility for supporting the JRTC 

and developing as a rapid deployment force. The latter necessitated sustained training by the entire regiment likely to conflict with the needs of 

the JRTC. They also questioned the realism of regimental deployment with 

400 aircraft sorties, when the 199th Brigade proved unable to deploy with 

fewer than 500. Some concern also emerged regarding the unit’s ability to 

recover and repair vehicles with a minimal support capability.36 Field artillery personnel disagreed with the intent to rely on towed howitzers, pending development and fielding of the HIMARS. They considered towed 

weapons unable to keep pace with the regiment and provide timely fire 

support. Their counterproposal to meet fire support needs with the tracked 

and armored M109A6 Paladin were rejected by the Armor Center due to 

the detrimental impact of the vehicle’s weight on deployability.37

These concerns did not constitute opposition to the concept of a light 

cavalry regiment, which continued to receive support within TRADOC, 

Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Department of the Army.38 The III 

Corps leadership, for example, proved supportive of the light cavalry regiment in any of its planned configurations, including its original HMMWV 

mix. The latter suited its need for a force oriented on reconnaissance with 

a limited security capability. Moreover, the corps leadership considered 

the ability of a lighter force to arrive in theater faster worth the cost of less 

combat power.39

In July 1992, the 199th Infantry Brigade (Motorized) became the 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light).40 The following year, it relocated to 
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Fort Polk. By then the baseline organization of the new light regiment 

had been determined. It included a headquarters and headquarters troop 

(HHT), three ground cavalry squadrons, a regimental aviation squadron, and a support squadron. Organic military intelligence, engineer, air 

defense artillery, and chemical reconnaissance companies provided combat support. Overall, the regiment numbered 4,017 soldiers and included 

402 HMMWVs, 108 HMMWVs with TOW missile launchers, 33 helicopters, 18 mortars, and 24 towed howitzers. The general organization paralleled the proven configuration of the heavy armored cavalry regiment. The 

headquarters also retained the capacity to control a variety of attachments, 

while the support squadron could detach assets to sustain a squadron independently employed. Combat support assets proved more austere than 

those of the heavier regiments. Air defense focus lay on helicopters while 

the chemical reconnaissance and engineer assets represented the minimum necessary. The military intelligence company, however, included 

the means to access intelligence and data from higher headquarters and 

national intelligence sources prior to and during deployments.41

The Armor Center coordinated training and doctrinal development 

directly with the regiment. It prepared to train cavalry troopers for assignment to the light cavalry regiment, and it compiled the field manuals, gunnery training, and tactics appropriate to light cavalry operations.42 Despite 

this energy, expectation inherent to most doctrinal and organizational 

actions remained on a unit built around an AGS/M113 mix. So equipped, 

the regiment possessed credible lethality, mobility, and survivability. Its 

missions included those of screen, guard, and covering force operations 

for a light corps, and it possessed the ability to fight for information.43

Realizing these capabilities sooner rather than later became more 

important in the wake of American experiences in Somalia. There, US 

forces deployed to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid found 

themselves confronting armed factions, culminating in a major firefight in 

Mogadishu in October 1993. The fighting demonstrated the vulnerability 

of the unarmored HMMWV in a hostile city. The Somalian experience 

encouraged consideration of a better-protected platform and an accelerated 

transition of the 2d Armored Cavalry from HMMWVs to the M113A3. 

The latter vehicle began fielding in 1987, and it featured improvements 

to the engine and transmission in addition to the inclusion of spall liners. 

Relocating the fuel tanks to an external position freed internal space, and 

the ability to accommodate additional armor improved the platform’s overall effectiveness and survivability.44 Nevertheless, no immediate fielding 

of the M113A3 to the light cavalry regiment occurred. Its vehicle upgrade 

remained tied to the availability of the AGS.
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

The focus of soldiers assigned to the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

(Light) lay in actually standing up the unit and training. Much of the transition to a HMMWV-based organization occurred in the 1993–94 timeframe, simultaneous with the shift in personnel from infantry to armor 

and cavalry backgrounds. At Fort Polk, two troops of the regiment served 

as the OPFOR during the first peace enforcement rotation conducted at 

the JRTC in November 1993. This activity gave the regiment experience 

in security patrols, checkpoint operations, and force protection measures. 

Sustainable, versatile, and encompassing many of the qualities traditionally associated with armored cavalry, the emerging light armored cavalry 

regiment offered a potential solution to the need for forces suited to operations other than war.45

The first test of these qualities occurred in 1995. The United Nations 

(UN) intervened in Haiti to prevent that country’s decline into chaos and 

civil war following political upheaval and persistent economic problems. 

The 2d Armored Cavalry participated in the UN action, supporting other 

elements from the XVIII Airborne Corps. The volatile situation in Haiti 

necessitated the use of the cavalry to deter violence through continuous 

patrols in and around the capital city of Port-au-Prince. These patrols 

operated continuously throughout the day and night, combining both 

mounted and dismounted operations. They always included at least two 

scout HMMWVs commanded by a noncommissioned officer (NCO) or 

lieutenant. When necessary, an infantry squad augmented the patrols and 

Figure 94. Elements of the 2d Cavalry Regiment in Haiti.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Chapter 7

narrowed the focus of their efforts on a particular neighborhood or city 

area. The patrols could be manipulated to saturate a locale or disperse over 

a broader area. Regimental soldiers also provided security for key installations considered central to government authority, and ensured the absence 

of violence during political elections. In this manner, they deviated from 

past practices dating from the Vietnam era in which the security of fixed 

sites was left to other forces to permit the cavalry to exploit its mobility. 

The 2d Armored Cavalry also performed more familiar missions, including 

convoy escort, traffic control, cordon and search, and quick reaction. The 

regimental staff formed the cadre for a joint task force command cell.46

The ground cavalry squadrons served tours in Haiti in succession 

and effectively tested the regiment’s ability to deploy subordinate units 

independently. During its operations in Haiti, however, the regiment’s 

squadrons benefited from the attachment of rifle companies and military 

policemen, which provided additional combat power and the means to 

cope with a difficult and confusing environment.47

Haiti provided a testing ground for the new light cavalry regiment and 

served to build unit cohesion. The last element did not return to the United 

States until 1997. By then, the rest of the regiment had completed training and deployed to Bosnia. There, US forces intervened to support UN 

peacekeeping operations, following several years of violence among ethnic 

factions that followed the collapse of central authority in Yugoslavia. As 

part of its preparation, the 2d Armored Cavalry completed an NTC rotation 

in 1996. There it was augmented with two artillery battalions, an engineer 

battalion, a signal company, and elements of a corps support battalion from 

the XVIII Airborne Corps. These accretions transformed the regiment into 

a more powerful combat team that proved effective against the OPFOR.48

In June 1997, the regiment also completed training at the JRTC before 

deploying to Europe. This training included interaction with civilian refugees, apprehension of suspected war criminals, and operations with a broad 

range of organizations not routinely experienced during more conventional, 

combat-oriented rotations. The regiment then moved to Germany, crossing the Sava River into Bosnia in August. In any event, the unit did not 

initially function as a single force. The regimental headquarters returned to 

Germany to conduct a training rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training 

Center (CMTC) with the 1st Armored Division. This exercise made the 

2d Armored Cavalry the first unit to complete training at all three combat 

training centers in a single 12-month period. However, while the headquarters trained in Germany, the regiment temporarily remained scattered 

among five countries and two continents.49
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

This dispersal ended in the fall with the concentration of most of the 

unit in Bosnia. There it seized Serbian-held radio towers to prevent the 

broadcast of propaganda. It helped to create a local police force, provided 

security for public business related to implementation of peace measures, 

and helped to restore the Bosnian rail system. Through the execution of 

over 12,000 patrols, the regiment made its presence felt and served to deter 

potential violence. It also inspected weapons storage sites and oversaw the 

removal of over 12,000 mines. All of these activities necessitated direct 

and regular interaction with the indigenous population to gather intelligence and calm fears of renewed violence.50

The nature of operations in Bosnia required a different set of skills 

than more traditional military actions. The provision of election security, 

protection of faction leaders trying to resolve differences, and inspections of weapons storage sites became crucial operations. Reconnaissance 

remained a primary function of the ground and air cavalry squadrons, oriented less on a clear military threat and more on the actions of the civilian populace. Video documentation became a significant tool that assisted 

negotiations with local leaders and proved/disproved allegations of misconduct. The regimental aviation squadron performed missions similar to 

a wartime environment. These included route, area, and zone reconnaissance; area security; hasty attack; convoy escort; and, on occasion, air 

assault. Generally, the squadron employed two-aircraft teams that included 

a scout and a security platform. The OH-58D Kiowa helicopter proved an 

ideal reconnaissance vehicle in Bosnia and received considerable praise. 

In the event of a crisis, they were generally the first on the scene. Indeed, 

the efficacy of aviation generated concerns that the employment of overly 

aggressive tactics and weapons use undermined the political process of 

reconciliation.51

Ground cavalry found itself working with foreign soldiers and a variety of personnel not frequently included in scout teams. Among the latter 

were psychological operations teams, civil affairs personnel, and counterintelligence specialists. These individuals proved vital in understanding 

the cultural and political environment in which the regiment functioned, 

but coordination of their efforts with those of the regiment proved difficult.52 Movement in the mountainous country suffered from the erosion of 

infrequently used skills, including route and bridge classification.53 A host 

of other issues surrounded communications and administrative actions. In 

part, they stemmed from the growing use of computers and related hardware and software. Some soldiers proved unfamiliar with these systems, 

while other configurations did not permit interoperability among different 
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programs or computers. Coping with these problems amid the mountainous environment highlighted the pros and cons of the Army’s increasing 

use of information technology in the field. The promise of more efficient 

data management had to be balanced against training and compatibility 

issues even as Force XXI pushed the boundaries of what could be realistically achieved.54

The 2d Cavalry’s Bosnia experience stimulated interest in other light 

cavalry organizations, including those assigned to the light infantry division. 

These formations emerged in the 1980s to provide the Army a force to 

deploy rapidly outside Europe. The division cavalry squadron included a 

HHT, one ground cavalry troop, and two air cavalry troops. The ground 

troop included platoons equipped with HMMWVs carrying a TOW missile 

launcher, a 40-mm grenade launcher, or a .50-caliber machinegun.55

In 1993, the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment deployed to Somalia 

with its parent 10th Mountain Division to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This operation marked the first employment of light 

cavalry in these roles. The operational area for the mounted unit included 

much of southwest Somalia and incorporated largely rural terrain. The single ground troop generally operated on or near the main supply routes, while 

the air cavalry troops roamed throughout the operational area. Squadron 

missions performed included area reconnaissance, convoy escort, raids, 

show of force patrols, quick reaction force, force protection, road checkpoints, and village assessments intended to gather intelligence.56

To perform these missions, the ground cavalry troop possessed less 

than its full strength. It deployed with only 42 of 66 soldiers. To provide 

all HMMWVs with a 3-man crew, it used only 13 of its available 22 vehicles. It operated as three platoons with a small headquarters element. Each 

platoon included two HMMWVs equipped with a TOW missile launcher 

and one or two HMMWVs with either a grenade launcher or a .50-caliber 

machinegun. The TOW HMMWVs also mounted an M-60 machinegun. 

The troop possessed no organic mortar support, although it benefited from 

the attachment of medical and maintenance contact teams. Further augmentation included interpreters and a counterintelligence team. Nevertheless, 

the ground cavalry troop remained a small force responsible for operations over a broad area, necessitating continuous long-distance movement. 

Vehicle load plans reduced the amount of ammunition and equipment carried in favor of more fuel and water.57

Whenever possible, the squadron sought to coordinate the actions of 

its ground and air components. The air cavalry helped to locate routes for 

the HMMWVs to move over and identified villages not labeled on any 
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map. Helicopters also permitted access to remote areas and difficult terrain. 

The ground scouts generally operated mounted, leaving their vehicles only 

to reconnoiter positions that could not be reached by HMMWV. They 

remained in close proximity to their mounts, however, and sometimes 

were overwatched by air cavalry. Global positioning systems (GPSs) 

greatly enhanced navigation and permitted a high degree of precision in 

coordinating actions of HMMWVs and helicopters.58

The squadron faced a number of challenges even though hostile 

resistance proved scarce. The squadron became a task force headquarters 

responsible for control of additional forces. The air cavalry also assumed 

the role of aviation headquarters for all Army forces, following the departure of the 10th Mountain Division’s aviation brigade headquarters. This 

change provided some additional assets while increasing command responsibilities. The size of the operational area underscored the importance of 

reliable, long-range communications and vehicle/aircraft sustainment. It 

also necessitated the squadron establishing up to three different command 

posts in a manner reminiscent of cavalry units in Vietnam. The dispersion 

of squadron assets further increased the importance of effective leadership 

at the platoon and section level, since junior leaders in charge of checkpoints and patrols often could not rely on immediate access to senior commanders for guidance.59

One of the most common operations performed by light cavalry in 

Somali included checkpoints intended to interdict the movement of rogue 

personnel. Established at random locations and intervals, they also served 

to monitor civilian movement. The rural nature of the operational area and 

the general dearth of obstacle materials posed challenges. Poor road conditions encouraged traffic to utilize camel paths that paralleled the roadway 

and effectively extended the area each checkpoint needed to control. The 

absence of obstacle materials other than concertina wire also forced each 

checkpoint to be located where it could be linked to natural obstructions. 

Although the ground cavalry developed standard operating procedures for 

checkpoints prior to deployment, it did not anticipate routinely operating 

them at night. Lacking sufficient night vision devices, scouts relied on 

vehicle headlights and the thermal sight of the TOW missile launchers 

to track vehicles approaching checkpoints. Each checkpoint also required 

an entire platoon, constituting a significant commitment of the troop’s 

already diminished strength. The unit overcame these difficulties, but its 

ability to do so was considerably improved by the absence of any organized resistance and the generally friendly disposition of the populace in 

the area—in sharp contrast to the violent reaction to the American presence in Mogadishu.60
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The operations 

of the 2d Armored 

Cavalry and the 

3d Squadron, 17th 

Cavalry sustained 

interest in light cavalry. They offered 

an answer to the 

problem identified 

when the United 

States first deployed 

forces to Saudi 

Arabia in response 

to Iraq’s invasion of 

Kuwait. Initially, the 82d Airborne Division represented the only American 

force in theater ready to defend the Saudis against further Iraqi aggression. 

The division, however, lacked sufficient combat power to cope with a powerful mechanized threat. Until the arrival of heavier forces, the formation 

remained vulnerable. The problem remained unresolved and a persistent 

concern to formation commanders, exemplified by the observation of the 

III Corps commander in 1992:

The build up of a credible military force during Desert 

Shield showed that there is, in fact, a window of vulnerability between the arrival of light and armored forces in 

an operational theater. The existing force structure currently provides to a corps headquarters an armored cavalry regiment that has similar deployability requirements 

as a heavy division. In effect, the initial entry light forces 

are left without a corps level reconnaissance and security force in the operational theater until the arrival of the 

armored cavalry regiment.61

As the Army leadership developed the military force structure in the 

1990s, they sought a rapidly deployable combat force with the means to 

protect initial entry forces until the arrival of heavier units. Light cavalry 

seemed ideal for this role, but first its capabilities required improvement. A 

1993 Armor Center analysis of light division cavalry organizations found 

them lacking in uniformity and unable to meet their parent formation’s 

needs.62 The light infantry division cavalry included a headquarters, a 

single ground troop equipped with HMMWVs, and two OH-58D Kiowa 

Warrior aviation troops. The HMMWV-equipped ground component 

Figure 95. Enforcing the peace—Bosnia

Courtesy Armor Magazine
353

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

possessed just 66 officers and men organized into a headquarters section 

and 4 scout platoons.63 The 82d Airborne Division included an additional 

aviation troop, but the 101st Air Assault Division possessed four aviation 

troops without any ground cavalry.64

The Armor Center sought a single cavalry squadron configuration for 

all three division types. The proposed organization included a headquarters, two light ground cavalry troops, three aviation troops, and organic 

service support. The last element eliminated the squadron’s dependency 

on the division aviation brigade for maintenance and supply, facilitating 

the squadron’s use directly under division control. The increased ground 

strength improved the squadron’s ability to operate under all weather, climate, and terrain conditions. It also made possible the establishment of 

observation posts and checkpoints for long periods, permitted detailed terrain reconnaissance, and offered more stealthy reconnaissance capability. 

The ground cavalry troops retained the existing mix of scout and TOW 

HMMWVs, but added a mortar section.65

Field commanders proved generally positive, although concerns 

emerged about the deployability impact of the expanded ground cavalry 

component. These concerns were most pronounced among the leadership 

of the 101st Air Assault and 82d Airborne Divisions, whose formations 

depended on available helicopters for transportation. In the 10th Mountain 

Division, the proposal found acceptance without reservation. The formation leadership desired a cavalry squadron capable of more than just 

reconnaissance, and their views found support among the Aviation Center 

and the JRTC.66 Nevertheless, the standard light cavalry design never 

progressed beyond a conceptual state in the 1990s. It failed to attract the 

resources and authorization necessary for implementation.67

Heavy Cavalry

Among the Army’s heavy forces, cavalry organizations underwent 

significant change. By mid-decade, the Active Component retained 

only one armored cavalry regiment. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

transitioned into a light regiment in 1993, and the 11th Armored Cavalry 

reconfigured and assumed the role of the NTC’s permanent opposition 

force in 1994.68 These changes, coupled with Army downsizing, left the 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment a unique organization. It constituted a 

powerful, combined arms force organized as a HHT, three ground cavalry 

squadrons, an aviation squadron, and a support squadron. It possessed 

its own chemical, air defense, military intelligence, and engineer assets. 

Similarly, each ground squadron remained a combined arms team with 
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a headquarters, a tank company, an artillery battery, and three troops. 

Each troop included two tank platoons, two scout platoons, a maintenance 

section, a mortar section, and a headquarters.69

Throughout the decade, training and readiness activities constituted 

much of the regiment’s activity. In 1998, it participated in an NTC rotation, where an aggressive use of combined arms tactics at all command 

echelons permitted it to seize the initiative from the OPFOR, win tactical 

engagements, and exploit each success. This result reflected the regiment’s 

continuous emphasis on maneuver training and its permanent combined 

arms nature.70 The unit did not deploy overseas, but individual soldiers 

were tasked to support operations in Bosnia, Kuwait, Honduras, and Haiti. 

Linguists and aviation personnel bore the brunt of these actions.71

The Army’s emphasis on rapid deployment found reflection in the 

regiment’s experimentation with a lighter and smaller tactical command 

post. Air transportable and retaining robust communications, it permitted 

the regimental commander to establish control quickly over his unit once 

in theater without the elaborate and time-consuming process normally 

required. The new command post emulated a similar organization established by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment before its conversion into 

a training force.72

Heavy division cavalry squadrons regained tanks. In December 1990, 

the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, assigned to the 3d Infantry 

Division in Germany, became the first unit to regain its tanks. Each scout 

platoon replaced one M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle with three M1A1 

Abrams tanks, giving a squadron total of 27 tanks and 47 M3s. The resultant mixed platoons possessed greater combat power and restored the 

ability of the squadron to execute traditional cavalry missions, including 

guard and economy of force without extensive augmentation. Within the 

platoon, “scouts find the enemy, and the tanks remove them.” In 1992, the 

3d Infantry Division also realigned its cavalry from control of the aviation 

brigade to the division commander, but this change proved local. The official organization for heavy divisions retained the cavalry under the aviation brigade, and this alignment characterized the Force XXI division.73

Further changes to the 3d Infantry Division’s reorganized cavalry 

occurred prior to exercises intended to evaluate the squadron’s effectiveness. Platoons operated as mixed tank/M3 sections. Troop organization 

remained unchanged with a headquarters, three platoons, and a mortar 

section. The squadron gained a ground cavalry troop at the expense of 

one air cavalry troop. It also gained a reconnaissance platoon with 10 

HMMWVs, intended to perform a mission set similar to that of battalion 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

scouts. However, “the addition of this platoon defied logic when having 

three troops’ worth of scouts.” The most common use included command 

post and supply route security, although it could provide a flank screen, 

manage traffic control points, or serve as an additional command and control element.74

The new squadron configuration proved less than ideal. The addition 

of tanks improved combat power, but not the capacity for dismounted 

operations. It lacked ground surveillance radars and its two heavy recovery vehicles proved inadequate to meet squadron needs.75 Conversion to 

the new configuration also required a reshuffling of personnel that resulted 

in scouts filling positions for which they lacked experience and training. 

Knowledge of cavalry operations proved greatest among executive officers and platoon leaders. The experience of the squadron and troop commanders lay in tank units, and was only partially offset by their attendance 

at the Cavalry Leaders Course. Platoon leaders arrived at the unit straight 

from the Scout Platoon Leaders Course and then further benefited from the 

tutelage of NCOs within the squadron.76

The organization of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment served as 

a model only for those division cavalry units stationed in Europe. In the 

United States, squadrons either retained their tankless Army of Excellence 

structure or received enough tanks to create mixed platoons of two tanks 

and three M3s. These platoons possessed fewer vehicles than the organization they replaced and could not provide the same breadth of coverage. The 

greater combat power came at the cost of reconnaissance capability.77

By 1995, a standard squadron organization existed on paper. It included 

a HHT, three ground cavalry troops, two air reconnaissance troops, and an 

aviation service troop. This structure reflected the final success of advocates who had pushed for a more powerful cavalry squadron since the 

mid-1980s. The squadron possessed no air defense assets, dropped the 

reconnaissance platoon, and abandoned the mixed platoon configuration. 

Each ground cavalry troop now possessed an organization identical to that 

of the armored cavalry regiment. However, a variety of configurations 

existed among division cavalry squadrons, reflecting the availability of 

funding and materiel for conversion to the new organization.78

Regardless of their composition, heavy division cavalry squadrons in 

Bosnia performed similar missions. In general, they enforced peace by 

occupying battle positions once occupied by feuding ethnic factions; clearing minefields; and maintaining a continuous, visible presence throughout 

their assigned sectors. When necessary, the cavalry engaged in crowd control operations and interacted with the local populace to ease tensions. 
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Extensive use of video and camera footage from air and ground cavalry 

proved especially effective in deterring disruptive actions and documenting peace treaty violations. In many of these actions, the M3 proved easier to maneuver over narrow roads than the Abrams tank. Its size, armor, 

and highly visible array of weapons also made it more effective than the 

HMMWV in deterring violence by crowds or individuals.79

Continuous operations in the Balkans posed command and maintenance challenges. High vehicle wear necessitated a sustained command 

emphasis on preventive maintenance by crews. Decentralized operations 

also necessitated the creation of a tactical operations center by each troop, 

resulting in a series of improvised solutions reminiscent of the Vietnam 

war. The mountainous terrain added another complication, since radio 

communications proved difficult to maintain without an extensive network of retransmission and relay stations. Nor did the peace enforcement 

mission obviate the need to maintain more traditional skills, including 

gunnery, forcing unit commanders to balance training requirements and 

their mission.80

Battalion Scouts—Observers, Killers, or Victims?

The 1990s witnessed the steady transition of armor and mechanized 

battalion scout platoons from M3s to HMMWVs. The attributes of small 

Figure 96. Mounted patrol moves through Bosnian village.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
357

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

size, quietness, ease of sustainment, and adequate mobility provided the 

momentum behind this shift, despite nagging survivability concerns. The 

platoon included a headquarters section and four scout sections. Each 

section included six soldiers and two HMMWVs, one mounting a grenade launcher, the other a machinegun. For self-defense against armored 

threats, each section also carried a hand-held Javelin antitank missile 

launcher.81 Optimized for reconnaissance and limited security, the scout 

platoon became the subject of increased scrutiny and suggested modifications as it became more commonplace throughout the Army.

Scout effectiveness improved throughout the decade, but at the NTC 

they continued to suffer destruction before mission completion. In most 

cases, the scouts became engaged in firefights, blundered into minefields, 

or compromised their location through faulty concealment. Such fates 

awaited scouts whether equipped with the HMMWV or the more powerful 

M3.82 Reconnaissance failures did not characterize every NTC rotation, 

but they proved sufficiently frequent to sustain concerns about the overall 

effectiveness of battalion scouts. They also led Armor Center commander 

Major General Paul Funk to request a second RAND Corporation review 

of battalion reconnaissance at the NTC to evaluate the effects of training, 

doctrine, and materiel improvements implemented since the 1980s. The 

final report found scouts more often completing tasks and less prone to 

engaging in combat. Nevertheless, survivability remained a critical issue, 

because scout platoons suffered an average 50-percent loss rate during each 

mission. The study concluded, “The issue of scout survivability remains 

unresolved. Either a new vehicle, or mix of vehicles, plus changes in the 

doctrine of employment are indicated.”83

These findings encouraged experimentation with alternate reconnaissance configurations, including the hunter-killer teams utilized by armored 

cavalry units. In 1989, a 3d Armored Cavalry troop reorganized to form 

composite groupings of tank and scout platforms. The tanks overwatched 

scout operations and remained concealed until enemy contact occurred. 

The scouts then pinpointed the hostile force that the tanks destroyed. The 

success of this technique in Operation DESERT STORM led to its refinement and broader application. During a 1991 NTC rotation, use of these 

hunter-killer teams resulted in the repeated destruction of OPFOR reconnaissance assets and facilitated successful mission completion by friendly 

scouts.84

The hunter-killer teams resulted from the reorganization of the troop 

into one pure tank platoon and two mixed platoons each with two tanks 

and five or six M3s. The latter operated in sections of a tank and two M3s, 
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while the pure tank platoon constituted a troop reserve capable of attacking enemy opposition while the mixed platoons continued to reconnoiter. 

The tank-scout team also permitted faster breaching operations, particularly when the tanks carried mine plows. The hunter-killer approach provided versatility through its combination of combat power, reconnaissance 

capability, and survivability. Well suited to acquire information aggressively, perform security, and conduct counterreconnaissance, the team 

could be further enhanced through the attachment of fire support, forward 

observers, and ground surveillance radar.85 Other suggestions for alternate 

hunter-killer arrangements soon emerged. One recommendation featured a 

troop reorganized into just two platoons and a headquarters element. Each 

platoon possessed four tanks and six M3s organized into three sections. 

Thus configured, the troop contained six hunter-killer sections operating 

semi-independently of one another.86

Similar practices emerged among light cavalry units. The 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment abandoned its pure platoon organization in favor 

of a scout/antitank mix. Reorganized, each platoon included five scout 

HMMWVS and two equipped with a TOW missile launcher. The TOW 

sights improved the platoon’s observation capability and provided it the 

means to conduct an antiarmor ambush. Moreover, the TOW HMMWV 

provided the firepower necessary to cope with armored threats, particularly when employed in conjunction with Claymore mines and handheld 

AT-4 antitank missile launchers. For the light cavalry, the TOW HMMWV 

provided a degree of security for the scouts somewhat similar to the role of 

tanks in the hunter-killer configuration of the heavier cavalry.87

In the cavalry squadrons of the light infantry divisions, the single 

ground cavalry troop initially included two scout platoons equipped 

with HMMWVs and two platoons of HMMWVs mounting TOW missile launchers.88 These platoons could be task organized into mixed scout/

TOW platoons to: 

. . . enhance acquisition and destruction of the enemy 

under reduced visibility conditions and in restrictive terrain, where massed TOW fires are not possible. This task 

organization can also be used to respond to multiple but 

separate taskings of a troop usually associated with operations other than war, for example, manning checkpoints 

and area security missions.89

In this mixed configuration, the troop functioned as 4 platoons each of 3 

scout HMMWVs, 2 TOW HMMWVs, and 15 soldiers. The TOW missile 

launchers provided not only an antitank capability, but their sites enhanced 

observation by scouts otherwise dependent on binoculars alone.90
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

Many veterans noted similarities between the hunter-killer concept and 

previous cavalry organizations, particularly the combined arms platoon. 

With its mix of scouts, tanks, dismounts, and mortar, this unit possessed a 

versatility that the newer hunter-killer configuration seemed to be seeking. 

The hunter-killer configuration restored the versatility once associated with 

cavalry organizations but partially lost during reorganizations in the 1970s 

and 1980s. Dissatisfaction with simplified organizations encouraged small 

unit commanders to return to a mix of capabilities.91 One officer observed 

that it was “too bad that our young leaders must experiment through trial 

and error to find an efficient organization for combat operations when all 

they have to do is read some 20- to 30-year-old MTOEs and doctrine.”92

However organized, the use of hunter-killer teams necessitated a high 

degree of training and junior leadership competence to ensure the necessary cohesion between tanks and scouts.93 In fact, training constituted the 

principal concern expressed over the hunter-killer team. Platoon leadership became more complicated, necessitating effective control over several 

mixed groupings of tanks, M3s, and dismounted scout teams. The ability 

of new second lieutenants to command such a team seemed problematic, 

especially when simultaneously required to coordinate aviation and fire 

support. Older veterans proved more sanguine, noting the ability of junior 

officers to lead far more diverse organizations in the past.94

Maneuver battalion scout platoons also sought to expand their capabilities. In South Korea, HMMWV scout platoons included a sniper section 

of two snipers and two spotters. This section enhanced screen operations 

and provided additional observation posts and the ability to eliminate 

select hostile individuals. The mountainous terrain of South Korea provided numerous locations on high ground for snipers to become ensconced 

and observe. In reconnaissance, the snipers could be employed to infiltrate a particular locale, although their slow speed and dismounted nature 

required special attention in planning. In security operations, the snipers 

provided small arms cover and targeted key enemy personnel. Overall, the 

sniper section gave depth and breadth to screen lines and possessed the 

ability to harass enemy positions.95

For most maneuver battalions, efforts to overcome reconnaissance 

deficiencies and improve scout survivability centered on organizational 

changes. The 1996 RAND Corporation study recommended replacing the 

HMMWV with a different scout vehicle or using a mix of platforms in the 

platoon.96 Consideration of a different vehicle included upgraded versions 

of the M3 and the M113.97 Another recommendation included a mixed 

platoon of HMMWVs and M3s, thereby capturing in one unit the best 

capabilities of each vehicle. The stealth and small size of the HMMWV 
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overwatched by the M3 seemed to offer a more robust solution and could 

be implemented immediately with existing vehicles.98 Ironically, this platoon structure had previously been rejected in favor of the pure HMMWV 

unit. By the mid-1990s, however, survivability concerns encouraged a 

more favorable reception for the mixed scout platoon.99

In the absence of a new platform or related equipment, most units 

worked with existing organic assets to enhance their reconnaissance capability. In 1999, the 1st Battalion, 33d Armor Regiment, developed a solution 

that transcended simple platoon adjustments. This battalion sought a much 

more robust and versatile force for a broad range of reconnaissance and 

security missions. Through augmentation, the battalion command transformed its scout platoon into a company-size force dubbed Team Recon. 

It included the scout platoon, a tank platoon, a mortar section, an engineer 

section, and two infantry squads together with maintenance and medical 

assets. The battalion headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) also 

provided a small command cell to control Team Recon.100

Team Recon remained an information gathering organization, but 

combat power now supported the scouts in all missions. During security and counterreconnaissance, they now belonged to a force capable of 

eliminating hostile probes rather than just reporting their presence. Team 

Recon trained together and remained an integral part of the battalion, simplifying its inclusion in task force planning. Cohesion and effectiveness 

further improved, since those scout missions that generally necessitated 

temporary battalion attachments could now be performed by organic team 

assets.101

The creation of Team Recon encouraged further discussion regarding the optimum organization for battalion reconnaissance. The common 

theme among various proposals reflected a desire for a more powerful 

and versatile battalion reconnaissance and security force. Adding a scout 

troop to the battalion composed of scouts, tanks, infantry, and mortars, for 

example, provided a significant firepower enhancement together with a 

greater dismount capability.102 Proposals such as this one constituted a partial rejection of the rationale used to justify adoption of the pure HMMWV 

scout platoon.

Scout Modernization Strategy

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a comprehensive scout modernization plan to address a wide range of issues, including survivability 

and emerging reconnaissance requirements for the Force XXI battlefield. 

At its core, this plan reflected the continued emphasis of the Armor Center 
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on purpose-built, manned platforms crewed by specially trained soldiers. 

Organizations so equipped were not dependent on favorable weather or 

terrain conditions, and they possessed the ability to assess evolving tactical situations in the context of the commander’s intent. This emphasis constituted a reaction to growing Army-wide interest in the use of unmanned 

systems and aerial platforms to acquire information. The Armor Branch 

leadership wanted scouts to benefit from the capabilities of emerging technologies without being supplanted by them.103

Through materiel upgrades, the scout modernization strategy sought to 

provide more capable reconnaissance organizations suited to future operational environments. It included a phased transition in scout platforms. 

The first step lay in the shift from the existing mix of M3A2, M3A2 ODS 

(Operation DESERT STORM), and HMMWV to a combination of M3A3 

and long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped 

HMMWV. The latter vehicle set featured much improved optics, including 

second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR), a laser rangefinder, 

and high resolution day television. Combined with digital communications, these vehicles possessed the means to transmit rapidly detailed battlefield information, including imagery.104

Intended for completion by 2000, this first step marked an interim 

state, pending the fielding of a new scout platform for use by both cavalry 

and maneuver battalion scout platoons. By the mid-1990s, this new vehicle 

was the Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS). It replaced the earlier 

Figure 97. Scout patrol prepares for next move.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Future Scout Vehicle program, whose design work dated to the previous 

decade. The FSCS was intended to—

Navigate, communicate, reduce signatures, be more 

mobile and survivable, acquire threat information (to 

include detection of nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) hazards), locate targets, synchronize fires, and 

integrate information for battlefield decisionmaking without delay. This ability must extend itself unabated across 

all types of terrain, during periods of limited/obscured 

vision, while receiving indirect fire from mortar and artillery, under NBC conditions, and beyond visual range for 

both air and ground targets. These critical capabilities 

allow the commander to achieve freedom of action, focus 

combat power, and decisively defeat the enemy on any 

battlefield.105

To achieve these capabilities, the FSCS design included a sophisticated 

sensor and sight array to detect targets well beyond the latter’s ability to see 

or engage the scout. Survivability of the FSCS depended on a combination 

of armor, an active protection system, signature management, smoke, and 

chaff. Sensors were expected to detect minefields, obstacles, and hostile 

laser targeting. It also featured a mast mounted sight that permitted the 

vehicle to hide behind terrain features while observing the battlefield. 

Combined with a 60-mile per hour speed, these features were expected to 

permit the FSCS to move about the battlefield swiftly and largely unseen. 

Yet plans included a medium caliber weapon to permit the FSCS to engage 

threats equivalent in capability to the BMP-3.106

Scout needs drove the FSCS design. Expected to operate primarily off 

roads, the vehicle required a robust suspension. Its initial swim capability, 

however, gave way to a 1-meter fording ability and reliance on a special 

swim kit for deeper bodies of water.107 Weighing no more than 17 tons, 

the FSCS would be air deployable and possess an operational radius of 

400 miles. Once deployed, the vehicle was expected to function for 3 days 

without resupply.108

The ability of the FSCS to gather battlefield information was to be 

linked to other platforms throughout the combined arms and/or joint team. 

By incorporating Force XXI communications technologies, the FSCS could 

quickly share its information and operate on multiple nets simultaneously. 

Moreover, it could designate targets for other direct or indirect fire assets 

to engage without revealing its location. Indeed, employment concepts 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

envisioned an FSCS screen line well in advance of friendly forces, using 

its long-range detection capability to orchestrate the destruction of hostile 

units without being seen.109

The complexity of the FSCS necessitated major funding, but the unexpected support of the United Kingdom helped overcome this challenge. 

The British also sought a new reconnaissance vehicle with similar requirements to those of the FSCS. In 1996, both nations began to explore the 

viability of a joint program, which became reality 2 years later. Neither 

nation could afford a new platform alone, but together they could share the 

cost and leverage the technological developments of both countries. In this 

cooperative atmosphere, development progressed and a joint acquisition 

strategy began to emerge.110

The Armor leadership made the FSCS a priority and lobbied to build 

support within the Army and Congress. The expected capabilities of the 

vehicle constituted a major selling point, since the “FSCS uses technology to reduce force structure and optimize Army ground reconnaissance 

force.”111 Smaller units were expected to be more effective than current, 

larger organizations. Therefore, fielding plans stressed the smaller numbers of platforms and personnel required by FSCS units. In 1997, Active 

Component cavalry and scout organizations included some 520 HMMWVs 

and 381 M3s manned by 3,325 soldiers. If replaced by platoons equipped 

with 6 FSCS, the number of personnel fell to 2,781. The total number of 

vehicles changed little due to the anticipated addition of brigade reconnaissance troops. Among battalion scouts, however, the number of platforms 

fell from 520 to 312, reflecting the change from 10- to 6-vehicle units.112

Critics of FSCS questioned the wisdom of fielding smaller units 

with fewer scouts. Emerging doctrine envisioned a broader battlespace 

and greater dispersion among forces, which suggested a need for more 

scouts. For years, scout organizations struggled with an insufficient dismounted capability. The 3-man crew of the FSCS and the smaller size of 

FSCS-equipped units did not resolve this problem. FSCS platoons would 

possess fewer dismounts than either the current HMMWV or M3 organizations, undermining effective operations in urban or wooded terrain. 

With its small crew and array of sensors and displays, some commanders wondered whether the scouts could be pried loose from their screens 

to conduct an actual ground reconnaissance at all. For others, the FSCS 

embodied fears that technology was driving doctrinal requirements rather 

than the reverse. These concerns were not allayed during briefing sessions 

in which these and other concerns met with the response “tough decisions 

have been made.”113
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Individuals concerned with the modernization and fielding of existing 

equipment found the FSCS concept somewhat chimerical. They advocated 

a greater focus on maximizing the capabilities of existing and near-term 

materiel rather than overemphasizing programs that might never come to 

fruition. In the words of one retired armor officer with program management expertise, “While it’s nice to have a group working on the international FSCS program that may give some future generation of scouts a 

new system, we had better expend more energy on optimizing the new 

systems we are getting now.”114 Yet, the FSCS program evolved from dissatisfaction with the M3 and HMMWV as reconnaissance platforms, a 

desire for significant capability improvement, and the inability to achieve 

the desired performance by modifying existing scout vehicles. By pursuing a new vehicle, the Armor leadership sought to provide for the first time 

a purpose-built platform optimized for reconnaissance and surveillance 

and leveraging the benefits of Force XXI developments.115

Reconnaissance Platforms

Fielding of the FSCS was not anticipated for several years, but in the 

1990s the Army expected to equip select light units with the AGS. Work on 

this vehicle began in the 1970s, but development proved sporadic, subject 

to problematic funding and design change. In the aftermath of Operation 

DESERT STORM, AGS development continued at a steady pace, and it 

was ready for fielding by mid-decade. Intended as a replacement for the 

aging M551 Sheridan in the XVIII Airborne Corps and to equip the 2d 

Armored Cavalry (Light), the AGS was a light, tracked vehicle. It carried 

a turret-mounted 105-mm gun with optics and a fire control system similar 

to that of the Abrams tank. A coaxial and external machinegun constituted 

its secondary armament. The AGS lacked the protection of a main battle 

tank, but its armor could be tailored to meet different levels of threat. It 

borrowed features from the Abrams tank to enhance survivability, including an automatic fire suppression system and the compartmentalization 

of fuel and ammunition stowage. It utilized many parts already in use by 

American vehicles, and with good cross-country mobility, an autoloader, 

and an easily accessed engine, the AGS offered a much more reliable and 

robust alternative to the M551. Moreover, the new vehicle could be air 

transported or delivered into the battle area via low velocity air drop.116

In its primary role, the AGS would “deploy as an integral part of a 

combined arms team to any contingency area and provide direct support 

to airborne, air assault, and light infantry as a mobile reaction force.”117

Indeed, it offered an ideal weapon for contingency operations, due to its 

combination of deployability, combat power, ease of sustainment, and 
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relative survivability. These qualities also made it attractive for broader 

use in cavalry and scout organizations, ensuring considerable interest in 

its testing and development. By 1996, with the development of related 

doctrine and training programs complete, the AGS was ready to enter 

production. Instead, the program was canceled for fiscal reasons, leaving 

the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 2d Armored Cavalry without effective 

armor support and quashing any thoughts of wider AGS use in reconnaissance organizations.118

The HMMWV and the M3 remained the principal platforms for 

mounted reconnaissance units. The HMMWV, however, became the target of growing criticism. In armor and mechanized infantry battalions, it 

could not keep pace with either the Abrams tank or the Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle when moving cross-country. The HMMWV lacked a swim capability and possessed only a limited fording ability. Reconnaissance and 

surveillance operations suffered from the vehicle’s lack of a long-range 

or thermal sight. Binoculars constituted the primary means of seeing the 

battlefield, although night vision goggles assisted short-range observation 

during hours of darkness.119

Vulnerability constituted the greatest cause for concern, generating 

criticism similar to that once applied to the jeep. More than one soldier 

shared the following view: “The HMMWV is an excellent, comfortable 

field vehicle; it is fun to train with, but I don’t want to face the real thing in 

it.”120 Despite its small size and quietness, most weapons, including small 

arms, could readily disable the HMMWV. Nor did it possess an NBC system to protect the crew in a contaminated environment. Limited firepower 

only compounded the vehicle’s poor survivability. Against a mechanized 

threat, the scout’s antipersonnel weaponry did not facilitate disengagement. In the words of one NCO, “Scouts, unfortunately, by the nature of 

their business, will frequently get into trouble in combat. They must be 

provided the capability to defend themselves and survive on potential battlefields.” Stealth alone did not ensure survivability.121

Urban operations in Mogadishu highlighted the vulnerability of the 

HMMWV and led to the accelerated development of an up-armored 

variant for use by military police. This vehicle benefited from additional 

underbody protection, light armor to protect the crew from small arms 

fire, and overhead protection against the effects of indirect fire.122 The 

Army also developed another armored HMMWV model, the M1114, for 

broader employment. It offered improved protection against small arms 

fire, artillery, and mines. It also featured more powerful brakes, improved 

suspension, and air conditioning. The tires remained vulnerable, although 
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their run-flat nature permitted the vehicle to be driven several miles before 

complete failure to allow the crew to escape danger.123

In 1996, the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment employed early 

production models of the up-armored HMMWV in Bosnia. There it 

patrolled in lieu of heavier vehicles. In this role, it proved an effective 

platform, able to traverse roads and trails with ease. More fuel efficient 

than Abrams tanks and M3s, the M1114 did not damage roads or buildings 

in the war-torn province, thereby avoiding the civilian complaints that 

accompanied the movement of heavier vehicles. For administrative actions 

and patrols amid a populace more concerned with survival than combat, 

the up-armored HMMWV was in fact an effective platform, particularly 

when it remained on established roadways.124

Conversely, the M1114 lacked the deterrence effect of the Abrams and 

M3, and its utility diminished in the face of hostile crowds. Hence, the 1st 

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Bosnia maintained two sets of vehicles. 

HMMWVs performed those missions associated with a minimal threat, 

while tanks and M3s were used in more dangerous environments where 

their combat power and deterrence capability were deemed necessary.125

Even with its added protection, the simple presence of the M1114 did not 

intimidate would-be aggressors or influence crowd behavior. In 1997, a 

HMMWV column in the town of Brcko found itself confronted by angry 

Figure 98. The LRAS3 mounted on a HMMWV.

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crowds that surrounded the vehicles, blocked the exit of the crews, and 

climbed atop them. In another incident:

The crowd actually attempted to overturn a HMMWV 

with crew inside. To escape the rock-throwing crowd, the 

XM1114 crew had to back out down a long street. Mirrors 

gone, the driver could not navigate the maze of rubble 

behind them—only the selfless courage of a young trooper 

climbing into the open hatch, exposed to the crowd’s 

wrath, guided the vehicle backwards. Had there been bullets rather than stones flying in Brcko, the outcome would 

have had much more serious consequences.126

Operations in Bosnia provided an opportunity to assess the M1114’s 

reliability and mobility. There the vehicle sustained reasonable operational 

readiness rates, despite less than ideal maintenance.127 Fielding plans anticipated its employment by cavalry, scout, and military police organizations, 

but the slow procurement pace resulted in few vehicles actually reaching combat organizations. More ominously for reconnaissance operations, 

the M1114 demonstrated “significant reliability problems when tested to 

Scout mission profile.” It performed adequately on roads, but its mobility 

dropped during cross-country movement and raised questions about its 

effectiveness as a scout platform.128

Other developments unrelated to survivability improved the effectiveness of the HMMWV as a reconnaissance platform. The development of 

an extended stowage rack for the HMMWV helped to overcome the perpetual problem facing scouts of where to stow personal gear, rations, and 

equipment.129 HMMWV scouts benefited from the fielding of a modification kit that included improved cargo capacity and stowage, a GPS, an 

additional radio, and an intercom system. It also provided a mounting and 

power system for a TOW sight. These items addressed key deficiencies in 

the HMMWV scout’s ability to see, navigate, and communicate, but the 

kit was not universal.130

Persistent survivability concerns prompted consideration of alternative scout vehicles. One such vehicle was the German Wiesel, a small, 

3-ton tracked weapons carrier. This armored platform was designed for 

airlift by a helicopter, and it could be equipped with a variety of weapons.131 The combination of mountains and snow in Bosnia also triggered 

interest in the M973 Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV). Swedish-built, 

it included two track driven units coupled. With both sections moving at 

once, the SUSV possessed both traction and very low ground pressure, 

which made it ideal for moving in snow and/or mountainous conditions. A 
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prior study addressing the shortfalls of HMMWV operations in the mountains of Korea and difficulties encountered by the same platform in Bosnia 

contrasted sharply with the successful employment by American forces of 

limited numbers of SUSVs in the Balkans. Therefore, recommendations 

emerged to replace the HMMWV with the SUSV.132

The most commonly advocated HMMWV alternatives included the 

light armor vehicle (LAV) and the M113.133 The Marine Corps employed 

several LAV variants, providing a body of American experience with the 

platform. The wheeled, armored platform seemed to offer many of the 

qualities desired in a scout platform and a significant advantage over the 

HMMWV, particularly in survivability and lethality. Moreover, it suited 

the need for a lighter platform with greater strategic deployability.134 Yet, 

the LAV’s armor protection proved marginal, offering protection against 

little more than small arms. Its eight-wheel suspension posed a vulnerability for which no simple solution existed. As one observer noted, “Until we 

make the wheels of the HMMWV and 8-wheeled LAV combat-hardened, 

neither will be mission-mobile in the face of enemy small arms, obstacles, broken glass, and wire.” Too large for an effective reconnaissance 

vehicle, it possessed insufficient protection for use in other roles.135

Adoption of the LAV also faced the hurdle of insufficient funds for 

its purchase and use in Army organizations—a point noted by advocates 

of the M113. This latter platform already existed in the Army inventory, 

obviating the need for any new vehicle purchase. It was a proven vehicle, 

which in the A3 variant included improvements to its protection, engine, 

and transmission. The tracked M113 offered greater cross-country mobility 

than the HMMWV and could negotiate obstacles. It possessed an amphibious capability that did not require time-consuming special preparations. 

Able to carry up to 11 soldiers or a variety of different weapons, it also 

benefited from mechanical reliability. Supporters noted that the M113 did 

not risk immobilization from shredded tires.136

Yet most units continued to employ either HMMWVs or M3s. The 

HMMWV remained a vulnerable platform with limited lethality, while 

the M3 lost none of its noise, bulkiness, or readily identifiable exhaust 

plumes.137 The M3 benefited from a series of improvements throughout the 

decade. In 1997, fielding of the M3A2 ODS began. This version incorporated 

upgrades to the platform based on operational experience gained during 

the 1991 Gulf War. The most significant included the addition of a laser 

rangefinder, a global positioning system, a driver’s thermal viewer, and a 

reconfiguration of the internal layout to increase space. The ODS version 

also accommodated add-on digital communications to share information 
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with units equipped solely with digital systems. For protection against 

antitank guided missiles, a missile countermeasure device interfered with 

the missile operator’s ability to guide the projectile to its target. These 

improvements enhanced overall vehicle effectiveness, but they came at the 

cost of weight, which increased to over 35 tons. The 3d Infantry Division 

became the first formation to receive the improved platforms.138

Further enhancements were included in the M3A3. It included a digital 

data bus to permit networking with other digital systems in the combined 

arms team. This linkage permitted the automatic sharing of information, 

particularly friendly force locations, and its depiction on a graphic display 

that all recipients could see. Digital communications further permitted 

some crew functions to be automated and streamlined the reporting and 

sharing of information, including maps and images. The M3A3 version 

included second-generation FLIR sights and a commander’s independent 

thermal viewer that permitted scanning independently of the gunner. To 

reduce heat signature, the vehicle’s exhaust was funneled to the rear.139

Inside the vehicle, dismount teams could view the battlefield on a computer display, which enhanced their situational awareness and orientation 

when they disembarked. Embedded diagnostics assisted the crew to identify problems and speed maintenance. Additional survivability enhancements were also included, but the electronically complex nature of this 

vehicle slowed its development. The Army received its first M3A3 in 

1998, but it was not scheduled for unit assignment until 2000, pending 

completion of testing.140

Despite recurring interest in the use of motorcycles for scout operations, none were fielded. Testing and periodic development occurred since 

World War II, and the ability to field a durable bike that could be carried 

on a HMMWV or M3 existed. However, funding restraints and the low 

priority given to the effort in comparison with other programs led to its 

abandonment. In the early 1990s, several cavalry units purchased motorcycles on their own, while a proposal remained for the addition of four 

motorcycles to the maneuver battalion scout platoons for patrolling and 

liaison.141 Nevertheless, the decade would not witness any formal action to 

field motorcycles with mounted reconnaissance units.

For the HMMWV, the LRAS3 constituted the most important development in the 1990s. This device included second-generation FLIR 

capability, a GPS, and a laser rangefinder. Together in one system, they 

permitted an operator to detect, identify, and locate a target with a 10-digit 

grid coordinate within seconds of scanning. Furthermore, LRAS3 permitted scouts to see out to 10 kilometers and provide a coordinate accurate 
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to within 60 meters. It also possessed zoom and wide-angle capabilities 

that provided unprecedented target details to be seen at ranges under 10 

kilometers. System development occurred as part of Force XXI to permit 

an interface between the LRAS3 and emerging digital systems. EXFOR 

scouts used the device to identify targets and direct aircraft or artillery 

strikes against it while remaining outside the enemy’s direct-fire range. 

Testing and development continued throughout the 1990s with plans to 

begin fielding the new device in 2001.142

Yet LRAS3 

possessed several disadvantages. Early use 

by soldiers found 

the system prone 

to errors while 

pinpointing distant targets, particularly when 

the vehicle was 

in motion. Its 

precision target 

location ability depended 

on receiving 

accurate information from satellites. This requirement imparted a delay 

between initial target detection and the receipt of accurate location data. 

When mounted on a HMMWV, the device interfered with operation of the 

vehicle’s weapon. Weighing over 100 pounds, it proved difficult to dismount and employ away from the vehicle, particularly in rugged terrain. 

Once set up, its batteries permitted only 6 hours of operation. Its range 

and fantastic zoom capabilities proved much less spectacular when trying to detect targets in complex terrain. By late 1999, testing had yet to 

reflect actual conditions facing scouts in a combat environment, including 

operations in urban areas, wooded terrain, or amid obstacles. Nor did they 

incorporate basic techniques and procedures employed, such as bounding 

and traveling overwatch.143

Many of these issues reflected the developmental status of the 

new system. Most could be corrected and were. The LRAS3 offered a 

significant increase in the scout’s ability to detect targets from afar 

without compromising his security. It did indeed hold high promise for 

scout organizations that labored throughout the decade with platforms of 

Figure 99. Close-up view of the LRAS3, which greatly 

increased the scout’s ability to see the battlefield.

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questionable utility, optics that did not overmatch those of potential threats, 

and who faced extinction if detected and engaged. Amid the plethora of 

new materiel development stimulated by Force XXI, one officer ruefully 

noted, “Quite frankly, binoculars are the most sophisticated piece of 

equipment the scout platoon has today in quantities.”144

Reconnaissance Doctrine in the 1990s

In 1991, the publication of FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, provided 

the overarching doctrinal guidance for armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons. It reflected the AirLand Battle concepts employed 

during Operation DESERT STORM. The new manual made no fundamental changes to existing principles of cavalry use. Cavalry performed 

reconnaissance, security, and economy of force functions. It gathered 

information, provided reaction time and maneuver space, preserved the 

combat power of other unit types, facilitated movement, and performed 

rear area operations as necessary.145

In what would become a recurring theme, the manual emphasized the 

value of ground cavalry as a superior intelligence source. Able to counter 

enemy deception efforts, it actively sought hostile forces and developed 

tactical situations. It constituted the essence of reconnaissance-pull by 

identifying enemy weaknesses and guiding friendly forces into and through 

these vulnerable areas. In fluid, nonlinear situations, cavalry restored command and control by locating friendly units, filling gaps between them, 

and identifying dead space on the battlefield.146

Coverage of reconnaissance operations acknowledged the importance of stealth and aggressiveness, underscoring the need for cavalry 

organizations to employ both. Reconnaissance fundamentals remained 

unchanged in their emphasis on the objective, rapid and accurate reporting, and avoidance of decisive engagement. The manual outlined the various reconnaissance techniques and offered criterion for the use of each 

one. Reconnaissance by fire, for example, suited situations in which time 

proved limited or became necessary to develop a situation once contact 

with enemy forces occurred. Coverage of zone, area, and route reconnaissance included more attention to trafficability, urban areas, and obstacles. 

The emphasis given to time considerations, planning, and the potential value of reinforcing tanks all reflected the experience of Operation 

DESERT STORM and lessons learned at the NTC.147

Security operations gained information on the enemy and provided the 

parent force reaction time, maneuver space, and protection. These missions 

were characterized by aggressive reconnaissance to reduce uncertainty 
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about the enemy and terrain considerations while ensuring a continuous 

flow of information. Surveillance and counterreconnaissance were considered tasks inherent to any security action. Types of security operations 

included screen, guard, and covering force, but only the armored cavalry 

regiment was considered capable of performing the latter without augmentation due to the independent nature of the mission, the large area covered, 

and the related command and control requirements. Screen operations 

included a series of observation posts with connecting patrols to observe 

a given area and impede enemy activity, but they were expected to rapidly 

transition into a more active, combat-oriented guard role in the event of 

hostile attack. Threat analysis within the manual continued to template a 

mechanized Soviet-style force.148

Contingency operations received a scant two pages. They were 

vaguely defined as “military operations requiring rapid deployment to 

perform military tasks in support of national policy.”149 Related activities included a show of force, deterrence of aggression, reaction to the 

invasion of a friendly nation, protection of American nationals, or hostage 

rescue. In contingency operations, cavalry largely performed reconnaissance and security, but no planning or execution guidance was provided 

for such missions. Similarly, a separate appendix addressed low-intensity 

conflict. Yet other than acknowledge the potential employment of cavalry 

in operations other than war and offer a few guiding principles, this section provided little useful guidance for cavalry commanders thrust into 

these roles.150 Doctrinally, the situation facing cavalry organizations in 

contingency operations at the start of the 1990s paralleled that of mounted 

counterinsurgency in the early 1960s.

In 1996 an updated FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, was published. 

It constituted a refinement of the earlier manual with much of its content 

similar or identical. In format and writing style, it proved much clearer and 

easier to comprehend, losing much of the earlier version’s arcane flavor. Its 

emphasis on training leaders how to think through tactical situations found 

praise among field commanders.151 It also reflected many developments 

impacting the Army by the mid-1990s. Joint operations were referenced 

throughout, while the chapter addressing battle command included a section devoted to the type of automated information systems being developed as part of Force XXI. A related change occurred through the addition 

of a special appendix devoted to digital cavalry operations that introduced 

the reader to a digital cavalry squadron organization. Symptomatic of 

the developmental status of digital combat organizations, the appendix 

described their value but also their limitations, including problems interfacing with nondigital units and hardware and software difficulties.152
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The focus of the manual remained on the armored cavalry regiment 

and the division cavalry squadron, but it now also addressed the light 

armored cavalry regiment. The latter was described as a “self-contained 

combined arms organization capable of being packaged and rapidly 

deployed by air or sealift as part of a force projection Army responding 

rapidly to world-wide contingencies.”153 Modular, easily tailored, and able 

to accept attachments, the light armored regiment supported joint or Army 

initial entry operations. Intended for operations with the XVIII Airborne 

Corps, it was expected to be reinforced with corps or division assets. To 

permit rapid deployment, the regiment lacked many assets found in heavier 

regiments, including a tactical command post, a smoke platoon, bridging 

assets, ground surveillance radars, and attack helicopters. The absence 

of tanks and the minimal protection of the HMMWVs led the manual to 

note that the regiment required “judicious application of standard cavalry 

doctrine.”154

Coverage of reconnaissance and security missions dropped the 

detailed references to a Soviet-style threat that had been staples in manuals throughout the Cold War. Instead, the new manual provided more guidance for the execution of a broader range of activities. Versatility became 

one response to the variety of potential threats that might be encountered. 

The integration of air and ground cavalry also became a common theme, 

doubtless encouraged by the increased numbers of AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopters fielded. This aircraft provided cavalry organizations a powerful array of weapons able to support scout activity. In effect, the scout 

became the helicopter’s sensor, identifying targets for it to destroy without compromising the scout’s presence. During security operations, the air 

cavalry added depth, patrolled between observation posts, and augmented 

the surveillance of key areas of interest.155

While reconnaissance guidance included similar principles to those 

found in the 1991 version, the new manual’s coverage of security expanded 

considerably. The return of tanks to the division cavalry and the growing 

interest in hunter-killer operations found reflection in the manual’s recommendation for the integration of tanks and scouts in screen lines. Area 

security, including “reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, 

airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical points,” now returned with expanded 

coverage—a direct reaction to the needs of stability and support operations. Doctrine governing area security included those principles proven in 

Vietnam, including the use of assigned sectors, the importance of continuous intelligence collection, and the use of quick reaction forces. Similarly, 

the reader also found himself learning Vietnam-tested techniques for the 
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execution of route and convoy security. These included checkpoint operations, air and ground patrols, preconvoy reconnaissance, ambush counterattacks, and the use of preplotted indirect fires.156

An entire chapter devoted to stability and support operations provided 

doctrinal acknowledgment of the changed environment in which cavalry 

organizations might operate. The first page noted: 

Stability and support operations missions and scenarios 

are not new to the cavalry. For many years cavalry units 

have been involved in these types of missions: from securing the nation’s frontiers during the westward expansion, 

to border surveillance in Europe, to peace operations missions in Haiti.157

While true, stability and support operations did not figure prominently in 

cavalry manuals at least since the Vietnam war.

A variety of different types of stability and support were outlined. In 

their execution, emphasis was given to key, recurring principles, including 

patience, adaptability, and restraint in stark contrast to a more traditional 

aggressive and fast-paced nature of operations. The importance of intelligence to stability and support missions found reflection in this chapter, 

which also identified key types of information desired for peacekeeping 

Figure 100. Well-camouflaged Bradley Fighting Vehicle at the JRTC.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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and peace enforcement. The manual clearly indicated how the information 

gathering capabilities of cavalry organizations could be adapted to a more 

unconventional operational environment. Belligerent crowds, legal issues, 

and political organizations replaced enemy vehicle locations, weapons, 

and likely intent. The stability and support chapter offered tips and principles but was far less detailed than those pages devoted to traditional 

cavalry operations. Despite the complexity of operations other than war, 

much was left to the reader to determine. Perhaps the most useful information lay in training activities suggested to prepare a unit for a stability and 

support deployment.158

In the 1990s, the Army published only one manual devoted to cavalry 

troop leadership. The principles found in FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop, largely 

applied to armored cavalry regiments and heavy division cavalry squadrons. This manual focused on the troop commander’s role as a manager, 

coordinator, and integrator of his unit and attachments, most commonly 

engineers, ground surveillance radars, and a fire support team. All mission types included planning and preparation guidance and tips, together 

with detailed examples that depicted common battlefield developments, 

the role of the troop leader, and an assessment of the factors influencing 

each decision together with its impact. Considerable attention was given 

to what guidance should be issued to platoon leaders and the type of information they required for their actions. In this manner, the manual provided 

an effective leadership guide and immersed the reader in troop level cavalry operations.159

The manual distinguished where necessary between heavy and light 

cavalry troops. Both shared a similar organization of a headquarters section, two scout platoons, two antitank or tank platoons, a mortar section, and 

a maintenance section. The tank or antitank platoons provided overwatch 

and direct fire support, but they could also be integrated with the scouts to 

form hunter-killer teams. The heavy troop’s tank and M3 mix possessed 

greater combat power and stabilized gunnery for firing on the move. The 

thermal sights and night vision devices of these vehicles also made the 

troop better suited to night and low visibility operations. Conversely, “the 

light cavalry troop’s ability to fight under reduced visibility conditions is 

limited because of its lack of integrated passive and thermal sights on stabilized weapons platforms.” The light troop’s advantages lay in its deployability and ease of air transport, but it could only perform reconnaissance 

and screen operations without reinforcement against a weak threat. Both 

troop types encountered difficulty in close or urban terrain due to their lack 

of dismounted soldiers.160
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The mission of the cavalry troop included reconnaissance, security, 

and actions in an economy of force role. Typical of cavalry organizations, 

the troop operated in a decentralized manner, increasing the importance 

of effective small unit leadership and timely monitoring of tactical 

developments by the troop tactical operations center. The latter served as 

the nexus of information and proved vital for effective management of 

subordinate platoons. Indeed, troop leadership remained the theme of the 

entire manual.161

The troop commander retained the decision to approve or disapprove 

actions recommended by his platoon leaders. Flexibility constituted an 

important quality for the troop commander; therefore, the manual did 

not proscribe solutions or actions. Rather it identified the leadership role 

required and offered a wealth of guidance and tips for its execution. The 

individual commander, based on his knowledge of cavalry operations and 

the capabilities inherent to the troop, would have to determine the best 

means of employing his subordinate platoons.162

The troop commander possessed few combat assets under his direct 

control other than the mortar section and any external attachments. 

However, he constituted the central influence on the tempo and conduct 

of platoon actions and how scouts should react to contact with the enemy. 

By monitoring developments and manipulating the troop’s organizational 

flexibility, he could reorient his platoons to support forces in contact or 

exploit an opportunity. He also determined the level of indirect fire support 

available to each platoon via the fire support team. This asset provided the 

central hub for coordinating mortars, artillery, aviation support, and precision munitions. Its mix of digital and radio communications permitted it 

to operate in multiple nets, while its target laser designator facilitated the 

delivery of accurate fires.163

Troop assets were deemed capable of reconnoitering a 10-kilometer 

zone or covering two major routes simultaneously at a sustained rate of 

1 kilometer per hour. This pace suited deliberate, stealthy operations, but 

it could be accelerated at the risk of detection. The manual identified the 

pros and cons of stealthy and aggressive reconnaissance, and stressed the 

importance of organizations being capable of both. Lack of combat power 

made aggressive reconnaissance by the light troop viable only against a 

weak, nonmechanized enemy. The range of information sought during 

reconnaissance focused on enemy forces, trafficability, dominant terrain, 

urban areas, lateral routes, bridges, fords, overpasses, defiles, and obstacles. This listing required time to compile, contributing to the slow pace of 

deliberate reconnaissance.164
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The manual’s coverage of security operations concentrated on screens 

and convoy security. These proved common missions for the troop to perform without reinforcement. In a screen mission, troop assets could monitor six different avenues of approach, cover a 10-kilometer wide sector, 

and sustain up to 12 observations posts (16 for the light troop). However, 

continuous operations by the observation posts beyond 12 hours stretched 

the limited dismounted manpower available. Convoy escort operations 

did not suffer from the same constraint due to their mounted nature. The 

troop was expected to reconnoiter the route in advance of the convoy, 

maintain screens to either flank, provide vehicle escorts throughout the 

convoy, and ensure the presence of a reaction force. Light troops were 

encouraged to integrate scout and antitank platoon assets for this role. 

Emphasis lay in early detection and disruption of potential ambushers 

supported by the reaction force, which could counterattack. This escort 

organization reflected the development of similar tactics in Vietnam. In 

all security actions, surveillance, reconnaissance, and counterreconnaissance were considered inherent tasks. Enemy reconnaissance was to be 

destroyed through direct combat action.165

In 1994, publication of FM 17-98, Scout Platoon, provided long 

overdue guidance. It was the first manual to address the HMMWV scout 

platoon and offered a belated update to its 1987 predecessor. Its comprehensive nature and clearly written style made the new manual ideal 

for training and introducing a new generation of platoon leaders to scout 

operations. A special chapter explained communications and command 

responsibilities, while another detailed the fundamentals of scout operations. Detailed examples showing planning, preparation, and execution 

phases accompanied most mission types. Its appendixes included detailed 

coverage of operations in an NBC environment and a wealth of guidance 

for dismounted operations to include movement, tracking, and search 

techniques. Finally, another appendix addressed operations other than war, 

providing practical guidance for the most common platoon tasks, including checkpoint operations and handling prisoners.166

The manual made clear distinctions between HMMWV and 

M3 platoons in terms of their capabilities and optimal employment. 

Reconnaissance and security operations constituted the primary functions 

of both unit types, but their platforms determined how these actions would 

be performed. The M3 platoon possessed more combat power and survivability at the expense of stealth and coverage area. Conversely, the more 

vulnerable HMMWV platoon offered broader coverage and stealth with 

only a limited combat capability.167 The complementary nature of the two 
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platoons paralleled a similar relationship between horse and mechanized 

cavalry in the interwar years.

The fundamentals of reconnaissance remained unchanged, but in its 

execution, the manual emphasized stealth, information collection, and 

survival. The manual acknowledged the potential value of both stealthy 

and aggressive reconnaissance, but it demonstrated a clear preference for 

stealth and undetected operations: “Scouts should dismount their vehicles 

and use binoculars whenever enemy contact is possible and vehicle movement is not necessary.”168 Nevertheless, the authors noted that such methods might not always prove possible. They offered tactics, techniques, 

and procedures to govern those situations requiring more overt methods 

while highlighting the inverse relation between reconnaissance tempo and 

scout security. Faster movement increased the likelihood of detection and 

engagement. In general, platoon leaders were expected to employ a mix of 

formations, techniques, and methods to achieve the best balance of security 

and operational tempo. Perhaps reflective of Operation DESERT STORM 

experiences, obstacle reconnaissance also received considerable attention, 

and scout responsibilities included limited obstacle clearance.169

Security operations entailed surveillance rather than combat. In the 

establishment of screens, scout platoons could expect the attachment of 

ground surveillance radars, engineers, and combat operation lasing teams. 

By employing radar to monitor more remote areas, scouts could concentrate their attention on the most important locales. Enemy incursions were 

to be harassed and impeded, but direct fire engagements were not stressed. 

Alternatively, the manual acknowledged the potential role of hunter-killer 

tactics in screen operations. The presence of tanks permitted hostile probes 

to be eliminated and enabled a more aggressive counterreconnaissance 

role to be adopted.170

Area, route, and convoy security were also missions considered suited 

to the scout platoon. Each of these mission types possessed relevance to 

both conventional combat and operations other than war. At the platoon 

level, area security occurred through adoption of a coil, or defensible 

laager, that incorporated concertina wire, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 

screens, and dismounted emplacements. Route security mandated the use 

of outposts connected by patrols to detect enemy activity along the protected roadway. When route security could not be assured, the platoon 

assumed the role of convoy escort. The manual provided detailed coverage of vehicle placement and ambush reaction. HMMWV scouts were 

expected to clear the ambush point, while the heavier M3 platoons utilized 

their firepower and armor protection to counterattack.171
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

In 1999, the Army published an updated scout platoon manual. It 

retained the instructional layout and readability of the earlier version, constituting less a replacement than a refinement. However, the new manual 

tended toward a common set of principles for scout platoon operations 

with fewer distinctions drawn between M3 and HMMWW-equipped units, 

despite major differences in the capabilities of these platforms.172

The new manual increased the emphasis of the earlier version on 

information collection, preferably via stealth. Reconnaissance coverage 

included a new section governing infiltration/exfiltration—the process of 

penetrating hostile security screens to complete a mission and return without being detected. The most common mission types included establishment of an observation post, employment of a sensor, and the collection 

of specific information about the enemy. The narrower range of activity 

more closely resembled that of the NTC OPFOR in a deliberate attempt 

to resolve recurring reconnaissance problems reported there. Similarly, 

the planning and preparation of reconnaissance and surveillance missions 

received heightened emphasis, particularly in conjunction with battalion/

troop missions. The manual encouraged the use of information from scouts 

in the planning, preparation, and execution of the parent organization’s 

operations. This guidance targeted repeated criticisms from combat training centers concerning failures to integrate scout operations into battalion 

and troop planning.173

Figure 101. Scouts dismount from their HMMWV.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Scout platoon reconnaissance retained its emphasis on information 

collection. Zone, route, and area reconnaissance remained basic missions, 

but the new manual included few references to fighting for information.174

Indeed, scout platoon leaders encountering the enemy were expected to 

seek approval from their commander before enacting a recommended 

course of action. In effect, they needed authority to engage any hostile 

force encountered. This requirement was not new to the 1999 manual, 

but together with the emphasis on undetected information collection, integrated planning, and the absence of guidance for more combative action, 

it discouraged aggressive reconnaissance. The manual further warned 

against massing platoon combat power to defeat an enemy, since doing 

so might compromise its overall mission. In those instances when the platoon received authorization to attack, targets were limited to unarmored or 

lightly armored targets.175

Dismounted operations remained the most desirable method of conducting reconnaissance: “The platoon should strive to make contact with 

the smallest possible element: the dismounted scout. Visual contact, in 

which the enemy is observed but the scout remains undetected, is the 

goal.” Detailed guidance for dismounted scouts became the thrust of the 

chapter devoted to basic scout skills. It covered the establishment of observation posts, patrols, and hasty dismounted reconnaissance. Gone was the 

detailed coverage of tracking and related skills, which had emerged in the 

1994 manual.176

Security missions included primarily screen and surveillance. In fact, 

the new manual redefined the platoon’s mission as that of reconnaissance 

and “to a limited extent, security for its parent unit.” The chapter introduced the reconnaissance avenue of approach, or that path most likely 

traversed by hostile reconnaissance assets. It had to be identified and covered to prevent penetration of friendly screens, but it might vary from 

the route followed by the enemy main body. To establish a screen with 

some depth, the manual anticipated the augmentation of the platoon with 

engineers, combat operations lasing teams (COLT), and ground surveillance radars. The security team provided surveillance and early warning 

to friendly commanders. Although counterreconnaissance remained an 

important related task, the platoon’s role was limited to identifying hostile 

reconnaissance elements for friendly combat forces to eliminate.177

Coverage of the scout platoon’s role in stability and support operations 

expanded to reflect overseas experiences in the 1990s. It addressed rules of 

engagement and the integration of light and heavy forces in operations other 

than war. Much of the chapter, however, focused on key activities required 
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of platoons, including checkpoint operations, roadblocks, searches of personnel and vehicles, and the conduct of cordon and search missions.178

The urban nature in which stability and support operations occurred, 

coupled with a renewed Army interest in urban operations that grew 

throughout the decade, resulted in better guidance for scout activities in 

built-up areas. The platoon was expected to begin gathering information 

before entering a town or city, using its reconnaissance work to enable the 

parent organization to achieve tactical surprise. Scouts identified enemy 

weakness and helped to determine where combat power should be massed 

for maximum effect, with particular emphasis on avenues of approach for 

attacking forces. These principles proved little different than those applied 

outside urban areas, but towns and cities posed unique challenges. The 

scouts gathered information for local residents, identified targets, and distinguished between combatants and civilians. In providing a steady stream 

of information to the parent commander, the scouts were to simplify the 

friendly force task of isolating the defending forces prior to defeating them 

in detail.179

Reconnaissance at the Combat Training Centers 

In the 1990s, the Armor Center made a determined effort to improve 

cavalry doctrine. The result of this effort became manifest in the manuals 

published during the decade. They generally provided better guidance for a 

broader range of missions and situations. The pages of newer manuals contained detailed examples of how to apply doctrinal principles. The clarity 

and training-oriented nature of the published material reflected a deliberate 

effort to make unit commanders and staffs more aware of their roles and 

responsibilities. The improved manuals also marked a doctrinal response to 

recurring reconnaissance problems at the combat training centers.180

Criticism of the new manuals generally focused on their neglect of 

select topics or their conventional operations orientation. Cavalry doctrine 

appeared to some to stress the security and economy of force missions 

over reconnaissance. Guidance for information acquisition suffered from 

allegations of becoming too dependent on technical means better suited to 

tracking large, mechanized concentrations than the small militant groups 

that characterized the principal threat to stability and support operations. 

Doctrine writers were encouraged to focus more on the interaction of information operations, reconnaissance, and maneuver in lieu of technology, 

since “the Army as a whole is too enamored with the pursuit of technology 

to explain how information operations result in increased effectiveness on 

the battlefield.”181
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Cavalry constituted an active information-gathering source, and it possessed advantages over the growing trend toward standoff sensors and digital systems linked to global information assets. By the end of the decade, 

a doctrinal need existed to show how emerging technologies improved 

the quality and timeliness of information collection and expanded the 

coverage area of cavalry organizations. With Force XXI concepts moving toward reality, doctrine needed to reflect the impact of these ideas and 

related technology.182

For much of the decade, doctrine focused on traditional missions and 

rectifying problems identified at the combat training centers. These issues 

required effective responses for immediate implementation by current 

organizations. A 1996 report covering reconnaissance operations at the 

NTC outlined multiple shortcomings, including ineffective employment 

and planning of scout activities. Brigade mission planning often included 

reconnaissance measures as an afterthought rather than an integral part. 

Consequently, scouts received vague guidance without specific objectives 

and their actions went unmonitored.183

The development of rigid brigade plans before reconnaissance missions completed and continued commitment to them afterward effectively 

nullified the battlefield value of scouts. During one training exercise, an 

armor brigade planned a frontal assault on a heavily fortified position. 

Scouts identified an open path to the enemy’s flank, but the brigade commander and staff remained committed to the plan, which had consumed 

much of their energy and preparation time. The resultant operation resulted 

in heavy casualties and significant time loss.184

Doctrine encouraged a maximum scout presence forward. 

Implementation often resulted in a “recon-push.” Scouts were thrust forward equipped with a shopping list of information requests but no overarching objective. They were neither expected nor directed to assess 

battlefield developments. Consequently, scouts provided a mass of diverse 

data without indication of its relative importance. Nor did commanders 

receive an analysis of the tactical situation from those soldiers best placed 

to observe it. Commanders found their understanding of the battlefield and 

enemy vulnerabilities only marginally improved by their scouts. This condition led to the caustic observation that “recon-push is a Mission Training 

Plan approach to reconnaissance—a check-the-block method that lends 

itself to planning in a reconnaissance vacuum.”185

Recon-pull offered a more effective means of integrating scouts with 

brigade and battalion operations, and it was supported by the Armor 

Center. Essentially, scouts maneuvered over a broad frontage to locate 
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enemy positions and probe for weaknesses. Once identified, the scouts 

then helped friendly forces to penetrate and exploit these points. In effect, 

the parent unit relied on its reconnaissance elements to guide it forward 

instead of adhering to predetermined plans. This concept was not new, but 

the recurring reconnaissance problems at the combat training centers revitalized interest in recon-pull. To be effective, it required unit commanders 

and staffs to generate flexible plans readily modified in response to input 

from scout leaders. It also necessitated a degree of trust in junior leader 

judgment that not all commanders were willing to accept. Many scouts 

also proved only mediocre in their ability to conduct the patrols, probes, 

and reconnaissance in force operations inherent to recon-pull.186

The doctrinal emphasis given to the avoidance of combat undermined 

the ability of advancing scouts to overcome OPFOR security assets. 

Focused on reaching a predetermined observation point undetected, scouts 

gained little information en route to guide their parent battalion. Once in 

place, they found themselves subjected to a continuous and active effort 

by the OPFOR to locate and eliminate them through a variety of active 

and passive measures. Simply penetrating the OPFOR security proved difficult, since it relied on combat reconnaissance patrols, a motorized rifle 

company screen, and antitank guided missiles arrayed in depth.187

Counterreconnaissance posed another challenge. Too often, training 

units found their security zones penetrated by OPFOR reconnaissance 

assets and their dispositions soon became the knowledge of the OPFOR 

commander. This information permitted the OPFOR to mass its combat 

power on vulnerable areas and achieve victory. Doctrinal guidance considered counterreconnaissance an inherent part of any security mission. 

However, no comprehensive guidance existed to illustrate how counterreconnaissance operations should be organized and conducted, much to 

the chagrin of unit commanders struggling to cope with OPFOR reconnaissance probes.188

The problem lay not in the neglect of counterreconnaissance, but in 

its execution. Most battalion task forces relied on a screen line manned 

by scouts and buttressed by a combined arms company team dedicated to 

counterreconnaissance. The scouts detected and tracked hostile reconnaissance for the company team’s armor and infantry components to destroy.189

This approach necessitated planning and a high degree of coordination 

that failed to materialize. Like reconnaissance actions, counterreconnaissance found little incorporation into the overall brigade plan of operations. 

In sharp contrast to the OPFOR, counterreconnaissance was not considered a universal responsibility. Command involvement largely ended with 
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the designation of a counterreconnaissance team, effectively delegating 

responsibility to the team leader.190

In defensive actions, units experienced another type of problem with 

screen operations. In accordance with doctrine, most units pushed their 

scouts forward, massing them to cover one or two avenues of approach. 

When OPFOR elements advanced, the scouts retired to avoid detection 

and engagement. In the process, they frequently lost contact with friendly 

forces to the rear. Consequently, tracking of the enemy penetration ended 

as soon as the scouts displaced, creating a chaotic situation for the parent 

organization struggling to relocate and eliminate the OPFOR. To avoid 

this problem, one solution called for a screen line in-depth instead of a 

linear arrangement. With one or two observation posts established forward to view the potential pathway for the OPFOR from the flanks, one 

remained rearward. As the OPFOR advanced, the forward scouts tracked 

them as long as possible before transferring observation responsibility to 

the rear observation post. In this manner, the scouts maintained a degree of 

continuous surveillance of an attacking enemy without necessarily having 

to relocate and lose contact with them.191

The company team assigned to counterreconnaissance often served as 

the battalion reserve, necessitating separate planning and preparation for 

this role. This dual responsibility contributed to the speedy degeneration of 

the counterreconnaissance effort into two separate, uncoordinated actions 

by the forward screen and the counterreconnaissance team. OPFOR probes 

thus found it easy to penetrate the linear, unsupported screen and push into 

and through the defending security zone. In the process, they identified 

routes for the main attack to follow. Accepting losses, they often managed 

to secure sufficient information to permit effective planning and execution 

of offensive action, while the counterreconnaissance force floundered to 

find and destroy them.192

To correct these problems, one commander urged the adoption of 

counterreconnaissance measures similar to those used by the OPFOR. He 

believed the root cause lay in the failure to make counterreconnaissance 

a command-wide responsibility that required command focus and oversight. Security operations in which counterreconnaissance was an integral part required rehearsals like other missions to avoid the confusion 

and breakdown of control that occurred when OPFOR incursions began. 

Counterreconnaissance needed to be incorporated into unit planning and 

continuously monitored in the same manner as reconnaissance.193

Cavalry organizations improved counterreconnaissance by strengthening their forward screens with tanks. Through hunter-killer tactics, the 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

screens became more robust and capable of eliminating OPFOR reconnaissance without additional assistance. Tank sections paired with scout 

platoons and received further support from engineers, fire support, and the 

forward pre-positioning of high demand supplies. Careful monitoring and 

updating of threat activities further enhanced the effectiveness of these 

measures.194

In all operations, battalion scouts labored under a logistical challenge 

not shared by cavalry units. The dispersion and continuous employment of 

the scouts made it difficult to receive supplies, maintenance, and medical 

support. Doctrine provided a range of options rather than a common standard for service support. The parent battalion could provide a dedicated 

service support team to support the scouts, the platoon could tap into the 

logistical support of the nearest company team, or the platoon sergeant 

could serve as the service support conduit. The first option proved the 

most effective, because it did not require the scouts to coordinate their 

resupply actions with any other unit and did not remove a vehicle and 

crew from information collection. While this solution proved optimal for 

the scouts, it diverted battalion assets. A proposed remedy lay in the addition of a service support section to the scout platoon, but no organizational 

change occurred. Each battalion continued to adopt its own means of providing logistical support to the scouts.195

Combat training center assessments derived from actions between 

training units and a dedicated OPFOR. The latter served to test the former 

and improve unit effectiveness. Yet, for all their realism, the combat training centers remained an artificial environment and the OPFOR a fictitious 

enemy. Not all commanders were convinced that the OPFOR justified the 

large investment in training time and funding. At each training center, the 

Figure 102. A UAV ready for operations at the NTC.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Chapter 7

OPFOR benefited from frequent operations on the same terrain at a time 

when most units in the Army struggled to sustain effective training anywhere. As the nature of the threat facing the Army became more amorphous, ranging from hostile demonstrators to an array of conventional and 

unconventional enemies, the relevance of the OPFOR came into question. 

In the words of one commander, “We have become fixated on an OPFOR 

doctrine that is not executed by anyone but us.” With the end of the Cold 

War, OPFOR organizations would have to become more dynamic and less 

well defined—much like the threats they needed to represent.196

Scout Training

The effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance in part reflected the quality of related training programs and personnel policies. Throughout the 

1990s, both remained of high caliber despite significant challenges. One 

of the most important concerned NCOs. In reconnaissance units, these 

leaders played central roles as vehicle commanders, section leaders, and 

tutors for new platoon leaders. However, Army downsizing after the Gulf 

War contributed to the onset of a general shortage of NCOs that continued 

throughout the decade. Efforts to develop replacements were hindered by 

a drop in the numbers of individuals joining the Army to become scouts. 

The latter received a lower recruitment priority and a smaller enlistment 

bonus in comparison with other military career paths.197 Downsizing also 

reduced the number of training organizations charged with scout training 

to just one.198

In 1996, the Army initiated the change in NCO structure (CINCOS) 

to enhance career progression. This program reduced the rank associated 

with a variety of field and staff duty positions. CINCOS resulted in the 

downgrading of many positions associated with doctrine writing, combat 

development, and training within the Armor Center. In addition to a general 

shortfall of NCOs, many now possessed less experience than their predecessors. Competition arose among organizations for the reduced number 

of seasoned NCOs for a variety of branch-related activities, including 

small group instruction for tankers and scouts.199

More junior NCOs in positions of responsibility necessitated greater 

oversight by officers, but a shortage of commissioned personnel also 

existed. The greatest dearth occurred among captains, partly because the 

Armor Branch failed to meet its annual requirements for new officers of 

this rank. The mandatory assignment of captains by the Army to nonarmor duty assignments only exacerbated this problem, and encouraged 

the Armor Branch to seek alternate sources of personnel for branchimmaterial postings.200
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

Armor captains found themselves in high demand for a variety of 

assignments. This situation resulted in most Armor captains spending less 

time in field command positions than their counterparts in other branches. 

Combat organizations already facing readiness and manning shortfalls 

found little relief in the short tenures of company and troop commanders. Consequently, plans emerged to rely on distance learning to enable 

captains to train without leaving their units to attend school for extended 

periods. A longer-term solution affected personnel assignments to ensure 

an increase in the time spent by lieutenants, captains, and majors in command and staff duty positions.201

Within the Armor Center, work progressed on the Force XXI Training 

Program, part of an Army-wide initiative to integrate combined arms 

doctrine, training, and emerging information technology. It incorporated 

insights from the Advanced Warfighting Experiments, built on the best 

practices of simulator use, and sought to streamline training cycles through 

advanced technologies. The program also sought to incorporate proven 

technologies and training strategies into existing training, exemplified by 

the expansion of distance learning.202

The Force XXI Training Program exploited computer technology to 

enhance officer and staff instruction. It directly supported the work of the 

EXFOR through computer-driven staff training courses, exercises, and 

support packages. In turn, the experience of the EXFOR provided data 

for further Force XXI training developments and drove requirements for 

digital training ranges, gunnery changes, and related upgrades to training 

infrastructure. At Fort Knox, these requirements resulted in the fielding of 

the Close Combat Tactical Trainer and Classroom XXI. The former was an 

enhanced set of networked simulators for unit training. The latter created 

a network between schools and training facilities. The Cavalry Leaders 

Course was among the first to utilize Classroom XXI. While the primary 

instructor remained in a classroom with students, links with the NTC and 

other branch schools permitted students to interface directly with subject 

matter experts from those facilities, considerably broadening the in-class 

discussion.203

The Scout Platoon Leaders Course also underwent change in the 

1990s. The Gulf War demonstrated the need for more emphasis on route 

reconnaissance, hostile obstructions, and obstacles. The course, therefore, 

expanded to include an extended, continuous field exercise. By 1998, the 

course included 44 hours of advanced reconnaissance techniques and a 4-

day field exercise. It also opened to staff sergeants in response to requests 

from field units, and the course name changed to Scout Leaders Course. 
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Despite its success, however, the Scout Leaders Course was not immune 

to budgetary constraints, and the Department of the Army opted to stop 

funding it. In response, the Armor Center shared the course’s operational 

costs with those units who sent personnel to attend, effectively salvaging 

an effective cavalry-oriented training program.204

Other changes to officer instruction reflected feedback from field units 

and the influence of Force XXI. The Armor Officer Basic Course grew 

from 15 to 17 weeks to provide familiarization with the digital M1A2 

Abrams tank and more cavalry instruction. In the Armor Officer Advanced 

Course, brigade level operations and mission execution received greater 

emphasis. This change reflected the increase in numbers of graduates who 

went straight into staff positions rather than troop or company command. 

Other subjects added included the use of training devices for instruction 

and operations other than war. To offset the impact of a drop in course 

length from 20 to 18 weeks, distance learning was used to address those 

subjects not specific to Armor. The course retained 24 hours devoted to 

reconnaissance and security planning in response to observations from the 

combat training centers and 32 hours dedicated to terrain exercises without troops.205

New scouts similarly benefited from the addition of more M3 and 

HMMWV driving time in their instruction, together with additional emphasis on mounted and dismounted navigation. The use of global positioning 

systems was introduced and prospective scouts received more instruction 

in calling for indirect fire. Opportunities to practice skills taught occurred 

during a 4-day situational training exercise. Graduates received a reference book that consolidated all of the individual and unit tasks indicated in 

field manuals and training literature for reference in the field.206

Many of these changes also stemmed from emerging Force XXI doctrine that emphasized reconnaissance-pull. Relying on scouts to identify 

enemy weakness and guide friendly forces into these vulnerable areas 

necessitated competent junior leaders capable of spotting weakness and 

commanders who exploited their observations in the direction of their 

unit. Hence, the Armor Center deliberately sought to expand programs 

of instruction and devote more training time to reconnaissance actions. 

The precommand course, for example, introduced students to cavalry 

organizations, missions, and tactics, which could then be observed in 

operation during a 5-day NTC visit. Overall, leader instruction in reconnaissance emphasized rapid execution of missions and the ability to plan 

on the move, because “commanders must be trained to seize the fleeting battlefield opportunities that Information Dominance will present.” 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

Reconnaissance‐pull on the fast-paced Force XXI battlefield required 

decisive commanders who would act without awaiting a perfect alignment 

of resources and circumstances.207

Some combat units already understood these principles. In the 1st 

Cavalry Division, the scout platoon of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry 

Regiment, for example, responded directly to the squadron commander, 

not the S2 or fire support officer. Indeed the linkage between the squadron commander and the platoon leader was considered vital for command 

decisions to reflect the input of the scouts: “The task force commander 

must be willing to have a close personal relationship with his scout platoon 

leader.” This relationship facilitated understanding of the commander’s 

priority information requirements and ensured a focused mission for the 

scouts.208

Finding the training opportunities to develop the tight leadership 

bonds required of recon-pull sometimes proved problematic. For division 

cavalry squadrons, the 1990s marked the return of tanks to these organizations and a related boost in combat power and capability. Yet combat 

seemed to offer most squadrons the best opportunity to train. Most of these 

units faced inadequate training resources and insufficient maneuver space 

at home station. Moreover, the squadrons now possessed a large number 

of different weapons. They needed additional range time to permit crews 

to become proficient in their use, but rarely did squadrons receive extra 

time necessary for this training.209

In Germany, constraints on the movement of heavy combat vehicles 

directly affected the training of cavalry organizations equipped with tanks, 

self-propelled artillery, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. For one scout platoon leader, “these restrictions presented the question of how to train my 

platoon with little or no maneuver area.” During an 18-month command 

tenure, this officer found only one opportunity to operate his M3-equipped 

platoon in the field and then only within a very small area. Under these 

conditions, realistic training became difficult, particularly since the platoon 

could not utilize its vehicles to conduct battle drills and hone basic skills. In 

frustration, it turned to the use of HMMWVs as surrogate platforms. These 

vehicles posed little threat to local infrastructure and were largely exempt 

from land use restrictions. This expedient increased maneuver opportunities, but did little to acquaint soldiers with their primary platform.210

Preparations for contingency deployments posed other challenges. 

In Europe, the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment prepared for possible 

operations in Bosnia through a CMTC rotation that focused on operations 

other than war. The scenario set necessitated protracted dealings with 
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recalcitrant ethnic factions less than enthusiastic about foreign intervention. The cavalry’s role lay in providing a UN convoy escort, establishing checkpoints, dealing with the media, and controlling multiple civilian 

work groups. Fundamentally different from conventional warfighting missions, one participating officer noted, “This training is exceptionally difficult, putting severe strain on command and control systems and on junior 

leader initiative and understanding of the political situation and the commander’s intent.” To their growing list of necessary skills, junior leaders 

needed to add patience together with cultural and political awareness.211

The likelihood of operations in urban areas triggered some units to 

seek more training opportunities in built-up areas. Before its conversion to 

the NTC resident OPFOR, the 11th Armored Cavalry developed a training 

exercise that involved convoy escort into and through an urban area. It 

made use of the urban combat training site at Bonnland, Germany. Convoy 

movement through streets became complicated with the addition of roleplayers representing crowds, a skeptical media, and militants employing 

ambush tactics. The overall scenario loosely reflected the deteriorating 

conditions characteristic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In the course 

of the training, 11th Armored Cavalry personnel were expected to follow 

restrictive rules of engagement and minimize civilian casualties. Specific 

training tasks for the scouts included dismounted movement, reaction to 

snipers, and urban area reconnaissance. In preparation, the regiment applied 

techniques once commonplace during the Vietnam war, but during actual 

operations, scouts proved much too aggressive against civilians. A similar 

problem among other units training for potential contingency operations 

highlighted the difficulties of transitioning soldiers from warfighting to 

operations other than war.212

For light cavalry organizations, training efforts focused on contingency 

operations and the optimal employment of assets to offset their limited 

combat power. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, for example, adopted 

the integrated scout antitank teams initially associated with light infantry 

division cavalry. Nevertheless, additional work was required to determine 

the engagement criteria and best tactics for each of the HMMWV-mounted 

weapons available. The light regiment needed to avoid protracted engagements, particularly with heavier forces. It therefore focused on the refinement of antiarmor ambush skills and the integrated use of hand-held 

antitank guided missiles and Claymore mines.213

The Force XXI Division and the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop

Force XXI initiatives ultimately aimed at building a more effective 

force suited to current and future battlefields. Division redesign constituted 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

the most significant manifestation of this intent. For much of the decade, 

work on a division structure remained an analytical process encompassing 

the Army Warfighting Experiments, EXFOR activities, computer modeling, and paper studies. At any rate, by the decade’s end a new organization 

had been adopted for fielding early in the the 21st century. Initially known 

as the Conservative Heavy Division, reflecting its status among a range 

of options, it became the Force XXI division and guided materiel fielding 

needs.

The new division design reflected the Army’s shift from a forward 

deployed to a power projection force that deployed from home stations 

to operational environments. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the 

immediate danger of a confrontation with a large-scale, highly mechanized army. Hence, the Force XXI formation possessed increased deployability, partially achieved through a reduction in size and combat power. 

Division size fell to about 15,000 soldiers, thereby easing manning problems evident throughout the 1990s. Using digital systems, the formation 

was expected to possess an unprecedented ability to see and understand the 

battlefield, permitting its fewer combat assets to be maneuvered with an 

unmatched degree of precision. The 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 

was the first formation designated to convert to the new configuration in 

2000. However, the extent and pace of conversion throughout the Army 

Figure 103. The LRAS3-equipped HMMWV was intended for fielding in the 

new brigade reconnaissance troop.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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remained closely tied to the availability of new equipment in a manner 

reminiscent of similar formation changes in the 1980s.214

The basic structure of the Force XXI division remained similar to 

the Army of Excellence configuration it replaced. The new formation 

included a HHC, a cavalry squadron, an armor brigade, two mechanized 

brigades, an artillery brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade. 

Air defense, military intelligence, and engineer assets completed the 

structure. Significant changes included the adoption of combined arms 

battalions and the integration of engineers at the brigade rather than the 

division level.215 The division lost its chemical company, but its NBC 

reconnaissance capability shifted to the division cavalry squadron. It 

gained a rear area operations company and increased fire support, while 

losing a second attack helicopter battalion and an antiarmor company 

in the mechanized infantry battalion. Brigades benefited from increased 

staffs that included a new S5 (Civil Affairs) officer, more liaison teams, 

and two retransmission teams for supporting communications over long 

distances or difficult terrain.216

Tank battalions shrank from 4 companies with 58 tanks and 604 soldiers to 3 companies with 44 tanks and 343 soldiers. Precision maneuver via digital communications was expected to offset this loss in combat 

power. The consolidation of most battalion service and support assets in a 

separate organization at the division level proved more controversial. This 

change eliminated the maneuver battalion commander’s ability to control 

his own service support, forcing him instead to rely on external organizations anticipating his logistical needs. Digital monitoring of supply 

consumption theoretically enabled an accurate sensing of the maneuver 

unit’s needs, but the concept had not been validated at the time the division structure was adopted. The scout platoon remained, but at a new standard organization of six vehicles. Cavalry platoons fielded M3A3s, while 

the battalion scout platoon included six M1114 up-armored HMMWVs 

equipped with the LRAS3. Increased protection and surveillance capabilities were expected to offset the impact of a smaller organization. Mortar 

support within the battalion similarly shrank to four mortars controlled by 

a dedicated fire direction center for more effective and responsive fires.217

The cavalry squadron underwent relatively few changes in the Force 

XXI division. It retained its basic structure of a HHT, three ground cavalry troops, two air reconnaissance troops, and an aviation service troop. 

Ground troop organization included two armor and two scout platoons for 

a total of 9 tanks and 13 M3s. The principal change lay in the addition of 

the NBC reconnaissance detachment. Despite prior efforts to realign the 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

squadron from the aviation brigade to direct division control, it remained 

within the aviation unit.218

At the brigade level, the inclusion of an organic brigade reconnaissance troop constituted another significant development. With this unit, 

each organization from battalion through corps possessed its own dedicated reconnaissance agency. A similar reconnaissance unit had been 

included in armored divisions from their inception in World War II, but 

formation changes in the 1970s eliminated them. Initial plans for the Army 

of Excellence division had included a brigade scout platoon of six M3s, 

but it became a bill payer for other desired changes and disappeared before 

fielding began.219

The failure to restore a reconnaissance capability did not eliminate 

the desire to do so. Armor Center analysis in the 1980s demonstrated a 

consistent need for such an entity in a series of studies devoted to heavy 

force requirements and reconnaissance assessments. However, despite 

TRADOC support for a brigade reconnaissance unit, in 1989 the Army 

Chief of Staff ruled its potential value insufficient to justify its cost in 

manpower and money. At that time, the addition of a scout platoon for 

every heavy brigade added a requirement for 1,400 soldiers that could not 

be readily met.220

Operation DESERT STORM reenergized interest in brigade reconnaissance. The conflict seemed to confirm the battlefield value of brigade scouts 

and led TRADOC to undertake their design and fielding.221 Similarly, some 

units began to improvise their own, driven in part by NTC experiences. 

Although brigades were intended to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations up to 15 kilometers beyond their forward elements, they 

had to rely on battalion scouts, who rarely managed half that distance. The 

gap was to be covered by aviation, air support, and electronic assets, but 

these were not controlled by the brigade commander. Coordination became 

a problem. A brigade commander could overcome this issue by improvising a small HMMWV scout platoon supplemented by ground surveillance 

radar, combat operations laser targeting, and retransmission teams. Relying 

on stealth to infiltrate hostile security, their task lay in establishing undetected observation posts out to 15 kilometers as per doctrine.222

The Force XXI division design resolved the issue by the incorporation 

of an organic reconnaissance troop in each armor and mechanized infantry 

brigade. It reflected a consensus regarding its need based on the Advanced 

Warfighting Experiments, NTC rotations, and digital training conducted 

by the EXFOR. Modeled on the light cavalry troop, the brigade unit was 

intended for a broader range of missions beyond information collection.223
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In May 1996, the first brigade reconnaissance troop activated at Fort Hood, 

Texas, as part of the EXFOR. This unit served as a test organization to 

determine the optimal organization and role for brigade scouts. The initial 

configuration included a headquarters and two scout platoons, with a 

personnel strength of 85 soldiers. Each scout platoon included 31 soldiers 

and 9 HMMWVs, one of which carried either an LRAS3 or a sensor suite. 

Capability enhancement occurred through the frequent attachment of 

engineers, military intelligence sensor squads, a combat operations laser 

targeting team, and a medic. Digital communications sped information 

sharing and provided much better situational awareness through electronic 

transmission of maps and graphics. The unit generally operated via stealth, 

and it was common for a heavier combat unit to open a path through 

enemy screens at the start of the mission to compensate for the troop’s 

limited combat power and need to avoid casualties. Alternatively, OH-58D 

helicopters and UAVs might overwatch the troop’s movement, with the 

former providing a direct fire capability as well. Security operations 

occurred through surveillance and rapid reporting of enemy activity. In 

effect, they became the forward tier of a layered security zone that ranged 

from the scouts of the reconnaissance troop to the overwatching OH-58Ds, 

to battalion scouts, and finally to combat assets.224

The new brigade reconnaissance troop participated in its first NTC 

rotation during the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment in 

March 1997. It returned in March 1999, but its configuration had changed. 

Scout platoon size shrank from nine to six vehicles. During this rotation, 

it benefited from the attachment of a COLT platoon from division artillery 

that operated as a collection of six teams closely integrated with scout 

teams. This close cooperation generated positive results during simulated 

combat, particularly in the request for and delivery of fire missions. The 

COLT teams worked forward, often in the same observation post as the 

scouts, providing the brigade commander not only a sense of the battlefield in depth, but the capability through indirect fires to influence hostile 

activity before his maneuver battalions came into direct contact with the 

enemy. One of most significant problems encountered, however, lay in 

efforts to share the same information with battalion commanders. While 

the brigade commander often received excellent intelligence with which to 

understand the tactical situation, maneuver battalions did not.225

These experiences helped to finalize the reconnaissance troop’s 

composition. By 1999, it included a small headquarters element and two 

scout platoons. Each platoon was to include 6 up-armored HMMWVs 

equipped with LRAS3 and 18 soldiers. Total troop strength came to just 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

49 soldiers.226 Personnel and equipment for the unit were provided through 

the simultaneous reduction in strength of battalion scout platoons from 10 

to 6 vehicles. The reconnaissance troop was expected to benefit from the 

frequent attachment of a Striker platoon from the division artillery. This 

unit carried artillery observers in HMMWVs. Fielding plans envisioned 

the first brigade reconnaissance troops to be established among those units 

stationed in Europe, while future plans considered replacement of the 

HMMWV with the FSCS, probably in the 2007 timeframe.227

The new unit’s reliance on the up-armored HMMWV quickly drew 

criticism. Although the reconnaissance troop was intended to operate 

via stealth and collect information via surveillance, some felt its mission 

would by default resemble that of a division cavalry squadron. The troop 

would be the most forward element on the battlefield and likely thrust into 

traditional route, zone, and area reconnaissance in addition to carrying 

the brunt of the counterreconnaissance battle. Against this mission set, the 

M1114 would not survive long enough to complete missions. Despite its 

improved ballistic protection over unarmored HMMWVs, the M1114 did 

not offer effective protection against RPGs. The gunner remained unprotected and the armored windows became nearly impossible to see through 

when struck repeatedly by small arms. The heavier weight of the M1114 

also served to erode its cross-country mobility and increase the wear and 

tear of key components: “The new XM1114 is not the same HMMWV 

you enjoy back in the garrison environment, a vehicle that requires little 

maintenance and is able to leap small mountains in a single bound.” Less 

mobile and lacking effective firepower, it could not fight its way out of 

situations. Given these views, the M3 seemed the optimal platform for the 

new reconnaissance troop.228

These concerns reflected more traditional reservations about the creation of a mounted organization optimized for information acquisition 

and the avoidance of combat. The brigade reconnaissance troop was not 

intended to perform the basic information collection, security, and economy of force missions associated with prior reconnaissance organizations. 

It constituted less a cavalry unit than a collection of digitally networked 

and maneuverable sensors. The troop provided another set of eyes and ears 

on the battlefield, but it was not designed to either fight for information 

or conduct security operations that entailed combat. Its real value lay in 

the acquisition and rapid transmission of battlefield intelligence and the 

delivery of fires far forward on the battlefield. Still, questions concerning survivability would continue to surround any organization designed to 

operate deep in enemy terrain with minimal combat power.
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The emergence of the brigade reconnaissance troop and the smaller 

battalion scout platoon posed other problems. Existing doctrine did not 

reflect a six-vehicle organization, while the absence of the LRAS3 among 

current units left a gap in their surveillance capability. The smaller Force 

XXI scout platoons also suffered from a minimal dismount capability. Their 

limited manpower permitted the establishment of only two long-duration 

observation posts. They also lacked the ability to conduct observation in 

depth and lost much of their effectiveness if they suffered casualties. In 

short, “The current 18-man, six-HMMWV platoon is simply not capable 

of accomplishing all the tasks required to ensure mission success.”229

Recommended changes followed. Infiltration offered the best means 

of operation, especially when combined with an emphasis on dismounted 

scouting and the addition of a fourth crewman to each HMMWV. Sniper 

teams offered some additional capability that had already been demonstrated by other cavalry units. In addition, the attachment of a retransmission team permitted scouts to select observation posts on the basis of 

best position rather than the ability to receive and transmit information. 

To ensure maximum effectiveness, training needed to address the coordination of brigade and battalion scouts. Moreover, the small size of the 

new scout platoons and its perceived weakness encouraged a recommendation for a return to a 10-vehicle organization with a mix of M3s and 

HMMWVs. Such a platoon had been a common recommendation in the 

1980s to capture in one organization the complementary qualities of the 

Army’s two principal reconnaissance platforms.230

Regimental Strike Force

The reconfiguration of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment into a light 

cavalry organization constituted the only significant force structure change 

in response to the changed geopolitical landscape actually implemented. 

Yet this unit remained in a transitional state throughout the 1990s. Plans 

for upgrading its vehicle set to an AGS/M113A3 mix ended with the cancellation of the former in 1996. This action, driven by budgetary considerations, left the cavalry unit as a light force built around the HMMWV. 

It remained highly deployable and able to inundate the battlespace with 

scout teams. Yet it lacked combat power.231

It could perform peacekeeping operations and fulfill the reconnaissance needs of the XVIII Airborne Corps, but its security and economy 

of force capability depended on the threat and operational environment. A 

number of recommendations emerged to address this deficiency. Advocates 

of a heavier organization supported replacement of the TOW HMMWV 

and towed howitzer with the M1A1 tank and self-propelled M109A6 
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

Paladin, while the scouts transitioned to the up-armored M1114. This mix 

utilized available Army assets and minimized the number of additional 

training requirements to be met. The principal value of this configuration 

lay in boosting combat power without entirely sacrificing the unit’s deployability. The presence of armor permitted a more aggressive stance against 

hostile security and mechanized components as well as offering a deterrence capability in operations other than war.232

Other proposed modifications favored mobility, deployability, and a 

more modest increase in firepower. The regiment needed to remain oriented on operations other than war without sacrificing its rapid response 

capability. If anything, it required more dismounts. However, such advocates acknowledged the utility of an improved platform such as a “lighter 

vehicle with a small cannon that offers improved crew protection over the 

armored HMMWV, yet is easily air transportable.” It remained to be seen 

whether this might be a role for the FSCS.233 Another alternative called for 

reequipping the regiment with the LAV family of wheeled vehicles to provide a better balance of firepower, protection, mobility, and supportability. 

This suggestion found ready support from the Marine Corps, already using 

the LAV in similar roles.234

In February 1997, the Chief of Staff directed the concept development of a modernized cavalry regiment oriented on operations at least a 

decade in the future. The response featured a regimental strike force structured to rectify through advanced technologies the existing shortcomings 

of the 2d Armored Cavalry, particularly its poor optics, limited combat 

power, and inability to fight for information or to gain time for a friendly 

force. One conceptual strike force design closely paralleled the existing 

armored cavalry regiment configuration. It included a HHT, three ground 

cavalry squadrons, an air cavalry squadron, military intelligence assets, 

engineer support, and related logistical services. A more radical proposal 

envisioned a brigade organization with two combined arms maneuver 

battalions, a reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, and a battalion 

each of motorized infantry, artillery, and aviation. In both cases, the LAV 

family constituted the intended vehicle mix for the strike force, utilizing a range of different LAV variants. They included a LAV with a turret 

mounted 120-mm mortar and the LAV-105, carrying a stabilized 105-mm 

gun. Initially equipped with a mix of towed howitzers, HMMWVs, TOW 

HMMWVs, and LAV-25s, the regiment was also a candidate for the FSCS 

when fielded.235

The use of the LAV family to equip the strike force permitted use of a 

platform already in use by the Marine Corps and simplified maintenance 
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Chapter 7

and supply. It also transformed the 2d Armored Cavalry into a medium 

force that merged the deployability of light forces with some of the combat power associated with heavier organizations. The need for such an 

organization increased with the rise in contingency operations and the 

pending inactivation of the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor Regiment—the XVIII 

Airborne Corps’ only light armor unit. The proposed strike force offered 

a substitute armored capability and the means to perform a broader mission set without augmentation than currently possible for the 2d Armored 

Cavalry. In addition, the strike force would benefit from those concepts 

and technologies matured under Force XXI related to command, control, 

and surveillance. In its final state, the strike force would be characterized 

by superior strategic mobility, a degree of lethality, high situational awareness, and the capacity for modular augmentation. Planners sought a versatile organization ideal for contingency operations but much more mobile 

and robust than the light forces actually deployed for such missions.236

The medium-weight strike force never progressed beyond a conceptual stage. Despite interest in the unit, it failed to secure the necessary 

resources from an Army focused on deployments and Force XXI activities. Hence, instead of a combat unit, the Army leadership opted to pursue 

development of a strike force headquarters that could be implemented in 

a much shorter time and had immediate relevance to contingency operations. The new headquarters would consist largely of a permanent staff 

with no organic combat units. Its role lay in organizing, deploying, and 

controlling a variety of units to respond on short notice to a sudden crisis 

overseas. In the 1990s, such contingencies had been met by drawing units 

and command elements from several different formations. This practice 

disrupted the activities of each affected force and resulted in an amalgam 

of organizations struggling to develop cohesion in the midst of deployment. A permanent headquarters with a robust communications network 

and designed to control a variable number of subordinate units drawn from 

a designated pool offered a more effective means of crisis response.237

The strike force headquarters supplemented existing corps headquarters without disrupting their activities. It was intended to control not only 

Army combat and service units, but organizations taken from all branches 

and allied nations. It could be utilized for a variety of missions ranging 

from humanitarian aid to combat. With its personnel and equipment capable of deploying within 96 hours, it offered a much faster response time 

than current, improvised measures. The planners of the headquarters considered Task Force Hawk an example of the role the new command organization might perform. Task Force Hawk controlled US forces deployed 

to Albania in support of military operations in Kosovo in 1999.238
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

The selection of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to craft the strike 

force headquarters stemmed from several factors. The unit remained in 

an anomalous state since its conversion to a light force and subsequent 

stalled modernization. Yet, it possessed the extensive command and 

communications network characteristic of armored cavalry regiments. 

In Bosnia, it served as the nucleus for the NATO stabilization force, and 

demonstrated its ability to integrate a wide variety of attached units. It 

routinely worked with intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological 

operations organizations, and its association with the XVIII Airborne 

Corps placed it squarely among the Army’s first responders to sudden 

contingencies.239

Early development of the strike force headquarters centered on Fort 

Polk, Louisiana, the home station of the 2d Cavalry. There the skeleton of 

the new headquarters would be generated from regimental assets. Further 

momentum came with the appointment of a brigadier general and two cells 

to oversee coordination, organizational development, and related training 

and leadership issues. Through advanced technology use, the Army sought 

a much leaner headquarters, but the details of its composition became subject to considerable debate that could not be resolved until tested. By late 

1999, however, time ran out for the strike force headquarters. In November, 

just months after the appointment of Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. 

Shinseki and the onset of Army Transformation, related activities were 

formally canceled.240
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Notes

1. Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Louisiana Maneuvers: The First Year

(Fort Monroe, VA, 1994), 6.

2. “U.S. Military Operations November 1990-Present,” Defense 96 

Almanac, No. 5 (1996): 41–42.

3. Louisiana Maneuvers: The First Year, 5.

4. US Army Armor Center (hereafter referred to as USAARMC), “Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm Emerging Observations,” Report, 7 October 1991, 3-5, 

3-10, 5-4, 6-40, US Army Armor Branch Archives (hereafter referred to as Branch 

Archives).

5. John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort 

Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command Military History Office, 

1997), 74–77; Robert S. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort 

Knox 1996 Annual Command History,” Report, 11 March 1998, 122–123, Branch 

Archives.

6. Louisiana Maneuvers: The First Year, 8–11.

7. Robert S. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort 

Knox 1997 Annual Command History, Draft Report, undated, 4-2 to 4-3, Branch 

Archives.

8. US Army Armor Center, “Advanced Warfighting Experiment Operation 

Desert Hammer VI: Final Report,” 28 July 1994, Branch Archives; US Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, “Land Combat in the 21st Century,” pamphlet, 

1995, 6–7, Branch Archives.

9. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, 

Military Operations: Force XXI Operations, A Concept for the Evolution of FullDimension Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century

(Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC, 1994); Romjue, American Army 

Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 139–141.

10. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, 139–141.

11. Memorandum, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Subj: Force XXI 

Experimental Force Prime Directive, 14 February 1995, quotation from page 2, 

Branch Archives, 1995 Annual Command History.

12. Briefing, US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, Subj: 

Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment Results, 16 June 1997, Branch 

Archives, 1997 Annual Command History.

13. Armor Conference Briefing, General William W. Hartzog, Subj: Future 

Army Training, 4 June 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual Command History.

14. E-mail, Major General George H. Harmeyer, Subj: AWE Observations 

to CG, TRADOC, 11 April 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual Command 

History; Interview, Major General George H. Harmeyer, 28 May 1997, Branch 

Archives, 1997 Annual Command History.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson, “Armor’s Role in the Future 

Combined Arms Team,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 48–49; Cameron, 

“United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox Annual Command History,” 

Draft Report, undated, 4–13.
401

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

16. W. Blair Haworth Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, 

Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 245–146; “AH 64 Apache,” undated, 

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/ah-64.htm (accessed 29 September 2008).

17. Briefing, General Hartzog, Future Army Training, 4 June 1997.

18. BDM International, Inc., “Armor 2000 Study Synopsis,” Report, 

31 January 1991, 1, Branch Archives.

19. Major General Thomas C. Foley, “An Armored Force for the Future: 2000 

and Beyond—Technology,” Armor C, no. 5 (September–October 1991): 4–5.

20. “Armor 2000 Study Synopsis,” 255.

21. Ibid., 99, 101, 256.

22. Ibid., 107–110, quotation from page 107.

23. Ibid., 103, 107–110.

24. End of Tour Interview, Major General Thomas C. Foley, 8 July 1992, 

10, Branch Archives.

25. “Armor 2000 Study Synopsis,” 100–102, 240–242, 246, 250; Foley, “An 

Armored Force for the Future: 2000 and Beyond—Technology,” Armor C, no. 5 

(September–October 1991): 5–6; Major General Thomas C. Foley, “An Armored 

Force for the Future: 2000 and Beyond—Technology” (November–December 

1991): 4–6.

26. Lieutenant Colonel Craig B. Whelden, “Light Cavalry: Strategic Force 

for the Future” (student paper, US Army War College 3 January 1992), 17, DTIC 

Report no. ADA247881.

27. E-mail, Commander, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, 

Subj: Reconnaissance, Counter Reconnaissance, Surveillance Forces, 18 July 

1988, 2, Branch Archives, Cavalry.

28. See, for example, Major Robert J. Wottlin, “The Case for Light Cavalry,” 

Armor C, no. 6 (November–December 1991): 30–32.

29. Briefing, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, August 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; 

Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Provide Emerging Results of the Light Cavalry 

Regiment Suitability and Acceptability Analysis, 27 February 1992, Branch 

Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; Briefing draft, USAARMC, Subj: Light 

Armored Cavalry Regiment,” 27 March 1997, Branch Archives, 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment.

30. USAARMC, “Background Study of Light Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Issues,” Report, 1991, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. While the 

JRTC did not open until 1993, planning included reliance on a unit permanently 

stationed at Fort Polk, LA, to support training.

31. Briefing, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Subj: Light 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 24 April 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment; USAARMC, “Background Study of Light Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Issues.”

32. Briefing, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, August 1992; USAARMC, Light Armored Cavalry Regiment Suitability 
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and Deployability Study, notes, 1991–92, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment.

33. Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Stephen L. Bowman, Lieutenant Colonel 

John M. Kendall, and Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sauders (eds.), “Motorized 

Experience of the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, 1980–1989,” 

unpublished manuscript, 9 June 1989, Branch Archives, 9th Infantry Division.

34. USAARMC, Light Armored Cavalry Regiment Suitability and 

Deployability Study, notes, 1991–92; E-mail, Subj: Light Cavalry Regiment 

(LCR) Design Guidance, 29 April 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment.

35. Briefing, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Subj: Light 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 24 April 1992; Briefing, Combined Arms Center, 

Subj: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment, August 1992.

36. Memorandum, Brigadier General Stanley Kwieciak Jr., Subj: Light 

Armored Cavalry Regiment Briefing, 5 May 1992, 18 May 1992, Branch Archives, 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

37. Correspondence, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment Fire Support 

Issues, May–July 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

38. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Armor/Cavalry Information Briefing for 

Commander, USAAVNC, 26 June 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment.

39. E-mail, III Corps Commander, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment 

(LACR), 16 June 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

40. Memorandum, Brigadier General Robert B. Rosenkranz, Subj: 

Redesignation of 199th Motorized Brigade, 16 July 1992, Branch Archives, 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment.

41. Briefing, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, August 1992.

42. Memorandum for Record, Colonel Edward A. Bryla, untitled update of 

actions of US Army Armor Center TIPOF Task Force, 1992, Branch Archives, 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; Memorandum, Brigadier General Edward G. 

Anderson III, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment (LACR) Proponency and 

Taskings, 24 August 1992, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

43. “Light Cavalry Regiment Organizational and Operational Plan,” c. 1992, 

Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; “Operational and Organizational 

Concept for the Second Cavalry Regiment (Dragoons),” 28 October 1999, Branch 

Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

44. Memorandum, Major John C. Woznick, Subj: Position Paper: Second 

(2d) Cavalry (CAV) Regiment Equipment Issues,” 14 October 1993, Branch 

Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; “M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier,” 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m113a3.htm (accessed 

8 October 2008).

45. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G. Dodd Jr., “The 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment: A Force for Peace Enforcement Operations,” Armor CIV, no. 2 

(March–April 1995): 48–49.
403

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

46. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson, “A Report From Haiti: 

Cavalry in Peacekeeping Operations,” Armor CIV, no. 6 (November–December 

1995): 15–17; Armor Conference Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Weber, Subj: 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 5 June 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual 

Command History; “2d Cavalry Regiment,” 9 September 2006, http://www.

globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2acr.htm (accessed 9 October 2008).

47. Benson, “A Report From Haiti: Cavalry in Peacekeeping Operations,” 

15–17; Lieutenant Colonel Bill Weber, Subj: 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 

5 June 1997.

48. “2d Armored Cavalry Regiment: Back From Haiti, Then on to Bosnia, 

the Army’s ‘Light ACR’ Remains ‘Always Ready,’” Armor CVI, no. 6 (November–

December 1997): 23–24.

49. “2d Armored Cavalry Regiment: Back From Haiti, Then on to 

Bosnia, the Army’s ‘Light ACR’ Remains ‘Always Ready,’” 23–24; “2d Cavalry 

Regiment.”

50. “2d Cavalry Regiment.”

51. Memorandum, Major David R. Gaumer Jr., Subj: Regimental Fire 

Support Officer AAR Comments for 2ACR Deployment in Support of Operation 

Joint Guard, 17 June 1998, 4, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; 

Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Mark T. Little, Subj: 2d Squadron AAR 

(Operation JOINT GUARD), 9 October 1998, 1, 4, 5, Branch Archives, 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment; Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel David Lawrence, 

Subj: 4th Squadron AAR (Operation JOINT GUARD), 9 October 1998, 1–2, 9, 

18, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

52. Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Mark T. Little, Subj: 2d Squadron 

AAR (Operation JOINT GUARD), 9 October 1998, 6; Memorandum, Lieutenant 

Colonel Mark Corda, Subj: 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s After 

Action Review for Deployment from 16 August 1997 to 15 May 1998, 22 June 

1998, 2, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

53. Memorandum, Major Richard L. Gingras, Subj: Regimental Engineer 

AAR Comments for 2ACR Deployment in Support of Operation JOINT 

GUARD, Bosnia-Herzegovina, undated, 1, Branch Archives, 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment.

54. Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Corda, Subj: 3d Squadron, 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s After Action Review for Deployment from 

16 August 1997 to 15 May 1998, 22 June 1998, 4–6, 12–14.

55. Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R. Witsken, “Peacekeeping with 

Light Cavalry: The 10th Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cav Deploys to Somalia,” 

Armor CIII, no. 5 (September–October 1994): 26–27.

56. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry: The 10th 

Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cav Deploys to Somalia,” 26–28; First Lieutenant John 

Williamson, “Ground Cavalry Checkpoint Operations in Somalia,” Armor CIII, 

no. 6 (November–December 1994): 21.

57. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry: The 10th 

Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cav Deploys to Somalia,” 28–29.
404

Chapter 7

58. Ibid., 28–30.

59. Ibid., 27–29.

60. Williamson, “Ground Cavalry Checkpoint Operations in Somalia,” 

20–22.

61. E-mail, III Corps Commander, Subj: Light Armored Cavalry Regiment 

(LCR), 16 June 1992.

62. Briefing, Subj: Light Divisions’ Cavalry Squadron, 1997, Branch 

Archives, 1997 Annual Command History.

63. USAARMC, FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (Fort Knox, 

KY: US Army Armor Center, May 1999), annex F, Branch Archives.

64. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Directorate of Force Development, 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual 

Command History.

65. Memorandum, Duane Klug, Subj: 1997 Annual Historical Summary—

DFD Organization Division, 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual Command 

History; Briefing, Subj: Light Divisions’ Cavalry Squadron, 1997.

66. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Light 

Divisions’ Cavalry Squadron, 23 February 1999, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual 

Command History.

67. Memorandum, Duane Klug, Subj: 1997 Annual Historical Summary—

DFD Organization Division, 1997.

68. Anne W. Chapman, The National Training Center Matures 1985–1993

(Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command Military History 

Office, 1997), 310.

69. USAARMC, FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (May 1999), 

annex D.

70. Captain Robert B. Brown, “Kill OPFOR: The 3d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment at the NTC,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 14–15.

71. “3d Armored Cavalry Regiment: From Bliss to Carson’s Canyons,” 

Armor CVI, no. 6 (November–December 1997): 19–20; “The 11th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment: NTC’s ‘Home Team’ Battles with the Best,” Armor CVII, no. 

6 (November–December 1998): 43.

72. Captain Christopher Boyle, “The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s 

Tactical Command Post: An Alternative Command and Control Facility,” Armor

CV, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 32–35.

73. Captain George Salerno, “Repairing the Broken Sabre: Overview of the 

L-Series Divisional Cavalry,” Armor CIII, no. 1 (January–February 1994): 29–30, 

quotation from page 29.

74. Ibid., 30–31, quotation from page 31.

75. Ibid., 32–33; Staff Sergeant Frank R. Belonus, “Dismounted Scouts in 

Mechanized Cavalry Operations,” Armor CIV, no. 5 (September–October 1995): 

3, 49.

76. Salerno, “Repairing the Broken Sabre,” 30, 32.

77. Ibid., 33; Belonus, “Dismounted Scouts in Mechanized Cavalry 

Operations,” 3.
405

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

78. Captain John L. Gifford, “Fundamentals of Air-Ground Integration in 

Division Cavalry Operations,” Armor CIII, no. 4 (July–August 1994): 15–16; 

USAARMC, FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (Fort Knox, KY: US 

Army Armor Center, January 1995), annex C; Department of the Army, FM 

17-95, Cavalry Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, 1996), 1-20, 1-24; USAARMC, FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference 

Data (May 1999), annex C.

79. First Lieutenant Frank Lozano, “The Six-Bradley Scout Platoon in 

Bosnia,” Armor CV, no. 5 (September–October 1996): 36–37; Captain Robert 

G. Ivy, “A Cavalry Experience in Bosnia,” Armor CVII, no. 3 (May–June 1998): 

26–28.

80. Ivy, “A Cavalry Experience in Bosnia,” 26–28.

81. FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (January 1995), A-3.

82. Captain Bob Burns, “Reconnaissance: Task Force Scouts—Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures,” Combat Training Centers Bulletin No. 93-4 (July 

1993): 1–5.

83. Martin Goldsmith, Battalion Reconnaissance at the National Training 

Center (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), iii, ix, 9, 13, 15, quotation from page 

15.

84. Captain Karl S. Flynn and First Lieutenant Joseph Miller, “HunterKiller Operations,” Armor CII, no. 4 (July–August 1993): 48–50.

85. Ibid.

86. Cesar A. Cruz, “More on Hunter-Killer Technique,” Armor CII, no. 6 

(November–December 1993): 3.

87. Captain Larry Reeves, “Light Cavalry Table XII,” Armor CVI, no. 3 

(May–June 1997): 44–45.

88. Major John M. Stawasz, “Light Divisional Cavalry and Low-Intensity 

Conflict Reconnaissance” (student report, School of Advanced Military 

Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 1991), 13–14, DTIC Report no. 

ADA258097.

89. Department of the Army, FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1995), 2-40 to 2-41.

90. Stawasz, “Light Divisional Cavalry and Low-Intensity Conflict 

Reconnaissance,” 13–14; FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (May 

1999), F-4.

91. Major Michael K. Robel, “Keeping OPORDs Simple,” Armor CII, no. 

6 (November–December 1993): 2–3; Lieutenant Colonel James F. Crawford, 

“Reviving Old Concepts,” Armor CII, no. 6 (November–December 1993): 3, 50; 

Brigadier General (Retired) Philip L. Bolté, “Full Circle: The Armored Cavalry 

Platoon,” Armor CIII, no. 5 (September–October 1994): 36.

92. Crawford, “Reviving Old Concepts,” 3, 50.

93. Cruz, “More on Hunter-Killer Technique,” 3; Flynn and Miller, “HunterKiller Operations,” 48–50.

94. Crawford, “Reviving Old Concepts,” 3, 50; Bolté, “Full Circle: The 

Armored Cavalry Platoon,” 36; First Lieutenant Christopher M. Doneski, 
406

Chapter 7

“Challenges of the ‘Three By Five’ Platoon,” Armor CIII, no. 2 (March–April 

1994): 3–4; Cruz, “More on Hunter-Killer Technique,” 3; Flynn and Miller, 

“Hunter-Killer Operations,” 50.

95. First Lieutenant Eric J. Teegerstrom, “Scout Snipers: One Shot, One 

Kill,” Armor CIII, no. 4 (July–August 1994): 20–21.

96. Goldsmith, Battalion Reconnaissance at the National Training Center, 

15.

97. Lieutenant Colonel John C. Woznick, “The Scout Vehicle,” Armor CIII, 

no. 5 (September–October 1994): 31–34.

98. Captain Louis J. Lartigue, “Fixing the Scout Platoon,” Armor CIV, no. 

1 (January–February 1995): 51.

99. See US Army Armor School, “Proponent Evaluation Report for the 

Concept Evaluation of the Maneuver Battalion Scout Platoon,” Fort Knox, KY, 

12 March 1990, DTIC Report no. ADA224363.

100. Lieutenant Colonel Henry M. St-Pierre and First Lieutenant Jamie E. 

Warder, “Team Recon: A New Approach to Armored TF Reconnaissance,” Armor

CVIII, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 24–26, 29.

101. Ibid.

102. Captain Bill Williams, “The Battalion Scout Troop: A Doctrinal and 

Organizational Answer to Battalion Tactical Reconnaissance,” Armor CVIII, no. 

4 (July–August 1999): 37–40.

103. American Defense Preparedness Association Briefing, Major General 

Lon E. Maggart, 25 September 1996, Branch Archives, 1996 Annual Command 

History; Major General Lon E. Maggart, “Cavalry in Force XXI,” Armor CV, no. 

5 (September–October 1996): 11–13.

104. Armor Conference Briefing, Major General George H. Harmeyer, Subj: 

Report to Force, 4 June 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual Command History; 

Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Tank and Scout 

Modernization Strategy (POM 00-05), 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual 

Command History; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, 

Subj: Armor Functional Area Assessment, 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual 

Command History.

105. USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, “Mission Need 

Statement for Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS), 1996, 1, Branch Archives, 

1997 Annual Command History.

106. American Defense Preparedness Association Panel Discussion, Subj: 

Future Mounted Systems, 25 September 1996, Branch Archives, 1996 Annual 

Command History; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, 

Subj: Future Scout and Cavalry System, c. 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual 

Command History; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, 

Subj: Directorate of Force Development, 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual 

Command History.

107. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Future 

Scout and Cavalry System, c. 1997.
407

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

108. American Defense Preparedness Association Panel Discussion, Subj: 

Future Mounted Systems, 25 September 1996; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate 

of Force Development, Subj: Tank and Scout Modernization Strategy (POM 00-

05), 1997; National Defense Industrial Association Briefing, Colonel Peter Wall 

and Mr. R. Asokalis, Subj: Future Scout and Cavalry System, 22 September 1998, 

Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History.

109. American Defense Preparedness Association Panel Discussion, Subj: 

Future Mounted Systems, 25 September 1996; USAARMC Directorate of Force 

Development, Subj: Tank and Scout Modernization Strategy (POM 00-05), 

1997.

110. USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Tank and Scout 

Modernization Strategy (POM 00-05), 1997; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate 

of Force Development, Subj: Directorate of Force Development, 1997; National 

Defense Industrial Association Briefing, Colonel Peter Wall and Mr. R. Asokalis, 

Subj: Future Scout and Cavalry System, 22 September 1998; Interview, Major 

General George H. Harmeyer, 26 January 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual 

Command History.

111. Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The 

United States Army Heavy Force Modernization Plan,” Report, 1998, O-18, 

Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History, quotation from USAARMC 

Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Tank and Scout Modernization Strategy 

(POM 00-05), 1997.

112. Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The United 

States Army Heavy Force Modernization Plan,” O-16; USAARMC Directorate of 

Force Development, Subj: Tank and Scout Modernization Strategy (POM 00-05), 

1997.

113. Armor Conference Briefing, Major Mitch Stokan, Subj: Doctrine 

Development Update, 19 May 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command 

History; Armor Conference Briefing, Major Paul Begemann, Subj: Future Scout 

and Cavalry System, 19 May 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command 

History; Sergeant First Class Monty A. Miller, “Is the New Scout Motto Death 

Before Dismount?” Armor CVII, no. 1 (January–February 1998): 54–55; Staff 

Sergeant Dwayne C. Thacker, “Scout Vehicle Designs Must Allow for Easy 

Dismount,” Armor CVIII, no. 4 (July–August 1999): 18.

114. Christopher V. Cardine, “At Least in the Near Future, Today’s Scouts 

Will Use Bradleys and HMMWVs,” Armor CVIII, no. 1 (January–February 

1999): 3–4.

115. Colonel John F. Kalb, “Seeking Alternatives to ‘Scouting in a 

Winnegabo,’” Armor CVIII, no. 2 (March–April 1999): 3–4.

116. “The Armored Gun System,” Armor CI, no. 2 (March–April 1992): 

13–14; Captain John A. Nagl, “The Armored Gun System: Sheridan Replacement 

Offers Better Firepower Plus Worldwide Mobility,” Armor CI, no. 4 (July–August 

1992): 26–29; Colonel Franklin Y. Hartline, “AGS Questions,” Armor CII, no. 

2 (March–April 1993): 2–3; Colonel Charles F. Moler and Colonel Richard L. 
408

Chapter 7

Knox, “AGS Answers,” Armor CII, no. 2 (March–April 1993): 3–4; Major Martin 

N. Stanton, “Assault Gun Battalion 96,” Armor CIII, no. 5 (September–October 

1994): 43.

117. “The Armored Gun System,” 14.

118. Memorandum, Gilbert F. Decker, Subj: Armored Gun System, 2 May 

1996, Branch Archives, 1996 Annual Command History; Jason Sherman, “Budget 

Squeeze Drives Army to Terminate Armored Gun System Program,” Inside the 

Army, Special Report, 26 January 1996.

119. Sergeant First Class James C. Lawrence, “The Plight of the Scout 

Vehicle,” Armor CIII, no. 2 (March–April 1994): 4; Sergeant William Bighouse, 

“Scout Vehicles: Still No Good Answer,” Armor CIV, no. 5 (September–October 

1995): 49.

120. Lawrence, “The Plight of the Scout Vehicle,” 4.

121. Bighouse, “Scout Vehicles: Still No Good Answer,” 49.

122. Woznick, “The Scout Vehicle,” 32.

123. “M1114/XM1114 HMMWV Up-Armored Armament Carrier,” http://

www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1114.htm (accessed 24 

November 2008); “Up-Armored HUMVEE,” http://www.defense-update.com/

features/du-3-04/up-armored-humvee.htm (accessed 24 November 2008); “UpArmored HMMWV,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/

hmmwvua.htm (accessed 24 November 2008).

124. First Lieutenant Jonathan C. Byrom, “Up-Armored HMMWVs: The 

Answer for Peacekeeping Operations,” Armor CVII, no. 1 (January–February 

1998): 35–36.

125. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Prevou, “HMMWVs Lack the Firepower 

and Protection for Bosnia Role,” Armor CVII, no. 1 (January–February 1998): 36, 

56.

126. Ibid., 56.

127. National Defense Industrial Association Briefing, Nancy Moulton, 

Subj: HMMWV, 23 September 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command 

History.

128. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Directorate of Force Development, 1997, quotation from same; Briefing, 

USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Reconnaissance Update, 

1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History; End of Tour Interview, 

Major General George H. Harmeyer, 1999, 38, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual 

Command History.

129. Captain T.J. Johnson, “The HMMWV Storage Rack,” Armor CVIII, no. 

3 (May–June 1999): back cover.

130. Woznick, “The Scout Vehicle,” 32.

131. Richard K. Fickett, “Wiesel-Mounted Scouts,” Armor CII, no. 1 

(January–February 1993): 2–3; Stanley C. Crist, “The Case for an Airmobile, 

Amphibious Scout Vehicle,” Armor CVIII, no. 4 (July–August 1999): 30–32.

132. Charles Lehner, “Bosnia Report: Task Force Eagle’s Armor and Cavalry 

Operations in Bosnia,” Armor CV, no. 3 (May–June 1996): 9–10, 45–47.
409

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

133. See, for example, Captain William S. Riggs, “Global Cavalry,” Armor

CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 23–29.

134. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Melton, “Heavy Force Emphasis Flirts 

with Irrelevancy,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 3–4.

135. Mike Sparks, “LAV Solution Too Vulnerable,” Armor CIV, no. 3 (May–

June 1995): 48–49, quotation from page 48; Technical Sergeant Mike Sparks, 

“Winning the 21st Century Battle for Reconnaissance,” Armor CVIII, no. 4 (July–

August 1999): 3–4.

136. Stanley C. Crist, “Best ‘Global Cavalry’ Mounts Are M113s, Not 

LAVs,” Armor CVII, no. 4 (July–August 1998): 53–54; Mike Sparks, “If M113s 

Don’t Work in Snow, Let’s Find Out Why,” Armor CVI, no. 1 (January–February 

1997): 48–49.

137. Bighouse, “Scout Vehicles: Still No Good Answer,” 49.

138. Haworth, The Bradley and How it Got That Way, 145; Headquarters, US 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The United States Army Heavy Force 

Modernization Plan,” 1998, C-3 to C-4; “M2A2ODS/M3A2ODS (Operation 

Desert Storm) Bradley,” undated, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/

ground/m2a2ods.htm (accessed 20 October 2008).

139. 1999 Armor Conference Briefing, Subj: Future Scout and Cavalry 

System, 18 May 1999, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual Command History.

140. “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” undated, http://

globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m2a3.htm (accessed 20 October 

2008); Test and Experimentation Command Close Combat Test Directorate, 

“Bradley Fighting Vehicle System-A3 (BFVS-A3), Report, December 1998, 

DTIC Report no. ADB240666; National Defense Industrial Association Briefing, 

Colonel Paul S. Izzo, Subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle Program Manager,” 23 

September 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History; Headquarters, 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The United States Army Heavy 

Force Modernization Plan,” 1998, C-3 to C-4; American Defense Preparedness 

Association Briefing, Subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 25 September 1996.

141. Lieutenant Colonel Craig S. Harju Sr., Sergeant First Class David 

F. Wilson, and Richard B. Armstrong, “Tactical Employment of the Military 

Motorcycle,” Armor CI, no. 3 (May–June 1992): 18–20; Briefing, USAARMC 

Directorate of Combat Developments, Subj: Combat Developments, October 

1991, 142–143, Branch Archives, Cavalry.

142. Darryl A. Phillips, “Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System,” 

Information Paper, 1 May 1997, Branch Archives, 1997 Annual Command History; 

Captain Michel Jones and Sergeant First Class Christopher Wagner, “Long Range 

Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3),” Armor CVII, no. 6 (November–December 

1998): 22–24.

143. Review of LRAS3 Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, 22 November 

1999, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual Command History.

144. Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lynch and Captain Steve Cichocki, “Training 

the Task Force Scout Platoon,” Armor CV, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 42–44, 

quotation from page 44.
410

Chapter 7

145. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1991), 1-2, 1-4.

146. Ibid., 1-5 to 1-6, 1-17.

147. Ibid., chapter 3.

148. Ibid., chapter 4.

149. Ibid., 7-66 to 7-77.

150. Ibid, 7-66 to 7-77, A-1 to A-14.

151. Cavalry Symposium Briefing, Subj: Contemporary Issues FM 17-95, 

1996, Branch Archives, Cavalry.

152. FM 19-95 (1996).

153. Ibid., 1-18.

154. Ibid., 1-18 to 1-19, quotation from page 1-19.

155. Ibid., 2-55 through 2-64, 3-16, 4-11.

156. Ibid., 4-13, 4-40 through 4-49, quotation from page 4-40.

157. Ibid., 7-1.

158. Ibid., chapter 7.

159. FM 17-97 (1995).

160. Ibid., 1-2 to 1-3, 1-8, 1-9 to 1-11, 1-16 to 1-17, 2-40 to 2-41, 3-20, 5-5, 

quotation from page 1-17.

161. Ibid., 1-16, 2-1, 2-27 to 2-28, 2-31 to 2-32.

162. Ibid., 3-16.

163. Ibid., 2-29 to 2-31, 2-36 to 2-37, 8-1 to 8-8.

164. Ibid., chapter 3.

165. Ibid., chapter 4.

166. Department of the Army, FM 17-98, Scout Platoon (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994).

167. Ibid., 1-5 to 1-7.

168. Ibid., 3-2.

169. Ibid., chapter 4.

170. Ibid., chapter 5.

171. Ibid.

172. Department of the Army, FM 17-98, Scout Platoon (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999).

173. Ibid., 2-8 to 2-13, 3-47 to 3-55.

174. Ibid., chapter 3.

175. Ibid., 8-40.

176. Ibid., 8-1 to 8-14, quotation from page 8-35.

177. Ibid., 4-4 to 4-26, quotation from page 1-1.

178. Ibid., appendix C.

179. Ibid., appendix D.

180. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Reconnaissance Update, 1998, Branch Archives, Cavalry.

181. Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Reardon, “Development of Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Doctrine for the Next Century,” Armor CVIII, no. 4 (July–August 

1999): 19–20, quotation from page 20.
411

Force XXI and the Winds of Change

182. Ibid., 19–24.

183. Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Kirby, “Find the Enemy,” Armor CII, 

no. 3 (May–June 1993): 20–21; Goldsmith, Battalion Reconnaissance Operations 

at the National Training Center, 1996, ix, 9–14; Cameron, “United States Army 

Armor Center and Fort Knox 1996 Annual Command History,” 101–103.

184. Captain Christopher D. Kolenda, “Reconnaissance in the Offense: ‘Command Push’ vs. ‘Recon Pull,’” Armor CV, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 45–46.

185. Ibid., 45–46, quotation from page 45.

186. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1996 

Annual Command History,” 101–103; Kolenda, “Reconnaissance in the Offense: 

‘Command Push’ vs. ‘Recon Pull,’” 46–47; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of 

Force Development, Subj: Reconnaissance Update, 1998.

187. Lieutenant Colonel Chris Baggot, “Executing the Defensive 

Counterreconnaissance Fight,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 8–9; 

Captain Richard Randazzo, “OPFOR Counterreconnaissance at the National 

Training Center,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 12.

188. Captain Blaise Cornell-d’Echert Jr., “Counterreconnaissance: Defining 

the Nature of Security Area Operations,” Armor CII, no. 5 (September–October 

1993): 5; Baggot, “Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight,” 7–8.

189. Baggot, “Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight,” 9; 

Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr., “The Counterreconnaissance Battle: Managing the 

Monster,” Armor CI, no. 6 (November–December 1992): 22–25.

190. Baggot, “Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight,” 8–9.

191. Captain Christopher D. Kolenda, “Screen In Depth,” Armor CII, no. 3 

(May–June 1993): 14–15.

192. Deal, “The Counterreconnaissance Battle: Managing the Monster,” 

22–25; Cornell-d’Echert, “Counterreconnaissance: Defining the Nature of 

Security Area Operations,” 5–11; Baggot, “Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight,” 8–10.

193. Baggot, “Executing the Defensive Counterreconnaissance Fight,” 10–

11.

194. Captain Doug Boltuc and Captain Scott Efflandt, “Counterreconnaissance: Taking the Fight to the Enemy,” Armor CV, no. 6 (November–

December 1996): 31–35.

195. Captain Michael L. Maus, “Combat Service Support for the Task Force 

Scout Platoon,” Armor CII, no. 2 (March–April 1993): 40–41; First Lieutenant 

John S. Wilson, “CSS for the Scout Platoon—Another Solution,” Armor CIV, no. 

5 (September–October 1995): 46–47; FM 17-98 (1994), 8-2 to 8-3; FM 17-98 

(1999), 7-2 to 7-3.

196. Captain Mark H. Salas, “Who is the OPFOR That We Plan to Fight?” 

Armor CVII, no. 3 (May–June 1998): 3.

197. Briefing packet, Subj: Armor 1998 Functional Review—Proponency, 

9 March 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History.

198. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Matheny, “Growing Scouts,” Armor CI, 

no. 5 (September–October 1992): 13.
412

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199. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1997 

Annual Command History,” 3-32.

200. Briefing, Major General Lon E. Maggart, Subj: The Armor Force in 

Transition: Armor Functional Area Assessment, 1996, Branch Archives, 1996 

Annual Command History; Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort 

Knox 1997 Annual Command History,” 3-32; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate 

of Force Development, Subj: Armor Functional Area Assessment (FAA), 1998, 

Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History.

201. Briefing, Major General Lon E. Maggart, Subj: The Armor Force in 

Transition: Armor Functional Area Assessment, 1996, Briefing, USAARMC 

Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Armor Functional Area Assessment 

(FAA), 1998.

202. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1996 

Annual Command History,” 11 March 1998, 65.

203. Interview, Colonel William R. Betson, 25 March 1998, Branch Archives, 

1998 Annual Command History; Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center 

and Fort Knox 1997 Annual Command History,” 3-6, 3-12, 3-15.

204. John W. Cranston, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 

1994 Annual Command History, Report, undated, 19–20; Cameron, “United 

States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1997 Annual Command History,” 

3-29 to 3-31; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Reconnaissance Update, 1998.

205. Cameron, “United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox 1997 

Annual Command History,” 3-9, 3-29, 3-31; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of 

Force Development, Subj: Reconnaissance Update, 1998.

206. Major General George H. Harmeyer, “19D and 19K Training in 1st 

Armor Training Brigade,” Armor CVI, no. 6 (November–December 1997): 5, 56; 

Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Reconnaissance 

Update, 1998.

207. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Reconnaissance Update, 1998.

208. Lynch and Cichocki, “Training the Task Force Scout Platoon,” 42–43, 

quotation from page 42.

209. Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Schmidt, Subj: Cavalry 

Symposium Executive Summary, 8 March 1996, Branch Archives, Cavalry.

210. First Lieutenant Todd A. Napier, “USAREUR Maneuver Training: 

Overcoming the Limitations,” Armor CVII, no. 4 (July–August 1998): 4.

211. Captain John A. Nagl and Captain Tim Huening, “Training a Divisional 

Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other Than War,” Armor CV, no. 1 (January–

February 1996): 23–24, quotation from page 23.

212. Lieutenant Colonel Kurt D. Norman and Captain George M. Schwartz, 

“Scout MOUT: Model for Future Cavalry Training,” Armor CII, no. 5 (September–

October 1993): 36–41.

213. Reeves, “Light Cavalry Table XII,” 44–45.
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

214. Major General George H. Harmeyer, “The New Heavy Division: It’s 

More Deployable and Just as Deadly,” Armor CVII, no. 4 (July–August 1998): 7–8, 

46; Armor Conference Briefing, Major General George H. Harmeyer, Subj: Report 

to Force, 19 May 1999, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual Command History.

215. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Directorate of Force Development, 1997.

216. Harmeyer, “The New Heavy Division: It’s More Deployable and Just 

as Deadly,” 8; Armor Conference Briefing, Major General George H. Harmeyer, 

Subj: Report to Force, 19 May 1999.

217. Harmeyer, “The New Heavy Division: It’s More Deployable and Just 

as Deadly,” 8, 46; Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: 

Armor Functional Area Assessment (FAA), 1998; End of Tour Interview, Report, 

Major General George H. Harmeyer, 1999, 35; Armor Conference Briefing, Major 

General George H. Harmeyer, Subj: Report to Force, 19 May 1999.

218. Command Sergeant Major David L. Lady, “The Conservative Heavy 

Division: Enlisted Impact,” Armor CVII, no. 5 (September–October 1998): 7; 

Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Armor Functional 

Area Assessment (FAA), 1998; Harmeyer, “The New Heavy Division: It’s More 

Deployable and Just as Deadly,” 8.

219. Major Craig S. Harju Sr., “White Paper—A Study of the Maneuver 

Battalion Reconnaissance or Scout Platoon,” Report, US Army Armor School, 

Fort Knox, KY, 18 September 1989, 76–77, DTIC, Report no. AD-A214 798; John 

L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort 

Monroe, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997), 95–96; Major 

Peter S. Kindsvatter, “The Army-of-Excellence Divisional Cavalry Squadron—A 

Doctrinal Step Backward?” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 December 1985), 25–26, Branch Archives, Cavalry; 

Memorandum, Robert L. Keller, Subj: Brigade Scouts, 24 October 1991, Branch 

Archives, Cavalry.

220. Memorandum, Robert L. Keller, Subj: Brigade Scouts, 24 October 

1991.

221. Ibid.

222. Captain William K. McCurry Jr. and First Lieutenant Joel R. Phillips, 

“Brigade Deep Operations: Task Organizing for Victory,” Armor CII, no. 5 

(September–October 1993): 42–45.

223. Robert S. Cameron, Major General Harmeyer End of Tour Interview, 

1999, 36.

224. Captain Thomas M. Feltey, “The Brigade Reconnaissance Troop: 

Profiling a New Kind of Unit,” Armor CVII, no. 5 (September–October 1998): 

26–27, 55.

225. First Lieutenant Thomas P. Brennan Jr., “Scout-COLT Integration in the 

Brigade Reconnaissance Troop,” Armor CVIII, no. 4 (July–August 1999): 35–36, 

40.

226. FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data (May 1999), annex O.
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227. Briefing, USAARMC Directorate of Force Development, Subj: Armor 

Functional Area Assessment, 1998; Major General George H. Harmeyer, “The 

Armor Force: A Pre-conference Overview,” Armor CVIII, no. 2 (March–April 

1999): 6; Armor Conference Briefing, Major General George H. Harmeyer, 

Subj: Report to Force, 1999; Harmeyer, “The New Heavy Division: It’s More 

Deployable and Just as Deadly,” 8.

228. First Lieutenant Wayne T. Westgaard, “Will the New Brigade 

Reconnaissance Troop Be Adequately Protected?” Armor CVIII, no. 2 (March–

April 1999): 27–29, quotation from page 28.

229. Sergeant First Class Frank R. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task 

Force and Brigade Recon Troop Scout Platoons,” Armor CIX, no. 6 (November–

December 2000): 7–9, quotation from page 8.

230. Ibid., 8, 10–12, 14.

231. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson, “Whither the 2d Cavalry?” 

Armor (January–February 1997): 20.

232. Ibid., 20–21.

233. Colonel Tom Molino, “Don’t ‘Heavy-Up’ the 2d ACR,” 3.

234. Riggs, “Global Cavalry,” Armor CVII, no. 2 (March–April 1998): 23–

29; Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Walker, “Marine Light Armor Tested ‘Global 

Cavalry’ Concepts,” Armor CVII, no. 4 (July–August 1998): 53.

235. Briefing, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Design Concepts 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, 1 May 1997, Branch Archives (electronic), Transformation; 

Memorandum, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Redesign Concept for the 2ACR, 

undated, Branch Archives; Briefing, USAARMC Strike Force Cell, Subj: Strike 

Force Update, 21 September 1998, Branch Archives, Strike Force.

236. Memorandum, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Redesign Concept for 

the 2ACR, undated; Briefing, USAARMC Strike Force Cell, Subj: Strike Force 

Update, 21 September 1998; National Defense Industrial Association Briefing, 

Major General George H. Harmeyer, 22 September 1998, Branch Archives, 1998 

Annual Command History.

237. Interview, Major General George H. Harmeyer, 23 November 1998, 

Branch Archives, 1998 Annual Command History; Briefing, USAARMC Strike 

Force Cell, Subj: Strike Force HQ Design CoC [Council of Colonels] Work Group, 

15 December 1998, Branch Archives, Strike Force; “Strike Force Organizational 

and Operational Concept Version 3.5,” draft, 15 August 1999, Branch Archives, 

Strike Force; Armor Conference Briefing, Colonel Michael Mehaffey, Subj: Strike 

Force, 18 May 1999, Branch Archives, 1999 Annual Command History.

238. Armor Conference Briefing, Colonel Michael Mehaffey, Subj: Strike 

Force, 18 May 1999; End of Tour Interview, Major General George H. Harmeyer, 

1999, 36–37.

239. Memorandum, Combined Arms Center, Subj: Redesign Concept for the 

2ACR, undated.
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Force XXI and the Winds of Change

240. Cameron, Harmeyer end of tour interview, 36–37; “Strike Force 

Organizational and Operational Concept Version 3.5,” Draft, 15 August 1999; 

Permanent Orders, Subj: Experimentation Coordination Cell-Strike Force 

(W3U202), Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, 19 November 1999, Branch Archives, 

2000 Annual Command History.

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Army Transformation, RSTA Squadrons, and ISR Operations

The years 1999 to 2003 witnessed major changes within the US Army. 

Transformation initiated a major reorganization of the force structure 

simultaneous with a commitment to doctrine and technologies oriented 

toward future battlefields. These actions necessarily impacted mounted 

reconnaissance, which increased its tilt toward greater reliance on digital 

networks, combat avoidance, and the achievement of an unprecedented 

level of situational understanding. These occurrences became manifest 

in the development of the reconnaissance squadrons for the new Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and in the concept design work undertaken 

for the Future Combat System. These trends marked a shift away from the 

powerful combined arms teams that comprised the heavy division cavalry 

squadron and the armored cavalry regiment. Indeed, the former disappeared altogether while the latter remained an anomalous unit type with 

an uncertain future. Cavalry in the traditional sense appeared on the verge 

of extinction. However, combat operations in Iraq began before completion of most Transformation objectives. It remained to be seen whether 

battlefield experiences would validate the new reconnaissance concepts or 

justify the need for more robust organizations capable of combat.

Army Transformation

In June 1999, General Eric K. Shinseki became Army Chief of Staff. 

He introduced a new direction for military development known as Army 

Transformation. Its thrust lay in preparing to cope with the broad array 

of 21st century threats anticipated. The Army also required the ability to 

provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and execute stability 

and support operations. Contrasting these needs with current capabilities, 

Shinseki noted a gap between heavy and light forces. While the former 

possessed great combat power, they remained slow to deploy and required 

a developed infrastructure to support operations. These qualities made the 

heavy forces less than ideal for responding to the varied contingencies 

likely to emerge in the future. Conversely, light forces proved faster to 

deploy, but lacked sufficient survivability, lethality, and the ability to sustain combat operations once committed. Both force types remained too 

reliant on extensive and costly logistical support.1

Therefore, General Shinseki sought to reduce the logistical tail of 

combat organizations and improve their deployability. The desired force 

structure included the ability to work within a joint framework and conduct 
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all likely military operations, including those supporting humanitarian 

relief. Combat units also needed the ability to transition quickly from 

one type of operation to another. Rapid deployment became synonymous 

with deterrence, since a force able to respond quickly to a contingency 

might prevent crisis escalation and far larger troop commitments. In 1999, 

the Russians demonstrated the disproportionate influence of a small but 

rapidly deployed force when they moved a motorized unit from BosniaHerzegovina to Kosovo just before NATO forces moved into that province. 

Consequently, Russia became an active participant in the negotiations 

underway to determine the long-term status of Kosovo.2

To accomplish his goals, General Shinseki sought to leverage existing and emerging technology to build a new force that blurred the distinction between heavy and light. He also anticipated that redesigning the 

Army would necessitate changes in doctrine, training, and organizational 

structure. He believed the Army possessed a window of opportunity to 

undertake the major changes intended. With a strong economy, no significant national threat, and the absence of a major military rival, Shinseki 

wanted rapid action to realize Transformation goals before these conditions changed.3

Shinseki classified the force structure according to three categories: 

Legacy, Interim, and Objective. The first constituted the existing force 

with current materiel, while the last included high-tech combat organizations organized in brigade sets. Relying on innovative concepts and 

new technologies, the Objective Force was to become the mainstay of the 

Army in the 21st century. Intended to operate in nonlinear battlefield environments, it relied on a new family of ground platforms, known as Future 

Combat Systems (FCS).4

The Objective Force relied on high-tech combined arms organizations. 

Networked together to permit rapid data sharing and also linked to satellites and a host of national and joint intelligence and imagery databases, 

these units were intended to operate as a collection of fast-moving noncontiguous elements that presented multiple threats to an enemy force. By 

leveraging the latest information technology, Objective Force units could 

plan operations en route to a theater of operations. Once there they utilized available intelligence sources to track hostile activity and plan tactical movements long before combat occurred. Information technology was 

expected to permit enhanced coordination and faster decision cycles and 

expedite planning among commanders of widely dispersed units.5

The desire to accelerate decision cycles and operational tempo through 

the innovative application of the latest information technology was not 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

unique to the Objective Force. In general terms, similar objectives had 

influenced combat organizations at least since the interwar period. The 

difference, of course, lay in the far greater span of capabilities, which 

Objective Force planners sought to harness to a combat force. They envisioned tactical units able to see an enemy first, understand the situation 

first, take appropriate action before the hostile force reacted, and decisively 

defeat it. Sometimes referred to as a “quality of firsts,” this simple concept 

succinctly summarized the purpose of Objective Force design, although 

the realization of this goal proved much more complex and dependent on 

an array of new technologies seamlessly interacting.6

Objective Force planners envisioned combined arms brigades and battalions built around the FCS. These general-purpose units were to possess 

a radically reduced logistical tail, partially achieved through maximum 

use of common platforms and parts. Modular in design, they could be 

tailored to fit specific operational environments with each combined arms 

team a basic building block for task organization. The FCS was designed 

to provide lethality and survivability equal to or greater than the Abrams/

Bradley team and weigh much less to facilitate deployability. The FCS 

would benefit from active protection systems and signature management. 

Armament varied with the particular variant. The maneuver combat system, for example, fulfilled a role akin to that of the tank and mounted 

a large caliber main gun. The reconnaissance vehicle carried a smaller 

weapon but more sensors to assist information acquisition. These manned 

platforms worked alongside unmanned air and ground vehicles and robotic 

devices. Through the network, each one could access precision fires delivered from aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or other FCS platforms. Non-line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight munitions provided 

further fire support to assist elimination of targets without revealing the 

firing or spotting element’s location.7

The FCS-equipped brigade combat team (BCT) was intended to operate over a 150 x 150 kilometer box, marking a significant expansion over 

current units. Moreover, the FCS organization would only require resupply every other day due to efficiencies gained through reliability improvements, commonality, and technology enhancements.8

 The improved 

capability and agility of the planned FCS brigade permitted economies 

in personnel strength. Initial plans for the unit indicated a manning level 

of less than 2,500 soldiers with the bulk of these assigned to 3 combined 

arms battalions. Each battalion and the brigade included a reconnaissance 

troop intended for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; but these 

troops numbered just 60 soldiers. Overall, the brigade constituted a much 

smaller and more dispersed organization than previous brigade designs, 
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but planners anticipated its ability to deliver much more destructive and 

precise firepower to select targets and achieve a faster rate of sustained 

maneuver.9

Building such an organization required a massive technology investment to realize the quantum leap in desired capability and permit fielding 

of the first FCS brigade in 2010. This commitment occurred in the early 

stages of General Shinseki’s tenure as Army Chief of Staff. Although the 

entire Transformation process built on the Force XXI effort of the 1990s, 

still further advances in technology and capabilities were sought beyond 

the establishment of digital combat formations. Transformation entailed 

an entire makeover of the Army and its related doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. On completion, the 

nation would possess a powerful instrument of policy, suited to the entire 

spectrum of military operations from stability and support to conventional, 

high-intensity warfare. Moreover, it would possess a rapid deployment 

and response capability that would obviate the lengthy preparation and 

deployment time so characteristic of 1990s contingency operations.10

Yet even at an accelerated pace, the Objective Force required time to 

develop. In the meantime, the Army still faced a dilemma. Its heavy forces, 

while powerful, required lengthy deployment times and remained optimally suited for operations in central Europe. Operation DESERT STORM 

demonstrated the adaptability of heavy forces to much different battlefield 

Figure 104. Preproduction Stryker infantry carrier vehicle.

Armor Branch Archives
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

environments, but their deployment time remained slow. Conversely, light 

forces proved capable of rapid deployment, but they lacked the lethality 

and survivability of the heavy forces, particularly when confronted by a 

large-scale, hostile armored threat. Pending the arrival of heavy forces, 

they remained at risk—a condition that characterized the status of the 82d 

Airborne Division during Operation DESERT SHIELD in 1990. General 

Shinseki desired a medium force that possessed a balance of light and 

heavy force capabilities. He wanted the rapid responsiveness of the former 

and some of the lethality and survivability of the latter.11 Until fielding of 

the Objective Force, the Interim Force would provide these capabilities.

At least since 1980 the Army had pursued such a goal. The High 

Technology Light Division, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), 

and the Strike Force initiative all reflected efforts to build a rapid deployment force with some combat capability, but each one became a victim 

to budgetary concerns and the difficulties of fielding enhanced technologies in a short period.12 Under General Shinseki’s leadership, the medium 

force concept quickly evolved from concept to reality. By the end of 2002, 

two Interim Brigade Combat Teams had been organized at Fort Lewis, 

Washington. A wheeled platform, loosely based on the LAV III, served 

as the basis for the design of a family of vehicles for the principal combat 

and combat support vehicles. Known as the Interim Armored Vehicle, in 

February this platform was formally designated the Stryker after medal of 

honor winners from World War II and Vietnam.13 Fielding began the same 

year and the brigades that received them became known as Stryker Brigade 

Combat Teams (SBCTs).14 The Army planned to convert six maneuver brigades, including one National Guard unit, into SBCTs.

In 2002, the Army participated in Millennium Challenge, one of several experiments associated with Army Transformation. It involved 13,500 

troops and 70,000 computer-generated forces. Set in 2007, Army, Air 

Force, Marine, and Naval personnel all participated in the simulated battles 

against a hypothetical enemy. The exercise utilized multiple engagement 

areas on land and sea across the country—many simulated on computers. It culminated in maneuvers at the National Training Center (NTC) in 

which the new Stryker vehicles participated. The overall scenario pitted 

a Blue Force, equipped with the latest digital communications and networks, against an opposing force (OPFOR) using unconventional tactics 

to offset the Blue Force’s technological superiority. Millennium Challenge 

served to test a variety of Transformation ideas in a climate not unlike that 

of the Middle East. It also permitted participants to experiment with new 

tactics, doctrine, and materiel in an operational setting.15
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Millennium Challenge underscored the military’s tilt toward jointness 

on and off the battlefield. Through the interaction of personnel from different service branches at multiple locations, it provided a taste of how 

the military expected to conduct future operations and use information 

superiority to achieve battlespace dominance. The growing reliance on 

improved situational awareness, net-centric operations, and the tactical 

internet were all staple elements of emerging Transformation doctrine and 

found expression during Millennium Challenge.16

The demands of Army Transformation for new capabilities fostered a 

continuous development process. As new technology became available, 

it was inserted into existing programs. Hence, technology upgrades to a 

platform or organization would occur in a continuous manner, without 

waiting for all requirements to be met before production and fielding. In 

this manner, new capabilities could be exploited by combat organizations 

in a more timely fashion. In the context of Transformation, this process—

known as “spiral development”—permitted the Army to pursue new technologies for the FCS and insert select capabilities into the Legacy and 

Interim Forces as they became available. These capabilities in turn became 

subject to subsequent upgrades through ongoing research and development. Inspired by the software industry, spiral development differed from 

previous military acquisition processes in that the result was not known in 

detail at the outset. Instead, spiral development provided the flexibility to 

pursue unanticipated advances in capabilities resulting from continuous 

concept/technology evolution.17

The fielding of the first SBCTs and the simultaneous development of the 

Objective Force impacted the Legacy Force. Modernization and upgrades 

to the latter received reduced priorities and in some critical cases were canceled outright. The Army’s focus lay on the future and a different type of 

combat environment than that for which the conventional Legacy Force had 

been designed. Funding reflected this emphasis. Although military leaders supported Legacy Force modernization, they proved unwilling to slow 

development of the Interim and Objective Force to do so. In 2002 alone, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) canceled 14 separate programs associated 

with the Legacy Force. This action marked a major setback for the Army’s 

current force capability, because programs affected included the M1A2 

System Enhancement Program (SEP), the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), 

and the Crusader artillery system. The last proved among the most contentious, with Army officials lobbying for the program only to be overruled 

by the Secretary of Defense. Collectively, these actions severely impacted 

production and modernization plans for the Legacy Force, although some 

programs were later restored, including the M1A2 SEP.18
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The challenges facing Transformation increased substantially after 

11 September 2001. On that day, terrorist attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon killed nearly 3,000 Americans and augured 

the start of a new era of increased security and uncertainty at home and 

abroad. In response, President George W. Bush authorized a direct invasion of Afghanistan, responsible under the Taliban regime for harboring 

the al-Qaeda terrorists who launched the 9/11 attacks. He also embarked 

on a variety of actions intended to thwart terrorism worldwide. The 

nation’s foreign policy shifted toward preemptive strikes against threatening forces. Given the brutality and potentially catastrophic effects of 

terrorism, particularly when combined with weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD), the Bush administration determined to strike first against known 

enemies likely to act against the interests of the United States.19

In October 2001, American forces began military activity in 

Afghanistan to overthrow the ruling Taliban regime, destroy the al-Qaeda 

terrorist cells in that country, and capture Osama Bin Laden—considered 

the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks. Subsequently, American forces 

were to assist the reconstruction and transition of Afghanistan to a democratic state. Designated Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, this action 

involved the projection of Marines and Soldiers, supported by the Air 

Force and Navy, to central Asia. Initially, much of the military action 

was borne by Special Forces operatives working with local anti-Taliban 

militias and American airpower.20 However, combat operations continued 

into 2002 and significant numbers of American ground forces deployed 

to Afghanistan. Taliban authority as a governing body soon collapsed, 

but terrorist cells and Taliban soldiers continued to fight, retreating into 

the mountainous region along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. The 

remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban forces resorted to roadside bombings, 

intermittent mortar barrages, and the attempted assassinations of key 

leaders.21 The end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan led to the creation of 

an interim government to preside over the nation’s efforts to rebuild and 

hold its first elections. US and NATO forces helped to provide security 

and humanitarian assistance.22

The nature of operations in Afghanistan seemed perfect for the SBCT. 

The qualities that made these units ideal as first responders to international 

crises also suited them to the type of stability and support operations now 

underway. Hence, the war on terror was used to justify an accelerated pace 

of development and fielding of these new units. Simultaneous work on the 

Objective Force offered the promise of incorporating related technologies 

and concepts directly into the SBCTs to make them among the most technologically sophisticated of the Army’s units.23
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Operations in Afghanistan, nevertheless, were not the only threats 

faced by America in its war on terror. Despite the continuation of combat 

activity in Afghanistan, tension with Iraq increased. The Bush administration believed Iraq and its dictator, Saddam Hussein, to be a principal instigator and supporter of terrorism to include the actions of al-Qaeda. Already 

suspected of violating UN resolutions and secretly building a stockpile of 

WMDs, its apparent link with terrorism made Iraq an especially dangerous 

threat. While American diplomats waged a campaign to convince NATO 

allies and the UN to take strong action against Iraq, DOD began preparations for possible military action, including the buildup of US forces in the 

Middle East.24 The likelihood of other, near-term commitments of forces 

encouraged greater attention to the needs of the Legacy Force, whose personnel and materiel would be utilized in any new deployments. Moreover, 

the increased tension with Iraq drew attention to conventional, heavy force 

readiness needs.

Stryker Brigade Combat Team

The design of the SBCT constituted one of the first major developments associated with Army Transformation. This unit embodied the 

essence of the Interim Force. It directly addressed problems encountered 

by the Army in the execution of contingency missions in the 1990s.25 The 

Army found its ability to respond to sudden crises overseas limited by 

its heavy/light force dichotomy. The heavy force provided combat power 

but required time to deploy and operated best in an environment with a 

developed infrastructure—a condition not always found in the lesser 

developed parts of the world most likely to experience political or economic upheaval. Light forces could deploy in a much shorter timeframe 

and proved less dependent on established road nets, high capacity ports, 

and large airports. This responsiveness came at the cost of combat power. 

The SBCT addressed this capability gap.26

The Army planned to field at least six such brigades.27 Design work 

began in 1999 under Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leadership. The brigades were intended primarily for contingency missions 

rather than major combat operations in a conventional war. The organizational challenge lay in balancing rapid responsiveness with an ability 

to defeat a variety of threats. Planners also needed to minimize personnel 

and logistical requirements while retaining a desirable level of lethality, 

survivability, and mobility: “The Brigade Combat Team must approach 

the deployability standards of a light force while arriving with the punch 

and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation.”28

The resultant organization received a unique mission: 
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The Brigade Combat Team is a full spectrum, combat 

force. It has utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environments against all projected 

future threats, but it is designed and optimized primarily for employment in small scale contingency operations 

(SSCO) in complex and urban terrain, confronting lowend and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. . . . The Brigade 

Combat Team deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, 

and conducts effective combat operations immediately on 

arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict 

through shaping and decisive operations.29

The organization of the medium brigade centered on three motorized 

combined arms infantry battalions. Each included three combined arms 

companies with three infantry and one mobile gun system (MGS) platoon 

plus a mortar section and sniper team. The MGS provided armored direct 

fire support for the infantry. Available battalion combat support included 

snipers, mortars, and fire support teams for observation and targeting. 

Other brigade assets included reconnaissance, artillery, antitank, engineer, 

signal, and military intelligence; while the brigade support battalion provided maintenance, logistics, and medical services.30

The principal qualities that defined the unit lay in its high tactical mobility and capacity for dismounted combat operations. Dismounted infantry 

operations constituted the principal form of combat and related activities. 

Figure 105. The basic components of the FBCB2.

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Light armored vehicles provided rapid tactical mobility. The nature of 

the combined arms infantry units facilitated operations in complex and 

urban terrain. The brigade and its component battalions were intended to 

operate as a concentrated mass or as a collection of dispersed elements 

linked together via a digital communications network that included higher 

headquarters. The antitank company provided a degree of protection from 

mechanized threats, but against a robust armored presence the brigade 

required augmentation.31

The SBCT reflected design parameters established by the Army leadership. These included reduced logistical and maintenance requirements 

with a parallel minimization of personnel that did not compromise combat 

ability. The entire unit had to be deployable via C-130 air transport to 

ensure ready access to operational theaters that might not possess large 

airstrips. The combined arms nature of the infantry battalions reflected a 

deliberate desire to create tactical elements organized as they would normally operate. The brigade did not include those functions that could be 

provided by another force or command. Instead, the brigade relied on its 

digital network to access nonorganic capabilities. This “reach-back” capability particularly applied to the delivery of fire support, intelligence, planning, sustainment, and force protection.32

Much of the planned effectiveness of the SBCT stemmed from its 

communications network. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 

Below (FBCB2) constituted a central component. It included a computer 

system complete with keyboard and screen mounted on individual vehicles together with related software. FBCB2 transmitted information via 

digital and FM radios, sharing situational awareness data and command 

messages throughout the brigade. It provided a common operational picture of the battle area to commanders, staffs, and units by automatically 

updating the location of all friendly, digital forces. It also depicted the 

most recently reported locations of enemy units. This information was 

graphically depicted on the screen. This image also provided key terrain 

information useful for maneuver and determining line of sight. For command purposes, FBCB2 provided standard message formats and enabled 

the transmission of graphics. These tools simplified the issuance of command guidance and planning documents, which could now be computer 

generated and disseminated without the time-intensive requirement to 

make and distribute paper copies. Moreover, it ensured that all recipients 

received identical guidance and imagery.33

The unit also interfaced with higher headquarters and external Army 

assets via the Army Battle Command System, a collection of digital 

communications devices each focused on a particular function. Through 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

the Army Battle Command System, the brigade could, for example, 

request air or fire support from other organizations or tap into intelligence 

data otherwise unavailable. Together with FBCB2, this system provided 

the means of sharing and acquiring information continuously to obtain the 

level of situational awareness necessary for a high operational tempo and 

rapid, effective decisionmaking.34

The digital communications architecture also enhanced the operation of the brigade’s reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

(RSTA) squadron. The mission of this unit lay in acquiring information to 

guide the brigade’s operations and in establishing situational understanding. Given the brigade’s orientation on contingency response, the squadron focused on an area of operations rather than a specific enemy force. 

It also sought a broader range of information including not only terrain 

and enemy forces but also political, cultural, and economic factors. To do 

so required an analytical capability found in the squadron headquarters, 

supplemented by brigade and external intelligence assets. The actual collection of information occurred preferably through stealth and direct interaction between squadron personnel and local inhabitants.35

To perform its mission, the RSTA squadron possessed a mix of sensors, radars, UAVs, manned platforms, and intelligence personnel. It 

constituted an unusually large organization for a BCT, which generally 

included only a single reconnaissance troop. The large size and special 

nature of the RSTA squadron reflected the importance attached to information acquisition and situational awareness. The squadron also fundamentally differed from other mounted reconnaissance units. Its principal 

components included a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), three 

reconnaissance troops, and one surveillance troop. Each reconnaissance 

troop comprised a headquarters, three platoons, and a mortar section. The 

platoons in turn possessed four reconnaissance vehicles, each carrying a 

two-man crew and a three-man dismount team that included a human intelligence (HUMINT) collector. The surveillance troop included a headquarters and one platoon each of UAVs; sensors; and nuclear, biological, and 

chemical (NBC) reconnaissance. The UAV platoon constituted the aerial 

component of the squadron and performed observation and surveillance 

missions, while the sensor platoon included ground surveillance radars 

and devices intended to intercept hostile transmissions and identify the 

direction of their origin. The NBC reconnaissance platoon provided early 

warning of contaminated areas and assisted the location of WMDs.36

The RSTA squadron constituted a unique reconnaissance unit, yet it 

also incorporated organizational trends stretching back to the Vietnam era. 

The RSTA squadron consolidated a broad range of information assets that 
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sometimes worked together but were distributed among different units and 

command echelons. This concentration created a powerful combination 

that further benefited from the enhanced digital communications available. The inclusion of dismount teams and counterintelligence personnel 

helped alleviate earlier platform manning problems, while boosting the 

ability to gather intelligence related to a civilian population. In terms of its 

ability to gather information, the RSTA squadron was unprecedented, but 

its headquarters elements possessed the staff necessary to both plan intelligence missions and analyze the data. This reduced the burden on brigade 

planners and facilitated the integration of reconnaissance operations into 

the overall brigade plan. At the brigade level, several organizations existed 

within the headquarters to assist in data collection and analysis.37

The RSTA squadron was not expected to fight for information. Instead, 

it employed its assets to gather information without being detected, using 

organic weapons primarily in self-defense. In sudden contact situations, 

RSTA elements relied on supporting fires to provide the necessary combat 

power to disengage. Hence, the squadron constituted a large organization 

optimized for information acquisition with only limited combat power. In 

low-threat environments, it could perform security missions, but generally security and economy of force activities lay outside its responsibility. 

Through information acquisition and situational awareness, the squadron 

provided advance warning and assisted the brigade commander to maneuver his infantry battalions. In this sense, the RSTA squadron marked a 

return to the type of pure reconnaissance organization that had not found 

favor in the past. An important difference, however, existed in the level 

of information assets available to the squadron coupled with the digital 

communications network. It remained to be seen whether these features 

would, in fact, enable the unit to realize its purpose in an actual combat 

environment.38

Plans for the medium brigade’s vehicle set called for the use of an 

existing platform. The Army gathered data on a variety of different vehicles. 

The Platform Performance Demonstration conducted at Fort Knox in 

December 1999–January 2000, for example, provided an opportunity 

to inspect potential vehicles and observe their operation in various field 

activities. After assessing potential vehicle candidates, the Army opted 

for a family of vehicles based on the wheeled LAV III for use in the 

medium brigades.39 This platform underwent substantial modification to 

accommodate specific functions, including reconnaissance, command, 

infantry transport, antitank, mortar support, NBC reconnaissance, medical 

evacuation, engineer operations, fire support, and direct fire support for 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

the infantry.40 Design work proceeded rapidly and the first vehicles were 

delivered to the Army in 2002.41

The Armor Center played a key role in the development of the SBCT. 

Despite its infantry nature, responsibility for developing the communications architecture, RSTA squadron, reconnaissance vehicle, command 

platform, and the direct fire support MGS all lay with the Armor Center. 

Major General B.B. Bell commanded at Fort Knox from 1999 to 2001 and 

made support for the medium brigades a primary branch focus.42

Platform development reflected the intended use of the brigade. Each 

vehicle carried sufficient armor to protect the crew and passengers from 

small arms fire and fragmentation, but add-on armor packages could be 

applied to provide increased levels of protection, especially against rocket 

propelled grenades (RPGs). The reconnaissance vehicle came equipped 

with a global positioning system (GPS), FBCB2, long-range advanced 

scout surveillance system (LRAS3), and a radio. Its equipment included 

either a grenade launcher or a machinegun for self-defense. Able to achieve 

speeds up to 60-miles per hour, its run-flat tires also offered the ability to 

escape dangerous environments with one or more flat tires before losing 

its mobility. Like the rest of the Stryker family, the reconnaissance vehicle 

was designed to fit into a C-130 aircraft for rapid deployment. Compared 

to previous reconnaissance platforms, the Stryker variant offered multiple improvements, specifically in the ability to navigate, communicate, 

and identify targets from a long distance. Its principal drawback lay in its 

large size, particularly in comparison with the high-mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), but it possessed better protection and the 

capacity to carry a larger dismount team.43

The decision to base the Stryker on the LAV III encountered fierce criticism from supporters of the M113. They considered the M113 a superior, 

proven vehicle. Already in the Army inventory, it did not seem to require 

the same level of design and development work to transform it into the 

desired family of vehicles for the medium brigade. This resistance manifested itself on Internet Web sites dedicated to highlighting flaws in the 

LAV III and in efforts to sway members of Congress and force a reconsideration of the Army’s decision. Part of this reaction stemmed from a preference for a tracked vehicle over the wheeled Stryker. Tracks were believed 

to offer better cross-country mobility and facilitate movement through rubble and other obstacles and were less vulnerable than wheels. Despite such 

opposition, the Army pushed forward with Stryker development. Congress 

did mandate a side-by-side comparative evaluation with the M113, but this 

event did not prove the alleged inferiority of the LAV III design.44
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Development and fielding of the first SBCT demonstrated the Army’s 

commitment to rapid implementation of a key Transformation goal. 

However, SBCT fielding generated fears among armor soldiers. The new 

brigades were created through the conversion of existing units, including 

tank battalions. The increased reconnaissance component of the SBCT generated a demand for additional cavalry soldiers. To fill this need, many tankers found themselves reclassified as scouts, fueling fears about the future of 

tank units and the related Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 19K.45

Light wheeled vehicles seemed poised to replace the combat power 

of the Abrams tank. Such a development proved particularly worrisome, 

since many nations possessed large quantities of Soviet-built tanks and 

mechanized vehicles that eclipsed the combat power of the Stryker.46

These concerns were sufficiently widespread for the Army leadership to 

mount an information campaign to explain the rationale behind the SBCT. 

They focused on the role of these brigades in providing an additional capability rather than replacing current ones. Specifically, they highlighted the 

continued importance of tank organizations and their need in the future. A 

related theme lay in stressing the orientation of the SBCTs on contingency 

operations rather than the conventional warfighting associated with heavy 

force elements.47 These efforts partially ameliorated concerns of armor 

soldiers, but they did not entirely remove concerns over the future of the 

branch’s heavy component.48

Figure 106. Officers confer during a training exercise at Fort Knox.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

The development of the SBCT stimulated study of the potential of 

combining several such brigades into a division. Analysis suggested that 

overall effectiveness of the SBCT increased if employed as part of a larger 

formation. Hence, a conceptual design for an interim division (IDIV) 

emerged between 2000 and 2002. Intended to operate as part of a corps or 

joint task force, this formation included additional assets, combat power, 

and an expanded RSTA element that increased the flexibility of each brigade 

and the ability to tailor each one to a particular tactical environment. In 

effect, the IDIV amplified the capabilities of subordinate SBCTs, boosting 

brigade capability while offering a greater range of options in the conduct 

of operations throughout the division sector. However, fielding such a 

formation raised questions of manning, funding, and equipping not readily 

resolved. The IDIV, therefore, never progressed beyond a notional state.49

Transforming the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment

Army Transformation and the establishment of SBCTs created an 

opportunity to modernize the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. After previous plans to upgrade this HMMWV-based organization into one built 

around an Armored Gun System (AGS)/M113A3 mix failed, the regiment 

remained a light unit with limited capabilities. It could perform reconnaissance and limited security, but it required augmentation to operate 

against most conventional force threats. It could not perform the standard 

armored cavalry regiment functions of guard, cover, and economy of force 

operations with its organic assets. It possessed only minimal lethality, 

encountered difficulties operating in complex terrain, included no armored 

platform for direct fire support, and could not ensure 24-hour information 

acquisition in all weather and visibility conditions. However, it did incorporate all the deficiencies associated with the HMMWV.50

The Army’s decision to create several medium brigades and build the 

related equipment set offered the chance to upgrade the 2d Cavalry using 

the Stryker family of vehicles. TRADOC Commander General John N. 

Abrams directed the Armor Center to develop a modernization strategy 

and an organizational and operational concept for the regiment. This effort 

utilized the expertise of other Army centers and schools in addition to the 

collective wisdom of retired senior armor officers. The latter served as 

mentors to the process, while several Blue Ribbon Panels provided forums 

for all participating organizations to meet, exchange ideas, and generate 

the necessary modernization plans and employment concepts.51

Basic design parameters for the restructured regiment included an 

emphasis on combined arms operations, air deployability, and the ability 

to perform all missions associated with corps cavalry organizations. The 
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regiment was to include “only those organic capabilities that are always 

needed and cannot be reasonably provided through force tailoring from 

corps or Army assets.” In short, its design would occur under size and 

manning restraints. Similarly, it would make use of equipment either 

already in or soon expected to be in the Army inventory.52

The first step lay in resolving identified deficiencies. This work provided the foundation for a more capable organization in line with the 

Objective Force, thereby ensuring cavalry’s role in the future. The Armor 

Center played a central role in this work, and its commander, Major General 

Bell, directed the work of the Blue Ribbon Panels and related analysis: 

Initially, my intent is to produce an O&O that articulates 

the use of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment as XVIII 

Airborne Corps’ cavalry regiment, capable of conducting 

all traditional cavalry missions. This O&O will allow 

the 2ACR to become a strategically deployable, 

multi-dimensional, and lethal warfighting force that 

is sustainable; highly deployable; has a ‘friendly’ 

MANPRINT which needs no new equipment or MOS’s; 

survivable through its dispersion; tactically mobile; and 

possesses a co-efficient of lethality to accomplish security 

missions. We will roll these characteristics into a force 

effectiveness model, bringing about the interim cavalry 

regiment, which will be the harbinger of the objective 

force cavalry regiment. This objective force allows for 

the reconnaissance, surveillance, and security capabilities 

for a Corps.53

Several challenges faced the redesign effort. Like the SBCTs, the 2d 

Armored Cavalry was expected to operate in complex and urban terrain. 

Underdeveloped infrastructure in prospective operational environments 

required a unit able to sustain itself and function without dependence 

on comprehensive road nets or modern airfields. Threat forces included 

conventional, paramilitary, terrorist, and other irregular organizations. 

They were likely to employ a variety of tactics and technologies to offset 

American superiority, including attacks on command and control nodes, 

logistics support, and the denial of access to the region.54

Given the failure of previous modernization efforts, the Armor Center 

commander deliberately sought the support and involvement of multiple 

organizations within TRADOC and Forces Command (FORSCOM). 

Doing so helped to build a consensus of support to simplify manning and 

funding decisions while ensuring the project’s viability. Hence, the views 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

of the commanders of FORSCOM, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 2d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) became central in shaping how the 

organizational and operational concept evolved.55

The late summer and fall of 2000 witnessed considerable energy toward 

developing a structure for the 2d Cavalry. The first two Blue Ribbon Panels 

convened to begin developing possible organizations, while simulation and 

modeling work provided data suggesting the capabilities of each one. The 

focus of this virtual analysis lay in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, both 

areas that had seen the deployment of American forces and would likely 

do so again. Potential organizations were evaluated for their ability to perform the full range of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force roles 

typically associated with an armored cavalry regiment, although no intent 

existed to duplicate the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.56

Simulations and modeling focused on three organizational designs: the 

existing 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment structure and two more based on 

Stryker platforms. The latter differed primarily in the composition of their 

ground squadrons, which contained either embedded MGSs and an attached 

ATGM company or the reverse. The MGS was the direct fire version of 

the Stryker and mounted a fully stabilized 105-mm gun. Unsurprisingly, 

computer gaming found the capabilities of the Stryker-equipped configurations significantly superior to the existing organization. The existing 2d 

Cavalry lacked both the standoff surveillance of the LRAS3 and the ability to acquire targets while moving at night. Consequently, the unit found 

itself forced to react to hostile threats, often entering the effective directfire range of the latter. The HMMWV platforms proved susceptible to 

most weapons, including small arms, and the unit had to commit substantial air and ground cavalry assets to destroy even small enemy incursions. 

Indeed, the unit’s OH-58D helicopters served as one of its principal combat platforms to the detriment of their intended reconnaissance role. The 

Stryker-equipped organizations possessed more combat power, benefited 

from UAV tracking of targets, leveraged the MGS ability to engage targets 

while moving day or night, and proved much more survivable. Detection 

ranges proved twice those of the existing organization.57

Nevertheless, the Stryker configurations were not perfect. While the 

MGS received considerable accolades for its ability to acquire and engage 

targets on the move, this capability needed to be more widespread. The 

Stryker seemed to need better protection and the unit needed the ability 

to destroy hostile reconnaissance. Scouts needed the means to eliminate 

a broad range of targets, leading to discussions regarding the viability of 

mounting a 25-mm weapon on the reconnaissance vehicle. Such a solution 
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Chapter 8

contradicted efforts to control funding and the acquisition of new materiel. 

It simply was unrealistic. The Stryker units also possessed no long-range 

antitank system other than the ATGM platforms, and the squadron headquarters troop included no indirect fire capability or sensors.58

By November 2000, force designers found themselves confronted with 

another challenge. At the start of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment modernization process, the goal lay largely in improving the capabilities of the 

current unit. However, this purpose became superseded by Major General 

Bell’s growing emphasis on using the modernization process to build the 

foundation for an Objective Force cavalry regiment. Rather than evolve 

the current regiment through an interim design, it would transition to an 

organization much closer in concept and equipment to the Objective rather 

than the Legacy Force. In effect, force designers were attempting to craft 

the interim and final organization simultaneously. They attempted to look 

10 to 20 years into the future and build a mounted unit appropriate for an 

operational environment whose threats and nature could only be guessed. 

This shift paralleled a desire to ensure a future for cavalry organizations 

by aligning them with the high-profile and future-oriented Objective Force 

that constituted the ultimate goal of Army Transformation.59

In the process, the 2d Armored Cavalry transformation plans ensured 

satisfaction of XVIII Airborne Corps needs. Satisfying that formation’s 

commander also ensured his support in the ongoing struggle to secure 

resources and authorization to implement the new configuration. These 

included the ability to perform traditional reconnaissance, security, and 

economy of force actions. Through reliance on a large number of MGS 

platforms, the proposed unit improved survivability and lethality. Given 

the nonlinear nature of the anticipated battlefield, the regiment’s capacity 

for dispersed operations and self-sustainment made sense. The value of 

these capabilities directly depended on their immediate availability via air 

deployment.60

The emerging design for the 2d Armored Cavalry required a related 

effort to ensure Congressional support. Much of this action entailed highlighting the purpose of the regiment in clear terms. The design work to 

date suffered from a malady that plagued many Army Transformation 

projects—“too many buzzwords, that it is confusing gibberish. Language 

needs to be simple and understandable to the non-military layman. 

Couldn’t sell this on the Hill with this kind of language.” The regiment’s 

unique reconnaissance capabilities needed to be highlighted to show a 

requirement for this type of organization and how the proposed organization fulfilled this need, in turn encouraging field commanders, particularly 

the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, to press for the fielding of this unit. 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

It also required underscoring the differences between the SBCTs and the 

redesigned 2d Armored Cavalry.61

By January 2001, the redesign effort had garnered support from the 

Army Chief of Staff, the TRADOC commander, and numerous field 

commanders. However, questions remained among other members of the 

senior leadership. Their concerns centered on funding, the need for the 

cavalry regiment, and whether or not the SBCT could perform its mission. 

The Armor Center design team undertook an effort to explain the rationale 

for the inclusion of cavalry organizations in the Objective Force, justify 

reliance on dismounted scouts rather than sensors, and assess SBCT 

performance of the intended mission set for the reconfigured 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment. At issue was not simply the fate of the 2d Armored 

Cavalry, but the entire concept of cavalry.62

Consequently, work on the regiment focused on reducing its strength, 

justifying its utility, and generating the most effective organization within 

a personnel cap. It still utilized an SBCT equipment set, but the mix of 

Stryker platforms varied to reflect the cavalry nature of the 2d Armored 

Cavalry. In particular, the number of MGS platforms proved significantly 

higher than that planned for the SBCT. In the proposed cavalry organization, the MGS performed a role broader than that of direct fire support 

for infantry. It constituted the principal mobile, offensive capability of the 

cavalry regiment, enhancing its ability to fight for information, perform 

security missions, and engage hostile armor if necessary.63

Figure 107. Two M3 cavalry fighting vehicles conducting live fire exercise.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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During January–February 2001, the TRADOC Analysis Center 

(TRAC) conducted a focused simulation intended to test the relative effectiveness of the current 2d Armored Cavalry, the Armor Center’s emerging design for the regiment, and an SBCT. Related analysis examined 

the optimal size of MGS platoons. The computer simulations evaluated 

these organizations in the performance of zone reconnaissance and moving flank guard missions. Data analysis found the proposed 2d Armored 

Cavalry organization to perform zone reconnaissance faster than the 

SBCT, provide coverage over a broader area, and eliminate the greatest 

number of threat reconnaissance forces. Against hostile armor, the modernized cavalry regiment proved capable of defeating the threat the fastest 

and with the least risk to itself. Generally, the computer study supported 

the value of the emerging cavalry design over the SBCT and existing 2d 

Armored Cavalry. Results also emphasized the value of the MGS platoon, 

encouraging reliance on a regiment design with far more of these platforms than the 27 intended for the SBCT.64

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the start of military 

operations in Afghanistan, new questions arose concerning the nature of 

the recommended cavalry regiment organization. General Montgomery C. 

Meigs, commanding Army forces in Europe, preferred a mounted unit oriented toward reconnaissance rather than traditional cavalry operations. In 

his view, operations in Afghanistan better suited a RSTA-type unit rather 

than the large force now proposed for the 2d Armored Cavalry. He questioned its deployability and believed the Stryker too large to serve as an 

effective reconnaissance platform. To address the latter issue necessitated 

the design and development of a new vehicle to be fielded to a single unit. 

Given the failure of the AGS once intended for two or three organizations, 

this approach was not likely to succeed.65

The Armor Center continued to advocate a more robust cavalry organization. By October 2002, the proposed structure for the 2d Armored 

Cavalry included a HHT, three ground cavalry squadrons, one aviation 

squadron, and a support squadron. Its strength totaled 4,077 soldiers, 334 

Stryker vehicles, and 41 helicopters. It retained the traditional characteristics associated with cavalry units of robust command and communications, ability to accommodate a variety of attached forces, organizational 

flexibility, and combined arms nature. Artillery support was decentralized 

under squadron control, while UAVs and advanced sensors and ground 

surveillance radars enhanced its ability to monitor the battlefield. The 

ground squadrons included four troops, each one configured in the more 

familiar 2x2 arrangement with two Stryker reconnaissance platoons, two 

MGS platoons, a fire support platoon, and a headquarters element. The 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

MGS overwatched the reconnaissance platoons and helped to ensure 

scout survivability and sustain operational tempo. The aviation component included a mix of attack, observation, and utility helicopters, alleviating the current light armored cavalry regiments forced dependence on the 

OH‐58D for both combat and reconnaissance.66

However, the large number of MGS platforms increased the cost associated with fielding. Indeed, the price tag for the unit surpassed that of the 

SBCT by nearly $260 million. Funding for the proposed regiment had to 

compete with a variety of other high-priority demands facing the Army, 

including the growing cost associated with the Objective Force. While the 

cavalry organization offered a powerful capability, it also constituted an 

unfunded requirement for which no easy method of paying for it existed. 

Hence, in February 2003, TRADOC Commander General Kevin P. Byrnes, 

who replaced General Abrams, requested the Armor Center validate the 

need for the high number of MGS platforms.67

The Armor Center completed this analysis by August, confirming 

the need for 96 MGSs. General Byrnes disagreed with this finding and 

directed a redesign of the cavalry regiment with only 48 MGSs.68 This 

new action resulted in changes to the organizational and operational 

concept. No longer could one MGS platoon provide overwatch for one 

reconnaissance platoon. Instead, each ground cavalry troop shrank in 

size through the elimination of one MGS platoon. The surviving platoon 

became responsible for supporting two reconnaissance platoons. Despite 

these changes, the proposed cavalry regiment still constituted a significant 

increase in capability over the existing 2d Armored Cavalry. Each reconnaissance platoon included larger dismount teams transported in armored 

vehicles. The inclusion of LRAS3, UAVs, and sensors greatly enhanced 

the ability to observe hostile activity at greater ranges, while the digital 

communications network improved the ability to access close air and fire 

support. Moreover, the effectiveness of the latter improved through integration of the artillery and aircraft observers on the same platform to boost 

coordination.69

By February 2004, most issues facing approval of the proposed cavalry regiment had been resolved, and the Army Chief of Staff approved the 

organization. Planning immediately began on related production and fielding, and the Armor Center’s involvement ended. Although several issues 

surrounded MGS development, the Army leadership resolved to proceed 

with fielding the new cavalry organization regardless of the outcome.70

These decisions seemingly ended the saga of 2d Armored Cavalry 

modernization and the Army’s efforts to field an effective light cavalry 
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regiment. Yet, just 3 months after committing to fielding such a force, 

the senior Army leadership reversed itself and canceled the entire action. 

Instead, the 2d Armored Cavalry would transition into an SBCT, retaining 

its cavalry orientation in name only. According to the press release of the 

decision,

The conversion of the 2d ACR to an infantry-centric SBCT 

supports the Army’s transition to modularity, standardizes 

the design for all six planned SBCTs, and increases the 

number of Army infantry formations available to combatant commanders worldwide to set the tempo of battle and 

act decisively against enemy forces.71

This rationale called into question the need for any cavalry organization 

at all.

ISR Operations and the New Contact Paradigm

Between 1999 and 2002, the SBCT and its RSTA squadron dominated 

mounted reconnaissance doctrinal development. This work benefited from 

the confluence of Force XXI developments, Army Transformation, and 

new information technologies. The resultant reconnaissance concepts 

marked a significant shift in the manner of battlefield information collection and use. These ideas soon began to permeate all reconnaissance 

organizations.

Force XXI experimentation with digital technologies and communications devices led to greater emphasis on situational awareness, understanding, and the development of a common operation picture. Situational 

awareness entailed a basic sense of the disposition of friendly and hostile 

forces. A digital communications network supported by satellite feeds and 

GPS input that automatically tracked and updated friendly forces locations 

in real time directly supported it. The most current information on threat 

positions was similarly tracked. Automatically shared among friendly 

forces, this information gave the commander and subordinate leaders of 

a combat organization an identical view of the battle area. This common 

operational picture facilitated rapid planning and maneuver by all combat, 

support, and service elements. It simplified coordination of dispersed units 

toward common objectives. 

Still, knowledge of friendly and enemy force dispositions alone did 

not equate to comprehension of enemy intentions. Such situational understanding required an analytical effort that encompassed background information on hostile doctrine, weapons, and past operations, coupled with 

all significant data collected from the battle area by friendly assets. This 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

analysis clarified the tactical situation and enabled a much higher degree 

of precision in the maneuver of friendly forces. 

Situational understanding stemmed directly from the actions of a 

commander’s staff responsible for reviewing information gathered from 

the battlefield, analyzing it, and providing an intelligence assessment. 

Traditionally, this staff process occurred separately from the actual acquisition of information on the battlefield. However, doctrinal guidance for the 

SBCT merged the actions into a single set of intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) operations that integrated the information collection 

function of the RSTA squadron and the intelligence generation function 

of the brigade’s military intelligence company. In essence, “Where reconnaissance and surveillance answered the ‘what,’ ‘where,’ and ‘when’ on 

the battlefield, ISR has the additional requirement of answering ‘why.’”72

ISR operations were continuous in nature, and they both shaped 

and were influenced by information collection efforts. Not only did they 

help to influence the commander’s understanding of the battlefield, they 

also served to direct information acquisition toward those areas or items 

considered vital to decisions governing the maneuver of friendly forces. 

The ISR process promoted a more effective linkage between reconnaissance 

and surveillance activities and the planning efforts of commanders and 

their staffs throughout an operation. The rapidity of information sharing 

associated with the SBCT’s digital communications network further 

Figure 108. The mounted urban training site built at Fort Knox to support 

the training of heavy forces in built-up areas.

Armor Branch Archives
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enhanced the integrating nature of ISR operations. It ensured the timely 

and continuous influx of information from the battlefield and similarly 

speedy issuance of guidance to reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

The fusion of information collection and intelligence generation was 

encouraged by the number and variety of information gathering systems 

within the SBCT. The RSTA squadron included scouts, LRAS3, ground 

surveillance radars, and signal detection devices. The HMMWV-mounted 

AN/MLQ-40 Prophet detected signal emissions, intercepted them, and 

provided direction finding to the signal source. The improved remotely 

monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) detected seismic, acoustic, magnetic, and infrared signatures. Radars within the artillery battalion 

enhanced counterfire capability through the detection of hostile mortar, 

artillery, and rocket fire. Additional reconnaissance assets included the 

engineer company and the NBC reconnaissance platoon of the RSTA 

squadron’s surveillance troop. The brigade or a higher headquarters might 

also provide Guardrail and Quickfix support. The former provided rapid 

signal recognition, direction finding, and targeting information from an 

aerial platform. Quickfix enabled direction finding and jamming from a 

helicopter. Further information on the battle area could also be accessed 

via civil affairs channels, satellite tracking, and more conventional aerial 

reconnaissance.73

Collectively, these systems proved more reliable, robust, and capable 

than similar previous devices. Used together in a coordinated manner, they 

offered the SBCT commander an effective means of monitoring developments within his area of operations. Indeed, the powerful combination of 

scouts, sensors, radars, platforms, and high-powered optics made possible a 

change in the way reconnaissance elements gained contact with the enemy. 

Traditionally, scouts advanced until they encountered a hostile presence. 

For the SBCT, initial contact was sought through sensors or radars beyond 

direct fire engagement range. Further development of the situation also 

occurred via other sensors without endangering the scouts. The information gathered while the enemy remained out of physical contact permitted 

the commander to determine how best to maneuver his forces. He sought to 

engage the hostile force at a time, place, and manner of his choosing. Under 

this new contact paradigm, reconnaissance and surveillance elements permitted early warning of the threat and provided continuous information to 

the commander without detection and at reduced risk. Scouts employed the 

devices at their disposal to collect information via stealth.74

This approach suited the high-tech nature of the SBCT in general 

and the RSTA squadron in particular. It offered a solution to the problem 

of HMMWV scouts blundering into hostile forces without the ability to 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

either attack a weak enemy or disengage from a more powerful one. The 

integrated and coordinated use of all reconnaissance and surveillance 

assets provided a high degree of situational awareness to reduce the chance 

of an unexpected encounter. However, even in such a case, the armored 

Stryker reconnaissance vehicle offered a much better chance of survival 

and escape than the HMMWV.

The reconnaissance platoons of the RSTA squadron also employed 

a vehicle crew and an organic three-man dismount team. This arrangement eliminated the problem faced by past reconnaissance units of insufficient manpower to both conduct dismounted operations and properly 

man their vehicles. Indeed, their platforms could operate independently.75

Dismounted teams were intended especially for urban areas. They mapped 

enemy positions, identified key structures for seizure by brigade combat 

elements, and observed tactical developments via stealth. They played a 

central role in collecting information on the social, political, and economic 

environment, relying on their organic HUMINT collector to interact with 

friendly civilians and police.76

The urban orientation of the reconnaissance scout teams stemmed from 

the SBCT’s optimization for small-scale contingency operations. These 

would necessarily entail action in population centers, particularly given 

global urbanization trends. The emphasis given to collecting information 

on the people reflected the experience of the 1990s in which major deployments necessitated operations among a civilian population. Understanding 

that population proved central to the achievement of key objectives and 

helped to prevent incidents that would alienate it. RSTA squadron doctrine 

stressed the importance of multidimensional reconnaissance, or reconnaissance focused on a broad array of social factors in addition to the more 

conventional emphasis on the enemy and terrain.77

The new contact paradigm placed a premium on information collection and made combat superfluous for the reconnaissance platoon scouts. 

Indeed, engaging the enemy other than in self-defense meant the neglect of 

the scout’s primary mission. Hence, the RSTA squadron was not designed 

or intended to fight for information in the same manner as cavalry. It was 

not a cavalry organization, and its mission set did not entail the execution 

of those security and economy of force functions long associated with 

the mounted arm.78 It constituted a major shift in mounted reconnaissance 

thinking, making full use of the digital communications networks and 

information technology pioneered under Force XXI.

RSTA squadron employment concepts also built on a longstanding 

belief that the purpose of reconnaissance lay primarily in information 
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acquisition. Such a view could be traced back to the horse cavalry, but it 

certainly found expression in the transition to HMMWV-equipped scout 

platoons with minimal combat power. The RSTA squadron’s array of 

sensors, radars, UAVs, armored platforms, and LRAS3-equipped scouts 

working under the rubric of ISR operations, offered a resolution to many 

of the problems that plagued reconnaissance units in the 1980s and 1990s 

while demonstrating how to boost the ability to collect information.

Not surprisingly, the doctrinal concepts developed for the RSTA squadron began to influence other mounted reconnaissance organizations. This 

migration occurred through briefings, training guidance, and in the publication of new doctrinal manuals. In 2002, the publication of FM 3‐20.971, 

Reconnaissance Troop: Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop,

marked the formal incorporation of the new contact paradigm into doctrine. This manual provided overdue guidance for the operation of the brigade reconnaissance troop in addition to the reconnaissance troop of the 

SBCT RSTA squadron. Like previous reconnaissance manuals produced 

by the Armor Center, it highlighted the scout’s value and ability to operate in all weather and mixed terrain and maintain 24-hour operations. He 

continued to be “the eyes and ears of the maneuver commander and provide the necessary information to allow him to make timely and accurate 

decisions.”79

Both types of reconnaissance troops supported the attainment of situational understanding through application of the new contact paradigm and 

exploitation of the capabilities of UAVs, radars, satellite tracking systems, 

and sensors. They were expected to perform multidimensional reconnaissance, satisfy critical information requirements, support targeting of threat 

troops, and generally build and maintain a clear picture of the battlefield 

for their parent brigade.80

The principal missions of both troop types included route, zone, and 

area reconnaissance together with area and convoy security. Other missions necessitated substantial augmentation. Against other than a weak 

threat, the manual considered both troop types capable of only zone and 

area reconnaissance with their organic assets and combat power. Both 

lacked medical and maintenance support, possessed minimal survivability 

in the face of a mechanized threat, and carried weapons of limited lethality. 

Unlike cavalry organizations, “rarely will the troop fight for information. 

The troop primarily conducts reconnaissance, using surveillance, technical means, and human interaction to gain information.” Reconnaissance 

coverage varied with the threat encountered. Against minimal opposition, 

route reconnaissance could be conducted at the rate of one per platoon. 
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Against heavier resistance, this number fell to just one for the entire troop. 

In the conduct of screen and surveillance missions, each troop could continuously monitor up to six battalion-size avenues of approach and maintain six observation posts (OPs) for long periods.81

Neither troop type possessed the means to sustain or survive protracted engagements. Therefore, the manual stressed the importance of 

undetected operations. To minimize the chance of a sudden, unexpected 

encounter with hostile forces, troop elements were to exploit the common 

operational picture shared via FBCB2 and the input of other ISR assets to 

avoid such potentialities. Premission threat and terrain analysis using data 

from multiple sources within the command chain provided opportunities 

to plan movements to maximize cover and concealment. The same data 

feeds facilitated stealthy movement and infiltration.82

Should contact with the enemy occur, the reconnaissance element 

was expected to develop the situation report, formulate a course of action, 

and act. This basic response remained unchanged in principal from earlier guidance, but the manual expected greater reliance on sensors, radars, 

UAVS, and indirect fires in lieu of direct fire engagements. To the extent 

possible, the reconnaissance element was expected to avoid or disengage 

from physical combat, possibly using extensive lateral and/or dismounted 

movement.83

The importance of building and sustaining situational awareness found 

expression in the introduction of battle handover. This term referred to the 

Figure 109. Vehicle road march during the Platform Performance 

Demonstration at Fort Knox in 1999–2000.

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transfer of responsibility between units for the observation or surveillance 

of a particular area or target. Battle handover proved critical to the avoidance of gaps in the coverage of the battle area, and it required a degree of 

coordination to determine not only which units were involved but also the 

type of sensor, radar, or aerial platform concerned.84 Done wrong, it provided hostile forces an opportunity to operate unobserved with potentially 

catastrophic results. The nonlinear nature of the expected battlefield and 

nature of the contact paradigm made uninterrupted reconnaissance and 

surveillance critical. The NTC had already witnessed too many incidents 

in which attacking forces compelled scouts to retire without other assets 

able to assume their observation role.85

Security coverage emphasized screen, area, and convoy-related 

operations. In screening operations, the reconnaissance troop monitored 

developments to the flanks and rear of its parent organization to prevent 

enemy surprise action. In these operations, the limited combat power of 

the reconnaissance elements restricted their action to detection and tracking of hostile forces. Although they were expected to utilize indirect fires 

to impeded intruding elements, the destruction of the latter was left to 

designated combat elements. The manual clearly expected the relation 

of the reconnaissance and combat assets so employed to function in a 

hunter-killer relationship. Area and convoy security guidance relied on the 

proven principles established during the Vietnam War, updated to reflect 

new technologies. Area security entailed the creation of platoon perimeters integrated with sensors and attached combat elements, while convoy 

operations anticipated the use of UAVs for aerial reconnaissance.86

The reconnaissance troop manual provided overdue guidance for 

brigade reconnaissance troop and RSTA squadron reconnaissance troop 

personnel. Training activities for the latter had commenced in 2001 and 

with the first SBCT nearing operational status, the need for clear doctrinal guidance became critical. A parallel manual published at the same 

time addressed reconnaissance platoons. In FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance 

Platoon, an effort was made to consolidate all reconnaissance and scout 

platoon manuals into one.87 The complexity of this task lay in the existence of four different organizations not including those in the light cavalry units: the reconnaissance platoon of the RSTA squadron, the cavalry 

platoon, the six-HMMWV platoon of the division’s battalion scouts and 

brigade reconnaissance troop, and the traditional 10-HMMWV platoon. 

The applicability of basic reconnaissance fundamentals to all platoons 

provided the justification for the consolidation.88

The final product numbered over 800 full-size pages that underscored its 

complexity in relation to prior platoon manuals. Although comprehensive 
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in scope, it lacked the training-oriented nature of earlier publications. No 

doubt this reflected the challenge facing the writers who sought not only 

to merge existing manuals but also to address digital communications, 

ISR operations, and the new contact paradigm. The manual also included 

chapters dedicated to stability and support, urban, and dismounted 

operations. Another section addressed “Essential Field Data,” a grab bag of 

detailed information related to the assessment of terrain and infrastructure 

capability.89

Overall, however, the new platoon manual reflected those concepts 

associated with the RSTA squadron. Platoon guidance mirrored or closely 

resembled that issued for the reconnaissance troop. The primary platoon 

missions addressed in detail included route, area, and zone reconnaissance, while security coverage focused on screen, area, and convoy security. The platoon manual addressed battle handover, infiltration, and urban 

operations. It reiterated the importance of avoiding decisive engagement, 

because “It is critical that scouts never lose sight of their reconnaissance 

priorities and become involved in battles that invariably wear down reconnaissance forces.”90 This lesson learned from the earliest rotations at the 

NTC now found full expression in a manual nearly devoid of any discussion of direct fire engagements. While such action was not expressly 

forbidden, the overall emphasis of the manual lay on reconnaissance by 

stealth and sensor. On contact with hostile forces, the platoon developed 

the situation through the use of undetected dismounted scouts, stealth, 

attached ground surveillance radar, and supporting UAVs. Direct fire 

might be utilized to suppress the enemy or in self-defense, but it did not 

constitute the preferred option. Similarly, reconnaissance by fire coverage 

referred only to indirect fire use.91

The manual made few references or even acknowledgment of the fargreater combat capability of the cavalry platoon. The same principles of 

stealth and combat avoidance applied, despite the broader range of missions expected of cavalry organizations in general. The writers noted the 

existence of two types of reconnaissance units—those optimized for passive surveillance, HUMINT, and technical means of gaining information 

and those capable of fighting for information. The manual’s orientation lay 

on the former, which included the scouts of the RSTA squadron, the brigade reconnaissance troop, and the battalion scout platoon. The concepts 

developed for these units were superimposed on all platoons, including the 

more capable M3-equipped cavalry units.92

The reconnaissance platoon manual marked one of the first to clearly 

address FBCB2 use and the related tactical internet. It also devoted 

considerable attention to ISR operations and their planning. This emphasis 
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reflected the nature of ISR in which reconnaissance and surveillance 

operations had to be integrated with intelligence generation at the lowest 

tactical level. It marked a response to repeated problems noted at the 

combat training centers. ISR effectiveness depended on the close linkage 

of the scout platoon’s actions and the ongoing efforts to build situational 

awareness and understanding at every command echelon.93

Publication of the reconnaissance platoon manual was preceded by 

the issuance at Fort Knox of a special training text summarizing its basic 

principles.94 These employment concepts also began to circulate via briefings and inclusion in Armor School training curriculums. At the brigade 

level, the publication of FM 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team,

addressed changes in heavy brigades, including digitization. An entire 

chapter focused on ISR concepts and their application to help commanders 

and staffs leverage information assets to better understand the battlefield 

and maneuver with greater precision.95

A new gunnery manual for cavalry and reconnaissance units emerged 

at the same time. It, too, consolidated prior separate coverage into a single 

manual. Despite the deemphasis on combat operations by reconnaissance 

organizations, the gunnery manual expanded the range of potential targets 

and engagement types for all mounted reconnaissance units. Reflective 

of the broadening nature of potential battlefield threats, gunnery training 

shifted from single to multitarget engagements. Snipers, bunkers, urban 

areas, and a civilian presence were also introduced together with digital 

reporting of gunnery results. For the Stryker reconnaissance vehicle, the 

crew and dismount teams pursued separate qualification standards, including a Javelin engagement for the latter.96

Reaction to the new contact paradigm, ISR operations, and the related 

concepts for employing reconnaissance troops and platoons proved 

mixed. For some, the emerging reconnaissance ideas did not appear new, 

but rather a rediscovery of much older principles driven by combat training center experiences in which training units lacking sufficient time for 

proper reconnaissance simply blundered into contact. Reserve Component 

personnel faced a more pressing challenge: how to implement ISR concepts without the necessary communications equipment, sensors, radars, 

and UAVs.97

Skeptics found little wisdom in the fielding of tactical reconnaissance 

organizations that did not fight. They feared what might occur if such a 

unit were forced into combat. Others wondered what its survivability in 

an urban environment might be, particularly in light of Russia’s disastrous 1994–95 experience in the streets of Grozny. Training challenges 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

also loomed, given the increased emphasis on and requirements for dismounted operations. For scouts already burdened with a long list of skills 

to master, new requirements for urban dismounted skills more often associated with infantry posed a serious challenge.98

At the combat training centers, efforts to plan and execute successful 

ISR operations similarly proved difficult. Too often ISR actions did not 

benefit from an integrated staff effort and responsibility for their coordination rested on junior officers with little experience. Scouts found 

themselves receiving guidance that lacked clarity or emphasis on specific 

objectives. Worse, their actions were not always incorporated into the 

overall planning effort of their parent unit, thereby reducing their ability to 

influence command decisions. The presence of aerial platforms, sensors, 

radars, and satellites generated a degree of reconnaissance and surveillance 

clutter that required careful and continuous command oversight to avoid 

confusion. Such monitoring became noticeable by its absence. Generally, 

units struggled to plan and execute effective ISR operations, encountering 

difficulties similar to those experienced by units striving to apply earlier 

reconnaissance doctrine.99

Cavalry at the Crossroads—Again

The start of the 21st century found cavalry organizations facing an 

uncertain future. The emerging RSTA concepts with their decoupling of 

the traditional linkage between reconnaissance and security left heavy 

cavalry organizations in an anomalous position. With their combined arms 

nature and combat power, they constituted powerful organizations capable 

of influencing any area of operations, including those associated with 

Figure 110. Downtown Grozny, which became the scene of bitter and 

bloody street fighting between Russians and Chechens in 1994–95.

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the stability and support operations for which the SBCT was optimized 

to execute. However, heavy cavalry was left behind in the scramble to 

generate light, stealthy reconnaissance elements dependent on an array of 

technical devices.

The principal manual governing the operation of the armored cavalry 

regiment and the heavy division cavalry squadron remained FM 17-95, 

Cavalry Operations, published in 1996.100 It did not reflect the proliferation of digital systems, the impact of ISR operations, or related changes in 

materiel since then. Moreover, discrepancies existed between the manual, 

which outlined the basic principles of employment, and related training 

publications that governed unit readiness. Similar problems afflicted the 

value of FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop.

101

Cavalry organizations continued to suffer from an insufficient dismounted capability. At full strength, the M3s of each platoon carried a 

two-man scout team, but losses to any cause forced the adoption of varied 

expedients. This problem was not new, but it had never been properly 

addressed in any reconnaissance organization. The M3s, which equipped 

cavalry platoons, proved large enough to carry more scouts, but reloads for 

the TOW missile launcher consumed much of the interior space. This state 

reflected the Cold War need for reconnaissance platforms with a powerful 

antitank capability. In the years since the Cold War’s end, cavalry platoons 

needed more scouts than missiles. This problem, like that of doctrinal 

updates, ranked a low priority.102

The effectiveness of cavalry units also suffered from a diminished 

familiarity with cavalry operations among Army officers. Most received 

little institutional training related to cavalry organization and doctrine. 

The resultant unfamiliarity resulted in the issuance of ineffective orders 

to cavalry forces during training exercises. Outside the Cavalry Leaders 

Course and Scout Leaders Course, few opportunities existed for officers to 

become familiar with cavalry operations. Consequently, a number of unit 

commanders lacked the background to train and develop subordinate leaders into effective cavalry leaders.103 This problem was not alleviated by the 

discrepancy between the doctrine that cavalry units operated under and 

those concepts most familiar to senior commanders and their staffs. The 

latter proved more conversant with the 2001 FM 3-90, Tactics, but most 

cavalry organizations still trained and functioned according to principles 

outlined in manuals published in 1995–96. In any event, cavalry troop 

commanders struggled with orders and guidance that too often did not 

focus their capabilities on key information objectives. Instead, they found 

themselves given too many tasks that dispersed their assets and made them 

susceptible to frequent combat and a rapid erosion of strength.104
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In the absence of Army-wide understanding of cavalry operations, 

implementation of RSTA-related reconnaissance concepts created new 

problems. Within the division, for example, the proper interaction between 

the new brigade reconnaissance troops and the division cavalry squadron constituted uncharted waters. Efforts to work through this and similar 

problems were subject to periodic piecemeal deployments of key personnel or subordinate units. The aviation component was the most common 

element thus tasked, and its absence undermined unit readiness and combined arms training.105

Nevertheless, the armored cavalry regiment and division cavalry 

squadron still constituted powerful, combined arms teams. With their mix 

of scouts, tanks, and helicopters, they retained their ability to fight for 

information and influence battlefield developments in a less high-tech but 

still effective manner. Indeed, they proved one of the few reconnaissance 

assets capable of functioning in the presence of a strong threat with or 

without detailed information on the enemy’s disposition and status. The 

continued fielding of the M1A2 SEP tank and the M3A3 Cavalry Fighting 

Vehicle also offered the promise of even greater combat and visualization 

powers in the near term.

Figure 111. Instruction for officers attending the Armor Captains 

Career Course.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Amid the spread of RSTA concepts, cavalry organizations focused 

on improving the effectiveness of those assets available to them. Within 

armored cavalry troops, attention was given to better integration of scouts 

and mortar sections, fire support in general, the refinement of hunter-killer 

concepts, and the employment of quick reaction forces.106 The use of dismounted scout teams to support both stealth and aggressive reconnaissance 

also received more emphasis, particularly in complex terrain. Their intelligent use helped their parent platoon to avoid premature contact, ensured 

that the heavy cavalry retained a degree of stealth, and increased the depth 

of security missions. As observers, these teams benefited from the use of 

GPS devices and mini eye safe laser infrared observation sets (MELIOS) 

to complement their more traditional binoculars and paper maps.107

Tactics, techniques, and procedures for the optimal use of air cavalry 

within the division cavalry squadron also continued to improve. In light of 

previous and ongoing organizational changes, this unit remained “the only 

organization in our Army that possesses both ground and air elements in a 

single battalion-sized organization.”108 At any rate, Army Transformation 

triggered a proposal to remove aviation assets from division cavalry 

squadrons and armored cavalry regiments. Part of the rationale lay in previous advanced warfighting experiments in which aviation capabilities 

seemed constrained by their link to ground scouts. Moreover, the growing capabilities of aviation platforms, particularly those associated with 

the RAH-66 Comanche before its cancellation, suggested that they might 

be able to achieve greater results if employed independently. This proposal gained support outside the Armor community, but it was not implemented. However, it caused considerable consternation among cavalry 

supporters already alarmed at the steady erosion of cavalry capabilities in 

favor of high-tech devices and RSTA principles. The commander of the 3d 

Armored Cavalry expressed a common view among cavalry soldiers when 

he characterized the concept as “dumb as dirt,” because it merely detracted 

from a proven combined arms capability.109 Another officer noted,

The single best enhancement to our reconnaissance efforts 

was the ability of the ground scouts to talk directly to the 

air scouts and to reinforce one another’s capability. It’s 

difficult for the scout on the ground to develop such a 

relationship with a sensor or UAV.110

Indeed, the trend toward reconnaissance and surveillance reliant on 

technology and the avoidance of combat engendered concern among 

some mounted officers. They reasserted the enduring relevance of cavalry 

organizations. In contrast to sensors and UAVs, cavalry provided a 

continuous, all-weather ability to gather detailed information regarding 
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the enemy, his intent, and his capability to conduct operations. Cavalry 

possessed a critical human quality that permitted assessment of hostile 

intent and civilian interaction during small-scale contingency operations. 

Support for cavalry organizations stemmed from operational experience 

rather than the theoretical and simulations-based justification for new 

technologies and RSTA principles. They considered the ability to fight 

for information and employ combat power to execute combat missions 

critical enablers of brigade and division commanders, who otherwise had 

to divert maneuver assets to perform the same roles. While the latter might 

perform such actions, doing so diverted them from their primary functions. 

Moreover, they lacked the training, agility, and robust communications 

architecture associated with cavalry organizations.111

Faced with future concepts that preferred reliance on air and ground 

sensors linked via a digital network to enhance information acquisition 

and obviate the need for traditional security missions, critics found fault 

with the underlying assumptions. They considered the new contact paradigm fundamentally flawed. It depended on accurate and detailed information regarding the enemy and the operational environment that sensors 

and aerial platforms could not continuously provide, particularly during 

operations in urban and/or complex terrain. As the US military improved 

its technical prowess, threat forces seemed more likely to seek methods 

and locations to negate technology and force a close fight. Urban environments became likely battlegrounds. Threat analysis and experience 

with both Serbian forces during the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo and the 

Taliban in Afghanistan demonstrated the growing effectiveness of deception measures and the use of inexpensive jamming devices to interfere 

with GPS navigation and targeting. In Kosovo, aerial platforms and sensors provided much of the intelligence used to locate, identify, and target 

Serbian ground forces for air attack. However, subsequent analysis found 

that these measures resulted in only limited Serbian losses. A better means 

of securing accurate information about the enemy was required—one that 

could sustain contact with the enemy. Organizations trained and equipped 

to execute traditional cavalry missions constituted one viable solution.112

Brigade and Battalion Scouts 

The fielding of the new heavy division based on Force XXI principles and technologies (also known as the limited conservative heavy division) impacted reconnaissance at the brigade and battalion levels. The 

new division introduced the brigade reconnaissance troop, which filled a 

void between battalion and division reconnaissance. The troop included 

49 soldiers distributed among a small headquarters element and 2 scout 
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platoons. This structure reflected the results of testing by Experimental 

Force (EXFOR) elements in the 1990s. The brigade reconnaissance troop 

supported the information needs of the brigade commander, who now benefited from the activities of five subordinate scout platoons.113

The brigade reconnaissance troop enhanced the brigade commander’s ability to see the battlefield. It also eliminated the danger of battalion 

scouts operating too far forward in pursuit of brigade information requirements at the expense of their parent unit.114 Increased effectiveness also 

occurred through the attachment of a Striker platoon with its six fire support teams. Integrated with the scouts, these teams provided an effective 

sensor-shooter linkage between the scouts observing targets and supporting artillery, while enhancing the brigade commander’s ability to shape 

the battlefield with indirect fires. Coordination between the brigade and 

battalion scouts also provided maximum situational awareness, although 

it did necessitate some additional training. Battalion scouts monitored the 

communications network of the brigade reconnaissance troop, while both 

organizations relied on the same graphics and ensured seamless battle 

handover through practice.115

However, the fielding of the brigade reconnaissance troop came at a 

cost. To provide the men and materiel necessary, the size of battalion scout 

platoons in the new division organization shrank from 30 men and 10 

HMMWVs to just 18 men and 6 vehicles. This change made the brigade 

and scout platoons identical, but reduced the coverage area and general 

effectiveness of the battalion scout platoon. The smaller platoons limited 

the number of OPs that could be established and constrained route reconnaissance to just one route per platoon. The platoon no longer possessed 

sufficient strength to offset losses through chance contacts. Moreover, the 

platoon leader did not have the option of controlling his unit—he had to 

both manage the platoon and perform as an active scout. Although the 

fielding of new equipment, including the LRAS3, was expected to offset 

this strength reduction, the organizational change began before the new 

equipment became available.116 The LRAS3, for example, was planned 

to equip every scout vehicle, but by 2004 its slow fielding supported only 

three per platoon. Hence, the principal means of observation remained the 

binoculars, although light cavalry scout platoons might benefit from the 

use of TOW missile launcher sights.117

The smaller size of the new scout platoons and their reliance on the 

vulnerable HMMWV constituted the most significant concerns. Each platform carried only a single scout for dismounted operations. Losses to any 

cause all but eliminated even this minimal capability. Common recommendations for improving the platoon, therefore, sought more men and vehicles 
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with better survivability, since the “current 18-man, six HMMWV platoon 

is simply not capable of accomplishing all the tasks required to ensure 

mission success.” Suggested vehicle alternatives included the Stryker or a 

M3/HMMWV mix.118 The Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS) with 

its suite of sensors and capabilities was the planned solution. However, 

the program became the subject of restructuring and a source of funds to 

support other actions associated with Transformation. Although technologies related to the FSCS continued to develop, by 2003 the program was 

effectively dead and its requirements incorporated into ongoing work on 

the FCS.119

In the absence of a more effective platform or more scouts, other recommendations for the platoon as a whole focused on attachments. While 

scout platoons regularly worked with attached ground surveillance radar 

teams, combat operations lasing teams (COLT), and engineers, snipers 

were considered another powerful enhancement to its effectiveness in 

both reconnaissance and security operations.120 The attachment of a retransmission team allowed scouts to select OPs on the basis of optimal observation rather than on the ability to transmit signals. Similar attachments were 

planned for the reconnaissance platoons of the SBCT’s RSTA squadron.121

The regular attachment of a medic and a mechanic were considered partial fixes to the absence of organic combat service support in the platoon. 

The inclusion of a medic helped to sustain wounded scouts, but it did not 

resolve the problem of removing him from the battlefield. Hence, units 

continued to improvise solutions.122

The publication of a consolidated reconnaissance platoon manual provided uniform doctrine for the brigade and battalion scouts. Yet the concepts it introduced required time to master, particularly those associated 

with infiltration and battle handover. Infiltration operations proved highly 

effective when successfully completed, but this did not always occur. Too 

often battalion staffs focused on the main fight proved less than attentive to the intricate planning necessary for infiltration. Once the mission 

began, scouts tended to neglect the use of dismounts to guide their vehicles through complex and/or potentially defended terrain. Other problem 

areas included actions on contact, casualty evacuation, and the selection of 

OP sites. Improvement came through practice and the involvement of the 

battalion staff in all stages of planning and preparation.123

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—Major Combat Operations

Against the backdrop of Transformation and ongoing military 

operations in Afghanistan, the United States moved toward war with 

Iraq. Despite its defeat by a US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq 
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continued to defy UN sanctions, brutally suppressed uprisings by Shiites 

and Kurds, and continued to threaten regional stability. Under Saddam 

Hussein’s leadership, the governing regime appeared to have developed 

WMDs. Iraq’s unwillingness to work openly with UN weapons inspectors 

encouraged this belief, while its financial support for Palestinian terrorist 

organizations gave credence to fears that the state supported terrorism. In the 

wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and America’s adoption of a preemptive 

approach to terrorism in general, Iraq’s activities brought it into direct 

conflict with the United States and its allies. After the failure of diplomatic 

efforts to avert a war, American forces spearheaded a multinational effort 

to remove Saddam Hussein from power and eliminate all WMDs.

The opening phases of the conflict began with cruise missile strikes, 

air attacks, and information operations intended to separate the population from the regime leadership and undermine the nation’s capacity 

for military resistance. A ground campaign followed to seize Baghdad, 

the center of Saddam Hussein’s political, military, and economic power. 

Simultaneous operations focused on preventing the destruction of the 

nation’s oil industry.

The US Army’s 3d Infantry Division bore responsibility for leading 

the drive to Baghdad. Its task lay in the destruction of Iraqi forces and 

isolation of the city. Marine Corps and United Kingdom forces constituted 

supporting efforts responsible for securing the city of Basra and the 

Figure 112. Combined arms elements of 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry in the 

early days of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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oilfields of southern Iraq to prevent their destruction. They also protected 

the 3d Infantry Division’s right flank during its drive to Baghdad. The 82d 

Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions followed to eliminate bypassed 

resistance. Initial plans also called for the digitized 4th Infantry Division 

to enter Iraq from Turkey, but the latter’s government refused to allow this 

movement. The formation had to be redeployed to Kuwait from where it 

entered Iraq well after combat operations began. Preparations for these 

operations assumed a determined resistance by Iraqi forces, particularly 

when Baghdad became threatened. 

Operations began on 19 March and within a month, Baghdad had fallen 

and with it Saddam Hussein’s regime. The 3d Infantry Division played a 

central role in this turn of events, fighting through Iraqi resistance that 

varied from well-equipped Republican Guard elements to paramilitary 

organizations. Its drive to Baghdad taxed its logistical support and often 

resulted in the dispersal of combat assets. Nevertheless, it maintained a 

rapid pace in accordance with initial plans intended to keep Iraqi resistance 

off balance. Although not intended to become embroiled in urban combat, 

the division could not entirely avoid such engagements. Indeed, when it 

arrived outside Baghdad, rather than assume positions outside the city and 

await the arrival of other forces, the division conducted a limited incursion 

to test the defenses. The favorable result triggered a more involved operation that resulted in division elements moving into and remaining inside 

the city. These actions, dubbed Thunder Runs, undermined the credibility 

of Saddam Hussein’s regime and directly contributed to its collapse.

Mounted reconnaissance during these operations did not follow the 

pattern inherent to ISR doctrine or the new contact paradigm. Instead, tactical operations at brigade level and below constituted a series of movements to contact.124 Many command decisions were made with only a 

limited sense of Iraqi intent and capability, and what intelligence did influence command came from small units in contact with the enemy. As one 

planner noted, 

We went in with the assumption that with all the sensors 

we have like the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack 

Radar System (JSTARS), the unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV) feeds, and things like that, we would know where 

each individual tank was and then we could just attack 

accordingly. Well, that wasn’t necessarily the case.125

The failure to apply the new ISR doctrine stemmed from multiple 

reasons. It assumed a viable intelligence template on which initial plans and 

the commander’s priority intelligence requirements were determined. These 
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requirements then guided the information operations by reconnaissance and 

surveillance assets utilizing stealth and infiltration. Their actions permitted 

the unit commander to maneuver his combat elements to engage hostile 

forces in the time, place, and manner of his choice. In Iraq, the campaign’s 

high operational tempo established at theater level precluded deliberate 

and extensive reconnaissance by subordinate units. Tactical formations 

struggled to keep pace, resulting in reconnaissance measures at variance 

with doctrinal procedures.126 One scout platoon found itself performing 

route reconnaissance for its parent task force at 25 to 30 kilometers per 

hour, far in excess of normal standards. Moreover, this pace prevented 

the use of dismounted drills to check danger areas and the careful use of 

terrain to offset the vulnerability of the unit’s HMMWVs.127 Consequently, 

battalion task force and company team commanders often maneuvered 

with little sense of the enemy and simply reacted to a continuously evolving 

tactical situation.128

ISR doctrine relied heavily on many information sources via a digital 

communications network. However, the 3d Infantry Division possessed 

few of the requisite devices to make this concept viable, and communications proved less than ideal. According to the division operations officer, 

I think maneuver commanders at brigade, battalion, company, and troop levels will tell you that they received very 

little pinpoint intelligence with any degree of fidelity from 

higher headquarters. This was aggravated by a couple of 

things, not least of which was that our communications 

backbone was broken. . . . Our ability to transfer data, 

particularly video and other types of data that come from 

satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), was significantly limited.129

Information, nevertheless, moved more easily between the division and 

higher echelons, but at brigade and below levels, it tended to bottleneck. 

The lower the command echelon, the fewer computers were available to 

receive imagery and graphics. Hence, information flow became largely 

limited to what could be transmitted via radio.130 The general absence of 

computers at battalion level precluded effective “reachback” to access 

resources from other commands and agencies. Connectivity problems 

only made things worse, no doubt contributing to a lack of information 

sharing between adjacent units and the absence of reconnaissance battle 

handover.131

Battalion task forces did receive intelligence from brigade and division 

levels, but it proved limited in value. Much of the focus at these higher 
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commands remained on the activities of large enemy formations. This 

emphasis proved less than useful to battalion commanders, who found 

the enemy transitioning to the employment of small groups of fighters and 

paramilitary units. Battalion staffs noted this change and altered their planning process and operations without input from higher commands, which 

remained oriented toward conventional Republican Guard formations. In 

effect, “The brigades were looking for the knock-out punch only to discover that the anticipated opponent had already left the ring.”132

The collective impact of these issues lay in tactical units advancing 

with little sense of the opposition awaiting them. Intelligence from higher 

echelons indicating the size and weaponry of enemy units provided little 

indication as to the type and intensity of resistance to be expected. At the 

tactical level, 

Since the size and composition of the enemy said little 

about his capability or his intent, commanders found this 

type of detailed information that often flowed down from 

satellite imagery, UAV surveillance, or passive reconnaissance efforts was essentially meaningless. To understand 

the enemy’s intent, they needed human intelligence.133

Figure 113. An armored task force en route to Baghdad.

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In the 2d Brigade Combat Team, the 3d Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment 

found itself the target of a large counterattack on 3 April, following its seizure of a bridge over the Euphrates River in preparation for an advance on 

Baghdad. Despite the massing of Iraqi units that made little effort to conceal their actions from aircraft and loitering UAVs, the battalion received 

no warning of the pending attack. It broke up the Iraqi assault, but the 

event underscored the danger of relying too much on sensors and technology to provide intelligence in a combat zone.134 An Army study of the Iraqi 

operations further noted, 

The ability of the Iraqis to hide, with some success, from 

the incredible array of technical intelligence available to 

the coalition may give pause to those advocating that US 

forces will be able to develop the situation out of contact 

and attack from standoff distances.135

At brigade and battalion levels, the most useful intelligence often 

came from Iraqi civilians or captured soldiers. At An Najaf, the 1st Brigade 

Combat Team commander possessed little sense of hostile activities until 

warned by Iraqi civilians of the nearby presence of Saddam Hussein loyalists compelling the local population to attack American forces. Such situations encouraged brigade and battalion commanders to rely on information 

obtained by their own unit rather than that provided from higher echelons. 

In the case of the 3d Infantry Division’s cavalry squadron, it received little 

information from division and relied largely on the intelligence gained 

through its own actions.136

In lieu of doctrinally prescribed ISR operations and the new contact 

paradigm, the 3d Infantry Division employed much simpler reconnaissance 

techniques. The division cavalry squadron’s mix of M3s and Abrams tanks 

led the formation for much of the drive to Baghdad, receiving its guidance 

directly from the division commander. In the first month of the war, it constituted the only heavy cavalry unit in combat. While leading the division, 

the squadron performed screen, guard, and economy of force missions 

intended to protect division assets. It established blocking positions to prevent Iraqi interference with the main division effort, and it moved quickly 

to seize critical objectives, including bridges, in advance of the BCTs. The 

extent of dispersion that characterized 3d Infantry Division operations 

often resulted in the squadron functioning semi-independently as another 

maneuver element. Unit activities were not oriented toward meeting the 

formation commander’s priority intelligence requirements.137

Extensive and frequent combat accompanied the squadron’s activities. 

According to a unit summary:
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

The troopers faced everything from traditional mechanized and light infantry to organized RPG ambushes, 

infantry in civilian clothes intermixed with civilians to suicide bombers. There were times when Cavalry Troopers 

were engaging dismounts with small arms that were less 

than 5 meters from their vehicles. Every trooper in the 

Squadron received contact. . . . Many times they engaged 

armored vehicles at ranges less than 1000 meters.138

The squadron employed indirect fires, close air support, and benefited 

greatly from its organic aviation.

Survival during combat owed much to the armor protection, optics, 

and firepower found on the tanks and M3s. Their effectiveness was further enhanced through the prewar reconfiguration of platoons into hunterkiller teams of two tanks and three M3s. During the march to Baghdad, the 

use of these integrated hunter-killer teams helped to sustain momentum. 

On contact with the enemy, platoons utilized their own available organic 

firepower to eliminate resistance rapidly and continue their mission. In 

this manner, combat power served to prevent the platoons from becoming decisively engaged. In those circumstances in which the intensity of 

resistance made even the M3’s survivability problematic, tanks assumed 

the most forward positions.139

Other organizational changes helped to tailor the squadron for operations in Iraq. The lack of a significant air threat freed air defense artillery 

platforms to secure forward arming and refueling points for the squadron’s 

aviation. The retransmission section benefited from the addition of several 

M113s for additional protection. However, the division cavalry lacked sufficient supply platforms and heavy vehicle recovery assets. The importance of these requirements increased the further the squadron advanced 

and the more dispersed operations became. To some extent, it overcame 

the supply challenges generated by independent operations through the 

creation of an improvised supply company using squadron personnel and 

assets—a solution used previously in Bosnia and again at the NTC. An 

attached engineer company proved instrumental in ensuring the speedy 

removal of obstacles and sustaining momentum. Yet organizational adjustments could not improve less than ideal long distance communications or 

boost the squadron’s intelligence analysis capability.140

Overall, the division cavalry squadron performed tasks and operations 

similar to those performed by parallel organizations in previous conflicts. 

It performed reconnaissance, security, and economy of force missions in 

support of the division effort. In the course of these activities, it experienced 
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sustained combat, although losses sustained proved minimal. It did not 

perform ISR operations as intended, and its entire experience seemed to 

raise anew the question of cavalry organization and role. After interviewing 

3d Infantry Division personnel about their experiences, one officer seeking 

operational insights on behalf of the Armor Center concluded: 

Conduct further study into the relevance of Division 

Cavalry Squadrons and ACRs in the conduct of Cavalry 

Operations. Traditional missions of such large cavalry 

organizations are more relevant to linear battlefields. Is the 

RSTA model the accurate depiction of future cavalry?141

For those soldiers who fought their way to Baghdad in the 3d Infantry 

Division’s cavalry squadron, the answer was a resounding negative. Even 

those scouts assigned to brigade reconnaissance troops and battalion scout 

platoons had cause to rethink the validity of the RSTA model. Scouts at the 

brigade and battalion levels started operations executing reconnaissance in 

advance of their parent organization, but this orientation soon shifted to a 

less forward role that reduced their potential exposure to combat. As the 

RPG threat increased, the 2d Brigade Combat Team removed its brigade 

reconnaissance troop from reconnaissance operations. The 2d Battalion, 

69th Armor Regiment employed its scouts forward, but kept them close to 

the maneuver companies for their own protection. In the 3d Battalion, 15th 

Infantry Regiment, the battalion scouts served as convoy escorts, and their 

reconnaissance role became assigned to M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles 

drawn from mechanized infantry companies. Scouts provided immediate 

early warning for their parent battalion, helped secure tactical assembly 

areas, screened rear areas, and assisted in the passage of lines.142

Nevertheless, they could not entirely be kept out of danger. During 

the 7 April Thunder Run, one scout platoon found itself escorting a convoy of fuel tankers and ammunition trucks along a fire-swept route inside 

Baghdad to resupply combat units under attack.143 Scouts moving forward 

to find and monitor enemy activities soon found themselves in direct fire 

contact and required heavy force assistance to disengage. Indeed, the 2d 

Brigade Combat Team found that its reconnaissance troop could not be 

employed in screen operations without significant augmentation.144

The diversion of scouts into route and convoy security missions, 

or activities other than forward reconnaissance, reflected survivability 

concerns. In general, both brigade and battalion scouts entered combat 

equipped with HMMWVs. Many were the up-armored M1114, but this 

platform sacrificed some mobility for improved protection that still left the 

vehicle vulnerable. In the 3d Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, the scout 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

platoon exchanged several of its HMMWVs for M113s taken from the 

maintenance section to improve survivability.145 Nor was it uncommon 

for the scout platoon to be integrated into a company team with tanks and 

mechanized infantry.146 One operational analysis concluded: 

In short, they [commanders] elected to give up their “eyes” 

rather than risk losing them. Put another way, commanders chose not to employ scouts and brigade reconnaissance 

troops in the role for which they were intended. This phenomenon warrants study and arguable action to correct 

problems commanders perceived. Heavier scout vehicles 

may not be the answer; perhaps the answer is how reconnaissance units are trained and supported.147

During urban operations, the scouts played only a marginal role. They 

did not conduct the urban mapping outlined in doctrine or provide a clear 

template of enemy positions and key facilities. The high tempo of operations did not offer the time for such operations and survivability concerns led commanders to employ them in less high-risk missions. When 

3d Infantry Division forces reached Baghdad, they determined the Iraqi’s 

strength and willingness to resist through a reconnaissance in force by an 

armored task force—not through scout infiltration. 

Figure 114. Urban combat on the outskirts of Baghdad.

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Brigade and battalion scouts did make important contributions to 3d 

Infantry Division operations, but they did not inundate the battlefield with 

human and artificial sensors to build and maintain the commander’s situational understanding. Arguably, their most important activities lay in 

establishing initial contact with hostile forces, particularly when equipped 

with LRAS3. This device provided the scout the ability to spot and identify 

targets at safe distances. Additionally, it permitted the scout to provide a 

digital grid coordinate and share this data with supporting artillery, which 

could deliver accurate fire with a minimal response time.148 In this manner, 

“Our task force scouts made contact with the enemy and did a solid job of 

maintaining contact, going to ground, reporting, and then providing that 

information to shape the environment.”149 LRAS3 thus became a critical 

enabler that permitted the scouts to have some information gathering role 

and support combat operations. When part of a company team, the scouts 

helped to detect hostile targets for heavier platforms to destroy.150

Even so, the high tempo of operations, the absence of general information about the enemy, and lack of survivability all combined to reduce 

the role of brigade and battalion scouts. They certainly did not prevent 

the drive to Baghdad being other than a series of movements to contacts. 

Moreover, scout platoons did not benefit from the attachment of COLTs 

due to the latter’s lack of survivability. Urban operations also minimized 

the effectiveness of the LRAS3.151

The FBCB2 proved popular, but its limited fielding constrained 

usage.152 The 3d Infantry Division’s cavalry squadron, for example, possessed only five of the devices, while brigade reconnaissance troops 

included only three. No unit included sufficient numbers to equip every 

combat platform or even every command vehicle. Consequently, FBCB2 

could not be used to maintain a detailed situational awareness picture, 

although it did give users a general sense of friendly force locations. Its 

primary employment included navigation and long-distance communications. Its reliance on satellites enabled it to carry messages far beyond 

the range of radio communications. This ability proved exceptionally useful when division elements became dispersed. Its ability to provide exact 

grid coordinates for locations also facilitated the delivery of indirect fire 

quickly and on target. For those commanders and staffs with access to 

the device, its ability to transmit images and graphics all but eliminated 

dependence on paper maps and overlays.153

For many users, the drive to Baghdad marked their first exposure to 

FBCB2, and they were skeptical. The commander of the 3d Battalion, 15th 

Infantry Regiment, for example, remained wedded to the use of paper maps 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

and radio until a sandstorm shut down radio communications. Forced to 

rely on FBCB2, he soon discovered its capabilities, which included tracking combat mission events in the worst weather. This experience “completed my conversion to digital battle command.”154

Combat operations in Iraq quickly generated a number of recommendations to drive changes in the training of armor soldiers. Many participants questioned the value of NTC rotations that reflected conventional 

battlefields rather than the more varied operational environment in Iraq. 

Within the 3d Infantry Division, a general consensus emerged to improve 

the extent and nature of intelligence and reconnaissance-related training 

given to captains and lieutenants. Related weapons training recommendations included a shift toward close-range engagements, greater small arms 

use, and a broader array of target types. The urban nature of many of the 

most intense battles encouraged more attention to combat in built-up areas. 

The Scout Leaders Course received high praise, but proposed changes 

included the insertion of LRAS3 training and expanded FBCB2 use.

155

Modularity

In 2003, General Peter Schoomaker succeeded General Shinseki 

as Army Chief of Staff. Schoomaker continued his predecessor’s 

Transformation initiatives, but introduced a new dimension to them. To 

make the Army more responsive to a broad array of threats, Schoomaker 

directed a shift in the Army’s force structure away from divisions and 

toward BCTs as the principal element of maneuver. This change aimed at 

increasing strategic flexibility and enhancing the ability of Army organizations to operate within a joint framework.156

The reconfigured brigades were intended for employment alone, as 

part of a division structure, or within a task force with elements from other 

Services. The modular brigades were designed to be mixed in different 

ratios to suit the needs of commanders in the field. Each new brigade was 

to benefit from enhanced communications networks to facilitate information sharing within the unit and with other organizations typically found 

in a joint task force.157

The modularity initiative sought an increase in the total number of 

brigades available. Overall, the Army leadership sought to raise the total 

number of BCTs in the Active Component from 33 to as many as 48 over a 

3-year period. A parallel change was also planned for the National Guard. 

These increases provided a larger pool of deployable forces to meet worldwide needs. They also helped to build predictability into Army deployment 

schedules and permit units longer periods between overseas tours.158
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The brigades fell into maneuver and support categories. The former 

included heavy, infantry, and Stryker. Another type would be added to 

reflect the FCS when it became available.159 Each brigade received assets 

normally retained at division or corps level to enable independent operations. Division and corps headquarters also underwent restructuring to 

permit them to manage a variable number of brigade teams and campaign 

operations. They could be tailored for a specific mission and their internal 

composition remained variable. They assumed a role similar to the flexible 

corps structure adopted during World War II in which the corps received 

troop assignments based on its theater of operations and mission.160

To generate more maneuver brigades, each ground division was 

expected to reconfigure its assets into five BCTs. On its return from Iraq in 

2004, the 3d Infantry Division became the first to undergo this transition, 

followed by the 101st Air Assault and 4th Infantry Divisions. Shortfalls 

in equipment and personnel soon resulted in the restructuring of divisions into just four maneuver brigades. These early efforts coupled with 

planning assessments of much larger deficiencies across the force led the 

DOD to authorize a temporary increase of 30,000 soldiers to the Army’s 

end strength. However, these additions did not directly address the related 

challenges of cost and training that accompanied the transition to modular forces. Building a robust, digital network into each brigade required 

time and money, particularly since many formations, like the 3d Infantry 

Division, were not digital organizations. The combined arms nature of the 

new maneuver brigades also made training more complex.161

Figure 115. A suicide car bomber attacks an American armored column.

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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

The 3d Infantry Division was due to return to Iraq late in 2004, where 

it would provide a field test of the modular concept. Its experiences would 

shape the implementation of modularity among other formations. Even 

before this deployment began, other formations had begun to reconfigure 

into modular brigades. When the 3d Infantry Division did arrive in Iraq, 

it had not finished its conversion. Only its heavy brigades and the aviation support brigade had done so. Nor did the division commander control 

a reconnaissance asset with which to supplement brigade and battalion 

information collection efforts. Traditionally, the division cavalry squadron 

fulfilled this role, but this organization ceased to exist under the modular 

redesign. The division commander, therefore, resorted to pooling brigade 

and battalion UAVs under division control.162

Support brigades provided additional capabilities and helped to tailor 

a force for a specific deployment or operation. These brigades included 

aviation, reconnaissance, maneuver enhancement, fires, and sustainment. 

They constituted functions traditionally organic to corps and divisions, but 

their assignment was no longer limited to a particular formation. For the 

Aviation community, modularity offered the ability to concentrate aircraft 

and related maintenance into one brigade devoted to aviation operations. 

This marked a change from existing division designs in which aviation 

and division cavalry constituted a single brigade. Moreover, the aviation 

brigade was designed for independent employment—it was not tied to a 

particular division. The RSTA brigade provided an ISR capability outside 

the BCTs. The maneuver enhancement brigade provided force protection 

for headquarters at different command echelons and possessed a limited 

capacity for offensive and defensive operations.163

The continuity of senior leadership support facilitated the transition to a 

modular force structure largely between 2004 and 2007. Indeed, the pace of 

conversion for two brigades was accelerated in December 2006. The nature 

of modularity also suggested new sources of manpower among those functions no longer considered critical on the battlefield. The reduced aircraft 

threat to American forces, for example, made the Air Defense Artillery a 

likely candidate for the transfer of personnel to other duties for which a personnel shortfall existed. Similarly, the need for engineer, field artillery, and 

armor soldiers fell while that of scouts, military police, transportation, civil 

affairs, psychological operations, and biological operations increased.164

The Army’s shift to a modular structure directly impacted reconnaissance organizations. The operational emphasis placed on self-sufficient 

BCTs rather than divisions led to enhancements in the former’s capabilities, but it also eliminated the division cavalry squadron. Consequently, 
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at the division level, no significant reconnaissance and surveillance organization remained unless through the assignment of a RSTA brigade. A 

heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) organization included a headquarters 

element, a reconnaissance squadron, and two combined arms battalions 

supported by artillery and service support assets. They contained no aviation, since such assets were being consolidated in the aviation support 

brigades. A headquarters, two tank companies, two mechanized infantry 

companies, an engineer company, and a forward support company constituted the essence of each combined arms battalion. The headquarters 

company also included a scout platoon and mortar platoon, while each of 

the mechanized and tank companies included UAVs.165

Within the modular BCT, the brigade reconnaissance troop disappeared. In its place, the brigade gained a reconnaissance squadron. This 

unit reflected the influence of the RSTA squadron initially designed for the 

SBCT.166 It included three reconnaissance troops, one surveillance troop, 

and an HHT. The surveillance troop included a mix of UAVs, sensors, 

and radars in addition to an NBC reconnaissance section. Service support 

and platoon reconnaissance proved more robust in the HBCT reconnaissance squadron. Each reconnaissance platoon included three M3s and five 

HMMWVs equipped with LRAS3. Typically, two HMMWVs functioned 

as the platoon headquarters, controlling three scout sections each including 

one M3 and one HMMWV. Other configurations were possible, including 

a hunter-killer organization at both the troop and platoon level. Overall, 

the platoon possessed more combat power and greater survivability than 

the Stryker reconnaissance platoon or all-HMMWV units.167

The new reconnaissance squadron marked several developments. 

First, all elements of the squadron were part of a digital network that 

facilitated reporting, information sharing, command and control, and situational awareness. However, this capability did not extend to dismounted 

scout teams operating away from their vehicles. At the platoon level, the 

dismount team of each M3 included a soldier charged with human intelligence collection.168 The mix of M3 and HMMWV constituted a belated 

response to the vulnerability problems associated with pure HMMWV 

organizations. Combat operations in Iraq underscored the HMMWV’s 

poor survivability and the related hesitancy of commanders to employ it 

near hostile forces. These factors provided the driving force for a change 

in platoon structure.

Reactions to the new reconnaissance squadron proved cautious at 

best. At least one officer found a similarity between the new units and the 

World War II-era mechanized cavalry organizations. The design of each 
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

focused on reconnaissance rather than a broader mission set that necessitated combat. The difficulties experienced by the mechanized cavalry 

when employed in roles other than information collection and their routine 

use in such roles underscored the concerns surrounding the new reconnaissance squadrons. The new units might well be forced into functions they 

were not designed to perform, creating major challenges for unit commanders and potentially greater losses of men and materiel.169

While the HBCT squadron possessed the ability to perform reconnaissance and some security, it lacked the means to perform the full range of 

operations traditionally associated with cavalry organizations, particularly 

economy of force. Indeed, one officer concluded, “After modularity, a fully 

functional cavalry force effectively no longer exists.” The reconnaissance 

squadron was not designed to conduct guard, covering, or offensive and 

defensive missions, but because the division no longer possessed a cavalry 

squadron, these missions could not be left to a division asset to execute. 

Even in the presence of an RSTA brigade, these missions remained unaddressed, since this support brigade was not intended to fight for combat. A 

gap in capabilities appeared at the division and brigade levels, despite the 

improved functionality of the brigade reconnaissance squadron in comparison with its predecessor brigade reconnaissance troop. The squadron 

benefited from its link to a tactical communications network that provided 

access to a variety of assets, but even with the M3, the M1114, and the 

Figure 116. The combat power of the Abrams/Bradley team is unleashed.

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LRAS3, it possessed insufficient combat power to assume the role once 

performed by division cavalry. Moreover, each troop included only two 

platoons, which further limited its span of operations.170 These limitations 

led one observer to conclude that new reconnaissance organizations “are 

not cavalry squadrons at all—they are merely groupings of scout platoons 

standardized under a permanent headquarters. It might look good on an 

organizational chart; it is, however, woefully inadequate.”171

The modular infantry BCT also included a reconnaissance squadron. 

Its composition differed significantly from that of the heavy brigade. It 

included two mounted reconnaissance troops and one dismounted troop. 

Although a surveillance troop was expected to routinely operate with 

the squadron, the actual troop was a brigade asset. The mounted troop 

included three platoons, a mortar section, and a COLT. Each platoon possessed six HMMWVs, including two with a TOW missile system, three 

with LRAS3, and one with a .50-caliber machinegun. Each platoon also 

carried two Javelins. This mix permitted the use of antitank ambush tactics 

and the integration of TOW and non-TOW platforms, which had been customary since the introduction of the light division in the 1980s. However, 

the platoon retained only a limited dismounted capability and remained 

vulnerable to most weapons on the battlefield. The squadron also included 

a dismounted reconnaissance troop. This provided a much greater degree 

of dismounted capability, but it also presented a transportation problem unless supported through the attachment of vehicles. The squadron 

marked an increase in reconnaissance ability, but the dismounted troop 

posed a dilemma not unlike that once associated with long-range surveillance detachments—how to get the scouts into position without organic 

transport.172

Above the brigade, the RSTA brigade provided ISR support. This 

organization included a mix of capabilities designed to collect intelligence 

from imagery, signals, people, signatures, reconnaissance, and surveillance. 

This unit also assisted the division commander in the planning and execution of reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It was intended to cover 

those parts of the battlespace not addressed by the BCTs. It possessed the 

ability to conduct persistent surveillance using organic UAVs, Prophets, 

and long-range surveillance detachments.173 The RSTA brigade’s principal 

components included a headquarters, military intelligence battalion, longrange surveillance detachment, signal, and support elements. It possessed 

no ground reconnaissance other than the surveillance detachment.174

The RSTA brigade proved less than ideal in its early configuration. 

The unit remained a work in progress. Its precise mission and the manner 
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in which it would apply proven reconnaissance principles had yet to 

be resolved. It lacked an all-weather reconnaissance capability, and its 

interaction with the brigade combat teams required determination. Further 

analysis followed to refine its organization and provide the RSTA brigade 

with a more effective set of capabilities.
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Notes

1. General Eric K. Shinseki and Louis Caldera, “The Army Vision: 

Soldiers On Point for the Nation—Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” 

12 October 1999, presentation transcript, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

Transformation/CSA/Vision 1999.

2. Briefing, Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: Medium Weight Brigade, 

3 November 1999, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Transformation files.

3. Shinseki and Caldera, “The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the 

Nation—Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” 12 October 1999.

4. US Army, United States Army Posture Statement, 2002, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2002 Annual Command History files; Secretary of Defense, 

Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2002, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, 2002 Annual Command History files; Shinseki and Caldera, “The Army 

Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation—Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in 

War,” 12 October 1999.

5. “The Foundations of Army Transformation and The Objective Force 

Concept,” Final Draft, 3 May 2001, quotation from page 45, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, Transformation/Objective Force.

6. US Army, “Concepts for the Objective Force,” white paper, 2001, iv, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, Transformation/Objective Force.

7. Armor Conference Briefing, Major Brian Byers, Subj: FCS ORD 

Update, 18 May 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command 

History files; UABML, “Mission Need Statement for Future Combat System 

(FCS), Version 1.2, Working Draft, 28 May 2002, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

Transformation/FCS.

8. Armor Conference Briefing, General John N. Abrams, Subj: Objective 

Force in Context of the Changing Operational Environment, 23 May 2001, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2001 Annual Command History files; Armor 

Conference Briefing, Colonel Fletcher, Subj: Unit of Action Maneuver Battle 

Lab Experimentation, 18 May 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual 

Command History files.

9. Briefing, Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, Subj: Operational 

Maneuver by Ground in Offensive Operations (Mounted Enabled by Dismounted), 

July 2002, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/OBJ Force/UA 

MBL/Briefings.

10. Shinseki and Caldera, “The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the 

Nation—Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” 12 October 1999. 

11. Briefing, General Eric K. Shinseki, Subj: Army Transformation: Soldiers 

on Point for the Nation, October 2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

Transformation/CSA/2000.

12. For more information on the High Technology Light Division, see 

Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Stephen L. Bowman, Lieutenant Colonel 

John M. Kendall, and Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sauders, eds., “Motorized 

Experience of the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis 1980–1989,” unpublished 

manuscript, 9 June 1989, Branch Archives, 9th Infantry Division.
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

13. Michael Gilbert, “‘Stryker’ is Name Army Selects for New Light 

Armored Vehicles,” Tacoma News Tribune, 28 February 2002.

14. Tom Gordon, “Depot Rolls Out First of 1000 Strykers,” Birmingham 

(AL) News, 23 April 2002.

15. Dennis O’Brien, “Controversial War Game Improved Warriors,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 23 August 2002; Linda D. Kozaryn, “Demystifying ‘Transformation,’” American Forces Press Service, 14 August 2002; Peter Pae, “War 

Exercise Adds a Digital Front,” Los Angeles Times, 9 August 2002; Kim Burger, 

“US ‘Super Exercise’ is Window on Future Warfare,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

7 August 2002; “Largest Military Experiment to Test Transformation Theories,” 

American Forces Press Service, 18 July 2002; “Joint Forces War Games Focus on 

Real-World Scenarios,” Honolulu Advertiser, 22 July 2002; Sean Naylor, “Stryker 

Impresses in its First Real Test,” Army Times, 19 August 2002, 10; United States 

Joint Forces Command, “Millennium Challenge 2002: Experiment Initiatives,” 

July 2002, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2002 Annual Command History files.

16. Burger, “US ‘Super Exercise’ is Window on Future Warfare”; 

Timothy L. Rider, “Transformation Director Explains Importance of Situational 

Understanding in Combat,” MC02 Media Operations Center, 28 July 2002; Jim 

Garamone, “Largest Military Experiment to Test Transformation Theories,” 

Armed Forces Press Service, 18 July 2002; “Joint Forces War Games Focus 

on Real-World Scenarios,” Honolulu Advertiser, 22 July 2002; Megan Scully, 

“Millennium Challenge Communications, Information Sharing Hailed,” Inside 

the Army, 19 August 2002; “US Explores a New World of Warfare,” Early Bird, 

New York Times, 20 August 2002; Jim Caldwell, “MC02 Experiment Extends 

C4ISR to All Services,” TRADOC News Service, 26 June 2002.

17. Jason Sherman, “Aldridge to Clarify ‘Spiral Development,’” Defense 

News, 3–9 June 2002, 12.

18. Erin Q. Winograd, “Army Prepares to Kill 14 More Programs to Pay 

for Objective Force, Inside the Army, 29 July 2002; Andrew Koch, “End of the 

Line for US Tanks?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 August 2002; Erin Q. Winograd, 

“Shinseki Orders Review of Proposed POM Cancellations, Reductions,” Inside 

the Army, 5 August 2002, 1. Funding was subsequently restored to some programs 

in recognition of the Legacy Force’s role as the primary tool for upholding national 

interests in the near term. The M1A2 SEP was one such beneficiary. In early 2004, 

the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment received 129 SEP tanks. 

19. David E. Sanger, “Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First,” 

New York Times, 17 June 2002, 1.

20. House of Commons Library, “Research Paper 01/81: Operation 

Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan—An Update,” 31 October 

2001, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 02ACH/Army/Ops/Afghanistan; 

Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army 

and Defense Policy,” 20 October 2002, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War 

College, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 02ACH/Army/Ops/Afghanistan.

21. Ann Scott Tyson, “Anaconda: A War Story,” Christian Science Monitor, 

1 August 2002, 1; Peter Baker, “GIs Battle ‘Ghosts’ in Afghanistan,” Washington 
472

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Post, 16 May 2002, 1; Vernon Loeb, “Built for the Cold War, Flown in a Hot 

One,” Washington Post, 28 April 2002, 16; David Rohde, “Anatomy of a Raid 

in the Afghan Mountains,” New York Times, 3 June 2002; John Burns, “Afghan 

President Escapes Bullets; 25 Killed By Car Bomb in Kabul,” New York Times, 

6 September 2002, 1.

22. “Afghanistan—Army,” 7 June 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/world/afghanistan/army.htm (accessed 11 August 2004).

23. “Report of the Secretary of the Army,” included in Secretary of Defense, 

Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2002; US Army, “United States 

Army 2002 Posture Statement.”

24. Michael Evans, “Ship to Move More Tanks to the Gulf,” London 

Times, 5 September 2002; Noelle Phillips, “3d Division Prepares for War,” 

Savannah Morning News, 15 November 2002; Michael R. Gordon, “GIs Train 

on Iraq’s Border,” New York Times, 20 November 2002, 1; Greg Jaffe, “Number 

of US Troops in the Gulf is Expected to Nearly Double,” Wall Street Journal, 

19 December 2002; Walter Pincus and Karen DeYoung, “US Sets Late January 

Decision on War,” Washington Post, 19 December 2002, 1.

25. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 4–6, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

Transformation/IBCT; US Army, “2002 Army Modernization Plan,” undated, 45, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2002 Annual Command History files.

26. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 4, 10.

27. US Army, “2002 Army Modernization Plan,” undated, 21.

28. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 10–11, quotation from page 11.

29. Ibid., 7.

30. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 21–25; Briefing, Brigade Coordination Cell—

Forward (Alaska), Subj: SBCT-3 Staff Officer’s Organizational and Operational 

(O&O) Information, 15 September 2003, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2003 

Annual Command History files.

31. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: The Brigade: Providing Freedom’s 

Guardian with Tomorrow’s Victories, 20 January 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, Transformation/IBCT files.

32. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 12–13, 19.

33. Briefing, TSM XXI, Subj: FBCB2, 2003, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, 2003 Annual Command History files; Major Michael C. Kasales and Chief 

Warrant Officer (2) Matthew E. Gray, “Leveraging Technology: The Stryker 

Brigade Combat Team,” Armor CXII, no. 1 (January–February 2003): 10.

34. Briefing, TSM XXI, Subj: FBCB2, 2003; Kasales and Gray, “Leveraging 

Technology: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” 10.

35. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000.
473

Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

36. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: The Brigade: Providing Freedom’s 

Guardian with Tomorrow’s Victories, 20 January 2000; Briefing, USAARMC, 

Subj: The Brigade: RSTA O&O, 13 July 2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

Transformation/IBCT/RSTA files.

37. Kasales and Gray, “Leveraging Technology: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team,” 9–11; Briefing, Captain Denny, Subj: Assets to Support Reconnaissance, 

10 July 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Transformation/RSTA files.

38. USAARMC, “The Brigade Combat Team Organizational and 

Operational Concept,” 6 January 2000, 41; Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Medium 

Weight Brigade In-Progress Review, 12 November 1999, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, Transformation files.

39. Initial data for this assessment was collected during the Platform 

Performance Demonstration conducted at Fort Knox in December 1999 to January 

2000. For information on this event, see USAARMC G3/DPTM, Operations 

Order 00-01 (Platform Performance Demonstration), 16 November 1999, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/IBCT/PPD/OPORD files; Briefing, 

USAARMC, Subj: The Brigade: Providing Freedom’s Guardian With Tomorrow’s 

Victories, 20 January 2000; Briefing, Army Test and Evaluation Command, Subj: 

Initial Brigade In-Progress Review and Performance Demonstration Decision 

Brief, 15 November 1999, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/

IBCT/PPD/Purpose.

40. “Roll On! Army Selects LAV III Variants to Equip New Interim 

Brigades,” Armor CX, no. 1 (January–February 2001): 13–15; Thomas E. 

Ricks, “Light Armored Vehicles Key to New Army Units,” Washington Post, 

18 November 2000, 8; Contract Announcement, Offices of the Secretary of Army 

and Legislative Liaison, 16 November 2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

Transformation/IBCT/Platform Dev/Contract Award.

41. Army Press Release, “Army Announces Name for Interim Armored 

Vehicle,” 27 February 2002, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/

IBCT/Platform Dev/Articles/2002.

42. Major General B.B. Bell, “Armor Branch’s ‘Way Ahead’ Advances on 

Four Thrust Lines,” Armor CX, no. 4 (July–August 2001): 5–6; Briefing, Major 

General B.B. Bell, Subj: Address to Fort Knox Permanent Party, 3 November 1999; 

Statement to AUSA Core Comte, Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: USAARMC and 

Fort Knox Command Information Update, 16 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, Transformation/USAARMC CG; Statement to Armor Force, Major General 

B.B. Bell, Subj: Medium Weight Force Initiative Brigade Combat Teams: What 

it Means to the Armor Force, 3 March 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

Transformation/USAARMC CG; Statement to Armor Force, Major General B.B. 

Bell, Subj: Chief of Armor Update, 21 February 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, Transformation/USAARMC CG.

43. “The Stryker ‘Reconnaissance Vehicle,’” Armor CXII, no. 4 (July–

August 2003): 54; “Stryker 8-Wheel Drive Armoured Vehicles, USA,” http://

www.army-technology.com/projects/stryker/ (accessed 15 December 2008).

44. Stanley C. Crist, “We Already Have Light Armor: It’s Called an M113,” 
474

Chapter 8

Armor CIX, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 3; Don Loughlin, “M113’s Versatility 

Meets Test for Lighter Force Initiative,” Armor CIX, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 

3–4; A. William Criswell, “LAV III Fails to Meet the Army’s Own Requirements,” 

Armor CX, no. 4 (July–August 2001): 3; Sean D. Naylor, “It’s Stryker Against 

M113A3—Again,” Inside the Army, 23 September 2002, 13; Joe Burlas, “Test 

Compares Stryker with M113,” Army News Service, 16 September 2002.

45. Briefing, USAARMC Office Chief of Armor, Subj: Mission Statement 

and Plan of Action, 23 November 1999, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

Transformation/IBCT/Personnel; Briefing, USAARMC Office Chief of Armor, 

Subj: Brigade Combat Team Command Update to FORSCOM Commander, 

1 February 2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/IBCT/

Personnel; Briefing, USAARMC Office Chief of Armor, Subj: Personnel Manning 

Strategy, 20 January 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Transformation/

USAARMC Personnel/Personnel Status.

46. See, for example, First Lieutenant Alfred C. Prill, “The Medium Weight 

Force: Reinventing the Wheel?” Armor CIX, no. 1 (January–February 2000): 3–4.

47. E-mail, Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: Abrams Tank Update, 8 December 1999, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/USAARMC CG; 

Statement to Armor Force, Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: Medium Weight Force 

Initiative Brigade Combat Teams: What it Means to the Armor Force, 3 March 

2000, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/USAARMC CG; Major 

General B.B. Bell, “Manuscript’s Tone Raised Editing Questions,” Armor CIX, 

no. 1 (January–February 2000): 5, 47; Armor Conference Briefing, General Eric 

K. Shinseki, Subj: Army Transformation, 25 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

2000 Annual Command History files; Armor Conference Briefing, Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: Report to Force, 24 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

2000 Annual Command History files; Armor Conference Briefing, General John 

N. Abrams, Subj: Army Transformation, 24 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

2000 Annual Command History files; Erin Q. Winograd, “Army Executes PR 

Gambit to Bolster Stryker Against Critics,” Inside the Army, 21 October 2002, 1.

48. While teaching branch history classes to the officer basic course, the 

author repeatedly fielded questions related to Stryker vulnerabilities and its 

relative capabilities in comparison with the T-72.

49. USAARMC, “Interim Division (COA4) O&O Plan,” Draft version 3.7, 

9 January 2001, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/IDIV/O&O; 

TRAC, “Interim Division Design Analysis Final Report,” July 2001, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, Transformation/IDIV/Final Report; “Armor Modernization 

Plan, 2002, 23; Briefing draft, USAARMC, Subj: The Division: USAARMC 

IDIV Reconnaissance Recommendation,” 2 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, Transformation/IDIV/O&O IDIV.

50. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Transformation, 15 September 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2CR/IPR.

51. Memorandum, General John N. Abrams, Subj: Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) 

Charter for 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) Transformation, 17 July 2000, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.
475

Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

52. Ibid.

53. Major General B.B. Bell, “Operations Order 00-18 (2ACR 

Transformation),” 11 September 2000, quotation from page 2, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

54. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Transformation, 23 August 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

55. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: 2ACR In-Progress Review, 22 September 

2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue Ribbon Panel 1 Briefing, 

Major General B.B. Bell, Subj: 2ACR Transformation, 11 October 2000, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, Major 

General B.B. Bell, Subj: 2ACR Transformation, 1 November 2000, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

56. Blue Ribbon Panel 1 Notes, 11–13 October 2000, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Memorandum, Colonel John L. Ballantyne, Subj: 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) Blue Ribbon Panel Session 1 Notes, 

13 October 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue Ribbon Panel 

2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Modeling Insights, 1 November 2000, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

57. Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Modeling Insights, 

1 November 2000.

58. Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Modeling Insights, 

1 November 2000; Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Organization, 

3 November 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

59. Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Roles, Missions, 

and Requirements, 3 November 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR 

files; Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: O&O, 3 November 

2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue Ribbon Panel 2 Briefing, 

USAARMC, Subj: After Action Review, 3 November 2000, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: 2d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment Transformation Executive Update, 9 November 2000, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2ACR Files.

60. Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: 2d Armored Cavalry Transformation, 

9 November 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

61. E-mail, Colonel John L. Ballantyne, Subj: 2ICR Meeting with the CG, 

27 November 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

62. Blue Ribbon Panel 4 Briefing, Major General B.B. Bell, 17 January 

2001, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

63. Blue Ribbon Panel 4 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: Transformation 

Strategy, 17 January 2001, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue 

Ribbon Panel 4 Briefing, Colonel John L. Ballantyne, Subj: Organizational Update, 

17 January 2001, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files; Blue Ribbon Panel 

4 Briefing, USAARMC, Subj: C4ISR-TA Panel Outbrief, 19 January 2001, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

64. Major Karl Gingrich and Lawrence G. Vowels, “Interim Cavalry Regiment 

Analysis,” Report, 1 June 2001, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.
476

Chapter 8

65. Robert S. Cameron, “2d Cavalry Regiment Status Update,” 5 February 

2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2ACR files.

66. Briefing, Department of the Army Military Operations, Subj: 2d Cavalry 

Regiment Unit Transformation CSA Decision Brief,” 9 October 2002, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/2CR/2002/2CR Briefings.

67. Executive summary memo, Charlie Shepard, Subj: 2CR, Impact of 

Requirement to Conduct Additional MGS Analysis, 12 February 2003, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/2CR/2003.

68. Robert S. Cameron, “2d Cavalry Regiment Status Update,” 5 February 

2004.

69. Robert S. Cameron, “2d Cavalry Regiment Status Update,” 5 February 

2004; USAARMC, “2d Cavalry Regiment O&O Summary,” draft, 17 December 

2003, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/2ACR/2003; Briefing, 

USAARMC, Subj: 2d Cavalry Regiment Transformation, 4 February 2004, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, Transformation/2ACR/2004.

70. Robert S. Cameron, “2d Cavalry Regiment Status Update,” 5 February 

2004.

71. Press release, Subj: Army Announces Reconfiguration of Fourth Stryker 

Brigade, 14 May 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Transformation/2ACR 

files.

72. Department of the Army, FM 3-21.31, The Stryker Brigade Combat 

Team (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 3–1.

73. Advanced NCO Course Briefing, Sergeant First Class Frank Belonus, 

Subj: Cavalry Brief, 2001, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2001 Annual Command 

History files; Briefing, Brigade Coordination Cell—Forward (Alaska), Subj: 

SBCT-3 Staff Officer’s Organizational and Operational (O&O) Information, 

15 September 2003.

74. Advanced NCO Course Briefing, Sergeant First Class Frank Belonus, 

Subj: Cavalry Brief, 2001; Armor Conference Briefing, Major Ricketts, Subj: 

Situational Awareness, 23 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2000 Annual 

Command History files.

75. One potential role identified for the reconnaissance vehicles operating 

apart from their dismount teams included a communications node to assist 

command and control. A similar role was once advocated for the armored cars of 

the horse cavalry.

76. Armor Conference Briefing, Captains Athey and Denny, Subj: RSTA 

Squadron, 22 May 2000, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2000 Annual Command 

History files; Staff Sergeant Dwayne C. Thacker, “The ‘Recce Stryker’—Making 

a Good Vehicle Great,” Armor CXII, no. 3 (May–June 2003): 3; Sergeant First 

Class Andrew L. Barteky, “The Stryker-Equipped Cavalry Squadron in an Urban 

Environment,” Armor CXII, no. 4 (July–August 2003): 28–36.

77. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop: Recce 

Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (Washington, DC: Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, 2002), chapter 7; Barteky, “The Stryker-Equipped 

Cavalry Squadron in an Urban Environment,” 28–36; Armor Conference 
477

Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Berg, Subj: Doctrine Overview, 20 May 2001, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2001 Annual Command History files; Advanced 

NCO Course Briefing, Sergeant First Class Frank Belonus, Subj: Cavalry Brief, 

2001; Briefing, DTDCD, Subj: The Cavalry Squadron—RSTA (Reconnaissance 

Surveillance and Target Acquisition Squadron): Doctrine Overview & Practical 

Exercise, “Reconnaissance in Support of Urban Operations,” c. 2001, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, Transformation/RSTA.

78. Armor Conference Briefing, Captains Athey and Denny, Subj: RSTA 

Squadron, 22 May 2000.

79. FM 3-20.971 (2002), 1-1.

80. Ibid., 1-2 to 1-3.

81. Ibid., 1-13 to 1-15, quotation from page 3-1.

82. Ibid., 3-6, 3-15, 3-18, 3-28 to 3-30.

83. Ibid., 3-15 to 3-20.

84. Ibid., 3-21 to 3-22.

85. Captain Christopher D. Kolenda, “Screen in Depth,” Armor CII, no. 3 

(May–June 1993): 14–15.

86. FM 3-20.971 (2002), 4-10 to 4-11, 4-16, 4-30, 4-33 to 4-35.

87. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2002).

88. Armor Conference Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Jim Berg, Subj: 

Doctrine Overview, 20 May 2001.

89. FM 3-20.98 (2002).

90. Ibid., 3-2.

91. Ibid., 2-35 to 2-36, 2-38, 3-19.

92. Ibid., 1-2.

93. Ibid., 1-25 to 1-27, 1-29.

94. US Army Armor Center and School, ST 3-20.983, Reconnaissance 

Handbook (Fort Knox, KY: USAARMC and School, 2002).

95. Briefing, TDCD, Subj: FM 3-90.3 (FM 71-3): The Mounted Brigade 

Combat Team Information Brief, 2002, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2002 

Annual Command History files.

96. Briefing, Sergeant First Class Matthew Sheets, Subj: FM 3-20.8: 

Cavalry Gunnery, 2002, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2002 Annual Command 

History files.

97. Armor Conference Briefing, Major Ricketts, Subj: Situational 

Awareness, 23 May 2001.

98. Armor Conference Briefing, Captains Athey and Denny, Subj: RSTA 

Squadron, 22 May 2000.

99. Captain David A. Meyer, “On a Wing and a Prayer: Reversing the Trend 

in BCT ISR and Shaping Operations,” Armor CXII, no. 4 (July–August 2003): 

22–25; Center for Army Lessons Learned, CTC Trends: National Training Center, 

No. 03-10 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003), 5–

11; Center for Army Lessons Learned, CTC Trends: National Training Center, No. 

03-11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003), 4–9.
478

Chapter 8

100. Department of the Army, FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1996).

101. Department of the Army, FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1995); Captain William E. Benson, “The 

Cavalry Paradigm: ‘We Aren’t Training as We Intend to Fight,’” Armor CX, no. 4 

(July–August 2001): 8–9.

102. Benson, “The Cavalry Paradigm: ‘We Aren’t Training as We Intend to 

Fight,’” 8–9.

103. Ibid., 10.

104. Captain Scott K. Thomson, “Focused Reconnaissance and Developing 

Battlespace in the Armored Cavalry Troop,” Armor CXII, no. 2 (March–April 

2003): 14–15.

105. Benson, “The Cavalry Paradigm: ‘We Aren’t Training as We Intend to 

Fight,’” 10, 15.

106. First Lieutenant John M. Ives, “Armored Cavalry Mortars: Operations 

and Myths,” Armor CX, no. 6 (November–December 2001): 22–26; Chief Warrant 

Officer 3 Christopher A. Saindon, “Targeting and Fire Support with the Brave 

Rifles Regiment,” Armor CXI, no. 2 (March–April 2002): 26–27; First Lieutenant 

Leif Nott and First Lieutenant Ryan Popple, “The Cavalry Team: Scout-Tank 

Integration,” Armor CXI, no. 5 (September–October 2002): 26–31.

107. Captain Jarrod P. Wickline, “Integrating Dismounts Into Reconnaissance 

and Security Operations in the Heavy Cavalry Troop,” Armor CXIII, no. 2 

(March–April 2004): 34–36.

108. Captain Thomas M. Feltey, Major Brian K. Serota, and Captain Erick 

W. Sweet II, “Air-Ground Integration: Proven TTPs,” Armor CXI, no. 4 (July–

August 2002): 22–25, 50, quotation from page 22.

109. E-mail, Colonel Christopher Baggott, Subj: Division Cavalry Future, 

15 February 2000, 1, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Cavalry files.

110. E-mail, Daniel R. Murdock, Subj: Division Cavalry Future, 15 February 

2000, 4, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Cavalry files.

111. Colonel John D. Rosenberger and Major Jerry P. Schulz, “White Paper: 

Cavalry Operations,” Draft, version 6.0, 20 November 2002, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2002 Annual Command History files; Major Louis B. Rago 

II, “Cavalry Transformation: Are We Shooting the Horse Too Soon?” (student 

report, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2002).

112. Colonel (Retired) John D. Rosenberger, “Breaking the Saber: The Subtle 

Demise of Cavalry in the Future Force,” Institute of Land Warfare, Land Power 

Essay No. 04-1, June 2004, http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/

ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Landpower%20Essays/LPE04-1.pdf (accessed 

24 February 2009); Timothy L. Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of 

Information Superiority,” Parameters (Spring 2000): 13–29.

113. Major Michael C. Kasales, “Reconnaissance and Security Forces in the 

New Heavy Division Structure,” Armor CIX, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 27.

114. Sergeant First Class Frank R. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task 
479

Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

Force and Brigade Recon Troop Scout Platoons,” Armor CIX, no. 6 (November–

December 2000): 11.

115. Lieutenant Colonel Bart Howard and Captain Jeff Ramsey, “Employing 

the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop,” Armor CXI, no. 2 (March–April 2002): 17–

19.

116. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon Troop 

Scout Platoons,” 7; Kasales, “Reconnaissance and Security Forces in the New 

Heavy Division Structure,” 27–28.

117. Staff Sergeant Matthew Mayo, “Adjustments to the Task Force Scout 

Platoon,” Armor CXIII, no. 2 (March–April 2004): 19; Captain T.J. Johnson, 

“TOW-HMMWV’s Thermal Sight Works Fine for Light Cavalry,” Armor CXI, 

no. 1 (January–February 2002): 3–4.

118. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon Troop 

Scout Platoons,” 8–9, quotation from page 8; First Lieutenant Greg W. Dameron, 

“Training Killers,” Armor CXI, no. 2 (March–April 2002): 5, 47; Captain Ryan 

Seagreaves, “Transforming the Task Force Scout Platoon,” Armor CXII, no. 2 

(March–April 2003): 40–42.

119. “Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS), Tactical Reconnaissance 

Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement (TRACER), Armored Scout and 

Reconnaissance Vehicle (ASRV),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

systems/ground/fscs.htm (accessed 25 February 2009).

120. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon Troop 

Scout Platoons,” 12; Staff Sergeant Brendan F. Kearns, “Scout Platoons Need 

Snipers,” Armor CXII, no. 6 (November–December 2003): 51.

121. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon Troop 

Scout Platoons,” 14.

122. Belonus, “Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon 

Troop Scout Platoons,” 13; Sergeant First Class Harald Jeffery, “CSS and the 

Battalion Scout Platoon,” Armor CX, no. 3 (May–June 2001): 37–39; Howard and 

Ramsey, “Employing the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop,” 19; Captain Geoffrey 

A. Norman, “Planning Scout Casualty Evacuation,” Armor CXII, no. 2 (March–

April 2003): 46–49.

123. Major O. Kent Strader, “Successful Scout Mounted Infiltration,” Armor

CXIII, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 43; Center for Army Lessons Learned, CTC 

Trends: National Training Center, No. 03-10, 5–6, 32–33, 80–81; Center for Army 

Lessons Learned, CTC Trends: National Training Center, No. 03-11, 22–23.

124. Interview, Major Christopher Mahaffey, 15 August 2007, 1–2, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, OIF/3ID/Thunder Run; Memorandum, Major 

Chris L. Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 3ID Operation 

Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 10, Armor Branch Archives, 2003 

Annual Command History files; Major Curtis D. Taylor, “The Transformation 

of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information on the Future Battlefield?” 

(master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 2005), 41.
480

Chapter 8

125. Interview, Major Christopher Mahaffey, 15 August 2007, 1–2.

126. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 41–42, 48.

127. Major J. Bryan Mullins, “Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. 

Cavalry” (student report, SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 50.

128. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 41–42.

129. Interview, Colonel (Promotable) Peter Bayer, 13 August 2007, 2, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, OIF/3ID/Thunder Run.

130. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 44.

131. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 

3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 5, 12–13.

132. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 

3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 10–11, quotation from 

page 11; Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 45–46.

133. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 

2003 3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 10; Taylor, “The 

Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information on the Future 

Battlefield?” 43, quotation from same.

134. Mullins, “Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry,” 53; Taylor, 

“The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information on 

the Future Battlefield?” 45; Jim Lacey, Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s 

Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2007), 148–155.

135. Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, 

Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group, On 

Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 422.

136. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 43–46.

137. Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Terry R. Ferrell and Command Sergeant 

Major Gabriel Berhane, Subj: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 3d Squadron, 7th US 

Cavalry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2003, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2003 Annual Command History files; Major J.D. Keith, “3d 

Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned,” 

Armor CXII, no. 5 (September–October 2003): 28; Taylor, “The Transformation 

of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information on the Future Battlefield?” 

49; Mullins, “Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry,” 51–53.

138. Briefing, Ferrell and Berhane, Subj: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 3d 

Squadron, 7th US Cavalry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), 2003.

139. Keith, “3d Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi 

Freedom Lessons Learned,” 26; Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: 

Who Will Fight For Information on the Future Battlefield?” 47.
481

Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

140. Keith, “3d Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi 

Freedom Lessons Learned,” 28–31.

141. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 

3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 6.

142. Interview, Major Christopher Mahaffey, 15 August 2007, 1–2; Interview, 

Colonel Eric Schwartz, 21 April 2007, 6, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

OIF/3ID/Thunder Run; Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who 

Will Fight For Information on the Future Battlefield?” 46–48; Mullins, “Defining 

the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry,” 50.

143. Dennis Steele, “Baghdad: The Crossroads,” Army Magazine 53, no. 6 

(June 2003): 30–40; Lacey, Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One 

Day Assault on Baghdad, 256–257; David Zucchino, Thunder Run: The Armored 

Strike to Capture Baghdad (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004), 205–

215.

144. Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For 

Information on the Future Battlefield?” 48.

145. E-mail, Lieutenant Colonel Ricky J. Nussio, Subj: HMMWV Use in 

OIF by 3ID, 22 January 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, Cavalry files; 

Mullins, “Defining the Core Competencies of U.S. Cavalry,” 50.

146. Memorandum, Captain Larry Q. Burris, Subj: Operation Iraqi Freedom 

After Action Review Comments, 24 April 2003, 8–9, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, 2003 Annual Command History files; Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: 

Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 

22 October 2003, 9.

147. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, 423.

148. “Scout Platoon Actions on 23 March 03,” included in “Unit History for 

Task Force 3-69—Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

2003, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2003 Annual Command History files; 

Taylor, “The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information 

on the Future Battlefield?” 46.

149. Interview, Colonel Eric Schwartz, 21 April 2007, 6.

150. Memorandum, Captain Larry Q. Burris, Subj: Operation Iraqi Freedom 

After Action Review Comments, 24 April 2003, 8–9.

151. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 

2003 3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 14; Taylor, “The 

Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who Will Fight For Information on the Future 

Battlefield?” 48.

152. In 2003, most units operating in Iraq were equipped with a variant of 

FBCB2 known as Blue Force Tracker, an appliqué system that possessed many of 

the basic capabilities associated with FBCB2. For simplicity, the term FBCB2 is 

used throughout the text.

153. TSM XXI, “FBCB2/BFT-A After Action Review Packet,” following 

items: 3d ID AAR (Major Vogelhut), 31–32, 34; Interview with 3d Squadron, 7th 

Cavalry (Major Brad Gayle, Major John Keith, and Captain Clay Lyle), 59–60, 
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63; Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 3ID 

Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, Enclosure 1, 24 October 2003, 1–8.

154. Frank Tiboni and Matthew French, “Blue Force Tracking Gains Ground,” 

FCW.Com, 22 March 2004, http://www.fcw.como/fcw/articles/2004/0322/tecblueforce-03-22-04.asp (accessed 26 September 2006).

155. Memorandum, Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 6–8 October 2003 

3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 5–7; Enclosure 1 to 

same, 24 October 2003, 1-1 to 1-10.

156. Department of the Army, FM 1, The Army (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), 4–7; Andrew Feickert, “U.S. 

Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research 

Service Report, 6 January 2005, 6–7, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 2005 

ACH/Army/Modularity.

157. Briefing, Subj: This is Modularity: The Redesigned Army, 26 March 

2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command History files; 

Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004, Armor Branch 

Archives, 2004 Annual Command History files.

158. FM 1 (2005), 4–7; Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 

31 March 2004; Armor Conference Briefing, OCOA, Subj: The Modular Army, 17 

May 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual command history files.

159. Initially, the redesigned brigade combat teams were referred to as Units 

of Action. This term was subsequently dropped and for simplicity is not used in 

this text.

160. Briefing, Subj: This is Modularity: The Redesigned Army, 26 March 

2004; News Release, Army Public Affairs, Subj: Army Announces FY05 and 

FY06 Modular Brigade Force Structure Decisions, 23 July 2004, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command History files.

161. News release, Army News Service, Subj: Army Restructure Effort 

Needs Additional Troops Through 2007, 29 January 2004; Ron Martz, “Fort 

Stewart Unit is First to Undergo Reorganization,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 

2 January 2004; Elaine M. Grossman, “Third Infantry Division Redesign May 

Require Thousands More Troops,” Inside the Pentagon, 22 January 2004; Anne 

Plummer, “TRADOC: Analysis Points Toward At Least Four Brigades Per 

Division,” Inside the Army, 26 January 2004; Megan Scully, “U.S. Army Division 

Tries Out New Info Network,” Defense News, 13 September 2004; Feickert, “U.S. 

Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” 7, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, 2004 Annual Command History files; US Government Accountability 

Office, “Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain 

Uncertain,” GAO Report No. 06-548T, 4 April 2006, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, 06ACH/Army/Modularity.

162. Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Initial Impressions Report No. 06-

10: 3ID Modular Force Assessment,” March 2006, ix, x, 8, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, 06ACH/Army/Modularity; Department of Defense, “Modular Army 

Brigades Prepare for Deployment,” 22 November 2004, www.defenselink.mil/

transformation/articles/2004-11/ta112204e.html (accessed 26 February 2009).
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Army Transformation: RSTA Squadrons and ISR Operations

163. FM 1 (2005), 4–7; Briefing, Subj: This is Modularity: The Redesigned 

Army, 26 March 2004; Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 

2004.

164. Grossman, “Third Infantry Division Redesign May Require Thousands 

More Troops”; Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004; 

Major General Terry L. Tucker, “Restructuring the Force,” Armor CXIII, no. 

3 (May–June 2004): 5; Army News Service, “Army Accelerates Conversion of 

Brigade Combat Teams,” 20 December 2006, Army.Mil/News, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, 07ACH/Army/Modularity.

165. Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004; Armor 

Conference Briefing, OCOA, Subj: The Modular Army, 17 May 2004.

166. Major General Terry L. Tucker, “Future Cavalry Organization and the 

Recon Squadron,” Armor CXIII, no. 4 (July–August 2004): 4.

167. Major Christopher Connolly, “Reconstructing the Cavalry Force,” 

Armor CXIII, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 16–18.

168. Ibid., 18.

169. Captain William S. Nance, “The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron 

and the Mechanized Cavalry Group,” Armor CXV, no. 1 (January–February 

2006): 7–11.

170. Major Andrew D. Goldin, “Ruminations on Modular Cavalry,” Armor

CXV, no. 5 (September–October 2006): 13–17, quotation from page 14.

171. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Chester A. Kojro, “Restructuring the 

Cavalry Force: Has the Armor Center Missed its Mark?” Armor CXIV, no. 1 

(January–February 2005): 3.

172. Goldin, “Ruminations on Modular Cavalry,” 15–16; Connolly, 

“Reconstructing the Cavalry Force,” 17–18.

173. Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004.

174. Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004; Armor 

Conference Briefing, OCOA, Subj: The Modular Army, 17 May 2004.

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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations constituted major 

influences on mounted maneuver developments in the years following the initial invasion of Iraq. They generated a wealth of experience 

against which to measure organizational, doctrinal, and materiel changes 

associated with Army Transformation and the transition to modular brigade combat teams (BCTs). Many reconnaissance units found themselves 

employed as maneuver units with a broad range of activities beyond information collection. Others found it difficult to employ doctrinal principles 

based on the use of stealth and technology in major urban areas. Most 

found their capacity for dismounted operations insufficient. Conversely, 

the demand for and effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance remained 

high. These trends raised important questions concerning doctrine and 

organization that facilitated ongoing efforts to determine the path of future 

development.

Overview

The 2003 capture of Baghdad by coalition forces triggered the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Government authority broke down and 

contributed to widespread civil disorder. Mob action and looting became 

commonplace in Iraqi cities. This sudden change in conditions caught US 

forces unprepared. They struggled to transition from combat to stability 

operations in the absence of clear guidance from higher headquarters. The 

resultant confusion left soldiers struggling with street situations for which 

they were not ready. In Baghdad, the 3d Infantry Division attempted to 

restore order, but the tactics that brought victory on the battlefield no 

longer applied. Subordinate units lacked the means to secure the densely 

populated urban areas that now became their responsibility. Moreover, 

“Guidance on how to handle the chaos and looting of an anarchic urban 

area was missing and the effect was shocking to the units. Small unit leaders were routinely being asked to provide security and management—in 

effect, be the mayor—for tens of thousands of people.”1

Their ability to do so was further undermined by the breakup of teams 

that had fought well together and developed a high degree of cohesion. The 

reassignment of the aviation troop, for example, stripped the 3d Infantry 

Division’s cavalry squadron of its ability to conduct aerial reconnaissance 

and support ground elements with a helicopter reaction force. Small unit 

commanders sought to impose some degree of order on their own authority 
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by establishing checkpoints, conducting presence patrols, and organizing 

humanitarian support. In doing so, they leveraged the experience of 

soldiers who had performed similar tasks in Bosnia and Kosovo. Civil 

affairs personnel arrived to provide assistance, but their tendency to operate 

independent of military organizations undermined their effectiveness. Nor 

did most military commanders possess much experience in coordinating 

their efforts with the efforts of other US Government agencies active in 

Iraq.2

Conditions remained unstable throughout the rest of 2003. The establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority asserted temporary governing powers while plans for a new Iraqi Government materialized. However, 

the provisional body lacked the means to restore basic services, including 

power and water. Coalition forces also proved inadequate to securing Iraqi 

military installations and weapons stores. The disbandment of the Iraqi 

Army and the removal of individuals with a Baath Party membership from 

any government service created a mass of unemployed disgruntled soldiers and bureaucrats with little reason to support coalition efforts.

Opposition to the coalition emerged from this unsettled state of affairs. 

Resistance initially lacked organization and purpose. Random attacks 

tended to be sporadic, poorly planned, and haphazardly executed. By 

2004, a more coherent insurgency had arisen, comprised of several different groups, including al-Qaeda. Muslim clerics opposed to the Western 

presence spurred resistance on the basis of religious principles. Coalition 

forces became the subject of more frequent and better-organized attacks by 

insurgents who demonstrated a willingness to contest openly reconstruction 

and stability actions. They did so through a combination of conventional 

and terrorist tactics. The year witnessed some of the heaviest fighting in 

Fallujah, An Najaf, and Sadr City, where insurgents defended safe havens. 

Coalition personnel and Iraqis seeking to assist the reconstruction of their 

country became prime targets for terrorism. Torture, executions, and death 

squads intimidated local populations and undermined coalition credibility. 

Wherever a coalition presence could not be maintained, insurgents sought 

to expunge all signs of Western support through coercion and violence. 

These activities further destabilized the nation at the same time the Abu 

Ghraib scandal discredited the American military mission. 

In 2005, the election of a transitional Iraqi Government provided a 

promise of hope, but a Sunni boycott of the political process undermined 

its value. While the Sunnis once benefited from the old regime, Shiites 

now dominated the new government, spurring fear that their power would 

permit retribution for their persecution under Saddam Hussein’s rule. The 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

election did not end violence or rapidly improve quality of life. A growing divide emerged between Shiite and Sunni that escalated into civil war 

in 2006. American forces struggled to establish the security necessary for 

reconstruction. In Iraq, suicide bombings rose in frequency, while at home 

public support for the war waned.

President George W. Bush made the unpopular decision to commit 

additional forces to Iraq. These combat organizations focused on reasserting security in Baghdad and establishing a permanent presence among the 

inhabitants. This surge coincided with the success of efforts to work with 

Sunni leaders disenchanted with the brutality of their erstwhile al-Qaeda 

allies. Ex-Sunni insurgents began to help the coalition establish security and 

provide intelligence regarding insurgent activities. Reconstruction efforts 

benefited from a drop in sabotage and terrorist attacks, and Iraq’s economy 

began to recover. The Iraqi Government began to assert its authority, bolstered by a coalition-trained army growing in size and effectiveness. These 

positive developments led American forces to transition to a training and 

support role, gradually turning over primary security responsibility in one 

province after another to the Iraqi Government. At the beginning of 2009, 

an agreement between the US and Iraqi Governments mandated the complete withdrawal of American combat forces by 2011.

Operational Environment

After Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, the focus of American forces 

shifted to COIN, reconstruction, and support for the new Iraqi Government. 

Formation commanders soon discovered that COIN operations rooted in 

Figure 117. Combat elements of the 1st Cavalry Division in Sadr City.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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combat operations alone proved a fool’s game and alienated the population. 

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, commanding the 1st Cavalry Division, 

considered the creation of an effective sewage and solid waste disposal 

system central to the accomplishment of his formation’s overall mission. 

The project provided jobs, improved living conditions, and resulted in 

direct relationships with key local leaders. These positive developments 

eroded insurgent support.3

 Therefore, COIN assumed a multifaceted quality at the unit level. Combat operations occurred simultaneous with efforts 

to improve quality of life, train Iraqi security personnel, promote economic 

opportunity, and support the establishment of a local government. All of 

these actions served to rebuild Iraq, encourage support for the coalition, 

and create an environment anemic to insurgents and terrorists.4

Soldiers required a broader range of skills to perform this mission 

set. Those individuals with prior service in Europe, particularly if they 

participated in operations in Bosnia or Kosovo, were often better prepared 

for the variety of activities required—at least until training in the United 

States became more reflective of conditions in Iraq. Balkan experience 

proved especially useful for the conduct of searches, patrols, checkpoint 

operations, and interaction with the local population.5

Security actions entailed deterrence of insurgence attacks coupled with 

the identification and apprehension of terrorists. Related tasks included the 

removal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the creation of checkpoints, vehicle searches, and identification checks. Within Iraqi towns and 

cities, key facilities required protection, while mounted and dismounted 

patrols sought to prevent insurgent attacks and promote a sense of stability 

among the populace. Checkpoints became commonplace. During the day, 

they tended to be more elaborate and located amid areas of high traffic 

density. Personnel manning them searched vehicles and passengers to disrupt insurgent movement and detain wanted individuals. At night, smaller 

forces conducted rolling checkpoints. Moving under blackout conditions, 

checkpoints targeted vehicles to apprehend criminals and insurgents seeking to benefit from the cover of darkness.6

Active measures included regular sweeps for weapons caches and 

raids on the suspected insurgents. Company and troop level actions often 

included cordon and search operations. Intelligence for these missions 

typically originated with Iraqi citizens. The information was analyzed 

and, if considered valid, a reconnaissance of the objective followed. The 

forces available formed into an outer cordon element, an inner cordon 

component, and an assault team. The first isolated the targeted area. The 

dismounted inner cordon then blocked escape routes from the objective 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

structure. Finally, the assault team secured an entry point, cleared the 

objective, and sought weapons and bomb-making materials.7

In urban areas, mounted and dismounted patrols served to establish the 

coalition presence, but they also helped to identify suspected insurgents and 

gauge local sentiment. Their success often hinged on the patrol members’ 

ability to gain the respect of local inhabitants. Only through frequent 

interaction could soldiers gain an understanding of the neighborhoods in 

their area of operation. When available, the addition of tactical human 

intelligence (HUMINT) teams to these patrols could significantly enhance 

the quality and nature of information gained. Initially, high-mobility, 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) constituted the principal 

mode of transport for these patrols. The vehicle doors were removed to 

improve visibility and facilitate return fire from all passengers in the event 

of an attack. As the frequency of IED attacks rose, this mode of operations 

became increasingly hazardous.8

 To better protect its patrols, the 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment utilized its armored combat vehicles to create 

a loose cordon around the area in which dismounted patrols operated. The 

mounted element helped to deter interference with the soldiers on foot and 

doubled as a quick reaction force.9

Dismounted patrolling constituted a common activity for all American 

soldiers, including armor crewmen and cavalry scouts. For mounted soldiers, the frequency of dismounted operations necessitated the development 

of skills more commonly associated with infantry. Indeed, the emphasis on 

dismounted operations led to recommendations to provide training, battle 

drills, and weapons instruction more akin to riflemen. Such measures had 

the undesired effect of eroding those skills specific to mounted maneuver 

combat. Armor and cavalry units lacked the personnel to sustain regular foot patrols. Although reconnaissance organizations included scouts 

intended for actions away from their vehicles, they were too few in number 

for the scope and frequency of dismounted missions required in Iraq. To 

generate more soldiers for such operations, some armored reconnaissance 

squadrons merged headquarters and mortar platoon personnel to form an 

ad hoc dismount team. Leaving one or more vehicles behind during a mission freed their crews for foot operations. To strengthen the firepower of 

dismounted teams, most units collected additional small arms while some 

created their own sniper teams. Cavalry organizations also applied hunterkiller concepts to dismounted operations, particularly in the interdiction of 

hostile IED teams and during route security missions. They also created 

dismounted small kill teams to ambush insurgents attempting to establish 

IED attacks. These teams relied on marksmanship, stealthy movement, 

and accurate intelligence regarding insurgent activities for success.10
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Military operations in Iraq depended on a network of convoys to 

provide regular deliveries of supplies. These convoys became prime targets for insurgents, making their security a standard mission for most 

units.11 Typical protection methods included regular route reconnaissance 

over roads traveled by supply vehicles and the provision of an escort to 

accompany the convoy. The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted 

over 1,000 such missions during its 2003–2004 rotation. It found a ratio 

of 4 armed HMMWVs to every 12 supply vehicles sufficient security.12

Indeed, HMMWVs were common escort vehicles throughout Iraq, but 

their use in this role led to improvised modifications to improve protection and firepower.13 Convoy escort necessarily diverted units from other 

tasks, but the related personnel, vehicle, and maintenance requirements 

made it especially resource intense. Hence, when the 1st Squadron, 14th 

Cavalry Regiment assumed responsibility for protecting supply traffic in 

its operational area, the mission necessitated the employment of the entire 

squadron.14

Convoys were subject to a variety of attacks. The most common 

involved IEDs ranging from small explosives hidden near a roadway to 

multiple artillery rounds daisy chained together. Dead animals, roadside 

trash, guardrails, and light poles became common locations for such 

Figure 118. 1st Cavalry Division HMMWV and crew engaging 

insurgents in An Najaf.

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491

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

devices. IED use was sometimes coordinated with a more traditional 

ambush. Alternatively, assailants targeted a single vehicle for an IED 

attack to cause casualties. Medical personnel attempting to assist the 

victims then came under small arms or sniper fire. Vehicle-borne IEDs 

were used either as stationary car bombs or as mobile platforms that could 

be detonated alongside convoy vehicles. Drive-by attacks by insurgents 

firing small arms and RPGs also proved common. Other than suicide 

bombings, most attacks were of a hit and run nature and reflected a degree 

of planning.15

Convoy security encompassed several different actions. Regular 

reconnaissance of supply routes facilitated identification and removal of 

IEDs. Establishing observation posts (OPs) along a convoy route also provided a degree of security, but this method proved less effective in urban 

areas. Buildings provided cover and concealment for the initial ambush 

and simplified escape.16 An effective but labor-intensive approach lay in 

the combined use of OPs, route clearance, and regular route reconnaissance. OPs watched for efforts to emplace IEDs or prepare an ambush. 

Soldiers manning these posts generally included a sniper whose task 

lay in eliminating insurgents planting bombs. Route clearance entailed 

the removal of all trash and potential items along roadways that might 

hide explosive devices. This task required a sustained effort over time. 

Afterward, regular patrols over the same route served to keep it clear of 

fresh attempts to place IEDs.17 Special techniques emerged to maneuver 

and secure the convoy through congested built-up areas, particularly in 

the danger areas posed by traffic circles, major intersections, overpasses, 

and traffic stops. Aviation support for convoys proved especially effective, 

since the precise location of a target could be relayed via Force XXI Battle 

Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) for aerial platforms to attack.18

Initially, convoys under attack were trained to fight through the ambush 

and continue movement toward their objective. Similarly, vehicles that 

broke down were pushed to predetermined safe areas before any repair 

effort began.19 When a route became subject to repeated attacks, convoys 

were redirected to less vulnerable roadways. These generally proved more 

circuitous and less developed. They remained clear only until insurgents 

shifted their focus to them. This failure to contest principal roadways 

caused frustration among some commanders who felt that the initiative 

was being ceded to the insurgents. Cavalry commanders responsible for 

convoy escort also preferred to exploit their superior firepower by counterattacking the insurgents.20 In 2006, the passive reaction to attacks on convoys gave way to a more aggressive one in which escorts were directed to 

engage and destroy the assailants.21
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All military organizations needed to maintain bases from which to 

conduct operations. These installations required staffing and security. 

Initially, forward operating bases provided secure areas to which soldiers 

returned after completing missions. In accordance with the new COIN 

doctrine adopted in 2006, most units shifted to the creation of combat 

outposts directly among the population. This transition from remote locations to a permanent presence directly amidst the civilian populace helped 

to improve intelligence, stability, and security for the immediate vicinity. 

However, most outposts came under attack shortly after their creation, due 

to the threat they posed to insurgent activity.22

Mounted units faced another challenge in Iraq: maintenance. Large 

operational areas, frequent long-distance travel, and operations conducted 

on varied terrain generated considerable wear and tear on vehicles resulting 

in increased maintenance requirements. The Strykers of the 1st Squadron, 

14th Cavalry Regiment experienced frequent steering faults and a high 

demand for tire replacements. Hull damage also resulted from the installation of slat armor. Designed to protect the vehicles from rocket propelled 

grenade (RPG) attacks, the armor increased vehicle width. In congested 

urban areas, vehicles so equipped were more prone to collisions with other 

vehicles and buildings. When the unit moved to border security operations 

along the Syrian border, the rugged terrain, dust, and high temperatures 

increased the number of engine and power train failures. Electronic components experienced more failure rates due to a combination of high temperature and the continuous power demands of the communications and 

surveillance systems.23 Tracked vehicles experienced additional problems 

from sustained operations on paved roads. These included rapid wear of 

track pads, road wheels, and suspensions. Shortages of parts sometimes 

resulted in otherwise minor problems deadlining vehicles for extended 

periods.24

The continuous wear and tear on men and materiel was often the most 

tangible experience of COIN operations. The insurgents proved adaptive 

and elusive, frustrating efforts to eliminate them. They observed American 

units and adjusted their tactics to exploit perceived weaknesses. US 

commanders responded by changing their techniques frequently, which 

resulted in a continuous cycle of change as both sides sought to outfox the 

other. The insurgents also operated as a collection of cells, each operating 

semi-autonomously from one another. Decentralized leadership tended to 

mitigate the effects of leader loss and complicated efforts to eradicate an 

insurgent organization in its entirety. Conversely, insurgents deliberately 

targeted key leaders among the Iraqi security forces to erode their morale. 

Command guidance occurred through direct personal contact, cell phones, 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

and conferences held in mosques, which coalition forces were prohibited 

from attacking to avoid offending the Muslim population. The insurgents 

financed their operations through criminal activities, including carjackings 

and kidnappings.25

In 2004, the most common forms of threat attacks included small arms 

fire, IED attacks, ambushes, and mortar attacks. Efforts were also made—

with some success—to shoot down helicopters. Coalition checkpoints, 

convoys, and patrols were frequent targets for attacks that varied in their 

intensity and sophistication. Mortars conducted harassing attacks either 

alone or in conjunction with other insurgent operations. Periodically, they 

were massed to unleash a barrage on coalition positions. Firefights often 

were initiated at very short ranges in urban environments to offset the 

effects of superior American firepower and artillery support. Foreign fighters often provided the insurgency with a degree of military experience 

and planning capability that resulted in more sophisticated and dangerous 

operations.26

Insurgent attacks tended to become more lethal over time. IEDs became 

more sophisticated in their construction and detonation method. Those 

using large caliber shells or explosively formed penetrators proved capable 

of destroying tanks. In early 2007, American forces reported an increase 

in assaults on military bases and the use of more powerful explosives. 

In some instances, chlorine gas was included in IEDs to add a chemical 

Figure 119. The An Najaf battlefield, scene of heavy fighting against Shiite 

militia using the urban area and large, ancient cemetery for cover.

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dimension to these attacks.27 Noting the effectiveness of American snipers, 

insurgents formed their own sniper teams to target key personnel such as 

medics, chaplains, engineers, officers, and tank drivers.28

Countering the insurgent threat required an understanding of Arab 

culture and the application of this knowledge to every mission.29 Without 

an understanding of Iraqi society and the Arabic language, the ability to 

gather intelligence so vital to COIN proved minimal. Early operations 

were hindered by the general inability of soldiers to understand Arabic or 

comprehend Iraq’s tribal, religious, and ethnic divisions. One unit’s after 

action analysis of its first deployment noted:

Our unwillingness to shed the “heavy mentality” and 

conduct dismounted patrols in the communities denied 

a “human face” to the locals. Over time, we learned 

how important interpersonal relationships are in the 

Arab culture, but we were slow in effectively using this 

knowledge.30

Lack of cultural awareness exasperated other problems facing soldiers. Frequent changes to the rules of engagement that governed when 

and how force should be employed against the populace caused frustration.31 Their correct implementation depended on an understanding of the 

Iraqi people that took time to develop: 

There is a lot of tension between Iraqis and American 

forces. Some of this tension is understandable. It should 

not matter what phase of the operation we are in to determine what is right and proper behavior and treatment of 

people and what is not proper. For example, when is it 

appropriate to fire a warning shot or hand out food and 

humanitarian items. Every soldier (from the chain of command down to the private) is poorly trained on when to 

use such varying levels of actions with and against civilians. The statement “react if you feel threatened” is inadequate since soldiers have not been trained to know when 

they should feel threatened in a non-war environment.32

The ability to speak to Iraqis in their own language increased mission effectiveness. Generally, the Arabic speaking skills of American soldiers improved over time, but the lack of language skills hampered initial 

operations. The 1st Cavalry Division found that tactical HUMINT teams 

intended to gather information proved ineffective because they could not 

communicate with local civilians. Lacking Arabic linguists, units became 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

dependent on interpreters whose quality and motivation varied. Most did 

not remain with the same unit very long and, therefore, developed no 

bonds with it.33

Even without a language or cultural barrier, the dispersed nature of 

operations complicated intelligence collection. Decentralized operations 

resulted in small units operating at considerable distances from higher 

headquarters with their superior ability to analyze intelligence data. Troop 

and company commands shouldered a greater share of the responsibility 

for analysis in addition to information collection. They were not staffed 

to analyze data, monitor events, and manage multiple, simultaneous 

operations. Personnel attachments from senior headquarters sometimes 

alleviated the problem, but more often the unit simply struggled to make 

do with existing resources. Some units endeavored to form and train 

their own organic tactical HUMINT team. Others benefited from the 

compression of unit areas of responsibility that resulted from the 2007 

influx of American soldiers into the Baghdad area, but an ideal solution 

did not exist. A similar and related problem surrounded the management 

of civil affairs operations and reconstruction contracts. Not surprisingly, 

recommended improvements included the addition of more staff personnel 

at squadron and troop levels.34

To cope with the array of intelligence and civil related actions required, 

the headquarters of Task Force 1-77 Armor created its own civil-military 

operations section and an information operations cell. The personnel for this 

staff expansion came from attached psychological operations (PSYOPs) 

and civil affairs teams. These elements provided a core of expertise to 

which additional officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were 

assigned from within the task force. The civil-military section participated 

in mission planning and assisted the execution of all contracting and 

construction projects. The information cell supported mission planning, 

coordinated efforts among the task force and its subordinate company 

teams, and evaluated the overall civil-military and information operations 

effort. Further enhancements to the task force’s ability to implement 

actions involving the populace came through liaison with Iraqi security 

forces.35

Cultural awareness and language ability directly facilitated the fostering 

of relationships with local leaders and residents. These links proved vital 

to implementing public works projects and gathering intelligence. The 

dispersion of American forces meant that fostering constructive ties with 

the local populace often fell to small unit leaders. Some of this work 

entailed financial skills and familiarity with contracting processes. It also 
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involved the disbursement of cash. Such skills generally did not constitute 

much if any of the predeployment training for the junior officers who 

became responsible for their implementation. Ready or not, company 

grade commanders often found themselves invested with considerable 

diplomatic and economic power. In the words of one observer, “Young 

Army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with 

large sectors to run and near autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they 

are the ‘ground-owners.’ In practice, they are power brokers.”36

Over time, the effectiveness of American COIN efforts improved. The 

ability of soldiers to understand their operational environment, their enemy, 

and the Iraqi people increased. As it did so, soldiers became more adept at 

gathering intelligence and making assessments from it. In this manner, the 

war in Iraq tended to validate the emphasis of recent reconnaissance doctrine on social, political, economic, religious, and demographic factors. 

Careful tracking of all activities within an area of operation provided an 

ability to conduct trend analysis and anticipate enemy attacks. In responding to improvised explosive device attacks, for example, this type of information helped to identify and locate the chain of operatives responsible 

for making the device, deploying it, and triggering its detonation.37 The 

capture of Saddam Hussein proved an exercise in comprehending family 

and tribal ties.

Mounted Reconnaissance

Between 2004 and 2008, most Active Component divisions were 

in the process of transitioning to the modular BCT configuration of 

two combined arms battalions and a reconnaissance squadron. Their 

deployment sometimes occurred before completion of this change, 

resulting in deficiencies in materiel and personnel. Once in Iraq, brigades 

dispersed their subordinate assets to cover the large areas of responsibility 

assigned, which included towns and cities. Attachments of Iraqi security 

forces and assets from higher headquarters only partially offset the effects 

of this dispersion.

Under the modular design, reconnaissance squadrons constituted the 

primary means of information collection for each brigade. In the heavy 

brigade combat team (HBCT), the armored reconnaissance squadron bore 

responsibility for building and sustaining situational understanding. It 

gathered the intelligence necessary for precision maneuver and through 

continuous information acquisition and dissemination provided security 

for its parent brigade. This concept of operations proved unrealistic in 

Iraq. There the small size of the BCTs coupled with their large areas of 

operation necessitated the employment of the reconnaissance squadron as 
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another maneuver element. It gathered information, but it also performed 

a much broader range of mounted and dismounted operations.38

Employment in this manner contradicted its information-gathering 

configuration. The unit lacked the combat power and the personnel to 

perform this expanded mission set, particularly in comparison with the 

now defunct division cavalry squadron. Augmentation and improvised 

solutions ensued. In Iraq, the armored reconnaissance squadrons needed 

more combat power and the ability to provide effective and lethal 

overwatch for scouts.

The squadron’s effectiveness depended on a digital communications 

network and the availability of sufficient sensors, radars, and longrange advanced scout surveillance systems (LRAS3s). Yet many units 

commenced operations without their full complement of these devices. 

Moreover, the operational realities of Iraq necessitated the execution of 

more traditional security missions than those depicted in a doctrinal base 

focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations 

and the new contact paradigm’s “quality of firsts.” The ability to identify 

the enemy first and develop a situation outside direct contact proved nearly 

impossible in crowded urban environments in which insurgents blended 

into the civilian population. Assumptions regarding the attainment of 

information superiority via technical means shaped the squadron’s design, 

but they proved largely unfounded in Iraq. The reconnaissance unit proved 

Figure 120. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment mounted patrol.

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unable to realize the expectations that engendered its creation, and it lacked 

the organic means to fight for information otherwise unobtainable.39

Nor could it rely on the close support of aviation assets, since it possessed none. Under modularity, aviation became consolidated in separate 

brigades that simplified satisfaction of multiple requirements, including 

training and maintenance. The absence of organic aviation in the reconnaissance squadron reduced the amount of helicopter support available 

and prevented the close integration of aviation and ground components 

otherwise possible.40 Squadron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provided 

some of the support once provided by helicopters, but a lack of personnel skilled in their use limited their accessibility. Therefore, they tended 

to be consolidated under division control and less available to small unit 

commanders.41

Many field commanders considered the net result of consolidated UAV 

and aviation support a reduction in aerial support for brigade and smaller 

unit operations. Department of the Army force designers saw few alternatives. Insufficient personnel and platforms existed to assign UAVs and 

aviation to each BCT in the numbers desired. Without additional funding, 

consolidation at a higher echelon proved one of few options left. Indeed, 

the question of UAV and aviation allocation exemplified the tradeoffs the 

Army had to accept to transition to a modular force structure. The BCT 

constituted a compromise solution, but commanders in the field were only 

too aware of the capabilities it lacked.42

Not surprisingly, when a BCT did receive aviation support, coordination issues emerged between the ground element and the external aerial 

attachment. To ensure effective synchronization of the BCT and attached 

aviation, the Army leadership developed the brigade aviation element. 

This six-man team constituted an organic cell with the expertise necessary 

to integrate aviation and UAV operations with those of the brigade. They 

also helped to manage the airspace over the brigade and assisted in mission 

planning. Although the brigade aviation element could not replace organic 

aviation support, it could ensure the effective employment of those aerial 

assets that became temporarily available.43

Armored reconnaissance squadrons fared better in securing attachments of civil affairs, PSYOPs, and HUMINT collection teams. These 

assets boosted the squadron’s ability to gather information, support 

reconstruction, and improve civil-military relations. The manner of their 

employment, however, depended on the squadron commander. In the case 

of the 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, these attachments were configured into a separate platoon and provided with their own security. The 
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consolidation of special skill sets made it especially effective in gathering 

intelligence and working with the local populace and government, particularly in the execution of reconstruction projects.44

The reconnaissance platoons of heavy brigade combat teams possessed 

a less than ideal platform mix. Each platoon included three M3s and five 

HMMWVs. While this configuration provided a degree of firepower and 

protection, it could not entirely offset the HMMWV’s vulnerability. The 

unarmored version initially employed proved susceptible to most insurgent weapons. Field solutions to improve their survivability included sand 

bags, Kevlar blankets, and bolted on steel plates. More than one National 

Guard unit improvised armor protection with the help of local welding 

companies before deploying to Iraq, and one resorted to painting its doors 

the same color as armored HMMWVs to confuse would-be assailants.45

The problem of HMMWV survivability intensified in the months 

following the cessation of major combat operations. Many formations 

increased their use of the vehicle to present a less-threatening demeanor 

to the populace. Increased violence aimed at the coalition reversed this 

trend, triggering demands for more armored vehicles, including tanks. 

Production and delivery of the M1114 up-armored HMMWV increased 

along with specially manufactured armor kits that could be installed in 

the field. Indeed, a shipment of M1114s intended for Israel was redirected 

to Iraq to meet the spike in demand. The need for more armor protection 

drew Congressional attention and resulted in allegations of Army neglect 

and misjudgment.46

Increased fielding of the M1114 did not provide scouts with a better 

platform. The M1114 offered better protection to its passengers, but not to 

Figure 121. 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment soldiers establishing a cordon to 

prevent the escape of potential terrorists during a search operation.

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its gunner, who remained in an exposed position. Dangling electrical lines 

that hung low in many urban areas posed an added danger of electrocution 

for gunners. During fighting in An Najaf, tanks preceded the HMMWVs, 

relying on their height and bulk to tear down low electrical lines.47 The 

development of an improved weapons station and the crew remotely 

operated weapon system (CROWS) reduced this vulnerability, but such 

enhancements did not save the vehicle from destruction or major damage. 

It did prove a lifesaver to many soldiers, but often was destroyed in the 

process. Its heavier weight reduced mobility, while its different handling 

requirements necessitated special training to prevent rollovers. Its boxlike configuration remained susceptible to mines and IEDs that exploded 

beneath it. The vehicle also reduced passenger visibility. By 2005, little 

disagreement existed in the armor community that the HMMWV, particularly the M1114, was not an ideal reconnaissance vehicle. However, while 

improvements and a new solution were sought, it remained a better choice 

than other immediately available alternatives.48

Reconnaissance doctrine anticipated the use of the FBCB2 and 

LRAS3 to offset HMMWV vulnerability. Ideally, these devices permitted 

scouts to observe and report hostile activity outside direct fire engagement ranges. In Iraq these expectations were only partially realized. The 

LRAS3 did permit scouts to observe hostile actions at a safe distance, 

and it proved reliable and popular. Its value diminished in the crowded 

urban areas where insurgents often operated.49 Similarly, FBCB2 proved 

an effective means of communications and reporting, often being able to 

transmit much further than FM radio. Its ability to transmit digital imagery and automatically track friendly forces proved invaluable to building 

a common operational picture. Yet despite dramatic increases in FBCB2 

fielding, most units did not possess their full complement. When available, they made many converts among commanders and staffs. Still, most 

soldiers lacked the expertise to repair them when they malfunctioned, 

resulting in the permanent loss of their capabilities. The ability of FBCB2 

to interact with other digital command systems also remained a work in 

progress, although significant improvements in interoperability occurred.50

All of these factors made the armored reconnaissance squadron the 

subject of criticism by those who believed a more robust organization was 

required. An imbalance existed between the unit’s organizational capabilities and the mission set required in Iraq. Conversely, the experience of 

the 3d Infantry Division’s cavalry squadron during the drive to Baghdad 

seemed to underscore the importance of sufficient strength to respond to 

multiple threats, fight for information, and sustain combat operations. The 
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armored reconnaissance squadron lacked these qualities, because it was 

not designed to operate in this manner.51

Recommendations emerged to improve its ability to perform independent operations and execute counterreconnaissance and economy of force 

operations. The most common suggestions included more dismounts and 

the addition of tanks. In the field, the latter could be provided by shifting 

a tank company from one of the combined arms battalions. This solution 

reduced maneuver battalion strength, but made the squadron capable of 

acting as a brigade guard or covering force—roles which the maneuver 

battalions already performed with their own assets.52

The desire to bolster the reconnaissance squadron reflected the need 

for an organization capable of reconnaissance and security missions rather 

than the reconnaissance and surveillance emphasis originally envisioned. 

The collection of organic skills and assets found in armored cavalry organizations made them likely models for a reorganized squadron. Cavalry 

units possessed decentralized logistics support and a combined arms 

nature at the small unit level considered ideal for COIN operations. The 

contrast in capabilities between the armored reconnaissance squadron and 

parallel cavalry organizations led to recommendations within the senior 

leadership to transform each squadron into an armored cavalry unit. This 

approach proved less costly than adding a third maneuver battalion to each 

brigade, but it still constituted a major bill for the Army. Another proposal added more scouts, bolstered each troop with two tank platoons, and 

called for the replacement of all M1114s with M3s. Any change in organization, however, necessitated competition for resources within a military 

establishment committed to Future Combat System (FCS) development, 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continued implementation of 

Transformation goals.53

Armored Cavalry

Armored cavalry served as the standard of comparison for the new 

reconnaissance squadrons. The former’s more robust, combined arms 

nature compared favorably to the latter, although the reconnaissance 

squadrons were not designed to perform the same mission set. Modularity 

further drained the force structure of armored cavalry, leaving the 3d 

Armored Cavalry as the only heavy armored cavalry regiment (ACR) in the 

Active Component. Its preparations for initial deployment to Iraq focused 

on conventional operations and included the activation of a second troop 

of attack helicopters. The regiment arrived in Iraq in early 2003, but too 

late to participate in the drive to Baghdad. Its mission entailed securing 
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and stabilizing Al Anbar province in western Iraq. This area encompassed 

some 140,000 square miles and amounted to nearly a third of Iraq. It also 

shared long borders with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Its population 

included many Baath Party members and individuals loyal to Saddam 

Hussein’s regime. Coalition information on the province proved limited.54

The regiment became the core of a regimental combat team strengthened through additional troop attachments to 8,300 soldiers. Its principal activities included reconnaissance to identify insurgents, the removal 

of Baathists, and the elimination of anticoalition media sources. Combat 

operations focused on the destruction of insurgent camps and weapons 

caches. Parallel civil-military operations served as a conduit for the allocation of money for reconstruction projects and UN food deliveries. These 

actions helped to identify both local leaders and those individuals hostile 

to the coalition. Regular meetings with local sheiks and tribal members 

followed to build working relationships and preempt terrorist actions. 

Money was also used to influence activity, because “the introduction of 

American currency to the population does wonders for operations and 

intelligence.”55

One regimental squadron assumed responsibility for border security, but the magnitude of the task required it to limit its focus to known 

crossing points and waterholes. Local Bedouins provided intelligence on 

Figure 122. Dismounted patrols became the norm for armor and 

cavalry soldiers.

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individuals attempting to enter Iraq and engage in operations against the 

coalition. The dispersal of the regiment to provide a presence throughout 

the province necessitated the creation of a network of forward operating 

bases and regular supply convoys. Both the installations and the convoys 

required security details, although efforts to train new Iraqi security personnel offered a source of additional manpower.56

The broad mission set of the regiment included direct engagement of 

insurgents. Combat demonstrated the value of heavy mounted maneuver 

forces capable of closing with hostile forces in all terrain and destroying 

them. Against sometimes fanatical resistance, armored cavalry platforms 

proved largely immune and much more resistant to the IED attacks, which 

posed a common threat throughout the province: 

M1 tanks are nearly invincible in an insurgency. Very few 

weapons the enemy possesses can disable, or much less 

destroy one. They create a powerful psychological force 

on the enemy (who only rarely directly attack them) and 

give soldiers both on and operating with the tank added 

confidence.57

Organic aviation served to provide security for ground troops, clear rooftops of threat forces in urban areas, and serve as aerial retransmission 

stations. Against ambushes, soldiers were encouraged to—

. . . try to trap the enemy by intersecting your fields of 

fire. If you can cut off his escape routes, you can trap him 

into a small area. If you can pinpoint a building where fire 

came from, level the building. The enemy has the uncanny 

ability to know where you are at all times. Vehicles cannot 

approach stealthily.58

Such tactics suited the regiment’s combat capabilities, but their impact on 

public support was much more uncertain.

Operations in western Iraq demonstrated the importance of effective 

communications and navigation aids. The dispersed nature of regimental 

operations resulted in many units moving beyond FM radio range. Hence, 

FBCB2 became critical for sustained communications in addition to its 

value in tracking operations and facilitating casualty evacuation. Together 

with satellite imagery and GPS devices, FBCB2 ensured the availability 

of an exact grid coordinate and digital image of each targeted objective. 

Conversely, paper maps wore out from weather and the impact of daily 

use, while their 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scales often proved impractical 

for detailed tactical planning. Imagery maps proved ideal for navigation 
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and planning, but they were often in short supply. Scouts especially felt 

the shortage, because “more often than not, a scout platoon of three independently working sections had one or two imagery maps to navigate and 

conduct operations with. This is insufficient and unnecessary.”59

Scouts also labored under other problems. Their training did not prepare them for COIN operations. Hence, their information collection efforts 

did not initially focus on religious, political, and demographic issues. 

They searched for IEDs over long patrol routes in unarmored HMMWVs, 

while inadequate night vision devices required constant redistribution to 

ensure their availability to those teams participating in night operations. 

Scout shotgun use increased once the value of such weapons in breaching 

gates and doors as well as cowing hostile crowds became clear. Bradleyequipped scouts, however, appreciated their vehicle’s reliability, firepower, 

and armored protection.60

The regiment departed from Iraq in March 2004, returning for a second 

tour of duty in February 2005. In the interim, training focused on COIN 

operations and cultural awareness, exemplified by mandatory Arabic language training and the study of Iraq’s history. When it returned to Iraq, 

the 3d Armored Cavalry commenced operations south of Baghdad, where 

insurgents planned and prepared attacks in the capital. With the exception 

of the 3d Squadron, the regiment was redeployed northwest of Baghdad, 

where its operations focused on Tal Afar. This city had become a staging 

area for insurgents crossing the Syrian border en route for Mosul to operate against coalition and Iraqi Government forces there. Tal Afar had also 

become a safe haven for terrorists and insurgents, particularly in that part 

of the city where narrow streets and sturdy structures made movement by 

armored vehicles difficult.61

To reduce this strongpoint, the regiment first sought to reduce the 

flow of foreign fighters into Tal Afar. Along the Iraqi-Syrian border, one 

ground cavalry squadron together with attached Iraqi soldiers focused on 

the interdiction of infiltrators. Locations noted for providing temporary 

housing for foreign fighters were taken by American soldiers and secured 

by Iraqis. Outside Tal Afar, the regiment built a berm and ring of checkpoints to control movement into and out of the city. Intelligence operations helped to identify local leaders, tribal affiliations, and kinship ties. 

This information resulted in the roundup of many insurgents, including 

those seeking to escape from the city. With the city effectively isolated, 

the regiment began methodical clearing operations. Close integration of 

aviation and ground elements simplified the task of identifying, tracking, 

and engaging insurgents. The creation of outposts linked by regular patrols 
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throughout the city then secured areas taken through combat and ensured 

a permanent presence among the population. Interaction with local leaders 

fostered a new city government and police force to prevent the return of 

insurgents. The success of these measures made the regiment’s actions a 

model for subsequent operations in other parts of Iraq.62

The 3d Squadron 

functioned independently of the regiment. 

It operated near Baghdad attached to other 

commands, ultimately 

operating under six 

different brigades and 

two divisions. Despite 

these changes, its area 

of operation remained 

the built-up area immediately south of the capital. The squadron’s mission lay in establishing a 

stable and secure environment in the face of staunch opposition. Related 

operations included training Iraqi forces and securing the main supply 

route for coalition forces in Baghdad. The squadron undertook all of these 

actions simultaneously. It also performed some civil-military actions, but a 

lack of funds prevented widespread use of reconstruction projects and jobs 

to draw local residents away from supporting insurgents.63

The squadron faced several insurgent groups that continuously modified their tactics in actions against the cavalry. The squadron first seized 

houses from which to launch patrols. These small bases, manned by Iraqi 

and American soldiers, became staging areas for further operations. They 

were linked together via OPs and regular combat patrols by tanks and 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Over time, the 3d Squadron steadily expanded 

its presence, even in the face of regular attacks that utilized powerful IEDs 

capable of destroying armored vehicles. October 2005 alone witnessed 

132 attacks on the squadron.64

Against an elusive, adaptive enemy who routinely exploited local 

ambivalence to the coalition presence, the squadron relied heavily on 

intelligence and trend analysis to pinpoint insurgents. It developed lists of 

suspicious personnel and known terrorists and established a roster of the 

different insurgent organizations and their chain of command. This information guided combat operations, including one in which the squadron 

sought to eliminate multiple insurgent commanders at once. The attack 

Figure 123. American trucks burn after an attack 

on a convoy.

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failed when Iraqi government officials leaked news of the pending action. 

Nevertheless, the steady collection and analysis of information permitted development of a clear picture of threat activity. It became possible, 

for example, to track bomb maker activity by the configuration of their 

IEDs. Ultimately, intelligence efforts culminated in combat missions to 

eliminate or capture insurgents. Aerial reconnaissance provided digital 

photographs of target locations in advance, while the actual execution of 

a mission was monitored by UAVs. The tactics employed varied, but success often depended on the effectiveness of blocking forces preventing 

insurgent escapes from a targeted locale.65

The success of the 3d Armored Cavalry stemmed partly from its 

organic capabilities, particularly combat power and intelligence collection 

and assessment. It proved able to not only collect information but follow 

up with combat operations in sometimes extremely hostile environments. 

This experience encouraged criticism of the assumptions underpinning 

the shift in reconnaissance doctrine toward ISR concepts and away from 

traditional cavalry missions. For both the 3d Armored Cavalry and other 

reconnaissance organizations, the ability to achieve perfect situational 

awareness and understanding proved chimerical, resulting in confrontations with threat elements. Indeed, the commander of the Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) noted the inability of subordinate commanders to possess complete 

comprehension 

of an entire battlefield: “Somebody 

is always doing 

a movement to 

contact.” These 

situations became 

opportunities for 

a r m o r e d c a v -

alry to exploit 

its superior firepower and generate insurgent 

casualties.66

The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) also participated in 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, entering Iraq in April 2003. The regiment 

secured supply lines before transitioning to a security and stabilization 

Figure 124. LRAS3-equipped HMMWV in Iraq.

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role in Baghdad. There, it conducted regular patrols and raids to 

apprehend terrorists, criminals, and prospective insurgents. To bolster 

the regiment’s combat power, it exchanged a ground cavalry squadron 

equipped with HMMWVs for the 2d Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment 

from the 1st Armored Division. Equipped with M1A2 tanks, the armor 

battalion permitted the regiment to play an active role during combat 

operations against the Mahdi army in 2004. Large-scale uprisings by this 

organization triggered the commitment of the 2d Armored Cavalry to 

combat operations in Sadr City and An Najaf. In the former, regimental 

elements retook police stations captured by the Mahdists and engaged 

them in combat operations. They also used their mobility to disengage 

rapidly from Sadr City, execute a rapid road march, and immediately 

undertake street clearing operations against other Mahdist forces in 

Al Kut and An Najaf. The attached tank battalion proved central to the 

effective suppression of organized resistance.67

The urban nature of these operations necessitated extensive dismounted 

actions. To provide the necessary manpower, scout platoons reduced the 

number of vehicles in use. The extra crews provided the soldiers necessary 

to form two four- or five-man dismount teams. These teams sought to gain 

and maintain contact with Mahdist elements amid a confused and cluttered 

city environment. Combat often resulted, with platoon members seizing 

key terrain and buildings from which to deliver fire into alleys, streets, and 

rooftops. Scouts worked directly with supporting armor to mark targets 

and engage hostile personnel seeking to avoid the firepower of the tanks. 

Dismounted OPs served to locate and eliminate Mahdi forward observers 

marking the fall of enemy mortar rounds.68

While these operations may have constituted a high point for the 

2d Cavalry in terms of their intensity, the regiment worked to establish 

stability throughout its deployment. It did so by training and working 

with Iraqi security forces, assisting reconstruction efforts, and conducting 

continuous civil-military operations. These efforts were applied to Sadr 

City after the Mahdist uprising had been quelled. The regimental leadership 

considered its tour in Iraq a success, but it marked its last deployment as 

a light armored cavalry regiment. On its return to the United States, it 

converted to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).69

In November 2004, the National Guard’s 278th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment deployed to Iraq. There it reconfigured into a regimental combat 

team through the attachment of additional combat and support elements. 

Other modifications further reduced its resemblance to a heavy armored 

cavalry regiment. These included the absence of its aviation component 
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throughout its tour of duty and the replacement of many Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles and tanks with M1114 up-armored HMMWVs. This change 

reflected a belief that the unit’s mission did not require heavy firepower. 

Its principal role lay in securing Iraq’s border with Iran and protecting the 

convoy network necessary to sustain its operating bases. A single ground 

cavalry troop served under the control of the 3d Infantry Division in 

Baghdad, where it supported security for the 2005 Iraqi elections.70

The manpower intense requirements of operations in Iraq resulted in 

the mobilization and deployment of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

Normally, this unit constituted the National Training Center’s (NTC’s) 

opposing force. It was not organized as a deployable combat organization. 

Nevertheless, in 2004 regimental elements began to arrive in Iraq, although 

they did not operate as a single maneuver unit. Instead, the regimental 

headquarters became the division headquarters for Multi-National Force–

Northwest, while the other components supported four different BCTs in 

Baghdad and surrounding environs.71

RSTA Squadron Operations

The arrival of the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division in Iraq in 2003 

marked the first combat deployment of an SBCT. Its subordinate RSTA 

squadron, the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, was considered ideal for COIN 

due to its mix of human and technological information collection assets. 

In November the squadron supported the 4th Infantry Division’s efforts 

to secure Samarra through the creation of traffic control points around its 

perimeter. Due to its limited combat power, the squadron was not allowed 

to conduct missions inside the city. The unwillingness to risk the squadron in a hostile urban environment prevented it from gathering information to assist its parent brigade. Therefore, the SBCT’s infantry battalions 

advanced through the streets until they met contact, effectively being made 

to “troll for contact.”72

No doubt this cautious use of an RSTA squadron stemmed partly 

from the high visibility associated with SBCT activity. It also reflected 

the squadron’s limited combat power. Against a determined opponent, the 

RSTA unit had few options but to disengage. One troop commander found 

the conduct of rapid, aggressive reconnaissance against even a weak threat 

nearly impossible without massing several platoons. He found that despite 

the new contact paradigm, “it is still necessary for the troop to fight in 

contact to allow the infantry battalions to conduct decisive maneuver out 

of contact.”73

The combination of large operational areas and limited manpower in 

Iraq necessitated employment of the RSTA squadron in roles other than 
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reconnaissance. Despite the earlier reluctance to permit its operation in one 

urban environment, the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry soon assumed a much 

larger role in another. In Mosul, this unit became responsible for an array 

of activities similar to those performed by most tactical organizations, 

including reconnaissance, security, convoy escort, reconstruction, and the 

training of Iraqi soldiers. It simultaneously undertook civil-military operations and secured its own forward operating base. When another RSTA 

squadron, the 2d Squadron, 14th Regiment, replaced the 1st Squadron, the 

broad mission set remained. The routine attachment of aviation provided 

an additional set of capabilities, although attacks by aerial platforms were 

subject to limitations imposed on the use of firepower in urban areas.74

In 2007, the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment arrived in Iraq as part 

of the surge in American troops deployed to secure Baghdad. The squadron operated in Diyala province, immediately east of the capital. There it 

assisted in the clearance of towns noted for their terrorist and insurgent 

activity. In this hostile, built-up area, the squadron engaged in combat 

operations, helped train Iraqi security forces, established operating bases, 

manned traffic checkpoints, and opened a major highway long closed to 

the passage of coalition traffic. Regular raids and cordon operations targeted insurgent leadership. When the parent SBCT’s infantry deployed to 

clear objectives of insurgents, the squadron created a cordon to block their 

escape. Once towns were cleared of hostile forces, the squadron assumed 

a defense posture to hold them. All of these operations occurred simultaneously with efforts to begin reconstruction and organize local residents to 

manage their own affairs. Reconnaissance activity focused on gathering 

intelligence to guide brigade combat operations, but the squadron found 

itself subjected to IED attacks and routinely in firefights.75

The broad nature of these operations, often in the midst of urban 

battlegrounds between insurgent and coalition forces, eliminated the 

ability of RSTA squadrons to avoid combat. Insurgents often controlled 

the time and place of a firefight by triggering an ambush. Sometimes, small 

incidents quickly escalated into full-scale battles. In September 2004, for 

example, the downing of an OH-58 Kiowa helicopter in Tal Afar resulted 

in the dispatch of a Stryker reconnaissance platoon to secure the crew and 

the crash site. The platoon established a perimeter and awaited the arrival 

of additional forces, but it soon came under attacks that grew in size and 

intensity. The arrival of Stryker-borne infantry companies defeated these 

attacks with minimal loss, but only after a sustained street battle.76

In addition to limited combat power, RSTA squadrons faced a problem common to most reconnaissance organizations: insufficient personnel to conduct extensive dismounted operations. At full strength, the 
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reconnaissance platoons included 4 vehicles, 1 officer, and 20 soldiers. 

Each vehicle carried a two-man crew and a three-man dismount team. In 

practice, proper manning of each platform required three men to provide 

adequate all-round security and monitor the digital communications. 

Meeting this requirement left just eight men for dismounted operations, 

but losses to routine causes often reduced this number to six or less. 

Improvisation resulted. Sometimes a platoon left a vehicle behind, using the 

crew and passengers to bolster the dismount teams available. Alternatively, 

soldiers might be borrowed from another platoon, or the troop commander 

could reassign mortar section personnel to the reconnaissance platoons.It 

was common to find personnel normally assigned to air defense and field 

artillery units working alongside scouts to conduct IED sweeps, escort 

convoys, perform raids, or execute searches.77

Dispersed operations generated force protection requirements not 

easily met. The ground surveillance troop, for example, depended on 

other organizations to provide security. It possessed no organic ground 

scouts—a deficiency characterized as “loopy.”78 The 2d Squadron, 1st 

Cavalry Regiment made its headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) 

responsible for forward operating base security, while assigning its 

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance platoon to serve 

as part of the squadron’s quick reaction force.79 Such use highlighted the 

organizational flexibility of the unit and the willingness of commanders to 

Figure 125. Remains of a HMMWV after an IED attack.

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use nonstandard solutions to problems. It also highlighted the discrepancy 

between unit manning and operational reality.

Operations in Iraq demonstrated the need for reconnaissance platoons in 

the RSTA squadrons to both find and fix hostile forces. They could not simply 

locate insurgentas and await the arrival of combat elements to destroy them, 

lest the enemy slip away before they could be engaged. Scouts needed the 

means to engage insurgents immediately on discovery—a lesson similarly 

identified in Vietnam. However, the RSTA platoons were not designed 

for this role. Each Stryker M1127 Reconnaissance Vehicle mounted an 

LRAS3, but the positioning of this device interfered with operation of the 

platform’s machinegun. This configuration complicated rapid engagement 

of insurgents, particularly in cluttered urban environments that often left 

the gunner only seconds to identify, acquire, and engage targets. His task 

was made still more difficult by the weapon’s lack of stabilization. One 

recommended solution called for the substitution of two of the platoon’s 

reconnaissance platforms with Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicles. 

This change reduced the number of LRAS3 devices available, but each 

infantry carrier mounted a more effective, precision weapon system that 

could be fired from under cover. The proposed platform mix offered a more 

versatile combination with enhanced firepower. Similarly, recommendations 

for the RSTA troop included the addition of the M1128 Mobile Gun System 

to provide heavier firepower capable of engaging targets inside buildings. 

These changes sought to make RSTA organizations more robust and 

broaden their capabilities.80

In contrast to platform and organizational issues, operations in Iraq 

validated the emphasis given by doctrine writers to multidimensional 

reconnaissance. The success of COIN operations often hinged on the availability of information on the local populace and the tracking of insurgent 

trends. Initially, however, RSTA squadrons labored under the twin difficulties of inadequate language skills and manpower shortages. Without 

Arabic speaking skills, the reconnaissance platoon HUMINT collectors 

could not gather intelligence from detainees or local residents. Units relied 

on interpreters, but many were hired from the local populace and not 

always properly screened to confirm their loyalty and reliability. Platoon 

leaders competed with senior officers in their chain of command also seeking interpreters. The pool of available candidates quickly shrank amid the 

twin influences of high demand and terrorist intimidation. Consequently, 

the HUMINT soldiers often found themselves employed as ad hoc scouts 

at the expense of their special skills.81

Ironically, improvements in language ability increased the effectiveness of HUMINT collectors, but higher utility made them more susceptible 
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to consolidation at troop or squadron level where a demand for their skills 

existed. They assisted in the evaluation of intelligence data and helped to 

refine target lists. The best solution to meeting RSTA squadron HUMINT 

needs occurred through the attachment of additional intelligence collection teams from a higher headquarters. Indeed, reliance on these collectors became the preferred means of determining individuals to target and 

apprehend. Their value also extended to the collection of related material 

and information useful to subsequent prosecution.82

Intelligence dissemination in the RSTA squadron generally proved 

rapid via the digital communications network. The proliferation of FBCB2 

sets down to platform level coupled with experienced operators made this 

device an exceptionally valuable command and communications tool. 

Operational readiness rates also remained high. Nevertheless, communications problems did exist. The dispersed nature of operations often resulted 

in the RSTA squadron being unable to sustain FM communications with its 

parent brigade and other units. During the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division’s 

first deployment, the brigade S2 did not have voice or FBCB2 communications with subordinate forward elements, necessitating reliance on relay 

stations. HUMINT collection teams carried their own special communications equipment, but often could not use it on operations. Lacking armored 

transport of their own, they often rode with other soldiers in Strykers. In 

doing so they gained protection at the expense of communications.83

The Stryker platform entered combat operations under intense public 

scrutiny, fueled by the competing claims of skeptics and supporters. Like 

all new vehicles, it possessed its share of faults. Soldiers quickly identified 

them and proposed solutions. Overall, the Stryker proved a successful, 

popular platform. It offered better protection than HMMWVs and carried 

more passengers and equipment. The speed and relative quiet of the Stryker 

permitted it to move quickly from one location to another, sometimes 

achieving surprise. The vehicle’s survivability also gained attention. One 

Stryker was hit by a vehicle car bomb, suffered from nine IED attacks, 

received eight direct hits from RPGs, and came under extensive small 

arms fire during the course of operations. The vehicle was quickly repaired 

and back in action.84

Stryker survivability improved with the attachment of slat armor and 

better ceramic armor tiles. The slat armor increased fuel consumption and 

maintenance requirements. It also altered the vehicle’s handling characteristics, necessitating special driver training. To protect crewmen standing in 

open hatches, sandbags were piled on the top of the vehicle. This measure 

helped to offset the danger posed by external fuel tanks that might explode 
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if hit. Not surprisingly, the wheeled suspension attracted considerable 

enemy fire, resulting in numerous flat tires. Despite the run-flat system 

employed to ensure the vehicle could escape from danger, it sometimes 

failed when subjected to the combined stress of long distance travel and 

multiple flat tires. Tire problems became a regular feature of contact with 

the enemy and were at first exasperated by a shortage of tire jacks.85

The Stryker was vulnerable. As IED lethality increased, no vehicle, 

including the Abrams tank, could be ensured against loss. In 2006, the 

4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division operating in Diyala province became 

the subject of media scrutiny after a series of Stryker losses. One infantry company lost five Strykers in a single week. In a separate incident, 

the destruction of a Stryker also killed six soldiers and a journalist riding 

inside. These losses reflected the use of an SBCT against a determined 

enemy in an urban area not intimidated by the vehicle’s presence. In this 

environment, vehicle losses were unavoidable, but critics quickly reopened 

earlier questions about the Army’s wisdom of fielding the vehicle.86

For RSTA squadrons in general, operations in Iraq generated 

recommendations to improve their organization and capability. The most 

significant favored an increase in combat power, particularly through the 

addition of more dismounted capability. At the troop level, criticism focused 

on the use of a HMMWV platform burdened by a cargo trailer to transport 

the tactical operations center. This vehicle offered little protection, could 

Figure 126. M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV with improved protection for 

the gunner.

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not keep pace with mobile operations, and offered minimal command 

and control capability while in motion. Similarly, a 5-ton truck and trailer 

combination served as the troop mortar platoon leader’s transport. It could 

not match the mobility or speed of the Stryker-based mortar carriers. 

Personnel issues included reconnaissance platoons comprised of equal 

numbers of NCOs and soldiers, a rank structure that posed responsibility 

issues.87 Action on these and similarly recommended changes proved 

slow. Theater modifications and unit improvisation remained the principal 

means to overcome organizational deficiencies.88

Doctrinal Refinement

In August 2006, the Army published FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance 

Squadron. This manual addressed the principles for employing the reconnaissance units found in the heavy, infantry, and SBCTs. It introduced few 

new concepts, but it offered a clearer and more comprehensive depiction 

of existing principles. The manual enunciated a common set of principles for the three squadron types addressed. The reconnaissance squadron served as the commander’s eyes and ears. It developed a common 

operational picture to assist visualization of the battlefield by finding and 

tracking enemy developments. Orientation on hostile forces continued to 

embrace a multidimensional nature that included political, economic, and 

social information in addition to the more traditional emphasis on combatants and terrain. Guidance for stability operations was embedded throughout the manual.89

The manual writers anticipated future enemies to conceal their activities, employing a variety of new technologies and procedures to offset 

American technical dominance. They would operate in close, complex, or 

urban areas, utilizing dispersion and signature reduction to evade detection 

and observation. Against such a threat, the reconnaissance squadron’s role 

lay in building situational awareness and gathering information to assist 

brigade operations. Supported by joint and national intelligence assets, the 

squadron provided a continuous stream of information regarding the threat 

to preserve its parent brigade’s freedom of action and avoid surprise. In a 

best case, the squadron’s activities let the brigade commander determine 

how to maneuver his battalions to destroy hostile elements.90

The squadron manual reaffirmed the value of the new contact 

paradigm and ISR operations. The doctrine writers, determined to present 

these concepts in a clear manner, rejected recommendations to broaden 

the mission set and capability of the squadron. The manual repeated the 

emphasis of earlier manuals on more capable technologies, asserting, 

“The increased capabilities of information-age technologies give the 
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reconnaissance squadron’s leadership the opportunity to ‘see first’ with 

insights into the enemy’s decision-making process.”91 The writers 

reminded readers that the reconnaissance squadron’s particular capabilities 

and vulnerabilities were addressed in the construct of the modular BCT. 

The squadron was to be used according to its abilities as a reconnaissance 

unit and not thrust into missions for which it was never designed to 

perform. The manual brooked no deviation from the squadron’s singular 

reconnaissance purpose: 

. . . the BCT reconnaissance squadrons are not designed, 

equipped, or intended to be employed as a robust direct 

combat force. Although they possess sufficient armament 

and firepower for self-defense, they were not overendowed 

with weapons systems and armor protection for a distinct 

reason. The historical principle is that reconnaissance 

units that are sufficiently equipped to fight are routinely 

used for fighting instead of performing reconnaissance. In 

our nation’s history, reconnaissance and cavalry units that 

were impressively armed (possessing organic armor, aviation and artillery, for example) were routinely employed 

in direct combat roles. When reconnaissance units engage 

in direct combat missions, reconnaissance ceases. When 

reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and 

capitalizing on information dominance is lost.92

Figure 127. American checkpoints like this one became a common sight 

throughout Iraq’s towns and cities in an effort to disrupt terrorist movement.

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The new manual effectively applied those principles associated 

with the SBCT RSTA squadron to all BCT squadrons. Primary missions 

included area, route, and zone reconnaissance, while security operations 

emphasized screens, area security, and convoy escort.93 Other missions 

necessitated augmentation due to the limited combat power and absence 

of organic armor. Reconnaissance elements were expected to avoid combat and rely on stealth to acquire information. More aggressive reconnaissance found little support: 

Although the reconnaissance squadron has close combat capabilities, it is not organized, equipped, or trained 

to conduct a reconnaissance in force. That is a maneuver battalion mission. The reconnaissance squadron can 

conduct screen operations and other security operations, 

but it is designed to be most effective when employed in 

reconnaissance roles. To avoid giving away their position, scouts will rarely engage the enemy with direct fire 

on their own initiative. Rather, they are armed with direct 

fire weapons only for protection. Mortars are provided to 

reconnaissance troops for immediate suppression and disengaging fires. All scouts can engage targets without giving away their locations through the fires network with a 

variety of indirect means, depending on the requirement.94

Reconnaissance and combat were considered mutually exclusive. 

While combat generated some information regarding the enemy, the 

manual writers considered the related cost of casualties, time, and 

diversion from more profitable reconnaissance too high. Therefore, the 

reconnaissance squadrons “must be focused not on engaging the enemy 

with direct fire, but on conducting reconnaissance in a never-ending 

quest to continually update the common operational picture (COP) and 

answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).”95 The 

absence of powerful direct fire systems further discouraged employment 

in an aggressive manner likely to trigger combat.96 The squadron relied 

on sensors and other ISR assets to detect the enemy beyond direct fire 

engagement range and avoid chance contacts. The reconnaissance 

squadron was expected to use its weapons in self-defense, but indirect 

fires constituted the weapon of choice.97

Coverage of security operations included the same cautions against 

combat operations. The manual noted:

Security operations cannot be divorced from reconnaissance and surveillance missions. It is essential to 
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remember, however, that reconnaissance squadrons in the 

modular brigade combat teams (BCT) are not organized, 

manned, or equipped to execute the full spectrum of security missions previously executed by armored cavalry 

regiments and squadrons. By virtue of their smaller organization, relatively lighter armament, and lack of organic 

armor, artillery or aviation, reconnaissance squadrons 

must focus their efforts and mission sets on reconnaissance. There will be times and circumstances, however, 

when reconnaissance squadrons are tasked to execute 

security missions. In these instances, they may execute 

a screen or area or local security without significant augmentation. Guard and cover missions will require substantial augmentation and will, in most cases, be executed 

by the BCTs themselves.98

The reconnaissance squadrons were expected to provide timely 

information to the brigade commander, exploiting their digital 

communications network. Given the dispersed, nonlinear and 

noncontiguous nature of the battlefield, gaps between maneuver 

battalions were likely. The reconnaissance squadron monitored these 

gaps, leveraging its ability to operate in limited visibility or in inclement 

weather conditions. More traditional security missions considered viable 

for the squadron included area security, screening operations, route 

security, and convoy escort. Principles for these missions remained 

unchanged from earlier manuals.99

The manual’s emphasis on reconnaissance contradicted actual employment experience in Iraq. There squadrons found themselves thrust into 

the role of ad hoc maneuver units required to assume responsibility for a 

broader range of actions than information collection. Indeed, this reality 

encouraged recommendations from the field for a more robust squadron. 

The discrepancy between doctrine and field experience raised concern 

over an organizational trend toward lightness and singularity of purpose 

at the expense of needed capabilities. Together with the demise of traditional cavalry organizations, this trend increased fears that reconnaissance 

units would lose entirely the ability to fight for information. For veterans 

familiar with mounted reconnaissance trends and experiences since World 

War II, the combined arms cavalry platoon warranted reconsideration as a 

possible basis on which to restructure the squadron.100

COIN operations in Iraq influenced views on reconnaissance. 

Opponents of a reconnaissance-only organizational and doctrinal emphasis 
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noted that such units depended on the availability of time and stealth. Too 

often, however, the time necessary for stealthy reconnaissance did not 

exist. Even when it did, the ability of insurgents to blend into a population 

called into question the validity of relying on stand-off observation. Little 

information was likely to be obtained. In this situation: 

. . . someone must go forward into the unknown and 

make contact with the enemy. If that element possesses 

the combat power to survive that contact and the flexibility to react, tactical commanders can sustain the tempo 

advantage, understand the enemy based on his actions and 

react faster than the threat. This will be the key to victory 

on the future battlefield. To engage in combat beyond the 

supporting range of friendly forces, reconnaissance forces 

must have access to the full suite of combined arms critical to tactical success.101

A parallel concern surrounded the proper reconnaissance platform. 

The unarmored HMMWV proved too vulnerable in Iraq. The M1114 uparmored HMMWV offered better protection for its crew and passengers 

at a cost in mobility and visibility. The HMMWV facilitated interaction 

with civilians by not intimidating them, but it was not an optimal scout 

platform.102 In Iraq, the M1114 proved among the most commonly targeted 

vehicle by insurgents. Consequently, it was associated with a high number of killed or wounded 

soldiers. Casualties led 

to decreased use by some 

commanders. The vehicle’s 

weight and visibility limitations made its value as a 

reconnaissance platform 

questionable at best, while 

its survivability remained 

an issue. Pending development of a new scout platform, the M3 constituted a 

better solution, despite its 

size and noise.103

In 2006, the Armor Center conducted a comprehensive force protection 

initiative to demonstrate the capabilities of currently available platforms 

considered superior to the M1114 and suitable for employment in a COIN 

environment. This action constituted a demonstration and assessment to 

Figure 128. The growing 

sophistication of terrorists 

became evident in the 

wide variety of electronic 

devices, including this cell 

phone, used to detonate 

IEDs.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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gather information similar to the 1999 platform performance demonstration. It was not a procurement decision. Nevertheless, despite considerable 

interest to field a more effective scout platform to replace the M1114, a 

quick, affordable solution did not exist, and scouts continued to operate in 

HMMWVs.104

HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment

Questions regarding reconnaissance squadron doctrine coupled with 

the difficulties experienced by the Israeli Defense Force during combat 

operations in Lebanon encouraged further analysis. In 2007, the battle 

lab at Fort Knox undertook a simulations-based experiment to assess the 

effectiveness of a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) reconnaissance 

squadron operating against a hybrid threat that employed a mix of irregular and conventional tactics in the 2017 timeframe. The experiment sought 

to provide data and insights into ongoing development work on mounted 

reconnaissance organizations, doctrine, and platforms.105

The threat included some 2,000 irregulars, highly trained, motivated, 

and equipped. They operated in a dispersed, decentralized manner, utilizing 

a mix of conventional and asymmetric tactics. Arrayed in a multilayered 

defensive network, the threat forces made extensive use of minefields 

and IEDs to channel attacking forces into prepared engagement areas. 

Although the fighters possessed no armored assets, they used an array 

of small arms, machineguns, recoilless rifles, multiple launch rockets, 

surface-air missiles, antitank guided missiles, and precision mortars. The 

near future timeframe permitted depiction of likely weapons improvements 

and capabilities available to both the attacking and defending forces.106

The focus of the experiment lay on troop and platoon operations. The 

principal situation pitted a reconnaissance squadron operating in advance 

of its parent BCT. The squadron applied reconnaissance pull principles to 

determine the best attack routes for the brigade’s maneuver battalions. For 

this operation, the squadron had access to limited aviation support, extensive fire support, and UAVs. Since one objective of the experiment lay in 

reviewing reconnaissance materiel, several different organizations were 

modeled and their effectiveness compared. These organizations included 

the current mixed M3/HMMWV platoon and two other pure configurations based on upgraded versions of the M3 with mast-mounted sensors, 

an active protection system, and varied enhancements to armor protection 

and firepower.107

During the course of the experiment, the tactics employed by the threat 

forces varied. In some instances, they engaged targets as soon as possible 
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with long-range precision weapons. At other times, they permitted reconnaissance elements to penetrate their defenses without molestation before 

engaging them from multiple directions with a mix of weapons. Indirect 

fires served to draw American attention away from critical areas. Intense, 

multiweapon engagements were reserved for the most heavily armored 

platforms, while machineguns routinely focused on HMMWVs. To overcome active protection systems, threat fighters employed high-volume 

fires to strip away the active protection before attacking the target with an 

antitank guided missile. The use of laser designation teams in the forward 

areas of the defense network also enhanced the effectiveness of long-range 

precision fires and placed all American reconnaissance vehicles in jeopardy 

early in their missions. Conversely, threat fighters wore no uniforms and 

easily blended into the surrounding populace. The carefully coordinated 

use of urban areas, complex terrain, minefields, and IEDs all served to 

channel the squadron into preplanned engagement areas. Unmanned aerial 

systems were considered high-value targets and deliberately attacked with 

considerable success.108

Against this threat, the reconnaissance squadron found its ability 

to develop the situation out of contact as per doctrine largely negated. 

Stationary sensors deployed to observe deep into the defensive network 

were quickly targeted and destroyed. A similar fate befell vehicles that 

stopped to employ onboard devices. This issue particularly impacted 

the LRAS3-equipped M1114, since the system could not be used while 

the vehicle moved. For the M3/M1114 platoon, this development forced 

heavier reliance on UAVs. Indeed, all modeled reconnaissance configurations employed these aerial systems to a much greater extent than anticipated, with some units delaying forward movements until a UAV could 

provide a view of their advance route. In many instances, the presence of 

these aerial assets directly contributed to a unit’s survivability and ability 

to operate at a desired operational tempo.109

Nevertheless, the nullification or loss of standoff detection and observation systems coupled with disciplined threat fighters who remained 

hidden until directed to attack forced scouts to close with the enemy. It 

remained otherwise impossible to determine the threat dispositions and 

identify potential weaknesses for the parent brigade to exploit. Against an 

elusive enemy and contrary to reconnaissance squadron doctrine, reconnaissance by fire and combat became the primary methods of securing 

information. Closing with the enemy to detect and eliminate him, however, increased the vulnerability of the reconnaissance units. Already targeted by precision long-range weapon systems, fighting for information 

increased their exposure to attacks from a variety of shorter range direct 
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fire weapon systems and underscored the importance of platform survivability. Ironically, in those cases where scouts sought to avoid decisive 

engagement through maneuver, they often found themselves subjected to 

a chance contact with threat forces in conditions less advantageous than 

deliberate efforts to secure information through combat.110

Throughout the experiment, reconnaissance units made extensive use 

of indirect fires to suppress threat weapons and assist penetration of the 

defensive network. Constraints on use proved light, resulting in largescale expenditures of ordnance, often in the early stages of a mission. 

This fire support enhanced scout survivability, but it also raised questions 

about rules of engagement. In a real world situation, the likelihood of 

using artillery to eliminate strongpoints and help clear a path for the 

reconnaissance forces through urban areas was much more problematic 

given the danger of civilian casualties and the impact on local attitudes.111

The reconnaissance squadron lacked the means to breach minefields. 

This deficiency required scouts to bypass them, even when they had 

advance knowledge of their presence. Too often detouring around 

minefields brought units into prepared enemy engagement areas that 

necessitated a fight for survival. Augmentation with engineers when 

available overcame this problem and raised the issue of whether or not an 

engineer element should be organic to the squadron. In other instances, 

Figure 129. Personal interaction with the local population proved critical 

to counterinsurgent operations.

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units found themselves blundering into minefields and IED ambushes, 

detecting them only after detonation.112

Overall, the reconnaissance squadron found itself hard pressed to detect 

the enemy until engaged. Similarly, it experienced difficulty wresting the 

initiative from threat fighters who posed a series of challenges and tactical 

dilemmas not readily resolved. When casualties began to mount, the desire 

to save lives often transformed a mission into one of casualty evacuation. 

Initiative passed to the enemy, who intensified attacks on those individuals 

and platforms employed to recover wounded soldiers.113

In assessing the experiment’s outcome, evaluators acknowledged the 

exercise’s artificial nature. However, the experience suggested that modular 

reconnaissance with its emphasis on information collection via stealth and 

standoff observation might be insufficient to satisfy tactical intelligence 

requirements. If so, they lacked the combat power to close with the enemy 

and did not possess the survivability to win either deliberate or chance 

encounters without incurring substantial loss. The final report noted: 

The findings of this experiment suggest that the modular 

force concepts need revision. The reconnaissance squadron 

proved unable to develop the situation out of contact in 

all cases during the HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment. In all trials the reconnaissance squadron 

was forced to fight its way into the enemy’s “Disruption 

Zone” to discover the information required to answer the 

commander’s PIR [priority information requirement].114

Recommendations followed to improve the squadron’s capabilities. 

These addressed organizational, materiel, and doctrinal changes. The 

experiment encouraged a doctrinal revision that accepted the need for units 

to fight for information. The value of unmanned aerial systems necessitated 

measures to improve their protection, and their utility could be further 

enhanced through their ability to observe and engage targets while moving 

or hovering. For ground scouts, the experiment confirmed the effectiveness of mast-mounted sensors and the employment of dismounted teams 

to gather information. Still, to avoid the constraints on maneuver posed 

by hostile minefields, the squadron needed its own engineering element to 

facilitate rapid obstacle detection and clearance. These findings confirmed 

the value of a combined arms organization possessing broader capabilities 

than the light reconnaissance squadron. Not surprisingly, they gained the 

support of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment commander.115

TRADOC also seemed to endorse the general conclusions from the 

experiment. In August 2008, the command published a concept capability 
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plan for future ISR operations. It confirmed the importance of ground 

reconnaissance, but noted the need for multiple capability improvements. 

These included greater survivability for scout platforms, the ability to 

outperform hostile forces in the collection of information at both close 

and standoff distances, and the means to employ an extensive array of fire 

support. The planners desired reconnaissance units with the “capability to 

defeat threat counterreconnaissance efforts with comprehensive lethality 

overmatch and to survive and operate in the same battlefield conditions as 

the supported force in all environmental conditions.”116 This requirement 

was matched by similar emphasis on communications, sensor use, allweather operations, dismounted action, and the ability to “interact, interdict, 

and fight for information, allowing immediate action by the operational 

commander.”117 The plan did not alter the existing reconnaissance emphasis 

on information acquisition, but it added those capabilities necessary to 

make a robust and more combat-capable organization. In effect, TRADOC 

merged several different schools of thought regarding reconnaissance into 

one. Whether the resultant laundry list of desired capabilities could be 

incorporated into a single organization remains to be seen.118

Organizational Limbo

The growing momentum for altering reconnaissance organizations 

and doctrine did not result in rapid action. Evidence of institutional change 

Figure 130. Potential insurgent being detained and searched.

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remained noticeable by its absence. Analysis certainly occurred and task 

organization in the field addressed conditions in Iraq, but the tables of 

organization and equipment for these modular units remained largely 

unchanged. Budgetary concerns and manpower limitations accounted 

for much of this seeming inertia, but a consensus supporting a return to 

powerful, multicapable reconnaissance organizations did not yet exist. 

Moreover, the Army’s commitment to the FCS limited its ability to implement unrelated large-scale organizational changes. 

For the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, this condition of stasis proved 

a welcome relief. The regiment remained an anomaly among the Active 

Component, and it was due for a reconfiguration following its return from 

Iraq in 2006. Amid the trend toward light reconnaissance organizations 

that eschewed contact with the enemy and relied on stealth and sensor 

technology to gather information, the regiment had become the subject of 

debate—particularly governing its future. Discussion of the need for an 

armored cavalry regiment constituted part of a broader issue concerning 

the need for any cavalry organization at all. Indeed, one proposal called 

for the removal of the cavalry designations given to the reconnaissance 

squadrons.119

When the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment completed its second tour in 

Iraq, it did not undergo conversion into a modular organization. However, 

it faced the loss of its air cavalry squadron, following Army Vice Chief 

of Staff guidance for the consolidation of all aviation units into special 

aviation support brigades. This action constituted part of the Army’s conversion to a modular force structure, but it disrupted the combined arms 

teamwork—long a hallmark of armored cavalry. Loss of the air cavalry 

eliminated the expertise with integrated ground-air operations, reduced the 

regiment’s ability to operate without augmentation, and limited the area 

coverage it could provide with organic assets. Opposition to this action 

was bolstered by the high-profile success of the unit in Tal Afar and by the 

Aviation Center, whose leaders did not seek the organizational disruption 

of a proven combat organization. The regiment retained its air cavalry 

component and its unique nature.120

A more constructive change occurred through a command directed 

initiative to review the regiment’s headquarters and support organizations. 

The action sought to improve the unit’s ability to control attached modular 

organizations and refine its maintenance support. While the basic structure 

of the regiment remained unchanged, recommended modification focused 

on expanding command, control, and communications capabilities to make 

them commensurate with those found in the HBCT. A deputy regimental 

commander served to provide more command flexibility. Proposed 
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organizational changes included the addition of a signal company, a more 

robust military intelligence company, and an armored platform in the 

engineer company to facilitate breaching operations.121

Outside the cavalry regiment, reconnaissance platoons could look forward to an increase in their personnel strength. Unit reports highlighting 

too few soldiers to conduct operations combined with the firsthand observations of senior Army leaders to prompt a change. In 2007, analysis of 

the doctrinal responsibilities of the platoon demonstrated the discrepancy 

between required actions and available manpower. The Armor Center submitted a formal request to increase the size of reconnaissance platoons in 

the BCTs and the armored cavalry regiment by six men.122 This action was 

approved and sources identified for the additional manpower, but by early 

2009 it remained unclear when units in the field would actually see their 

new scouts.

Combat experience generated a broader assessment of organizational 

and materiel issues related to mounted reconnaissance. A series of proposed changes followed to correct the most serious problems. Frequent 

employment of the HBCT’s reconnaissance squadron in roles other than 

pure information collection coupled with its limited combat power led the 

Armor Center to recommend a more powerful organization. The proposed 

configuration added tanks and replaced the reconnaissance platoon’s M3/

HMMWV mix with all M3s. These changes effectively transformed the 

unit into an armored cavalry squadron with a headquarters, a mortar section, two scout platoons, and two tank platoons. Parallel recommendations 

boosted the SBCT reconnaissance platoon strength by two Strykers, while 

the dismounted troop of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron gained a third platoon.123

A holistic review of the BCT manning and organization followed in 

2008. This analysis also addressed the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and 

provided another opportunity to identify possible alterations based on 

operational experience and commander feedback.124 It resulted in proposals to improve the targeting, intelligence, fire support, and UAV capability of the brigade headquarters. Similarly, the reconnaissance squadron 

benefited from suggested increases in its headquarters staff, particularly 

those functions associated with operations, fire support, and intelligence 

analysis at the troop level. Parallel proposals for the 3d Armored Cavalry 

Regiment enhanced the unit’s ability to perform HUMINT collection, 

planning, information operations, and public affairs.125

All of these proposals gained senior leadership support. Nevertheless, 

final approval and implementation required time, particularly because 
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every branch advanced similar proposals. While the recommendations 

for mounted reconnaissance proved modest, their implementation necessitated additional manpower. Without an increase to the Army’s end 

strength, these increases required other organizations to suffer a personnel loss. Determining which proposals to adopt and identifying sources to 

meet the manpower requirement required time, but the review constituted 

a deliberate effort to identify deficiencies and find solutions.

Despite the proven efficacy of the heavy armored cavalry regiment and 

recommendations to use this organization as a template for restructuring 

the heavy brigade combat team, the Army leadership gravitated toward 

abandonment of the regiment. The unique nature of this organization and 

its high cost made it an anomaly amid a trend toward smaller and more 

standard BCT configurations. The mounted maneuver community sought 

to highlight the value of the armored cavalry regiment, but its efforts 

failed to secure the necessary senior leader support. Instead, the Army 

announced its decision to convert the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment into 

another SBCT. This action effectively eliminated traditional armored 

cavalry organizations capable of reconnaissance, security, and economy 

of force operations with their organic assets.126

The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

The Army’s transition to modular BCTs resulted in the elimination 

of the division cavalry squadron and the related appearance of the 

reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade. 

This unit was intended for attachment to a division or larger formation, 

and it strove to “focus joint combat power and effects with precision to 

simultaneously support current and future operations throughout the area 

of operations.” The RSTA brigade addressed the division commander’s 

information requirements and complemented the ISR efforts of the brigade 

reconnaissance squadrons. In its original configuration, the unit possessed 

little organic ground reconnaissance beyond a long-range surveillance 

element. For additional support, it depended on external attachments.127

The unit designation changed to battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) in 

2005, but no significant structural modification occurred.128

Initial activities by the first BFSB identified problems that drove further organizational development. The unit proved capable of extensive 

surveillance, observation, and intelligence analysis, but its lack of combat 

power necessitated the attachment of maneuver elements to provide security. This requirement added to the mission burden already stretching the 

smaller BCTs and maneuver battalions. They were not designed to provide force protection to assets operating outside their area of operations. 
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Traditionally, a higher headquarters performed this role, but modularity 

shifted many of the assets previously available to a division commander 

to the BCTs. Within the BFSB, a similar issue surrounded the employment 

of the long-range surveillance unit. This force included teams intended 

for deep insertion and observation, but they possessed no organic transport. Instead, they depended on the availability of aviation assets no longer 

organic to either the division or the BCT.129

These issues spurred efforts to create a BFSB capable of meeting its 

own needs. Between 2004 and 2006, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) 

developed the unit’s organization through simulations, modeling, analysis, 

and testing in conjunction with other Army organizations.130 The design 

that resulted included a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), a 

military intelligence battalion, a reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, 

a network support company, and a support company. It also possessed the 

staff to accommodate additional attachments of maneuver, aviation, and 

intelligence assets. The military intelligence battalion included HUMINT 

teams, counterintelligence personnel, UAVs, and radars. The reconnaissance and surveillance squadron bore little resemblance to the squadrons 

found in the BCTs. It included a HHT, a long-range surveillance company, 

and two ground reconnaissance troops. The last were patterned on the earlier brigade reconnaissance troop of two HMMWV scout platoons. The 

long-range surveillance company controlled 15 separate teams that utilized 

a common pool of HMMWVs and all terrain vehicles to provide organic 

transport. Their purpose remained stealthy observation far forward.131

Figure 131. Stryker with slat armor installed to provide improved 

protection against RPGs.

Armor Branch Archives
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The new BFSB organization marked a significant improvement in 

capabilities. It provided multiple means of gathering and assessing intelligence from aerial and ground platforms. It could monitor those portions 

of the battlespace left uncovered by the BCTs. Indeed, the ground reconnaissance elements were intended to function up to 50 kilometers from a 

brigade area. The BFSB offered several unique capabilities and skills not 

found in either brigade reconnaissance or within the armored cavalry regiment. It could not perform traditional cavalry missions, but its capacity for 

stealth and infiltration made it a viable complement to existing reconnaissance organizations.132

Nevertheless, the organization of the BFSB remained a work in progress. It remained oriented on information collection rather than combat, 

and it did not possess the means to fight for information. Its lack of combat power made it the target of criticism from proponents of more robust 

cavalry-type organizations. Others feared it might evolve into a powerful 

maneuver unit at the expense of its special information gathering capabilities. Whether the unit required the ability to conduct combat operations lay 

at the center of this debate, but no simple answer existed. Further design 

work and analysis ensued.133

The experience of the 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade provided 

valuable insights for further organizational development. It was the first 

BFSB to deploy to Iraq. There, it operated under a modified organization 

that included a reduced headquarters and two small military intelligence 

battalions. Instead of a full reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, 

it fielded only the long-range surveillance company. Shortages encountered by other units deployed overseas also impacted the 525th Battlefield 

Surveillance Brigade, which suffered from deficiencies in equipment and 

personnel. Consequently, its command and control capabilities suffered, 

while the absence of tactical air control parties impaired the unit’s ability 

to coordinate the close air support considered necessary for its survivability. The long-range surveillance company also went to war manned 

by riflemen rather than specialized scouts familiar with ISR operations.134

In 2008, proponency for the BFSB shifted from CAC to the Armor 

Center.135 This change in responsibility reflected the assignment of armor 

soldiers to surveillance brigades. Analytical work continued to draw 

on operational experience, field commanders, and the support of other 

branches, particularly Military Intelligence.136 The Armor Center conducted 

a computer assisted map exercise (CAMEX) to evaluate the existing BFSB 

mission and organization. The scenario involved a BFSB operating as part 

of a division given a counterattack role in a conventional war setting. The 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

exercise designers sought to assess BFSB effectiveness in major combat 

operations as well as more familiar COIN and stability actions.137

The experiment found the BFSB unable to operate forward of an 

advancing division to shape the battlespace. It did not permit the division 

commander to see beyond his forward BCTs. However, the BFSB proved 

much more effective operating on the division’s flank and rear. It was able 

to cover critical areas and implement a flank screen that provided early 

warning to the division and its subordinate brigades. The surveillance 

brigade’s staff proved sufficient to handle attachments, but it lacked the 

means to sustain the additional forces. Mine detection proved deficient, 

and the reconnaissance and surveillance squadron possessed only a 

marginal ability to operate to the division’s front. Observers noted the 

squadron’s greater likeness to a long-range surveillance unit rather than 

other mounted reconnaissance units. Overall, the BFSB proved highly 

effective when employed in stability operations, but its ability to bridge 

the gap in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs between 

the BCTs and higher headquarters proved problematic.138

By year’s end, it remained unclear whether the BFSB satisfied the 

need for a reconnaissance capability above the brigade. It functioned less 

as a source of actionable intelligence driving combat maneuver than it 

did a means to collect and report information. In short, it did not reflect 

the fusion between information acquisition and intelligence dissemination 

inherent to ISR operations. The BFSB’s surveillance capability also outstripped its ability to conduct reconnaissance. This observation suggested 

that the unit’s design reflected COIN needs more than the Army’s broader 

mission needs. Although new technologies associated with the FCS might 

benefit the BFSB, no such linkage existed.139

Figure 132. A Stryker unit rolls into action.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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Chapter 9

A different perspective of the BFSB’s capabilities emerged during an 

exercise conducted by US Army Japan. In this event, a surveillance brigade participated as part of a larger organization engaged in major combat 

operations. It was augmented with maneuver elements, indirect fires, and 

close air support. These additions transformed the BFSB into a powerful 

combat organization capable of gathering information and acting immediately with its own assets. The unit proved effective in the exercise, but its 

enhanced configuration was considered atypical. It fundamentally altered 

the very nature of the BFSB from a light reconnaissance unit with special abilities into something more akin to an armored cavalry regiment. 

Permanently reshaping the BFSB in this manner was not seriously considered. The Army did not possess the resources to do so.140

The BFSB offered a unique set of capabilities, but it left senior leaders 

uneasy about its effectiveness and utility. Therefore, the TRADOC commander directed the Armor Center to revise the organizational and operational concepts underpinning the unit. The collection of lessons learned 

from the BFSBs deployed overseas would help shape this effort together 

with further experimentation and testing of both the current organization and alternatives. The Armor Center’s mission lay in refashioning the 

BFSB into a unit that offered a needed capability that clearly benefited 

commanders at multiple echelons.141

By December 2008, an initial revision of organizational and operational concepts emerged for staffing throughout the Army. The following 

February, a panel of subject matter experts convened to review the input 

received and refine the draft. Its participants included members drawn 

from across TRADOC, a BFSB contractor support team, and soldiers from 

the 525th BFSB. The panel generated a much improved description of 

the BFSB and eliminated some of the confusion surrounding this unit. 

The new organizational and operational concept also served to identify 

subjects for experimentation and those actions requiring senior leadership 

action. Reconnaissance in force ceased to be a BFSB mission. Similarly, 

earlier references to its ability to conduct limited offensive operations and 

fight for information disappeared. The BFSB remained a lightly armed 

organization with minimal combat power, although it could be augmented 

with a variety of maneuver and combat support elements. Unsuited for 

most security missions, it was nevertheless considered capable of screen 

operations and area security.142

Computer assisted map exercises in March and August 2009 served to 

test the revised organizational and operational principles. The first exercise 

focused on the ability of the BFSB to meet division level information 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

requirements; provide supply, maintenance, and medical support; execute 

signal operations; employ UAVs; and conduct ground reconnaissance. 

In this exercise, the BFSB received missions considered well within its 

capabilities, and no effort occurred to evaluate the ground reconnaissance 

squadron’s combat ability. In general, the CAMEX tended to support 

the emerging principles for the BFSB and identified new study areas for 

further experimentation.143

By the time of the August CAMEX, work on a field manual to govern BFSB operations had begun. The exercise served to test the concepts 

included and provide feedback that could be incorporated before the manual’s final draft. The CAMEX did not test alternate BFSB organizations 

or require the unit to operate outside its intended capability parameters. It 

provided a better understanding of the BFSB together with its capabilities 

and limitations that directly supported doctrinal development.144

The emerging configuration for the BFSB included a headquarters and 

headquarters company, two military intelligence battalions, one reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, a signal company, and a brigade support 

company. The reconnaissance and surveillance squadron constituted the 

brigade’s ground reconnaissance component. It included a headquarters 

element, two ground reconnaissance troops, and a long-range surveillance company. Troop organization included a small headquarters and two 

mounted reconnaissance platoons, each one equipped with six HMMWVs 

carrying LRAS3 and either a grenade launcher or a machinegun. Although 

the troop headquarters included a UAV, the unit possessed no mortars. 

However, the squadron possessed a variety of intelligence collection and 

surveillance means. The headquarters also was designed to accommodate 

augmentation from a variety of unit types, and it integrated personnel drawn 

from the military intelligence and maneuver communities. Unlike earlier 

configurations, the intended long-range surveillance company possessed 

its own vehicles, eliminating its dependency on external attachments. The 

BFSB as a whole proved ideal to control a variety of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets. Indeed, its organic collection of human, 

signals, and imagery intelligence, coupled with ground reconnaissance 

and robust, long-range communications made it highly suited to gathering 

information over a broad area. The BFSB’s principal constraint lay in its 

lack of combat power. With no organic aviation or fire support and only a 

small, lightly armed ground reconnaissance element, the brigade’s focus 

lay in information collection rather than more traditional cavalry operations in a contested environment.145

Yet even this configuration required time to implement. The first 

BFSBs to see combat in Iraq did so minus many of their basic components, 
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including the ground reconnaissance squadron. Nevertheless, the Army 

planned to field over 10 BFSBs in the Active Component and National 

Guard. While the Active Component units gradually began their 

restructuring to the planned organization, the National Guard brigades 

would not begin fielding before 2011.146

Doctrinal development occurred at a faster pace. By September 2009, 

the Armor Center had completed a final draft of FM 3-55.1, The Battlefield 

Surveillance Brigade. It incorporated the revised organizational and 

operational principles and comments obtained through an Army-wide 

staffing process. Publication of the new manual was planned for 2010. It 

reflected the evolution of views concerning the BFSB. The basic mission 

of this unit lay in addressing intelligence and information requirements 

at the division, corps, and joint task force levels. It constituted the only 

modular brigade specifically designed for this mission. It also supported 

brigade-level reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence efforts. 

The information collection focus of the BFSB lay on hostile combat 

forces, terrain, and the local population—much like the original RSTA 

Squadron from which the BFSB traced its roots. It possessed a wealth of 

tools to both collect and evaluate information, particularly when used in 

conjunction with the intelligence assets of a division, corps, or joint task 

force headquarters. The brigade’s capabilities proved especially suited to 

gathering information on people and the social, political, religious, and 

economic environment in which they lived. Such information proved 

central to successful counterinsurgency and stability operations and 

increased the utility of the BFSB in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it did 

not generally fight for information and sought the avoidance of direct fire 

engagements. While special circumstances might provide opportunities 

for the limited firepower of the BFSB, it was neither intended nor designed 

as a combat organization.147

Unfortunately, the difficulties associated with the employment of 

ground organizations intended to avoid combat were becoming manifest 

in experiments conducted by the Maneuver Battle Lab between 2007 and 

2009. These experiments addressed a variety of organizations executing 

missions in different operational environments. The threats modeled 

proved similarly varied and reflected combatants US forces might face in 

real world encounters. These threats often included a mix of conventional 

and guerrilla-type capabilities. In urban and/or complex terrain, they 

proved capable of sophisticated concealment and avoiding early detection 

by friendly reconnaissance. The nature of urban areas and rugged terrain 

further reduced the ability of US forces to find, track, and engage threat 

elements without committing ground reconnaissance. The American 
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units modeled in these experiments were forced to fight for information. 

The presence of civilians added another dimension of complexity to the 

experiments, permitting threat soldiers to mask themselves among local 

populations. Too often, American commanders proved unaware of hostile 

fighters until they elected to reveal themselves, usually to trigger an 

ambush.148

In these circumstances, ground reconnaissance found itself forced 

to close with the enemy to determine his location, identify concealed 

obstacles, and even assess the ability of friendly forces to move through 

terrain features. These actions often required a degree of combat power 

that American reconnaissance units lacked. Yet, they were unable to rely 

on augmentation from brigade combat teams, already fully committed to 

offensive actions in the nonlinear environments depicted. A need existed 

for more robust reconnaissance organizations.149

Operational experience from Iraq and analysis of Maneuver Battle 

Lab experimentation demonstrated a clear need for ground reconnaissance 

with an ability to fight for information and execute traditional security 

missions. Reconnaissance required the ability to find hostile forces, prevent 

their escape, and ensure their destruction—either through direct action 

or by coordinating the efforts of other combat forces. Reconnaissance 

further required the ability to survive and respond to surprise encounters 

with enemy combatants. Even when a hostile force was detected, 

reconnaissance still required an ability to develop the situation and hamper 

enemy activities. Otherwise the enemy retained a freedom to maneuver or 

simply evade the reconnoitering unit.150

The combination of real world and simulated combat operations 

underscored the importance of each command echelon possessing its own 

reconnaissance element. While brigade combat teams included organic 

ground reconnaissance at the brigade and battalion levels, division and 

corps headquarters possessed none. Yet these echelons bore responsibility 

for a broader battle space than the brigades. The BFSB helped to address 

this void, but its noncombative nature prevented it from executing 

aggressive reconnaissance or the traditional array of security missions to 

include guard and cover. While the BFSB provided an array of capabilities 

that enhanced situational understanding and command decisions, it could 

not satisfy the need of division and corps echelons for a robust, combined 

arms ground reconnaissance unit able to fight for information and perform 

security missions.151

To address this capability gap, in June 2009 the TRADOC commander 

directed the Armor Center to articulate the specific limitations of the BFSB 
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and identify the ground reconnaissance and information requirements for 

division and corps commands. This analysis provided the foundation for 

developing a plan to address reconnaissance needs above the brigade 

through enhancement of the BFSB. Although the plan would not be 

complete until sometime in 2010, emerging concepts clearly embraced 

a robust and versatile organizational concept. A division/corps ground 

reconnaissance unit required the ability to conduct continuous operations 

in varied environments and execute reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

security missions. It was expected to develop a tactical situation through 

direct action, employing a mix of lethal and nonlethal effects. A variety 

of sensors that included electronic devices, ground scouts, UAVs, and 

military intelligence personnel provided both active and passive means 

of obtaining information. The prospective unit’s area of responsibility 

extended far beyond that assigned to subordinate brigade combat teams 

and embraced the full spectrum of military operations. Related analytical 

work focused on restructuring military intelligence organizations to make 

them more compatible with the Army’s modular force structure.152

BFSB enhancement and the related studies effectively sought to restore 

the Army’s tiered reconnaissance structure. The shift to a modular force 

structure resulted in brigade combat teams with increased reconnaissance 

capability. This gain, however, was partially offset by the shrinkage in 

brigade combat power to just two maneuver battalions, often necessitating 

the use of reconnaissance in roles other than information collection. 

Divisions lost their cavalry squadrons, while the pending demise of the 

armored cavalry regiment negatively impacted corps reconnaissance 

capability. The BFSB only partially satisfied the information needs of 

these formations, but it did not possess the versatility or broad mission set 

associated with armored cavalry. BFSB enhancement sought to identify 

corps and division information and reconnaissance needs in their entirety 

and provide the necessary capabilities.

The Quest for Core Competencies

Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq created stresses on the 

Armor School’s ability to train new scouts. Prior to these wars, the Army 

leadership opted to maintain combat formations at full strength. It reduced 

the manning levels of service schools to provide the necessary manpower. 

The onset of combat operations further drained students and training 

cadre. Units seeking to stabilize their personnel while engaged in active 

operations or anticipating overseas deployment proved reluctant to release 

experienced officers and NCOs to attend schools. Similarly, qualified 

specialists were retained in their positions instead of being promoted 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

or going before a board to become NCOs. The Armor School was also 

pressured to send graduates of the Officer Advanced Course directly to 

combat units rather than allow them to attend the Combined Arms and 

Services Staff School (CAS3) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The training 

cadre also became subject to overseas requests for soldiers with specific 

skills or experience. The net impact of these developments lay in the 

erosion of the Armor Branch’s ability to grow new leaders and meet future 

training needs.153

Combat operations and the transition to modular brigades increased 

the need for scouts to man the new reconnaissance squadrons. This demand 

resulted in a training base expansion. With Reserve Component support, 

a second training battalion became dedicated to developing new scouts.154

The nature of operations in Iraq also necessitated changes in the training provided to ensure familiarity with COIN and urban environments. 

The time necessary to secure additional resources for training constrained 

initial efforts to make the instruction at Fort Knox more realistic. In the 

interim, a number of local alterations occurred within the existing scout 

training program based on the needs of field commanders. Within the 

16‐week training cycle, 126 of the 176 tasks taught were combat-oriented. 

Areas given emphasis included patrols, weapons use, vehicle driving, traffic control operations, and urban combat skills. The amount of time a new 

scout spent training in the field tripled. This increase was partially enabled 

by merging the instruction of several tasks during field exercises.155

By 2007, basic and advanced training for scouts included some 134 

basic combat training skills and 82 additional tasks specific to Military 

Occupational Specialty (MOS) 19D. Major changes had been implemented to reflect the operational environment in Iraq and to a lesser extent 

Afghanistan. Increased attention to weapons use, dismounted operations, 

urban areas, forward operating bases, and mounted combat constituted 

the principal thrust. Physical fitness remained a central theme to help condition new soldiers for duty in Iraq. Scout weapons training expanded 

to include the broad range of small arms and larger caliber guns found 

among reconnaissance organizations. A 7-day field exercise marked the 

culmination of training. It included a mix of urban operations, dismounted 

patrols and combat, mounted maneuver, and actions related to the management and security of a forward operating base. Throughout the exercise, 

soldiers were exposed to the presence of civilians and media represented 

by role players.156

The differences found among reconnaissance organizations in the 

infantry, heavy, and SBCTs broadened the range of skills required by 
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scouts. Too some, 

this skill set had 

become too large 

and was resulting 

in the degradation 

of those basic 

abilities traditionally 

associated with the 

19D soldiers.157 However, to others the 

basic scout skills 

remained unchanged 

by modularity, ISR 

concepts, or the new 

contact paradigm. 

Mounted scouts traditionally proved flexible in their assignments and 

capabilities. More recent changes in reconnaissance doctrine, organization, 

and materiel offered the ability to further enhance these abilities by 

harnessing them to newer technologies.158

Armor officer training also adjusted to better prepare leaders for COIN 

operations. Veterans with service experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan 

taught many instructors, while newer instructors were sent overseas to 

serve with a unit for a month before assuming their training responsibilities. In 2005, the basic course featured more emphasis on reconnaissance 

and weapons familiarization. Instruction was provided in mounted and 

dismounted patrols, checkpoints, building clearance, and the conduct of 

raids. A 7-day field exercise exposed students to urban operations, COIN, 

and stability missions.159 The following year, the Officer Basic Course 

became known as the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC). This 

name change reflected a major shift in the manner of developing platoon 

leaders throughout the Army that addressed their instruction during precommissioning and a common core training phase focused on basic skills 

required of all junior leaders regardless of branch. Afterward, students 

received their branch-specific training in their final phase of instruction.160

The BOLC curriculum at Fort Knox reflected the Armor Branch’s 

shift from a tanker heavy force to one weighted in favor of scouts. It bore 

the influence of the Scout Leaders Course and included more cavalry 

and reconnaissance instruction at the expense of pure armor training. It 

retained a culminating field exercise that incorporated both armor and 

reconnaissance platoons while introducing new platoon leaders to a civilian 

presence, terrorists, RPG attacks, and stringent rules of engagement. On 

Figure 133. Stryker conducting mounted patrol.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
537

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

graduation, those students slated for reconnaissance unit assignments 

were strongly encouraged to attend the Scout Leaders Course before they 

arrived at their unit.161 Modifications in 2008 resulted in the inclusion of 

light cavalry gunnery together with increased maintenance and recovery 

training in a longer BOLC course.162

The specialized scout course suffered a temporary suspension due to 

resourcing issues, but it had resumed training by 2006. Many of its students 

were BOLC graduates, although it remained open to all Combat Arms 

and Military Intelligence Branches. Its quality derived in part from the 

low student-to-teacher ratio. For immersion in mounted reconnaissance 

principles, the Scout Leaders Course continued to be unparalleled, 

although the changing nature and needs of the Army led some potential 

students to attend other schools instead, particularly the Reconnaissance 

and Surveillance Leaders Course and Ranger School.163 The former once 

provided training for long-range surveillance units, but it had expanded to 

address reconnaissance in infantry and SBCTs.

The advanced officer course similarly underwent change to reflect 

experiences in Iraq and in response to the cancellation of CAS3. The latter 

course introduced students to brigade operations and related staff duties. 

Some of its subject matter migrated to a redesigned and lengthened Armor 

Captains Career Course (AC3). The program of instruction included a 

10-day segment focused on COIN operations together with more content 

related to brigade, stability, support, and security operations. It also 

addressed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in more detail. 

The availability of improved simulators for training further enhanced 

familiarity with digital equipment, including FBCB2. Parallel adjustments 

occurred to the Reserve Component version of the course.164

Further changes to the training of mounted troop and company 

commanders followed the 2005 announcement of the realignment of the 

Armor Center and School to Fort Benning, Georgia, where they would 

be organized together with their Infantry counterparts into the Maneuver 

Center of Excellence. The emergence of a Maneuver Captains Career 

Course (MC3) no longer rooted in either branch resulted. Its purpose lay 

in training company-level commanders and staff officers for combined 

arms units within a 21-week timeline. It emphasized mental agility, critical 

thinking, and familiarization with a variety of different unit types. In the 

latter half of the course, students found their instruction focused on the 

brigade type to which they would be assigned upon graduation. Special 

sections addressed COIN, the execution of stability and support operations 

in an urban environment, and reconnaissance squadron operations.165

The initial course design continued to evolve to become more reflective 
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of the operational environment in Iraq. Principal additions included 

COIN exercises and the importance of cultural understanding to military 

operations.166

Redesign of the Cavalry Leaders Course in 2005 also helped to 

improve the preparation of commanders and staff officers for operations 

involving the modular reconnaissance squadrons. The course detailed 

coverage of reconnaissance units in each type of brigade. It also served 

to immerse students in the doctrine, missions, and capabilities of each 

of the related reconnaissance squadrons. The course was open to most 

branches to help instill a broader-based understanding of reconnaissance 

organizations and doctrine. Specifically, it prepared senior NCOs and 

officers through the rank of major for assignment to a cavalry organization 

or brigade reconnaissance squadron.167

These training improvements, coupled with related changes at the 

combat training centers, helped mounted soldiers cope with the challenges 

of COIN operations. However, they came at the cost of skills once valued for conventional combined arms operations. Basic maneuver, gunnery, and command and control abilities began to erode amid the sustained 

focus on combating terrorism and performing stability and reconstruction 

work in Iraq. Surveys of Armor School students, training cadre, combat 

Figure 134. Dismounted patrol backed up by the heavy firepower of a 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
539

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

training centers, and unit commanders all indicated skill degradation that 

undermined the effectiveness of mounted units to conduct conventional 

combat operations. Company and troop units proved adept at cordon and 

search missions but rarely participated in company or higher-level maneuvers. Similarly, the sense of offensive and defensive operations began to 

fade. Other tactical skills associated with declining proficiency included 

direct fire planning, support by fire actions, breaching operations, smoke 

use, battle position preparation, and the employment of indirect fires.168

Vehicle maintenance also suffered a shift in emphasis from preventive 

maintenance to reactive, crisis management.169

Tank gunnery skills atrophied through lack of use and limited opportunities to apply them. The technical nature of gunnery coupled with the 

skill loss also resulted in a declining ability to train the related skills and 

principles. Indeed, among MC3 students, two-thirds experienced none or 

only limited gunnery training. These problems extended to the enlisted 

ranks. At the platoon level, soldiers demonstrated difficulty with basic 

gunnery tasks and tactical maneuver.170

This skill slippage became especially worrisome in light of the Israeli 

experience during the Second Lebanon War of 2006. The war followed a 

series of incidents between Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah 

fighters operating out of southern Lebanon. The deliberate abduction of two 

Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah fighters precipitated a crisis. Israel responded 

with large-scale ground operations into Lebanon, but its army proved far 

less effective than in prior conflicts. Much of the IDF’s recent operational 

experience lay in COIN and stability operations in Gaza. Many soldiers 

lacked or lost the skills necessary for the type of combined arms maneuver operations that Israel sought to apply in Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters 

used a combination of conventional and irregular tactics to slow down 

and defeat Israeli armor. Instead of a quick victory, the IDF found itself 

mired in sustained combat that highlighted major readiness deficiencies. 

One disgruntled reservist noted, “For the last six years we were engaged 

in stupid policing missions in the West Bank. . . . Checkpoints, hunting 

stone-throwing Palestinian children, that kind of stuff. The result was that 

we were not ready to confront real fighters like Hezbollah.”171

The difficulties faced by the IDF in Lebanon underscored the potential 

cost of prolonged and extensive emphasis on COIN and stability operations. 

Traditional combat skills suffered and could not readily be reacquired once 

hostilities commenced—especially against an adaptive enemy. This lesson 

was not lost on American military planners. Indeed, the Armor Center’s 

HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment suggested that US forces 

would also face significant challenges fighting a hybrid threat similar to 
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that posed by Hezbollah to the Israeli Defense Force in 2006. These two 

events combined with mounting evidence of a real decline in combined 

arms maneuver skills encouraged preventive action. 

An emphasis on preserving core competencies, or those skills deemed 

fundamental to the performance of mounted maneuver, resulted. In 2007, 

these competencies were generally described as command and control, 

maintenance and combat service support, gunnery, and maneuver.172 To 

determine what related tasks should be identified and preserved within the 

training base, the Armor Center established a core competency work group 

that included representatives from Fort Knox, the RAND Corporation, the 

NTC, and a BCT. Its work paralleled at the branch level a similar effort 

undertaken by TRADOC for the entire Army. The work group revised the 

basic core competencies to include movement and maneuver, command 

and control, sustainment, and fires. The first grouping included offensive 

and defensive operations, reconnaissance, security, and gunnery.173

This preliminary 

work was followed 

by a more detailed 

review and assessment of the Armor 

School curriculum 

that assessed the 

training of each task 

associated with the 

basic core competencies. In 2008, 

this effort focused 

on BOLC and MC3. 

While the former 

course was considered acceptable given the time and resources available, the evaluation 

found “many Cavalry Tasks (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Security) are not covered in great detail or are not taught in MC3.” Corrective measures sought to ensure greater emphasis on the broad range of 

military operations from stability to high-intensity conventional combat. 

Similar assessments were planned for NCO courses, the Cavalry Leaders 

Course, and the Scout Leaders Course. The results were to guide revisions 

to training curriculums.174

In effect, the armor leadership sought to readjust mounted maneuver 

training from a dominant emphasis on COIN to a more balanced one that 

Figure 135. Platoon leader training at Fort Knox.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
541

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ensured the retention of basic skills necessary for other combat operations.175 Positive developments in Iraq assisted this effort. By the start of 

2009, conditions in that country had improved dramatically and attacks 

against coalition forces had diminished. Reconstruction rather than combat came to define the focus of many units in Iraq, in stark contrast to the 

nearly guaranteed combat facing earlier deployments. While the nation 

remained in a fragile state, it appeared to be moving away from civil war 

and dissolution. This development made it possible to refocus training on 

a broader range of military operations.

Yet the precise method of achieving this end state remained unclear. 

The positive developments in Iraq were offset by a deteriorating situation 

in Afghanistan and President Barack Obama’s determination to increase 

military support there. Operations in Afghanistan, however, seemed to 

require many of the COIN skills acquired in Iraq. A shift in training back 

toward conventional capabilities might not suit this operational environment. Moreover, major training changes in the schoolhouse and at the 

unit level required resources whose availability remained problematic. At 

branch and TRADOC levels, core competency preservation remained a 

work in progress. Yet some corrective measures were implemented to sustain mounted reconnaissance skills. For MC3 graduates slated for assignment to a cavalry or reconnaissance unit, the Cavalry Leaders Course 

became a mandatory follow-on course.176 Other initiatives included the 

addition of cavalry troop instruction into MC3, and the possibility of providing sustainment training via distance learning, training support packages, and mobile training teams that brought instruction to the units.177

Into the Future

Core competency assessment and sustainment proved vital to an Army 

seeking to retain its effectiveness against a broad range of threats. For the 

mounted reconnaissance community, however, deeper issues remained. 

Operations in Iraq raised serious questions about the validity of a doctrine that eschewed aggressive action in favor of information gathering 

via stealth and sensors. They also called into question organizational and 

training trends in reconnaissance units while tending to validate the effectiveness of the traditional heavy armored cavalry regiment. The Army’s 

continued support and determination to field the FCS further clouded 

reconnaissance development, since the planned FCS-equipped BCT placed 

a much heavier emphasis on technology and unmanned systems.

The year 2009 opened with the Army in a state of transition. Combat 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continued, but the emphasis in military 
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activity began to shift. Declining violence in Iraq coupled with significant 

gains in capability by the new Iraqi Government helped reconstruction 

efforts. Insurgent and terrorist activity continued, but it proved far less 

widespread or effective than in previous years. These conditions created 

an environment favorable to the start of a gradual drawdown of US forces 

that was encouraged by a new American president determined to end the 

large-scale commitment of resources and soldiers to Iraq. Between 2010 

and 2011, the American presence was expected to become much smaller 

and focus on training and support. Already in 2008, American combat 

forces began withdrawing from Iraqi towns and cities, turning over primary responsibility for their security to Iraqi military and police elements. 

Simultaneously, the war in Afghanistan began to receive greater attention 

and led to an increase in the American military presence there. 

In June 2009, the FCS program was officially canceled. Secretary of 

Defense Robert Gates did not feel the program’s collection of high-tech 

assets suited the needs of the military in its current conflicts, particularly 

in the areas of personnel and armor protection. Although some of the 

nonvehicular components remained in development, the planned family 

of networked combat vehicles did not survive. In effect, FCS became a 

casualty of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, because it did not reflect the 

needs of either operational environment. Funding for FCS, however, was 

redirected toward the design and development of a new ground combat 

vehicle better suited to operations in IED-invested areas and offering better 

survivability. Nevertheless, FCS cancellation ended an effort that had 

been the Army’s focus for nearly a decade. The program had influenced 

modernization, doctrine, and the way in which future combat operations 

were envisioned. Its demise forced the Army to reconsider the course of its 

development and related modernization actions.178

By late 2009, concepts for the new family of ground vehicles to replace 

the FCS began to emerge. The new platforms were intended to support the 

full range of operations expected of an increasingly expeditionary Army. 

Hence deployment would occur via air, land, or sea. Planned survivability 

centered on armor protection that could be scaled to a particular threat or 

operational environment. The weapons mix for the vehicle family included 

nonlethal assets. Intended to possess high mobility in urban as well as 

countryside areas, the new ground vehicle aimed at reliability similar 

to that of the Stryker, reduced fuel consumption, and lower sustainment 

needs. It was also intended to interact with existing and planned digital 

communications systems. These basic objectives incorporated some 

concepts associated with the now defunct FCS, but they also reflected 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

an effort to refocus design on a versatile platform capable of accepting 

technology upgrades and easily incorporated into brigade combat teams.179

These developments provided the backdrop for constructive changes 

in mounted reconnaissance doctrine and training. Efforts to improve 

reconnaissance organizations generally through increases in personnel and 

capabilities awaited final approval and authorization by the Army senior 

leadership. Only the modest increase of six scouts to the reconnaissance 

and scout platoons was ready for implementation. Nevertheless, doctrinal 

and training changes provided a more realistic conceptual foundation for 

reconnaissance operations that reflected lessons learned from several years 

of combat, COIN, and stability operations in Iraq. The exclusive emphasis 

on a “quality of firsts,” the new contact paradigm, and a greater reliance on 

sensors and standoff technology gave way to a more balanced approach in 

the execution of reconnaissance and security missions. 

In February 2009, before announcement of plans to convert the 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment into an SBCT, the Armor Center submitted an 

updated reconnaissance troop manual for final approval and publication. It 

incorporated insights from the combat training centers, unit commanders, 

and combat operations overseas. It also consolidated coverage of the 

different troop types found in the BCTs, the armored cavalry regiment, 

and the BFSB. In general, all troops served to build and maintain 

situational awareness and understanding for their parent squadron through 

Figure 136. Training new scouts at Fort Knox.

Courtesy Armor Magazine
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the execution of reconnaissance and security. They retained a focus on 

multidimensional information collection, particularly cultural factors, in all 

weather and terrain conditions, employing a wide range of reconnaissance 

and surveillance systems.180

However, the manual writers acknowledged the different capabilities 

of each troop type throughout the text, noting where appropriate those 

qualities that made a particular unit either more effective or constrained in 

the conduct of a particular mission type. It noted, for example, the light, 

flexible, and mobile nature of the BCT and BFSB troops, with their optimization for reconnaissance. Similarly it underscored the limited combat 

capability of the BFSB troop due to its lack of armored vehicles, mortars, 

and missile systems.181 Unlike previous manuals that generally ignored the 

greater combat capabilities of armored cavalry, this one openly acknowledged them and devoted an entire chapter to the use of armored cavalry 

in offensive and defensive operations.182 Compared to other troop types, 

the armored cavalry troop was the only one considered capable of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force operations without mandatory 

augmentation or the existence of a weak threat.183

Many of the principles indicated in prior manuals remained unchanged, 

but their depiction in the new publication proved much clearer. The reconnaissance and cavalry troops were expected to assist the operation of their 

parent squadron by acquiring information that satisfied command needs 

to facilitate decisions and maneuver combat forces. The threat envisioned 

included a broad spectrum ranging from conventional forces to insurgents 

and terrorists to unruly mobs in similarly varied environments. Urban 

operations were considered highly likely due to global urbanization and 

the tendency of potential opponents to offset American combat power and 

technology superiority with close range engagements in complex terrain.184

Reconnaissance guidance continued to reflect an emphasis on ISR 

operations and the collection of information outside direct physical contact with a threat force. The information gained was expected to assist the 

precision maneuver of combat forces through either reconnaissance-pull 

or reconnaissance-push. Similarly, reconnaissance assets were expected to 

rely on stealth and avoid detection: “Under normal circumstances, however, to avoid giving away their position, scouts will rarely engage the 

enemy with direct fire on their own initiative. Rather, they are armed with 

direct fire weapons primarily for protection.”185

In contrast to previous doctrine, this statement did not mark the 

final word regarding potential combat situations. Instead, it was the 

preferred method of information collection, but the manual writers 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

openly acknowledged the likelihood of some degree of combat and its 

desirability in select circumstances. Reconnaissance in force, for example, 

became an acceptable mission for reconnaissance and cavalry troops when 

operating as a part of a combined arms team. This acceptance of combat 

clearly reflected the reality of operations in Iraq and marked an important 

adjustment to doctrinal principles. Hence, reconnaissance organizations:

. . . are capable of employing combat power to fight for 

information. Because these units are usually the forwardmost elements in full spectrum operations, they must 

have the capability to survive meeting engagements and 

to destroy or impede enemy forces as necessary to sustain operations. Reconnaissance and cavalry troops must 

maintain contact once they have established it. If a platoon 

or section leader has established sensor contact with an 

enemy element, the troop must pursue the contact until it 

has finally identified and reported the enemy. In general, 

troops are capable of fighting through enemy reconnaissance (destroying the enemy’s “eyes and ears”) to gain 

combat information needed by higher unit commanders. 

In shaping operations, the ability to fight for information is 

important in determining the intent of a threat (for example, whether the threat is willing to defend, withdraw, fight 

when confronted, or wait for a specific target such as C2 

or resupply elements) without requiring the higher commander to commit main body infantry or armor units.186

The ability to fight for information directly correlated to available 

combat power. The armored cavalry troop with its organic tanks possessed 

the most, while the limited capabilities of the BFSB troop required a 

careful understanding of the hostile force and its environment. These 

varied unit capabilities influenced the engagement criterion and tempo 

associated with reconnaissance missions. Therefore, included mission 

examples addressed the different types of troops showing how each could 

be employed to maximize their particular mix of mounted, dismounted, 

and sensor assets. These depictions also gave considerable attention to the 

planning of reconnaissance operations and the type of command guidance 

necessary to execute them as intended.187

A second manual submitted alongside the troop publication for final 

approval and publication addressed reconnaissance and scout platoon 

operations. It, too, consolidated guidance for the platoons found in the 

BCTs, the BFSB, and the armored cavalry regiment. Each different platoon 
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Chapter 9

type, however, received coverage oriented on its particular capabilities, 

although a general set of principles applied to all. In this manner it differed 

sharply from the 2002 version, which superimposed concepts intended 

for the RSTA squadron reconnaissance platoon on all reconnaissance and 

scout platoons without respect to their varied capabilities.188

Platoon operations focused on reconnaissance with a more limited 

capacity for security operations. Like the troop, platoons were expected to 

operate via stealth and avoid combat while gathering information to satisfy commander information requirements and provide targeting data.189 

Although combat and direct fire engagements were not encouraged, they 

were not ignored. The more realistic tone found in the troop manual was 

paralleled in the platoon publication: “Reconnaissance and scout platoons 

must be prepared to operate beyond the traditional roles of reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition of enemy forces.”190 While HMMWVmounted scouts were expected to favor stealthy and discreet information 

collection due to their vulnerable platforms and limited firepower, they 

were not required to do so. Instead, a careful understanding of the environment and the threat were to be the guiding influences. The writers expected 

the employment of a mix of reconnaissance methods during a single mission to be commonplace. They avoided a prescriptive approach that locked 

a platoon leader into a single course of action. A mental flexibility, able to 

adapt method to evolving tactical condition was preferred.191

This flexibility also applied to fighting for information: “All reconnaissance and scout platoons must be prepared to fight for information and 

report it.”192 The inclusion of this subject in a manual whose previous version intentionally eschewed combat reflected a more realistic appraisal of 

actual operational conditions. The new platoon manual outlined a broader 

range of methods and techniques for the accomplishment of reconnaissance 

based on likely conditions and threats on the battlefield. In some respects, 

it merged the cavalry’s traditional emphasis on a more combat-oriented, 

aggressive style of operations with the stealthy and sensor driven approach 

of the original RSTA squadrons. The resultant document provided the new 

platoon leader with a range of actions from which he could select those 

most suited to his unit type, capabilities, and tactical situation.193

Combat comprised only a fragment of the reconnaissance coverage 

provided. Planning reconnaissance missions received considerable 

emphasis at both the platoon and troop levels to ensure more effective 

mission execution. Scouts required clear objectives to guide their actions 

lest they provide a laundry list of information rather than those specific items 

necessary for a command decision. Multidimensional reconnaissance, 

urban operations, infiltration, battle handover, dismounted operations, 
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Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

and interaction with HUMINT teams remained important topics for 

platoon reconnaissance. The coverage given to these areas complemented 

that given to use of the tactical internet, unmanned aerial systems, and 

sensors. In short, the new platoon manual provided a clear sense of the 

unit’s purpose, the tools available to it based on its type, and the methods 

of operations that could be applied at the commander’s discretion and 

understanding of the tactical situation.194

The broader range of tools and employment concepts offered by the 

manual suited the wide range of potential threats and operational environments facing the US Army. However, it placed a premium on high-caliber 

leadership at the platoon level. To exploit the flexibility inherent to their 

reconnaissance or scout platoon, new platoon leaders needed more than 

familiarization with reconnaissance before assuming command. They 

required a thorough grounding in the fundamentals of scouting and the 

related mental ability skills and accumulated experience to varied tactical 

environments.

Developing these skills among soldiers destined for reconnaissance 

and scout platoon leadership positions became the focus of a redesigned 

Scout Leaders Course. This course consistently received high praise 

throughout the armor community, but several factors encouraged a shift in 

its nature and emphasis. The TRADOC commander directed this action, 

which also reflected the shift in the Armor Branch from a predominantly 

tank-oriented focus to one weighted in favor of reconnaissance organizations. The 2005 Base Realignment Commission (BRAC) decision to 

collocate the Armor and Infantry Schools at Fort Benning centralized the 

reconnaissance instruction traditionally conducted separately in Georgia 

and Kentucky. The movement of the Armor School to Fort Benning offered 

an opportunity for mounted reconnaissance instruction to benefit from the 

materiel support available there. Similarly, the expertise associated with 

the Infantry School’s Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course, 

which prepared soldiers for service in long-range surveillance units, could 

be leveraged to support scout training.195

The resultant Army Reconnaissance Course constituted a fundamental 

change in the nature of reconnaissance/scout leader training. The course 

spanned 27 days, a significant increase over the 17 days of the Scout 

Leaders Course. The longer timeline permitted the inclusion of more field 

exercises and hands-on instruction directly relevant to the operation of a 

reconnaissance platoon assigned to a BCT or an armored cavalry regiment. 

Instruction was derived from the emerging troop and platoon manuals, 

but it also emphasized reporting, navigating, mission planning, employing 

fires and air support, relating cultural awareness to military operations, 
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Chapter 9

and using new surveillance technologies. While these subjects did not constitute the entire range of instruction, they did reflect concerns from unit 

commanders and the combat training centers.196

The new course diverged from other training models and practices in 

its emphasis on teaching skills rather than tasks. Course designers sought 

to determine those qualities that made the scout unique and embed those 

into the overall training objectives. Graduates were to demonstrate a higher 

ability in the execution of basic missions such as reconnaissance, security, 

surveillance, navigation, and communications. They were to possess a 

better understanding of their commander’s information requirements and 

how to meet them. They showed a greater capacity for effective mission 

planning, proved comfortable with the use of organic and attached assets, 

and demonstrated confidence in their leadership and abilities.197

Developing this type of competent, capable, and adaptive leader 

required fundamental changes in the nature of instruction and the role 

played by the training cadre. It was not an easy transformation, but the 

potential value to reconnaissance operations could not be overstated. 

Junior leaders able to think, learn, and apply a broad range of information 

to complex tactical situations suited the doctrinal flexibility found in the 

new reconnaissance troop and platoon manuals. Moreover, such leaders 

would possess the mental mobility to adjust to the broad range of operational environments in which the Army might find itself engaged.

In 2009, the Army Reconnaissance Course remained a work in progress. 

A pilot course in the early spring built on the lessons learned from work 

done the previous 2 years. Resourcing issues remained to be resolved, 

although it was believed that the ranges and materiel support available 

at Fort Benning would ease these problems. The course, like mounted 

maneuver reconnaissance in general, lay in a state of transition. The future 

remained uncertain, but the flexibility embedded in the emerging doctrine 

and the new course suggested a more balanced approach to reconnaissance 

organizations and their principles of employment. The unrealistic 

expectations once associated with the “quality of firsts” had given way 

after 6 years of combat operations in Iraq to an acknowledgment of the 

value of more robust reconnaissance organizations capable of fighting for 

information. Ironically, this acceptance did not prevent the abolition of 

armored cavalry, though it did generate efforts to create a more versatile 

BFSB. If the past is prologue, future operations by the US Army will 

require the capabilities of both stealthy and fighting reconnaissance 

organizations.
549

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Notes

1. Memorandum, Major Chris L. Connolly, Subj: Detailed Trip Report 

6–8 October 2003 3ID Operation Iraqi Freedom Seminar, 22 October 2003, 15, 

Armor Branch Archives, 2003 Annual Command History files.

2. Ibid., 11, 15, 17.

3. Scott Wilson, “A Different Street Fight in Iraq,” Washington Post, 

27 May 2004, 1, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 04ACH/Army/Iraq/

Impressions/1stCAVDIV.

4. Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement 

for Full Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July–August 2005): 4–17; 

Briefing, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Subj: Task Force Baghdad, 9 March 

2005, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 05ACH/Army/Iraq/Impressions/1CD; 

Briefing, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Subj: “Task Force Baghdad,” 22 March 

2005, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 05ACH/Army/Iraq/Impressions/1CD; 

Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, “Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad,” 

Military Review (January–February 2007): 27–34; Armor Warfighting Symposium, 

COIN Panel Discussion, 18 May 2006, Armor Branch Archives, paper files, 2006 

Annual Command History files.

5. US Army Armor Branch History Office, Operation Enduring/Iraqi 

Freedom Experience Survey, executive summary, 2 May 2006, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, OIF/Surveys (History Office).

6. First Lieutenant Michael Gantert, “Checkpoint and Traffic Control 

Point Operations,” Armor CXIII, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 38–40.

7. Captain Dale Murray, “Company-Level Cordon and Search Operations 

in Iraq,” Armor CXIII, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 26–31.

8. First Lieutenant Gregory S. Hickerson, “Reconnaissance Patrols in 

Baghdad,” Armor CXIII, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 35–37.

9. Memorandum, Major James J. Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR 

Comments for OIF I (FOUO), 14 March 2004, 6–7, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, 04ACH/Army/Iraq/Impressions/Lessons Learned.

10. Captain Mike Sullivan, “Arming the Knight for Dismounted Combat,” 

Armor CXIII, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 7–10; Major Mark J. Aitken, “Hunter-Killer 

Teams,” Armor CXVII, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 20; Captain William C. 

Baker, “The Anatomy of an Ambush: Small Kill Teams in the Contemporary 

Operating Environment,” Armor CXVIII, no. 4 (July–August 2009): 5–9.

11. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF I 

(FOUO), 14 March 2004, 14.

12. Captain Jonathan Dunn, “Mounted Security Procedures in Iraq,” Armor

CXIV, no. 4 (July–August 2005): 11–14.

13. Richard E. Killblane, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 13, 

Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 77–78.
550

Chapter 9

14. Captain Walt Reed, “Fault Trend Analysis: A Proactive Maintenance 

Approach,” Armor CXIV, no. 4 (July–August 2005): 36–37.

15. Raymond Michaud, “TTPs and Lessons Learned in Iraq 2003–2004,” 

Informal scout observations, 2004, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 04ACH/

Army/Iraq/Impressions/Lessons Learned.

16. Ibid.

17. Captain Nicholas C. Sinclair, “An Approach to Route Security,” Armor

CXVII, no. 2 (March–April 2008): 26–32.

18. Dunn, “Mounted Security Procedures in Iraq,” 11–14.

19. Michaud, “TTPs and Lessons Learned in Iraq 2003–2004.”

20. Captain Robert B. Gillespie, “Route Ownership Versus Route 

Concession,” Armor CXIV, no. 5 (September–October 2005): 18–20.

21. Seth Robson, “Convoys Will Now Stand and Fight When Attacked in 

Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 31 March 2006.

22. For example, see Captain Jim Capobianco and First Lieutenant John 

Dickson, “Be There: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Armor CXVII, 

no. 4 (July–August 2008): 42–44.

23. Reed, “Fault Trend Analysis: A Proactive Maintenance Approach,” 36–

39.

24. Captain Jonathan Kluck, “OIF Vignettes,” Personal experience 

monograph, 4 April 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command 

History files.

25. Armor Warfighting Symposium, COIN Panel Discussion, 18 May 2006; 

Greg Grant, “Insurgency Chess Match,” Defense News, 27 February 2006, 6; 

Captain Daniel Helmer, “The Poor Man’s FBCB2: R U Ready 4 the 3G Celfone?” 

Armor CXV, no. 6 (November–December 2006): 7–10.

26. Sinan Salaheddin, “Chopper Shot Down; All Aboard Evacuated,” 

Washington Times, 22 February 2007, 13; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Attacks Surge 

as Iraqi Militants Overshadow City,” New York Times, 16 April 2007, 1; US Army 

Armor Branch History Office, Operation Enduring/Iraqi Freedom Experience 

Survey, executive summary, 2 May 2006; Briefing, Chiarelli, Subj: Task Force 

Baghdad: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 9 March 2005.

27. Ann Scott Tyson and Joshua Partlow, “Insurgents Broaden Arsenal In 

Battles With U.S., Iraqi Forces,” Washington Post, 23 February 2007, 15.

28. John Diamond, “Insurgent Snipers Sent After Troops,” USA Today, 

28 July 2006, 1; Rick Jervis, “More Troops Means More Targets for Snipers,” 

USA Today, 25 October 2006, 8.

29. Briefing, Chiarelli, Subj: “Task Force Baghdad,” 22 March 2005; First 

Lieutenant David A. Tosh, “Engaging the Population and Local Leaders,” Armor

CXIII, no. 5 (September–October 2004): 41–43.

30. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF I 

(FOUO), 14 March 2004, 33.

31. US Army Armor Branch History Office, Operation Enduring/Iraqi 

Freedom Experience Survey, executive summary, 2 May 2006.
551

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

32. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF I 

(FOUO), 14 March 2004, 54.

33. Briefing, Chiarelli, Subj: “Task Force Baghdad,” 22 March 2005.

34. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Subj: Unmanned Aerial Systems, 

13 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 Annual Command 

History files; First Lieutenant David R. Cowan, “The Company Intelligence 

Section,” Armor CXVII, no. 4 (July–August 2008): 19–22, 50.

35. Captain Jason Goodfriend and Captain David Levasseur, “An Armored 

Task Force Approach to Civil-Military Operations,” Armor CXIV, no. 4 (July–

August 2005): 28–32.

36. Michael Kamber, “Sovereigns of All They’re Assigned, Captains Have 

Many Missions to Oversee,” New York Times, 21 March 2008, 6.

37. “4th Infantry Division Lessons Learned Executive Summary,” After 

Action Report (FOUO), undated, 38; Armor Warfighting Symposium, COIN 

Panel Discussion, 18 May 2006.

38. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater, “Reorganizing the Recon Squadron 

to Enhance Heavy Brigade Combat Team Capabilities,” Armor CXVI, no. 5 

(September–October 2007): 37.

39. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, TDCD, Subj: Backbrief of Summit 

Findings to CG TRADOC, 14 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

2007 Annual Command History files.

40. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

Aviation Center, Subj: Aviation Concept of Operations, 24 August 2005, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2005 Annual Command History files.

41. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Ted Maciuba, Subj: Unmanned 

Aerial Systems, 13 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 Annual 

Command History files.

42. Ibid.

43. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

TDCD, Subj: HBCT Tactical Scenario—Recon Operational Requirements, 

24 August 2005, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2005 Annual Command 

History files; Paul V. Marnon and Robert D. Carter, “Manning, Equipping, 

Training, and Deploying the Brigade Aviation Element,” Infantry Magazine,

September–October 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAV/is_5_94/

ai_n16084363 (accessed 11 March 2009).

44. Captain David J. Smith and First Lieutenant Jeffrey Ritter, “Team 

Enabler: Combining Capabilities During the Execution of Full Spectrum 

Operations,” Armor CXVII, no. 2 (March–April 2008): 43–45.

45. Special Defense Department Briefing, Lieutenant General R. Steven 

Whitcomb, Subj: Armored Vehicles, 9 December 2004, transcript, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command History files; Steve Liewer, “Sandbags 

Become Makeshift Vehicle Armor,” European Stars and Stripes, 26 April 2004; 

Greg Jaffe, “Cold-War Thinking Prevented Vital Vehicle From Reaching Iraq,” 

Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2004; “Pentagon OKs Reinforcing Trucks, 
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HMMWVs,” New York Times on the Web, 29 January 2004; Amy Schlesing, 

“39th’s Humvees, Armored At Last, Ready to Enter Iraq,” Arkansas DemocratGazette, 6 April 2004.

46. Special Defense Department Briefing, Lieutenant General R. Steven 

Whitcomb, Subj: Armored Vehicles, 9 December 2004; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. 

Forces Rush to Send Tanks To Iraq,” New York Times, 29 April 2004; Amy 

Klamper, “Hunter Faults Pentagon Over Lack of Armor for Vehicles,” National 

Journal’s Congress Daily AM, 22 April 2004; “Rare Armored Humvees Save 

Troop Lives,” Colorado Springs Gazette, 26 April 2004; Arieh O’Sullivan, 

“Armored Hummers Shipment to Iraq Instead of Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 15 April 

2004; Lisa Troshinsky, “U.S. Army at Halfway Mark for Up-Armored Humvees,” 

Aerospace Daily, 9 March 2004.

47. Jason Chudy, “Humvee Gunners in Najaf Face Web of Wires,” European 

Stars and Stripes, 31 August 2004.

48. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

Major General Terry L. Tucker, Subj: Closing Remarks/Way Ahead, 25 August 

2005; US Army Armor Branch History Office, Operation Enduring/Iraqi Freedom 

Experience Survey, executive summary, 2 May 2006; Greg Jaffe, “Cold-War 

Thinking Prevented Vital Vehicle From Reaching Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, 

19 March 2004; Lisa Burgess, “New Humvee Weapons System Keeps Gunner 

Covered Inside,” European Stars and Stripes, 8 February 2004.

49. Major Edward J. Stawowczyk, “A Combat Multiplier in Iraq: The Long 

Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System,” Armor CXIII, no. 2 (March–April 

2004): 39–41.

50. Armor Warfighting Symposium Briefing, Major Tom McNew, Subj: 

FBCB2, 17 May 2006, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2006 Annual Command 

History files; US Army Armor Branch History Office, Operation Enduring/Iraqi 

Freedom Experience Survey, executive summary, 2 May 2006; Captain Shane 

Robb, “FBCB2: Past, Present, and Future,” Armor CXV, no. 4 (July–August 

2006): 15–18.

51. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

TDCD, Subj: HBCT Tactical Scenario—Recon Operational Requirements, 

25 August 2005; Major Daniel L. Davis, “Fighting for Information,” Armor

CXVII, no. 3 (May–June 2008): 26–35.

52. Broadwater, “Reorganizing the Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy 

Brigade Combat Team Capabilities,” 37–40.

53. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, TDCD, Subj: Backbrief of Summit 

Findings to CG TRADOC, 14 December 2007.

54. 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, “Regimental History,” http://www.

hood.army.mil/3d_acr/regimental_history.aspx (accessed 3 February 2009).

55. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF 

I (FOUO), 14 March 2004, 12–13, 55, quotation from page 12; 3d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, “Regimental History.”

56. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF I 

(FOUO), 14 March 2004, 18; 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, “Regimental History.”
553

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57. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF I 

(FOUO), 14 March 2004, 3, 16, 47, quotation from page 47.

58. Ibid., 6, 8–10, quotation from page 6.

59. Ibid., 18, 31, 33, 40, quotation from page 33. In the fully digitized 

4th Infantry Division, the large map supply provided at the start of operations 

remained unused in favor of digital navigation during its first deployment.

60. Memorandum, Gallivan, Subj: 3ACR MSC AAR Comments for OIF 

I (FOUO), 14 March 2004, 21, 29, 33; David N. Simms, Personal experience 

monograph, 4 April 2004, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command 

History files; Kluck, “OIF Vignettes,” Personal experience monograph, 4 April 

2004.

61. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” Washington 

Post, 16 February 2006, 14.

62. 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, “Regimental History”; Thomas E. 

Ricks, “The Lessons of Counterinsurgency,” 14; Ricardo A. Herrera, “Brave 

Rifles at Tall ‘Afar, September 2005,” in In Contact! Case Studies from the Long 

War, Vol. I, ed. William G. Robertson (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2006), 125–152; Captain Gregory R. Mitchell, “Disrupting an 

Insurgent Bedroom Community,” Armor CXV, no. 3 (May–June 2006): 16–19.

63. Armor Warfighting Symposium Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. 

Brown, Subj: 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 18 May 2006, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2006 Annual Command History files; Captain Amos Y. 

Oh, “Rush Hour: 24 Hours of Route Security Along MSR Tampa,” Armor CXVII, 

no. 1 (January–February 2008): 47–49.

64. Armor Warfighting Symposium Briefing, Brown, Subj: 3d Squadron, 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 18 May 2006; Brown, “Commander’s Assessment: 

South Baghdad,” 27–34.

65. Armor Warfighting Symposium Briefing, Brown, Subj: 3d Squadron, 3d 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 18 May 2006; Brown, “Commander’s Assessment: 

South Baghdad,” 27–34.

66. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

Lieutenant General William Wallace, Subj: Brigade Combat Team Reconnaissance 

Comments, 24 August 2005, quotation from same, Armor Branch Archives, 

paper, 2005 Annual Command History files; Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, 

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Eastman and Bill Betson, Subj: HBCT Reconnaissance 

Experiment Analytic Insights, 13 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

2007 Annual Command History files.

67. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition 

to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2008), 28, 117–118, 126, 141, 329–330; “2d Cavalry Regiment, ‘Second 

Dragoons,’” undated, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2acr.

htm (accessed 4 February 2009); Major Todd E. Walsh, “The Fight for Kufa: Task 

Force 2-37 Armor Defeats al-Sadr’s Militia,” Armor CXIII, no. 6 (November–

December 2004): 26–30.
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68. First Lieutenant Jonathan Silk, “Light Cavalry Platoon—Armor Team 

Integration Procedures,” Armor CXIV, no. 4 (July–August 2005): 6–10.

69. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 117–118, 411, 440, 460; “2d Cavalry 

Regiment, ‘Second Dragoons.’”

70. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Holmes, “The Cavalry Model In Iraq: Right 

Time, Right Place,” Armor CXV, no. 1 (January–February 2006): 12–14; “278th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (United States),” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/278th_

Armored_Cavalry_Regiment_(United_States)#OPERATION_Iraqi_Freedom 

(accessed 4 February 2009).

71. 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment unit history, undated, 

http://wapedia.mobi/en/11th_Armored_Cavalry_Regiment_%28United_States 

%29?t=3 (accessed 4 February 2009); “History of the 11th Armored Cavalry 

Regiment,” http://www.irwin.army.mil/Units/11TH+Armored+Cavalry+ 

Regiment/11th+CR/ (accessed 4 February 2009).

72. Captain Keith R. Walters, “The RSTA Squadron: Agile and Adaptive, 

Relevant and Ready,” Armor CXIII, no. 6 (November–December 2004): 19–21; 

Captain Matthew L. Blome, “The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,” Armor

CXV, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 29, quotation from same; Mark J. Reardon and 

Jeffery A. Charlston, From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade 

at War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 19–26.

73. Blome, “The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,” 29–30, quotation 

from page 30.

74. Armor Warfighting Symposium, Subj: Reconnaissance Panel 

Discussion, 18 May 2006, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2006 Annual 

Command History files; Blome, “The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,” 

26–27, 29–30; Reardon and Charlston, From Transformation to Combat, 26–

34.

75. 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, “The Blackhawk Journal: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom 2007–2008,” Unit history, 2008, 8–9, 31, 49, 50–51, 52, 

83, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, OIF.

76. Matthew Cox, “They Weren’t Going to Get This Bird,” Army Times, 

22 November 2004, 22.

77. Blome, “The Stryker Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,” 26–29; Master 

Sergeant John Hegadush, “A Better Recce Troop,” Armor CXV, no. 5 (September–

October 2006): 38–39.

78. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Colonel Steven Mains, Subj: OIF/

OEF Lessons Learned Reconnaissance Squadron (FOUO), 13 December 2007, 

Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 Annual Command History files.

79. 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav Regt, “The Blackhawk Journal: Operation Iraqi 

Freedom 2007–2008,” 53–54.

80. Sergeant First Class James Gentile, “Enhancing the Recce Troop’s 

Lethality,” Armor CXVIII, no. 4 (July–August 2009): 10–13.

81. Hegadush, “A Better Recce Troop,” 37; Blome, “The Stryker Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Troop,” 27, 32.

82. Ibid.
555

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

83. 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, After Action Review notes, 1 April 

2005, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 05ACH/Army/Iraq/Impressions/

SBCT; Wright and Reese, On Point II, 332.

84. Matthew Korade, “Working Out the Kinks: Soldiers Testing Out the 

Stryker in Iraq Reap Benefits, Discover Problems,” Anniston Star, 12 September 

2004, 1; General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

TDCD, Subj: SBCT Tactical Scenario—Recon Operational Requirements, 

25 August 2005, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2005 Annual Command History 

files; “Soldiers Hail New Army Troop Transport,” New York Times on the Web, 

5 April 2005, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 05ACH/Army/Iraq/Materiel/

Stryker; Michael E. Kurilla, “Strykers Get the Job Done,” Washington Post, 5 

April 2005, 22.

85. Paul Alfieri and Don McKeon, “Stryker Suitability Challenges in 

Complex Threat Environment,” Defense A R Journal, 1 April 2008, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, OIF/SBCT; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Study Faults Army Vehicle,” 

Washington Post, 31 March 2005, A01; Sandra Jontz, “Despite its Flaws, Troops 

Prefer Stryker,” Mideast Stars and Stripes, 23 May 2005; Wright and Reese, On 

Point II, 512.

86. Robert H. Reid, Anne Flahery, Todd Pitman, and Pauline Jelinek, “U.S. 

Strykers Take Beating in Iraq,” Washington Times, 6 June 2007, 13.

87. Hegadush, “A Better Recce Troop,” 37–39; Blome, “The Stryker 

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,” 26–31.

88. US Army Armor Center, FKSM 71-8, Armor/Cavalry Reference Data: 

Ground Cavalry and Reconnaissance Organizations (Fort Knox, KY: US Army 

Armor Center, 2007), A-30 to A-37 (FOUO).

89. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006).

90. Ibid., 1-7 to 1-9.

91. Ibid., 2-23.

92. Ibid., 1-9 to 1-10.

93. Ibid., 1-14.

94. Ibid., xi.

95. Ibid., 3-2.

96. Ibid., 3-4.

97. Ibid., 3-5 to 3-6, 3-16. Similar principles were affirmed in the December 

2007 draft version of the reconnaissance troop manual.

98. Ibid., 4-1.

99. Ibid., 4-2, 4-9 to 4-22.

100. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Charles W. Treese, “Taking Another Hard 

Look at the Combined Arms Cavalry Platoon,” Armor CXV, no. 5 (September–

October 2006): 3.

101. Curtis D. Taylor, “Trading the Saber for Stealth: Can Surveillance 

Technology Replace Traditional Aggressive Reconnaissance?” Association of the 

US Army, The Institute of Land Warfare, No. 53 (September 2005), 21, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, 06ACH/TDCD/Recon Dev.
556

Chapter 9

102. Major Mark S. Leslie, “The HMMWV is an Effective Option in COIN 

Operations,” Armor CXVI, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 3.

103. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

Major General Tucker, Subj: Closing Remarks/Way Ahead, 25 August 2005; 

Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Colonel Robert Valdivia, Subj: Backbrief to 

CG TRADOC, 14 December 2007.

104. Briefing, TDCD, Subj: Fort Knox CFPI Platform Demonstration 

Overview, 2006, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 06ACH/TDCD/Vehicle 

Demo.

105. Briefing, Mounted Maneuver Battle Lab, Subj: HBCT Reconnaissance 

Squadron Experiment In-Progress-Review 4, 1 August 2007, Armor Branch 

Archives, paper, 2007 Annual Command History files.

106. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), Technical Report, draft version 2.0, 28 September 2007, 

13, 17, 59–60, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 Annual Command History 

files.

107. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Eastman and Betson, Subj: HBCT 

Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic Insights, 13 December 2007; “Heavy 

Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment” (FOUO), 

5–7, 9–10, 54–58.

108. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Eastman and Betson, Subj: HBCT 

Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic Insights; “Heavy Brigade Combat Team 

(HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment” (FOUO), 14–15, 18–20.

109. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Eastman and Betson, Subj: HBCT 

Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic Insights; “Heavy Brigade Combat Team 

(HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment” (FOUO), 4, 16, 20–22, 24–25, 

33.

110. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), 17, 44–45.

111. Ibid., 5, 26–27.

112. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), 4, 13–14, 25, 35; Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, 

Eastman and Betson, Subj: HBCT Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic Insights.

113. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), 35; Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Eastman and 

Betson, Subj: HBCT Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic Insights.

114. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), 53.

115. “Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Reconnaissance Squadron 

Experiment” (FOUO), 4, 13, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, 45; Reconnaissance Summit 

Briefing, Eastman and Betson, Subj: HBCT Reconnaissance Experiment Analytic 

Insights.

116. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-7-9, 

The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan: Intelligence, Surveillance, 
557

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

and Reconnaissance, 2015–2024 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, 2008), 35, 56.

117. Ibid., 56–57, quotation from page 57.

118. Ibid., 56–58.

119. Elaine M. Grossman, “Army Cavalry Regiment May Be Last Bastion 

in ‘Fight for Information,’” Inside the Pentagon, 10 February 2005, 1; Sean D. 

Naylor, “End of the Road?” Army Times, 21 February 2005.

120. E-mail, Duane F. Klug, Subj: 3ACR Air Cav Squadron Retention 

Justification, 1 October 2008, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 08ACH/

TDCD; Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory D. Reilly, Subj: Value of 

Organic Air Cavalry Squadron to Regimental Operations, 2008, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, 08ACH/TDCD; USAARMC, FKSM 71-8, Armor Cavalry 

Reference Data: Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor 

Center, 2008).

121. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Clifford T. 

Burgess, Subj: Platforms/Dismounts/Organization—Force Design Updates, 

13 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 Annual Command 

History files.

122. Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Jeffrey Davidson Jr., Subj: 

Mounted Scout Platoon FDU April 2007, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

2007 Annual Command History files.

123. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Burgess, Subj: Platforms/Dismounts/

Organization—Force Design Updates.

124. Memorandum, John J. Twohig, Subj: Requirements Determination 

for the Brigade Combat Team and Armored Cavalry Holistic Review,” 25 

November 2008, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2008 Annual Command 

History files.

125. Briefing, TDCD&E, Subj: BCT/ACR Holistic Review: FDU Unit 

Reference Sheets (URS), 28 November 2008, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

2008 Annual Command History files; Briefing, TDCD&E, Subj: BCT/ACR 

Holistic Review: 3d ACR Unit Reference Sheets, 10 December 2008, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2008 Annual Command files.

126. Major Christopher Mahaffey, “Maintaining the ACR and its Capabilities 

for the Force,” Armor CXVIII, no. 4 (July–August 2009): 34–43; Dan Murdock, 

“White Paper for Full Spectrum Reconnaissance and Security for Echelons Above 

Brigade (EAB) Combat Team,” action officer working draft (FOUO), 11 August 

2009, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, Cavalry Development/2007–

2010/2009/3ACR Fate; Colonel Robin Mealer, Decision Paper: Conversion 

of Two Active Component HBCTs to SBCTs, 25 August 2009, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, Cavalry Development/2007–2010/2009/3ACR Fate; Gina 

Cavallaro and Kris Osborn, “U.S. to Switch 2 Heavy Brigades to Strykers,” 

Defense News, 5 October 2009, 1.

127. Briefing, FORSCOM, Subj: Army Modularity, 31 March 2004, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2004 Annual Command History files.
558

Chapter 9

128. Briefing, Association of the US Army, Subj: Unit Designations in the 

Army Modular Force, 2005, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 05ACH/Army/

Modularity.

129. General Officers Reconnaissance Integrated Concept Team Briefing, 

CAC, CDD, Subj: Operational Concept for Employment of BFSB/Implied 

Reconnaissance Tasks from Modular Force Concept, 24 August 2005, Armor 

Branch Archives, paper, 2005 Annual Command History files.

130. Major Jaren K. Price, “The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade: The 

Future of Division-Level Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Armor

CXVII, no. 6 (November–December 2008): 34.

131. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Mr. Benn, Subj: Division/Corps 

Reconnaissance Discussion, 13 December 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

2007 Annual Command History files.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Price, “The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade: The Future of DivisionLevel Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” 36–39; Reconnaissance 

Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Ted R. Stuart and Pete Rose, Subj: 2008 

Recon Summit, BFSB Mission and Organization Overview, 13 November 2008, 

Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 08ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit 2008/Read 

Ahead files.

135. Price, “The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade: The Future of DivisionLevel Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” 34.

136. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Stuart and Rose, Subj: 2008 Recon 

Summit, BFSB Mission and Organization Overview, 13 November 2008.

137. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Kenny D. 

Harper and Bill Betson, Subj: BFSB Brigade Computer Assisted Map Exercise, 

13 November 2008 (FOUO), Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 08ACH/TDCD/

Recon Summit 2008/Read Ahead Files.

138. Ibid.

139. Memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel C. Thomas Burgess, Subj: 2008 

USAARMC Recon Summit, 21 November 2008, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 

2008 Annual Command History files.

140. Colonel Peter C. VanAmburgh, “The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade in 

the Attack? 560th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Lessons from Exercise North 

Wind 2008, Iwate, Japan, and Employment of Attached Maneuver Forces,” News 

From the Front, 2008, http://call.army.mil (accessed 9 March 2009).

141. Memorandum, Burgess, Subj: 2008 USAARMC Recon Summit.

142. Recon Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Ted R. Stuart, Subj: 2008 

Recon Summit Due-outs and BFSB Update (FOUO), 19 November 2009, Armor 

Branch Archives, electronic, 09ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.
559

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

147. Ibid.

148. Recon Summit Briefing, Subj: Recon and Surveillance Support to 

Stability Operations—A Vignette (FOUO), 19 November 2009, Armor Branch 

Archives, electronic, 09 ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit.

149. Ibid.

150. Recon Summit Briefing, Colonel Mike Smith, Subj: Backbrief to CG 

TRADOC, 20 November 2009, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 09 ACH/

TDCD/Recon Summit.

151. Ibid.

152. Recon Summit Briefing, Subj: Enhancing the Battlefield Surveillance 

Brigade (FOUO), 18 November 2009, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 09 

ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit; Recon Summit Briefing, Subj: Division/Corps PIR 

Development (FOUO), 18 November 2009, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

09 ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit.

153. Major General Terry L. Tucker, “Managing and Developing Tankers 

and Scouts,” Armor CXII, no. 6 (November–December 2003): 4; Command 

Sergeant Major George DeSario Jr., “A Soldier’s Path to Success,” Armor CXII, 

no. 6 (November–December 2003): 5.

154. Colonel James K. Greer and Command Sergeant Major David L. Morris, 

“3d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment: A New Source of 19D Cavalry Scouts,” 

Armor CXIII, no. 6 (November–December 2004): 53.

155. Colonel James K. Greer and Command Sergeant Major David L. 

Morris, “Resequencing Training for More Battle Focus: The Transformation of 

19D OSUT,” Armor CXIII, no. 2 (March–April 2004): 51.

156. Captain William F. Shakespeare and Captain Wes Loyd, “Training the 

Next ‘Old Bill’ for the Contemporary Operating Environment,” Armor CXVI, no. 

3 (May–June 2007): 12–16; Armor Warfighting Conference Briefing, Subj: Initial 

Entry Training (IET) for an Army at War, 30 April 2007, Armor Branch Archives, 

electronic, 07ACH/Armor Conference 07/IET Briefing.

157. Staff Sergeant Brendan F. Kearns, “The Future of the Reconnaissance 

Professional,” Armor CXIII, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 24–25.

158. Staff Sergeant Matthew H. Johnson, “Scouts Lead the Way!” Armor

CXIV, no. 3 (May–June 2005): 3, 49.

159. Major General Terry L. Tucker, “The Armor Officer Education System 

Expands to Include ‘Reconnaissance-Centric Training,’” Armor CXIV, no. 4 

(July–August 2005): 3, 48.

160. Captain Mark Belinsky and Lieutenant Colonel Steven Duke, “Armor 

Basic Officer Leaders Course III,” Armor CXV, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 33–35, 

40.

161. Ibid., 33–35, 40.

162. Armor Warfighting Conference Briefing, TDCD&E, Subj: Institutional 

Course Update, 6 May 2008, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 08ACH/Armor 

Warfighting Conference.

163. Major General Robert M. Williams, “U.S. Army Armor School: 

Building New Leaders,” Armor CXV, no. 1 (January–February 2006): 4.
560

Chapter 9

164. Tucker, “The Armor Officer Education System Expands to Include 

‘Reconnaissance-Centric Training,’” 3, 48; Armor Warfighting Symposium 

Briefing, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Subj; Maneuver Captains Career Course 

Information Brief, 18 May 2006, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 06ACH/

DAS/Armor Conference/Boudinot 122/18 MAY SME/1500-1530.

165. Lieutenant Colonel Patrick A. Clark and Major Edward Hayes, “Maneuver 

Captains Career Course,” Armor CXV, no. 5 (September–October 2006): 18–22, 47; 

Armor Warfighting Symposium Briefing, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Subj; Maneuver 

Captains Career Course Information Brief, 18 May 2006.

166. Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, “Teaching 

and Learning Counterinsurgency at the Armor Captains Career Course,” Armor

CXVI, no. 1 (January–February 2007): 15–17.

167. “The New Cavalry Leaders Course,” Armor CXIV, no. 2 (March–April 

2005): 52; Williams, “U.S. Army Armor School: Building New Leaders,” 4.

168. Armor Warfighting Conference, USAARMC, Subj: Core Competency 

Task Analysis, 8 May 2008, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 08ACH/Armor 

Warfighting Conference/Briefing Slides.

169. Major General Robert M. Williams, “Maintaining Armor Core 

Competencies,” Armor CXVI, no. 1 (January–February 2007): 4; Armor 

Warfighting Conference Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Shane E. Lee, Subj: Core 

Competency Work Group, 1 May 2007, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2007 

Annual Command History files.

170. Williams, “Maintaining Armor Core Competencies,” 4; Armor 

Warfighting Conference Briefing, Lee, Subj: Core Competency Work Group; 

Captain Irvin Olivier Jr., “Short-term Focus at the Expense of Long-Term 

Technical Competency,” Armor CXVI, no. 3 (May–June 2007): 3.

171. Matt M. Matthews, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, We Were 

Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 49. This reference is an excellent overview 

of tactical issues facing the Israeli Defense Forces and highlights readiness issues.

172. Williams, “Maintaining Armor Core Competencies,” 4.

173. Armor Warfighting Conference Briefing, Lee, Subj: Core Competency 

Work Group.

174. Armor Warfighting Conference, USAARMC, Subj: Core Competency 

Task Analysis, 8 May 2008.

175. Brigadier General Donald M. Campbell, “Counterinsurgency and Core 

Competencies,” Armor CXVII, no. 5 (September–October 2008): 4.

176. Armor Warfighting Conference Briefing, TDCD&E, Subj: Institutional 

Course Update, 6 May 2008.

177. Armor Warfighting Conference Briefing, Lee, Subj: Core Competency 

Work Group.

178. Brian Robinson, “FCS Cancellation Confirmed, Army Modernization 

Changes Course,” Federal Computer Week, 24 June 2009; Sandra I. Erwin, 

“Army’s Next Combat Vehicle: New Beginning or FCS Sequel?” National 
561

Into the Storm: Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Defense, August 2009; Megan Scully, “Army Making Progress on Plan for Next 

Combat Vehicle,” National Journal’s Congress Daily AM, 20 October 2009.

179. Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Colonel Mike Smith, Subj: Combat 

Developments Update, 19 November 2009, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

09ACH/TDCD/Recon Summit.

180. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance and Cavalry 

Troop (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), final 

draft for approval (FOUO), 1-2 to 1-3, 1-7, Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 

09ACH/TDCD/Doctrine.

181. Ibid., 1-8.

182. Ibid., chapter 5.

183. Ibid., 1-22.

184. Ibid., xv, 1-3, 1-5 to 1-7.

185. Ibid., xv.

186. Ibid., 3-1 to 3-2.

187. Ibid., chapter 3.

188. Department of the Army, FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance and Scout 

Platoon (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), final 

draft for approval (FOUO), Armor Branch Archives, electronic, 09ACH/TDCD/

Doctrine.

189. Ibid., xx.

190. Ibid., 3-8.

191. Ibid., 3-4 to 3-5.

192. Ibid., 3-20.

193. Ibid., chapter 3.

194. Ibid., chapters 3 and 5.

195. Briefing, 3/16 Cavalry, Subj: Army Recon Course: Pilot Design, 

27 January 2009, (FOUO), Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2009 Annual 

Command History Files; Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel 

Scott D. King, 14 November 2008, Armor Branch Archives, paper, 2008 Annual 

Command History files.

196. Briefing, 3/16 Cavalry, Subj: Army Recon Course: Pilot Design; 

Reconnaissance Summit Briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Scott D. King.

197. Ibid.

563

Conclusion

The 80-year period between the interwar era and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM witnessed the emergence of new mounted reconnaissance 

types, the frequent reconfiguration of some, and the demise of others. 

Technological advances became particularly manifest in the evolution 

of reconnaissance platforms and communications. These developments 

necessarily impacted training and doctrine, while the capabilities of specific materiel at times triggered organizational restructuring. The evolving 

nature of the battlefield threat exerted a similar influence on reconnaissance 

trends that reflected the differing information requirements associated with 

conventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.

The conceptual framework in which these changes occurred remained 

largely unaltered. The Army retained its tiered reconnaissance echelons 

from the corps down to the battalion, and information collection remained 

the primary function of all reconnaissance assets. The manner in which 

information collection occurred, however, remained a controversial issue 

throughout the period addressed. Differing schools of thought existed 

and their ability to influence doctrine, organization, training, and materiel development rose and fell over the decades. Yet within discord lay 

constancy. The reconnaissance debate remained rooted in a fundamental 

disagreement over the basic mission and nature of reconnaissance assets. 

Should they possess a robust organization with sufficient combat power to 

fight for information, perform an economy of force role, and execute security operations that entailed combat, or should their nature and employment principles embrace stealthy operations and combat avoidance? Was 

the scout a fighter or an observer?

The answer to these questions proved anything but simple. In its effort 

to determine one, the Army proved indecisive, alternatively favoring 

stealthy or fighting reconnaissance. The resultant swings from one school 

of thought to the other generated turbulence in reconnaissance organizations, usage, and materiel development. Training and readiness bore the 

cost. The shifts in emphasis often coincided with changes in the nature 

of the anticipated threat or battlefield. Hence, they appeared on the surface to be legitimate responses to an alteration of the operational environment. In fact, they reflected somewhat illogical attempts to resolve the 

reconnaissance dilemma by superimposing one set of ideas on another. 

This approach did not foster an effective resolution, because the competing schools of thought each had proven merit. Emphasizing one over the 

other often had the contradictory effect of accentuating the strengths of 

the sidelined view. Debate ensued and helped to precipitate the next shift 
564

Conclusion

in emphasis. The cyclic nature of this process made the reconnaissance 

debate remarkably stable—the fundamental issue did not change.

In the interwar years, the establishment of the 7th Cavalry Brigade 

(Mechanized) challenged the horse cavalry’s monopoly on mounted reconnaissance. The cavalry mission set embraced a wide range of operations, 

but its doctrine governing reconnaissance favored stealth. The vehiclebased mechanized cavalry developed employment principles designed to 

facilitate a high operational tempo and rapid, decisive action. Its reconnaissance elements relied on armed and armored platforms with the capacity 

for much greater combat power than the horse. This combination resulted 

in an emphasis on aggressive reconnaissance that accepted the likelihood 

of combat and the need to fight for information.

In 1940, the Armored Force assumed responsibility for the development of mechanized combat organizations. The 7th Cavalry Brigade 

(Mechanized) experience constituted its doctrinal foundation, and further 

reconnaissance development followed the pattern set by that unit. The 

cavalry retained responsibility for horse organizations and reconnaissance 

within the corps and infantry division. Motorization of support assets in 

horse cavalry units resulted in the use of the jeep as a scout platform. 

The latter’s vulnerability encouraged the avoidance of combat and reliance on undetected observation. Reconnaissance developed in a bifurcated 

fashion until subjected to Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair’s Armywide organizational rationalization. Standardization of reconnaissance 

units and the demise of the horse cavalry followed. McNair’s functional 

approach to Army organization translated into mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units oriented on the singular mission of information collection. They supported army, corps, and division operations; but doctrine 

and training encouraged reconnaissance via observation and stealth rather 

than combat.

The reality of combat operations in North Africa and the European 

Theater of Operations forced mechanized cavalry units to perform a much 

broader mission set than intended. Pure reconnaissance operations became 

exceptional. Instead, most units performed the full range of activities 

once associated with the cavalry mission. Information collection proved 

inherent to these other roles. Large-scale improvisation in the combat 

theaters ensued to boost the overall capability of the mechanized cavalry, 

but a discrepancy remained between established doctrine and organization 

on one hand and battlefield reality on the other. The war’s end generated 

a consensus within the mounted community to restructure reconnaissance 

organizations with more combat power and a stronger dismount capability. 
565

Conclusion

Both trends became evident in the establishment of the armored cavalry 

regiment and the universal combined arms reconnaissance platoon.

The trend toward greater robustness and combat power reflected the 

wartime reality of a broad mission set and the necessity of combat. Units 

often fought for information and in the performance of other roles, but 

direct engagement of enemy forces was not the only or the most successful method of understanding the battlefield. Stealthy reconnaissance 

associated with the undetected establishment of an observation post on a 

strategic location often provided critical information that facilitated command decisions and maneuver. However, in the immediate postwar years, 

the inadequacy of mechanized cavalry organizations to perform a broader 

mission set dominated discussion of future reconnaissance needs.

Nevertheless, the universal reconnaissance platoon did not last long. 

The platoon’s versatility and combat power came at the cost of reduced 

coverage. The mobility differential between its wheeled and tracked vehicles complicated maneuver, while the variety of weapons, military occupational specialty (MOS) types, and platforms posed training challenges 

for an Army suffering with readiness issues before and after the Korean 

War. The desired characteristics of reconnaissance units also varied, suggesting the validity of different organizations. The combined arms platoon 

suited the armored cavalry regiment and remained a staple element of that 

organization into the 1970s. The utility of this platoon organization for 

the mounted maneuver battalion proved less clear. The latter employed 

scouts to gather information, assist movement, and provide early warning 

of a hostile presence. Hence, the first battalion reconnaissance platoons in 

World War II included a handful of jeeps. The vulnerability of this platform resulted in the ad hoc reconfiguration of the platoon to include light 

tanks to provide some degree of armored firepower and protection. The 

combined arms platoon replaced this improvisation, but after the Korean 

War the platoon’s organization reverted to an all-jeep configuration. In the 

early 1960s, the platoon regained its combined arms nature. This transition accompanied implementation of the Reorganization Objective Army 

Division (ROAD) with its emphasis on greater combat power.

This change marked the fourth reorganization since World War II. It 

reflected the meandering nature of reconnaissance concepts that bounced 

back and forth between light units intended for information collection via 

stealth and more robust organizations capable of additional missions and 

combat. Armored cavalry remained largely free from this confusion, partly 

because their mission set consistently included reconnaissance, security, 

and economy of force roles. Intended to operate independently, tactical 
566

Conclusion

units down to the platoon level required a degree of self-sufficiency and 

combat capability. Hence, the armored cavalry regiment remained a powerful combined arms force and influenced the transition of the armored 

division reconnaissance battalion into a division cavalry squadron. The 

squadron possessed characteristics similar to those of the regiment albeit 

on a smaller scale. Both organizations further increased their versatility 

through the integration of organic aviation assets.

Maneuver battalion reconnaissance lacked this clarity of purpose. 

Fighting reconnaissance necessitated armed and armored platforms, but 

few suited this requirement. The Army’s abandonment of the armored car 

after World War II and the slow development of a fully tracked replacement to the halftrack left few vehicle options for scouts. Light tanks possessed desirable qualities but possessed minimal dismounted capability 

and compromised all chance of undetected observation. The jeep posed 

the only viable platform for a light organization intended for reconnaissance and observation. Yet it offered minimal survivability and its crosscountry mobility proved inferior to the tracked platforms of its parent 

armor or mechanized infantry battalion. A combined arms platoon, in 

addition to sacrificing coverage, posed a training challenge, since it constituted the only mixed organization in the battalion. Yet a lighter, pure 

organization required augmentation if employed in missions with a likelihood of combat. Instead of freeing combat assets for other missions, the 

reconnaissance platoon in this case forced their commitment to actions for 

which they were not optimized. Hence, the materiel, training, and capability tradeoffs necessary to establish a clear mission set and organization for 

battalion reconnaissance posed a dilemma that defied simple resolution. 

The nature of each tradeoff ensured that any final decision would not be 

met with unanimous consent.

Platform development offered the prospect of reducing these tradeoffs 

and combining desirable qualities in a single vehicle. The fielding of the 

M114 as a replacement to the jeep provided scouts with a full-tracked, 

armored vehicle. It offered increased mobility, better firepower, greater 

stowage capacity, and survivability. Another reorganization of battalion 

reconnaissance followed, resulting in a platoon equipped almost entirely 

with the M114. Unfortunately, the failure of this vehicle to meet its expectations undermined the effectiveness of this organization. It certainly did 

not become the definitive platoon structure.

Operations in Vietnam suggested the need for a more versatile organization. There scouts employed the larger and more reliable M113, modified 

to enhance firepower and survivability. Reconnaissance, however, proved 
567

Conclusion

only one of many missions performed. Route security, convoy escort, base 

security, and conventional combat operations became standard activities in 

addition to information collection. Reconnaissance units found themselves 

employed as maneuver units by formations lacking sufficient manpower 

for their area of operations. The elusiveness of the Vietcong thrust scouts 

not only into the role of locating hostile forces but of immediately engaging them to prevent their escape. Consequently, the Vietnam experience 

shifted the nature of reconnaissance from stealthy information collection 

to a much more combative stance. The regular attachment of surveillance 

devices and the availability of aviation support for reconnaissance organizations established a pattern of interaction that lasted beyond the war. 

These developments suited the versatility of armored cavalry organizations, which helped to pioneer the principles governing mounted force use 

in a counterinsurgency role.

After Vietnam, the Army’s focus shifted back to Central Europe, where 

it faced the armored threat of the Warsaw Pact. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War 

further underscored the increased lethality of new Soviet combat vehicles 

and the effects of large-scale armored combat. Consequently, the armor 

and antitank capabilities of US forces in Europe, including those dedicated for reconnaissance, increased. The armored cavalry platoon lost its 

combined arms nature in favor of a mix of main battle tanks, M113s, and 

Improved TOW Vehicles (ITV). The division cavalry squadron similarly 

increased its complement of tanks and missile launchers. Increased combat capability came at the cost of information collection and dismounted 

operations. These developments made cavalry appear little different from 

a mounted maneuver force and critics quickly called into question the 

need for any cavalry force at all. In the interest of countering the Soviet 

mechanized threat, cavalry organizations lost some of the versatility and 

combined arms quality that made them unique and desirable within the 

Army force structure.

Maneuver battalion scout platoons were not immune from this trend. 

They gradually transitioned to a mix of M113s and ITVs. The platoon 

shrank in personnel and vehicles, but its antitank capability improved. 

These changes encouraged mounted operations at the expense of stealth 

and dismounted capabilities. In the wake of the aggressive reconnaissance 

conducted in Vietnam, both cavalry and battalion scout organizations were 

demonstrating a similar trend toward mounted combat to counter a conventional mechanized threat.

This confluence of development found further expression in the M2/

M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. This platform reflected the 1970s emphasis 
568

Conclusion

on a powerful armament capable of destroying tanks and enhanced 

armored survivability. Intended to operate with the M1 Abrams tank on 

the armor-dominated battlefields of Central Europe, the Bradley’s fielding 

to maneuver battalion scout platoons and armored cavalry organizations 

constituted a major increase in combat power to reconnaissance units. 

Moreover, by the early 1980s, all scout platoons were transitioning to a 

pure configuration based on this vehicle. The specter of a standard platoon 

organization once again arose, this time inspired not by previous combat 

experience but by the threat of a new war against a mechanized enemy.

Ironically, the division cavalry squadron’s combat power and capability diminished with the M3’s fielding. The unit lost its tanks and the 

last vestiges of combined arms capability in its subordinate troop and platoon organizations. Plans to offset this loss through the addition of brigade 

reconnaissance units and additional sensors at the division level never 

materialized. Hence, the division’s cavalry component by default became 

restricted to reconnaissance and limited security missions. Its alignment 

also moved from the formation commander’s direct control to subordination within the aviation brigade. Collectively, these actions restrained 

the squadron largely to reconnaissance activities and lowered its visibility 

within the division. They also triggered criticism of the trend in cavalry 

organizations, which seemed to stray from their traditional versatility, 

combined arms nature, and capacity to perform reconnaissance, security, 

and economy of force operations. Only the armored cavalry regiment 

retained these basic qualities. While its platoons converted to pure M3 

organizations, it did not lose its tank component. Indeed, the fielding of the 

Abrams tank resulted in a troop structure that included both tank and scout 

platoons for task organization.

For the maneuver battalion scout platoons, their adoption of the pure 

M3 configuration marked the apex of the trend toward fighting reconnaissance. Whether or not heavy armament encouraged scouts to engage in 

combat at the expense of their reconnaissance duties became the subject 

of a study at the National Training Center (NTC) in the 1980s. Analysts 

perceived a direct correlation between scout direct fire engagement and 

access to heavy weapons. Too often, such combat resulted in the scout’s 

simulated destruction, leaving the parent battalion to maneuver blindly 

or divert combat assets to resume the scout’s mission. A reaction against 

the M3 scout platoon and its combat orientation ensued that resulted in 

changes to doctrine, training, and organization. Information collection 

without combat became the central focus of the platoon in an effort to 

promote reconnaissance success at the NTC and scout survival. A doctrinal 

consolidation merged employment principles for cavalry and battalion 
569

Conclusion

scout platoons in favor of the latter. Institutional training increased the 

attention given to dismounted operations, stealth, and infiltration in 

lieu of fighting for information. Finally, organizational experimentation 

resulted in the 1990 adoption of the pure high-mobility, multipurpose 

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) scout platoon for the maneuver battalion. 

Yet the unarmored, wheeled vehicle possessed lethality and survivability 

problems once associated with the jeep. Scouts had little option but to 

observe and collect information while avoiding battle, because they no 

longer possessed the means for combat.

In the space of a decade, the maneuver battalion scout platoon moved 

from one organizational extremity to another. In lieu of heavily armed 

and armored platforms, scouts maneuvered in unprotected vehicles. 

Reconnaissance coverage and attention to stealth increased at the expense 

of combat capability, survivability, and versatility. These extremes suited 

neither Army needs nor operational reality. Stealth, infiltration, and dismounted operations required time to plan and execute. Even at training 

centers, this time often proved unavailable, forcing scouts into hasty 

operations and a faster tempo. Such conditions increased the likelihood 

of detection and sudden contact with an enemy force for which they were 

not configured to overcome. The linkage between time, tempo, and reconnaissance method (aggressive or stealth) was not a new discovery in the 

1980s. It had been understood since the interwar era and constituted part 

of the justification for providing scouts a degree of protection and combat 

capability. Unfortunately, in the adoption of the HMMWV scout platoon, 

survivability considerations took second place to the avoidance of combat. 

Too much of this decision rested on analysis of operations in an artificial 

training environment rather than the accumulated operational experience 

of previous reconnaissance organizations similarly equipped.

Operation DESERT STORM quickly demonstrated the importance 

of lethality and survivability in combat against a conventional force. 

The HMMWV scout platoon’s battlefield debut proved inauspicious. 

Survivability concerns led battalion commanders to marginalize their 

employment to preserve the lives of their scouts. HMMWV vulnerability made commanders reluctant to employ the platoons in situations that 

might result in enemy contact, effectively nullifying their primary role. Ad 

hoc combined arms teams resulted in some cases to perform the type of 

aggressive reconnaissance desired. The short conflict provided a justification for the M3’s capabilities, even if scouts equipped with this platform 

operated under the same restrictive doctrine as their HMMWV counterparts. Generally, combat operations proved a boon for cavalry organizations, confirming the versatility and effectiveness of the armored cavalry 
570

Conclusion

regiment while generating powerful support for the return of tanks to the 

division cavalry.

Nevertheless, the decade following Operation DESERT STORM did 

not reverse the trend toward stealthy reconnaissance. Instead, the end of 

the Cold War removed the threat of combat with a major mechanized 

power. Regional threats necessitating intervention came to dominate the 

1990s, but these operations underscored the need for rapid deployment. 

Downsizing and demobilization tended to erode heavy force strength, ultimately leaving only one heavy armored cavalry regiment in the Active 

Component. A second regiment converted to a light, HMMWV-based 

configuration. Despite survivability issues, the HMMWV remained the 

principal scout platform, with the M3 restricted to the reduced number of 

armored cavalry organizations. In stability and contingency operations, 

the HMMWV proved adequate and did not intimidate local populations, 

but survivability concerns remained, driven by the results of combat operations in Somalia and the threat of mines in the Balkans. Development of 

an up-armored HMMWV began, but the number fielded remained small. 

Among field units, interest in a mixed scout platoon of HMMWVs and 

M3s revived, but no institutional change occurred.

In the peace and stability operations undertaken in the Balkans, interaction with civilian populations proved critical to mission success. Only 

through discussions with individuals could scouts assess the problems, 

prevailing attitudes, and social climate of an area. Interpersonal relationships rather than technology proved the most important tools during 

these operations. Indeed, by the decade’s end doctrine embraced the cultural aspects of information collection within the term multidimensional 

reconnaissance. The expansion of a scout’s purview beyond hostile forces 

and terrain considerations to include a broad range of demographic and 

social data suited an Army confronted with a high likelihood of urban 

operations.

The explosion of information technology that characterized the 1990s 

and constituted the central focus of the Army’s Force XXI initiative 

offered new opportunities for scouts. Through connection to a digital communications network, they could benefit from automated battle tracking of 

friendly units and easier access to a broad range of fire support, aviation, 

and intelligence assets to better understand and influence the battlefield. 

Information dominance and the sustainment of situational understanding 

became central goals of reconnaissance. Indeed, information became associated with survivability. Armed with a more comprehensive understanding 

of their environment, scouts were to evade hostile contact while collecting 
571

Conclusion

critical information for their parent organization. The development of the 

long range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3) offered the scout 

the ability to observe hostile forces and report on their activities without 

entering direct-fire range. The combination of these developments seemed 

to address scout survivability. They also reinforced doctrinal emphasis on 

stealth, dismounted operations, and infiltration.

Reconnaissance techniques and doctrine became more reliant on technology. This became evident in the growing dependence on digital communications and devices to achieve unprecedented levels of situational 

awareness without having to fight for information. The Future Scout and 

Cavalry System (FSCS) was expected to end dissatisfaction with scout 

platforms. Plans for this vehicle included a host of sensors, digital communications, and the LRAS3. However, technology came at an escalating 

cost. Fielding plans for the FSCS envisioned a reduction in scout platoon 

size with a corresponding loss in manpower. The latter reduced a dismounted capability already considered inadequate. The end of the FSCS 

program did not end overreliance on technology. Instead, technology 

dependency dramatically increased with the development of the Future 

Combat System (FCS), a collection of networked manned and unmanned 

ground and aerial systems with a reduced human footprint.

The acquisition of new technology and organizational alterations 

proved a zero-sum game. More technology meant fewer platforms and 

personnel. The LRAS3 provided a considerable boost to scout capabilities. 

Yet its emergence in the scout platoons of a new division design encouraged vehicle and personnel strength reductions. This shrinkage permitted realization of another organizational goal: the fielding of a brigade 

reconnaissance troop. This digital unit filled the gap in information collection that existed between the division cavalry and the maneuver battalion. 

Little more than a collection of two reduced HMMWV scout platoons 

equipped with LRAS3, its contribution to combat operations remained 

limited to observation. It possessed the same vulnerabilities as every other 

HMMWV scout platoon.

By 2000, the ability to fight for information was becoming irrelevant 

in reconnaissance doctrine. An emphasis on unprecedented situational 

awareness and understanding achieved through reliance on advanced sensors, radars, unmanned aerial systems, and scouts equipped with LRAS3 

led to the adoption of a new contact paradigm. It anticipated a vast increase 

in the information available to scouts, permitting them to locate enemy 

forces, track them, and continuously update their status without directly 

engaging them. Maneuver assets then prepared a response based on a 
572

Conclusion

time, location, and manner of their choosing. Combat in the classical sense 

would not occur before this critical point of decision.

These concepts together with multidimensional reconnaissance pushed 

reconnaissance doctrine toward an extreme emphasis on information collection that necessarily affected organizational trends. Army Transformation 

resulted in the creation of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). 

Each one included a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

(RSTA) squadron devoted to building situational awareness. Digital communications, unmanned aerial systems, radar, and sensors complemented 

the reconnaissance platoons that included counterintelligence personnel. 

The combat capability of this organization, however, remained limited. 

It was designed to collect and assess information from multiple sources, 

including civilians. The unit leveraged intelligence available within its 

chain of command to avoid direct contact with hostile forces. In the event 

of a chance encounter, it employed indirect fires to disengage.

The noncombatant nature of the RSTA squadron went further with the 

development of the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB). This organization possessed a mix of military intelligence personnel, long-range surveillance teams, and a HMMWV-based scout organization. It possessed 

unique capabilities for information collection and evaluation, but none for 

combat. Designed for attachment to a division, the BFSB was intended to 

establish observation posts throughout the battlespace, in particular covering those areas not addressed by brigade reconnaissance. It relied on a 

digital network to access indirect fires and support from unmanned aerial 

systems, aircraft, or aviation to influence enemy action.

The model of building situational understanding without actually 

engaging the enemy did not survive combat operations in Iraq. There 

the initial drive to Baghdad proved a series of movements to contact that 

entailed combat. The combined arms nature and armored combat vehicles of the division cavalry squadron made it effective in these actions. 

Conversely, survivability concerns again limited the employment of 

HMMWV platoons. Maneuver battalions employed their scouts in roles 

other than reconnaissance, reequipped them with armored vehicles, or 

kept them close to combat units.

Subsequent counterinsurgency operations similarly belied reliance on 

technology to identify terrorists from standoff distances, particularly in 

urban areas. The most successful reconnaissance operations tended to be 

those that placed scouts in close proximity to both the civilian population 

and enemy fighters. In the former instance, the civilians became sources of 

intelligence and the focus of the multidimensional reconnaissance called 
573

Conclusion

for in doctrine. In the latter case, the ability of insurgents to blend into the 

demographic landscape necessitated seeking them in city streets.

Maneuver battalion scout platoons also found they did not have 

the luxury of focusing entirely on information collection. Their activities included a broad range of missions common to most units in Iraq, 

including combat. Unfortunately, performance of these operations quickly 

revealed the unsatisfactory nature of the HMMWV, whose vulnerabilities were highlighted by hostile improvised explosive device (IED) use. 

Efforts to improve their protection and the accelerated fielding of an uparmored version helped to save lives, but degraded the vehicle’s mobility 

and overall utility as a scout vehicle. The survivability issue triggered a 

shift in platoon configuration from a pure HMMWV to a HMMWV/M3 

mix. The mixed platoon marked a step back from the inflated expectations 

once associated with information technology, standoff devices, and higher 

headquarters intelligence assets. It increased platoon combat power and 

offered some armored protection. It proved nearly identical to the solution adopted by tank battalions in World War II faced with a similar scout 

survival problem.

Counterinsurgency operations underscored the strengths and weaknesses of the RSTA squadron. The squadron proved highly effective in 

gathering information and in the execution of multidimensional reconnaissance. Its armored platform gave its reconnaissance platoons a degree of 

protection superior to that of the HMMWV, while its mobility permitted a 

high level of responsiveness. However, it did not have the luxury of focusing its activities on information collection. RSTA squadrons performed a 

much broader range of missions, including urban combat. Their efforts to 

build and sustain situational understanding depended less on technology 

than on the ability of their reconnaissance platoons to interact with the 

civilian populace.

Operations in Iraq also witnessed the emergence of a new reconnaissance organization: the brigade reconnaissance squadron. This unit 

resulted from the Army’s transition to a modular force based on brigade 

combat teams that incorporated assets traditionally controlled by division and corps headquarters. Combined arms battalions matched with a 

reconnaissance squadron provided the principal means of influencing the 

battlefield. The squadron paralleled the RSTA squadron’s reconnaissance 

orientation. It was not designed to fight for information, perform economy 

of force missions, or execute security operations other than observation. 

Still, its capabilities surpassed those of the brigade reconnaissance troop, 

which it replaced. The squadron’s mixed HMMWV/M3 platoons also 

proved more robust.
574

Conclusion

Modularity increased the number of brigades available to provide a 

force pool better suited to sustain Army combat deployments over a long 

period, but each brigade combat team proved smaller than previous brigade organizations. In Iraq, the smaller size of the brigade combat teams, 

coupled with large areas of operation, resulted in the use of the reconnaissance squadron as another maneuver unit. This employment created challenges and necessitated squadron improvisation to satisfy its expanded 

mission set—a situation not unlike that faced by mechanized cavalry in 

World War II.

The combined arms division cavalry squadron became a casualty 

of modularity. The assets of this unit were absorbed in the process of 

expanding the number of brigade combat teams. This development left 

the armored cavalry regiment as the sole representative of cavalry organizations configured to perform reconnaissance, security, and economy of 

force roles. The enabling capabilities for this mission made the armored 

cavalry regiment an effective counterinsurgency instrument—reaffirming 

a similar conclusion drawn in Vietnam. The unit’s combined arms nature 

gave it a versatility and tactical agility that permitted ready adaptation to 

most tactical environments. These qualities also made the armored cavalry regiment anomalous. It contradicted the prevalent trend in mounted 

reconnaissance toward organizations optimized for the singular purpose 

of stealthy information collection. Similarly, the regiment’s retention of 

organic aviation ran counter to Army-wide efforts to consolidate aviation 

assets in specialized brigades. Pressure to dismantle the cavalry regiment 

organization mounted and resulted in the restructuring of the light regiment into another SBCT. The last Active Component heavy cavalry regiment avoided a similar fate through operational effectiveness in Iraq. In 

2009, this reprieve came to an end with the Army’s announcement of its 

intent to convert the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment into an SBCT.

In the modular force structure, the absence of organizations with the 

combined arms qualities once associated with armored cavalry created 

new problems. Within the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), the 

reconnaissance squadron’s orientation toward information collection 

reduced its ability to perform fighting reconnaissance forward of the parent 

brigade or undertake security operations likely to require combat. It could 

not expect significant augmentation from the parent brigade, whose two 

maneuver battalions lacked the means to reinforce the squadron without 

significant reduction in their own capabilities. In the absence of a division 

cavalry squadron, the brigade could expect little assistance from its parent 

division unless a BFSB augmented the latter. The BFSB offered unique 

information collection and observation abilities to enhance maneuver and 
575

Conclusion

assist in the effective employment of fire or aerial support. It could not 

fight for information, conduct security missions, or execute economy of 

force missions. If performed at all, these missions had to be undertaken 

by combat assets drawn from shrunken brigade combat teams. While 

modularity offered brigade commanders powerful new tools represented 

by unmanned aerial systems, digital networks, and reachback capabilities, 

it also tended to reduce ground reconnaissance capability throughout the 

division—particularly the ability to fight for information and assess enemy 

intent and disposition through direct contact.

Yet the continued development of mounted maneuver reconnaissance 

was not a fixed course. Change proved possible, especially when operations demonstrated the need for adjustment. The publication of new doctrinal manuals in 2009, for example, retained much of the prior emphasis on 

information collection and situation development without engaging hostile 

forces. However, they also acknowledged the periodic necessity to fight 

for information and likely employment of reconnaissance organizations in 

a broader mission set than preferred. Security missions began to receive 

greater emphasis in training and doctrine. Similarly, a number of recommended organizational modifications sought to make reconnaissance units 

more effective through additional dismounted scouts, increased firepower, 

and greater responsiveness to varied tactical conditions. Training improvements focused on the development of scout commanders whose demonstrated competency in critical skill areas made them readily adaptable to 

most operational environments.

All of these actions remained works in progress. Collectively, they 

reflected a step back from the extreme reliance on technology and the 

avoidance of combat that prevailed prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

Combat operations pushed the emphasis in reconnaissance development 

back toward a middle ground that favored stealthy information collection 

and the enabling capabilities of new technology while simultaneously 

acknowledging the utility of more aggressive reconnaissance and security 

measures. Whether this acceptance would extend to include economy of 

force operations or result in the rebirth of a division reconnaissance unit 

with qualities similar to those of the division cavalry squadron remained 

unknown.

The trends outlined in these pages, however, are not. Mission 

assignments for reconnaissance units determine their organization, 

materiel, and training requirements. They need to embrace more than 

one principal activity. Units optimized for a single function invariably 

are thrust into additional roles for which they are not configured, forcing 
576

Conclusion

improvised solutions and the invalidation of much of their related training 

and doctrine. These occurrences reflect not poor command judgment but 

operational realities. The Army has never possessed sufficient resources 

to permit the proliferation of highly specialized organizations with only 

one purpose. Therefore, the mission set for a reconnaissance organization 

must reflect its roles in major conventional wars, counterinsurgency, 

and stability actions. In the past, such operations necessitated security, 

administrative, and liaison duties in addition to information collection. 

Although the required roles will vary by command echelon, there is little 

reason to assume that future demands on reconnaissance units during the 

conduct of these operations will be any less than in the past.

Rejection or acceptance of the economy of force function requires 

attention. In the modular force structure, this issue becomes especially 

relevant at the brigade and division levels, because it influences decisions 

regarding the configuration of the brigade reconnaissance squadron and 

BFSB. Traditionally, the division cavalry squadron performed this role as 

necessary, but the absence of this unit and the smaller size of the modular 

brigades make its execution problematic at best. If it is no longer required, 

current unit configurations will suffice. If—as in Iraq—a requirement to 

perform economy of force operations does exist, organizational change 

will either be required at the division or brigade level.

Doctrine must embrace the value of both fighting and stealthy 

reconnaissance. Failure to do so will continue to push reconnaissance 

down a meandering path. The ability to fight for information or collect 

a steady stream of intelligence from an undetected observation post are 

both valid methods of securing details on threat activities. They are not 

mutually exclusive but complementary. Together they constitute options for 

a commander seeking information dominance. Similarly, reconnaissance 

and security operations need to be seen as integral elements that cannot be 

readily separated. Separation of the two generally results in the neglect of 

the latter and the adoption of an organization too light for any but the most 

permissive environment. Older doctrine routinely saw each reconnaissance 

mission as an implicit security mission and vice versa. This linkage needs 

to be reaffirmed and the related organizational and training implications 

accepted. 

The doctrinal combination of a broader mission set, different styles of 

information collection, and the interrelated nature of reconnaissance and 

security underscore the importance of mental mobility. This term, once 

associated with horse cavalry, expresses the scout’s ability to adjust, assess, 

and function in diverse operational settings. It is a critical requirement 
577

Conclusion

for individuals charged with making rapid assessments in highly complex 

situations to assist decision making by commanders. Technology can assist 

but not replace the human brain’s ability to analyze and apply intuition. 

Reconnaissance doctrine must provide a realistic framework of principles 

readily adaptable to different circumstances. Concepts designed for a 

single operational environment possess little resilience or longevity for 

the globally oriented US Army.

Multidimensional reconnaissance makes sense. It fits global urbanization trends and the likelihood of future operations among a civilian population. While its basic concepts may not be new, its codification within 

doctrine ensures a degree of visibility otherwise dependent entirely on 

a unit commander. However, emphasizing the importance of gathering 

social information in addition to more traditional intelligence on hostile 

forces and terrain requires commanders to provide a clear focus to their 

scouts. Information requirements must be readily understood and achievable to prevent the accumulation of a laundry list of situational data that 

does not facilitate rapid decision making.

Reconnaissance organizations require versatility to adapt to everevolving tactical situations and operational realities. Versatility without 

survivability and combat power has little relevance. Reconnaissance units 

unable to survive contact with an enemy and incapable of overcoming 

even light resistance tend to be marginalized either by a threat or by their 

own commanders. Even stealthy reconnaissance requires an ability to survive a chance contact or an ambush that may occur with little warning, 

particularly in an urban environment or during counterinsurgency and stability actions.

Units dependent on regular augmentation to perform their missions 

are improperly designed. Organizational capabilities must reflect unit specific missions and requirements. Necessarily this will result in different 

types of reconnaissance units, but this variance provides the Army with a 

mix of capabilities. Standard organizations generally have not lasted long 

precisely because they did not address the differing reconnaissance needs 

of the battalion, regiment, brigade, and division.

Organizational designs reflect a series of tradeoffs among capabilities. 

While combined arms reconnaissance organizations offer the most combat 

power and versatility, they do so at the expense of coverage. Similarly, 

more vehicles increase manning requirements and reduce the scouts available for dismounted operations. Determination of the optimum capability 

mix reflects the intended mission and the framework within which the unit 

will operate. Will it, for example, remain in close proximity to a combat 
578

Conclusion

organization, thereby permitting more information collection capability at 

the expense of some combat power? Failure to appraise realistically how 

the unit will be employed or likely budget and manpower constraints will 

generate unbalanced organizations that struggle to execute missions.

Reconnaissance organizations require a robust dismount capability. 

The ability to dismount ensures a degree of stealth capability even for 

heavily armed and armored reconnaissance organizations. It also facilitates multidimensional reconnaissance, urban operations, and any activity 

that requires interaction with a civilian population. Technology enhances 

the scout’s ability but cannot replace him. Moreover, machines have little 

value in situations requiring interpersonal relations with non-Western cultures. At the platoon level, it makes little sense to design organizations that 

substitute technological devices for scouts. Such a path reduces versatility, requires special diversions of manpower to protect the machines, and 

undermines overall operational effectiveness.

The proven value of aviation and unmanned aerial support to 

reconnaissance organizations demands clear policies regarding their 

distribution and usage. With the demise of the armored cavalry, 

reconnaissance units must seek such aviation support from external 

organizations—a process that does not promote close teamwork among 

air and ground cavalry. Unmanned aerial systems provide a viable but less 

capable alternative. Should they become organic to most reconnaissance 

units, and if so, at what level? No support is a step back from the 

demonstrated value of integrated air-ground reconnaissance established 

in the 1950s.

No definitive set of requirements exist for a reconnaissance vehicle 

that will satisfy all. This state reflects the inability to merge multiple capabilities onto a single platform. Heavily armed and armored vehicles tend 

to be tracked and possess a high noise signature and silhouette. These 

qualities preclude stealth and infiltration against an alert foe. Conversely, 

light, quiet platforms tend toward minimal survivability and lethality but 

compromise the safety of their passengers. Neither vehicle is optimal for 

all circumstances. Hence, a mix of vehicles is required, although this mix 

need not occur within a single organization. Pure platoons that can be task 

organized at the troop level will suffice. Each platform needs a baseline 

level of ballistic protection to make survival viable in the event of ambush 

or sudden contact. It also needs a weapon that not only facilitates disengagement but gives the scout the option of employing reconnaissance 

by fire or initiating a direct fire engagement with some chance of success. Experience with the jeep and HMMWV underscores the importance 
579

Conclusion

of survivability and lethality. Stealth alone will not ensure survival. All 

reconnaissance vehicles need mobility equal to or preferably superior to 

their parent organization if they are to operate forward. They also require 

digital communications and the best optical devices available to identify 

and acquire targets both night and day.

Doctrine, materiel, and organization mean little without a capable 

scout to apply and employ them. Training, therefore, must reflect a fundamental skill set applicable to most operational environments. A definite requirement remains for such specialized training, given the unique 

and multifaceted nature of mounted maneuver reconnaissance. However, 

training rooted in rote, mechanical drills will not help the scout on the 

complex battlefields of tomorrow. Instead, training needs to instill not only 

the ability to execute specific tasks but also the ability to think through 

problems and solve them with a minimum of guidance. Teaching scouts 

how to think rather than what to do are central to building mental mobility 

and ensuring the ability to function in any operational environment.

The historical record from which these basic conclusions are drawn 

provides a rich tapestry of experience based on actual operations and 

real world events. It is a tool with which to address current and future 

reconnaissance challenges. Historical experience offers an alternative to 

exclusive reliance on current events, computer modeling, and simulations 

analysis. Moreover, its focus lies on the activities and accomplishments of 

individuals. This human emphasis reflects the most important asset in any 

reconnaissance organization—the individual scout, who must make the 

determination to fight or not.

581

Glossary

AAR after action review

AC3 Armor Captains Career Course

ACAV Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle

ACR Armored Cavalry Regiment

ACT armored cavalry trainer

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGS Armored Gun System

ALB AirLand Battle

AM amplitude modulation

ANCOC	 Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course

AOAC	 Armor Officer Advanced Course

AOBC	 Armor Officer Basic Course

APC armored personnel carrier

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

ASRV Armored Scout and Reconnaissance Vehicle

ATGM antitank guided missile

AUV armored utility vehicle

AVLB armored vehicle launch bridge

AWC Army War College

AWOL absent without leave

BCT brigade combat team

BFSB	 battlefield surveillance brigade

BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle

BOLC	 Basic Officer Leadership Course

BRAC Base Realignment Commission

BRDM literally “Combat Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle”

BRP Blue Ribbon Panel

C2 command and control

CAC Combined Arms Center

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAS3 Combined Arms and Services Staff School

CAV cavalry

CCH Close Combat Heavy

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CDC Combat Development Command

CEWI Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence

CFV Cavalry Fighting Vehicle

CINCOS change in NCO structure

CLC Cavalry Leaders Course

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center

COIN counterinsurgency

COLT combat operations lasing team

CONARC Continental Army Command
582

Glossary

CONUS continental United States

COP common operational picture

CROWS crew remotely operated weapon system

CVC combat vehicle crewman

DA Department of the Army

DOD Department of Defense

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center

e.g. for example

ETO European Theater of Operations

EXFOR Experimental Force

FAA Functional Area Assessment

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below

FCS Future Combat System

FDU force design update

FEBA forward edge of battle area

FLIR forward looking infrared

FM	 field manual; frequency modulation

FORSCOM Forces Command

FOUO	 For Official Use Only

FSCS Future Scout and Cavalry System

GCM George C. Marshall Foundation

GHQ General Headquarters

GPS global positioning system

HBCT heavy brigade combat team

HHC headquarters and headquarters company

HHT headquarters and headquarters troop

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HQ headquarters

HUMINT human intelligence

HUMRRO Human Resources Research Organization

IBCT Infantry Brigade Combat Team

IDF Israeli Defense Forces

IDIV interim division

IED improvised explosive device

IET initial entry training

IPR In-Process Review

IR infrared

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ITV Improved TOW Vehicle

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

LACR light armored cavalry regiment

LAV light armored vehicle

LAW light antitank weapon
583

Glossary

LCR light cavalry regiment

LRAS3 long range advanced scout surveillance system

MACOV Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam

MACV Military Assistance Command–Vietnam

MC3 Maneuver Captains Career Course

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

MELIOS mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set

MGS mobile gun system

MHI Military History Institute

MICV Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle

MILMO military motorcycle

MLRS multiple launch rocket system

MOS military occupational specialty

MTOE	 modified table of organization and equipment

NARA National Archives and Records Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCO	 noncommissioned officer

NLOS non-line-of-sight

NTC National Training Center

NVA North Vietnamese Army

O&O organizational and operational

OCAFF	 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces

ODS Operation DESERT STORM

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OOTW operations other than war

OP observation post

OPFOR opposing force

PIR priority information requirement

PSYOP psychological operations

REMBASS	 remotely monitored battlefield sensor system

RG Record Group

ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division

ROCAD Reorganization of the Current Armored Division

RPG rocket propelled grenade

RSTA reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition

S2	 intelligence officer

S3	 operations and training officer

S5	 civil affairs officer

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAMS School of Advanced Military Studies

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SEP System Enhancement Program
584

Glossary

SIMNET Simulations Network

SPLC Scout Platoon Leaders Course

SSCO small scale contingency operations

SUSV Small Unit Support Vehicle

TF task force

TOE (TO&E) table of organization and equipment

TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided

TRAC TRADOC Analysis Center

TRACER Tactical Reconnaissance Armored Combat Equipment 

Requirement

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

URS Unit Reference Sheet

US United States

USAARMC US Army Armor Center

USAARMS US Army Armor School

VC Viet Cong

WMD weapon of mass destruction
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617

Index

1st Armored Division, 27, 53–54, 57, 348

1st Armored Regiment, 53, 56

1st Cavalry Division, 5–6, 12, 44–45, 121, 125, 488, 494

1st Cavalry Regiment, 11

1st Squadron, 239, 366, 389

2d Squadron, 208, 211, 234, 237, 240, 242, 296, 509–510

3d Squadron, 498

1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized), 12–14, 16

1st Infantry Division, 202–203, 321, 366

10th Mountain Division, 350, 353

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 178–179, 203, 208, 211–214, 216, 224, 234–

235, 238–241, 243, 245–247, 353–354, 390, 508

11th Armored Division, 78

13th Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized), 16

13th Armored Regiment, 54

14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 98, 112, 178–179

14th Cavalry Group, 72

14th Cavalry Regiment

1st Squadron, 490, 492, 508–509

2d Squadron, 509

15th Infantry Regiment

3d Battalion, 460, 462

16th Reconnaissance Company, 121

17th Air Cavalry Regiment

4th Squadron, 345

17th Cavalry Regiment

3d Squadron, 350–352

101st Air Assault Division, 353, 455–464

102d Cavalry Group, 71

113th Cavalry Group, 71

199th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized), 344–345

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 98, 112, 316, 344–348, 352–353, 358, 364–365, 

390, 396–399, 421, 431–438, 490, 506–507

2d Armored Division, 27, 40, 54, 60, 112, 156, 273, 284

2d Cavalry Group, 72

2d Infantry Division, 508, 512–513

24th Reconnaissance Company, 125

25th Infantry Division, 121, 203, 207, 317

25th Reconnaissance Company, 124

278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 507–508

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 98, 112, 178–179, 191, 193–194, 212, 251, 270–

271, 295, 316, 353–354, 357, 433, 450, 489, 501–506, 524–526, 543
618

Index

3d Armored Division, 60, 111

3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, 57–58

3d Cavalry Regiment, 2

3d Infantry Division, 354, 454–456, 458, 460–462, 464–465, 485, 500, 508

3d Reconnaissance Company, 124

33d Armor Regiment

1st Battalion, 360

34th Armor Regiment

2d Battalion, 207, 236

34th Infantry Division, 59

37th Armor Regiment

2d Battalion, 507

4th Cavalry Group, 71–72

4th Cavalry Regiment

1st Squadron, 203, 209, 211

2d Squadron, 317–318

3d Squadron, 210, 234, 354–355

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 339, 391, 455, 464

5th Cavalry Regiment

3d Squadron, 213

525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, 528

6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 98, 112

6th Armored Division, 77

6th Cavalry Group, 71–73

6th Cavalry Regiment, 7

64th Armor Regiment

1st Battalion, 305

68th Field Artillery (Mechanized), 16

69th Armor Regiment, 42

1st Battalion, 207, 236

2d Battalion, 460

3d Battalion, 458, 460

7th Armored Division, 78

7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), 1, 16–17, 19, 25–27, 29, 46, 100, 110, 168

7th Infantry Division, 121

7th Reconnaissance Company, 125

70th Tank Battalion, 27, 120

73d Armor Regiment

3d Battalion, 307, 321, 398

77th Armor Regiment

1st Battalion, 236–239

8th Cavalry Regiment, 78, 389

81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 53, 55, 59, 62
619

Index

82d Airborne Division, 307, 315, 352–353, 421, 455

89th Tank Battalion, 119

9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 344, 421

91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 53, 56

Abrams, Creighton W., 235

Abrams, John N., 431, 437

Active Defense, 265–266, 268, 271, 273, 275–276, 288–290, 292, 294

Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), 314

Advanced Warfighting Experiment Task Force XXI, 339–340, 394

aerial reconnaissance, 19, 100, 156–157, 167–168, 180, 293

aerial surveillance, 155

Afghanistan, 423–424, 436, 451

AH–64 Apache Attack Helicopter, 291, 340, 373

air cavalry, 157, 167, 210–211, 222, 224, 229, 239–240, 247–248, 294, 297–298, 

350–351, 450

Aircraft Armaments Corporation, 158

AirLand Battle doctrine, 289–291, 295, 297, 316, 337, 340–341, 371

air transport, 133–134

Albania, 398

Allenby, Edmund H.H., 4

al-Qaeda, 423–424, 486–487

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 2

antitank guided missile (ATGM), 264, 281

Arab-Israeli War (1973), 264, 267, 275

Arabic language skills, 494–495

area security, 194–195, 212, 226, 378, 442, 444

Armor 2000 study, 341–343

Armor Branch, 117, 127, 270, 341, 361, 386

Armor Captains Career Course (AC3), 537

Armor 

Center, 157, 267, 288, 295, 297, 343, 346, 353, 360, 381, 388, 393, 429, 431, 

436–437, 518, 525, 528, 530

Combat Developments Agency, 193-194

Conference (1946), 96

Conference (1977), 273

..... and Engineer Board, 283

Officer Advanced Course (AOAC), 251, 388

Officer Basic Course (AOBC), 200, 313, 388

Officer Orientation Course, 200

School, 129–130, 171–172, 179–180, 195, 200, 248, 251, 271, 298, 313–314, 

446

armored car, 7, 16–17, 20–23, 46–48, 55, 64, 75, 77, 114

platoon, 21–23

troop, 13–17, 19, 21
620

Index

armored cavalry 

assault vehicle (ACAV), 196, 203, 207, 209, 211, 218, 230, 235, 239, 243, 285

Journal, 94

platoon, 150–155, 161, 163, 199–200, 231, 250–251, 269, 271, 279, 280–

281, 392, 445, 448, 504

Combat Readiness Check, 201

regiment, 91, 98–100, 110, 178–179, 180–183, 192–193, 198–199, 227, 279, 

281, 297, 372–373, 449

regiment (light), 342–346, 373

squadron, 164, 281

troop, 149–151, 155, 158–159, 161, 164, 181, 282, 312, 375–376, 450

trainer, 201–202

Armored Center, 91, 111

Armored Command, 91

armored division, 39–40, 49, 60, 64, 93, 97

Armored Equipment Board, 113

Armored Force, 1, 27–29, 35, 39, 42, 45–47, 49, 51–52, 57, 91

Replacement Training Center, 51, 111

Armored Gun System, 345–346, 364–365, 396, 431, 436

armored reconnaissance battalion, 39, 41, 46, 52, 60, 71, 97

Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle Task Force, 286–287

armored vehicle launched bridge, 221, 228, 235, 281–282

Army

Army 86 Study, 266–267, 289, 291–292, 297, 311

Battle Command System (ABCS), 426–427

Combat Developments Command, 222

Army of Excellence, 289, 291–292, 297, 317, 319, 335

Ground Forces (AGF), 45, 80

Equipment Review Board, 113

Organization Act of 1950, 117

Policy Conference on Armor, 127

Reconnaissance Course, 547–548

Tank Panel, 127

Training Board, 299

Army Transformation, 399, 417, 422–434, 450

modularity, 463–469

Objective Force, 418–420, 423, 432, 434–435, 437

Platform Performance Demonstration, 428

Army Warfighting Experiments, 338, 391

assault gun, 46, 48, 55, 66, 77

Atomic Field Army-1, 146

Aviation Branch, 296–297

base camp management, 214, 237, 492

Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), 536–537
621

Index

Battle of the Bulge, 72

Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB), 526–534

computer assisted map exercise, 528–531

battle handover, 443–444

battle labs, 337

Battreall, Raymond R. Jr., 174

Bell, B.B., 429, 432, 434

Berlin Airlift, 98, 116

Blue Ribbon Panels, 431–433

Bosnia, 336, 348–349, 355, 366, 399, 418, 486, 488

BRDM-2, 304

brigade aviation element, 498

brigade reconnaissance troop, 393–396, 442–445, 449, 451–452, 460–461, 466–

467

brigade scout platoon, 292–293, 319, 323

Byrnes, Kevin P., 437

Bush, George W., 423, 487

C-130 air transport, 426, 429

California National Guard, 336

Cambodia, 217, 235, 246

cavalry, 1–3, 11, 28, 35, 38

Field Manual, Vol. I: Horse Cavalry (1938), 7–8

Field Manual, Vol. II: Mechanized Cavalry (1938), 19, 22

group, 60, 64, 71, 99

Journal, 4, 24, 69

Leaders Course (CLC), 313, 355, 387, 448, 538, 541

reconnaissance troop, 38

Cavalry School, 6, 57–58, 70, 111

maneuvers (1934), 5, 7, 12

Cavalry Scout Ad Hoc Committee, 268–269, 280, 286–288

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 303

Chaffee, Adna R. Jr., 26–27

checkpoint operations, 351, 374, 488

Chiarelli, Peter W., 488

Clarke, Bruce C., 132

Classroom XXI, 387

Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), 387

Coalition Provisional Authority, 486

Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Company, 281

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), 348, 389

combat operations lasing teams (COLT), 380, 394, 453, 462, 468

Combined Arms Center (CAC), 295, 297, 300–301, 343, 527–528

Conference on Medium and Light Gun Tanks, 127

Constabulary, 91, 98
622

Index

Continental Army Command (CONARC), 154, 157, 165, 179–180, 200, 202, 263

convoy operations and security, 193, 210, 212–213, 226, 242, 374, 377–378, 442, 

444, 490–491

Cook, Gilbert R., 113

cordon and search operations, 488–489

countermine operations, 61– 62, 219, 245–246

counterreconnaissance, 383–384

crew remotely operated weapon system (CROWS), 500

cultural awareness, 494–495

Dager, Holmes E., 78

DePuy, William E., 265

Desert Hammer VI, 338–339

Detachment for Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, 12

Digitization Special Task Forces, 338

dismounted patrols, 489

division 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment, 340

cavalry squadron, 148–150, 155–156, 167–168, 198, 209–210, 235, 263, 

266, 277, 279, 282–283, 292–296, 298, 317, 319, 323, 354–356, 373, 

389, 392, 449–450, 458–460, 465

cavalry squadron (light), 350, 352–353, 358

Pentomic, 146

Restructuring Study, 266

Reorganization of the Current Armored Division (ROCAD), 146–150, 154–

155, 157–161, 181

Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD), 165–169, 189, 194, 197–

198, 221, 266

Eighth Army (British), 51

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 143

European Theater of Operations (ETO), 71

Experimental Force (EXFOR), 339–340, 387, 393–394, 452

Experimental Mechanized Force, 11

Faїd Pass, 57

Federal Republic of Germany, 178, 191, 226, 263, 265, 268, 271, 277, 315, 317

Fickett, Edward M., 72

Field Manual

2-5, Cavalry Field Manual: Horse Cavalry (1940), 28–29

2-10, Mechanized Elements (1941), 37

2-15, Employment of Cavalry (1941), 35

2-20, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized (1944), 65, 71

2-30, Cavalry Mechanized Cavalry Squadron (1943), 62, 69

2-30, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized (1944), 67–68

3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron (2006), 514–517
623

Index

3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop: Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance 

Troop (2002), 442–444

3-20.971, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop (2009), 543–545

3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon (2001), 444–446

3-20.98, Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon (2009), 545–547

3-55.1, The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (2009), 532

3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team (2002), 446

17-1, Armor Operations (1963), 194, 197

17-1, Armor Operations (1966), 222, 224–228, 230–232

17-15, Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion (1966), 229–230

17-20, Employment of Armored Units, Reconnaissance Platoon and 

Company (1942), 46–47, 49

17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance Company (1950), 

102, 104–105, 107, 109

17-30, The Armored Division Brigade (1961), 190–191

17-33, The Armored Battalion, Light and Medium (1942), 49–50

17-35, Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Division (1951), 108

17-35, Armored Cavalry Units, Armored and Infantry Divisions (1957), 

149–154

17-35, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and Squadron (1960), 160–165, 

190

17-36, Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units (1968), 230–233

17-36, Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry 

Squadron (1973), 249–250

17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Armored Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Battalion (1951), 109–111

17-95, The Armored Cavalry Regiment (1966), 227–229, 231

17-95, Cavalry (1977), 275–277

17-95, Cavalry Operations (1991), 371–372

17-95, Cavalry Operations (1996), 372–375, 448

17-97, Regimental Armored Cavalry Troop (1988), 312

17-97, Cavalry Troop (1995), 375–377, 448

17-98, The Army 86 Scout Platoon (1985), 307–309

17-98, Scout Platoon (1994), 377–378

17-98, Scout Platoon (1999), 379–381

71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (1977), 

277–279

71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (1988), 

311–312

71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division Operations (1978), 277

100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (1949), 101

100-5, Operations (1976), 265

100-5, Operations (1982), 290

fire support, 75, 153, 172–173, 376
624

Index

First Army maneuvers (1939), 25

Flexible Response, 165, 189

Foley, Thomas C., 343

Force XXI, 335, 337–341, 343, 350, 370–372, 382, 388, 398, 420, 438

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), 426–427, 429, 443, 

445, 462–463, 491, 500, 503, 512

Force XXI Division, 391–393, 451

Force XXI Training Program, 387

Forces Command (FORSCOM), 263, 271, 291, 295, 345

Ford Motor Company, 47

Fort Knox, Kentucky, 12, 17, 94, 111, 117, 171, 195, 200, 268, 271, 285–286, 

314, 387, 428, 446, 519

Fort Monroe, Virginia, 127

Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, 17

Fort Polk, Louisiana, 347

Fort Riley, Kansas, 25, 94

Funk, Paul, 357

Future Combat Systems (FCS), 417–420, 501, 524, 542

Future Scout and Cavalry System (FSCS), 361–364, 395, 453

FV 701 Ferret, 129

Gay, Hobart R., 125

General Board, 92–94, 98–99

General Headquarters (GHQ), 45

Maneuvers (1941), 41–44

global positioning system (GPS), 320, 351, 388, 429, 438, 451

ground surveillance radar, 155–156, 162, 164, 277, 358, 380, 445, 453

ground sensors, 247, 277, 451

Grow, Robert W., 167

Grozny, 446

Haiti, 336, 347

halftrack, 39, 46, 49, 57, 75, 79

Harmon, Ernest N., 96, 130

heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), 466

Reconnaissance Squadron Experiment, 519–523, 539

Hezbollah, 539, 540

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), 303–306, 319, 322–

323, 345–346, 350, 357–358, 361, 365, 367–368, 377, 388–389, 431, 

433, 456, 466, 489, 499–500, 518–519

up-armored, 365–367, 395, 460, 499–500, 518–519

horse cavalry, 1, 4, 8, 17, 19, 25, 35, 36, 41–42, 52

horse-mechanized cavalry regiments, 38, 41, 43–44

Howze Board, 167

Howze, Hamilton H., 167

Hoy, Charles L., 55
625

Index

Human Resources Research Organization (HUMRRO), 200

hunter-killer teams, 357–359, 373, 375, 384–385, 459, 466, 489

improvised explosive device (IED), 488–491, 493, 503, 505–506

infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), 468, 525

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (ISR), 439–440, 443, 

445–447, 455–456, 458, 460, 497, 506, 514, 523, 528–529

Interim Division (IDIV), 431

Iraq, 315, 453–454, 456

Al Anbar province, 502

An Najaf, 458, 486, 500, 507

Baghdad, 454–455, 458, 460–461, 485, 487, 495, 500, 505, 509

Diyala province, 509, 513

Fallujah, 486

insurgents, 492–493

Saddam Hussein, 424, 454–455

Sadr City, 486, 507

Samarra, 508

Tal Afar, 504, 509, 524

Israeli Defense Force, 264, 519, 539–540

jeep, 25, 43–44, 46–47, 49, 53–55, 57, 60–62, 64, 74–75, 77–79, 97, 112, 115, 

120, 123–125, 129, 131, 163, 172–176

Johnson, Lyndon B., 190

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), 344–345, 347–348

Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), 340, 455

Kasserine Pass, 53–54, 57

Kennedy, John F., 165, 190

Korean War, 91–92, 113, 117–118, 126–127, 143

Pusan perimeter, 118–121

Kosovo, 336, 398, 418, 451, 486, 488

Kuwait, 315, 336

Laos, 217, 235, 239, 246, 248

LAV-III, 421, 428–429

LAV-25, 307, 321–322

light armored vehicle (LAV), 368, 397

Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), 361, 369–370, 394, 

396, 429, 452, 462–463, 497, 500, 511

Losheim Gap, 72

Louisiana Maneuvers (1993), 337–338

M1 Abrams tank, 291, 293, 316–317, 319, 321, 340, 354, 422, 449

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 287–289, 291, 294, 302–303, 306–307, 316–

317, 319–322, 340, 354, 357, 361, 365, 368–369, 377, 388, 395, 422, 

448–449, 466, 518

M3 Halftrack, 116
626

Index

M3 Scout Car, 25, 29

M5 Light Tank, 78

M8 Light Armored Car, 47, 61–62, 64, 74, 77–78

M21 Mortar Carrier, 131

M24 Light Tank, 78, 114, 125, 127

M26 Medium Tank, 100

M39 Armored Personnel Carrier, 116, 126, 131

M41 Light Tank, 125, 127–128, 131, 133, 158, 178

M42 Duster, 209, 236

M44 Armored Utility Vehicle, 116, 126

M48 Tank, 127, 178, 203, 207–208, 219, 221–222, 242, 244

M50 Ontos, 129

M59 Armored Personnel Carrier, 131, 189

M60 Main Battle Tank, 166, 189, 272

M75 Armored Infantry Vehicle, 116, 131, 133, 189

M88 Recovery Vehicle, 216

M106 Mortar Carrier, 269

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, 166, 189, 194, 196, 203–205, 209, 211, 216–

219, 221–222, 229, 244, 269, 272, 280, 284, 322, 346, 368, 396, 429, 431

M114 Armored Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle, 176–178, 189, 194, 196–

197, 203, 209, 211, 229, 279, 283–284, 286, 395

M551 Sheridan, 158, 227, 231–232, 243–244, 249, 269, 272, 279–280, 343, 364

M577 Command Vehicle, 235

M578 Recovery Vehicle, 244

M901 Improved Tow Vehicle, 280–281, 287, 321–322

M973 Small Unit Support Vehicle, 367–368

M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle, 511

M1127 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicle, 511

M1128 Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS), 425, 433, 435, 437, 511

MacArthur, Douglas, 11

maintenance, 65, 196, 215–216, 244, 356, 385, 492

Maneuver Battle Lab, 532–533

Maneuver Captains Career Course (MC3), 537–538, 540

massive retaliation, 143, 165

McNair, Lesley J., 45, 47, 59, 80

Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV), 216–224

mechanized cavalry (WWII), 16, 18–19, 25–26, 36, 45, 51, 92–93

reconnaissance squadron, 59–61, 63–65, 71

reconnaissance troop, 59–61, 63–64, 66, 71, 74

mechanized force, 11, 12

mechanized infantry, 236

Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), 272, 287

medical support, 77

Meigs, Montgomery C., 436

Middle East, 3, 264, 424
627

Index

military advisers, 190, 195–197, 203–205

Millenium Challenge, 421–422

mines, 62, 74, 219, 244–245

Mobility Requirements Board, 167

motorcycle, 8, 21, 43–44, 46, 49, 60–61, 285, 369

National Defense Act of 1920, 4, 11

National Guard, 35, 45

National Training Center (NTC), 296, 298–307, 313–314, 338, 357, 382, 393, 

421, 445, 463

New Look defense policy, 144–145, 165

Nixon, Richard M., 246

Normandy, 72

North Africa, 35, 51–53, 56, 61–62, 69–70

OH-58D Kiowa, 349, 433, 437

Old Bill, 2

Operation DESERT SHIELD, 421

Operation DESERT STORM, 315–316, 322–323, 335–336, 341, 357, 371, 378, 

420

73 Easting, 316

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 423

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 453

Thunder Run, 455, 460

Palastra, Joseph T. Jr., 295

Panzer Division (German), 27

Panzerfaust/Panzerschreck, 77

Patton, George S., 273

Patton, George S. Jr., 41

“Portée Cavalry,” 4

RAH-66 Comanche, 450

RAND Corporation, 300, 303, 357, 359

reconnaissance battalion 

(armored cavalry regiment), 99

(armored division), 108, 112

reconnaissance company, 97, 118, 121–123

(WWII armored regiment), 39, 41, 46, 52, 54, 60

Reconnaissance Leaders Course, 171

reconnaissance platoon

(combined arms), 91, 97, 102–105, 110, 120, 123, 147

(maneuver battalion), 40–41, 49–50, 52, 54, 60, 79, 94, 106–107, 118–120, 

143, 147–148, 158–159, 161–163, 169–170, 173–175, 178, 198, 229–

230, 238, 263, 277–279, 283–284, 298–302, 305–307, 309–311, 319, 

321–323, 356–357, 359, 377, 385, 392, 445, 452–453, 460–462, 499, 525

(mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop), 63, 67, 74–77
628

Index

(reconnaissance company), 39, 46–47, 55

(RSTA Squadron), 441, 453, 510–511

reconnaissance-pull, 21, 312, 382–383, 389

reconnaissance-push, 382

reconnaissance squadron 

(HBCT), 466–468, 496–498, 500–501

(IBCT), 468

recommended changes, 525–526

reconnaissance and surveillance platoon, 149, 155

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron (RSTA), 427–428, 

438–441, 445, 466, 508–509, 511–514

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade, 465–469, 

526

reconnaissance troop (RSTA Squadron), 442–444

regimental strike force, 396–398, 421

Robertson, J.J., 295–296

Robinett, Paul M., 113

rocket propelled grenade (RPG), 208, 213, 244, 264, 395, 429

route security, 193, 210–213, 226, 374, 378

Saint, Crosby E., 304

Saudi Arabia, 315, 317, 336

Schoomaker, Peter, 463

Scott, Charles L., 24, 51

scout car, 10, 17, 39, 46

platoon, 5, 8–10, 29, 38, 42

scout modernization strategy, 361

Scout Platoon Leaders Course/Scout Leaders Course (SPLC/SLC), 313–314, 

355, 387–388, 448, 537, 547

Scout Section (Combat Command), 147, 163

Second Army Maneuvers (1936), 14, 16

Second Lebanon War (2006), 539

Seoul, 118

Seventh Army, 156, 171, 200

Combined Arms Training Center, 199

Shinseki, Eric K., 399, 417–418, 420–421

Sicily, 57–58, 70

silent watch, 302

small kill teams, 489

snipers, 359, 396, 453, 494

Snoul, 246

Somalia, 336, 346, 350–351, 365

Southeast Asia, 189–190, 196, 202, 225, 233, 246, 251

stability and support operations (SASO), 374–375, 380–381

Starry, Donn A., 265–268, 271

striker platoon, 395, 452
629

Index

Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 417, 421–424, 426, 429–431, 435–436, 

438–440, 448, 507–508

Stryker family of vehicles, 417, 421, 428–430, 433, 436, 446, 492, 512–513

ceramic armor, 512

slat armor, 512

surveillance operations, 241–242, 250, 378

tactical HUMINT teams, 489, 494–495, 498, 512

Tait, Thomas H., 295, 302

Taliban, 423, 451

Task Force 1-77 Armor, 495

Task Force Dolvin, 121

Task Force Hawk, 398

Task Force Smith, 117

Taylor, Maxwell D., 146, 157

Team Recon, 360

Tennessee maneuvers (1941), 40

Third Army, 73

maneuvers (1940), 27, 43

Thompson, T.B., 78

training, 69–71, 105–106, 109, 111–113, 151, 159–160, 170–173, 199–202, 270–

271, 279, 313–314, 386–388, 390, 447, 534–536

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 263, 265, 267, 295, 337, 341, 345, 

393, 424

Analysis Center, 436

Pamphlet 525-5, Military Operations: Force XXI Operations, A Concept 

for the Evolution of Full-Dimension Operations for the Strategic Army 

of the Early Twenty-First Century (1994), 338–339

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 340, 445, 455–456, 458, 468, 498, 506

Vietnam War

jungle operations, 242–243

Khe Sanh, 239

Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MAC-V), 190, 233

North Vietnamese Army, 235, 263

Operation CEDAR FALLS, 213–214, 225

Operation JUNCTION CITY, 214

Pile-on, 240

Republic of South Vietnam, 189, 193, 195, 197, 203–205, 207–208, 217–

218, 220–221, 225, 230, 233, 248

Road Runner operations, 219, 221, 225

Rome Plows, 240–241

Rubber plantations, 243

Saigon, 211, 213, 234, 240

Special Text 17-1-3, Armor in Vietnam (1970), 248

Suoi Cat, 213
630

Index

Tet Offensive (1968), 225, 233–234, 243, 246

Westmoreland, William, 235

Vietnam Battle Tricks (1973), 248–249

Viet Cong, 190, 203, 207, 210–214, 219–220, 233–234, 263

War Department Equipment Board, 113

Warsaw Pact, 98, 190, 251, 263–266, 271, 288, 290, 297, 310, 335

White, I.D., 94

Wiesel, 367

XVIII Airborne Corps, 342–343, 347, 364, 396, 398–399, 434

Xenon searchlights, 220

XM1 main battle tank, 287

XM800 Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle, 286–287
631

About the Author

Robert S. Cameron attended Binghamton University from 1983 to 

1987, graduating with a B.A. in both economics and history. He then 

studied military history under the tutelage of Dr. Russell F. Weigley at 

Temple University, earning his Ph.D. in the same subject area from that 

institute in 1994. While still a graduate student, he began teaching as a 

college instructor and continued to do so on receipt of his doctoral degree. 

He taught a variety of classes in American, European, and world history 

for Temple University, Camden County Community College, and Manor 

Junior College. In 1996, Dr. Cameron began work as the US Army’s 

branch historian for Armor, completing the Armor Officer Basic Course as 

a civilian that same year. He continues to serve in this capacity and bears 

responsibility for documenting principal developments in the Armor Branch 

and Center, providing historical instruction, supporting staff rides, and 

performing historical research and analysis related to mounted maneuver 

organizational, doctrinal, and materiel actions. He also has supported 

the Patton Museum of Armor and Cavalry in a professional capacity. Dr. 

Cameron has written several articles related to armor developments for 

military publications and authored the Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle 

of Perryville, 8 October 1862 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2005), and Mobility, Shock, and Firepower: The Emergence 

of the U.S. Army’s Armor Branch, 1917–1945 (Washington, DC: Center 

of Military History, 2008). His professional interests include armored 

warfare, combined arms development trends, the internal workings of 

military bureaucracies, and the Civil War in the Western Theater.

Combat Studies Institute

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is a military history “think 

tank” that produces timely and relevant military history research 

publications and contemporary operational history for the US 

Army. CSI also conducts battlefield staff rides and provides other 

types of educational and historical support to Army units and 

commands on request. CSI consists of six divisions: the Research 

and Publications Team, the Staff Ride Team, the Contemporary 

Operations Study Team, the Military History Instructional Support 

Team, the Combined Arms Center Command History Office, and 

the Frontier Army Museum.

Other CSI Special Studies

Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units 

in Modern Armies

Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in 

the Korean War

Iroquois Warriors in Iraq

 Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US 

Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries

Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities

The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in the 

US Army

Crossing the Line of Departure: Battle Command on the Move—

A Historical Perspective
Military History/Reconnaissance