UNITED STATES ARMr IN WORLD WAR II 

The Technical Services 

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: 

PROCUREMENT AND SUPPL Y 

by 

Harry C. Thomson 

and 

Lida Mayo 

CENTER OF MIUTARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991 





Foreword

In cost and bulk, the munitions manufactured by and for the Army's

Ordnance Department during World War II exceeded the output of all the

other technical services of the Army combined, and in cost they rivaled that

for the aircraft and ships with which the war was fought. The process of

getting these munitions to fighting forces all over the world—of storing them

until needed, of keeping track of them, and of keeping them in repair—was

almost as complicated as their manufacture. In writing the story of these two

main aspects of the Ordnance mission on the home front, the authors have

produced a record of enduring value; for whatever the character of military

procurement now and in the future, the problems of producing and distributing

military equipment on a very large scale remain much the same.

Since private industry and civilian labor inevitably are called upon to

contribute enormously to the making of munitions on any large scale, civilian

as well as military readers should find much in this volume to instruct them.

Perhaps its greatest lesson is the long lead time required to get munitions into

full production, and therefore the need for calculating military requirements

with the utmost accuracy possible. It is imperative, in this age of international

tension and partial mobilization, that all of the intricacies of military production

be clearly understood if the nation is to get the maximum of economy as well

as security in preparations for its defense.

Washington, D. C.

22 September 1959

JAMES A. NORELL

Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

Chief of Military History

vii
Note on the Authors

Harry C. Thomson received his doctorate in government from Harvard

University. During World War II he was a historian with the Army Air

Forces, serving both as an enlisted man and as a commissioned officer. He

became a member of the Ordnance Historical Branch in 1948, serving as its

chief from 1952 until June 1959, when he resigned to become Assistant

Editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Lida Mayo, a graduate of Randolph-Macon Woman's College, served as

Historian with the Military Air Transport Service from 1946 to 1950, when

she joined the Ordnance Historical Branch. Except for the years 1954-56,

when she was Project Historian on the staff of The American University, she

has continued with the Branch, becoming its chief in June 1959.

viii
Preface

This is the second of a 3-volume series on the role of the Ordnance Department (now Ordnance Corps) in World War II. As the first volume, subtitled

Planning Munitions for War,1 gave emphasis to research and development, this

volume deals with procurement and supply, and the third will describe Ordnance

operations overseas. It is particularly important for the reader of this volume

to bear in mind that the first volume includes, in addition to research and

development, separate chapters on the early history of the Ordnance Department, its organizational and personnel problems during World War II, and its

efforts to conserve scarce materials such as copper, steel, and aluminum. The

organizational charts in the earlier volume may be of special assistance to the

reader not familiar with Ordnance organization. Taken together, the three

volumes deal with every major aspect of Ordnance history in World War II,

and give some attention to the prewar years when the art of munitions making

was sadly neglected. The authors have studiously avoided duplication of material

in other volumes of the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II,

particularly The Army and Economic Mobilization by R. Elberton Smith.

In his preface to Charles Ffoulkes' little classic, The Gun-Founders of

England, Lord Cottesloe observed, on the eve of World War II, "In all that

has been written about war, but little mention has been made of the making

of weapons; it is their use which is dramatic and tragic and commands public

attention." The mystery of such important matters as the invention of gunpowder in the 13th century and its employment in crude firearms in the 14th

century has never been properly unraveled; nor has the method by which

medieval chain mail was manufactured in quantity ever been satisfactorily

explained. Neglect of the armorer's art by historians has been traditional in this

country as well as in England, owing in part, no doubt, to the reluctance of

scholars to explore the sooty mysteries of forge and furnace.

After World War I, this reluctance was reinforced by a strong desire to

emphasize the pursuits of peace rather than the ways of war and to write new

textbooks giving less space to battles and political campaigns and more to

social, economic, and cultural history. Most professional historians of the 1920's

and 1930's systematically avoided the study of both warfare and munitions

manufacture, while a number of journalistic writers turned out lurid accounts

1

 Constance McLaughton Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance

Department: Planning Munitions for War, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1955).

ix
of the evil traffic in arms, labeling its practitioners "Merchants of Death."

During World War II the life-and-death importance of arms production swept

away part of the earlier aversion to the subject, and some of the newly

aroused interest in munitions carried over into the postwar years. But it is still

true that, in proportion to its significance, remarkably little substantial material

has been published on the manufacture of munitions. This volume is a modest

effort to redress the balance.

With storage, issue, and maintenance—subjects not mentioned in Lord

Cottesloe's comment but nevertheless implied in it—the situation has been

much the same. If anything, these topics have appeared less appealing and

have been less written about. Warehouses, pipelines, inventories, parts catalogs

—there is nothing glamorous or exciting about these subjects unless an investigator uncovers fraud or waste. Yet even the most casual student of military

affairs recognizes that these humdrum activities are an essential link in the

long chain of supply. They may not win wars, but their neglect or mismanagement may bring on military disaster.

A word of explanation is needed for the preponderant emphasis on the

early years, 1939-43, in the chapters devoted to procurement (I to XV), and

on the later years in the Field Service chapters. This emphasis is considered

justified for the procurement chapters because the early years saw the emergence of many new problems and led to pioneering efforts to work out solutions.

"If you do any research on procurement," Brig. Gen. John K. Christmas once

advised Industrial College students, "don't look at procurement as it was in

1944. Anybody could do it in 1944. . . . But go back and look at 1940-41,

and so on, if you want to really do some research on procurement."

 2 This

injunction has been followed and has been found to fit the facts of life on

the procurement front. With Field Service the opposite has been true. Though

due attention has been given to the early formative years when the Army,

swollen by selective service, was training with broomstick rifles and stovepipe

cannon, the big job for field service came in the latter half of the war when

factories were pouring out equipment in vast quantities and troops were being

deployed around the world. Problems in the management of stocks and maintenance of equipment became critical during the 1943-45 period just as pressure

on the procurement front eased off.

Another distinction between the two parts of the volume should be noted.

As the Industrial Service was organized mainly along product lines—small arms,

artillery, combat vehicles, and ammunition—the procurement chapters follow,

with obvious exceptions, the same pattern. The Field Service organization,

mainly along functional lines, is reflected in the supply chapters on such

topics/as storage, stock control, and maintenance. Co-ordination of the two has

proved as difficult in the writing as it was in actual operation during the war.

Of the procurement chapters all except Chapter VIII were written by Dr.

Harry C. Thomson; the Field Service chapters (XVI to XXII) and the In2

 Lecture, Brig Gen John K. Christmas, Procurement Organization, Policies and Problems

of the Department of the Army, 2 Nov 48, ICAF, 149-36, OHF.

X
troduction are the work of Lida Mayo. Both authors were ably supported

by Mrs. Irene House, whose many services as research assistant were invaluable

and who wrote most of Chapter VIII on small arms. The entire manuscript was

typed and retyped with great skill and patience by Mrs. Feril Cummings.

In the Office of the Chief of Military History, Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief

Historian, and Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, Editor in Chief of the World War II

series, gave the utmost assistance in all aspects of the volume's preparation.

Editing of the manuscript was performed by Carl Brinton Schultz, senior editor,

most ably assisted by Mrs. Helen Whittington, copy editor. Miss Margaret E.

Tackley chose the photographs.

Washington, D. C. HARRY C. THOMSON

22 September 1959

xi
Contents

Chapter Page

I . INTRODUCTION ....... . 1

I I . PROCUREMENT PLANNING ........... . 9

Plans fo r Ne w Facilities ............. . 1 1

Plans fo r Decentralized Procurement ......... . 1 3

Contract Forms an d Legal Restrictions ........ . 1 6

Surveys o f Industry .............. . 1 7

Educational Orders an d Production Studies ....... . 1 9

Conclusion ................. . 2 1

III. LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 .... . 24

Procurement Objectives ............ . 2 4

Placing th e First Orders ............ . 2 5

Activating th e District Offices, August 1940 ....... . 2 7

Successes an d Failures ............. . 2 9

Plant Allocations ............. . 2 9

District-Arsenal-OCO Relations ........... . 3 1

Creating Ne w Facilities ............. . 3 2

Criticisms, Delays, an d Difficulties .......... . 3 3

Engineering Advisory Committees .......... . 3 9

B i g Business vs . Small Business ........... . 4 0

Status o f Rearmament, December 1941 ........ . 4 2

I V . TH E PROBLEM O F REQUIREMENTS ........ . 4 5

Elements o f Requirements Computation ........ . 4 6

Requirements i n th e Defense Period, 1940 - 4 1 ...... . 5 5

T h e Army Supply Program, 1942-1944 ........ . 5 9

Introduction o f Supply Control, 1944-45 ....... . 6 4

xiii
Chapter Page

V . ARTILLERY ................ . 6 8

Artillery o n Hand i n 1940 ............ . 6 9

Production Preparedness ............. . 7 1

Launching th e Program, 1940-41 ......... . 7 4

T h e First Year o f Wa r ............. . 8 3

Production Techniques ............. . 9 2

Fire Control Instruments ............ . 9 5

Changing Requirements an d Types, 1943-45 ...... . 9 9

Heavy Artillery ............... . 10 0

V I . ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION ...... . 10 4

A Government-Owned Ammunition Industry ...... . 10 5

T h e Anatomy o f Ammunition Production ....... . 10 7

T h e Period o f Plant Expansion, 1940-42 ....... . 10 8

Metal Components ............ . 11 3

VII. ARTILLERY AMMUNITION; PRODUCTION 125

Operations o f FDAP ............. . 12 5

Safety ............... . 13 0

Technological Advances ............. . 13 3

Balancing Production, 1941-43 .......... . 14 0

T h e Crisis o f 1944-45 ............. . 14 4

I n Conclusion: Quality an d Quantity ......... . 15 0

VIII. SMALL ARMS .............. . 15 4

A i d t o Britain i n 1940 ............. . 15 5

Production Preparedness ............. . 15 6

Getting th e Garand into Production ......... . 16 0

T h e Carbine Enters th e Picture .......... . 16 8

Post-Pearl Harbor Requirements .......... . 17 0

Rifle Production ............... . 17 1

Carbines ................. . 17 4

T h e BA R ................. . 17 8

Machine Guns ............... . 17 8

Submachine Guns .............. . 18 1

T h e Bazooka Rocket Launcher .......... . 18 2

Recoilless Rifles ............... . 18 4

Miscellaneous Items ............... . 18 5

I X . SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION .......... . 18 8

Dwindling Reserves .............. . 19 0

Prewar Plans an d Operations ........... . 19 1

Building Ne w Plants, 1940-42 .......... . 19 3

Production Processes an d Problems ......... . 20 4

Surpluses, Cutbacks, an d Terminations ........ . 21 7

xiv
Chapter Page

X. PREPARATION FOR TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 222

Early Plans an d Preparations ........... . 22 3

T h e Upswing i n 1940 ............. . 22 6

Doubling th e Program i n 1941 ........... . 23 1

T h e All-Out Effort i n 1942 ........... . 23 3

X I . PRODUCTION O F TANKS ........... . 24 1

Engines ................. . 24 4

Transmissions ................ . 24 6

Armor .................. . 24 7

Light Tanks: M2A4 t o M2 4 ........... . 25 0

T h e Shift From Grants t o Shermans i n 1942 ....... . 25 2

Tank Depots ................ . 25 4

T h e 1943-45 Period ............. . 25 5

Shift t o Heavy Tanks i n 1944-45 .......... . 25 9

T h e Balance Sheet .............. . 26 2

XII. MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES ......... . 26 5

T h e Struggle fo r Standardization .......... . 26 6

T h e Defense Period, 1939-41 ........... . 27 0

T h e First Year o f Wa r ....... . .... . 28 0

Crisis i n Heavy-Heavy Trucks, 1943-45 ........ . 28 6

Special Vehicle Types ............. . 29 2

XIII. SPARE PARTS FO R VEHICLES .......... . 30 0

Categories o f Parts .............. . 30 1

Spare Parts i n Ordnance, 1939-42 ........ . . 30 2

Spare Parts i n th e QMC, 1939-42 ......... . 30 7

After th e Merger, 1942-45 ........... . 30 9

XIV. INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL ... 320

Inspection Manuals .............. . 32 2

Recruiting an d Training Inspectors ......... . 32 3

General Somers' Role ............. . 32 5

Inspection Gages ............... . 32 6

Proving Grounds ............... . 32 6

Statistical Quality Control ............ . 32 7

Commodity Groups .............. . 33 2

X V . CONTRACT TERMINATION AN D SETTLEMENT .... . 33 9

T h e Walter Scott Case ............. . 34 1

T h e Guiberson Case ............. . 34 1

T h e International Harvester Case .......... . 34 3

Organization an d Training ........... . 34 4

T h e Statutory Base .............. . 34 6

Action o n V- J Da y ............. . 34 8

xv
Chapter Page

XVI. FIELD SERVICE: LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I ..... . 351

T h e Pattern fo r Depots an d Maintenance Facilities ..... . 35 2

T h e Ordnance Provision System .......... . 35 4

T h e Lamp o f Experience ............ . 35 9

XVII. TH E NE W DEPOT SYSTEM ........... . 36 0

Appropriations fo r Storage i n 1940 ......... . 36 3

T h e First Prewar Ammunition Depots ........ . 36 6

T h e Fiscal Year 1942 Program .......... . 36 8

Opening th e Ne w Depots ............ . 37 6

XVIII. REVISIONS I N TH E DEPOT SYSTEM ........ . 37 9

Storage o f General Supplies ........... . 37 9

T h e Acquisition o f Quartermaster Facilities ....... . 38 3

Reallocation o f Space b y AS F ........... . 38 6

T h e Changing Pattern o f Distribution ........ . 38 7

T h e Master Depot System ............. . 38 9

Instability i n Depot Missions ........... . 39 1

XIX. TH E LANGUAGE O F SUPPLY .......... . 39 5

A Ne w Spare Parts Organization .......... . 39 6

T h e Us e o f IB M Machines ............. . 39 6

T h e Parts Control Division ........... . 39 8

Effects o f th e Motor Vehicle Transfer .......... . 39 9

T h e Crisis Early i n 1943 ............ . 40 1

Parts Numbering ............... . 40 2

Interchangeability o f Parts ............ . 40 3

Implementation o f th e New Numbers Program ...... . 40 5

A Common Language o f Supply .......... . 40 7

X X . STOCK CONTROL .............. . 41 0

Departures From the Ordnance Provision System . . . . . . 410

Decentralization o f Stock Control .......... . 41 1

Special Problems o f Automotive Parts Supply ...... . 41 3

T h e Influence o f AS F ............. . 41 5

Redistribution an d Disposal ........... . 41 8

Stock Control i n Retrospect ........... . 42 0

XXI. AMMUNITION SUPPLY ............. . 42 3

Means o f Identification ............. . 42 3

Improvements i n th e Pattern o f Distribution ....... . 42 9

xvi
Chapter Page

XXII. MAINTENANCE ............... . 44 0

Maintenance a t th e Arsenals ........... . 44 2

Reorganization o f Me n an d Equipment ........ . 44 3

T h e Echelon System ............. . 44 8

Problems o f Automotive Maintenance ........ . 45 0

T h e Preventive Maintenance Program ........ . 45 1

Maintenance Shops .............. . 45 5

Combined Shops ............... . 45 8

T h e Reclamation Program o f 1944 ......... . 46 1

Trends i n Maintenance Engineering ......... . 46 3

XXIII. CONCLUSION ................ . 46 5

Appraising th e Record ............. . 46 5

Looking t o th e Future ............. . 47 2

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ............. . 47 7

GLOSSARY ................... . 47 9

INDEX ..................... . 48 7

Tables

No. Page

1 . Selected Items From Time Objective, August 1940 ....... . 2 5

2. Selected Ordnance Items Procured, July 1940-December 1941 ... . 43

3. Examples of Ground Ammunition Day of Supply for Theater

o f Operations, 2 3 December 1941 ........... . 4 9

4. Summary Tabulation of Ordnance Share of Expenditure Programs ... 56

5. Presidential Objectives: Ordnance Items, 3 January 1942 ..... . 61

6 . Decline i n Tank Requirements During 1942 ......... . 6 4

7 . Selected Ordnance Items, 1942-1943 .......... . 6 5

8 . Artillery Available, 3 0 June 1940 ............ . 7 0

9. Artillery Production, 1 July 1940-31 December 1941 ...... . 84

10. Summary of Artillery Production, 1940-1945 ............... 101

11. Expenditures for Heavy Field Artillery Ammunition, January

1944-August 1945 ............... . 14 8

12. Shipments of Selected Types of Artillery Ammunition to the

European Theater, December 1944-March 1945 ....... . 15 0

13. Heavy Artillery Ammunition Stocks on Hand in ETO, 31 May 1945 ... 151

14. Major Types of Ammunition Procured, 1 July 1940-31 August 1945 . . . 152

xvii
No. Page

1 5 . Rifle Production, 1940-1945 ............. . 17 4

1 6 . Machine Gu n Production, 1940-1945 .......... . 18 1

17. Small Arms Ammunition Production, 1940-1945 ....... . 189

1 8 . Estimated Yearly Capacity o f Frankford Arsenal ...... . 19 3

1 9 . Tank Production b y Facility, 1940-1945 ......... . 24 2

2 0 . U.S. Tank Production, 1944-1945 ........... . 26 2

21. Comparative Table of German, British, and American Tank

Production, 1940-1945 .............. . 26 3

22. Production of Heavy-Heavy Trucks by Month, 1943-1944-1945 ... 290

23. Production of Motor Transport Vehicles, 1939 - 1945 ...... . 296

24. Dollar Value of Ordnance Contract Terminations: As of 31

December 1945 ................ . 34 9

Charts

1. ETO Authorized Levels and Theater Stocks: Ground Ammunition . . 149

2. Spare Parts Buying for Tank Combat and Motor Transport

Vehicles, 1940-1945 .............. . 31 7

Illustrations

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Aboard Medium Tank M2 ....... . 3

Maj. Gen. James K . Crain ............... . 6

Maj. Gen. Charles T . Harris, Jr . ............. . 7

T h e Fourteen Ordnance Procurement Districts ......... . 1 4

Assistant Secretary o f Wa r Louis Johnson .......... . 1 7

Inspecting a 75-mm. Pack Howitzer ............ . 7 1

Major Caliber Gu n Shop a t Watervliet .......... . 7 5

Platform fo r 90-mm. A A Gu n Carriage ........... . 7 8

M 3 Medium Tank Mounting a 75-mm. Gu n .......... . 8 2

T h e Priest, a 105-mm. Howitzer Motor Carriage M7 ........ . 8 9

Night Construction Operations .............. . 10 6

A 500-pound Demolition Bomb ............ . 11 8

A 22,000-pound Semi-armor-piercing Bomb .......... . 11 9

B o x o f Bulk TN T ............ . 13 2

Inspector a t Volunteer Ordnance Works ........... . 13 3

Workmen Pouring Molten TN T Into 155-mm. Shells ....... . 13 9

xviii
Page

Saginaw Gu n Plant ................. . 15 7

John C . Garand .................. . 16 1

Producing Carbine Barrels ............... . 17 6

Completed Carbines ................. . 17 7

John C . Browning, Gu n Inventor .............. . 17 9

Officer Candidates a t Fontainebleau ............ . 18 3

Loading a 57-mm. Recoilless Rifle ............. . 18 5

Small Arms Ammunition Industry ............. . 20 1

Lead Slugs fo r .45-caliber Bullets ............. . 20 6

Maj. Gen. Thomas J . Hayes ............... . 20 9

.50-caliber Machine Gu n Ammunition i n Fabric Belts ....... . 21 4

Detroit Tank Arsenal Under Construction ........... . 22 9

General Sherman M4A1 Medium Tank Assembly Line ....... . 23 6

General Grant M 3 Medium Tank Assembly Line ......... . 23 7

Overhead Crane Lowering a General Stuart M3 Light Tank .... . 24 3

Remanufacturing Light Tanks M3A3 ............ . 25 8

Heavy Tank M 6 .................. . 26 0

Assembling 21⁄2-ton Trucks ............... . 27 6

Jeep, 1⁄4-ton 4x 4 Truck ................ . 27 8

Dukw, 21⁄2-ton Amphibian Truck .............. . 28 5

Half-track Cars M 2 ............. . 29 4

Cartoon b y Bill Mauldin ............ . 29 8

Maj. Gen. Levin H . Campbell, Jr . ............. . 30 6

Laboratory Foreman Loading 37-mm. Antitank Gu n ....... . 32 8

Large-Caliber Ammunition i n Storage ............ . 35 3

Igloos a t Umatilla .................. . 36 9

S a n Jacinto Ordnance Depot Dock Area ........... . 37 0

Inside Storage o f 155-mm. Shells ............. . 37 4

Outside Storage o f 100-pound Bombs ............ . 37 5

Open-type Storage Sheds ................ . 38 2

Ordnance Storage Facilities ............... . 38 4

Brig. Gen. Julian S . Hatcher .............. . 40 1

Soldiers Looking u p SN L Numbers ............. . 42 4

Convoy o f Ordnance Maintenance Trucks ........... . 44 1

Trucks o f Newly Formed Ordnance Battalion .......... . 44 6

"Joe Dope" Posters ................. . 45 4

All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for the

cartoon by Bill Mauldin on page 298 and the photographs from the American

Ordnance Association on pages 82, 179, and 441.

xix

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:

PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

CHAPTER I

Introduction

"Nobody can see through this curtain of

battle smoke that enshrouds the earth today," cried a member of the U.S. House

of Representatives on 10 May 1940, the

morning Hitler invaded the Low Countries. As the early news bulletins came

over the radio, the first reaction in America

was shock. On succeeding days, as news

reports described the full weight of the

offensive—the great thunder and roar of

tanks, artillery, and dive bombers crushing

Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and rolling toward France and the

English Channel—shock became alarm.

Another Representative expressed the general feeling when he shouted, "Hell is out

of bounds!"1

Speculations that would have seemed

fantastic a few months before suddenly became horrifying possibilities: that Hitler

would quickly defeat Britain and France;

that Japan would move to seize the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya; and that

the United States would soon stand alone,

virtually isolated in a world of hostile dictatorships, "the last great Democracy on

earth."2 How well would the United States

be able to defend itself if attacked? What

weapons did it have?

Congress had the answer as of 1 May

1940, submitted by the War Department

at hearings on the military appropriations

bill for Fiscal Year 1941. When the figures

came out in late May, on the floor of Congress and in the published hearings, they

caused an uproar. There were not enough

effective antiaircraft guns to defend a single

large American city. There were coastdefense guns for most large coastal cities

but some of them had not been fired for

twenty years, and all could be bombed out

of existence by carrier-based airplanes. As

for field artillery, there were about 5,000

French 75's left over from World War I,

but nearly all of them were mounted on

big wooden wheels with steel tires made to

be drawn by mules or horses. Such guns

would be shaken to pieces if towed by a

truck or tractor at high speed over rough

ground; furthermore, they did not have

sufficient traverse or elevation to be fully

effective. Only 141 had been modernized

with improved carriages and pneumatic

tires. The 105-mm. howitzer, a companion

piece to the 75-mm. gun as primary divisional artillery, was just going into production. There were none on hand, and it

would take fourteen to sixteen months to

produce the 48 for which funds had been

provided. There were only four modernized

1

 (1) Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., pp. 5916, 6560; (2) Time, May

27, 1940, pp. 17-18. 2

 Walter Lippmann quoted in Time, May 20,

1940, p. 15. By 27 May a Gallup poll showed that

U.S. confidence in an Allied victory had dropped

from 82 percent to 55 percent.
2 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

155-mm. guns, and no modern 8-inch howitzers.3

And what of the ability of the U.S. Army

to wage tank warfare, so brilliantly employed by the Germans? Senator Henry

Cabot Lodge, just returned from maneuvers in Louisiana, reported to the Senate:

"I have recently seen all the tanks in the

United States, about 400 in number, or

about one finger of the fanlike German advance about which we have read, or about

the number destroyed in two days of fighting in the current European War. The

Germans have a rough total of 3,000."

Furthermore, almost all American tanks

were of the light type, weighing only 10 or

12 tons. Little was authoritatively known

about German tanks; some were said to be

80-ton monsters. The Army believed that

37-mm. antitank guns would be effective

against them. But the United States had

only 218 guns of this type.4

The brightest spot in the dark picture

was the small arms situation. There were

enough machine guns; and there were some

two and a half million rifles. About 35,000

of the rifles were new Garand semiautomatics, and the number was increasing

steadily; 4,000 a month were being turned

out at Springfield Armory. The new rapidfiring rifle had received high praise from

no less a personage than Vice President

John N. Garner, who had used it in deer

hunting.5

All types of weapons needed ammunition

in unprecedented quantities to wage blitzkrieg warfare. The figures for ammunition

on hand were as discouraging as those for

artillery. Congress was told that there were

only 46,000 rounds for 37-mm. antiaircraft

guns, 75,000 for 37-mm. tank and antitank

guns, about 17 million of .30-caliber armorpiercing ammunition, and about 25 million

of .50-caliber ball ammunition. The sudden, crucial importance of the bomber

threw a glaring light on the pitifully small

stock of bombs. There were only 11,928

bombs of the 500-lb. size and only 4,336 of

the 1,000-lb. type.6

Alarmed and angry, Congress, the press,

and the public demanded to know the

reason for the low state of the nation's defenses. Since 1933 there had been mounting appropriations for defense, the largest

peacetime appropriations for military purposes in the history of the United States.

Where had the money gone? When President Roosevelt stood before a joint session

of Congress on 16 May 1940 to ask for

over a billion dollars more, his program

was almost unanimously approved by the

lawmakers and the press. But some members of Congress were demanding to know

whether new appropriations would "go

down the same rat hole into which we have

poured $7,000,000,000 . . . during the last

6 years."

 7

The Army's answer was that about

three-fourths of the $3,400,000,000 appropriated for the Army had gone for such

things as pay, subsistence, and travel expenses,—"merely a case of the American

standard of living applied to the mainte3

 Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 9209,

Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for

1941, 76th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 221-24. (Hereafter

Congressional Hearings on Army appropriation

bills will be cited as WDAB, S. or H.R.) 4

 (1) Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., pp. 6130-39, 6877; (2) WDAB,

S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 223. 5

 Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson's 11 O'Clock

Conf Min, 1 Apr 40, OHF. (Hereafter Minutes

of the Wesson Conferences are cited as Min, Wesson Confs.) 6

 WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 422. 7

 Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., pp. 6163, 6776, 6830-31. See also

critical comments by Arthur Krock in The New

York Times, May 16, 1940, p. 22.
INTRODUCTION 3

SENATOR HENRY CABOT LODGE ABOARD MEDIUM TANK M2 of the 67th Armored

Regiment. Officer in left foreground is Lt. Col. Omar N. Bradley. (Photograph taken May

1940.)

nance of a volunteer army scattered over a

tremendous number of small posts."

 8 Some

of the money, a small proportion, had gone

into munitions, but weapons were not yet

coming off the production lines, for they

could not readily be obtained from commercial sources, as could food and uniforms, and were hard to manufacture. A

year earlier General Malin Craig, then

Chief of Staff, had stressed the inexorable

demands of time in weapons manufacture:

"the sums appropriated this last year will

not be fully transformed into military power for two years."

 9 Besides, as one Senator

pointed out in defense of the War Department, America had not been "under the

same strain, nor in the same sphere as the

warring nations of Europe. We prepared

ourselves for national defense and not to

invade Belgium and Holland."

 10

Yet nothing could quiet the outcries over

"popgun defense," not even the President's

steady, reassuring voice telling the country

over the radio in a fireside chat that the

United States had "on hand or on order"

792 tanks, 744 antitank guns, 741 modernized 75's, and 2,000 antiaircraft guns. The

press was quick to point out that most of

the tanks were light rather than medium

or heavy, that more than half the antiaircraft guns were .50-caliber machine guns,

good only against low-flying aircraft, and,

8

 Testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall, CofS,

May 17, 1940, in WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d

sess., p. 429. 9

 Gen. Malin Craig, "Our Present Military Position," (extracts from final report to SW, 30 Jun

39), Army Ordnance, (now Ordnance), XX, No.

116 (September-October 1939), 89. 10

 Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., p. 6165.
4 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

most important of all, that only a small

percentage of all weapons were actually on

hand. Complete delivery of the weapons

"on order" could not be expected before

June 1941.

At the current rate of delivery, the

$348,228,998 just appropriated for ordnance could not be translated into antiaircraft guns, tanks, field artillery, powder,

and shells until June 1942. Recalled to

Senate hearings, General Marshall gave a

more optimistic (and prophetic) date; he

thought the nation could be ready for war

by December 1941.11 "I am terribly disappointed in the attitude of the Army," said

one Senator. "Their ambition is to get

ready in a period of 18 or 24 months, when

we are living in a period of wars being settled in 30 days."

 12

The agency responsible for developing,

procuring, and distributing the Army's

weapons and ammunition was the Ordnance Department. One of the supply services of the War Department, Ordnance

consisted of a headquarters staff in Washington and numerous field installations,

including manufacturing arsenals, storage

depots, and procurement district offices in

major cities.13 It was headed by a major

general who reported on procurement matters to the civilian Assistant Secretary of

War (later Under Secretary) and on military matters to the Chief of Staff through

G-4. The line between military and procurement matters was not always distinct.

But as a general rule decisions as to types

and quantities of weapons needed for each

unit of the Army were looked upon as military matters, while decisions as to contracts, financing, and production schedules

were regarded as procurement matters. As

a supply service (later technical service)

the Ordnance Department had little authority for independent action except in

the execution of directives from the Assistant Secretary or the Chief of Staff. Ordnance might advise and suggest on the

development of new weapons, but the final

decision was made by the Chief of Staff on

the basis of recommendations of the using

arms—the Infantry, the Coast and Field

Artillery, the Air Corps, and the Cavalry or

Armored Force.14

How good a job would it do in this

crisis? Some commentators had doubts.

The Chicago Tribune denounced "Army

and Navy bureaucrats." Time, contending

that most generals were still thinking in

terms of horse warfare, made the point that

money was not the only cure for unpreparedness and that brains were needed as

well as weapons. Others argued that if the

nation was unprepared the fault lay rather

in the apathy of the public than in the

attitude of the Army or the caliber of the

professional officer. Even so severe a critic

as Senator Lodge had been impressed by

the officers who had testified at committee

hearings on the appropriations bill.15

11

 (1) Editorial, "Editors Approve President's

Defense Plan; Score 'Fireside' Talk," Army and

Navy Journal, LXXVII, 40, June 1, 1940; (2)

Time, May 27, 1940, p. 14, and June 3, 1940,

p. 17. 12

 WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 191. 13

 The other supply arms and services in 1940

were the Chemical Warfare Service, Corps of

Engineers, Medical Department, Quartermaster

Corps, and Signal Corps. 14

 Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C.

Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance

Department: Planning Munitions for War,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1955), ch. IV (hereafter cited

as Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War). 15

 (1) WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 226;

(2) Congressional Record, vol. 86, pt. 6, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., p. 5943; (3) Time, June 3, 1940.

p. 14.
INTRODUCTION 5

One of these was Maj. Gen. Charles M.

Wesson, Chief of Ordnance. Another was

Brig. Gen. Charles T. Harris, Jr., who, as

the Chief of the Ordnance Department's

Industrial Service, was the man in charge

of procuring the weapons and ammunition.

A stocky, plain-spoken, hard-driving officer,

he was, in the opinion of one high-ranking

Army official, "the dynamo of Ordnance."

His years of experience in the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of War—the Army's

agency for industrial planning—had given

him an excellent grasp of the first and most

important rearmament task, which was to

put industry to work. Just as nobody expected to fight a war with the small Regular Army, nobody expected the six Ordnance arsenals to turn out more than a

small portion of the munitions that would

be needed, perhaps 5 percent. After years

of neglect, they were at last being renovated. But to one Senator, who had recently

inspected Ordnance installations, the arsenals "looked like ... a plant that had

been abandoned for 20 years, and then a

bunch of men were feverishly trying to get

them back into shape to start production."

 16

 They were valuable mainly as

centers of technical knowledge where the

art of design was kept alive and production was maintained on a laboratory basis.

For the past eighteen years the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of War had been

planning a training program for industry

that was comparable to the peacetime training of the Reserves, and Ordnance had the

lion's share. The most fruitful part of the

early program for Ordnance wartime expansion consisted of small orders given to

qualified manufacturers to educate them in

the intricacies of munitions manufacture.

Under the Fiscal Year 1939 program, educational orders had been placed for semiautomatic rifles, recoil mechanisms for

the 3-inch antiaircraft gun, and 75-mm.

shells;17 and by the spring of 1940 the results were beginning to come in. In March

General Harris was able to bring a shell

made by the S. A. Woods Company to the

daily Ordnance conference in General Wesson's office, where it was passed around and

examined with much interest.18 Advance

planning enabled Ordnance production to

get off to a fast start before tool and materials shortages and low priorities put a

brake on the program.

In the old Munitions Building on Washington's Constitution Avenue, a World War

I temporary structure where all the supply

services were housed, General Harris and

Brig. Gen. Earl McFarland, chief of Ordnance's Military Service, met with General

Wesson every morning to hear reports of

staff officers and discuss Ordnance policy.

Just as the Industrial Service was the point

of contact with industry, under the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of War, the Military Service was the point of contact with

the Chief of Staff and the using arms and

services. This contact was of great importance, for Ordnance received its guidance

and approval on matters of weapons development from the using arms.

At the time the Germans invaded the

Low Countries, the storage, distribution,

and maintenance duties of Ordnance were

delegated to an office under General McFarland that was designated Field Service

and was headed by Col. James K. Crain.

The following year Field Service was raised

to the same level as Industrial Service, and

16

 WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 34. 17

 (1) WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., pp.

130-31 and 141-46; (2) Col. Harry K. Rutherford, "Industry's Manual of Arms: A Progress

Report on the Educational Orders Program,"

Army Ordnance, XX, No. 120 (June-July 1940),

371. 18

 Min, Wesson Confs., 21 Mar 40.
6 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

MAJ. GEN. JAMES K. CRAIN, Chief of

Ordnance Department's Field Service.

(Photograph taken October 1944.)

Colonel Crain was soon to become a brigadier general.19

 A slender, thoughtful man,

a few years older than General Harris,

Colonel Crain looked more like a college

professor than an Army officer. He had

had long service in the field, beginning

with his assignment as Chief Ordnance

Officer of the Rainbow Division in World

War I,20 and had recently engineered an

innovation in field maintenance organization by grouping Ordnance companies

into an Ordnance battalion. The battalion

was tried for the first time in the spring

1940 maneuvers, and Colonel Crain, on

the scene as Corps Ordnance Officer, saw

that it was successful.21

Though after the blitzkrieg the maneuvers that spring seemed to the press "more

unreal than most such playing at soldiers,"

and against the background of Europe's

total war "the U.S. Army looked like a few

nice boys with BB guns,"

 22

 yet there were

presages of the World War II Army. Gone

were the khaki breeches and wrapped puttees, replaced by loose trousers; almost entirely departed were the horse and mule.

For the first time in history the Army was

equipped with enough motor transportation to carry weapons and men, food, and

ammunition; and the star of the Air Corps

was rising.

The coming of age of air power had a

definite impact on the Ordnance Department. Bomb cases and fuzes formed a large

part of the educational orders under the

Fiscal Year 1940 program;23 and, since industry had cut down the time of making

bomb bodies to six months, quick results

could be expected from production orders.24

 Prospects for new and more powerful bomb fillings were being explored. In

mid-January 1940 Dr. Lyman J. Briggs of

the Bureau of Standards had called on

General Wesson about obtaining three

thousand dollars "for the purpose of splitting the uranium atom." It seemed to Ordnance that the development had "possibilities from an explosive viewpoint."

 25

19

 For the organization and the research and

development activities of the Ordnance Department, see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War. 20

 "New Ordnance Strength," Army Ordnance,

XXI, No. 123, (November-December 1940), 214-

15.

21

 (1) Min, Wesson Confs, 3 Apr. 40; (2)

Capt. Joseph M. Colby [Comdr, Ord Bn, Fourth

Army Corps], "The New Ordnance Battalion:

Maintenance and Supply in the Streamlined Division," Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 123 (November-December 1940),208-13. 22

 Time, May 27, 1940, p. 19. 23

 Rutherford, "Industry's Manual of Arms,"

Army Ordnance, XX, No. 120 (June-July 1940),

370.

24

 WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 42. 25

 Min, Wesson Confs, 15 Jan 40. For a detailed account of Ordnance participation in early

atomic bomb work, see Arthur Adelman, Fission

Explosives, 30 Jun 44, OHF.
INTRODUCTION 7

MAJ. GEN. CHARLES T. HARRIS, JR.,

Chief of the Ordnance Department's Industrial Service, 1939-42.

A few months later Mr. Lester P. Barlow, an employee of the Glenn L. Martin

aircraft factory, submitted to the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs a bomb

filled with liquid oxygen. Called "glmite"

in honor of Mr. Martin, the explosive was

said to give off violent vibrations of the air

waves that would kill every living thing

within a radius of a thousand yards. Senator Gerald P. Nye was so impressed that

he called in reporters to watch while minutes of the committee meeting were burned

—"so great was the military secrecy of the

subject! ... an explosive so deadly it might

even outlaw war!!!"

 26

Tests of the Barlow bomb took up a

good deal of the time of Ordnance planners

in April and May, extending down into the

most anxious weeks in May. When the

newspapers announced that goats would

be tethered at varying distances from the

bomb to determine its lethal effects, Congress and the War Department were deluged with letters of protest from humane

societies and private citizens.27 All the

concern turned out to be wasted. At the

first test, the bomb leaked and did not go

off; at the second, held at Aberdeen Proving Ground in late May, the explosion occurred, but the goats, unharmed, continued

to nibble the Maryland grass.28

In a few days' time, such matters as

cruelty to goats became trivial. On 3 June

the British were driven off the Continent

at Dunkerque. On 8 June the Ordnance

Department received instructions to load

twelve Thompson submachine guns on the

Atlantic Clipper scheduled to leave for

Europe the next day; the guns were for

protection of the American Embassy in

Paris. But it was already too late; the order

was canceled by the President almost as

soon as given.29 Paris surrendered on 14

June.

The fall of France marked the real beginning of America's rearmament. Once the

tremendous Munitions Program of 30 June

1940 became effective, dwarfing all previous programs, there was an unheard-of expansion in Ordnance operations. Factories

had to be converted into armories; ammunition plants, magazines, and depots

built; huge stocks of weapons and ammunition distributed. And there was never

enough time. It took an inexorable number

of months to build a powder plant, make

a tank, or fill a requisition, in spite of the

26

 Editorial, Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 121

(July-August 1940), 45. 27

 Min, Wesson Confs, 6, 11, 12 and 19 Apr; 2

and 13 May 40. 28

 (1) Editorial, Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 121

(July-August 1940), 45; (2) Time, May 27, 1940,

p. 21. 29

 Min, Wesson Confs, 10 Jun 40.
8 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

most strenuous efforts of hard-pressed men

to speed up the machinery of supply. At

Ordnance conferences in the old Munitions

Building and later in the new Pentagon,

there was always present the haunting

specter of Time.
CHAPTER II

Procurement Planning

Planning for military preparedness in

the United States before World War II

differed somewhat from planning by European military establishments. The differences stemmed largely from two factors:

lack of a munitions industry in this country

comparable to those of the major European

nations, and American emphasis on maintenance of a small Regular Army backed by

a modest reserve of war supplies. War Department planners had for many years assumed that, in event of war, the United

States would have time to mobilize its reserves both of manpower and of industrial

production, and would not need to maintain either a large standing army or large

stores of munitions. Quantities of matériel

left over from World War I were kept in

storage during the 1920's and 1930's, but

ammunition gradually deteriorated and

weapons became outmoded. With each

passing year, therefore, the Ordnance Department gave more attention to development of plans for speedy conversion of

private industry to new munitions production in time of war. Ordnance procurement

plans provided essential background for the

vast rearmament effort launched in 1940.1

In spite of the injunction of the National

Defense Act of 1920 to plan in advance for

military supply, the War Department

found the climate of opinion in the United

States during the 1920's and 1930's not at

all favorable to such planning.2 The Planning Branch in the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of War, headed in the middle

1930's by Col. Charles T. Harris, Jr., provided official encouragement for procurement planning, but its activities were

strictly limited. During the years when

hopes for peace were high, and military

budgets low, this agency managed to keep

alive the system of district procurement

offices within the supply services and to

promote arrangements with industry for

1

 (1) Lt. Col. Gladeon M. Barnes, "Procurement

Planning," Army Ordnance, XVIII, No. 103

(July-August 1937), 22-23; (2) Maj. Gen.

Charles M. Wesson, "Fundamentals of Preparedness," Army Ordnance, XIX, No. 114 (May-June

1939), 329-32; (3) Col. James H. Burns, "Production is Preparedness," Army Ordnance, XX,

No. 115 (July-August 1939), 9-11; (4) Capt.

Paul D. Olejar, Procurement Planning for War—

Ordnance, May 44, a monograph prepared in the

Ordnance Historical Branch, OCO. For a broad

survey of the subject from the Army level, see R.

Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1959), Chapters II-IV. A

comparable Navy volume is Robert H. Connery,

The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). An interesting essay by Troyer S. Anderson, The Influence

of Military Production and Supply Upon History,

may be found in OCMH files. 2

 The effect of public opinion on the War Department is discussed in chapter II of Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, and in Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,

1950), ch. VI (hereafter cited as Watson, Chief of

Staff). See also summary of testimony before the

Special Comm., Investigating the National Defense Program, S. Rpt No. 440, pt. 4, 80th Cong.,

2d sess., 28 Apr 48, p. 292ff.
10 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

converting to war production.3 By the

spring of 1940 a change of popular sentiment was taking place; the American people were demanding more adequate national defense, but they still found the thought

of planning for another war extremely distasteful.

The neutrality legislation of the 1930's

had reflected the public's mood by forbidding shipment of American arms to other

nations. Though the ban was altered in

November 1939 to permit warring nations

to purchase munitions in this country, all

transactions had to be on a cash-and-carry

basis. Under these circumstances, the British and French purchasing commissions

made few contracts for munitions before

June 1940, preferring to shop around for

more favorable prices and to use the United

States as a source of aircraft, machine

tools, and scarce raw materials.4 It was

only after the disastrous defeats of May

and June 1940 that the British plunged

into an "arms at any price" buying campaign. Meanwhile the build-up of munitions for the U.S. Army was proceeding

cautiously but picking up speed. Using

a financial yardstick, General Wesson

summed it up in the fall of 1939 as follows:

In the fiscal year 1938 approximately $25,-

000,000 was expended for the procurement

of Ordnance material. In the fiscal year 1939

approximately $50,000,000 has been and is

being expended for like purposes. In the fiscal

year 1940 a total of approximately $150,-

000,000 has been made available. . . .5

The depression of the 1930's had a very

real, though indirect, influence on procurement planning. Since most industries were

operating far below their normal capacity

during the depression, Army planners tended to look upon the unused portion of the

nation's industrial plant as an immediately

available reserve for war production.6 Unused industrial capacity was, of course, far

more readily available for Quartermaster

items, which were largely commercial in

nature, than for Ordnance items. But the

existence of idle factories, tools, and manpower throughout nearly the whole decade

of the 1930's served to condition all planning for war procurement. It placed primary emphasis on utilization of existing

capacity, rather than on building additional plants, and tended to minimize estimates of the probable impact on the civilian economy of a war production program.

It gave rise to the belief, still widely held

in 1940, that the capacity of American industry was great enough to support both

a war economy and a peace economy, or,

to employ the language popular at the

time, to produce "both guns and butter."

 7

3

 (1) Testimony of Brig. Gen. Charles T. Harris, Jr., in WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 129

ff; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to ASW, 20 Sep 39, sub:

Readiness of the Ord Dept. . . , OO 381/27800

ASW. For a critical evaluation of the War Department's procurement planning, see Harry B.

Yoshpe, "Economic Mobilization Between the Two

World Wars," Military Affairs, Winter 1951, pp.

199-204, and Summer 1952, pp. 71-83. 4

 For an account of these purchases, see (1)

Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,

Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1955), ch. I; (2) Watson Pierce,

Foreign Purchasing Competition Before the LendLease Act, ICAF Research Project RP No. 28,

July 1946. By 28 December 1940 British orders for

machine tools, explosives, propellants, ammunition, tanks, and other ordnance equipment totaled

nearly $800,000,000. See also Lt Col John N. Lyle,

Historical Review of Lend Lease Activities, Small

Arms and Small Arms Ammunition, 17 Jul 45,

OHF. 5

 Ltr, CofOrd to ASW, 20 Sep 39, sub: Readiness of the Ord Dept to Meet the Requirements of

a Major Emergency, OO 381/27800 ASW. 6

 Lecture, Maj Ray M. Hare, The Allocations

Division, OASW, 8 Jan 40, ICAF. See also History,

Rochester Ordnance District, I, p. 15. 7

 For discussion of this point from the level of

the National Defense Advisory Commission, see

Civilian Production Administration, Industrial
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 11

Ordnance devoted far more attention to

procurement planning during the interwar

years than did any of the other Army supply services. In the early 1920's Ordnance

officers took a leading part in the establishment of the Army Industrial College, and

throughout the interwar years they held

key positions in the Planning Branch of

the Office of Assistant Secretary of War.8

Through its many procurement district offices Ordnance kept officially in touch with

industry in all parts of the nation while

the Army Ordnance Association, on a

semiofficial level, promoted public interest

in industrial preparedness. In fiscal year

1939, Ordnance Department procurement

planning (including educational orders)

accounted for about $8,000,000 of the

$9,275,300 allocated for all War Department (including Air Corps) procurement

planning for that year. In the early months

of 1940 Ordnance had 231 officers and

civilians engaged in procurement planning

activities compared to only 264 for all the

other supply services combined (including

the Air Corps).9 That Ordnance defense

production got off to a fast start in 1940-

41 was due in large measure to this prewar

planning.10

Plans for New Facilities

Because of the specialized nature of its

products, the Ordnance Department was

fully aware of the need for scores of new

facilities in time of war.11 For such products as smokeless powder,12

 TNT, ammonia, and small arms ammunition, and also

for loading artillery ammunition, there

were no existing plants that could be readily

converted. Furthermore, because powder

and ammunition plants offered none of

the usual attractions for private capital, it

was recognized that they would have to be

built at government expense if they were

to be built at all. Working on these assumptions during the interwar years, Ordnance

engineers, co-operating with the nation's

small peacetime explosives industry and

using the technical developments of Picatinny and Frankford Arsenals, drew up

plans and specifications for typical plants

to be built in time of need. In 1937 they

established an office in Wilmington, Delaware, to carry on this work, and in 1938

Congress appropriated funds for the purchase of some of the highly specialized machinery required for the production of

Mobilization for War, History of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, 1940-1945

(Washington, 1947), pp. 57-58, and p. 185.

8

 The importance of the Ordnance planning

effort in the broad Army-wide picture is revealed

in Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization,

Chapters II-IV. The library of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has several lectures given

by Ordnance officers during 1940 and earlier years

on the work of the Planning Branch. 9

 WDAB, 1941, H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p. 98. 10

 See remarks by Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell

praising Ordnance as "preeminent" in this area,

Rpt of Conf of Ord Dist Chiefs, Detroit, 22 Apr

44, p. 2, OHF. See also the report by Luther

Gulick and his associates on the Cincinnati Field

Survey, Apr 42, p. 20, ASF Contl Div files. 11

 (1) WD Ann Rpt, Report of the Chief of

Ordnance, 1938, p. 9. (Hereafter, regardless of

variations of title, these reports are cited as Ann

Rpt CofOrd); (2) Memo, Col Lucian D. Booth,

Ammo Div, for Gen Harris, 3 Jan 39, sub: Gen

Data . . . for Ammo in an Emergency, OHF; (3)

Lecture, Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, The Ordnance Department, 9 May 41, ICAF; (4) Memo,

CofOrd for ASW, 6 May 40, sub: Additional Facilities Required. . . , OO 381/35763 ASW; (5)

Rpt of Comm. headed by Col Rutherford for

ASW, 24 Jun 40, sub: Proposed WD Program

for Increasing Productive Capacity for Munitions,

Maj Gen James H. Burns's personal file; (6) Notes

on conversation with Col Leo Dillon, assistant executive officer to Gen Burns, no date, in Troyer

Anderson's notes, folder 4, OCMH. 12

 "Smokeless powder" is used throughout this

volume because of its wide currency, not because

it was an accurately descriptive term. "Propellant"

was generally preferred by specialists in this area.
12 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

powder and small arms and for the operation of loading plants. By the summer of

1940, thanks largely to the efforts of General Harris, Ordnance had a fairly clear

idea as to the type of new facilities it would

need to produce smokeless powder, explosives, ammonia, and TNT.13

 These plans

and reserve machinery, General Wesson

told the Truman Committee in April 1941,

proved to be of "untold value" in promptly

starting the new facilities program.14

In the summer of 1940 the Munitions

Program of 30 June opened a new era in

procurement planning. It called for immediate procurement of equipment for 1,200,-

000 ground troops, procurement of important long-lead-time items for a ground force

of 2,000,000, creation of productive capacity for eventually supplying a much larger

force on combat status, and production of

18,000 airplanes. Approval of this plan,

formulated in large part by an Ordnance

officer, Col. James H. Burns, was a big step

forward along the road toward effective industrial mobilization.15

 It made a sharp

break with all previous plans to supply

equipment for small Army increments, for

it established broad planning goals far in

advance of any formal action to increase

the strength of the Army. It cleared the

way for creation of munitions plants for a

big military effort and left to the future

the tedious task of refining and adjusting

its parts. But Ordnance planners found

that there were still many unknown factors

in the equation—new weapons, tables of

equipment, estimated rates of consumption,

speed of mobilization, timetable for overseas deployment, and, most important, how

much money would be available.

Although Ordnance maintained six manufacturing arsenals in time of peace, they

were not intended for large-scale production in time of war.16 It was estimated that

all the arsenals combined would never be

able to produce more than about 5 percent

of the Army's requirements for war. In the

initial stages of an emergency, while indus13

 Memo, CofOrd for Col Burns, OASW, 1

Mar 40, sub: Ord War Construction Rpt, OO

381/33041 ASW. The inclosure to this memo tabulated 29 proposed loading and powder plants,

with tentative locations indicated. See also list of

proposed new plants in Munitions Program of 30

June 1940, ASF Contl Div dr G43; Dir, High Explosives Manufacturing Plants, 20 Sep 39, by Lt

Col Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., approved by Col Booth

and Brig Gen Harris, OHF; and Dir, War Plans

for Loading Ammunition, 21 Mar 40, by Brig Gen

Harris, OHF. On the role of General Harris, see

Ltr, Louis Johnson to Harry C. Thomson, 14 Oct

52, OHF. The New York Times on 2 January

1941 ran a front-page article on the need for powder plants and on Ordnance plans for their construction. 14

 (1) Statement of Gen Wesson . . . before the

Spec S. Comm. Investigating the National Defense

Program, 77th Cong., 1st sess,, Hearings on S. Res.

71, Investigation of the National Defense Program,

Apr 41. (These hearings, which extended from 1

March 1941 through 11 June 1948, from the 77th

through the 80th Congresses, will hereafter be

cited as Truman or Mead Comm., Hearings according to date. The successive chairmen of this

committee were Harry S. Truman, James M.

Mead, and Owen Brewster). A copy of Gen Wesson's statement is in OHF; (2) Interv with Maj

Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr., and Brig Gen Burton

O. Lewis, 13 Jan 53; (3) Min, Wesson Confs, 20

Jun 40. On the development of plans and purchase of machinery, see also (4) Small Arms Ammunition, A History of an Industry, 1918-1944,

vol. I, ch. 4, prepared by Ammo Br, SA Div, OCO

(hereafter cited as SAA) ; and (5) Ord Monograph No. 4, Ammunition, 1 July 1940-31 August

1945, by Maj Berkeley R. Lewis and Lt C. B. Rosa;

31 Dec 45, p. 6, OHF. 15

 (1) Munitions Program of 30 June 1940

(corrected as of 24 July), in ASF Contl Div files,

dr G43. For the important role played by Col.

(later Maj. Gen.) James H. Burns in developing

this program, see (2) Watson, Chief of Staff, pp.

172-182, and (3) Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, Chapter VI. (4) See also Ltr,

Johnson to Thomson, 14 Oct 52, OHF. 16

 For names, locations, and wartime activities

of the arsenals, see Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, pp. 6-7. A detailed

history of each arsenal may be found in OHF.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 13

try built new plants, the arsenals were to

produce certain types of urgently needed

munitions; but, with a few exceptions,

their major wartime role was to serve as

sources of production techniques, as development centers, and as training grounds

for Ordnance production personnel, inspectors, and key men from industrial

plants. The main burden of war production

would fall on private industry and on

new government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) plants built for the purpose.17

Plans for Decentralized Procurement

In terms of organization, the foremost

principle of Ordnance procurement planning in the summer of 1940 was decentralization through the six manufacturing arsenals and the thirteen district offices.18

Ever since World War I, Ordnance procurement plans had provided that, with

certain exceptions, contracts for war matériel would be placed by the arsenals or the

district offices, each of which was familiar

with industries capable of producing the

required munitions. Over-all direction of

the program in wartime was to be exercised from Washington by the Chief of the

Industrial Service, General Harris, but the

day-by-day work of negotiating and administering contracts was to be carried on in

the districts.19

The districts had a combination of civilian and military leadership. Each district

had as its chief (until 1942) a prominent

local businessman, usually a Reserve officer, who devoted part of his time to district

affairs. To each district a regular Ordnance

officer was assigned on a full-time basis as

assistant chief or executive officer. Most of

the districts also had advisory boards made

up of prominent business leaders who were

sympathetic, at least in theory, with

the Ordnance Department's preparedness

plans. There was an element of "window

dressing" about these boards but there

was some real substance, too. The New

York district, for example, numbered

among its board members in the 1939-41

period such prominent figures as Patrick E.

Crowley, president of the New York Central Lines; James A. Farrell of the United

States Steel Corporation; Maj. Gen. James

G. Harbord (Ret.), chairman of the board

of directors of the Radio Corporation of

America; Robert P. Lamont, former Secretary of Commerce; and Owen D. Young,

chairman of the board of the General Electric Company. The Cleveland district probably reflected the experience of other districts when it reported that the names of

highly respected industrialists on its advisory board helped to unlock industrial

doors.

17

 (1) Lectures, Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson,

Ordnance Department Procurement, and The

Ordnance Department, 15 Jan 40 and 9 May 41

respectively, ICAF. (2) See also Memo, CofOrd

for Planning Br, OASW, 8 Sep 39, sub: Measures

... in Event of War. . . , OO 381/27496 Misc. 18

 The origins and early history of the arsenals

and district offices are treated in Green, Thomson,

and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter

I. In 1940 the district offices were in the following cities: Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Hartford (redesignated

Springfield in May 1942), New York, Philadelphia,

Pittsburgh, Rochester, St. Louis, and San Francisco. 19

 For detailed description of the organization

of the Industrial Service, and its relation to the

districts, see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, Chapters II and IV. The

mechanics of Ordnance procurement, and many

references to specific procurement planning directives, are described in History of the Industrial

Service, District Administrative Branch, vol. 101,

OHF. See also Dir for Procurement . . . for FY

1940. . . , 1 May 39, OHF; Cir 18, The Mission

of the New York Ord Dist, 29 Oct 35, in History of. New York Ordnance District, I, pt. 1,

app. C.

PROCUREMENT PLANNING 15

In the early stages of an emergency,

while the districts built up their staffs and

established operating procedures, the arsenals were to let contracts for the more

complicated types of matériel and were to

aid the districts by providing blueprints,

specifications, and technical guidance to

manufacturers.20 Up to July 1940, the districts had no authority to award contracts.

During the preceding eighteen months they

had handled some of the preliminary work

for educational orders and production

studies.21 They had been given increasing

responsibility for inspecting finished products, but they had had no authority to

place orders with industry. The grant of

that authority to the districts was nevertheless an integral part of the Ordnance

plan, and to lend realism to such planning

each district was requested in December

1939 to submit its recommendations covering the first twenty contracts it expected

to place in time of war. The reports sent in

by the districts showed names of plants,

items to be produced, types of contracts to

be used, and the reasons for selecting each

plant.22 The Chicago district, to cite one

example, planned to place orders with

Elgin National Watch Company for time

fuzes, with Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing

Company for machining 75-mm. shells,

with Bucyrus-Erie Company for 3-inch AA

gun mounts, with Stewart-Warner Corporation for metallic belt links, and so on

through the list.23

The Industrial Service in mid-July 1940

described in some detail the specific procurement procedures to be followed by the

arsenals and districts. To use the district

procurement system and at the same time

retain competitive bidding to the maximum extent, Ordnance proposed to divide

the requirement for each item among districts that had facilities allocated for production of that item.24

 When district

offices received these assignments they

would request facilities allocated to them

to submit bids. The bids from all districts

would then be reported to the Ordnance

office in Washington. That office would

compare the bids with each other and with

known costs of manufacture at arsenals

and would make awards to facilities that

offered the best assurance of producing on

schedule and at a fair price. Rigid acceptance inspection by the district offices, coupled with periodic interchangeability tests,

would assure uniformity of product. In

analyzing the plan the Chief of Ordnance

wrote:

It will be observed that this plan, in effect,

provides for nation-wide competition among

allocated facilities, with contract negotiations

carried on in the geographic territories of the

several Ordnance Districts. Assurance of the

timely production of munitions through use

of the district system cannot be obtained in

any other manner, and it is considered that

20

 (1) Ann Rpt CofOrd FY 1938, p. 8; (2)

Hist, Ind Serv, Dist Admin Br, sec. B, vol. 101;

(3) Harry B. Yoshpe, Plans for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-39, ICAF Research Project RP

No. 28, Nov 45, p. 78. For the experience of the

Quartermaster Corps wherein current procurement

and procurement planning were not closely tied

together, see Thomas M. Pitkin and Herbert R.

Rifkind, Procurement Planning in the Quartermaster Corps 1920-40, QMC Historical Studies

No. 1, Mar 43, pp. 121-28. 21

 Discussed below, pp. 19-21. For a detailed

record of one district's activities, see the bound

volumes of monthly reports of the Cincinnati Ordnance District for 1940 and 1941, OHF. 22

 Ltr, CofOrd for all districts, 14 Dec 39, sub:

Negotiation of Wartime Contracts, OO 381/-

30303 San Francisco. Replies from the districts

are also in this file. 23

 Ltr, Chicago Ord Dist to CofOrd, 21 Dec

39, sub: Negotiation of War-time Contracts, OO

381/3062, copy in OHF. 24

 Allocated facilities were those assigned in War

Department plans for use of a specific procurement agency. See below, p. 19.
16 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the plan will bring forth the best facilities

producing at the lowest cost, consistent with

the desired distribution of the load.25

It was estimated that in meeting requirements of the Munitions Program of 30

June the districts would place approximately four hundred prime contracts, utilizing

some eight thousand facilities. For that

part of the procurement load assigned to

the arsenals, competitive bidding among

allocated facilities or any other facilities

with suitable production experience, and

the signing of fixed-price contracts, were

to be the rule. Arsenal commanders had

authority to close contracts involving less

than $50,000 without referring them to

Washington for approval, but larger contracts had to have the approval of the

Chief of Ordnance, the Assistant Secretary

of War, and Commissioner William S.

Knudsen of the Advisory Commission to

the Council of National Defense (usually

referred to as NDAC).26

Each district office was to administer its

own contracts and also all contracts with

industries within its borders placed by the

arsenals. Administration of contracts included, among other things, helping contractors solve production problems, making

periodic reports to the Chief of Ordnance

on the status of production, inspecting finished products, and paying for the goods

delivered. By means of production reports

from the districts and the arsenals the

Chief of Ordnance planned to exercise close

control over the flow of components to final

assembly points and loading plants, and to

bring pressure to bear upon contractors

who failed to meet their production

schedules.

Contract Forms and Legal Restrictions

By the summer of 1940 the Assistant

Secretary of War had approved six standard contract forms for use in a national

emergency.27 These had been drafted to

prevent recurrence of the confusion of

World War I when purchasing agencies

of the War Department evolved and used

over four hundred different and troublesome contract forms. Ordnance expected

that the most important of the approved

contracts would be Standard Form No. 32,

a fixed-price supply contract to be used

under the system of competitive bidding.

It was thought that this type of contract

would account for 95 percent of all awards

by the district offices. But, because of the

difficulty of estimating costs of war equipment that manufacturers had never before

produced, other types of contracts, such

as the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF), which

allowed greater flexibility in pricing, were

also considered.

In January 1940 the Ordnance Department regarded the legal restrictions on

peacetime procurement as a major factor

that would retard the award of Ordnance

contracts in time of emergency. It cited

the law requiring public advance advertising and award to the lowest responsible

bidder, and other legislation affecting

hours, wages, and profits. In January 1940,

General Wesson stated that because of this

legislation, with which many manufactur25

 Memo, CofOrd, for ASW, 19 Jul 40, OO

381/1335 ASW. The Ordnance plan was officially approved by the Secretary of War in a

memo for NDAC, 23 Jul 40, OO 334.9/26. The

plans of all the supply services are summarized in

Ann Rpt USW FY 41, and in Ann Rpt P and C

Br, OUSW, FY 41. 26

 Memo, ASW for CofOrd, 10 Jun 40, sub:

Approval of Important Purchases. . . , OHF. 27

 For copies of these forms see Ind College

Spec Text No. 98, War Department Procurement

Planning, ch. 8, prepared in 1940 by Extension

Course Div ICAF. See also Yoshpe, op. cit., pp.

50-53. and Lt. Col. John P. Dinsmore, "War

Contracts," Army Ordnance, XX, No. 119 (March

-April 1940), 317-21.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 17

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR Louis

JOHNSON

ers were not familiar, it took about ninety

days to advertise for bids, examine the

bids, and make an award. He went on to

say that this procurement cycle could be

cut from ninety to thirty days for essential

items in an emergency only if the industrial

mobilization plan were put in effect, legal

restrictions removed, and Ordnance permitted to negotiate directly with selected

facilities.28

Surveys of Industry

In the summer of 1940 each district office had on file hundreds of reports of industrial surveys made during the preceding years and kept as nearly up-to-date as

possible with the handful of officers and

civilian engineers available for the job.

These surveys, made under the broad supervision of Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War, covered major industrial

plants within each district that might be

converted to munitions production in time

of war. For each plant the survey recorded

the firm's normal product, its productive

capacity, floor space, and major items of

equipment. It also gave information on the

firm's financial standing and resources,

transportation facilities, availability of

skilled workers, and, most important, the

type and quantity of Ordnance matériel

the company might produce in an emergency. Above all, Ordnance was interested

in firms with good management and strong

engineering departments. "It was not just

the machines and floor space that counted," observed Brig. Gen. Burton O. Lewis,

a leader in Ordnance procurement planning. "Of even greater importance were

the men—the skilled workers, the production engineers, the executives who understood the secret of high-quality mass production." 29

 In most cases, after the survey

was complete, Ordnance and the company

signed an informal agreement known as an

"accepted schedule of production" showing

specifically what the company was prepared to produce.30

 Accepted schedules of

production were "all important," General

Wesson told Industrial College students

early in 1940. "They are part of our war

reserve. They are as vital as the material

in our storehouses."

 31

28

 Lecture, Wesson, Ordnance Department

Procurement, p. 10. See also Memo, Brig Gen

Harris, Actg CofOrd, for ASW, 15 May 40, sub:

Measures to Expedite Proc, OO 400.12/5908. 29

 Interv with Brig Gen Burton O. Lewis, 29

Apr 52. The same view was expressed by many

other Ordnance officers in interviews with the

author. 30

 For discussion of this topic, see testimony of

Brig Gen Harris, WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess.,

p. 239ff. See also Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, ch. III. 31

 Lecture, Wesson, Ordnance Department Procurement.
18 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Before 1940 the process of making industrial surveys was slow, hampered by

lack of interest on the part of some manufacturers and by lack of personnel in the

district offices. It was also hampered by the

fact that not all Ordnance district officers

had sufficient manufacturing background

and engineering knowledge to do a good

surveying job. But during the first six

months of 1940 the tempo of survey work

increased markedly, stimulated by a procurement planning conference called by

Louis Johnson in October 1939. The Pittsburgh District made more than two hundred surveys during the first half of 1940

as compared with only thirty-nine during

the preceding six months, and the cumulative total for the District in July 1940 rose

to five hundred.32

By 1940 the purpose of industrial surveys had generally ceased to be discovery

of firms that could turn out complete

items of Ordnance matériel ready for

storage or issue. The search was for several

firms, each of which might manufacture

one or more components or perform one or

more steps in the whole process of manufacture. Further, surveying officials were

looking for plants that could do the job by

using equipment already on hand and with

workers already trained in similar processes.

The search for plants that could undertake Ordnance production with existing

equipment was dictated largely by the anticipated shortage of machine tools. Ordnance planners were aware that the nation's small machine-tool industry would

be swamped in time of war; they realized

that every possible step should be taken to

utilize existing machines rather than count

on extensive retooling. The dearth of machine tools in the South was spectacularly

revealed in the fall of 1939 when the Birmingham District office reported that, of

eighteen contractors approached, not one

had the tools needed to begin production

on any type of matériel contemplated for

production in that District.33 The educational orders program revealed that lack

of machine tools was also a problem for

industries in the North. In January 1940,

for example, the Philadelphia District reported that bids on educational orders

"indicate a larger deficiency of machine

tools than was anticipated six months

ago."

 34

Planning for an adequate supply of gages

—those essential measuring and checking

devices needed to assure precision manufacture—was an altogether different story.

Profiting from the experience of World

War I, the Ordnance Department during

the 1920's and 1930's took a number of

important steps to assure an adequate supply of gages for a future emergency. More

than half a million World War I gages were

collected, checked for accuracy, and put in

storage. During the 1930's nine district

gage laboratories were established at universities to provide gage-checking services

to manufacturers and to train personnel

for gage-surveillance duties, and gage laboratories were established at all the arsenals. Beginning in 1938 Ordnance made a

concerted effort to design gages for all

items for which it was reasonably sure that

production would be required. Gages on

hand at the arsenals were brought up to

date, and new gages were procured for

32

 History, Pittsburgh Ordnance District, I, pt.

3, p. 382. For similar data, see History, Detroit

Ordnance District, I, p. D-3- 33

 History, Birmingham Ordnance District, I,

pt. 1, pp. 285-90. 34

 Monthly Progress Rpt, Phila Ord Dist, Jan

40. See also. History, New York Ordnance District,

I, pt. 2, pp. 75-76.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 19

standard items. In July 1940 Ordnance

allotted approximately $2,500,000 for gage

procurement in advance of actual production of weapons or ammunition. At the

same time, steps were taken, in cooperation with other government agencies

and private industry, leading to allotment

by the War Department of $4,000,000 to

expand productive capacity of the gage industry.35

 So effective were these preparatory measures that the gage problem,

which proved so serious in World War I,

was scarcely a problem at all in World

War II.

Closely related to industrial surveys was

the system by which a certain percentage

of a plant's capacity was allocated by the

Army and Navy Munitions Board for the

exclusive wartime use of one or possibly

several supply services.36 Originally adopted

to guard against recurrence of the confusion and interagency competition that

had marked the procurement process in

1917, the allocation system was designed

also to forewarn industry of the tasks it

would be called upon to perform in time

of war, to promote mutual understanding

between industry and procurement officers,

and to serve as a basis on which to plan

war production. The supply services furnished allocated facilities with drawings,

specifications, descriptions of manufacture,

and in some cases samples of the critical

items they were scheduled to produce, and

encouraged them to study means of converting their plants to munitions production.37

Educational Orders and

Production Studies

Perhaps the most radical departure from

conventional practice, and the most highly

publicized feature of Ordnance prewar

procurement plans, were the educational

orders. Approved by Congress in 1938,

after years of urging by procurement officers and the Army Ordnance Association,

the Educational Orders Act permitted

placement of orders with allocated facilities

for small quantities of hard-to-manufacture

items. The purpose was to give selected

manufacturers experience in producing

munitions and to procure essential tools

and manufacturing aids. Other supply

services participated in the program to

some extent, but the bulk of the educational orders were for Ordnance matériel.38

35

 (1) History, Gage Section and Gage Facilities Section, OCO, I, pt. 1; (2) Memo, ASW for

Donald Nelson, 21 Sep 40, sub: Project for Expansion of Productive Capacity for Gages, copy

in OHF. 36

 The next chapter discusses the allocation system more fully. 37

 For a detailed description of the allocation

system, see Yoshpe, op. cit., pp. 22-26. See also

Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, "Arms for the

Army," Army Ordnance, XIX, No. 112 (January-February 1939), 209; Maj Scott B. Ritchie,

"The Allocations System," Army Ordnance,

XVIII, No. 104 (September-October 1937), 77-

83. The district histories, particularly that of the

Pittsburgh District, describe the allocations procedure in detail. The names of all allocated plants,

and the service or services to which they were

allocated, appear in Alphabetical Directory of

Industrial Allocations, May 1940, issued by ANMB.

The most recent review of the allocation system

appears in Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter III. 38

 See Chapter III of Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, for a summary of the program before 1940. The Annual

Report of the Secretary of War to the President,

1939 (Washington, 1939) (hereafter cited as Ann

Rpt SW, 1939), pp. 16-17, describes the over-all

program as does Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, ch. III. The histories of the Ordnance districts report on the details of its administration. Many pertinent documents are in OHF.

See also testimony of Brig. Gen. Harris and Col

Rutherford, WDAB, S., 76th Cong., 3d sess., p.

129ff; Col. Harry K. Rutherford, "Educational

Orders," Army Ordnance, XX, No. 117 (November-December 1939), 162-66; and Benedict
20 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

After a rather cautious start in fiscal

year 1939, when Ordnance awards went

to only four companies, the program leaped

ahead in fiscal 1940 with more than eighty

educational awards. As orders for a wide

range of items went to manufacturers in

all parts of the country, the district offices

and arsenals plunged into the task of sharing with industry their knowledge of production methods peculiar to munitions

making. The invitations to bid for educational orders were issued by the arsenals

and the contracts were let from the Office

of the Chief of Ordnance, after approval

by the Secretary of War and the President,

as required by law. Selection of firms to

receive invitations to bid, negotiation of

contract details, and inspection and acceptance of finished matériel were all managed by the district offices. The entire

process was thus an educational experience

for the Ordnance Department as well as

for the manufacturers. But, just as the program was getting well under way in the

summer of 1940, it was suddenly halted.

Because of the swift German victories in

western Europe and the huge appropriations for military supplies voted by Congress, educational orders gave way to production orders. Ordnance placed its last

educational order in July 1940 while the

British Army was recovering from its evacuation of Dunkerque.39

The prevailing opinion in the Ordnance

Department and among contractors holding educational orders was that the program, in spite of being too limited in scope

and too brief in duration, proved its value

as a means of industrial preparedness.40

The Winchester Repeating Arms Company

estimated that its educational order for

the M1 rifle saved a full year's time in

getting into quantity production.41 Not

all companies with educational orders completed them successfully, nor were all holders of educational contracts later given

production orders for exactly the same

product. But in April 1941 Ordnance reported that about half had received production orders for the same or similar

items.42 All told, the educational orders

had spread the "know how" of specialized

ordnance manufacture to some eighty-two

companies, made available to them at least

a minimum of special tools and other

manufacturing aids, and, by familiarizing

them with Ordnance inspection methods,

probably cut down rejections on later

production orders.43

While Ordnance was launching its educational orders experiment it also entered

Crowell, et al., "The Crowell Board Report on

Educational Orders for Peacetime Munitions Production," Army Ordnance, XX, No. 117 (November-December 1939), 167-70.

39

 Min of conf in Gen Wesson's office, 1 Apr

41, relative to S. Res. 71, OHF. See also Memo,

Lt Col Hugh C. Minton for Mr. Julius H. Amberg, 4 Apr 41, sub: Educational Orders, OHF. 40

 (1) Replies to questions submitted to Maj

Gen C. T. Harris. . . , 28 Feb 45, OHF, pp. 3-4;

(2) WDAB, 1942, H.R., 77th Cong., 1st sess.,

p. 27; (3) Yoshpe, op. cit., p. 37; (4) Histories of

Ord Districts; (5) Testimony of Rutherford, 27

Feb 40, WDAB, 1941 H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess.,

p. 108, passim; (6) WDAB, 1941, S., 76th Cong.,

3d sess., p. 200. See also the statement by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson that educational

orders were of "immeasurable value," Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 131 (March-April 1942),

729-30. 41

 History, Rochester Ordnance District, I, p.

50. Similar testimony may be found in the histories of other districts and in the Report of the

Under Secretary of War, 30 June 1941. 42

 Memo, Minton for Amberg, 4 Apr 41, sub:

Educational Orders. 43

 (1) Statement of Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson, Truman Comm. Hearings, Apr 41, copy in

OHF. (2) Statement of Wesson, WDAB, H.R.,

77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 527, and statement by

Maj Gen Harry K. Rutherford, p. 229.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 21

into nearly one hundred contracts for production studies to determine the techniques

and equipment needed for quantity production of items of ordnance.44

 Congress

authorized the War Department to purchase such studies in 1939. In the spring

of 1940 General Wesson told a Congressional committee that funds for 420 additional studies should be appropriated as he

considered such studies to be "of paramount importance to national defense."

 45

Averaging about $5,000 each, these studies

had the advantage of being much cheaper

than either educational orders or production orders, but they were of far less value.

Their usefulness depended in large measure

on the strength of the contracting company's engineering staff and on the seriousness with which it tackled the study. In

the final analysis, only production orders

under wartime conditions could provide

the proof of the pudding. That proof was

not slow in coming, for in some cases contracts for production studies were replaced,

even before they were signed, by production orders.46

During the year ending 30 June 1940

the Ordnance Department awarded 1,450

contracts to industry for approximately

$83,000,000 worth of weapons, ammunition, and new machinery, and it allocated

a nearly equal sum to the arsenals for production and modernization.47

 Plans called

for completion of this 1940 program within

two years, with 95 percent of it completed

by December 1941. "In general," observed

General Wesson, "it takes approximately

one year to place orders and to get production started, and a second year to finish

any reasonable program."48 Beyond the

1940 program, provision had been made

for a tremendous increase in production

when funds for fiscal year 1941 became

available.

Conclusion

Such, in broad outline, was the nature

of Ordnance procurement planning in the

summer of 1940. It was fundamentally

sound, in terms of the political and economic atmosphere of the time. Its most

serious weakness lay in the limitations on

its application and development. The value

of plant surveys made in the late 1930's was

demonstrated time and again during the

defense period and was recognized by the

Office of Production Management (OPM)

in the spring of 1941 when it declared that

they "have been found adequate for the

purpose of OPM's defense contract service

and will not be duplicated."

 49

 But Ordnance and the other supply services never

had enough money or enough manpower

to carry on a fully adequate program of

industrial surveys. Similarly, the educational orders program, although soundly con44

 Memo, Lt Col Quinton for Maj Hugh B.

Hester, OASW, 5 Aug 40, sub: Production Studies, OO 381/2210 ASW. See also testimony of

Col Harry K. Rutherford in WDAB, H.R., 76th

Cong., 3d sess., 27 Feb 40, pp. 100ff, and "Production Studies," and editorial in Army Ordnance, XX, No. 120 (June-July 1940), 396. The

History of the Pittsburgh Ordnance District, I,

Part 3, Chapter 4, describes that District's experience with production studies in detail. 45

 WDAB, 1941, H.R., 76th Cong, 3d sess., 12

Mar 40, pp. 558 and 601. 46

 History, Pittsburgh Ordnance District, I, pt.

3, p. 416. This reference also gives evidence of the

usefulness of the production studies which were

completed. 47

 Analysis of FY 1940 Ord Dept Contracts,

Asst Chief of Ind Serv (Prod), OHF. 48

 Speech by Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson in

Pittsburgh, 3 May 40, OHF. For a review of the

contracts in force in the spring of 1940, see testimony of Wesson, WDAB, H.R., 76th Cong, 3d

sess, pp. 555-56. 49

 Proc Plng Bull, 1 Apr 41, cited in Hist,

Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 3, p. 385. See also

statement by Secretary Patterson in praise of these

surveys before Select Comm., Investigating Rational Defense Migration, 23 Dec 41.
22 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ceived and effectively administered, was

started so late and was allotted so little

money that its full value was never realized. The system of plant allocations

formed the basis for a fruitful exchange of

information between Ordnance and industry during the interwar years, and, when

the emergency came, the allocation plans

provided most useful guidance for placing

Ordnance contracts. But the allocation

plans were only a first step toward industrial preparedness. Their effectiveness depended upon their being backed up by the

district system, the arsenals, and a competent managerial staff in Washington.

Maintenance of the six manufacturing

arsenals as the "Regular Army of production" throughout the interwar years was

one of the most important Ordnance contributions to the cause of industrial preparedness. But it must also be remembered

that, because of lack of funds, the equipment of the arsenals was not kept up-todate. Although some progress toward modernizing arsenal equipment was made in

the late 1930's, particularly at Frankford,

by 1939 some 80 percent of the machine

tools in the arsenals were eighteen or more

years old, and some of them antedated the

Civil War.50 With such equipment the

arsenals were not able to keep abreast of

the latest developments in manufacturing

techniques, nor were they fully prepared in

1940 to serve as model factories to be

copied by private industries about to convert to munitions making.

Without the district offices, with their

continual and friendly liaison with industrial leaders, the paper plans for war procurement would have been far less valuable than they actually proved to be. But

the fact that no annual meeting of the district chiefs was held between 1931 and

1935 because of lack of funds is eloquent

testimony to the limitations on district activity during those years. So is the fact that

before 1939 the employees on duty in the

average district office could be counted on

the fingers of one hand. It is no doubt true,

as General Harris asserted, that there was

never a time in the 1938-40 period when

he could not gain a sympathetic hearing

from the president of any leading corporation in the United States to discuss procurement plans. In some degree the same

was true of the district chiefs who were

themselves prominent industrialists and

were supported by advisory committees

composed of industrial leaders. But most

businessmen were reluctant to undertake

detailed planning for an unforeseeable future. They were willing to go just so far,

and no farther. As a result, within the limited budgets of the peacetime years the

districts did a great deal of valuable work,

but in 1940 much still remained to be done

before a major program of munitions production could be launched.

In one respect a great advance was

made in Ordnance procurement planning

between the fall of 1939 and the fall of

1940. More and more people, both in and

out of the Army, began to take such planning seriously for the first time. Before

50

 Three significant magazine articles on this

subject appeared in 1939. "The Arsenals in Action" in American Machinist, vol. 83, (February

8, 1939), pp. 48aff., reported the findings of a study of arsenal machines made by the magazine

staff. Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, in "Adequate

National Defense Requires Modernized Arsenals,"

Machinery, vol. 45 (July 1939), pp. 735ft., de- clared that a great proportion of arsenal machinery was obsolete. The same facts were presented

by General Wesson in Army Ordnance, XIX, No.

114 (May-June 1939), 331, and in WDAB, 1941,

H.R., 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 596-97. The official histories of the arsenals provide some data on

new machinery purchased in 1939-40, as does

Memo, CofOrd for Col Wade H. Haislip, 28 Jan

39, OO 111.6954, copy in OHF.
PROCUREMENT PLANNING 23

1939, when the prospects of American involvement in war seemed remote, only a

few people took procurement planning

seriously. Among these, it should be noted,

were the members of the Army Ordnance

Association, who worked throughout the

interwar years to promote the cause of industrial preparedness for national defense.

Established in 1919, the AOA immediately

gained recognition in both industry and

government when it elected as its first president Benedict Crowell, director of munitions in World War I. At the annual dinners held by AOA posts in major cities the

most important leaders of American industry were brought together to consider

industry's role in national defense. The

bimonthly magazine, Army Ordnance,

brought to all members of the association

articles on new developments in ordnance

engineering along with news and comment

on industrial preparedness.

In the late 1930's Louis Johnson made

countless speeches in all parts of the country urging the need for industrial preparedness, but the response was generally apathetic, and frequently hostile.51

 Then, in

the spring of 1940, the swift German victories aroused public interest in rearmament of the United States and in plans

for national defense. Instead of being denounced for making war plans, military

men were now criticized for not having

made better plans. With the launching of

the munitions program in the late summer

of 1940 a new attitude prevailed in the

Army and among businessmen. The change

did not come overnight, nor was it complete

before Pearl Harbor, but it had a steady

growth. It gave to all considerations of

procurement plans a sense of reality and

urgency they had never had before. It not

only freed the procurement planners of the

psychological handicap under which they

had labored for two decades but it also

brought forth the money needed to transform blueprints into weapons.52

51

 Ann Rpt of ASW, 30 Jun 38, in Ann Rpt

SW, 1938, pp. 19-20. See editorial in Saturday

Evening Post, vol. 211, No. 22 (November 26,

1938), attacking the Industrial Mobilization Plan

as "articles of war-time dictatorship." The broad

background of these events is described in Smith,

Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter V. 52

 For comment on this matter as viewed from

the highest level in the War Department, see Ann

Rpt SW, 1941, pp. 2-3.
CHAPTER III

Launching the Defense Program,

1940-41

Appropriations for preparedness in the

early months of 1940 indicated a growing

awareness of the dangers threatening the

nation, but they fell far short of financing

a long-range military program for the

United States. Because of the cumbersome

machinery used in making military appropriations, and the uncertainty among advocates of preparedness as to how far and

how fast the nation should go in the directions of rearmament, the money to finance

the munitions program did not come all at

once but in varying amounts at irregular

intervals. After the startling German successes in May and June, Congress acted

quickly to make more funds available.

Following the $436,000,000 approved for

Ordnance in June 1940, there came a

supplemental grant of $1,442,000,000 in

September. Six months later $913,000,000

was appropriated for Ordnance expenditures under lend-lease, followed by

$1,339,000,000 for general purposes in

June, and nearly $3,000,000,000 in August 1941.1

 These funds strengthened the

rearmament effort, but each appropriation

also called for a revision of plans and objectives, thus making it difficult for the

General Staff to provide Ordnance with a

firm long-range statement of procurement

goals.2

Procurement Objectives

As a first step toward providing detailed

procurement objectives for the supply services, the General Staff issued an Expenditure Program in August 1940. Designed as

a master shopping list for Army procurement, this document showed requirements for the Protective Mobilization Plan

(PMP) force of 1,200,000 men and for the

augmented force of 2,000,000 men, the

1

 Ordnance appropriations during the defense

period are discussed in Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter III.

See also Incl to Memo of Harris for USW, 9 Sep

41, sub: Comments on Study. . ., OHF. For a

brief summary of other measures adopted during

1940 and early 1941, see testimony of the Secretary

of War and the Under Secretary before the Truman Committee, 15 April 1941, pt. 1. 2

 The history of industrial mobilization during

the defense period, written from the vantage point

of higher civilian or military levels, may be found

in several published works, notably Bureau of the

Budget, Committee on Records of War Administration, The United States at War, (Washington,

1946) ; Watson, Chief of Staff; and Smith, Army

and Economic Mobilization. Among the many

unpublished manuscripts dealing with this period,

two are particularly worthy of mention: Troyer

S. Anderson, Office of the Under Secretary of

War, 1914-41, and History of the ASF Purchases

Division, both in OCMH files. The annual reports

of the Under Secretary of War for 1940 and 1941

are valuable, as is the annual report of the

Purchase and Control Branch, OUSW, 1941.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 25

TABLE 1—SELECTED ITEMS FROM TIME OBJECTIVE, AUGUST 1940

unit cost of each item, the stocks on hand,

the resultant shortages, and the approved

expenditures. The Expenditure Program

showed how much money was to be spent

for each type of equipment, but it did not

establish any delivery schedules or even

broad time objectives for procurement. To

fill this gap, G-4 issued separately in

August a statement of time objectives that

served as a target for production planners.3

 The "all-important present objective" was to provide at the earliest possible

date initial equipment for the PMP force

and sufficient monthly production to maintain this force in combat. (Table 1) For

small arms, combat vehicles, tractors, and

miscellaneous fire control equipment, the

target date for equipping the PMP force

was 30 June 1941, and for the 2,000,000-

man force it was 31 December 1941. For

antiaircraft and field artillery, the corresponding deadlines were six months later

—31 December 1941 for the PMP and 30

June 1942 for the larger force. Production

of ammunition was to reach by 30 September 1941 the estimated expenditure

rate of the 2,000,000-man force.

Many of the items listed in the Time

Objective were approaching obsolescence.

All during the 1920's and 1930's Ordnance had been hampered in its development of new and improved matériel by

lack of money. Ordnance did not have a

free hand either to develop or to procure

the materiel it considered most desirable.

It worked within the framework of Army

command as a service agency bound to

meet, as best it could, the wishes of the

using troops. With the approach of war,

co-ordination between Ordnance and the

using arms became closer. It was expressed

in the approval of new items by the Ordnance Technical Committee on which the

using arms were represented. But it was

never without its rough spots.4

Placing the First Orders

Even before the Expenditure Program

and the Time Objective were issued, re3

 Time Objective for Rqmts, approved 26 Aug

40, in G-4 file 31773, and in OHF. 4

 See Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. XXIX, and ch. VII.
26 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

quirements for Ordnance items financed

by the $436 million that became available

in July 1940 were sufficiently clear to permit placing some orders with the arsenals

and private industry. Placing these and

later orders was a large and complicated

task, not only because Ordnance was responsible for about 1,200 principal articles,

involving some 250,000 components, but

also because each order had to be drawn

up for specific quantities of munitions to

be delivered according to a definite time

schedule. Manufacturers could not accurately estimate unit production costs unless

they knew the quantities to be produced,

for unit costs normally declined as volume

rose. Prospective bidders also required

blueprints and specifications before they

could calculate probable costs on items

they had never before produced. The entire program required careful balancing so

that adequate supplies of each component

would arrive in proper time at the assembly

points. Pervading the whole atmosphere

was the demand for speed in signing contracts and starting production, for the

dramatic German victories of May and

June had shocked the American people

and pointed up the urgent need for a

stronger national defense.5

Because of its extensive advance planning, the Ordnance Department was ready

to act quickly when funds became available on 1 July 1940. Unlike 1917, when

the lack of designs and specifications held

up production for many months, 1940

found the Ordnance Department with production drawings of most items ready for

immediate issue to manufacturers. The

only delay was with items still undergoing

test and development and not yet standardized, such as the new medium tank.6

On the administrative level there were delays caused by legal restrictions and

red tape. Procurement officers frequently

spoke of the need to "take the law into

their own hands" to get quick action. Only

gradually were the time-consuming procedures of the years of peace replaced by

more expeditious means of conducting

business.7

In dividing orders between the arsenals

and private industry, the policy was to give

industry as much work as possible, and

thus share with it the knowledge of production methods gained by the arsenals,

and at the same time to avoid overloading

the arsenals with straight production orders at the cost of curtailing their development activities. To private industry went

orders for articles previously produced in

quantity at the arsenals, items for which

production methods had been worked out;

the arsenals were given orders for items not

yet produced in quantity.8 The assignment

5

 Memo of USW for CofOrd, 19 Sep 40, sub:

Priorities and Scheduling, OO 400.12/476. For a

description of procurement policy and citation of

numerous directives, see Hist, Ind Serv, Dist

Admin Br, vol. 101. 6

 (1) Memo of CofOrd for ASW, 11 Jul 40,

sub: Contracts Awarded Under the FY 1941

Proc Program, OO 381/716 ASW; (2) Replies to

questions submitted to Maj Gen C. T. Harris, Jr.,

28 Feb 45, OHF; (3) Memo, Brig Gen Gladeon

M. Barnes for Mr. John J. McCloy, OSW, 1 Apr

41, sub: Status of Ord Prod, OO 400.12/2386;

(4) Statement of Maj Gen Wesson prepared for

Truman Comm., Apr 41, OHF. The story of tank

development is told in Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, and, from

the procurement viewpoint, in Chapters X and

XI, below. 7

 See Contract Forms and Legal Restrictions in

preceding chapter. The attitudes of officers in the

districts is reflected in the district histories. The

problem is discussed at some length in Smith,

Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter III. 8

 (1) Lecture, Wesson, Ordnance Department

Procurement; (2) Intervs with Maj Gen Charles

T. Harris, Jr. and other officers in the summer of

1950. For the policy on artillery ammunition, see

Contract Negotiation and Administration, Ord

Dept, May 1945, I, ch. 5 (a), OHF.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 27

of specific items to the arsenals for manufacture or for procurement from industry

posed no special problems, for each arsenal

had specialized for many years in one or

two broad classes of matériel. Springfield

Armory, the center of small arms development, was assigned production of the M1

Rifle, and Rock Island, the recuperator for

the new 105-mm. howitzer. To Watertown

went orders for gun tubes and carriages;

to Watervliet, machining of cannon; to

Picatinny, powder, explosives, and components of artillery ammunition; and to

Frankford, ammunition and fire control

instruments.9 Over half the $50,000,000

awarded in arsenal orders during early

July 1940 went for ammunition, and the

remainder was distributed among such

items as the M1 rifle, 37-mm. and 90-mm.

antiaircraft guns and carriages, fire control

instruments, and "high-speeding" old 75-

mm. gun carriages by equipping them with

pneumatic tires and improved springs.

Most of the awards to industry in July

1940 were for metal components of artillery ammunition, including such items as

577,000 75-mm. cartridge cases with the

Bridgeport Brass Company, 285,000 3-inch

shells with the Budd Wheel Company,

500,000 pieces of brass tubing with the

Revere Brass and Copper Company, and

over 3,000,000 artillery shells with the

United States Steel Corporation. Under

the heading of automotive equipment, an

order for 500 heavy tractors went to the

International Harvester Company, 1,057

scout cars to the White Motor Company,

and an armor plate contract for over

$5,000,000 to the United States Steel Corporation. Orders for small arms and small

arms ammunition went mostly to such well

known firms as General Motors, Colt,

Remington, DuPont, and U.S. Steel, and

one contract for construction of a smokeless powder plant costing $26,000,000 was

placed with the DuPont Company.10

Activating the District Offices,

August 1940

While the first orders under the July

1940 appropriations were being placed by

the divisions of the Industrial Service in

Washington, and by the arsenals, plans

were on foot to give the districts an important share in the procurement process

when the second supplemental appropriation, carrying $1,442,000,000 for Ordnance, should pass. At the end of July

district chiefs and arsenal commanders met

in Washington to review and discuss procurement plans. Two weeks later, on 16

August, the first General Directive on Contract Negotiation went out to all district

offices.11 This directive is generally regarded as marking the "activation" of the

Ordnance districts in World War II. It did

not give the districts authority to make

final awards to industry but made them

responsible for soliciting bids and discussing the terms of contracts.12

9

 Army Ord Dept Tentative Program for Proc

from Industry during the Fiscal Year Beginning

1 July 1940, OHF. 10

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 11 Jul 40, sub:

Contracts Awarded Under the FY 1941 Procurement Program, OO 381/716; (2) Interv with

Maj Gen Charles T. Harris and Brig Gen Burton

O. Lewis, 13 Jan 53. As new lines were added by

supplemental agreement the cost of this plant

eventually exceeded $100,000,000. 11

 (1) Conf of Dist Chiefs and Arsenal Comdrs,

30 Jul 40, Ord Tech Rcds; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to all

dist offices, 16 Aug 40, sub: Gen Dir on Contr

Negotiation, OHF. 12

 The published history of the New York

Ordnance District presents a picture of these

events as seen by a high-ranking officer of that

district. Chester Mueller, The New York Ordnance

District in World War II (New York: New York

Post and Army Ordnance Association, 1947). The

manuscript history, The Ordnance District System, 1918-1945, 8 May 45, describes these events
28 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The ground rules to govern the negotiation of contracts were set forth in some

detail by the Chief of Ordnance in the

directive of 16 August. The importance of

these rules is hard to exaggerate, for they

helped to shape some of the most controversial features of the Ordnance program

in 1940 and 1941. Because of the critical

lack of machine tools, and the prevailing

emphasis in the War Department on economy and speed of delivery, the districts

were instructed to give first preference to

plants already holding production orders if

those plants could fill additional orders

with existing capacity. Companies allocated to Ordnance and companies with

educational orders, production studies, or

accepted schedules of production were also

to be given priority in bidding. No limit

was set to the size of any contract or to the

size of any producer, but the districts were

warned that letting many small contracts

would be uneconomical and would place

an added strain on the already overloaded

machine-tool and gage industries.

Along with the directive of 16 August

went a list of items on which each district

was to seek bids. The list had been drawn

up by the Industrial Service in accordance

with existing procurement plans of the districts, although in some cases the quantities were larger than the planning figures.

In most cases the districts had in their files

the technical data for each item, including

drawings, specifications, and descriptions

of manufacture as practiced at the arsenals. The list issued on 16 August was

mainly for forging and machining artillery

shells, for manufacture of cartridge cases,

bomb bodies and fins, booster cases, pyrotechnics, and a wide variety of fuzes for

shells and bombs. A few examples will

illustrate. The Cleveland District was assigned solicitation of bids for over two

million 37-mm. shells, with small quantities of the same shell going to San Francisco, New York, and Cincinnati. The machining of nearly four million 60-mm. mortar shells was divided among the Cleveland,

St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Detroit districts. In most cases the production load

was divided among at least six districts.

Deliveries were to start during January or

February 1941 and were to be completed

within twelve months.

With issuance of the August directive,

the usefulness of the district procurement

plans was put to the test. The results

varied, but in general were good. Virtually

all orders went to allocated facilities, and

many went to firms that had completed

educational orders, production studies, or

schedules of production.13 The procurement program got off to a fast start, and

by early November orders had been placed

for all ammunition components at a total

cost of $190,000,000.14

All of this work called for intensive effort

by the small staff of officers and civilians

in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance

(usually abbreviated OCO) and necessitated speedy enlargement of the staff. General Wesson's staff at the end of May 1940

as seen by Brig. Gen. Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., Chief

of the District Administration Branch in 1940-

41. OHF. See Harry B. Yoshpe, "Economic Mobilization Planning between the Two World

Wars," Military Affairs (Summer 1952), p. 76.

13

 (1) History, Boston Ordnance District, I, p.

27; (2) Hist, Birmingham Ord Dist, I, pt. 1, pp.

137 and 177; (3) History, Cleveland Ordnance

District, I, pp. 51-52; (4) Ord Dist Hist, Pittsburgh, I, Gen exs. 25, 26, and 27. 14

 Memo, CofOrd for ASW, Weekly Rpt of Accomplishments, 7 Nov 40, Ord Tech Rcds (hereafter cited as Weekly Rpt of Accomplishments

and Difficulties).
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 29

numbered only 400—56 Regular Army

officers, 3 Reserve officers, and 341 civilians.15

 During the next two years this staff

grew by leaps and bounds, reaching a total

of 5,000 in June 1942. It included a small

but valuable contingent of Reserve officers

who had trained with Ordnance during

the years of peace and were thus prepared

to step into important administrative positions. The Ordnance office outgrew its

peacetime quarters in the Munitions Building, moved temporarily to the Social Security Building on Independence Avenue, and

then to the newly built Pentagon, still

under construction in the spring of 1942

when Ordnance moved in. Meanwhile,

at Ordnance installations throughout the

country—such as the district offices, arsenals, and depots—nearly 100,000 civilian

workers were added to the rolls, not counting hundreds of thousands of other workers

employed by Ordnance contractors. All

the districts drew upon their pools of Reserve officers to find qualified administrators for key positions. In 1939 and 1940

the districts were able to recruit competent

civilian engineers and procurement specialists, but during 1941 the recruitment

task became more difficult, and many able

employees were lost to industry or to the

draft. The level of competence of district

production engineers tended to decline as

the demand for war production mounted.16

Successes and Failures

As was to be expected, not everything

went according to plan during the hectic

eighteen months leading up to Pearl Harbor. As a general rule, firms that had

made production studies of ordnance items

were able to submit more accurate bids

than firms with less knowledge of the particular items. But the firms with most

technical knowledge were sometimes underbid by competitors more eager to get

the award or less conscious of production

difficulties to be overcome. The lowest bid

was more often a guess than an accurate

estimate.17 Further, the planned procurement pattern was upset by the fact that

many businessmen frankly disliked War

Department contracts because they entailed a great deal of red tape, demanded

tolerances much closer than those commonly applied in commercial production,

and required manufacturers to assume

abnormal risks.18 Some companies with

which the districts had made procurement

plans over the years either refused to bid

or, it was suspected, deliberately entered

high bids to avoid getting an award. As a

result, contracts occasionally went to less

desirable firms that experienced difficulty

in meeting production schedules while the

more dependable companies later took orders from the Navy or Air Corps on more

favorable terms.19

Plant Allocations

The usefulness of plant allocations during the defense period caused sharp dis15

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. IV. 16

 Lt Col Frederick C. Winter, Analysis of

World War II Production Activities of New York

Ordnance District, 5 Sep 47, Hist, New York Ord

Dist, VII. 17

 Contract Negotiation and Administration,

Ord Dept, May 45, ch. 6, p. 133. See also Hist,

New York Ord Dist, VII, op. cit. 18

 For description of these conditions, see Hist,

New York Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, pp. 70-73, and Hist,

Rochester Ord Dist, I, p. 52. The "formidable web

of red tape" surrounding government contracts is

mentioned by Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, The

Industry-Ordnance Team (New York: Whittlesey

House, McGraw Hill, 1946), p. 15. 19

 For examples, see histories of the Chicago,

Cleveland, St. Louis, and Rochester Districts.
30 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

agreement among observers, both then and

later. Critics of the allocation plan contended that, like so many other military

plans, it was better designed for avoiding

the known mistakes of the last war than

for meeting the unforeseen needs of the

next conflict.20 Others, particularly Ordnance officers assigned to procurement duties during the emergency period, insisted

that the allocation system worked remarkably well, even though it was not enforced

by War Department authority.21 They

pointed out that, unlike the Quartermaster

Corps, which, after due deliberation, abandoned its allocation plans during the

emergency period, the Ordnance Department followed its plans quite closely, placing 90 percent or more of its orders with

allocated plants.22 Although the computations on which these statements were

based have not been found, they are

generally substantiated by a study made at

the Industrial College in 1945 of military

contracts let in four representative industrial areas in 1940-41.23

All generalizations as to the use made

of the allocation plans must be taken with

a grain of salt. Standing by themselves,

the figures do not show whether the orders

went to allocated companies because they

were allocated or because they were well

established firms ready to take production

contracts. It must be borne in mind that,

had there been no allocation plans at all, a

large proportion of the orders would inevitably have gone to these firms, for allocated plants were generally the most

important in their field. The plans were an

important element in the picture, but not

the only element. Lt. Col. Ray M. Hare,

who was in the Office of the Under Secretary and in a good position to observe their

operation in 1941, commented that many

of the allocated plants got the contracts

because they were "the best prepared and

had the courage to bid the lowest and

furnish the fastest deliveries on the tricky

items of munitions that [Ordnance] has

had to supply."

 24

More important than strict adherence to

plans for use of allocated facilities, in the

opinion of many Ordnance officers, was

the very existence of the system in the

summer of 1940 with all that it implied in

terms of surveys and contacts with industry through district offices. The knowledge

of available facilities gained by Ordnance

officers in making surveys of allocated

plants was never adequate but it was of

immeasurable value in getting procurement

under way, particularly during the latter

half of 1940.25 It is of some interest to note

that the benefits of procurement planning

were appreciated by industry as well as

20

 For example, see Yoshpe, "Economic Mobilization Planning between the Two World Wars,"

pt. II, Military Affairs, (Summer 1952), 71-83. 21

 Intervs with Maj Gen Harris, Maj Gen Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., Brig Gen Lewis, and others,

1952-53. 22

 (1) Lecture, Wesson, The Ordnance Department, 9 May 4,1, ICAF, p. 10; (2) Statement by

Maj Gen Charles M. Wesson before WDAB, 1942,

H.R., 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 529. The same

figure was cited by Harris in lecture, 25 Jul 41.

The procedure followed in selecting contractors is

described in detail in History, Pittsburgh Ordnance District, I, pt. 3, pp. 543ff. 23

 Clarence Niklason, Use of Industrial Mobilization Plan in World War II, ICAF Research

Project, RP No. 24, Apr 45. 24

 Lecture, Lt Col Ray Hare, A Brief Resume

of Activities of the OUSW, 7 May 41, ICAF,

P. 2. 25

 The histories of the districts during World

War II describe in some detail the activities of

these offices during the prewar years. See also

Quinton, The Ordnance District System, pp.

1-8, and Olejar, Procurement Planning for War

—Ordnance, pp. 45-60, OHF. Testimony before

the House Appropriations Committee in the spring

of 1941 gave high praise to the procurement

planning of the War Department.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 31

government. "The studies made in connection with the accepted schedules of production," the General Electric Company

reported in July 1940, "are proving beneficial in connection with current problems

as they provide capacity data useful in

developing current schedules."

 26

District-Arsenal-OCO Relations

The directive giving the districts authority to negotiate contracts did not by any

means indicate that the arsenals and the

Office of the Chief of Ordnance (OCO)

were out of the procurement picture. Not

only did OCO retain full authority to

make the awards on bids forwarded to

Washington from the districts but, for major items such as tanks, it also conducted

negotiations directly with industry without

going through the district offices. The

arsenals did the same for certain complex

items, for development projects, and for

supplies for their own use.27 During 1941,

for example, a single arsenal, Picatinny,

sent out 200,000 invitations to bid, enclosing a total of more than 2,000,000 drawings. In mid-December 1940 the arsenals

were told to turn over administration of

all contracts to the districts, but not until

May 1941 were the districts given independent authority to make awards. Although

the districts steadily gained ground during

the defense period, the arsenals and OCO

carried a major share of the procurement

load largely because the division chiefs in

Washington were reluctant to turn over to

the newly activated districts the power to

place contracts.28

Under these circumstances there was not

only friction between OCO and the districts but also confusion among manufacturers as to who was who in the Ordnance

Department. When a businessman who

had signed an accepted schedule of production with the district office for a certain

item saw one of the arsenals or OCO

place an order for that item with another

company he questioned the authority of

the district and the value of its procurement planning activities. In some cases,

after a contract was signed, the contractor

did not know whether he should deal with

the district, with the arsenal that normally

produced the item, or with the Industrial

Service in Washington. The arsenal that

produced a given item was regarded as

the repository of production know-how,

and the district was the authority on

contractual terms, but the two sometimes

overlapped, and there was always the feeling that the final authority was in Washington.29

 Even as late as August 1941

the district offices complained that they

were being bypassed by businessmen who

preferred to deal directly with the Washington office,30

 and in December the chief

of the District Administration Branch declared at a staff conference that there was

26

 Ltr, General Electric Co. to ANMB, 16 Jul

40, OO 381/1479 ASW. 27

 See Ord Dept Cir 135, 16 Aug 41, sub: Ordnance Department Procurement Procedure. For

criticism of this procedure, see Mueller, op. cit.,

p. 116, and History, Philadelphia Ordnance District, I, pt. 5, p. 30. The friction between the

arsenals and the districts is mentioned in Quinton, op. cit., p. 22. 28

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for dists, 27 May 41, sub:

Procurement Without Advertising, ex. F in Hist,

Ind Serv, Dist Admin Br., vol. 101; (2) Min,

Wesson Confs, 22 Dec 41, p. 1253; (3) OCO Ind

Serv, Contract Negotiation and Administration,

Ord Dept, I, 11, May 1945. See also Ind Serv Gen

Instructions No. 19, 12 Mar 41. 29

 Lt Col Frederick C. Winter, Analysis of

World War II Production Activities of New York

Ordnance District, 5 Sep 47, Hist, New York Ord

Dist, I. 30

 Min, Wesson Confs, 16 Aug 41, p. 1045.
32 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

still "too much negotiating going on in

Washington."

 31

Creating New Facilities

A large proportion of the Ordnance

funds obligated during the latter half of

1940 went for new government-owned facilities, mostly plants for making powder

and explosives and for loading ammunition. The contracts for these plants were

negotiated not by the arsenals or districts

but through an office created for the purpose in the Industrial Service by General

Harris. It should be recalled that in July

1940 the capacity of the United States to

produce specialized types of munitions was

limited. Available facilities could turn out

fewer than 100 light tanks and about 500

machine guns per month, and only 30

tons of smokeless powder and 12 tons of

TNT per day. Against the requirements of

the Munitions Program of 30 June these

quantities were altogether inadequate.32

Ordnance signed its first contract for a

new GOCO (government-owned, contractor-operated) plant in July 1940 with the

DuPont Company for construction of a

smokeless powder works (later named the

Indiana Ordnance Works), followed in

August by another with the Chrysler Corporation for construction of a tank arsenal

(later named Detroit Ordnance Plant).33

A contract with the Hercules Powder

Company for another smokeless powder

works was approved in August, as was a

contract for an ammunition loading plant

with the Atlas Powder Company. By December 1940, a full year before Pearl Harbor, the task of constructing and equipping

twenty-two major new facilities was under

way by private corporations for shellloading and for production of chemicals,

explosives, tanks, guns, and armor plate.34

By the end of June 1941 the contracts for

new facilities reached a total of $576,-

000,000, roughly equivalent to the sum

planned the year before as necessary to

supply the 2,000,000-man force.35

One of the major criticisms of the defense program made by the Truman Committee of the Senate and the Tolan

Committee of the House of Representatives

in 1941 was that the War Department had

built new plants needlessly and had failed

to make full use of existing plant capacity.

The committees described Army procurement officers as comparatively helpless in

dealing with large corporations which refused to convert their plants to war production and demanded that the government build new plants, with all new

equipment, for producing munitions. The

Army's acceptance of such industry proposals, the committee charged, wasted

strategic building materials, contributed to

31

 Min, Wesson Confs, 22 Dec 41, p. 1253. Four

months later the Cincinnati Field Survey made

for ASF listed as one of its major conclusions,

"District offices should be given more power."

Contl Div files of ASF. 32

 A detailed summary of the types of new facilities may be found in Expansion of the Activities of the Ordnance Department, 1940-41, pp.

9-10, OHF, and in the various Weekly Statistical

Report Summaries issued by the Statistical Branch,

OUSW. See also Campbell, op. cit., ch. 7, and

Ann Rpt ASW, FY 40, p. 5. 33

 The names of new facilities, according to the

Ordnance formula, consisted of three parts: (1)

the location, (2) the word "Ordnance," and (3)

"works" if basic materials were required for production and "plant" if the operation was only

fabrication or assembly. Min, Wesson Confs, 5

Jul 40, OHF. 34

 Chronology of Ord Activities, OHF. 35

 Expansion of Activities of the Ordnance Department. The reluctance of powder manufacturers to engage in this military production, and

risk being branded as "merchants of death," is

described in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge

Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 353.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 33

the machine-tool shortage, and delayed

production of essential equipment.36

Insofar as existing facilities that could

economically be converted to defense production were not so converted, the criticisms of the Congressional committees were

justified. But with Ordnance production

the great bulk of the new facilities did not

fall into that category. For producing

smokeless powder and TNT, or for loading

bombs and artillery shells, there simply

were no existing facilities suitable for

conversion. In December 1941, when the

Under Secretary of War summed up the

War Department answer to the Tolan

Committee's criticisms, he vigorously defended the construction of new Ordnance

facilities, and assured the committee that

the Army had not proceeded with erection

of new plants except where necessary.37

Much of the criticism of undue facilities

expansion during the defense period lost its

meaning after the outbreak of war. What

had appeared to be overexpansion in the

fall of 1941 took on the appearance of

underexpansion after Pearl Harbor. The

mounting demand for munitions of all

types early in 1942 put a severe strain on

all existing Ordnance facilities and brought

into war production an ever larger proportion of civilian industry, including both

small businesses and the big automobile

companies.38

Criticisms, Delays, and Difficulties

There was much impatience with the

slowness of the rearmament program during the latter half of 1940, and throughout

1941, Observers found many opportunities

to criticize as they watched the vast and

cumbersome mechanism for Army procurement swing slowly into action with much

creaking in the joints. After appropriation

of funds by Congress, the supply services

speedily placed their orders with industry,

but delivery of hard-to-manufacture items

was a mere trickle throughout the defense

period. To experienced Ordnance officers

the small quantities produced during 1940

-41 came as no surprise. For a full generation they had been saying that massproduction of munitions could not even

begin in less than eighteen months.39 They

pointed out that Germany had started to

rearm in 1933 and seven years later had

not yet reached full production. They cited

reports of British experience showing that

it took about two years, on the average,

for a new munitions plant to reach full

production. "In no case," reported Col.

James H. Burns in June 1940, "was an

ordnance plant [in England] constructed

and placed in operation in less than 12

months from date of decision and in some

instances the time factor exceeded three

36

 (1) S. Rpt No. 480, pt. 3, 17 Nov 41, pp.

191-99, Truman Comm., 77th Cong., 1st sess.;

(2) Second Interim Rpt of Tolan Comm., 77th

Cong., 1st sess., H.R. Rpt No. 1553. See also Mil

Rqmts and Materiel Prod, Incl to Memo, Brig

Gen Harris, Actg CofOrd, for USW, 9 Sep 40,

OO 400.12/5853-1/2. 37

 Statement of USW before the Select Comm.,

Investigating National Defense Migration, H.R.,

23 Dec 41. 38

 This process of production expansion is

treated on a commodity basis, covering ammunition, artillery, small arms, and tanks, in later

chapters. 39

 See General Wesson's lectures at the Army

War College and Army Industrial College in the

late 1930's. "Balanced armament production does

not come overnight," the Ordnance Department

told a House Committee in July 1941, "nor does it

come within the first half year. It has always been

recognized that a major military armament effort

for the United States would require the first year

to get under way and from six months to a year

thereafter to reach full production." Ord Dept

Reply to Questionnaire No. 2, Spec Comm. No.

3, H.R. Comm. on Mil Affairs, 14 Jul 41, OO

400.12/4454.
34 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

years."

 40

 But to many people unfamiliar

with the problem of producing tools of war

the Ordnance Department appeared to be

slow and inefficient. In 1940-41, after two

decades of neglect, and in an economy that

had learned to eschew arms manufacture

as something immoral, Ordnance was asked

to perform an industrial miracle.41

Patterson's Criticisms

As early as 23 August 1940 the newly

appointed Assistant Secretary of War,

Robert P. Patterson, opened the season of

criticism by writing to all the supply services that reports reaching him indicated

that the procurement program was being

retarded in some instances by four factors:

(1) lack of clear requirements to be met

by the suppliers; (2) unusual military

specifications which could not be met under normal commercial procedures; (3)

unnecessarily close tolerances and too severe inspection requirements; and (4) frequent changes in specifications and designs

affecting work in progress.42 Patterson

directed all the supply services to take

prompt action to eliminate these sources of

delay, and three days later wrote a confidential memorandum to the Chief of

Ordnance to emphasize particularly the

need for freezing designs. He quoted an

observer who said the desperate position

of the British armed forces was due to their

failure to freeze designs. "The best,"

he commented, "is the enemy of the

good . . . Germany has demonstrated

that thousands of imperfect tanks on the

battlefield are better than scores of perfect

tanks on the proving ground. . ."

 43

Patterson's advice was not as easy to

practice as it was to preach. Ordnance

could not freeze designs and resist all

pressure to change, and at the same time

meet demands for the most advanced

weapons, particularly when the war in

Europe was daily revealing a need for new

or improved equipment. Everyone agreed

that a thousand "imperfect" tanks on the

battlefield were better than scores of "perfect" tanks on the proving ground, but

whether they were better than 500 "morenearly-perfect" tanks on the field of battle

was a moot question. General Burns tells

the story that on the day after issuing instructions to freeze designs Patterson was

asked to approve a contract for helmets.

"Are these the same old hats we had in

1918?" he asked. When told that they

were, he refused to sign until a new helmet

design was adopted.44 In July 1940, Patterson's predecessor had written concerning the Munitions Program of 30 June:

"The program obviously cannot be frozen

either as to quantities or types. ... A

happy compromise must be effected between the two opposites of production

40

 Statement by Col Burns to H.R. Appropriations Comm., 5 Jun 40 (copy in Gen Burns'

personal file). See also Munitions for the Army:

A Five Year Report, prepared by Troyer S. Anderson in 1946 for Secretary Patterson, copy in

OHF. 41

 For comparison with World War I, see manuscript study by Harvey .A. De Weerd, Production

Lag in the American Ordnance Program, 1917-

18, particularly pp. 250-62, OHF. See also Memo,

Col Burns for CofS, 1 Feb 40, sub: Industrial

Preparedness Essential to Adequate National Defense, in Gen Burns' personal file. The slow

progress toward British rearmament in the 1930's

is described in Michael M. Postan, British War

Production (London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1952). 42

 Memo of ASW for supply services, 23 Aug

40, OO 400.12/312. Cf. Memo, CofOrd for ASW,

12 Aug 40, in General Minton's file. 43

 Memo, ASW for CofOrd, 26 Aug 40, sub:

Freezing Designs, OO 400.114/752 Misc. 44

 Interv with Maj Gen James H. Burns, summer 1950.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 35

and perfection in order to obtain most

effective results."

 45

There can be little doubt that manufacturers' complaints of unusual production

requirements and unnecessarily close tolerances in Ordnance drawings and specifications were sometimes justified. The smallscale operations during the peace years had

left their mark on Ordnance designs and

designers. The arsenals had produced small

quantities of munitions with the men and

machines available; they never had full

opportunity to apply the most modern

production-engineering ideas or use the

newest machine tools. "If our designs, as

some people have said," wrote Lt. Gen.

Levin H. Campbell, "were 'wrapped

around a milling machine,' it was because

we simply could not afford productionengineering studies of our various models

or pilots."

 46

 The educational orders had

provided that the contractors recommend

improved production methods and design

changes to facilitate mass production, but

such orders had covered only a small fraction of Ordnance items.

From this it should not be inferred that

the Ordnance Industrial Service was unaware of the problem or was not production-minded. As far back as the days of

Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams, Chief of

Ordnance from 1918 to 1930, the philosophy of using standard industrial designs,

and avoiding unusual manufacturing

procedures, had become an established

principle in the arsenals. It was forcefully

restated by General Harris in the fall of

1940. Writing in Army Ordnance, he described in detail the painstaking efforts

made at Springfield Armory to assure efficient mass production of the Garand rifle,

and the installation of a modern highspeed production line at Frankford Arsenal

for the manufacture of ammunition. "The

Department is making certain," wrote

General Harris, "that the trends of modern

engineering and industry in the field of

mass production shall be woven into the

very fiber of its organization and practice."

 47

 Ordnance tried, to be sure, and

made notable progress, but, as later events

revealed, it fell short of full success in

preparing for mass production.

There was also another side to this

matter that should not be overlooked.

When manufacturers accustomed to the

production of civilian goods found themselves faced with the task of producing

munitions with novel and exacting specifications, they sometimes tended to be unduly impatient and critical of Army

methods. They did not always understand

the essential complexity of guns and ammunition. The rapid-firing machine gun,

for example, is an intricate and finely

balanced mechanism whose design has been

worked out over many years by specialists

and tested under all sorts of atmospheric

conditions. A slight change made to speed

manufacture might appear perfectly innocent, even trivial, to the production engineer, but it might also throw the whole

mechanism out of kilter. As with the matter

of freezing designs, there was no easy

solution to the problem of simplifying Ordnance specifications. Each component had

45

 Memo, ASW for Mr. McReynolds, 16 Jul 40,

sub: Progress in Army Munitions Preparedness,

G-4 file 31773. 46

 Campbell, op. cit., p. 292. Criticism of Army

designs, and of military hostility toward suggestions for improvement, is voiced by Donald M.

Nelson in Arsenal of Democracy (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company,, 1946), p. 34. 47

 Brig. Gen. Charles T. Harris, Jr., "Armament

Production, a Study of Ordnance Engineering

Policies," Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 123 (November-December 1940), 225.
36 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

to be studied separately and in relation to

the other parts of its assembly, and before

production-speeding modifications could

safely be made it was necessary to consult

the research and development specialists

as well as the production engineers of industry. This was accomplished in large

measure through engineering committees,

such as the Tank Committee, formed in

October 1940, that brought together representatives of industry and Ordnance to

clarify drawings and specifications and to

discuss changes to speed production.48

But committee action was too often taken

only after trouble developed.

Early in 1941 Ordnance prepared for

signature by the Secretary of War a letter

to all Ordnance districts, arsenals, plants,

and works emphasizing the necessity for

"the most searching analysis" of all

factors affecting production and calling

for prompt, decisive, energetic action.49

Throughout the defense period, Patterson

exhorted the supply services to speed up

the procurement of munitions. Twice during one week in April 1941, when German

submarines were taking heavy toll of Atlantic shipping, he asked the Chief of

Ordnance to expedite deliveries, describing

the need for increased production as "a

matter of extreme urgency," and as "vital

to our national existence."50 He urged

'round-the-clock operation of critical machinery and unceasing effort to break

production bottlenecks. In June 1941,

when he requested all supply services to

obligate the funds on hand before the end

of the fiscal year, Ordnance negotiators

worked night and day to place contracts

with industry, and were rewarded with a

commendation from Patterson for having

placed under contract "the largest peacetime program of national defense procurement in the history of this country." 51

Some Time-Consuming Factors

Production on some Ordnance items

was disappointingly slow during the defense period. By July 1941, for example,

only an estimated 3 percent of the matériel

covered by the appropriations for the 1941

fiscal year, which had begun in July

1940, had been delivered to troops.52 It is

sometimes argued that one reason for the

slow progress was that manufacturers who

took defense orders in 1940 and 1941 were

not spurred on by the urgency of actual

war. But a comparison between 1941 and

1942 does not indicate that manufacturers

were dilatory before Pearl Harbor. After

the outbreak of war it took just as long as

before to get into production on a new

item. The experience of the 1940-42 era

suggests that a delay of a year or more in

getting into large-scale production on a

new item of ordnance is practically inevitable, war or no war.53

48

 Brief notes about these committees may be

found in Weekly Reports of Accomplishments and

Difficulties, beginning with the report dated 31

October 1940. 49

 Ltr, SW to CofOrd and others, 19 Feb 41,

sub: Ord Prod. . . ,copy in OHF. 50

 (1) Memos, USW for CofOrd, 21 Apr and

25 Apr 41, in OHF Policy papers; (2) Chronology

of Ord Activities; (3) Ltr, SW for CofOrd, 19

Feb 41, sub: Ord Prod under the National Defense Program, copy in History, Denver Ordnance

Plant, I, ex. 71. 51

 Ltr, USW to CofOrd, 2 Jul 41, sub: Commendation. . . , OO 201.2/14. See also Min, Wesson Confs, 3 Jun 41, p. 896, and 19 Jun 41, p.

935, and Memo, USW for Supply Services, 31

May 41, sub: Obligation of Current Funds, OHF.

Patterson also praised Ordnance for speedy placement of contracts when he testified before

Congressional committees. See Hearings, WDAB,

Apr 41, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 116. 52

 Ord Dept Reply, Questionnaire No. 2. Spec

Comm. No. 3, H.R. Comm. on Mil Affairs, 14 Jul

41, p. 12, OO 400.12/4454. 53

 For discussion of this point see Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 4, pp. 712-22.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 37

A brief recital of time-consuming factors

that delayed production in 1940-41 will

illustrate. The time required to solicit bids,

make awards, and draw up formal contracts—usually two or three months—was

only the beginning. After receiving his

government order the contractor had to

make a detailed engineering study of his

shop and perhaps rearrange his equipment

for more efficient operation. In most cases

he had to procure additional equipment,

and the delay in delivery of a single item,

such as a lathe or a heat-treating furnace,

might hold up the entire production process for months. For most items of ordnance, manufacturers found it impossible

to use existing production lines; they had

to start nearly from scratch to create new

production setups. When, for example, a

large locomotive company in the New

York District was awarded a contract for

155-mm. gun carriages in August 1940, it

did not convert its existing production

lines but removed all the old equipment

from a long unused foundry building, put

in new concrete floors, replaced the electric

wiring, and literally built a new production

line from the ground up. All this took time,

but the company felt that it was sound

manufacturing practice.54

After receiving his government order,

every contractor had also to obtain a supply of materials—not always an easy job

in 1940 when shortages were becoming

increasingly common, particularly among

the grades of steel, copper, and aluminum

needed for ordnance manufacture. Each

contract for the machining of shell had to

be geared to the availability of forgings. To

operate on a 3-shift, 24-hour day, contractors had to hire additional workers and

train them for the specialized jobs they

were to fill. In recruiting new workers,

contractors found that the years of depression had taken a heavy toll of skilled

labor throughout American industry. These

years had also taken their toll of management if the occasional reports of production inefficiency are any criterion.55

During early 1941 Ordnance began to

complain that new and expanding highlevel agencies created in Washington to

manage the defense program were hindering procurement. Accustomed to the comparatively simple administrative structure

which prevailed before 1940, when the

final authority on nearly all procurement

matters for the Army was the Assistant

Secretary of War, Ordnance officers frequently objected to the growing administrative overhead. At the end of May 1941,

for example, General Harris went so far as

to state that the whole production program

might soon come to a standstill because

"there are too many people in other echelons who desire to consider and approve

each project."

 56

 He declared that it took

six times as long in the spring of 1941 to

place orders as it had taken in the fall of

1940, and cited as one example of unreasonable delay a project for tank parts

which had been held in the Office of Production Management (OPM) for nearly a

month. But General Harris' complaint did

not stem the growth of the co-ordinating

hierarchy, and Ordnance officers continued

to complain of excessive administrative

54

 Hist, Rochester Ord Dist Hist, I, pt. 2, p. 59.

See article in The New York Times, January 2,

1941, p. 14, outlining some 40 steps involved in

procurement of each type of weapon. 55 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 4, pp. 716-

17.

56

 Min, Wesson Confs, 28 May 41. In his testimony before the Truman Committee in April

1941, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson entered

a similar complaint. Hearings, Truman Comm., pt.

1, 15 Apr 41, pp. 35-36. See also Smith, Army

and Economic Mobilization.
38 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

machinery throughout the defense period

and well into the war period.57

Because a large share of Ordnance production required the machining of metals

to fine tolerances, the munitions program

of 1940 brought a demand for thousands

of complicated and costly tools such as

grinding, boring, broaching, and drilling

machines, and lathes of various types. In

their prewar planning, Ordnance officers

had attempted to catalog the tools possessed by various manufacturing concerns

and select for wartime .production the

companies that would need least retooling. But in many instances manufacturers

found that for most efficient massproduction of munitions they needed to

add new machines or replace some of their

standard machine tools with new, specialpurpose equipment. Great Britain and

France placed large orders in this country

for machine tools early in 1940, as did

companies holding Navy and Air Corps

contracts, and the nation's small machinetool industry was swamped with orders.58

In spite of the measures taken to alleviate it, the machine-tool shortage among

Ordnance contractors continued to grow

worse during the winter of 1940-41 and

in mid-March became so critical that General Wesson presented the matter to the

Under Secretary in a memorandum with

the ominous title, Probable Failure of Ordnance Program. Citing the policy of the

Army and Navy Munitions Board

(ANMB) that gave first priority to Navy

and Air Corps orders,59 General Wesson

declared that Ordnance contractors, with

low priorities, could not acquire the tools

they needed to get into production and

meet their delivery schedules. With large

new production programs in the offing, he

recommended that remedial measures be

taken before demands for new production

brought further delays in machine-tool deliveries. "Otherwise," the general concluded, "the situation which is now critical

may become calamitous."

 60

This was strong language, but the Under

Secretary was not moved by it. Rather

than propose a sweeping increase in Ordnance priorities, which would adversely

affect other major programs, Patterson requested more specific details on machine

tools most urgently needed by Ordnance

contractors. To provide this detailed information the Ordnance office directed each

district to get in touch with all its con57

 For further discussion of Ordnance relations

with higher authorities see Green, Thomson, and

Roots, op. cit., Chapter VI. The history of the

civilian superagencies is told in Bureau of the

Budget, The United States at War, and Civilian

Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War. 58

 For a brief description of the machine-tool

problem in 1941, see testimony of Secretary of

War Stimson and Mr. Knudsen before the Truman Committee, in Hearings. Truman Comm., pt.

1, pp. 13 and 102. The file kept by Maj. Elmer

E. Barnes, Chief of Priorities Section in the

OUSW, contains weekly reports on the priorities

system during 1940-41. See ASF 205.04, Prod

Div 319.1. The Minutes, Wesson Conferences, in

early 1941 contain many references to the problem. 59

 The priorities directive issued by the ANMB

on 27 November 1940 gave the highest rating,

A-1-a, to supplies and equipment for manufacture of machine tools and gages. The second

highest rating, A-1-b, went almost entirely to Air

Corps and Navy items, and included only a few

Ordnance items, chiefly aircraft machine guns and

small arms ammunition. By May 1941 only small

arms and ammunition were as high as the A-1-b

category. See Min, Wesson Confs, 31 May 41, pp.

892-93. 60

 Memo, CofOrd for USW, 12 Mar 41, sub:

Probable Failure of Ordnance Program, OO 400.-

12/2085. See also Memo, Col Thomas J. Hayes

for Lt. Col. Alfred B. Johnson, 4 Mar 41, OO

413.8/1772, and a report by USW, 3 Mar 41,

sub: Estimate of Production Possibilities Calendar

Years 1941 and 1942, copy in OHF. The histories

of the districts describe the effect of the machinetool shortage on production, particularly Hist,

Rochester Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, p. 68.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 39

tractors and compile a list of undelivered

machine tools that were holding up production. It was a long and tedious process

that went on for many weeks.61

Meanwhile the Office of Production

Management tackled the problem from

other angles. It stimulated the production

of new tools, promoted the use of subcontractors possessing adequate equipment, took direct action to solve individual

bottleneck cases, and endeavored to ferret

out and put to work second-hand tools

which were not being used. Late in August

1941 the ANMB issued a new priorities

directive which slightly improved the Ordnance position,62

 but the lack of machine

tools continued to hamper Ordnance production throughout 1941 and beyond.

General Harris reported two days before

Pearl Harbor that delivery dates on machine tools were "most unsatisfactory,"

 63

As with the problem of freezing designs

or simplifying Ordnance equipment, there

was no easy solution to the machine-tocl

problem. Each case had to be considered

on its merits, and in relation to all other

cases. It was impossible for Patterson, the

ANMB, or OPM to accede to General

Wesson's request for a higher priority on

Ordnance items without at the same time

giving lower priorities to some Navy and

Air Corps orders, a policy which would

have amounted to little more than robbing

Peter to pay Paul.64 Whether, in the

broad national view, considering the relative urgency of ships, airplanes, guns,

tanks, and all the other paraphernalia of

war, it was wise to give Ordnance production such a low priority is beyond the scope

of this study to determine. But there can

be no doubt that it was a physical impossibility for the Ordnance Department fully

to overcome the handicap of that low

priority during 1941. It was, in the words

of General Campbell, "the most heartbreaking bottleneck of the early armament

period."

 65

Engineering Advisory Committees

At the start of the munitions program,

Ordnance officers realized that countless

questions and problems would arise as

civilian manufacturers undertook to make

complex military items on the basis of

Ordnance drawings and specifications.

From experience in World War I, they

knew that interpretation of drawings and

specifications would require close supervision if widespread failure to pass inspection were to be avoided. Ordnance was also

aware of the fact that its drawings and

specifications, running into tens of thousands, were not perfect and would need

careful checking. To meet this situation

Ordnance created, in the spring of 1941,

twenty-five groups known as Engineering

Advisory Committees. All manufacturers

of tanks were represented on one committee, all manufacturers of mobile artillery

61

 Correspondence on this and other phases of

the machine-tool problem is filed in OO 413.8.

For a brief statement on the specific Ordnance

items being delayed for lack of machine tools, see

Weekly Stat Rpt Summary No. 51, 21 Jun 41,

Stat Br, OASW. 62

 ANMB Priorities Dir, 20 Aug 41. See also

correspondence related to this directive in History

of Ordnance Priorities Unit, OHF. 63

 Ord Cir Ltr, 5 Dec 41, sub: Machine Tools,

OO 413.8/9334. Tanks were given A-1-a priority by ANMB ltr to all supply services, 4 Dec 41,

copy in Hist, Ord Priorities Unit. 64

 See Memo from Patterson and James V.

Forrestal for ANMB Priorities Comm., 20 Aug 41,

directing the committee not to yield to pressure

for higher priorities. 65

 Campbell, op. cit., p. 15. For discussion of

the parallel position of the British Army during

the rearmament period, see Postan, op. cit., pp.

27ff. Because of its low priority the author calls

the British Army "the Cinderella service."
40 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

carriages on another, and so on down the

list through rifles, shells, machine guns,

bomb fuzes, etc. A representative of industry headed each committee while an

Ordnance officer served as permanent secretary. An opinion of the Attorney General

in April 1941 provided some assurance that

as long as the committees kept within

prescribed bounds they would not stand in

violation of the antitrust laws.66

At meetings of the committees the members, usually engineers, exchanged information about sources of scarce materials,

use of substitute materials, or new production techniques. They frequently recommended to the Ordnance Department

that certain design changes be made or

that specifications be revised to speed production. All this activity was beneficial to

Ordnance, for it brought to bear on each

problem topflight engineering talent from

industry. But in the opinion of Brig. Gen.

Gladeon M. Barnes, who was in charge of

all Ordnance engineering, the greatest benefit was the healthy psychological reaction

from the association of Ordnance officers

and civilian engineers. "The meetings

have done much to overcome the industrial conception of the massive immobility

of Government agencies," wrote General

Barnes, "and have increased the desirability [of] Government contracts."67

These engineering committees were the

forerunners of scores of industry integration committees formed the following year

under the leadership of General Campbell.68

Big Business vs Small Business

During 1940-41 a steady drumfire of

criticism was directed at the defense agencies—Navy as well as Army—for placing

orders with big business to the neglect of

many small concerns scattered throughout

the country. The criticism appeared in

newspaper and magazine articles and in

official reports of the Truman and Tolan

Committees which investigated the defense

program during 1941 and later. These

Congressional committees observed that, in

spite of procurement plans, all the services

in 1940 entered into a "mad scramble" to

procure the munitions they needed, and

each desired to place its contracts with the

biggest and most reliable concerns. The

investigators charged that procurement officers favored big business because it was

less trouble, and took less time, to award

a single large contract to a big corporation

than to divide up the order among many

small companies, or provide for extensive

subcontracting. They denounced the disproportionate emphasis put on big business

by the military services, asserting that it

led to unnecessary plant expansion, delays

in production, heavy migration of workers

to congested areas, and other problems.69

In answering criticism of this nature,

War Department spokesmen delcared that

it should have caused no great surprise

when large concerns which normally got

the lion's share of civilian business also got

66

 Ltr, Attorney Gen Robert H. Jackson to John

Lord O'Brian, Gen Counsel, OPM, 29 Apr 41,

copy in History, Small Arms Branch, Ind Div.,

OHF. 67

 Brig. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, "Armament

Engineering," Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 127

(July-August 1941), 33-35. See also Min, Wesson

Confs, 30 Jan 42, on which date Col. William A.

Borden submitted an oral report on the engineering committee organized by the Industrial Service. 68

 See chs. VI and VIII, below. 69

 (1) S. Rpt No. 480, pt. 3, pp. 191-99, Truman Comm., 77th Cong., 1st sess.; (2) Third Interim Rpt, Tolan Comm., 77th Cong., 2d sess.,

9 Mar 42, H.R. Rpt No. 1879. For testimony by

witnesses, see Hearings, Truman Comm., pt. 6.

Similar testimony appears in WDAB, 1942, H.R.

77th Cong., 1st sess.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 41

the lion's share of defense contracts. They

pointed out that military procurement officers, and their associations in OPM, were

not social reformers bent upon changing

the nation's industrial pattern, but practical realists charged with the sobering responsibility for procuring munitions as

quickly and surely as possible. Although it

dealt with some small concerns, Ordnance

awarded the great majority of its early

contracts to big corporations because these

corporations had the facilities, the experience, and the engineering skill to turn out

the required armament in the shortest possible time. Most Ordnance contracts went

to allocated plants that had been surveyed

and selected beforehand as the most promising producers of war matériel. "To have

done otherwise," wrote General Campbell,

"would have been national suicide. The

small plants of the country could not have

turned out one day's requirements of ammunition. . . . Heavy manufacturing automatically demanded large concerns."

 70

It was largely through subcontracting

that small businesses were brought into the

Ordnance program in the defense period.71

Although Ordnance had no authority to

direct its prime contractors to use specific

subcontractors, or otherwise attempt to tell

them how to manage their affairs, it did

encourage voluntary subcontracting wherever possible. To assist small businesses—

usually defined as those employing fewer

than five hundred workers—General Wesson in February 1941 directed each district

to establish a display room to exhibit

samples and photographs of Ordnance

items, assemblies, and components.72 By

visiting these rooms, examining in detail

the items on display, and discussing manufacturing requirements with district

officials, a small businessman could decide

which items or components he was qualified to produce, either as prime contractor

or subcontractor. When the Defense Contract Service was created in OPM early in

1941 each Ordnance district appointed an

officer to maintain liaison with that service. In September 1941, to promote wider

distribution of defense orders, the requirement that the districts negotiate only with

allocated facilities was rescinded,73 and in

November and December Ordnance participated in the Defense Special Trains that

toured the country to show small manufacturers, what the supply services wished

to buy.

Bringing small business into the defense

program was an endless task that continued throughout the defense period and

70

 (1) Campbell, op. cit., p. 89; (2) Memo,

CofOrd to [no addressee given], 4 Apr 41, sub:

S. Res No. 71, OO 032/37; (3) Statement of

Patterson before the Select Comm., Investigating

National Defense Migration, H.R., 23 Dec 41,

USW file 004.4 Allocation of facilities, Colonel

Hare; (4) Statements of Patterson before Truman

Committee, 16 Apr 41 and 15 Jul 41, Hearings,

Truman Comm., pt. 1, pp. 60-61, and pt. 6, p.

1515. The official history of WPB observes that

Mr. Knudsen's ties with big industry, and his emphasis on proven ability to produce, delayed the

utilization of small business. Civilian Production

Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War,

P. 31. 71

 For an account of this process, and a collection of documentary evidence, see R. F. McMullen, Smaller War Plants: Their Part in the

Ordnance War Effort, PSP 71, Jun 45, OHF, and

Maj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., Subcontracting

in Ordnance Procurement, a rpt, 18 Jun 42, OHF.

The difficulties of subcontracting as seen at the

district office level are set forth by Lt. Col. Frederick C. Winter, Analysis of World War II Production Activities of the New York Ordnance District,

Hist, New York Ord Dist, VII, pp. 22-24. 72

 Cir Ltr, CofOrd, 21 Feb 41, sub: Display

Rooms, OO 381/19091. See also ASW Ltr to

Chiefs of Supply Arms and Servs, 20 Dec 40, sub:

Use of Sub-contractors. . ., OHF. 73

 Cir Ltr, CofOrd, 23 Sep 41, sub: Distribution

of Defense Orders, ex. 6 in study entitled Subcontracting in Ordnance Procurement, OHF.
42 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the years of war.74 As production increased there was some spreading of prime

contracts to smaller firms such as those

that made up the New England Small

Arms Corporation.75 Even more important, small business firms got into defense

production as subcontractors or subsubcontractors. For this reason the extent

to which Ordnance used small business

during the defense period is not easy to

measure, but one investigation of the problem made in the Cincinnati area for ASF

a few months after Pearl Harbor sheds

some light on the matter. "We hunted for

the 'small business' which could take on

prime war contracts with its existing equipment and which is not already at work or

well known to the supply arms and services," the survey team reported. "We

found none. . . . The 'small business'

which needs only money or a contract to

get going on critical material is, in this

area, a myth."

 76

Status of Rearmament, December 1941

To what extent did the United States

succeed in rearming during the eighteen

months before December 1941? Critics of

the armed services have charged that the

rearmament effort was bungled, while military spokesmen have stoutly denied the

charge. In December 1941, for example,

the Tolan Committee pulled no punches in

asserting that defense production to date

had been a failure, and a few days later

the Under Secretary of War vehemently

denied that it had been a failure. The

arguments on both sides have continued to

command widespread interest among military planners because the accomplishments

and shortcomings of the procurement effort

during the defense period afford a tangible

means of evaluating the methods employed to mobilize the nation for war.77

By considering only the more important

types of guns, ammunition, and combat

vehicles actually produced during the defense period, the Ordnance record may be

quickly summarized. (Table 2} In most

cases the quantities procured far exceeded

the quantities for initial equipment of the

PMP force of 1,200,000 men. When compared with the Time Objective issued in

August 1940 the record reveals that, in

small arms, light artillery, and tanks, production went far beyond the original requirements. But with medium and heavy

artillery, notably the 105-mm. howitzer

and the 155-mm. gun, the quantities procured fell considerably short of requirements. Among smaller items, the steel helmet also lagged far behind the 1940

schedule, primarily because a satisfactory

helmet design had not been developed and

standardized before 1940. With small arms

ammunition, the goals set by the Time Objective were not reached by the fall of

1941, for Frankford Arsenal remained the

74

 For an account of the problem from the

NDAC and OPM level, see Civilian Production

Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War,

pp. 61-63 and pp. 146-47. 75

 Hist, Boston Ord Dist, VI-VII (Jan-Jun

44), pp. 40-48. See also ch. VII, below. 76

 Cincinnati Field Survey, Apr 42, Contl Br,

ASF, p. 16. See also Memo, Alfred R. Glancy,

ASF Hq, for CofOrd, quoted in History, Cincinnati Ordnance District, I, pt. 1, pp. 60-61. 77

 See the Second Interim Rpt of the Select

Comm., Investigating National Defense Migration,

December 19, 1941, H.R., 77th Cong., 1st sess.,

H.R. Rpt 1553, and the reply by Patterson, December 23, 1941, USW file 004.4 Allocation of

Facilities. For high praise of the prewar planning

and the speed with which Ordnance launched its

procurement program in the defense and early war

periods, see remarks by Somervell in Rpt of Conf,

Ord Dist Chiefs, 22 Apr 44, copy in Hist, Detroit

Ord Dist, vol. 117.
LAUNCHING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM, 1940-41 43

TABLE 2—SELECTED ORDNANCE ITEMS PROCURED, JULY 1940-DECEMBER 1941

Source: Theodore E. Whiting et al., Statistics, a volume to be published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II.

only source of production until new plants

were completed. In the over-all picture of

the Army's equipment on hand there was

little room for complacency on the eve of

Pearl Harbor.

More important, in the eyes of Ordnance procurement officers, than matériel

on hand, was the promise of vastly increased future production that lay in the

new facilities built and equipped during

1940-41. It is not too much to say

that within a period of less than eighteen months something resembling a new

industry had been created, with seventeen government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) plants actually in production and thirty-two additional plants under

construction or in the negotiation stage.78

Several large ammunition plants and works

—Lake City, Denver, Baytown, Gadsden,

Iowa, Kankakee, Weldon Springs, and

others—came into production in September and October 1941, and by the end of

the year there was at least one of every

essential type of government-owned ammunition plant in operation, including

TNT, DNT, tetryl, toluene, anhydrous

ammonia, smokeless powder, bag loading,

and shell loading.79 A dozen new privately

owned plants were also in production, including 6 for machine guns, 4 for artillery,

1 for armor plate, and 1 for tanks. Only 3

of these plants had required new construction (the tank, armor-plate, and 37-mm.

gun plants) but all had required com78

 (1) Weekly Stat Rpt Summary No. 25, 20

Dec 41, Stat Br, OUSW; (2) Directory of GOCO

Plants, OHF. 79

 (1) Notes on lecture by Brig Gen Leonard

Ayres before H.R. Comm. on Mil Affairs, 25 Feb

42, ASF Contl Div file 350.001; (2) Memo, USW

for Harry Hopkins, 13 Jan 42, and Memo of

CofOrd for USW, 7 Jan 42, in USW file 104,

Ammunition. For further discussion of ammunition production, see Chapters VI and VII, below.
44 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

pletely new equipment.80 Although the

materiel turned out by these new plants

during the defense period does not loom

large in the total production figures—

about 5 percent of total 1940-45 Ordnance procurement—the existence of these

producing units in December 1941 was of

inestimable value to the United States and

its allies during the war years that lay

ahead.81

Neither Ordnance nor the War Department itself was given full freedom during

the defense period to procure all the munitions it felt the Army needed. Both were

limited by Congressional appropriations

and bound by long-established regulations

and policies that set the framework within

which procurement took place. Hurried

production is usually high-cost production,

and the defense period was not a time of

all-out production at any cost. It was more

nearly a time for "business as usual."

Ordnance was also handicapped by having

to take a third-rate priority behind the

Navy and Air Corps, and by having to

meet constantly shifting requirements for

items that took a long time to produce. In

the mushrooming defense economy Ordnance found great difficulty in recruiting

capable production engineers and procurement experts to staff its arsenals, districts,

and Washington offices. As a result of these

and other factors Ordnance encountered

many delays and difficulties which under

different circumstances might have been

avoided. Nevertheless, it must be recorded

that the really essential things were accomplished with remarkable speed—contracts were let, district procurement offices

were activated, new plants were built, the

arsenals began to hum with activity, and

production of war matériel started at

countless private industrial plants. By the

time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, just

eighteen months from June 1940, the

Ordnance program in most lines was shifting into high gear and needed only further

acceleration and expansion along the established course to meet the requirements

of a world-wide shooting war.82

80

 Weekly Stat Rpt Summary No. 20, 15 Nov

41, Stat Br, OUSW. 81

 For comment on this matter see Anderson,

Munitions for the Army. 82

 For a parallel appraisal of the defense period

from the ASF level, see Hist of Purchases Div,

ASF, a manuscript in OCMH files. For a contemporary journalistic comment see Time, October

37, 1941, p. 38: "On some counts [Ordnance]

has not made a passing grade. Overall, the average has been reasonably good." Figures showing

the mounting volume of munitions produced in

1942 are shown in Civilian Production Administration, Official Munitions Production of the

United States, (Washingtion, 1 May 1947).
CHAPTER IV

The Problem of Requirements

To persons not intimately acquainted

with procurement of military supplies the

critical importance of exact and timely

requirements figures is often not fully apparent. But a moment's reflection suggests

that the mass production of weapons and

ammunition cannot get under way in an

orderly manner until procurement officials

know exactly what types are to be produced, what quantities are required, and

what delivery schedules are to be met.

Only with such detailed information, along

with countless technical specifications and

blueprints, can production engineers determine what plants and equipment will be

needed, how much labor will be required,

and what materials will be necessary.

Without computation of requirements for

each of the thousands of items of equipment needed by the armed forces of the

United States and its allies in World War

II, scheduling of balanced production

would have been impossible and the whole

productive effort would have run the risk

of being plunged into chaos.1 "It is literally

true," wrote a War Production Board official, "that half the production battle is

won when we have decided what we want

to produce, how much ... we want to

produce, and when we want it."

 2

A story that dramatically illustrates the

importance of exact figures for military

supply requirements was told by men who

were close to William S. Knudsen when he

came to Washington in the spring of 1940

to help mobilize American industry for

war production. In conference with Army

procurement officials, one of Knudsen's

first questions was stated bluntly and

simply: "What do you want?" When advised of the Army's mobilization plan with

its provision for arming an initial protective force of four hundred thousand men

within three months of M-Day, and an

additional eight hundred thousand men

after one year, Knudsen shook his head.

"That's not what I want," he declared.

1

 For the history of requirements from the War

Department level, see Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, ch. VI-VIII, and Leighton and

Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-

1943, ch. XII. See also a typescript study, Lt. Col.

Simon M. Frank, The Determination of Army

Supply Requirements, OCMH Files. A similar

study from the Ordnance level, entitled Ordnance

Requirements, 1939-46, consisting of one volume

of narrative and three volumes of documents, was

prepared as PSP 55 by the Ordnance Historical

Branch, July 1945, OHF. Another is Chapter

XVII in Ordnance Administration, part IV, a

draft manuscript by Richard F. McMullen, 1945,

OHF. For the WPB viewpoint, see CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, Part III, Chapter 4. 2

 Unsigned Memo in WPB PD file 212 Prod

Program—Objectives, NA. For a brief review of

military requirements as viewed from the WPB

level, see Wartime Production Achievements and

the Reconversion Outlook report of WPB chairman, 9 Oct 45. See also Richard U. Sherman, Jr.,

The Formulation of Military Requirements for

Munitions and Raw Materials, written chiefly

from WPB sources, Mar 53, ICAF library UG

633S4.
46 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

"I want to know what kind of equipment

you need for these men—and how many

pieces of each kind. Please tell me how

many pieces"3

For the Ordnance Department, knowing

well in advance "how many pieces" was of

utmost importance because mass production of munitions could not be improvised

on the spur of the moment as could the

production of many civilian-type articles.

In World War I, U.S. troops were ready

for combat within a year after the declaration of war, but they had to be equipped

in large measure with munitions obtained

from the Allies. As the preceding chapters

have emphasized, it takes months, or even

years, for civilian industry to get ready to

produce intricate weapons of war such as

tanks, artillery, and fire control instruments. From 1940 to 1942 hard-to-manufacture munitions were generally known as

"critical" items as distinguished from

"essential" items which posed less serious

production problems. For both classes, but

particulary for those in the critical category, it was most desirable that requirements be established as accurately as possible, and long in advance of expected

need.4 The fact that the objective was

never wholly achieved constituted one of

the most serious difficulties faced by Ordnance during World War II. On this

point all Ordnance officers charged with

broad procurement responsibility were

agreed. How this came about and how the

shape and nature of the requirements problem were determined by a variety of factors can be understood, at least in part,

by looking into the process of forming

policy and making the computations.

Elements of Requirements Computation

The Ordnance Department did not participate directly in making top-level policy

decisions that determined over-all requirements for military supplies. It had the

technical service function of making detailed computations on the basis of policies

determined by higher authority. The size

of the Army, manner of its organization,

nature of its equipment, and schedules for

its deployment overseas—all these matters

were decided by the nation's highest military and political authorities.5

 Once made,

these decisions were passed on to Ordnance

and other supply branches by the General

Staff in the form of numerous lists and

tables on which procurement computations

were based. To describe each of these

documents and to outline the various steps

in the procedure of requirements calculation would lead into bypaths of interest to

no one but the requirements specialist.

The following account, therefore, touches

only broad principles and problems.6

3

 Interv with Maj Gen James H. Burns, summer

1950. See also Knudsen's and Leon Henderson's

comments in GPA, Minutes of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense

(Washington, 1946), p. 12. 4

 For an excellent contemporary statement of

the matter, see Memo, Col James H. Burns for

ASW, 10 May 40, sub: Adequacy of Supply Preparedness, copy in OHF. 5

 Several other volumes in the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II deal

with these matters, among them being Watson,

Chief of Staff, Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, John D. Millett, The Organization and

Role of the Army Service Forces (Washington,

1954), and Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943. 6

 For a detailed analysis of the process as viewed

by the Ordnance Department, see History of the

Materiel Control Division, OCO, Dec 45; Manual

of the Replacement Factor Branch, OCO, 1945;

and PSP 55. All in OHF. For a description of the

process as seen from the ASF level, see ASF Ann

Rpt for FY 1943, ch. II; Ann Rpt ASF Rqmts

Div, FY 1944; and Notes on Presentation of

Rqmts Div before Proc Review Bd, ASF Contl

Div file.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 47

Tables and Their Multiplication

The most important document for requirements computation by the supply

services was the Troop Basis, which specified the strength of the Army and listed all

units actually in existence or to be formed

in the near future.7 It was supplemented

by tables prescribing the strength of each

type of Army unit and listing the quantities of supplies authorized for each type.

As there were some five thousand different

kinds of units there were thousands of

these tables, variously known as tables of

organization, tables of allowances, tables

of basic allowances, and tables of equipment. In addition, for units on special

missions there were separate lists of equipment that applied either to individually

numbered units or to all units in a given

geographic area.8

The first step Ordnance took in computing requirements was to multiply the

quantity of each item of equipment authorized for each type of unit by the number

of such units in the Troop Basis. The

number of rifles authorized for a rifle

company, for example, was multiplied by

the number of rifle companies, the trucks

per infantry regiment by the number of

infantry regiments, and so on until all

items were accounted for. The computations were all made by hand before the installation of tabulating machines in the

fall of 1940.9 The figures thus determined

represented initial allowances for units in

the Troop Basis. The next step was to

project these calculations into the future

and provide additional equipment for replacement of losses, for filling supply pipelines, for supplying certain items to the

Navy and Marine Corps, and for foreign

aid. The quantity added for replacement

was calculated on the basis of a replacement factor (or maintenance factor, as it

was sometimes called) established for each

major item of equipment by the General

Staff after study of recommendations submitted by the arms and services. Expressed

as a percentage of the initial issue, it

represented an estimate of the quantity of

matériel that would be needed during a

given period of time to replace equipment

lost, worn out, stolen, or destroyed by

enemy action.10 Finally, to arrive at net

requirement figures, the quantity of each

item already on hand, whether in storage,

in transit, or in possession of troops, was

subtracted from the total of gross require7

 For examples, see Table B of Notes on Presentation . . . Proc Review Bd; and Ltr, TAG

to Chiefs of Arms and Services, 14 May 41, sub:

Revision of Troop Unit Basis, FY 1942, with Incl,

AG 320.12 (5-13-41) MC-C-M. 8

 AR 310-60 (1942) and Ann Rpt Rqmts Div,

ASF, FY 1944, ASF Req Div. Tables of Organization prescribed the organic structure and personnel strength of Army units. Tables of Allowances

covered all items of equipment normally required for use at posts, camps, and stations which

were not taken by units upon change of station.

Tables of Basic Allowances prescribed the equipment for individuals and units other than training

equipment or that issued to posts, camps, and

stations. In October 1942, Tables of Basic Allowances were superseded by Tables of Equipment. 9

 For an intimate view of the process, see report

of interview by Capt. Paul D. Olejar and others

of personnel of the OCO Requirements Division,

8 May 45, ex. 8, PSP 55, vol. 3. 10

 "Replacement factor" was defined in ASF

Manual M412, The Supply Control System, 10

April 1945, OHF, as follows: "The estimated percentage of equipment in use that will need to be

replaced each month. It includes losses due to

wearing out beyond repair, capture, abandonment,

pilferage, and all other causes except in-transit

losses attributable to ship sinkings, losses of certain items of clothing incident to the separation

of personnel from the service, and losses from

such other categories of attrition as may be specifically expected from time to time." For World

War II replacement factors, see War Dept Supply

Bull 38-4-WD, Replacement Factors. . . 29 May

47. Spare parts requirements are discussed in

Chapter XIII, below.
48 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ments. The whole process was, in the

words of a G-4 memo, "a very demanding, exacting and tedious task."

 11

Days of Supply and Replacement Factors

The computation of ammunition requirements was altogether different from

the computation of requirements for weapons, vehicles, and other general supplies,

for ammunition was expendable. As food

for guns it" ranked in importance with the

supply of food for troops, and posed far

more difficult requirements problems because its rate of consumption was irregular

and unpredictable. There were no tables

showing the number of rounds to be issued

to any tactical unit, but there was a figure

known as the "day of supply" on which

ammunition requirements for individual

weapons were based. The ammunition day

of supply was an estimate of the average

number of rounds that would be expended by each type of weapon per day in

the course of planned operations.12 The

rate for each weapon included a breakdown showing the estimate for each type

of shell—high explosive, armor piercing,

incendiary, and so on—and for each type

of fuze when more than one type could be

used on a shell. (Table 3) To compute

ammunition requirements for a tactical

unit the Ordnance planners multiplied the

appropriate day of supply for each type of

weapon by the number of such weapons

authorized for the unit, and then multiplied the total by the number of days for

which supplies were to be provided. Like

the replacement factor for general supplies,

the ammunition day of supply was established by the General Staff on recommendations of the arms and services. For training in the United States specified quantities per man were authorized.13

After the 1918 armistice most of the

statistical data and technical knowledge of

requirements gained during the war were

lost through disuse and through failure to

study the records before marking them for

destruction. Like many other elements of

the War Department, Ordnance failed to

provide Civil Service grades and salaries

high enough to attract and keep technically

qualified research employees. There were

only five persons on the requirements staff

during the interwar years, and the highest

paid received an annual salary of about

$2,300. It is doubtful that much progress

could have been macle under any circumstances in peacetime, but the lack of an

adequate nucleus of competent requirements specialists insured failure.14

At the beginning of World War II, and

for nearly two years thereafter, replacement factors for weapons and days of

supply for ammunition were based largely

on guesswork. No one knew how long the

Army's equipment, much of it far different

from that used in 1917-18, would stand

up under rigorous combat conditions, nor

did anyone have an accurate notion of

how much ammunition an infantry regiment or field artillery battalion would need

in an active theater of operations. Virtually

the only source of information on the sub11

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 29 Nov 40, sub: Stabilization of Bases for . . . Rqmts, G-4/32277. 12

 The adoption and definition of this term are

described in Ltr, TAG to CG AGF and others,

16 Feb 43, sub: Ammunition Supply Policies,

OO 471/1728, copy in OHF, See also Smith,

Army and Economic Mobilization, ch. VI-VIII;

and Rpt on Methods Used in the Ord Dept in

Determining . . . Needs . . ., submitted to Mead

Comm., of U.S. Senate, Aug 46, copy in OHF

(hereafter cited as Mead Comm. Rpt). Another

source is Ann Rpt, ASF Rqmts Div, FY 1944. 13

 Folders marked Day of Supply in OCO

Rqmts Br, FS Div files, and Rqmts Docs, in OHF. 14

 Hist of Matériel Contl Div, ch. I.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 49

TABLE 3—EXAMPLES OF GROUND AMMUNITION DAY OF SUPPLY FOR THEATER OF

OPERATIONS, 23 DECEMBER 1941

a This proportion of types was approved in principle, but the old figures (65% Ball, 20% AP, and 15% Tracer) continued

until production could be rescheduled.

Source: Day of Supply of Ammunition other than Aircraft for Theater of Operations, 23 December 1941, copy in OHF.

ject at the beginning of World War II was

the Partridge Board Report made in 1938

by a board of Ordnance officers headed by

Lt. Col. Clarence E. Partridge.15 Based in

part on fragmentary records of World

War I experience and in part on "educated

guesses," it was concerned more with general principles than with exact statistical

data. As late as March 1943 the Chief of

Ordnance reported that "factors now in

use are based largely on inadequate and

obsolete data obtained from the last war,

supplemented by opinion as to present

needs. No current battle experience data

are available."16

15

 (1) Ord Day of Supply of Ammo. . ., 30 Nov

38, AG 381.4 (1-25-39) Misc D; (2) Manual

Replacement Factor Br, ch. 8; (3) WD Supply

Bull 38-4-WD, Replacement Factors. . ., 29 May

47. The other members of the Partridge board were

Lt. Cols. Burton O. Lewis, Donald Armstrong, and

Sidney P. Spalding. See also FM 101-10, Jun 41,

as cited in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 301, n. 21. 16

 Memo, CofOrd for CG, ASF, 31 Mar 43,

sub: Determination of Distribution and Maint

Factors, OO 210.3/724, copy in OHF.
50 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The day of supply figures used in 1940

and 1941 had two principal defects: they

were too high, and they did not allow for

differences among theaters, Although Ordnance was convinced that the figures were

too high, and recommended their reduction, there was no combat experience during the defense period to support the Ordnance view. No change occurred until December 1941 when the day of supply for

.30-caliber machine guns was cut nearly in

half—from 250 to 150—and others were

reduced in varying degrees.17

The second difficulty with the original

figures, as just noted, was that a single set

of rates was applied equally to all theaters

of operation. In June 1943, after several

theaters had been activated and some combat experience accumulated, Army Service

Forces directed the supply services to begin systematic collection of data on which

to base revisions of maintenance factors

and days of supply.18 During the North

African campaign no provision had been

made for systematic reporting of loss and

expenditure rates. In July 1943 Ordnance

sent teams of officers schooled in requirements work to headquarters in England,

Algeria, Egypt, India, New Caledonia, and

Australia. The teams met with varying degrees of success, but in general their work

was hampered by a lack of appreciation

in the theaters of the far-reaching importance of accurate replacement factors. The

theater Ordnance officers, under constant

pressure to provide adequate supplies at

all times, were far more interested in maintaining an ample supply of everything than

in providing data for refined statistical

computations by planners back in Washington. This gave rise to one of the most

persistent supply problems of the war, the

tendency of each echelon to hoard supplies

and build up its own reserve. The requirements teams also found that theater records

did not provide adequate data on quantities of equipment in the hands of troops,

and contained practically nothing on quantities lost. Theater officers insisted that

data for determining replacement factors

were more readily obtainable at ports of

embarkation than overseas. "Officers in

this theater," wrote a member of the team

sent to North Africa, "are of the firm belief that our mission is a wild goose chase

and utterly futile. . . ."19

In spite of these difficulties, the teams

made some progress. Their reports showed

that different rates were required for the

various theaters because weapons and

types of ammunition varied in importance

from theater to theater. Beginning in February 1944 the War Department required

each theater to submit detailed information

in a regular monthly report of matériel

consumed, and in June it established separate days of supply for the ZI and for

17

 (1) Day of Supply of Ammo Other than Aircraft for Theater of Operations, 23 Dec 41, Rqmts

Docs, OHF; (2) Hist of Matériel Contl Div,

OCO, ch. 4; (3) Mtg of the Ord Bd on Spare

Parts, 27 Nov 41, copy in OHF. See also correspondence on day of supply in Sep-Oct 43 in

collection of requirements documents, OHF, and

Day of Supply correspondence in G-4/20052-67,

TAG. 18

 (1) Notes on Presentation . . . Proc Review

Bd, p. 33; (2) Ltr, SW for CG's Overseas Commands, 24 Jun 43, sub: Determination of Maint

Factors. . . , AG 400 (21 Jun 43) OB-SSPOPP-M; (3) Rpt of Richards Comm. in Levels

of Supply and Supply Procedures, 1 Jan 4.4, copy

in OCMH; (4) WD Supply Bull 38-4-WD, op.

cit.; (5) Manual Determination and Use of Maint

Factors and Distribution, ASF, Jul 43; (6)

Memo, Col John J. Binns, Director Plng Div, for

Director of Plans and Opns, ASF, 20 Nov 43,

sub: Study of Ammo Rqmts, ASF Plng Div,

Theater Br file 471 Ammo, vol. I, Box 389, NA. 19

 (1) Manual Replacement Factor Br; (2)

PSP 55, pp. 115-18; (3) Memo, Deputy TIG to

Deputy CofS, 21 Jun 44, sub: Memo, 1 Jan

1944. . ., in WD Spec 334, vol. 2, G-4.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 51

three major overseas areas—Europe, North

Africa, and the Pacific.20 Differences

among theaters were substantial. In the

South Pacific, for example, the replacement rates for bayonets, trench knives,

and carbines were from ten to thirty times

as great as in North Africa. In the summer

of 1944 the number of items covered by

replacement factors was sharply reduced,

and a new set of replacement factors submitted to ASF headquarters was approved

with minor changes.21 But replacement

factors were seldom constant for long

periods of time in any active theater, since

they varied with the intensity of the fighting, the nature of enemy tactics, the

method of reporting losses, and even with

changes in the weather.

In addition to replacement factors and

days of supply the Partridge Board Report

had pointed out in 1938 that two other

elements entered into the distribution of

supplies. First was the time required to

ship materiel from the point of origin to

the point of use, and second was the

quantity of supplies absorbed within the

system itself, chiefly in the form of depot

stocks. The Partridge Board recommended

that the first of these elements be covered

by advancing delivery dates by the number of days required for the shipment of

supplies to any given troop units. It recommended that distribution stocks be provided by increasing the total requirements

by a certain percentage to be known as the

distribution factor. Exactly what percentage should be allotted for distribution was,

of course, a question the Partridge Board

could not answer because of the paucity of

experience data.22

Aviation Ordnance

Guns and ammunition for war planes

formed another distinct phase of the requirements picture. In 1940 the method

used for calculating aviation ordnance requirements was the same as that used for

ground ordnance, but in 1941 a new

system was worked out by the Ordnance

Requirements Division. The new method

made no attempt to multiply tables of

equipment or allowances by the number of

units to be supplied, but based requirements on airplane production schedules

compiled by the Office of Production

Management and later by WPB. The number of guns per plane, taken from armament charts prepared by the Air Technical Service Command, was multiplied by

the number of planes to be produced. To

this total was added what the Air Force

felt was a sufficient quantity to provide

replacements for these weapons.23

 Although considered at the time to be a

radical departure from traditional requirements practice, the new system proved

successful and continued in effect without

change until the summer of 1944 when it

was modified to provide ammunition and

bombs only for planes in active theaters.

The Army Air Forces had meanwhile collected sufficient experience data from its

units overseas to provide a statistical basis

for more refined techniques of requirements determination and supply control.

Mission rates for each theater were developed for each type of squadron in much

20

 Copies are in folders marked Day of Supply

in OCO Rqmts Br, FS Div files. See also correspondence on the subject in AG 471; Ord Comm.

Min 24343, 6 Jul 44; and Ann Rpt ASF Rqmts

Div FY 1944. 21

 (O Mead Comm. Rpt, pp. 15-16; (2)

Frank, op. cit., p. 127. 22

 Hist, Matériel Contl Div, ch. 8. 23

 Hist, Matériel Contl Div, ch. 6. For a more

detailed statement, see Ltr CG AAF for CG SOS,

8 Jan 43, sub: Basis for Computation. . . , copy

in Frank, op. cit., vol. 3, ex. 76.
52 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the same manner as were days of supply for

ground ammunition. In the European theater seasonal rates were used because

of lessened air activity during winter

months.24

The early requirements for bombs and

aircraft ammunition called for production

of a 5-month supply for each bomber,

based on aircraft production schedules, the

estimated number of sorties a month for

each plane, and the number of bombs

dropped and rounds fired per sortie. The

bomb supply for 4-engine bombers, for

example, was based on an estimated eight

missions per month over a period of five

months. These computations soon resulted

in overproduction of bombs and aircraft

ammunition, largely because all planes did

not go immediately from factory to overseas theater, nor did they all engage in

bombing raids exactly as planned. "We

now have in storage in the United Kingdom," reported the McCoy Board in August 1943, "a greater tonnage of bombs

than has been dropped over Europe by the

RAF since the beginning of the war."25

Deep cuts in bomb requirements came in

1943, cuts that soon proved to be too deep.

As the air war mounted in intensity during 1944 many of the cuts had to be

restored.26

Fluctuating Requirements

It is no exaggeration to say that the

worst problem facing Ordnance production planners during World. War II

stemmed from the fact that requirements

were always changing. As soon as one set

of figures came out of the machines it was

necessary to incorporate changes in one or

more of the basic lists and make the computations all over again.27

 The figures in

the over-all Troop Basis rose and fell every

few months as the strategic situation

worsened or improved, and as the War

Department planners estimated and reestimated military needs in terms of the

capacity of the nation to support forces of

varying sizes.28

The situation was further complicated

by the fact that the Ordnance Requirements Division always had to work with

two different versions of the Troop Basis,

one coming from G-3 and the other from

G-4. Ordnance normally prepared its allowance figures on the basis of the former

and its requirements on the latter. The two

versions of the Troop Basis were not identical and were often not even reconcilable,

at times being as much as half a million

men apart on specific dates. As late as the

spring of 1944 Ordnance complained,

"The essence of the problem is that the

troop basis furnished is not synchronized

with the factual situation as to activation

and deployment of troops. . . ,"29 Another difficulty arose in correctly identifying

the units included in the Troop Basis.

When units appeared without adequate

identifying information it was impossible

24

 (1) Hist, Matériel Contl Div, ch. 6; (2) Ord

Rpt to Mead Comm., 12 Aug 46, OO 400.12/-

2311 and copy in OHF. 25

 (1) Rpt WD Proc Review Bd, 31 Aug 43, p.

50, ASF 334, 020 CofS U.S. Army. Copy also in

Levels of Supply and Supply Procedure, 1 Jan

44, OCMH file; (2) Rpt WD Spec Comm. for

Re-study of Reserves, 13 Nov 43, p. 48. 26

 (1) Ann Rpt ASF Rqmts Div FY 1944, pp.

17-18; (2) Dr. Ralph Ilsley, The Facilities Program of the Ammunition Division, Oct 44, vol. 2,

pp. 160-63, OHF. 27

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 17 Dec 40, sub: Stabilization of ... Rqmts, G-4/32277, copy in OHF. 28

 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 29 Nov 40, sub: Stabilization of Bases for . . . Rqmts; G-4/32277. See

also McMullen, op. cit., pp. 646-47. 29

 PSP 55, p. 142, and ex. 9 in vol. 3, Docs.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 53

to know which equipment table applied to

them.30

Of nearly equal importance with fluctuations in the Troop Basis were the constant

revisions of tables of equipment. During

the latter part of 1940, in addition to

changes resulting from expansion of the

air arm, creation of an armored force, and

the transition from square to triangular

infantry divisions, there were innumerable

changes in allowances of equipment for

both individuals and units.31 In the early

stages of the war when planners were considering the possibility of air raids on the

United States and on American bases and

troop units overseas, large numbers of antiaircraft units were scheduled for activation, and requirements for antiaircraft

guns and accessories were high. The open

type of warfare encountered in North

Africa late in 1942 demanded that tanks

and antitank guns be given first priority,

and later still the demands for heavy artillery topped the list when American

troops came up against heavily fortified

positions in Italy and France. Each change,

however small, demanded a revision of total requirements figures, and every major

change in requirements meant a revision of

production schedules.

The nature of the equipment changes

that occurred between 1940 and 1945 may

be illustrated by the single example of the

infantry regiment. In 1940 an infantry

regiment numbered 3,449 men, but in

1942 it had only 3,088, and in 1943, 3,257.

It was authorized 1,181 pistols in 1940,

213 in 1941, 233 in 1942, 275 in 1943, and

293 in 1944. It had no 1⁄4-ton trucks in

1940 but was authorized 103 in 1941, 68

in 1942, 146 in 1943, and 149 in 1944. Of

the basic weapon, the M1 rifle, it had

2,099 in 1940, 1,600 in 1941, 1,678 in

1942, and 1,882 in 1943, 1944, and 1945.

These were by no means all the changes in

the equipment of the infantry regiment

during World War II, but they serve to

illustrate the frequency and extent of the

revisions of equipment tables. In terms of

individual units the changes were often

small, but, when multipled many times

over and added to those of other organizations, the cumulative effect on total requirements figures was anything but small.

Yet it should not be suggested that nothing

was static. The number of .30-caliber machine guns (M1917) in an infantry regiment remained at 24 year after year.

Throughout the war there were always

twenty-seven 60-mm. mortars and eighteen

81-mm. mortars per regiment of infantry.

The number of BAR's dropped from 189

to 81 between 1941 and 1942 but thereafter held steady.32

Changes in plans for armored divisions

had greater impact on Ordnance than did

changes in infantry divisions, for equipment

of armored units required far more industrial effort than did equipment of

infantry units of the same size. A measure

of the gradual decline in Ordnance requirements is found in the number of armored

divisions scheduled for activation. In early

1942, estimates went as high as 46; the

30

 Ibid. See also lecture, Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes,

the ASP, 23 Sep 46, ICAF, and Marvin A. Kreidberg and Lt. Merton G. Henry, Military Mobilization in the U.S. Army, 1775-1945, Dept of the

Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, 1955),

ch. XVIII. 31

 (1) Memo of Lt Col Walter A. Wood, Jr.,

quoted in Frank, op. cit., p. 10; (2) Memo, G-4

for CofS, 17 Dec 40, sub: Stabilization of ...

Rqmts, G-4/32277; (3) Memo, ACofS, G-4 for

CofOrd, 6 Sep 40, sub: Rqmts for Combat Vehicles, with Incls, G-4/29365-71, copy in PSP

55, ex. 6. 32

 (1) Mead Comm. Rpt, pp. 14-15; (2) PSP

55, vol. 3, Docs, ex. 9. The latter contains a table

of major items of infantry regiment equipment,

year by year, 1940-45 inclusive.
54 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Troop Basis of November 1942 called for

only 20; the following summer the figure

was down to 16, the number actually

formed.33 Tank requirements, set at 169,-

000 in early 1942, were scaled down to

half that number before the war ended.

Ordnance officers fully realized the need

for timely revision of the Troop Basis and

reorganization of tactical units. They recognized that sudden shifts in the worldwide strategic situation sometimes necessitated drastic revision of supply requirements. They knew that losses through

ship sinkings had to be taken into account,

that plans for sending troops and supplies

overseas had to be geared to available

shipping space, and that combat experience frequently demanded changes in types

or quantities of equipment. But they nevertheless felt that General Staff planners, not

fully aware of the consequences of changes

in supply requirements, sometimes ordered

such changes without full consideration of

their effects. They felt, rightly or wrongly,

that ASF and staff planners did not realize

that every modification in the tables of

equipment meant elaborate recomputations of requirements and also, much more

important, far-reaching revisions of production and distribution schedules. They

became convinced that staff planners did

not realize the need for supplying data

well in advance to allow a long lead time

for Ordnance production.34

Over and above all this was an intangible but nonetheless real psychological factor that caused requirements planners to

adopt a bullish attitude when the war news

was good and to turn bearish when it was

bad. Requirements were not always determined in the light of pure reason. Sometimes, Ordnance requirements specialists

testified, an entire computation would be

thrown out and a new one demanded

because the results "were not in accord

with the 'feeling' of those who had initially

established the method for the first computation."

 35

 There was also the practical

matter of how much could be produced.

Theoretically, requirements were always

fully stated regardless of the potentialities

of supply but in fact there were ways and

means of reducing requirements that

seemed unattainable.36

The truth of the matter seems to be that

the General Staff and ASF planners were

well aware of the need for firm long-range

requirements even though they were not

always fully aware of the details of Ordnance operations. They tried hard to keep

requirements on an even keel, and it was

not ignorance of procurement but the

exigencies of war that forced them to revise

the Army Supply Program.37 "The conclusion is inescapable," wrote Brig. Gen.

Walter A. Wood, Jr., in 1943, "that such

a program cannot be static ... it rerequires constant review . . . continuing

study, and never-ending adjustment."38

33

 Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer,

and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: Organization of Ground Combat Troops UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), p. 161. 34

 (1) Lutes, Lecture, The ASP; (2) Intervs

with many Ord officers. 35

 Hist, Matériel Contl Div, ch. 10. 36

 Ibid., ch. 1. 37

 See, for examples, Memo, G-4 for CofS, 29

Nov 40, sub: Stabilization of ... Rqmts (with

G-3 concurrence), G-432277; comments by Gen

Somervell in Review of Prod Plans of Ammo Div,

19 Jun 42, p. 6, T652-C; and Memo, CG ASF

for Tech Services, 15 Jun 43, sub: Computation

of Rqmts. . . . SPRML 400, copy in folder

marked Dirs, Basic Data for ... ASP, in OCO

Rqmts Br, FS Div files. 38

 Notes on Presentation . . . Proc Review Bd,

op. cit., p. 9. See also Background of the Army

Supply Program, an ASF document apparently

written by Brig. Gen. Walter A. Wood, Jr., no

date, pp. 3-4, copy in OHF, and Leighton and

Coakley, Global Logistics, 194O-1943, p. 302.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 55

Requirements in the Defense Period,

1940-41

Multiplication of a given Troop Basis

by the proper equipment tables, and subtraction of stocks on hand, yielded a theoretical statement of Army requirements, but

for procurement purposes, particularly in

1940-41, everything depended upon the

availability of money. In the uncertain

period before Pearl Harbor, and immediately after, requirements were computed

for scores of different theoretical situations,

but the only results that counted for

Ordnance were those covered by appropriations and embodied in an Expenditure

Program approved by G-4. Enactment of

an appropriation bill, it should be noted,

did not automatically give the supply services a green light for procurement. Only

after an item of equipment appeared on an

Expenditure Program did the supply services have authority to proceed with its

procurement.39

All told, ten Expenditure Programs were

issued between July 1940 and July 1942,

each based on an appropriation measure.

The Ordnance share of the funds in each

varied from $38 million to more than $12

billion. When added together the 10 programs allotted to Ordnance approximated

$31 billion, or three-fourths of all funds

appropriated for Ordnance during the

1940-45 period.40 (Table 4)

Before issuance of the first Expenditure

Program, Ordnance made a series of computations leading up to the regular appropriation for the fiscal year 1941. Work on

this subject began with a request from

the War Department Budget Officer in

September 1939, after the invasion of Poland, that Ordnance list the items it would

include in a $250 million program to eliminate shortages of critical items for the

PMP.41 Ordnance quickly complied with

this request and with others that came

during succeeding months, including such

questions as the following: What additional ordnance would be required for a

17,000-man increase in the Regular Army

and a 500-plane increase in the Air Corps?

What items would be short if a 600,000-

man Army, plus PMP augmentation, were

to be equipped? What would be needed

at each stage during the Regular Army's

expansion in enlisted strength from 173,000

to 242,000, to 280,000, to 375,000? All

these calculations, combined with those

from other supply services, were used in

drawing up the Army appropriation for

fiscal year 1941 and the first supplemental,

totaling approximately $500 million for

Ordnance. This program was widely

known as the first Expenditure Program

until it was officially decided that the 12

August 1940 statement of requirements

for the Munitions Program of 30 June

1940 would be considered the first such

program.42

Even before it was passed, the regular

1941 appropriation was known to be inadequate to meet the Army's needs in

view of the swift German victories in

Europe during May and June 1940, and

the transfer to the hard-pressed British of

39

 For a late example, see Equipment Expenditure Program . . . FY 1943, 30 Jun 42, copy in

OCO-Detroit file. 40

 For discussion of prewar finances, see Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, Chapter III, and Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization. [Wood], Background of the

ASP, briefly covers the whole period from 1920 to

World War II. 41

 Memo of WD Budget Officer for CofOrd, 6

Sep 39, sub: Supplemental Estimates. . . , copy

in PSP 55, ex. 2. 42

 For detailed listing of items, see Fig. 4, p. 59,

PSP 55. See also [Wood], Background of the

ASP, pp. 10-11, and Frank, op. cit.
56 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 4—SUMMARY TABULATION OF ORDNANCE SHARE OF EXPENDITURE PROGRAMS

Source: PSP SS, pp. 65-88.

615,000 Enfield rifles, 25,000 BAR's, and

other supplies after Dunkerque.43 At the

direction of the President the Army hastily

drew up in June 1940 a new statement of

broad military requirements.44 The bulk of

this program, known as the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, was financed by the

second supplemental appropriation, which

allotted $1,442,000,000 for Ordnance. As

noted in the preceding chapter, the first

Expenditure Program issued by G-4 on 12

August 1940 gave Ordnance authority to

proceed with procurement under this and

the two preceding appropriations.45 The

authority came at a dark hour for the

western democracies. With France conquered, the British army driven from the

continent after losing all its heavy equipment, and the German air force opening

its assault on England itself, there were

some who felt that further resistance by

the British was useless. For the United

States the need to strengthen its defenses

was clear, but there was still doubt as to

how that need should be met.

The second Expenditure Program was a

relatively minor one, totaling only $38

million. Drawn up in September—while

plans were being made to inaugurate

peacetime conscription—it provided essential items for an additional 200,000 men to

bring the PMP force up to 1 ,400,000. The

43

 See Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. III. 44

 Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, dr G43

ASF Contl Div. The contribution of an Ordnance

officer, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) James H. Burns,

executive officer to the Assistant Secretary of War,

to this and later programs is described in Watson,

Chief of Staff, Pages 172-82, and Smith, Army

and Economic Mobilization, Chapter VII. 45

 On the importance of this program see Smith,

Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter VI.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 57

third Expenditure Program appeared in

April 1941, just after enactment of lendlease, and provided $725 million for Ordnance, mostly for artillery ammunition.

The fourth covered Air Force and Field

Artillery requirements financed by the

regular fiscal 1942 appropriation. By far

the largest of the pre-Pearl Harbor programs was the fifth, dated 25 August

1941; it placed major emphasis on ammunition and combat vehicles and was

based on an Army strength of 1,820,000

to be raised eventually to 3,200,000.46

By the time the fifth Expenditure Program appeared, Ordnance had been allotted over $6 billion and its procurement

program was well under way. But meanwhile the whole defense effort came in for

a good deal of criticism, some bearing

directly on the problem of Ordnance requirements. Early in September 1941, for

example, Ordnance was criticized because

the bulk of its production was not scheduled for completion before 30 June 1943

and some items such as antiaircraft guns

and armor-piercing ammunition would run

well into fiscal year 1944. There was

complaint that Ordnance was giving new

orders to the few firms already holding

contracts and was thus not broadening

the base for procurement but was "extending a relatively narrow stream of production farther and farther into the future." The report making this charge stated

further that, in spite of multibillion-dollar

appropriations, existing production schedules for many items would fall far short of

meeting either British or United States

requirements by June 1942. "The lag of

production behind requirements is general," the report concluded, "and is not

the result of specific items being produced

at the expense of other items. Increased

total output in all areas is essential."

 47

In commenting on this report General

Harris, acting Chief of Ordnance, pointed

to many discrepancies in it, particularly as

they concerned plans and appropriations.

He declared that the report took contemplated programs not yet submitted to

Congress—much less enacted into law—

and added them to approved requirements

in order to make production schedules,

which were based only on approved requirements, appear inadequate. Defending

the award of new contracts to established

producers, General Harris argued that the

creation of new production capacity was a

long and costly process that was not encouraged by the receipt of requirements

"in small successive increments." The

source of most of the difficulties encountered in scheduling Ordnance production,

the general declared, was the problem of

requirements, and on this subject he clearly

stated the Ordnance position in words that

bear quotation at some length.

There has not been since the beginning of

the Defense Program a comprehensive longrange Schedule of Ordnance Requirements

which would permit planning for adequate

production capacity. On the contrary, the

program has been changed at least seven

times in the last fifteen months for most

items. . . . It is impracticable to create production capacity without definite orders, especially if extensive subcontracting is to be

used in accordance with existing instructions

of the War Department. Defense Aid orders

have been even more varied, repetitive, unpredictable, and apparently unstudied than

the United States orders, and action in filling the orders has been correspondingly

difficult and unsatisfactory.

The Ordnance Department believes strongly that a carefully studied, long-range pro46

 The directive initiating this program appears

as exhibit 11 in Frank, op. cit. 47

 Mil Rqmts and Matériel Prod, Incl 1 to

Memo of Maj Gen Harris, Actg CofOrd, for USW,

9 Sep 41, OO 400.12/5853-1/2.
58 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

gram of munitions requirements for the

democracies should be determined as soon as

possible and thereafter adhered to with a

minimum of change. ... It will then, and not

until then, be possible for the Ordnance Department, as well as the other supply arms

and services of the War Department, to proceed with assurance that planned production

will satisfactorily meet requirements.48

While General Harris was thus appealing for a sound and comprehensive statement of requirements, others in the War

Department recognized that a new approach to the problem was needed.49

 It

was obvious that the Expenditure Programs

were not altogether satisfactory documents

for stating procurement objectives. Because

they were primarily fiscal rather than supply documents they did not list supplies

needed by the armed forces for long-range

planning but only supplies to be bought

with money appropriated for a given fiscal

year. Being short-range projections, they

kept procurement on something of a handto-mouth basis. Further, they omitted important categories such as Army-type materiel procured for the Navy, and they did

not establish any definite time periods for

delivery of new materiel, though the separate documents known as Time Objectives

were issued, to fill this latter gap. All things

considered, the Expenditure Programs

were inadequate as bases for accurate production scheduling and for determining the

need for raw materials and industrial facilities. "During 1941 . . ." wrote the

chief of the Ordnance Branch of WPB,

"procurement officers, and others, requested and failed to get any answers to

the three basic questions of—What? How

many? When?"50 After Pearl Harbor,

when the critical factor in military planning was no longer money but time, the

Army Supply Program (ASP) was developed to replace the Expenditure Program as the basic document for stating

requirements and procurement objectives.

The transition was not made immediately

but extended over the first half of 1942.

More than any other individual, Lt. Gen.

Brehon B. Somervell, as G-4 and later as

head of Services of Supply, was responsible

for its introduction.51

Many civilian critics of the War Department have declared that in the pre-Pearl

Harbor years the Army, conservative by

nature and suffering from two decades of

penny-pinching, could not change overnight to meet the challenge of a new day.52

Military planners set their sights too low,

according to the War Production Board

history, and it was left to the more realistic

and aggressive members of the civilian

agencies to push for adequate defense production. These charges are not fully borne

out by the official record. There undoubt48

 Incl No. 2 to Memo of Maj Gen Harris, for

USW, 9 Sep 41, sub: Comments on Study Entitled Mil Rqmts and Matériel Prod, OO 400.12/

5853-1/2 and OHF. For similar comments from

the WPB level, see CPA, Industrial Mobilization

for War, page 13. 49

 See Min of conf on the ASP in Somervell's

office, 29 Jan 42, copy in folder marked Rqmts

Div 1943, ASF. For an excellent brief summary

of Somervell's views, see his Memo for Maj. Gen.

Richard C. Moore, Deputy CofS, 22 Jan 42, sub:

Army Supply Program, ASF, Rqmts Div 1943,

copy in Frank, op. cit., vol. 2, ex. 21. 50

 Summary Rpt, Ord Br, WPB, OHF. See also

Maj. Paul D. Olejar, Ordnance Requirements and

the Control of Production, 1939-45, Project

Papers, 6, 7, and 12, dtd Aug 45, OHF. 51

 (O Lecture, Lutes, The ASP; (2) Frank, op.

cit., p. 15; (3) Summary Rpt, Ord Br, WPB; (4)

Memo, Col Clinton F. Robinson for Brig Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, 16 Jul 42, sub: Equipment Expenditure Program, ASF folder marked Rqmts Div

1943. The delicate political situation facing the

administration in 1940, and the tense international scene, accounted in part for the lack of a

more forthright approach to the requirements

problem. 52

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, and

Sherman, The Formulation of Mil Rqmts.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 59

edly was some timidity and hesitation in

the War Department in 1938-39, but not

in later years. The Munitions Program of

30 June 1940, for example, developed by

the Army under the leadership of Assistant

Secretary of War Louis Johnson, was both

big and bold. Its original totals were scaled

down, not by shortsighted generals but by

President Roosevelt, who feared Congress

would not accept such huge expenditures

for military purposes. Earlier proposals by

G-4 and General Marshall had called for

speedy and substantial increases in national

defense expenditures, but they too had

failed to win full approval. The only qualifying element in the picture is the delay

inherent in drafting requirements and forwarding them through the proper channels

to Congress, with the result that expansion

plans drawn up in mid-1939 before the

European war broke out were obsolete

when they reached Congress a year later.

But that the Army set its sights too low and

had to be prodded into preparedness by

the civilian agencies hastily organized in

1940 is a myth.53

Strongest pressure for raising requirements sights came from the British, especially from Lord Beaverbrook and Prime

Minister Churchill, who came to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. Depending

upon American aid for Britain's survival,

they urged astronomical figures that soon

proved to be entirely unrealistic. Their

pleas were directed just as much toward

civilian production men such as Donald

Nelson as to military leaders.54 The net

effect of British urging was the adoption of

altogether unrealistic goals.

The Army Supply Program, 1942-44

As early as July 1941, shortly after Germany invaded Russia, President Roosevelt

had directed the armed services to draw up

a long-range statement of requirements

such as General Harris had in mind. "I

wish you would explore the munitions and

mechanical equipment of all types which

in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our enemies."

 55

 The evolution of

the resulting Victory Program during 1941

and early 1942 has been described elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail

here, but a brief sketch of some of the steps

in its development will help to provide

essential background for the Ordnance

phase of the Army Supply Program.56

Assuming that victory over all potential

enemies might require the maximum number of troops the nation could provide, the

War Plans Division of the General Staff

drafted a troop basis in August 1941 calling for mobilization within two years of

nearly 9 million men, organized into 215

divisions, of which 61 were to be armored.

This was more than double the maximum

force of 4 million men that had been a

factor in earlier plans, and, in terms of

divisions, was more than twice the number

actually organized during World War II.

In terms of manpower this troop basis

proved a remarkably accurate forecast, but

in terms of divisions equipped and put into

the field, it was very wide of the mark.57

While computation of materiel require53

 See Watson, Chief of Staff, Chapter VI, for

discussion of Army requests for funds in 1939-40. 54

 CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pt.

III, ch. 4. 55

 Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41, copy in OHF. 56

 (1) Frank, op. cit., pp. 15-22; (2) Watson,

Chief of Staff, ch. XI; (3) Smith, Army and

Economic Mobilization, ch. VI; (4) [Wood],

Background of the ASP. 57

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics,

1940-1943, ch. V; (2) Watson, Chief of Staff,

ch. XI; (3) Memo, G-4 for CofOrd, 26 Aug 41,

sub: Spec Computation. . . , OO 475/1064.
60 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ments for a force of this size was in progress

the President requested that additional

calculations be made of munitions to be

supplied Great Britain, the Soviet Union,

and other countries at war with the Axis.

The completed estimates for all these purposes were quickly assembled and given

limited distribution in September, but no

steps were taken to implement the program

as it was to be held in reserve for an

emergency. On 7 December 1941 the emergency arrived.

For Army planners the weeks following

the attack on Pearl Harbor may fairly be

described as hectic. The sixth Expenditure

Program, published on 12 December 1941,

was larger than any of its predecessors.

Computed on a Troop Basis of 2 million

men, with proposed augmentation to 3.7

million, it provided more than $3 billion

for Ordnance materiel. But it was obviously inadequate in view of the entrance of

the United States into the war against

Japan, Germany, and Italy, and attention

was quickly turned to implementing the

Victory Program.58 While the War Department planning agencies were working

feverishly on the details of the program,

and adjusting their calculations to the

actuality of war with specific enemies,

President Roosevelt dropped a bombshell

in their midst on 3 January 1942. In a

letter to the Secretary of War he wrote:

The victory over our enemies will be

achieved in the last analysis not only by the

bravery, skill, and determination of our men,

but by our overwhelming mastery in the

munitions of war.

The concept of our industrial capacity

must be completely overhauled under the impulse of the peril to our nation.

Our associates amongst the united nations

are already extended to the utmost in the

manufacture of munitions, and their factories fall far short of the needs of their own

armies. We must not only provide munitions

for our own fighting forces but vast quantities to be used against the enemy in every

appropriate theater of war, wherever that

may be.

The President then proceeded to name

five types of equipment—four of them

Ordnance responsibilities—and to list specific quantities to be procured during the

two calendar years ahead. (Table 5) For

ammunition the President stated that he

wanted production to be based on the

assumption that these weapons were to be

used in combat.59

The President's letter to the Secretary of

War, and his address to Congress three

days later, constituted a striking example

of lack of co-ordination between the White

House and the Army staff. The President

apparently drew up his plans in consultation with a few close advisers and with the

British delegation that had come to Washington soon after Pearl Harbor, but without consulting his own generals. Reaction

in Ordnance to these goals was not

favorable, for they were regarded as unbalanced and in some cases unattainable.

But there could be no outspoken criticism

of the decision of the Commander in Chief.

The War Department issued its hurried

calculation of requirements for the Victory

Program on 11 February 1942 as the Overall Requirements for the War Munitions

Program.60 This new statement provided

58

 By way of illustration, see Memo, SW for the

President, 26 Dec 41, sub: Victory Program, copy

in Frank, op. cit., II, ex. 18. 59

 Memo of President to SW, 3 Jan 42, AG

452.1 (1-3-42) (1), copy in PSP 55, ex. 19. The

President made a dramatic public announcement

of these objectives in his State of the Union message to Congress on 6 January. For discussion of

their origin, see CPA, Industrial Mobilization for

War, Part III, Chapter 4. 60

 Copy in OCO-Detroit files. For a brief history of this program, see PSP 55, I, pp. 91-95.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 61

TABLE 5—PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES: ORDNANCE ITEMS, 3 JANUARY 1942

for three stages of Army expansion: 3.6

million troops to be fully equipped by the

end of 1942; double that number by the

end of 1943; and an "ultimate" force of

over 10 million equipped by the end of

1944. The Army staff estimated the cost of

the 1942 and 1943 programs combined at

about $63 billion, far above the $45 billion

maximum the production experts had earlier set for 1942.61

Despite the term "over-all" in the title,

the new program was far from all-inclusive.

It made no provision for construction

needs, miscellaneous supplies, Navy items

procured by the Army, or allowances to

fill distribution pipelines, nor did it show

quantities of materiel on hand. To remedy

these inadequacies, and to keep requirements within estimated production capacity, the program was completely restudied

during the weeks that followed and was

replaced early in April by the Army Supply Program issued by the newly created

Services of Supply (later redesignated

Army Service Forces, or ASF).62 The first

61

 (1) ASF Ann Rpt FY 1943, p. 18; (2) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, ch.

VIII. 62

 For the reorganization of the War Department early in 1942, and the creation of the Services of Supply, see Millett, Organization of the

Army Service Forces, ch. II, and Leighton and

Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, ch. IX. For the relationship between Ordnance and ASF, see

ch. VI of Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning
62 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ASP, sometimes called the Balanced Program, consisted of several sections that

projected Army needs for three calendar

years, 1942, 1943, and 1944, and provided

what General Somervell once called "a

spelled-out all-out program of complete

Army requirements."

 63

 Since the War Department reorganization gave the air arm a

status independent of the Army Ground

Forces and Services of Supply, the ASP

did not include requirements for airplanes

but did include Ordnance-supplied aircraft guns, ammunition, and bombs.

Where requirements for tanks, antitank

guns, antiaircraft guns, and machine guns,

computed in the orthodox fashion, did not

equal the figures set by the President in

January they were arbitrarily increased to

match the Presidential objectives. Total

required production for 1942-43 was

about $48 billion, but the ASP, unlike

Expenditure Programs, did not at first

show the dollar value of requirements and

made no reference to appropriations.64

Upon receipt of the ASP or other statements of requirements, Ordnance drew up

a production planning book for each category of equipment. Using separate sheets

for each item of materiel, these books

showed total requirements, facilities in production or scheduled for future production, and estimated delivery rates for each

month during 1942 and 1943, and sometimes early 1944. Each book included a

statement of production accomplishments

and difficulties to date, availability of machine tools and materials, and actions

recommended by Ordnance to speed production. When discussed by the appropriate division chief at production conferences

attended by representatives of the War

Production Board, the Under Secretary's

office, and other high-level agencies, these

books played an important role in helping

to formulate requirements policies during

the first six to eight months after Pearl

Harbor.

All during this period officials of the

Office of Production Management and the

War Production Board contended that requirements were being set at unrealistic

levels. In the so-called feasibility dispute

they took the position that the Army's

goals were too high to be achieved in the

time allotted. Although not familiar with

the strategic justification for all the guns,

ammunition, and tanks included in the

various programs, they nevertheless

doubted the need for such huge quantities

of equipment; and, knowing the hard facts

of munitions production, they questioned

the feasibility of the objectives. In this

matter they were joined by Ordnance

officers who felt that the President and the

General Staff were allowing their judgment to be unduly influenced by urgent

British requests for aid and by the public

clamor for prompt action that followed

Munitions for War. The evolution of the ASP is

described briefly in Ann Rpt ASF FY 1943, ch. 2,

and more fully in Frank, op. cit., with copies of

numerous basic documents. See also Min of the

conf on the ASP held in Somervell's office.

63

 Memo, Somervell for Moore, 22 Jan 42. For

detailed statement of regulations governing its

preparation, see SOS Admin Memo 38, 16 Sep 42,

OO 381/9948 Misc and WD Tech Manual 38-

210, 25 Jan 44. The ASP was briefly described by

Maj. Gen Lucius D. Clay in "The Army Supply

Program," Fortune, February 1943, pp. 96-97,

225.

64

 (1) Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization; (2) McMullen, Ordnance Administration,

pt. IV, ch. XVII, p. 650, OHF. For the War

Department's effort to persuade the President to

reduce his objectives, see Ltr, Actg SW to President, 10 Jan 42, and reply dated 12 Jan 42, ASF

Contl Div files, 400 Time Objective.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 63

the outbreak of war.65 Describing the

goals as wholly impossible, the War Production Board planning committee in

March 1942 called for reduction of the

Army Ordnance portion of the total program from $15.6 billion in 1942 to $9.2

billion.66 Ordnance officers concentrated

their fire on foreign aid requirements,

which loomed rather large in the over-all

picture, arguing that they were far too

high and were not based on precise calculation of needs. There was virtually no

argument on this score within the Army.

The prevailing view was expressed by Maj.

Gen. Richard C. Moore, former Deputy

Chief of Staff, who remarked at a production conference in June 1942: "I'll tell you

one thing about Defense Aid—they just

guessed the requirements. They never had

a true basis. They didn't have any foundation. They just reached up in the air and

got what they thought the United States

would give them." General Somervell

agreed. "That's entirely correct."

 67

In spite of the President's reiteration on

1 May of his desire to see the January goals

attained, the Army Supply Program underwent constant revision during 1942 and, to

the relief of Ordnance leaders, was steadily

scaled down.68 (Table 6) The authors of

the program had hoped that it would require full recomputation only once each

year, but the need for revision became

apparent almost as soon as the first ASP

was distributed. Reductions in production

goals were dictated in part by the rubber

shortage that followed the loss of Malaya

and in part by lack of enough production

capacity for Army trucks. Lend-lease requirements were cut and less mechanized

equipment was provided for the U.S.

forces. A few weeks later, in mid-July

1942, ASF informed the technical services

that the ground equipment section would

have to be revised again because of

"changes in the Troop Basis, modifications

in the Tables of Organization, Tables of

Basic Allowances, and Tables of Allowances, and the adoption of new maintenance and distribution factors."

 69

 In this

edition, major reductions resulted from

earmarking certain units in the Troop

Basis as training units that would remain

in the United States during 1942 and

would therefore require only half the authorized allowance of certain items. Requirements for small arms ammunition

were sharply reduced in the summer of

1942, bringing them closer to Ordnance

recommendations, and causing cancellation

of 43 production lines.

During the second half of 1942 the Ordnance load was both increased and de65

 Ordnance views were made plain in the production conferences of 1942 and were repeated by

many retired Ordnance officers during interviews

while this volume was in preparation. For WPB

views, see Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter X; CPA, Industrial Mobilization for

War, part III, chapter 4; John E. Brigante, The

Feasibility Dispute (Washington: Committee on

Public Administration Cases, 1950) ; and Memo,

WPB Plng Comm. to Donald Nelson, 17 Mar 42,

WPB PD 212 Prod Programs, NA. The whole subject is reviewed in Leighton and Coakley, Global

Logistics, 1940-1943, ch. VIII. 66

 Memo, Plng Comm. to Nelson, 17 Mar 42. 67

 Review of the Prod Plans of the Ammo Div,

OCO, 19 Jun 42, T652-C. See also Production

Progress and Production Scheduling, p. 7, a rpt

based on the presentation to the WPB by SOS on

1 Dec 42, ASF 200.02. The growing pains of lendlease are described in Leighton and Coakley,

Global Logistics, 1940-1943, ch. III. 68

 For the broad background see Smith, Army

and Economic Mobilization; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, Production Progress and

Production Scheduling, pp. 7-8; and CPA Industrial Mobilization for War. 69

 Memo, ASF for tech servs, 15 Jul 42, sub:

Recomputation of ... ASP, ex. 39 in Frank, op.

cit. For broad picture of Troop Basis planning,

see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization

of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 189-259.
64 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 6—DECLINE IN TANK REQUIREMENTS DURING 1942

[IN ROUND NUMBERS]

creased. The increase came in September

with transfer from the Quartermaster

Corps to Ordnance of all responsibility for

trucks and other noncombat vehicles. The

decrease came two months later when,

after the President's decision to boost output of ships and planes during 1943 and

cut back requirements for armored forces,

a new computation of the ASP was issued

under date of 12 November 1942.70 It

reduced requirements for medium tanks

and allied vehicles by some 21,000 units

and marked the end of the "all out" effort

to build tanks. As the danger of air attacks

faded, some 11,000 AA guns were eliminated from 1943 requirements. At the

same time—less than one year after Pearl

Harbor—small arms ammunition requirements were cut back further and construction work on new ammunition plants was

canceled. All together, work was stopped

on more than 75 Ordnance projects.71 The

new ASP called for production of only

about $22 billion in 1943 instead of over

$31 billion required for 1943 by the first

edition.72 By the end of 1942 the troop

basis listed only one hundred divisions,

instead of the two hundred earlier planned,

and the number of armored divisions had

dropped from over sixty to only twenty.

Introduction of Supply Control, 1944-45

The cutbacks in 1942 did not prevent

production in 1943 from reaching peak

levels. Plants newly built or converted to

munitions production during the first year

of war poured forth a flood of military

supplies in the second year. The accompanying list of Ordnance items selected

70

 Copy in OCO-Detroit file. See also Memo,

Brig Gen L. D. Clay, ACofS Materiel, for CG

SOS, 8 Nov 42, sub: Effect on Prod of Further

Curtailment in Troop Basis, ASF; Memo, Clay to

Somervell, 28 Aug 42, sub: Revision of ASP, ex.

44 in Frank, op. cit.; and Master Schedule, Ord

Ind Div, 25 Nov 42, OHF. 71

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for Chief Prod Div, SOS,

21 Nov 42, sub: Review of Mil Construction,

WPB file PD 411.33 Construction Projects, NA.

(2) Memo, Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay for Somervell, 14 Dec 42, sub: Construction Stopped by

Ord, ASF Prod Div, folder 400-Rqmts Gen 1943.

(3) Major Items of Munitions Removed from

1943 War Prod Objectives. . . , WPB PD file 212

NA. For the status of deliveries, requirements,

and scheduled production of all major items, see

Master Schedule, Ord Ind Div, 25 Nov 42, OHF. 72

 For tabulation of dollar values for the editions of ASP, see Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, Chapter VII. For quantities of items

and planned monthly capacity, see various issues

of Master Schedule of Ordnance Industrial Division, 10 August 1942, 20 September 1942, and 25

November 1942. See also bar charts showing required production at various intervals in [Wood],

Background of the ASP.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 65

TABLE 7—SELECTED ORDNANCE ITEMS, 1942-1943

more or less at random illustrates the contrast between 1942 and 1943. (Table 7)

By the end of the first year after Pearl

Harbor the immense task of equipping the

rapidly expanding Army was well under

way. Sufficient supplies were on hand for

the North Africa landings in November

1942, for the supply of other overseas

forces, and for aid to allies. By the summer

of 1943 the first phase of the supply

process was virtually complete, and reserve

stocks of many items were beginning to

accumulate. In July and August 1943 the

War Department Procurement Review

Board headed by Maj. Gen. Frank R.

McCoy, and including among its members

a former Chief of Ordnance, General

Williams, surveyed the whole situation and

reached the conclusion that the time had

come for closer screening of requirements

and tighter control of inventories.73 As

noted above, a move in this direction had

been taken by Ordnance and other technical services earlier in the year with the

dispatch overseas of teams trained to survey actual consumption data.74

The conclusions of the McCoy Board

were received with some misgivings at ASF

headquarters. Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay,

ASF Director of Materiel, had labored

hard throughout 1942 to boost production

and overcome equipment shortages. His

goal had been to supply combat troops

with all the fighting tools they needed, and

to that end he had constantly urged industrial leaders and workers in the shops to

put forth every effort to meet their production quotas. Now the McCoy report gave

the impression that production had caught

up with demand and that relaxation of

effort was in order. "They came out with a

report telling the world that we had too

much of everything," complained General

Clay in the spring of 1944, "and the

emphasis went over on economy instead

of man-you-don't-be-short."

 75

 In General

Clay's opinion it was "the worst thing that

ever happened around here," for it resulted

in a slackening of effort on the home front

during 1944. Cutbacks in some production

schedules were certainly called for by the

latter half of 1943, but there were major

exceptions, such as artillery ammunition,

73

 For copy of McCoy Bd Rpt, see Levels of

Supply and Supply Procedure, 1 Jan 44, op. cit.

The board was appointed by WD SO No. 183,

2 Jul 43. 74

 PSP 55, P. 134. 75

 Telcon, Clay and Maj. Gen. Levin Campbell,

Jr., 27 Mar 44, in folder Heavy Arty and Ammo,

Ord ExecO file.
66 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

which should have been pushed ahead instead of being held back.76

As a follow-up to the McCoy Board

report a special committee headed by Brig.

Gen. George J. Richards studied reserve

stocks in both the ZI and overseas. It

recommended some cuts and urged improvement in methods for computing requirements and controlling reserve supplies, but did not take exception to the

supplies of ammunition that had accumulated during the period of limited fighting.

In view of the rise in total Army storage

inventories to more than $5 billion the

committee urged that for some types of

equipment reliance be placed in the future

on reserve production capacity rather than

on reserve stocks. As sea lanes to all theaters were open the committee urged reduction in the huge reserve stocks in overseas

depots. The so-called McNarney Directive

of 1 January 1944 put these recommendations into effect and was soon followed by

the introduction of new techniques that

came to be known as Supply Control.77 In

essence, the new system was nothing more

than a close integration of all supply data

with known requirements. For each principal item of equipment, it brought together

on one sheet of paper all data affecting

supply and demand status, including past

issue experience, estimated future issues to

ports, and the schedule of future production. Monthly supply reports from overseas

commands were used to keep procurement

plans in line with the actual supply situation in the theaters of war. From the

production standpoint an important feature of the Supply Control system was the

fact that, unlike the ASP, it stated requirements on a monthly as well as an annual

basis with a view toward keeping closer

control of procurement and supply.78

Requirements leveled off in the 1944-45

period as compared to the earlier years.

Production was mostly for replacement of

equipment worn out or lost in action, and

settled down to a fairly stable level month

after month. But for Ordnance there were

several major exceptions to this rule. Adoption of new types of weapons and ammunition, or suddenly increased demands for

old types, caused sharp fluctuations in

requirements.79 A notable example was

the emergence of rockets as major Ordnance items, resulting in a steadily rising

curve of requirements for rockets and

launchers during the latter half of the war.

In other areas the trend was toward bigness—heavy artillery to batter down fixed

defenses, blockbuster bombs to blast military targets, huge tanks to counter the

German heavyweights, and large trucks to

provide fast overland transport in the

European theater. Whatever the nature of

the change in requirements, they spelled

trouble for Ordnance. In large measure

76

 See below, Chapter X, and Comparison of

Victory Program Troop Basis of 22 Nov 43 with

Victory Program Troop Basis of 15 June 1943,

exhibit 94 in Frank, op. cit., showing sharp drop

in AA artillery and armor. 77

 (1) Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization,

ch. VII; (2) Frank, op. cit.; (3) PSP 55, I, p.

132ff; (4) ASF Cir 67, 7 Mar 44, pt. 3; (5) ASF

Manual M413. The McNarney directive, the report of the McCoy Board, and the report of the

Richards Committee appear in Levels of Supply

and Supply Procedure, 1 Jan 44, copy in OCMH.

The background is discussed in Annual Report of

Requirements Division, ASF, FY 1944, and in

Memo, ASF Director of Matériel for ASF, directory 28 Jan 44, copy in OHF. 78

 PSP 55, I, discusses this topic in some detail.

See also Frank, op. cit., pp. 138ff and Smith,

Army, and Economic Mobilization, ch. VI-VIII.

Since the impact of the new procedures within

Ordnance was greatest in Field Service the subject is discussed below in Chapter XVI. 79

 For summary statements see Ann Rpt ASF

FY 1944, ch. 7, and Memo, CG ASF for Director

OWMR, 7 Dec 44, ASF Director Matériel file,

dr 1595, Reading File, Matériel.
THE PROBLEM OF REQUIREMENTS 67

the chapters that follow are devoted to the

maneuvers necessary to keep production in

line with stated requirements.

As early as 1943 the War Department

took steps to estimate the effect on requirements of the end of the war in Europe. To

guard against adverse psychological effects

of announcing that the Army was already

planning for the end of the war, the fact

that demobilization studies were being

conducted was not made public, and within the Army they were discreetly referred

to as "special planning" studies. They began in the fall of 1943 with a requirements

computation based on a reduced troop

basis for Period I—after defeat of Germany

but before defeat of Japan—and from that

time forward special planning computations played a more and more important

role as the end of the war came closer.

After the defeat of Germany in early May

1945, the Ordnance Materiel Control Division (the former Requirements Division)

continued its calculations for the redeployment of materiel from Europe to the Far

East. The task involved determining what

quantities should be kept in Europe and

what surplus materiel was serviceable

enough, or could be properly repaired, for

shipment to the Pacific. In the war against

Japan the Army planned to use more heavy

infantry weapons, more amphibious equipment, more self-propelled artillery, and

fewer heavy tanks. While these calculations

were in process the Japanese surrender

was announced and the war was over.
CHAPTER V

Artillery

Artillery weapons were the dark horses

of World War II. Less spectacular and

newsworthy than tanks and planes, they

were sometimes neglected, if not forgotten,

until the need for them reached the crisis

stage. The artillery lessons of World War I

had been forcefully set down in 1919 when

the Westervelt Board emphasized the need

for systematic development of improved

weapons. But lack of funds during the interwar period slowed research to a snail's

pace and practically stopped all procurement of new materiel.1

 At the start of the

defense period in 1939 and 1940 there was

a tendency, stronger at the General Staff

level than in Ordnance, to feel that big

guns were outmoded, that aerial bombardment would in the future largely replace

artillery fire. The ground forces believed

that nothing larger than the 155-mm. gun

"Long Tom" would be needed. But experience soon exposed the error of these notions. Fighting in North Africa, at Stalingrad, on Pacific islands, and in Italy

proved there was no substitute for big,

powerful guns to blast enemy fortifications

or lay down a curtain of fire before advancing foot soldiers. No lesson of World War

II was plainer than this. Only heavy artillery could provide sustained, accurately

placed fire on a 'round-the-clock basis regardless of weather conditions.2

 In Italy

the Allied forces found themselves consistently outranged by German heavy artillery but they accepted only reluctantly

the assignment of 240-mm. howitzers and

8-inch guns.3

As the war progressed, demands arose

for more powerful tank guns, automatic

aircraft guns, and a variety of selfpropelled antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Rapid-firing guns of intermediate caliber proved essential for AA defense as guns

powerful and accurate enough to reach

fast, high-flying bombers. The trend in

tank armament was all toward more

powerful guns firing armor-piercing am1

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. VII. See also History of the

Procurement Activities of the Ordnance Department Since 1938 in Truman Comm. Report, Aug

46, OHF. 2

 For discussion of this theme, see address by

Maj. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes before the American Society for Metals, 19 Oct 44, Cleveland O.,

OHF. The same thought was vigorously presented

by Senator Harry S. Truman in Truman Comm.

Hearings, pt. 25. See also Campbell's Memo for

Somervell, 3 Jun 43, quoting letter from Col. D.

J. Crawford, Ordnance officer in Africa, OHF,

and Brig. Gen. Gordon M. Wells "The New 155-

mm. Howitzer," Army Ordnance, vol. XXVIII,

No. 149 (March-April 1945), 223-25. The Air

Force view is set forth in Wesley Frank Craven

and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces

in World War II," vol. III, Europe: Argument

to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. X. 3

 Lida Mayo, draft MS for Ordnance Overseas, Anzio ch., OHF.
ARTILLERY 69

munition. In addition to .50-caliber machine guns, airplanes required automatic

weapons of artillery caliber, chiefly the

20-mm. and 37-mm.4 When the United

States began to rearm in 1940 the Ordnance Department, still suffering from

twenty years of poverty, was ill prepared to

meet the new demands. Speedy development of improved types or adoption of

war-tested foreign models became the order

of the day with the result that nearly all

the artillery pieces in the hands of U.S.

troops in 1943 were different from those

standard in 1938.5

The prewar neglect of artillery development was a sad mistake, for the design and

manufacture of big guns cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment. Design and test of a new weapon takes

months, even years, of effort. Adoption of

foreign weapons always entails a host of

production problems and delays. Building

new plants and tooling them for the manufacture of complete artillery pieces in

quantity are always time-consuming processes. For the U.S. Army this lesson had

been forcibly driven home in 1917-1918

when only a few American-made artillery

weapons reached France in time to contribute to the defeat of Germany.6

 During the

two decades that followed the Armistice,

some effort was devoted to improving manufacturing techniques, but the over-all advance was slight.7

 Big guns were expensive

items that the small Ordnance budget

would not adequately cover. Nevertheless,

when war appeared imminent in 1940 even

the slight progress made during the lean

years was important, and the mere existence of arsenals with long experience in the

manufacture and procurement of guns,

recoil mechanisms, carriages, and fire control instruments was of incalculable help in

getting production started.

Artillery on Hand in 1940

In the spring of 1940 the Army's stock

of field artillery was made up for the most

part of antiquated pieces left over from

World War I. About 40 percent of the

weapons (including mortars) on hand

were 75-mm. guns of World War I vintage,

most of French manufacture. Though excellent in their day, they had long since

been outmoded.8 During the 1930's some

of the old 75's had been "high-speeded"

with roller bearings and pneumatic tires

that enabled them to travel 50 miles per

hour on good roads but had no effect on

their firepower. For the 75 an improved

carriage with split trails was developed to

increase its range, angle of elevation, and

traverse, but, for lack of money, only a few

weapons had been so improved. Throughout the 1930's the using arms considered

this gun their standard field artillery weapon and stoutly defended it even as late as

1939 and 1940. But on the eve of World

4

 The dividing line between small arms and artillery was drawn at .60-caliber by Ordnance in

World War II. 5

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, especially ch. VII; (2) Hist,

Arty Div, Ind Serv OCO, 1940-45, I, sec. 2; (3)

The Development Record in Artillery, draft in

typescript form apparently prepared in Ord Hist

Br in 1945, OHF. 6

 (1) Final Rpt, Gen John J. Pershing, 1 Sep

19, pt. III, sec. 24; (2) Rpt SW, II Nov 19, pp.

4-5.

7

 (1) Brig. Gen. Gordon M. Wells, "Artillery"

in Army Ordnance Association pamphlet, Artillery

in World War II and Plans for the Future, May

1946, OHF; (2) Campbell, op. cit., pp. 206-07;

(3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. VII; (4) Hist, Arty Div, Ind

Serv, OCO, I, sec. 2. 8

 For frank criticism of the 75, see remarks of

Senator Thomas (Okla.), Congressional Record,

96th Cong., 3d sess., May 15, 1940, vol 86, pt.

6, p. 6135. For comparison of American with

German and Japanese artillery, see The Development Record in Artillery.
70 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 8—ARTILLERY AVAILABLE, 30 JUNE 1940

Source: Green, Thomson, Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 74. Compare tabulation as of 31 Dec 39 in Hist, Arty Div, I,

sec. 10, Fig. 1. Compare also artillery available to British Home Forces on 8 June 1940 as summarized by Peter Fleming in Operation

Sea Lion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), pp. 198-99.

a Includes 599 high-speeded.

b Number produced before 30 June 1940 according to production records of Weapons and Fire Contl Br. Ind Div, OCO.

War II it was superseded by the more

powerful and more modern 105-mm. howitzer.9

Nearly all the remaining guns and howitzers in stock were obsolete—deficient in

range, mobility, or other important tactical

features. The situation had not changed

much since early 1939 when the Chief of

Staff had declared, "Twenty years after the

close of the World War finds us equipped

with much the same type of artillery we

used during the war."

 10

 Furthermore, the

limited stocks were depleted after Dunkerque by transfer to the British Army of

some 895 75-mm. guns, along with small

arms and ammunition of various calibers.11

By the end of June 1940, when the French

surrendered and the outlook for all the

democracies was gloomy, the sum total of

mobile artillery available to the U.S. Army

was not impressive. (Table 8} The only

reasonably modern weapons on this list

were the new 105-mm. howitzers just going into production, the 155-mm. "Long

Tom" guns, and the 75-mm. pack howitzers, and the newly adopted 60-mm. and

81-mm. mortars. The 37-mm. tank and

antitank weapons were effective against

light tanks but useless against the heavy,

thick-skinned tanks coming into service in

Europe.12 In like manner the 3-inch anti9

 For Congressional reluctance to modernize the

obsolescent 75's, see H.R. Rpt No. 112, 76th

Cong., 1st sess., 1 Mar 39, p. 9. For the Army's

defense of the 75, see WDAB, H.R., 76th Cong.,

3d sess., pp. 5-7, and WDAB, S., H.R. 4630, 76th

Cong., 1st sess., 15 Mar 39, pp. 38-41. See also

Min, Wesson Confs, 22 Oct 41. 10

 Statement by Gen Malin Craig, WDAB, H.R.,

76th Cong., 1st sess., 1940, 24 Jan 39. See also

Kreidberg and Henry Military Mobilization, pp.

550-51. 11

 For a detailed account of British artillery development and use during these years, see Brigadier A. L. Pemberton, The Development of

Artillery Tactics and Equipment (London, 1950). 12

 PSP 31, The Design, Development and Production of Wheeled Antitank Guns, May 1945, I,

p. 2, OHF.
ARTILLERY 71

INSPECTING A 75-MM. PACK HOWITZER during Third Army maneuvers prior to World

War II. From left, in civilian clothes, are Congressmen J. Buell Snyder, Overton Brooks, and

Francis Case.

aircraft gun was ineffective against highflying planes then being produced.13

 Ordnance was designing and testing improved

weapons to make good these deficiencies,

but the supply of guns ready for action

was both meager and out of date, and the

prospects for immediate new production

were limited. As late as the winter of

1943-44 some 155-mm. howitzers of

World War I vintage were in service in

Italy. Their tubes were still in good condition but their carriages and recoil mechanisms gave no end of trouble, largely due

to their old age.14

Production Preparedness

To the average citizen, familiar only

with cannon displayed in the village

square, these weapons appear to be nothing more than simple steel tubes mounted

on sets of wheels. But close examination of

World War II guns reveals that they were

highly complicated mechanisms demanding

top quality steel and precision workmanship, with tubes or barrels15

 strong

13

 For contemporary criticism and rebuttal, see

article by Arthur Krock in New York Times,

October 1, 1940, and Memo, CofOrd for ASW,

2 Oct 40, ExecO file M-Materiel-Cannon. 14

 Ltr, Lt Col Harry P. Storke, Arty officer, Hq

II Corps, to Brig Gen Wells, Hq Fifth Army, 4

Jan 44, sub: Comments on Arty Materiel, copy

in OHF. This 8-page letter reports on performance of all types of U.S. artillery. 15

 The term "barrel," as applied to gun tubes,

derives from the ancient practice of forming cannon from metal rods arranged like barrel staves

and held in place by hoops.
72 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

enough to withstand pressures of approximately forty thousand pounds per square

inch. Every step in the process of gun

production had to be rigidly controlled to

assure the desired metallurgical results.

After the forged or cast gun tube was

carefully machined inside and out, its bore

had to be honed to a mirror finish and

then rifled to precise dimensions, with

measurements to the thousandth of an

inch the rule rather than the exception.16

 Recoil mechanisms and recuperators, mounted on the carriage to take up

the force of recoil and return the gun to

firing position, were made of cylinders and

pistons that could withstand extremely

high internal pressures. "The action of the

240-mm. recuperator after a shot," wrote

Benedict Crowell following World War I,

"is equivalent to stopping a locomotive

[traveling at more than 50 miles per hour]

in less than 4 feet in half a second without

damage."

 17

 Recoil mechanisms had to be

built with great care to withstand repeated

firings, for failure of a recoil mechanism

was potentially as dangerous as failure of

the gun tube itself. Carriages and mounts

were rugged platforms capable of absorbing all the stresses and strains of firing the

piece. They also carried sighting and ranging devices, fuze setters, and gears and

hand wheels for aiming the gun. "Oncarriage" fire control equipment for field

artillery was fairly simple—telescopes and

gunner's quadrants—but "off-carriage" directors for antiaircraft guns were incredibly

complex, containing thousands of precision-made parts.18

The most encouraging factor in the production picture in 1940 was the existence

of four Ordnance arsenals experienced in

manufacture of artillery components. Watervliet was the center for production of

finished guns. Watertown made gun castings as well as carriages and recoil mechanisms for seacoast and antiaircraft guns.

Rock Island made carriages and recoil

mechanisms for field guns, and Frankford

supplied fire control instruments. These

four arsenals were prepared in 1940 to do

two things immediately: manufacture and

assemble artillery components on a small

scale in their own shops, and instruct

industry in the mysteries of the gunmaker's

art.19 Before the outbreak of the war in

Europe there had been no production of

field artillery by American private industry for many years. In fact, during the two

decades of peace between the wars, there

had been very little production of big guns

anywhere in the United States. The small

additions to Army supplies permitted year

by year had come chiefly from the Ordnance arsenals, while a few private contractors and the Naval Gun Factory—supplemented on occasion by the Ordnance

arsenals—had supplied the Navy's needs.20

Equipped in 1938 and 1939 with many

new machine tools and staffed with experienced craftsmen, the Ordnance arsenals

were ready in 1940 to go immediately into

16

 Lt. Col. Thomas J. Hayes, Elements of Ordnance (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1938), pp.

158-67, pp. 200-11. For an older but nonetheless

useful account, see Benedict Crowell, America's

Munitions 1917-18 (Washington, 1919), pp. 21-

56.

17

 Crowell, America's Munitions, p. 57. 18

 (1) Artillery, 1 Jul 40-31 Aug 45, prepared

in Ord Hist Sec by F. D. McHugh, C. B. Rosa,

and F. W. F. Gleason, under the direction of

Brig Gen John K. Christmas, 31 Dec 45, OHF;

(2) Rpt on M5 Director by Singer Mfg Co. in

Hist, New York Ord Dist, 100, pt. 3. 19

 History, Artillery Division, OCO, op. cit., I.

sec. 3, and Truman Comm. Report. Compare

with the situation in 1917 as described in Crowell,

op. cit.

20

 For the Navy experiences, see Lt. Cdr. Buford

Rowland and Lt. William B. Boyd, U.S. Navy

Bureau of Ordnance in World War II (Washington, 1953).
ARTILLERY 73

production. They constituted a ready industrial reserve to help meet the national

emergency and during the defense period

produced approximately 25 percent of all

artillery built for the Army.21 But it was

well understood that they could supply

only a small fraction of the Army's artillery demands in time of war. To arm a

large force, and to help supply friendly

nations, main reliance would have to be

placed on production by private industry.

The hitch was that industry was unfamiliar with the manufacture of artillery.22

Through its industrial surveys, which were

given added impetus in the late 1930's,

Ordnance had acquired some knowledge of

the firms most suitable for war production

and had discussed with them the problem

of gun manufacture. In the spring of 1939

Ordnance took a further step, placing with

R. Hoe and Company, a New York manufacturer of printing presses, an educational

order for five recoil mechanisms for the

3-inch AA gun. One of the first four

educational orders placed by Ordnance, it

was satisfactorily completed within a year.

The company was then given a production

contract for 125 mechanisms of the same

type, and completed them in less time

than it took to make the first 5. Having

proved its ability to deliver the goods, R.

Hoe and Company was asked to make

recoil mechanisms for the new 90-mm. AA

gun, which replaced the 3-inch, and thereafter Hoe continued as a major Ordnance

supplier.23

During 1940 and early 1941 additional

educational orders for recoil mechanisms

went to another printing press facility,

Walter Scott and Company of New Jersey,

and to the Byron Jackson Company of

California, a leader in the oil equipment

industry. The contract with Walter Scott

turned out badly and had to be terminated

a year later without delivery of any mechanisms, but Byron Jackson completed its

order in the spring of 1942 and continued

during the war to produce recoil mechanisms for Ordnance. Another educational

order went to the Duraloy Company for

work on centrifugal castings, and several

were awarded other firms, principally Eastman Kodak Company, and MergenthalerLinotype Company, for telescopes, aiming

circles, and related fire control instruments.

To cover additional artillery items Ordnance turned to the less costly production

study,24 which did not call for production

of materiel but nevertheless provided essential data on methods of manufacture.

While R. Hoe and Company Was completing production of recoil mechanisms for

the 3-inch AA gun the Otis Elevator

Company undertook a production study

on the same process.25 The Wood Newspaper Machinery Corp. studied production

of the 155-mm. mechanism and American

Type Founders, Inc., the 75-mm. mechanism. In the spring of 1940 the Cowdrey

Machine Works undertook a production

study of the 75-mm. pack howitzer, the

21

 Campbell, op. cit., p. 214. 22

 For comments on this theme, see Notes for

New York Mtg, 12 Jun 45 by Brig Gen Gordon

M. Wells, OHF. 23

 (1) Maj Carl A. Gerstacker, Recoil Mechanisms and Equilibrators, Apr 39-May 45, bk. I,

ch. 1, OHF; (2) Hist, New York Ord Dist, 100,

pt. 3, statement by Harry M. Tillinghast, chairman of the board of R. Hoe and Co.; (3) Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, p. 58; (4) Documents in Educational Orders

file, OHF; (5) "Welding Plays Top Role in AA

Gun Recoils" by Joseph L. Auer, vice president

R. Hoe and Co., American Machinist, 86 (November 26, 1942), 1371-82. 24

 See Chapter II above for discussion of this

technique of procurement planning. 25

 For a revealing account of Otis' experience,

see its historical report in Hist, New York Ord

Dist, 100, pt. 3, OHF.
74 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

National Pneumatic Company did the

same for the 37-mm. tank gun, and the

Nash Engineering Company took on the

81-mm. mortar and its mount. Between

educational orders and production studies

Ordnance attempted to stretch its meager

funds over the most important problem

items in the manufacture of artillery and

thus prepare industry for munitions production if war should come.26

Launching the Program, 1940-41

Though war did not come to the United

States in 1940, production got under way

on something approaching a wartime scale,

as the smoldering conflict in Europe burst

into flames. Congress appropriated billions

of dollars for rearmament, and Ordnance

was given the green light to put its procurement machinery in action. Firms with

educational orders received production

contracts, and the district offices intensified

their search for other qualified producers.

After business firms signed contracts to

produce artillery items they sent their engineers and master mechanics to arsenal

shops and drafting rooms to learn all they

could about tool design, gages, specifications, and requirements for material.

"They all go to Watertown and Watervliet," General Wesson reported at a conference. "They are just overrun with these

fellows." 27 The arsenals were able not only

to provide specifications but also to advise

on tool design and requirements for machinery, and to make gages available for

study. When manufacturers ran into

trouble with specific processes they could

call upon the arsenals to send out trained

experts to give help. In one instance a

Picatinny expert on automatic drilling machines was lent to an Ordnance contractor

for three months to help install new equipment and to train company employees in

its operation and upkeep.28 Fundamental

knowledge of the gunmaking art, carefully

preserved and nurtured at the arsenals

during the interwar years, was thus quickly

passed on to industry at the very start of

the rearmament effort.29

All the arsenals bustled with unaccustomed activity in 1940-41. They overhauled and modernized weapons in stock,

installed new machine tools, and reconditioned buildings that had long been neglected. Barbed wire was strung along the

top of stone walls surrounding Watervliet,

and floodlights were turned on at night.

Carloads of specialized gunmaking machines held in arsenal storage since World

War I were shipped to Ordnance contractors. Manufacturing techniques developed

during the years of peace were given an

opportunity to prove their worth. In October 1940 Watervliet came into the national

spotlight for a day when it was honored

with a visit by President Roosevelt. The

curve of gun production at Watervliet rose

steadily until an entire year's production at

the 1938 rate could be turned out in a

single day. Producing thousands of centrifugally cast gun tubes, Watertown became in the 1940-41 period the only important source of medium caliber gun

tubes for the Army. The number of

26

 Documents in Educational Orders folder,

OHF. 27

 Review Prod Plans of the Arty Div, 13 Feb

42, p. 34. OHF. 28

 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 44-45. See also History

of the Watervliet Arsenal, XV, particularly 111-

15.

29

 The histories of the arsenals on file in OHF

are replete with examples. See also radio speech

by Col Steven L. Conner, Apr 42, quoted in Hist,

Watervliet, XV, 114-16. For detailed data on procurement procedures in 1940-41, see Hist, Arty

Div, Ind Serv, OCO, 1 Jul 40-1 Oct 45, I, pt. 2,

especially ch. 9.
ARTILLERY 75

MAJOR CALIBER GUN SHOP AT WATERVLIET, New York, in operation before the beginning of World War II.

employees at all the arsenals nearly doubled

in the twelve months following June 1940,

and production rose in proportion, its

value totaling over $138 million in calendar year 1941.30

The task of getting production started at

the arsenals was not without its problems,

but far more difficult was the job of bringing private firms into production. The

Ordnance procurement list included cannon of many different sizes, all with complicated recoil mechanisms, carriages, and

fire control instruments. As the type of

manufacturing equipment needed for these

components varied widely, and individual

firms lacked the machinery to make complete guns, contracts did not call for complete weapons but only for certain major

components. As a result, meeting production schedules demanded widespread cooperative effort among all the producers.

With the 37-mm. antitank gun, for example, Watervliet in the spring of 1940

made the gun, Rock Island the carriage,

and Bausch and Lomb Company the sight.

The 37-mm. antiaircraft gun was more

complicated, requiring, in addition to Watervliet tubes and Watertown carriages, gun

mechanisms from Colt's Patent Fire Arms

Manufacturing Company, control sets from

Bendix Aviation Corporation, and sights

from General Electric. For the powerful

90-mm. AA gun Ordnance contracted with

the Sperry Corporation for directors,

Bausch and Lomb for height finders, Bendix for data transmission systems, and R.

Hoe and Otis Elevator for recoil mecha30

 For detailed data, see Hist, Arty Div, Jul 40-

Oct 45, I, ch. 1, Figs. 2 and 3.
76 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

nisms. All told, more than thirty components of this gun were procured on separate

prime contracts, and the cost of a single

complete weapon with its proportionate

share of fire control instruments amounted

to about $50,000.31 In addition to parts

for assembly into complete weapons, Ordnance called upon industry to produce

large quantities of spare parts, particularly

spare tubes to replace those worn out in

service.32

AA Guns

Because of the growing menace of the

bombing plane in 1940-41 high priority

went to guns for antiaircraft defense. They

were a relatively new type, as time is

measured in the history of artillery, having

emerged only as hasty improvisations during the early 1900's.33

 After World War I

Ordnance had devoted a goodly portion

of its weapons research funds to development and production of a 3-inch AA gun,

with the result that about eight hundred

were on hand in 1940. In peacetime that

appeared to be a not inconsiderable quantity but it was in fact less than the British

had in 1940 to defend the single city of

London.34 Development work of the interwar years had also led to standardization

of an intermediate AA gun, the 37-mm.,

but, as it was just going into production

in 1940 at the Colt's Patent Fire Arms

Manufacturing Company, there was no

prospect of speedy improvement in output.35

 General Marshall told a Senate committee in the spring of 1940 that, at the

current rate of production, the Army

would gain only enough for three additional regiments by the end of the year,

and four more by the end of 1941. He

referred soberly to "the long and maybe

tragic delay involved in securing such material after appropriations have actually

been made."36 While General Marshall

was speaking, the 3-inch (76.2-mm.) gun

was on its way out in favor of the newer

and more powerful 90-mm. gun being

readied for production after its adoption in

February 1940.37 Within a year the 37-

mm. AA gun was to suffer the same fate.

Aside from the obsolescent 3-inch, the

37-mm. was the only antiaircraft gun produced in the United States in 1940, and

production amounted to but 170. By January 1941 the Colt Company was turning

this gun out at the rate of forty per month,

and plans were afoot to adapt the new

British director to the 37-mm. and produce

it in the United States. But in February,

because of the urgent need for 37-mm.

aircraft guns, Ordnance was ordered to

sidetrack the 37-mm. AA weapon.38 At

the same time a new and more powerful

31

 (1) Sources of Arty Materiel, Incl to Memo,

Brig Gen Harris, for CofS, 13 May 40, OO 381/

36045 NA; (2) Memo, Lt Albert L. Keneman,

Jr., for Lt Col Willis R. Slaughter, 16 Nov 40,

sub: 37-mm. gun, AA, ASF Prod Div 472.93 AA

guns, Job 19B, G 1867; (3) Hist, Arty Div, I, ch.

1, secs. 3 and 4, and ch. VI on spare parts. 32

 For a detailed description of artillery spare

parts, see History, Artillery Division, Volume I,

Chapter 6, and Volume 100. 33

 For research and development background, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Chapter XIV. 34

 Congressional Record,. S, 14 May 40, 76th

Cong., 3d sess., vol. 86, pt. 6, p. 6137. 35

 For details on production delays, see Memo,

Keneman for Slaughter, 16 Nov 40, sub: 37-mm.

gun, AA, ASF Prod Div 472.93 AA Guns, Job

19B, G 1867. 36

 Ibid. For background on the 37-mm. gun, see

PSP 29, 37-mm. and 40-mm. AA Guns, Design,

Development, and Production (May 1945), OHF. 37

 William S. Lohr, 90-mm. AA Materiel, OHF. 38

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 20 Feb 41, sub:

Schedule for 37-mm. guns, AG 472.91 (2-5-41)

M-D; (2) Memo, William E. Curley for Slaughter,

14 Jul 41, sub: Prod of 37-mm. AA Gun, ASF

Prod Div 472.93 AA Guns, Job 19B, G 1867.
ARTILLERY 77

AA gun entered the picture, a 40-mm.

weapon made in Sweden by the Bofors

Company. It was strongly recommended

by the Chief of Coast Artillery, but Ordnance was reluctant to abandon its heavy

investment in the 37-mm. and spend many

months tooling up for the 40-mm.39

The Bofors gun had proved its worth in

the Spanish civil war and on the beaches

at Dunkerque, and was generally held to

be superior to the 37-mm.40 For sale to any

nation that cared to buy it, it had come to

the attention of the Ordnance Department

as early as 1937, but for one reason or

another, no sample gun was obtained for

testing. In the fall of 1940, when the

British were eager to buy munitions from

American firms, they supplied Ordnance

with one of their Bofors guns at about the

same time that the U.S. Navy obtained one

directly from Sweden. After performing

admirably in tests the 40-mm. was adopted

by the Army. The Navy, equally enthusiastic about the gun, negotiated with Bofors

for a license to permit manufacture in this

country of both the Army type air-cooled

mobile gun and carriage and the Navy type

water-cooled twin mount. The contract,

signed in June 1941, covered manufacturing rights, blueprints, manufacturing drawings, and the services for one year of two

production experts, who, unfortunately,

never arrived.41 Early in February 1941

Ordnance contracted with Chrysler to prepare working drawings and two pilot

models of the gun, and a few weeks later

placed another contract with Firestone

Tire and Rubber Company to do the same

for the carriage. The first letters of intent

to start the tooling up process went out

over Navy signature to take advantage of

the higher Navy priorities. Barrels for the

two pilot guns were made by a Canadian

firm and were rifled at Watervliet. The

Navy meanwhile contracted with the York

Safe and Lock Company to supply Navy

requirements.42

The complexity of the 40-mm. carriage

forced Firestone to spread its work among

more than 350 subcontractors. Firestone

had not only to translate all metric measurements into inches, sometimes with

troublesome decimals, but also had to make

all threads and gear shapes conform to

standard American practice and prepare

tracings in accord with Ordnance drafting

room regulations. Urged by Ordnance to

recommend design changes to speed production or improve operations, Firestone

contributed a wide variety of acceptable

ideas. It adopted welding to replace one

thousand rivets in the Bofors design and

oilite bushings instead of the original

manganese-bronze bushings. Steel tubing

replaced forged and machined axles, a new

type of traverse mechanism was employed,

and the carriage was equipped with electric instead of hydraulic brakes. These

steps were typical of the "Americanization"

of the 40-mm., converting its production

from a slow, painstaking job according to

39

 (1) Min, Wesson Confs, Feb 41; (2) Memo,

CofOrd for CofS Gen Marshall, 17 Jan 41, sub:

Characteristics of the 37-mm. AA . . . , AG

472.91 (1-17-41); (3) PSP 29; (4) Folder marked 40-mm. Bofors Materiel, OHF. 40

 PSP 29, pt. IV. 41

 Gen Barnes, diary, passim, and folder marked

40-mm. Bofors Materiel, both in OHF. For Navy

background, see Lt. Col. George M. Chinn, The

Machine Gun, III, Chapter 22 (Washington,

1953), and Rowland and Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau

of Ordnance in World War II, Chapter 11. 42

 (1) McHugh, Rosa, and Gleason, Artillery;

(2) Barnes, diary, 11 Apr 41, 17 May 41, passim;

(3) Maj Daniel J. Martin, "The 40-mm. AA Cannon," Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 129 (November

-December 1941), 386; (4) J. E. Trainer, "Antiaircraft Gun Carriages," Army Ordnance, XXII,

No. 130 (January-February 1942), 543; (5) Hist,

Detroit Ord Dist, 100, pt. 18, pp. 45ff ; (6) Chinn,

op. cit.; (7) Rowland and Boyd, op. cit.
78 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

PLATFORM FOR 90-MM. AA GUN CARRIAGE in production at Watertown Arsenal, Mass.,

September 1940.

European practice to speedy quantity production on the pattern of American industry. After the two pilot guns were shipped

to Aberdeen for test in July 1941, both

Firestone and Chrysler began tooling up

and were ready for quantity production

soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl

Harbor. But by the end of the year no

40-mm. guns had been completed. The

only intermediate AA weapon on hand was

the 37-mm., and it continued in short

supply. The Colt Company, swamped with

demands on its small staff and plagued

with labor trouble, had run into one production delay after another, and by December 1941 had turned out only five

hundred gun mechanisms.43

To reach high-flying planes the 90-mm.

AA gun was adopted in February 1940,

replacing the 3-inch. With requirements

for the new gun totaling only 114 in the

spring of 1940, Watertown was assigned

the production of carriages and Watervliet

the gun tubes.44 In the fall, with requirements soaring above the one thousand

mark, invitations for bids on carriages were

issued to a dozen companies. Because the

90-mm. carriage was a new, difficult, and

untried item, industry was reluctant to

undertake its manufacture; only one concern, the York Safe and Lock Company,

then making the 3-inch AA mount, entered

a bid. As Ordnance considered the York

price too high, another and more successful

43

 (1) PSP 29; (2) Memo, CofOrd for USW,

19 Dec 41, sub: The Colt Patent Fire Arms Mfg

Co., OO 472.54/6972. 44

 Memo, CofOrd for USW, 18 Mar 41, sub:

Comparison of Prod Possibilities of British . . .

and American . . . Guns, OO 472.93/1961.
ARTILLERY 79

effort was made in October to attract

bidders. Awards were then made to York,

Allis-Chalmers, and Worthington Pump,

with Watertown also taking on a portion

of the total. The guns themselves were

made only by Watervliet at the start, but

private contractors were later brought into

the picture, chief among them being the

Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation (GMC), the Wheland Company,

and the Oliver Farm Machinery Company.

Production was not only slow to start because of the need for factory conversion,

but it fell below expectations. For the year

1941 it amounted to only 171 complete

units, less than half of which had been

assembled and proof fired.45 The lack of

big AA guns worried Under Secretary

Patterson. "If we get into a shooting war,"

he wrote in August 1941, "the demand

for weapons of these types will be pressing

and immediate. Every city will be demanding antiaircraft guns, and there will be

very few on hand."

 46

Aircraft Cannon

The story of aircraft guns parallels that

of the AA weapons. As the need had arisen

in the late 1930's for an intermediate AA

gun, so there came a demand for an aircraft weapon more powerful than the

standard .50-caliber machine gun, but not

as large as the 37-mm. After all known

weapons in this intermediate range had

been tested by Ordnance and the Air

Corps, both services, in the spring of 1940,

recommended adoption of the 20-mm.

Hispano-Suiza gun known as Birkigt type

404.47 Thirty-three of these weapons had

been purchased from the French owners in

the winter of 1939-40, along with an

option on manufacturing rights. In April

and May 1940 Watervliet made drawings

that could be used as a basis for competitive bids, thus avoiding delay in waiting

for French drawings. Of three bids entered,

the lowest was that by Bendix Aviation

Corporation (Eclipse Machine Division),

a firm that had been interested in the gun

for several years.48 In September 1940,

even before a final contract for manufacturing rights had been signed, Ordnance

contracted with Bendix to make some

1,200 guns (for Air Corps, Navy, and

British) with Ordnance providing about

$1 million for special tools, jogs, fixtures,

and dies.49

Tooling up at the Bendix plant in Elmira, N. Y., was a long, slow process, partly

because the gun (designated M 1 and ANM2) carried the relatively low priority

rating of A-1-c throughout 1940. Watervliet helped by leasing tools to Bendix, and

after the fall of France tools ordered in the

United States by the French government

were diverted to Bendix, even after some

45

 (1) PSP 29, The Design, Development and

Production of 90-mm. and 120-mm. AA Guns

(May 1945), OHF; (2) Lt Walter G. Finch,

Study of 90-mm. AA Gun, 19 Feb 42, OHF; (3)

Memo, USW for CofOrd, 15 Nov 41, OO 4727

1084. 46

 Memo, USW for Moore, 30 Aug 41, OUSW

file 104, folder marked Guns, AT, Aircraft, and

so on. 47

 (1) Ltr, CofAir Corps to CofOrd, 12 Apr 40,

sub: Intermediate Aircraft Cannon, OO 472.91/

2105; (2) OCM 15739, 19 Apr 40 and OCM

15827, 21 May 40; (3) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 23

Oct 39, Purchase of 20-mm. Aircraft Cannon, copy

in OHF Arty docs.; (4) Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. XV. 48

 For correspondence with Bendix, see OO

472.91, NA. 49

 For background of the Hispano-Suiza gun,

see Chinn, op. cit., ch. 13. See also B. D. Barrow,

Production of 20-mm. Automatic Guns, M1 and

AN-M2, OHF, and Design, Development and

Production of 20-mm. Guns, M1 and AN-M2

(Nov 44), both in OHF. The latter study contains

copies of many pertinent documents.
80 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

of them were on the high seas.50 To meet

the rising demand for guns for the Air

Corps program, Ordnance brought three

more producers into the picture in the

spring of 1941. The Army and Navy Munitions Board raised the priority rating to

A-1-b, and eventually to A-1-a. Contracts were placed with the Oldsmobile Division of GMC for nine thousand guns,

with International Harvester for a like

amount, and with Munitions Manufacturing Corporation of Poughkeepsie, N.Y., a

wholly owned subsidiary of International

Business Machines Corporation, for over

thirteen thousand. All told, requirements

for U.S. and British forces exceeded forty

thousand, and the four contractors raced

to get into production. Bendix, which had

a head start, completed five weapons for

test during the summer of 1941 and was

ready for quantity production in September, but production was temporarily delayed because forgings were not available.

After a few guns came off the line in October, design changes in several parts delayed

the start of volume production until November. Meanwhile a trickle of production

came from Oldsmobile and Munitions just

before Pearl Harbor, and International

Harvester came along early in 1942.51

With the 37-mm. aircraft gun there was

no problem of foreign patents or drawings,

but nevertheless production lagged behind

requirements all during the defense period.

The only source for this weapon was Colt's

Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, owner of all the basic patents. An

old, well established gun-making firm, Colt

had started production with a small order

in the winter of 1939-40. In August 1940

Ordnance placed a new contract with Colt

for production at the rate of two hundred

units per month, at the same time authorizing expenditure of nearly $4 million for

new machinery, dies, gages, and fixtures.

In the spring of 1941 Ordnance foresaw

difficulties in meeting the demand for 37-

mm. guns and pleaded in vain for funds to

establish a second producer.52 Colt delivered a few guns in March 1941, but

throughout the rest of the year deliveries

were disappointing and did not keep pace

with production of P-39 planes.53 On the

day after Pearl Harbor, Under Secretary

Patterson, disturbed at the "apparent complacency of the Colt Company," directed it

and all its subcontractors to go on a 24-

hour day, 7-day-week schedule until the

shortage was overcome.54 A few days later

Patterson called upon General Wesson to

"bring about promptly a change in management in the Colt Plant."55

 General

Wesson went to Hartford in person, made

an appeal to the workers for increased

production, and conferred at length with

company officials. General Wesson knew

that the company had taken on so much

war work that it had spread its management dangerously thin. Confident that

50

 Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, XV, bk. II, 269-

70.

51

 (1) Barrow, Prod of 20-mm. Automatic

Guns: (2) Barrow, Design, Development, and

Prod of 20-mm. Guns; (3) Hist, New York Ord

Dist, 100, pt. 5, sec. 2, IBM Corp, OHF; (4)

Review of the Prod Plans of the Arty Div, OCO,

4 Mar 42, p. 3. 52

 Memo, CofOrd to TAG, 5 May 41, sub: 37-

mm. Automatic Cannon, AG 472.93/2299. 53

 Min, Wesson Confs, 16 Aug 41. 54

 (1) Memo, USW for Wesson, 8 Dec 41, sub:

37-mm. Aircraft Gun, ExecO file; (2) Memo,

USW for CofOrd, 15 Nov 41, OO 472/1084; (3)

PSP 30, Design, Development and Production of

37-mm. Gun, M4 (Nov 44), pt. 2, OHF. 55

 (1) Memo, USW for CofOrd, 13 Dec 41,

ExecO file M-Matériel-Cannon; (2) Martin,

Memo of conf at Colt Plant on 17 Dec 41, 19 Dec

41, OO 472.91/1365; (3) Memo, CofOrd for

USW, 19 Dec 41, sub: The Colt Patent Fire Arms

Mfg Co., OUSW file 104, folder Guns, AT, and

son on; (4) Memo, USW for Brig Gen Thomas

J. Hayes, 22 Dec 41, same file.
ARTILLERY 81

the company could overcome its difficulties, he decided against making a change

in management, but offered help instead.

He directed that Springfield Armory send

Col. Elbert L. Ford and several production

engineers and expediters to the Colt plant

to help boost production. The results were

gratifying. More than 6,000 guns were

produced in calendar year 1942 as compared with 390 in 1941.

Tank and Antitank Guns

Though destined soon to be replaced by

more powerful weapons, the 37-mm. was

the most important tank and antitank

gun before Pearl Harbor, and was produced in the largest quantities. As a tank

gun the 37-mm. went into production at

Watervliet in November 1938 with an order for eighteen pieces, followed in June

1939 by an order for some four hundred

more.56 These orders were awarded to

Watervliet because that arsenal had taken

an active part in developing the weapon,

had manufactured the pilot models, and

possessed both the equipment and the

trained personnel for its production. After

the first 18 guns were shipped in February

1940 the production rate was gradually

stepped up to 150 per month early in 1941.

Meanwhile contracts for tank guns (M5)

were placed in the summer of 1940 with

United Shoe Machinery Corporation and

National Pneumatic Company.57 Both

concerns got into production quickly and

between them completed delivery of over

2,800 guns before Pearl Harbor, when they

switched over to an improved model, the

M6. Late in 1940 a contract for the M6

gun had been placed with American Type

Founders, which completed some 900 guns

before the end of 1941. By the end of the

year total output by Watervliet and the

three contractors had passed the 5,000

mark, but requirements, including several

thousand guns for the British, had meanwhile risen to nearly 35,000.58

As an antitank gun the 37-mm. went

into production at the arsenals during the

winter of 1939-40, Watervliet making the

guns and Rock Island the carriages.59 As

early as April 1940 contracts were placed

with the York Safe and Lock Company for

both guns and carriages. Within a few

weeks two other concerns signed up to

make guns—the United Shoe Machinery

Corporation and National Pneumatic Company—and two others agreed to make

carriages—Muncie Gear Works and Duplex Printing Press Company.60

 But there

was a wide gulf between signing contracts

and delivering finished weapons. "Delivery

of 37-mm. AT guns is very slow," reported

G-4 in June 1940, "and it will be at

least 18 months before the requirements

for existing units will be filled."

 61

While the 37-mm. was being adopted for

light tanks in the late 1930's, reports from

abroad indicated the need for a more

powerful weapon for medium tanks. By

the spring of 1940 Ordnance had tested

one medium tank with a 75-mm. howitzer

in a sponson and with the 37-mm. as the

secondary weapon in the turret. Soon

thereafter a 75-mm. gun was hurriedly

56

 These were procured as field guns M3

because the tank gun M5 had not yet been developed. 57

 Hist, New York Ord Dist, 100, pt. 14. 58

 PSP 28, 37-mm. Guns M5 and M6, Design,

Development, Production (Apr 45), OHF. 59

 See comments on this weapon by the Army

Chief of Staff, Gen Malin Craig, in WDAB, H.R.,

1940, 24 Jan 39. An early Ordnance report on it

appears in ltr, CofOrd to CofS, 2 Sep 37, sub: AT

and AA Development, OO 472/3371. 60

 PSP 28. 61

 Memo, ACofS, G-4 for CofS, 11 Jun 40, sub:

Sale of 75-mm guns, AG 472 (6-11-40).
82 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

M3 MEDIUM TANK MOUNTING A 75-MM. GUN delivered to the U.S. Army by the

Chrysler Corporation. Standing in front of the tank from left: Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee,

Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, and Mr. K. T. Keller.

modified for the General Grant medium

tank and adopted as standard. Although a

makeshift, this arrangement was hailed in

1940 as the only available answer to the

threat of German armor, and by September demands for 75-mm. tank guns

reached the 2,500 mark.

An order for 1,308 75-mm. tank guns

was assigned to Watervliet in mid-July

1940, and 9 months later the first completed units were shipped. By September

1941 Watervliet was turning out 75-mm's.

at the rate of one hundred per month, and

had completed nearly one thousand by the

end of the year. Meanwhile, as requirements continued to rise, two commercial

firms were given contracts in August and

September of 1940, the Empire Ordnance

Corporation of Philadelphia and the Cowdrey Machine Works of Fitchburg, Mass.62

Both were slow to get into production,

and neither was regarded as a strong

source.63 Empire shipped its first guns in

August 1941 and Cowdrey in January

1942. Just a week before Pearl Harbor,

with total requirements rising above

twenty thousand and guns lagging behind

tank production, a third source was added,

the Oldsmobile Division of General Motors

Corporation. Watervliet carried the burden

of production during the critical months

of the emergency period, manufacturing

62

 The Cowdrey firm was soon taken over by

American Type Founders, becoming its Cowdrey

Machine Division. 63

 Memo, USW for CofOrd, 15 Nov 41, OO

472/1084.
ARTILLERY 83

1,000 of the 1,200 guns produced during

1941.64

In the category of antitank and general

field artillery weapons the change on the

eve of war from the 75-mm. gun to the

105-mm. howitzer slowed production temporarily.65

 Only 597 105's were delivered

in 1941 but nearly 10,000 were added in

the next three years. In the fall of 1941

slow deliveries of the 105-mm. howitzer

were a cause of serious concern to the

Secretary of War and the Chief of Field

Artillery. Production of this weapon was

hampered from the beginning by frequent

changes in requirements, low priority (A1-g at the start), and lack of essential

machine tools. But by the end of the year

production was at the rate of 250 per

month.66

The larger weapons, the so-called medium and heavy artillery, were neglected

during the defense period, as were selfpropelled weapons. Only 65 155-mm. guns

were built before Pearl Harbor. No 155-

mm. howitzers, 4.5-inch guns, 8-inch guns,

8-inch howitzers, or 240-mm. howitzers

were produced because Army planners

considered them less useful than lighter

weapons. Ordnance was not authorized to

procure self-propelled artillery until the

closing weeks of 1941,67

All told, the production figures for the

defense period were discouraging. In the

cold grey days following Pearl Harbor, the

Chief of Ordnance had to report that during the preceding eighteen months of rearmament he had managed to procure only

those artillery items listed in the accompanying table. The quantities were admittedly small. But to Ordnance officers

the really important fact was not revealed

in the statistics. That was the existence of

production capacity—plants tooled up and

manned for quantity production. By the

end of 1941 Ordnance had procured only

small quantities of finished weapons but it

had laid a solid foundation for volume

production in 1942-43. (Table 9)

The First Year of War

Within four weeks of the Pearl Harbor

attack, President Roosevelt set new and

challenging goals for artillery production.68

In his letter to the Secretary of War on

3 January the President called specifically

for delivery of 55,000 antiaircraft guns and

18,900 antitank guns within two years.

These goals were high, but the really big

artillery requirements were only implied in

the President's letter and in his state of the

64

 (1) PSP 28, III, 75-mm. Guns. M2 and M3,

Design, Development and Production, OHF; (2)

Memo, E. F. Johnson, OPM, for CofOrd, 12 Nov

41, sub: 75-mm. Guns for Medium Tanks, ExecO

file M-Materiel-Cannon. The M2 was standardized in May 1941 and the M3 in June 1941. 65

 Typical of the thinking of the time is Ltr,

CofFA to TAG, 28 Mar 40, sub: Use to be Made

of 75-mm. Field Gun. . ., OO 381/34198, NA. 66

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for SW, 15 Oct 41, sub:

Delays in 105-mm. howitzer program, ExecO file

M-Materiel-Cannon; (2) Memo, Brig Gen

Hayes, Director ASF Prod Br, to USW, 12 Nov

41, OUSW file, 104, folder marked Guns, AT,

acft and so on; (3) Memo, CofFA for ACofS

G-4, 26 Dec 41, sub: Prod of 105-mm. Howitzers, OO 472.22/1269; (4) Memo, Col Burnett R.

Olmsted for CofOrd, 21 Jan 42, sub: Status of

Prod of 105. . ., ExecO file M-MaterielCannon. 67

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for Deputy CofS, 20 Dec

41, sub: SP Arty, OO 451/2846; (2) Memo,

Deputy CofS for CofOrd, 20 Dec 41, sub: Approval of and Expediting of SP Arty Projects,

OHF. For an account of development of selfpropelled artillery, see Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pages 314-17. 68

 Ltr, President to SW, 3 Jan 42, copy in OO

472/1218. The address on the state of the Union,

6 Jan 42, in Public Papers and Addresses of

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 Volume, Humanity

on the Defensive, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950) pp.

36-37.
84 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 9—ARTILLERY PRODUCTION, 1 JULY 1940-31 DECEMBER 1941

Source: Extracted from MS draft, dated 9 Apr 52, of Procurement section, prepared by Richard H. Crawford and Lindsley F.

Cook under the direction of Theodore E. Whiting for Statistics.

Union message on 6 January. These were

the guns for 120,000 tanks and 145,000

airplanes to be built during 1942-43. In

mid-January 1942 the Artillery Division

estimated that, to meet the President's

program, it would have to procure during

1942 alone some 200,000 artillery pieces,

evenly divided between tank and aircraft

types.69 To Ordnance officers familiar with

the complexities of gun manufacture, and

keenly aware of the vast quantities of tools

and materials needed, the task appeared

impossible. But with the President's

words still ringing in their ears—"Let no

man say it cannot be done. It must be

done. . . ."—they set about the task of

planning new production schedules.

The chief bottleneck at the start was the

lack of machine tools, and the lack of tools

stemmed from low priorities on artillery.

During the last 6 months of 1941 Ordnance artillery contractors had received

only 1,363 tools out of a total national

production of 80,000.70 The first step

taken by Ordnance to remedy this situation after announcement of the President's

"must program" was to request AA or

A-1-a priority on needed tools and equipment.71

 The request brought higher ratings for a few selected items, but for

months antitank and field artillery weapons

continued to carry such low priorities that

it was almost impossible to get deliveries of

new tools. Next Ordnance drew up a detailed tabulation of artillery requirements,

placing opposite each item the name of

69

 Rpt of Prod Plans, Arty Div, Ind Serv, 18

Jan 42. For an itemized list, see Overall Requirements for War Munitions Program, 11 Feb 42,

which called for 105,000 75-mm. tank guns, copy

in OCO-Detroit file. 70

 Review . . . Arty Div, 4 Mar 42, p. 2. 71

 (1) Memo USW for ANMB, 7 Jan 42, sub:

Schedules for manufacture. . . , OO 472/1219;

(2) Conclusions reached at a conf held in Wesson's office, 7 Jan 42, ExecO file MatérielCannon; (3) Review Prod Plans of Arty Div, 4

Mar 42, pp. 29-31.
ARTILLERY 85

producing companies and needed production month by month. To every important

prime contractor went a letter from General Wesson stating exactly what each had

to produce to meet the President's directive. "We believe that if machine tools and

materials come in exactly as wanted, this

thing might be done," Col. Gordon M.

Wells, Chief of the Artillery Division, reported in mid-February. "But on the basis

of past experience it seems rather impossible."

 72

Colonel Wells moved slowly in contracting for new plants because he did not

want to spread too thin the few machine

tools available. "We will get better and

quicker results," he observed in midFebruary, "by giving the tools to a few

strong companies."73 How to get production with the fewest new tools was a

prime consideration in awarding all contracts. As a result, the firms under contract

before Pearl Harbor continued as the backbone of the artillery program throughout

1942. There were increases in scheduled

production, enlargement of plant capacity,

and the enlistment of a few new producers

but no wholesale additions to the prePearl Harbor production base.74

Early in the defense period, contracts

with industry were placed by the arsenals,

under direction of the Chief of Ordnance;

but after the district offices built up their

staffs more of this work flowed through

them.75 Beginning in January 1942, in

order to decentralize more activities from

Washington to the field, a Fire Control

Sub-Office was created at Frankford Arsenal, followed by similar offices at

Watertown, Watervliet, and Rock Island.

Responsible for production engineering,

inspection standards, surveys of industrial

capacity, cost analysis, and related matters,

they served throughout the war.76

AA Guns

Antiaircraft guns were the chief artillery

problem in 1942. The first item on the

President's AA list—1,600 37-mm. weapons in 1942—could easily be met by Colt,

but the newer 40-mm. and 90-mm. guns

were different matters.77 The President's

program required something like 300 percent expansion of rates previously planned

for these weapons. Both were extremely

difficult to manufacture and required hundreds of new tools.78

 The 40-mm. was in

the hands of two strong producers, Chrysler and the Pontiac Division of General

Motors, but Chrysler was just starting

production in February 1942 and Pontiac,

with a priority of A-1-d, found it could

not get essential tools.79 When the priority

was raised to A-1-a Pontiac could still

not get tools because it had no "urgency

standing." In view of these facts, Ord72

 Rpt of Prod Plans of Arty Div, 13 Feb 42,

pp. 1-2. 73

 Rpt Prod Plans, 13 Feb 42, p. 3. See also Rpt

Prod Plans, 15 Sep 42, pp. C and D of Foreword. 74

 Ibid. This report, and others throughout the

year 1942, list all major items and their producers. 75

 Chapter II above describes the roles of districts and arsenals in procurement. 76

 (1) Hist, Arty Div, I, pt. 3, ch. X, XI, XII,

XIII; (2) ODO 231, 27 Jan 42, OHF; (3) History, Cannon Sub-Office, Watervliet Arsenal, 9

vols., OHF. 77

 For a detailed analysis of the 37-mm. as of a

Jan 42, see History, Artillery Division, Volume

102. More than a score of firms made important

components of this weapon. 78

 (1) Review of the Prod Plans of the Arty Div,

OCO, 4 Mar 42, summary; (2) Memo, USW for

Gen Clay and Alfred R. Glancy, 30 May 42, ASF

Prod Div 472.93 AA Guns, Job 19B, dr 1867; (3)

Memo, Brig Gen Lucius D. Clay for USW, 5 Jun

42, ASF Prod Div, 472.93 AA Guns, Job 19B, dr

G1867. For background on the 90-mm., see PSP

29 (2 May 45), OHF. 79

 For correspondence on the urgent need for

machine tools for AA gun production, see Memos

in ASF Prod Div, 472.93 AA Guns Job 19B, dr

G1867.
86 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

nance recommended, and higher authorities approved, that the 37-mm. gun be

accepted as a substitute to make up the

deficit in 40-mm. output.80

"This is one of the tightest jobs we

have," commented General Knudsen when

the 90-mm. AA gun came up at an ordnance production conference in February

1942.81 Watervliet was the only real producer at that time, turning out 120 per

month and steadily increasing its output.

Wheland was just reaching the production

stage while Chevrolet and Oliver had only

recently received contracts and were not

expected to begin producing until near the

end of the year. Ordnan.ce estimated that

only 3,650 guns would be produced during

1942 against the President's goal of

5,400.82 As if this were not bad enough,

output of carriages was lagging behind

guns in spite of having Watertown Arsenal

and seven commercial producers in the

picture. None of the commercial firms was

scheduled to reach production stage during

the first half of the year, and most were

expected to start producing only during

the last three months of 1942.

The 90-mm. carriage was a complicated

item, very difficult to make. "There are so

many different devices on that carriage,"

General Knudsen commented, "if you

once set up for the whole job it will be as

big as the Detroit Tank Arsenal."83 It was

also a newly developed item that experienced all the difficulties inherent in production of a complicated piece of new

equipment. Some of the most competent

firms in the heavy machinery field found

difficulty in meeting prescribed tolerances

and specifications.84 The brightest spot in

the picture was production of recoil

mechanisms. In addition to Watertown Arsenal, two old standbys, R. Hoe and Otis

Elevator, were carrying the load for this

component. Both concerns had got off to a

head start through educational orders. The

darkest spot was the director. Two strong

sources, Sperry Gyroscope and Ford

Motor, had contracts for directors for the

90-mm., but Ford was behind schedule on

tooling and Sperry was just starting to

produce. An extremely complicated computing machine, the director contained

thousands of parts, cost about $20,000,

and required precision workmanship

throughout. "I think this is our real choke

item on the 90-mm. program," reported

Colonel Wells in February 1942,85 and it

remained a choke item for many months.

At the March production conference Ordnance reported that it would probably be

impossible to meet the President's directive

on the 90-mm. unless extraordinary measures were taken to grant it overriding

priority. General Somervell pointed out

that scheduled monthly production of AA

guns would supply sixty-two AA regiments

a month, "a terrific number of guns."

When General Wesson, who had grave

doubts about the need for so many

90's, asked on what the President had

based his directive, no one could answer.

"I think what we ought to do," Donald

80

 (1) Review . . . Arty Div, 4 Mar 42, p. 10;

(2) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 8 Mar 42,

sub: 40-mm. AA guns, G-4/23631-92, copy in

OO 472.93/18. 81

 Mtg on review of prod plans of the Arty Div,

OCO, 13 Feb 42,p. II. 82

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Prod Plng Rpt, Arty Div, 9

Feb 42, p. 27. 83

 Mtg on review of prod plans, Arty Div, OCO,

13 Feb 42, p. 14. 84

 For an account of the 90's history, see Col

Well's statement in Review . . . Arty Div, 21 May

42, and also PSP 29, pp. 42-43. 85

 (1) Prod Plng Rpt, Arty Div, 9 Feb 42; (2)

Review . . . Arty Div, 4 Mar 42, pp. 18-19; (3)

Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 7 Oct 42, sub: Recommended Revisions in ASP. . ., OO 381/9948

Misc.
ARTILLERY 87

Nelson concluded, "is to review this in

terms of its urgency in the picture . . .

and then let's go back to the President and

talk to him about it."

 86

 In less than a

month the requirement was cut in half.87

Aircraft Guns

Production of aircraft cannon easily kept

pace with plane deliveries in 1942. With

four facilities making the 20-mm. gun,

Ordnance estimated that output for the

year would total 67,000 pieces, more than

enough for aircraft use though short of the

Time Objective figure of 89,000. A recomputation of requirements soon cut the latter figure in half and turned the 20-mm.

deficit into a surplus. The 37-mm. gun was

also well ahead of plane output, so far

ahead, in fact, that plans were made in

March to convert some of Oldsmobile's

production to 37-mm. AA guns.88

Tank and Antitank Guns

Providing guns for all the tanks on the

President's program meant building some

66,000 during 1942, but in February the

Artillery Division nevertheless reported

that it expected to reach its goal. Reasonable production of 37-mm. guns by Watervliet, United Shoe, National Pneumatic,

American Type Founders, and York was

calculated at 41,179 for the year. Production of the 75-mm. gun by Watervliet,

Oldsmobile, Cowdrey, and Empire Ordnance was expected to reach 26,172. The

3-inch gun for the heavy tank, a new

project, fell below requirements because

the three producers, Vilter, Munitions, and

Goodyear, had only A-1-d priorities and

were unable to get tools. But the 3-inch

was the least important of the tank weapons and caused no great concern.89

In spite of the hopeful outlook, guns

lagged behind tanks all during the first

half of 1942. The lag was not great if one

counted every gun as soon as it came off

the assembly line. But there was a delay of

from ten to thirty days between completion

of guns at the factory and their installation

in tanks. This time was taken up in packing, shipping to proving grounds, proof

firing, transporting to tank arsenals, and

finally installing the guns. At the end of

April the Under Secretary called Ordnance

to task because more than half the light

tanks and two-thirds of all medium tanks

with armored divisions had no guns.90

Ordnance immediately redoubled its efforts

to speed proof firing and shipping. Hundreds of guns, intended for use with gyrostabilizers and special mounts on light

tanks, were installed instead on medium

tanks without special mounts,91 and by

June the number of tanks and guns was

fairly well balanced.92

86

 (1) Review . . . Arty Div, 4 Mar 42, pp.

20-22; (2) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 6

Mar 42, sub: Presidential Objectives for 1942 and

1943, and 1st Ind CofOrd to CG SOS 10 Mar 42,

with 2 Incls. Copy attached to preceding document. 87

 (1) Review . . . Arty Div, 18 Apr 42; (2)

ASP sec. I, 6 Apr 42, copy in OCO-Detroit file. 88

 (1) Review of Prod Plans by the Arty Div,

1942; (2) Memo, Maj Gen Thomas J. Hayes, for

Lt Gen William S. Knudsen, 3 Jul 42, sub: June

Prod of Important Arty Items, OO 400.12/729. 89

 (1) Review of prod plans, pp. 19ff; (2) Prod

Plng. Rpt. pp. 47-52; (3) Overall Rqmts for War

Munitions Program, 11 Feb 42. 90

 (1) Memo, USW for Brig Gen Charles D.

Young, ASF Proc and Dist Div, 26 Apr 42, USW

file 104, Guns, and so on; (2) Review . . . Arty

Div, 18 Apr 42. 91

 Memo, CG SOS for USW, 5 May 42, sub:

Acceleration of Tank Armament, USW file 104,

Guns, and so on. 92

 (1) Memo, Glancy, ASF Prod Br, for USW,

8 Jun 42, sub: Progress of Tank Armament, USW

file 104, Guns, and so on; (2) Rpt by Col Wells in

Review . . . Arty Div, 21 May 42.
88 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Antitank guns formed a weak segment

in the allied arsenal.93 Production of the

37-mm. AT gun was halted in 1943 after

nearly twenty thousand had been delivered.

The more powerful but still inadequate

57-mm. AT gun came into production in

1942 and ran well ahead of schedule. It

remained the one most important U.S.

antitank gun throughout the war, total

output exceeding sixteen thousand. The

3-inch AT gun, after coming into production late in 1942, continued at a modest

rate in 1943 and stopped in 1944. Ordnance meanwhile labored to develop a

fourth AT weapon, the high velocity 76-

mm. gun, but failed to get it into production before the war ended. An even more

powerful 90-mm. AT gun was approved for

limited procurement in May 1944, but

further tests revealed the need for design

changes to correct structural weaknesses

in the carriage. Of two hundred produced,

only one was sent overseas before the war's

end.94 At least part of the lack in AT guns

was made up by the introduction of powerful and effective self-propelled weapons,

often called tank destroyers or gun motor

carriages. Most famous was the 105-mm.

howitzer mounted on a medium tank

chassis, nicknamed The Priest. After proving its value to the British in defeating

Rommel's armor in North Africa, the 105-

mm. howitzer was followed by the 3-inch

and 90-mm. guns, both mounted on medium tank chassis, the 76-mm. gun on a

special carriage, and smaller pieces down to

the 37-mm.95

To provide mobile antitank defense, the

57-mm. gun (formerly the British 6

pounder) was mounted on a half track

personnel carrier. Manufacture of this gun

motor carriage was undertaken by the Diamond T Motor Company but, because of

its limited tactical usefulness, less than one

thousand were produced, and all were

shipped to the British on lend-lease. These

were clearly stop-gap weapons hurriedly

designed to meet the threat of German

armor. So was the 75-mm. gun motor

carriage standardized late in 1941, the

first piece of self-propelled artillery adopted

by the U.S. Army in World War II. It

consisted of a 75-mm. gun mounted on the

standard half track personnel carrier and

was manufactured in small quantities by

Autocar. A companion weapon, the 75-

mm. howitzer motor carriage, also utilized

the half-track personnel carrier and was

produced in small quantities by the White

Motor Car Company. Another vehicle produced by the White Company was a halftrack carrier for the 81-mm. mortar.

Though standardized two full years before

Pearl Harbor it was never in great demand. These weapons were not produced

in large numbers because they lost out in

competition with full-tracked antitank vehicles of greater power and cross-country

maneuverability.96

Heavy mobile artillery and seacoast guns

ran far behind schedule throughout 1942.

Production of the 155-mm. howitzer

scarcely got started because of its low

93

 Testimony on this score appears in Biennial

Report of General George C. Marshall, the Chief

of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945 (Washington: 1946), p. 97. 94

 McHugh et al., Arty, p. 37. 95

 (1) Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8; (2)

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, pp. 314-17; (3) McHugh, Arty, pp. 32-

37.

96

 (1) Draft Project Report on Light Selfpropelled Artillery prepared by Daniel Chase, Ord

Hist Br, n.d. OHF; (2) TM 9-2800, Standard

Military Vehicles, 1 Sep 43; (3) Catalog of

Standard Ord Items, 1 Mar 44, Tank and Automotive Vehicles. The latter citation gives numerous references to Ordnance Committee Minutes

(OCM's) for each item.
ARTILLERY 89

THE PRIEST, A 105-MM. HOWITZER

MOTOR CARRIAGE M7, passing through

a town in Sicily, July 1943.

priority. Only 33 were delivered against a

requirement of 452. "There never was a

possibility of meeting the 1942 requirement of 452 units, as we have pointed out

on many occasions," General Wells reported in December 1942.97

 The 155-mm.

gun and 240-mm. howitzer were in better

shape but still behind schedule while the

8-inch field gun barely met the year's

requirement. The delay with all these

weapons sprang from the combination of

low priority and the need for elaborate

equipment and preparation for production.98

Mortars

Mortars, among the simplest weapons

employed in World War II, caused no

major production problems, though diversion of seamless steel tubing to Air Force

contractors in September 1942 completely

stopped production of 60-mm. mortars for

a time.90 Both of the two main types, the

60-mm. and the 81-mm., were foreign

models purchased in the 1930's from the

Edgar Brandt firm in France. Both were

manufactured first at Watervliet and then

by industry as rearmament got under way

in 1939 and 1940.

When the 60-mm. mortar was adopted

in 1938, it was given the designation M1.

Ordnance bought eight mortars, with

French production drawings, from the

Brandt company. When Watervliet Arsenal prepared production drawings of

this weapon it adopted standard American threads and made minor dimensional

changes to suit tubes and plates of American manufacture. To distinguish the

French from the American model the latter

was designated M2.100 In January 1940

the first production contract for 1,500

mortars went to the Read Machinery Co.

97

 Review of Prod Plans, Arty Div, 16 Dec 42. 98

 Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS, 7 Oct 42, sub:

Recommended revisions in ASP Rqmts for Arty,

OO 381/9948 Misc. For details on priorities,

contractors, and production, see PSP 80, Medium

Artillery Weapons, Design, Development and Production of the 155-mm. Howitzer and 4.5-inch

Gun, OHF. 99

 (1) Production Progress and Production

Scheduling, report by SOS to WPB, 1 Dec 42,

p. 17, ASF 200.02; (2) Memo, CofOrd for CG

SOS, 7 Oct 42, sub: Recommended Revisions in

ASP. . . , OO 381/9948 Misc. For the development and use of mortars during and after World

War I, see PSP 27, the Design, Development, and

Production of Mortars, Feb 45, vol. 3, OHF, and

the report of Board of Officers appointed by par.

142, SO No. 289-0, WD, 1918 (hereafter cited as

Westervelt Bd Rpt), 5 May 1919. 100

 (1) OCM 14273, 4 Feb 38; (2) OCM

14421, 7 Apr 38; (3) OCM 15118, 22 Jun 39;

(4) OCM 15229, 27 Jun 39; (5) PSP 27, vol. 1,

OHF.
90 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

of York, Pennsylvania, and the PullmanStandard Car Manufacturing Company

signed a contract for the 81-mm. As requirements for the 60-mm. rose rapidly

during 1940, Ordnance placed orders with

a second producer, Kennedy-Van Saun

Engineering and Manufacturing Company

of Danville, Pennsylvania. Requirements

dropped early in 1944 but by the fall of

that year the demand for mortars in the

European theater exceeded existing supplies. To meet the demand for 60-mm.

mortars Ordnance took two steps; it ordered Read and Kennedy-Van Saun to

boost production, and it placed a contract

with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company

for 24,250.101 Production for the first

eight months of 1945 totaled 30,152, nearly

equal to total production of the three

preceding years. No similar crisis marked

the 81-mm. program. It moved along at a

fairly even pace year after year, its requirements and production following the general

pattern set by the 60-mm. but with less

extreme fluctuations.102

Of four new mortar models procured in

1944 the smallest was a 60-mm. mortar

that weighed only 19.5 pounds and could

easily be carried and fired by one man.

The largest was a powerful 155-mm.

weapon that could easily be disassembled

and transported to forward positions to

provide the equivalent of divisional or

corps artillery support. Between these extremes were a lightweight 81-mm. and a

new 105-mm. mortar.103 All were designed

to meet the needs of troops in the South

and Southwest Pacific Areas for mortars

light enough to be carried forward through

the jungle by infantry and yet powerful

enough to blast prepared enemy positions

at fairly long range. None of these new

models was produced in large quantities

and all remained limited procurement

items with "T" designations.104 The only

real difficulty in manufacture arose from

the fact that these new types were rushed

into production before Watervliet had time

to complete the manufacturing drawings.

The contractors thus had to use research

and development sketches at the outset,

with the result that some of the early

production mortars failed to pass proof

firing tests.

Over the Hump

By the end of its first year of war Ordnance could feel that, regardless of what

the future might hold, it was over the

hump in artillery production. The heavy

investment in plant capacity made during

1941 and early 1942 was beginning to pay

dividends, and output was steadily rising.

Production of all types of artillery weapons

during 1942 totaled some 160,000 pieces,

distributed roughly as follows:105

Aircraft guns.....................................68,114

Antiaircraft guns .....................................14,509

Tank guns and howitzers. .....................................42,731

Self-propelled weapons ..................................... 8,751

Light field and AT weapons .....................................20,536

Mortars .....................................10,160

Heavy field artillery ...................................... 647

101

 (1) PSP 27; (2) Rpt on Visit to ETO, 23

Oct 44, by Christmas, Col Herbert R. White, and

Col Theodore A. Weyher, par. 15, Incl to OO

350.05/15609. For month by month developments,

see Review of Prod Plans, Arty Div. 102

 Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8. 103

 Descriptive data and photographs may be

found in Limited Procurement Supplement to

Catalog of Standard Ord Items and in PSP 27,

vol. 2. The latter reference includes copies of relevant OCM's. 104

 Production of the 155-mm. totaled 244; the

105-mm., 500; the 81-mm. (T27) 850; and the

60-mm. (T18E6), 6,145. 105

 For detailed figures on types and models, see

Whiting, Statistics.
ARTILLERY 91

On the debit side Ordnance had to report

that the Presidential goals for AA guns

(40-mm. and 90-mm.) and for antitank

guns (37-mm. and 3-inch) were not met.

On the credit side, the figures showed

that aircraft guns had kept well ahead of

plane production all during the year, allowing some carryover to apply on the

large 1943 requirements, and tank gun

production had moved well ahead of tank

output in the second half of the year. But

more important than the President's objectives was the Army Supply Program

(ASP) that brought together all artillery

items in a balanced statement of requirements. On some items the ASP called for

more than the Presidential directive, on

others less, and it was revised several times

during the year. As a result, no precise

comparison of goals and achievements was

possible. But output for the year, totaling

roughly one billion dollars in value, was

encouraging. The most serious deficiences

in December were in directors and height

finders for AA guns, other fire control

items, 60-mm. mortars, and 155-mm. howitzers.106

There was no difficulty in identifying the

factors that had hindered artillery production most. They were the same problems

that had plagued all other Ordnance

procurement efforts—lack of machine

tools and lack of raw or semifinished materials. Throughout the nation there were

too few machine tools to go around and

Ordnance efforts to win higher priorities

for its own materiel had been only moderately successful. In mid-summer of 1942,

when it had become apparent that there

was no immediate prospect of getting more

tools, Ordnance decided to favor a few

key gun plants where rapid expansion was

most needed instead of assigning new tools

to all contractors regardless of the urgency

of their need. Plants making 40-mm. AA

carriages and directors and 3-inch AT guns

were put ahead of plants producing 57-

mm. AT guns and 90-mm. AA guns and

carriages, which were not as urgently

needed by the middle of the year. Meanwhile, the Ordnance district offices put

pressure on prime contractors to subcontract work they could not do with their

own tools.

Each district formed a Machine-Tool

Panel to help contractors solve their

machine-tool problems. In January 1942

General Campbell conferred at length with

a machine-tool distributor from Philadelphia, Mr. N. P. Lloyd, and evolved the

idea of using industrial specialists to aid

the Ordnance districts.107 The Chicago district took the lead in forming a panel of

machine-tool distributors familiar with the

equipment in all plants within their business territory. The members served on a

part-time basis and received no pay from

the government, though they were reimbursed for travel expenses. When a contractor drew up a list of the tools he felt

he needed, and submitted it to the district

office, the Machine-Tool Panel would review it, urge greater use of subcontracting,

suggest substitute types of machines that

were known to be available, or recommend

the use of idle equipment in the area. In

one instance a Machine-Tool Panel was

able to reduce the number of new machine

tools for a given schedule of production

from 1100 to 450.108 Industry integration

committees for the pooling of tools and

materials also helped a great deal in the

latter half of the year while a sharp cut106

 Review . . . Arty Div, 16 Dec 42. 107

 Campbell, op. cit., ch. 9. 108

 Winter, Analysis of World War II Prod

Activities of the New York Ord Dist, 5 Sep 47,

pp. 20-22.
92 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

back in the Army Supply Program eased

the pressure for production.109

As early as June 1942 Colonel Wells had

reported that, more than any other factor,

lack of materials would hold back artillery production for 1942. The urgency of

the need was dramatized by Watervliet's

contribution to the national scrap drive

of hundreds of tons of material, including

iron fence, antique cannon, and large cannon balls that had been piled at the base of

the arsenal flagpole since Civil War days.

To the general materials shortage that

affected all wartime production there was

added for the artillery program the need

for a wide range of semifinished materials,

often in such small quantities that rolling

mills and other suppliers were not interested in them.

There was no effective procedure for

scheduling and balancing production of

artillery components during 1941-42. The

practice was to schedule all components

for production in the shortest possible time,

working plants at full capacity. Not until

the end of 1942 did a system of scheduling

for balanced production go into effect with

creation of a Central Planning Committee

in the Artillery Division.110

Production Techniques

Of all the new or refined production

techniques employed in making artillery

during World War II, two may be taken

as major advances—cold-working and centrifugal casting of gun tubes. Their

novelty, it should be added, was not so

much in the processes themselves as in

their application to cannon manufacture

on a large scale for the first time.111

Cold-Working (Autofrettage}

In the nineteenth century Springfield

Armory had adopted the practice of firing

in each rifle barrel, before it was bored to

final dimensions, a cartridge loaded far

above normal pressure. The purpose was to

discover defective barrels, but toward the

end of the century it was discovered that,

for some unknown reason, firing a highpressure cartridge imparted greater elastic

strength to the rifle barrel. At about the

same time European designers were applying the principle to large gun tubes by use

of hydraulic pressure. During World

War I, American Ordnance officers

brought back to the United States reports

on the European experience. Engineers at

Watertown achieved some success during

the 1920's in applying the principle to

big guns, using controlled hydraulic pressure up to 150,000 pounds per square

inch within the bore. Tests established the

fact that pressure high enough permanently to enlarge the bore strengthened

the barrel by imprisoning internal compressions at the bore comparable to those

created in a built-up gun when a heated

jacket or hoop was slipped on the barrel

or breech and allowed to cool, shrinking to

a very tight fit.112 As hydraulic pressure

produced this effect without hoops it was

sometimes described by the French term

"autofrettage" meaning "self hooping." By

subjecting gun tubes to pressures exceeding

109

 (1) Review . . . Arty Div, 16 Dec 42; (2)

Memo, USW for McCloy, 23 Dec 42, sub: Superheavy Arty, USW Guns, AT, Aircraft, and so on.

See ch. 8 for description of industry integration

committees. 110

 Mead Comm. Report, OHF. 111

 Both processes are described in "World

Leader in Gun Making" by Brig. Gen. Rolland W.

Case, Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 129 (November

-December 1941), 359-61. 112

 Compare with Rodman guns cast around a

water-cooled core in mid-19th century. See also

Hayes, op. cit., pp. 164-66, and Earl McFarland,

Textbook of Ordnance and Gunnery (New York:

J. W. Wiley and Son, 1929), pp. 180-84.
ARTILLERY 93

any they would experience in service, it

further served as a proof test.113 Both

Watertown and Watervliet were producing

cold-worked tubes in quantity long before

Pearl Harbor and continued to do so

throughout World War II.

Centrifugal Casting

Though the first patent on casting in a

rotary mold was issued in England early in

the nineteenth century before the Ordnance Department was created, application

of the principle to gun production in the

United States dates only from World

War I and the years following. Long before

1918 the centrifugal process had been used

for commercial manufacture of pipes,

piston rings, gear blanks, and thin-walled

metal tubing, but Ordnance did not begin

serious experimentation with centrifugal

casting of cannon until 1925. In 1918 an

Ohio concern, the Paper and Textile Machinery Company of Sandusky, had submitted to Ordnance for examination three

centrifugally cast steel cylinders and had

been awarded a contract to build a machine large enough to cast the 155-mm.

howitzer tube. In 1925, after delivery of

the machine, its use was energetically

pushed by Brig. Gen. Tracy C. Dickson,

commanding officer at Watertown from

1918 to 1932. During the experimental

stages in the mid-20's Watertown made

large numbers of castings under different

conditions and gave the resulting guns

every known metallurgical test. The experimental casting cylinder used at Watertown

was fitted with glass end pieces to permit

observation of the molten metal after it

was poured into the whirling cylinder.114

By 1932, after years of experimental production, a member of the Watertown staff

was able to report in a scientific journal

that, "The manufacture of cannon from

cast steel is an accomplished fact. Molten

steel is poured into a revolving mold and

shaped by centrifugal force to the shape of

the mold. The result is a piece of ordnance

superior in many ways to anything heretofore produced."

 115

 There were still many

problems to be solved, and rejection rates

remained high, but by 1940 the process

was sufficiently developed to be ready for

quantity production.

During World War II centrifugally cast

guns made a substantial contribution,

starting with the small sizes and eventually

working up to medium sizes. On 20 June

1944 Watertown passed two landmarks in

its production history: completion of its

100,000th centrifugally cast gun tube, and

installation of a new machine for casting

heavy cannon weighing up to 10 tons. The

centrifugal process not only resulted in

speedy production and economy of material but produced a gun that, unlike the

forged gun which was stronger lengthwise

than crosswise, had uniform directional

properties. Centrifugal force tended to

drive impurities toward the center where

they could be eliminated when the gun

was bored, and to increase the specific

gravity of the product. Economy, simplicity of manufacture, speed of production,

113

 Hist, Watertown Arsenal, vol. 102. This reference contains an important technical paper, Design Data for Gun Tubes and High Pressure

Vessels by Capt Donald H. Newhall, officer in

charge of the Cold Work Section at Watertown

before and during World War II. See also Hist,

Watertown Arsenal, XV, pp. 6-7, and Hist,

Watervliet Arsenal, I. 114

 History, Watertown Arsenal, vol. 102. This

reference gives a detailed account of centrifugal

casting experience at Watertown, including numerous photographs. 115

 "Whirling Molten Steel to Make Gun Castings" by 1st Lt Steven L. Conner, Scientific

American, 147 (September 1932), 160.
94 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

and greater uniformity of product—all

these were virtues of centrifugal casting.116

In December 1941 Ordnance placed

contracts for two government-owned,

contractor-operated plants to make gun

tubes according to Watertown's centrifugal

casting method. The Houston Tool Company built and operated the Dickson Gun

Plant in Houston, Texas, and the Ohio

Steel Foundry Company operated the Ohio

Gun Plant at Lima, Ohio. The latter

arrangement was terminated in September

1942 in view of the drastic reductions in

the Army Supply Program, and the plant

thereafter became the Lima Tank Depot.

The Dickson plant continued in operation

until the end of the war, turning out a

total of more than 12,000 gun tubes, of

which about half were for 105-mm. howitzers.117

The list of other new methods adopted

for artillery production is almost endless.

The work of the Firestone Company in

redesigning the 40-mm. gun carriage has

been noted above. The use on this carriage

of welding to replace riveting was well in

advance of the adoption of welding for

tanks and proved to be the forerunner of

a host of new applications for welding

techniques. Employment of lathes that

permitted simultaneous boring of the inside

and machining of the outside of gun tubes

saved valuable production time.118 The

use of seamless steel tubing for the smaller

gun tubes and for recoil cylinders not only

lightened the load on forging and casting

plants but also saved time and material

and gave a uniformly high quality product.

With breech rings for the 90-mm. AA

guns, casting instead of forging reduced

machining time and doubled the rate of

production.119 To speed output of optical

instruments a new method was developed

for casting optical glass in rods and bars

from which could be cut small circular

blanks ready to go on the lens-grinding

machines. Formerly optical glass had been

cast in large chunks from which slabs were

cut and then gradually reduced to small

circular blanks. In the long list of such

cost-cutting, production-speeding techniques lay part of the secret of American

industry's high-speed quantity production

in World War II.120 The whole process

was in line with General Campbell's admonition to the District chiefs in December

1944: "Make no compromise with quality

and yet at the same time wherever we can

let's cut out the monkey business."

 121

But there was another side of the picture, too, with defects in production causing much concern. When artillery weapons

reached the proving ground for final test

they often failed to pass. In spite of a

vigorous campaign to tighten inspection,

General Wells reported late in 1942 that

"a lot of material is getting into the proving grounds that has various things wrong

116

 Hist, Watertown Arsenal, vol. 102, including

long extracts from Watertown Arsenal Rpts by

Dickson, Capt Hugh C. Minton, Capt Scott B.

Ritchie, and Lt Steven L. Conner during the

1920's and 1930's and personal notes of Dr. J. L.

Martin, superintendent of production. 117

 (1) History, Dickson Gun Plant, OHF; (2)

History, Ohio Gun Plant, OHF. The latter contains a lengthy memorandum by Maj. Tracy

Dickson, Jr., to OCO Historical Section, 31 December 1943. 118

 William S. Knudsen, Lecture, Problems in

War Production, 18 Jun 46, ICAF. 119

 (1) The Ordnance Digest, XXVII, No. 10

(October 1945), p. 3; (2) Ordnance Reports for

ASF Report on Logistics in World War II, 28

Sep 45, SR 104, pp. 7-8, OHF. 120

 Artillery, 1 July 1940 to 31 August 1945,

Ordnance historical monograph prepared under

the direction of Brig Gen John K. Christmas by

F. D. McHugh, C. B. Rosa and F. W. F. Gleason,

pp. 74-80. 121

 Rpt Conf Dist Chiefs, Cleveland, 19 Dec 44,

p. 105, OHF.
ARTILLERY 95

with it. It's a critical situation."

 122

 Pressure to get out production sometimes led to

unwise shortcuts that caused no end of

trouble, while material accepted without

inspection on the basis of the manufacturer's certificate was sometimes found to be

the source of defective parts. Constant

efforts by Ordnance, under pressure from

Army Service Forces, to reduce inspection

forces probably also contributed to lowering of standards. The lack of inspection

gage designs from which manufacturers

could produce work gages and the necessity to find substitutes for critical or

strategic materials and machine tools were

the principal causes of the discrepancies.

Fire Control Instruments

Instruments for observing distant targets, measuring distances, and aiming

weapons—collectively known as fire control

instruments—contributed greatly to the

effective employment of U.S. artillery in

World War II, but they were among the

most troublesome items for Ordnance to

procure. Ranging from relatively simple

binoculars, telescopes, and quadrants to

more complex items such as periscopes,

panoramic telescopes, height finders, and

range finders, and finally to enormously

complicated directors for antiaircraft guns,

they covered a wide area of manufacturing

problems. Compared to standard guns and

howitzers, which were themselves not simple in construction, fire control instruments were generally more complicated,

required more drawings, called for more

different kinds of material, and demanded

more exacting machining and more meticulous assembly operations. As the quantities

required of the more complex instruments

were relatively small, and the risks of

production were great, manufacturers were

usually reluctant to accept contracts for

their production. Ordnance district representatives had to overcome this reluctance

by meeting with industry executives and

explaining to them the urgency of the

Army's needs. The success of these efforts

is indicated by the fact that from 1940 to

1945 the value of fire control instruments

produced by industry under Ordnance

contracts exceeded $1,000,000,000.123

Frankford Arsenal had been the Ordnance center for fire control research and

procurement all during the interwar years

and continued in that role throughout

World War II. Because of lack of funds,

progress in both research and procurement

planning was slow during the peace years,

but in 1939 the arsenal was enabled to

place several educational orders with industry for height finders, gunner's quadrants, telescopes, and telescope mounts.124

Before much was accomplished on these

orders the arsenal was faced in the fall of

1940 with the need to replace them with

quantity production contracts. Over-all direction of fire control procurement came

from the Industrial Service in Washington,

but the day-by-day work of placing contracts and expediting production was

122

 (O Rpt Conf Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia, 8

Oct 43, pp. 17-18; (2) Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs,

Springfield, Mass., 28 Jul 43, pp. 12-13; (3) Rpt

Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, New York, 18 Jan 44, p. 20. 123

 (1) Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. I, pt. 4,

p. 465; (2) Hist, Arty Div, Ind Serv, OCO, 1940-

45, vol I, pt. 2, ch. VII. For the research and development aspect, see Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, pp. 333-45. For a

description of the manufacturing and inspection

problems with fire control instruments see Inspection and Quality Control, Problems and Solutions,

PSP 13, Jun 45, vol. I, ch. 5, sec. 9 OHF. An excellent summary of the development of AA weapons and fire control may be found in Special Text

9-169, February 1953, The Ordnance School. 124

 For a list of these orders, see Hist, Arty Div,

Ind Serv, OCO, 1940-45, vol. 3, ch. X, OHF.
96 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

handled by Frankford Arsenal. Except on

matters of inspection, the arsenal bypassed

the District offices and dealt directly with

contractors, justifying this action on the

ground that the Districts, which were just

then building up their staffs, lacked specialized knowledge of the instruments and

their production. As far back as 1930 the

arsenal had stationed an officer, known as

an Army Inspector of Ordnance, at the

Sperry Gyroscope plant in Brooklyn, N.Y.,

and as time went on increased his jurisdiction to include contracts with Keuffel

and Esser, Eastman Kodak, and other

concerns. Soon after Pearl Harbor, as the

District offices gained strength and as General Wesson moved to promote further

decentralization of Ordnance procurement,

a Fire Control Sub-Office was established

at Frankford Arsenal with directions to

transfer all Frankford Arsenal fire control

contracts (then totaling about two hundred) to the appropriate districts for administration.125

 Production lagged far behind requirements during 1942, but the

sharp cut in the Army Supply Program

announced in November 1942 reduced the

gap between production and requirements.126

 Meanwhile the quality of American fire control materiel came in for a

good deal of criticism from British forces in

North Africa, who were equipped in part

with American tanks and artillery, criticism

that was soon echoed by U.S. troops who

landed in North Africa in November

1942.127

Of the three main categories of fire

control instruments—binoculars and telescopes, range finders and height finders,

and directors—the first was the least complicated and least subject to changes in design, but it nevertheless posed difficult

procurement problems. Early in 1941, to

meet an urgent requirement for 350,000

binoculars, Ordnance took the unusual

step of standardizing for military use a

commercial design of the Bausch and Lomb

Optical Company. This design closely approximated the old World War I binocular,

known as type EE, that was still standard.

Other commercial models were also standardized and produced in quantity for shipment to allies. But this policy soon proved

to be a costly mistake. Designed for normal

civilian use, the commercial binoculars

failed to stand up under combat service

where they were subjected to rough handling, submersion in water, and exposure to

extremes of temperature. Using them was,

in the words of one field commander, "like

looking through two dirty milk bottles."

 128

The existence in the supply system of

different types of binoculars with noninterchangeable parts also complicated spare

parts supply and field maintenance. To

remedy the situation a new military model

was adopted early in 1943.129

With compasses, Ordnance followed the

same policy with better luck. In 1941,

while development of a more rugged instrument to replace the standard compass

used in World War I was under way,

Ordnance examined a commercial compass

known as the Brunton Pocket Transit. It

was adopted late in 1941 and, with minor

modifications, remained the standard Army

compass throughout the war.

When the Bausch and Lomb binocular

was adopted in 1941 it was understood

125

 (1) ODO 231, 27 Jan 42; (2) Hist Arty

Div, Ind Serv, OCO, vol. 3, ch. X. 126

 Review of Prod Plans, Arty Div, 16 Dec 42. 127

 PSP 13, ch. V, sec. 13. 128

 Interv with Maj Gen Orlando Ward, summer

1949. 129

 For details on this phase of the problem, see

Encyclopedia of Army Ord Binoculars photolithographed at Frankford Arsenal, n.d., no author, copy in OHF.
ARTILLERY 97

that the Bausch and Lomb Company could

not be counted on for large-scale production of binoculars because its resources

were needed for more critical precision

optical instruments. Ordnance therefore

turned to the Nash-Kelvinator Company

and the Mansfield, Ohio, works of the

Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing

Company. Neither firm had any experience

in making optical instruments, nor any

facilities for manufacture of optical elements, but plant surveys had convinced

Ordnance that the two concerns could

readily adapt their equipment and build--

ings to binocular production. Optical elements—lenses, prisms, windows, reticles,

and other parts made of optical glass—

were to be procured from optical glass

manufacturers and turned over to NashKelvinator and Westinghouse as government free issue materials. Production was

slow to start. "We were told by old line

binocular manufacturers," Westinghouse

later reported, "that they questioned if we

would ever be able to produce satisfactory

binoculars, let alone produce them in the

quantities called for under our contract."

But by the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor the two contractors were producing at

the rate of 8,000 binoculars each per

month. During 1943, the peak year for

production, 245,672 were turned out, including both old and new models.130

Manufacture of panoramic telescopes by

the camera works of the MergenthalerLinotype Company and the Eastman Kodak Company may be taken as a representative sample of this special field of

Ordnance procurement. As used for artillery fire control, the panoramic telescope

was a periscopic instrument with a head

that could be rotated to permit the observer to look in any direction without

moving the eye piece. It was also, in the

words of the Eastman company, "a precision instrument manufactured to extremely close tolerances."

 131

 Frankford

Arsenal had made small quantities of the

panoramic telescope M1 during the 1930's

but its maximum capacity was only about

10 per month. To develop an industrial

source that might be called upon for

quantity production in time of war, Ordnance placed an educational order in May

1940 with the Mergenthaler Company,

which had signed an accepted schedule of

production for panoramic telescopes in

1939. The company followed arsenal

methods to the letter, obtained good results, and was soon asked to take on a

quantity production order.132 Meanwhile

an improved model was adopted and a

production contract placed with the Eastman Company, which soon became the

leading producer.133

Production of directors, the heart of

most antiaircraft fire control, was far more

difficult than production of binoculars,

telescopes, or height finders, but Ordnance

was fortunate in its selection of contractors and made a good production record.

The only director produced in large quantities was the M5, based on the British

Kerrison predictor, for the 37-mm. and

40-mm. guns, and the great majority of

M5's were made by the Singer Manufac130

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Whiting, Statistics; (3) Historical Data, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Mansfield, Ohio, in Hist,

Cleveland Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 4. 131

 Hist, Rochester Ord Dist,7 vol. 100, pt. 4,

Eastman Kodak Co., p. 42, OHF. 132

 (1) Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. I, pt. 2

(1939-41), pp. 280-81, and vol. 100, pt. 2; (2)

The Optical Industry by Capt Samuel M. Grafton,

March 1945, in Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol.

100, pt. 1. 133

 Eastman Kodak Co. Rcd of War Prod Activities for the Rochester Ord Dist, 1945, Hist,

Rochester Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 4.
98 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

turing Company of Elizabethport, N.J.134

As early as December 1940 Singer engineers had come to Frankford Arsenal to

see the Kerrison predictor and study the

problem of manufacturing it. They found

that it was a 500-pound mechanism built

with the precision of a wrist watch, carefully assembled to make mathematical calculations that would show how the gun

should be aimed to reach its target. Early

in 1941, after the director had been standardized, Singer agreed to manufacture it at

the rate of 1,700 per year, a rate that

company officials then considered "overwhelming."

 135

 The company obtained

drawings from Frankford, planned its work

procedures, ordered over 1,300 new machine tools, and erected a new building,

completely air-conditioned. As Singer could

find no satisfactory source for large quantities of aluminum and bronze castings it

decided to convert its foundry from the

production of cast iron to aluminum and

bronze. The company used its other plants

and subsidiaries to make packing chests,

motors, small parts, and subassemblies. Delivery of eight directors to the Ordnance

inspector in February 1942 marked the end

of the period of preparation and the beginning of the period of production. By

mid-July 1942 the 1,000th director had

been accepted, requirements were doubled

and redoubled, and by 1944, when production was curtailed in view of Allied air

supremacy, Singer had made some 23,000.

Procurement of optical elements, such as

lenses, prisms, windows, reticles, and so

forth, was one of the most difficult phases

in the production of fire control instruments. The metal parts, known as optical

components, posed far less difficult problems. As the United States had always

imported optical elements, chiefly from

Germany, it had very little capacity for

home production. In the New York Ordnance District, for example, it was estimated in 1939 that total annual production of all optical element manufacturers in

the district was less than $100,000. "The

competition for optics," wrote one procurement officer, "almost resolved itself into a

'free for all' between the Army, Navy and

Air Corps, with the British Purchasing

Commission interfering with all three."

 136

Because of the shortage of optical elements, and the instrument makers' lack of

experience in procuring them, Ordnance

decided to procure optical elements from

qualified producers and turn them over to

instrument manufacturers as government

free issue material. One of the most successful procurements under this policy

flowed from a contract with the Optical

Research Company of Long Island City.

This concern produced most of the optical

elements for the binoculars made by the

Nash-Kelvinator Company and the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company. As requirements for optical elements

mounted after Pearl Harbor and it became

necessary to bring many small manufacturers into production, Frankford Arsenal

and the New York Ordnance District arranged with the Mergenthaler-Linotype

134

 For description, see Catalog of Standard Ord

Items, OHF. For the research and development

background, see Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, pp. 416-21. Some

2,500 of the larger M7 and M9 directors for the

3-inch, 90-mm., and 4.7-inch guns were made by

the Ford Motor Company and the Sperry Gyroscope Company. 135

 Fire Control Director, M5, A Report to Army

Service Forces, New York Ord Dist, by the Singer

Mfg Co., prepared by W. A. Davidson, asst. vice

president, 9 Jul 45, copy in Hist, New York Ord

Dist, vol. 100, pt. 3, OHF. 136

 Capt Samuel M. Grafton, The Optical Industry, Mar 45, Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. 100,

pt. 1.
ARTILLERY 99

Company to attempt an unusual experiment. Mergenthaler set up the U.S.

Optical Supply Corporation, with an office

in New York City, to provide central

control of numerous contracts with small

producers. Its officers were also officers of

Mergenthaler, the parent company, and received no compensation for their services.

Operating on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract

with the government, the company placed

subcontracts with many small producers,

helped them get into production, provided

storage space for optical pressings, and

eventually delivered some $4 million of

material. It supplied nearly all the optical

elements used by the Bulova Watch Company in manufacturing tank telescopes.137

The Fire Control Sub-Office encouraged

the optical glass industry by arranging

for government financing of plant expansion and administering an optical machinery pool which procured some 1,000 machines for use by optical glass producers.

It arranged for the Corning Glass Works

to build a government-owned, contractoroperated plant at Parkersburg, W.Va., and

to operate a glass depot there. In October

1943, when the coating of optics to improve the performance of instruments under poor lighting conditions was made

mandatory, the Fire Control Sub-Office

supervised the procurement of equipment

and provided technical instruction to contractors on this difficult project. Similar

action was taken after the introduction in

December 1943 of thermosetting cements

that increased the resistance of instruments to failure under extreme heat or

cold.138

Changing Requirements and Types,

1943-45

During 1943, the peak year for artillery

production, Ordnance arsenals and contractors produced something over 150,000

weapons, of which roughly half were aircraft guns. The one item that bulked largest

in 1943 output, nearly equal to all other

artillery weapons combined, was the 20-

mm. aircraft gun, which reached a

production figure of 70,000 for the year.

The next largest item on the list was the

75-mm. tank gun with a total of something

over 20,000.

An analysis of the production figures for

1943-44-45 reveals sharp fluctuations in

requirements and the emergence of many

new types as Allied forces pushed forward

against the enemy on many fronts, employing novel tactics and weapons. Aircraft

and AA guns, which held the highest

priority at the start of the war, were cut

back in 1944, and their manufacture

virtually came to a standstill early in 1945.

Large-scale procurement of plastic 4.5-

inch rocket launchers in 3-tube clusters

began in February 1944 when contracts

were placed with General Electric and

Firestone.139 The 37-mm. AA gun dropped

out of the picture in 1944 and output of

the 40-mm. declined sharply. Production of

the 90-mm. AA gun, after reaching a peak

of over 4,000 in 1943, dropped to 300 in

1944, and stopped altogether by 1945.

Meanwhile a new and more powerful AA

weapon, the 120-mm. "Stratosphere" gun,

came into production on a small scale—

550 all told. Because it was extremely

heavy and complex it saw little service

overseas, and with the enemy on the de137

 (1) Grafton, op. cit.; (2) U.S. Optical Supply Corporation by A. J. Mackay, president of

U.S. Optical Supply Corporation, 6 July 1945,

copy in Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 1. 138

 History of Industrial Service, Artillery Division, vol. I, pt. 3, ch. X. 139

 Design, Development and Production of

Launchers, Rocket, 3-Tube 4.5-inch, A.C. [Aircraft], M10, M14, and M15, OHF.
100 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

fensive in 1944-45, virtually no demands

were heard for additional AA guns.140 As

Allied planes were armed primarily with

.50-caliber machine guns—and a few with

75-mm. cannon—output of intermediate

aircraft weapons, 20-mm. and 37-mm.,

came to a standstill in 1944-45. All told,

output of aircraft guns dropped from over

78,000 in 1943 to only 1,000 in 1945.

In other categories the story was much

the same with steadily declining output of

tank guns, self-propelled weapons, and

field guns. But within each category new

or improved weapons forged ahead of older

types. For tank armament the 90-mm. gun

anductio d thne i 105-mm n 1943. howitze and rosre cam to mor e inteo tha pron2,000 each in 1945, while the 76-mm. tank

gun took first place on the list with more

than 12,000 produced in 1944-45.141 The

37-mm. AT gun went out of production in

1943 followed by the 3-inch in 1944. The

4.5-inch gun which had been adopted in

May 1942 as corps artillery was dropped

in 1945, after 426 had been produced,

because field commanders reported it could

do nothing the 155-mm. howitzer could

not do.142 Self-propelled weapons did not

come into production until 1942 but soon

rose to a peak of over 13,000 in 1943. They

dropped off to about 3,000 for 1944, and

in 1945 new, larger types came on the

scene, the 8-inch howitzer and 155-mm.

gun, but all in very small numbers. Although the foregoing fluctuations in output were apparent in the individual categories of artillery, production of all types

of artillery for the 1940-45 period totaled

519,031. (Table 10)

Heavy Artillery

From the very start of World War II

most Ordnance officers were advocates of

heavy artillery, a term that generally included weapons ranging from the 155-mm.

gun (or the medium 155-mm. howitzer) to

the 240-mm. howitzer, but their views were

not shared by responsible Army planners.143

 The General Staff and field commanders felt that big guns, like heavy

tanks, were not sufficiently mobile to counter German fighting tactics and imposed a

disproportionate burden on the nation's

limited shipping resources. Though a few

big guns were listed in the early estimates

of Army needs, they carried a low priority

and their manufacture proceeded at a

snail's pace.144 Then, during the winter of

1942-43, even these small requirements

were sharply cut in successive revisions of

the Army Supply Program, partly because

of the desire to conserve steel and partly

because of the belief that heavy equipment, however valuable in Europe, would

be altogether useless in jungle warfare in

the Pacific.145 Late in 1942 Lt. Gen. Lesley

J. McNair, Commander of the Army

140

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Barnes to Maj Gen

Russell L. Maxwell, ACofS G-4, 8 Jan 45, G-4

vol. II; (2) PSP 29. 141

 PSP 105-mm.. Howitzer M4, Design, Development and Production. 142

 Memo, CofOrd to Col Scott B. Ritchie,

OCO, 13 Feb 45, ExecO file. On development

and production of the 4.5, and its obsolescence,

see PSP 80. 143

 For a detailed account, see The Design, Development and Production of Heavy Mobile Artillery Weapons and Ammunition, Oct 44, OHF.

See also Millett, Organization of the Army Service

Forces, p. 117, and comments by Gen George C.

Marshall in interview with Dr. Sidney T. Mathews and others, 25 July 1949, p. 5, extract in

OHF. 144

 For an artilleryman's complaint, see Capt.

Trevor N. Dupuy, "For Men Only," in Field

Artillery Journal, 32 (Sep 42), 708-12. 145

 (1) ASF Ann Rpt FY 1944, p. 96; (2)

Memo, USW for McCloy, 23 Dec 42, sub: Superheavy Arty, USW 104 Guns, AT, aircraft, and so

on.
ARTILLERY 101

TABLE 10—SUMMARY OF ARTILLERY PRODUCTION, 1940-1945

Source: From Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8.

Ground Forces, unsuccessfully urged production of 16-inch howitzers on railway

gun mounts to supply the need for "superheavy" artillery and in April 1943 criticized the Troop Basis for its lack of sufficient heavy artillery units.146

 In the spring

of 1943 General Campbell made a strong

plea for immediate approval of more heavy

artillery, asserting that powerful guns

would be needed to blast heavy concrete

fortifications on the continent. "The bigger

the weapon," he warned, "the longer it

takes to get into production."

 147

 A small

increase was authorized on 1 July 1943,

but the gain was only temporary. In January 1944, in February, and again in

March, General Campbell protested against

proposed new cuts, contending that once

production was stopped it could not be

resumed speedily at a later date if the

need for heavy artillery should arise

again.148 But he meanwhile proceeded as

directed to terminate contracts, and gave

increased attention to manufacture of

spare gun tubes and reworking of worn

out tubes returned from overseas.149

Just as the curtailment orders were being

carried out they were suddenly rescinded.

Early in April ASF headquarters ordered

that production of heavy artillery weapons

146

 Memo, McCloy for USW, 20 Dec 42, USW

104 Guns, AT, aircraft, and so on. See also

Greenfield, Wiley, and Palmer, Organization of

Ground Combat Troops, pp. 178 and 233. 147

 Quoted in The Design, Development and

Production of Heavy Mobile Artillery Weapons

and Ammunition, p. 17. 148

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 8 Jan 44,

sub: Reduction in Heavy Arty Program, and 1st

Indorsement, 12 Feb 44, OO 400.12/11812; (2)

Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 14 Feb 44, copy in

ASF Contl Div, 020 Ord; (3) Memo, CofOrd for

CG ASF, 10 Mar 44, sub: Prod Capacity for

Heavy Arty Matériel, and 1st Indorsement CG

ASF to ACofS G-4, 12 Mar 44, in folder marked

6-Class V Supply in ASF Plng Div, Theater Br,

Box 393, NA; (4) Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 26

Mar 44, sub: Status of Heavy Field Arty, OO

475/19588. 149

 Ann Rpt CofOrd FY 1944, p. 6. For the

heavy artillery ammunition side of the story, see

next chapter.
102 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

and ammunition be expedited, describing

the project as of "high operational urgency."

 150

 The experience of the Italian

campaign, where German artillery outranged that of the Allies, had proved the

need for big guns.151 In mid-May G-4

issued the specific requirements, all adding

up to enough weapons for 66 new battalions of medium and heavy artillery.152

Capacity that had been laboriously built

up over a long period of time and then

dismantled had now to be built up again.

But to resume production took time, six

months or more, depending on the circumstances. One of the chief difficulties was

that plant capacity released following the

cutbacks had been taken over by the Navy

and was no longer available to Ordnance.

Further, contractors who had released

their subcontractors could not win them

back overnight. As a result, some artillery

contracts had to be placed with firms that

had never before made big guns for the

Army.153 Others had to be placed in labor

shortage areas because of the lack elsewhere of forging and machining capacity.154

 Meanwhile, as Allied troops fought

their way inland after the 6 June 1944

landings in France, General Eisenhower

sent back an urgent request for more

powerful antitank ammunition, more tanks

with 90-mm. guns, and more 90-mm. selfpropelled guns.155

 This request was given

special priority and was merged with the

intensive drive for heavy artillery production.156

 At the same time the demand for

spare gun tubes and recoil mechanisms rose

steadily. The tremendously increased rate

of fire after the invasion pushed the requirement for spare tubes in 1944 to nearly

4,000 as compared with actual delivery of

only 323 in 1943.157

Output lagged behind requirements all

during the winter of 1944-45. Then, just

as it was about to catch up, the defeat of

Germany brought an end to the need.

Testifying before the Truman Committee

in April 1945, Donald Nelson reported

that, "the heavy artillery is going along as

well as could possibly be expected." Then

followed this interesting colloquy that may

serve as a conclusion for one chapter:

Mr. Nelson: On artillery, there are tremendously increased requirements.

Senator Ferguson: Due mostly to

changes in plan?

Senator Truman: Due mostly to the fact

150

 Memo, Director ASF Prod Div for Br chiefs,

6 Apr 44, sub: Expediting . . . Heavy Arty. . .,

ASF Prod Div 472 Guns. See also Greenfield,

Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, p. 235; Memo, ASF Director of Materiel for CG ASF, 1 Apr 44, sub: Heavy FA

Program, OHF; and Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd,

2 Apr 44, same sub, OHF. 151

 Ltr, Col John G. Detwiler to Campbell, 4

June 1945, OHF. 152

 (1) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CG ASF, 15

May 44, sub: Proc . . . Arty, OO 400/12103; (2)

Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 19 May 44, same

sub, OO 400/12103. See also Robert R. Palmer,

Bell I. Wiley and William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1948), p. 541. 153

 Memo, Col Ward E. Becker, WDGS G-4, for

ACofS G-4, 29 May 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to

Chicago. . . , G-4 file 472.2 vol. II. 154

 ASF Urgency Cir, 28 Aug 44, sub: Heavy

Arty. . . , 300.5 ASF Urgency Cirs, ASF Prod

Div, G1987. 155

 (1) Cable, Eisenhower for Marshall, 5 Jul

44, ASF Prod Div 472 Guns; (2) Memo for record by Lt Col John A. Sargent, ASF Prod Serv

Br, 8 Jul 44, same file. 156

 (1) WPB Joint Operating Instruction No. 5,

14 Jul 44, copy in ASF Prod Div 473 Gun Carriages; (2) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 10 Jul

44, sub: Prod of Carriage, Motor, 90-mm. Gun,

M36. . ., OO 400.12/12944; (3) Ltr, CofOrd to

Arty Contractors, 18 Jul 44, OO 472/6157; (4)

ASF Urgency Cir, 28 Aug 44, sub: Heavy Arty,

ASF Prod Div, 300.5 ASF Urgency Cir, G1987. 157

 Hiland G. Batcheller, Critical Programs, a

Report to the WPB, 14 Nov 44, WPB Doc. 315,

p. 6, WPB file 210.3, NA.
ARTILLERY 103

that they found out aircraft bombing

could not take the place of artillery.

Mr. Nelson: That is very true.

Senator Hatch: This is one of the lessons of war.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, the

dropping of the bomb didn't have the

same effect as the shooting of the shell.

Mr. Nelson: The Ordnance Department

knew that from the very start.

Senator Ferguson: And contended for

it?

Mr. Nelson: Contended for it; proved it

mathematically in every way, shape, and

form.

Senator Truman: But you couldn't convince them except by experience.158

158

 Hearings, Truman Comm., S., 78th Cong.,

2d sess., pt. 25, p. 10,884.
CHAPTER VI

Artillery Ammunition: Preparation

The settled doctrine of U.S. Army field

commanders in World War II was to pave

the way for advancing foot soldiers by

massed artillery fire and aerial bombing.

Whenever possible, stubbornly held positions were reduced at long range with

steel and high explosives, not with frontal

attacks by infantry columns. In the first

two days of the March 1944 attack on

Cassino, for example, U.S. artillery units

fired something like eleven thousand tons

of shells, accompanied by a hailstorm of

bombs dropped by the Air Force. Similarly,

landings on islands in the Pacific were

regularly preceded by hours of methodical

pounding from planes and surface vessels

to destroy the enemy's strong points and

drive him back from the beaches. During

the attack on Iwo Jima close to forty

thousand tons of shells and bombs fell on

its 8-square-mile area. In the European

theater, in the single month of December

1944, the total quantity of 105-mm, howitzer ammunition fired exceeded three

million rounds. In his diary kept during the

Italian campaign Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas

quoted a captured German medical officer

as raving against the German command

and saying, "You people expend artillery

ammunition but mine expend only the

bodies of men."

 1 U.S. Army tactics helped

achieve the all important goal of sure

victory at minimum cost in American

lives, but they ate up ammunition at a

rate never before considered feasible.2

Massed fire power on the scale employed

during World War II was utterly beyond

the capability of the U.S. Army in the

summer of 1940, or even as late as the

summer of 1941. The stocks of ammunition

on hand in 1940 were so meager that, in

the words of Secretary of War Stimson,

"We didn't have enough powder in the

whole United States to last the men we

now [1943] have overseas for anything

like a day's fighting."

 3 Worse still, only a

1

 Maj Gen John P. Lucas, Diary, vol. II, Italy,

5 Sep 43-1 Jan 44, OCMH. 2

 For ammunition statistics, see Ammunition

Supply for the European and Mediterranean

Theaters, 15 Aug 45, by ASF Contl Div, OHF.

On the effect of artillery fire on U.S. casualties

see Rpt, Director of Intelligence, ASF, n.d., sub:

Report From AGF Board Report, 26 Nov 43, ASF

Plng Div. Theater Br, Gen File 17, Lessons

Learned, NA. 3

 Army Ordnance, XXIV, No. 137 (MarchApril, 1943), 275. For smokeless powder, the total

capacity of the country in July 1940 was 60,000

pounds per day, and for TNT, 25,000 pounds per

day. Report re SR 71 in papers of Brig Gen John

W. N. Schulz, Chief of Proc Br, OASW, 1940-41.

See also detailed figures in Report on Explosives

Capacity vs. Requirements, incl to Memo of CofOrd for USW, 2 Feb 43, no file number, carbon

in OHF file, pp. 10-11. For earlier history, see

Dorothy B. Howard, Disposition of Five DuPont

Munitions Plants World War I, 1918-26, Historical Study No. 77, U.S. Dept of Labor, Dec 44,

OHF.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 105

handful of small plants were making propellent powder and high explosives, and

there were virtually no facilities for the

mass loading and assembling of heavy ammunition. American industry was just beginning, through educational orders, to

learn techniques for forging and machining

shells and producing intricate fuze mechanisms. The only sources for new artillery

ammunition were Frankford and Picatinny

Arsenals, while a few Ordnance depots

were equipped to renovate old ammunition. Private ammunition plants did not

exist, and, because of the specialized nature of the process, there were no commercial plants that could be converted to

ammunition production.4

A Government-Owned

Ammunition Industry

To meet this situation the Ordnance

Department took steps in the summer of

1940 to create something new in American

economic life—a vast interlocking network

of ammunition plants owned by the government and operated by private industry.

More than 60 of these GOCO (government-owned, contractor-operated) plants

were built between June 1940 and December 1942. Representing a capital investment of about $3 billion they produced a

wide range of military chemicals, and they

loaded millions of shells, bombs, grenades,

rockets, and mines. The plants employed

nearly a quarter of a million workers and

covered a total land area equalling that of

New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia combined. Their annual operating expense

amounted to about $1 billion.5

It was this ammunition industry, spread

widely throughout the Mississippi Valley,

that accounted for the spectacular growth

of the U.S. Army's fire power between

1940 and 1943. From some of these quietly

efficient plants, operated by competent industrial firms, came smokeless powder and

death-dealing high explosives. From countless other privately owned plants—some as

far away as New England—came shells,

cartridge cases, fuzes, and related metal

components. At still other governmentowned plants, managed by concerns that

in peacetime handled such products as

soap, soft drinks, rubber tires, or breakfast

food, the ammunition was loaded and assembled into complete rounds for shipment

overseas. All along the line, inspectors

checked each step in the process to assure

high quality production. Total output for

the 1940-45 period reached astronomical

figures. The 105-mm, shells alone, if placed

end to end, would have extended twice

around the earth at the equator. The total

for all types and sizes amounted to nearly

one billion rounds, ranging from 20-mm, to

240-mm., not counting over one hundred

million grenades and mines, and over

thirty-three million bombs and bomb clusters.6

4

 For a listing of plants in existence in 1939-40

for producing TNT, ammonium picrate, lead

azide, mercury fulminate, and smokeless powder,

see Ilsley, Facilities Program of the Ammo Div,

Oct 44, vol. I, pp. 25-26, OHF, and Rpt of

Comm, headed by Col Rutherford to ASW, 24

Jun 40, sub: Proposed WD Program for Increasing Production Capacity. . . , Gen Burns' personal file. Ammunition procurement policy is outlined in PSP 1, Contract Negotiation and

Administration, Ord Dept, May 45, ch. 5a. 5

 (1) PSP 73, St. Louis Suboffice, Office of the

Field Director of Ammunition Plants, Jul 45, by

Ammo Div, Ind Serv, OCO, pp. 3-4, OHF; (2)

Maj Edwin J. Grayson, PSP 18, The Establishment of the Artillery Ammunition Loading Program for World War II, Oct 45, OHF; (3)

Historical Rpt by FDAP, vol. I, Gen Hist, 1 Aug

42 to 30 Sep 45, p. 4, OHF; (4) Maj Gen Levin

H. Campbell, Jr., Address before The Mile High

Club, Denver, Colo., 2 Nov 43, OHF. 6

 Whiting, Statistics, Proc sec., pp. 48-52.
106 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

NIGHT CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS in 1941 at Weldon Spring Ordnance Works, built for

manufacture of high explosives.

In terms of dollar value, artillery ammunition, bombs, and related items constituted the largest single element in the

Ordnance procurement program. Ordnance not only filled the ammunition needs

of the Army, including the Air Force, but

it supplied large quantities of bulk explosives and complete rounds to the Navy

and to lend-lease recipients. The value of

artillery ammunition produced between

Pearl Harbor and V-J Day was nearly $7

billion at 1945 prices, and the value of

bombs, mines, grenades, and pyrotechnics

brought the total up to about $10 billion,

or nearly one-third of all Ordnance procurement during World War II. The value

of artillery ammunition procured by Ordnance exceeded the combined total of all

procurement by four of the other technical services—Signal Corps, Transportation

Corps, Chemical Warfare Service, and the

Medical Department. It was over five times

the total sales volume of General Motors

Corporation in 1940.7

The complexity of ammunition procurement increased in geometric proportion to

the number of weapons and the types of

ammunition employed by each. There were

only twenty different sizes of artillery shell

used in World War II, but there were

more than a dozen types of shell for each

caliber. Artillery weapons were supplied

not only with high explosive and armor

piercing ammunition, but also with smoke,

illuminating, and phosphorous shells.

Some ammunition was stuffed with propaganda leaflets. All told, Ordnance produced 270 types of artillery shell, and

seventy different types and sizes of bombs.

7

 (1) Statistical Review, World War II, a Summary of ASF Activities prepared by the Stat Br,

Contl Div, ASF, n.d., p. 2; (2) Moody's Industrial Manuals, annuals published by Moody's

Investors Service.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 107

The Anatomy of Ammunition Production

To see the process of artillery ammunition production in proper perspective it is

necessary to take a round of ammunition

apart and inspect its composition. There

are five major elements in a complete

round of high-explosive ammunition: the

cartridge case, the projectile, the propellent powder, the high explosive, and the

fuze mechanism. For bombs the principal elements are the bomb body, explosive,

fin, and fuze. In addition, there are many

other small parts, such as the primer,

booster, and adapter, all of which are essential but of lesser importance in terms of

production volume. From the procurement point of view, all parts of a bomb or

round of artillery ammunition naturally fall

into two groups—metal components, and

powder and explosives. In general, the

metal components were procured from

private industry, through the district offices, using existing plant capacity; powder

and explosives were produced in the main

by the new GOCO plants under the direction of the Ammunition Division of Industrial Service. After the elements of a

shell had been produced there still remained

the task of loading and assembling them

into complete rounds at the loading plants,

and inspecting them with care. A complete

round of ammunition did not spring fullborn from any one plant. It was, rather,

the end product of a whole series of interrelated manufacturing operations in a host

of different plants. The TNT came from

one source, the smokeless powder from

another, and the metal components from

scores of widely separated factories. With

the 105-mm. howitzer high-explosive shell,

for example, it has been estimated that the

metal parts traveled over 10,000 miles from

twelve Ordnance plants and works.8

Two additional features of ammunition

production merit special note: the precision work required on the metal components, and the hazardous nature of powdermaking and ammunition loading. An artillery shell is a delicate and complicated

mechanism packed with two death-dealing

powder charges—smokeless powder in the

case, and TNT or other high explosives in

the shell. Both the brass case and the steel

projectile must be formed to meet exact

specifications. The fuze must be built with

the precision of a fine watch and yet be

strong enough to withstand violent shocks

—and sure to function with split-second

accuracy. Its sensitive detonator and booster charge must be assembled by skilled

operators. Propellants and highly sensitive

percussion primers must pass rigid inspection tests to assure safety for the gun crew

and uniformity in the flight of the projectiles round after round. The TNT or

other high explosive must be loaded with

extreme care, must remain safe to handle

and store for long periods of time, and then

must explode with terrific shattering effect

at precisely the right moment.

This type of work was obviously not for

amateurs. Yet in 1940 there were only a

half-dozen companies in the United States

familiar with explosives manufacture, and

their experienced personnel were few in

number. These companies had but recently

come through the "Merchants of Death"

era when everyone connected with the

8

 (1) Lewis and Rosa, Ammo, pp. 56-57; (2)

Memo, Col Francis H. Miles, Jr., for Chief Ind

Serv, 31 Jan 41, sub: Monthly Progress Rpt of

the Ammo Div. . . , filed as ex. 49, PSP 6, 7, 12,

Ordnance Requirements and the Control of Production, Aug 45, by Maj Paul D. Olejar; (3)

Testimony by Wesson and Col Rutherford, 25 Jul

40, WDAB, H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., 2d Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1941, pp. 192-

212.
108

manufacture of munitions had been publicly castigated. Nor did the Ordnance

Department itself, with only 375 Regular

Army officers in the summer of 1940, have

very many officers or civilian engineers

with more than elementary knowledge of

ammunition production. Notable among

these was Maj. John P. Harris, who in

1937 had established the Wilmington, Del.,

suboffice to draw up plans for ammunition

production and take counsel with the explosives firms that had home offices in

Wilmington.9

The Period of Plant Expansion, 1940-42

Site Selection

The selection of sites for new ammunition plants was complicated by a variety of

factors. At the outset, the policy of avoiding coastal areas in favor of the less vulnerable interior regions set certain broad

limits, as did the need for avoiding, on

grounds of safety, large centers of population. Next came a whole series of interrelated considerations, such as availability

of water, manpower, electricity, railroads,

and highways. There were strong political

pressures always at work, and they sometimes decided the issue in favor of the less

desirable sites.10 Mistakes were sometimes

made in selecting sites as, for example, the

choice of land in Illinois that had oil

pipes under it.11 Huge tracts of land were

needed for both the explosives plants and

the loading plants, not because the buildings were large but because safety demanded wide open areas between production lines and between storage areas. The

Illinois Ordnance Plant, for example, with

eight loading lines, covered an area of

twenty-four thousand acres—about one

and a half times the size of Manhattan

Island. Within the Wolf Creek plant and

its adjoining depot there were seventy-five

miles of railroad track and 130 miles of

highway. Whenever possible, plants were

built on land that was not well suited for

farming and could be purchased at reasonable cost.12

 Finally, Ordnance was required to spread its new plants widely for

reasons of security, with resultant increase

in freight hauls between plants. "If we were

a private concern," commented General

Wesson in the spring of 1941, "we would

have concentrated our plants so as to reduce transportation but it has been necessary to yield to the demand to spread

them out."

 13

9

 (1) Ilsley, Facilities Program of the Ammo

Div, Oct 44, vol. I, p. 27; (2) Intervs with Brig

Gen Merle H. Davis and Col John P. Harris during the summer of 1953; (3) Dir, Lt. Col. Alfred

B. Quinton, Jr., High Explosives Manufacturing

Plants, 20 Sep 39, copy in OHF. 10

 Interv with Col John P. Harris at Picatinny

Arsenal, 19 Jun 53. Colonel Harris' testimony is

borne out by History of Ohio River Ordnance

Plant and History of Oklahoma Ordnance Plant. See also draft MS., Jesse A. Remington and

Lenore Fine, The Corps of Engineers: Construc- tion in the United States, a volume in preparation

in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II, ch. VIII. 11

 Min of Second Mtg in Brig Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr.'s office. . . , 12 Feb 41, p. 12. OUSW

Prod Div 185.6 Munitions Ord Plant Comm. 12

 (1) Lt. Col. Robert Ginsburgh, "Inland Sites

for New Ammo Plants," American Machinist, 85

(10 December 1941), 1281-82; (2) Hearings,

Truman Comm., 17 Nov 41, pt. 9, p. 2906, 77th

Cong., 1st sess. For figures on land costs, see

Quarterly Inventory of WD Owned, Sponsored

and Leased Facilities, 31 Mar 45. For data on site selection and acquisition of land for loading

plants, see PSP 18. Verbatim minutes of two conferences in February 1941 on sites may be found

in OUSW Prod Div, 185.6 Munitions Ord Plant

Comm. See also Maj John F. Joorfetz, Site Rpt,

Mar 44, History of Ammunition Division, Ind

Serv, OCO. 13

 (1) Min of Conf in Wesson's Office, 1 Apr 41, relative to SR 71, OHF; (2) Testimony by

Wesson and Col Rutherford, WDAB, H.R., 2d

Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1941, 76th
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 109

The decision to avoid areas within two

hundred miles of the nation's borders

forced Ordnance to modify its mobilization

plans for loading plants. In the 1930's the

accepted plan for an emergency was to

construct two different types known as

First Phase and Second Phase plants. The

former were to be built at existing Ordnance depots such as Delaware, Nansemond, Raritan, Charleston, Savanna, and

others.14 It was believed that, on the approach of a crisis, shipment of ammunition

from these depots to troops in the field

would release buildings that could readily

be converted into ammunition loading

plants in ninety days. These plants would

supply the Initial Protective Force during

the first stages of the emergency while

Second Phase plants—large, newly constructed plants—were being built.15

 This

plan had to be abandoned in 1939-40

because most of the depots were along the

seacoast and were considered too vulnerable to air or sea attack. Further, some

were near large cities such as Baltimore

and Charleston. Another factor practically

completed the wiping out of all plans for

First Phase loading plants. This was the

desire to minimize the effect of enemy air

attacks by spreading plants out over very

large areas, with such great distances between lines that a bomb dropped on one

line would not destroy the entire plant.

The effect of this decision was to double

the distances previously planned between

loading lines, and increase the total area

and total cost of all plants. It also contributed materially to the remarkable safety

record made by Ordnance in World

War II.16

The location of ammonia plants demands at least brief mention, for it introduced a permanent shift in the geographic

center of the ammonia industry. Before the

war, when ammonia was made chiefly

from coal, the plants were built in coalproducing areas, generally near the coke

ovens. Some industrial chemists and Ordnance officers, particularly Maj. John P.

Harris, were convinced that in time of war

enough ammonia for the mass production

of explosives and smokeless powder could

never be produced from coal.17 The pre1940 Ordnance plans therefore called for

the production of ammonia from natural

gas and the location of new ammonia

plants in the Southwest rather than in.

the Pennsylvania-West Virginia-Kentucky

coal region. "People told me I was crazy

Cong., 3d sess., pp. 192-212. For a readable and

informing story of site selection and plant construction, see William P. Vogel, Jr., Kingsbury:

A Venture in Teamwork (New York: Todd and

Brown, 1946).

14

 A list of proposed plants appears in Memo,

Col Lucian D. Booth, Ammo Div, 3 Jan 39, sub:

General Data Regarding . . . Plans for Ammo in

an Emergency, copy in OHF. The background

planning is described in PSP 18. 15

 Dir, War Plans for Loading Ammunition,

WDPMP 1939 Augmented, 21 Mar 40, by Brig

Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr., OHF. 16

 Revised Requirements for Sites for SecondPhase Ammo Loading Plants, 15 Jun 40, copy in

OHF. An excellent and authoritative presentation

of this whole phase of the history of loading

plants is to be found in part II of a report,

Powder, Explosives, and Loading Capacity vs. Requirements, inclosure to ltr, CofOrd to USW, 18

Feb 43, sub: Report on Powder, Explosives and

Loading Capacity, pt. II, 18 Feb 43, copy in OO

675/889 Misc Incl file. See also PSP 18. In 1939-

40, two loading lines were built at Savanna

Ordnance Depot in Illinois and proved valuable

in correcting faults in design and construction.

Two minor caliber lines were also built on land

adjacent to the Ogden Ordnance Depot in Utah.

See also Gen Rpt on Bag and Shell Loading, 4

Jan 44, in files of War Projects Unit, Bureau of

the Budget, ExecO of the President, copy in OHF. 17

 (1) Interv with Col John P. Harris, 19 Jun

53; (2) History, Dixie Ordnance Works, vol I,

OHF. The latter reference tells of the early interest of the Commercial Solvents Corporation in

this matter.
110 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

when I proposed the idea," Harris declared, "but it succeeded and today all the

ammonia producers use natural gas."

 18

Four ammonia works—Cactus (Tex.),

Dixie (La.), Missouri (Mo.) and Ozark

(Ark.)—were built to utilize natural gas as

their basic raw material. Three other ammonia works—Buckeye (Ohio), Jayhawk

(Kans.), and Morgantown (W.Va.) —

continued to make ammonia from coal.

The Construction Phase

Construction of new plants was managed by the Quartermaster Corps until 16

December 1941 when this responsibility

was transferred to the Corps of Engineers.

War Department plans provided that the

service responsible for plant construction

should select the construction contractor

while Ordnance would choose the operating contractor. In most cases the operating firm helped design the plant, and in

some instances served also as the construction contractor. To speed work.and avoid

protracted negotiations that would be

required for fixed-price contracts, the

Quartermaster Corps and Corps of Engineers used cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts

with results that led to sharp criticism by

committees of Congress.19 The criticism

may have been unwarranted, as the

Quartermaster Corps and Corps of Engineers contended, but its publication left

many people with the erroneous impression

that the Ordnance Department was at

fault.20

The expansion program began on a

rather modest scale in the summer of 1940

when contracts were left for two smokeless

powder plants (Radford and Indiana), one

TNT plant (Kankakee), and one shell

and bomb loading plant (Ravenna).21 A

few weeks later another loading plant (Elwood) for shells and bombs was added.

Twice during the latter part of 1940 the

capacity of the Indiana plant was raised,

bringing the total up to three times the

original plan and boosting the cost to more

than one hundred million. In October construction started on the Baytown Ordnance Works in Texas for the production

of toluene, basic chemical needed for TNT,

using a process recently developed by industry with Ordnance support and encouragement.22

 The British meanwhile

(August 1940) contracted with the DuPont Company to build a large smokeless

powder plant (later named Chickasaw

Ordnance Works) at Millington, Tennessee, and Ordnance in October 1940 signed

a contract with the Lansdowne Steel and

18

 Interv with Col John P. Harris, 19 Jun 53.

See also Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team,

pp. 259-60. 19

 (1) Interim Gen Rpt, Comm. on Mil Affairs,

H.R., 77th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Rpt 2272, 23

Jun 42, pp. 5-6; (2) S. Rpt No. 480, pt. 5, 15

Jan 42, pp. 232-74, 77th Cong., 2d sess. For

Campbell's personal account of the plant construction phase, see The Industry-Ordnance Team,

ch. 7. For a frank discussion of the matter within

Ordnance, see Min of Conf in Wesson's Office, 1

Apr 41, Relative to SR 71, OHF. The legal background for GOCO plants is sketched by Col.

Irving A. Duffy in Memo for CofOrd, 24 Mar 42,

sub: Background and Status of New GOCO

Facilities. . . , OHF. The official history of each

plant gives detailed information on a wide range

of topics. 20

 Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, ch.

XII. For the viewpoint of the Corps of Engineers

historians, see Remington and Fine, Construction

in the United States, Chapter VIII. 21

 For Ordnance plans for new facilities as they

existed in the spring of 1940, see Memo, CofOrd

for ASW, 6 May 40, sub: Additional Facilities. . . , OO 381/35763 ASW. See also Rpt on

Explosives Capacity vs. Rqmts, and Memo, ASW

for SW, 29 Aug 40, sub: Time Schedule of Munitions Prod. . . , Gen Burns' personal file. 22

 For a detailed account of this project, see

Toluene for War, OHF. Baytown was built near

the Gulf Coast because it had to be near the

Humble Oil Company refinery.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 111

Iron Company to build a plant in Alabama

for forging and machining 105-mm, shells.

The Gadsden Ordnance plant, as it was

known, was the only GOCO plant that

produced metal components for ammunition.

During 1941 the expansion program

rapidly gained momentum as work on

twenty-five new plants began and the

capacity of existing plants was greatly

increased. Broadly speaking, these plants

were intended to raise production capacity

to the level required for a 4,000,000-man

Army.23 Thirteen of the new plants were

designed for loading operations—eight for

bomb and shell loading, four for bag loading, and one for loading fuzes and boosters.

Five of the new plants produced ammonia,

three TNT, two smokeless powder, one

oleum, and one ammonium picrate. In

addition, Ordnance took over the British

smokeless powder plant at Millington, Tennessee, following enactment of the LendLease Act in March 1941, but output of

the plant continued to go to the British.

After Pearl Harbor the program was

doubled, with construction starting on 25

new plants between January and August

1942. Ten were for loading bombs, shells,

fuzes, boosters, detonators, and primers.

Six were for TNT, two for a newer and

more powerful explosive known as RDX,

two for smokeless powder, and the remaining five for ammonia, magnesium, and ammonium picrate.24

Erection of the new facilities is sometimes described as coming in a series of

waves, each wave forming a balanced array

of lines for producing smokeless powder,

TNT, and auxiliary chemicals, and for

loading and assembling complete rounds.

But the actual construction of the plants

did not fall into any such neat pattern.

The expansion moved forward rather unevenly along a wide front, beginning with

Indiana and Radford in the fall of 1940

and ending in the late summer of 1942

with Holston and Sunflower. The goal was

always to achieve balanced production as

soon as possible, but the task of keeping

production in balance was never easy,

though it was simplified somewhat by construction of multiple-purpose plants.

In most cases, Ordnance plants turned

out more than one product or performed

more than one function. The Badger Ordnance Works, for example, was originally

intended to provide only three smokeless

powder lines, but the contract was revised

to add double-base powder and TNT. The

Illinois Ordnance Plant went into operation

in June 1942 with production of percussion primers, but it was soon producing

detonators, assembling fuzes, and loading

boosters for 155-mm, shells. The use of

such multiple-purpose facilities gave the

program a flexibility it would otherwise

have lacked. Flexibility was essential, for

the situation was never static. As requirements rose or fell, or shifted from one

type of ammunition to another, production

lines had to be shut down, new lines

23

 The Ordnance plan for 17 of these plants

may be found in Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 28 Dec

40, sub: Funds Required for Additional Facilities, OO 381/15444 ASW. See also Memo, Col.

Miles, for Chief of Ind Serv, 31 Jan 41, sub:

Monthly Progress Rpt of the Ammo Div. The

early plants were designed to last for many years,

but the later plants were of less durable construction. 24

 The complexity of the Ordnance powder and

explosives program is suggested by the fact that

30 chemicals, including raw materials, intermediate materials, and end products were manufactured at Ordnance works. For detailed

information, see PSP 15, Chemicals Used in the

Powder and Explosives Program in World War II,

1945, OHF. For the new plants proposed by

Secretary Patterson on 2 Jan 42, see Incl to

Memo of that date for Knudsen, OUSW Madigan

file (Ord Gen).
112 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

added, or entire plants taken out of production. For example, because of a drop

in requirements, the large bag-loading

plant at Flora, Mississippi, was not needed

in the summer of 1942, when it was nearing completion; it was converted into a

Unit Training Center until 1945 when

need for it arose in the heavy ammunition

program.25

For many reasons, precision in planning

plant expansion in 1941-42 proved to be

impossible. Requirements fluctuated from

month to month. No one could predict

exactly how long it would take to build a

new plant, for it depended on such factors

as weather, labor supply, and deliveries of

materials and production equipment. Improvements in techniques boosted the rate

of production in many plants and completely invalidated the original estimates of

plant capacity. Construction of a number

of plants and new operating lines authorized after Pearl Harbor were canceled late

in 1942 as requirements dropped and existing plants reached unexpectedly high production levels.26

New facilities were never created as fast

as Ordnance officers thought they should

be. Of twenty-three new loading plants

built in the 1940-42 period, the average

time required for construction was nine

months.27 A constant source of delay was

the interval between the time the need for

new capacity was foreseen and the time

funds became available. After that, approval by higher authorities of both sites

and projects was often slow in coming, for

it demanded co-ordination with The

Quartermaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Site Board appointed by

the Assistant Secretary of War, the National Defense Advisory Commission, the

Bureau of the Budget, and the President

himself. Aggressive action was necessary to

push urgent projects through this labyrinth of offices in anything like reasonable

time. The division of authority between

Ordnance and the QMC on construction

came in for particularly vehement criticism

by Ordnance officers.28

The Operating Contractors

To meet the 1940 emergency Ordnance

adopted the policy of placing contracts for

operation of new TNT and smokeless

powder plants with established explosives

manufacturers, chiefly the DuPont, Atlas,

Hercules, and Trojan companies. Their

staffs were "stretched to the breaking

point" to man the new plants.29 For

auxiliary chemicals such as anhydrous ammonia, toluene, oleum, and ammonium

picrate, contracts were made with industrial chemical firms and with oil refining

companies. To operate the loading plants

it was necessary to bring in companies

25

 For a list of specific cancellations, see Ilsley,

Facilities Program of the Ammo Div, Oct 44, vol.

1, pp. 158-59. 26

 (1) Rpt on Explosives Capacity vs. Rqmts,

pp. 13-44; (2) Memo, Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay,

ASF Director of Matériel, for USW, 10 Jul 43,

sub: Ord Plant Data for the H.R. Mil Affairs

Comm., printed in Second Gen Rpt of H.R.

Comm. on Mil Affairs, 78th Cong., 2d sess., H.R.

Rpt No. 1903 ex. F. 27

 Table No. 1 in Gen Rpt on Bag and Shell

Loading, 4 Jan 44. 28

 (1) For an outline of approval procedures,

see Campbell, op. cit., pp. 105-106. See also (2)

Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 12 Aug 40, OO 400.-

12/234; (3) Rpt on Explosives Capacity vs.

Rqmts, op. cit., and (4) Ilsley, Facilities Program

of the Ammo Div, Oct 44, vol. I, p. 24. (5) See

Remington and Fine, Construction, ch. 8. 29

 Development of Production Capacity in the

Ordnance Department, PSP 8 [1945], pp. 2-3.

For a good, brief description of the expansion, see

Rpt on Explosives Capacity vs. Requirements.

These reports have been supplemented by numerous interviews with officers and civilians who were

in charge of the expansion program.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 113

with no previous experience in handling

explosives or related chemicals. The

Quaker Oats Company took over management of a bomb-loading plant in Nebraska;

the Sherwin-Williams Paint Company operated a shell and bomb-loading plant in

Illinois; and the Procter and Gamble Soap

Company operated the Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant in Tennessee for loading

shells.30 Todd and Brown, Inc., which

had helped build Rockefeller Center in

New York and had directed the colonial

restoration of Williamsburg, built and operated the Kingsbury Ordnance Plant. In

selecting such contractors the Ordnance

Department did not attach any great importance to the nature of their peacetime

functions, but gave first consideration to

their managerial ability, reputation for

efficient operation, integrity, and financial

stability. The idea was that such firms

knew the fundamentals of mass production

and good business management, had competent plant managers on their staff, and

could soon learn all they needed to know

about the special problems of loading shells

and bombs.31 "One of the lessons Ordnance learned in the Second World War,"

wrote General Campbell, "was that any

up-to-date, alert manufacturing company

with a strong executive, engineering, and

operating staff could take an ammunition

plant and operate it effectively, even

though the plant was of a character entirely

foreign to the previous activity of the

company."

 32

With all of these companies, known as

"agent operators," Ordnance signed costplus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts with

rather liberal provisions. Each company

was reimbursed at regular intervals for

approved expenses in operating the plant,

and in addition was paid a fee based on

the number or rounds of ammunition or

pounds of explosive produced. Under this

arrangement the contractors ran no risk of

failing to make a profit. To protect the

government's interest, teams of auditors at

each plant checked the company's accounts

and approved or disallowed every item of

expense in accordance with policies established in Washington. As the CPFF

contract had never before been used by the

Army on such a scale, it raised many

knotty legal and fiscal problems for both

government and contractor. There was

some criticism that the fees allowed the

contractors were excessive, but the Ordnance contracts for plant operation encountered little of the public criticism

directed against the CPFF construction

contracts.33

Metal Components

While new powder, explosives, and loading plants were being built and put into

operation the Ammunition Division also

launched a tremendous program for procurement of the metal components of ammunition. The magnitude of this phase of

ammunition procurement is indicated by

the fact that in the single year 1943 it

used four million tons of steel, second only

to the tank-automotive program, which ate 30

 For detailed testimony on Wolf Creek, see

Hearings, Truman Comm., 17 Nov 41, pt. 9, pp.

2905ff, 77th Cong., 1st sess. See also Interim Gen

Rpt, Comm, on Mil Affairs, H.R. 77th Cong.,

2d sess., H.R. Rpt No. 2272. 31

 (1) Statement prepared by Wesson for the

Truman Comm., Jun 41, OHF; (2) PSP 8, pp.

2-3.

32

 Campbell, op. cit., p. 72. 33

 For a comprehensive tabulation of operating

costs and fixed fees earned, see Hist, Ammo Div,

Ind Serv, OCO, vol. 100, Relationship of Actual

Costs and Fees. . . , 31 May 45, OHF. For

criticism of fees, see reports of inspections of the

plants and of the Office Field Director of Ammunition plants by representatives of The Inspector General's Department.
114 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

up seven million tons of steel. Procurement

of metal components was not only a big

but also a highly complex operation, requiring the co-ordination of literally hundreds of widely scattered producers. For

each type of ammunition, cartridge cases

might be procured from one source and

shell forgings from another, while a third

source machined shells, and still other firms

produced primers, fuzes, adapters, and

boosters. Contracts were negotiated and

administered by the arsenals and district

offices with delivery direct to loading plants.

Generally speaking, the prewar planning

by the districts for procurement of metal

components was not adequate and was

thrown overboard when war came.34

Production of all components had to be

carefully planned in advance, and then

schedules had to be adjusted from month

to month to meet changes in over-all requirements. All items had to conform

exactly to specifications so the products of

many separate plants could be speedily

assembled on a mass-production basis. Because of the great variety of shell sizes

and types, constant efforts were made to

reduce the number of components and to

adapt each part to fit different types of

shell. This resulted in a great number of

interchangeable parts that helped to simplify procurement but required close central control of production scheduling. Although the Ammunition Division procured

several hundred different small parts for

all kinds of ammunition, the story of procurement of metal components may be

told in broad outline under four headings

—shot and shell, cartridge cases, bomb

bodies, and fuzes.35

Shot and Shell

In the literal meaning of the term, an

artillery shell is a shell, i.e., it is not solid

but hollow. This distinguishes it from shot,

which is solid (or has only a small cavity)

and is most widely used in the smaller

sizes for penetrating armor plate. Most

World War II shells, and a large proportion of bombs, contained a high explosive

such as TNT or RDX and achieved their

effect either by blast or by scattering steel

fragments. Driven from gun barrels at supersonic speed, shot and shell carried death

and destruction directly to the enemy.

They formed, in the words of General

Harris, "the fist of our fighting forces."

There were two main processes involved

in shell production—forging and machining—and at the outset separate contracts

were made for each. The importance of

these two processes had been recognized by

Ordnance procurement officers for many

years before World War II and both had

been included in the educational orders

program of 1939. Forging of the 75-mm.

high-explosive shell was one of the six

production processes on the first educational orders list, and machining of the

same shell was added a short time later. In

the late 1930's Frankford Arsenal established a modern shell-machining pilot line

capable of making three thousand 75-mm.

shells per 8-hour day with only forty-one

machine operators. During the emergency

period it was available as a model for

private industry. But in spite of all these

efforts, shell producers ran into a lot of

trouble in getting quantity production in

1940 and 1941.36

34

 (1) Interv with Col John P. Harris; (2)

Interv with Dr. Ralph Ilsley, 9 Jun 53. 35

 For detailed data on number of items and

number of components in the program in 1941,

see draft memo from Ammo Div to Dist Contl

Div, 18 Sep 41, Sub: Plans for Current Proc,

OHF. 36

 This section is based on many interviews with

Ordnance officers during the summer of 1953, and
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 115

Only one government-owned facility, the

Gadsden Ordnance Plant, was built to

produce shells. All other production came

from privately owned plants. Operations at

Gadsden, where both forging and machining of 105-mm. shells took place, were

fairly typical of the process of shell manufacture, and may be cited to illustrate the

techniques employed. After the plant received a shipment of 1,000-pound steel

billets from steel mills, the billets were

nicked and broken into slugs on a hydraulic press. These slugs, each about the

size and shape of a loaf of bread, were

then heated, run through a roller, and

placed upright in a die pot. Powerful

presses then performed piercing and drawing operations that formed the deep cavity

for holding the high explosive. After

further shaping and cleaning, the rough

forging went to the machine shop where it

was finished on a variety of lathes and

grinders, and heat treated in hardening

furnaces.37

Most manufacturers, when shown an

artillery shell and asked if they could make

it, promptly answered, "Of course." A

shell appeared to be a comparatively simple

object, but making thousands of them to

exact measurement proved far harder than

it at first appeared.38 A shell had to meet

exacting specifications, particularly on outside measurements, over-all weight, and

uniformity of wall thickness. These specifications were not needlessly precise, as

some harried producers were inclined to

think, but were the products of long years

of experimental production and test firing.

Slight variations in wall thickness, for

example, appeared trivial to the manufacturer, but Ordnance ammunition men

knew that they would throw the shell off

balance and shorten its range.39 Ordnance engineers responsible for the performance of ammunition were reluctant to

approve any deviations from tried and

proved specifications, for they could not be

sure, without prolonged tests, what effect

such deviations might have. And if an

engineering change were authorized for

one contractor it had to be authorized for

all, with the corollary need to revise all

contracts pertaining to the item.40 "We

are not going to abrogate inspection drawings or specification requirements for quality," General Campbell told the District

chiefs in the spring of 1943. "I don't care

if he is Judas Priest himself he is not going

to get it because we saw some of that in

on the numerous histories in the Ordnance files

bearing on procurement of metal components. On

the Frankford line, see Charles Grazioso, "How to

Machine 75-mm. Shell," in Artillery and Small

Arms Ammunition (New York: McGraw Hill

Publishing Company, 1942) compiled by the editors of American Machinist, and Lt. Col. Levin

Campbell, Jr., "Artillery Ammunition Production,"

Army Ordnance, XIX, No. 113 (March-April,

1939), 273.

37

 (1) History, Gadsden Ordnance Plant, OHF;

(2) A. F. MacConnochie "Forging 105-mm. HE

Shell at Gadsden Ordnance Plant," Steel, vol. 113,

No. 4 (26 Jul 43), pp. 72-76; (3) History of

155-mm. Shell Forging Production, by Tennessee

Coal, Iron and Railroad Co., in Hist, Birmingham

Dist, vol. 100, pt. 4. For comparison of pierce-anddraw method with upsetter method, see J. B.

Nealey, "Notes on Shell Forging," American Machinist, 86 (26 November 1943), 1383. 38

 See recognition of this fact in The Armed

Forces of A.C.F., p. 40, a booklet put out by

American Car and Foundry Co. at the end of the

war, in OHF. 39

 As an example, see, Col. Herman U. Wagner,

"The Projectile in Flight—Effects of Eccentric

Wall Thickness on Shell Behavior," Ordnance,

XXXVII, No. 194 (September-October 1952),

339-45. For similar comments on this theme, see

address, The Time Is Now, by Maj Gen Gladeon

M. Barnes, 4 Sep 44, Weirton, W.Va., OHF. 40

 Documentation of a specific case in the explosives field when Ordnance was accused of

showing bad management may be found in Hist,

FDAP, IV, app. IV-15 to IV-22, and IV-30.
116 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the last war. Once you lose control of

drawings, God help the Ordnance Department."

 41

The history of the Pittsburgh District,

largest steel-producing area in the nation,

reveals some of the difficulties in shell

procurement. Small-scale production began

early in 1940 when educational orders for

forging 75-mm. shells were placed with the

Pressed Steel Car Company and the Pittsburgh Forgings Company. A short time

later another educational order, for forging

the 81-mm. shell, was awarded the Dresser

Manufacturing Company of Bradford, producer of oil well equipment. In June 1940

an educational order for the 105-mm. shell

was placed with the Pullman-Standard Car

Manufacturing Company, and was soon

followed by a production contract. At the

same time, a $34 million contract was

awarded the National Tube Company for

forging a wide variety of shell sizes, from

75-mm. through 155-mm. In peacetime

the manufacturer of seamless steel tubing

and pressure cylinders, National Tube

served in war both as a shell forger and as

a laboratory for developing new production

methods. National Tube and PullmanStandard also signed contracts during the

defense period for shell machining, as did

the Armstrong Cork Company. But there

were not many contracts of this kind because the Pittsburgh area was not well

supplied with firms capable of machining

shells to close tolerances.42

An analysis of fourteen contracts for

forging artillery shells in the Pittsburgh

district shows that they averaged a little

over four months in coming into production. Even then, contractors encountered

repeated difficulties in getting quality production. The rate of rejection by inspectors

was so high that Ordnance was forced to

widen certain tolerances and relax some of

its inspection requirements.43 This step

did not lower the quality of finished shells

but simply placed a greater burden on the

firms that machined the shells to final dimensions. The record on shell machining is

more difficult to measure, for machining

could not begin until forgings were available. Pullman-Standard's educational order for machining 105-mm. shells did not

get into production until August 1941,

almost a year after the award. The delay

resulted chiefly from difficulties the company had with its order for forging the

same shell. In July 1941, when the company took a production contract for

forging and machining the 105-mm. shell,

it profited from the earlier experience and

completed the job three months ahead of

schedule.

Probably the most important improvement in shell-forging technique adopted by

American industry during the war was a

method for more exact forging of the interior of a shell. Adoption of this improved

technique for piercing and drawing

enabled the Pullman-Standard Company,

which used it effectively, to produce 155-

mm. shells from billets weighing only 126

pounds instead of the standard 150

pounds. The new process not only saved

steel but, what was even more important,

it also cut down on the man-hours and

machine time needed to finish the shell.44

Beginning in midsummer 1942 with the

155-mm. shell, Ordnance canceled all its

41

 Rpt, Conf Dist Chiefs, Rochester, 19 May 43,

p. 18, OHF. 42

 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 3, ch. 5 and

pt. 4, ch. 6. 43

 Ibid., pt. 3, ch. 4. Critical comments on

arsenal methods by a San Francisco district engineer appear in History, San Francisco Ordnance

District, I, pt. 2, ch. 6. 44

 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 4, pp. 778-

79, and vol. 100, sec. 10.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 117

contracts for shell forgings and inaugurated a new procedure for ammunition

procurement. Originally the Department

had made separate contracts, usually with

different companies, for forging and machining shells, and had assumed responsibility for delivering forgings to the machiners as required. This arrangement

enabled the Ammunition Division to keep

close control over forging operations during

the early phase when the forgers encountered many difficulties in meeting specifications. After these difficulties were surmounted Ordnance told the companies

holding contracts for machining that it

would no longer supply them with forgings

but would expect them to buy directly

from the forging companies. One advantage of this move for Ordnance was that it

freed the Department of a rather demanding job and thus simplified its procurement

process. The new procedure was welcomed

by industry because it left more room for

the free play of normal business forces. As

shell forgings varied slightly in outside

dimensions, depending on the technique

and skill of the producer, and thus required different amounts of machining, the

forgers and machiners could now work out

between themselves whatever adjustments

were required on each order.45

During the early months of 1942 the

production of shells used such a high

percentage of steel output that measures

had to be taken to relieve the situation.

Ordnance revised the prevailing specification of steel with a high manganese content to permit use of lower grade steel

and more scrap metal. But use of this

steel required heat treating by the shell

machiners to retain the desired physical

properties. Every shell-machining plant had

therefore to install hardening furnaces, oil

quench systems, and draw furnaces. There

were, of course, other factors to be considered in this move. Manganese steel had

been specified originally because of its

free-machining quality, but in 1941 metallurgists became alarmed at the prospect of

polluting the nation's steel scrap pile with

sulfur from the manganese steel.46

Producers of shot encountered many of

the same problems as did the shell manufacturers. When contracts for shot were let

in large volume, few producers had sufficient machines to get into production.

Lack of centerless grinders, which were not

extensively used in peacetime industry,

presented the most serious problem and

blocked many contractors from starting

production. Next in importance was the

great need for heat-treating equipment,

and, for the smaller shot, automatic screw

machines. Stepped up production schedules posed problems with cutting tools as

"round-the-clock" operation of machines

at higher-than-normal speeds reduced the

life of all tools. Use of carbide-tipped tools

proved helpful as did liberal use of

coolants.47

One of the most striking contrasts between procurement plans and actual output in 1941 and 1942 appears in records

of 75-mm. and 105-mm. shell production

in the Pittsburgh district. Before 1940,

when the 75-mm. gun was the main

weapon of the Field Artillery, its ammunition topped the requirements list with

nearly five million scheduled for the Pittsburgh district in the first year of war. In

comparison, only 598,000 shells for the

45

 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 3, ch. 5, pp.

630-32. 46

 (1) Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. I, pp. 48-

49; (2) Interv with Brig Gen Merle H. Davis, 27

May 53. 47

 (1) Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. I, pp. 55-

56; (2) Memo, Miles for Chief Ind Serv, 31 Jan

41.
118 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

A 500-Pound DEMOLITION BOMB ready

for shipment to a loading plant to be filled

with high explosives. (Fins are attached for

photographic purposes.)

105-mm. gun were scheduled. Actual production in 1942 reversed this proportion,

with only about one million of the smaller

shell and nearly five million of the larger

type accepted. In spite of these variations

in specific items, total planned production

for the first year of war was quite close to

total actual production.48

Artillery Cartridge Cases

Unlike shot and shell, which were generally made of steel, cartridge cases were

normally made of brass. These cases not

only contained the propellent charge, usually smokeless powder, but also held the

percussion primer and gripped the base of

the projectile. They expanded when the

gun was fired to form a tight-fitting valve

that helped prevent escape of gases to the

rear, and then instantly contracted to permit easy extraction from the breech. Like

shells, brass cases, which resembled big tin

cans, looked easy to make. They were

certainly easier to make than fuzes, but

their manufacture was not without its

problems. It required special machinery

and full knowledge of time-tested procedures for which Frankford Arsenal served

as the development center. Although many

other techniques had been tried over the

years, the only successful method was deep

drawing the entire case from a single

disc.49

In the fall of 1940 the Bridgeport Brass

Company surveyed existing brass-making

capacity in terms of planned production

for military use and reported that more

plants were urgently needed. Early in 1941

the War Department approved an Ordnance proposal to build a new governmentowned brass plant in the Midwest to be

operated by the Bridgeport Brass Company

of Bridgeport, Connecticut. Designed to

turn out twenty million pounds of brass

strip per month, and also fabricate light

and medium cartridge cases, the new plant

was built at Indianapolis and was formally

opened on 15 May 1942.

Just as the production of brass cases

was moving into high gear in the closing

48

 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 4, pp. 764

-65 and ex. B. 49

 Detailed information on the new machines

installed at Frankford, and new processes adopted,

in the late 1930's, may be found in History Frankford Arsenal, Artillery Ammunition, volume I,

OHF. The technique of cartridge case manufacture as practiced in 1940 is described by F. J.

Lerro, foreman of the artillery cartridge case shop

at Frankford, in American Machinist, 84, (2

October 1940), 761. See also Hist, Chicago Ord

Dist, I, pp. 82ff.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 119

A 22,000-POUND SEMI-ARMOR-PIERCING BOMB compared with a 2,000-pound

one produced by the A. O. Smith Corporation, Milwaukee, Wis.

months of 1941, a severe shortage of copper and its alloys developed. Sea transport

was not available to bring in copper from

Chile. The demands of the Maritime Commission and the Navy for copper were

huge, and there was no apparent substitute

for the copper needed in ocean-going vessels. Ordnance was therefore faced with

the problem of substituting some other

metal for brass in ammunition if production schedules were to be met. The choice

fell upon steel, and the widespread efforts

to make acceptable steel cases dominated

the scene for the next two years. As the

manufacture of steel cases has been described in detail in the preceding volume,

we need mention only at this point that the

results were never altogether satisfactory.

The progress was an industrial miracle,

General Hayes once observed, but "not a

big enough miracle. It has to be a more

resplendent miracle."50 The ambitious

goals set for the steel-case project early in

1942 were not attained, and the project

became, in the words of one high-ranking

officer, "a pain in the neck."

 51

 Solution of

the steel-case problem had to await a renewed attack, in which Army and Navy

co-operated, in the postwar years.52

Bombs

The sharply rising curve of bomb procurement in 1942 represented the biggest

single increase in ammunition production

during World War II. After a sudden drop

in the summer of 1943 it rose again in

1944 and resulted in the total production

of something over thirty-three million

bombs and bomb clusters. The bombs

ranged in size from 4-pound "Butterflies,"

usually dropped in clusters, to 4,000-

pound block busters.53 Ordnance procured

a few 10,000-pound bombs for test by the

AAF, but they were not used in combat.

Small quantities of 12,000-pound "Tall

Boy" bombs and 22,000-pound "Grand

Slam" bombs were produced in the United

50

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, 28 Jul 43,

Springfield, Mass., p. 7, OHF. 51

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Rochester, 19

May 43, p. 13. 52

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. 18; (2) William F.

Stevens, "Steel Cartridge Cases Advance Toward

Standardization," Steel, 129, No. 2 (1951), 72;

(3) Lt. Col. Harold R. Turner, "Steel Cartridge

Cases," Army Ord Rpt No. 5, 1 Jul 44, published

by Army Ordnance Association. 53

 (1) Ammunition Supply in European and

Mediterranean Theaters, p. 74; (2) Harry S.

Beckman, "High Explosive Bombs," Ordnance,

XXXII, No. 64 (September-October 1947), 98-

99; (3) Ann Rpt ASF Rqmts Div FY 44, p. 18.
120 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

States for the British, but the bulk of

American production was in the smaller

sizes with the 500-pound bomb accounting

for nearly half of all general-purpose bombs

produced in the United States. Through

the medium of the bombing plane, this

production contributed in a spectacular

way to weakening the enemy on the battlefield and on the home front.54

Before 1940 there had been very little

production of bombs in the United States.

Aside from some work on small fragmentation bombs at Frankford, no Ordnance

arsenal had produced bombs. The educational orders for bombs in 1939 were too

small to be of much value, and it was not

until the emergency had arrived that production problems were tackled in earnest.

Even then, progress was hindered somewhat by uncertainty as to the most desirable types and sizes. Sharp differences- of

opinion developed as to the relative merits

of high-explosive bombs with great blasting effect and fragmentation bombs that

filled the air with flying particles of steel.55

Policy on this and other matters for all

the services was determined by a subcommittee of the Joint Aircraft Committee.

Ordnance handled the biggest share of

bomb procurement, the Chemical Warfare

Service filled chemical bombs, and the

Navy procured depth bombs for attacking

submarines and armor-piercing bombs for

use against ships with thick deck armor.

Specifications for bombs to be dropped

from airplanes were less exacting than for

shells to be fired from guns, but they

nevertheless caused some manufacturing

difficulties. The old method of bomb production was to start with a solid steel

billet, machine it down the outside, gouge

out the inside, and then fill it with TNT

or amatol. "They were pretty good

bombs," wrote one contemporary observer,

"but they cost too much, took too much

machine work and time. . . ."56 The

answer was to use short lengths of thickwalled, large-diameter tube or pipe of the

type used by the oil industry in peacetime.

One end of the pipe was put into a

furnace, brought to a white heat, and then

forced into proper shape for the tail. The

nose was formed in the same fashion, and

was then cut and threaded to receive the

fuze. After sandblasting to remove all

scale, and heat treating to harden the

steel, the bombs were ready to be painted

and inspected before shipment to loading

plants.

Ordnance did not prescribe the method

of fabrication to be followed by bomb

producers, but permitted each company to

work out the method best suited to its

equipment and past experience. Shops that

had produced steel bottles in peacetime by

spinning used the same process to produce

bombs; hammer shops used the swaging

method; and in factories where wobbling

dies had been used to form flanges on pipes

the same type of die was used to make

bombs.57 The largest bombs were made of

rolled plate because there was no seamless

54

 On bomb research and development, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Chapter XVII. 55

 For detailed consideration of this topic, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Chapter XVII. 56

 Steel, 24 May 43, p. 76, quoted in Hist,

Cleveland Ord Dist, III, p. 112. 5 7 ( 1 ) Harry S. Beckman, "High Explosive

Bombs," Ordnance, XXXII, No. 64 (SeptemberOctober 1947), 98-99; (2) J. B. Nealey, "Seamless Bombs from Steel Plate," American Machinist

vol. 86 (October 1, 1942), 1117ff; (3) Interv

with Beckman and Otto C. Pototschnik, 6 Jul 53.

Among the most prominent bomb-producing firms

were A. O. Smith Corporation of Milwaukee;

Harrisburg Steel Corporation; and National Tube

Company and Jones and Laughlin Steel Company,

both of Pittsburgh, Pa.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 121

tube made of sufficiently large diameter.

Armor-piercing bombs were generally made

from billets by the pierce-and-draw

method. General-purpose and semi-armorpiercing bombs were made from welded or

seamless tubes.58

Bomb production suffered from changes

in requirements more than did any other

aspect of the ammunition program. At the

beginning of the war, requirements for

demolition bombs were based on airplane

production schedules and the estimated

number of sorties per airplane. Production

facilities were contracted for on this basis.

But a year or so of experience demonstrated

that these figures were far too high because

planes did not fly immediately from factory

to combat theater. Some were held in this

country for training, and a large proportion of all planes produced was needed to

fill the supply pipelines. A drastic cutback

in bomb procurement was therefore ordered in April 1943.59

 So great was the

reduction of bomb requirements for 1943-

44 that General Somervell wrote to General

Henry H. Arnold that the effect of this

reduction on established production lines

would be "tremendous" and would cause

cancellation of contracts at sixteen metalworking plants, the complete shutdown of

one ammonia plant, and elimination of

thirty-five TNT lines.60 The machines and

facilities released in the spring of 1943

could not be held in cold storage for the

future because they were badly needed in

other programs. In 1944, when bombs requirements mounted and production was

resumed, lines had to be set up all over

again. According to one estimate, it took

seven months to reach 75 percent production on bomb bodies, and at least nine

months for full production. "Requirements

varied to such an extent," wrote one observer, "that nothing but the patriotism of

the manufacturers kept them cooperating."

 61

Fuzes

Of all the metal components of ammunition, fuzes were by far the most difficult

to manufacture and use, and were sometimes compared to the Army mule as

"ornery but necessary." Not only were they

complicated mechanisms but they had to

meet the most exacting standards of performance. The mechanical time fuze used

on 75-mm. field artillery and 3-inch antiaircraft shells, for example, consisted of

106 parts, many of which had tolerances of

less than one thousandth of an inch.62 All

the time and money spent on manufacturing a round of ammunition and all the

effort expended by combat troops in getting it into position for firing were completely wasted if the fuze failed to function

properly. For this reason, Ordnance had

spent a portion of its limited research

funds on fuzes during the interwar years,

and on making plans for their manufacture. Plans of this nature were particularly

58

 Report on the Manufacture of Demolition

Bomb Bodies by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1 Jun 45, copy in files of Bomb

and Pyrotechnic Sec., R & D Div, OCO. This

report describes and illustrates the different production methods used during the war. 59

 Ltr, CG AAF to CofOrd, 4 Apr 43, sub: Reduction in Bomb Rqmts, OO 400.12/5164, copy

in Demolition Bombs, 1 Aug 44, vol. I, OHF. For

an excellent brief'analysis of this problem, see Rpt

of WD Proc Review Bd, 31 Aug 43, ASF 334 (WD

Proc Review Bd), 020 CofS, USA. See also Maj.

Berkeley R. Lewis, Project Paper, PP 19, Bombs

—Research, Development, Production and Performance, 1919-45, Jul 45. 60

 Memo, CG ASF for CG AAF, not dated, sub:

Reduction in AAF Bomb Rqmts, copy in Demolition Bombs, 1 Aug 44, vol. I, OHF. 61

 Lewis, PP 19. 62

 Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. 1, ch. 6.
122 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

important because, with more than 150

types of fuzes required, the need to establish a system of common contours and

weights was imperative. Minor variations

in the contours and weights of pointdetonating fuzes would affect the ballistics

of the projectile and would require readjustment of the weapon when changing

from one type of fuze to another.63

Picatinny had been the center of this

work for many years before 1940, and in

the late 1930's Frankford installed modern

machinery for small-scale production of

primers and mechanical time fuzes. When

war production orders were placed, practically every fuze manufacturer received

drawings from Picatinny or Frankford of

the required tools, jigs, and fixtures. Fuze

contractors sent their production men to

Picatinny for training in arsenal methods.

Specialists from Picatinny visited most of

the commercial plants to assist them in

setting up equipment and starting production. There was a remarkably fruitful interchange of information and ideas between

industry and Ordnance, resulting in early

production by industry and a constant

stream of new fuze-making machines and

improved production methods. For pointdetonating fuzes some of the early contracts went to companies that normally

produced electrical equipment, automobile

accessories, fountain pens, pressure cookers, gasoline engines, and sewing machines.

The earliest contracts for mechanical time

fuzes, containing clockwork mechanisms,

went to established watch and clock manufacturers. To speed delivery, all these

firms set up temporary production lines

with secondary equipment that bridged

the gap until new machines arrived. Use

of such equipment, including single-spindle

drill presses and hand milling machines,

intensified the problem of meeting the

exacting tolerances required by Ordnance.64

Because mechanical time fuzes were

among the most troublesome items in the

ammunition program, their manufacture

demanded some means of systematic cooperation among contractors. In the spring

of 1942, when huge new requirements for

the mechanical time fuze M43 were announced, General Campbell and a successful fuze contractor, Mr. Roy T. Hurley

of the Bendix Aviation Corporation, set

out to form an industry integration committee for this purpose. At the end of

April they called a meeting of representatives from the six companies holding

contracts for the M43 fuze, plus Frankford

Arsenal, to discuss ways of sharing the

experience of the four firms that were

already in production with the two that

were just getting started.65 Within four

months the newly formed M43 Mechanical

Time Fuze Committee not only increased

production by about 100 percent but also

introduced improved manufacturing techniques that greatly reduced the cost of the

fuze.66

As noted in Chapter III, Ordnance had

formed many engineering and research ad63

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War; (2) Barnes, Weapons of

World War II (New York: D. Van Nostrand

Company, 1947), pp. 83-84. 64

 Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, p. 60ff. For a

description of fuze manufacturing methods, see J.

B. Nealey, "Artillery Fuzes," Army Ordnance,

XXII, No. 132 (May-June 1942) 961-64. 65

 Min, Wesson Confs, 27 Apr 42. 66

 Integration with Industry, PP No. 14, OHF.

The six companies on this committee were Eastman Kodak, National Cash Register, Elgin Watch,

Hamilton Watch, the Eclipse Machine Division of

Bendix Aviation Corporation, and the Thomas B.

Gibbs Division of Borg Products Corporation. For

an account of the Smokeless Powder Integration

Committee, see H. LaTourette, Propellants—

Smokeless Powder During World War II, Feb 46,

pp. 47-50, OHF.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PREPARATION 123

visory committees in 1941 to help with

design and production problems, but it was

not until formation of the M43 fuze committee (and nearly simultaneous formation

of the carbine committee) that cooperation between contractors came to

cover nearly every aspect of production.

"In the integration of the mechanical time

fuze industry," General Campbell wrote

to Frankford Arsenal and the six fuze contractors in April 1942, "parts, material, engineering information, production information, tools, equipment, and, in fact, all

elements—both material and personnel—

will be placed by the chairman of the committee at the disposition of any and all

manufacturers in the mechanical time fuze

industry without let or hindrance."

 67

 Described as "the cross-weave in the fabric of

America's wartime Ordnance production

program," these committees brought together representatives of firms that were

business competitors in time of peace and

enabled them freely to share their knowledge and skills in the interests of national

defense. At committee meetings these representatives exchanged new production

ideas and arranged for the transfer from

one company to another of scarce materials, badly needed machine tools, or even

skilled workmen and production engineers.

The companies were assured in 1942, as

their predecessors had been in 1941, by a

letter from the Attorney General that their

committee action would not be regarded as

violations of the antitrust laws. Each integration committee was headed by an

Ordnance officer, usually the chief of the

branch having jurisdiction, with the title

of chairman. It also included another Ordnance officer as deputy chairman, an

industrial member as assistant chairman,

and an Ordnance officer on duty at the

plant where the committee had its headquarters. By June 1943 there were 131

such committees in existence, 75 of them

dealing with ammunition (both small

arms and artillery) .

68

The most remarkable new type of fuze

developed during World War II was the

VT69 or proximity fuze containing a

miniature radio transmitting and receiving

oscillator that caused the shell to detonate

when it came within a certain range of its

target. Not only was development of VT

fuzes one of the top-ranking scientific

achievements of the war; its mass production was a triumph of production engineering. "Never, perhaps, in the history of

assembly-line methods," wrote the author

of Scientists Against Time, "have the

standards of performance been more difficult to meet."

 70

 Procurement of VT fuzes

67

 Quoted in Campbell, Industry-Ordnance

Team, p. 123. 68

 For the official Ordnance statement outlining

the functions of the committees, see letter from

General Campbell to Donald M. Nelson, 29 Apr

42, in History of Carbine Industry Integration

Committee and Prior Carbine Committees, Part

III, OHF, and Ordnance Fiscal Circular 105, 22

August 1942. For discussion of problems in administration, see Report, Conference Ordnance

District Chiefs, Rochester, 19 May 1943, Pages 6-

16. For an excellent brief account of integration

in production of the M48 fuze, see Report, Conference Ordnance District Chiefs, 22 April 1944,

Pages 12-13, in History, Detroit Ordnance District, Volume 117, OHF. The whole subject of Industry Integration Committees is discussed by

Richard F. McMullen in Industry Integration

Committees, OHF, and by General Campbell in

The Industry-Ordnance Team, Chapter 8. The

former reference includes a list of committees and

their members. 69

 A code designation with no significance. 70

 James P. Baxter, Scientists Against Time

(Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p.

227. Baxter also describes the development of the

fuze, as does Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, and Ordnance Development Division, National Bureau of Standards, The

Radio Proximity Fuzes for Bombs, Rockets and

Mortars (Washington, 1945).
124 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

was a co-operative enterprise in which

Ordnance was but one of many partners.

As the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, with

NDRC, had taken an early interest in the

use of VT fuzes with antiaircraft guns,

while Army Ordnance and the National

Bureau of Standards concentrated their

first attention on fuzes for bombs, rockets,

and mortars, a broad division of responsibility for procurement was made between

the two services in March 1942. The Navy

was to procure the rotating type, used

chiefly with rifled-bore artillery, and the

Army was to procure the nonrotating type

used on bombs, rockets, and mortar shell.

Because the delicate electronic elements of

the fuze fell naturally within the Signal

Corps field, procurement of those parts

was assigned to the Signal Corps which

supplied the parts to Ordnance for final

assembly. As it eventually turned out, most

of the Navy-procured fuzes were used by

the Army, and most of the Army-procured

fuzes went to the Navy. But the cooperation between the two services proved

so effective that the division of labor was

continued throughout the war and into the

postwar years. The less satisfactory arrangement with the Signal Corps was

terminated in 1944 after production got

under way and Ordnance assumed full

responsibility for parts procurement.71

Manufacture of the battery-powered

fuzes (both radio and photoelectric) was

started in the latter part of 1942 by Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing

Company, Philco Radio and Television

Corporation, General Electric Company,

Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation, Julien P. Friez and Sons, Western

Electric Company, and Rudolph Wurlitzer

Company. Production of this type totaled

780,000. Approximately a million bomb

fuzes of a later generator-powered type

were produced by Westinghouse, Emerson, Philco, General Electric, and Zenith

Radio Corporation.72

By the summer of 1943 sufficient experience had been gained with VT fuzes for

large projectiles to suggest that development of much smaller fuzes for trench

mortars was possible, and in November

1943 the Office of Scientific Research and

Development (OSRD) was requested to

undertake the job. By the winter of 1944-

45 interest began to grow in the possibility

of getting VT mortar fuzes into largescale production before the war ended. In

March 1945, Dr. Vannevar Bush of OSRD

wrote that the project could be carried

through successfully only if the Army put

the full weight of its influence on the scale.

Within two weeks a meeting of OSRD and

Ordnance representatives was held to discuss the goal of 400,000 fuzes per month

by January 1946. By the end of July the

design was complete and tooling for largescale production had started, but the

project was canceled when the war ended

the following month.73

71

 (1) Interv with Hoyt W. Sisco, Chief VT

Fuze Sec, R&D OCO, 14 Jul 53; (2) OCM

31683, 7 Aug 47, citing the early documents; (3)

Baxter, op. cit., ch. XV; (4) Joseph C. Boyce, ed.,

New Weapons for Air Warfare (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 194 and 207;

(5) Telecon with W. S. Hinman, Jr., Asst Director of Ord National Bureau of Standards, 15 Jul

53. For an account of Signal Corps procurement,

see History, Signal Corps Research and Development in World War II, vol. 4, Project 453-C,

Signal Corps historical files. 72

 Ord Development Div, Nat Bur of Standards,

Radio Proximity Fuzes for Bombs, Rockets and

Mortars pp. 30-31. 73

 Boyce, op. cit., ch. XXIII
CHAPTER VII

Artillery Ammunition: Production

By the summer of 1942 the period of

plant expansion for artillery ammunition

had to come to an end, and the period

of intensive production was beginning. In

the history of the ammunition program

the transition from expansion to production is conveniently marked by the creation on 5 August 1942 of the Office of the

Field Director of Ammunition Plants

(FDAP) in St. Louis.1 Headed by Col.

Theodore C. Gerber, an Ordnance officer

with experience as commander of a

government - owned, contractor - operated

(GOCO) plant, this office administered

all the ammunition plants, most of which

were within an overnight train ride from

St. Louis. The new headquarters was

staffed by transferring from Washington

the lawyers, contract negotiators, and administrators who had piloted the plants

through the expansion period.

Operations of FDAP

At the outset it was assumed that FDAP

would be primarily an administrative and

legal office and that most technical problems would be referred to Washington or

to Picatinny Arsenal. General Campbell,

who had launched the GOCO plants

while assistant chief for new facilities,

knew that legal and administrative problems were inevitable because of the novelty

of the GOCO arrangement whereby private concerns produced war materials on

government property, using governmentowned machinery, and received payment

under a cost-plus-fixed-fee formula. In the

beginning FDAP had no authority over

inspection, packaging, renovation, or

scheduling, but as time went on these

responsibilities were delegated to it. By

1945 FDAP had, in the words of the official memorandum, "complete control,

administration, coordination, and direction" of the GOCO plants under the Ammunition Division.2

 But it never had as full

control of the ammunition program as

OCO-Detroit had of tank-automotive

procurement. Broad control of scheduling

of production remained in Washington, as

did authority to approve engineering

changes. St. Louis was not granted as

much authority as was Detroit, primarily

because of the marked procurement differences between ammunition and vehicles.

Ordnance did not contract for a complete

round of ammunition as it contracted for

a complete truck or tank. The division into

1

 FDAP was authorized by ODO Number 305,

16 July 1942. Its creation is described in Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, Chapter IV. 2

 History, FDAP, Aug 42-Sep 45, vol. I, p. 7.

This history contains a copy of Ammunition

Branch Memorandum 48-42, 31 July 1942 and

Ammunition Division Memorandum no. 2-45,

2 March 1945. See also Mead Comm. Report,

Aug 46.
126 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

three distinct operations—procurement of

metal components from industry, production of powder and explosives at GOCO

plants, and assembly and loading at

GOCO plants—made wholesale decentralization to St. Louis far more difficult than

was decentralization of tank-automobile

procurement to Detroit.

The administrative problems handled by

FDAP covered a wide range. Most of them

centered around the interpretation of contracts, auditing expenses, and applying

specifications. There were questions, for

example, about the propriety of charging

to government expense the cost of certain

activities such as plant newspapers and

charitable contributions that were normal

business practice for the contracting firms.

There were more important problems in

recruiting personnel and obtaining draft

deferments for essential workers. Difficulties in production, or in satisfying inspection demands, were also brought to the

attention of FDAP, which served as a

"home office" for all the plants.3

There were many obvious advantages in

the GOCO arrangement, but the dual

control required by the governmentindustry partnership in the ammunition

plants caused certain difficulties. There

was inevitably some duplication of function between contractor and government

and many opportunities for friction developed. When emergency production first

began, all available talent had to be used

in the process of training new personnel.

Contractors who knew little or nothing

about handling ammunition had to depend

upon Ordnance officers and civilian technicians. During the construction period,

government representatives at each plant

site handled payrolls, timekeeping, and inspection of all incoming material. After

the plants reached the operating stage the

contracting firms took over most of these

duties, with government auditors checking

the accounts only on a selective basis. As

all the sites on which Ordnance facilities

were located were designated as military

reservations, a commanding officer was assigned to each with responsibility for the

activities of the government auditors and

inspectors, and for protecting government

property. This system of dual control was

not only wasteful of personnel but annoying to both sides and administratively unsound because it tended to divide responsibility for performance. Frequent changes

in the Ordnance commanders at the plants

caused further difficulty. One plant, for

example, had seven different commanding

officers during three years, each new commander "coming in to get the plant running right."4

 Most of the contracting

firms directed their representatives at the

plant sites to work in co-operation with

the government representatives and to

reach practical solutions on the spot rather

than to refer every problem to the home

office. With some firms, particularly those

with no experience in munitions making,

there was criticism that the safety provisions required by Ordnance were too

elaborate, that labor-saving machinery was

not used enough, and that "many decisions forced upon the contractor by directive were uneconomical and unsound.

3

 Hist, FDAP, vol. II, pt. 1, Oct 45. 4

 Key Pers Rpts from Lone Star Ord Plant,

OHF. Criticism of dual control was made by a

representative of the Bureau of the Budget in the

General Report on Bag and Shell Loading, 4

January 1944. For an illustration of difficulties

during the construction period, see History, Wolf

Creek Ordnance Plant, I. This plant was cited

by the Truman Committee as an example of unduly high-cost construction. See S. Rpt 480, pt.

5, 15 Jan 42, 77th Cong., 2ad sess., pp. 125-66. 5

 See, for example, History, Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, I, pp. 11-12.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 127

On 3 October 1942 the Chief of Ordnance issued a directive to clarify the situation at the GOCO plants. His purpose

was to put a stop to duplication of effort

between contractors and Ordnance field

staffs, to reduce the Ordnance payroll by

transferring to the contractor responsibility

for property records, production planning,

motor pools, and in-process inspection.6

As a result of this directive, the number of

Ordnance officers and civilian employees

at the plants dropped sharply. At the

Arkansas Ordnance Plant, for example,

there were 424 civilians on the government payroll in September 1942 but only

255 at the end of December, and during

the same period the number of officers

dropped from 15 to 9.7 Nevertheless, a

study of loading plants completed in January 1944 showed that some Ordnance

employees were duplicating work done by

contractor employees.8 Between January

1943 and June 1944 the number of civilian

employees at all GOCO ammunition facilities was cut in half.9

 The October 1942

directive not only conserved manpower

and reduced duplication but it also promoted greater understanding and confidence between the contractor and the

government.10

Competition among Plants

Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement of FDAP was the use of standard

methods to measure the efficiency and

economy of plant operations. The need for

such methods was obvious. The CPFF

contracts under which the plants operated

provided an incentive for quantity production but not for efficiency and economy.

As the contracting firms received a certain

fee per unit of production their prime

objective was speed of production, not

economy or efficiency. Colonel Gerber and

his superiors in Washington decided to

attack this problem by recording and

analyzing the cost of operation for each

plant. They believed that once this was

done—and the results distributed—a spirit

of competition would develop, with every

plant manager eager to make a good showing in the eyes of his home office and in

view of the other plant managers. Pride

was to take the place of profit as an incentive to efficient low-cost production.11

The success of this plan cannot be

measured accurately, but there is some

indication that it worked well. A record of

improved efficiency under the system does

not of itself prove the point, for efficiency

6

 Ltr, CofOrd to CO's Ord plants, 3 Oct 42,

sub: Clarification of Functions of Ord Dept Field

Staff at New Ord Facilities, copy in Hist, Cornhusker Ord Plant, vol. II, app. See also comments

on the "substantial progress" made by Ordnance

in Memo of Director SOS, Contl Div, for CG

SOS, 22 Nov 42, sub: GOCO Ord Plants, in ASF

Contl Div file, folder marked Orgn of Ord Dept

1943-44. 7

 History, Arkansas Ordnance Plant, I, pp. 6-7.

This history describes in some detail the specific

duties performed by government employees at the

plant. For an excellent account by an Ordnance

plant commander, see Lt. Col. John K. Willard,

Key Personnel Report, 31 October 1945, Pennsylvania Ordnance Works, OHF. 8

 Gen Rpt on Bag and Shell Loading, 4 Jan 44. 9

 Performance Analysis . . . FDAP, By Statistics

and Progress Unit, FDAP, 1 Jun 45, copy in Hist

FDAP. 10

 For testimony on this point from one Ordnance officer with wide experience, see Final Report of Maj Vernon L. Keldsen, 22 October 1945,

Key Pers Rpts, Alabama Ord Works, OHF. 11

 Hist, FDAP, vol. II, pt. III, and vol. VIII.

Reports on the comparative standing of the loading plants in August 1943 are conveniently assembled in General Report on Bag and Shell

Loading. For an account of the work done by

the contractors in compiling cost data, see La

Tourette, PSP 17, Propellants-Smokeless Powder

During World War II, quoting final report of the

Smokeless Powder Industry Committee, pp. 46-

50.
128 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

would probably have risen steadily under

any circumstances as both management

and worker gained experience and as new

machines or techniques were introduced

on the production lines.12 But the record

of the GOCO plants was so good that the

FDAP administration must be credited

with having inspired performance far

above normal. The record was one of

steadily increasing production, lowering

costs, rising labor productivity, and substantial savings in the use of raw materials.

The cost of TNT, for example, was cut in

half while the rate of production was

doubled. The amount of alcohol required

per 100 pounds of smokeless powder was

cut from 7 gallons to 2 gallons, a saving of

over 4,000,000 gallons per month. It cost

over 27 dollars and took nearly 10 manhours to load a l000-pound bomb in

January 1943; the same bomb was loaded

a year later at a cost of about 16 dollars

and in less than 5 manhours.13

In the spring of 1944, Representative

Albert J. Engel, a member of the War

Department Subcommittee of the House

Appropriations Committee, personally inspected twenty-two ammunition plants

and summarized his findings in a report

printed in The Congressional Record, 21

June 1944. After citing many specific examples of the remarkable savings achieved

by Ordnance and its ammunition contractors, Representative Engel offered the following comments, which still stand as the

best brief explanation of the factors behind the FDAP accomplishment:

Reduction of cost and conservation of man- power has been outstanding. It has been

due, in my judgment, in a large measure to:

(1) The excellent quality of the responsible

and experienced contractors selected. (2)

The creation of integrating committees and

the meeting of those committees periodically to exchange information between plants.

(3) Continuous analysis and comparison of

unit costs and cost of operation of respective

plants by the Field Director of Ammunition

Plants. This policy created a competitive

spirit, each plant trying not only to increase

efficiency but also to reduce their costs to

the level of the plant which had the lowest

unit-cost level. (4) The high quality of the

technical knowledge available in loading

units of the Field Director of Ammunition

Plants. (5) The establishment of manpower

standards by skilled industrial engineers

working through administrative units aided

by industrial representatives. (6) Last, and

certainly of great importance, was the close

and effective cooperation between industry

and the War Department in the operation of

these plants, making available, without reservation, information of every kind and

quality which industry possessed.14

Shortcomings

There was also much that was not accomplished by FDAP and industry before

the war ended. No fully satisfactory

method of comparing the operating efficiency of plants was devised. Cost statements alone were not adequate, for there

were many uncontrollable factors in the

12

 By way of comparison, see the discussion of

steadily rising efficiency in British plants for shell

loading (called "filling" by the British) in Postan, British War Production, pp. 174-183. During

the 18 months preceding Pearl Harbor the

efficiency of "filling labour" increased by 40 percent.

13

 For a broad summary, see Performance

Analysis of ... Ammo Plants, 1 Jun 45, ex.

XXII in Hist, FDAP, VIII. 14

 Hon Albert J. Engel, Ordnance Ammunition

Production, Army Ord Rpt, No. 6, 21 Aug 44,

AOA, Army Ordnance Association, OHF. See

also the generally favorable report submitted in

January 1944 by a representative of the Bureau

of the Budget, General Report on Bag and Shell

Loading. Inspecting officers in 1945 praised the

FDAP staff for its competence and efficiency. See

ltr, Col J. B. Jones and Maj C. F. Heney to

Acting TIG, 4 Mar 45, sub: Spec Inspection of

OFDAP. . ., NA.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 129

total cost. The labor rate at each plant was

geared to the prevailing rates in the locality, and costs of raw materials varied from

month to month and plant to plant. In

January 1945 a proposed plan for evaluating the performance of TNT works was

prepared, assigning a percentage value to

each basic cost factor and expressing overall ratings by a single index number. But

the proposal did not proceed beyond the

discussion stage before the end of the war

was in sight.15

Few of the plants under FDAP supervision ever had a chance to achieve peak

efficiency by operating at capacity over a

long period. In most cases, as soon as a

plant came into production and completed

a few months of shakedown operations, it

received notice to curtail production. By

the fall of 1943 the tendency throughout

the War Department was to feel that

adequate supplies were on hand and that

Ordnance was producing too much ammunition.16

 In January 1944 Ordnance

was forced to practice extremely shortrange scheduling of plant operations, few

schedules running for more than one

month ahead. Changes in types of ammunition also had an effect on plant

efficiency, for it required the plants to

shut down a line for loading bombs, for

example, and convert to a shell-loading

line, or switch from small to large calibers.

Changes often had to be made suddenly,

without advance preparation for management or workers, and the effect on morale

was, to say the least, disconcerting. Because of the lack of firm, long-range forecasts of requirements, it was not possible

to concentrate production in the most

efficient plants and operate them full time.

Instead, particularly in late 1943, the production load was spread out among many

plants in order to keep them in operation

as a reserve against unexpected demands

in the future. But during the winter of

1943-44 many plants were closed as the

War Department emphasized the curtailment of production.17

As noted in the preceding chapter, the

Ordnance Department's management of

the ammunition program was subject to

criticism on one score—the terms of its

contracts with the plant operators. No

generalization applies with equal force to

all the contracts, but it may be said that

in many cases the contractors received fees

that were generous if not excessive. The

contractors were as free of business risk as

any businessman could hope to be. They

had no capital invested in the plants;

they contributed no operating funds; they

oftentimes utilized government free-issue

materials; they had an assured market for

their products; and they were reimbursed

for all costs. Officers of The Inspector

General's Department who made a special

inspection of FDAP in March 1945 expressed the view that the terms of contracts with the operating firms were "extremely liberal."

 18

 Though in many cases

15

 See draft letter, entitled Index of Operating

Performance—TNT Industry, 3 Jan 45, in Hist,

FDAP, IV, app. III-1. For a report on loading

plants, see General Report on Bag and Shell

Loading. 16

 (1) Report of WD Equipment Review Board,

31 Aug 43, ASF, 334, 020 CofS USA; (2) Gen

Rpt on Bag and Shell Loading. The author of

this report concluded that "the condition most

affecting use of manpower and economy in loading is the reported frequent changes in operating

schedules." See Chapter IV. 17

 The resumption of full production in 1944

is discussed below. For data on the closing of

plants, see reports in OO 334. 18

 Ltr, Jones and Heney to Acting TIG, 4 Mar

45. Reports by other IG officers who made inspections of the administration of CPFF contracts at artillery ammunition and small arms

ammunition plants reached the same conclusion.
130 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the fees originally agreed upon had been

substantially reduced during the preceding

two years, the inspecting officers felt that

further reductions were in order. They

pointed out that one company, operator of

a loading plant, had contributed very little

"know-how"; it had not contributed

trained employees from its own staff but

had trained all its workers for the plant at

government expense. Yet, in spite of its

modest contribution the company had received to date over $470,000 in fees.

Neither the Chief of Ordnance nor the

director of FDAP agreed with these conclusions. They insisted that, all things considered, the fees were not excessive and

pointed to the fact that FDAP was constantly reviewing contracts to keep fees

down to the proper level.

Cost-plus-fixed-fee supply contracts differed from CPFF construction contracts in

one important respect: the fixed fee was

not really fixed. It was not a single lumpsum payment for the whole operation but

a fee for each unit produced, such as a

pound of TNT or round of small arms

ammunition. The fees were originally set

without full knowledge of production costs

or of economies that might be achieved.

Volume production usually resulted in

high fees. One small arms producer, for

example, received a total of $12,801,-

620.16 in fees during thirty-two months of

operations. In 1943, when output was at

its peak, the firm averaged over $600,000

per month in fees. Though the fixed fees

had been reduced three times, an inspecting officer in October 1944 still considered

them to be out of line.19

Safety

No account of ammunition production

would be complete without a word about

safety. The operations at ammunition

plants, where huge quantities of TNT,

RDX, and smokeless powder were handled

by relatively inexperienced workers, were

potentially the most hazardous in the

world. But Ordnance and its industrial

contractors took such effective safety precautions that the ammunition industry

proved to be one of the safest in wartime

America. These safety measures have a

particular relevance to the preceding paragraphs on efficiency and cost of production, for, in the minds of Ordnance officers,

safety was more important than either

efficiency or economy. Speaking at a meeting of plant managers in the summer of

1944 Colonel Gerber declared: "I cannot

overemphasize safety. . . . Safety comes

first, quality comes second, and efficiency

comes later." At the same meeting Brig.

Gen. Roswell E. Hardy, Chief of the Ammunition Division, said: "I don't care how

much it costs or how much time it takes,

I want safety and quality."

 20

 This attitude was supported by many coldly practical considerations as well as by the ever

present desire to safeguard the lives of

employees. Fires and explosions were to be

avoided because they destroyed badly

needed facilities, stopped production, and

cost a great deal of money. Older Ordnance officers remembered the disastrous

explosion at the T. A. Gillespie Company

plant at Perth Amboy in World War I that

took the lives of scores of workmen and

destroyed over three hundred buildings.

Furthermore, in a tight labor market the

danger of explosions was a serious handi10

 This subject is discussed in Smith, Army and

Economic Mobilization, Chapter XII. 20

 Admin Cir 142, FDAP, 10 Aug 44, sub: Notes

Taken at the Joint Conf. . . , copy in Hist,

FDAP, VIII.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 131

cap to the recruitment of needed workers.21

From the very beginning, safety was

built into the ammunition plants. The explosion in the late summer of 1940 at the

privately owned Hercules Powder Company plant at Kenvil, New Jersey, served

as a dramatic and timely warning to the

whole industry. It revealed the hitherto

unknown fact that small-grain smokeless

powder would explode if the depth of the

mixture exceeded a certain critical point.

The layouts of the Radford and Indiana

plants then under construction were immediately revised to incorporate additional

safety features. Operations were thereafter

more widely separated so that a blast in

one unit would not set off another unit.

Workers were trained to be safety conscious and were required to observe rigid

safety rules. Elemental good housekeeping, including sweeping and scrubbing, was

stressed constantly. Ordnance sought the

aid of the Surgeon General's Office and

the U.S. Public Health Service to protect

the health of workers. As a safeguard

against the toxic effects of TNT a special

soap was developed that turned violet until

a worker had washed all traces of TNT

from his body. Whenever an explosion

occurred, its cause and prevention were

studied by a flying team of experts and

warnings were immediately sent to all

other plants.

During the early months of the war the

safety record left much to be desired. Between December 1941 and June 1942 there

were three explosions that killed a total

of 83 persons and caused property damage

of more than one million dollars. Two of

these three incidents occurred at the Iowa

Ordnance Plant where an explosion in

December 1941 caused 13 deaths, and

another in March 1942 took 22 lives. The

worst disaster in an Ordnance plant during World War II occurred at the Elwood

Plant on 5 June 1942 when an explosion

occurred in a building where antitank

mines were being loaded. Forty-eight persons were killed, and property damage

amounted to $489,000. To see these explosions in perspective we need to view

them in relation to other wartime disasters.

Each of the worst Ordnance explosions

was comparable, in terms of lives lost and

property damaged, to the crash of a single

commercial airliner. When compared to the

Navy's Port Chicago explosion in July

1944, when 250 persons were killed, and

over 1,000 injured, or to the disasters of

World War I, the accidents at Ordnance

plants appear small.

To strengthen the Ordnance safety organization, General Campbell established

an Explosives Safety Branch (later renamed the Safety and Security Branch)

in Chicago in July 1942. The new office

was headed at first by Col. Francis H.

Miles, Jr., and later by Colonel Gerber

who was at the same time head of

FDAP.22 This office reviewed the design

of new plants before their construction,

prepared safety manuals and bulletins,

investigated fires and explosions, and kept

the Chief of Ordnance informed on matters of safety. It launched an intensive

program for training "safety auditors" who

inspected plants, and it outlined plans for

training foremen and workers in safety

21

 For an account of disastrous explosions in

the United States and elsewhere before 1930, see

Ralph Assheton, History of Explosions on Which

the American Table of Distances Was Based, Including Other Explosions of Large Quantities of

Explosives, (Wilmington, Del.: The Press of the

Charles L. Story Company, 1930). 22

 History, Safety and Security Branch, OCO, I,

pp. 12-15 and appended documents, OHF.
132 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

BOX OF BULK TNT being processed in the melt unit is handled by a workman wearing

nonsparking safety shoes made without nails.

methods. This latter type of training was

considered the one most important means

of preventing accidents. In its early days

the branch received helpful advice and

assistance from civilian agencies such as

the National Safety Council, Underwriters'

Laboratories, Illinois Institute of Technology, and metropolitan fire and police departments.23

In the twelve months following establishment of the safety office in Chicago the

accident frequency rate at GOCO plants

was cut by more than half. It declined

further in 1944, and in 1945 the ammunition industry had the best safety record of

all manufacturing industries in the United

States, surpassing even the traditional

leader, the ladies' garment industry. Congressman Engel termed the Ordnance

safety achievement "one of the most amazing records made in the history of any

industry."

 24

 The Morgantown Ordnance

Works, to cite one outstanding example,

operated for nearly four years, accumulating approximately nine million manhours,

without a single lost-time injury. A note23

 Memo of Col Crosby Field to Miles, 19 Nov

42, sub: Progress Rpt, copy in History Safety and

Security Branch, OCO, OHF. For an account of

the training and duties of "safety auditors," see

the progress report attached to Colonel Field's

memo. For a published volume of lectures delivered in the fall of 1943 at the Chicago office

of the Safety and Security Branch, see Clark S.

Robinson, Explosions, Their Anatomy and Destructiveness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1944). 24

 Engel, op. cit.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 133

INSPECTOR AT VOLUNTEER ORDNANCE WORKS taking a sample of TNT for testing at

an ordnance laboratory.

worthy feature of the World War II record is that more than 95 percent of all

disabling injuries at ammunition plants

were not due to explosives but to run-ofthe-mill accidents such as falling off a

ladder or being hit by a truck.25

Technological Advances

Some of the most remarkable technological advances of World War II occurred

in the ammunition industry. The field was

wide open for the development of new

processes and new machinery, for there

had been virtually no mass production of

military ammunition in the United States

for over two decades. Small-scale production of powder and explosives by Picatinny Arsenal and by several commercial

firms had served to keep alive some

knowledge of production methods and to

make important advances in certain areas.

Pilot production lines at Frankford Arsenal served a similar purpose for metal

components. But small-scale production

does not justify construction of the costly

and intricate machines suitable for mass

25

 (1) Hist Rpt, FDAP, I, Gen Hist Aug 42-

Sep 45, p.39; (2) Engel, op. cit.; (3) "Shot, Shell

and Bombs," Fortune (September 1945) pp.

131-36, 260. (4) Rpt on Safety, Incl to Memo,

Gerber for Campbell, 7 May 45, in Safety and

Security Br files; (5) Stat Review World War II,

issued by ASF Contl Div, p. 165. This last reference covers all Ordnance installations and shows

that the accident frequency rate in Ordnance was

far lower than at all other ASF installations.
134 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

production, nor does it always clearly reveal the problems of the high-speed production line. Ordnance officers were well

aware of these limitations during the peace

years but were unable to do much about

them until 1938-40. Long before the

beginning of the emergency period Ordnance experts had seen the need for automatic machines to load detonators, for example, but the problems involved in

designing them were so baffling, and the

prospects of profit so dim, that few machine designers could be persuaded to take

any interest in the matter. The whole list

of World War II technological advances

made under pressure of war would fill a

volume; only a few may be mentioned

here. Reverse nitration of TNT, toluene

from petroleum, mechanization of loading,

and the development and use of wood

pulp, RDX, and rocket powder—these

have been selected because of their intrinsic importance and illustrative value.26

Reverse Nitration of TNT

During the 1941-42 period the inadequate supply of TNT for high-explosive

bombs and shells was a major problem for

Ordnance. Because the shortage had been

foreseen, plans were made to use a substitute explosive known as amatol (a mixture of TNT and ammonium nitrate) for

shell or bomb loading until new TNT

plants came into full production.27 Quantities of ammonium nitrate were imported

from Canada and maximum use was made

of commercial ammonium nitrate facilities

in the United States to stretch available

supplies of TNT as far as possible. Admiral

Blandy reported that the TNT shortage

was so acute he had to dole TNT out to

the Navy "with a teaspoon."28 But the

shortage suddenly disappeared when a

new process appeared on the scene almost

by accident. For many years before the

emergency, the method used by TNT

makers, and the only method considered

safe, had been to add the nitric acid to

the toluene. But in 1941 Lt. Col. John P.

Harris visited a small Canadian TNT

plant at Beloeil, near Montreal. His visit

to this plant had not been planned in advance but was added at the end of his

itinerary to fill in the time before his train

left. To his surprise, he found the plant

was "doing things backward" by putting

toluene into the acid instead of putting

acid into the toluene, thereby making

TNT much faster. When Colonel Harris

reported what he had seen at the Canadian

plant, American TNT makers were skeptical. They were reluctant to change tried

and proven methods, but a successful trial

run of the new process at the partly built

Keystone Plant at Meadville, Pennsylvania,

convinced them. Soon the reverse nitration

process was adopted for all TNT production in the United States. The result was

a trebling of TNT output. Lines designed

26

 (1) Campbell, "Artillery Ammunition Production," Army Ordnance, XIX, No. 113 (March

-April 1939), 273; (2) Col William E. Larned,

"Mechanized Ammunition Manufacture," Army

Ordnance, XXIV, No. 138, (May-June

1943) 504-10. For an account of improved

techniques in smokeless powder production, see

the study by H. LaTourette, Historical Report

on Smokeless Powder Program of the Ordnance

Department in World War II, PSP 17, OHF. The

official histories of Frankford and Picatinny provide further detailed information on prewar

conditions. 27

 Amatol was developed in England during

World War I because of the shortage of TNT.

History, Picatinny Arsenal, Manufacturing Group,

vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 68-72. 28

 Quoted in Memo, Brig Gen Campbell for

M. J. Madigan, OUSW, 14 Nov 41, OUSW

Madigan files (Ord Gen).
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 135

to turn out 33,000 pounds a day produced

more than 100,000 pounds a day. The

need for TNT substitutes vanished and the

price dropped from twelve cents a pound

to six cents.29

Toluene from Petroleum

Development of a new means of producing toluene,30

 the basic raw material from

which TNT is made, was another highly

significant technological advance of World

War IL The importance of this chemical

stems from the fact that nearly half of

every pound of TNT—trinitrotoluene—

must come from toluene. In World War I

toluene was derived from coal as a byproduct of coke ovens, and some was

extracted from illuminating gas. But the

supply was so limited that the Assistant

Secretary of War, Benedict Crowell, later

called it "the greatest and most pressing

of all the problems in regard to the

existing raw materials."31 In contrast,

during World War II, high-explosives

production was never seriously hampered

by lack of toluene. Production of toluene

by Ordnance-sponsored facilities reached

such a high level in 1943 that large quantities were diverted from ammunition to

aviation gasoline.32

The groundwork for this achievement

was laid during the 1930's by Picatinny

Arsenal, Maj. John P. Harris, and the

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. As

early as 1927 Standard had obtained patent rights from a German firm to use a

process for producing toluene from petroleum. Tests were made on small samples

at Picatinny during the 1930's, and in

1939 Major Harris began negotiations

with Standard to prepare for the day when

the striking power of the nation's military

forces would depend on abundant supplies

of TNT. In June 1940 Ordnance placed

a contract with Standard for two tank

cars of toluene to be produced in the several refineries owned by the company and

its affiliates. The raw material had to

travel to three widely separated plants in

Texas, Louisiana, and New Jersey before

the process was completed and the first

tank car of synthetic toluene ever made

was delivered to Ordnance. After test at

DuPont's TNT plant in Wisconsin, Ordnance signed a contract with the Humble

Oil and Refining Company, Standard's

affiliate in Texas, for the specific purpose

of building a toluene plant, the Baytown

Ordnance Works, on a site adjacent to

its Baytown refinery in Texas. By October

1942 this plant was producing toluene at

the rate of 65 million gallons per year—

compared with less than 9 million gallons

total toluene production in the United

States in 1918.33

29 (1) Interv with Col John P. Harris, 19 Jan

53; (2) Report on Explosives Capacity vs. Requirements, op. cit., pp. 13-14; (3) "Shot, Shell

and Bombs," Fortune, (September 1945), p. 260.

(4) Campbell, op. cit., p. 271; (5) Barnes,

Weapons of World War II, p. 76; (6) Engel,

op. cit.; (7) Hist, FDAP, Aug 42-Sep 45, vol.

I, app. 10, p. 25. 30

 The words "toluene" and "toluol" are virtually interchangeable. Toluene is the chemical

name for the compound C7H8 which, when

nitrated, produces TNT. Toluol is commonly

used to designate a coal-tar product high in

toluene content. 31

 Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-18, p.

106.

32

 Capt Vern C. Whitman, Toluene for War,

1940-45, Nov 45, OHF. This history of over two

hundred typed pages, plus documents, treats the

entire toluene program in considerable detail. 33

 (1) Ibid; (2) History of Baytown Ord

Works, vol. I, OHF; (3) 18 Dates With Destiny,

a pamphlet published by the Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, copy attached as exhibit to

Toluene for War 1940-45.
136 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

RDX

The superexplosive known as RDX (Research Department Explosive) or cyclonite,

with 30 percent more power than TNT,

was not new at the outbreak of World

War II.34 It had been known for many

years but had never been produced commercially in this country. It was considered

too sensitive for use as a bursting charge

and no more effective than tetryl as a

booster. Ordnance was reluctant to embark upon large-scale production of RDX,

a new and untried endeavor, in view of

the existing capacity for production of

TNT.35 But in May 1941, when the

British Purchasing Commission requested

the United States to produce 6,500 tons

and the U.S. Navy expressed a desire for

20 tons per day, Ordnance constructed a

completely new RDX plant, the Wabash

Ordnance Works, at a cost of $70 million.

Starting production in November 1942,

Wabash attained a monthly capacity of

over five million pounds of RDX which

was converted into various compositions.36

As demands for RDX skyrocketed after

Pearl Harbor, Ordnance built another facility, Holston Ordnance Works, to use a

more economical process than the British

nitration method used at Wabash. This

new process, developed by Canadian and

American investigators through the National Defense Research Committee

(NDRC), enabled Holston by May 1945

to reach a monthly capacity of 27 million

pounds and cut the estimated cost in half.

Holston was operated by the Tennessee

Eastman Corporation, which had taken a

leading part in the development work. The

support auxiliary facilities that provided

raw material for Holston were the Morgantown Ordnance Works that produced ammonia, methanol, formaldehyde, and hexamine, and the Cherokee Ordnance Works

that made formaldehyde and hexamine.37

Wood Pulp and Cotton Linters

Before the war the standard practice for

making smokeless powder called for the

treatment of bleached cotton linters38

with a mixture of nitric and sulfuric acid.

34

 The Ordnance historical file contains a detailed and authoritative 3-volume study on the

subject by Dr. Robert O. Bengis, Super Explosive

Program, RDX and Its Components A, B, and

C, Nov 45, PSP 16. 35

 In Scientists Against Time, Pages 256-57,

Baxter criticized Ordnance for its lack of interest

in creating new facilities for RDX production.

Ordnance men contended that the civilian scientists in NDRC did not fully realize the problems

involved in shifting a big production program

from one commodity to another when both time

and materials were at a premium. Interv with

Bengis, Ammo Div, OCO, 17 Jul 53. 36

 Beside its pure form, RDX was produced in

three compositions. Composition "A," a mixture

of 90 percent RDX and 10 percent desensitizing

agent, was used for press loading. Composition

"B," about 60 percent RDX and 40 percent TNT,

was used for bombs and other ammunition where

cast loading was required. Composition "C,"

about 88 percent RDX and 12 percent plasticizer,

was used to form demolition charges. Lewis and

Rosa, Ammo, 1 Jul 40-31 Aug 45, p. 39. 37

 For details on the development of the new

process and construction of Holston see Bengis,

op. cit., and History, Holston Ordnance Works,

Volume I, OHF. The latter volume contains a

fascinating narrative by Maj. Karl P. Doerr concerning the removal from the Holston plant site

of buried explosive materials left over from World

War I. The NDRC contribution is described in

Preparation and Testing of Explosives, Summary

Technical Report of Division 8, NDRC, in Ordnance R&D Reports Section, dtd 1946. This

report also contains an extensive bibliography. 38

 "Cotton linters" are the lint or fuzz remaining on cotton seeds after the cotton has been

removed. For a more detailed account of their

use, see Cotton Linters and Wood Pulp Uses in

Smokeless Powder Program, November 1945,

OHF. This study provides a bibliography and an

appendix containing significant documents. See

also Smokeless Powder During World War II, pp.

9ff, OHF.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 137

In the summer of 1941 it became apparent

to Ordnance that, even with a good cotton

linters crop and capacity operation of

bleacheries, the supply of linters for powder would fall short of requirements. Ordnance therefore turned to the use of a

special type of wood pulp that was available in quantity, was suitable for most

kinds of powder, and was cheaper than

cotton linters. The Hercules Powder Company had made smokeless powder from

wood pulp for a number of years, and

Ordnance had found the product fully

acceptable. Use of wood pulp as a supplement to, but not a replacement for, cotton

linters was approved promptly except for

rifle powder, Navy rocket powder, and

certain other uses. New machinery was

installed first at Indiana and Radford, and

then at other plants. Soon most plants had

one or two lines for nitrating cotton, an

equal number for nitrating wood pulp,

and several "swing lines" adaptable to the

use of either material.

From January 1942 to the end of the

war, Ordnance plants used roughly equal

quantities of cotton linters and wood pulp.

There was never a concurrent shortage of

both materials, although there were times

when the supply of one ran low or was

expected to run low. At such times Ordnance drew upon its inventories while it

converted the "swing lines" to meet the

situation. The use of wood pulp doubled

the existing supply of cellulose for powder

and eliminated a serious potential bottleneck in ammunition production.

Rocket Powder

When development of military rockets

was undertaken in the United States in

1940-41, one of the most troublesome

problems was the manufacture of suitable

propellants. Double-base smokeless powder39

 was a satisfactory rocket propellant

but its production in the large, long-burning, thick-web sticks or "grains" needed

for rockets was a difficult undertaking.

The accepted method of producing smokeless powder in this country in 1940 was

by the solvent-extrusion process in which

the nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine were

mixed with a volatile solvent (alcohol or

acetone) to form a doughlike substance

that could be pressed into grains of the desired shape. The solvent was then removed

by evaporation. As solvent powder was

used for the 2.36-inch bazooka rocket and

for the 4.5-inch rocket, lines for its production were built at the Radford and

Sunflower Works. For the small, thin-web

powder this production method proved

satisfactory, but when it was employed for

large, thick-web grains two difficulties

arose—the long time required for the

sticks to dry out, and the distortions in

the sticks that occurred during the drying

period. The obvious answer was to turn

from solvent powder to solventless or dryextruded powder, but American producers

lacked both the experience and the heavy

equipment needed for producing solventless rocket powder. British firms made

large thick-web grains of cordite, the

standard British smokeless powder, by

rolling the powder into a sheet, winding

the sheet into a roll, and then placing the

roll, still dry, into a press that extruded it

at moderate temperature and high pressure.

39

 The term "smokeless powder" is misleading,

for it is neither smokeless nor a powder. The

individual "grains" in conventional artillery ammunition may be an inch or more in length while

the grains or sticks of rocket powder may be

several feet long. The large sticks are perforated,

and the term "web thickness" refers to the thickness of the wall between perforations.
138 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

In 1941 the National Defense Research

Committee undertook study of dryextrusion processes, as did the Hercules

Powder Company under contract with

Ordnance. By December 1941 the dryextrusion press set up by NDRC representatives at the California Institute of

Technology produced sticks nearly an inch

in diameter, and by the early months of

1942 a larger press was extruding sticks

up to three inches in diameter. In February1942, Hercules was authorized to establish

a pilot plant with a capacity of twelve

hundred pounds per day at the Radford

Works. Soon the Soviet Union requested

thirty-six thousand long tons of solventless rocket powder to augment its own

production, and authority was granted

Ordnance to build an addition to the Sunflower Ordnance Works in Kansas to fill

the Russian request. By the middle of 1943

the U.S. rocket program had reached the

point where large new requirements "for

solventless powder were placed on Ordnance, and thereafter the requirements

steadily increased. In January 1945 the

over-all requirements reached a peak of

more than eighteen million pounds per

month, and plans were made to expand

facilities at the Sunflower, Badger, and

Indiana Works. Without the dry-extrusion

process developed for making solventless

rocket powder the extensive employment of

rockets by U.S. military forces in 1944-45

would not have been possible.40

Mechanization of Loading Operations

In the tedious process of loading and

assembling complete rounds of ammunition, industry and Ordnance made countless improvements. The simple hand fixtures and machines in use at Picatinny

Arsenal in 1939 gave way to high-speed

mechanisms that operated as nearly automatically as possible. One striking example

was the detonator-loading machine developed under contract with Picatinny by

R. A. Jones and Company, an Ohio manufacturer of automatic machines. As

several detonators, each containing a

sensitive explosive, were needed in a single

fuze, and fuzes were needed by the millions, the demand for speedy production

was great. After many failures, R. A.

Jones and Company finally developed a

detonator-loading machine with which 6

operators could load 8,000 detonators in

one 8-hour shift, as compared with 7,500

formerly loaded in the same time by from

seventeen to twenty operators.41

Ordnance introduced a new method of

loading TNT that was considered to be

one of the greatest developments in the

shell-loading industry, resulting in great

savings in time, money, and manpower. In

the older process, molten INT was poured

into the shell where it cooled and solidified.

Because the TNT contracted as it cooled,

and left a hollow in the center, the pouring was done in layers, the hollow in each

layer being opened up by hand to permit

molten TNT to flow into it when the next

layer was poured. Each shell was thus

practically tailor-made as each was loaded

individually and by hand. In the new

4 0 ( 1 ) Dr. E. H. Hemingway and E. N. Smith,

Historical Rpt on Solventless Rocket Powder

Program, Jul 45, OHF; (2) Baxter, Scientists

Against Time, pp. 202-05; (3) John E. Burchard,

Rockets, Guns, and Targets (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1948); (4) Notes on Rockets and Rocket Powder, a collection of documents

in OHF. 41

 (1) Col. William E. Lamed, "Mechanized

Ammunition Manufacture," Army Ordnance,

XXIV, No. 138 (May-June 1943), 504-10; (2)

Hist, Picatinny Arsenal, Mfg Gp, II, pt. 2. The

Picatinny history contains many excellent photographs of machines and processes.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 139

WORKMEN POURING MOLTEN TNT INTO 155-MM. SHELLS at Charleston Ordnance

Depot, October 1941.

method the shells were loaded in groups by

a multiple volumetric loading machine and

were then transferred to another machine,

a multiple core melter, which forced a

heated probe into the center of each shell

to melt out all porosity and crystals. As

these probes were withdrawn, molten TNT

was quickly poured into the cavity. The

Chief of Ordnance reported late in 1944

that this new procedure would save nearly

five million man-hours during the year

ahead.42

In making ammunition, minute quantities of sensitive explosives, such as tetryl,

must be placed in small cups or cavities in

primers, detonators, boosters, and other

components. To permit their speedy handling, the explosives are pressed into pellets

by using the same type of machinery

employed in making pills or candy. In

cooperation with Picatinny Arsenal, the F.

J. Stokes Machine Company of Pennsylvania developed rotary presses that poured

out pellets in any size or shape in a continuous stream. After the pellets were

made they had to be placed in small

booster cups by hand. Not only was it

slow and tedious work, but handling the

pellets presented a health hazard. This

phase of the problem was finally solved

when the Stokes Company produced a

rotary pelleting press that automatically

inserted pellets into booster cups at a

speed of 75 units per minute. When machines of this type were put to use

throughout the ammunition industry the

dividends in terms of increased output,

reduced costs, saving in floor space, and

42

 (1) Rpt of CofOrd for SW on Ord Dept

Activities, 1 Nov 44, and 20 Dec 44, Barnes file,

OHF.
140 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

reduction of personnel requirements were

tremendous.43

At the bag loading plants, where powder

for large-caliber separate loading ammunition was put into cloth bags, there were

equally important improvements in machines and equipment. Instead of wrapping the powder charges by hand, as was

the standard practice, machines that were

almost entirely automatic were introduced,

with resultant saving of manpower and

increase of production by over 50 percent.

Changes in design of propelling charges

were introduced to permit application of

mass production principles in cutting the

cloth and assembling the powder bags.44

There was no end to the improvements

that could be made in the loading of ammunition, nor was there any lack of engineering skill and imagination among the

World War II producers. The ceiling on

technological advances was set by the demand for production, the funds available,

and requirements of other programs for

machines and materials. The end of the

war in 1945 momentarily stopped the intense drive for increased mechanization of

bomb and shell loading, but the process

continued on into the postwar years.45

Speeding production and conserving

manpower were highly important considerations throughout World War II, but

they were not the only considerations in

the minds of Ordnance ammunition officers. In commenting on the trend toward

more and more mechanization of operations at the loading plants, Brig. Gen. Merle

H. Davis, postwar chief of the Ammunition

Division, observed that the most important result was not increased output nor

reduction in the number of employees,

great as those considerations were. "The

most important dividend," he wrote, "is a

better and more uniform product, with a

reduction in the errors that can be made

by human beings."

 46

With reduction of errors and elimination

of imperfections its constant goals, the

Ammunition Division set up elaborate inspection procedures for metal components,

powder, and explosives, and stood firm

against manufacturers' requests for waivers

of inspection standards. Inspection of ammunition was rigid but was not intended

to be arbitrary. Throughout the production phase, efforts were made to keep

quality high even if it meant holding up

production. The Ordnance philosophy was

well expressed by General Hardy when he

advised the district chiefs that, "We don't

save anybody any expense and we cause

plenty of trouble when we let anything of

an inferior nature get into the hands of

troops."

 47

Balancing Production, 1941-43

In theory, the procurement of all chemicals and metal components should have

43

 (1) Larned, op. cit., (2) Hist, Picatinny

Arsenal, Mfg Gp, I, pt. 2. 44

 Report on Powder, Explosives, and Loading

Capacity, pt. II, 18 Feb 43, copy in OO 675/889

Misc Incl file. 45

 German munitions-makers also made rapid

technological advances and in some cases were

more successful than British and American producers. For examples, see PSP 17, PropellantsSmokeless Powder during World War II, pp. 57-

72. For a statement of the problems encountered

in England in mechanizing these operations, see

Postan, British War Production, pp. 174-83. The

Royal Ordnance Factories were planned very

largely as "manufactories" where large numbers

of unskilled workers would perform the operations by hand or with small tools. For reasons of

safety, individual units were kept small and

much" dispersed, thus making impractical the use

of conveyor belts and heavy machinery. 46

 Brig Gen. Merle H. Davis, "Explosive Ammunition Production," Ordnance, XXXVI, No.

192 (May-June 1952), 934-36. 47

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia,

8 Oct 43, p. 19, OHF.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 141

been kept in balance so that the number or

quantity of each exactly matched the

needs of the loading plants. But such

theoretical exactness was impossible to attain in practice. As some components were

easier for industry to produce than

were others, production of the easy-tomanufacture items surged ahead and got

out of line. Shells, bomb bodies, and

cartridge cases, for example, came into

quantity production during 1941 well

ahead of powder, explosives, and fuzes.

After Pearl Harbor the unbalance grew

worse because of the public statements by

high-ranking government officials urging

every war plant to speed production to the

maximum. To arrest the trend toward unbalance, the Industrial Service issued in

December 1941 a directive to the districts

and other field installations to expedite

only those items appearing on a "Short

List" to be issued weekly.48

The "Short List" helped, but it did not

work miracles. It was not possible to

achieve exact mathematical balance of all

components by curtailing or stopping completely the production of fast items, for

that would have resulted in complete loss

of facilities through their conversion to

other work, loss of labor force, or, in the

case of smaller plants, bankruptcy. There

were also many other factors that entered

the picture—changing requirements, slow

deliveries on machine tools, lack of raw

materials, technical difficulties in production of certain components, and occasional

plant shutdowns due to strikes, fires, or

explosions. Use of the "Short List" brought

criticism on Ordnance because some of its

contractors were working only half their

maximum capacity at a time when the

whole nation was being mobilized for war.

These were contractors producing fast

items and they had to be held back until

plants making slow items caught up with

them. Ordnance reported that about 10

percent of its contractors were responsible

for items on the "Short List" and that

half of these were still tooling-up and were

not yet in production. Other plants had

unbalanced production lines because the

tools needed for some items had not been

delivered; others reported interruptions in

their raw materials supply as the source of

their troubles.49

During the 1941-42 period the Ammunition Division was not at all satisfied with the means at its disposal for

balancing production. One of the chief

difficulties lay in the lack of flexibility in

dealing with industry. The Division could

institute procurement only on programs

for which funds were available, and these

programs often bore no relation to the

needs of industry or to production potential. With ammunition, as with other types

of materiel, Ordnance could not forecast

its requirements long in advance and take

the steps necessary to prepare industry for

production, to eliminate bottlenecks, or

smooth out uneven spots in the schedule.

Contractors already engaged in production

were sometimes faced with interruption in

production, and potential contractors requiring some preparation or additional

equipment were often unable to proceed

until an order was available under a

specific program. Savings on one fund

48

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Lewis for all districts.

. . , 13 Dec 41, sub: Acceleration of Prod. . . ;

(2) Memo, Brig Gen Lewis for all districts . . . ,

22 Dec 41, sub: Expediting Prod. Both in History,

Production Service Branch, OHF. 49

 (1) Memo, Milo J. Marsh for Brig Gen

Hermon F. Safford, 21 Nov 42, sub: Balancing

of Ord Prod, Ord ExecO file. This memo cites

the complaint made by Mr. Donald Nelson to

General Somervell on 28 April 1942 and the

Ordnance comment of 13 May 1942.
142 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

could be applied to another fund only by

going through the cumbersome process of

getting approval from higher authority.

The result was a long lag in getting new

production started. Deliveries against new

requirements were always behind schedule.

In 1941 the chief of the Ammunition Division summarized the situation as follows:

A proper description of our present situation is that we are trying to run an arsenal

the size of the United States without the

flexibility of existing government arsenal procedure. We are trying to operate a mass

production job involving numerous production changes without any anticipatory action

regarding procurement until the funds are

available and the requirements are announced in the form of an official program

specifying delivery schedules. To put it

another way, we are in the position of an

automobile company which takes no action

as regards the procurement and production

of new equipment, raw materials, and parts

in planning the coming year's production,

when the standard practice in that industry

is to start such activity 18 to 24 months

before the model is announced.50

With adoption of the Army Supply Program early in 1942 an effort was made by

ASF to provide long-range procurement

forecasts for all types of ordnance. The

emphasis shifted from monthly capacity

objectives to yearly quantity objectives. At

the same time, fiscal regulations were relaxed so that the necessity for earmarking

each increase for a specific production

order was no longer necessary. In the

summer of 1942 the Ammunition Division

under General Hardy set machinery in

motion to improve procedures for keeping

ammunition production in balance. The

former practice of forecasting production

by adding together all theoretical maximum monthly capacities, and multiplying

the total by the number of months in the

period, was abandoned. Production forecasts for each component were made in

terms of realistic capacity figures, not

theoretical maximums, and in terms of

orders actually placed. Production of complete rounds was then scheduled in terms

of planned delivery of components to the

loading plants, with the components in

shortest supply setting the pace for all the

others.

The new procedure centered around use

of "preliminary work plan sheets" issued

each month by the Ammunition Division.

These planning sheets showed the status of

all metal components in terms of realistic

production forecasts and were used to

determine feasible loading schedules. They

placed on one sheet of paper all procurement data concerning a single component

by district, by manufacturer, and by

quantities expected in the months ahead.

Although used at first only for analyzing

and planning procurement the sheets were

soon given the status of legal documents

authorizing the districts to procure.51 The

value of the PWP sheets is attested to by

the fact that they were not only used during the rest of the war but were continued

into the postwar years. At the same time

that the new scheduling procedures were

being put into effect in the latter half of

1942, Industry Integration Committees

50

 Memo, Chief of Ammo Div for Chief of Ind

Serv, 9 Jul 41, sub: Proc Procedure, quoted in

full in draft of Contract Negotiation and Administration, Ord Dept, ASF, pp. 51-54 OHF. Many

other memos dealing with the same subject are

also quoted in this study. 51

 (1) Statement by Hardy quoted in Contr

Negotiation and Admin, pp. 88-95; (2) Lewis

and Rosa, Ammo, 1 Jul 40-31 Aug 45, pp. 95-

96; (3) Interv with Nathan Nachamkin, Chief,

Opns Sec, Ammo Br, OCO, 3 Aug 53. See also

folder marked Original Army Supply Program,

Feb 24, 1942.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 143

were formed to help balance production

by raising the output of plants working on

problem items.

Along with the PWP sheets for components the Ammunition Division drew up

forecast sheets for end items showing the

quantity of complete rounds of ammunition expected to be available each month

for distribution to troops. They were based

on known production capacity and were

kept within the requirements set by the

Army Supply Program. They constituted

the basic control documents for the FDAP

in regulating activities at the loading plants

and were used by the military high command to plan the allocation of ammunition

to the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy,

Marines, and lend-lease recipients. Even

before the new system was put in operation

the emphasis switched from maximum production at any cost to curtailment and

leveling off of production in terms of combat experience and existing stock levels.

Downward revision of the Army Supply

Program was so substantial in the latter

half of 1942 that the Chief of Ordnance

appointed a special board of officers to

review all matters relating to the readjustment of production schedules.52

A drastic reduction of bomb requirements was made early in 1943 with consequent reduction in the demand for TNT,

ammonium nitrate, metal components, and

loading capacity. Some plants that were

still under construction were dropped from

the program, and in many other plants

individual lines not needed to meet the new

requirements were eliminated.53 Several

factors other than requirements were taken

into account in deciding which plants were

to close and which were to stay open. Cost

of production, flexibility, labor supply, location with respect to other plants, and

the variety of items produced—all these

were considered.54 Cutbacks in certain

items made it impossible to keep metal

components in balance. Ordnance reported in September 1942 that its powder

and explosives production was in balance

with the loading schedule but that for

some metal components there was no stock

on hand and with others there was a 2-

year supply in stock. The former were new

items that were in great demand but were

not yet in full production. The latter were

supplies made surplus by sudden and drastic cuts in requirements.55

The cutback policy was reinforced in the

fall of 1943 when the War Department

Procurement Review Board, headed by

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, urged curtailment of production on the ground that

excessive stocks of many kinds had been

built up both in the ZI and in overseas

theaters.56 Ordnance contended that ammunition stocks were not excessive, and

52

 This board was composed of Brig. Gen.

Hermon F. Safford, Col Herbert R. White, and

Col. John C. Raaen. See Ilsley, Facilities Program

of the Ammo Div, Oct 44, pt. 2, pp. 175ff. 53

 The details of this program cover many

closely typed pages in Ilsley, Ammo Div, Oct 44.

A total of twenty-two TNT lines at the Keystone,

Pennsylvania, Volunteer, Weldon Springs, and

West Virginia works were closed. The New River

and Mississippi bag loading plants were shut

down as well as the Cactus plant that produced

ammonia, the Pilgrim plant for grinding magnesium, and many others. 54

 Memo, Maj Gen Clay for USW, 10 Jul 43,

sub: Ord Plant Data for H.R. Mil Affairs

Comm., copy in OHF. See statement on cutback

policy by General Clay at ASF staff conf, 14

Mar 44, quoted in Ilsley, Facilities Program of

the Ammo Div, Oct 44, pt. 2, pp. 256-61, and

reports on specific plants described in the first

100 pages of the same reference. 55

 For ASF policies see Memo, Director Materiel Div ASF for CofOrd, 20 Jun 43, sub:

Prod Information on Components, copy in folder

marked Dirs, Basic Data . . . ASP. 56

 Rpt of WD Proc Review Bd, 31 Aug 43,

ASF file 334 WD Proc Rev Bd, 020 CofS USA.
144 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

declared that expenditure rates for the

North African campaign, a war of movement allowing for little artillery fire, should

not be accepted as a guide to expenditure

rates during an invasion of western

Europe.

In spite of Ordnance objections, the

ASF policy announced in January 1944

was directed toward continued retrenchment and avoidance of overproduction in

the year ahead. All down the line the

technical services were told to procure

during the calendar year 1944 only the

materiel specifically required by the

Army Supply Program. Production of any

items in excess of requirements for the

purpose of retaining labor or facilities was

expressly forbidden.57 In conformity with

this policy, work at some Ordnance facilities was stopped altogether in January

1944. In other cases, facilities not currently needed for Ordnance production

were diverted to other programs, notably

fertilizers, synthetic rubber, and aviation

gasoline.

The Crisis of 1944-45

The year 1944 was a year of trial and

tribulation for the Ammunition Division.

At the start the emphasis was on slowing

down the mounting tide of production as

the defeat of Germany appeared more and

more imminent, but at the end there was

an almost frantic drive for more production at any cost. As late as the last week

in March 1944 Ordnance, in line with

recent ASF directives, was reviewing the

need for existing plants and recommending

that three bomb- and shell-loading plants

—Illinois, Pantex, and Gulf—be closed

within the next sixty to ninety days and

put in stand-by condition. Illinois had always been a high-cost plant while Pantex

and Gulf were both small plants with only

three or four lines. But by the time the

Ordnance recommendation reached ASF

it encountered a reversal of the cutback

policy and was not approved.58

Early in 1944 Ordnance officers were

convinced that the Army's neglect of

heavy artillery and its ammunition was a

mistake, but they felt they had nearly

exhausted their powers of persuasion in

presenting the argument to higher authorities. At the end of February, and again

in mid-March, Ordnance called to the attention of ASF the low stocks of 240-mm.

ammunition and the high expenditure

rates reported from overseas theaters.

"This type ammunition is so large," wrote

General Hardy, "that facilities for its manufacture are very limited in extent, and

the time required to reach production

amounts to about eight months." He

warned that, if authority were not granted

him to expand facilities immediately, it

would be impossible to meet increased requirements during 1944 or early 1945.59

This appeal broke the log jam. Ordnance

was authorized on 27 March to expedite

production with a view to attaining as

soon as possible a monthly production rate

of forty thousand rounds of 240-mm.

57

 Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd and others, 29

Jan 44, sub: 1944 ASP—Policies Affecting Prod,

ASF Contl Div files, folder marked Supplemental

Rpt on Implementation of Dir to Deputy CofS,

1 Jan 44. ... 58

 Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 25 Mar 44,

sub: Proposal to Close . . . Loading Plants, and

Incls, OO 334/8206 Misc. 59

 Memo, Hardy for CG ASF, 18 Mar 44,

sub: Rqmts for 240-mm. Ammo, OO 471/3074.

Two memos dated 28 February 1944 are quoted

in Dr. Ralph Ilsley, $700,000,000 Facilities Program, Ammunition Division, May 1945, OHF,

pages 10-11. See also Brig. Gen. Roswell E.

Hardy, "Heavy Artillery Ammunition," Army

Ordnance, XXVII, No. 147 (November-December 1944), 442.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 145

ammunition. Similar increases in ammunition for the 8-inch gun and howitzer, the

155-mm. gun and howitzer, and the 4.5-

inch gun were authorized on 2 April. By

far the largest quantity in this directive

was for the 155-mm. howitzer—1,303,000

rounds per month.60

The next step was taken in mid-May

when G—4 and ASF, concluding that the

cutback policy had been a mistake, ordered a major increase in production of

medium artillery and ammunition, and

added to the heavy artillery program. The

campaign in Italy, where artillery ammunition and bombs were used in huge quantities against strongly fortified mountain

positions, had forced a change in Army

plans. The new directives required Ordnance to double its monthly rate of heavy

artillery ammunition production in seven

months and triple it in thirteen months.

In June and July substantial increases in

bomb requirements were added. Here, at

last, was the procurement authority Ordnance had repeatedly requested earlier, but

it came so late in the war that it had to

be handled on a "blitz" basis.61

Creation of additional production capacity for heavy artillery ammunition was

a big job comparable to the expansion

undertaken by Ordnance after Pearl Harbor. Some of the government-owned plants,

such as Gopher, Keystone, and Weldon

Springs, that had been shut down a few

weeks or months before, had to be speedily reopened and re-equipped, and new

contracts for metal components had to be

placed with industry under very unfavorable conditions. Enormous forging presses

had to be built and countless gages, jigs,

fixtures, and machine tools assembled; production of explosives and smokeless powder had to be increased; new lines had to

be set up at the loading plants; and increased capacity had to be found for forging and machining shells, machining cartridge cases, and producing fuzes. General

Campbell reported that the facilities for

production of shells for the 240-mm. howitzer and the 8-inch gun and 8-inch howitzer called for one thousand heavy-duty

lathes, nineteen 1,000-ton piercing presses,

seventeen 300-ton draw presses, twelve

600-ton billet-breaking presses, and

twenty-seven 500-ton nosing presses. All

this equipment required motors, hydraulic

pumps, and other accessories. The expansion program for heavy artillery ammunition as of April and May 1944 required

the building of new facilities costing $203

million, divided in roughly equal parts between production of metal components

and the manufacture and loading of explosives and propellants. A heartbreaking

feature of the situation for Ordnance was

that production capacity for part of this

load had been laboriously built up in

60

 (1) 1st Indorsement to above Memo, ASF

to CofOrd, 27 Mar 44; (2) Memo, CG, ASF for

CofOrd, 2 Apr 44, sub: Heavy FA Program,

OO 381/12117 Misc, copy in Ilsley, $700,000,000

Facilities Program. For background of these decisions, see Memo, ASF Director of Matériel for

CG ASF, 1 Apr 44, sub: Heavy FA Program,

OHF. The Troyer Anderson file at OCMH also

includes notes on this subject in Folder 15, Heavy

Ammo Crisis. 61

 Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 19 May 44,

sub: Heavy and Medium Arty and Ammo Program, OO 400/12103. For a detailed account of

this process, with supporting documents, see

Ilsley, The Facilities Program of the Ammunition

Division, a 3-volume study, and Ilsley, $700,000,-

000 Facilities Program of April 1944. For a brief

summary, see Ammunition Division Annual Report, 30 Jun 45, OHF. See also Hardy, "Heavy

Artillery Ammunition," Army Ordnance, XXVII,

No. 147 (November-December 1944), 442-43,

and The Production Story-Heavy Artillery Ammunition by ASF Prod Div, 20 Dec 49, copy in

OHF.
146 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

1941-1942, only to be lost during the

1943 cutback era.62

Every facility of the Ordnance Department was placed at the disposal of the

heavy ammunition contractors to expedite

delivery of equipment and help with technical problems of manufacture. Industry

integration committees' disseminated information among contractors and provided a

common pool of knowledge and experience.

Col. Simpson R. Stribling was sent on a

mission to England, France, and Italy to

survey production facilities in those countries and to arrange for shipment of available machine tools to the United States.

In August 1944 Ordnance reported to the

Secretary of War that manpower was "the

greatest single problem facing the expanding heavy artillery ammunition program."

 63

 Labor recruiting caravans

toured the country to help overcome the

shortage, and women were employed for

many positions formerly held by men.64

When requirements were further increased

at the end of the year provision was made

for furloughing enlisted men having skills

as machinists, toolmakers, or machine operators to work in ammunition plants. The

furlough program reached its peak in

March 1945 when 3,066 enlisted men were

at work in plants and several thousand

requisitions for additional men were on

file with ASF.65

On 1 December 1944 Ordnance was

directed to step up its production of light

and medium artillery ammunition. The

monthly rate of production for ammunition for the 155-mm. gun was to be increased by 50 percent, from four hundred

thousand per month to six hundred thousand; similar increases for the 57-mm. and

90-mm. guns, 105-mm. howitzer, and the

60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars were included,66

 Knowing in advance that these

increases were coming, the Ammunition

Division worked night and day to prepare

its plans. General Campbell then called a

conference attended by Robert P. Patterson, Bernard Baruch, General Clay of ASF,

and representatives of the War Production

Board, War Manpower Commission, and

other government agencies, at which the

chief of the Ammunition Division outlined

a program of expansion that called for

expenditure of about $300 million for

producing mortar and medium artillery

ammunition, in addition to the $329 million earlier allotted for heavy ammunition

expansion. He provided the conferees with

a complete set of planning sheets showing

all the facilities selected for increased capacity and detailed information about

each plant's management, previous work

on ammunition, available machine tools,

62

 A detailed description of this process is given

by General Campbell in a memorandum for

General Somervell, 29 Sep 44, sub: Heavy Arty

Ammo, OO 471/3834. See also Ann Rpt of

Ammo Div, 30 Jun 45, OHF, and folder marked

Heavy Arty and Ammo Ord ExecO file; and brief

summary in Hiland G. Batcheller, Critical Programs, a Report to the WPB, 14 Nov 44, WPB

Doc. 315, p. 6, WPB file 210.3, NA. 63

 Rpt for SW on Ord Dept Activities, 16 Aug

44, Barnes file. 64

 In smokeless powder plants the percentage

of women increased from 18.43 percent in October 1943 to 34.71 percent in May 1945, and in

some plants more than half the employees were

women. PSP 17, Propellants-Smokeless Powder

during World War II, p. 49, OHF. 65

 This subject is treated in detail in PSP 59,

Manpower and Its Utilization, Contractor and

Ordnance Personnel, June 1945, Volume I, OHF.

The second volume contains copies of pertinent

documents. See also Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1959). 66

 (1) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 1 Dec 44,

sub: Rates of Prod Required for Ammo for 90-

mm. and 155-mm. guns, OO 400.12/13638: (2)

Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 1 Dec 44, sub:

Rates of Prod Required for Ammo, OO 400.12/

13639.
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 147

floor space, and requirements for manpower, fuel, and electricity. In the course

of one day it was possible for Ordnance to

obtain co-ordinated approval for the greater part of its planned expansion, and by

the end of the month contracts for the

entire program had been placed.67 In January 1945 came new directives for increased production of ammunition for the

75-mm. howitzer, the 75-mm. field gun,

and the 37-mm. antitank gun, followed by

a demand for 355,300 rounds of armorpiercing ammunition with tungsten carbide cores for guns ranging from the

75-mm. to the 155-mm. When these

comparatively small January 1945 additions were made, the total program called

for the expenditure of $682 million on

facilities alone, divided on roughly even

proportions between metal components on

the one hand and powder, explosives and

loading, on the other.68

Production of 105-mm. high explosive

(HE) howitzer ammunition in December

1944 reached a record high of 3,600,000

rounds and put this item at the top of the

Ordnance list in terms of dollar value of

procurement, just ahead of the medium

tank. By the end of January 1945 Ordnance reported that it had procured a

little over fifty million rounds of this type

since 1940. Deliveries on some other

rounds, mostly the heavy types, did not

come up to expectations in December

1944. One of the chief causes of failure

to meet production forecasts was the high

rate of absenteeism at loading plants because of unusually heavy snowstorms during the month. Labor and machine-tool

shortages retarded production of smoke

shells for the 155-mm. gun early in 1945,

but by April rates of production for nearly

all types were so high that cutbacks were

being talked about.69

During the first four months of 1945

expenditures for heavy artillery ammunition reached record levels—more than four

times those of the first four months of

1944—and then declined sharply after

Germany's surrender in May. (Table 11)

At the end of June the chief of the Ammunition Division reported that his office

had supervised the procurement of more

than $5 billion worth of ammunition

weighing over seven million tons during

the fiscal year 1945. Procurement was

roughly 50 percent greater, in both dollar

value and weight, than in fiscal year

1944. Over two hundred new items, representing more than one-third of the average

number of ammunition items under procurement, were brought into production.

The new items included various calibers of

recoilless ammunition, and the "Tall Boy"

and "Grand Slam" bombs for the British.

A new rocket propellant went into production at Longhorn, a new RDX composition at Wabash, and a new explosive,

tritonal, was used to load British bombs.

TNT production increased so much that a

shortage of nitric acid developed, necessitating expansion of acid-making capacity.70

These events naturally raise the question, "Were the frantic efforts to boost

production necessary?" The answer seems

to be "yes" if we base our analysis on the

situation as it existed in the winter of

1944-45.

67

 Ann Rpt of Ammo Div, 30 Jun 45, p. 7. 68

 (1) Ilsley, $700,000,000 Facilities Program,

pp. 27-29; (2) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 27

Jan 45, sub: Rates of Prod. . ., OO 400.12/

13827. 69

 Ammo Supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters, 15 Aug 45, pp. 25ff. 70

 Ann Rpt, Ammo Div, OCO, Ind Serv, FY

1945, OHF.
148 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 11—EXPENDITURES FOR HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION,

JANUARY 1944-AUGUST 1945

Source: Stat Review World War II, app. A, p. 75, by ASF Contl Div, OHF.

Chart 1 shows that stocks of artillery

ammunition on hand in the European

Theater of Operations ran well below the

authorized level from the summer of 1944

to early 1945. An urgent cable from the

ETO to the War Department on 23 September 1944 declared bluntly, "There is a

serious shortage of heavy artillery ammunition for current operations."

 71

 As Table

12 reveals, ammunition was shipped in increasingly large quantities during these

months, but did not catch up with the

rise in authorized levels resulting from deployment of additional weapons. Vigorous

efforts were made to speed the flow of

ammunition from England and from the

European beaches and ports to the front

lines. Ammunition was rationed, and the

armies were unable to fire at the desired

rate. The fact that the campaign was a

success does not prove that the ammunition supply was adequate, for the fighting

71

 Quoted in Ordnance Service in ETO, Ammunition Supply, pp. 120-23, OHF. See also

cable from Eisenhower to Marshall quoted on p.

154, ibid. For statistics, see Ammunition Supply

for European and Mediterranean Theaters, 15

Aug 45, p. 69, and Memo, Director of Supply,

ASF, for Contl Div, ASF, 21, Dec 44, sub: Critical

Items, copy in black binder in Somervell files,

Box 48, NA. The subject is covered in some detail

by Roland G. Ruppenthal in Logistical Support

of the Armies, Volume I, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, (Washington,

1953), and in Ammunition Supply for European

and Mediterranean Theaters, pp. 25ff.
CHART 1—ETO AUTHORIZED LEVELS AND THEATER STOCKS—GROUND AMMUNITION

Ammunition Supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters Control Division, Hdqrs, ASF, War

Department -15 August 1945-p. 3.
150 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 12—SHIPMENTS OF SELECTED TYPES OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION TO THE

EUROPEAN THEATER, DECEMBER 1944-MARCH 1945

[IN ROUNDS]

Source: Ammo Supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters, ASF Contl Div, 15 Aug 45, p. 13., OHF.

might have ended sooner and with fewer

casualties had more ammunition been

fired. The conclusion seems to be inescapable that strenuous efforts to increase production and to speed distribution were

called for in the critical months following

6 June 1944. The statistics showing that

output more than doubled between June

1944 and June 1945 suggest that the

production part of the program achieved

a fair degree of success.

After Germany surrendered there were,

of course, large quantities of all types of

ammunition on hand, surplus to the needs

of a campaign that was ended. How

great was the surplus? It was large in all

calibers and in some calibers it was unreasonably large. Table 13 shows that the

3.8 million rounds on hand at the end of

May 1945 constituted a 3-month supply

for the 155-mm. gun, based on the experience of the preceding three months (February, March, April). For the 155-mm.

howitzer the supply was nearly four

months, and for the other calibers it was

roughly six months.

In June and July 1945 procurement

was scaled down to the level of the onefront war against Japan, and requirements

were far less than during the early months

of the year. Then in mid-August the surrender of Japan put a stop to further

production. On 14 August the FDAP

sent telegrams to all its ammunition plants

to halt production on all except a few

types of materiel, and the district offices

took similar action with respect to their

contractors. These events suddenly ushered

in a new era for which Ordnance had

been making plans for many months, an

era of demobilization and postwar planning.

In Conclusion: Quality and Quantity

Ammunition has been called the unsung hero of wars. When a gun fires

straight and true the user is likely to remark that it is a fine weapon. When the

gun fails to function properly the comment

is likely to be, "There's something wrong

with the ammunition." Realizing that ammunition which failed to function properly

might have disastrous consequences, Ordnance went to extreme lengths to maintain

quality at the highest possible level. Every
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 151

TABLE 13—HEAVY ARTILLERY AMMUNITION STOCKS ON HAND IN ETO, 31 MAY 1945

Source: Prepared from data found in Ammo Supply for Eurpoean and Mediterranean Theaters, ASF Contl Div, 15 Aug 45, OHF

newly designed shell, fuze, or cartridge

case was subjected to the most severe tests

before it was standardized for issue to

troops. In the manufacturing process an

unbelievable number of inspections were

made to screen out defective elements.

And in the overseas theaters Ordnance

officers followed up on every reported instance of malfunction to determine its

cause and root out the source of the

trouble. General Merle H. Davis, who had

wide experience in ammunition procurement and as a theater Ordnance officer,

estimated that during World War II the

Chief of Ordnance received information on

95 percent of the serious malfunctions that

occurred in combat.72

 Early in the war,

reports of premature explosions of shells

came in from time to time, but by mid1944 the rate of such malfunctions

dropped to something less than one in

100,000 rounds fired. For certain rounds

it was less than one per million.73 "Based

on performance," wrote Maj. Gen. Henry

B. Sayler, chief Ordnance officer in

ETOUSA, "American artillery ammunition was far superior [to German].

Whether because of sabotage or poor

workmanship, the percentage of German

duds was exceedingly high as compared

with that of American performance."

 74

If combat troops seldom had cause to

complain of the quality of their ammunition, they sometimes cursed its inadequate

supply. This is not the time or place to

analyze the intricacies of overseas ammunition supply, but the observation may be

made here that lack of ammunition has

been a perennial complaint of combat

troops since the invention of gunpowder.

In American history, from the defeat of

the colonial forces on Bunker Hill to the

war in Korea, field forces have occasionally

run short of ammunition, sometimes at

critical moments in the tide of battle.

Ammunition is one of the most unpredictable items in the military supply catalog.

Food, clothing, guns, tanks—the need for

all these can be predicted with fair accuracy, but the supply of ammunition depends

upon such incalculables as the success of

an attack or the stubbornness of enemy

resistance. It is not enough to have at

overseas bases a large supply of ammunition in general. What the fighting forces

need and demand are the particular types

72

 Davis, "Explosive Ammunition Production,"

Ordnance, XXXVI, No. 192 (May-June 1952),

934-36. 73

 Lewis and Rosa, Ammo, 1 Jul 40-31 Aug

45, P. 67. 74

 Ibid., p. 67.
152 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 14—MAJOR TYPES OF AMMUNITION PROCURED, 1 JULY 1940-31 AUGUST 1945

[IN ROUNDS]

a

 Not including a few minor types such as the 7.2-inch, 6-inch, 5.5-inch, and 120-mm. b

 Excludes chemical bombs procured empty by Ordnance Department to be filled by Chemical Warfare arsenals. The total

exceeds 100,000,000 if the individual bombs in bomb clusters are counted separately. See Bomb—Research, Development, Production, and Performance by Maj. Berkeley R. Lewis, pp. 58—59.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Procurement sec., 9 Apr 52, Table PR-8.

and sizes of shell to fit the weapons being

used to achieve the specific objective of

the moment. With literally hundreds of different sizes and types of shell in common

use, this problem was enormously difficult

from both the procurement and the distri-
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION: PRODUCTION 153

bution angles. But at the end of the war

the Ammunition Division was prepared to

stand on its record of procurement and to

maintain that, except for heavy artillery,

lack of production was not the cause of

shortages in overseas supply.75 (Table 14)

The Mead Committee of the U.S. Senate

supported this stand in a report issued in

July 1945.76 Perhaps the most thorough

analysis of the problem was made by the

General Board, U.S. Forces, European

Theater. It concluded that no one factor

caused the shortage but that three elements entered the picture at different

times: (a) insufficient discharge over the

beaches or through the ports, June through

October 1944; (b) inability to move ammunition from ports and beaches to the

armies, August through October 1944;

and (c) inability of the Zone of Interior

to meet requirements, November 1944

through March 1945.77

75

 For a discussion of requirements, see Chapter

III. The problems of overseas supply will be

treated in the next volume of this series. 76

 Mead Comm. Report No. no, pt. 2, 79th

Cong., 1st sess., 6 Jul 45. 77

 Rpt of Gen Bd, U.S. Forces, European

Theater, Arty Sec, Study No. 58, ch. 7, n.d

.
CHAPTER VIII

Small Arms

In a war that saw the employment of

huge artillery weapons on a grand scale

and that featured first the "block buster"

and then the awe-inspiring atomic bomb,

the smallest of military weapons—rifles,

carbines, pistols, and machine guns—

nevertheless played an important role

throughout. Among ground combat

troops, small arms were regarded as valued

personal possessions, usually winning a

place on mythical lists of "the soldier's best

friends." Their effectiveness, light weight,

and simplicity of operation made them the

most versatile and most widely used weapons of the whole war.

As with so many other terms in military

language, "small arms" did not have a

hard and fast meaning. General usage

over the years defined it as including all

weapons with bore diameter of .60-inch

(.60-caliber) or less, whether pistols, revolvers, rifles, carbines, submachine guns,

or machine guns. These standard hand or

shoulder weapons of infantry troops were

supplemented traditionally by mortars that

stood somewhere between shoulder weapons and artillery. But in World War II the

infantry soldier also fought with 2.36-inch

rocket launchers and a few recoilless rifles

which, in spite of their large calibers, were

generally classed as small arms or, more

meaningfully, as infantry weapons.1 By this

usage, the determining characteristic was

not diameter of bore but portability—

whether the weapon could be carried into

combat by infantry troops and could be

fired from the hand, shoulder, or light

support. The dividing line between small

arms and artillery was thus less distinct

than that separating the two classes of

ammunition. With ammunition the diameter of the projectile was the deciding

factor: everything up to and including

.60-caliber was small arms; everything over

.60-caliber was artillery.

Though small arms were regarded as

being primarily ground weapons, the combat infantryman had no monopoly on

them. Virtually every soldier in an overseas theater, whether assigned to a combat

arm or a supply service, at one time or

another used a rifle, carbine, or pistol.

Small arms also went to sea and were almost as familiar to the sailor as to the

soldier; every warship carried its store of

such weapons, ranging from pistols to antiaircraft machine guns. More important,

machine guns were the principal armament of Allied warplanes. The long-range,

rapid-firing .50-caliber machine gun

played the leading role both in plane-toplane combat and in strafing attacks on

surface targets. Easily the most outstanding

aircraft gun of the war, it was also the

most versatile, the same basic mechanism

1

 See Chapter V, above, for discussion of

mortars.
SMALL ARMS 155

serving for infantry, aircraft, tank, or antiaircraft use.2

Unlike the manufacture of artillery

weapons, small arms production did not

require the use of huge dies, presses,

forges, and cranes, for the smaller weapons

consisted of fewer and less complicated

parts and were not equipped with intricate

fire control devices or elaborate recoil

mechanisms. The M1 rifle, for example,

consisted of about seventy parts while an

artillery piece, together with its on-carriage

fire control equipment, consisted of thousands. Nevertheless, mass production of

small arms was an exacting process. Parts

had to be cut and machined to rigid

tolerances. Detailed specifications had to

be met to assure finished weapons that

could fire thousands of rounds with little

deviation in accuracy and could withstand exposure to heat, cold, rain, snow,

mud, and sand. Carrying on a tradition

that began in the days of Eli Whitney,

Ordnance insisted upon complete interchangeability of parts for like models.3

Production of most small arms got under way fairly quickly in 1940-42 because

the basic designs had been worked out

and standardized long before the outbreak of hostilities, and manufacturing

techniques had been well developed. Some

standard weapons of 1940-42 were, in

fact, essentially World War I designs that

had stood the test of time. Among the

most widely used of the older weapons

were the 1903 Springfield rifle, the 1918

Browning automatic rifle (BAR), and the

.45-caliber automatic pistol adopted in

1911. Four basic infantry weapons were

comparatively new—the M1 rifle, the carbine, the M3 submachine gun, and the

Thompson submachine gun. The last, a

modified version of a commercially produced weapon, had won acceptance by

the Navy in 1928, been adopted by the

Army four years later as a limited procurement item, and in 1938 been classed as

a standard Army weapon. The more easily

mass produced M3 submachine gun supplanted the Thompson as a production

item in 1944. The semiautomatic M1 rifle

had been adopted in 1936 and put into

small-scale production at Springfield Armory the following year. A lightweight carbine, adopted in record time, went into

production in 194I.4

Aid to Britain in 1940

Although Ordnance research and development had brought forth a number of

improved models during the two peacetime decades, the meager funds available

in those years had not permitted quantity

production. Nor had there been any sense

of urgency for small arms procurement.

2

 (1) Record of Army Ordnance Research and

Development, vol. 2, Jan 46, R&D Serv, OCO,

OHF; (a) Lt. Col. George M. Chinn, The Machine Gun, vol. I (Washington, 1951), p. 334;

(3) Lt. Col. William C. Farmer, ed., Ordnance

Field Guide, vol. II (Harrisburg: Military Service

Publishing Company, 1946), p. 110, (4) Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, p. 178; (5) PSP 36, U.S. Machine Guns,

Calibers .30 and .50, 1940-45, 18 Feb 46, compiled by Lt Col Emanual Schugar, Maj Berkeley

R. Lewis, and William H. Davis, pp. 10-14 (6) ;

Catalog of Standard Ord Items—Small Arms, 1

Mar 44, pp. 402-04. 3

 Lecture, Maj James L. Hatcher, Ordnance

Production Difficulties and Their Solution, 20

Feb 39, ICAF. This lecture is quoted extensively

in "Armament Production," Army Ordnance,

XXI, No. 123 (November-December), 221-24. 4

 For the research and development background on small arms, see Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 175-78,

and Record of Army Ordnance Research and Development, vol. 2, bks. 1 and 3. For the carbine,

see History of Small Arms Matériel U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30, prepared by Maj H. P. Smith and

William H. Davis under the direction of Lt Col

H. H. Mitchell (1945) OHF.
156 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

After World War I, some three million

rifles plus large quantities of pistols and

machine guns had been reconditioned and

put in storage along with machinery for

their manufacture. These reserve stocks

were considered more than adequate to

meet replacement needs of the small

peacetime Army and to equip a larger

force in time of emergency. Though reserves of aircraft machine guns were virtually nonexistent, this fact caused little concern because the air arm possessed few

planes and both Springfield Armory and

Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company were

producing enough for peacetime needs.

This complacent view was rudely shaken

in the summer of 1940 as the British Army

suffered its Dunkerque and both Belgium

and France fell to the Germans. To bolster

the hard-pressed British forces, President

Roosevelt decided to transfer to them all

weapons and ammunition that might be

considered surplus to the needs of United

States forces.5 As a result, during the summer of 1940 the British received about

615,000 Enfield rifles, 25,000 BAR's,

86,000 .30-caliber machine guns, and

20,000 revolvers. Transfer of this matériel

took a big bite out of the U.S. Army's

small arms stockpile, and at the same time

the President's call for 50,000 airplanes

boosted machine gun requirements. Complacency soon gave way to alarm, and

immediate increase in the output of small

arms of all kinds was demanded. But

quantity production could not be achieved

overnight. As with other types of munitions, increased production depended on

expansion of facilities, installation of specialized machine tools, and recruitment

and training of new workers, all of which

took time. It was at this point that the

public began to ask what Ordnance had

done to prepare for such an emergency.

Production Preparedness

While the meager Ordnance budget in

the 1920's and 1930's had barely sufficed

to keep the arsenals open and had not

permitted placing any substantial small

arms orders with private industry, Ordnance had endeavored in other ways to

prepare industry for its wartime task. During the late 1930's and in early 1940 contracts for production studies of small arms

of various types were awarded to several

concerns. Typical of such studies were

those prepared by Remington Arms Company, Inc. on .30-caliber aircraft machine

guns and the new M1 rifle; by Colt's

Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company on .30- and .50-caliber aircraft machine guns; and by the Singer Manufacturing Company and the Nash-Kelvinator

Company on .45-caliber pistols.6 These

studies did not call for actual manufacture

but merely for analysis of ways and means

by which the item could best be produced

should the need arise.7 Growing out of

production studies were detailed descrip5

 See Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. III, and Leighton and

Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, pp. 33-34.

For a summary of the stocks on hand, see Memo,

Brig Gen Richard C. Moore, ACofS G-4, for

CofS 5 Jun 40, sub: Surplus Ord Matériel

. . ., G-4/26057-2. 6

 (1) PSP 76, Design, Development and Procurement of Small Arms, 1917-45, by William H.

Davis, SA Div, Ind Serv, May 45, p. 6; (2) PP

76, Small Arms and Small Arms Ammunition,

Design, Development and Procurement 1917-45,

by Lt Col Calvin H. Goddard, Historical Sec,

Exec Div, Jun 45, p. 52; (3) PSP 36, U.S. Machine Guns, Calibers .30 and .50, Development,

Requirements and Production 1940-45, 18 Feb

46, pp. 70a-72; (4) Hist, Rochester Ord Dist,

vol. I, 1923-42, pp. 46-47. For an explanation of

the term "production study" in Ordnance prewar

planning, see Chapter II. 7

 Ltr, CofOrd to Budget Officer of the WD, 8

Apr 40, OO 111.3/7485.
SMALL ARMS 157

SAGINAW GUN PLANT, Mich., where machinery and equipment installed for operations on

10-caliber machine gun barrels are shown.

tions of manufacture prepared by the arsenals and private industry for all kinds

of small arms. Springfield Armory kept

data of this type for aircraft guns; Rock

Island Arsenal kept a similar file on ground

machine guns.8

Further to prepare industry for emergency production, Ordnance in 1939 and

1940 had placed four educational orders

for small arms—one each for rifles and

machine guns and two for pistols.9 To the

Winchester Repeating Arms Company

had gone an order for five hundred M1

rifles and to Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors Corporation an

order for five hundred .30-caliber machine

guns. Ordnance had placed an order for

five hundred pistols with the Singer Manufacturing Company of Worcester, Mass.,

which had previously completed its production study on this weapon; a similar

order had gone to the Harrington and

Richardson Arms Company of Worcester,

Mass.10 After Pearl Harbor, Winchester

and Saginaw continued to manufacture

their educational order items, but the two

educational orders for pistols, fortunately

far less important weapons than machine

guns or rifles, proved of less direct benefit

8

 Among the important "descriptions of manufacture" were those prepared at Springfield

Armory covering the .30-caliber M2 aircraft machine gun, the .50-caliber M2 machine gun, and

the M1 rifle; those prepared at Rock Island

Arsenal covering the Browning .30-caliber

M1917A1 and M1919A4 ground type machine

guns and their mounts and the BAR, and one

prepared by the Singer Manufacturing Company

for the .45-caliber automatic pistol. PSP 76, p. 7. 9

 The educational orders program is discussed in

Chapter II, above. 1 0 (1) PP 76, pp. 18, 29, 53; (2) PSP 36, U.S.

Machine Guns, Calibers .30 and .50, Development, Requirements and Production, 1940-1945.
158 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

to wartime production. Although Singer

satisfactorily completed the five hundred

pistols called for under its educational

order, Ordnance did not call upon it to

make pistols after 1941, for its facilities

were by then heavily committed to manufacture of artillery directors, which had a

higher priority. Upon completion of the

educational order, Singer transferred all

tools and other material relating to pistol

manufacture to the Ithaca Gun Company,

which turned out large quantities of excellent pistols.11

 The Harrington and

Richardson contract turned out badly. After two extensions in delivery date owing

to management difficulties and changes

in operating personnel the contract was

canceled in June 1942 before a single

finished pistol had been produced.12

Despite Springfield Armory's production

potential, Ordnance had decided to award

an educational order for the Garand rifle

because of the large requirement for rifles

in the Protective Mobilization Plan. In

the spring of 1939 the Infantry listed the

new rifle as the top priority item in the

rearmament program. The million-dollar

contract went to Winchester, was successfully completed, and was soon followed by

large production orders.13

Though not part of Ordnance plans for

production preparedness, foreign orders in

1939-40 helped in a very practical way to

prepare American industry for its wartime

role. After the outbreak of war in Europe

in September 1939, Britain, France, the

Netherlands, China, and other countries

offered contracts to U.S. firms that had

experience in the manufacture of military

weapons or sporting arms. As American

manufacturers were not keenly interested

in munitions production, most such negotiations proceeded slowly during the

winter of 1939-40, and some other complicated arrangements had to be worked

out with the few companies interested in

foreign munitions contracts.14

In December 1939 and early 1940, for

example, both Britain and France placed

substantial orders for Thompson submachine guns with the Auto Ordnance Corporation. This concern owned manufacturing rights for the Thompson gun but had

neither plant nor skilled labor force. Auto

Ordnance therefore subcontracted the

work to the Savage Arms Company of

Utica, N.Y. The weapons thus produced

were the first "Tommy guns" turned out

in the United States since Colt had completed a small order for Auto Ordnance

in 1921-22.15 The Netherlands government meanwhile entered into a similar contract with Defense Supplies Corporation, a

newly organized American firm with exclusive license to manufacture a new submachine gun known as the High Standard.

Like Auto Ordnance, Defense Supplies had

no manufacturing facilities and had to

11

 (1) Hist, New York Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt.

3, Contractor Histories, Fire Contl Div MS, Rpt

by Singer Manufacturing Co., 9 Jul 45, p. 3; (2)

PSP 39, Pistol, Automatic, Cal. .45, M1911A1,

1917 through August 1945, compiled by Annie

J. Gregg and reviewed by John P. Aitchison, 31

Jan 47, OHF, p. 10. 12

 (1) Hist, Boston Ord Dist, vol. I, 1922

Through 1942, pp. 10-11, 67, OHF; (2) PP 76,

Small Arms and Small Arms Ammunition, Design, Development and Procurement 1917-45, p.

29; (3) PSP 39, pp. 9-11. 13

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 58-59. See below for further

discussion of Winchester production. 14

 SA Div, Historical Review of Lend-Lease

Activities—Small Arms and Small Arms Ammunition, 17 Jul 45, OHF. 15

 PSP 40, Submachine Guns, 1921-45, by

William H. Davis and Capt Andrew J. Gleason,

SA Div, Ind Serv, Dec 45, pp. 1-4. In 1944 the

Auto Ordnance Corp. was renamed Maguire

Industries, Inc. Hist, Springfield Ord Dist, vol.

100, pt. 23, Contractor Histories, Maguire Industries, Inc.
SMALL ARMS 159

subcontract the work to the Marlin Firearms Company of New Haven, Conn.

More important than submachine gun

orders was the foreign demand for Browning machine guns. In the fall of 1939,

when the British government turned to

American industry for manufacture of

these weapons, it soon became apparent

that the Colt Company, holder of patent

rights on the Browning guns and their

sole commercial producer, would not be

able to supply all that were needed. The

British government not only arranged to

finance expansion of the Colt plant but

also opened negotiations with three other

firms to produce Browning guns under a

Colt license. During the winter of the

so-called "phony war" these negotiations

moved slowly with each side holding out for

more favorable terms. But the swift German victories of May and June 1940

changed the picture almost overnight.

Agreement was soon reached on construction of three new aircraft machine gun

plants by the Buffalo Arms Corporation,

High Standard Manufacturing Company,

and the Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company.16

For rifles the British turned to the

Savage Arms Corporation, signing a contract with it in March 1941 for manufacture of the standard British rifle, the .303-

caliber Lee-Enfield (No. 4, Mark I) at its

plant, known as the J. Stevens Arms Company Division, near Chicopee Falls, Mass.

Although tooling was rushed and the

company completed its first rifle in July,

quantity production was just getting

started when the Japanese attacked Pearl

Harbor. Meanwhile, in October, the U.S.

Government, under provisions of the LendLease Act, had taken over administration

of the British contract. Additional orders

were placed after Pearl Harbor, and by

June 1944, when the contract was terminated, Savage had produced 1,030,228

rifles, plus spare parts.17

Early in 1941 Britain asked the Remington Arms Company to produce half a

million Lee-Enfields at its Ilion, N.Y.,

plant. At this point General Wesson raised

an objection. He proposed that the reserve

machinery for manufacturing Springfields

be removed from storage at Rock Island

and leased to Remington, and that Remington use it to make .30-caliber Springfields instead of .303-caliber Lee-Enfields

for the British. As the labor situation at

Rock Island was acute, Ordnance opposed

opening the rifle plant there. Further, the

Army had enough rifles on hand to equip

a 2-million-man force, and output of the

new semiautomatic rifle was expected to

add even more to the reserve stocks.18

Wesson pointed out that, starting from

scratch, it would take Remington two and

a half years to get into production on

Lee-Enfield rifles for the British. Using the

Rock Island machinery, production of

Springfields could reach one thousand

per day within one year, and after completion of the British contract this machinery would be in place for supply of

16

 PP 36, U.S. Machine Guns, Calibers .30 and

.50, Development, Requirements and Production

1940-45. Jul 45, OHF. See also History of Small

Arms Materiel, Buffalo Arms Corp., 9 Mar 45,

OHF. 17

 (O Hist, Springfield Ord Dist, Sub-Office

Admin Div. I (1942) sec. on Savage Sub-Office;

(2) Hist, Springfield Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 3. 18

 (1) Memo, Col Vincent Meyer. WDGS G-4

for ASW, 10 Oct 40, sub: Advisability of Opening up the Springfield Rifle Plant . . . ; (2)

Memo, Lt Col Willis R. Slaughter, OASW for

Col Spaulding, 16 Oct 40, same sub; (3) Memo.

CofOrd for ASW, 19 Oct 40, sub: Prod of U.S.

Rifle, Caliber .30, M1903; (4) Memo, SW for

CofS, 23 Oct 40, sub: Advisability of Opening

. . . Rifle Plant. ... All in folder 474 Small

Arms, ASF Prod Div files. See also G-4 files

32116.
160 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the U.S. Army if needed. The British were

not at all enthusiastic about this proposal,

insisting that they wanted only rifles of

.303-caliber. But they finally conceded the

point after a delay of several months and

accepted Wesson's plan. The rental agreement was signed early in 1941, just a few

days before passage of the Lend-Lease Act

under which the Army was later to take

over all British rifle procurement in the

United States. The machinery was quickly

shipped to Ilion where manufacturing got

under way in less than a year, and continued until 28 February 1944.19

Manufacturing capacity created to fill

foreign orders was an important resource

when the United States began to rearm in

earnest during 1941. But of greater value

were the two Ordnance arsenals, Springfield and Rock Island, experienced in the

manufacture of small arms. Though badly

in need of new machine tools, and staffed

with only a nucleus of skilled workmen,

these two arsenals stood ready not only to

expand their own output as needed but

also to share with civilian industry their

technical knowledge and their war reserve

machinery. Springfield Armory, the traditional center for military rifle production,

had begun as early as 1937 to tool up for

production of the new Garand rifle, and

as public interest in rearmament grew in

1940 and early 1941 its progress was

closely watched.

Getting the Garand into Production

Despite a rather long period of preparation, mass production of the Garand rifle

proved to be far more difficult than anyone anticipated. In part, the difficulty

sprang from the usual problems encountered in beginning quantity production of

a new weapon. But in the case of the

Garand, run-of-the-mill difficulties were

compounded by a violent public controversy touched off when the competing

Johnson rifle was submitted for Army test

in 1938, two years after standardization of

the Garand and while tooling up for its

manufacture was under way at Springfield Armory. Throughout most of the

defense period (1939-41) debate raged in

the halls of Congress and in magazines and

newspapers across the nation over the

merits of these two weapons, and before

the controversy subsided a third semiautomatic model had entered the picture.

Some critics meanwhile contended that the

old, mechanically reliable Springfield was

superior to any of the semiautomatics;

others expressed doubts that the Garand

could ever be successfully mass-produced.

Probably no other weapon in American

history went into production amid such

intense controversy.20

Officially designated "Rifle, semiautomatic, cal. .30, M1," the new weapon was

universally known either as "the Garand"

or "the M1." The product of a 35-year

search, it was gas-operated, weighed about

19

 (1) Statement by Wesson in Review of Production Plans of Small Arms Division, 20 Feb

42, T676A, pp. 38-39; (2) Hist, Rochester Ord

Dist, vol. 100, pt. 9, Ilion Works; (3) In Abundance and On Time, 1939-43, published by

Remington Arms Co., Bridgeport, Conn., 1944;

(4) Lt. Col. H. H. Mitchell, Hist, Small Arms

Materiel, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1903 [1945], SA

Br, Ind Div, OCO, p. 23; (5) PP 76. 20

 The most complete published account of the

development of the Garand is made by Maj. Gen.

Julian S. Hatcher, The Book of the Garand

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948). See

also Green. Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 175-77; Maj. Guy H.

Drewry, "Our New Service Rifle," The American

Rifleman, vol. 86, No. 8 (Aug 1938), pp. 5-9,

and manuscript History of Springfield Armory by

Constance McLaughlin Green, vol. II, bk. I, pp.

43-48 and 74-76.
SMALL ARMS 161

JOHN C. GARAND at work in his model

shop, September 1940.

nine and a half pounds, and was loaded

by an 8-round clip. It could fire more than

twice as fast as the Springfield. With it

a soldier could fire eight aimed shots

without taking his eye off the target, for

all he needed to do was squeeze the trigger

for each shot.21 Designed by John C.

Garand, chief civilian engineer at Springfield, it was subjected to grueling service

tests by both the Infantry and the Cavalry

before being adopted in January 1936.

Garand received no monetary reward for

his invention beyond his modest Armory

salary—though a bill to grant him

$100,000 was introduced in Congress—

but he was the recipient of numerous

medals. In 1941 the Army Ordnance Association honored him with its first Brig.

Gen. John H. Rice Gold Medal for Meritorious Service in Armament Engineering.

Three years later Garand received an

official government award, the Medal for

Merit.22

Tooling at Springfield

As soon as the Garand was adopted,

Springfield began preparations for producing it in quantity, but at that time the

Armory was at low ebb, having lived on a

hand-to-mouth basis since the end of

World War I. A small cadre of skilled

workers remained, engaged for the most

part in turning out each year a few improved Springfield rifles and rifle parts.

Most of the machine tools on hand had

been in use for twenty or thirty years,

and some even antedated the Civil War.

Surveying these tools to determine which

could be used in producing parts for the

new rifle was in itself a major undertaking.

Preparing manufacturing drawings, planning production line processes, and designing and making new tools, jigs, fixtures, and

21

 A semiautomatic weapon differs from a fully

automatic weapon in that the former requires a

separate squeeze of the trigger for each shot while

the latter fires until the magazine is empty as

long as the trigger is held down. 22

 (1) "Army Ordnance Medalists, 1941," Army

Ordnance, XXII, No. 127 (July-August 1941),

30-31; (2) New York Times, March 29, 1944,

p. 22; (3) PSP 37, U.S. Rifle, Cal. .30 M1, Design, Development, Procurement, and Production,

by William H. Davis, Jul 46, OHF; (4) Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, pp. 175-77; (5) Philip B. Sharpe, The

Rifle in America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls

Company, 1953), pp. 513-31; (6) Hatcher, The

Book of the Garand; (7) Melvin M. Johnson,

Jr., Rifles and Machine Guns (New York: W.

Morrow and Company, 1944), pp. 40-45; (8)

Walter H. B. Smith, Small Arms of the World

(Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing

Company, 1955), pp. 154-57; (9) "Garand's

Gun," Newsweek, December 4, 1939, pp. 18-19;

(10) Edwin Teale, "He Invented the World's

Deadliest Rifle," Popular Science, December 1940,

pp. 68-71; (11 ) Joseph W. Shields, Jr., From

Flintlock to M1 (New York: Coward-McCann,
162 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

gages were all equally time-consuming.23

In 1934 the Armory model shop had

completed an order for eighty experimental

Garands, but tooling up for quantity production was an entirely different matter.

When work began in the fall of 1937 on

an order for 1,500 rifles it soon became

clear that many of the old machines that

appeared to be in good condition had lost,

through long use, the accuracy needed to

meet close tolerances. It soon became clear

also that an entirely new system of production would be required to achieve highspeed output. Determined that the new

rifle should be manufactured by the most

modern methods to attain a high rate of

production with a saving of manpower,

space, and operating cost, Ordnance

launched a major retooling program at

Springfield in the spring of 1938.24 Tooling

engineers from all over the country were

invited to aid in design of modern production equipment and to submit bids for its

manufacture. Coming at a time when the

machine-tool industry was in financial doldrums, this invitation met with a ready

response. After detailed study of each rifle

part, and consultation with machine tool

builders, machining operations were substantially reduced. Many of the machine

tools and much of the accessory equipment

on hand at Springfield could be used in

the modernized production setup, but the

quantity of new equipment needed was

substantial.

When Congress in 1938 appropriated

$1,800,000 for retooling, Ordnance anticipated the project would be completed by

the end of the following year and would

boost production from ten thousand to fifty

thousand rifles per year.25 This sum supplemented approximately one million dollars that had already been expended at

Springfield for new equipment and gages,

primarily for the M1 rifle, since 1935.26

As the years from 1935 on had brought a

gradual upswing in all activities at the

Armory, Ordnance decided to modernize,

to the extent of funds available, the whole

Springfield manufacturing plant during

the process of tooling up for output of the

new rifle.27 While no new buildings were

erected at the Armory before 1940, many

improvements such as better wiring, new

floors, and strengthening of supports as

well as the shifting of existing machinery

were required to house the new rifleproducing equipment and reorganize the

production line. Some of the buildings at

the Armory were positively archaic.

The first production models of the M1

rifle came off the line in September 1937

1954) PP. 172-81; (12 ) Who's Who in America,

1956-57.

23

 (1) Lecture, Hatcher, 20 Feb 39; (2)

"1,000 Garands a Day" in armament section of

American Machinist, vol. 84, November 27, 1940.

24

 (1) Lecture, Hatcher, 20 Feb 39; (2) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team, p. 192; (3)

Lt. Col. .H. H. Mitchell, Hist of Small Arms

Materiel, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1, 12 Dec 44, pp.

10-11; (4) PSP 37, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1,

History of Design, Development, Procurement,

and Production, 1936-45, pp. 52-55; (5) Hist,

Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk. 1, p. 64; (6) Col.

Gilbert H. Stewart, "Springfield Armory Tools Up

for New Semi-Automatic Rifles," Machinery, vol.

45, No. 5 (July 1939). 25

 (1) Statement by Craig, Hearings, WDAB,

FY 1940, H.R., 76th Cong., 1st sess., 26 Jan 39,

p. 6; (2) Statement by Wesson before House

Subcomm. on same bill, 1 Feb 39, pp. 396-97 of

the Hearings; (3) Ltr, Wesson to CO Springfield

Armory, 16 Dec 38, sub: Spec Authority for Proc

of Caliber .30 M1 Rifle Equipment, copy appended to Mitchell, Hist SA Materiel, U.S. Rifle

Cal. .30 M1, 12 Dec 44; (4) Memo, Col W. L.

Clay, OCO to Col Haislip, WD Budget and

Legislative Plng Br, 28 Jan 39, OO 111.3/6954. 26

 PSP 37, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1, Hist of Design, Development, Proc and Prod, 1936-45, p.

55.

27

 Ltr, Wesson, CofOrd, to Hon. Charles R.

Clason, H.R., 7 May 40, OO 474.2/2960.
SMALL ARMS 163

at a rate of about 10 per day. By the time

the first order for 1,500 was completed the

following March, daily output stood at 20,

and work was started on a second slightly

larger order. Boosted to 40 in September

1938, daily output gradually continued to

rise as new tools and equipment were inStalled and new orders were received,

reaching a rate of 100 per day one year

later and 200 per day or 50,000 per year

in January 1940.28 But future requirements had also risen in the fall of 1939.

Against a need for 150,000 new rifles

during the next two years, Springfield could

produce only about 100,000 if it continued on an 8-hour day. Under these

circumstances General Wesson decided

that the Armory should be kept on an 8-

hour day and that additional rifles should

be obtained from private industry. He

reasoned that this plan would keep extrashift reserve capacity at the Armory for an

emergency and would enable industry to

tool up for rifle production.

When Ordnance called for bids in the

summer of 1939, two famous gunmaking

concerns, Remington and Winchester, responded. Each submitted a bid based on

the assumption that it would furnish all

necessary tools and equipment. Winchester

not only turned in the lower bid on this

basis but also submitted an alternate bid

—$1 million less—assuming use of tools

and equipment being procured under its

educational order. On the basis of this

latter proposal, Winchester received a contract for 65,000 Garand rifles to be completed by June 1942. As the million dollar

reduction in the second Winchester bid

was approximately equal to the cost to the

government of the educational order,

there was no saving in money but there

was a full year's reduction in the time

required for tooling up.29

Production Troubles

In the fall of 1939, just as the contract

with Winchester was being signed, the

Garand rifle made its public debut and at

once ran into a storm of criticism, much of

it related to the troubles experienced with

the first production models of the new

rifle. While the first eighty toolroom

models, made in 1934 under the designer's

direct supervision, had performed superbly, the first production models were

plagued by several new and unexpected

minor troubles. The cam on the operating

rod tended to stick, and the rear sights

would not hold their adjustment. Another

puzzling defect was that the seventh round

in the clip often failed to feed, and frequently the 8-round clip jumped out of the

gun after the seventh round had been

fired. Eventually it was found that very

28

 For details on output during these years, see

(1) Memo, Lt Col Guy H. Drewry to Chief of

Ind Div, 25 Sep 39, sub: Status of M1 Rifle

Prod, ex. 20, Mitchell, Hist of SA Matériel, U.S.

Rifle Cal. .30 M1, Jul 46; (2) Memo, Capt

William T. Moore to CofOrd through Chief of

Ind Serv, 9 Mar 40, sub: Costs—Caliber .30 M1

Rifles, Spare Parts and Accessories, ex. 21 to

above study; (3) William H. Davis, Springfield

Armory, Pertinent Data Concerning Plant and

Activities 1794—Feb 1946, SA Div, Ind Serv,

OCO, 7 Mar 46, p. 2. For a popular version, see

Donald Wilhelm, "What 'On Order' Means,"

Reader's Digest, October 1940, pp. 33-36. 29

 For details on the placing of this production

order and the benefits gained from the educational order, see: (1) Memo, Lt Col Drewry to

Chief Ind Serv, 24 Aug 39, sub: Bids on Cir

Proposal 852-39-483, M1 Rifles, Extra Parts &

Combination Tools, ex. 23, Mitchell, Hist SA

Materiel, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1, 12 Dec 44, SA

Br, Ind Div; (2) Lecture, Wesson, Ordnance

Department Procurement, 15 Jan 40, ICAF, p.

6; (3) Harold F. Williamson, Winchester—The

Gun That Won the West (Washington: Combat

Forces Press, 1952), pp. 385-88; (4) Statements

by Col Rutherford and Wesson, WDAB, 1941,

H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., 27 Feb 40 and 12 Mar

40.
164 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

few of these defects were inherent in the

design of the rifle. Nearly all stemmed from

the fact that during retooling for mass

production slight changes had been introduced in the shape and dimensions of some

of the parts. Perhaps, one Ordnance officer

later suggested, many of these troubles

might have been avoided if Garand, a

topflight machine-tool designer as well as

designer of the rifle, had been consulted

more closely during the retooling program.

But other Ordnance officers challenged

this view; they asserted that no liberties

were taken with the design and that every

engineering change made at the Armory

had Garand's approval.30

The Infantry, well aware of these

troubles with the production models, was

not alarmed, for it accepted the Ordnance

Department's assurance that the defects

could and would be corrected. But the

general public was kept in the dark regarding the troubles experienced with the rifle

and the progress made in remedying them.

So was the staff of the National Rifle Association, an organization that numbered

its members in the hundreds of thousands

and for almost half a century had been

recognized as a quasi-governmental institution devoted to the promotion of small

arms shooting as a part of the national

defense. Had the NRA been kept fully and

frankly informed, it might have provided

constructive criticism and powerful support of any decisions reached by the Army.

Details of the construction and operation of the Garand had first been given

to the public in the fall of 1938 with no

hint of unusual production or performance

difficulties.31 The first public demonstration came one year later when two hundred Garand rifles were sent to Camp

Perry, Ohio, for use in the small arms

firing school for civilians held in conjunction with the National Rifle Matches. The

performance of these rifles immediately

raised doubts. The expert rifle shots who

had assembled for the annual marksmanship contest were accustomed to using the

National Match Rifle, an improved Springfield made with extra care and painstakingly adjusted for the best results in longrange shooting. To these experts the

Garand rifles did not appeal, for the

Garands were battle rifles, not target

models. Their sights gave good visibility

under poor lighting conditions, but did

not make for high scores at long ranges

under match conditions. Even more disturbing to the sharpshooters was the fact

that the Garand sights would not hold

their adjustment.32 Ordnance was well

aware of this problem and had in production at Springfield an improved gas cylinder assembly to correct it, but the public

was not informed. Although civilians at

Camp Perry were invited to test fire the

new rifles they had a vague suspicion that

everything was not above board. "There

was always an Army man at the shooter's

elbow," wrote one observer, "ready to

snatch the rifle away and perform some

sleight of hand at the slightest sign of a

malfunction. Moreover, the members of the

NRA staff, to their surprise, found that

30

 (1) Hatcher, Book of the Garand, p. 120;

(2) Comments on draft manuscript of this chapter by Maj Gen Elbert L. Ford (Ret.) and Maj

Gen James Kirk, (Ret.), 18 Apr 57, OHF; (3)

Lecture, Hatcher, Ordnance Production Difficulties and Their Solution, 20 Feb 39, ICAF. 31

 (1) Drewry, "Our New Service Rifle," The

American Rifleman, vol. 86, No. 8 (August

1938), pp. 5-9; (2) Capt. Frank J. Jervey, "The

New Semiautomatic Rifle," Army Ordnance, XIX,

No. 111 (November-December 1938), 144-47. 32

 See testimony by Maj Gen Milton A. Reckord, CG 29th Div, National Guard, before

WDAB, H.R., 76th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 783-86,

14 Mar 40.
SMALL ARMS 165

they were unwelcome whenever they

approached a Garand or wanted to fire

it."33

The Garand-Johnson Controversy

This official protective attitude toward

the Garand was doubly suspicious in view

of the fact that Capt. Melvin M. Johnson,

Jr., USMC Reserve, had recently brought

forth a rival semiautomatic. The Army

had tested toolroom models of the Johnson

rifle in the summer of 1938 and, following redesign, again in December 1939.34

It. operated on the short-recoil principle

and was designed so that its barrel could

be quickly replaced in the field. The

mechanical performance of the Johnson

rifle was satisfactory, but in February 1940

the Ordnance Committee recommended

that it be given no further consideration

because it was not superior to the Garand

for which Springfield Armory was already

tooled.35 This action, coupled with the

bad impression made by the Garand at the

1939 rifle matches, set off the fireworks.

The Washington Evening Star ran a series

of three articles in February 1940 under

the heading "Battle Efficiency of Garand

Rifle Provokes Controversy." The Associated Press reported in March that the

House military appropriations subcommittee was giving the rifle controversy "exhaustive study behind closed doors."

 36

After failing to get answers from the

Army to its questions about the Garand,

or rifles for test, the NRA published an

editorial in the April 1940 issue of

The American Rifleman expressing grave

doubts about the new weapon and its slow

rate of production.37 The editorial also

questioned the Army's decision to drop its

172-grain bullet in favor of the shorter

range 152-grain bullet. The NRA urged

the Army to lay all the facts on the table

and clear up the whole rifle issue.

The flames of controversy were fanned

higher in May 1940 when The American

Rifleman published a long article by one

of its staff members who had obtained a

Garand for personal test. Though generally favorable to the Garand, the article

pointed out shortcomings and cited the

low production rate and the change in

ammunition.38 This article, together with

testimony being presented to Congressional

committees, inspired a series of newspaper

and magazine articles on the subject. Life

called it "one of the greatest military

squabbles in U.S. history."

 39

During lengthy committee hearings

Congressmen listened to conflicting testimony and found themselves as confused

as the general public.40 It seemed for a

time in the spring of 1940 that appropriations for the Garand rifle might be stopped

33

 Hatcher, Book of the Garand, p. 129. General Hatcher was chief of the Small Arms Division, Manufacturing Service, OCO, during the

early 1930's. His brother was Ordnance adviser at

the national matches in 1939. 34

 (1) Ltr, ASW to Congressman Clyde L.

Herring, 16 May 40, OO 474.2/2996; (2) Wesson's testimony on these tests in Hearings, H.R.

WDAB, 1940, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1 Feb 39.

pp. 401-22. See also annual reports of Johnson

Automatics, Inc., and other related material on

Johnson rifles and light machine guns in folder

Johnson Automatics, Incorporated, OHF. 35

 OCM 15650, 23 Feb 40. 36

 Associated Press dispatch, March 22, 1940. 37

 "The Courage to be Frank," The American

Rifleman, vol. 88, No. 4 (April 1940), p. 4. 38

 F. C. Ness, "M-1 (Garand Semi-automatic)

Rifle," The American Rifleman, vol. 88, No. 5

(May 1940), 43-45. An article by the same author on the Johnson rifle had appeared in the

same magazine in November 1938. 39

 Life, November 18, 1940, pp. 55-56. 40

 Hearings WDAB, 1940 and 1941, H.R. and

S., 76th Cong., 1st and 3d sess. See also Hearings

on S. 3983, 76th Cong., 3d sess.. 14 May 40.

Excerpts from these sources are in OHF.
166 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

entirely and all the time and money spent

in tooling up for its production might be

wasted. The Army's claim that the Garand was an excellent weapon and the best

semiautomatic available was hotly disputed

before the Congressional committees by

proponents of the Johnson rifle who insisted their weapon was more accurate, was

less complicated in design, easier to maintain in the field, and much simpler to

manufacture. They also charged that the

tests had not been conducted fairly.41

Ordnance replied that, as the Johnson

rifle had never been produced in quantity,

nor tested on a large scale, there was no

real evidence that it would function better

or could be produced more easily than the

Garand. Long experience in weapons manufacture had taught Ordnance that unforeseen difficulties nearly always appear

between the test of toolroom models and

large-scale production, and that estimates

of the time required to produce new

weapons in quantity were seldom fulfilled.42

 Meanwhile, a member of the U.S.

Senate introduced a bill to force adoption

of the Johnson as the standard rifle for

the Army and Navy.43

In defending the decision to drop longrange ammunition and produce only

shorter-range types for all .30-caliber machine guns and rifles, military spokesmen

cited the Infantry Board's findings that

the more powerful ammunition was not

required for combat, and that it was

dangerous to use in training because suitable target ranges could seldom be found

that would protect neighboring communities. Adoption of the lower-powered ammunition for machine guns was defended

on the ground that the 81-mm. mortar

eliminated the need for long-range machine gun fire; that the new ammunition

would permit longer life of barrels and

parts and the searching of more area on

the reverse sides of slopes; and that use of

one type of .30-caliber ball ammunition

would simplify manufacture.44 The only

real reason for the change, said the critics,

was the heavy recoil when long-range

ammunition was used in the Garand. Was

it wise, they asked, to give up long-range

ammunition to accommodate a weapon

whose performance was doubtful in

other respects?

In April and May 1940 the House and

Senate committees approved funds for

manufacture of twenty five thousand more

Garands. Though the Congressmen were

not altogether sure that the Garand was

better than the Johnson, they agreed with

the Army that, as Springfield was being

tooled for the Garand, it would be unwise

to launch production of a second weapon.

Meanwhile the Marine Corps held off replacing its Springfields with either Johnsons

or Garands, and the rifle controversy

stayed very much alive all summer. Late

in the year the Marines announced they

41

 As examples, see statement of Melvin M.

Johnson, Sr., 13 May 40, before WDAB, 1941,

S., copy in OHF. 42

 For statement of Army views see Memo,

ASW to SW, 30 Aug 40, OO 474.2/149, and

Memo, Marshall for SW, 23 Apr 40, Hearings,

S. Mil Affairs Comm., 76th Cong., 3d sess., 29

May 40, pp. 82-85. See also Johnson's dispassionate summary in Rifles and Machine Guns,

pp. 40-45. 43

 Hearings on S. 3983, 76th Cong., 3d sess.,

14 May 40. 44

 (1) "The Garand Rifle," Army Ordnance,

XXI, No. 121 (July-August 1940), 52-57; (2)

Hearings, WDAB, 1941, H.R. 76th Cong., 3d

sess.; (3) Hatcher, Book of the Garand, pp. 125-

27; (4) Ltr, McFarland to Congressman Walter

G. Andrews, 10 May 40, OO 474.2/2982; (5)

Memo, Gen Marshall for SW, 23 Apr 40, sub:

Investigation of Gen Staff Concerning M1 Semiautomatic Rifle (Garand), copy in Hearings, S.

Mil Affairs Comm., 76th Cong., 3d sess., On

Johnson Semiautomatic Rifle, S.3983, 29 May

1940, pp. 82-85.
SMALL ARMS 167

would conduct exhaustive tests of the

Springfield, Garand, and Johnson, along

with a third semiautomatic recently designed by Winchester. Held by an organization that had no bias in favor of the

Garand such as had been imputed to

Ordnance, these tests commanded widespread interest and respect. The final

report placed the Garand first among the

semiautomatics; though no more accurate

than the Johnson, it had proved itself

more rugged and more reliable in operation. The old reliable Springfield led the

field in accuracy, ruggedness, and dependability, but it simply could not pour out

lead as fast as the semiautomatics. The

Winchester gun proved too susceptible to

breakdown to be a serious contender in

the competition. With release of this report and adoption of the Garand by the

Marine Corps, public criticism of the new

rifle subsided. Meanwhile Ordnance remedied the defects in the early production

models, and output of Garands rose

rapidly as the long slow process of tooling

up neared completion. As the emergency

deepened, Springfield and Winchester were

soon working around the clock; by mid1941 Winchester was turning out over one

hundred rifles per day, the Armory one

thousand.45

Improved techniques helped speed production and saved both time and scarce

materials. For barrel manufacture, Springfield abandoned its practice of buying

round bar stock of uniform diameter and

substituted forged barrel blanks tapered

toward one end. Time on the turning

lathe machine for each barrel was cut in

half. Cutting the rifling by broaches also

saved time and yielded a better product.46

The introduction of tumbling as early as

1940 to supplant burring and filing of

several small components was another production short cut that grew in importance

during the war. As they came from the

machines, small parts were put in a mixture of light abrasive and oil or water in

used beer kegs obtained from the local

brewery. The kegs were then rotated gently

until the parts were worn smooth and

could be rinsed clean with hot water.47

All these short cuts were important, for

the Garand was not an easy gun to make.

It consisted of some seventy parts and

required nearly one thousand machining

operations.48

As a result of all these efforts, U.S.

troops entered World War II with semiautomatic rifles that gave them a decided

advantage over their enemies. No other

major power equipped its soldiers with a

really good semiautomatic rifle. The Rus45

 Report of Board to Conduct Competitive Test

with Caliber .30 Rifles Held at Marine Corps

Base, San Diego, Calif., 12 Nov 40-21 Dec 40,

dtd 15 Jan 41, prepared by Hq Fleet Marine

Force, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif.,

OKD 474.1/27.1. The report of the Marine

Corps board is also quoted in detail in Hatcher,

Book of the Garand, pages 141-52. For further

comments on the test, see (1) Mitchell, Hist of

Small Arms Materiel, U.S. Rifle Cal. .30 M1, 12

Dec 44, p. 14; (2) Robert McCormick, "What

Have We Got for Guns," Collier's, May 3, 1941,

pp. 14-15; (3) "Report on the Garand," Time,

March 12, 1941, pp. 20-21; (4) Smith, Small

Arms of the World, p. 157; (5) Sharpe, op. cit.,

pp. 503-12. On production, see Hist, Springfield

Armory, vol. II, bk. II, pp. 95-96 and chart

following p. 145; Davis, PSP 37, U.S. Rifle Cal.

.30, Jul 45, p. 66, OHF. 46

 "Rifling Machine-Gun Barrels by Broaching,"

Machinery, vol. 49, No. 2 (October 1942), 157-

59.

47

 Hist, Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk. II

(1939-41)) PP. 86-105. For a description of

older manufacturing techniques,., see Col. Gilbert

H. Stewart, "Springfield Armory Tools up for

New Semi-Automatic Rifles," Machinery, vol. 45,

No. 5 (July 1939). 48

 Brig. Gen. James Kirk, "Machining the

Garand Rifle," Iron Age, vol. 151, No.1 9 (May

13, 1943), 66-71.
168 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

sians used the M1940 Tokarev rifle extensively but abandoned it because of its

many inherent defects. During the war the

Germans produced a few semiautomatics

but they were never very effective and

did not reach the battlefield in significant

numbers. The standard German rifle at

the end of the war was still a bolt-action

piece. The only reasonably satisfactory Japanese semiautomatic in World War II was

an imitation of the Garand.49

The Carbine Enters the Picture

One of the most popular items of ordnance used by American troops in World

War II was the lightweight carbine. Designed to replace the automatic pistol

for certain purposes, it was intended primarily as a defensive weapon for service

troops; but it also appealed to combat infantrymen as a companion weapon for the

more powerful Garand, and was affectionately nicknamed "baby Garand." Fully

loaded with a 15-cartridge magazine and

with sling attached, it weighed less than

six pounds and was about three feet long.

It was fairly accurate at ranges up to

three hundred yards—at least four times

the effective range of the pistol. A gasoperated, semiautomatic weapon, the carbine followed some of the design principles

of the Garand, but with certain distinctive

features.

Selecting the Best Design

By definition, a carbine is a light rifle

with a short barrel, commonly used during

the nineteenth century by mounted troops.

Early in the twentieth century, carbines

passed out of the picture in the United

States as the Springfield rifle, adopted in

1903, proved satisfactory for both mounted

and foot troops. But by the 1940's, aircraft, tanks, and new infantry weapons

had brought about marked changes in

military tactics. Cavalry was no longer as

important as it had been, but new elements

with even greater mobility had come on

the scene with the result that flanks and

rear areas, including airfields, were under

constant threat of air or mechanized attack. At the same time, the addition to

small infantry units of such weapons as

machine guns, trench mortars, and antitank guns brought the need for an auxiliary offensive-defensive weapon for the

soldiers who manned them or carried ammunition for them. The pistol was ideal

for combat at point-blank range. It was

issued to officers, to troops manning crewserved weapons, and to rear area service

troops, but few soldiers could hit anything

with it beyond twenty-five yards. As a

full-size rifle was unnecessarily heavy for

such troops, the carbine seemed to be the

answer.50

The Infantry, as early as 1938, had

asked that Ordnance develop a .30-caliber

carbine weighing five pounds or less, and

with an accuracy range of three hundred

yards. Ordnance objected on the ground

49

 (1) DA Pamphlet 30-50-1, Handbook on

The Soviet and Satellite Armies, pt. I—The

Soviet Army, Mar 53, p. 96; (2) Biennial Rpt of

the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to SW, Jul

1, 43-Jun 30, 45, pp. 97-98; (3) Shields, From

Flintlock to M1, p. 172; (4) Smith, Small Arms

of the World, pp. 153, 157-58; (5) PSP 83,

Small Arms Development in World War II, Jul

47, by R&D Div, p. 4. 50

 History of Small Arms Matériel, U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30, prepared by Maj. H. P. Smith and

William H. Davis under the direction of Mitchell

[1945]. This manuscript study, prepared in the

Small Arms Branch of the Industrial Service, is

the best account of carbine development and

production. See also Brig. Gen. James Kirk,

"Manufacturing the Light Carbine," Iron Age,

vol. 151, No. 14 (April 8, 1943), 47-52.
SMALL ARMS 169

that such a weapon would require special

ammunition. But the Infantry pressed its

demand, and in the fall of 1940 a definite

requirement was set up for a weapon of

this type.51 Thereafter events moved with

bewildering speed. Ordnance requested

Winchester, which had extensive experience with ammunition for semiautomatic

weapons, to undertake design of a cartridge for the proposed carbine. Modeled

on an existing Winchester .32-caliber cartridge, the new carbine ammunition was

submitted in November 1940, found satisfactory, and approved for production in

small experimental lots.52

Meanwhile Ordnance had sent a circular to gun manufacturers and designers

throughout the country inviting submission

of model weapons for preliminary engineering tests. Of the nine models presented for

trial in the summer of 1941, three did not

meet the general specifications and were

withdrawn, leaving six models actually

tested. Though all showed promise, none

was entirely satisfactory. As a result of the

tests, the Ordnance Committee dropped

the requirement for full-automatic fire,

deciding that the proposed carbine should

be strictly semiautomatic. Two of the guns

tested showed such promise that five toolroom models of each, embodying the improvements recommended after the tests,

were ordered. One was the Bendix Aviation

Corporation entry designed by George J.

Hyde; the other was the Springfield

Armory entry designed by John C. Garand.

In August 1940, Hyde had become associated with the Inland Manufacturing Division of General Motors Corporation, and

had constructed there the toolroom models

of his design. At the same time, Inland

signed a contract for preparation of production studies of both the Hyde and Garand models.53

Since none of the models tested in May

and June proved satisfactory, Ordnance

extended the deadline until 15 September

1941, the date set for the final service tests.

It urged inventors to improve and resubmit their guns, and invited designers

who had not yet entered the contest to do

so. In July 1941 Ordnance, impressed by

an improved version of Winchester's semiautomatic rifle, asked Winchester to build

a sample carbine of similar design. Fully

occupied with production of the M1

rifle and other development work, Winchester had not submitted a carbine for

the earlier tests. But in just fourteen days

after accepting Ordnance's invitation to

construct a carbine, Winchester completed

a handmade first model. Though not a

finished product, it passed its preliminary

tests at Aberdeen on 11 August 1941.

There remained only thirty-four days for

Winchester to perfect its design and complete an improved specimen for entry in

the general service tests set for 15 September. After intensive day and night work

51

 (1) Record of Army Ordnance Research and

Development, vol. 2, Small Arms and Small Arms

Ammunition, bk. I, ch. 2, Jan 46, OHF; (2)

Design, Development and Production of Carbine,

Cal. .30, Jan 45, by OCO, p. 1, OHF; (3) Ltr,

CofInf to CofOrd, 25 Mar 38, sub: Weapons

and Ammo Carriers, OO 474/3991; (4) Ltr, CofInf to TAG thru CofOrd, 16 Sep 38, sub: Light

Weapons for Ammo Carriers, OO 474/4246; (5)

Ltr, CofInf to TAG, 15 Jun 40, sub: Carbine for

Infantry Soldiers, with Indorsements 1 through

7, OO 474.5/120. 52

 (1) Hist of Small Arms Matériel, U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30, 1945; (2) Design, Development,

and Prod of Carbine, Cal. .30, Jan 45; (3)

Sharpe, op. cit., pp. 532-44. 53

 (1) Hist of Small Arms Matériel, U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30, pp. 6-7; (2) Hist, Cincinnati Ord

Dist, vol. I, pt. 2, 1922-42, pp. 23-26; (3) Hist,

Cincinnati Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 2, Contractor

Histories—Inland Div of General Motors Corp.
170 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

that set a new record for weapon development, Winchester met the deadline.54

All told, six models were entered in the

September tests, including one each of the

two designs that had earlier showed such

promise that Ordnance had ordered toolroom models. The Winchester carbine outperformed them all. On 30 September

1941, exactly one year after Ordnance had

first announced that a carbine was desired by the Army and only two months

after Winchester had started work on its

design, the Ordnance Committee recommended standardization of the Winchester

model. This recommendation was formally

approved on 22 October 1941, and the

new weapon was given the designation

carbine, caliber .30, M1.55

Production Contracts

Just as speed had keynoted development

of the new weapon, speed became the goal

for getting into production. The first

requirement was set at 886,698, and funds

were at once made available for procurement.56

 Since Winchester's facilities were

inadequate to turn out this number, Ordnance selected as a second contractor

GMC's Inland Division, which had gained

some knowledge of carbine manufacture

through its production studies of the

Hyde, Springfield, and Winchester models.

Without waiting until an agreement could

be worked out with the government regarding manufacturing rights, Winchester

quickly agreed to share its knowledge with

Inland. In November 1941, Ordnance

placed large contracts with both Winchester and Inland for each to produce at

the rate of one thousand per day.57 Soon

thereafter Winchester assigned a license to

the United States Government for production of M1 carbines in exchange for a fee

of $886,000.58

Post-Pearl Harbor Requirements

Pearl Harbor found the United States

with something over 1,600,000 rifles on

hand, in depot stocks, and in the hands of

troops, including state guards. They were

mostly Springfields and Enfields, but included nearly 350,000 new Garands. The

inventory also included about 480,000

pistols and revolvers, about 60,000 machine guns (mostly .30-caliber) and some

56,000 BAR's.59 During the hectic weeks

that followed the attack on Pearl Harbor,

Anglo-American planners drew up ambitious programs for procuring millions of

additional small arms. In his message to

54

 The story of the carbine's development is

briefly told by Edwin Pugsley, a Winchester executive, in his epilogue to Williamson, Winchester

—The Gun That Won The West, pages 385-88.

See also Edwin Pugsley, Development of the .30

caliber M1 Carbine, 12 Jul 44, a five-page historical summary filed in OO 474.5/8387, copy in

OHF; Hist, SA Materiel, U.S. Carbine, Cal. .30,

pp. 3-4; Sharpe, op. cit., pp. 536-37; Johnson,

Rifles and Machine Guns, pp. 46-48, 257-60;

and Arcadi Gluckman, United States Muskets,

Rifles and Carbines (Buffalo: O. Ulbrich Company, 1948), pp. 444-47. 55

 (1) OCM 17278, 30 Sep 41; (2) OCM

17360, 22 Oct 41. 56

 Design, Development and Prod of Carbine,

Cal. .30, Jan 45, p. 6. 57

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Memo, CofOrd for Brig Gen

Rutherford, OUSW, 4 Nov 41, sub: Proposed

Site for Manufacture of Rifle, U.S. Carbine, Cal.

.30, M1, at Inland Mfg. Div. . . , OO 675/

21715 Misc.; (3) Ltr, CofOrd to OUSW, 31

Oct 41, sub: Negotiated Contract (re M1 Carbine at Winchester), OO 160/78532; (4) Hist

of SA Materiel, U.S. Carbine, Gal. .30, pp. 16-

17; (5) Hist, Cincinnati Ord Dist, vol. I, pt. 2,

1922-42, pp. 23-36 and vol. 100, pt. 2, Contractor Histories Inland Div, GMC. 58

 (1) Design, Development and Production of

the Carbine, Cal. .30, p. 26, citing contract

ORD-625, OO 160/131149; (2) Pugsley, Development of the .30 Caliber M1 Carbine; (3)

Sharpe, op. cit., pp. 538-39. 59

 These figures were compiled from a variety

of documents in small arms document notebook,

OHF.
SMALL ARMS 171

Congress on 6 January 1942, President

Roosevelt set the pace by listing requirements for one million machine guns of all

kinds. In the Army's munitions program of

February 1942, rifle requirements were set

at four million for the year 1942; the

staggering total of twelve million rifles became the goal for production by June

1944. In addition, more than four million

carbines were to be turned out during the

same 30-month period, plus three and a

half million pistols and five million submachine guns. The grand total was twenty

five million weapons.60 Only about onethird of the rifles were for United States

forces; the remaining two-thirds—over five

million Springfields, nearly a million Garands, and over a million Enfields—were

scheduled for lend-lease.

Even for some of the Army people these

figures appeared high. The following exchange at the production conference on

small arms in February 1942 illustrates

the feeling of incredulity with which some

planners viewed the post-Pearl Harbor requirements:

Gen. Somervell: I would just like to ask

a question. It may be terribly ignorant, but

we set up for an American army of 10 million people, 528,000 of these machine guns.

Now we are proposing to build 1,302,000 of

them. In other words, it will be for an army

of about 24 million people.

Judge Patterson: What's this? Where do

you get that figure?

General Somervell: Take line three. . . .

God, I just don't believe it.

General Aurand: I can explain it ...

About from 75 to 80 percent of the tanks

that are on this program are Defense Aid

tanks. ... If we are going to get the tanks

. . . and other things that are in there, we

are going to have these machine guns for

them.

General Moore: They are basing that on

a lot of wastage, a lot of short life for tanks,

and of course if a tank goes out, a machine

gun goes with it. So it really isn't based on

the number of men: it is based on the

tanks.61

To supply U.S. ground forces with small

arms, to provide machine guns for airplanes and tanks, and to meet the sometimes frantic demands of friendly nations

—all this added up to an impossible production load. Ordnance drew up plans to

boost output of rifles, machine guns,

submachine guns, and pistols, but by June

1942 requirements were scaled down,

chiefly through cuts in lend-lease. Garand

rifles, for example, were eliminated altogether from foreign aid and were reserved

exclusively for U.S. forces. By November

1942 requirements had been cut still further to bring them within the realm of

possible achievement. Lend-lease requirements were set at about two and a half

million rifles, mostly .303-caliber LeeEnfields. For U.S. forces the November

1942 Army Supply Program called for

more than three and a half million Garands

and nearly five and a half million carbines

by December 1944. Production schedules

for these two weapons were closely coordinated because it was hoped that a

shortage of one could be temporarily offset by increased production of the other.

Rifle Production

World War II rifle production in the

United States included five main types:

the Springfield, the Browning automatic

60

 (1) Overall Requirements for War Munitions

Program, 11 Feb 42; (2) Memo, USW for G-4.

21 Feb 42, USW file 104 Rifles, copy in OHF. 61

 Review of Prod Plans of the SA Div, 20 Feb

42, pp. 29-30. See also Memo, USW for G-4,

21 Feb 42, wherein Patterson asked for a review

of the huge requirements for small arms, and

Memo, G-4 for USW, 23 Feb 42, wherein Somervell defended existing requirements. Both in USW

file 104 Rifles, and copy in OHF.
172 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

rifle (BAR), the Brtitish Lee-Enfield, the

Garand, and the carbine. (See Table 75.)

The newest and smallest, the carbine, won

the quantity production laurels, its more

than six million nearly equaling the total

for the other four. The Garand was the

preferred weapon for front-line troops,

but during 1942 and 1943 its production

could not keep up with demand. Oldest

of the lot was the Springfield, adopted

while Theodore Roosevelt was in the White

House but still able to hold its own when

matched with newer designs, and useful as

a substitute for the Garand. Most unusual

from the production viewpoint was the

BAR, manufactured chiefly by a group of

firms known as the New England Small

Arms Corporation.

Spring fields

As noted above, manufacture of Springfield rifles for the British got under way

in 1941 at Remington's Ilion plant with

machinery shipped from Rock Island. But

many problems arose. Some machine tools

needed by Remington were not supplied by

the arsenal, and many were badly worn

from previous hard use. Remington had to

obtain hundreds of new manufacturing

drawings as well as a large number of

gages. Worst of all, the tools and techniques from Rock Island were outdated;

newer and cheaper manufacturing processes developed since 1918 had not been

adapted to manufacture of the Springfield

rifle. In the early days, highly skilled

craftsmen had literally hewn parts of the

Springfield out of solid steel blocks and,

by careful machining and hand finishing,

had produced components that functioned

so well when assembled that every gun

fancier was proud to own a Springfield.

But such methods were costly in terms of

time, materials, and skilled manpower.

Just as the first pieces were coming off

the line at Ilion, Pearl Harbor brought a

desperate need for speedier production.

Remington at once began work on design

changes and improved techniques to

simplify manufacture. It eliminated the

polishing of outside surfaces; increased tolerances on outside surfaces to permit

finishing of forgings by buffing instead of

machining; redesigned twenty-three parts

so they could be made of stampings instead of forgings; and eliminated several

parts completely. As a result, each rifle

required less steel, less labor, and less

machine-tool time. More parts were subcontracted to firms with stamping facilities.

The modified gun—no longer the collector's pride, but still an effective weapon

—was approved for manufacture in May

1942 as M1903A3.62 Another change to

speed production came later when tests

at Aberdeen proved that two rifling grooves

gave just as good results as the traditional

four, but the effect on production was not

great because plants already tooled for 4-

groove production continued without

change.63

62

 (1) Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 9,

Contractor Histories—Summary Report, Production of Rifle, U.S. Cal. .30 M1903 and M1903A3

at Ilion Works of the Remington Arms Co., Inc.,

9 May 45, by Remington Arms Co., Inc.; (2)

Mitchell, Hist, SA Matériel; U.S. Rifle Cal. .30

M1903, [1945], pp. 23-28; (3) Ltr, Rochester

Ord Dist to OCO, 14 Jun 44, sub: Historical

Data—SA Matériel, with attached rpt dtd 15

Jun 44, sub: Production of Rifles, U.S. Cal. .30

M1903 in Rochester Ord Dist, pt. I Remington

Arms Co.. OO 474/3053; (4) Ltr, Col Drewry,

OCO to Rochester Ord Dist, 22 Apr 42, sub:

Change in Contract DA-W-74O-Ord-36 Remington Arms Co., OO 400.3295/55624 Misc. (x) ;

(5) Ltr, Remington Arms Co., Inc., to Col Guy

H. Drewry, 19 Feb 42, re modification of M1903

rifle, OO 474.1/1132. 63

 (1) Mitchell, Hist, SA Matériel, U.S. Rifle

Cal. .30 M1903 [1945], p. 31; (2) OCM 19053,
SMALL ARMS 173

Requirements for Springfields were so

high in early 1942 that Ordnance brought

in a second producer, the L. C. SmithCorona Typewriter Corporation of Syracuse, N.Y. The first contract was for

100,000 rifles followed in July by a second

order for 280,000 to be completed by

December 1943. Smith-Corona subcontracted with twenty other firms for minor

components. Production was hampered by

the fact that Remington had not completed its redesign work before SmithCorona started production. A continuous

series of design changes marked the production period, with one change order in

July 1943 affecting practically every component.64

By the fall of 1943 termination of contracts for Springfields was in sight, for

Garands and carbines were by then being

turned out in quantity and requirements

had been lowered. Remington and SmithCorona completed their final rifles in February, 1944. Remington continued with

the manufacture of spare rifle parts while

Smith-Corona, after completing 234,580

M1903 rifles, returned to making typewriters. Total output of the two contractors was 1,318,951 M1903 rifles of all

types.65

Lag in Garand Production

In the fall of 1941 Springfield Armory's

production of 1,000 Garands per day

looked good, but after Pearl Harbor it fell

far short of meeting requirements. It had

to be raised to 2,000 per day, and then

boosted to 3,000 while Winchester raised

its output from 100 per day to 750. In

August 1942, total production amounted

to 68,660 for the month while requirements to the end of the program in June

1944 stood at about four million, or

200,000 per month. It was a huge gap

that was not closed until the war was

nearly over.

All during 1942, 1943, and early 1944

production of the Garand lagged behind

requirements, lending support to the argument of critics that it was a hard-tomanufacture weapon. Springfield was

plagued by one problem after another.66

Slow deliveries of new equipment hampered it at the outset, and then lack of

materials slowed production. Late in 1942

the War Production Board, apparently

acting without full knowledge of the facts,

canceled the Armory's order for receiver

steel with the result that forging operations

on receivers stopped for four weeks. New

broaching techniques were adopted to save

time and material, but for a long period

the Armory's broaching capacity was insufficient to meet the rifle schedule of

90,000 per month. Labor turnover including the drafting of several experienced

machine operators, also held back production. At Winchester, slow delivery of new

heat-treating furnaces delayed production.

The requirement of complete interchange15 Oct 42; 19129, 4 Nov 42; (3) Ltr, Maj Sam

Marshall, OCO, to CO, Springfield Armory, 23

Oct 42, sub: Two Groove Rifling for Rifle Barrels,

OO 474.4/802; (4) Julian S. Hatcher, Hatcher's

Notebook (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Military Service

Publishing Company, 1947), pp. 7, 17.

64

 Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 9,

Contractor Histories—Rifle Production at the

Syracuse Plant of L. C. Smith & Corona Typewriters, Inc. during World War II, 14 May 45,

by Harold McD. Brown. 65

 (1) Whiting, Statistics, Proc sec., 9 Apr 52,

p. 47; (2) PP 76, Small Arms and Small Arms

Ammunition, Design, Development and Procurement 1917-45, Jun 45, pp. 6-10. 66

 As an example, see Ltr, Col G. A. Woody,

Springfield Armory, to CofOrd, 25 Feb 41, sub:

Expansion of M1 Rifle Prod, OO 400.12/4138,

copy in OHF.
174 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 15—RIFLE PRODUCTION, 1940-1945

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8.

ability of all parts caused Winchester the

most trouble, for in commercial practice

such interchangeability was not required.67

Considering the long period of preparation

at Springfield Armory, Winchester's educational order in 1939, and the urgency of

Garand production, output during the

1940-42 period was a major disappointment in the Ordnance record. The weapon's high quality was not matched by a

sufficiently high rate of production until the

end of 1943.

 68

 (Table 15)

Carbines

The ink had barely dried on the first

two carbine contracts with Winchester and

Inland in 1941 when the United States

found itself at war. Before Pearl Harbor,

requirements for carbines had stood at

886,698, but the War Munitions Program

drawn up in February 1942 listed over one

million needed by the end of 1942 and

over three million by the end of 1943. As

Winchester and Inland were being set up

to produce only one thousand each per

day and could not start producing at all

before June, achievement of the one

million goal for 1942 was clearly impossible for them. Part of the 1942 shortage

could be offset by speeding production of

Springfields and by issuing old Enfields in

place of carbines, but for the future additional producers had to be lined up. As

no single plant could meet the whole

deficit, five smaller plants were placed

under contract, each to turn out thirty

thousand carbines per month. Known as

the second wave of carbine plants, these

were the Rock-Ola Company and Quality

Hardware and Machine Company, both of

Chicago; Irwin-Pedersen Arms Company

of Grand Rapids; Underwood-ElliottFisher Company of Hartford, Conn.; and

the Rochester Defense Corporation of

Rochester, N.Y.69 Most were inexperienced in munitions making, having turned

from making hardware, juke boxes, and

67

 See General Report on Small Arms Production, 18 Mar 43, by War Projects Unit, Bur of

the Budget, pt. VII, copy in OHF. 68

 Manufacturing and inspection techniques are

discussed below in Chapter XIV; in Hist, Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk. II, 1939-41, pp. 100-

104; and in PSP 76. For conservation of materials, see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. XVIII. 69

 Rochester Defense Corp. was taken over by

the National Postal Meter Co. in the summer of

1942, and National Postal Meter became Commercial Controls Corp. in 1944; (1) Design,

Development and Production of Carbine Cal.

.30, Jan 45, by OCO, pp. 7-9; (2) Hist, SA

Materiel, U.S. Carbine Cal. .30 [1945], pp. 18-

21; (3) Correspondence between OCO and

OUSW in Mar and Apr 42, filed in OO 160; (4)

History, Procurement of Carbine Cal. .30 M1 in

Chicago Ord Dist, 28 Jun 46, by Samuel O. Rice,

Historian Chicago Ord Dist, filed in Hist, Chicago

Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 3—Contractor Histories.
SMALL ARMS 175

typewriters; yet all but one proved successful.

No sooner had these five new producers

been added than further expansion became

necessary. By June 1942 carbine requirements had jumped to over four million

needed by the end of 1943. In what was

known as the third wave of expansion a

contract was awarded in August 1942 to

Standard Products Company of Port Clinton, Ohio, for manufacture of carbines at

the rate of forty five thousand per

month.70 Meanwhile Inland had started

producing in June, only six months after

signing its contract, and by the end of the

year reached a rate of one thousand per

day. Winchester started producing in September, followed by Underwood-ElliottFisher and Rock-Ola in November. Al-,

though the November 1942 Army Supply

Program made deep cuts in most items,

the drop in carbine requirements was

slight and the need for additional producers again became apparent. In January

and February 1943 contracts were placed

with International Business Machines Corporation and Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors Corporation,

both of whom were nearing completion of

orders for other types of small arms. This

so-called fourth wave brought the total of

carbine prime contractors to ten. Of this

group, Inland, the first plant to start

producing, became the leader, making

available to other firms the details of its

manufacturing techniques along with

drawings and specifications for tools, jigs,

and fixtures. Because of its close contacts

with gage manufacturers, Inland was

awarded a contract for procurement of

gages for the entire carbine program.71 Of

all the carbine contractors, the only one

that failed to produce was Irwin-Pederson.

After this concern experienced many production problems Ordnance canceled the

contract, purchased the company's plant at

Grand Rapids, and arranged for Saginaw

Steering to operate it.72

Integration Committees

With so many contractors in the carbine

picture the need for over-all co-ordination

soon arose. In late March 1942 Ordnance

called together representatives of the seven

prime contractors, discussed production

problems, and gradually worked out procedures for interchange of ideas, raw materials, and machine tools. At first called

Carbine Production Committee, this group

later took the name of industry integration

committee in common with other similar

committees formed by the Ordnance Department. The carbine committee appears

to have been the first such committee

formed by the Ordnance Department, with

the mechanical time fuze committee a close

second. The carbine committee was

headed in the beginning by Lt. Col. Ed70

 For a graphic description of this company's

work, see Thomas E. Lloyd, "Mass Production of

the Caliber 0.30 M-1 Carbine," Iron Age, vol.

152, No. 9 (August 26, 1943), 42-47. 71

 Rpt, Production History of Carbine Cal. .30

M1 and M1 A1, filed as Incl 1 to 1st Indorsement,

Cincinnati Ord Dist to CofOrd, 22 Apr 44, sub:

Historical Data, Carbine Cal. .30 M1, Inland

Manufacturing Co., OO 474.5/7279. 72

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen James Kirk, OCO, to Detroit Ord Dist, 20 Mar 43, sub: Contract W374-Ord-1548 with Irwin-Pedersen Arms Co.,

with attached Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas J. Hayes,

OCO, to Director of Purchases Div SOS, 10 Mar

43, sub: Termination of Order for 146,735 Carbines, M1, with Irwin-Pedersen. . . , OO 160/

94129—Irwin-Pedersen Arms Co.; (2) Out of the

Valley to Victory, published by Saginaw Steering

Gear Div of GMC in 1943; (3) Rpt, Historical

Data on Carbine Cal. .30—Irwin-Pedersen Co.

and Saginaw Steering Gear Div of GMC, 1 Jul

44, filed in folder marked Hist of Carbine Cal.

.30, OHF.
176 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

PRODUCING CARBINE BARRELS. Finished barrels ready for the assembly department (left);

broaching the rifling grooves in the carbine barrels (right).

ward C. Franklin as chairman and Mr. D.

M. Fincke of the Underwood-Elliott-Fisher

Company as assistant chairman. It became

a central clearing house for all sorts of

problems encountered by the prime contractors.

In the early stages, the committee held

meetings every month or six weeks to discuss engineering changes that would

improve the functioning of the carbine or

speed its manufacture. It forwarded recommendations to the Office Chief of Ordnance and Springfield Armory for review

and approval.73 Meetings to discuss inspection procedures were held at regular

intervals and included representatives of

district offices and resident inspectors from

each carbine plant. At frequent intervals

the committee conducted interchangeability tests as checks on the standardization

of inspection procedures at the various

plants. Carbines from each plant were

brought together, disassembled, their parts

systematically scrambled, and then reassembled and tested.74

A special problem for carbine producers

was the supply of alloy steel. Though the

amounts required by the individual carbine contractors were small, the contractors were compelled to buy in large quantities at the insistence of the steel mills,

which would deliver only minimum mill

heats. This left some carbine producers

with a year's supply of steel on hand while

73

 See Flow Chart of Carbine Industry Integration Committee Engineering Changes in History

of Carbine Industry Integration Committee and

Prior Carbine Committee, pt. IV, OHF. 74

 Hist, Carbine Industry Integration Comm.

and Prior Carbine Comms., 15 Apr 44, OHF.

This history reproduces many of the basic documents and describes the activities of the committee in detail.
SMALL ARMS 177

COMPLETED CARBINES, .30-caliber M1, are checked by company inspectors at end of assembly line.

other producers were unable to get enough

to assure continuous production. To deal

with this situation a Raw Materials Facility, or central steel warehouse, was established and operated under contract by

Brace-Mueller-Huntley, Inc. The carbine

contractors, together with machine gun

and other small arms contractors, placed

their special steel orders with this central

warehouse; it in turn pooled them into

large orders placed with the steel mills.

The Raw Materials Facility contract was

canceled in the spring of 1943, shortly

after the Controlled Materials Plan became

effective.75

The Production Record

Only 115,000 carbines were delivered in

1942 against a requirement for more than

one million, and Springfields and Enfields

had to be substituted for carbines. But in

1943, with ten plants in production, output

reached nearly three million, against a requirement for four million. As requirements

for 1944 were only half those for 1943,

the deficit was carried over to make 1944

requirements approximately three million.

The end of 1943, with production at the

rate of 500,000 per month, found Ordnance planning drastic cuts in carbine

capacity. Action followed promptly, and of

nine firms in production in January only

two, Inland and Winchester, were still

75

 (1) Hist, Ind Serv, SA Div, vol. I, 1939-43,

pp. 10-11 and vol. VII, Hist of Small Arms Raw

Materiels Facility at Rochester, N.Y.; (2) Ltr,

Brig Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr., to OUSW, 6

Feb 42, sub: Proposed Establishment of a Central

Warehouse for Supply of Steel for SA Mfg,

OO 160/117290; (3) Planning Sheets, Equipment Sec of ASP, by SA Div, Ind Serv, 15 Jun

42, p. 4 and 15 Sep 42, p. 11.
178 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

producing in June. Both the latter firms

were low-cost producers and both were in

noncritical labor areas. Between them they

were easily able to meet carbine requirements for the rest of the war. Total production of carbines during three and a

half years was a little over six million,

probably the greatest quantity of small

arms of any kind ever produced in such a

short time.

In the spring of 1944 the Army achieved

its original goal—a carbine that could be

set for full automatic as well as semiautomatic fire. The M2 carbine, as it was

called, went into production at Inland in

April 1944 and at Winchester the following month. By April 1945, with the collapse of all German resistance in sight,

Inland had reached a production rate of

more than 100,000 per month. Meanwhile

M1 carbines not yet issued to troops were

modified for selective automatic fire.76

The BAR

The Browning automatic rifle—part

rifle, part machine gun—was familiarly

known to U.S. infantrymen of both World

Wars as the BAR. Only slight change occurred in the 1918 model during the

1920's and 1930's, and substantial quantities left over from World War I were held

in storage. But, after transfer of some

twenty-five thousand to the British in 1940

-41, followed by rapid expansion of the

U.S. Army, the post-Pearl Harbor requirement for 150,000 BAR's demanded immediate new production as well as modernization at Springfield Armory of the M1918's

in stock. During the winter of 1941-42,

six New England firms,77 with encouragement from Ordnance, formed the New

England Small Arms Corporation for manufacture of BAR's and other munitions,

using some government-owned equipment

left over from World War I. After award

of the first contract early in 1942 this

corporation continued throughout the war

as the main source of BAR's. Manufacture

of components was carried out by the six

member companies in their own plants or

by subcontractors. The corporation encountered its share of manufacturing

problems, including scarcity of machine

tools, slow delivery of materials, lack of

skilled workers, and mistakes in Ordnance

drawings.78 But production began early

in 1943 and eventually rose to a total of

over 168,000 rifles plus spare parts.

Ordnance had meanwhile placed a contract with a second producer, International

Business Machines, to assure an adequate

supply. This firm quickly reached the production stage and by May 1943 was turning out five thousand BAR's per month.

A few weeks later requirements dropped

and Ordnance terminated the contract

after only about twenty thousand rifles

had been produced. To make use of the

equipment IBM had installed, Ordnance

placed with IBM a substantial order for

carbines, which were then on the critical

list.79

Machine Guns

With about 140,000 machine guns left

over from World War I, the Army felt no

76

 Supplement I to History of Carbines, Cal.

.30, Jul 44 to Jun 45, by C. A. S. Hewlett, 19

Jul 45, OHF. 77

 International Silver Co., Blake Mfg Corp.,

Elliott Addressing Machine Co., National Blank

Book Co., A. G. Spalding and Brothers, and the

Boston Wire Stitcher Co. See Hist, Boston Ord

Dist, I, 65-66. See PSP 41, Browning Automatic

Rifle, Development, Procurement and Production

1917 to 1945 by Capt. Charles H. Schroder;

Hist, Boston Ord Dist, Jan-Jun 44, pp. 40-48. 78

 Hist, Boston Ord Dist, Jun 44, pp. 40-49,

and vol. 100, pt. 6. 79

 Hist, New York Ord Dist, II, pt. 1, 372-77.
SMALL ARMS 179

JOHN M. BROWNING, GUN INVENTOR, attending a World War I conference with officials

of the Winchester Repeating Arms Company. From left: Val A. Browning, Edwin Pugsley,

Fred Werme, Mr. Browning, Frank F. Burton, and William C. Roemer.

urgent need for new production during

the 1920's and early 1930's. As time went

on, the various wartime types—Lewis,

Vickers, Marlin, and others—were one by

one declared obsolete, though prudently

kept in storage for an emergency, until

only the Browning models remained as

standard. At Springfield and Rock Island

the M1917 Brownings were modified and

given new designations, M1917A1 (watercooled) and M1919A4 (air-cooled). The

one outstanding machine gun development of these years was the redesign of the

.50-caliber Browning machine gun so that

it could be quickly converted to serve as

tank, aircraft, or antiaircraft weapon. The

heavy barrel of the tank gun, the waterjacket barrel of the AA gun, or the lighter

parts of the aircraft gun could be attached

in a matter of minutes without modification of the basic receiver. This simplified

design, adopted in 1933, eased manufacture, maintenance, and troop training

throughout the war.80

Of the commercial gunmaking firms in

the United States, only Colt retained active interest in machine guns during the

interwar years. Under contract with Ordnance, it made production studies on

80

 (1) Chinn, The Machine Gun, vol. I, pt. IV;

(2) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 178; (3), PP 36, U.S. Machine

Guns, Calibers .30 and .50, Development, Requirements and Production 1940-45, Jul 45, pp.

37-38; (4) PSP 36. The latter, a 268-page typed

study, is the best single source for machine gun

production data.
180 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Browning guns, both .30-caliber and .50-

caliber, and contributed to the preparation

of descriptions of manufacture. In 1939

Rock Island installed a production line

capable of turning out .30-caliber machine

guns at the rate of twenty five per day,81

and Ordnance placed production orders

with the Savage Arms Company of Utica,

N.Y., and with four divisions of General

Motors—Saginaw Steering, Frigidaire, AC

Spark Plug, and Brown-Lipe-Chapin. The

British placed contracts with Colt and

three other firms to make machine guns

for planes and tanks being built in the

United States for the British Army, and to

all these firms Ordnance released its

latest designs. Thus, total machine gun

production capacity created during the defense period for the U.S. Army and its

allies was considerable. By Pearl Harbor,

Ordnance had contracted for annual production of some 430,000 .30-caliber and

300,000 .50-caliber guns, and ten plants,

including Rock Island, were in production.

supported by scores of subcontractors.

When President Roosevelt announced

his "must" program in January 1942, he

called for the production of 500,000 machine guns each year for the next two

years. The War Munitions Program of

February 1942 put total requirements at

1,302,000 for 1942-43 and the first half

of 1944. To meet the demand for aircraft

guns Ordnance found itself well prepared;

it was able to report in February 1942

that output of caliber .50's was running

well ahead of plane production, so far

ahead, in fact, that caliber .50's were being mounted on 37-mm. AA carriages as

additional weapons. General Wesson had

told his staff earlier: "Forget everything

else, but be sure you have a gun on every

plane that comes out of this country; I

don't care where it goes, I want a gun for

it."

 82

 For ground machine guns, capacity

was below requirements early in 1942 but

tank objectives dropped during the year,

bringing a corresponding drop in ground

machine gun requirements.83 By the

end of the year production of all types,

both air and ground, totaled 662,331, just

enough to meet requirements. The most

sharply defined trend was the shift from

the small .30-caliber to the powerful .50-

caliber aircraft machine gun with armorpiercing, incendiary ammunition. (Table

16) Hidden within these over-all figures

were many stops and starts as requirements were cut and factories shut down

at one point only to be followed by an

emergency demand for new production a

few months later.

The .50-caliber aircraft gun program

reached its peak during early 1944 when

production capacity rose to 45,000 per

month, just enough to meet the Army

Supply Program requirement of 540,000

for the year.84 With 1945 requirements set

at 747,000 guns, Ordnance planned to

build two additional plants, but dropped

the matter during the second half of the

year when requirements were cut and surplus machine guns piled up in Field Service warehouses. The contract with the

Buffalo Arms Corporation, a high-cost

81

 Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, I (1918-39),

59-60. 82

 Review of Prod Plans for SA Div, 20 Feb

42, p. 20 83

 (1) Memo, USW for Glancy, 4 May 42; (2)

Memo, ASF Prod Br for USW, 9 May 42, sub:

Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns and Mounts; (3)

Memo, Maj Gen Campbell for Glancy, 9 May 42,

sub: Caliber .50 AA Guns and Mounts. All in

ASF Prod Div 472.93 AA Guns, Job 19B, G1867:

(4) PSP 36, pp. 93-97- 84

 Memo, CofOrd for ASF Prod Div, 10 Jan

44, sub: Capacity for Prod . . . , ASF Prod Div,

472.91 Aircraft Guns.
SMALL ARMS 181

TABLE 16—MACHINE GUN PRODUCTION, 1940-1945

a

 Covers only period from 1 July through 31 December 1940. b

 Covers only period from 1 January through 31 August 1945.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-8.

producer in a tight labor area, was terminated early in 1945, and Kelsey-Hayes

was put in a standby status.

Production engineers worked miracles in

simplifying processes, saving material, and

speeding production of machine guns.

Rifling broaches more than cut in half the

time required for rifling barrels. Pearlitic

malleable iron castings, known as Arma

steel, not only saved scarce steel alloys but

proved superior to the steel or bronze

originally used for certain machine gun

parts. Substitution of castings, stampings,

or a combination of stamped and riveted

parts for completely machined parts saved

countless man-hours and machine-toolhours, and resulted in lower costs. There

were problems, too, that had to be ironed

out through the Machine Gun Industry

Integration Committee. Some problems

stemmed from the fact that commercial

machine gun production had been on a

small scale during the preceding two decades, and had been limited to one manufacturer. Colt's small peacetime orders had

not warranted extensive application of

mass-production techniques. Tolerances,

specifications, and inspection rules had not

been worked out in sufficient detail to

guide numerous producers unfamiliar with

gunmaking, nor were the rules always

applied in the same way. The General

Motors plants, for example, complained

that inspectors were rejecting parts for

exceeding tolerances on the drawings although the parts were identical with those

taken from sample guns made by Colt.

Tripods were the chief bottleneck in 1941

and could be turned out in adequate

quantities only by adopting less complicated designs.85

 An Army inspecting officer reported in April 1943 that, although

production to date had been "extremely

satisfactory," some of the older plants

clung to outmoded methods, resisted

change, and were generally less efficient

than the newcomers.86 But, all things

considered, machine gun production was

one of the most successful features of the

whole Ordnance program.

Submachine Guns

In June 1942 Ordnance placed an order

for a new type of Thompson submachine

gun, the M2, with the Marlin Firearms

Company of New Haven, Conn.; but, before production started, the M3 supplanted

85

 These matters appear frequently in Gen.

Wesson's conference in 1941 and PSP 36, pp.

158ff. See also (1) Armament section of American

Machinist, vol. 85, (July 23, 1941); (2) Memo,

Maj Gen Campbell for Glancy, 9 May 42, sub:

Cal. .50 AA Gun and Mounts, ASF Prod Div

472.93 AA Guns, Job 19B, G1867. 86

 Ltr, Lt Col Jack G. Allen to TIG, 12 Apr 43,

sub: Study of ... Machine Gun Proc, ASF

Prod Div 472—Guns.
182 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the M2.87 Built along the lines of the

British Sten and the German Schmeisser,

the new gun had been designed by the

Inland Division of General Motors. As all

Inland's capacity was committed to production of the carbine, a contract for the

M3 went to another General Motors division, Guide Lamp, with Buffalo Arms

Corporation making the bolt.

The M3, nicknamed the "grease gun"

for its resemblance to the tool used for

lubricating automobiles, weighed less than

a Garand, yet it could fire 45-caliber

pistol ammunition at a rate of four hundred shots per minute and could be produced for as little as $20. It was of the

type known in Europe as "machine

pistols." With its folding stock and barrel

removed for packing it was small enough

to fit into a briefcase. In contrast to the

precision-made Thompson the M3 was designed for cheap mass production with

unskilled labor, making full use of stamped

metal parts and other short cuts. But it

did not escape manufacturing problems.

There were so many manufacturing problems, in fact, that, for lack of M3's, manufacture of M1's had to be continued into

February 1944 instead of stopping as

planned in the fall of 1943. All told, some

621,000 M3's were produced as compared

to roughly twice that number of Thompsons and M1 's combined.88

In making M3'S, Guide Lamp adopted

an entirely new process for rifling the

barrel, using neither the traditional hooked

cutter that required an experienced operator nor the more or less automatic broaching machine. Instead, it inserted in each

barrel a mandrel that had the rifling lands

and grooves cut on its outside surface in

reverse. A powerful hydraulic press then

forced the barrel through a ring die,

squeezing it forcibly against the hard steel

mandrel and thus imprinting the rifling on

the inside of the barrel. The barrel's

tight grip on the mandrel was then loosened

by an ingenious centerless rolling machine

that stretched the metal slightly. The

whole sequence of press work, rolling, and

mandrel removal could be performed by

three girls, and each mandrel, made of

special nondeforming steel, lasted for

thousands of barrels.89

The Bazooka Rocket Launcher

Most impressive small arms development

of the year was the 'bazooka'—a rocketlaunching device operated by two men.

Armed with this weapon, the individual foot

soldier possessed, for the first time, the

means whereby he could, single-handedly, do

battle with a tank.

So wrote the Chief of Ordnance in his

annual report for the fiscal year 1943.

After a century of neglect the rocket had

again come into its own as a weapon of

war, and the United States, though slower

than other countries to take it up, made

rapid strides after Pearl Harbor.90

In its original form the bazooka was one

of the simplest pieces of equipment ever

produced by Ordnance. It consisted essentially of a 54-inch steel tube of 2.36-inch

inside diameter, open at both ends,

equipped with two hand grips, a trigger,

and simple sights. When Ordnance first

87

 The M3 was standardized by OCM 19401,

23 December 1942. For research and development, see Rcd of Army Ord Research and

Development, vol. 2, bk. 1. 88

 (1) PSP 40; (2) Whiting, Statistics, PR-8. 89

 "Novel Methods Speed Manufacture of M3

Submachine Gun," American Machinist, vol. 88,

Armament Section (May 11, 1944). 90

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 328-30. See also PP 79, The

Bazooka, OHF. Production of rockets is treated in

Chapter VI, above.
SMALL ARMS 183

OFFICER CANDIDATES AT FONTAINEBLEAU, France, learning to fire the 2.36-

inch bazooka.

asked General Electric to manufacture bazookas it allowed the company only thirty

days for delivery of 5,000. GE had to spend

nearly half the allowed time in making

working models for test by Ordnance;

not until the fourteenth model was tested

did Ordnance give its approval. Then GE

threw all its resources into assembling materials and setting up a makeshift production line. Skilled workmen were borrowed

from many departments; office workers

with technical skills went to work on

production lines; executives and foremen

lugged materials and lent a hand whenever needed. According to the company's

historical report, the 30-day deadline was

met with eighty-nine minutes to spare.91

The bazooka was such an immediate

success that Ordnance asked General

Electric to produce some sixty thousand

more in 1942, nearly one hundred thousand in 1943, and two hundred thousand

in 1944. Battlefield reports dictated a

number of design changes, starting with

deflectors to protect the gunner against

backblast of slow-burning rockets in coldweather. This was followed by wrapping

the rear section of the barrel with piano

wire to reinforce it against detonation of

rocket motors within the launcher, substituting a generator for batteries in the

firing mechanism, eliminating the forward

hand grip, and, in the fall of 1943, the

most radical change of all, the take-apart

launcher M9. Each design change posed its

own problems, but, as the bazooka enjoyed a high priority, nothing was allowed

to stand in its way for very long. In fact,

production schedules were met more consistently on the bazooka than on any other

item of small arms manufacture. Perhaps

the worst failure was that of the Magnavox Company to produce the complicated

firing device on schedule.92

General Electric's Bridgeport works,

though making use of more than one

hundred subcontractors, carried the production load almost single-handedly for the

first two years, despite objections by the

91

 "Development and Production of Rocket

Launchers" by the General Electric Co., a contractor's report in Hist, Springfield Ord Dist, vol.

100, pt. i, pp. 13-14. Project Paper No. 79, The

Bazooka, OHF, concludes its coverage of this incident by stating that GE met the deadline with

79 minutes to spare! See also John Anderson

Miller, Men and Volts at War (New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947), pp. 105-09. 92

 Hist, Springfield Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 1,

p. 4.
184 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Smaller War Plants Corporation that the

work should be shared with small business.

In June 1944, when requirements were

boosted, a contract for part of the requirement was placed with a small concern, the

Cheney Bigelow Wire Works of Springfield, Mass. The Springfield Ordnance

District was at first skeptical of the company's ability to meet production schedules, but during the winter of 1944-45

Cheney Bigelow turned in an excellent record of production on the M9A1 launcher.

Further orders were canceled in May 1945

at both GE and Cheney Bigelow, though

GE continued until the Japanese surrender to work on an experimental order for

five hundred aluminum launchers. Cheney

Bigelow had produced some forty thousand, and GE nearly four hundred and

fifty thousand.93

Recoilless Rifles

Though the basic idea of the recoilless

rifle, which ranks with the bazooka as one

of the most impressive ordnance developments of World War II, was perhaps a

century old, its practical application

came only in the 1940's under the forced

draft of war research. The 57-mm. recoilless rifle put artillery fire power in the

hands of the individual foot soldier, for it

required no ponderous carriage or recoil

mechanism. It was, in fact, an altogether

new type of weapon for the infantry's

arsenal. Developed by the Small Arms Division of the Ordnance Research and

Development Service, and light enough to

be fired from the shoulder, it was usually

classed as a small arms weapon, though it

fired artillery-type explosive shells. The

larger 75-mm. rifle was more nearly an

artillery piece. Whatever their classification, they were outstanding new weapons;

only their late arrival in the last months of

the war robbed them of honors they might

otherwise have won.94

After demonstration of 57-mm. and 75-

mm. recoilless rifles at Aberdeen in September 1944 for the Secretary of War and

high-ranking officers of both War and

Navy Departments, orders for one thousand of each were placed with industry.

The guns were tentatively named "Kromuskits" in honor of the two Frankford

Arsenal inventors, William J. Kroeger and

C. Walton Musser, but the name did not

stick. Final design work was completed in

conferences attended by representatives of

both the small arms designers and artillery

production engineers. As the Ordnance districts reported that no U.S. facilities to

manufacture the 57-mm. weapon were

available, a contract went through the Detroit district to the Dominion Engineering

Works in Canada. An order for the 75's

went to the Miller Printing Machinery

Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., and by

March, 1945, production was under way

without serious difficulties. Approximately

one hundred recoilless rifles reached the

European theater in mid-March 1945,

about six weeks before Germany surrendered, and proved effective. Others went

into action on Okinawa in May and June

with spectacularly successful results. Before

production stopped at the end of the sum93

 Ibid. This reference includes an account by

the Springfield District, another by GE, and a

third by Cheney Bigelow. 94

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 330-31; (2) OCM

22989, 24 Feb 44, copy in PSP 78, 57-mm. Rifles

T15E . . . , OHF; (3) Rcd of Army Ord Research and Development, vol. 2, bk. 3, Special

Weapons, OHF; (4) Elizabeth C. O'Neill, Frankford Arsenal Doctrine, Recoilless Rifle—Development, Nov 55, OHF.
SMALL ARMS 185

LOADING A 57-MM. RECOILLESS RIFLE on Okinawa, June 1945.

mer, 1,238 75's and 951 57's had been

accepted.95

Miscellaneous Items

Under the small arms heading fell a

number of miscellaneous items such as

pistols, revolvers, bayonets, trench knives,

helmets, and body armor. None was of

great importance in the over-all procurement picture but, taken together, they

rounded out the essential equipment of

combat troops. Prominent among these

minor items were .45-caliber pistols and

.38-caliber revolvers. Pistols were made at

first only by Colt but in 1942 three other

producers were added—Remington-Rand,

Union Switch and Signal, and the Ithaca

Gun Company. As Springfield Armory and

the High Standard Manufacturing Company had the needed capacity for making

pistol barrels, they supplied the pistol contractors, as did the Flannery Bolt Company

for a time. Pistols were not a high-priority

item and were in short supply during the

whole war, their production suffering from

run-of-the-mill obstacles such as low priorities and fluctuating requirements.

The experience of Remington-Rand illustrates the problem. The company took

over a vacant plant and bent every effort

during 1942 and 1943 to train new workers, acquire needed tools, and build up

production. Just as its production line was

shifting into high gear at the end of 1943

the company's order was slashed. After

workers had been laid off and production

virtually halted, the company received an

urgent request from Ordnance in the

95

 Prod rcds in OCO Ind Div. See also PSP 78;

Rcd of Army Ord Research and Development,

vol. 2, bk. 3, Spec Weapons, OHF; and Col.

Rene R. Studler, "They Give Field-Artillery

Firepower to the Infantry," Army Ordnance,

XXIX, No. 152 (September-October 1945), 232

-33.
186 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

spring of 1944 to restore and even increase

its former rate of production. Ordnance

was keenly aware of the fact that such

starting and stopping of production was

most uneconomical, but was forced into it

by fluctuating requirements. Adoption of

the carbine brought some reduction in

over-all pistol requirements, but the demand for pistols nevertheless remained

strong throughout 1944. Almost two million pistols were produced during the war,

plus 889,000 .38-caliber revolvers, most of

the latter by Smith and Wesson, Inc.96

Among small arms items, not including

ammunition, steel helmets chalked up a

record for quantity production, with more

than twenty two million delivered before

V-J Day. In 1940 the first contract with

the McCord Radiator and Manufacturing

Company of Detroit called for production

of the famous World War I tin hat whose

shallow pan-shaped design made it a

comparatively simple item to produce. But

soon a deeper model that gave more protection to the sides and rear of the head

was adopted in 1941 after some 900,000 of

the 1917 models had been produced. The

switch to a new design held up production

at a critical time and brought upon Ordnance a fair share of criticism, but McCord eventually solved the problem of

mass-producing M1 helmets of tough Hadfield manganese steel. After turning out

only 324,000 in 1940-41, McCord delivered five million in 1942. Meantime

special flyer's helmets were standardized

and nearly 400,000 were produced during

the 1943-45 period. Protective vests, aprons, and groin armor for flyers also went

into quantity production during the last

two years of the war as experience showed

that air crews needed protection against

low velocity shell fragments and, unlike

ground troops, could afford to sacrifice

freedom of body movement for protection.97

Before the termination telegrams went

out in August 1945, Ordnance had accepted some 21,000,000 rifles, machine

guns, and other small arms to equip the

U.S. and Allied armies, navies, and air

forces. Although dwarfed by expenditures

for artillery and artillery ammunition, the

$2 billion small arms program nevertheless

loomed large in comparison with the procurement activities of other technical services. From January 1942 to the end of

1945, the dollar value of small arms deliveries exceeded the dollar value of all

procurement by either the Transportation

Corps or Chemical Warfare Service, and

was more than double that of the Medical

Department. It amounted to about half

the dollar value of all Signal Corps procurement; and a little less than half the

value of all Corps of Engineer procurement.

Far more important than quantity, in

the eyes of Ordnance small arms specialists, was the quality of the weapons supplied to fighting troops. Ordnance drew

considerable satisfaction from battle re96

 There were two studies of this subject in

OHF, both labeled PSP 39. One is entitled PSP

Relating to Pistol, Automatic, Caliber .45,

M1911A1, 1917 through August 1945, compiled

by Annie J. Gregg and reviewed by John P.

Aitchison (31 January 1947). The other is entitled Hand Weapons Development, Production

and Procurement of Miscellaneous Pistols and

Revolvers in World War II (August 1945),

written by Walter W. Sanborn and reviewed by

Maj. H. P. Smith. See also Hist, Rochester Ord

Dist, vol. 100, pt. 11. 97

 (1) Whiting, Statistics; (2) Daniel L. Wells,

The Story of the New American Helmet (undated brochure in Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol.

105); (3) Maj Berkeley R. Lewis, Small Arms

and Small Arms Ammunition, pp. 76-77. See also

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, pp. 379-80.
SMALL ARMS 187

ports testifying that the U.S. Army's small

arms were among the best in the world.

The Garand rifle was generally regarded

as the best infantry rifle of World War II,

suffering only from complaints of slow

production, not poor quality. The carbine

was enthusiastically received and met

criticism only when it was expected to

reach long range or otherwise do what it

was not designed to do. Browning machine

guns earned world-wide fame. The .50-

caliber aircraft gun was outstanding in

aerial combat where its unfailing performance under, extremes of heat and cold

contributed notably to Allied victories in

the air. Of wholly new developments the

bazooka carried off the honors, followed

later by the light recoilless rifle, and fortunately neither posed serious manufacturing problems.

But the picture was not all roseate,

either from the design or the production

viewpoint. There were no miracles associated with small arms procurement, in spite

of the exuberant claims of public relations

experts. Production of small arms was an

exacting task that demanded essentially

the same qualities as any other form of

precision metal work—good machine tools,

trained workers, efficient management, a

steady flow of materials, and constant inspection to keep quality both high and

uniform. As indicated in the preceding

pages, wartime production of small arms,

and all other types of ordnance, was

frequently held up by lack of one or another of these elements. In dealing with

such problems the nation was fortunate in

having some production potential at the

outbreak of war with a thriving civilian

small arms industry and two government

installations, Springfield and Rock Island.

Though far less modern than they might

have been, Springfield and Rock Island

served both as producing plants and as

centers of technical ordnance knowledge.

It seems only fair to say that without them

the conversion of industry from peace to

war production would have been more difficult than it was and the eventual production of some two and a half million

machine guns, six million carbines, and

over six and a half million rifles would

have taken much more time.
CHAPTER IX

Small Arms Ammunition

Rounds of small arms ammunition were

produced during World War II in greater

numbers than any other item of Army

supply. Whereas most Ordnance matériel

was counted in the thousands or millions,

small arms ammunition was numbered in

the billions of rounds, total production for

the 1940-45 period amounting to more

than forty-one billion. Some measure of the

magnitude of small arms ammunition production may be gained by comparing it

with total wartime production of artillery

ammunition (excluding bombs, grenades,

and mines) of one billion rounds, or with

procurement of high-volume Quartermaster items such as men's socks, about

half a billion pairs, or shoes, about

145,000,000 pairs. If fired at the rate of

twenty rounds per minute, night and day,

year after year, the small arms ammunition

procured by Ordnance in World War II

would have lasted for almost forty centuries. (Table 17)

The huge quantities of ammunition required for World War II dramatically reflected the impact on warfare of rapidfiring weapons. In the days of the

American Revolution the firing of muskets

was a slow process, each shot requiring

the hand loading of both powder and ball.1

A century later, after breech loaders had

replaced muzzle loaders, the rate of fire

increased somewhat, but it was not until

late in the nineteenth century that the

mechanical marvel known as the machine

gun boosted the rate of fire a hundredfold.2

 Soon developed to the point where it

could fire hundreds of shots in one

minute, the new gun's appetite for ammunition was virtually insatiable. During

World War II the trend toward fasterfiring weapons continued, including all

types and sizes but advancing most among

the smaller calibers. Armed with the semiautomatic .30-caliber rifle M1, a U.S.

infantryman could easily fire an 8-round

clip in half a minute. With the semiautomatic carbine a 15-round clip could be

fired with similar speed while the fully

automatic carbine—adopted in 1944 and

equipped with a 30-round magazine—

could be fired even more rapidly. Standard machine guns using .30-caliber and

.50-caliber ammunition, and submachine

guns of .45-caliber, could fire at rates

ranging from 400 to 1,200 rounds per

minute. Armed with such weapons a single

infantry platoon or individual bombing

plane in World War II possessed as much

1

 Using the "Brown Bess" flintlock, an expert

could load and fire five shots a minute under

ideal conditions, but the average for combat was

much less. James R. Jacobs, The Beginning of the

U.S. Army 1783-1813 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 7. 2

 Mechanically powered guns of the Gatling

type had appeared as early as the Civil War, but

the truly automatic machine gun did not appear

until the 1880's.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 189

TABLE 17—SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION PRODUCTION, 1940-1945

[IN ROUNDS]

Source: Whiting, Statistics, p. 51.

small arms firepower as an entire infantry

division of the Civil War era.

The huge volume of small arms ammunition procurement must not be interpreted as meaning that it exceeded artillery

ammunition procurement in either size or

complexity. There were only twelve government-owned, contractor-operated small

arms ammunition plants as compared to

more than sixty artillery ammunition plants

and works. The dollar value of small arms

ammunition was about one-fourth that of

artillery ammunition. The difference in

tonnage is suggested by the fact that a

round of .3o-caliber ball ammunition

weighed only a few ounces while a 105-

mm. howitzer round weighed about forty

pounds. Compared to the twenty different

calibers of artillery ammunition there were

only three important sizes of small arms

ammunition—.3O-caliber, .45-caliber, and

.50-caliber—and there were only five main

small arms types—ball, armor-piercing

(AP), armor-piercing-incendiary (API), incendiary, and tracer.3

 The manufacture of the smaller ammunition was not

only simpler but easier, for it did not

involve the production of fuzes or the

manufacture and loading of high explosives. (See Table 77.)

The mass production of high quality

small arms ammunition was nevertheless

an exacting process. Each round had to

meet rigid specifications, particularly if it

was to be used in aircraft machine guns.

A defective round could usually be cleared

from a ground machine gun without great

difficulty, but fixed aircraft guns mounted

in the wings could not be serviced while

the plane was in the air. A slight imperfection in one cartridge might put the gun

out of action at a critical moment and

cause loss of both crew and plane. The

Ordnance objective was to produce ammunition that could be fired round after

round for billions of rounds, whether in

tropic heat or arctic cold, in desert sand

3

 There were many other sizes, including .22-

caliber, 60-caliber, and 7.92-mm. (for China),

and many other types such as armor-piercingincendiary-tracer, blanks, guard, dummy, and the

so-called headlight tracer, but they were not produced in great quantities. All the main types are

listed in Table 17.
190 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

or steaming jungle, without malfunctions

and without significant deviations in performance.

Dwindling Reserves

Of the large reserve of ammunition held

by the United States in 1919, a small

portion was used in training each year

during the 1920's and 1930's, and the

remaining rounds gradually deteriorated

in storage. There was some new production

by Frankford Arsenal, but the quantities

were small, and by the spring of 1940 the

national stockpile was only about half

what it had been twenty years before.

Reserves of .30-caliber, which far exceeded

all other calibers in volume, dropped from

about one billion rounds in 1919 to a

little over half a billion early in 1940.4 This

long, slow process of attrition was one

cause of the shortage of small arms ammunition that developed with the approach of war in 1940-41. Reserves were

further depleted in the summer of 1940 by

shipment of rifle ammunition to the hardpressed British forces.

The transfer of 138,000,000 rounds of

.30-caliber ammunition to the British after

Dunkerque took a big slice—nearly 25 percent—from the existing United States

stock. A later shipment brought the total

for British aid up to 188,000,000 rounds

before passage of the Lend-Lease Act in

March 1941. The first shipment was paid

for through the U.S. Steel Export Company on a "cash-and-carry" basis; for

the second shipment the British agreed to

release fifty million rounds of new ammunition from their Remington contract to

replace the old ammunition received from

the United States.5 But, regardless of the

method of reimbursement, transfer of this

matériel seriously weakened the Ordnance position. Just at the moment that

demand for ammunition was rising—for

troop training and equipping defense forces

—Ordnance saw its reserves suddenly cut

by from 25 to 30 percent. Pressure for

increased production became intense during 1941, and Ordnance was subjected to

frequent criticism for not having more

ammunition on hand and for not producing new ammunition fast enough. Even

without aid to Britain there would have

been a shortage of rifle ammunition in the

winter of 1940-41, but it was most disheartening for Ordnance officers to find in

the fall of 1940 that, after two decades

devoted to husbanding their reserves and

planning for an emergency, they were short

of the very types of ammunition most

needed, and some of them tended to place

more than the proper share of blame on

aid to Britain.6

More important than apportionment of

blame for the crisis was the action taken

to meet it. Frankford Arsenal quickly

stepped up its production but could not

hope to keep pace with the mounting

needs of the armed forces. Ground was

therefore broken in the fall of 1940 for

three large new government-owned ammunition plants with capacities running

4

 The exact figure as of 31 December 1939 was

588,411,466 rounds, valued at $16,951,466. Rpt

on Ammo Stocks prepared by FS, Incl to Memo

of F. W. F. Gleason for Olejar, 14 Jan 44, sub:

Requested Report on Ammunition Stocks, OO

381.4/1889, copy in OHF. 5

 The details of this operation may be found in

the monograph, How the Ordnance Department

Aided Britain After Dunkirk, by Capt. Paul D.

Olejar, 1 Jun 44, OHF. 6

 The whole subject of foreign aid during 1940-

41 is discussed in Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, Chapter III. For

discussion of this topic from a higher level of

authority, see Watson, Chief of Staff, Pages 312-

14, and Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics

and Strategy, Chapter I.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 191

into the millions of rounds per day. But

bringing new plants into production was a

time-consuming operation. No amount of

emergency action could banish the ammunition shortage overnight, and the lack of

small arms ammunition hung like a cloud

over the Ordnance program for the next

year and a half.

Prewar Plans and Operations

During the 1930's Frankford was the

only plant in the United States producing

military small arms ammunition. Several

commercial firms made sporting ammunition—Remington, Western, and Winchester were the best known—but the difference between sporting and military ammunition was great, comparable to the

difference "between a taxicab and a tank,"

in the words of one observer.7 Incendiary,

tracer, and armor-piercing ammunition, to

name three outstanding examples, presented production problems that had no

counterpart in peacetime manufacture of

cartridges to be used by hunters, farmers,

or policemen. Private companies received

no contracts during the 1930's for military

ammunition because they could not underbid Frankford, and the Army was forbidden by law to purchase from industry

unless the price was less than the cost of

arsenal-produced ammunition. But by

1936 two facts had become apparent to

Army planners: (1) a major war would require, in addition to Frankford's production, large-scale manufacture by commercial arms makers in existing plants, and

(2) this production would have to be

supplemented by a new government-owned

ammunition plant in the midwest operated

for the government by a leading industrial

firm. In 1936 and 1937 Ordnance representatives conferred frequently with officials of the Remington Arms Company

with a view to having Remington expand

its capacity in time of emergency and also

take over operation of a proposed new government plant. Following these discussions

a formal statement of the plan drawn up

by Frankford Arsenal was concurred in by

Mr. C. K. Davis, president of Remington,

in 1938.8

At the same time, after nearly twenty

years of starvation rations, Frankford received $5 million for the purchase of new

machinery and equipment of all sorts, part

of an Ordnance-wide move to modernize

all the arsenals. Navy orders and federal

work relief projects helped supplement the

regular appropriations. In 1939 Frankford

obtained additional funds to expand its

facilities for powder storage and .30- and

.45-caliber production, and to build a

complete new .50-caliber manufacturing

section. The arsenal also purchased

$800,000 worth of specialized production

machinery known as War Reserve Equipment, and stored it for emergency use by

the Remington Arms Company and Western Cartridge Company.9

 Arsenal personnel

drew up plans for speeding production in

the event of war, including model plant

layouts, descriptions of manufacture, esti7

 In Abundance and On Time, p. 11. This

little booklet, published by Remington Arms

Company, Inc., records that company's contribution to the wartime production of small arms

ammunition. See also History, Frankford Arsenal,

Volume I, Part 1, Pages 34-35, and remarks by

Brig. Gen. Kirk on the 1945 small arms ammunition program, 10 January 1945, OHF. 8

 The planners envisaged a manufacturing unit

capable of producing in 24 hours the following

quantities: 1,000,000 .30-caliber ball, 200,000-

500,000 .30-caliber tracer and AP, and 300,000

.50-caliber (80 percent ball and AP and 20 percent tracer). SAA, I, p. 69. 9

 SAA, I, p. 49 and pp. 70-71. See also comments on draft of this chapter by Maj Gen James

Kirk (Ret.), 6 Apr 57, OHF.
192 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

mates of personnel needs, lists of tools and

machinery requirements, and data on

commercial sources of raw materials. To

prepare industry for its role in an emergency, Frankford placed twelve orders for

small arms ammunition under the Educational Orders Act in fiscal years 1940

and 1941. Ten of these went to the Remington Arms Company for .30-caliber

tracer, .30-caliber AP, 45-caliber ball,

.50-caliber tracer, and .50-caliber AP.

The remaining two orders went to the

Western Cartridge Company for .30-

caliber ball and .45-caliber ball. Frankford

made exhaustive tests on all ammunition

these companies produced to determine its

conformity to drawings and specifications.

The quantities in the early orders were

small, seven contracts totaling only twentyfive million rounds, but in 1941 the three

largest orders totaled nearly three hundred

million rounds. The primary purpose of

educational orders, of course, was not

production but education for industry;

nevertheless, after the transfer to Britain of

over one-fourth the U.S. stockpile of small

arms ammunition in the summer of 1940,

production became more and more important.10

Allied with educational orders for complete rounds of ammunition were procurement orders placed with machine-tool

builders in 1939 and 1940. Orders for

machinery that had been developed and

tested at Frankford were placed not only

with the old line companies such as

Waterbury-Farrel and E. W. Bliss but with

many others who thus gained experience

in building small arms ammunition machinery.11

 A most significant result of these

steps was the eventual standardization of

all American ammunition makers on

Frankford Arsenal machinery, and the

adoption of this machinery by Great

Britain in 1940. This standardization made

possible the pooling of machines and the

transfer of equipment and spare parts from

one plant to another to meet any emergency.12

Although not for educational purposes,

the orders placed by other countries with

U.S. firms played an important part in

preparing American industry for war production. Beginning in 1939, small purchases of military cartridges were made of

the Remington Arms Company by China,

followed at the end of the year by Britain

and France, and by Finland in 1940. The

British orders, constituting the bulk of all

foreign purchases after the fall of France,

called for both American and British calibers—including .30- and .50-caliber cartridges for aircraft machine guns, .303-

caliber rounds for rifles and machine guns,

.45-caliber ball ammunition for Thompson

submachine guns, and 9-mm. parabellum

cartridges for British Sten submachine

guns. As U.S. plants did not have capacity

for such production, the British government had to supply machinery and capital

for expansion to the Winchester plant in

New Haven, Connecticut, and the Remington plant in Bridgeport, Connecticut.

In addition, Britain financed the building

of three new facilities for making small

arms powder and one for making armorpiercing cores. These measures, in the

opinion of Ordnance small arms ammunition specialists, were ultimately of value

1 0SAA, I, pp. 62-63. See also Hist, Frankford

Arsenal, I, pt. I, pp. 1-5. 11

 The Waterbury-Farrel Foundry and Machine

Company was located in Waterbury, Conn., and

the E. W. Bliss Company in Brooklyn, N.Y. SAA,

I, pp. 215-16 lists all the production machinery

venders who supplied Ordnance in World War II. 12

 For details on machinery procurement. see

SAA, I, pp. 200ff, and Hist, Frankford Arsenal,

I, pt. I, pp. 35-36.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 193

TABLE 18—ESTIMATED YEARLY CAPACITY OF FRANKFORD ARSENAL

a All figures as of 30 June of the year specified. They represent estimated capacity, not actual production.

Source: SAA, I, p. 48. See also Hist, Frankford Arsenal, SA Div, I, pt. 1, p. 23.

to the U.S. war effort because they enabled

American producers to expand facilities,

buy new machinery, train workers, and

make arrangements for subcontracting.13

Meanwhile Frankford steadily increased

its rate of production by buying new

machinery, allotting more floor space to

small arms ammunition, and recruiting

employees to man extra shifts.14 Because

of the urgent need for immediate production to supply U.S. troops in 1940-41,

Frankford was permitted to take for its

own use the war reserve machinery earmarked for Remington and Western. In

August 1940 the arsenal's small arms division went on a 6-day week, and added a

second 8-hour shift later in the year, but a

full third shift was not organized and put

into production until mid-1941. As a result

of these efforts, Frankford Arsenal's estimated yearly capacity, based on 'roundthe-clock operation seven days a week,

increased. (Table 18)

Building New Plants, 1940-42

At the start of the defense period there

was considerable uncertainty as to how

much ammunition would be needed and

what arrangements should be made for

its production. Ordnance leaders tended to

be conservative in their estimates and

reluctant to embark upon an overly ambitious program. They frequently questioned the estimates of future needs prepared by. G-4 and the Assistant Secretary.

In July and August 1940, when productive capacity to meet the Munitions Program of 30 June was under study, the

ammunition requirements figures reached

such high levels that about half the program was postponed to allow time for

reconsideration of the whole subject. Ordnance started planning for only two new

plants. Then in late September Brig. Gen.

Richard C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff,

informed Ordnance that the original requirements were sound and declared it

was "imperative" that production of all

small arms ammunition, particularly .30-

caliber, be greatly increased at once.15

13

 SAA, I, pp. 84-86. To supply China with

7.92-mm. ammunition the plant of the Western

Cartridge Co. at East Alton, Ill., was expanded

in 1942. 14

 For an account of this process by the officer

in charge, see "Small-Arms Ammunition," by Col.

James Kirk, Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 129

(November-December 1941), 369. The manufacturing methods are described and illustrated

with photographs. 15

 Memo, Deputy CofS (Gen Richard C.

Moore) for CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Prod of

SA Ammo, G-4/31773. See also disposition slip,

Deputy CofS to TAG and CofOrd, 6 Aug 40,

sub: Ammo Expenditure and Prod Program, in

same file.
194 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

In reply, General Wesson reviewed the

steps already taken to increase the capacity

of Frankford Arsenal and commercial

plants. The only way to gain more new

production at once, he pointed out, was

to take over the British contracts with

commercial firms in the United States. To

meet the future needs of the 2-millionman force, General Wesson said he would

have to build three new plants (including

the two under way) at a cost of $20

million each, but warned that they probably would not come into production for

fifteen months. The proposal to take over

British contracts was not acceptable, for it

ran counter to the policy of aiding Britain,

but G-4 and the Assistant Secretary

promptly approved General Wesson's proposal to build three new plants. They

thus launched the so-called First Wave of

expansion in the Ordnance small arms

ammunition program.16

The First Wave

While these discussions were in progress

Ordnance drew up detailed plans for three

government - owned, contractor - operated

(GOCO) plants. After much intensive

study, followed by approval of various

agencies, the sites were selected—Lake

City, Mo., Denver, Colo., and St. Louis,

Mo.17 The first two were to be operated

by Remington and the third by the U.S.

Cartridge Company (a subsidiary of Western Cartridge Company of East Alton,

Ill.) with the McQuay-Norris Company

operating the core-making part of the St.

Louis plant.18 A letter of intent covering

the Lake City project was sent to Remington and Western as early as mid-September

enabling them to proceed with engineering

work and placement of orders for production equipment. Ground was broken by

Senator Harry S. Truman the day after

Christmas 1940, and the first loaded cartridges were produced in September 1941

—three months ahead of General Wesson's

estimate. The site for the St. Louis plant,

largest of the small arms ammunition facilities, was selected in January 1941, and

production of .3O-caliber and .50-caliber

got under way within the year. Patterned

after Lake City, the .30-caliber Denver

plant went up faster, taking only seven

months from the start of construction in

March to first production in October

1941. With a daily population of some

20,000, the Denver plant was Colorado's

fourth largest community. It covered a

2,000-acre reservation, had more than 200

buildings, a police force larger than that

of Denver, a hospital, a railroad station,

11 miles of railroad track, 17 miles of

roads, and 15 miles of fencing.19

16

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for DCofS, 30 Sep 40,

sub: Prod of SA Ammo, OO 471/200; (2)

Memo, Lt Col Henry S. Aurand for Brig. Gen.

Eugene Reybold, sub: Prod of SA Ammo, G-4/

31773; (3) Memo, Acting ACofS (Col Reybold)

for ASW, 3 Oct 40, sub: Prod of SA Ammo,

G-4/31773; (4) Intervs with Burns and Maj.

Gen. Charles T. Harris, fall of 1953. 17

 Memo, Chief of SA Div for Chief of Ind

Serv, 16 Oct 40, sub: Funds for Manufacture of

SA Ammo. . . , OHF. When this memo was

written the Denver site had not yet been selected.

Photostat copies of letters of approval signed by

President Franklin D. Roosevelt are in OHF. The

cost of all three plants was originally estimated

to be $65,000,000. 18

 For description of the early planning on the

production of armor-piercing cores, see History of

the Core Program, by SA Div, Ind Serv, (1945),

p. 205. A single government-owned source of

supply was considered, better than purchasing

from many small commercial concerns because of

the great need for screw machines and heattreating equipment and the necessity for carefully

controlling quality. Efficiency, speed, and economy

dictated the decision to put all core production

under one roof. The subject is also treated in

SAA, I, pp. 270-84. 19

 For details on construction and early production, see the plant histories in OHF. Including

later additions, the cost of building and equip-
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 195

These First Wave plants were all in

production by December 1941. Combined,

they had a capacity of over 300,000,000

rounds per month—more than six times

the capacity of Frankford.20 But all during

1941, while they were being built and

equipped, Frankford was virtually the sole

source of new small arms ammunition.

Commercial firms under contract to the

British were not disturbed. Frankford thus

served as an element of the "Regular Army

of production" holding the fort alone until

new plants could come to the rescue. It

also served as a school where contractor

personnel were trained in methods of producing various types of ammunition.21

All during the 1940-41 defense period,

small arms ammunition was in extremely

short supply. It was the most critical class

of items in Ordnance procurement. Both

G-4 and the Assistant Secretary of War

repeatedly urged Ordnance to open new

plants as fast as possible. Secretary Patterson time after time stressed the need for

more production. In February 1941, for

example, he wrote to General Wesson as

follows:

As you know, the situation in regard to

Caliber .30 and Caliber .50 small arms ammunition is most critical. The existing stocks

together with deliveries scheduled for 1941

are, in general, not adequate to meet the

needs of the Army and Navy for target

practice . . . and to provide necessary combat reserves. ... It will be necessary to

limit training to a very small part of requirements.212

A few months later he told General Wesson

and General Somervell that the shortage of

small arms ammunition was being presented to him from day to day and that

officers in the field considered it "the major deterrent to proper training of the

troops."

 23

 Because of the urgency of the

situation, construction and equipment of

all the small arms plants was given an

A-1-a priority in May 1941, the only

such priority rating granted to Ordnance,

and their operation after completion was

given the same rating.24

The Second Wave

Under these pressures Ordnance drew

up plans for the Second Wave of three

plants. Approved by the War Department

in the spring of 1941, construction of the

Utah, Twin Cities, and Des Moines plants

began during late July and August. In

addition to its already heavy burden as

operator of Lake City and Denver, Remington undertook to operate the Utah

plant at Salt Lake City. To staff this

facility, which covered five thousand acres,

the company recruited and trained more

than ten thousand employees in a nonping these three plants was a little more than

$250,000,000. SAA, I, table opposite p. 114.

20

 The total daily capacity of the new plants

included 8,000,000 .30-caliber, 2,000,000 .30-

caliber carbine (added in December 1941) and

1,200,000 .50-caliber. Frankford's daily capacity in

June 1941 was about 2,000,000, including .30-

caliber, .45-caliber, and .50-caliber, SAA, I, p.

153. 21

 It should be noted that small arms ammunition was only one part of Frankford's responsibility. The arsenal was also a center for development

and production of artillery ammunition and fire

control apparatus. 22

 Memo, ASW for CofOrd, 10 Feb 41, sub:

Expediting Prod of SA Ammo, OO 471.4/504.

For G-4 opinion, see Memo, G-4 for CofOrd,

23 Sep 40, sub: Prod of SA Ammo. G-4 file

31773. 23

 Memo, Patterson for Wesson, 2 Jul 41, OO

471-4/1337. 24

 (1) Memo, ANMB for Brig Gen Charles T.

Harris, 9 May 41, sub: Priority Rating for SA

Ammo, OO 471.4/988; (2) Memo, Lt Col

Drewry for Chief of Ind Serv, 13 May 41, sub:

Priority Rating for SA Ammo, OO 471.41/1002.
196 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

industrial area where workers with factory

experience were almost unknown. The

Federal Cartridge Company of Anoka,

Minn., contracted to operate the Twin

Cities Ordnance Plant a few miles north

of Minneapolis and St. Paul.25 The plant

at Des Moines, Iowa, went to a concern

with no experience in ammunition production—the U.S. Rubber Company of Akron, Ohio. Because the rubber shortage

had forced curtailment of its normal operations, this concern was able to place part

of its managerial resources at the disposal

of the Ordnance Department.26 All these

plants were of a less permanent type than

those of the First Wave and came into

production during February and March

1942, averaging only seven months from

the date ground was broken. When completed, they brought total monthly production capacity up to 480,000,000 for

.30-caliber and 140,000,000 for .50-

caliber.27 Steel cores for AP ammunition

were supplied all the Second Wave plants

by the Toledo Core Plant operated by the

Willys-Overland Company.

In 1940 Ordnance saw that the old line

brass and copper companies would not be

able to produce all the brass strip needed

by the ammunition program. As ammunition requirements rose time after time

during 1941 the need for new brass strip

capacity became more clearly apparent.

Ordnance therefore made arrangements

for building four new brass mills to be

financed by the Defense Plant Corporation

and operated under cost-plus-fixed-fee

contracts by four leading brass companies

—American, Bridgeport, Chase, and Revere. Expansion of existing privately owned

plants—particularly Western Cartridge,

supplier for the St. Louis plant—was also

undertaken, but in 1942 the shortage of

brass strip capacity became acute.28

Building and equipping all these new

plants during 1941 in competition with

hundreds of other high priority projects for

scarce machine tools and building materials was not easy. For the First Wave,

machine-tool deliveries took almost a year

after the orders were placed, and there

was nearly as long a delay in equipping

the Second Wave plants. Heavy machinery

needed for mass production of ammunition

was of special design and could not have

been built quickly even if machine-tool

builders had not been flooded with other

orders. At the request of the government,

Remington and Western co-operated closely in standardizing equipment and placing

orders for machinery, opening a joint office

at Frankford for the purpose in November

1940. Intensive efforts were also made to

provide an adequate supply of perishable

tools at all the plants.29

Shortage of experienced management

was another major bottleneck. It was estimated that in 1940 there were in the

United States less than one hundred men

25

 On selection of these sites, see memo for

record by E. M. Martin, 9 Sep 41, pp. 138-39,

SAA, II, Ref 40. The Ordnance historical files

contain histories of each plant. 26

 Memo, Maj Edward C. Franklin for Fisc Div,

1 Oct 41, pp. 140-41, in SAA, II, Ref 41. This

memo explains the reasons for selecting each contractor for the Second Wave plants. 27

 Each plant was originally designed to produce 2,000,000 rounds of .30-caliber and 600,000

rounds of .50-caliber per day, but the quantities

were changed frequently. See Incl to Memo,

CofOrd for USW, 18 Apr 41, OO 400.12/2764. 28

 (1) SAA, I, pp. 254-58; (2) Memo, Campbell to Brig Gen Charles T. Harris, 23 Nov 40,

Ref 107 in SAA, II. 29

 For details on procurement of machinery, see

SAA, I, pp. 200ff. The contract with Remington

to schedule and expedite procurement of all production machinery is described in History, Utah

Ordnance Plant, Volume 101. The tool problem

is discussed in History, St. Louis Ordnance Plant,

Volumes VIII-IX.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 197

with comprehensive knowledge of military

ammunition production. To staff the First

Wave plants, the small arms industry had

spread its executive and supervisory personnel so thin that there was some question as to its ability to take over management of the Second Wave. Ordnance

officers were deeply concerned about this

matter, for they recalled the failure of

many firms to produce in 1917-18. "During the last war," wrote General Wesson,

"a large number of concerns, inexperienced

in the production of small arms ammunition, attempted its production and the

records show that not one of them ever

delivered a satisfactory round."

 30

All these factors combined led General

Wesson to conclude in the spring of 1941

that, beyond the three First Wave plants

under contract and the three Second Wave

plants just approved, no further expansion of small arms ammunition facilities

should be undertaken. He felt that taxing

the managerial ability of the ammunition

industry beyond its capacity would jeopardize the entire program.31

The Third Wave

No additional plants were authorized by

the War Department during the summer

of 1941, but in September, Col. Thomas J.

Hayes of the Under Secretary's office made

a comparison of requirements with production capacity and concluded that capacity fell far short of meeting the needs

of the Army, Navy, and Air Corps—

without even considering defense aid.32

After his requirements figures were confirmed by G-4, Colonel Hayes recommended that Ordnance create additional

capacity at once, including facilities for

rolling sheet brass. He recognized that copper would be difficult to obtain but did

not believe it should be accepted as "the

determining factor in this question" in

view of the possible savings from converting to steel artillery cases, salvaging used

brass cases, and curtailing civilian use of

copper.33 General Harris, then acting

Chief of Ordnance, was reluctant to undertake this expansion (estimated to cost

$225 million if new plants were built)

without more definite assurance that copper and machine tools would be available.

He cited figures to show that requirements

for the new plants, when added to those

of existing plants, would total fifty-three

million pounds of copper per month, or

nearly 18 percent of all copper expected to

be available to the United States during

1942. He quoted the Office of Production

Management to the effect that this amount

of copper could not be allocated to small

arms ammunition without seriously curtailing production of other items. But on

1 November the Under Secretary's Office

overruled General Harris and directed

Ordnance to go ahead with the new construction. General Hayes meanwhile reiterated his opinion that curtailment of

civilian consumption would ease the copper

30

 Memo, CofOrd for USW, 18 Apr 41, sub:

Prod Capacity for Cal. .30 and Cal. .50 Ammo,

OO 400.12/2764, copy in SAA, II, Ref 16b. For a

list of the concerns that did produce ammunition

in World War I, see Memo, Col Rene R. Studler

for CofOrd, 12 Aug 41, sub: SA Ammo Prod

during the World War. Gen Minton's file, Reports

Requested. For an excellent brief account of

World War I experiences, see Crowell, America's

Munitions 1917-18, Chapter 12, Book 1. 31

 Ibid. 32

 Memo, Col Thomas J. Hayes, OUSW, for

WD Facilities Bd, 15 Sep 41, sub: Prod Capacity

for . . . Ammo, SAA, II, Ref 48. 33

 Memo, Hayes, OUSW, for WD Facilities Bd,

3 Oct 41, sub: Prod Capacity for . . . Ammo,

SAA, II, Ref 50. See also Memo, G-4 for WD

Facilities Bd, 26 Sep 41, same sub, in G-4/

28664-104, OO 471.4/2169, and copy in SAA, II,

Ref 62.
198 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

shortage and pointed out again that existing plants, even operating twenty-four

hours per day seven days a week, could

not meet stated requirements.34

Still doubting the wisdom of this decision, Generals Wesson and Harris in

mid-November called for a reconsideration

of the whole subject of ammunition requirements. They pointed out that facilities sufficient to maintain an army of four

million men in the field were under construction and would start producing early

in 1942. "By reason of shipping difficulties

alone," they wrote, "it does not appear

probable that an American army of 4,000-

000 men will engage in combat within the

next twelve months either in this hemisphere or in any other theater. This twelve

month period will permit filling up the

lines of supply and producing a reserve

. . . sufficient . . . for an additional year."

They argued that no new plants were

needed, except possibly for special new

items, and challenged the validity of the

astronomical figures being used for 1942

ammunition requirements. In addition to

their contention that four million men

would not see combat overseas in 1942,

the generals asserted that the established

Day of Supply for computing ammunition

requirements was far too high and could

possibly be reduced by as much as 75

percent.35

While awaiting an answer, Ordnance

went ahead with plans to carry out the

1 November directive. To provide the additional capacity as quickly and economically as possible, Colonel Drewry, Chief of

the Small Arms Branch, decided to expand

existing plants rather than build new ones

—and also take into account the fact that

the plants were producing from 30 to 40

percent more than expected.36 Space originally provided at each plant for storage

of incoming and outgoing materials was

taken over for manufacturing. One new

building was erected at Lake City and

three at Twin Cities. AP cores were produced by the Edison G. E. Appliance

Company of Chicago, operator of the Chicago Core Plant, and by Cuneo Press, Inc.,

and other commercial firms.37 This expansion, generally referred to as the Third

Wave, was estimated to cost just under

$100 million and to add about 50 percent

to the capacity established by the first two

waves.38 While these steps were being

taken war broke out with the attack on

Pearl Harbor, and Secretary Patterson redoubled his demands for more ammunition. "The combat forces need .50-caliber

ammunition more than anything else," he

wrote late in December. "The need is

urgent and pressing. . . . There is no time

to lose."

 39

34

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for USW, 8 Oct 41, sub:

Additional Prod Capacity for . . . Ammo, and

1st Indorsement, 1 Nov 41, OO 471.4/2172; (2)

Memo, Brig Gen Hayes for WD Facilities Bd, 24

Oct 41, OO 471.4/2172. 35

 Memo, CofOrd, for USW, 17 Nov 41, sub:.

Plng Rules for the Victory Program, OO 381/

48577 and ExecO files. See also Ltr, Brig Gen Guy

H. Drewry (Ret.) to Thomson, 26 Jan 54, OHF,

stating, "I thought the small arms ammunition

requirements were unrealistic and excessive from the beginning." 30

 The capacity of each plant had been conservatively estimated in advance without operating

experience to show what might be accomplished

by adapting conveyorized production to previous

Remington and Frankford procedures. 37

 (1) Hist, Core Program, pp. 15-17; (2)

SAA, II, p. 281. 38

 (1) SAA, I, p. 164. See also the original

statement of this plan by Col Drewry in Memo

for Brig Gen Charles Harris, 13 Nov 41, sub:

Plan for Increased Prod Capacity of SA Ammo,

OHF. For Secretary Patterson's approval and detailed statement of costs, see Memorandum of Approval-No. 9, 20 Dec 41, copy in SAA, II, p. 199. 39

 Memo, USW for CofOrd, 27 Dec 41, sub:

.50-Cal. Ammo, OO 471.4/2977. See also strongly

worded Memo of Somervell (G-4) to USW, 26
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 199

Post Pearl Harbor Requirements

The Ordnance memo of mid-November

was answered by the tide of events more

than by careful study of production problems. In the hectic weeks following Pearl

Harbor the planners reviewed the Day of

Supply, the planned rate of mobilization,

probable losses through ship sinkings, the

maximum production to be expected from

existing plants, the time required to build

new facilities, the availability of machine

tools, the supply of copper, and aid to

allies. The British Prime Minister and his

staff came to Washington in December

1941 for a series of conferences at which

the need for increasing American production goals was forcefully presented. The

huge lend-lease requirements then formulated greatly strengthened the case for new

ammunition plants, but Ordnance considered them "unrealistic and excessive."

General Harris argued in vain to have the

estimates for foreign aid reduced. "But in

those days," he remarked later, "it was

practically treason to question anything

the British asked for."

 40

During January and February 1942 the

prevailing attitude among the high-level

planning agencies in Washington was that

the sky was the limit. There was no time

for tediously accurate computations but

only for quick and generous estimates.

Following the Churchill-Roosevelt conversations in December and the signing of the

Declaration of the United Nations on New

Year's Day 1942, President Roosevelt revealed the new production goals in a

dramatic message to Congress. The armed

services were to procure during 1942 some

forty-five thousand airplanes, forty-five

thousand tanks, five hundred thousand

machine guns, and "ammunition commensurate to this program on the assumption

that these munitions of war are to be used

in combat."

 41

Under this statement of policy by the

Commander in Chief, requirements for

small arms ammunition reached dizzy

heights, one proposal calling for the production of 122 billion rounds by the end

of 1944. General Harris, who as chief of

the Industrial Service was responsible for

procuring these vast quantities of ammunition, felt that the Presidential advisers,

and their British counterparts, were suffering from an attack of the jitters and were

asking Ordnance and American industry

to do things that were neither necessary

nor possible. Conceding that there was an

ammunition shortage at the moment, he

urged patience and assured his listeners

that when the new plants came into production the nation would find that, for

the first time since the emergency began,

it had "too much, too soon." "Give us a

little time," he pleaded, "and you will

have ammunition running out of your

ears." He and General Wesson warned

Dec 41, sub: Priority of Munitions, referring to

the "acute shortage" of .50-caliber ammunition

and the "urgent necessity for increased production," USW file 104 Ammo.

40

 Interv with Maj Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr.,

Dec 53. In telephone conversation with the author

on 7 January 1954, Maj Gen Hayes declared

that the lend-lease requirements formulated in

December 1941 were "staggering" and were first

presented to Ordnance during a long night conference on 30 December 1941. See also memo

referring to this conference, Hayes for USW, 1

Jan 42, USW files 104, Ammo. General Drewry's

opinion that the requirements were too high is

expressed in letter to the author, 26 January

1954, OHF. 41

 See also Ltr, President Franklin D. Roosevelt

to Stimson, 3 Jan 42, ex. 19 in PSP 55, vol. I, by

Maj Paul D. Olejar and others, Jul 45, OHF, and

Incl to Memo, Patterson for Knudsen, 2 Jan 42,

OUSW Madigan file (Ord Gen), 50-240.
200 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

that additional plants were unnecessary,

would be a waste of money and materials,

and would not be able to operate for lack

of copper. But these pleas were out of

tune with the prevailing Washington mood,

and in mid-February, when G-4 commented on the Ordnance memo of 17

November, the existing Day of Supply and

the over-all ammunition requirements were

upheld. "The quantities contained in current programs," wrote General Somervell,

"are not excessive."

 42

 The War Production Board gave assurance that sufficient

copper would be available, and Ordnance

was directed to build eighty more production lines—the equivalent of three new

plants—before the end of the year.43 These

new lines, known as the Fourth Wave,

could produce during 1943 about 5,500,-

000,000 rounds of .30-caliber or 3,240,-

000,000 rounds of .50-caliber. G-4 was

to determine the proportion of each caliber and type. One hundred more lines

were tentatively proposed for the first half

of 1943, but it was planned to review the

situation again before these lines were

finally authorized.44

The Fourth Wave

The 8o-line expansion was mostly for

.30-caliber ammunition, 51 of the lines

being devoted to that caliber. It was designed to increase existing capacity by

about 40 percent and bring total yearly

production up to 22,500,000,000 rounds.45

Ordnance decided to achieve it by expanding four existing plants—Lake City,

Denver, Des Moines, and Evansville—, by

converting the Kings Mills plant from

.45-caliber to .30-caliber carbine, and by

converting five commercial plants that had

formerly made candy, textiles, rubber

tires, and automobiles. Remington undertook to operate the Lowell Plant in Massachusetts, Kelly-Springfield Tire Company

the Allegany Plant in Maryland, U.S.

Rubber Company the Eau Claire (Wis.)

and Milwaukee plants, and Simmons Bed

Company the Kenosha plant in Wisconsin. A new cup plant in Detroit, to be

operated by the Parker-Wolverine Company, was added in the fall. Contrary to

expectations, most of these plants got into

production before the end of the year,

Milwaukee and Eau Claire starting up in

August, Allegany and Lowell in November.

At the year's end there were twelve small

arms ammunition plants in operation, and

the peak of the wartime expansion had

been reached. (See Illustration) The designed capacity of these plants was about

twenty billion rounds per year, but their

42

 (1) Intervs with Maj Gen Charles T. Harris,

Jr., Dec; (2) Memo, G-4 for USW, 12 Feb 42,

sub: Day of Supply. . . , G-4/20052-67 and Ord

ExecO files; (3) Memo, GofOrd for OUSW, 10

Jan 42, sub: SA Prod Capacity, OHF; (4) Memo,

CofOrd for OUSW, 31 Jan 42, sub: Request for

Approval of Facilities Project (Evansville), OO

160/116196 Chrysler; (5) Excerpts from testimony of Col Drewry at conf, 30-31 Dec 41, 21

Jan 42, SAA, II, pp. 216-18; (6) Memo, CofOrd

for CG, SOS, 25 Apr 42, sub: Additional Capacity for SA Matériel, Ref 109 in SAA, II. 43

 A "line" was a manufacturing area capable

of producing 250,000 rounds of .30-caliber or

150,000 rounds of .5O-caliber per 24-hour day. As

plants could produce 30 percent or 40 percent

over designed capacity, figures for line capacity

went up considerably in 1942. 44

 (1) Memo, Col Drewry for CofOrd, 23 Feb

42, sub: Confirmation of Decisions Made During

Conf, Friday, Feb 20, 1942. SAA, II, pp. 221-24.

For detailed reports of the discussions of this

problem, see the series of stenographic reports of

conferences in the first half of 1942 entitled Review of Production Plans of Small Arms Division.

Excerpts from these reports are in SAA, II. 45

 Memo, SA Div for Ind Serv Prod Div, 6

Mar 42, sub: Request for A-1-a Rating. . . ,

SAA, II, p. 354.
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION INDUSTRY

SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION PLANTS

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Plant

Allegany Ordnance

Plant

Denver Ordnance Plant

Des Moines Ordnance

Plant

Eau Claire Ordnance

Plant

Evansville Ordnance

Plant

Kings Mills Ordnance

Plant

Lake City Ordnance

Plant

Lowell Ordnance Plant

Milwaukee Ordnance

Plant

St. Louis Ordnance

Plant

Twin Cities Ordnance

Plant

Utah Ordnance Plant

Location

Cumberland, Md.

Denver, Colo.

Des Moines, Iowa

Eau Claire, Wis.

Evansville, Ind.

Kings Mills, Ohio

Independence, Mo.

Lowell, Mass.

Milwaukee, Wis.

St. Louis, Mo.

New Brighton, Minn.

Salt Lake City, Utah

Contractor

Kelly-Springfield Eng. Co.

(Goodyear)

Remington Arms Co.

United States Rubber Co.

United States Rubber Co.

Chrysler Corporation

Remington Arms Co.

Remington Arms Co.

Remington Arms Co.

United States Rubber Co.

United States Cartridge Co.

Federal Cartridge Co.

Remington Arms Co.
202 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

maximum actual capacity was close to

thirty billion.46

Coming just before the 80-line Fourth

Wave, but generally considered part of it,

was the Evansville plant in Indiana operated by the Chrysler Corporation to manufacture .45-caliber ammunition. Requirements for this caliber had been low during

1940 and most of 1941, but in August

1941 new British and Chinese requirements

necessitated doubling existing capacity. A

contract was soon placed with Remington to convert its Kings Mills plant at

Cincinnati, Ohio, to 45-caliber production, and in late January 1942 the Chrysler

Corporation agreed to convert its idle

body plant at Evansville, Indiana, to .45-

caliber production. In the summer of 1942

the Kings Mills Plant was converted to

.30-caliber carbine cartridges. Between

June 1942, when it started producing,

and the spring of 1944, when it closed,

Evansville turned out over 90 percent of

all .45-caliber ammunition produced in

the United States. The Sunbeam Electric

Company operated a division of the Evansville Plant making cartridge cases.47

The Fourth Wave was the high point for

small arms ammunition, so high, in fact,

that it was never reached. Plans for one of

the plants were canceled before the contract was signed, and during the summer

of 1942, as Ordnance had predicted, the

shortage of copper and a revision of requirements led to curtailment at all other

plants. Because of the lack of copper, Twin

Cities, Des Moines, and Utah were specifically directed in June to freeze their

production at the level attained in midMay. In spite of efforts to use steel in

place of brass, the copper shortage caused

a loss of over one hundred eighty-five

thousand rounds in the single month of

June 1942.48 Magnesium was so scarce

that Ordnance reported its plants were

"living from hand to mouth—eating off

the stove."

 49

 Before the Fourth Wave

plants were more than half built, substantial cuts were made in requirements.

With .30-caliber, for example, requirements for 1942 production were cut back

from 8.6 billion in March 1942 to 4.8

billion in September. There were some

increases in .50-caliber and .30-caliber carbine requirements for 1943 but they were

small in comparison with the cuts in .30-

caliber and .45-caliber.

 50

 Total output required for 1942 dropped from fifty-nine

billion in February to twenty-three billion

in November.51

The Fifth Wave

As early as July 1942 Ordnance submitted recommendations for curtailing

1943 production and making minor

46

 Interim Rpt on SA Ammo, 26 Dec 44, by

War Projects Unit, Bur of the Budget, OO 471.4/

2333 (c). For a brief period in 1943 the Scioto

Ordnance Plant at Marion, Ohio, produced small

arms ammunition and brought the total up to 13. 47

 Bullets by the Billion, issued by Evansville

Ord Plant. Evansville was not a governmentowned plant as were the first six plants, but a

privately owned plant converted to war production. The same was true of Lowell, Allegany, and

Eau Claire. 48

 Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS 1 Jul 42, sub:

Curtailment of Prod at SA Ammo Plants Due to

Shortage of Copper, Ref III, SAA, II. The figure

of 209,000,000 rounds is given in Review of Production Plans, Small Arms Branch, 20 July 1942.

See also discussion of copper as "the limiting

factor in ammunition production" by Kirk in Review of the Production Plans of the Small Arms

Division, 19 Jun 42. 49

 Review of Prod Plans, SA Br, 16 Dec 42,

ExecO file. 50

 (1) Memo, Col Drewry for Chief, Ind Serv,

3 Jun 42, sub: Prod and Rqmts of SA Matériel,

and attached buck slip, both in OHF; (2) SAA,

I, p. 178. 51

 Review of Prod Plans, SA Br, 16 Dec 42,

T676A.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 203

changes in plants already in operation or

under construction. The recommendations

were promptly approved by the Services of

Supply and the Under Secretary and,

though calling for reduction rather than

expansion, came to be known as the Fifth

Wave. Kenosha was canceled entirely;

Kings Mills shifted from .45-caliber to

.30-caliber carbine; Evansville closed down

twenty lines; Allegany and Lowell switched

from .30-caliber ball to .50-caliber AP;

and additional capacity for .50-caliber was

created at Lake City, Des Moines, and

Twin Cities. Including other minor

changes, forty-three lines were canceled

and four added—two for .50-caliber incendiary and two for .50-caliber AP.

Planned production for 1943 was reduced

by 2,500,000,000 rounds. The period of

facilities expansion, which had cost about

$500 million for buildings and equipment, was over, and the period of readjustment and retrenchment was beginning.52

The Philadelphia Suboffice

General Campbell decentralized the office force for administration of the small

arms ammunition plants in the summer of

1942 by creating the Small Arms Ammunition Suboffice in Philadelphia. It was

headed by Lt. Col. Boone Gross and was

administratively attached to Frankford

Arsenal. Under control of the Small Arms

Division in Washington, it co-ordinated

small arms ammunition production in

much the same way that FDAP in St.

Louis co-ordinated production of artillery

ammunition. Inspection problems and requests for engineering changes were

handled by the Philadelphia office in collaboration with Frankford Arsenal. Manufacturing costs at the GOCO plants were

studied and compared, and efforts were

made to reduce contract prices where the

evidence warranted such action.53 In July

1943 the Philadelphia suboffice adopted an

incentive plan for determining fees paid to

plant operators. This plan provided that

the contractor's fee would be raised or

lowered, within specified limits, according

to the success he achieved in producing

high quality ammunition, lowering costs,

and using manpower effectively.54

All the plants were further tied together

by industry integration committees. The

foundation for this co-operative effort was

laid in 1940 when Remington and Western,

with Ordnance approval and encouragement, agreed to use identical machinery

in the new plants they were to operate.

This was long before industry integration

committees were formally established in

1942. Remington and Western were soon

joined by other contractor-operators, Federal Cartridge, U.S. Rubber, Chrysler,

and Kelly-Springfield, and by many concerns making bullet cores, clad metal

jackets, tools and metallic belt links, and

ammunition containers. These committees

held countless meetings to iron out technical difficulties, exchange information,

52

 (1) Memo for record by Col James Kirk, 8

Jul 42, sub: Prod Capacity for SA Ammo, and

inds, OHF; (2) SAA, I, pp. 178ff; (3) Hist,

Lake City Ord Plant, II, Jan-Mar 43, app. A;

(4) Review of Prod Plans, SA Br, 16 Dec 42,

T676A. For details on costs, see SAA, I, pp.

114-30. 53

 (1) Lt Col Boone Gross, Cost Analysis of

Six GOCO Small Arms Ammunition Plants, 4 Jan

43; (2) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team,

pp. 62-63; (3) SAA, I, pp. 108-10 and 131-40;

(4) Maj A. R. Coleman, "Economy in Weapon

Production," Army Ordnance, XXVII, No. 145

(July-August 1944), 83-87. 54

 For a description of the plan and its application to one plant, see 2d Indorsement, Philadelphia Suboffice to OCO, 29 Dec 44, on Report of

Special Inspection of CPFF Contracts at St. Louis

Ord Plant, 30 Nov 44, OOP 333.1/182 St. Louis

OP (Incl file). See also SAA, I, pp. 132-40.
204 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

and agree upon standard engineering practices. "It is impossible to over evaluate the

work of the various participating industries," states the official history of the

Small Arms Branch. "It has been brilliant

and distinguished."

 55

Production Processes and Problems

The number of GOCO plants making

small arms ammunition was only onefifth the number of artillery ammunition

plants and works, for it included no smokeless powder or TNT plants, no chemical

works like Baytown, nor any loading plants

comparable to Kingsbury or Cornhusker.

As smokeless powder for rifle and machine

gun cartridges was required in comparatively small quantities it was obtained from

the powder plants built for artillery ammunition. High explosives such as TNT

and RDX were not used at all in small

arms ammunition. Nor did manufacture of

small caliber cartridges require separate

plants for making cases, shells, fuzes, or

other components, or for loading and assembling complete rounds. Each small

arms plant was a self-contained unit wherein thousands of workers—including as

many women as men—completed the

whole process of manufacture amid rows

of huge automatic machines, conveyor

belts, and annealing furnaces. Raw material in the form of brass strips or cups, lead

billets, steel wire, and smokeless powder

came in at one end of the plant; millions

of bright and shining cartridges came out

the other end.

Description of Manufacture.

Operations within the St. Louis Ordnance Plant, largest of the small arms ammunition facilities, may be cited as fairly

representative of the production process.

Covering an area of three hundred acres

and employing more than forty thousand

workers, this $130 million plant, operated

by the United States Cartridge Company,

was the largest employer of labor in the

St. Louis area. Its first lot of ammunition

was accepted by Ordnance on the day

after Pearl Harbor, and during the next

four years it turned out over seven billion

rounds, including ball, armor-piercing, and

incendiary types.56

Each cartridge made at St. Louis, as at

other plants, consisted of three metal parts

—case, primer, and bullet. The case was

normally made of brass and, except for

size, was similar to an artillery case. The

primer, inserted in a pocket in the head

of the case, was a small cup containing a

sensitive explosive. When struck by the

firing pin it burst into flame and ignited

the propellent powder in the case. The

bullet was an elongated lead slug covered

with a thin jacket of gilding metal (a soft

copper alloy) or copper-clad steel and was

held firmly in the mouth of the case. Each

of these parts had to meet rigid specifications governing its weight, shape, lineal

measurements, and exterior finish—specifications that had been worked out during

55

 (1) SAA, I, pp. 342-484; (2) History of all

Small-Arms Industry Integration Committees.

Both volumes contain many letters from small

arms ammunition contractors describing the work

of the committees and praising their usefulness.

See also, for specific data on each committee,

McMullen, Industry Integration Committees. 56

 (1) History, St. Louis Ordnance Plant, OHF;

(2) Bullets by the Billion, a pamphlet for employees and visitors issued by the St. Louis plant

in 1943, copy in vol. VI of plant history. For

related data on ammunition see TM 9-1900, 18

Jun 45, and Bullets by the Billion issued by the

Evansville plant. Reports of inspecting officers also

contain a wealth of specific information. See OOP

333.1 St. Louis Ord Plant.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 205

many years of experiment and been tested

by firing millions of rounds at Ordnance

proof ranges.57

Cartridge brass came to the St. Louis

plant from Western Cartridge Company's

nearby brass mill at East Alton, Ill., in the

form of long strips coiled like huge rolls

of cellophane tape. The first step in cartridge case manufacture at St. Louis was

to feed these brass strips into a blank-andcup machine that simultaneously

stamped out round disks and formed them

into cups. These cups were then washed,

dried, and placed in furnaces to relieve

stresses and strains developed during the

cupping process. If not relieved, these

metallurgical pressures might cause the

case to crack during later manufacturing

operations or during storage. Ordnance

later transferred this phase of cartridge

manufacture to the brass mills as the shipment to ammunition plants of strips containing a good deal of scrap was less

economical than shipment of cups.

As they emerged from the furnaces the

cups had to be "pickled" in an acid bath

to remove the oxide film that formed

during annealing. To wash off every trace

of surface impurity they were rinsed in

cold water, bathed in hot soapy water,

rinsed again, and dried. Only then were

they ready for the "first draw" during

which a long, powerful punch was forced

into each cup, making it deeper and

thinner-walled—more like a drinking glass

than a cup. Four such draws were needed

before the case reached its proper length,

and after each draw the cases had again

to be annealed, pickled, washed, dried,

and trimmed. Company inspectors visually

examined the cups after each operation to

detect crooked heads, scratches, or other

defects; they also gaged them for length,

inside and outside diameter, and wall

thickness. Next came the punching of a

small pocket in the head of the case to hold

the primer cup, followed by the heading

operation that flattened the end of the

case, stamped on it the plant initials and

year of manufacture, and cut the extractor

groove.

The tapering and necking process was

far more difficult than it appeared to be.

It demanded careful annealing and precision working of the case to give it a

narrow neck, sloping shoulders, and a

slightly tapered body. Only the body was

annealed—not the head, for it had to

remain hard—so the cases were slipped

into holes in a revolving dial that exposed the bodies to a row of gas burners

while the heads were submerged in cold

water. The next step was insertion of the

primer. The machine used for this purpose

first punched a "flash hole" in the primer

pocket, then seated the primer to the

proper depth and crimped it into place.

After shellac and varnish were applied to

make the cases moisture-proof, they were

dried and inspected. If they passed muster

they were ready to be filled with powder

and topped with bullets.

The bullets used at St. Louis were

innocent-looking metal slugs that appeared

to present no difficult manufacturing

problems. But in fact their fabrication involved a number of rather intricate steps.

The simplest type of ammunition was ball,

with tracer, armor-piercing, and incendiary

rounds each introducing its own complications. Ball bullets belied their name.

They were not ball-shaped but pointed at

the nose. AP bullets not only had a pointed

nose but also a slight taper or boattail at

the base. The only small arms bullet that

57

 For contemporary description data, see TM

9-1900, Small-Arms Ammunition, 23 May 42.
206 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

LEAD SLUGS FOR .45-CALIBER BULLETS being cut from reel of lead wire.

even approached ball shape was the .45-

caliber.

 58

 The essential material in .30-

caliber and .45-caliber ball bullets was

lead, but the lead had to be covered with

a bullet jacket, normally made of gilding

metal. Cutting the lead slugs from lengths

of slender wire was a comparatively simple

operation, but forming the bullet jacket

was something akin to making cartridge

cases. Starting with strips of gilding metal,

disks were stamped out and formed into

cups which then went through a whole

series of annealing, pickling, cleaning, and

drawing operations before they were ready

to be slipped over the lead slugs. As it did

with cartridge brass, Ordnance transferred

the process from its ammunition plants

to commercial suppliers. For armorpiercing ammunition special AP cores of

hardened steel took the place of lead slugs,

and only enough lead was used to insure

a snug fit. AP cores used by the St. Louis

plant were manufactured by the McQuayNorris Company in its core-making facility within the plant. A tracer bullet consisted of a jacket containing a small lead

slug and illuminant powder that burned

while the bullet was in flight. An incendiary bullet contained a chemical mixture

that ignited on impact with the target.

Assembling the parts of the cartridge was

usually referred to as "loading," although

this term did not include insertion of the

58

 The use of the term "ball" was apparently

a carryover from earlier days when spherical bullets were standard. It was used in World War II

to describe bullets of plain lead, or soft steel and

lead combined, and to distinguish them from

bullets of a specialized nature such as AP, incendiary, or tracer.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 207

primer into the case. At the loading machine the case was filled with smokeless

powder, the bullet was inserted in its

mouth, and the case was crimped to hold

the bullet securely, i.e., the edge of the

case mouth was rolled so that it bit into

the groove or cannelure in the bullet. The

nose of the bullet was then dipped into

lacquer of the proper color to identify it

as to type—red for tracer, black for AP,

blue for incendiary, and so on. Powder was

brought to the plant as needed from the

Tyson Valley Powder Storage Area, a

2500-acre plot thirty-two miles southwest

of the plant site.

All along the line of manufacture and

assembly, company inspectors watched for

imperfections that might cause trouble

when a cartridge was fired. With the aid

of mirrors and magnifying glasses some

looked for surface defects while others

with hand gages checked various dimensions. For inspection purposes the St.

Louis plant used over sixteen thousand

precision gages and micrometers costing

more than half a million dollars. When

completely loaded, the ammunition went

through a machine that automatically

checked each cartridge for weight, length,

and profile. At this point government inspectors entered the picture to take samples from each lot for thorough inspection

before acceptance of the entire lot. Ordnance considered this sampling technique,

known as "quality control," adequate because employees of the company had already made countless inspections during

the manufacturing process.59 In the St.

Louis "proof house" more than a million

rounds were fired every month to check

their performance; some were taken apart

to see whether they had sufficient powder;

others were soaked in water to test their

ability to "keep their powder dry." Muzzle

velocity tests and accuracy tests were also

part of the program to maintain quality at

a high level. All told, inspections on a

typical round numbered more than fifty.

The St. Louis Episode

In January 1943 sensational charges of

faulty inspection procedures at the St.

Louis plant appeared in a local newspaper, the St. Louis Star-Times. "Unfit

Shells Pass Plant Inspection at Factory

Here, Inspectors Charge" was the frontpage headline on 4 January 1943. "Five

company employees have given statements

to the St. Louis Star-Times," the article

read, "charging manufacture of defective

ammunition. All are engaged in some form

of inspection and testing in the manufacture of .50-caliber machine gun cartridges.

They say they have direct knowledge of

defects in some of the component parts of

cartridges produced under their eyes."

Cases with cracked heads sometimes

passed inspection, the employees charged

in affidavits, and cases with ragged flash

holes were passed "if any kind of hole was

visible." Under pressure to speed production, powder was loaded into cases that

still retained water after being washed and

dried, or that contained grease or oil from

production machines. One laboratory

worker declared that defective brass had

been used for the past month in cartridge

cases despite reports of tests showing the

defects. Another charge was that the company's production department approved

cartridges with loose-fitting bullets. As

Ordnance inspectors at the plant checked

only small samples—less than 1 percent

59

 For discussion of over-all Ordnance policies

on inspection, see Chapter XIV, below.
208 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

—from each lot of ammunition before

accepting it for the government, the employees asserted there was a "strong

chance" that defective cartridges were

slipping through unnoticed in the 99 percent of each lot that was not government

inspected.60 Though not made public, a

report of an inspecting officer dated 31

December 1942 cited complaints by employees that foremen had told minor inspectors to violate established practice by

forcing gages to provide a greater amount

of aircraft ammunition.

 61

The United States Cartridge Company

promptly denied the charges and declared

that "bad or imperfect ammunition has

not been sent from this plant." It branded

the charges "false and ridiculous" and

called for a complete investigation by the

government.62 The other newspapers in St.

Louis played down the story and suggested it was based on "tavern talk." On 6

January a spokesman for the Army declared that "no report had been received

by the Ordnance Department about defective material from the St. Louis Small

Arms Plant during the current situation."

 63

 The Federal Bureau of Investigation had been looking into the charges for

several weeks before 4 January 1943 when

the Star-Times broke the story, but after

that date St. Louis was deluged with investigators. Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hayes,

chief of the Industrial Service, announced

appointment of a board of experts, headed

by Col. Merle H. Davis, chief of the St.

Louis Ordnance district, to review the inspection methods at the plant.64

 The

commanding officer, Lt. Col. Charles S.

Paullin, meanwhile declared that the

charges had unsettled operations and

held up production.

The Davis Board spent several days

studying inspection practices at the plant

with a view toward making them as nearly

foolproof as possible. It concluded that

inspection at the St. Louis plant was

neither better nor worse than at other

plants and that, if any poor ammunition

got through, it was inconsequential in

amount. But it recommended more than a

dozen changes in procedure to tighten up

the inspection process.65 When the report

reached Washington it was not made

public, but on 16 January Under Secretary

Patterson told reporters, "The method of

ordnance acceptance sampling and inspection of the finished product at the St.

Louis Ordnance Plant is entirely satisfactory."

 66

 This categorical statement did

not satisfy the critics who wanted to know

60

 St. Louis Star-Times, January 4, 1943. The

story was written by two of the paper's staff

writers, Julius M. Klein and Ralph O'Leary. Additional data appeared in issues of the next few

days. The newspaper and the two writers received

the National Headliners' Club 1943 award for

outstanding public service in publishing the

articles. 61

 Ltr, Lt Col Arthur E. Allen to TIG, 31 Dec

42, sub: Spec Inspection of ... St. Louis Ord

Plant, OOP.333.1 St. Louis OP. Colonel Allen

concluded that "the supervision, control and administration of the Government employees in the

Inspection Department was lacking in efficiency

and thoroughness . . ." and that morale in the

Inspection Department was at "an unsatisfactory

low ebb." 62

 The company placed a statement of its position in all St. Louis papers. Photostats of articles may be found in History, St. Louis Ordnance

Plant, Volume 100, OHF. 63

 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 6, 1943. 64

 The other members of the board were Capt.

James H. Dunbar, Jr., chief of engineering and

inspection at the Small Arms Ammunition Suboffice, and Capt. Frank D. Grossman, Henry H.

Hover, and Arthur W. Darby, all of Frankford

Arsenal. 65

 (1) Interv with Brig Gen Merle H. Davis,

11 Dec 53; (2) St. Louis Star-Times, January 12,

1943. 66

 St. Louis Post-Dispatch and St. Louis StarTimes, January 16, 1943, and St. Louis GlobeDemocrat, January 17, 1943.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 209

MAJ. GEN. THOMAS J. HAYES, Chief of

the Industrial Service, 1 July 1942 to 30

December 1944.

why, if everything at the plant was satisfactory, the Davis Board had recommended

numerous changes in existing inspection

procedures. The next day Drew Pearson

in a radio broadcast termed the Patterson

statement a "whitewash" and predicted

that, in spite of Army opposition, the

Justice Department would proceed with

its investigations.67 In St. Louis General

Campbell promptly branded the Pearson

charges untrue. "Do you think a man

[i.e., Colonel Davis] who has spent his

entire life in the Army is going to whitewash any contractor?" the general asked

a group of newsmen. "If you do, you don't

know the United States Army. If the experts who investigated the plant here had

found the charges borne out by the facts,

you would have found us moving in there

strongly. We could cancel our contract at

any time." He went on to say that so little

defective ammunition had gone to troops

that combat commanders had requested

shipments of defective cartridges to show

their men how to deal with them.68

Not much was heard of the charges

during the next ten months while further

evidence was collected and presented to a

federal grand jury. Then in December

1943 came the grand jury's report indicting ten persons on charges of sabotage and

of conspiracy to defraud the government

while employed at the St. Louis Ordnance

Plant. With the indictments the grand

jury submitted direct criticism of both the

company and the Ordnance Department.

After studying the voluminous documentary evidence, the jury concluded:

1. That the then authorized system of inspection and delivery to the United States

Ordnance Department by the United States

Cartridge Company was inefficient and

highly conducive to the commission of the

infractions for which true bills have been

voted.

2. That the system for acceptance of such

ammunition on the part of the United

States Ordnance Department was inefficient

in a like manner as compared to the contractor and not equal to the task assigned.

The jury went on to say that the circumstances at the time "may or may not have

extenuated the situation" and further observed that evidence submitted later showed

that extensive improvements had been

made in inspection procedure and supervision.69

67

 St. Louis Star-Times, January 18, 1943. Pearson's exact statement is quoted in memorandum

of Julius H. Amberg to USW, 18 January 1943,

sub: St. Louis Ord Plant USW, Geographic. 68

 General Campbell's remarks were reported by

all the St. Louis papers on 18 January 1943. 69

 The grand jury indictment was printed in all

the St. Louis papers on 22 December 1943. Photostat copies are in History, St. Louis Ordnance

Plant, Volume 100. An eleventh individual was

indicted later.
210 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Trial, Acquittal, and Reform

Trial of five of the indicted employees

resulted in their acquittal in April 1944.

During the trial three of the defendants

admitted that they had passed cartridges

without adequate inspection but contended that it was done on orders of their

superiors. After acquittal of the first

group, charges against the others were not

pressed by the government. A civil suit

filed against the U.S. Cartridge Company,

under the False Claims Act, in December

1943 dragged on for nearly ten years before

it was finally settled. The company won

its case in both the District Court and the

Court of Appeals, and in 1953 the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of

certiorari to bring the case before it. The

government introduced voluminous evidence to show that the company had not

maintained a satisfactory system of inspection and that defective ammunition from

the St. Louis plant had caused aircraft

guns to jam in combat. In the opinion of

the courts, the company had made every

reasonable effort to maintain a satisfactory

inspection system and could not be held

liable for occasional unauthorized acts of

a few employees.70

The facts of this case point to the

conclusion that inspection practices at the

St. Louis plant in late 1942 were neither

wholly satisfactory nor as bad as the sensational newspaper charges suggested.

Ordnance officers felt the plant was no

better and no worse than other ammunition plants, except, perhaps, in the field of

employee relations. There was apparently

considerable employee dissatisfaction, and

Ordnance officers close to the scene felt

that at least some of the inspection complaints came from disgruntled former employees or from employees who did not

fully understand the elaborate inspection

system. Because inspection of ammunition

was not a simple, cut-and-dried process

but a long series of checks and rechecks

employing many ingenious measuring and

weighing devices, it was sometimes misunderstood or misinterpreted. Further, as

the grand jury pointed out, there were

extenuating circumstances. This huge

plant was built and put into operation

with great haste during a national emergency. The intense pressure to speed production in 1942 may have led some contractor employees on occasion to take shortcuts and push ammunition through without complying with every detail of the inspection rules. It also appears that, no

matter how faithfully inspection procedures were observed, they were not

foolproof. They were inevitably subject to

improvement in the light of experience

gained during the first year of mass production. Combat experience in North

Africa and Italy in 1942-43 revealed instances of jammed aircraft guns, including

some cases when planes returned with all

their guns jammed. But whether this resulted from faulty inspection at the plant

or from rough handling that broke the

watertight liners of packing boxes and

caused corrosion was never positively determined.71

70

 Memorandum opinion, United States of

America vs. The U.S. Cartridge Company, No.

2486, District Court of U.S., Eastern District of

Missouri, Eastern Division, 95 F. Supp. 384. See

also U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit,

No. 14,389, United States of America vs. The

U.S. Cartridge Company 198 F.2d 456, files of

OCO Legal Office. 71

 (1) SAA, I, pp. 339-41; (2) 95 F. Supp.

391, op. cit; (3) Intervs during December 1953

and January 1954 with many persons familiar

with the case, including Maj Gen Thomas J.

Hayes, Brig Gen Merle H. Davis, and Brig Gen

David L. Van Syckle.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 211

Numerous changes were made in inspection methods at the St. Louis plant

immediately after the newspaper charges

appeared, along with a similar tightening

up at other plants. When, for example,

controlled studies during 1943 showed that

the existing sampling method allowed poor

lots to pass inspection in too many cases,

it was replaced by the double sampling

procedure.72 The need for improvement

and standardization was officially recognized by the chief of the Small Arms

Branch in May 1943 when he issued a

new directive establishing revised procedures to "insure that the methods in use

appear to be sound even to the uninitiated

observer, the worker in the plant, or the

qualified investigator examining the

plant."

 73

 An intensive study of inspection

methods at all plants was made during

1943, prompted in part by the St. Louis

episode; it resulted in a clarification of

standards and publication of numerous

manuals to guide inspectors.74

Maintenance of an adequate force of

trained inspectors was always a problem.

Salaries were low, and the work offered

little room for advancement. Selective service took its share of the inspection staffs

while pressure to economize on manpower

led to widespread reduction of inspection

forces. At one point, late in 1943, General

Drewry declared flatly that, in trying to

turn out "quality stuff," he was having

some trouble. "I feel that this business of

cutting too far is wrong and I don't

propose to reduce our inspectors to the

point where we can't guarantee a quality

product. I just can't do it."

 75

Labor Problems

The St. Louis plant encountered a good

deal of difficulty in dealing with labor

unions, and in training and employing both

white and colored workers. Some Ordnance officers felt that criticisms of employment and inspection practices that

arose during the war were motivated in

large part by labor elements hostile to the

U.S. Cartridge Company. The location of

the plant in a border state and in a city

with a large Negro population provided a

natural setting for problems in race relations.

In 1941 both U.S. Cartridge and

McQuay-Norris had not only to recruit

thousands of workers but also to train

them in the specialized jobs required in

ammunition manufacture. Both companies

started with a nucleus of their own trained

workers and supervisors, recruited new

employees, established training schools,

and quickly built up large work forces.

Frankford Arsenal trained many employees

for this and other plants. By July 1943

the entire St. Louis plant employed a total

of forty-three thousand workers—thirtyfive thousand by U.S. Cartridge and eight

thousand by McQuay-Norris. The tight

labor market of the early war years forced

both companies to hire some workers who

did not measure up even to the minimum

72

 (1) Hist, Denver Ord Plant, 1st supp, pp.

17-18; (2) Hist, Lake City Ord Plant, V, pp.

83-88. 73

 Memo, Chief of SA Br, 4 May 43, cited in

SAA, I, pp. 339-40. 74

 SAA, I, pp. 339-41. Comments on the value

of the manual on visual inspection issued in

March 1944 appear in History, Lake City Ordnance Plant, VI, p. 117. A broad picture of the

effort to improve inspection of all types of

materiel during 1943 is presented in G. Rupert

Gause, "Quality Through Inspection," Army Ordnance, XXV, No. 139 (March-April 1943), 117,

and 1st Lt. Robert J. Saunders, "Standardized

Inspection," Army Ordnance, XXIV, No. 137

(March-April 1943), 290. 75

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia,

8 Oct 43, p. 23.
212 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

standards of peacetime employment. Nearly half the employees were women, many

of whom had no previous industrial experience. To use such unskilled employees

effectively, work was simplified as much as

possible and new employees were given

brief but intensive courses of instruction in

the specific jobs assigned to them.76

In recruiting Negro workers the U.S.

Cartridge Company, in common with other

war plants in the area, adopted a policy of

following the St. Louis population ratio of

90 percent white and 10 percent Negro.

During most of the war years the number

of Negro workers at the plant averaged

between 10 and 12 percent—between three

thousand and four thousand—but there

was no intermingling of the two races. All

colored workers were assigned to one production unit, under a white superintendent. The other seven units were staffed

entirely by white workers. In the colored

unit every major craft was represented

and Negroes held all positions up to and

including general foremen.77

These practices led to a number of racial

disputes during 1943 but did not come

under strong attack until late 1943 and

early 1944 when cutbacks in production

schedules forced the company to lay off

many of its workers. Charges were then

made that, in selecting employees to be

laid off, the company discriminated against

Negroes. The President's Committee on

Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) held

hearings on these charges (and others

brought against other St. Louis plants)

during the first week in August. It dismissed some of the complaints as groundless but upheld others and on 29 December 1944 ordered both the U.S. Cartridge

Company and McQuay-Norris to abandon

their quota systems and stop racial discrimination in hiring and firing workers.

Referring to the cutbacks in the spring of

1944 when the use of different seniority

systems for white and colored workers

sometimes had worked to the advantage of

one race and sometimes to another, the

FEPC declared:

A racial quota system is equally as mischievous when used to select employees for

layoffs as when applied with regard to their

hire. Executive Order 9346 does not provide

that Negroes or other minority groups shall

be hired or retained in employment in accordance with population ratios ... . It is

no defense to argue, as the respondent has

done, that its quota system on certain occasions operated to the advantage of Negro

employees and to the prejudice of white

workers. The executive order forbids discrimination against white as well as against

colored employees.78

By the time this decision was made the

St. Louis plant had only about six months

more of wartime operation ahead of it.

Its notice to terminate came in June 1945.

During this brief period the companies

took steps to carry out the FEPC policy.

They abandoned the quota system of hiring and attempted to recruit members of

both races to work together on a nonsegregated basis, but they encountered

considerable difficulty in carrying out the

program. Operation of the plant on an

integrated or nonsegregated basis, and hir76

 (1) Hist, St. Louis Ord Plant, vols. I-IX,

OHF; (2) Ltr, Lt Col Carleton G. Chapman to

TIG, 30 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Spec inspection

... of St. Louis Ord Plant, OO 333.1/1883 Misc

(c); (3) SAA, I, p. 147. 77

 For comparison of operating efficiency, showing the colored unit to be much less efficient, see

Ltr, Maj R. R. Porter to TIG, 14 Jul 45, sub:

Spec Inspection of ... St. Louis Ord Plant,

OO 333.1/2323. 78

 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 29, 1944.

Clippings from St. Louis newspapers of the

period are in History, St. Louis Ordnance Plant,

Volumes VIII-IX, OHF. The records of these

cases and others are in the National Archives.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 213

ing without regard to race, had to wait

until the plant reopened in the early

1950's.79

Conversion from Copper to Steel

During 1941, as the copper shortage

took definite shape on the horizon, Ordnance launched a far-reaching program to

conserve copper in all types of materiel,

including small arms ammunition. There

were two main lines of endeavor as far as

small arms cartridges were concerned—

substitution of clad steel for gilding metal

in bullet jackets, and substitution of steel

for brass in cartridge cases. The development of clad steel jackets progressed so

rapidly that by the fall of 1942 production

of the new type jackets was in full swing.

But conversion to steel cartridge cases

proved to be a much more difficult problem.

Frankford Arsenal succeeded during

1941 and early 1942 in converting the

.45-caliber case to steel, and by the summer of 1942 the steel case went into

production at the Evansville plant. After

thorough testing, it was accepted as standard in January 1943, the only small arms

cartridge fully converted to steel in World

War II.80 Meanwhile, research on the .30-

and .50-caliber cases encountered a host

of technical problems, stemming in large

part from the fact that steel is less elastic

than brass. But the shortage of copper

during 1942 forced continued efforts to

develop acceptable steel cases. As soon as

the new plants, built to make cases from

brass, came into production they ran short

of brass and had to begin the difficult

task of converting their equipment and

processing methods to the use of steel. To

save time, development work was done on

the production lines rather than in the

laboratory. Then, just as success appeared

to be within reach, the copper shortage

eased, requirements dropped, and the

whole steel conversion effort was discontinued except for experimental production

lines at Frankford.81 The progress made in

producing steel cases was, in the words of

General Hayes, "a miracle, but not a big

enough miracle."

 82

Ammunition Belts

As efficient operation of machine guns

was impossible without belts or other devices to feed ammunition, a small but

essential phase of Ordnance ammunition

procurement dealt with production of ammunition belts, both fabric and metallic.

Of these two types, metallic belt links were

used chiefly in aircraft guns and fabric

belts in ground weapons until the closing

months of the war when metallic belt

links were issued to ground troops. Though

they appeared to be simple to manufacture,

both types posed troublesome manufacturing problems.

The principal producer of .30-caliber

fabric belts for the U.S. Army in World

War I was the Russell Manufacturing

Company, which held a 1916 patent on a

79

 (1) Interv with Ray Bryan, Ord representative at St. Louis plant, and F. A. Lutz, Chief

Ammo Sec, SA Br, OCO, 12 Jan 54; (2) Ltr,

Porter to TIG, 14 Jul 45, sub: Spec Inspection

of ... St. Louis Ord Plant, OO 333.1/2323 St.

Louis Ord Plant. The file of FEPC records contains one brief letter from each company reporting on its efforts to comply with the ruling. 80

 OCM 19493, 14 Jan 43. A detailed statement of the Ordnance plans for meeting the

copper shortage in the fall of 1942 appears in

Memo, CofOrd for CG SOS, 10 Sep 42, sub:

Copper for Ammo Manufacture, ExecO file. 81

 For a more detailed account of this whole

subject, see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, Chapter XVIII. 82

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Springfield,

Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 7.
214 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

.50-CALIBER MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION IN FABRIC BELTS, being arranged for crating

by women in an ordnance arsenal.

fabric belt. After the war this concern

continued development work in co-operation with Springfield Armory and in 1936

was granted another patent on an improved belt design. Russell was the only

source of fabric belts for the Army during

the defense period, but in the fall of 1941,

with requirements rising fast, Ordnance

adopted a modified design to enable other

producers to come into the picture without

infringing the Russell patent. The need for

this alternate design was eliminated after

Pearl Harbor when Russell granted the

government a royalty-free license for the

duration of the emergency. By June 1942

six facilities other than Russell were producing the 250-round infantry-type belt,

but of the twenty-eight million belts manufactured through May, 1944, when all production stopped for about eight months,

Russell made slightly more than half.

Meanwhile the temporary shortage of steel

and of strip mill and furnace capacity in

late 1942 prompted the adoption of .50-

caliber fabric belts for aircraft guns. As

Russell had previously made small quantities of such belts for foreign sale it was in

a position to start production promptly.

Several other concerns also made fabric

.50-caliber belts before the project was

terminated in September 1943 because of

the easing of the metals shortage and reduction of ammunition requirements. Production of fabric belts for ground machine

guns was resumed for a short time after

the German breakthrough of December

1944, but in 1945 fabric belts gradually

gave way to steel links for infantry use.83

83

 PSP 36, Machine Guns, Development and

Production of Metallic Belt Links and Fabric

Ammunition Belt, by SA Div, Ind Serv, OCO,

Oct 45.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 215

To manufacturers, metallic belt links

were deceptively simple in appearance.

Each steel link consisted of three small

loops, two on one side and one on the

other. A belt of ammunition was formed

by placing the single loops of one link

between the two loops of the other and inserting the cartridge through the three

loops in much the same manner as one

slides a bolt through the hinge of a screen

door. Any number of links could be assembled in this manner to make a long

belt of cartridges that had great flexibility

and could be rolled and twisted to fit

confined spaces in airplanes.84 In addition,

the belt links automatically fell apart as

the cartridges that held them together

were fired and ejected from the gun. Thus

the origin of the term "disintegrating

metallic belt links." Though simple in design these metallic links demanded exceptional accuracy in piercing, cutting, forming, and heat-treating to guarantee faultless performance when used in aerial combat. If links were too hard they were likely

to break under pressure, and if too soft

they might stretch and cause stoppage of

the weapon. If either too loose or too tight

they would not function properly. As rust

or corrosion on links would render them

unfit for use, they had to be given a carefully controlled rustproofing treatment before being sent to the field. Rigid

inspection was essential to guard against

acceptance of a single link that might

cause trouble, for it was literally true

that an ammunition belt was only as strong

as its weakest link.

During the years of peace Rock Island

Arsenal was the sole producer of links in

the United States. As there was but a

trickle of new ammunition produced each

year the need for links was correspondingly

small, but during 1940 Rock Island turned

out about 50,000,000 .30-caliber links and

about 15,000,000 .50-caliber. With requirements for aircraft ammunition on the

rise, and with a shift toward the larger

caliber taking place, Rock Island placed

contracts with industry for .50-caliber

links, beginning in June 1940 with the

Fort Pitt Bedding Co. and three other

concernwerse i produce n 1941. Approximatel d in 1941, thre y 150,000,00 e time0s

the 1940 output. In the summer of 1941

production of .30-caliber links began at

Jackes Evans Manufacturing Company

and General Aviation Equipment Company. After Pearl Harbor, requirements

for both sizes combined rose to eighteen

billion for the 2-year period 1942-43. To

meet these astronomical requirements a

speedier production process was introduced, using a progressive multi-station die

developed at Rock Island in the 1930's,

and contracts for link production were

placed with many different firms. To speed

production and break bottlenecks a Metallic Belt Link Industry Integration Committee was formed in the summer of 1942, and

by September 1943 the monthly rate of

production had reached more than half a

billion. Thereafter requirements were reduced with some contracts being terminated outright and others continued at

greatly reduced rates. Early in 1945, after

the Battle of the Bulge, there was a brief

period of rising requirements followed by

contract cancellation as the end of the

war appeared in view. Total production of

metallic links during the 1940-45 period

reached close to thirteen billion.85

84

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 426. 85

 (1) PSP 36, Machine Guns, Development

and Prod of Metallic Belt Links and Fabric

Ammo Belt; (2) Whiting, Statistics, p. 47; (3)

Historical Data, Link, Metallic Belt, Cal. .50, M2,
216 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Packing Boxes and Cans

Packing small arms ammunition for

overseas shipment was a troublesome problem for Ordnance during World War II.

The boxes used at the start of the war

were essentially the same as those used in

World War I—nailed wooden boxes lined

with terneplate (tin-coated sheet steel).

When soldered shut, the liners of the

M1917 boxes provided a tight seal against

dirt, water, or air unless broken by rough

handling. They had served well in the

1920's and 1930's but proved less suitable

for the combat conditions encountered in

World War II Weighing one hundred

pounds or more, they were too heavy for

troops or native bearers to carry, and,

when subjected to rough handling, the

boxes or liners sometimes broke, resulting

in dirty or corroded ammunition.86

Another difficulty with the M1917 pack

was that it used scarce materials, particularly tin. Solder with a lower tin content

was therefore prescribed for sealing the

terneplate liners, and less tin was used in

the liners themselves. Steel was substituted

for brass in the nuts and bolts of the boxes,

and zinc plating was used instead of cadmium to plate the handles and other box

hardware. At the same time, Ordnance

engineers studied the possible replacement of terneplate liners with nonmetallic

materials such as wax paper, asphalt

paper, and plastic film. The most promising substitute, waxed fiber board, was

adopted in the summer of 1942, but it did

not prove satisfactory and was abandoned

a year later.

In peacetime, most ammunition had

been shipped in bulk pack, with troops in

the field responsible for assembling cartridges into clips or machine gun belts. This

procedure was soon changed as the using

arms demanded that cartridges be put in

so-called functional assemblies or ready-touse packs. Another major change in packing procedure occurred in the summer of

1942 when responsibility for packing ammunition was transferred from Field Service depots to the manufacturing plants.

The earlier practice had been for the plants

to pack ammunition in cartons and ship it

to depots where it was unpacked, assembled into clips, belts, or links, and then

repacked.

All during the first half of 1943 Ordnance received frequent reports that the

packing of cartridges in M1917 boxes was

unsatisfactory, whether in waxed paper

cartons or terneplate liners. The chief

complaints were of corroded or broken

links and dirty ammunition caused by

broken boxes or ruptured liners, but the

boxes were also criticized as too heavy and

hard to handle in the field. Minor changes

and improvements were made, but it was

not until the closing months of the year

that steps were taken to introduce a completely new type of container. Under contract with Ordnance, the Chrysler Corporation and the American Can Company

developed a hermetically sealed can that

could be opened with a key in the same

manner as a coffee can. The new pack,

including an improved wooden box holding two cans totaling about fifty pounds,

as manufactured by S.W. Farber, Inc., in Hist,

New York Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 1.

86

 Rcd of Army Ord Research and Development,

vol. 2, bk. 2—Small Arms Ammunition, ch. 18;

(2) PSP 58, Packaging, Development of, in the

Ordnance Department, by Prod Serv Div, Ind

Serv, OCO, Jul 45; (3) Small Arms Ammunition,

Highlights of History, 1 Jul 44-1 Apr 45, supp.

III, by Ammo Br, SA Div, OHF; (4) History

of Ordnance Section, Hq Sixth Army, 27 Jan 43-

15 Dec 45, pp. 40-41.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 217

was standardized for 45-caliber and .30-

caliber carbine ammunition early in 1944.

It was extended to other calibers later in

the year—too late to have any effect on

the crucial Allied drive across France in

the summer of 1944.87

The best ready-to-use packs were the

.30-caliber M1 box containing belted cartridges and the .50-caliber M2 box holding

linked ammunition. These boxes were not

only packing containers for storage and

shipment but were also ammunition feed

boxes and were cheap enough to be expendable. Functional assemblies had such

advantages that they were standardized,

whenever possible, for future packing of

ground ammunition. There was no need

for packing aircraft ammunition in such

assemblies, for it was removed from shipping containers and stowed aboard airplanes in special trays and feed boxes.88

Packing ammunition in the M2 boxes

brought its share of problems. As the

plants were not designed for this work it

had to be squeezed into odd corners. One

result was that in September 1943 nearly

half the eight hundred thousand boxes

packed developed leaks. As Colonel Boone

Gross summed up the matter, "we had to

go out and run a service program and buy

new gaskets and then open up the boxes

and test them 100%."

 89

Surpluses, Cutbacks, and Terminations

As 1942 was a year of shortages, 1943

was a year of surpluses. Production during the first half of 1943 was so great that,

as General Harris had predicted early in

1942, the Army had ammunition "running

out of its ears." The pipelines were filled

and the monthly production of two billion

cartridges was creating a storage problem

for Field Service. At both ends of the

line—in the plants and on the battlefield

—earlier estimates had proven wholly inaccurate. The plants were producing at a

rate far higher than had been expected,

and the mobile tank warfare in North

Africa called for much smaller expenditure

of rifle and machine gun ammunition than

had been anticipated.90 In August 1943

the Procurement Review Board reported

that the on-hand stock of small arms

ammunition in the United States amounted

to 2.5 billion rounds, with an additional 1.4 billion rounds—nearly equal to

the entire AEF expenditure in World War

I—in reserve in North Africa. It observed

that the Day of Supply figures were

"excessively large," that ammunition plants

were operating far below their capacity,

and that reserves of ammunition were

"tremendous" and would soon be "astronomical." The Board bluntly concluded

that "the War Department must take

steps to bring production of ammunition

and stocks of ammunition into the realm

of reality."

 91

87

 (1) SA Ammo, Highlights of Hist; (2) Hist,

Frankford Arsenal, SA Ammo Div, I, pt. 3, p.

154; (3) Rcd of Army Ord Research and Development, vol. 2, bk. 2, ch. 18. 88

 SAA, I, pp. 335-38. For a detailed history

of development of small arms ammunition packs,

see Record of Army Ordnance Research and

Development, Volume 2, Book 2. 89

 Rpt of Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia,

8 Oct 43, p. 22. 90

 On reduction of the Day of Supply for small

arms ammunition, see correspondence during Sep

-Oct 43 in Rqmts Docs, folder, OHF. 91

 Rpt of WD Proc Review Bd, 31 Aug 43.

Members of the Board were Maj. Gen. Frank R.

McCoy, Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams (former

Chief of Ordnance), Brig. Gen. William E. Gillmore, and Mr. J. Madigan. See also comments on

the report by General Somervell in the same file,

and remarks by Brig Gen James Kirk before Small

Arms Ammunition Labor Advisory Committee, 10

Jan 45, OHF.
218 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

While the Procurement Review Board

was at work a representative of the Bureau

of the Budget surveyed the small arms ammunition plants and reached similar conclusions. His report revealed that the existence of excess plant capacity was exacting a heavy toll in terms of production

costs because the plants were operating

far below their capacity. The most significant factor in the cost of production at any

plant was found not to be the managerial

skill of the contractor or the supervision

by Ordnance representatives but the

percentage of maximum capacity at which

the plant operated. Efficiency rose and

costs declined when a plant produced near

its peak; the trends were reversed when

the plant operated at a low level. The report recommended that five plants—Allegany, Eau Claire, Denver, Lake City, and

Lowell—be shut down and that adjustments be made at the remaining plants

to provide needed production.92

Before either of these reports was made,

the process of reducing requirements and

slowing down production had begun.

Over-all requirements for small arms ammunition (1943-44 combined) dropped

from the 1943 peak of about fifty billion

in February to approximately thirty-six

billion in September.93 During the summer of 1943 Frankford eliminated its second and third shifts and returned to its

traditional role of laboratory for development of improved ammunition and production techniques. In the closing months of

the year six plants were shut down—

Allegany, Utah, Eau Claire, Milwaukee,

Lowell, and Scioto—and production rates

were cut by one-third at most of the

others. When ammunition production

stopped, the plants were promptly converted to other war uses, and the machinery was transferred for use elsewhere, put

in storage, or sold as scrap. Frankford

Arsenal collected a great deal of technical

information from every closed plant—reports of experiments, floor layouts, production processes, and related material.

Early in 1944 when ASF reduced requirements again, three more plants closed

—Denver, Evansville, and Kings Mills—

leaving only four of the original twelve

plants in operation. At two of the remaining plants—St. Louis and Twin Cities

—several buildings were converted to artillery ammunition manufacture. At the same

time production of bullet cores at commercial plants stopped almost completely, and

deep cuts were made in the schedules of

the privately owned plants of the Remington and Winchester companies in Connecticut. Production of all types of small

caliber ammunition dropped from nearly

20 billion in 1943 to 6.5 billion in 1944.94

The effect of the 1943-44 reductions is

92

 (1) General Report on Production of Small

Arms Ammunition, 16 Oct 43, War Projects Unit,

Bureau of Budget; (2) Supplemental Report to

the foregoing, 30 Oct 43, both in OHF. In 1942

Ordnance was directed to keep plants in operation part-time, rather than close them down,

though it was recognized that some waste and

inefficiency resulted. Review of Prod Plants, 20

July 1942. 93

 Supp. Rpt, 30 Oct 43, Bur of Budget. See

also Munitions Assignments Board in Washington,

Caliber .50 Ammo Program, 12 Oct 43, ASF

Plng Div Theater Br, Box 389, 471 Ammunition,

vol. I, N.A. 94

 Detailed information on all these actions is

recorded in the reports of a board appointed by

the Chief of Ordnance to review recommendations of the operating branches of the Industrial

Division, by SO 265, par. 59, 5 Nov 42. See

OO 334 (8150-8250). See also Interim Report on

Small Arms Ammunition, 26 Dec 44, Bureau of

Budget and comments on this report by General

Kirk. On the private plants, see Memo of Clay

for Charles E. Wilson, 25 Feb 44, OO 471.4/2568

Incl 2. Procurement deliveries of small arms ammunition in 1944 were valued at $649,600,000 as

compared to $1,522,000,000 in 1943.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 219

shown in the following tabulation of monthly production figures for combat types:95

July 1943 January 1944 July 1944

Cal. .30 - 903,000,000 513,000,000 172,000,000

Cal. .50 - 455,000,000 210,000,000 168,000,000

Cal. .45 and

carbine- 433,000,000 310,000,000 51,000,000

With the termination notices that went

out in November and December 1943 the

Chief of Ordnance sent a letter to each

plant explaining the reasons for the action.

These letters were placed on employee

bulletin boards and published in local

newspapers. They cited four factors that

made it possible to reduce operations—

the high rate of production attained by the

plants, the virtual elimination of the submarine menace, the effectiveness of .50-

caliber incendiary ammunition in downing enemy planes, and the Japanese

evacuation of Kiska without a fight. General Campbell made it clear that the war

was far from over but explained that the

War Department had ordered the reductions because the worst phase of the ammunition crisis had passed.96

 He might also

have added that the War Department had

decided, in view of the huge stocks on

hand, to depend on reopening closed

plants to meet any emergency that might

arise in the future.

Despite these efforts to explain the situation the announcement of cutbacks

brought sharp criticism from organized

labor, particularly the United Electrical,

Radio, and Machine Workers of America,

a CIO affiliate. In February 1944 the

union charged that, in selecting plants to

be cut back, the military authorities "are

violating all considerations of national

manpower allocation, are closing down the

most efficient and maintaining in operation

the least efficient small arms ammunition

plants, and are closing the plants most

favorably located from the standpoint of

military security."

 97

 In reply, Under Secretary Patterson expressed regret that

more advance notice had not been given

to plant management and workers but

declared that the Army, far from overlooking manpower, had made it "the dominating factor in our decisions." He defended

the retention of small-scale production at

the privately owned Remington and Winchester plants in Connecticut on the

ground that these plants "are an integral

part of the Nation's establishment available for the maintenance and continued

development of the small arms ammunition

art." In selecting plants to be retained,

Patterson pointed out, the Army considered the kind of ammunition manufactured by each and retained only capacity needed to meet specific requirements.

The Army's explanation did not minimize

the effect on labor of the 1943-44 cutbacks.98

 The small arms ammunition

plants in operation in the fall of 1944

employed only one-fourth the number

employed in July 1943 when all plants

were in production and nearly 170,000

were at work.

Along with the vertical drop in total

requirements there were several significant

lateral shifts as some types decreased in

importance and others gained. The one

95

 Remarks by Brig Gen James Kirk before SA

Ammo Labor Advisory Comm., 10 Jan 45, on the

1945 Small Arms Ammunition Program, OHF. 96

 Ltr, CofOrd for CO Milwaukee Ord Plant,

11 Nov 43, copy in History, Milwaukee Ordnance

Plant, vol. V, p. 56. 97

 Ltr, United Electrical, Radio and Machine

Workers of America (signed by Russ Nixon) to

Wilson, WPB, 21 Feb 44, OO 471.4/1851 (c). 98

 Ltr, USW to Nixon, 27 Feb 44, OO 471.4/

1851 (c).
220 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

most important shift, in terms of quantities, was the decline in .30-caliber machine

gun ammunition and the rise in .50-caliber. Early combat experience showed that

the smaller cartridge was far less effective,

particularly against airplanes, than was the

.50-caliber. This shift was accompanied by

a rise in the demand for armor-piercing

cartridges for both .30- and .50-caliber

and for the .50-caliber incendiary cartridge. A newer type, the armor-piercingincendiary for .50-caliber, came into

production in 1943 and in 1944 accounted

for more than half the total .50-caliber

output. An even more complicated round,

the .50-caliber armor-piercing-incendiarytracer, came into production in 1944-45.

Production of incendiary and AP cartridges was far more difficult than

production of ball ammunition and created

heavy new demands for machines, furnaces, and tools. The new types also had

to undergo continuous testing to determine

their performance under extremes of heat,

cold, and humidity, and to check their

stability in storage. Less difficult to manufacture was the .30-caliber carbine that

entered the picture in 1942 and largely

supplanted the .45-caliber pistol cartridge,

though .45-caliber ammunition for the submachine gun continued unchanged. In

1944 a new type of smokeless powder

—called ball powder because its grains

were spherical—was adopted for carbine

ammunition. A development of Western

Cartridge Company, it could be manufactured much faster than ordinary powder. The largest small arms cartridge produced in World War II was the

experimental .60-caliber of which six

million were manufactured in 1944-45.99

The downward trend of requirements

was temporarily reversed a few months

following the long-awaited invasion of

western Europe in June 1944. After two

and a half years of building up stocks and

using comparatively little small arms ammunition in combat, the Allied armies

launched the climactic campaign of the

war and began firing tremendous quantities of ammunition. In the single month of

September 1944 the U.S. ground forces

used nearly three-fourths as much small

arms ammunition as the AEF expended

in battle during the whole year 1918. The

huge stocks rapidly dwindled, and in December 1944, when large quantities were

lost in the German offensive, they fell

below authorized levels in the European

theater.100 Further, much of the ammunition that had been shipped to overseas

theaters in 1942 and 1943 was not available or not usable in late 1944 and early

1945. Lack of transportation, manpower,

and handling facilities at Pacific Island

bases sometimes made it impossible to retrieve leftover ammunition, and great

quantities had deteriorated. In explaining

the need for new production General Kirk

said:

Ammunition is a perishable commodity.

The powder and the primer cap contain

delicate chemical compounds. If the ammunition is exposed for considerable periods of

time to hot weather, the chemical compounds

will tend to change. The result is that the

powder becomes less powerful. The primer

is less sensitive and more likely to hang fire.

If moisture gets into the inner package the

brass will corrode. . . . Ammunition stored

under good conditions of care for as little as

two years in the tropics becomes questionable

99

 The most concise data on this subject appears in Whiting, Statistics, Procurement, p. 51.

For Western ball powder, see Army Ordnance,

XXVI, No. 142 (January-February, 1944), 126

-27.

100

 Ammunition supply for European and Mediterranean Theaters, p. 3, ASF Contl Div, 15 Aug

45, OHF.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION 221

for issue in combat. . . . Much of the ammunition which was manufactured in 1943

and shipped overseas has had to be stored

under conditions which are far from ideal.

. . . The point is that we may expect that

sizeable quantities of ammunition now overseas will have to be replaced with new ammunition. We will not risk American lives

with questionable cartridges.101

By the end of October 1944 supplycontrol studies revealed greatly increased

requirements for the year ahead, particularly for ground force weapons such as the

rifle, submachine gun, and carbine. Ordnance promptly forwarded the new figures

to ASF, asked for instructions, and commented that it considered the situation

"one of the most serious facing the Army

Service Forces."

 102

 There was no actual

shortage in the theaters but General

Campbell predicted that, if production

were not speeded up at once, shortages

would develop in the spring of 1945.

ASF immediately issued a directive doubling the 1945 requirements for certain

types. In contrast to actual production of

about 6.5 billion rounds in 1944, the

program for 1945 called for 12.4 billion.

Schedules for the first half of 1945 called

for a 50 percent increase over output during the last six months of 1944. None of

the closed plants was to be reconverted

to ammunition production, but the Toledo

Core Plant, then in standby condition,

was returned to full production. The new

schedules were met by doubling the output

for the four existing GOCO plants—St.

Louis, Lake City, Des Moines, Twin Cities

—plus Frankford and three plants owned

by commercial producers— Winchester,

Remington, and Western. In Canada the

Dominion Arsenal and Defense Industries,

Ltd., were brought into the picture. Capacity for producing brass strip was more

than doubled and, to relieve the critical

shortage of AP cores, a contract for their

manufacture was placed in Canada with

the York Arsenal.103

In March 1945, just as the accelerated

program was getting into high gear, the

production goals were cut by about 20

percent in view of the imminent defeat of

Germany. In May, after the actual surrender, the program was further reduced.

Two GOCO plants, St. Louis and Des

Moines, were given termination notices in

June and production at Winchester was

discontinued. When the Japanese surrender was announced on 14 August production stopped at all plants except Lake

City, where the .60-caliber line continued

for two weeks, and Frankford Arsenal,

where experimental types were being produced. Then began the tedious process of

decontaminating equipment, preparing it

for storage or sale, making final payments

to contractors, and closing the books on

all the plants. Soon Frankford Arsenal was

once again the only producer of military

ammunition in the United States. The

Lake City and Twin Cities plants, with all

their machinery and reserve stocks and

with equipment from two core plants, were

prepared for long-time storage and retained as reserves for the future.104

101

 Remarks by Kirk, 10 Jan 45, op. cit. 102

 Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 21 Nov 44,

sub: Prod Rqmts for SA Ammo, OO 471.4/2271

(c). A detailed summary of theater stocks at the

end of November 1944 appears in Incl to Memo,

Director of Plans and Operations, ASF for CofOrd, 12 Jan 45, sub: SA Ammo Stocks, OO

471.4/2381. 103

 (1) SA Ammo, Highlights of Hist, 1 Jul 44-

1 Apr 45, pp. 3-4; (2) Hiland G. Batcheller,

Progress on Critical Programs, a Report to the

WPB, 12 Dec 44, p. 35, WPB Doc. 317, WPB

210.3R, NA. 104

 (1) SA Ammo, Highlights of Hist, 1 Jul

44-1 Apr 45; (2) First Quarterly Report for FY

1946, SA Div, 1 Nov 45. These two reports are

supplements to Small Arms Ammunition and are

in OHF.
CHAPTER X

Preparation for Tanks

and Other Fighting Vehicles

More than any other weapon of land

warfare, the tank in World War II captured the imagination of soldier and

civilian alike. Its roaring motors, inscrutable armor, and smoking guns added a

new and terrifying element to the already

grim life of the battlefield. It symbolized

for the ground forces, as did the sleek

bombing plane for the air forces, the revolution in warfare that had sprung from

the union of military need with industry

and technology. It was, by any standard

of comparison, one of the most important

weapons of the war.

But for Ordnance the tank was the

source of more trouble and more criticism

than any other item of equipment. Ordnance-procured small arms, artillery, and

ammunition were generally praised, as

were trucks and other transport vehicles,

but all during the war American tanks

were the objects of sharp verbal attacks.

Army spokesmen, eager to build up public

confidence, asserted time after time that

U.S. tanks were superior to anything the

enemy could produce. General Wesson

and General Campbell strongly defended

them against all criticism, and cited laudatory letters from combat commanders to

prove the point.1 But the secret reports on

tank performance submitted by overseas

commanders (both British and American)

and the Armored Force Board told a

somewhat different story. Along with frequent words of praise came many complaints,2

 ranging from the lack of good

binoculars for tank commanders to the

inferiority of U.S. tank guns and armor

to the German guns and armor pitted

against them. Unofficial observers were

quick to take up critical comments from

tank men returned from combat, sometimes to the neglect of less newsworthy

praise for U.S. tanks. Why, it was asked,

could not the United States, with its unrivaled industrial capacity for making cars

and trucks of all kinds, produce better

tanks than Germany? In particular, why

1

 Compare comments on these "testimonials" of

combat commanders in Hugh M. Cole, The

Lorraine Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), p.

604, and in "Our Tanks Are Without Equal," an

editorial in Army Ordnance, XXVIII, No. 149

(March-April 1945), 265. For a typical example

of Ordnance claims to tank superiority, see address by Maj Gen Gladeon M. Barnes, 19 Oct

44, Cleveland, Ohio. 2

 A notable example of praise is "Our Tanks

Meet the Test," by Maj, Gen. Charles L. Scott,

Army Ordnance, XXIV, No. 136 (JanuaryFebruary 1943), 67ff. Compare with 13-page

Memo of complaints written by Maj S. B. Tatom,

Hq Armored Force, to Col Morris K. Barroll, Jr.,

25 May 1943, sub: Final Rpt on Accelerated

Tests of 40 M4 Series Tanks, Gen. Christmas

file. 451.3/M.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 223

did the U.S. Army have no heavy tank

to match the German Tiger? By 1945 the

chorus of criticism reached a point where

leading American newspapers were calling

for a Congressional investigation of "a

situation that does no credit to the War

Department."

 3

Meanwhile in both England and Germany there were similar complaints. A

Parliamentary committee roundly criticized the Churchill government in 1942

for failing to develop a tank that could

hold its own on the battlefield and for

losing precious time in getting production

started. At the end of the war, when the

government's white paper on tanks appeared, The Times of London observed

editorially that, "If there was not a 'tank

scandal,' there was certainly a good deal

of tank muddle."

 4 In Germany, where

public criticism was less freely expressed,

there was considerable dissatisfaction with

both designers and producers. When German medium tanks encountered the Soviet

T-34 in late 1941 the results were disastrous for the Nazi legions. Hitler personally

ordered his designers to come up with a

superior heavy tank at once and directed

his production ministry to build it in

hitherto unheard of quantities.5

The problems encountered in British,

German, and American tank production

stemmed chiefly from the fact that, at

the start of World. War II, the tank was

essentially a new weapon with still untested tactical potentialities. Further, it

was an enormously complicated machine,

difficult to design and difficult to produce.

The design phase has been described in

some detail in the preceding volume of this

series.6 Here we are concerned less with

design than with production, but it must

be recognized that there is no sharp dividing line between the two processes. Design

changes were constantly intruding into

the manufacturing area, to the dismay of

production engineers, and production

techniques were always a limiting factor

in design. The only satisfactory approach

to the task of understanding the World

War II tank experience lies in reviewing

the two separate but intertwined threads

of design and production from the late

1930's to the end of the war.

Early Plans and Preparations

Production of guns and ammunition

rested on a solid foundation of more than

a century of development and use, but

production of tanks in World War II was

based on twenty years of neglect. A few

American tanks had been built in 1918

but none saw action in World War I.

The Mark VIII's assembled at Rock Island

Arsenal after the war were crude specimens with a top speed of only five miles an

hour. All during the next two decades

there was no real production, only the

building of hand-tooled test models, some

described as capable of "bursts of speed

3

 Hanson Baldwin in New York Times January

5, 1945, quoted in Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, ch. X. For a striking example of journalistic criticism and Army

caution, see "American Locomotive," Fortune

(February 1942), pp. 79ff. The views of some

Army Ground Force officers appear in two historical studies: AGF Study No. 27, The Armored

Force, Command and Center, dated 1946, and

AGF Study No. 34, The Role of the AGF in the

Development of Equipment, dated 1946. 4

 The Times, London, July 16, 1946. For a

brief account of the deficiencies of British tanks,

see Postan, British War Production, pp. 183-95. 5

 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS),

Tank Industry Report, 2d edition, Jan 47. 6

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. X.
224 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

up to 18 miles an hour."

 7 From 1920 to

1935 no more than thirty-five tanks were

built, every one a different model. The essence of mass production—acceptance of

design and its exact reproduction in volume—was altogether lacking. Not until

1935-36 when sixteen medium tanks were

made at Rock Island Arsenal was more

than one tank of any specific model produced.8

 In England the situation was much

the same. One recorder of British tank

history described the events of the 1930's

as follows:

In 1931 a medium tank of superior design

was issued, but the great depression and

pacifist agitation on top of it prevented

large-scale production. When this was finally

decided in 1936 the tank proved to be out

of date. There was debate and debate . . .

and the tank has yet [1938] to reach the

men.9

In the War Department plans of the

1930's, tanks were not very important.

Army tacticians were not planning to use

hundreds of hard-hitting, fast-moving

tanks to spearhead lightning attacks. The

Tank Corps of World War I had long

since been abolished and control of tanks

placed with the Infantry, which held armament down to machine guns, limited

armor thickness to about one inch, and

gave priority to small, light tanks.10 Reflecting this attitude, Ordnance had no

Tank Division, made no plans for wartime

procurement of tens of thousands of tanks,

and confined its development work to light

tanks. The unit responsible for fighting

vehicles was, until 1941, an appendage of

the Artillery Division. Test models built at

Rock Island were only a small part of that

arsenal's over-all responsibility, which embraced tractors, armored cars, gun mounts,

and recoil mechanisms. It is no exaggeration to say that, before 1940, tank procurement was but a drop in the Ordnance

bucket.11

In the educational orders program of

1939-40, tanks were given scant attention. As the using arms had not adopted

a clear statement of desired tank characteristics, nor assigned tanks a high priority,

Ordnance did not consider it advisable to

attempt much by way. of educating industry in their manufacture. Further, the cost

of tanks—between $25,000 and $50,000

each—was so high, and the funds for

educational orders so limited, that a big

program could not be considered. In contrast to the dozens of educational orders

7

 Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, I (1919-39), p. 63.

See also The Development of Combat Vehicles,

a manuscript prepared in Oct 43 by Samuel H.

Woods, chief engineer, Automotive Division, APG,

and Evolution of American and German Medium

Tanks by Lt. Col. Robert J. Icks, 20 Jan 43,

both in OHF. Descriptions of the Mark VIII and

other early vehicles may be found in Ralph E.

Jones, George H. Rarey, and Robert J. Icks, The

Fighting Tanks Since 1916 (Washington: National Service Publishing Company, 1933). 8

 (1) Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, I (1919-39).

pp. 61-66; (2) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance

Team, pp. 220-21. In the mid-1930's, Major

Campbell, later to become wartime Chief of Ordnance, was in charge of manufacturing at Rock

Island Arsenal. 9

 Maj. Eric W. Sheppard, Tanks in the Next

War (London: G. Bles, 1938), pp. 77-80. 10

 In France, Italy, Russia, and Japan the same

trend was followed. See Richard M. Ogorkiewicz,

"The Ten Ages of Tank," Armor, LXI, No. 3

(1952), 10-18. Up to 1938 it was not much different in Germany. Only light tanks were built before that date, and not in large quantities.

USSBS, Tank Industry Rpt, 2d edition, Jan 47. 11

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. VII; (2) Campbell, op.

cit., ch. 14; (3) Combat Vehicles 1940-45, MS

study prepared by Daniel Chase, 31 Dec 45, OHF;

(4) Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, I, pp. 61-66. In

the 1930's the automotive section consisted of five

officers, headed by Maj. John K. Christmas and

including Capt. Emerson L. Cummings who later

became Chief of Ordnance. Similar neglect of

tank work in England is described in Postan, op.

cit., p. 7 and pp. 188-89.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 225

placed for forging and machining artillery

shells, and for making rifles, recoil mechanisms, and fire control instruments, only

two small educational orders were placed

for tanks. One went to the Van Dorn Iron

Works for light tank hulls and the other

to the Baldwin Locomotive Works for ten

light tanks (M2A4). Design changes and

slow deliveries of machine tools and armor

plate, coupled with higher priority for medium tank orders, delayed the start of

production at the Baldwin plant until after

Pearl Harbor. In terms of production preparedness, the two orders brought no

significant results.12

In time of emergency, Ordnance planned

to place its tank contracts with firms that

built railway equipment. Firms experienced in handling heavy rolling stock and

in fabricating and assembling big steel

components—such as American Car and

Foundry, American Locomotive, and Baldwin—were considered the most suitable

contractors. Further, because of the depressed state of the railroad industry,

these companies were not very busy. Production plans provided that these firms

were to make hulls, turrets, and numerous

other parts, but major assemblies such as

engines, transmissions, and guns were to be

made elsewhere and shipped to the locomotive plants as "government free issue."

The first tank order of the World War

II period illustrates the nature of the procurement plans and manufacturing procedures. It was a fixed-price contract for

329 light tanks, M2A4, awarded by Rock

Island through competitive bidding to the

American Car and Foundry Company

(ACF) in early October 1939—the first

American tank order placed with industry

in twenty years.13 ACF engineers immediately set to work checking more than

2,000 blueprints and placing orders for

parts and materials. The 12-ton M2A4

required more than 2,806 different kinds

of parts, totaling over 14,000 individual

pieces—not counting engines or accessories. The aircraft type engine used in the

light tank was made by Continental

Motors. When ACF found that steel mills

were unable to supply in time the type

of armor plate required, it installed heattreating furnaces to make its own facehardened plate. The company delivered its

first tank to Ordnance in April 1940, well

ahead of schedule, and completed the

entire order (meanwhile increased to 365)

in March 1941.14

The most serious problem in the early

stages of light tank production was change

of design. As early as the spring of 1940,

for example, the need for heavier armor

plate was revealed by reports from the war

in Europe, and the added weight required

a stronger suspension system. In July 1940

a much improved light tank, known officially as the M3 and unofficially as the

12

 (1) Educational Orders folder, OHF; (2)

Telcon with Brig Gen Burton O. Lewis (Ret.),

8 Mar 54; (3) Hist, Phila Ord Dist, vol. I, pt.

8, History of Eddystone Sub-Office. 13

 For a first-hand account, see "Light Tanks"

by Charles J. Hardy, president of ACF, in Army

Ordnance, XXII, No. 130 (January-February

1942), 568-69. See also PSP on Production

Planning, OCO-Detroit, 16 Jun 45, dr. P4336,

OCO-D files. 14

 (1) F. A. Stevenson (Vice President ACF),

"Mass Production of Combat Tanks," Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 125 (March-April 1941), 485;

(2) Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, II, ch. 5; (3)

Hist, Phila Ord Dist, I, pt. 1, Contractor Histories, OHF; (4) Chase, Combat Vehicles 1940-45,

p. 27 and pp. 47-48; (5) OCO-D History, Engineering and Manufacturing Division, vol. 7, pt.

1; (6) American Car and Foundry Co., The

Armed Forces of ACF. For detailed characteristics, see Catalog of Standard Ordnance Items,

Volume 1, Tank and Automotive Vehicles, OHF.

For problems in administering the contract, see

History, Philadelphia Ordnance District, I, pt. 7,

Tank and Combat Vehicle Br, OHF.
226 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

General Stuart, was adopted, and orders

for it went to American Car and Foundry.

During the next twelve months the 7-

sided riveted turret of the early model took

on a rounded shape; welding took the place

of riveting; a power traverse for the turret was added; armor thickness was increased; and a gyrostabilizer was installed

to steady the 37-mm. gun while the tank

was in motion. ACF received a steady

stream of engineering change orders during

1940 and 1941, and, as the contract was

of the fixed-price type, nearly every change

required a change in the contract price.15

When the new model (M3A1) was

adopted in August 1941, ACF was directed

to switch over to its production as soon as

possible. In 1942 the M3A3 appeared with

an all-welded hull, sloping frontal armor,

and an improved radio compartment, but

it was soon replaced by the M5.16 This

model, using two Cadillac engines and two

automatic transmissions, required countless revisions in drawings and specifications. All these design changes added up

to a steady trend of improvement, but they

complicated the procurement task immeasurably and made field maintenance

and spare parts supply extremely difficult.

The process required balancing the value

of each proposed improvement in battlefield performance against the delay it

would cause in getting tanks to the troops.

It was the eternal conflict that Under

Secretary Patterson had in mind when he

declared, "The best is the enemy of the

good."

 17

While production of light tanks was

getting under way, manufacture of medium tanks proceeded slowly at Rock

Island Arsenal. After building 18 M2's in

fiscal year 1939, Rock Island began work

on an order for 126 mediums of improved

design, M2A1. But in 1940, when much

larger orders were being considered, Ordnance opposed further production of this

model and urged adoption of a more

powerful tank with a 75-mm. gun and

heavier armor. As a result, the Army had

on hand in May 1940, when the German

Army launched its invasion of western

Europe, only 28 new tanks—18 medium

and 10 light—and they were soon to become obsolete, along with some 900 older

models in stock.18 Even more serious was

industry's lack of experience in tank manufacture, and limited production facilities.

The Upswing in 1940

In mid-June 1940, Col. Alexander G.

Gillespie of the Artillery Division reported

to General Charles Harris that plans for

tank production during the coming fiscal

year were well in hand. Requirements for

light tanks stood at 405. As American Car

and Foundry was building this tank at

the rate of one per day, no trouble was

anticipated in getting production on the

1941 requirements. The medium tank program was much larger—1,741 to be built

in eighteen months—but no difficulty was

expected with it as both American Locomotive and Baldwin Locomotive had un15

 For details, see Hist, Phila Ord Dist, I, pt.

7, pp. 115-20. 16

 Originally designated M4 but changed to M5

to avoid confusion with the M4 medium tank.

The M3A2 never went into production. Hist,

Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D, Tank and Combat

Vehicle Sec. See also Daniel Chase, The Design,

Development and Production of Tanks in World

War II, 15 Aug 44, OHF. 17

 Seech. III, above. 18

 (1) Statement of Gen George C. Marshall,

Army CofS, before S. Appropriations Comm., 22

May 40, summarized in Army Ordnance, XXI,

No. 121 (July-August 1940), 15; (2) Munitions

Program of 30 June 1940 (corrected as of July

24, 1940) in ASF Contl Div, dr G43.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 227

used capacity and were going to submit

bids. Gasoline engines for these tanks were

to be supplied by the Wright Aeronautical

Corporation and diesel engines by the Guiberson Diesel Engine Company.19

 But

while Colonel Gillespie was writing his report, events at home and abroad were

forcing a reconsideration of the whole

tank program.

In May and June of 1940 the German

Army, led by light and medium tanks and

dive bombers, defeated the Belgian Army,

drove the British Expeditionary Force

from the Continent, and overwhelmed

French resistance. In this blitzkrieg campaign, the Germans did not use heavy

tanks, nor did they throw great numbers

of tanks into the battle, but they employed

their well-trained armored forces with

great skill.20 Their highly mobile attacking

units won a decisive victory over immobile

defenses, and brought tanks into a new

position of prominence in military thinking.

At the end of June a British tank commission arrived in the United States with

plans to procure thousands of tanks from

American factories as soon as possible.21

On 10 July 1940 the U.S. Army announced creation of a separate Armored

Force, thus ending the Infantry's 20-year

control of tank doctrine and formally recognizing the fast-growing importance of

tanks in warfare. With adoption of the

Munitions Program of 30 June 1940 the

War Department began to plan in earnest

for mass production of all weapons, including thousands of tanks.22

As early as the first week in June,

William S. Knudsen, newly appointed

member of the National Defense Advisory

Commission (NDAC), had looked over

the Ordnance tank production plans and

concluded they were totally inadequate

for the big job that he saw ahead. Convinced that the locomotive companies,

which normally built a few specially designed locomotives each year, would

never be able to meet the emergency

demand for high-speed tank production,

he decided to bring the Detroit automobile

industry into the tank picture.23 Ordnance

leaders were also aware of the need to

widen the base for tank production and

welcomed Knudsen's aid in persuading the

automobile industry to join them. The

big difficulty was that the industry could

not be "converted" to tank production

overnight, nor could tanks be built in a

few odd corners of existing plants. Building tanks required a different set of tools

and a complete new production layout; it

could not be sandwiched in with automobile production.

Knudsen's proposal was not to convert

19

 Memo, Col Alexander G. Gillespie for Chief,

Ind Serv, 17 Jun 40, sub: Tank Prod Plans for

1941 Program, OCO ExecO files. 20

 The 4 German tank models in 1940 were

the light tanks, Pz. Kfw. I and II, and the

mediums, Pz. Kfw. III and IV. They were little,

if any, better than U. S. tanks of the same year.

See Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. X; Garrett Underhill, "Introduction to German Armor," Armored Cavalry

Journal, LVIII, No. 4 (1949), 6; and Rcd of

Army Ord Research and Development—Tanks,

pp. 1A41ff. 21

 For one account of this commission, see Ltr,

Michael Dewar, head of British Tank Commission, to Minister of Supply, London, 10 Mar 42,

in Icks, op. cit. The progress and difficulties of

British tank production in 1940 are described in

Postan, op. cit., pp. 183-95. 22

 For a popular history of the Armored Force,

see Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing

Company, 1947). The background of tank doctrine, 1919-40, is reviewed briefly in Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, pp. 189-94. 23

 For comment on the nature of peacetime

locomotive production, see History, Philadelphia

Ordnance District, I, Part 7, page 103.
228 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

existing auto plants but to build an entirely new plant in the Detroit area, a

tank arsenal specially designed and

equipped to make medium tanks. On 7

June he telephoned K. T. Keller, president

of the Chrysler Corporation, and arranged

a conference with him for the following

weekend. When asked if he would consider

building and operating such a plant for

the government, Keller immediately agreed

to put his production planners to work on

the problem. Within forty-eight hours he

was in Washington conferring with General Wesson and his staff.24

Not only had Chrysler never made tanks

before, but few of its engineers had ever

even seen a tank. They had to go at once

to Rock Island Arsenal to examine a tank

model and obtain the necessary blueprints

—186 pounds of them. Back in Detroit on

17 June they began intensive work, behind

closed doors, estimating the cost of buildings, machines, and materials. They

worked from early morning until late at

night, seven days a week. Finally, on 17

July, Keller delivered his completed estimate to Knudsen in Washington. A tank

arsenal to produce ten medium tanks a

day would cost $21,000,000, and each

tank (complete except for guns) would

cost about $30,000. Knudsen told Keller

to give these figures to General Wesson

and then make a recalculation on the

basis of cutting the capacity to five tanks

per day. Reporting this conference to

General Charles Harris the same day,

Colonel Lewis remarked, "It looks like a

good proposition to me."

 25

The only real trouble with the proposition was lack of a first-rate tank design.

The Chrysler engineers started with the

design of the M2AI, mounting only a 37-

mm. gun, but reports from the European

battlefront had already shown its inadequacy. To meet the crying need for tanks

with bigger guns and tougher armor, the

Armored Force and Ordnance collaborated in rushing through plans for a new

tank, salvaging what they could from the

existing M2AI model and profiting from

British battle experience. For the first

time a turret basket, power operation of

turret, and a gyrostabilizer were applied to

an American tank. The 75-mm. gun was

put in the right sponson, where it had

limited traverse, because Ordnance had

tried out such an arrangement some

months earlier with good results, but it

was understood at the time that a completely new design with the gun in the

turret, giving all-round traverse, would be

more desirable.26

Design of the tank, the M3, was still

under way at the time the contract with

2 4

 Keller' s own version of the incident is told

in "The Detroit Tank Arsenal," Army Ordnance,

XXII, No. 130 (January-February 1942), 545-

46. Knudsen's account is in Lecture, Problems in

War Production, ICAF, 18 Jun 46, p. 13; (1)

Wesley W. Stout, Tanks Are Mighty Fine Things

(Detroit: Chrysler Corporation, 1946); (2) Intervs with Generals Charles Harris and Burton

Lewis, Mar 54; (3) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, I;

(4) Truman Comm. Hearings, 77th Cong., 1st

sess., pt. 1, pp. 102-03. 25

 Memo, Col Burton O. Lewis for Chief Ind

Serv, 17 Jul 40, sub: Chrysler Motor Co., ExecO

file. See also: (1) Stout, op. cit.; (2) Lecture,

K. T. Keller, Problems of Tank Production,

ICAF, 17 Mar 48, ICAF Library L48-111; and

(3) Testimony of John D. Biggers in Hearings,

Truman Comm., 77th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 7, 13

Aug 41, pp. 2059-61. 26

 (1) Hist, Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D, secs.

entitled History of U.S. Medium Tank and Brief

History of Medium Tanks from 1939 to 1942;

(2) Brig Gen John K. Christmas, Development of

the U.S. Medium Tanks M3 and M4, 20 Jul 43,

OHF; (3) Icks, Evolution of American and

German Medium Tanks; (4) Chase, Design, Development and Prod of Tanks in World War II,

p. 21; (5) Lt. Col. John K. Christmas, "Our

New Medium Tank," Army Ordnance, XXII,

No. 127 (July-August 1941), 27-29.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 229

DETROIT TANK ARSENAL UNDER CONSTRUCTION on a 100-acre tract of farmland on the

outskirts of Detroit.

Chrysler was being negotiated.27 At a

meeting of top production officials on 1

August, General Wesson stated that the

last of the ten thousand drawings required

for the new design would not be completed for at least sixty days, but he

nevertheless asked for authority to sign

the contract with Chrysler so that work on

the new plant could begin at once. "As far

as it is humanly possible to say, the design

is right and settled," Lt. Col. Walter W.

Warner told the meeting. "This design is

based on our best engineering knowledge,

but I do not believe we have ever built a

tank or anything else that did not have to

be altered at first." In spite of the many

uncertainties in the picture the conferees

unanimously approved immediate action

to close the contract for building and

equipping the new tank arsenal and producing one thousand medium tanks of the

new M3 design, soon to be nicknamed the

General Grant. This meant that Ordnance

was attempting to go into production, do

the development work, and build new

facilities all at the same time.28

The contract signed, and a 100-acre

tract of farmland on the outskirts of Detroit selected as the site, ground for the

tank arsenal was broken early in September 1940. A Chrysler engineer was meanwhile sent to Aberdeen where designs of

the new M3 were coming off the drawing

boards. He mailed copies of blueprints to

Detroit, relayed other information by

27

 The Mead Committee in 1946 was sharply

critical of the Army for its lack of tank drawings

in 1940. See S. Rpt No. no, pt. 7, p. 7, Additional Report of the Mead Spec S. Comm., 79th

Cong., 2d sess., 1946. 28

 Min of a conf held in OCO, Munitions

Bldg, 1 Aug 40, ExecO file. For a brief account of

the development work, see Hist, Engr and Mfg

Div, OCO-D, and other references in preceding

footnotes. Design and production of the Churchill tank in Britain followed the same streamlined

course, as did German production of Tigers and

Panthers.
230 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

telephone, and, along with representatives

of the railway equipment companies, offered Ordnance designers valuable suggestions on engineering changes that would

mean cheaper and faster production.29

Late in January the steel of the main arsenal building was up, and in mid-April

1941 the first tank was presented to

Ordnance as the gift of Chrysler dealers

throughout the country. By July, Keller

wrote to Under Secretary Patterson that

the tank arsenal was "beginning to look

like a producing department" and would

turn out 507 tanks during the next five

months.30

While the tank arsenal was being built,

Ordnance placed large orders for M3 tanks

with the American Locomotive Company

and the Baldwin Locomotive Works—

685 to be built by American and 535 by

Baldwin—bringing total orders up to

2,220. The British government meanwhile

contracted directly with Baldwin, Lima

Locomotive Works, and Pullman-Standard

Car Company; the Canadian government contracted with the Montreal division

of American Locomotive for 1,157 tanks

of the M-3 design. The United States

refused to permit the British to place

contracts with American firms for Britishdesigned tanks, thus forcing adoption of

the M3 by the British and Canadian forces.

This step greatly simplified production

and maintenance, but the M3 design had

been improvised so hastily, and with so

little opportunity for test, that it soon had

to be replaced by the M4.31

There was a strong spirit of competition

among the three Ordnance contractors in

early 1941, and each strove to win the

honor of producing the first tank. There

was also an extreme shortage of certain

major components, particularly power

trains (transmissions and final drives). In

April, when American and Baldwin were

about to complete their first tanks, the

Mack Manufacturing Company had only

one power train available. It was delivered

to American, and completion of that company's first tank was heralded with a

demonstration before Secretary Patterson

and other high-ranking Army officials. The

power train was then quickly removed and

delivered by truck to the Baldwin Locomotive Works so that company could celebrate completion of its first tank a few

days later. Meanwhile Chrysler, which

built its own transmissions, had completed

its first tank on 11 April but the acceptance ceremony did not take place until

24 April when General Wesson personally

accepted two complete tanks. It was a

photo finish with all three companies crossing the line at about the same time.32

29

 (1) Hist, Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D; (2)

Stout, op. cit., pp. 21-23; (3) Christmas, "Our

New Medium Tank," Army Ordnance, XXII, No.

127 (July-August 1941), 27-29. 30

 Ltr, Keller to Patterson, 21 Jul 41, copy in

ExecO file. The plant was officially designated

Detroit Tank Arsenal in May 1941. See Ltr, TAG

to CofOrd, 29 May 41, sub: Redesignation of

Detroit Ord Plant, AG 680.9 (5-5-41)- A pictorial section of Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 127

(July-August 1941) is devoted to the tank plants

and their products. See also Charles O. Herb,

"Tanks for the Democracies Roll from Chrysler's

Arsenal," Machinery, vol. 48, No. 4 (December

1940). 31

 (1) Christmas, "Our New Medium Tank,"

Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 127 (July-August

1941), 27-29; (2) Memo, Lt Col William W.

Knight, Jr., for Brig Gen Christmas, 16 May 45,

sub: Informal Rpt on Early Phases of Tank

Program, OHF; (3) PSP on Prod Plng, OCO-D,

16 Jun 45, P4336. Histories of the Rochester and

Philadelphia district offices contain additional

data on these early tank contracts. For a British

report, see Ltr, Michael Dewar, head of British

Tank Commission, to Ministry of Supply, London,

10 Mar 42, in Icks, op. cit. 32

 (1) Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt.

13; (2) Ltr, Keller to Thomson, 1 Apr 54, OHF;

(3) Telcon with Gen Burton O. Lewis, 15 Apr

54; (4) Stout, op. cit., p. 26.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 231

The U.S. Army had no heavy tanks at

the start of 1940, and little desire to acquire any. Its plans were oriented toward

defense of the nation against invasion, not

toward sending an expeditionary force

overseas to attack strongly fortified positions. Ordnance tank experts consistently

argued for heavy tanks, but the Infantry

and other branches opposed the idea. Critics of the heavy tank argued that it was

needed only for assaulting major fortifications and taunted the heavy tank advocates by reminding them that neither

Canada nor Mexico, the nation's nearest

neighbors, had erected Maginot Lines. But

in the spring of 1940, largely due to the

shock of the German successes—including

exaggerated reports of the size of German

tanks—work on development of a 60-ton

heavy tank was approved.33 The M6,

powered by a 1,000-horsepower gasoline

engine and mounting a 3-inch gun, was

standardized later in the year, and one

pilot tank was ordered from Baldwin in

August, but production had to wait for

another twelve months.34

It is worth noting that by the fall of

1940 the critics were already attacking the

Army for its slowness in rearming, particularly in getting airplanes and tanks. They

appeared not to understand that the huge

sums appropriated for the so-called "defense program" could not be translated

into military hardware overnight. Arthur

Krock, writing in the New York Times on

1 October, declared the nation was totally

unprepared to meet any challenge in the

air, whether at home or abroad, and went

on to say, "The Army has about 500 tanks,

one-half of which are obsolete. It has ordered one heavy tank, but at the moment

it does not own one." General Wesson

declared the following day that U.S. tanks

were not obsolete and added that no

other country in the world was known to

have heavy tanks in quantity.35 By the

end of December 1940 the score on tank

procurement stood as follows: light tanks

—325, mediums—6, heavies—0.

Doubling the Program in 1941

The first five months of 1941 were relatively uneventful, both at home and

abroad. England had survived the bombing attacks of late 1940 and was receiving

more American aid. The war against the

U-boats in the Atlantic and the fighting

in North Africa were both causing concern, but they were less spectacular than

events in 1940. For Ordnance, requirements remained steady and production

gradually gained momentum. ACF continued to produce light tanks, and the

output of mediums rose steadily at Chrysler, American, and Baldwin. The worst

bottleneck during this period was the

supply of machine tools, with contractors

sometimes finding that lack of a single

machine prevented their completing an

order. The difficulty in getting tools on

time was due to the low-priority rating,

33

 (1) OCM 15842, 22 May 40; (2) Ltr,

CofOrd for TAG, sub: Heavy Tanks, 27 May 40,

OO 451.25/10292. The Germans had no heavy

tanks in service in 1940. The Pz. Kw. IV

weighed only 19 tons and mounted a 75-mm.

gun. For an account of the heavy tank controversy, see Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. X. 34

 For discussion of heavy tank potentialities in

1940, see Capt. Charles R. Kutz, "Break-Through

Tanks," Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 123 (November-December 1940), 242-45. The Baldwin

heavy tank contract is described in History,

Philadelphia Ordnance District, Volume I, Part

7, pages 104 and 129. For an account of development, see History of the Heavy Tank, M6, n.d.,

in Ord R&D files, no author, OHF. 35

 (1) New York Times, October 1, 1940,

editorial page; (2) Memo, CofOrd for ASW, 2

Oct 40, sub: Article by Arthur Krock, ExecO file.
232 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

A-1-g, applied to producers of medium

tanks.36

The calm that prevailed in the tank

program during the first half of the

year was suddenly broken in July 1941—

immediately following the German invasion of the Soviet Union—when President

Roosevelt stepped into the picture and

directed that production of tanks be expedited at once, "with the only limiting

factor . . . the ability of American industry

to produce tanks."

 37

 This was part and

parcel of the President's plan to gear

American production to a comprehensive

Victory Program aimed at the defeat of

all "potential enemies." Secretary Patterson gave the President a preliminary estimate that 1,600 medium tanks could be

built by the end of the year and that the

established objective was production at

the rate of 1,000 per month. More than

this could not be produced, OPM officials

advised the President, "without considerable industrial dislocation."

 38

 A few days

later, General Wesson stated that only

1,400 mediums could be produced by the

end of the year—850 by U.S. contractors

and 550 by British suppliers—plus 1,900

light tanks. But he warned that even this

estimate could not be met if tools scheduled for tank plants were diverted elsewhere.39

During July and August, while General

Staff planners were at work on the

Victory Program, several important steps

were taken to speed production. Ordnance created a separate Tank and Combat Vehicle Division40

 headed by Lt. Col.

John K. Christmas, thus taking tanks out

of the Artillery Division. A short time

later, to eliminate conflict of responsibilities between Ordnance and the recently

created Office of Production Management,

the tank section of OPM, headed by Lt.

Col. William W. Knight, Jr., was transferred to Ordnance. Further, control of all

tank production, both American and

British, was centralized in Ordnance.41

In the midst of this concerted drive to

speed production President Roosevelt

dropped a bombshell in mid-September.

At a White House conference, where

Generals Charles Harris and Burton Lewis

represented Ordnance, the President reviewed current military production plans.

When he came to the schedule calling for

production of 1,000 medium tanks and

400 light tanks per month, the President

paused, placed a cigarette in his famous

long holder, lit it, and then calmly issued

this cryptic directive: "Double it!"

Monthly production was to be 2,800— or

33,600 per year. The cost would be close

to a billion dollars for one year's production.42

Ordnance leaders, as conservative in

their way as the President was bold in his,

thought this decision ill-advised. From

their point of view, doubling production

goals meant a further worsening of the

already critical machine-tool situation and

meant bringing new, less experienced producers into the picture. Unlike the Presi36

 Memo, Knight, to Brig Gen Christmas, 16

May 45. See also ch. III, above. 37

 Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41, ExecO file. 38

 Ltr, Sidney Hillman and Biggers, OPM, to

President, 11 Jul 41, ExecO file. 39

 Memo, CofOrd for USW, 25 Jul 41, sub:

Monthly Prod . . . Tanks, OHF. 40

 An oddly redundant title as tanks are combat vehicles. The new division was created by

ODO 183, 29 July 1941. 41

 (1) Memo, Knight, for Brig Gen Christmas,

16 May 45; (2) Ltr, USW to CofOrd, 17 Jul

41, OO 451.25/7113; (3) PSP on Prod Plng,

OCO-D, 16 Jun 45, P4336. 42

 Intervs with Generals Harris and Lewis in

1953-54. See also Smith, Army and Economic

Mobilization, Chapter VI, for discussion of formulation of Victory Program.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 233

dent, they were close to the practical

problems of production and not up-to-date

on plans to send military equipment on a

vast scale to friendly powers, chiefly

Britain and the Soviet Union.43 But once

the President had spoken Ordnance had

no choice but to push ahead with the

enlarged program. As a first step, an A1-a priority was requested for all tanks.

Ordnance estimated that with such a priority tank production could be increased

15 percent by 30 June 1942. When this

estimate was reported to the President he

upped the figure to 25 percent. The next

steps were to increase existing tank orders, urge faster production, and build

new capacity. Ordnance took over British

orders with Pressed Steel, PullmanStandard, and Lima, firms that had just

come into production at old plants rehabilitated at British expense. Contracts for

transmissions and final drives were placed

with the Caterpillar Tractor Company and

the Iowa Transmission Company, the latter a subsidiary of John Deere Company.

Negotiations were started with steel foundries to increase their capacity for cast

armor, then only half of estimated requirements. At the same time, capacity for

producing both homogeneous and facehardened armor plate had to be greatly

increased, with such companies as Republic Steel, Carnegie-Illinois, and Henry Disston heading the list. In mid-November

negotiations were completed for an entirely new tank arsenal at Grand Blanc,

Michigan, to be operated by the Fisher

Body Division of General Motors. Comparable to the Chrysler tank arsenal, it was

to have capacity for one thousand M4

medium tanks per month and was to cost

something over $37 million for buildings,

machinery, and equipment.44

While these long-term projects were being launched, production from existing

plants was disappointingly slow. For November, only 306 medium tanks were

produced against a scheduled 490. The

trouble was in the production of transmissions, with one leading source making

only 33 units during the month. Considerable improvement was achieved in December when increased transmission production brought the figure on medium

tanks up to 506. The December rate for

light and medium tanks combined was a

little over 900—far short of the President's

new objective, though well ahead of the

rate of 32 in the preceding December.45

Most important, there were five competent

producers of medium tanks in the field

—American, Baldwin, Chrysler, Pressed

Steel, and Pullman-Standard—and the

huge new Fisher tank arsenal was under

construction. By the end of the year the

production score for all of 1941 stood as

follows: light tanks—2,591, mediums—

1,461, heavies—o.46

The All-Out Effort in 1942

At the start of 1942, while Ordnance

leaders were pushing hard to reach the

43

 For discussion of the strategic plans, see

Watson, Chief of Staff, Chapter XI, and Maurice

Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Chapter III. The British side of

the picture is reported in Postan, op. cit., Pages

238-39. 44

 (1) Chase, Combat Vehicles, 1940-45, op.

cit., pp. 101-02; (2) Military Tank Production,

a progress report by War Projects Unit, Bur of

the Budget, 24 Oct 44, OHF; (3) Hist, Chicago

Ord Dist, I, pt. 2. 45

 Summary Report of Acceptance, TankAutomotive Materiel, 1940-45, OCO-D, December 1945, OHF. 46

 Whiting, Statistics. A pilot model of the 60-

ton heavy tank with a cast hull was accepted

from the Baldwin Locomotive Company on the

day after Pearl Harbor.
234 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

"double it" objective, President Roosevelt

suddenly raised the requirements still

higher. In a secret letter to the Secretary

of War on 3 January he set the following

tank production goals:47

1942 1943

Total ................ . 45,000 75,000

Heavy ................. . 500 5,000

Medium ..............25,00 0 50,000

Thre Light ....................19,50 e days later the President0 mad 20,00 e these0

figures public in his message to Congress

and touched off a heated public discussion

of the feasibility of the new goals—and

as to the origins of the President's figures.

On this latter point, one fact was crystal

clear: they did not originate with the

Ordnance Department. General Staff

planners working on the Victory Program

were dealing with such big, round figures,

but Ordnance leaders were not. General

Wesson and his staff not only doubted the

need for such huge numbers of tanks but

also felt they could not be produced without sacrificing other equally important

munitions. Ordnance leaders assigned

credit—or blame—for the new objectives

to Lord Beaverbrook, British supply chief,

and to such Presidential advisers as Harry

Hopkins and Robert Nathan.48 In support

of this view they cited the conference on

29 December 1941 when Lord Beaverbrook's views were presented to Donald

Nelson and others in the office of Vice

President Henry A. Wallace. According to

Nelson, the British supply chief stated

"that in talking to Stalin, Stalin told him

that Germany had thrown 30,000 tanks

into the fight with Russia. . . . He made

the statement that if an invasion of America was attempted we had no conception

of the number of tanks we would have to

cope with. . . . He thinks we should plan

for the production of 45,000 tanks in 1942

against Mr. Knudsen's estimate of

30,000."

 49

 These exaggerated views were

also impressed upon the President who

not only recognized the need for "overwhelming superiority in munitions" but

also valued the psychological effect of a

dramatic gesture to instill confidence in

the American people, and in their many

allies throughout the world. When questioned on the industrial practicality of

figures to be used in his message to Congress, he is said to have answered, "Oh

—the production people can do it if they

really try."

 50

Within two weeks of the President's

directive, Ordnance had its plans drawn

up and ready for presentation to the

Office of Production Management and the

Under Secretary of War for approval. For

the medium tank, Colonel Christmas reported, the nine firms so far lined up were

considered capable of producing the required 25,000 tanks during 1942, if they

got the tools and materials needed. By

far the biggest producer on the list was

the Detroit Tank Arsenal, which was to be

enlarged to make 7,765 units during the

year, plus 500 transmissions to be used by

other tank producers. It was followed by

five railway equipment companies—American (both U.S. and Canadian plants),

Baldwin, Pullman-Standard, Pressed Steel

47

 Ltr, President to SW, 3 Jan 42, copy in OHF.

A similar letter went to OPM on 5 Jan 42. See

CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, p. 278. 48

 Intervs with Generals Harris and Lewis, Mar

54. For further light on this point, see Wesson's

confs, Jan-Mar 42, particularly 27 Mar 42. 49

 Quoted in CPA, Industrial Mobilization for

War, p. 277. See also Robert E. Sherwood,

Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp.

473-74. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing

Survey, Germany had only 4,500 tanks in service

on 1 June 1941—not 30,000. 50

 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 474.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 235

Car, and Lima Locomotive—and the new

Fisher tank arsenal. The Ford Motor Company was also to start building tanks

and was scheduled to reach a 500-permonth rate in November 1942. On a

smaller scale, the Pacific Car and Foundry

Company of Renton, Wash., was to come

into production in 1942. The conferees

concluded that Ordnance had the tank

program well in hand but recommended

adding two more sources for medium

tanks.51

In February Colonel Christmas made a

strong case for revising the President's light

tank requirements so that fewer would be

produced in 1942 and more in 1943.

"There is no doubt that we could achieve

these objectives [19,500 in 1942 and

20,000 in 1943]," he explained to a

conference attended by Patterson, Harrison, Knudsen, and others, "but there is

this major objection to it—if we set up

facilities to do that, they will be idle in

1943 to a considerable extent." Producing

19,500 tanks during 1942 would mean

building up to a high capacity in the latter

part of the year, capacity far in excess of

that needed to produce virtually the same

number of units in twelve full months of

1943. But the conference gave no positive

answer to the queston before passing on

to the medium tank. Here, with eleven

firms at work, some on the M3 (General

Grant) and others on the M4 (General

Sherman), Ordnance expressed confidence

that the Presidential objectives could be

reached, both for 1942 and 1943, if given

a high priority. Engines, transmissions, and

guns were the critical components, but

vigorous efforts were being made to speed

their production. As for the heavy tank, it

presented the same problem as the light

tank—production was too much concentrated in 1942. There was also a further

question as to the real need for such

tanks, as they were desired only by the

British, not by the U.S. Army. "I haven't

found an officer yet in the U.S. Army that

proposes that we get these heavy tanks,"

commented Deputy Chief of Staff General

Richard Moore. "I think that should be

deferred until this British tank committee

gets over here." The decision was that

Ordnance should "proceed as planned and

no further," and await the joint BritishAmerican conferences scheduled for

March.52

Two weeks later, Colonel Christmas

presented additional thoughts on the tank

program. He reported that the prospects

of achieving the Presidential objective for

medium tanks—25,000 in 1942 and 50,000

in 1943—were good. But, he warned, this

could be done only at the cost of other

items, particularly armored cars and selfpropelled artillery. He therefore recommended that the 1942 objective be cut

from 25,000 to 20,000, and heavy tanks

be reduced proportionately. This would

help balance production by making it

possible to produce a proper complement

of scout cars, half tracks, and selfpropelled artillery. Colonel Christmas also

raised a question as to the reasonableness of the over-all tank objectives, pointing out that they would supply light tanks

for 123 armored divisions, medium tanks

for 216 armored divisions, plus 100 percent

51

 Conf held in Wesson's office, 16 Jan 42, sub:

Proc Plan for Tanks Covered by the President's

Dir, ExecO file. On Pacific Car and Foundry, see

Hist, San Francisco Ord Dist, I, Seattle Regional

Office, pp. 7-15. 52

 Review of the Prod Plans of the Tank and

Combat Vehicle Div, 25 Feb 42, T676A. General

Moore apparently overstated the case somewhat.

There certainly had been some heavy tank advocates in the Army in 1941 when the pilot model

of the M6 was authorized.
236 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

GENERAL SHERMAN M4A1 MEDIUM TANK ASSEMBLY LINE at Lima Locomotive

Works, 1942.

replacement for one year's operation. He

questioned whether the United States,

Britain, and the Soviet Union could organize and otherwise equip and transport such

huge numbers of tank units, and suggested

that each nation would do better if it

planned to equip more modest forces, perhaps 25 armored divisions each for 1942.

Even this figure was nearly three times

the number actually activated by the U.S.

Army in 1942.53

Later in March the British Tank Mission

and the U.S. Tank Committee held a

number of conferences to work out detailed plans for co-ordinating American,

British, and Canadian production. A major

product of these meetings was the decision to recommend a program of balanced

production, as Colonel Christmas had

urged. Basically, this meant cutting the

President's tank objectives and boosting

those for armored cars and self-propelled

artillery. As early as September 1941, when

General Wesson was in London, the British had urged the need for self-propelled

artillery, citing the "startling successes

gained by the German assault artillery."

 54

But the President's January program

called for only 2,539 self-propelled weapons in 1942—all of the relatively ineffective 37-mm. type. The British-American

conference recommended production of

53

 (1) Memos of Col Christmas for CofOrd, 10

and 11 Mar 42, sub: President's Objectives for

1942 and 1943: Prod of Tanks. ExecO file; (2)

Memo, Maj Gen Brehon B. Somervell for CofOrd,

6 Mar 42, sub: Presidential Objectives . . . , in

folder ASP. The number of armored divisions

actually organized by the U.S. Army throughout

World War II was 16. Palmer, Wiley, and Keast,

Procurement and Training of Ground Combat

Troops, pp. 491-92. 54

 Min of Mtg held at Claridge Hotel, London,

30 Sep 41, p. 17, OHF.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 237

GENERAL GRANT M3 MEDIUM TANK ASSEMBLY LINE at Detroit Tank Arsenal.

more than 15,000 self-propelled weapons,

ranging from 40-mm. to 105-mm. Production of these weapons was nearly equivalent to production of the same number of

tanks, for they consisted of artillery pieces

mounted on tank chassis. Known variously

as self-propelled mounts, gun motor carriages, or howitzer motor carriages, they

served in many different roles, chiefly as

antitank, antiaircraft, and mobile field artillery weapons.55

In spite of the evidence that was piling

up, both Somervell and Patterson were

reluctant to advise the President that the

objectives needed revision. At a conference

in General Wesson's office late in March,

when the U.S. Tank Committee's proposed changes in the objectives were discussed, Mr. Patterson stated that he could

not report to the White House that certain

items in the program were superfluous

and not useful.56 General Wesson was less

restrained, bluntly declaring that the program should be "balanced" and "in line

with actual requirements," even if it meant

informing the President that his objectives

were unsound. When reminded that the

President had set his production goals on

the basis of Lord Beaverbrook's advice,

General Wesson replied that "he sometimes

disagreed with statements made by Lord

55

 (1) Findings and Final Min of the Joint

British Tank Mission and the U.S. Tank Comm.,

30 Mar 42, p. 8, OHF; (2) Statement by Col

Christmas, 15 Apr 42, copy in app. to PSP 55,

Ord Rqmts 1939-46, by Maj Paul D. Olejar and

others, Jul 45. See also Ltr, CofS for President,

I Apr 42 in ASF Director of Matériel file marked

Presidential Objectives, dr G1591. 56

 Min, Wesson Conf, 25 Mar 42. See the

President's letter to WPB Chairman Nelson, 1

May 42, reiterating his desire to meet the January objectives, quoted in CPA, Industrial Mobilization for War, pp. 281-82.
238 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Beaverbrook." The conferees then considered sugar-coating the proposed changes

by adopting a new nomenclature for tanks,

self-propelled mounts, armored cars, and

other fighting vehicles. General Harris remarked that a heavy armored car was

virtually a light tank, and Secretary Patterson agreed. General Clay proposed

calling a self-propelled mount an "artillery tank." General Somervell observed

that the Ordnance Technical Committee

could hold a meeting that afternoon and

rename all its combat vehicles to bring

them under the heading of tanks, but

General Wesson objected on the ground

that any such move would lead to confusion.57

 The conference adjourned without reaching a final agreement, but when

the Army Supply Program appeared early

in April it embodied most of the changes

under discussion. Tank requirements for

1942 were cut deeply and large quantities

of self-propelled artillery added. With the

medium tank, for example, the 1942 requirements dropped from 25,000 to

14,000, but 6,580 self-propelled weapons

—built on medium tank chassis—were

added. As the self-propelled weapons

were nearly the same as tanks, Colonel

Christmas described the shift as "a virtual

renaming of part of our product." He

estimated the net over-all effect was to

reduce the 1942 program by 10 percent to

15 percent, and to raise the 1943 program

in proportion. The money value of the

new 1942 program was approximately $3

billion, and for 1943 about $8 billion. This

shift was of great benefit from the production standpoint because it eased the

load in 1942 and transferred some of it to

1943 when new and expanded facilities

would be better able to handle it.58

The production problems were nevertheless ominous, for the total tank schedule

to mid-1944 called for expenditure of over

$16 billion. In February 1942 the difficulty of obtaining machine tools appeared

to Ordnance as the most serious problem.

In April the supply of materials moved

into first place on the critical list, and

stayed there for the rest of the year. In

the tank program, nine-tenths of the material needed was steel, much of it highgrade steel. Nickel, copper, aluminum, and

rubber were also required. "Even now,"

Colonel Christmas reported in April,

"shortages of material are holding back

our production."

 59

 This was further evidence to justify reducing requirements,

and it invalidated earlier Ordnance estimates of production potential. In spite of

shortages throughout 1942, production

rose month by month from 954 in January

to 4,853 in December. But the total for

the year was only 25,000 instead of

45,000 as directed by the President in

January 1942. The failure to produce

more tanks was due in part to reduction

of requirements but chiefly to shortages in

material, irregular deliveries of material,

and increasing emphasis on spare parts.60

Of the vehicles produced, roughly 11,000

57

 Min, Wesson Confs, 25 Mar 42. 58

 (1) Review of the Prod Plans for the Tank

and Combat [Vehicle] Div, 18 Apr 42; (2) PSP

55, Ord Rqmts 1939-46, by Maj Paul D. Olejar

ant others, Jul 45. 59

 (1) Review of the Prod Plans for the Tank

and Combat [Vehicle] Div, 18 Apr 42; (2)

Tank-Automotive Center Production Review, 11

Dec 42, ASF Prod Div file 470.8 Tanks; (3) Rpt

of Principal Accomplishments and Difficulties,

30 Sep 42, OO 400.12. For discussion of conservation measures to save scarce materials, see

Chapter XVIII in Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War. For production

problems on a by-item basis, see Production

Analysis Notes, TCVD, 30 Apr 42. 60

 For a summary of factors affecting production, see Memo, Brig Gen Christmas for Lt Col

Wallace E. Niles, 16 Sep 42, copy in OHF. On

spare parts, see Chapter XIII, below.
TANKS AND OTHER FIGHTING VEHICLES 239

were light tanks, 14,000 were mediums

(mostly Grants), and 1 was a heavy tank

M6. In addition, there were 11,420 selfpropelled weapons, 9,846 half tracks, and

7,366 scout cars. The total for all combat vehicles combined, including selfpropelled weapons, armored cars, cargo

carriers, loading vehicles, and others, was

about 58,000.61

British and German Efforts in 1942

Meanwhile British tank production came

under fire in the House of Commons, with

critics citing difficulties not unlike those

encountered in the United States. In March

1942 the Select Committee on National

Expenditure declared that: ". . . in the

matter of settling the design for the weapons of war and the relative quantities of

each that are required . . . the programme

for manufacture as transmitted to industry shows signs of inadequate foresight

and sureness of decision, as well as a

tendency at times to give consideration to

producing the maximum volume of certain articles rather than the exact types

required by the fighting forces."

 62

 Aside

from lack of a first-rate design, British

tank production suffered from poor coordination between the War Office and

the civilian Ministry of Supply. British

production rose in 1942 to 8,611 units,

but the quality of the tanks produced

brought forth a good deal of criticism.

 63

Two trends dominated German tank

production in 1942—increased production,

and emphasis on heavier tanks. In January

1942, three weeks after announcement of

President Roosevelt's objectives, Chancellor

Hitler decided to expand German tank

production—then running at about 4,000

a year—in view of the disastrous losses his

armies had suffered in Russia late in 1941.

He also directed his generals to begin

producing heavy tanks that could cope

with the Russian T-34's. While American

tank men were trying out the heavy M6,

and preparing to discard it, Hitler set in

motion the machinery that brought the

powerful German heavy tanks, the Tiger

and the Panther, onto the battlefield in

small numbers about a year later. Less

concerned with mechanical perfection than

the U.S. Army, the Germans rushed these

tanks from drawing board to battlefield in

record time.64 In September 1942 Hitler

set a goal of 800 tanks per month to be

attained by the spring of 1944—less than

15 percent of President Roosevelt's objective for 1943. After the tremendous German tank losses at Stalingrad later in

1942, the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program

was drawn up by Albert Speer, Minister

of War Production, calling for 1,200 per

month by the end of 1944. Hitler immediately told Speer this figure was too low

and called for sharp increases which

production officials regarded as fantastic.

Hitler nevertheless issued a decree on 22

January 1943 that all necessary measures

be taken to increase tank production "even

if by these measures other important

branches of the armament industry are

adversely affected for a time." The result

was that production rose from about

61

 (1) Whiting, Statistics; (2) OCO-D Summary Rpt, pp. XX-XXIV. 62

 War-Time Tank Production, Report by the

Select Committee on National Expenditure . . . ,

p. 3, Jul 46, London. This is frequently referred

to as the British White Paper on Tanks. A summary of it appeared in The Times, London, July

16, 1946, p. 5. 63

 Ibid. This report includes criticisms by the

Select Committee and defenses by the War Office.

For a brief historical summary of British tank

production, see Postan, op. cit., pages 183-95. 64

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. X.
240 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

9,300 tanks during 1943 to about 17,500

in 1944, with the monthly production rate

reaching a peak of 1,600 in July 1944.65

The Tank-Automotive Center

Administratively, the most important

development affecting U.S. tank production in 1942 was the creation of the Detroit Tank-Automotive Center (T-AC)

later named Office Chief of OrdnanceDetroit (OCO-D). General Campbell

took this step in September 1942 when

responsibility for trucks and other transport vehicles was shifted from the Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance. He had a

dual purpose in mind: to combine truck

and tank procurement in one office and at

the same time decentralize it to Detroit.

Congestion in Washington had reached an

acute stage in the summer of 1942, with

both office space and housing at a premium. General Campbell made Brig. Gen.

Alfred R. Glancy, a newly commissioned

industrialist-in-uniform, chief of the center,

aided by Brig. Gen. John K. Christmas,

former chief of the Tank and Combat

Vehicle Division, and Brig. Gen. Donald

Armstrong, former chief of the Chicago

Ordnance District. Creation of the T-AC,

along with the simultaneous transfer to

St. Louis of artillery ammunition procurement, made Ordnance the leader among

the Army technical services in decentralization.66

Three months after the TankAutomotive Center was formed, and nine

months from announcement of the President's objectives, the pressure on the

production front was relieved by a sharp

cut in requirements. In the revised Army

Supply Program issued in November 1942

the 1943 figure for Sherman tanks dropped

from 46,500 to 24,582, and that for the

105-mm. howitzer motor carriage from

4,400 to 1,200. The only major increase

was for 3,000 of the 3-inch gun motor

carriages recently adopted as "tank destroyers." The net effect of all changes

was to reduce the requirement for medium

tanks and allied vehicles by more than

21,000 units. This sudden drop in requirements marked the end of the "all-out"

effort. Although there were few immediate

cancellations of tank contracts, General

Christmas remarked in December that the

cutback had had a bad effect on industry

morale, and concluded, "I doubt if we

will ever get industry back to its enthusiasm of last fall."

 67

65

 USSBS, op. cit. Brief comment on German

production appears also in Gordon A. Harrison,

Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp.

34-35. 66

 For details on the organization of T-AC, and

its administrative problems, see Green, Thomson,

and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter

IV. For a brief summary of tank procurement

procedures, see Outline of Tank Procurement,

May 1942, Report No. 7, ASF Control Division,

copy in OHF. Creation of the T-AC is described

in Army Ordnance, XXIII, No. 135 (NovemberDecember 1942), 501. 67

 The background for this phase of tank procurement is discussed above in Chapter IV. See

also T-AC Prod Review, 11 Dec 42, and Chase,

Combat Vehicles 1940-45, pp. 73-74.
CHAPTER XI

Production of Tanks

In a general way, tank building followed

the methods of automobile production. Major components were produced in widely

separated plants and then brought together

and assembled at an assembly plant. Although some tank contractors made more

components in their own shops than did

others, none made them all. Armor plate

and castings, for example, came from Pittsburgh or Chicago steel mills and foundries

in a rough or semifinished state. The guns

were supplied by Ordnance arsenals or

commercial producers. Rubber-bushed

tracks came from one of the major rubber

companies in Ohio.1 Within the tank's

enveloping armor the two most important

major assemblies were the engine and the

transmission, but there were also radios,

periscopes, ammunition racks, and countless other items. Most tank parts had two

things in common—they were very heavy,

and they were made chiefly of steel. More

than any other factors, these two determined the pattern of tank production.

They required plants with big cranes to

handle heavy assemblies, ingenious fixtures

to hold parts in position, and a great

variety of huge machine tools for cutting

and shaping the material. (Table 19)

The Schenectady plant of the American

Locomotive Company was such a plant.

Its tank assembly line—adjacent to continuing locomotive production areas—was

a series of seven stations at each of which

a major component was added. Starting

with the lower hull, or chassis, the gas

tanks and the mount for the big gun were

first put in place. At the next station the

giant transmission was added. At the third

stop an overhead crane lowered the engine

into place and the drive shaft was connected with the transmission. As the hull

moved slowly from station to station it

gradually took on the appearance of a

fighting tank, finally rolling onto its tracks

and receiving its big gun and turret.2

Although the locomotive companies were

able to use much of the equipment they

had on hand, many new machine tools

were required, as well as additional handling equipment. American Locomotive not

only needed over one hundred new machine tools for its first tank order but also

had to rearrange its entire plant layout to

make room for them.3 For its first light

tank order, American Car and Foundry installed seventy-five new tools and a series

1

 For an account of tank track development, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Chapter XI. 2

 Fortune, February 1942, p. 79. This article

shows the early influence of military "censorship."

After it had been blue-penciled by the War Department, Fortune published the article with the

word CENSORED covering each deletion. 3

 History of Combat Tank Production at the

Schenectady Plant of the American Locomotive

Company, 1 Aug 45, prepared by the company,

OHF.
242 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 19—TANK PRODUCTION BY FACILITY, 1940-1945

BREAKDOWN OF LIGHT, MEDIUM, AND HEAVY TANKS BY FACILITY BUT DOES NOT

INCLUDE EXPERIMENTAL TANKS BY DEVELOPMENT DIVISION.

of heat-treating furnaces.4 The Detroit

Arsenal required over 1,000 machine tools

and some 8,500 specially designed jigs and

fixtures. All the companies had to pioneer

in developing new techniques as well as

new tools and fixtures, particularly for

4

 Rpt by ACF, 3 Mar 44, in Hist, Phila Ord

Dist, vol. 100, pt. 1.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 243

OVERHEAD CRANE LOWERING A GENERAL STUART M3 LIGHT TANK onto its tracks

at Rock Island Arsenal.

welding, cutting, and straightening heavy

armor plate.

The Detroit Tank Arsenal stood in sharp

contrast to the locomotive plants, for it was

built from the ground up for the sole

purpose of building tanks. But it nevertheless went through a series of rather drastic

changes. Before the arsenal was built,

Knudsen's idea of having it produce its

own armor plate—and practically all

other parts—was abandoned, the first step

in a long process of decentralizing tank

production. The year before, American Car

and Foundry had installed furnaces for

face-hardening its own plate because other

sources were not readily available, but the

planned production schedules for the Detroit Arsenal were so high—and the use

of thicker homogeneous plate was rising so

fast—that Chrysler decided to buy its

armor plate and heavy steel castings from

other firms. Nearly all other parts, except

guns, were made at the arsenal during

1941, including the famous 30-cylinder

engine built by gearing five Chrysler truck

engines to a single drive shaft, and hundreds of extra transmissions for other tank

contractors. The arsenal became a well

integrated basic pilot plant.5

In 1942, as tank requirements zoomed

and automobile manufacture stopped for

the duration of the war, Chrysler began

5

 For a description of arsenal methods, see

Herb, "Tanks for the Democracies Roll from

Chrysler's Arsenal," Machinery, vol. 48, No. 4

(December 1941).
244 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

farming out its operations. This was in

accord with Keller's original plans for expansion in time of a real emergency. Between February and September more than

700 large machine tools were moved to

other Chrysler plants, some of which machined gears and suspension wheels while

others welded hulls and still others performed a variety of machining, forging,

and assembling jobs. More and more, the

tank arsenal became a final inspection and

assembly plant supplied by scores of other

production units.6 Looking back on the experience from the vantage point of the

year 1948 Keller observed that

. . . the job experienced all the standard

hardships of World War II production. The

first design was scrapped before we could

begin. Despite the early start made, the

value of priorities for machine tools and

equipment quickly melted away like snow on

a hot day. Frantic calls for increased production alternated with drastic cutbacks. Disappearance of critical materials held it up.

Sudden changes in design upset ability to

deliver, and broke the planned flow of operations. We never once had all of the machine tools and equipment that our schedules

called for.7

In tank production, as in other phases

of Ordnance procurement, industry integration committees played an important

role in bringing manufacturers together to

eliminate bottlenecks and speed production.8

 Beginning with the medium tank

committee in 1942, a total of twentyseven were created by April 1943 when the

last one was organized. Many committees

were active only for short periods because

the problems they dealt with were successfully solved. But some lasted all during the

war years. Speaking of the medium tank

committee, one Ordnance officer aptly described the work of them all. "You might

think of this committee," he remarked, "as

being a great merger of tank plants all

combined under the trade mark of the

Ordnance Department and all making the

same product—the American medium

tank."

 9

Engines

Tank engines constituted one of the

worst bottlenecks early in the war.10 Before 1940, Ordnance tank designers had

planned to use both diesel engines made

by the Guiberson Company and "Whirlwind" gasoline engines made by the Wright

Aeronautical Corporation, but as the defense program got under way these firms

could not meet the tremendous demand for

tank, plane, and ship engines. As airplanes

and ships had top priority, Ordnance had

to look for other sources. In the fall of

1940 Ordnance contracted with the Continental Motors Company to rehabilitate

its old Detroit plant to produce the Wright

aircraft engine, under a license arrangement, at the rate of twenty engines per

day. Early in 1941 Ordnance felt that,

with more than six thousand engines con6

 (1) Stout, Tanks Are Mighty Fine Things,

pp. 44-45; (2) Ltr, Keller to Thomson, 1 Apr

54; (3) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol. I, pp. T-20-

25). The latter reference gives names of plants

and products of each, based on production progress reports. 7

 Lecture, K. T. Keller, Problems of Tank Production, 17 Mar 48, ICAF. 8

 For the origins of integration committees, see

Chapter III and Chapter VI, above. 9

 Press release, 8 Dec 42, T-AC, quoting General Glancy, copy in Hist, Engr and Mfg Div,

OCO-D. See also History, Ordnance Department

Industry Integration Committee for Medium

Tanks, by Maj Louis Antol, Jr., 1 Jun 45),

(P4332) . 10

 For the research and development background on tank engines, see Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 202-03

and 287-301.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 245

tracted for, it faced no real problem, but

as the tank program was doubled and redoubled in ensuing months, the need for

engines far exceeded earlier calculations.11

In the winter of 1941-42 there was no

time to design and test a completely new

tank engine, and build new plants for its

manufacture. Substitute engines that

could be produced at once, using tools

already at hand in existing plants, had to

be adopted, including the Chrysler multibank, the GM twin diesel, the Ford V-8,

and the Caterpillar RD-1820—an aircooled radial diesel. The Guiberson diesels

were manufactured for a time at a new

plant in Garland, Texas, but the contract

was later terminated and the plant taken

over by Continental Motors to make gasoline engines.12

 The picture was further

complicated by the preference of the British and Soviet governments for diesel engines in lend-lease tanks, and by differences

of opinion among U.S. Army authorities as

to the relative merits of gasoline and diesel

engines for tanks. As early as April 1942

Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers of the Armored

Force had urged elimination of both the

Guiberson and Chrysler engines.13 But

the demand for engines was so great that

every reasonably acceptable type had to be

used, even though this practice played

hob with field maintenance and spare parts

supply.

Meanwhile engines scheduled for tanks

were diverted to the Navy or the Air

Forces, sometimes without consulting the

Ordnance Department. At a production

conference in June 1942 General Christmas reported that since the first of the

year, 2,500 GM diesel engines had been

diverted to the Navy, and General Clay

added that 1,100 more had recently been

diverted. General Christmas bluntly warned

the conference as follows:

We cannot stand any more diversions of

engines and still meet the 1942 tank objectives. . . . They are continually calling me

into meetings where they want to take the

Wright engine and put it into training

planes. Fifty percent of the tanks made this

year will have Wright engines, 34 percent

will have General Motors engines, 10 percent

will have Chrysler and six percent will have

the Ford. So if they start taking away General Motors' and Wright's engines, they are

taking away the foundation of the program.14

The supply of engines improved gradually

during the year, but remained a problem

even in the early months of 1943.

In June 1943 General Christmas reviewed the whole engine problem in a

11

 (1) Meme, Knight, to Brig Gen Christmas,

16 May 45, sub: Informal Rpt on Early Phases

of Tank Program, OHF; (2) The Design, Development and Production of Tanks in World

War II, I, sec. EB Medium Tanks, p. 10, EE

Components, and PE Components, prepared by

OCO-D [1945]. On engine development in the

1930's, sec History of Development of the WrightContinental R-975 Radial Engine, Feb 47, both

by Edward Promack, OHF. See also the difficulties of engine design and production faced by the

British, as described in Postan, British War Production, pp. 187-88. 12

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Christmas for CofOrd,

25 May 42, sub: Guiberson Engine Contracts,

OO 160/160298; (2) Memo, Col James E. B.

McInerney for CofOrd, 8 Jun 43, sub: History

of Authorizations and Cancellations . . . Diesel

Engines, OHF. See also Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. X. 13

 Ltr, CG Armored Force to CG SOS, 29 Apr

42, sub: Engine for Tanks. . . , Ord ExecO file.

The development of tank engines is treated at

length in Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, Chapter X. See also Daniel

Chase, Design, Development and Production of

Tanks in World War II, 15 Aug 44, pp. 102ff;

Statement by Colonel Christmas in Review of the

Prod Plans of the TCVD, 25 Feb 42, pp. 13-14;

Tank and Combat Vehicle Sec of Hist, Engr and

Mfg Div, OCO-D; and AGF Study No. 27, 1946,

pp.85, 95. 14

 Review of the Prod Plans of the TCVD, 19

Jun 42, p. 8.
246 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

letter to General Clay. He pointed out that

the War Department goal was to use only

one type of medium tank engine and then

outlined the reasons for continuing with

the half-dozen existing models. He cited

the "wide divergence of reliable opinion"

on two points: the relative merits of diesel

and gasoline engines, and the merits of

liquid-cooled versus air-cooled engines.

Furthermore, he pointed out that none of

the American engines had yet seen extensive battle service, and all were still in

various stages of engineering development.15

 Considering all factors, ASF approved the continued use of all existing

engines, but their number was soon reduced by elimination of the less desirable

types.16

Transmissions

Transmissions and final drives—described together as power trains—were, at

the start of the rearmament program, as

troublesome as tank engines, but they

were well under control by the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor. The gears and

castings needed for tank transmissions—of

special Ordnance design and much larger

than commercial products—were not easily

manufactured. When American Car and

Foundry began production of the light

tank in 1940 it obtained transmissions from

the Timken-Detroit Axle Company, a firm

that had shared in their development and

had specially equipped itself for their production, and from Spicer. In 1941, when

production began on the General Grant,

the railway equipment companies, as

noted in the preceding chapter, obtained

transmissions from the Mack Manufacturing Company, a pioneer in this field, and

later also from the Iowa Transmission

Company. The Detroit Arsenal not only

made its own transmissions but also supplied other contractors. At the outset,

Ordnance purchased transmissions from

the producers and furnished them as

"government free issue" to tank contractors, but later Ordnance stepped out of the

picture and let the tank builders buy

transmissions direct. During the winter of

1941-42, as requirements mounted, Ordnance took steps to create monthly capacity for over five thousand medium tank

transmissions. The Buick Division of

General Motors, the Ford Motor Company, the Reed Roller Bit Company, and

Caterpillar Tractor all came into the program and by the end of 1942 production

had caught up with demand.17

Lack of machine tools was at the root

of the delay in transmission production

15

 Ltr, Brig Gen Christmas, T-AC, To Maj Gen

Clay, ASF, 17 Jun 43, sub: Medium Tank and

Allied Vehicle Engine Installations, OO 470.8/75.

Sec also Min of Tank Engine Conf held by the

Director of Materiel, ASF, 29 Jun 43, copy in

OCO-Detroit file in folder marked Tank, Medium. 16

 2d Indorsement, Brig Gen Christmas, T-AC,

to Col McInerney, 9 Jul 43, on basic Memo,

CG ASF for CofOrd, 26 Jun 43, sub: Review of

Tank Program, OO 470.8/929. For detailed discussion of tank engine development and test, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter X. 17

 (1) D. J. Crowley, Report of Production—

Transmissions and Final Drives, T643-c; (2)

Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, pp. 368-76 and

107, ch. 2; (3) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, 100, pt.

2, summary history of Timken-Detroit Co., 22

Feb 45; (4) 2d Indorsement, CG T-AC to

CofOrd, 9 Jul 43, on Memo of CG ASF for

CofOrd, 26 Jun 43, sub: Review of Tank Program,

OO 470.8/929; (5) Historical Record World War

II, by Mack Manufacturing Corporation, p. 3

and pp. 47-48, [hereafter cited as Hist, Mack

Mfg Corp.], filed as Hist, New York Ord Dist,

vol. 100, pt. 10, OHF; (6) The Design, Development and Prod of Tanks in World War II, PE

Components. For further data on Mack power

trains for medium tanks, sec History, New York

Ordnance District, 100, Part 14.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 247

during 1941. In the case of one contractor, the Mack Manufacturing Corporation,

production was hindered by the firm's

inability to get delivery on four vertical

boring mills. In the fall of 1940 Mack had

made the first two M3 medium tank transmissions for Ordnance by hand, but volume

production had to await the installation of

special equipment. The first two Mack

transmissions were described at the time

as "the most traveled transmissions in the

history of Ordnance," for they were sent

to tank plants all over the country as

pilot models. Mack and other contractors

could not get the machine tools they

needed before Pearl Harbor because their

contracts carried a relatively low priority,

but the high tank production goals set early

in 1942 brought higher priorities and

eventually eased the machine tool problem.18

Armor

Pre-1940 tank production did little to

prepare American industry for manufacture of tank armor in World War II. The

few tanks built in the 1930's were made

with comparatively thin steel plates of high

nickel content, face-hardened on the outside. To protect light vehicles against small

arms fire—the function of armor in the

1930's—these face-hardened plates were

the best known material, for they had a

hard, bullet-resistant surface and a tough

back. Because the metallurgical composition of face-hardened plates made welding

extremely difficult, the plates were riveted

or bolted together. As a result, tanks of the

1930's were not only lightly armored but

had a boxlike shape, were studded with

rivets—two thousand in every light tank

—and offered many flat surfaces to enemy

fire.19

All these characteristics went out the

window before the war was over. Suddenly

faced in 1940 with a demand for armor

protection against artillery fire, Ordnance

had to develop and produce a radically

new type of tank. One-inch armor gave

way to 3-inch and 4-inch steel hulls, and

by 1945 study was being made of armor

from five to ten inches thick. Facehardened plates were supplanted by homogeneous armor that permitted the welding

of joints and speeded production.20 Flat,

angular surfaces gradually disappeared as

cast hulls and turrets with rounded contours—less vulnerable to enemy fire—came

into production. Meanwhile the use of

nickel and other scarce alloys was reduced, and new techniques were developed

for welding, casting, and heat-treating

tank steel. The armor on 1945 tanks was

as different from that on 1939 models as

the 90-mm. gun was from the 37-mm. on

prewar tanks. More than any other factor,

it accounted for the doubling and tripling

of tank weights, for armor accounted for

more than half the weight of World War

II tanks.21

18

 (1) Knight Memo, 16 May 45; (2) Hist,

Mack Manufacturing Corporation, pp. 3-4, and

47-48. 19

 (1) Brig. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, "Supertanks," Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 131 (March

-April 1942), 735-37; (2) PP 77, Armor Plate,

Development and Production, 1940-45, by Daniel

Chase, Jul 45, OHF. 20

 Homogeneous armor has, insofar as possible,

the same physical and chemical composition

throughout, unlike face-hardened armor that is

harder on one side than on the other. 21

 For an account of armor research and development, see Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, Chapter XIII. For

conservation of alloy steel, see Chapter XVIII.

Progress in armor development is described briefly

in Summary of the War Department Metallurgical Research during World War II, n.d., Pages

19-22, R&D files, OHF, and in History, Watertown Arsenal, XV, OHF.
248 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

As early as 1938 Ordnance had

achieved some success, after years of experimentation, in welding a medium tank

turret of face-hardened plate. The advantages of welding over riveting were

readily recognized, but the difficulty of the

process delayed its adoption until 1941.

Early that year two welded M3 medium

tank hulls were produced, one by the

Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation and the

other by Rock Island Arsenal.22 The most

troublesome problem at the start was finding a way to keep the plates from buckling

during the welding process, and to eliminate cracks that appeared in the armor.

Working on the light tank, the Cadillac

plant tried reinforced fixtures but the

plates buckled even in the strongest frames.

To aid in overcoming these difficulties the

Ferrous Metallurgical Advisory Board

formed a subcommittee on the welding of

armor. Composed of industry and Army

members, this subcommittee studied

methods, procedures, and specifications

and periodically submitted its recommendations. It was only after countless experiments by all the producing firms that a

complicated procedure of welding operations was devised that partially solved the

problem, but the real solution lay in

switching to homogeneous plate.23

The switch to homogeneous armor was

prompted by several factors in addition to

the welding problem. For one thing, facehardened armor was so difficult to produce and hard to machine that its use in

the expanded tank program of 1941-42

was out of the question. Building thousands of tanks with face-hardened plate

would have made impossible demands on

an economy in which manpower and machine tools were at a premium. Homogeneous armor was not only easier to

produce but could be produced either by

rolling or casting. The case for homogeneous armor was further strengthened

when test firing showed that, if properly

sloped, it had resistance to penetration

substantially equal to face-hardened

armor. An additional advantage was that

homogeneous armor had less tendency

toward "back spalling," i.e., splintering of

the back under impact of a projectile. As

a result, homogeneous armor was authorized for all areas where a sloped surface

could be presented to the enemy.24

The next step in the process of tank

armor development came with the use of

cast armor. Before 1940 neither the U.S.

Army nor any other army in the world had

made use of such armor except at points,

such as the transmission housing, where

the shape and contour were such that

plates could not readily be used.25 In

1939 the General Steel Castings Corporation of Eddystone, Pa., designed and produced for Ordnance a one-piece cast upper

hull, claimed to be the first of its kind

ever produced.26 In June 1940 procure22

 The Design, Development and Prod of Tanks

in World War II, vol. II, EE Components, p. 29.

For an account of the welding methods adopted,

see the article by William Osha, "Transition from

Riveted to Welded Tank Construction," Army

Ordnance, XXVI, No. 142 (January-February

1944), 120-22. Mr. Osha was general welding

foreman at Berwick plant of ACF.

23

 (1) Hist, Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D, sec.

on light tanks; (2) Cadillac Motor Car Division

History of World War II, pp. 22-27; (3) Chase,

PP 77, pp. 32-44. For history of the Ferrous

Metallurgical Advisory Board's subcommittee on

welding of armor, see History, Watertown Arsenal,

105, OHF.

24

 (1) Chase, PP 77, pp. 15-16; (2) Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. 1, pp. 169-70.

25

 Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, I, pt. 1, pp. 156-57. 26 (1) Hist, Phila Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 1,

Historical Report of General Steel Castings Corporation; (2) Knight Memo, 16 May 45, pp.

8-9; (3) M. H. Pettit, In Review, 1945, a

personal historical narrative in History, Industrial Service, Executive Division, vol. 100, OHF.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 249

ment of a 6-ton cast upper hull for the

new M3 medium tank was authorized.

When ballistic tests of the first models—

described as resembling "inverted bathtubs for elephants"—showed excellent results the cast hull was adopted as an

alternate type, and further development

was pushed. In September 1940 the Ferrous Metallurgical Advisory Board formed

a subcommittee on cast armor to draft

specifications and to advise on production

techniques. The cast hull, formed all in

one piece, not only eliminated the need for

riveting or welding together over one

hundred separate plates and castings, but

also facilitated the production of hulls with

rounded contours.

In the fall of 1941, and again in January 1942, when tank requirements were

doubled and redoubled, the chief armor

procurement problem was enlarging production capacity for armor of all kinds—

face-hardened and homogeneous plate and

castings of many shapes and sizes. Some

armor-making capacity had been created in

1939 and 1940 but it was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of 1941-42.27

Beginning in September 1941, Ordnance

arranged for the expansion, with Defense

Plant Corporation financing, of nearly all

existing cast armor plants, notably American Steel Foundries, Continental Foundry

and Machine Company, and the General

Steel Castings Corporation. The Ford

Motor Company built a foundry with a

capacity of ten thousand tons per month,

of which nearly half was to be cast armor.28

Two safe manufacturers, Diebold and

Mosler, produced face-hardened plate.

Early in 1942, when production of rolled

armor also had to be increased, leading

steel producers, such as Republic Steel,

Henry Disston and Sons, and CarnegieIllinois, expanded their rolling mills. The

latter corporation not only operated the

government-owned Gary Armor Plant in

Indiana next to its Gary steel mill, the

largest of its kind in the world, but also

enlarged its plant at Farrell, Pa. American

Car and Foundry, a pioneer in the field,

expanded its capacity for making armor

plate for light tanks and eventually became

the largest producer of face-hardened

armor plate in the United States. The

Pacific Car and Foundry Company of Renton, Washington, enlarged an existing

foundry to make its own armor and thus

avoid heavy shipments from the Chicago

area to the West Coast.29 The Standard

Steel Spring Company of Detroit contributed greatly to the program when it became the co-ordinating agency for a pool

of firms that normally made automobile

springs, bumpers, and related equipment.

The need to build a new plant was avoided

when the facilities of these firms were used

27

 Knight Memo, 16 May 45, p. 9. On production of heavy homogeneous plate for the Navy,

see Lt. Cmdr. Buford Rowland and Lt. William

B. Boyd, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World

War II, Chapter 3.

28

 For a tabulation of all cast armor foundries,

see ex. 1 in D. J. Crowley and Lt. W. Cadogan,

Narrative History of Cast Armor Procurement

Program 1940-45, 30 Jun 45, filed in study Development and Procurement of Cast and Rolled

Armor Plate, OCO-D, Jul 45, OHF. See also

editor's note in Army Ordnance, XXII, No. 130,

(January-February 1942), 539, and monthly

Production Analysis Notes, TCVD, 1942.

29

 D. J. Crowley, History of Rolled Armor Plate

Procurement for the Ordnance Department Tank

and Combat Vehicle Program, [30 Jun 45], filed

in study Development and Procurement of Cast

and Rolled Armor Plate, OCO-D, Jul 45, OHF.

This history contains a chronological list of all

armor plate facility expansions. For detailed information, see weekly reports by General Christmas

in History, OCO-D, Volume 107, OHF.
250 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

to cut, harden, straighten, and machine

rolled plate received from steel mills.30

By the time plans for armor production

were well in hand the first cutbacks came

in September 1942. The Army Supply Program published at that time dropped the

requirement for heavily armored assault

tanks, thus reducing the cast armor requirement from about 77,000 tons per

month to 57,000. When the over-all program for tanks and other combat vehicles

was further cut in November the armorproducing plants felt the effect immediately. Expansions under way were abruptly

canceled, and Ordnance began a detailed

review of its future needs.31 In selecting

plants to be closed down, Ordnance was

guided by the desire to retain in production three types of plants: the older facilities, those in advanced state of completion,

and those with excellent production records. Wherever possible, excess plants were

converted to other war production through

transfer to the Air Force, Navy, or Maritime Commission.32

Light Tanks: M2A4 to M24

In terms of numbers produced, light

tanks led the procession in 1939, 1940,

and 1941. These 13- to 18-ton machines

mounting 37-mm. guns were the first

American tanks to come into production in

1940 and in 1941 outnumbered medium

tanks by nearly two to one. They were

used effectively by the British in North

Africa in 1941-42, particularly as reconnaissance vehicles. But in 1943 they fell

behind as the demand for more powerful

tanks continued and production of Grants

and Shermans gained momentum. In 1945

the number of light tanks produced was

less than half the number of mediums.33

In the spring of 1941, while American

Car and Foundry was producing early

model light tanks at its Berwick plant in

Pennsylvania, the Cadillac Division of

GMC proposed to Ordnance that a light

tank be built with twin Cadillac engines

and automatic transmission, then a new

development in the automotive industry.

Ordnance was reluctant to change from

the air-cooled engine, but the need for tank

engines was acute and test reports on a

Cadillac-powered model were favorable.

Furthermore, the Cadillac engine was easier to start; it operated better at idling

speeds; and the hydramatic transmission

made the tank driver's job much easier.

In October 1941 a Cadillac-powered tank

proved its durability by running under its

own power all the way from Detroit to

Aberdeen, a distance of over five hundred

miles. In the course of installing its engine

and transmission in the standard M3 light

tank, Cadillac had made so many design

changes that, when adopted, the tank was

given a new model number, M4, later

30

 (1) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team,

pp. 227-28; (2) PP 77, p. 75; (3) Cadillac

Motor Car Division Hist of World War II, pp.

35-36; (4) Knight Memo, 16 May 45; (5) E.

L. Warner, Jr., "Changing over to Tanks," Automotive and Aviation Industries, 86, 15 Apr 47,

p. 17.

31

 Memo, Maj Gen Clay for Lt Gen Somervell,

14 Dec 42, sub: Construction Stopped by Ord,

Folder 400, Rqmts-Gen-1943, ASF Prod Div. See

also Memo, Col C. D. Wiman for Brig Gen

Christmas, 1 Nov 42, sub: Survey of Problems

Relative to Manufacture of Medium Tanks with

Cast Upper Hull, copy in Gen Glancy's file, OCO

-D, D56-347.

32

 For a listing of facilities and Ordnance plans

for closing each, see Memo, Brig Gen Christmas,

T-AC, to CofOrd, 5 Dec 42, sub: Revision of

Armor Plate Facilities, with Incls, OHF, folder

marked Armor Plate Facilities.

33

 Whiting, Statistics. For correspondence, sec

folder marked Tank, Light in OCO-Detroit file.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 251

changed to M5 to avoid confusion with the

M4 Sherman tank.34

The M5 was the first combat vehicle to

use the new automatic transmission, which

soon gained widespread acceptance.35

 The

first tank came off the Cadillac assembly

line in Detroit at the end of March 1942,

and in July the Cadillac plant at Southgate, California, turned out its first tank.

Meanwhile another producer, the MasseyHarris Company, a farm implement firm,

came into the picture. It took over the

former Nash-Kelvinator plant in Racine,

Wis., rounded up the needed machine tools,

and, with the aid of Cadillac, got into

production as an assembly plant for the

M5. In October 1943, American Car and

Foundry switched to the M5 and production of M3's stopped altogether.36

The changeover from automobiles to

tanks at the Cadillac plant was accomplished speedily, but not without the usual

conversion problems. Makeshifts were the

order of the day, for new equipment specially designed for tank production was

virtually unobtainable. Because jigs and

fixtures, so essential to mass production,

take a long time to make, Cadillac did

without them at the start, building its

first tanks almost by hand. The company

sent representatives all over the country

to look for used machine tools, and, as it

did not itself plan to manufacture scores of

tank parts, to discover sources of parts

supply. In January 1942 it set up a "parts

clinic" in its new car show room exhibiting 189 tank parts and inviting potential

suppliers to examine them and quote

prices on such items as oil pumps, axle

housings, clutch drums, herringbone

gears, and axle shafts.37

In the post-Pearl Harbor drive to build

twenty-five thousand light tanks a year,

Ordnance created another new facility, the

Quad Cities Tank Arsenal at Bettendorf,

Iowa. Purchasing adjoining plants owned

by three private firms—one in bankruptcy

—Ordnance contracted with the International Harvester Company to operate them

as an integrated unit. The roof was repaired, new concrete flooring laid, and

new wiring installed throughout so that

International Harvester could build a new

model tank known as the T-7 at a rate of

750 per month. The arsenal was intended

to be purely an assembly plant, with engines, transmissions, final drives, and all

other components coming in from subcontractors, but the arsenal did some machining and welding of hulls, turrets, and

rings.38

The history of the Quad Cities arsenal

during 1942 shows the tank program in its

worst light. At the start there was great

demand for speed, high rates of production,

and a "cost be damned" attitude. The

company placed orders for two thousand

34

 For an account of the conversion of the M3

to the M5, see Cadillac Motor Car Division

History of World War II, pp. 140-51; Cadillac

—From Peace to War, booklet prepared by GMC,

14 Apr 44, filed as History, Detroit Ordnance

District, Volume no, and Chase, The Design, Development and Production of Tanks in World

War II, 15 Aug 44. All in OHF. 35

 See praise for the M5 in letter, Devers to

Maj Gen Campbell, 24 Oct 42, copy in Gen

Glancy's file, OCO-D, D56-347. 36

 (1) Chase, The Design, Development and

Prod of Tanks in World War II, 15 Aug 44; (2)

Memo, Brig Gen Christmas for Maj Gen Hayes,

acting CofOrd, 9 Nov 42, sub: Revised ASP:

Light Tanks, Gen Glancy's file, OCO-D, D56-

347. 37

 Cadillac Motor Car Div Hist of World War

II, pp. 20-42. This history provides the best

account of specific production problems and

methods to be found in the Ordnance historical

files.

38

 Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, vol. 107, ch. 2, sec.

entitled Quad Cities Tank Arsenal, OHF. See

also John C. Furnas, "Good-by Contract!" Saturday Evening Post, June 2, 1945, p. 18.
252 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

new machine tools with firms that were

already swamped with tool orders and

could not promise delivery for months.

More than three thousand drawings were

needed for the complete tank but, as

Rock Island was still at work on the pilot

models, the drawings were not available.

As the priority rating for the plant was not

high enough to give it a green light, countless hours were spent in trying to expedite

the project. Then in the middle of the

summer Ordnance decided upon a major

change of design—equipping the tank

with a 75-mm. rather than a 57-mm. gun.

This meant redesigning the turret and

adding to the over-all weight of the vehicle.

Even before the gun was changed, the

tank, originally expected to weigh between eighteen and twenty tons, was up

to twenty-five tons. The added weight was

too much for the engine and made the

tank slow and hard to steer. To remedy the

deficiencies as they appeared, Rock Island

issued hundreds of revised drawings every

month, and continued to do so until near

the end of the year when the contractor

and Ordnance representatives finally

agreed to freeze the design. The first essentially complete tanks were shipped in

December 1942 just as cutbacks in all tank

production were taking effect. Scheduled

production at Quad Cities was then

scaled down and discontinued completely

in April 1943, after completion of only

thirteen tanks.39

Meanwhile the Marmon-Herrington

Company of Indianapolis undertook production of the M22, an 8-ton airborne

tank, and Ordnance began planning to

switch from the M5 to a more powerful

light tank, the M24. In the spring of

1944 manufacture of the M5 at ACF,

Cadillac, and Massey-Harris was discontinued. ACF dropped out of tank production at this time after having produced

over fifteen thousand tanks, more than

half the entire wartime output of light

tanks. In 1944 and 1945, Cadillac and

Massey-Harris, the only two producers,

turned out a total of 4,731 M24 tanks

mounting the 75-mm. gun and weighing

approximately 20 tons.40

The Shift From Grants to

Shermans in 1942

The most far-reaching change in production plans for medium tanks during

1942 was the shift from the Grant (M3)

to the Sherman (M4).41 From the very

start, the Grant had come in for a lot of

criticism. It had been hurriedly designed in

1940, after the German offensive had demonstrated the unsuitability of existing

mediums. It went into production in

spite of inadequate test and development

because it was more advanced than the

design that later became the Sherman.42

During its initial production, when the

39

 (1) Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, vol. 107, ch. 2,

sec. entitled Quad Cities Tank Arsenal; (2) General Report on Military Tank Production, 20 May

43 (revised 14 Aug 43), War Projects Unit, Bur

of the Budget, OHF; (3). Abstracts of Field Reports on Tank Production, Jan 44, Bur of the

Budget, OO 470.8/927 Tanks. 40

 Chase, The Design, Development and Prod

of Tanks in World War II, 15 Aug 44. For description of the M24, and comparison with M5A1,

see Catalog of Standard Ordnance Items, vol. I.

Procurement of the airborne tank is described in

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Pages 318-20. 41

 For figures showing requirements and scheduled production of the two models, see Master

Schedule, 25 Nov 42, prepared by Ord Ind Div,

p. 20, copy in OCO-D file. See also Memo,

Brig Gen Christmas for Maj Gen Hayes, acting

CofOrd, 8 Nov 42, sub: Revised ASP: Medium

Tanks, Gen Glancy's file, OCO-D, D56-347. 42

 The British Churchill tank had a similar

history. See Postan, op. cit., pp. 192-93.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 253

inevitable "bugs" were being eliminated,

engineering changes were authorized at the

rate of three thousand per month. They

ranged from minor modifications in track

design to major changes in the shape of

the hull or turret. The riveted hull of the

early Grants gave way to a welded hull on

later models, and the welded hull on the

first Shermans eventually gave way to a

cast upper hull.43

The shift from Grants to Shermans was

gradual, starting in July 1942 when the

first Shermans were made by the Fisher

Tank Arsenal, which, unlike the Chrysler

arsenal, had been designed with production

of Shermans in mind. Chrysler produced

its first Sherman in July 1942 and closed

out production of Grants on 3 August and

the railway equipment companies followed

suit. The nearly five thousand Grant tanks

built in 1942 remained in service during

1943 as "limited standard" and were not

declared obsolete until early in 1944. They

posed a major problem of disposal for

Ordnance. "We are beginning to run into

the motor car dealer's problem," Colonel

Christmas commented. "Our customers,

the fighting men, want only the latest

models."

 44

 Some Grants were converted

to tank recovery vehicles, i.e., their heavy

guns were removed and replaced by

powerful winches for towing disabled

tanks. Others were used for instructional

purposes by Ordnance evacuation companies and by Engineer training centers.

The rest of the Grants were dismantled,

with usable parts salvaged and the remainder disposed of as scrap.45

Discontinuance of the Grant models did

not completely simplify the matter by any

means, for there were five different models

of the Sherman tank in production in the

United States by the end of 1942.46 The

essential differences were in the engines.

The original M4 was powered by a Continental radial aircraft engine. The M4AI

also used the Continental radial engine but

had a cast rather than a welded upper

hull, and improved surface contour. The

M4A2, shipped in large quantities to the

Soviet Union and the British, was powered

by twin General Motors diesels. The M4A3

had a Ford GAA, and the M4A4, which

went to the British, had the multibank

Chrysler engine. The designation M4A5

was assigned a model with a 57-mm. gun

produced in Canada for Canadian use,

often called the Canadian Ram. The M4A6

was powered by a radial air-cooled dieseltype engine manufactured by the Caterpillar Tractor Company.47

The armament of the M4 tanks introduced further complications. The original

design mounted a 75-mm. gun as its main

weapon, but later models were equipped

with the high velocity 76-mm. gun, and a

few were supplied with 105-mm. howitzers.

Early in 1944 limited procurement of a

heavily armored "assault tank" known as

43

 For a brief summary of the shift from Grants

to Shermans, see appendix A of Outline of Tank

Procurement, May 1942, Report No. 7. See also

Warner, "Changing Over to Tanks," Automotive

and Aviation Industries, vol. 86 (April 15,

1942), 17. 44

 Review of Production Plans of TCVD, 21

May 42. See also Ltr, Maj Gen Hayes, acting

CofOrd, to Brig Gen Christmas, 5 Nov 42, sub:

Mtg held in Gen Somervell's Office, 4 Nov 42,

in Gen Glancy's file, OCO-D, D56-347. 45

 OCM 23185, 16 Mar 44. 46

 Memo, ACofS (Maj Gen T. T. Handy) for

CG AGF, 28 Dec 42, sub: Assignment of Tanks,

AGF file 470.8. For discussion of modifications

desired by the Armored Force, and the production

problems they entailed, see The Design, Development and Production of Tanks in World War II,

sec. EB Medium Tanks, pp. 20-21. 47

 For data on production and distribution of

these tanks, see Statistical Work Sheets, 1 September 1945, Volume 42, the final report in this

series of monthly reports by OCO-D.
254 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the M4A3E2 was authorized.48 As production of the new heavy tank M26 got

under way early in 1945, production of

mediums was gradually scaled down and

ended in July 1945 after some 57,000 had

been built.

Tank Depots

The experience of 1940-41 demonstrated that it was not practical for the

tank plants to install the scores of minor

accessories—radios, spare parts, small

arms, first aid equipment, interphones, and

Chemical Warfare items—needed to make

a tank fully ready for battle. Unavoidable

delays in getting delivery on all such

items slowed down production at the factories, and the spectacle of scores of

nearly complete tanks standing for weeks

outside factories waiting for some small

parts had a bad effect on labor morale.

Further, as supply of many of these accessories was the responsibility of the Government, not of the contractor, Ordnance

considered it more sensible to install this

"On Vehicle Materiel" itself rather than

disperse it to the contractors' plants. It

was for this purpose, along with others,

that the tank depots were established.49

The depots were intermediate facilities

that received tanks from manufacturers in

a reasonably complete condition, installed

required items, made any special modifications needed, prepared tanks for shipment, and stored them until shipping instructions were issued. In January 1942

Ordnance took over the New York Central

Railroad shops in Toledo as its first tank

depot, and soon contracted with the Electric Auto-Lite Company for its operation.

Two others were opened shortly, both operated by the Ford Motor Company. The

first was at Chester, Pennsylvania, and the

second at Richmond, California. Both were

Ford assembly plants and were well located for both rail and water shipment. In

December 1942, when work on a proposed

gun plant at Lima, Ohio, was discontinued, the plant was taken over as a tank

depot, soon replacing Toledo. It was operated by the United Motors Service Division

of GMC. The Longue Pointe depot at

Montreal, Canada, was a Canadian Army

installation used by Ordnance primarily

for processing tanks and other vehicles

shipped to the United Kingdom on lendlease.50

Early in the war, when most overseas

shipments of tanks went to other nations

on lend-lease, it was discovered that some

standard U.S. equipment was not suitable

for those countries. British rather than

American radios had to be put in tanks

going to the United Kingdom or Russia,

and all tanks destined for British Army use

were equipped with sand shields, smoke

generators, and a smoke bomb thrower. To

avoid confusion at the plants, the depots

were given responsibility for installing this

special equipment. Meanwhile field reports

on defects and proposed modifications

were received by Ordnance, and, on tanks

already built, the approved changes were

made at the depots. In addition, major

modifications were made on certain vehicles to meet special needs, as when some

48

 Catalog of Standard Ord Items, vol. I, pp.

18-22, 1 Mar 44, and pp. 23-24A, 1 Oct 44.

For correspondence on the change-over to 76-mm.

guns, see G-4 file 472—vol I. 49

 (1) Tank Depot sec. in Hist, Engr and Mfg

Div, OCO-D, vol. 7, pt. I; (2) Campbell, op.

cit., p. 229; (3) C. H. Coster, PSP 74, Report

oh Industrial Service Tank Depots, 8 May 45,

OHF; (4) Industrial Service Tank Depot Operations, Final Issue (January 1942 through December 1945) prepared by OCO-D, OHF. 50

 Coster, op. cit.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 255

medium tanks were converted to mine

exploders and other tanks and gun motor

carriages were converted to prime

movers.51

The early experience with shipment of

vehicles overseas "in accord with best commercial practice" was disastrous. The tanks

arrived in badly damaged condition after

a long sea voyage. Special techniques had

then to be worked out to protect the engines, fire control instruments, and other

parts from damage by rough handling or

exposure to salt water. Accessories were

individually packed in boxes and stowed

inside the vehicles. Engines were protected

with an internal coating of preservative

oil and an external rust-preventive spray.

After a desiccant was hung in the engine

and crew compartments, these sections

were sealed with a waterproof tape. The

guns were treated with a heavy rust preventive and sealed at the muzzle. To permit

the vehicle to be towed and steered without

breaking the sealing tape, cables were attached to the steering levers and brought

out through the bow gun mount.52

The worst problem for the depots at the

peak of tank production was the failure of

accessory shipments to keep pace with

tank shipments. Tanks reached the depots

with innumerable shortages of tools,

equipment, and supplies. The situation

grew more critical all during 1942, with

more than ten thousand tanks deadlined in

November when tracks were in extremely

short supply. The shortage of tracks

stemmed chiefly from lack of alloy steel

and the doubling of demand for spares.

The tank producers appealed directly to

the WPB for more track steel, and Ordnance assigned expediters to follow up all

types of parts.53 In January, General

Christmas forbade manufacturers to ship

tanks to depots unless completely equipped

according to the latest On-Vehicle Matériel

List. By March 1943 the shortages on

vehicles at depots, which had averaged

forty items per vehicle in November, had

dropped to three.54

The 1943-45 Period

By the spring of 1943 light and medium

tanks were rolling off the assembly lines of

sixteen plants at the rate of about four

thousand per month. This was roughly

half the designed capacity of the plants,

not counting Quad Cities Arsenal, which

stopped producing tanks in April. The

over-all capacity of 7,705 tanks per month

had been created during the preceding two

years at a cost to the government of approximately $250,000,000 for tools, equipment, and buildings. In May 1943 a

representative of the Bureau of the Budget

was able to report that, all things considered, the tank program had "gone very

well," with most of the contractors getting

into production with surprising promptness. But he raised serious questions on

two points: the wide variations among the

51

 Lecture, Lt Col George W. White, Wartime

Difficulties in the Production of Combat and

Motor Transport Vehicles, p. 4, 16 Feb 48, ICAF,

L48-87. 52

 (1) Hist, Phila Ord Dist, vol. 104, pt. 1,

containing Inspection Dir of the Chester Tank

Depot; (2) Intraoffice Memo, Maj Samuel R.

McCluney to Lt Gerber, 22 Jun 42, sub: Intermediate Depot Opns, Hist, OCO-D, vol. 107. 53

 Ltr, C. M. Burgess, president Burgess-Norton

Mfg. Co. to Donald M. Nelson, WPB, 4 Sep 42,

sub: Failure of Tank Prod, copy in Hist, Ord

Dept Industry Integration Comm. for Medium

Tanks, sec. IX, by Maj Louis Antol, Jr., 1 Jun

45, P4332. Development and production of tank

tracks are discussed in Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter X,

and in weekly reports by General Christmas in

History, OCO-D, Volume 107. 54

 Tank Depot secs, of Hist, Engr and Mfg Div,

OCO-D.
256 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

producers in the cost of tanks, as shown in

contracts, and the need for closing plants

no longer necessary to meet falling requirements.55

 General Glancy and other

officials of the Tank-Automotive Center

strongly objected to this report on the

ground that it contained factual errors

and drew unwarranted conclusions.56

The estimated costs of medium tanks

under contract in the spring of 1943

showed a wide spread, from $33,500 for

the Grant tank and $42,400 for the Sherman tank at the Chrysler arsenal to

$70,000 for the Sherman tank at the

Federal Machine and Welder Company.

Both firms had so-called fixed price contracts, but, General Glancy pointed out,

the prices were actually not fixed at all

because they were subject to redetermination and were, in fact, little more than

estimates. Further, the operating conditions

of the two firms were not comparable as

the arsenal was completely governmentowned and the Federal plant was privately

owned, and the prices cited were for

different models of tanks. The contract

price for the Sherman tank at the Fisher

arsenal was high, $67,173, but was undergoing substantial reduction to bring it into

line with cost data resulting from actual

production experience. The Fisher arsenal

soon proved to be one of the lowest-cost

producers in the whole program. The

other medium tank producers, holding

cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, showed estimated costs per Grant tank ranging from

$58,850 at Baldwin to $67,860 at Lima.

The fixed fees on these contracts ranged

from a low of $2,860 per tank at Lima to

$3,850 at Baldwin. The cost figures in

these contracts—but not the fees—were

clearly estimates and had no binding effect.

They were generally based on toolroom

production experience only, and the assumption was that they would be revised

later as assembly line production brought

the cost down. The companies with costplus-fixed-fee contracts were eventually reimbursed for all approved costs incurred

in producing tanks, plus the stipulated fee

for each tank. With both CPFF and fixed

price contracts the problem of keeping

costs down was extremely complicated and

continued so to the end of the war when

final adjustments were made.57

The underutilization of plants was one

of the most striking features of tank production all during 1943 and early 1944.

"It has been evident," wrote a Bureau of

the Budget representative, "that too much

production capacity was provided. . . ."58

The sixteen plants placed under contract

in 1941-42, when tank requirements were

sky high, continued in operation until the

last quarter of 1943 when four were

eliminated — Lima, Pullman - Standard,

Ford, and Pacific Car and Foundry.59

These cancellations reduced over-all capacity from approximately 8,000 to 6,600, but

capacity was still more than double the

55

 Gen Rpt on Mil Tank Prod, 20 May 43

(revised 14 Aug 43), War Progress Unit, Bur of

the Budget, OHF. This agency reached the same

conclusions after another survey in 1944. 56

 Ltr, Brig Gen Alfred R. Glancy to Bur of

the Budget, 5 Jul 43. See also Memo, Oscar A.

Kaufman, staff assistant, for Glancy, 28 Jun 43,

sub: Gen Rpt on Mil Tank Prod. ... . Both

in 319.1 Bur of the Budget Rpt, OCO-D,

Glancy's file. 57

 (1) Military Tank Production, An Industry

Review, 10 Mar 44, Bur of the Budget, OHF;

(2) The Design, Development and Prod of Tanks

in World War II, vol. II, MB Cost Data. For

further analysis of this topic, see Smith Army and

Economic Mobilization, Chapters XII and XIII. 58

 Military Tank Production, Progress Report,

24 Oct 44, War Projects Unit, Bur of the Budget,

D50-49 dr 2, copy in OHF. 59

 The Ford plant was needed to produce

bombers and the locomotive plants to make railroad equipment. Pacific Car and Foundry was in

an area of labor shortage.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 257

rate of production. In 1944, four more

plants stopped building tanks—American

Car and Foundry, Baldwin, and MarmonHerrington in April, and Fisher in October.

By the end of the year capacity was down

to about 4,000—half what it was at the

start of 1943—but still more than double

the rate of production.60

The excess of production capacity during 1943-44 eliminated some problems

and created others. By and large, shortages

of machine tools and materials—the two

major bugbears of 1941-42—eased considerably in the spring of 1943. So did the

manpower problem in the tank industry,

although there were always difficulties in

some areas. The output of spare parts

rose rapidly in relation to complete vehicles.61

 Among the new problems was

that of arranging for the orderly transfer

of plants and workers to other war production. Similarly, the accumulation of

surplus parts and raw materials was becoming a problem at plants where schedules were cut back. Efforts were made to

divert such materiel to other tank

manufacturers, but a report in the spring

of 1944 on one plant that had been closed

for months showed that millions of dollars

worth of critical matériel—guns, gun

mounts, cable, tools, motors, welding rods,

and so on—was still on hand.62

Production declined during each of the

first five months of 1944, but invasion of

Europe in June reversed the trend. The

rise in output during the latter half of the

year was gradual, for, in spite of excess

capacity, manufacture of specific models

could not be increased overnight—or even

over a period of several months—to meet

sudden increases in theater demands. In

May 1944, for example, the ASF Requirements Division declared that restudy of the

tank picture had shown that, "we should

push at once for as many additional

medium tanks as we can get in 1944."

 63

The change in calculations stemmed

chiefly from two factors: an unexpected increase in the overseas replacement rate, and

the large proportion of old tanks counted

as resources in the February 1944 supply

program. After conferring with Ordnance

officers in Detroit, the head of the ASF

Production Division, Brig. Gen. Hugh C.

Minton, reported that from three hundred

to five hundred additional Sherman tanks

could be produced in 1944 but only "by

applying all possible pressure to the producers."

 64

 Ordnance was immediately directed to apply the necessary pressure, but,

because of changes in design and the need

for retooling, production rose slowly.65 The

measures taken by General Campbell to

increase output included personal visits to

the tank plants, publicity, recruitment of

labor, and "every other known means of

stimulating production."

 66

 To break the

bottleneck that developed in production

60

 The Design, Development and Prod of Tanks

in World War II, PB Medium Tanks and Tank

Chassis Vehicles. See also Mil Tank Prod, 24

Oct 44. 61

 For further discussion of spare parts, see

Chapter XIII, below. 62

 Mil Tank Prod, An Industry Review, 10 Mar

44. For an excellent case history of disposition

of excess property, see History, Philadelphia Ordnance District, Volume 100, Part 10, Baldwin. 63

 Mem, Dir Rqmts Div ASF for Clay, 22 May

44, sub: Additional M4 Tank Prod in 1944, ASF

Prod Div file 470.8. 64

 Memo, Director Prod Div, ASF for Col Lee

A. Denson, 27 May 44, OO 470.8/1192. There

were only three medium tank producers at this

time—Chrysler Tank Arsenal, Fisher Tank Arsenal, and Pressed Steel Car Company. 65

 For a brief summary of production bottlenecks, see Hiland G. Batcheller, A Report to the

War Production Board, 14 Nov 44, WPB doc. 365,

ASF Director of Matériel file. 66

 Memo, Howard Bruce, Acting Director of

Matériel, for Wood, 4 Jan 45 sub: Tanks, ASF

Prod Div 470.8—Tanks.
258 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

REMANUFACTURING LIGHT TANKS M3A3 at Red River Arsenal, Texarkana, Tex.

of wide tracks, the "special directive treatment" was resorted to, giving wide tracks

an overriding WPB priority that put them

in the same class with landing craft, heavy

artillery, and the Dukw.67 Meanwhile, as

theater commanders called for more and

more tanks, Ordnance was instructed to

launch a supplementary program for tank

"remanufacture.''

This new process—the complete overhaul of combat vehicles—was, in the summer of 1944, a natural solution to the

problem of how to increase the supply.

During the preceding months, as one

armored unit after another had been

shipped overseas, the tanks they had used

during long months of arduous training

were withdrawn and replaced by new vehicles, with the result that large numbers

of used tanks accumulated. Occasional

criticism of the Army resulted when irate

taxpayers saw these tanks standing idle in

storage and concluded that they represented waste of valuable war materiel. As

early as the summer of 1943 General

Campbell, during a trip to the West Coast,

had explored the possibility of contracting

with industry to recondition these tanks.

In October 1943 he formally recommended

to ASF that a reconditioning program be

authorized, including a balanced withdrawal of tanks from troops for this purpose. It was not until June 1944, when

the quantities of tanks left behind by

troops going overseas had reached high

levels, that Ordnance was assigned the

job of overhauling and modernizing them

so they could be shipped overseas in new67

 Memo, Director ASF Prod Div for CofOrd,

10 Jul 44, sub: Prod . . . Medium Tank. . . ,

ASF Prod Div file 473.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 259

tank condition.68 The process was to start

with a thorough cleaning of each tank

and partial disassembly, followed by an

overhaul of its engine, replacement of worn

tracks, reconditioning the guns, adding

improvements made since the original design, and giving the whole vehicle a new

coat of paint. The total cost of remanufacture was estimated to be about half that

of building a new tank. After teams of

Ordnance technicians visited Army Ground

Forces camps to select the tanks to be

overhauled, the work began in August

and proceeded at the rate of six hundred

medium tanks per month for the rest of

the year. Light tanks, half tracks, gun

motor carriages, and scout cars were also

remanufactured, bringing the total for

1944 up to more than eleven thousand

combat vehicles. The bulk of the work was

done at the Quad Cities Tank Arsenal,

Evansville Ordnance Plant (converted

from production of small arms ammunition), and the Montreal plant of the

American Locomotive Company.69

By January 1945, the demand for more

tank production became intense and industry was once again called upon to make

an all-out effort. Requirements for all

types of tanks went up from 18,000 to

22,000, and then to 25,000 in February,

including nearly 10,000 heavy Pershing

(M26) tanks armed with 90-mm. guns

or 105-mm. howitzers.70 In February,

Ordnance reported that even though all

tank producers were scheduled to capacity the procurement goals could not be

reached. General Hayes, chief of the Industrial Service, stated that the tanks

required for 1945 could be produced only

by bringing back into production all

former tank producers—a slow process

that would not yield any results until

near the end of the year, and would be

prohibitively costly. Considering the two

most critical components—Ford engines

and torquematic transmissions—General

Hayes observed that it was "extremely

doubtful" if production could be further

increased in 1945 by any means.71

By March the storm had subsided. As

the defeat of Germany appeared more and

more imminent, tank requirements were

cut back and manufacturers received cancellation notices. The planned expansions

at various plants were halted. From the

peak of 2,268 tanks accepted in March,

production declined to about 1,800 in both

April and May and then dropped to 456

in July. By November it had stopped

altogether

 72

Shift to Heavy Tanks in 1944-45

Of all the various shifts and trends of

tank production in the later war years,

both in Germany and the United States,

68

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Clay, ASF Director of

Materiel, for CofOrd, 6 Mar 44, sub: Factory

Overhaul. . . , OO 470.8/854 Misc.; (2) Memo,

CofOrd for CG ASF, 9 Jun 44, sub: Tank

. . . Overhaul, OO 470.8/1153; (3) Memo, CG

ASF for CofOrd, 13 Jun 44, sub: Overhaul and

Rebuilding of Tanks . . . and correspondence

therein cited, OO 451/2834; (4) Mil Tank Prod,

Progress Rpt, 24 Oct 44. 69

 (1) Rpt for SW on Ord Dept Activities, 2

Aug 44, ExecO file; (2) Mil Tank Prod, 24 Oct

44; (3) The Design, Development and Production of Tanks in World War II, PB Medium

Tanks; (4) Summary Rpt of Acceptance . . . ,

1940-45, OCO-D, Dec 45, p. XII. 70

 Memo, Acting Director of Matériel for CG

ASF, 24 Jan 45, sub: Lighter Medium and Heavy

Tank Prod, ASF Prod Div 470.8 Tanks. 71

 Memo, Maj Gen Hayes for CG ASF, 7 Feb

45, sub: Prod Rates for Medium and Heavy

Tanks, OO 470.8/1793. 72

 Summary Rpt of Acceptance. . . , 1940-45,

OCO-D, Dec 45, p. XVII. See also Rpt of Board

to Review Recommendations of the Operating

Divs of the Ind Serv. . . , 12 Apr 45, sub:

Readjustment of Tank Production Schedules, OO

470.8/2037.
260 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

HEAVY TANK M6, mounting a 3-inch gun, produced by Baldwin Locomotive Works, is inspected by (from left) Lt. Col. David N. Hauseman, Brig. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, William

H. Harmon (Baldwin official), and Capt. Arthur J. Seiler, December 1941.

none was more important than the coming

into its own of the heavy tank. And none

illustrates more clearly the problems faced

by Ordnance in developing new materiel

under pressure and meeting rapidly changing requirements. To see the full picture

of changes in U.S. requirements we must

look at two separate stages in the history

of heavy tanks: the 1940-42 period, and

the eleventh hour demand for heavy tanks

in 1944-45.73

During the 1930's no one had shown

much interest in heavy tanks, but in the

spring of 1940 Ordnance was authorized

to proceed at once with development of

a 50-ton tank mounting a 3-inch gun. An

appropriation was soon made to build fifty

tanks; a contract for their manufacture

was placed with the Baldwin Locomotive

Company in August 1940; and the pilot

model was finally unveiled in a public

ceremony on the day after Pearl Harbor.74

The M6 heavy tank, as it was called, had

a cast hull between three and four inches

thick, a 925-horsepower engine; and

weighed over sixty tons. It still needed a

lot of development work to improve its

suspension, transmission, brakes, and other

73

 For an account of tank development, see

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, Chapter X. 74

 (1) Hist, Phila Ord Dist, vol. I, pt. 7, p.

129; (2) Barnes, Weapons of World War II, pp.

210-13.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 261

vital parts, but time was at a premium

in the winter of 1941-42—and the President's program announced in January

called for building five hundred heavy

tanks in 1942 and five thousand in 1943.

Two models of the tank were quickly

standardized and Ordnance contracted

with the Fisher Tank Arsenal as well as

Baldwin to build them at the combined

rate of 250 per month.75

The Army Supply Program of September 1942 took the steam out of this ambitious plan by cutting heavy tank requirements from more than 5,000 to only 115.

Ordnance immediately canceled its contract with Fisher and curtailed production

at Baldwin. In December 1942, on the first

anniversary of Pearl Harbor, General Devers of the Armored Force declared that,

because of the M6's great weight and

limited tactical use, the Armored Force

had no requirement for it and recommended that its production be stopped.76

The British later agreed, apparently because the M6 had been intended for North

Africa, where bridges were not a problem,

and by early 1943 the end of the North

African campaign was in sight.77 In the

summer of 1943 the Armored Force Board

reported, on the basis of service tests, that

the heavy tanks M6 and M6AI were not

acceptable because they lacked firepower

commensurate to their weight, had obsolete fire-control equipment, were equipped

with unsatisfactory transmissions, and had

awkwardly arranged crew compartments.78

As a result, only forty heavy tanks of

the M6 series were built, nearly all of

them in 1943. The Germans, meanwhile,

were throwing the bulk of their tankproducing capacity into building the

heavy Tiger (63-ton) and Panther (47-

ton) tanks, in spite of their many

mechanical deficiencies.

While the M6 tanks were running into

trouble, Ordnance was attempting to give

its medium tanks more punch by equipping them with the 76-mm. high velocity

gun and the 105-mm. howitzer, and improving their suspensions and tracks. It

was also trying to win acceptance for the

T-20 series of new and more powerful

tanks to replace both the M6 and the

Sherman, but the Army Ground Forces

strongly opposed these efforts.79 Then in

June 1944, after a demonstration at Aberdeen before high-ranking War Department

officials, Ordnance finally won approval of

its plan to mount a 90-mm. gun on the

experimental medium tank T26 and reclassify it as a heavy tank.80

 This marked

75

 (1) History of the Heavy Tank M6; (2) The

Design, Development and Prod of Tanks in

World War II, EC Heavy Tanks and PC Heavy

Tanks; (3) OCM 18283, 26 May 42, standardized the M6 and M6A1. The latter had a welded

rather than a cast hull. The M6A2, adopted

later, had an electric drive and a cast hull. 76

 Ltr, L. Devers, CG Armored Force to CG

AGF, 7 Dec 42, sub: Heavy Tank, copy in

History of Heavy Tank M6, OHF. The attitude

of the Army Ground Forces toward Ordnance

heavy tanks is presented in AGF Study No. 34, The

Role of the AGF in the Development of Equipment, 1946, Chapter 6. 77

 Memo, Col Raymond R. Robins, ASF Development Br for ACofS, G-4, 3 May 43, sub:

Further Notes on African Trip, G-4 file 472.2

vol. I—Arty. 78

 Final Rpt, Test of Heavy Tanks M6 and

M6A1, AFB, 12 Jul 43, copy in Hist of Heavy

Tank M6. 79

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. X; (2) Chase, The Design, Development and Prod of Tanks in World

War II, 15 Aug 44, pp. 39-40; (3) Memo,

CofOrd for CG ASF, 23 Mar 44, sub: Heavy

Tank T 28, OO 470.8/905 Tank. This memo describes unsuccessful Ordnance efforts to gain approval for an 80-ton tank, with 8-inch armor and

105-mm. gun. 80

 OCM 24277, 29 Jun 44. See also Tank Report, 1944-45, OCO-D, DC-Heavy Tanks, OHF,

and Chase, The Design, Development and Prod

of Tanks in World War II, 15 Aug 44, p. 41.
262 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Source: Summary Report of Acceptances Tank-Automotive Matériel 1940—45, by OCO-D.

the beginning of a new cycle in heavy

tank production, inspired largely by the

appearance during 1943 in Africa and

Italy of heavy German tanks that were

more than a match for the American

mediums. Thus, long after the M6 series

went by the board, the T26 was permitted

to take its place in 1944, but only ten of

these 45-ton heavyweights were delivered

during the first half of 1944. After extensive tests and modifications, the new

tank went into limited production in November 1944 and was standardized early

in 1945 as the heavy tank M26. Nicknamed the General Pershing, it was probably the best heavy tank to see action in

World War II. But it did not arrive in

Europe until after the worst of the fighting

was over. Only fifty were built in 1944,

and, all told, only seven hundred were

built before Germany surrendered in May

1945.81 (Table 20)

The Balance Sheet

Arguments about American tanks in

World War II will no doubt continue as

long as veterans of that conflict survive to

continue the discussion. They will continue because the subject is so involved,

with so much to be said on all sides, that

no simple analysis can encompass the

whole. To draw up a balance sheet fairly

representing the views of all concerned,

and weighing every factor in due proportion, is extremely difficult, if not impossible. But at this point some of the essential

data may be mentioned on which there is

likely to be general agreement.

Had the war been fought with light

tanks the U.S. Army would have been as

well equipped at the start as any army in

the world. The M3 light tank that

emerged in 1941 from the experimental

work of the 1930's gave a good account of

itself in North Africa, and its successors,

the M5 and M24, were well received in

the field. But the war was not fought with

light tanks. Medium and heavy tanks

predominated, and the U.S. Army had no

first-rate medium or heavy tanks on hand

in 1940. When the 1940 campaign in

81

 (1) Green, Thomson and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. X; (2) Barnes, Weapons

of World War II, pp. 214-18; (3) Col. Joseph

M. Colby, "From Designer to Fighter," Armored

Cavalry Journal, LIX, No. 1 (1950), 12-18. An

even heavier tank, the T28, weighing 100 tons,

carrying 12 inches of frontal armor, and mounting

a 105-mm. gun, was designed in 1944 but never

reached the production stage.
PRODUCTION OF TANKS 263

TABLE 21—COMPARATIVE TABLE OF GERMAN, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN TANK

PRODUCTION, 1940-1945

a

 USSBS—Tank Industry Report, ex. A. b Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Statistical Digest of the War (L

126.

c

 Whiting, Statistics, Table PR-7.

d

 Includes procurement from 1 July 1939 to 31 December 1940.

France revealed the need for tough-skinned,

hard-hitting tanks, Ordnance had to

rush through a drastic redesign of its

existing medium model and begin work

on a new heavy tank. Both the Grant

medium and the M6 heavy were hasty

improvisations that brought little credit

to Ordnance, in the eyes of the Armored

Force, and were regarded even by Ordnance engineers as makeshifts. The M6

never got into volume production, and

the Grant was soon replaced by the Sherman—a well-designed vehicle that could

hold its own with any medium tank on the

battlefield. The Sherman was more mobile

and mechanically more reliable than German medium tanks, and had greater flexibility and rapidity of fire. The trouble was

that it too often found itself up against

heavy Panthers or Tigers.82

The lack of heavy tanks to match the

German heavies was the crux of the problem. In summing up the reasons for this

lack, two items are reasonably clear: (1)

the using arm's lack of interest in heavy

tanks during the prewar and early war

years, and (2) Ordnance's failure to

come up with something better than the

M6 in 1941. The two items are closely

related and mutually supporting. Because the using arm expressed no desire

for heavy tanks in the prewar years

Ordnance made no effort to carry on the

elaborate design and development work

such tanks required. Because Ordnance in

December 1941 could produce no heavy

tank better than the primitive M6 model,

the Armored Force was more than ever

convinced that heavy tanks were impracti82

 For comparison of the medium Sherman

with the heavy Panther in battle, see Cole, The

Lorraine Campaign, pp. 603-04. For a collection

of Ordnance records, see Comparison of American, German and Japanese Ordnance, I, 6 May

45, OHF.
264 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

cal and could be dropped. Meanwhile the

Germans, who in 1941 had no tank comparable even to the M6, launched a heavy

tank program after their encounter with

the Russian heavyweights. The result was

that the Germans in 1944 were able to

oppose American Shermans with heavy

tanks which, though far from perfect, had

much tougher protective armor and more

powerful guns than did the Sherman.

Only then was Ordnance given a green

light to proceed with production of the

Pershing—too late to have much effect on

the fighting in Europe.

The best way to take the quantitative

measure of U.S. tank production in World

War II is to view it in comparison with

German and British production. Qualitative considerations aside, the following

table clearly reveals the extent to which

the United States outproduced Germany.

In every year except 1940 the United

States produced more tanks than Germany

and in the middle years of the war turned

out from five to six times as many. (Table

21) Even Britain, while subjected to intensive bombing, produced almost as many

tanks as Germany did in 1940, and in

1941 Britain turned out more tanks than

either Germany or the United States.

These figures should serve to demolish

some of the myths that have grown up

around German tanks. They should demonstrate for all to see that German tank

successes were due more to skilled tactical

use, and the employment of heavy German

tanks against Allied mediums, than to any

failure of American industry to produce in

quantity the tanks desired by the using

arms.
CHAPTER XII

Motor Transport Vehicles

Military historians of the future may

some day label World War II the "gasoline engine war," or, if they prefer a more

exact but more cumbersome title, the "internal combustion engine war." As the

twentieth century neared its midpoint,

military forces everywhere, on land, at sea,

and in the air, depended for their mobility

on internal combustion engines, both gasoline and diesel. Three of the most spectacular weapons—the tank, the airplane, and

the submarine—were powered chiefly by

internal combustion engines, as were the

millions of hard-working military trucks

that bore the brunt of the task of supply

distribution in the field. Although some

experimental efforts were made to use

new techniques such as jet propulsion and

rocket power, they had limited application.

The immense power of the atom, utilized

in World War II only for the A-bomb, was

not harnessed for submarine propulsion

until the mid-1950's. But in all the leading

armies of the world, gasoline and oil provided the energy—still commonly measured

in terms of horsepower—to drive the

wheeled and tracked vehicles that made for

a war of movement.

In World War II the U.S. Army was

better able than ever before in its history

to take to the road on gasoline-driven

wheels. The purchase of more than three

and a half million motor cars and trucks

—not counting thousands of tanks and

other combat vehicles—marked the end of

the horse and mule era of the Army's

history. Although infantrymen in World

War II still had to march mile after weary

mile, they had at their disposal, for transport of both men and supplies, more

trucks, cars, buses, and other vehicles

than ever before. As in Napoleon's day, the

armies of the world still marched on their

stomachs, but their mobility had come to

depend more and more on rubber tires

and gasoline engines.1

The motor truck was not by any means

a new item of military equipment in the

1940's. Two decades earlier thousands of

trucks went to France with the AEF and

played a minor role in winning the war,

but it was not until the 1940's that the

U.S. Army really became "motorized." In

France in 1918 the U.S. forces had,

roughly speaking, one truck for every forty

men; in the European theater in 1945 the

ratio was about one to four.2 In the latter

stages of World War II it was theoretically

possible, if not feasible for practical reasons,

to put an entire army on wheels—pile

everyone into trucks, buses, ambulances,

1

 For a detailed discussion of this development,

see Capt. Charles R. Kutz, War on Wheels (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940). 2

 Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps:

Responsibilities, Organization and Operations,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1951), p. 14 and docs. therein cited.
266 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

and other vehicles, and all take to the road

at once.

In one respect truck supply differed

from every other type of Ordnance activity: it was suddenly transferred—lock,

stock, and barrel—from one technical service to another in the midst of war. On 25

July 1942 War Department Circular 245

formally announced the coming transfer

from Quartermaster to Ordnance of responsibility for transport vehicles—research

and development, procurement, storage,

maintenance, and distribution—virtually

everything except the operation of the

vehicles, which continued for a time with

the Quartermaster Corps and other user

arms and services. To see this transfer in

proper perspective and to measure its

impact on Ordnance we need to review

Quartermaster efforts during the 1920's

and 1930's to standardize military trucks

and in 1940-42 to procure the thousands

of transport vehicles needed by the rapidly

growing Army.3

The Struggle for Standardization

The experience of World War I had

clearly revealed the need for rugged Army

trucks that could operate over the worst

of roads, ford shallow streams, and be

easily repaired in the field. It had shown

the value of the 4-wheel drive—used

mainly in Ordnance vehicles—and the

need for a 4-speed transmission, maximum

ground clearance, towing hooks and

pintles, sturdy bumpers and radiator

guards, electric lights, and many other

features.4 But most of all it had shown the

need for standardization of Army vehicles

and an improved system to provide spare

parts for maintenance. The mechanical

limitations of the 1917 model trucks were

gradually eliminated in the postwar years

as production of improved motor vehicles

became one of the nation's most important

industries, but standardization of parts

was a more stubborn problem. Motor

Transport officers fought so long and hard

for their ideal, as one of them put it,

"Standardization became almost a cussword in the Army."5

 The history of

Army motor transport from World War I

to World War II is largely the record of

the Quartermaster Corps' unsuccessful

efforts to achieve standardization. In the

failure of these efforts lie the roots of the

spare parts problem inherited by the Ordnance Department in 1942.6

3

 The QMC volumes in THE UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series do

not cover this subject except for a brief summary

in Erna Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply and Services, Volume I (Washington, 1943), Pages 139-43, but the author is

indebted to the QMC Historical Branch for

permission to use the manuscript study by Vernon

Carstensen, Motor Transport Under The Quartermaster General, 1903-42, copy in QMC Historical Br, and for other assistance. 4

 For discussion of Ordnance vehicle characteristics, see pars. 87-89 of Westervelt Board Report.

Development of the Ordnance 4-wheel drive truck

is described by L. C. Freeman in Journal of the

SAE (later the SAR Journal), V (1919), 281-

87. For opinions of officers opposing use of 4-

wheel drive vehicles, see answers to questionnaire

described in manuscript entitled World War I by

Harry Roberts, pp. 313-16, in OCMH files. The

Roberts file is an extensive collection of notes,

documents, and draft manuscripts on the history

of motor transport. 5

 Address by Lt Col Edwin S. Van Deusen before the metropolitan chapter, SAE, New York

City, 19 Feb 42, copy in MTS files, Speeches,

P4244. See also Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory,

"Army Motor Transport," Army Ordnance,

XXII, No. 131 (March-April 1942), 731.

6

 For an able review and analysis of the problem by a leading motor transport officer, see Ltr,

Col Brainerd Taylor, CO Holabird QM Depot,

to QMG, 16 Dec 35, sub: Standardization.

. . , QM451 Proc Standardization Policy, NA.

Carstensen, op. cit., provides an excellent comprehensive history of the struggle for standardization. There is a collection of Colonel Taylor's

articles and speeches in History, Holabird Ordnance Depot, Volume 102.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 267

Quartermaster officers consistently advocated the standardization concept in the

postwar years but found their hands tied

by Army Regulations and the laws governing procurement. These laws and regulations, as interpreted by the Comptroller

General, required that contracts be

awarded to the lowest responsible bidder

and forbade the QMC to issue detailed

engineering specifications for trucks. There

was to be no Army truck of special design but only commercial trucks with a

few military trimmings. Nor could the

Army adopt as standard any vehicle under

its trade name. Specifications were limited

to such general matters as carrying capacity, speed, and weight; those intended to

secure uniformity of design, materials, or

dimensions could not be allowed.7 Each

time the Army announced its intention of

buying new trucks, scores of manufacturers submitted bids. Nearly every time a

different company was the low bidder and

got the contract. As a result, the Army

continued to add new makes and models

to its heterogeneous collection of trucks

left over from World War I. These vehicles generally performed well enough but

they made maintenance and spare parts

supply continuously more complicated.

Purchase of commercial types through

competitive bidding was defended on many

grounds. It was, for one thing, the accepted way of doing government business,

and was designed to guard against favoritism or fraud. It enabled private industry

to fill government orders from regular

production lines and thus obviated the

need for costly, time-consuming retooling

of factories to meet special military requirements. In a war emergency, it was

argued, speedy production would be more

important than perfection of design. The

Army would simply buy vehicles it could

"pick up on the street." The delay in

getting the specially designed Class B

truck into production in World War I

was cited as an object lesson, as was the

Ford Motor Company's experience in

shifting from the Model T to the Model

A.8 Finally, competitive bidding was defended on the ground that it enabled the

Army to profit from competition among

truck manufacturers and thus keep abreast

of the latest engineering achievements

without carrying on an elaborate research

and development program of its own.

While recognizing the validity of some

of these arguments, advocates of standardization maintained that the real problem was ease of maintenance in the field,

not ease of procurement. They insisted

that standardization of parts would speed,

not hinder, procurement in an emergency,

for it would permit all truck makers to

use parts already in production. They

contended that the advantages of competitive bidding were far outweighed by the

simplification of maintenance and parts

supply that standardization would bring.

They further asserted that use of commercial types made it impossible for the Army

to develop vehicles specially designed to

meet military requirements.9

7

 Proposed statement on Proc of Spare Parts for

. . . Vehicles, prepared in August 1944 by Lt Col

Daniel J. Clifford and Maj J. A. Norman, OHF.

See also Carstensen, op. cit., pp. 57-58, and

World War I, Roberts file. 8

 (1) Memo, ACofS.G-4 for CofS, 2 Feb 32,

sub: Rqmts for Motor Transport. . . , G-4/

20052-56; (2) Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 10

Jun 32, sub: Rqmts for Motor Transport. . . ,

G-4/20052-56. For an influential journalistic

statement of the case against standardization, see

W. F. Bradley, "Automobiles in the Great War—

I," Scientific American Supplement, No. 2117, 29

Jul 16, and "Automobiles in the Great War—II,"

Ibid., No. 2118, 5 Aug 16. 9

 The files of the QM Motor Transport Service

contain many documents covering the standard-
268 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

maste At thr Corp e ends o attempte f the 1920' d ts tho develo e Quarter p astandard fleet by building on its experience

with the Class B truck. Although forbidden

by law to purchase complete vehicles according to detailed specifications, the Army

was permitted to buy vehicle components

any way it chose. In 1928, therefore, the

QMC decided to buy enough commercial

unit assemblies—engines, transmissions,

axles, and so forth—to build two complete

trucks at its Holabird depot. This was a

step toward standardization of vehicles

through adoption of standard commercial

parts and assemblies, a principle that the

Quartermaster Corps was to fight for all

during the 1930's.10 In the next four years

Quartermaster engineers studied and

tested enough major components and assemblies to make up a standard fleet of

eighteen truck chassis designed to cover

all Army requirements. These eighteen

chassis were divided into five groups, according to size, with all major parts in

each group completely interchangeable.

Most important, all components could be

bought from industry and assembled

either at privately owned plants or at

Quartermaster motor depots.11 Here was

a workable plan that applied one of the

most important lessons of World War I.

But, in spite of being ably defended by

Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt, The Quartermaster General, it soon had to be abandoned.12

 It was, for one thing, opposed

by the Chief of Ordnance on the ground

that it was impractical, would entail too

much delay in procurement in time of war,

and would not improve maintenance as

much as General DeWitt thought it

would.13 The Chief of Staff considered

standardization unwise in view of the continuous engineering advances made by

industry. Manufacturers of parts liked the

Quartermaster plan, but many vehicle

manufacturers strongly opposed it.

In September 1933 the views of the

vehicle manufacturers triumphed when

War Department General Orders No. 9

appeared, virtually forbidding purchase of

parts and assembly of vehicles by the

Quartermaster Corps. It was followed in

the spring of 1934 by a decision of the

Comptroller General that further hampered the Quartermaster program by attacking the practice of buying parts for

assembly.14 The prevailing view was that

ization question, as do the QM unclassified files

under 451 Standardization. Specific answers to

the G-4 memos cited above are in QM 451 Proc

Standardization Policy, NA.

10

 In his annual Report for 1930 The Quartermaster General described the standardization plan,

listed its advantages, and concluded they were

"beyond dispute." The commanding officer of

Holabird QM Depot in 1932 hailed it as "the

most important step in the advancement of military motor transport that has ever taken place."

Col. Edgar S. Stayer, "The Year's Advancement

in Military Motor Transport," Quartermaster

Review, XII, No. 1 (1932), 33. 11

 Memo, QMG for TAG, 5 Oct 31, sub:

Standardization of Motor Truck Chassis. . . ,

QM 451 Proc Standardization Policy, NA. 12

 Special Report of the QMG on Procurement

of Motor Transportation for War, Incl to Ltr

QMG to ASW, 12 Oct 33, same sub, photostat

copy in Roberts file. See also Carstensen, op.

cit., wherein much of General DeWitt's correspondence is cited, particularly his Special Report.

General DeWitt outlined the plan in Hearings,

WDAB, H.R., 2 December 1932, 72d Cong., 2d

sess., Part 1, pages 214ff. See also Stayer, "The

Year's Advancement in Military Motor Transport," Quartermaster Review, XII, No. 1

(1932), 33, and Maj. E. H. Holtzkemper, Standardization of Quartermaster Corps Motor Vehicles, n.d., in folder marked Standardization

Policy, P4338, OCO-D files. 13

 Memo, CofOrd for Maj Gen George V. H.

Moseley, 7 Feb 31, sub: Motor Vehicle Proc

Policy, quoted in Carstensen, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 14

 Decisions of the Comptroller General of the

U.S., vol. 13 (1933-34), pp. 284ff (A-53405 and

A-54540).
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 269

the Army should stay out of the business

of manufacturing and assembling trucks,

and should not carry on any automotive

research and development. Appropriation

acts in the middle thirties specifically forbade spending money for research on

motor vehicle standardization.15 These

measures, backed by political pressure

from competing truck manufacturers, not

only closed the door on General DeWitt's

standardization plans but also locked and

barred it. One motor transport officer

tartly observed that this government policy

was based on belief that "vehicle types

and models that fully meet military requirements are not practicable of production in quantity in time of war nor legally

procurable in time of peace."

 16

As the Army continued to add to its

polyglot fleet, the spare parts problem

got completely out of hand. The commanding officer at Holabird reported in 1935

that, "the 360 different models of vehicles

now in the Army . . . involve nearly a

million items of spare parts which neither

the War Department nor any other authority can control."

 17

 Two years later

the Assistant Secretary of War termed the

situation "absurd" and blamed Congress

for requiring the Army to buy from the

lowest bidder.18 Meanwhile, the German

Army adopted a standard fleet which,

Motor Transport Division officers believed,

was initiated by a German officer who had

studied the proposed American standard

fleet in 1932. German industry in the

1930's was permitted to produce only

those types of trucks that were approved

for military use.19

When new Army Regulations on the

subject appeared in September 1939, just

after the outbreak of war in Europe, they

declared that procurement of trucks for

the U.S. Army would be limited to

"models produced commercially by two or

more competing companies. . . ." The

Army was to use commercial trucks with

only a few modifications such as brush

guards and towing pintles to fit them for

military use. All parts and assemblies were

to be standard production items in the

automotive industry, but there was to be

no specially designed vehicle such as the

15

 H.R. Rpt No. 1215 on H.R. 11897, p. 13,

72d Cong., 1st sess., WDAB, 1933. See also MS

study by Harry Roberts, The Two-and-One-HalfTon Truck, p. 10, Roberts file. 16

 Col. Brainerd Taylor, "Military Motor Transport," Army Ordnance, XVII, No. 99 (November

-December 1936), 156. Colonel Taylor, CO of the

Holabird Depot, stated his views at length in a

letter to the QMG, 16 December 1935, sub:

Standardization. . . , QM 451 Proc Standardization Policy. For similar comments, see lengthy

statement by Maj Rex J. Howard, 12 Aug 44, Re

Standardization During Last War and Through

1940, copy in OHF. These events are also discussed in Record of U.S. Army Ordnance Combat

and Motor Transport Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and Operations from 1940 to 1945 by Lt

Col Daniel J. Clifford and Maj Robert O.

Alspaugh, OCO-D, Nov 45, copy in OHF. 17

 Memo, Taylor to QMG, 27 Feb 36, sub:

Policy on Purchase of Motor Vehicles, quoted in

Carstensen, op. cit., p. 59. 18

 Address by Louis Johnson, ASW, to convention of the Motor and Equipment Wholesalers

Association, Chicago, 3 Dec 38, quoted in Carstensen, op. cit., p. 69. 19

 (1) Proposed Statement on Procurement

Spare Parts for Combat and Wheeled (TankAutomotive) Vehicles Prepared for Possible Use

in Testifying Before Senate Investigating Committee in August 1944 by Lt Col Daniel J. Clifford

and Maj J. A. Norman, OCO-D files, P4338; (2)

Maj Paul D. Olejar and R. F. McMullen, Motor

Transport Vehicles 1940-45, MS study, OCO, 31

Dec 45, pp. 12-14, OHF; (3) Carstensen, op.

cit.; (4) Roger Shaw, "Mars Motor East,"

Quartermaster Review, XVIII (March-April

1939), 7-10; (5) Roberts, World War I. For a

German view, see the article "Commercial Motor

Vehicles in War," by W. Kempf, a major in the

German Army, Army Ordnance, X, No. 59

(March-April 1930), 324.
270 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Class B truck, nor any Standard Fleet.20

This policy was intended to assure speedy

production at the outbreak of war, regardless of the maintenance and spare parts

problem that might develop later. To

minimize the maintenance problem the

War Department limited procurement to

five chassis types—1/2-ton, 1-1/2-ton,

2-1/2-ton, 4-ton, and 7-1/2-ton.21 As a

result of this policy, the only thing standardized about Army trucks at the start of

the defense period was their size. The

door was still wide open for the procurement of dozens of different makes and

models.

The Defense Period, 1939-41

In the late 1930's the Quartermaster

Corps kept in touch with all the leading

manufacturers of cars and trucks through

its procurement planning office in Detroit.

This office surveyed plants, filed allocation

requests with the Army and Navy Munitions Board, and drew up estimates of

emergency production. It counted on the

"Big Three" of the industry—General

Motors, Chrysler, and Ford—to carry most

of the wartime load, but also gave attention to other concerns such as International Harvester, Mack, Willys, and American Bantam, and to suppliers of special

components such as the Timken-Detroit

Axle Company.22 Only for the latter type

of firm did the Detroit office consider

plant expansion. It assumed that other

plants could easily shift from civilian to

military production and could produce all

the trucks the Army would need in time

of war. With excess capacity throughout

the industry in the 1930's there was little

reason to believe that some day the automobile plants would have more orders

than they could fill. The worst deficiency

in this prewar planning proved to be the

failure to plan on a realistic basis for

mass production of the special components needed for tactical vehicles and for

greatly enlarged production of heavy

trucks.23

From a virtual standstill in the 1920's,

truck procurement built up slowly in the

1930's, pushed along at first by measures

to counteract the depression. The Quartermaster General reported in 1935 that he

had on hand about eleven thousand trucks,

most of them left over from World War I,

and that nearly sixteen thousand new vehicles had been purchased during the

year, mostly for the Civilian Conservation

Corps and the Public Works Administration. These were all commercial types with

only minor modifications required by the

government. After 1935, when Congress

declared the World War I vehicles obso20

 AR 850-15, 29 Sep 39. "SAE in National

Defense," an address by Lt Col Edward E. MacMorland printed in SAE Journal, XLVII, No. 1

(1940), 18. See also address by Hon. Robert P.

Patterson, ASW, "Motorization Policy of the

Army" in SAE Journal, XLVII, No. 5 (1940),

18-19. 21

 Ltr, TAG to QMG, 12 Aug 39, sub: Standardization of Motor Vehicles, AG 451 (6-15-39)

Misc D. The tonnage figures indicate the approved carrying capacity of the vehicle, not its

own weight. 22

 The status of this activity in May 1940 is

briefly summarized in Letter, Capt. Clarence E.

Jones to Maj. George E. Hartman, OQMG, 4

March 1940, copy in Roberts file. This file contains many letters that passed between the Detroit office and the OQMG on the subject of

procurement planning in the pre-1941 years. 23

 Evidence along this line appears in the contractor histories on file in OHF. For example, the

request of the Mack Manufacturing Company for

an educational order to develop capacity for rear

axles and transmissions was denied on the grounds

that in time of war Mack would be called upon to

build only dump trucks and fire apparatus for the

Army. Hist, Phila Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 12,

pp. 1-2. For a brief review of the immediate prewar situation, see PSP on Prod Plng, 16 Jun 45.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 271

lete, procurement for "remotorization of

the Army" was in full swing. In July

1940 it was estimated the Army would

spend nearly $60 million for new cars and

trucks in the year ahead.24

Although these vehicles were not to be

of standard design their variety was far

less than in World War I. In addition to

the 1939 order limiting procurement to

five standard sizes, the Quartermaster

Corps had taken two other steps to avoid

the mistakes of 1917-18. First, it had

tried, within the framework of competitive

bidding, to keep to a minimum the number of makes and designs, and in 1941

was actually buying only sixteen different

makes. Second, it had urged manufacturers to adopt a wide variety of interchangeable small parts such as batteries, spark

plugs, generators, fan belts, speedometers,

and gas tanks.25 But the one big step that

would have made these efforts really effective was not taken. That was the switch

from competitive bidding to the negotiated

contract.

By June 1940 the Quartermaster Corps

had tested and approved three commercial

trucks, the Dodge 4x4, 1-1/2-ton, the

GMC 6x6, 2-1/2-ton, and the Mack 6x6,

6-ton.26 In view of the big procurement

program getting under way, it earnestly

requested authority to purchase these vehicles from the firms indicated instead of

advertising for bids and awarding contracts to the lowest bidder. The purpose,

it explained, was "to take advantage of

the lessons of motor vehicle maintenance

learned from our World War experience,"

and avert a breakdown of field maintenance in an emergency.27

 But the request

was denied. The Assistant Secretary of

War recognized the value of standardization but pointed out that there were also

other things to consider. He particularly

opposed any action that would "give manufacturers a feeling of monopoly as applied

to any particular type of truck."

 28

When it enacted Public Law 703 on 2

July 1940 Congress opened the door for

the military services to negotiate contracts

with firms of their own choosing instead of

making awards to the lowest bidder. But

24

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Richard H. Jordan to

QMG, 18 Jul 40, sub: Final Rpt, Transportation

Div, copy in Roberts file; (2) Ann Rpts QMG,

1935; 1936, 1937. This period is reviewed in some

detail by Thomas E. Downey in draft manuscript

prepared for QM Historical Branch, undated, entitled Procurement, pages 19-24, copy in OHF

and in OQMG historical file. See also Herbert R.

Rifkind, The Jeep—Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps, 1940-42

(1943), pp. 43-45. copy on file in Historical Br,

OQMG; and testimony of Craig, 24 Jan 39,

Hearings, WDAB, 1940, H.R. pp. 11-12. 25

 (1) Brig Gen Frank F. Scowden, Lecture,

The Quartermaster Corps, 14 Feb 41, ICAF.; (2)

Remarks by Brig Gen Joseph E. Barzynski at

conf of Corps Area Quartermasters, 28 Jan 41,

copy in OHF. 26

 The designation 4x4 meant the vehicle had

four wheels and that all four were power driven;

6x6 meant 6 power-driven wheels. The description

4x2 meant that only two of the four wheels were

driven, as 6x4 meant that only four of six were

driven. For a brief but comprehensive explanation

of military automotive terms, see Handbook of

Motor Vehicles Used by the U.S. Armed Forces,

published by the Timken-Detroit Axle Co., Detroit, Mich., 1944, copy in OHF. 27

 Memo, QMG to ASW, 19 Jun 40, QM 451

T-M (Proc FY 41). Representatives of the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery

concurred in this request. For another such instance, see PSP on Prod Plng, 16 Jun 45. 28

 1st Indorsement, 3 Jul 40, to Memo cited in

preceding footnote, copy in OHF. See also Carstensen, op. cit., Page 74, and Clifford and Alspaugh, Record of U.S. Army Ordnance Combat

and Transport Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and

Operations from 1940 to 1945, Pages 109-10. As

late as September 1940, the report of a conference in the OASW stated, "It was the consensus

of the meeting that advertising for bids should

not be abandoned in favor of negotiated contracts." Memo, QMG to ASW, 13 Sep 40, sub:

Proc of QM Supplies. . . , QM 400.13 (Proc

Program-1941).
272 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the War Department was slow to permit

its procurement agencies to exercise this

new freedom when buying commercialtype items. More than a year passed after

Congress opened the door before the

Quartermaster Corps was permitted to

cross the threshold.29 In that delay the

last chance to standardize Army trucks for

World War II was lost.

Not until the summer of 1941 did truck

procurement by negotiated contract come

into its own. Even then it was looked upon

with some disfavor because it ran counter

to the Army's efforts to distribute contracts

as widely as possible. It continued as a

subject of discussion between Secretary

Patterson and The Quartermaster General

up to Pearl Harbor. By that time the

procurement pattern was set and Army

trucks had to remain pretty much what

they were. Thereafter it was largely a

matter of continuing to procure models

already in service.30

Getting Production Started

Early in the defense period The Quartermaster General was not in any great hurry

to buy new trucks. In May 1940 he proposed that bids for the smaller sizes be

held back until September to allow time

for testing the new models.31 Although

overruled on this point by the Secretary

of War, some months later he reported to

a meeting of the Society of Automotive

Engineers, "We are buying them gradually

to make them available only as rapidly as

the divisions and other troop units spring

into being." This was done, he explained,

to lighten the burden on the automotive

industry and "to interfere as little as possible with its regular commercial program."

 32

 The industry was able to handle

without difficulty both civilian and military

orders during 1940, but during 1941 the

picture changed swiftly. As estimates of

future needs rose faster than expected, and

also shifted from one type to another,

military truck production began to lag

behind schedule. From about 30,000 in

July 1940, the total number of Army

trucks on hand rose to more than 70,000

early in 1941 and exceeded 250,000 by the

end of the year.33 By peacetime standards

this was a notable achievement but it was

not enough to keep pace with the Army's

demands. To ease the drain on scarce

materials and speed military production,

the Office of Production Management announced in August 1941 a 50 percent cut

29

 PSP on Prod Plng, 16 Jun 45. 30

 (1) Memo, Maj Charles J. Norman for Director, Prod Br, OUSW, 18 Jul 41, ASF Prod Div,

Job 19B; (2) OQMG Daily Activity Reports, 27-

28 Nov 41 and 5 Dec 41. For an authoritative

statement of the delay in adopting negotiated

purchasing, see remarks by Col Edwin S. Van

Deusen appended to Rifkind, The Jeep—Its Development and Procurement. . . . The matter is

also discussed, and numerous documents cited, in

incomplete MS on Truck Procurement by Thomas

E. Downey in QM Historical Br files. 31

 Memo, QMG for ACofS G-4, 4 May 40,

QM 451-T-M (Proc FY 41), photostat in

Roberts file. 32

 Maj Gen Edmund B. Gregory, Address to

SAE, 7 Jan 41, in Detroit, reprinted in Quartermaster Review, XX (January-February 1941), 66

-67. The Secretary of War's instructions were

issued in Ltr, TAG to QMG, 17 May 40, sub:

Purchase of Gen Purpose Vehicles, FY 1941,

AG451 (5-15-40) M-D. 33

 Address by Brig Gen Joseph E. Barzynski,

asst to QMG, 20 Feb 41, reprinted in Quartermaster Review, XX (March-April 1941), 37.

Similar figures appear in Scowden, ICAF lecture,

The Quartermaster Corps, 14 Feb 41. See also

Whiting, Statistics, Proc sec., pp. 38-41; George

W. Auxier, Truck Production and Distribution

Policies of the WPB and Predecessor Agencies,

July 1940-December 1944, WPB Spec Study No.

17, 1946, pp. 14-15, copy in Army Library; and

testimony of Patterson before Truman Comm., 15

Jul 41.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 273

in production of cars and trucks for civilian

use during the ensuing six months.34

After the Assistant Secretary of War

ruled in July 1940 that competitive bidding

would continue to be the rule and negotiated contracts the exception, the Quartermaster Corps was unable to implement

its prewar plans for placing orders with

allocated plants. Selection of contractors

was determined by the play of competitive

forces, rather than by prearranged plan.

General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford received the first major contracts. For a

brief period in the latter part of 1940 the

Ford Motor Company was denied government business because it would not accept

the labor policy adopted by the National

Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC)

and approved by the President, but this

barrier was soon removed.35 Among the

more specialized producers were Mack,

Federal, Studebaker, Willys, White, Diamond T, Corbitt, Bantam, Autocar, Four

Wheel Drive, International Harvester, Yellow Truck and Coach, and Ward LaFrance. Behind these firms—all of whom

assembled complete vehicles—were hundreds of parts makers such as TimkenDetroit Axle Company, Bendix Products

Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation,

Borg-Warner Corporation, Budd Wheel

Company, Spicer Manufacturing Corporation, Kelsey-Hayes Company, Hercules

Motor Company, and many others.36

Critical Components

Most of the production problems of the

Quartermaster Corps stemmed from the

fact that Army trucks with all-wheel drive

required three important components not

used to any great extent in commercial

trucks—constant velocity joints, transfer

cases, and bogie rear axles—and they used

two or three times as many driving axles.

The constant velocity joint was a device

that permitted use of a driving and steering front axle. Intricate in design, its

manufacture called for many complicated

machining operations and the use of large

forgings made to exact specifications.37

In 1939 only two firms, Bendix Products

Division and Gear Grinding Machine Company, produced constant velocity joints,

and both had but small capacity. By the 34

 Auxier, WPB Spec Study No. 17, 1946, pp.

3ff. On conservation of rubber and other scarce

materials, see PSP on Prod Plng, 16 Jun 45. For

a broad survey of the automotive industry's role,

see The Automotive Industry in War Production,

10 May 44, typescript by Policy Analysis and Rcds

Br, WPB, copy in WPB file PD 033.309 Automotive, N.A. For criticism of the industry's failure

to convert more fully to war production, see

Additional Rpt of Truman Comm., 15 Jan 42,

Rpt No. 480, pt. 5, 77th Cong., 2d sess. 35

 Memo, QMG for USW, 1 Apr 41, sub: Proc

Cir 43 WD 1940, QM 451 Proc FY 1941. 36

 Freedom's Arsenal, The Story of the Automotive Council for War Production (Detroit,

Mich.: Automobile Manufacturers Association,

1950) (hereafter cited as Freedom's Arsenal), p.

82. See extensive correspondence between Jones,

QM Motor Procurement Planning Office, Detroit,

and OQMG in the late 1930's, copies in Roberts

file. Contracting procedures are described in

Memo, QMG for USW, 9 January 1941, sub:

Procurement Activities under the Various 1941

Appropriations, QM 400.13 (Proc Program 1941).

Contractor histories in the OHF give detailed data

on most of the manufacturers, including contract

information, specifications, and rate of production. 37

 For brief description and illustrations of

Bendix-Weiss, Rzeppa, Tracta, and helical joints,

see Lt. Col. William C. Farmer, Ordnance Field

Guide, II, 725-31. For detailed discussion of

constant velocity joint production, see Memo, Col.

Van Deusen for Procurement Contl Div, OQMG,

4 Jan 41, QM 400.13 (Procurement Program,

1914). See also. Memo, QMG for USW, 23. Oct

41, sub: Priorities . . . Constant Velocity Joints,

QM 161 M-P (Gear Grinding Machine Company) and Memo, William W. Knight to Knudsen, 16 July 1940, WPB file PD 631.241C. The

OQMG Daily Activity Reports and Weekly Progress Reports mention this subject frequently in

1940-41. The achievements of the Chevrolet

Division of GMC in producing joints is detailed

in History, Detroit Ord Dist, Volume 100, pt. 14.
274 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

spring of 1942 three additional firms, Ford,

Dodge, and Chevrolet, had come into production and boosted capacity to more than

one hundred times what it was in 1939.38

Transfer cases were sometimes called

"power dividers" because they permitted

transmission of power from the engine to

both front and rear axles. They also required a great deal of gear cutting and

machining, and to supply them in quantity

several axle and transmission builders

pushed their output far above peacetime

levels. Bogie rear axles required heavy

parts not previously made in any quantity

by the automotive industry and also greatly

increased the quantities of axles normally

used. Before Pearl Harbor the Quartermaster Corps arranged for two leading

manufacturers of axles and transmissions

—Timken-Detroit and Fuller—to expand

their capacity to meet anticipated requirements, but all such expansions took many

months to complete.39

The largest truck contract awarded in

the summer of 1940 went to Chrysler's

Fargo Division for more than 14,000 1/2-

ton 4X4's. A smaller contract went to

Chevrolet for the 1-1/2-ton 4x4. As these

vehicles were similar to standard commercial designs, except for the 4-wheel drive,

there was no need for new plants or extensive retooling, and both concerns got

into production quickly. The chief bottleneck at the start—lack of constant velocity

joints—was broken when Chevrolet and

Fargo went into production of joints to

supplement the output of Bendix and Gear

Grinding Machine Company. Licensing

agreements were worked out to permit

production of the patented items.40

Workhorse of the Army: the 2-1/2-Ton

Meanwhile the Quartermaster Corps

placed contracts for several thousand 2-

1/2-ton 6x6 trucks with the Yellow Truck

and Coach Company41 in accord with

earlier plans, and in September 1941 the

contracts were greatly increased. When

Yellow Truck started production in January 1941 it found that its chief bottleneck

was procurement of axles and transfer

cases from the Timken-Detroit Axle Company. To meet the demand, Timken had

to buy new gear-cutting and gear-grinding

equipment, make new patterns and dies,

and spend months training additional

workers. Other parts manufacturers, notably the Clark Equipment Company, BorgWarner Corporation, and the E. G. Budd

Company also increased their production

capacity to keep pace with the Army's

truck demands.42

38

 (1) Memo, Col Herbert J. Lawes, OQMG,

to OUSW, 23 Oct 41, sub: Priorities. . . , copy

in Roberts file; (2) Survey of ASP by QMC

Motor Transport Serv, 8 Mar 42, MTS file. 39

 (1) Survey of ASP by QMC Motor Transport Serv; (2) Memo, Maj Ralph G. Boyd to

William L. Marbury, SOS, 7 Apr 42, sub: Fuller

Mfg. Co., QM 161 M-AL (Fuller), copy in

Roberts file; (3) Ann Rpt QMG FY 1942, MTS

files, P4233, pp. 65ff; (4) Progress Rpt QMC

MTS, 2 Jul 42, P4229. For a discussion of the

bogie axle, see Sergeant Morgan O'Connor's

"Bogie—The Army's Baby," Quartermaster Review, XXI, No. 2 (1941), 22. 40

 (1) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 14,

Chevrolet; (2) Lt Col Douglas Dow, Draft of

Rpt on inspection trip to Detroit and South Bend,

1-9 Oct 40, copy in Roberts file. For a detailed

account of the 1-1/2-ton truck, see The Design,

Development, and Production of Trucks and

Semi-Trailers, Ord PP 47, Oct 44, pp. 21-26,

OHF. The Fargo negotiations are described in

detail in Downey, op. cit., pp. 50ff, as are

patents, pp. 70ff. 41

 Yellow Truck and Coach was an independent

company until 1943 when it was taken over by

General Motors Corporation and became the

General Motors Truck and Coach Division. Its

plant was at Pontiac, Mich. 42

 Dow, op. cit. For a tabulation of contracts

by number, amount, date, type, and cost, see

Procurement of Motor Vehicles.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 275

The 2-1/2-ton truck, a military adaptation of a commercial model, was an immediate success and remained unsurpassed as

a general purpose vehicle throughout the

war. "I have seen nothing belonging to our

enemies or our Allies that can compare

with it," wrote one combat observer.43

The most widely used truck in the Army's

fleet, it could carry on good roads far more

than its rated capacity and soon earned the

nickname "workhorse of the Army." Its

six driving wheels were mounted on three

axles, each having its own differential.

Power could be applied to all six wheels

for steep hills or rough cross-country travel,

or the front axle could be disengaged on

smooth highways.44

The demand for the 2-1/2-ton was so

great by the end of 1941 that it ranked as

the most serious production problem in the

entire truck program. As Yellow Truck

could not handle it alone the Quartermaster Corps turned to the Studebaker

Company to augment the supply; later two

smaller producers—Reo and International

Harvester—came into the picture. At first

the plan called for Studebaker to make an

exact copy of the Yellow model, but this

idea was dropped because it would delay

the start of production and would cost

several million dollars for new tooling. Although most components of the model

built by Studebaker were identical with

those in the Yellow version, many parts

were not interchangeable. For example,

Studebaker used engines made by the

Hercules Motor Company of Canton,

Ohio, while Yellow Truck made its own

engines. No serious difficulties developed

in this score because the Studebakers

were shipped to lend-lease countries—

chiefly the Soviet Union, which received

over 100,000—and the Yellow models were

issued to the U.S. Army.45

Heavy-Heavy Trucks

While the largest orders were going for

light, medium, and light-heavy vehicles,

the smallest orders went for so-called

heavy-heavy trucks capable of carrying

payloads of from four to six tons.46 Officers of the Motor Transport Division were

convinced that in time of war the Army

might find itself operating a long-distance

trucking service over improved roads as

well as conducting the usual short, crosscountry tactical movements. For long hauls

the big trucks, labeled strategical vehicles

by Motor Transport officers, would be

needed in quantity. But the using arms

were not interested in such trucks in

1940-41. The Quartermaster Corps was

permitted to place a few orders with Mack,

Federal, Corbitt, White, and Diamond T,

but the quantities were in the hundreds

rather than the thousands. This failure to

recognize the importance of heavy trucks

later proved to be one of the most costly

mistakes of the prewar and early war

years.47

43

 Lucas quoted in Memo, CG ASF for Deputy

CofOrd, 10 Sep 43, sub: Rpt on Motor Vehicles

in Sicilian Campaigns, OO 451/2038. 44

 For description of performance, see O'Connor, "Bogie—The Army's Baby," Quartermaster

Review, XXI, No. 2 (1941), 22, 107. The 2-1/2-

ton truck was also built in 6x4 and 4x2 types,

but the great majority of the 2-1/2-ton vehicles

were 6x6's. 45

 (1) Anticipated Production Difficulties—QM

Vehicles for Delivery in 1942, 24 Jan 42; (2)

Olejar and McMullen, Motor Transport Vehicles,

1940-45, pp. 49-54; (3) PP 47, pp. 27-32; (4)

Roberts, The Two-and-One-Half-Ton Truck; (5)

Stat Work Sheets, 1 Sep 45, final rpt in series by

Engr and Mfg Div, OCO-D. 46

 Light trucks had capacity for 1 ton or less;

medium for 1-1/2; light-heavies for 2-1/2; and

heavy-heavies for more than 2-1/2. 47

 See ch. XIII, sec. on Heavy-Heavy Trucks,

1943-44. This matter is clearly illustrated in

History, Mack Manufacturing Corporation.
276 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ASSEMBLING 21⁄2-TON TRUCKS at Ford Motor Company plant in Antwerp, Belgium,

December 1944.

The Versatile Jeep

The only really new vehicle to come into

the picture in 1940 was the 1/4-ton 4x4

truck, better known as the jeep. The

Army, which had begun to think about

such a vehicle in the 1930's as a fast

reconnaissance car, focused its attention

in the summer of 1940 on a lightweight

car built by the American Bantam

Car Company of Butler, Pennsylvania.48

After representatives of the Ordnance

Technical Committee visited the Bantam

plant and studied its product, seventy of

the Bantam cars were purchased for testing purposes. Built to Army specifications,

these cars were purely military vehicles.

Only eleven feet long and three feet high,

they weighed about two thousand pounds

but had plenty of power, stamina, and

maneuverability.49

After successful tests of the Bantam vehicles the Army was ready to buy jeeps in

quantity, and directed The Quartermaster

General to procure 1,500 from Bantam.

But Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory was

48 For the early history of the jeep, see Rifkind,

The Jeep—Its Development and Procurement

Under the QMC, 1940-42. Supporting documents for this study are in OHF. See also Lt.

Eugene P. Hogan, "The Story of the Quarterton," Quartermaster Review, XXI, No. 2 (1941),

53ff. The name "jeep" was originally applied to

the 1/2-ton 4x4 truck, and the 1/4-ton vehicle

was at first dubbed "peep." When the 1/2-ton

truck was discontinued the smaller vehicle became the "jeep." One theory is that the name

"jeep" came from a slurring of the letters GP

used to designate general purpose vehicles, and

another is that it came from a comic strip character created by E. C. Segar. 49

 Rpt Subcomm. on Auto Equipment to The

Ord Comm., 22 Jun 40, sub: Light Infantry and

Cavalry Vehicles, and Indorsements, copy in Rifkind notes on jeep, OHF.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 277

reluctant to place the entire order with

Bantam, describing it as "a small firm

with no productive facilities of any importance."

 50

 As Willys and Ford had

meanwhile shown considerable interest in

producing such a vehicle, and were then

building pilot models, the Quartermaster

Corps was permitted to place a contract

in November with Bantam for 1,500 jeeps

and soon thereafter to make similar awards

to Willys-Overland and Ford.51 These

were negotiated, not competitive bid contracts, and were concurred in by the

National Defense Advisory Committee,

subject to delivery of acceptable pilot

models by Ford and Willys. When Bantam

protested bringing in other concerns that

had not shared in the earlier work, and

allowing them to observe the Bantam

model, the Quartermaster Corps replied

that it preferred to have more than one

company share in this stage of design and

development and be ready to produce in

time of war. Protests came also from prolabor interests who pointed out that the

Ford Motor Company had been repeatedly

charged with violations of the Wagner Act.

In newspapers, magazines, and Congressional committees the arguments raged for

some time, but the contracts remained in

force.52

After rigorous tests of Bantam, Willys,

and Ford jeeps—tests that revealed structural weaknesses in all three and led to

many design changes—the Willys jeep was

standardized. When the QMC was authorized to procure sixteen thousand it called

for bids on an all-or-none basis. Although

Willys submitted the lowest bid, by a

narrow margin, the QMC preferred Ford

as a larger and more dependable producer

and recommended that it be given the

contract. But when the Office of Production Management refused to go along with

this recommendation the contract went to

Willys.53 The order was not split up

among the three potential producers because it was desired that all jeeps be of

identical make, and Motor Transport officers argued there was no time to arrange

for identical production by two or more

firms. But a few months later, when Willys

proved unable to keep pace with fastmounting requirements, another producer

had to be added. A contract then went to

Ford to produce jeeps exactly according

to Willys blueprints. Willys turned over to

Ford copies of its drawings, specifications,

and patents, and for the rest of the war

50

 Memo, QMG for Brig Gen Richard C.

Moore, Deputy CofS, 6 Nov 40, QM 451 (Proc

398-41-9), copy in Rifkind notes. See also testimony of Col Edwin S. Van Deusen and John D.

Biggers before Truman Comm., Aug. 6, 1941,

77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1978ff. 51

 For discussion of Bantam production, see

memo, Curley, consultant, for Col Sidney P.

Spalding, 25 Apr 41, sub: Status of Prod ... at

Bantam . . . , ASF Prod Div 451.2 Motor and

Auto Trucks, Job 19B. See also testimony of

Francis H. Fenn, president of Bantam, in Hearings, Truman Comm., Aug. 6, 1941, 77th Cong.,

1st sess., pt. 7, pp. 1967ff; also, Van Deusen, pp.

1978ff and Biggers, pp. 2067ff. An excellent summary of these events appears in Federal Trade

Commission Decisions, 1947-48 (Washington,

1950), vol. 44, pp. 572-90. 52

 (1) Ltr, Charles H. Payne, American Bantam Car Co., to SW, 14 Oct 40, QM 451 (Proc

398-41-9) ; (2) Articles by I. F. Stone in PM,

December 14 and 30, 1940 and January 24. 1941,

copy in Rifkind notes; and in The Nation,

December 30, 1940, quoted at length in Rifkind,

pp. 77-80; (3) Proceedings of Motor Transport

Sub-Comm. QM Tech Comm., 18 Oct 40, QM

451 (Proc 398-41-9), copy in Rifkind notes;

(4) Ltr, Dow, OQMG, to ASW, 20 Dec 40, sub:

Contract No. W398-qm-8887 . . . , QM 161

(Ford), copy in Rifkind notes, OHF. 53

 Ltr, QMG to CO Holabird QM Depot, 1

Aug 41, sub: Award under Informal Request for

Bids . . . with 12 inds, QM 451-M-P (Proc

398-42-NEG-1). See also Interim Gen Rpt, H.R.

Comm. on Mil Affairs, Jun 23, 42, Rpt No. 2272,

77th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 285-87.
278 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

JEEP, 1⁄4-TON 4x4 TRUCK, on display during a talk given to the employees of Willys-Overland Motor Company by Brig. Gen. Burton O. Lewis.

the two firms turned out thousands of

jeeps with interchangeable parts. Both

firms, it should be noted, bought many of

their major components from the same

sources—frames from Midland Steel,

wheels from Kelsey-Hayes, axles and transfer cases from Spicer, and so on. Both

companies also contributed to developing

and improving the jeep throughout the

war.54

Award of the contract to Ford excluded

Bantam from the picture entirely and thus

denied to the firm that had pioneered the

vehicle any share in its wartime production. Bantam was later given a contract to

produce small trailers, but it built no

more jeeps for the Army. Enlistment of big

producers was defended on the ground

that Bantam could never have turned out

jeeps in the quantities needed for World

War II. From a production viewpoint this

decision may have been sound but it

brought upon the Army a great deal of

criticism that might have been avoided if

Bantam had not been entirely excluded

from jeep production.55

54

 For an excellent brief summary of the early

contract awards and the reasons for them, see

Memo, Chief MTD Legal Sec for chief, MTD, 27

Mar 42, sub: American Bantam Motor Car Co.,

Rifkind notes. 55

 Rifkind discusses the controversy over award

of the jeep contracts in detail, and his notes

contain copies of pertinent documents. The subject was also reviewed by the Truman Commmittee in August 1941 and by the House of Representatives Military Affairs Committee, Interim

General Report, June 23, 1942, Report 2272, 77th

Congress, 2d session. See also (1) Hist, Detroit

Ord Dist, vol. 114 (Ford); (2) The Automotive

Industry in War Prod, 10 May 44; (3) PP 47,

pp. 1-10; (4.) Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, pp.

177-78; and (5) A. Wade Wells, Hail to the
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 279

As the jeep skyrocketed to world-wide

fame controversy naturally arose as to its

genesis. In the keenly competitive automotive industry, where all companies had

their eyes on the postwar market, the rivalry

was intense. Willys-Overland advertisements claimed that its engineers, working

with their counterparts in the Army,

"created and perfected the jubilant Jeep."

Bantam naturally resented these claims

which seemed to add insult to injury.

Soon the Federal Trade Commission entered a formal complaint against Willys.

After extensive investigation the FTC

eventually—in 1948—ruled that the Willys

advertisements constituted unfair methods'

of competition, and issued a "cease and

desist" order. Willys had indeed designed

and built the model of jeep used in World

War II, but Bantam and the Army had

laid the groundwork for Willys' success.56

As to the proper division of credit within

the Army there was no dispute between

the Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance.

After transfer of motor transport to Ordnance, General Campbell sent to General

Gregory the following forthright statement

about the jeep:

All of us in the Ordnance Department

fully realize that this vehicle was developed

and put into production by the Quartermaster Corps prior to the time when MotorTransport was transferred to the Ordnance

Department on August 1, 1942. None of the

credit for this achievement belongs to the

Ordnance Department and it would be presumptuous on our part ever to allow a

shadow of doubt on this point. ... It is a

very remarkable achievement for which the

Quartermaster Corps, and those who worked

for or with it, are entitled to credit. We of

Ordnance join with all your other friends in

giving this credit completely and gladly.57

A few months after this letter was written,

one of the original Bantam jeeps took its

place beside other historical properties in

the halls of the Smithsonian Institution in

Washington, and the word "jeep" appeared

in the newer dictionaries as a war-born

addition to the English language.58

Production Lag

All during the defense period truck production in one category or another lagged

behind requirements. As early as October

1940 nearly a third of all vehicles due for

delivery were behind schedule.59 They

continue to lag behind during the winter,

and in March 1941 the Office of the Under

Secretary of War called the matter to

the attention of The Quartermaster GenJeep (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946) ;

(6) Additional Rpt of the Mead Comm., S.

Report No. 110, pt. 7. 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7,

1946.

56

 (1) FTC Docket No. 4959, 6 May 43; (2)

FTC Decisions, vol. 44 (Jul 47-Jun 48) p. 590.

For the claim of Lt Col Homer G. Hamilton, see

H.R. Report No. 1045, 82d Cong., 1st sess., and

H.R. Report No. 290, 83d Cong., 1st sess. For a

journalistic account giving chief credit to the

Army for development of the jeep, see "Jeep at

Any Price," Time, June 28, 1943, pp. 84-86. 57

 Quoted by Maj. Eugene P. Hogan, "The Jeep

in Action," Army Ordnance, XXVII, No. 146

(September-October 1944), 271. 58

 An amphibian jeep was developed but not

widely used, and some effort was devoted to an

extra-light airborne model. For the amphibian,

see extensive correspondence in OO 451.2/1301-

1420; OCM 20771, 17 Jun 43; Progress Report,

QMC MTS, 3 July 1942, Pages 10-12; and Rifkind's notes. Both types are discussed in PP 47;

History, Detroit Ordnance District, Volume 114;

Report on Design, Development, Engineering, and

Manufacturing. . . , 14 October 1944, OCO-D,

OHF; and Baxter, Scientists Against Time, Chapter XVI. 59

 Memo, Lt Col William C. Young for Spalding, OASW, 31 Oct 40, in ASF Prod Div file

451-2 Motor and Auto Trucks. This memo

itemizes all vehicles on contract to each manufacturer and shows quantity due and quantity

delivered to date.
280 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

eral, urging action to bring deliveries more

nearly into line with the Time Objective.60

In July 1941 Patterson complained that

the automotive industry had "hardly been

touched by the rearmament effort" and

urged that steps be taken to put munitions

ahead of pleasure cars.61

Of the many reasons for the lag in

production, most were beyond control of

the QMC. Requirements kept rising with

every new estimate of Army needs; priorities for trucks remained low; steel and

rubber were scarce; productive capacity

for certain items was limited; and labor

unrest slowed production in some plants.62

The program lacked momentum because

the Quartermaster Corps had not pushed

forward toward big procurement in 1940.

Manufacturers of bottleneck items—chiefly

axles, transmissions, and transfer cases—

were induced to enlarge their capacity and

help meet the demand, but the QMC

could not do much about the remaining

problems, for they were fundamental to

nearly every phase of war production. As

this condition dragged on through 1941,

dissatisfaction accumulated both in the

QMC and the Office of the Under Secretary. "For the past two years," wrote the

chief of the Procurement Control Branch

to General Gregory three days after Pearl

Harbor, "it has been known that there

were important bottlenecks limiting the

procurement of tactical motor vehicles.

This problem has been attacked in a piecemeal fashion from time to time with

only limited success. ... It is felt that

an overall approach to a solution is long

overdue. . . ."

 63

The First Year of War

Pearl Harbor put an end to piecemeal

attacks on the whole problem of industrial

mobilization. Beginning in January 1942,

the nation took drastic measures on all

fronts to convert to all-out war production.

And the automotive industry in Detroit

dramatically symbolized the whole process.

The newly created War Production Board

moved promptly and decisively in January

to issue orders banning further production

of motor cars and trucks for civilian

use.64

 The cars and trucks already on the

road or in the stockpile would have to

last until the Army's needs were met.65

60

 Memo, USW for QMG, 6 Mar 41, sub: Proc

of Motor Vehicles, ASF Prod Div file 451.2 Motor

& Auto Trucks. 61

 Memo, USW for Brig Gen Rutherford, 10

Jul 41, ASF Contl Div file 400 Time Objective,

dr 47. See also Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41,

same file. 62

 (1) Memo, Maj Charles Norman for Director Prod Br, OUSW, 18 Jul 41, sub: Proc of

Motor Vehicles, ASF Prod Div Job 19 B; (2)

Memo, QMG for USW, 20 Aug 41, sub: Prod

Rates and Time Objective, ASF Prod Div, Job

19 B. The QMG Daily Activity Reports in 1941

contain countless references to strikes and threats

of strikes, and the annual Report of the QMG

for FY 1942 reviewed the difficulties encountered. 63

 Memo, Chief Proc Contl Br for Gregory, 10

Dec 41, sub: Critical Order Situation of Constant

Velocity Joint Suppliers, QM 451.01 PC-Proc. For

expression of the USW's dissatisfaction, see Memo,

USW for QMG, 19 November 1941, sub: Production of Motor Vehicles, ASF Prod Div file

451.2 Motor and Auto Trucks, Job 19 B. See

also the lengthy discussion in 1942 Motor Transport Procurement Program—Anticipated Production Difficulties, 25 January 1942, MTS files

P4228. For a summary of the situation as of

November 1941, see Memo, Col. Doriot for John

D. Hertz. 14 November 1941 copy in Roberts file. 64

 Auxier, Truck Prod and Distribution Policies

of the WPB and Predecessor Agencies, Jul 40-

Dec 44, p. 17 citing General Limitation Order

L-I-C and L-3-a, both dated 1 Jan 42. See

also Operations Rpt of WPB Automotive Div, 26

Dec 42, WPB 053.108 NA. Trucks in the hands

of manufacturers and dealers were frozen temporarily and then rationed to war industries. Production of special types of civilian trucks was

permitted later. 65

 For a critical analysis of the results of this

policy, see Report, Truman Comm., 78th Cong.,

1st sess., S. Report No. 10, pt. 13, 15 Dec 43,

pp. 18-25.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 281

"America's major industry died in Detroit last week," one news magazine commented.66

 But the industry did not really

die. It merely shifted from peace to war

production—the greatest model changeover in its history. When the War Production Board ruling freed the entire industry

for conversion to munitions making, confidence ran high in its capacity to meet the

challenge of war. "When Hitler put his war

on wheels," General Somervell observed

after a tour of Detroit industries, "he ran

it straight down our alley."

 67

Production Problems

But behind the scenes the stubborn,

hard problems of production were still

there.68 No magic wand or government decree could banish materials shortages or

rearrange production lines overnight. Rubber, aluminum, steel, and canvas duck were

still in short supply, and production of

constant velocity joints and various types

of bearings was far below the required

level. To deal with these bottlenecks and

speed the conversion process, leaders of the

industry early in 1942 formed the Automotive Council for War Production,

headed by Alvan Macauley of Packard.69

In March, when the Army was reorganized

at the top, the newly formed Army Service Forces set to work drafting an Army

Supply Program (ASP) that called for

production of more than three million vehicles of all types by July 1944—nearly one

million in 1942, over one million in 1943,

and over one million in the first six months

of 1944. Quantities of light trucks in this

program, although much greater than the

mid-1941 requirements, were not beyond

the industry's capacity, judging by its

1939 production. The hitch lay in ASP

emphasis on heavy trucks, those that carried two tons or more. In 1939 heavy

trucks constituted only 7 percent of the

year's annual production, light trucks 93

percent. But ASP required roughly 50

percent heavy and 50 percent light.70

In May 1942 the Quartermaster Corps

submitted a detailed report showing that

industrial capacity for light trucks was

more than adequate to meet the ASP, but

that capacity for heavy trucks, although

already expanded 600 percent since 1940,

was far below the required level.71 It

further reported that the shortage of rubber

might force a one-third cut in the Army

Supply Program and that lack of strategic

metals was a constant drag on the produc66

 Newsweek, February 9, 1942, p. 42. For a

reflection of industry views, see articles in Business

Week with titles such as "Car Dealers Weep,"

"Detroit's War Load," and "Autos—No. 1 Conversion Job." 67

 Quoted in Freedom's Arsenal. The Story of

the Automotive Council for War Production, p. v.

For a pictorial story of the changeover in a

typical plant, see the yearbook of the automotive

industry, Automobile Facts and Figures 1942

(Detroit, Mich.: Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1943), pp. 32-33. 68

 For discussion of the outlook early in 1942,

see 1942 Motor Transport Procurement Program

—Anticipated Production Difficulties, and Van

Deusen, Speech, 19 February 1942, before SAE.

An informative article written from the industry

viewpoint is E. L. Warner, Jr., "What Uncle Sam

Expects of the Automobile Industry," Automotive

Industries, vol. 36, No. 2 (January 15, 1942),

p. 17. 69

 Freedom's Arsenal describes the history of

this council in detail. See also Automobile Facts

and Figures, 1942; Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol.

116; and Harold Titus, "Goodby, Bottlenecks,"

Saturday Evening Post, November 21, 1942,

p. 16. 70

 (1) Ann Rpt QMG, FY 1942, p. 69; (2)

Auxier, op. cit., p. 4; (3) Survey of ASP by QM

MTS, 8 May 42. 71

 Survey of ASP by QM MTS. 8 May 42. See

also the earlier report titled Anticipated Production Difficulties—QM Motor Vehicles for Delivery

in 1942, 24 Jan 42, and the later report, Progress

Rpt QMC MTS, 2 Jul 42.
282 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

tion machine. "Motor Transport Service

production schedules are almost daily being drastically interrupted by the uneven

and insufficient flow of almost every type

of metal product," wrote The Quartermaster General. With scarce metal going

into high priority Navy and Air Force

items, Motor Transport Service72 had had

to get along as best it could with an

A-1-i or A-1-f rating throughout 1941.

It did not get up even to an A-1-c until

after Pearl Harbor, and on several occasions

automotive plants had to shut down temporarily for lack of materials.73

What was needed to correct the situation? Nearly everything, it seemed. Further expansion of facilities to make axles,

transfer cases, constant velocity joints,

transmissions, and other parts was high on

the list. This meant collateral expansion of

forging and machining capacity and depended entirely on a better supply of both

steel and machine tools. Machine tools

formed a narrow bottleneck because QMC

requests for them went into a miscellaneous classification to which only 8 percent

of all machine tools were allotted.74 Speedy

production of synthetic rubber was also

called for, along with strict economy in

the use of existing tires and other rubber

products. Deliveries of needed steel had to

be assured, and, to reduce consumption,

cargo bodies had to be made of wood

instead of steel. Finally, the QMC recommended that, in view of the difficulties

ahead, the whole ASP should be restudied

with a view toward reducing requirements

for heavy trucks.75

The Transfer to Ordnance

While the QMG was recommending restudy of truck production goals, and industry was building new plants for producing bottleneck items, General Somervell's staff was considering a drastic

realignment of motor transport responsibilities. The impetus for change came originally in the area of maintenance, not

procurement. As early as November 1941

the Hertz report had revealed glaring

abuses in maintenance of Army trucks by

the using arms and had recommended that

Motor Transport Service be given independent status and full authority to

enforce maintenance discipline.76 The move

ment for creation of an independent automotive corps to handle maintenance for

both combat and transport vehicles gained

considerable support during the winter of

1941-42 but was strongly opposed by

both The Quartermaster General and the

Chief of Ordnance. As the discussion continued, an alternative idea gained ground,

to concentrate all responsibility, including

72

 The Motor Transport Division was renamed

Motor Transport Service in April 1942. 73

 (1) Survey of ASP, 8 May 42; (2) Ann Rpt

QMG FY 42, p. 70; (3) Desk Book of Statistics,

Maj S. B. Robinson. In June the MTS requested

the War Production Board to study the problem

of expanding production facilities and come up

with recommendations. Ltr, QM MTS to WPB,

12 Jun 42, sub: Expansion of Prod Facilities,

MTS file, P4229. For examples of plant shutdowns, see Incl to Memo, QMG for ACofS

Materiel, SOS, 27 Jul 42, sub: Efforts Made by

MTS to Maintain Truck Production. . . ,

SPQMC 411.5 (Steel). 74

 Progress Rpt QMC MTS, 2 Jul 42, p. 30. 75

 (1) Survey of ASP by QMC Motor Transport Serv, 8 May 42; (2) Ann Rpt QMG FY

1942, pp. 65-80; (3) Progress Rpt QMC MTS,

2 Jul 42. As early as mid-May the requirements

for Defense Aid vehicles were cut. See OQMG

Daily Activity Rpt, XI, No. 15. 76

 Summary of Motor Maintenance Activities

in the U.S. Army, Incl to Ltr, Hertz to USW, 18

Nov 41, copy in OHF. See also comments on this

report by Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell (then

G-4, WDGS) in Memo for CofS, 7 Jan 42,

Somervell files, folder ASF Automotive Serv 1941

-42.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 283

research, procurement, and maintenance,

for both tanks and trucks either in the

Quartermaster Corps or Ordnance. This

would achieve the desired unification without creating a new command in the middle

of the war. With manufacture of both

tanks and trucks depending on the automotive industry for many components—

engines, transmissions, axles, and so on—

ASF decided to put an end to the unnatural division of responsibility by making Ordnance the sole channel for dealing

with the industry. General Somervell issued

orders to this effect in mid-July with the

first of August 1942 as the effective date.

No adequate explanation for the choice of

Ordnance over the Quartermaster Corps

has ever been given.77

Along with the shift of construction

from the Quartermaster Corps to the

Corps of Engineers, this was one of the

two largest transfers of functions among

the technical services during World War

II. It caused the shift to Ordnance of

thousands of civilians, officers, and enlisted men, along with the motor bases,

motor supply depots, and automotive

schools they operated. The chief of the

Motor Transport Service, Brig. Gen. James

L. Frink, did not make the transfer, preferring to remain with the Quartermaster

Corps, but most of the others joined forces

with Ordnance. General Campbell, who

had opposed the move originally, made it

clear that he welcomed the MTS personnel

and would tolerate no discrimination

against them.78 But it was inevitable

that they should feel for a long time like

strangers in a strange land.

On the procurement side the transfer

brought to Ordnance some 4,000 contracts

with a total value of nearly $3 billion. And

it led to a far-reaching organizational

change within Ordnance—establishment of

the Tank-Automotive Center in Detroit.

The T-AC, as it was called, was formed

by moving the QM Motor Transport Service and the Ordnance Tank and Combat

Vehicle Division from their offices in the

Washington-Baltimore area to the Union

Guardian Building in Detroit where they

joined up with small Quartermaster and

Ordnance units already there.79

By the time Ordnance took over motor

transport the worst of the production crisis

was past.80 Many difficulties remained,

and new problems were to come up later,

but the sky-high requirements of the

original ASP had dropped considerably,

and were soon to drop more.81 Production

of bottleneck items was steadily increasing,

and the trend toward procurement of

more and more different types of vehicles

had been halted.82 The War Production

77

 (1) Ltr, CG SOS to CofOrd, 17 Jul 42, sub:

Transfer of Motor Transportation. . . , OO 020/

47; (2) WD Cir 245, 25 Jul 42, sub: Transfer of

Motor Transport Activities, par 10, as amended

by WD Cir 267, 8 Aug 42; (3) ODO 315, 28 Jul

42, sub: Transfer of Motor Transport. . . , copy

in OHF. The QMC version of the transfer is to

be found in Risch, The Quartermaster Corps,

Volume I, pp. 19-22, and in Carstensen, Motor

Transport Under Quartermaster General, 1903-

42, pp. 167-81; the ASF version is found in

Millett, Organization and Role of the Army

Service Forces, p. 302. The Carstensen version is

the most detailed and comprehensive account

extant. Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell's views are

expressed in a personal letter to Thomson, 31

August 1955, OHF. 78

 Ltr, Campbell to Thomson, 31 Aug 55, OHF. 79

 Intervs with Generals Glancy, Christmas, and

Armstrong, and Col E. S. Van Deusen, summer

1949. See ch. XI, above. For further details on

the T-AC organization, see Green, Thomson,

and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter

IV, and references therein cited. 80

 Prod Analysis Notes for Oct 42, by Plng Sec,

Mfg Br, T-AC. 81

 See Progress Rpt QMC MTS, 2 Jul 42. 82

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG SOS and others, 6 Apr

42, sub: Standardization of Wheeled Motor Vehicles. . . , AG 451 (4-4-42) MO-SP-M; (2)

Ltr, TAG to CG SOS and others, 8 Jun 42,
284 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Board and the Army and Navy Munitions

Board had clarified the priority ratings on

steel, and the automotive industry had

made rapid progress in converting from

steel to wooden cargo bodies.83 Steel,

rubber, copper, and machine tools were

still in short supply, but a production

report prepared by Ordnance in October

showed most vehicles to be on schedule or

just a little behind schedule. The very

heavy trucks, four tons and over, were

running well ahead of requirements.84

Development work was also nearly complete by the time motor transport came to

Ordnance, and definite steps had been

taken to freeze existing models. In June

1942, after the 1/4-ton jeep had been

adopted and the 1/2-ton truck had been

eliminated in favor of the 3/4-ton, the

Secretary of War had issued orders standardizing the following eight chassis, all

then in production:

1/4-ton, 4x4------------------------Willys and Ford

3/4-ton, 4x4------------------------Dodge

1 -1 /2-ton, 4x4 ------------------------ General Motors

2-1 /2-ton, 6x6------------------------ General Motors

4-ton, 6x6 ------------------------Diamond T

4-5-ton, 4x4------------------------Diamond T

5-6-ton, 4x4 ------------------------Diamond T

6-ton, 6x6------------------------White, Corbitt,

and Brockway

The Secretary of War had further declared

that all development, procurement, and

standardization of wheeled vehicles would

be co-ordinated by the QM Technical

Committee in accordance with AR 850-

25. Existing contracts for nonstandard

equipment were to be completed but not

renewed or extended.85

The Dukw

The most important new vehicle to

come into production during the period of

Ordnance control—though ordered by the

QMC—was the 2-1/2-ton amphibian. In

the spring of 1942 the QMC turned over

to the National Defense Research Committee responsibility for developing a swimming truck to carry supplies from ship to

shore. Landing cargo quickly at overseas

destinations, right on the beach without

benefit of piers or heavy cranes, was a

crucial problem for the Allies in 1942. But

ASF was cool to the idea of taking on a

new and possibly impractical type of special vehicle. Nevertheless NDRC, working

sub: Standardization of Wheeled Vehicles. . . ,

AG 451 (6-5-42) MO-SPOP-M; (3) PSP Prod

Plng, OCO-D, 16 Jun 45.

83

 (1) Memo, CG, SOS, for QMG, 7 Aug 42,

sub: Efforts Made by MTS to Maintain Truck

Prod . . . , SPQMP 411.5 (Steel); (2) Survey

of ASP by QMC MTS, 8 May 42; (3) Progress

Rpt by MTS, 2 Jul 42; (4) Ann Rpt QMG FY

42, pp. 65ff; (5) Ltr, CG ASF to CofOrd, 4

Aug 42, sub: Wood Bodies for Cargo Trucks;

(6) WD Press Release, Army Saves 275,000 Tons

of Steel Annually . . . , 18 Jun 42, copy in OHF;

(7) SOS Ann Rpt FY 1942, p. 49; (8) History,

Ordnance Industry Integration Committee for

Wood Cargo Bodies, OHF. 84

 Production Planning Report based on ASP,

15 Oct 42, vol. 8, copy in Roberts file. Compare

with Status of Procurement-Transportation, Volume XXXVIII, 8 December 1941, QM Statistics

Br, P4236, showing 12 out of 23 items behind

schedule, and the Survey of ASP, by MTS, 8 May

42, which recommended deep cuts in the ASP.

The improved situation as of mid-1942 is outlined

in Progress Report—QMC MTS, 2 Jul 42, pp.

2-8. Detailed requirements for 1943 are to be

found in Truck Requirements 1943, October 1942,

prepared by Automotive Branch, WPB, and in

Master Schedule, 25 November 1942, prepared by

Ordnance Industrial Division, both in OCO-D

file.

85

 Ltr, TAG to CG, AGF and others, 8 Jun

42, sub: Standardization of Wheeled Motor Vehicle Chassis and Trailers, AG 451 (6-5-42),

MO-SPOP-M. This letter rescinded an earlier

letter on the subject, dated 6 April 1942, AG 451

(4-4-42), MO-SP-M. See also Ann Rpt QMG,

FY 42, pp. 65ff.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 285

DUKW, 21⁄2-TON AMPHIBIAN TRUCK, leaving the water with cargo, Noumea, New Caledonia, April 1943.

closely with the New York firm of naval

architects, Sparkman and Stephens, Inc.,

and the Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing Company, soon produced a pilot

model that performed so well in tests that

several hundred were ordered.86

The new swimming truck took its nickname, Dukw or Duck, from its amphibious

qualities and from its manufacturer's code

—D for 1942, U for utility, K for frontwheel drive, and W for two rear driving

axles. It consisted of a watertight body on

a 2-1/2-ton truck chassis. Thirty-six feet

long and eight feet wide, it could accommodate fifty men or an equivalent load of

supplies. While on land it used its six

driving wheels and conventional steering

gear; in the water it used a marine propeller and a rudder. To avoid getting

stuck while entering or leaving water the

driver could shift controls to provide both

wheel and propeller drive. Standardized by

Ordnance in October 1942, the Dukw was

used successfully at Noumea in March

1943, and by General Patton's Seventh

Army in its attack on Sicily a few months

later. General Eisenhower reported the

Dukw to be "invaluable."

 87

86

 The NDRC phase of the development, as

well as the Army's—and Navy's—lack of interest

in the Dukw, are presented briefly in Baxter,

Scientists Against Time, Chapter XVI, and in

far greater detail in Summary Technical Report

of NDRC, Division 12, Transportation Equipment

and Related Problems (Washington, 1946), Chapters 3 and 4. See also Milton Silverman, "Three

Men in a Dukw," Saturday Evening Post, Volume

218, Number 42 (April 20, 1946) and An Account of the War-Time Activities of GMC Truck

and Coach Division of General Motors Corporation, 1945, OHF. An 11-page account of the

Dukw's history written in February 1944 may be

found in RCS 19, Transportation Corps Historical

Program file, Amphibian Vehicles in World

War II. 87

 (1) OCM 18950, 1 Oct 42; (2) OCM 19059,

22 Oct 42; (3) Col. Edwin S. Van Deusen,

"Trucks That Go Down to the Sea," Army Ord-
286 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The success of the Dukw in its first

combat test soon led to an increase in

requirements. In November 1943 the War

Production Board wired Yellow Truck and

Coach Manufacturing Company that

Dukw production was "of utmost urgency

in the war program."

 88

 Ordnance was

authorized to request overriding priorities

to help any manufacturer meet his schedules. From 4,508 in 1943, production

rose to 11,316 in 1944 before tapering off.

All told, 21,147 Dukw's were purchased

before the end of the war. They were all

produced by the Yellow Truck and Coach

Division of General Motors.89

Lack of experience with this type of vehicle and the haste with which it was put

into production led to a long series of design changes. So many engineering changes,

including substitutions to save critical

material, were made during the production

period that some engineers remarked that

no two Dukw's were ever built exactly

alike. The Dukw was not a particularly

complicated vehicle, but it did present

some unusual manufacturing problems

such as fabrication of the sealed tubes

through which axles and propeller shafts

pierced the hulls. The worst problem with

the Dukw was maintenance in the field.90

Crisis in Heavy-Heavy Trucks,

1943-45

During the first six months of 1943

truck production moved along at a fairly

steady pace. Then in July the lightning

struck. ASF suddenly directed Ordnance

to double its procurement of heavy-heavy

trucks (4 tons and up) in 1944—to produce 67,000 instead of something under

35,000. Fighting in North Africa had demonstrated the need for thousands of heavy

trucks to tow big guns and to haul food,

ammunition, and other supplies for fastmoving armies in the field. At the same

time Ordnance understood that the War

Production Board was planning a program

to replace worn commercial trucks in the

United States and that the Navy would

require several thousand vehicles in 1944.

It was a staggering, if not impossible, job.

As General Christmas observed, "It's going

to be Subject No. 1, 24 hours a day."

 91

Ordnance officers, not fully briefed by

their superiors on the justification for the

huge new requirements, were at first

skeptical.92 They knew that manufacture

nance, XXV, No. 141 (November-December

1943), 557; (4) Paraphrase of secret Msg from

Algiers, Eisenhower to Marshall, No. 86, CM-IN

-9804 (14 Jul 43); (5) Ltr, Gen Marshall to

Bush, OSRD, 22 Jul 43, copy in OHF; (6)

Summary Technical Report of NDRC . . . , ch.

4. See also Colonel Van Deusen's folder marked

Amphibian Research in Roberts file. A report on

the Sicilian campaign by Lucas is quoted in

Memo, CG ASF for Deputy CofOrd, 10 September 1943, sub: Report on Motor Vehicles in

Sicilian Campaign, OO 451/2038.

88

 Telg, WPB to Yellow Truck and Coach Mfg

Co., 27 Nov 43, ASF Prod Div, Job 19B, G-1996,

451.2 Trucks. See also Memo, ASF Director of

Matériel for CofOrd, 1 Sep 43, sub: Expediting

Prod of 2-1/2-ton, 6x6, Amphibian Trucks, ASF

Prod Div files, 19B, G-1996, 451.2 Trucks. 89

 Summary Report of Acceptances TankAutomotive Matériel 1940-45, by OCO-D, p. 86. 90

 (1) PP 47, p. 37; (2) Van Deusen, "Trucks

That Go Down to the Sea," Army Ordnance,

XXV, No. 141 (November-December 1943),

557; (3) Hist, Detroit Ord Dist, vol. 100, pt. 14,

Contractor History—Chevrolet; (4) Summary

Technical Report of NDRC . . . , ch. 4. 91

 (1) Rpt, Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Springfield,

Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 5, OHF; (2) Memo, Brig

Gen Christmas, T-AC, for CofOrd, 2 Jul 43,

sub: 1944 Prod of Heavy Duty Trucks, with 2

Incls and 2 Indorsements, OO 451.2/636 (c) ;

(3) Memo, Rqmts Div, ASF for CofOrd, 26 Jul

43, sub: Proc of Motor Vehicles, Incl to OO

400.12/9285 (c) ; (4) Memo, Brig Gen Christmas, T-AC, for CofOrd, 25 Jun 43, sub: Status

of Proc for ... 1944, OO 451/1692-1/2; (5)

The Automotive Industry in War Prod. 92

 The Truman Committee was also skeptical.

See S. Report No. 10, pt. 13, 15 Dec 43, 78th

Cong., 1st sess., pp. 18-25.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 287

of more than 67,000 heavy-heavy military

trucks in 1944, plus thousands more for

civilian needs, would require Herculean

efforts by the heavy truck builders and

their suppliers. In a lengthy memo on the

matter, General Campbell estimated that

the new 1944 schedule would cost about

three quarters of a billion dollars and

would require the labor of 200,000 men for

one year. In terms of weight of finished

material it was equivalent to manufacture

of 14,000 medium tanks. General Campbell

pointed out that in July 1943 only about

3,000 heavy-heavy trucks had been produced and that the average peacetime

rate was only 600 per month. The new

program would require approximately

6,000 per month all during 1944. "It is

necessary that we be realistic. . . ," he

observed. "It is my considered opinion

that . . . [only] 75 percent of the 1944

heavy truck program will be obtainable

practically."

 93

One of the worst fears of the Ordnance

Department was that the truck program,

in addition to all its other problems, would

have to take a back seat because of its

low priority. When there was a scarcity of

labor, materials, or facilities, trucks "sit in

the last place following the Navy, Maritime Commission, Air Corps, and combat

vehicles."

 94

 These fears, first aroused by

War Production Board approval of limited

civilian truck production in May, were

heightened early in August when WPB

approved a large, high-priority farm implement program. District offices reported that

in plant after plant farm implements were

elbowing truck orders out of their regular

places in the line.95 But when all these

facts were presented to General Clay he

merely advised General Campbell that the

1944 requirements were not based on

"wishful thinking" and directed that every

effort be made to meet them. He assured

General Campbell that action would be

taken promptly on Ordnance recommendations regarding specific bottleneck items.96

A few weeks later General Hayes expressed

the following attitude toward the matter

at a conference of district chiefs:

Our job is to meet the Army Supply Program. We are not responsible for the figures

in the Program. We are responsible that

production meets those requirements—not

whether it is adequate or inadequate,

whether too great or too little. . . . Our

job is just to meet the program.97

With the new requirements in hand,

Ordnance turned at once to the established

makers of heavy equipment. These were

not the Big Three of the automotive industry but firms that normally built

heavy specialized vehicles. Some, like

International Harvester, were industrial

giants while others were small firms that

built only a few hundred vehicles a year.

Among their numbers were Autocar,

Brockway, Corbitt, Diamond T, Federal,

Four Wheel Drive, Kenworth, Mack,

Marmon-Herrington, Pacific Car and

93

 Memo, CofOrd for CG, ASF, 12 Aug 43,

sub: 1944 Heavy Truck Program, OO 400.12/

9218. The same estimate was made by W. B.

Murphy, WPB Deputy Vice Chairman for Prod, in

Memo, to Krug, 29 Sep 43, WPB PD 631.241. 94

 Maj Gen Hayes, Min Conf Ord Dist Chiefs,

Springfield, Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 5, OHF. 95

 Memo, Lt Col George W. White, T-AC for

McInerney, OCO, 6 Aug 43, sub: Accomplishment of 1943-44 Truck Program, OO 451.2/

10321. The Truman Committee in December

1943 criticized the lack of civilian truck production. 96

 Memo, Maj Gen Clay, ASF, for CofOrd, 31

Aug 43, sub: 1944 Heavy Truck Program, filed as

Incl to OO 451.2/805, copy in OHF. For an

analysis of the problem by the Automotive Div of

WPB, see booklet, Production . . . 1944 Truck

Program, 11 Oct 43. 97

 Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Philadelphia, 8

Oct 43, p. 1, OHF.
288 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Foundry, Ward La France, and White.98

Most of these concerns were essentially assembly plants, not highly integrated like

the Big Three. With the exception of

Mack, they did not make their own engines, axles, and transmissions but purchased them from other companies such as

Timken-Detroit, Fuller, Clark, Spicer, Eaton, Continental, Waukesha, and Hercules.

The key to expanding production lay in

obtaining an increased flow of components,

chiefly axles, engines, and transmissions,

but producers of these items were already

working at full capacity. Axles were the

tightest item at the start, closely followed

by transmissions and engines. The shortage of heavy-duty engines was so great

that General Christmas actually suggested

powering heavy trucks with two or three

small engines hitched in tandem."

As time was at a premium, Ordnance

had to take shortcuts. Plants that had

never before made working automotive

parts were converted to meet the emergency. A notable example was Standard

Steel Spring of Gary, Indiana, peacetime

producer of springs and bumpers for passenger cars, which became a fabricator of

driving axles. Under a subcontract with

Timken-Detroit, it took over an idle

armor plant, retooled it completely, lined

up scores of sub-subcontractors, and, after

many delays, finally got into production.

National Slug Rejectors, Inc., of St. Louis

switched from slot machines to nondriving

axles for big trucks, and Kearney and

Trecker, a machine-tool firm in Milwaukee, took on the unfamiliar job of making

transmissions.100 Meanwhile the Ordnance

Industry Integration Committee for

Heavy Trucks, formed in March 1943,

promoted co-operative effort among all

producers.101 It was closely tied in with

the WPB Production Consultants Committee for heavy trucks with which it held

joint meetings every month.

In the fall of 1943 WPB appointed an

Automotive Production Committee to coordinate military and civilian truck production, screen proposals for building new

plants, and allocate scarce components.102

Truck production was officially labeled a

"must program" and was placed near the

top of the production urgency list for

manpower. Recognizing that the production job assigned to Ordnance was a

tremendous undertaking, Army and WPB

representatives arranged for close working

relations all around and assigned production follow-up to the Tank-Automotive

98

 For a brief report on truck manufacturers

and component manufacturers, see Memo, Lt.

Col. Maurice R. Scharff, Production Division,

for Director Production Division, ASF, 28 September 1943, sub: 1944 Heavy Truck Program,

ASF Production Division, 19B, G-1996, 451.2

Trucks, 1943. More detailed data appear in

folder, The 1944 Truck Program, no date, same

file for 1944. 99

 (1) Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Springfield,

Mass., 28 Jul 43, p. 7; (2) Auxier, op. cit., p.

52, showing percentage expansion required in

1944 for axles, transmissions, and engines; (3)

Reports on Critical Programs made by Batcheller

to WPB, 1944-45, WPB 210.3 R NA; (4) Memo,

Col Edward L. Cummings, T-AC, for CofOrd,

14 Aug 43, sub: Survey Report of Heavy Duty

Truck Requirements. . . . , ASF Prod Div

Job 19B G-1996 451.2 Trucks; (5) War Production in 1944, Report of Chairman of the War

Production Board (Washington, 1945), pp.10-11. 100

 (1) Hist, St. Louis Ord Dist, VI, pp. 23-25;

(2) History, Report, Ordnance Industry Integration Committee for Axles and Transmissions,

1943-45, OHF; (3) PSP on Prod Plng, 16 Jun 45. 101

 History of Industry Integration Committee

for Heavy Trucks, 1 Mar 43-31 May 45, OHF. 102

 (1) Automotive Prod Comm. files, 631.-

04095, NA; (2) Min of Mtg at T-AC, 29 Oct

43, sub: 1944 Truck Program ASF Prod Div

file 19-B, 451.2 Trucks 1943; (3) Auxier, op.

cit., pp. 56-60. The latter account stresses the

lack during the first two years of war of an

over-all program for civilian and military truck

production. See also War Production in 1944,

Report of Chairman of WPB, Page 21.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 289

Center and the Ordnance district offices.103

At the end of October General Campbell

took the unusual step of writing a memo

for General Somervell's personal attention,

pointing to the failure to meet required

schedules of production and declaring that

the reasons for the failure—shortage of

manpower and components—were "beyond

the power of the Ordnance Department

and of the automotive industry to correct."

 104

 At the end of the year General

Hayes again warned that the goals for

1944 would not be met unless ASF and

WPB took vigorous efforts to relieve the

shortage of manpower, increase the supply

of critical components, and push completion of new plants. In fact, wrote General Hayes, "unless manpower and component shortages can be solved, vehicular production in 1944 may not equal the

rate attained in the last quarter of

1943. . ."105

In spite of everything that could be

done, the new year got off to a poor start.

Only 2,788 heavy-heavy trucks were produced in January 1944, compared to

4,353 in December 1943. (Table 22)

February and March were not much better than January, and in May the Automotive Production Committee (APC) reported: "The Heavy-Heavy Program continues to run materially behind. . . . All

companies in the Heavy-Heavy Program

have fallen behind."

 106

 The reasons for

this discouraging performance were traced

back to shortages of forgings and castings

for heavy duty axles, engines, and transmissions, and to the time required to

bring new producers into the picture. The

results were not good, and, what was even

worse, there was no immediate relief in

sight. Col. Emerson L. Cummings bluntly

declared at a Detroit conference in April

1944: "The second quarter is going to be

tough, and as for the third quarter we can

see no way of meeting it at present."

 107

In June 1944, as Allied invasion forces

consolidated their Normandy beachheads,

WPB took drastic action to speed heavy

truck production. It authorized use of the

"special directives treatment" that had

been adopted earlier for landing craft and

heavy artillery. This action was taken a

few days after E. J. Bush, Chairman of

103

 (1) Memo, Minton, ASF, for CofOrd, 10

Nov 43, sub: Critical Situation with Respect to

Prod of Automotive Equipment, OO 400.12/

10898; (2) Memo, CofOrd for CG, ASF, 30 Oct

43, sub: Critical Situation . . . Automotive

Equipment, ASF Prod Div, 19-B, 451.2 (1943);

(3) Rpt of Conf on 1944 Truck Program, 2 Nov

43, by Brig Gen Walter P. Boatwright, OCO-D,

WPB PD 631.241 C, NA; (4) Memo, Director

WPB Auto Div for Deputy Vice Chairman for

Prod, 18 Nov 43, sub: Manpower Situation.

. . , WPB PD 631.241 C, NA. 104

 Memo, CofOrd for CG ASF, 30 Oct 43,

sub: Critical Situation with Respect to Prod of

Automotive Equipment, ASP Prod Div 19-B,

451.2 Trucks 1943. 105

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Thomas J. Hayes,

OCO, for CG, ASF, 16 Dec 43, sub: Motor Truck

Proc Program 1944, OO 400.12/11332; (2)

Memo, Brig Gen John K. Christmas for CofOrd, 4

Dec 43, sub: Motor Truck Proc Program 1944,

OO 400.12/11198; (3) Statement by Minton,

ASF, in Rpt, Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, New York, 18

Jan 44, pp. 8-9. OHF; (4) Rpt on the 1944

Prod Program, Motor Trucks, by Progress Div,

WPB, 20 Nov 43, copy in ASF Prod Div, 19B,

G-1996, 451.2 Trucks 1944; (5) S. Report No.

10, pt. 13, 15 Dec 43, Truman Comm., 78th Cong.,

1st sess., pp. 18-25. 106

 Rpt of Mtg Automotive Prod Comm., 11

May 44, Washington, D.C., APC file 631.02095,

NA. See also Memo, Murphy, Deputy Vice Chairman for Prod, WPB, for L. R. Boulware, 9 Jun

44, WPB PD 641.243C, NA. For the February cut

in requirements, see Memo, Fletcher E. Nyce to

Murphy, 4 Feb 44, sub: Mtg February 3, 1944.

. . , WPB 631.2412, NA. 107

 Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Detroit, 22 Apr

44, p. 26, OHF. See also Ann Rpt ASF FY 1944,

p. 148; Ann Rpt WPB Automotive Div 1944, p.

14, WPB 053.108, NA; and Memo, Minton, ASF,

for CofOrd, 5 Feb 44, sub: Possibilities of Increasing Prod . . . , with 1st Indorsement, 14

Feb 44, CofOrd to CG, ASF, OO 400.12/11689.
290 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 22—PRODUCTION OF HEAVY-HEAVY TRUCKS BY MONTH, 1943-1944-1945

a

 Includes 1,460 that were remanufactured, converted, or modified.

Source: Summary Report of Acceptances Tank-Automotive Matériel 1940-45, by OCO-D, pp. III-IV OHF. This source

also gives acceptances by truck types from each manufacturer. The two models with highest volume were the 6-ton, 6x6, and

the 10-ton 6x4.

the WPB Production Consultants Committee, wired WPB Chairman Donald M.

Nelson that, since truck production was

"sadly behind schedule," someone in authority had to decide what was wanted

most and then had to enforce that decision. "Someone must recognize bottlenecks which are choking our program,"

Bush declared, "and issue directives that

will insure preference and priority being

given to castings."108 Under the "special

directives treatment," manufacturers unable to obtain supplies needed to meet

production schedules could appeal

through channels for a special and immediate WPB directive to cope with the

problem.109 This procedure, one of the

most potent weapons in the WPB arsenal,

had psychological as well as legal effect.

It proclaimed to all industry that component parts for heavy trucks were to be

108

 Telg, Bush to Nelson, 12 Jun 44, WPB, PD

631.241 C, NA. For discussion of the problem of

identifying orders for castings with end products,

see War Production in 1944, Report of the Chairman of the War Production Board, Page 92. 109

 Ltr, Murphy, Deputy Vice Chairman for

Prod, WPB, to Manufacturers of Heavy Trucks,

Truck Trailers, and Components for Such Vehicles, 8 Nov 43, copy in PSP on Prod Plng, 16

Jun 45.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 291

given the right of way over all other traffic,

except artillery and landing craft. But it

was not widely used and did not work

miracles. It had to be followed up by

periodic conferences and visits to the

plants by WPB and Ordnance representatives to deal with specific problems at the

source.110

As June gave way to July, the Allied

armies overcame initial enemy resistance

and began to move inland. After winning

the battle for Normandy they drove into

Brittany and swung around to outflank

Paris from the south. Hard-driving armored units led the advance that soon

brought about the liberation of Paris and

of all France. To keep pace, the supporting

forces called for more and more trucks of

all kinds. Because French railroads had

been systematically bombed by Allied air

forces to hamper German resistance, and

had been further destroyed by retreating

Germans, many supplies and reinforcements had to move forward during the

early months of the campaign in truck

convoys over ever-lengthening supply

routes. To meet this emergency the famous

Red Ball Express, employing 5,958 vehicles at one point, was organized in August to provide a fast and uninterrupted

flow of supplies to the advancing front-line

troops. It was for such long-distance hauling that heavy-heavy trucks were needed

in large numbers. But there were never

enough to meet the demand.111 Lighter

trucks, forced to carry emergency overloads

and run for long distances at high speeds,

soon wore out.112 Theater transportation

officers were convinced that the lack of

heavy-duty trucks "contributed materially

to the bogging down of [combat] operations in the first days of September."

 113

The supply line to France was not the

only one that called for heavy trucks. The

Italian campaign also had its truck requirements, and in the Far East there was

a constant demand for heavy trucks to

haul supplies over the Stilwell Road to

China. In the spring of 1945 there were

actually more 4-ton 6x6's in the Pacific

Area than in the European Theater of

Operations.114 Every theater had its own

peculiar needs, and the supply had often

to be spread dangerously thin.

Throughout the summer of 1944 heavy

truck production slowly gained momentum. From 3,800 in June and 3,980 in

July it rose to 4,518 in August and to

6,347 in December. (See Table 22.) The

work of WPB and Ordnance committees,

plus all the other measures taken to speed

output, helped boost production totals,

110

 (1) Ltr, Murphy, Deputy Vice Chairman for

Prod, WPB, to Manufacturers of Heavy Trucks,

22 Jun 44; (2) Joint Operating Instructions No.

4, 19 Jun 44, sub: Heavy Truck Program. Both

in WPB file PD 631.241 C. NA. See also telg,

Wilson, WPB Executive Vice Chairman, to Selected List of Foundries and Forge Shops, 20 Jun 44,

quoted in Auxier, op. cit., p. 86; PSP on Prod

Plng, and Batcheller, Critical Programs, a Rpt to

WPB, 14 Nov 44, p. 13, WPB 210.3 R NA. 111

 Memo, Chief of Transportation for CG ASF,

23 Jun 44, sub: Cargo Hauling Vehicles for ETO,

copy in ASF Prod Div 451.2 Trailers. See also

Wardlow, Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,

Organization, and Operations, pp. 91-92, and

Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, vol.

I, ch. XIV. 112

 Incl 3 to Memo, CG ASF for Dir, Office

of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 7 Dec 44;

Gen Clay's reading file, G1595. 113

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, vol. I, p.

555. Chapter XIV of this volume, with the title

"Transportation in the Pursuit," describes the Red

Ball Express and the condition of railroads in

some detail. See also Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, Pages 23-25 and 595, and an urgent

appeal by the Chief of Transportation in Memo,

to CG ASF, 23 Jun 44, sub: Cargo Hauling

Vehicles for ETO, ASF Prod Div files 451.2

Trucks 1944, 19B, G1996. 114

 Transport Vehicle Mission to Europe, Apr

45, R&D file, OHF.
292 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

but the chief reason for increased output

was simply the passage of time. No

matter what else was done, it took time to

bring in new producers of essential components. In the case of Standard Steel

Spring, to cite one important example, it

took twelve months—from November 1943

to November 1944—to convert an armor

plate plant to production of truck axles.115

As Ordnance officers frequently remarked,

"You can't turn production on and off like

a spigot." Even with the rise in the production curve during the latter half of the

year, the 1944 total fell short of requirements—only 50,862 against initial demand

for 67,000.

Early in 1945 requirements for the year

ahead were set at approximately 60,000

heavy-heavy trucks on the assumption that

fighting would continue for some time in

Europe and then the final attack on Japan

would be launched. Somewhat less than

the original 1944 requirement, the figure

was nevertheless challenging, for it exceeded actual 1944 production. Ordnance

drew up plans to expand capacity for

major components such as Hercules engines

and Clark transmissions and to keep

Standard Steel Spring producing axles.116

But, with the surrender of Germany in

early May, the pressure was relieved and

schedules were cut back.

Special Vehicle Types

In addition to the standard types and

sizes of trucks, Ordnance procured a bewildering array of special vehicles, ranging from light pickup and dump trucks to

heavy wreckers and giant diesel-powered

tank transporters. A mere cataloging of

truck types in the fall of 1943 required

178 pages in TM9-2800. Among the better

known types were ambulances, carryalls,

panel delivery trucks, weapons carriers,

bomb service trucks, buses, repair vehicles,

fire trucks, huge tank trucks for hauling

gasoline or water, and tractors for towing

big guns. Four broad categories—halftracks, tractors, tank transporters and

wreckers, and truck-trailer combinations

—illustrate the procurement problems in

this area.

Half-Track Cars and Personnel Carriers

These hybrid vehicles, standing midway

between trucks and tanks, were closer to

the former than to the latter. They consisted of lightly armored truck chassis with

standard front wheels for steering and

track-laying rear drives to give them

greater cross-country mobility. When designed primarily as mobile mounts for machine gun or light artillery pieces they

were known as gun motor carriages, but,

when built primarily for transporting

troops or cargo in combat zones, they were

called either cars or carriers.117 The latter

were normally armed with one or more

machine guns and other small arms and,

unlike gun motor carriages, were procured

in comparatively large quantities. The

Autocar Company and the White Motor

115

 Hist, St. Louis Ord Dist, V, p. 13, pp. 72-

73, pp. 93-94, pp. 101-102; VI, pp. 90-100, VII, pp. 55-64; VIII, p. 73-80, IX, pp. 90-103. See

also Hist Rpt, Ord Industry Integration Comm.

for Axles and Transmissions, 1943-45; Rpt Meeting, APC, 28 Dec 44 (dated 3 Jan 45), in APC

file PD 631.04095, WPB files, NA; and monthly

reports to WPB on Critical Programs by Hiland

G. Batcheller, 1944-45, WPB 210.3 R, NA. 116

 (1) Memo, Director Auto Div WPB for Lt

Col H. P. Valentine, ASF, 8 Feb 45, sub: Program

Determination No. 713... , ASF Prod Div, 19-

B, 451.2 Trucks 1945; (2) Memo, Actg Director

of Matériel ASF for Chairman WPB, 6 Jan 45,

sub: ASF Truck Program for 1945, same file. 117

 Gun motor carriages are discussed in Chapters V and X.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 293

Company turned out some 16,400 halftrack cars of various models. These two

concerns, along with the Diamond T

Motor Company and the International

Harvester Company, produced 22,837

half-track carriers of various models. Ordnance formed a Half-Track Integrating

Committee in September 1942 to coordinate the efforts of the four producers.

There were many design changes in halftrack vehicles, and frequent changes in

requirements, but otherwise half-track

production posed no unusual problems for

manufacturers or for Ordnance.118

Tractors

Before the war, only trucks and

commercial-type tractors were available

for towing heavy artillery weapons, and it

was widely believed that special tractors

for this purpose were not needed. But

experience soon showed that battlefield conditions demanded specially designed vehicles, and in 1941 Ordnance undertook

development of full-tracked, high-speed

prime movers for cross-country towing of

big guns. Four high-speed types eventually

went into production, the 7-ton for towing

light equipment, the 13-ton for towing

155-mm. howitzers, the 18-ton for towing

155-mm. guns and 8-inch howitzers, and

the powerful 38-ton that could pull 240-

mm. and 8-inch guns over rough terrain

and maneuver them into firing position.119

Caterpillar Tractor, International Harvester, Cleveland Tractor, and Allis-Chalmers

started production in 1940 and 1941 on

the 7-ton model but did not begin producing the 13-ton and 18-ton types until

1943, or the 38-ton until 1944. Roughly

21,000 of all four types combined were

produced before V-J Day.120 As lowspeed tractors for construction work were

used chiefly by the Corps of Engineers,

ASF directed Ordnance in 1943 to turn

over to the Engineers full responsibility for

their procurement and supply.121

Tank Transporters and Heavy Wreckers

During World War I, trucks were employed to save wear and tear on light

tanks by hauling them up to the forward

areas. But as tanks grew heavier and better

able to travel long distances under their

own power this practice was abandoned.

The earliest tank transporters in World

War II were designed for a different purpose—removing disabled tanks from

points along lines of evacuation or supply.

They were not standard cargo trucks but

combinations of truck-tractors and lowbed trailers such as one occasionally sees

on the highway loaded with heavy construction machinery. Because of the laws

governing over-all dimensions of vehicles,

maximum loads on axles, and tire sizes,

the early models did not give good off-theroad performance and could not be used

118

 (1) The Design, Development, Engineering

and Production of Half-Track Vehicles, 1940-

1944, OHF; (2) Catalog of Standard Ord Items;

(3) A History of Half-Track Vehicles, Jun 46,

OHF; (4) Ltr, Col Gerald B. Devore, president

of Armored Force Bd, to CG, Armored Force,

22 July 1942, sub: Half-Track Personnel Carrier,

M5, and 7 Indorsements, OO 451/756 (c) ; (5)

Memo, 1st Lt Eldon M. Messersmith for M. B.

F. Jones and others, 7 Oct 42, sub: Organization

of the Half-Track Prod Comm., copy in OHF. 119

 (1) Barnes, Weapons of World War II, pp.

271-81; (2) TM 9-2800, sec. X. 120

 Whiting, Statistics, p. 42. 121

 (1) OCM 22535, 30 Dec 43; (2) OCM

21873, 16 Oct 43; (3) Memo, CofOrd for CG

ASF, 27 Oct 43, sub: Commercial Low Speed

Tractors—Transfer ... to ... Engineers, OO

451.3/194- See also correspondence on this subject during October 1942 in Gen Glancy's file,

OCO-D, D 56-347.
294 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

HALF-TRACK CARS M2, built primarily to transport cargo and personnel in combat areas,

nearing completion at the White Motor Company, June 1941.

for battlefield recovery. But, as the war

progressed, new and improved types came

into service along with tank retrievers, i.e.,

medium tanks fitted with winches, cranes,

and other wrecking equipment. The huge

40-45-ton tank transporters had an armorprotected cab for their crews and mounted

a .50-caliber machine gun on the roof.

Equipped with three powerful winches,

they could pull a mired tank out of the

mud or haul a disabled tank behind the

lines for repair. Fruehauf Trailer Company,

holder of the prime contract for these

vehicles, subcontracted the work first to

Knuckey Truck and later to Pacific Car

and Foundry, which had greater capacity.122

Along with tank transporters went other

trouble-shooting vehicles known as heavy

wreckers. These were big trucks that carried all sorts of equipment for administering first aid to disabled vehicles, including

an oxyacetylene cutting and welding outfit.

The best known heavy wrecker was the

10-ton M1A1, an outgrowth of the M1's

built by Corbitt in 1939. Ward LaFrance

made the first M1A1 version in 1942, and

Kenworth was later brought into the picture to boost production. Basically a

heavy-duty 6x6 truck, the M1A1 carried

a single-boom crane mounted behind the

cab as well as winches front and rear and

a small arsenal of wrecking tools. Of the

smaller wreckers, the 6-ton model was

122

 (1) Barnes, Weapons of World War II, pp.

269-70; (2) Army Ordnance, XXX, No. 154

(January-February 1946), 76; (3) Report on Design, Development, Engineering, and Manufacturing, 14 Oct 44, OCO-D, OHF; (4) Wheeled

Vehicle Project, Oct 44-May 45, OCO-D, OHF.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 295

buil T 12t3 by Mack and the 4-ton by Diamond

Truck-trailer Combinations

For hauling cargo long distances over

improved roads the most efficient vehicle

was the big truck-trailer combination. It

consisted of a so-called truck tractor,

ranging in size from a 1-1/2-ton 4x2 up to

an 8-ton 6x4, and a trailer of proportionate

size. The standard van-type trailer or

semitrailer for general cargo had a boxshaped body with either one or two

axles.124 This type of trailer could be put

to an infinite variety of uses other than

hauling general cargo. It could be fitted

to carry anything from pigeons to horses,

and was suitable for use as a refrigerator

car, map reproduction unit, JOT shop for

repair of shoes, clothing, or delicate instruments. Some models served as mobile

laundries, photographic laboratories, or

bathing and sterilizing units. Still others

were specially designed for hauling telephone poles, chemical containers, bombs,

radio antennae, gasoline, or ponton bridge

material.125

Production of the truck tractor portion

of the combination was essentially the

same as building standard trucks and was

handled by established truck makers. In

the manufacture of trailers and semitrailers, a comparatively simple process, a host

of firms participated, some producing only

a few hundred and others turning out tens

of thousands. The biggest volume came in

the smaller sizes, (up to one ton) with

American Bantam, Ben Hur, Checker Cab,

Gerstenslager, Nash - Kelvinator, and

Willys-Overland among the leading producers. In the larger sizes, Fruehauf,

Gramm, Highway, Trailmobile, and

Winter-Weiss led the list.126

Total production of military transport

vehicles from 1939 to 1945 amounted to

more than 3 million vehicles, counting

passenger cars, motorcycles, and bicycles.

(Table 23) Ranging from 1/4-ton jeeps to

giant tank transporters, the list included

about forty different vehicle types. Roughly

one-third of the total was procured by the

Quartermaster Corps before the transfer

to Ordnance in August 1942. In terms of

number of units delivered, peak procurement came in June 1942 when 62,258

trucks of all kinds were accepted. Total

cost of World War II transport vehicles,

including spare parts and tools, was something over $7 billion, with prices ranging

from about $1,000 for a jeep to nearly

$6,000 for a Dukw and $14,000 for a

heavy wrecker.127

Although more than two dozen firms

held major truck contracts, the bulk of the

Army's cars and trucks came from the

Big Three of the industry. The number of

trailer manufacturers ran into scores, and

the number of subcontractors making

parts and assemblies of all kinds ran into

hundreds. As most contractors turned out

123

 (1) Summary Rpt of Acceptances, TankAutomotive Matériel 1940-45, pp. 113-25; (2)

TM 9-2800, pp. 286-313; (3) PP 47, pp. 54-56. 124

 A trailer had two axles and could "stand on

its own feet." A semitrailer had only one axle

and had to rest on a dolly when not on the move,

or on the truck tractor which pulled it. 125

 TM 9-2800, sec. XV. 126

 For a tabulation of types, companies, quantities, and contract numbers, see Summary Rpt of

Acceptances, Tank-Automotive Matériel 1940-

45. Numerous documents on trailer procurement

are in ASF Prod Div 19B, 451.3 Trailers. 127

 (1) Summary Rpt of Acceptances, TankAutomotive Matériel 1940-45; (2) Whiting,

Statistics; (3) Summary Hist Engineering-Manufacturing Division, OCO-D, copy in OHF; (4)

Ord Supply Catalog, ORD 5-3-1, Hq ASF, 9

Aug 45; (5) Ordnance Wheeled Vehicle Program

1939-45, prepared by Rqmts and Progress Br,

Prod Div, OCO-D, 28 Mar 46, copy in OHF.
296 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TABLE 23—PRODUCTION OF MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES, 1939-1945

a

 Excludes 82,099 commercial type tractors procured by the Corps of Engineers.

Source: Whiting, Statistics, and Summary Report of Acceptances Tank-Automotive Matériel 1940-45, by OCO-D, copy

in OHF.

vehicles closely allied to their peacetime

products they were able to use existing

plants with little change and to turn out

products that had already been tested and

proved by years of experience. There was

no Standard Fleet such as Motor Transport

officers had fought for during the interwar years, but neither was there a repetition of World War I experience. Although

the number of different types was high,

there were only about thirty different

makes in World War II, and of this number only five were high volume items.128

The jeep was the outstanding example

of standardization, with Willys and Ford

turning out more than six hundred thousand nearly identical models. The 2-1/2-

ton, 6x6, was another, with General

Motors producing those issued to the U.S.

Army, and Studebaker those needed for

lend-lease. But not all the trucks produced

by either firm were identical. Some GMC

2-1/2-ton trucks used the Timken axle

while others used the General Motors axle,

and there were other variations. Even

with the jeep there were a few noninterchangeable parts, and with the Dukw the

variations were so numerous that, as

noted above, engineers joked that no two

Dukw's were really identical. Yet the

Dukw was built on the 2-1/2-ton chassis,

and between the two vehicles there were

more than one thousand interchangeable

parts. The greatest diversity of types came

in the heavy-heavy category where nearly

a score of producers took part and the

128

 See list titled Types of Vehicles, OHF, and

Summary Rpt of Acceptances, Tank-Automotive

Matériel 1940-45.
MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 297

number of noninterchangeable components

quickly multiplied.

Many different models of engines were

used but nearly all were of the liquidcooled gasoline type. A few air-cooled

models were tested during the 1930's but

none saw service in the war. Diesel engines

were produced only for some lend-lease

trucks and for a limited number of heavy

duty vehicles. The policy of procuring commercial vehicles for Army use precluded

adoption of new devices such as automatic transmissions which had not yet

been put into production for commercial

vehicles.

It is sometimes asserted that truck production in World War II was unduly delayed by the Army's search for perfection.

Prolonged testing and retesting of vehicles

by the technical services and by the combat arms have been blamed for loss of

precious time in getting volume production under way. But the facts do not bear

out this criticism. There was rigorous testing of pilot models, to be sure, followed

by numerous design changes, but the

testing and redesigning were not carried to

extremes. In most cases standard commercial trucks were put into production with

very few basic design changes. Minor modifications were always being made to meet

specific military needs, but major modifications were rare. Two completely new

vehicles—the jeep and the Dukw—were

designed, tested, and adopted in record

time. Both went into volume production

quickly and both were highly successful in

the field. The using arms were cool

toward the idea of an amphibian truck at

the start but they lost no time in adopting it after they saw the Dukw in action.

After production got under way the

basic design of vehicles was frozen unless

some really serious weakness developed.

But minor changes were frequently approved under the title of Engineering

Change Orders (ECO's). This, it should

be noted, is standard practice in private

industry and is unavoidable when new

models are introduced, whether one is producing trucks, washing machines, or airplanes. With the exception of the Dukw,

the flow of ECO's on military trucks was

not out of line with commercial practice or

with experience in other areas of war

production. Perhaps the chief difficulty in

this area was the lack of adequate liaison

between the armies in the field and the

Office Chief of Ordnance in Detroit. Engineering changes that originated with experienced automotive engineers, whether in

Detroit or overseas, were usually based or.

sound principles, but in many instances

requests for modifications came from officers in the field with no explanation as to

their purpose or necessity, and without

review by competent automotive specialists. The Engineering Division in Detroit

complained that, as a result, the Army was

in the position of having its right hand

ignorant of what its left hand was doing,

and of making design modifications without adequate engineering study.129

One of the incredible features of World

War II truck production was that it lagged

behind schedule year after year. With all

its vaunted capacity to lead the world in

automotive production, the United States

turned in a poorer score on trucks than on

most other items of military equipment.

Light and medium trucks, closely akin to

normal production of the automotive industry, generally met their schedules, but

129

 (1) Interv with Lt Col John H. Davis, Ord

R&D Div, 2 Jun 55; (2) Draft MS entitled The

Lessons of World War II in Roberts file.

MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES 299

light-heavy (2-1/2-ton) models fell short

of requirements both in 1942 and 1943.

This was partly the Army's fault. After

underestimating its needs for heavy-heavy

trucks early in the war the Army in mid1943 set impossible goals for their production in 1944, and the goals were not met.

A great deal of time and effort was devoted to studying the bottlenecks, but no

really effective action was taken to deal

with them. All things considered, the automotive industry did a magnificent job, but

it could not work miracles.

Another discouraging facet of the situation was the inexcusable abuse meted out

to military trucks by some of their drivers,

young and irresponsible enlisted men not

adequately trained or properly indoctrinated with the need for treating their

vehicles with the same care that cavalrymen gave to their horses in years gone by.

The average American soldier was regarded

as possessing more mechanical aptitude

and experience than the soldiers of any

other army in the world, but he often

gave a poor account of himself in handling

military trucks. There were many exceptions, of course. Countless examples of

mechanical ingenuity in keeping vehicles

running might be cited, but the toll from

neglect and abuse was terrific. Overloaded

vehicles were driven recklessly at excessive

speeds over good roads and bad with the

result that tires, brakes, motors, clutches,

and transmissions wore out at an alarming

rate. In spite of efforts to enforce maintenance discipline, many soldier drivers appeared to consider their position behind

the wheel as an opportunity to demonstrate

both their courage and their powers of

destruction. Bill Mauldin, the Army's satirical cartoonist, once drew a soldier mechanic, possibly from Ordnance, standing

atop a pile of wrecked vehicles and calling

to his buddy, "I'll be derned. Here's one

what wuz wrecked in combat." Much of

the hard usage meted out to trucks was, of

course, unavoidable, but all of it, avoidable

or not, added to the Ordnance problem of

maintenance. The casualty rate among vehicles was so high, and the load on maintenance units so heavy, that a separate

chapter is required to deal with the problem of spare parts.
CHAPTER XIII

Spare Parts for Vehicles

The term "spare parts" has an unfortunate connotation. It suggests something

unimportant, dull, and uninteresting. It

also brings to mind the thought of a fifth

wheel on a cart, something not wholly

necessary that under normal conditions can

be done without or "spared."

But all these connotations are completely misleading when we examine closely

the role of spare parts in World War II.

As far as Ordnance history is concerned, it

is no exaggeration to say that spare parts,

particularly for trucks and tanks, posed

one of the most important and persistent

problems of the whole war. In Africa,

General Rommel's success in recovering

from defeats was often ascribed to the

fact that he was well supplied with parts

and had a competent maintenance organization while the British were less well off.

"When I die," a high-ranking British Ordnance officer once remarked, " 'spare parts'

will be written across my heart."

 1

The basic reason for the spare parts

problem lies in the fact that an Army tank

or truck does not last for one hundred

years, as did the Deacon's wonderful onehoss shay. Nor does it all fall apart at once

—"like a bubble when it bursts"—unless

blasted by an enemy mine or shell. It

usually breaks down one part at a time.

And the whole vehicle may be immobilized

for lack of that one part, whether it be a

simple item like a cracked spark plug or

something more intricate like a burned-out

bearing. "This is not a war of ammunition,

tanks, guns, and trucks alone," wrote Ernie

Pyle, the famed correspondent.

It is as much a war of replenishing spare

parts to keep them in combat as it is a war

of major equipment. . . . The gasket that

leaks, the fan belt that breaks, the nut that

is lost . . . will delay GI Joe on the road

to Berlin just as much as if he didn't have

a vehicle in which to start.2

In World War II the role of the proverbial horseshoe nail in battles of the distant

past was assumed by a host of mechanical items—spark plugs, distributor points,

condensers, generators, carburetors, gaskets, fuel pumps, tires, tank tracks, and so

on and on. Their types were numbered in

the hundreds of thousands, and the quantities of some, like spark plugs and tires,

ran into the millions. They formed

several different categories, including

small individual pieces such as spark plugs

1

 Maj Gen L. H. Williams, Controller of Ord

and Director of Warlike Supplies, British War

Office, at a conf on 27 Sep 43, quoted in Hines,

History of the General Purpose Vehicle in ETO,

vol. I, OHF. For evidence that the Germans

also had tank maintenance problems, see DA

Pamphlet No. 20-202, Jun 54, German Tank

Maintenance in World War II. 2

 Quoted in Wheels of Victory, the Story of

Industry-Ordnance Accomplishment in the Tank

and Automotive Field, OCO-D, Nov 45, p. 12,

OHF.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 301

and points; larger subassemblies such as

carburetors or generators; and big assemblies such as complete engines or rear

axles. They ranged in size from delicate

springs weighing a fraction of an ounce

to tank engines weighing more than half a

ton. They had to be produced in huge

quantities and also had to be named,

numbered, packed, and shipped to all

corners of the globe. "Almost anywhere in

the world you can get spare parts for the

family car when it breaks down," Colonel

Van Deusen once observed. "Not so with

an Army truck; it has to take its mechanic

civilization with it. If it travels light it

may not travel far."

 3 In the middle of the

war the rate of Ordnance shipment of

spare parts to the using arms and lendlease countries amounted to more than one

hundred million pieces per month.4

Categories of Parts

When cars and trucks were placed beside tanks and heavy guns, the contrast

between commercial design and military

design made itself clear. Except for a few

components, tanks and big guns were designed entirely by Ordnance, or under its

direct supervision. The drawings and specifications for every part were kept on file

in Ordnance and could not be changed

without its consent. Further, tanks and

guns were produced only for military use,

not for ordinary commercial sale, and the

same was true of their spare parts. Trucks,

on the other hand, were designed by industry primarily for commercial sale, and,

before the war, only incidentally for sale to

the government. As wholesale and retail

outlets all over the country carried supplies of spare parts for cars and trucks,

Army repair shops were able to purchase

locally whatever parts they needed to keep

their motor fleets in operation.

Another distinction of importance was

that between the old and the new. Ordnance experience with rifles and artillery

weapons ran back for over one hundred

years, and with machine guns for about

half that time. Decades of development

work, combined with long experience in

field maintenance, had built up a solid

backlog of maintenance data, including

fairly exact knowledge of what replacement

parts would be needed. Throughout World

War II there were, as a consequence, few

complaints of parts shortages for shooting

ordnance. "It is the rarest thing I ever

hear that there is a shortage of machine

gun parts or artillery parts," General

Campbell commented early in 1944. "On

the other hand, there is hardly a day,

hardly an hour, that I don't hear about a

shortage of automotive parts."

 5 Because

tanks and trucks were comparatively new

items of military supply they had not been

through a century of development, test,

and field maintenance. Further, they were

complex mechanisms whose proper functioning depended upon precise integration

of countless moving parts. In addition to

all this, trucks were called upon to perform

3

 Quotations from speech by Col Edwin S. Van

Deusen before SAE, New York, 19 Feb 42. 4

 For discussion of spare parts supply, numbering, and distribution within the Field Service area,

see Chapter XIX, below. For a brief summary of

the spare parts story, see draft of booklet, Ordnance Spare Parts in Mechanized Warfare, August 1944, copy in P4341, OHF. A much more

detailed account is Clifford and Alspaugh, Record

of U.S. Army Ordnance Combat and Motor

Transport Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and Operations. Brief historical reports and scores of documents are to be found in OCO-D History of

Spare Parts, Project No. 54, Volumes 43-44,

P4336. See also section on spare parts in Annual

Report Requirements Division ASF, ASF file. 5

 Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, 18 Jan 44, New

York, N.Y., p. 4, OHF.
302 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

their strenuous missions day after day,

often working around the clock, over rough

terrain, and in all kinds of weather. While

rifles, guns, and howitzers were fired only

for short periods in training or in combat,

motor vehicles were always in demand and

were in actual use a great deal of the

time.6

These distinctions gave rise in Ordnance

and the Quartermaster Corps to sharply

differing spare parts policies. With supplies available from commercial outlets, the

QMC did not carry warehouse stocks of

parts for peacetime maintenance of the

Army's cars and trucks. As a result, it had

no real spare parts problem in peacetime,

except insofar as the great variety of vehicles made it a problem. For tanks and

other combat vehicles, on the other hand,

there were no local garages carrying periscopes, tank tracks, or spare gun tubes.

Ordnance had to maintain its own supply

of such parts. It is true that the burden

was not very heavy, for the few tanks in

service saw little if any use during the

average peace year and big guns were

seldom fired. But the principle of keeping

on hand a full stock of maintenance parts

for weapons and combat vehicles was

firmly rooted in Ordnance long before

1940.

Spare Parts in Ordnance, 1939-1940

The Ordnance contract for 329 light

tanks placed with American Car and

Foundry in November 1939 is historically

important as the first U.S. Army tank

order awarded industry since World

War I. It is also significant in the World

War II history of vehicular spare parts

because, following standard Ordnance

policy, it included a provision for replacement parts as well as for complete vehicles.7

 Before the order was placed engineers of the Industrial Service, with the

concurrence of Field Service maintenance

specialists, had compiled a list of "essential

extra parts" needed to keep the tanks in

repair for one year of war. Lacking data

from combat experience, the engineers

could make only estimates, taking into account the number of miles the tanks would

probably run, estimated hours of operation, results of proving ground tests, and

other factors. The parts on this list were

known as "first year parts" or, because

they were delivered concurrently with the

vehicles, "concurrent parts." Standard

shop supplies such as solder, welding rod,

cotton waste, gaskets, and nuts and bolts

were procured in bulk by Field Service

along with such standard commercial items

as spark plugs, batteries, oil seals, radiator hose, and tires.8

 Also procured concurrently with the vehicles, these items

were described as Field Service supplies

to distinguish them from first year spares

procured by the Industrial Service.

When Ordnance depots occasionally

ran short of parts to repair deadlined vehicles they bought directly from automotive dealers or requested procurement

through Rock Island or the district offices.

The parts thus obtained went under the

name of "deficiency parts" as they were

used to make up unexpected deficiencies in

6

 For a discussion of this theme, see Brig. Gen.

Julian S. Hatcher, "Automotive Spare Parts,"

Army Ordnance, XXVII, No. 146 (SeptemberOctober 1944) 257ff. 7

 In 1939 the governing regulation was OO

Memo No. 467, 2 March 1935. It was later replaced by OO Memo No. 510, 21 January 1941.

Copies in folder marked Spare Parts, ORDIRT640-A. 8

 For tires and other rubber products, see Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, Chapter XVIII.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 303

depot stocks. This practice served well

during peacetime, but after Pearl Harbor

the mounting flow of requests for small

quantities of many deficiency parts led to

confusion and had to be discontinued.9

A new system was then introduced to

procure second-year parts for all equipment. The quantities on the second-year

lists amounted to 60 percent of the first

year lists and were to be delivered within

six months of delivery of the original

item.10

In 1940, when defense production rapidly gained momentum, estimates of Ordnance parts requirements reached what

then appeared to be staggering totals. During fiscal year 1940 the Department had

spent on spare parts over $15 million

—more than the entire Ordnance appropriation in earlier years—and plans called

for spending ten times as much in fiscal

1941. A survey in the fall of 1940 by an

industrial consultant, Lawrence S. Barroll,

showed that roughly 20 percent of all

funds apportioned for new materiel went

into spare parts.11 In view of the magnitude and complexity of parts procurement

after Pearl Harbor, Ordnance decided to

give its parts policies and practices a

careful re-examination. Barroll was again

called in late in 1942 to study the situation. Many conferences were held to

discuss proposed new procedures.12

One of the underlying difficulties at the

start was the need for closer co-ordination

between Field Service and Industrial Service. Because of the nature of their functions these two services did not always see

eye to eye on spare parts.13 Alert to its

duty to keep depots and field units always

well supplied, and mindful of its long experience with the knotty problems of maintenance, Field Service gave high priority to

spare parts. The Industrial Service recognized the needs for parts but was more

directly influenced by pressure to procure

complete items. Production of a carload of

extra carburetors or spare tires did not

make news; nor did it satisfy the demands

of the Assistant Secretary of War half as

well as did production of an additional

tank or carload of complete machine

guns. The essence of the difficulty was the

calculation of requirements. When General

Harris questioned the need for the huge

quantities of parts that Field Service

wanted for spares, and asked to see the

records of parts consumption on which

they were based, General Crain replied

that the records were fragmentary or nonexistent. He contended that troops in the

field should not be burdened with demands for consumption data but should

9

 Roy W. Stosch, Spare Parts and Supplies Replenishment, sec. 6 of PSP 63, Stock Control and

Supply Control Policy and Practice, by OCO, Jun

45, OHF. 10

 For a brief summary by an ASF officer, see

Memo, Col Phillips W. Smith for Brig Gen

Albert J. Browning, Director ASF Purchases Div,

5 Apr 44, sub: Proc of Standard Motor Vehicle

Spare Parts, copy in folder Whom Do We Buy

From?, P4340. See also Memo, Duffy, OCO for

ASF, 27 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc Policy,

OO 451.01/8190, and Memo, Howard, OCO-D

for Col Phillips Smith, ASF, 8 Mar 44, sub: Spare

Parts Proc Policy, T617. 11

 Study of U.S.A. Ordnance Department Spare

Parts Procedure, 8 Oct 40, by Lawrence S. Barroll,

Technical Consultant of the office of W. K. Norton, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as Barroll

Rpt, 1940), in PSP 63, ex.1. An earlier version

date -A, folde d 13r Se onp spar 40 ma e parts y b.e found in ORDIR T640

12

 Lawrence S. Barroll, Survey of Ordnance

Spare Parts Supply, 26 Dec 42 (hereafter cited

as Barroll Rpt, 1942), in PSP 63, ex. 2. This

survey reviews the situation as it existed in 1940

and describes development during 1941 and 1942.

The stock control aspect of the Barroll report is

discussed below in Chapter XIX. 13

 For an example of disagreement between

Field Service and Industrial Service on parts

lists, see Report, Wesson Conference, 31 October

1940.
304 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

be supplied automatically, at least in the

early stages of war. "I did not believe in

blind automatic supply of spare parts,"

wrote General Harris years later. "I believed rather in selective supply based on

consumption experience."

 14

 Lacking experience data, Field Service tended to set

requirements high to be sure of having

enough, and Industrial Service tended to

set them low to allow more production of

complete items.

Another difficulty cited by Barroll in his

1940 report was that the division of spare

parts responsibility between the two services was too vague. He recommended that

Field Service be given full responsibility for

determining parts requirements and that

the Industrial Service be responsible only

for placing the orders with industry or the

arsenals.15 Meanwhile a conference of

Field Service and Industrial Service representatives came to the opposite conclusion

—that the Industrial Service should be

responsible for preparing parts lists.16

General Wesson, apparently not agreeing

fully with either proposal, in early November 1940 appointed a permanent Spare

Parts Board, headed by the chief of

Field Service, to review and approve all

parts lists before the Industrial Service

placed orders with industry.17

Appointment of this board was a step in

the right direction but it did not solve the

whole problem by any means. In midJanuary 1941 when General Wesson inquired at an 11 o'clock conference how

spare parts were coming along, the answer

of General Crain, chief of Field Service,

was, "Not so well." For one thing, he

reported, Rock Island Arsenal, because of

the pressure to meet production goals, was

giving priority to complete items and was

neglecting parts. He complained that some

parts orders placed with the arsenal in

1939 were still unfilled. This was contrary to standing instructions, replied the

Industrial Service representatives. But that

was of little help to General Crain.18 A

year later the problem apparently still

existed. General Harris found it necessary

at that time to call the policy on spare

parts orders to the attention of his division

chiefs and direct them in forceful language

to give top priority to Field Service requisitions for parts and to expedite their production "in every way possible."

 19

Another troublesome problem was the

delay in compiling parts lists for new

items and getting them into the hands of

contractors. With the ACF light tank order

in 1939, parts lists had been provided

promptly. But with the medium tank,

which went into production in 1940 while

design work was still in progress, the story

was different. By the end of February 1941

the medium tank contracts with American

Locomotive, Baldwin Locomotive, and

14

 Ltr, Maj Gen Charles T. Harris, Jr. (Ret.)

to Thomson, 25 Aug 55, OHF. 15

 Barroll Rpt, 1940. See also Memo, Chief of

FS for Chief of Ind Serv, 23 Aug 40, sub: Proc

of Spare Parts . . . and Memo, Lt Col William

A. Borden, for Col Gladeon M. Barnes, 23 Aug

40, sub: Spare Parts, both in folder marked

Spare Parts ORDIR T640-A. For a critical review of the Barroll report, see Memo, Borden for

Lt. Col. Walter W. Warner, 21 September 1940,

sub: Spare Parts, in folder marked Spare Parts,

ORDIR T640-A. 16

 Memo, Chief FS for ACoflnd Serv, Engr, 13

Sep 40, sub: Preparation of Essential Extra Parts

Lists, OO 451.01/98. 17

 (1) Ord SO No. 263, 7 Nov 40; (2) Min,

Wesson Confs, 31 Oct 40. The other members of

the board were representatives of the Industrial

Service, Fiscal Division, and General Office. The

minutes of the board are in OHF. 18

 Min, Wesson Confs, 15 Jan 41. See also

same source 28 Jan 42 and OOM 510, 21 Jan 41. 19

 Memo, Maj Gen Charles Harris, for Chiefs

of Divs, 30 Jan 42, sub: Placing Orders for and

Prod of Spare Parts, copy in Min, Spare Parts

Board, OHF.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 305

Chrysler still did not provide for production of spare parts lists because the parts

lists had not yet been completed.20 As

late as December 1942, Barroll declared

that preparation of parts lists was still "in

bad shape."

 2l

 Compilation of parts lists

was no easy chore, for a single list might

include thousands of items, and every

item posed its own peculiar problems.

When reports reached Ordnance from

Fort Benning early in the spring of 1941

that large numbers of tanks were deadlined

for lack of parts, General Wesson sent a

teletype to Rock Island authorizing immediate procurement of parts without advertising.22

 "It is absolutely essential," he

added, "that every spare parts order be

given the highest priority."

 23

 But the

backlog of unfilled parts orders remained

for months, particularly hard-to-manufacture items like engines and transmissions.

Meanwhile both General Harris, chief of

Industrial Service and General Crain, chief

of Field Service, opposed cutting parts

production to boost output of complete

items. Although not always achieved, their

objective was to keep parts production

synchronized with complete item production even at the cost of reduced totals for

complete items.24 The wisdom of this

policy was confirmed by British combat

experience. "Striking figures of tanks produced per day look very well in the

papers," a British report stated, "but we

cannot fight this war with statistics. . . .

Tanks without spares are very little more

use than no tanks at all."

 25

After Pearl Harbor, and particularly

after announcement of the Presidential Objectives early in January 1942, the pressure

for procurement of complete items became

intense and the task of bringing parts

production abreast of vehicle production

became even more difficult. In the early

weeks of 1942 the Under Secretary of War

and other high-ranking officials kept almost daily tab on the output of tanks,

guns, and ammunition, and constantly exhorted Ordnance to speed production.

"The demand for completed pieces of

equipment . . . was so great," wrote General Campbell, "that the fundamental urge

of all concerned, both in Industry and

Ordnance, was to produce as many finished articles as possible." 26

 With many

industrialists asserting that Ordnance parts

requirements were excessive, and complaining of delays in receipt of approved parts

lists, the District offices had constantly to

combat a tendency in industry to neglect

parts production. The Chief of Ordnance

in April 1942 specifically directed the District offices to include in every contract a

list of spare parts, with time of delivery

clearly stated and synchronized with delivery of major items.27

Ordnance also gave close attention to

20

 Memo, Maj William F. Sadtler for file, sub:

Spare Parts for Tanks, 26 Feb 41, ORDIR

T640-A. 21

 Barroll Rpt, 1942, p. 19, in PSP 63, ex. 2. 22

 Min, Wesson Confs, 15 Apr 41. 23

 Teletype, CofOrd to CO Rock Island Arsenal, 7 May 41, OO 451.25/5199. 24

 Min, Wesson Confs, 15 Jul 41. For similar

comments, see same source 19 Nov 41, and Min

of Spare Parts Board, OHF. 25

 Importance of Provision of Spare Parts for

Tanks, April 1942, British Army Staff. See also

Rpt of Conf, 3 Jul 42, British and U.S. officers

on spare parts. Both in Tank-Automotive Spare

Parts Policy docs., OHF. 26

 (1) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team,

p. 349; (2) Intervs, summer 1949, with Maj Gen

Charles Harris and Brig Gen Burton Lewis. 27

 Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit., p. 73. See

also OO Memo No. 618, 30 Apr 42, copy in

folder marked Spare Parts, ORDIR, T640-A. On

the contract between military and commercial

parts requirements, see Memo, Col Raaen for

Amberg, 25 Jul 44, sub: . . . Truman Comm.

Ltr. . . ,OHF.
306 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

MAJ. GEN. LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, JR.,

Chief of Ordnance, May 1942.

Wesson retired at the end of May 1942 his

successor, General Campbell, was pre- pared to take drastic measures to deal

with the parts problem. Early in June, in

line with the General Motors report, he

created a Parts Control Division headed by

Brig. Gen. Rolland W. Case and staffed in

part by General Motors men who had

made the survey.30 Its mission was to

formulate spare parts policies for Ordnance

and see that they were carried out by

Field Service and the Industrial Service. But it never achieved its objectives. After

spending some time in discussing plans and

procedures, General Case became con- vinced that the new division was adminis- tratively unsound because it overlapped

existing organizations and did not have

sharply defined lines of control. Another

factor that entered the picture was the

coming merger of the Motor Transport

Service with Ordnance, and the absence of

a Parts Control Division in the MTS. In

view of these facts, General Case recom- mended that the new division be abolished. General Campbell reluctantly agreed and

on 28 July 1942 issued orders abolishing

the division and assigning its duties to

the organizational side of the problem in

the spring of 1942. When the newly

formed ASF Control Division looked into

the matter it observed that Ordnance's

parts troubles stemmed from the fact

that "ten separate offices deal with various

aspects of Spare Parts, and no one person

is effectively co-ordinating the entire opera- tion."

 28

 The Spare Parts Board was the

final authority on parts lists, but its authority did not extend to procurement and

distribution. A survey of Ordnance in May

1942 by a team from General Motors also

came to the conclusion that responsibility

was too widely scattered. The General

Motors people went on to recommend

creation of a Spare Parts Service, to be on

the same level as Industrial Service and

Field Service.29

The General Motors report came at an

opportune time for action. When General

28 Notes on Organization and Operation of the

Tank and Combat Vehicle Division of the Ordnance Department by ASF Contl Div, Rpt No.

26, no date but probably March 1942, dr 2172

ASF Contl Div files. 29

 General Motors Overseas Operations, May

1942, General Survey of the Organization, Functions and Operations of the Ordnance Department, 3 vols., OHF. For criticism of the GM

proposal on parts as functionally unsound, see

Memo, Gordon M. Bain, Bur of Budget, for Col

Clarence E. Davies, Ord Contl Div, 22 Jul 42,

sub: Recent Ord Reorganization. . . , ASF Contl

Div file 321 (Ord). 30

 (1) ODO 285, 26 Jun 42; (2) Interv with

Brig Gen Rolland W. Case, 22 Nov 49; (3) Key

Pers Rpt, 2 Nov 45, Col Lawrence J. Meyns,

ExecO Parts Contl Div, OHF.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 307

Field Service.31 This marked the end of

more than two years of persistently unsuccessful efforts to "solve" the parts

problem and ushered in a new phase with

absorption into Ordnance of transport

vehicles.32

scheduled vehicle procurement but were

more closely akin to Ordnance replenishment parts purchased to fill deficiencies in

depot stocks. The QMC did not undertake

systematic procurement of first year spares

concurrently with procurement of vehicles

until the Lend-Lease Act came into the

picture in 1941 and did not get the new

system into good working order until after

Pearl Harbor.36 To keep lend-lease vehicles supplied with repair parts after they

were shipped overseas the QMC decided to

compile voluminous parts lists to be incorporated in lend-lease contracts. The same

lists were later made a part of all domestic

contracts as well. Based at the outset on

Spare Parts in the QMC, 1939-42

All during the years before World

War II the QMC made no provision for

purchasing spare parts along with vehicles.

Not only were its financial resources too

slender to purchase stock of about half a

million different parts, but there was no

real need to keep large supplies of parts on

hand, for Army cars and trucks were of

the same design as commercial vehicles.

When they broke down, the QMC purchased repair parts from local distributors

on an "off the shelf" basis.33 For Army

transport vehicles there were no lists of

first year spares, nor any concurrent procurement of parts as there was for combat

vehicles.

In the summer of 1940, as the Army's

truck fleet expanded, the motor depots

were authorized to build up small reserve

stocks of parts by direct purchase from

vehicle manufacturers. Drawing upon the

experience of industry and the Motor

Transport Division staff, depot commanders endeavored to build up stocks that

would give "a good general coverage."

 34

This step marked the first departure from

the policy of relying solely on local purchase, but local purchase continued as a

major source of parts supply for the next

two years.35

The depot stocks of parts procured in

this manner were not strictly analogous to

Ordnance first year or concurrent spares.

They were not geared in directly with

31

 (1) Change 1, ODO 285, 28 Jul 42; (2)

Interv with Case, 22 Nov 49; (3) Key Pers Rpt,

2 Nov 45, Meyns; (4) Memo, Deputy Chief FS

Suboffice for Chief FS Suboffice, Rock Island, 6

Jun 45, sub: Stock Contl Activities 1941-45, copy

in OHF. 32

 See Barroll Rpt, 1940, for a critical review of

the 1940-42 period. 33

 (1) Ann Rpt QMG 1942; (2) Memo, QMG

for ASW, 13 Dec 37, sub: Contracts for Purchase

of Repair Parts. . . , QM 451.01 T-M. See also

draft MS by Harry Roberts on Spare Parts, OHF,

and Memo, Col Roland P. Shugg, ASF Opns Div,

for Generals Somervell and Lutes, 17 Mar 42,

sub: Automotive Parts, OHF. 34

 (1) Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit., p. 40;

(2) Memo, Barzynski to CO, Holabird QM

Depot, 30 Oct 40, sub: Purchase of Assemblies

and Parts for Motor Vehicles, and 1st Indorsement CO Holabird QM Depot to QMG, 8 Nov

40, QM 451.01 M-FO (Holabird), copy in OHF;

(3) Ann Rpt QMG 1942. 35

 For restrictions on local purchase in the

summer of 1941, see: (1) MTS Ltr No. 8, 28

Aug 41, quoted in Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit.,

p. III; (2) Ann Rpt QMG 1942; (3) Press Release, OQMG, 4 Sep 41, sub: Quartermaster

Corps Establishes Spare Parts System, copy in

OHF. 36

 (1) Ann Rpt QMG 1942; (2) Stosch, Spare

Parts and Supplies Replenishment, PSP 63, sec.

6; (3) Press Release, OQMG, 4 Sep 41, sub:

Quartermaster Corps Establishes Spare Parts

System.
308 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

commercial experience,37 they had to be

revised as time went on to bring them into

line with combat experience of the Allied

nations. They were known variously as

first-year lists, concurrent lists, and United

Nations lists. For export shipment, and also

for a time for domestic use, they were put

up in l00-unit packs, that is, packs with

enough parts in each to maintain one hundred vehicles for a year of wartime service.38

Preparation of United Nations lists took

months of painstaking work and was not

completed until the end of 1941. Meanwhile the Motor Transport Service had

procured some three hundred thousand vehicles without spares, except for small

depot stocks, and friendly nations had procured for their own use another three hundred thousand—also without first-year

spares.39 After Pearl Harbor it became

obvious that further reliance on local

purchase to supply a wartime truck fleet

was out of the question, for commercial

production of parts had been stopped and

distributors' shelves were nearly bare. In

the spring of 1942 the Director of the

Motor Transport Service therefore took the

bull by the horns and authorized purchase

of $20 million worth of parts for the cars

and trucks already in service.40 The Munitions Assignment Board approved similar

procurement of parts for cars and trucks

in the hands of the British and other

friendly nations.41 To avoid disrupting

production schedules of vehicle manufacturers, and in the hope of saving both

time and money, these parts were purchased whenever possible directly from

parts manufacturers. This was a departure

from existing practice and was apparently

initiated by Jack Creamer, formerly with

a New York firm known as Wheels, Inc.,

who had been placed in authority over

MTS purchase policy.42 As established

parts suppliers were immediately flooded

with orders, the Motor Transport Service

departed from its stated policy of buying

only from concerns that supplied original

equipment and turned to the so-called

"independents" who did not normally supply parts to vehicle manufacturers but

sold to the public cut-rate parts that were

claimed to be just as good as original

parts.43

While orders were being placed against

this huge backlog, General Somervell

urged General Frink to stop buying parts

"in driblets of from 5 to 6 percent of the

gross value of the vehicles" and adopt the

British practice of ordering parts worth 35

percent of the vehicle cost. General Frink

37

 For detailed comment on the differences between commercial experience and military experience, see Memo, Raaen for Amberg, Spec

Asst to SW, 25 Jul 44, sub: . . . Truman

Comm. Ltr. . . , copy in OHF. 38

 (1) Ann Rpt QMG 1942; (2) Stosch, Spare

Parts and Supplies Replenishment, PSP 63, sec.

6; (3) Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit., pp. 76-81. 39

 Statement by Brig Gen Walter P. Boatwright,

29 Nov 44, Hearings, Mead Comm., pt. 26, pp.

11927-28. 40

 Ltr, John H. Creamer, OQMG, to Maj Paul

G. Tossy, QM Motor Supply Depot, Fort Wayne,

Mich., 15 May 42, sub: Misc. Spare Parts

Purchases, 1940-41 Vehicles, copy in OHF. See

also unsigned typescript, Hist of Spare Parts

Procurement Policy, 1942, p. 6, in folder Purchase Policy IV, photostat copy in OHF. 41

 Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit., pp. 141-46. 42

 (1) Ann Rpt QMG FY 1942, copy in MTS

files, P 4233; (2) Memo, Raaen, OCO, for Amberg, Spec Asst to SW, 4 Jan 44, sub: Senate

Investigation. . . , in Maj John F. Lane, Spare

Parts Notebook, T618; (3) Memo, sub: Conf with

Maj G. W. Pillers, Jr., 8 Mar 44, no signature

or addressee, OHF; (4) Hist, Spare Parts Proc

Policy, 1942, p. 3. 43

 (1) Statement by Boatwright, 29 Nov 44,

Hearings, Mead Comm., pt. 26, pp. 11927-28;

(2) Ltr, Creamer, OQMG, to Tossy, QM Motor

Supply Depot, Fort Wayne, Ind., 15 May 42, sub:

Misc. Spare Parts Purchases, 1940-41 Vehicles;

(3) Hist, Spare Parts Proc Policy, 1942.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 309

was happy to be released from the existing

ceiling of 10 percent on parts. He soon

established for motor transport the same

basic procedure for parts procurement that

Ordnance had for combat vehicles—to

contract for a two-year supply of parts at

the time vehicles were ordered, first-year

parts to be delivered with the vehicles and

second-year parts six months later.44 In

addition, so-called deficiency spares were

ordered as needed to make up for incorrect

calculations in the first-year list, and

replenishment, spares were ordered as

needed to keep depot stocks up to par. The

weakest link in this chain of supply was

the second-year list. Calculated as a percentage—usually 60—of the first-year list,

it tended to perpetuate whatever deficiencies appeared in the first-year list and

placed an added burden on deficiency procurement. It was abolished in July 1943,

after the merger with Ordnance, in favor of

a system of quarterly replenishment whereby actual records of consumption and

stocks on hand during a given quarter set

the pace for procurement during the next

quarter.45

It should be noted that neither the

Quartermaster Corps nor Ordnance attempted to supply spares for all parts of a

given vehicle. In fact, the percentage of

truck parts supplied as spares was rather

low in most cases. In one vehicle, the

3/4-ton weapons carrier made by Dodge,

less than one thousand out of some eight

thousand separate parts were supplied as

spares. The many bits and pieces that

went into small assemblies such as generators or carburetors were not issued separately. Nonfunctional parts such as fenders and hub caps were seldom issued at

all, for vehicles would still run even if

these parts were missing, and replacements

could usually be obtained from other vehicles shot up or otherwise damaged beyond repair. Nevertheless, the number of

different spare parts was great—some

260,000 for automotive equipment—and

posed baffling problems of identification,

storage, and distribution.46

After the Merger, 1942-45

After the merger of Motor Transport

Service with Ordnance in September 1942,

the spare parts problem went through

several different phases. At the outset,

from late 1942 to the end of 1943, the

44

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Brehon Somervell,

ACofS, G-4, for QMG, 5 Feb 42, sub: Automotive Parts, G-4/22528-153, and 1st Indorsement,

Frink to Somervell, 26 Feb 42; (2) Memo, Frink

for Gregory, 13 May 42, sub: Spare Parts, copy

in OHF. See also Admin Order No. 51, MTS, 4

Jul 42, in folder marked Whom Do We Buy

From?; Ann Rpt QMG 1942; AG Memo No.

W850-5-42, 24 Aug 42, sub: Automotive Parts

Policy; and Spare Parts and Supplies Replenishment, in PSP 63, sec. 6, OHF. 45

 The new procedure was authorized by AG

Memo No. W-700-32-43, 6 July 1943. It is

described in detail in booklet entitled Spare

Parts Requirements Policy, Procedure and Practice

for Ordnance Vehicles, September 1943, T-AC,

copy in OHF. See also Memo, Duffy, OCO, for

CG ASF, 27 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc

Policy, OO 451.01/8190; Memo, Howard, OCDD, for Col Phillips Smith, ASF, 8 Mar 44, sub:

Spare Parts Proc Policy, T617; Memo, Col Emerson Cummings for Howard, 21 Mar 44, sub:

Spare Parts Policy and Procedure, in folder

marked Purchase Policy II, P4337; and Memo,

Boatwright for CofOrd, 15 Mar 44, sub: Spare

Parts Proc Policy, in folder Whom Do We Buy

From?, P4340. 46

 For a discussion of Ordnance parts requirement methods, see Memo, Raaen for Amberg, 25

Jul 44, sub: Further Inquiries in Truman Comm.

Ltr. . . , OO 032/416. See also booklet entitled

Spare Parts Procurement Policy, Procedure and

Practice for Ordnance Vehicles, Sep 43, T-AC,

and Clifford and Norman, Proposed Statement on

Proc of Spare Parts for Combat and Wheeled

(Tank-Automotive) Vehicles prepared by Lt Col

Daniel Clifford and Maj J. A. Norman for

Possible Use in Testifying Before S. Investigating

Comm., Aug 44.
310 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

main problem was to meet the insistent

demand for production. How the parts

were procured was a secondary consideration: the main thing was to get them as

soon as possible. After that job was taken

care of, attention was turned to the

methods used. The Mead Committee in

1944 focused its spotlight on Ordnance

spare parts procurement policies and asked

a number of searching questions. At about

the same time more and more effort was

devoted to improving overseas parts supply

while ASF attempted to regulate with great

care the flow of production and distribution.

Getting Out Production

In spite of everything that was done to

speed production, spare parts for both

tanks and trucks lagged behind schedule

throughout 1942. One reason was that

spare parts carried a lower priority rating

—in the minds of industrial leaders as well

as in government decrees—than did parts

for vehicle assembly. Another reason was

that requirements for complete vehicles

had shot upward in 1942 leaving spare

parts to catch up later. Near the end of

July, on the day before the Ordnance Parts

Division was abolished, General Campbell

had written to all District chiefs that

shortages of parts had become "so acute

that drastic and immediate action is necessary."

 47

 After setting up four priority

ratings for parts orders and directing that

assembly of complete vehicles be halted

when necessary to make spare parts available, he added that after 1 October 1942

Ordnance would not accept any more

major items unless delivery of the corresponding spare parts was up to date. At the

same time he wrote directly to K. T.

Keller, president of Chrysler, to request

his help in dealing with this "nationally

serious matter."

 48

But when October rolled around parts

deliveries were still behind schedule. General Campbell then sent a teletype to all

Districts advising them that henceforth,

unless a waiver were granted for a specific

contractor, no major item would be accepted or paid for if the corresponding

parts were not on schedule.49 Many contractors protested that this policy was

unfair because the fault lay as much with

Ordnance as with industry. In cases where

parts lists were not available at the time

of contract signing the manufacturer had

to hold off placing his orders for materials

and then later on found himself unable to

get prompt delivery. Frequent engineering

changes also upset original production

schedules and made it extremely difficult

to match spare parts with the proper

vehicles.50 Changes in priority ratings

added further complications. As a result,

rigid enforcement of the October directive

proved impossible. After lagging behind

throughout the winter of 1942-43, parts

47

 Memo, CofOrd to District Chiefs, 27 Jul 42,

sub: Spare Parts for Tanks and Combat Vehicles,

ASF Maint Div 451.9 Spare parts policy. See

also Teletype, Christmas to Col Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., Chief, Detroit Ord Dist, 16 Jul 42, copy

in OHF. 48

 Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell to K. T.

Keller, president, Chrysler Corp., 27 Jul 42,

OO 451.25/383331. 49

 Teletype, Campbell to District Chiefs, 5 Oct

42, quoted in Clifford and Alspaugh, op. cit.,

p. 84. See also Ord Fiscal Cir 162, 17 Oct 42,

par. 3. For General Campbell's comments on this

the following spring, see Rpt Conf Ord Dist

Chiefs, Detroit, 22 Apr 44, pp. 23-25, OHF. For

copies of Ordnance Procurement Circulars setting forth the new policy, see Spare Parts,

Procurement-Contractual Provisions by Capt M.

C. O'Neal, Legal Div, OCO, 1 May 45, OHF. 50

 Memo, David J. Long, Chief Spare Parts

Mfg Br, T-AC, for Col Milton E. Wilson, 14

Oct 42, sub: Spare Parts Sec Rpt. . . , copy in

OHF.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 311

production gradually improved as requirements for complete items were scaled

down, parts lists were revised downward,

and steady pressure for parts production

was maintained. But, in the words of one

Ordnance officer, "the results [were]

none too good."

 51

 All during 1943 and

into 1944 shortages of spare parts continued.52

A major change occurred in the summer

of 1944 when the War Department eliminated procurement of first-year or concurrent spare parts, except for new types of

equipment. With the Army well supplied,

the War Department reasoned that future

procurement would be needed chiefly to

replace initial issue materiel for which

stocks of spare parts had already been

created.53 All the technical services were

enjoined to keep a close watch on parts

procurement schedules to avoid either

overprocurement or short supply. The

practice of ordering parts in sets was

abandoned in favor of ordering by individual items. Each service was permitted to

order specific replenishment parts only as

the need for them was shown by stock

records and issue experience.54 As procurement of second-year spares had been

stopped in 1943, elimination of first-year

spares in 1944 put an end to the complicated pattern of parts procurement in

force early in the war period.

Senate Committee Investigation

In the summer of 1943 the Truman

Committee turned its attention to the Ordnance Department's handling of spare parts

and devoted a good deal of time to exploring all the complexities of the problem.

Hearings were held, reports were submitted, and numerous exhibits were introduced into the record. It is probably safe

to say that on no other phase of Ordnance

wartime procurement was so much effort

spent in collecting documentary material.

Intent upon ferreting out examples of

waste or mismanagement in the national

defense program, the Truman Committee

found Ordnance parts procurement an inviting field for investigation on several

counts. With roughly half a billion dollars

being spent annually for motor vehicle

parts, the opportunities for either waste or

economy were obviously substantial. Furthermore, in an industry as highly competitive as the automotive, the government had

to be constantly on the alert to safeguard

its own interests and to avoid charges of

favoritism toward any manufacturer or industrial group. Complaints had in fact

been made that Ordnance was favoring the

Big Three of the automotive industry by

purchasing parts for Chrysler, Ford, and

General Motors vehicles directly from those

concerns instead of from parts manufac51

 Memo, Wells for Chief, Ind Div, 2 May 44,

sub: Spare Parts Policy and Procedures, in folder

Spare Parts, ORDIR, T640-A. On revision of

parts lists, see Memo of Col Graeme K. Howard,

Director Parts and Supplies, for Chief, T-AC, 3

Jul 43, sub: Rpt for Week Ending 2 Jul 43, in

folder D-1 Wheeled Vehicles. See also O'Neal,

Spare Parts, Procurement-Contractual Provisions. 52

 (1) Remarks by Maj Gen Thomas Hayes,

Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, New York, 18 Jan 44,

pp. 2-5, OHF; (2) Notes for Spare Parts Mtg,

22 Feb 44, by Wells, in notebook marked Spare

Parts, ORDIR, T640-A; (3) Memo, Asst TIG

to Deputy CofS 12 May 44, sub: Memo, 1 Jan

44. . . , WD Spec Comm. 334, G-4. 53

 WD Cir 227, 7 Jun 44. See also WD Cir

434) 9 Nov 44, and O'Neal, Spare Parts, ProcContractual Provisions. 54

 For discussion of the new policy, see Memo,

CofOrd for CG ASF, 12 Dec 44, sub: Proc of

Spare Parts, and 1st Indorsement CG ASF to

CofOrd, 16 Dec 44, copy in OHF, and Memo,

CofOrd for Hayes and Hatcher, 16 Dec 44, same

sub, copy in OHF. The legal consequences of the

new method are treated in Spare Parts Procurement-Contractual Provisions.
312 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

turers who were willing to quote lower

prices on identical items. Ordnance was

charged with refusing to buy directly from

the concerns that manufactured certain

parts while willingly purchasing the same

parts from vehicle manufacturers who

bought the parts from the original producers—adding their handling charges to

the price paid by the government.55 It

was also alleged that Ordnance was wasting millions of dollars by procuring too

many parts of one kind and not enough of

another. In particular, critics charged that

the supply of small, fast-moving parts like

spark plugs and distributor points was

below actual requirements while the stock

on hand of heavy, bulky replacements like

axles and transmissions was too great. All

told, the Truman investigation touched

upon nearly every facet of the complex

problem of spare parts procurement and

distribution.

The committee questioned most intensively whether Ordnance should buy

parts from the vehicle manufacturer or

the parts manufacturer. The chief complaint was that purchase of parts from

vehicle manufacturers was not the most

direct or most economical method of procurement. Ordnance had always bought

most of its spare parts from vehicle manufacturers and stoutly defended that policy.

There were exceptions, of course. With

track-laying vehicles Ordnance had arranged for a number of facilities before the

war to produce specially designed components such as armor plate, transmissions,

and track rollers, and when war came

Ordnance naturally purchased spare parts

directly from these facilities rather than

from the tank assemblers.56 With general

purpose vehicles, whose components were

of commercial design, the most natural

method was to procure parts from the

vehicle manufacturer, for he carried a

complete line of parts and guaranteed

their quality. That was the practice of the

QMC until the summer of 1942 when the

policy of procuring replenishment parts directly from parts makers was tried for a

short time.57

Precise definition of certain terms is essential to an understanding of the controversy. Spare parts fell naturally into three

classes. Parts peculiar were those that fitted

only one make of vehicle and could not be

used in any other. Parts interchangeable

could be used successfully in two or more

makes but would not necessarily fit other

types. Parts common, sometimes called

standard parts, were such items as batteries, tires, tubes, brake lining, or spark

plugs that came in various sizes to fit a

wide range of vehicles regardless of their

make or model.58 On parts peculiar there

was no argument: they could be purchased

only from the vehicle manufacturer. Nor

55

 As an illustration, see remarks by Senator

Homer K. Ferguson, Congressional Record, vol.

89, pt. 8, 15 Dec 43, pp. 10685-86. These remarks should be read in the light of Memo,

Amberg for USW, 17 Dec 43, sub: Senator Ferguson's Statement. . . , copy in Lane, Spare Parts

Notebook. 56

 (1) Memo, Duffy, OCO, for CG ASF, 27

Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc Policy, OO 451.017

8190; (2) Memo, Raaen for Chief, Purchase Div

ASF, 27 Dec 43, sub: Request for Info. . . ,

Truman Comm., OO 451.01/7853. 57

 Memo, Raaen for Amberg, 4 Jan 44, sub:

Senate Investigation, OO 032/383. For an earlier

discussion of QMC policy, see Memo, Barzynski,

OQMG, for CO Holabird QM Depot, 30 Oct 40,

sub: Purchase of Assemblies and Parts for Motor

Vehicles QM 451.01 M-FO (Holabird) directing

purchase from parts makers, and 1st Indorsement

by Lt Col Van Ness Ingram opposing the move.

On 7 March 1941 Colonel Ingram wrote a lengthy

memo to The Commanding Officer (apparently

of Holabird) on the same subject, copy in OHF. 58

 For a detailed explanation of these terms, see

Clifford's Memo for file, 12 Sep 44, sub: Explanation of Variations from Proc Policy. . . , P4337,

copy in OHF.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 313

was there much disagreement on parts

common, for Ordnance usually purchased

such parts from parts manufacturers. It

was on parts interchangeable that the

argument turned, with the Senate committee favoring purchase directly from

parts makers and Ordnance defending its

practice of buying from vehicle manufacturers.59

 But the situation was never static

for long and by the winter of 1943-44

Ordnance was moving toward procurement of replenishment spares from the

parts makers, meanwhile continuing to

buy first-year spares from the vehicle

manufacturers.60

One of the most telling arguments used

by Ordnance officers in defending the

policy of buying from vehicle producers

was that purchase from hundreds of parts

manufacturers would demand a large staff

to negotiate and administer contracts. Vehicle manufacturers such as General

Motors had experienced specialists to handle the job of placing orders for parts

with hundreds of subcontractors, scheduling and expediting production, and finally

inspecting the finished product, but Ordnance did not.61

 Had Ordnance attempted

to bypass these firms and purchase directly

from several thousand parts producers, it

would have been faced with the virtually

insuperable task of recruiting, in the midst

of the wartime shortage of manpower, a

staff of parts experts. "A government procurement colossus composed largely of

inexperienced personnel," one official

dubbed it.62 In addition, the administrative cost of placing and following up thousands of parts contracts with many small

concerns would have been great, as would

the task of co-ordinating countless engineering changes between the vehicle

makers and the parts makers. Employment

of hundreds of additional inspectors would

have been required at a time when Ordnance was barely able to recruit enough

inspectors for its established needs. The

result might well have been higher cost to

the government, and perhaps slower procurement of critically needed items, or

failure to keep up with engineering changes

made by the vehicle manufacturer.63 This

59

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for Chief, Purchase Div

ASF, 27 Dec 43, sub: Request for Info. . . ,

Truman Comm., OO 451.01/7853, copy in Lane,

Spare Parts Notebook; (2) Memo, Raaen for

Amberg, 4 Jan 44, sub: Senate Investigation, OO

032/383, copy in Lane, Spare Parts Notebook;

(3) OQMG Admin Order No. 51, 4 Jul 42, copy

in OHF; (4) Draft of statement prepared for use

of Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay at proposed Mead

Comm., Hearings on Automotive. Spare Parts in

September 1944, folder 334 in D56-347, OCO-D,

Field Serv Opns. 60

 Memo, Raaen, OCO, for CG ASF, 21 Jan

44, sub: Purchase of Replacement Parts. . . ,

OO 451.01/7977. 61

 See Brief for Processing and Development of

Concurrent and Replacement Spare Parts Orders

Received from Government Procurement Agencies

by Chevrolet Motor Div, GMC, Incl to Ltr, E.

W. Ivey, Chevrolet, to Maj Robert Bruce, OCOD, 16 Jun 44, copy in OHF. 62

 Unsigned, incomplete draft of Memo from

OCO-D to CofOrd, 28 Mar 44, sub: Specific

Info . . . for the Truman Comm. . . , in folder

marked Purchase Policy, V, P4337. Similar views

appear in Memo, Brig Gen Gordon Wells for

Amberg, 25 Apr 44, sub: Specific Info . . . , in

Lane, Spare Parts Notebook. 63

 (1) Statement by Boatwright, 29 Nov 44,

Hearings, Mead Comm., pt. 26, pp. 11,927-28;

(2) Memo, Col Phillips Smith, Deputy Director

ASF Purchases Div for Browning, Director ASF

Purchases Div, 5 Apr 44, sub: Proc of Standard

Motor Vehicle Spare Parts, copy in folder Whom

Do We Buy From?; (3) Memo, CofOrd for

Amberg, Spec Asst to SW, 25 Apr 44, sub:

Specific Info Requested by ... Truman Comm.,

in Lane, Spare Parts Notebook; (4) Clifford and

Alspaugh, op. cit., pp. 69-70; (5) Ltr, Brig Gen

Alfred Quinton, Chief Detroit Ord Dist, to

CofOrd, 16 Nov 44, sub: Practicability of Purchasing. . . , P4337. See also Memo, Duffy, OCO

for CG ASF, 27 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc

Policy, OO 451.01/8190, Memo, Maj Rex

Howard, OCO-D for Col Phillips Smith, ASF,

8 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc Policy, T617;

Memo, Col Emerson Cummings for Maj Rex
314 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

was the conclusion of all Army representatives who studied the matter, and also of

a leading industrialist, Arthur G. Drefs,

president of McQuay-Norris Manufacturing Company, who reviewed the whole

parts procurement process in Ordnance at

General Campbell's request. Although offering certain specific criticisms, and urging more direct purchase from parts manufacturers, Mr. Drefs' report in July 1944

stated that the parts industry as a whole

endorsed existing Ordnance procedures

and concluded that, in the time available

to it in 1942-43, Ordnance "could not

have recruited an organization which could

have handled the job with the same effectiveness and at the same cost."

 64

But the picture was neither all black nor

all white. On some parts interchangeable

it was entirely feasible for Ordnance to

purchase directly from the parts manufacturer. A leading example was the carburetor. Three companies dominated the field

—Bendix, Carter, and Zenith—and the

Senate committee counsel, Mr. Meader,

successfully argued that Ordnance could

purchase replenishment carburetors directly from these concerns with no more

trouble, perhaps with less, that it could

buy the same items from about twenty

truck manufacturers. Direct purchase

from the parts manufacturer whenever

feasible became the established Ordnance

policy during the last year of the war.65

But in many cases direct procurement was

not feasible because the parts manufacturers lacked staffs for handling government business, had no facilities for overseas

packaging, preferred to deal with vehicle

manufacturers, or positively refused to do

business directly with the government.66

The Senate committee correctly maintained that, in principle, direct purchasing

was better than indirect. It reduced handling and transportation costs, eliminated

the middleman's mark-up, and simplified

the procurement process. Purchasing of an

interchangeable part from the vehicle manufacturer instead of from the parts manufacturer constituted what the committee

termed "a kink in the pipe line of supply."

 67

 But it was a kink that could not be

avoided at the start of the war and could

be untangled only very slowly as time

went on. The war ended long before the

policy of purchasing directly from parts

makers was put fully into effect.

As U.S. Army units moved into overseas

bases, reports trickled back to Ordnance

that supplies of spare parts were inadeHoward, 2 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts. . . , copy

in OHF; and Memo, Clifford for Col Olaf P.

Winningstad, OCO-D, 11 Sep 44, sub: Problems

Involved in Direct Purchase of Parts. . . , copy

in OHF.

64

 Ltr, Arthur G. Drefs to Maj Gen Levin

Campbell, 27 Jul 44, in folder, Purchase Policy,

V, P4337- See also Ltr, T. R. Lippard, president

Federal Motor Truck Co., to Maj Robert Bruce,

OCO-D, 21 Jun 44, copy in OHF. General

Campbell's defense of the Ordnance policy appears in Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance

Team, Chapter 22. Memos commenting on the

Drefs report are in folder, Replenishment, P4338. 65

 (1) Mead Comm., Hearings, pt. 26, 20 Nov

44, pp. 11,924-67; (2) Memo, Duffy, OCO, to

CG ASF, 27 Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc

Policy, OO 451.01/8190. 66

 (1) Memo, Col Phillips Smith for Browning,

5 Apr 44, sub: Proc of Standard Motor Vehicle

Spare Parts, copy in folder Whom Do We Buy

From?; (2) An Historical Brochure Presenting

a Summary of the Activities of the EngineeringManufacturing Division, OCO-D, 1 Nov 45,

P4332; (3) Hearing Before a Sub-committee

. . . , S., held at Detroit, Mich., 29 Dec 43, in

OCO-D Spare Parts History, Project No. 54, vol.

43, P4336. 67

 Hearings, Mead Comm., 78th Cong., 2d

sess., Rpt No. 10, pt. 20, p. 176, 19 Dec 44.
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 315

quate and that vehicles were deadlined

for long periods awaiting repairs. Typical

of the reports that came through is the

following excerpt from a personal letter

written by Col. Ward E. Becker:

Our chief headache continues to be shortage of fast moving maintenance parts, especially those for wheeled vehicles. . . . Our

vehicles have received torturous treatment.

... In general, a 2-1/2-ton truck engine

requires 4th echelon rebuild in 10,000 miles,

due largely to the lack of parts with which

to properly take care of 2nd and 3rd echelon

maintenance. Another reason, however, is

lack of maintenance discipline. . . . We have

rear axles for GMC trucks "running out of

our ears" but zero stocks of point sets, main

bearing kits, carburetor repair kits, overhaul

gasket sets, spark plugs, oil filters, etc. . . .

In many units from 50-75% of the vehicles

require . . . repairs which cannot be made

due to lack of parts.

Pardon my lengthy cry on your shoulder.

If you could see our pathetic array of deadlined trucks, I really believe that you would

feel that my official tears are justified.68

The reasons for these conditions were

many. Faulty calculation of requirements,

early neglect of spare parts, bottlenecks in

the distribution system, ship sinkings, unforeseen conditions overseas—all these entered the picture. A spectacular example

of the loss of spare parts occurred during

the Italian campaign when the SS William

W. Gherard sank off the coast near Salerno

with more than two hundred long tons of

spare parts aboard.69 At the outset, parts

requirements had been estimated hurriedly

without benefit of extensive combat experience. Priority was given to complete

vehicles, and the tendency, particularly

with transport vehicles, was to neglect

spare parts. Storage and distribution overseas under primitive conditions added further complications. Parts actually on hand

at overseas bases were sometimes as good

as lost because they were not properly

identified by name or number.70 Unusual

conditions at overseas bases—whether fine

sand or volcanic dust that got into oil

filters and bearings, fungus that covered

electrical equipment, or land mines that

broke front axles—caused excessive damage to specific parts.71

 An amusing example was reported to Ordnance by a

civilian field investigator who declared

that French native troops in North Africa

were so imbued with the thought that

water was not fit to drink, and so indoctrinated with the importance of good care

for their vehicles, that they poured wine

into their batteries.72 Under such circumstances, parts mortality tables were meaningless.

The problem was unpredictable and

was never "solved" to the extent that it

ceased to be a problem, but some improvement resulted from a new system of overseas packaging adopted in the spring of

1943. At the start of the war, first-year

parts were boxed in quantities sufficient to

supply one hundred trucks or twenty-five

tanks. Each set or quarter set contained

a complete line of parts and was suitable

for initial supply of a depot or for lend68

 Ltr, Becker to Col William Borden, OCO, 1

Aug 43, copy in OHF. See also Memo, Maj

Donald C. Pippel to CG, T-AC, 13 Oct 43, sub:

Rpt of Travel to NATO. . . , copy in OHF. 69

 Lida Mayo, Ordnance Overseas. 70

 For discussion of "the numbers racket," see

below, Chapter XIX. 71

 For other examples, see par. 10 of Memo,

Raaen for Amberg, 25 Jul 44, sub: . . . Truman

Comm. Ltr. . . , OHF. 72

 This story was told by W. E. Burnett of

GMC to Maj Samuel C. Pace, OCO-D, 12 Jan

44. See 4-page report entitled Verification of

Statements Made in Ordnance Spare Parts in

Mechanized Warfare, and Ltr, Burnett to OCO

-D, attn Maj A. E. Hadlock, 21 Sep 44. Both

in folder marked Cost of Spare Parts, P4338.
316 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

lease shipments of hundreds of vehicles.

But the system soon proved too inflexible

for everyday use and had to be abandoned. As Colonel Becker's letter reveals, a

depot might quickly use up all its fastmoving high-mortality parts like points

and spark plugs, and have left over a

surplus of little-used parts, like axles.

When it ordered additional supplies they

came in full sets, including duplicates of

all the unneeded slow-moving parts.73

To correct this condition the so-called

cycle pack was adopted. The essence of the

new procedure was to pack parts in the

smallest practical quantity that would

meet the needs of the lowest echelon of

supply. Each box contained only one type

of part, was clearly labeled on the outside,

and weighed no more than seventy

pounds.74 Under this system depots could

requisition only those parts they actually

needed, and could issue them in small,

usable quantities.

After July 1943 all parts were preserved,

packed, and boxed for export, generally at

the point of manufacture. There was criticism of this policy by the Senate Committee on the ground that some of these

elaborately packaged items were consumed

in the United States. Ordnance answered

this charge by reporting that the percentage of parts destined for overseas use was

great, and rising all the time, and no one

could tell in advance which parts would go

overseas and which would stay at home. It

was considered more economical to pack

all parts for export, even if some never

went overseas, than to attempt operation

and scheduling of dual packaging lines.75

Compilation of a 20-volume index of

interchangeability data brought some improvement in parts supply. During 1943,

OCO-D devoted countless manhours to

the tedious job of listing all types of automotive parts by number with cross

references to all other parts that were interchangeable.76

 Much of the information

on interchangeability came from parts

manufacturers who sold to many different

vehicle manufacturers, and from the Automotive Council for War Production. With

this index, Ordnance depots could quickly

determine which parts of different makes of

cars or trucks were actually identical. This

information increased the usefulness of

each part in the supply system and improved service to maintenance companies

in the field. But it was so cumbersome

and complicated that in some instances it

"reposed on the shelves of organizations

throughout the war with very little

use."

 77

 When coupled with constant engineering efforts to standardize parts, the

interchangeability index, with all its defects, proved to be an effective means of

attacking the parts supply problem and

73

 This system was criticized by Phillip W.

Copelin after his trip overseas. See Memo, Raaen

for Amberg, 26 May 44, sub: Packaging . . .

Spare Parts, copy in Lane, Spare Parts Notebook. 74

 (1) Memo, Col Graeme K. Howard, Director Parts and Supplies, for Chief, T-AC, 3 Jul

43, sub: Rpt of Director, Parts and Supplies

. . . D-1 Wheeled Vehicles; (2) Clifford and

Norman, Proposed Statement on Proc of Spare

Parts, Aug 44, pp. 31-32; (3) Clifford and

Alspaugh, op. cit., pp. 20-24. 75

 (1) Ltr, Boatwright to Senator Ferguson, 6

Jul 44, sub: Visit by Senator Ferguson. . . ,

copy in Lane, Spare Parts Notebook; (2) Memo,

Raaen for Amberg, 14 Jul 44, sub: Packaging of

Automotive Spare Parts, Lane, Spare Parts Notebook; (3) Clifford, and Alspaugh, op. cit., pp.

20-24. 76

 Memo, Col Herbert White for CofOrd, 23

Aug 44, sub: Rpt ... by Drefs, T617, ORDGL.

The index was published in two l0-volume

series designated ORD 15-1 and ORD 15-2. 77

 1st Indorsement, CG Sixth Army to TAG, 8

Jun 48, on DA Ltr, 6 Apr 48, AGAM-PM 451.9

(30 Mar 48).
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 317

CHART 2—SPARE PARTS BUYING FOR TANK COMBAT AND MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES,

1940-1945 a

Total War Spare Parts Expenditure, $3,796,450,587

a

 The transfer of the Motor Transport Service From Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department in 1942 made an uneven break in certain accounts at a time when continued action was more important than accounting details. Records of expenditures were not kept separately for several of these years and accordingly

the above annual allocations are strictly in the nature of estimates which we believe, however, are fairly accurate reflections of actual spare parts expenditures.

Source: Record of U.S. Army Ordnance Combat and Motor Vehicle Spare Parts Policies and Operations from 1940 to 1945, by OCO-D, Nov 45, copy in OHF. Compiled under direction of Lt. Col. Daniel J. Clifford and Maj. R. O. Alspaugh.

earned for Ordnance words of praise from

the Mead Committee in December 1944.

 78

Ordnance officers derived some consolation from the fact that they were not alone

in finding spare parts supply a persistent

problem. When General Somervell attended an Ordnance conference in Detroit

in 1944, he offered the following comments

on spare parts:

I don't want you to think for a minute this

is something that applies only to Ordnance.

It is equally applicable to all the other

services. We had a terrible time . . . with

spare parts for kitchen ranges in QMC. We

had a terrible time with spare parts in radio

equipment. We are having perhaps the worst

situation of all in the Engineers with respect

to spare parts for construction equipment

and tractors.79

Nevertheless, reports that parts were not

available when needed made Ordnance

officers feel they were failing in their mission to support combat troops. At first

they found reports of parts shortages overseas incredible in view of the enormous

quantities procured. In the single year of

1943 Ordnance spent $1,364,750,000 on

vehicle parts procurement, both concurrent and replenishment, or more than $100

million worth of parts each month. (Chart

78

 S. Report No. 10, pt. 20, Mead Comm., 78th

Cong., 2d sess., 19 Dec 44, p. 169. See also below,

Ch. XIX, and Memo, Col Phillips Smith for

Browning, 5 Apr 44, sub: Proc of Standard Motor

Vehicle Spare Parts, copy in folder Whom Do We

Buy From? 79

 Rpt Conf Ord Dist Chiefs, Detroit, 22 Apr

44, pp. 24-25.
318 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

2) This represented roughly 27 percent of

the $5 billion spent that year on the

whole combat and transport vehicles program.80

 Yet parts deliveries were frequently behind schedule, and vehicles

were often delivered with some of their

tools or spare parts missing. For trucks

or tanks at bases in the United States, the

problem was usually not serious. But for

units in overseas theaters the lack of certain parts or tools could sometimes not be

made good for months. Shipping space was

at a premium, and supply routes, particularly in the Pacific area, were long and

slow. Although reports from overseas

struck a more optimistic note in 1944,

 81

at the end of the war Ordnance officers

were convinced that improved supply of

parts to permit more effective field maintenance was one of the Army's most pressing

needs.82

The spare parts problem is a striking

example of the Army's failure to profit

fully from its own experience. World War

II saw a repetition, with variations and on

a much grander scale, of the same type of

maintenance failures that plagued the AEF

in 1917-18. Indeed, as one historian has

remarked, "Turn your field glasses on

World War II and you will be looking at

the Mexican Punitive Expedition insofar

as vehicle maintenance is concerned."

 83

There was the same multiplicity of makes

and models, the same difficulty with parts

supply and field maintenance, and the

same encounter with rough terrain and

severe climatic conditions.

Had the Army in the 1930's standardized its truck fleet along the lines suggested

by World War I experience, the number

of different makes and models in World

War II would have been held to a minimum and interchangeability of parts

greatly increased. But the fleet was not

standardized, and in World War II there

were actually more different types of vehicles in service than in World War I—

about 330 as compared to 216. Standing

alone, these figures are somewhat misleading. A few widely used types such as the

jeep, the21⁄2-ton , and the 2-1/2-ton

cargo truck accounted for the bulk of all

World War II transport vehicles, so the

situation in 1945 represented a considerable advance over 1918. The number of

different parts needed for tank-automotive

maintenance was considerably less than in

the earlier conflict—some 260,000 as compared to about 445,000 in 1917-18.

Nevertheless, procurement and distribution

of such a vast array of items to meet

virtually unpredictable demands from all

parts of the world imposed a heavy burden

on both industry and Ordnance.

Some automobile manufacturers, observing the Army's struggle to supply spare

parts to its troops overseas, recommended

abandonment of all combat zone maintenance except organizational upkeep. They

contended that it would be easier for industry and cheaper for the Army to supply

80

 (1) Memo, Duffy, OCO, for CG ASF, 27

Mar 44, sub: Spare Parts Proc Policy, OO 451.-

01/8190; (2) Memo, Col Emerson Cummings,

OCO-D for Maj Rex Howard, 8 Mar 44, same

sub, copy in OHF. 81

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen John W. Coffey, Ord

Officer, Hq SOS, NATOUSA, to CofOrd, 24 Jun 44; (2) Memo, Brig Gen Stewart E. Reimel for

CofOrd, 30 Jun 44, sub: Automotive Spare Parts;

(3) Memo, Raaen for Amberg, Spec Asst to SW,

10 Jul 44, sub: Overseas Rpts on Automotive

Parts Supply. All in folder Automotive Parts Supply Situation in Combat Areas. . . , T615. Reference 3 summarizes findings and reports from

many sources. 82

 See below, Chapter XXII, for further discussion of field maintenance and supply. 83

 Quoted by Wilfred G. Burgan in The Spare

Parts Problem and a Plan, Incl to DA Ltr, 6 Apr

48, AGAM-PM 451.9 (30 Mar 48).
SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES 319

new vehicles instead of repairing those

that were worn out or damaged.84 After

the war a modified version of this recommendation was developed by an Army

civilian maintenance specialist with long

experience with military vehicles. At a Supply Group Staff Conference in March

1948, Wilfred G. Burgan asserted that 15

percent of the different types of spare parts

issued during World War II had met

approximately 85 percent of all combat

zone maintenance needs.85 He therefore

proposed that the Army cease its effort to

repair all damaged or worn vehicles and

concentrate on those that could be readily

repaired in the field with a limited variety

of parts. The others might never be repaired at all or might be torn down to

yield special parts not normally issued.

Although superficially attractive as a

means of quickly solving the parts problem, the Burgan plan met with little favor

among Ordnance officers with overseas

maintenance experience. They felt that

its major premise—that modern warfare

precludes higher echelon maintenance in

combat zones—was contrary to their experience.86

 In World War II, they declared, the tendency was all the other way,

toward requiring lower echelons to perform

higher echelon repairs. They asserted that

in both the European and Mediterranean

theaters higher echelon maintenance was

carried on in the field even under fluid tactical conditions. For the acknowledged

difficulties encountered in the process they

saw no simple or easy solution. Better

tables of parts mortality, further standardization of designs, and more complete records of interchangeable parts were all

recommended. Patient accumulation of

experience data and constant pressure

toward standardized components appeared

to offer the best prospects for future attacks on this knotty problem.

84

 Ibid. 85

 Ibid. 86

 1st Indorsement, Hq Sixth Army to TAG, 8

Jun 48, on basic DA Ltr, 6 Apr 48, AGAM-PM

451.9 (30 Mar 48). This indorsement was based

on the experience of the Sixth Army Ordnance

officer, who had been chief of Ordnance mainte- nance in the ETO.
CHAPTER XIV

Inspection and Statistical Quality Control

Inspection of Ordnance materiel in

World War II appears at first glance to

have been a fairly cut-and-dried affair.

Weapons, rounds of ammunition, and vehicles produced by industry were accepted

if they conformed to drawings and

specifications, and rejected if they failed

to conform. The casual observer assumed

that the inspector had merely to examine

each item to discover obvious surface defects, make specific measurements, and

perhaps check on the weight or other

physical characteristics of the item. But

Ordnance inspection in World War II was

far more complicated than this description

suggests. Though some inspection was

routine in nature, much of it was complex, difficult, and troublesome. Few Ordnance functions raised as many problems

as did inspection; few were as important

to the safety and welfare of troops in the

field.

Ordnance inspection differed from

standard commercial inspection chiefly

because of the use to which Ordnance

materiel was put. Drawings and specifications for guns and ammunition called

for closer tolerances than most commercial

work, for a weapon that exploded or

failed to fire in an emergency might cause

loss of life among American troops, result

in a tactical setback, and have a bad

effect on the morale of troops. Yet all

inspection standards had to be geared to

industry's ability to manufacture materiel

in quantity to close tolerances. Of necessity, they represented a compromise between the ideal and the practical.1

Each class of Ordnance materiel had

its own inspection procedures and requirements. Rifles and machine guns were

visually inspected, measured with a variety

of instruments, and then given the test of

actual firing at a small range near the

plant. Spare parts for small arms were inspected 100 percent for conformance to

specifications. Tanks, trucks, and artillery

pieces could be visually inspected, measured, and put through their paces at a

proving ground. Inspection of fire control

instruments, particularly optical elements,

called for special techniques because of

the great precision required in their assembly. Ammunition, because of its explosive nature, was in a class by itself.

There were many weighing and measuring

tests for ammunition, but the only sure

way to find out whether a round would

function properly was to fire it and thus

destroy it. Small arms ammunition required test firing of small samples from

each lot, usually at a range near the

plant; samples of artillery ammunition

were test fired at one of the Ordnance

proving grounds.

1

 For discussion of this theme, see Col. Chester

Mueller, The New York Ordnance District in

World War II, Chapter 12.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 321

The broad heading of inspection embraced several different types of activity.

"Surveillance" inspection was applied to

materiel in storage, such as ammunition,

that was subject to deterioration with the

passage of time. "In-process" inspection

was applied at various stages along the

production line to check on processes; it

was normally the function of the contractor, not of Ordnance. Another type,

known as "screening" inspection, permitted acceptable items to go through and

culled out the nonacceptable. Ordnance

sometimes applied screening inspection to

critical items but this type of inspection

was normally the function of the contractor. Ordnance inspectors concerned themselves primarily with "acceptance" inspection, the final acceptance or rejection of

materiel offered by the contractor in

fulfillment of his contract. But acceptance

inspection sometimes called for inspection

of materiel during manufacture, before

final assembly. Certain gears of a transmission, for example, had to be inspected

before the transmission was assembled and

placed in a vehicle. This type was really

acceptance inspection but was occasionally

referred to as "in-process" inspection.2

In theory, every piece of ordnance could

easily be classed as acceptable or not acceptable by determining whether or not it

conformed to drawings and specifications.

But inspectors encountered all sorts of

borderline cases that called for close study

by engineers before final acceptance or

rejection. Good judgment had to be mixed

with engineering knowledge, familiarity

with production processes, and an understanding of the functioning of the end

item. No production line could turn out

quantities of absolutely identical and acceptable items; there was always some

variation, though it might amount to only

one thousandth of an inch. Permissible

variations shown on Ordnance drawings

and specifications in the form of "tolerances" were usually on the conservative

side. From experience and training, Ordnance inspectors knew that materiel that

deviated from the tolerances set forth in

the drawings and specifications might

function perfectly—or might fail at a

critical moment. Ordnance did not wish to

reject serviceable materiel on the narrowly legalistic ground that it did not

conform to the letter of the requirements;

nor did it wish to take too liberal a view

and run the risk of accepting materiel

that might prove unserviceable, perhaps

even dangerous, when issued to troops.

Writing about this problem as it concerned artillery ammunition, one inspection specialist summed the matter up as

follows:

Conformance to a design implies that

there exist arbitrary limits to variations in

dimensions, in finishes, in materials, and so

on. This is true, in a legal sense, since

drawings and specifications prescribe such

limits. From an engineering point of view,

however, there generally do not exist sharp

boundaries between good and bad. For most

dimensions, and for most other prescribed

properties, an increase in variation means

either a decrease in effectiveness of the ammunition or an increase in probability of obtaining a malfunction. In most cases, the

effect on functioning is very gradual, so that

a very considerable variation may exist before the results become apparent in the small

sample subjected to proving ground test.3

Once materiel passed inspection it was

marked with the Ordnance escutcheon,

commonly referred to as "the crossed

cannon and bomb in circle," using a sten2

 Types of inspection are described in ASF

M608 Inspection Manual. 3

 PSP 13, Jun 45, vol. I, ch. 6.
322 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

cil, stamp, seal, or tag. For some classes of

items, identifying lot numbers or serial

numbers served as evidence of inspection.

When an inspector gave materiel only

provisional acceptance he marked it with

the Ordnance insigne, the flaming bomb.

Artillery weapons that underwent proof

testing were marked with the letters

"P.A." (for small arms, "P" or a prick

punch mark) followed by the initials of

the proving ground. Materiel that failed

to pass inspection was marked with a

stamp, die, red rejection seal, or tag consisting of a large "X" in a circle with the

words "Ordnance Rejected." All such matériel was carefully segregated to prevent

its entering the production line until reworked to meet Ordnance standards, or

until the Office Chief of Ordnance granted

a waiver for it or decided to scrap it.

Ordnance did not inspect everything

that it procured from industry. In some

instances it accepted products on the

strength of a contractor's certificate that

they met the specifications. The contracting officer might accept such certificates in

lieu of inspection when, for example, the

product was a standard commercial item

and past performance of the contractor

had been particularly good. Certification

not only helped to conserve inspection

manpower but also promoted mutual respect and understanding between industry

and the Ordnance Department.

Inspection Manuals

During the 1920's and early 1930's the

Ordnance Department procured so little

materiel that inspection was not a major

problem. Practically every item that came

off the production line was painstakingly

examined, measured, and weighed. Each

arsenal provided inspection service on materiel that fell within its domain; each had

on its staff inspectors with long experience

in their work. As early as 1922 the Chief of

Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams, had recommended that the arsenals

keep alive the art of inspection and be

prepared to train inspectors in a future

emergency when the districts would take

over responsibility for inspection as part of

their procurement function. As one of its

preparedness activities, Ordnance in 1935

drafted a General Inspection Manual and

circulated it to all the arsenals and district

offices, followed three years later by a

revised edition and by manuals on specific

classes of materiel.

The 1938 manual continued to serve as

the basic general guide for Ordnance inspection until 1945. One of the most important principles it set forth was that inprocess inspection was the contractor's

responsibility and that Ordnance inspectors should, wherever possible, be limited

to inspection of end items. The manual

set high standards of conduct for Ordnance inspectors because they were the

personal representatives of the Ordnance

Department in dealing with industry. In

the eyes of workers in the plants, inspectors were "the government." "It is the

desire of the Ordnance Department," the

manual stated, "to have its inspectors

. . . respected for their integrity, ability,

impartiality, tact, thoroughness, and

prompt and business-like methods of conducting inspections." Because they were

Usually the only government representatives in plants, inspectors were often called

upon to perform many services not related to inspection, such as looking after

government equipment in the plant or

helping to solve production problems.

A few inspection manuals for specific

items such as artillery shells and cartridge
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 323

cases were in use. They described the

items, told how they were manufactured,

and listed possible defects that the inspector was to look for. Defects were sometimes classed as critical, major, or minor,

depending upon their importance to the

proper functioning of the item. For some

critical characteristics the manuals required 100 percent inspection; for others

they stated that inspection of a certain

percentage of items would be sufficient. As

a rule, the manuals provided that the percentage of items inspected could be reduced if quality remained consistently

high. Thus, during this early period, Ordnance was applying some of the basic

principles of statistical quality control by

using sampling techniques, classifying defects according to their importance, and

gearing inspection to known quality level.

for inspectors usually went to contractors'

plants to inspect materiel before it was

packed for shipment. Stretching meager

district funds to pay for travel of inspectors

caused many headaches for district executive officers during the 1938-40 period.

Later, when contractors achieved steady

output on regular production orders, the

districts assigned one or more inspectors to

each plant on a full-time basis.

As the inspection work load mounted

during 1938 and 1939 the districts appealed to the arsenals for help in supplying

qualified inspectors. Nearly every district

obtained one or two arsenal inspectors, but

the arsenal commanders, faced with

mounting work loads of their own, were

reluctant to release more. The other

source of supply, recruitment through

Civil Service, gradually dried up as industry absorbed more and more workers at

rates of pay higher than those offered inspectors under Civil Service.5

 At times

the districts experienced exasperating delays, some stemming from pure red tape,

in obtaining approval by the Civil Service Commission and the Chief of Ordnance

of employees hired as inspectors.6 To help

meet such problems, the qualifications for

inspectors were lowered, civilian schools

were encouraged to offer courses in

inspection techniques, and in June 1940

the Chief of Ordnance directed each district to send several of its most promising

inspectors to one or another of the arsenals

Recruiting and Training Inspectors

The Educational Orders Act of 1938

marked the revival of inspection activities

in the district offices. Though the Chief

of Ordnance retained in his hands close

control over all educational orders, he delegated to the districts responsibility for

inspecting the final product. The Boston

district hired its first inspector in June

1938 and assigned him the task of bringing

up-to-date the district's file of specifications and drawings. He also inspected

whatever materiel was procured and, as

time permitted, made plant surveys.4

Other districts followed suit and most were

able to recruit competent men to handle

inspection of the small quantities of materiel procured under educational orders.

Most districts, in fact, hired more inspectors than they needed at the start. The

work called for a good deal of traveling,

4

 Hist, Boston Ord Dist, 1922-42, I, pp. 32-33.

This history describes in some detail the gradual

development of inspection activities in 1938-40. 5

 Inspection, a student comm, rpt, p. 25, 2 Apr

48, ICAF, SR 48-48, OHF. 6

 Hist, Pittsburgh Ord Dist. I, pt.2, pp. 175-83.

This is an excellent detailed account of the Pittsburgh experience in recruiting and training

inspectors.
324 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

for a 6 weeks' training course.7 Each arsenal instructed the trainees assigned to it

on the items it normally produced, and

repeated the courses as new groups of

trainees arrived. Meanwhile each district

assigned a few of its reserve officers to inspection work. Some took inactive duty

training in inspection methods; others

spent their terms of active duty in manufacturing plants observing the work of

resident inspectors.

The districts were not altogether satisfied with the training their inspectors received at the arsenals. Some of the arsenals

gave excellent instruction; others merely

turned the students loose in the shops to

learn what they could.8 The main complaint was that the arsenals encouraged inspectors to use their own judgment in

dealing with borderline cases. The districts

felt that uniformity of inspection could

never be achieved if inspectors were permitted to use their own judgment in accepting materiel that did not comply with

specifications and drawings. District officials wished inspection standards to be as

uniform as possible so that no contractor

could complain that his products were

rejected while similar products submitted

by a competitor were accepted. The districts were keenly aware of the fact that

most of their inspectors had too little experience to be counted on for exercise of

good judgment on engineering problems.

During 1941 many of the Ordnance districts arranged with local schools or colleges to offer prospective inspectors training in elementary mathematics, physics,

blueprint reading, mechanical drawing,

machine shop practice, and the use of

measuring instruments. During their time

of study in these courses the trainees held

the rank of Under Inspector, CAF-2, received a salary of $1440 per year, and

upon graduation became Junior Inspectors, CAF-3, earning $1620 per year.

Trainees received pay during their schooling, because experience had shown that

most of those who attended courses without pay took jobs in industry instead of

working for Ordnance.

In spite of low salaries and other problems, the districts managed to recruit inspectors rapidly during the defense period.

In New York, for example, the number of

civilian inspectors jumped from 5 at the

end of 1939 to 492 in December 1941; in

the latter month the district had 54 reserve

officers on active duty and had under inspection roughly 800 prime contracts and

1,000 subcontracts.9 At the end of 1941,

inspectors accounted for about threefourths of all civilians employed in each

district. Most were in the lower Civil

Service brackets; only a few were as high

as CAF-9. Though they were technicians

and should have been considered as Wage

Board or subprofessional personnel, nearly

all had CAF (clerical, administrative, and

fiscal) ratings. As selective service took

more men, women were hired to replace

them. The turnover among inspectors was

appalling. "If it were possible to secure

higher grade inspectors," the Philadelphia

Ordnance District reported, "it would be

possible to handle the work with less

personnel. This would lead to higher

average standards and fewer rejections.

7

 Ltr, CofOrd to Ord districts, 24 Jun 40, sub:

Training Courses, OO 381/38900 New York Ord

Dist. See also pertinent chapters of histories of

the districts in OHF, particularly History of New

York Ordnance District, I, Part 2, Pages 41-55. 8

 For a detailed description and criticism of the

arsenal courses, see Hist, Rochester Ord Dist, vol.

15, bk. I, pt. 1, pp. 314-28. 9

 Hist, New York Ord Dist, 1 (1939-41), pp.

41-55. See also Hist, Philadelphia Ord Dist, I,

pt. 2, pp. 54-55.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 325

. . ."

 10

 In most districts a commissioned

officer directed the inspection staff and

served as adviser on inspection to the district chief.11

General Somers' Role

Because of the growing importance of

inspection, General Harris in July 1941

added Brig. Gen. Richard H. Somers to

his staff in the Industrial Service as assistant chief for inspection. He assigned to

General Somers responsibility for coordinating the inspection activities of the

commodity branches, supervising acceptance testing at the proving grounds, and

advising on inspection policies.12 But responsibility for production, both quantity

and quality, continued to rest with the

commodity branches and the district offices. General Somers was to be consulted

on proposed changes in specifications that

had a bearing on inspection, but he had

no overriding authority to enforce inspection standards. This basic arrangement

continued throughout the war, though

General Somers retired in 1942 and his

duties were assigned to the Production

Service Branch of the Industrial Division.

In spite of some brave talk about making the inspection staff the independent

guardian of quality, it never achieved true

independence either in the Office Chief of

Ordnance or in the districts. General

Campbell in the summer of 1942 delegated

inspection responsibility to the materiel

operating divisions on the theory that the

same officials should be held accountable

for both quantity and quality. Inspectors

in the districts felt that, because commodity branch chiefs gained recognition by

meeting production schedules, pressure to

boost production sometimes contributed to

deterioration in quality. Branch chiefs replied that quality was not absolute but

relative. They contended that Ordnance

had to deal with hard practical realities

and that its objective was to procure the

best materiel possible in the quantities

required by the Army in the time available.13

There was, further, a diversity of practice among the district offices. Though all

the districts procuring a given item used

the same drawings and specifications there

was no enforced uniformity among them

on inspection procedures or organization.

Early in the defense period the districts

complained that some of the drawings

and specifications issued by the arsenals

were not up-to-date and did not show the

latest changes in design. But, as time wore

on, these discrepancies were corrected.

When the ASF survey team headed by Dr.

Luther Gulick visited Cincinnati in April

1942 it found that contractors were generally satisfied that government inspection

was both fair and necessary.14

10

 Hist, Philadelphia Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, p. 56. 11

 For an excellent detailed report on all phases

of inspector recruitment and training, see Hist,

Pittsburgh Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, ch. 3. 12

 (1) General Instruction 22, Ind Serv, 24 Jul

41, OHF; (2) ODO 183, 29 Jul 41; (3) PSP

13, vol. I, ch. 3; (4) Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 88. For

a contemporary statement by General Somers,

see his article, "Ordnance Inspection," in Industrial Standardization, vol. 13 (June 1942), pp.

155-57. 13

 See comments on this theme in PSP 13,

Chapter 6 and Chapter 9, and by Col. D. C.

Seagrave in History, San Francisco Ordnance

District, Volume I, pt. 2. Compare with Memo,

Safford for Asst CofS for Matériel, SOS, 3 Feb

43, sub: Ordnance Inspection System and

Memo of Safford for Production Division, ASF,

8 April 1943, sub: Inspection Manual. Both in

OHF. 14

 Cincinnati Field Survey, Apr 42, p. 10, ASF

Contl Div.
326 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Inspection Gages

As mentioned in an earlier chapter,

during the 1930's nine of the Ordnance

districts set up gage laboratories, usually

at universities, where acceptance gages

could be checked for accuracy. In 1940

and 1941 the remaining districts and all

the arsenals established similar laboratories, raising the total to nineteen.15

 As the

Ordnance inspection force grew during the

defense period, and as more and more

items of equipment went into production,

the need for gages and gage laboratories

steadily rose. A single example illustrates

the scope of the problem: one type of

fuze for the 75-mm, shell consisted of

some thirty-five metal parts and required

over two hundred different gages for its

inspection.

Ordnance met the early demands by

using the half million old gages in storage.

In 1938 and 1939 the Ordnance Gage

Section vigorously pushed efforts to design

gages for all items that were reasonably

sure of going into production. In July

1940 approximately $2.5 million was

made available to start production of new

gages well ahead of the signing of major

procurement contracts. In October 1940

President Roosevelt approved a $4 million

program to enable gage manufacturers

who had already expanded their plants

with their own funds to increase their production capacity still further.16

 As the

Ordnance Department was the agency

with the greatest need for gages it was

placed in charge of the expansion of gage

capacity for all elements of the Army and

Navy. In 1941 Ordnance gave another

boost to gage production by purchasing

machine tools and leasing them to gage

manufacturers.17

These timely steps averted a critical

shortage of gages that might otherwise

have developed. But Ordnance occasionally had to resort to temporary expedients.

By the end of the defense period, when

production volume was rising fast, Ordnance inspectors sometimes had to borrow

gages from contractors whose products they

were inspecting. Whenever this was done

the borrowed gages were first sent to a

district gage laboratory to be checked for

accuracy. Later, as Ordnance gage procurement caught up with demand, inspectors were required to submit their gages

to a laboratory at intervals for checking.

As an added safeguard, roving teams of

gage checkers visited plants, examined

Ordnance gages, and checked on their

use.18

Proving Grounds

From its establishment in World War I,

Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland

had been the principal Ordnance center

for proof firing of weapons and ammunition, but it was not capable of handling

the heavy, diversified work load anticipated in 1940-41. Ordnance had established a second test center during World

War I, Erie Proving Ground adjacent to

15

 Hist of the Gage Sec and Gage Facilities

Section, Ind Serv, OCO, I, pt. 1, p. 5. This

history contains copies of many pertinent documents. 16

 Ltr, President to SW, 15 Oct 40, copy in

OHF. 17

 Ltr, CofOrd to Boston Ord Dist, 6 Jun 41,

sub: Expansion of Gage Facilities. . . , copy in

OHF. 18

 Hist of the Gage Sec and Gage Facilities

Section, OCO, vol. I, pt. 1. See also Summary

Report on Gages by Col William Borden in Min,

Wesson Confs, 23 Jan 42, pp. 1, 292-93; collection of gage directives in Hist, Ind Serv, vol.

100; Mueller, op. cit., ch. 12; and Hist, Chicago

Ordnance Dist, vol. 107, ch. 5.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 327

Camp Perry, Ohio, but had converted it

in 1920 from a proving ground to a Field

Service storage depot. Late in 1940 Ordnance decided to re-establish Erie as a

proving ground for acceptance testing of

guns, carriages, mounts, recoil mechanisms, and armor plate. At about the same

time Ordnance selected a 50,000-acre site

for a new proving ground near Madison,

Indiana, in the heart of the ammunitionproducing area. Named Jefferson, it was

to proof fire all types of ammunition,

ranging from small 20-mm. rounds up to

heavy 240-mm. shells, from hand grenades

to giant bombs. The first shot was fired at

Jefferson on 10 May 1941, just a short

time before construction began on another

50,000 acre proving ground near Hope,

Arkansas. Named Southwestern, it had the

mission of proof testing primers, fuzes,

boosters, cartridge cases, propellants,

bombs, pyrotechnics, and, late in the war,

rockets. It fired its first shot on New

Year's Day 1942. As these three new proving grounds came into service Aberdeen

did less acceptance testing and devoted

more time to research and development

tests.19

Statistical Quality Control

One of the most significant developments in Ordnance inspection during

World War II was the use of statistical

sampling techniques under the name of

"quality control." The origins of this practice in industry are usually traced back to

the year 1924 when Dr. Walter A. Shewhart and his associates in the Bell Telephone System began to apply statistical

analysis to the inspection of large numbers of production items. Seven years later

Dr. Shewhart set forth the principles of

what some writers called "a new science"

in his book, The Economic Control of

Quality of Manufactured Product (New

York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1931).

But progress in the industrial application

of the principles was slow.20

Simon's Pioneering Work

The first Ordnance Department experience with the subject came in 1934 when

1st Lt. Leslie E. Simon at Picatinny Arsenal began to study and apply Dr. Shewhart's work. Picatinny was a logical choice

because it endeavored to make large numbers of rounds of ammunition as nearly

identical as possible. As Dr. Shewhart's

home was conveniently located in nearby

Mountain Lakes, N.J., Lieutenant Simon

soon became acquainted with the "father"

of quality control and interested him in

becoming a consultant to the arsenal. Under Simon's direction the arsenal drew up

and published a practical pamphlet for

shop use called Instructions for Control of

Quality Thru Percentage Inspection.21 In

spite of the gains registered in the early

tests, Picatinny's interest in the subject

waned after Simon's transfer in 1937, and

was not aroused again until the danger of

war brought the need for mass production

of munitions. In 1941, Simon, now a

major and assistant director of the Ballistic

Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving

19

 See PP 68, Proving Grounds, Aug 45, and

histories of Aberdeen, Erie, Jefferson, and Southwestern, OHF. 20

 For an excellent brief summary of the prewar developments, and evaluation of the contributions of Shewhart and 1st Lt. Leslie E.

Simon, see S. B. Littauer, "The Development of

Statistical Quality Control in the United States,"

American Statistician, vol. 4 (October 1950), pp.

14-20. 21

 Reprinted in app. C of An Engineers'

Manual of Statistical Methods by Maj. Leslie

E. Simon (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1941).
328 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

LABORATORY FOREMAN LOADING 37-MM. ANTITANK GUN for test shot at Erie Proving

Ground, July 1941.

Ground, published some of his thoughts

on the matter in book form under the

title, An Engineer's Manual of Statistical

Methods, which soon found its way into

college classrooms as well as into industrial plants.

Simon illustrated the nature of the

problem faced by inspectors dealing with

mass production items by pointing out

that small samples taken at random from a

moderately defective lot of items would

not accurately reflect the quality of the

lot; they would consistently show a lower

proportion of defectives than the average

for the entire lot. If, for example, Ordnance set up a requirement that each lot

of one hundred items would be accepted

when a sample of ten items selected at

random from the lot contained not more

than one defective item, it would in fact

be accepting lots that averaged a good

deal more than 10 percent defective. A

commonly applied remedy for this condition was to require that the inspection

sample contain no defectives at all. But

Simon found this remedy far from satisfactory. "It is true," he wrote, "that it

somewhat reduces the chances of acceptance of poor quality; but its penalties

fall both on the just and the unjust, and

it results in rather high rejections of relatively good quality."

 22

Simon's answer to the problem was not

to reject the sampling technique but to

buttress it with other evidence by keeping

records that would tell the history of a

given production run, would indicate its

expected quality level, would sound the

alarm when any variation in quality occurred, and would tell the producer when

22

 Simon, op. cit., p. 11.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 329

and where to look for trouble. The practical man, Simon noted, does not confine

himself to the evidence of the sample, but

instinctively considers everything he knows

about the production process. This was

essentially the line of thought earlier developed by Dr. Shewhart; it became the

basis for the application of statistical

sampling or "quality control" in Ordnance

World War II inspection.23

The Edwards Survey

Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor, General Somers decided to explore the possibility of making further use

of statistical sampling techniques in Ordnance acceptance inspection. Their use

was growing in industry and they were

being applied for special purposes in the

Ammunition Division, at the arsenals, and

at Aberdeen Proving Ground. According

to their proponents, these techniques

yielded better control of quality, required

fewer inspectors, and reduced the amount

of matériel destroyed in testing. The importance of this latter item is suggested by

the fact that in 1942, Ordnance was shooting up enough armor plate in ballistic tests

to make approximately thirty medium

tanks a month.24 One of the first steps

taken by General Somers was to enlist the

services of George D. Edwards, director of

quality assurance of the Bell Telephone

Laboratories, as consultant to the Ordnance Department. Edwards was asked to

survey existing Ordnance inspection

methods and recommend ways of increasing their effectiveness by using the newest

techniques of statistical quality control.25

The Edwards survey revealed that there

was much room for the use of quality control methods in the acceptance inspection

of matériel produced for Ordnance by

industry. Lieutenant Simon's work at Picatinny had dealt mainly with in-process

inspection of matériel being manufactured at the arsenal, and the bulk of all

Ordnance inspection during the interwar

years had been of this type. But by 1942

the situation had changed. The arsenals

were producing only a small percentage of

the Army's munitions. Industry was the

chief source of new materiel, and the

Ordnance task was that of acceptance inspection of industry's products. The Edwards survey also revealed that few persons

in Ordnance, whether military or civilian,

knew anything about quality control, and

many were opposed to its adoption in

their fields of inspection.26

Edwards took an eminently practical

approach to the inspection problem. He

recognized that no feasible plan of inspection would guarantee rejection of every

defective item. The best that any inspection system could hope for was reduction

to a minimum of the risk of accepting

defective items without unduly holding up

production. "The hard facts are," he

wrote, "that we must have ordnance and

we must accept and get along with ord23

 For a detailed description of Ordnance practice, see lecture by Walter S. Oliver, Standard

Sampling Procedures, at University of Michigan,

11 December 1944, copy in Inspection Br file,

and H. F. Dodge, "A Sampling Plan for Continuous Production," Annals of Mathematical

Statistics, vol. XIV, September 1943, pp. 264ff.

The Production Handbook (New York: Ronald

Press, 1947), edited by Leon P. Alford and John

R. Bangs, contains, in Section 10, an extensive

description of quality control methods. 24

 PSP 13, ch. 3. See description of sampling

procedures in History, Birmingham Ordnance

District, Volume I, Part 1, Chapter 5. 25

 Ltr, Somers to all dists, 21 Feb 42, sub:

Statistical Methods of Quality Contl, copy in

PSP 13, ch. 3. 26

 No copy of the Edwards report has been

found but it is briefly summarized in PSP 13,

Chapter 3.
330 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

nance of the highest quality which can be

produced in the quantities which we must

have under present conditions."

 27

 The

problem was to determine a level of acceptable quality and then draw up a

statistical sampling plan that would pass

matériel of the desired quality and would

immediately sound an alarm when quality

fell below that level.

armor. Laboratories at the contractors'

plants performed metallurgical tests; the

manufacturers' knowledge and past experience in steelmaking gave added assurance that their production methods were

sound.

Beginning in September 1942 the Inspection Branch, under Edwards' direction,

conducted a series of 3-day conferences on

statistical quality control. Some 220 officers and civilians from the district offices,

arsenals, plants, works, and proving

grounds, attended and gained at least a

rudimentary knowledge of the basic principles.28

 One of the main themes stressed

at the training conferences was that inprocess inspection was the contractor's responsibility. The conference leaders demonstrated that sampling inspection, by

accepting or rejecting large lots on the

basis of small samples, would force contractors to screen out defective items before presenting a lot to Ordnance for

acceptance. If contractors did not do so

they would run the risk of having large

lots rejected and sent back for screening.29

While the training conferences were being

held the Industrial Division issued a directive to the effect that Ordnance inspectors

should perform only acceptance inspection.

It called for the elimination of all inprocess inspection that had been provided

to aid contractors in getting production

The Quality Control Campaign, 1942-43.

The plan of campaign that resulted

from the Edwards report called for two

distinct attacks on the problem. Ordnance

was to select one or more suitable types of

matériel and apply quality control principles to their inspection. This would provide working examples of the system. The

other attack was to develop a training program within Ordnance to teach the basic

principles of quality control.

Ballistic testing of armor plate was selected as one area for the application of

quality control principles, beginning in

July 1942. The method involved plotting

on a control chart the results of tests on

armor submitted by each manufacturer. If

the chart for a given manufacturer indicated that he was consistently producing

acceptable armor Ordnance reduced the

number of tests made on his product by

two-thirds. Testing continued at this reduced rate as long as the chart indicated

that the manufacturer was properly controlling the quality of his production. But

if the number of rejections exceeded a

certain level the reduced inspection rate

was discontinued, inspection went back to

normal, and a search was made for the

factor that had caused quality to decline.

Ballistic testing was, of course, by no

means the only way of assuring quality of

27

 George D. Edwards, "Quality Control of

Munitions," Army Ordnance, XXIII, No. 135

(November-December 1942), 482-85. 28

 Ltr, CofOrd for Dist Offices, 2 Nov 42, sub:

Quality Contl Program, copy in OHF; Ltr, Maj

Gen Thomas Hayes, Chief of Ind Div, to all

Ord Dists and Others, 22 Feb 43, sub: Quality

Contl Program, OO 337/4515- 29

 As an example, see Summary of the Quality

Contl Conf held at Birmingham Ord Dist, 23-25

Sep 42, copy in Hist, Birmingham Ord Dist, I,

pt. 1, ch. 5.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 331

under way.30 By February 1943 the Industrial Division was able to report that over

400 inspection plans embodying quality

control principles in the inspection of some

150 types of matériel were in effect. To

push the program further, General Hayes

in that same month directed the branches

of the Industrial Division, the TankAutomotive Center, and all the district

offices to appoint an officer or civilian to be

responsible for quality control.31

As a result of these and related efforts,

the number of Ordnance inspectors per

million dollars of accepted matériel

dropped from forty in September 1942 to

about nine in April 1943. While the value

of accepted matériel rose from $500 million in September 1942 to $1400 million

in April 1943, the total number of Ordnance inspectors dropped from twenty

thousand to thirteen thousand. "Such a

record," wrote one inspection specialist,

"can be attributed entirely to Ordnance

contractors accepting the responsibility of

producing satisfactory material before

presenting it to Ordnance for acceptance."

 32

 But there were other elements in

the picture, too. The Army-wide drive to

conserve manpower was in full swing during the winter of 1942-43; in some

instances Ordnance reduced its inspection

force at the cost of lowered quality. Some

economies naturally resulted from volume

production as well as from increased use of

sampling methods. As manufacturers got

into production and gained experience

with Ordnance requirements the need for

meticulous inspection of every item by

Ordnance inspectors declined. The Boston

district conserved inspection manpower by

forming small teams of traveling inspectors

to handle the work at plants that did not

produce enough matériel to justify fulltime resident inspectors.33

At no time did Ordnance tell its contractors exactly what inspection to perform.

It gave advice when requested and made

a practice of conferring with each, contractor on inspection matters as soon as his

contract was signed. But it did not give

its contractors detailed instructions on how

to inspect. Had it done so Ordnance would

have been morally bound to accept what

the contractors turned out in accord with

those instructions. Instead, Ordnance kept

its hands free to accept or reject the

finished items presented to it.34

The Trundle Report

While Ordnance was thus feeling its

way in the quality control area, Army

Service Forces decided to prepare an Inspection Manual as a means of simplifying

and co-ordinating the inspection procedures of all the technical services. To this

end it enlisted the services of the Trundle

Engineering Company of Cleveland, Ohio,

to survey existing practices and later prepare the manual.35

 When they made their

30

 Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas Hayes, Chief of Ind

Div, to Ord field installations, 3 Oct 42, sub:

Clarification of Functions of Ord Dept Field

Staff. . . , copy in OHF. 31

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas Hayes to All

Ordnance Dists and Others, 22 Feb 43; (2) Ltr,

Safford to All Dists, 15 May 43, sub: Quality

Contl Program, copy in OHF. 32

 G. Rupert Gause, PSP 13, ch. III. 33

 Boston Ord Dist, Mobile Group Plan of Inspection Control, n.d., copy in Inspection Br file.

See also Hist, Boston Ord Dist, II, p. 5, and IV,

pp. 6-8. 34

 For comparison of Ordnance and Army Air

Forces inspection policies on this point, see Memo

Report by 1st Lt D. F. Boyd, AAF Matériel

Center, 30 Aug 44, copy in Inspection Br file. 35

 Memo of Brig Gen Hugh Minton, ASF Prod

Div, for CofOrd and others, 30 Mar 43, sub: Inspection Manual, copy in OHF. See also Memo,

Safford for Resources and Prod Div, ASF, 8 Apr

43, sub: Inspection Manual, copy in OHF.
332 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

report in the summer of 1943 the Trundle

analysts observed that the inspection mission of the technical services had become

"a stupendous and complex task."

 36

 This

task had grown with bewildering speed

from the peacetime year 1939, when the

U.S. Army numbered about 188,000 men,

to the second year of war when the

strength of the Army exceeded 7,000,000

men and annual expenditures for munitions ran into the billions of dollars. "Haste

inevitably contributes to confusion, friction and ineffectiveness," the report continued. As a result it found that there was

urgent need for improving, simplifying,

and standardizing the inspection work of

all the technical services.

The section of the report dealing with

Ordnance criticized the districts for placing incompetent persons in responsible positions, for maintaining only loose control

over inspectors, and for tolerating—or being ignorant of—"inefficient handling and

duplication of forms in the field offices of

the resident inspectors." The report scored

the lack of uniformity among the inspection practices of the Ordnance districts,

pointing out that one district would accept

such raw materials as steel, paint, grease,

and oils without inspection or test while

another district would go to great lengths

to inspect and test the same material.

Considering all the technical services,

and without special reference to Ordnance, the report concluded that government inspectors were doing too much inprocess inspection. It did not cite examples of undesirable Ordnance inprocess inspection, nor did it describe the

history behind the situation that it

criticized. As noted above, the demand for

production had been so great during

1941-42 that Ordnance had tried to help

speed output by placing inspectors in

plants to perform inspection that the contractors would normally have performed

themselves. But after October and November 1942, when the districts were ordered

to stop this practice, the only type of

so-called in-process inspection officially approved was the inspection of certain parts,

such as gears in a crankcase, before they

were assembled and became inaccessible.37

The report also concluded that none of

the technical services was making enough

use of statistical quality control, though

the report did not spell out in detail how

or where Ordnance was deficient. In view

of the pioneering work the Ordnance Department had done in this area the Ordnance inspection staff felt that this criticism was not fully justified. Ordnance had

pushed forward with the adoption of

statistical quality control techniques during the preceding year at what was considered to be prudent speed. It had gone

farther and faster than any of the other

technical services and was steadily advancing at the time the Trundle survey was

made. The Ordnance inspection staff felt

that it deserved commendation for its

achievements rather than censure for its

shortcomings.

Commodity Groups

The real story of Ordnance inspection

can be told only by dealing with individual

groups of commodities handled by the

matériel operating divisions of the In36

 Rpt of Inspection Survey for Inspection Sec,

Facilities and Inspection Br, Prod Div, Hq ASF,

by the Trundle Engr Co., 1 Jul 43, copy in Inspection Br, Ind Div, OCO. 37

 Ibid. See also Saunders, "Standardized Inspection," Army Ordnance, XXIV, No. 137

(March-April 1943), 290-92.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 333

dustrial Service. Each group was different.

Each had its own peculiar problems and

each found its own solutions. The following accounts put the spotlight briefly on

rifles, tank-automotive materiel, and fire

control instruments as three fairly representative types.38

tests. . . . But this was true in spite of the

fact that separate components often failed to

meet the gage requirements. Presumably the

tolerances entered on the drawings were

closer than functioning of the assembled

parts demanded. Still it was far from an

ideal situation for the plant that was to

serve as the model for all small arms manufacturers.39

In January 1944, with pressure for production eased, Lt. Col. William Gallagher

took charge of the Inspection Department

and mapped a vigorous campaign to improve quality. Though no complaints of defective rifles had come in from the field,

the armory determined to improve its

product in every way possible. After

thorough study of the problems involved,

Colonel Gallagher outlined four major

steps:

(1) Housecleaning in the manufacturing department. Tools, fixtures, and machines that had been continually in use

during the months of heavy production

were to be overhauled and put into the

most perfect adjustment attainable.

(2) Floor inspection at every machine.

Instead of inspection at the end of three

or four operations, a system of floor inspection at every machine was to be inaugurated so that machines in need of

resetting or new cutters would be

promptly detected and serviced.

(3) Education. The need for raising

quality and holding every part within prescribed tolerances was to be sold to everyone in the armory, from machine operators

up to production engineers and chief

Rifles at Springfield Armory

The history of the inspection of rifles

at Springfield Armory sheds a good deal of

light on the difficulties Ordnance inspectors encountered during the war and the

progress they made in improving quality.

In peacetime, when Springfield turned

out only small quantities of rifles and rifle

parts, inspection was a slow and painstaking business. High quality craftsmanship was the order of the day. But with

mounting requirements for M1 rifles in

1940 and 1941 the armory was called upon

to expand its shops and turn out rifles by

the million. Under these circumstances inspection had to take a back seat. Minor

defects in parts were ignored if the rifle

fired satisfactorily when tested. All rifles

were test fired with one high-pressure

proof round and twenty or more normal

rounds. A small percentage from each lot

underwent a 6,000 round endurance firing; and a few were disassembled and

checked for interchangeability. But there

was no insistence on rigid adherence of all

parts to drawings. In 1944 Dr. Constance

McLaughlin Green, armory historian,

wrote as follows:

The drive to meet schedules had increased

month by month in intensity to a point

where standards of work had been somewhat

undermined, from machine operator up

through top inspection ranks. Rifles shipped

out had, to be sure, always met function

38

 Inspection of small arms ammunition has

been given some attention above in Chapter IX. 39

 Hist, Springfield Armory, vol. II, bk. III,

Jan-Jun 44, pp. 473-74. See criticism of inspection at Springfield Armory in Ltr, Lt Col Stanley

H. Ellison to TIG, 14 Oct 43, sub: Spec Inspection of Springfield Armory.
334 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

inspectors. All employees were to be taught

that quality was just as important as

quantity.

(4) Periodic checking of manufacturing gages. The general practice earlier had

been to send gages back for checking only

when a foreman or an inspector had reason

to believe that they were worn. By setting

up a schedule for checking each gage

periodically it was hoped that faulty gages

would be eliminated as causes of manufacturing inaccuracies.

The arsenal commander promptly approved Colonel Gallagher's proposals. They

went into effect during the first six months

of 1944.

 40

At the same time the armory's inspectors were divided into two groups: manufacturing inspectors and acceptance inspectors. Complying with the ASF Inspection Manual issued in March 1944, the

armory put its production division in the

same position as an Ordnance contractor

by divorcing in-process inspection from

acceptance inspection. All manufacturing

operations and in-process inspection were

to be performed under authority of the

Manufacturing Department; the finished

products were then to be turned over to

the final inspection staff for acceptance

or rejection. At the same time the final

inspection staff began placing all components of the M1 rifle on a statistical

sampling basis.

The over-all results of these two steps

were found to be good, but quality still

did not rise to the level desired by the

Chief of Ordnance. During the early

months of 1945 the armory inspection

staff held weekly meetings to get to the

bottom of the problem. The experts went

over every component, studied its methods

of manufacture, and examined its gages.

But progress was slow and piecemeal with

no major improvement before the end of

the war.

Tank-Automotive Materiel

Ordnance inspection officials realized

early in World War II that they could not

apply traditional inspection procedures to

products of the automotive industry. The

very magnitude of the task was appalling

even when Ordnance had only combat vehicles to consider, for each tank and gun

motor carriage consisted of thousands of

individual parts. After the transfer to Ordnance of transport vehicles in September

1942 the inspection job reached staggering

proportions. "The complexity of parts as

well as automotive sub-assemblies," wrote

one observer, "caused inspectors to throw

up their hands at the practicability of any

statistically and technically logical approach. . . ."

 41

 The Ordnance inspection

staff recognized that the procedures developed over the years for inspection of

"shooting ordnance" would, if applied to

automotive products, result in too much

inspection and the wrong kind of inspection. There was, for example, no danger of

explosion in the normal operation of trucks

or tanks such as there was with weapons

and ammunition. Nor was the process of

manufacture unfamiliar to industry. The

manufacture of military trucks was to a

large extent the same as manufacture of

civilian trucks; even tanks were made up

in part of components similar to standard

commercial items. "We are dealing with

the largest and most responsible industrial

40

 (1) Hist, Springfield Armory; (2) William

H. Davis, PSP 37, U.S. Rifle Caliber .30, M1,

History of Design, Development, Procurement

and Production, 1936 to 1945 (Jul 46), pp. 42-

43, OHF. 41

 PSP 13, ch. 3, p. 16.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 335

units," wrote the chief of the Inspection

Branch on OCO-Detroit, "where no one

in his right mind would endeavor to furnish substandard matériel for any reason

whatsoever."

 42

 Though Ordnance felt

that the manufacturers of tank-automotive

matériel could be depended upon to produce acceptable materiel, it also realized

that occasional lapses were inevitable and

that a certain degree of inspection was

necessary to protect the government's interests. Inspection policies were kept

broad and flexible to permit their application to a wide variety of manufacturers.

Standard Ordnance procedure called

for a functional test of every complete

vehicle before it was accepted. This test

included operating the vehicle on the road

and trying out major units such as

winches, lift devices, and turret traversing

mechanisms. The contractors conducted

these tests, under the eyes of Ordnance

inspectors, at small test areas adjacent to

the plants. To supplement such tests the

Ordnance inspection force selected a few

vehicles from each assembly line for special

testing at one of the Ordnance proving

grounds. These "inspection control tests,"

as they were called, proved to be valuable

as checks on the manufacturers, as a

means of revealing weaknesses in design,

and as a test of packing procedures.

Subcontractors who manufactured engines, transmissions, axles, and other major

components ran each of these items on a

test stand before delivering it to the assembly plant. As a rule, this functional

testing was done on a 100 percent basis.

Little use was made of statistical quality

control procedures, except in ballistic testing of armor, inspection of tank track components, and acceptance of pneumatic tires

and tubes. With combat vehicles the proof

firing of gun mounts was an added means

of assuring that vehicles would perform

properly. Ordnance also conducted interchangeability tests at the manufacturers'

plants or at the proving grounds on components selected at random from process

lines. These tests were spot checks only, for

Ordnance did not insist upon complete interchangeability of automotive equipment.

In peacetime the automotive industry had

never achieved 100 percent interchangeability; it was generally understood that

in using spare parts some slight fitting

was necessary. Ordnance realized that it

was not feasible, in time of manpower

shortages and high production goals, to

insist upon a degree of interchangeability

never attained by industry.

Ordnance inspection of tank-automotive

matériel was marked by great diversity.

The basic policy provided that Ordnance

would conduct inspection upon end items

and as far back in the production chain

as necessary to assure quality products.

Tank-automotive production was characterized by assembly in the prime contractor's plant of many complicated subassemblies such as engines, transmissions, and

axles. No single type of inspection would

fit all these components. With some, materials and heat-treating controls were the

essence of quality. With others, dimensional characteristics were the keys to

proper performance. With still others there

were simple operating tests that gave adequate assurance of quality. Most of the

Ordnance tank - automotive contractors

had enviable records in industry for quality production, but some were newcomers

to the business who had little previous

experience in making the parts needed by

42

 Maj F. A. Gitzendanner, Hist of Ord Inspection of Tank-Automotive Materiel, Dec 41

-Sep 45, p. 4, OHF.
336 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Ordnance. Inspection requirements had to

be tailored to fit the needs of each case.

Fire Control Instruments

Binoculars, telescopes, directors, and

other fire control matériel ranked as perhaps the most difficult class of items for

Ordnance inspection. They presented a

wide variety of problems, for they included

mechanical, electrical, optical, hydraulic,

and electronic instruments. Production of

good optical glass required careful control; machined parts of fire control instruments had to be held to close tolerances;

and assembly of optical elements called for

meticulous accuracy. Evaluation of the

importance of scratches, pits, and stain on

surfaces of optical elements was largely a

matter of experienced judgment, as was

the determination of allowable distortion

in the glass. Dependence on human judgment led to innumerable difficulties.

Added to these problems was the need to

use inexperienced inspectors and to meet

constant demands for speedy production.

"I think no one would willingly sacrifice

or adulterate the quality of Ordnance

supplies going to the fighting forces,"

wrote the chief of the Fire Control SubOffice, Col. Gordon B. Welch, in March

1945. "However, that has to be tempered

with judgment when the attainment of

high quality prevents the fighting forces

from having anything at all. I ... have

never hesitated to lower the quality in

particular cases when it was necessary to

meet our objectives."

 43

 As a result of all

these circumstances, Ordnance accepted

far too much unsatisfactory matériel in

the early war period. American and British

troops in North Africa in 1942-43 sent

back a stream of complaints about defective fire control instruments.44

Reports that defective matériel had

been issued to troops shocked the Chief

of Ordnance and his staff. To correct the

situation the Artillery Division strengthened the Inspection Section of the Fire

Control Sub-Office at Frankford and set

up new procedures calling for prompt action on reports of defective materiel. The

chief of the sub-office wrote official letters

to all the district offices and followed them

up with a personal appeal to each district

chief to stop the acceptance of substandard materiel. The Inspection Section

pursued a vigorous program of interchangeability tests coupled with investigation of all deficiencies. As measured by

these tests and by the number of defective

matériel reports that came in, the quality

of fire control instruments rose steadily

from August 1943 to the end of the war.45

Some reports of defective materiel,

thought to be caused solely by inadequate

inspection, proved to be due wholly or in

part to engineering design. With binoculars, for example, Ordnance received many

reports that moisture and dirt had got into

the instruments. As inspection standards

for binoculars were strict, the reports were

puzzling. Even after Ordnance began packing the instruments in vaporproof barriers with silica gel the reports persisted.

Finally, a study of a large number of defective binoculars at Augusta Arsenal revealed that the so-called dirt within the

binoculars was the result of a chemical

43

 Ltr, Col Gordon B. Welch to Dr. H. S.

Newcomer, Dioptric Instrument Corp., 20 Mar

45, copy in OHF. 44

 Ltr, Welch to Dist Chiefs, 9 Aug 43, sub:

Inspection of Fire Control Instruments, copy in

PSP 12, ch. V. See also Hist, Ind Serv, Arty Div,

p. 321. 45 For evidence on this score, see Reports of

Defective Fire Control Matériel, ex. 21 in Hist,

Ind Serv, Arty Div, ch. 10.
INSPECTION AND STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL 337

action on the reticle cell, which was made

of secondary aluminum. Investigation also

proved that after the binoculars underwent the rain test at the plant they contained minute quantities of water that escaped detection by the inspection measures

then in use. Once these facts were brought

to light, corrective measures were taken,

and reports of defective binoculars dropped

almost to zero.46

Most fire control instruments did not

lend themselves to inspection by statistical

sampling, chiefly because they were produced in small numbers and did not involve a high volume of repetitive operations. As a matter of policy the Fire

Control Sub-Office made little use of

quality control. Along with artillery weapons themselves, fire control instruments

ranked lowest in the Ordnance list of items

inspected by statistical quality control

methods.47

All things considered, the Ordnance

record on inspection was checkered. With

some items there was always a gap between the quality prescribed by the drawings and specifications and the quality of

the matériel actually accepted. Ammunition, for example, was produced in huge

quantities and won an enviable reputation

for quality and reliability. But it was not

perfect. Even late in the war, after more

than two years of steady production, one

investigator who checked on the manufacture of metal parts for fuzes reported

that, "the quality of matériel being accepted by Ordnance inspectors is nowhere

near that which has been established as

acceptable."

 48

 The same was true in

greater or less degree of weapons, both

small arms and artillery, and of trucks and

combat vehicles. They functioned well, as

a rule, but they did not always comply

exactly with specifications and drawings.

In many instances there was reason for

excusing noncompliance on the ground

that the Ordnance tolerances were too

strict. But in other cases it may safely be

assumed that, had the manufacturers

(including the arsenals) kept within the

limits set by Ordnance, the end product

would have functioned better, lasted

longer, or been more reliable.

The chief reason for failure to maintain

the highest quality was pressure to get out

production. Ordnance realized that in time

of war the overriding requirement was for

good munitions in huge quantities, not

perfect munitions in small quantities. The

highest standards of precision manufacture

were impossible of attainment in a war

economy where skilled workers were

scarce, the demand for speedy production

was intense, and machine tools ran every

day with very little time out for maintenance. Production managers looked upon

the rejection of material by inspectors as

something on a par with throwing a monkey wrench into the machinery. It caused

loss of time, labor, and materials, and it

played havoc with scheduling. Coupled

with this was the fact that contractors

could sometimes prove that Ordnance tolerances were unnecessarily close, or that

inspectors were rejecting matériel for

trivial defects. All these elements conspired

to make the maintenance of high standards

of quality a very difficult task. The result

was a compromise between the ideal and

the practical.

46

 PSP 13, ch. 5, pp. 41-42- 47

 Hist, Ind Serv, Arty Div, OCO, ch. 10. 48

 Rpt of Check Inspection on Metal Parts of

Fuze, P.D., M52 and M53, Inspection Br, Ammo

Div, OCO, 29 Jan 45, copy in Mr. Lorber's file.

See also ch. IX, above. There are frequent

criticisms of inspection in the annual general

inspections of Ordnance installations made by

officers of the Inspector General's Department.
338 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The most notable new development in

Ordnance inspection was the introduction

of statistical quality control. Ordnance

took pride in being a pioneer in the use

of quality control techniques. How successful its efforts were is hard to measure,

for the techniques were not applied equally

to all types of materiel. But the following

summary statement drafted early in 1943

by the wartime chief of the Quality Control Unit in the Ammunition Branch appears to be close to the truth:

Ordnance inspection is becoming more efficient, Government inspectors are beginning

to accept and reject on a more rational and

standardized basis, rule of thumb is being

eliminated, quality of accepted material is

improving, and Ordnance inspection personnel are, in general, being reduced. At the

same time, the responsibility of manufactur- ers to submit only material of satisfactory

quality for acceptance is being more definitely crystallized, and greater cooperation is

being obtained.49

49

 Saunders, "Standardized Inspection," Army

Ordnance XXIV, No. 137 (March-April 1943),

290. An evaluation along these lines was presented by Gause at the ASF Inspection Conference, Washington, D.C., 9-11 Aug 45, pp. 185

-86, copy in ASF Distribution Div files, NA

Box 663.
CHAPTER XV

Contract Termination and Settlement

For Ordnance, termination of contracts

began as a mere trickle in December 1941,

continued at a steadily mounting rate

during the next three years, and then

reached flood proportions at the end of

the war. After the basic policy decisions

were made, the number of terminated

contracts rose steadily until some thirteen

thousand had been closed out by the end

of 1944. Valuable experience was thus

gained long before the war ended, and

staffs were trained to deal with the problem. When the Japanese surrendered in

August 1945, Ordnance was able to settle

its outstanding contracts quickly, and generally with satisfaction to all concerned.1

This record stood in sharp contrast to

the debacle after World War I when

thousands of war contracts remained unsettled for many months after the Armistice, leaving a legacy of ill will and

suspicion for the next twenty years.2 Conscious of its World War I history, the War

Department during World War II resolved to avoid making the same mistake

twice. "Let's leave a better taste in their

mouths after this war" was the attitude

frequently expressed at contract termination conferences.3

 Taking a broad look at

the economy of the nation in the middle

of the war, Army policymakers saw that

about 60 percent of all business concerns

were dependent, wholly or in part, on

war production, and that most of these

concerns needed prompt action on their

contracts if they were to succeed in making

the change back to peacetime production.

Under Secretary Patterson testified before

the House Military Affairs Committee on

the magnitude and urgency of the problem, recalling that after 1918 the Ordnance Department alone had 10,000 employees working on terminations.4

 In 1943

1

 For a comprehensive survey, see Lt. Col.

Harold Shepherd, History Contract Termination

Branch, Legal Division, OCO, 4 volumes, 30 April

1945, OHF. A concise history by Colonel Shepherd was published as Settlement of Ordnance

Contracts, Army Ordnance Report Number 2, 9

August 1943, by the Army Ordnance Association

(now American Ordnance Association). For a

broad Army-wide treatment of this subject, see

Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, chapters XXVII-XXIX. 2

 J. Donald Edwards, Termination of Ordnance Contracts, Jan 43, Historical Study No. 57,

and William Hoyt Moore, Post-Armistice Industrial Developments, 1918-20, Jan 43, both

prepared by Bur of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept

of Labor, ORDGL-CR files. See also I. J. Gromfine and J. Donald Edwards, Termination After

World War I, Law and Contemporary Problems

(Duke University School of Law) X, No. 4

(Spring, 1944), 563-93. A History of War Contract Terminations and Settlements, July 1947, by

U.S. Office of Contract Settlement, contains a

bibliography on terminations in World War II. 3

 Min of Termination Mtg, 12 Aug 44, Chicago, p. 59, in Hist, Chicago Ord Dist, vol. 102.

Historical studies of World War I contract termination prepared by the U.S. Department of

Labor were distributed to the Ordnance districts

and to divisions of OCO. 4

 Statement, USW, before H.R. Mil Affairs

Comm., 15 Oct 43, Hearings, on H.R. 3022, 78th

Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, pp. 145ff.
340 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

it was estimated that Ordnance had

148,000 contracts with industry totaling

$47 billion in value, and giving employment to millions of workers.5

 "If terminations are not completed and money paid

to the contractors with utmost expedition," wrote an Ordnance district official

from Chicago, "we will inevitably have a

wrecked and bankrupt business structure

in the United States."

 6 Ordnance was

also keenly aware of the importance for

future production of retaining the good

will of industry by fair treatment at the

time of contract termination.7

Ordnance had given little thought to

contract termination during peacetime,

for the problem seldom arose. Nor was

much attention paid to the matter during

the defense period when top priority was

assigned to speedy placement of orders

with industry. The contract forms standardized by the Army in 1939 contained

termination clauses covering instances of

default by contractors, but their use by

the procuring services was optional.8 In

September 1941 Ordnance broke new

ground by issuing a standard clause for

contract termination at the convenience of

the government, and a few weeks later

the Under Secretary's office issued Supply

Contract No. 1, including a clause for

termination when the contractor was not

in default, and settlement according to a

formula. The essence of these clauses was

their provision that the contractor be

reimbursed for "all actual expenditures

certified by the Contracting Officer as

having been made. . . ."

 9 The hitch to this

arrangement was that the contracting officer could certify that expenditures had

been made only after the auditors had

gone over all the books and assured him

that every penny was accounted for. This

was a long and tedious process, and it was

feared that firms without strong financial

backing might go bankrupt while the auditors were at work; for employees the

procedure might result in "unemployment

by audit."

 10

 Further, cost accounting was

not an exact science or a matter of simple

arithmetic. It required exercise of good

judgment in weighing a host of varied

elements. As a leading industrialist testified, "If you take six cost accountants of

equal competency and put them on the

job to find out what one of our crankshafts cost you would get six different

answers."

 11

 How Ordnance contributed

5

 Termination Notes and Data for use at the

Rochester Mtg of Dist Chiefs, and Address by

Lt Col Harold Shepherd before the Michigan

State Bar Assn, Detroit, Mich., 16 Sep 43, both

in folder marked Speeches Delivered by Col

Shepherd, ORDGL-CR files. 6

 Ltr, H. P. Isham, Chief Purchasing, Termination and Renegotiation Policy Br, Chicago Ord

Dist, to Lt Col A. R. Cutler, ASF Purchasing

Sec, 14 Aug 43, OO 164/471. See also Remarks

by Browning, in transcript of Proceedings of Joint

Conf of Price Adjustment Bds, 15-17 Aug 43,

New York, copy in OHF, and Statement by

Automotive Council for War Prod, 7 Aug 43,

OO 400.12/48943. 7

 Memo on Negotiated Settlement, 27 Aug 43,

prepared by H. P. Isham of Chicago Ord Dist,

copy in OUSW file, dr 14. 8

 Leon Malman, "Policies and Procedures for

the Termination of War Contracts" Law and

Contemporary Problems (Duke University School

of Law), X, No. 3 (Winter, 1944), 449-517. 9

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to all Contracting and Purchasing Officers of the Ord Dept, 3 Sep 41, sub:

Provision for Termination. . . , copy in Shepherd, Hist, Contract Termination Br; (2) History

of Readjustment Division, ASF, prepared by 1st

Lt Reynold Bennett, 1946, pp. 20-21, copy in

OCMH; (3) Hist, New York Ord Dist, I, pt 2,

pp. 96-99. 10

 The phrase is from Bernard M. Baruch and

John M. Hancock, Report on War and Post-War

Adjustment Policies, (Washington: 15 Feb 44),

p. 8.

11

 Testimony of J. H. Marks, vice president,

Packard Motor Co., before H.R. Mil Affairs

Comm., Hearings, on H.R. 3022, 70th Cong., 1st

sess., pt. 2, p. 477. On the same point, see Statement by Secretary Patterson, ibid., p. 148.
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT 341

to solving this problem is illustrated by

the following two case histories.

The Walter Scott Case

On 5 June 1940 Ordnance had placed

an educational order with Walter Scott

and Co. of Plainfield, N.J., for manufacture of fifteen recoil mechanisms for the

155-mm. gun, along with certain machine

tools and manufacturing aids. Fifteen

months later the company, not yet in production, had taken on a large Navy contract that threatened to leave no room

for future Ordnance production orders.

Under these circumstances Ordnance decided, two weeks before Pearl Harbor, to

cancel the contract and move elsewhere

the machine tools the company had purchased. This decision officially opened the

contract termination phase of Ordnance

World War II history.12

As there was no question of default on

the part of the contractor this was clearly

an example of contract termination "for

the convenience of the government," as the

lawyers expressed it. The paragraph of the

contract that covered such cases provided

that the government should reimburse the

contractor for all expenses incurred by

him in good faith in performance of the

contract plus 10 percent of the total of

such expenses. To avoid making a complete audit of the contractor's books, the

Chief of Ordnance, on the day after Pearl

Harbor, suggested that the company

might be willing to terminate the contract

by a supplemental agreement providing

for payment of a lump sum determined by

negotiation. Here was the origin of the

negotiated settlement that did so much to

speed reconversion at the end of the war.

Satisfactory terms were soon worked out,

and the contractor signed a termination

agreement on 26 June 1942 releasing the

government from all further obligation

under the contract in return for payment

of $18,155.89.

 13

The Guiberson Case

Before the Scott case was closed, another

and much larger termination was in the

works. In April 1942, when the Army decided to replace diesel tank engines with

gasoline engines,14 steps were taken to

cancel two contracts, totaling $8 million,

with the Guiberson Diesel Engine Co.,

and to turn over the Guiberson plant in

Garland, Texas, to Continental Motors

Co. for production of gasoline engines.

Although the earlier of the two Guiberson

contracts had no clause covering termination for convenience of the government,

the later contract did, and the company

agreed to let this clause apply to both. But

the clause in the later contract called for

reimbursement of the contractor according to a formula based on a complete

audit of all expenditures. The accounting

and auditing work on such a contract,

Ordnance reported, would reach "gigantic proportions," requiring the full-time

services of fifteen auditors for nine

months, for the contract extended over a

long period of time and involved large

sums of money, complex inventories, work

in process, and claims of many subcon12

 (1) Ltr, Col Alfred B. Quinton, Jr., to

USW, 22 Oct 41, sub: Cancellation of Educational Order Contract. . . , OO 160/74713; (2)

Shepherd, Hist, Contract Termination Br; (3)

Mueller, New York Ordnance District in World

War II, pp. 124-26; (4) Hist, New York Ord

Dist, I, pt. 2, pp. 96-99. 13

 (1) Shepherd, op. cit.; (2) Hist, New York

Ord Dist, I, pt. 2, pp. 96-99. 14

 See Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, ch. X.
342 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

tractors.15 When he had signed the contract, the contractor had had no idea he

would some day be called upon to produce

a written record of every expenditure. In

addition, Ordnance pointed out that the

results of the audit would be subject to

review by "another governmental agency,"

meaning the General Accounting Office,

and expressed some concern lest the GAO

take exception to minor irregularities and

thus do, in the long run, more harm than

good. Ordnance felt that any such review

would involve the exercise of new judgment on complex problems and would, in

effect, amount to a new negotiation. Ordnance argued that terminations should be

kept within the control of the agency responsible for the original contract, for

only in that agency was there intimate

knowledge of the kinds of property involved, the avenues for its disposition, and

knowledge of its value. Further, Ordnance

contended that a detailed audit of all

large contracts would delay contractors

from shifting to other war work and would

thus hamper the war effort, while the war

continued, and would hold up reconversion in the postwar era.

In view of these facts the Ordnance

legal branch proposed that the contract be

terminated with a negotiated lump-sum

settlement; there would be no complete

audit or review by another governmental

agency, but only sufficient spot checking

and accounting analysis to satisfy both

parties. This proposal was based on the

ancient common law principle that private

contracting parties may agree to settle a

contract in any way they choose, regardless

of contract provisions for some other

method of settlement. The Ordnance view

was that contracting officers who were

empowered to enter into contracts and

agree upon prices to be paid for war goods

in the first place were assumed to have

equal authority to agree upon final compensation when the contracts were canceled.16

 "The negotiated settlement in

essence," wrote Lt. Col. Harold Shepherd

in formal legal language,

is the use of a contract device to convert

unliquidated claims not susceptible of exact

demonstration without 100 percent audit

into a new liquidated obligation in the nature of an accord, merging and extinguishing

all prior rights and claims not specifically

reserved. It has all the sanctions and legal

incidents of an original contract, and the

contracting officer who negotiates it has all

the discretion, authority, and responsibility

that he has in making any original contract.17

Convinced of the wisdom of this approach, Ordnance laid the whole matter

before the Judge Advocate General in

August and asked for an opinion. Within

three weeks that office and the U.S. Attorney General approved the Ordnance

proposal on the basis of the First War

Powers Act and Executive Order No.

9001, and Ordnance proceeded at once

to settle the Guiberson case by negotiation.

In the process it used the services of only

five auditors for about four or five months.

Thus another major step was taken toward

developing a new Army policy on contract

termination and settlement for conveni15

 (O Memo, Col Charles R. Baxter, Fiscal Br,

for Duffy, Legal Br, 24 Aug 42, sub: Settlement

of Guiberson Contract, copy in Shepherd, op. cit.,

(2) Ltr, Maj Harold Shepherd to JAG, 28 Aug

42, sub: Termination of Contract. . . , OO 160/

133. See also Malman, op. cit. 16

 This was the line of reasoning enunciated

by the Supreme Court in the case of U.S. vs.

Corliss Steam-Engine Co. (1876), 91 U.S. 321. 17

 Shepherd, Army Ord Rpt No. 2. For the

legal background, see Malman, op. cit. For comments by Ordnance districts, see folder marked

Terminations—Procedure (Districts), cabinet 2,

dr 1.
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT 343

ence of the government. Soon thereafter

Ordnance drew up termination instructions for its field representatives and gave

wide publicity to the negotiated settlement among Army personnel, lawyers, and

industrial contractors.18 Emphasis was

placed on speeding war production by

enabling contractors to shift quickly from

one product to another, and assuring industry that, at war's end, their claims

would be settled fairly and quickly. The

goal was to achieve the 3 F's of contract

termination, making them "fair, fast, and

final."

 19

The International Harvester Case

In December 1941 Ordnance approached the International Harvester

Company about making a new type of

tank that then existed only on the drawing board. It was to weigh twenty tons,

carry a 57-mm. gun, and be both fast and

maneuverable. International Harvester accepted the proposal, contracts totaling

$217 million were signed, and Ordnance

immediately purchased and remodeled for

Harvester's use an idle plant at Bettendorf, Iowa, naming it the Quad Cities

Tank Arsenal.20 Soon thereafter the proposed tank was redesigned in the light of

British reports from North Africa of the

need for more powerful guns and tougher

armor to cope with German tank and antitank weapons. The 57-mm. gun became a

75-mm., and the weight of the tank went

up to 28 tons. A steady flow of engineering change orders delayed the start of

production until March 1943. Then on

St. Patrick's Day, just as the first tanks

were rolling off the line, the contract was

canceled. It was a stunning blow for the

company and its employees and caused a

certain measure of resentment. Assurance

that cancellation was dictated by the

fortunes of war, and that no blame attached to the plant, was received in silence

by the employees assembled to hear the

news from Col. John Slezak of the Chicago

district.21 Explanation that the tank,

originally meant to be light, had grown

to be of medium weight and was thus too

close to the existing Shermans did not

prove very convincing.

Compared with the Harvester contract,

the Scott and Guiberson cases had been

small potatoes. Not only was there $217

million involved in the Harvester contract,

but the company used 12 different plants

located in as many cities. Its 438 subcontractors were to be found in 100 cities

scattered over an area of 20 states, and

there were, in addition, about 2,000 subsubcontractors. The company had on hand

a huge stock of all the countless parts

that go into a tank—generators, tracks,

periscope assemblies, and even a few tank

hulls—as well as machine tools, jigs, and

fixtures. When everything was piled into

an impromptu warehouse so the company

18

 (1) Ord Fisc Cir 153, 9 Oct 42, sub:

Termination of Fixed Price Contracts, copy in

Hist, Contract Termination Br; (2) Ord Fisc Cir

170, 29 Oct 42, sub: Termination of CPFF Contracts, copy in Hist, Contract Termination Br;

(3) Leon Malman, op. cit.; (4) Campbell, The

Industry-Ordnance Team, ch. 25; (5) U.S.

Office of Contract Settlements A History of War

Contract Terminations and Settlements, p. 7. 19

 Ann Rpt CofOrd, FY 1944, p. 7. See also

Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, and

"Termination of War Contracts for the Government's Convenience," J. Harry LaBrum, Temple

University Law Quarterly, vol. XVIII, No. 1,

Dec 43. 20

 See p. 251. 21

 (1) Furnas, "Good-by Contract!" Saturday

Evening Post, June 2, 1945, p. 77; (2) Hist,

Chicago Ord Dist, vol. 102, Min Termination

Mtg, 12 Aug 44, pp. 48ff; (3) Chicago Tribune,

May 21, 1943, p. 25; (4) Wall Street Journal,

August 8, 1944, p.1.
344 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

could get on with a tractor order that was

to replace the tank contract, the place

looked like "an auditor's nightmare and a

junkman's dream."

 22

 The whole stock,

valued at over $10 million, had to be

quickly inventoried and disposed of by

public sale or transfer to other government agencies. Engines, tanks, and armor

plate were promptly diverted to other

tank manufacturers or to Field Service

for use as spare parts.23 Hundreds of

subcontractors had to be given help in

submitting their claims, and for that purpose the company organized a staff of

fifteen traveling termination specialists.

The Chicago Ordnance district sent representatives to Bettendorf to work with the

company's termination team toward arranging advance payments for subcontractors and ironing out procedural details.

Although the principle of the negotiated

settlement was applied, so many aspects of

the problem required careful checking that

the whole process took about fifteen

months. This was no speed record, to be

sure, but the Chicago district felt that in

the process it had gained experience that

would enable it in the future to cut that

time in half. The company settled for $25

million.24

Organization and Training

By mid-summer of 1943 Ordnance had

completed about eight hundred negotiated settlements. The district offices reported that contract settlements could be

reached by negotiation with a 75 percent

saving of time and labor over settlements

based on a complicated formula and complete audit. Immediate partial payments

were made to both prime contractors and

subcontractors to tide them over the conversion period. Contracting officers were

permitted to use their own judgment in

each case, and there was no need for review of the settlement by any other agency,

except in case of suspected fraud. All this

was to the good, but adequate preparation

for the anticipated avalanche of terminations at the end of the war called also for

creating and staffing strong termination

units in all the district offices, and providing a firm statutory and regulatory base

for the new procedures.25

Though keenly interested in speed, Ordnance did not intend that negotiated settlements would be reached haphazardly

without scrutiny by lawyers, auditors, and

production experts.26 A set of rules was,

in fact, soon developed and published in

April 1943 as a section of the Ordnance

Procurement Instructions. Ordnance assigned termination work to its district

offices where each terminated contract was

passed through the hands of district specialists in procurement negotiation, inspection, engineering, and accounting, and was

finally reviewed by the district's Settle22

 J. C. Furnas, op. cit., pp. 77. 23

 Ordnance policy on this score was described

in detail by an Ordnance officer, Maj. Forton A.

Christoffer, in "Disposal of Contractor-Owned

Property on Termination," Law and Contemporary Problems (Duke University School of Law),

X, No. 4 (Spring, 1944), 646-58. 24

 This subject is discussed at length in History,

Chicago Ordnance District, Volume 102. For

brief summaries of other cases, see Contract

Termination in the Chicago Ordnance District,

OUSW file. 25

 On the importance attached by the War Department to termination planning and organization, see Remarks by J. Browning, in transcript

of Proceedings of Joint Conference on Price

Adjustment Boards, 15-17 August 1943, New

York. 26

 Termination Notes and Data for Use at the

Rochester Mtg of Dist Chiefs, n.d., in file marked

Speeches Delivered by Col Shepherd, ORDGLCR files.
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT 345

ment Review Board. It thus became "procurement in reverse."

 27

 In the Chicago

district the basic philosophy was put into

a memo by the chief of the termination

policy unit, stressing speed rather than

meticulous accuracy and "true negotiation

vs. the rejection of each part of each claim

that cannot be proven in detail by the

contractor.

In the summer of 1943 ASF helped to

standardize procedures throughout the

War Department by issuing a technical

manual on termination accounting for

fixed-price supply contracts, closely following the earlier Ordnance instructions.29

Soon thereafter a new section on contract termination was added to the Procurement Regulations as PR 15.

 30

 This

section described the main steps in termination procedure, beginning with the

government's telegram to the contractor

advising him to stop work on a specific

contract, followed by a confirming registered letter and a copy of the War Department Termination Accounting Manual.

The contractor then notified his subcontractors, began to look for other business,

and put men to work drawing up his

claim for payment by the government.

Surplus material and government-owned

equipment was promptly moved out of

the plant, and representatives of the

company sat around a conference table

with government officials to work out a

negotiated settlement. When possible, a

pre-termination conference was held with

the contractor to iron out problems of

timing and procedure.31 Reasonably explicit rules and regulations governed each

major step in the process, and it was

through these regulations, plus the detailed provisions of the termination accounting manual, that the interests of

both contractor and government were

protected and the whole process given a

semblance of due process of law.32

A much simpler type of settlement was

that in which the contractor made no

claim for payment above what he had

already received. In return for waiving any

claim he might have against the government the contractor had the right to retain his termination inventory, which

might include scarce raw materials or useful semifinished items, and dispose of it as

he saw fit. He was immediately free to

proceed with conversion to other work

without need to take an inventory and

prepare his claim against the government,

thus saving time for himself and for the

27

 Campbell, op cit., p. 404. See also histories

of all Ordnance districts in OHF, and Memo of

Duffy, OCO, for CG ASF, 1 Jan 44, sub: Comments on Admin of Contract Termination, copy

in OHF. 28

 Memo by H. P. Isham, Chicago Ord Dist.

27 Jul 43, sub: Negotiated Settlement, copy in

OUSW file. See also Ltr, Lt Col George V.

Rountree, Chicago Ord Dist, to Duffy, OCO, 1

Apr 43, sub: Termination. . . , copy in OHF. 29

 TM 14-320, Termination Accounting Manual for Fixed-Price Supply Contracts (1943),

later issued as TM 14-1005 (1944). See also the

recommendations supporting negotiated settlements in memo of William C. Foster, Chairman

Purchase Policy Advisory Comm., for USW, 30

Sep 43, copy in OUSW file. 30

 Copy in Hist of Readjustment Div, ASF. 31

 On pretermination, see Memo, Shepherd,

OCO. for Director Readjustment Div, ASF, 30

Dec 44, sub: Progress Rpt on Pre-termination

Training, copy in OHF. 32

 Settlement procedures were described in general terms by Secretary Patterson in Hearings.

Comm, on Mil Affairs, H.R., 78th Cong., 1st

sess., on H.R. 3022, pt. 2, pp. 151ff, and by Leon

Malman, op. cit. For a detailed case history, see

"Settlement of a War Contract," Mill and Factory, May 1945, copy in History, Philadelphia

Ordnance District, Volume XI, Part 3. See also

manual entitled Termination Procedure for War

Contracts issued by Cincinnati Ordnance District,

and Hearings, Committee of Military Affairs,

H.R., 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 3022, 24

June 1943, Pages 47-49.
346 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

government. This was especially attractive

to contractors during the first two years

of the war when they could easily shift to

other war work. As it was the essence of

administrative simplicity, its use was also

attractive to the government and was

given official encouragement. A further

reason for the popularity of "no cost"

settlements was the Renegotiation Act.

When a contractor knew he had earned

all allowable profit during a given period

there was no point in trying to gain more

in the final settlement.33 By the end of

December 1945, "no claims" cases accounted for roughly one-fourth the money

value of all Ordnance settlements, and

well over half the number of cases

settled.34

In November 1943, when ASF created

a Readjustment Division, headed by an

Ordnance officer, Col. David N. Hauseman, and the Office of War Mobilization

established the Joint Termination Board,

Ordnance set up a contract termination

section in the Legal Branch and called in

Col. Dean Witter from the San Francisco

district office to head it. Meanwhile, Ordnance called regional conferences in Chicago, Detroit, New York, and St. Louis

to inform district officials of plans and

policies being formulated in Washington.

The Ordnance districts created their own

termination sections and prepared to put

their procurement machinery into reverse.

Each Ordnance district opened termination training courses for members of its

staff and drew up manuals to prescribe

practical operating procedures. When this

work was well under way the districts

turned to the task of introducing contractors to the mysteries of contract termination and settlement, and stimulating their

interest in advance preparation for submitting termination claims. Specialists

from Colonel Witter's staff and from district offices gave short talks on the subject

to trade associations, chambers of commerce, and professional societies. In February and March 1944 the Boston district

held a series of eight all-day conferences

for contractors in the Boston area. The

Springfield district conducted similar

training conferences while the New York

district arranged for New York University

to give evening classes in contract termination. In the Philadelphia area, the Ordnance district co-operated with other government procurement offices to prepare a

course in contract termination to be given

by the University of Pennsylvania. The

purpose of these courses was to speed

contract termination and settlement by

instructing contractors how to submit

their claims to the proper government

agency. The staff of the Chicago district

wrote a comedy skit called "Negotiation

for Termination, or You Can't Take It

With You," presented it as after-dinner

entertainment for many businessmen's

groups, and gave one performance for a

subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee.35

The Statutory Base

The principle of termination by negotiation was applied, on the basis of the

33

 (1) Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization; (2) War Contract Terminations and Settlements, Report by the Director of Contract Settlement to the Congress, 2d rpt, Jan 45, p. 20; (3)

Hist, Readjustment Div, ASF, pp. 43-46. 34

 Graphic Analysis, Progress of Ord Program,

sec 4, 23 Jan 46, OHF, p. 2. 35

 (1) Shepherd, op. cit.; (2) Mueller, The

New York Ordnance District in World War II,

ch. 9; (3) Robert T. Gebler, Philadelphia Ordnance District in World War II (Philadelphia;

Westbrook Publishing Company, 1949); (4)

Folder marked Termination-Training.
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT 347

Judge Advocate General's decision, to

cases that came up in 1942-43, but procurement officials and contractors both

saw the need for putting such important

matters on a firm statutory base. The War

Department drafted proposed legislation

for this purpose in 1943, and committees

of Congress opened hearings on the subject. At this point, Lindsay Warren, the

Comptroller General, vigorously objected

to the Army's plan to put the negotiated

settlement on a firm statutory base. Mr.

Warren complained that the procedures

proposed by the War Department contained no adequate means of safeguarding

the public interest. They bypassed the

General Accounting Office, and required

no audit, no documentary evidence of the

validity of contractors' claims, and only a

spot check that was "an insult to proper

audit of a matter of this magnitude."

"When I read these regulations," he testified,

I became so amazed and astounded that

I have wondered if those officers or civilian

employees of the War Department who prepared them ever gave a passing thought

that they were in fact servants of the Government, whose interest they were sworn to

protect. These regulations have all the appearance of being put forward by special

pleaders for industry in disregard of the

Government and those other citizens who

are paying the Government's bills.36

Warren brought forth case after case to

show that contractors in the past had

claimed payment for goods or services in

no way related to their government contracts, and had been stopped only by the

GAO audit. He challenged the War Department's assertion that all its contracting officers were efficient and capable men

working within a well established framework of regulations, and asserted that contract settlements without audit were open

invitations to fraud. The War Department's answer to these charges was that

the General Accounting Office had so far

disallowed less than 10 cents per $1,000

of expenditures under War Department

contracts, and had approved 99.95 percent

of all procurement vouchers submitted for

audit during the four months ending with

August 1943.37 Industry spokesmen termed

Warren's proposal impractical.38

The House Committee on Military Affairs later reported out a bill to place the

Comptroller General in charge of termination settlements, but the bill was defeated

in favor of a modified version of the War

Department's proposal. Strong support for

the negotiated settlement came from industry representatives who testified before

the House Committee in October 1943,

and further support appeared in February

1944 when the Baruch-Hancock report

on postwar adjustment policies was released. It recommended "quick, fair, and

final settlement of terminated war contracts through negotiations by the contractors and the procurement agencies." The

Comptroller General's insistence on detailed audit before payment would, the

36

 Hearings, H.R. Comm, on Mil Affairs, 78th

Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 3022, pt. 2, p. 191. See

also Ltr, Comptroller General to Hon. Andrew

J. May, 20 Sep 43, and to Hon. James E.

Murray, 20 Sep 43, copies in OCMH file. 37

 Ltr, USW to May, 27 Oct 43, printed in

Hearings, H.R., Comm, on Mil Affairs, 78th

Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 3022, pt. 2, pp. 626-27.

See also Ltr, Patterson to Murray, 8 Oct 43, copy

in OCMH file. 38

 The New York Times, October 24, 1943, p.

57. See also the later Report to the Office of

Contract Settlement by Industry Comm. Selected

to Investigate Direct Settlement and Related

Problems, 12 Dec 44, OCMH file; and Termination of War Contracts, a study prepared by the

Law Department of the National Association of

Manufacturers, copy in OUSW file.
348 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

report contended, "quibble the nation into

a panic."

 39

 The Contract Settlement Act

of 1944, signed by the President on 1

July, created the Office of Contract Settlement headed by a director responsible for

prescribing policies and procedures and

enforcing their observance.40 The act followed existing procedures in providing for

quick negotiated settlements, prompt removal of inventories from contractors'

plants, and interim financing to enable

contractors to proceed with conversion to

peacetime business.41 Joint Termination

Regulations (JTR) issued by the War and

Navy Departments in November 1944 set

forth detailed procedures to guide government officials in applying the law. JTR

and the Contract Settlement Act laid a

firm statutory and regulatory base for the

procedures Ordnance had first tried out in

the Scott and Guiberson cases more than

two years earlier.

By the end of December 1944, Ordnance had authorized termination of nearly

fourteen thousand contracts, and of that

total some 93 percent had been finally

settled. The time required to settle cases

was steadily reduced during the year,

dropping from ten months for settling a

large claim in April to less than six months

by the end of the year. The backlog of

pending cases had dropped from its February peak of 2,265 involving over $4

billion to less than one thousand totaling

about $1-1/2 billion.42 In February

1945 the Office of Contract Settlement

commended the War Department on its

contract settlement performance during

the preceding six months and observed

that the progress made during this period

was "largely due to the continued good

performance of the Ordnance Department

and to the great improvement made by

Army Air Forces."

 43

Action on V-J Day

During the second week in August

1945, ASF gave Ordnance detailed instructions for terminating contracts upon

Japan's surrender. A standard telegram to

be sent to prime contractors was enclosed,

along with one for the contractor to send

to his subcontractors.44 These forms were

to be filed with Western Union, accompanied by a list of contractors, contract

numbers, and other essential data, pending

the signal for Western Union to send

them out. Ordnance forwarded these plans

to its district offices and arsenals with

instructions to be ready for prompt action

as soon as Japan surrendered. Shortly

after 7 p.m. on 14 August the Japanese

surrender was announced and the Chief

of Ordnance received a letter from ASF to

get out the termination telegrams at once.

In this process some eleven thousand contracts were terminated and the district

39

 Baruch and Hancock, op. cit. 40

 For brief and sympathetic analysis of termination activities, see the periodic reports to Congress by the Office of Contract Settlement,

particularly the Tenth Report, Jan 47, in Army

Library, which summarizes the whole record. 41

 U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 58, p. 649. See

also ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945, pp. 220-26, and

"Contract Settlement Act of 1944" by Sen.

James E. Murray, Law and Contemporary Problems (Duke University School of Law), X, No. 4

(Spring, 1944), 683ff. 42

 Graphic Analysis, Progress of Ord Program,

sec. 4, 20 Feb 45. See also Memo, Capt D. E.

Varner for Lt Col H. T. Bodman, 28 Aug 44,

sub: Analysis of ... Contract Terminations.

. . , copy in OHF; and Ltr, Robert H. Hinckley,

Director OCS, to USW, 3 Feb 45, ex. 33 in

Shepherd, op. cit. 43

 Ltr, Hinckley, to USW, 3 Feb 45. 44

 (1) Memo, ASF Director of Matériel to

USW, 4 Aug 45, sub: Advance Termination

Notice of V-J Day Cancellations, in ASF Director of Matériel file marked V-J Day Notices;

(2) Memo, ASF Director of Matériel for

CofOrd, 10 Aug 45, sub: Plng for Contract

Terminations on V-J Day, same file.
CONTRACT TERMINATION AND SETTLEMENT 349

TABLE 24—DOLLAR VALUE OF ORDNANCE CONTRACT TERMINATIONS:

As OF 31 DECEMBER 1945

Source: Graphic Analysis, Progress of Ord Program, sec. 4, 23 Jan 46, p. 2, OHF.

offices were deluged with settlement work.

By the end of the year, the job was well

under way, as the table shows. (Table

24) By the end of the following year

Ordnance could sum up its contract settlement record in terms of some thirty-five

thousand fixed-price contracts settled—

most on a no-claim basis—for a total

canceled commitment value of over $13

billion. Settled cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts

were fewer in number—only. 184 all told

—but accounted for an additional $3

billion.

Termination of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts posed special problems. Under such

contracts the government was obliged to

reimburse contractors for expenses incurred in performance of their contracts.

But what expenses were to be considered

reasonable and proper? Each contract

presented a host of puzzling questions.

Seemingly small matters, such as a few

cents increase in the hourly rate of pay

for employees, could mount up to a million dollars on a large contract. Contractors were slow to settle their CPFF contracts because they feared that agreements

reached with Ordnance or one of the other

military procurement agencies would be

upset later by the General Accounting

Office. They declined to dispose of their

inventories or close their accounts with

subcontractors until the government settled their claims. The situation became so

serious that Under Secretary of War

Patterson appealed to the Attorney General for help. In October 1944 the Attorney General expressed the opinion that

contracting agencies had the authority to

make settlements of all claims and that the

Office of Contract Settlement had authority to issue appropriate regulations on the

subject. The Office of Contract Settlement soon published, as part of the Joint

Termination Regulations, a procedure that

required contracting officers to answer

objections raised by the General Accounting Office during a 60-day period after the

termination agreement was reached.45

Insofar as speed was concerned, the overall Ordnance record on terminations was

good, but by January 1946 the original

forecast of accomplishment had not been

met. In explanation, the contract termination section reported that delays stemmed

from a variety of causes. Some contractors

had not submitted their claims promptly

while others, having received partial payment, were content to postpone final set45

 This complex problem is discussed on an

Army-wide basis, with specific details on the Ordnance tank contract with the Baldwin Locomotive Works, in Smith, Army and Economic Mobilization, Chapter XXVIII.
350 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

tlement until more urgent reconversion

work was completed. Other contractors

showed a tendency to insist upon getting

the last dollar on each claim even though

that meant prolonging the negotiation.

Ordnance was at fault in some instances.

The districts had underestimated the personnel they would require after V-J Day,

while mandatory cuts in personnel undermined morale and disrupted normal routine. The letdown that came with the end

of the war combined with the desire of

civilians to get back to peacetime pursuits

to create a really serious personnel problem.46

The conclusion that Ordnance contract

settlements were, on the whole, fast and

final, appears sound,47 but it is impossible

to determine precisely how "fair" they

were. The settlement process left much to

the discretion of the contractor and the

contracting officer, and placed less emphasis on following the rule book than on

following the practices of private business

in drawing up an agreement acceptable to

both parties. It may be assumed that contracting officers, modestly paid guardians

of the public interest, must at times have

grown weary of the struggle when pitted

against representatives of firms with a

heavy financial stake in the settlement.

Pressure to settle contracts with utmost

speed must at times have led them to take

short cuts and to accept rule of thumb

estimates that may have been overly generous. But a field survey by accountants

from the Office of Contract Settlement in

December 1944, including a check of

twelve Ordnance district offices, concluded

that contract settlement agencies were

doing a good job and that many contractors were so eager to convert to peacetime

business that they did not insist on all the

profits they were entitled to. Later surveys

sponsored by the Office of Contract Settlement came to the same conclusion 48

The years that followed World War II

brought to light no substantial evidence of

unjust enrichment of Ordnance contractors. Neither did these years bring the

economic paralysis and widespread unemployment feared by many. Instead, they

brought speedy demobilization of the

armed forces and rapid conversion of the

nation's economy from war to peace production, and a relatively high level of

prosperity. Friendly relations of Ordnance

and its contractors, the indispensable basis

for wartime co-operation, were not disturbed. Several factors contributed to this

result, chief of them being the high wartime tax rates and the recapture of excess

profits under the Renegotiation Act. The

Internal Revenue Bureau's decision that

termination payments were to be considered as income received on the day of

termination, rather than on the date of

final settlement, kept contractors from

dragging out negotiations to take advantage of lower postwar tax rates.49

 Industry's natural desire to beat swords into

ploughshares, aided by the government's

enlightened contract termination and settlement policy worked something akin to

an industrial miracle in postwar reconversion.

46

 Reasons for the Ordnance Department Not

Meeting the Forecasts Originally Set (Termination of Contracts), 22 Jan 46, apparently prepared by Contract Termination Br of Legal Div,

attached to Shepherd, op. cit. See also Letter,

CofOrd to all district chiefs, 13 Dec 45, OO160/

19008 Misc. 47

 Memo, CofOrd for Chief Detroit Dist, 29

Jan 46, sub: Time Required to Settle Terminations, copy in OHF. 48

 War Contract Terminations and Settlements,

Report by the Director of Contract Settlement to

the Congress, 2d rpt, Jan 45; 4th rpt, Jul 45, and

8th rpt, Jul 46. 49

 U.S. Office of Contract Settlement, A History

of War Contract Terminations and Settlements, p. 2.
CHAPTER XVI

Field Service: Legacy of World War I

Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams created

Field Service as a major division of the

Office of the Chief of Ordnance in January 1919.1

 Field Service was clearly a

product of World War I, a war that had

revealed the inadequacies of traditional

supply systems. The primary responsibility

assigned to Field Service was management

of the Ordnance Department's huge postwar supply of weapons, ammunition, and

related matériel, valued in the spring of

1921 at approximately $1,311,000,000.

Within the framework of the Office of the

Chief of Ordnance the new division's

storage and maintenance functions complemented the development and procurement functions of the Manufacturing

Service, later to be renamed Industrial

Service.

Field Service had charge of all Ordnance depots; it bore responsibility for the

maintenance and issue of equipment to

troops, and for all salvage operations; and

it was primarily responsible for training

Ordnance troops. Except for a brief interlude in 1925-28, when the Manufacturing

Service took over the task, Field Service

had the important duty of making surveillance inspection of ammunition in

storage. It was also assigned the duty of

preparing standard nomenclature lists

(SNL's), technical regulations, firing

tables, and the tables of organization and

basic allowances that determined the distribution of Ordnance supplies. To aid in

carrying out this aspect of its duties, Field

Service organized a publications department at Raritan Arsenal. During most of

the period before 1940 Field Service consisted of four branches—Executive, General Supply, Ammunition, and Maintenance. There was some reshuffling of

responsibilities among these branches during World War II, and creation of new

branches, but the broad outlines of Field

Service organization remained fairly stable.2

The supply procedures of the new division grew out of the experiences of

Ordnance officers in France. To make the

most of these experiences while they were

fresh in men's minds, the chief Ordnance

officer of the AEF, Brig. Gen. John H.

Rice, in April 1919 appointed a board to

prepare a manual to guide future Ordnance operations in the field. When the

members of the board assembled at Tours

they had before them the reports that

General Rice had required of all officers

commanding Ordnance installations in

1

 (1) Ord Office Order 495, 7 Jan 19; (2) WD

General Orders 80, 19 June 1919, gave Field

Service permanent status. See also Annual Report Chief of Ordnance, 1919, and History,

Field Service, Executive Branch, vol. I, 1919-39,

pt.1. 2

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 20, 99; (2) Hist, FS,

Exec Div, vol. II, pt. 1 (1939-43).
352 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

France, plus a special report prepared by

several officers who had visited British

supply depots to make a thorough study

of the British system.3 The board members also had as a basis for their recommendations their own firsthand knowledge

of the chaos of the early months of war;

they recalled the lack of planning and the

almost insuperable difficulty of using an

outmoded system to supply a modern

army. Colonel Crain was an ammunition

specialist who had made a study of the

French system of ammunition supply; Lt.

Col. Lucian D. Booth had served as Ordnance Officer of the First Army; Maj.

Keith F. Adamson and Capt. R. K. Lane

knew maintenance problems intimately;

and Capt. C. Huth and Capt. J. D. Ashton were specialists in stock control.4

The result of their deliberations was the

Provisional Manual for Ordnance Field

Service . . ., published by the War Department in 1920. It covered all phases

of Ordnance work in a theater of operations: organization and operation of the

office of the chief Ordnance officer; duties

of the Ordnance officer at army, corps,

division, and camp and port levels; methods of storing and issuing supplies; types

of depots and depot layouts; ammunition

supply in the combat zone; maintenance

facilities; and the organization and training of ammunition companies and maintenance units.5

 The proposed ammunition

supply system resembled that of the French

Army; the stock control system for weapons and other general supplies was patterned on that of the British;6

 and the

depot system was formed on the plan

evolved by the U.S. Services of Supply by

which supplies were forwarded to the front

through base, intermediate, and advance

depots.7 Because it was desirable to have

operations in the Zone of the Interior

closely resemble those of a theater of operations, the 1919 manual formed, with

some modifications, the basis for the entire

Ordnance distribution system at the time

Field Service was formed.8

The Pattern for Depots and

Maintenance Facilities

The depot pattern grew out of an Armywide realization that new methods of

forwarding supplies to front-line troops

would have to be evolved to meet such

unprecedented conditions of warfare as

those encountered in World War I. General Staff planners in France considered

several choices: "Should all supplies arriving from overseas be stored at the port,

being forwarded as needed, running the

chances of interruption to the rail communication by air attack, storm, or the

changing position of our troops at the

front but minimizing the handling of the

freight? Should it all be shipped to the

vicinity of the troops with possibility of its

destruction by air raids, or of capture or

abandonment through the shifting of the

battle lines? Or should it be divided into

Base, Intermediate and Advance storage, in

the proportions say of ten days' supply in

Advance storage, twenty-five days' in Intermediate and ten in Base storage?"

3

 Lt. Col. Lucian D. Booth, "The General Supply Division, Field Service," Army Ordnance, I,

No. 4 (January-March 1921), 196. 4

 Interv, Maj. Gen. James K. Crain, 1 7 Feb 54. 5

 Provisional Manual for Ordnance Field Service. . . , September 1919 (Washington, 1920)

[hereafter cited as Manual of 1919] , p. 3, OHF. 6

 Allied and Associated Powers, Report of the

Military Board of Allied Supply (Washington,

1924), I, 316; II, 298. 7

 James J. Harbord, The American Army in

France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1936), pp. 120-21. 8

 Booth, op. cit., p. 196.
FIELD SERVICE: LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I 353

The latter plan was the one adopted, with

the advance depot feeding the Army

depots or railheads in the combat zone.9

After the war the Army depot system in

the United States similarly consisted of

three main types of depots, called reserve,

intermediate, and area. Reserve depots received vast stocks in bulk from factories

and held most of them for use in time of

war or other emergency. Intermediate

depots, spread out across the country,

acted as wholesale warehouses for certain

areas, storing in bulk enough supplies to

meet requirements for three months. Area

depots were retailers, carrying enough

stocks to meet their responsibilities to

posts, camps, and stations for three

months. The small depots at the station

level kept on hand enough supplies for

one month's consumption.

Along these lines the War Department

maintained general depots, containing

supplies of all types—weapons, food, medical supplies, and so on, and the Ordnance

Department and several other supply services maintained branch depots of the reserve and intermediate types. The Secretary of War in 1920 designated eighteen

Ordnance reserve depots, most of them

for ammunition, and four intermediate

depots. The latter were not merely storage

depots but old-line repair arsenals dating

from the Civil War or before.10

As the system worked out in the postwar years., reserves of artillery, small arms,

fire control instruments, tractors, and

other general supplies were stored at proving grounds or at the arsenals where they

were made. Fire control instruments were

kept at Frankford, small arms at Springfield, gun carriages at Watertown, and big

guns at Watervliet; the greatest concentration of tank, artillery, and small arms

reserves was maintained at Rock Island

LARGE-CALIBER AMMUNITION IN STORAGE at an ammunition reserve depot, 1940.

Arsenal in Illinois.11 By 1929 about half

of the 1920 ammunition reserve depots

had been abolished; from 1929 until the

World War II expansion began ammunition reserves were stored at the following

depots: Curtis Bay in Maryland, Delaware

and Raritan in New Jersey, Pig Point

(renamed Nansemond) in Virginia, Savanna in Illinois, Wingate in New Mexico,

and Ogden in Utah. The intermediate

depots—Augusta in Georgia, Benicia in

California, Rock Island in Illinois, and

9

 Harbord, op. cit., pp. 120-21. 10

 (1) Booth, op. cit., p. 197; (2) "Storage of

Supplies for the Army," Army Ordnance, I, No.

4 (January-March 1921), 200. 11

 (1) OCO Historical Sec, Spec Plng Br,

Monograph No. 8, Ordnance Field Service, 1

July 1940 to 31 August 1945, 31 Dec 45 [hereafter referred to as Monograph No. 8], p. 13.

OHF; (2) Interv, Crain, 17 Feb 54.
354 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

San Antonio in Texas—also served as area

depots.12

Maintenance problems scarcely existed

before World War I. Each infantry company took into the field a small box of

spare parts and a few simple tools with

which the company mechanic repaired the

rifles and pistols; each battery of field

artillery had a store wagon, a battenwagon, and a forge limber including a

blacksmith's outfit for shoeing horses. In

World War I the use of motor vehicles to

a degree never before known and the development of new and more complex weapons made necessary an elaborate system of

maintenance. There had to be substantial

base shops in the rear of the armies for

major repairs on heavy ordnance matériel

and large-scale repair of small arms. Advance base shops, of a rather permanent

nature, had to be pushed as far forward

as the safety of their stores and suitable

railway facilities permitted. Mobile shops,

mounted on trucks or trailers, were needed

to accompany the armies. The system set

up in the United States after the war

corresponded to this theater-of-operations

plan. Four manufacturing arsenals, Rock

Island, Watertown, Watervliet, and

Springfield, performed the heavy work

done by base shops during the war; four

depots, Benicia, San Antonio, Augusta,

and Raritan, acted as advance maintenance shops for the Corps Areas they

served.13

The Ordnance Provision System

The methods of distributing weapons at

the beginning of World War I were as

antiquated as the phrasing in the definition of ordnance and ordnance stores contained in Army Regulations of 1913:

"Cannon and artillery vehicles, and

equipments; apparatus and machines for

the service and maneuver of artillery;

small arms, ammunition and accoutrements; horse equipments and harness for

Field Artillery, and horse equipment for

Cavalry and other mounted men; tools,

machinery and materials for the Ordnance

service; and all property of whatever nature supplied to the Military Establishment by the Ordnance Department."

 14

To aid the troops in ordering supplies

and the storekeepers in issuing them, the

Ordnance Department listed all matériel

in detail in a "storage catalogue" of seven

volumes. Volume I, for example, listed

ammunition of all kinds; Volume II,

caissons and limbers; and Volume III,

cannon, carriages and mounts, including

fire control items. For definite identification and for convenience in ordering by

cable or telegraph, each item and its various parts carried a number of several

digits, the first of which was always 7, the

General Staff designation for Ordnance.

Thus, since 4 meant the equipment volume

and 1 meant animal, a requisition for

741-1 would call for one complete

"Aparejo" or packsaddle, and 741-1-2,

741-1-3 and so on, would call for specific parts of the Aparejo.15

 The classification differed little from that in use at

the time of the Civil War.16

12

 (1) Survey of the Ordnance Department, 20

Sep 29, Incl 6, Survey of Depots and Excess Supplies, and Incl 12, Supply and Maint of Combat

Matériel in the Existing Army, 320/377 NA; (2)

Monograph No. 8, p. 2. 13

 Col. Kenneth B. Harmon, "Ordnance Maintenance," Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (January

-March 1921), 167-72. 14

 Manual of 1919, p. 7. 15

 U.S. Ord Dept, Storage Catalogue, IV

(Washington, 1919), v-vii. 16

 U.S. Ord Dept, Instructions for Making

Quarterly Returns of Ordnance and Ordnance

Stores. . . , (Washington, 1863), pp. 39-77. Line

officers reported quarterly on the weapons as-
FIELD SERVICE: LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I 355

In addition to the number of each

article the catalogue gave the accepted

name, or "standard nomenclature," together with a brief description that would

theoretically enable an inexperienced man

to identify it. But the vast numbers of inexperienced men that came into the Army

in World War I, and the growing complexity and volume of Ordnance matériel,

soon made it evident that new methods of

identification and classification would

have to be devised.

American officers who studied the

British system of supply in France discovered an interesting experiment in decentralization and specialization. The British had found that it was impossible under

the pressure of a large-scale war for the

officer or new recruit called from civilian

life to gain a thorough knowledge of all

ordnance matériel; but he could learn

thoroughly one particular kind of article.

This was the principle behind the segregation of like stores into groups that resembled small depots within a depot. The

group system had been introduced at

Nantes in the fall of 1914 by Col. Thomas

Heron, a retired officer of ripe experience

who had tried it out in prewar years at

Aldershot. It worked well in France. As a

British historian explained, "No one would

set a fitter to do saddler's work or vice

versa; and though storekeeping involves a

less specialized skill, still there is a great

difference between being able to identify

the particular fittings used with each type

of gun and being able to piece together

the various bits of leather that go to make

up different sets of harness and saddlery,

and knowing in each case the exact

nomenclature."

 17

Knowledge of nomenclature and ability

to identify were of the first importance in

the accurate reporting of stocks in wartime, as Americans were to rediscover in

World War II; but these were not the

only advantages of the British system. The

use of the records was directed toward

"provision"—the replenishment of stocks

—rather than merely property accountability. Each group, no matter in what

depot it was located, reported promptly

and simultaneously, and thus the central

office knew at all times the condition of

any one type of stores and could make

procurement when necessary.18

The Manual of 1919 directed that depots be organized on the group system,

with each group acting as an independent

depot, receiving and issuing property and

keeping such records as were necessary;

but it did not definitely designate what

classes went into what groups. The Ordnance Provision System Regulations after

the war not only used the British system,

but also included some modifications based

on American military experience and procedures used by two American mail order

houses, Montgomery Ward and Company

and Sears Roebuck and Company.19 The

signed to them. A Form for Keeping a Record

of Company Ordnance Property in an Ordinary

Memorandum Book recounted the losses of a

hypothetical Capt. A. B. Brown of Company A,

199th R.I. Volunteers, mustered into service January 1, 1862. As the company passed through

New York, "Private V. Shiftless deserted, taking

with him his musket and set of accoutrements";

later, at the battle of Gaines' Mill, the muskets,

cartridge boxes, gun slings, bayonet scabbards,

and waist belts of ten casualties had to be written

off because "the Regiment was obliged to retire

from the ground on which they fell." Ibid., pp.

117-19.

17

 Maj. Gen. A. Forbes, A,History of the Army

Ordnance Services, Volume III: The Great War

(London: Medici Society, Ltd., 1929), pp. 112

-13.

18

 Ibid. 19

 Interv, Ernest L. Kahlert, 30 Jul 52.
356 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

term "provisioning" was defined as estimating requirements, distributing matériel,

and maintaining necessary stocks at the

arsenals, depots, and other Ordnance establishments issuing stores to troops. The

object of the regulations was to provide

the records necessary to control stocks, to

place orders for new procurement, and to

make special distribution in time of war.

The system was entirely separate from the

system of property accounting that was

common to all supply departments of the

Army and served a different purpose. It

closely linked distribution and procurement, using one set of records for both.20

The Ordnance Provision System adopted

after World War I placed all Ordnance

supplies in groups, each group containing

major items of a similar character with

their own spare parts and accessories.21

Parts common to two or more major items

were placed in one general group, to avoid

dividing the supply among several groups

with the probable result of an accumulation in one group and a shortage in

another. In its strict sense a major item

was an element of matériel of sufficient

importance to require individual classification or documentation. It might be an

article normally issued or procured separately, even if not used separately, as, for

example, a fuze for a large bomb or a

carriage for an artillery piece. Generally,

the major item was the weapon itself, the

complete, independent, operating unit such

as the rifle ready to shoot. A major combination was a single composite unit consisting of two or more major items, such

as a tank and its gun, or a gun mounted

on its carriage. In ammunition supply a

distinction was made between the complete round, meaning the artillery shell or

bomb or mine loaded, fuzed, and ready to

function, and the component, which was

the cartridge case, fuze, or other part that

would be assembled to make the complete

round.22

Groups of major items were designated

by letters of the alphabet. Items of general

supply, with their parts and accessories,

were in Groups A through G; common

and maintenance supplies were in Groups

H, J, K, L, M, and N. Group A consisted

of automatic weapons and mortars; Group

B, hand and shoulder arms; Groups C

through E, various kinds of artillery;

Group F, sighting and fire control equipment; Group G, tank and automotive

matériel; Group H, hardware: Group

J, common tools; Group K, cleaning, preserving, and welding materials; Group L,

targets and target materials; Group M,

electrical apparatus units and parts;

Group N, equipment issued to ordnance

establishments, ordnance units, and certain

20

 (1) Booth, op. cit., pp. 196-200; (2) General Motors Overseas Operations, General Survey

of the Ordnance Department (May 1942) [hereafter cited as GM Survey], I, 58-59; 175-82,

OHF; (3) OCO FS, Stock Control Division, vol.

1, History From 1921 Through 31 Aug 43 [hereafter cited as SCD Hist], pp. 15-22; (4) Memo,

Maj William G. Hynds for Brig Gen Harry R.

Kutz, 21 Sep 42, sub: General Supply Branch

Activities as I See Them [hereafter cited as

Hynds Memo], OHF. 21

 Generally speaking, an accessory was an article that was not a part of the major item but

was needed to operate it successfully, such as

a cleaning rod for a rifle. PSP 65, Field Service

Publications, Development and Distribution, Jun

45, ex AD, OHF. 22

 (1) Col. Harry B. Hambleton, History of the

Engineering Administrative Branch, Industrial

Service, OCO, 19 Nov 45 [hereafter cited as

Hambleton, Hist, Engr-Administrative Br], ex. 26,

Drafting Room Regulations, Ordnance Department, United States Army (Washington, 1945),

p. 147, OHF; (2) WD Cir 155, 8 Jul 43. For an

explanation of the confusion that sometimes resulted from various applications of these definitions, see Ordnance Department Board Reports,

Project No. 48, Establishment of Definitions and

Policies Concerning Major Items, Aberdeen Proving Ground.
FIELD SERVICE: LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I 357

tactical units. Groups P through T were

ammunition. When general supply items

became obsolete they were transferred

from their several live groups and segregated in Group OGS. Obsolete ammunition was retained in its original group

because it had to be carefully watched

and controlled. There was one final category, Group Z, for captured foreign

matériel.23

Within the lettered groups, supplies were

further subdivided into smaller classes of

stores. These had a subgroup number that

served as an identification code. Thus the

.30-caliber rifle in Group B had a subgroup number, 21, making its classification

B-21. A further means of identification

was the "piece mark," or drawing number.

The great bulk of artillery and small arms

items, and some combat vehicle matériel,

bore the numbers that appeared on their

engineering drawings. These were usually

nonsignificant numbers prefixed by "A,"

"B," "C," "D," or "E." The letters indicated drawing sizes, "A" the smallest,

"E" the largest; the numbers assigned for

each size began with 1 and continued

serially. But if an article was of a common

kind called "standard," like automotive

parts, hardware, or tools, it would be

marked with a number prefixed by four

letters, the last of which was always "X."

These were known as "taxi" numbers after

the first number of this type, TAAX1.

Standards that were common to other government agencies might carry a Federal

Standard Stock Catalog number assigned

by the Treasury Department: for example,

42-C-4625 was the number for a certain

kind of gasoline can.24

The machinery for producing the records

was simple. For all stores, reports known

as Schedules of Stores Reports were sent

periodically from field establishments—arsenals and depots alike—to Washington.

They showed the stock on hand; the issues

covering a definite period; the obligations,

or unfilled requisitions—known as "duescut"; the anticipated receipts from all

sources—known as "dues-in"; and demands for replenishment. Distinction was

made between "dues-out" to troops and

"dues-out" to depots; the former meant

real obligations of the Ordnance Department to the using arms; the latter, merely

intradepartmental obligations. Similarly, a

distinction was made between "dues-in"

from original procurement and "dues-in"

from depots, because the latter did not

increase the total stock.25

The dates of reporting were spread

throughout the year in order not to work

a hardship on the depots. The schedule

ranged from monthly to annually, but

there was no hard and fast rule. Normally

the greatest spread was semiannually. In

the case of great activity in the volume or

importance of any item, the schedule could

be shortened to daily, using telephone or

telegraph if necessary. But it was of the

utmost importance that any given item be

regularly reported by all depots on the

same date. The consolidated report gave

the Group Chiefs in Washington a close

central control of stock. If one depot

showed a shortage, he or she—most of the

Group Chiefs were women—could tell

whether another depot had a surplus, and

if so, make a transfer. If there was a general shortage, the Chief of Field Service

could recommend procurement. Because

23

 PSP 65, exs. AD and AF. 24

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Hambleton, Hist, EngrAdminstrative Br, exs. 12, 24; (3) Rock Island

Arsenal, History of Ordnance Drawing Numbers

and Ordnance Part Numbers, 8 Oct 45, pp. 1-6,

OHF. 25

 (1) GM Survey, I, 175-82; (2) Hynds

Memo.
358 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

he had to make important decisions on the

basis of the Schedules of Stores Reports,

the Chief of Field Service took precautions

to see that the figures were accurate. He

directed the depot supply officers to work

closely with the men actually in charge of

supplies to check nomenclature carefully,

and to call for physical inventory of any

item whenever he had reason to suspect

that storehouse records were inaccurate.26

Standard Nomenclature Lists

The official name of every item was established by the Ordnance Committee,

composed of representatives of the Technical, Industrial, and Field Service Divisions, and of the using arms. The interested

subcommittee recommending development

work on a new item or adoption of a

newly developed item obtained the nomenclature from a Basic Nomenclature and

Classification File kept in the Office of the

Chief Engineer, Artillery Branch, Industrial Division. The nomenclature consisted

of the most important noun followed by

qualifying nouns or adjectives in the order

of importance, as, "gun, machine, cal. .30,

Browning." After approval and assignment

of the model numbers (prefixed by "M"

for standard types and "T" for development types), which then became a part of

the nomenclature, the items were listed in

the Book of Standards, Ordnance Department.27

For requisitioning, stockkeeping, the

guidance of maintenance units, and also for

the use of procurement and distribution

officials in Washington, Field Service after

World War I began to publish a series of

pamphlets called Standard Nomenclature

Lists (SNL's). Collectively they formed

the Ordnance supply catalog, and were a

basic tool of the Ordnance Provision System. For each numbered subgroup of the

lettered groups, such as the .30-caliber

rifle, B-21, there was a pamphlet listing

alphabetically the major item and all parts

and equipment, with identifying numbers.

There was a column for the stockkeeping number, another for the number that

appeared on the engineering drawing,

another for the "figure number" that was

a clue to the diagrams or photographs in

another section, and a column for the note

symbol, a reference to notes in the back of

the SNL. Two very general pamphlets

served as guides, the Introduction to the

Ordnance Catalog (IOC), explaining the

use of the SNL's; and an index called

Ordnance Publications for Supply Index

(OPSI), containing a numerical and alphabetical listing of all the pamphlets and

a description of the matériel in each

lettered group.28

In some respects the SNL's were comparable to commercial parts lists; in

another sense they were supplements to

Tables of Organization and Equipment,

Tables of Basic Allowances, and Tables of

Allowances. For example, if a T/OE stated

that an organization was authorized a

Tool Set Unit Equipment, Second Echelon Set No. 1, the pertinent SNL, which

was G-27, Tools, Maintenance, for Repair

of Modern Vehicles, described the com26

 (1) Ordnance Provision System Regulations,

1 Jan 45, pp. 4-6, OHF; (2) Intervs, Crain, 17

Feb, 3 May 54. 27 (1) ASF Contl Div Rpt No. 105, Nomenclature and Supply Catalog, Apr 43 [hereafter

cited as ASF Rpt 105], pp. 2-3, ASF Contl Div

Files G129; (2) and see Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 33-34. 28

 (1) PSP 65, p. 38 and exs. AD and AF; (2)

Sgt. Mortimer Gordon, "Use of the Standard

Nomenclature List," The Ordnance Sergeant, V

(April 1943), 384-92.
FIELD SERVICE: LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I 359

ponents of the set in detail.29 Close coordination with the using arms, with designers, and with procurement officials was

necessary to provide the information in

the pamphlets. For that reason the group

charged with the preparation of SNL's

was conveniently located after 1921 at

Raritan Arsenal, New Jersey.30

The Lamp of Experience

In the House of Representatives shortly

after World War I, Representative John Q.

Tilson said, "The next five years will be

the very best years in the century to make

plans. The lamp of experience, a heartrending experience in many respects, will

be a light to guide us."

 31

 In France after

the Armistice Ordnance officers had drawn

upon their own experience and that of the

Allies in the preparation of the Provisional

Manual for a theater of operations, in the

adoption of the Ordnance Provision System, and in plans for the organization of

Field Service. In the period immediately

following World War I the tremendous

effort required to store the vast stocks of

ordnance matériel that had to be cleared

out of war industry plants, ports, and

training camps justified the wisdom of

creating a separate division of the Ordnance Department to handle operations in

the field.32 Field Service managed to provide shelter for this huge accumulation of

stores, and this experience influenced the

thinking of the men who would have to

expand the depot system in World War II.

29

 PSP 65, pp. 36-38 and ex. AD. 30

 Ibid. For developments in the preparation of

SNL's after 1940, see Chapter XXII, below. 31

 John Q. Tilson, "Swords and Plowshares,"

Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (January-March

1921), 165. 32

 Brig. Gen. George W. Burr, "Ordnance Field

Service," Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (JanuaryMarch 1921), 165-66.
CHAPTER XVII

The New Depot System

The first postwar Congressional investigation into the operations of the War

Department took place shortly after the

Revolutionary War. On 2 October 1788

an investigating committee reported that

most of the arms and ammunition left

over from the War were stored at the three

permanent Army arsenals1—Springfield,

West Point, and Philadelphia. Some

matériel remained at four temporary depots

and at furnaces where the shot and shell

were cast. The committee recommended

that temporary depots be abandoned and

that all stores be placed in the permanent

arsenals.

Facilities at the arsenals were not ideal.

The buildings at Springfield were in good

condition, but those at West Point, constructed of unseasoned wood, were decaying fast. The so-called arsenal at Philadelphia consisted of rented buildings unsuited

for ordnance storage and scattered inconveniently throughout the city. The construction of proper and permanent arsenals

and magazines plainly demanded the

serious attention of the Government. But

the investigators concluded that "as the

expense of erecting suitable buildings for

this purpose will be great, it will perhaps

be thought advisable to defer it for the

present."

 2

After succeeding wars the Government

repeatedly adopted a similar policy of contraction and economy. The dangerous

concentration of ammunition in Atlantic

Coast depots following the Armistice in

1918 made necessary the construction of

two new depots in the interior in 1920,

Savanna in Illinois and Ogden in Utah.

But this gain was more than offset by the

loss in the early twenties of nine of the

Ordnance reserve depots that had been

marked for retention under the National

Defense Act as amended 4 June 1920.3

In the mid-twenties a major disaster

brought the subject of ammunition storage

forcibly to the attention of the public. Late

in the afternoon of 10 July 1926 a bolt of

lightning struck a magazine at the Naval

Ammunition Depot at Lake Denmark,

New Jersey. The resultant explosions

killed a number of people, wrecked the

Navy depot, and partially demolished

1

 As used here the term arsenal meant a storehouse for arms and ammunition. Springfield

Armory was not established as a manufacturing

arsenal until 1794. See Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 14. 2

 (1) U.S. Adjutant General's Office, Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of

the United States . . . 1775-1901 (Washington,

1901), pp. 569-71; (2) Brig. Gen. William H.

Tschappat, "Early History of American Ordnance," Army Ordnance XIII, No. 78 (MayJune 1933), 336. 3

 (1) "Storage of Supplies for the Army,"

Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (January-March 1921),

200; (2) 70th Cong., 1st sess., Doc. 199, Ammunition Storage Conditions (Washington, 1928)

[hereafter cited as Doc. 199], p. 48.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 361

neighboring Picatinny Arsenal.4 As a result, Congress directed the Secretaries of

War and of the Navy to make a survey

of ammunition storage, with special emphasis on the likelihood of danger to

nearby communities. The Army section of

the joint Army-Navy board appointed to

make the survey reported that with

minor exceptions there was ample safe and

properly located storage to care for all

Army ammunition in the continental

United States. It asserted that preventing

a repetition of the disaster and generally

improving unsatisfactory conditions was

almost entirely a matter of redistribution

and rearrangement.5 Its recommendation

that a permanent Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board be appointed to

serve as adviser on ammunition storage to

the Secretary of War and the Secretary of

the Navy was promptly accepted.6

An important feature of the 1928 rearrangement program was the construction

at several depots of a new type of magazine. Called an "igloo" from its resemblance to Eskimo shelters, it was a low,

earth-covered structure of reinforced concrete, its sides arched to form a semicircular roof. The shape directed the power of

an explosion upward rather than outward.

It was the best type of storage yet devised

for such dangerous ammunition as loaded

bombs and large-caliber shells. To take

care of East Coast ammunition the Ordnance Department built twenty-four igloos

at Savanna, Illinois, which was considered

ideal because of its isolated situation. Bybuilding igloos in lesser numbers at Aberdeen, Delaware, and Benicia, Ordnance

made those depots safe for limited amounts

of larger caliber ammunition. The igloos

were all completed by March of 19297

Very little other new construction was

possible in the lean years of the twenties

and early thirties. As a result, depots became run down. Buildings were old, railroad trackage rusted and inadequate,

highways patched and narrow, docks dilapidated, and equipment insufficient and

largely obsolescent.8 It was not until the

mid-1930's that the War Department gave

serious attention to any considerable expansion of Ordnance storage facilities.

Mobilization Regulations 4-2 of February

1935 provided for increased production of

munitions, and a proposal by the Baker

Board in 1934 to build up the Air Corps

had brought a demand for more space for

bomb storage. Moreover, the money available for the program of public works organized to combat the effects of the depression could defray some of the cost.9

Late in 1936 the Chief of Ordnance

submitted requests amounting to approximately $21 million for new construction

and repair at various Ordnance establish4

 (1) Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, "The

Lake Denmark Naval Ammunition Depot Disaster," Army Ordnance, VII, No. 38, (September—

October 1926), 125-29; (2) Col. William H.

Tschappat, "The Lake Denmark Explosion—Its

Effect on Picatinny Arsenal," Army Ordnance,

VII, No. 38 (September-October 1926), 131-34. 5

 Doc. No. 199, p. 7. 6

 45 Stat. 928, 29 May 1928. 7

 (1) Doc. 199, pp. 7-15; (2) Brig. Gen. Edward E. MacMorland, "Ordnance Supply System," Mechanical Engineering, vol. 67 (Dec 45-

Jan, Feb, Mar 46), p. 792; (3) Capt. Albert D.

Lueders, Historical Report on Development and

Construction, Ammunition Storage Depots, [hereafter cited as Lueders Rpt], p. 1, in History,

Field Service Storage Division, vol. 101 [hereafter

cited as Hist, Storage Div], OHF. 8

 Monograph No. 8, p. 12. 9

 (1) War Department Policy Concerning Sites

for New Ordnance Depots. . . , Approved Site

Board Reports, 1 Dec 44 [hereafter cited as Site

Bd Rpts], exs. 1-13, OHF; (2) Ltr, SW to

CofOrd, 22 Aug 34, sub: Storage for Air Corps

Ammo, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 26. There were

22 inclosures, dated 21 Sep 34 to 2 Oct 38; see

resume, ibid.
362 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ments, including manufacturing arsenals

as well as depots.10 This request, and a

recommendation by the Chemical Warfare Service for rehabilitation of chemical

manufacturing establishments at Edgewood Arsenal, led Brig. Gen. George R.

Spalding, Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, to

the decision that, before any large sums of

money were spent, the War Department

ought to draw up a plan for an ideal system of manufacturing and storage facilities.

The most important considerations were,

in order of importance, strategic location

to avoid destruction by enemy attack;

proximity to vital raw materials; nearness

to probable theaters, assuming that the

most probable theaters were in the West

and Southwest; economy of operation;

and, finally, climate. On General Spalding's recommendation, the Secretary of

War ordered the Chief of Ordnance, Maj.

Gen. William H. Tschappat, to submit

such a plan for his own installations. General Tschappat delegated the job to a

board of five officers, headed by Col.

Norman F. Ramsey.11

The Ramsey Board dismissed considerations of climate and economy of operation

as relatively unimportant; it concentrated

on strategic location and proximity to

probable theaters. As to strategic location,

the Secretary of War had laid down the

policy that, generally speaking, after M-day

there would be no construction for the

storage of wartime reserves on the eastern

seaboard of the United States, the area

between the Atlantic Coast and the eastern

slope of the Appalachian Mountains; or

on the western seaboard, in the area lying

west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada

ranges.12 The Board proposed as an additional safety measure that depots be located at a reasonable distance from the

northern and southern boundaries of the

United States,13 and concluded that the

best locations for storing war reserves were

Rock Island, for general supplies, and

Savanna, for ammunition.

On the second point, proximity to theaters of operation, the Board assumed that

the best system in time of peace was one

that would function best in time of war.

On this basis, the mountain and Pacific

Coast states (IX Corps Area), and Hawaii

would be best served by Ogden in Utah

and Benicia in California; the Central

United States (V, VI, and VII Corps

Areas) by Rock Island and Savanna, both

in Illinois; the Southeast (IV Corps Area)

by Augusta Arsenal, Georgia. These were

all existing depots. For the Southwest

(VIII Corps Area) ideally there should be

a new depot in Texas, but practically San

Antonio Arsenal could be built up to serve.

For the Northeast (I, II, and III Corps

Areas) the best solution was a new depot

in central Pennsylvania; but the cost was

prohibitive. The Board felt that the expense was not justified and that Raritan

would be adequate to serve the northeast

area and also provide overseas supply of

Panama, if Delaware assumed some of the

10

 Ibid., ex. 17. Of this amount, $4-1/2 million

was for a new bomb storage project at Cheat

Bridge, W. Va. This site was later discarded because the remote mountainous country created

problems of construction, transportation, and

labor; also, there was no level space for an airfield. Ltr, CofOrd to Hon Jennings Randolph,

26 Dec 40, OO 675/2356 Misc. 11

 Site Bd Rpts, exs. 17, 19, 20. 12

 Ltr, SW to Chiefs of All Supply Arms and

Services, 17 Feb 36, sub: Policy from Mil Point

of View as to Location of Additional Construction of Storage Plants, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex.

11.

13

 Report of Board of Officers to Prepare Secret

Plan Embodying An Ideal Set-up for Ordnance

Manufacturing and Storage Facilities in the

United States, 15 Apr 37, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 20, p. 24.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 363

ammunition load. The Board recommended that Curtis Bay, Nansemond, and

Charleston be abandoned, by a process of

attrition rather than immediate transfer of

the ammunition to other storage.14

In submitting this report to the War

Department, General Tschappat suggested

that a new ammunition depot might be

built in the East, perhaps in West Virginia

or Pennsylvania, for the ammunition

stored at Curtis Bay, Nansemond, and

Charleston. But he urged that the East

Coast depots should be retained, if not for

ammunition for some other purpose, because they were so well adapted to water

shipments.15 Thus the result of this early

prewar planning did not change very

much the distribution pattern that had

developed in World War I, and, when

G-4 in the summer of 1938 made a study

of the supply depot network from the

standpoint of its adequacy to serve the

Protective Mobilization Plan, the investigators considered that there was still a

"faulty concentration of many Ordnance

establishments along the Atlantic seaboard."

 16

At the outbreak of the war in Europe

in 1939 Ordnance planners reviewed the

ammunition storage situation and found

that roughly 65 percent of the space was

in the East, 27 percent in the central

portion of the United States, and only 7

percent in the West. These figures showed

that the War Department's policy of 1937,

to store 25 percent in the East, 60 percent

in the Central United States, and 15 percent in the West, had not been followed.

Savanna and San Antonio could be expanded to bring the Central area up from

27 to 39 percent, reducing the East from

65 to 55; but further than that it seemed

impossible to go by expanding existing

depots.17 Money was scarce, even for storing the ammunition needed under the Air

Corps Expansion Program and Initial Protective Force Program.18

 It was not until

the summer of 1940, when the fall of

France brought about mounting appropriations for defense, that any considerable

expansion of storage facilities was possible.

Appropriations for Storage in 1940

The main trouble about planning for

depot expansion in June 1940 was that

nobody could say how much matériel

there would be to store. Figures on the

size of the army-to-be fluctuated from day

to day, sometimes from hour to hour;19

and even when a definite figure was set,

there was difficulty in determining, first,

how much equipment was needed and,

second, how much of this equipment

should be placed in storage. On 29 June

the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 asked the

Ordnance Department to prepare a list of

critical items for an army of two million

men, and also requested estimates on the

money that would be needed for storage.

An answer was required by four o'clock of

the same day.20

14

 Ibid., pp. 24-32. 15

 2d Indorsement (Memo, Brig Gen George R.

Spalding for the CofS, 8 Dec 36, sub: Location

of Government Mfg Plants), CofOrd to TAG, 6

May 37, Site Bd Rpts, ex. 23. 16

 Memo, Brig Gen George P. Tyner, Asst CofS

for CofS, 6 Jan 39, sub: Supply Facilities under

the PMP—Revision of Oct, 1938, Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 27. 17

 Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 22 Sep 39, sub, Strategic Storage of Ammo, ex. E of Lueders Rpt. 18

 Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 20 Jan 39.

sub: New Construction and Facilities Pertaining

to National Defense Program, FY 1940, OO

6001/1386. 19

 Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 171-79. 20

 Memo, G-4, 6-29-49, sub: Instructions for

Computation of Additional Critical Items Required for a Force of 2,000,000 Men, copy in

Col James K. Crain, Diary, OHF.
364 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The estimates for ammunition storage

were prepared by Lt. Col. Robert N. Bodine, Chief of the Ammunition Supply

Division of Field Service, and they were

necessarily very rough, because Colonel

Bodine did not know the basis on

which ammunition requirements for the

2,000,000-man program were computed.

He estimated $81,208,000 for igloos,

magazines, and auxiliary buildings, and

$12,750,000 for the procurement of land

—85,000 acres at $150 per acre—making

a total of $93,958,000.21

For general supplies, Field Service's

storage planners had a figure of $1,310,-

900,000 worth of items on which to base

their estimates. But how much of this

matériel would require permanent storage

in specially built warehouses? The first

estimates, prepared by Col. Everett S.

Hughes, Chief of the Equipment Division

of Field Service, were based on storing

$105,000,000 worth of items, about onetwelfth of the total amount, at a cost of

$6,449,576 in warehouses and $250,000 in

land. These figures seemed too conservative

to the Chief of Field Service, Colonel

Crain, whose World War I experience had

taught him the wisdom of planning ahead.

He raised the sights considerably: the estimates that went to the General Staff

were based on storing approximately $655,-

000,000 worth of critical items, half the

total amount. The warehouses were to be

built of reinforced concrete, and were to be

bombproof, well equipped, and strategically well located in cities like Memphis, Tennessee, where water and rail transportation

was available, and where city power, lights,

and roads could be used. The cost of such

warehouses was estimated as $20,000,000;

the land at $1,000,000. For the labor and

warehousing equipment needed to receive

and store the stocks, $2,225,000 was

added. The total estimate for general supply storage was therefore $23,225,000.22

For all this planning, the General Staff,

acting on a basis unknown to Ordnance,

put into the Munitions Program of 30

June 1940,23 a lump-sum estimate of

$42,000,000 for all Ordnance storage,

whether ammunition or general supply,

and $7,125,000 for the acquisition of

land. By agreement between the Chief of

the Ammunition Supply Division and the

Chief of the Equipment Division these

amounts were apportioned between ammunition and general supply storage in the

same ratio generally as had appeared in

the estimates for the 2,000,000-man program, about four for ammunition to one

for general supplies.24 But the exact

figures that would appear in the breakdown for defense of the estimates required

careful planning by Ordnance storage experts to produce a program that would be

acceptable to the General Staff and at the

same time would be practicable for the

special needs of ordnance storage.

Nowhere was there sharper differentiation between the two types of Ordnance

matériel, explosive and inert, than in the

question of storage. Because of its explosive

21

 Memo, Lt Col Robert N. Bodine, Chief

Ammo Supply Div, for Chief, Fiscal Div, 29 Jun

40, copy in Lueders Rpt, ex. F. 22

 (1) Draft of Memo, ESH for Fiscal Div in

Crain, Diary, OHF; (2) Memo, Col Everett S.

Hughes for Fiscal Div, 29 Jun 40; (3) Memo,

23 Jul 40, sub: Defense Supplemental Estimates

FY 1941 Based on the Munitions Program of 30

Jun.40, Crain, Diary, OHF. 23

 For details of this program, see Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for

War, ch. III and Watson, Chief of Staff, pp.

178-79. It provided essential items for an army

of 2,000,000 men at a cost of $2,286,254,041 and

for storage and distribution costs, $435,693,570. 24

 Memo, Chief Ammo Supply Div for CofFS, 17

Jul 40, sub: Storage Required for Ammo on Program of 30 Jun 40, copy in Lueders Rpt, ex. E,

OHF.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 365

nature, weight, and extreme sensitivity to

strategic considerations, ammunition demanded special methods, including storage

in igloos or magazines, ample acreage to

allow for safety distances between igloos,

isolation from neighboring towns, and location related to possible theaters of war.

There was little doubt that new ammunition depots were needed. Strategic, supply,

and local considerations argued against expansion of any existing depots, except for

relatively small expansion of Ogden and

Benicia. Taking all these factors into consideration, Ordnance ammunition experts

came up with a figure of $32,000,000 for

2,286 igloos to be located in four new

depots and Benicia Arsenal, and $6,325,-

000 for the acquisition of land for

ammunition storage depots.25 The amount

for construction fell far below later estimates for storing the $994,000,000 worth

of ammunition provided for in the program

of 30 June, but with possible economies in

igloo design, it would do. The amount for

land seemed ample, perhaps excessive if

much of the new construction could be

located on military reservations or on

cessions from national forests, as seemed

possible.26 The total was approved by G-4

and carried in the Second Supplemental

National Defense Appropriation Bill, Fiscal

Year 1941.27

Ordnance plans for storing general supplies had rougher going. Unlike ammunition, such supplies as weapons, tanks, and

spare parts could theoretically be stored

in leased commercial facilities or in temporary structures. This type of storage was

contemplated in the Protective Mobilization Plan under the assumption that upon

mobilization troops would move as soon as

possible to a theater of operations.28 In

discussions of the Munitions Program of

30 June, President Roosevelt asked the

War Department for assurance that full

use would be made of commercial storage.29

 Leasing was a quick and flexible

way of expanding or contracting storage

space to meet uncertain needs, and G-4

favored it.30

But leasing had many serious disadvantages. Commercial buildings were scattered, so that efficient depot management

and movement were difficult; many of the

most desirable warehouses in late 1940

were already occupied by the Navy or

other Government agencies and most of

those that were left were too old or too

small to be of much use. These drawbacks

were recognized by the Quartermaster

Corps, whose perishable stores were better

adapted to leased storage than was Ordnance matériel.31

 In the case of Ordnance, an immediate consideration was

that most commercial warehouses were

multistoried rather than one story. More

than half of the equipment under the 30

June program consisted of tanks and combat vehicles that required storage at

ground or car level. Important in the

long-range view was the fact that artillery

guns and carriages, fire control instru25

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 17 Jul

40, sub: New Ammo Depots, OO 633/43. 26

 (1) Crain, Diary, 8 Jul 40; (2) Memo, Chief

Ammo Supply Div for CofFS, 17 Jul 40, sub:

Storage Required for Ammo on Program of 30

Jun 40, copy in Lueders Rpt, ex. E. 27

 (1) Crain, Diary, 17, 20 Jul 40; (2) Ltr,

CofOrd to TAG, 17 Jul 40, sub: New Ammo Depots, and Indorsement, 2 Aug 40, OO 633/43. 28

 (1) General Marshall, quoted in Watson,

Chief of Staff, p. 183; (2) Alvin P. Stauffer,

Quartermaster Depot Storage and Distribution

Operations, QMC Historical Studies No. 18, 1948,

pp. 14-16. 29

 Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 179. 30

 (1) Memo, Hughes for CofFS, 23 Jul 40,

sub: Storage Rqmts, in Crain, Diary; (2) Wesson's

11 O'Clock Confs, 15 Jul 40. 31

 Stauffer, QM Depot Storage and Distribution Opns, pp. 18-19.
366 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ments, tanks, rifles, and machine guns

were expensive and long-lived. Ordnance

storage experts believed that this equipment ought to be stored in permanent,

fireproof buildings, to which it could be

returned after the emergency and be kept

as a reserve for the future. From the

standpoint of economy, leasing for a long

period of time would be more expensive

than construction.32

Strong representations by the Ordnance

Department convinced G-4 that leasing

ought to be held to a minimum.33 The

FY 1941 appropriations carried $7,244,-

000 for the construction of general supply

warehouses and only $245,000 for leasing.34

 For land, the sum of $800,000 was

allotted. Ordnance storage experts had

computed 80 acres as the space necessary

for the 2,068,900 square feet of storage

required under the FY 1941 program,

1,207,900 of which had to be one-story

construction. If the two projected depots

were located near a city, such as Memphis,

the land would be expensive, about

$10,000 an acre.35 Excellent choices for

two depots of 40 acres each were Memphis,

close to the great maneuver area of the

South, and Toledo, Ohio, in the heart of

the manufacturing area. But the Ordnance

proposal to establish a depot at Memphis

was denied by higher authority,36 and

Toledo was also ruled out, as being outside

the zone that the War Department had

determined to be strategically safe.37

As planning progressed in 1940, with no

guidance from the past for such an unprecedented situation as full mobilization

in time of peace,38 the one certainty

seemed to be the need for returning the

equipment to storage after the emergency

was over, and holding it as war reserves.

Ordnance planners concluded that the best

solution was to build permanent warehouses for general supplies at the projected ammunition depots; for this purpose more than six million dollars worth of

land had been appropriated.39

The First Prewar Ammunition Depots

Within the strategic limits set by the

War Department in the late 1930's the

Ordnance Department planned to place

the first ammunition depots roughly in the

four corners of the United States, for

support of forces repelling attacks from

any direction. In the southwest no purchase was required because old Fort Wingate in New Mexico, which was rapidly

being cleaned out of its bulk TNT by an

American corporation buying for the British, could be used. In the northwest, the

Montana-Idaho region was favored; in the

northeast a site near Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania was considered, and in the southeast

the Atlanta-Birmingham area seemed the

best choice. This plan would have reduced

the percentage of ammunition stored in

the east and central United States and

sharply increased the percentage in the

32

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Memo, 23 Jul 40, sub: Defense Supplemental Estimates FY 1941 Based on

the Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40, copy in

Crain, Diary. 33

 (1) Personal Ltr, Maj Gen Crain to CofOrd,

25 Jul 50; (2) Wesson's 11 O'Clock Confs, 15

Jul 40. 34 Ltr, SW to CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Storage, AG 112.05 (9-19-40), copy in Lueders Rpt,

ex. H. 35

 Memo, 23 Jul 40, sub: Defense Supplemental

Estimates FY 1941 Based on the Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40. 36

 Monograph No. 8, p. 28. 37

 Crain, Diary, 28, 29 Jul 40. 38

 General Marshall, quoted in Watson, Chief

of Staff, p. 183. 39

 (1) Memo, 23 Jul 40, sub: Defense Supplemental Estimates FY 1941 Based on the Munitions Program of 30 Jun 40; (2) Wesson's 11

O'Clock Confs, 23 Aug, 11 Sep 40; (3) Crain,

Diary, 13, 27 Sep, 1, 12 Oct, 13, 28, 29 Nov 40.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 367

west.40 When the proposal for western

sites was presented to the War Department, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4

objected on the grounds that the war was

in Europe, that nearly all manufacture of

munitions was east of the Mississippi, and

that location of depots in the west would

mean long, roundabout railroad hauling.

But Ordnance planners stressed the possibility that the war might extend to the

Pacific. They also pointed out that experience had shown that rusting of metal was

much less in the dry atmosphere of the

west. Convinced by these arguments, the

General Staff approved the western sites.41

To make the surveys necessary to determine exact locations within the general

areas, Colonel Crain brought in from the

field two ammunition storage experts, Lt.

Col. Ittai A. Luke, commanding officer of

Ogden Ordnance Depot, and Maj. Lemuel

P. Crim, and gave them certain criteria to

guide their investigations. He stated that a

site for an ammunition storage depot

should be on a railroad line, be at a safe

distance from towns and cities, and have

topography and soil that would reduce

construction and operation costs; it should

cover from six thousand to twelve thousand acres of land, depending on the shape

of the tract and the number of magazines

to be constructed.42 These were the most

important considerations, but there were

other qualities that were desirable, such as

a cool climate to promote safety, and

nearness to a loading plant, for economy.43

The latter was one of the factors in the

substitution of Ravenna, Ohio, for Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, as the site for the

northeast depot, later named Portage.

There was to be a loading plant at Ravenna, from which ammunition could be

put in permanent storage at minimum

cost; also, depot and plant could use in

common one safety distance zone, an

economy in land.44 Good transportation

was the deciding factor in the selection by

Colonel Luke of Umatilla, near Hermiston,

Oregon, as the northwestern depot; it was

directly on one railroad, the Union Pacific,

and had ready access to four others.45

Fort Wingate needed only the removal of

all the old TNT and the withdrawal from

the Department of the Interior of some

nine thousand acres which that agency

had been licensed by the War Department

in 1925 to use as an Indian School.46 The

selection of Anniston, Alabama, as the

site for the southeastern depot came after

an investigation by Crim revealed that

land within the Talladega National Forest

was too rugged and that a site near Ft.

McClellan lacked room for expansion and

would place magazines too close to troops

in training.47 On all the new depots con40

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 21 Jun 40, sub:

Additional Bomb Storage, OO 471.887/3973; (2)

Grain, Diary, 19 Jun 40; (3) Monograph No. 8,

p. 20; (4) Hist, Storage Div, I, pt. 2, The Depot

System, Jul 39 to 7 Dec 41, p. 9; (5) Ltr, CofOrd

to TAG, 17 Jul 40, sub: New Ammo Depots,

OO 633/34. 41

 Personal Ltr, Maj Gen Crain to Maj Gen

Ford, 25 Jul 50, OHF. 42

 Memo, CofOrd for Exec to the USW, 26

May 41, sub: H.R. Mil Affairs Comm. . . ,

Site Bd Rpts ex. 47. 43

 Memo, Col Booth, Chief of Ammo Div, for

Brig Gen Charles Harris, Chief of Ind Serv, 3

Jan 39, sub: General Data Regarding Ord Dept

Plans for Ammo in an Emergency, General Minton's Files, War Plans. 44

 Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 23 Aug 40, sub: New

Ammo Storage Depot, OO 633/69. 45

 Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 21 Sep 40, sub: Northwestern Ammo Depot, OO 633/95. 46

 (1) Crain, Diary, 17 Jun 40, OHF; (2)

Lueders Rpt, ex. K. 47

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to TQMG, 1 Aug 40, sub:

Survey for New Ammo Depots, OO 633/44 Misc;

(2) Lueders Rpt, ex. L; (3) Ltr, Lt Col Ittai

A. Luke to Col Robert N. Bodine, 16 Aug 40,

OOD 201/404, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 55,

OHF; (4) Proceedings of a Board of Officers
368 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

struction began early in 1941. Umatilla

was completed in January 1942 and the

others in April and May 1942. Ammunition was being shipped into all four by

November 1941.48

For maximum safety, the igloo type of

magazine had long been preferred by the

Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage

Board (JANASB) and the Ordnance

Safety Board for all types of ammunition

except small arms. After January 1941 the

Ordnance Department required that igloos

be used in all future depot construction.49

Uncertainty as to standard igloo design

was "one of the most annoying difficulties"

encountered in depot construction during

1941.50 Generally, igloos ranged in length

from forty to eighty feet and were about

twenty-six feet wide and thirteen feet

high.51 The 60-footer, with a capacity of

250,000 pounds of explosives, was the type

most often built, although a few of the

80-foot size were used. Umatilla, for example, had some 650 of the former and

about 100 of the latter.52

In all cases igloos were built in blocks

of not more than 100 each, the blocks

being 1,400 feet apart. Ammunition depots

required a great deal of acreage. There

had to be room for a road system, administration buildings, and several aboveground magazines to serve as transfer

points for the railroads. For safety considerations, there had to be a distance of 400

feet between igloos. Unless there were

earth mounds before the doors to serve as

barricades, the igloos had to be staggered

so that the front of each was at least 800

feet from the rear of the one opposite. For

each 10 igloos there was a foxhole for

10 persons. All doors faced north, to absorb less heat from the sun. Most of the

igloos were sodded on the top, but at

Umatilla, where wind erosion was a more

serious problem than water erosion, the

roofs were covered with gravel. The roads

afforded some protection against the

spread of grass fires. The unit cost of the

60-foot igloo was about $7,000, a figure

that was doubled when the necessary

roads and barricades were included.53

The Fiscal Year 1942 Program

Construction had hardly begun on the

four new depots when ammunition proconvened at Fort McClellan, Alabama, by oral

orders of CO, Fort McClellan, Alabama, 17 Jul

40, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex, 59, OHF; (5) Ltr,

Maj Lemuel P. Crim to CofOrd, 31 Aug 40, sub:

Development Plan for the Anniston Ord Depot.

Anniston, Alabama, OO 675/361, copy in Site Bd

Rpts, ex. 63.

48

 (1) Lueders Rpt, exs. I, J, K, L; (2) Time,

November 24, 1941, p. 46. 49

 (1) Crain, Diary, 30 Jul 40, Résumé of

Conf . . . Attended by the Army and Navy Bd;

(2) Ord Dept Safety Bull 11, 3 Jan 41, sub:

Safety Distances [hereafter cited as Ord Dept

Safety Bull 11], OO 633/295 Misc. 50

 Anniston Ordnance Depot, vol. I, History

From the Beginning Through 30 December 1942

[hereafter cited as Anniston Hist], p. 6, OHF. 51

 (1) Crain, Diary, 30 Jul 40; (2) MacMorland, "Ordnance Supply System," Mechanical

Engineering, vol. 67, p. 792. 52

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to QMG, 9 Jan 41, sub:

Construction Program at the Ravenna Ord Depot,

OO 633/286 Misc; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to QMG,

27 Jan 41, sub: Construction Program at Umatilla Ord Depot, OO 675/3252. 53

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to QMG, 9 Jan 41, sub:

Construction Program at the Ravenna Ord Depot.

OO 633/286 Misc.; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to QMG, 27

Jan 41; sub: Construction Program at Umatilla

Ord Depot, OO 675/3252; (3) Crain, Diary 30

Jul 40; (4) Ord Dept Safety Bull 11; (5) Ltr,

CofOrd to QMG, 9 Nov 40, sub: Construction

Program at Umatilla Ord Dept, OO 633/158

Misc.; (6) Ltr, Maj Crim to CofOrd, 31 Aug 40,

sub: Development Plan for Anniston Ord Depot,

Anniston, Alabama, OO 675/361; (7) Ltr, CofOrd to QMG, 4 Jan 41, sub: Construction Program, Umatilla Ord Depot, OO 633/266 Misc.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 369

IGLOOS AT UMATILLA Ordnance Depot, Hermiston, Oreg.

duction figures made plain the need for

further expansion.54 For the fiscal year

1942 the Chief of Ordnance in January

1941 submitted an estimate of $55,000,-

000 for 5,663,000 additional square feet of

ammunition storage. A little more than a

million square feet of this space was for

expansion at Anniston, Ravenna, and

Umatilla. The bulk of it was for new

depots.55

There was need for one new depot in

the south, to supply troops on maneuvers;

for another in the northeast, primarily to

serve Air Corps units protecting the coast

line and secondarily to back up the ports

from Boston to Norfolk; and for a Gulf

Coast depot and terminal, primarily as a

defense measure. There was at that time

no ammunition shipping point on the Gulf.

The region seemed important to Ordnance

planners, for they did not discount the

possibility that the Germans, everywhere

victorious, would ultimately move against

the United States by way of South America. As the munitions program advanced

and lend-lease became a reality early in

1941, additional storage was needed in the

East to receive the output of the factories

and back up the Atlantic ports shipping

ammunition to Great Britain.56 The Secretary of War gave high priority to the

acquisition of land for an ammunition

54

 Wesson's 11 O'Clock Confs, 21 Mar 41. 55

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 23 Jan 41, sub:

Ammo Storage Program for FY 1942 and 1st Indorsement 23 Mar 41, OO 471/887/115; (2)

Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 28 Feb 41, sub:

Ammo Storage Program for FY 1942, AG 681

(1-23-41), copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 44, OHF;

(3) Memo, CofOrd for Lt Col Claudius M.

Easley, Office CofS G-4, 18 Feb 41, Sub: Comment on Proposed Dir, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 43. 56

 (1) Interv, Crain, 17 Feb 54; (2) Lueders

Rpt, p. 4; (3) Ltr, TAG to CofOrd, 4 Sep 41,

sub: Ammo Storage Program FY's 1942 and

1943, AG 681 (7-26-41) MO-D, copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 90.
370 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

SAN JACINTO ORDNANCE DEPOT DOCK AREA. Note three Liberty ships in the background.

depot in the western Maryland-south central Pennsylvania area and another in the

eastern Kentucky-southwestern West Virginia area. From both, reasonably rapid

transportation would be available to the

seaports on the Atlantic Coast.57

For the new depot in the South, a survey

by Colonel Luke revealed that Milan, Tennessee, was an excellent choice for several

reasons. It was well located strategically,

could serve important maneuver areas on

the Gulf Coast and lower Mississippi Valley, and had good transportation facilities.

Most important of all, its nearness to the

Wolf Creek loading plant made possible

great savings in freight and in employees

for policing the two areas.58

The selection of the Gulf Coast site took

a little longer. General Crain ruled out

New Orleans because of the vulnerability

of the levees to damage by saboteurs, natural causes, or an explosion. A survey of

Alabama and Texas ports revealed only

one site that had deep water, railroad facilities, highway connections, and enough

isolated acreage with satisfactory ground.

Investigated by Mr. (later Maj.) John D.

Kerr, an Ordnance civilian with railroad

experience, it was a tract of about five

thousand acres on the Houston Ship

Channel, a bayou that had been deepened

to connect Houston, Texas, with the Gulf.

As the site was less than half a mile from

the spot where Texas colonists under

Sam Houston had defeated the Mexican

forces led by Santa Ana, the depot was

named San Jacinto. Construction was

57

 (1) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 21; (2) Memo, OCO

for ACofS G-4, 1 Dec 41, sub: Proposed Ammo

Depot Site at Charles Town, Jefferson County.

W.Va., OO 675/23993 Misc., in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 92. 58

 (1) Lueders Rpt, ex. M; (2) Interoffice

Memo, Luke, Ord Dept, to CofOrd, Rpt on

Milan, Tenn., Site for an Ammo Depot, copy in

Site Bd Rpts, ex. 66.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 371

authorized in March 1941.59 To back up

San Jacinto and help supply troops in the

south central area, Red River Ordnance

Depot was authorized in June. The selection of its site, adjacent to Lone Star

Ordnance Plant, Texarkana, Texas, was

made in a matter of days.60

To find a suitable site in the East,

primarily for bomb storage, General Crain

had Mr. Kerr make a study of several

regions in New York State, and sent

Colonel Luke to investigate them. The

problems differed somewhat from those

encountered in the west and southwest. It

was hard to find enough suitable land that

was on a railroad yet was not too close to

a town, and hard to find a level site that

was not prohibitive in price. In every case

the purchase meant uprooting some families who had owned their farms for generations. Some of the land bought for

Seneca Ordnance Depot in New York, for

example, had been granted by the Government to soldiers in Sullivan's Expedition of

1779 and was still owned by their descendants.61

 The Seneca site consisted of

about ten thousand acres in the Finger

Lakes section, between Lake Cayuga and

Lake Seneca, ninety miles east of Buffalo

and approximately two hundred west of

New York City. The price required was

about twice the normal value of the land,

but low-cost construction made possible by

the level site made the purchase feasible.

An airfield could be built if necessary on

neighboring land. There was less opposition locally than Ordnance was to encounter with Kentucky and Pennsylvania

sites.62

In the summer of 1941 the selection of

two sites in the Kentucky-West Virginia

-Maryland-Pennsylvania area, of about

fourteen thousand acres each, was speeded

by the prospect of additional funds for

storage in the amount of $84 million included in a supplemental appropriation bill

then before Congress, and by the allocation

of $12 million in lend-lease funds.63 General Crain appointed Maj. Carroll H.

Deitrick to investigate several sites that

had survived thinning-out surveys earlier

in 1941. After a month's study, in October Major Deitrick recommended tracts in

the neighborhood of Richmond, Kentucky,

and Charles Town, West Virginia, as sites

for the two new depots. The eastern Kentucky site was chosen over one in southwestern West Virginia because it was less

rugged, more economical, and better suited

for expansion. The West Virginia land was

chosen over a tract in south central

Pennsylvania because it was less productive, cheaper, and promised lower con59

 (1) Ltr, Luke to TAG thru OCO, 17 Mar

41, sub: Bd of Officers, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 73-77; (2) Crain, Diary 23 Nov 40; (3)

Lueders Rpt, ex. N; (4) San Jacinto Ordnance

Depot, vols. I and II, History From Beginning

Through 31 March 1943 [hereafter cited as San

Jacinto Hist], pp. 4, 7, OHF; (5) Personal Ltr,

Maj Gen Crain to Lida Mayo, 19 May 54, OHF. 60

 (1) Lueders Rpt, ex. O; (2) Ltr, OCO to

TAG thru QMG, 12 Jun 41, sub: Bd of Officers,

OO 334.3/1473 Misc., copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex.

85; (3) 2d Indorsement, AGO to USW, 21 Jun

41, sub: Bd Proceedings—Selection of Site, Texarkana, Texas, for Ammo Storage Depot, AG

601.1 (6-12-41) MO-D, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 86; (4) Ltr, QMG to TAG, 7 Oct 41, sub:

Bd of Officers, OO 633/2260 Misc., copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 87. 61

 (1) Ltr, Luke to TAG, 7 Apr 41, sub: Bd of

Officers, OO 675/5905 Misc., copy in Site Bd

Rpts, ex. 78-84; (2) Seneca Ordnance Depot,

vol. I, Original, History to 31 December 1942

[hereafter cited as Seneca Hist], p. 13, OHF. 62

 (1) Ibid.; p. 1; (2) Memo, Brig Gen Crain

for USW, 29 May 41, sub: Ord Ammo Storage

Depot in New York State, OO 675/8730. 63

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 26 Jul

41, sub: Locations for Additional Ammo Depots

and Ocean Shipping Facilities, OO 675/13163

Misc.; (2) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 90; (3) Wesson's 11

O'Clock Confs, 8 Aug 41.
372 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

struction costs. The Chief of Ordnance and

The Quartermaster General concurred in

these recommendations, and early in November the Secretary of War gave his

approval.64

Then local opposition developed to both

new depots. In the case of Richmond,

Senators Alben W. Barkley and Albert B.

Chandler and Representative Virgil Chapman requested an investigation into the

protests; it revealed, according to an Ordnance report on construction, "that all

opposition was from a handful of wealthy

landowners whose property was not affected." Meanwhile, the Governor's office

stirred up favorable sentiment, and the

Richmond project went through. The first

step in the construction of Blue Grass

Ordnance Depot came in mid-December.65

The Charles Town story ended differently.

Telegrams and letters of protest poured in

to the President, the Secretary of War, and

the Chief of Ordnance. Landowners objected to being forced out in the middle of

winter, and to losing their homes, livestock, dairies, and orchards. Representative

Jennings Randolph led an opposing delegation in person. In the end, G-4 decided

to suspend all action with regard to Charles

Town and to explore further the south

central Pennsylvania area.66

A site of about eighteen thousand acres

was found near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. General Crain and Major Deitrick

considered that it had some advantages

over Charles Town: it was some four

thousand acres larger, could more easily

be expanded, and was farther from the

town—a safety consideration. Although

the cost of construction would probably be

greater because the terrain was more rolling, the cost of land acquisition would

probably be less. On the other hand, there

was as much opposition by the local

citizens as there had been at Charles

Town. Telegrams of protest came from

Governor Arthur H. James, Senator James

J. Davis, and Representative Harry L.

Haines. Not only was the entire area more

productive and more thickly settled—with

some eight hundred people as opposed to

about fifty on the West Virginia site—but

also many of the farmers were descendants

of original settlers of the area. Many were

Mennonites and Dunkards who were opposed to war even for defense. But the

military planners had come to believe that

there would be protests no matter what

site was selected; moreover, Pearl Harbor

occurred in the midst of the furor, and the

argument of military necessity outweighed

all others.67

64

 (1) Site Bd Rpt, ex. 87; (2) 3d Ind, TAG

to USW, 5 Nov 41, sub: Acquisition of Land for

Ammo Depot, Charles Town, W.Va., Richmond,

Ky., AG 681 (10-7-41) MO-D, copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 88; (3) Intraoffice Memo, Ammo

Supply Div FS to Chief FS, 29 Jul 41, sub: Rpt

of Examination of Prospective Ammo Storage

Depot Sites in Eastern Ky., OO 633/1725-1/2

Misc., copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 89; (4) Site Bd

Rpts, ex. 90; (5) Ltr, OCO to QMG, 25 Aug

41, sub: Survey of Proposed Ammo Depot Site in

W.Va., OO 675/15745 Misc., copy in Site Bd

Rpts, ex. 91. 65

 Lueders Rpt, ex. Q. 66

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 1 Dec

41, pub: Proposed Ammo Depot Site at Charles

Town, Jefferson County, W.Va., OO 675/23993;

(2) Ltr, Col Charles M. Steese to Chief FS, 6

Sep 41, sub: Sites for Ammo Depots in Pa., Md.,

Va., W.Va., and Ky., copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex.

93; (3) Memo, Col S. J. Chamberlain, Actg

ACofS for Deputy CofS (Maj Gen Richard

Moore), 15 Nov 41, sub: Proposed Ammo Depot,

Charles Town, W.Va., G-4/31866-2, copy in

Site Bd Rpts, ex. 94. 67

 (1) Memo, CofOrd for ACofS G-4, 12 Dec

41, sub: Proposed Ammo Depot—Chambersburg,

Pa., in lieu of Charles Town, W. Va., OO 633/

2354 Misc.; (2) Min, Wesson's 11 O'Clock Confs,

19 Dec 41; (3) Hist, Storage Div, I, p. 13;

(4) Interv, Crain, 30 Jun 49; (5) Memo for

Rcd on Disposition Form, Brig Gen Somervell,

actg ACofS G-4 to TAG, 11 Dec 41, sub:
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 373

On 2 January 1942 Secretary of War

Stimson refused the request of Governor

James for reconsideration, and six days

later survey crews were at work on the

boundary lines for Letterkenny Ordnance

Depot.68 The speed with which negotiations were pushed through was one cause

of community resentment against Letterkenny, "the ammunition dump," as it was

called locally. There were others. This

depot, one of the largest in the whole Ordnance system, needed more than five thousand workers and drained the countryside

of manpower badly needed at sowing and

harvesting time. There was no large city

near enough to supply a pool of labor. And

the antiwar sentiment of the community

was hardly conducive to good morale

among the workers. One depot employee,

an elderly, chin-whiskered gentleman

named George B. McClellan Flora, was

suspended from his church because he put

on an Uncle Sam suit and sold War Bonds.

In time, public relations improved, but

they were always a problem and hampered

depot operations to an extent that had

not been foreseen.69

In addition to the Kentucky and

Pennsylvania depots, the $84-million program of the summer of 1941 included one

large new ammunition depot in the Far

West, two on the plateau east of the

rockies, and the expansion of facilities at

Ogden. First priority in this group went

to the project in the Far West, the acquisition of a site in western Nevada or eastern

California for an intermediate depot to give

closer support to overseas movements from

the San Francisco area, and also meet the

needs of the Air Corps. Second priority

went to the expansion of Ogden and the

construction of the two plateau depots,

one in the southeastern Colorado-western

Kansas area, the other somewhere in

southwestern South Dakota or western

Nebraska, both for long-time reserve storage. These regions had the high altitude

and dry climate that would minimize

rusting and other deterioration, and in the

more northerly area Ordnance hoped to

find a site isolated enough to make possible

the storage of gas ammunition.70

Major Deitrick spent most of the fall of

1941 touring the West, often accompanied

by members of the appropriate Zone

Quartermaster's office, representatives of

the transcontinental railroads, and local

Petition Protesting Location of Ammo Depot in

Vicinity of Chambersburg, Pa., G-4/31866-2,

copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 95; (6) Memo, OCO

for ACofS, G-4 12 Dec 41, sub: Proposed

Ammo Depot—Chambersburg, Pa., in lieu of

Charles Town, W. Va., OO 633/2354 Misc., copy

in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 96; (7) Memo, Brig Gen

Somervell, ACofS to CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub:

Site for an Ammo Depot, 6-4/31866-2, copy

in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 97; (8) Memo, Brig Gen

Somervell, ACofS, for CofS, 26 Dec 41, sub: Site

for Ammo Depot, Chambersburg, Pa., G4/31886-2, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 98; (9)

Ltr, SW to Hon Arthur H. James, 2 Jan 42,

G-4/31866-2, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 99;

(10) Memo, TAG for USW, 18 Dec 41, Site for

an Ammo Depot, AG 681 (12-17-41) MSC-D,

copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 100; (11 ) Memo,

Brig Gen Somervell, ACofS, for CofS, 1 Jan 42,

sub: Site for an Ammo Depot, Chambersburg,

Pa., G-4/31886-2, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 101.

68

 (1) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 99; (2) History,

Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, vol. I, From Beginning Through 31 December 1942, p. 8, OHF. 69

 (1) Lt Col A. G. Erpf and Lt Col E. D.

Mohlere, Report of a Visit to Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania [Aug

44], ASF 200.02 Contl Div files; (2) Min, Conf

of Depot Comdrs, FS Div, Ord Dept, 25-26 Aug

43, p. 12, OHF. 70

 (1) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 90; (2) Hist, Storage

Div, I, p. 17; (3) Ltr, OQMG to TAG thru

OCO and QMG, 2 Dec 41, sub: Bd of Officers,

with 1 Incl, Rpt of Bd of Officers Pursuant to

Dir From SW dated 4 Sep 41—Bd to Select Site

for Ammo Depots Southeastern Colo.-Western

Kans. Area, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 105.
374 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

INSIDE STORAGE OF 155-MM. SHELLS at Blue Grass Ordnance Depot, Richmond, Ky.

officials.71 In the eastern Californiawestern Nevada area he found an arid

valley of about forty-three square miles in

the Sierra Nevada Mountains, just west of

the Nevada line near Hackstaff, California, and on the edge of Honey Lake. It

was about 50 miles by highway north of

Reno and about 250 by highway and 400

by rail from Benicia Arsenal. After approval by the Secretary of War, the site

was named Herlong, in honor of Capt.

Henry W. Herlong, an Ordnance officer

killed in an Air Corps crash the preceding

summer. At Herlong was built Sierra

Ordnance Depot.72 In the ColoradoKansas area Major Deitrick recommended

a tract of 21,120 acres of grazing land

near Avondale, Pueblo County, Colorado,

which became the site of Pueblo Ordnance

Depot.73 For the second depot in the

plateau country he selected 20,000 acres of

sagebrush land in a very thinly populated

71

 (1) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 105; (2) 1st Indorsement, OCO to TAG Through QMG, 8 Dec 41,

and 2d Indorsement, QMG to TAG, 8 Dec 41,

OO 682/145, copies in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 106; (3)

3d Indorsement, AGO to CofEngrs, 16 Dec 41,

sub: Bd of Officers, AG 681 (12-2-41) MSCD, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 107; (4) 4th Indorsement, CofEngrs, to OCO, 23 Dec 41, OO

682/145, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 108. 72

 (1) Sierra Ordnance Depot, vol. I, History

Through 1942 [hereafter referred to as Sierra

Hist], pp. 1, 4, OHF; (2) Ltr, OQMG to TAG

Through OCO and QMG, 2 Dec 41, sub: Bd of

Officers, with 1 Incl, Rpt of Bd to Select Sites

for Ammo Depots Western Nev.-Calif. Area,

copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 113; (3) Memo, Lt

Col Harold De L. Stetson, QMC, to Zone Constructing QM, Zone IX, 27 Sep 41, sub: Rpt

of Inspection of Ord Sites, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 114; (4) Ltr, O Zone Construction QM

Zone IX to QMG, 30 Oct 41, sub: Proposed

Ord Site—Western Nev., with 1 Incl, Memo,

Claude L. Coray to Col Edward M. George, 29

Oct 41, sub: Ord Storage Sites near Susanville,

Calif., OO 685 Western Nev., copy in Site Bd

Rpts, ex. 115; (5) Exec Order No. 5827, 28 Mar

32, sub: Withdrawal of Public Land for Military

Purposes, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 116. 73

 (1) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 105; (2) Ltr, Con-
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 375

OUTSIDE STORAGE OF 100-POUND BOMBS at Sierra Ordnance Depot, Herlong, Calif.

area in South Dakota. The nearest town,

Provo (population 20), gave its name to

the site on which was built Black Hills

Ordnance Depot.74

Along with the study of these three

sites, Major Deitrick investigated the expansion of Ogden Ordnance Depot, Utah.

He found that the depot lay in a narrow

rectangle bounded by the Wasatch Mountains, the Great Salt Lake, the city of

Ogden, and Salt Lake City; within this

rectangle it was immediately hemmed in

by a neighboring airfield, main trunk

highways, and fertile farm and orchard

lands. There was no way to enlarge the

site. The best solution was the acquisition

of a tract in the valley of the Wasatch

Range of about twenty thousand uninhabited acres near the town of Tooele,

Utah.75

In forwarding to the Secretary of War

the report on the four sites, dated 2

December 1941, General Wesson suggested

one change. He thought action with regard

structing QM Denver Ord Plant to QMG, 24

Oct 41, with 1 Incl, Ltr, Constructing QM Denver Ord Plant to Constructing QM, VIII Constructing Zone, 24 Oct 41, sub: Inspection of

Prospective Camp Sites, copy in Site Bd Rpts,

ex. 111 ; (3) Ltr, Constructing QM Denver Ord

Plant to QMG, 8 Nov 41, with 1 Incl, Ltr, Constructing QM Denver Ord Plant to QMG, 30

Oct 41, sub: Prospective Camp Sites (Ammo

Storage), 06 635 Denver Ord Plant, copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 112.

74

 (1) Ltr, OQMG to TAG through OCO and

QMG, 2 Dec 41, sub: Bd of Officers, with 1

Incl, Rpt of Bd to Select Sites for Ammo Depots

Southwestern S. Dak.-Western Nebr. Area, copy

in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 117; (2) Survey for Ammunition Storage Depot in Southwestern South

Dakota, Western Nebraska and Western Wyoming, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 117a. 75

 Ltr, OQMG to TAG Through OCO and

QMG, 2 Dec 41, sub: Bd of Officers, with 1

Incl, Rpt of Bd to Select Sites for Ammo Depots

—Ogden Ord Depot (Expansion), copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 123.
376 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

to Tooele should be held in abeyance until

the War Department had investigated a

site in the Flagstaff-Prescott area of

Arizona. On 4 December 1941, at a time

of rapidly worsening relations with Japan,

The Quartermaster General had suggested

establishing water shipping facilities in the

San Diego-Los Angeles area. Flagstaff was

approximately three hundred miles nearer

this area than was the Tooele site.76 By

the time General Wesson's memorandum

reached the desk of the Secretary of War,

the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken

place. The War Department ordered that,

without delay, ammunition storage depots

of one thousand igloos each be constructed

at the sites selected in California, Colorado,

and South Dakota; and at a place somewhere in the Flagstaff-Prescott, Arizona,

area.77 Late in December Col. Charles M.

Steese inspected several sites in the area

and found a suitable tract of twenty seven

thousand acres in the vicinity of Bellemont,

Arizona. It became Navajo Ordnance

Depot.78

Taking stock of the ammunition storage

situation at the beginning of 1942, the

Chief of Ordnance reported to G-4 that,

after completion of all ammunition depot

construction then in process or authorized,

there would still be a shortage of 15,479,-

201 square feet in the amount of space

required to support the force contemplated,

about 3,635,000 men. Nothing like this

amount of additional construction seemed

advisable, because expenditures of stored

ammunition would make room for the

ammunition coming out of the plants. But

General Wesson did recommend that about

half of the 7,677,410 square feet of ammunition storage in deferred status be

constructed at once. He urged the building

of two new depots of 1,719,884 square

feet each, one at Tooele, Utah, to carry

out the long-planned expansion of Ogden,

and the other at Sidney, Nebraska. The

latter site had been explored at the time

the Black Hills depot was decided on but

rejected because it was not suited to the

storage of lethal gas. Here was built Sioux

Ordnance Depot. Ordnance planners considered that its location in the central

portion of the United States achieved a

proper geographic and strategic balance of

ammunition stocks.79 With the enlargement of the old East Coast depots and

Benicia Arsenal the ammunition storage

program was virtually complete.80

Opening the New Depots

When war came in December 1941 construction was well advanced at eight new

ammunition depots, and at four of them

—Umatilla, Portage, Wingate, and Anniston—shipments were already being received. But throughout 1941 and 1942,

even at the most carefully selected sites,

Ordnance encountered problems of construction and operation created by terrain

or location. In the East, the Appalachian

76

 Site Bd Rpts, ex. 106. 77

 Ibid., ex. 107. 78

 (1) Ltr, U.S. EngrO, Caddoa Dist, to

WDGS G-4 through OCO and CofEngrs, 30

Dec 41, sub: Bd Rpt on Selection of Site for

Ammo Storage Depot, Flagstaff-Prescott, Ariz.,

Area with 1 Incl, Rpt of Bd, OO 601.1/415

Flagstaff-Prescott, copy in Site Bd Rpts, ex. 109. 79

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 7 Jan 42, sub:

Depot Storage Problem, Supplemental FY 1942,

OO 471.887/1137; (2) Site Bd Rpts, ex. 117;

(3) Lueders Rpt, exs. W, X. 80

 (1) Monograph No. 8, Plate V, Ord FS

Facilities Existing and Authorized, as of 1 Dec

42; (2) Memo, CofOrd for TQMG, 9 Dec 41,

Expediting Magazine Construction at Benicia

Arsenal, OO 633/2348; (3) Memo, CofOrd for

ACofS G-4, 8 Dec 41, sub: Expansion of Raritan

Arsenal, OO 633/2350; (4) Personal Ltr, Maj

Gen Crain to Maj Gen Ford, 25 Jul 50, OHF.
THE NEW DEPOT SYSTEM 377

foothills made it difficult to grade the

roads and railways; in the igloo area, well

camouflaged as it usually was with trees

and grass and often protected by natural

mounds that served as barricades, there

was always the danger of brush fires, and

the fear of the damage an explosion might

do in a more or less thickly settled region.81

The vast Western depots, on the level

floor of a high mountain valley or on a

wind-swept prairie, with orderly and accessible rows of igloos stretching as far as the

eye could see against a background of

snow-covered peaks, had the virtue of

isolation, an important consideration; yet

isolation created a desperate problem of

manpower.

Prewar planning, based on defense of

the continental United States, had intended the use of troop labor in the event

of invasion, because the depots would very

likely be in the combat zone. As the danger

of invasion passed, the General Staff made

the decision to operate the depots with

civilians.82 In setting up criteria for location, General Staff planners had properly

placed highest priority on strategic requirements, including available transportation trunk lines to areas to be served,

recognizing at the time that, should these

depots ever have to be operated by civilian

employees, a tremendous problem of housing and personnel transportation would

be posed.83 Sometimes there were Indians

in the neighborhood of the western depots

who could be mustered into service, as at

Navajo, where a bespectacled descendant

of Chief Manygoats was driving a truck;84

but at most of these depots labor had to be

brought in, housed, and offered the facilities of a town.85

As an example of the problems encountered at the "big unwieldy depots out in

the Western desert," one Ordnance officer

cited an instance in January 1943 when

the food supply at Sierra was cut off because floods had washed out the railroad

tracks and road to the nearest town,

thirty-five miles away.86 After Pearl Harbor the shortage of equipment and materials of various kinds affected the new

depots. The great size and complexity of

these installations soon dispelled the peacetime idea that "a good Ordnance sergeant

or warrant officer" could operate a depot.

Trained commanding officers were needed

and were hard to find. Inexperienced men

were given an almost impossible job in

meeting the very tight time schedules for

opening the depots.87

By 14 January 1943, all of the sixteen

new ammunition depots had been activated. They had cost altogether about

$367 million. Among the individual depots

the costs ranged from $37 million down to

$ 11 million, depending on the size of the

installation, the cost of the site, and the

cost of construction. There were striking

differences in the amounts paid for the

sites. Land for Blue Grass Ordnance

81

 Depot histories in OHF. 82

 Interv with Col Carroll Deitrick, OCO Field

Service Plans and Operations, vol. I, pt. 1,

History From 1 June 1942 to January 1943

[hereafter cited as Hist, P&O, I], p. 92, OHF. 83

 (1) The Army Ind College Dept of Research, Study of Experience in Industrial Mobilization in World War II: Handling of Matériel,

Nov 45, Rpt 28, ICAF Library; (2) Ltr, Brig

Gen Deitrick to Col George White, 11 Jul 55,

OHF. 84

 Navajo Ordnance Dept, vol. I, Basic History

Through 31 December 1942, p. 3, OHF. 85

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, 92-121. 86

 (1) Ltr, Col Robert Sears, CO Ogden Arsenal, to Maj Gen Levin Campbell, Jr., CofOrd,

26 Mar 43, Gen Campbell's Personal Correspondence; (2) Sierra Hist, 1 Jan-31 Mar 43, p. 12. 87

 (1) Memo, Col James W. Freeman for Exec

to Chief of FS, 1 Jun 45, sub: Final Rpt of Key

Personnel, in FS Key Pers Rpts, OHF; (2)

Lueders Rpt, ex. X; (3) Umatilla History, p. 2.
378 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Depot, for example, cost about $150 per

acre—that for Sierra about nine cents.88

At all the depots the igloo construction

was of permanent type, but in other respects there was a difference between the

buildings erected at the first eight depots,

called the "A" program, and the second,

called "B." At Anniston, Umatilla, Portage, Wingate, Milan, Seneca, San Jacinto,

and Red River, all begun in 1941 and

nearing completion in the spring of 1942

when materials became critical, most of the

administration buildings, warehouses for

inert supplies, and like construction were

of permanent type; but at the "B" depots,

Sierra, Navajo, Letterkenny, Sioux, Black

Hills, Tooele, Blue Grass, and Pueblo,

most construction was of a type called

"mobilization," designed to last five years,

or "theater-of-operations," designed to last

only for the duration of the war.89

In acreage the depots were almost

unbelievably vast compared to depots of

other supply services. Quartermaster installations generally occupied between one

hundred and eight hundred acres.90 The

Ordnance Department had six depots

with more than twenty thousand acres

each.91 An interesting sidelight on the size

and location of these great tracts was the

amount and variety of the wildlife they

contained; as military reservations they

afforded protection from hunters. In the

East, Letterkenny had quantities of deer,

fox, raccoon, opossum, and ringnecked

pheasant. The western depots had large

populations of deer, bear, antelope, elk,

and coyote. At Black Hills there were two

prairie-dog towns; at Wingate, tassel-eared

squirrels and deer; at San Jacinto, alligators, wildcats, and armadillos.92

88

 Hist, Storage Div, I, pp. 24-25 and exs. 3, 6. 89

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, pp. 88-90; (2) Ltr, Brig

Gen Somervell, ACofS G-4 for CofS, 17 Jan 42,

sub: Depot Storage Program, Supplemental FY

1942, AG 681 (1-17-42) 6-4/32315; (3) Personal Ltr, Maj Gen Crain to Mrs. Constance McLaughlin Green, 27 Aug 50, OHF. 90

 Stauffer, op. cit., p. 18. 91

 Monograph No. 8, Plate V. 92

 Public Information Br, OCO, Background

Information on Ordnance Field Service, Apr 53,

OHF.
CHAPTER XVIII

Revisions in the Depot System

After starting in 1941 with a depot system that could not meet all its constantly

increasing needs, Ordnance faced four

major problems during the war: (1) finding storage space for general supplies far

in excess of original forecasts; (2) meshing

motor transport facilities into the Ordnance supply system; (3) adjusting to

reallocation of depot space by Army Service Forces; and (4) shifting emphasis

from support of troops in training in the

United States to the support of overseas

theaters.

Storage of General Supplies

As noted in the preceding chapter, Ordnance did not build many warehouses in

1939-1940 for storage of general supplies,

or "combat equipment" as such matériel

was beginning to be called. Its main effort

had been directed toward ammunition

storage. But with the rising tide of war

production, actual and planned, in 1940,

Ordnance was allotted $7,244,000 for

warehouse construction in fiscal year

1941. This appropriation was divided

three ways: $2 million was to be used to

add 500,000 square feet at Ogden Ordnance Depot and the rest was to be divided very nearly evenly between two unnamed depots, one in the southeast to

provide 650,000 square feet and one in

the central area to provide 661,000 square

feet.1

The existing depot at Anniston, Alabama, was selected as the site for new

storage space in the southeast because its

location was ideal to serve the maneuver

area of the south, and adjacent land was

available for purchase if needed for expansion. After the site was approved, construction proceeded rapidly. By March

1942, seventeen warehouses with a combined floor area of 772,200 square feet had

reached completion.2 For the depot in the

central area, Ordnance planners decided to

enlarge Rock Island Ordnance Depot,

traditionally a great center for general

supply storage. One enormous warehouse,

1,423 by 545 feet, with a total of 767,888

square feet, reached completion in June

1942, and was the first of its size and

type in War Department history. Planned

to house tanks, it was one story high,

covered eighteen acres, and could receive

under its roof a freight train of sixty cars.3

The forty new warehouses begun at Ogden in the fall of 1940 were at first filled

with inert ammunition components and

empty practice bombs; this matériel was

removed to open storage when the first

1

 Ltr, SW to CofOrd, 23 Sep 40, sub: Storage,

AG 112.05 (9-19-40) M-D, copy in Lueders

Rpt, ex. H. 2

 (1) Anniston Hist, pp. 10-14, 44; (2) Crain,

Diary, 1 Oct 40. 3

 Hist, Rock Island Arsenal, vol. II (1939-43),

p. 306.
380 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

stock of general supplies arrived in March

1942.4 Months before the new facilities at

Ogden, Anniston, and Rock Island were

ready, it became evident that space for

combat equipment would again have to be

increased because of accelerated production to meet rising mobilization objectives.

In the summer of 1941 a new problem

arose—the amount of lend-lease matériel

that was accumulating in the United

States because there were not enough ships

to move it out.

In July 1941 the Ordnance Department,

after a careful study of requirements, recommended that twelve million additional

square feet of permanent-type warehouses

for general supplies be built at the new

ammunition depots; later it urged that

seventeen million more square feet be provided to take care of the fiscal year 1943

program. Ordnance pointed out that the

ammunition depots under construction

were equally well suited for general supplies from the standpoint of transportation and strategic location. Many of them

were in the high altitude region considered

ideal for long-term storage. They had

adequate power, water, and other facilities

for expansion, and plenty of acreage.5

This pre-Pearl Harbor attempt at expansion was unsuccessful. At a meeting in

September 1941 the War Department

Budget Advisory Committee appeared uninterested in the Ordnance presentation.

That fall, the War Department began to

build general depots in Michigan, Illinois,

Ohio, and Indiana—the area in which

about 75 percent of the munitions would

be produced—to regulate the flow of lendlease supplies to ports; G-4 contemplated

placing much of the new production of

weapons and tanks, along with supplies of

other technical services, in these depots.

There were eventually eleven of them,

called Defense Aid originally but soon renamed War Aid.6

After Pearl Harbor, the General Staff

allotted to Ordnance about $39 million

for new storage space for general supplies

at Letterkenny, Anniston, Red River,

Umatilla, Sierra, and Ogden; this sum was

to provide a total of 2,747,000 square feet

of warehouse space and 5,000,000 square

feet of shed space.7 But the bulk of the

space allotted to Ordnance was at the

eight Defense Aid depots, a total of eight

million square feet of covered space and

sixteen million square feet of open storage.

There was also in contemplation the utilization of commercial warehouses and the

end of permanent-type construction.8

The War Munitions Program of 11

February 1942 set extremely high production goals for tanks, artillery, and other

equipment.9 Preliminary estimates by

Colonel Steese, chief of a new office established within Field Service on 2 February to consolidate all depot construction

activities and planning, indicated that a

total of about 119 million square feet of

space would be necessary if Ordnance had

to store all matériel to be produced in

1942 and the first three months of 1943.

Not all of it would have to be stored, of

course, for some of it would immediately

go to troops or to allied nations. The best

guess was that Ordnance would have to

4

 History, Ogden Arsenal, I, pt. 2 (1939-42),

pp. 53-54. 5

 Monograph No. 8, pp. 28-30. 6

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Min, Wesson Confs, 2 Jul, 18

Sep, 21 Oct 41. 7

 (1) Ltr, SW to Chief of Engrs, 14 Feb 42,

sub: Depot Storage Program Ord Dept, AG

681 (2-9-42) MO-D; (2) Memo, Brig Gen

Somervell, ACofS G-4, for CofS, 17 Jan 42. sub:

Depot Storage Program, Supplemental FY 1942,

AG 681 (1-17-42) G-4 32315. 8

 Monograph No. 8, p. 30. 9

 See ch. IV, above.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 381

store about 50 percent of the total production for U.S. troops and about 40

percent of War Aid production. On this

basis, about 25,900,000 square feet of

storage space would be needed; the Ordnance plan divided it into 13,400,000 for

warehouses and 12,500,000 for sheds.

In their presentation to higher authority, Ordnance planners pointed out that

postwar needs should also be taken into

account, because building materials and

labor would become scarce as the war

went on, and funds for postwar construction would be hard to get. They also

argued that sheds with walls were far

better than open storage for artillery,

tanks, and other combat vehicles equipped

with delicate fire control instruments and

radios. Granted that most of the supplies

would be manufactured in the Ohio,

Michigan, and Illinois area, they did not

recommend that region for postwar storage

because its climate would make excessive

maintenance necessary. The Ordnance solution was to locate the new general supply space at twelve ammunition depots,

balancing warehouse and shed space with

that already authorized at Sierra, Letterkenny, Umatilla, and Ogden, and building both types in approximately equal

amounts at Tooele, Sioux, Pueblo, Wingate, Navajo, Blue Grass, Seneca, and

Black Hills.10

After a survey showed that 74 percent

of the expected carload deliveries would

be for tanks and combat vehicles that

could not be stored in the open, the General Staff reversed its earlier decision to

place Ordnance matériel at War Aid

depots and approved the building of warehouses and sheds at the ammunition

depots. Except for permanent buildings

already authorized, all construction was to

be temporary,11 meaning mobilization or

theater-of-operations type. Warehouses of

the latter type were built of some flimsy

material, such as plywood, and were not

much better than tents. They were not

suitable for housing certain types of Ordnance matériel, as the Chief of Engineers

pointed out to the War Department.

Nevertheless, General Somervell laid down

the principle in March 1942 that, because

the first consideration was economy in

money, time, and critical materials, warehouses were to be of light frame construction, with fire walls only where necessary,

with roofing specifications not to exceed a

lo-year limit, and without excessive roof

spans; sheds were to be of open-type light

frame construction, without concrete

floors. On 1 June 1942 the War and Navy

Departments and the War Production

Board set up rigid rules for wartime construction. It was to be "of the simplest

type, just sufficient to meet the minimum

requirements." Thus any additional construction at existing Ordnance depots,

with the exception of igloos, had to be

theater of operations type whenever possible. There was one loophole: masonry

construction, such as concrete blocks,

could be used if the material was not

critical in the area concerned and if its

cost would not run more than 15 percent

10

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to TAG, 27 Feb 42, sub:

Storage Requirements for Ord Gen Supplies, for

1942 and First Three Months of 1943, OO 400.-

24/697; (2) Min, Wesson Confs, 4 Mar 42. 11

 (1) Monograph No. 8, pp. 31-34; (2) Personal History of Col. Lawrence J. Meyns, Ordnance Office, 1 Jul 41-Jun 42 [hereafter referred

to as Meyns Rpt], FS Key Pers Rpts; (3) Ltr,

SW to CofEngrs, 7 Mar 42, sub: Temporary

Type Construction, Depot Storage Program, AG

681 (2-24-42) MO-D, copy in OCO FS Plans

and Opns, vol. I, pt. 2, History From 1 June

1942 to January 1943 [hereafter cited as Hist,

P&O II], ex. 69, OHF.
382 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

OPEN-TYPE STORAGE SHEDS (right) at Casad Ordnance Depot, New Haven, Ind., September 1943.

over the cost of the theater of operations

construction.12

Not all the new combat equipment went

into ammunition depots. Some of it was

stored in Ordnance sections of the three

Army general depots at Columbus, Ohio;

New Cumberland, Pennsylvania; and

Schenectady, New York. Some of it went

into old-line repair arsenals such as Augusta, where Civil War caissons had to be

moved out into the open to make room

in the warehouses.13 But most of the general supplies went into warehouses and

sheds built for the purpose at the new

ammunition depots. At the time the fifty

million additional square feet of combat

equipment space was estimated, no great

influx of new ammunition was expected.

Of all the new ammunition to be produced, Ordnance assumed that about

half would be stored and half would be

expended in combat or in training.14 By

December 1942, twelve of the ammunition

depots that grew out of the expansion

plans of 1940 and 1941—Anniston, Black

Hills, Blue Grass, Letterkenny, Navajo,

Pueblo, Red River, Seneca, Sierra, Sioux,

Tooele, and Umatilla—each had, existing

or authorized, between 900,000 and

2,500,000 square feet of combat equipment space. Anniston, Letterkenny,

Pueblo, Red River, Seneca, Sierra, Sioux,

and Tooele had more square feet in com12

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, pp. 87-92; (2) Ltr, SW

to CG AAF, et al., 1 Jun 42, AG 600.12 (5-30

-42) MO-SPAD-M, copy in Hist P&O II, ex.

70.

13

 Crain, Diary, 28 Oct, 12 Nov 40. 14

 Min, Wesson Confs, 6 May 42.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 383

bat equipment warehouses than they had

in ammunition magazines and igloos.15

Early in 1942, when Ordnance storage

officials planned the move of general supply stocks into ammunition depots, they

were thinking in terms of reserve storage

to back up distribution depots and space

to store war reserves that would accumulate at the end of the war. Nobody knew

at the time to what extent the great ammunition depots would be drawn into the

distribution picture.16 Problems of distribution aside—and these would become

acute in 1943 when the emphasis shifted

from domestic supply to overseas supply

—the disadvantages of isolation came to be

keenly felt in the case of combat equipment. Ordnance supply experts felt later

that general supply operations were more

seriously hindered by isolated locations and

the lack of skilled labor resources than

were the ammunition supply operations at

the same depot.17

Yet the fact that the Ordnance Department combined equipment storage with

ammunition storage and secured the necessary land at low prices stretched the funds

allotted for land so that the General Staff

could use some of the money for other

supply services and buy the site for at

least one training camp.18 Moreover, the

early construction of equipment warehouses helped to ease a critical storage

situation both during the war, when the

War Department could place in Ordnance

warehouses and sheds large stocks of

materiel of other agencies for which no

adequate provision had been made, and

immediately after the war, when rented

commercial warehouses and railroad storage yards had to be given up. General

Cram's insistence on permanent construction, in the period before building materials

became scarce, provided for the first time

in Army history suitable storage for war

reserves.19

The Acquisition of

Quartermaster Facilities

When the Ordnance Department in

midsummer of 1942 received from the

Quartermaster Corps the responsibility for

motor transport vehicles,20 the storage

facilities that came with the new mission

included six War Aid depots, eight motor

bases, four motor supply depots, eleven

motor supply sections at Quartermaster

depots, and one motor reception park. At

the time of transfer, a large proportion of

the covered storage at War Aid depots was

shed space, and a great deal of the total

area, in some cases most of the total, was

open storage.21 There were maintenance

difficulties, because the buildings had been

hastily constructed for limited service at a

time when shortages forced the use of substitute building materials. As "holding and

reconsignment points" or stopping places

for supplies already consigned to a destination, these depots had not had the function

of filling requisitions and therefore had

15

 Monograph No. 8, Plate V. 16

 Meyns Rpt. 17

 (1) Field Service Division History, vol. XII,

History of Storage Branch, pt. II, Sep . . . Jun

Through Dec 43 [hereafter cited as Hist, Storage

Br, II], p. 5, OHF; (2) Monograph No. 1, The

Ordnance Task And Its Management, 1 Jul 40

to 31 Aug 45 [hereafter cited as Monograph No.

1].p. 71, OHF. 18

 Personal Ltr, Maj Gen Crain to Maj Gen

Ford, CofOrd, 25 Jul 50, OHF. 19

 (1) ASF Historical Monograph, Storage

Operations December 1941-December 1945, pp.

34-36, 269-71; (2) Memo, Lt Gen Somervell

for CofOrd, 9 Mar 43, sub: Assignment of Space,

SPOPN 400.24 (3-9-43); (3) Depot histories in OHF. 20

 For this transfer, see Chapter XII. 21

 Monograph No. 8, Plate V.

REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 385

little or no operating equipment, office

space, lunchrooms, and so on; as reservoirs for bulk storage, they lacked bins

and other facilities. But these disadvantages were offset by the location of the

War Aid depots in the area in which about

75 percent of general supplies were manufactured; after extensive rewarehousing

programs, they served Ordnance well.

Rossford (formerly named Toledo) became

the master depot-for automotive parts and

Lordstown the master depot for tools.22

The motor facilities that came with the

Motor Transport Service were scattered

throughout the country. The eight motor

bases were at Atlanta, Georgia; Fort

Crook, Nebraska; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Holabird (near Baltimore), Maryland; Fort Lewis, Washington; San Antonio, Texas (called Normoyle); and

Pomona and Stockton in California. The

four motor supply depots were mostly in

the central area: Little Rock, Arkansas;

St. Louis, Missouri; Fort Wayne, near

Detroit, Michigan; and Candler, at Atlanta, Georgia. There was one motor reception park, at Carteret, New Jersey, and

there was space for motor supplies at

eleven Quartermaster depots, more than

half of them in the east.23

Space had been allotted to the Motor

Transport Service on the basis of the 1942

procurement program, which consisted of

approximately one million vehicles with

corresponding parts, tires, and supplies.

The plan for 1943 called for about the

same number of vehicles but with an increase of approximately 67 percent in the

volume of parts, and an 85 percent increase in tools and equipment. All this

added up to a heavy load on storage

facilities, beginning in the fall of 1942

when most of the matériel ordered under

the 1942 program would be delivered.

Against this load the Ordnance Department could count on using some space

that had been intended for such material as

gasoline drums, since responsibility for

petroleum products remained with the

Quartermaster Corps; also, some vehicles

could be stored for short periods in railway

transit yards. A few vehicles could be

stored at factories, though Quartermaster

policy had been to keep such storage at

a minimum because of the bad psychological effect on labor.24

Ordnance storage specialists, with the

aid of the experienced motor transport

officers who were transferred along with

their service and the reservists who continued to come into the Army from the

automobile industry, worked throughout

1942 and into the summer of 1943 to

mesh the Quartermaster motor bases and

depots into the Ordnance distribution

system. They consolidated the two Atlanta

installations, the motor base and the motor

supply depot, to form the Atlanta Ordnance Depot. In Texas they moved the

Normoyle Ordnance activities to San Antonio Arsenal, forming the San Antonio

Ordnance Center. At Pomona, California,

they turned over the buildings and facilities of Pomona Ordnance Base to the

Desert Training Center, which was run as

a theater of operations with an Ordnance

base. All the motor transport bases were

designated depots, and two were renamed.

22

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, p. 32; (2) ICAF Economic Mobilization Course, Planning Depot

Systems to Meet Major Emergencies, 1940-46

(Discussion), p. 7, ICAF Library, 1,47-32. 23

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, pp. 19-21; (2) Monograph No. 8, pp. 35-36. 24

 (1) Depot Opns Br, Supply Div, Motor

Transport Serv, Analysis of Storage Space Rqmts

Through 1943, 23 Jul 42, copy in Hist, Storage

Div, I, pt. 1, History From August 1942 to July

1943, ex. B, OHF; (2) ASF History, Storage

Operations, pp. 15-17.
386 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Fort Lewis in Washington became Mt.

Rainier to distinguish it from other military activities at the Fort Lewis installation, and for the same reason Fort Devens

in Massachusetts was renamed Whittemore, in honor of the late Brig. Gen. James

M. Whittemore.25

Reallocation of Space by ASF

Ordnance reached the peak of its storage

expansion in December 1942. At that time

it had fifty-four depots in the United

States, twenty sections in Quartermaster

or other non-Ordnance installations, two

depots in territorial areas, and storage

facilities at ports of embarkation. At Ordnance depots general supplies were allocated nearly thirty-nine million square feet

of warehouse space, more than eight million square feet of shed space, and about

fifty-two million square feet of open storage. Some two million square feet were

devoted to packing, shipping, receiving,

and repairing. When Ordnance space at

shipping terminals, general Army depots,

and depots of the other technical services

was added, the total figure for general

supply storage exceeded one hundred million square feet. This made Ordnance the

largest warehouse operator in the world,

with more storage space at its command

than all the commercial warehouses in the

United States combined.

At this point, Army Service Forces began to question whether Ordnance really

needed all this space. The answer was

made clear by a survey showing that the

depots were only about half full. Only

54.2 percent of Ordnance's net usable

warehouse space was occupied, 55.2 percent of the shed space, 31.2 of the open

space, and 60.7 percent of the igloo and

magazine space.26 ASF planners coneluded that Ordnance had overbuilt in

the early stages of the war, a conclusion

that was reiterated in a postwar study by

the General Staff. Conceding that it was

natural enough for each service to allow

itself some margin for reserve, ASF officials

blamed lack of strict General Staff supervision in the early days of the war for

inequitable distribution of space. In the

spring of 1943 they decided to reallocate

existing space on the basis of collective

needs rather than add new space. They

not only redistributed space among the

technical services and Ground Forces but

also co-ordinated requirements of the

Army Air Forces, the Treasury Department, the Navy, and other Government

agencies.27

In July 1943 Ordnance surrendered to

the Medical Department the Louisville

depot that had come in with the War Aid

group. In the fall, two of the motor transport depots were released: Little Rock

went to the Army Air Forces and Holabird

to the Signal Corps. The functions of both

could easily be absorbed by great Ordnance depots near by—Red River in the

case of Little Rock, which had carried a

small stock of tires only; and Letterkenny

in the case of Holabird. About the same

time, the old World War I ammunition

depot at Charleston, South Carolina, was

turned over to the Transportation Corps.

In January 1944, two more motor transport depots were released, Whittemore to

the First Service Command, and Normoyle

to the Army Air Forces. By then Ordnance

had also released motor supply sections at

Quartermaster depots in Richmond and

25

 Hist, P&O, I, pp. 19-27. 26

 Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944, p. 5, OHF.

Only about eighty percent of total storage space

was usually considered occupiable. Ann Rpt of

FS for FY 1943, p. 2, OHF. 27

 ASF Hist, Storage Opns, pp. 13, 30-34.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 387

Alexandria in Virginia, Atlanta and Savannah in Georgia, and Mira Loma in

California. During FY 1944 Ordnance

lost about four million square feet in warehouse space, two million in shed space,

and about half a million in open space. At

the same time, the percentage of occupancy rose sharply in all cases, from 54.2

to 67.7 in warehouses, 55.2 to 64.5 in

sheds, and 31.2 to 65.3 in open storage.28

After this period of contraction there

were a few minor additions and some

readjustments. Facilities once a part of

Fort Wayne Ordnance Depot became

Palmer Woods Ordnance Depot. In the

spring of 1944 a one-story rented building

at Vernon, California, became Los Angeles Ordnance Depot; and the Pennsylvania Ordnance Works, transferred from

Industrial Service to Field Service, was

renamed Susquehanna Ordnance Depot.29

In April 1945 space had to be provided

at depots and plants to take care of the

overflow of ammunition stopped on its

way to Europe; but this was temporary

in-transit storage lasting only from V-E

Day to the time of reshipment to Japan.30

On the whole, the Ordnance storage

space that remained after the contraction

of 1943 and early 1944 carried the load

throughout the war. By 1944 the emphasis

had shifted to overseas supply and there

was an increasing number of direct shipments that bypassed the depots. Better

warehousing and depot management and,

in some cases, better methods of stock

control also aided in the supply of armies

much larger than had been estimated in

early planning.31

The Changing Pattern of Distribution

For ammunition storage, at the beginning of 1943 there were three types of

depots—reservoir, area, and transshipment. Typical of the reservoirs were the

big depots in the interior that stored

slow-moving stocks—Black Hills, Blue

Grass, Milan, Navajo, Ogden, Portage,

Red River, Sierra, Sioux, and Wingate.

Area depots were Pueblo, San Antonio,

and Savanna; along with Anniston, Letterkenny, Seneca, and Umatilla, they had the

responsibility in certain areas of supplying

posts, camps, stations, and air bases. San

Jacinto was primarily a transshipment

depot, a kind that handled ammunition

shipments en route to ports and awaiting

ship movements. Other transshipment

depots were Charleston, Curtis Bay, Delaware, Nansemond, and Raritan on the

East Coast, and Benicia on the West

Coast. Some of the reservoir depots had

had from the beginning the responsibility

for "backing up" various area depots and

ports. During 1943 and 1944, as the

emphasis shifted to overseas supply, a

number of depots of all three types were

given "back-up" or "intermediate" duties,

in order to regulate the flow to the overburdened ports. Some of the reservoir

depots began to supply the service commands in their own areas. Generally the

tendency was to reduce the number of

depots that were exclusively reservoir or

transshipment and to increase the area and

intermediate missions. In 1944 there were

some changes in terminology: reservoir became "reserve," area became "distribution."

 32

 But on the whole there was no

28

 (1) Hist, P&O, I, p. 28; (2) Hist, Storage

Br, 1, p. 38; (3) Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944,

pp. 4-5. 29

 OCO FS Storage Div, vols. III, IV, V, VI,

VII, History from 1 January 1944 to 31 March

1945, p. 2. 30

 Monograph No. 8, pp. 40-41. 31

 Seech. XX, below. 32

 Hist, Storage Br, I, pt. II, Depot Missions,

pp. 22-32.
388 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

major revision in the ammunition depot

system. The most significant change in the

pattern of ammunition supply from 1943

on was the trend to ship direct from

plants to ports, training camps, the Navy,

or other users. And, to avoid unnecessary

movement of this heavy and dangerous

matériel, better stock control methods

were evolved.33

In planning for the distribution of the

tremendous quantities of weapons, tanks,

and other general supplies produced after

Pearl Harbor, Field Service officials relied

on the old-line general supply depots,

backed up by reserve stocks stored in

warehouses and sheds at the new ammunition depots. Seneca and Letterkenny were

to back up Raritan, which handled the

First, Second, and Third Service Commands and supplied the Atlantic bases;

Anniston would back up Augusta, which

served the Fourth Service Command, Red

River would back up San Antonio; Ogden

would back up Benicia, which served the

Ninth Service Command and supplied the

Pacific bases. Space at the great high altitude depots like Sierra, Pueblo, Sioux,

and Black Hills would be used to store the

reserves that were expected to accumulate

after the war.34 This plan was feasible

enough as long as general supplies consisted mainly of weapons and combat vehicles. But when the heavy load of motor

vehicle responsibilities was added, involving an unprecedented spare parts problem,

it became evident that the depot system

would have to be revised.35

In December 1942 the storage experts

of the Supply Branch of the TankAutomotive Center in Detroit, which now

had most of the responsibility for general

supplies, drew up a plan for the distribution of parts, tools, and equipment. It contained the germ of the change in depot

missions that took place in 1943. The planners proceeded on the premise that distribution depots ought to be kept to a

minimum and ought to keep their stocks

at the lowest possible level consistent with

requisitioning demands. Keeping the number of such depots to a minimum would

avoid undue dispersal of critical stocks

and would permit the concentration of

office and warehouse equipment, key personnel, and labor, all of which were becoming scarce. Getting rid of excess stocks

would free more space for fast-moving

items and would cut down on physical

handling and paper work. The depots

would be kept fluid. Current stocks over

and above those needed to fill requisitions

would be moved into Master Supply, or

wholesale, depots, from which they could

be withdrawn by the distribution depots

as needed. Current stocks in excess of the

capacity of the Master Supply depots

would be shipped into Reserve Storage

depots, on a bulk basis. Obsolescent items

would be concentrated in one depot.36

In applying these principles, the planners brought into the active distribution

pattern some of the large new ammunition

depots and revised the missions of some

of the motor transport and War Aid depots

acquired from the Quartermaster Corps.

For example, in the eastern area the distribution depots serving the First, Second,

and Third Service Commands and the

ports of Boston, New York, and Hampton

Roads in the fall of 1942 were Schenectady, Raritan, and Holabird. In the future,

33

 See pp. 428-35. 34

 Meyns Rpt. 35

 Monograph No. 8, pp. 47-48. 36

 Storage and Issue Sec, Supply Br, T-AC,

Present and Future Distribution Plan for Parts

and Supplies and Tools and Equipment of Ordnance General Supply, copy in Hist, Storage Div,

I, pt. 1, ex. E.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 389

Letterkenny was to be the distribution

depot for all parts, supplies, tools, and

equipment, with one exception—tools and

equipment for tanks and tractors were to

come from Lordstown, the distributor for

this kind of matériel to all service commands and ports of embarkation except

those on the West Coast. The substitution

of Letterkenny would free Raritan to be

the requisitioning point for the eastern

ports of embarkation for all parts and

supplies except those of wheeled and

semiwheeled vehicles, which would come

from Toledo (soon to be renamed Rossford), a kind of reservoir for autombile

parts in the same sense that Lordstown

was for tools and equipment.37

The Master Depot System

From this early planning stemmed the

Master Depot concept that profoundly influenced the Ordnance depot system. By

April of 1943 the pattern was clear. Parts,

supplies, tools, and equipment flowed

through four major types of depots:

master, distribution, storage, and arsenal.

There were only four master depots, but

each stocked every item required for the

maintenance of certain classes of matériel.

Rock Island was responsible for tank,

tractor, artillery, and small arms parts and

supplies; Rossford for wheeled and halftrack parts and supplies; Lordstown for

tools and equipment, except for fire control

instruments; and Frankford for parts, supplies, tools, and equipment for fire control

instruments. Their stocks were available

for immediate movement into combat

theaters or into domestic activities, as the

situation demanded. Supplies from master

depots flowed through the distribution

depots, the second major type.

In the category of distribution depots

were several groups, the most important of

which were the "retail" or domestic depots

that supplied the service commands within

their respective areas. In the eastern area,

Letterkenny supplied everything needed;

in the south, Atlanta furnished motor

transport matériel and Anniston everything else; in the middle west and west,

Ft. Wayne and St. Louis supplied motor

transport matériel and Rock Island

everything else; in the southwest, Red

River carried the full line, as did Ogden

for the West Coast. Second in importance

in this category were the filler or export

depots that supplied the ports of embarkation: Raritan serving Boston, New York,

and Hampton Roads; Atlanta serving

Charleston and New Orleans; Anniston

serving Charleston; Red River serving

New Orleans; Mt. Rainier serving Seattle;

and Stockton and Benicia both serving

San Francisco. Less important than the

retail depots and the filler depots, but

still in the category of requisition points,

were the "special stock" depots that carried parts for major items that were in

limited supply because they were substitute standard, obsolescent, or experimental.

For this type of matériel St. Louis issued

parts for wheeled and half-track vehicles

and Rock Island parts for weapons, tanks,

tractors, and fire control instruments; Ft.

Crook issued tools and equipment for all

major items, with some assistance from

Lordstown.38

The storage depots, the third of the four

major types, were the largest in number.

37

 Ibid. 38

 (1) Ord FS Bull No. 2-15, 1 Apr 43; (2)

Lt Col W. W. Townsend, Depot Supply of Ordnance Parts and Tools, in Transcript of Talks,

Depot Comdrs' Conf. 13-14 Apr 43, St. Louis,

Mo., OHF.
390 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

There were twenty-two in all. Five of them

were Ordnance sections in ASF depots,

five were 1940-41 war-reserve depots such

as Black Hills and Sierra, nine were former

motor transport or War Aid installations,

and three were old-line Ordnance depots.

Of the latter, in a reversal of roles, Augusta was now supporting Anniston, and

San Antonio, Red River. Some of the

storage depots were well located geographically to support filler, rather than domestic retail, depots. Known as "advance"

depots, they temporarily held boxed or

crated parts and tools until the Ports of

Embarkation called for them on movement

orders. Others had processing layouts to

assemble certain classes of matériel into

sets, and box and crate it. Assembly and

processing were important functions also

of the fourth type, the arsenal depots at

Springfield, Watertown, and Watervliet,

and also at Aberdeen and Erie Proving

Grounds. At these Industrial Service installations, workers assembled the parts,

supplies, tools, and equipment that accompanied the major items that went

forth to the requisitioners.39

By the time the new depot system went

into effect, on 1 July 1943, the trend from

domestic to export business had already

set in. Fifty-seven percent of all general

supply tonnage was being shipped overseas. But the impact of this shift on the

new depot system did not become plain

to Ordnance planners until late in 1943

when the campaign in Italy was well under

way and stockpiling had begun for the

invasion of Europe. Then it became apparent that the weakness in the new system

was the bottleneck that could be caused

by an inadequate filler depot. Raritan, a

comparatively small installation, was attempting to supply the eastern ports with

stocks of weapons parts, general purpose

vehicles, combat vehicle parts, and cleaning and preserving materials; and it was

falling behind. Ordnance storage experts

decided that it was better to depend for

export less on the "country store" type of

filler depot and more on the master depot

specializing in certain lines. Two of the

master depots had been shipping for export direct to ports for some time, Lordstown for tools and Rossford for automotive

parts.40

With the emphasis increasing on master

depots rather than distribution or filler

depots, in the spring of 1944 General

Campbell, acting on the advice of Mr.

Lewis H. Brown, president of the JohnsManville Corporation, and Mr. Keller,

president of Chrysler, decided to use the

master depot technique to speed the flow

of tank and automotive supplies to troops

overseas, concentrating at one depot all

parts for a certain make of vehicle, such

as Chevrolet, and at another all parts for

a certain kind of vehicle, such as heavy

duty trucks. The object was to achieve

better control of stocks by concentrating

like and interchangeable parts in one place

and enabling depot employees to specialize

more narrowly; to simplify requisitioning;

and to give more flexibility in meeting

overseas demands.41 As of August 1945

the principal master depots were Rock

Island, Frankford, Palmer Woods (a new

depot added in the spring of 1945), Rossford, St. Louis, Letterkenny, Terre Haute,

Fort Wayne, Lincoln, and Atlanta. Depots

with more limited master depot responsi39

 FS Bull No. 2-15, pp. 12-13. 40

 (1) PSP 56, Depots, Field Service, Mission

and Management, Jun 45, exs. B and E, OHF;

(2) Monograph No. 8, p. 53. 41

 (1) FS Div Order 29-44, 3 Apr 44, sub:

Master Depot Distribution Plan for Tank-Automotive Parts and Tools, OHF; (2) Hist Storage

Br, I, pt. I, Storage, pp. 18-19.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 391

bilities were Watervliet, Watertown, the

Submarine Mine Depot at Fort Monroe,

Anniston, Blue Grass, Aberdeen, Ogden,

and the Ordnance section at Columbus

General Depot.42

General Campbell believed that the

master depot plan for automotive supplies

"contributed greatly to the lessening of

serious bottlenecks in the overseas supply

problems."43 But stocking by make of

car, such as Dodge or Chevrolet, ran

counter to the parts-identification system

set up in 1944.44 Another obstacle to

smooth functioning was the inability of

the Ordnance Department after May 1945

to operate the master depots strictly as

wholesalers shipping bulk quantities in unbroken cartons or boxes. ASF Manual

M411 of 1 May 1945, Procedures for

Processing Overseas Requisitions, required

that if an item was anywhere in the depot

system, any customer was entitled to it,

regardless of the quantity desired. Consequently, retail depots were forced to requisition small lots from the master depots,

which had to set up retail departments.

Ordnance storage experts believed strongly

that wholesale and retail operations

could not be efficiently combined.45

Even under the master depot system,

missions were not clearly defined. One

depot usually had several functions; that

is, it might be some combination of the

master, distribution, filler, or storage type

of installation, and the missions varied,

not only as to type of depot but as to

type of matériel. For example, by June of

1945 Anniston was a master depot for

parts and supplies for scout cars and K

and L groups (cleaning and preserving

matériel and targets). It was also a distribution depot for the Fourth Service

Command for tracked and wheeled vehicles, K and L matériel, supplies and

equipment for automatic weapons of 20-

mm. and above, and for field artillery; for

the same matériel, excepting wheeled vehicles and K and L items, it was a filler

depot to the Charleston Port of Embarkation.46

Instability in Depot Missions

Changes in missions were common in the

last two years of the war. A case history,

perhaps an extreme one, is the story of

Letterkenny. One of the large ammunition

depots of the 1940-41 group, it first came

into the general supply distribution pattern in January 1943 as a reserve storage

depot to back up Raritan. In the changeover to the master depot system that took

place on 1 July 1943 it became the distribution depot for the First, Second, and

Third Service Commands. When congestion became apparent at Raritan late in

1943, Letterkenny became a filler depot to

assist Raritan for Dodge, Ford, and General Motors parts. In addition to these

major changes, there were several minor

changes in types of matériel handled and

requisitioners supplied; in September 1943,

for example, the Army Air Forces in the

area became one of the depot customers.

In the words of the depot historian, "The

missions given to Letterkenny during the

year speeded and picked up like a snowball rolling downhill. Heterogeneous carloads of matériel were rolling in to a

depot with incompleted bins and ware42

 Monograph No. 8, p. 56. 43

 Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team, p.

339.

44

 See pp. 405-09. 45

 PSP 56, ex. F. 46

 PSP 56, p. 4.
392 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

houses while back orders were accumulating for matériel that was not yet stored."

 47

Early in 1944 the depot took over

Raritan's filler responsibilities and ceased

being a domestic distribution depot except

for targets and cleaning and preserving

matériel. Six months later came another

important change. In July 1944 Letterkenny became the master depot for parts

and supplies for Chevrolets, the distribution depot for combat, wheeled, and semiwheeled vehicles for the First, Second, and

Third Service Commands, and the filler

depot for eastern ports for wheeled vehicles, common hardware, parts common,

and major items. Early in January 1945

storage planners at Detroit, seeking to

relieve the overburdened Ft. Wayne installation, gave Letterkenny the master

depot responsibility for heavy duty trucks,

taking away certain parts supply functions.48

Criticism by higher authority that the

Ordnance Department failed to achieve

stability in depot missions appears to be

justified; and there is evidence that instability placed heavy burdens on the

depots.49 When mission changes were

made, Ordnance tried to keep interdepot

movements of matériel to a minimum,

using them only when it was not possible

to deplete stocks through attrition; but

they were necessary at times and often

required not only shifting stocks but extensive rewarehousing, moving bins and

other storage equipment from one depot to

another, and retraining workers.50

Some rearrangement of the depot system

was doubtless inevitable to correct faults

caused by the improvisation of the early

expansion period. Some changes were adjustments to decisions of ASF, such as the

loss in the summer of 1943 of some of the

motor transport depots that had been integrated into the master depot system.51

 An

Ordnance study made in June 1945

ascribed the large number of mission

changes in the second and third year of the

war to the fact that planners had had to

work by trial and error. With very little

basis on which to forecast the quantity of

matériel to be shipped, or the rate at

which such shipments would be required

by the theaters, they had found it almost

impossible to forecast depot loads with

any degree of accuracy.52 Also, there were

defects in organization, notably an unfortunate division of responsibility for distribution between Detroit and Washington.53

But it is permissible to speculate whether

some of the changes in depot missions

might not have been avoided by more

careful planning. At the time the Master

Depot system was evolved early in 1943,

the congestion at Raritan might have been

foreseen. And if the change-over to stocking master depots by make of car such as

Chevrolet or Dodge was desirable it might

better have been effected then rather than

47

 Hist, Letterkenny Ord Depot, vols. II, III,

IV, V, History for the Period 1 January 1943

thru December 1943 (hereafter cited as Hist,

Letterkenny, 1943), p. 4. 48

 Hist, Letterkenny Ord Depot, X, History, 1

January 1945 through 31 March 1945, pp. 5-7. 49

 (1) Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1945, p. 14; (2)

Maj. A. W. Coopes, Key Pers Rpt, 4 Apr 46,

in Key Pers Rpts OCO-D. See also other key

personnel reports in this file. 50

 (1) Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944, p. 304;

(2) Hist, Letterkenny, 1943, p. 7. 51

 FS Supply Bull 2-15, 1 Apr 43, p. 12. 52

 PSP 56, ex. B. 53

 (1) Project 91, Relationships Between the

Office of the Chief of Ordnance in Washington

and the Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit,

OHF; (2) Memo, Col John A. Barclay, Deputy

Chief FS Suboffice for Chief FS Suboffice, Rock

Island, 6 Jun 45, sub: Stock Contl Activities

1941-45 (hereafter cited as Barclay Rpt), in FS

Key Pers Rpts, OHF; (3) Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. IV.
REVISIONS IN THE DEPOT SYSTEM 393

in 1944, after the by-item system had gone

into effect. Col. W. C. Gamrath, an experienced Ordnance supply officer, feelingly expressed one point of view on shifting patterns of distribution:

"The methods of distribution of ordnance

supplies seemed to be a target of many

'experts' within the Ordnance Department,

within Headquarters ASF, and from industries on the outside. There was a period

during 1943 and 1944 when it seemed in

vogue to change the methods. ... I have

observed and studied a sufficient number of

businesses to realize that there are several

different methods under which materials

similar to Ordnance supply may be successfully distributed. I am of the firm opinion

that it would have been far better to select

one of these approved methods and stick to

it throughout the war than to go through a

constant state of change."

 54

Though some alteration in the pattern

of supply was contemplated to meet the

emphasis on a one-front war in the Pacific,

changes in 1945 were kept to a minimum.

Looking to the postwar period, Field Service began comprehensive planning to

achieve a stable program of supply. The

program envisaged a network of permanent depots carefully selected on the basis

of the facilities that were available, the

workload that could be handled, the

sources of labor that could be tapped, and

the technical knowledge of the workers. To

these permanent depots there would be

gradually transferred the functions of the

less desirable installations, which would be

closed out. Generally speaking, the pattern

of distribution after the war would be

based on two factors. One was the correct

location of depots, with distribution responsibilities assigned to depots situated in

the area they served. The other was storage

by commodity, with related types of matériel stored at specific depots.55

The Ordnance experience in World War

II showed that the efficiency of a supply

and distribution system depended on

many factors, chief of which were the location of depots, the nature of depot

facilities, and availability of civilian workers. In its final report, Logistics in World

War II, ASF observed that, "As the war

progressed, it became evident that the

entire distribution system depended for its

efficiency upon the location of the depots."

Unfortunately, no pattern of depot locations would serve all purposes equally

well. Nearness to manufacturers was an

advantage that had to be weighed against

nearness to ports of embarkation. In terms

of safe storage of ammunition, vast desert

tracts were ideal, but in terms of labor

supply they left much to be desired. At the

start of the defense period the War Department permitted each technical service

to develop its own system of distribution

and storage with the result that there was

no integrated plan for the Army as a

whole. As far as Ordnance was concerned

the result was overexpansion of depots in

the early years. But the choices of sites

were generally good, and the excess capacity created in the 1940-42 period was

readily redistributed by ASF in the 1943

-44 period. The capability of individual

depots as measured in terms of buildings,

equipment, and labor supply was also of

great importance to efficient operations.

On this score, the lack of adequate provision in the early years for storing general

supplies—as distinguished from ammunition—proved to be the biggest shortcom54

 Memo, Lt Col W. C. Gamrath, Chief, Supply Operations Br, for Exec to Chief of FS, 22

Mar 46, sub: Final Historical Rpt, in FS Key

Pers Rpts, OHF. 55

 Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1945, p. 14.
394 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ing. But it was rather quickly remedied

after Pearl Harbor, as was the other

major problem of integrating with Ordnance depots the storage space acquired

from the Motor Transport Service. Not so

easily solved were the problems of supply

terminology, stock control, and maintenance discussed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER XIX

The Language of Supply

One of the important lessons of World

War II, according to the Hoover Commission, was the need for a better means of

identifying and classifying military stores.1

This conclusion was based to a large

extent on Ordnance experience, for Ordnance failed to solve this problem satisfactorily during World War II. In spite of

persistent efforts, Field Service did not

work out an effective means of identification and communication, so that the

soldier in the field, the storekeeper in the

depot, and the official in Washington

could all speak the same language.

The problem mainly concerned spare

parts.2 A tank, a gun, or a truck could be

identified at sight, even though its nomenclature might sometimes cause trouble.

But its parts were a different matter. They

were numerous, and many were hard to

identify. In the critical months of preparation for the invasion of Europe, a report

that there was a shortage of spare parts

startled men who were familiar with the

great flow of production after Pearl Harbor. The Chief of Ordnance found it

"inconceivable that there can be an actual

physical lack of spare parts per se"; he

believed that "parts are available but they

are not recognized and are not identified.

They are, in other words, in effect, lost."

 3

In the late 1930's a British expert on

logistics suggested that the art of war

might be read in terms of the spare—

human and material—and that in the warfare of the future the emphasis might

conceivably be on the mechanical rather

than the human reinforcement. A missing

or faulty part, small, inexpensive, and

ordinarily negligible, that immobilized a

tank on the eve of battle assumed a value

greater than even a replacement for the

tank commander himself. A man could replace a man but nothing else a particular

part. And the time, place, and occasion of

the need for it was unpredictable. Nobody

could say with certainty what part would

break or fail, or when or where. Therefore spare parts control in the sense of

seeing to it that the man in the field had

the part when he needed it was "the

essence of supply."

 4

With each lot of one hundred tanks,

guns, or other major products, it was

Ordnance policy to order enough spare

1

 MBCA Newsletter, Munitions Board Cataloging Agency, I (30 Jun 50), 6, filed in Office of

Cataloging in Office of Secy of Defense. 2

 See Chapter XIII for discussion of spare parts

procurement. 3

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Campbell, to Col John B.

Medaris, 14 Dec 43, in General Campbell's Personal Files; (2) Memo, Col W. W. Townsend

for Exec to Chief of FS, 29 Aug 45, FS Key

Pers Rpts, OHF [hereafter cited as Townsend

Rpt]; (3) Lt Gen Somervell, Talk to Key Pers

of ASF, 9 Mar 45, ASF Prod Div Files, 470.8

Tanks. 4

 Brevet Lt. Col. George C. Shaw, Supply in

Modern War (London: Faber and Faber,

Limited, 1938), p. 303.
396 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

parts to last a year. But what was

"enough"? The best estimates were often

wrong, because of differences in climate,

terrain, and operations in a world-wide

war; and for newly developed items there

was no maintenance experience at all.5

Shortages developed in certain parts,

though in general the tendency was to

provide too much rather than too little.

The spare parts required to maintain one

hundred medium tanks for one year

filled twenty boxcars. For one jeep, Ordnance undertook to stock and furnish

1,006 different spare parts, a total that

seemed large, though actually it was less

than half the 2,500 different parts, totaling 9,000 individual pieces, that were required to manufacture the jeep.6

 The

effort to provide machinery capable of

keeping records on these huge stocks began

in 1940. It involved a new spare parts

organization within Field Service and the

use of electrical accounting apparatus

made by the International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation.

A New Spare Parts Organization

In the late summer of 1940 the Ordnance Department requested Lawrence

Barroll, formerly a representative in Sweden of General Motors Overseas Operations, to make a study of Ordnance

procedure for initial spare parts requirements and a survey of the spare parts

organization of Field Service. Barroll spent

two weeks in Washington, two weeks in

the Detroit area consulting with General

Motors parts specialists, and three days at

Raritan Arsenal where Standard Nomenclature Lists were published. This short

survey convinced him that the traditional

Ordnance Provision System procedure for

parts control by which major items and

their spare parts were handled by the

same persons, using the same form of

stock record cards, was inefficient. He

therefore recommended on 8 October

1940 that all spare parts, regardless of

their nature, be segregated in one organization in Field Service, and that this organization manage not only parts distribution but also the determination of parts

requirements.7

The Chief of Ordnance approved the

recommendation for centralized control of

spare parts distribution. He agreed to the

separation of parts from their major items

and on 16 December 1940 employed

Barroll to build up a new Parts and

Accessories Unit to assume responsibility

for them.8 But from the beginning the

new spare parts unit was plagued with

troubles. It was, according to Barroll, unable to get enough experienced help, office

space, or even supplies. Furthermore, it

was hampered by the confusion resulting

from the simultaneous installation of

electrical accounting machines for stores

reporting.9

The Use of IBM Machines

In the spring of 1940 the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of War had proposed

that IBM machines be installed in all

5

 This problem is discussed above in Chapter

IV.

6

 Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance Team, pp.

351, 358, 363. 7

 Barroll Rpt, 1942, pp. 5-7. Mr. Barroll also

criticized the Ordnance system of depot commodity specialization; for example, he believed

that placing most tank parts at Rock Island Arsenal, small arms parts at Springfield, and so on,

resulted in "poor geographic availability and also

left stocks in a very vulnerable position for

enemy sabotage or offensive measures." 8

 (1) Ibid., p. 8; (2) Crain, Diary, 30, 31 Oct

40; (3) Ord Office Memo 510, 21 Jan 41. 9

 Barroll Rpt, 1942, p. 8.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 397

Army depots. Considered much more flexible than the bookkeeping machines, such

as Elliott Fisher, which had been adopted

by Ordnance in the mid-twenties, these

electrical accounting machines (EAM)

could prepare in hours reports that by

manual procedures would take days or

even weeks. The IBM Corporation tested

its apparatus at several Quartermaster

depots, pronounced at suitable for military

record-keeping,10 and was given the job by

the War Department. On a directive from

the Assistant Secretary of War that the

IBM Corporation be given all assistance in

installing its machines, on a rental basis,

the Chief of Ordnance ordered the machines to be used in all Ordnance stock

control operations for spare parts. This

involved the bulk of general supply articles, since major items, which were not

included, represented only about eight

hundred out of a total of about eighty

thousand items. Some Ordnance officials

had misgivings, not only as to the superiority of the IBM system over competitors

like Remington-Rand, but also as to the

wisdom of employing the machines on a

rental rather than a sales basis.11 Col.

Lawrence J. Meyns, who became chief of

the General Supply Branch in July 1941,

thought that the decision to use the machines was good, because he believed that

stock cards on the spare parts that were

coming off the production lines in an

ever-mounting flood could not be kept

posted on the old system.12

Whatever the ultimate merits of the

new system, it soon became apparent, to

Colonel Meyns among others, that Ordnance had rushed it through too fast and

had not planned the timing and installation with enough care and foresight.13

Decided upon in the fall of 1940, the

installation of the machines was accomplished with the aid of the IBM Corporation the following spring and the changeover took place in July 1941.14

Almost at once there was a lag rather

than a speed-up. In a tight manpower

market there was the difficulty of obtaining, and keeping, trained machine operators. This could hardly have been avoided.

Another obstacle to smooth operation

grew out of the failure to foresee the necessity for converting a commercial system

more fully to military operation before

installing it. For example, the stock record

card as originally drawn up had no provision for "demands," a term not used in

business, although essential in military

supply. Such drawbacks to the new system, together with lack of understanding

of it in the depots, or downright opposition

to it, were not peculiar to Ordnance. The

Quartermaster Corps had similar problems

in some degree.15

The greatest problem presented to Ordnance by the machine system was that of

adapting to it the numbers hitherto used

for requisitioning, procurement, and distribution. Stores reports, which were actually carbon copies of depot stock ledgers,

used the numbers found in Standard

Nomenclature Lists—the Group letter, the

number indicating the class of stores, and

the piece mark. For example, in reporting

a bayonet catch the depot officer used the

SNL designation B8 plus the piece mark

10

 Stauffer, QM Depot Storage and Distribution Opns, p. 159. This monograph also contains

a description of the actual functioning of the

machines, pp. 159-60. 11

 Interv with Kahlert, 14 Apr 53. 12

 Meyns Rpt. 13

 Ibid.; (2) Barclay Rpt. 14

 Min, Wesson Confs, 12 Sep 40, 28 Jul 41. 15

 (1) Hynds Memo; (2) Stauffer, op. cit.,

pp. 160-65, 178-79, 187-88.
398 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

B147058. In the spring of 1941 Field

Service considered the possibility of adopting the piece mark as the universal means

of identifying and reporting stores. But a

study of stores reports revealed the fact

that there were hundreds of items in stock

that had no piece mark; furthermore, the

Industrial Division was too busy with procurement to stop and assign them. In any

case the IBM machine cards then available

could not take "taxi" numbers such as

BECX3G, because they fell in a field of

the card that could not take letters of the

alphabet. Some kind of coding was necessary.16

In this dilemma Field Service turned to

a numbering system that had been devised

in prewar years for a statistical report on

parts usage by maintenance echelons. It

was a code number consisting of three

elements. The first four digits represented

the SNL letter and number; the next two

digits, the section of the SNL in which the

item was listed; and the last five digits

the item within the section of its particular

SNL. Thus the item code number assigned

to the bayonet catch was B008-01-00030,

that for the item next below it in the

same section was B008-01-00040.17

For the job of assigning item code

numbers to all Ordnance parts the chief

of the Equipment Division set up a coding section in the Machine Records Unit.

After coding an item the Machine Records

Unit punched a master card containing

the piece mark or drawing number, the

nomenclature, and the new code number,

and sent copies of it to all reporting installations. The coding operation, which

included items coming off production

lines as well as those in stock, was gigantic,

and the Coding Section was understaffed.

It soon fell behind. By mid-June of 1941

coding was in "lamentable condition."

 18

The Parts Control Division

After Pearl Harbor it became evident

that something had to be done to improve

spare parts supply. This was the greatest

problem facing the Ordnance Department,

according to a survey made in the spring

of 1942 by General Motors Overseas Operations. This survey recommended that

Ordnance create a Parts Control Division

on the same administrative level as Industrial Service and Field Service. General

Campbell acted on this recommendation

after he became Chief of Ordnance in

June 1942. But this attempt to solve the

problem was short-lived, for several reasons. Floor space, equipment, and experienced people were lacking. There was disagreement, even among the GM officials

who made the recommendation, as to

whether the new organization should take

over spare parts operations directly or

merely set up controls over the people responsible for operations.19

 The Parts

Control Division was abolished in July

1942. In the reorganization that took place

at that time the Field Service spare parts

organization, which included the Machine

Records Unit, was renamed the Parts and

Supplies Section and placed under the

General Supply Branch. It now had a

staff of 267, but according to Mr. Barroll

was "still comparatively green" and much

remained to be accomplished in "future

16

 (1) Barclay Rpt; (2) Col W. C. Gamrath,

History of Official Stock Number (Item Stock

Number) [hereafter cited as Gamrath, Hist], 17

May 45, pp. 1-3. 17

 PSP 65, ex. AF. 18

 (1) PSP 63, ex. 2; (2) Gamrath, Hist, pp.

3-4.

19

 (1) General Motors Survey, vol. II, p. 10;

(2) Meyns Rpt; (3) Barclay Rpt; (4) Ch. XIII

above; (5) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. IV.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 399

development, training of personnel, and

refinement of operating procedures."

 20

Effects of the Motor Vehicle Transfer

At this critical stage in parts control

planning, Army Service Forces directed

that Ordnance take over motor transport

vehicles, formerly supplied by the Quartermaster Motor Transport Service. It was a

logical step, because combat vehicles and

transport vehicles had parts in common;

but it tremendously increased and complicated the problems of distribution, especially that of stock control. Before the

merger, Ordnance handled a total of

some 80,000 items. Estimates of the items

handled by Motor Transport Service

varied from 75,000 to 150,000. Accurate

figures did not exist. There were some

400,000 item numbers, but thousands

were duplicate names for the same item.21

As a result of the transfer of motor

transport the Chief of Ordnance established the Tank-Automotive Center in Detroit on 1 September 1942. This step

drastically affected the whole Ordnance

distribution system. To Detroit went the

Parts and Supplies Section of the General

Supply Branch along with three other

sections—Automotive, Tools and Equipment, and Storage and Issue.22

 Stock

control of major items for Groups A to F,

small arms, artillery, and fire control, remained in Washington because their

Group Chiefs, whose unique technical

knowledge made them irreplaceable, refused to move, but stock control of spare

parts for this matériel went to Detroit.23

The move centered in Detroit the direction

of distribution for virtually all Ordnance

installations except those handling ammunition. The planners intended that

henceforth the Washington office would

set forth policy, the Tank-Automotive

Center would carry it out.24

Colonel Raphael S. Chavin, Chief of the

General Supply Branch, justified the decentralization to Detroit of stock control

for all spare parts, for weapons as well as

vehicles, on two grounds: first, it complied with the general directive to reduce

the number of employees in Washington,

and, second, it permitted the concentration

of the IBM stock control installation in one

central place.25 Another explanation was

that in the planning stage the Ordnance

Department had considered moving to Detroit the major item units handling

weapons; at that time the pattern of the

T-AC as a product center had not fully

crystallized.26

But this further separation of spare

parts from major items caused forebodings. To Colonel Meyns, the movement of

weapons parts from Washington to Detroit

was "a terrible setback."

 27

 Major Hynds

of the General Supply Branch, who

doubted the wisdom of setting up the

Parts and Accessories Unit in the first

place, believed that the real reason for

moving all spare parts to Detroit, parts for

small arms and artillery as well as vehicles,

20

 (1) Barroll Rpt, 1942, p. 9; (2) ODO 285,

Change I, 28 Jul 42. 21

 (1) Hynds Memo; (2) Memo, Maj Gen

Julian S. Hatcher to CofOrd, 5 May 1945, sub:

Rpt of Activities in World War II [hereafter

cited as Hatcher Rpt], OHF. 22

 (1) GS Br Order 13, 14 Oct 42; (2) GS

Br Order 20, 7 Dec 42. 23

 (1) Interv with Col William F. Sadtler, 25

Aug 52; (2) Statement by Maj Gen John K.

Christmas, 11 Oct 49, OHF. 24

 Remarks by Brig Gen Julian S. Hatcher,

Chief FS Div, at Depot Comdrs' Conf, 13-14

Apr 43. 25

 Ltr, Col Raphael S. Chavin to Thomson, 9

Aug 49, OHF. 26

 Barclay Rpt. 27

 Meyns Rpt.
400 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

was that "spare parts have been placed in

such a rigid, inflexible grouping that we

now find it is impossible to separate them,

regardless of how advisable such a division

might be."

 28

 He pointed out that if parts

had remained with their major items, as

provided in the Ordnance Provision System Regulations, the move of Group G,

the automotive items, to Detroit "could

have been accomplished with scarcely a

ripple to disturb the effective operations

of the other groups."

 29

As it was, the disturbance to Field

Service supply operations approached the

proportions of a tidal wave. Detroit, now

the stock control center for Ordnance, the

place to which depots and district offices

sent their stores reports and the place

where these reports were combined into

the Consolidated Stores Report that was

the heart of the supply system, became an

impossible bottleneck. By December 1942

the posting of Consolidated Stores Report

data on parts distribution and other card

records in Detroit was seriously in arrears

—as much as one month behind on distribution cards and several months behind

on order cards. These delays made the

data misleading, since the figures did not

reflect the situation as it was at the

moment.

Moreover, the records were not accurate because depots frequently reported

parts under wrong code numbers.30 The

Coding Unit was handicapped by lack of

the tools essential for its job. The engineering drawings for small arms, artillery,

and fire control instruments were not

available in Detroit; parts lists and reference data from manufacturers were still

far from complete. The engineers of the

Parts and Supplies Section, who had

formerly supplied the necessary technical

information, worked in a separate building.

Because of continual engineering changes

and undependable records, knowledge of

the product was at a premium.31

In the move to Detroit, Field Service lost

a number of trained people who were

badly needed. The Parts and Supplies

Section lost 50 percent of its engineers.

When the move was announced some of

the engineers accepted commissions in the

Army and others transferred to other

government agencies in Washington. Some

who went to Detroit soon left government service to take jobs in the automobile

industry at increased salaries.32 The manpower situation grew worse in February

1943 when the Chief of Ordnance directed

personnel cuts throughout the TankAutomotive Center. The Parts and Supplies Section protested that it could not

operate on the ceiling then existing, much

less on a lower ceiling.33

Parts supply required manpower, in

quantity and in quality.34 A sympathetic

understanding of this fact in the War Department and the Army Service Forces

would have helped solve Ordnance's problems. But as late as the fall of 1944 the

Mead Committee found that neither the

Army nor the Navy recognized "the extent

of the paper work and bookkeeping work

required in order to maintain the flow of

28

 Hynds Memo, p. 18. 29

 Ibid.

30

 Barroll Rpt. 1942, pp. 12-13. 31

 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 32

 Meyns Rpt. 33

 Memo, Lt Col Martin P. Vorberg, Chief Plng

and Contl Div, for Chief FS Div, 11 Jun 45,

sub: Chronological Hist of Events Concerning

Martin P. Vorberg's Connection With the Ord

Dept (hereafter cited as Vorberg Rpt), FS Key

Pers Rpts. The broad picture of civilian personnel problems is presented in Green, Thomson,

and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Chapter

VI.

34

 Barroll Rpt. 1942, p. 19.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 401

BRIG. GEN. JULIAN S. HATCHER (seated at desk), Chief of Field Service, in his office at

the Pentagon, 1943. From left, Col. James L. Hatcher and Brig. Gen. Raphael S. Chavin.

materials."

 35

 The Chief of the Parts and

Supplies Section complained that he was

"constantly criticized and harassed by

higher authority for not doing an efficient

job and at the same time this same higher

authority was reducing the personnel available to do the job."

 36

The Crisis Early in 1943

By the beginning of 1943 it was evident

that mistakes had been made in the hasty

revamping of traditional Ordnance supply

procedures to meet the exigencies of war

and that the stock control situation was

critical. Late in 1942 General Somervell

had stated that "distribution is rapidly becoming our number one consideration."

 37

An avalanche of supplies was coming from

the factories, and some more efficient way

had to be found to get them to the users.

Big-scale troop movements were just getting under way. Complaints about Ordnance spare parts provision and distribution began to come from the using arms,

The Inspector General, and the Army

Service Forces.38 Disability reports from

the Inspector General's Office, surveys by

ASF, and special studies and analyses by

the Ordnance Department all stressed the

seriousness of the situation.39 At ASF

depots in England preparing for TORCH

35

 Rpt Mead Comm., 78th Cong., 2d sess., S.

Rpt No. 10, pt. 20, p. 23. 36

 Barclay Rpt. 37

 Stauffer, op. cit., p. 4. 38

 (1) PSP 63, ex. 18, Memo, Col Sadtler to

CofOrd, 11 May 43, sub: Adequate Provision of

Spare Parts; (2) Maint Div, Hq ASF, Maintenance Problems: A History. . . , pp. 66, 114,

copy in OCMH files. 39

 Lawrence S. Barroll, Reduction of Back

Orders, Transcript of Talks at Depot Comdrs'

Conf, 13-14 Apr 43, p. 24.
402 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

in 1942, the changeover to a different

parts identification scheme had necessitated

retraining thousands of workers and created "an almost hopeless confusion."

 40

In a nationwide radio broadcast on 11

March 1943, the anniversary of ASF, General Somervell said, "Stock or inventory

control requires immediate attention."

 41

General Campbell in February 1943 replaced Brig. Gen. Harry R. Kutz, whose

health had not been good, with Brig. Gen.

(later Maj. Gen.) Julian S. Hatcher as

Chief of Field Service. He also had Field

Service operations reviewed by his personal

advisory staff, Messrs. Baruch, Lewis H.

Brown, Benjamin F. Fairless, and Keller,

to which had been added Mr. Fowler

McCormick, president of International

Harvester, General Robert E. Wood, president of Sears Roebuck and Company,

and B. Edwin Hutchinson of Chrysler

Corporation. These eminent industrialists

did not propose any radical changes in

operations; they confined themselves to a

few helpful suggestions. But their visit to

OCO and their belief that hard and detailed work would bring Field Service out

of its difficulties were a boost to morale.42

In the field the General Supply Branch

made an intensive effort to find out why

unfilled requisitions, or back orders, were

piling up at the depots. Investigators surveyed two typical depots, Atlanta for automotive parts and Augusta for weapons

parts. Analysis of some seventeen thousand

back-order, items showed that poor records

were responsible and that the depots and

the Tank-Automotive Center shared the

blame equally. Most of the trouble in the

depots was caused by failure of the storekeepers to identify items in stock. The

greatest percentage of errors by the TankAutomotive Center was failure to correct

a shortage in one depot by transfer from

another, a failure that might have been

prevented by accurate and timely Consolidated Stores Reports.43

To purify records and improve the reporting system became matters of great

urgency. The first step was to find a

single workable system of parts numbering

to replace the many systems in use, because the fact that identical parts could

have different numbers made it difficult to

locate the parts and impossible to reflect

true stock levels. The second step was to

decentralize stock control on a product

basis, relieving the bottleneck at Detroit

and placing control in the hands of people

who had technical knowledge of the particular item. These two objectives occupied

some of the best brains in the Ordnance

Department from 1943 on.

Parts Numbering

"The Numbers Racket," as Ordnance

men called it, was clearly in need of reform

even before the end of 1942. No less than

seven different parts numbering systems

were being used. In addition to Ordnance

drawing numbers, taxi numbers, and Federal Stock Catalog numbers, there was still

another number that might be stamped

on the part—the manufacturer's number,

brought into the picture by the transfer of

40

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, vol. I, p. 158. 41

 Col Lawrence J. Meyns, Stock Control Program, Transcript of Talks at Depot Comdrs'

Conf, 13-14 Apr 43, p. 36, OHF. 42

 (1) Memo, Maj Gen Campbell, for Brig Gen

Harry Kutz, 8 Jan 43, OO 020/368; (2) Ltr,

Maj Gen Campbell, to Brown, 8 Jan 43, OO

020/368; (3) Campbell, The Industry-Ordnance

Team, pp. 335-36; (4) Ltr, Maj Gen Edward

E. MacMorland to Lida Mayo, 18 Mar 54, OHF. 43

 Lawrence Barroll, Reduction of Back Orders,

Transcript of Talks at Depot Comdrs' Conf 13-

14 Apr 43, pp. 24-25.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 403

motor vehicles to the Ordnance Department, and by the fact that more and more

automobile companies were manufacturing parts for tanks.

The manufacturer's number opened a

Pandora's box of troubles. It might be

either that of the end-item manufacturer or

that of the component-item manufacturer;

that is, it might be either the number

assigned by the Ford Company making

the car, or the Timken Company making

the axle. Most likely it would be that of

the automobile manufacturer, and this

fact caused incalculable confusion, because

several automobile manufacturers would

buy components from a single source and

put their own numbers on them. A bearing

that appeared in a Packard, a Ford, a

Chrysler, a Dodge, and a Plymouth could

have five different numbers—but it was

the same bearing.

Four types of numbers—Ordnance

drawing, Ordnance standard parts (taxi

system), Federal Standard Stock Catalog,

and manufacturer's—were primarily for

procurement purposes. They were also used

to some extent in requisitions, especially

the manufacturer's number, because of the

many manufacturers' catalogs in the

hands of troops. For stockkeeping, there

was the item stock number that had been

designed by Field Service as a basis for

the depot and Detroit records under the

IBM system.44 This item stock number

was not physically applied to parts but

was marked on tags and containers, in

most cases along with the drawing numbers. The item stock numbers were a

change-over from the SNL system, but the

coding had proceeded so slowly that some

SNL's were still being used. Also, in the

interim before the change-over could be

accomplished, depots had been forced to

assign temporary item stock numbers for

stores reporting. There were, therefore,

three possible stockkeeping numbers in

addition to four procurement numbers,

and the fact that parts were procured

under one number and stored under

another—and might be requisitioned under a third—contributed immeasurably to

the confusion.45

Interchangeability of Parts

Another aspect of the parts numbering

problem was the need for information on

what parts were interchangeable between

truck and truck, or truck and tank. The

desirability of being able to substitute one

part for another could hardly be overemphasized, from the standpoint of reducing the number of individual parts or

part numbers in the stock control system,

and of maintaining in operation equipment that would otherwise be deadlined

for lack of parts.

The necessity for compiling and disseminating interchangeability information on

automotive parts had long been obvious.

In 1940 The Quartermaster General had

begun such a project. But at that time

the size and urgency of the wartime task

could hardly have been foreseen. The emphasis then was on procurement, rather

than on distribution; further, it was

difficult to find, and keep, personnel with

sufficient technical knowledge for the

work. The job was far from complete

44

 See above, pp. 396-98. 45

 (1) Report of Board Appointed to Develop

Method of Numbering Standard Parts (Ordnance Department Special Orders 129, paragraph 5, dated 31 May 1943), 23 Jun 43 (hereafter cited as Wells Bd Rpt), copy in Hambleton,

Hist, Engr-Administrative Br; (2) Interv with

Sadtler, 25 Aug 52; (3) Hynds Memo. See

also FS Key Pers Rpts and OCO-D Key Pers

Rpts in OHF.
404 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

when the Motor Transport Service was

transferred to the Ordnance Department.

There now arose the problem of relating

the parts of trucks to parts of tanks and

other Ordnance items. The Ordnance Department had for years maintained at

Raritan Arsenal a file of data that showed

by SNL number all the major items on

which each part was used, and thus provided complete interchangeability for each

part number. But with the added load

imposed by the incorporation of the Motor

Transport Service, these records could not

be kept current. The Special Parts and

Interchangeability Group was overloaded

with work even on general purpose vehicles. The task was made more difficult

by the proprietary interests of some manufacturers who refused to make their interchangeability data available. Ordnance

did not undertake a definite program to

compile interchangeability data until the

spring of 1943 when the whole parts

numbering system became so critically obstructive that it had to be completely

revamped.46

Early in 1943 a breakdown in the effort

to convert manufacturers' numbers to the

Ordnance taxi system resulted in the

formation at Detroit of a committee to

study the whole numbers problem. But

reports by this and other committees accomplished little, and in April the Supply

Branch, T-AC, called a conference of

depot commanders from Ordnance and

Motor Transport installations to map out

a plan of action. These men recommended

that, except for standard commercial parts

common to other services, which would

continue to be carried under the Federal

Stock Catalog Number, every part be

given one number, to serve in place of the

drawing number, piece mark, manufacturer's number, or any other, and that this

number be the item stock number, plus a

classification code, if an item stock number had been assigned. They further recommended that new items, or items to

which no item stock number had been assigned, be given a simple numerical number starting with 5,000,001. To study this

plan and various suggested modifications

of it, the Chief of Ordnance appointed an

Ordnance Numbering Board consisting of

Brig. Gen. Gordon M. Wells, Artillery

Branch, Industrial Division; Col. Graeme

K. Howard, Director of Spare Parts, T--

AC; and Mr. Lawrence S. Barroll, Supply

Branch, Field Service. Representatives of

the Board held meetings with the Detroit

committee at Detroit and examined witnesses there and at Washington between

7 and 22 June I943.47

The Wells Brard decided to throw out

the item stock numbers and concentrate

on a system using seven digits, between

5,000,000 and 9,999,999, for all Ordnance

matériel except Federal Stock Catalog

items. But it also decided that the seven

digit number would have some relation to

the piece mark that was stamped, embossed, or otherwise marked on Ordnance

components and recommended an ingenious method that would permit incorporating the piece mark, which consisted of six

digits plus a letter, in the seven digit number. To A drawing numbers were assigned

the block of numbers from 5,000,000 to

5,499.999 to C numbers, 5,500,000 to

46

 (1) Maj Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr., Spare

Parts History, 24 Jun 44, ex. E-12; (2) Ordnance Spare Parts in Mechanized Warfare, Aug

44, pp. 18-21; (3) Comments on draft of this

chapter by Brig Gen John A. Barclay, Apr 57,

OHF. 47

 (1) E. J. Almquist, History of Engineering

Administrative Branch—later Engr and Inspection

Br—Executive Division, 20 Nov 45, OHF; (2)

Gamrath, Hist, pp. 5-6; (3) Wells Bd Rpt.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 405

5,999,999, to B numbers 6,000,000 to

6,499,999, to D numbers, 6,500,000 to

6,899,999 and to E numbers, 6,900,000 to

6,999,999.48 Thus, the new number for a

part stamped with A-277276 would be

5,277,276. One drawback to this system

was the fact that the sizes of the engineering drawings, which the letters A to E

represented, were sometimes changed.

Therefore, the numbers from 7,000,000 to

9,999,999 were reserved to be assigned

consecutively to all new Ordnance parts

prepared after the system went into effect,

without regard to drawing size.

The next consideration was the administration of the new system. The Board

found strong evidence that the existing

confusion stemmed partly from the fact

that the assignment of numbers and the

making of rules for their use had been

left to a subordinate agency in the Artillery Branch that did not have sufficient

prestige or authority to enforce a uniform

system, and recommended that a new

agency be set up immediately. Accepting

the findings of the Wells Board, the Chief

of Ordnance directed the change-over to

the new numbers and placed responsibility

for it with an Engineering and Administrative Section headed by Col. Harry B.

Hambleton.49

Colonel Hambleton and his staff began

immediately an exhaustive study of the

whole parts numbering problem, visiting

depots, ports, product centers, and the

Tank-Automotive Center. As the investigation proceeded it became clear that the

problem was one of stock control rather

than engineering. Since stock numbers

were being assigned at Detroit, a suboffice

was established there under the direction

of Major Charles M. Buhl to administer

the new system. Further study by Major

Buhl and members of his staff made it

increasingly evident that the engineering or

part number phase was a relatively minor

factor when compared with the confused

stock number situation and that the provision of Ordnance Department Order 69

for identifying all Ordnance standard

parts by Federal Stock Numbers was impractical. Consequently on 14 September

1943 the Chief of Ordnance issued a revision of Ordnance Department Order No.

69. It scrapped existing Ordnance numbering systems and provided for the

assignment of one Official Ordnance Part

Number to almost every new part. The

revised order became the Bible of the parts

numbering and interchangeability program.50

Implementation of the

New Numbers Program

From the new system the Engineering

Administrative Branch evolved an Official

Stock Number that became the key to the

whole numbering and interchangeability

program. It was made up of the Official

Ordnance Part Number, when one existed,

prefixed by a classification code that might

be either the SNL Group prefix or the

manufacturer's code. The problem now

was to bring under the Official Stock

Number all the other numbers that an

identical or interchangeable part might

carry, such as that of the part manufacturer, unit manufacturer, or the old taxi

number. The Branch began the preparation of a cross reference list of Ordnance

48

 It will be noted that "C" drawing numbers

were assigned lower stock numbers than "B"

drawing numbers. Wells Board Report, pp. 4-8. 49

 (1) Wells Bd Rpt, pp. 4-8; (2) ODO 69,

9 Jul 43; (3) ODO 65, 25 Jun 43; (4) ODO

169, 16 Jul 43. 50

 Hambleton, Hist, Engr-Administrative Br, pp.

1-5, including copy of Revision 1 in app.
406 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

part and stock numbers in two sections,

one listing serially the number stamped on

the part, with the corresponding stock

number or numbers opposite. This information was progressively turned over to

Field Service, which sent to depots that

had IBM equipment a master stock card

carrying the new number and showing all

other reference numbers and a corresponding number card for each corresponding or "alias" number on the master card.

This theoretically enabled the depot to

put into one bin all interchangeable items,

no matter what number they bore.51

The implementation of the new numbers

program took time. Concurrently with the

interchangeability project, designers both

in Ordnance and industry had to be given

blocks of the new official part numbers to

apply to new parts. New drafting-room

regulations had to be developed. The cross

referencing job (except for Federal Stock

Catalog numbers, which were handled in

Washington); the assignment of numbers;

the screening of parts; and the elimination

of duplicate numbers were assigned to the

Parts Number Control Section, OCO-D,

under the direction of the Engineering Administrative Branch. But it was woefully

short of personnel. Strenuous efforts by

Colonel Hambleton and Major Buhl resulted in the employment by contract of

employees of a commercial firm, SmithHinchman and Grylls. From this source

there were added to the Section a day

shift averaging forty-four persons and a

night shift of about forty-eight. These

made possible a round-the-clock operation

from October 1943 to May 1944. For the

cutting of master cards to send to the

depots, Field Service's Machine Records

Section also had to rely on a contractor,

the R. L. Polk Company.52

In June 1944 the Cross Reference List

of Ordnance Part and Stock Numbers,

known as ORD 15, appeared in two

parts of ten volumes each. ORD 15-1 was

based on part numbers, ORD 15-2 on

stock numbers. Twenty-two thousand sets

were printed and distributed to users such

as bases, depots, and stock control points.

Revisions in the spring of 1945 increased

the total of the numbers listed from

600,000 to 750,000, and so great had the

demand become that 32,000 sets had to

be distributed. The realization that a

similar cross reference list was needed for

tools and tool equipment resulted in the

publication of ORD-5, Stock List of

Items, and ORD 5-1, Numerical Index of

Manufacturer's Part Numbers and Drawing Numbers. ORD 5, listing the official

nomenclature, was made necessary by the

fact that one element of the Federal Stock

Number was the initial letter of the principal noun; for example, 11-P-600 was

the number for an oil barrel pump. Also

published during the latter part of 1944

and early 1945 were interchangeability

lists for tanks and vehicles of related

chassis and for general purpose and

wheeled combat vehicles, known respectively as ORD 14-1 and ORD 14-2.53

Nobody claimed that the new numbering system was perfect. The Ordnance

51

 (1) Campbell, Spare Parts Hist, ex. F-4;

(2) The Ordnance Sergeant, IX (March 1945),

OHF; (3) PP 66, Parts Numbering System 1940

-45, p. 34, OHF. 52

 (1) Hambleton, Hist, Engr-Administrative

Br, pp. 5-6 and ex. 23; (2) Final Report of

Committee to Make Survey of Ordnance Numbering System and Depot Operations, 2 May 45

[hereafter referred to as Safford Comm. Rpt]

p. 7, in Numbers Racket folder; (2) Memo, Lt

Col John D. Witten for Director, Contl Div

ASF, 10 Jan 44, sub: Contract for Tabulating

Work, T-AC, ASF Contl Div Files, 413/51. 53

 (1) Hist Engr-Administrative Br, pp. 7-17;

(2) PP 66, pp. 35-39; (2) The Ordnance

Sergeant, IX (March 1945).
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 407

Department admitted that it was a compromise. Obviously, in the midst of war,

all supply functions could not be stopped

pending the ideal solution to the numbering problem; nor could all past mistakes

be rectified at once and all future situations foreseen. Controversies arose over

such matters as the correct components

for the Official Stock Number; the proper

method of marking packaged matériel at

the facility in the absence of identification

information; and the fixing of responsibility for the determination of the right

SNL or Stock Class Code for each item.54

The greatest impediment to smooth operation of the new plan was the inauguration early in 1944 of the Master Depot

system for storing at one depot all parts

pertaining to a single vehicle or group of

closely related vehicles. The new Official

Stock Number incorporating the SNL

number connected the part with the end

item in which it was most frequently

used; on the other hand the master depots

stocked items on the car-line system followed by the automobile industry, in

which all parts for a particular make of

vehicle, Ford, Dodge, Chevrolet, and so

on, were stored at one depot.55

Because of unavoidable delay in getting

cross reference lists disseminated and in

use at all levels, no really fair trial of the

Official Stock Number system was possible

during the war. On the credit side, by

June 1945, parts formerly identified by

862,000 numbers were for stock purposes

and review identified by 315,880. Control

of the assignment of numbers had been

effectively centralized, and the basic compilation of interchangeability and cross

reference data had been completed.56

Shortly after the issuance of ORD 15, the

Cross Reference List of Ordnance Part

and Stock Numbers, an ASF report noted

that the publication had "met with

enthusiastic response and . . . led to many

requests for its extension and the furnishing of similar information by other services."

 57

Unfortunately it was not entirely successful. Users found that it was "rife with

errors."

 58

 This was perhaps inevitable

because in the rush of the war years the

compilers had not had time to give to

every spare part the painstaking analysis

that was essential to produce ideal interchangeability data.59

 But ORD 15 was

at least a step in the right direction, and

in the opinion of General Hatcher, Chief

of Field Service, "accomplished more to

simplify parts supply, as well as eliminate

apparent shortages than all previous attempts to arrive at an answer to this

complicated problem."

 60

A Common Language of Supply

The complexity of Ordnance materiel,

the vastness of the organization required

to produce and use it, and the lack of

experience among wartime employees,

brought to the forefront another problem

of identification—the correct name for the

individual weapon or vehicle. It was exceedingly difficult to solve. There were

changes in model, disagreement as to the

characteristic to be emphasized, and nu54

 Gamrath, Hist, pp. 6-8. 55

 See ch. XVIII. 56

 (1). PP 66, pp. 45-51; (2) ODO 43-45, 19

Apr 45. 57

 Griffenhagen and Associates, Report on

Item Identification, vol. I, sec. IV, p. 13, ASF

Contl Div Files. 58

 Maj. Gen. James Kirk, Chief of FS, "Streamlined Supply," Ordnance, XXXIV, No. 179

March-April 1950), 350. 59

 Ibid. 60

 Memo, Hatcher to CofOrd [n.d.], sub: Rpt

of Activities in World War II, copy in OHF.
408 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

merous other opportunities for misunderstanding. Sometimes an item had no more

accurate name than just device. The preparation of a major item Standard Nomenclature List could not begin until a model

had been constructed, tested, modified,

and adopted. Then followed disassembly

and the examination and cataloging of

every part. Publication might take months

or even years.61

In the middle of the war the time required for publishing SNL's was shortened,

and major item lists were brought up

to date, but confusion in nomenclature

seemed inherent in a system that divided

the function between the procurement and

the distribution services.62 A promising

solution was the assignment of responsibility for standardizing nomenclature and

matériel identification to a single agency.

In June 1943 the Chief of Ordnance gave

the job to Industrial's Engineering Administrative Section.63

 The new unit

made a study of such matters as proper

nomenclature for major combinations as

well as major items; the crying need for

a simple and uniform system of model

numbers, that is, the T and M numbers

that appeared in OCM's; and the advisability of setting up an organization that

would control nomenclature and model

numbering and co-ordinate the work of

design offices, stock control offices, and

the Ordnance Technical Committee.

The need for devising a common language of supply for the use of the Army as

a whole was recognized in early 1943 by

Army Service Forces.64 After some preliminary investigation of the problem, ASF

employed a commercial firm of management consultants, Griffenhagen and Associates, to make a study of item identification. Reporting 31 August 1944, the

firm recommended a uniform system of

article description and numbering for all

the technical services;65 but ASF felt that

no new system or even any major revision

of the old systems should be attempted

during the war.66 The only co-operative

venture was the preparation of the ASF

Tool and Tool Equipment Catalog, in

which the Federal Standard Stock Catalog

nomenclature and stock number for every

tool were indicated, together with the

stock number of each of the technical

services. The Ordnance Department,

which had major interest, was given responsibility, with the assistance of the

other technical services.67

This was but a small step toward the

solution of a problem that was increasing in importance and size by 1945. During

World War II the Federal Standard

Stock Catalog had failed to be readily

expansible to meet the needs of the armed

services, and the Treasury's cataloging

staff was inadequate to develop a uniform

system. Each service, bureau, and command had to establish its own system,

resulting in duplication that was costly in

manpower and money. According to one

61

 ASF Rpt 105, pp. 14-15. 62

 (1) ASF Rpt 105, pp. 2-3, 5-8, 13-15;

(2) Hynds Memo; (3) FS Sub-Office, Frankford

Arsenal, Major Items—Major Combinations. . . .

conf, 10-11 Jan 45, p. 2, OHF. 63

 ODO 65, 25 Jun 43. 64

 ASF Rpt 105, p. 1. 65

 Griffenhagen and Associates, Rpt on Item

Identification. The firm acknowledged the aid it

had received from Colonel Davies, Colonel Hambleton, Lt. Col. Roger H. Hemion, Major Coopes

and Maj. John A. Mathews of Ordnance and

commended the Ordnance Department, especially Hemion, for its work on cross reference, I,

iv-v.

66

 Memo, Brig Gen Theodore M. Osborne for

CG ASF, 29 Nov 45, sub: Item Identification

and Cataloging Program, ASF Contl Div Files. 67

 (1) ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 257; (2)

Hambleton, Hist, Engr-Administrative Br, pp.

14-15.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUPPLY 409

estimate, the lack of a uniform system of

cataloging in World War II cost the

government five billion dollars in unneeded materiel.68

On 18 January 1945 President Roosevelt

instructed the Director of the Bureau of

the Budget to prepare a United States

Standard Commodity Catalog employing

all systems then in use by the Government insofar as they conformed to a central

plan. The Board established for the purpose submitted a plan for a uniform

Federal Catalog system; but an effective

start toward implementing any plan in the

postwar years required action by President

Truman, the military departments, and

Congress. After May 1948 the catalog

program became the responsibility of the

Munitions Board Cataloging Agency.69

68

 Lecture, Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, West

Point, 8 Jan 51, copy in Dept of Defense R&D

Bd files. 69

 MBCA Newsletter, I (30 Jun 50).
CHAPTER XX

Stock Control

A clear language of supply and a workable system of parts numbering were essential to the preparation of accurate

stock reports by field installations. But to

achieve full usefulness such reports had

further to be speedily consolidated into one

report that would provide figures for procurement and distribution officials to act

upon. Detailed knowledge of the quantities of stocks on hand—and their exact

location—was the key to orderly supply

operations. It was to provide such knowledge as a means of controlling the distribution of supplies that the system known

as stock control came into use. After the

war the final report of Army Service

Forces stated that the development and

adoption of an Army-wide stock control

system was "the most important single

wartime improvement in distribution operations within the Zone of the Interior."

 1

Departures From the

Ordnance Provision System

The Ordnance Provision System, based

on the experience of World War I, was

potentially an effective method of keeping

records on stocks. Unfortunately, in the

period between wars the money allotted

for stock control purposes was infinitesimal,

in proportion to the immense dollar

value of Ordnance stores.2 Between 1920

and 1940 the office staff in Washington,

organized in sections or groups, dwindled.

For example, Group C, light artillery, and

Group G, tank and combat vehicles, which

each had fifteen persons in 1918, were

reduced to two each.3

In the spring of 1940 the staff had to

be expanded. But the new employees who

were brought in were entirely unfamiliar

with the organization of the Army, with

War Department procedures, and with

Ordnance materiel. No systematic training

program existed to prepare them for their

jobs. The group chiefs, all of whom had

been with Ordnance since World War I,

were reluctant to entrust responsibility to

inexperienced clerks. Furthermore, there

were never enough new employees to set

up and maintain the greatly increased

records on issues, particularly the quantities of equipment transferred to foreign

governments. At the time of the Dunkerque evacuation, when the United

States shipped large quantities of armament to Great Britain, it was all but

impossible, because of the great urgency of

the need, to maintain accurate records by

1

 Logistics in World War II, Final Report of

the Army Service Forces, rpt to USW and CofS

by Director of Servs, Supply and Proc Div,

WDGS, 1947, p. 79. 2

 Interv, Kahlert, 30 Jul 52. 3

 SCD Hist.
STOCK CONTROL 411

model and quantity of each weapon involved.4

The confusion that resulted caused

some Ordnance stock controllers to wonder whether the Ordnance Provision System, which theoretically provided a cadre

of trained persons on which to build a wartime staff, was indeed capable of expansion to meet wartime needs. Colonel

Meyns, who became chief of the General

Supply Branch in July of 1941, concluded

that, "Whereas this type of organization

was very valuable in that it concentrated

the production knowledge at one point

and had been used to advantage for over

25 years, it was not flexible enough to

provide for the rapid expansion required

by the velocity of war activities."

 5 But

other supply experts pointed out that

sufficient time had not been allowed to

prepare and organize special training

courses for inexperienced employees.6

More attention in the 1930's to planning

for the enlargement of stock control operations in the event of war might have

made possible orderly and efficient operation when the emergency came. The question remained theoretical. Although the

Ordnance Provision System Regulations

were not rescinded, remaining in effect

throughout World War II, Ordnance supply experts whose memories went back to

World War I observed that the regulations

were not followed in their essentials.7 One

departure was the establishment of a set

of records for distribution only, whereas

the Ordnance Provision System used one

set of records for both procurement and

distribution. Another was the separation

of spare parts from their major items.

Both actions were taken in the emergency period before Pearl Harbor. The

effects of these innovations, the problems

they created, and the solutions to the

problems, became increasingly important

in the early years of the war. By December 1942 the situation had become critical.

The bottleneck at Detroit caused by the

concentration there of stock control for

all spare parts had delayed the posting of

the Consolidated Stores Report figures

until they were out of date; the immense

recoding operation cast doubt on the accuracy of the data.

Decentralization of Stock Control

A simple answer was decentralization,

and some planning along this line was in

progress in the spring of 1943.8 Colonel

Sadtler, Assistant to the Chief of Ordnance for Parts, suggested that Field Service, organized at the operating level on a

functional basis, be decentralized on a

product basis, as had been successfully

accomplished by the Technical and Industrial Divisions. Colonel Sadtler's plan

called for bringing major items and their

spares and tools back together, as in the

old Ordnance Provision System, and for

concentrating upon each product the best

technical skill available by locating in one

place all Ordnance activities connected

with each type of product. Colonel Sadtler

argued that this plan would lift the burden

of operations from top-level Field Service

agencies and enable them to perform better

the important job of planning and supervision.9

4

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Meyns Rpt. 5

 Meyns Rpt. 6

 SCD Hist, p. 22. 7

 (1) Hynds Memo; (2) Intervs with Kahlert

and Sadtler, Jul 52. 8

 Memo, Raaen to Statistics and Progress Br,

Contl Div, ASF, 3 Apr 43, sub: Improvement

of Reporting and Rcd Systems. 9

 (1) Memo, Col William Sadtler for CofOrd,

11 May 43, sub: Adequate Provision of Spare

Parts, copy in PSP 63, ex. 18.
412 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The complete product center concept

was not followed, but the Chief of Ordnance did decide to set up Field Service

suboffices that would administer stock

control, supervise storage, and direct

maintenance operations for certain types of

materiel. The first was at Frankford Arsenal. On 23 August 1943 Frankford received responsibility for fire control and

antiaircraft matériel distribution operations

formerly performed at T-AC, and on 31

December was assigned stock control

functions for certain major items of this

kind. The second suboffice was established

at Rock Island on 15 January 1944 for

mobile artillery and small arms, exclusive

of major items. By that time stock control

had been further decentralized along several lines. In addition to Frankford and

Rock Island, three stock control points for

items of general supply had been designated. For automotive items and end parts,

districts and arsenals sent their stores reports to Detroit, for tools and tool equipment of tank-automotive items to the St.

Louis Ordnance Depot, and for cleaning

and preserving materials and major items

of small arms and artillery to the Office,

Chief of Ordnance in Washington. Effective 24 January 1944, reports on the status

of ammunition stocks went to the Ammunition Supply Office in Philadelphia.10

The job of reporting approximately three

hundred fifty thousand items of general

supply each month from forty different

locations was large and involved. No stock

control system could automatically solve

all problems, but there is evidence that

decentralization brought about improvement almost at once. After only ninety

days of operation, the Rock Island suboffice, for example, had cut the time for

consolidating stores reports to a little more

than two weeks, as compared with approximately six weeks formerly required by

the Stock Control Branch in Detroit. This

was accomplished mainly by promoting

familiarity with the item. Rock Island

broke down the organization into small

groups handling no more than two thousand items and provided records that gave

the complete distribution and replenishment history of each item. Another effective technique, followed also at the Frankford suboffice, was to clear the records of

all duplicate and dead numbers. In this

way Rock Island reduced the thirty-nine

thousand items formerly handled at Detroit to 17,600. Frankford reduced its

items from fifty thousand to twenty-five

thousand and by July 1944 had achieved

better than 90 percent availability on all

fire control and antiaircraft materiel.11

By the fall of 1944 General Campbell

felt that the results completely justified

his decision to decentralize Field Service

operations, and he planned to continue the

process as fast as it could be done without

disrupting supply at that critical period.

After V-E Day, for example, he would

transfer to Rock Island stock control operations for major items of small arms and

mobile artillery as well as parts. In the

meantime he thought that some of the

10

 (1) ODO 85, 23 Aug 43 and Change 2, 31

Dec 43; (2) ODO 96, 8 Nov 43; (3) ODO 107,

24 Dec 43; (4) ODO 108, 24 Dec 43; (5) ODO

17-44,

 20

 Jan 44; (6) ASF Contl Div, Report on Adequacy of Stock Accounting and Stock

Reporting Procedures. . . , 29 Aug 44, Table A

-1, sec. 7, ASF Contl Div Files; (7) Min, Conf

of SC Ord Officers, 28 and 29 Jan 44, Cincinnati,

Ohio, p. 12, OHF. 11

 (1) Report Covering the Present Status of

the Rock Island Field Service Division SubOffice—15 April 1944, and Ltr, Col Hiram B.

Ely to Col Fred A. McMahon, 22 Jul 44, both

in folder, Gen Campbell's Personal Correspondence; (2) Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944, p. 25;

(3) Interv with Col William Sadtler, 25 Aug

52; (4) Vorberg Rpt.
STOCK CONTROL 413

hazards of dividing stock control responsibilities between Washington and the field

could be avoided by a realignment of the

Stock Control Division in Washington to

place emphasis on supervision rather than

operations and by an Ordnance Department Order clarifying the responsibilities

of the various divisions.12

Ordnance supply experts believed that

the establishment of the Frankford and

Rock Island suboffices went a long way

toward solving distribution problems as far

as "shooting Ordnance'' was concerned.13

This belief was substantiated by General

Somervell's statement in February 1945

concerning his conversations with members

of the War Department General Staff:

"The only thing I have not heard any

complaints about was spare parts for

weapons."

 14

could, especially those planning the invasion of Europe. Maj. Gen. Everett S.

Hughes, a former chief of the Equipment

Division, Field Service, who was now

deputy commander of the North African

theater, considered that the Ordnance Department had underestimated the requirements for parts, basing estimates too much

on the peacetime experience both of the

automobile industry and military planners.

Yet he also recognized distribution factors

that could not have been foreseen.18

The Stock Control Branch at Detroit,

which had just been given responsibility for

spare parts replenishment, worked with

the Industrial Service to improve production.19

 As for distribution, some of the

volume of paper work at Detroit was relieved by the establishment of the tools

and equipment suboffice at St. Louis. At

the same time the Chief of Ordnance, who

was spending "a tremendous amount of

time ... in spare parts and Field Service

matters,"20 considered using master

depots as stock control points for tankautomotive supplies. Automotive parts

Special Problems of Automotive

Parts Supply

Automotive parts were another matter.

Ordnance troubles "smelled of gasoline."

 15

The size of the problem faced by the

vehicle supply operation in Detroit is indicated by the fact that vehicles, including

spare parts, tools, and equipment, accounted for $19 billion out of a total of

$26 billion worth of Ordnance major

model types procured and scheduled between 1942 and 1945, as compared with

$3 billion for small arms and $4 billion for

artillery and fire control items.16 At the

end of December 1943 Ordnance was

paying more than $100 million a month

for automotive parts alone. In the light of

these figures it seemed to the Chief of

Ordnance "inconceivable for anyone to

say there are no spare parts."

 17

But theater commanders were saying so,

and were saying it as emphatically as they

12

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell, to

Sadtler, 23 Oct 44, in folder, Gen Campbell's

Personal Correspondence; (2) ODO 10-44, 7

Oct 44. 13

 Interv, Sadtler, 25 Aug 52. 14

 Min, Spec ASF Staff Conf, 21 Feb 45, ASF

200.02. 15

 Interv, Sadtler, 25 Aug 52. 16

 Ord Spare Parts in Mechanized Warfare,

Aug 44, p. 10. 17

 Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell, to Brig Gen

Henry Sayler, 14 Dec 43, folder, Gen Campbell's

Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material). 18

 Ltr, Maj Gen Everett Hughes to Maj Gen

Levin Campbell, 30 Jan 44, Gen Campbell's

Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material). 19

 For the spare parts procurement story, see

Chapter XIII above. 20

 Maj Gen Campbell, to Col Thomas H.

Nixon, Ord Officer Hqs I Armored Corps, 3 Feb

44, folder, Gen Campbell's Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material).
414 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

planners intended that master depots

would eventually be completely responsible

for their own items, including keeping the

stock control record.21 But the new Parts

Numbering and Interchangeability Program, creating the necessity for several

installations to stock the same parts, made

it inadvisable after 1944 further to decentralize stock control functions to master

depots.22

Safford Committee Findings

Investigations in the spring of 1945 by

the Safford Committee probed deeply into

the fundamentals of automotive spare

parts supply. One thing the members of

the committee agreed upon—the problem

of effective control of stocks was staggering and had no easy solution. In the words

of Colonel Clifford of OCO-Detroit,

"There are so many points of view on it

and any time a decision is made it means

so many thousands of tons of iron moving

around that it makes you shiver."

 23

 Some

Field Service officials felt that the Industrial Service had placed too much emphasis

on the assignment of Official Stock Numbers and not enough on their use. There

was also disagreement on the subject of

the master depot plan for automotive supply. General MacMorland of Field Service

believed that the master depot plan by carline had not been outstandingly successful.

Members of the committee from Industrial

Service pointed out that the close relationship between the master depots and manufacturers had helped on questions of

identification and in other ways, and that

the committee could not wait to achieve

the ideal system but had to take action

to improve parts supply quickly without

disrupting operations.24 In planning for

the postwar period the committee leaned

toward a scheme to recede the Official

Stock Numbers by manufacturer's codes.25

The By-Item Supply Plan

There was a growing sentiment in the

field, however, for a return to the by-item

supply plan of the Ordnance Provision

System, which specifically provided a

"home" for each item in its catalog. Citing

the case of a former Ford man in Cherbourg who had opposed the Ordnance

Provision System for a long time but had

finally become converted, Col. Waldo E.

Laidlaw of the New York Port of Embarkation testified during the committee investigations that, "I have never talked to

anyone from the highest echelon that I

deal with to the lowest that doesn't state

that the system we used in 1925 was the

best one that was devised."26 Long

experience in Ordnance supply during

World War II, especially automotive supply, convinced Gamrath that the Ordnance

21

 (1) The Master Depot Distribution Plan for

Tank-Automotive Parts and Tools, Revised 1

May 44, OHF; (2) FS Div Ord 29-44, 3 Apr

44; (3) Min, Conf of SC Ord Officers 28-29

Jan 44; pp. 12-13; (4) PSP 63, ex. 9; (5) 1st

Indorsement (Memo), CG OCO-D to CofOrd,

27 May 44, in Campbell, Spare Parts Hist. 24

June 1944, ex. F-4, Mead Comm. 22

 Safford Comm. Rpt., p. 8. 23

 Telcon among Col Waldo E. Laidlaw, New

York Port of Embarkation, Clifford, and Coopes,

OCO-D, 18 Jan 45, sub: Spare Parts Numbers

Subcomm., in Gen MacMorland Numbers file,

p. 80. 24

 Min of Comm, to Make Survey of Ord

Numbering System and Depot Opns—Mtg at Office of CofOrd Detroit, 6 and 

45, pp. 8-10, in Gen MacMorland Numbers

file.

25

 Ibid., p. 9. 26

 Telcon among Laidlaw, Clifford, and Coopes.

OCO-D, 18 Jan 45, pp. 80-81.
STOCK CONTROL 415

Provision System was "a sound method of

operation."

 27

The Influence of ASF

Beginning in January 1943, the month

in which, according to an Army Service

Forces official, "stock control was conceived,"

 28

 ASF held a series of conferences

on the subject, called for reports from the

chiefs of the technical services, and began

the preparation of a manual for posts,

camps, and stations. Appearing in tentative form in March, the manual was also

a directive. It placed stock control procedure, under the general policies of ASF,

in the hands of the chiefs of technical

services. Each of these chiefs was to organize a stock control agency, set stock

levels at depots and stations, establish inventory procedures, and supervise the

distribution and redistribution of stocks to

maintain an efficient balance between supply and demand. An important result, not

specifically set forth in the manual, was the

placing of full responsibility for handling

requisitions on the depot commanders; the

new system put a stop to the earlier practice of referring requisitions to the Service

Commands for processing.29

The Ordnance Department was reluctant to establish a stock control agency

because this move increased the functionalism in Field Service organization that had

already caused trouble. General Campbell

and General Hatcher both favored assigning supply responsibility on a product

basis. But efforts at compromise with ASF

were fruitless, and a Stock Control Branch

was established in August 1943.30 In the

meantime the Field Service Division took

action to extend Ordnance stock control,

which had hitherto mainly operated by

means of the Ordnance Provision System

between factory and depot, more effectively

to the level below the depots—posts,

camps and stations.

Some benefits of the new program were

apparent immediately; for example, during

the month of June the Normoyle Ordnance

Depot recovered 1,155,370 pounds of excess stocks;31

 but all problems were not

immediately solved. In spite of frequent

inspections at stations by stock control

teams sent by Ordnance, the Service Commands, and ASF, there continued to be

hoarding, on the one hand, and, on the

other, shipments to depots of stocks that

were not true surpluses and might be

requisitioned by the same post a few days

later. Excesses sometimes arrived improperly packaged and unidentifiable.32

 On the

credit side, more than 110,000,000 pounds

of critically needed parts, supplies, tools,

tires, and tubes were returned to supply

channels from posts, camps, and stations

during fiscal year 1944 as compared with

30,000,000 for the year preceding.33

By early 1944 large surpluses of usable

parts were accumulating in stations and

key supply points as troops began to move

27

 Memo, W. C. Gamrath, Chief Supply Opns

Br, FS, to Exec to Chief of FS, 22 Mar 46, sub:

Final Historical Rpt, in Key Pers Rpts, OHF. 28

 Col Creswell G. Blakeney, Gen Staff Corps,

Spec Asst to Director of Rqmts and Stock Contl

Div, ASF, "The Control of Supplies," Military

Review, XXIV, (October 1944), 67. 29

 TM 38-220, 3 May 43. 30

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Ch. IV. 31

 Dr. Rolfe Allen, ICAF Research Project 116,

History of Stock Control ASF, U.S. Army, January 1948, p. 129 [hereafter cited as ICAF

R-116]. 32

 (1) Min, Conf of SC Ord Officers, 28-29

Jan 44, p. 2; (2) Ord-SC Conf, 8-9 May 44,

p. 33, OHF; (3) ICAF R-116, pp. 130, 143-45;

(4) ASF Cir 10, sec. VIII, 8 Jan 44, sub: Stock

Control. 33

 (1) Ann Rpt FS FY 1943, p. 2; (2) Ann

Rpt FS FY 1944, p. 19.
416 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

out of the United States for the invasion

of Europe. Recapturing this excess material

was in the opinion of one stock control

officer Field Service's "No. 2 job"

 34

second only to getting supplies overseas.

Once the parts came into the stock control

system of the depots they could be used to

fill overseas lines or to recondition vehicles

for shipment to Europe.

Stock Levels

The setting of proper stock levels was a

matter of greatest importance, for determination of the amount of a particular

item to be kept on hand was the keystone

of all supply operations. In July 1943

ASF instructed the technical services to

establish levels according to a formula that

provided for a Maximum Distribution

Level (MDL) consisting of minimum

stock, working stock, and provisions for

replenishment. In addition there could be

several types of reserves. It was expected

that levels would vary; no rigid figures

were given, only examples.35 In February

1944 the War Department authorized an

over-all allowance of a 105-day supply on

hand in the United States. Of this, except

in a few special cases, supply for 45 days

was to be carried in depots, 45 days in

stations, and 15 days in transit between

depots and stations. This meant, in effect,

that depots might maintain a 60-day supply of items for issue to posts and overseas,

plus the various reserves then authorized

—strategic, contingency, utility, and production. When the computation of these

levels and reserves proved too great a task,

ASF sought and obtained a revision in

May 1944 that provided for a 90-day supply plus a strategic reserve.36

Nothing was clearer than that levels of

stock at the various stages in the supply

system had to be determined, yet it became

equally clear as time went on that the

correct computation of these levels depended greatly on the good judgment of

individual supply officers. In Ordnance, as

in other technical services, there was a

tendency to base the formula unduly on

past experience rather than on intelligent

projection into the future.37 It became

necessary for ASF in a 1944 revision of

TM 38-220 to state specifically that past

demands of a nonrepetitive nature not anticipated in the future were not a proper

base for an increase in station levels. Nor

was simple projection into the future

enough. Careless or uneducated guesswork could hinder the process of orderly

supply. Late in 1944, for example, the

Chief of Ordnance found that the repair

of automotive vehicles was handicapped

because station supply officers and depot

representatives had underestimated future

requirements and moved too much matériel 

ASF Supply Control Program, 1944

The phasing of requirements by months

for the immediate future and by quarters

for the years ahead was one of the most

34

 Lt Col F. Von Schlegell, The Current Distribution Pattern, Min, Conf of SC Ord Officers,

28-29 Jan 44, p. 14. 35

 Memo, CG ASF for TQMG and others, 13

Jul 43, sub: Depot Stock Levels, 400.291, QM

files.

36

 (1) WD Cir 85, 25 Feb 44; (2) ASF Cir

67, 7 Mar 44; (3) ICAF R-116, pp. 141-48;

(4) ASF Ann Rpt FY 44, p. 64. 37

 (1) ICAF R-116, p. 208; (2) Rpt Mead

Comm., S. Report No. 10, 78th Cong., 2d sess.,

pt. 20, 1944, p. 24; (3) Ltr, Maj Gen Wilhelm

D. Styer to Deputy Chief of Staff for SC's

et al, 29 Oct 43, sub: Stock Contl Conf, ASF

401.1; (4) Min, Ft. Wayne Ord Depot Stock

Contl Conf, 23 Sep-2 Oct 44, talk by Capt K. J.

Kolosky, Scope of Station Supply Plan, pp. 1-3.
STOCK CONTROL 417

important characteristics of the ASF Supply Control System announced in March

1944. By then the supply task was to

maintain an 8-million-man Army that had

already been equipped, and the job had

to be done without unnecessarily increasing production. Careful adjustment of supply to demand required that all factors for

each principal item be assembled on one

sheet of paper—past issues, stock levels,

reserves, and so on. After studying these

data, ASF officials projected the future

demand, by intervals of time. Against this

were balanced deliveries from production,

the amount of stocks on hand, and anticipated returns to stock. Reliable data were

the essence of the whole operation. As a

high-ranking ASF officer, Lt. Gen. LeRoy

Lutes, stated after the war:

With the inauguration of the Supply Control System, it quickly developed that the

process of controlling supply was in the last

analysis entirely dependent upon basic records and paper work in depots, procurement

district offices, and other installations in the

field. The data for the supply control form

could only be assembled from these sources.38

To determine whether the data available

on stocks provided the information needed

for the supply control form, the ASF Control Division in August 1944 made an analysis of the technical services' depot stock

accounting and reporting procedures. The

survey revealed that most of the services

could meet the requirements of supply

control, although some deficiencies were

noted in methods. In the case of the Ordnance Department, for example, the investigators counted as a deficiency the fact

that stock records were maintained manually on major items, a slow method that

might produce errors because of multiple

postings of identical data.39 In general,

the greatest criticism of the technical service procedures was that they were not

uniform. The technical services protested

that, to achieve uniformity, they would

have to rewrite manuals and retrain personnel; they contended that errors were

bound to occur during the change-over

and that there would certainly be a large

loss in punch cards and report forms. They

also argued that the transition would take

time and should not be attempted so late

in the war. After considering these objections, the surveyors still maintained that

the advantages of standardization outweighed the disadvantages.40

ASF then began the process of converting existing procedures in stock reporting

into one uniform system, with stock status

reports conveying the same information

from all the services. This took the greater

part of the winter and spring of 1945.

Manual 413-1 putting the program into

effect did not appear until August 1945.

In the meantime ASF planners, discovering that the quantities of stocks in depots

often varied from recorded stock balances,

turned their attention to improving inventory procedures. On this project Ordnance worked closely with ASF's Control

Division in the preparation of a manual.

The draft of the manual was test-checked

in an Ordnance depot; in its final form,

issued 15 May 1944, it incorporated Ordnance recommendations.41

38

 Lecture, Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes. Army Supply

Program, 23 Sep 46, ICAF. 39

 Contl Div, ASF, Report of Adequacy of

Stock Accounting and Stock Reporting Procedures

With Respect to Supply-Control and on the

Feasibility of Standardizing Such Procedures, 29

Aug 44, p. 1-4, ASF Contl Div files. 40

 Ibid., p. 6. 41

 (1) History, Control Division, Army Service

Forces, 1942-45, app. (Compilation of Projects),

pp. 171ff; (2) ASF Manual 413-1, Stock Accounting and Reporting Procedures, 31 Aug 45;

(3) Memo, Maj Gen Clinton F. Robinson, Di-
418 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The Supply Control program did not

radically change Ordnance reporting and

inventory procedures; such changes as were

made came late in the war. During fiscal

year 1945, ASF placed responsibility for

control of supplies on the stock control

point rather than the depot. But this

emphasis on the stock control point as the

key to the distribution system, "the most

important development in the fiscal year

in the stock control field,"

 42

 was not new

to Ordnance, which had already established six such organizations before February 1944.

Perhaps the most important effect of the

ASF program on Ordnance Field Service

operations was the establishment of lower

stock levels for spare parts.43 Early in

1944 ASF set depot maximum stock levels

at ninety days. After the Normandy landings in June and the successes of the

summer of 1944 the maximum level was

reduced to sixty days. Manual 416 of

November 1944 directed that stockpile

quantities above this level would have to

be reviewed and approved by the Commanding General of ASF. In late December combat losses in the Battle of the

Bulge suddenly increased demands from

the theater and threatened to reduce

stocks to the danger point. There was

not time to seek ASF approval for a

cushion of stocks. General Campbell took

the problem personally to General Somervell and obtained authority to put in a

liberal factor for battle losses, a factor to

be based on the Ordnance Department's

own best judgment.44 After the crisis was

over, stockpiling was discontinued. In

April 1945 ASF set at ninety days the

normal stock level for parts and special

tools for weapons, for fire control instruments, and for combat vehicles; and at

sixty days, that for items needed in the

civilian economy, including automotive

and standard parts. After V-E Day, the

narrowing of the war to the Pacific area

focused the attention of Ordnance stock

controllers on problems of redistribution

and disposal.45

Redistribution and Disposal

Early attention to the disposal of unneeded Ordnance supplies was brought

about by the shortage of critical matériel

late in 1942 that also started the nationwide scrap-collection program. At that

time the Ordnance Department directed

depot commanders to scrap all matériel

that had been declared obsolete by the

Ordnance Committee and much other

matériel that was no longer standard

issue and was not being manufactured.

matériel that was surplus, carefully considered so in the light of depot requirements, possible future demands, and national needs, was to be moved out of distribution depots.46

 Later, the work of

clearing obsolete and unauthorized items

from stock became a continuing function

of stock control points and master depots,

and the reporting of excesses, for redistrirector ASF Contl Div, for Director of Supply,

ASF, 2 Oct 44, sub: Depot Inventory Procedures;

(3) Statement, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes, Items for

Discussion at Staff Conf, 24 Oct 44, sub: Inventories; (4) FS Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 21.

42

 ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 240. 43

 Hist, OCO FS Stock Contl Div, III (1

Apr-30 Jun 44), p. 5 and IV (1 Oct -31 Dec

44), p. 26. 44

 PSP 63, sec. 5, pp. 4-5 and exs. 1-14. 45

 (1) Ibid., exs. 15-25; (2) ASF Manual

M413, 10 Apr 45; (3) ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945,

p. 240; (4) FS Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 23. 46

 Lt Col John A. Barclay, Chief Parts &

Supplies Sec, Supply Br, T-AC, Disposition of

Obsolescent Materiel, Transcript of Talks, Depot

Comdrs' Conf, 13-14 Apr 43, pp. 40-41.
STOCK CONTROL 419

bution or disposal, an important factor in

supply control. Stores reports were adjusted to reflect this information, and they

helped to prevent unnecessary procurement.47

In the summer of 1944 floods of excess

stocks began to inundate the depots. Fort

Wayne Ordnance Depot, for example,

which received in April 9,060 items weighing 110,404 pounds from 29 stations, by

the following September was receiving

20,652 items weighing 1,240,364 pounds

from 94 stations. These were only about

60 percent of the total items reported, as

they did not include items extracted to

master depots, unauthorized items reported

to Detroit, or obsolete items reported to

the Treasury Department.48 Between 30

June 1944 and 30 June 1945 Army Service Forces made available for redistribution

or disposal some $946 million worth of

property; about 60 percent of it was

Ordnance materiel.49

Control of excess stocks began with a

"station excess stock account" kept in the

depots on individual item cards showing

nomenclature, unit, item stock number,

and SNL group or manufacturer's code.

The depots transmitted this information to

stock control points on their stores reports

under a special heading, Condition Code

No. 4.50 The stock control points, whose

records showed the national stock position,

then determined whether the item was

truly excess. Thereafter, disposal action

depended on whether the excess stock consisted of principal, or major items, for

convenience called P items, or of secondary

items—accessories, parts, supplies, tools

and equipment—termed S items. The

stock control point reported P items at

once to Field Service's matériel Control

office, which declared them surplus, obtaining prior approval from ASF for items

valued at more than $500,000. S items

were circularized for thirty days to other

Ordnance establishments, other War Department agencies, and the Navy; only

those that were unneeded were reported in

the Office of matériel Control. After that

office made the surplus declaration on P

and S items, it issued disposition instructions to the stock control point concerned,

which in turn instructed the depots.51

To set up a reporting system for excess

stocks was not difficult, but to be reasonably sure that the figures were accurate

was another matter. Errors in the amount

and type of excess stocks began when

troops departing for overseas turned in

their equipment to the stations. Because of

lack of time or lack of the technical knowledge required for identification, the turnin figures were often inaccurate. Sometimes, rather than perform the necessary

paper work, troop units abandoned their

excess equipment, in one instance dumping

it on a neighboring farm and in another

throwing it into a lake.52

The problem of item identification appeared again at the stations and even in

the depots, which often received items in

mixed lots without tags, physical markings, or written records. Station classification as to serviceability was meaningless

47

 (1) Ltr, Col Ely to Col McMahon, 23 Jul

44, in Gen Campbell's Personal Correspondence:

(2) ODO 98-44, 20 Jul 44; (3) ODO 107,

Revision 2, 1 Oct 44, p. 10. 48

 Carl H. Mott, Chief of Inventory Contl Br.

Disposition of Excess Property at Posts, Camps,

and Stations, p. 3, in Min, Stock Contl Conf.

Fort Wayne, 23-25 Oct 44, OHF. 49

 ASF Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 246. 50

 (1) ODO 107 Revision 2, 1 Oct 44; (2)

FS Order 122-44, 14 Oct 44. 51

 (1) Min, SC-Ord Supply and Maint Conf.

16-17 Feb 45, pp. 33-34, OHF; (2) ODO 32-

45, 22 Mar 45. 52

 ASF Contl Div Rpt, Survey of Returns to

Stock, Jan 45, pp. 4, 6-7, Contl Div files, OCMH.
420 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

when careless packing resulted in damage

in transit. Big axle assemblies might be

thrown in the same box with delicate

gages. One package received at Red River

Depot contained a shovel, a hydrometer,

and a pressure gage; another was a jumble

of instruments and old iron of all kinds.53

To the problem of unidentifiable and

damaged stocks the best solution seemed to

be closer co-ordination between the depots

and Service Commands. Ogden Arsenal

found that sending out small, fast-moving

Station Excess Stock Teams composed of a

Service Command representative and two

civilian experts from the Arsenal was effective.54

The orderly disposal of surplus stocks

became increasingly important as the end

of World War II came in sight. The board

set up under the Surplus Property Act of

3 October 1944 made the Reconstruction

Finance Corporation the disposal agency

for industrial-type property and the Treasury that for consumer-type items, which

represented about 90 percent of Service

Command materiel.55 As stocks began to

pile up in Ordnance depots from posts,

camps, and stations at a rate averaging

twenty-one million pounds per month during Fiscal Year 1945,56

 the storage problem became extremely troublesome because

the Treasury lacked space and manpower;

the problem of locating, identifying, and

reporting the individual items in this vast

hoard, the first step in moving them out,

was also serious. Ordnance's main disposal

official, Col. Fred A. McMahon, stayed in

close contact with the ASF Stock Control

Division, but found that the great number

of hazy and sometimes conflicting regulations from above made the task of reporting excess stocks extremely difficult.57

 By

the summer of 1945 there were nearly one

hundred separate War Department and

ASF instructions dealing with the disposition of excess and surplus property.58

After the Ordnance Department complained that the directives were difficult to

interpret and apply, the ASF Control

Division surveyed the situation and recommended certain improvements in procedure. General Somervell appointed a working group that by the middle of August

1945 succeeded in consolidating the numerous instructions into four basic documents, including two manuals in which

terms such as disposition, redistribution,

transfer, and excess were carefully defined.

Other results of the group's work were

some degree of decentralization of disposal

authority to depots and stations, better

systems of reporting and circularization,

and a general tightening of the ASF organization for property disposition. The

fruits of these efforts would come after

V-J day.59

Stock Control in Retrospect

More imaginative planning in the period

between wars might have averted many of

the mistakes in the wartime management

of general supplies, especially spare parts.

Caught unprepared by the flood of parts

coming off the production lines in 1940,

the Ordnance Department turned to the

business world for advice, and, on the

recommendation of an expert from in53

 (1) Ibid., p. 10; (2) Ord-SC Conf, 8-9

May 44, pp. 39-40. 54

 Min, SC — Ord Supply and Mai

-17 Feb 45, p.51. 55

 Ibid., p. 39. 56

 FS Ann Rpt FY 1945, p. 20. 57

 Min, SC — Ord Supply and Main

-17 Feb 45, p. 35. 58

 History of Control Division, ASF 1942-45,

app. (Compilation of Projects), sec. 158, ASF

Contl Div files, OCMH. 59

 Ibid.
STOCK CONTROL 421

dustry, set up a new organization to

control all parts. Sent to Detroit in the

fall of 1942 when the Tank-Automotive

Center was established there, the new parts

unit suffered badly in the move, losing

experienced employees and access to technical records that remained in Washington. Moreover, the new unit was burdened

with a huge coding operation made necessary by the installation of IBM machines

in the summer of 1941.

Electrical accounting machines were

doubtless necessary to keep records current; but here again there was not adequate planning. Instead of adapting the

IBM cards to military purposes, Ordnance

set up a new system of parts identification

to suit the machines. The change-over to

the new item stock number lagged behind

production and was swamped when more

than one hundred thousand automotive

items came into the Ordnance system in

the summer of 1942. For this reason, and

because of inability to keep up with the

records at Detroit, the stock control machinery was on the verge of a breakdown

by December 1942.

After replacing his Chief of Field Service, General Campbell reviewed Field Service operations with a committee of advisers

from industry, and took .several steps to

improve supply. One was the appointment

of a board to study parts numbering.

Another was the removal from Detroit of

stock control responsibility for weapons

parts, fire control parts, tools, and other

items of equipment, and the establishment

of suboffices, or stock control points, for

these types of materiel. But there still

remained at Detroit the very large operation for tank-automotive items, and from

the theaters in the crucial first months of

1944 came complaints of a shortage of

vehicle spare parts. To speed up the flow

from factory to port, the Chief of Ordnance, again consulting with industrial

experts, set up master depots stocking

everything needed for a certain make of

vehicle such as Dodge. The master depot

plan was helpful in some respects but

conflicted with the new parts numbering

system that had in the meantime been

evolved by the Ordnance Numbering

Board.

The assignment of a new number for

every part, cross referencing to it all the

old numbers that the item might have, was

one of the major supply efforts of the

Ordnance Department. The whole question of item identification in relation to

stock control, including accurate and uniform nomenclature of all items, became

increasingly important throughout the

Army. Early in 1945 the President set in

motion a program for preparing a uniform

Federal catalog for supplies of all kinds.

The influence of Army Service Forces on

the management of stocks was felt mainly

at the level below the depots—in posts,

camps, and stations, and in the establishment of stock levels. The ASF stock control

manual for depots did not appear until

August 1945; the ASF item-identification

program, for a common language of supply for all technical services, was postponed until after the war. Generally

speaking an Army-wide appreciation of

the need for effective stock control and the

amount of manpower it took to achieve it

came too late in the war to be of much

value.

Looking back over the experiences of

World War II many Ordnance supply experts felt that Ordnance had placed too

much reliance on civilians who were familiar only with commercial stock control

and did not understand military procedure. Some felt a better solution to the
422 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

problem caused by Army inexperience in

stock control would be the assignment of

Army officers to commercial concerns for

training in peacetime.60 The success of

the experiment in decentralization by

commodity, the stock control points, lent

weight to proponents of the product

center concept, in which procurement, issue, storage, maintenance—and stock control—of both major items and spare parts

would be located in one place, with one

set of records.

60

 (1) Vorberg Rpt; (2) Memo, Maj W. L.

Kelly to Chief Stock Contl Div FS OCO 8 Oct

45 sub: Final Report of Key Personnel, in FS

Key Pers Rpts (hereafter cited as Kelly Rpt).
CHAPTER XXI

Ammunition Supply

The control of ammunition stocks presented peculiar problems because of

strategic considerations and the nature of

explosives. Ammunition was distributed

more widely and at the same time was

kept under tighter control than other

supplies. The Ordnance Department supplied small arms ammunition, artillery

shells, rockets, bombs, mines, grenades,

pyrotechnics, propellent powders, and explosives not only to the Army but also to

the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard,

other executive departments, states, and

foreign governments. Most of the ammunition produced after Pearl Harbor was

destined for shipment overseas, either to

U.S. forces or lend-lease countries. Because

of safety requirements, the first consideration was to get it from loading plants to

ports as quickly as possible; the foremost

problem in stock management was how to

cut down the time in transit.1 Because of

the War Department policy of keeping

tight control of ammunition, none could be

shipped from Ordnance depots—other

than interdepot transfers—without approval of the Secretary of War. Because

War Department decisions on the quantities and types of ammunition to be shipped

were based on the status of stocks in the

depots, accurate and timely records were

important.2

Means of Identification

For ammunition, item identification did

not present the problem that it did in the

case of spare parts. Soldiers and storekeepers could easily identify a round of

ammunition by the color of its projectile,

by the lettering on the packing container,

or, where size permitted, on the item

itself. Explosive bombs, artillery shells,

grenades, and mines were painted olive

drab, for camouflage purposes; chemical

types were gray.3 Against these neutral

backgrounds, bands of color provided

further identification as to filler. On olive

drab, yellow meant high explosive, purple

meant incendiary. On gray, green meant

casualty gas, red meant harassing gas, and

yellow meant smoke. Small arms cartridges

1

 (1) Brig Gen Harry R. Kutz and staff, The

Mission and Operation of the Field Service Division, Ordnance Department, 27 Jan 43, pp.

19-27; (2) OCO FS, Ammo Supply Div, History

of Ammunition Supply Division in World War II,

30 Sep 46 [hereafter cited as Hist, Ammo Supply Div], vol. XI, pt.1, pp. 32-34, OHF; (3)

Interv with Col Charles M. Steese, P&O Hist II,

ex. 1. 2

 (1) Ltr, SW to CofOrd, 18 Dec 41. sub:

Distribution of Ammo, AG 471 (12-15-41)

Misc-D; (2) Ord Stock Contl Manual, Apr 43,

p.1, OHF. 3

 Explosive ammunition was painted yellow at

the beginning of the war.
424 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

SOLDIERS LOOKING UP SNL NUMBERS

to order needed artillery parts, France, 1944.

did not require painting, but bullet tips

were colored to denote certain types such

as armor piercing (black) or incendiary

(blue). The lettering on the packing container or the item always gave two essential pieces of information, the standard

nomenclature and the lot number.4

The lot number was essential. It identified a quantity of complete items of one

specific type of ammunition loaded and

assembled by the same manufacturer under

controlled conditions kept as uniform as

possible. In firing some weapons, successive rounds had to be from the same lot

to achieve maximum accuracy. For this

reason all ammunition was stored, issued,

inspected, tested, and accounted for by

lot number. Assigned at the time of manufacture, it consisted of the manufacturer's

initials and a series of digits differently

arranged for each lot.

During the Sicilian campaign the

Seventh Army complained to the Ordnance Department that certain calibers of

its artillery ammunition were inaccurate.

Investigation showed that lots had been

indiscriminately mixed when the ammunition was issued to the firing batteries. The

best solution was to have on hand the

largest possible amount of one lot; the

minimum asked by the overseas theaters

was ten thousand rounds. Beginning in

1944 Field Service made strenuous efforts

to increase the quantities of a single lot

sent to one user and to obviate the possibility of mixed lots. By fall, ships arriving in

ETO carried sizeable quantities of individual lots. But failure by the services and

the combat arms to achieve complete lot

integrity up to the firing line hampered

ammunition supply throughout the war.5

In addition to lot number and nomenclature there were two other means of

identifying ammunition, the Ammunition

Identification Code (AIC), primarily for

field use in reporting and requisitioning,

and the item stock number, used in depot

accounting in the United States. The AIC

was an ingenious substitute for nomenclature. Ammunition had been identified by

codes in an Ordnance field manual published about 1930, but the codes, assigned

arbitrarily, were meaningless and were not

widely used. Early in 1942 Col. Grosvenor

F. Powell, an officer at Aberdeen Proving

Ground, suggested the AIC, a code that

really described the item. The first two

characters indicated the SNL in which the

4

 TM 9-1900, 18 Jun 45, pp. 5-24. 5

 (1) Ammunition, Monograph No. 4, p. 66,

OHF; (2) PSP 64, Ammunition Supply, June

1945, pp. 17, 69-72, OHF; (3) Hist, Ammo

Supply Div, p. 71-74; (4) Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. II,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1959), ch. V, pp. 57-61.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 425

item was listed, such as T1; the third

indicated the weapon in which it was used,

or the general class, such as Grenades; the

fourth, the type and model of the ammunition; and the fifth the method of

packing. The AIC proved to be so useful,

especially in messages transmitted by wire,

that it was placed on SNL's and before

the end of the war was employed on

requisitions, shipping documents, property

accountability records, and all other documents where the lengthy standard nomenclature was not definitely required.6

SNL's were revised to include AIC symbols

about 1 July 1942. At the same time,

revisions were made to include item stock

numbers similar to those used for general

supplies. These numbers were made necessary by the decision to employ IBM machines to speed up the reporting of ammunition stocks.7

The Search for Better

Methods of Reporting

Ammunition was exempted from the

change-over to the IBM system of stores

reporting made effective for general supplies in the spring of 1941. But it became

clear early in the emergency period that

the methods of reporting ammunition

stocks needed improvement. The Supply

Section of the Ammunition Supply Division was hampered by lack of current

information from two sources, plants and

depots.

With ammunition it was vitally important to know the status of shipments: the

time of loading on cars at plants, the time

the cars got in motion, and the time of

arrival at depot, camp, or port. Before

1941, there was no effective procedure for

obtaining this information. Plants reported

the loading by telephone, then awaited

instructions from Washington on routing

and destination. Preparation of these instructions took time. The Supply Section

had to find out what depot could handle

the shipment and then obtain routing

from the Quartermaster Freight Traffic

Branch. At last the instructions went out,

and then nothing more was heard in

Washington. If the officials of the Supply

Section wanted to find out what had

become of the shipment—and they received constant requests for this information, particularly from ports—they had to

make inquiries, often by telephone.

This clumsy procedure was streamlined

in the summer of 1941 on the recommendation of two members of the Supply

Section, Lt. Col. Samuel L. Smith and

Mr. Arthur Hinchcliffe. Under the new

system, prompt reports came in to Washington showing the status of shipment at

every point. At the time of loading the

plant sent to Washington a notice of availability, an Availship, followed by a report

of transfer to Field Service and shipment,

a Transrepship. The depot sent in a report

of arrival, a Reparrive, and when the

ammunition went forth again, to camp or

port, a report of shipment, a Repship.

Eventually plants and depots consolidated

all transactions of this kind for a 24-hour

period into a daily teletype.8

Stores reports showing the status of

stocks in depots were carbon copies of

6

 (1) Hist, Ammo Supply Div, pp. 27-28 and

ex. 8; (2) Memo, Lt Col Samuel L. Smith to

Exec to Chief of FS, 28 May 45, sub: Final

Rpt of Key Pers, FS Key Pers Rpts [hereafter

cited as Smith Rpt]; (3) ODO 122-44, 17

Oct 44. 7

 (1) Hist, Ammo Supply Div, p. 28; (2)

Chapter XX, above. 8

 (1) Smith Rpt; (2) Rpt of Maj. Richard T.

Burroughs, Jr., 28 Jul 45, in FS Key Pers Rpts,

OHF [hereafter cited as Burroughs Rpt].
426 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

stock records prepared on Elliott-Fisher

machines. Monthly for active groups,

quarterly for less active, and semiannually

for the least active, the depots reported

SNL ammunition groups P, R, S, and T

to their respective group chiefs in the

Supply Section. Each group chief maintained his own central stock record, wrote

shipping orders, and, in a sense, operated

as a distinct supply section.

In the summer of 1942 a survey by Lt.

Col. Samuel Smith revealed that the procedures of the groups were not uniform

and the workload was not evenly distributed. One commodity group, for example,

the S group handling primarily bombs and

pyrotechnics, might be overburdened with

work at a time when another group was

having a lull. In the reorganization that

followed this survey, one central group

was established to receive and consolidate

all ammunition stores reports. The P, R,

S and T groups were reduced in strength

and relieved of all but technical supervision. The change from a commodity to

a functional organization for stock control

saved manpower. It was also one means of

tightening stores reporting procedures.9

Another way, considered even earlier, was

a change-over to IBM machines.

IBM Machines for Ammunition

Stores Reports

Soon after the installation of IBM machines for general supplies in 1941 the

Ordnance Department decided to try them

for ammunition also and shipped machines

to several depots. But this early attempt

was not very successful. The system had

been designed principally to accommodate

General Supply materiel. It was true that

item code numbers were less of a problem

for ammunition than for general supplies,

for fewer changes would be encountered

and there would be less difficulty in identification. But this advantage was more

than offset by the fact that for ammunition

the total stock on hand for any one item

had to be broken down into various reserve balances such as special reserves for

task forces, ammunition credits, and so

on; these balances had in turn to be

broken down into individual organizations,

such as the corps area.10 All this greatly

complicated the reporting of stocks. Moreover, since the assistance of the IBM

Corporation was directed mainly toward

improving spare parts reporting, the Ammunition Supply Branch had no expert

help with its greatly expanded ammunition

stocks. As a result, the processing of stores

reports took so much time that the central

stock records were out-of-date and useless

by the time they were available.

The first hope of improvement came in

the spring of 1942 with the commissioning

of an officer who had been with IBM in

civil life, Lt. Richard T. Burroughs, Jr.,

and the loan of Mr. John Schick by IBM.

These experts made a survey of machine

operations both in the depots and in the

central office and established better procedures. The new procedures were tried

out at Portage Ordnance Depot and were

then explained to representatives of all

depots at a series of training courses at

Portage from September 1942 to March

1943. The educational program was slowed

down by the recall of Mr. Schick to active

duty with the Adjutant General's Office

shortly after the first course opened, but

Major Burroughs took over the supervision

9

 Smith Rpt. 10

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Notes on Ammo Stock Control

Procedure, in Manual—The Application of Electric Accounting Machines to War Department

Supply Records.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 427

of the whole program. By the summer of

1943 most of the depots had installed the

machine system and satisfactory stores reports were coming in.11

 Then in September

1943 ASF directed the Chief of Ordnance

to cut down on IBM equipment in depots.

A survey had in some degree substantiated

charges that the use of punch card machines had been carried to an impracticable and inefficient extreme throughout the

War Department, and in 1943 a cut in the

production schedules for tabulating equipment led to rationing by the War Production Board and stricter control by ASF.12

Faced with the order to cut down on

the machines in the depots, General Campbell decided to apply it to ammunition

rather than general supplies.13 He returned the preparation of ammunition

stores reports to the manual system, effective 1 December 1943. Forms were redesigned and distributed to the depots,

and Major Burroughs had to begin another

program of education, conducting a 3-day

conference at Blue Grass for all Eastern

depots and at Ogden for the Western.

The manual system remained in effect in

ammunition depots for the rest of the

war, and, thanks to Major Burroughs'

procedures, stores reports continued to

come in satisfactorily.14

The next objective was to improve the

consolidation of reports in Washington.

The central stock records had been converted from manual to machine on 1

February 1943, but the Machine Subgroup had been placed too far down in the

organization of the Stock Control (formerly Supply) Section's Inventory Control

Unit.15 The accuracy of the reports that

came to it depended on an Analysis Subgroup that interpreted the documents

before transmitting them; little or no use

was made of stores reports. In December

1943 Major Burroughs, who had been

placed in charge of the central IBM installation the summer before, brought

about a reorganization of the Inventory

Control Unit to bring into one group, the

Records Group, all activities devoted to

the production of current operating figures

—the IBM Sub-group, the Analysis Subgroup, and a group auditing stores reports.

The new organization soon found that it

was hampered by inability to secure

enough civilians to do the job, especially

civilians who would work the night shift

necessary to process the transactions of the

day. The most promising solution was to

move out of Washington.16

The Move to Philadelphia

The Chief of Ordnance decided to move

the Records Group to Philadelphia, where

11

 (1) Burroughs Rpt; (2) Hist, Ammo Supply

Div, pp. 21-23; (3) Manual, The Application of

Electric Accounting Machines to War Department-Ordnance Department Stock Control Ammunition Items, Revised 10 Sep 42. 12

 (1) Burroughs Rpt; (2) Rpt, Methods Management Br, Contl Div, AGO, 19 Nov 42, sub:

Study of Comments and Recommendations of

Machine Records Contained in Final Report of

Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison, Inc., 12 Nov

42, ASF Contl Div files, 413.51. (The study

found that, if approved commitments for additional punch card machines were executed, ASF

would be paying approximately 15 million dollars

a year in rental); (3) Memo, CG ASF for Directors of All Staff Divs and Chiefs of Supply

and Administrative Servs, 11 Mar 43, sub:

Business Machines, ASF Contl Div files, 413.51;

(4) ASF Contl Div Rpt 154, Mar 44, sub:

Utilization of Machine Tabulating Equipment in

the Ord Dept., ASF Contl Div files. 13

 (1) Interv with Sadtler, 4 May 53; (2)

Final Rpt of Maj Robert E. Nutt, 24 Oct 45,

FS Key Pers Rpts. 14

 (1) Burroughs Rpt; (2) History, Blue Grass

Ordnance Depot, 1 Jul 43-31 Dec 43, OHF; (3)

History, Ogden Arsenal, vol. V, 1 Oct Through

31 Dec 43, pp. 104-5, OHF; (4) Smith Rpt. 15

 PSP 64, ex. 4. 16

 (1) Burroughs Rpt; (2) Smith Rpt.
428 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

a field office of the Ammunition Supply

Branch had been established late in 1942

to take care of war aid supply, records of

resources, and records of surveillance and

renovation.17 To this organization, known

as the Philadelphia Ammunition Supply

Office (PASO), the new group was attached on 24 January 1944. Misgivings

about separating current operating records from the daily operations in Washington were allayed by establishing twice-aday courier service.18

The assignment of a detachment of

thirty-three WAC's to operate the machines made possible a three-shift operation. Even so, progress toward producing

accurate and current central records was

slow. The WAC's were inexperienced and

needed training. Time was lost during the

move to Philadelphia. There was a heavy

backlog of work, and not until March did

the office receive from Washington the files

it needed for reference purposes. Beginning

in June there were a number of mechanical

failures in the machines and even major

breakdowns. Service by the IBM Corporation was poor until December 1944, when

the appointment of a service manager for

the Philadelphia area brought about improvement.19

An essential step toward more accurate

figures on the amount of stock in all

depots was the reconciliation of depot and

central records, but this proved to be

exceedingly difficult. The first efforts

failed. In June 1944 a new chief scrapped

all previous methods, overhauled organization and procedures, stepped up training,

and achieved closer co-ordination with the

depots and closer liaison within the office.

The reconciliation project finally got under

way but it was February 1945 before it

was complete for all depots and all items.20

By that time, depot stock records for

ammunition were lessening in importance.

Late in 1943 the Ordnance Department

had begun to ship ammunition directly

from manufacturing plants to ports and

training camps; by February 1945 about

half of all ammunition shipments were

bypassing the depots, and the trend was

continuing.21 The Records Group by the

spring of 1945 was furnishing reports on

the tonnage of ammunition moved by

direct shipment, as well as an audit and

follow-up on such movements, and keeping

records on returns of ammunition from

overseas, an increasingly important phase

of its work. After V-J Day the Group

was returned to Washington.22

At least one officer felt that the records

and reports groups should henceforth remain in Washington. But the Records

Group in Philadelphia had worked under

heavy handicaps that were not all a matter

of location. Frequent changes in required

reports to ASF and other agencies for the

purpose of control and requirements computation revealed the inadequacy of existing records from time to time. Whenever

procedures for gathering and recording

data were changed the new records resulting from the change were not reconcilable

with previous records and reports. This

trial-and-error approach was extremely

17

 (1) ODO 361, 26 Nov 42; (2) ODO 17

-44, 20 Jan 44. 18

 (1) Smith Rpt; (2) Maj Henry B. Davidson, Personal History, 8 Oct 45, FS Key Pers

Rpts. 19

 Lt Francis E. Boesche, Rpt, 23 Jul 45, sub:

Job History . . . , [hereafter referred to as

Boesche Rpt], FS Key Pers Rpts. 20

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Lt Theodore Doll, Jr., Rpt,

Job History . . . , [hereafter referred to as Doll

Rpt], FS Key Pers Rpts; (3) Burroughs Rpt. 21

 (1) Maj Daniel J. Strauss, Personal Historical Rpt, 9 Feb 46, OHF; (2) Capt Joseph J.

Calhoun, Rpt, 1 Aug 45 [hereafter referred to

as Calhoun Rpt], OHF; (3) PSP 64, p. 13. 22

 (1) Boesche Rpt; (a) Doll Rpt.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 429

costly in man-hours and provided records

of dubious value. Co-ordination between

Industrial and Field Service records had

been faulty. The efforts of 1943 and 1944

had been largely devoted to correcting the

mistakes of the past.23

Improvements in the Pattern

of Distribution

In 1940 and early 1941, American strategists were thinking in terms of defense.

All Ordnance depots stocked every type of

ammunition that might be needed in the

defense of a particular area. The depots

received their stocks under the direction of

the Supply Section's Groups, P, R, S, and

T, handling each type of ammunition.

Working independently, each group received reports of production on its own

type of ammunition from manufacturing

plants and found a depot to store it, without regard to instructions issued by other

groups. As a result, some depots would

become overstocked or would face a

sudden, heavy workload with little notice.

Depots were equipped for handling a

certain amount of ammunition, expressed

in carloads to be moved in and out each

day. If a depot with a 25-carload-a-day

capacity was assigned shipments which required its entire handling capacity, no additional shipment could be made to it

without incurring demurrage charges.

After Pearl Harbor it became evident

that prewar methods of stocking the depots

would not work-under wartime conditions.

Closer co-ordination at the top was essential. Consequently, in the summer of

1942 when Groups P, R, S, and T were

relieved of all but technical supervision,

the Chief of Field Service created one

central group to handle distribution. This

gave better regulation of the flow into the

depots and improved record-keeping.24

The second step toward improving distribution was even more important. It

dealt with the flow out of the depots to

the ultimate users. Ammunition was not

subject to requisitioning in the ordinary

sense, because it fell into the category of

controlled items, under the Mobilization

Regulations of 5 January 1940. The

amount to be distributed to troops for

training was decided upon monthly by the

War Department General Staff, and the

Ordnance Department simply directed a

certain depot to make it available or credit

it to a certain Corps Area or other specified

user. Once credited, the ammunition was

no longer reported under the heading of

stocks available. These credited stocks

were essentially the same as a deposit in a

bank account; shipment to the user represented a withdrawal from the account.

For lend-lease users, ammunition was also

distributed on instructions from higher

authority. When an allied nation submitted a request to the War Department,

Ordnance determined which depot had the

right ammunition in stock and earmarked

the quantity desired for the lend-lease

account. The depot was also instructed to

honor the shipping instructions of the

foreign government, to obtain a Quartermaster Release (QMR) and eventually to

move the ammunition to the designated

port of exit.25

The great defect in this system was that

the depot where the stock was earmarked

23

 (1) Smith Rpt; (2) Davidson Rpt; (3)

Burroughs Rpt; (4) Interv with Col Samuel L.

Smith, 4 Aug 53. 24

 (1) PSP 64, pp. 2-4; (2) Hist, Ammo Supply Div, pp. 2-12. 25

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Richard Moore, ACofS

for CofS, 5 Jul 40, sub: Supply Under MR

4-1, 0-4/31793; (2) Hist, Ammo Supply Div,

pp. 89 and 246, and ex. 51; (3) PSP 64, pp.

43-44.
430 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

might be at a great distance from the

place where the ammunition was eventually needed. Troops moved from training

camps near the depot to camps far away.

As for lend-lease distribution, Field Service's War Aid Section had no way of

knowing what the port of exit would be.

The matériel was reserved at whatever

depot had unobligated stock. As a result,

a West Coast depot might have to ship the

ammunition to an East Coast port, or vice

versa. A close check on shipping tickets

by the War Aid Section in June 1942 revealed that crosshauls and backhauls were

increasing along with increased production

and increased assignments. For example,

on 8 June one carload of 30-caliber armorpiercing cartridges was shipped from

Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, N.J., to San

Francisco; one day later two carloads of

the same item were shipped from Ogden,

Utah, to Jersey City, N.J.26

Lend-Lease Shipments

Contributing to wasteful crosshauls and

backhauls was a directive of April 1942

requiring lend-lease nations to ship all

their matériel out of a depot within fortyfive days after the date of its availability.

Otherwise it would be returned to Ordnance stock. Very often shipment abroad

was not possible within that period, as

vessels were scarce. In that case the foreign

government had the matériel shipped to

another location in the United States,

possibly across the continent from the

probable port. Sometimes when a ship did

become available, ammunition at a distant

depot could not reach the port in time to

meet the sailing deadline and had to be

freighted back to storage. In one instance

the cost of returning a carload of high

explosives from Philadelphia to Letterkenny Ordnance Depot at Chambersburg,

Pennsylvania, the nearest depot, and reshipping it later to the port was approximately one thousand dollars.27

One suggested solution to the problem of

crosshauling was to request in advance

from the foreign government agencies the

name of the intended port. But the agencies were seldom able to comply with such

requests. The shortage of ships made ports

and sailing dates uncertain; lack of information from overseas headquarters made

uncertain the name of the ultimate consignee. Another solution was to arrange

with the Traffic Control Branch of the

Transportation Corps to notify Ordnance

when it received releases from War Aid

nations from depots at a distance from

the port to which the ammunition was to

be shipped. Upon notification, Field Service's War Aid Section could find out

whether a depot nearer the port had the

materiel, and, if so, could cancel the

shipping order at the original depot and

set up new obligations. This procedure

eliminated some crosshauls, but it was

cumbersome; it required a tremendous

amount of paper work and many longagencies. distance calls to depots and foreign 2 8 In the end, the best answer to the

problem was a system evolved in the War

Aid Section in the summer of 1942. This

plan, suggested by Lt. Leon M. Leathers,

Jr., Chief of the Supply Unit, was simple.

It consisted essentially in not earmarking

stocks. After the War Aid Section received

26

 (1) PSP 64, pp. 44-45; (2) Hist, Ammo

Supply Div, pp. 246-47. 27

 (1) Hist, Ammo Supply Div, p. 252; (2)

PSP 64, p. 59. 28

 (1 man ) PSP 64, p. 49; (2) Kenneth W. Still,- 

nance Digest, XXVII No. 10 (October 1945),

p. 12.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 431

authority for release of materiel to a

foreign government, it issued a credit to

that government against U.S. stocks, without specifying any particular depot. Then,

when the government in question received

shipping instructions, it notified the Ordnance Department, giving the port of export and the date when the matériel

should arrive there. After that, the War

Aid Section requested the Supply Section

to convert the credit to physical stock at

the Ordnance depot nearest the port of

exit.

Notwithstanding its simplicity and feasibility the plan was not adopted until the

spring of 1943. A survey had to be made

showing the wastefulness of the old scheme

of distribution, and numerous agencies

outside Ordnance had to be consulted, including lend-lease nations, Army Service

Forces, Transportation Corps, and the

War Shipping Administrator. One obstacle

in the way was a War Shipping Administration directive stating that the point of

origin had to be known before a shipping

number could be assigned; another was

opposition from one member each of the

British Purchasing Commission and the

British Ministry of War Transport. But

the Chief of Ordnance was eventually

able to get the directive amended. In

general the British were enthusiastic about

the plan, as were the officials of the ASF

International Division and the International Branch of the Transportation Corps.

In January 1943 a War Department

circular placing responsibility for avoiding

crosshauls and unnecessary movement on

the procuring services gave impetus and

authority for implementation, buttressed

by directives from ASF early in 1943 to

conserve manpower and transportation. In

the meantime, Ordnance had established

the Philadelphia Ammunition Supply Office to handle the distribution of greatly

increasing lend-lease materiel, expected to

amount to one hundred thousand tons per

month; and the Chief of Transportation

assigned a liaison officer to PASO at the

request of General Campbell. The credit

system for War Aid shipment of standard

items was placed in effect in May 1943.

The first shipment under it occurred on

15 May. In the first few months of operation there was a reduction of 49.5 percent

in mileage over the old method, representing a tremendous saving in time, facilities,

labor, communications, and storage. The

British reported "great benefit," and the

Transportation Corps noted that the system might well be applied to other technical services. It was so successful that it

was extended that fall to nonstandard

items, bulk explosives, and chemicals.29

Training Ammunition

Not long after the new system was suggested for War Aid ammunition, attention was given to the problem of efficient

routing of shipments to U.S. troops. The

impetus came from Capt. Hollis M. Carlisle, an officer whose entire civilian

experience had been in merchandise distribution and stock control, first with

Montgomery Ward and later with the

Carlisle Hardware Company. Assigned to

the Shipping Section's Distribution Unit in

December 1942, Captain Carlisle turned a

fresh and critical eye on established procedures. He found them based on an outmoded system of strategic distribution

developed at a time when ammunition was

in extremely short supply. Every week

each producing plant submitted a report

29

 (1) WD Cir 12, 7 Jan 43; (2) PSP 64, exs.

55-58, 61-62, 75, 79-85.
432 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

to the Ammunition Supply Branch showing the number of carloads to be expected

the following week. The Supply Section

then determined the distribution according

to three factors. First was the most desirable strategic location of stocks—roughly

65 percent in eastern depots, 12 percent in

central, and 23 percent in western. The

second factor was the current status of

each depot's handling capacity, reported

weekly by the Depot and Facilities Section. The third consisted of the maximum and minimum levels of each type of

ammunition prescribed by each depot.

Within the restrictions imposed by these

three factors, the Distribution Unit tried

to avoid crosshauling and backhauling by

sending the ammunition to the nearest

depot or to one on a straight line between

the plant and the ultimate user.30

But the restrictions made efficient routing all but impossible. An investigation by

Captain Carlisle of all shipments from

plants to depots and from depots to using

services during January, February, and

March of 1943 uncovered some striking examples of crosshauling and backhauling.

For example, 2,000-pound bombs produced at Ravenna, Ohio, were shipped to

a depot at Anniston, Alabama, and reshipped to the New York Port of Embarkation; 1,000-pound bombs produced

at McGregor, Texas, were shipped to

Seneca, N.Y., and then to the Charleston

Port of Embarkation.31

An analysis of these findings and of

maps showing the unnecessarily long distances traveled by ammunition items resulted in a new conception of the depot.

It was no longer thought of as a complete

supply source for all types of items regardless of their probable ultimate destination

but rather as a stopover point in transit to

the user. Unlike earlier years, 1943

brought a steady flow of ammunition from

the plants every week. To cope with it,

Ordnance drew up a revised distribution

plan in March. All depots east of the Mississippi River were to be considered as a

common supply source for all East Coast

ports; all those west of the river would

supply West Coast ports. As for training

ammunition, estimated requirements in the

immediate area would govern allocations to

depots.32

Plans for speeding the flow of training

ammunition were discussed during the

spring of 1943 by Ordnance officials with

representatives of Army Ground Forces,

Army Service Forces, Army Air Forces,

and the War Department General Staff.

By June 1943 they reached an agreement

and established a system similar to that

applied in May to War Aid ammunition.

Matériel was not earmarked at any one

depot but each station submitted its requisition to the Chief of Ordnance, and the

Ammunition Supply Branch directed shipment from the nearest depot or loading

plant. In September the practice was applied to ever-increasing amounts of ammunition going to U.S. troops overseas.33

In the meantime, the Distribution Unit

was making a critical examination of its

30

 (1) Memo, Chief Supply Sec for Exec Asst

FS, 5 Feb 43, sub: Cross Haul in Ammo Movements, ex. 28 of Hist, Ammo Supply Div: (2)

Maj Hollis M. Carlisle, Terminal Report, 9 Oct

45, FS Key Pers Rpts, OHF [hereafter cited as

Carlisle Rpt] ; (3) Smith Rpt. 31

 Memo, Chief Supply Sec to Maj. Edgar Tiner, Captain Mullikin, and Capt. Frank Eccles, 2

Mar 43, sub: Analytical Study, ex. 29 of Hist,

Ammo Supply Div. 32

 (1) Carlisle Rpt; (2) Ltr, Chief of FS to

CO's All Ord Ammo Depots, sub: Plan of Ammo

Distribution and Supply, 5 Apr 43, OO 471/1904

-31.

33

 (1) Smith Rpt; (2) Hist, Ammo Supply Div,

pp. 78-102; (3) PSP 64, pp. 7-8.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 433

method of distributing ammunition allocated by the Munitions Board to the Navy.

The journey to the user seemed long and

wasteful. In May 1943 a striking instance

was uncovered in which a plant at Carbondale, Illinois, shipped a consignment

of 500-pound bombs to the Ordnance

depot at Tooele, Utah, which in turn

shipped them to a Navy depot at Hawthorne, Nevada. There was no real reason

for the stopover at the Army depot. The

explanation that it simplified bookkeeping hardly justified the cost in time, manpower, and money. If the ammunition had

been shipped directly from the plant to the

Navy depot, $1,506 per car would have

been saved in transportation cost and the

Navy would also have been able to take

advantage of the cheaper storage-in transi-t through rate to the 

Convinced by figures such as these that the

Army depot ought to be eliminated from

the routing, the Distribution Unit very

soon began shipping Navy ammunition

directly from producing plants to Navy

depots.35

Direct Shipments

The policy of making all possible shipments directly from the loading plant to

the ultimate consignee promised to yield

great savings in transportation cost and the

expense of rehandling at depots. But it

was not to be put into effect until the

new program of issuing to the user an

over-all obligation against stocks rather

than a credit at a specified depot gave the

Ammunition Supply Branch better control

over shipments. Nor could the maximum

number of direct shipments be made until

closer co-ordination was achieved within

the Branch. In August 1943 the Shipping

and Issue Sections were combined under

Maj. Stanley E. Mulliken and control of

all shipments was placed under Captain

Carlisle.36

During September 1943, 511 carloads of

training ammunition were shipped directly

from manufacturing plants to posts,

camps, and stations; during October the

figure rose to 671. Exact savings in dollars

and man-hours were difficult to calculate, but a rough estimate indicated that

over 100,000 man-hours were saved in

September by eliminating the necessity to

load and unload cars at depots, not taking

into account the labor that would have

been required to restencil or mark boxes,

place dunnage in cars, and fill out papers.

Another important economy was in the

use of railroad rolling stock—estimated for

September at approximately 3,066 car days

and for October at 4,026 car days. Still

further savings in crating material and

labor were achieved by shipping uncrated

ammunition directly from a plant to a

post. In one instance the elimination of the

crating operation saved approximately

$70,000 on a single shipment of fortyfive carloads of 105-mm. ammunition. In

addition to the conservation of materials,

manpower, and equipment, the new system speeded up operations; ammunition

was made available in time to provide

34

 In November 1942 Ordnance and the Transportation Corps had made arrangements with the

Association of American Railroads for storage-intransit privileges. A shipment from a loading

plant in Ohio, for example, could go to a depot

in Pennsylvania and later to the New York Port

of Embarkation at the same rate that would have

been charged if the shipment had gone directly

from the plant to the port. Hist, Ammo Supply

Div, p. 66. 35

 PSP 64, p. 6. 36

 (1) Hist, Ammo Supply Div, p. 90; (2)

Carlisle Rpt.
434 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

maximum training for troops before they

moved out to combat theaters.37

Bypassing the depot was even more desirable in the case of ammunition destined

for American troops overseas than it was

for ammunition sent to training camps or

the Navy, because speed in overseas

shipments was of greater importance. No

great harm was done if a shipment was a

little late in arriving at a training camp or

Navy depot; if it failed to make a port

deadline it had to be shipped back at great

expense and, far worse, was lost to the

men who needed it most. But the time

factor made port shipments more difficult. Shipping directly from plants to ports

required not only tight control by the

Ammunition Supply Branch but also close

co-ordination among all agencies.

A new procedure set up in September

1943 made tighter control possible. Portbound stocks were no longer obligated at

any one depot but were shipped, on orders

from Washington, from the depot nearest

the port. Conferences with the Transportation Corps in the fall of 1943 resulted in

better co-ordination. Agreements were

made to cut down the number of days in

the acceptance period at the port and to

center responsibility more definitely on

Transportation's Traffic Control Division.

The Ordnance Department would now

deal directly with that Division, rather

than go through the subordinate Ocean

Traffic Branch. Responsibilities were in

general more clearly defined. The Chief of

Ordnance was responsible for giving early

information to the Traffic Control Division

as to availability of items; the Traffic Control Division was responsible for determining the deadline date from the Port of

Embarkation and for arranging transportation in such a way that the items arrived

on time.38

At the same time, General Campbell

began a program of educating the Industrial Service and loading plants in handling Field Service orders on a direct basis.

Instructions went by telephone to the man

at each plant who was responsible for

routing the ammunition as it came off the

production line. As the program got under

way, plants were ordered to ship speedily,

in the exact quantities specified, giving

first priority to shipments to Ports of

Embarkation, and to furnish the Chief of

Ordnance with complete and accurate information. Major Carlisle's assistant, Capt.

Joseph J. Calhoun, kept current records on

daily production schedules, running times

between plants and ports, holding capacities of plants, and so on. When he received

a port clearance from the Transportation

Corps on a Notice of Availability, he went

through it and obligated all items possible

on producing plants. The records on which

he based his decisions were obtained by

close liaison with the producing plants as

well as the Transportation Corps and Industrial Service. He found at the producing plants an excellent spirit of cooperation. An important by-product of

the new system was a boost to the morale

of the workers when they saw their

ammunition stenciled with an overseas

marking and loaded into cars consigned to

a port of embarkation. Of all ammunition

shipped from plants between January 1944

and February 1945 the percentage shipped

directly to users rose from 28.6 to 50.12.

Direct port shipments climbed steadily,

37

 Ltr, CofOrd to ACofS G-4, 23 Nov 43, sub:

Distribution of Ammo for Training, and Indorsements, OO 471/33664. 38

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to Chief of Transportation,

23 Nov 43, sub: Port-Bound Ammo Shipments,

and Indorsement, 7 Dec 43, OO 400.37/4145;

(2) Calhoun Rpt; (3) Hist, Ammo Supply Div,

pp. 83-85.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 435

until by June 1945, 62.5 percent of all

ammunition arriving at ports came directly from plants.39

From 1 August 1943 to 21 July 1945,

107,517 cars of ammunition were shipped

directly to the consignee, at an estimated

saving in car dunnage and transportation

alone of $1,000 a car, or $107,517,000.

Nor was this the only saving. Ordnance

stock controllers estimated that, if all the

ammunition shipped directly at the peak

of operations had been placed in storage

en route, it would have required at

least twelve additional depots of the capacity of Wingate, which cost approximately

three million dollars a year to operate, to

say nothing of the cost of construction.

Of incalculable value logistically was the

economy in time, figured at ten days

travel time per carload. In the fall of 1944

and spring of 1945, this saving was an

important factor in theater planning in

combat areas.40

Control of Excess Stocks in

the Zone of Interior

As effective as the new system was in

preventing long hauls between depots,

training camps, and ports, it could not

solve the problem of controlling excess

stocks at posts, camps, and stations, a

problem that assumed ever greater importance as troops began to move overseas.

Returning stocks to the depots without

adequate supervision from Washington

could conceivably result in unnecessary

crosshauls and backhauls, the type of

waste that stock controllers had been trying to avoid. An especially troublesome

aspect of the problem was the improper

handling of odd lots of ammunition left

behind by departing troops; there was

also danger in allowing ammunition to

pile up at camps that lacked adequate

storage facilities. One way to prevent

waste and to economize on storage was to

provide better control of issues by the

Office, Chief of Ordnance, so that no more

ammunition was shipped to the station

than could be used. Another was to be

sure, by careful co-ordination with Ground

Forces, that the ammunition was truly

excess and was not needed by any neighboring installation.

With both objectives in mind, two Ordnance stock controllers, Lt. Col. Samuel

L. Smith and Maj. Joseph Rollins, after

consultation with representatives of the

using arms and ASF, proposed a change

in the method of issuing training ammunition. All forces would present their demands to the Post Ordnance Officer with

the deadline date at which they had to

have ammunition for their training programs. The Post Ordnance Officer would

report every month to his area depot the

amount of ammunition he had on hand,

the issues for the last thirty days, and the

amount he wanted shipped. He would

furnish the desired time for arrival of the

ammunition at the post and the rate at

which he would be able to handle and

store it. The area depot, reviewing the

report, would have authority to ship directly from its stock all less-than-carload

amounts and all items for which there

was an urgent need. The report would

then be forwarded to the Office, Chief of

Ordnance, for supply of the larger quantities, which would be scheduled for ship39

 (1) Calhoun Rpt; (2) Carlisle Rpt; (3) Ltr,

CofOrd to FDAP, 5 Oct 43, sub: Direct Shipments from Loading Plants, ex. 30, Hist, Ammo

Supply Div. 40

 (1) Calhoun Rpt; (2) Smith Rpt; (3) Carlisle Rpt.
436 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ment directly from loading plants whenever

possible.41

Presented to G-4 early in 1944, the

plan ran into serious objections from officers of the Army Ground Forces, who felt

that it gave too much authority to the

Post Ordnance Officer. By giving him control over station stocks of ammunition the

plan would in effect give him control of

training. The AGF counterproposal was to

continue the system by which the Ground

Forces commander ordered what he considered necessary, within the limits of the

local storage and transportation capacity

reported to him by the Ordnance and

Transportation Officers.42

One basic difficulty in this system, admitted by AGF, was that the post authorities were allowed to keep ammunition for

as long as ninety days before they determined whether or not they had an excess.

The period was too long, and when excesses were finally reported to Ground Forces

headquarters, the excess stocks might be

shifted around to various commands for

months. Meantime, troops were moving out

of the camps continuously, often unexpectedly. Ammunition piled up, and the

post authorities had no control over shipments coming in. By 1945, magazine areas

were becoming dangerously overloaded.

An investigation by the Joint Army and

Navy Storage Board made it plain that

some action would have to be taken. Accordingly, an AGF representative met with

representatives of the Ordnance Ammunition Supply Division and agreed upon a

plan that was similar to the one Ordnance

had proposed before, except that the Service Command rather than the Post Ordnance Officer would control excess stocks.

At a later date ASF insisted that the job

be given to the area depot rather than to

the Service Command. As finally worked

out, the plan provided that all requisitions

would be channeled through the depot.

They would be prepared on the tenth of

each month for the requirements beginning

the first of the next month. When the

second month's requisition came in, any

stocks that had not been used in the first

30-day period would apply against the

ammunition required for the second 30-

day period. At the end of sixty days, area

depot officers were authorized to move

excesses back to the depot. To the more

important depots would be assigned two

officers who would travel from post to

post, assisting the Post Ordnance Officer

to remove excesses or to plan for additional

storage if necessary. They were like the

"excess stock teams" used for general supplies.43

Under the constant supervision of Major

Rollins the plan was tested at Red River

Ordnance Depot, Texarkana, Texas. Two

months after it went into effect, a check

of station ammunition stocks indicated

that they had been reduced by 46 percent.

But AGF felt that the new procedures

placed too great a restriction on the flexibility of its credits, and a compromise

plan, proposed in July, was under consideration as the war ended.44

41

 (1) Min, Conf of SC Ord Officers, 28 and

29 Jan 44, pp. 2-4; (2) Min, Ord-SC Conf, 8

-9 May 44, pp. 1-2. 42

 Min, Ord-SC Supply and Maint Conf 16

-17 Feb 45), p. 11, OHF. 43

 (1) Ltr, JANASB to SW and SecNav, 4

Oct 44, sub: Inspection of AGF Installations,

471 JANASB vol. II, G-4 files; (2) Ltr, Col

William M. Cobb to JANASB 1 Nov 44, sub:

Inspection of Ammo Storage at GF Stations, 471

JANASB, vol. III, G-4 files; (3) Ltr, CofOrd

to CG ASF, 25 Jan 45, sub: Plan for Distribution of Training Ammo, and Indorsement. 30 Jan

45. 00471/38578. 44

 (1) Ltr, CofOrd to CG ASF, 23 Feb 45,

sub: Plan for Distribution of Training Ammo,

and Indorsement 27 Feb 45, OO 471/38884: (2)
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 437

Long after V-J Day, training ammunition was still being issued on the wartime

system of monthly credits based on allocations to the various services. Ordnance

supply experts believed that the best plan

for an orderly change-over to peacetime

operation was a revision of AR 775-10 of

30 December 1943, which authorized the

kind and amount of firing required for

training. They recommended that for all

services ammunition be issued on an allowance basis and that expenditure guides for

each service, similar to those used by

AGF beginning in 1944, be included in

the program.45

Return of Excess Stocks from Theaters

A growing problem after 1943 was the

safe and orderly return of excess stocks

from overseas theaters. Such shipments

had to be cleared with ASF for ground

ammunition and AAF for air ammunition.

With a few exceptions, War Department

policy was to return only serviceable ammunition that was definitely known to be

safe for shipping and handling. The

quantities were enormous. Early in August 1944 when both ETOUSA and

NATOUSA expressed a desire to return

excesses there was an estimated total of

1,737,000 tons in both theaters, including

an overage of fifty days of supply. Out of

this amount there were available for distribution 1,570,000 tons, of which 1,085,-

ooo, ground and air, would go to other

theaters. This left for return to the United

States 485,000 tons, all of it ground ammunition.46

The first step was to select the lots of

ammunition that would be retained in the

theater, those that would be transferred

to other theaters, and those that would be

returned to the United States. Over this

step the Ordnance Department had no real

control, because it was the policy of

G-4, General Staff, to permit overseas

theaters to return any lots of ammunition

they desired. But Ordnance could offer

advice and guidance. Field Service prepared lists of all lots that had been

shipped to ETOUSA and to NATOUSA,

reviewed them carefully in co-operation

with Industrial Service, and arranged the

individual lots by caliber and type in the

order of frequency of issue. These lists

were sent to the two theaters to serve as

a guide in the retention, transfer, or return of ammunition. Ordnance also offered

technical assistance on the problem of

safe and efficient handling of excess stocks.

It urged G-4 to reconsider its policy of

not requiring theaters to destroy unserviceable ammunition locally, and emphasized War Department regulations on the

segregation, packing, marking, and safe

storage of explosives and incendiary materials in outgoing shipments.47

Planning for the reception of excess

stocks in the United States began early in

1944 on a directive from ASF stating

Ltr, CofOrd to CG ASF, 2 Jun 45, sub: Plan

for Distribution of Training Ammo, and Indorsement 7 Jun 43, OO 471/40021; (3) Memo, Col

William C. Young to Chief, Staff Rqmts Sec

Admin Br Fld Serv OCO 7 Jan 46 with inclosures, final report of Maj Joseph Rollins Stock

Control Branch Ammunition Supply Division

Field Service for Tour of Duty, 15 July 1942

Through 3 January 1946, in Fld Serv Key Pers

Rpts (hereafter cited as Rollins Rpt) ; (4) Smith

Rpt; (5) History of Red River Ordnance Depot,

vol. IV sec. I (1 Jan-31 Mar 45) pp. 386,

390-91 ; (6) WD Cir 269, 7 Sep 45.

45

 (1) Rollins Rpt; (2) Maj Daniel J. Strauss.

Supplement to Historical Report. . . ,1 Jul 45

to 10 Feb 46, FS Key Pers Rpts. 46

 Hist, Ammo Supply Div, ex. 65. 47

 Hist, Ammo Supply Div, pp. 103-08 and

ex. 65.
438 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

that ports should be used that were not

actively engaged in handling outgoing

shipments. Ordnance recommended Curtis

Bay, near Baltimore; Nansemond, at

Hampton Roads; San Jacinto, Texas; Boston; Charleston; New Orleans; Benicia,

near San Francisco; Seattle; and Beaver

Site at Portland, Oregon. But the Joint

Working Committee Concerning Return of

U.S. Army and U.S. Navy Ammunition

From Overseas, appointed in June 1944,

determined that the Navy would provide

facilities and sorting service at or near

ports on the West Coast and that the

Army would handle East Coast terminals.

The Army was to enlarge Nansemond and

use Charleston for current and continued

receipts and Curtis Bay when outgoing

shipments stopped or decreased materially.48

From the ports, ammunition would be

sent to loading plants for screening. This

process would include segregating by caliber, type, and lot, and necessary renovation to make sure that only the highest

quality ammunition was kept for longterm storage as War Reserve. The final

step was storage in depots. As of August

1944, igloos and magazines in the United

States were only two-thirds filled and could

accommodate more than a million tons of

returned stocks. An expected cutback in

the current production of 600,000 tons

per month would increase the amount of

storage available.49

Beginning in the summer of 1944 the

Ordnance Department worked out several

ways of controlling the flood of stocks that

was expected after the war was over in

Europe. The Ammunition Supply Division

established a system of identification markings for ammunition shipments. Stock controllers also contrived a system of facilitating shipments from port to plant or depot

by using a single shipping order number.

They devised this number by assigning a

series to each port and combining it with

the code number already assigned to each

plant and depot. A shipment from New

York, series 600, to Milan Ordnance

Depot, number 25, would be coded 625.

Co-ordination between port and depot

was furthered by a meeting in Washington

in November 1944 of Port Ordnance Officers with representatives of the depots.

Port Ordnance Officers were instructed to

obtain shipping instructions from the Ammunition Supply Division and after shipment to mail a copy of the shipping order

to the Philadelphia Ammunition Supply

Office for record purposes. At PASO a

Returned Ammunition Unit of two persons was established to keep records, and

the establishment of a purpose code permitted analysis of returns from individual

theaters and the reason for the return.50

In general the ports were co-operative in

obtaining shipping instructions from the

Ordnance Department, though there were

some cases of carelessness in reporting

shipments, as well as some instances of improper identification and segregation. One

Ordnance stock controller felt that segregation centers adjacent to ports would

have saved considerable money in transportation and handling at both ports and

depots.51

The effectiveness of the Ordnance Department's ammunition supply operations

depended on two factors: knowing where

the stocks were and what their condition

was, and being able to deliver them to the

right place at the right time. The main

objectives were to meet deadlines for de48

 Ibid. 49

 Hist, Ammo Supply Div, ex. 65. 50

 (1) Rollins Rpt; (2) Strauss Rpt. 51

 Burroughs Rpt.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY 439

livery and to maintain an accurate record

of all items received from production. In

the opinion of Col. William G. Young,

Chief of the Ammunition Supply Division

from June 1942 to August 1946, the first

objective was well met; the second was

only partially met. The reasons for the

failure to achieve completely accurate

records were many. Some errors crept into

accounting when ammunition had to be

returned to production plants for reworking; others were caused by changes in

procedures for gathering and recording

data, faulty co-ordination between Industrial Service and Field Service, and lack

of enough personnel for the necessary

paper work. Complete adjustment of records was never possible. Yet partial reconciliation was achieved. By reducing the

number of crosshauls and backhauls, and

by developing effective techniques for

making shipments directly from plants to

ports, Ordnance ammunition supply experts contributed notably to the war

effort.52

52

 (1) Final Rpt of Col William C. Young, 20

Aug 46, FS Key Pers Rpts; (2) PSP 64, exs.

79-84.
CHAPTER XXII

Maintenance

In the hot sun of a September day in

1921 the people of Columbia, South Carolina, witnessed the beginning of an interesting experiment in Army mechanization

and mobility. The 51st Artillery Regiment

(heavy) was setting out on a march from

neighboring Camp Jackson to Camp Eustis, Virginia, six hundred miles away, the

first long journey overland ever made by

a heavy motorized artillery regiment under

its own power.

The convoy was an impressive spectacle.

Rumbling and clanking through the

streets of Columbia were sixteen pieces of

heavy ordnance: eight 8-inch howitzers

and eight 155-mm. GPF (Grande Puissance Filloux) guns, each towed by a 10--ton tractor. There were twenty-one add

tional tractors—more than half of them

10-ton types—and 240 trucks carrying

tentage, equipment of all kinds, machinery for repair work, and spare parts. Accompanying the artillerists was a detachment of Engineers to repair roads and

bridges and an Ordnance company to keep

the guns, howitzers, tractors, and trucks in

running order. As the great procession

ponderously moved north on the long

journey, much of it over narrow dirt

roads in a cloud of dust, farmers along the

way stared and wondered. Some thought

another war had broken out. Most of

them had never before seen guns of such

size or troops of the Regular Army.

At night, when the regiment halted near

a small town, country people would gather

around the Ordnance shop, attracted by

the blaze of light and whir of machinery.

In the middle of a cleared field stood an

artillery repair truck—itself a complete

machine shop—and from its generator

electric lights on extension cords ran to

each job. Near it were parked some of the

thirteen Ordnance trucks in the convoy,

containing tentage and baggage for the

company, blacksmith's tools, light tools for

truck repair, chain blocks and ropes, and

spare parts. For the latter there was also

a huge stock-bin trailer drawn by a l0-ton

tractor. The spectators—marveling at a

machine shop on wheels, a soldier working

at an anvil, another skillfully using an

acetylene torch—saw tractors with the

whole transmission out or with the armor

removed and engine totally dismantled.

They freely expressed doubt that the regiment would be able to reach Camp

Eustis before Christmas.

Exactly one month and ten days after

leaving Camp Jackson the convoy rolled

into Camp Eustis, on the afternoon of 22

October 1921, with all wheels turning, and

all vehicles still in the line of march, not

one having been abandoned. The Ordnance Department's maintenance experts

in Washington, who had followed the

progress of the march with even more interest than the farmers, were extremely
MAINTENANCE 441

CONVOY OF ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE TRUCKS on maneuvers shortly after World War I.

gratified. The march had been in a sense a

test of the ability of Field Service—an

organization then less than three years

old—to serve the using arms; and its successful conclusion had vindicated maintenance planning that had begun in World

War I.1

Mobile repair shops, first improvised on

the Mexican border in 1916, had been

used by the AEF, but in France only the

Field Artillery brigade had rated an Ordnance company. The Infantry depended

on the small arms section of that company

and, for first aid repairs, on small detachments of three or four men that were

often called on to perform duties other

than their specialty. In one case Ordnance men washed the trucks of the ammunition train because the train commander ordered them to do so.2

The first thoughtful organization of

Ordnance maintenance specialists, trained

and supplied by the Ordnance Department, came into being as a result of study

by the board of officers appointed by the

chief Ordnance officer of the AEF, Brig.

Gen. John Rice, in France immediately

after World War I.3 In addition to fixed

base shops in the rear of the army in the

field, the planners envisaged two types of

maintenance companies, the light maintenance company to accompany the division, and the heavy maintenance company

at corps and army level. These performed

to the limit of the capability of their

equipment and the amount of time available all field repair that the individual infantryman or truck-driver could not do for

1

 Capt. James A. B. Gibson, CO 32nd Ordnance

Company, "Ordnance Maintenance En Route,"

Army Ordnance, II, No. 11 (March-April 1922),

266-69. 2

 Interv, Crain, 17 Feb 54. 3

 See Ch. XVI, above.
442 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

himself.4 The companies were placed directly under the commanding officer of

the line organization. Also under the command of the line was the Ordnance

officer attached to the staff of the camp,

division, corps, and army commander. He

exercised technical supervision over the

maintenance troops, was the adviser on

Ordnance matters to his commander, and

in general was responsible for efficient

Ordnance operations in the field.5

The maintenance responsibility of the

Ordnance Department had two aspects.

Maintenance engineering, closely allied

with design and production, meant the

analysis of new design with an eye to

maintenance, the preparation of Modification Work Orders (MWO's) for the correction of defects, the determination of

requirements for parts, tools, and equipment, the preparation of publications, and

various kinds of planning. Maintenance

operations meant technical help to the

shops and troops that were under the

command of the using arms, and the operation of arsenals and base shops under

the direct orders of the Chief of Ordnance.6

Maintenance at the Arsenals

Following World War I, there had to be

a general overhaul of the Ordnance ma tériel- returned from France, about 75

percent of which was in such bad condition that it could not be issued to troops.

This work was done at the arsenals. Rock

Island Arsenal, for example, performed an

enormous amount of work on artillery

materiel, tanks, and tractors, with assistance from special shops organized at

Camp Meade, Savanna Proving Ground,

and Erie Proving Ground.7 In 1924 the

Ordnance Department spent $309,655 for

maintaining in storage matériel worth

about $500 million, exclusive of ammunition, a figure comparable to the $471,355

spent on matériel in the hands of troops.

The life in storage of many weapons was

almost unlimited.8

A continual arsenal task was modification of equipment. On the march from

Camp Jackson to Camp Eustis in 1921

the Ordnance troops kept a detailed list of

all classes of repairs made to tractors and

other motor vehicles and submitted it to

the Ordnance Maintenance Division in

Washington. From such a list Ordnance

engineers could tell which parts of the

mechanism gave trouble, and often were

able to correct malfunctions by a change

in design. In that case, Field Service prepared Modification Work Orders that applied to all matériel of that particular

kind. Experience in the field was also useful in preparing spare parts data. Tables

showing parts consumption on a mileage

basis were invaluable in estimating the

4

 (1) Harmon, "Ordnance Maintenance,"

Army Ordnance, I, No. 4 (January-March 1921),

167-73; (2) C. A. Schimelfenig, "Ordnance

Service Stations," Army Ordnance, II. No. 11

(March-April 1922), 260-62. 5

 (1) Manual of 1919, pp. 14-31; (2) Fred A.

McMahon, "Maintenance Activities at Camp

Bragg," Army Ordnance, II, No. 11 (MarchApril 1922), 273-74; (3) Maj. Harry R. Kutz.

"Corps Area and Department Ordnance Officers,"

Army Ordnance, II, No. 11 (March-April 1922),

279-84. 6

 History of the Maintenance Division, OCO-D,

1942-45, exs. to General History—Plan for the

Rearrangement of Automotive Maint Activities,

17 Nov 42. 7

 Harmon, op. cit., pp. 172-73. 8

 (1) Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams, "Annual

Report of the Chief of Ordnance, Part II,"

Army Ordnance, V, No. 29 (March-April 1925),

729-34; (2) Survey of the Ord Dept, 20 Sep 29,

Incl. 6, Survey of Depots and Excess Supplies,

320/377 NA.
MAINTENANCE 443

number of parts that would be needed for

a similar operation in the future.9

Ordnance planners were aware that

overhaul at arsenals was expensive. Peacetime maintenance could be done more

economically and efficiently by civilian

mechanics in commercial repair shops.

Many commanders preferred to have work

done locally to save the cost of transporting the matériel to and from an arsenal

and to avoid loss of the weapons for a

long period. Yet the advantage of having

arsenal maintenance facilities ready to back

up corps area and field maintenance facilities in time of war outweighed considerations of economy or convenience.10

An example of the peacetime work of an

Ordnance maintenance company stationed

at an arsenal is afforded by the 33rd Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance), at

Rock Island Arsenal, organized 11 April

1921 from the Ordnance detachment at

the Arsenal. Its peacetime strength was 2

officers and about no enlisted men. The

only company at the Arsenal, it was comfortably quartered in stone barracks with

excellent recreational facilities, including a

large ballroom; for its mess it maintained

a garden and some fine Holstein cattle.

The men of the company's Automotive,

Artillery, and Small Arms Sections were

experts in the repair and upkeep of their

own types of materiel; those in the

Service Section were machinists, welders,

blacksmiths, saddlers, painters, carpenters,

and electricians.

The company not only worked on the

matériel stored at the Arsenal but furnished maintenance service to the Fifth,

Sixth, and Seventh Corps Areas, at whose

various stations thirty-seven men of the

33rd Ordnance Company were on detached duty throughout the year. During

the summer training season the company

took to the field, leaving only a handful

of men at Rock Island. At the training

camps of the three Corps Areas they

checked matériel in the hands of troops;

repaired, replaced, and issued all necessary Ordnance stores and equipment; and

at the close of camp prepared the stores

and equipment for winter storage. When

the company moved into the field, its

rolling equipment included thirty-four

trucks, of which nine were for artillery

repair, two for light repair, two for equipment repair, and six for spare parts; the

rest contained baggage, a toolroom, a

power saw, an office, and other cargo.

There were thirteen trailers, seven carrying various types of maintenance tools and

equipment, five carrying parts, and one

containing a kitchen.11

Reorganization of Men and Equipment

The Ramsey Board appointed in December 1936 to study Ordnance manufacturing and storage facilities in the United

States also reviewed Ordnance maintenance facilities "to determine whether in

the main such facilities should be concentrated at a few of the manufacturing

arsenals and depots or more widely divided

9

 (1) Gibson, "Ordnance Maintenance En

Route," Army Ordnance, II, No. 11, (MarchApril 1922), 268; (2) Ord FS Bull 5-1, 2 Jan

30, sub: Field Service Modification Work Orders

Method; (3) Ord FS Bull 4-2, 11 Aug 41, sub:

Spare Parts and Tools. 10

 (1) Report of Board of Officers to Prepare

Secret Plan Embodying an Ideal Set-Up for

Ordnance Manufacturing and Storage Facilities

in the United States, 15 Apr 37 [hereafter cited

as Ramsey Bd Rpt], OO 682/1499, copy in Site

Bd Rpts, ex. 20; (2) History, Augusta Arsenal,

I, Through December 1942, p. 198, OHF. 11

 George W. Outland, "The 33rd Ordnance

Company, Rock Island Arsenal," Army Ordnance,

V, No. 28 (January-February 1925), 658-60.
444 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

among field establishments as seems to be

the tendency at present."

 12

 The members

of the board decided that existing policies

were generally sound and should be continued, but observed that maintenance

companies attached to line organizations

were prone to use more elaborate machinetool equipment than was necessary, thus

turning their organizations into semipermanent shops that could not be carried

efficiently into the field.

The question came up again in the

summer of 1937 following tests in Texas of

the new "streamlined" Infantry division.

The 3-truck Ordnance shop authorized in

1935, composed of 2-1/2-ton trucks,

seemed to the using arms excessively heavy

and bulky, and there was some talk of

eliminating it. Ordnance officers disagreed.

They considered machine-shop and welding equipment essential, for it was impossible to carry an inexhaustible supply of

parts, even if they were available. Parts

had to be improvised at times; frequently

the parts on hand had to be machined or

welded to fit them into the mechanism

where they were needed. The answer to

the problem of mobility was to simplify

and reduce the equipment of the machineshop and welding units. This effort, which

continued throughout the thirties, was

aided by such commercial developments as

the power take-off that permitted the

truck engine to power the generator. In

addition to shop trucks, Ordnance companies in the prewar years carried two

other types of automotive equipment:

trucks for spare parts, and roving emergency trucks for repairing matériel in

place whenever possible.13

Along with equipment, Ordnance studied the question of the number of men

and amount of time required for maintenance in the 1937 tests. It was from these

tests that plans grew for the new triangular

division. The aim was to create a mobile,

hard-hitting division with a minimum of

noncombat troops. One means of reducing

nontactical overhead was to draw more

heavily than before on higher headquarters for logistical support.14

 Yet demands

for maintenance were sure to increase,

because more mobility meant more mechanization, and greater firepower meant

wider use of automatic weapons.

If Ordnance personnel with the triangular division were reduced, the Ordnance

organization at corps level, upon which the

division would draw, would have to be

strengthened. One means of making the

most of available personnel had been observed in World War I by Col. James K.

Crain, who was Ordnance Officer of the

Eighth Corps Area from 1934 to 1939 and

later became the first wartime Chief of

Field Service. In France he had observed

that the French Eleventh Corps put all

ordnance companies of the corps in one

place to serve as a pool to support all

division and corps troops; in this way the

workload was kept even and there were

seldom any idle mechanics. This gave him

the idea for an Ordnance battalion.15

The planners shaping the new division

moved the Ordnance maintenance companies out of the division and placed them

as corps troops to form a battalion under

centralized control. Each division retained

12

 Ramsey Bd Rpt. 13

 (1) Lt. Col. Donald Armstrong, "To Keep

the Guns Firing: Equipment of the Modern

Ordnance Maintenance Company," Army Ordnance, XX, No. 116 (September-October 1939),

84-88; (2) History of the Field Service Maintenance Division, vol. I, From July 1939 to December 1941 [hereafter cited as Hist, Maint Div,

I], pp. 48-49, OHF. 14

 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 271-76, 15

 Interv, Crain, 17 Feb 54.
MAINTENANCE 445

only a small Ordnance section composed of

one officer and sixteen enlisted men. This

new organization promised to promote

efficiency as well as economy in manpower.

By pooling Ordnance field personnel in as

large an organization as was practicable,

Ordnance planners believed that the full

force of the maintenance organization

could be exerted where maintenance was

most needed. The load of spare parts of

any company became a potential reserve

for any other company; the mechanic

who specialized in a certain type of maintenance became available to other companies. There would be greater economy

in tools, since a single tool of a certain

type might serve the entire battalion.16

The new Ordnance battalion, consisting of three medium-maintenance companies and one ammunition company, was

attached to the IV Corps, and it was

commanded by the Corps Ordnance Officer. Tested in the April-May 1940 exercises of the Third Army, it performed well.

Continuing study of this new organization

indicated that the battalions should be of

several types. By February 1941 five types

had been evolved: (1) Maintenance, attached to corps and consisting of three

medium - maintenance companies; (2)

Maintenance and Supply, attached to

armies and consisting of two or more

medium-maintenance companies, an Ordnance depot company, and sometimes a

heavy-maintenance company; (3) Ammunition, attached to armies and consisting

of two or more ammunition companies;

(4) Armored, attached to general headquarters of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions; and (5) Aviation, located at air

bases.17

Ordnance officers who participated in

the 1940-41 maneuvers studied several

ways of using the battalion to best advantage. Some advocated specializing the

companies, that is, having an artillery

company, an automotive company, and

so on. But this conflicted with the concept

of the company as a balanced maintenance team to support a rapidly moving

tactical unit. Planners tried the consolidated corps Ordnance shop, in which like

sections of the different companies, such as

artillery sections, were grouped together

under the senior section officer. Friction

developed between the different groups,

and it was difficult for the men to work

under a system that involved dual command, that of the company officer and the

shop officer; also, there was confusion in

going from shop formation to company

formation for the march and back again.

For these reasons, in the Carolina maneuvers of 1941 the companies operated

their own sections. The consolidated-shop

system did have the merit of combining

the tools, parts, and manpower resources of

the companies; some officers believed that

this functional as opposed to tactical organization would be preferable under

actual combat conditions.

In the 1941 maneuvers the Ordnance

maintenance battalion worked satisfactorily. For Ordnance companies it provided

a parent organization, the battalion headquarters, that knew and understood their

problems and relieved them of difficult

housekeeping problems. It made "a family

16

 (1) Speech, Brig Gen Edward E. MacMorland, Weapon Maintenance in Battle, OCO

Maint Div, vol. 100, pp. 8-9, OHF; (2) Colby

(Comdr, Ord Bn, Fourth Army Corps), "The

New Ordnance Battalion: Maintenance and Supply in the Streamlined Division," Army Ordnance,

XXI, No. 123 (November-December 1940), 208. 17

 Ordnance Sergeant, I, No. 2 (February

1941), 65-66, and No. 6 (June 1941), 254-56;

II, No. 3 (September 1941) 170-71, and No. 4

(October 1941), 202-12.
446 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

TRUCKS OF NEWLY FORMED ORDNANCE BATTALION at the April-May 1940 exercises

of the Third Army.

of a group of orphans"18 The observers

considered command of the battalion by

the corps Ordnance officer to be a distinct

advantage because it provided a close

working arrangement between all Ordnance units and with the corps general

staff.

The equipment of an Ordnance battalion was considerable: 3 artillery-repair

trucks, 3 automotive-repair trucks, 32

emergency-repair trucks, 2 instrumentrepair trucks, 3 major shop trucks, 5

small-arms repair trucks, 20 small-parts

trucks, 3 tank-maintenance trucks, 3 tooland-bench trucks, 5 welding trucks, nine

l0-ton wrecking trucks, 2 sedans, 12

motorcycles, 1 water trailer carrying 250

gallons, 6 motor tricycles, 4 half-ton command trucks, one 1-1/2-ton cargo truck,

forty nine 2-1/2-ton cargo trucks, and

three 600-gallon gas-and-oil trucks. There

were also 6 scout cars with armament, including light and heavy machine guns,

submachine guns, and automatic pistols.19

In 1942, when the planning for offensive action made it plain that the most

economical use would have to be made of

all available manpower and every ship-ton,

Army Ground Forces concluded that

economy could best be achieved by a

18

 (1) Lt. Col. L. Monroe Bricker, Corps Ord

Officer, IV Army Corps, "Ordnance in the

Field: Maintenance and Supply in the IV Army

Corps During Maneuvers," Army Ordnance,

XXII, No. 132 (May-June 1942), 967; (2)

Greenfield, Palmer, Wiley, The Organization of

Ground Combat Troops, pp. 357-58. 19

 "Professional Digest," Army Ordnance, XXII,

No. 129 (1941), 411. See also schematic drawing

of the vehicles of Ordnance maintenance companies, Army Ordnance, XXI, No. 124 (January

-February 1941) facing p. 364.
MAINTENANCE 447

further process of streamlining and pooling. This time the streamlining—in the

sense of limiting a unit organically to what

it needed at all times and not just occasionally—was applied to the corps,

which General McNair considered to be a

tactical, combat unit; and the pooling, in

the sense of massing units under higher

headquarters for servicing of lower commands when needed, took place at army

level. The idea was that the army was

both a combat and an administrative

agency, the corps a combat agency only,

unless it was operating independently, in

which case it would be reinforced to function as a small army. Thus, in the reorganization that took place in the summer

of 1943, the maintenance battalions attached to IV, VIII, and X Corps in the

United States became a part of. the Third

Army troops.20

Overseas a new type of Ordnance organization had already taken shape. In

North Africa in the late fall of 1942 Col.

Urban Niblo, Ordnance Officer of II

Corps, organized provisionally an Ordnance Group consisting of several battalions. It was more flexible than a regiment,

for battalions could be added to it or

detached from it as the situation demanded. It was so successful that several

groups for operations at army level became

the accepted practice throughout the war.

By April 1944 the Ordnance Group had a

Table of Organization and Equipment.

Going a step further, Niblo and others

advocated an Ordnance brigade to control

the groups, but this proposal failed to win

approval.21

There was a brief experience with regimental organization. In 1941 General

Crain foresaw the need for a new type of

unit to operate the large supply bases

that would be required overseas. When

the General Staff called for recommendations for overseas units in early 1942, he

recommended the organization of Ordnance regiments, and his plan was approved.22

 During 1942 four regiments, the

301st, 302d, 303d, and 304th, were activated, and the 305th was partially activated. Recruited with the aid of commercial organizations such as the National

Automobile Dealers Association, they were

known as affiliated units. These units were

experimental; their recruitment, training,

and use in the field presented problems

that were never entirely solved.23 ASF

maintenance experts believed that more

effective service was obtained from smaller

and more flexible units. In the spring of

1943 the five Ordnance regiments were

reorganized into individual, numerically

designated Ordnance Base Armament

Maintenance Battalions; the battalions of

the original regiments became companies.24

20

 Greenfield, Palmer, Wiley, The Organization

of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 364-71 and 375

-76.

21

 (1) Mayo, The Ordnance Department:

Ordnance Overseas; (2) Greenfield, Palmer, and

Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat

Troops, pp. 357-59. 22

 Maj. Gen. James K. Crain, "Ordnance in

the Field," Ordnance, XXXIX, No. 206 (September-October 1954), 329. General Crain also

wanted an Ordnance brigade consisting of two

regiments—one Ammunition, one Maintenance

and Supply—but could not obtain General Staff

approval for it. 23

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, ch. V; (2) Memo, CG ASF for

CG SOS Through CofOrd, 9 May 42 and 1st

Indorsement, 16 May 42, OO 320.2/1759; (3)

Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell to Senator D.

Worth Clark, 11 Jul 42, OO 320.2/2129; (4)

Memo, Brig Gen Julian S. Hatcher for Brig Gen

James Kirk, 22 Sep 42, sub: Training of Ord

Base Regiments, OO 322.1/414; (5) History,

Troop Units Reports, 301st Ordnance Regiment,

OHF. 24

 Ann Rpt ASF for FY 1943.
448 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

An important part of the reorganization

for war that took place in the late 1930's

was the effort to obtain better grades and

ratings for Ordnance enlisted men. Pay

had been so low that skilled mechanics to

repair the increasingly complicated ma tériel- could not be recruited. A General

Staff survey in 1929 found Ordnance

personnel inadequate for work in the field,

and as late as FY 1938 approximately 90

percent of the maintenance funds allotted

to Ordnance officers of corps areas, departments, and exempted stations went to

pay the salaries of civilian mechanics.25

As the Air Corps began to expand, it

attracted many of the best Ordnance enlisted men. But in the summer of 1940

General Crain managed to get much more

liberal Tables of Organization, and by 1941

Ordnance grades and ratings were second

only to those of the Air Corps.26

The Echelon System

The Army assigned responsibility for

maintenance in the field according to the

skill and tools available at various levels.

The individual soldier was responsible for

the proper care of his rifle, truck, or other

equipment and for such minor repairs as he

was able to make; the company mechanic

made the slightly more difficult repairs

that he could accomplish with his limited

tools. The work that the using organization did not have the tools or parts to do

was turned over to Ordnance specialists

in the field. The Ordnance men could perform a considerable amount of repair, but

could not be so loaded down with tools

and spare parts that they could not accompany the tactical unit to which they

were assigned. Therefore, for everything

beyond their capabilities—major overhaul

or complete rebuild—the weapon or truck

was sent to a base shop, manufacturing

arsenal, or Ordnance depot.

Sometime in the 1930's the term echelon

came into use to describe these levels of

maintenance. The work performed by the

line organization was first echelon; that

done by the Ordnance maintenance companies was second echelon; and that in the

rear was third echelon.27 A study of

maintenance problems in 1941 suggested

the possibility that more echelons might

be needed. The Motor Transport Service,

before it was transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance in midsummer of 1942, had four echelons: the first

performed by the drivers; the second by

company, battalion, and regimental mechanics, who made inspections and the

necessary mechanical adjustments in

time to prevent failures; the third by units

trained to make minor repairs, replace engines, and supply parts; and the fourth

by semimobile or fixed shops that took care

of major repairs, general overhaul, reclamation, and supply.28

Ordnance maintenance planners devised

a 5-echelon system. The two types of

25

 (1) Survey of the Ord Dept, 20 Sep 29,

Incl. 13 to Ltr, SW to All Chiefs of Branches

and Burs, 1 Aug 29, sub: Spec Survey of the

Mil Establishment; (2) WD OCO Annual Summary, Ordnance Digest of Activities, Including a

Summary of Principal Operations Fiscal Year

1938, OHF; (3) Lecture, Maj Gen Charles M.

Wesson, Operations of the Ordnance Depanment, 12 Nov 38, Army War College, p. 14, OHF. 26

 (1) Crain, Diary, 27 Jun 49, OHF; (2) Interv with Maj Gen James K. Crain, 30 Jun 49,

OHF. 27

 (1) Hist, FS Maint Div, vol. II, History

From 7 December 1941 to December 1942 [hereafter referred to as Hist, Maint Div, II], p. 40:

(2) Ramsey Bd Rpt, pp. 33-37; (3) 2d Indorsement, (Memo, SW for CofS, 8 Dec 36, sub:

Location of Government Mfg Plants). CofOrd to

TAG, 6 May 37, AG 381 National Defense, copy

in Site Bd Rpts. 28

 Hertz Rpt.
MAINTENANCE 449

simple maintenance performed by the

using organization—the individual or the

regiment, battalion, company, or detachment—were labeled first and second echelon. That accomplished by Ordnance

troops was now divided into two categories,

third echelon and fourth echelon. Third

echelon, sometimes called medium maintenance, was done in mobile shops, in close

support of using troops. Soldier mechanics

at this level took care of the overflow from

lower echelons, replaced assemblies such as

recoil mechanisms, engines, and transmissions, and supplied parts to the lower

echelons. Fourth echelon, commonly referred to as heavy maintenance when armament work was meant, was done in fixed

and semifixed shops serving a specific geographic area. Its major function was the

rebuilding of major items by using serviceable assemblies and subassemblies that

were in stock or could be obtained by

cannibalization. Fifth echelon maintenance, performed at an arsenal or base

shop, was the highest level and consisted

of completely reconditioning or rebuilding

materiel, and, to a limited extent, manufacturing parts and assemblies. The work

in the first and second echelon class was

known as organization maintenance; that

of the third, fourth, and fifth echelons

was service maintenance.29

The echelon system required that the

various repair operations be definitely allocated to certain persons in preestablished places; the guiding principle

was that repair would be performed in the

lowest echelon of maintenance consistent

with the availability of suitable tools and

necessary parts, the capabilities of personnel, the time available, and the tactical

situation. Constant supervision was necessary to be sure that the work was done

at the right echelon.

Every energetic shop commander of

whatever echelon wanted to undertake all

work employing existing skills of his men.

This meant demands for tools, parts, and

supplies beyond their tables of equipment

and the capability of Field Service to

supply. Sometimes a third echelon company, well dug-in at a permanent post,

forgot that it would some day have to

take the field and, consequently, accumulated more heavy items than it could transport.30

 Deviations from the echelon levels

were permitted, but only in emergencies.

A third echelon Ordnance company, for

example, might perform first and second

echelon work for exhausted combat troops

or might provide fourth echelon maintenance for a new division whose station

shop facilities were not ready for operation.31

ASF maintenance experts considered

Ordnance too inflexible in its adherence to

the echelon system. They felt that the field

organization at the top would have been

more effective if it had made more allowance for circumstances in which a heavy

maintenance company, for example, might

have to take on some of the work of a

medium maintenance company. They also

disliked the too-rigid compartmentation of

fourth and fifth echelon work, arguing

29

 (1) AR 850-15, 6 Oct 42; (2) Hist, Maint

Div, II, pp. 44-45; (3) Draft MS, George R.

Powell, U.S. Army in World War II, Statistics:

Maintenance, 16 Jan 50 [hereafter cited as

Powell MS], p. 2, OHF; (3) ASF Staff School

Presentation, Maintenance Policies and Procedures, 23-24 May 44 [hereafter cited as ASF

Presentation], pp. 5-6, 28 in 337 Confs 1944,

ASF Maint Div files. 30

 Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, 10 Dec. 54,

OHF. 31

 (1) ASF Presentation, p. 33; (2) "Who Does

What and Why and When? or, Those Exasperating Echelons of Maintenance," The Ordnance

Sergeant, V (February 1943), 142.
450 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

that a good mechanic could do either;

they maintained that, if a fourth echelon

shop could do fifth echelon work efficiently, it ought to be permitted to do so.32

There were also differences of opinion on

the subject within Ordnance. General

MacMorland believed that the lessons of

the war had indicated that only three

echelons were necessary—organizational,

field, and base.33 General Niblo believed

that the five-echelon system was excellent

and declared that, "No effort should be

made to change this to such terms as

organizational, field and base."

 34

Problems of Automotive Maintenance

The transfer to Ordnance of the

Quartermaster Motor Transport Service

brought a staggering maintenance task. In

the peak war years 1944-45, the repair

and overhaul of automotive equipment accounted for more than 75 percent of the

total man-hours spent on the maintenance

of Ordnance materiel.35 More than a

million transport vehicles were transferred

to Ordnance in 1942. The magnitude of

the maintenance problem is suggested by

the fact that there were thirty-seven different makes of cars and trucks; and over

three hundred different models.30

The automotive maintenance problem

was of long standing. Shortly before Pearl

Harbor, Secretary of War Stimson, in forwarding a report on motor transportation

to the Chief of Staff, observed, "Our

motor transport maintenance system ought

to be the best in the world because our

people are the best natural mechanicians";

but the report revealed that both the vehicles and the maintenance facilities were

in bad condition.37 In the eighteen months

before Pearl Harbor, Army vehicles had

increased from a few thousand of the

simple, 2-wheel-drive type to more than

two hundred thousand highly complicated

4-wheel- and 6-wheel-drive types. Because

of the rapid expansion of the Army, these

vehicles had been entrusted to young, often

irresponsible drivers, commanded by inexperienced officers who sometimes did not

even require that their drivers have

operators' licenses. Few officers had adequate mechanical training or background

in automotive shop work and parts supply,

and this disadvantage, aggravated by lack

of centralized control, accounted in large

part for the poor condition of maintenance

facilities.38

Ordnance planners looked at the new

motor vehicle problems not only from the

standpoint of maintenance operations, but

also that of maintenance engineering. In

the weeks following the acquisition of

motor transport, poor co-ordination between the various branches of the Ordnance Department delayed the issuance

of Modification Work Orders, the dissemination of technical publications, and the

receipt of information on the development

of new items. Often by the time maintenance information on new projects was

received, it was too late to apply it, as the

vehicle was already in production. The

remedy was found in decentralization. In

late September 1942 the Chief of Ordnance

transferred the Technical Unit of the

32

 Interv with Maj Gen Frank A. Heileman, 1

Sep 54. 33

 Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, 10 Dec 54. 34

 Ordnance Lessons Learned in the U.S.-U.K.

-and MTOUSA by Brig Gen Urban Niblo, Incl

1 to Ltr, Niblo to CofOrd 27 May 46. sub:

Personal Ord Lessons Learned . . . During World

War II, OHF. 35

 Powell MS, pp. 9, 16, 28. 36

 Hist, Maint Div, II, p. 50. 37

 Memo, SW for CofS, 22 Nov 41, QM 451

E (Maint), copy in Hertz Rpt folder. 38

 Hertz Rpt.
MAINTENANCE 451

Maintenance Branch, along with the rest

of the Automotive Section, to the new

Tank-Automotive Center in Detroit; and

within a short time this decentralization

made it possible to expedite MWO's and

other actions requiring co-ordination.39

One of the earliest maintenance engineering tasks was that of preparing for

combat landings. This entailed modification of existing vehicles so that they could

ford deep water, and improvement of the

design of new vehicles such as the amphibian truck (Dukw). The issuance of new

or modified vehicles required a program

for acquainting the users with their characteristics by sending teams of specialists

into the field and publishing new Standard

Nomenclature Lists.40

For repair work on automotive matériel

in the field, the Ordnance Light Maintenance Company was made organic in the

division. Most automotive repairs had to

be made by the troops, for no Ordnance

company, General McNair realized, could

"even make a dent in the trucks of a

division."

 41

 But the light maintenance

company could often take care of the

broken down vehicles that would otherwise have had to be sent rearward to

army shops. This was a great advantage

in combat, as it meant that the division

kept control of its equipment. And it

illustrated the tendency to push as many

repairs as possible forward to line units.42

General McNair intended the maintenance company in an armored, motorized,

cavalry, mountain, or airborne division to

make the division self-sufficient for a short

period of time, that of the infantry division to provide only a part of the necessary third echelon maintenance. The infantry division generally, and other divisions occasionally, would have to be reinforced by the services of nondivisional

medium maintenance units under army

(or corps) control. In combat, beginning

in North Africa, it was usual for line

divisions to be backed up by additional

third echelon companies.43

The Preventive Maintenance Program

In the fall of 1941 a spot check of

about one-third of the motor vehicles of

five divisions, made by a group of mechanics under the control of The Inspector General, showed that 47 percent of the

vehicles were improperly lubricated, 50

percent had distributors loose or dirty and

points badly burned, 49 percent had loose

steering gear housings, 53 percent had

underinflated tires, 23 percent had improper wheel alignment, 36 percent had

dry batteries, and 37 percent had tires

that were badly worn, cupped, and improperly mounted. There was no reason to

believe that this discovery did not represent

average conditions throughout the Army;

and it was plain that the conditions were

mainly the fault of careless drivers.44 The

Quartermaster General was inclined to

39

 (1) OCO-D Hist, Maint Div, pt. 1, vol. 22,

sec., Parts Requirements Unit; (2) OCO FS

Maint Div, PSP 57, Maintenance Facilities, Personnel, Equipment and Supplies, Jun 45, p. 15,

OHF; (3) Capt. H. Durst, III, Final Rpt, OCO

-D Key Pers Rpts. 40

 (1) PSP 57, pp. 16-30; (2) ASF Presentation, pp. 1-11; (3) FS Ann Rpts, Jul 42, p. 9,

OHF; (4) MS, C. W. Spooner, Fording and

Floating Equipment (Record of Army Ordnance

Research and Development) and booklet, The

Adaptation of Standard Combat Vehicles to Amphibious Operations, both in OHF. 41

 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, p. 310. 42

 Ibid.

43

 (1) Ltr, McNair to CG's Second and Third

Armies, and Others, 5 Dec 42, sub: Ord Maint,

AGF files 400.402/-GNGDS; (2) Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, 10 Dec 54. 44

 Hertz Rpt.
452 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

blame the unit commanders for not enforcing stricter maintenance discipline,

and concluded: "When unit commanders

realize that a motor vehicle is a fighting

weapon, the greater part of motor transport problems will be solved."

 45

The Quartermaster Corps was sending

to the troops preventive maintenance material, including a monthly publication

called Army Motors, and on the recommendation of the Hertz Committee, appointed by the Undersecretary of War to

study motor maintenance, had tested with

some success a program for using civilian

automotive experts as instructors in the

field. But no standard procedures for preventive maintenance had been evolved by

the War Department, and the civilian adviser program was scarcely out of the

embryo stage.46

Preventive maintenance had long been a

subject of concern to Ordnance Field

Service47 and it received concentrated attention after the assignment of motor

vehicle responsibility. In August 1942 Field

Service organized a Preventive Maintenance Section and placed under it a unit

to handle the Civilian Automotive Advisor

Program; a maintenance engineering unit

was charged with the preparation of standard preventive maintenance procedures

and with the publication of Army Motors

and technical manuals.

The men directing the Civilian Automotive Advisor Program devoted their first

efforts to recruiting better qualified advisers and then to giving them more

thorough indoctrination in Army procedures than had before been possible. The

unit also prepared a booklet to guide them

and provided better supervision in (he

field. By July 1943 these civilians, whose

numbers had increased from six hundred

to about sixteen hundred, were working

constantly with the troops on preventive

maintenance and were instructing officers

as well as enlisted men.48

The civilian advisers were recruited with

the assistance of several hundred transportation and maintenance executives

throughout the country, who located, interviewed, classified, and recommended

applicants. Qualifications were rigid: the

men had to have wide experience either

as fleet superintendents, maintenance managers, shop foremen, service managers, or

mechanics. There were several advantages

to retaining them as civilians rather than

commissioning them as officers. Under

Civil Service their appointments could be

effective immediately; age or slight physical disability was no barrier; and as

civilians they did not have to accompany

their assigned units into combat areas, but

could be reassigned to train newly activated units.49

Automotive advisers were not at first

authorized to accompany units leaving the

United States, but the theater commanders began to request them in 1943,

after the landings in North Africa. In

March 1944 the War Department made

45

 OQMG, Comments on the Rpt on Motor

Vehicle Maint by Hertz, Hertz Rpt folder. 46

 (1) Hertz Rpt; (2) OCO-D Hist, Maint

Div, pt. 1, vol. 22, Summary of Activities of

Preventive Maintenance Section (Prior to 1 January 1943) [hereafter cited as OCO-D Preventive Maint Summary], pp. 25-26. 47

 Capt. George H. Schoenbaum, "Lubrication:

The Essence of Ordnance Operation and Maintenance," Army Ordnance, XXII. No. 129 (November-December 1941), 393. 48

 (1) OCO-D Preventive Maint Summary, pp.

25-28; (2) Ann Rpt FS FY 1943, p. 13: (2)

Report on the Army July 1, 1939 to June 30,

1943: Biennial Reports of General George C.

Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States

Army to the Secretary of War (Washington.

1943), p. 108. 49

 Hist. Maint Div. II, pp. 66-68.
MAINTENANCE 453

them available for overseas duty upon request of the theater commanders, but

proportionately few went overseas. As of

11 September 1945 there were 61 in the

ETO, 34 in the Pacific Ocean Area, 2 in

the African Middle East Theater, and 1

in India-Burma.50 Ordnance officers connected with the program felt that the

central authority to co-ordinate and supervise it, which was given to the Chief of

Ordnance in October 1943, might better

have been issued at the beginning.51 The

program was delayed because of inability

to obtain qualified men, but Maintenance

Division experts felt that it was of "immeasurable value" in the earlier stages of

the war. After Ordnance had had time to

train its own people in automotive problems, the need for civilian advisers lessened.52

Ordnance took other steps to promote

preventive maintenance. In November

1942 maintenance planners requested AAF

and AGF officers to join them in forming

a Preventive Maintenance Board to act as

a clearing house for procedure and techniques, to co-ordinate training, and to

standardize forms. At the same time General Campbell requested the aid of the

Society of Automotive Engineers, which

had within its organization a group of

experts conducting research on maintenance problems. This group, together with

representatives from Ordnance, formed the

Ordnance Vehicle Maintenance Committee to study and do research on specific

problems of military maintenance.53 But

reports by ASF observers during maneuvers in the fall of 1942 and spring of

1943 indicated that an intensive training

program at troop level was essential.54

In the fall of 1943 shortage of manpower, demands of the Navy and AAF,

and limitations on the supply of critical

materials and components created serious

over-all maintenance problems and special

problems of meeting the need for components such as ball and roller bearings,

plain bearings, and electrical equipment

and instruments. General Campbell recommended to General Somervell that even

stronger emphasis be placed on preventive

maintenance along with the reclamation of

critical automotive components when unserviceable, and strict control of the supply

of critical items. ASF accordingly began,

in close liaison with Ordnance, a special

program of education to alert users and

repairers of vehicles to the importance of

conservation. This involved the use of

posters, cartoons, magazine articles, and

other kinds of publications.55

Ordnance's Preventive Maintenance

Branch improved the format of Army

Motors and stepped up the circulation. A

peak of 211,000 was reached in August

1945. The percentage that went to the

using arms is indicated by the figures for

October 1945: 19,885 to Ordnance personnel and installations, and 174,392 to

all other services, including the Marine

Corps, Navy, Seabees, and Coast Guard.56

50

 Final Reports of Lt E. D. Scholey, 19 Oct

45, and Lt Col Monroe F. Weill, 8 Oct 45,

both in OCO-D Key Pers Rpts. 51

 Scholey Rpt. 52

 (1) Weill Rpt; (2) Hist, Maint Div. II. p.

109; (3) Ann Rpt FS FY 1944, p. 12. 53

 (1) Ann Rpt FS FY 1944. pp. 64-6.1 and

69-70: (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell, to

A. W. Herrington. President, SAE, 26 Nov 42.

OO 334.8 15708: (3) FS Office Memo 86. 11

Dec 42. 54

 Ltr. CG ASF to CofOrd and Others. 16 Apr

43. sub: Lack of Preventive Maint, ASF Maint

Div files, 400.402 Preventive Maint 1943. 55

 Memo, Campbell for Lt Gen Brehon Somervell, 2 Sep 43, sub: Conservation of Automotive

Equipment, and Indorsement 1 Oct 43. ASF

Maint Div files. 431 Vehicles, Sep-Dec 43. 56

 Weill Rpt.
454 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

In addition to the magazine, the Branch

disseminated thousands of posters to the

troops, a new design every two weeks.

Most effective were those featuring "Joe

Dope" who did everything wrong. Cartoonist Will Eisner, a private at Aberdeen

Proving Ground, drew the amusing pictures. The text consisted of catchy rhymes

such as:

At maneuvers Joe Dope took a tank

Hell bent o'er a 30-foot bank.

Uncle Sam, you can guess,

Now can boast one tank less—

As for Joe, he's a permanent blank!57

These educational efforts were helpful,

but early reports from overseas indicated

that nothing could take the place of

maintenance discipline. A General Staff

officer in NATOUSA in April 1943 observed that "Driver maintenance was universally bad. Service units reported that

almost without exception vehicles presented for repair (excluding those in accidents) were the result of driver neglect."

 58

A survey group from the Inspector General's office reported from North Africa

that Ordnance officers were unanimous in

declaring that basically the American

soldier was extremely wasteful and undisciplined where maintenance was concerned. He seemed inherently extravagant

and irresponsible. If an American driver

had trouble with his carburetor he immediately demanded a new one, even

though the only trouble was the malfunction of one small part. Vehicles left along

57

 Hist, Maint Div, II, pp. 42, no, and ex. 33.

An ASF-sponsored Army Preventive Maintenance

Week to be proclaimed by the President was

turned down by the CG ASF as being merely

"an advertising scheme" of little value. Memo,

Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes for ASF Director Opns,

1 Oct 43, sub: Army Preventive Maint Week,

ASF Maint Div files 400.402. 58

 Memo, Col Floyd C. Devenbeck, Chief Policy

Br, for Chief Preventive Maint Br, 5 Aug 43,

sub: Overseas Maint Deficiencies, ASF Maint

Div files, 400.4 Maint.
MAINTENANCE 455

the roadside unguarded were cannibalized

by almost every passer-by.59 Failure of

the users to grease the clutch-release

bearing in the half-tracks of an armored

division caused loss of the vehicles at

critical times; failure of tank crews to

lock the 75-mm. guns on medium tanks

during a march damaged the turret rotating mechanisms and deadlined thirty-five

to forty badly needed tanks. In the latter

case the Commanding General fined those

responsible $50 each—and the failures

fell to zero.60

This was an extreme case, but it did

show that at least one officer understood

maintenance discipline as well as combat

discipline. Some officers did not themselves

appreciate the importance of proper preventive maintenance. In one theater a

supply train carrying ammunition, rations,

fuel, and lubricants to a regiment about to

launch an offensive literally fell apart, with

more than 50 percent of the trucks on

deadline, not only because of disregard

of maintenance by the drivers but also

because the corps permitted the trucks to

run twenty-four hours a day for weeks

without any time out for upkeep. Better

indoctrination of field and staff officers

was indicated. One way of doing it was

developed by the 26th Infantry Division.

Each staff and field officer was given a

two weeks' refresher course, one hour a

night; and a different staff officer was

assigned each day as motor officer of the

day to keep a close check on all equipment.

In seven months this program brought

deadlined vehicles down to one-tenth of

one percent. Frequent and formal command inspection by high-ranking officers,

in the course of which they checked the

preventive maintenance procedures of unit

commanders, and other techniques of control, were developed by Ordnance and ASF

experts.61 There was ample recognition of

the fact that maintenance would continue as a Field Service problem in direct

ratio to the degree to which preventive

maintenance was accepted as a responsibility of the command to which Ordnance

equipment was assigned.62

A year after the transfer of trucks to

Ordnance, The Inspector General's deadline report showed a progressive decrease

in deadline percentages. In the opinion of

General Campbell, this result was achieved

by emphasis on preventive maintenance,

and by the increasing co-operation of field

commanders in the enforcement of maintenance discipline.63

 It was a sign that the

Army had passed through the first hectic

stage of mobilization and training and was

settling down to smoother, more efficient

operation.

Maintenance Shops

One of the first problems faced by Ordnance after taking over motor transport

59

 Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman, Deputy Director of Opns, ASF, for Director Stock

Contl Div, 24 Aug 43, sub: Survey of Organizations, Admin, Supply and Procedures of the North

African Theater of Opns, ASF Maint Div files,

400.4 Maint. 60

 ASF Presentation, pp. 33-34. 61

 (1) ASF Presentation, pp. 28-34; (2) Ltr,

CofOrd to CG AGF, thru CG ASF and ACofS

G-4, 4 Oct 43, sub: Preventive Maint Training

Program, and Indorsement 15 Oct 43, OO 353/

4736; (3) Memo, Lt Col Thomas B. Evans for

Chief, Preventive Maint Br ASF, 4 Aug 43, sub:

Improvement of Preventive Maint, ASF Maint

Div files, 400.402 Preventive Maint 1943; (4)

Ltr, Col William S. Conrow to Lt Col Walter

C. Thee, 25 Sep 44, sub: Preventive Maint of

Vehicles, ASF Maint Div files, 451 Maint Neglect, Jun-Nov 44. 62

 Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944, p. 8. 63

 Memo, Maj Gen Levin Campbell, for CG

ASF, 14 Aug 43, sub: Transfer of Fifth Echelon

Automotive Shops to SC's. OO 020/776.
456 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

vehicles was that of combining the various

repair shops for automotive and armament

matériel. For both types of matériel, third

echelon maintenance was accomplished in

the United States at posts, camps, and

stations. For automotive matériel, fourth

echelon maintenance was done in Ordnance Service Command Shops that served

districts covering a radius of from one

hundred to one hundred fifty miles containing eight thousand to ten thousand

vehicles. These Ordnance Service Command Shops performed heavy maintenance, supplied parts to lower echelons,

handled tire inspection and reclamation,

and evacuated major units to base shops

for overhaul. Sometimes located at posts,

but often in cities, they usually consisted

of seven buildings—two for shop operations, two for storing parts, two for inspection, reclamation, and salvage operations,

and one for administration. The) employed

from 240 to 275 persons.64 Fifth echelon

maintenance for automotive matériel was

done at base shops formerly under the

Quartermaster but transferred to Ordnance; for armament, the work was done

at Ordnance arsenals and depots.

There were advantages to combining the

automotive and armament shops. A shop

that repaired tanks and guns as well as

trucks could, for example, use one paint

shop, one reclamation section, one tire

section, and one safety and security officer

instead of the two or three that would be

required if the facilities were operated

separately; spare parts could be concentrated instead of scattered; and labor

could be shifted from one shop to another

to meet peak loads of work. Faulty distribution of the maintenance load, caused by

rapid expansion in all echelons and tardy

activation of the higher echelon establishments, was a serious problem. But. although some progress was made toward

consolidation, it was not sufficient to provide the answer to these problems. Most

Service Commanders considered consolidation impractical, mainly because the

physical facilities were separated.65

The Chief of Ordnance could only offer

advice and guidance in the formulation of

any plan, for the Service Commander had

responsibility. In July 1942 third and

fourth echelon maintenance had passed

from the old Corps Areas to the newly

formed Service Commands; the geographical boundaries were about the same, but

the Service Commands, as field agencies of

ASF, had tighter control. Reporting on

maintenance conditions in the fall of 1942,

The Inspector General was inclined to

believe that the Service Commander had

too much control over heavy maintenance

for vehicles, and that one of the basic

causes for the unsatisfactory condition of

vehicle repair was separation of the two

functions of maintenance and supply. The

Ordnance Service Command Shops, serving the motor districts, obtained supplies

from motor bases controlled by the Chief

of Ordnance. While a parts representative

of the base generally operated in each dis64

 Min, Conf of CG's, SC's. . . , 18 Dec 42,

New Orleans, La., p. 18, ASF Contl Div files,

dr G104. 65

 (1) Memo, Col James L. Keasler for a Col

Campbell, 18 Aug 42, sub: Ord and QM Maint,

in binder, Hist, Maint Div OCO-D 1942-45,

exs. to Gen Hist; (2) Ltr, CofOrd to CG First

SC, 12 Dec 42, sub: Ord Maint, and Indorsement, 5 Feb 43, OO 400.5/2644; (3) Ltr, CofOrd

to CG Second SC, 12 Dec 42, sub: Ord Maint,

and Indorsement, 23 Dec 42, OO 400.5/2645;

(4) Ltr, CofOrd to CG Third SC, 12 Dec 42, sub:

Ord Maint, and Indorsements, 25 Feb 43, 8 Apr

43, OO 400.5/2654; (5) Ltr, CofOrd to CG Fifth

SC, 12 Dec 42, sub: Ord Maint, and Indorsement, 7 Jan 43, OO 400.5/2648; (6) Ltr, CofOrd

to CG Seventh SC, 12 Dec 42, sub: Ord Maint,

and Indorsement, 10 Feb 43, OO 400.5/2653.
MAINTENANCE 457

trict to control stock levels, his efficiency

was affected by the fact that he was there

only on sufferance of the commanding general of the Service Command.

Because of the close correlation of parts

and maintenance, The Inspector General

concluded that the districts ought to operate as sub-bases under the control of the

base commanders. To the objection that

this system would concentrate too much

control in the Office, Chief of Ordnance,

the answer was that vehicle supply ought

not to be different from supply of other

matériel, which was requisitioned by the

post from the area depot; and that fourth

echelon maintenance pertained more to

supply than to maintenance, because Army

Regulation 850-15 prescribed that when

vehicles required fourth echelon maintenance they should be turned in and other

vehicles issued in their place.66

General Somervell, constantly opposing

the "separatist" tradition of field administration in the technical services,67

 did not

favor turning over control of the Ordnance

Service Command Shops to the Ordnance

Department; on the contrary, he wished

to strengthen the Service Commands as

much as possible and to give them even

greater control of ASF field problems. Yet

better integration of automotive maintenance had become necessary. The quality

of the work performed in the fifth echelon

shops was excellent, and the shops were of

great assistance to the Ordnance training

program for mechanics; but as of midsummer 1943 the shops were starved for

work, operating at about one fourth of

their capacity. There were two main

reasons for this situation: (1) much of

the Army's matériel was new and had

not reached the stage of major overhaul;

and (2) there was a natural desire on the

part of fourth echelon shop commanders

to do as much of their own overhaul work

as possible.68

As one solution to the problem, the

Chief of Ordnance considered contract

operation of the shops, but he finally concluded that they ought to be a Government

operation.69 At a conference, ASF and

Ordnance representatives agreed to continue the shops under Government operation but to transfer them from Ordnance

to the Service Commands, with the understanding that the Chief of Ordnance retained technical direction through publications and letters of instruction.70

 The

details of the transfer, including decisions

on a definition of technical control, were

worked out during August 1943. The

ASF and Ordnance representatives finally

agreed that technical control of the shops

would consist of instructions covering the

utilization of equipment, tools, shop methods, shop layouts, and procedures to insure

uniform quality.71

66

 Memo, Brig Gen Philip E. Brown, Deputy,

TIG for CG SOS, 11 Jan 4:5, sub: Maint Inspection for Period 1 Oct-31 Dec 42, ASF Maint

Div files, 400.4 Maint. 67

 Millett, The Organization and Role of the

Army Service Forces, p. 321. 68

 Memo. CofOrd for CG ASF, 14 Aug 43,

sub: Transfer of Fifth Echelon Automotive Shops

to SC's, OO 020/776, copy in Hist, FS Maint

Div, vol. III, pt. 1, History From 1 January 1943

to 31 March 1944 [hereafter cited as Hist,

Maint Div, III ], ex. 7. OHF. 69 Ibid. 70

 Memo for Rcd, ASF Maint Div files, 635

Shops (Gen) 1943. General MacMorland considered release of the shops to the Service Commands "no great sacrifice." Ltr. MacMorland to

Thomson, 10 Dec 54. 71

 Memo, Heileman, Deputy Director Opns,

ASF, for CG, ASF, 27 Aug 43, sub: Transfer of

Fifth Echelon Automotive Shops to SC's, and

Memo Routing Slip, Heileman for Maint Div

(Col Conrow), both in ASF Maint Div files,

folder 635 Shops (Gen) 1943. See also ASF Cir

76, 11 Sep 43, sec. II, Transfer to SC's of Fifth

Echelon Automotive Maint Activities.
458 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Effective 1 November 1943 three of the

six Ordnance Base Shops for automotive

work were turned over to Service Commands—Whittemore to the First Service

Command, Atlanta to the Fourth Service

Command, and Mount Rainier to the

Ninth Service Command. Stockton was

closed and Normoyle was consolidated with

Red River Ordnance Base Shop, which

Ordnance retained as a reserve plant for

rebuilding unit assemblies, and for doing

such overflow work as might have to be

evacuated from the Service Commands.72

Service Commands had full responsibility

for maintenance through the fifth echelon

but had the privilege of referring to the

Ordnance Department all fifth echelon rebuilding of engines beyond the capacities

of their shops. For assemblies other than

engines, they could contract overflow work

to local commercial shops. Any work not

handled by those two methods was referred

to Ordnance for transfer between Service

Commands, for commercial contracts, or

for overhaul at Red River.73

For armament the Ordnance Department had full responsibility for all fifth

echelon work. For tanks and combat vehicles it had responsibility for such fourth

echelon maintenance as could not be handled in Service Command shops or by

maintenance companies of Army Ground

Forces. For small arms, artillery, fire control instruments, and all tools, third and

fourth echelon responsibility rested with

post, camp, and station shops (Service

Commands) and maintenance troop units

(AGF, ASF, AAF).74

The co-operation of the Service Commands with Ordnance was "a source of

gratification" to General MacMorland.

After the war, recalling a series of meetings

at which ASF, Service Command G-4's,

and Service Command Ordnance Officers

collaborated in the solution of technical

problems, supply interchanges, and the

equalization of work loads, he recorded

that all the Service Commands "were imbued with the idea of winning the war and

appreciated the real efforts we were making

to provide guidance in maintenance problems."

 75

Combined Shops

Consolidation of Post Ordnance Shops

with the Ordnance Service Command

Shops that were located on posts was early

recommended by Ordnance maintenance

experts as being economical in tools, equipment, parts, and personnel.76

 By the

spring of 1943 the using services were

convinced that the dual channels and dual

procedures involved in having at the same

post one Ordnance shop commanded by

the Post Commander and another commanded by the Commanding General of

the Service Command were confusing and

wasteful. The Commanding General of

ASF agreed; but he was already considering a much more inclusive type of consolidation.77

 This was a combined shop

for repairing matériel of all types, whether

Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineer, or

72

 Ann Rpt of FS for FY 1944, p. 9. 73

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Edward MacMorland

for CofOrd, I Mar 44, sub: Ord Maint Responsibilities, Hist, Maint Div, III, ex. 2; (2) Ltr,

Maj Gen Edward MacMorland to Thomson, 10

Dec 54. 74

 Memo, Brig Gen Edward MacMorland for

CofOrd, 1 Mar 44, sub: Ord Maint Responsibilities, Hist, Maint Div, III, ex. 2. 75

 Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, 10 Dec 54. 76

 Presentation by Brig Gen James Kirk, in

Min, Conf of CG's, SC's. . . , 18 Dec 42, pp.

30-31. 77

 Ltr, CG Armored Force to CG ASF, 31 Mar

43, sub: Automotive Maint, and Indorsements,

10 Apr 43, 16 Apr 43, 3 May 43, and 25 May

43, AGF 400.402 (3-31-43), copy in ASF Maint

Div files, 451 Vehicles, Mar-Aug 43.
MAINTENANCE 459

other technical service. It was like the

system used by the British, who turned

over all shop operations to their Royal

Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

(REME). It would include an automotive

shop, an armament and instrument shop,

a clothing and equipment shop, an electrical equipment shop, a machine shop,

and a paint shop.

A survey by the ASF Maintenance

Division had convinced ASF planners that

the whole shop system in the Zone of the

Interior was haphazard and wasteful. Of

the 656 shops in operation as of 2 June

1943, 526 were under the supervision of

the service commands, 89 were under the

technical services, 27 under the port commands, and 14 under the defense commands. All had been established to meet

the immediate requirements of each command or technical service, without coordination or any over-all policy, and there

was inevitably duplication of effort and

inefficient use of men and tools. ASF

planners felt that shop facilities represented

one of the most important fields of maintenance activity in which improvement

could be effected. Accordingly, in May

1943, they drew up a plan to provide for

the receipt, inspection, and repair of all

Army matériel of all technical services

by a shop, or group of shops, co-ordinated

under the supervision of a maintenance

shop officer for operation.78

Technical supervision of each shop in

the group was to be assigned to the technical service having major interest. At

Fort Knox, where the plan was tested in

July 1943, the armament and instrument

shop, the automotive shop, the machine

shop, and the paint shop were under the

Ordnance Department, the clothing and

equipment shop under the Quartermaster

Corps, and the electrical equipment shop

under the Signal Corps. During the experiment representatives of the Service Commands and technical services visited Fort

Knox, at General Somervell's direction,

and submitted comments and recommendations. General MacMorland, who attended for the Chief of Ordnance, thought

the combined shop operations as exemplified at Fort Knox would give satisfactory

results at large posts, camps, and stations;

that the consolidation seemed to have resulted in a reduction of personnel; and

that the overhead would not be excessive.

He recommended that the plan be tested

at one large post in each service command

before being adopted.79 Tested throughout the service commands in model shops

and redrafted in accordance with suggestions by service command and technical

service officers, the combined shop plan

was placed in effect 7 September 1943 at

all posts, camps, and stations (except

Class IV) in the United States.80

The integration was accomplished, but

without enthusiasm on the part of either

the service commands or the technical

services; in fact, "resentment and objec78

 (1) Monograph, Maintenance Problems, A

History of the Maintenance Division Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Apr 43-1 Sep 45

[hereafter cited as Hist, ASF Maint Div], pp.

126-30, OCMH; (2) ICAF Rpt 28, Maintenance

Operations of the War Department, Apr 46

[hereafter cited as ICAF Rpt 28], 28-29, ICAF

Library. 79

 (1) ICAF Rpt 28, p. 30; (2) Memo, Lt

Gen Brehon Somervell for TQMG and Others,

31 Jul 43, sub: Combined Maint Shops at Posts.

Camps, and Stations; (3) Ltr, Maj Gen Richard

Donovan to CG ASF, 19 Aug 43, sub: Consolidation of Maint Activities at Posts, Camps, and

Stations, both in ASF Maint Div files. 635

(W210-25-43), ASF; (4) Memo, CofOrd for

CG ASF, 4 Aug 43, sub: Combined Maint Shops

at Posts, Camps, and Stations, ASF Maint Div

files, folder 635 Shops (Gen) 1943. 80

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to CG First SC and

others, 7 Sep 43, sub: Combined Maint Shops:

(2) WD Memo W210-25-43. 7 Sep 43.
460 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

tion," it seemed to the ASF historian,

persisted throughout the life of the combined shop system. The technical services

maintained that, since they were responsible for the development, procurement, and

provision of spare parts for equipment,

they ought also to have responsibility for

maintenance. They feared that, in combined shops, operating standards would

be lowered and that men belonging to one

technical service would neglect the equipment of another.81

 The Ordnance position

was that the same authority that controlled the supply of parts, tools, and supplies ought also to control shop operations,

as was the case with their own Field

Service; they had observed that the fault

in the British system was that REME did

not control supply. And General MacMorland "never had much patience" with

the idea that Ordnance would favor its

own operations to the detriment of the

other technical services. In North Africa

he had visited an Ordnance medium

maintenance company which was busy

making repairs to all types of equipment,

mainly Medical Department items.82

Service Commanders pointed out some

of the practical difficulties in operating

combined shops. One could see little need

for additional organization with the inevitable increase in personnel. The commanding general of the Eighth Service Command pointed out the great disparity

between the amount of Ordnance maintenance and that of any other technical

service. At the Camp Hood shops, for

example, there were 417 Ordnance shop

employees as compared with 68 for Quartermaster and 13 for Signal. At Fort Knox,

four out of the six shops were under

Ordnance supervision, and Ordnance had

75 percent of the personnel and 90 percent

of the shop equipment. The real maintenance problem, he believed, was an Ordnance problem; the solution was to concentrate on economies in Ordnance

maintenance.83

Some idea of the size of the Ordnance

operation as compared with that of the

other services is indicated by a breakdown

of the 89 shops operated by the technical

services before the combined shop plan

went into effect: 51 were Ordnance, 12

were Engineers, 11 were Signal, 8 were

Transportation, 5 were Quartermaster,

and 1 each was operated by the Chemical

Warfare Service and the Medical Department. Of the 526 shops operated by the

service commands, 288 were Ordnance,

163 were Quartermaster, 37 were Signal,

28 were Engineers, and 10 were Transportation. Of the 14 shops operated by the

defense commands, 13 were Ordnance and

1 was Signal; of the 27 operated by the

port commands, 21 were Ordnance and 6

were Signal.84 Ordnance was unsympathetic to combined shops, and opposition

to them in other quarters, extending to

The Inspector General's representatives,

could not be overcome, in spite of the

belief at ASF headquarters that the combined shops were a satisfactory and economical operation.85

 In July 1945 the War

81

 Hist, ASF Maint Div, pp. 132-33. 82

 Ltr, MacMorland to Thomson, 10 Dec 54. 83

 (1) Ltr, Somervell to CG Third SC, 28 Ju!

43, sub: Consolidation of Maint Activities at

Posts, Camps, or Stations, and Indorsement, 24

Aug 43, ASF Maint Div files, 635 (W210-25-

43); (2) Ltr, Donovan to CG ASF, 19 Aug 43,

sub: Consolidation of Maint Activities at Posts.

Camps, or Stations, 19 Aug 43. 84

 Hist, ASF Maint Div, p. 128 and ex. A. 85

 (1) Ibid., p. 133; (2) Interv with Heileman,

1 Sep 54; (3) Memo, Conrow, Director Maint

Div, ASF, for Director of Supply ASF, 10 Jun

44, Sub: Rumors Tending to Undermine Morale

within Combined Shops at Posts, Camps and

Stations, and Memo for rcd. ASF Maint Div

files. 635 Shops Jun-Dec 1944.
MAINTENANCE 461

Department approved a new plan by

which combined shops could be discontinued at the option of the commanding

generals of the service commands and the

shops could revert back to the technical

services. They were retained in only two

service commands out of nine, the Second

and Third.86

The Reclamation Program of 1944

Because of confusion about the meaning

of the word reclamation, the Army Service

Forces in a circular dated 6 December

1943 defined it as "the process of restoring

to usefulness condemned, discarded, abandoned, or damaged property, or parts, or

components thereof, by repair, refabrication or renovation." By December 1943

the subject had become important enough

to warrant a definition, a circular, and a

program. Troops departing for the invasion of Europe left mountains of damaged weapons and vehicles at posts, camps,

and stations; at the same time a trickle of

unserviceable but repairable matériel was

coming back from overseas.

The need for a definite reclamation

program was centered in the spare parts

problem. Early in 1944 inability to produce enough new trucks to meet the

enormous demands of the European theater made it necessary to repair or rebuild

used trucks for shipment overseas.87 Repair and rebuild were responsibilities of

the Service Commands, but Ordnance had

technical supervision of the work. This

involved close liaison with Service Commanders to determine the locations and

quantities of unserviceable vehicles and to

distribute the work among Service Command shops. Ordnance inspectors discovered that many of the vehicles designated

as "ready for issue" by Service Command

shops required further repair.88

Ordnance was also responsible for the

supply of spare parts, engines, assemblies,

tools, and other equipment required for

the task of overhaul. To augment this supply, returned matériel centers were set up

at Twin Cities Ordnance Plant in Minneapolis, at the Salt Lake Branch of Ogden

Ordnance Depot, and at the Cressona

Ordnance Plant in Pennsylvania. There

were eventually five such plants, and by

August 1945 more than 200,000 tons of

equipment were being processed each

month. In the reclamation of tires, production rose from 69,000 per month in

1944 to 202,000 in the month of January

1945.89

In spite of critical spare parts shortages

and a manpower shortage caused by the

shipment overseas of base shop personnel,

Service Command shops and Ordnance

shops were maintaining by early 1944 an

excellent production rate on the overhaul

of general purpose vehicles. This was

86

 (1) Hist, ASF Maint Div, pp. 142-45; (2)

WD Cir 207, 7 Jul 45. 87

 (1) Hist, ASF Maint Div, pp. 25, 29; (2)

Ltr, Lt Gen Somervell to CofOrd and others, 18

Dec 43, sub: Repair of Unserviceable Wheeled

Vehicles, ASF Maint Div files, 451 Vehicles,

Sep-Dec 43; (3) Memo, Conrow, Director Maint

Div ASF, for the Director of Supply, ASF, 17

Feb 44, sub: Repair of Unserviceable Vehicles for

Overseas Shipment, ASF Maint Div files, 451

Vehicles, Jan-Mar 44. 88

 (1) Monograph No. 8, p. 82; (2) Col B.

Ourisman. Final. Rpt, 4 Oct 45, OCO-D Key

Pers Rpts; (3) Min, Ord-SC Conf, Maint, Storage, Stock Contl and Reclamation, 8-9 May 44,

p. 43, OHF. 89

 (1) Maintenance Division Annual Report for

1945, Hist OCO-D, FY ending 30 Jun 45

[hereafter cited as Ann Rpt Maint Div 1945] ;

(2) Ourisman Rpt; (3) A. D. Rathbone, IV,

"Junk Goes Back To War," reprint from Liberty

magazine, 10 Feb 45, OHF.
462 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

achieved by recruiting civilians on a large

scale and working overtime—often on a

two-shift and even three-shift basis. Beginning in January 1944, the preparation

of transport vehicles for shipment overseas was the No. 1 priority job for Service

Command shops.90

Late in 1943 Ordnance maintenance

experts had to turn their attention to

tanks, motor carriages, armored cars, and

tracked vehicles. The need to supply overseas theaters could not be met from new

production, for there had been a cutback.

It could be met only by overhauling combat vehicles that had been used in training. But these were generally in poor condition, for the troops had neither the skill,

the tools, nor the time to keep their equipment in good repair. Though the Chief of

Ordnance recommended factory overhaul,

ASF preferred Service Command Shops.

The program originally provided that

preference be given first to Service Command Shops, second to Ordnance Department Shops if a major overhaul was

necessary, and third to commercial shops

for an operation that amounted to remanufacture.91

But by midsummer of 1944 it became

evident that thousands of combat vehicles

would have to be overhauled to meet

overseas requirements, and that the work

could not be done by Ordnance arsenals

or by Service Command shops already

burdened with the tremendous job of

overhauling transport vehicles.92 Before

the year was out Ordnance came to rely

more and more upon contracts with commercial facilities.93

 During 1944 and

1945, out of a total of 1,248,557 transport

vehicles repaired or overhauled, 74,268

were repaired at commercial shops. For

the same period, out of a total of 79,653

combat vehicles repaired or overhauled.

12,476 were overhauled at commercial establishments.94

 The shift to dependence

on commercial facilities for combat vehicle

repair in 1945 is revealed by the fact that

private organizations accounted for only

7 percent of the light tanks rebuilt in 1944,

and handled 65 percent of those rebuilt in

the first five months of 1945.95

90

 (1) Memo, Conrow, Director Maint Div

ASF, for Director of Supply ASF, 26 Feb 44, sub:

Repair of Gen Purpose Vehicles for Overseas

Shipment; (2) Memo for Rcd, 3 Mar 44, sub:

Conf—Heileman, MacMorland, Conrow, and Col

Alfred Johnson, Factory Overhaul Gen Purpose

Vehicles and Combat Vehicles. Both in ASF

Maint Div files, 451 Vehicles, Jan-Mar 44; (3)

See also Ann Rpt Maint Div, p. 8. 91

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen John Christmas, Asst

Chief OCO-D, for CofOrd, 22 Oct 43, sub:

Factory Overhaul and Modernization of Tanks

and Other Combat Vehicles, and Indorsements,

14 Nov, 13 Dec 43, 1 Jan 44, OO 470.8/464

Tank; (2) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 6 Mar

44, sub: Factory Overhaul and Modification of

Ord Matériel, OO 470.8/854 Misc.; (3) ODO 72

-44, 24 May 44, sub: Rehabilitation of Combat

Vehicles. 92

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Edward MacMorland,

Chief Stock Contl Div, for CG OCO-D, 12 Jul

44, sub: Overhaul of Tank and Combat Vehicles,

OO 451/2820; (2) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd.

29 Jul 44, sub: Remanufacture of Tanks, OO

470.8/1361 Tank; (3) Memo, Brig Gen Elbert

L. Ford, Chief Maint Div, for CG OCO-D, 30

Aug 44, sub: Remanufacturing Program, OO

451/2992; (4) OCO-D Historical Summary,

Maint Div, pp. 13-14. 93

 (1) Hist, ASF Maint Div, p. 66; (2) Memo,

Conrow for Director of Supply ASF, 16 Nov 44,

sub: Additional Automotive Repair Facilities, in

ASF Maint Div files, 451 Vehicles, Nov-Dec

44; (3) Memo, CG, ASF for CofOrd, 11 Feb 44,

sub: Overhaul and Modernization of Motor

Vehicles other than Combat Vehicles, and 1st

Indorsement, CofOrd to CG ASF, 14 Feb 44. OO

451/2334; 2d Indorsement (Memo) Brig Gen

Ford to CG OCO-D, 13 Dec 44, sub: Status of

Rehabilitated Combat Vehicles, Misc. Correspondence re Rehabilitation Program: (4") See also

Ch. XI, above. 94

 Powell MS, pp. 9, 13. 95

 Monograph No. 8, p. 83.
MAINTENANCE 463

Trends in Maintenance Engineering

The experience of World War II led

many Field Service officers to believe that

some maintenance problems could have

been solved by closer co-ordination within

Ordnance and with the using arms. Too

frequently, some experts felt, designers did

not give enough consideration to maintenance problems, so that when the matériel

reached the field extensive modifications

were necessary. These observers were convinced that if designers gave more attention to easy removal of parts for repair

and replacement the problems of field

maintenance would be greatly simplified.

Closer co-ordination in the preparation of

Essential Extra Parts Lists (EEPL's) was

also needed, as well as better and faster

methods of getting maintenance publications out to the field and obtaining better

information from the battlefields.96 Late in

1943 ASF experts stressed the importance

of using field experience data to determine

maintenance factors, estimating that approximately 80 percent of production for

1944 and 100 percent for 1945 would be

determined in that way.97

Improvements in maintenance were

noted after 1943 when the Chief of Ordnance established maintenance suboffices

at Rock Island Arsenal, Frankford Arsenal,

and the Detroit Tank Arsenal. At these

centers of technical information, maintenance experts studied drawings or, if

drawings were not available, went to manufacturing plants and looked over the

shoulders of draftsmen.98 In addition to

analyzing the designs of new matériel

with an eye to improved maintainability,

the suboffices also studied methods and

procedures for preventive maintenance,

analyzed performance of matériel in the

field, issued Modification Work Orders to

correct safety and functional faults, and

prepared Products Correction Reports.99

To secure firsthand information from the

field, the suboffices sent out maintenance

teams, first to troops in training in the

United States, and later to theaters all over

the world. These specialists gave instruction on the maintenance of new equipment

and brought back data on previously unreported malfunctions of various types of

Ordnance matériel.100

Among the most important engineering

contributions to the preventive maintenance program were the preparation of

lubrication guides for use in the field and

the standardization of fuels and lubricants.

Because each agency responsible for the

development of weapons and vehicles in

the rearmament program of 1939-40 issued its own instructions governing the use

of fuels and lubricants, there were, by late

1940, more than 250 types required for

Ordnance equipment. At that time the

Ordnance Department began a program to

reduce the number of types, and by March

1943 had succeeded in cutting down the

number to 37. Another effort toward

standardization was directed at lubrication

fittings and grease guns.101

A continuing task of maintenance engineers was the analysis of reports on malfunction and failure of all types of Ord96

 (1) FS Ann Rpt, Jul 43, p. 10, OHF; (2)

Capt Arthur G. Alen, Final Rpt, 21 Sep 45,

FS Key Pers Rpts; (3) Ourisman Rpt. 97

 Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm Styer, for CofOrd

and others, 13 Sep 43, sub: Determination of

Maint Factors, copy in G-4 files. 98

 (1) FS Ann Rpts, Jul 43, p. 10; (2) Monograph No. 8, p. 78; (3) PSP 57, pp. 110-12. 99

 (1) Lt Col Harry H. Needham, Final Rpt,

5 Aug 46, FS Key Pers Rpts; (2) Ann Rpt

Maint Div, 1945, pp. 3-4. 100

 PSP 57; pp. 109-10. 101

 (1) Ibid.; (2) Monograph No. 8, pp. 78

-80; (3) Hist, ASF Maint Div, pp. 259-60; (4)

Alen Rpt, 21 Sep 45.
464 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

nance matériel; the conducting of tests to

correct faults; and the issuance of Modification Work Orders (MWO's) to the

field so that equipment could be made

safer or more efficient on the spot. Men

who worked closely on the very important

MWO program felt that the greatest

danger was the tendency to publish too

many work orders. MWO's took up the

time of the using troops, and it was

extremely difficult if not impossible to control the parts involved and to have a

central control on the modification performed.

An example of the parts difficulty is

revealed in a letter General Campbell

wrote to General Hughes, Deputy Theater

Commander of NATOUSA, about the M6

heavy tractor for towing heavy guns: "It

is a new design and, like all designs, when

it reaches production and use in the field

the bugs will begin to appear. Then we will

make a series of changes to correct the

bugs and in the meantime our spare parts

will not be applicable to the latest tractor

and then our troubles, as usual, will

start."

 102

 In the last year of the war,

OCO-D's Maintenance Division made a

study of all work orders issued and in

process, and those not considered absolutely essential to the safety of the user or

the functioning of the matériel were

canceled.103

A searching examination into all phases

of maintenance after the war convinced

many Ordnance specialists that tighter

control and more emphasis on standardizing good maintenance practices were

heeded. On hardly any other aspect of

Ordnance operations had there been more

diverse views. There was need for careful

evaluation of various theories on such

matters, for example, as to whether it was

cheaper in many cases to replace a. damaged major item rather than to attempt

to repair it, and whether it was not better

to cannibalize for parts that were rarely

needed, rather than attempt to supply

spare parts to make any and all repairs.

Acquainting maintenance engineers more

thoroughly with design and production

aspects of Ordnance seemed to be indicated. One tank expert at Detroit believed

that obtaining men sufficiently informed in

all phases of development, engineering,

production, and maintenance of new matériel was one of the major problems of

the war. There was a general feeling that

the Ordnance Department ought to consider establishing in peacetime a more

definite maintenance policy.104

Yet flexibility was essential, as was an

open mind toward new techniques such

as the spare parts ships suggested by General Campbell, the floating depots proposed in the Central Pacific area, and the

plan for a maintenance-and-manufacturing

center for a theater of operations worked

out by Field Service's Maintenance Division.105

 Above all, good maintenance

engineering depended greatly on the freest

possible flow of technical information, in

both directions, between the technician in

the office and the soldier in the field.

102

 Ltr, Maj Gen Levin Campbell, to Maj Gen

Everett Hughes, 13 Dec 43, Gen Campbell's

Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material). 103

 (1) Needham Rpt; (2) OCO-D Maint

Div Ann Rpt 1945, p. 3. 104

 (1) Lt Col Louis M. Ballard, Final Rpt, 22

May 45, OCO-D Key Pers Rpts; (2) MS, Wilfred G. Burgan, The Spare Parts Problem and a

Plan. Mar 48, OHF; (3) Maj William L. Drennen, Final Rpt, OCO-D Key Pers Rpts. 105

 (1) Memo, Campbell, for Somervell, 15 Jan

44; (2) Memo, Col Robert A. Case, Director

Stock Contl Div ASF, for Director of Supply,

ASF, 24 Jan 44, sub: ASF Spare Parts Ships,

both in ASF Maint Div Files, 451.9 Spare Parts

Policy; (3) PSP 57, pp. 133-345 (4) MS, Lt

Col Charles R. Petticrew, Ordnance Floating

Depots, 10 Sep 45.
CHAPTER XXIII

Conclusion

Appraising the Record

In the months and years that followed

the defeat of Germany and Japan, the

wartime leaders of the Ordnance Department looked back upon their achievements

with a keen sense of satisfaction. They felt

they had made a significant, if not always

fully appreciated, contribution to victory.

General Harris was outspoken in his

praise of the Ordnance record on procurement; General Crain and General

Hatcher were equally emphatic about the

Ordnance Department's success with storage, issue, and maintenance. General

Campbell wrote a book to eulogize the

"Industry-Ordnance Team" and to portray its war record as "an epic of industrial

accomplishment which had never been

equaled in the history of the world." No

less laudatory was the volume on research

and development that appeared in 1947

over General Barnes' signature, Weapons

of World War II. In reviewing the advances in weapons made during the war

General Barnes gave a special salute to

science, allotting credit for "results far

beyond our expectations" to "the ScienceIndustry-Ordnance team," thus introducing a term that was to gain wide currency

in Ordnance circles after the war.

The farther one moved from the immediate staff of the Chief of Ordnance the

more frequently one heard notes of criticism in the postwar years. General Burns,

who viewed the Ordnance Department

during the defense and war periods from

the offices of the Assistant Secretary of

War and the Lend-Lease Administrator,

spoke highly of Ordnance procurement

plans and operations, but in postwar interviews he expressed disappointment that

Ordnance leaders had not been sufficiently

"international-minded" to appreciate the

needs of allied nations. Officers who had

served in ASF headquarters went much

further in their criticism. They conceded

that in many areas Ordnance had done

an excellent job, but they complained that

most influential Ordnance officers resented

staff supervision and did not make good

team players. Combat commanders overseas usually spoke well of the Ordnance

equipment and support they received, but

they sometimes voiced criticisms. Some

complained that American tanks were no

match for the enemy's: others denounced

the Ordnance failure to provide combat

troops with the ammunition they needed:

still others castigated Ordnance for failing to provide enough spare parts for

maintenance. General Niblo, an Ordnance

officer with long experience overseas, found

many points at which Ordnance service in

the field needed improvement.1

1

 The activities of Ordnance units overseas form

the theme of the volume by Lida Mayo, The

Ordnance Department: Ordnance Overseas, a

volume in preparation in the scries UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
466 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

In any attempt to review and evaluate

the Ordnance record on the procurement

and supply fronts, one fact stands out

clearly and serves as a point of departure:

much of what the Ordnance Department

did in World War II was an outgrowth of

its experience in World War I. Most of the

senior officers of the Department in World

War II were men who still remembered

their own successes and failures in World

War I. Major elements of the Ordnance

organization had been created during or

immediately after World War I. The Field

Service Division, for example, was a direct

outgrowth of World War I, and its chief

in the 1940-42 period, General Crain,

brought to his office valuable experience

gained as a young officer with the AEF.

The Ordnance district offices had first

been established in 1918 to relieve the congestion that hampered procurement officials in Washington. Though closed for a

time after the Armistice, they were soon

reopened on a skeleton basis in the early

1920's and became permanent elements

of the Ordnance Department. Within the

limits of their meager budgets, the district

offices—with their unusual combination

of military and civilian leadership—kept

in touch with industries capable of conversion to munitions manufacture. They

were not strong in 1940-41 when the need

again arose for placing huge contracts

with industry, but they were in existence

and were rapidly expanded.

Outside the official hierarchy, but of

great importance to it, was the Army

Ordnance Association, also an outgrowth

of World War I. Founded in 1919 as a

voluntary association of American citizens

(headed by Benedict Crowell, wartime

Director of Munitions) to promote "industrial preparedness for war as being one

of the Nation's strongest guarantees of

peace," it provided influential civilian

backing for Ordnance interests. Through

the meetings of its many local posts and

special committees, and through its magazine, Army Ordnance, it helped foster an

interest in industrial preparedness and in

the training of Ordnance reserve officers.

The manufacturing arsenals of the Ordnance Department antedated World War I

by many years, Springfield Armory tracing

its history back to the days when

George Washington was President. Though

starved for funds during the 1920's and

1930's, they managed to preserve some

munitions manufacturing capacity for a

nation that vainly hoped it would never

again have to resort to war. Because the

Ordnance budget was so low during the

interwar years the arsenals were unable to

replace equipment that wore out or became obsolete; they soon fell behind the

rapidly advancing American technology.

When the nation began to rearm in 1940

-41, the arsenals were far from modern

and their staffs were depicted. They nevertheless proved their value as the "Regular

Army of production," carrying the load

almost single-handedly while civilian industry was tooling up to make guns, ammunition, and tanks. For many months

during the so-called defense period before

Pearl Harbor, Frankford Arsenal was the

sole source of small arms ammunition for

the U.S. Army, and Springfield Armory

was the only producer of the new M1

rifle. Meanwhile, the arsenals helped in

another way: they opened their doors to

engineers from industry and made available to them Ordnance drawings, specifications, and descriptions of manufacture.

It is impossible to calculate to what extent

the process of rearmament would have

been delayed had there been no arsenals,

but there certainly would have been some
CONCLUSION 467

delay. During an assessment of the value

of the arsenals the question may well arise

as to how the war might have turned out

if the June 1944 invasion of the continent

had been held up even for six months and

Germany had meanwhile pushed forward

with its atomic research and its development of V-2 weapons.

Along with developments based on the

past came new factors that sprang from

the experience of World War II itself.

Most notable, perhaps, was the emergence

of the Technical Division (later named

Research and Development Division) as a

major organizational element on a par with

the Industrial Division and Field Service

Division. Under the energetic leadership

of General Barnes, it gave recognition to

the increasing importance of science and

technology in the development of modern

weapons. At the other end of the development-procurement-supply chain were the

greatly expanded activities of Field Service with scores of new storage depots, a

vast bookkeeping operation, and complex

problems of organization and management.

Other new developments on the organizational side were the steady trend toward

decentralization, the delegation of more

and more responsibility to the arsenals and

district offices, and the creation of new

field agencies such as OCO-Detroit and

the St. Louis office of the Field Director

of Ammunition Plants. There were two

factors working toward decentralization:

one was the vast size of the Ordnance

task, demanding that it be broken up into

small pieces; the other was the congestion

and lack of office space in Washington.

Even after completion of the Pentagon in

1942, office space in the Washington area

remained at a premium, and the need to

check the trend toward concentrating

authority at the seat of government became daily more urgent.

Impetus for the one most important

decentralizing move came with the transfer from the Quartermaster Corps to

Ordnance of responsibility for motor transport vehicles in 1942. No other organizational change during the war had such

great impact on Ordnance. The transfer

affected some four thousand contracts

valued at $3 billion. It brought into the

Ordnance supply system a great variety of

civilian-type vehicles, enormously complicated the task of supplying spare parts for

maintenance, and made Ordnance procurement equal in dollar value to the procurement of all the other technical services

combined. The acquisition of new storage

space made the Ordnance Department the

largest warehouse operator in the world.

To keep the decentralization picture in

perspective it should be noted that Ordnance had adopted a policy of decentralized operations long before 1942. The

storage depots and the six "old line" manufacturing arsenals—Springfield, Watertown, Watervliet, Frankford, Picatinny,

and Rock Island—were historic examples

of decentralized operations under centralized supervision. After the procurement

district offices built up their staffs in

1940-41 and assumed authority to make

contracts, they, too, represented a major

delegation of authority by the Chief of

Ordnance. They placed a large measure of

procurement authority in the major industrial areas of the nation, close to the

industrial firms that were to sign Ordnance

contracts.

The other side of the organizational

coin was represented by the new Army

Service Forces, created early in 1942 to

provide for all the technical services more

supervision and control than that to which

they had formerly been accustomed. In
468 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

both procurement and supply ASF and its

commanding general, Brehon Somervell,

exerted a good deal of influence on the

Ordnance Department. The decision, for

example, to transfer trucks from the

Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance was

essentially a Somervell decision. On the

supply side, it was ASF that directed the

redistribution of depot space in 1943 and

in 1944 established new and lower stock

levels. In fact, of the many Ordnance

activities, there was scarcely any major

aspect that was not touched by ASF in

one way or another. It was almost inevitable that friction should result from the

sudden imposition of unwonted controls.

Ordnance leaders were, to some extent,

set in their ways and reluctant to change;

they were also able, strong-minded men

with long years of experience. They resented supervision by management experts

who, in their opinion, had little or no

technical knowledge of the procurement

and supply of munitions. Yet one of the

worst mistakes made by Ordnance itself

early in the war period was placing too

much faith in civilian supply experts unfamiliar with military procedures.

Ordnance procurement officers took

special pride in their prewar planning;

they felt that it had contributed greatly

to the success of the Nation's rearmament,

especially in the 1940-41 period. General

Wesson, General Harris, and their associates were convinced that maintenance of

the arsenals and district offices in time of

peace paid big dividends in 1940 and 1941.

Ordnance leaders steadfastly maintained

that surveys of industry, accepted schedules of production, educational orders, and

production studies proved their value at

the start of the rearmament drive by

saving the all-important commodity, time.

In spite of objections raised by some observers that the prewar plans were valueless because not followed to the letter, the

evidence suggests that the planning was

well conceived and proved more helpful in

Ordnance than in the other technical

services. Had the planners been given more

public support and more funds to work

with, the results of their efforts would have

been even more apparent.

One of the hardest things for General

Wesson and his staff to accept in the

1940-41 period was the low priority assigned to Ordnance procurement. In an

economy where priority ratings were more

important than money, the Ordnance Department found that it had to take third

place, ranking below both the Navy and

the Army Air Forces. "We were so far

ahead of the rest of them in our advance

planning," some Ordnance officers commented, half in jest, "they had to hold us

back to let the others catch up." Because

the nation's strategic position in the 1940

-42 period led to emphasis on air power

and sea power, the Ordnance procurement effort, being geared mainly to supply

of the ground army, had to take a back

scat. Its rate of progress was thus inescapably slowed.

A notable Ordnance procurement innovation in World War II was the widespread use of government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. Plants

and works of this type were needed

chiefly to make powder and explosives and

to load ammunition. As there were no

civilian plants that could readily be converted to these purposes, nor any appreciable opportunity for commercial profit in

the peacetime manufacture of military

ammunition, such plants had to be built

by the government if they were to be built

at all. Broadly speaking, the experiment

with GOCO facilities was highly success-
CONCLUSION 469

ful. Ordnance managed to recruit competent firms to operate the plants; it strictly

enforced safety regulations with excellent

results; it achieved quantity production, a

high level of quality, and steadily decreasing costs. The main criticism of the GOCO

contracts was that they were sometimes

too liberal in permitting contractors to

make profits that were out of proportion

to services rendered.

The chief blot on the artillery ammunition record was the failure to provide

enough heavy artillery ammunition for the

invasion of Europe. It was not a failure

on the production front but a mistake in

planning. During the early months of the

war, top Army planning agencies decided

to put their faith in light and medium

artillery, and aerial bombing. To a large

extent their faith was justified. But heavy

artillery was needed, too, and, when an

urgent demand for big guns and ammunition came in 1944, Ordnance was unable

to produce them overnight. Ordnance officers who had for many years been heavy

artillery advocates were keenly disappointed that the demand for it came late

in the war and had to be handled on a

"blitz" basis. With heavy tanks and heavyheavy trucks the story was much the

same.

These examples illustrate the importance

of sound strategic planning and accurate

forecasting of future requirements. On this

point, all Ordnance leaders were in agreement at the end of World War II. Some

considered requirements as the Number

One problem of the Ordnance Department; others rated it somewhat lower;

but all recognized its great importance.

They also recoganized that it was an extremely difficult problem to deal with. No

matter how imaginative and farsighted the

planners might be, there were always unforeseen twists and turns in the course of

events. The Army high command, Ordnance leaders said in effect, with help and

advice from Ordnance, must plan ahead,

determine long-range production goals,

and then stick with them. Given time and

money, they said, there was nothing they

could not produce—but the manufacture

of fighting equipment would take both

time and money and must be planned for

long in advance. Changes in the plan

could and must be made to keep production in step with battlefield needs, but

changes must be held to a minimum and

approved only after careful study of all

factors in the situation.

Among the mistaken overestimates of

requirements, the Ordnance Department

objected most strongly to those for small

arms ammunition and tanks. The goals

set for both early in 1942, while the shock

of Pearl Harbor was still fresh and British

needs were being dramatically revealed by

Churchill and his advisers at White House

conferences, soon proved to be completely

unrealistic. As Ordnance leaders warned

at the time, some of the productive capacity built at great expense during 1942

proved to be unnecessary even before the

year was out.

The same was true of storage depots,

but here it was Ordnance rather than the

Army staff that set its sights too high.

Given a relatively free hand in 1940-42,

Ordnance built more depots than it

needed. ASF then stepped in, redistributed

the excess capacity, and allocated storage

space on an Army-wide basis.

In striving for efficient operation of its

vast supply and distribution system, Ordnance found that many factors had to be

considered. Nearness of depots to manufacturing plants had to be weighed against

nearness to ports of embarkation; the de-
470 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

sirability of vast desert tracts for safe, dry

storage had to be balanced against the

problem of labor shortage in such areas.

The integration of the storage space acquired from the Motor Transport Service

in 1942 called for a good deal of reshuffling, as did the ASF-directed redistribution

of excess capacity in 1943. On top of all

this, Ordnance was justly criticized for

making too frequent changes in depot

missions, with resultant expense and loss of

efficiency during the periods of changeover. The Master Depot System of 1943

was an ambitious plan to put Ordnance

storage operations on a sound basis, but

it worked no miracles.

Of all the many categories of Ordnance

items, spare parts for vehicles caused the

most trouble, in both procurement and

distribution. The trouble originated with

the Quartermaster Corps' losing battle

during the 1930's to standardize Army

trucks. The transfer of transport vehicles

to the Ordnance Department in the latter

half of 1942 made it necessary for Ordnance suddenly to assimilate a vast number of unfamiliar items. Before that time

nearly everything procured by Ordnance

had been a military item designed under

Ordnance supervision exclusively for military use. With the exception of tanks and

a few special articles such as new fire

control devices, Ordnance had many years

of experience on which to base its estimates

for replacement parts. As a result, the

wartime supply of spare parts for weapons

—"shooting ordnance"—was usually adequate. But with military trucks the situation was much different. In the first place,

trucks were basically civilian vehicles converted to military service; they were manufactured in many different makes and

models with a bewildering variety of parts

and parts numbers. Second, the Army had

only limited experience in the field maintenance of a truck fleet.

To one not familiar with the complexities of automotive spare parts, the assigning of a name and number to each part

as a means of identification would seem to

be a fairly simple task. But in World War

II it was far from simple, partly because

of the vast number of parts made by many

different manufacturers — some interchangeable, some not—and partly because

Ordnance was in the throes of adapting

its parts numbering system to electrical

accounting machines at the time the truck

transfer brought in some hundred thousand additional parts. The "Numbers

Racket," as Ordnancemen dubbed this

problem, caused endless trouble and was

still not solved at the end of the war. Some

vehicle parts masqueraded under many

"aliases" as well as under their basic

names and numbers. As a result, vitally

needed spare parts could sometimes not

be found because, for lack of a good

numbering system, they were "lost." The

one most effective step toward solving the

problem was the compilation of many

volumes of interchangeability data known

collectively as ORD 15, supplemented by

ORD 14 for combat vehicles and ORD 5

for tools.

On the procurement side, Ordnance

recognized early in the defense period that

production of spare parts had to be given

just as high a priority as production of

complete items. The principle was sound

enough but it was not easy to apply,

particularly as the procurement people did

not see eye-to-eye with the supply people.

Requirements for spare parts were based

at the start on educated guesses and had

to be adjusted later as field experience

data became available for more accurate

forecasting. How far to go in the direction
CONCLUSION 471

of supplying all types of parts for all types

of equipment was another unresolved

problem at the end of the war.

When it received responsibility for

transport vehicles in September 1942,

Ordnance was fortunate in one respect:

the worst of the procurement crisis was

over. The Quartermaster Corps had gone

through a trying period since the summer

of 1940, laying the groundwork for a

large-scale truck procurement program;

soon after Pearl Harbor steps had been

taken to harness the automotive industry

to the war effort. By the fall of 1942

three remarkably successful vehicles were

either in production or ready for production—the 1⁄4-ton jeep, the 2-1/2-ton

truck, and the 2-1/2-ton amphibious

Dukw. The one serious lack was in

heavy-heavy trucks, for which the using

arms then foresaw no great need. Though

total truck production was high all during

the war, it nevertheless lagged behind

schedule year after year, especially in the

heavier types.

Among the most successful devices

Ordnance developed to break bottlenecks,

speed production, and promote cooperation among contractors in the automotive industry, and all other industries,

were the many integration committees

formed during the war. Fully protected

from prosecution under the antitrust laws,

these committees formed meeting grounds

where representatives of all the firms making a certain product could discuss their

manufacturing problems, exchange ideas,

and arrange for temporary loans of materials, machinery, or production experts.

Countless production problems were settled in committee meetings by the men best

qualified to deal with them. Closely related to the integration committees were

the machine-tool panels formed in the Ordnance districts to help remedy the lack of

new machine tools by bringing to light the

existence of used tools or recommending

alternative types.

Stock control appeared as a new term

in the military vocabulary during World

War IL It described an activity that was,

in essence, as old as war itself—the maintenance of an orderly flow of supplies to

troops. But the magnitude of the supply

task in World War II introduced the need

for elaborate procedures to keep records

on hundreds of thousands of separate

items destined for shipment to troops in

all parts of the world. Had Ordnance

given more attention during the 1930's to

adapting the Ordnance Provision System

to sudden wartime expansion, or had it set

up a training program for new Field Service employees in 1940, some of the delays

and difficulties experienced in this area in

World War II might have been avoided.

The influence of ASF on Ordnance stock

control methods came too late in the war

to be of great value, but the experience

pointed up lessons for the future.

The Ordnance Department, and the

Army as a whole, learned much about

maintenance during the war, particularly

maintenance of trucks and tanks. Long

before World War II a tradition of good

maintenance practice had been well established in the Army, reaching from the

soldier's daily care of his rifle to the proper

upkeep of buildings and grounds. But the

rapid expansion and mechanization of the

Army during the 1940's, and the influx

of millions of raw recruits led by inexperienced officers, brought neglect of equipment maintenance. A profligate and irresponsible spirit pervaded many units.

Regardless of the administrative problems

relating to echelons of maintenance and

the control of repair shops, the one lesson
472 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

of the war that stood out above all others,

from the maintenance point of view, was

that troops must learn maintenance discipline as well as combat discipline. Illness

and death caused by disease can cripple

an army as effectively as wounds inflicted

by shot and shell; vehicles with broken

springs or burned out bearings caused by

neglect or rough handling can halt an advance just as surely as damage from enemy

action.

On the procurement front, the Ordnance Department, acting almost entirely

on its own initiative, did some significant

pioneering work in applying the techniques

of statistical quality control to acceptance

inspection. Here, as with so many other

Ordnance activities, the seeds were sown

during the 1920's and 1930's. Progress

was slow during the prewar years, partly

because the need for new inspection

methods was not urgent and partly because few Ordnance officers were enthusiastic about statistical sampling techniques.

But, with the coming of war production on

a tremendous scale, the theories of Col.

Leslie E. Simon and others were put to the

test, in a few limited areas at first, and

then with gradually widening usefulness.

They helped make Ordnance inspection

more efficient and rational, and shifted to

the contractor more of the responsibility

for quality production.

In its speedy termination of contracts

Ordnance set a record of which it could

well be proud. With the approval of the

War Department, and in consonance with

acts of Congress, it worked out—long

before the war ended—enlightened plans

for terminating and settling contracts

without elaborate and time-consuming

audits. Speedy contract termination not

only promoted good will in the business

community but also helped the nation

make the difficult transition from war to

peace without suffering a postwar depression.

Though Ordnance officers seldom mentioned it as anything remarkable, the Ordnance Department's record of honesty was

certainly noteworthy. Ordnance procurement officers placed contracts for billions

of dollars worth of war matériel with

thousands of industrial firms, both large

and small, without any taint of graft or

corruption. In all the Congressional investigations of irregularities in wartime procurement, no evidence was uncovered to

show that any Ordnance officer or civilian

employee profited from double dealing.

Ordnance procurement was sometimes

criticized on the ground that it was too

slow, too cumbersome, or too favorable to

big business; but it could not be criticized

for lack of integrity. The mistakes made

appear to have been honest mistakes, not

fraud. Most Ordnance leaders apparently

saw nothing remarkable in this fact; they

simply took it for granted as being the

least that was expected of them.

Looking to the Future

Long before the war was over, General

Campbell gave serious thought to the form

the postwar organization of the Ordnance

Department should take. As early as January 1944 he appointed a board of officers

headed by General Harris to study the

matter and prepare recommendations.

General Campbell described his thinking

on the matter as follows:

As the outcome of the war became apparent I considered that it might well be of

great value to the future of the Department

and. of value to the Army and the country

if a Board composed of men who had been

through the Ordnance job from the declaration of war, and who were to continue as an

active part of the Department until the
CONCLUSION 473

War's end and possibly beyond that period, were to study and report upon the future

organization of the Department and its personnel. I thought that the recommendations

of these men, many of them of long experience, all of whom were engaged in the

successful operation of the Department,

would be of more value and would be better

founded in fact than observations to be made

after the war by officers returning from overseas who had not been connected in any

way with the Industrial and Field Service

front.2

During February the board's preliminary

report was distributed for comment to six

general officers, most of whom gave it

their approval, and on 12 May the final

Harris Board Report was placed on General Campbell's desk.3

This report recommended that the Ordnance headquarters consist of five major

services closely comparable to the existing

services and staff branches. The Military

Service was to combine the Military Plans

and Training Service with the Military

Personnel Branch; the Administrative

Service was to be made up of five existing

staff branches—Legal, Fiscal, Plans and

Requirements, Civilian Personnel, and

Control. Both of these services were to

report directly to the Chief of Ordnance,

but the other three services, to be known

as Research and Development, Procurement (formerly Industrial), and Supply

and Maintenance (formerly Field Service),

were to be responsible to a Deputy Chief

of Ordnance for Matériel Services. The

Board recommended creation of this position of Deputy Chief to relieve the Chief

of Ordnance of the responsibility for supervising all the activities of the Department, and thus allow him more time to

confer with chiefs of the using arms, with

representatives of higher headquarters, and

with committees of Congress, to study

ways and means of strengthening the

Department, and to consider the assignment and promotion of key personnel. It

was also felt that the position of Deputy

Chief would "tend to break down some of

the present dividing lines" between the

major operating divisions.4

The most important recommendation of

the Harris Board was for the establishment of six decentralized Product Centers,

each with full responsibility for design,

procurement, storage, and maintenance of

a certain class of matériel, and with

jurisdiction over all arsenals, plants, and

depots dealing with such matériel. "The

finally accepted organization," the Board

reported, "must be based upon product

lines, with strong centralized control, and

complete integration by product, from design to obsolescence." The six Ordnance

establishments proposed by the Board as

Product Centers were the following:

Springfield Armory Small Arms and Small

Arms Ammunition

Rock Island Arsenal Artillery

Frankford Arsenal Fire Control

Indiana Ordnance

Works Ammunition

Augusta Arsenal Troop Equipment and

Miscellaneous Supplies

Detroit Tank Arsenal Tanks and Transport

The recommendations of the Harris

Board thus combined the functional and

2

 Ltr, Campbell to Thomson, 7 Sep 49, OHF.

See also Memo CofOrd for CG, ASF, 13 Aug

43, sub: Prod, OO 400.12/9396, and Memo CG,

ASF, for CofOrd, 21 Aug 43, sub: Prod, OO

400.12/9461. 3

 Report of the Committee on Post-War Organization of the Ordnance Department, 12 May 44,

OHF. The Harris Board was appointed by Ordnance Special Order 14, 17 January 1944, and

consisted of Generals Harris and Armstrong, Col.

Philip R. Faymonville (vice General Safford, relieved), and Colonels Clarence E. Partridge, Reed,

Raaen, and Gerson K. Heiss. 4

 Ltr, Boatwright, OCO-D, to Campbell, 22

Mar 44, OHF.
474 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

the product types of organization, but with

far greater emphasis than had ever before

been given to decentralization along

product lines. The five services proposed

for the Office of the Chief of Ordnance

were functional in nature, but they were

to be strictly limited to staff work and

were not to engage in actual operations.

The six Product Centers were to be the

main operating divisions. Just as the TankAutomotive Center had become a decentralized and semiautonomous organization

specializing in the development, production, and distribution of one broad class

of matériel, so each proposed Product

Center was to become a decentralized

headquarters specializing in one class of

ordnance.

The broad principles of the Product

Center idea were accepted by many Ordnance officers during the 1944-45 period,

but there were differences of opinion as to

how the six proposed Centers should be

administered. In March 1944, for example,

when General Hayes was asked to comment on the Harris Board's preliminary

report, he declared: "I think that the

Product Centers are a very fine idea, and

they are probably essential to the further

healthful development of the Ordnance

Department. As shown on the chart, however, I am not sure exactly how they will

work because they seem to have too many

bosses, i.e., Chiefs of all Services except

the Military Service. . . ."

 5 General Barnes

and Safford expressed similar views.

There was also disagreement as to the

most desirable locations for the six proposed Product Centers. In September 1945

six committees were appointed to study

this matter and make recommendations

as to which Ordnance installations were

best suited for use as Product Centers.

These committees agreed with the recommendations of the Harris Board on only

two Centers— Rock Island for artillery and

the Detroit Tank Arsenal for tanks and

other vehicles. For small arms they chose

Frankford rather than Springfield, Picatinny rather than Indiana Ordnance

Works for ammunition, Pottstown Depot

rather than Frankford for fire control, and

Raritan instead of Augusta Arsenal for

troop equipment.6

In addition to its specific recommendations for organizational changes, the Harris

Board laid down certain fundamental

principles of organization to guide the future development of the Department. First

and most fundamental was the principle

that the technical services should continue

to exist. "The successful prosecution of

any war effort," the report stated, "can be

obtained only by retaining the Technical

Services as entities in the postwar organization of the War Department." The

second principle was that the peacetime

organization of the Department should be

capable of handling the wartime mission

simply by expansion, without a major organizational change. The third principle

was that the Department should be organized along product lines, with decentralization of operations to Product

Centers. The Harris Board also recommended that the Ordnance Districts be

continued as the procurement agencies of

the Department, that the existing Industry-Ordnance Team be maintained, and

that the manufacturing arsenals "return

to their pre-war role of keeping alive those

phases of munitions art that do not have

a commercial counterpart."

5

 Memo, Hayes to Campbell, 17 Mar 44, OHF. 6

 Memo, Christmas for Sayler, 2 Oct 45, sub:

Product Organization of Ord Dept, OHF. Reports

of the six committees are also in OHF.
CONCLUSION 475

The recommendations of the Harris

Board take on added significance when

they are compared with the trend of thinking within the Army Service Forces. The

proposal that the Ordnance Department

be organized along product lines ran directly counter to the prevailing opinion

in the ASF that the technical services

should be organized on a functional basis.

During the preceding summer, General

Somervell's staff had drafted a plan for

the complete reorganization of the ASF,

abolishing all of the technical services and

merging their functions in various divisions

within the ASF headquarters.7 All research, development, and procurement

activities of the technical services would

have been centralized in one ASF division,

all transportation in another, all supply in

another, and so on. At the same time, the

field establishments of all the technical

services, including the Ordnance Districts,

arsenals, and depots, would have been absorbed by the headquarters of the Service

Commands in which they were geographically situated.

General Somervell and his staff vigorously pushed this reorganization proposal

during the summer of 1943, but when it

was finally referred to the Secretary of War

in September he refused to approve it.

As explained in his published memoirs,

Stimson "was prepared in general to accept Somervell's judgment that his proposed changes would in the end increase

the efficiency of the Service Forces, but it

was a grave question whether the improvement would outweigh its concomitant disadvantages in the creation of bad feeling."

 8 Stimson knew from experience "how

deeply imbedded in sentiment the services

of the Engineers, Ordnance, and Quartermaster are in the memories of all the

people that belonged to them, and the

tremendous uproar that would be created

if we tried to destroy all that sentiment

by wiping out the distinction of the services with their insignia, etc." Stimson also

knew that the technical services had done

outstanding work in organizing production

for war and specifically noted the high

quality of General Campbell's performance. He therefore opposed "stirring up a

hornet's nest right in the middle of the war

when things are going well."

The Harris Board was appointed just

three months after this rejection of the

ASF reorganization plan by the Secretary

of War. The Board's conclusions were

diametrically opposed to the ASF proposals, and represented the point of view

held by most high-ranking Ordnance officers. As a result of wartime operational

experience, leaders in the Ordnance Department had become convinced not only

that the traditional product basis of the

technical services should be preserved but

also that the internal organization of each

service should be along product lines.

General Campbell was in full agreement

with the recommendations of the Harris

Board, and in May 1945 directed a memorandum to the chiefs of his staff divisions

announcing that the Harris Board report

was to be the basis of all planning of

postwar organization within the Depart7

 For a description of this plan, see Millett,

The Organization and Role of the Army Service

Forces, Chapter XXIV. Another similar proposal

was advanced in 1944 by the ASF Control Division, but was not accepted by the Under Secretary of War. This plan would have retained the

names of the technical services but would have

assigned all procurement to Ordnance, all storage

and distribution to Quartermaster, etc. Organization of the ASF in the Post-War Military Establishment, 15 Jul 44, ASF Contl Div files, 020. 8

 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in

Peace and War, p. 452.
476 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

ment.9 But he decided against any attempt

to revamp the organization of the Department along such lines while the war was in

progress. As a result, no major changes

occurred before the surrender of Japan in

August 1945. Even then there was no

sudden reorganization, but only a reduction of staff, a gradual consolidation of

administrative groups, and the elimination

of specialized branches that were no longer

needed.

After the war the Ordnance Department

did not settle down immediately to a quiet

life of peacetime routine. Too many startling new developments were in the air. In

the closing months of 1945 it was widely

felt that the atomic bombs that had

blasted Hiroshima and Nagasaki had ushered in a new era in the history of war, or

indeed in the history of mankind. The new

forces miraculously unleashed from the

nucleus of the atom made the power of

TNT suddenly appear puny and outmoded. At the same time, the future

possibilities of long-range rockets and

guided missiles were taking definite shape.

Even without the atomic bomb these new

devices were in themselves sufficient to

mark a major turning point in the long

history of weapons. Some Ordnance men

were momentarily stunned by the thought

that rockets might some day render all

existing artillery obsolete. Was the era of

guns and howitzers that had opened about

the time of the battle of Crécy in 1346

now about to end after six long and turbulent centuries? Were small arms and tanks

to be of any military value in the future?

In the face of the onrushing weapons revolution, would any of the arsenals save

Redstone be able to hold their positions?

If future wars were waged with longrange missiles carrying atomic warheads

and lasted only thirty days, as some predicted, where was the value of procurement

planning? Of what use were production

plans or factories designed to swing into

war production after from three to six

months of conversion time? Would it ever

again be possible to concentrate great

quantities of supplies in huge depots of the

World War II type, either at home or

overseas? Would all the experience of

that war have any relevance at all to the

atomic war of the future?

These and many other questions went

through the minds of the Ordnance officers and key civilians who remained in

service after the war. There were no sure

answers immediately forthcoming. It

seemed to many Ordnance men that they

had successfully concluded one war, with

prodigious effort, only to find themselves

confronted with a host of new, baffling,

and yet challenging problems.

The situation was in some respects not

unlike that following the Armistice of

1918 when the armored tank and the

airplane appeared as dread new devices

that threatened to change altogether the

nature of war. People had said then, as

they were saying in the fall of 1945, that

war had become too terrible to contemplate and ought to be outlawed by international agreement. The older Ordnance

leaders could remember the earlier years;

their experience during the 1930's had

left them with little faith in leagues of

nations; they found it hard to comprehend the magnitude of the new weapons.

The younger men paid little heed to philosophical principles; they turned their attention to the immediate problems at hand,

began to pick up the scattered pieces left

by the departing armies, and worked to

master the techniques of the new science

of war.

9

 Campbell. The Industry-Ordnance Team, p.

444.
Bibliographical Note

As a starting point for their research on this volume, the authors turned

to the extensive collection of World War II records, both classified and unclassified, in the Historical Branch of the Executive Office, known as the Ordnance Historical Files (OHF). Here they found a comprehensive series of typewritten historical reports submitted quarterly during the war to the Historical

Branch. These reports had been prepared by the division and staff offices in

the Office Chief of Ordnance and by scores of Ordnance field installations,

including arsenals, depots, district offices, proving grounds, plants and works,

and decentralized headquarters such as OCO-Detroit and the Field Director

of Ammunition Plants in St. Louis. They were made on a quarterly basis for

the war years (1942-45); those from the older installations include introductory

sections outlining the prewar history, some going back for more than one

hundred years. In spite of their uneven quality, these reports were of inestimable value as records of major events and as accounts of the more important

problems and achievements. Their appended documents, photographs, maps,

charts, and statistical tables were particularly useful to the historians, as were

some of the historical narratives prepared by contractors to supplement the

histories of the Ordnance district offices.

Closely related to these periodic reports are many historical monographs—

generally referred to as project papers or project supporting papers. These

monographs had been prepared during the war, or soon after its close, by

members of the Historical Branch or by specialists in other branches of the

Office Chief of Ordnance. Each monograph covers a longer time span than do

the individual quarterly reports and endeavors to treat a broad topic in analytical fashion.

The Ordnance Historical Files also include a useful set of personal narratives known as Key Personnel Reports. These reports had been written at the

end of the war by Ordnance officers and civilians to describe their wartime

experiences. Of comparable importance are the minutes of General Wesson's

regular 11 o'clock conferences at which he discussed with his staff the major

problems facing the Department during the 1940-42 period. For Field Service

in the 1940-41 period, Col. James K. Grain's diary was invaluable. Of special

importance for the chapter on motor transport vehicles was the collection of

notes and documents assembled by Herbert R. Rifkind of the Historical Branch,

Office of The Quartermaster General, and turned over to the Ordnance Historical Branch.

After exhausting the OHF material on a given subject the authors turned to

a variety of other sources. Most important was the collection of retired Ordnance
478 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

records, dating back to 1940. At the time of research, these records were in

the custody of Departmental Records Branch (DRB) of The Adjutant General's

Office. Subsequent to their use for this volume, however, this collection of

records was transferred to the custody of the Federal Records Center, Region

3, General Services Administration, in Alexandria, Virginia. These records—

letters, memos, reports, conference minutes, and the like—were voluminous and

were not always systematically arranged for ready reference. For pre-1940

Ordnance records the authors went to the National Archives. They also made

intensive searches in the retired files of the Office of the Under Secretary of

War, the Army Service Forces, the G-4 Division of the War Department

General Staff, the Office of The Inspector General, the Transportation Corps,

the former Motor Transport Service of the Quartermaster Corps, and the War

Production Board. The series of volumes known as the Quartermaster Corps

Historical Studies proved useful, and the hearings of Congressional committees

were invaluable. The authors also consulted copies of lectures, committee reports, and research projects in the library of the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces and in the General Reference Section of the Office, Chief of

Military History. One of the. most useful works for the purposes of the present

volume, produced by the latter Office, was The Army and Economic Mobilization, by Dr. R. Elberton Smith, published in 1959.

Special mention needs to be made of Army Ordnance (now Ordnance),

the bimonthly publication of the American Ordnance Association, whose pages

included articles written by persons with firsthand knowledge. The Historical

Branch possessed a complete set of this remarkable periodical beginning with

the first issue of July-August 1920. There is scarcely a chapter in this volume

that is not indebted in one way or another to material first published in Army

Ordnance.

Final and most rewarding sources for the authors were interviews and

correspondence with persons who held key positions during the war, whether in

Ordnance or in other branches of the Army, and some industrial contractors,

all of whom had intimate personal knowledge of events. This correspondence

was carefully preserved, along with interview notes, and made a part of the

Ordnance Historical Files.
Glossary

AA

AAF

ACF

Acft

ACofAS

ACofS

ACofOrd

Actg

Admin

AEF

AF

AG

AGF

AGO

AIC

Ammo

ANMB

Ann

AOA

AP

APC

APG

API

App.

AR

Arty

ASF

ASP

Asst

ASW

AT

BAR

Bd

Br

Bull

Bur

CG

Cir

Antiaircraft

Army Air Forces

American Car and Foundry Company

Aircraft

Assistant Chief of Air Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff

Assistant Chief of Ordnance

Acting

Administration

American Expeditionary Forces (1917-18)

Air Force

Adjutant General

Army Ground Forces

Adjutant General's Office

Ammunition Identification Code

Ammunition

Army and Navy Munitions Board

Annual

Army Ordnance Association

Armor piercing

Automotive Production Committee

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Armor piercing incendiary

Appendix

Army Regulation

Artillery

Army Service Forces

Army Supply Program

Assistant

Assistant Secretary of War

Antitank

Browning automatic rifle

Board

Branch

Bulletin

Bureau

Commanding general

Circular
480 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Civ

CO

Co.

CofAC

CofAS

CofEngrs

CofFA

CofInf

CofOrd

CofS

Comdr

Comm.

Conf

Cong.

Contl

Contr

CPFF

DCofS

Dept

Dev

Dir

Dist

Div

DNT

Doc.

Dr

DRB

Dukw

EAM

ECO

Ed.

Educ

EEPL

Engr

ETO

ETOUSA

EUCOM

Ex.

Exec

ExecO

FA

FDAP

FEPC

Fig.

Civilian

Commanding officer

Company

Chief of Air Corps

Chief of Air Staff

Chief of Engineers

Chief of Field Artillery

Chief of Infantry

Chief of Ordnance

Chief of Staff

Commander

Committee

Conference

Congress

Control

Contract

Cost-plus-fixed-fee

Deputy Chief of Staff

Department

Development

Directive

District

Division

Dinitrotoluene

Document

Drawer

Departmental Records Branch

2-1/2-ton amphibian truck

Electrical accounting machines

Engineering Change Orders

Editor

Educational

Essential Extra Parts List

Engineering

European Theater of Operations

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

European Command

Exhibit

Executive

Executive Office

Field Artillery

Field Director of Ammunition Plants

President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices

Figure
GLOSSARY 481

Fisc

FM

FS

FTC

FY

G-3

G-4

GAO

GE

Gen

GF

GHQ

GMC

GO

GOCO

Gp

GP

GPF

HE

Hist

HP

Hq

H.R.

H.S.

IBM

ICAF

Incl

Ind

Inf

Info

Instr

Intel

Interv

IOC

JANASB

JTR

Ltr

Maint

MBCA

Memo

MDL

Mfg

MG

Fiscal

Field Manual

Field Service

Federal Trade Commission

Fiscal year

Operations and Training Division of the War Department General Staff

Supply Division of the War Department General Staff

General Accounting Office

General Electric

General

Ground Forces

General Headquarters

General Motors Corporation

General Order

Government-owned, contractor-operated

Group

General Purpose

Grande Puissance Filloux

High explosive

History

Horsepower

Headquarters

House of Representatives

Mustard gas

International Business Machines Corporation

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Inclosure

Industrial

Infantry

Information

Instruction

Intelligence

Interview

Introduction to the Ordnance Catalog

Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board

Joint Termination Regulations

Letter

Maintenance

Munitions Board Cataloging Agency

Memorandum

Maximum Distribution Level

Manufacturing

Machine gun
482 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Mil

Min

Misc

MS

Msg

Mtg

MTOUSA

MTS

MWO

NA

NADA

Natl

NATO

NATOUSA

N.d.

NDAC

NDRC

No.

NRA

OASW

OC

OCM

OCMH

OCO

OCO-D

OD

ODO

OHF

00

OOM

OP

OPM

Opns

OPSI

Ord

Orgn

OSRD

OSW

OUSW

OWMR

Par.

PASO

Pers

PL

Military

Minutes

Miscellaneous

Manuscript

Message

Meeting

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Motor Transport Service

Modification Work Order

National Archives

National Automobile Dealers Association

National

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

No date

National Defense Advisory Commission

National Defense Research Committee

Number

National Rifle Association

Office of the Assistant Secretary of War

Ordnance Committee

Ordnance Committee Minutes

Office of the Chief of Military History

Office of the Chief of Ordnance

Office, Chief of Ordnance-Detroit

Ordnance Department

Ordnance Department Order

Ordnance Historical Files

Ordnance Office

Ordnance Office Message

Ordnance plant

Office of Production Management

Operations

Ordnance Publications for Supply Index

Ordnance

Organization

Office of Scientific Research and Development

Office of the Secretary of War

Office of the Under Secretary of War

Office War Manpower and Reconversion

Paragraph

Philadelphia Ammunition Supply Office

Personnel

Public Law
GLOSSAR

Y 48

3

Plng

PMP

POW

PP

PR

Proc

Prod

PSP

PT

PWP

QM

QMC

QMG

QMR

Rcd

R&D

Rds

RDX

Ref

Regt

REME

Res

Ret

Rev

RP

Rpt

Rqmt

S.

SA

SAE

SC

Sec

SecNav

Secy

Serv

Sess.

SNL

SO

SOS

SP

Spec

SR

Stat

Stat.

Planning

Protective Mobilization Plan

Prisoner of War

Project Paper

Procurement Regulations

Procurement

Production

Project Supporting Paper

Point detonating

Preliminary work plan

Quartermaster

Quartermaster Corps

Quartermaster General

Quartermaster Review

Record

Research and Development

Rounds

Research Department Explosive (cyclonite)

Reference

Regiment

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Resolution

Retired

Review

Research Project

Report

Requirement

Senate

Small arms

Society of Automotive Engineers

Service command

Section

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary

Service

Session

Standard Nomenclature List

Special Order

Services of Supply

Self-propelled

Special

Senate Resolution

Statistical

Statutes
484 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Sup

Supp.

SW

T-AC

TAG

TCVD

Tech

Telcon

Telg

TIG

TM

Tng

TNT

T/OE

TORCH

TQMG

U.K.

USAF

USSBS

USSR

USW

V-E

V-J

WD

WDAB

WDBO

WDGS

W.P.

WPB

WPD

ZI

Supply

Supplement

Secretary of War

Tank-Automotive Center

The Adjutant General

Tank and Combat Vehicle Division

Technical

Telephone conversation

Telegram

The Inspector General

Training Manual

Training

Trinitrotoluene

Tables of Organization and Equipment

Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942

The Quartermaster General

United Kingdom

United States Air Force

United States Strategic Bombing Survey

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

Under Secretary of War

Victory in Europe

Victory in Japan

War Department

War Department Appropriations Bill

War Department Budget Officer

War Department General Staff

White phosphorus

War Production Board

War Plans Division

Zone of Interior
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
486 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 7, 169, 172, 229, 326-

29, 361, 390-91, 424

AC Spark Plug Division (GMC), 180

Accepted Schedules of Production, 17, 28-31, 468

Adamson, Maj. Keith F., 352

Administrative Service, postwar proposal for, 473

Advisory Commission to the Council of National

Defense (NDAC), 16

Affiliated units, Ordnance regiments, 447

Air Corps, U.S. Army. See Air Forces, U.S. Army.

Air Forces, U.S. Army, 4, 6, 11, 29, 38, 44, 51, 55,

57, 79, 98, 106, 119, 143, 197, 245, 250, 348,

363, 369, 373-74, 386, 432, 448, 453

Air Technical Service Command, 51

Aircraft guns, 79-81, 90, 99, 101, 154, 156, 159,

180-81, 214

Algeria, requirements teams sent to, 50

Allegany Ordnance Plant, 200, 203, 218

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 15, 79,

293

Allocation of plants, 15, 19, 29-31

Amatol, 120, 134

American Bantam Car Company, 270, 273, 276-79,

295

American Brass Company, 196

American Can Company, 216

American Car and Foundry Company, 225-26, 231,

241-43, 246, 249-52, 257, 302, 304

American Locomotive Company, 225-26, 230-31,

233-34, 241-42, 259, 304

American Revolution, 188, 360

American Rifleman, The, 165

American Steel Foundries, 249

American Type Founders, Inc., 73, 81, 87

Ammonia plants, location of, 109-10

Ammonium nitrate, 134

Ammonium picrate, 111-12

Ammunition, artillery

and crisis in 1944-45, 144-50

dollar value of, 106, 147

expenditures for, 148

First Phase loading plants for, 109

first prewar depots for, 366-68

GOCO plants for, 105, 107-53

heavy, 144-50

light, 146, 149

means of identification of, 423-25

medium, 146, 149

metal components for. 113-24

preparation for, 125-53

production of, 107-08, 125-53

quality of, 150-53

Ammunition, artillery—Continued

requirements for, 112

Second Phase plants for, 109

shortage of in ETO, 148, 469

sites for plants, 108-10

stocks on hand in 1940, 104

storage of, 364-65

tactical use of, 104

types of procured, 106, 147, 152

Ammunition, balancing production of, 140-44

Ammunition, direct shipments of, 433-35

Ammunition Division, Industrial Service, 107, 114,

117, 125, 140-44, 146, 153, 329

Ammunition Identification Code, 424

Ammunition, small arms

belts for, 213-14

contrasted with artillery ammunition, 189

cutbacks in production of, 217-21

and descriptions of manufacture, 204-05

Educational orders for, 192

Fifth Wave, 202-03

First Wave, 194-95

foreign orders for, 192

Fourth Wave, 200-202

Frankford Arsenal production of, 190-93

for Garand rifle, 165

GOCO plants for, 193-203

increase in rate of fire of, 188

inspection of, 207-11

machinery for production of, 191-92

packing of, 216-17

prewar plans for production of, 191-92

quantities produced, 188-89, 219

requirements for, 199-203, 469

reserves of, 190

Second Wave, 195-97

shortage of, 195

steel cartridge cases for, 213

suboffice for, 203-04

Third Wave, 197-98

transfer to British, 190

types of, 189, 220

Ammunition supply, 423-39

control of excess stocks 435-39

direct shipments, 433-35

distribution, 429-39

Lend-lease shipments, 430-31

lot numbers, 424

methods of reporting, 425-26

Ammunition Supply Branch (Division), Field Service, 364, 426, 433, 436, 438-39

Anhydrous ammonia, 112
488 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Anniston Ordnance Depot, 367, 369, 376, 378-80,

382, 389-91

Antiaircraft guns, 61, 76-79, 90, 101

Antitank guns, 61, 81-85, 87-90

Aparejo, 354

Appropriations, 1-2, 24, 44, 55, 363-65

Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives, 128

Arkansas Ordnance Plant, 127

Arma steel, for machine guns, 181

Armor, body, 185-86

Armor, tank, 247-50, 330

Armored cars, 238

Armored Force, 4, 53, 227-28, 245, 261, 263

Armored Force Board, 222, 261

Armory. See Springfield Armory.

Armstrong, Brig. Gen. Donald, 240

Armstrong Cork Company, 116

Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), 19,

38-39, 80, 270, 284, 433

Army Ground Forces, 62, 100-101, 143, 261, 386,

432, 436, 446, 458

Army Industrial College, 11, 30. See also Industrial

College of the Armed Forces.

Army Motors, 452-53

Army Ordnance, 23, 35, 466, 478

Army Ordnance Association, 11, 19, 23, 161, 466,

478

Army Regulations, and transport vehicles, 269, 284

Army Service Forces, 95, 246, 284, 407, 432, 478

and Army Supply Program, 61-64, 142

and echelon system of maintenance, 449

and excess ammunition, 437-39

and functional organization of technical services,

475

and heavy artillery, 101

and heavy artillery ammunition, 144-45

and heavy-heavy trucks, 286

and importance of stock control system, 410

influence of on Ordnance Department, 467-69

and inspection practices, 331

and instructions for terminating contracts, 348-49

and McCoy Board Report, 65

and medium tanks, 257

and Readjustment Division, 346

and reallocation of depot space, 379, 386-87

and reconditioning of tanks, 258

and requirements, 50-51, 54, 142

and small arms ammunition, 1944, 221

and spare parts supply, 306

and stock control, 415, 421, 470-71

and studies of item identification, 408

and supply control program, 416-18

and supply procedures, 401-02

and termination manual, 345

and transfer of motor vehicles to Ordnance, 282-

83, 399

and utilization of small business, 42

Army Supply Program (ASP), 54, 58-64, 91-92,

96, 100, 142-44, 171, 175, 180, 238, 240, 250,

261, 281, 287

Arnold, Gen. Henry H., 121

Arsenals, 15-16, 20, 467. See also individual arsenals

by name.

and artillery production, 72-76

modernization of, 22

placement of orders with in 1940, 26-27

and relations with District offices and OCO, 31-32

after Revolutionary War, 360

and role in prewar planning, 5, 12-13

and small arms production, 160

and training of inspectors, 323-24

Artillery Division, Ordnance, 224, 226

Artillery weapons

and aircraft bombing, 102-04

compared with small arms, 154

early neglect of, 68-69

exacting nature of production of, 71-72

fire control instruments for, 72, 95-99

German. 68, 102

heavy, 68, 90, 100-103

new types of, 69, 99-100

production goals for, 83-84, 91

production preparedness for, 71-74

production techniques for, 92-95

self-propelled, 90, 100-101, 236-38

summary of production of, 101

supplies of on hand in 1940, 1, 3-4, 69-71

transfer of to British, 70

3-inch gun, 70-71, 73, 76, 84, 87-88, 91, 100,

152, 260

4.5-inch gun, 83, 100, 152

8-inch gun, 68, 83, 89, 145, 150-52

8-inch howitzer, 70, 83, 100, 145, 150-52, 440

16-inch howitzer, proposed, 101

20-mm. aircraft gun, 79-80, 84, 87, 100, 152

37-mm. AA gun, 70, 75-76, 78, 84-86, 152

37-mm. AT gun, 70, 75, 81, 84, 88, 91, 100, 147,

152

37-mm. tank gun, 70, 81, 84, 87, 99, 152

37-mm. aircraft gun, 76, 80-81, 84, 100, 152

40-mm. AA gun, 77-78, 85-86, 91, 99, 152

57-mm. AT gun, 88, 91, 146, 152

57-mm. tank gun, 252-53

75-mm. gun, 69-70, 81-84, 88, 99, 147, 152, 226,

228, 252-53

75-mm. howitzer, 70, 73, 81-82, 84, 88, 147, 152

76-mm. gun, 88, 100, 152, 253, 261

90-mm. AA gun, 73, 75-78, 84-86, 91, 99, 152

90-mm. tank and AT gun, 88, 102, 146, 152, 261

105-mm. AA gun, 70

105-mm. howitzer, 70, 83-84, 88, 100, 146, 152,

253, 261

120-mm. AA gun, 99-100

155-mm. gun, 68, 70, 83-84, 89, 100, 146-47,

150-52, 440
INDEX 489

Artillery weapons—Continued

155-mm. howitzer, 70-71, 83, 88, 100, 150-52

240-mm. howitzer, 68, 70, 83, 89, 100. 145, 150-

52

Ashton, Capt. J. D., 352

Assistant Secretary of War, 4-5, 9, 11, 16-17, 34,

37, 59, 193-95, 269, 271, 273, 303, 396. See

also Patterson, Robert P.

Associated Press, 165

Atlanta Base Shop, 458

Atlanta Ordnance Depot, 385, 389-90, 402

Atlantic Clipper, 7

Atlas Powder Company, 32, 112

Atomic bomb, 6, 476

Attorney General, U.S., 40, 123, 342, 349

Auditing, and contract settlement, 340-44

Augusta Arsenal, 336, 362, 382, 473-74

Augusta Ordnance Depot, 353, 388, 390, 402

Aurand, Brig. Gen. Henry S., 171

Australia, requirements team sent to, 50

Auto Ordnance Corporation, 158

Autocar Company, 88, 273, 287, 292

Autofrettage. See Cold-working of gun tubes.

Automotive Council for War Production, 281, 316

Automotive parts. See Spare parts.

Automotive Production Committee of WPB, 288-89

Aviation ordnance, 51-52

Axles, 273-74

Badger Ordnance Works, 111, 138

Bag loading, methods of, 140

Baker Board (1934), 361

Balanced Program. See Army Supply Program.

Baldwin, Hanson, 223

Baldwin Locomotive Works, 225-26, 230-31, 233-

34, 242, 256-57, 260-61, 304

Ball powder, 220

Ballistic Research Laboratory, 327

Bantam Car Company. See American Bantam Car

Company.

Barkley, Senator Alben W., 372

Barlow, Lester P., 7

Barnes, Maj. Gen. Gladeon M., 40, 465, 467, 474

Barroll, Lawrence S., 303-04, 396, 398, 404

Baruch, Bernard, 146, 402

Baruch-Hancock Report, 347-48

Base shops, Ordnance, 458

Basic Nomenclature and Classification File, 358

Battalions, Ordnance, 6, 444-47

Battle of the Bulge, 418

Bausch and Lomb Optical Company, 75, 96-97

Baxter, James Phinney, 123n

Baytown Ordnance Works, 43, 110, 135, 204

Bazooka rocket launcher, 182-84

Beaverbrook, Lord, 59, 234, 237-38

Becker, Col. Ward E., 315

Bell Telephone Laboratories, 329

Bell Telephone System, 327

Belts, ammunition, 213-15

Bendix Aviation Corporation, 75, 79-80, 122, 169.

273

Bendix Carburetor Company, 314

Bendix Products Division, 273-74

Ben Hur Company, 295

Benicia Arsenal, 365, 374. 376

Benicia Ordnance Depot, 353, 362, 387-88, 438

Big business, and share of defense contracts, 40

Binoculars, 96-97

Birkigt type 404, Hispano-Suiza gun, 79

Birmingham Ordnance District, 18

Black Hills Ordnance Depot, 375-76, 378, 381-82,

387-88, 390

Blake Manufacturing Corporation, 178n

Blandy, Admiral W. H. P., 134

Bliss, E. W., Company, 192

Blue Grass Ordnance Depot, 372, 377-78, 381-82,

387, 391

Bodine, Lt. Col. Robert N., 364

Body armor, 185-86

Bofors Company, 77

Bofors 40-mm. AA gun, 77

Bombs, 2, 6, 52, 106, 119-21, 128, 143, 147, 152

Book of Standards, Ordnance Department, 358

Booth, Lt. Col. Lucian D., 352

Borg-Warner Corporation, 273-74

Boston Ordnance District, 323, 331, 346

Boston Wire Stitcher Company, 178n

Brace-Mueller-Huntley, Inc., 177

Brandt, Edgar, 89

Brass, 118-19, 196, 205, 213

Bridgeport Brass Company, 27, 118, 196

Briggs, Dr. Lyman J., 6

British Army, supply system of, 352, 355

British government, 38, 59, 62, 70, 110-11, 155-56,

158, 180, 192, 199

British Ministry of War Transport, 431

British Purchasing Commission, 98, 136, 431

British rearmament, 33

British report on spare parts, 305

British Tank Commission (1940), 227

British Tank Mission (1942), 236

British tank production, 223, 264

Brockway Motor Truck Company, 287

Brown, Lewis H., 390, 402

Browning automatic rifle (BAR), 56, 155-56, 170-

72, 178

Browning machine guns, 159, 179-81

Brown-Lipe-Chapin Division (GMC), 180

Brunton Pocket Transit, 96

Buckeye Ordnance Works, 110

Bucyrus-Erie Company, 15

Budd Wheel Company, 27, 273-74

Buffalo Arms Corporation, 159, 180, 182

Buhl, Maj. Charles M., 405-06

Buick Division (GMC), 246

Bullets, for small arms ammunition, 205-07
490 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Bulova Watch Company, 99

Bunker Hill, 151

Bureau of the Budget, U.S., 112, 218, 255-57, 409

Bureau of Standards, 6

Burgan, Wilfred G., 318-19

Burns, Maj. Gen. James H., 12, 33-34, 465

Burroughs, Lt. Richard T., Jr., 426-27

Bush, E. J., 289-90

Bush, Vannevar, 124

"Butterflies" (bombs), 119

Byron Jackson Company, 7 3

Cactus Ordnance Works, 110

Cadillac Motor Company, 242, 248, 250-52

Calhoun, Capt. Joseph J., 434

California Institute of Technology, 138

Campbell, Lt. Gen. Levin H., 40, 203. 222, 412,

418, 421, 427, 431 434, 453, 455, 464-65

and creation of T-AC, 240

and credit for jeep development, 279

and decentralization of stock control, 412-13

and Drew Pearson's charges, 209

and GOCO plants, 125

and heavy artillery, 101

and heavy artillery ammunition, 145-46

and heavy-heavy trucks, 287-89

and industry integration committees, 122-23

and inspection, 325

and low priority for Ordnance, 39

and machine tool panels, 91

and master depot system, 390-91

and Ordnance designs, 35

and placement of contracts with big business, 41

and postwar plans, 472-76

and production shortcuts, 94

and Safety Branch, 131

and selection of plant operators, 113

and spare parts, 301, 305-06, 310, 395, 398, 413

and specifications, 115-16

and St. Louis plant episode, 209

and Stock Control Branch, 415

and tank overhaul, 258

and tank production, 257

and termination of ammunition contracts, 219

and transfer of trucks to Ordnance, 283

Camp Eustis, 440, 442

Camp Hood, 460

Camp Jackson, 440, 442

Camp Meade, 442

Camp Perry, 164, 326-27

Candler Motor Supply Depot, 385

Carbine Production Committee, 175

Carbines, 154-55, 168-70, 174-78

Carlisle, Capt. Hollis M., 431-33

Carlisle Hardware Company, 431

Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, 233, 248-49

Carter Carburetor Division, 314

Carteret Motor Reception Park, 385

Cartridge cases, 118-19, 204-13

Case, Brig. Gen. Rolland W., 306

Cassino, use of artillery at, 104

Caterpillar Tractor Company, 233, 246, 253, 293

Cavalry, 4, 168

Central Planning Committee, Artillery Division, 92

Centrifugal casting, 92-94

Chandler, Senator Albert B., 372

Chapman, Rep. Virgil, 372

Charleston Ordnance Depot, 109, 363, 387, 438

Charleston Port of Embarkation, 391

Chase Brass and Copper Company, 196

Chavin, Col. Raphael S., 399

Checker Cab Company, 295

Chemical Warfare Service, 106, 120, 186, 362, 460

Cheney Bigelow Wire Works, 184

Cherokee Ordnance Works, 136

Chester Tank Depot, 254

Chevrolet Division (GMC), 79, 86, 274

Chicago Core Plant, 198

Chicago Ordnance District, 15, 91, 343-45

Chicago Tribune, 4

Chickasaw Ordnance Works, 110

Chief of Coast Artillery, 77

Chief of Field Artillery, 83

Chief of Ordnance, 5, 15-16, 20, 31, 36, 83, 127,

143, 219, 341, 351, 396, 400, 412, 416, 427.

See also names of individual chiefs: Campbell;

Tschappat; Wesson; Williams,

and bazooka rocket launcher, 182

and depot plans, 361-62, 369, 372

and educational orders, 323

and electrical accounting machines, 397

and freezing designs, 34-35

and inspection of matériel, 323-24, 334

and placement of contracts, 15-16, 28

and replacement factors, 49

and Service Command Shops, 457

and spare parts, 305, 395-96, 398, 413

and staff enlarged, 28-29

and truck procurement, 268

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 4, 5, 70, 268, 450

China, orders by, 158, 192

Christmas, Brig. Gen. John K., 232, 234-35, 238,

240, 245, 253, 255, 286, 288

Chrysler Corporation, 32, 77-78, 85, 202-03, 216,

228-31, 233, 243, 270, 273, 305, 311

Chrysler tank arsenal. See Detroit Tank Arsenal.

Churchill, Winston S., 59, 199, 469

Cincinnati Field Survey, 42, 325

Cincinnati Ordnance District, 28, 325

Civil Service Commission, U.S., 323

Civilian Automotive Adviser Program, 452-53

Civilian Conservation Corps, 270

Clark Equipment Company, 274, 288

Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D., 65, 146, 238, 245-46,

287

Cleveland Ordnance District, 13, 28
INDEX 491

Cleveland Tractor Company, 293

Clifford, Colonel, 414

Coast Artillery, 4, 77

Coast Guard, 423, 453

Cold-working of gun tubes, 92

Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company,

27, 75-76, 78, 80, 85, 156, 158-59, 179-81, 185

Columbus General Depot, 382, 391

Combined shops, 458-61

Company, ammunition, 445

Company, Ordnance maintenance, 441, 443, 445,

451

Company (Heavy Maintenance), 33rd Ordnance,

443

Compasses, 96

Competitive bidding, 267

Comptroller General, U.S., 267-68, 347

Congress, 1, 2, 7, 11, 19, 21, 24, 32, 40, 160, 162,

166, 170-71, 360-61, 371

Congressional Record, The, 128

Consolidated Stores Reports, 402, 411

Constant velocity joints, 273-74

Continental Foundry and Machine Company, 249

Continental Motors Company. 225, 244-45, 288,

341

Contract Settlement Act (1944), 348

Contract Settlement, Office of, 348-50

Contractors, criteria for selection of, 113

Contracts, 16-17

businessmen's attitude toward, 29

CPFF, 110, 113, 127

criticism of terms of, 129-30

ground rules for negotiation of, 28

placement with industry in 1940, 26-27

settlement of, 339-50

speedy placement of, 36

termination of, 339-50

Control Division, ASF, 306, 417, 420

Controlled Materials Plan, 177

Copper, shortage of, 119, 197-98, 202, 213

Corbitt Company, 273, 275, 287, 294

Cordite, 137

Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, 204

Corning Glass Works, 99

Corps Areas, 354, 362, 443. See also Service Commands.

Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.

Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (CPFF), 16, 113. 127,

130, 256, 349

Cotton linters, 136-37

Cowdrey Machine Works, 73, 82, 87

Craig, Gen. Malin, 3, 70n

Crain, Maj. Gen. James K., 5-6, 448, 465

diary of, 477

and plans for Ordnance battalions, 444-45

and plans for storage facilities, 364, 383

and proposed Ordnance regiments, 447

Crain, Maj. Gen. James K.—Continued

and selection of depot sites, 367, 370-72

and spare parts supply, 303-05

and World War I experience, 352, 444, 466

Creamer, Jack, 308

Crécy, battle of, 476

Cressona Ordnance Plant, 461

Crim, Maj. Lemuel P., 367

Cross Reference List of Ordnance Part and Stock

Numbers, 406-07

Crosshauling of ammunition, 429-39

Crowell, Benedict, 23, 72, 135, 466.

Crowley, Patrick E., 13

Cummings, Col. Emerson L.. 289

Cuneo Press, Inc., 198

Curtis Bay Ordnance Depot, 353, 363, 387, 438

Cutbacks in ammunition program, 1943, 143-44

Cyclonite, See RDX.

Davis, C. K., 191

Davis, Senator James J., 372

Davis, Brig. Gen. Merle H., 140, 151, 208

Day of supply for ammunition, 48-51, 199, 217

Decentralization, 13-16, 411-13, 467

Defense Aid depots. See War Aid depots.

Defense Contract Service of OPM, 41

Defense Industries, Ltd., 221

Defense Plant Corporation, 196, 249

Defense program, criticism of, 34-35, 57

Defense Special Trains, 41

Defense Supplies Corporation, 158

Deitrick, Maj. Carroll H., 371-75

Delaware Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 387

Denver Ordnance Plant, 43, 194, 200, 218

Depots. See also names of individual depots.

"A" and "B" types of, 378

for ammunition, 387

changes in mission of, 391-94

cost of, 377-78

evaluation of, 393-94

general, 353, 382

master depot system of, 389-91

overconstruction of, 469

plans for renovating ammunition at, 109

problems concerning, 376-79

reallocation of by ASF, 386-87

and storage of general supplies, 379-83

for tanks, 254-55

transfer of from QMC, 383-86

types of, 352-53, 387-89

War Aid, 380-81, 383, 385

after World War I, 360

Depression, effect of on procurement planning, 10

Deputy Chief of Ordnance, proposal for, 473

Descriptions of manufacture, 156-57

Desert Training Center, 385

Designs, Ordnance, 34-35, 225-29
492 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Des Moines Ordnance Plant, 195, 200, 202, 203,

221

Detonators, machines for loading, 138

Detroit cup plant, 200

Detroit Ordnance District, 28, 184

Detroit Ordnance Plant, 32

Detroit Tank Arsenal, 86, 234, 246, 463, 473-74

construction of, 227-30

cost of tanks produced at, 256

development of, 242-43

total production at, 242

Devers, Maj. Gen. Jacob L., 245, 261

DeWitt, Maj. Gen. John L., 268-69

Diamond T Motor Company, 88, 273, 275, 287,

293, 295

Dickson, Brig. Gen. Tracy C., 93

Dickson Gun Plant, 94

Diebold, Inc., 249

Directors, 97-98

Disston, Henry and Sons, 233, 249

Distribution factor, 51

Distribution Unit, Field Service, 432-33

District Administration Branch, 31

District Offices, Ordnance, 11, 305, 310, 466-67,

474

"activation" of in 1940, 27

contracting procedures of, 28

evaluation of, 22

and inspection practices, 325

personnel of, 29

prewar plans and organization of, 13-16

relations of with arsenals and OCO, 31-32

and termination of contracts, 344-46

and training of inspectors, 323-24

and utilization of small business, 41

Division, armored, 53

Division, triangular, 53, 444

Division, 26th Infantry, 455

Dixie Ordnance Works, 110

DNT, 43

Dodge Motor Company, 274

Dominion Arsenal, 221

Dominion Engineering Works (Canada), 184

Drefs, Arthur G., 314

Dresser Manufacturing Company, 116

Drewry, Brig. Gen. Guy, 198, 211

Dukw (21⁄2-ton amphibian), 258, 284-86, 295-97

Dunkards, and opposition to depot, 372

Duplex Printing Press Company, 81

DuPont Company, 27, 32, 110, 112

Duraloy Company, 73

Eastman Kodak Company, 73, 96-97

Eaton Company, 288

Eau Claire Ordnance Plant, 200, 218

Echelon system, problems of, 448-50

Eclipse Machine Division (Bendix Aviation), 79

Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured Product,

The, 327

Edgewood Arsenal, 362

Edison G. E. Appliance Company, 198

Educational orders, 5-6, 18-22, 73, 86, 95, 97, 114,

116, 157, 163, 174, 192. 224-25, 468

Educational Orders Act (1938), 19, 192, 323

Edwards, George D., 329-30

Egypt, requirements team sent to, 50

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 102,

285

Eisner, Will, 454

Electric Auto-Lite Company, 254

Electrical accounting machines, 386, 396, 421, 470

Elgin National Watch Company, 15

Elliott Addressing Machine Company, 178n

Elliott Fisher bookkeeping machines, 397, 426

Elwood Ordnance Plant, 110, 131

Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corporation, 124

Empire Ordnance Corporation, 82, 87

Enfield rifles, 56, 156, 170

Engel, Rep. Albert J., 128, 132

Engineering Administrative Branch, 405, 408

Engineering Advisory Committees, 36, 39-40

Engineering Change Orders, 297

Engineering Division, OCO-Detroit, 297

Engineers, Corps of, 110, 186, 244-46, 253, 283,

293, 460

Engines, 244-46, 265, 297

England, requirements team sent to, 50

Equipment, "critical" and "essential" items of, 46,

55

Equipment Division of Field Service, 364, 398

Erie Proving Ground, 326, 390, 442

Essential Extra Parts Lists (EEPL's), 463

European Theater of Operations

and heavy-heavy trucks, 291

recoilless rifles in, 184

return of excess stocks from, 437-39

shortage of ammunition in, 148-49

surplus matériel in at end of war, 150

Evansville Ordnance Plant, 200, 202-03, 218, 259

Evening Star, 165

Excess stocks, 418-20, 435-39

Executive Order No. 9001, 342

Expenditure Programs (1940-42), 24-25, 55-58, 60,

62

Explosions, accidental, 130-31

Explosives Safety Branch, 131

Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) 212-

13

Fairless, Benjamin F., 402

False Claims Act, 210

Fargo Division (Chrysler), 274

Farrell, James A., 13

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 208

Federal Cartridge Company, 196, 203

Federal Machine and Welder Company, 242, 256

Federal Motor Truck Company, 273, 275, 287

Federal Standard Stock Catalog, 357, 402-04, 408
INDEX 493

Federal Trade Commission, 279

Fees, contractors', 129-30

Ferguson, Senator Homer, 102-03

Ferrous Metallurgical Advisory Board, 248-49

Field Artillery, 4, 57, 441

Field Director of Ammunition Plants, 125-30, 143,

203, 467, 477

Field Service, 5, 460, 473

and ammunition supply, 217, 423-39

decentralization of, 411-13

and depots, 352-54, 360-78, 379-94, 469-70

establishment of, 351-52

and IBM machines, 396-98, 426-27

and Lend-Lease shipments, 430-31

and maintenance, 440-64, 471-72

and Ordnance Provision System, 354-58, 410-11

and parts numbering, 402-03

and spare parts, 302-07, 398-99, 402-07, 413-14.

470

and Standard Nomenclature Lists, 358-59

and stock control, 410-22, 471

and transfer of motor vehicles to Ordnance, 399-

401

Fincke, D. M., 176

Finland, orders by, 192

Fire control instruments, 72, 95-99, 336-37

Fire Control Sub-Office (Frankford), 85, 96, 99,

336-37

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 77-78, 90,

94, 99

First War Powers Act, 342

Fisher Body Division (GMC), 233

Fisher tank arsenal, 233, 235, 242, 253, 256-57, 261

Flannery Bolt Company, 185

Flora, George B. McClellan, 373

Forbes, Maj. Gen. A., 355n

Ford, Col. Elbert L., 81

Ford Motor Company, 86, 235, 242, 246, 249, 254,

256, 267, 270, 273, 277, 296, 311

Foreign orders, 158

Fort Benning, 305

Fort Crook Depot, 389

Fort Knox, 459-60

Fort Lewis, 385

Fort McClellan, 367

Fort Pitt Bedding Company, 215

Fort Wayne Ordnance Depot, 385, 387, 389-90,

392, 419

Fort Wingate, 366-67

Four Wheel Drive Company, 273, 287

Fourth Corps, Ordnance battalion with, 445

France, 1, 7, 38, 158, 192

Frankford Arsenal, 11, 27, 35, 42, 72, 120, 133 221,

390, 412, 467

and artillery ammunition, 105, 114, 118

and fire control instruments, 95-98, 353

Fire Control Sub-Office at, 85

and fuzes, 122-23

Frankford Arsenal—Continued

maintenance sub-office at, 463

and postwar plans, 473-74

and small arms ammunition, 190-95, 218, 466

and Small Arms Ammunition Sub-Office, 203

and steel cartridge cases, 213

Franklin, Lt. Col. Edward C., 175-76

French Eleventh Corps, 444

Frigidaire Division (GMC), 180

Frink, Brig. Gen. James L., 283, 308-09

Fruehauf Trailer Company, 294-95

Fuller Company, 274, 288

Functional organization, ASF plan for, 475

Furlough program, 146

Fuzes, 121-24

Gadsden Ordnance Plant, 43, 111, 115

Gage laboratories, 326

Gage Section. Ordnance, 326

Gages, 18-19, 326

Gallagher, Lt. Col. William, 333-34

Gamrath, Col. W. C., 393, 414

Garand, John C., 161, 169

Garand rifle, 157, 160-68, 173-74

Garner, John Nance, 2

Gary Armor Plant, 249

Gause, G. Rupert, 331n

Gear Grinding Machine Company, 273-74

General Accounting Office, 342, 347, 349

General Aviation Equipment Company, 215

General Board, U.S. Forces, ETO, 153

General depots, 382

General Electric Company, 13, 31, 75, 99, 124,

183-84

General Grant tank (M3), 82, 229, 235, 246, 252-

54, 263

General Inspection Manual (1935-38), 322

General Motors Corporation, 27, 106, 270, 273, 296,

306, 311, 313. See also divisions by name.

General Motors Overseas Operations, 308n, 396, 398

General Pershing tank (M26), 259, 262

General Sherman tank (M4), 235, 252-56, 263

General Staff, War Department, 46-48, 54, 352, 432,

436

and artillery, 68

and depot sites, 365-67, 377

and expansion of depots, 380-83, 386

and feasibility dispute, 62

G-3, 52

G-4, 4, 25, 48, 52, 55, 59, 81, 102, 145, 193-97,

365-67, 380, 436-37, 478

and procurement objectives in 1940, 24

and storage requirements in 1940, 363-64

and tank requirements, 234

War Plans Division of, 59

General Steel Castings Corporation, 248-49

General Stuart tank, 226

General supplies, storage of, 365-66
494 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

General Supply Branch, 398-99, 402, 411

Gerber, Col. Theodore C., 125, 127, 130-31

German army, 226-27

Germany, 33, 239, 259-64, 292, 465

Gerstenslager Company, 295

Gillespie, Col. Alexander G., 226-27

Gillespie, T. A., Company, 130

Gitzendanner, Maj. F. A., 335n

Glancy, Brig. Gen. Alfred R., 240, 256

Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 87

Gopher Ordnance Plant, 145

Government-owned, contractor-operated plants

(GOCO), 13, 468-69. See also Field Director of

Ammunition Plants and names of individual plants.

for artillery ammuntion, 105-53

competition among, 127-28

contracts for in 1940, 32-33

dual control at, 126-27

for small arms ammunition, 194-221

Gramm Company, 295

"Grand Slam" bombs, 119, 147

Green, Dr. Constance M., 333

Gregory, Maj. Gen. Edmund B., 276, 279-80

Grenades, 152

Griffenhagen and Associates, 408

Gross, Lt. Col. Boone, 203, 217

Group, Ordnance, 447

Group chiefs, Field Service, 357, 399, 410

Groups, supply, 356-57

Guiberson Diesel Engine Company, 227, 244, 341-42

Guide Lamp Division (GMC), 182

Guided missiles, 476

Gulf Ordnance Plant, 144

Gulick, Dr. Luther, 325

Gun motor carriages, 88, 237

Gunner's quadrant. See Fire Control Instruments.

Guns. See Artillery weapons.

Haines, Rep. Harry L., 372

Half track cars, 88, 292-93

Half Track Industry Integration Committee, 293

Hambleton, Col. Harry B., 405-06

Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 13

Hardy, Brig. Gen. Roswell E., 130, 140, 142, 144

Hare, Lt. Col. Ray M., 30

Harrington and Richardson Arms Company, 157-

58

Harris, Maj. Gen. Charles T., Jr., 22, 37-39, 59,

114, 197, 226, 228, 325, 465, 468

and additional ammunition plants. 197-200

and British requirements, 199

as chief of Industrial Service, 5-6, 13

as chief of Planning Branch, 9

and defense of Ordnance program, 57-58

and designs for mass production, 35

and machine tool deliveries, 39

and plans for new facilities, 12, 32

and plans for postwar organization, 472-76

Harris, Maj. Gen. Charles T., Jr.—Continued

and requirements, 57, 238

and small arms ammunition production, 199, 217

and spare parts, 303-05

and White House conference on tanks, 232

Harris, Col. John P., 108-09, 134-35

Harris Board Report, 472-76

Hatch, Senator Carl A., 103

Hatcher, Maj. Gen. Julian S., 402, 407, 415, 465

Hauseman, Col. David N., 346

Hayes, Maj. Gen. Thomas J., 119, 197, 208, 213,

259, 287, 289, 331, 474

Height finders. See Fire control instruments.

Helmets, 34, 186

Henry Disston and Sons, 233, 249

Hercules Motor Company, 273, 275, 288

Hercules Powder Company, 32, 112, 131, 137-38

Herlong, Capt. Henry W., 374

Heron, Col. Thomas, 355

Hertz Committee, report of, 282, 452

High Standard Manufacturing Company, 158-59,

185

Highway Company, 295

Hinchcliffe, Arthur, 425

Hiroshima, 476

Hispano-Suiza gun, 79

Hitler, Adolf, 1, 223, 239

Hoe, R. and Co., 73, 75, 86

Holabird QM Depot, 268, 385-86

Holston Ordnance Works, 111, 136

Hoover Commission, 395

Hopkins, Harry L., 234

Houston, Sam, 370

Houston Ship Channel, 370

Houston Tool Company, 94

Howard, Col. Graeme K., 404

Howitzers. See Artillery weapons.

Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 364, 413, 464

Humble Oil and Refining Company, 135

Hurley, Roy T., 122

Hutchinson, B. Edwin, 402

Huth, Capt. C., 352

Hyde, George J., 169

Hynds, Maj. William, 399

IBM machines, 396-98, 421, 426-28. See also International Business Machines Corporation.

Igloos, ammunition storage, 361, 368

Illinois Institute of Technology, 132

Illinois Ordnance Plant, 108, 111, 144

India, requirements team sent to, 50

Indiana Ordnance Works, 32, 110-11, 131, 137-

38, 473-74

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 478

Industrial Service (or Division), Ordnance, 5, 27-

28, 31-32, 95, 303-04, 325, 330-31, 351, 414,

434, 467
INDEX 495

Industry integration committees, 142-43, 471

for carbines. 175-77

for heavy trucks, 288

for machine guns, 181

for M43 mechanical time fuze, 122-23

for small arms ammunition, 203-04

for tanks, 244

"Industry-Ordnance Team," 465

Infantry, 4, 164, 168-69, 227

Infantry Board, 166

Initial Protective Force program, 109, 363

Inland Manufacturing Division (GMC), 169-70,

174-75, 177-78, 182

Inspection, 320-38, 472

of artillery, 95

and artillery ammunition, 140

Edwards report on, 329-30

of fire control instruments, 336-37

gages for, 326

of machine guns, 181

manuals for, 322-23, 334

recruiting and training personnel for, 323-24

of small arms ammunition, 209-11

of tank-automotive matériel, 334-36

Trundle report on, 331-32

types of, 321-22

Inspection Branch, Ordnance, 330

Inspector General, The, 129, 401, 451, 456-57, 478

Integration committees. See Industry integration

committees.

Interchangeability of parts, 403-05

Interior, Department of, 367

Internal Revenue Bureau, 350

International Business Machines Corporation, 80,

175, 178, 395, 397, 426

International Harvester Company, 27, 80, 242, 251,

270, 273, 275, 287, 293, 343-44

International Silver Company, 178n

Introduction to the Ordnance Catalog (IOC), 358

Iowa Ordnance Plant, 43, 131

Iowa Transmission Company, 233, 246

Irwin-Pederson Arms Company, 174-75

Isham, H. P., 340, 345

Italian campaign, 102, 104, 145

Ithaca Gun Company, 158, 185

Iwo Jima, 104

Jackes Evans Manufacturing Company, 215

James, Gov. Arthur H., 372

Jayhawk Ordnance Works, 110

Jeep (54-ton truck), 276-79, 295-97

Jefferson Proving Ground, 327

Joe Dope posters, 454

John Deere Company, 233

Johns-Manville Corporation, 390

Johnson, Louis, 17-18, 23, 34, 59

Johnson, Capt. Melvin M., Jr., 165-68

Johnson rifle, 160, 165-68

Joint Aircraft Committee, 120

Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board, 361,

368, 436

Joint Termination Board, 346

Joint Termination Regulations (JTR), 348-49

Joint Working Committee Concerning Return of

U.S. Army and U.S. Navy Ammunition from

Overseas, 438

Jones, R. A., and Company, 138

Judge Advocate General, 112, 342, 347

Julian P. Friez and Sons, 124

Justice Department, 209

Kankakee Ordnance Plant, 43, 110

Kearney and Trecker Corporation, 288

Keller, K. T., 228, 230, 244, 310, 390, 402

Kelly-Springfield Tire Company, 200, 203

Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, 159, 181, 273, 278

Kennedy-Van Saun Engineering and Manufacturing Company, 90

Kenosha Ordnance Plant, 200, 203

Kenworth Motor Truck Company, 287, 294

Kerr, John D., 370-71

Kerrison predictor, 97-98

Keuffel and Esser, 96

Key Personnel Reports, 477

Keystone Ordnance Plant, 134, 145

Kings Mills Ordnance Plant, 200, 202-03, 218

Kingsbury Ordnance Plant 113, 204

Kirk, Maj. Gen. James, 220

Knight, Lt. Col. William W., Jr., 232

Knuckey Truck Company, 294

Knudsen, William S., 16, 45-46, 86, 227-28, 234-

35

Korean War, 151

Krock, Arthur, 231

Kroeger, William J., 184

"Kromuskits," 184

Kutz, Brig. Gen. Harry R., 402

Labor supply, 37, 211-12, 377

Laidlaw, Col. Waldo E., 414

Lake City Ordnance Plant, 43, 194, 198, 200, 203,

218, 221

Lamont, Robert P., 13

Lane, Capt. R. K., 352

Lansdowne Steel and Iron Company, 110

L. C. Smith-Corona Typewriter Corporation, 173

Leasing of storage space, 365-66

Leathers, Lt. Leon M., Jr., 430

Lee-Enfield rifle, 159, 171-72

Legal restrictions on procurement, 16-17, 26

Lend-Lease Act, 57, 111, 159, 190, 307

Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, 373, 378, 380-82,

386-92

Lewis, Brig. Gen. Burton O., 17, 228, 232

Life magazine, 165

Lima Locomotive Works, 230, 233, 235, 242, 256
496 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Lima Tank Depot, 94, 254

Lincoln Ordnance Depot, 390

Lippmann, Walter, 1n

Little Rock Motor Supply Depot, 385-86

Lloyd, N. P., 91

Loading plants, 105-12, 138-40

Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, 2, 4

"Logistics in World War II," ASF final report, 393

London Times, 223

Lone Star Ordnance Plant, 371

"Long Tom," 155-mm. gun, 68, 70. See also Artillery weapons.

Longhorn Ordnance Plant, 147

Longue Pointe Depot, 254

Lordstown Ordnance Depot, 385, 389

Los Angeles Ordnance Depot, 387

Lot numbers, ammunition, 424

Lowell Ordnance Plant, 200, 203, 218

Lucas, Maj. Gen. John P., 104, 275n

Luke, Lt. Col. Ittai A., 367, 370

Lutes, Lt. Gen. LeRoy, 417

Macauley, Alvan, 281

McCord Radiator and Manufacturing Company,

186

McCormick, Fowler, 402

McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R., 65-66, 143-44

McCoy Board (1943), 52, 65-66, 143-44

McFarland, Brig. Gen. Earl, 5

Machine guns, 61, 154-56, 159, 170-71, 178-81,

213-14. See also Small arms weapons.

Machine pistols, 182

Machine Records Unit, 398

Machine-Tool Panels, 91, 471

Machine tools, 18, 28, 38-39, 84, 91, 161-62, 192,

196, 238, 241, 244, 246, 251, 257, 282

Mack Manufacturing Company 230, 246-47, 270,

273, 275, 287, 295

McMahon, Col. Fred A., 420

MacMorland, Brig. Gen. E. E., 414, 450, 458-60

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 100, 447, 451

McNarney Directive, 66

McQuay-Norris Company, 194, 206, 211-12, 314

Magnavox Company, 183

Magnesium, plant for producing, 111

Maintenance Company, 33rd, 443

Maintenance Division, ASF, survey by, 459

Maintenance Division, Field Service, 442, 464

Maintenance Division, OCO-D, 464

Maintenance engineering 463-64

Maintenance factor, 47

Maintenance of Ordnance matériel, 354, 440-64,

471-72

at the arsenals, 442-43

combined shops for, 458-61

echelon system of, 448-50

neglect of, 454-55, 471

preventive, 451-55

Maintenance of Ordnance matériel—Continued

problems of automotive, 450-51

and the reclamation program of 1944, 451-62

shops for, 455-58

Maintenance shops, 455-58

Manufacturing Service, Ordnance, 351

Marine Corps, 47, 143, 166-67, 423, 453

Maritime Commission. See United States Maritime

Commission.

Marks, J. H., 340n

Marlin Firearms Company, 159, 181

Marmon-Herrington Company, 242, 252, 257, 287

Marshall, General of the Army George C., 4, 59, 76

Martin, Glenn L., 7

Massey-Harris Company, 242, 251-52

Master depot system, 389-91, 407, 470

Master supply depots, 388

Materials, shortage of, 37, 91-92, 238, 257

Matériel Control Division, OCO. 67

Mauldin, Bill, 299

Maximum Distribution Level, 416

Mead Committee, U.S. Senate, 153, 310, 314, 317,

400

Meader, George, 314

Mechanical Time Fuze Committee (M43), 122-23

Medal for Merit, 161

Medical Department, U.S. Army, 106, 186, 386, 460

Mennonites, 372

"Merchants of Death" era, 107

Mergenthaler-Linotype Company, 73, 97-99

Metallic Belt Link Industry Integration Committee,

215

Metallic belt links, 213-15

Mexican punitive expedition, 318

Meyns, Col. L. J., 397, 399, 411

Midland Steel Corporation, 278

Milan Ordnance Depot, 378, 387

Miles, Col. Francis H., Jr., 131

Military Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 339, 346-47

Military Affairs Committee, Senate, 7

Military Service, Ordnance, 5

Military Service, proposal for, 473

Miller Printing Machinery Company, 184

Milwaukee Ordnance Plant, 200, 218

Mines, 152

Ministry of Supply, British, 239

Minton, Brig. Gen. Hugh C., 257

Missouri Ordnance Works, 110

Mobilization Regulations 4-2 (1935), 461

Modification Work Orders (MWO's), 442, 450-51,

463-64

Montgomery Ward and Company, 355, 431

Montreal Locomotive Works, 242

Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 63, 171, 193, 235

Morgantown Ordnance Works, 110, 132, 136

Mortars, 70, 74, 84, 88-90, 101, 146, 152, 154, 166

Mosler Safe Company, 249
INDEX 497

Motor bases, transfer of, 383-86

Motor reception park, 385

Motor supply depots, 385

Motor Transport Service (Division), QM, 269, 275,

282-83, 306-09, 385, 399, 404, 448, 450, 470

Motor transport vehicles. See Trucks.

Mt. Rainier Base Shop, 458

Mt. Rainier Ordnance Depot, 386

Mulliken, Maj. Stanley E., 433

Muncie Gear Works, 81

Munitions Assignment Board, 308

Munitions Board Cataloging Agency, 409

Munitions Building, 5, 8, 29

Munitions Manufacturing Corporation, 80, 87

Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, 7, 12, 16, 32,

34, 55-56, 59, 193, 227, 364-65

Musser, C. Walton, 184

Nagasaki, 476

Nansemond Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 363, 387,

438

Nash Engineering Company, 74

Nash-Kelvinator Company, 97-98, 156, 251, 295

Nathan, Robert, 234

National Automobile Dealers Association, 447

National Blank Book Company, 178n

National Bureau of Standards, 124

National Defense Act of 1920, 9, 360

National Defense Advisory Committee (NDAC),

112, 227, 273, 277

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC),

124, 136, 138, 284

National Match rifle, 164

National Pneumatic Company, 74, 81, 87

National Rifle Association, 164-65

National Rifle Matches, 164

National Safety Council, 132

National Slug Rejectors, Inc., 288

National Tube Company, 116

Navajo Ordnance Depot, 376-78, 381-82, 387

Naval Ammunition Depot, 360

Naval Gun Factory, 72

Navy, U.S., 29, 38, 40, 44. 47, 58, 61, 72, 77, 79,

98, 102, 106, 119-20, 124, 136, 143, 197, 245,

250, 286, 360-61, 381, 386, 419, 423, 433, 453,

468

Negotiated contracts, 271-72

Negotiated settlements, 342-50

Negro workers, 211-13

Nelson, Donald M., 59, 86-87, 102-03, 234, 290

Netherlands, orders by, 158

Neutrality legislation, 10

New Caledonia, requirements team sent to, 50

New Cumberland General Depot, 382

New England Small Arms Corporation, 42, 172, 178

New York Central Lines, 13, 254

New York Ordnance District, 13, 28, 37, 98, 324,

346

New York Times, The, 231

New York University, 346

Newsweek magazine, 281n

Niblo, Brig. Gen. Urban, 447, 450, 465

Normoyle Ordnance Base Shop, 386, 458

Normoyle Ordnance Depot, 415

North Africa, 65, 261-62, 286, 336, 343, 437-39,

451-52

North African Theater (NATOUSA), 437, 454

Numbering, spare parts, 402-03, 470

Numerical Index of Manufacturers' Part Numbers

and Drawing Numbers, 406

Nye, Senator Gerald P., 7

Office Chief of Ordnance-Detroit, 125-26, 240,

297, 467, 477. See also Tank-Automotive

Center.

Office of Contract Settlement, 348-50

Office of Matériel Control, 419

Office of Production Management (OPM), 21, 37,

39, 41, 51, 62, 197, 232, 234, 272, 277

Office of Scientific Research and Development

(OSRD), 124

Office of War Mobilization, 346

Official Ordnance Part Number, 405

Official Stock Number, 405, 407, 414

Ogden Arsenal, 420

Ogden Ordnance Depot, 353, 360 362, 373, 375.

379-81, 387-91, 461

Ohio Gun Plant, 94. See also Lima Tank Depot.

Ohio Steel Foundry Company, 94

Okinawa, recoilless rifles used on, 184

Oldsmobile Division (GMC), 80, 82, 87

Oleum, production of, 111-12

Oliver Farm Machinery Company, 79, 86

On-vehicle matériel, 254-55

Optical elements, 98-99

Optical Research Company, 98

ORD-5, 406, 470

ORD-14, 406, 470

ORD-15, 406-07, 470

Ordnance (magazine), 478

Ordnance Base Armament Maintenance Battalions,

447

Ordnance Committee. See Ordnance Technical

Committee.

Ordnance Department. See also Chief of Ordnance,

plans for postwar organization of, 472-76

role of, 4

Ordnance Gage Section, 326

Ordnance Group, 447

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, 451

Ordnance Numbering Board, 404, 421

Ordnance Provision System, 354-56, 358-59, 396,

410-11, 414, 471

Ordnance Publications for Supply Index (OPSI),

358

Ordnance Safety Board, 368
498 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Ordnance Service Command Shops, 456-57

Ordnance Technical Committee, 25, 165, 169, 238,

276, 358, 408, 418

Ordnance Vehicle Maintenance Committee, 453

Otis Elevator Company, 73, 75, 86

Ozark Ordnance Works, 110

"P" items, 419

Pacific Car and Foundry Company, 235, 242, 249,

256, 287-88, 294

Packing boxes and cans, 216-17

Palmer Woods Ordnance Depot, 387, 390

Pantex Ordnance Plant, 144

Panther tank, 239, 261, 263

Paper and Textile Machinery Company, 93

Parker-Wolverine Company, 200

Partridge, Lt. Col. Clarence E., 49

Partridge Board Report (1938), 49, 51

Parts and Accessories Unit, Field Service, 396

Parts and Supplies Section, of General Supply

Branch, 398, 400

Parts Control Division, Ordnance, 306, 398

Parts Number Control Section, OCO-D, 406

Parts Numbering and Interchangeability Program,

402, 409, 414

Patterson, Robert P., 171, 230, 232, 235, 237-38,

272, 349. See also Assistant Secretary of War;

Under Secretary of War.

and artillery ammunition production, 146

and Colt plant, 80

and criticism of procurement progress, 34-36

and demand for AA guns, 79

and lag in truck production, 280

and machine tools, 38-39

and St. Louis plant, 208

and small arms ammunition, 195, 198

and tank improvements, 226

and termination of contracts, 219, 339

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 285

Paullin, Lt. Col. Charles S., 208

Pearson, Drew, 209

Pennsylvania, University of, 346

Pennsylvania Ordnance Works, 387

Pentagon, 8, 29, 467

Periscopes. See Fire Control Instruments.

Personnel carriers, 292-93

Philadelphia Ammunition Supply Office (PASO),

412, 428, 431, 438

Philadelphia Ordnance District, 28, 324-25

Philco Radio and Television Corporation, 124

Picatinny Arsenal, 11, 27, 31, 74, 105, 122, 125,

135, 138-39, 327, 360, 474

Pig Point Ordnance Depot, 353. See also Nansemond Ordnance Depot.

Pistols, 154-55, 168, 185-86

Pittsburgh Forgings Company, 116

Pittsburgh Ordnance District, 18, 116-17

Planning Branch, Office of ASW, 9, 11

Polk, R. L., Company, 406

Pomona Ordnance Base, 385

Pontiac Division (GMC), 85

Port Chicago explosion, 131

Portage Ordnance Depot, 367, 376, 378, 387, 426

Pottstown Ordnance Depot, 474

Powell, Col. Grosvenor F., 424

Power trains. See Transmissions.

"Preliminary work plan sheets," 142-43

Presidential objectives for production, 59-61, 83-84,

305

President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC), 212-13

Pressed Steel Car Company, 116, 233-34, 242

Preventive maintenance, 451-55

Preventive Maintenance Board, 453

Preventive Maintenance Branch, Ordnance, 453

Preventive Maintenance Section, 452

Priest (105-mm. howitzer), 88

Priorities, 38-39, 84, 231-33, 282, 287, 468

Probable Failure of Ordnance Program, memo on,

38

Procter and Gamble Soap Company, 113

Procurement Control Branch, QM, 280

Procurement planning, 9-23, 26-31

Procurement Review Board, 143, 217-18

Procurement Service, proposed, 473

Product Centers, proposed, 473-76

Product Correction Reports, 463

Production achievements, 1940-41, 42-44

Production Consultants Committee of WPB, 290

Production Division, ASF, 257

Production planning books, 62

Production Service Branch, Industrial Service, 325

Production studies, 19-21, 73, 156, 468

Propellants, 107

Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP), 24-25, 42, 55-

56, 158, 363, 365

Proving grounds, 326-27

Provisional Manual for Ordnance Field Service (1919),

352, 355

Proximity fuze, 123-24

Public Law 703 (1940), 271

Public Works Administration, 270

Pueblo Ordnance Depot, 374, 378, 381-82, 387-88

Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company,

90, 116, 230, 233-34, 242, 256

Pyle, Ernie, 300

Quad Cities Tank Arsenal, 251-52, 255, 259, 343-44

Quadrants. See Fire control instruments.

Quaker Oats Company, 113

Quality control, statistical, 207, 320-38, 472. See

also Inspection.

Quality Hardware and Machine Company, 174

Quartermaster Corps

and allocated facilities, 30

and construction of new plants, 110
INDEX 499

Quartermaster Corps—Continued

and standardization of vehicles, 266-70

and transfer of depots to Ordnance, 383-86

and transfer of trucks to Ordnance, 64, 240, 266,

467, 471

Quartermaster Corps Freight Traffic Branch, 425

Quartermaster Corps Technical Committee, 284

Quartermaster General, The, 112, 272, 376, 451-52

Radford Ordnance Works, 110-11, 131, 137-38

Radio Corporation of America, 13

Rainbow Division, 6

Ramsey, Col. Norman F., 362

Ramsey Board, 362-63, 443-44

Randolph, Rep. Jennings, 372

Range finders. See Fire control instruments.

Raritan Arsenal, 351, 359, 362, 404, 430, 474

Raritan Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 387, 389-91

Ravenna Ordnance Depot, 367, 369

Ravenna Ordnance Plant, 110, 367

Raw Materials Facility, 177

RDX, 111, 114, 130, 134, 136, 147, 204

Read Machinery Company, 89

Readjustment Division, ASF, 346

Reclamation program (1944). 461-62

Recoil mechanisms, 72-73, 86

Recoilless rifles, 154, 184-85

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 420

Records Group, 427-28

Recuperators, 72

Red Ball Express, 291

Red River Ordnance Base Shop, 458

Red River Ordnance Depot, 371, 378, 380, 382,

386-90, 420, 436

Redstone Arsenal, 476

Reed Roller Bit Company, 246

Regiments, infantry, equipment of, 53

Regiments, Ordnance, 447

Regular Army, 5, 9, 55, 440

Regular Army officers, 29, 108

Remington Arms Company, 27, 156, 159, 163, 172-

73, 191-95, 202-03, 218-19, 221

Remington-Rand accounting machines, 397

Remington-Rand Company, 185, 397

Renegotiation Act, 346, 350

Reo Motor Company, 275

Replacement factor, 47-51

Republic Steel Corporation, 233, 249

Requirements, 45-67

and Army Supply Program, 59-64

for artillery, 1943-45, 99-103

for artillery ammunition, 143-46

for aviation ordnance, 51-52

and day of supply, 48-51

and defense period, 55-59

elements of computation of, 46-54

fluctuations in, 52-54

importance of, 45-46, 469

Requirements—Continued

for small arms, 170-71

for spare parts, 470-71

and Supply Control, 64-67

for tanks, 232-33, 235-37, 240, 256-59

teams for collecting data for, 50

Requirements Division, ASF, 257

Requirements Division, Ordnance, 51, 67

Research and Development Division, 467

Research and Development Service, proposed, 473

Reserve officers, Ordnance, 29

Reserve Storage depots, 388

Revere Brass and Copper Company, 27, 196

Revolvers, 156, 185-86

Rice, Brig. Gen. John H., 161, 351, 441

Richards, Brig. Gen. George J., 66

Richmond Tank Depot, 254

Rifles, 2, 154, 174, 333-34. See also Recoilless rifles.

Browning automatic (BAR), 155-56, 170-72, 174,

178

Enfield, 156, 170, 174

Japanese, 168

Johnson, 165-68

Lee-Enfield, 159, 171-72, 174

Ml (Garand), 155, 160-68, 170-74

Production of, 171-74

Requirements for, 170-71

Springfield 1903, 155, 160-61, 167-68, 170-74

Tokarev 1940, 167-68

Rochester Defense Corporation, 174

Rock Island Arsenal, 27, 81, 85, 187, 242, 248,

353-54, 467

as center for carriages and recoil mechanisms, 72

and descriptions of manufacture, 15 7

and early tank production, 223-26, 252

Field Service suboffice at, 412, 463

and machine gun production, 180

and maintenance work, 442-43

and metallic belt links, 215

proposed artillery product center, 473-74

and rifle-making machinery in storage, 159-60,

172

and spare parts for vehicles, 302-05

Rockefeller Center, 113

Rocket launcher, 2.36-in., 154, 182-84

Rocket launcher, 4.5-in., 99

Rocket powder, production of, 137-38

Rockets, 66, 476

Rock-Ola Company, 174-75

Rollins, Maj. Joseph, 435-36

Rommel, Erwin, 300

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 2, 365, 409

and aid to Britain, 156

and production of gages, 326

and production goals, 59-64, 83-84, 171, 180,

199, 232-39

and visit to Watervliet Arsenal, 74

Roosevelt, Theodore, 172
500 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Rossford Ordnance Depot, 385, 389-90

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME),

459

Rubber, shortage of, 281-84

Rudolf Wurlitzer Company, 124

Russell Manufacturing Company, 213-14

"S" items, 419

Sadtler, Col. William Field, 411

Safety, in artillery ammunition plants, 109, 130-33

Safety and Security Branch, 131

Safford, Brig. Gen. Hermon, 474

Safford Committee (1945), 414

Saginaw Steering Gear Division (GMC), 157, 175,

180

St. Louis Ordnance Depot, 390, 412

St. Louis Ordnance District, 28, 208

St. Louis Ordnance Plant, 194, 204-13, 218, 221

St. Louis Star-Times, 207-08

San Antonio Arsenal, 362

San Antonio Ordnance Center, 385

San Antonio Ordnance Depot, 354, 363, 387-88,

390

San Francisco Ordnance District, 28, 346

San Jacinto Ordnance Depot, 370, 378, 387, 438

Santa Anna, 370

Savage Arms Corporation, 158-59, 180

Savanna Ordnance Depot, 109, 353, 360-63, 387

Savanna Proving Ground, 442

Sayler, Maj. Gen. Henry B., 151

Schedules of Stores Reports, 357-58

Schenectady General Depot, 382

Schick, John, 426

"Science-Industry-Ordnance Team," 465

Scientists Against Time, 123

Scioto Ordnance Plant, 218

Seabees, 453

Sears Roebuck and Company, 355, 402

Secretary of War, 20, 36, 60, 83, 104, 146, 234,

272, 284, 353, 361-62, 369-70, 372, 375, 423,

475. See also Stimson, Henry L.

Select Committee on National Expenditure (British),

239

Seneca Ordnance Depot, 371, 378, 381-82, 387-88

Service Command shops, 456-57, 462

Service Commands, 388, 391, 415, 436, 456, 458,

461, 475

Services of Supply. See Army Service Forces.

Services of Supply, U.S. (World War I), 352

Settlement of contracts, 339-50

Settlement Review Board, 344-45

Seventh Army, 285, 424

Shaw, Brevet Lt. Col. George C., 395

Shells, procurement of, 114-18

Shepherd, Lt. Col. Harold, 342

Sherwin-Williams Paint Company, 113

Shewhart, Dr. Walter A., 327-29

"Short List," 141

Shot, procurement of, 114, 117

Sicily, Dukw in invasion of, 285

Sierra Ordnance Depot, 374, 377-78, 380-82, 387-90

Signal Corps, U.S. Army, 106, 124, 186, 386, 460

Simmons Bed Company. 200

Simon, Col. Leslie E., 327-29, 472

Singer Manufacturing Company, 97-98, 156-58

Sioux Ordnance Depot, 376, 378, 381-82, 387-88

Site Board, ASW appointment of, 112

Sites for ammunition plants, 108-10

Sites for depots, 366-76

Slezak, Col. John, 343

Small arms weapons, 2, 154-87. See also individual

items such as carbines and rifles.

and aid to Britain, 155-56

and BAR production, 178

and bazooka rocket launcher, 182-84

and carbine production, 168-70, 174-78

Garand-Johnson rifle controversy, 165-68

and machine guns, 178-81

miscellaneous items, 185-86

and production of Garand rifle, 160-61, 163-65

and production preparedness, 156-60

and recoilless rifles, 184-85

requirements for, 170-71

rifle production, 171-74

and Springfield Armory, 161-63

and submachine guns, 181-82

Small arms ammunition. See Ammunition, small

arms.

Small Arms Ammunition Suboffice (Philadelphia),

203

Small Arms Division, Industrial Service, 203

Small Arms Division, Research and Development

Service, 184

Small business, alleged neglect of, 40-42

Smaller War Plants Corporation, 184

Smith and Wesson, Inc., 186

Smith, R. Elberton, 478

Smith, Lt. Col. Samuel L., 425-26, 435

Smith-Corona Typewriter Corporation, 173

Smith-Hinchman and Grylls, 406

Smokeless powder, 11-12, 43, 104, 109, 111, 137,

220

Social Security Building, 29

Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), 272, 453

Somers, Brig. Gen. Richard H., 325, 329

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 418, 420, 453

and AA gun production, 281

and Army Supply Program, 58, 62

and bomb requirements, 121

and Defense Aid requirements, 63

and depot construction, 381

and motor vehicle production, 281

and postwar organization plans, 475

and Service Command shops, 457-59

and small arms ammunition requirements, 195,

200
INDEX 501

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.—Continued

and small arms requirements, 171

and spare parts, 308, 317, 413

and stock control, 401-02

and tank requirements, 237-38

and transfer of motor vehicles, 283, 289, 468

Southwestern Proving Ground, 327

Soviet Union, 59-60, 138, 232, 275

Spalding, A. G., and Brothers, 178n

Spalding, Brig. Gen. George R., 362

Spare parts, 257, 266, 269

for automotive vehicles, 413-15, 470

categories of, 301-02, 312-13

consumption data (1921), 442-43

effect of motor vehicles transfer on, 399-400

identification and numbering of, 395-409

interchangeability of, 316, 403-05

methods of procurement of, 311-14

Ordnance and (1939-42), 302-07

overseas supply of, 314-18

packaging of. 315

Quartermaster Corps and (1939-42), 307-09

reclamation of, 461-62

Senate Committee investigation of, 311-14

after transfer of vehicles (1942-45), 309-19

and weapons, 301-02, 413, 470

Spare Parts Board, 304, 306

Spare Parts Service, proposed, 306

Sparkman and Stephens, Inc., 285

Special Parts and Interchangeability Group, 404

"Special planning" studies, 67

Specifications, 34-36, 115-16, 267-68

Speer, Albert, 239

Sperry Corporation, 75

Sperry Gyroscope Company, 86, 96

Spicer Manufacturing Corporation, 246, 273, 278,

288

Springfield Armory, 27, 35, 81, 92, 155, 176, 178-

79, 353-54, 360, 390, 466, 473-74

and carbine design, 169

and fabric belts, 214

and inspection problems, 333-34

and lag in Garand production, 173-74

and miscellaneous items, 185-87

and production preparedness, 156-60

reserves stored at, 353

and rifle controversy, 165-68

rifle output at, 2, 161-63

Springfield Ordnance District, 184, 346

Springfield rifle (1903), 155, 160-61, 167-68, 170-73

Stalin, Josef, 234

Standard Form No. 32, 16

Standard Nomenclature Lists (SNL), 351, 358-59,

397, 403, 408, 424, 451

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 135

Standard Products Company, 175

Standard Steel Spring Company, 249, 288, 292

Standard truck fleet, proposed, 268-70, 296

Standardization, motor vehicle, 266-70

Star-Times, 207-08

Station Excess Stock Teams, 420

Statistical sampling. See Inspection; Quality control, statistical.

Steel

need of for carbines, 176-77

shortage of for trucks, 282, 284

use of for cartridge cases, 119, 213

Steese, Col. Charles M., 376, 380

Sten gun, ammunition for, 192

Stevens Arms Company Division (Savage Arms

Corporation), 159

Stewart-Warner Corporation, 15

Stilwell Road, 291

Stimson, Henry L., 104, 373, 450, 475. See also

Secretary of War.

Stock control, 410-22, 471

Stock Control Branch (OCO-D), 412-13

Stock Control Branch (OCO), 415

Stock Control Division (ASF), 420

Stock Control Division (Field Service), 413

Stock levels, 416

Stock List of Items, 406

Stockton Base Shop, 458

Stockton Ordnance Depot, 389

Stokes, F. J., Machine Company, 139

Storage catalogue, World War I, 354-55

Stribling, Col. Simpson R., 146

Studebaker Company, 273, 275, 296

Subcontracts and small business, 41-42

Submachine guns, 155, 181-82, 192

Submarine Mine Depot, 391

Suboffices, Field Service, 412

Sullivan's expedition (1779), 371

Sunbeam Electric Company, 202

Sunflower Ordnance Works, 111, 137-38

Supply and Maintenance Service, proposal for, 473

Supply Contract No. 1 (form), 340

Supply control, 64-67, 416-18

Supply Control System, ASF, 416-18

Supply Section, Ammunition Supply Division, 425

Supreme Court, U.S., 210

Surgeon General's Office, 131

Surplus matériel, 418-19

Surplus Property Act (1944), 420

Surveys of industry, 17-19, 73, 468

Susquehanna Ordnance Depot, 387

Tables of allowances, 47, 63, 358

Tables of basic allowances, 47, 63, 358

Tables of equipment, 47, 53

Tables of organization, 47, 63

Tables of organization and equipment, 358

"Tall Boy" bombs, 119, 147

Talladega National Forest, 367

Tank and Combat Vehicle Division, 283

Tank arsenal. See Detroit Tank Arsenal.
502 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Tank-Automotive Center (T-AC), 256, 331, 402,

404, 412, 451, 474. See also Office Chief of

Ordnance-Detroit.

establishment of, 240, 283

and follow-up of truck production, 288-89

and inspection, 334-36

and parts distribution, 399, 402, 421

and personnel cuts, 400-401

Supply Branch of, 388, 404

Tank Committee, 36

Tank Corps, World War I, 224

Tank depots, 254-55

Tank guns, 81-85, 87-89, 101

Tank recovery vehicles, 253, 293-95

Tank transporters, 293-94

Tanks, 2, 3, 61, 64

British, 223-24, 239, 254, 263

Canadian Ram type of, 253

cost of, 256

criticism of, 222-23

depots for, 254-55

early plans for procurement of, 223-26

educational orders for, 224-25

engines for, 244-46, 253

evaluation of record of, 262-64

German, 222-23, 239-40, 261-63

heavy, 231, 235, 239, 259-62

and howitzer, 75-mm., 81-82

industry-integration committee for, 244

inspection of, 334-36

light, 225-26, 250-52, 262

medium, 226, 228-30, 252-54, 257, 262

production methods for, 241

production of by facility, 242

production totals, 262-63

"remanufacture" of, 258-59

requirements for, 231-39, 469

Soviet, 223, 239, 264

transmissions for, 246-47

"Taxi" numbers, 357, 398

Taylor, Col. Brainerd, 269n

Technical Division, Ordnance, 467

Technical services, 474-75

Technological advances, 133-40

Telescopes, 97. See also Fire control instruments.

Tennessee Eastman Corporation, 136

Termination Accounting Manual, 345

Termination of contracts, 217-20, 339-50, 472

Terre Haute Ordnance Depot, 390

Third Army, 447

Thompson submachine gun, 155, 158, 181

Tiger tank, German, 223, 239, 261, 263

Tilson, Rep. John Q., 359

Time magazine, 4

Time objectives for procurement, 25, 42, 58, 87, 280

Timken-Detroit Axle Company, 246, 270, 273-74, 288

TNT, 11, 12, 32-33, 43, 107, 111, 114, 120, 128,

130-31, 134-36, 138-39, 143, 147, 204, 366-67,

476

Todd and Brown, Inc., 113

Tokarev rifle, 167-68

Tolan Committee, House of Representatives, 32-33,

40, 42

Toledo Core Plant, 196, 221

Toledo Ordnance Depot. See Rossford Ordnance

Depot.

Toledo Tank Depot, 254

Toluene, production of, 43, 112, 135

Tooele Ordnance Depot, 378, 381-82

Tool and Equipment Catalog, ASF, 408

TORCH, 401-02

Tractors, 293

Trailmobile Company, 295

Transfer cases, 273-74

Transmissions, 246-47, 297

Transport vehicles. See Trucks.

Transportation Corps, 106, 186, 386, 430-31, 434,

460, 478

Treasury Department, U.S., 357, 386, 419-20

Trojan Powder Company, 112

Troop Basis, 47, 52-55, 59-60, 63-64, 101

Trucks

amphibian (Dukw), 258, 284-86, 295-97, 471

ban on civilian production, 280-81

Brockway 6-ton, 284

Chevrolet 11⁄2-ton, 274, 284

Chrysler 1⁄2-ton, 274, 284

Class B (World War I), 267-68, 270

Corbitt 6-ton, 284

during defense period, 270-80

Diamond T, 4-ton, 4-5-ton, 5-6-ton, 284

Dodge 3⁄4-ton, 284

Dodge 11⁄2-ton, 271

German army's standardization of, 269

GMC 21⁄2-ton, 271, 274-75, 471

heavy, 281

heavy-heavy, 275, 286-92

jeep 1⁄4-ton, 276-79, 284, 471

lag in production of, 279-80

Mack 6-ton, 271

maintenance of, 282, 299

production record, 297-99

spare parts for, 413-15, 470

special types of, 292-99

storage of, 385

struggle for standardization of, 266-72

transfer of to Ordnance, 64, 266, 282-84, 383,

399-400, 467-68

White 6-ton, 284

World War I experience with, 265

Yellow (GMC) 21⁄2-ton, 274-75, 284

Truman, Harry S., 102-03, 194, 409

Truman Committee, U.S. Senate, 12, 32, 40, 102,

311-14

Trundle Engineering Company, 331-32

Trundle Report, 331-32

Tschappat, Maj. Gen. William H., 362-63
INDEX 503

Twin Cities Ordnance Plant, 195-96, 198, 202-03,

218, 221, 461

Tyson Valley Powder Storage Area, 207

Umatilla Ordnance Depot, 367-69, 376, 378, 380-

82, 387

Under Secretary of War, 30, 33, 38, 42, 62, 87, 197,

203, 234, 279-80, 305, 478. See also Patterson,

Robert P.

Underwood-Elliott-Fisher Company, 174-76

Underwriters' Laboratories, 132

Union Guardian Building, 283

Union Pacific Railroad, 367

Union Switch and Signal Company, 185

United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of

America, 219

United Motors Service Division (GMC), 254

United Nations lists, 308

United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 81, 87

United States Cartridge Company, 194, 204, 208-12

United States Maritime Commission, 119, 250, 287

United States Optical Supply Corporation, 99

United States Public Health Service, 131

United States Rubber Company, 196, 200, 203

United States Standard Commodity Catalog, 409

United States Steel Corporation, 13, 27

United States Steel Export Company, 190

United States Tank Committee, 236-37

Unit Training Center, 112

Utah Ordnance Plant, 195, 202, 218

Van Deusen, Col. Edwin S., 301

Van Dorn Iron Works, 225

Victory Program, 59-60, 232, 234

Vilter Company, 87

VT fuze, 123-24

Wabash Ordnance Works, 136, 147

WAC's, 428

Wagner Act, 277

Wallace, Henry A., 234

Walter Scott and Company, 73, 341

War Aid depots, 381, 383, 385, 390

War Aid Section, Field Service, 430-31

War Department, 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 21, 44, 59-60,

118, 129, 195, 376

and approval of ammunition plants, 195

and combined shops, 460-61

and contract termination, 339, 347-48

and control of ammunition supply, 423, 429, 432

and curtailment of ammunition production, 129,

143

and defense of policy toward small business, 40-41

and demobilization studies, 67

and depot construction policy, 380-82

and IBM machines, 397

and plans for new facilities, 32-33

and plans for storage facilities, 361-63, 383

and plans for tanks, 227

War Department—Continued

and preventive maintenance, 451-52

and procurement of trucks, 271-72

and sites for depots, 366-68

and spare parts, 311

and theater requirements, 50-51

War Department Budget Advisory Committee, 380

War Department Circular 245, 266

War Department Procurement Review Board, 65-

66, 143-44, 217

War Manpower Commission, 146

War Mobilization, Office of. See Office of War

Mobilization.

War Munitions Program (11 Feb 42), 174, 180, 380

War Munitions Program, Overall Requirements for,

60-61

War Office, British, 239

War Plans Division, General Staff, 59

War Production Board, 51, 146, 173, 255, 283-84,

427, 478

and availability of copper, 200

and ban on civilian automotive production, 280-

81

and feasibility dispute, 62-63

history of cited, 58

and production of Dukw's, 286

and production of heavy trucks, 286-89

and requirements, 45, 58

and rules for wartime construction, 381

War Reserve Equipment, 191

War Shipping Administrator, 431

Ward-La France Company, 273, 288, 294

Warehouses, 379. See also Depots.

Warner, Lt. Col. Walter W., 229

Warren, Lindsay, 347

Washington Evening Star, 165

Washington, President George, 466

Waterbury-Farrel Foundry and Machine Company,

192

Watertown Arsenal, 27, 72, 74-75, 78-79, 85-86,

92-94, 352, 354, 391, 467

Watervliet Arsenal, 27, 72, 74-75, 77-82, 85-87,

89-90, 92-93, 352, 354, 391

Waukesha Motor Company, 288

Weapons of World War II, 465

Welch, Col. Gordon B., 336

Welding of tank armor, 248

Weldon Springs Ordnance Plant, 43, 145

Wells, Brig. Gen. Gordon M., 85-86, 89, 92, 94-95,

404

Wells Board, 404-05

Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M., 5, 85-86, 163, 222

and accepted schedules of production, 17

and aircraft guns, 180

and arsenal aid to manufacturers, 74

and Colt Company production problems, 80-81

and District Office display rooms, 41

and eleven o'clock conferences, 5, 477

and establishment of Fire Control Sub-Office, 96
504 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY

Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M.—Continued

and growth of staff, 28-29

and legal restrictions on procurement, 16-17

and low priorities, 468

and machine tools, 38-39

orders highest priority for spare parts, 304-05

and procurement plans, 12, 15-16

and production of rifles, 159, 163

and production of small arms ammunition, 194-

95, 197-98

and production of tanks, 228-38

and production studies, 21

and rearmament expenditures, 10

and requirements for ammunition, 198-200

and reserve machinery, 159

retirement of, 306

and sites for ammunition plants, 108

and sites for depots, 375-76

and spare parts board, 304

and time needed for production, 21

West Point, arsenal at, 360

Western Cartridge Company, 191-92, 194, 196, 203,

205, 220-21

Western Electric Company, 124

Western Union, 348

Westervelt Board, 68

Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, 97-98, 124

Wheels, Inc., 308

Wheland Company, 79, 86

"Whirlwind" tank engines, 244

White Motor Car Company, 27, 88, 273, 275, 288,

292-93

Whitney, Eli, 155

Whittemore, Brig. Gen. James M., 386

Whittemore Base Shop, 458

Whittemore motor transport depot, 386

William W. Gherard, S.S., 315

Williams, Maj. Gen. C. C., 35, 65, 322, 351

Williams, Maj. Gen. L. H., 300n

Williamsburg restoration, 113

Willys-Overland Company, 196, 270, 273, 277-79,

295-96

Wilmington, suboffice at, 11, 108

Winchester Repeating Arms Company, 20, 157-58,

163, 167, 169-70, 173-74, 191, 218-19, 221

Wingate Ordnance Depot, 353, 376, 378, 381, 387

Winter-Weiss Company, 295

Witter, Col. Dean, 346

Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant, 108, 113, 370

Wood, Brig. Gen. Robert E., 402

Wood, Brig. Gen. Walter A., Jr., 54

Wood Newspaper Machinery Corporation, 73

Wood pulp, 136-37

Woods, S. A., Company, 5

Worthington Pump Company, 79

Wreckers, heavy truck, 293-95

Wright Aeronautical Corporation, 227, 244

Yellow Truck and Coach Company, 273-75, 285-86

York Arsenal (Canada), 221

York Safe and Lock Company, 77-79, 81, 87

Young, Owen D., 13

Young, Col. William C., 439

Zenith Carburetor Company, 314

Zenith Radio Corporation, 124

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