1 John T. Boyd, Chief Ju stice (Re t.), Seven th Court of Appeal s, sittin g by assi gnment.

Tex. Gov ’t Code A nn. §75.0 02(a)(1) (Vernon S upp. 200 5). NO. 07-04-0229-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL E JUNE 30, 2006

______________________________ MYRON DAVID GREEN, APPELLANT

v. THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CR IMINAL JUSTICEINSTITUTIONAL DIVISION AND TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY’S CORRECTIONAL MANAGED HEALTH CARE, ET AL., APPELLE ES

_________________________________ FROM THE 108 TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 91,966-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., REAVIS, J., and BOYD, S.J. 1 MEMORAND UM OPINION This pro se appeal arises from a suit, also filed pro se , by appellant against appellees, the Texas Depar tment of Criminal Justice and Texas Tech U niversity’s Correctional Managed Health Care, et al. In the suit, app ellant, an in mate of the Texas2

penal system, so ught reco very of damages alleged to have been suffered by him because of an asserted taking of orthope dic footware medically req uired to be worn by him as well
as a refusal to furnish him medical care necessitated by the taking and destruction of the footware. We affirm the orde r of the tr ial cour t. This appeal presentsthree issues for our decision. Those issues a re: 1) did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing appel lant’s suit under Chapter 14 of the Texas Ci vil Practi ce and Remedie s Code; 2) did the trial court err in doing so without a hearing; and 3) did th e trial court err i n failin g to appo int couns el for ap pellant. Statute Effective June 8, 1995, the legisla ture enacted Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice an d Remedies Code en titled “In mate Liti gation.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001- 014 (Vernon 2002). With the exception of actions brought under the Famil y Code, Chapter 14 applies to suits brought by an inmate who has filed “an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inabil ity to pa y costs.” Id. §14.002 . Sectio n 14.004 requires that an i nmate file with his suita separate a ffidav it or declaration identifying each prior suit brought b y the inmate. Thataffidavit or declaration must specify the operative facts, the ca se name, the cause number, the court in which it was brought, the names of the parties, and the result of the suit. Standard of Review The standard by which a dismissal under Cha pter 14 is reviewed is by an abuse of discretion. That standard is determined by a decision whether the dismissing court acted withoutreference to any guiding principles, or, stated another wa y, was the action of the court arbitrary or unrea sonable

. Hickson v. Moya , 926 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. App.–Waco3

1996, no writ). In making that decision, the fact that an appellate court might have decided
a matter w ithin thetr ial court’s discretion differently from the decision made by the trial court doe s not demo nstrate th at an abu se of dis cretion o ccurred. Id. at 399. Discussion Logica l continu ity requires that we first consider whether the trial court reversibly erred in failing to appoint an attorney to repres ent appe llant in this matt er. A district judge may appoint

counsel for an in digent p arty in a civil case in exceptio nal instances in which the public interests at stake may be such that the proper admin istration of justice may be best served b y the app ointment of counse l. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield , 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996); Tex. Gov’tCode Ann. §24.016 (Vernon 2004). Indeed, our Texas Supreme Court, noting that inmate suits ar e so commo nplace t hat the l egislatu re enacted Chapter 14 to curb this particular area of litigation, opined that the mere fact that
an inmate brings suit against an employee of the prison in which the inmate is incarcerated does not constitute an exceptional circumstance such as to warrantappointed counsel. See Gibson v

. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Tex. 2003). Likewise, thi s suit is neither of such exceptional character as to require the appoin tment of counsel nor has appellant demonstrated thatthe public and private interests at stake here are such as to require the appointment of counsel. Thus, the trial court did not err i n failing to do so. The purpose of

Chapter 14 is obvious. In adopting it, the legisla ture recognized the problem of constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation in this state, and sought to reduce such litigation by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome of such l itigatio n. In this way, the trial court could determine, based upon previo us filings, if the suit was

frivolou s becaus e the inm ate had prev iously f iled a s imilar cl aim. See4

Bell v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Justice
- Institutional Div. , 962 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 ( Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 19 98, pet. d enied). In this case, although appellant did list a previous filing made by him, in doing so he merely listed the general nature of the suit without stating the underlying facts which formed the basis of the suit. Without the pleading of those alleged operativ e facts, th e trial court could nothave determined whether the instant suit was frivolous because of its simi larity to the previous filing as required by thestatute. As we have noted above, the stating of the operative facts of the prior suit is mandatory. Because of the failure to plead the operative facts of theprior suit, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing thissuit wit hout a hearing. Accordingly, we must, and do hereb y, affirm t he judgme nt of the trial cou rt. John T. Boyd Senior Justice