115th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Ukraine: Report from the 

Front Lines 

NOVEMBER 30, 2017 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2018 
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

@HelsinkiComm 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

Co-Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, TEXAS

STEVE COHEN, TENNESSEE

RICHARD HUDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

RANDY HULTGREN, ILLINOIS

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, TEXAS

GWEN MOORE, WISCONSIN

SENATE 

ROGER WICKER, MISSISSIPPI, 

Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. MARYLAND

JOHN BOOZMAN, ARKANSAS

CORY GARDNER, COLORADO

MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

Executive Branch Commissioners 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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Ukraine: Report from the 

Front Lines 

NOVEMBER 30, 2017 

Page 

PARTICIPANTS 

Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe ................ 1 

Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 

to Ukraine .................................................................................................................................... 3 

Appendix .......................................................................................................................................... 18 

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Ukraine: Report from the 

Front Lines 

November 30, 2017 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington, DC 

The briefing was held at 2 p.m. in Room 215, Senate Visitors Center, Washington, 

DC, Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Panelists present: Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special 

Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. 

Mr. TIERSKY. On behalf of Senator Roger Wicker, Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki 

Commission, and Congressman Chris Smith, Co-Chairman, I’d like to welcome you to this 

briefing of the Helsinki Commission titled ‘‘Ukraine: Report from the Front Lines.’’ My 

name is Alex Tiersky. I’m the political military affairs advisor for the Helsinki Commission. 

This has been something of a Ukraine week for the Commission. Yesterday we had 

a similar briefing on the subject of corruption in Ukraine. You may have seen the report 

on that subject. That is outside on the table. 

Like yesterday’s briefing, this event is streaming live on the Helsinki Commission’s 

Facebook page. So I’d like to welcome those of you who are viewing that way. And I’m 

told I should remind you to use our Twitter handle, @HelsinkiComm, if you’re tweeting 

this meeting. 

Ladies and gentlemen, for more than three years now civilians in eastern Ukraine 

have suffered the effects of a needless conflict, manufactured and managed by Russia. An 

estimated 10,000 people have been killed and more than 23,500 injured. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, amidst almost daily ceasefire violations and 

threats to critical infrastructure. Joseph Stone, an American paramedic, was killed on 

April the 23rd of this year while monitoring this conflict as a member of the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. We will 

often refer to it in this briefing as the SMM. SMM reports remain the only source of 

verifiable public information on this ongoing conflict, and the grave daily impact it has 

on the local civilian population. Mission personnel, like Joseph Stone, are unarmed 
2 

civilians. They face regular and sometimes violent harassment by combined Russian separatist forces seeking to limit the mission’s access to the areas they control. 

We are very fortunate that Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the 

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, has agreed to travel to Washington from 

Ukraine at our request to be with us today. By way of introduction let me note that Mr. 

Hug is a trained lawyer, he served as an officer in the Swiss army. He has served in a 

number of roles and positions at the OSCE previously, including as a section head and 

a senior advisor to the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities. He served at the 

OSCE Mission in Kosovo. His career in conflict resolution includes work with the Swiss 

Headquarters Support Unit for the OSCE in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the temporary international presence in Hebron, and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. 

I’d like to underline on a personal basis Mr. Hug’s sterling reputation as a tough, 

courageous, and principled diplomat with an exceptional background for the work that 

he’s doing now. Not afraid to personally engage in sometimes quite dangerous situations, 

he’s been a very strong voice for suffering civilians in an often-challenging political 

environment. His service is to be commended. 

I’ve asked Mr. Hug to focus his presentation for us today on two broad themes. The 

first, which we really want to emphasize, is the substance of the work of the monitoring 

mission. In other words, what do the monitors see? What does it tell us about the evolution of the conflict, as well as the plight of the civilians impacted by it? The second main 

theme I’ve asked him to focus on is the process of the monitors’ work. How effectively are 

the monitors able to carry out their mandate? What obstacles prevent them from doing 

more? 

Before passing the microphone to Mr. Hug for his presentation, let me offer a few 

key substantive points from the perspective of the Helsinki Commission. The U.S. Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine, and remains committed to an independent, sovereign, democratic Ukraine. It has committed to continuing 

to stand against Moscow’s aggression and ongoing efforts to destabilize Ukraine and keep 

it from making its own choices regarding its strategic direction. Members of the Helsinki 

Commission continue to express strong concern about the deteriorating humanitarian 

situation in eastern Ukraine and, importantly, occupied Crimea. 

Our commissioners remain firm supporters of the OSCE and of the Special Monitoring Mission in particular. They recognize the unique value it provides as an authoritative source of information on the ongoing violations of the Minsk Agreements, effectively 

serving as the international community’s eyes and ears on the ground. Our commissioners 

have consistently recognized and commended the courage demonstrated by the monitors 

who serve with Mr. Hug in the face of the dangers they must confront on a daily basis 

to carry out the mission that we collectively have assigned to them. Our commissioners 

seek to better understand how best to ensure that the monitors are able to accomplish 

their mission as effectively and safely as possible. 

I very much look forward to Mr. Hug’s presentation. He’s going to give us a rundown 

of the situation using a very effective use of PowerPoint, which I know sometimes can 

be not necessarily a given. But this is one that I think you’ll all find tremendously compelling. Thank you all for joining us today. I look forward to your questions after Mr. Hug’s 

presentation. 

Alexander, please, you have the floor. 
3 

Mr. HUG. Thank you very much. Thank you to the Helsinki Commission for the 

opportunity to address this forum today here. 

And I start right away. I’m just back from a weeklong tour, together with my monitors, in eastern Ukraine. The picture that you see behind me was taken Monday a week 

ago in the area called Luhansk, the only crossing area in this area where civilians can 

formally and officially go across the contact line. [See Appendix, Figure 1.] We have been 

there documenting the suffering. And this picture probably tells a lot more than I can 

describe here. You can see the monitors in their white helmets and the civilians there, 

trying to get about their normal lives in that conflict area. And, as Alex just said before, 

this is not a conflict that lasts a year. It is now over three years since it is raging in the 

eastern part of Ukraine. 

Very briefly, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has two main tasks enshrined in 

its document which has established it. It’s the Permanent Council Decision 1117. It’s on 

the one side monitoring and reporting activity, and on the other hand the dialogue facilitation task on the ground. That makes the SMM. You will find it interesting to note that 

the mandate itself does not refer to the Minsk Agreements, does not refer to ceasefire 

monitoring. And the reason for that is that the mission had been created on the 21st of 

March 2014, before the conflict had been erupting. Of course, these days, we are supporting the Minsk process, consisting of the Normandy format, the trilateral contact 

group, and four working groups that support the creation of the framework which should 

lead to a normalization at the contact line. 

These have different starting dates. The Normandy format was put into place on the 

6th of June 2014. The first trilateral contact group meeting took place two days later 

when it had been recommended to be established. The joint center for control and 

coordination, which you see at the bottom there [Points to presentation slide; figure not 

available.] is a bilateral arrangement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine to 

jointly control and coordinate the implementation of the agreements the trilateral contact 

group has been forming. The connection between the two is that the special monitoring 

mission head—my boss, Ambassador Apakan—chairs the working group on security 

issues. 

Very briefly to where we came from—the mission was originally set out to monitor 

the change in government in Kyiv over the winter 2013–2014. It was meant to be a smallscale monitoring mission dispatched to 10 locations all over Ukraine. And we are still in 

these 10 locations. Very quickly after dispatching the mission on the 21st of March 2014, 

we saw demonstrations erupting in the eastern part of the country, where administrative 

buildings had become occupied. Occupants first were armed with wooden sticks, that 

turned into metal sticks, turned into sidearms, turned into Kalashnikovs, turned into mortars, turned into artillery devices, turned into multiple launch rocket systems. And the 

mission quickly found itself in the midst of an armed conflict. 

It was then in the summer of 2014 where the mission for the first time showed the 

world that it was able to implement its mandate both by reporting from the ground, but 

also facilitating dialogue—most dominantly so during the incident when that civilian airliner came down in the middle of the conflict area, where the mission facilitated access 

to the crash site, to emergency workers, including but not limited to the recovery of the 

bodies. The mission continued to try to evolve and develop alongside the emerging conflict 

here. Here you see the mission in front of what used to be International Airport of 

Donetsk. [Points to presentation slide; figure not available.] And continued to help to 
4 

assist the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, including the verification of the withdrawal of heavy armory. 

Our best assets are the monitors. Alex made reference to it. They undertake daily 

important work on both sides of the contact line. [See Appendix, Figure 2.] They are all 

civilian, unarmed monitors, stationed mostly in the eastern part, but also in the rest of 

Ukraine where, as I’ve mentioned before, we have a mandate to monitor too. Here you 

see the map of Ukraine. [See Appendix, Figure 3.] Every OSCE flag symbolizes a presence 

across the country. However, most dominantly, of course, our monitors are dispatched to 

the eastern part. Here you see, at the moment, current figures of our deployment, some 

640 monitors in place, most of them in the east. Roughly 400 Ukrainian colleagues and 

another 100 international staff members, like myself and other colleagues, that support 

the mission. 

Zooming in in the east, this is the eastern part of the country. Yellow here on this 

map is the contact line, this 500-kilometer-long line dividing government from nongovernment-controlled area. Every dot on that map there represents a presence where our teams 

are stationed. And you see two photographs there of forward patrol bases. [See Appendix, 

Figure 4.] These are smaller units where the mission places its monitors very close to the 

contact live, where they live, where they operate from, but also where they monitor, 

during nighttime in particular. 

The dimension of the conflict is also important to note. The conflict area is bordered 

with a contact line, which is approximately 500 kilometer[s] long. You can look far and 

wide until you see another conflict with such a long contact line, a line where opposing 

forces face each other. There is the unsecure border, which is currently beyond government control, which is over 400 kilometer[s] long. Down south you have a seashore of 

approximately 70 kilometers that is currently also beyond the control of the government 

in Kyiv. The whole area that is currently outside government’s control amounts to almost 

20,000 square kilometers, a bit less than half of the entire size of the two oblasts there. 

It’s approximately half the size of my country, Switzerland, where I come from. 

A few words on the agreements in Minsk, important here. You read in the media 

about Minsk 1 and Minsk 2. There are, in fact, at least six agreements reached in Minsk. 

The most important ones are in front of you there. [See Appendix, Figure 5.] They list 

measures that should be taken to normalize the situation at the contact line. They also 

include political measures. The important, military, technical measures are here. This is 

the nonuse of weapons—that is the language used for the ceasefire. The disengagement 

to bring the forces apart from one another. The nonuse of mines to protect civilians. And 

the nonuse of weapons. Before I use more words, here is a quick video clip of what the 

mission currently is doing. It’s in Ukrainian with English subtitles. 

[A video in Ukrainian is shown.] [See Appendix, Figure 6.] 

Mr. HUG. The Special Monitoring Mission’s best asset are its monitors. They not only 

document the fighting in the eastern part of the country, also document the suffering of 

the civilian population. [See Appendix, Figure 7.] 

But first, to the current situation out in the east, you see here, the past six months 

documented on a week-by-week basis. [See Appendix, Figure 8.] You see the steadily 

increasing number of ceasefire violations that we currently see. And you can also see they 

reach high numbers that we still register. I have just cleared the latest summary report 
5 

of the last 24 hours. And they have reached, yet again, a thousand ceasefire violations 

in a single day that we have seen. 

What is important also here is that you can see when they, the sides, agree to stop 

firing, as they have done there where the red arrow is at the beginning of the new school 

year, it is possible for them to cease fighting almost immediately. Within an hour’s time, 

the entire 500-kilometer-long contact line is quiet. Why it doesn’t seem to be sustainable? 

It’s for the following reasons. There are reasons in the geography of the contact line. [See 

Appendix, Figure 9.] Some parts of it are made up of a river, like in the Luhansk region 

where the river builds a natural barrier between the sides. They can’t come close enough. 

Fighting is less acute there. There are the proximity of the positions, which is a big 

problem. A decision has been taken to disentangle them. 

There is a big difference between the fighting in the countryside and in the town 

areas. And unfortunately, almost all the fighting takes place inside or nearby built-up 

areas and the heavy weapons, tanks, mortars, artillery that should have been long withdrawn are still there. We see them every day. Here you see main battle tanks in an area 

beyond government control at a distance where they should not be. [See Appendix, Figure 

10.] You can see our monitoring patrol car there. That is the daily view that our monitors 

see. These findings are all made public on a daily basis on our website in Ukraine and 

English and Russian language. Here, more heavy artillery guns hidden in a tree line, 

photographed by one of our unmanned aerial vehicles that we use to monitor areas where 

we have no access to—equally a violation. [See Appendix, Figure 11.] 

The same on the government side. There are guns also very close up to the contact 

line, in engagement distance. Guns that should not be there. [Figure not available.] We 

also see other violations, including—and that picture also taken last week—the presence 

of mines. Here you see anti-tank mines over a road that normally is used by civilians. 

[See Appendix, Figure 12.] A mine like this killed our colleague, Joseph Stone, in the 

beginning of this year. All of those are clear violations of the agreements that I’ve just 

shown you before. Impact on the civilian populations, and more words cannot replace a 

short clip that I would like to show you. [Figure not available.] First, you see here the 

bridge that I have seen before in the winter period, now from above. This is this bridge 

over which up to 8,000 civilians cross every day. They have no chance to do it by vehicle 

or by any other means. They have to do it on foot. People die on this bridge because 

they’re exhausted from crossing it. In the summer, very hot. In the winter months, very, 

very slippery. 

Other crossing points look like this. [Figures not available.] Endless queues of thousands of cars, waiting times up to a day until civilians can cross the line. They do it either 

on car elsewhere, or on foot. There are only five crossing points all along the contact line. 

And where the conflict has been, the situation looks like this. Devastation. Villages 

destroyed. People have left, displaced inside Ukraine or now as refugees outside. People 

also die in the conflict still up to this date. We have registered this year alone more than 

400 civilian casualties both killed and injured. Most of them die through shrapnel, 

through the use of these weapons that should not be there—the artillery, the mortars, 

the tanks that are still being used. The second biggest category of casualties are those 

that die or get injured from mines and unexploded ordnance. And I said before, over 400 

this year. [See Appendix, Figure 13.] 

Infrastructure they rely on is also affected. Here you see a map that provides you 

the triangle between government-controlled Avdiivka, Donetsk city, the gray shaded areas 
6 

in the lower part of the picture, and Yasynuvata, also not government-controlled area. In 

the middle of that is a filtration station. You see it here in this picture. [See Appendix, 

Figure 14.] This is a water filtration station that delivers clean water to both government 

and nongovernment controlled areas. Because positions are very close up to that facility, 

the facility comes regularly under fire. Not only interrupts the production of clear water, 

but also is an environmental hazard because in the building where the red circle is there, 

they store chlorine gas which they use to purify the water. Should a shrapnel penetrate 

the building there—and it has been hit and affected—but should it penetrate the canisters 

where it is stored, it will lead to a leakage that will have devastating effect. And the gas 

will not hold and stop at the contact line. It will affect both sides equally. 

What needs to be done to stabilize the situation are two main measures. First is 

increase the proximity between positions. [See Appendix, Figure 15.] As I’ve shown you 

before, this is one of the big problems. They are too close in the area you’ve seen before, 

between 100 meters and 10 meters one another. They see across this room their positions. 

That, of course, is recipe for more violence. So there the agreement says in some of these 

areas at least two kilometers distance needs to be built in. And depending on the weapons 

types, these weapons need to be withdrawn out of engagement distance. If that happens, 

and it has been agreed that it should happen, then more than 90 percent of the civilian 

casualties could be prevented, there would be less damage to infrastructure, and it would 

be a conductive environment to operate better on the ground and bring the situation back 

to normal, irreversibly so. 

A few words on our freedom of movement and our own challenges on the ground. 

Here you see a picture taken last week when I was in Luhansk, where there were internal 

struggles among the control structures there, unidentified armed men blocking roads in 

the middle of the city there. [See Appendix, Figure 16.] Here, on this map, you see what 

is an average patrolling routing here in the months of October. [See Appendix, Figure 17.] 

Yellow are the patrol routes. This is a computer system that allows us tracking our 

vehicles that are on the ground through a satellite imagery system. You see they go up 

to the unsecure border with the Russian Federation. But until they reach the border, they 

go through multiple checkpoints. By the time they arrive at the border, everyone knows 

that they’re coming and anything we see there is highly controlled. You also see the presence of the patrols along the red line there, the contact line. 

We have stopped in our tracks on both sides of the contact line, statically so, through 

mine fields, in almost equal terms on both sides. But if you look at the right-hand side 

of this slide, you will see that the more intrusive, aggressive, intimidating stoppages of 

our work occur mainly, with a few exception[s], in areas beyond government control. [See 

Appendix, Figure 18.] It is also visible here, the more serious incidents. When assets of 

the mission are affected or under threat, then this mainly occurs to three-quarters in 

areas beyond government controlled, and to one-quarter in areas in government control. 

We face a serious incident when staff or assets are at risk every third day. 

A few words on the technology that we use at the moment, because this has become 

necessary to overcome the deficiencies of our operating patrols on the ground, because 

they’re stopped so we deploy UAVs, different ones, small ones as you see here [See 

Appendix, Figure 19.] but also long-range UAV. We have cameras in place. [See Appendix, 

Figure 20.] We have acoustic sensors in place. We have access to satellite imagery. And 

there are handheld tools that the monitors can use to look into areas where they otherwise would have no access. What they see there you can look as follows. Here, again, the 
7 

area of that bridge that you have seen during the nighttime, active fighting in the area 

captured by our camera there. The monitors monitor 24 hours, around the clock, and are 

being able to document the violence that also continues during nighttime in these areas. 

[See Appendix, Figure 21.] 

Also, these instruments are sometimes interfered with. What you see here is the 

blinding of a camera in the same area by an armed man with a laser pointer, who had 

blinded the camera for two hours. You see the man walking away there. Again, here, the 

blinding of the camera. [See Appendix, Figure 21.] Interference with our work happens 

regularly. And it happens only when those who interfere with our work want to prevent 

us from seeing what is going on on the ground. Now, this, dear Alex, is the end of my 

brief presentation. And I list here a few links to our website where our daily reporting 

can be accessed and where we try to document objectively and verifiably the reality in 

the eastern part of Ukraine. [See Appendix, Figure 22.] 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Alexander, thank you for that tremendously compelling presentation. I 

think the first thing I’d like to do is, I know there are representatives of the Ukrainian 

Embassy present. I wonder whether you might want to make a statement? I think we 

have a roving microphone that we could provide? I’ll follow with a couple of questions of 

my own, if you don’t mind. Please. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Hug. 

Thank you very much, Alex, for initiating this discussion and this briefing. 

I would like to praise the effort and courage and dedication of the SMM mission, 

which really makes a difference. From the day one it was very important to have mission 

on the ground to monitor and verify the ongoing violations of the Russia-backed militants. 

It was a necessary tool to tell the world about the launched and ongoing Russian aggression. I would like to also underline the fact that the monitors are carrying out their very 

dangerous mission without arms to be in the conflict zone. And as mentioned, you are 

everyday exposed to a lot of danger. 

In recent months, there has been discussion—and there was an initiative from 

Ukraine. One—actually, it was an initiative one-and-a-half year ago to deploy a peacekeeping mission, which would be an armed international mission to have access to the 

entire territory of the conflict, and to the uncontrolled parts of the border, in order to stop 

the access and to stop provision of the arms from the Russian Federation, to stop the militants. To also ensure the ceasefire, ensure the storage of the weapons in the designated 

places. 

Could you please comment on the Ukrainian proposal and what is the position of the 

SMM? Because the Russian proposal only asks for deployment along the contact line, 

which would not by any means contribute to the safety or the region and to the peaceful 

process. From the side of the monitors, how do you see the possibility of helping you and 

helping the peace process? 

Thank you. 

Mr. HUG. Should I take this? Thank you for the question and the kind words, which 

I will duly convey to our monitors on the ground. They are appreciating the attention they 

get and the appreciation, of course, will be well-received at the contact line. 

With regard to the different proposals that have been made to add further stabilization in eastern Ukraine, I can only stick to the facts in the position I represent today. 
8 

I have outlined that measures to stabilize the situation at the contact line which have 

already been agreed. If they would be implemented, even if only rudimentary ones that 

have been agreed—which is the stop using of weapons, the ceasefire, and the withdrawal 

of some of the weaponry—there would be immediately an environment within which other 

measures could be implemented, and an environment in which the OSCE SMM could 

report more. 

At the moment, the non-implementation—it’s not a lack of monitoring, it’s the lack 

of implementation. Our monitoring activities highlight the deficiencies of implementing 

the agreements, which is required now. And we would note it and duly report it if the 

will has been taken and this implemented and transmitted to the ground, which then 

should translate into tangible results in terms of ceasing fire and withdrawing weapons. 

Mr. TIERSKY. I’ll come back to the audience in just a moment, but I would like to 

put a couple of questions myself. I want to make sure that we are focusing on the challenges to the affected civilian population. So I’d like to ask you what your monitors are 

seeing in the context of falling temperatures and winter in terms of the impact on the 

humanitarian situation there that your monitors are seeing. I would also ask, in a secondary question, given the important work that the SMM is doing one would expect the 

local populations to be unanimously in support of the mission, and demonstrating their 

support of their mission regularly. Yet, sometimes we see images of local civilians having 

grievances with the SMM and expressing those grievances vociferously. Can you clarify 

why that might be? 

Mr. HUG. OK. Thank you. And I welcome that focus on the civilians. It is the civilians 

that bear the brunt of this conflict. I have mentioned before that civilians still die and 

get injured, more than one a day, still now in the fourth year of this conflict. That 

includes children. 

The winter, which is winter number four in this conflict, has now started in eastern 

Ukraine. Snow has been falling and the ground is freezing. There are villages along the 

contact line that now face the fourth winter without heating. Temperatures will go down 

below minus-20. And these people have been pleading for ceasefires, not to protect themselves but to repair the gas pipelines that lead across the contact line. In some of these 

cases, one hour or two hour[s] of ceasing fire would be enough to repair the infrastructure 

to allow reconnection to the gas system, the water system that would provide them at 

least a warm home. 

Some of them have no electricity for years without end. And that means they have 

no communication. They can’t charge their mobile phones, a very simple thing, but they 

run out of batteries of their mobile phones. They can’t watch the news. They don’t know 

what’s going on. They can’t refrigerate their food. They can’t store their food without electricity. That makes life very difficult. 

And in areas very close to the line, the delivery of humanitarian aid becomes very 

difficult because, normally, the places at the line itself are beyond the last checkpoint of 

either side and in an area beyond control of any side, which makes it a very unpredictable 

area to deliver anything, services, visits by doctors, delivery of food. 

With regard to the attitude of the civilian population, it is true that whenever we 

enter these villages at the contact line, we face great frustration by the population. And 

we are the only international organization, at least with this footprint, that normally 

enters these places. They see no one else of the international community and then 
9 

download their frustration of being shelled for three-and-a-half years without stopping. 

Some of these places that you have seen have not seen a single day without being shelled 

or being fired upon. That leads to great frustrations. 

However, we also have seen that civilians have been marshaled into protests against 

us, meaning being bused into the areas where we operate. And that, of course, creates 

not only a wrong picture of the mission, but also is a security concern to us. 

We welcome any dialogue with the civilian population, as only dialogue ultimately, 

we believe, will be able to solve this conflict. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. I’d like to ask if anyone in the audience would like to ask 

Mr. Hug a question at this time. 

Please. 

QUESTIONER. Orest Deychakiwsky, formerly with the Helsinki Commission, now with 

the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation. 

I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the demining efforts and 

what the SMM is doing, how it’s contributing to those. 

And also, to what extent are civilians still being used essentially as hostages where 

a lot of the firing takes place too close to residential areas? Has that diminished with the 

passage of time? Does it go up and down? If you could just give a little bit more of a 

handle on that. 

Mr. HUG. Yes, thank you. Mine action, very important. You have seen the secondbiggest cause for injury and death among civilians in the area of the contact line. And 

tragically also, these weapons have killed our colleague Joseph Stone. 

I want to be very clear. These weapons are indiscriminate weapons. They kill at 

random and not necessarily those they are intended to. That’s very important to recognize. 

Article six of the memorandum of 2014 clearly says that those who have signed the 

memorandum, which is the Russian Federation, certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk 

and Ukraine, they have pledged to remove any mine that was in the ground at the time 

and not to place any new mines onto the ground. So any mine that we see at the moment, 

placed in the areas, including the ones we have seen before, are a violation of what has 

been agreed. 

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reports any minefield or any individual mine 

or even mine signs publicly so that those who have the capability to remove the mines 

can do so. We also liaise with the respective armed formations or the Ukraine armed 

forces to ensure that the paths we use are being cleared for mines so that we can do our 

job. 

The mines that we see are both antitank mines and antipersonnel mines. But the 

risk also extends to improvised explosive devices, which we have seen, as well as 

unexploded ordnance. These are unexploded shells fired and littering some of these villages, which also need to be removed. Touching them alone would be sufficient to be 

killed. A lot of children die because they see these shiny objects on the ground, they pick 

them up, it explodes either in their hands immediately or then when they take them home 

and start to dismantle them. 

In terms of the civilians, it is true that civilian areas are still being used as firing 

positions, not only places that hardware and ammunition and armed personnel into 
10 

civilian areas, it also becomes a target because firing from these positions attracts 

counterfire. And because the weapons used in this conflict are not precision weapons, it 

is most likely and unavoidable that civilian infrastructure that is nearby is affected by 

it. 

And I have mentioned to you before, a lot of the fighting takes place in or nearby 

built-up areas, including big towns such as Donetsk city or Horlivka. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. 

Other questions from the audience at this time? Please. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you very much for hosting this briefing. 

Mr. Hug, you mentioned that a lot of people don’t have access to television, for 

example, because they have no power and so they’re not getting information that way. 

That may be good or bad. What are the primary channels for people to get practical 

information that they need in the conflict zone and along the line of contact or elsewhere 

in the conflict zone? And how much information is or is not getting through? 

Mr. HUG. If those affected villages would like to get access to information, they would 

have to walk or drive towards the next town or village that has electricity, and that 

implies they would have to often travel through the lines, which is dangerous in itself 

both for being caught in the crossfire or due to the mines placed on the ground, and then 

would be able there to get access to information. 

Now, all sides involved use information, as well, as a tool to make their position 

clear. So often, that information that is provided, and it doesn’t matter on which side of 

the line one is consuming the information, information not always is reliable. And there, 

the Special Monitoring Mission tries to make a contribution of objective, verified information that describes the reality on the ground as seen by monitors mandated to establish 

the facts. 

We have no radio station of our own, but we make our reports public also through 

media, social media channels. It’s unique in the OSCE work that this has been done. Normally, the OSCE reports are cables that are not public. The OSCE reports from this mission are being made public on a daily basis in Ukrainian, Russian and English languages. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Thank you. 

Please. 

Mr. MASSARO. Thanks, Alex. I’m Paul Massaro. I’m the anticorruption adviser with 

the Helsinki Commission. 

I understand that there are corrupt activities in the region that you monitor. To what 

extent do those corrupt activities make it difficult to perform your mission? And to what 

extent do you notice them as an issue in the conflict? 

Mr. HUG. First of all, it’s important to mention here that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is an observer mission, not an intelligence-gathering operation. So what we 

are mandated to is to report what we see and what we hear. Investigating into any circumstance would go beyond our mandate. It’s very important to make that distinction 

between the task of an intelligence agency and that of an observer mission, and that not 

least is important so that those we are confronted with understand what we’re actually 

doing. So the ability to monitor corruptive practices is very limited. 
11 

However, to come back to the facts that we see, is that orders that are being discussed or have been proclaimed as being issued often are not adhered to, which we can 

establish as facts on the ground. To begin with, the ceasefire orders to the orders to let 

us through at checkpoints without being hindered or searched, so there are indications 

that there is indeed an issue of not being able to centrally control on either side the last 

forward positions the sides have. 

Whether or not that is related to a corruptive practice or not, there are clear signs 

that centrally issued orders or processes are not followed through to the dots at the areas 

where we have our monitors dispatched. 

Mr. TIERSKY. I’d like to express my gratitude to Alexander for the focus that he’s put 

on the suffering of the civilians. We’ve spent quite a bit of time on that and I think you’ve 

really sketched it out for us quite compellingly. 

I would like, however, to come back to this question of the monitors and their ability 

to carry out their mandate. We are in Washington, we are in the U.S. Congress and 

Joseph Stone was an American citizen. He is the first casualty for an OSCE field mission. 

I wonder if you could take us through what investigations were done of that incident, 

what they’ve revealed, what the implications of Joseph Stone’s death—or the attack that 

caused the death—what the implications have been on the monitoring mission’s ability to 

do its job. Have procedures changed? Have they made it more difficult to conduct the 

observations that you would like conducted? And has there been an impact, for instance, 

on the recruitment of volunteers? How are we doing in terms of manning the monitoring 

mission? 

Mr. HUG. Thank you. And I would like to make it very clear that Joseph Stone didn’t 

die in an accident. He died at the explosion of an indiscriminate weapon. That has to be 

very clear and we have made that clear from the very beginning. 

Immediately in the aftermath of his death, there were several processes initiated. An 

internal audit process looked at the way the patrol has been put together, how the mission 

has tackled the aftermath of the incident. That process has come to a conclusion and led 

to several revisions of internal rules and procedures of how patrols are being conducted. 

There was an external, independent forensic investigation which looked into the 

cause of the explosion, the nature of the explosion as such. And that process has also been 

concluded. 

There is a criminal inquiry by the Ukrainian authorities launched into the incident 

under Ukrainian law. And I have to open here a bracket: The incident took place in an 

area beyond government control, so very difficult for anyone to look into the incident 

because it happened in an area where government officials have no access. 

And the mission itself has also undertaken immediate measures. It has written to 

the signatories of the Minsk Agreements, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the 

regions of Donetsk and Luhansk beyond government control, to provide the mission with 

maps of contaminated areas where they know the areas are risky for patrolling. We have 

not yet received any answer from anyone that had been addressed by this letter that dates 

back to the 5th of May 2017. 

In terms of mitigation measures, we have immediately stopped deploying new monitors to the area starting 23rd of April up to the 1st of October, when we have resumed 

deploying new staff to the eastern part of the country. 
12 

The second mitigation measure was to restrict patrolling activities to concrete and 

asphalt services only. The roads that we have been using before included gravel roads. 

An assessment of the gravel road as to the contamination with mines is very difficult and 

we have excluded them at the moment from our patrolling routes. Should we get information from the sites, that might be an input towards lifting this restriction either partially 

or fully. 

These restrictions, however, did not prevent us from being able to establish the 

trends, document the suffering. We are still present in all of the hotspots along the contact line—less than before, but we are still present there during daytime and during 

nighttime with the capability of technology, of which I have outlined for you some before. 

They help us to look into areas which would be otherwise difficult to access. 

The mission will not be the same after the death of Joseph. We will keep that 

moment with us and we will make sure that his work will not be forgotten. And I’m grateful that it has been mentioned here again. 

The sacrifice he made, the ultimate sacrifice, is the demonstration of the will of this 

mission to contribute to finding a solution that will bring Ukraine back to a stable, normal 

pace. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Can you tell us a few words about the national representations, the 

national contingents in the mission as a whole as well as in the monitoring teams when 

they go out on patrol? What are the major nationalities we’re talking about and how do 

you approach the issue of composition of a particular team for a patrol? 

Mr. HUG. The OSCE is an organization consisting of 57 participating States. That 

includes Switzerland, France, the U.S., Russia, Ukraine and others. Of those 57, over 40 

are seconding staff, sending staff to this mission. 

The biggest contingent among the monitors is that of the United States with 66 staff 

in total; others have far less. The biggest group in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 

is that of the European Union. Between 50 and 60 percent of all monitors come from 

member States of the European Union. The Russian Federation, as this is certainly 

implicit in your question, has a contingent of 39 monitors at the moment in the mission. 

Patrols that are dispatched along the contact line are never uniform patrols, so there 

is not a Swiss patrol or a Ukrainian patrol or an American patrol or a Russian patrol. 

They are mixed in terms of their seconding states’ memberships. When they come back 

in the evening from patrol, all the different members need to sit down and agree on their 

patrolling report which then is becoming part of the overall mission report. 

These are groups between six and eight, as a minimum, of officers that come from 

different nationalities and different backgrounds. And the mission takes great care that 

this information is objective, including in the way how it is being collected. 

Mr. TIERSKY. And in terms of gender balance in the mission, can you describe where 

we stand with that and what the implications are thereof? 

Mr. HUG. The gender balance is not as we wish to have it. In many contingents, there 

are no female monitors at all dispatched to the mission itself. I believe among the 66 

Americans, there are some 20 females, a rather good percentage there, but we encourage 

all participating States to send additional candidates, female candidates forward. The mission itself is relying on the candidates put forward by participating States. As we do not 
13 

recruit in the open market, we depend that these candidates come through participating 

States. 

The background for being able to work with the mission is not as such that you need 

to have necessarily a military background. What we look for are candidates, in particular 

for the monitoring activity, that have previous exposure to similar circumstances. You can 

gain that experience as a diplomat in a crisis region, as having worked for the ICOC or 

an NGO, being a journalist in an area of conflict, but also, of course, as being dispatched 

as part of the military or a police force in these areas. But experience is what we are 

looking for, because dispatched to the contact line means immediate exposure to high 

risks where we expect people to react accordingly, not to put themselves or their colleagues at risk. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Well, if there is anyone in the room who fits those qualifications or on 

our Facebook feed watching, this is clearly a vital mission and I would encourage you to 

volunteer your services. 

Do we have more questions from the audience? 

We have several. Let’s start right here, please. 

QUESTIONER. Hi. Is there anything that lawmakers in the U.S. can do to help your 

mission? 

Mr. HUG. I think the most important thing that needs to continue is to pay attention 

to the conflict. And the Special Monitoring Mission is contributing to that by providing 

the Congress here, but also all 57 participating States, with objective information that can 

form the basis for any decision that needs to be taken. 

The information we provide doesn’t reflect the entire reality on the ground because 

we are prevented from doing so, but it represents trends, it highlights the risks, it highlights the noncompliance with the agreements and it provides, once again, a basis for any 

decision that lawmakers or others need to take with regard to the ongoing conflict. 

Mr. TIERSKY. And I saw another question over here, please. 

QUESTIONER. Hi. My question regards when the observers observe a clear violation 

of the Minsk Agreement, either the heavy weaponry or the point of contact—and there’s 

a lot of them, the data shows—do you report that to either side, saying, You have your 

tanks too close, move them back? Or is there any punishment that goes to the side that 

breaks that agreement? Or what incentives are there for both sides to agree to disengage 

from the point of contact? 

Mr. HUG. A very important question. The first part I can answer very quickly. Yes, 

we make all information that we see on the ground publicly available. So if we see a tank 

in an area where it shouldn’t be—and a tank, just as an example, needs to be moved back 

15 kilometers from the contact line—so any tank that we see within the range of 1 to 

15 kilometers is a violation. We report it, including giving the location where we have 

seen the tank. And that you will find in our report the next day. 

We also report violations to the Joint Center for Control and Coordination—I briefly 

introduced this before—a construct consisting out of Russian and Ukrainian officers that 

are formally in Ukraine and are mandated to jointly control and coordinate the 

implementation of these agreements. And they have specific tasks given also by the agreements itself. 

The second part of your question is an important one, and that is the lack of accountability for violating the agreements. I have just here the figures with me. This year 
14 

alone—now, hold your breath—we have registered 352,000 ceasefire violations alone— 

352,000 ceasefire violations. There would need to be a process in place through which 

those sides that know that they have been firing, because nobody fires without being 

given an order or at least the firing having been tolerated, but these acts need to be followed up. Not holding violators to account is an open invitation for more of the same. And 

we have made it very clear that any violation, including those that affect us directly, 

should be followed up immediately. And why do we say so? Because if we are directly 

affected, it is very clear who did it, there is no doubt, because we see it directly. If someone threatens us at gunpoint, if someone stops us, these are all violations of the agreements and they require follow up. 

The systems are there. There is a disciplinary code in the Ukraine armed forces. 

There are similar systems in the armed formations. But what is lacking is a follow 

through and to hold those to account who continue to violate the agreements. 

Mr. TIERSKY. I see a question in the back, please. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. And I guess I’m building off of the last questions a little 

bit. 

Really impressed with the objectivity that you all put into what you’re doing. And 

to that end, there’s discussion here about defensive weapons being supplied to the 

Ukraine. Can you talk about what effect that would have on the whole situation from a 

monitoring perspective? We have accountability issues, we have a question about what the 

United States can do—just kind of curious what effects that would have. 

Mr. HUG. As I have said before, I can only stick to the facts. And with regard to your 

question, I know this is a question that has been often asked to us. Unless we know 

exactly what these weapons would be and how they would be delivered and under which 

conditions they will be deployed, I can’t make any judgment. Anything I would say at this 

stage would be a speculation. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Please. Oh, sorry, there’s a question in the back. 

QUESTIONER. Hi. I wanted to ask something. In your reports, your recent reports, you 

mentioned that the Ukrainian armed forces are now in control of parts of the gray zone, 

including the village of Travneve. Have you been able to follow up on that? And do you 

know if there has been any media reaction to that? 

Thank you. 

Mr. HUG. Thank you. Also, very important here to note there is no gray zone defined 

anywhere. So the word ‘‘gray zone’’ is an invention that has come to the surface. The 

Minsk Agreement has clearly identified a line, the contact line, and also clearly identified 

that positions that had been at the time of the agreement when it was signed should not 

be moved. This agreement has been violated multiple times on both sides of the contact 

line, most obviously so in the beginning of 2015 when the area around Debaltseve was 

taken. That was clearly in the agreements on the side that would belong to the control 

of the government of Ukraine. 

The specific villages you have mentioned before, we have not yet been able to access, 

including due to the presence of mines, which we know they’re there because the civilians 

have reported they have seen them. We have requested the sides to jointly demine the 

area to make it possible for us to access the area. 

We have been accused by both sides of not having access to village and not reporting 

about the village. We have made it very clear that the mission stands ready. If you look 
15 

in our social media feeds, you see that at the time patrols were nearby the villages, we 

have been clearly seeing that those who have the responsibility to demine have not done 

so and, therefore, prevented the mission from accessing these specific areas. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Please. 

QUESTIONER. Thank you for taking the time to talk with us. And thanks for doing 

this important monitoring mission. 

I just wanted to ask—I’ve seen your reports, they’re incredibly detailed. I’m curious 

about the methodology of the monitoring and as you work to report the trend analysis 

over time if there’s a consistency in the number of sensors that are employed so that those 

numbers aren’t just a reflection of an increased number of sensors of more flight time with 

your UAVs or greater patrol presence or something like that. Is it fairly consistent over 

time as we look at those numbers? 

Mr. HUG. A very important question. As any statistics, statistics have to be analyzed 

first before one can draw conclusions. What certainly is consistent is the trends that we 

see. They will be the same if we see more or less, we would see whether there would be 

an increase or a decrease. But we have steadily been increasing our ability to monitor, 

including the placement of sensors, cameras and acoustic sensors, and that led to more 

observations. But the trends, the increase in violence or the decrease in violence, are 

clearly visible. Also, if we restrict, for instance, our patrolling is still there, we can see 

because we monitor statically then the number of violence. 

But it’s a very important point. Numbers, as such, don’t tell much because it depends 

on how they have been collected. Important is what measures the sides have been taking 

in the period these numbers have been recorded and what actions they’re taking to prevent the numbers from reoccurring at the same level. 

Mr. TIERSKY. More questions from the audience at this time? Please. 

QUESTIONER. Just wondering if you can comment on whether there are opportunities 

for humanitarian corridors. You’ve talked about asking each side to demine or the need 

for time to repair electricity or other utilities and so forth. Is there actually any cooperation on that? Are there opportunities to build on that to create humanitarian corridors 

for addressing the needs of civilians? 

Mr. HUG. Access to these areas is very difficult and needs always to be locally negotiated. The methodology we apply in there, the mission is also vital as we have our teams 

on both sides of the line. The sides don’t talk to one another, there is no communication 

formally across the contact line. Our teams discuss across the lines or they facilitate that 

dialogue that otherwise will not happen. 

It then allows to create what we call local windows of silence where in an area 

defined on the map in a planning session—an area is defined where the sides through 

our dialogue agree to hold fire to enable a repair crew to come in to repair a gas pipeline, 

a water pipeline or recover the dead or fallen or take out the wounded—and at the time 

this action is happening, not only facilitate the dialogue—the mission facilitates the dialogue, but also dispatches what we call mirror patrols on both sides to then flag immediately if there is a movement of troops towards that area that has been called for an 

area of silence. 

The problem is, because the sides don’t move their positions out, often when this 

window of silence is terminated and the mission moves out, the fighting resumes. And 

then the next day, the same repair work most likely will have to be done. Therefore, the 
16 

only sustainable way to generate access would be disengagement of forces and the withdrawal of the heavy weapons to a distance where they cannot be engaged any longer. 

Mr. TIERSKY. I see another question. 

QUESTIONER. Thanks. Do you feel you have a sufficient number of observers in the 

east? And one reason I ask that is because you mentioned the 9 or 10 cities across 

Ukraine. I know that initially there may have been more of a reason to have, back in 

2014, observers in those cities. Has there been any discussion of sort of shifting that, 

because one could perhaps make the argument that they aren’t as needed in some of the 

other cities in central and western Ukraine, let’s say, but more observers might be needed 

on the line of contact? Or is that part of the mandate, so it’s completely beyond your control? 

Mr. HUG. That will be indeed the short answer to it. The mandate lists all the towns 

where we have to be present. These are the 10 towns all across Ukraine. How we then 

split up the workforce among those is the prerogative then of the head of mission, but 

there has to be a representation in all of the 10 areas. That is part of the mandate. Should 

it be changed, it requires a new Permanent Council decision in consensus to change that 

specific area. 

More monitors in the east would deliver more results, as you rightly have said, but 

not necessarily more stability. Only the will of the sides to abide by what they have promised to do, combined with more monitors, would lead to more change. 

We are already able to identify what needs to be done. That is a fact at the moment. 

It is now time that the sides realize and accept their failure to implement the agreements 

and withdraw their weapons and disengage where they’re too close. Unfortunately, the 

opposite often happens, that the positions are moving forward and weapons, as you have 

seen before, are brought in, even under our noses, towards a distance where they can 

easily be engaged. 

And we only see the tip of the iceberg, so you can imagine the scale of the tension 

that is out there that we actually have no eyes or ears on at the moment. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Sure, one more. Yes. 

QUESTIONER. Yes, thanks for bringing that up, Orest. I figured I’d also chime in there 

because that surprised me when I saw on a map that there are these observers in the 

west and central Ukraine and, OK, that makes sense with the mandate. But I understand 

the Kyiv office, you’re probably putting the reports together, the data is going there. In 

those other offices, what is the daily job of observers? 

Mr. HUG. The mandate mandates and tasks the mission to monitor on the security 

situation in Ukraine as well as monitoring adherence to human dimension commitments 

that Ukraine has taken and which is enshrined in our mandate. So this is what they are 

monitoring. And also, these findings are being made public. 

There are offices that are close to the conflict area. The office in Kharkiv, for 

instance, the office in Dnipro. The office in Kherson also very important, close to the 

administrative boundary line with the Crimean Peninsula, an issue that we haven’t been 

discussing yet. They also fulfill a very important monitoring function also to see whether 

or not the conflict that is tucked now to the far southeast is spilling over further towards 

the west. So they have an early-warning function in these areas as well, warning the 

participating States of an emerging—possibly emerging conflict in these areas so that 

early action can be taken to remedy that. 
17 

QUESTIONER. So they really are monitors. 

Mr. HUG. They’re monitors, yes. And some of them have served in the east before 

and they then move into areas outside the conflict area. But these teams are relatively 

small. They’re between 5 and 14 depending on the location. 

Mr. TIERSKY. Ladies and gentlemen, I think you’ll agree that we have spent a 

tremendously useful and informative hour together. 

I am again reminded by this discussion of the extraordinarily admirable effectiveness 

of the Special Monitoring Mission within the political constraints that are imposed from 

outside. 

In closing our briefing today, I want to thank Alexander Hug for his service to the 

monitoring mission and, through you, the monitors who work with your teams. Clearly, 

the challenges are enormous. The suffering of civilians continues on a daily basis. Ultimately, progress will rely on the political will of the violators of the Minsk Agreements. 

We at the Helsinki Commission will continue to address that point publicly and regularly. 

We will continue to, as you requested, keep attention on the conflict, both in eastern 

Ukraine and in Crimea, and in doing so we will, as much of the rest of the international 

community, rely in no small part on the excellent reporting of the SMM itself. 

So again, I’d like to thank you for coming to Washington to provide us with this 

briefing and for your time with us today. 

Please join me in thanking our speaker. 

Mr. HUG. Thank you. [Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the briefing ended.] 
18 

A P P E N D I X 

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