Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Long War Against Piracy: 

Historical Trends

James A. Wombwell

Occasional Paper 32
Cover photo: Members of a US Navy visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) 

team from guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG 64) and US Coast Guard 

Tactical Law Enforcement Team South, Detachment 409, capture suspected 

pirates in the Gulf of Aden, 13 May 2009, after responding to a merchant vessel 

distress signal while operating in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area 

of responsibility. Both teams are part of Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a 

multinational task force that conducts counterpiracy operations under a missionbased mandate throughout the CMF area of responsibiity to actively deter, disrupt, 

and suppress piracy to protect global maritime security. US Navy photo by Mass 

Communication Specialist 1st Class Eric L. Beauregard
Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

James A. Wombwell

Occasional Paper 32

The Long War Against Piracy: 

Historical Trends
First printing, May 2010.

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at: 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wombwell, James A., 1956-

 The long war against piracy : historical trends / James A. Wombwell.

 p. cm. -- (Combat Studies Institute occasional paper ; 32)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. Piracy--History. 2. Pirates--History. I. Title. 

 G535.W67 2010

 364.16’4--dc22

 2009028633
iii

Foreword

The Combat Studies Institute is pleased to present Occasional Paper 

32, The Long War Against Piracy: Historical Trends, by CSI historian 

James A. Wombwell. This study surveys the experience of the United 

States, Great Britain, and other seafaring nations in addressing the 

problem of piracy at sea, then derives insights from that experience that 

may be relevant to the suppression of the current surge of piratical activity. 

Wombwell, a retired naval officer, traces the course of several outbreaks 

of piracy during the past 300 years in a variety of geographical areas. 

Although each case varies in its details, Wombwell concludes that enough 

similarities exist to permit several useful generalizations. Among these are 

the causes of piracy, the factors that permit the behavior to flourish, and 

the range of countermeasures that have been available to policymakers 

seeking to eradicate the problem. When conditions are favorable for 

piracy to develop, and no strong response is made by the forces of law 

and order, what began as low-level brigandage often grows to outrageous 

proportions, ultimately requiring significant military resources to suppress 

or eliminate the threat posed to legitimate commerce.

This Occasional Paper is a timely work because of the dramatic surge 

of piratical acts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa in recent 

years. Although piracy has been a problem for several decades in other 

international sea lanes, the actions of the Somali pirates have focused world 

attention on the issue. This study is especially pertinent to the US Army 

because the historical record clearly indicates that piracy seldom, if ever, 

has been eradicated solely through naval operations alone. As Wombwell 

makes abundantly clear, only when nations have acted to remove piracy’s 

enabling conditions ashore through military and/or political means has the 

scourge of piracy truly been eliminated. Moreover, in almost every case, 

because of the extensive resources needed to combat piracy, the nation 

taking the lead against the pirates was a dominant military power, either 

on a world or regional scale. Thus, as the author suggests, the land forces 

of the United States may at some point be called on to assist in making the 

waters off the Somali coast safe for international commerce once more. 

Should that time come, James Wombwell’s survey of the historical context 

of the problem may be instructive to both policymakers and Soldiers. 

CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

 William G. Robertson

 Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Preface

Modern-day piracy is no joke. After thousands of years, pirates 

remain a serious threat to innocent mariners in many parts of the world. 

Moreover, their mode of operations has changed little over that time. They 

are criminals—thieves and murderers—who prey on defenseless sailors at 

sea and in port.

As a former naval officer, I take pride in the actions of the United 

States Navy against pirates. But a closer examination of piracy through 

the ages reveals that piracy cannot be eliminated by sea-based operations 

alone. In the end, piracy is a land problem and must be solved ashore, 

whether by force or political means. This Occasional Paper examines the 

actions taken by nations against pirates in the past and sheds light on how 

contemporary leaders should approach the current piracy crisis plaguing 

Africa and Asia.

I am grateful to all those who helped me with this project. I want 

to acknowledge Dr. William G. Robertson, Director of the Combat 

Studies Institute, who conceived the project and encouraged me along 

the way. I also want to thank Mr. Kendall Gott, Chief of the Research 

and Publications Team, for his advice and support. An old shipmate, Rear 

Admiral Kendall L. Card, discussed his role in some of the recent events 

off the coast of Somalia, and his staff pointed me toward some useful 

sources of information. Mr. Tray Green, an accomplished game designer 

and budding historian, provided me access to a number of books and 

other piracy-related sources. My wife, Paula, and daughters Heather and 

Katherine, kept me motivated and on track. Finally, Mrs. Marilyn Edwards’ 

outstanding editorial work greatly improved the initial draft. This book 

is much better because of their assistance. As always, any omissions or 

errors in judgment in this work are mine alone. 

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword................................................................................................. iii

Preface.......................................................................................................v

Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................1

Chapter 2. Piracy in the West Indies.........................................................9

Caribbean Piracy, 1500–1730...........................................................13

19th-Century Piracy .........................................................................36

Chapter 3. Piracy in the Mediterranean ..................................................57

Barbary Pirates.................................................................................61

Greek Piracy.....................................................................................75

Chapter 4. Asian Piracy...........................................................................91

Piracy in the Persian Gulf.................................................................92

East Indies Piracy .............................................................................96

Chinese Piracy................................................................................103

Chapter 5. Modern Piracy.....................................................................123

The Emergence of Piracy in the Late 20th Century .......................124

Southeast Asian Piracy ...................................................................132

Somali Piracy .................................................................................144

Chapter 6. Conclusion...........................................................................167

Bibliography .........................................................................................173

Appendix A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of

 10 December 1982...................................................................185

Appendix B. Types of Ships and Boats.................................................189

About the Author...................................................................................195

Tables

Table 1. Incidents of Piracy, 1984–2008...............................................130

Table 2. Piracy Attacks by Region, 2003–2008....................................132

Table 3. Incidents of Piracy in the Malacca Strait ................................142

Table 4. Incidents of Piracy Off Somalia..............................................144

Table 5. Types of Attacks Off Somali Waters.......................................147
viii

Page

Figures

Figure 1. Caribbean Islands ...................................................................... 9

Figure 2. Jamaica and Hispaniola ........................................................... 19

Figure 3. Gulf of Mexico ........................................................................ 38

Figure 4. Cuba and the Straits of Florida................................................ 42

Figure 5. Barbary coast and the Mediterranean...................................... 62

Figure 6. Greece...................................................................................... 77

Figure 7. The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.................................. 94

Figure 8. Sumatra and the Strait of Malacca........................................... 97

Figure 9. Hong Kong, Macao, and Canton ........................................... 104

Figure 10. Hainan Island and the South China Sea .............................. 106

Figure 11. Nanking (Nanjing), Shanghai, and Ningpo (Ningbo)...........113

Figure 12. The Strait of Malacca, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia ........ 133

Figure 13. Singapore and the Riau Archipelago ................................... 134

Figure 14. Somalia Coast...................................................................... 145
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

They struck at night, quickly scrambling over the side of the ship. 

Ten pirates, armed with knives and pistols, quickly overcame the unarmed 

crew. After ransacking the ship, the buccaneers moved the crew to their 

vessel. The crew was held captive on the pirate ship for 6 days and then 

set adrift in one of the ship’s boats. The pirates sailed away with their 

prize and later disposed of part of the cargo at one of the many ports that 

welcome such freebooters.1

Although this sounds like a story from the “Golden Age of Piracy,” 

when English and French pirates terrorized the Spanish Main, the incident 

did not occur 300 years ago, but in the Straits of Malacca in October 2000. 

The crew was lucky; it was rescued by Thai fishermen after drifting in 

a boat for 11 days. The pirates managed to dispose of almost half of the 

Alondra Rainbow’s cargo, some $10 million worth of aluminum ingots, 

before they were captured off the coast of Goa, India. No one knows what 

happened to the cargo they sold.

Until recently, when Somali pirates made the headlines after a series 

of seemingly ever more audacious attacks in 2008, most people did not 

realize that piracy still existed. But it does and it may, in fact, be more 

prevalent today than during the Golden Age of Piracy in the late 16th 

and early 17th centuries. This Occasional Paper examines piracy in its 

historical context and looks at the modern dilemma facing the world’s 

maritime nations. The study considers piracy over both time and space, 

looking at the practice in the Caribbean Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Asian 

waters, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Aden. It shows how 

nations, primarily the United States and Great Britain, dealt with piracy in 

the past and points to ways in which it may be effectively countered in the 

present.

Merchants have been plagued by pirates for almost as long as their 

ships have sailed the seas. The Sumerians, Babylonians, Cretans, and 

Egyptians all mention piracy in their ancient records. According to 

Sumerian documents, Sumer was raided by pirates from what is now the 

Persian Gulf more than 4,000 years ago.2 Hammurabi (1948–1905 BC) 

included a law against piracy in his famous code. This is the first known 

written law against piracy.3 According to Greek writers, Crete, which 

dominated the Aegean Sea from 2000–1400 BC, was the first nation to 

develop a navy. The Cretan Navy was, in part, built to suppress pirates in 
2

the region.4 After pirates entered the Nile delta and attacked shipping in 

the 14th century BC, King Amenhotep III of Egypt established a special 

maritime police squadron to patrol the delta area and protect shipping.5

As maritime trade expanded, pirates found more opportunities for 

plunder. Most people are familiar with the exploits of Blackbeard, Captain 

Kidd, and the other famous pirates of the 17th and 18th centuries. However, 

less well known are the pirate outbreaks of the 19th and 20th centuries. A 

line from the United States Marine Corps hymn, “to the shores of Tripoli,” 

reminds us that the United States fought the Barbary pirates in the 19th 

century. Piracy was not just a European or Western phenomena; pirates 

also plagued China, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian 

Ocean as well. Therefore, piracy has existed for thousands of years over a 

wide geographic area. 

The economics of commercial shipping, whether in the 14th century 

BC or the 19th century AD, facilitated piracy. Since merchants are most 

interested in maximizing profit, merchant ships throughout the ages have 

typically been lightly armed and sparsely manned. Ship designers usually 

concentrate on increasing cargo space not defensibility. Therefore, heavily 

armed pirates have almost always been able to overwhelm their victims, 

whether in port or at sea.6

Piracy has also been a cyclical phenomenon that concludes when the 

priates themselves are countered decisively. Piracy usually begins small 

scale, with attacks on vulnerable ships in dangerous waters. Initially, 

pirates are more of a nuisance than a threat, but in the absence of organized 

resistance, piracy flourishes. As their attacks increase in frequency and 

intensity, they begin to affect seaborne trade.

Once piracy begins to affect commerce, nations respond. Initially, 

the response to piracy is limited and disjointed because nations often 

view pirates differently. For example, the English did not, at first, view 

the Caribbean pirates negatively since they preyed on Spanish shipping. 

Once the pirates began to affect English shipping, British commercial 

leaders lobbied the government to use the Royal Navy to suppress piracy. 

Conversely, since they were frequently victimized by English pirate 

attacks, the Spanish considered England a “nation of pirates.” They treated 

all Englishmen harshly, often summarily executing those captured at sea, 

regardless of the legitimacy of their actions. Moreover, during the early 

stages of a nation’s maritime development, piracy often served as that 

country’s first avenue for trade.7 That was certainly the case with early 

English and Dutch piracy, which was used to make inroads into the areas 

controlled by Spain and Portugal. The profits generated by English and 
3

Dutch pirates encouraged merchants to invest in maritime commercial 

enterprises, whether legal or illegal. Soon, the Dutch Republic and later 

England became dominant maritime powers.

Another important historical reason why nations have historically 

viewed piracy in unique ways was their use of privateers. Essentially, 

privateers were state-sponsored pirates. They were civilian auxiliaries 

commissioned by authorized government officials to attack an enemy 

nation’s merchant ships. A letter of marque issued by their government 

legitimized their piratical activities. But Spain, frequently the victim of 

privateering attacks, did not recognize the validity of most privateers’ 

letters of marque and usually treated them as pirates.8 For this study, pirates 

and privateers are used interchangeably since privateers often slipped over 

into outright piracy when legitimate targets were difficult to find. 

In the final stage of the cycle, the threat from piracy becomes more 

prominent and nations organize and dispatch antipirate naval forces. 

Typically, these are unilateral operations conducted by the dominant naval 

power in the region. Powerful naval squadrons seek out and destroy pirate 

forces at sea. Equally important, they eliminate pirate support operations 

ashore by assaulting their strongholds. Despite the best efforts of those 

naval forces, unless they are successful in eliminating the shore support 

systems, they cannot completely eradicate piracy. Thus, in many parts of 

the world, even though piracy has been suppressed from time to time, it 

has continued at low levels, waiting to reemerge when conditions became 

more conducive to such activities. 

Although piracy can occur anywhere in the world, it begins as a local 

phenomenon. In other words, it requires specific conditions to flourish, as 

follows:

• Favorable maritime geography. Pirates need easy access to fertile 

shipping lanes, preferably far from naval or police forces that 

might oppose their activities. They gravitate toward places where 

they can easily acquire plunder, which is the primary reason why 

they became pirates. Consequently, piracy often occurs near 

chokepoints or established sealanes. Moreover, they rarely attack 

vessels far out to sea because it is much more difficult to locate 

victims on the open ocean. 

• Favorable political climate. Pirates exploit instability and 

uncertainty, whether the result of war, civil strife, legal ambiguity, 

jurisdictional conflict, or the failure of governmental functions. 

Each of those situations produces desirable conditions since they 
4

reduce the likelihood of government opposition, often result in 

weak or inadequate security measures, and open up opportunities 

to cultivate relationships with corrupt officials who allow them to 

act without fear of reprisal.

• Safe havens ashore. Pirates must have safe, secure ports where 

they can obtain logistics support, dispose of their stolen goods, 

recruit replacements, gather intelligence, and hide from law 

enforcement agencies. Sanctuaries may emerge because piracy 

is a culturally acceptable practice among the people involved or 

they might develop under the patronage of corrupt officials and 

merchants who profit from the pirates’ activities.9

While most nations have laws against piracy, there is little international 

agreement on what piracy is and how to combat it. Nations view piracy 

differently depending on whether they are victims or tacit co-conspirators. 

For example, many Somalis view the indigenous Somali pirates that 

emerged in the first decade of the 21st century as heroes. During interviews, 

Somali pirates often claim that they are merely protecting Somalia’s 

sovereign waters and retaliating for foreign exploitation of Somalia’s 

maritime resources. Most other nations view them as out-and-out thieves.

Frequently, national rivalries prevented successful legal proceedings 

against pirates. Thus, Great Britain (GB), the dominant naval power by 

the early 18th century, was disinclined to act against the Barbary pirates 

because they disproportionately preyed on the shipping of Britain’s 

enemies, France and Spain. Although GB had the naval power to eliminate 

or suppress the Barbary pirates, British leaders chose to negotiate safe 

passage for their ships instead of taking direct action against the Barbary 

corsairs.

Moreover, states have often favored pirates from their country, and 

those who receive the stolen goods, over other nation’s victims. Piracy 

requires safe havens ashore, where the brigands can rest, refit their ships, 

and dispose of their ill-gotten goods. For example, American colonists, 

angered by the Navigation Acts, were only too willing to buy cheap pirate 

plunder. Many fortunes were made by corrupt colonial merchants and 

officials who allowed pirated goods to be sold in their local markets.

Since there is no international tribunal to try and punish pirates, 

prosecution is left to the nation that captures them. In the case of the 

Somali pirates, the United Kingdom is reluctant to apprehend them 

because British authorities do not want to prosecute them in British courts, 

and British officials are reluctant to turn them over to Somalia since the 
5

pirates could justifiably claim asylum because of the harshness of Sharia 

law practiced in Somalia. The United States circumvented that concern by 

negotiating a bilateral treaty with Kenya that allows the United States to 

turn over Somali brigands to Kenyan authorities for prosecution.

Thus, piracy is a tough, enduring, problem. Pirates are difficult to 

find and even more difficult to eliminate. Short of the historic method 

of punishment—execution—modern pirates have little to fear from the 

international judicial system. They can operate with impunity at sea, 

confident that they will extract ransom or steal valuable items from 

vulnerable merchant ships cruising the world’s oceans.

In the modern period, piracy has thrived in different parts of the 

world at various times. There were two significant periods of piracy in the 

Caribbean Sea. Pirate attacks against Spanish treasure ships began soon 

after the Spanish began extracting wealth from their new colonies. The 

Golden Age of Piracy lasted from the 1670s through 1725. This is the age 

of piracy with which most people are familiar. It eventually ended when 

the impact on British commerce forced the British to react with a heavy 

hand. The Royal Navy, which emerged as the dominant naval power after 

a series of wars with France and Spain, eliminated piracy in the Caribbean 

by 1730. 

But piracy in this region reemerged in the second decade of the 19th 

century when Spain’s South and Central American colonies began to break 

away from their mother country. Since the newly emerging nations had 

limited naval power, they relied on privateers to attack the Spanish. Spain 

retaliated by issuing letters of marque to privateers who also preyed on 

neutral shipping. American merchant ships were a favorite target of the 

Spanish privateers because of their resentment over American support 

to the South and Central American rebels. The United States and Britain 

reacted by stationing naval squadrons in the region, and by 1826, those 

naval forces had, once again, eliminated piracy in the Caribbean. 

Piracy in the Mediterranean dates back to the Greeks and even earlier. 

But one of the greatest pirate empires was based in the Barbary principalities 

on the north coast of Africa. Although they maintained nominal allegiance 

to the Ottoman Empire, they were essentially independent states who 

depended on piracy for their existence. The Barbary corsairs were statesponsored pirates motivated for both financial and religious reasons—

attacking infidels was almost as important as capturing Christian goods 

and slaves. They remained a threat to commercial shipping in the 

Mediterranean for more than 300 years. Despite naval operations by the 

United States and Great Britain, the Barbary pirates were not eliminated 
6

until France invaded North Africa in the 1830s. Land operations in this 

case were crucial to the elimination of the Barbary pirate threat. 

Political upheaval caused by the Greek revolt against the Ottoman 

Empire in the 1820s led to an outbreak of piracy in the eastern 

Mediterranean. Exploiting the turmoil, Greek pirates preyed on shipping 

from all nations. Their success eventually forced Britain and France to act. 

The navies of these two powers settled the question of Greek independence 

and then acted against the pirates. But the Greek pirates avoided capture 

or death by abandoning their boats when located and fleeing ashore. This 

prompted the British naval commander to threaten the fledgling Greek 

Government with actions ashore if it did not act to eliminate the pirate’s 

safe havens. Once again, land operations proved to be a necessary element 

in the suppression of piracy.

Piracy has also existed in Asian waters for thousands of years. The 

narrow straits of Southeast Asia are still home to many pirates. The 

Straits of Malacca, through which more than 50,000 commercial vessels 

transit each year, have always been an attractive location for pirates. The 

restrictive waters cause ships to slow and the many coves and bays make 

perfect hiding places for pirates. In the 19th century, the Royal Navy 

eventually suppressed piracy in the area by maintaining an active, yearround presence in the area. When local pirates attacked an American 

merchant vessel in Qualla Battoo in the 1830s, an American warship 

was dispatched to retaliate. Fear of reprisal put a damper on further 

depredations of American ships, although ships of other nations continued 

to suffer attacks.

Similarly, Chinese corsairs have operated with impunity for thousands 

of years. In the early 19th century, as the Manchu dynasty weakened, a 

vast pirate confederation rose up along China’s southern coast. This league 

of pirates challenged the power of the central government and defeated 

the Chinese Navy in several engagements. Because of the government’s 

weakness, they eventually co-opted the pirates into the government, since 

they were unable to suppress them with force. 

Pirates continued to plague Chinese waters for another 100 years. Both 

the Royal Navy and United States Navy maintained permanent stations in 

the region to discourage piracy. British and American sailors conducted 

a number of operations against Chinese brigands throughout the 19th 

century and into the 20th century. 

It was the increasing number of piratical attacks in the Straits of 

Malacca that eventually drove home the problem of modern-day piracy. 
7

There was little piracy in the region until the mid to late 1970s. Then, 

in the early 1980s, the International Chamber of Commerce set up the 

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in response to a surge in maritime 

crime. As concerns about piracy increased, the IMB began tracking pirate 

attacks and giving advice on how to mitigate the risks of piracy. The 

United Nations also acted by redefining piracy and the means available to 

nations to counter the threat. Finally, in the 1990s, the IMB established the 

Piracy Reporting Centre in Malaysia. All of this attention eventually led to 

a decrease in attacks in the region although piracy has definitely not been 

eliminated in the Straits and surrounding waters.

Piracy also flourished in the Persian Gulf for thousands of years. Pirate 

states emerged along the coast of what is now the United Arab Emirates. 

When Arab corsairs began affecting British trade, the British Empire acted 

by sending two expeditions against the Arab pirates. Although they burned 

ships and razed villages, the British effort was ineffective because it was 

primarily sea based. A third expedition in the early 1820s, which included 

a significant land component, was successful in convincing Arab leaders 

that it was in their best interests to cooperate with the British. 

Today’s newspapers are flooded with articles about piracy off the 

coast of Somalia. This piracy follows the traditional cycle. Initially, it 

consisted of a few events amounting to nothing more than an annoyance. 

But the lack of response emboldened the Somali pirates to the point where 

they began attacking cruise ships, expensive yachts, and now a cargo 

ship carrying tanks and a supertanker. Such highly visible attacks caused 

a reaction from many of the world’s maritime powers. Consequently, in 

2009 the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, an antipirate naval 

force, began operating off the coast of Somalia. Although it has not had 

much success capturing pirates, its presence clearly serves as an inhibitor 

and presages perhaps other actions.

The following chapters examine piracy in the West Indies, the 

Mediterranean, Asia, and the Middle East. Using the three primary 

conditions for the growth of piracy as a framework they will demonstrate 

how those conditions contributed to the expansion of pirate power and 

how neutralizing or eliminating their effect facilitated the suppression of 

piracy. As will be seen, in almost every case, more than raw naval power 

was required to eradicate piracy.
8

Notes

1. Richard L. Parry, “Indonesian Waters Become Centre of World Piracy 

Boom,” The Independent, 25 January 2000, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/

world/asia/indonesian-waters-become-centre-of-world-piracy-boom-727302.

html (accessed 20 November 2008).

2. Ralph T. Ward, Pirates in History (Baltimore: York Press, 1974), 1.

3. Ibid., 2. 

4. Ibid., 4–5.

5. Ibid., 7.

6. Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), 

17.

7. Ward, 64.

8. Frank Sherry, Raiders and Rebels: The Golden Age of Piracy (New York: 

Hearst Marine Books, 1986), 23.

9. Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and 

Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (London: Hurst & Co., 2008), 28–45.
9

Chapter 2

Piracy in the West Indies

Piracy in the West Indies emerged not long after Columbus discovered 

the Americas. The French privateer Jean Fleury captured three Spanish 

treasure ships containing gold, jewels, and other Aztec finery in 1523.1 Up 

until then, Europeans had little knowledge of the fantastic wealth of the 

New World. But the news quickly spread, and by the 1530s, pirates based in 

the Old World regularly preyed on Spanish ships in the Caribbean. Piracy 

flourished in the region for more than 200 years until British naval power 

finally suppressed it around 1730. But piracy experienced a resurgence in 

the second decade of the 19th century, only to be put down once again, 

this time by American as well as British naval forces. (Figure 1 shows the 

Caribbean Islands.)

The three primary conditions necessary for piracy to flourish, favorable 

maritime geography, favorable political climate, and sanctuaries ashore 

were clearly present during both phases of West Indies piracy. There were 

numerous uncharted islands, coves, and inlets near the main Caribbean 

shipping channels. Pirates used those isolated spots to hide and wait for 

their prey. Then, when they spotted a victim, the buccaneers swooped down 

0 100 200 300 miles

F lorida

C uba

Me xico

H o n d u ra s

J am aic a Puerto R ic o

Baham as

P a n am a

Ca rta g e n a

Prov idenc e ls land Barbados

M a ra c a ib o

H is paniola

Caribbean Sea

Gulf of Mexico

Bay of

Campeche

Atlantic

Ocean

Pacific

Ocean

Figure 1. Caribbean Islands.
10

on the unsuspecting merchant ship and quickly took it before the merchant 

ship’s crew could respond. In addition, the many narrow channels of the 

Caribbean made it easier for the brigands to locate and attack their victims. 

The political climate also made piratical activities much easier. The 

English, French, and Dutch Governments used pirates and privateers to 

protect their Caribbean possessions and to weaken Spain economically. 

Throughout most of the 16th and 17th centuries, Spanish authorities 

viewed the English, French, and Dutch colonies in the West Indies as 

intrusions into Spain’s sphere of influence that needed to be eliminated. 

There were numerous battles between those colonists and Spain. Since 

the navies of England, France, and the Dutch Republic were relatively 

small, they could not station naval forces permanently in the Caribbean 

to protect their fledgling colonies. Lacking official naval protection, the 

colonies used pirates and privateers as their first line of defense against 

the Spanish.2

Privateers were essentially legalized pirates. Their commission, or letter 

of marque, gave them permission to attack the vessels of any nation listed 

in the document. Although privateers were technically only supposed to be 

used during time of war, Spain fought an almost continual undeclared war 

in the Western Hemisphere for more than 200 years. Colonial governors 

often issued letters of marque during peacetime, despite government 

directives not to do so. With the cover of such documents, privateers were 

free to prey on any vessel flying the flag of an enemy nation. The situation 

was further complicated because privateers often turned into pirates at 

war’s end when many privateers found it difficult to return to peaceful 

activities. European nations finally outlawed privateering in the mid-19th 

century.3

The main difference between privateers and pirates was their ultimate 

purpose. Since privateers were state sanctioned, their goal was to protect 

or strengthen the nation by weakening its enemies’ merchant fleets and 

commercial power. Although privateering provided those involved with 

the opportunity to obtain wealth, from the perspective of the state, the 

primary objective was to weaken enemies of the state, not to enrich private 

citizens. Thus, privateering complemented mercantilist theory since the 

destruction of enemy merchant ships reduced competition and, therefore, 

improved the nation’s opportunity for garnering wealth. Buccaneers preyed 

on ships from all states; every nation’s shipping was a pirate’s enemy. 4

Of course, piracy was often in the eye of the beholder. What one country 

deemed as a valid privateering activity was, in many cases, considered 

piracy by the victim nation. On more than one occasion, Spanish officials 
11

executed captured privateers with their letters of marque hanging around 

their necks.5 Although Queen Elizabeth I knighted Francis Drake for his 

exploits, Spanish officials considered him a pirate and protested the honors 

given him.6 Such attitudes were not, however, exclusive to the Spanish. It 

might come as a surprise to American readers to learn that the English 

writer Charles Johnson included a chapter in the appendix of his History 

of Highwaymen and Pirates, published in 1813, about the “wicked and 

daring pirate” John Paul Jones, an American naval hero.7

The political climate also affected the third element, sanctuaries. Since 

the English, French, and Dutch settlements needed the pirates to serve as 

their first line of defense, they welcomed the buccaneers, as well as their 

stolen goods, into their ports. Pirates needed the ports to refit their ships, 

buy food and water, and enjoy their ill-gotten gains. In addition to the 

protection the freebooters provided, colonial merchants welcomed pirate 

goods because they could be bought cheaply and sold at a profit.

Over time, as political conditions changed, so did the location of 

sanctuaries. The first pirates were based out of Europe and sailed to 

the Caribbean looking for prey. By the 1620s, they began to develop 

bases closer to their targets.8 Tortuga, located off the northwest coast of 

Hispaniola, was the first great pirate sanctuary. It maintained its reputation 

as a pirate haven for almost 100 years. Jamaica was another important 

pirate stronghold. But the English eventually closed Jamaica to the 

buccaneers when the political climate in England changed. With Jamaica 

no longer available, the freebooters shifted their base of operations to the 

Bahamas and, to a lesser degree, the American colonies. Pirates were often 

seen in Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, and New York in the 1600s.

The causes of West Indies piracy changed over time as well. Initially, 

it was a commercial war tacitly sponsored by European nations. Pope 

Alexander VI had in 1493 issued a papal bull dividing the world between 

Spain and Portugal. Embracing the economic theory of mercantilism, 

Spain sought to eliminate all foreign commerce within its sphere of 

influence. Consequently, Spain only allowed its colonies to trade with 

the mother country and treated all foreign merchants, even legitimate 

ones, attempting to trade with its Caribbean possessions as smugglers 

and pirates.9 Many nations, England and France in particular, resented 

the monopoly granted by the Pope and actively ignored it. Consequently, 

they encouraged, if not assisted, private interests trading with the Spanish 

colonies. The Spanish colonists, in turn, were willing to trade with 

foreigners, despite edicts by the King, because Spanish products were 

either unavailable or too costly.10 When the Spanish reacted harshly to the 
12

traders, an undeclared war broke out between Spain and other nations. 

There was “no peace beyond the line.”11

Soon, state-sponsored piracy, using privateers, flourished in the 

Caribbean. Spain was almost continuously at war with either France, 

England, or the Dutch Republic from the 16th through the early 18th 

century. Again, lacking the resources to build and maintain large national 

fleets, England, France, and the Dutch Republic used privateers to augment 

their naval forces. With normal trade disrupted by war, shipowners were 

frequently willing to risk their vessels on privateering cruises.

Finally, by 1670, the damage inflicted by the privateers and buccaneers 

so weakened Spain that they were no longer needed. England used pardons 

to entice pirates to give up the trade. When that failed, the English resorted 

to pirate hunters. Now lacking state sponsorship, pirates began attacking 

ships of all nations. Thus, piracy became a commercial venture against 

anyone sailing the ocean.12

Piracy has always followed a cyclical model, ebbing and flowing over 

time.13 Initially, it was small scale and generally ignored by the Spanish, 

who were the primary victims of piracy in the West Indies. Over time, 

as pirate attacks became more brazen, the Spanish responded with force 

and wiped out the buccaneers’ strongholds. But the Spanish did not 

permanently eliminate the brigands’ sanctuaries so, after a short hiatus, the 

buccaneers returned to their former haunts and began attacking Spanish 

shipping again. 

The first phase of piracy in the West Indies only ended when the 

dominant naval power, Great Britain, chose to apply its resources to the 

problem. When the War of Spanish Succession ended in 1713, the Royal 

Navy reigned supreme on the seas. With peace at hand, British merchants 

wanted to expand their trading relations throughout the world. Piracy was 

not conducive to maritime commerce, thus Britain began a concerted effort 

to end piracy in the West Indies. The British campaign, which involved 

legal and political reforms as well as naval operations, successfully 

suppressed piracy in the West Indies for almost 100 years. 

A second round of piracy in the West Indies erupted in the late 1810s 

when Spain’s colonial possessions in South and Central America sought 

independence. Once again, the three primary conditions that facilitate 

piracy came into play. First, political turmoil made piracy possible. The 

fledgling South American and Central American nations issued letters of 

marque to privateers authorizing them to attack Spanish ships. Spain, in 

turn, unleashed privateers against the shipping of the new nations. 
13

The perpetrators of this second phase of West Indian piracy, primarily 

Spanish privateers, again used the many uncharted islands and coves in the 

Caribbean to prey on shipping. Most of the Spanish privateers and pirates 

operated from bases in Cuba and Puerto Rico. But, as in other periods, the 

privateers were not always judicious in whom they attacked. Since their 

sanctuaries were close to the shipping lanes used by American and British 

merchants, Spanish corsairs began preying on both nations’ shipping. 

Although the United States was not at war with Spain, Spanish officials 

and merchants provided sanctuary and support to the brigands. Many 

Spaniards believed such actions were justified because of American and, 

to a lesser degree, British support for the rebels. Thus, they were only too 

willing to buy the pirates’ stolen goods; supply them with food, weapons, 

and naval stores; and provide them with safe havens out of reach of the 

American and British naval forces.

Eventually, the Spanish buccaneers’ depredations sparked a response 

by the United States and Great Britain. Working together, the American 

and British Navies eliminated the pirate threat in a few short years. But, 

given Spanish complicity with the corsairs, it was not an easy task. The 

pirates were not completely eradicated until the Americans and British 

gained Spanish permission to pursue the brigands ashore. Only then was 

piracy finally ended in the Caribbean.

Caribbean Piracy, 1500–1730

The first period of piracy in the Caribbean had two phases. During 

the first phase, piracy was an extension of warfare against the Spanish 

Empire. Most of the buccaneers, whether English, French, or Dutch, were 

nationalists waging war against Spain. Moreover, since those nations 

had small navies, they used the pirates to augment the defenses of their 

fledgling island possessions. By the 1670s, the nations sponsoring piracy, 

particularly England, no longer needed the assistance of the buccaneers to 

protect their overseas possessions. Additionally, they realized that pirates 

disrupted trade and endangered relations between nations. Consequently, 

they tried to entice the buccaneers into abandoning piracy by granting 

pardons for their crimes. But many of the brigands were uninterested in 

legitimacy and expanded their scope of targets, including the vessels of 

their native countries. During this phase of piracy, the pirates were at war 

with the world, and in turn, their home countries were at war with them. 

The activities of the pirates and privateers during the first phase have 

been described as “piratical imperialism.” British and French authorities 
14

used pirates and privateers to put pressure on Spain, hoping Spain 

would eventually recognize the legitimacy of their New World colonies. 

Moreover, since Spain forbade foreign trade with its colonies, piracy was 

a way to obtain goods from those markets. Finally, piracy and privateering 

removed commercial competitors, which according to mercantilist theory, 

strengthened the economies of the countries sponsoring piracy. Thus, 

nations used piracy to advance national goals.14

Spain’s problems began not long after Cortes conquered the Aztecs 

in 1519. The promise of great wealth induced many Spanish colonists 

to abandon the islands for the mainland. By the 1560s, perhaps as few 

as 1,000 Spaniards lived on Hispaniola, half of whom lived in Santo 

Domingo, 200 on Puerto Rico, 240 on Cuba, and only a handful on 

Jamaica. Similarly, the Spanish Government increasingly focused on its 

mainland possessions, to the detriment of the islands. Only Havana, which 

superseded Santo Domingo as the most important island port, continued 

to grow after sailors discovered a new route to Spain through the Florida 

Straits and Old Bahama Channel in 1519. Spain eventually constructed a 

new fort in Havana to protect the treasure fleet that rendezvoused there 

before setting out to cross the Atlantic.15

Before that happened, disaster struck. In 1523, Jean Fleury, a French 

privateer operating out of Honfleur, captured two of the three ships 

transporting Cortes’ treasure back to Spain off the Azores. Fleury captured 

62,000 ducats of gold, 600 marks of pearls (approximately 140 kilograms), 

and several tons of sugar.16 Although this was a legitimate act of war, Spain 

considered it an act of piracy and executed Fleury when he was captured 

in 1527.17 While there were widespread rumors about the great wealth of 

the New World prior to this, Fleury’s capture confirmed the truth of those 

rumors. At first, French privateers concentrated on Spanish ships in the 

eastern Atlantic, but by the 1530s, more than 30 French vessels sailed to 

the Caribbean each year looking for Spanish treasure ships.18

The French and Spanish continued to wage war against one another 

in the Caribbean despite intermittent peace between the two countries 

throughout the rest of the 16th century. Resentment over the May 1493 

decision by Pope Alexander VI to give Spain control of all lands west of 

a line 100 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands fueled the 

conflict. Neither France nor England accepted the Pope’s pronouncement. 

While the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) established peace in Europe, 

French and Spanish diplomats decided to ignore all violence west of 46° 

W. “No peace beyond the line” meant that French corsairs were allowed 

to take whatever they could, and the Spanish were equally free to punish 
15

French intruders as they saw fit. Whatever happened west of the line 

would not affect their relations in Europe. This agreement remained in 

effect until the Treaty of Ratisbon in 1684, when Spain and France agreed 

to implement the peace accord throughout the world, not just in Europe.19

England and the Dutch Republic eventually came to similar understandings 

with Spain as well.

French corsairs were the primary threat to Spanish interests in the 

Caribbean through the first half of the 16th century, but by mid-century, 

the lure of Spanish treasure enticed interlopers from other nations. Much 

of the attraction was due to an increase in silver exports from Spain’s New 

World possessions. The surge in production was caused by the discovery 

of a new method of extracting silver from previously played-out mines and 

two new silver strikes in Mexico. The Spaniards needed labor, primarily 

slaves, to work those mines, which opened up an avenue for trade for nonSpaniards.20 Thus, the desire for Spanish silver, whether earned through 

legitimate trade or taken through piracy, enticed more and more English 

and Dutch sailors and merchants, along with the French, to test their luck 

in the Caribbean during the second half of the 16th century. 

Among those drawn toward the New World were the English seadogs 

John Hawkins and Francis Drake. Hawkins and Drake exemplify the type 

of pirate prevalent during the first phase of piracy. While they showed 

little mercy to their Spanish victims, they were loyal Englishmen who 

did not prey on English vessels. Their piratical ventures made both men 

wealthy and famous; each was knighted and held in high regard by Queen 

Elizabeth I. But their actions also underscored the gray area between 

privateering and piracy. Even though Hawkins and Drake sailed with 

Royal approbation, Spanish officials considered them pirates and would 

have speedily executed them if they could have captured either man. 

John Hawkins was an English merchant and slave trader. Hawkins led 

three slave ships to the Caribbean in 1562, where he made a fortune by 

selling 300 slaves to the Spanish. Two years later, from October 1664 until 

September 1665, Hawkins led a second, even larger, trading expedition to 

the New World. This time, his squadron included one of the queen’s ships. 

Once again, he traded some 400 slaves for Spanish silver and made even 

greater profits. When the Spanish ambassador protested, Hawkins claimed 

he was nothing more than a peaceable merchant.21

His third cruise, which set out in October 1567, did not go as well. 

Some Spanish officials wanted to trade with Hawkins. In one case, 

Hawkins and the governor staged a mock battle to provide the governor 
16

with an excuse for trading with the English. In other locations, he used 

force to make the Spanish buy his slaves. Finally, in September 1568, 

Hawkins and his flotilla limped into San Juan de Ulúa, the harbor for 

Vera Cruz, in need of supplies and repairs. Soon thereafter, a Spanish fleet 

arrived with the new colonial viceroy, trapping Hawkins in the harbor. The 

situation resulted in a stalemate. Even though Hawkins was outnumbered 

and outgunned, he controlled the harbor. The Spanish could not remain off 

the coast indefinitely because they needed supplies and were threatened by 

bad weather. Consequently, Hawkins negotiated a truce with the viceroy, 

allowing him to remain in San Juan de Ulúa to refit his ships and enabling 

the Spanish to enter the port. But the viceroy reneged on the agreement 

as soon as he realized he was bargaining with men he considered pirates. 

On the night of 23 September, the Spanish attacked without warning and 

decimated the English squadron. Hawkins and Drake managed to escape 

in two ships. Although Drake made it back safely, only 15 of the men in 

Hawkins’ ship survived the trip home to England.22

The Battle of San Juan de Ulúa proved to be a watershed event. From 

that date forward, the English, especially Drake, sought revenge for the 

Spanish attack. Drake led successful voyages to the West Indies in 1570, 

1571, and 1572. Then, from November 1577 until September 1580, Drake 

circumnavigated the globe, attacking Spanish vessels with impunity 

and capturing many valuable prizes.23 Queen Elizabeth I, who was one 

of his backers, profited immensely from Drake’s successful voyage and 

recognized his feat by knighting Drake soon after he returned home.24

Drake’s example and the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 opened 

the door for even more English incursions into Spain’s New World domain. 

From 1588 through 1603, English sailors set out on 100 to 200 piratical 

voyages each year.25 The government did little to control those ventures. 

“Piratical imperialism” encouraged commercial expansion, boosted ship 

construction, and served as a cheap means of waging war against the 

Spanish.26 Moreover, it was profitable. During that same period, English 

adventurers brought back between £150,000 to £300,000 in Spanish booty 

each year.27

Spain’s problems increased when the Dutch revolted in 1568. At first, 

the Dutch confined themselves to smuggling, trading Dutch products for salt 

and tobacco. Between March 1599 and December 1605, 768 Dutch ships 

traded for salt along the coast of Venezuela. But as the Dutchmen waited to 

load their ships, they began attacking Spanish coastal vessels using armed 

sloops and pinnaces. By 1606, Dutch freebooters had virtually eliminated 

all Spanish shipping along the northern coast of South America.28
17

The successes of the English, French, and Dutch marauders hurt Spain 

financially. Since the Spanish crown borrowed extensively against the 

wealth extracted from its colonies, it was crucial that the treasure fleet 

arrive safely. Consequently, starting in 1564, all ships were ordered to 

sail to Spain in one of two heavily armed convoys. One left in April and 

the other in August. Treasure ships from Mexico and Central America 

congregated in Havana in late spring or early summer. Once the convoy 

was organized, it set out for Spain, escorted by two to eight warships.29

But the convoy system was not entirely successful, and by the early 17th 

century, Spain was bankrupt. Spain’s financial problems contributed to the 

growth of piracy in the Caribbean. Since the crown was only concerned 

with the safety of the treasure fleet, small ports were left to provide for 

their own defenses. Few of those harbors could afford to adequately fortify 

themselves, so most Spanish towns were vulnerable to attack.30 Moreover, 

because Spain could not afford to police the entire Caribbean, buccaneers 

rarely encountered Spanish warships. Free to go wherever they pleased, 

the corsairs soon terrorized Spaniards throughout the West Indies. To stop 

illegal trade with foreigners and to better protect those settlers still living 

on the islands, in 1605, Spanish officials began relocating the remaining 

colonists into a few population centers where they could be better protected 

and more closely controlled. Spanish soldiers destroyed crops, burned 

towns to the ground, and forcibly removed citizens from areas that traded 

with foreign merchants.31 They left behind only the pigs and cattle, which 

thrived in the benign environment.

That decision produced dire consequences for the Spanish. Foreigners 

soon moved into the void left by the forced relocation of the Spanish 

colonists. Up until that point, English, French, and Dutch adventurers 

sailed for the Caribbean from European ports. Now the foreign corsairs 

began to shift their bases to the Caribbean, where they were closer to their 

targets. The buccaneers’ new ports provided them the three elements they 

needed to flourish: geographic advantage, political support, and sanctuaries 

ashore.

Among the first interlopers were French hunters who settled on the 

island of Hispaniola in the first quarter of the 17th century. They survived 

by trading with Dutch merchants, who bought hides, tallow, and dried 

meat from the hunters. The hunters became known as boucaniers because 

they dried their meat over a grate made of green wood called a boucan. 

Given that sailors subsisted almost entirely on salt pork while at sea, the 

boucaniers’ dried meat became quite popular and a brisk trade ensued.32
18

Since the Spanish considered the entire Caribbean a closed area, they 

reacted harshly against all foreigners encroaching on their territory. When 

French Huguenots established a colony at Fort Caroline near presentday Jacksonville, Florida, in 1564, the Spanish reacted ruthlessly. They 

attacked the settlement and killed all of the inhabitants in 1565. Then, they 

established a new colony at St. Augustine to guard against further French 

incursions and to protect Spanish shipping entering or leaving the Straits 

of Florida.33 In 1593, Spanish authorities captured 10 Dutch merchant 

vessels while trading with Spanish towns. Convicted of smuggling, they 

executed the ship captains and condemned the crews to servitude as galley 

slaves.34 The Venetian ambassador to London reported in 1604 that Spanish 

authorities tortured the crews of two English ships caught trading with the 

Spanish. They cut off the hands, ears, noses, and feet of the crewmen, 

smeared them with honey to attract flies and other insects, and left them to 

die tied to trees.35 Such atrocities encouraged retaliation, which furthered 

the violence in the region.

Spanish soldiers also hunted down and killed both the boucaniers and 

the wild cattle and pigs that the boucaniers hunted for their livelihood 

on Hispaniola. Stripped of their ability to support themselves, many of 

the boucaniers fled to Tortuga, a small island off the northwest coast of 

Hispaniola, and turned to piracy. The French boucaniers, whose name was 

soon corrupted into buccaneers, became implacable enemies of Spain. 

Operating close to shore in dugout canoes, they stealthily attacked larger 

Spanish vessels. In turn, they used those boats to capture bigger ships 

in which they ranged farther and farther throughout the Caribbean. By 

1665, the buccaneers commanded large sailing vessels and operated with 

impunity throughout the Caribbean. Although the Spanish raided Tortuga 

from time to time, it remained the stronghold of the French buccaneers 

from 1630 until about 1710.36

Since most of the other Caribbean islands were also left uninhabited 

by the Spanish, foreigners moved in and filled those voids as well. Pirates, 

smugglers, and colonists established settlements on many Caribbean 

islands. Great Britain acquired Barbados (1621), St. Kitts (1623), 

Montserrat (1632), and Antigua (1632). Then, in 1655, British forces 

captured its Caribbean crown jewel, Jamaica. Similarly, France obtained 

Martinique (1635) and Guadeloupe (1635) and the Dutch took Curacao 

(1634).37 Although Spain refused to acknowledge their legitimacy, there 

were permanent English, French, and Dutch colonies in place throughout 

the Caribbean by mid-century. 
19

Two of the most important pirate havens were Tortuga and Port 

Royal, Jamaica (figure 2). Each island met the three conditions needed for 

piracy to flourish. They were favorably located near important sealanes. 

Tortuga dominated two important straits: the Windward Passage between 

Cuba and Hispaniola and the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico and 

Hispaniola. Likewise, Jamaica was close to the shipping lanes between 

Cuba and Central and South America.38 Thus, both locations provided 

the buccaneers geographical advantages over their enemies. The political 

climate also favored piracy. Since neither England nor France had sufficient 

naval forces to protect their island possessions, the buccaneers served as 

the first line of defense for both islands. Therefore, local officials were 

reluctant to take any action against the pirates. Finally, since both islands 

prospered financially because of the brigands, the freebooters found 

protection and support on both Tortuga and Jamaica. Despite the presence 

of a French governor, Tortuga really behaved like an independent pirate 

kingdom for more than 60 years, generally ignoring the French crown.39

Similarly, buccaneers operated with impunity out of Jamaica for more than 

30 years.40

Although the Spanish raided Tortuga on several occasions, they were 

never able to put it out of business. The first Tortuga-based buccaneer 

0 50 100 miles

C u b a

Jam a ica

Bah amas

H isp a n io la

Atlantic

Ocean

Port R oyal

Santiag o de C uba

Santo D om ing o

T o rtug a

Figure 2. Jamaica and Hispaniola.
20

was Pierre le Grand, who captured a large treasure galleon in 1620 

with 28 men. Unlike most buccaneers, le Grand supposedly sailed the 

ship back to France, sold the contents, and lived out the rest of his life 

in grand style.41 France laid claim to the island in 1628 although it had 

to fend off counterclaims by the English between 1631 and 1635.42 As 

noted previously, even though Spain did not populate its many Caribbean 

islands, it was unwilling to allow trespassers to settle on the islands either. 

Thus, Spain carried out a series of raids in 1631, 1635, and 1638. During 

the 1635 raid, the Spanish hung all of the men they captured and deported 

the women and children. Still, the buccaneers always returned to the island 

once the Spanish left.43

Weary of the Spanish attacks, the buccaneers requested aid from the 

French governor of St. Kitts. In 1642, the governor sent Jean le Vasseur, 

a French engineer, to help. Le Vasseur built an almost impregnable fort 

overlooking the harbor and, after cutting ties with St. Kitts, established 

himself as the ruler of Tortuga. Not long after the fortress was completed, 

the Spanish attacked again. This time, they were soundly defeated. For the 

next 12 years, Tortuga was the undisputed center of piracy in the Caribbean. 

There were brothels, taverns, and gambling halls for the pirates. It was 

also a thriving commercial center. Dutch and French merchants brought 

guns, ammunition, powder, cloth, and brandy, which they traded for the 

buccaneers’ plunder.44

Tortuga underwent a period of instability from 1654 until 1665. In 

1654, the Spanish attacked in force and captured the island. They left a 

permanent garrison on the island to prevent the buccaneers from returning. 

Unfortunately for the Spanish, they had to withdraw the troops the next 

year when an English invasion force arrived off the coast of Hispaniola. 

Soon thereafter, an Englishman took over although he was deposed by a 

French adventurer in 1659. By 1665, the island was securely under French 

rule. Tortuga continued to serve as a safe haven for pirates although it was 

eventually superseded by Petit Goâve, a more remote port on the west 

coast of Hispaniola, around 1670.45

Jamaica also served the interests of pirates for many years. Oliver 

Cromwell dispatched a large force under Admiral William Penn and 

General Robert Venables to the West Indies in December 1654. Their 

mission was to seize Hispaniola. When they failed to take Santo Domingo, 

they set their sights on the lightly populated island of Jamaica and captured 

it instead. Despite several Spanish attempts to retake the island, Jamaica 

was firmly under English control by 1660.46
21

The Spanish threat led to a decision that soon turned Port Royal, 

Jamaica, into the “wickedest city in the world.”47 Lacking proper military 

support and worried about another Spanish attempt to retake the island, in 

1657, the governor of Jamaica invited all of the English pirates based on 

Tortuga to move to Jamaica in an effort to bolster his island’s defenses. By 

1665, more than 2,000 corsairs operated out of Port Royal.48

Jamaica was ideally suited as a pirate haven. It was located near the 

shipping lanes from Panama, where the Spanish accumulated their South 

American treasure for further transfer home to Havana. Intermittent 

warfare between Spain and England made it easy for freebooters to acquire 

letters of marque, thus giving their activities the veneer of legitimacy. 

Finally, Port Royal quickly became a secure haven for the buccaneers. 

English merchants welcomed the brigands’ booty and provided the pirates 

with taverns, gambling houses, and prostitutes, as well as naval stores, 

weapons, ammunition, and powder. During much of the second half of the 

17th century, the island’s prosperity depended almost entirely on piracy 

rather than agriculture and commerce. 49

Since almost any action taken “beyond the line” was, to some degree, 

legitimized by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, it was often difficult 

to distinguish between legitimate military operations and piracy. The 

career of Captain Christopher Myngs underscores that difficulty. Myngs, 

commander of the 44-gun frigate Marston Moor,

50 reached Jamaica in 

January 1656. Soon after he arrived, Myngs participated in a fruitless raid 

against Santa Marta, Venezuela. In October 1658, as commander of the 

Jamaican naval squadron, he tried to capture the Spanish treasure fleet. 

When that venture failed, the British force burned two Spanish towns and 

captured two ships. The next year, Myngs achieved more success when he 

sacked the Venezuelan towns of Cumana, Puerto Caballos, and Coro. The 

total take was £200,000 to £300,000. The Spanish responded to Myngs’ 

attack by declaring him a pirate and condemning him to death.51

The Spanish death sentence was not the only problem Myngs soon 

faced. When he returned to Jamaica, Myngs claimed that Admiralty laws 

did not apply to his plunder and proceeded to dispose of the goods without 

handing over a share to the government. The governor of Jamaica arrested 

Myngs and sent him back to London for trial in 1660. His arrival coincided 

with the restoration of Charles II, and in the confusion, Myngs avoided 

punishment for his transgressions. Instead, he was sent back to Jamaica in 

1662 in the 34-gun frigate Centurion with encouragement from Charles II 

to continue harassing the Spanish.52
22

Myngs quickly resumed his semipiratical operations. In October 

1662, Myngs attacked Santiago, Cuba, and captured six ships as well 

as a significant amount of treasure. That success encouraged substantial 

buccaneer support for his final Caribbean endeavor, an assault on the town 

of San Francisco in the Bay of Campeche. Supported by 1,500 English, 

French, and Dutch buccaneers in 12 ships, Myngs seized the town in 

February 1663. He also captured 14 Spanish ships and extorted 150,000 

pesos from the town’s citizens. But the brutality of the attack triggered 

vehement Spanish complaints, and Charles II forbade further attacks on 

Spanish possessions.53

One of the most infamous Jamaican buccaneers was Henry Morgan. 

Morgan was never a pirate according to English law because he always 

had a commission from the governor of Jamaica, however dubious that 

authority might have been. Still, Morgan and his men committed numerous 

piratical acts and atrocities during their engagements with the Spanish.54

Morgan probably accompanied Myngs during his 1662–1663 operations. 

In 1663–1664, he accompanied John Morris on a 22-month-long voyage 

along the coast of Central America, during which they plundered three 

Spanish cities. By 1668, Morgan was elected admiral of the Jamaican 

privateers.55

Sir Thomas Modyford, the Governor of Jamaica, authorized Morgan 

to conduct another expedition in early 1668 to thwart a rumored Spanish 

attack on the island. Even though his commission did not authorize 

land operations, in January 1668, Morgan led 700 English and French 

buccaneers in 12 ships against Puerto Principe, Cuba. Unfortunately for 

Morgan, the Cubans got wind of the operation and fled the city with their 

treasures. The rovers were only able to extract about 50,000 pesos from the 

remaining citizens. Disgusted by the lack of success, the French buccaneers 

abandoned Morgan, leaving him with about 500 men. With those men, 

he attacked Portobello, the collection point for Spanish treasure on the 

Isthmus of Panama. This operation was more successful. Morgan and his 

men captured the city, three forts, and 100,000 pesos. Morgan returned 

to Jamaica with a vast amount of plunder, which lessened the governor’s 

unease about Morgan exceeding his commission by attacking Cuba.56

In April 1669, Morgan led another campaign against Maracaibo 

and Gibraltar, Venezuela. Although many of the residents fled before he 

arrived, using torture, Morgan and his men managed to extort 125,000 

pesos from those they captured. When Morgan tried to return to Jamaica, 

he found himself trapped by the Spanish governor, who blocked the 

exit from Lake Maracaibo with three warships. Even though he was 
23

outgunned, Morgan managed to blow up the largest Spanish warship with 

a fireship and capture the second one in battle; the third went aground and 

sunk. Morgan returned to Jamaica in May, and once again, the enormous 

amount of booty he returned with prevented the authorities from looking 

too closely at his actions.57

Morgan’s most famous exploit was the sack of Panama in 1671. 

Although there was peace between England and Spain in 1669, Spanish 

retaliatory raids on Jamaica gave Governor Modyford the excuse he 

needed to authorize another expedition. In August 1670, Modyford 

ordered Morgan to counter any planned attack on Jamaica by attacking the 

Spanish wherever he wished. When word got out that Morgan was sailing 

once more, almost every buccaneer in the Caribbean responded to the call. 

Morgan set sail in December 1670 with more than 2,000 men in 33 ships. 

After taking Providence Island, the buccaneers captured the Spanish fort 

San Lorenzo, which protected the mouth of the Chagres River. During that 

battle, more than 300 Spanish soldiers and 100 rovers were killed. With 

his remaining force, some 1,500 to 2,000 pirates, Morgan and his men 

paddled up the Chagres River toward Panama in canoes and sloops. The 

trek took 2 weeks, much of it on foot through dense jungle. Finally, on 

27 January 1671, the half-starved buccaneers reached the Pacific Ocean. 

The next day, they assaulted the city of Panama and quickly overran its 

inexperienced defenders. For the next 3 weeks, the pirates ransacked the 

town and tortured its remaining citizens, forcing them to reveal the location 

of additional booty. When Morgan left Panama, it took 200 pack mules to 

carry all the plunder.58

Unfortunately for Morgan, the assault took place after the Treaty of 

Madrid (July 1670) took effect. In one of the more important clauses in 

the treaty, Spain acknowledged England’s New World colonies, and in 

return, England agreed to enforce the peace settlement throughout the 

world, not just in Europe. With the repudiation of the doctrine of “no peace 

beyond the line,” which legitimized piracy in the Caribbean, two of the 

main conditions for piracy, political turmoil and sanctuaries ashore, were 

undermined. From this point forward, the buccaneers could no longer count 

on Jamaica as a safe haven. Still, the treaty did not grant England the right 

to trade with Spanish colonies, so opportunities for conflict remained.59

Although Modyford did not learn of the treaty until May 1671, the 

commission he gave to Morgan clearly exceeded his authority. Responding 

to Spanish complaints about the attack, Charles II replaced Modyford with 

Sir Thomas Lynch. Lynch arrested Modyford and sent him back to England 

where he was imprisoned in the Tower of London for 2 years. Morgan was 
24

also arrested and conveyed to England in April 1672, but his good fortune 

held and he was never imprisoned. Instead, the King knighted Morgan and 

returned him to Jamaica as the deputy governor of the island when Lynch 

was ousted from office in 1674. Morgan retained that title until 1682 when 

Lynch returned to Jamaica and dismissed him.60

The English were not the only ones preying on Spanish vessels. Both 

the Dutch and French were active throughout the 17th century. The Dutch 

proved particularly troublesome to Spain. They conducted illegal trade 

with the Spanish colonies, provided essential supplies to the fledgling 

British and French colonies, and devastated Spanish shipping in the 

Caribbean. Their most spectacular success occurred in September 1628 

when Piet Heyn captured the entire Spanish treasure fleet in Matanzas 

Bay. He took gold, silver, and other goods worth more than 12 million 

guilders (approximately 4.8 million pesos). By the late 1630s, Dutch 

depredations had destroyed almost all Spanish commerce in the Caribbean, 

forever changing the balance of power in the region.61 Unfortunately for 

the Dutch Republic, it did not benefit from the shift in power. Instead, 

after a series of wars with England and France, the Dutch were confined 

to a few possessions in the southern Caribbean and the northern Leeward 

Islands.62

Unlike the Dutch, who conducted most of their operations from 

their home waters, French buccaneers benefited from bases located in 

the Caribbean, especially Tortuga. Among the most notorious French 

buccaneers was Francois l’Olonnais, who received his first ship from 

the governor of Tortuga.63 When the Spanish killed most of his crew 

after his ship wrecked along the coast of Campeche (Mexico), l’Olonnais 

became an implacable enemy of Spain. He reputedly lopped the heads off 

of 87 Spanish prisoners in retaliation for the mistreatment of his crew.64

His most famous exploit was the sacking of Maracaibo and Gibraltar, 

Venezuela, in the spring 1667. When the residents of Maracaibo learned 

of his approach ahead of time, they fled the city. L’Olonnais responded 

by attacking Gibraltar instead. He took the town easily and extracted 

10,000 pesos from the terrified citizens who knew of his reputation. 

Then, outsmarting the people of Maracaibo, l’Olonnais returned to the 

city and caught many residents who came back after he left the first time. 

L’Olonnais extorted 20,000 pesos and 500 cattle from those he captured 

on his return to Maracaibo. Each of the adventurers who participated in 

the mission received 70 pieces of Eight and the value of 100 more in cloth 

and linen. L’Olonnais’ career came to a bloody end a year later when he 

shipwrecked once again and was killed by Indians.65
25

During the last third of the 17th century, British authorities began to 

take actions to curb piracy, which led to the second phase of Caribbean 

piracy. During this phase, which is often characterized as the “Golden Age 

of Piracy,” the buccaneers stopped operating in large squadrons. With their 

safe havens curtailed or eliminated, they were unable to concentrate in 

large numbers as before. Instead, these pirates sailed singly or in small 

flotillas, preying on any ship they encountered. Since they considered 

not just Spain but all nations their enemies, their depredations eventually 

forced the Royal Navy to act to eliminate them as a threat to English 

commerce. 

Tacit governmental support for piracy, especially in Great Britain, lost 

its appeal as British leaders came to realize that piracy hindered rather 

than furthered national goals. Spain, weakened by Morgan and the other 

buccaneers, no longer posed a threat to Jamaica, so the pirates were not 

needed for its defense. British officials shifted their attention away from 

stealing from Spain toward empire building. New colonies, they believed, 

would bring wealth to the mother country by providing raw materials and 

products that were unavailable at home. In the new, more ordered world 

that British politicians and merchants sought to establish, pirates were 

a liability. They interfered with trade, especially the African slave trade 

that provided much of the labor needed in the colonies, and endangered 

relations among the European nations. In a series of treaties negotiated 

toward the end of the century, European nations abandoned the doctrine 

of “no peace beyond the line,” thus weakening one of the pillars of piracy, 

political turmoil.66

England began taking steps to reign in the pirates as early as the 1670s. 

The new governor of Jamaica, Sir Thomas Lynch, who replaced Modyford 

in 1671, offered pardons and 35 acres of land to any pirate willing to give 

up the trade.67 Pardons were also offered to English buccaneers in 1688, 

1701, and 1717.68 The 1717 general pardon included a threat as well—a 

bounty was placed on all who refused to accept the pardon. Pirate hunters 

received £100 for captains and £20 for common pirates, both generous sums 

since merchant captains only earned about £65 per year.69 By the 1680s, 

as agricultural-based commerce, primarily sugar, became more important 

to the economy of the island, public sentiment in Jamaica shifted from 

support to opposition to piracy. Those who chose to continue as pirates 

found Jamaica increasingly inhospitable. Even Jamaican merchants, who 

had profited greatly from the buccaneers, became ever more reluctant to 

trade with pirates, which further served to drive them away from their 

formerly secure haven.70 New legislation, such as prohibitions against 
26

English sailors accepting foreign letters of marque and the Piracy Act of 

1699, which expedited the punishment of pirates by setting up Admiralty 

Courts in the American colonies, made piracy much less attractive.71

Increases in the number of Royal Navy ships stationed in the West 

Indies and American colonies also made it more difficult for the pirates. 

Before the 1670s, British warships were rarely stationed in the West Indies. 

In the 1670s, Jamaica received two frigates, Barbados got one, and a ketch 

was stationed in the Leeward Islands. The Admiralty did not assign any 

ships to the American colonies, although two warships were stationed off 

Newfoundland to protect that rich fishing ground. The situation changed 

in the 1680s. The number of ships posted to Jamaica increased to four, 

and two more arrived in the Leeward Islands. The American colonies 

finally received permanent naval components as well. One or two ships 

took station in the Chesapeake Bay and another in Boston.72 Although 

they were not sufficient to suppress piracy by themselves, the presence 

of permanently assigned naval vessels served as a deterrent. As the 

government clamped down on the pirates, many buccaneers moved to 

safer hunting grounds in the Pacific or Indian Oceans, while others found 

new refuges in the Bahamas or the American colonies.73

All of those steps contributed to the eventual elimination of piracy in the 

West Indies. But the extermination of the pirates did not happen overnight. 

International conflict, such as the Nine Years’ War (1688–1697)74 and the 

War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713),75 impeded the suppression 

of piracy because it gave those inclined to continue pirating the cloak of 

legitimacy from a letter of marque. Moreover, at the end of both wars, 

unemployment pushed many sailors and former privateers toward piracy, 

causing a surge in piratical activity each time. For example, with the end 

of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Royal Navy discharged some 

36,000 sailors, almost 75 percent of its wartime complement. Thousands 

more privateers found themselves out of work as well. The surplus of 

maritime labor allowed ship captains to cut the wages of sailors by more 

than 50 percent. Thus, piracy became a viable alternative for many seamen 

who were accustomed to violence at sea.76

Additionally, France did not conform to the British policy change at 

first. Instead, French filibustiers stepped up their attacks on Spain. The 

Marquis de Maintenon devastated the pearl trade on Margarita Island in 

1676. Two years later, Michel de Grammont, along with 700 buccaneers, 

captured Maracaibo. Even though they held the town for 6 months, they 

were unable to extract much booty from its citizens because of previous 

attacks by l’Olonnais and Morgan.77 Then, in 1683, Grammont and others 
27

attacked Vera Cruz. This venture was much more successful; each of the 

1,000 pirates involved in the raid garnered 800 gold coins. But the assault 

so enraged the Spanish that they declared war on France. France quickly 

negotiated a peace settlement, in which France agreed to abandon the “no 

peace beyond the line” doctrine.78

French buccaneers actively supported the French crown during the 

Nine Years’ War. In 1694, the French buccaneer Jean du Casse led an 

expedition against Jamaica. Du Casse burned 50 sugar plantations and 

captured more than 1,300 slaves. Coming on the heels of the earthquake 

that destroyed Port Royal in 1692, it was a devastating attack. Then, in 

1697, French buccaneers and Royal troops under the command of Admiral 

Baron de Pointis sacked Cartagena. It was a bloody but financially 

rewarding venture. The French extracted some 20 million livres worth of 

treasure from the citizens of Cartagena although de Pointis retained control 

of the plunder and cheated the corsairs out of their fair share, leaving them 

a mere 40,000 livres worth of booty. Angered, the buccaneers returned to 

the city and squeezed another 5 million livres out of the survivors. Despite 

their success, this raid generally marks the end of the buccaneers.79

With the loss of their base in Jamaica and later Tortuga, many 

buccaneers drifted north to the Bahamas or the American colonies. Neither 

place offered the same advantages as Jamaica and Tortuga, but given the 

threat presented by Royal Navy ships stationed in Jamaica, they were 

viable alternatives. By the turn of the century, pirates sailed from the 

American colonies for the West Indies, the west coast of Africa, or the Red 

Sea on a regular basis.80

The Bahamas met, to some degree, all three of the conditions necessary 

for piracy to thrive. They were strategically located near the Florida 

Straits and Windward Passage, two of the primary outlets to the Atlantic 

Ocean, thus giving the pirates a geographic advantage. In addition to that, 

the Bahamas were privately owned. King Charles II sold the Bahamas 

to six of the proprietors of South Carolina in 1670. Soon thereafter, in 

contrast to the governor of Jamaica’s attempt to rein in privateering and 

piracy, the governor of the Bahamas began indiscriminately selling letters 

of marque to English pirates and privateers. Thus, political conditions in 

the Bahamas facilitated piracy. But the islands, which were first settled by 

Puritans in the 1640s, were sparsely populated. By 1671, the population 

was only 700 people. Consequently, the Bahamas were a poor market 

for the pirates’ plunder at first. But colonial American smugglers soon 

established trading posts on the islands, providing a voracious market 

for the pirates’ stolen goods. Despite that limitation, the Bahamas were 
28

a relatively safe haven, far from those who might capture and punish the 

rovers for their acts of piracy.81

The American colonies also became a hotbed of piracy. While the 

eastern seaboard of North America did not provide easy access to the 

West Indies shipping lanes, fertile hunting grounds existed off the coast 

of South Carolina and Virginia, two of the more prosperous colonies.82

The colonies, however, did have a favorable political climate. Rhode 

Island, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Delaware, 

Connecticut, North Carolina, and South Carolina all had reputations for 

harboring pirates. Many of the colonial governors were involved in piracy 

in some way. In addition to that, the colonies were eager consumers of pirate 

plunder. Since the Navigation Acts increased the cost of goods imported 

into the colonies, many colonials willingly purchased cheap stolen goods. 

Moreover, other colonials, flush with cash, eagerly invested in piratical 

ventures, outfitting privateers and outright pirates, who operated in the 

West Indies and Red Sea.83 Thus, the American colonies met the three 

criteria for piracy reasonably well.

The Bahamas figure into both the beginning and end of this phase of 

piracy. In April 1696, the 46-gun privateer Fancy arrived in Nassau. The 

captain of the ship claimed to be Henry Bridgeman, and he offered to pay 

the Governor, Thomas Trott, £2,000 if he allowed Bridgeman to offload 

his cargo in Nassau. Since Trott’s annual salary was only £300, the offer 

was too enticing to pass up. Thus, the notorious pirate John Avery (or 

Henry Every) reached the relative safety of the Bahamas.84

 The previous summer, Avery and two other pirate vessels captured the 

80-gun ship Ganj-i-sawai (also referred to as Gunsway) in the Red Sea. 

The largest ship in the fleet of the Great Mogul of India, it was a lucrative 

prize, bringing the pirates an estimated £150,000. But the attack outraged 

the Great Mogul, and he retaliated against the British East India Company 

by seizing its trading posts and imprisoning its representatives. Realizing 

they had to appease the Indian ruler, British officials put a £500 bounty on 

Avery and his crew. The East India Company pledge doubled that amount 

for the capture of any of Avery’s men. Thus, Avery and his crew were in 

great need of a safe haven.85

Although Trott welcomed Avery, his men, and their money, they could 

not stay in Nassau for long. Since Trott was a proprietary governor, he 

did not have the authority to grant the men a pardon, and the governor of 

Jamaica refused a £20,000 bribe to do so. Therefore, the crew decided to 

disperse and disappear. Some 50 crewmembers traveled to the American 
29

colonies while 44 others sailed to Ireland in two groups. None of the pirates 

who went to the American colonies were ever caught. Some disappeared 

into the frontier while others bought protection from corrupt officials. 

Those who went to Ireland were not so fortunate. Seven were apprehended 

and five eventually hung. Avery was never heard from again.86 Still, only 

7 were caught and punished out of a crew of 94. Such results convinced 

many mariners that the opportunity to acquire great wealth through piracy 

outweighed the risk of capture and death, thus piracy blossomed in the late 

17th and early 18th centuries.

During the last few decades of the 17th century, collusion with the 

pirates was endemic throughout the American colonies. Almost every 

seaboard colony was involved in piracy to some extent. Public involvement 

was so widespread that it was difficult, if not impossible, to convict pirates 

in the colonies. Frustrated that many pirates escaped punishment, King 

William III declared that jailers would be punished for allowing them to 

escape.87

Most of the New England colonies were especially involved in piracy. 

Rhode Island was considered by many to be the pirate capital of the 

colonies. Thomas Tew, a well-known Red Sea pirate, was a prominent 

citizen. Even though Rhode Island had little trade with England, more 

European goods were available in Newport than any other place in the 

colonies. Massachusetts also provided support to the buccaneers. Several 

governors were suspected of taking bribes from pirates. Pirates sentenced 

to hang could avoid that fate by paying a £13 fine or accepting indentured 

servitude in Virginia. Governor Sir William Phips supposedly invited the 

corsairs of Philadelphia to move to Boston, which was another notable 

pirate haven. When a French pirate arrived off Boston in 1684, city 

merchants sent a pilot to guide him into port and helped the brigands 

dispose of their ill-gotten gain. The governors of Connecticut normally 

left visiting pirates alone because of domestic politics. Connecticut was 

a trading colony and needed the hard currency the corsairs brought with 

them. Since governors were elected annually in Connecticut, few acted 

against the buccaneers because doing so almost guaranteed their ouster 

during the next election.88

Pirates provided a significant contribution to the economies of the 

mid-Atlantic colonies. Pirates reputedly put more than £100,000 into the 

New York economy each year. Governor Benjamin Fletcher, his secretary, 

the collector of customs, and the captain in charge of the New York guard 

ship were all in league with the buccaneers. Fletcher sold letters of marque 

for £300 and protection for £100 per man. Thomas Tew, who frequented 
30

New York as well as Newport, was seen riding in Fletcher’s carriage. The 

center for piracy in New York was the eastern shore of Long Island. New 

Jersey was also a known haunt for pirates. Some residents maintained that 

the King’s laws against piracy did not apply in New Jersey since it was a 

proprietary colony. In Pennsylvania, another proprietary colony, several 

high-level officials consorted with the brigands. Lieutenant Governor 

William Markham supposedly sold protection to pirates at £100 per 

head. Markham also allowed his daughter to marry James Brown, one of 

Avery’s crewmen. Brown was later elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly 

although he was subsequently expelled. Robert Snead, a successful pirate 

captain, was appointed Justice of the Peace in Pennsylvania.89 Delaware, 

with easy access to the markets of Philadelphia and New York, was also a 

popular haven for corsairs. When a crown official in Newcastle proved too 

energetic in pursuing locally based pirates, residents threatened to throw 

him into prison if he did not leave the freebooters alone.90

Pirates found refuge in several of the southern colonies as well. 

South Carolina welcomed the pirates at first, but that sentiment changed 

rather quickly when the buccaneers began to prey on South Carolinian 

merchant vessels. Charleston, the colony’s foremost port, was particularly 

vulnerable because of a substantial sandbar that forced ships to wait until 

high tide to cross it. Judge Robert Quary, who later gained a reputation as 

a pirate hunter in Pennsylvania, was removed from office several times in 

South Carolina because of his association with known pirates. As acting 

governor, he allowed buccaneers to openly land goods in Charleston and 

trade with local merchants. North Carolina was a poor state that produced 

little of trade value. Consequently, its citizens welcomed pirate booty, 

which they sold at cheap prices. From the pirates’ perspective, North 

Carolina was an excellent haven because its many coves and creeks were 

excellent hiding places and its shallow waters made it difficult for warships 

to pursue them.91

Although it took decades, political reform and more aggressive 

operations by the Royal Navy finally eliminated piracy in the West Indies. 

By the end of the century, most of the notorious governors were replaced 

by more honest officials. The laws enacted to suppress piracy also took 

effect. Colonial Admiralty Courts made it easier to try and execute 

captured pirates. Moreover, the pirates hurt themselves by shifting their 

hunting grounds from the Caribbean to the Atlantic seaboard. Twenty 

years of piratical depredations along the American coast turned many of 

the colonials against them. All of those developments eventually resulted 

in the closing of the American colonies to the pirates. 
31

The histories of two of the most renowned pirates, Captain William 

Kidd and Blackbeard, illustrate those points. Although one of history’s 

most infamous pirates, Kidd was a privateer rather than a pirate. 

Unfortunately for him, he got caught in the policy transformation at the 

end of the 17th century, was accused of piracy, and ended up hanging for 

something he did not do.92 William Kidd was a successful privateer during 

the Nine Years’ War. By the mid-1690s, he was a well-respected citizen of 

New York, where he lived with his wife and children. In 1695, he received 

another privateer commission to chase pirates and French vessels. Among 

his backers was the new Governor of the New York and Massachusetts 

colonies, Lord Bellomont. Through Lord Bellomont, four high-ranking 

members of the British Government, the Lord Chancellor, Secretary of 

State, first Lord of the Admiralty, and Chief Justice, became silent partners 

in the venture. King William III granted Kidd three commissions that 

allowed him to capture French shipping, arrest pirates anywhere in the 

world, and keep all the booty without going through the courts. This last 

commission was especially important since the King got 10 percent of the 

take as well.93

Kidd’s expedition was doomed almost from the beginning. As he left 

London in his new ship, the Adventure Galley, in February 1696, some 

of his best crewmen were impressed into the Royal Navy. He sailed on to 

New York, where he filled out his crew and then left for the west coast of 

Africa in September 1696. Ostensibly a pirate hunter, Kidd never captured 

any pirates. Instead, after months of unsuccessful cruising, he captured 

two ships with French passes, legal prizes under his commission. The 

first was a Dutch-owned vessel captured in November 1697. The second, 

captured in January 1698, carried a rich cargo owned by Muklis Khan, 

a high official in the court of the Great Mogul of India. Although the 

Quedah Merchant was a legal prize, the loss of another Indian ship to 

English predators once again angered the Indian emperor. He threatened to 

expel all European traders unless his subjects’ losses were repaid and the 

perpetrators punished. The East India Company quickly compensated the 

owners for their goods, paid large bribes to Indian officials, and agreed to 

establish antipirate patrols in the Indian Ocean.94

Meanwhile, unaware of the hornet’s nest he stirred up, Kidd began his 

return voyage home. He burned the Adventure Galley because its hull was 

rotten after months in the warm Indian Ocean waters and transferred his 

booty to the Quedah Merchant, which he renamed the Adventure Prize. 

Most of his crew decided to turn pirate and remain in the Indian Ocean. 

The rest returned home with Kidd. When the Adventure Prize reached the 
32

Caribbean island of Anguilla in April 1699, Kidd learned that he had been 

declared a pirate the previous November. Hoping to clear his name, he left 

the Adventure Prize in Hispaniola and sailed for Boston to meet with Lord 

Bellomont, his patron. But Lord Bellomont, understanding the politics of 

the situation, arrested Kidd and sent him to London for trial.95

Kidd was a victim of domestic politics. By the time he arrived in 

London, his backers were too busy trying to protect themselves from 

impeachment proceedings brought up by the opposition party to protect 

Kidd. His primary defense was that both prizes were legal under his 

commission because they carried French passes. Mysteriously, those 

passes disappeared after Kidd turned them over to Lord Bellomont. 

Soon after testifying before the House of Commons in the impeachment 

proceeding, Kidd was convicted of piracy and murdering a crewmember. 

With no proof supporting his claim, Kidd was hung on 23 May 1701, thus 

removing a threat to the ruling party.96

Blackbeard, whose name was probably either Edward Teach or 

Edward Thatch, was an even more notorious but equally short-lived 

pirate. Blackbeard ravaged the Caribbean and east coast of the American 

colonies from 1716 to 1718.97 Despite his reputation, he captured few rich 

prizes and never harmed any captives who fell under his control.98 After 

his death, when his sloop and booty were auctioned off, they only brought 

in £2,500.99 Still, his activities eventually raised the ire of the governor 

of Virginia, who mounted an expedition against his safe haven in North 

Carolina. Blackbeard was brought to justice when political and military 

leaders worked together to eliminate a serious threat to colonial American 

commerce.

Like Kidd, Blackbeard started out as a privateer. In 1716, he joined the 

crew of Benjamin Hornigold. Hornigold quickly recognized Blackbeard’s 

abilities and gave him command of a sloop they captured. Together, they 

seized six prizes off the coast of the American colonies in 1717.100 Late 

that summer, Blackbeard and Hornigold parted company. Blackbeard, 

now accompanied by the gentleman pirate Stede Bonnet, let loose a reign 

of terror along the Atlantic seaboard. During a 2-week period, Blackbeard 

captured more than 15 vessels and made himself famous.101

But the tide was already beginning to turn. Blackbeard learned from 

his victims that two frigates, the HMS Rose and HMS Squirrel, were now 

assigned to Boston, the HMS Phoenix recently took station in New York, 

and the HMS Lyme joined the HMS Shoreham off the Virginia capes.102

Then, in July 1718, Woodes Rogers arrived in the Bahamas and restored 
33

Royal control over the islands. With the loss of the Bahamas as a safe 

haven, it was only a matter of time before the pirates succumbed.

Before he arrived, Rogers convinced the King to issue a general pardon 

for any crime committed before 5 January 1718. Proclaimed on 5 September 

1717, any pirate could take advantage of the offer before 5 September 

1718. Along with the pardon, the King also established bounties for anyone 

who spurned the pardon.103 More than 200 of the 500 pirates inhabiting the 

Bahamas eventually took the pardon.104 Among those who accepted the 

pardon were Benjamin Hornigold, who later completely forsook his former 

compatriots and became a pirate hunter, working for Rogers.105

Meanwhile, Blackbeard moved northward to the Carolinas. In January 

1718, he met Charles Eden, the Governor of North Carolina. They quickly 

came to a mutually beneficial understanding. Eden pardoned Blackbeard 

for his crimes and allowed the pirates to keep their loot. In exchange, Eden 

became a silent partner in Blackbeard’s ventures.106

After resting and refitting in North Carolina, Blackbeard set out on 

another cruise in March 1718. Again sailing with Stede Bonnett, Blackbeard 

captured several prizes in the Caribbean.107 In May 1718, his squadron 

grown to four ships and 400 men, Blackbeard blockaded Charleston, 

completely stopping all shipping in and out of the port. One week later, 

Blackbeard unexpectedly left after extorting a chest of medicine from the 

city. He returned to North Carolina where he wrecked two of his ships 

and marooned most of his crew in an effort to avoid sharing his meager 

booty with so many people. Once again, Governor Eden gave Blackbeard 

a pardon for his crimes and convened an Admiralty Court that confirmed 

the legality of his prize.108

Blackbeard remained in North Carolina for several months. He 

married a planter’s daughter and lived lavishly. Eventually, his money 

began to run out, so he set out on another cruise. This time, he captured 

a French ship carrying sugar. When he returned to North Carolina, 

Blackbeard claimed that he found the ship wrecked at sea and merely took 

over the abandoned vessel and sailed her back to North Carolina. Once 

again, Governor Eden played along. He convened an Admiralty Court that 

confirmed Blackbeard’s claim. Eden received a gift of 60 barrels of sugar 

from Blackbeard.109

Blackbeard’s luck finally ran out in November 1718. His blockade of 

Charleston concerned the Governor of Virginia, Alexander Spottswood, 

who feared a similar incident at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay would 

devastate Virginia’s economy. Consequently, in October 1718, he met with 
34

the commanders of the two British guardships, the HMS Lyme and HMS 

Pearl, to discuss plans to capture Blackbeard. Since both ships were too 

large to navigate the shallow inland waters of North Carolina, Spottswood 

agreed to buy two small unarmed sloops for the Royal Navy to use. 

Lieutenant Robert Maynard, the First Lieutenant on the HMS Pearl, was 

put in charge of the seaborne contingent. Maynard set out on 17 November 

1718 with 35 sailors from the Pearl in his sloop and 25 more from the Lyme

in the other sloop under the command of Mr. Hyde. Meanwhile, Captain 

Brand, Commander of the Lyme, set out for Bath by foot with a contingent 

of sailors. They did not reach Bath until 23 November. Before Brand 

arrived, in a dramatic encounter on 22 November, Lieutenant Maynard 

killed Blackbeard along with a dozen other pirates. He also captured 14 

members of Blackbeard’s crew, 13 of whom were later hanged. The Royal 

Navy suffered 11 dead and more than 20 wounded.110

Governor Eden tried to hide his complicity in the matter. In an attempt 

to obscure his relationship with Blackbeard, Eden accused Captain Brand 

and Governor Spottswood of illegally invading North Carolina. But Eden 

eventually gave up the 60 barrels of sugar as well as six slaves he received 

from Blackbeard when Lieutenant Maynard produced an incriminating 

letter found in Blackbeard’s pocket. Despite such evidence, Eden managed 

to avoid prosecution, and he was able to protect his secretary, Tobias 

Knight, who was the primary liaison with Blackbeard, from charges of 

collusion with pirates.111

The increased presence of the Royal Navy in the West Indies and 

along the Atlantic seaboard helped accelerate the demise of the pirates. 

Beginning in 1717, the Royal Navy began stationing even more ships in 

the Americas.112 From a peak of nearly 2,400 active pirates during 1719–

1722, they declined to less than 200 by 1726.113 Although many of the 

pirates retired into obscurity or died in combat or of disease, some 500 to 

600 of them were captured and executed.114 After years of ineffectiveness, 

the Royal Navy finally began to take its toll on the pirates. 

In January 1722, HMS Swallow set out on an antipiracy cruise. On 

5 February, Swallow spotted Bartholomew Roberts’ squadron of ships 

off the coast of Africa. Roberts was one of the most successful pirates 

of this era, capturing more than 400 prizes during a career that lasted 

less than 3 years. When contrary winds forced Swallow to steer away, 

Roberts sent one of his ships, Ranger (32 guns), after what he assumed 

was a Portuguese merchant ship fleeing the flotilla. Swallow slowed to 

allow Ranger to overtake her. When the pirates finally realized they were 

chasing a warship, it was too late. After a short engagement, during which 
35

she suffered 26 casualties, Ranger surrendered. Once she secured her 

prize, Swallow returned to confront the remaining pirates. On 10 February, 

Swallow defeated Roberts’ ship, Royal Fortune (40 guns). Roberts was 

killed during the action. Of his crew, 54 were executed, 37 were sentenced 

to work in the mines of the Royal Africa Company, 74 were acquitted, and 

70 black pirates were given up as slaves.115

Other victories soon followed. In May 1722, HMS Launceton (40 guns) 

captured a Spanish pirate ship off Hispaniola. Of the 58 crewmembers, 

41 were later executed in Jamaica. The next year, in May 1723, HMS 

Winchelsea captured the pirate captain Finn and eight crewmen on Tobago. 

Six of the pirates were hung in Antigua. The next month, on 10 June 1723, 

HMS Greyhound engaged two pirate ships commanded by Edward Low, 

a pirate renowned for his brutality, off the coast of Long Island. Although 

Low escaped, he never surfaced again and was either lost at sea or retired 

from piracy. But Greyhound captured Low’s escort, and 26 pirates were 

executed on 19 July 1723.116

The British Government augmented the Royal Navy’s effort by 

commissioning pirate hunters. In November and December 1715, the 

governor of Jamaica sent out 10 ships to hunt pirates. One of those vessels, 

the Tyger, commanded by Jonathan Barnet, captured Calico Jack Rackham 

in November 1720. Rackham was notable as the lover of the female pirate 

Anne Bonney. Another female pirate, Mary Read, was also captured on 

Rackham’s ship. Although Rackham was executed on 27 November 1720, 

Bonney and Read escaped punishment by claiming they were pregnant.117

A few months after Blackbeard terrorized Charleston, two more pirate 

ships showed up off the entrance to the port and captured several merchant 

vessels. Alarmed by the continual attacks on the colony’s commerce, the 

governor commissioned two privateers, the Henry (8 guns) and Sea Nymph

(8 guns), to capture the pirates. Although they failed to catch the two 

pirates they set out after, they did capture Blackbeard’s compatriot Stede 

Bonnet on 8 October 1718. During the engagement, 18 of the privateers 

and 9 pirates were killed. Bonnet and 34 of his men were captured. Despite 

considerable public sentiment to pardon the gentlemanly Bonnet, South 

Carolina officials hung Bonnet and 29 others the next month.118

In October 1722, the privateer Eagle discovered a ship careening on a 

deserted island. Suspecting it to be a pirate vessel, the Eagle closed on the 

ship. When the pirates began firing at the Eagle, she stood off and pounded 

the vulnerable pirate ship. Although several of the pirates escaped into 

the jungle, most of them remained with their ship and were captured. The 

privateers searched for those who escaped and eventually captured five 
36

more. During a subsequent search, the pirate captain, George Lowther, 

was found dead with a pistol at his side, an apparent suicide. Eleven of the 

pirates were later executed.119

Piracy in the Caribbean finally ended when two of the pillars of piracy, 

political turmoil and safe havens were removed. With the repudiation of 

the “no peace beyond the line” doctrine and government actions that made 

it harder to obtain letters of marque, it became increasingly difficult for 

the pirates to maintain a façade of legitimacy. Once they became enemies 

of all nations, they faced opponents such as the Royal Navy that were too 

powerful to successfully resist. Moreover, as the political climate changed 

from that of support for the pirates to opposition to their actions, their safe 

havens were slowly taken away from them. Without places to rest, refit, 

and sell their ill-gotten gains, the pirates could not sustain themselves. New 

legislation against piracy, pardons, rewards for their capture, and speedy 

trials and executions also took their toll on the pirates. By 1730, piracy 

in the West Indies was over. It would remain dormant until conditions 

allowed it to resume in the first quarter of the 19th century.

19th-Century Piracy

On 19 December 1818, the Emma Sophia was accosted by a Spanish 

privateer in the Santaren Channel. Facing a privateer armed with a swivel 

gun and 30 crewmen, the unarmed Emma Sophia surrendered without a 

fight. After taking over the ship, the pirates sailed the Emma Sophia to the 

Florida Keys where they expertly transferred the merchant vessel’s cargo 

to other ships in the harbor. Once they finished offloading the cargo, the 

pirates ransacked the ship, looking for hidden valuables. Frustrated by not 

finding anything else of value, they began threatening the crew of the Emma 

Sophia. When their threats failed to produce any results, they prepared to 

hang one of the ship’s officers from a yard arm. Before they could do 

so, the man jumped over the side of the ship but weighed down by his 

clothes, he was quickly recaptured. Despite their blood-thirsty reputation, 

the pirates took no further action against the crew. Later that night, the 

privateer set sail, leaving the Emma Sophia to continue on its way, minus 

its cargo.120 The officer later warned that “the neighborhood of Cuba will 

be troubled waters until our government shall seriously determine to put 

down this system of piracy.”121

Within a few months, the United States Government did act. On 3 

March 1819, Congress authorized President James Monroe to dispatch 

naval forces south to deal with the pirates. But suppressing those pirates 

proved difficult because of the three conditions that facilitate piracy. As 

in the earlier period of Caribbean piracy, the geography of the region 
37

was favorable to piracy. Many of the pirates operated along the northern 

coast of Cuba or Puerto Rico, where there were many coves and creeks 

protected by shallow water and dangerous reefs, making them inaccessible 

to frigates and larger warships. The islands’ dense forests grew right up to 

the waters’ edge, which made it easy for the pirates to hide their vessels. 

Finally, since there was plenty of fresh water, fruit, and fish along the 

coast, the pirates had little difficulty sustaining themselves.122 This was 

also a period of significant political turmoil. The Napoleonic Wars, the 

Haitian Revolution, and the Wars for Latin American Independence fueled 

privateering activities. Even though the United States was ostensibly 

neutral, American merchant vessels were vulnerable to privateers who 

strayed over the line into piracy. Finally, there were safe sanctuaries 

ashore in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Merchants and local officials tacitly, and 

sometimes even overtly, supported and profited from the activities of the 

Spanish pirates.

Suppressing piracy was also a challenge because it was such a lucrative 

business that it attracted more than 10,000 participants during 1820–1830. 

Those pirates captured about 500 vessels worth approximately $20 million 

in the Caribbean during that timeframe. As a point of comparison, the 

cost of running the United States Government in 1821, including interest 

payments and redemption of the public debt, was $19.785 million.123

Although rewarding, piracy was also a dangerous business. Even 

though no more than 2,000 pirates were active at any one time, US naval 

forces engaged about 3,000 buccaneers during the 1820s, capturing 79 

ships and 1,300 pirates. The Royal Navy snared 13 pirate craft and 291 

pirates. The Spanish Navy was not very active, but they still managed to 

catch 150 men and 5 vessels.124 Although no estimates are available of the 

number of pirates killed during antipiracy operations, that number was 

quite substantial as well.

The United States Navy engaged pirates in the West Indies decades 

before Congress acted in 1819. On 1 January 1800, the 12-gun schooner 

Experiment was attacked by Haitian pirates in 10 barges while escorting 4 

merchantmen. Although greatly outnumbered, the Experiment sunk three 

of the barges and drove off the rest, saving two of ships. Luckily, the crews 

of the two captured vessels managed to escape.125 The hero of this battle, 

Lieutenant David Porter, was wounded, but he survived to fight pirates 

repeatedly in the Caribbean.

A few years later, after the United States bought the Louisiana Territory 

from France, President Thomas Jefferson expressed concern about the 

rampant smuggling and piracy at the mouth of the Mississippi River, 
38

where French and Spanish privateers and pirates operated with impunity. 

On 3 December 1805, he commented in his annual message that “our 

coasts have been infested. . . . They have captured, in the very entrance of 

our harbors as well as on the high seas, not only the vessels of our friends 

coming to trade with us, but our own also.”126 Consequently, President 

Jefferson decided to establish a naval station in New Orleans to combat 

the pirates. Captain John Shaw took command of 20 gunboats and 400 

sailors in 1806. Shaw’s forces were, however, ineffective because most 

citizens were sympathetic to the pirates and smugglers. Civil authorities 

were unwilling to prosecute the pirates in court and Governor William 

C.C. Claiborne was reluctant to help because he needed local political 

support.127 (Figure 3 shows the Gulf of Mexico.)

The situation soon changed when Master Commandant David Porter 

arrived in New Orleans in 1808.128 Porter, like Shaw, was stymied at first. 

He had to deal with local hostility, the poor material condition of his 

gunboats, and a shortage of sailors. On top of that, he contracted yellow 

fever. Meanwhile, the pirates and smugglers under Jean Lafitte prospered 

and grew stronger at their headquarters on Grand Terre Island in Barataria 

Bay. By the end of 1809, more than 30 ships and untold numbers of boats 

operated from Grand Terre Island.129

0 50 100 150 miles

C u b a

Atlantic

G alv es ton Ocean

M ex ic o

Caribbean Sea

Gulf of Mexico

Bay of

Campeche

Barataria

Bay

Vera Cruz

Hav an a Matan zas

LA

New O rlean s

F lo rida

T errito ry

MS AL G A

Figure 3. Gulf of Mexico.
39

Porter realized his force was too small to take on the Baratarian pirates, 

but in early 1810, he got word of the arrival of three pirate vessels at the 

mouth of the Mississippi River and moved against them. When Porter 

demanded their surrender, the pirates refused. Instead, they contacted the 

Federal district attorney, Mr. P. Grymes, who informed Porter he did not 

have the right to detain the pirates. An infuriated Porter warned the pirates 

that, if they did not surrender immediately, he would attack. The pirates 

backed down and surrendered, but the battle was not yet over because the 

pirates had to be tried in the district court by Mr. Grymes! While the pirate 

crews sauntered about the city, bragging that they would be acquitted, 

Porter was threatened and shunned by the citizens of New Orleans. At 

one point, the pirates even brought suit against Porter for detaining them. 

Finally, after stationing marines in the courtroom, the largest of the three 

pirate vessels, the Montebello, was condemned and sold as a prize.130 This 

incident highlights the difficulty of combating piracy if the pirates are 

favored by safe sanctuaries ashore. 

Although Jean Lafitte and the Baratarian pirates continued to operate 

from Grand Terre Island, they were somewhat less brazen after Porter’s 

actions. Finally, in September 1814, Porter’s successor, Commodore 

Daniel T. Patterson, moved against Lafitte.131 Patterson conducted a joint 

operation in conjunction with soldiers from the 44th Infantry Regiment. 

They attacked the pirate haven on 16 September, but the buccaneers got 

word of the operation and fled before the soldiers and sailors arrived. Even 

though they captured 10 pirate vessels and $500,000 worth of goods, most 

of the 800 to 1,000 brigands living on the island escaped.132 But the impact 

of Patterson’s mission was short lived; the Baratarian corsairs returned 

to the island and resumed operations soon after the soldiers and sailors 

left. The temporary nature of Patterson’s operation demonstrates the 

importance of permanently eliminating pirate havens ashore. Commodore 

Patterson emphasized that point in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy in 

April 1815 when he wrote, “The immediate return of these people to their 

former mode of life will point out the indispensable necessity of keeping a 

small active naval force on this station in time of peace.”133

The end of the Napoleonic Wars meant that many privateers lost their 

veneer of legitimacy. Some continued on as before, operating as out-and-out 

pirates. Others obtained letters of marque from the former Spanish colonies 

that revolted from Spain in 1810–1811. Many of those fledgling nations 

began issuing letters of marque to privateers soon after they rebelled. Even 

though the United States was sympathetic to the new republics, some of 

their privateers preyed on American shipping.134 Even more troublesome 

were the actions taken by Spain in response to the successes achieved by 
40

the Latin American rebels. Spain imposed a blockade on most of the South 

and Central American nations. But without sufficient forces to enforce the 

blockade, it was merely a pretext for Spanish warships and privateers to 

seize neutral vessels violating the blockade. In one case, three Spanish 

naval ships were assigned responsibility for patrolling 1,200 miles of 

coastline.135 Because of the Spanish Navy’s weakness, Spanish officials 

used privateers to enforce the blockade. Many of the privateers focused on 

American shipping in retaliation for the support given to the Latin American 

revolutionaries. Preying on American shipping became so lucrative that 

other Spaniards resorted to outright piracy. Operating along the coast of 

Cuba and Puerto Rico, they attacked innocent vessels transiting coastal 

waters. Local authorities provided political cover and Spanish merchants 

eagerly disposed of the stolen goods at cut-rate prices. Their depredations 

soon began to affect American shipping, and insurance rates increased by 

more than 100 percent over a 1-year period.136 Merchants, shipowners, and 

insurance companies clamored for help. 

The Federal Government acted in response to the threat. First, as 

noted previously, Congress authorized President Monroe to deploy naval 

forces to combat pirates in the West Indies. Second, in the summer of 

1819, the President sent Captain Oliver Hazard Perry, hero of the Battle of 

Lake Erie, on a delicate diplomatic mission to South America. Perry’s job 

was to convince the South Americans to restrain their privateers without 

jeopardizing the United States good relations with those countries. His 

first stop was Venezuela. Although Perry’s mission was a success, since 

Venezuela agreed to restrict the actions of its privateers and promised to 

pay restitution for previous losses, Perry contracted yellow fever and died 

on his way home. Consequently, the South American mission foundered.137

Meanwhile, US naval forces began operations against pirates in the 

West Indies. One of the first targets was Jean Lafitte. Although Lafitte 

received a presidential pardon as a reward for his support to Andrew 

Jackson during the Battle of New Orleans, he soon returned to his old 

ways. Lafitte moved his operation from Louisiana to Galveston, which 

he claimed was the capital of the province of Texas in the Republic of 

Mexico.138 Galveston was a perfect location for Lafitte; it was outside 

of the United States yet close to New Orleans. Lafitte thrived until a 

combination of events did him in. First, in September 1818, Galveston 

was hit by a powerful hurricane that devastated the town and almost ruined 

Lafitte financially.139 Second, the New Orleans station began to operate 

more aggressively against pirates in the Gulf of Mexico. Lafitte lost one 

of his newest vessels to those operations.140 Third, increased competition 
41

with Spanish pirates made it more difficult to capture valuable prizes. 

Finally, in 1821, the United States Navy acted to eliminate Lafitte’s haven 

in Galveston by sending the Enterprise, Lieutenant Lawrence Kearny 

commanding, to Galveston to root Lafitte out of his safe haven. Although 

Kearny did not dispute Lafitte’s claim that Galveston was outside of the 

jurisdiction of the United States, legal constraints did not deter him from 

warning Lafitte that failure to leave would precipitate an attack. Lafitte 

acquiesced to the demand and abandoned Galveston, burning what 

he could not take with him.141 With the loss of his secure base, Lafitte 

disappeared from the pages of history. 

While Commodore Patterson’s forces harried Jean Lafitte, other 

Navy ships commenced operations off the coast of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 

Initially, these were single ship missions. In 1820, the Enterprise (12 

guns), Nonsuch (8 guns), Lynx (6 guns), and gunboats Nos. 158 and 168

cruised the waters of the Caribbean looking for pirates. The Secretary of 

the Navy also directed all US Navy ships returning to the United States 

from Africa, the Mediterranean, and other places to sail through the West 

Indies as a further deterrent. Despite their presence, pirates seized 27 ships 

in 1820.142

By 1821, there were six US Navy ships assigned to antipiracy operations 

in the West Indies: Hornet (18 guns), Enterprise (12 guns), Spark (12 

guns), Porpoise (12 guns), Shark (12 guns), and Grampus (12 guns).143

The Porpoise, Shark, and Grampus each carried a large barge armed 

with a cannon for operations in shallow waters. Although they operated 

independently, they had a little more success against the freebooters. On 

16 October 1821, while cruising off Cape Antonio, Cuba, Enterprise

caught four pirate vessels robbing three US merchant ships. Since the 

water was too shallow for Enterprise to engage the pirates, Lieutenant 

Kearny sent five of the ship’s boats in pursuit of them. The sailors rescued 

the merchant ships and captured 40 brigands and two of their vessels. The 

rest of the pirates escaped ashore.144 A month later, Enterprise cleaned out 

a buccaneer haven near Cape Antonio. Two months later, on 21 December 

1821, Enterprise captured another pirate ship, but once again, its crew 

escaped ashore.145 The Hornet captured the corsair schooner Moscow on 

29 October 1821. After escorting several merchant ships to Havana and 

Matanzas, Porpoise sailed west toward Cape Antonio. On 16 December 

1821, Porpoise, Lieutenant James Ramage commanding, encountered 

the brig Bolina, out of Boston, and learned that pirates plundered Bolina

the previous day. Because a shallow reef extended far from the shore, 

Lieutenant Ramage sent 40 men in the ship’s boats to find the buccaneers. 
42

They captured one corsair vessel and burned five others. Once again, most 

of the brigands escaped ashore, but the sailors caught three pirates and 

killed several others.146 (Figure 4 shows Cuba and the Straits of Florida.)

Several lessons stand out from these early attempts to suppress Spanish 

piracy. First, the rules of engagement were too restrictive. American sailors 

were not allowed to land on Spanish soil, and all captured pirates were 

turned over to Spanish authorities. Since the Spanish were sympathetic 

and often worked with the buccaneers, they were usually released after a 

cursory trial.147 Second, it is almost impossible to stamp out piracy if the 

brigands have support and sanctuary ashore. Time after time, the pirates 

escaped ashore, out of the reach of the American sailors. Third, the US 

naval squadron was not equipped with the right mix of vessels. Larger 

ships were ineffective pirate hunters. They needed small, oar-powered 

craft that could maneuver along the coast in shallow water, searching for 

pirates hiding in coves and creeks.

Despite the best efforts of the US forces operating in the West Indies, 

attacks on American shipping increased. Moreover, the pirates increasingly 

0 50 100 miles

San tiag o

d e Cuba

Baham as

Bah ia Ho n da

Puerto Prin c ipe

Hav an a

Matan zas

Cuba

Atlantic

Ocean

Caribbean Sea

Gulf of Mexico

Jam a ica

Nas s au

Cape

Antonio

F lo rida Key s

Flo rid a

Te rrito ry

Figure 4. Cuba and the Straits of Florida.
43

treated their captives harshly, torturing or killing many crewmembers. In 

September 1821, three American merchant ships were captured near the 

entrance to Matanzas harbor. The crew of one ship was beaten and the 

vessel was set on fire. The crewmembers managed to escape ashore in 

their boat. The captain and two other people were killed on the second 

ship. The entire crew of the third ship was killed and that vessel was also 

set afire. Spanish corsairs captured the Exertion in November 1821 and 

marooned the crew on a deserted island.148 These and other outrages drove 

home the need for a strong, permanent naval presence in the West Indies. 

Consequently, Congress authorized the establishment of a West Indies 

squadron in 1822. Commodore James Biddle assumed command of a 

powerful force, including the frigates Macedonian (36 guns) and Congress

(32 guns); the corvettes Cyane (32 guns) and John Adams (24 guns); the 18 

gun sloops Hornet and Peacock; the brigs Spark (12 guns) and Enterprise

(12 guns); the 18-gun schooners Alligator, Grampus, Shark, and Porpoise; 

and gunboats Nos. 158 and 168. Altogether, there were some 1,300 sailors 

and marines in this naval force.149

Commodore Biddle deployed in Macedonian in April 1822. Upon 

arrival off the coast of Cuba, Biddle contacted the governor and Captain 

General of Cuba, Don Nicholas Mahy, and asked him to cooperate with 

the antipiracy operation by allowing US sailors to pursue pirates ashore. 

By this time, relations between the United States and Spain were strained 

since the United States recognized the independence of Spain’s rebellious 

colonies the month before. In addition to that, the Spanish were concerned 

that American adventurers might invade Cuba in an attempt to bring it into 

the Union as another slave state. Consequently, Mahy demurred, replying 

that he was doing all that was necessary to suppress piracy in Cuba. Biddle 

also contacted the governor of Puerto Rico. Although he was cordial, he 

too denied Biddle’s request. Fortunately, Biddle’s request was merely a 

formality; the Secretary of the Navy changed the rules of engagement 

before Biddle departed, giving him permission to land in remote areas of 

Cuba and Puerto Rico while pursuing pirates.150

Even though the Spanish were not cooperative, the squadron vigorously 

pursued the Cuban pirates. In March 1822, boat crews from the Enterprise

captured two launches and four boats in a creek near Cape Antonio. A 

few days later, on 6 March, the Enterprise apprehended 8 pirate craft 

and 160 buccaneers.151 Grampus captured the Spanish privateer Palmyra

during a short battle on 15 August 1822.152 Peacock, Captain Stephen 

Cassin commanding, seized a pirate boat 60 miles west of Havana on 28 

September. That afternoon, Peacock encountered Speedwell, an American 

merchant vessel, and learned that corsairs attacked her 2 hours earlier. 
44

Peacock set out in pursuit. When Peacock reached the coast, Cassin sent 50 

men in the ship’s boats to search along the coast. They were unsuccessful 

on the 28th, but they spied a sail along the shore the next day. This time, 

when Cassin dispatched sailors from the Peacock in the ship’s boats, they 

found their quarry and captured four schooners. Once again, most of the 

pirates got away on shore.153

It is important to note that much of the American squadron’s work was 

performed in open boats away from the mother ship. Sailors and marines 

rowed for days and days, searching for pirates hiding in the many coves and 

inlets along the Cuban coast. One officer later recalled that he and his crew 

once spent 68 consecutive days in an open barge searching for corsairs 

along the northwest coast of Cuba.154 While in the boats, the crews were 

vulnerable to attack by larger pirate vessels, subjected to the unrelenting 

Caribbean sun, and exposed to dangerous diseases such as yellow fever 

and malaria. It was slow, arduous, and dangerous work.

Despite the increased American presence, the pirate marauding 

continued. In May 1822, pirates plundering the brig Aurilla showed 

considerable ingenuity when they tricked the Aurilla’s crew into revealing 

all of ship’s hidden money. The brigands smeared fresh chicken blood on 

the ship’s windlass. Then, they brought the Aurilla’s crewmembers topside 

one at a time and told the sailors that they killed the other crewmen because 

they refused to talk. The chicken blood was a convincing prop; each sailor 

told the pirates as much as they knew, and consequently, the pirates found 

all of the money hidden on the ship.155 Other corsairs were not as gentle 

with their victims. In July 1822, Spanish freebooters made the master 

of the British merchant ship Blessing walk the plank when he refused to 

tell them where his money was. When he tried to swim away, the pirate 

captain shot and killed him. Not satisfied, the pirate captain smashed the 

skull of the master’s 14-year-old son when he could not stop crying after 

witnessing his father’s murder.156 By the end of the year, the United States 

Gazette estimated that almost 3,000 acts of piracy had been committed in 

the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico from 1815 to 1822.157

Toward the end of the year, an event occurred that further galvanized 

American public opinion against the pirates. On 9 November 1822, 

Lieutenant William Allen, a War of 1812 naval hero, was killed while 

pursing Spanish corsairs. Allen, Commanding Officer of the Alligator, 

encountered two American sailors on 8 November while in Matanzas. 

They informed Allen that pirates had captured their ships and that they 

were trying to raise the $7,000 ransom. Allen immediately set sail toward 

the bay where the brigands were hiding. There, he discovered the two 
45

American vessels as well as three pirate schooners and three more 

merchant vessels. Even though there were more than 100 buccaneers on 

their three schooners, Allen took 40 sailors and marines in the ship’s boats 

and set out to get them. As the Americans approached the first schooner, 

the pirates began firing muskets and cannon at the Americans. Although he 

was wounded by the gunfire, Allen pressed on. The buccaneers panicked, 

abandoned their ship, and fled toward a second pirate schooner. Most of 

the pirates escaped on that vessel, but they abandoned their prizes and two 

schooners. Four Americans, including Lieutenant Allen, were killed and 

three others were wounded. At least 14 brigands were killed during the 

engagement.158

Less than a month later, the Secretary of the Navy advised Congress 

that the West Indies squadron needed to be expanded to improve its ability 

to combat the pirates. Secretary Smith Thompson recommended adding a 

steamboat, 10 shallow draft schooners, and 5 barges large enough to carry 

40 men. Congress quickly approved the recommendation.159

Secretary Thompson picked Captain David Porter to command the 

expanded naval flotilla. Porter immediately went to work building his 

new command. He purchased eight small schooners: Beagle, Ferret, 

Fox, Greyhound, Jackal, Terrier, Weasel, and Wild Cat. Each was armed 

with three cannon and carried a complement of 31 personnel. Porter also 

acquired five large, 20-oar barges for use in the shallow waters along the 

coast of Cuba—the Gnat, Gallinipper, Midge, Mosquito, and Sandfly. The 

barges were particularly important since American sailors spent much of 

their time in open boats searching the Cuban coast for pirates. Finally, 

Porter procured a storeship, Decoy, and a steam-powered riverboat, Sea 

Gull. The Sea Gull was the second steam-powered vessel in the United 

States Navy and the first to actively serve as a warship. It was armed with 

five cannon.160

Commodore Porter and his “Mosquito Squadron” set sail on 15 

February 1823. His mission was to suppress piracy, protect US commerce, 

and stop the illegal slave trade. He was also directed to establish relations 

with any foreign naval forces conducting antipiracy operations. This meant 

coordinating his operations with his old nemesis, the Royal Navy. Porter 

also benefited from an important change to the rules of engagement. He 

was allowed to pursue pirates ashore in inhabited areas as well as unsettled 

places. The only stipulation was that he had to notify local officials before 

he acted and assure them that his only purpose in landing was to capture 

pirates. This was a significant improvement over the rules with which 

Commodore Biddle had to comply.161
46

Porter arrived in St. Thomas in early March 1823 and immediately 

began deploying his forces. He sent Shark and three of the small schooners 

to patrol the southern coast of Puerto Rico. The Fox was dispatched to San 

Juan, Puerto Rico, to obtain a list of all legally commissioned privateers 

and a copy of their instructions. When the Fox entered San Juan harbor 

on 3 March, a shore battery fired at the ship, killing the Commanding 

Officer, Lieutenant William H. Cocke. Many in the American squadron 

believed that the Spanish fired at the Fox in retaliation for the capture of 

the Palmyra the previous August. But Porter, who was notorious for his 

temper, was surprisingly diplomatic and accepted the governor of Puerto 

Rico’s apology for the incident. Still, Porter failed to gain the governor’s 

cooperation with his mission.162

Stymied in Puerto Rico, Porter sailed to Cuba and began searching the 

coast for corsairs. The squadron achieved significant results almost immediately. The barges Gallinipper and Mosquito rescued an American merchant vessel on 8 April 1823. The American sailors killed two pirates and 

captured one other.163 The rest of the brigands got away. Eight days later, 

on 16 April 1823, the two barges, along with Peacock, spotted a pirate 

felucca propelled by 16 oars near the harbor of Colorados. Although the 

pirates escaped, Peacock captured the felucca, and the buccaneers burned 

three other schooners before they fled.164

On 2 June 1823, Grampus rescued the crew of the American schooner Shiboleth after it was attacked by pirates. The brigands snuck up on 

the ship, killed the watch, and confined the rest of the crew in the forecastle. After they took what they wanted, the corsairs set the ship on fire. 

The crew managed to break out of the forecastle, but the ship was still on 

fire when Grampus arrived and rescued the remaining crewmembers. The 

same pirates were hunted down by Spanish dragoons after they attacked 

another merchant ship several days later. Once again, the buccaneers managed to escape.165

Also in June, Ferret tried to engage some pirates near Matanzas, but as 

its boat rowed toward the pirates, they shot a hole in the Ferret’s boat. The 

boat returned the Ferret before it sank, but the Ferret, unable to approach 

the buccaneers because of shallow water, sailed away in frustration. The 

Ferret soon encountered a small coastal vessel, which it commandeered. 

After returning to the bay to resume the attack, the Ferret was forced 

to abandon the operation because of bad weather. The next day, Ferret

encountered a British merchant ship, which loaned the Americans a boat. 

When the Ferret’s crew returned to the spot, they only found the two boats 

that had been sunk by Ferret’s cannon fire. 
47

On 5 July 1823, the Sea Gull, with the barges Gallinipper and Mosquito

in tow, searched the Cuban coast for pirates. Lieutenant William Watson 

sent the two barges into the bay where Lieutenant Allen was killed months 

earlier. The Americans soon discovered a corsair schooner and launch plundering several merchant ships at anchor. Watson, who was embarked in the 

Gallinipper, immediately ordered the two barges to attack the schooner. 

The schooner tried to sail away, but the barges pursued the pirates to an 

anchorage near a village. Although they were significantly outnumbered 

and outgunned, the Americans stubbornly pressed home the attack. Once 

again, the brigands panicked and fled the ship. The Americans, yelling 

“Allen, Allen,” showed the buccaneers no mercy. Those not cut down on 

the schooner were slaughtered in the water as they tried to swim ashore. 

Only 15 made it ashore, and the angry sailors ran down and killed 11 of 

them. The other four were seized by the villagers. Out of 70 to 80 corsairs, 

only 5 survived the American attack.166

By the end of the summer, the American effort to suppress piracy in 

the Caribbean was working. Even though piracy along the coast was still 

problematic, reports of piracy on the high seas waned. Porter established 

a virtual blockade of Matanzas, which effectively eliminated one of the 

pirates’ most important havens. But just when it appeared that the tide 

was turning, yellow fever struck Porter’s squadron in August. Porter withdrew most of his forces from the unhealthy Caribbean waters. Those that 

remained were stretched too thin, and consequently, there was a resurgence of piracy in the West Indies. Still, by the end of the year, President 

James Monroe was able to report that “the piracies by which our commerce in the neighborhood of the island of Cuba had been afflicted have 

been repressed, and the confidence of our merchants, in a great measure, 

restored.”167

The British West Indies squadron, which had a few small vessels similar to the American squadron, contributed to the suppression of piracy in 

the Caribbean as well. British forces began actively patrolling for buccaneers in 1822. On 30 September 1822, the Firme Union (5 guns), a 

pirate felucca, attacked the sloop Eliza (1 gun) while cruising along the 

northern coast of Cuba in company with the Tyne (26 guns). After a running gun battle, the British boarded and captured the felucca. They killed 

10 corsairs and drove the rest overboard. The British suffered two killed 

and seven wounded.168 The Grecian (6 guns) captured the schooner La 

Cata (8 guns) on 1 March 1823 south of Cuba. Thirty pirates were killed, 

but only 3 were captured and almost 70 escaped.169 Later that month, 

the Tyne and Thracian (18 guns) learned that the famed pirate Captain 
48

Cayatano Aragonez in his ship Zaragozana (13 guns) was cruising nearby. 

The British ships spotted the Zaragozana on 31 March and gave chase. 

Aragonez sailed into Mata, on the eastern tip of Cuba, and anchored in the 

mouth of the harbor, ready to fight the British. Despite being outnumbered, 

British sailors rowed over to the pirate ship in their boats and captured it. 

Out of 70 to 80 buccaneers on board, 10 were killed, 28 captured, and the 

rest escaped ashore. Aragonez and the others who were captured were later 

hung for their crimes. The British lost only one killed and five wounded.170

Commodore Porter returned to the Caribbean in February 1824. This 

second cruise was much less successful than the first. There were few captures, and once again, the squadron was hit with another round of yellow 

fever in mid-spring. Porter himself contracted yellow fever for the third 

time. Weakened by the fever, Porter withdrew most of his force north by 

early July 1824.171 In his absence, pirates, based primarily out of Puerto 

Rico, increased their attacks on merchant shipping. Between early July 

and early August, 10 incidents were reported.172 Subsequent complaints 

by merchants and insurance companies led to criticism of Porter and put 

pressure on him to return to the Caribbean quickly and restore order. 

Most of the squadron was back on station by October 1824.173 Porter’s 

third cruise was marred by a diplomatic gaffe involving Puerto Rico that 

led to Porter’s removal in February 1825.174 The only clashes with pirates 

of note involved the Porpoise and Terrier. In both cases, even though 

the American ships captured the corsairs’ vessels, the crews managed to 

escape.175

The situation in the Caribbean changed for the better in 1825. During his 

final address to Congress in late 1824, President Monroe suggested that the 

United States might have to take more forceful actions against the Spanish 

in Cuba and Puerto Rico to end their support for piracy. Among his suggestions were hot pursuits ashore, reprisals against those assisting the pirates, 

and blockading ports implicated in piracy. Even though the United States 

did not act on any of those suggestions, fear of the American Government 

doing so motivated the Spanish to cooperate with the American squadron. 

At the same time, by 1825, Spanish opposition to the independence of the 

new South and Central American Republics waned. Thus, those countries 

stopped commissioning privateers, which took away one of Spain’s primary justifications for using privateers. Finally, as the pirates were barred 

from the sea, they began to prey on Spanish citizens ashore. Consequently, 

the Spanish Army began to more actively patrol against pirates. Thus, in 

March 1825, when Grampus lured a pirate ship into attacking several 

armed schooners disguised as merchant ships, the Spanish Army captured 

those who escaped ashore and executed them.176
49

Another important reason for the eventual demise of piracy in the 

Caribbean was the cooperation between the United States and Great Britain. 

Although there was no formal agreement between the British and American 

commanders, both naval forces freely cooperated with one another. The 

most significant joint operation occurred in March 1825 when the Sea Gull

and Gallinipper met the Dartmouth. The Commanding Officer of the Sea 

Gull, Lieutenant Isaac McKeever, learned that Dartmouth’s boats and two 

British schooners, Lion and Union, were searching the Cuban coast for 

pirates. McKeever transferred to the Gallinipper and led the combined 

US-British force against some buccaneers hiding near the mouth of the 

Sagua la Grande River. There, on 25 March, they located and attacked a 

corsair schooner. The allies killed 8 brigands and captured 19 more with 

only one slight casualty. The next day, they captured another pirate schooner although this crew managed to escape ashore.177 Even though there 

were several isolated incidents over the next few years, this successful 

mission essentially ended active piracy in the Caribbean.

The 19th century antipiracy mission of the United States clearly demonstrates the importance of the three conditions on the growth and sustainability of piracy. Piracy was a practical endeavor in the region because of 

the geography. Lucrative trade routes from New Orleans, South America, 

and Central America passed close to the two primary pirate havens: Cuba 

and Puerto Rico. Pirates could wait in the relative safety and security of the 

coves and bays along both coasts for a victim to sail too close. Once they 

found a target, they darted out from their protected location and quickly 

captured their prey. Political turmoil during the first quarter of the 19th 

century facilitated piracy. First the Napoleonic Wars and then the wars for 

South American and Latin American independence presented opportunities for privateers and pirates. Neutrals, such as the United States, were 

drawn into the fray when privateers exceeded their commissions and took 

readily available targets. Finally, Spanish pirates and privateers were able 

to operate with impunity for years because of the protection afforded them 

by Spanish civil authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The pirates had safe 

havens where they could refit, recruit, relax, and sell their plunder. 

Piracy ended only when those three conditions were negated. Constant 

patrols by American and British warships eventually made piracy too dangerous. The pirates lost their justification when Spain finally accepted the 

independence of its former colonies in South and Central America. But it 

was the elimination of their safe havens ashore that finally ended piracy 

in the Caribbean. Once the governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico decided it 

was in their nations’ interests to stop providing support to the pirates, the 

pirates were quickly put out of business.
50

Notes

1. Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500–1750

(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 18.

2. Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005), 92.

3. Stefan Eklof, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s 

Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2006), 7–9.

4. Ralph T. Ward, Pirates in History (Baltimore, MD: York Press, 1974), 

20.

5. Hugh F. Rankin, The Golden Age of Piracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 

Winston, 1969), 17.

6. Philip Gosse, The Pirates’ Who’s Who: Giving Particulars of the Lives 

and Deaths of the Pirates and Buccaneers (Boston: Charles E. Lauriat & Co., 

1924), 15.

7. Captain Charles Johnson, The History of the Lives and Actions of the 

Most Famous Highwaymen, Street-Robbers, etc. To Which Is Added, a Genuine 

Account of the Voyages and Plunders of the Most Noted Pirates (London: 

Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown, 1813), 529.

8. Earle, 90.

9. Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy (New York: Tudor Publishing 

Company, 1932), 141.

10. Ibid., 142.

11. Ibid., 141.

12. Rankin, 16.

13. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 1.

14. Earle, 93.

15. David Watts, The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and 

Environmental Change Since 1492 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1987), 121–122.

16. Lane, 18.

17. David Cordingly, consulting ed., Pirates: Terror on the High Seas From 

the Caribbean to the South China Sea (Atlanta, GA: Turner Publishing, 1996), 17.

18. Jan Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and 

the Carib to the Present (New York: Facts on File, 1992), 38.

19. Jan Rogozinski, Pirates! Brigands, Buccaneers, and Privateers in Fact, 

Fiction, and Legend (New York: De Capo Press, 1996), 241; Rogozinski, A Brief 

History of the Caribbean, 98; Watts, 130.

20. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 26.

21. Cordingly, Pirates, 26–27; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 153.

22. Cordingly, Pirates, 27–29; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 153.

23. Cordingly, Pirates, 29–30.

24. Earle, 22.

25. Cordingly, Pirates, 33.

26. Earle, 23.

27. Cordingly, Pirates, 33.
51

28. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 42.

29. Ibid., 36–39.

30. Ibid., 39.

31. Cordingly, Pirates, 34; Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 42.

32. Rankin, 7; Gosse, The Pirates’ Who’s Who, 20.

33. Brenda Lewis, The Pirate Code: From Honorable Thieves to ModernDay Villains (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2008), 102–103.

34. Cordingly, Pirates, 34.

35. Lewis, 103–104.

36. Rankin, 7–9.

37. Lewis, 117.

38. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 83.

39. Ibid., 90.

40. Ibid., 86.

41. There is some doubt as to the actual existence of Pierre le Grand and 

when he took the Spanish treasure ship. Rogozinski sets the date of the action as 

about 1620, which matches other developments in the vicinity of Tortuga. Gosse 

states that le Grand took the Spanish ship in 1665, which is well into the buccaneer 

era. Both authors use Alexander Exquemelin’s Buccaneers of America, which was 

first published in 1678. Exquemelin does not provide a date. See Rogozinski, 

Pirates!, 194–195; Gosse, The History of Piracy, 147–148.

42. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 75; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 

339.

43. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 85; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 

339–340.

44. Lewis, 104–106; Rankin, 8–9; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 340.

45. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 340.

46. Lane, 103–104.

47. Rankin, 12.

48. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 91–92.

49. Ibid., 83; Lane, 105; Douglas R. Burgess Jr., The Pirates’ Pact: The 

Secret Alliances Between History’s Most Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial 

America (Chicago: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 45–47.

50. The Marston Moor’s name was changed to the HMS York after the 

restoration of Charles II. See http://www.ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.

php?ref=6075 (accessed 23 March 2009).

51. Watts, 122–123; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 235–236.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid. Despite the Spanish complaints, when Myngs returned to England 

in 1665, he was knighted and promoted to Vice Admiral. Less than a year later, in 

June 1666, he was mortally wounded in battle against the Dutch. 

54. Earle, 95.

55. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 227–228.

56. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 228; Lewis, 125–126; Gosse, The History of 

Piracy, 156–157.
52

57. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 228–229; Lewis, 127–128; Gosse, The History of 

Piracy, 157. 

58. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 229; Lewis, 129–130; Gosse, The History of 

Piracy, 158–159.

59. Earle, 95–96.

60. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 229; Gosse, The History of Piracy, 159–160.

61. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 59–60; Lane, 69–70.

62. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 95; Watts, 247.

63. E.O. Hoppe, Pirates, Buccaneers, and Gentlemen Adventurers (South 

Brunswick, NJ: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1972), 97.

64. Albert Marrin, The Sea Rovers: Pirates, Privateers, and Buccaneers

(New York: Atheneum, 1984), 58.

65. Lewis, 131–132; Hoppe, 97; Marrin, 58.

66. Rankin, 16; Watts, 246; Earle, 146–147; Lewis, 116–118.

67. Earle, 96.

68. Earle, 146, 155, and 189.

69. Earle, 189; Colin Woodward, The Republic of Pirates: Being the True 

and Surprising Story of the Caribbean Pirates and the Man Who Brought Them 

Down (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2007), 34.

70. C.H. Haring, The Buccaneers of the West Indies in the XVII Century

(New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1910), 230.

71. Earle, 99–100; Gosse, The History of Piracy, 315–316.

72. Earle, 136–137.

73. Ibid., 99–100.

74. Also known as King William’s War (1689–1697) in the American 

colonies.

75. Also known as Queen Anne’s War (1702–1713) in the American 

colonies.

76. Woodward, 86.

77. Lewis, 115; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 144.

78. The Treaty of Ratisbon between France and Spain was signed in August 

1684. See Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 98; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 

144.

79. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 98–100.

80. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 176–177.

81. Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean, 88–89; Rogozinski, 

Pirates!, 239–240.

82. Rankin, 42.

83. Ibid., 54–58.

84. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 115–116; and Woodward, 12.

85. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 115–116; Woodward, 20–23; Gosse, The History 

of Piracy, 179.

86. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 115–116, Woodward, 24–26; Gosse, The History 

of Piracy, 179–180.

87. Rankin, 63.
53

88. Ibid., 56–57.

89. Ibid., 54.

90. Ibid., 54–57.

91. Ibid., 54–58.

92. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 180–181; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 179–181; 

Earle, 119–120.

93. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 180–183; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 179–181; 

Earle, 119–120.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 335–336; Earle, 193–194; Marrin, 118–127.

98. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 335.

99. David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of 

Life Among the Pirates (New York: Random House, 1995), 191.

100. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 164.

101. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 207.

102. Ibid., 208.

103. Ibid., 226.

104. Ibid., 236.

105. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 164.

106. Ibid., 335.

107. Ibid., 335.

108. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 253–255; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 335.

109. Rogozinski, Pirates!, 335.

110. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 194–201; Woodward, 282–298; 

Rogozinski, Pirates!, 335.

111. Woodward, 296–298.

112. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 208–209.

113. Angus Konstam, Blackbeard: America’s Most Notorious Pirate

(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006), 105.

114. Earle, 207.

115. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 209–216; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 292–

294.

116. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 217–218.

117. Ibid., 219–220; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 33 and 281.

118. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 220–221; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 32–

33.

119. Cordingly, Under the Black Flag, 221–222; Rogozinski, Pirates!, 205.

120. Wheeler, 82–85.

121. Ibid., 85.

122. Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates (Salem, MA: 

The Essex Institute, 1929), 1.

123. Francis B.C. Bradlee, Piracy in the West Indies and Its Suppression

(Salem, MA: The Essex Institute, 1923), 21–22.
54

124. Ibid., 22.

125. Allen, 2–3.

126. Ibid., 3.

127. Wheeler, 30–31.

128. Master commandant was an intermediate rank between lieutenant and 

captain. Master commandants typically commanded ships too small for a captain 

but larger than those commanded by lieutenants. The rank was later shortened to 

commander.

129. Wheeler, 42–43.

130. Ibid., 44–45.

131. Commodore was a courtesy title used by Navy captains when in command 

of multiple ships. Congress was unwilling to establish the rank of admiral in the 

United States Navy because of its aristocratic connotations. Consequently, captain 

was the senior rank in the United States Navy until 1862. 

132. Wheeler, 54–58; Allen, 6–8.

133. Allen, 8–9.

134. David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities 

of United States Naval Officers, 1798–1883 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval 

Institute Press, 1988), 51.

135. Ibid., 58.

136. Bradlee, 22.

137. Edgar S. Maclay, A History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1894,

vol. II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894), 106–108.

138. Long, 59–60.

139. Wheeler, 78–79.

140. Ibid., 96.

141. Ibid., 96–97.

142. Allen, 20.

143. Ibid., 22.

144. Bradlee, 13.

145. Maclay, 109–110.

146. Bradlee, 15–16.

147. Allen, 20–21.

148. Ibid., 22–23.

149. Wheeler, 99.

150. Ibid., 100.

151. Allen, 27.

152. Ibid., 32–33.

153. Ibid., 35–36.

154. Bradlee, 55.

155. Wheeler, 103.

156. Ibid., 104–105.

157. Ibid., 106.

158. Bradlee, 30–31; Wheeler, 107–108.

159. Wheeler, 110.
55

160. Ibid., 110–111. See also the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting 

Ships (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center), http://

www.history.navy.mil/danfs/index.html, for more details on individual ships.

161. Allen, 41–42.

162. Wheeler, 114–116; Maclay, 113.

163. Wheeler, 118.

164. Bradlee, Piracy in the West Indies and Its Suppression, 38.

165. Ibid., 41.

166. Wheeler, 125–126.

167. Ibid., 132.

168. William L. Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times 

to the Present, vol. III (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1898), 

234.

169. Wheeler, 117.

170. Clowes, 235.

171. Wheeler, 138–139.

172. Allen, 60.

173. Wheeler, 140. 

174. Ibid., 156.

175. Maclay, 122.

176. Wheeler, 168.

177. Ibid., 169; Allen, 84.

57

Chapter 3

Piracy in the Mediterranean

In 78 BC, pirates from the island of Pharmacusa encountered a 

merchant vessel off the coast of Caria (modern-day Turkey). The slowsailing ship was quickly overtaken by the pirate galley, which was 

propelled by oars manned by slaves. When the pirates boarded the ship, 

most of the passengers shrank back in terror. One passenger, a young 

Roman nobleman, ignored the pirates and continued reading a book. His 

indifferent attitude infuriated the pirates. Consequently, when they began 

setting the ransom prices for the passengers, the pirate leader doubled the 

price he thought reasonable, 10 talents to 20 talents, thinking he would 

put the arrogant young man in his place. Instead, the Roman nobleman 

haughtily responded, “If you knew your business, you’d realize I’m worth 

at least 50.”1

It was difficult for the young man’s friends to gather such a large sum, 

so the pirates played host to the young noble for 38 days.2 During that 

time, he interacted with the pirates in a friendly manner by competing with 

them in athletic exercises, reading his poetry, and practicing his oratory. 

The young man continually reminded his captors, however, that once he 

was freed, he planned on returning to Pharmacusa and getting revenge by 

capturing and executing the pirates. The pirates, who regarded the man as 

a blustering youngster, thought his threat of crucifixion quite humorous. 

When the ransom arrived, the young man was sent to Miletus in Asia 

Minor. Once there, he took command of four war galleys with 500 soldiers 

and returned to Pharmacusa. As he expected, the pirates were celebrating 

their good fortune when he arrived and were in no condition to resist the 

Roman troops. The nobleman recaptured his 50 talents as well as 350 

pirates. He then set out for Pergamum to get permission from the Praetor 

to execute the pirates. When the Praetor hesitated, the young man carried 

out the sentence on his own authority. But he granted 30 of the pirates a 

favor for their good treatment: he ordered their throats cut before they 

were crucified to spare them the pain of the punishment.

Who was the arrogant young Roman? Julius Caesar. Caesar had been 

banished from Rome by Sulla and was traveling to Rhodes to work on his 

oratory when he was captured by Cilician pirates. At the time of his capture, 

piracy was rampant throughout the Mediterranean. Despite Caesar’s harsh 

reprisal, piracy continued to plague the Romans and all others sailing the 

Mediterranean Sea for many years until Rome finally acted to stamp out 

piracy.3
58

Piracy in the Mediterranean has deep roots. Ancient writers note that 

both the Greeks and Romans suffered from piratical attacks. As with other 

geographical areas and periods, piracy was cyclical in the Mediterranean. 

When political turmoil embroiled the region, piracy flourished; when 

strong nations exerted control over the Mediterranean, piracy waned. 

Thus, the decline of Rome led to an upsurge in piracy. Later, the rise of 

the Ottoman Empire and expulsion of the Moors from Spain resulted in a 

new round of piracy perpetrated by Muslims operating from North Africa. 

Later still, piracy rebounded in the eastern Mediterranean when the Greeks 

rebelled against their Ottoman masters. 

Why did piracy thrive in the Mediterranean for thousands of years? Once 

again, specific conditions in the region facilitated piracy. The geography 

of the Mediterranean is favorable to piracy. Since the Mediterranean is 

an enclosed sea, merchant vessels normally sailed relatively close to 

the shore. For example, the Spanish coast from Gibraltar to Cartagena, 

some 300 miles long, lies within 120 miles of North Africa. Cartagena is 

located about 230 miles west-northwest of Algiers. Thus, Moroccan and 

Algerian pirates were well situated to attack merchant ships entering or 

leaving the Mediterranean. Similarly, the Mediterranean narrows to less 

than 100 miles between Tunisia and Sicily, making Tunis an ideal port for 

the corsairs preying on merchants trading with the eastern Mediterranean. 

Although it opens up east of Sicily, the Mediterranean quickly narrows to 

less than 250 miles between the Greek islands and Libya. And the many 

islands of the Greek archipelago dominate the approach to Constantinople, 

the capital of the Ottoman Empire. 

Geography also played a part in maritime navigation. Since the 

Mediterranean is a relatively enclosed area, there was little need for 

advanced navigational techniques. Instead, mariners sailed from bay to 

bay and island to island. Although that made navigation simpler, it also 

kept merchant vessels close to shore where they were vulnerable to pirate 

attack.4

Frequent political turmoil among the Mediterranean nations also aided 

the spread of piracy in the region. Since the ancient Greeks were fiercely 

independent, a strong central Greek government never emerged to control 

or limit piracy.5 As the power of the individual Greek city-states declined 

in the late Hellenic period (323–31 BC), piracy surged throughout the 

Mediterranean.6

Moreover, Greeks were both victims and perpetrators of the crime. 

Although early Greeks considered trade a less than honorable profession, 

no such stigma was attached to piracy. Raiding and piracy were considered 
59

manly enterprises.7 Consequently, piracy was a common activity among 

the ancient Greeks, and their victims were often Greeks from other citystates. Piracy remained a legitimate enterprise to many Greeks through the 

19th century, finding widespread enthusiasm in the midst of the turmoil 

caused by the Greek War for Independence.

Nor was Rome immune to piracy. As a land-based, agrarian nation, 

Rome had little interest in maritime trade. The ancient Romans ceded 

responsibility for maritime control to the Carthaginians and others. One 

of the negative outcomes of the Punic Wars (264–241 BC, 218–201 BC, 

and 149–146 BC) was that the defeat of Carthage put the responsibility 

for controlling pirates onto Rome.8 Since the Romans were uninterested in 

policing the Mediterranean, piracy surged after the defeat of Carthage. The 

situation worsened when Rome defeated Rhodes in 167–166 BC. Rhodes’ 

navy had suppressed piracy in the eastern Mediterranean.9 By 100 BC, 

piracy posed a serious threat to Rome, even threatening to cut off grain 

shipments into the city. 

By the time pirates captured Caesar, Rome was a trading nation, 

dependent upon seaborne trade for food and other products. But Rome was 

wracked by civil war, and the pirates grew so strong that they disrupted the 

flow of food into the city. Finally, in 74 BC, Proconsul Marcus Antonius 

was directed to subdue the corsairs. After Marcus Antonius failed to 

rectify the situation, Pompey was given broader powers, which he used 

to suppress the pirates. His commission granted him supreme command 

over the entire Mediterranean Sea as well as 50 miles inland. Deploying 

a fleet of 500 ships and an army of 12,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, 

Pompey swept the sea clear of pirates in less than 3 months.10 Despite his 

success, some of the frontier areas were never fully cleared, and Rome 

had to maintain a strong fleet in the Black Sea and other places.11 But as 

long as Rome controlled the coastline, thus eliminating safe havens, piracy 

was mostly eliminated. It reemerged, however, when the power of Rome 

began to crumble in the 5th century AD.12 Once again, the key conditions 

came into play as political turmoil and the availability of safe havens made 

piracy a viable alternative to fishing and maritime trade.

Among history’s most feared pirates were the Barbary corsairs. 

Based out of several small principalities along the North African coast, 

they preyed on shipping in the Mediterranean for more than 400 years, 

capturing ships, stealing cargos, and enslaving Christians. Most European 

nations turned to bribery, in the form of annual tribute, to limit the impact 

the Barbary pirates had on their commerce. From time to time, European 

naval powers did, however, use force to temporarily stop attacks on their 

merchant fleets. 
60

To the east, Venetian and Maltese corsairs operated with impunity 

in Greek waters. Since they considered any non-Catholic fair prey, 

they attacked Orthodox Greeks as frequently as Muslim Turks. But the 

Greeks were not merely innocent victims; they also participated in piracy. 

Since provincial governors in Greece were not paid a salary during the 

Byzantine Empire, they raised money by allowing brigands to operate 

from their shores. Similar activities continued under the Ottomans after 

they conquered Constantinople in 1453. 

Even though piracy was prevalent in the Greek islands, it rarely reached 

the level of notoriety achieved by the Barbary corsairs. One exception was 

the outbreak of piracy during the Greek War for Independence from the 

Ottoman Empire. During the 1820s, as the Greeks struggled to gain their 

independence, piracy in the Greek islands reached such a level that Great 

Britain, in conjunction with France and Russia, acted to end the rebellion 

and suppress the concurrent piracy by Greek rebels.

The Barbary and Greek pirates were so successful over such a long 

time that piracy became an accepted aspect of each society’s economic 

life. Piracy among the Barbary states continued long after it was no longer 

economically viable because it was intrinsic to life in the Barbary nations. 

Piracy among the Greeks was also integral to their society, although it 

never reached the heights achieved by the Barbary pirates. 

The three conditions that make piracy possible clearly influenced 

the growth and longevity of piracy among the Barbary states. They were 

favored by their geographic location since the relatively confined space of 

the Mediterranean made it easy for the corsairs to locate and attack their 

prey. Moreover, the Barbary pirates could always count on safe havens 

ashore. Since Barbary piracy was state-sponsored piracy, the political 

climate was always supportive. Plus there was strong support for the 

practice among the populace, who benefited economically from piracy. 

Finally, the lack of effort on the part of European naval powers to eliminate 

the Barbary corsairs’ home bases further reinforced the legitimacy of their 

actions. 

The Barbary rovers also highlight the conflicting definitions of piracy. 

Considering themselves soldiers of Islam rather than pirates, the Barbary 

corsairs were at war with every nation that did not pay tribute to their 

kingdom. Even though they signed treaties with nations, they regarded 

them as temporary truces that could be repudiated at their convenience. 

Conversely, European nations considered them pirates and treated them 

accordingly. Still, they did not treat the Barbary corsairs as universal 
61

enemies of society and execute them as they did the pirates of the West 

Indies. Instead, the Barbary pirates were often ransomed, exchanged for 

Europeans held by the corsairs, or employed as galley slaves.

In contrast to the state-sponsored nature of Barbary piracy, Greek piracy 

was a deep-rooted local practice. But it, too, depended on the three main 

conditions. The Greek isles were ideal for piracy. The Greek pirates could 

hide among the many islands and then suddenly attack merchant vessels 

trading with the Levant. Since piracy was intrinsic among the Greeks, a 

certain amount of piracy was always in the region. But political turmoil 

in the 1820s, caused by the Greek War for Independence, led to increased 

levels of piracy in the region. When the political situation stabilized, 

piracy quickly declined to levels acceptable to the region’s naval powers. 

Another aspect of the intrinsic nature of piracy in the Greek isles was that 

the pirates could always count on safe havens ashore. When the British 

and French Navies attempted to suppress them, the pirates often slipped 

ashore and blended in with the locals. Since many locals profited from the 

actions of the pirates, most Greeks were reluctant to hand over their fellow 

citizens. 

Barbary Pirates

Piracy perpetrated by the Barbary corsairs was, in many ways, vastly 

different from that practiced by their contemporaries in the West Indies, 

Greek isles, or other parts of the world. The most important and obvious 

difference was that it was state-sponsored piracy. In fact, piracy served as 

the economic foundation of the four Barbary states. Unlike other areas, the 

main target of the Barbary pirates was human plunder, not gold, jewels, 

and commercial products. Their victims were a valuable commodity that 

brought wealth through ransom or slavery. Finally, piracy practiced by the 

Barbary states differed from other regions in that it was tolerated, if not 

encouraged, by powerful nations, particularly Great Britain, for foreign 

policy reasons. Great Britain had the resources necessary to eliminate the 

Barbary pirates but chose not to do so because the actions of the Barbary 

pirates assisted Britain’s foreign trade policies. Thus, the Barbary pirates 

survived for hundreds of years, whereas large-scale piracy in other regions 

existed for relatively short periods of time.

There are, however, similarities as well, for the Barbary pirates 

benefited from the three necessary conditions. Geography clearly helped 

the Barbary pirates. Even though the Mediterranean is a large body of 

water, it is a relatively confined space that is further narrowed by several 

important chokepoints. All traffic en route to or from Atlantic ports must 
62

pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. Once inside the Mediterranean, eastwest trade routes necessarily pass close by the corsair cities situated on 

the northern coast of Africa. (See figure 5.) The Mediterranean narrows 

between Sardinia, Sicily, and Tunis and a second time between Crete and 

Tripolitania. Thus, their geographic location dominated trade routes in the 

Mediterranean, making it easier for the pirates to locate and attack their 

prey. 

Geography or, more specifically, the environment also encouraged the 

expansion of piracy among the Barbary states. Many centuries earlier, the 

irrigation systems developed by Carthage and Rome fell into disrepair, 

allowing the desert to encroach on the arable land. By the 18th century, 

other than a few small strips along the coast, most of the land making up 

the Barbary states was arid and unsuitable for agriculture.13 Consequently, 

since they were deficient in other natural resources as well and thus unable 

to produce the food and other necessary products, the inhabitants of North 

Africa sustained themselves for centuries by trading with the Europeans. 

They exchanged African slaves, horses, fish, hides, dates, and olive oil for 

European wood, metals, and cloth (silk, wool, and cotton).14

That commercial system collapsed in the early 16th century soon after 

the Spaniards drove the last of the Moors out of Spain in 1492. The Moors 

fled to North Africa, followed closely by the Spanish who eventually 

conquered all of North Africa. The Spanish imposed harsh peace terms on 

the Barbary states in 1510, including heavy trade duties. But peace did not 

0 100 200 300 miles

Tangier

Atlantic Ocean

Mediterranean Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Tyrrhenian

Sea

Ionian

Sea

Sp a in

Fra n ce

Co rs ica

Sard in ia

Sic ily

Crete

Balearic

Is lan d s

Malta

Gibraltar (U K)

Algiers

Tripoli

R om e

N aples Athens

Palm a C artagena

M adrid

D erna

Tunis

I s tanbul

Au stria

Ottom a n

Em p ire

Figure 5. Barbary coast and the Mediterranean.
63

last long, and by 1534, under the leadership of the Barbarossa brothers, 

North Africa was back in Ottoman hands. But the victory by the Turks 

put the Barbary states in a dilemma. They were too far from the Ottoman 

Empire to take advantage of its protection and now they were locked out 

of the European trading system as well.15 This forced the Barbary rulers to 

look to other ways to sustain themselves. If they could not trade for what 

they needed, they had to get it some other way.16

The Barbary pirates’ heyday occurred in the first half of the 17th 

century. The state built and manned corsair galleys, which operated much 

like European navies. During this timeframe, they were more than a 

match for their Christian opponents. From 1622 to 1642, Barbary corsairs 

captured 300 English ships and enslaved more than 7,000 English sailors.17

At the start of that period, the Barbary states commanded significant 

fleets. Six large galleys and 14 sailing ships operated from Tunis. Algiers 

possessed a similar number of large galleys as well as 100 sailing ships, 

many of which were commanded by European pirates. But the power of 

the Barbary pirates was broken, although not eliminated, by the Venetians 

in 1638. One hundred years later, Algiers could only muster eight small 

galleys and eight more sailing ships.18

Although they were nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, by the end 

of the 18th century, the leaders of the Barbary states were semi-independent 

rulers.19 Morocco was ruled by the Sultan Suleyman (Slimane). US 

relations with Morocco, which was the first nation to recognize the newly 

independent country, were fairly cordial.20 The ruler of Algiers, who was 

the commander of the Algerian janissaries, was elected by a council of 

senior military officers.21 The council elevated Dey Ali Hassan to the 

throne in 1791.22 Yusuf Karamanli, the Bashaw23 of Tripoli, took the throne 

during a bloody coup in 1795.24 The Bey of Tunis was a hereditary title 

held by Pasha Hamouda.25

To one degree or another, all of the Barbary rulers needed the 

proceeds generated by piracy to maintain their positions as ruler. They 

did not, however, think of themselves as pirates; instead, they considered 

themselves at war with any nation that did not have a peace treaty with 

them.26 Moreover, since they needed piracy to maintain power, piracy 

evolved into a state-sponsored system. Over time, piracy became the 

primary engine of the local economy. Captured cargos provided a source 

of cheap goods for local merchants. Crews and passengers were enslaved 

and forced to perform a wide variety of jobs, depending on their skills. 

The fate captives feared the most was becoming a galley slave, rowing the 

corsairs’ boats.27
64

As piracy became more entrenched in society, it evolved into a private 

enterprise. Syndicates of government officials, merchants, shipowners, 

sailors, and small trades people invested in the galleys.28 They profited 

from the goods stolen as well as the ransoms extorted from the captives 

and their families. Even after private syndicates took over from the state, 

the state continued to benefit from piracy. The Barbary rulers coerced 

tribute from smaller nations to prevent attacks on their country’s shipping 

and they received a share of all profits generated by the pirate syndicates. 

Thus, the political climate in the Barbary states was extremely favorable 

toward piracy. 

Finally, because of the state-sponsored nature of Barbary piracy, 

the corsairs benefited from secure sanctuaries ashore. Both state and 

commercial enterprises depended on the proceeds of piracy. There was no 

stigma attached to piracy; in fact, the opposite was true. Sailing with the 

galleys was viewed as an honorable activity. Moreover, since the corsairs 

preyed on infidels, the rovers were able to combine religious obligation 

with financial gain. 

Equally as important, the Barbary corsairs faced few external threats. 

Although the combined naval power of Europe could have eliminated 

the pirates with relative ease, Europeans never made a concerted effort 

to do so. While it is true that individual nations mounted attacks from 

time to time, those nations never tried to destroy the corsair ports and thus 

eliminate their shore sanctuaries. Consequently, as soon as the European 

force left, the inhabitants resumed piratical attacks.29

Still, some nations did make an impact on the Barbary corsairs. Algiers 

signed a treaty of peace and commerce with Great Britain in 1682.30 France 

and Spain negotiated a similar pact with Algiers. Fearing the consequences, 

the Barbary pirates tended to leave vessels from those nations alone. But 

the Barbary pirates felt free to attack the ships of smaller nations, such as 

the Dutch Republic, Austria, Denmark, and the Italian republics unless 

they paid tribute.31 Soon, much of the trade in the Mediterranean was 

carried on British and, to a lesser extent, French ships.

Thus, France and Britain came to view the Barbary corsairs as pseudoallies. France wanted “just enough corsairs to eliminate our rivals, but 

not too many.”32 French leaders realized that if the Barbary pirates were 

completely eliminated, France would descend to the same level as their 

weaker competitors. Similarly, British officials realized the strategic 

advantages the existence of the Barbary corsairs afforded them, especially 

with regard to their newly independent former colonies. Writing in 1784, 

Lord Sheffield suggested the following: 
65

It is not probable that the American States will have a 

very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be in the 

interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect 

them there from the Barbary States. . . . The Americans 

cannot protect themselves from the latter; they cannot 

pretend to a navy.”33

Thus, the Barbary pirates were sustained by the tacit support of the 

more powerful European nations. Piratical depredations by the Barbary 

states only ended when France, weary of Algerian transgressions, invaded 

North Africa in 1830 with overwhelming force and occupied the country. 

By 1847, France was in control of most of North Africa, and with minor 

exceptions, piracy emanating from the Barbary states ended.34

Lord Sheffield’s words were partly correct. Soon after independence, 

with the cloak of British protection withdrawn, the Barbary pirates began 

preying on American shipping. It was almost inevitable that American 

ships would fall to Barbary corsairs. According to Thomas Jefferson, prior 

to the American Revolution, American trade with Mediterranean nations 

was fairly extensive. He estimated that one-quarter of the dried and pickled 

fish as well as one-sixth of the wheat and flour produced in the colonies 

was exported to the Mediterranean in 80 to 100 ships annually.35 Once the 

Treaty of Paris was signed in 1783, American merchants sent ships to the 

Mediterranean, hoping to reestablish their trade contacts. By 1790, nearly 

100 American ships sailed to the Mediterranean annually.36

The first Barbary nation to act was Morocco. Frustrated by the lack of 

progress during treaty negotiations with the United States, the Sultan of 

Morocco ordered his corsairs to attack. On 11 October 1784, they captured 

the armed brig Betsey. Although the Sultan did not enslave the captives, he 

demanded a ransom and a treaty of friendship with the United States. As 

a show of faith, he released the captives, ship, and cargo without payment 

of a ransom on 9 July 1785. The next summer, an American commissioner 

arrived and, within days, negotiated a treaty that ensured that American 

vessels could pass safely through the Strait of Gibraltar. To Congress’ 

pleasure, the treaty cost less than the $20,000 the commissioner was 

authorized to spend.37

The next encounter with Barbary pirates did not go as well. In the 

summer of 1785, surprisingly, Algiers was at peace with both Spain and 

Portugal. With the active encouragement of the British consul in Algiers, 

the Algerians sailed out into the Atlantic Ocean and began taking American 

ships.38 On 25 July 1785, Algerian corsairs captured the schooner Maria. 

Then, on 1 August 1785, they captured another American vessel, the 
66

Dauphin. Unlike the Moroccans, the Algerians enslaved the 21 Americans 

captured during the two attacks. The Dey of Algiers demanded $1 million 

for a treaty of friendship. With no power to tax under the Articles of 

Confederation, the United States did not have the financial resources to 

either buy peace with Algiers or build a navy to enforce it.39Although 

renewed hostilities with Portugal soon ended the Algerian forays into the 

Atlantic, 21 Americans were left to languish as Algerian slaves.40

Over the next several years, the United States attempted to ransom 

the sailors and negotiate peace treaties with Algiers and Tripoli. Both 

attempts failed because the central government lacked, under the Articles 

of Confederation, the financial resources needed to ransom the captives 

or buy peace with the Barbary states. Despite the lack of governmental 

support, American vessels continued to sail the Mediterranean in relative 

safety by joining Spanish and Dutch convoys.41

Finally, in 1791, 2 years after the establishment of the Federal 

Government, Congress acted. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the 

Constitution gave Congress the power it needed to deal with the Barbary 

pirates, such as full control over the Nation’s commerce, the right to raise 

revenue through taxation, the authority to build a navy, and the power 

to wage war with the Barbary corsairs, if necessary.42 In 1791, a Senate 

committee declared that the Nation needed a navy to protect its commercial 

fleet in the Mediterranean. The next year, Congress appointed a peace 

commission to negotiate a treaty with Algiers and the other Barbary 

states. Congress authorized the payment of as much as $100,000 for a 

peace treaty, $13,500 in annual tribute, and up to $27,000 to ransom the 

American captives.43

Unfortunately, in 1793, before the American peace commissioner 

arrived,44 Britain brokered a truce between Portugal and Algiers that 

allowed Algerian corsairs access to the Atlantic once again. With British 

and American relations strained because of a recent British order-incouncil that led to the seizure of more than 250 American vessels in the 

Caribbean, many Americans believed that the British purposely arranged 

the truce to set loose the Barbary rovers on American ships. Whatever the 

reason, the impact on American commerce was immediate. By the end 

of November 1793, less than 2 months after the truce was reached, the 

Algerians captured 11 American ships and 105 sailors. The United States 

was powerless to stop the havoc of the Barbary corsairs.45

The crisis spurred Congress to action in early 1794. American 

diplomats worked to reestablish peace, or at least peaceful relations, with 

Britain and the Barbary states. John Jay negotiated a settlement with Great 
67

Britain that averted war. Congress authorized $1 million for a peace treaty 

and the release of American captives held in Algiers. The American peace 

commissioner, David Humphreys, was able to reduce the Dey’s demands 

from $2 million down to about $600,000, plus an annual tribute of $21,000-

worth of naval stores and a new 36-gun frigate, the Crescent, which was 

delivered in February 1798. In 1797, the cost of the treaty was estimated to 

be $1 million.46 Much less was spent to gain peace with Tripoli ($56,000) 

in November 1796 and Tunis ($107,000) in August 1797.47

Meanwhile, in March 1794, Congress authorized the construction of 

the six frigates that became the backbone of the United States Navy in the 

wars against France, the Barbary pirates, and England over the next 21 

years. The debate over the Navy was long and heated. In the end, opponents 

of the Navy inserted a provision in the bill that mandated that construction 

of the frigates cease if American negotiators reached a settlement with 

Algiers.48 When the treaty with Algiers went into effect in March 1796, 

work on the frigates came to a halt, but Congress, at President George 

Washington’s urging, authorized construction to resume on three of the 

six warships.49

With the treaties in place, business with Mediterranean nations grew 

rapidly. In 1799, trade with Spain and Italy amounted to $8.8 million in 

goods. The next year, trade with those nations almost reached $12 million.50

But the expansion of American commerce led to increased demands for 

tribute by the Barbary states, particularly Tripoli. 

The Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, seized the throne during a 

bloody coup in 1795. With Tripoli in shambles, he believed that the only 

way he could restore his country economically was by taking prizes and 

extorting tribute. Thus, he began “revising” his treaties with every nation 

trading in the Mediterranean. Spain, Venice, and France paid the Pasha 

off with money, ships, and other “presents.” Sweden, Denmark, the Dutch 

Republic, and Naples resisted and suffered numerous attacks on their 

shipping. Sweden and Denmark soon reconsidered their policy and began 

paying tribute to Tripoli as well.51

In April 1800, the Pasha of Tripoli, jealous of Algiers, demanded that 

the United States build him a frigate as well. In September, one of his 

ships captured two American merchant vessels, the Betsy and Sophia. 

Although he released the Sophia because it was carrying tribute to the 

Dey of Algiers, the Betsy was converted into a pirate ship and her crew 

was enslaved. The Pasha repudiated the existing treaty with the United 

States in February 1801 and demanded $250,000 and $20,000 annually for 

a new treaty. Finally, in May 1801, the Pasha declared war on the United 

States.52
68

Anticipating just such a move, President Thomas Jefferson dispatched 

a squadron to the Mediterranean in late spring 1801. Commodore Richard 

Dale’s force included the frigates President (44 guns), Philadelphia (36 

guns), and Essex (32 guns), as well as the schooner Enterprise (12 guns).53

All were veterans of the recently concluded Quasi War with France. 

Unfortunately, since Congress had not declared war, Dale’s squadron was 

not authorized to take action against the corsairs unless they attacked an 

American ship. Moreover, Dale was not allowed to seize enemy ships and 

retain them as prizes.54 Thus, he was limited to passive operations such 

as convoys and blockading Tripoli. With only four ships in his squadron, 

executing both of those tasks simultaneously was problematic.

Over the next 8 months, Dale’s squadron carried out its mission as best 

it could. Soon after he arrived in July 1801, Dale visited Tunis and Algiers. 

When he arrived at Tripoli on 24 July, he found the Pasha in no mood 

to negotiate, so Dale established a blockade of the city. One week later, 

while en route to Malta to pick up fresh water for the squadron, Enterprise

encountered and defeated the enemy ship Tripoli (14 guns). Since he 

could not take Tripoli as a prize, the American commander, Lieutenant 

Andrew Sterett, stripped it of all valuable goods and released the corsair 

vessel.55 Even though the blockade caused some hardship in Tripoli, it 

was not totally effective because ships were frequently siphoned off to 

escort convoys or to pick up additional supplies. Three rovers slipped 

out of Tripoli and captured the American merchant ship Franklin. Others 

smuggled needed food and other supplies into the city. Finally, in February 

1802, with his crew’s 1-year enlistments almost up, Dale returned to the 

United States, leaving Philadelphia and Essex to continue patrolling off 

Tripoli and Gibraltar.56

In May 1802, another American squadron set out for the Mediterranean. 

Commanded by Commodore Richard Morris, it included the frigates 

Chesapeake (36 guns), Constellation (36 guns), New York (36 guns), 

Adams (28 guns), and John Adams (28 guns).57 Before his departure, 

Congress authorized President Jefferson to use the Navy to protect 

American interests in the Mediterranean, thus removing the Constitutional 

restraints that shackled the previous squadron. Morris was free to conduct 

offensive operations against Tripoli and seize its ships as prizes.58

Despite his orders and new authority, Morris executed his mission 

with little energy. Taking his wife and son, Morris made calls at numerous 

French, Italian, and Spanish ports. It took him more than a year to reach 

Tripoli. Meanwhile, the other ships in the squadron had some success. The 

John Adams captured the Tripolitan warship Meshuda (the ex-American 
69

merchant ship Polly) in May 1803. During that same month, Lieutenant 

David Porter, who later commanded the American antipiracy squadron in 

the West Indies, led a group of boats close to the coast to destroy a grain 

convoy.59 But Morris’ lack of initiative frustrated Jefferson and Congress, 

so he was relieved by Commodore Edward Preble, a man of much greater 

activity.60

Preble arrived off Tripoli in September 1803. Sizing up the situation, 

he immediately ordered a more vigorous blockade of the city. Fortunately, 

Preble had the ships to conduct a more effective blockade. His squadron 

included the frigates Constitution (44 guns) and Philadelphia (36 guns); 

the 16-gun brigs Argus and Siren; and the 12-gun schooners Vixen, 

Nautilus, and Enterprise. As the United States relearned during other 

antipiracy operations, smaller vessels were critically important because 

of their ability to operate closer to shore. Moreover, Preble ordered two of 

his ships to continuously patrol the coast of Tripoli, and he established a 

naval depot on Malta so that transit times for ships requiring replenishment 

would be less.61

Soon after he arrived in the Mediterranean, Preble showed his mettle 

by confronting the Sultan of Morocco, who was threatening war against 

the United States. Preble sailed into Tangier in early October 1803 with 

five ships and confronted the Sultan. Instead of war, the Sultan renewed 

his pledge of friendship without the payment of tribute.62

But disaster struck no longer afterward when the Philadelphia ran 

aground on 1 November while chasing smugglers along the coast of 

Tripoli. Unable to free himself, Captain William Bainbridge surrendered 

his ship. Not only did Tripoli now have 307 more American captives, it had 

a powerful new addition to its fleet, for soon after the Tripolitans captured 

the Philadelphia, a storm blew it off the rocks. The Tripolitans fixed the 

damage to the ship, refloated it, and retrieved the guns that the American 

crew dumped overboard.63

Undeterred, Preble spent the winter blockading Tripoli and planning 

a response. On 7 February 1804, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur entered 

Tripoli harbor in the captured ketch Intrepid, boarded the Philadelphia

under the noses of the Barbary corsairs, and blew the ship up. Although it 

was a daring feat that brought great fame to Decatur and the Navy, it did 

little to end the war with Tripoli. In fact, the Pasha, angered by the loss of 

his prize and fearful of further attacks, increased the amount of money he 

required for peace with the United States and put the Philadelphia’s crew 

under stronger guard. But the destruction of the Philadelphia did restore 

the US strategic advantage since the Constitution did not have to remain 
70

on station off Tripoli to counter the threat that the larger vessel presented 

to the smaller American brigs and schooners.64

Preble had, for some time, suggested to the Navy Department that a 

larger force with smaller vessels was needed to defeat Tripoli. During the 

summer of 1804, just such a squadron was formed: 6 frigates, 6 brigs and 

schooners, 2 mortar boats, and 10 gunboats. Unfortunately, despite his 

successes, Preble was not placed in command of this expanded flotilla 

because of his lack of seniority. Instead, Commodore Samuel Barron was 

picked to command the task force.65

Determined to end the war with Tripoli before Barron arrived, Preble 

decided to attack. Since he did not have enough shallow-draft vessels, 

he convinced the King of Naples, who was also at war with the Barbary 

pirates, to loan him six gunboats and two mortar ships. The gunboats were 

armed with a single 24-pounder, and the two bomb ketches carried a 13-

inch mortar.66

Preble attacked on 3 August 1804. He sent Decatur into Tripoli’s 

harbor with six of the gunboats and the two mortar ketches. Unfavorable 

winds kept three of the gunboats from entering the harbor but Decatur 

was undeterred. With two other gunboats and the bomb ketches, Decatur 

wreaked havoc on the city. He was soon joined by the Constitution, which 

blasted away at the shore batteries, the town, and, most insultingly, the 

Pasha’s castle. The Americans captured three Tripolitan gunboats, sunk one 

other, and damaged the rest. They also killed 52 Tripolitans and captured 

56 others. Stephen Decatur’s brother James was the only American killed 

although 13 others were wounded.67

Preble followed up his success with several more attacks, but the 

Pasha remained obdurate. In an effort to finish the fight, Preble converted 

the Intrepid into a bomb ship and sent her into Tripoli harbor during the 

evening of 4 September. Volunteers planned to sail the ship up to the castle 

and, in the midst of the Tripolitan fleet, detonate the explosive-filled vessel. 

Unfortunately, the ship exploded prematurely, killing the entire crew of 

volunteers. With the weather turning against him and his supplies running 

low, Preble returned to Malta with the main body to await the arrival of his 

replacement. In the meantime, the blockade continued.68

While Preble worked to defeat Tripoli using naval power, others 

developed plans to end the war through land operations. When 

Commodore Barron arrived in September 1804, he brought with 

him William Eaton, a former Army officer and counsel in Tunis. 

Earlier, Eaton convinced President Jefferson to provide assistance to 
71

Hamet Karamanli, Pasha Yusuf’s older brother. Pasha Yusuf took the 

throne in 1795 by killing his older brother. Although Hamet, by right 

of primogeniture, should have succeeded his deceased brother, Yusuf 

usurped the crown. Hamet was willing to sign a treaty of perpetual peace 

if the United States provided him $40,000 and enough military support to 

overthrow his brother.69

Eaton reached Cairo in November 1804. While he began negotiations 

with Hamet, others began recruiting a motley army. By the time Hamet 

signed the treaty with Eaton, he had an army of 400 Greeks, Levantines, 

and Arabs. The force also included a midshipman and a Marine lieutenant, 

sergeant, and six enlisted men. Eaton and Hamet set out for Derna on 6 

March 1805. Along the way, 650 Arabs also joined the force. The 500-

mile march took 6 weeks. After many trials and tribulations, they arrived 

outside Derna on 27 April. Derna’s defenders felt themselves safe, but 

they did not count on a combined operation. On 28 April, the Argus, 

Hornet, and Nautilus entered the harbor and devastated the town. At the 

same time, Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon led an attack by his marines on 

one side while Hamet attacked from another. The defenders were quickly 

overwhelmed and surrendered. While Eaton was planning the next march 

on to Tripoli, he learned that the Pasha had finally given in. In exchange 

for $60,000, he surrendered the crew of the Philadelphia and all other 

American captives and agreed to stop attacking American ships.70 Thus 

ended the first Barbary War.

With a small naval squadron on station, a tenuous peace held for the 

next few years, but the situation changed in 1807. Conflict between the 

United States and Great Britain over impressments and neutral rights led 

to an unprovoked attack on the Chesapeake by the HMS Leopard on 22 

June 1807. The United States responded to that incident by withdrawing 

the Mediterranean squadron. From the summer of 1807 until peace with 

Britain was restored by the Treaty of Ghent, American merchant vessels 

sailed the Mediterranean at their own risk.71

Not surprisingly, without a naval squadron to keep them in check, the 

Barbary states resumed attacking American vessels and making demands 

for more tribute. Algiers captured three American ships in late 1807. The 

crew of one of the three ships, the Mary Ann, rallied and took the ship back 

from the Algerian prize crew. That, too, became a cause for complaint, for 

the Americans threw the Algerians overboard, which prompted the Dey to 

demand $16,000 in restitution.72 As American trade ground to a halt under 

the Embargo Act of 1807, so too did Barbary attacks on American ships, 

for Americans rarely ventured into the Mediterranean after 1807.
72

The end of the war with England provided the United States with 

an opportunity to redress the situation with the Barbary states once and 

for all. The United States declared war on Algiers on 3 March 1815. 

Within a few weeks, two powerful American squadrons were en route to 

the Mediterranean. Commodore Decatur’s squadron left first. His force 

included the frigates Guerrière (44 guns), Macedonian (38 guns), and 

Constellation; the sloops Epervier (18 guns ) and Ontario (16 guns); three 

14-gun brigs—Firefly, Spark, and Flambeau; and the 12-gun schooners 

Torch and Spitfire. Commodore Bainbridge followed with the new shipof-the-line Independence (74 guns); the frigates United States, Congress, 

and Java (44 guns); and eight smaller vessels.73

Decatur arrived in the Mediterranean on 15 June 1815. Two days 

later, his squadron encountered the Algerian flagship, the Mashouda (46 

guns). It did not take long for the Constellation, Guerrière, and Epervier

to reduce the Mashouda to a hulk. Decatur’s forces captured another 

Algerian vessel, the Estedio (22 guns) on 19 June. Within days of entering 

the Mediterranean, Decatur seized more than 500 prisoners and two 

prizes. He now felt he could negotiate with the Algerians from a position 

of strength.74

The American flotilla arrived off Algiers on 28 June 1815. Decatur sent 

the Dey a letter from the President explaining that the two nations were at 

war but that the United States was willing to reestablish peaceful relations 

if the terms were beneficial to both nations. Decatur also informed the 

Algerians that he would not accept any treaty that required tribute and that 

if he encountered any Algerian vessels, since they were at war, he would 

destroy them. When the Algerians tried to negotiate a cease-fire, Decatur 

refused. The Algerians caved in and agreed to release the 10 Americans 

held captive, paid $10,000 in compensation to the owners of the brig Edwin, 

and promised never to enslave American citizens. The overwhelming 

power Decatur brought with him resulted in equally as satisfactory treaties 

with Tunis, which paid $46,000 in compensation for 2 American prizes the 

Bey handed over to the British during the War of 1812, and Tripoli, which 

paid a $25,000 fine and released 10 Christian slaves. When Commodore 

Bainbridge arrived, his presence further reinforced the determination of 

the United States to deal forcefully with the Barbary corsairs. With that, 

the American role in the Barbary wars came to an end.75

But the end of the war with America did not mean that the Barbary states 

stopped their piratical attacks. Decatur’s success motivated other nations 

to renegotiate their treaties with the Barbary states. The United Kingdom 

was the first to act. The end of the Napoleonic Wars eroded the strategic 
73

value of Barbary states as a threat to other nations’ merchant shipping. 

Moreover, one of the primary discussions during the Congress of Vienna 

in 1814 dealt with ending slavery. Although the focus of the conversation 

was African slavery, it also renewed interest in ending the enslavement 

of Europeans by North Africans.76 So the United Kingdom dispatched 

Admiral Edward Pellow, Lord Exmouth, to rectify the situation.

Lord Exmouth’s task was to negotiate the release of all European 

slaves from the Barbary states. He was not authorized to use force; all he 

could do was pay ransoms for the captives. When he arrived off Algiers on 

24 March 1816 with five ships-of-the-line and seven smaller vessels, the 

sight intimidated the Dey into negotiating a settlement. He agreed to peace 

with all European nations and accepted payments for all of his prisoners. 

Lord Exmouth did not, however, demand that Algiers cease piracy, thus 

the Dey no doubt believed himself able to resume the practice some time 

in the future. The British found Tunis much less amenable. After reaching 

the brink of battle, the Bey agreed to ransom 524 slaves, release 257 others 

without payment, and treat all future captives as prisoners of war rather 

than slaves. The Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, was more agreeable. 

He accepted payment for 468 slaves and further agreed to abolish slavery. 

When Lord Exmouth returned to Algiers and tried to extract a similar 

promise from the Dey, he was rebuffed. With tensions high and no authority 

to use force, Lord Exmouth returned to England on 24 June 1816.77

Soon after Lord Exmouth returned, public outrage at the murder of 

200 Italian fishermen and the perceived leniency of the terms obtained led 

to new orders for Lord Exmouth, directing him to use force, if necessary, 

to extract better terms from the Algerians. Lord Exmouth sailed for 

Algiers on 28 July 1816. His squadron included two triple-deck ships-ofthe-line, Queen Charlotte (100 guns) and Impregnable (98 guns); three 

74-gun ships-of-the line, Albion, Minden, and Superb; the frigate Leander

(58 guns); two 40-gun frigates (Glasgow and Severn); two 36-gun frigates 

(Hebrus and Granicus); five sloops; and four bomb ships. When he arrived 

at Gibraltar on 9 August, he found a Dutch squadron, consisting of four 40-

gun frigates, one 30-gun frigate, and an 18-gun sloop, in port. The Dutch 

commander volunteered to participate in the British campaign, further 

augmenting the attack force.78

The allied squadron arrived on 27 August. Lord Exmouth gave the 

Dey an opportunity to capitulate, but when the Algerians failed to respond 

to the allied demands, the combined squadron attacked. The bombardment 

lasted 8 hours, from 1400 to 2200. By 1900, many of the Algerian guns 

were silenced, the town was on fire, the arsenal and many storehouses 
74

were destroyed, and most of the Algerian’s warships were sunk. With their 

ammunition almost gone, the allies left the harbor about 2200.79

The next morning, as the allies prepared to resume the attack, the 

Dey gave in and agreed to the British terms. The Algerian leader released 

1,642 slaves, including 18 British citizens; agreed to abolish slavery; 

returned $382,500 in ransom money to Naples and Sardinia; apologized 

to the British consul for his mistreatment over the previous few days; and 

accepted peace terms with the Netherlands.80 The cost of success was 

heavy: the British suffered 128 killed and 690 wounded, while the Dutch 

lost 13 killed and 52 wounded. The British fired almost 40,000 rounds, and 

the Dutch fired over 10,000 rounds, resulting in more than 4,000 casualties 

on the Algerian side.81

Despite that drubbing, piracy among the Barbary states did not end 

until the 1830s when France invaded North Africa. There were isolated 

incidents in 1817 and some of the smaller European nations, such as 

Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Naples, continued to pay tribute to the 

Barbary states as late as 1827. But the situation changed in 1827 when 

a dispute between the French consul and the Dey of Algiers provoked 

France. At first, France limited its response to a blockade, but when the 

Dey expelled the French consul in August 1829 and fired on his ship as 

he left under a flag of truce, France responded by invading Algeria. A 

French fleet carrying 37,000 troops arrived at Algiers on 13 June 1830. 

Within weeks, the powerful French ground force defeated the Algerians 

and invested the city. Algiers fell on 4 July. Finally, Barbary piracy was 

eliminated.82

The actions against the Barbary pirates demonstrate that piracy is 

ultimately a land problem. Despite strong naval actions by the United 

States and Great Britain, piracy emanating from the Barbary states did 

not end until the corsairs were conquered by the French Army. In the case 

of the Barbary kingdoms, the three pillars of piracy, geography, political 

instability, and safe havens, were not easily disrupted by naval operations 

alone. The geography, of course, remained the same, and naval power was 

unable to change the political situation in the three principalities. But the 

Barbary corsairs did respond to land operations. Thus, Eaton’s invasion of 

Tripoli caused the Pasha to finally agree to terms. Although the American 

and British Navies eventually forced the Barbary rulers to accept treaties 

ending piracy, they did not stop preying on other nation’s shipping until 

France eliminated their safe havens ashore by permanently occupying 

them.
75

Greek Piracy

The Greek Revolution began on 25 March 1821. Once it started, nearly 

all of Greece rose up against its Ottoman rulers. Within days, the entire 

Morea83 was in rebellion, and within 6 weeks, the rebels killed virtually 

all of the 25,000 Turks living in the region.84 By the end of the year, most 

of the Morea was free of Turks and the uprising spread onto mainland 

Greece. 

Many of the early leaders of the rebellion were bandits. Brigands, 

or klefts, were an offshoot of an irregular militia (armatoli) that served 

the Ottoman rulers for many years. When the Sultan withdrew his 

patronage in the late 18th century, they became opponents of the Ottoman 

Empire. Forsaken by the Sultan, the militias turned to thievery to support 

themselves.85 They lived in bandit villages, called kleftochoria, high in the 

mountains where the Turks rarely ventured. Since almost four-fifths of 

Greece was mountainous, the bandits suffered little outside interference.86

Thus, topography made brigandage a viable and common occupation 

throughout the country.

Despite their unlawful activities, most Greeks held the klefts in high 

esteem. Their opposition to the Turks caused many people to consider 

the brigands heroes rather than villains. They were protectors of the 

people and defenders of the Orthodox Christian faith against its heathen 

oppressors.87 Consequently, when the klefts rebelled, most Greek peasants 

followed their lead. Virtually overnight, the entire nation went sto klari

(became brigands).88 Bandit tactics and behaviors influenced and shaped 

the conduct of warfare on land.

Similarly, the Greek effort at sea soon lapsed into piratical practices 

as well. As with banditry ashore, piracy was considered an honorable 

profession by the Greeks. Many of the commanders in the new Greek 

Navy were former pirates.89 Moreover, since the Greek Government was 

chronically short of cash, it was unable to pay its sailors or adequately 

supply its ships. Always in need of money, food, and supplies, the navy 

viewed prospective missions as commercial ventures and expected to 

profit from them. Without plunder, the navy could not exist, and without 

an opportunity for plunder, it would not fight.90

Although piracy was a nuisance from the beginning of the war, 

European naval forces kept it in check for awhile. But Austrian support 

for the Ottomans soon led to retaliation by the Greeks against Austrian 
76

shipping. By 1824, the lack of monetary support from the rebel 

government, the relatively easy profits that could be attained through 

piracy, and despair as the Egyptian fleet turned the tide against the 

Greeks at sea pulled many more Greek sailors into piracy. Even more 

concerning, most of the Greek pirates were not particularly discerning 

about who they attacked. A contemporary historian recounted that “it was 

a common saying among them that they were at war with Turkey, Egypt, 

Barbary, Austria, and France.”91 But piracy builds its own momentum, 

and by 1825, Greek pirates began to prey on British, American, and other 

nations’ shipping as well.

As with brigandage on land, Greece’s geography played an important 

role in the success of piracy in the eastern Mediterranean. (See figure 6.) 

Its many islands were perfect bases for pirates, who could hide along the 

coast and then quickly swoop down on their unsuspecting victims as they 

passed within range. Psara, for example, was ideally situated to disrupt both 

Turkish commerce and naval operations. Located in the central Aegean, 

Psara is only about 80 miles from Smyrna (present-day Izmir, Turkey), 

which was an important Turkish commercial port, and all ships en route to 

the Dardanelles had to pass within 50 miles of the island. Similarly, sailors 

from Skiathos, Skyros (Skiros)*, and Skopelos92 attacked ships trading 

with the Ottomans with impunity and defied the Greek Government to 

stop them. Although many sailors from Spetsai served the revolution with 

distinction, Spetsai was also a notorious pirate haven.93

Greek pirates used fast, three-masted vessels called mistikos. Each 

mistikos carried about 40 men and one bow-mounted gun. Their mistikos’

shallow draft allowed the pirates to avoid detection by hiding in small 

creeks and coves along the coast. If pursued too closely, the Greek corsairs 

abandoned their small vessels and escaped ashore, blending into the local 

populace.94

Once they were ashore, Greek pirates benefited from widespread 

support and assistance. Greek support for piracy at sea paralleled 

acceptance of banditry on land. Greek citizens participated in piracy 

by providing safe havens for the corsairs, disposing of their plundered 

goods, repairing or replacing their damaged vessels, and giving the 

pirates access to supplies and naval stores. Their active support of the 

brigands made suppressing Greek piracy a difficult task.95

Thus, the three pillars of piracy came into play during this episode of 

piracy in the eastern Mediterranean. The geography of the Greek islands 

*Names in parenthesis are present-day names of islands.
77

greatly facilitated piracy. Since the islands sat astride the shipping lanes to 

Istanbul, Smyrna, Egypt, and cities in the Levant, they were outstanding 

bases for Greek corsairs. The islands provided the pirates with easy 

access to lucrative targets and readily available places to hide. The Greek 

Revolution also triggered considerable political turmoil, which the pirates 

used to their advantage. The Ottoman Empire no longer policed Greek 

waters, and the revolutionary government of Greece was too weak to exert 

any meaningful control. Thus, Greek pirates were able to act with impunity 

throughout much of the war. Finally, Greek corsairs benefited greatly from 

safe havens ashore. The Greek tradition of brigandage, whether on water 

or ashore, legitimized their actions. Moreover, with the Greek economy in 

shambles, piracy was one of the most rewarding enterprises available to 

Greek sailors and merchants. Few Greeks, therefore, willingly turned in 

their compatriots who engaged in piracy. 

Despite the horrific atrocities the Greeks and Turks perpetrated on one 

another during the war, Greek pirates rarely treated their captives harshly. 

Since merchant crews seldom resisted, the Greeks usually confined their 

0 50 100 miles

Sea of Crete

Grabus a

I s tanbul

R hodes

C re te

C erig o

Skyros

Andros

Tinos

N axos

Syra

C hios

Sam os

Aegean Sea

Ionian Sea

Psara

M ilo

H ydra Spetsai

Athens

Sm y rna

Navarino

Bay

N eg roponte

Kasos

M ykonos

Jura

Skiathos

Skopelos

Ottom an

Em pire

Ottom an

Em pire

Figure 6. Greece.
78

actions to beatings. This is in stark contrast with the behavior of the 

Caribbean pirates of the 19th century, who often killed or tortured their 

victims.96

Much like the Greek Army, the Greek Navy was an ad hoc organization. 

Individual islands contributed forces to an operation as they saw fit. Each 

island selected its own captains and admirals, and they retained control of 

their own ships. Although there was a nominal head of the combined naval 

force, as a practical matter, each islands’ commanders could, and often 

did, act independently.97

Notwithstanding those organizational challenges, the Greeks had 

many advantages at sea when compared to the Ottomans. Some of the 

Greek islands, such as Spetsai, Psara, and Hydra (Ýdra), were maritime 

powers in their own right. Although the Greeks did not have a navy when 

the war began, the rebels controlled about 300 armed merchant vessels 

employing some 12,000 Greek sailors. More than half of those ships and 

crews came from Spetsai, Psara, and Hydra.98 Moreover, because of the 

threat posed by piracy in the Mediterranean, those ships were well armed 

and their crews were well trained. Conversely, the loss of the Greek islands 

severely crippled the Ottoman Navy. The Ottoman Empire was a landoriented empire. It relied on its subjugated peoples, primarily the Greeks, 

to man and operate its navy. Loss of the Greek islands severely hampered 

the Ottoman Navy’s ability to man its ships during the war. Thus, when the 

Turkish fleet put to sea in 1821, it was manned by an inexperienced and 

diverse mix of sailors drawn from all parts of the Ottoman Empire.99

During the first few years of the rebellion, the Greeks reigned supreme 

at sea. Ottoman admirals were reluctant to confront the Greeks and often 

remained in port. With little to fear from the Turkish Navy, the Greeks 

turned their attention to commerce raiding. They attacked coastal vessels 

operating between the Dardanelles Straits and Egypt. Although their 

primary targets were Turkish merchant ships, they also took ships of 

other nations, especially Austria. They generally left British, American, 

and French ships alone, but even those nations suffered attacks by Greek 

pirates from time to time.100 Since the United States and most European 

nations supported the revolution, they were willing to tolerate a limited 

amount of piracy.101 By the end of 1822, piracy and privateering were so 

lucrative that many of the best Greek ships preferred to act as commerce 

raiders rather than join the fledgling nation’s navy.102

The situation on both land and at sea changed markedly in 1824 when 

Sultan Mahmud decided to call on his vassal, Mohammed Ali, Pasha of 
79

Egypt, for help. The Sultan realized that he needed command of the sea 

to defeat the Greeks. Since the Ottoman Navy was not up to the task, he 

decided to use Mohammed Ali’s French-built and French-trained fleet to 

do so.103

The Egyptians began their campaign in June 1824. On 19 June, 200 

Egyptian warships and transports set sail carrying 18,000 troops.104 That 

same day, an independent Egyptian squadron landed 3,000 troops on 

Kasos, from which Greek ships had preyed on Egyptian merchant vessels 

for more than 3 years. The island was poorly defended so the Egyptians 

quickly overran it, killing 500 seaman and taking 2,000 women and 

children into slavery. The Egyptians moved against Psara next. Although 

they put up a better fight, the residents of Psara were no match for the 

Egyptians either, and some 8,000 people were killed or carried off into 

slavery.105 A series of inconclusive naval battles in the late summer and 

fall of 1824 kept the Egyptians from invading Crete, but on 24 February 

1825, the Egyptians landed on the southern tip of the Morea.106 With that, 

the tide of the war turned against the Greeks.

Although the Greeks continued to struggle, the course of events in 

1825 and 1826 gave them little hope for success.107 Anarchy prevailed 

throughout the country and the surrounding waters. In September 1826, 

six Greek Navy ships mutinied and turned to piracy, claiming they were 

driven to do so because of the lack of support by the rebel government.108

Greek turmoil and Ottoman ineffectiveness at sea led to an “administrative 

no-mans’ land in the eastern Mediterranean.”109 There are estimates that 

more than one-quarter of the Greek population was involved in piracy by 

this time.110

The large number of Greek vessels involved in piracy and the broad 

geographic area over which they ranged threatened to bring trade in the 

eastern Mediterranean to a halt. Although their actions were contrary to 

the established rules of international law, the Greeks considered any ship 

trading with the Ottoman Empire, regardless of the cargo it carried, as 

fair game. More and more British vessels fell victim to the Greek pirates. 

The most notorious corsair base was Grabusa (Gramvoússa). Pirates from 

there reputedly captured 487 merchant ships, 93 of which were British.111

Throughout the Greek isles, more than 150 British ships were attacked 

between March 1825 and October 1827.112 But the impact of the pirates 

went well beyond merely capturing and plundering of merchant ships. 

Since the pirates were willing to take whatever they could get for their 

stolen goods, pirate plunder depressed the prices of legal merchandise and 

drove many legitimate merchants out of business.113
80

By the 1820s, American trade with the Levant was fairly substantial. 

Although the American colonies were not allowed to trade directly with 

the Levant, American merchants quickly established commercial relations 

with the Levant after the American Revolution ended. Trade with the 

Levant grew steadily until, by 1820, it averaged $1 million per year.114 The 

Spark became the first American warship to visit a Middle Eastern port 

when it sailed into Smyrna in 1820. The Greek Revolution did not, at first, 

greatly affect American trade with the region. That changed in 1825 with 

the general breakdown of authority in the eastern Mediterranean. In May 

of that year, an American ship was plundered by Greek pirates. 115

Concern for American commerce prompted President Monroe to 

dispatch the most powerful naval force in the country’s history to the 

Mediterranean in early 1825 to protect American interests there.116

Merchant ships were only safe if they sailed in armed convoys, and even 

then, it was risky to transit Greek waters. Despite the presence of the 

American squadron, two more American ships were taken in 1826, which 

led to the establishment of an American convoy system later that year.117

US Navy ships escorted merchant vessels from Smyrna to Malta, allowing 

ships of all nations to join the convoys.118

But even convoys did not always deter the Greek corsairs. They 

merely adopted other tactics, such as picking off stragglers separated from 

the main body of the convoy at night or as the result of bad weather.119

During a convoy in September 1827, boat crews from the Porpoise saved a 

British vessel sailing with the convoy. The Porpoise left Smyrna bound for 

Malta in company of 11 merchant ships, only 5 of which were American. 

While transiting through the Doro Passage (Stenón Kafiréos), the winds 

died and the convoy drifted apart.120 At that moment, 200 to 300 pirates 

in five vessels from Andros and Negroponte (Évvoia) attacked the Comet, 

which had lagged behind in the calm air. As the buccaneers towed Comet

away, Porpoise gave chase using her oars. When it became apparent that 

Porpoise could not overtake the pirates, 40 sailors were dispatched in the 

ship’s boats to deal with them. Rowing strenuously, the American sailors 

caught up with the Comet and, in a sharp fight, recaptured the vessel and 

killed 80 or 90 corsairs.121

The fortunes of three American brigs that left the Porpoise’s convoy 

demonstrate the dangers all merchant ships ran. They left the convoy near 

Chios (Khios). Soon thereafter, one was attacked and robbed of its cargo. 

The crewmembers of the second merchantman abandoned their ship before 

the brigands could capture them. Only the third vessel reached its next port 

unscathed.122
81

The cruise of the Warren during 25 September through 6 December 

illustrates the activities conducted by American warships in the Levant. 

On 25 September, Warren escorted a group of American merchant ships 

from Smyrna to a point about halfway to Sicily, some 200 miles west of 

Cerigo (Kýthira). Warren captured a boat with 15 brigands on board and 

a pirate brig armed with 16 guns off Grabusa on 4 October. Over the next 

3 weeks, Warren patrolled the sea between Crete and Cerigo (Kythira), 

occasionally escorting merchants vessels transiting the area. Warren

received word that Greek corsairs attacked two American ships, the Rob 

Roy and Cherub, and went looking for the victims to provide assistance. 

While searching for Cherub, Warren encountered a 10-gun pirate brig near 

Argenteero (Kimolos). Warren attacked and sunk the brig, but the brigands 

escaped ashore into the mountains. She located the Cherub at Syra (Syros) 

Island on 28 October. When Lexington arrived later that evening, Warren

left Cherub in her charge and resumed her patrol. The next day, Warren

discovered the Austrian brig Silence adrift after being robbed of her cargo 

and sails. Warren towed Silence back to Syra and left her in Lexington’s 

care as well. Warren captured a large, 40-oar pirate boat on 30 October 

while cruising off Mykonos (Mikonos). When she entered the port of 

Mykonos on 1 November, Warren discovered some of the property stolen 

from Cherub, Rob Roy, and Silence, including sails, rigging, and opium. 

After returning the sails and other property to the merchant ships at Syra, 

Warren began cruising around Andros Island. Boats from the Warren were 

sent to explore the coast of the island on 7 November. The boats returned 

2 days later with a captured pirate boat. They also burned a second 

boat. Warren continued cruising around Andros and Jura (Yiaros) until 

18 November when she sailed into Milo (Milos) Island’s harbor. While 

off Andros, some of the inhabitants returned to Warren a boat, cannon, 

and tools stolen from Cherub. On 30 November, Warren got underway 

with two American ships and six other vessels en route to Smyrna. The 

convoy arrived in Smyrna on 6 December without incident. It was a busy 

cruise. In a little over 2 months, Warren captured or destroyed seven pirate 

vessels, rescued three merchant ships, found some of their stolen cargo 

and other property, escorted two convoys, and patrolled hundreds of miles 

of ocean.123

Many other nations stationed substantial naval forces in the eastern 

Mediterranean as well, including the United Kingdom, France, Austria, 

the Netherlands, and Sardinia. However, there were several reasons why 

those naval contingents never combined to crush the Greek pirates. First, 

despite the large number of warships in the region, there were never 

enough vessels to successfully suppress Greek piracy. Second, a majority 
82

of the naval officers tasked with suppressing piracy were sympathetic 

to the Greek cause and were reluctant to react harshly to Greek actions. 

Moreover, Britain, France, and Russia were not eager to suppress piracy 

since it served as one of the most important pretexts for their eventual 

intervention in the war. Therefore, cultural, geographic, and diplomatic 

considerations worked together to retard efforts to suppress piracy in 

Greek waters.

Austria, which was one of the few European nations not supportive of 

the Greeks, reacted aggressively to Greek piracy. Austria’s opposition to 

the Greek Revolution was based on two important considerations. First, 

since Russia, Austria’s traditional enemy, backed the Greeks, Austria 

naturally became a supporter of the Turks. Second, and perhaps even 

more important, the Austrians viewed Greek nationalism as a threat to 

their own empire, which was cobbled together among peoples of many 

nationalities.124

Believing that the Austrians were in league with the Ottomans, the 

Greeks enthusiastically attacked Austrian merchant vessels. The Austrians 

responded by sending a large naval contingent to the Levant. In 1826, 

22 Austrian ships operated in Greek and Turkish waters. Because of the 

hostility between the Greeks and Austrians, the Austrians resorted to force 

more often, whether to prevent acts of piracy or to punish villages that 

provided support to pirates, than did the other navies operating in the 

Mediterranean. For example, the Austrians landed on Mykonos in July 

1826 in retaliation for a pirate attack. They burned three boats, destroyed a 

house, and forced the villagers to pay a fine. A few days later, on 22 July, the 

same Austrian force attacked Tinos and captured a Greek corvette and brig, 

which they held for ransom. A month later, the Austrians bombarded and 

then assaulted Naxos in retaliation for two attacks on Austrian vessels.125

Despite such efforts, the Greeks continued to prey on Austrian shipping.

The Austrian squadron actually outnumbered the Royal Navy forces 

in the Mediterranean in 1826. The British Mediterranean Fleet was only 

assigned 13 warships in 1826. Of those 13 ships, 8 were sloops and small 

frigates, the ships most useful for antipirate operations. Following the 

pattern used against the Caribbean pirates, the British used their small boats 

to engage the corsairs close to shore. For example, in April 1826, sailors in 

boats from the sloop Alacrity destroyed 3 pirate vessels, killed 40 pirates, 

and captured 70 more near Psara. Although the Alacrity suffered only five 

wounded, such actions were not always easy. When the frigate Sibylle

sent its boats to recapture a Maltese vessel taken by two mistikos off the 
83

coast of Crete in June 1826, the British sailors were bloodily repulsed. As 

they approached the cove into which the buccaneers fled, several other 

pirate crews ambushed the British, killing 14 and wounding 30 others.126

As in the Caribbean, crews spent many hours in small boats, searching for 

and chasing brigands. One captain stated that his crew chased five pirate 

vessels for almost 20 miles before giving up.127 But the British did not 

have enough ships to effectively counter the pirates. Consequently, the 

British sloops and frigates were stretched thin and unable to stem the tide.

Some Greeks believed that the more piracy occurred, the greater the 

likelihood of allied intervention. They may have been right. By the spring 

of 1827, serious negotiations were underway between Britain, France, and 

Russia to settle the terms for intervention in the war. In the meantime, 

Admiral Sir Edward Codrington took command of the Mediterranean 

Fleet in February 1827 with orders to put a damper on piracy. Soon after 

he arrived, he met with Greek leaders in Napoli de Romania (Náfplio) 

and warned them that they had to end the piracy plaguing the region if 

“unpleasant consequences were to be avoided.”128 Codrington also received 

additional ships, more than doubling his force by the end of 1827. Just as 

important, 19 of Codrington’s ships were sloops and small frigates.129

Meanwhile, the allies agreed to terms and signed the Treaty of 

London on 6 July 1827. One explicit justification for the treaty was the 

need to suppress piracy and protect the commercial interests of the three 

signatory nations, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. The treaty did 

not necessarily guarantee independence for Greece; instead, it proposed 

establishing Greece as a tributary state under Turkish rule. But a secret 

article also directed the allies to enforce an armistice if either side chose not 

to participate. In the instructions sent to the British, French, and Russian 

admirals, the admirals were directed to treat the Greeks as friends if they 

accepted the armistice. The admirals were also authorized to prevent 

resupply of Turkish and Egyptian forces if the Turks failed to abide by 

the treaty.130 When the Ottoman and Egyptian commanders resisted the 

restraints placed on them by the allies, the allies pulverized the Egyptian 

and Turkish Fleets at Navarin Bay on 20 October 1827. With the loss of 

their fleet, the war was effectively over for the Ottomans since they could 

not control the sea and were thus unable to resupply or reinforce their 

forces in Greece.131

Navarin Bay demonstrated to the Greek Government what would 

happen to them if they failed to comply with the allies’ demand that they 

stop piracy. To head off further action, the president of Greece asked the 
84

allies to eliminate the most galling pirate haven—the island of Grabusa 

near Crete. Grabusa was a perfect pirate haven. Its citadel was almost 

impregnable, and its harbor was difficult to blockade because of the winds 

and current. But it was a place of little significance until some 6,000 

Christians, driven off Crete by the Turks, took refuge on the island in 

August 1825. With no means to support themselves, the refugees turned 

to piracy. Their first foray occurred in February 1826 when the raiders 

extorted $5,000 from a French ship. Over the next 2 years, the corsairs 

of Grabusa captured 486 more vessels. They soon developed a highly 

organized structure, much like a joint stock company, to distribute the 

booty. Each inhabitant owned shares of the venture and was rewarded 

accordingly. The community received one-fifth of all the spoils. Soon, 

20 brigs and schooners and almost 60 smaller craft were operating from 

the island. Even worse, they were later joined by some of the best Greek 

warships, which abandoned the cause for plunder and profit.132

An allied squadron, including three British frigates, two British sloops, 

and two French corvettes, sailed into the harbor of Grabusa on 31 January 

1828. There, they found 14 Greek ships and two prizes. Most of the other 

pirates fled Grabusa because of rumors of allied retribution. Commodore 

Sir Thomas Staines demanded that the pirates surrender immediately. 

When they failed to do so, his flotilla opened fire and destroyed most of 

the pirate ships.133 Although this action destroyed the naval power of the 

island, Staines still had to reduce the citadel and capture the pirate leaders. 

Over the next month and a half, through negotiation and subterfuge, Staines 

managed to accomplish that task as well without combat. Once he gained 

control of the fortress and evacuated all the inhabitants, Staines’ soldiers, 

sailors, and marines demolished the citadel, rendering it useless.134

Around the time that Commodore Staines finished with Grabusa, the 

Greek Navy moved against having the pirates operate from the island of 

Sporades. In early March 1828, the Greek frigate Hellas, accompanied by 

two gunboats, seized 78 armed craft on the island without incident. The 

Greek Government kept 37 of the boats and destroyed the rest. None of the 

pirates were, however, prosecuted by the government.135

Although there continued to be isolated acts of piracy in the eastern 

Mediterranean, those two actions essentially ended piracy in the Greek 

islands. As in other regions and eras, Greek piracy flourished because of 

the three conditions that facilitate piracy: favorable geography, political 

turmoil, and sanctuaries ashore. Once the political situation stabilized and 

the Greek Government neutralized the corsairs’ island sanctuaries, piracy 
85

diminished to acceptable levels. But it took operations ashore, such as 

the capture of Grabusa and the destruction of the havens on Sporades, 

to remove the pirates’ support system and demonstrate that the cost of 

continued acts of piracy was worse than pursing other means of support. 

Therefore, naval power alone was not sufficient to end piracy in the Greek 

isles.
86

Notes

1. Philip Gossse, The History of Piracy (New York: Tudor Publishing 

Company, 1932), 5.

2. Gosse estimated that 50 talents was the equivalent of £12,000, which is 

approximately $850,000 in current dollars.

3. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 4–8.

4. Ralph T. Ward, Pirates in History (Baltimore, MD: York Press, 1974), 22.

5. Ibid., 20.

6. Ibid., 29.

7. Ibid., 18.

8. Ibid., 33–34.

9. Ibid., 37.

10. Ibid., 41–44.

11. Ibid., 45.

12. Robin Fowler, “Pirates of the Mediterranean: Pillaging and Plundering 

in Ancient Times,” Suite101.com, 21 May 2007, http://ancient-culture.suite101.

com/article.cfm/pirates_of_the_mediterranean (accessed 29 January 2009).

13. Ward, 115.

14. Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the 

Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), 31.

15. Ibid., 32–33.

16. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Wars of the Barbary Pirates; To the Shores 

of Tripoli: The Rise of the US Navy and Marines (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 

2006), 16–17.

17. Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), 

41.

18. Ward, 118.

19. Fremont-Barnes, 16.

20. Lambert, 51.

21. Ibid., 35; Ward, note 2, 123.

22. Lambert, 73–74.

23. The title Bashaw is a variation of Pasha and is used by a head of 

government with the added role of military commander. See Ward, note 2, 123.

24. Lambert, 90.

25. Ibid., 93. Bey means governor and is also an honorific for persons of 

equivalent rank to a governor. See Ward, note 2, 123.

26. Ibid., 123.

27. Lambert, 37–38.

28. Earle, 51.

29. Ibid., 71.

30. Fremont-Barnes, 19.

31. James A. Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 29.

32. Earle, 73.
87

33. Field, 32.

34. Fremont-Barnes, 85–86.

35. Lambert, 32.

36. R. Ernest Dupuy and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the United 

States (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968), 28.

37. Fremont-Barnes, 32; Lambert, 58–59.

38. Field, 33.

39. Fremont-Barnes, 32–33; Lambert, 59–61.

40. Field, 33.

41. Ibid., 34.

42. Lambert, 71–72.

43. Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1936), 58; Lambert, 73.

44. John Paul Jones was the first commissioner, but he died before he could 

carry out his mission. Likewise, the second appointee, Thomas Barclay, also died 

before he even left the United States. In the meantime, the Dey of Algiers died and 

was replaced by Ali Hassan, who decided he needed to take a hard line against the 

United States to solidify his position as Dey. See Lambert, 73–74.

45. Ibid., 73–76; Field, 37.

46. Knox, 60; Field, 37; Lambert, 81.

47. Knox, 60.

48. Ibid., 58–59; Field, 37.

49. Knox, 60.

50. Dupuy and Baumer, 30; Knox, 61.

51. Lambert, 90–92.

52. Knox, 61–62; Lambert, 92.

53. Knox, 62.

54. Fremont-Barnes, 39.

55. Dupuy and Baumer, 36–37.

56. Fremont-Barnes, 41.

57. Knox, 63.

58. Lambert, 132–133.

59. Dupuy and Baumer, 41.

60. Lambert, 133.

61. Knox, 63–64; Fremont-Barnes, 44.

62. Dupuy and Baumer, 44; Knox, 64.

63. Lambert, 140–141; Fremont-Barnes, 46; Knox, 64.

64. Lambert, 143–145; Fremont-Barnes, 47–49; Knox, 65–66; Dupuy and 

Baumer, 46–49.

65. Lambert, 146; Dupuy and Baumer, 52.

66. Dupuy and Baumer, 49.

67. Lambert, 147; Fremont-Barnes, 49–52; Dupuy and Baumer, 49–51; 

Knox, 70–72.

68. Lambert, 148–149; Fremont-Barnes, 53–55; Dupuy and Baumer, 53; 

Knox, 73–74.
88

69. Field, 52–53; Lambert, 146–147; Fremont-Barnes, 56–57.

70. Field, 53–54; Lambert, 150–153; Fremont-Barnes, 58–62; Dupuy and 

Baumer, 55–59.

71. Field, 56–57.

72. Lambert, 177–178.

73. Fremont-Barnes, 76–77; Dupuy and Baumer, 61–62.

74. Fremont-Barnes, 76–77.

75. Fremont-Barnes, 77–79; Dupuy and Baumer, 63–64.

76. Fremont-Barnes, 80.

77. Ibid., 81.

78. William L. Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History From the Earliest Times 

to the Present, vol. VI (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1901), 226–

227.

79. Ibid., 227–229; Fremont-Barnes, 83–85.

80. Clowes, vol. VI, 229; Fremont-Barnes, 84–85.

81. Clowes, vol. VI, 227.

82. Fremont-Barnes, 85–87.

83. The Morea was another name used for the Peloponnese Peninsula. 

84. W. Alison Phillips, Modern Europe, 1815–1899, Period VIII, 2d ed. 

(London: Rivingtons, 1902), 136.

85. W. Alison Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 1821–1833 (New 

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1897), 10.

86. Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821–1833

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 17.

87. Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 10.

88. Dakin, 60.

89. Earle, 225.

90. C.G. Pitcairn Jones, ed., Piracy in the Levant, 1827–28: Selected From 

the Papers of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, KCB (London: Navy Records 

Society, 1934), xvii; Dakin, 74–75.

91. Thomas Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, vol. II (Edinburgh: 

William Blackwood, 1832), 477.

92. These islands are part of the Sporades Islands in the northern Aegean 

Sea.

93. Gordon, 478–479.

94. Earle, 226–227.

95. Gordon, 479.

96. Earle, 227.

97. Dakin, 74–75.

98. Ibid., 74.

99. Phillips, Modern Europe, 137–138.

100. Dakin, 100.

101. Earle, 225.

102. Dakin, 100.

103. Ibid., 121.
89

104. Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 156–157.

105. Dakin, 122.

106. Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 168.

107. Dakin, 184.

108. Earle, 226.

109. David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities 

of United States Naval Officers, 1798–1833 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval 

Institute Press, 1988), 200.

110. Phillips, The War of Greek Independence, 253.

111. Gordon, 486.

112. Earle, 226.

113. Ibid.

114. Field, 125.

115. Edgar S. Maclay, A History of the United States Navy From 1775 to 

1894, vol. II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894), 125.

116. Peter M. Swartz, “US-Greek Naval Relations Begin: Antipiracy 

Operations in the Aegean Sea” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 

Center for Strategic Studies, June 2003).

117. Field, 127.

118. Swartz.

119. Gordon, 479.

120. A passage between the islands of Negropont (Evvoia) and Andros.

121. A Naval Encyclopedia (Philadelphia, PA: L.R. Hamersly and Co., 1881), 

314–315.

122. US Congress, On the Expediency of Sending Two Additional Sloops-ofWar to the Mediterranean Sea, for the Suppression of Piracy by the Greeks, 20th 

Cong., 1st sess., no. 361, 11 March 1828, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/USN/1828/

18280311Piracy.html (accessed 18 February 2009).

123. Ibid. 

124. R.C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853 (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1952), 509.

125. Ibid., 508–509.

126. Clowes, vol. VI, 251.

127. Earle, 248.

128. Jones, xxviii.

129. Ibid., xxv. Of the 13 ships assigned to the British Mediterranean Fleet in 

1826, there were the seven sloops, one sixth-rate frigate, four fifth-rate frigates, 

and one third-rate ship-of-the-line. Because of their shallow draft, the sloops and 

the Talbot, a sixth-rate frigate, were useful antipiracy vessels. By the end of 1827, 

there were 27 ships in the Mediterranean Fleet, including six fourth-rate or better 

ships-of-the-line, six fifth- or sixth-rate frigates, and 15 sloops.

130. Dakin, 182–183. After the battle, Admiral Codrington received 

significant public criticism, and the battle was officially labeled an “untoward 

event.” Codrington steadfastly maintained that he merely followed his orders. 

Since Prime Minister George Canning died on 8 August 1827, a little over a month 
90

after he sent Codrington his orders, there was considerable uncertainty about 

what, exactly, the admiral was authorized to do. Although he was never officially 

reprimanded for the destruction of the Ottoman Fleet, Admiral Codrington was 

recalled to Britain in the summer of 1828 and never given another sea-going 

command. See also Clowes, vol. VI, 261.

131. Dakin, 226–230.

132. Gordon, 482–486.

133. Clowes, vol. VI, 261–262.

134. Gordon, 490–796.

135. Ibid., 496–497.
91

Chapter 4

Asian Piracy

Asia encompasses a broad geographic range and a wide variety of 

cultures. However, whether in the Persian Gulf, among the islands 

of Southeast Asia, or along the coast of China, piracy found the right 

conditions to flourish: geography, political instability, and safe havens 

ashore. Moreover, piracy prospered in many eras, not just the periods 

under consideration in this chapter. As noted earlier, pirates from the 

Persian Gulf raided the Sumerians more than 4,000 years ago and 

Hammurabi outlawed piracy in his code.1 There are written records 

referring to piracy during the Chow (Zhou) dynasty in China, which 

lasted from 1122 to 221 BC, as well.2 Although similar records do not 

exist among the Malays, piracy in the islands no doubt goes back equally 

as far.

Once again, geography played a crucial role in the development 

of piracy in Asia. Both the Arabs and Malays benefited from major 

chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz for the Arabs and the Strait of Malacca 

for the Malays. The Arab pirates, who were based on the Arabian 

Peninsula, could easily control the Strait of Hormuz. Southeast Asian 

pirates based on Sumatra or the Riau Archipelago were in a position to 

dominate the Strait of Malacca. The thousands of islands in the region 

provided the pirates excellent places to hide and to wait for victims. 

Although there is no comparable chokepoint for Chinese pirates, they 

too benefited from favorable geography. China’s long coastline and many 

rivers gave the pirates innumerable places to hide. Moreover, China was 

so large that the central government could not easily control the entire 

country, so pirates often acted with impunity along the frontier. 

Political instability also played an important role in Asian piracy 

during the 19th century. There was conflict between the Arab pirates and 

their nominal ruler, the Sultan of Oman. The rulers who emerged after 

the destruction of the empire of Malacca were not strong enough to 

regulate the Southeast Asian pirates. Even though China had a centralized 

government, by the 19th century, the Manchu dynasty was in decline and 

unable to exert control over its periphery. 

Finally, in all three geographic areas, safe havens existed, which made 

piracy feasible. Piracy was integral to the lives of many Arabs and Malays, 

who essentially lived on the water. Piracy supplemented their income. 

Since it was woven into the fabric of their lives, those involved in piracy 

found ready havens ashore where they could rest, refit, and expend their 
92

plunder. Chinese piracy was not as integrated into the primarily agrarian 

society. Still, Chinese pirates found ready markets for their stolen goods, 

often through the good offices of corrupt officials.

Piracy in the Persian Gulf

The Portuguese were the first European mariners to enter the Persian 

Gulf in force in the modern period. They dominated the Gulf from the early 

16th century until the arrival of the British and Dutch in the early 17th century. With help from the East India Company, Shah Abbas of Persia drove 

the Portuguese out of their stronghold on Kharg Island in 1622. From that 

point onward, British commercial interests grew in importance even as 

Portuguese fortunes declined.3 But the Persian Gulf remained a strategic 

afterthought to British policymakers for almost 200 more years. 

During the late 18th century, particularly after the death of the Shah 

Karim Khan in 1779, Persia lost control of the Gulf. The result was 

increased competition and conflict among the various coastal tribes of 

the Persian Gulf. That conflict devolved into raiding and, in British eyes, 

piracy.4 Arab corsairs based on the western coast of the Arabian Peninsula 

ranged far out into the Indian Ocean, threatening British shipping there as 

well as in the Persian Gulf. 

The increase in piracy negatively impacted British trade in the region. 

Since the East India Company’s trade in the Persian Gulf was relatively 

limited, it made no effort to suppress piracy in the Gulf. But independent 

British merchants, known as “country traders,” were affected. These 

country traders developed fairly substantial and lucrative trade relationships in the Gulf.5

 They exchanged British manufactured goods for 

pearls, Persian silks, and specie that were used in the China trade. Even 

though the Arabs normally left the well-armed East India Company vessels 

alone, they sometimes attacked the smaller, more vulnerable country traders. 

British merchants, of course, condemned such transgressions and pressed 

both the British Government and East India Company to take action.6

The strategic outlook also changed at the beginning of the 19th century. 

Because the Persian Gulf was one of the primary mail links between the 

United Kingdom and India, the pirates impinged on official Britain when 

they attacked British mail ships.7 Even more important, the French expedition to Egypt (1798–1801) and France’s short-lived alliance with the Shah 

of Persia (1807–1809) raised the threat of French invasion through India’s 

northwest territories. British policymakers began to view the Persian Gulf 

as a buffer zone, protecting India’s western flank.8

The death of the Sultan of Oman in November 1804 led to further 

aggression against British merchant shipping in the Gulf. At the time of the 
93

Sultan’s death, the British were actively pursuing an alliance with Oman. 

East India Company leaders realized that Oman, because of its location at 

the entrance to the Persian Gulf, was perfectly situated to restrict French 

and Dutch access to the Gulf. But Britain’s relationship with Oman put it at 

odds with one of the tribes most involved in piracy. The al-Qawasim9 were 

nominal vassals of the Sultan of Oman, but when he died, they reneged on 

their allegiance and broke away from Oman.10 Britain became a de facto 

enemy of the al-Qawasim. But that circumstance had distinct advantages 

since suppression of piracy in the Gulf not only would appease merchant 

and shipping interests in Britain but also would enhance Great Britain’s 

strategic relationship with Oman.

All three conditions that facilitate piracy are readily apparent when 

considering the Persian Gulf. The al-Qawasim were ideally situated 

geographically to perpetrate acts of piracy. The tribe’s territory included 

some 25 coastal towns on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula from the 

tip south to Dubai.11 Its main port was Ras al-Khaymah,12 which is located 

some 50 miles from the northern tip of the Arabian Peninsula. At that point, 

the Strait of Hormuz is only about 30 miles wide. Thus, the al-Qawasim 

could easily control traffic entering or leaving the Persian Gulf. The decline 

of Persian control of the Gulf and the death of the Sultan of Oman led to 

political turmoil, which facilitated piracy in the Gulf. Furthermore, since 

the United Kingdom was fully involved in the Napoleonic Wars, the British 

lacked the resources to aggressively respond to piracy in the Persian Gulf. 

Since the al-Qawasim depended on the sea for their existence, whether by 

trading, harvesting pearls, or raiding, there was considerable land-based 

support for their piratical activities within their territory as well. (Figure 7 

shows the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.)

The attacks began in the last quarter of the 18th century. In December 

1778, six al-Qawasim vessels attacked a British ship carrying official dispatches. After a running battle that lasted 3 days, the British ship succumbed and was taken to Ras al-Khaymah as a prize. Encouraged by 

their success, the al-Qawasim assaulted two more British vessels the next 

year. The most significant incident occurred in October 1797 when the 

al-Qawasim stormed the East India Company cruiser Viper while in port 

in Bushehr.13 Although the company ship drove off the attackers, Viper

suffered 32 casualties out of a crew of 65.14

After they broke away from Oman, the al-Qawasim began levying 

tolls on all shipping entering or leaving the Gulf. When the British refused 

to pay the toll, the al-Qawasim retaliated by raiding British shipping.15

They captured two British ships in 1804 and attacked a 24-gun East India 

Company cruiser in January 1805.16 There was a short respite after the 
94

Omanis, led by the British Resident in Muscat, blockaded the main alQawasim fleet in Ras al-Khaymah and forced them to submit.17

The truce did not, however, last long. In the meantime, the alQawasim continued to consolidate their power. By 1808, the al-Qawasim 

fleet numbered some 63 large vessels, 810 small dhows, and 18,000 to 

25,000 fighters.18 In April 1808, two al-Qawasim dhows attacked another 

East India Company ship, the Fury (6 guns).19 Once the summer pearling 

season ended,20 the al-Qawasim resumed the war against the United 

Kingdom. The violence quickly escalated. When they captured the East 

India Company schooner Sylph (8 guns) in October 1808, the pirates killed 

22 crewmembers. Only the captain survived. Wounded when the Arabs 

took the ship, the captain hid in a storeroom below deck and was rescued 

when the HMS La Nereide (38 guns) recaptured the Sylph as the raiders 

sailed her back to Ras al-Khaymah.21 The next month, some 40 al-Qawasim 

dhows entered the Indian Ocean and wreaked havoc on British and Indian 

shipping. Within a short time, they captured 20 merchant vessels and shut 

down commerce along the western coast of India.22

This proved too much for the East India Company to accept so, in 

September 1809, a combined land and naval force was dispatched to the 

Persian Gulf to deal with the pirates. The force included 2 Royal Navy 

Figure 7. The Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

0 50 100 miles

Gulf of Oman

Abu Dh abi

Pe rsia

Oman

Easte rn Arab ia

Qatar

Persian Gulf

Dubai

Ras al-Kh aymah

Mus c at

Bushehr

Ba h ra in

Kh a rg

Isla n d
95

frigates, 8 East India Company cruisers, 1 East India Company bomb 

ketch, and 1,300 soldiers, half of whom were Europeans.23 Its primary 

objective was Ras al-Khaymah, which was assaulted and captured on 13 

November 1809. Company soldiers sacked the town and burned 60 dhows 

trapped in the harbor.24 Later, the British force attacked two al-Qawasim 

strongholds in Persia: Linga and Luft.25

British operations against the al-Qawasim pirates demonstrate the 

difficulty of trying to eliminate piracy using primarily naval forces. 

Although the British inflicted a substantial amount of damage on the alQawasim, the impact of the 1809 expedition was limited. Once the British 

returned to India, the al-Qawasim quickly recuperated. By the fall of 1813, 

al-Qawasim dhows once again hunted for prey off the coast of India. 

Further pirate cruises were conducted in the spring and fall of 1814. The 

al-Qawasim acted even more aggressively in the Persian Gulf, attacking 

two American, one French, and three Indian ships.26 In 1816, the British 

sent another expedition to punish the pirates, but it was even less effective 

because the naval force limited its actions to merely bombarding Ras alKhaymah.27 During the 1817–1818 trading season, the situation was so 

bad that convoys were used to mitigate the risk of attack.28

By the end of 1818, the situation was ripe for a more forceful response 

to the pirates. By that date, the British successfully concluded two wars 

in India, the Pindari and Mahratta Wars, and now had sufficient forces 

available to mount a more substantial attack on the al-Qawasim. Major 

General Sir William Grant-Keir organized and led this expedition. His 

force included 1,450 European soldiers and 2,100 Sepoys; the HMS 

Liverpool, a 50-gun frigate, and the HMS Curlew, an 18-gun brig; and a 

14-gun East India Company cruiser. The HMS Eden (24 guns) and seven 

East India Company warships were already in the Persian Gulf and joined 

the task force once it arrived in the Gulf.29

The British force anchored off Ras al-Khaymah on 4 December 

1819. The troops landed southwest of the town and advanced to within 

300 yards of the city walls. There, they erected entrenchments and set up 

artillery to bombard the fortifications. The bombardment continued for 2 

days. By 6 December, it was clear that the 12- and 18-pounders were not 

powerful enough to knock down the town’s walls, so sailors brought two 

24-pounders ashore. They began firing on 8 December and continued until 

Grant-Keir’s troops assaulted Ras al-Khaymah on 9 December. Meanwhile, 

the Arabs abandoned the city, so the troops entered unopposed. Over the 

next few days, the British force occupied itself by destroying the town’s 

fortifications and burning all of the dhows in the harbor.30
96

Over the next few weeks, realizing the power of the British force, 

all of the leading sheiks traveled to Ras al-Khaymah and submitted to 

General Grant-Keir. On 8 January 1820, they signed the General Treaty 

of Peace.31 The most pertinent provisions of this treaty required all 

signatories to suppress piracy and refrain from killing captives.32 If they 

failed to do so, other parties, that is, the United Kingdom, could step in 

and take action. From this point forward, acts of piracy in the Persian Gulf 

declined precipitously. Moreover, when they did occur, the local sheik 

acted quickly to punish the deed before the British stepped in to rectify 

the situation.33

British antipiracy operations in the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrate 

the need to eliminate shore havens. The first two British expeditions 

were of limited value because the land element was either insufficient or 

nonexistent. Even though the first expedition captured Ras al-Khaymah 

and destroyed several more towns, its impact was short lived because the 

British force soon sailed away. Once they were gone, the Arabs resumed 

acting as they had before the British arrived. The second expedition, which 

made no attempt to conduct operations ashore, was totally ineffective. Only 

the third expedition, which included a substantial land component, was 

successful. This force had enough troops to insinuate that the British were 

there to stay and intimidate many Arab groups, not just the al-Qawasim, 

into signing the General Treaty of Peace. 

East Indies Piracy

Spices such as nutmeg, pepper, cinnamon, ginger, and cloves were 

highly prized commodities for thousands of years. Before the 16th century, 

such spices were only available to Europeans through overland caravan 

routes terminating in the Levant. That changed in the 16th century when 

the Portuguese reached the East Indies. The Portuguese began bringing 

back spices by ship around the Cape of Good Hope. The desire to obtain 

a share of the spice trade was a significant motivation for the exploration 

and subsequent colonization of the East Indies by other European countries.34 Once the Dutch and English joined in the competition, the number 

of ships sailing to the Malay Archipelago in search of spices increased 

from a couple each year to 11 per year during 1600–1630.35 By the late 

18th century, spice imports into Europe tripled.36 Although the potential 

for profit was great, trading with the East Indies was risky. Commenting 

on the risks in 1796, a British merchant noted that, if piracy was suppressed, trade would become more regularized and profitable.37

Piracy in the East Indies proved, however, difficult to suppress. As with 

other regions, it flourished because of the three conditions that make piracy 
97

possible. The pirates of the Malay Archipelago benefited from favorable 

geography. Some 17,500 islands make up modern-day Indonesia, which 

lies at the heart of the geographic region under consideration. Moreover, 

Indonesia has almost 34,000 miles of coastline. Even today, with all of 

our modern technology, it is impossible to effectively patrol such a vast 

coastline.38 There are also a limited number of passages through which 

vessels heading east toward the Spice Islands and China can transit. Thus, 

ships laden with valuable cargo were funneled into confined areas, making 

them more vulnerable to attack. The Malay pirates used their geography to 

their advantage. Because of the chokepoints, they knew where to look for 

potential prizes. While they waited for their quarry, the pirates hid in the 

many coves, bays, and inlets dotting the coast of the East Indies islands. 

When they spotted a likely target, usually a ship becalmed or aground in 

the shallow coastal waters, the pirates swooped down on it in their swift 

boats and quickly boarded and plundered it.39 (Figure 8 shows Sumatra 

and the Malacca Strait.)

0 100 200 miles

Indian Ocean

J av a

Ria u Arch ip e la g o

Sin g apore

Java Sea

Andaman Sea

Gulf of Siam

South China

 Sea

B o rneo

Malay a

P enins ula

S umatra

S iam

Q uallah Battoo

A c eh

Figure 8. Sumatra and the Strait of Malacca.
98

The region also suffered from political instability, making it ripe for 

piracy. The Portuguese destroyed the Malay Empire of Malacca in the 

early 16th century. A series of relatively weak small kingdoms took its 

place. For example, in the early 19th century, the Sultan of Johor was 

nominal ruler of the Riau Archipelago. Piracy was rife in the islands of 

the Riau Archipelago, which dominated the southern end of the Strait 

of Malacca. Since the Sultan was unable to exert control over the many 

local chiefs, they operated as they pleased most of the time.40 Similarly, 

the Sultan of Acheen ruled the northwestern coast of Sumatra, known 

as the “pepper coast.” Although he was strong enough to maintain his 

independence from the Europeans, he had little control over most of his 

subjects.41 Thus, political instability made it easier for the Malay pirates to 

operate with impunity.

The Malay pirates also benefited from safe havens ashore. Piracy was 

an integral part of life in the East Indies. In the Riau Archipelago, an annual 

cycle of commercial activity and piracy evolved. From February to April, 

islanders busied themselves collecting agar-agar, an edible algae they 

traded with the Chinese. In early summer, when the southeast monsoon set 

in, the islanders turned to piracy. They remained at sea through October, 

ranging throughout Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean in search of 

plunder. After a short rest, the cycle resumed in February.42 Since piracy 

was deeply woven into life in the islands, the pirates were afforded safe 

places to rest, replace their losses, and dispose of their plunder.

For many years, the East Indies pirates avoided the heavily armed 

European vessels. But as the volume of trade expanded in the 19th century, 

so did the temptation to attack European and American vessels. The first 

American ship to visit the pepper coast was the brig Cadet out of Salem 

in 1789.43 When other American merchants learned that the Cadet turned 

a 700-percent profit on that voyage, they too turned their sights onto the 

East Indies.44 By 1812, 29 American ships sailed to the Orient each year. 

The pace quicken after a lull due to the War of 1812. From 1815 to 1820, 

American merchants sent, on average, 39 ships per year to the Orient. 

President James Monroe considered this commerce so important that he 

sent the Congress to the Orient in 1819 to protect US merchant ships from 

pirates.45

One of the most successful Malay pirates was Raga, who terrorized 

the Makassar Strait for more than 17 years. Raga first garnered attention in 

1813 when he captured three British vessels and personally executed the 

captains of all three ships. The British responded by sending two sloops to 
99

chastise the pirate. When one of the warships, the Elk, destroyed several 

of Raga’s vessels and killed many of his crewmen, he swore vengeance 

against the British. A contemporary observer claims that, through 1830, 

Raga captured more than 40 European ships and murdered the captains 

and crews of each one.46

The East India Company responded to the transgressions of Raga and 

others half-heartedly, sending a rag-tag collection of vessels to the Malacca 

Strait to deal with the pirates. These included schooners, yachts, flatbottomed boats, and other small craft. But the heart of the British antipiracy 

flotilla was a 6-gun brig and a 12-gun schooner.47 Hamstrung by the lack 

of resources, Royal Navy and East India Company naval commanders 

had little impact on the situation until 1830 when Rear Admiral Edward 

Owen arrived. Owen soon determined that the indifference with which 

local officials treated the piracy problem was, in part, due to their lack of 

success against the corsairs. Consequently, he instituted several changes 

in tactics that proved moderately successful. Owen decided to focus on 

destroying the brigands’ boats and controlling the coastline. When British 

forces engaged pirates, they allowed the brigands to escape, but they 

seized and destroyed the corsairs’ vessels. Without their boats, the pirates 

were unable to prey on merchant shipping. He also constructed small forts 

and established small boat patrols near the mouths of rivers known to 

serve the brigands. By controlling the pirates’ egress points, Owen’s forces 

prevented the brigands from putting to sea and attacking commercial 

vessels. By the mid-1830s, after Owen departed, his initiatives waned and 

piracy surged in the region.48

East Indian piracy eventually provoked the United States into using 

military force against the brigands. Malay pirates attacked an American 

merchant ship, the Friendship, while anchored off the coast of Quallah 

Battoo, Sumatra, on 7 February 1831. A boatload of armed Malays 

boarded the Friendship, killing three crewmen and wounding three others, 

while the captain and four other crewmen were ashore negotiating with the 

inhabitants of the village. Four sailors escaped the massacre and joined the 

captain, Charles Endicott, and his party who were saved by a Raja from a 

neighboring village. The Americans rowed to Muckie, some 25 miles away, 

and enlisted the help of three other American vessels. When the American 

merchant ships arrived at Quallah Battoo, the Raja refused to release the 

Friendship and return the goods plundered from it. The Americans used 

their guns to drive the Malays away from the Friendship and then boarded 

the ship without incident. The pirates stole all of the ship’s navigational 

instruments, trade goods, opium, and $40,000 in hard specie.49
100

When word of the incident reached the United States in the summer of 

1831, President Andrew Jackson ordered the Navy to investigate the affair 

and, if necessary, to secure restitution and ensure that the transgressors 

were punished. The 44-gun frigate Potomac, under the command of 

Commodore John Downes, left the United States on 26 August 1831. 

Downes’ orders authorized him to attack the village, reclaim the stolen 

goods, and punish the murderers if his inquiry confirmed Endicott’s story 

and the village Raja refused to cooperate. By the time Downes arrived at 

Quallah Battoo on 5 February, he had decided to ignore the first part of his 

orders, directing him to look into incident before acting. Convinced that 

the Malays were guilty, Downes attacked Quallah Battoo without warning 

on 6 February 1831. Early that morning, 282 sailors and marines assaulted 

four of the forts defending the town. Within hours, more than 100 Malays, 

including the Raja, were dead. The Americans suffered only 2 dead and 11 

wounded. The next day, Potomac fired several broadsides into the village, 

which prompted the Malays to surrender and submit to Downes. He warned 

the inhabitants that, if they attacked another American ship, the United 

States would respond with even more force. A few days later, he sailed into 

a neighboring village and delivered a similar message. After learning of 

Quallah Battoo’s fate, the Raja of that town as well as several surrounding 

villages precipitously promised to treat American ships as friends.50

Even before the Potomac returned home, Downes’ actions caused 

considerable political turmoil in Washington. The aftermath of the Quallah 

Battoo mission underscores the difficulty of dealing harshly with pirates. 

The Daily National Intelligencer, an anti-Jackson newspaper, severely 

criticized Jackson for making war without Congressional approval. While 

the newspaper agreed that the Federal Government had the right to punish 

the pirates, it maintained that only Congress had the authority to declare 

war and it considered the action at Quallah Battoo warfare. Downes’ 

actions put Jackson in a bad spot. Jackson did not reveal that Downes 

failed to comply with his orders, instead arguing that the punishment was 

justly deserved. With current international law ambiguous, this incident 

highlights one of the potential pitfalls facing modern naval forces if they 

use lethal force against modern-day pirates.

Although he severely punished the pirates, the impact of Downes’ 

actions was short lived and a second incident occurred in August 1837. The 

Eclipse, from Salem, was taking on pepper off Trabangan, when a group 

of armed Malays were allowed on board. They quickly killed the captain 

and an apprentice. Several other crewmen were wounded but allowed to 

escape by climbing the rigging or jumping overboard. Those who escaped 
101

ashore were saved by the Raja of Trabangan. The pirates stole 4 cases of 

opium and 18 casks of Spanish dollars.51

Before news of that incident arrived, President Martin Van Buren 

dispatched another naval force to the Orient to check on the situation in 

Sumatra and elsewhere. Commodore George Read set sail from Hampton 

Roads on 6 May 1838 on the Columbia, a 50-gun frigate. Columbia was 

accompanied by the sloop John Adams (30 guns), a veteran of the West 

Indies antipiracy campaign. While visiting Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 

in early December, Read learned of the attack perpetrated on Eclipse. He 

immediately set out for Sumatra, arriving there on 22 December. Learning 

from Downes’ mistake, Read did not act precipitously. Instead, he tried 

to negotiate with the Raja of Quallah Battoo. After 3 days of discussion, 

Read determined that the Raja was stalling and decided to act. The next 

day, Christmas 1838, he bombarded Quallah Battoo. The inhabitants 

surrendered within a half hour and Read refrained from further attack. 

Read then sailed over to the village of Muckie, where some of the chief 

instigators of the crime lived. Once again, negotiations failed, so Read 

attacked Muckie on New Years’ Day 1839. After a brief bombardment, 

320 sailors and marines landed on the beach and laid waste to the town. 

Read then transited to the third town involved in the crime, Susu. When 

he got there and discovered its miserable condition, Read refrained from 

attacking the village. Instead, he forced the ruler of Susu, along with many 

of the other local rulers, to promise not to attack American vessels in the 

future.52

By the mid-1830s, piracy was on the rise in the Malacca Strait. In 

May 1833, Singapore merchants estimated the value of their trade at 2 

million Spanish dollars. That trade, along with the commercial traffic that 

did not stop in Singapore, acted as a magnet for pirates. Singapore officials 

estimated that 40 to 50 pirate vessels were operating in the strait.53 When 

the world descended into an economic depression in the 1830s and 1840s, 

suppression of the East Indian pirates took on new importance because 

of the impact it had on trade.54 Losses to piracy depressed prices and 

discouraged merchants from trading with the East Indies. 

Any attempt at suppressing piracy in the region was complicated by 

the United Kingdom’s treaties with the various Malay Sultans. Most of the 

treaties prohibited British interference in local affairs. Since many of the 

Sultans gave support and cover to the pirates, intervention would infringe 

on the treaties.55 By the mid-1830s, piracy in the Malacca Strait became so 

obtrusive that the British began to act unilaterally. The Harrier (18-guns) 

eradicated two pirate settlements in the Strait of Malacca in 1834. Two 
102

years later, boats from the Andromache located and destroyed three pirate 

proas operating in the strait. During a running battle on 30 May 1836 that 

lasted long into the night, British sailors killed 113 Malays and captured 9 

while sustaining no casualties themselves. Disregarding Dutch protests, the 

British then moved against Galang Island in the Riau Archipelago. Even 

though they killed only a few brigands, the British razed three villages and 

burned dozens of proas. By smashing the corsairs’ havens, the British put 

a significant damper on further pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca.56

Similarly, British forces led by Captain Henry Keppel and James 

Brooke, who had used intrigue to become a native official known as the 

Raja of Sarawak, conducted a series of expeditions against the pirates 

operating along the northern coast of Borneo in the 1840s. Brooke and 

Keppel agreed that the most effective way to counter the pirates of Borneo 

was to destroy their strongholds far upriver. The first expedition set out up 

the Saribas River in July 1843. The mixed British and native force traveled 

up the river in eight boats. Over the next 9 days, the British-led force 

captured and destroyed three fortified villages. By 17 July, all of the tribes 

along the river submitted to Brooke. The next year, in August 1844, the 

pair led another expedition against a different pirate tribe. This time, they 

captured 4 forts, seized 60 brass cannon, burned numerous villages, and 

destroyed several hundred boats. This campaign broke the power of the 

pirate leader, Raja Seriff Sahib, who went into hiding. There were several 

more engagements with the pirates of Borneo in 1846. Still, those actions 

were not enough to convince the pirates to stop their piratical activities, so 

in July 1849, Brooke and a large British force under Commander Arthur 

Farquhar set out to subdue the Dyak pirates. During the Battle of Bantung 

Maru, 31 July 1849, the British force trapped the pirates and smashed 

their fleet. Perhaps as many as 800 pirates were killed and 60 vessels were 

destroyed. Although isolated instances of piracy continued to occur, the 

pirates of Borneo never recovered from this defeat.57

The American and British actions against the Malay pirates demonstrate 

the necessity of cleaning out pirate havens ashore. Both the Americans and 

British struck the pirates where they were most vulnerable: their shore 

bases. It is never easy to detect, identify, and destroy pirates at sea. The 

geography of the Malay Archipelago made that task even more difficult. 

Consequently, antipiracy forces eliminated their shore havens and thus 

neutralized the pirates.

Even though the impact of the first American expedition was short 

lived, and there were several more unsuccessful attacks on American ships 

in the 1840s, no more American merchant ships were taken by Malay 
103

pirates after the second expedition. Some of the credit for neutralizing the 

Malayan brigands must go to the vigorous American response to the attacks. 

But changing political conditions also contributed to the decline in attacks. 

The Dutch took control of Sumatra in 1846 and set up trade restrictions 

that prevented Americans from freely trading with the Sumatrans. By the 

mid-1850s, the once vigorous pepper trade had withered away to almost 

nothing. With little reason to visit Sumatra, few American merchant ships 

exposed themselves to the risk of Malay piracy after the mid-1850s.58

Similarly, the British campaigns in the Strait of Malacca and Borneo 

succeeded because they attacked the pirates in their lairs. But the success 

Brooke and Farquhar achieved was tainted by the high number of 

casualties inflicted on the native pirates. Both men were severely criticized 

in Parliament and in public.59 Their subsequent treatment underscores the 

challenges of dealing harshly with pirates. Even though such actions might 

be effective, public backlash might render them moot.

Chinese Piracy

Late one afternoon, a heavily armed junk got underway from Hong 

Kong en route to Swatow (Shantou), 180 miles to the north. Later that 

evening, when the winds died, the vessel dropped anchor to wait for better 

sailing conditions. While at anchor, the junk was accosted by pirates, 

who quickly overran the ship. After locking the passengers and crew 

below deck, the pirates sailed south toward Macao. The next morning, 

the pirates tied the hands and feet of all but one of the 83 passengers and 

crewmembers and flung them overboard to drown. They only spared a 

12-year-old boy, who they put to work as their servant. The pirates pulled 

into a small cove north of Macao and disposed of the junk’s cargo. Then, 

they burned the junk, and breaking up into smaller groups, they returned 

to Hong Kong. Seven of the pirates, along with the young boy, took a ferry 

from Macao to Hong Kong. The boy managed to tell the ferry’s captain 

what had happened, and the captain notified the Hong Kong police, who 

captured the seven pirates. When the boy’s story was corroborated by one 

of the passengers who managed to avoid drowning, the pirates were tried 

and executed.60

That story encapsulates much of the piracy rampant along the coast 

of China in the 19th century. Chinese piracy was frequently perpetrated 

against Chinese rather than foreign vessels. It was a bloody affair; if 

ransoms were not forthcoming, Chinese pirates frequently murdered their 

victims. Much of the piracy occurred in the vicinity of Hong Kong and 

Macao. And it conformed to the three conditions for piracy. The coast of 

China is inundated with many small coves, harbors, creeks, and inlets. 
104

These served as excellent hiding places for pirates, who darted out and 

attacked coastal vessels. China was in the vortex of political turmoil 

throughout much of the 19th century as the ruling Manchu dynasty slowly 

collapsed. Consequently, there were many safe locations from which 

the pirates could operate. Local officials, situated far from the centers 

of Chinese power, often protected the pirates and profited from their 

activities. Thus, the pirates were able to safely dispose of their plunder; 

repair their ships; and rest, recuperate, and recruit without fear of capture.

The first American ship to sail to China was the Empress of China, 

which arrived at Canton, China, on 28 August 1784.61 American trade with 

China grew gradually throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. 

From 1804 to 1812, on average, 29 American ships sailed for Asia. 

Between 1815 through 1820, that number increased to 39 ships.62 In 1832, 

30 American ships set out specifically for China.63 By 1820, American 

trade with China exceeded that of all nations except the United Kingdom.64

In 1832, that trade amounted to more than $1.5 million in exported goods 

and $5.3 million in products imported from China.65 Thus, protection of 

foreign trade from piracy, whether in Chinese waters or in other parts of 

the Far East, was an increasingly important task. (Figure 9 shows Hong 

Kong, Macao, and Canton.)

Figure 9. Hong Kong, Macao, and Canton.

0 10 20 miles

Ma ca o

South China Sea

Ch in a

Bias

Bay

Ho ng K o ng

Lantau

Is land

C a n to n
105

Although trade with China was even more important to the United 

Kingdom, it was a decidedly one-sided affair at first. The China trade, 

primarily tea, began expanding in the mid-18th century. The British East 

India Company imported 15 million pounds of tea from China in 1785.66

Because of their vast internal market, Chinese officials viewed trade with 

Great Britain with indifference. Everything they needed, most Chinese 

believed, could be produced from within.67 Even more frustrating to foreign 

diplomats, Chinese officials refused to deal with other nations on equal 

terms. They believed that China was the Middle Kingdom, suspended 

between heaven and earth. Consequently, since the Emperor was superior 

to all other rulers, Chinese officials treated foreign dignitaries as social 

and political inferiors. This caused considerable friction between Great 

Britain and China. It also meant that China would not countenance direct 

foreign trade because it was beneath them. Instead, all trade was conducted 

between middle men (co-hong) in one port—Canton. Foreign merchants 

feared offending the Chinese and precipitating a prohibition against foreign 

trade altogether, so they were reluctant to challenge Chinese conditions.68

One of the primary consequences of the Chinese mind-set was that 

Chinese officials insisted on receiving silver for their tea instead of trading 

for other goods they believed they did not need. That policy quickly 

led to a trade surplus that reached $26 million during 1800–1810.69 But 

the British soon developed a substitute for silver—opium. Although the 

Emperor forbade the importation of opium in 1730, imports continued to 

grow steadily. More than 1,000 chests70 of the drug were imported into 

China in 1773.71 Imports of opium grew to 34,000 chests in 1836. More 

important for the British, China’s trade surplus was transformed into a 

trade deficit of $38 million by 1836.72 But increased trade meant more 

pressure to protect the sealanes from pirates. By the mid-19th century, this 

became a main concern of both the British Government and Royal Navy.

As in other parts of the world, many ordinary Chinese citizens living 

along the coast participated in petty piracy. Temporary, seasonal piracy was 

common because sea conditions prevented most fishermen from working 

more than 120 to 150 days per year. During the summer months, when 

fishing was difficult and dangerous, many fishermen turned to low-level 

piracy. Taking advantage of the southerly winds, they sailed north and 

pillaged along the coast until the winds shifted in the fall. Such patterns 

led to the integration of piracy into the framework of coastal society, thus 

making it possible for pirates to blend back into society once the cruise 

was over.73
106

Chinese piracy remained relatively inconsequential until the early 

19th century when a vast pirate confederacy emerged. The impetus for the 

formation of this confederation was civil war in Vietnam—the Tay-son 

Rebellion. The Tay-son rebels recruited Chinese pirates to augment their 

naval forces during the war.74 When they were not fighting the deposed 

Vietnamese ruler’s forces, the pirates preyed on Chinese vessels in the 

Gulf of Tonkin. By 1796, the pirates were so successful that the Chinese 

Government could no longer ignore their activities. But when a squadron 

of gunboats tried to crush the pirates the following year, the government 

forces were routed.75 (Figure 10 shows the Hainan Island and the South 

China Sea.)

When the Tay-son Rebellion ended in defeat in 1802, the pirates returned 

to Chinese waters and began attacking native shipping. Outnumbering the 

government forces more than three to one, the pirates soon gained control 

of most of the southern coast of China.76 By 1809, the pirates threatened 

Canton itself.77 Fighting for the Tay-son rebels had taught the pirates 

Figure 10. Hainan Island and the South China Sea.

0 10 20 miles

C a n to n

South China

 Sea

Ch in a

Gulf of

Tonkin

Ho ng K o ng

P hilip p ines

Fo rmo s a

Hainan

East

China

Sea

Pacific

Ocean

Ma ca o

Am o y

Fo o ch ow

N in g p o

Sh a n g h a i
107

many valuable lessons. They were no longer loose gangs of petty pirates; 

they had become well organized both operationally and logistically. They 

were also much more skilled in combat than the government forces sent 

to suppress them.78 At first, the various pirate groups competed with one 

another for prizes, but in 1805, seven pirate leaders joined forces, creating 

a confederation that, at its height, encompassed more than 2,000 vessels 

of all sizes.79

China’s military was poorly organized and unable to effectively 

counter the pirates. Since the Chinese Government was concerned about 

rebellion originating on the periphery of the empire, it was reluctant to 

concentrate military power along the seacoast. Instead, it parceled out 

small units of soldiers in guard houses along the coast to protect against 

raiders. Moreover, China did not have an established fleet. Instead, it 

dispersed its naval forces among several independent naval districts that 

could not combine or coordinate their operations. Additionally, there were 

rules governing the size of vessels, which, in turn, limited the size of 

naval vessels because the Chinese did not build specific naval craft. Since 

the pirates did not comply with those rules, Chinese naval vessels were 

consistently smaller than and outgunned by the pirates.80 The result was 

that Chinese Government forces could never concentrate enough combat 

power to overwhelm the pirates and suffered a series of defeats during 

the first decade of the 19th century. By the end of the decade, government 

forces were afraid to put to sea.81

Unable to defeat the brigands, Chinese provincial leaders attempted 

to co-opt the pirates instead. Government officials implemented a “pardon 

and pacification” policy, in which any pirate who agreed to stop piracy 

received a pardon, money, and, if so desired, an appointment in the military 

or as a servant.82 Even though they continued to suffer defeats at sea, the 

pardon and pacification policy eventually worked, and by June 1810, the 

last of the corsair fleets were defeated by former pirate leaders.83

But the final victory against the pirates came much too late, for attacks 

on American and British flagged vessels opened the door for foreign naval 

involvement in the region. An American schooner, the Pilgrim, was captured in 1808 and its crew held for ransom.84 Five more US ships suffered 

attacks in 1809. By the summer of that year, it was clear that the government was unable to control the corsairs, and foreigners became concerned that the pirates might shut down all trade with China.85 Thus, in 

September 1809, when Chinese officials approached the “barbarians” in 

Macao for help, the Europeans were ready to act. The Chinese hired the 

British ship Mercury, which was armed with 20 cannon and manned by 50 
108

American merchant sailors, to confront the pirates. Later that same month, 

the Chinese leased six Portuguese warships to use against the pirates.86

While those forces were not able to defeat the brigands either, they set the 

precedent of foreign intervention against pirates in Chinese waters.

Acts of piracy in Chinese waters eventually drew a response from 

the navies of both the United States and Great Britain. The first US warship to visit China was the frigate Congress (36 guns), which arrived in 

November 1819. But her mission, protecting American commerce from 

piracy by convoying them out of the region, went unfulfilled because 

American merchants, fearful that accepting the Congress’ protection 

would offend the Chinese and precipitate a trade ban, refused to join any 

convoys. Congress, therefore, returned to the United States in May 1821 

with little to show for her effort.87 By the time the sloop Vincennes (18 

guns) arrived in 1830, after years of growing pirate activity, the attitude 

of American merchants toward naval intervention was much different. 

American merchants requested annual visits by a warship, and from the 

mid-1830s onward, the United States maintained at least one warship 

in Far Eastern waters to look after American interests. The East Indies 

Squadron was formally established in 1841.88

The Royal Navy increased its presence in Chinese waters during the 

1830s as well. That decision was due in part to the increase in piracy in the 

region. The antipiracy mission fell to the Royal Navy in 1834 when the 

East India Company’s monopoly on trade with China expired. From 1715 

until 1834, the East India Company was responsible for Anglo-Chinese 

relations. The company’s powerful East Indiamen and warships made the 

presence of Royal Navy warships in Chinese waters unnecessary.89 Very 

few Royal Navy ships visited China during that period. Like American 

merchants, the East India Company complied with the Chinese prohibition 

against foreign warships entering China’s territorial waters because of fear 

that failing to do so might trigger a trade ban.90 But British warships were 

disinclined to follow such rules, which led to conflict between China and 

Great Britain when the Crown took over responsibility for relations with 

China in 1834.

During the first few years after the expiration of the East India 

Company’s monopoly, the British Government maintained a hands-off 

approach. But an increasing number of incidents in the second half of the 

1830s led to a change in that policy. By the early 1840s, Chinese brigands not only were attacking native craft but also were targeting British, 

American, and European vessels. On 26 March 1841, they attacked the 

British vessel Blenheim and killed three British citizens.91 The British 
109

responded by dispatching the sloop Pylades (18 guns) to the Chusan 

Archipelago where she captured three pirate junks.92 Eventually, a permanent squadron consisting of one ship-of-the-line, one frigate, five sloops, 

and one steamship was established. A second frigate was added to the 

squadron in 1853.93

More attention was also paid to pirate hunting because it was potentially profitable. The British Parliament passed “An Act for Encouraging 

the Capture or Destruction of Piratical Ships and Vessels” in June 1825. 

This act paid a bounty of £20 for each pirate killed or captured and £5 for 

any pirate that was on the pirate vessel at the time of the attack who later 

escaped.94 So, there were significant monetary incentives to seek out and 

kill the brigands, even if they were hiding in Chinese territorial waters. 

The Chinese state had other problems in this period, with political 

turmoil threatening to overwhelm the Manchu dynasty in the 1840s and 

1850s.95 Friction between China and Great Britain burst into outright hostility in 1839 when the new Governor General of Canton, Lin Tse-hsu, 

tried to enforce the Emperor’s edict against the importation of opium into 

China. After 21⁄2 years of desultory warfare, the British forced the Chinese 

to submit. Among the reasons for the war, in Britain’s view, was the right 

to carry out and defend legitimate trade.96 The Treaty of Nanking, which 

ended the war, opened four more ports to British trade and ceded Hong 

Kong to Great Britain.97

A second, far more serious, war broke out in 1856. This time, the 

French teamed up with the British to punish the Chinese. After a delay 

caused by the Indian Mutiny, an Anglo-French task force assembled in 

Hong Kong in December 1857. The allies quickly took Canton. After they 

threatened to assault Peking, the Chinese agreed to negotiate. The Treaty 

of Tientsin, completed in June 1858, seemed to acknowledge political 

equality between China and the victors. It allowed for the establishment 

of a permanent residency in Peking, opened five more ports to trade, and 

allowed foreign travel in China with a passport. But the Chinese continued 

to equivocate, and the allies responded by marching on Peking. When they 

broke through the Chinese river defenses and began bombarding the city, 

the Chinese finally gave in.98

Those two wars, plus the Taiping Rebellion, which raged from 1850 

until 1864, tore the country apart and critically wounded the Manchu 

dynasty. The turmoil created by the wars greatly facilitated the proliferation of piracy in Chinese waters. It was difficult to tell who was a rebel and 

who was a pirate. With the central government unable to respond, pirates 

acted with growing impunity.
110

The acquisition of Hong Kong was problematic for the British. On 

the one hand, Hong Kong had an excellent harbor that could be developed 

for the Royal Navy and British merchants. On the other hand, many 

Chinese corsairs operated in or near Hong Kong. Hong Kong merchants 

and shopkeepers provided those pirates with substantial assistance. They 

furnished them with arms, ammunition, supplies, and information. In 

exchange, the merchants and shopkeepers bought the pirates’ stolen goods 

at cut-rate prices.99 Thus, the British were now responsible for controlling 

piracy in the waters surrounding Hong Kong.

Although the Governor of Hong Kong could prosecute pirates 

captured within 3 miles of shore and the Royal Navy could apprehend 

them on the high sea, corsairs operating within China’s territorial waters 

were subject only to Chinese laws. Since it was clear that the Chinese 

did not have the ability to suppress piracy in their territorial waters, this 

posed a dilemma for the British because the Treaty of Nanking did not 

grant Great Britain the right to pursue pirates in those waters.100 Chinese 

determination not to extend any further privileges to the British resulted 

in restrictive rules of engagement for the Royal Navy. At the insistence of 

the British Superintendent of Trade, Vice Admiral William Parker ordered 

his captains to refrain from attacking possible pirate vessels unless they 

personally observed a piratical act.101 The result was an upsurge of piracy 

after 1842.

By 1846, the Admiralty Board considered piracy such a problem that 

it advised the Commander of the East Indian and China Station, Rear 

Admiral Samuel Hood Inglefield, that “suppression of the system of 

Piracy prevailing on the Coast of Fukien as far as it may be practicable to 

accomplish it, is an object of great importance to our commercial interests 

and to the improvement of our relations with China.”102 Soon, the new 

British commander, Rear Admiral Francis A. Collier, eased up on the 

requirement to personally observe an act of piracy before taking action. To 

allay Chinese concerns, Collier tried to work with the Chinese whenever 

he could.103 Thus, the conditions were set for a more aggressive response 

to the pirates in the late 1840s and 1850s. 

There were plenty of opportunities for action and British and American 

naval forces frequently operated together against Chinese pirates. In 1849, 

the United States sloop Preble (16 guns), operating in support of British 

naval forces, helped capture 57 junks and destroy two pirate havens.104 The 

British sloop Pilot (16 guns) spent the entire summer of 1849 looking for 

pirates along the east coast of China.105

British and American forces conducted a successful campaign against 

the Chinese pirate Shap-ng-tsai and his associate Chui-Apoo in 1849. 
111

Chui-Apoo murdered two English officers in February 1849 in Hong 

Kong, thus bringing down the fury of the Crown on him. The British brig 

Columbine (12 guns), with help from the paddle-wheel sloop Fury (6 

guns), the Peninsula and Orient Company steamer Canton, and boats from 

the HMS Hastings, destroyed Chui-Apoo’s fleet during two encounters on 

28–29 September 1849. British forces destroyed 23 pirate junks and killed 

an estimated 400 of the 1,800 pirates engaged.106

One month later, in October 1849, Columbine, caught up with Shapng-tsai. Shap-ng-tsai’s pirates devastated the southern coast of China 

in the spring and summer of 1849. He even had the temerity to attack 

a British-owned junk off Hainan in June. Accompanied by a Chinese 

official and eight imperial warships, Columbine went in search of Shapng-tsai. The coalition force finally caught up with Shap-ng-tsai and his 

pirates on 20 October. Over the next 2 days, British and Imperial Chinese 

forces destroyed 58 pirate ships, including Shap-ng-tsai’s, and killed some 

1,700 pirates with the loss of only one man. Both Shap-ng-tsai and ChuiApoo escaped. Shap-ng-tsai was eventually pardoned and co-opted into 

the Chinese bureaucracy while Chui-Apoo was captured and committed 

suicide while in jail.107

Despite the successes achieved in 1849, pirate attacks continued. The 

China Mail reported pirate attacks on a weekly basis. A British official 

complained that “there does not appear to have been any piracy committed 

on a grand scale, but the seas continue to be infested by a class of rovers 

who are fishermen, traders, or Pirates, as it serves their turn.” The British 

squadron in Chinese waters, while successful, was too small to be effective, 

and it had too many responsibilities to provide continual protection to any 

one location.108

After a short interlude caused by the First Opium War, antipiracy 

operations resumed in 1853. In May of that year, the Rattler (11 guns), a 

screw-propelled sloop, engaged seven corsair junks and an eighth vessel 

near Namquan. The pirates had recently captured a merchant convoy 

and were waiting there for their prizes to be ransomed. Gunfire from the 

Rattler sunk the pirate commander’s junk and one other vessel, which 

disheartened the pirates. The other junks beached themselves, and the 

brigands tried to escape ashore. But angry peasants on the beach hunted 

down and killed most of the pirates. One group seized a nearby junk, 

murdered the crew, and tried to escape upriver. The Rattler’s cutter caught 

up with the pirates, but when the British sailors tried to board the junk, an 

officer and two sailors were killed and the survivors were driven off. The 

Rattler’s commander reported that they killed 500 pirates; captured 84 

guns, 4 junks, and 1 lorcha; and sank 2 junks and burned a third.109
112

By 1854, civil disturbances sparked by the Taiping Rebellion added 

to the piracy problem in China. The Pearl River was almost impassable 

for Chinese vessels, and even foreign ships were attacked while trying 

to make the transit up river to Canton. Conditions were almost as bad 

in Shanghai.110 When Commodore Matthew C. Perry withdrew the East 

Indies Squadron from China so he could make a more impressive showing 

in Japan, his action caused an uproar in the American merchant community. 

To appease the merchants, Perry leased a British-owned steamboat, the 

Queen, and left her behind to protect American commercial interests. The 

Queen was manned with 20 American and 10 Chinese sailors and armed 

with 4 small guns. Its first commander was Lieutenant Alfred Taylor from 

the side-wheel steamer Mississippi (10 guns).111 Later that year, Lieutenant 

George H. Preble was detached from the sloop Macedonian (36 guns) and 

given temporary command of the Queen.

112

With the situation becoming more serious each day, the British decided 

to act. Since they expected most of the encounters to occur in Chinese 

territorial waters, the Governor of Hong Kong asked the Chinese to join 

the coalition against the pirates. Chinese officials agreed and sent a highranking official and a war junk to participate in the operation. American 

and Portuguese naval forces as well as Chinese merchants also contributed 

to the operation. By November 1854, the British had gathered together a 

task force consisting of the screw-propelled sloop Encounter (14 guns), 

the paddle-wheel sloop Barracouta (6 guns) and the paddle-wheel sloop 

Styx (6 guns), a launch from the Winchester, and the pinnace from the 

Spartan. Other vessels included the Queen, the Portuguese Amazon, two 

Peninsula & Orient Company steamers hired by Chinese merchants, and 

the Chinese war junk.113

One of the first actions by the newly established coalition force 

occurred in early November when the Queen discovered a large group 

of corsairs anchored in Taiho Harbor on the north side of Lantau Island. 

Since the Queen was unable to close with the pirates because of shoal 

water, Preble returned to Hong Kong and requested assistance from Rear 

Admiral Sir James Stirling. Admiral Stirling sent the Encounter and some 

armed boats to help. Encounter used her guns to drive the brigands off 

their ships. Boarding parties in the armed boats captured and burned 17 

pirate vessels.114

Following that mission, Admiral Stirling led seven allied vessels 

against the Chinese corsair Aw-ung, who was thought to be hiding near 

Khulan (Coulan) on a nearby island. The allies attacked the brigands on 

11 November 1854, destroying 50 junks, razing 3 villages, and smashing 
113

3 shore batteries. Although the coalition force killed 90 pirates, its losses 

were light. Only one American, a sailor off the Macedonian, was killed.115

In February 1855, the British brig Bittern (12 guns) rescued the British 

schooner Zephyr, which was held captive on the River Min near Wanchew. 

The sailors captured 3 pirate junks and 64 corsairs. Eight or nine other 

vessels got away.116

Later, Preble commanded two more missions against brigands in 

the vicinity of Shanghai. In June 1855, Preble led an armed party on the 

towboat Confucius to Foochow and Ningpo. Along the way, they escorted 

a convoy of 250 junks carrying timber and successfully engaged five 

pirate vessels. The next month, Preble joined a British expedition against 

corsairs operating in the Yellow Sea. Once again, Preble sailed on the 

Confucius. This time, the allies aborted the mission after their support 

vessel, the coal brig Clown, foundered in heavy seas.117 (Figure 11 shows 

Nanking (Nanjing), Shanghai, and Ningpo (Ningbo).)

The British sloop Racehorse (18 guns) discovered a pirate flotilla 

while searching the Chinese coast between Amoy and Foochow. The 

Figure 11. Nanking (Nanjing), Shanghai, and Ningpo (Ningbo).

Fo 0 50 100 miles rmo s a

Fo o ch ow

East China Sea

Ch in a

Chusan Archipelago

Sh e i p o o

N in g p o

N a n kin g

Sh a n g h a i
114

next day, 26 June 1855, a cutter from the Racehorse captured one of the 

corsairs’ vessels and burned it. That afternoon, two more pirate junks were 

engaged. One was captured and the other burned. A captured lorcha was 

liberated and returned to Amoy.118

A few weeks later, on 4 July 1855, Racehorse captured a pirate junk. 

Unfortunately, during the same engagement, Racehorse suffered nine 

casualties while trying to capture a larger junk. As the sloop’s gig pulled 

up alongside the pirate ship, a stinkpot was dropped into the gig, igniting 

the ammunition in the boat. All nine sailors were blown out of the boat. 

While all nine crewmen were recovered, seven received severe injuries, 

two of whom subsequently died. Meanwhile, the vessel approached the 

junk unnoticed and blasted away at the corsairs. With their ship full of 

holes, the brigands ran it ashore to prevent it from sinking. Most of the 

pirates were either killed or drowned. Those who survived were captured 

by Racehorse’s crew or villagers living nearby.119

In late July 1855, three trading junks and a fourth vessel were captured 

by pirates while under escort by the armed steamer Eaglet. When Rattler

learned of the incident, she went in search of the pirates. Rattler located 

the pirates in Khulan Harbor, scene of a battle the previous November. 

Unfortunately, Rattler was unable to engage the brigands because she 

drew too much water to enter the anchorage and did not have enough small 

boats to take on the pirates. Consequently, Rattler returned to Hong Kong 

and requested assistance from the Powhatan. Rattler got underway on 3 

August, towing three small boats from the Powhatan that were manned 

by 100 American sailors and marines and armed with a howitzer. The 

next morning, 4 August, the shallow-draft Eaglet took both the Rattler’s 

and Powhatan’s boats under tow and steamed into the anchorage. When 

a private vessel tried to escape, the Rattler’s pinnace and the Powhatan’s 

cutter moved to cut it off. Just as the two boats rowed out of view, the 

rest of the small flotilla discovered the main pirate force—36 war junks. 

Although the corsairs directed heavy cannon fire toward the allies, it was 

ineffective. But the aim of the British and American sailors was not. They 

sank six vessels and captured 14 large junks although 16 smaller ones 

escaped. They also liberated seven junks. Two of the junks could not be 

salvaged and were burned along with the 14 captured pirate vessels.120

The Bittern continued operations against the pirates during the summer 

of 1855. Over the last 2 weeks in August, Bittern engaged a pirate fleet 

composed of 30 to 40 vessels and destroyed 20 of them. On 19 August, 

Bittern attacked corsairs in the Gulf of Leotung (Liaodong Wan) and sank 

eight vessels. Most of the brigands fled south, and Bittern caught up with 
115

13 of the pirate ships the next day and captured or sank 11 of them. Finally, 

on 30 August, Bittern discovered one more pirate vessel from the original 

flotilla and destroyed it as well.121

A few weeks later, on 18 September 1855, Bittern, along with the 

hired armed ship Paoushun, engaged 22 pirate vessels near Sheipoo. 

During a sharp fight that lasted more than an hour, Bittern devastated the 

corsair fleet. After the battle, Bittern determined that only one of the 22 

vessels was seaworthy, so her crew destroyed the rest of them. Some of 

the brigands tried to flee ashore but they were killed by peasants from 

neighboring villages. The commander of the Bittern noted that, since the 

mandarin in Sheipoo was almost totally helpless, the village near where 

the corsairs were discovered, which he described as “thoroughly piratical,” 

was clearly a haven for the pirates.122

Despite those efforts, piracy remained a problem throughout the 1860s. 

But a series of measures implemented by British and Chinese authorities 

reduced piracy to acceptable levels by the end of the decade. The Treaty of 

Tientsin, which ended the Second Opium War, granted the British the right 

to enter Chinese waters in pursuit of pirates.123 Later, the United States 

received similar concessions from the Chinese.124 More important, the new 

Governor of Hong Kong implemented reforms in 1866 that ended Hong 

Kong’s role as a haven for brigands. Helping pirates in any way, whether 

by providing them with arms and supplies, protecting them, or receiving 

their plunder was a violation of the law and subjected the violator to heavy 

penalties.125 Although the British organized a coalition antipiracy task force, 

including Chinese, American, Dutch, Portuguese, and Prussian ships in the 

mid-1860s, by the end of the decade, the British sought to disengage from 

antipiracy operations.126 Instead, they tried to provide the Chinese with 

the military and administrative tools necessary to do the job themselves. 

For example, in 1869, the Chinese received two gunboats for use against 

pirates. They also ordered three small armed steamers that same year.127

While one cannot claim that corsairs no longer roamed Chinese waters, 

these measures made it possible for the United Kingdom to scale back its 

antipirate activities after 1870. 

Piracy in Chinese waters flourished because of the three primary pillars. 

There was favorable geography. Much of the piracy was concentrated in 

the approaches to Canton. Those waters are filled with small islands, bays, 

coves, and inlets, all of which made ideal hiding places for pirates. China 

also suffered from political turmoil throughout much of this period. The 

Chinese fought two wars with the United Kingdom and, in between the 

two wars, was wracked by rebellion. Chinese pirates profited from those 
116

circumstances. One of the benefits was safe havens ashore. In many areas, 

local officials were unable to effectively govern, thus allowing the pirates 

to act with impunity. But their most important haven was Hong Kong. 

Until the reforms of the late 1860s, pirates freely walked the streets of the 

colony. They were able to resupply, gather intelligence, and dispose of 

their plundered goods there. Thus, for much of the 19th century, conditions 

in China made piracy a profitable venture. 

But the story of antipiracy operations in China also underscores other 

conditions that limited the viability of piracy. One of the most important 

was that pirates did not always operate in friendly or benign environments. 

On more than one occasion, British and American officers reported that 

villagers attacked and killed the brigands who tried to escape ashore. 

Therefore, Chinese pirates, unlike their Greek and Arab contemporaries, 

could not always count on safe havens ashore. Moreover, British and 

American actions to suppress piracy occurred during the transition from 

wind power to steam power. This was an important development, for the 

antipirate naval forces had a significant technological advantage over 

their foes whenever steamships were added to the mix. Since British 

and American naval forces often engaged the pirates in rivers or in 

shallow bays, where it is difficult to maneuver sailing ships, steampowered vessels provided them with a decided advantage. The war 

against Chinese corsairs also demonstrated the superiority of British and 

American weapons, tactics, and discipline, which enabled them to defeat 

much larger pirate forces with minimal losses. Unlike earlier antipirate 

campaigns, the British and Americans had the right ships and tactics 

from the beginning. 

Thus, the battle waged by British and American naval forces against the 

Chinese pirates serves as a bridge between modern antipiracy operations 

and those of the age of sail. Even though the pirates had the advantages 

of geography, political turmoil, and sanctuaries ashore, the British and 

Americans were able to limit the scope of their actions. Technology, not 

overwhelming force, enabled them to do so.
117

Notes

1. Ralph T. Ward, Pirates in History (Baltimore, MD: York Press, 1974), 

1–2.

2. Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 

1932), 265.

3. Middle East Research and Information Project, “Neo-Piracy in Oman 

and the Gulf: The Origins of British Imperialism in the Gulf,” MERIP Reports, 

no. 36 (April 1975): 4.

4. L.E. Sweet, “Pirates or Polities? Arab Societies of the Persian or Arabian 

Gulf, 18th Century,” Ethnohistory 11, no. 3 (Summer 1964): 265.

5. Country traders were East India Company officials acting in a private 

capacity or Indian merchants operating under license by the East India Company, 

which found it expedient to allow private merchants to conduct external trade, 

especially the ever growing opium trade with China. See C.M. Turnbull, “Country 

Traders,” in Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia From Angkor Wat to East 

Timor, Ooi Keat Gin, ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 389–390; C.E. 

Davies, “Britain, Trade and Piracy: The British Expeditions Against Ras AlKhaima of 1809–10 and 1819–20,” in Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, Charles 

E. Davies, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 36.

6. “Neo-Piracy in Oman and the Gulf,” 4.

7. Patricia Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence 

in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region During a Long Eighteenth 

Century,” Journal of World History 12, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 2.

8. James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, 

and the British in the 19th Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 

35.

9. This tribe is also referred to as the Joasmees and Jowasim in various 

sources.

10. J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880 (Oxford: Clarendon 

Press, 1968), 105.

11. Sweet, 271.

12. Ras al-Khaymah, which is sometimes identified as Ras-al-Khyma, 

Ras al-Khaimah, and Ras al-Khaima, is located in what is now the United Arab 

Emirates.

13. Bushehr may also be spelled Bushire or Bushir.

14. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 255–256.

15. Onley, 44.

16. Kelly, 106.

17. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 257.

18. Kelly, 111.

19. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 257.
118

20. The Arabs traditionally honored a truce during the summer months when 

they harvested pearls. Raiding resumed during the winter months. See Sweet, 

275.

21. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 257–258.

22. Kelly, 114.

23. Ibid., 116.

24. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 263.

25. “HMS Caroline,” Michael Phillips’ Ships of the Old Navy, http://www.

ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.php?ref=0460 (accessed 15 January 2009). 

Linga (Bandar-e Lingeh) is located on the mainland of Persia. Luft (Laft) is 

located on the island of Jazireh-ye Qeshm.

26. Kelly, 129–132.

27. Gosse, The History of Piracy, 264; Kelly, 133–134.

28. Kelly, 137.

29. Ibid., 149.

30. “HMS Liverpool,” Michael Phillips’ Ships of the Old Navy, http://www.

ageofnelson.org/MichaelPhillips/info.php?ref=1348 (accessed 14 January 2009).

31. Kelly, 154–156.

32. Risso, 11.

33. Kelly, 205–208.

34. The terms East Indies and Malay Archipelago will be used 

interchangeably in this chapter. The CIA World Fact Book defines the Malay 

Archipelago as the modern-day nations of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua 

New Guinea, and the Philippines and their surrounding waters. See The CIA 

World Fact Book (Washington, DC: Office of Public Affairs, 2008), https://

www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendixf.html (accessed 23 February 2009). 

35. Anthony Reid, “An ‘Age of Commerce’ in Southeast Asian History,” 

Modern Asian Studies 24, no. 1 (February 1990): 9.

36. Ibid., 7.

37. H.R.C. Wright, “The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in the East, 1814–1824,” The 

Economic History Review 3, no. 2 (1950): 231.

38. The CIA World Fact Book.

39. Proas are wooden boats of 35 to 50 feet displacing some 6 to 8 tons. They 

were typically armed with one or two small bow-mounted cannon and four swivel 

guns on both sides. They carried crews of 20 to 30 men. See Charles Ellms, The 

Pirates Own Book: Authentic Narratives of the Most Celebrated Sea Robbers

(Philadelphia, PA: Thomas, Cowperthwait, & Co., 1837), 106.

40. David Cordingly, consulting ed. Pirates: Terror on the High Seas From 

the Caribbean to the South China Sea (Atlanta, GA: Turner Publishing, 1996), 

189.

41. David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities 

of United States Naval Officers, 1798–1833 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval 

Institute Press, 1988), 252.

42. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 190.
119

43. Charles O. Paullin, American Voyages to the Orient, 1690–1865: An 

Account of Merchant and Naval Activities in China, Japan, and the Various 

Pacific Islands (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1971), 43.

44. Long, 252.

45. Paullin, 23.

46. Ellms, 107–108. See also Gosse, The History of Piracy, 285–286.

47. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 193.

48. Ibid., 194–195.

49. Paullin, 44–45; Long, 252–253.

50. Paullin, 45–53; Long, 253.

51. Paullin, 79; Long, 256–257.

52. Paullin, 79–83; Long, 256–258.

53. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 195.

54. Nicholas Tarling, Imperial Britain in South-East Asia (London: Oxford 

University Press, 1975), 66.

55. Ibid., 58.

56. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 196–198.

57. Ibid., 198–205; Gosse, The History of Piracy, 288–294; and William L. 

Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, vol. VI 

(London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1901), 332–336; 362–363.

58. Long, 259–260; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and 

the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 49.

59. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 205.

60. Captain H.C. St. John, RN, Notes and Sketches From the Wild Coasts of 

Nipon, With Chapters on Cruising After Pirates in Chinese Waters (Edinburgh: 

David Douglas, 1880), 279–282.

61. Paullin, 9.

62. Ibid., 23.

63. Robert E. Johnson, Far China Station: The US Navy in Asian Waters, 

1800–1898 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1979), 3.

64. Paullin, 23.

65. Johnson, Far China Station, 3.

66. Peter Lowe, Britain in the Far East: A Survey From 1819 to the Present

(London: Longman, 1981), 9.

67. Donald MacIntyre, Sea Power in the Pacific: A History From the 

Sixteenth Century to the Present Day (New York: Russell and Co., 1972), 62.

68. Long, 208.

69. Lowe, 10.

70. A chest of opium contained 140 to 160 pounds of the drug. See MacIntyre, 

64.

71. Ibid.

72. Lowe, 10.

73. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 214–215.

74. Dian H. Murray, Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790–1810 (Stanford, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 35.
120

75. Ibid., 43–45.

76. Cordingly remarks that just before the formation of the confederation, 

some 70,000 pirates operated 400 junks along the coast of China. See Cordingly, 

Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 222.

77. Ibid., 234.

78. Ibid., 222–225.

79. Murray, 91.

80. Grace E. Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832–1869

(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940), 84.

81. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 232.

82. Murray, 114.

83. Ibid., 144.

84. Ibid., 85.

85. Ibid., 132.

86. Cordingly, Pirates: Terror on the High Seas, 235.

87. Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. 

Putnam’s Sons, 1936), 145–146.

88. Long, 209.

89. Fox, 25–26.

90. Ibid., 30.

91. Ibid., 88.

92. Ibid., 89.

93. Ibid., 60–61.

94. Ibid., 85–86.

95. The First Opium War (1840–1842), the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1865), 

and the Second Opium War (1856–1860).

96. MacIntyre, 84–91.

97. The treaty ports were Canton (Gangzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow 

(Fuzhou), Ningpo (Nanjing), and Shanghai. See Long, 212.

98. MacIntyre, 103–107.

99. Fox, 94.

100. Ibid., 90–91.

101. Ibid., 98–99.

102. Ibid., 102.

103. Ibid., 105.

104. Long, 218.

105. Fox, 107.

106. Ibid., 107–108.

107. Ibid., 107–109.

108. Ibid., 122.

109. Clowes, vol. VI, 385–386.

110. Fox, 123.

111. Johnson, Far China Station, 67–68.

112. Long, 218.

113. Fox, 123–125.
121

114. Johnson, Far China Station, 77.

115. Ibid.

116. Fox, 130–131.

117. Johnson, Far China Station, 78.

118. Clowes, vol. VI, 388.

119. Ibid., 388–389.

120. Ibid., 389–390; Long, 218; Johnson, Far China Station, 79.

121. Clowes, vol. VI, 390; Commander E.W. Vansittart to Rear Admiral Sir 

J. Stirling, letter dated 2 September 1855, in Allen’s Indian Mail and Register of 

Intelligence for British and Foreign India, China, and All Parts of the East, vol. 

XIV, January–December 1856 (London: Wm. H. Allen and Co., 1856), 48–49.

122. Clowes, vol. VI, 390; Vansittart to Stirling letter, 49–50.

123. Fox, 143.

124. Ibid., 145.

125. Ibid., 156–159.

126. Ibid., 175.

127. Ibid., 183.

123

Chapter 5

Modern Piracy

The headlines read “Somali Pirates’ Unexpected Booty: Russian 

Tanks”1; “Ship Seized by Somali Pirates Carrying 33 Russian Tanks”2; 

and, more ominously for the pirates, “US Navy Watches Seized Ship With 

Sudan-Bound Tanks.”3 In an unprecedented act on 25 September 2008, 

Somali pirates captured the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter carrying 

33 T-72 tanks and other weapons. Explaining the event, the pirates’ 

spokesman, Sugule Ali Omar said, “We saw a big ship, so we decided to 

capture it, and later we discovered that it was carrying tanks. That made us 

happy because we got a chance to demand more money.”4 They did indeed 

demand more money—$35 million at first. But the opportunity for more 

money also sparked a crisis that resulted in increased international pressure 

to end piracy emanating from Somalia. As one intelligence official noted, 

they “might get more than they bargained for.”5

This was the Somali pirates’ most brazen attack up to that point. 

The pirates seized the ship on Thursday, 25 September 2008, some 200 

miles off the Somali coast and sailed it into Somali territorial waters near 

Hobyo.6 The international reaction was swift. The USS Howard arrived 

in the vicinity of the MV Faina later that same day and began continuous 

surveillance of the ship.7 According to Rear Admiral Kendall Card, commander of the task force that monitored the Faina, Howard’s mission was 

to ensure that no weapons left the ship. Admiral Card recalled that it was 

made quite clear to the Somalis that the task force was in Somali territorial 

waters under the authority of the United Nations and that it would sink 

any vessel that tried to offload the Faina’s military cargo.8 The seizure of 

the Faina changed the game. Almost immediately, Russia announced that 

it was sending a warship to the area to protect Russian merchant vessels.9

Soon, other nations sent ships to the region as well. Some came under the 

auspices of NATO or the European Union. Others, such as China, India, 

and Japan, came to protect their individual nations’ interests.

Seemingly oblivious to the scrutiny, the pirates settled in and waited 

to collect their ransom. On 23 October, almost a month into the standoff, 

the pirates’ spokesman reiterated that they would hold the ship as long as it 

took to get the money they demanded. Sugule Ali Omar asserted that “they 

are not worried at all. They are comfortable and ready to wait.”10

Conditions were not as pleasant for the hostages. The Faina’s captain 

died of a heart attack soon after the ship was taken. The rest of the crew 

survived, but their living conditions were grim. The Somali freebooters 
124

locked them in a single room and only let them out once or twice each 

week. Water and food were in short supply, and they lived in constant fear 

of their guards. When the Americans demanded that the crew be brought 

topside to be observed and checked out, the Faina’s sailors thought they 

were about to be executed.11

Finally, even the pirates began to tire of the drama, and they lowered 

their ransom demand. After several more rounds of talks, at long last, they 

agreed to release the ship for $3.2 million. On Thursday, 5 February 2009, 

the ship’s owners delivered the cash to the modern-day buccaneers via 

parachute. Once they collected their money, the pirates left the ship and, 

after 51⁄2 months of captivity, the Faina was free.12 Soon thereafter, Faina

departed the area under an American escort and arrived at its original 

destination, Mombasa, Kenya, on 12 February 2009.

According to Secretary of the US Navy Gordon R. England, “The 

seas are un-policed and unregulated and, therefore, attractive to those who 

want to exploit and abuse them.”13 Although he made that comment in 

2004, nothing has occurred over the last 6 years to undermine the validity 

of that statement. In fact, the late 20th and early 21st centuries, rather 

than the late 16th and early 17th centuries, may be the real “Golden Age 

of Piracy.” Estimates are that the buccaneers of the West Indies captured 

about 2,400 ships during 1716–1726 or about 218 per year.14 By way of 

comparison, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 3,521 

pirate attacks over the last 11 years (1998–2008), an average of 320 per 

year.15 If, as the IMB and others suggest, 50 to 90 percent of all attacks 

are not even reported, then the comparison looks even more dramatic.16

Clearly, piracy has emerged as a real problem over the last three decades. 

The Emergence of Piracy in the Late 20th Century

The history of international awareness of and concern with modern 

piracy dates back to the early 1980s. The International Chamber of 

Commerce established the International Maritime Bureau in 1981. Although 

its primary responsibility was countering maritime fraud, it soon started 

working to counter other types of maritime crime, such as piracy.17 During 

a 1983 meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee of the International 

Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN agency responsible for legislation 

to “improve the safety and security of international shipping,” Sweden 

raised concerns about the prevalence of piracy off the coast of West Africa. 

Sweden had a strong trading relationship with Nigeria—oil and raw 

materials for Swedish machinery—but piratical acts were damaging that 

trade. Since the Nigerian Government was unable to rectify the situation, 

Sweden turned to the United Nations.18 Responding to Sweden’s concerns, 
125

the IMO adopted a resolution in November 1983 that urged governments 

to “take, as a matter of the highest priority, all measures necessary to 

prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in or 

adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of security measures.”19

The resolution, Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 

Against Ships, also requested nations to report incidents of piracy to the 

IMO. With this measure, piracy achieved visibility at the international 

level for the first time in many decades.20

Despite the IMO request that nations report incidents of piracy, few 

did. Only West Germany, Japan, and Greece submitted reports on a regular 

basis.21 In a 1983 report to the IMO, the IMB postulated four reasons why 

nations or shipowners might forgo reporting incidents: 

1. Negative press reports of pirate attacks might hurt 

a nation’s commerce.

2. Reporting incidents might anger local officials, 

leading to retaliatory actions by local officials.

3. Merchant mariners might refuse to sail into danger 

areas or demand hazardous duty pay, thus increasing costs 

for shipowners.

4. Evidence of piracy might lead to increased 

insurance costs.22

In addition to these reasons, which remain valid today, many shipping 

companies cite the costs associated with investigations and court 

proceedings as reasons to avoid reporting attacks. Every day that a vessel 

remains in port while law enforcement officials investigate an incident costs 

the shipping company $25,000 or more.23 Moreover, it is often difficult 

and expensive for witnesses to return to foreign countries to testify during 

court proceedings. Thus, many shipowners encourage, and even direct, 

their masters to refrain from reporting pirate attacks. 

Despite those concerns, the number of reported incidents rose in the 

early 1990s. That increase, coupled with the belief that the reports did 

not accurately reflect the true scope of the problem, convinced many in 

the shipping industry that they needed a better reporting mechanism. In 

October 1992, the Regional Piracy Center, an agency of the IMB, began 

operations in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.24 Malaysia was chosen as the site 

of the new center because Southeast Asia was the region most affected 

by piracy at the time. But officials in several regional countries reacted 

negatively to the establishment of the center, apparently concerned that 

the center’s name, Regional Piracy Center, reflected negatively on their 

nations and might harm their country’s commercial interests. Even though 
126

the center’s name was changed to the Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in 

1997, regional nations remain ambivalent about the PRC.25

The PRC is a piracy information clearinghouse. Merchant ships 

victimized by piracy report incidents to the PRC. The center, in turn, 

issues piracy and armed robbery reports via voice communications, 

ensuring mariners are aware of incidents and danger areas. At the same 

time, it provides assistance to victims, shipowners, and law enforcement 

agencies. The PRC has, on several occasions, provided law enforcement 

agencies with vital intelligence that led directly to the apprehension of the 

criminals. Finally, the PRC publishes weekly updates on pirate activity 

over the Internet as well as comprehensive quarterly and annual reports.26

Although self-reporting by victims has increased the number of incidents 

reported, the IMB still suspects that no more than half of all occurrences 

are reported to the PRC.27

Even more basic to the problem of reporting and understanding modernday piracy is the contentiousness surrounding the definition of piracy. 

There are two competing definitions. The United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was enacted in 1982, narrowly 

defines piracy as:

a. Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 

of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 

the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 

directed: 

1) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 

against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

2) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 

place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

b. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 

a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it 

a pirate ship or aircraft; 

c. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 

act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).28

According to the United Nations, piracy can only occur on the high 

seas. A criminal act committed in territorial waters is not piracy. It is, 

instead, “armed robbery against ships,” which the United Nations defines 

as “any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, 

or threat thereof, other than an act of ‘piracy,’ directed against a ship or 

against persons or property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction 

over such offences.”29
127

What makes the UN’s narrow definition of piracy problematic is the 

phrase “high seas.” Territorial waters, which were generally limited to 

3 nautical miles prior to UNCLOS, were extended to 12 nautical miles 

by the convention. A second 12-mile zone, the contiguous zone, further 

extended the control of coastal nations out to 24 miles. The contiguous 

zone is not necessarily part of the high seas, where countries can act to 

suppress piracy, because UNCLOS allows nations to enforce their customs, immigration, and sanitary regulations within this zone. Finally, 

UNCLOS permits nations to establish an exclusive economic zone, up 

to 200 miles from the coast, within which they can regulate fishing and 

control the exploitation of resources under the seabed such as oil and gas. 

Both the contiguous and exclusive economic zones introduce ambiguity 

into the definition of high seas and thus piracy because some legal theorists argue that neither zone constitutes the high seas.30

Meanwhile, the IMB defines piracy much more broadly. According 

to the IMB, piracy is “an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship 

with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the 

apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”31

Thus, the IMB reports and tracks any attack, or attempted attack, whether 

in port, at anchor, or underway as an actual piratical incident. 

The problem is that the definition of piracy under UNCLOS transforms 

most acts of piracy into armed robbery against ships since a majority of the 

incidents do not take place on the high seas. Instead, as in the days of the 

buccaneers and Barbary corsairs, contemporary pirates generally operate 

close to shore, within the territorial waters of sovereign nations, where 

they can hide from potential victims until they strike and more easily avoid 

law enforcement authorities. In 2003, for example, only 27 percent of the 

445 reported incidents occurred on the high seas.32 Of the 210 incidents 

that occurred while underway, only 58 percent took place in international 

waters.33

For both the victims of the crime and those charged with suppressing it, the distinction between acts of piracy on the high seas and armed 

robbery of ships at sea in territorial waters is a “distinction without difference.”34 There is little difference between being assaulted by Somali 

pirates in the Indian Ocean, hundreds of miles beyond Somali’s territorial 

waters, and being accosted by pirates in Indonesian territorial waters in the 

Strait of Malacca. But under the UN’s definition, the first is piracy while 

the second is not. More important, other nations can legally act against the 

former but not the latter.
128

Regardless of the definition, piracy encompasses a wide range of 

actions, from petty theft in port to permanently stealing a ship. There is, 

however, a significant difference between the level of violence associated 

with petty theft conducted in port or at anchor and piracy against ships 

underway. Criminal attacks on ships in port are typically less violent than 

attacks while underway. The pirates usually want to get on and off the 

ship quickly so they target things they can easily access and steal. For 

example, they might take paint, rope, spare parts, electronic equipment, 

or the personal effects of crewmembers. Since they are opportunistic and 

quick, these incidents do not normally bring the perpetrators much plunder, but they seldom result in violence unless confronted by crewmembers 

who resist.35

Conversely, pirate attacks while underway are more difficult to 

execute and their target is frequently the ship itself, its cargo, or the crew. 

While 90 percent of the pirate attacks in port were successful in 2003, only 

58 percent of the attempted boardings were successful while underway. 

Moreover, in 2003, attacks at sea tended to be more violent. During the 

235 incidents that occurred in port in 2003, there were only two deaths 

and two more crewmembers went missing. During the 210 underway 

attacks, 19 crewmembers were killed and 38 more are still missing. There 

were also 13 hijackings involving 193 hostages.36 It is, therefore, clear 

that incidents while underway are of a different order of magnitude when 

compared to incidents in port.

The types of pirate attacks that are routinely carried out while underway 

include low-level armed robbery, long-term ship seizures, hijackings, 

and ship theft. Low-level armed robbery involves temporarily taking 

over a ship and forcing the crew to give up valuable personal items and 

the ship’s safe. The attacks normally occur between midnight and 0400. 

The victims are usually underway at speeds up to 15 knots. The pirates 

approach the merchant ship in high-powered speedboats from the stern, 

thus masking the ship’s radar. Four to 10 pirates scramble over the side of 

the ship using grappling hooks or bamboo poles. Their primary objective 

is the safe in the master’s cabin. If they cannot open it, they often seize 

crewmen and coerce them into opening the safe and giving up personal 

items such as cash, jewelry, watches, credit cards, binoculars, cameras, 

electronic equipment, and medicine. Consequently, they may use some 

level of violence to intimidate crewmembers into complying with their 

demands. The attack is usually over in 15 to 20 minutes, even if they fail to 

steal anything. Still, this type of attack requires greater sophistication than 

incidents of petty theft because it requires speedboats and weapons.37
129

A long-term ship seizure is similar to low-level armed robbery except 

for the objective, which is to take the ship’s cargo. The pirates may transfer 

the cargo to another vessel at sea or sail the prize to a safe port and offload 

the cargo there. Hijackings involve taking an entire ship and holding the 

vessel, cargo, and crew for ransom. Finally, there have been cases of 

pirates stealing ships, disposing of their cargos, and falsely registering the 

stolen vessels so that they can be used for other activities. Again, all of 

these attacks involve greater levels of violence and, at times, murder of 

the innocent crew.38

Piracy is an international crime, but measures to suppress it often rely 

on national efforts rather than international actions largely because of 

concerns about national sovereignty. The regions of the world most often 

plagued by piracy today are usually controlled by developing nations. Like 

the Spanish in Cuba and Puerto Rico in the 1820s, many of those countries 

are reluctant to allow other nations to pursue pirates into their territorial 

waters because doing so could potentially undermine their sovereignty 

over those areas. Modern-day pirates understand that and take advantage 

of those concerns by attacking vessels in international waters and then 

scurrying back into territorial waters for protection. 

Piracy began to increase in the mid-1990s. According to the IMO, up 

through 1994, an average of 42 acts of piracy occurred each year worldwide 

(see table 1). Over the next 4 years, 1995–1998, the average increased to 

216 per year. Another spurt occurred in 1999, pushing the annual total to 

300 for the first time. Over the last 10 years, the average number of pirate 

attacks increased further to 332. 

Why has piracy grown so much over the last two decades? One of 

the most important explanations is simply opportunity. In an increasingly 

interconnected global economy, with more than 80 percent of all freight 

shipped by sea, many more ships at sea are available as targets.39 Many 

of those vessels must transit chokepoints such as the Malacca Straits, the 

Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz to deliver their goods to 

the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and other places. Chokepoints not 

only concentrate potential targets into a limited area, but they also force 

merchant ships to slow down to safely navigate those heavily trafficked 

areas, thus making them even more vulnerable to pirates. Because 

shipowners have reduced the size of their crews over the last several 

decades, it is also easier for modern-day buccaneers to approach and board 

merchant ships undetected. Hard times economically, the reallocation of 

maritime surveillance assets from antipiracy to antiterrorism missions, 

lax port and coastal security, and political corruption all factor in as well. 
130

Finally, the easy accessibility of weapons gives the pirates the firepower 

necessary to take on larger, harder, targets.40

Despite the upsurge in piracy incidents, shipping companies have 

shown surprisingly little interest in adopting measures to counter the 

pirates. Among the options available are Secure-Ship, a collapsible 

nonlethal 9,000-volt electric fence that surrounds the ship; Long-Range 

Acoustic Device (LRAD), which directs a high-pitched tone at intruders; 

and water cannons.41 Shipping companies could also arm their crews 

or hire armed security guards to protect their ships, but those measures 

have the potential to be dangerous, costly, and complicated legally. The 

commander of the US Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, is a proponent 

of using armed guards. He maintains that companies hire armed guards to 

protect their assets ashore so they should also do so to protect their afloat 

assets.42 But many people in the shipping industry worry that such actions 

might prompt the pirates to use more force, thus further endangering 

the crews.43 Furthermore, guards are expensive. Unarmed guards cost 

$12,000 to $18,000 for a 3- to 5-day transit.44 Armed guards, some of 

whom will even provide their own escort vessels, cost from $10,000 to 

as much as $200,000 per transit.45 Even if shipping companies employ 

them, there is no guarantee that guards will be effective. Despite the 

Table 1. Incidents of Piracy, 1984–2008

From: The 1984–1994 data comes from the Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak 

States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (London: Hurst 

& Co., 2008), 61; the 1995–2002 data comes from the Murphy, 62; the 2003–2008 data 

comes from Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2008 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime 

Bureau, January 2009), 5–6.
131

presence of unarmed guards using LRAD, Somali pirates captured the 

chemical tanker Biscaglia on 28 November 2008. When it was apparent 

that their actions did not deter the brigands, the guards abandoned their 

charges and jumped over the side of the ship. They were later rescued by 

a German Navy helicopter.46 Shipping companies could also train and arm 

their crews, but again, they run the risk of escalating the level of violence 

during hijacking attempts. Moreover, there are significant legal hurdles 

to overcome, since many countries do not allow mariners to bring arms 

into port. Both Indonesia and Malaysia initially opposed the use of armed 

guards in the Strait of Malacca although they eventually relented.47

Another reason why shipowners are reluctant to invest in defensive 

systems is that the costs of piracy, whether cargo theft, ransom, or increased 

insurance and labor costs, are miniscule when compared to overall world 

maritime trade. Analysts estimate the cost of piracy ranges anywhere 

from $500 million to $25 billion.48 The IMB calculates the cost to be $1 

billion to $16 billion per year. Even the largest of those numbers, $25 

billion, is dwarfed by the estimated total of $7.8 trillion in world maritime 

commerce in 2005.49 Although kidnapping and ransom insurance policies 

have increased in cost almost tenfold, to about $30,000 per trip through the 

Gulf of Aden, it is still cheaper than transiting around the Cape of Good 

Hope.50 A Norwegian company that recently stopped sending its fleet of 

100 vessels through the Gulf of Aden reported that doing so is costing the 

company $30,000 each day.51 Diverting an oil tanker from Saudi Arabia 

around the Cape of Good Hope to the United States instead of through the 

Suez Canal adds 2,700 miles to the trip, costs an extra $3.5 million in fuel 

costs each year, and results in only five annual transits instead of six.52

Since insurance spreads risk, even at the higher rates, it is cheaper than 

paying for armed guards or diverting vessels around the southern tip of 

Africa. Thus, there is little incentive for maritime businesses to invest in 

countermeasures that may or may not be effective.

But piracy is not just an international crime, it is also a local problem. 

For example, over the last 5 years, the average number of reported 

incidents of piracy worldwide was 280. In 2004, almost 47 percent of all 

incidents occurred in Southeast Asia while less than 5 percent of the total 

took place along the coast of east Africa. By 2008, a new trend emerged, 

which demonstrates the local nature of piracy. In 2008, 44 percent of all 

pirate attacks occurred off the eastern coast of Africa, primarily Somalia.53

Meanwhile, piracy in Southeast Asia, declined to 16 percent of all 

incidents. World attention, therefore, shifted to the pirates of Somalia (see 

table 2). These two regions—Southeast Asia and Somalia—are the areas 

most plagued by modern-day pirates. 
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Southeast Asian Piracy

The increase in piracy in Southeast Asia in the 1990s was sparked by 

the growth of international commerce, especially seaborne trade. Today, 

80 percent of the world’s trade is transported by sea. More than 46,000 

merchant vessels ply the seas.54 The United States is the world’s largest 

Table 2. Piracy Attacks by Region, 2003–2008

Region/Nation 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

Pacific Ocean

0 1 0 0 2 0 3

0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.2%

Far East (South 

China Sea)

31 19 20 11 14 18 113

7.0% 5.8% 7.2% 4.6% 5.3% 6.1% 6.1%

Southeast Asia

158 154 102 77 64 47 602

35.5% 46.8% 37.0% 32.2% 24.3% 16.0% 32.6%

Indian Ocean

87 34 39 55 34 24 273

19.6% 10.3% 14.1% 23.0% 12.9% 8.2% 14.8%

Arabian Gulf

3 3 10 5 7 0 28

0.7% 0.9% 3.6% 2.1% 2.7% 0.0% 1.5%

East Africa

29 15 53 29 66 129 321

6.5% 4.6% 19.2% 12.1% 25.1% 44.0% 17.4%

West Africa

64 58 27 32 54 60 295

14.4% 17.6% 9.8% 13.4% 20.5% 20.5% 16.0%

Europe

1 0 0 1 1 1 4

0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2%

South America

45 27 13 25 18 12 140

10.1% 8.2% 4.7% 10.5% 6.8% 4.1% 7.6%

Central America

3 1 1 0 0 0 5

0.7% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%

Caribbean

23 16 11 4 3 2 59

5.2% 4.9% 4.0% 1.7% 1.1% 0.7% 3.2%

United States

1 1 0 0 0 0 2

0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%

World Totals 445 329 276 239 263 293 1,845

From: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 

2008 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, January 

2009), 5–6.
133

trading nation, and a large portion of that trade is conducted with Asia, 

especially Japan, South Korea, and China.55 As China’s economy exploded 

in the 1990s, increasing almost fivefold from 1990 to 2000, merchant 

shipping to and from China also increased.56 Along with trade came piracy 

as the number of targets available to the modern-day buccaneers in the 

Strait of Malacca and Indonesian waters increased as well. 

As with other eras and geographic areas, the conditions facilitating 

piracy came into play in Southeast Asia. Geography is of critical 

importance. Southeast Asia is home to one of the world’s most important 

chokepoints—the Malacca Strait. More than 50,000 ships, almost 25 

percent of the world’s shipping, transit through the strait each year.57 (See 

figure 12.) Virtually all of the oil delivered to Japan, China, and South 

Korea, about 10.3 million barrels of oil, passes through the strait each 

day.58 Moreover, it is estimated that some 10,000 boats fish the plentiful 

fishing banks in the strait every day. In addition, more than 80,000 people 

cross the strait daily on other business.59 Thus, the Strait of Malacca, just 

as it was 150 years earlier when Great Britain sought to suppress piracy in 

the region, is a fertile hunting ground for pirates. 

But Southeast Asian piracy is not confined to the Malacca Strait. 

The Phillip Channel and Singapore Strait, which separate Malaysia and 

Singapore from Indonesia’s Riau Archepelago, are rife with piracy as 

well. Incorporating more than 17,500 islands, modern-day Indonesia is 

Figure 12. The Strait of Malacca, Indonesia, and Southeast Asia.

0 200 400 miles

Indian Ocean

T h ailand

Cambo d ia

Malay s ia

Vietn am

Kaliman tan

W es t

Pap ua

Aus tralia

Burma

Sulawes i

South

China

Sea

Philippine

Sea

Pacific

Ocean

Ph ilippines

J av a

Sing apore

In d o nesia
134

a pirate paradise (figure 13). Indonesia has more than 34,000 miles of 

coastline that provides countless coves, harbors, creeks, and other places 

from which Indonesian pirates operate.60 Similarly, Malaysia has more 

than 2,900 miles of coastline, making it another regional nation with many 

remote locations for pirates to hide.61 Since more than 200 merchant ships 

as well as numerous small boats transit through the region each day, the 

waterways are congested.62 As in the Malacca Strait, the heavy traffic, 

narrow channels, and shallow waters force merchant vessels to slow while 

transiting the Phillip Channel and Singapore Strait, making them all the 

more vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the geography of Southeast Asia 

provides the pirates with a concentrated target area and thus increased 

opportunities for plunder.

Political conditions also facilitate piracy in Southeast Asia. Piracy is 

a regional issue, and countering it requires cooperation among the three 

regional states affected by the crime—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 

Unfortunately, such cooperation is not always forthcoming because of 

sovereignty issues. Pirates operating from one nation can, within minutes, 

Figure 13. Singapore and the Riau Archipelago.

0 10 20 miles

B atam

South

China

Sea

Sin g apore

Ria u Arch ip e la g o

B intan

Malay s ia

Ind o nes ia
135

cross into the territorial waters of another country, attack a ship, and 

then flee back into their home waters, free from pursuit by maritime law 

enforcement officials from the victim state. Or the brigands can capture 

a ship in one nation’s waters and sail it into another’s territory to dispose 

of the booty, all the while controlled by bosses in a third country.63 The 

permeability of national borders at sea makes it easy for pirates to operate 

in the region.

Unfortunately, Indonesia has done relatively little to suppress piracy in 

its territorial waters. Part of the problem is resource based—the Indonesians 

do not have the resources necessary to effectively police their more than 

17,000 islands. But the other part of the problem is that Indonesia does not 

consider piracy to be as great a threat to its security and economy as other 

countries do to theirs.64 Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia is not a 

shipping terminus and thus benefits little from the massive amount of trade 

that passes through the region each year.65 Moreover, Indonesian officials 

view the Aceh rebels’ criminal activities, arms, people, and merchandise 

smuggling, and illegal fishing, which costs Indonesia more than $4 billion 

each year, as much greater threats.66 Therefore, it stands to reason that 

Indonesia has put more emphasis on those problems that more directly 

affect its security and economy.

By contrast, as an island nation dependent on foreign trade, Japan has 

been greatly concerned with piracy in the region since the mid-1990s. 

Japan imports 70 percent of its food by sea. Virtually all of Japan’s trade 

with Europe, Africa, Australia, and the Middle East passes through the 

region. And almost all of its oil imports come through the Malacca Strait. 

Thus, suppression of piracy in Southeast Asia is important to Japan’s 

economic security.67

Political instability and corruption have also allowed pirates based 

in Indonesia to thrive. With the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, 

Indonesia moved into a period of political uncertainty, which was further 

exacerbated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2004 Asian tsunami. 

Despite these challenges, Indonesia has slowly moved toward democracy.68

But corruption, which was rampant under Suharto, remains a problem. 

There were numerous reports almost 25 years ago that Indonesian naval 

and maritime police forces moonlighted as pirates.69 Despite the passage 

of time and the change of regime, similar criminal activities remain 

a concern today. Royal Malaysian Marine Police openly complain that 

Indonesian naval units supplement their pay through part-time pirating.70

Such corruption does two things. First, dishonesty among elected officials 

and members of the security forces undermines the legitimacy of the 
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elected government.71 Second, it damages Indonesia’s relations with its 

regional partners, Malaysia and Singapore. Good relations between the 

three countries are crucial if piracy is to be stopped in the Malacca Strait 

and surrounding waters.

Finally, piracy continues to flourish in the region because the brigands 

have secure sanctuaries among the many islands of Indonesia. Most of the 

pirates preying on the Phillip Channel and Singapore Strait are based on 

the island of Batam, which is part of the Riau Archipelago, 9 miles south of 

Singapore. During the economic boom of the 1980s, tens of thousands of 

Indonesians flocked to the island looking for work. When the bubble burst 

and they lost their jobs, many turned to criminal activities such as piracy to 

make a living.72 With its direct access to the shipping lanes in the vicinity 

of Singapore and a readily available pool of labor, Batam became a hotbed 

for piracy in the region. In the northern portion of the Malacca Strait, the 

primary culprits are brigands operating out of the Sumatran province of 

Aceh. This province has been wracked by a separatist insurgency for a 

number of years, making it an area ripe for piracy.73 Thus, in both areas, 

piracy reemerged because the three conditions necessary for piracy to 

exist—geographic location, political instability, and safe havens—were 

present and available for the pirates to exploit.

One of the first-known cases of modern-day piracy in the region 

occurred on 20 May 1981 when a Liberian-flagged tanker was attacked 

in the Phillip Channel.74 During the early part of the decade, Indonesian 

pirates refrained from attacking Indonesian-flagged vessels, apparently 

hoping that by doing so they could avoid the attention of Indonesian 

authorities.75 Despite that self-imposed limitation, Indonesian pirates were 

extremely active in the months following the initial attack. They assaulted 

21 ships in the Phillip Channel and many more while at anchor in the 

vicinity of Singapore, stealing money and other personal property.76 Most 

of the attacks were random, opportunistic assaults involving petty theft. 

That pattern continued throughout the remainder of the decade.

During the 1990s, Southeast Asia averaged 99 incidents per year.77

As the Indonesian pirates became more organized during the decade, they 

began to carry out long-term ship seizures and ship theft. Those attacks 

require more arms, personnel, and organization. Because the pirates had to 

seize control of the prize, acts of violence against crews also increased.78

An example of long-term ship seizure occurred in August 1991 in the 

Singapore Strait when 25 pirates boarded and took over the Sprintstar. 

While securing the ship, the pirates killed the chief officer. The rest of the 

crew was imprisoned on board while the freebooters transferred the ship’s 
137

cargo, worth some $3 million, to another vessel. The Far Trader, a small 

cargo ship carrying food, textiles, electronics, and cigarettes, suffered a 

similar fate in December 1992. Armed pirates locked up the crew and 

diverted the vessel to Thailand, where they conveyed the ship’s $7 million 

cargo to another ship. Although the IMB did not report any long-term ship 

seizures in 1993, there were nine more during 1994–1997.79

Then, in April 1998, a gang of pirates tried to steal the tanker Petro 

Ranger outright. The tanker, which was carrying $1.5 million worth of 

diesel and jet fuel, was captured on 16 April east of Malaysia. The pirates 

locked up the crew and sailed the ship toward southern China. While 

underway, the pirates painted a new name on the ship—Wilby—to match 

recently obtained Honduran registration. Six days after they seized the 

Petro Ranger, the brigands offloaded most of the diesel fuel into two 

smaller tankers that the gang had stolen earlier. The small tankers were 

apparently used to smuggle the stolen fuel into Hainan Island. Soon after 

one of the small tankers returned with the sale proceeds, both Wilby and the 

small tanker were detained by the Chinese Marine Police, who suspected 

them of smuggling. The Chinese eventually figured out the situation and 

arrested the pirates. They released the Petro Ranger and the crew but kept 

the money and the rest of the cargo as evidence. The pirates, who bragged 

to the Petro Ranger’s captain that they were working with some senior 

Chinese naval officers, were not prosecuted for their crimes. Instead, 

they were deported to Indonesia where Indonesian officials released them 

without investigating the case.80

China figured prominently in most of the major organized pirate 

incidents in the mid-1990s. Hijacked ships often surfaced in Chinese 

ports where they were sold or Chinese officials tried to force the owners 

to pay for the release of their property. International pressure finally 

forced China to suppress corruption among government officials and 

to crack down on black market activities, which eliminated one of the 

primary markets for stolen vessels.81

Then, in November 1998, one of the most notorious incidents of 

piracy occurred in Chinese waters when pirates captured the MV 

Cheung Son and brutally murdered all 23 crewmembers. After killing 

the crew, the brigands disposed of their victims by attaching weights to 

their bodies and dumping them over the side. Although neither the ship 

nor its cargo was ever found, a few days later, Chinese fishermen pulled 

up six bodies, thus exposing the crime. Chinese authorities eventually 

discovered incriminating photographs of the pirates carousing in the 

midst of the dead crewmen while questioning a suspect. In December 
138

1999, a Chinese court convicted 38 men of hijacking the MV Cheung 

Son, 13 of whom were sentenced to death and executed in January 2000. 

The Cheung Son executions and the stiff prison sentences handed out to 

another group of pirates around the same time seems to have put a damper 

on pirate activity in the vicinity of China.82

Although there were no long-term seizures or thefts of commercial 

vessels from October 2002 until late September 2005, piratical actions in 

the region did not stop. Instead, the brigands shifted their attention to softer 

targets such as tugs and barges. Since tugs are slow with a low freeboard, 

they are easy to board and capture. Moreover, their cargoes, especially 

palm oil, are valuable and relatively easy to dispose of. Pirates hijacked 22 

tugs and tows between September 2001 and September 2005.83

Two of those attacks occurred in February and March 2005. On 28 

February, pirates boarded a tug in the Malacca Strait and took the captain 

and chief officer hostage. They held them for a week before releasing 

them. Similarly, pirates attacked the Japanese tug Idaten on 14 March 

2005 while it was towing a crew barge with 154 personnel on board. This 

was a more violent attack, during which the pirates fired at the pilot house 

to force the tug to stop. Four pirates boarded the vessel and took three 

crewmembers hostage. Five days later, they transferred the hostages onto 

a Thai fishing boat.84

The northern part of the Malacca Strait was relatively free of piracy 

until mid-2001 when an Indonesian tanker was attacked. The Tirta Niaga 

IV suffered an engineering casualty and anchored off the west coast of 

Aceh. While the crew was making repairs, brigands assaulted the ship, 

robbed the ship’s safe and crew, and took the master and second officer 

hostage. They soon let the second officer go, but the pirates kept the 

captain and eventually extorted $30,000 in ransom for his release.85

The success of the attack on the Tirta Niaga IV served notice to others 

that kidnapping for ransom was a lucrative business. In 2002, there were 

five kidnappings in the northern part of the Malacca Strait. The next year, 

2003, the number of incidents dropped to 4, but they rose again in 2004 

to 14, as well as 8 unsuccessful attempts. Because kidnapping requires 

coercion to force victims off their ships, violence increased in the northern 

Malacca Strait as well. The brigands are almost always armed, often with 

automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Moreover, they are not 

reluctant to use them, routinely shooting at merchant ships’ pilot houses to 

force them to stop.86
139

Not every attack is successful. On 8 August 2003, pirates attacked 

the MV Dong Yih in the Malacca Strait off Aceh. The pirate boats looked 

like oil-rig support craft so the Dong Yih’s crew ignored them at first. The 

crews of the two boats fired more than 200 rounds at the Dong Yih during 

an attack that lasted more than 2 hours. In the end, the Dong Yih did not 

slow, and the pirates were unable to board the vessel.87

The treatment of the crew of the oil tanker Cherry 201 demonstrates 

the increased violence in the Malacca Strait. Pirates captured the tanker 

and crew on 5 January 2004. They released the captain so that he could 

transmit their demands. Initially, the pirates demanded more than $47,000, 

but the shipowners negotiated them down to a quarter of that amount. 

Unfortunately, when the shipping company tried to negotiate further, the 

pirates grew angry and killed four of the crewmembers. The rest of the 

hostages jumped overboard and escaped.88

Malaysian fishermen are the primary target of the pirates operating in 

the northern Malacca Strait.89 Since the fishermen’s state-of-the-art trawlers are usually manned by only four sailors and cost between $210,000 

and $275,000, Malaysian fishing boats are lucrative targets that are relatively easy to take. During the 1990s, when Indonesian pirates hijacked 

fishing boats and held them for ransom, they typically received about 

$27,000. After 2001, more frequent maritime patrols in the strait made it 

more difficult for the brigands to escape with a hijacked vessel, so they 

began kidnapping the trawler captains instead. The amount of the ransom 

is normally about 10 percent of the value of the trawler.90 Pirate depredations have clearly damaged the Malaysian fishing industry. Although most 

incidents are not reported to the IMB, on average, Indonesian pirates have 

taken one fishing vessel per month for the last 5 years. More important, the 

cost of ransom has risen from about $8,000 to $27,000. Compounding the 

problem, corrupt Indonesian officials often demand an additional payment 

of as much as $27,000 more to release the captured vessel.91

The peak years for piracy in Southeast Asia were 2003–2004. Almost 

47 percent (see table 2) of all pirate attacks worldwide occurred in Southeast 

Asia in 2004. Reacting to that data in 2005, Lloyd’s Joint War Council 

declared the Malacca Strait an area of enhanced risk. That decision, which 

took into account the activities of both the maritime criminals and Islamic 

militants at work in the region, enabled insurance companies to add a war 

surcharge of 0.10 percent of the total value of the cargo insured. The three 

states most affected by the decision, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 

objected vigorously to the determination. The war risk judgment triggered 
140

further efforts to suppress piracy on the part of those nations and led to the 

revocation of the designation in mid-2006.92

It is important to avoid placing too much emphasis on statistics, however. According to the IMB, the number of maritime piracy incidents quadrupled from 107 attacks in 1991 to 445 in 2003.93 But if we use 2005 as 

the end point, then the overall increase is less dramatic: 107 to 276, less 

than a threefold increase. From 2003 until 2008, on average, one-third of 

all acts of piracy were committed in Southeast Asia (see table 2). But even 

if we take a high year such as 2003, when 158 pirate attacks occurred, 

the number of incidents as a percentage of the overall regional traffic, 

which exceeds 50,000 commercial vessels each year, is miniscule—0.32 

percent. With a probability of attack of less than one-third of 1 percent, 

there is little wonder why shipping companies or states such as Indonesia 

are reluctant to invest much money or resources into piracy prevention. 

Still, the impact of a pirate attack is significant to the victims, who are 

sometimes beaten, held hostage, and even killed.

One of the most significant barriers to effective actions against the 

pirates has been the reluctance of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to 

work together. They jealously guard their sovereignty, fearful that any weakness might lead to another nation claiming their territory. Still they have, 

from time to time, worked out agreements that have positively affected 

antipiracy operations in the region. In May 1992, Malaysia, Indonesia, 

and Singapore established a joint patrol area. Two months later, Singapore 

and Indonesia agreed to coordinate patrols and share information about 

activity in the Singapore Strait and Phillip Channel. Coordinated patrols 

have reduced piracy in the Singapore Strait to some degree, but the agreements remain hamstrung by the requirement to stay within each nations’ 

own waters.94 As long as maritime law enforcement forces are not allowed 

to pursue pirates into a neighbor’s territorial waters, such initiatives will 

be largely ineffective.95 Thus, antipiracy efforts in the region continue to 

founder on the shoal of sovereignty.

Unilateral operations can, of course, positively impact local conditions. For example, in June 1992, the Indonesian Navy conducted Operasi 

Kikis Bajak (Operation ENDING THE PIRATES) and intensely focused 

patrolling and intelligence-gathering efforts in the Riau Archipelago. 

Dozens of criminals were arrested and convicted. The operation produced 

a dramatic drop in pirate attacks that was sustained for several years. No 

attacks were reported in the Singapore Strait or Phillip Channel during the 

final third of 1992 and attacks were down by eight on an annual basis over 

the next 2 years.96 Malaysia also took several unilateral actions in 2005 
141

when the government began putting armed policemen on selected tugs and 

barges and it began offering escorts for ships carrying valuable cargoes 

through the Malacca Strait. Singapore also initiated a boarding and escort 

program in its waters.97 But such operations must be sustained on a continuous basis or their effect will be short lived.

Incidents of piracy remained down for several years until a 

combination of events led to a resurgence. The 1997 Asian economic 

crisis followed by the fall of Suharto in 1998 and subsequent political 

instability led to an increase in piracy in the late 1990s. The number 

of attacks in Indonesian waters almost doubled in one year, rising to 

115 incidents in 1999. Assaults on vessels underway jumped from 11 

in 1997 to 49 in 1999. Even attacks in the Malacca Strait outside of 

Indonesian territorial waters grew from 3 in 1998 to 91 in 2000. The 

Indonesian Government initiated another round of arrests in early 

2000 that, once again, suppressed piracy for a while.98 Despite the 

Asian economic crisis, incidents of piracy in the waters surrounding 

Singapore and Malaysia were fairly low throughout the last decade 

of the 20th century. Both nations routinely committed more resources 

and attention to antipiracy operations than Indonesia. Moreover, when 

piracy surged in Malaysian waters in early 2000, the government 

stepped up antipiracy patrols.99

After another surge in 2003, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore 

agreed to conduct joint maritime patrols (Operation MALSINDO) in the 

Malacca Strait. In July 2004, the three countries began conducting patrols 

in the 550-mile-long strait on a 24-hour basis. Soon thereafter, piracy in 

the Malacca Strait dropped from 38 attacks in 2004 to 12 in 2005 to 2 

in 2008 (see table 3). Coordinating efforts between the three countries 

is, however, still difficult since vessels cannot cross over into one of the 

other state’s territorial waters, and the ability of all three nations to sustain 

continuous patrols is limited.100

Hoping to leverage efforts to combat piracy and terrorism in the 

region, the United States proposed the Regional Maritime Security 

Initiative (RMSI) to improve security against piracy and other maritime 

threats through information sharing. Malaysia and Indonesia declined to 

participate in RMSI, however, after comments before Congress by Admiral 

Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of the United States Pacific Command, in 

March 2004 seemed to indicate that the United States intended to send 

Marines and Special Forces personnel in high-speed vessels to protect 

the Malacca Strait. Only Singapore willingly accepted that proposal. The 

United States remains a proponent of RMSI as a framework to synchronize 
142

maritime operations. RMSI could be used to improve information sharing 

and thus situational awareness, facilitate better decisionmaking, boost 

nations’ abilities to intercept potential threats, and promote international 

cooperation. At this time, RMSI is still in its formative stage, a vague 

concept of sharing information about piracy and other threats between a 

“coalition of the willing.”101

In a further attempt to promote regional cooperation independent of 

the United States, Malaysia’s deputy prime minister set forth some ideas 

about maritime security at a regional security conference in Singapore 

in June 2005. Mr. Najib Razak stated that maritime security in the 

region requires significant coordination and cooperation. If they could 

coordinate maritime air surveillance, link the coastal radar picture, and 

establish a radio tracking network to provide real-time information to law 

enforcement agencies using new technologies, Razak said, they could 

regain the initiative from the pirates. Razak argued that those actions 

were up to the regional states, which must retain primary responsibility 

for implementing all security measures. He also reiterated that the best 

way to suppress pirates is to eliminate their shore havens, cutting them 

off from their support systems. Although he emphasized cooperation and 

coordination, he also cautioned that any actions taken must not impinge 

on the sovereignty of the regional states. Thus, he undermined his own 

Table 3. Incidents of Piracy in the Malacca Strait

From: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2008 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime 

Bureau, January 2009), 5–6.
143

agenda since restricting the right of hot pursuit into adjacent territorial 

waters guaranteed that any such cooperation would be limited.102

Still suspicious of the US Regional Maritime Security Initiative, 

regional nations came up with several other alternatives. One such 

program is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 

and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Growing slowly 

from four members, Singapore, Japan, Laos, and Cambodia, in 2005, 

it now includes 14 regional countries.103 ReCAAP serves as a means of 

exchanging information, conducting research, and analyzing data about 

Asian piracy and armed robbery at sea.104 All of the information flows 

from national sources, typically a member nation’s coast guard or navy, 

into the Information Sharing Center in Singapore. The jury is still out 

on ReCAAP since Indonesia and Malaysia, the two nations most closely 

involved with the Southeast Asian piracy problem, have not ratified the 

ReCAAP agreement.105 In addition, since part of the impetus for ReCAAP 

appears to be regional objections to a nongovernmental agency, the Piracy 

Reporting Center, serving as the piracy clearing house, it remains to be 

seen how objective and effective ReCAAP can be. 

Another regional initiative is the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) program, a 

joint maritime air patrol operation over the Malacca Strait agreed to by 

Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.106 Each nation contributes 

two aircraft to the scheme, which began in 2005. Unlike the other 

arrangements between these nations, this agreement does allow limited 

(3-mile) incursions into the airspace of the other signatories. The program 

has, however, received criticism as merely window dressing because eight 

flights per week cannot possibly provide effective coverage of the strait, 

and the countries lack sufficient surface vessels to investigate suspicious 

ships identified by the aircraft.107

Together, all of those actions have had a salubrious effect on piracy 

in the region. From a peak of 158 attacks in 2003 (see table 2), incidents 

of piracy in the region dropped to 47 in 2008. Indonesia, Malaysia, and 

Singapore deserve credit for what they have done and continue to do. Since 

they rejected the US RMSI overture, they had to come up with alternatives 

and they have done so.

Although much progress has been made in terms of cooperation, 

training, and the acquisition of patrol craft and surveillance equipment, 

much more needs to be done. Indonesia still does not have the resources 

it needs to unilaterally patrol its enormous territorial waters, thus making 

any effort to permanently suppress piracy problematic. Until Malaysia and 
144

Table 4. Incidents of Piracy Off Somalia

Location 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals

Gulf of Aden/

Red Sea 18 8 10 10 13 92 151

Somalia 3 2 35 10 31 19 100

Totals 21 10 45 20 44 111 251

From: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 

2008 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, January 

2009), 5–6.

Indonesia either acquire more antipiracy resources or allow allied nations 

to assist with antipiracy operations in their waters, piracy will remain a 

threat to shipping in the region. Even though Indonesia has made some 

efforts to improve the economic well being of those living in areas prone to 

piracy, until the safe havens in the Riau Archipelago and along the eastern 

coast of Sumatra are permanently eliminated, piracy in Southeast Asia will 

continue to be a problem. But that is a domestic law enforcement problem 

that only Indonesia can solve.

Somali Piracy

Somalia, which has been described as a pirate’s paradise, has all of the 

conditions necessary for piracy to thrive.108 It has an excellent geographic 

location, there is considerable political turmoil, and there are numerous 

safe havens ashore. Together, those conditions created a place where today 

piracy flourishes.

Piracy along the coast of Somalia has been a problem for some time, 

but it exploded in 2008, surging from 44 attacks off the coast of Somalia 

and in the Red Sea in 2007 to 111 incidents in 2008 (table 4). One reason 

for the increase in piracy is that many Somalis discovered that piracy was 

a lucrative alternative to fishing, bringing them perhaps as much as 10 

times more money than they earned from their once prosperous fishing 

industry.109 Experts estimate that the Somalis garnered more than $150 

million in ransom money during 2008.110

Somalia’s geographic location makes it an ideal spot for piracy. 

Although it has more than 1,880 miles of coastline, it does not have 

thousands of small islands on which pirates can hide, waiting to pounce on 

victims like Indonesia.111 What it does have is close proximity to the Gulf 

of Aden, through which some 20,000 ships, as well as tankers carrying 7 

to 12 percent of the world’s annual oil production, transit annually and the 

sealanes running from South Africa to the Persian Gulf.112 This geographic 
145

position enables Somali-based pirates to dominate the Gulf of Aden and, 

so it seems, a large portion of the Indian Ocean as well (figure 14).

Somalia is also a country wracked by political turmoil. The country 

has not had a viable government since Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted 

from power in 1991. Since 1991, warlords, the Islamic Courts Union, and 

14 transitional governments have tried to rule the country. None have 

succeeded and Somalia has another new leader after President Abdullahi 

Yusuf Ahmed resigned in December 2008. The current president is Sheik 

Figure 14. Somalia Coast.

0 50 100 150 miles

Keny a

Indian Ocean

D jib o u ti

Ethiopia

Som alia

Yem en

Gulf of Aden

Be rb e ra

Bo o sa a so

C a lu u la

C e e l H u u r

Eyl

Ga ro ow e

Kism a yo

Mo g a d ish u

Xa ra d h e e re

H o b yo
146

Sharif Ahmed, a moderate Islamist and former leader of the Islamic Courts 

Union.113

The Transitional Federal Government was established in Kenya 

in August 2004 under President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. During the 

summer of 2006, Islamic militias under the leadership of the Islamic 

Courts Union took control of Mogadishu. Their presence, in turn, 

precipitated a response by the United States and Ethiopia. In December 

2006, Ethiopian troops intervened and drove the Islamist militia out of 

Mogadishu. The next month, President Yusuf entered Mogadishu for the 

first time. Despite his presence in the capital, little changed regarding 

governance of the country. Moreover, the presence of the hated Ethiopians 

gave rise to insurgency throughout the country.114 As a result, some 

10,000 people have died in fighting since late 2006. At least 1 million 

more have been displaced from their homes, and possibly as much as 

half of the country’s population, which is about 7 million people, is on 

the verge of starvation.115

The food crisis in Somalia was made worse by both the political 

turmoil and piracy. Twenty aid workers were killed during the first half 

of 2008, causing some aid groups to suspend operations and others to pull 

out of Somalia completely. At the same time, after several aid ships were 

hijacked in 2005, aid groups stopped shipping food to the country unless 

the vessels had a military escort. When the Netherlands stopped escorting 

the World Food Program (WFP) ships in June 2008, all shipments by 

sea temporarily halted. Shipping food by ground transportation is just as 

dangerous and much more expensive. Militia groups frequently attack, 

and even hijack, the food convoys. Even worse, five drivers were killed 

during the first half of the year.116 In the midst of such turmoil, it is not 

surprising to find piracy thriving. 

In a country with little commerce, the money extorted by the pirates is a 

huge boon to coastal communities. Consequently, there are numerous safe 

havens along the coast of Somalia, providing vital support to the pirates. 

Among the most well-known ports are Eyl, Hobyo, and Xaradheere, all 

located in the break-away province of Puntland. The pirates operate with 

impunity from these towns, leading some analysts to conclude that they 

have the tacit approval of the Puntland government.117

The pirate havens are boom towns, with new houses, cars, and other 

consumer items. These contemporary buccaneers are heroes to many 

Somalis. According to one pirate leader, half the money received goes 

to the pirates who took the ship; 30 percent goes to investors who help 
147

finance the pirates’ activities; and 20 percent goes to villagers who help 

guard the ship, serve as translators, or provide food and other supplies to 

the pirates. Like modern-day Robin Hoods, they also give money to the 

poor.118

In places like Garoowe and Eyl, everyone wants to be a pirate. A 12-

year-old boy in Garoowe told a reporter, “When I finish high school, I will 

be a pirate man, I will work for my family and will get more money.” If 

you cannot be a pirate, you can marry one. Thus, a young woman in Eyl 

promised, “I’ll tie the knot with a pirate man because I’ll get to live in a 

good house with good money.”119 With such enthusiastic support from the 

local populace, it will be difficult to eliminate piracy in Somalia.

Unlike the pirates of Southeast Asia, who commit the full range 

of piracy, including petty theft, low-level armed robbery, long-term 

ship seizures, hijackings, and ship theft, Somali pirates normally 

confine themselves to taking hostages and asking for ransoms. Ranging 

throughout the Gulf of Aden and far out into the Indian Ocean, this type 

of activity exploded in 2008, increasing from 177 hostages taken in 2007 

to 815 in 2008 during 155 pirate attacks over the 2-year period (see 

table 5).120 Despite the large number of incidents, deaths and injuries are 

rare: the pirates killed six crewmen and injured eight more although 14 

crewmembers also went missing during that timeframe.121

Table 5. Types of Attacks Off Somali Waters

Type of Attack 2007 2008 Totals

No. of Attacks 44 111 155

Taken Hostage 177 86.3% 815 97.3% 992 95.1%

Kidnap/Ransom 20 9.8% 3 0.4% 23 2.2%

Threatened 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0.0%

Assaulted 0 0.0% 0 0.0% - 0.0%

Injured 6 2.9% 2 0.2% 8 0.8%

Killed 2 1.0% 4 0.5% 6 0.6%

Missing 0 0.0% 14 1.7% 14 1.3%

Totals 205 100.0% 838 100.0% 1,043 100.0%

From: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 

2008 (London: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, 

January 2009), 5–6.
148

Spokesmen for the pirates often claim that they are members of the 

Somali Coast Guard and are merely defending their territorial waters or 

exacting retribution for illegal fishing or dumping. In all likelihood, many 

of the original pirates probably were fishermen who turned to piracy after 

their sourced income was destroyed by illegal fishing. Somali fishermen 

maintain that foreign fishing vessels use illegal fishing equipment, steal 

their catches, cut their nets, and ram their fishing boats. Thus, they 

declare, any action they take is not piracy but justifiable retaliation. No 

doubt, the absence of an effective government in Mogadishu opened the 

door for illegal fishing in Somali waters by European and Asian fishing 

vessels. According to a UN estimate, more than 700 foreign fishing 

trawlers operated illegally in Somali waters in 2005. Analysts estimate 

that more than $300 million worth of fish are poached from Somali waters 

each year.122 This is a crucial issue, for there is little chance that piracy 

emanating from Somalia will end unless illegal fishing is stopped and the 

fishing industry restored, thus giving Somalis some means of legitimately 

supporting themselves.

Somali pirates have become increasingly more sophisticated over the 

last few years. Initially, their tactics involved nothing more than launching a fishing boat from shore and attacking the first ship that happened by. 

Like the buccaneers in the Caribbean, they started out using small boats, 

but as they became more successful, they acquired bigger and faster vessels as well as more powerful weapons and more sophisticated navigational equipment. As the frequency of their attacks increased, merchant 

vessels moved farther and farther away from the shore. Many maritime 

security experts assumed that the pirates’ small boats would be unable to 

operate 50, 100, or 200 miles from land because they were not sufficiently 

seaworthy and they lacked the fuel capacity to remain on station for very 

long. But the Somalis proved them wrong when they took the Saudi tanker 

Sirius Star some 420 nautical miles off the coast.123 The Somalis adapted 

to the change in shipping patterns by capturing fishing trawlers and small 

freighters and using them as mother ships or afloat operating bases. Since 

they look like any other commercial vessel, mother ships help the pirates 

disguise their purpose and extend their range hundreds of miles out to 

sea. Now, the Somalis can hide in the shipping lanes, waiting for a likely 

target in relative comfort and security. Once they identify their quarry, the 

pirates swarm their victim in wolf pack-like style, using six or more highpowered speedboats. The Somalis are heavily armed to intimidate their 

quarry into giving up without resistance. To help them make that decision, 

they fire automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the 
149

pilot house to force the master to stop. If they can convince the merchant 

ship to slow or stop, they can board and take control of the ship in a matter 

of minutes.124

One of the earliest reported attacks in Somali waters exemplifies many 

of the techniques still used today. On 9 September 1994, a Somali dhow 

manned with 24 pirates accosted the MV Bonsella 3 miles north of Caluula 

in the Gulf of Aden. The pirates fired two mortar rounds at the Bonsella

to force her to stop. When they came on board, the pirates claimed to be 

part of the Somali Coast Guard. They told the ship’s master that they were 

going to use the Bonsella as a mother ship to apprehend trawlers fishing 

illegally without proper licenses. On the second day, they pursued two 

ships thought to be fishing vessels. Once the Somalis realized the ships 

were merchant vessels, they continued to pursue them. As with Bonsella, 

they fired mortar rounds to induce the ships to stop. In this case, neither 

vessel slowed down, and they both escaped. When asked why they continued to chase the merchant ships, the pirates indicated that they wanted to 

capture a ship faster than Bonsella so they could extend their patrol area. 

On 13 October, they made another failed attempt to capture another ship. 

Finally, on 14 October, after stealing all the cash on board, almost all of 

the ship’s stores and equipment, and the entire cargo of aid supplies, the 

pirates set Bonsella free.125

Since Somali piracy is a kidnapping/ransom business, the pirates take 

reasonably good care of their hostages. In the port of Eyl, the pirates’ main 

haven, several new restaurants have been opened to cater to the captives’ 

culinary needs.126 Shipping companies are more willing to meet the pirates’ 

demands because they realize that the pirates do not intend to harm their 

crews, ships, or cargoes.127 Moreover, there are few good options beyond 

paying the ransom. Attempting to take the vessel back by force might 

result in casualties among the crew, endanger the ship, or spark retaliatory 

violence by the Somalis. Allowing the ship to remain under their control is 

not a viable alternative since every lost day costs the shipping company as 

much as $25,000. Thus, it is in the best interests of both the victims and the 

perpetrators to pay the ransom and end the hostage situation.128

A good example of the dangers of trying to recapture hostages occurred 

recently when the French retook the yacht Tanit, which Somali pirates 

seized in the Gulf of Aden on 4 April 2009. Five French citizens were on 

board the ship, including the captain’s 3-year-old son. A French naval vessel disabled the yacht by shooting holes in its sails to prevent it from making landfall in Somalia. With the boat adrift and ransom negotiations at a 
150

standstill, French commandos attacked on 9 April. During the gunfight, the 

yacht’s skipper, Florent Lemaçon, was killed. His wife, son, and another 

couple survived. Two pirates were killed and three others captured.129

Claims of illegal entry into territorial waters or illegal fishing served as 

the justification for most pirate attacks in the 1990s. For example, Somali 

militia detained a Syrian ship towing a Bulgarian freighter in January 

1998, claiming that the ships were in Somali waters illegally. They were 

released in February after the owners paid a $110,000 fine.130 Later that 

year, Somali militiamen seized a Kenyan fishing vessel they claimed was 

illegally fishing off the coast near Eyl. The ship was fined $500,000 by a 

Somali court.131

Incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters were fairly 

infrequent until 2005. Only 23 incidents were reported in 2000. Assaults 

decreased further in 2001–2002 after Combined Task Force 150, a US-led 

Naval force, began patrolling the Indian Ocean, Northern Arabian Sea, 

and the Gulf of Aden in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 

2001. Still, attacks did occur from time to time, so in August 2002, the IMB 

advised mariners to sail no closer than 50 miles off the coast of Somalia 

and to remain 100 miles offshore if possible because of several recent acts 

of piracy.132 In early July 2002, Somali militiamen seized a Cypriot-owned 

ship off the coast of Puntland. The cargo ship Aamir was en route from the 

United Arab Emirates to Mogadishu when bad weather forced it to anchor 

off the northern coast of Somalia. While at anchor, Somali militiamen 

seized the ship.133 The owners eventually paid $400,000 for the release of 

the ship. Later that month, Somali pirates seized a North Korean-owned 

ship and demanded $300,000 for her release.134 By the end of 2002, the 

IMB warned that the likelihood of attack in Somali waters increased from 

a possibility to a certainty.135 But instead of further increases, pirate attacks 

ebbed in 2003 and 2004, dropping to only 10 attacks in 2004.

The situation turned for the worse in 2005 when the Somalis carried 

out a number of high profile attacks that focused considerable attention to 

their activities. One of the most appalling incidents was the hijacking of 

the MV Semlow, which was carrying 850 tons of rice meant for Somali 

victims of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.136 The ship was 

en route from Mombasa, Kenya, to Boosaaso, Somalia, when the pirates 

struck on 27 June 2005.137 Captain Sellathurai Mahalingam recalled that 

the pirates came out of nowhere, fired 5 to 10 shots at the bridge, and then 

pulled alongside the ship in speedboats. Ten pirates armed with pistols, 

AK-47 rifles, and RPGs scrambled over the side of the ship and took control in less than 15 minutes. Mahalingam noted later that the pirates were 
151

very calm. Semlow was, they said, their 20th victim of the year. Once in 

control, they began ransacking the ship. They stole $8,500 from the ship’s 

safe and personal items from the crew. Then, they directed Mahalingam to 

head for Ceel Huur.138

Once they arrived, they anchored off the coast within sight of land. 

Soon, life on board the ship fell into a routine. The pirates restricted the 

Semlow’s crew to the aft part of the ship. Although they were not mistreated, they ran short of food and had to ration water. Meanwhile, the 

pirates were relieved every 4 or 5 days. They spent their time cleaning 

their weapons, drilling on the main deck, and chewing khat, a native plant 

containing an amphetamine-like stimulant. The pirates also ate well. They 

brought goats, potatoes, tomatoes, and onions with them from the shore 

and freely used the World Food Program rice.139

Throughout the ordeal, the Somalis negotiated with both the Kenyanbased shipping company and the WFP, attempting to extort $500,000 in 

ransom. The director of the shipping company maintained that his was 

a poor company unable to pay the ransom. A group of UN, Kenyan, Sri 

Lankan, and Tanzanian officials flew to Somalia to discuss the situation 

with the transitional government and clan leaders.140 When negotiations 

foundered, the WFP suspended aid shipments to the country.141

In late September, the pirates used the Semlow to strike another victim. An Egyptian cement carrier, MS Ibn Batuta, sailed near the Semlow

on 23 September. The pirates used Semlow as a mother ship, steaming 

her close enough to the Ibn Batuta that they could approach her in their 

speedboats and capture her as well. After further negotiations, Ibn Batuta

got underway for el Maan with Semlow under tow because Semlow had, by 

this time, run out of fuel. Along the way, the pirates abandoned both ships, 

leaving them free to continue on to el Maan, where Semlow offloaded the 

WFP rice.142 Although the WFP did not pay any ransom, maintaining it 

would set a bad precedent, the pirates managed to extort $135,000 from 

the shipping company.143

By this time, a full-blown piracy crisis was brewing. On 8 October, 

5 days after Semlow was released, Somali pirates captured the MV 

Toregelow, which was carrying food and fuel to Semlow.

144 They followed 

that up 4 days later by seizing another UN aid ship, MV Miltzow, on 12 

October. They only held Miltzow for 2 days before releasing her without receiving any ransom.145 Finally, on 19 October, Somali pirates captured MV Pagonia, a Ukrainian ship carrying iron ore. They demanded 

$700,000 for the release of this ship.146
152

Somali piracy gained even more notoriety when, early on the morning of 5 November 2005, pirates in two speedboats attacked the Seabourn 

Spirit, an American-owned luxury cruise ship. The ship, which carried 151 

passengers and 161 crewmembers, was on a 16-day cruise from Alexandria, 

Egypt, to Singapore. When the pirates attacked at 0550, the captain woke 

the passengers, warned them of the danger, and directed them to muster in 

the dining room, which was in the center of the ship. At the same time, he 

activated the ship’s LRAD defense system and sped up, leaving the pirates 

in his wake. The LRAD, a nonlethal weapon, emits a high-pitched tone 

that operators can direct at specific targets to drive them away. Still, the 

situation was rife with danger for the Somalis fired rifles and at least three 

RPG rounds, one of which struck the ship. No passengers were injured, 

but one crewmember suffered shrapnel wounds during the attack.147

Those attacks sparked a more determined response by the United 

States and other nations. On 21 January 2006, the USS Winston Churchill

seized the dhow Al Bisarat, a Somali mother ship. Acting on a report from 

the Piracy Reporting Center, Winston Churchill located the suspected 

mother ship during the evening of 20 January. When the dhow refused to 

stop, Winston Churchill fired a warning shot over its bow, which quickly 

brought it to a halt. After boarding the dhow, sailors from the Winston 

Churchill discovered 10 pirates and an arms cache. The vessel’s crew was 

apprehended and turned over to Kenya where they were sentenced to 7 

years in jail.148

A couple of months later, on 18 March 2006, the USS Gonzalez and 

USS Cape St. George engaged a suspected mother ship with small-arms 

fire. The two US ships intercepted a suspicious-looking fishing dhow that 

was towing two smaller boats. As sailors from the Gonzalez prepared to 

board the dhow, they spotted men armed with RPG launchers. When the 

Somalis opened fire on the Gonzalez, striking her multiple times, both 

American ships responded. They destroyed the dhow, killed one pirate, 

and wounded five more. The Americans captured seven other pirates.149

In June 2006, the Islamic Courts Union took control of Mogadishu 

and much of the surrounding area. Believing that the pirates were in 

league with the warlords who opposed the Islamic Courts Union, Islamic 

militiamen shut down many of the pirate havens during the second half of 

the year. Thus, only 20 acts of piracy occurred in the vicinity of Somalia 

in 2006.150 But attacks rebounded in 2007 after Ethiopian troops drove the 

Islamic Courts Union out of the country. Free to act with impunity, the 

pirates attacked 44 ships in 2007.
153

Once again, Somali pirates rashly hijacked a World Food Program 

ship. The MV Rozen was captured on 25 February 2007 and held for 

40 days. The ship was captured off Puntland Province after delivering 

supplies to Berbera and Boosaaso, Somalia.151

The US Navy unsuccessfully engaged the pirates on two occasions in 

2007. When brigands captured the Danish vessel Danica White on 2 June 

2007, a US warship responded. The USS Carter Hall fired over the bow 

of the Danica White and shot flares at the ship in an attempt to prevent 

her from entering Somali waters. Although Carter Hall did not prevent 

the hijacking, it destroyed two pirate skiffs towed behind the merchant 

ship. Carter Hall broke off the engagement when the merchant ship 

entered Somali territorial waters.152 The Japanese chemical tanker Golden 

Nori was hijacked on 28 October 2007 in the Gulf of Aden. The USS 

Arleigh Burke and USS Porter responded to the Golden Nori’s distress 

signal. The American ships tried to stop the attack by firing over the ship’s 

bow, but the pirates refused to comply. Eventually, the Americans sank 

several small boats towed by the tanker, but they were unable to prevent 

the brigands from sailing the ship into Somali territorial waters.153 In both 

cases, restrictive rules of engagement prevented the Navy from acting 

more forcefully to stop the pirates.

A third engagement turned out better. Somali pirates tried to hijack 

the North Korean cargo ship MV Dai Hong on 30 October 2007. The USS 

James E. Williams responded to the Dai Hong’s distress signal by sending 

its helicopter to investigate. When it arrived on station, the helicopter crew 

spoke to the pirates on the bridge-to-bridge radio and ordered them to put 

down their weapons. While the brigands were distracted by the helicopter, 

the ship’s crew overpowered the Somalis. One pirate was killed and three 

were wounded during the melee. Three crewmen were also injured.154

The actions of the captain and crew of the cargo ship Ibn Younos

demonstrate the importance of taking defensive actions. The Somalis failed 

to capture the ship during an attack on 14 May 2007. During that assault 

which lasted more than an hour, the pirates raked the ship’s bridge with 

automatic weapons fire, and RPGs destroyed the crews’ accommodation 

area. Still, the captain of the Ibn Younos refused to give in. Instead, he sped 

up and commenced a zigzag course to ward off the pirates.155

In 2008, Somali pirates had a banner year. They attacked 111 ships 

during the year and were successful 44 times. That effort brought in $30 

million to $80 million in ransom payments.156 Somali piracy was constantly 
154

in the news throughout much of the year. There were several dramatic 

attacks such as the MV Faina and the tanker Sirius Star.

There were also defeats such as when the French military captured 

several of the pirates who hijacked Le Ponant. The French luxury yacht Le 

Ponant was captured by Somali pirates on 4 April 2008. At the time, the 

pirates thought they had hit the jackpot. But for six of the pirates, it proved 

to be a false dream.157 The drama began in early April when nine pirates, 

using two borrowed speedboats, captured a Yemeni trawler. They used the 

trawler as a mother ship, steaming through the Gulf of Aden in search of 

lucrative targets. They thought they found one on 4 April 2008 when they 

spotted the 850-ton, 3-mast yacht. Three pirates motored over to the yacht 

in one of the speedboats. When Le Ponant’s crew tried to resist by using 

fire hoses, the pirates began shooting at them. The other pirates abandoned 

the trawler and assisted with the assault. They soon had the unarmed crew 

under control and sailed the vessel to Garaad, where the locals assisted the 

pirates by standing guard and providing the pirates with other services. 

The pirates eventually settled on a $2 million ransom demand. For their 

assistance, each villager was promised $50, and each pirate was supposed 

to take home $11,000 to $20,000.158

Meanwhile, the French began mobilizing a force to strike back. The 

French frigate Commandant Bouan tracked the pirates to their lair. The 

frigate was soon joined by the aircraft carrier Jeanne d’Arc. When the 

pirates released the 30 crewmembers after receiving the ransom on 11 

April, French commandos in helicopters struck back. They captured six of 

the nine pirates as they tried to escape from the area in cars.159

A few days after the pirates captured MV Faina, other Somali corsairs 

really did hit the jackpot when they captured the very large crude carrier 

Sirius Star on 15 November 2008. The tanker was loaded with about 2 

million barrels of oil, which represented 25 percent of Saudi Arabia’s daily 

production. The attack shocked most maritime experts because the ship 

was 450 miles east of Somalia en route to the United States via the Cape 

of Good Hope. Few people thought the pirates could operate that far from 

shore or take a vessel that big. But 10 pirates took control of the tanker in 

less than 20 minutes after forcing it to stop by shooting at the pilot house. 

They steamed the ship to Xaradheere, where they announced their ransom 

demand of $25 million. They eventually lowered their demands and 

released the ship on 9 January 2009 after receiving $3 million in ransom. 

Several of the brigands drowned as they headed for shore after splitting 

the money.160
155

In addition to these dramatic attacks, 2008 was also marked by more 

aggressive moves on the part of the multinational force tasked with 

suppressing piracy. A French frigate captured nine buccaneers in the Gulf 

of Aden in October.161 In November, HMS Cumberland sank a suspected 

pirate ship that had attempted to capture a Danish cargo ship. The 

Cumberland spotted the dhow in the vicinity of the Dutch ship and tried 

to force it to stop. When it would not comply, Cumberland dispatched a 

boarding party in a rigid inflatable boat to force it to submit. Instead, the 

brigands opened fire on the British ship. During an exchange of gunfire, 

two pirates were killed, one was mortally wounded and five others were 

captured. One week later, they were transferred to Kenya, which agreed to 

prosecute those captured.162 A short time later, the Indian Navy ship Tabar

engaged a suspected mother ship and destroyed it as well. Only after a 

Cambodian sailor was rescued from the debris did the Indians learn that 

15 other innocent fishermen died during the assault on the ship.163 This 

incident underscores the difficulty of differentiating between legitimate 

fishermen and pirate vessels. 

In early 2009, as the Somali pirates became increasingly more bold, 

coalition forces stepped up their level of aggressiveness to match the 

Somali’s audacity. There is, however, much concern that the naval forces 

do not become too belligerent. Thus far, the pirates have behaved rationally, 

preserving the safety of the ships, cargo, and crews. If nations become more 

aggressive, it stands to reason that the pirates might change their attitude 

as well. That was certainly the case in the 18th and 19th centuries. The 

18th-century pirates of the West Indies became progressively more brutal 

as Great Britain began executing them with greater regularity. By the 19th 

century, the policy of executing pirates was well established. Consequently, 

19th-century pirates usually treated their captives much more harshly than 

their 16th-century counterparts did because they realized that it did not 

pay to leave survivors who might testify against them.

The situation off the coast of Somalia underscores the futility of trying 

to suppress piracy using only naval forces. Despite the presence of a 

powerful flotilla of ships—CTF 50—and the availability of sophisticated 

surveillance equipment, the coalition task force does not have the resources 

needed to guard more than 1 million square miles of ocean adjacent to 

Somali. The Somalis continue to operate with impunity. When American 

and French forces killed several pirates recently, the Somalis responded 

by taking four more ships almost immediately. They seemed to be sending 

a message that they know that there is little the coalition force can do to 
156

stop them. The best the naval antipiracy task force can do is to guard the 

primary sealanes and to encourage ship captains to only sail through those 

areas where the coalition naval force operates.

In the end, piracy emanating from Somalia can only be resolved 

ashore. That does not, however, mean merely attacking the shore havens. 

Such attacks would be transitory and of limited value. Somalia’s piracy 

problem can only be solved by fixing Somalia. But Somalia remains in the 

midst of social and political chaos and there is no reason to believe that the 

current Transitional National Government will be able to accomplish any 

more than the previous 13 administrations. In light of the US experience in 

Somali in the early 1990s, it is understandable that American policymakers 

are reluctant to take on that task. But as in previous periods of piracy, 

resolution of this outbreak of piracy requires determined effort by the 

dominant naval power—the United States—acting both at sea and on land.
157

Notes

1. Nick Wadhams, “Somali Pirates’ Unexpected Booty: Russian Tanks,” Time, 

26 September 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1844914,00.

html (accessed 1 April 2009).

2. Associated Press, “Ship Seized by Somali Pirates Carrying 33 

Russian Tanks,” FoxNews.com, 26 September 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/

story/0,2933,428582,00.html (accessed 2 April 2009).

3. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “US Navy Watches Seized Ship With SudanBound Tanks,” USA Today, 29 September 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/

world/2008-09-28-1797517683_x.htm (accessed 23 March 2009).

4. Nick Wadhams, “Somali Pirates Hold Whip Hand in Standoff,” San 

Francisco Chronicle,” 26 October 2008, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/

c/a/2008/10/26/MN6913NSJK.DTL (accessed 2 April 2009).

5. Wadhams, “Somali Pirates’ Unexpected Booty: Russian Tanks.”

6. Ibid.

7. US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, “USS Howard 

Monitoring MV Faina,” 25 September 2008, http://www.dvidshub.

net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=24242 (accessed 27 March 2009).

8. Rear Admiral Kendall Card, Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 3, 

telephone interview with James A. Wombwell, Combat Studies Institute, 1 April 

2009.

9. “Ship Seized by Somali Pirates Carrying 33 Russian Tanks.”

10. Bernard Momanyi, “Pay Up, Faina Pirates Demand,” Capital News, 23 

October 2008, http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/Local/Pay-up,-Faina-piratesdemand.html (accessed 1 April 2009).

11. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Hijacked Arms Ship Limps Into Port,” New 

York Times, 13 February 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/world/

africa/13pirate.html (accessed 2 April 2009).

12. Jeffrey Gettleman and Mohammed Ibrahim, “Somali Pirates Get Ransom 

and Leave Arms Freighter,” New York Times, 6 February 2009, http://www.

nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/africa/06pirates.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print 

(accessed 1 April 2009).

13. David W. Munns, “Rise in Murders, Kidnappings at Sea Makes Piracy 

a Top Naval Priority Worldwide,” Sea Power, October 2004, 11, http://www.

military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_Piracy_102604-P1,00.html (accessed 11 

April 2009).

14. Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s 

Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: NIAS Press), 2006, 2.

15. All data referenced came from the International Chamber of Commerce 

(ICC), International Maritime Bureau. See ICC, International Maritime Bureau, 

Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2008, London: ICC, International Maritime Bureau, January 2009, 
158

5–6, for 2003–2008 data; Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty 

Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (London: Hurst & 

Co., 2008), 62, for 1995–2002 data.

16. Murphy, 68–69.

17. International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crimes Services, 

“International Maritime Bureau,” no date, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27&Itemid=16 (accessed 5 April 2009).

18. G.O.W. Mueller and Freda Adler, Outlaws of the Ocean: The Complete 

Book of Contemporary Crime on the High Seas (New York: Hearst Marine Books, 

1985), 141–143.

19. Eklöf, 91.

20. Ibid., 90–91.

21. Ibid., 93.

22. Ibid., 92.

23. Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and 

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast 

Asia, 25 (2003), http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Young%2BValencia,%20

Conflation%20of%20Piracy%20and%20Terrorism.htm (accessed 25 November 

2008).

24. ICC, International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 

Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2007 (London: ICC International 

Maritime Bureau, January 2008), 2.

25. Eklöf, 94.

26. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2007, 2.

27. Eklöf, 94.

28. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2007, 3.

29. Ibid.

30. Murphy, 14–16.

31. Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge: Standing Strong Against the 

Military, Economic, and Political Threats That Imperil America (Lanham, MD: 

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 86.

32. Ibid., 85.

33. Ibid., 89.

34. Murphy, 8.

35. Young and Valencia; Rupert Herbert-Burns, “Compound Piracy at Sea 

in the Early Twenty-First Century: A Tactical to Operational-Level Perspective 

on Contemporary Multiphase Piratical Methodology,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy 

in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 

102–103.

36. Dillon, 88–89.

37. Young and Valencia; Eklöf, 46–47.

38. Young and Valencia.
159

39. Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: 

Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 

Corporation, 2008), 10.

40. Ibid., 11–14.

41. Eklöf, 129–130; David Axe, “4 Fronts for Pirate-Navy Battles as 

Pirate Attacks Continue,” Popular Mechanics, 29 September 2008, http://

www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4285201.html?page=4 

(accessed 20 January 2009).

42. Andrew Gray, “Armed Guards Would Deter Somali Pirates: US 

Navy,” The Manama Dialogue, IISS Regional Security Summit, 13 December 

2008, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2008/

december-2008/armed-guards-would-deter-somali-piratesus-navy/ (accessed 

21 April 2009).

43. Chris O’Brien, “Shippers Resist Calls to Arm Against Pirates,” 

Washington Times, 21 April 2009, http://www.studentnewsdaily.com/daily-newsarticle/shippers-resist-calls-to-arm-against-pirates/ (accessed 21 April 2009). 

See also Associated Press, “Private Security Companies Hired To Protect Ships 

From Pirates,” St. Petersburg Times, 28 October 2008, http://www.sptimes.ru/

story/27485 (accessed 21 April 2009).

44. Kim Sengupta, “Blackwater Gunboats Will Protect Ships,” The 

Independent, 19 November 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

africa/blackwater-gunboats-will-protect-ships-1024582.html (accessed 21 April 

2009).

45. Gregory Viscusi, “Mercenary Guards Jump Ship as Somali Pirates 

Remain Undeterred,” Asian Energy, 18 December 2008, http://asianenergy.

blogspot.com/2008/12/mercenary-guards-jump-ship-as-somali.html (accessed 

21 April 2009); Catherine Z. Raymond, “Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, 

Issues and Responses,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 9, no. 4 (Fall 2005), http://

www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/30/1/ (accessed 21 April 2009).

46. Viscusi.

47. Raymond.

48. Murphy, 50.

49. Chalk, 16.

50. Alexandria Lewis, “Kidnap Insurance Costs Up Tenfold in Gulf of 

Aden,” Aon Corporation Web site, 9 April 2009, http://aon.mediaroom.com/

index.php?s=43&item=1526 (accessed 21 April 2009).

51. John W. Miller, “Piracy Spurs Threats to Shipping,” The Wall Street 

Journal, 19 November 2009, http://www.studentnewsdaily.com/daily-newsarticle/piracy-spurs-threats-to-shipping-costs/ (accessed 21 April 2009).

52. Associated Press, “Piracy Drives Up Insurance Rates for Ships in Gulf,” 

Portland Press Herald, 13 April 2009, http://pressherald.mainetoday.com/story.

php?id=250548&ac=PHbiz&pg=1 (accessed 21 April 2009).

53. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2007, 5–6.
160

54. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asian Piracy: Research and 

Developments,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, 

ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 

2006), xviii.

55. Dillon, 83.

56. In 1990, China’s GDP was 1.854 trillion Yuan RMB. By 2000, it had 

grown to 8.946 trillion Yuan RMB. See “GDP Growth, 1952–2008,” Chinability, 

4 May 2008, http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm (accessed 3 April 2009).

57. Munns, 14.

58. Vijay Sakhuja, “Sea Piracy in South Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in 

the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23.

59. Murphy, 72.

60. Central Intelligence Agency, “Indonesia,” The 2008 World Fact Book

(Washington, DC: Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008), 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html 

(accessed 23 February 2009).

61. Central Intelligence Agency, “Malaysia,” The 2008 World Fact Book

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html 

(accessed 23 February 2009).

62. Sakhuja, 23.

63. Murphy, 73.

64. Eklöf, 133.

65. Raymond.

66. Murphy, 73–74.

67. Pranamita Baruah, “Japan’s Response to Sea Piracy,” Institute for 

Defence Studies and Analyses, 30 March 2009, http://www.idsa.in/publications/

stratcomments/PranamitaBaruah300309.html (accessed 21 April 2009).

68. Dillon, 45–46.

69. Mueller and Adler, 151.

70. John Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High 

Seas (New York: Dutton, 2002), 166–167.

71. Chalk, 16.

72. Eklöf, 48.

73. J.N. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: The Politics of 

‘Sustainable’ Piracy in the Strait of Malacca,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the 

Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 201–203.

74. Eklöf, 44.

75. Ibid., 133–135.

76. Ibid., 44.

77. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends,” 

in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New 

York: Routledge, 2007), figure 3.3, 50.

78. Ibid., figure 3.15, 60.

79. Eklöf, 69.
161

80. Ibid., 73–74.

81. Raymond.

82. Eklöf, 77–80; Munns, 14.

83. Eklöf, 80–82.

84. Herbert-Burns, 100; International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial 

Crime Services, “Violence Resumes in Malacca Straits,” 15 March 2005, http://

www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:violenceresumes-in-malacca-straits&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (accessed 6 April 2009); 

Republic of the Philippines, “Filipino Seaman Abducted in Malacca Strait Freed,” 

21 March 2005, http://www.gov.ph/news/default.asp?i=7530 (accessed 6 April 

2009).

85. Eklöf, 53.

86. Ibid.

87. Herbert-Burns, 105.

88. Eklöf, 53–54.

89. Mak, 203.

90. Ibid., 206–208.

91. Ibid., 213–214.

92. Chalk, 33 and note 9.

93. Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asian Piracy,” xxvii.

94. Chris Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in 

Southeast Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. 

Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), 195.

95. Young and Valencia; Eklöf, 135–136.

96. Eklöf, 136–137.

97. Raymond.

98. Eklöf, 137–139.

99. Ibid., 140.

100. Rahman, 195.

101. Ibid., 194.

102. Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asian Piracy,” xxix–xxx.

103. Ibid., xxxiv.

104. Members of ReCAAP are People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei 

Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the 

Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic 

Republic, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic 

of Singapore, the Democratic Socialists Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom 

of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. See Regional Cooperation 

Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 

(ReCAAP) Information Sharing Center, Adding Value, Charting Trends: 2007 

Annual Research Report, Singapore, 2008, www.southchinasea.org/docs/Recaap_

Trends.pdf (accessed 6 April 2009), 5.

105. Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asian Piracy,” xxxv; Rahman, 191.

106. Ong-Webb, xxx.
162

107. Raymond.

108. Peter Lehr and Hendrick Lehmann, “Somalai—Pirates’ New Paradise,” 

in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New 

York: Routledge, 2007), 2. 

109. Axe.

110. Derek S. Reveron, “Think Again: Pirates,” Foreign Policy (January 2009), 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4626&page=0 (accessed 2 

April 2009).

111. Central Intelligence Agency, “Somalia,” The World Fact Book, 2008, 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html 

(accessed 4 April 2009).

112. Brian Wilson and James Kraska, “Anti-Piracy Patrols Presage Rising 

Naval Powers,” Yale Global, 13 January 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.

article?id=11808 (accessed 4 April 2009).

113. Abdi Guled, “Somali Pirates Move to Aid Comrades,” Mail & Guardian, 

11 April 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-04-11-somali-pirates-move-toaid-comrades (accessed 10 April 2009).

114. BBC, “Timeline: Somalia,” BBC News Web site, 29 October 2008, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm 

(accessed 7 November 2008).

115. Dana Hughes, “Somalia Piracy: On Land and Sea,” ABC News Web 

site, 17 November 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/worldview/2008/11/somaliachaos-a.html (accessed 21 November 2008); Rob Crilly, “Wanted: Countries to 

Stand Guard on Ships,” The Times, 20 September 2008, http://www.timesonline.

co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4791107.ece (accessed 13 November 2008).

116. Steve Bloomfield, “‘Hidden Famine’ in Horn of Africa Puts 14 Million 

at Risk,” The Independent, 23 July 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/

world/africa/hidden-famine-in-horn-of-africa-puts-14m-at-risk-874873.html 

(accessed 20 November 2008).

117. Mary Harper, “Life in Somalia’s Pirate Town,” BBC News Web site, 

18 September 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm (accessed 6 

November 2008).

118. Jay Bahadur, “I’m Not a Pirate, I’m the Saviour of the Sea,” The 

Times, 16 April 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/

article6100783.ece (accessed 21 April 2009).

119. Harper; Daniel Howden and Mohamed Guled, “Off the Coast of 

Somalia: We’re Not Pirates. These Are Our Waters, Not Theirs,” The Independent, 

14 November 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/off-thecoast-of-somalia-were-not-pirates-these-are-our-waters-not-theirs-1017962.html 

(accessed 4 April 2009).

120. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 January–31 

December 2007, 13; Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report, 1 

January–31 December 2008, 13–14.

121. Ibid.
163

122. Christopher Jasparro, “Somalia’s Piracy Offers Lessons in Global 

Governance,” YaleGlobalOnline, 6 April 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/

display.article?id=12210 (accessed 10 April 2009); Peter Lehr, “Dealing With 

Somali Pirates,” The Guardian, 25 November 2008, http://www.china.org.cn/

international/opinion/2008-11/25/content_16820148.htm (accessed 10 April 

2009).

123. Reveron.

124. Axe; Lehr.

125. Murphy, 101; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Anti-Shipping 

Activity Messages, Single ASAM Ref. Number 1995–71, http://www.nga.

mil/portal/site/maritime/index.jsp?epi-content=RAW&beanID=844643208&

viewID=query_results&MSI_queryType=ASAM&MSI_generalFilterType=S

pecificNumber&MSI_generalFilterValue=1995_71&MSI_additionalFilterTy

pe1=None&MSI_additionalFilterType2=-999&MSI_additionalFilterValue1=-

999&MSI_additionalFilterValue2=-999&MSI_outputOptionType1=SortBy&M

SI_outputOptionType2=-999&MSI_outputOptionValue1=Date_DESC&MSI_

outputOptionValue2=-999 (accessed 10 April 2009). 

126. Jonathan Clayton, “Business Booms in Somalian Pirate Village Eyl,” 

The Australian, 19 November 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/

story/0,25197,24674415-32682,00.html (accessed 2 April 2009).

127. Reveron.

128. Alastair Dalton, “Two More Hijacked in Piracy Crisis,” The Scotsman, 

19 November 2008, http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/Two-more-shipshijacked-in.4706852.jp (accessed 2 April 2009).

129. John Lichfield and Daniel Howden, “French Sailor Killed in Gun Battle 

as Special Forces Storm Hijacked Yacht,” The Independent, 11 April 2009, http://

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/french-sailor-killed-in-gun-battle-asspecial-forces-storm-hijacked-yacht-1667275.html (accessed 11 April 2009).

130. BBC, “Somali Faction Frees Foreign Ships,” BBC News Web site, 

13 February 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/56514.stm (accessed 7 

November 2008).

131. BBC, “Ship’s Crew Fined for Illegal Fishing Off Somali Waters,” BBC 

News Web site, 24 December 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/242103.stm 

(accessed 7 November 2008).

132. BBC, “Somali Pirates Hold Greek Tanker, BBC News Web site, 

12 August 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2188900.stm (accessed 7 

November 2008).

133. Hassan Barise, “Somali Gunmen Hijack Cargo Ship,” BBC News Web 

site, 3 July 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2090651.stm (accessed 7 

November 2008).

134. “Somali Pirates Hold Greek Tanker.

135. BBC, “Pirate Warning for Somalia’s Coastline,” BBC News Web site, 

30 January 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2709339.stm (accessed 7 

November 2008).
164

136. BBC, “WFP Ultimatum Over Somali Ship,” BBC News Web site, 12 

July 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4677155.stm (accessed 6 November 

2008).

137. BBC, “Pirates Hijack Tsunami Aid Ship,” BBC News Web site, 30 

June 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4636695.stm (accessed 6 November 

2008).

138. Simon Robinson and Xan Rice, “In Peril on the Sea,” Time, 7 November 

2005, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1126762,00.html 

(accessed 1 April 2009).

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. BBC, “Somali Aid Suspended After Hijack,” BBC News Web Site, 4 

July 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4649825.stm (accessed 6 November 

2008).

142. Associated Press, “How Pirates Hijacked Us,” News24.com, 6 October 

2005, http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1812108,00.

html (accessed 2 April 2009).

143. Robinson and Rice.

144. BBC, “Somali Shock at New Ship Hijack,” BBC News Web site, 11 

October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4330492.stm (accessed 

6 November 2008).

145. BBC, “Somali Pirates Free Hijacked Ship,” BBC News Web site, 

14 October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4341196.stm (accessed 6 

November 2008).

146. BBC, “Pirates Hijack Ship Off Somalia,” BBC News Web site, 21 

October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4363344.stm (accessed 6 

November 2008).

147. Michael S. McDaniel, ed., “Pirate Cruise Ship Attack,” The Cargo 

Letter, 5 November 2005, http://www.cargolaw.com/presentation_casualties.05.

html#Seabourne-Spirit (accessed 5 April 2009).

148. Murphy, 104; Steven D. Smith, “US Navy Captures Pirate Vessel Off 

Somali Coast,” Armed Forces Press Service, 24 January 2006, http://www.

defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14539 (accessed 5 December 2008); 

BBC, “Jail Sentence for Somali Pirates,” BBC News Web site, 1 November 2006, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6105262.stm (accessed 6 November 2008).

149. Murphy, 104; “Somali Pirates Open Fire on US Navy Ships,” Ports & 

Ships, 20 March 2006, http://ports.co.za/navalnews/article_2006_03_20_3048.

html (accessed 10 April 2009).

150. Murphy, 104–105.

151. “WFP Welcomes Release of Hijacked Ship, MV Rozen,” Shipping 

Times, 8 April 2007, http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item399_rozen.htm 

(accessed 15 December 2008).

152. BBC, “Ransom Paid to Free Danish Ship,” BBC News Web site, 23 

August 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6959729.stm (accessed 

21 November 2008).
165

153. Andrew Scutro, “In Chasing Pirates, Navy Comes Full Circle,” Navy 

Times, 4 November 2007, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/11/navy_

pirates_071103w/ (accessed 10 April 2007).

154. BBC, “Pirates ‘Overpowered’ off Somalia,” BBC News Web site, 31 

October 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7069026.stm (accessed 

21 November 2008); Scutro.

155. “Pirates Attack Cargo Ship with Rocket Launchers,” Shipping Times, 15 

May 2007, http://www.shippingtimes.co.uk/item603_pirate_attack.htm (accessed 

15 December 2008).

156. Todd Pitman, “Somali Pirates a Far Cry From Buccaneers of Old,” 11 

April 2009, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090411/ap_on_re_af/piracy_somalia_

s_swashbucklers (accessed 11 April 2009).

157. Mike Lee, “Real-Life Pirates Can’t Match ‘Capt. Jack Sparrow,’” 

ABC News Web site, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/International/

story?id=4641039&page=1 (accessed 21 November 2008).

158. AFP, “Pirates Used ‘Good Conduct Guide’ in French Yacht Seige: 

Source,” AFP News Web site, 17 April 2009, http://afp.google.com/article/

ALeqM5ic4lMhcdvj6BV5HsRB-uabBjyUmA (accessed 21 November 2008).

159. BBC, “France Frees Sailors From Pirates,” BBC News Web site, 16 

September 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ic4lMhcdvj6BV5HsRBuabBjyUmA (accessed 21 November 2008).

160. “Pirates Took Just 16 Minutes to Steal Super-Tanker,” Indian Express.

com, 21 November 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pirates-took-just16-minutes-to-steal-supertanker/388724/ (accessed 26 November 2008); “Somali 

Pirates Demand Tanker Ransom, Three Ships Seized,” Khaleej Times Online, 19 

November 2008, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/

international/2008/November/international_November1334.xml§ion=in

ternational (accessed 19 November 2008); CNN, “Pirates Take ‘Super-Tanker’ 

Toward Somalia,” CNN.com/world, 19 November 2008, http://www.cnn.

com/2008/WORLD/africa/11/17/kenya.tanker.pirates/index.html (accessed 19 

November 2009).

161. “France ‘Captures Somali Pirates.’” 

162. Ministry of Defense, “Suspected Pirates Caught by the Royal 

Navy Handed Over to Kenya,” Defense News, 18 November 2008, 

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/

SuspectedPiratesCaughtByTheRoyalNavyHandedOverToKenya.htm (accessed 

11 April 2009).

163. Daily Mail, “Somali Pirate ‘Mother Ship’ Sunk by Indian Navy Turns 

Out to be Thai Trawler,” Daily Mail, 26 November 2008, http://www.dailymail.

co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1089514/Somali-pirate-mother-ship-sunk-Indiannavy-turns-Thai-trawler.html (accessed 11 April 2009).

167

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Piracy is a nontraditional security threat that cannot be 

solved through military solutions . . . piracy should be 

rooted out by attacking sources of their strength on land, 

disrupting their organizational structure, and isolating 

them from their sources of support. In particular, this 

means destroying their bases and hideouts; cutting off 

their sources of capital, technology, and recruitment; and 

crippling the middlemen and markets that allow them to 

dispose of their loot.*

By looking at piracy over both time and space, it is clear that naval 

operations alone will not eliminate the costly and criminal operations of 

pirates. The best approach is to remove one of the three pillars of piracy: 

geography, political instability, or safe havens. Since the first pillar, 

geography, is almost impossible to change, primary consideration must be 

given to the remaining pillars, both of which are land based.

Piracy in the West Indies flourished for hundreds of years because of the 

geography, political situation, and the availability of safe havens. During 

the 17th and 18th centuries, when Great Britain moved to eliminate piracy, 

British authorities had to change political conditions as well as eliminate 

the safe havens. It required removing corrupt officials who benefited from 

piracy and unauthorized privateering and making illegal trade with the 

pirates not worth it to the merchants of Jamaica and the American colonies. 

It took people like Woodes Rogers and Governor Alexander Spottswood 

of Virginia to eliminate the pirates’ havens. With no one to purchase their 

plundered goods and no place for them to hide from the authorities, the 

pirates eventually withered away.

Piracy reemerged in the West Indies in the 19th century because of 

political instability caused by the Wars for Latin American Independence. 

Since the geography of the area remained conducive to piracy, once the 

political conditions in the area deteriorated and safe havens ashore became 

available, piracy resurfaced. As in the earlier era, the advent of privateering 

led to piracy. Spanish merchants and officials, resentful over American 

*Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends,” in 

Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr, ed. (New 

York: Routledge, 2007), 90.
168

sympathy for the rebels, tacitly supported the brigands, providing them 

with political support and safe havens. Commodore David Porter finally 

made inroads against the buccaneers when he ignored Spanish concerns 

about the sovereignty of their Cuban and Puerto Rican possessions and 

allowed his forces to pursue the pirates ashore. Even then, it was the 

Spanish decision to stop providing support to the pirates, more than 

actions of the American and British Navies, that led to the end of piracy 

in the Caribbean.

The Barbary pirates preyed on shipping in the Mediterranean and 

Atlantic for hundreds of years. Great powers such as Britain and France 

used them as an instrument of their national power, calculating that 

whatever the corsairs did to other nations’ ships would benefit them. After 

the American Revolution, when the United States no longer enjoyed the 

protection of the Royal Navy, the Barbary corsairs became a threat to the 

United States. The American effort during the first Barbary War depended, 

at first, exclusively on naval power. Despite the presence of American 

naval forces off the coast of Tripoli for several years, the war threatened to 

drag on indefinitely until William Eaton introduced a land element. At that 

point, threatened from both sea and land, the Pasha of Tripoli accepted the 

American terms. But the treaty did not eliminate any of the three pillars 

of piracy, so when the threat of American retaliation dissipated during the 

years leading up to the War of 1812, Barbary corsairs began preying on 

American shipping again. Once the War of 1812 ended, the United States 

dispatched another squadron to the Mediterranean to deal with the pirates. 

Much like the current situation off Somalia, the second Barbary War 

depended entirely on naval power. But this naval force was strong enough 

to force the Barbary corsairs to accept the terms of the treaty. There was 

also a key difference between the Barbary states and Somalia—piracy 

from the Barbary nations emanated from a few, easily indentified safe 

havens, making the American blockade much more effective than anything 

contemporary naval forces can do to Somalia. Still, piracy originating from 

the Barbary states did not really end until France invaded North Africa in 

the 1830s and took control of the Barbary kingdoms, thus permanently 

eliminating their safe havens.

Greek piracy in the 1830s was the direct result of the political turmoil 

caused by the Greek Revolution. Once the political situation in the Greek 

isles deteriorated, piracy surged in the region because the other two pillars 

were already in place. The geography of the Greek islands, sitting astride 

the shipping lanes to the Levant, favored pirates and the numerous islands 

provided untold havens for the pirates. The British, French, Austrians, 
169

and Americans all sought to use naval power to control the problem. 

Despite being the largest naval power in the world, not even the United 

Kingdom had enough resources to suppress Greek piracy by itself. Unable 

to effectively strike the pirate havens, Admiral Sir Edward Codrington 

eventually threatened the Greek Government with bleak consequences if 

it did not act to eradicate the shore havens used by the pirates.

Asian piracy in the 19th century also demonstrates the futility of trying 

to control pirates using only naval forces. When piracy in the Persian 

Gulf became a nuisance, the British dispatched two naval squadrons to 

chastise the pirates. While they burned dhows and bombarded towns, their 

actions were not sufficient enough to stop the Arab corsairs. Finally, a third 

expedition that included a substantial land element attacked and occupied 

the primary pirate base. This time, Arab leaders realized the permanence 

of the situation and submitted to the British. Likewise, the Southeast Asian 

pirates of Sumatra and Borneo remained active until their shore havens 

were damaged or destroyed. By this time, the British also had an important 

technological advantage—the steam-powered ship.

British and American actions against the Chinese pirates benefited 

greatly from the use of steam-powered vessels. They were highly effective 

against the sail-powered junks the pirates used. Still, British and American 

naval forces were never able to completely eliminate piracy in Chinese 

waters because they could not remove any of the three pillars. The Chinese 

Government was unable to take care of the pirates and was also unwilling 

to accept help from the British and Americans. Consequently, since the 

British and Americans could only take half measures, they were never 

able to finish off the pirates. But their steam-driven ships gave them such 

an advantage that they were able to greatly decrease the magnitude of the 

problem.

Modern antipiracy efforts face a situation similar to that faced by 

the British and Americans in China. Although they had the power to act, 

they could not do so without violating China’s sovereignty. Similarly, the 

United States and its allies have the power to eliminate piracy but cannot 

use it to full advantage without violating the sovereignty of the nations 

plagued by piracy. Thus, in the case of the coalition forces off the coast of 

Somalia, they are forced to react to Somali depredation rather than take 

decisive action to eliminate it. In Southeast Asia, since the pirates operate 

in the waters of nations with viable governments, the United States has 

even less leeway. The best it can do is provide financial and technical 

support to those willing to accept such assistance.
170

Ultimately, piracy is a land-based problem. President Monroe made 

that clear in 1824 when he laid out the three alternatives: using hot pursuit 

ashore to capture or kill the pirates, conducting reprisals against those who 

help the corsairs, or blockading the pirate havens. President Monroe’s 

conclusions are still valid today. If you eliminate the shore havens or 

modify the political conditions that make piracy possible, then piracy will 

die out. If those pillars remain in tact, then no amount of naval patrols are 

going to fully suppress piracy.

Because of the actions of Somali corsairs, piracy is frequently in the 

news these days. The situation in Somalia is a difficult one. The political 

turmoil that has embroiled the country since the early 1990s makes piracy 

possible. There are several potential solutions to the current situation, 

none of which will be easy. Since it is unlikely that the United States, 

remembering the events of the early 1990s, will intervene in Somalia, then 

we must look to President Monroe’s three alternatives. The United States 

and other naval powers, acting under the auspices of the United Nations, 

could pursue the pirates ashore and kill or capture the perpetrators. Much 

like the British treatment of the Arab pirates, the Somalis will have to be 

taught that piracy is too dangerous to continue. The French have tried this 

course of action with some degree of success. The United States could also 

conduct reprisals against those who help the corsairs. American forces 

know where their bases are and should be able to identify those who have 

benefited from piracy. Once again, the objective would be to teach the 

Somalis that piracy is too dangerous to continue. This course of action 

would, of course, require considerable political fortitude since there is a 

likelihood that innocent Somalis would be injured or killed during such 

reprisals. Finally, we could impose a blockade on the primary pirate ports. 

It would not be difficult to establish a blockade of the primary ports and 

check all outgoing vessels. But blockades are long-term measures and 

are expensive to maintain. Moreover, since Somali piracy is relatively 

unsophisticated, the pirates could easily shift their operations to another 

port and continue as before. The best answer, of course, is to facilitate the 

establishment of a stable government in Somalia, which could police its 

shores and eliminate piracy. However, that is, most likely, years away.

In the end, if the world wants to suppress piracy off the coast of 

Somalia, it can be done. But President Monroe’s policy will have to be 

aggressively employed. We will have to pursue the pirates ashore, conduct 

reprisals against those who assist the pirates, and blockade the major 

pirate havens, thus preventing them from using the support infrastructure 

that has evolved over the last several years. These measures would 
171

require a level of international cooperation and resolve that is probably 

unobtainable, since there would also be considerable potential for civilian 

casualties. Instead, we will probably maintain the status quo, keeping a 

task force in the region to keep a lid on Somali activities without actually 

suppressing their actions or solving the root causes. There is little reason 

to expect more than that because the costs of both defensive measures 

and aggressive actions outweigh the benefits. While the Somali pirates 

have had some sensational successes, the money they have extorted is only 

a small fraction of overall world trade. With little financial justification 

for further defensive measures, the shipping industry seems willing to 

risk captures by pirates because the odds are in their favor and insurance 

ameliorates their losses. Further, if merchant captains and their crews are 

willing to continue risking capture, then it is likely that nations will not risk 

their reputations and resources trying to permanently suppress something 

that is more of a nuisance than a true threat to their national interests.

173

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185

Appendix A

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

of 10 December 1982

PART VII

HIGH SEAS

SECTION 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 100

Duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy

All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression 

of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 

any State.

Article 101

Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 

depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or 

the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 

directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 

persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in 

a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 

of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 

or aircraft;

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 

described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Article 102

Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose 

crew has mutinied

	 The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship,

government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and 

taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a 

private ship or aircraft.
186

Article 103

Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended 

by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing 

one of the acts referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship or

aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under 

the control of the persons guilty of that act.

Article 104

Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft

A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a 

pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by 

the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

Article 105

Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any 

State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft 

taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons 

and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried 

out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 

also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or 

property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 106

Liability for seizure without adequate grounds

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been 

effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be 

liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or 

aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

Article 107

Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy

A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or 

military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable

as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

 * * * * * * *

Article 110

Right of visit

1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred 

by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other 
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than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 

and 96, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for

suspecting that:

(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;

(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;

(c)	 the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag

State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;

(d) the ship is without nationality; or

(e)	 though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the

ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.

2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed 

to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under

the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains

after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further 

examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible 

consideration.

3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship 

boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated 

for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.

4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.

5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or 

aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.

Article 111

Right of hot pursuit

1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the 

competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that 

the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit 

must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the 

internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous 

zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial 

sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is 

not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial 

sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the 

order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. 

If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the

pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights 

for the protection of which the zone was established.

2. The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations 

in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf, including safety 

zones around continental shelf installations, of the laws and regulations 
188

of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the 

exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety 

zones.

3. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters 

the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.

4. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship 

has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the

ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using 

the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the territorial 

sea, or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive 

economic zone or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be 

commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a 

distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.

5. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or 

military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable

as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

6. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:

(a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis 

mutandis;

(b) the aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue 

the ship until a ship or another aircraft of the coastal State, 

summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, 

unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not 

suffice to justify an arrest outside the territorialsea that the ship

was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or suspected 

offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by 

the aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships which continue the 

pursuit without interruption.

7. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State 

and escorted to a port of that State for the purposes of an inquiry before 

the competent authorities may not be claimed solely on the ground that 

the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the 

exclusive economic zone or the high seas, if the circumstances rendered 

this necessary.

8. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial 

sea in circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot 

pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been 

thereby sustained.
189

Appendix B

Types of Ships and Boats

Sailing Warship Rates

By the 18th century, naval vessels were organized into six rates. The 

first through fourth rates were considered ships-of-the-line. The fifth and 

sixth rates, which were not large enough to sail in the line of battle, were 

known as frigates. All other smaller vessels were deemed nonrated ships.

First Rate—With three continuous gundecks, these were the largest ships 

in any fleet. They carried 60 to 80 guns in the 17th century, but the number 

of guns increased to more than 100 by the 18th century.

Second Rate—Older three-deck ships were consigned to second-rate 

status during much of the 17th century. By the 1680s, this category became 

an identifiable class carrying 80 to 100 guns.

Third Rate—These two-deck ships, which were the most common shipof-the-line, carried 64 to 80 guns. 

Fourth Rate—This was the smallest rate considered a ship-of-the-line. 

These vessels only carried 30 to 40 guns in the first half of the 17th century. 

By the end of the century, the rate was standardized to encompass ships 

carrying 50 to 60 guns.

Fifth Rate—This rate includes all large frigates. By the 18th century, 

these vessels carried 30 to 44 guns.

Sixth Rate—This rate was the smallest vessel in the Royal Navy 

commanded by a captain. During the 16th century, these vessels could 

carry as few as 16 guns, but by the end of the century, sixth-rate frigates 

carried 20 to 28 guns.

Types of Ships

Barge—A long (32-foot), lightweight boat rowed by 10 to 20 oars. It was 

normally used to transport senior officers and admirals.

Bark or barque—A sailing vessel with three or more masts, two or more 

of which were square rigged. The mizzenmast, or aftermast, was always 

rigged with fore and aft sails. (Example: USCG Eagle)

Boat—Essential auxiliary vessel for every sailing ship. Since many ships 

anchored out instead of laying up alongside a pier, small boats were used 

to transport personnel and cargo from ship to shore. They were also used 

to tow the sailing ship, conduct rescue missions, and carry out patrols in 

shallow waters. Small boats came in many shapes and sizes and performed 

various functions. 
190

Bomb vessel—Special craft designed to carry heavy mortars. The hulls 

of these vessels were strengthened to accommodate the additional weight 

of the mortars and they did not have a foremast. These vessels were 

sometimes called bomb ketches although they were typically ship rigged 

by the 1760s.

Brig—A two-mast square-rigged ship with a fore-and-aft gaff-and-boom 

main sail. Brigs were standard cargo ships. (Example: USS Somers, 

1842)

Brigantine—A two-mast ship similar to a brig except that the aftermast 

is fore-and-aft rigged. Many brigantines also had sweeps to propel them 

when there was no wind. 

Caravel—A small (250-ton average) three-mast sailing vessel used 

well into the 17th century. It was either square-sail or lateen-sail rigged. 

(Example: Columbus’ vessels the Nina and Pinta)

Carrack (or Nao)—The largest European sailing vessel of the 15th century 

at more than 1,000 tons. Carracks were characterized by very high bows 

and sterns that seriously hindered their sailing capabilities. (Example: 

Columbus’ vessel the Santa Maria)

Corvette—A French term for small three-mast square-rigged vessels. 

Corvettes, which displaced 400 to 600 tons, were sometimes designated 

“sloops of war.”

Cutter—Fast-sailing boats that were usually sailed rather than rowed. 

When rowed, they were double-banked, meaning two oarsmen sat beside 

one another, and were thus broader in the beam than other types of boats. 

Dhow—A lateen-rigged sailing vessel used by Arabs in the Persian Gulf 

and Indian Ocean. Lateen rigging is distinguished by a triangular sail hung 

from a yard secured to the mast at a 45-degree angle.

Dinghy—A name given to a warship’s smallest boat. Dinghies were used 

to ferry personnel or cargo. Although they could be rigged for sails, they 

were more typically propelled by oars.

Dory—A short (15- to 20-foot), shallow-draft, oar-powered boat 

characterized by high sides and a sharp bow. Dories typically held two to 

four people.

East Indiaman—A large, heavily armed merchant vessel used for trade 

between Europe, India, and the East Indies. English East Indiamen were 

chartered by the East India Company and designed to carry both passengers 

and cargo. Since they sailed far from England, they were well armed for 

protection against pirates, privateers, and foreign naval vessels.
191

Felucca—A small, fast lateen-rigged vessel used primarily in the 

Mediterranean.

Fireship—A vessel used as a floating incendiary device. Fireships were 

designed to allow the crewmembers to ignite the ship at the last moment, 

thus giving them an opportunity to survive the attack.

Fluyt—A large-capacity three-mast, square-rigged Dutch merchant ship. 

This design, which was adopted by many nations, was popular because 

of its substantial cargo-carrying capability and the small crew needed to 

operate the vessel. Since fluyts were lightly armed, they had difficulty 

fending off pirates and privateers. The British called them flyboats. 

(Example: Blackbeard’s ship Queen Anne’s Revenge)

Frigate—A fast, seaworthy warship that was too small to be included in the 

line of battle but large enough to conduct independent operations. Unlike 

ships-of-the-line, frigates only had one gun deck although guns were also 

mounted on the quarterdeck and forecastle. (Example: USS Constitution)

Full-Rigged Ship—A square-rigged ship of three or more masts. This 

description distinguishes ships from other vessels.

Galleon—A large 16th-century square-rigged three- or four-mast squarerigged, multideck warship. Although large galleons were generally lightly 

armed, the ship’s design was obsolete by the mid-17th century. Spanish 

treasure ships, however, retained the designation “galleon” regardless of 

their actual design. (Example: Magellan’s ship the Golden Hind)

Galliot—A small Dutch coastal vessel that used a square sail with a 

standing gaff on the mainmast and a lateen sail on the mizzenmast.

Gig—A light, narrow boat that was typically better under oars than sail.

Gunboat—A large boat equipped with one or more guns. A ship’s boat 

was sometimes converted into a gunboat by arming it with a small gun. 

Over time, nations built specifically designed gunboats that were larger 

and more seaworthy.

Hoy—A small coastal vessel, normally sloop rigged, used to transport 

passengers and cargo. Hoys were also used as dockyard work boats.

Jollyboat—A name applied to a ship’s smallest boat, usually a cutter. 

Jollyboats were typically all-purpose boats used for light duties.

Junk—A Chinese sailing vessel characterized by a high, overhanging stern, 

projected bow, and square sails reinforced by bamboo battens. The sails can be 

spread or closed like venetian blinds with the pull of one line. 

Ketch—A two-mast ship with the tallest mast (mainmast) forward of the 

second. The shorter aftermast (mizzenmast) was placed forward of the 
192

rudder. Although some ketches were ship rigged, most were fore-and-aft 

rigged. (Example: The ketch Intrepid was used by Stephen Decatur to 

destroy the Philadelphia.)

Launch—A large, flat-bottom boat that replaced the longboat by the 1780s 

because of its larger capacity. It was not as capable under sail as a longboat 

so it was normally rowed.

Lighter—A large barge that was originally used to lighten ships by 

offloading equipment and cargo while in port. The name later applied to 

any vessel working around dockyards and anchorages. 

Longboat—The largest boat carried by a ship. Despite the name, longboats 

were often shorter than other boats but their rugged construction meant 

they were capable of operating in rough seas and handling heavy cargos. 

Like cutters, they were designed for sailing but could also be rowed by 8 

to 10 double-banked oarsmen. Because of their size and weight, longboats 

were difficult to stow onboard ship.

Lorcha—A sailing vessel with a Western-style hull and junk rigging.

Lugger—A coastal craft with two or three masts rigged with lugsails. 

Since luggers were fast vessels that performed well in coastal tidewaters, 

they were often used by smugglers and privateers. 

Mystiko—The Greek version of the xebec.

Pink—A small, three-mast, square-rigged sailing vessel with a narrow 

overhanging stern.

Pinnace—A long (up to 35 feet), light boat used as a tender to guide 

vessels into port or carry messages between larger ships. At first, pinnaces 

were smaller versions of the longboat and operated under sail or oars. 

Later, they became more narrow and lighter and evolved into a rowed craft 

used by junior officers.

Polacre—A Mediterranean trading vessel with three lateen-rigged masts 

although they later acquired square sails set on a single mast as well.

Proa—A multihull vessel of two unequal parallel hulls, similar to an 

outrigger canoe, used by many Southeast Asian islanders.

Schooner—A vessel rigged with fore-and-aft sails on two or more 

masts. Later versions, called topsail schooner, had square topsails on the 

foremast. (Example: schooner USS Enterprise, 1799; topsail schooner 

USS Porpoise, 1820)

Ship-of-the-Line—A warship powerful enough to sail in the line of battle 

during a naval engagement. Ships in the first through fourth rates were 

called ships-of-the-line. (Example: USS Independence, 1815)
193

Skiff—A small light flat-bottom boat that was usually rowed rather than 

sailed. Skiffs had pointed bows and flat sterns.

Sloop—A single-mast ship with fore-and-aft rigged sails typically 

displacing less than 25 tons.

Sloop-of-war—A term applied to smaller vessels, below the sixth rate, 

commanded by a master and commander. The designation “sloop-of-war” 

was, in effect, a seventh rate and included brigs, corvettes, snows, and other 

types of ships. (Example: USS Wasp, 1806; USS Constellation, 1855)

Snow—A large two-mast sailing ship similar to a brig. The primary 

difference between a snow and a brig was that a brig hoisted its fore-andaft gaff-and-boom sail from the mainmast while a snow hoisted its gaffand-boom sail from an auxiliary (trysail) mast.

Xebec—A fast, lateen-rigged sailing vessel used in the Mediterranean. 

Xebecs had a shallow draft and a low freeboard that afforded them 

excellent maneuverability in restricted waters and light winds, but those 

same characteristics caused them to be poor vessels in the open ocean or 

in rough weather. They could also be rowed when necessary.

Sources

“Boat Types.” Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Boat_types 

(accessed 14 May 2009).

Gardiner, Robert. The Line of Battle: The Sailing Warship, 1650–1840. London: 

Conway Maritime Press, 1992. 

Moore, Ryan. “An In-Depth Analysis of the Xebec.” Xebec, Inc., 2004. http://

www.geocities.com/xebecinc/info2.html (accessed 14 May 2009).

Ossian, Robert. “Complete List of Sailing Vessels.” Rob Ossian’s Pirate Cove. 

http://www.thepirateking.com/ships/ship_types.htm (accessed 14 May 

2009).

“Sailing Ship.” Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sailing_ship (accessed 

14 May 2009).

“Sailing Ship Rigs.” Maritime Museum of the Atlantic. http://museum.gov.ns.ca/

mma/AtoZ/rigs.html (accessed 14 May 2009).

“Ship Types and Rates in the Age of Sail.” The Art of Age of Sail. http://www.

ageofsail.net/aoshipty.asp (accessed 14 May 2009).

“The “Stockholm Brig” Tre Kronor.” Nordic Underwater Archaeology. http://

www.abc.se/~pa/uwa/ (accessed 14 May 2005).

“Types of Sailing Ships.” Cadwalader Family of Criccieth. http://freespace.virgin.

net/r.cadwalader/maritime/types.htm#top (accessed 14 May 2009).

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About the Author

Mr. James Wombwell joined the Combat Studies Institute in October 

2007. A retired captain in the Naval Reserve, his last assignment was at 

the Naval Historical Center in Washington, DC, where he served as a 

Navy historian documenting current naval operations. While at the Naval 

Historical Center, he deployed to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe, Mons, Belgium; US Naval Forces Central Command, Bahrain; and 

the Naval Special Warfare Command, San Diego, California. A Surface 

Warfare Officer, he served on the USS Fiske (DD-842) and USS Texas

(CGN-39) and taught at the Surface Warfare Officers’ School in Newport, 

Rhode Island, while on Active Duty. Mr. Wombwell earned a B.A. from 

Vanderbilt University and an M.A. from the University of Memphis. He 

has taught history at the University of Memphis and University of Kansas. 

The Combat Studies Institute Press recently published Mr. Wombwell’s 

Occasional Paper 29, Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina 

Disaster.


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