MOBILIZING

for the STORM

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD 

AND DESERT STORM

B Y C APTAIN L E S ’ MELNYK

National Guard Bureau

Office of Public Affairs

Historical Services Division 

2001
3 Invasion

6 The Roundout Units

8 The Guard is Called

10 The Mobilization Begins

15 Preparing for War

18 The Fate of the Roundouts

22 Field Artillery in the Gulf

24 Life in the Desert

31 Saddam Responds

33 The Call Ups Continue

35 The Ground War Begins

37 The Costs of War

40 The Homecoming

42 Aftermath

44 Army National Guard Units Federalized 

for the Gulf War

55 Suggested Readings

56 Endnotes

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1

T

he mobilization of the Army National Guard for Desert Shield came 40 years to the month

after the last big mobilization of the Guard for the Korean War in 1950. Superficially,

there were similarities between the outbreak of the two wars. Both occurred in distant countries that the average American would be hard-pressed to locate on a map, and both wars

broke out after American diplomats delivered less than clear messages that the threatened

nations would be protected by American arms should they be attacked. In both instances,

greedy dictators gambled that the American president would not expend American lives for

such marginal strategic goals. In both cases, the dictators were badly mistaken.

But the parallels between the Korean War and Desert Shield/Desert Storm diverge quickly after that. The Army that achieved a “Certain Victory” during its “Whirlwind War”1 through

Kuwait and Iraq was a completely different organization from the one that struggled to 

a stalemate in Korea 40 years earlier. The destruction of Task Force Smith revealed the 

hollowness of the post-World War II Army when it first encountered the North Koreans in the

summer of 1950. The Army that deployed to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1990 was

arguably the most combat-ready peacetime fighting force in the nation’s history. It was a confident, all-volunteer force that reflected in its realistic training and doctrine the hard-learned

lessons of the Vietnam War, and had enjoyed unprecedented growth and modernization 

during the preceding decade. The incredible logistical success of deploying over 500,000

troops and their equipment in record time into an austere environment was only overshadowed by the mechanized blitz that reduced the Iraqi army “from the fourth-largest army in

the world to the second-largest army in Iraq in 100 hours.”2

MOBILIZING FOR THE STORM: 

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN

OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD 

AND DESERT STORM

“ Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border 

capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional 

preparation. Given the Iraqi government’s history of aggression

against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will

not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.”

President George Bush, Address to the nation, August 8, 1990
2

In 1990, the Army National Guard

began the year some 456,000 strong and

contained 46% of the combat, 32% of the

combat support, and 26% of the combat

service support forces in the total Army.3

Thus, the Army Guard could not help but

be a key player in this most one-sided victory in American history. In all, some

62,411 soldiers in 398 units were ordered

into active federal service, with 1,132 additional Army Guardmembers volunteering

for active duty.4 Forty-eight states, the

District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto

Rico contributed units. Some 297 units

consisting of 37,848 soldiers were certified

and deployed to Southwest Asia5

, while an

additional 84 units and 10,132 soldiers

were deployed throughout the U.S. and

Europe, or were validated but awaiting

deployment. The remaining soldiers, mostly members of the three mobilized

Roundout Brigades, were in the process of

obtaining validation for deployment when

the war came to its quick and victorious

conclusion. The Guard contribution to

Desert Shield/Desert Storm was not limited to individual augmentees or small units:

60 of the Army Guard units that deployed

to Southwest Asia were commanded by

Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels, including

the 142d and 196th Field Artillery

Brigades, the only two Army Guard combat units to fight in the war. 6

Unlike their Korean War predecessors,

who in most cases spent months at their

mobilization sites and had their units

stripped repeatedly of equipment and

experienced personnel, the Guardsmen

and women who were called up for Desert

Storm were deployed quickly and in the

same units they

had trained with

in peacetime.

Sixty-seven percent of all Army

Guard units deployed within 45

days of being mobilized; 28% within 20

days. In many cases, the limiting factor in

getting units into the field was not the

amount of train-up time required to validate a unit for deployment, but the lack of

assets - especially sealift - necessary to

transport equipment to Southwest Asia.

The long-held belief that the Guard could

not be ready in time to help the Army 

win a modern war was convincingly 

disproved.

The long-held belief that the Guard could not be

ready in time to help the Army win a modern war

was convincingly disproved.
I

n retrospect the warning signs preceding Saddam Hussein’s invasion of

Kuwait were there for the world to

see in the first half of 1990. A lengthy and

exhausting war with Iran had left Iraq with

a large and experienced army, but also

with crushing debts. These debts, mostly

owed to Arab neighbors, were difficult to

pay off because the price of oil - Iraq’s

major source of foreign income - was at an

historic low. Iraq’s dictator, Saddam

Hussein, blamed this on an overproduction of oil by his tiny Persian Gulf neighbors, the Sheikdom of Kuwait and the

United Arab Emirates, that had glutted the

world’s oil market and brought prices

down. He demanded compensation from

Kuwait for the money Iraq lost as a result

of these low prices, as well as a slowdown

in future production in order to make oil

prices rise. He further accused Kuwait of

stealing oil from Iraq by “slant-drilling”

underneath the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in the

Rumaylah oil field that straddles the two

countries, and which Iraq claimed for

itself. In bombastic public speeches,

Hussein tapped into the widespread Arab

distrust of the United States when he

claimed that U.S. subversion was behind

the worldwide drop in oil prices and

threatened military action against Kuwait if

it failed to reduce oil production. By this

time, in late July 1990, Iraqi troops were

massing on the border and last minute

diplomatic efforts failed to convince

Hussein that the rich and largely defenseless prize of Kuwait should be denied him.

On Thursday, August 2, 1990, at 2:00

a.m. local time, Iraqi armored formations

swept across the border and brushed aside

Kuwaiti resistance. Hussein declared that

Iraq had reclaimed Kuwait as its “19th

Province,” and his army stood poised - or

so it appeared - to continue into the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There was little

there to stop him. Saudi Arabia was a rich

country, with high-quality military equipment mostly of U.S. manufacture, but with

relatively few soldiers, and poorly trained

ones at that. The Iraqi army was, by some

estimates, the fourth largest in the world,

well-equipped and combat-experienced,

with a core of loyal, professional troops

manning the armored and mechanized

divisions of Hussein’s elite “Republican

Guard.” The Iraqi army was also known

for its use of chemical weapons, both in

the war against Iran, and against rebellious

minorities at home. Against this kind of

force, the Saudi army - like the Kuwaiti

army - would be little obstacle. But as the

largest exporter of crude oil to the United

States and the world, Saudi Arabia was

also a nation whose continued independence was in the vital interests of the

United States.

President George Bush’s reaction to

the invasion of Kuwait was swift and decisive. Immediately freezing Iraqi and

Kuwaiti assets in the United States, he

declared a trade embargo. While rallying

international support among U.S. allies

and in the United Nations, Bush dis3

I NVASION
patched Secretary of Defense Richard

Cheney to Saudi Arabia to offer U.S. assistance in the defense of that nation should

Hussein choose to continue his attack

south to secure more oil fields. On August

6, the same day the UN Security Council

voted to impose a worldwide embargo on

Iraq, Secretary Cheney met with King Fahd

of Saudi Arabia and gained the worried

monarch’s consent to host U.S. forces on

Saudi soil. The following day, at President

Bush’s order, Operation Desert Shield

began and U.S. Air Force F-15s flew to

Saudi Arabia. The United States would not

4

General H. Norman

Schwarzkopf,

Commander, U.S.

Central Command

(NGB)
be alone in its support of Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait - before it was over, 33 other

nations would join the coalition to restore

Kuwait to its rightful rulers. While the U.S.

commitment of troops would be the

largest - in excess of 527,000 servicemen

and women deployed to the Gulf region -

there were also large contingents from

Saudi Arabia (110,500 servicemembers),

the United Arab Emirates (43,000), the

United Kingdom (42,000), Egypt (40,000),

Oman (25,500), Syria (21,000), and France

(20,000).7

U.S. Army forces followed quickly on

the heels of the first Air Force fighters. The

Ready Brigade of the 82d Airborne

Division, the first of approximately

280,000 Army troops that would deploy to

Southwest Asia, began arriving in Saudi

Arabia on August 9. That same day,

Sergeant First Class Palmer Burchstead and

Sergeant First Class Timothy Hester, volunteers from South Carolina’s 228th Signal

Brigade acting as a mobile communications unit, claimed the honor of being the

first Army Guardmembers to arrive in the

theater when they reached Central

Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in

Riyadh just hours after the first 82d

Airborne troops. There they set up a Single

Channel Tactical Satellite Set for the Third

U.S. Army, the major Army component of

CENTCOM.8

While sending a message to Iraq that

America was committed to defending

Saudi Arabia, the light forces of the 82d

Airborne Division were vulnerable to

armored attack. Heavier reinforcements

were needed. As quickly as possible, the

mechanized infantry and armor of the 24th

Infantry Division and the helicopters of the

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were

loaded aboard ships and transport planes

and sent to Saudi Arabia. A key component of the 24th Infantry Division, one of

the division’s three ground maneuver

brigades, was a roundout unit from the

Georgia Army National Guard, the 48th

Infantry Brigade. Neither the 48th, nor an

additional roundout infantry battalion from

the South Carolina National Guard, were

mobilized when the 24th Infantry Division

was alerted for deployment to Saudi

Arabia.

Following closely on the heels of 

the 101st and 24th Divisions, the 3rd

Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st

Cavalry Division both began shipping their

equipment from Texas ports to the Persian

Gulf. Rounding out the 1st Cavalry

Division, but also not mobilized, was

Mississippi’s 155th Armored Brigade plus a

roundout battalion from the Texas

National Guard. The Army’s handling of

the roundout units was to become the

source of great frustration for the Guard in

a war otherwise full of success stories.

5
The Roundout program, first instituted by the Army in 1973, paired

a reserve component brigade

with an active duty division for purposes

of training and deployment. The program

saved money, since Guard and Reserve

units on average cost the taxpayer onequarter of what the equivalent active duty

unit would cost, and it gave Guardmembers a wartime mission on which to focus

their peacetime training. The active component division would have peacetime

oversight of the Guard brigade’s training,

and direct command of the unit in

wartime, thus creating a sense of “ownership” for the division and fostering closer

ties between the active and reserve components. Furthermore, the program was

designed to ensure that the Army would

never again fight a major war without

engaging the American people by calling

up the Guard and Reserves, a decision

consciously made by the Army Staff in the

wake of the Vietnam War. Nine active

component divisions at one time or another were organized with roundout brigades,

with an additional seven separate Army

Guard battalions also rounding out active

component divisions.9

In theory, Georgia’s 48th Infantry

Brigade should have been mobilized as

soon as its parent unit, the 24th Infantry

Division, was alerted for deployment 

to Saudi Arabia. Rather then request immediate authority from President Bush to

mobilize roundout units in the National

Guard, the Army leadership decided to

deploy the 197th Infantry Brigade - an

active component unit - instead of the

48th. The 197th was a separate brigade not

affiliated with any Army division, but

which served the Infantry School at Fort

Benning, Georgia.

The 197th was

sent to Saudi

Arabia despite the

fact that it was

equipped with

older M-60A3

tanks and M-113

armored personnel carriers, unlike

the 24th Infantry Division and 48th

Brigade, both of which had the modern M1A1 Abrams tank and M-2 Bradley Fighting

Vehicle. The 197th would learn to operate

this new equipment while occupying the

front lines in Saudi Arabia, awaiting an

Iraqi attack. In a similar fashion, the Army

chose to deploy the 1st Brigade, 2d

Armored Division to roundout the 1st

6

T H E R OUNDOUT U NITS

...the program was designed to ensure that the Army

would never again fight a major war without engaging 

the American people by calling up the Guard and Reserves,

a decision consciously made by the Army Staff in the wake

of the Vietnam War.
Cavalry Division instead of Mississippi’s

155th Armored Brigade, the designated

roundout unit for the 1st Cavalry Division.

Neither the 197th Infantry Brigade nor the

1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, had

ever trained with the divisions they were

about to join. This last-minute change in

the Army’s war plans that sent less-ready

(especially in the case of the 197th) active

component units to war in place of Guard

units was devastating for many in the

Guard. In the words of the Chief of the

National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant

General John B. Conaway, “The bottom

line was painfully clear to us in the Guard.

There were plenty of active Army units

that wanted to get into the fray and there

was little real chance the active Army leadership would send Guard troops in 

the active’s place, war plans or no war

plans. The fact was and remains, the active

Army missed a tremendous opportunity to

solidify their total force policy position

with the 48th.”10

The roundouts weren’t the only Guard

combat units not called up. War plans

called for the 82d Airborne Division to be

reinforced with Guard TLAT (TOW Light

Anti-Tank) battalions to bolster the 82d’s

anti-armor capability, but these rapiddeploying units were never called. Many

Guard combat units, like South Carolina’s

1st Battalion, 151st Aviation and 4th

Battalion, 178th Field Artillery, were

assigned (through a program the Army

called CAPSTONE) to reinforce a particular

theater or Corps - in this case, XVIII

Airborne Corps - but were replaced by

active component units. The commander

of the 1st Battalion, 151st Aviation

summed up his frustration with this situation when he stated: “Senior Department

of the Army officials were unwilling to

accept any National Guard combat aviation units as deployable. However, these

same reserve units were asked to provide

individual aviators and aircraft as fillers to

positions identified as unfilled by active

component forces.”11

7
Despite the Army’s lack of interest in using Guard combat

units, the need for reserve

component support troops to bolster the

defense effort in Saudi Arabia was abundantly clear from the very outset of

Operation Desert Shield. This was especially true for logistical planners in CENTCOM who were responsible for supplying

a growing number of troops with all the

basic essentials. Within days of the Iraqi

invasion the National Guard Bureau was

preparing for a major mobilization - setting

up a 24-hour Emergency Operations

Center, identifying key soldiers (especially

Arab linguists) and units for early deployment, issuing orders that prevented personnel from voluntarily leaving the Guard

during the emergency, and halting 

scheduled inactivations and conversions 

of units.12

The official call was not long in 

coming. On August 22, President Bush

issued Executive

Order 12727, ordering the Selected

Reserve of the

Armed Forces to

Active Duty. “By the

authority vested in me as President by the

Constitution and the laws of the United

States of America, including sections 121

and 673(b) of title 10 of the United States

Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of

the United States for the effective conduct

of operational missions in and around the

Arabian Peninsula. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the

Secretary of Defense to order to active

duty units of the Selected Reserve.”

It would become the largest mobilization of the Army National Guard since the

Korean War, and the first combat mobilization since 1968 when some 7,000

Guard soldiers were sent to Vietnam in

units or as individual replacements in

response to the Tet offensive. Rather than

declaring a partial mobilization of the

reserves, which would have obligated

reservists for service up to a year and

could have been challenged by the

Congress, President Bush opted to declare

a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up

(PSRC), using his executive authority to

mobilize up to 200,000 reservists for 90

days, with the option of extending the

Call-up an additional 90 days. The situation in Saudi Arabia was still uncertain at

the time - Iraq could withdraw and end

the standoff quickly, or U.S. troops could

be stationed in Saudi Arabia indefinitely.

The PSRC allowed the President to

respond to the immediate crisis, and

allowed him time to gain the support of

Congress and the American people should

a longer mobilization be necessary.

8

T H E G UARD IS C ALLED

A soldier from Arizona’s

222d Transportation

Company negotiates an

obstacle during postmobilization training

for Operation Desert

Shield (Defense Visual

Information Center)
It was up to the Secretary of Defense

to inform the various services how many

and what kind of reservists they could call.

After consulting with senior Army officers

on his staff, Secretary of Defense Cheney

instructed the Army to mobilize only

Combat Support and Combat Service

Support organizations. He placed no such

similar restrictions on the other services.

Guard leaders were taken by surprise by

this exclusion of combat forces. “This decision to eschew calling Army Guard combat units, apparently struck at the staff

level in the Department of the Army in

connection with the staff of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), came one day after

General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the

Army, told senior military association

executives...that the call up of the 48th

Infantry Brigade would be announced the

next day.”13

In fact, the Army did not intend to

deploy the roundout brigades in operations short of a major war and a full mobilization. “Despite public discussion to the

contrary, it had never been assumed by

the Army Staff that any of the roundout

units would deploy with their parent

organizations in a short-term scenario that

did not involve the Soviet Union.”14

Indeed, a 1988 General Accounting Office

report to Congress stated that the Army,

contrary to what it told the Guard, intended to deploy active component divisions

with separate active component brigades

instead of their roundouts.15 Mobilizing the

roundouts when the Army had no intention of using them also made no sense.

The Army had been severely criticized following the 1961 Berlin Crisis mobilization

when it called up reservists for what was

perceived to be no reason, and it had no

desire to be subjected to that kind of 

criticism again.16

Despite all the debate which continued

to cloud this issue long after the 

war was over, the decision not to deploy

the roundouts had little to do with their

readiness for war. Due in part to congressional pressure, the Army finally mobilized

three Roundout Brigades three months

after the first active component divisions

had deployed to Saudi Arabia. While these

Guardsmen hoped that they would deploy

to the Persian Gulf to fight alongside the

active component divisions they had

trained with, this was a slim prospect. No

plans were made, or sealift allocated, to

deploy the roundouts to Saudi Arabia prior

to the start of the ground offensive. They

would be held as a strategic reserve.

This policy was never clearly stated at

the time of the war, for several reasons.

The possibility existed that the Guard

might have to deploy to the Gulf if the war

lasted longer than anticipated, expanded

to other areas, or inflicted far higher casualties than estimated. Additionally, no one

wanted to tell the Guardsmen undergoing

combat training at Fort Polk, Fort Hood, or

Fort Irwin that they had been called up to

merely silence congressional critics and to

act as an insurance policy. Subsequent

accusations, aired in the press and attributed to “anonymous Army sources,” that

these roundout units were not deployed

because they could not meet the criteria

for deploying were not only inaccurate;

they miss this central point entirely.

9
What the Army needed from

the Guard was support

troops, and these the Guard

began supplying immediately. On August

24, the National Guard Bureau sent Alert

Order #1 to 69 Army National Guard units,

warning them that they would soon be

mobilized in support of Operation Desert

Shield. This alert phase, though usually

only lasting a few days, was a crucial time

during which units began preparing 

their soldiers for eventual mobilization,

getting a “jump-start” on the process. Most

importantly, the states used the time to

“cross-level” (redistribute) any needed

individuals and equipment from units that

were not called into units that were about

to be called. The end result was that a

remarkable 97% of Guard units met

deployability criteria on the first day they

were mobilized.17

Mobilization followed quickly for

some. In the early morning hours of

August 27, orders went out to 19 Army

National Guard units totaling 482 soldiers

10

T H E M OBILIZATION B EGINS

Yellow ribbons adorn a row of trees near

Fort McCoy’s main entrance - one ribbon

for each unit that used the Wisconsin post

for its mobilization base (Larry Sommers,

WI Dept. of Military Affairs)
in 13 states. The honor of being first was

determined by a coin toss that took place

in the Alabama Guard Emergency

Operations Center when two separate

mobilization orders arrived simultaneously

at 2:00 that morning. The winner was the

1241st Adjutant General Company (Postal),

which became the first Army Guard unit to

be called to active federal service since the

Cuban boatlift of 1980.18 The 1207th

Quartermaster Detachment (Water

Purification), which lost the coin toss, was

second. Before the war was over, Alabama

would provide more units then any other

state or territory - not a surprise in a state

where Guard service is a tradition and

mobilization readiness exercises were regularly conducted to ensure maximum

deployability of units.19

As every veteran knows, even the most

carefully laid plans made in peacetime fail

to anticipate actual requirements when a

war breaks out. The selection of the 1241st

Adjutant General Company as first to

mobilize served to further illustrate this

point. “Ironically, 1241st AG Company was

Alabama’s lowest priority unit in accordance with 200,000 call-up lists, Southwest

Asia ‘Capstone’ lists and the like. At no

time did the 1241st come up on any of the

‘usual’ Army mobilization lists. The incident only served to emphasize that all

Army National Guard units at all levels

must be ready for call-up to active duty at

any time.”20 Indeed, the 1241st would not

be the last unit to be surprised that it was

called up. The Army largely ignored its

peacetime plans once an actual crisis

broke out: only 103 of the 398 units that

were federalized were in the war plans for

deployment to Southwest Asia.21

11

Members of the District of Columbia’s Headquarters

and Headquarters Detachment, 372nd Military

Police Battalion relax aboard the upper deck of 

an Air Force C-5 on the way to Saudi Arabia 

(COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

Colorado’s 1158th Transportation

Detachment (Movement Control) became

the first mobilized Army National Guard

unit to deploy to Southwest Asia when it

arrived in Saudi Arabia on September 9,

1990, followed the next day by North

Carolina’s 382d Public Affairs Detachment

- a unit which had been mobilized just ten

days earlier. Alabama’s 1241st Adjutant

General Company, the first unit called up,

was the third unit in-country on September

13. By September 15, 32 units had been

mobilized; nine (with 223 soldiers) had

deployed to Southwest Asia. News reports

indicated that the U.S. had 150,000 troops

of all services in the theater.22

Back in Washington, the National

Guard Bureau (NGB) was struggling to

keep up with the almost daily changes to

the force lists supplied by the Department
of the Army, due to the changing needs of

CENTCOM for different kinds of units.

NGB also fulfilled its customary mission of

issuing instructions to the states while

channeling information between the Army

Staff and the states. In addition, myriad

other duties busied the staff, from input on

proposed legislation to assist Guard and

Reserve soldiers, to developing guidance

on medical standards for mobilization

where such guidance was lacking. The 22

years that had passed since the last

wartime mobilization created many 

unanticipated difficulties as a host of procedures were tested for the first time. In

general, morale remained remarkably

high. The Guard - both Army and Air -

was eager to serve, a message that

Lieutenant General Conaway conveyed

to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Colin Powell, in a late

September meeting. Conaway urged

Powell to call more Guard troops, while

Congress pressured the Army leadership

and the Secretary of Defense to explain

why they had delayed in calling up Guard

and Reserve combat units.23

While 180 days was considered more

than enough time to mobilize reserve

component support units and rotate them

through a deployment in the Persian Gulf,

it was not enough time, according to the

Department of Defense, to deploy reserve

combat units - at least in the Army.

Secretary Cheney, in response to written

inquiries from several prominent members

of the House Armed Services Committee,

stated: “To date, I have not authorized 

the call-up of Army combat units for

Operation DESERT SHIELD for two reasons. First, my senior military advisors

have not advised me that the call-up of

such units is necessary at this time.

Secondly, the statutory time limits on the

use of Selected Reserve units imposes artificial constraints on their employment. ...

Too much of the 180-day statutory maximum period for activated Selective

Reserve units would be consumed by

preparation, pre-deployment training, and

12

(ABOVE) Typical base

camp out in the desert

- this one belongs to

the Wisconsin Army

National Guard’s 13th

Evacuation Hospital,

which operated a field

hospital near the Iraqi

border (WI ARNG)

(RIGHT) PFC William

McIntyre of Maryland’s

200th Military Police

Company phones home

from the lone telephone near his unit’s

outpost in Eastern

Saudi Arabia during

Operation Desert

Shield (1LT John

Goheen, MD ARNG)
transportation to and from the Middle East,

with the result that the Reserve forces

could not be stationed in the region for a

full rotation period.”24 The Marine Corps

apparently did not share the Army’s concerns, as indicated by the mobilization of

two armor companies from the Marine

Corps Reserve. These companies - which

had been assisted in their peacetime training and wartime mobilization by the Army

Guard - transitioned from the M-60A3 tank

to the newer M1 just days before arriving

in Saudi Arabia, and joined the 4th Marine

Division’s 4th Tank Battalion one day

before going into battle. During the attack,

they played a key role in liberating Kuwait

City, destroying 59 Iraqi tanks in 90 

seconds in an epic armored battle.25

As the Guard commitment to Desert

Shield increased (89 units and 8,735 soldiers on federal active duty as of October

15, 1990), Lieutenant General Conaway

and a few members of his staff paid a visit

to Saudi Arabia. In a brief meeting with

General Schwarzkopf,

the Chief of the

National Guard Bureau

was encouraged to

find that his soldiers

and airmen were doing

excellent work that

was heartily appreciated by the CENTCOM

commander. As could

be expected, the topic

of the Guard roundout

brigades was raised.

Schwarzkopf, who had

commanded the 24th

Infantry Division, and

thus was familiar with

the capabilities of the 48th Infantry

Brigade, knew it was an issue he had little

control over: “I hear ya John, I hear ya.

That’s for the politicians back in

Washington to figure out. What I need

now is more support units and that’s what

you guys have a lot of. If we get call-up

authority for a longer period of time, I’d

love to see the brigades called up and

deployed over here.”26

Indeed, the initial 90-day call up

authority was drawing to a close, though

President Bush would soon sign an extension to make it 180 days.27 The mission of

the U.S. forces arrayed in the Gulf was

about to change. The arrival of heavy

forces from the United States and various

other coalition countries to shore up the

defensive “line in the sand” in Saudi

Arabia was essentially complete by the

end of October. With the threat of an Iraqi

attack receding and economic sanctions

showing no signs of causing Saddam

Hussein to budge, America’s political and

Arkansas

Guardsman

confers with

Kuwaiti

civilian 

(AR ARNG)

13
military leaders began to explore offensive

options as the only method still remaining

for removing the Iraqis from Kuwait.

While an attack was possible with the

forces already stationed in the Gulf, the

odds were not as favorable as the commanders would have liked. If an attack

was going to be made, then all agreed it

should be made with overwhelming force.

Accordingly, on November 8, President

Bush ordered a massive increase in force

in the Persian Gulf, to include the addition

of heavy armored forces from the Army’s

VII Corps in Europe and the 1st Infantry

Division from Fort Riley, Kansas. A further

large increment of Guard and Reserve

troops would also have to be mobilized -

in fact, far more then had been called 

previously. These troops would not only

support the planned offensive in the Gulf,

but provide backfill for the units departing

Europe or serve as a strategic reserve in

the United States should a second conflict

break out while the bulk of the active

Army’s forces were tied down in the

Persian Gulf. These forces would include

five combat brigades drawn from the Army

National Guard - the 48th Infantry, 155th

Armored, and 256th Infantry Brigades, and

the 142d and 196th Field Artillery

Brigades.

14

Typical sleeping

quarters in a

warehouse in

Dhahran (WI

ARNG)
F

or troops already in the desert, as

well as those waiting to deploy,

there were the age-old questions

that soldiers always ask. Will we attack?

Will the enemy attack? And increasingly,

How long will we be sitting here? In fact,

it was not until President Bush ordered the

build up, followed by the issuance in late

November of UN Resolution 678 (setting a

January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal) that the soldiers began to understand that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait

would end quickly - one way or the other. 

The pace of the call ups increased rapidly following the decision to prepare for

an offensive. Whereas on November 1,

there were 91 Army Guard units containing 9,102 soldiers on active duty, a month

later there were 231 units with 36,689 

soldiers in federal service. By the 15th of

December that number had climbed to 301

units and 50,040 soldiers on active duty.

While some 40,000 of these Guardmembers

were still in their mobilization stations,

compared to nearly 10,000 on the ground

in Southwest Asia, the number of Guard

soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf

would increase rapidly as the January 15

deadline drew near. By that date, over

23,000 Guardmembers would be on the

ground in the theater, preparing for a war

they knew was coming soon.28

A typical Guard unit, like Headquarters

and Headquarters Detachment, 369th

Transportation Battalion out of New York

City, was called up and processed in relative haste. The 369th, like many Guard

outfits, has a long and storied history. It

traces its lineage to one of the National

Guard’s most famous African-American

combat outfits, the 369th Infantry, known

as the “Hellfighters from Harlem,” and was

15

P REPARING FOR W A R

(BELOW) Christmas in the Gulf (NGB)

(RIGHT) Modern day Bedouins cross the Saudi

desert in an ancient Mercedes truck. Conducting

searches of civilian vehicles like this could be a

lengthy process (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)
one of the most decorated units in the

American Expeditionary Force in World

War I. In September 1990, a subordinate

element of the 369th, the 719th Transportation Company, had been mobilized 

and deployed to Saudi Arabia, where it

supported the 101st Airborne Division. On

December 1, another subordinate element,

the 1569th Transportation Company, was

alerted for active duty. Finally, on

December 5, the battalion headquarters

detachment itself was alerted for mobilization in the unit’s Harlem armory on

December 11. There they spent three days,

completing actions that were typical to all

the Guard units that were called: showdown inspections to check that all issued

gear was on hand; inventory and loading

of unit equipment, and seemingly endless

in-processing - filling out of forms, listening to briefings, completing wills and

powers-of-attorney, and ironing out pay

problems. Family Support officers, military

lawyers and chaplains were made available to help solve the variety of problems

that arose with mobilization. After completing these tasks, the 52 assigned personnel under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel Francis Kairson, Jr. made the relatively short trip across the Hudson River

and down the New Jersey Turnpike to

their “mob” (pronounced “mobe”, 

for mobilization) station, Fort Dix, 

New Jersey. 

At the mob station, Army Guard units

typically conducted weapons qualification

and training in such areas as chemical

defense, and cycled through more screenings and briefings. Guardmembers were

screened for dental, cardiovascular, and

other problems to determine if they were

medically fit to deploy overseas. The dental screening in particular was harrowing

for some soldiers. While only two soldiers

were disqualified from deploying because

of their teeth, over 13,000 were classified

as probably requiring emergency dental

care within the next 12 months.29 For

many of these soldiers, the required treatment was to have one or more teeth

pulled peremptorily by Army dentists who

had hundreds of patients and no time for

lengthy - if cosmetically more pleasing -

16

Keeping track of the

mail was a monumental job, as units moved

from one location to

the other. Americans

showed their support

by sending thousands

of care packages to

Saudi Arabia labeled

“To any U.S. servicemember” (NGB)
root canal surgery. Mobilized units spent a

great deal of time at their mob stations

packing gear and preparing vehicles for

movement overseas, to include a coat of

desert camouflage paint. In contrast to

their vehicles, the supply of desert camouflage uniforms was usually so limited that

few reservists were issued any prior to

deploying to Southwest Asia - indeed,

many soldiers did not receive these until

they were ready to come home!

With only limited post-mobilization

training, the Headquarters Detachment of

the 369th Transportation Battalion flew out

of McGuire Air Force Base for Dhahran,

Saudi Arabia two days after Christmas.

Given little time to acclimate to their new

situation, they were integrated into the 32d

Transportation Group. With over 800 soldiers from six attached Guard and Reserve

transportation companies (including the

1569th) under its command, the 369th

coordinated the transportation of tracked

vehicles and other equipment from the

port of Dammam to the front lines.30

Operations were reaching a fever pitch as

heavy equipment continued to come in

from Europe and the United States in

preparation for the ground offensive.

Later, after the January 15 deadline had

passed and the air war began, the men

and women of the 369th, along with thousands of other soldiers, began shifting the

VII and XVIII Corps 200 miles west from

their initial locations south of the

Saudi/Kuwaiti border to new positions out

on the right flank of the Iraqi army. It was

a tremendous logistical achievement, done

completely without Iraqi knowledge, the

equivalent of “moving the entire population of Akron, Ohio, and all of their vehicles and worldly goods westward to Fort

Wayne, Indiana, while the neighbors in

Cleveland, a few miles north, think they

are still at home.”31

17

Massachusetts

Guardsmen of the

1058th Transportation

Company carry paratroopers of the 82d

Airborne Division on

their truck into Iraq

during the ground

offensive (SSG James

Smith, MA ARNG)
The quick pace of call up, screening, validation, and deployment

seen with units like the 369th was

not matched when it came to the three

Roundout brigades that were called in

November. That these units would be

treated differently was made clear from

the moment Secretary Cheney announced

that the Roundouts were being activated:

“I want to be absolutely certain that the

units drawn from the Guard and Reserve

have the opportunity for the additional

workup training our people think they

require. I’m not eager to send units that

are not fully ready... Before they go, they

need to go to the National Training Center

to get into shape as if they were an active

duty division.”32 However, not a single

active duty brigade or division then in

Saudi Arabia was required to complete a

rotation at the National Training Center

following its alert for deployment.

Virtually every reserve unit requires a

period of post-mobilization training in

order to be ready to deploy, and each of

the roundout brigades was confident that

they could complete their post-mobilization training in a fairly short time. Indeed,

all three brigades met the Army’s deployability criteria established in the Army

Mobilization and Operations Planning

System (AMOPS) on the day that they

were mobilized, and had been rated as

combat ready by their respective active

component division commanders prior to

August 2, 1990. As with the other reserve

units that had been called up, the members of the roundout brigades expected a

fairly straightforward process of postmobilization training and preparation that

took into account the work they had

already accomplished during weekend

drills and annual training - but that was

not to be. “When the 48th and 256th

[roundout to the 5th Infantry Division, still

based in the U.S.] reached their mobilization stations on November 30th (the 48th

at Ft. Stewart, Georgia and the 256th at 

Ft. Polk, Louisiana), the unit commanders

were told that the combat readiness rules

had been changed. They were told that

they would have to be retrained, going

through the long, drawn-out instruction

process commonly referred to in the Army

as ‘crawl, walk, run.’”33

The deployment readiness requirements for the roundout brigades were set

by the Army at the highest level - “C1.”

The C rating is an objective measurement

based on the percentage of authorized

manning in a unit, the percentage of

authorized equipment on hand, the number of soldiers who have the requisite military qualifications for their positions, an

acceptable level of operational readiness,

and other factors. The AMOPS requirement for deployment of Guard and

Reserve units is generally C3, a standard

which 97% of Guard units met on the day

they were mobilized. Active component

units can deploy with a C2 rating, though

most went overseas with a C1. 

In addition to the imposition of a higher readiness standard for the roundout

brigades, the units were not permitted to

18

T H E F ATE OF THE R OUNDOUTS
2d Lieutenant Troy McNeely of

Georgia’s 48th Infantry Brigade

says goodbye to his girlfriend

when his unit departs Macon for

its mobilization station, Fort

Stewart (NGB)

train or evaluate themselves. The 48th

Brigade’s pre-war plans had recommended 42 days of post-mobilization training

prior to deployment. These plans were

developed before the war broke out, in

coordination with and based on the guidance of the commander of the 24th

Infantry Division, and were reviewed by

the Commander, U.S. Army Forces

Command, the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the

Army. Rather than follow these

plans, active component trainers

and evaluators instituted a training program for the brigade that

discounted the pre-mobilization

training that had already been

conducted - essentially treating

them like a unit of new recruits.

This policy was even applied to

battalions that had successfully

completed rotations at the

National Training Center (NTC)

within the past few years, where

the Army’s most realistic and

demanding maneuvers take place.

In addition, new tasks such as

obstacle breaching and counterreconnaissance training were

added to the list of requirements

necessary to achieve a “combat

ready” certification.34 Although

19

these additional tasks were assigned as 

a reasonable precaution based upon 

the assessment of the Iraqi opponent, 

nevertheless Guardsmen chafed at being

further delayed from deploying to the

combat zone.

Following their November 30 call up at

their home stations, the 48th assembled at

its mobilization station, Fort Stewart,

Georgia, on December 5. After completing
in-processing, screening, and some soldier

and crew level training, the 48th loaded its

equipment onto railcars and proceeded

across the country to Fort Irwin, California,

home of the NTC. Louisiana’s 256th

Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, assembled at

its mobilization station - Fort Polk,

Louisiana - and engaged in New

Equipment Training (NET) for transition

from the M-113 to the Bradley Fighting

Vehicle. Mississippi’s 155th Armored

Brigade conducted most of its training at

Fort Hood, Texas. A great deal of national

media attention focused on these three

units, and many of the problems they had

training up to the C1 deployment standard

were widely publicized. 

One key criticism was weakness in

leadership in the brigades, especially

among junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). For many leaders,

inexperience, lack of schooling, and

greater stress then they had ever previously

encountered in their military careers were

overwhelming. Compounding the stress of

the mobilization was the fact that many

leaders in the roundout units learned after

they were called up that they were

required to attend Army schools. This was

particularly true among NCOs, who under

the pre-Gulf War AMOPS regulations were

considered deployable if they were qualified in their occupational specialties, but

now, like their regular Army counterparts,

were required to be qualified for the grade

at which they

were assigned.

Eight company

commanders

from the 256th

were replaced

because they

couldn’t handle the stress,

while the commander of the 48th was replaced by his

deputy commander on the order of the

Second Army Commander.

Other criticisms focused on equipment

and maintenance. There were serious

equipment shortages in some of the units,

particularly a lack of chemical defense

gear, in part due to cross-loaning to other

Guard or Active component units which

had deployed earlier.35 The 48th also had

difficulties maintaining its equipment

while training at the NTC, a complaint

exacerbated by the Army’s decision to

field a new computerized unit logistical

system in the 48th after it mobilized. As a

result, many unit logisticians were in classrooms learning how to operate the new

system while their units struggled to maintain vehicles in the field without them. 

20

This behavior demonstrated serious morale and 

discipline problems in the roundouts, especially after 

it became clear that there was no way the units could

deploy to Saudi Arabia in time for the impending

ground war.
Perhaps the most damaging roundout

brigade mobilization story for the Guard

came in early February, 1991, when 53 

soldiers from Louisiana’s 256th Infantry

Brigade - at that time training at Fort Hood

- went AWOL or overstayed their passes,

and while doing so complained to the

local news media about the poor conditions they were experiencing in Texas.

These complaints concerning such issues

as poor food and living conditions, made

while there was a shooting war going on

in the Persian Gulf, were not well received

by either the Army or the public. This

behavior demonstrated serious morale and

discipline problems in the roundouts,

especially after it became clear that there

was no way the units could deploy to

Saudi Arabia in time for the impending

ground war. Regardless of their reasons,

this very public breach of discipline was a

black eye for the Army Guard delivered at

the same time that their fellow Guardmembers were doing yeoman service in

the Gulf. Most of the offending soldiers

were discharged as a result.36

Despite all the added tasks, changes

and problems, after 91 days (51 of them at

Fort Irwin), the 48th Infantry Brigade

enjoyed significant success against the

NTC Opposing Force and was certified as

“combat-ready” by its active component

evaluators. The 91 day figure was somewhat inflated by the 15 training days lost

due to movements and administrative

tasks, and by the 30 days of additional

training focused solely on assaulting Iraqistyle defenses - tasks that active component combat units trained on after arriving

in Saudi Arabia.37 Ironically, certification

came on the final day of the ground war,

February 28, 1991. In the opinion of many

Guardmembers, the prolonged certification process for the 48th and the passing

over of many other Guard combat units for

deployment was done with the specific

intent of keeping National Guard units out

of the fight. Major General Robert Ensslin,

President of the National Guard

Association, was one of the most vocal

critics of the Army’s policy when he said

“...many of us in the Guard have gained

the perception that our combat arms units

were put in a position where it was almost

impossible to succeed. Because the Army

did not need them in Saudi Arabia and

because many active Army officers instinctively disbelieve that a Guard maneuver

unit (infantry and armor) can be combat

ready, they set up a self-fulfilling 

prophecy.”38 One Adjutant General saw a

deeper motive for the exclusion of Guard

maneuver units - the regular Army’s fear of

post-war force reductions. “It adds up to

us the way two plus two adds up: If the

Guard was mobilized, and did well in the

theater, the Army would be in worse

shape in sustaining the force structure of

the active components.”39

21
The treatment of the two Guard

field artillery brigades upon their

mobilization was in stark contrast

to the training regimen the Army created

for the roundout brigades. The artillery

was needed in Saudi Arabia where its

offensive punch would be a welcome

addition to the ground attack. Their mobilization and deployment, as a result, 

proceeded with remarkable smoothness.

Tennessee’s 196th Field Artillery Brigade’s

post-mobilization training and validation

was based on clear standards and a concise set of missions. After a one-week field

deployment to validate collective tasks,

the brigade conducted a three-day command post exercise and then shipped their

equipment to Saudi Arabia. While the

22

F IELD A RTILLERY IN THE G ULF

An Oklahoma

Guardsman from the 1st

Battalion, 158th Field

Artillery, aboard his

MLRS launcher (NGB)
equipment was in transit, the unit

remained at Fort Campbell to polish up on

individual skills, before flying off to marryup with their equipment.40 One element of

the 196th, West Virginia’s 1st Battalion,

201st Field Artillery (whose lineage

includes units that fought on both sides of

the Civil War) found itself in Saudi Arabia

two months after being mobilized and

conducting its first fire mission, in support

of the French 6th Light Armored Division,

only two and a half weeks after that.41

Arkansas’ 142d Field Artillery Brigade

was ordered into federal service on

November 21, 1990, and had packed and

shipped its howitzers and rocket launchers

by December 15. Exactly one month later

the brigade was in Saudi Arabia picking up

its equipment and moving forward to support the 1st Infantry Division. Later, during

the ground offensive, the 142d supplied

artillery support for the British 1st

Armoured Division. Their contribution created a lasting impression on the commander of the British 4th Armoured

Brigade: “By golly, they were good. ... For

45 minutes, there was what I can only

describe as a running roar as MLRS submunitions exploded in a carpet right the

way across the full depth of the enemy

position. Talking to the Iraqi artillery commander after the war, he told me that 90

percent of his crews on that position had

been killed or wounded when this initial

bombardment had gone in. He lost more

than 70 guns in the space of an hour,

which was a pretty major achievement.”42

Oklahoma’s 1st Battalion, 158th Field

Artillery, the first unit in the reserves to be

equipped with the Multiple Launch Rocket

System, fired over 900 rockets during the

war, in the process achieving the highest

fire rate 

of any artillery unit in the Third Army.43

The rapid deployment and devastating

firepower delivered by the Guardsmen 

in these two artillery brigades was a 

significant example of what the Guard

could do when entrusted with the combat

mission.

23

8” Howitzers from

Arkansas’ 142d Field

Artillery 

conduct a fire 

mission 

(AR ARNG)
Everyday life for the average

Guardmember deployed in Saudi

Arabia during Desert Shield varied

depending on the soldier’s job and where

his unit was located. For soldiers fortunate

enough to be stationed in a city or on a

military base, some of the more basic

amenities - hot water, flush toilets, telephone access - were available, even if the

living quarters amounted to little more

than a cot on a warehouse floor with a

hundred other roommates. For those

bivouacked out in the desert, living conditions could be a bit more challenging.

Sand and dust were ever-present facts of

life, kicked up by every wind or passing

vehicle, getting into everything, and

increasing wear and tear on any object

containing moving parts. Sandstorms were

regular events, whose high winds tore

down tents and carried off loose objects.

Everywhere soldiers looked was the same

monotonous, flat terrain. Surprisingly for

most Guardmembers arriving in late 1990

and early 1991, the Arabian winter was

cold and wet - nothing like the overbearing sun and heat they anticipated.

Soldiers - as they have always done

throughout history - continued to adapt

and improve their positions for as long as

they stayed in them. “Building things

became a form of therapy to combat boredom and stress,” a relaxation method that,

before long, had converted scrap wood

into tables, dressers, benches and even a

gazebo in one company’s area. Security

was always an issue - “If you weren’t busy,

you would go fill sandbags” - but soldiers

also spent their leisure time doing laundry,

exercising, writing letters, or even - in the

case of one unit - getting in a round of golf

on an improvised six-hole golf course laid

out by unit members. Cleanliness - even

for soldiers in a relatively stable camp

environment - was a fleeting virtue.

Soldiers had varying opportunities to take

24

L IFE IN THE D ESERT

Guardmembers demonstrated their 

ingenuity by building many ammenities

out in the desert (COL James Engeler, 

WI ARNG)
Staff Sergeant Brad Clark of the 1267th Medical Company

plays on a six hole golf course constructed near his 

unit’s base camp. The 1267th was one of a few Guard 

units shared by two states, Missouri and Nebraska 

(1267th Medical Company, NE ARNG)

advantage of field showers, but the 

end result was always the same: “We 

were clean until we stepped out of the

showers, ...[but] as soon as the wind and

dust hit you, you were dirty again.”44

Restrictions on what the soldiers could

and couldn’t do were ever present. U.S.

and Saudi authorities were extremely concerned about the influence hundreds of

thousands of non-Islamic westerners

would have on the highly religious, traditional and conservative Saudi society.

Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest

sites in the Muslim world, and incidents of

cultural insensitivity could serve to break

down the Arab/Western coalition arrayed

against Iraq. American servicemembers

were given numerous briefings and issued

guide books detailing the “do’s and

don’ts” of behavior, to include prohibitions against displaying the Bible

or any religious jewelry, discussing

politics or religion with any Arab, or

eating, smoking or drinking anything

in public during the day for the

duration of the holy month of

Ramadan.45 Jewish and Christian religious services were limited to

American camps, and conducted by

chaplains who were euphemistically

referred to as “morale officers”

around the Saudis. Even the display

of the American flag was discouraged outside of American compounds, though this proscription fell

by the wayside as the war

approached. In an effort to appease Saudi

sensibilities, female servicemembers were

restricted from appearing outside of their

camps without headgear or in T-shirts.

Even so, it was shocking for many Saudis

to see American women, in the course of

performing their duties, driving vehicles,

wearing pants, and giving orders to men.

Though the soldiers serving in Saudi

Arabia during Desert Shield were not in 

a shooting war, there were still dangers to

cope with. Perhaps most familiar to soldiers who served in Transportation,

Ordnance, and Quartermaster type units

was the “thrill” of frequent missions along

MSR (Main Supply Route) Dodge, more

commonly referred to as “TAPline Road,”

after the Trans-Arabian Pipeline which

25
A field haircut 

is administered 

by a member of

Tennessee’s 212th

Engineer Company

(NGB)

(LEFT) Keeping fit in the desert (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

(BELOW) Staff Sergeant Ronald Yabor, from DC’s 372d MP

Battalion, and his pet Arabian Gila Monster. Soldiers in the

unit “adopted” several lizards and held races with them 

(COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

26
Ropes stretched between

tents make excellent clothes

lines for SPC Laurie Biermann

of Wisconsin’s 107th

Maintenance Company 

(WI ARNG)

Captain Seth Greene,

Headquarters and

Headquarters

Detachment, 372d

MP Battalion, does

his laundry in 

a washbasin 

(COL George Rojic,

DC ARNG)

27
(ABOVE) Base camp for Nebraska’s 24th

Medical Company. The unit evacuated

251 patients during their deployment -

many of them accident victims along

“Suicide Alley.” (24th Medical Company,

NE ARNG)

(LEFT) Sergeant Quintan Hardy, of Iowa’s

1133d Transportation Company, guards

Iraqi prisoners he is transporting from

Kuwait City to a holding compound 

(IA ARNG)

paralleled the road for hundreds of miles.

The soldiers, of course, had an even more

descriptive name for it - “Suicide Alley.”

The sheer boredom of driving hundreds of

miles in a straight line along this singlelane, no shoulder, no speed-limit highway

was broken by moments of extreme panic

as impatient soldiers or crazy local drivers

swung into oncoming traffic to attempt a

pass. Sleepy drivers often found themselves drifting off the pavement into surrounding sand, with sometimes tragic consequences. Accidents along MSR Dodge

were a leading cause of death and injury

before, during, and after the war.

28
While many of the Guard

units called up in November

and December of 1990 were

still in the process of packing gear, completing paperwork, and conducting postmobilization training, time was running

out on the January 15 deadline imposed

by the United Nations on Iraq. Last minute

diplomatic efforts - “going the extra mile

for peace” - failed to offer any hope of 

resolution short of war. American resolve

stiffened, even in a divided Congress

where three days of impassioned debate

culminated in a resolution to support the

use of all necessary means to remove Iraq

from Kuwait. When January 15 came and

went without any change in the Iraqi

army’s disposition, the only remaining

question was “When will the war start?” 

The hammer fell on Iraqi forces early

in the morning of January 17, 1991. In the

United States, where it was still the

evening of January 16, the air and missile

attacks coming in over Baghdad were

broadcast live as the networks broke in on

their evening lineup. Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater made the announcement to the nation. “The liberation of

Kuwait has begun. In conjunction with the

forces of our coalition partners, the United

States has moved, under the code name

Operation Desert Storm, to enforce the

mandates of the United Nations Security

Council.” 

The aerial pounding would last for 38

days before the ground war began on

February 24. The U.S. and coalition air

forces dominated the skies, while the

much-vaunted Iraqi air force barely challenged the assault. Those Iraqi planes that

“. . . if we get into an armed situation, he’s going to get his ass kicked.”

President Bush, December 20, 1990 46

(RIGHT) Medical Evacuation helicopter

from Nebraska’s 24th Medical Company

is offloaded from an Air Force C-5 upon

reaching Saudi Arabia in December 1990

(24th Medical Company, NE ARNG)

29
were not destroyed on the ground

attempted to flee to internment in neighboring Iran.47 The allied air campaign 

systematically began to destroy Iraqi air

defenses, military facilities, transportation

infrastructure, and numerous other targets,

down to the individual armored vehicles

dug in along the Saudi border. The development since the Vietnam War of precision-guided munitions - cruise missiles, TV

and laser-guided bombs - made for a revolutionary increase in the accuracy and

effectiveness of aerial bombardment. The

Iraqi military in Kuwait, a combathardened force with thousands of modern

armored vehicles and artillery pieces, was

cut off from Iraq and decimated. It was the

most stunning bombing campaign in the

history of the world.

While delighted with the success 

of the air campaign, and confident that 

victory would eventually be theirs, allied

planners remained worried about the

casualties that they would suffer once a

ground offensive began. Coalition forces

would have to breach a series of deadly

obstacles laid out by the Iraqi army over

the past six months along the Saudi 

border. Breaching operations are among

the most complex and perilous types of 

missions an army can undertake. Allied

units - slowed by Iraqi minefields, ditches,

and wire - would be vulnerable to both

direct and indirect (artillery) fires and possibly even chemical or biological attacks.

The Iraqis, after all, had shown no moral

qualms about using these weapons

before. Behind these obstacles were dugin infantry, and behind them were the

thousands of armored vehicles of

Hussein’s elite Republican Guards units.

Even the greatest air campaign in history

could only reduce this threat, 

not eliminate it. Freeing Kuwait would

require removing these forces with

ground troops. The American media

made much of the fact that U.S. forces

were stockpiling thousands of body bags

in anticipation of heavy casualties.

Statistical comparisons of the opposing

forces, using formulas based on previous

wars, predicted heavy losses among

coalition forces. The price for winning

“the mother of all battles” could be 

very steep.

30
F

or Guard soldiers this was a time

of furious activity - probably the

best medicine for the nervous

anticipation everyone felt. Army aviators

and field artillerymen (including those

from the Guard) got their first tastes of

combat during this period, conducting

cross border raids and artillery strikes. But

for most soldiers, knowledge that they

were at war came through observation of

the increased pace of operations - particularly at the air bases - increased workloads

for everyone, increased security, and

SCUD attacks. All the chemical defense

drills and training became very real as the

marginally “guided” Iraqi missiles made

almost nightly appearances over major

Saudi cities and military bases, causing

soldiers to don chemical protective

“MOPP” (Mission Oriented Protective

Posture) gear and seek shelter. The world

watched nightly on the news as streaks of

light soared through the sky - inbound

SCUDs met by outbound Patriot air

defense missiles, hurriedly modified with

software that enabled them to intercept

enemy missiles in addition to enemy 

aircraft. 

Hussein also launched SCUDs at

Israel, which was not a member of the

coalition, an obvious ploy to provoke

retaliation from the Jewish state.

Hussein’s gamble was that Israeli retaliation would generate sympathy for Iraq

among Arabs throughout the Middle East

and thus drive a wedge in the Arab/

Western coalition arrayed against him in

Saudi Arabia. Despite the deaths and terror

inflicted upon the Israeli population by

Iraqi missiles, the

United States was

able to persuade

its close ally to

forego retaliation

against Iraq. In

exchange, the U.S.

detailed several

Patriot missile batteries to defend

Israeli cities. 

31

S ADDAM R ESPONDS

Members of Massachusetts’s 772d Military

Police Company assist a wounded Kuwaiti

(COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)
Unable to effectively stop the attacks

raining down on his forces, Saddam

Hussein lashed out at the environment

instead, ordering the release of oil into the

Persian Gulf in late January in a vain

attempt to poison the water supply of his

Gulf neighbors. While this spill was

thwarted with American precision bombing of the outlet valves, it proved only a

prelude to Hussein’s later bid at environmental and economic destruction. As the

inevitable ground war approached in late

February, Hussein ordered Kuwaiti oil

wells set on fire. The skies turned black in

the middle of the day as over 500 well

heads spewed flame and billowing clouds

across the desert landscape. While it made

the air noxious and flying conditions perilous for aviators over parts of Kuwait,

Hussein’s environmental crime had little

other impact on the war - though it would

require years to clean up.

Aside from sacrificing a battalion of

mechanized troops in late January in an illfated assault on the abandoned Saudi border town of Khafji, the Iraqi armed forces

showed little appetite for offensive action

during the coalition air campaign. As a

result, U.S. Army combat units had the

freedom to continue training for the

ground offensive up until the last minute.

Training was conducted with a sense of

urgency that only imminent battle can

produce. Peacetime conditions afford few

opportunities for large combat units,

whether they be active or reserve, to conduct maneuver training, a complaint Major

General Paul Funk, commander of the 3d

Armored Division, made when he noted in

a February 1991 interview that his division

not ready for combat.48 This was particularly true for the VII Corps units just

recently arrived from Europe. Fortunately,

with ample resources and plenty of unrestricted training space available, commanders had sufficient time to complete

their post-deployment training prior to the

start of the ground war in late February.

32

Unable to hold on to

Kuwait, Saddam Hussein

ordered the destruction

of Kuwaiti oil wells 

during the last days 

of the war (NGB)
Even as the air war raged and the

ground war prepared to kick off,

Guard units were continuing to be

called up back in the United States. On

February 20, the Guard’s 20th Special

Forces Group (from Alabama, Mississippi

and Florida) was mobilized and began 

an intensive training cycle to become 

validated. The certification program they

followed was devised for all Special Forces

units by the U.S. Army Special Forces

Command, and the 20th Special Forces

Group was able to certify three battalions

and the group headquarters in 45 days -

half the 90 days allotted for the process.49

After the war ended, members of Florida’s

3d Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group

would participate in Operation Provide

Comfort, providing humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern

Iraq.

In the Gulf, Guardmembers continued

to provide support in anticipation of the

impending ground offensive. Five Army

National Guard C-23 “Sherpa” aircraft and

their crews deployed to Southwest Asia to

provide quick transport of critical spare

33

T H E C ALL UPS C ONTINUE

Chief Warrant Officer Steven Deaton

and Sergeant First Class Karl Jorgenson,

both of the Oregon National Guard,

trade headgear with their Saudi hosts

while deployed with their C-23 Sherpa

(OR ARNG)
parts for aviation units. The Sherpas - slow

but rugged airplanes that specialize in short

takeoffs and landings on unimproved

airstrips - carried over 400 passengers and

700,000 pounds of supply items over

200,000 miles within the theater. Iowa’s

1034th Quartermaster Company (Supply

and Service) was converted to a water distribution company after mobilization, and

supplied 800,000 gallons of water a day to

the multi-national force and civilians in

their area. Nevada’s 72nd Military Police

Company (Guard) established a huge 

prisoner-of-war camp and received and

processed the war’s first Iraqi POWs. The

eight personnel of Washington’s 241st

Transportation Detachment (Movement

Control) worked in shifts in the VII Corps

Movement Control Center and shared

responsibility for establishing and controlling the supply routes between logistical

bases and the front lines, coordinating

transportation requirements for the Corps,

and even such important, if mundane

tasks, as rounding up “lost,” stolen or

abandoned transportation assets spread

throughout the theater.50 The variety and

complexity of tasks performed by

Guardmembers to prepare the combat

forces for the attack was staggering. 

34

(ABOVE) Staff Sergeant Carla Welding,

Motor Sergeant for the 24th Medical

Company, prepares to service a Saudi

water truck at a ground POL (Petroleum,

Oil Lubricants) point. SSG Welding’s

motor maintenance section received 

the Fifth U.S. Army and National Guard

Bureau’s top maintenance award for

light units in 1991 for its performance 

in Desert Storm (24th Medical Company,

NE ARNG)
The long-awaited ground offensive

kicked off at 4:00 a.m. local time,

February 24, 1991 with U.S. and

coalition ground forces striking directly

across the border toward Kuwait City.

Simultaneously, the VII Corps and the

attached British 1st Armoured Division

began a massive “left hook” along the

western border of Iraq and Kuwait, with

the goal of engaging the Republican

Guard and cutting off the retreat of Iraqi

forces from Kuwait. Still further to the

west, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the

attached 6th French Light Armored

Division screened the movements of the

VII Corps and protected its left flank from

Iraqi attack. The pace of the offensive,

expected to be rapid, exceeded even the

expectations of Army planners. Iraqi

defenses, which after months of extensive

preparations included barbed wire, minefields, anti-armor ditches and “fire trenches,”

fell swiftly and relatively bloodlessly to the

well-rehearsed and well-coordinated

breaching operations of the allied armies.

General Schwarzkopf urged his commanders to move to their objectives even faster

than called for by the plans, placing even

more of a strain on the logisticians

attempting to refuel and rearm the heavy

forces.

The Tennessee National Guard’s own

212th Engineer Company (Combat Heavy)

was in the lead early on during the ground

offensive. Assigned to the 62d Engineer

Battalion, an active component unit supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps, the

212th Engineer Company was selected 

to begin laying out a six-lane supply 

road into Iraq starting six days before the

offensive began. According to the 212th’s

commander, Captain Terry Saltsman, his

battalion commander chose the Guard soldiers because “he understood our troops

were older and more mature than his, and

that they had more construction and combat experience, so he said we would be

first to cross.” Indeed, 40% of Saltsman’s

company were Vietnam veterans. While

they were not made aware of it until later,

the 212th Engineer Company, equipped

with little more than their dump trucks

and graders, was one of the first conventional Army units to cross into Iraq.51

By the second day, February 25,

Saddam Hussein was characteristically

declaring victory while at the same time

ordering his forces to withdraw from

Kuwait. At this point, with over 25,000

Iraqis taken prisoner, the Iraqi army was

already disintegrating and the idea of an

organized withdrawal was ludicrous.

Despite Saddam’s apparent new-found

willingness to withdraw, and a new Soviet

offer to broker a peace agreement, the

coalition attack continued. By February 26,

Kuwait had been liberated and the VII

Corps was engaging Republican Guard

formations in Iraq and along the western

Kuwaiti border. In battles that raged

35

T H E G ROUND W A R B EGINS
through the night and up until the 

cease-fire the next day, these elite Iraqi

formations, the backbone of Hussein’s 

military force, were largely crushed. 

Captain Debra Clark, commander of

Arizona’s 222d Transportation Company

(Medium Truck Petroleum) out of Tucson,

demonstrated initiative that was typical of

Guardmembers during this phase of the

war. Two days into the ground war, she

was faced with a dilemma. Ordered to

support the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions

as they raced towards a rendezvous with

the Iraqi Republican Guards, she had

200,000 gallons of fuel and nobody to give

it to. “Our orders were to remain approximately 50 miles behind the advancing 1st

Armored Division. But they were advancing faster than planned. We were stopped

in the desert with 44 trucks loaded with

fuel.” Her orders were to wait for trucks

from the 1st Armored Division Support

Command (DISCOM) to pick up her fuel,

but after almost two days, there were no

trucks in sight. “I knew what I had to do.

I was convinced that we needed to drive

fuel to the front lines. We had no communications, maps or coordination from the

active components.” 52 Captain Clark was

able to track down the Executive Officer

of the 1st Armored Division’s DISCOM and

get him to guide her forward to the thirsty

tanks. Her soldiers, who had been in their

trucks and driving for 27 hours, were finally able to refuel the attacking armor about

an hour and a half before it ran dry. Her

initiative enabled a key element of the VII

Corps to continue its mission and seal the

fate of the Republican Guards prior to the

cease fire.

With the objective of liberating

Kuwait accomplished, and Saddam’s 

military in ruins, President Bush was able

to sternly announce a conditional ceasefire to take place at midnight, Eastern

Standard Time, on February 27, exactly

100 hours after the start of the ground war.

“Kuwait is liberated...Iraq’s army is defeated...Our military objectives are met.”53

36

Iraqi troops, many 

of them unwilling 

conscripts, often 

surrendered at the 

first opportunity to

allied forces (NGB)
The cost to Iraq for Saddam

Hussein’s refusal to withdraw

from Kuwait will probably never

be known; unofficial estimates of up to

65,000 Iraqi casualties coupled with over

86,000 taken prisoner and probably another 100,000 desertions, give some idea of

the devastation suffered by the Iraqi army.

Thousands of pieces of expensive Iraqi

military hardware littered the desert floor,

useful, in most cases, for little more than

scrap metal. The cost in American lives for

this crushing victory was remarkably

small. Desert Storm was probably the first

major war in human history where the military death toll from all causes during the

war was less than the comparable military

death toll during peacetime. “During the

previous, peaceful year of 1989, a total of

1,684 service men and women died, mostly in automobile accidents. The death rate

was 79 per 100,000. The death rate in the

Gulf area, based on a force of 540,000 men

and women (and including combat

deaths), was 68 per 100,000.”54 The main

reason for these lower figures was that

37

T H E C OSTS OF W A R

(LEFT) Iraqi troops trying to flee Kuwait met their destruction along

the “Highway of Death” (SPC Craig Heathscott, AR ARNG)

(ABOVE) Hull art on the side of an Iraqi tank recovered by Tennessee

National Guard units. Many pieces of captured equipment were

shipped back to the U.S. for museum display (NGB)
automobile accidents usually account for

the majority of military deaths, and most

automobile accidents involve alcohol.

Alcohol was off-limits in Saudi Arabia

because its consumption is outlawed by

Islamic law, a policy which American generals - who remembered the problems

alcohol and drugs created in Vietnam -

were happy to go along with. Of the 148

combat deaths suffered by American

forces, none were Guardmembers. In all,

34 Guard soldiers died of all causes during

the entirety of Desert Shield/Desert Storm,

18 of these while deployed to the Gulf.55

The Army Guard had been involved in

nearly every aspect of the war, both in

Southwest Asia and acting as backfill for

active units in the United States and

Europe. In some military occupations the

Guard was particularly well-represented.

For example, military police units were

called in great numbers out of the Guard

in late 1990, most serving as traffic-controllers and guards for the over 71,000

Iraqi prisoners of war captured by U.S.

forces during the war. Puerto Rico provided five MP companies that all served in the

Gulf; California sent four companies, a

38

2d Lieutenant Hava

Shevat of New York’s

206th Military Police

Company coordinates

Enemy Prisoner of War

movements while in 

Saudi Arabia (TSgt John

Malthaner, NY ANG)
battalion headquarters, and a detachment;

Missouri sent four companies; the District

of Columbia, Mississippi and North

Carolina each provided three companies

and a battalion headquarters; Ohio sent

three companies, Michigan sent two 

companies, a battalion headquarters, and 

a detachment; Rhode Island sent two 

companies and a battalion headquarters;

Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland,

Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma,

Tennessee and West Virginia sent two

companies each; and Colorado,

Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Guam,

Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota,

South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and

Wisconsin each provided a single company or detachment or both. The Guard was

also heavily represented in the fields of

Transportation, Quartermaster, Medical,

Public Affairs, Field Artillery, Engineers,

and Ordnance, as judged by the numbers

of units called.

The last Army Guard unit mobilized

under the Presidential Selected Reserve

Call-up to return from Southwest Asia was

Alabama’s 111th Ordnance Detachment,

which finally came home on September

17, 1991. Some soldiers - all of them 

volunteers - stayed in Southwest Asia as

members of “Residual Force Units,” tasked

with “cleaning up” what was left behind

in the theater after the bulk of the forces

departed. The last “Residual” Army

Guard unit left the Persian Gulf on March

6, 1992. 

39

After Desert Storm, captured ordnance is loaded onto a five-ton

truck from the Mississippi Guard’s 1461st Transportation Company

(Defense Visual Information Center)
F

or most Guardmembers, the best

part about Desert Storm was 

coming home from it. Countless

people, from the President to media pundits to many a 20-year veteran, commented on the stark contrast between this

homecoming reception and the one that

soldiers received following the Vietnam

War. It wasn’t just the fact that their families, friends, and complete strangers came

out to greet them amidst a sea of yellow

ribbons, it was also the fact that they came

home in units, not as individuals.

Returning home to New York City in late

April, the 719th Transportation Company

was able to represent the rest of the 369th

Transportation Battalion, still deployed in

Saudi Arabia, as they proudly marched up

the “Canyon of Heroes” on lower

Broadway during New York City’s June 10

victory parade.56 While

most units didn’t experience a homecoming

reception on quite the

same scale, the satisfaction and pride 

felt by r eturning 

Guardmembers across

the nation was at least

as great. President Bush

emphasized the differences from twenty years

earlier when he told the

troops “We promised

you’d be given the

means to fight. We promised not to look

over your shoulder. We promised this

would not be another Vietnam. And we

kept that promise. The specter of Vietnam

has been buried forever in the desert

sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”57

40

T H E H OMECOMING

President Bush emphasized the differences from

twenty years earlier when he told the troops

“We promised you’d be given the means to

fight. We promised not to look over your shoulder. We promised this would not be another

Vietnam. And we kept that promise. The specter

of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert

sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”
41

(LEFT) Members of the 719th

Transportation Company

return home to New York

City to march in the June

10, 1991 victory parade 

(NY ARNG)

(BELOW) The DC National

Guard marches proudly in

its home town during the

National Victory parade

(NGB)
Desert Shield and Desert Storm

validated the Army’s postVietnam War commitment to

using the Guard and Reserve as integral

parts of the Total Army, insofar as the

leadership of the Army was willing to test

it. Mobilized in haste, Army Guardmembers exceeded everyone’s expectations

with the speed in which they deployed,

and the professionalism with which they

did their jobs. From hauling ammunition

and supplies, to guarding prisoners, to caring for the wounded, to firing rocket and

tube artillery, in units ranging from detachment to brigade size, they took on whatever tasks were assigned them. Rather

than resent the call up, as some in the

public and the active Army feared might

happen, the response from Guard soldiers

was quite the opposite - most embraced

the chance to serve, while those who were

not called often regretted missing the

chance to show how well they could

serve.58

The Persian Gulf War marked the first

time in history that America fought a war

without a single ground maneuver unit

from the Guard. The assertion - implied or

otherwise - that modern ground combat

had become too difficult a mission to be

performed by reservists was at odds with

the success that Guardmembers had with

every other mission assigned to them. This

includes Guardsmen who volunteered for

active duty and served as individual

replacements in active Army infantry,

armor, and aviation units. 

Many of the units, both Active and

Guard, that returned from the Gulf War

carried their colors proudly in victory

parades and then directly into storage. The

“peace dividend” - the reduction in

defense spending that Americans had

been expecting since the end of the Cold

War - was finally extracted from the

Department of Defense’s budget, with the

result that numerous units were quickly

retired. Ironically, had Saddam Hussein

waited a year or two to launch his attack

on Kuwait, the U.S. Army would have

been forced to use many more Guard

combat units to achieve the same overwhelming odds it had in 1991. 

The Gulf War doomed the Roundout

concept. Briefly replaced by the

“Roundup” program, where full-strength

active duty units were assigned an Army

Guard unit as a follow-on reinforcement,

the concept was completely dropped after

the Defense Department’s 1993 Bottom-Up

Review. Henceforward, the active Army

would organize a smaller number of complete divisions while the Army Guard

would provide select “Enhanced Brigades”

- units designed to augment the active

forces following 90 days of post-mobilization training. As for the remainder of the

Guard’s combat power, contained primarily

in eight combat divisions, the Army

42

A FTERMATH
throughout the 1990s

did not include them in

any warplans - arguing

at one point that it

would take an entire

year to prepare a Guard

division for combat.

Within a decade of

the Gulf War, with

peacekeeping missions

abounding and the

threats of further force

cuts apparently receding, the tension

between the active

Army and the Army

National Guard had

faded somewhat. The

Army Guard, either

with volunteers or as a

result of further

Presidential call ups,

had deployed in support of military operations in Somalia, Haiti,

Bosnia and Kosovo.

Guard divisions were

given command over

active troops in Bosnia.

The Army developed a

role for Guard divisions, pairing them

with active divisions

and assigning them to active corps. The

Guard has been asked to assume increasing counter-drug duties, homeland

defense against weapons of mass destruction, and even a role in the proposed

National Missile Defense program. The

huge drawdown in all Army forces since

1991 has led to an even greater reliance on

the Guard for everyday missions - not just

as a reserve in the event of a major war.

Many of these missions are new responsibilities not traditionally shouldered by the

nation’s citizen-soldiers, but as has been

true in the past, the Guard will be ready...

Always Ready, Always There.

43

SGT John Daley of New Hampshire’s 744th Transportation Company salutes the 

flag during “Welcome Home” ceremonies. His unit spent five months in the Gulf. 

(SSG Lorna Geggis, NH ARNG)
44

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

ALABAMA

1207th Quartermaster Co Wetumpka 8/27/1990 SWA

1241st AG Company Montgomery 8/27/1990 SWA

715th Maintenance Co Birmingham 9/12/1990 SWA

123rd Maintenance Co Goodwater 9/12/1990 SWA

1208th Quartermaster Co Lineville 9/12/1990 SWA

1659th Transportation Det Troy 9/12/1990 SWA

1167th Transportation Det Troy 9/20/1990 SWA

HHD, 731st Maintenance Bn Tallassee 9/27/1990 SWA

778th Combat Support Co Jackson 9/27/1990 SWA

638th Ordnance Co Brewton 9/27/1990 SWA

1128th Transportation Co Clayton 9/27/1990 SWA

HHC, 226th Theater Spt Gp Mobile 9/27/1990 SWA

1135th Gen Spt Co Selma 11/17/1990 SWA

781st Transportation Co Fort Deposit 11/17/1990 SWA

1206th Quartermaster Det Wetumpka 11/17/1990 SWA

127th Medical Det Ashland 11/17/1990 SWA

129th Medical Co Mobile 11/21/1990 SWA

109th Medical Hospital Birmingham 11/21/1990 SWA

1165th Military Police Co Butler 11/21/1990 SWA

946th Quartermaster Co Reform 11/21/1990 US

214th Military Police Co Alexander 11/21/1990 SWA

HHC, 440th Ordnance Bn Camden 11/29/1990 SWA

900th Maintenance Co Brundidge 11/29/1990 SWA

1209th Quartermaster Det Wetumpka 11/29/1990 SWA

2d Bn, 152nd Armor Oneota 11/30/1990 US

644th Ordnance Co Bessemer 12/6/1990 SWA

666th Ordnance Det Jacksonville 12/6/1990 US

HHD, 1103rd Transportation Co Eufaula 12/11/1990 US

HHD, 111th Ordnance Gp Opelika 1/31/1991 SWA

1st Bn, 20th Special For Gp Huntsville 2/20/1991 US

Spt Co. 20th Special For Gp Pell City 2/20/1991 US

HHC, 20th Special Forces Gp Birmingham 2/20/1991 US

ARKANSAS

1122nd Transportation Co Monticello 9/20/1990 SWA

296th Medical Detatchment Charleston 11/17/1990 US

216th Medical Co Lake Village 11/17/1990 US

2nd Bn, 142nd Field Arty Fort Smith 11/21/1990 SWA

HHB, 142nd Field Arty Bde Fayetteville 11/21/1990 SWA

1st Bn, 142nd Field Arty Harrison 11/21/1990 SWA

148th Medical Hospital N. Little Rock 11/21/1990 SWA

224th Maintenance Co Mount Home 11/21/1990 SWA

A RMY N ATIONAL G UARD U NITS

F EDERALIZED FOR THE G ULF W A R
45

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

HHB, 217th Maintenance Bn Russellville 11/29/1990 SWA

204th Medical Det Little Rock 12/6/1990 EUROPE

25th Combat Support Ctr Little Rock 12/6/1990 SWA

119th Adj Gen Co Camp Robinson 1/22/1991 US

212th Signal Battalion N. Little Rock 1/25/1991 US

ARIZONA

2220th Transportation Co Phoenix 9/20/1990 US

2221st Quartermaster Co Tucson 9/20/1990 SWA

2222nd Transportation Co Douglas 11/17/1990 SWA

222nd Transportation Co Tucson 11/17/1990 SWA

363rd Ordnance Det Mesa 11/21/1990 SWA

855th Military Police Co Phoenix 12/6/1990 SWA

259th Engineer Co Phoenix 12/7/1990 SWA

1404th Transportation Co Show Low 12/11/1990 SWA

416th Aviation Platoon Phoenix 1/17/1991 SWA

356th Signal Co Phoenix 2/6/1991 US

CALIFORNIA

224th Transportation Det Los Alamitos 9/20/1990 SWA

2668th Transportation Co Fresno 9/20/1990 SWA

1113th Transportation Co Sacramento 9/27/1990 SWA

126th Medical Co Mather AFB 11/21/1990 US

HHD, 185th Transportation Bn Fresno 11/29/1990 SWA

270th Military Police Co Sacramento 12/6/1990 SWA

870th Military Police Co Pittsburg 12/6/1990 EUROPE

970th Military Police Co San Mateo 12/6/1990 SWA

980th Medical Detachment Sacramento 12/6/1990 SWA

649th Military Police Co Alameda 1/3/1991 SWA

143rd Military Police Det San Mateo 1/17/1991 SWA

HHD, 185th Military Police Bn Pittsburg 1/17/1991 SWA

COLORADO

1158th Transportation Det Camp George West 8/27/1990 SWA

1157th Transportation Det Camp George West 9/20/1990 SWA

928th Medical Co Cortez 11/17/1990 SWA

947th Medical Co Las Animas 11/21/1990 SWA

HHD, 217th Medical Bn Pueblo 11/29/1990 SWA

220th Military Police Co Camp George West 1/3/1991 SWA

104th Public Affairs Det Denver 1/7/1991 US

193rd Military Police Det Camp George West 1/17/1991 SWA

CONNECTICUT

142 Medical Co New Haven 11/21/1990 SWA

143 Military Police Co Windsor Locks 1/3/1991 SWA

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) New Haven 2/1/1991 US

1109th Avn Class & Rep Dep Groton 2/13/1991 US
46

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

547th Transportation Co Washington DC 9/20/1990 SWA

115th Medical Hospital Washington DC 11/21/1990 SWA

273rd Military Police Co Washington DC 1/3/1991 SWA

276th Military Police Co Anacostia 1/3/1991 SWA

274th Military Police Co Washington DC 1/3/1991 SWA

HHD, 372nd Mlitary Police Bn Anacostia 1/7/1991 SWA

DELWARE

HHD, 736th Supply & Service Bn Delaware City 11/21/1990 SWA

249th Engineer Det New Castle 11/21/1990 SWA

FLORIDA

743rd Maintenance Co Fort Lauderdale 10/11/1990 SWA

325th Maintenance Co Lake Wales 10/11/1990 SWA

221st Ordance Det Camp Blanding 11/21/1990 SWA

269th Engineer Co Live Oak 11/21/1990 SWA

HHD, 202nd Medical Gp Jacksonville 11/29/1990 SWA

705th Military Police Co Cocoa 12/6/1990 SWA

653rd Signal Company Perry 12/6/1990 SWA

153rd Finance Spt Unit St Augustine 1/22/1991 US

710th Composite Svc Co Apalachicola 1/25/1991 SWA

213th Medical Bde (HSLD) St Augustine 2/1/1991 US

199th Medical Co (Air Amb) Lakeland 2/1/1991 US

144th Transportation Co Marianna 2/15/1991 EUROPE

3rd Bn, 20th Special Forces Camp Blanding 2/20/1991 US

GEORGIA

190th Military Police Co Atlanta 9/20/1990 SWA

1148th Transportation Co Augusta 9/20/1990 SWA

165th Quartermaster Co Savannah 10/11/1990 US

138th Medical Co Atlanta 11/17/1990 SWA

HHC, 265th Engineer Gp Marietta 11/21/1990 SWA

122nd Combat Support Ctr Lawerenceville 11/21/1990 SWA

166th Combat Support Co Hinesville 11/28/1990 US

HHC, 48th Infantry Bde Macon 11/30/1990 US

848th Engineer Co Douglas 11/30/1990 US

Trp E., 348th Cavalry Griffin 11/30/1990 US

1st Bn, 230th Field Arty Waycross 11/30/1990 US

148th Combat Spt Bn Forsyth 11/30/1990 US

1st Bn, 108th Armor Calhoun 11/30/1990 US

1st Bn, 121st Infantry Dublin 11/30/1990 US

2nd Bn, 121st Infantry Albany 11/30/1990 US

202nd Ordnance Det Atlanta 12/6/1990 US

124th Public Affairs Det Atlanta 1/7/1991 US

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Atlanta 2/1/1991 US
47

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

GUAM

731st Military Police Co Anderson 1/3/1991 SWA

IOWA

1133rd Transportation Co Mason City 9/27/1990 SWA

134th Medical Co Washington 11/17/1990 SWA

209th Medical Co Iowa City 11/17/1990 SWA

1034th Supply & Service Co Camp Dodge 11/21/1990 SWA

1187th Medical Co Waterloo 11/21/1990 US

1168th Transportation Co Red Oak 12/6/1990 SWA

186th Military Police Co Camp Dodge 1/3/1991 SWA

34th Military Police Det Camp Dodge 1/17/1991 SWA

224th Engineer Bn Fairfield 1/25/1991 EUROPE

3654th Combat Support Co Knoxville 1/25/1991 US

IDAHO

148th Public Affairs Det Gowen Field 12/7/1990 SWA

ILLINOIS

1244th Transportation Co Cairo 9/20/1990 SWA

1544th Transportation Co Paris 9/27/1990 SWA

HHD, 108th Medical Bn Chicago 11/17/1990 SWA

1644th Transportation Co Riverside 11/21/1990 SWA

233rd Military Police Co Springfield 11/21/1990 SWA

933rd Military Police Co Chicago 1/17/1991 EUROPE

INDIANA

838th Transportation Det Camp Atterbury 9/27/1990 SWA

1015th Adjutant Gen Co Michigan City 10/16/1990 SWA

1438th Transportation Co Camp Atterbury 12/11/1990 SWA

138th Finance Spt Unit Indianapolis 3/15/1991 US

KANSAS

170th Combat Support Co Hays 11/29/1990 SWA

KENTUCKY

137th Transportation Det Danville 8/27/1990 SWA

217th Quartermaster Det Danville 9/27/1990 SWA

2123rd Transportation Co Bowling Green 10/11/1990 SWA

475th Medical Hospital Frankfort 11/21/1990 SWA

133rd Public Affairs Det Frankfort 12/7/1990 SWA

1st Bn, 623rd Field Artillery Glasgow 12/9/1990 SWA

223rd Military Police Co Louisville 1/3/1991 SWA

438th Military Police Co Louisville 1/7/1991 US

LOUISIANA

1090th Transportation Det Camp Beauregard 8/27/1990 SWA
48

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

1083rd Transportation Co Jonesville 10/11/1990 SWA

1086th Transportation Co Jena 10/11/1990 SWA

3673rd Maintenance Co New Orleans 10/16/1990 SWA

Troop E., 256th Cavalry Natchitoches 11/21/1990 US

812th Medical Co Pineville 11/21/1990 SWA

1087th Transportation Co Vidalia 11/29/1990 SWA

HHC, 256th Infantry Brigade Lafayette 11/30/1990 US

256th Engineer Co Opelousas 11/30/1990 US

1st Bn, 141st Field Arty Jackson Barracks 11/30/1990 US

199th Combat Support Co Alexandria 11/30/1990 US

1st Bn, 156 Armor Shreveport 11/30/1990 US

2nd Bn, 156th Infantry Abbeville 11/30/1990 US

3rd Bn, 156th Infantry Lake Charles 11/30/1990 US

39th Military Police Co Jackson Barracks 12/6/1990 SWA

527th Engineer Bn Bossier City 12/6/1990 SWA

159th Medical Hospital Jackson Barracks 12/8/1990 SWA

MAINE

3620th Transportation Det Augusta 8/27/1990 SWA

HHC, 286th Supply & Svc Bn Gardiner 11/17/1990 SWA

112th Medical Co Bangor 12/6/1990 EUROPE

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Augusta 2/1/1991 US

MARYLAND

290th Military Police Co Towson 11/15/1990 SWA

200th Military Police Co Salisbury 11/15/1990 SWA

1229th Transportation Co Crisfield 11/17/1990 SWA

HHD, 29th Aviation Edgewood 12/11/1990 SWA

MASSACHUSETTS

704th Transportation Det Camp Curtis Guild 9/12/1990 SWA

1058th Transportation Co Hingham 9/20/1990 SWA

972nd Military Police Co Newton 11/21/1990 SWA

181st Engineer Co Whitman 12/6/1990 SWA

772nd Military Police Co Taunton 1/7/1991 SWA

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Camp Curtis Guild 2/1/1991 US

MICHIGAN

460th Quartermaster Co Midland 9/20/1990 SWA

1009th Transportation Det Lansing 9/20/1990 SWA

1461st Transportation Co Jackson 9/27/1990 SWA

1073rd Maintenance Co Greenville 11/17/1990 SWA

1439th Engineer Det Camp Grayling 11/21/1990 SWA

1440th Engineer Det Camp Grayling 11/21/1990 SWA

207th Medical Hospital Detroit 11/21/1990 SWA

210th Military Police Bn Detroit 12/6/1990 US

745th Ordnance Det Camp Grayling 12/6/1990 SWA
49

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

144th Military Police Co Owosso 1/3/1991 SWA

1072nd Maintenance Co Sturgis 1/7/1991 EUROPE

1776th Military Police Co Detroit 1/7/1991 SWA

146th Military Police Det Owosso 1/17/1991 SWA

MINNESOTA

109th Maintenance Co Duluth 10/9/1990 SWA

257th Military Police Co White Bear Lake 12/6/1990 SWA

MISSOURI

1138th Military Police Co West Plains 11/15/1990 SWA

1221st Transportation Dexter 11/17/1990 SWA

1139th Military Police Co Pleasant Home 11/21/1990 US

1267th Medical Company Jefferson City 11/29/1990 SWA

HHC, 35th Support Cmd Jefferson City 12/6/1990 SWA

1137th Military Police Co Kennett 1/3/1991 SWA

3175th Military Police Co Warrenton 1/17/1991 EUROPE

MISSISSIPPI

114th Military Police Co Clinton 9/12/1990 SWA

193rd Transportation Det Laurel 9/20/1990 SWA

HHD, 112th Military Police Bn Jackson 9/27/1990 SWA

162nd Military Police Co Crystal Springs 9/27/1990 SWA

1355th Supply Co Ocean Springs 11/17/1990 US

786th Transportation Co Lucedale 11/17/1990 SWA

624th Quartermaster Co Waynesboro 11/17/1990 SWA

367th Maintenance Co Philadelphia 11/28/1990 US

210th Finance Det Jackson 11/29/1990 US

Inst Spt Unit, Cp Shelby Shelby 11/29/1990 US

HHC, 155th Armored Bde Tupelo 12/7/1990 US

134th Engineer Co Carthage 12/7/1990 US

Troop A., 98th Cavalry Louisville 12/7/1990 US

2nd Bn, 114th Field Arty Starkville 12/7/1990 US

Troop A., 98th Cav Louisville 12/7/1990 US

HHD, 106th Support Monticello 12/7/1990 US

1st Bn, 198th Armor Amory 12/7/1990 US

2nd Bn, 198th Armor Greenville 12/7/1990 US

1st Bn, 155th Infantry McComb 12/7/1990 US

623rd Service Co Collins 1/7/1991 EUROPE

750th Adjutant Gen Co Jackson 1/25/1991 US

113th Military Police Co Brandon 2/6/1991 US

2nd Bn, 20th Special Forces Jackson 2/20/1991 US

MONTANA

103rd Public Affairs Det Helena 12/7/1990 SWA
50

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

NORTH CAROLINA

139th Support Ctr Morrisville 8/27/1990 SWA

382nd Public Affairs Det Raleigh 8/30/1990 SWA

210th Military Police Bn Sylva 9/12/1990 SWA

211th Military Police Co Clyde 9/20/1990 SWA

121st Transportation Det Raleigh 9/20/1990 SWA

1454th Transportation Co Concord 9/20/1990 SWA

HHD, 540th Quartermaster Bn Lenoir 9/27/1990 SWA

1450th Transportation Co Jefferson 10/11/1990 SWA

HHD, 690th Maint Bn Kinston 11/17/1990 SWA

691st Maintenance Co Fremont 11/21/1990 SWA

731st Maintenance Co Reidsville 11/21/1990 SWA

1451st Transportation Co Boone 11/29/1990 US

514th Military Police Co Greenville 11/29/1990 US

HHC, 30th Support Gp Durham 11/29/1990 SWA

213th Military Police Co Washington 12/6/1990 SWA

130th Military History Det Raleigh 12/6/1990 SWA

130th Finance Det Morrisville 1/25/1991 US

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Raleigh 2/1/1991 US

1st Bn, 130th Aviation Morrisville 2/12/1991 US

NORTH DAKOTA

132nd Quartermaster Co Cando 9/12/1990 SWA

134th Quartermaster Det Camp Grafton 9/12/1990 SWA

131st Quartermaster Det Camp Grafton 9/20/1990 SWA

818th Medical Detachment Bismark 11/17/1990 SWA

133rd Quartermaster Det Cando 11/29/1990 SWA

HHD, 136th Quartermaster Bn Camp Grafton 11/29/1990 SWA

191st Military Police Co Mandan 12/6/1990 SWA

842nd Medical Det Bismark 1/25/1991 US

NEBRASKA

24th Medical Co Lincoln 11/17/1990 SWA

Det 1, 1267th Medical Co Lincoln 11/29/1990 SWA

NEVADA

72nd Military Police Co Fallon 12/6/1990 SWA

NEW HAMPHIRE

744th Transportation Co Claremont 11/17/1990 SWA

1159th Medical Co Concord 11/21/1990 US

NEW JERSEY

328th Transportation Det Pemberton 9/27/1990 SWA

253rd Transportation Co Cape May 9/27/1990 SWA

144th Quartermaster Co Hammonton 11/21/1990 US

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Sea Girt 2/1/1991 US
51

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

NEW MEXICO

720th Transportation Las Vegas 11/17/1990 SWA

Air Defense Arty Tng Activity Las Cruces 1/22/1991 US

NEW YORK

10th Transportation Det Latham 8/27/1990 SWA

719th Transportation Co New York City 9/20/1990 SWA

102nd Combat Support Co Brooklyn 11/21/1990 SWA

145th Maint Co Fort Drum 11/21/1990 SWA

HHD, 244th Medical Gp Brooklyn 11/21/1990 SWA

134th Maintenance Co Rochester 11/21/1990 SWA

206th Military Police Co Buffalo 12/6/1990 SWA

1569th Transportation Co New York City 12/6/1990 SWA

HHD, 369th Transportation Bn New York City 12/11/1990 SWA

107th Military Police Co Utica 1/3/1991 SWA

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Latham 2/1/1991 US

OHIO

1487th Transportation Co Eaton 11/17/1990 SWA

1486th Transportation Co Ashland 11/17/1990 SWA

5694th Engineer Det Shreve 11/21/1990 SWA

641st Quartermaster Det Covington 11/29/1990 SWA

323rd Military Police Co Toledo 12/6/1990 EUROPE

1485th Transportation Co Mansfield 12/11/1990 SWA

324th Military Police Co Youngstown 1/3/1991 SWA

838th Military Police Co Youngstown 1/7/1991 US

337th Adjutant Gen Co Worthington 1/22/1991 US

OKLAHOMA

2120th Combat Support Co Wewoka 9/20/1990 SWA

HHD, 120th Medical Bn Midwest City 11/17/1990 SWA

145th Medical Co Broken Arrow 11/21/1990 SWA

1st Bn, 158th Field Arty Fort Sill 11/21/1990 SWA

1045th Ordnance Det Fort Sill 11/29/1990 SWA

745th Military Police Co Oklahoma City 12/6/1990 SWA

245th Medical Company Midwest City 12/6/1990 EUROPE

1245th Transportation Co Tishomingo 12/11/1990 SWA

1345th Transportation Co Ardmore 12/11/1990 SWA

1120 Maintenance Co Sulphur 1/2/1991 US

445th Military Police Co Mcalester 1/7/1991 US

OREGON

206th Transportation Det Portland 8/27/1990 SWA

2186th Combat Support Co Clackamas 11/21/1990 SWA

PENNSYLVANIA

228th Transportation Det Allentown 9/20/1990 SWA
52

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

131st Transportation Co Williamston 10/11/1990 SWA

3623rd Maintenance Co Bethlehem 11/21/1990 SWA

121st Transportation Co Lebanon 11/29/1990 SWA

28th Finance Unit Lebanon 3/15/1991 US

PUERTO RICO

219th Quartermaster Det Juanadiaz 9/27/1990 SWA

201st Medical Hospital Juanadiaz 11/21/1990 SWA

544th Military Police Co Yauco 11/21/1990 SWA

162nd Fld Service Co Juanadiaz 11/21/1990 SWA

1467th Medical Det Fort Allen 12/6/1990 EUROPE

1600th Ordnance Co Arroyo 12/6/1990 SWA

225th Military Police Co Ponce 1/3/1991 SWA

240th Military Police Co Penuelas 1/3/1991 SWA

755th Military Police Co Arecibo 1/3/1991 SWA

480th Military Police Co San Juan 1/3/1991 SWA

3678th Ordnance Co Toa Baja 1/7/1991 EUROPE

RHODE ISLAND

HHD, 118th Military Police Bn Providence 11/21/1990 SWA

119th Military Police Co Providence 1/3/1991 SWA

115th Military Police Co Pawtucket 1/7/1991 SWA

SOUTH CAROLINA

265th Quartermaster Det Allendale 8/27/1990 SWA

132nd Military Police Co Florence 9/12/1990 SWA

1052nd Transportation Co Kingstree 11/17/1990 SWA

264th Engineer Det Allendale 11/21/1990 SWA

742nd Maint Co Columbia 11/28/1990 US

1st Bn, 263rd Armor Mullins 11/30/1990 US

251st Support Ctr Columbia 12/6/1990 SWA

251st Medical Hospital Columbia 12/27/1990 SWA

108th Public Affairs Det Columbia 1/3/1991 EUROPE

218th Adjutant Gen Co Columbia 1/22/1991 US

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Columbia 2/1/1991 US

SOUTH DAKOTA

57th Transportaion Det Brookings 8/27/1990 SWA

747th Transportation Det Rapid City 9/12/1990 SWA

740th Transportation Co Milbank 11/17/1990 SWA

1742nd Transportation Co Watertown 11/17/1990 SWA

730th Medical Co Winner 11/21/1990 SWA

HHC, 109th Engineer Gp Rapid City 11/21/1990 SWA

TENNESEE

HHD, 176th Maintenance Bn Johnson City 8/27/1990 SWA

130th Support Ctr Smyrna 8/27/1990 SWA
53

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

776th Maintenance Co Elizabethton 9/15/1990 SWA

1175th Quartermaster Co Carthage 9/20/1990 SWA

251st Supply & Svc Co Lewisburg 9/20/1990 SWA

212th Engineer Co Tracy City 10/11/1990 SWA

1174th Transportation Co Dresden 11/17/1990 SWA

663rd Medical Det Nashville 11/21/1990 SWA

268th Military Police Co Ripley 11/21/1990 SWA

300th Medical Hospital Smyrna 12/6/1990 EUROPE

155th Engineer Co Waverly 12/7/1990 SWA

775th Engineer Det Camden 12/7/1990 SWA

1st Bn, 181st Field Artillery Chattanooga 12/9/1990 SWA

HHB, 196th Field Artillery Bde Chattanooga 12/9/1990 SWA

269th Military Police Co Dyersburg 1/3/1991 SWA

118th Public Affairs Det Nashville 1/7/1991 SWA

568th Adjutant Gen Co Nashville 1/22/1991 US

HHC, 213 Med Bde (HSLD) Nashville 2/1/1991 US

TEXAS

1104th Transportation Det Austin 9/20/1990 SWA

149th Adjutant General Co Austin 10/11/1990 US

149th Aviation Co Grand Prairie 12/6/1990 SWA

3rd Bn, 141st Infantry McAllen 12/7/1990 US

1836th Medical Det San Antonio 12/27/1990 US

217th Medical Hospital San Antonio 12/27/1990 SWA

49th Aviation Platoon San Antonio 1/17/1991 SWA

49th Finance Unit Austin 1/22/1991 US

UTAH

120th Quartermaster Det American Fork 8/27/1990 SWA

TM A, 142nd Mil Intel Bn Draper 8/27/1990 SWA

TM B, 142nd Mil Intel Bn Draper 8/27/1990 SWA

TM C, 142nd Mil Intel Bn Draper 8/27/1990 SWA

TM D, 142nd Mil Intel Bn Draper 8/27/1990 SWA

144th Medical Hospital Salt Lake City 11/21/1990 SWA

625th Military Police Co Murray 12/6/1990 SWA

Co A, 142d Mil Intel Bn Draper 1/3/1991 SWA

1457th Engineer Bn American Falls 1/25/1991 EUROPE

VIRGINIA

986th Medical Det Sandston 9/20/1990 SWA

1033rd Transportation Co Gate City 10/11/1990 SWA

1032nd Transportation Co Big Stone Gap 11/17/1990 SWA

HHC, 176th Engineer Gp Richmond 11/21/1990 SWA

HHC, 1030th Engineer Bn Gate City 11/21/1990 SWA

116th Military History Det Manassas 12/6/1990 SWA

183rd Adjutant Gen Co Sandston 1/3/1991 SWA

229th Military Police Co Chesapeake 1/7/1991 SWA
54

UNIT HOME STATION FEDERALIZED DESTINATION

HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD) Richmond 2/1/1991 US

Co B, 2nd Bn, 224th Avn Sandston 2/12/1991 US

VERMONT

131st Engineer Co Burlington 11/29/1990 SWA

150th Air Traffic Ctrl Plt South Burlington 1/17/1991 SWA

103rd Aviation Company South Burlington 1/17/1991 SWA

172nd Adjutant Gen Co Winooski 1/25/1991 US

213th Med Bde (HSLD) Winooski 2/1/1991 US

WASHINGTON

1444th Transportation Det Tacoma 8/27/1990 SWA

241st Transportation Co Tacoma 11/17/1990 SWA

116th Support Ctr Tacoma 12/6/1990 SWA

541st Adiutant Gen Co Camp Murray 1/25/1991 US

WISCONSIN

1122nd Transportation Det Madison 9/20/1990 SWA

107th Maintenance Co Sparta 9/20/1990 US

1158th Transportation Co Monroe 11/17/1990 SWA

13th Medical Hospital Madison 11/21/1990 SWA

1157th Transportation Co Oshkosh 12/6/1990 SWA

229th Engineer Co Prairie Du Chien 12/6/1990 SWA

132nd Military History Det Madison 12/6/1990 SWA

32nd Military Police Co Milwaukee 1/3/1991 SWA

WEST VIRGINIA

146th Medical Co Parkersburg 11/21/1990 SWA

157th Military Police Co Martinsburg 12/6/1990 SWA

1st Bn, 201st Field Artillery Fairmont 12/9/1990 SWA

152nd Military Police Co Moundsville 1/3/1991 SWA

WYOMING

1022nd Medical Co Cheyenne 11/21/1990 SWA
55

S UGGESTED R EADINGS

Allen, Thomas F.; Clifton Berry; and Norman Polmar. CNN War in the Gulf.

Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991.

Conaway, LTG John B. with Jeff Neligan. Call Out the Guard! Paducah, KY:

Turner Publishing Co, 1997.

Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis: Naval

Institute Press, 1991.

Scales, BG Robert H. Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington

DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993.

Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa Kraus, eds. The Whirlwind War. Washington D.C.,

United States Army Center of Military History, 1995.

Schwarzkopf, GEN H. Norman, with Peter Petre. It Doesn’t Take a Hero.

New York, Bantam Books, 1992.

Sifry, Micah and Cerf, Christopher, eds. The Gulf War Reader: History,

Documents, Opinions. New York: Random House, 1991.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York:

Dell Publishing, 1992.
56

1 Titles of two US Army official histories of the war;

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Scales,

BG Robert H., Washington DC: Office of the Chief of

Staff, 1993) and The Whirlwind War: The US Army in

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

(Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa Kraus, eds.,

Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1995).

2 LTG Tom Kelly, Director of Operations for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, as quoted in CNN War in the Gulf.

(Allen, Thomas F.; Clifton Berry; and Norman Polmar,

Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991) p. 215.

3 Schubert, Whirlwind War, p. 36. Annual Review of the

Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 20.

4 While the majority of Guardmembers were men, 7% of

the Army Guard was composed of women, the largest

percentage since the first women were permitted to

join the National Guard in 1956. Of those

Guardmembers mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, 8.8% were women.

5 More popularly known as the Persian Gulf region or

Arabian Peninsula, the U.S. Armed Forces defined the

geographic region in which the “Gulf War” took place

as Southwest Asia, and defined it to include all of Iraq,

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the

United Arab Emirates and the surrounding waters and

airspace.

6 All figures in this paragraph drawn from Army

National Guard After Action Report (hereafter cited as

NGB AAR) pgs 1-7 and Annual Review of the Chief,

National Guard Bureau, 1991, Appendices E & F.

7 Military Review, September 1991, pgs. 80-81.

8 Interview notes and Information paper, NGB-ARG,

Subject: South Carolina Army National Guard Success

Stories: Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM.

9 Historical background to the Roundout concept can be

found in “Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active

and Reserve Component Harmony” by David Shaver

(Strategic Studies Institute, The US Army War College,

February 11, 1992) and “The Army’s Roundout

Concept after the Persian Gulf War” by Robert L.

Goldich (Congressional Research Service, The Library

of Congress, October 22, 1991).

10 Conaway, LTG John B. with Jeff Neligan. Call Out the

Guard! Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Co, 1997,

pgs. 178-9. 

11 Spratt, Rep. John (D-SC) “The Call-up of National

Guard Combat Units During Operations Desert

Shield/Storm,” Report to Chairman Les Aspin, House

Armed Services Committee, Sep 1991, p. 8.

12 NGB AAR, pgs. 115-130.

13 Schwarzkopf, GEN H. Norman. “The 48th Brigade: A

Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization”;

National Guard, May 1991, p. 13.

14 Schubert, p. 71.

15 Chapman, MAJ Craig S. “Non-Deployed: The Story 

of the Roundouts in the Persian Gulf Crisis.”

Unpublished final draft located in National Guard

Association library, p. 18.

16 Goldich, p. 11.

17 NGB-ARR Information paper; “Issue: ARNG and

USAR availability.” The comparable first-day deployable figure for the USAR was 70%. The 11 Guard units

that did not meet deployability criteria on the first

day were all either undergoing reorganizations or

were authorized a lower level of readiness by CENTCOM.

18 Over 4,400 Guardmembers served two week tours of

federal active duty acting as military police in the

refugee camps, including all of Arkansas’ 142d Field

Artillery Brigade, which was also called up for Desert

Storm.

E NDNOTES
57

19 Conaway, p. 168; NGB-ARR Information Paper:

“Alabama Army National Guard Success Stories:

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.” 

32 Alabama Army Guard units were called for Desert

Shield/Storm; 27 units served in Southwest Asia.

20 Blake, Thomas G. The Shield and the Storm. Point

Pleasant, NJ: The Commemorative Group, 1991.

National Guard Section, p. 32.

21 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 27 January 1992,

“Issue: Total Force Policy and CAPSTONE programs,

during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM.” Additionally, only 50% of the units CAPSTONE to Southwest Asia deployed there.

22 NGB AAR, pgs. 134-137.

23 Ibid; Conaway, p. 171.

24 Letter, Secretary Cheney to Chairman Aspin,

September 18, 1990; reply to 6 Sep 90 letter from

Committee members Les Aspin, GV Montgomery,

Beverly Byron, & Dave McCurdy. Even accepting that

180 days was too short a time to mobilize, train and

deploy a Guard combat brigade, the Department of

Defense could have ordered the roundout brigades to

begin extended annual training under Title 10 or Title

32, USC and not start the clock on overseas deployment until they were ready to deploy. None of these

assumptions about length of time to train up were

ever made regarding Combat Support or Combat

Service Support units. 

25 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 28 Feb 1992, “Subject:

ARNG Assistance Provided to USMCR Armor Units

ODS.”

26 Conaway, p. 172.

27 Call-up extension was by Executive Order signed

November 12, 1990. The day after the air war began,

Congress passed legislation declaring a partial mobilization, thus authorizing the call up of up to

1,000,000 reservists for up to two years - far longer, it

turns out, than was needed.

28 NGB AAR, pgs. 147, 150, 156.

29 NGB AAR, p. 69.

30 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Experience Questionnaires, HHD 369 Trans Bn, 719 Trans Co, 1569th

Trans Co.; also Headquarters, 369th Transportation

Battalion memorandum, “Subject: After Action

Review, 27 Sep 1991.” The companies attached to the

369th would transport 292,000 short tons of supplies

and equipment and travel over 3,100,000 miles during and after Desert Storm.

31 Allen, et al., p. 198.

32 “Washington Tie-Line” National Guard, December

1990, p. 4.

33 Conaway, p. 177.

34 Schwarzkopf, “The 48th Brigade,” pgs. 12-15. 

35 When the 24th Infantry Division mobilized at Fort

Stewart for Desert Shield in August 1990, it stripped

vehicles belonging to the 48th Infantry Brigade for

spare parts in order to deploy as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately, this was not explained in later press

accounts that criticized the 48th’s maintenance status.

36 Schubert, pgs. 122-124; NGB-ARR Information Paper,

28 Oct 1991, “Subject: Absent Without Leave (AWOL)

Incident, 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), LA

ARNG.”

37 Youngman, COL D. Allen. Citizen Soldiers, Combat

and the Future: America’s Army at War With Itself.

Washington DC: American Defense Coalition, n.d., p.

15. The 48th returned to Ft. Stewart where it was

released from active duty on March 23d. Mississippi’s

155th Armored Brigade replaced the 48th at NTC and

was certified deployable after a two week rotation.

38 “President’s Message”, National Guard, May 1991, p. 2.

39 The Adjutant General, South Carolina, Major General

Eston Marchant, as quoted in Spratt, p. 2.

40 NGB AAR, p. 11.
58

41 Ibid., p. 4.

42 Ibid.

43 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 27 January 1992,

“Issue: Army National Guard Artillery in Operation

DESERT STORM.”

44 Hartman, 2LT Douglas. Nebraska’s Militia: The

History of the Army and Air National Guard, 1854-

1991. Virginia Beach: Donning Company, 1994, pgs.

221-226.

45 Department of the Army, A Soldier’s Guide to Saudi

Arabia. November 1990, pgs. 15, 19, 20.

46 Englehardt, LTC Joseph P. Desert Shield and Desert

Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-

1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, 25 March 1991, p. 40.

47 U.S. and Coalition forces flew over 116,000 combat

sorties (a sortie is a single flight by a single aircraft)

during the war, losing a total of 75 aircraft (42 combat, 33 non-combat losses). Iraq lost 42 aircraft in airto-air engagements, 81 destroyed on the ground, and

137 aircraft flown to Iran. Source: U.S. Department of

Defense, Defense Almanac, 1991. 

48 Schwarzkopf, “The 48th Brigade,” p. 15.

49 NGB AAR, p. 33.

50 NGB-ARG Issue Papers: “ARNG Aviation in

Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM”; “ARNG

Composite Services Units in Operations DESERT

SHIELD/STORM”; “Army National Guard Military

Police in Operation DESERT STORM”; and Desert

Storm Experiences Questionnaire, 241st

Transportation Detachment.

51 Blahut, CPT Phil. “Red Carpet, show of stars to be

seen by five Guard captains” On Guard, April 1992,

p. 6 ; NGB-ARR Information Paper, “Tennessee Army

National Guard Success Stories: Operation DESERT

SHIELD and DESERT STORM.”; Scales, pgs. 39-40.

52 Blahut, p. 6; NGB-ARG Information Paper, “Arizona

Army National Guard Success Stories: Operation

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,”; E-mail correspondence, LTC Clark and author, 8 February 2001.

53 Military Review, September 1991, pg. 77.

54 Allen, et al., p. 220. These figures are for American

forces only and do not take into account losses sustained by other members of the coalition.

55 NGB Survey, “ARNG Casualties during DESERT

SHIELD/DESERT STORM”, by CW2 John Listman. Of

the 34 deaths worldwide, 13 were from auto accidents, 10 from natural causes, 6 as a result of two

separate helicopter crashes (one in Honduras, the

other in the U.S.), and one death each from suicide,

accidental shooting while cleaning a weapon, rim

explosion while conducting a tire change, picking up

unexploded ordnance, and stepping on a land mine

after hostilities ended. U.S. Forces deployed in the

Gulf region suffered 145 non-battle deaths.

56 Riley, MAJ Bill “Harlem Hellfighters Keep Ground

War on the Move” National Guard, August 1991, pgs.

80-81.

57 Radio address to U.S. Armed Forces stationed in the

Persian Gulf, March 2, 1991.

58 Only three Army Guard soldiers of 62,411 called

refused to report for active duty; none refused to

deploy. 6% of the soldiers called were judged nondeployable for various reasons; e.g., soldier in high

school or OCS, awaiting basic training, medically

unfit, etc. Source: NGB AAR p. 6.
59

Enthusiastic

crowds welcomed

the troops home

(NGB)
Egypt
Drawn by Kevin Hittle, NE ARNG
Captain Les' Melnyk wrote Mobilizing for the Storm while

assigned as the Army National Guard Historian at

the National Guard Bureau. 

A native of New York City, he holds a Bachelor's

degree in English and History from Queens College,

City University of New York, and both an M.A. and

an M.Phil. in History from the Graduate School and

University Center, City University of New York. He

has taught courses in European, World and Military

history at Queens College, Hunter College, and

Queensborough Community College, and is 

currently writing his doctoral thesis on the National

Guard's role in shaping defense policy between the

World Wars. 

Commissioned in 1988 out of St. John's

University ROTC as a Military Intelligence officer,

Captain Melnyk served ten years as a traditional

Guardsman in New York City's 1st Battalion, 69th

Infantry (the "Fighting 69th") and 1st Battalion,

69th Air Defense Artillery. He performed a number

of assignments, including Tactical Intelligence

Officer, Assistant Air Defense Tactical Operations

Officer, Air Defense Platoon Leader, and Battalion

S-2. He entered active duty in 1998 to take on his

current assignment.

Captain Melnyk lives in Washington, DC with

his wife, Stephanie Scott-Melnyk, and their son

Zennon. They eagerly await the arrival of a second

child in late 2001.