= e nem EEE eS ry = -_ on | "® =

3)
4)

5)

6)

7)
8)

That po:

The operations would not be affected by
Defense Department or Navy cutbacks.

National Park Service appropriations would
“carry a more perpetual connotation.”

The. Park Service was "steeped in experience
in control and direction of large numbers
of visitors,"

The Park Service was “steeped in experience
in maintaining national parks and shrines."

It would continue operation of the Arizona
Memorial “in an atmosphere of respect and
dignity."

“No unfavorable incidents concerning the
general public would reflect -on the -Navy's
image. "2

sition was expressed succinctly by a subsequent

district commandant who wrote:

+ » we have become greatly concerned over the

ingreasing trend in Hawaii tourism and its

sp’

illover effect on the Arizona Memorial Visitor

program, By default the Navy at Pearl Harbor
has found itself deeply involved in the tourist

--business:-where-we do not belong: either -by
mission or experience, and we look forward to
the day when the professionais from the National
Park Service will take over the Arizona Memorial
and the new visitor center . , .28

58


aly iinet yielnieieiniedie elie

The commission's dissatisfaction was evidenced in a
February 1959 letter from Joe Custer, its executive secretary,
to Brady. Custer pointed out that the fund was only at the
halfway mark (to the commission's goal, not Brady's) and that
most donations to date had come from members of military units
and veterans' and patriotic organizations. The inference was
clear that those sources needed little selling and probably
would have donated whether or not Brady bad been involved. 28

The commissioners' frustration with Brady's always
impending, but never quite realized, coups was even more
evident in file memos. Gratz:wrote, "Brady has failed to
answer my questions satisfactorily and therefore has nothing
definite lined up." Another commissioner complained of Brady's
“far too nebulous" promises, 29

Brady, for his part, felt that despite his 15 percent
commission, his best efforts were unappreciated. He claimed
to be $30,000 in debt as a result of expenses incurred in the
Arizona Memorial campaign and appealed to the commission to
overlock the contract clause which obligated him to bear all
operating expenses. He asked for at least partial reimbursement.
If it were not forthcoming, he threatened that his creditors’
“attitude is bound to be then 'the Pacific War Memorial
Commission' is next in responsibility."2°

Some degree of tension and minor disagreements were
perhaps inevitable in any relationship between a freewheeling

fundraiser-publicist and a commission nervous about the actions

of its distant and loosely supervised agent. But the most

24


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments . . 2... 6 ee ee ee ee
Preface 2. 6. 6 ee ey ee ee ee ee
Memorial Day... - 1-1 ee ee ee te

PART I: 1941-1954

Remembering Pearl Harbor . ..... +. eae
The Pacific War Memorial Commission .... .
National Interest . 2... ee eee et ee

PART I1: 1955-1962

Navy Overtures ... a
Authorizing Legislation wo .
Pacific War Memorial Commission Fundraising. .

Congressional Appropriation . . oe .
James Roark and the Fleet Reserve “Association
Design, Construction and Dedication .... .

PART III: 1963-1982

Congressional Attempts for a Visitor Center .

Fourteenth Naval District Study. .......,
Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation ......
Congressional Authorization and

Transfer to the National Park Service . . .
Challenges for the Future .....-....-.

Appendix A: PL 85-344. ,....... +8465
Appendix B: PL 87-201 .. .
Appendix C: U.S. House of Reprosentatives

Conference Report No, 95-494

{Visitor Center Appropriation) .
Appendix D: Middendorf to Morton

Transfer Proposal . . sa ee
Appendix E: Frizzell to Middendorf

Transfer Acceptance ... woe
Appendix F: Navy-NPS Letter of Agreement se
Appendix G; Arizona Memorial Annual Visitor

Count 2. 6 we ee ete ee
SourceS 2 6 6 ye ee ee ee te ee ee
Notes 6. 6 ee ee et we ee te ee

qi
iv

ona

13
16
22
30

42

47
56
59
63
71

77
78
79
80

82
84

86

87
89


But as a practical matter, the 1975 cabinet-level
exchange of correspondence between the Navy and Interior
Departments went far to bridge that gap. Coupled with the
language of the committee report, it provided a clear state-
ment by both Congress and the executive branch that the
National Park Service should operate the Arizona Memorial
visitor complex.

There remained the matter of the Navy-NPS agreement
required by the Congressional] authorization, The transfer
agreement would involve countless details concerning privi-
leges, obligations and logistics. It would require much
time and meticulous work before such details could be agreed
upon by the Navy and the Park Service. But such an agreement
had toa be reached before awarding the construction contract,
Since construction was strictly the Navy's responsibility,
it made little sense to have the process delayed by the time-
consuming negotiations dealing with post-construction operation.,

That problem was solved in early 1978, when representatives
of the Navy and the NPS signed a letter of agreement in which
the Navy promised to transfer, and the Park Service agreed
to accept, responsibility for operating the memorial and
visitor center, The letter acknowledged that the details would
be worked out later in support and use agreements between the
agencies, 44

The way was now clear for work to begin. Accepting 2
design for the museum-theater visitor complex submitted by

the architectural firm of Chapman, Cobeen, Desai, Sakata, the

67


September §), 2960

U.S, Pacitic
War Vemerial.
Pearl Herbor.

Appropriation.

Appendix B

Public Law 87-201

AN ACT

To authorize the appropriation of $150,000 for use toward the construction of a
United Siales Pacific War Memorial

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Onited States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act
entitled “An Act to authorize construction of a Umied States Ship
Arizona Memorial at Pear] Harbor”, approved March 15, 1958 (Public
Law 85-344; 72 Stat. 36), is hereby amended by adding at the end
thereof the following: .

“Sec. 2. There is hereby authorized 10 be appropriated to the Secre-
tary of the Navy, for use toward the construction of such memorial

museum, tha sum of $150,000.

“Seo. 3. Such memorial and museum shall be maintained in honor
and in commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the
United States who gave their lives to their country during the attack
on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.7

Approved September 6, 1961,

78


of the pwuc,> Despite those weighty endorsements, there was
no immediate action forthcoming at the cabinet or Congressional
level.

The Navy was resolved, however, to explore alternative
routes to its goal. In early 1956 Commander Jay Smith, a
Fourteenth Naval District staff officer approached the PWMC
for help. He noted that the Navy Club was exploring the
possibility of raising funds nationally for an Arizona memorial,
Would the PWMC participate, too?4 The commission mulled over
the request. In May, when Navy Secretary Charles Thomas
publicly endorsed the Navy Club campaign, the PWMC offered
to work with that organization.> Responding to that offer,
the Fourteenth District Commandant directly requested the PWMC
to raise funds for an Arizona memorial.®

It soon became apparent that, for reasons not clear, the
Navy Club would be unable to fulfill its commitment. The
commission then faced the question of whether to undertake
the campaign on its own. It was not an easy decision. Hawaii
then was considerably more isolated--both psychologically and
in terms of travel time--from the mainland United States than
it was after the advent of statehood (1959), jet passenger
travel and mass tourism. Could a group working from Hawaii
command the national attention and credibility neede@ for such
a task?

After balancing those factors against its legal mandate
and its advantages (the.most important being Navy backing)

the commission decided to proceed with the project. One of

14


problem--the ambiguous legal status of the Arizona Memorial
and visitor center.

Both are located on Navy property in the midst of an
important military base, The memorial and visitor center
are unique (or nearly sco) among U.S. National Park Service
operations in that there exists no authorizing legislation
defining the facility's boundaries and definitively establishing
it as an NPS-administered site.

The language of the interdepartmental executive agreements
and the conference report of the 1978 military construction
authorization act are adequate for the day-to-day relationship
between the Navy and the Park Service. But, as noted earlier,
they are not law,

There are Many reasons why a firmer legal cornerstone
might be needed. Navy officers have often eapressed a proprie-
tary attitude toward the Arizoua Memorial. It is not beyond
the realm of possibility that someday a prominent Navy person-
ality would launch a drive to "return the Arizona" and its
visitor center to the Navy, Such a campaign might fly in the
face of budgetary and political reality, but an emotionally
motivated campaign might be willing to confront those obstacles.
Or, operating more indirectly, it might take the form of quasi-
efficial groups and/or the general public making the same
demand,

At least as likely is the prospect of a pressing Navy
need (or the perception of such a need) to reclaim control

of the memorial or the yisitor center site for security or

73


But the memory of Burns' promise was too fresh, Not
even Hawaii's majority Senator Oren Long could bring himself
to support the appropriation. He wrote, ". . . as meritorious
as this proposal may be, the original legislation... was
predicated on assurances that the Federal Government would
not be called upon to make appropriation for construction."

Nor would the Navy attempt to contravene such a recent pledge.
Its representative, referring to the promise of no appropriations,
stated, "in view of the . . . legislative history of Public

Law 85-344, the Department of the Navy is obliged to neither
support nor oppose "the appropriation authorization. 45

Although thebills died that year, the sponsors did enlist
some powerful support. The influential Senate Majority Secre-
tary, Bobby ‘Baker, promised his help in future efforts when
he pledged, "I am a private in your army . "46

The following year, 1961, saw the reintroduction of
Congressional proposals to authorize the use of federal funds
for the construction of the Arizona Memorial, Representative
Daniel Inouye submitted H.R. 44 to that end. Inouye'’s bill
originally called for $200,000 but was amended to authorize
$150,000 for the memorial. It cleared both houses of Congress
and was signed into law as PL 87-201 on September 6, 1961.

Its passage was not trouble-free. The most important
opponent was Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, chairman of
the Senate Armed Services Committee. Russell’s chief objec-
tion to the bill was the legacy of PL 85-344, the promise that

the Arizona Memorial would be built without federal funds.

31


commission had unwittingly created a situation that had spun
out of control. In this case the potent force lay in the
FRA’s special relationship with the Navy. The association
traditionally functioned as a quasi-official arm of the Navy,
and its leaders enjoyed ready access to senior admirais. What
would be the Navy's attitude toward these two campaigns, one
claiming the sanction of Congress and the other possessing
close and long-standing ties to the service?

On one level, at Fourteenth Naval District headquarters,
the PWMC continued to enjoy Navy support. It was a support
that went beyond Hawaii because the district commandant had
been designated the Secretary of the Navy's official liaison
with the PWMC. But the FRA executed a flanking maneuyer and
obtained the-endorsement of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of
Naval Operations.

This support was manifested in June 1959 when Roark's
committee organized a series of premiers of the movie “John
Paul Jones." The producers agreed to donate the proceeds from
the premiers to the FRA drive. Called the "Governor's Premier,"
Arizona Governor Paul Fanin promoted it by writing other state
governors urging them to publicize the event in their areas.
The key endorsement was not Fanin's, but that of Burke, who
wrote in a letter the governor circulated to his colleagues,
“The Fleet Reserve Association is working hard to build a

memorial that will serve as an appropriate tribute to these

men, "61

38


3

= r = = fe

w
i
§
a

‘-principle by the two-departments. «The Navy had no legal

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION

AND TRANSFER TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

While the AMMF was in the midst of raising funds, the
political-bureaucratic logjam in Washington began to break.
Ironically, despite nearly a decade of legislative discussion,
the first break occurred in the executive branch.

The Navy was anxious to transfer responsibility for the

memorial and visitor complex to the Park Service, but at the

same. time,..reluctant. to.expose itself tothe. financial liability—.....

of constructing the center--a feature of most Congressional

proposals. The Navy took the initiative in solving that

problem with a March 12,. 1975, letter. from. Navy Secretary, .. 1 --

William Middendorf II to Interior Secretary Rogers Morton

offering to transfer the operation to the NPS “at the earliest

possible date,/) With that. strategy the.Navy_could begin the--+.. =: 0".

groundwork for the transfer without supporting legislation

requiring it to spend its construction funds for the visitor

center, 39
The first Interior Department response tothe offer was

@ noncommittal acknowledgment stating that a more definitive

~reply? would-be-forthcoming after a>thorough Park Seryice#:7 t= 77

review, On August 19, 1975, Acting Secretary of the Interior

Kent Frizzell wrote Middendorf agreeing tothe transfer "only
. i

facility at appropriate standards, "40

This exchange waS a strictly informal statement of

63

+ following: the appropriation’ of funds necessary -to’operate ‘the? =


JAMES ROARK AND THE FRA

While the PWMC sought contributions from public and private
sources, it was also confronted with a different kind of
challenge--a breakaway fundraising campaign for the Arizone
Memorial.

The commission took the position that PL 85-344 made it
the sole authorized agency to solicit funds for the Arizona
Memorial on behalf of the Navy. It was anxious to exercise
total control over the effort for a number of reasons. On
one level, the PWMC saw the issue as one of usurpation of its
authority. Central to the commissioners' objections to
independent campaigns, however, was the protection of the
PWMC's credibility and hence its effectiveness.

The commission kept serupulous accounts of the money
passing through its hands, for it knew that the campaign's
chances for success could be fatally wounded by public doubts
about the manner in which funds were handled. The PWMC would
have no control over independent fundraising groups, which
might or might not keep such painstaking accounts, The
public would be hard pressed to distinguish between competing
Arizona Memorial.campaigns, and doubts about the methods of
one group would cast a shadow on the PWNC,

The full potential for conflict between the PWMC and a
separate drive materialized in the person of James Roark of
Phoenix, Arizona, Roark was a member of the Fleet Reserve

Association (FRA), a national organization of active and

34


assume responsibility for the operation of the
memorial upon the completion of such facilities. 43

"="

Why did Senator Inouye's efforts succeed in 1977 when

so.many previous attempts. had failed? Part of the answer

may lie in the sponsor's identity; Inouye was a senior Senator

and, ranking third in the majority part heirarchy, a powerful

_one.as well. Another reason might be that previous efforts,

although unsuccessful in the short run, had paved the way by

winning each year an increasingly wider acceptance of the need

.4-- for-a. visitor center. operated-by the National. Park. Service, . s:es-+a.+

The choice of legislative vehicle, too, undoubtedly helped,

Riding piggy-back on a multi-billion dollar measure, the

hoa. cots uyisitor. center: was: a comparatively minor detail on:a very
important bill. Congressional and military opponents of the
program would be reluctant to jeopardize the entire military

> -=construction program-just=to»eliminate the Arizona: Memorial. »..+::.--
visitor center. Finally, there was no need to solicit the
views of the nonforthcoming National Park Service in the
deliberations that accompanied the military construction
authorization bill,

The passage of funding authorization was a signal achieve-
ment, but it was not a law, ~The authorization language was
contained in the text of the conference committee report, not
the bill itself. It was the bill, minus the report, which

-was signed into law by thé President. The report served notice
of Congressional intent that the Nayy spend $2,000,000 of its
1978 construction budget on the visitor center, but in the

absence of Presidential conecurrance it was not law.

66


pierced by portholes., Visitors would be able to view the
underwater remains of the ship, encrusted with the rust and
marine organisms which reminded the architect of the jewelled
imperial sarcophagi, 73

That proposal met an unenthusiastic response from the
Navy (even his own partner called it "morbid"), so Preis
offered a second concept calling for a bridge which, in
accordance with the Navy's original specifications, spanned
the sunken battleship. That idea received a more positive
reaction. It envisioned a catenary span over the Arizona
and, in contrast tothe first proposal, created an open and
soaring effect.

He used that structural vocabulary to express his
philosophical approach to the memorial's purpose. Preis viewed
the United States as an essentially pacifistic nation, one
which inevitably would sustain the first blow in any war.

Once aroused by that shock the nation could overcome virtually
any obstacle to victory. Because of that characteristic, it
was unavoidable--even necessary, in Preis' view--that this
nation suffer the initial defeat at Pearl Harbor, He meant
his design for the memorial to be a reminder to Americans of
the inevitability of sustaining the initial defeat, of the
potential for victory, and the sacrifices necessary to make
the painful journey from defeat to victory. ?4

Such a complex message required a serene and noncoercive
atmosphere for contemplation, so Preis designed an open

assembly deck for the memorial. It would be separate from the

44


ARIZONA MEMORIAL ANNUAL VISITOR COUNT

(via Navy shuttle boat)

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
19°72
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

178,872
192,041
214,231
234,119
274,255
283,281
353,194
358,502
367 , 816
439 , 826
504, 885
490,292
510,667
585,953
687 , 460
733,504
728,224
107 , 487
851,320

Appendix G

(Compiled from Navy and National Park Service sources)

86


THE PACIFIC WAR MEMORIAL COMMISSION

In any event, public interest faded after the war as

attention in Hawaii and the mainland U.S. shifted to postwar

concerns. That interest, though, was not quite dead. It
began to revive several years after V-J Day. In 1949 the
territory of Hawaii established the Pacific War Memorial
Commission, an agency authorized to plan and raise funds for
the erection of war memorials in the territory.

a The commission. was..composed of seven unpaid- members. who--:
collectively represented the business community, Hawaii's
social elite, and the Islands' Japanese~American veterans. *

It was chaired by H. Tucker Gratz, a man with solid political
connections and formidable diplomatic skills. He was at
various times in his career a naval officer, a businessman

- and-a federal bureaucrat: - The*talents of Gratz and the other
commissioners would receive ample exercise, for the commissioners
received virtually no operating funds from the territorial
government.

Its enabling legislation charged the commission, as its

name implied, with duties relating to war memorials. However,

“Orr ER —— mn a =

the territorial government originally envisioned a very ~
different collateral (perhaps even primary) duty for the PWMC.
It was to serve as liaison with the Pacific War Memorial, Inc.,
a private nonprofit group formed to sponsor a wide variety of

scientific research activities in the Pacific Basin.



’ iniininininin yale’

PREFACE

The story of the USS Arizona Memorial and visitor center
is a story of persistence and hard work. Because it involved
hundreds of people and spanned more than three decades, it
necessarily includes conflict, confusion and setbacks.

This account does. not ignore or minimize those aspects,
They comprise part of the historical record, They are included
out of respect for the whole truth and to give an objective
account of the USS Arizona Memorial and visitor center,

I have tried to deal with those negative factors ina
spirit of appreciation for the vision, dedication, and goodwill
required to..overcome_the obstacles.in. the path.of al1l.who. ..
worked to establish the memorial and the visitor center,

In writing history it is inevitable that some names appear
more. -often::-than- others:-- I[t-is::not my purpose to: exaggerate
or denigrate the work of any individual, group or agency but
to reflect the facts recorded in available sources. Everyone
mentioned in this -account--and-many-more who are not--contributed
to the achievement of a common goal. One of those indiyiduals
expressed it best when he said, "Nobody was more important

than everybody." . - bas

iv


time Congress was considering the authorization of federal
appropriations for the memorial. 97

It is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the extent
to which the PWMC campaign was compromised by the competing
efforts of James Roark and the FRA. Those efforts did result
in raising more than $40,000 for the Arizona Memorial, and
there is no evidence that they actually harmed the commission's
fund drive. Yet there undeniably existed the potential for
widespread public confusion over the split effort and poor
accounting practices, so the PWMC's alarm was not unjustified.
If this chapter in the story of the Arizona Memorial proves
anything, it is that by the late 1950s the idea was so powerful

that it could no longer be contained or monopolized by the PWMC,

41


staffing resources, and packing increasing numbers into each
program will, in the long run, dilute the quality of each
visitor's experience.

The designers of the system's components chose to impose
limits. In designing the interpretive program Robert Barrel
consciously accepted three premises: 1) a certain standard
of program quality should be irreducible; 2) maintaining
that standard depended on respecting the finite capacity of
the system and the site; 3) visitors beyond that limit should
be turned away rather than compromise minimum quality standards.
When Alfred Preis designed the memorial, he saw the opportu-
nity for contemplation as essential to drawing the full meaning
and significance from the site,

Just how crowded and rushed can the NPS allow visitation
on the memorial become before the experience becomes just
another meaningless stop on the tourist agenda? Should the
Park Service draw a line beyond which it will not compromise
the quality of its interpretive program? If so, where should
that line be? These questions will be settled no doubt by
striking a compromise between the ideal of maximum quality
and public and political pressure to accommodate everyone
wanting to visit the Arizona Memorial.

The question of how best to reconcile the competing
demands of popularity and quality standards is a continuing
one, and the solution most likely will be reached gradually
through experimentation. Unfortunately, the National Park

Service may not enjoy that luxury with another potential

72


Navy would like to offer, for your affirmation, Navy =

participation in a consultative role in development of
your plans for improvements, displays and exhibits at the
Memorial, and an understanding that the naval character
of the Memorial will be preserved.

Sincerely, °

pee

J, William Middendorf II
Secretary.of the Navy

81


D-i3

THE Ss ARIZONA MEMORIAL
VISITOR CENTER

An Administrative
and Legislative History

by Michael Slackman

Prepared for
The Superintendent, USS Arizona Memorial
U.S. National Park Service

October 4, 1982

TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

ON MICROFILM B&W Scans HOTHNAL PARK SERVICE
5/3/2005


them for sharing their experiences and their time, I am
solely responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.
Finally, I would like to state for the record that I have
been employed at various times in the past by several agencies
and organizations mentioned in this study: the National Park
Service, the Arizona Memorial Museum Association (successor
organization to the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation), the

Hawaii State Legislature, and the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum.

aii


appropriation. They pursued the theme with justifications
based on the memorial's certain power to stimulate “tourist
interest "42

The strategy worked. The legislature appropriated $50,000
in 1959. It appropriated another $50,000 in 1961 after
Congressman Olin Teague of Texas pledged that if the state
would contribute $100,000, Congress would appropriate the
funds to cover any remaining shortfall in the Arizona Memorial

fund. 43

29


Affairs Office. When cited in the notes, these attached
documents are so noted. Additional Navy documents are in
the files of OICC, Mid-Pacific at Pearl Harbor.

Other souces consulted include daily newspapers, the
files of the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation (now in the
custody of Branch 46, Fleet Reserve Association at Pearl
Harbor), and the personal files of David McClung, @ Honolulu
attorney,

Written records were supplemented by personal interviews
with Robert Barrel, Gary Beito, George Chaplin, Faith Evans,
H, Tucker Gratz, David McClung, and Alfred Preis. C, E, Burns
provided additional information in 2 personal communication,

The following abbreviations are used in the notes;

Ady: Honolulu Advertiser
AMMF: files of the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation

AMSFS: the Navy’s Arizona Memorial Shoreside Facility
Study

McClung: Personal files of David McClung

PAAR: the files of the National Park Service's
Pacific Area Office

PWMC; the Pacific War Memorial Commission record
group in the Hawaii State Archives

SB: Honolulu Star-Bulletin

88



Ye appreciate very much your interest and the cooperation of the Navy
staff in this matter,

Sincerely yours, -

EXT FRIZZELL

87 ¥
. Acting Seerotary of the Interfor

bees

Secretary's Files
Secretary’s Reading Files. (2)
s

u/s-Mr,. Lyons

ES

ch.

FW

COL-Mr. Powell
[ Regional Director, Western Region (2)} w/e of inc.

+83



men killed in the attack. Congressman Lane, riding the flocd
tide of McCarthyism, wanted an opportunity to remind Americans
of the dangers of internel subversion. The Navy Club wanted
to recognize December 7, 1941, as a decisive turning point

in American history. With such a wide diversity of motives

it is little wonder that the proponents failed to carry the
day in the early 1950s.

There were also other, less abstract, reasons. Congres-
sional budget restrictions during that period virtually
guaranteed that "frills" such as an Arizona memorial stood
no chance of federal funding. In-addition, security regulations
then in force barred the general public from Pearl Harbor.

Who would expect a Congressional appropriation for a monument
which most taxpayers could not visit?12

Finally, a decade after the most spectacular defeat in
U.S. military history there remained a deep reluctance on the
part of many to recall that occasion. Collier's felt that the
Navy's hesitation to press for an appropriation stemmed less
from tight budgets than to a desire to forget a shameful
defeat.13 President Harry Truman encouraged such an attitude
when he had his secretary write the PWMC (in a negative response
to a request that he proclaim December 7th a ‘national day of
prayer") that the anniversary of the attack should be remem-—
bered, if at all, "only as a day of infamy."14 At least one
member of the PWMC shared those sentiments and objected to the
commission's planned observances on December 7th as "uncalled

for, "15

11


improved. They discussed the possibility of informal Park
Service assistance and training for Navy personnel dealing
with memorial visitors. Both men suggested to their respective
superiors in Washington involving the NPS in the operation of
the Arizona Memorial, Partially as a result of those discus-
sions, Barrel undertook to prepare a study of a possible
“urban-oriented national recreation area" in Honolulu which
would include the Arizona Memorial,16

In the end Park Service efforts on the study progressed
only to the point of listing sites (including the Arizona
Memorial) that might be included in the national recreation
area. However, the National Park Service did cite the lack
of the completed study as an excuse to recommend Congressional
delay of legislative proposals to give the agency responsibility
for the memorial complex. 17

Acting Director Hulett told House Armed Services Subcommittee
No. 4 that it should wait for the study before moving Matsunaga's
bills. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel Reed
wrote the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
"We urge delay of any further consideration of [NPS] adminis-
tration [of the Arizona Memorial] by the Department of the
Interior pending the consideration by both Departments [Navy
and Interior} of potential use areas in southeast Oahu . ..."
As. late as January 1973 Park Service officials in Washington
took the position that legislation should: await the study.
But by February they recognized that the study “seems infeasible
and should no longer be a factor in considering" Congressional
proposals, 18

53


T7COMFOURTEEN to CNO, Aug. 9, 1968; Bakutis to Matsunaga,
Aug. 20, 1968; Bakutis to Tobin; Aug. 9, 1968, PWHC.

8Rivers to Matsunaga, Jan. 28, 1969; Matsunaga to Rivers,
Jan. 23, 1969, PWMC.

8cNO to COMFOURTEEN, May 15, 1969; Ryan to House Armed
Services Committee, April 23, 1970, PWNC,

l0Wright to Hayward, Sept. 21, 1971, PWMC.
lyayward to Wright, Sept. 23, 1971, PWHC.

12¥atsunaga to Morton, Nov, 2, 1971, PAAR. Matsunaga
to Custer, Mar. 21, 1972.

13.hurmond to Wright, Sept. 13, 1972, PWMC. "Navy Refuses
to Aid Arizona Shrine Project," SB, Mar. 20, 1972, p. Al.
“House OXs Memorial Expansion," Adv., Aug, 17, 1972, p. Bé,
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress,
2nd Session. Committee Report No.’ 92-1327 (Aug. 10, 1972},

14y_s. Congress, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress,
2nd Session. Transcript of testimony before House Armed
Services Subcommittee No. 4, Aug, 2, 1972, PAAR.

DRobert ‘Barrel, interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 6,
1982, U.S, Navy, Fourteenth Naval District. "A Navy Concern
for Environment, n.d. (1971), with cover memo Timberlake to
"Agency Representatives interested in the 'Kokua’ recreational
concept-Aiea Bay-Pearl Harbor," Nov. 24, 1971, PAAR.

1p opert Barrel, interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 6,
1982. Hulett to NPS Legislative Counsel, July 31, 1972, PAAR.

17Robert Barrel, interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 6,
1982, Barrel to Chapman, Oct. 26, 1976, PAAR.

18y 5. Congress, House of Representatives, 92nd Coungress,
2nd Session, Transcript of testimony before House Armed
Service Subcommittee No, 4, Aug, 2, 1972; Reed to Stennis,
Oct. 3, 1972; Griswold to Chief, NPS Div. of Legislative
Coordination and Support, Jan. 22, 1973, and Feb. 21, 1973,
PAAR.

19Witlett to Hebert, July 12, 1973, AMSFS, Appendix B-4,
Matsunaga to Custer, Aug. 9, 1973, PWMC,

20Griswold to Chief, NPS Diy. of Legislation, June 20,
1973, PAAR,

95


operational reasons, There always exists the possibility of
war, a major military buildup at Pearl Harbor or the construction
of a sensitive installation nearby. In such an event Navy
officials might review the status of the memorial and Park
Service operations with an eye toward exerting more direct
control or even eliminating the visitor program entirely,

Also, for reasons entirely unrelated to its relationship
with the Navy, the Arizona Memorial visitor center might need
more definitive legislation. If Park Service budget cuts
ever become so severe that NPS activity at one or more sites
has to be reduced or even terminated, then ambiguous legal
authorization might well be among the criteria used to select
candidates for a drastic cut.

These ate admittedly far-fetched possibilities. Yet the
fact remains that there is limitless potential for confusion,
dispute and disaster arising from the lack of 2 clear law
establishing the Arizona Memorial and visitor complex as an
NPS site. Clearly, the last chapter in the long history of
Congressional deliberation on this matter has yet to be written.

The most abstract challenge facing the National Park
Service, and in many ways the most difficult to come to grips
with, is the continuing question of the meaning of the Arizona
Memorial. In past public discussions proponents have expounded
on 2 wide variety of themes to define its purpose. The “official”
purpose put forth in PL 87-201 notwithstanding, there remains

an enormous diversity of private interpretations,

74


retired Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps personnel. He
was drawn into the PWNC campaign but. branched out with
independent operations.

The pattern of those operations is complex and difficult
to trace, but Roark led at least four different campaigns
related to the USS Arizona, aften simultaneously. First,
Darrel Brady deputized Roark to head the PWMC drive for the
state of Arizona sometime in 1958. Second, Roark established
during the same year.a private nonprofit corporation called
the USS Arizona Memorial Foundation, Inc., for the purpose
of establishing a museum in the state of Arizona to exhibit
artifacts related to the battleship, Third, the governor of
Arizona established a USS Arizona Memorial Committee, with
Roark as chairman, Fourth, he also chaired the FRA's National
Committee To Enshrine The USS Arizona. °2

The boundaries between these organizations and their
mandates were vague and often nonexistent. Roark frequently
presented himself as head of one or another without much
regard for legai niceties in their respective charters. Some-
times he used stationery letterheads implying nonexistent

legal connections between the organizations. 93

He was also
negligent in presenting the accounting statements so fundamental
to fundraising work.

It was inevitable that Roark and the PWMC would come into
conflict. In fact, tension arose as early as June 1958 when,

upon learning of the USS Arizona Memorial Foundation's

existence, H, Tucker Gratz objected that the foundation would

35


PART III: 1963-1982

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS FOR A VISITOR CENTER

The. Arizona Memorial proved as. popular as predicted. ..- --. ve.e0+
In 1963, the first full year of operation, over 178,000

people visited the memorial in Navy shuttle boats, The numbers

eosPOG@.each-year,.-and-in £968.the-.figure had -climbed t0=2833 G00. = «:s.2cca

in a steady and substantial rise each year.1

The memorial was clearly fulfilling expectations, but,

e
3

~ dna: sense,-it-was a victim: of its own success. Increasing = 7sr >
numbers of visitors were forced to wait in ever longer lines

at the Navy's nondescript shuttle boat landing at the mouth

- —- -“¢

---+- -9f- Halawa' Stream? -Those-waits were- often bering; -inconvenient*=—- —--"-~

and exposed to inclement weather. 2

There arose a growing feeling among those connected with

** the Arizona ‘Memorial that ‘it ‘needed’improved*shoreside facilities’ ~~
not only for visitor comfort and convenience, but also to
create an opportunity to present an historical perspective

«+--- 6h thé Pearl- Harbor attack: in’ 1967:there‘was’a flurty ‘6f-~ °°"

interest and a brief exchange of correspondence on the subject

among senior Navy and political figures. But it was left to

those on the working level on the scene in'’Hawaii to take the ~
first steps forward.3
That year Rear Admiral Richard Lynch, Fourteenth District

“Commandant, asked the PWMC for hélp in improving the shoreside

47


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Although his measures failed to pass in 1972, Congressman
Matsunaga had the chance to express his frustration with the
Interior Department's tardy response to Congressional requests
for the agency's views. When National Park Service acting
director Stanley Hulett finally appeared before a House
Armed Services subcommittee, Matsunaga made his point:

. . . it appears that the word [from the
departmental level] has not gotten down to
him [Hulett], but both in the 91st Congress
and the 92nd Congress the Department of the
Interior was asked to make comments on the

bill which I introduced. No reply came to
the committee. Your committee, Mr. Chairman.

14 7
If things were not moving well in Washington there was

some movement on the scene in Hawaii, Beginning about 1970

Admiral Hayward began to develop a working relationship with

the senior National Park Service representative in Hawaii,

General Superintendent Robert Barrel (Barrel's title was

change@ later to Hawaii State Director, then.Pacific Area

Director). Hayward was pursuing a plan to open the waters

and shoreline of Pearl Harbor to civilian recreational use.

He contacted Barrel for advice because of the Park Service's

experience in recreational planning and management, Barrel

joined a working committee that prepared a plan to develop

the Aiea Bay area in a joint effort by the Navy, the NPS and

local government. It encompassed plans for recreational

facilities, including camping, nature trails, boating and a

new Landing for the Navy's Arizona Memorial shuttle boats. 15

As a result of their contact Hayward asked Barrel informally

for his views on ways the Arizona Memorial operation might be

52


facility. The commission responded by turning to Hawail's
Congressional delegation in January 1968 asking for appropria-
tions to build a full~scale visitor center with a museum and
theater complex. Congressman Spark Matsunaga, a former PWMC
member, responded by submitting to the Navy and the commission
a “discussion draft" for such a bill.4

Discussion and correspondence continued during 1968,

Many of the questions aired then came to dominate the planning
and decision making for the visitor center in the decade that
followed.

First was the issue of.who should operate the museum-
theater complex. In July the district: commandant told the
PWMC that the National Park Service (NPS) would be a more
appropriate choice for the job than the Navy. The idea struck
the commissioners by surprise since it was the first suggestion
that the Navy was considering another agency for the operation
of what had been until then a strictly Navy affair.>

Other Navy officers, however, had different ideas. The
Office of Nayal History suggested that the complex be operated
as part of the Navy's museum system. The Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet overruled the commandant by informing the Chief
of Naval Operations, "Under no circumstances should the
responsibility for operation and maintenance of this Navy
Memorial and its supporting facilities . . . be transferred
to another U.S. agency, |. 6

That proprietary attitude did not extend to providing

Nayy funds for the construction of the visitor center. In

48


Appendix A

Public Law 85-344

March 15, 1958 AN ACT .
GLR. 5809) Tp anthorize construction of a United States Ship Arizona Meworiel at Pearl
Harbor.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
pligpeta: Peat United States of America in Congress axsembled, Thut the Secretary

° of tho Navy may— ;

(1) ‘accept contributions for the construction of a memorinl
and museum to be located on the hulk of the United States ship
‘Arizona or adjacent United States property in Peerl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii;

{2) authorize Navy activities to furnish material to the Pacific
War Memorial Commission for use in national promotion of a
puvlic subscription campaign to raise funds for a United States

ship Arizona Memorial;
3) authorize Navy activities to assist in conceiving & design
and in determining the construction cost for the memorial;

{4) undertake construction of the memorial and museum when
sufficient, funds have been subscribed for completion of the struc-
ture; an

{5) provide for maintenance of the memorial and museum when
completed.

Approved March 15, 1958.

77



SOURCES

This study is based primarily on documentary evidence
found in the files of organizations and agencies which played
important roles in the history of thé USS Arizona Memorial
and visitor center. The most significant documentation is in
the files of the Pacific War Memorial Commission, now located
in the Hawaii State Archives in Honolulu. The commission was
not only instrumental in bringing the memorial into existence,
but was frequently consulted by the Navy on subsequent issues
relating to the memorial (such as the establishment of the
visitor center).

Ancther important source was the files of the National
Park Service's Pacific Area Office in Honolulu. They contain
material relating to the role of the Park Service in Hawaii
during the transfer period. Important documents shedding
light on the legislative process in Congress are also in those
files.

The holdings of the Navy's Pearl Harbor command (COMNAVBASE)
were digested in the form of a volume entitled Arizona Memorial

Shoresidge Facility Study. That study, available from the

Public Affairs Office at Pearl Harbor, includes important
documents reproduced in its numerous appendices. Completed
in 1974, the study also has a number of other documents

physically attached to the volume available from the Public

87


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DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND DEDICATION

The design and construction of the Arizona Memorial
were under way before the fundraising was completed, As soon
as it became apparent that the money would be raised, the
Navy began to draw funds from the PWMC account to begin the
project.

There were many ideas for the Arizona Memorial design,
and it is worth looking at a few of them for a notion of the
variety of concepts being circulated. One writer stated that
the memorial should enclose and seal the hulk of the Arizona
to prevent the corpses of the crew from drifting loose. Another,
a captain on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet,
suggested that the remains be disinterred, buried at Punchbowl
National Cemetery and the battleship be dismantled, because
"the general public will soon loose [sic] interest in the
proposed memorial and it will gradually go into decay." A
Navy public works official proposed burying the Arizona in
a landfill extending from Ford Island and setting aside the
spot as a picnic area, 98

Nayy officials in charge of the project, however, had
different ideas. Because of security and transportation
requirements, they rejected the idea of incorporating any
part. of Ford-Island-—in the. memorial... In addition, they stipu-
lated that the memorial was to be in the form of a bridge which
would not touch any part of the sunken battleship and that it

be capable of accommodating 200 people. Beyond that they

imposed no design specifications 69

42


oc eieiieieine Sebeieieien ied

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study wonld have been impossible without the support
and assistance of many people. For their indispensable help
I thank: the directors of the Arizona Memorial Museum Associa-
tion for financial support; the association's business manager,
Gary Beito; Superintendent Gary Cummins and Chief Ranger
John Martini of the National Park Service's Arizona Memorial
for their suggestions and encouragement; Susan Shaner of the
Hawaii State Archives; R..H, "Rock" Rothrock of the Pearl
Harbor Naval , Base Public Affairs Office; Bill Loo of OICC
Mid-Pacific at Pearl Harbor; Gary Barbano of the Pacific Area
Office of the National. Park Service; and Victoria Custer, former
executive secretary of the Pacific War Memorial Commission.

The following people provided me with recollections of
events covered in this study: Robert Barrel, retired director
of the Pacific Area Office of the National Park Service;

Gary Beita, former business manager of the Arizona Memorial
Museum: Foundation; C. E. Burns, Chief Boatswains Mate, USN
(ret.}; George Chaplin, Editor-in-Chief, Honolulu Advertiser;
U.S. Marshal and former Hawaii State Representative Faith Evans;
H. Tucker Gratz, former chairman of the Pacific War Memorial
Commission; former Hawaii State Senator David McClung, who
shared not only his recollections, but his files; and Alfred

Preis, architect of the Arizona Memorial, I am grateful to

it


At that point Inouye adopted a different strategy. Until
1977 all attempts to authorize construction of the visitor
center and turn it over tothe National Park Service had been
in the form of individual bills drafted, submitted and considered
for those specific purposes.

In 1977 Senator Inouye succeeded where previous attempts
had failed. He did so by attaching the visitor center proposal
to a larger and more powerful engine--the annual military
construction authorization act. Each year Congress passed
an omnibus military construction bill to authorize billions
of dollars in military construction projects for the following
fiscal year.

During the 1977 Congressional session, when the Senate
considered military construction authorizations for 1978,
Inouye proposed the inclusion of 2 $3,300,000 item for Navy
construction of a visitor center complex for the Arizona
Memorial. His Senate colleagues concurred, but the House
of Representatives were reluctant to accept the authorization.
The inter-house differences were reconciled in a conference
committee, which agreed to fund the project for $2,000,000.
The conference committee report, adopted by both houses,
inciuded language which specified Congressional wishes that
the facility be built by the Navy and operated by the National
Park Service. It rerd, in part:

. « . prior to the award of any construction
contract for the proposed ARIZONA Memorial
facilities, an agreement must be executed

between the Navy and the National Park Service
providing that the National Park Seryice wiil

65


By the end of 1971 the situation resembled the Gordian
knot, The Navy refused to support legislation which might
mean a cut in other Navy programs, and instead looked to the
PWMC to repeat its fundraising performance of the late 1950s
and early 1960s. The commission declined the responsibility
and looked to Congress to provide the funds, But, given the
Navy's opposition to the authorization bills, mobilizing
Congressional support was a hopeless task.

It was natural for Congressional sponsors to intensify
the focus on the prospect of National Park Service partici-
pation in the project. In November 1971 Congressman Matsunaga
explored the idea in a letter to Interior. Secretary Rogers
Morton noting, "existing shoreside facilities are painfully
inadequate" and citing the exposure to rain and sun for waiting
visitors, When the Navy opposed yet another measure for the
visitor center in 1972 Matsunaga suggested an amendment to the
bill which would allow “another Federal agency" to operate it.12

In August he introduced HR 16201, calling for the Navy
to spend $2,500,000 building the facility, which the Park
Service would subsequently operate. The Navy opposed that
proposal, too, because it would draw construction funds away
from other Navy programs. The Park Service broke its silence
by joining the Navy in opposing the bill on similar budgetary
grounds. Despite the negative reaction of the two agencies,
the House passed HR 16201, It died in the Senate, howeyer,
where Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina offered his
opinion that "the Navy's failure to support this bill" doomed
its chances, 13

51



important test of Brady's efforts was the amount of money he
brought in. In that regard the results were clearly lacking.

Between mid-June 1958 and mid-December 1959, the eighteen
months covered by the original contract, tne Arizona Memorial
fund received about $155,000 in donations. Of that amount
$50,000 was from an appropriation of Hawaii's territorial
legislature, and another $95,000 had been engendered by a
broadcast of the television program "This Is Your Life "31
Brady had little or nothing to do with generating income from
those sources (see below for more detailed treatment of the
broadcast and Hawaii legislative appropriations). This left
$10,000 at most which had come from Brady's efforts.

Yet Brady had received a 15 percent commission on all
donations to’ the Arizond Memorial fund. Clearly, the commission
was not getting its money's worth from Brady. As a result,
the commission, after two short-term extensions to give Brady
a chance to produce results, allowed the contractual arrange-—
ment to expire at the end of July 1960, Experience had taught
the commissioners to turn a deaf ear to Brady's final claim,
“we are now taking a nationwide endeavor, "32

In terms of donations from private sources, the most
significant event in the Arizona Memorial fundraising drive
was undoubtedly the December 3, 1958, national telecast of
"This Is Your Life." Hosted by television personality
Ralph Edwards, the program's format centered on a different
individual (usually a celebrity) each week. The guest shared

the stage with Edwards as former acquaintances spoke from

25


defeating it with delaying tactics, he declined the chance
to try to kill the measure by "amending it to death, "18

PWMC chairman, H. Tucker Gratz, a naval reserve officer,
had arranged for temporary active duty in Washington while
the bill made its way through Congress. He watched from the
Senate gallery as it passed on final vote.19 The measure

was Signed into law as Public Law 85-344 on March 15, 1958.

21


Other reasons were also advanced in floor discussions.
Speakers stressed the rationale of treating the Arizona as
a burial site, with Inouye referring to the ship as a
"common grave" for her crew. The point was elaborated on
by Representative Mendel Rivers, who noted that the $150,000

would amount to far less than the combined military burial
51

allowances for the entombed crewmen.
The one argument, however, made by all speakers for the
bill in 1961 was that most of the funds had already been
raised, turned over to the Navy, and construction actually
begun. It was one thing to resist authorizing funds for a
project still in its conceptual stage, but quite another to
refuse funds for one which was already under way, That
argument, more than any other, marked the difference between
the 1961 debate and previous Congressional discussion about
federal funding for the Arizona Memorial. That point, as

Congressman Teague had promised, carried the day.

33


committee felt it worthwhile to note some dissenting Navy
voices in its final report. it included a proposal by an
earlier commandant that the Navy retain control of the memo-
rial structure while the Park Service operate the visitor
center, “since the USS Arizona is a Navy ship and we do not
want to abandon the Navy's relationship with her and her
final resting place." Another Navy officer took vigorous
exception to turning any part of the operation over to the
NPS:

. . transferring the visitor program tothe

Park Service will have the effect of creating

an amorphous national shrine--important and

meaningful but without the same sentimenta},.

attachment the Memorial has with the Navy,

Of the other possibilities considered in the study, the
PWHC and ‘the Battle Monuments Commission rejected suggestions
that they might operate the visitor complex. State or muni-
cipal agencies were unsuitable because they "might open up
problems in downstream areas that pertain to the security"
of the naval base, Private enterprise operation was judged
inappropriate for the special nature of the Arizona Memorial.
A private nonprofit organization might, if it met strict Navy
requirements, be suitable. 26

The most desirable option, the study concluded, was
operation by the National Park Service, It gave several
reasons for that conclusion;

1) Congress would probably approve, since the
idea had already achieved wide circulation
there in the form of authorization bilis,

2} It might mean that construction funds could
be taken from the NPS budget instead of the

Navy's.

57


The only overt statement the NPS makes to all visitors
is in the film shown before they board the shuttle boat. The
narration incorporates an amorphous, emotionally strident
message summed up in the conciusion that to forget Pearl
Harbor is to "forget what America stands for." That unedifying
commentary may or may not be supplemented by the remarks of
individual park rangers.

The NPS visitor program does ACt really confront the
issue of the memorial's purpose and for good reason, There
are potentially as many purposes as there are individual visitors,
Some view it as a reminder that America should be eternally
vigilant and never again be caught unprepared by the outbreak
of war. Others see it as evidence of the tragic price of war,
a monument téthe need to seek peaceful solutions to international
differences,

Many, especially those of the generation that played an
active role in World War II, view the Arizona Memorial as a
proud tribute to American ability to achieve a great victory
after facing initial disadvantage. For others of that genera-—
tion, a visit to the Arizona Memorial rekindles the passions
of that period, reawakening a hatred of Japanese (exacerbated
by current economic tensions). Still other Americans are moved
by a stirring of patriotism ranging in tone from xenophobia
to simple love of country,

Nor is the commemoration of the dead overlooked, Visitors
are certainly reminded of the Arizona's casualties. Others

remember all who were killed in the December 7, 1941, attack.

75


In late 1960 the memorial fund was still well short of
its $500,000 goal. The editor of the Honolulu Advertiser,
George Chaplin, volunteered to help by writing about 1,500
letters to the editors of daily papers across the nation.
He asked them to help the fund drive by publishing stories
or editorials about the Arizona Memorial project and, in turn,
ask their readers to send contributions to the fund. 36

Among those papers which responded was the Los Angeles
Examiner, Presley's manager, Colonel Tom Parker, read the
Examiner editorial and immediately telephoned Chaplin with
the offer of a Presley benefit performance in Hawaii for the
Arizona Memorial (Presley was scheduled to come to Hawaii in
any event for movie location work), Parker's single condition,
and in this he was inflexible, was that all ticket proceeds
must go directly to the memorial fund. He insisted that any
overhead be covered from other sources, 37

Chaplin quickly referred the offer to the PWMC. The
commission lost little time in accepting Parker's offer and
arranged for the donation of incidental services for the
concert (ticket sales, sound system, etc.}. The Navy, under
its authority to cooperate with the PWMC, made available its
Bloch Arena at Pearl Harbor for the performance.

The March 25, 1961, concert was a sellout, with seat
prices ranging from $3 to $100. The star wore a gold lame
silver sequin lapelled sport coat and performed tothe accompani-
ment of what one observer called "sub-navel quaking and shaking"

and the screams of several thousand fans, 38

27


we x) Pe ee ry ee ee ee x) ae oe

5lonitea States Congress. Congressional Record. Vol. 107,
Part 12, pp. 14063-65 (July 31, 1961}.

52prady to Custer, Aug. 16, 1958; Gratz to Solomons,
June 4, 1958; State of Arizona Certificate of Incorporation
for USS Arizona Memorial Foundation, Inc., Dec, 7, 1959;
McFarland to Quinn, Nov. 21, 1958; Roark to Gratz, Jan 16,
1959, PWMC.

53poark to Quinn, Sept. 11, 1959, PWMC.

54¢ratz to Solomons, June 4, 1958; Roark to Gratz, June 27,
1958, PWHC.

SSprady to PWMC, cablegram May ‘31, 1959, PWMC.

56Roark to Gratz, Jan. 16, 1959; Gratz to Solomons, Dec. 11,
1959; Gratz to Brady, July 27, 1959; Brady to Roark, Mar, 11,
1959; Gratz to Roark, Feb, 17, 1961; "Digest Of Meeting With
Roark," undated, PWMC.

S?Roark to Gratz, Jan. 16, 1959, PWHC,
58poark to Quinn, Sept. 11, 1959, PWC,
59prady to PWMC, cablegram May 31, 1959, PWMC.
S0Gratz to Solomons, June 4, 1959; PWMC.
Slpurke to Fanin, June 17, 1959, PWMC.

82Gratz to Burke, cablegram July 7, 1959; Burns to Franke,
July 3, 1959, PWC,

83¢ratz to Kirkpatrick, Nov. 23, 1959; Kirkpatrick to
Gratz, Dec. 24, 1959; Stephan to Vinson, in Congress, 85th
Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Committee
Report No. 1125 (Aug, 13, 1957).

64yavy Judge Advocate Opinion, April 8, 1960, quoted in
“Joint Statement of Policy by the Fourteenth Naval District
and the Pacific War Memorial Commission," June 27, 1960, PWC.

65Elke to Solomons, Dec. 7, 1959; Solomons to Secretary
of the Navy, Dec. 24, 1959, PWMC.

86prady to Roark, Feb. 18, 1960, PWMC.

67cnristiansen toe Albright, Dec. 5, 1960; Gratz to Solomons,
Dec. 9, 1960; Albright to Coleman, Dec. 12, 1960; Albert to
Gratz, March 17, 1960; Custer to Albert, March 22, 1960; Albert
to Custer, May 16, 1960, PWMC, "Ship's Survivors Sought,"
Oklahoma City Times, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 3, Custer to Ballas,
Feb. 25, 1960, McClung,

93


The Pacific War Memorial, Inc., seemed to promise great
things for Hawaii. Its board of directors included a thick
slice of the Eastern establishment: Henry Stimson, William
Donovan, Ovetta Cupp Hobby, Artemus Gates, and a sprinkling
of Roosevelts and Rockefellers, There was talk of locating
the organization's field headquarters in Honolulu, with no
telling how much money and prestige might accrue to Hawaii.>

As fate would have it, though, the promise of the Pacific
War Memorial, Inc., never materialized. The PWMC turned its
attention to consideration of war memorial structures for
Hawaii.

The PWMC quickly concluded that the Pearl Harbor area
and the December 7th attack provided obvicus themes for a
memorial. Actually, the commissioners arrived in 1951 at a
conception for an entire system of memorials. It would
include sites and structures at Red Hill, the Marine parade
ground, the main gate of Pearl Harbor Naval Station, the
wreckage of the USS Arizona, and a connecting boulevard
between Nimitz and Kamehameha Highways.

It is clear that the PWMC recognized the importance of
the Arizona within the scheme. As early as 1946 H. Tucker Gratz
had been struck by the neglect of the sunken battleship when
he visited the wreckage to place a wreath on the anniversary
of the attack, only to find the dead wreath he had put there
the previous December 7th.

The commission's plan called for a permanent platform

over the ship. It would be connected by a ramp to Ford Island,


And some think of those killed in other battles and other wars.
Younger visitors, who have no personal recollection of
World War II, usually take a more detached view of the memorial
and its meaning. For many it is a history lesson, an intel-
lectual experience rather than an emotional one. Others take

to heart the various meanings older visitors ascribe to the
memorial.

Foreigners may invest the memorial with entirely different
meanings. Those from nations allied with the United States
in World War If may see the program’s content as slighting
their nations' contribution to the common victory. Some,
from nations which suffered millions of deaths in the war,
see it as another kind of American chauvinism--giving an
exaggerated Significance to American deaths, which pale into
insignificance when compared to the much greater casualty
figures of other countries. And what goes through the minds
of Japanese visitors, who comprise an increasingly large share
of the visitor total?

Obviously, then, there can be no single meaning or
Significance applicable to all visitors te the Arizona Memorial.
Regardless of how many "official" statements of purpose are
promulgated, each visitor will approach the experience with
and be guided by his or her personal predisposition, It is
not possible to be all things to all people. The National
Park Service faces not the task of imposing a single meaning
on the yisitor program, but of developing an objective inter-
pretive synthesis that transcends the wide range of individual

views while respecting all of them.

76


OFFICE OF *

United States Department of the Interior - Fe ;

YE SECRETARY - er
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

. + he, ey o-v (ye:

Lo gene
Appendix §&. Benes ‘

—«

AUG 191975 -

Honoreble J. William Middendort IT

Secretary of the avy
. Vaghington, D.C.

Dear Ur, Secretaryt

Ko ere pleased to respmd further to your le
a transfer of the U.S.5, *arizona” Meworial
2d an opportunity to consider the views of the

Interior, Ve have b

ter of Merch 12 proposing
to the Depsertramt of the .

Fetionsal Park Service and the recamendation of the Advisery Board on

Yotional Parks, Wiateric Sites, Bulldings,

Ve concur vith tha otatenent that you have

peregraph of your Varch 12 iette
- ferred to this Departacot at the
able for its cere and operation.

the perpetuct:
services are diversions from 4

the Rutional Ferk Service believes that 4
gl and the.shoreside facilities as a port of the

The Advisory Rosrd has recorrended thet the
pility ctucy. Aecordingly, tne Service wil

include the nexori.
Yintional Park Systeme

Service conduct 6 feast
progran a atudy for fiscal year

estimates and other data for a Depurtment

Sion to invlenent the trensfers
+4onol Park Gervice Weetern Region Dirsctor, whose

direction of the tn
nédress in Western

Gate Avenue, Box 36036, Sen Francisco, Celifornis

pnd Monusents on the proposal.

walle in the next to the Last
cv that the "ArizonaTM Mererial he treus~
earliest cate that resources are aveile
Ve appreciate ths yavy's concern for

jon of this memorial ena thet such related interpretive
he Vavy's nilitary reediness missiot.

would be xppropriate ‘to =~ -

1977. This study wilh dcvelop cost
nl recosucndetion on legis=
The study vill be uncer the

Re-ion Office, Rational Fark Gervice, 450 Golden

gu1LG2, and telephaose

number is 425-556-6196. Rovy participstion in the study will de

wolcause

Owing to the fiscal constraints
it is our intention to recommen

a transfer only folloiivg the arproy’
operate the facility at appropriate standards,

{BASIC RETAINED IN Lut) )

applicable to both our Departments»
d legisiation vuich would provide for
rintion of funds necescary to

AECEIVED
AUG 27 1975

Lo, Sy
Wotury revo
82



Hawaii worked to secure legal authorization, raise funds, and
execute the design and construction of the Arizona Memorial.

During the third era, 1963-1980, the focus was on the
increasing need for a shoreside visitor center to accommodate
and enhance the experience of growing numbers of visitors to
the memorial. It included the struggle for Congressional
appropriations, fundraising, and the transfer of the operation
of the Arizona Memorial from the Navy to the National Park
Service.

Cutting across these chronological lines are a number of
important themes which shape this history. They include: the
question of what, exactly, the Arizona Memorial commemorates;
the conflicts and problems inherent in different approaches
to fundraising; the growth and maturation of Hawaii as a state
and a tourist destination; the role of the PWMC over a three
decade period; the politics of securing Congressional action;

and the issues surrounding the Navy's connection with the

Arizona Memorial, and the Navy's relationship with other groups

and agencies interested in the memorial.


Appendix D
QEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350
March 12, 1975 ~

-The_Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton
The Secretary~-of~ the’ Interior
Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C, 20240

a Ge,
Dear Yr

I am writing in the belief that our respective Departments
should have a compatible objective for the eventual dis-
position of the United States Ship Arizona Memorial in
Pear] Harbor. My staff has met with representatives of
the National Park Service on this subject. I understand
that, in principle, and without commitment as to timing, +
they are in basic agreement. :

The Navy is concerned that the number of visitors desiring
to tour the Memorial has outstripped the capacity of faci-~
lities for their accommodation. There is now insufficient
parking, boat capacity, and on-shore reception area. More’
than 500,000 persons visited the Memorial in 1973. The
number is increasing ca a trend of 18% a year.

We ,|have completed a study of necessary improvements of
facilities, and the: associated investment and annual opera-
ting costs. Quite frankly, I cannot foresee that Navy _
appropriations will ever be adequate to support the reason-
able Convenience and necessity demands of public visitors.
While I regret that prospect, I respect -the judgement that
Navy should not divert funds from a military readiness
mission, to tourist support,

I propose that we agree on the objective of transfer of the

Memorial to your Department, at the earliest date that you
consider resources of your Department adequate for its care
and operation. On our part the Navy will support such legis-
lation for that purpose as may be agreeable. to the Department
of the Interior, and is prepared to fully cooperate with your
Department to ensure that current Navy management of the
Memorial is consistent with your longer term planning. In

that regard we would prefer to commence procurement of new

boats and to ¢arry on the beat transportation function in
a manner fully compatible with your overall management of the
Memorial operation.

80


14Burke to Roark, Oct. 24, 1958, PWMC,

1y_s. Congress. Congressional Record, Vol, 104, Part 3,
p. 3225 (Mar. 3, 1958)

16Nimitz to Gratz (holograph), July 11, 1961, PWMC.
17y\5. Congress, 85th Congress, lst Session, HR 5801.

18y,s. Congress. Congressional Record, Vol. 104, Part 3,
pp. 3224-27 (Mar. 3, 1958).

19H, Tucker Gratz interview with author, Honolulu, June 18,
1982, °

20ipid.

21 pyady-PWMC Agreement, June 16, 1958; Supplementary agree-
ment, Oct, 20, 1959 and April 7, 1960, PWMC,

22See "James Roark. and the FRA,"

?3Minutes, May 8, 1958, PWMC,

24yinuteg, June 25, 1956, PWMC.

Scuster to Brady, March 26, 1958; Brady to Yanofsky,
June 1, 1958; Brady to PWMC, March 11, 1958; Pesl to Quinn,
undated (1960), PWMC.

26custer to Brady, March 26, 1958, PWMC,

27Miki to Peal, April 7, 1960, PWMC.

28custer to Brady, Feb. 6, 1959, PWMC.

29 andwritten "Memo to the file,’ undated (1960); Styne,
"Memo to the file," June 4, 1960, PWMC.

30prady to Gratz, Aug. 7, 1959, PWMC.
3louster to Ramelb, May 4, 1960, PWMC.
32prady to Gratz, May 17, 1960, PWMC,

33custer to Deitrich, Jan. 22, 1958; Minutes, May 9, 1958,
WHC,

344, Tucker Gratz interview with author, Honolulu, June 18,
1982, "This Is Your Life" Dec. 3, 1958 (16mm film), PWNC.

91



a

_ m7
i
5 é

i.

THE ARIZONA MEMORIAL MUSEUM FOUNDATION

In the matter of funding the study committee discounted
the chances for a Congressional appropriation in the near
future. The most likely candidate to lead a fundraising
drive, the PYMC, had rejected the proposal. The Navy turned
then to Branch 46 of the Fleet Reserve Association, # group
already providing financial help for minor improvements and
maintenance in the Arizona Memorial system. (Branch 46, the

., Pearl Harbor. branch of..the. FRA, was, entirely. separate. from.......

the earlier FRA fundraising drive which aroused so much
animosity more than a decade earlier, }
In .1973 Branch.46-had planned a drive to. raise $120,000.

to improve the current Arizona landing, During the latter
part of that year branch officers were approached by the chief

. civil. engineering. officer: at. Pearl. Harbor... He noted the...
repeated failures to obtain Congressional authorization for
the visitor center and asked them to take on the task of
conducting a national: campaign to raise the money from private --
donors, The members of Branch 46 considered the request,

agreed, and in January 1974 organized the Arizona Memorial

‘+ Museum Foundation ¢AMMF),: a private nonprofit corporation: *""*

chartered to lead the drive, 29
In February retired Navy Chief Petty Officer C, E, Burns,

--whom-the Navy “generally -recognized as the‘ driving*force

+

59


financial burdens and budget restraints, 20

In fact, the Park Service suggested to Congress a mirror-
image program which would require the Navy to operate, as
well as build, the visitor center. The Navy, of course,
refused to support the measure, noting that operation of the
center would require an additional $500,000 annually. With
such a deadlock it is not surprising that the Navy considered
once again the possibility of raising funds from private
donors, with one officer suggesting an approach to the Retired

Officers Association. 2+

55


In addition, he obtained from the Navy a list of Arizona
casualties and their home towns. His staff proceeded to break
down the list by Congressional districts, and Burns provided
every Congressman with a list of crew members from his or her
district who had been killed on the battleship on December 7,
1941.9 That this touch provided a powerful incentive to support
the bill was attested to by, among others, Representative
Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, who told his colleagues:

in reminding us that among the heroes of the
nation . . . were some who had been our own
constituents, the gentleman from Hawaii gave
us the added personal sense that in supporting
HR 5809 we were aiding in building a memorial
not oniy for our countrymen personally

unknown to us but also for the members of

our own community families.

Burns knew additionally that, as was the case in the early
1950s, many people inclined to support a bill to authorize the
Arizona Memorial would- have widely varying and emotionally--
charged opinions on the reason(s) a memorial was needed.

The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (as
noted above) seemed at least as'concerned with the disgraceful -
spectacle of the Arizona's deteriorating remains as with the
memory of those killed in the attack.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General R, McC. Pate,
wrote, “Besides memorializing the brave men who lost their
lives at Pearl Harbor, such a shrine will serve as a reminder

of the courage, hardship and sacrifice [required] to bring

World War II to a successful conclusion. "11

17


In 1960 and 1961 that issue revolved around the question
of the memorial's dedication date. A Memorial Day dedication
would imply that it was essentially a cemetery; a December 7th
dedication implied a commemoration of the attack. There was
much confusion among officials of the PWMC and the Navy. Plans
for the dedication wavered back and forth between December 7,
1961 (the twentieth anniversary of the attack) and Memorial
Day 1962. The latter date was chosen for the reason, aS much
as any other, that construction could not be completed in time

for a December 7th ceremony, 78

46


in pursuit of funding is recommended." The Deputy Director
of Naval History sounded the same theme when he testified
before Congress to the Navy's opposition to HR 4044 saying
erroneously, "the Pacific War Memorial Commission is taking
positive steps to obtain funds for the construction of this
project."9
Because of the Navy's negative response, the bill made
no progress and died in committee. But Matsunaga persisted
and in 1971 introduced HR 206, which was similar to HR 4044,
Meanwhile, in Hawaii Rear A@miral Thomas Hayward, Fourteenth
Naval District Commandant (and future Chief of Naval Operations)
pressed on doggedly in the Navy's efforts to persuade the
PWMC to conduct the fundraising drive. The commission, perhaps
recalling the difficulties encountered in raising funds for
the Arizona Memorial, declined and continued to put its faith
in Congress. Harold Wright, H. Tucker Gratz's successor as
chairman of the PWMC, wrote to Hayward, "it would be somewhat
premature to proceed at this time with any [fundraising] plan
as such action may have the effect of impeding the enactment
of House Biil [sic] 206. . . ."10
Hayward's disappointment was obvious in his reply:

Quite obviously I would support his bili

completely and am willing to hold off on

any lesser proposal of my own in the hopes

that Congress will come up with adequate

funding to do the job right. I must say,

"*-->*) however, that I find little reason tobe
optimistic at the pace we are presently
proceeding; nevertheless I will necessarily

abide by the wishes of the Pacific War
Memorial Commission,

ple)


C HOUSE OF pppendix ¢
gra Coxoress 3 F REPRESENTATIVES
iat Session { No. pat

sHLEFARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1978

Joxy 12, 1977,.—Ordered to be printed

Mr, Nezpz1, from the committee of conference,
- submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

{To accompany S. 1474}

34

NGS BAY, GA——-BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARIS

ted $19.5 million for thy increment of facilj.
ballistic missiJa-sabmarine squadron that is
jwTo the east coast of the United
request for Kings Bay, Georgiz,
cred” site. The Senate deferrai
ill evaluating four otler
tion until January

The Navy req
ties to accommodate
to be redeployed from
States. The Honse approve:
which the Navy identifi the ope
the request on the basis that the Navy 7
possible sites will not make a final site
1978. Since-the Senate bill did provide snfficient entesgency authnnits

Kavy to proceed with the required facilities on: fina) site
fected, the House conferees agreed to recede to the Senate position

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL STATION, HIAWAIL—ARIZONA MEMORUL

In its bill, the Senate added $3.3 million for visitor facilities al
the ARIZONA Memorial, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. House conferes
expressed reservations about providing authority under the Militery
Construction Authorization Act for the construction of memonel
facilities and questioned the scope of the proposed project. The Houx
conferees were of the opinion that $2.0 million should be sufficient te
provide suitable facilities for the memorial. After a thorough revi
of the history of this project, the conferees agreed to authorized &*
million.

Further, the conferees agreed that prior to the award of pny con-
struction contract for the proposed ARIZONA Memorial facilities. a
agreement must be executed between the Navy and the National Pers
Service providing that the National Park Service ill assume the 1,
sponsibility for the operation of the memorial upon completion o*
such facihties.

72


The early 1250s were not quite ripe for an Arizona
memorial. But the idea was not dead. It would not be long
before proponents would once again marshal their resources and

conduct a successful effort to realize their goal.

12



That retreat did not mean the end of all Park Service,
much less the Navy's, objections. The 1973 session of Congress
saw continued attempts to establish the shoreside visitor
center. Representative Matsunaga introduced several bills,
and other legislators including Senator Daniel Inouye did
the same. The scenario was by then well rehearsed.

Matsunaga's HR 746 met with Navy objections that a
Navy appropriation to build the visitor center "might ultimately
result in the elimination or reduction of funds for more vital
operational facilities in the military construction program."
Such objections, added to continuing NPS reservations, were
enough to keep the bill mired in committee. Matsunaga relayed
the gloomy news to the PWMC with the observation that the
Navy's and the Park Service's "lukewarm or unfavorable reports"
caused House Armed Services Committee chairman F, Edward Hebert
to hait the bill's progress. 19

Even though the National Park Service no longer cited
the need for further studies as a reason to delay the legis-
lation, the agency still had reservations. Those reservations
turned out to be remarkably similar to the Navy's budgetary
objections.

The Navy suggested in 1973 that any legislation for the
Arizona Memorial visitor center should provide that funding
for both construction and operation come from the NPS budget,
That proposal met with a pained reaction from Park Service
officials, one of whom wrote, "No consideration is given to

the fact that the National Park Service also has serious

54


* an out+-of-office: politician,. Gratz had developed a-close

MEMORIAL DAY

The USS Arizona Memorial was dedicated in the warm
sunshine of Memorial Day 1962. White was the dominant color
for the cc¢asion with Navy uniforms blending with the freshly
painted surfaces of the memorial. As the waters of Pearl
Harbor lapped gently against the rusted hulk of the. sunken
battleship, the 200 invited guests and another 800 on the
nearby shore of Ford Island listened to speeches by admirals
and other dignitaries... After a prayer from the. chaplain, a
band played the Navy Hymn followed by the haunting notes of
taps. The Marine honor guard provided final punctuation with
a volley of rifie fire,

Among those gathered for the dedication were two whose
efforts had been critical in bringing to reality the idea of
a:memerial over the remains: of: the Arizona, .They were H. Tucker
Gratz, chairman of the Pacific War Memorial Commission (PWMC),

and John A, Burns, Hawaii's former Delegate to Congress.

. Ironically, neither: man- was-on the rostrum for ‘the: occasion,

Burns had abandoned his seat in Congress to run unsuccessfully
for Governor in Hawaii's first post-statehood election and was
relationship and high regard for Burns during their joint
endeavor, and when he saw the former delegate among the spec-
tators-he left:  the>platform:to join Burns in the crowd; tess) s+

1



CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

That professional expertise is sure to be challenged
in the years to come by the persistence of old problems and
changing conditions. The principal questions looming in the
foreseeable future bear striking resemblance to issues that
have surrounded the Arizona Memorial and visitor center from
their inception,

The most immediately pressing and obvious of those issues
is..the. increasing. number- of: visitors.. The unrelenting-rise
in numbers which first prompted the need for the visitor center
continues unabated. In 1981, the first full year of operation,
851,320 people yisited the complex and memorial.50 :There is:
every indication that the totals for 1982 and subsequent years

will be substantially greater. On especiaily busy days the

. NPS .staff..may: turn away-more than. 1,000 visitors because

program capacity is unequal to the demand,

The Park Service can make and has made adjustments to
accommodate the flood. Theater capacity was increased by more
than 10 percent in 1982, as was shuttle boat capacity and speed,
The NPS has experimented with shortening the intervals between
programs; -It might be possible to increase the number of
hours per week of operation (the visitor center now operates
six days per week}.

These changes undoubtedly allow, or would’ allow, the

Arizona Memorial visitor center to accommodate thousands of

people who otherwise would be turned away. They do, however,

have a price, Compressing program intervals, stretching

71


off-stage about shared experiences withthe guest of honor.
An emotional retinion would usually follow as the acquaintance
would emerge after speaking.

The idea of using the show as a vehicle for the memorial
fund drive first occurred to Mrs. Neil Deitrich, wife of the
commandant of the Fourteenth Navai District. The idea was
passed on to the PWMC by January 1958. The commission deliber-
ated on it and contacted Ralph Edwards, who agreed to use his
show to promote the fundraising effort .33

The December 1958 broadcast was timed to coincide as
closely as possible with the anniversary of the attack. It
featured, more than any one individual, the battleship
USS Arizona. Admiral Fuqua, as senior surviving officer,
stood in as the main guest. Appeals for contributions to the
memorial fund were a prominent part of the program. Fuqua
maintained a controlled military demeanor throughout the show
but, according to one witness, broke into sobs aS soon as it
was over.34

The response was stunning. Contributions began to pour
in immediately. During the single month from December 16th
to January 15th over $78,000 was received, By the time they
stopped the commission identified over $95,000 in donations
attributable to the broadcast, 35

The second big event stimulating private contributions
generated less cash then "This Is Your Life," but lodged more
permanently in public consciousness. It featured Elvis Presley,

the performer who dominated American popular music in the 1950s.

26


= x) mm ma se ry Ce ee ee ~*~ _

shuttle boat speeds and other factors, He knew also that
between 1963 and 1976 the annual number of people visiting
the Arizona Memorial by Navy shuttle boat had increased from
178,872 to 585,953--a rise of 300 percent. If that rate

of increase continued (and there was no indication it would

not) it would be only a matter of time before the memorial-

visitor center system faced more visitors than it could

accommodate.

Barrel confronted the problem and decided not to attempt
to design a system with an infinitely expandable capacity.
He accepted the fact that, in order to preserve the quality
of visitor experience, some people would not be accommodated,
The system's finite carrying capacity was a fundamental
precept in NPS planning for the visitor center.47

Concurrent with the basic planning, NPS administrators
worked with the Navy and other agencies to lay the groundwork
for the operation of the visitor center. In 1979 the AMMF
changed its name. to the. Arizona Memorial Museum Association
and became a nonprofit cooperating association that would
operate a bookstore at the visitor center. Proceeds would
be used to support the Park Service's interpretive programs.48

On March 21, 1980, the Navy and the NPS executed a use
agreement formally permitting the Park Service to manage the
visitor center and adjacent grounds which lay on Navy property.
On September 10th representatives of the two agencies signed
&@ Support agreement speiling out in detail what services
would be supplied by the Navy, which would be reimbursable, and
which would be free, 49

69


conditions subject to Navy approval.

Between 1975 and 1979 the AMMF raised over $500,000
by direct solicitation of visitors at the Arizona Memorial,
Substantial contributions to the AMMF fund also came from
the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the national Fleet
Reserve Association and its ladies’ auxilliary, and the
Disabled American Veterans. The total also included a
$350,000 appropriation from the state of Hawaii, 36

To obtain those state funds the legislative sponsor,
Representative Faith Evans, and the AMMF had to overcome the
opposition of the PWMC. The commission adhered to its position
of looking to Congress, and only Congress, for financial help.
For that reason it objected (without success) to the state
appropriation, and refused even-to endorse the AMMF campaign. 37

Despite the obstacles the foundation raised nearly
$1,000,000 during its four years of operation. That money
was turned over to the Navy, a8 promised, for the construction

of the Arizona Memorial visitor center, 38

62


= %* Eee SS ee ee ry nna Se & x) = om

prevent such a war by being so strong that the
dictators in Moscow will be afraid to drop the
first bomb.

It is, therefore, appropriate that, through
this memorial, we focus our attention on our
most striking example of unpreparedness, so
that we may be perpetually reminded gf the
security that is found in strength.

Yet, it would not do to push that theme too far.
Admiral Nimitz, whose cooperation in the fundraising drive
was vital, had a strong distaste for dwelling on that day
the fleet was crushed by surprise attack. "I have always
regretted," he wrote, "that we memorialize Pearl Harbor Day-~-
which was a great defeat for us. "16

It was important to keep supporters, both in and out of
Congress, from becoming embroiled neediessly in conflicting
interpretations of the need for a memorial. Burns solved
that problem neatly when he drafted the bill. He avoided
any preamble or clauses justifying the need for a memorial.
The measure contained no unnecessary verbiage or references
to who or what would be memorialized, just cleanly written
text to authorize “a United States Ship Arizona Memorial at
Pearl Harbor."17

It was well that Burns had done his political spadework,
exercised careful draftsmanship, and avoided clashes about
appropriations and metaphysics. The American Battle Monuments
Commission was ready with objections to this incursion into

its domain. Senator Charles Potter of Michigan, an ABNC

member, spoke against the bill, opposing it on two counts.

19


"duplicate and usurp the authority and responsibility” of
the PWMC. Roark replied that he intended to pursue the project
regardless of the commission's objections. 54
Despite the uneasiness of the PWMC, Darrel Brady appointed
Roark to head the commission-sanctioned fundraising drive in
Arizona, an appointment which ran until January 1, 1959. The
two men then devised another arrangement whereby Roark headed
an FRA project in which that organization raised money for
the PWMC by selling plastic model kits of the USS Arizona.
As the PWMC representative, Brady sanctioned that project
until March 31, 1959.55
Roark promised to forward the proceeds to the PWMC account
as they were received and to render a "final accounting of
all funds received to date" before the end of cach month.
Neither the accounting nor the funds arrived on time. It was
not until the end of May that Roark turned over to the PWMC
$5,603.35 in proceeds from the Arizona state campaign. The
accounting,despite repeated promises from Roark, never arrived. 96
More ominously, Roark was no longer content to act as a
functionary of the PWMC and confine his activities to the
state of Arizona. As early as January 1959 (while still a
participant in the commission's Arizona state campaign) he
announced that the governor would appoint a new committee,
which would presumably include Roark, and that committee “wili

handle all matters pertaining to the USS Arizona both within

the state and on a national basis" (emphasis added), 97

36


t

,

a

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT STUDY

At this point the Navy faced a pressing need to make a
thorough study of the requirements for a shoreside center for
the Arizona Memorial and to develop a strategy for building
and operating that facility. To achieve that goal Rear
Admiral Richard Paddock, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District, appointed a committee of Navy officers and civilian

specialists to conduct the study in late 1973 and early 1974.22

av« .::The, committee. studied. various sites and. different-design

and operating factors. In considering the need for the visitor

center the committee concluded that, strictly from its

perspective as-an armed: service, the Navy did-not need the

Arizona Memorial visitor center. But the members noted that

the substandard facilities at the Arizona landing tarnished

the. Navy's public».image-and that pressure from Congress: and

the general public made the facility a practical necessity. 23
In turning to the question of which agency should run

the visitor center once it was built, the committee considered

a wide range of alternatives: the Navy, the National Park

Service, the Pacific War Memorial Commission, the American

Battle Monuments Commission, state and municipal government,

private enterprise, and a private nonprofit corporation, 24
The Committee rejected the option of Navy operation on

the grounds that’ the task was an unjustifiable departure from ‘~

the seryice's primarily military mission. The sentimental

attachment to the Arizona was so strong, though, that the

56


PACIFIC WAR MEMORIAL COMMISSION FUNDRAISING

With legal authorization secured, the PWMC turned its
attention to the task of raising funds’ to build the Arizona
Memorial, Although fortified with the authority of PL 85-344,
the commission still faced the disadvantages of being based
in a distant island territory. In addition, the unpaid
citizens who formed the commission were unable to undertake
the demanding responsibility of operating a national fundraising
drive on a day-to-day basis.

They sought at that point 2 professional who had the
expertise to conduct such a campaign. After a period of
deliberation, the commissioners selected Darrel Brady, a
Southern California fundraiser cum publicist. Brady had worked
with H. Tucker Gratz for the Boy Scouts of America before the
war, and the commission followed its chairman's recommendation
in selecting a professional coordinator for the national
campaign. 20

On June 16, 1958, Brady contracted with the PWMC to conduct
the national campaign in return for a 15 percent commission on
all monies raised for the PWMC's Arizona Memorial fund,. The
agreement was-to:run for 18 months (it was later extended to
July 31, 1960). Brady's firm, Darrel Brady Associates, was
to bear all operating expenses, 21

The relationship between Brady and the commission was
not a happy one. Brady too often proclaimed exaggerated

fundraising goais an@ too seidom delivered on promises that

major breakthroughs were right around the corner. Many times

22


NOTES

Memorial Day

1For description of the dedication ceremony, H, Tucker
Gratz interview with author, Honolulu, June 18, 1982. "Memorial
Formally Dedicated Today," SB, May 30, 1962, p. 1.

_ Part I: 1941-1954

lvassistant Navy Chief Commends Tony Todaro On War Nemorial
Plan," SB July 22, 1944, p. 7. "Chief War Memorials That Have
Been Proposed and Considered," N.D., PWMC.

2°PH Memorial Design Proposed Here For Erection in Capital,"
Ad@v., April 26, 1944, p. 2,

3"py Memorial Group Elects New Trustees," SB, August 2,
1944, p. 7. °

{the original appointees were: H. Tucker Gratz; Mrs. Walter
(Louise} Dillingham; George Miki; Frank Midkiff; Dwight Styne;
and Brig. Gen. Fred Makinney, territorial adjutant general.

Later appointees included Duke Kahanamoku and future U.S.
Senator Spark Matsunaga.

Sfor material on the Pacific War Memorial, Inc., see
“Background History" file, especially Midkiff to Gratz, Dec. 1,
1950, PWMC.

6"War Memorial Proposals Filed With Governor," Adv.,
Oct. 24, 1951, Sec. II, P. 11. Honolulu Planning Commission
minutes, Feb. 18, 1952, PWMC. Map “Pacific Memorial System"
n.d.,.PWMC. H. Tucker Gratz interview with author, Honolulu,
June 18, 1982.

TWork Begun To Preserve Hulk of USS Arizona," Ady.,
Oct. 10, 1950, pp. 1, 4. "2 Plaques Honor PH War Dead," Adv.,
Dec. 12, 1950, pp. 1, 8. "1960-G6i Minutes” file, PWC.

8"Lest We Forget . ..." Collier's, July 22, 1950, p. 74.

90,S. Congress, Congressional Record, Yol. 96, Part 10,
pp. 14034-35 (Aug. 31, 1950). “Highlights of the USS Arizona
Story" Pacific War Memorial System (PWMC newsletter), Vol. I,
No. 1, p. 3, PWMC. Amvets Administrator to Gratz, June 6,
1952, PWMC,

89


The Navy selected the architect but leaned heavily on
the PWMC for advice. That reliance was natural, for the
commission had been in regular contact with members of the
Hawaii chapter of the American Institute of Architects since
the early 1950s. Those architects donated their services in
conceptualizing design ideas for various PWMC projects over
the years. In fact, the first money released from the Arizona
Memorial fund was $26,000 to allow the Navy "to ascertain bids
for the architectural and engineering plans for the memorial ,"70

The selection process consisted of interviews of. the
prospective architects by a committee of Navy officers and
Louise Dillingham, chairperson of the PWMC's design committee.
The architect selected was Alfred Preis of the firm Johnson
& Perkins, Preis Associates, The partnership was awarded the
commission in August t9sg9. 71

Preis had actually conceived a design for a memorial at
the Arizona site as early as 1950. He had envisioned a rock
wall on the shore of Ford Island and a floating flame on the
hulk of the Arizona. 72

At the 1959 selection interyiew Preis first submitted
a design that, in his words, "confronted the physicality of
the sarcophagous."' Born and raised in Vienna, he had been
impressed at an early age with the jewel encrusted crypts of
the Hapsburg.emperors and.the immanent..presence of death .they
conyeyed. Preis first proposed a boat landing anchored on
the Arizona's mooring quays which would descend to a sub-surface

enclosure open tothe sky and fronted with a viewing wall

43


HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
BOK 1G Appendix F
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII! S6950 IN REPLY REFER TO:
002:241:EC:amn
Ser 482
7 BAR 1978

Mr. Robert L. Barrel

State Director .

National Park Service

Department of the Interior .
Box 50165

Honolulu, Hawaii 96850

Dear Mr. Barrel:

LETTER OF AGREEMENT
ARIZONA MEMORIAL COMPLEX

COMFOURTEEN letter 002:241:EC:nyt serial 19 of 10 February
1978 discussed the requirement for two agreements in
connection with the operation of the Arizona Memorial Complex
by the National Park Service.

The support agreement, to be negotiated when plans for the
shoreside facilities have been finalized sufficiently to
determine the extent of Navy support to be required, would
cover the respective operations and services to be performéd
by the Navy and your agency. The use agreement, a draft copy
of which was forwarded for your review, would provide the
National Park Service with the necessary real estate rights
for the operation of the memorial. These two agreements are
planned to be effective as of the date that title to and plant
accountability for the shoreside facilities are transferred
to the National Park Service.

It has been advised that the House Armed Services Committee,
jn authorizing the funds for the construction of the shore-
side facilities, imposed the condition that, prior to the
award of any construction contract, the National Park Service
and the Navy must execute an agreement which provides that

the National Park Service will assume the responsibility for
the operation of the memorial upon completion of construction.
A copy of the applicable page of the conference report is
enclosed for your information.

It is recommended that a letter of agreement be utilized to
satisfy the above-mentioned condition, as attempting to
finalize the aforementioned support and use agreements at

this time will only serve to delay the construction of the |
proposed shoreside facilities. If your agency has no objection
to this proposal,.it is requested that this letter of agreement

84


[| x) Le | ry Ce s | al

the study observed:
The concept of the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum
encompasses a much larger scope than that
required should a museum be included as part of
the Arizona Memorial facilities. Such a museum
should be limited to a presentation of an
historical record of events occurring at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, 33
The Navy delayed for several months before coming to
a final decision, a delay that caused uncertainty and tension
for all involved. The frustration even included the general
public. It was expressed in a Honolulu Star-Bulletin edito-
rial urging the Navy, the National Park Service, the AMMF and
the PHMM to transcend their "private rivalries and a certain
amount of skepticism between the parties" and propose a joint
plan for the visitor center, 34
The Fourteenth Naval District broke the tension at the
end of June 1974 when it publicly announced that it would
endorse the AMMF fundraising drive. But that did not mean
immediate action, for the proposed Navy-AMMF agreement was
making its leisurely way through the Pentagon review process.
Chief Burns reflected his organization's impatience and frus-
tration with Nayy channels when he pointed out, "The Navy
asked the FRA to begin this project," and complained of
Admiral Paddock's “wishie-washie [sic] attitudes towards
our proposals. "35
; Finally, in December 1974 Burns and Paddock formalized
the agreement by signing an eleven point memorandum of under-

standing. In that document the AMMF undertook to raise

$4,500,000 for the construction of the yisitor center under

61


002:241:EC:amn
Ser 482

be signed on behalf of the National Park Service to
acknowldge acceptance of the following condition:

"Upon completion of Fiscal Year 1978 Military
Construction Project P-153, (title) USS ARIZONA
MEMORIAL Shoreside Facilities, the National -
Park Service hereby agrees to assume responsibi-
lity for the operation and maintenance of the
Arizona Memorial Complex, comprised of the
Arizona Memorial and associated shoreside
facilities, in accordance with the provisions

of a support agreement and a use agreement to
be executed between the National Park Service
and the Department of the Navy."

Upon signing on behalf of the National Park Service, it is
requested that the original of this letter of agreement be |
returned. The duplicate original may be tetained for your -

records.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

- : Sincerely, ,

R. P. yasrept

CAPTAIN, CEC, USN

District Civil Engineer .-
By direction of the Commandant

Encl: ‘
{1} Conference Report No. 95-494
. (Title page and page 34)

ACCEPTED:

RECEIVED
\ MAR 8 1978

ft,

&
2 Stay. AC
XN tau state off

85


CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION

The law authorizing the construction of the Arizona
Memorial banned the use of federal funds for the project, but
the PWMC did not accept that prohibition as permanent. The
commission recognized that it was.an unavoidable compromise
necessary for the enactment of the law. The commissioners
felt, however, that once enacted, the law was subject to
amendment.

That view was expressed tess than a year after it passed
when H. Tucker Gratz wrote Delegate Burns asking for a $150,000
appropriation for construction of the memorial. Burns refused
to introduce the measure replying3

One of the prime objections to HR 5809 was that
after the bill . . . was passed by Congress,
there would be a request of the Congress for
the appropriation of funds. This is the usual
program. Consequently, the members of Congress
are inclined to view such a memorial with a
jaundiced eye.
Burns went on to say that he had given his word to the skeptics
that there would be no appropriation request and, "I don't
want to go back on my wore, "44

Burns’ position was understandable inasmuch as being the
author of HR 5809 his personal credibility was at stake. But
the following year Hawaii had different representation in
Congress and, as a newly admitted state, a full yoting dele-
gation in both houses. Senatcr Hiram Fong and Representative

Olin Teague sponsored companion bilis to authorize $200,000

for the memorial in the 1960 session.

30


pursued the theme to the point of monomania. Seven steps,
the number representing the day of the month of the attack,
would lead to a 200-foot shaft. The base of the shaft would
be forty-one feet in diameter and surrounded by twelve pillars.
The dimensions of the shaft's width and the number of pillars
alluded, of course, to the year and month of the attack. The
structure would be surmounted by a clock stopped at 7:55.
The proposal also called for red, white and blue fountains
and a statue of Joseph Lockhart, the radar operator whose
report of the approaching Japanese raiders was ignored. Knowles
planned to have the names of all of America's World War II dead
inscribed on plaques in the memorial .2

Todaro and Knowles put forth their ideas as individuals,
but there was at least one concerted group effort toward the
same end. The Pearl Harbor Memorial Trust was a coalition
of Hawaii veterans and patriotic groups. They organized to
reise money to build a memorial honoring ail who fought in
the Pacific War. The organization planned to raise funds
nationwide, but the memorial would be built in Hawaii.®

The authors of all three wartime plans paid tribute to
the psychic power of the image of Pearl Harbor by including
it in the names of their proposals. But when it came to
specifics, their scope broadened to include the names of far
more casualties than those suffered in the Pearl Harbor attack.
Perhaps it was just too painful for Americans then to contem-

piate such a crushing defeat in isolation; it needed to be

treated as a point of reference for the victories which followed.

6


shrine room listing the names of the Arizona's dead, who
embodied the pain and sacrifice the architect saw as an
essential element in the memorial’s design. 75

Much has been said and written of the symbolism of two
of the memorial's most striking design features: the roofline,
which dips in the center and rises to peaks at either end,
ang the twenty-one large open spaces in the structure's sides
and roof. They have been taken to represent, respectively,
the low point in American fortunes in World War II eventually
culminating in victory, and a continuous twenty-one gun salute
to the Arizona's dead,

Preis feels that those interpretations are consistent
with his purposes, but he incorporated those features in the
design for utilitarian, rather than symbolic, purposes. The
dip and peak gave the structure the proper distribution of
weight for the catenary design. The large openings were
included to save as much weight as possible.76

The Navy began site preparation work after the PWMC
released approximately $250,000 for the project in early
1960, In October the Walker-Moody Construction Company won
the contract to build the memorial, which eventually cost
slightly more than $500,000, 77

Behind the dedication ceremonies on Memorial Day 1962
lay the unsettled question of the Arizona Memorial's purpose.
Was it primarily to entomb the dead or was it to commemorate

the significance of the events of December 7, 19417

45


.

——

PART I: 1941-1954

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR

Pearl Harbor was burned into American consciousness by
the shock cf the nation's initial defeat and sudden entry
into World War II, Few Americans who heard the news that
December Sunday doubted that the nation had crossed an his-
toric watershed. That awareness, shock and thirst for revenge
were expressed in the ubiquitous wartime propaganda theme
"Remember Pearl Harbor," .Not surprisingly, then, suggestions
for a memorial to fix the event permanently in national
memory appeared even before the war was over.

In the fall of 1943 a civilian worker at Pearl Harbor,
Tony Todaro, proposed a “Shrine of Pearl Harbor." The shrine
would be a series of structures built step-like on the slopes

-.O£ Diamond Head or Punchbewl, extinct volcanic craters in: -

Honolulu. It would house archives relating to the Pearl

Harbor attack and other Pacific War battles, as well as head-

‘ni Quarters: for veterans groups: It was to have the names of

all the Pacific War dead (presumably limited to American)

inscribed on its walis.?

--: In 1944 another: Pearl Harbor: worker, Herbert-Knowles, '=-*
proposed that a memorial be built in Washington, D.C., to

honor these who died on December 7, 1941. Knowles’ design

- 9-7"



The PWMC responded swiftiy. H. Tucker Gratz dispatched
a diplomatically worded cable to Admiral Burke pointing out
that PL 85-344 designated the PWMC as the official fundraising
agency and, most importantly, asked the admiral to specify
that all contributions should be mailed to the commission's
Arizona Memorial fund account. In addition, Delegate John Burns
asked the Secretary of the Navy to require "a]3 groups volun-
teering their services on behalf of the Arizona Memorial to
have their programs and projects approved in advance and
sanctioned by the Pacific War Memorial Commission. "62

The commission continued to press its case directly with
Navy officials in Washington. In November 1959 Gratz wrote
Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick, Navy Chief of Information,
objecting to’ the FRA campaign not only on grounds of usurpation,
but also because it failed to "provide proper accountability
of funds.” He reiterated that all donations for the Arizona
Memorial should be sent tothe PWMC's fund. Kirkpatrick's
reply was cool, and it implicitly endorsed the FRA. He wrote
that, although federal law prohibited the Navy from actively
aiding any other drive, it was free to accept contributions
directly from the FRA, The latter opinion directly contradicted
the Navy's position of 1957, when it informed Congress that
special legislation would be required before it could receive
funds from the Pwmc.63

The question was eventually referred to the Navy Judge
Advocate General, who issued an ambiguous opinion stating

that “primary responsibility" for fundraising was vested by

39


The senior surviving officer aboard the Arizona during
the attack, Rear Admiral Samuel Fuqua, saw the issue as being
one of providing "a suitable resting place" for his late
shipmates, ?2

Fuqua's feelings struck a responsive chord in H. Tucker
Gratz and the Navy's Chief of Legislative Liaison, Rear Admiral
E. C. Stephan. They saw the memorial as "a fitting tribute
to the personnel of the USS Arizona Who gave their lives...
and whose remains have not been and cannot be recovered from
the hull."45

Admiral Burke thought of it as commemorating “all American
servicemen who lest their lives in the Pacific area during
World War II and it will remind the people of the Free World
that they must never allow an attack such as that which sank
the Arizona to reoceur, "14

Burke's .afterthought found amplification in Congress.

This was the period of President Eisenhower's "bigger bang
for the buck” defense policy with its reliance on strategic
nuclear weaponry. The year Burns introduced the Arizona
Memorial bill saw the climax of the race between the United
States and the Soviet Union to build the first Intercontinental
Ballistic Missle. The potential for a surprise attack that
would dwarf the results of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor
was frighteningly obvious. Senator Carl Haydn of Arizona
vented a full charge of Cold: War rhetoric in support of the
bill:

it is imperative that we be prepared either to

win a war against Gadless communism or to

18


PART II: 1955-1962
NAVY OVERTURES

The first harbinger of success--albeit a modest one--
arrived in 1955. On December 7th of’ that year the Navy Club
dedicated on Ford Island, near the Arizona, a ten-foot high
basalt stone with a plaque dedicated to the memory of American
servicemen killed in the December 7, 1941, attack. It was
the first permanent memorial at Pearl Harbor.1

Whether or not that example spurred the Navy to further
action, the command at Pearl Harbor did renew its efforts.
Two weeks before the dedication of the Navy Club monument the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (the command
responsible for Pearl Harbor and other Navy bases in Hawaii)
wrote the Secretary of the Navy pointing out the need for a
memorial over the remains of the Arizona:

Whether or not the Navy has done its best
to preserve the dignity of the Arizona's
remains, it is still blamed because this
burial place for 1,102 men is a rusted
mass of junk... .-
. + » an appropriate memorial should be
constructed to honor the many valiant men
who went down with her and who now lie
entombed within her hull.
The sentiment was endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, World

War ILI commander of the Pacific Fleet and honorary chairman

13



In their personal histories and experiences Gratz and
Burns personified many of the themes that dominate the story
of how the Arizona Memorial and its shoreside visitor center
came to be. Burns was a Honolulu police captain on December 7,
1941, and served throughout the war as liaison between naval
and military intelligence agencies and Honolulu's beleaguered

Japanese community, Architect of the postwar political revo-

lution which brought Hawaii's Americans of Japanese Ancestry

into full participation in the Islands' public life, Burns
represented the territory in Congress from 1954 to 1959, In
Congress he initiated federal legislation to permit the construc-
tion of the Arizona Memorial on Navy property. During his
three terms aS governor, from 1962 to 1974, he developed state
policies which promoted the growth of tourism bringing millions
of visitors to Hawaii-most of whom wanted to visit the site

of America's catastrophic entry into World War II. Burns’
career encompassed events directly related to the Pearl Harbor
attack, the construction of the Arizona Memorial, and the
crushing increase in numbers of visitors tothe memorial, an
increase which ultimately made necessary improved shoreside
facilities.

H. Tucker Gratz served as a Navy officer at Pearl Harbor
during World War II and remained in Hawaii to pursue a postwar
career in business and government. From 1949 to 1966 he
chaired the Pacific War Memorial Commission, a territorial
(later state) agency which raised most of the funds to build

the Arizona Memorial. Under Gratz’s leadership the commission


~?

Navy awarded the construction contract to S & M Sakamoto.
Ground was broken for the project on October 19, 1978. The
$2,000,000 authorization and the approximately $1,000,000
from the AMMF proved inadequate for the center's eventual
$4,900,000 price tag, but the Navy made up the difference
from savings on other projects and funds not encumbered

for specific purposes, #5 .

Even before awarding the architectural and construction
contracts the Navy realized that, although the visitor center
would be a Navy construction project, it would be operated
by the National Park Service. The Navy therefore deferred
to Robert Barrel and other NPS officials in functional planning
of the visitor center. The Navy's district civil engineer
wrote Barrel in May 1977:

In view of the National Park Service's role

as ultimately having . .-. responsibility 7
for the permanent shoreside facilities,

your input regarding National Park Service
facilities' criteria is requested as soon

as possible. 46

Responding to that invitation, Barrel gesigned the complex's
visitor flow pattern taking visitors first to a front desk
where they would be issued @ program ticket. With the announce-
ment: of: their* program number: visitors would then gto oné
of the two theaters for a twenty-minute film and a short talk
by a park ranger. Then visitors would exit the theater and
board a Navy shuttle boat ‘for a round trip'to the Arizona” °°
Memorial.

Barrel was aware that the system had a variable but

finite capacity, depending on the intervals between programs,

68


= % = = ae. os = a oF ¢ mana es eS x) = =

he assured the commissioners that he was on the brink of
enlisting decisive support from unspecified prominent figures
and organizations, support that never materialized. Even
more troublesome, he did not always exercise good judgment
in selecting local area coordinators for the campaign. 22

Brady's approach is suggested by his first proposal to
the PWMC. He envisioned a giant piggy bank which would be
trailered from place to place to solicit donations for the
Arizona Memoriai from people throughout the country. 23

If his methods seemed odd, even amateurish, Brady's goals
were wildly exaggerated. The PWMC originally estimated 2
$250,000 cost for the memorial.24 It realized that projects
had a tendency to run over estimated costs and, in any event,
fundraising ‘goals hed to allow for some shortfall in effort.
Consequently, the commission felt that $500,000 was a realistic
target. Brady, however, took the bit between his teeth and
announced a goal of $2,000,000. He proclaimed it not only
to the commission but caused embarrassment by spreading the
exaggeration among national publications, veterans' groups
and public officials.25

The commission remonstrated gently at first: "your
proposal for a $2,000,000 goal leaves us a little breathless;
. . . our goal is a more modest $500,000, "26 When Brady
persisted, the tone became icier: ‘Such a figure has no
foundation in fact. Such statements can not only be misleading
and confusing, . . . they can be most damaging both to the

commission and the campaign, "27

23


aay Goliad! yielliiiedels Saline

where there would be an observation tower, archives and a
museum. A territorial legislator speaking on the commission's
behalf affirmed, “the Arizona is very much a factor in any
memorial system that is desired, "6

The PWMC did not, of course, operate in a vacuum. It
is impossible to say who first thought of the idea of a
memorial at the Arizona, but the Navy commands at Pearl Harbor
at the same time were well aware of the Arizona's presence
and bothered by the lack of tangible acknowledgment of its
significance.

In the early 1950s,.as the PWMC was formulating its
proposals, others were making their own plans for the Arizona.
On March 7, 1950, Admiral Arthur Radford, commander-in-chief
of the Pacific Fleet, caused a flagpole to be installed on
the protruding base of the hulk's rear mast, At the same time
he ordered that the American flag be raised and lowered daily.
Later that year a wooden platform was built over the amidships
area. On the ninth anniversary of the attack a commemorative
metal plaque was installed at the base of the flagpole and
another welded to the deck of the wreck of the target ship
USS Utah. Radford envisioned these steps as stopgap prelimi-
maries to a permanent solution tothe problem of ignominious
deterioration and ordered a study on “rehabilitating” the

Arizona.?



For the accountants, too, the show was a smashing success.
When the proceeds were finally tallied, the memorial fund was
$64,696.73 richer. 39

Even with the help of Elvis Presley and national television
exposure, the PWMC realized that it would have to seek public,
as well as private, funds. Since the explicit language of
PL 85~344 eliminated (for the time being) the possibility of
federal money, the commissioners turned tothe Hawaii territorial
(after August 1959, state) legislature.

In 1959 they found an ally in state Representative David
McClung, 2 World War II Navy veteran and an ardent champion
of the memorial fund drive. McClung enlisted the support of
other legislators with his arguments that the Arizona's dead
deserved a more fitting and permanent memorial.49 But the
commissioners felt the need to present the legislature with
a dollars-and-cents reason to appropriate state funds for the
memorial,

They articulated a well-calculated appeal based on the
Arizona Memorial's potential for Hawaii's then modest tourist
industry. The commissioners knew that argument would have
to be based on the rationale that the appropriation would be
seed money for a developing economic base which could (and
later did} become Hawaii's largest employer, 41

The commission canvassed key tourism executives on the
memorial's potential drawing power, and all predicted that
it would become an important focus of visitor interest.

Prominent PWMC commissioners lobbied key legislators for an

28


38Gary Beito interview with author, Honolulu, June 30, 1982,
394iddendorf toRogers, Mar, 12, 1975, PAAR.

20Lyons to Middendorf, April 11, 1975; Frizzell to
Middendorf, Aug. 19, 1975, PAAR.

41" Interagency Bickering Blocks Visitor Center," SB,
Dec. 5, 1975, p. A2. Matsunaga to Custer, July 1, 1976, PWMC.

425 ile memo, n.d. [1977] re meeting between Matsunaga and
PWMC staff, PWMC. Nystedt to Peters, April 4, 1977, AMMF,

4rile memo, n.d. [1977} re meeting between Matsunaga and
PWMC staff. PWMC. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives,
95th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No, 95-494 "Military
Construction Authorization Act Conference Report," (July 12,
1977), p. 34.

4suretter of Agreement, Arizona Memorial Complex,"
Mar. 7, 1978/April 21, 1978, PAAR.

45pi11 Leo interview with author, Pearl Harbor, Aug. 16, 1982.
48nystedt to Barrel, May 10, 1977, PAAR.

47Robert* Barrel interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 6,
1982.

48parrel to Wentworth, June 21, 1979; Wentworth to Barrel,
July 9, 1979, AMMF.

49I 56 Agreement Arizona Memorial Complex, Naval Station
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii’ (No. N6274280RP00029), Mar. 21, 1980;
“Support Agreement," Sept. 10, 1982, PAAR,

5Oxps figures.

97



= % mee we ms a ry m= es es oe 6 Ce i) = =

10Solomenson to Cross, Oct. 2, 1952, PWNC.
1lMinutes, Dec. 12, 1952, PWMC.

12-pyans For Memorial On Hulk Of Arizona Face Big Obstacles"
SB, Aug. 8, 1950, p. 5.

13"Lest We Forget . . ." op. cit.
34short to Gratz, Nov. 26, 1952, PWMC.

lSyinutes, Nov. 4, 1954, PWC.

Part II: 1955-1962
Lunavy Club Plans Memorial To Dead of Dec, 7th Attack"
SB, Oct. 12, 1955, p. 7. The Quarterdeck (Navy Club newsletter),
Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan. 1956), PWhC.
2COMFOURTEEN to Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 23, 1955, PWMC,

3Burke endorsement cited in Gratz to North, Aug. 27, 1957,
PwMc. Nimitz endorsement in Minutes, July 12, 1956, PWMC.

4ninutes, Mar. 29, 1956, PWNC,

Suyavy Chief Urges Shrine Over Arizona" Adv,, May 12,
1956, p. A-6. “Navy Club, Memorial Group To Sponsor Arizona
Shrine," Adv., May 14, 1956, p. 7.

SpwMc minutes of Dec. 7, 1959, refer to an Aug. 3, 1956,
meeting at which the commandant made the proposal,

TMinutes, July 11, 1957, PWNC,

8ror the legal impediments see U.S. Congress, 85th Congress,
ist Session, House of Representatives Report No. 1125.

9Burns to Gratz, June 16, 1957, PWHC.

10u_s. Congress. Congressional Record, Vol. 103, Part 12,
p. 15634 (Aug. 22, 1957).

Jipate to Roark, Oct. 31, 1958, PWC.

12rugua to Roark, Nov. 21, 1958, PWMC.

13Both men used identical wording in separate documents.
Gratz, undated (1957) statement, PWMC, Stephan quoted in

U.S. Congress, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Report No, 1229
(Jan. 28, 1958),

90


NATIONAL INTEREST

Qn the mainland, too, there was interest in the Arizona.
Collier's magazine printed an editorial calling for a memorial
over the ship as "a fitting tribute to the men of the Arizona,
and to the others who died at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field."®

Congressman Thomas Lane of Massachussetts submitted bills
in 1950 and 1951 to authorize a "shrine" at the Arizona so “we
shall be awakened to the need of protecting [freedom] from the

lurking enemies who would corrupt, undermine, and: destroy man's

-last best hope on earth."9 The Navy Club of the United States

suggested a bronze marker on the Arizona's hull "commemorating
Pearl Harbor Day, "10

With such widespread interest <.. the PWMC began to think
of the fundraising required to build its memoriai system.
Greatly overoptimistic, the-commissioners seriously under-
estimated the difficulty of raising money from private donors.
There were sanguine estimates that $10,000,000 might be raised
by such means as the sale -of vanda orchids on the mainiand. 11

Then reality closed in. The early flurry of interest
failed to generate enough momentum to overgpme the inertia.
For one thing, there was no meeting of the minds on why there
should be a memorial. Radford and other officers at Pearl
Harbor saW an Arizona memorial as a Navy obligation to what
had been one of the fleet's proudest ships and the sailors
who went down with her. Collier's editors viewed the issue

as basically one of marking the graves of alt American service—

10


= r eames ewe oe le ry m= ma & ss "> = os

2lourry to Matsunaga, May 1, 1974, PAAR, Willett to
Stennis, July 12, 1973, AMSFS, Appendix B-2, AMSFS, III-44,
Curry to Assoc. Director, NPS, Aug. 14, 1974, PAAR.

22committee members were: Capt. G, P. Peed, Capt. F. W.
Benson, Capt, C. Nelson, Lt, Cdr, E, N, Keltiikoa,
Lt. Cdr. R. M. Cugowski, Mr. R. H. Rothrock, Mr, S. Oberg,
Mr. S. Pinn, Mr. M. H. Yamamoto, and Mr, J. Busekrus, AMSFS,
VII-3.

23aMSFS, III-21-28, IV-1-3.
24ausFs, III-30-40,

25vorgah to Matsunaga, Mar. 1, 1972, AMSFS, Appendix E-3,
Blanchard to COMFOURTEEN, Mar. 27, 1974. filed in AMSFS,
AMSFS, ITI-30-40.

26aMSFS, III-30-40.
27inia,

28COMFOURTEEN to Director, Naval Historical Center,
Mar. 24, 1978, filed in AMSFS.

22purns to Nolan, undated (Jan. or Feb. 1974); AMMF
"Petition for Charter of Incorporation,'’ Jan. 14, 1974, AMMF,

9 ausFs, ITi-9. "Navy Ponders Proposals for Pearl Harbor

Museum,'' SB, Feb. 28, 1974, p, €10.
31PpHMM prospectus, PWMC,
32sessler to Rogers, Mar, 15, 1974, PAAR,
33amMSFS, III-11, V~2, Appendix B-14.
34Get It Together," SB, May 17, 1974, p. A18.

35"private Memorial Fund Drive Backed By Navy," SB, June 26,
1974, p. C7. Minutes, Sept, 17, 1974, AMMF.

36"'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
the Navy and Branch 46 Fleet Reserve Association, Arizona
Memorial Museum Foundation," Dec. 19, 1974, AMMF. U.S. Navy,
COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor, "Pearl Harbor's $5 million Visitors
Center," in "Press Kit, 40th Anniversary of the Pearl Harbor
Attack," Dec. 7, 1981. Gary Beito, interview with author,
Honolulu, June 30, 1982, Hawaii State Legislature, Senate
Bill 2202-78, S.D.1, H.D.1, C.D.1 (1978 State budget), p. 79a.

37pwMc to Ariyoshi, undated [1978]; Custer file memo,

Feb. 2, 1977, PWMC. Faith Evans interview with author, Honolulu,
Aug. 24, 1982,

96


authority to divest itself of the responsibility, nor did
the Interior Department have the authority to assume that
obligation, Still, it was a start. Most importantly, it
showed Congress that there was enough goodwill and agreement
in principle between the two agencies to effect a successful
transfer if only the right formula could be found,

That general agreement did not mean, however, that either
agency was prepared to drop its opposition to the type of
legislative proposal which had surfaced in Congress session
after session, The Navy continued to oppose legislation
following the formula "Navy construction, NPS operation";
the Park Service still maintained that it had too many autho-
rized projects awaiting funding to assume immediate responsibility
for the Arizéna Memorial system. A case in point was Congress-
man Matsunaga's HR 1882, submitted January 1975. [In June 1976
he wrote pessimistically to the PWMC that the bill was stalled,
because neither the Navy nor the NPS would support it.41

Matsunaga was so discouraged that he did aot even propose
a fresh bill in 1977, his first year as a Senator, He wrote
there was little point in repeating the exercise, since the
Interior Department "has been dragging its feet in getting
out a report on this." Hawaii's senior Senator, Daniel Inouye,
submitted in April S 139, a bill to have the NPS accept respon-
sibility for both construction and operation of the visitor
center. But. that measure, like others before it, failed to

elicit support, 42

64


On October 10, 1980, in a ceremony reminiscent of the
1962 dedication of the memorial, the Navy turned over to the
National Park Service the visitor center and operation of the
Arizona Memorial. That act closed a major chapter in the
history of the Arizona Memorial. It also heralded the advent
of a new era in which the Park Service would provide profes-
sional management for cone of Hawaii's most important visitor

attractions.

70



its first actions was to establish an Arizona Memorial fund

trust account at the Bishop Trust Company; it then secured
the agreement of the Post Office to route mail addressed to

"USS Arizona, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii" to Bishop Trust. ?

15



= : ) am eS = =— - C =a eee le a) = =

First he said, "This proposal relates to what is
essentially a Navy ship. We are considering what really is
a one-service affair." The ABMC knew from experience how
easily inter- or intraservice jealousies could mar a memorial
project if one ship, unit or service felt that the sacrifices
of its members or crew had been slighted in inscriptions,
statuary or a host of other symbolic representations. That
jealousy could linger like a pall over public attitudes toward
a memorial long after the structure had been completed.

Second, Potter cautioned, too many monuments had been
erected by indivudual units or services. Those who built them
rarely thought of the need for routine maintenance and upkeep.
Most had deteriorated disgracefully. The ABMC was created,
he pointed out, to deal with precisely that problem. It had
the experience and institutional resources to guarantee perma-
nent upkeep. Therefore, he concluded, functions such as the
building of the Arizona Memorial were rightly, and for good
reason, the province of his commission.

Potter's qualms about the problems of upkeep were given
little weight by his colleagues. Senator Leverett Saltonstall
of Massachussetts responded offhandedly, "The Navy estimates
that the cost of maintaining such a memorial will be no more
than the cost it now incurs in maintaining the battleship
Arizona in its present condition."

The work of Burns and his allies had been thorough,
Potter was the only member of either house to speak on the

floor against the bill. Seeing that he had little chance of

20


August 1968 the Fourteenth District Commandant submitted to
Washington plans and cost estimates for a $1,400,000 museun-
theater complex at the shuttle boat landing. But he informed
Congressman Matsunaga that, because of the demand of the
Vietnam War on Navy resources, funds should be sought from
private contributors and the state of Hawaii. In fact, the
commandant asked the PWNMC to once again assume the lead in
fundraising for the proposed visitor center.7

The Commission, however, looked to Hawaii's Congressional
delegation for help, In January 1969 Matsunaga introduced
HR 4044, the first of many such bills, to authorize an appro-
priation for the Navy to construct a shoreside visitor center
for the Arizona Memorial. Despite Navy intentions to retain
control of the complex, Congress clearly was thinking in terms
of a National Park Service operation. House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Mendel Rivers referred the bill to the
Department of the Interior (the parent organization of the
NPS}, as well as the Pentagon, for review and comment. Matsunaga
wrote that he envisioned a facility “similar in scope and
purpose as [sic] the edifice at Gettysburg [National Military
Park] ."8

The National Park Service, however, remained silent on
the issue and did not respond to Rivers’ request for its views.
The Navy continued to look to the PWMC to raise the money.
The Chief of Naval Operations wrote, "Funds for the construction
of this facility wili not be available through Navy programs.

Continued ‘cooperation with the Pacific War Memorial Commission

49


a y ) Cr ee eee ry om = a oe x) —_— =

68macCauley, T. H., “A Watery Grave on the Loose?" n.d.;
Kosco to PWMC, April 24, 1958; Fourteenth Naval District
Public Works Office suggestion form, Noy. 10, 1958, PWMC.

6% inutes, Aug. 20, 1959, PWNC, Alfred Preis interview
with author, Honolulu, Aug. 18, 1982,

7Opwuc to Quinn, Nov. 3, 1959, PWMC. Alfred Preis interview
with author, Honolulu, Aug. 18, 1982,

Tlalfred Preis interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 18,
1982. Minutes, Aug. 20, 1959, PWMC; "Highlights--U.S.S, Arizona
Memorial," n.d. [1966], PWMC.

72,ifred Preis interview with author, Honolulu, Aug. 18,
1982.

73 ibid.
?4ipid.
73ipia.
76.

ibid.

?7uHighlights--U.S.S. Arizona Memorial," n.d. [1966];
Minutes, June 27, 1960, PWNC.

78custer to Wright, Jan. 28, 1960; Custer to Topp, April 4,

1961; PWMC to Hawaii State Dept. of Budget and Review, Aug. 29,
1961; Campbell to Sallet, Nov. 3, 1961, PWNC.

Part III: 1963-1982

lsee chart, Appendix I.

personal communication from C. E. Burns to the author,
Sept. 6, 1982. Burns was the line supervisor of the shuttle
boat operation for several years.

3Bush to Inouye, Sept. 14, 1967; Mack to Bush, Sept. 12,
1967; Inouye to Burns, Sept. 18, 1967; Burns to Sharp,
Sept. 25, 1967, PWMC.

4aMSFS, IlI-5. Notes of Jan. 4, 1968 meeting between
Lynch and PWMC; Albright to Hawaii Congressional delegation,
undated [1968]; Matsunaga Discussion Draft, n.d. (19681, PWMC,

SMinutes, July 28, 1968, PWMC,

SManning to Gratz, July 22, 1968; CINCPACLT to CNO,
July ?(date illegible), 1968, PWMC.

94


He wrote;
The Committee report on the original authorization
indicated that there would be no cost to the
government for the construction cf the memorial,
Because of this history, I anticipate that ghere
will be some reluctance to approve (HR 44).

Russell was eventually wor over by a strong lobbying
campaign which required Joe Custer, the PWMC executive secre-
tary, to travel to Washington. Also instrumental were the
national staff of the American Veterans of World War II (AMVETS)
and Bobby Baker, whose entreaties moved Vice President
Lyndon Johnson to persuade Russell to allow the bill unhindered
passage through his key committee ;48

The appropriation authorization provided for the first
time an “official" definition of the memorial's purpose.
According to PL 87-201 it was to "be maintained in honor
and commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the
United States who gave their lives to their country during
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.49

That sense of purpose, however, was not shared by eyeryone,
As in the past, a wide variety of justifications were put
forth for the memorial,

In 1960 Senator Fong had opined’

The USS Arizona Memorial will have a dual

Significance to the United States, for it will

not only provide appropriate tribute to the

deceased men of the Arizona but it will also

stand as a national memorial to eternal vyigi-

lance against the dangers of surprise attack,
Representative Inouye echoed that theme in 1961 when he promised,

"the Arizona Memorial will serve also as our reminder and our

inspiration never again to be caught unprepared, "50

32


AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

After deciding to continue the PWMC and the Navy
encountered problems no one had considered. First, the Navy
had no legal authority to accept money from the PWMC for the
memorial. Second, even if it could accept the money, the
Navy had no authority to erect a memorial over the Arizona,

It would require an act of Congress to win an exemption
from the principle that federal agencies could be funded only
from the federal treasury. An even stickier point was the
jealously guarded perogative of the American Battle Monuments
Commission (ABMC),

The ABMC was a federal agency charged with erecting war
memorials such as the one proposed for the Arizona, It was
no lightweight organization, but included General of the Army
George Marshall and members of both houses of Congress, To
make the legislative obstacle course even more difficult, the
PWMC would have to rely mainly on the territory's single
nonvoting Delegate to Congress, John Burns, 8

Burns turned to the task with a will and a large fund
of political common sense, In January 1957 he introduced
HR 5809, which would provide the necessary authority for the
Navy to build the memorial, to accept funds from the PWMC,
and to give the commission incidental assistance during the
fundraising drive. He was careful to draft the bill so that
it could not possibly be construed to authorize the expenditure

of federal funds for the memorial, He continually emphasized

that selling point in public and private discussion,

16


behind the . . . effort," announced a goal of $6,000,600

for the AMMF campaign. But his announcement was premature,
for the Navy refused to commit itself formally to the AMMF
effort and told the news media that it was weighing the
relative merits of the AMMF proposal (which had been solicited
by a Navy spokesman) and that of another private nonprofit
organization. 30 .

The competing proposal was put forth by Warren Sessler,
director of the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum (PHMM). Sessler's
group proposed to build a museum in the Pearl Harbor area
which would adhere to a general interpretive theme of World
War IY in the Pacific. The PHMM asked the Navy for the use
of property adjacent to the Arizona Memorial landing on which
to erect its museum building, 31

Sessler opposed the involvement of both the federal
government and the AMMF in the establishment and operation
of a museum at the visitor center. He wrote Interior
Secretary Rogers Morton that the AMMF "proposes to duplicate
our efforts in establishing a museum at Pearl Harbor." He

objected further;

- +. . ours is a private organization, and it

voor “would be’ a needless waste of public funds for

the federal government to spend money in the
operation of a museum at Pearl Harbor when this
task can be performed by the Pearl Harbor
Memorial Museum . .,. 3
‘The Navy study committee examined the PHNM proposais and”
recommended against accepting them. The committee felt that
the PHMM had not done sufficient legal groundwork and its

prospects of raising the necessary funds were dim, In addition,

60


“gr srw rw ewegersss "=

provided the necessary cohesion, continuity and focus for the
national effort to bring to fruition the idea of a permanent
memorial over the remains of the Arizona and her crew.

Important as they were, Burns, Gratz and the PWMC were
but part of the history of the memorial and visitor center,
This study is an attempt to explain how and why those faci-
lities came to be, [It will treat the motives and methods of
those who worked toward that end. That story includes the
public and private institutions within which those individuals
acted. Except where necessary for a clearer understanding
of those subjects, the physical construction and operations
of the memorial and visitor center are outside the scope of
this study.

This account will trace the growth and development of
the idea for a memorial at Pearl Harbor from its inception
in the midst of World War Ii to its realization in 1962. It
will follow the story through the 1960s and 1970s as the need
for a complementary shoreside visitor center became ever more
pressing.

The narrative is divided chronologically into three parts.
The first period, 1941-1954, saw the germination of the concept,
early unsuccessful attempts to realize it, and the increasing
focus of attention on the hulk of the USS Arizona as the most
suitable site for a memorial at Pearl Harbor.

The second period, 1955-1962, was one of concentrated
effort to build the USS Arizona Memorial, During those years

the Navy, the PWMC, Congress, and the territory and state of


35custer to PWMC, Jan. 8, 1960; Minutes, Dec. 18, 1959,
PWHC.

36chaplin to "My Dear Fellow Editor," Nov. 25, 1960, PWC,

37chaplin to Gratz, Dec. 7, 1960; Chaplin to Townes, Jan. 18,
1961, PWMC. George Chaplin interview with author, Honolulu,
Sept. 13, 1982.

38yayer, Phil. “Elvis Sings Up A Storm To Aid Arizona
Memorial," SB, Mar, 26, 1961, p. 1,

39Gratz note to file, Mar. 29, 1961; Bishop Trust Co.
statement, April-30, 1961, PWMC. “

40pavid McClung interview with author, Honolulu, Sept. 13,
1982. :

4leratz to Burns, Mar. 6, 1959, PWMC.

42pyMc to McClung, Mar, 16, 1959; Mirikitani to Gratz,
April 28, 1961; Gratz and Dillingham to members of State
House and Senate Capital Improvement Committees, May 24, 1961;
Miyake to Gratz, April 26, 1961, PWMC.

43the 1959 sum was from McClung's "pork barrel,” a custom
which allowed each legislator discretion to include projects
for his or her district in the state budget, Additionally,
the 1959 legislature authorized a $77,000 bond issue for the
Arizona Yemorial, but technicalities in Hawaii's statehood.
legislation invalidated the authorization, David McClung
interview with author, Honolulu, Sept. 13, 1982,

44Gratz to Burns, Mar. 6, 1959; Burns to Gratz May 3,
1959, PWMC.

48.ong to Gratz, July 9, 1960; Office of the Secretary
of the Navy, Legislative Affairs, to Vinson, N.D. (1960), PWMC,

‘poker to Gratz, Sept. 21, 1960, PWNC.

47custer to Gratz, July 15, 1961; Russell to Gratz, July 24,
1961, PWMCc.

48yoward to Custer, Sept. 11, 1961; Custer to Gratz, July 19,
1961, PWNC.

49United States. Public Law 87-201,

50united States Congress. Congressional Record, Vol. 106,
Part 11, p. 15064 (June 30, 1960), Eighty seventh Congress,
ist Session. ' Congressional Record. Vol. 107, Part. 11, p. 14065
(July 31, 1961).

92


As it turned out the gubernatorial committee never
conducted any serious effort. But Mr. Roark was not to be
sidetracked so easily. In the spring of 1959 the model kit
sales campaign, which was to operate in Arizona under PWHC
auspices until March 31st, took on a life of its own. That
life was provided by the sponsorship of the FRA's national
organization, which continued the model kit program under
Roark's chairmanship. This effort, with a goal of $100,000,
was to be completely independent of the PWMC's Arizona Memorial
fund. 58

It would be an understatement to say that the PWMC was
upset, The spectre of confusion, damaged credibility and
resulting damage to the campaign haunted the commission.
Darrel Brady’, who would be deprived of his commission on
every dollar that went into another memorial fund, vented
his anger in a cable to the PWMC:

“You have an insubordinate, opportunistic,
sometimes stupid sailor on your hands, The
authorities who have licensed, bonded and
insured this national [Brady's] project
demand he oeive a complete accounting to you
and me.

The PWNC directed its expressions of alarm to the Navy,
reiterating its position that Roark's efforts would "usurp
the authority and responsibility” of the commission and
stressing that ail] Arizona Memorial contributions should be
addressed to its fund in Hawaii, ®9

The PWMC was well advised to be concerned about the Navy's

attitude, Like the sorcerer's apprentice, Brady and the

37


Congress with the PWMC. It stated further, "any assistance
provided by the Navy to other organizations in that matter
[should] be provided only upon the request or with the approval
of that Commission."" The opinion was silent on whether. official
endorsements of the Roark/FRA effort constituted "assistance. "64
The issue was rendered largely moot in December 1959,
when the FRA presented the Navy a check for $40,000, the
proceeds of its Arizona model kit campaign, 65
But even after that conclusion of the FRA drive, James
Roark continued his efforts on behalf of his Arizona Memorial
Foundation, still invoking his now-defunct connection with
the PWMC. On behalf of himself and the commission, Darrel Brady
wrote Roark threatening;
If‘you do not cease using my name and, or, The
Pacific War Memorial Commission in any connection
with your present activities, letterheads, etc.,
Or, if you attempt in any way to deceive people
into believing you hold any position or are in
any way authorized by the Pacific War Memorial
Commission, legal action which you so keenly
deserve will be taken:
Roark persisted nonetheless, but the conclusion of the
FRA campaign denied him the all important backing of that
organization and the Navy. Still his activities caused
concern by the PWMC and confusion in other quarters. He was
particularly active in Oklahoma, where he was either vague
or misleading about his connection with the PWMC, Roark also
played fast and loose with data concerning the numbers of

Oklahomans among the Arizona casualties, a matter which caused

confusion among Oklahoma's Congressional delegation at the

40