Leavenworth Papers Number 23

Third War

Irregular Warfare on the

Western Border 1862–1865

by James B. Martin, Ph.D.

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center
The cover illustration, “Main Street While Morgan Was Expected,” is by an unknown artist ca. 1864. Courtesy 

Kentucky Historical Society, Frankfort, KY, May 2012
Third War

Irregular Warfare on the

Western Border

1861-1865

James B. Martin, Ph.D.

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Martin, James B., Ph.D.

Third War: Irregular Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865 /

 by James B. Martin, Ph.D.

 p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 97809855879-0-1 (alk. paper)

1. United States--History--Civil War, 1861-1865--Underground movements. 2. Guerrilla 

warfare--United States--History--19th century. 3. Guerrilla warfare--Confederate States of 

America. 4. United States. Army--History--Civil War, 1861-1865. 5. Confederate States of 

America. Army--History. 6. United States--History--Civil War, 1861-1865--Campaigns. 7. 

Counterinsurgency--United States--History--19th century. 8. Raids (Military science)--History--19th century. 9. Ambushes and surprises--History--19th century. I. Title.

E470.45.M136 2012

973.7’3--dc23

2012023660

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A 

full list of CSI Press publications, all of them available for downloading, can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document 

as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any republication without the express written permission 

of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

In 1979, the Combat Studies Institute published the first of the Leavenworth Papers. 

The series afforded the CGSC Faculty the opportunity to present their scholarship to the 

professional military community seeking to learn about contemporary and doctrinal issues 

from historical events. After an eight year hiatus I am excited to bring back the Leavenworth 

Papers series to once again contribute to our Army’s education and leader development.

That first publication of the Leavenworth Papers examined the evolution of US 

Army tactical doctrine since World War II. The research offered historical insights to 

senior leaders and doctrine writers charged with refocusing the Army toward a possible 

conventional conflict with Warsaw Pact military forces. In the 25 years that followed, 

the Leavenworth Papers series grew to include 22 studies that addressed historical 

cases that were likewise of tactical, doctrinal, and organizational interest to the Army. 

The subjects of these studies varied but the authors were intent on making history relevant to military professionals engaged in thinking about current and future challenges.

This latest publication of the Leavenworth Papers marks the continuation of this 

storied series. Third War offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare 

during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin’s focus on insurgent operations in the western 

border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who 

may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future.

CSI – The Past is Prologue!

Roderick M. Cox

Colonel, Field Artillery

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Contents

Page

Preface..................................................................................................................................... vii

Introduction................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1. Kentucky................................................................................................................ 17

Chapter 2. Kansas-Missouri.................................................................................................... 47

Chapter 3. Indian Territory-Arkansas...................................................................................... 67

Chapter 4. Texas.......................................................................................................................85

Chapter 5. The Impact of Irregular Warfare............................................................................101

Chapter 6. Epilogue.................................................................................................................121

Glossary..................................................................................................................................131

Bibliography...........................................................................................................................135

Appendix A. General Orders No. 100....................................................................................A-1

Appendix B. General Orders No. 11......................................................................................B-1

Appendix C. General Orders No. 59......................................................................................C-1
vi

Maps

Map 1. Regional Area of Operations..........................................................................................2

Map 2. Kentucky Area of Operations.......................................................................................18

Map 3. Kansas Area of Operations...........................................................................................48

Map 4. Missouri Area of Operations.........................................................................................51

Map 5. Oklahoma Area of Operations......................................................................................68

Map 6. Arkansas Area of Operations........................................................................................78

Map 7. Texas Area of Operations..............................................................................................86
vii

Preface

Like many students of history in the United States, I have always been enthralled by the 

American Civil War. This short period in American History has captured the imagination of 

Americans and spurred them to consume the many volumes written about this brother-againstbrother conflict. Most of these volumes have dealt with the important battles of the war, which 

pitted massive armies from the North and South against each other in a struggle to determine 

whether the country would separate or stay together. These battles, highlighted by Gettysburg, 

Antietam, Vicksburg, Fredericksburg, and others too numerous to mention, were the predecessors of similar grand conflicts that would rack Europe and the world in the decades to follow. 

Arguably, for the first time in history, an entire nation mobilized to conduct a war that would 

eventually spill over and affect most of the population. From the gentlemanly preparation for 

the First Battle of Bull Run to the consuming power of Sherman’s march to the sea, the American Civil War involved far more of the American population than war in Europe historically 

had involved.

Least understood of the effects on this population, and least studied, is the personal war 

conducted in the Border States, where the North met the South. The number of titles written 

on this irregular warfare is dwarfed in the literature of the Civil War, with most of the early 

volumes being markedly partisan. Most of these focused on the violence at the Kansas and 

Missouri border which, while the most deadly, was by no means the only irregular violence 

along a border. Every state on the western border, from the gulf coast of Texas to the hills of 

Appalachia in Kentucky, was consumed by a violence that filled every street and town. This 

violence was not the type found on the battlefield at Gettysburg, where hoards of men in blue 

or gray shot at each other from considerable distance, finally moving to close quarters combat. 

This was a war that flowed into every barnyard or town square, pitting men with strong beliefs 

supporting one side against individuals they believed to be their enemy. One historian pointed 

out that “guerrilla war normally arises in impassioned circumstances” and the irregular war in 

the American Civil War was no exception.*

The hatreds and feuds that stayed below the surface in a civilized society were freed by the 

all-consuming violence of this war, allowing men to act in ways that would have been unacceptable at any other time. While the Union officials, notably Henry Halleck, tried to establish 

rules of war to control this personal violence, they were markedly unsuccessful. Union authorities attempted to use these rules to combat the southern irregulars, but often chose to abide by 

them only selectively themselves. Murder, arson, and robbery became common occurrences 

along the border and the only excuse necessary for such actions was a suspicion that the victim 

supported the wrong side. Men who had lived as neighbors for many years, some even related 

to one another, now took up a cause that made them violent enemies.

The border war would eventually degrade to such a level that death was not enough punishment for supporting the wrong side. Both sides would turn to dismemberment and mutilation 

as expressions of the total loss of control in border society. Actions previously reserved to savages and uncivilized people would now become common as a part of the border violence. This 

breakdown in society may be a major reason this part of the war has been given inadequate 

attention over the years. Many historians of the American Civil War have avoided this dirty, 

ugly war; preferring to continue the glorification of its heroes and grand battles. They, like the 

Union officers in this study, can’t bring themselves to lend legitimacy to the irregular warriors 

of the border. Through the Second World War, combat was for the most part still a relatively 

conventional event, with the rules being followed by the belligerents under a common agree-
viii

ment. Since that time, more and more conflicts throughout the world have been fought unconventionally, with the rules of war either watered down or totally ignored. The more common 

occurrence of this type of conflict has given it more credibility as a viable form of warfare and, 

as a consequence, sparked a growth in the study of irregular warfare through history. While the 

reality is that larger military nations continue to question the validity of this type of warfare, it 

has become commonplace in the modern world and has to be understood.

This study is a product of that movement to further understand irregular warfare and examine its importance in history. The personal, no-quarter violence that existed on the border 

was by no means the determining event in the American Civil War, but it had effects on a 

large portion of the population and left wounds that would fester for many years. My hope is 

to clarify this portion of the greater conflict, portraying the social and psychological impacts 

on the population of the border, as well as the military effects generated by the irregular war. 

In addition, I attempt to show the parallels that exist between actions and reactions during this 

conflict and similar instances in the more modern irregular war fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

This is not meant to be a history of these more modern conflicts, but to point out the similarities that exist in the actions of regular and irregular warriors in these two periods. A discussion 

of lessons learned from this nineteenth century conflict concludes this study, which may offer 

instruction for modern military leaders.

This work has spanned parts of four decades and seen me continue it on four continents. 

As with any major project, I have many people that I must thank for their help and support. 

Professor Norman Brown has been my mentor for many years and without his continuing 

support, this study would never have been completed. Dr. James Klotter was the impetus for 

my original interest in guerrilla warfare during this period and continued to offer advice and 

support as I trudged along through the research and writing. My thanks to the many archives 

that opened their doors to me and gave me the latitude necessary to find the important papers. 

Particularly I would like to thank the staff of the Western Historical Collection in Norman, 

Oklahoma. Though they didn’t know it, the missing papers of William E. Connelly were found 

there, providing me a resource that even Albert Castel thought was lost forever. Of course, I 

must thank the leadership and staff of the Combat Studies Institute, through whose auspices 

this project made its way into print. They provided me the opportunity every scholar searches 

for and I am very grateful.

Finally, I must express my gratitude to my family and friends. Colonel (retired) Ken Smith, 

who started my career as an historian, has always been a valuable supporter. Brigadier General 

(retired) Casey Brower supported me as an historian and gave me an academic role model to 

emulate. My parents have long wondered when I would give them a finished copy of this work, 

but have always done so in a supportive way. Now grown, Nathaniel and Benjamin grew tired 

in their youth of stories of guerrillas and never really understood why their father needed yet 

another book about the Civil War. Finally, Royce Ann has been my partner and intellectual 

mate throughout the end work of this study and is the reason why it is finally complete. I could 

not have done it without her and would not have wanted to try.

Ft. Leavenworth, KS

August 2012

* Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Conflict Before the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p. xiv.
Introduction

Future years will never know the seething hell and the black infernal background of countless minor scenes and interiors (not the official surface-courteousness of the Generals, not the few great battles) of the Secession war, and 

it is best they should not — the real war will never get in the books.1

These are the words of one of America’s greatest literary minds, Walt Whitman. He 

recognized that although the Civil War was composed of 60 or so major battles, the war went 

far beyond these battlefields. The scholarly community and the general reading public alike 

spend many hours in the study of this great conflict. Overwhelmingly, their focus is on the 

incredible carnage that characterized the regular combat during the most violent four years in 

American History. Yet, beyond these battlefields, in every town of every border state, the war 

raged on a daily basis. These towns experienced the irregular warfare that was imbedded within 

the greater conflict; a personal, low-intensity war that was brought into most of the streets and 

many of the homes along the border. Just to the west of the Appalachian Mountains, the citizens 

of Kentucky found themselves beset by guerrilla violence and living under martial law due to 

the effectiveness of these guerrilla bands. The violence here had profound effects, lasting well 

beyond the four-year duration of the war. The Kansas-Missouri border region became a scene 

of burning and burnt homes, the countryside dotted with the stone chimneys that marked the 

sites where farm houses once stood. The violence was so vicious that entire counties were 

forcibly depopulated to insure that no aid was available from the populace to support the Confederate guerrillas. This violence spilled over into the other two states in the four corners area, 

and Arkansas and present day Oklahoma (then the Indian Territory) were also caught up in the 

informal violence that permeated this part of the border. Confederate Texas, though not plagued 

by overt guerrilla violence as Kansas or Missouri, still saw this internecine conflict affect its 

communities and inflict pain that would be felt even after the war. This study is intended, to 

borrow a goal from historian Michael Dougan, to prove Whitman wrong and to insure that the 

“seething hell” is brought before Civil War historians.

Civil War historians have overwhelmingly been consumed with the need to provide 

every detail of the major battles which are the hallmark of this conflict. While there have been 

periods where authors like William Connelly, Virgil Carrington Jones, Albert Castel, and Michael Fellman have turned their attention to this topic, the vast majority of authors have either 

ignored these activities or argued that while they existed they were of little consequence. 

1
Map 1. Regional Area of Operations.

Since the turn of the century, however, a growing number of volumes have been dedicated to the study of this irregular warfare. Robert Mackey’s The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865, delves into irregular warfare and its effects on the war 

through case studies of previously under-examined states, most notably Arkansas and Kentucky.2

 Clay Mountcastle’s Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals, examines the Union response to irregular warfare and the growth of what he terms “punitive war” 

through the course of the war. He represents well how Confederate irregular warfare and the 

Union response to it turned out to be the most brutal, personal violence ever seen in the United 

States.3

 A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War, by 

Daniel Sutherland, is based on the premise that “it is impossible to understand the Civil War 

without appreciating the scope and impact of the guerrilla conflict...”4 His study sets out to 

demonstrate how irregular warfare helped to determine the eventual outcome of the American 

Civil War. 

These volumes represent a fresh look at irregular warfare during this period and helped 

shape this study. Each of these works, and those that preceded them, focused on the tactical 

and/or strategic military history of irregular warfare. It is not the goal of this study to examine 

this portion of the guerrilla war, though some of this will be necessary for background, but to 

examine how this very personal form of war affected the people of the border who had to live 

with it and through it. In almost every guerrilla conflict, the group that suffers the most is the 

2
population of the area under contention. Their story, and the effects of irregular conflict on 

them, is the focus of this study.

The initial, and certainly basic, cause of the guerrilla war that existed in the West was 

civil war. Few types of armed conflict are as violent as those which fall under the heading of 

revolutions, insurgencies, or civil wars. These wars are fought for the dismemberment of a 

state or the total overthrow of the existing government. They do not arise out of the differences 

between separate socio-economic systems or ideological structures, but are the culmination of 

social turmoil within a nation. People who once were of one mind and one country find themselves at a point where they can no longer live together as one entity in a peaceful environment. 

The American Civil War was fought for the dismemberment of the Union and represented a 

split in the populace of the United States along political and social lines. It pitted the North and 

the South against each other in violent struggle, with both believing that they were supporting 

the just side of the conflict. Avery Craven has written that “neither the North or the South could 

yield its position because slavery had come to symbolize values in each of their social-economic structures for which men fight and die, but which they do not give up or compromise.”5

 The 

war in itself, apart from the slavery issue, was built along a similar mentality. Men from both 

sides were more than willing to die for what they believed to be right, and in many cases gave 

up everything they had in support of the cause. 

The American image has long been represented as that of a peaceful nation, one which 

will fight only when wronged, a nation which prides itself in adhering to the laws of decency 

more than most other countries. A thorough examination of our historical record will, more 

accurately, portray a nation that longs for peace, but thrives on war. Most Americans would 

maintain that peace is our country’s normal state and it is only occasionally interrupted by 

war. Numerous historians believe the opposite to be true and view the normal state of mankind 

as warlike and violent, with short periods of peace occasionally breaking out. In our military 

history, America has shown itself capable of behavior as violent as any other nation. This reevaluation has revealed that the American nation was born as a direct result of violence, and 

has had a violent nature lurking below the surface of the national conscience for over two 

hundred years. During the Revolutionary War, Americans utilized whatever means were necessary to defeat the British Army. Similar adjustments were made during the American portion 

of the earlier Seven Year’s War, when the standard European military mentality proved to be 

unable to deal with the guerrilla tactics of their Indian foes. The conquering of the interior of 

the American continent was accompanied by violence on a regular basis, as was the expansion 

into Texas and the American West. It should come as no surprise that the Civil War, which took 

the violent nature of the American character to new heights, spawned unparalleled violence at 

every level — not just on the battlefield.

Wars which pit portions of a single society against each other have always tended to 

be particularly bloody. Political and social cleavages, which are deep enough to bring about 

violence within a society, have always created conflicts that bear very personal traits. The Civil 

War did just that in the United States. Soldiers were not fighting for national honor in Mexico 

or against Indians on the frontier; they were fighting for the way of life in which they had 

been raised. No war in American history has ever approached the number of casualties on the 

3
battlefield that this mutually-destructive conflict produced. Along with that infamous record 

also must stand the level of personal violence that existed throughout the country. Beginning 

with the early border violence in the Kansas-Missouri area and continuing with the violent raid 

of John Brown on Harper’s Ferry, the American people waged a war upon each other that did 

not restrict itself to the much-studied battlefields of Virginia and Tennessee. The war was felt 

anywhere that men and women of differing perspectives on the question of secession mixed 

together and could not be constrained to the pulpit or podium.

Even the conventional war, as fought by W. T. Sherman, Sterling Price, or others, was 

not the clean, gentlemanly war that professional soldiers had so long been used to waging. Total 

warfare grew out of the violence of this civil conflict, and men such as Sherman believed that 

the correct way to wage the war and win was to make the people of the South the enemy, not 

just their armies.6

 The burning and destruction which he and others practiced was symptomatic 

of the total nature of the war. With this great, violent war raging throughout the nation, it is 

little wonder that local violence raged just as strongly all along the border areas of the struggle. 

As one historian so aptly observed: “...civil war in the backwoods was hard to restrain like the 

immense national conflict of which it was a part (and to which it was giving certain characteristics). It was more easily started than controlled, and it could be extremely destructive.”7

Since the American experience in Vietnam, we as a people, and the world as a whole, 

have become more aware of and receptive to the concept of guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla 

struggles in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Central America, Africa, and other parts of the world 

have awakened the attention of scholars and non-scholars alike to the impact of this petite 

guerre on military actions, societies, economies, politics, and the national will of this country 

and others. The numerous studies of the momentous battles and important campaigns of our 

Civil War have focused, almost without exception, on the actions of major units and famous 

commanders. Countless volumes exist on Gettysburg or Antietam, but relatively few authors 

deal with the personal war that was fought everywhere along the border.

Before beginning to examine irregular warfare during the Civil War, a short history or 

background on this type of combat is appropriate. Though scholars have recently become more 

aware and accepting of irregular warfare, it must be remembered that it did not start with the 

Civil War, any more than it began in the jungles of Vietnam. The term “guerrilla” stems from 

the Peninsular War in Spain, is the diminutive of the Spanish word “guerra,” or war, and is used 

to connotate a small or petty war. “The dictionary of the Spanish academy gives, as the first 

meaning of the word guerrilla, a party of light troops for reconnaissance, and opening the first 

skirmishes.”8 In this context, the term referred to the bands of men, normally led by priests or 

lawyers, who came together to carry out a small, violent war against Napoleon’s army during 

the Peninsular Campaigns. Napoleon himself never fully understood the strength of these small 

bands and was unable to deal with them effectively, though he commanded the finest army of 

his time. Though the term dates from the late eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries, the 

concept of irregular warfare can be traced much farther back than that. Robert Asprey, in his 

lengthy study of the guerrilla in history, War in the Shadows (1975), follows the roots of this 

conflict back to the days of Darius, Alexander the Great, and Hannibal. It was used against the 

Romans by Hannibal and again during the Roman attempt to conquer Spain. In America, this 

4
type of warfare was used effectively by the rebels who fought to free themselves from the King 

of England in the years 1775-1783. The fighting in the Carolinas against Lord Cornwallis and 

Banastre Tarleton was largely carried out by southern irregulars under the control of General 

Nathaniel Greene, who cared little for the niceties of British warfare. Their hit and run tactics 

helped to drive Cornwallis from North Carolina to Yorktown, Virginia, where he met defeat. 

A common thread throughout this history of guerrilla activity is what Asprey calls an 

“arrogance of ignorance.” Military commanders from the young British officer, who swore he 

could march through all of the Colonies with one hundred good troops, to the early commanders of the US Army in Vietnam, to the American leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan, have failed 

in their assessment of the abilities of guerrillas and the methods necessary to defeat them. This 

inability to adapt conventional tactics to meet the guerrilla threat has led to untold frustration, 

and such frustration has often led to a breakdown in military efficiency. The result of these 

breakdowns has often been an attempt to defeat the guerrillas by the use of organized cruelty. 

In the western border states, as in other places, local commanders misused power in an attempt 

to alleviate the pressure they felt from these irregular warriors. We will examine some of these 

actions, as the usual effect of such cruelty is renewed support of the guerrilla by the local 

populace and the general undermining of the military organization. Another common reaction 

to organized cruelty is a rededication of the guerrilla bands and a significant increase in their 

ability to recruit new partisans. 

As in all historical inquiry, this study must be properly placed in the context of the 

period in which it occurred. The term guerrilla has a different meaning to us in the twenty-first 

century than it had for the men and women who lived in nineteenth century Kentucky or Missouri. To understand the actions and reactions of those who were participants in, or victims of, 

this type of conflict, it is important to understand these differences.

General Henry W. Halleck, later a pivotal figure in the Civil War, published a book in 

1861, entitled, International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and 

War.9

 In this book, Halleck included a section on guerrilla warfare and civil wars. His discourse 

on the definition of a guerrilla and the guerrilla’s legal standing reflects a dominant legal theme 

of his day. He identified these groups of combatants as operating without authority of a legitimate state and their actions, therefore, created only a personal responsibility. He likened their 

taking of property to common robbery and their taking of life to murder, unprotected by the 

laws of warfare that allowed the same actions by regular soldiers. He denied that they were soldiers at all and indicated that they retained no rights to be treated as prisoners of war. He closed 

his comments by asserting that “...in modern warfare, partisans and guerrilla bands, such as we 

have here described, are regarded as outlaws, and, when captured, may be punished the same 

as free-booters and banditti.”10

In this passage, Halleck laid the foundations for the definition and methodology which 

the Union forces and Federal government applied to the irregular warriors who plagued them 

throughout the border states. Similar response to irregular threats can be found in Texas, by the 

Confederate government that perceived a threat to their society and political structures. The 

term “guerrilla” became synonymous with bushwhacker, outlaw, and brigand. The words were 

5
used interchangeably and normally spoken with a distinct edge of derision by those whose 

political preferences were at odds with the raiders. 

These irregular warriors were also viewed with disdain by most professional soldiers, 

even when they fought on the same side, who regarded their own form of warfare to be of a 

higher order than that of the partisan. 

Normally, the opinions of a single legal scholar would not have had such far-reaching 

influence upon national policy, but Halleck was no average legal scholar. Not only did he serve 

as General-in-Chief of the Union Army for a time and Chief-of-Staff after that, but he was a 

former commander of the dominant general officers who contributed to the Union victory. 

Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan all served under Halleck when he was in command in the West, 

the theatre where the Union forces had their most consistent success. Not only did Halleck 

attain positions of considerable influence within the military establishment, but, as Lincoln’s 

closest military adviser, he became directly involved in the war policy of the nation at the highest levels of government. With these credentials, his view on guerrillas and guerrilla warfare 

was seen throughout the policies that governed Union commanders in their attempts to deal 

with these shadowy figures. The views of many other Union officers echoed his instructions, as 

will be shown in later chapters.

Another scholar, Francis Lieber, also played an important role in the formulation of the 

Union policy towards the guerrilla question.11 Lieber was the foremost legal scholar of his day, 

and when Halleck became General-in-Chief, he wrote to Lieber for his opinion on the legal 

question. Lieber answered the general in an essay, entitled “Guerrilla Parties Considered with 

Reference to the Laws and Usages of War,” in which he set forth his definitions of pertinent 

terms and historical examples of each. He defined guerrillas as “an irregular band of armed men, 

carrying on an irregular war, not being able, according to their character as a guerrilla party, 

to carry on what the law terms a regular war.”12 Lieber’s expertise was recognized by Halleck, 

who enrolled him to serve on a special commission set up to formulate the official policies for 

the Lincoln government. This commission’s final product took the form of a military general 

order, dated April 24, 1863. This famous order carried the official designation of General Order 

No. 100 and contained 10 separate sections and 157 articles. These sections dealt with a wide 

spectrum of the problems involved in the law-of-land warfare, but most notable for this study 

is Section IV, in which the provisions for dealing with irregulars were laid down. This General 

Order and two others of specific importance are included in the appendices.

These articles made up the groundwork for the local ordinances that were used by commanders to regulate such irregular warfare in their unique area of operations. Lieber’s influence 

was great in the writing of these articles, and evidence can be found in them that he disagreed 

on some points of law and definition with General Halleck. Halleck artificially placed any irregular into the category of guerrilla, not taking care to distinguish between what Lieber called 

partisans, war-rebels, or armed prowlers. This blurring of the legal categories in Halleck’s 

model is reflected in the minds of most of the soldiers who were called upon to administer 

General Order No. 100. The General Order divided potential partisans into five categories, 

only one of which (Article 81) provided them the protection of prisoner of war status. All other 

6
categories called for summary punishment, which most often meant immediate death. As the 

administration of General Order No. 100 on the border emerged, the Union commanders chose 

to treat all irregulars under Article 82 (which allowed for summary execution of bandits and 

pirates), a perception that was echoed by the majority of the Unionist press and civilians in the 

Trans-Mississippi west and the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The question of whether these 

legal categories should have been considered by Union commanders is rarely addressed by historians. Few have even considered the distinctions laid out by Lieber, but one recent historian 

did offer an opinion. 

Clay Mountcastle’s book, Punitive War, focuses on the Union response to irregular 

warfare and does an excellent job of examining the progressively more violent reactions to 

Confederate guerrillas. Mountcastle takes the position that these distinctions are only important when “examining the Confederacy’s use of guerrilla warfare”13 and that they should not 

be used when examining the Union response to these Confederate actions. He maintains this 

because as Union soldiers and leaders did not recognize such distinctions, their responses were 

in no way dictated by those distinctions. Their universal treatment of all irregulars as guerrillas and bushwhackers was the common thread in their response to these shadowy warriors and 

because they were “Primarily occupied with the burden of defeating the Confederate Army in 

the field, the Federals had neither the time nor the inclination to analyze this guerrilla threat to 

any greater extent”.14 This study will disagree with Mountcastle, who in a way gives the Union 

a free pass for their actions, and the small group of historians who have considered the issue 

and determined that the vagaries of General Order No. 100 created a near “blank check” for the 

Union when dealing with irregulars. While this order did create legitimacy for the retaliatory 

violence on the border, it cannot excuse the executions of prisoners or the unwillingness to deal 

with partisan ranger units openly claimed by the Confederate government. The fact that Union 

forces ignored their own regulations is no reason to excuse actions that substantially violated 

General Order No. 100.

Thus, guerrilla warfare in the eyes of the Union leaders was totally separate from the 

regular warfare on battlefields such as Gettysburg, Antietam, and Chickamauga. One modern 

day analyst of the art of guerrilla warfare has expressed the opinion that “Union treatment of 

guerrillas seems to have been based on Old Testament thinking.”15 As reflected in this characterization, Halleck and the Union forces had a notably narrow outlook on the guerrilla and his 

place in war. They were admittedly not alone in their evaluation of the place of these irregular 

troops. A military intellect as sage as Napoleon had also failed to recognize the potential of this 

type of warfare in his Peninsular Campaign, and Carl von Clausewitz, one of the great military 

thinkers of the nineteenth century, characterized it as “a state of anarchy declared lawful, which 

is as dangerous as a foreign enemy to social order at home.”16 The other prominent military 

analyst of the period, Baron de Jomini, had a keener appreciation for the role and potential of 

this war within a war. Jomini wrote of the comparative benefits guerrilla warfare afforded the 

guerrilla, who had not only a fighting force, but also the support of the populace to provide 

supplies, shelter, and intelligence. His comments on the state of a commander facing such a 

force indicated the numerous problems when he wrote, “He holds scarcely any ground but that 

upon which he encamps; outside the limits of his camp everything is hostile and multiplies a 

thousand fold the difficulties he meets at every step.” Jomini’s experience in Spain appears to 

7
have given him a strong sense of the power of the guerrilla force’s knowledge of the local terrain and their ability to gather intelligence on the army’s actions.17

Jomini’s description could have been taken directly from journal entries by Union military commanders in western Missouri or central Kentucky. As these regular soldiers attempted 

to find and eradicate the guerrilla organizations that roamed the countryside, they found both 

the terrain and the populace to be the ally of the irregular forces.

These two well known military analysts viewed guerrilla warfare as a force created by 

the people of a land rising up against an invading military or political force. In some ways they 

characterized it not only as a military phenomenon, but as a social force. It united the people 

of a given area or the elements of a social/political group and allowed them to participate in 

the war, either as combatants or as part of the support base for the combatants. The comment 

by Clausewitz reflects a general disdain for the guerrilla effort, a feeling similar to that of the 

Union general officers. Jomini, having served in Spain with the French Army, seems to be 

more of a realist. He neither applauds nor condemns this form of combat, but points out the 

difficulty that conventional forces have in coping with its irregular principles. Thus, in much 

of the nineteenth century, the subject of guerrilla warfare was treated as an afterthought. True 

to this form, most officers in the Union army had given very little thought to guerrilla warfare 

prior to 1861. Some had been exposed to it in Mexico (such as Halleck), a few in the various 

Indian conflicts in the early part of the nineteenth century, and others may have dealt with it 

in their own studies, but most had been concerned only with learning the tactical and strategic 

lessons which were taught at West Point and at such service schools that existed. They were 

unprepared to deal with guerrillas and unable to see them as soldiers, because guerrillas did not 

fit into the neat mold they had cast for their own soldiers.18 After all, soldiers wore uniforms 

and faced their enemies in well-disciplined battle lines — they did not resort to ambush or the 

wanton destruction of property.

The study of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare has changed greatly in the past century. 

Even the term “guerrilla” carries with it a different popular definition than it did in the past 

century. To the Unionist living in central Kentucky during the war, the term denoted an outlaw, 

someone residing outside the law, with little or no respect for human life. Today the word is 

used with a greater legitimacy attached to it. One leading dictionary defines a guerrilla as “any 

member of a small defensive force of irregular soldiers, usually volunteers, making surprise 

raids, esp. behind the lines of an invading army.”19 This study adheres to this twentieth century 

definition. Having grown up as part of the “Vietnam generation,” the author definitely views 

the guerrilla and his type of warfare as far more legitimate and far more important than did 

either the nineteenth century soldier or the pre-Vietnam historians. 

Guerrilla warfare in today’s context is far more than a form of military strategy or type 

of tactical maneuver. It is an all-encompassing world of total warfare in which almost anything 

goes, as long as it contributes to the accomplishment of the organization’s goals. It is a brutal, 

no-holds barred combat that affects not only conventional soldiers, but anyone who comes 

in contact with it. The conflict in Southeast Asia laid the groundwork for a number of studies 

of this kind of war, and even more studies of previous guerrilla conflicts, creating extensive 

8
re-examinations of the importance of irregular warfare and its effects on the larger military or 

political conflict. The current conflict in Iraq has undoubtedly caused an explosion of analysis 

on the impact of such irregular warfare.

The terrorism that currently afflicts the modern world is an extension of the petty war 

beyond the visions of Clausewitz and Jomini. Just as people used different terms to refer to and 

define the irregular warriors who fought in the Civil War, the modern version of the irregular 

warrior may be termed a guerrilla or an insurgent or, more likely, a terrorist. This evolution 

of irregular warfare is now common in our world and is as likely to be motivated by religious 

ideals as by nationalism or ideology. Regular soldiers and politicians still disparage the warfare 

of the terrorist, just as they did the warfare of the guerrilla in the 1860s. Traditional military 

thinkers during the American Civil War underestimated the damage that guerrillas could do to 

Sherman’s exposed lines of communication, just as American leadership underestimated the 

damage the insurgency in Iraq could do to US forces. Most historians have underestimated the 

damage guerrilla warfare on the western border did to the populace there, just as the damage 

that the campaign of terror would do to the Iraqi people and infrastructure, which was underestimated by most US leaders. History repeatedly shows us that the military attention paid to 

irregular combatants is less important in proportion than the impact they have on the population 

that has to suffer the pain of such personal violence. Because of this, a military force’s unwillingness or inability to deal with insurgent violence in an efficient and timely manner can often 

lead to negative feelings from the local population and serve as a serious hindrance to localized 

stability. 

The tactics of guerrilla warfare have changed little from the days of the American Revolution to the present. Small groups of men, operating independently or semi-independently, 

use their size and mobility to harass larger, better equipped, and more organized forces. Simply 

put, the guerrilla war can be used as the poor country’s form of war, because it does not require 

large outlays in capital, manpower, or equipment. It is a war of stealth and shadows, mixed 

with intermittent and extremely violent combat. Without delving into the basic political issues, 

it is easy to see military organizations in recent history, from Vietnam to Somalia to Bosnia 

to the Sunni Triangle, that could not stand toe-to-toe with the conventional forces they faced. 

With smaller numbers and inferior equipment, they were forced to use tactics that made the 

larger numbers of their enemy work for the underdog. By utilizing the tactics of the petty war, 

they created untold problems for their adversaries. Thus, the face of guerrilla warfare has not 

changed substantially, only the weapons and the world’s perceptions.

Guerrilla war has become a prevalent form of combat in the modern world. Since the 

end of the Korean War, few large scale conventional wars have been waged, with most occurring in the Middle East. During the same period, countless numbers of irregular wars or 

insurgencies have been fought in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 

other parts of the world. These small wars are easier to organize and finance, and can be used by 

other powers — regardless of political or religious ideologies — to support unrest in a desired 

area. The prevalence of this irregular warfare has contributed to its acceptance as a legitimate 

method of conducting war. It is within this framework that this study examines the Civil War 

on the border, to determine its origins, its personalities, and its effects.

9
Insurgent warfare occurred in every border state during the Civil War, from Maryland 

to Texas. In the pages that follow, this study will examine irregular conflict in the border area 

of the trans-Appalachian West. This theatre of war was treated much differently from that 

focused between Washington and Richmond, and the relative lack of attention in the West by 

both armies allowed irregular warfare to take center stage for much of the war. Six states or territories have been chosen for this examination, all of which were touched by the daily violence 

that guerrilla warfare in the West created. Their stories are at once similar and unique, shaped 

by their geographic location and their demographic makeup.

In 1860, Kentucky had almost equal parts of the North and South. While a slave state, 

most Kentuckians hoped that the Union could be maintained. Historically, Kentucky’s roots 

were to Virginia and the other slave states, but the growth of the market economy had linked 

much of the border area strongly to the northern and eastern business interests. Unable to support the Republican Party because it was viewed as the party of abolition, the state also shied 

away from supporting its native son, John C. Breckenridge, who had been nominated by the 

radical southern wing of the Democratic Party. The Whig Party of Henry Clay had long been 

the dominant political organization in the state, and its death prior to the election of 1856 had 

left a serious void in Kentucky’s political arena. The election of 1860 saw many Kentuckians 

support the Constitutional Union Party candidate, John Bell of Tennessee. As was the common 

practice in the antebellum period, this party avoided the sectional issues and sought only to 

arouse the patriotism of Americans and feed on their love of the national union. This party was 

most successful in the border states that stood to lose the most from civil strife. If the war came, 

it would obviously be fought in these states and they stood to lose no matter which side they 

chose to support. 

Kentucky’s attempt at neutrality in the spring and summer of 1861 proved unsuccessful. The secessionist sentiment in the state was insufficient to carry it out of the Union, but the 

government also rebelled at the thought of providing troops to Lincoln to force the Confederacy back into line. When, in the fall of 1861, both sides occupied portions of Kentucky, the 

battle line in the western theatre would stretch across the entire width of the Commonwealth. 

From the beginning, Kentuckians who supported the Confederacy recruited soldiers 

behind Union lines and conducted a small-scale hit and run campaign against the Union forces. 

These minor skirmishes would be only a nagging sideshow to the Union authorities until the 

summer of 1863, when they would become the dominant form of warfare in the state. The 

reason for the elevation was the destruction of John Hunt Morgan’s 2d Kentucky Cavalry during the Indiana-Ohio Raid of 1863. After the end of Morgan’s raids, guerrilla forces seemingly 

sprang up from the barren ground and began a very effective war of harassment and terror that 

would occupy the state and federal officials consistently until after the end of the formal war. 

Most histories of the war in Kentucky concluded with Bragg’s invasion and Morgan’s demise. 

One of the best recent treatments of irregular warfare in Kentucky, by Robert Mackey, still 

brings this personal war in Kentucky to a close with Morgan’s capture, indicating that “The 

summer of 1863 was the last real opportunity for organized raiding by conventional cavalry 

forces, the most acceptable form of irregular warfare to the Confederate army, to have a decisive role.”20 Morgan’s demise did not end irregular war in Kentucky; it created an environment 

10
where former Morgan’s raiders continued their fight against the Union in another form. One of 

the most prevalent of the partisans, Adam Rankin Johnson, is mentioned by name in Mackey’s 

treatment of the 2d Kentucky Cavalry as the commander of the Morgan’s Second Brigade.21 In 

essence, the irregular war didn’t stop; it merely morphed into something less controlled, but 

every bit as dangerous to the citizens of Kentucky. By moving on, once the large raids were 

over, historians have missed one of the most intriguing and important periods in Kentucky’s 

history.

The original seeds of this irregular violence in the 1860’s were planted in the soil 

of Kansas and Missouri in the mid-1850’s, a period well-known as “Bleeding Kansas.” This 

violence was sparked by the ongoing problem of the expansion of slavery, an issue which had 

become dominant on the national political scene. The people of the slave state of Missouri saw 

the Kansas Territory as the logical place into which they would expand the peculiar institution. 

Missourians took it for granted that their social and economic structure would be continued into 

what was to become their sister state. Anti-slave forces did not see this expansion as a foregone 

conclusion and organized the movement of Free State settlers into the Kansas Territory for the 

express purpose of winning this area for the anti-slavery cause by controlling the ballot box 

in the upcoming elections. The decision was to rest with voters, in keeping with the concept 

of “popular sovereignty,” and organizations like the Emigrant Aid Society believed they could 

save Kansas from the institution of slavery by filling the Kansas plains with small farmers and 

merchants who would stand against the spread of the institution.

This race to fill Kansas with voters who would decide the issue of slavery created 

animosity and hatred so great, that it turned the eastern portion of the future state into a battleground upon which pro and anti-slave factions spilled blood at an alarming pace. Missourians 

crossed the border and voted in the eastern counties around Leavenworth and Lawrence with 

impunity, and groups of these pro-slavery forces, who were referred to as “border ruffians,” 

roamed the countryside punishing those who were perceived to hinder their plans to dominate 

the future of Kansas. The support of the Buchanan Administration in Washington — support 

that was demonstrated by a total failure to curb this violence emanating from Missouri — contributed to a society in this border region that was filled with death, fear, and a growing hatred 

that would be carried over into the next decade when the rest of America was plunged into the 

Civil War. In this setting of rampant violence and crime, men and boys became desensitized to 

death and misery with the resulting growth of a class of men like James Lane, Charles Jennison, 

and the most noted name in American guerrilla violence, William Clarke Quantrill. These men, 

supporting different causes, came to know each other by reputation or personal contact. This 

familiarity that would breed hatred and even death lists when the violence surged east and west 

across the hills of Kansas and Missouri. The violence in Kansas and Missouri is best known 

along the border, with most of the volumes that have been written on the subject being centered 

here. This violence boiled over the geographical lines of these states, and the men mentioned 

above exported their violence south into the next tier of states.

As with most of the border states, there was considerable turmoil in Arkansas in late 

1860 and early 1861. The question in many states was whether or not to secede and join the 

lower south, and so it was in Arkansas. The battle between the unionist and secessionist ele11
ments in the secession convention raged throughout the spring of 1861, with the secessionists 

winning limited victories.22 It was not until the firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861 that the 

Unionist element was “overwhelmed by popular excitement” and the secession movement was 

given new life.23 The debate between unionist and secessionist could have been carried on indefinitely in the absence of violence, but with the combat at Fort Sumter the people of every 

state were forced to make a decision. Straddling the fence was no longer a viable alternative, 

particularly for Arkansas, which lay between the Confederacy and the hopeful secessionists 

of Missouri. With renewed vigor, the secessionists pushed for the state’s separation from the 

Union and on May 6, 1861, Arkansas finally voted to join the Confederacy.24

As with the rest of the Trans-Mississippi, Arkansas was not high on the list of strategic 

priorities for the Confederate officials in the early stages of the war. The question of how best 

to exploit the war on the border was relatively unimportant to Jefferson Davis and his advisors, 

whose focus rarely got further west than the Mississippi River. In the purely defensive strategy 

that marked the early part of the Confederate war effort, there was little or no role for a small 

frontier state that possessed nothing of worth beyond its manpower.

25

The army, which was assigned the task of protecting the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy, first had its nose bloodied seriously in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, on August 

10, 1861. The war in Missouri and Arkansas surged back and forth across the border area. By 

late May 1862, after the Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas was in desperate straits. 

The Federal army was only thirty-five miles from Little Rock, the Confederate army had left 

the state entirely, the civil government was in a state of virtual collapse, food was short, and 

guerrilla depredations were occurring throughout the northwestern portion of the state. The 

state of affairs in Arkansas prompted one newspaper editor, who was obviously no supporter of 

the government, to ask if someone could inform the public of the state government’s location 

and offer up that its last known location was “...aboard the steamer, Little Rock, about two 

weeks ago, stemming the current of the Arkansas River.”26

In an effort to remedy the situation, General P.G.T. Beauregard issued orders, on May 

31, 1862, assigning Brigadier General Thomas C. Hindman to command all Confederate forces 

in Arkansas. Though it may be questioned whether Beauregard had the authority to issue such 

orders, his action was the only one forthcoming and for lack of an alternative, Hindman proceeded to his native state to try to stem the Union tide.27 Hindman recognized the role that could 

be played by partisans and issued his Order Number 17, which authorized the formation of 

irregular units to combat the Federals. Though his authority is suspect, it is obvious that to the 

populace of Arkansas he represented the Richmond Government, and that his action gave an air 

of legitimacy to the bands of Confederate soldiers or sympathizers who actively took the war to 

the federals and their supporters in northern Arkansas.28 Hindman’s actions and his acceptance 

of the guerrilla form of warfare did not go without notice from his adversaries of the Union 

side. In a letter in October 1862, Major General William T. Sherman cautioned Hindman that 

individuals on both sides of the war were committing acts that their leaders should not sanction, 

and that this tendency set a dangerous precedent. He closed by indicating that, “If we allow the 

passions of our men to get full command, then indeed will this war become a reproach to the 

names of liberty and civilization?”29

12
This comment on the propriety of certain types of warfare is interesting if for no other 

reason than its source. Not quite two years after this correspondence with Hindman, Sherman 

faced a similar situation with the guerrilla war in Kentucky and confided to an influential friend 

that “those side issues of niggers, State rights, conciliation, outrages, cruelty, barbarity, bankruptcy, subjugation, are all idle and nonsensical. The only principle in this war is which party 

can whip.”30 The years that intervened between these two letters appear to have significantly 

changed Sherman’s outlook on the prosecution of the war.

To the west of Arkansas, in what is today known as Oklahoma, was the Indian Territory. The Five Civilized Tribes, having been forced to relocate from the Lower South decades 

before, were living in relative peace here. They had created their own tribal governments and 

societies that rivaled most of the white communities around them. The Cherokee Nation was 

governed by Chief John Ross, the elected principal chief. The Cherokees and most of the other 

tribes, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles reflected the southern society which they 

had been a part of previously. These tribal nations maintained the institution of black slavery in 

the Indian Territory, just as they had in Georgia and Mississippi. The geographical and social 

connections to the South cast a wide net over the emotions of the Indian people in Oklahoma. 

Decisions about allegiances had to be made, similar to those in Arkansas, and the situation in 

Oklahoma was far more complex than in any other area of the Trans-Mississippi. Old conflicts 

between those who wanted to fight the enforced movement to the Indian Territory and those 

who saw no other option boiled up again in the maelstrom which followed the beginning of the 

war. The conservative element of the Cherokee and Creek tribes cleaved to the Union, while 

the rest of the populace went with the Confederacy. 

This split in the political and social fabric of Indian society created, as it did on the 

rest of the border, violence that would destroy the communities in the eastern portion of the 

Territory. Fed by the previous hatreds and quarrels, these elements would wage war on each 

other for the next few years. Added to these problems was the Territory’s geographical position 

between the Kansas-Missouri theatre of war and the safety of Confederate Texas. The Texas 

Road was the highway in and out of the war in the west and the Indian communities along 

that route would suffer violence from names as notorious as William Clarke Quantrill himself. 

These depredations were not limited to the Confederate irregulars, as the Jayhawkers of Unionist Kansas were as prevalent in the personal literature penned by the inhabitants of Oklahoma 

as were the butternut ruffians.

At the southern end of the Texas Road was the Lone Star State, a horn of plenty in the 

burned up landscape of the Trans-Mississippi West. Cattle from Texas could be used to feed 

either army in the field, and it was viewed as a sanctuary by the Confederate troops, regular and 

irregular, who faced combat farther north. While the government of Texas was not in turmoil 

and its loyalty to the Confederacy was never in serious question, internecine warfare and the 

lawless activity that was prevalent above its northern border also existed here. The violent men 

who came south in the wintertime were initially sedate, but true to their nature they allowed 

their violent side to spill out into the southern community that had embraced them. This border 

area was also the haven for southern refugees from the internecine warfare in the Indian Ter13
ritory, and the accumulation of temporarily homeless ex-patriots created a fertile environment 

for violence. Farther south, the German community in central Texas was the subject of considerable violence and suspicion, engendered by their anti-slave stand and perceived alliance with 

the Union cause. Much of the violent reaction created in the Unionist governments to the north 

was also to be found in the Confederate halls of government in Texas. 

Gerald Linderman, in Embattled Courage, maintains that “every war begins as one 

war and becomes two, that watched by civilians and that fought by soldiers.”31 The violence 

on the western border represents a third war, outside of the boundaries of the violence about 

which Linderman writes. In this third war, civilians weren’t simply observers, but unwilling 

participants on a daily basis. The opponents who fought it were not just regular soldiers, bound 

by conventional thinking, but a mixture of combatants who worried less about rules and more 

about how to most effectively inflict death on their enemies and further their own narrow goals. 

It was a dirty war, not of interest to most scholars and not falling into the neat categories so appealing to military historians. Even those historians who do write about the irregular war tend 

to shy away from the people who inhabited the border. One historian of this conflict wrote that 

“The civilians themselves are of little importance in an antiguerrilla campaign, except in how 

they supply and sustain the guerrillas.”32 While this may be accurate if the goal of the author’s 

work is to focus on the pure military history of irregular warfare, it is inadequate to delve into 

dark corners of violence in which civilians and combatants had to live every day from 1861-

1865. 

Military history is part of the curriculum at the US Army Command and General Staff 

College for the express purpose of using historical context to inform military judgment in 

Army field grade officers. The most recent conflicts in America’s history have clearly shown 

that the civilian residents of the operating theatres are of more than a “little importance” and 

an understanding of their role is critical to successful conduct of irregular warfare. This study 

is focused on the irregular warriors and how their lives intertwined with the inhabitants of the 

border states. These border states and territories were beset with irregular violence, some organized by the Confederate military and some born of the proximity of North and South. Many 

Americans died along the western border due to real or perceived allegiance to the wrong side 

on the wrong day. The importance of this violence and its pervasiveness is a story left to be told. 

14
Notes

1. Walter Lowenfels, Walt Whitman’s Civil War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 293.

2. Robert R. Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865, (Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 2004).

3. Clay Mountcastle, Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals, (Lawrence: University 

of Kansas Press, 2009). pp. 3-7.

4. Daniel E. Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War, 

(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. ix.

5. Avery Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861, (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1953), p. 397.

6. Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 458.

7. Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 65-

66.

8. Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War, (Chicago: Precedent Publishers, 1983), 

p. 32.

9. For information on Halleck, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff, (Baton 

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962.)

10. Henry W. Halleck, International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 

(New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), p. 386.

11. For information on Lieber, see Frank Friedel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth Century Liberal, (Peter 

Smith, 1990).

12. Hartigan, pp. 9-10.

13. Mountcastle, p. 3.

14. Mountcastle, p. 4.

15. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 165.

16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), quoted in Asprey, War in 

the Shadows, p. 148.

17. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, The West Point Military Library, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 

1971), pp. 27-28.

15
18. A parallel also can be drawn between the American Army’s inability to initially recognize and 

respond to the insurgency in Iraq and the irregular warfare conducted in the Border States during the 

Civil War. The leadership went into the Iraq war with a mindset as to how it would proceed and what the 

enemy would look like. The denials concerning the importance of the insurgency by national leadership 

reflect the same “Arrogance of Ignorance” cited by Asprey and caused a slow and costly reorientation 

of the force.

19. David B. Guralink, ed., Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2d ed. (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 621.

20. Mackey, p. 194.

21. Mackey, p. 178.

22. Guralink, pp. 47-59.

23. Guralink, pp. 59-60.

24. Guralink, p. 63.

25. Thomas A. Belser, Jr., Military Operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 1861-1865, (Ph.D. Thesis, 

Vanderbilt University, 1958), pp. 2-8; Michael B. Dougan, Confederate Arkansas: The People and Policies of a Frontier State in Wartime, (University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1976).

26. R.H. Johnson, quoted in Dougan, Confederate Arkansas, p. 88.

27. Dougan, p. 89.

28. Dougan, p. 89.

29. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 

128 vols., (Washington: 1880-1902), Series 1, Volume 13, pp. 742-743.

30. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, pp. 240-241.

31. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War, 

(New York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 1.

32. Mackey, p. 53.

16
Chapter 1

Kentucky

In the fall of 1864, newspaper reports began to identify a guerrilla leader who was 

operating against railroad lines in central Kentucky. The Louisville Daily Journal mentioned 

him in a short piece that said “...the Lebanon train did not arrive last night...the train was 

captured by guerillas and burned...we are informed by a railroad employee that the guerillas 

were fifteen in number, under the command of Billy McGruder, and...the engine was thrown 

from the track and baggage car burned.”1

 The guerrilla leader was actually Henry C. Magruder, 

a former member of John Hunt Morgan’s 2d Kentucky Cavalry who conducted operations 

against Union facilities and personnel in Kentucky after the fall of 1864. Magruder left an 

excellent record of his life after he was captured and tried as a common criminal. His closing 

statement at trial in Louisville was an eloquent account of how southern soldiers came to be 

active in Kentucky. He very pointedly indicated that he had never been involved in killing 

anyone who was not a Union soldier and that while he had killed soldiers in Kentucky, “they lost 

their lives in defense of their government, while we exposed ours in defense of what we were 

taught to regard as sacred and to which we had pledged our fortunes and lives.” Magruder went 

through a chronological recitation of his time as a Confederate soldier, from his recruitment in 

the Confederate State Guard by General Simon Bolivar Buckner, his subsequent transfer to the 

cavalry unit of Lee Arnett at Fort Donelson, and eventual service as a bodyguard to General 

Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh. After Shiloh, he served with John Hunt Morgan’s command 

and maintained in his statement that “to that command I belonged when I received the deadly 

wound from which I now suffer intensely.” Magruder went on to ask for the same pardon that 

the leadership of the Confederacy had received and in closing asked that “surely you will not 

deny me the opportunity of again being, after the war, what I was before it. A peaceful, humble, 

unoffending citizen, and in coming years atone for any errors that in misguided, but honest zeal 

as a Southern soldier, I may have committed in defense of the interests of the South.”2

Unfortunately for Magruder, the eloquence of his closing statement did not deter the 

military tribunal from sentencing him to die on the gallows. Though he had served in the 

regular Confederate army, he now fell outside of its protection and was hanged on October 

29, 1865.3 He had been captured in Union territory, in a small group of men who, though they 

often wore the Confederate uniform, were considered by the authorities to be marauders and 

murderers.

The type of border violence described above is best known by most historians as 

occurring in the Trans-Mississippi West. Predictably, this phenomena was not just a TransMississippi problem, but very alive between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian 

Mountains. The border state of Kentucky was rife with guerrilla warfare and irregular violence 

for much of the Civil War. 

17
Map 2. Kentucky Area of Operations.

One notable difference in Kentucky was the presence of a partisan ranger unit directly 

commissioned by the authorities in Richmond to operate behind the lines in the Bluegrass 

State. While some debate is possible as to the legitimacy of most irregular warriors in the TransMississippi, there is no debate concerning this unit – the 10th Kentucky Cavalry. Because of this 

distinction between Kentucky and the Trans-Mississippi, this chapter will pointedly address the 

differences between these partisan rangers and the other guerrillas in the Commonwealth. The 

model for this comparison will be the categories devised by Francis Lieber.

The letters and newspapers from this period are very clear as to the extent of the guerrilla 

activity in Kentucky during the last years of the war. The sheer weight of evidence reveals the 

incredible presence of these irregular warriors. Unfortunately, this literature seldom recognized 

any difference between the various groups that made up this wealth of terror. Colonel Thomas 

Campbell, the commander of the state militia in Hopkins County, Kentucky, responded to an 

order from the Adjutant General of the state to assemble his troops by indicating that regardless 

of when he might have received his orders, he was unable to complete them because of the level 

of guerrilla activity in the area of operations. He informed the Adjutant General that “we have 

never been clear of Guerrillas since the War commenced. We have now at this time not less 

than four hundred Guerrillas in Hopkins, Webster, & Marion Counties & they will remain here 

during the summer unless they are driven out of the county. The way matters are managed in 

this county it is perfect mockery.”

Campbell continued to describe the ineffective actions of Federal forces in the area 

around Hopkins County, unhappily indicating that these forces would come in and make a show 

of force to drive the guerrillas away. Within a day or so, according to Campbell, the guerrillas 

would return and “commit more mischief than ever...robbing citizens of everything that is 

valuable... the time is coming when all the Union men will leave this part of the state....”4 

18
Obviously, Colonel Campbell paid no attention to the subtle question of just who these 

men were, and what their true military affiliation could have been. This was the general attitude 

of almost everyone connected with the Union in Kentucky, when asked to deal with or discuss 

the irregular war that was raging all around them. It was far simpler to lump all irregular 

warriors together under a single label of “outlaw,” than to attempt to deal with them on a more 

selective basis.

As in a comparison of William Clarke Quantrill in Missouri and John Mosby in 

Virginia, the guerrillas in Kentucky did not lend themselves to categorization under a single 

label. Some were just what they were called, outlaws, pure and simple. They were not engaged 

in a war against the Union, but in the pursuit of personal enrichment. Others were truly fighting 

the Union on behalf of the Confederate cause, but were not sanctioned by the Richmond 

government. Just as Quantrill was an embarrassment publicly, their warfare was professed by 

the Confederates to be out of their control. This may have been true, but these were, for the 

most part, ex-Confederate soldiers who had deserted the army or simply been separated from 

their units. They waged a war against the Union, not indiscriminately against all Kentuckians. 

Finally, there were in Kentucky, direct counterparts of John Mosby, authorized Confederate 

Partisan Rangers operating under orders from the Richmond government. Each of these groups 

requires examination, for each affected the war differently.

If one man can be considered the father of guerrilla warfare in Kentucky, it most 

certainly must be Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan. Morgan’s brand of war was very much 

akin to that of Mosby. Though he spent more time operating as a conventional cavalry than 

did his Virginia counterpart, his personal preference was for the hit-and-run raid, operating 

against the enemy’s communications and logistics installations. Morgan has been an extremely 

controversial figure in the study of the war. His detractors show him as unreliable, deserting 

Braxton Bragg when he was needed most, in order to lead a raid that went explicitly against 

his commander’s wishes. Those who look at Morgan with a friendlier outlook, see him as the 

epitome of the Southern cavalier — a dashing, handsome young man riding a magnificent steed 

against the black-hearted Union beasts. 

Robert Mackey focuses on John Hunt Morgan as a more conventional raider,5 but 

biographers Howard Doll and James Ramage identify the guerrilla-side to John Hunt Morgan 

very explicitly, and reveal an awareness that it doesn’t matter that Morgan wore a grey uniform 

and maintained a regular commission from the Confederacy — he was, at heart, a guerrilla. 

Morgan recognized his own penchant for the guerrilla at the same time that many of his 

contemporaries were chiding these irregulars. His division newspaper, The Vidette, printed the 

following excerpt:

It is a pleasant assurance we have, from the Louisville papers, that the rebels 

of Kentucky are determined to resist the Federal Government. Guerrilla bands 

have been organized over the State, and several “outrages” committed on 

“peaceable Union citizens.” Now, look here, Guerrillas – well, we won’t scold 

you this time.6

19
General Morgan recognized the importance and potential of the small war, which he 

conducted against the Federal forces within Kentucky. Because of his strong affiliation with 

Kentucky, and the fact that his 2d Division was manned by nearly 90-percent Kentuckians, 

Morgan’s raids normally were directed at Kentucky or passed through the Bluegrass State.7

 

While most contemporary newspaper men treated Morgan as a Confederate general 

who raided Kentucky, much the same way as Sheridan would later raid the Shenandoah, 

George Prentice, the influential editor of the Louisville Daily Journal, saw him in a different 

light. Prentice considered Morgan to be a guerrilla, and repeatedly referred to him as such in 

print. In March 1864, his newspaper commented that “we can appreciate John Morgan well 

enough...we detest him for having inaugurated in Kentucky the system of guerilla burnings, 

robberies, and general depredations.”8 In another short news story in the July 6th Louisville 

Daily Journal, Prentice reported that “the remaining three...were discovered to be Kentuckians, 

formerly belonging to the guerilla band of General Morgan.”9

 Earlier, with reference to the 

proclamation by Morgan that he would cause the head of any Union officer he captured to 

be shaved, Prentice wrote: “We don’t know if it is very cruel in John Morgan to shave off 

the hair of all the Federal officers he captures. If the officers have to associate long with him 

and his guerillas, they may escape a very revolting nuisance by being without hair.”10 As with 

any campaign that Prentice conducted, he may have stretched his references to Morgan as a 

guerrilla somewhat, but there was an underlying truth in his statements. Prentice reprinted a 

story from the Indianapolis Journal, which, while discussing the relative merits of the Indiana 

Legion, spoke of Morgan and the guerrillas in the same breath. After a discussion of how 

the guerrillas were swarming over the counties along the Ohio River, the article complained 

about the “Sons of Liberty, whose secret military organization is more damnable than the open 

operations of those who are butchering loyal men in Kentucky under authority of commissions 

from Jeff Davis.”11

For over two years, John Morgan and his raiders consistently made raids into Kentucky, 

but not in an attempt to seize ground or conquer the Federal troops stationed there. They 

devoted their time to tearing up railroad tracks, burning railroad stations, destroying telegraph 

lines and offices, and confiscating any piece of the Federal Government’s property that they 

could get their hands on. Morgan’s Raiders had a very strong impact on Kentuckians and the 

men who had the job of garrisoning the state, but the personal impact of John Hunt Morgan 

was far more pervasive than just the exploits of his 2d Division. Morgan was a teacher and his 

organization spawned tens of smaller groups who sought to combat the Unionists in the same 

way as Morgan had earlier. Some of these groups were regular Confederate troops and their 

acts were sanctioned by law, while others were not under orders from Richmond, but plied the 

trade which they had learned so well under Morgan. A quick accounting of the names that occur 

in the literature of Kentucky in the latter years of the war will reveal the names of the guerrilla 

chieftains. It is amazing to find that many of these names, far more than half, can also be found 

connected with the name of John Hunt Morgan in some way. 

Just as the tactics and strategy of Jomini dominated the thinking of the generals who 

planned the larger war, the teaching of Morgan, through example, dominated the conduct of 

the guerrilla war in Kentucky. Not only did his associates carry on the war on behalf of the 

20
Confederacy, but when the Federal and State governments finally fell upon an effective means 

of combating the guerrillas – they called on a man who had formerly fought with Morgan and 

the 2d Division. As much of this chapter focuses on the latter war period in Kentucky, it is 

obvious that Morgan could not have been a major factor physically. He was either in prison 

in Columbus or in southwest Virginia during most of the time prior to his death. Even without 

his physical presence, John Hunt Morgan played a remarkable role in the history of Kentucky. 

He influenced the leaders of most of the guerrilla groups in the state and continued to plague 

the Federal Army through his lieutenants who carried the war to the “Yankees” until well after 

Appomattox.

Partisan Rangers

It is interesting to note the connection made by the Indiana newspaper between Morgan 

and the guerrilla forces in Kentucky, and between Morgan and the infamous “Sons of Liberty” 

organization that existed in Indiana and many other border states. Also of note in this story is 

the final line — the reference to operations in Kentucky of men who were under the authority of 

commissions from the President of the Confederacy. Perryville was long over, and the regular 

armies were caught up in battles to the south of Kentucky, so who were these soldiers carrying 

commissions from Jefferson Davis?

At least a portion of the soldiers to which the article refers were those of Colonel (later 

Brigadier General) Adam R. Johnson’s 10th Kentucky Cavalry, a regularly constituted force of 

partisan rangers, assigned to an operational area inside the Union lines in Kentucky. 

As was the case throughout Kentucky during this period, these partisan rangers were 

not viewed as legitimate Confederate soldiers, but placed in the general category of guerrillas, 

and as such, hunted down and treated as outlaws. Throughout the literature of the period, 

references can be found to members of the command, almost exclusively as guerrillas. Not that 

Adam Johnson and his men didn’t act the part of guerrillas, they did, but they did so under the 

protection of the same act which protected John Mosby — the Partisan Ranger Act of 1862. 

By virtue of their status as partisan rangers, these men could carry the war to Union troops by 

the use of hit-and-run, guerrilla-type tactics and still be considered regular Confederate troops. 

This point of law was, unfortunately, not recognized or observed by the majority of Kentucky 

Unionists or military men in reference to Johnson’s unit. To their contemporaries they were no 

more legitimate than any of the other guerrillas swarming over Kentucky.

Johnson had fought with John Hunt Morgan before the Indiana-Ohio Raid, and had 

narrowly escaped capture on that raid by swimming the Ohio River with a few hundred of 

Morgan’s troops. His unit, as it operated in Kentucky in 1863 and 1864, consisted of many 

of these same troops and was led almost exclusively by officers from the old 2d Kentucky 

Cavalry. This cadre of ex-Morgan’s raiders entered Kentucky to recruit from the Southern 

sympathizers and returned Confederate soldiers, in order to raise a regiment that could carry 

the petty war to the Union-occupied cities and counties of the Bluegrass State. 

21
Even before riding with Morgan, Adam Johnson had been involved in activities 

behind the Union lines in Kentucky. Earlier in the war, he had been sent by General John C. 

Breckinridge into Kentucky on what was a two-fold mission. First, he was to deliver a message 

to a Southern sympathizer in Henderson, Kentucky, and second, he and his companion, Robert 

Martin, were to recruit among the secessionists in the vicinity and bring out as many troops as 

they could. They were reportedly offered command of any men they could succeed in bringing 

out.12

Having established that Johnson and a force of Confederates were in Kentucky, the 

historian must try to determine whether or not they had any effect upon the Commonwealth 

and its people. A short tour through the pages of the Louisville Daily Journal reveals a group 

that apparently had quite an impact. An editorial report published in the Journal demonstrated 

how widespread was the control of rebel authority, as represented by Johnson’s command. 

The editor complained that much of Kentucky had been abandoned by Federal authorities, 

particularly that which bordered the Ohio River. While he may have exaggerated some when 

he opined that “It is true that our main army lines are now established on the border of the 

Keystone State of the Confederacy, Georgia; and it is equally true that armed men, claiming to 

be rebel soldiers, fighting under the rebel flag, hold undisputed possession of the largest portion 

of Kentucky...”13

The newspaper’s contention that Confederate units held sway over a rather large portion 

of the state by the fall of 1864 is bolstered by the pleas of civilian and militia officials for help, 

such as Colonel Thomas Campbell’s mentioned earlier. More importantly, the Confederate War 

Department issued Special Orders, Number 211, in September of 1864, affirming Johnson’s 

authority to “inspect, muster in, and organize recruits and conscripts...organize new regiments 

of cavalry and infantry, and new companies of artillery.” The order went even further than to just 

give Johnson this authority, but recognized his previous activities within his assigned area. It 

stated that the “action of Col. A. R. Johnson, heretofore had within the limits of the Department 

of Western Kentucky, is recognized as coming within the purview of his authority and duties, 

and is hereby confirmed and made the action of the War Department.”14 Though the Federal 

Government and the Unionist citizens of Kentucky had refused to recognize Johnson and his 

troops as anything but guerrillas, operating outside the law, the Confederate Government had 

officially sanctioned their actions. 

This point may at first appear to be small, but it is central to the problem in studying 

guerrilla warfare during the Civil War and today. Other than one or two famous cavalrymen, 

guerrillas have been poured into a single mold by historians — as they were by the people 

of Civil War Kentucky. The actions of these irregular warriors are characterized as those of 

bandits or murderers who had little effect upon the outcome of the larger conflict. While it is 

difficult to show a direct correlation between the guerrilla activity in Kentucky and the outcome 

of Gettysburg or any other major battle of the war, that is not important. For Kentucky and 

Kentuckians, the war was fought at home by men who had opposing political ideals. While 

historians have portrayed the violence of the state as an aberration, separate from the war, 

it was actually an extension of the war into the homes of Unionist and Secessionist alike. 

This violence was not an aberration, but an example of the violence and tension that existed 

22
throughout the border areas of the South during the Civil War. It was, in fact, evidence of the 

Third War referred to in the opening chapter. The fact that a major portion of that violence was 

officially sanctioned by the Confederate Secretary of War displays the desire on the part of the 

Richmond Government to make the North feel the pain and fear of war firsthand, just as the 

people of the Confederacy had for years. The irregular warfare in Kentucky was not an accident 

of nature or a simple outbreak of social violence. It was a part of the war effort of the South, 

and had more impact on the populace of the Bluegrass State than any battle.

To visualize the forces that Johnson commanded as a single large group, occupying the 

western half of Kentucky, would be a mistake. His units were scattered widely over the central 

and western portions of the state in an effort to produce the illusion of a larger group. Johnson 

identified his method of creating this illusion when he wrote that “I sent men into the counties 

of Henderson, Daviess, and Union, with instructions to recruit men for the duty of picketing all 

the important roads and demanding passports from citizens; thereby producing the impression 

that there were various, large, well-organized bodies scattered over that part of the state.”15

Johnson may have commanded as many as 1,500 men during the time he operated in 

Kentucky, but they were split into many small groups for operational purposes. Though the 

citizens of various towns may have expected Johnson at any moment to ride in with a large 

force, seldom did any of his groups exceed 100 men. The men who commanded his smaller 

elements, normally holding commissions as captains, were extremely active, as the newspapers 

of the time will attest. The names of Jacob Bennett, Tom Henry, and others constantly appeared 

in print for their escapades on the rivers and railroad lines of the Commonwealth.

To examine the background and contribution of each of these young officers would 

require a volume in itself, but the story of one of them, Captain Jacob Bennett, will serve as an 

example. Bennett is probably best known to Civil War scholars and enthusiasts as one of the 

Confederate soldiers who escaped from Columbus Prison with John Hunt Morgan in the fall of 

1863.16 To Adam Johnson and the men of the 10th Kentucky Cavalry he was a comrade in arms, 

noted for his bravery and loyalty to his men. He was the Captain of Company A, 10th Kentucky 

Cavalry, and participated in combat throughout the war as a part of this unit. He was with 

Johnson early in 1862, having been recruited during the trip into Kentucky under the auspices 

of John C. Breckinridge. Bennett rode with Johnson, in Morgan’s Division, throughout 1863 

and was captured during the Indiana-Ohio Raid in the summer of 1863. He was first sent to 

Johnson’s Island Military Prison, but along with Morgan’s other officers, he was transferred 

to the State Prison at Columbus to join General Morgan. It was from this prison that he and 

the others helped Morgan escape and return to the Confederate ranks.17 Bennett returned to 

join Johnson’s 10th Kentucky after his escape and was extremely active in Kentucky from the 

winter of 1863-1864 until the end of the war. There was, in Johnson’s words, “no man in that 

regiment who was bolder or more fearless than Captain Bennett.”18 Bennett was the youngest 

officer in the regiment, but he could not have been accused of being anything less than a valiant 

fighting soldier. 

Johnson’s memoirs portray Bennett as a legitimate Confederate soldier, while other 

contemporary sources, particularly George Prentice, disagree. A comparison of the pages of the 

23
Louisville Daily Journal and Johnson’s memoirs shows a distinct difference in the perceptions 

of Bennett’s valor, integrity, and legitimacy. For the same actions, Bennett is considered a 

hero by the one side, and a murderous horse-thief by the other. The first reference to him in 

the Louisville newspapers came on March 29, 1864, when the paper reported that the express 

train from Louisville had been captured by guerrillas at the small way station of Newport and 

that “the guerillas at the train were...under the command of a villainous character known by 

the name of Bennette...” The depredation in this case was the stopping of the train, but no one 

was harmed, as the paper reported, that after burning the passenger cars, Bennett allowed the 

engine, tender, baggage car, and express car to proceed to their destination.19 Bennett’s entry 

onto the guerrilla scene in Kentucky was not seen as the triumphant return of a valiant warrior 

by the Unionists by any means, and through the next fourteen months he would become one of 

the most feared and wanted men in the Bluegrass State. 

Bennett’s chief targets seem to have been those that one should expect a regular soldier 

to attack in the enemy’s rear area. He was particularly active along the railroad lines and the 

rivers of Kentucky, which provided the supplies and communication for the Union armies that 

were taking the war to the Confederate armies farther south. One month after the first entry in 

the Daily Journal, Bennett was again in the news when it was reported that a steamer on the 

Green River, the R.B. Speed, was attacked by guerrillas and “Bennett and his gang made the 

Speed their boarding house until the Dunkerson came up, when the rebels took possession of 

her, and proceeded to rifle the boat and passengers.”20

Jacob Bennett continued to be a news item on a very regular basis throughout the 

remainder of the war. He was normally cast as a notorious horse-thief and murderer, as most 

of the Confederate guerrillas were, but his actions were entirely consistent with the objectives 

of a legitimate Confederate cavalry officer, engaged in a war of shadows against an occupying 

Federal army. Another example of Bennett’s actions, this time with no connection to the 

railroads or communications, continues this thread of action against the government. On May 

2, 1864, the Journal reported that he and his band were in Morganfield for the session of the 

Circuit Court. No one was murdered and, as far as can be determined nothing was stolen. 

Bennett came after a specific officer of the Kentucky State Militia, named Fombell, and when 

the judge protested, Bennett arrested him. When Fombell finally came forward he was required 

to give an oath and bond, upon which Bennett released both Fombell and the judge and left.21

As stated earlier, Captain Jacob Bennett was not the only partisan ranger who was 

active along the waterways of Kentucky. A news item in the Journal on July 12, 1864, details 

the account of another band working in this fertile field. In this case it was a group commanded 

by a guerrilla named Tom Henry, upon whom the newspaper conferred the rank of captain. A 

small group of six guerrillas, apparently from a larger command of about 50 former Morgan 

raiders, had taken control of a steamer on the Ohio River named the Tarascon. They had 

appeared very comfortable in their situation and, upon finding a Federal soldier on board, “they 

at once insisted that he should accompany them to the bar and join them in a social drink...when 

the glasses were filled, one of the scoundrels proposed a toast to ‘the health of Jeff Davis.’” 22

24
This story illuminates some interesting aspects in the activities of the partisan rangers 

in Kentucky during the latter stages of the war. The extent to which guerrillas, whether partisans 

or not, were effective in creating problems along the Ohio River and other waterways is well 

documented. Attacks on river steamers were not unique occurrences, but almost every-day 

events. Only by stationing gunboats off of the major landings or at strategic points along the 

rivers could the Union forces slow down the rebel work against this avenue of commerce. Even 

then, only the locations at which there were gunboats were safe, and the banks of the Ohio 

stretched over a great many miles. Captain Tom Henry was another partisan ranger belonging 

to Johnson’s command. Formerly of the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, Henry was placed under 

the 10th Kentucky after the reorganization of the Eleventh in June of 1863.23 His band of 50 

men was representative of the size of the companies of the 10th Kentucky that operated under 

Johnson’s direction. The fact that the guerrillas did not harm the steamer or its crew because 

it was not “connected with the Government” gives an indication that they were more than just 

highwaymen. It wasn’t consistent with the image of a mere robber to allow possible booty to 

slip through their fingers. Robbers would have plundered a private vessel just as quickly as one 

which was under contract to the Federal Government. Lastly, and possibly most interesting, 

is the air of calm that the article accorded to the six guerrillas. Their relative lack of urgency 

indicated the freedom that Confederate guerrillas were accustomed to in these months. They 

were comfortable enough to pause for a cool drink to Jeff Davis’ health, and to invite a Federal 

soldier to join them. 

To an outside observer, it would appear that these actions are more in line with those 

of a soldier than those of a common thief. Bennett is a perfect example of the question of 

legitimacy that was raised earlier. He was a commissioned officer in the Provisional Army of 

the Confederate States of America and had been accorded the privileges of a prisoner of war 

after his capture in Ohio. He was still a member of the same unit that he had been in during that 

raid, and was, in fact, still serving under the same commander as he had been in the summer 

of 1863. His actions were consistent with the tactics of John Hunt Morgan’s 2d Division 

and he was considered to be on a valid mission under the rules of warfare by the Richmond 

Government. With all of this going for him, Bennett was still viewed as a mere outlaw by the 

people of Kentucky and the Federal authorities. 

By August of 1864, Bennett and the other members of Johnson’s command had become 

such a thorn in the side of the Union element in the state that Brigadier General Hugh Ewing 

felt justified to instruct General E. H. Hobson in Evansville that “if Johnson is taken, he should 

be shot on the spot. I will be responsible for the killing of the entire command,” Johnson 

included. “This is law; I hope you will execute it.”24 The law to which Ewing refers is obviously 

General Order No. 100, but that law refers to bands of men who are not regularly constituted 

and do not continue the war on a permanent basis. To apply this to Johnson’s men appears to 

be a misperception, for they were a recognized unit of the Confederate Army. In an October 6, 

1864, letter to his Union counterpart, Robert Ould, the Confederate representative concerning 

prisoner exchanges, wrote that:

It is represented to me by very reliable authority that 100 of Col. Adam R. 

Johnson’s men and twenty-five or thirty of General Morgan’s men, embracing 

25
three or four officers, are at Louisville and not held or treated as prisoners of 

war. How is this? All these men are regularly enlisted soldiers.25

It appears obvious that the Union authorities chose to deal with Johnson’s command 

under Article 82 of Order No. 100 (see Appendix A), which placed them in the context of 

highway robbers and pirates. With the overt reference to these men as Confederate soldiers, 

Robert Ould placed them in a different category — that covered by Article 81 — which 

delineated those actions required towards partisans. As partisans, Johnson’s men were entitled 

to be accorded all the privileges of prisoners of war.

Obviously, Adam Johnson’s men had a great deal of effect in Kentucky, but they were 

not the only regular Confederate troops who were active in the Bluegrass State during this 

period. Other units, acting under authority from General Nathan Bedford Forrest or General 

Joseph Wheeler, found their way into Kentucky with various objectives and missions. Kentucky 

was nominally under Union control, but its populace was filled with Secessionists and returned 

Confederate soldiers, who were either on parole or had deserted. As the war became one of 

attrition, this pool of possible recruits became more and more important to the Confederate war 

effort. Forrest, though publicly espousing a dislike for guerrilla warfare, was responsible for 

sending groups into the Bluegrass State in an attempt to tap this important personnel resource. 

A letter from an anonymous Union soldier details the status of his section of the state 

and the activities of one such recruiting mission. He complained to his correspondent about 

conditions in the local area, indicating significant problems with horse thieves and guerrillas. 

He openly accused them of murder and indicated that “what Union men they do not murder, are 

fleeing as chaff before the wind to escape their foul hands and death.” The soldier expressed his 

concerns that Federal authorities had not been able to deal with guerrillas and concluded “that 

portion of the district west of the Nashville Railroad and south of the Salt River, thence to the 

Ohio and Cumberland Rivers, is subject to these outlaws and controlled by them.” Interestingly, 

though he referred to them as outlaws, he went on to indicate that they were recruiting for the 

Confederacy and shared an oath of allegiance that was found on one of their number who was 

captured. In the end, he indicated the long term problem the group posed for the Union, when 

he surmised that “If we are to keep Gen. Sherman’s communications open, and prevent his 

supplies from being cut off, this insolent recruiting must be stopped.”26

The prevalence of the guerrilla menace is again underlined by this plea from a 

Kentuckian who had experienced the problem firsthand. The oath that the recruiting team 

carried is particularly interesting in light of the legitimacy question. There would be little 

reason for outlaws to require an oath of allegiance to Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy, 

as they would owe no allegiance to anyone but themselves. How many of the recruits secured 

by the Confederates stayed in Kentucky to operate as guerrillas and how many journeyed 

south to join Forrest or another Confederate unit cannot be measured, but it is obvious that the 

Richmond Government or its military emissaries attempted to secure men from the heart of 

Union-occupied territory.

26
Another reason for Confederate incursions into Kentucky was to secure needed 

supplies and deny such supplies to the Union armies. This subject will be dealt with at length 

later, but a short news item from the Journal serves to outline the intent of the Confederates and 

the involvement of Nathan Bedford Forrest. It outlined the capture of a group of guerrillas who 

indicated they had been sent into Kentucky by General Forrest specifically to recruit, as was the 

group previously mentioned, but also to prevent the harvest of the bountiful crops that could be 

used to feed Union armies. Predictably, this pursuit was not well received by the editor of the 

Journal, as he complained that “if lawless characters can be instigated to band together and rob 

the farmers of their horses, pillage the country, interrupt civil pursuits, carry terror to the hearts 

of the people, they will gloat over the successful scheme and applaud the fiendish warfare.”27

These people and events do not represent the total picture of the partisan ranger activity 

in Kentucky in 1864 and 1865, but are intended to serve as an outline of the operations in which 

they were involved and the effects that these operations had upon the state.

The second category in this scheme of guerrilla warfare is that of the war-rebels. This 

category represents returned Confederate soldiers or Secessionists who chose to take the war 

to the Union authorities and citizens in their own unique way. They represent the gray area in 

the question of legitimacy, and are the most intriguing of the three categories of guerrillas.

War-Rebels

This second group of Confederate guerrillas is a much looser entity than the partisan 

rangers as represented by Adam Johnson’s command. These small groups of ten to fifty men 

were normally not connected with any larger organization, although one of these groups — 

commanded by Colonel George Jessee — at times numbered in the hundreds. These groups 

included the guerrillas who got the most press in Kentucky, and this contributed to the 

misperception of the role of partisans who operated during the same period.

These groups were not specifically authorized to operate in Kentucky, as were Johnson 

and others, but were in some cases recognized by the Richmond Government as serving their 

purpose quite well. They were treated by the Unionists under Article 82, which provided much 

less legitimacy, and within the strict legal limits of the period, they probably did fall under the 

power of this article.

Regardless of their status as guerrillas, these men believed themselves to be soldiers, 

dedicated to the Confederate cause. They were normally ex-Confederate soldiers, often having 

served with Morgan, and continued to carry the war to their sworn enemies from the North. 

It should not come as a surprise to anyone that these men acted as they did. They had been 

active in the battle against the invading Federal armies on many battlefields and could hardly be 

expected to lay down their arms simply because they were no longer under the direct command 

of the rebel authorities. 

Kentucky provided an environment that allowed these war-rebels to flourish and 

complicate the Union war effort. Though under Federal martial law, the state was replete 

27
with men who had Southern sympathies and these people provided a support base for not 

only the partisan rangers, but also the war-rebels who fought throughout the state. As with the 

partisan rangers, a look at the men that are categorized as war-rebels explains their reasons and 

importance.

Without a doubt, the most infamous guerrilla in the Civil War was William Clarke 

Quantrill. Though his name surfaced in every border state of the Trans-Mississippi, Quantrill 

closed out his career in the Bluegrass State and was buried there after his violent demise. An 

interesting little book on Quantrill’s time in Kentucky was published by Thomas Watson in 1971. 

Entitled The Silent Riders, the small volume was originally written as a radio documentary for a 

Louisville radio station, and later published in paperback. According to Watson, Quantrill and 

his band entered Kentucky between the first and fifth of January 1865, entering the state in the 

southwestern corner. For the next four months, Quantrill brought the violent brand of warfare 

that he had practiced in Missouri to bear upon the Unionists of Kentucky. He opened his stay 

in Kentucky with the murder of fourteen Union soldiers whom he had convinced that he was a 

Union officer.28

While the Richmond Government chose not to emphasize its relationship with Quantrill, 

he held a valid commission as a Captain in the partisan rangers, and had seen regular service 

with General Sterling Price and others.29 Because he and his followers followed the “black flag” 

and had perfected the art of fighting on a no-quarter basis, he was at times an embarrassment to 

the Confederates.30 Nevertheless, they did not hesitate to utilize his unique skills when it suited 

their purpose. As he had in Missouri, Quantrill struck terror in hearts of Kentuckians and was 

perceived as an arm of the rebel cause. This is not to say that he was accorded the protection 

of the laws of warfare, for he was not. He was considered to be an outlaw, possibly the most 

notorious to ever walk on Kentucky soil, and had he survived his wounds, would most certainly 

have been tried as a criminal, as were many of his Southern counterparts.

Though Quantrill was the most celebrated of the men who fall into this second 

category, he was by no means the most important. He spent a relatively short period of time in 

the Commonwealth and did not have the long-term effects of a few other war-rebels who spent 

much longer combating the Unionists of Kentucky.

The most celebrated Kentucky war-rebels were all products of the John Hunt Morgan 

“school of guerrilla warfare.” With colorful names such as One-Armed Berry and Sue Mundy, 

a number of these individuals stand out among the rest. Berry and Mundy were first introduced 

in the literature of Kentucky in a Louisville Daily Journal news item in October 1864. The 

article identified the leaders of the guerrilla band to be “a man with but one arm named Berry, 

formerly of Morgan’s command” and “the officer second in command, recognized by the men 

as Lieutenant Flowers.” After this standard identification, the article goes on to indicate the 

uniqueness of this particular second-in-command, in that “the officer in question is a young 

woman, and her right name is Sue Mundy. She dresses in male attire, generally sporting a full 

Confederate uniform. Upon her head she wears a jaunty plumed hat, beneath which escapes 

a wealth of dark brown hair...” The newspaper, in this article, connected this group to John 

Hunt Morgan and at least hinted at their previous service in the Confederate army. With this 

28
group now operating in Kentucky without Morgan, they have assumed a status different from 

the Partisan Rangers. This group was a favorite target for George Prentice and he closed the 

article with a further description of Sue Mundy, indicating that “prior to connecting herself 

with Berry’s gang of outlaws, she was associated with the gang commanded by the notorious 

scoundrel Captain Alexander.”31

In reality, Sue Mundy was not a young lady or Lieutenant Flowers, but an exConfederate artillery captain named Marcellus Jerome Clarke who had served with Morgan 

on his last raid into Kentucky. His father had been a storekeeper in Bloomfield, Kentucky, and 

Mundy was active in that area until March of 1865.32 Mundy represents the epitome of the warrebel category in Kentucky. Entering Kentucky with Morgan on his last raid, he remained with 

his division until Morgan’s death and then returned to the Bluegrass State. The earlier reference 

to his being part of a group led by Captain Alexander puts Mundy in the command of Colonel 

George Jessee, who will be discussed later in this section. Being in his home state, no longer 

connected to the main Confederate army, Mundy took the war to the people he considered the 

enemies of his country and state in the same way as John Morgan had in earlier years. During 

the rest of 1864 and the spring of 1865, many of the exploits of Confederate irregulars were 

attributed to Sue Mundy. The many reports of his activities, when compared, indicate that he 

could not have been in all the places that were claimed. As with other notorious guerrillas he was 

credited with many actions in which he could not possibly have taken part. His name brought 

forth the same kind of terror that Quantrill’s did and they were reputed to have joined forces for 

a period of time.33 When finally captured in March of 1865, Mundy was given the semblance of 

a trial and sentenced to be executed for murder. He claimed that he was a Confederate soldier 

and had carried out the killings that he was accused of in that role. He claimed his Confederate 

commission and, as Henry C. Magruder in the opening lines of this chapter, he maintained that 

he was acting on behalf of the Confederacy throughout his time in Kentucky. In the end, just 

before his death, he proclaimed: “I hope in and die for the Confederate cause.”34

Mundy’s continued emphasis on his Confederate commission and his relationship with 

Morgan and Buckner were calculated to align him with more regular soldiers. His detractors 

have maintained that he would have said anything to have escaped the noose and this would 

seem reasonable, but could he have really believed that he could have saved himself at such 

a late hour upon the gallows? It is completely possible that his statement from the platform 

represented his own perception of his deeds and was an honest attempt to represent his life and 

actions. His life, and death, comes down to a difference in perception between Mundy and the 

Union authorities who held the power of life and death over him. It should come as no surprise 

that he was hanged when one remembers the orders of General Ewing earlier in regards to a 

force that possessed a far greater claim to legitimacy.

A third individual, beyond Clarke and Magruder, who has been placed in the category 

of war-rebel is Colonel George Jessee. Jessee was a regimental commander with John Morgan 

on his final raid into the Commonwealth, apparently cut off from the command after the defeat 

at Cynthiana. In a report to the Confederate Congress, Jessee detailed that “he had remained in 

this [Owen] and one or two adjoining counties, with his men not held together in compact form, 

here in the very heart of Kentucky, for many months, almost undisturbed by the Federal troops 

29
immediately in his vicinity.”35 Jessee and his troops, including the unit referenced earlier under 

Captain Alexander,36 had been separated after the disastrous fight at Cynthiana and had found 

it to be much safer to stay in the area of Owen County than to attempt to return to Confederate 

lines. Though now behind the lines of the main armies, Jessee’s fervor for the war appears to 

have lost none of its edge. He repeatedly, until after the surrender at Appomattox, continued the 

war in that section of Kentucky with a unit that he claimed to be over 1,000 strong.37

The case of Jessee and his soldiers accentuates the problem in dividing the guerrillas 

into separate categories. He was, by the admission of Confederate representatives, a regularly 

enrolled member of the Confederate Army and so were his soldiers. They could hardly be accused 

of not believing in the Confederate cause, after following Morgan into Union-held Kentucky. 

These were soldiers, but unlike the rangers they were without specific orders authorizing their 

activities and failed to return to the main Confederate armies. Though not considered deserters 

by the Richmond Government, they were considered as outlaws by Union officers. General 

John Palmer, then commanding the Union forces in Kentucky, in responding to a proposal of 

surrender from Jessee and another guerrilla leader, Moses Webster, informed Brigadier General 

Stephen Burbridge that “I do not recognize Colonel Jessee or any other pretended military 

officer as having authority to speak for any other person.”38 Though a regular army officer in 

the service of the Confederacy, Jessee’s form of warfare earned him the name of outlaw and the 

treatment that went with it. 

These men represent the category of war-rebels well, but it must be remembered that 

there were many more than just these few. War-rebels made up the majority of the guerrillas 

studied during the research for this project, for they received the most press coverage and 

built reputations that struck terror in the minds of the Union citizens. Other names, such as the 

notorious Champ Ferguson, also evoked the same fear that Mundy or Magruder did and these 

represent only the more famous of the Kentucky war-rebels. Each area of the state had their 

own hero or villain, as much of the guerrilla warfare was carried on by local men against other 

local men. The difference between these men and the partisan rangers discussed earlier should 

now be apparent. Though both professed to fight for the Confederate cause, the rangers had 

the benefit of specific authorization from Richmond while the war-rebels carried the war to the 

Federal authorities on their own account without authorization beyond the ties they held with 

the regular Confederate army and its cause.

Outlaws

The third and final category of guerrillas is the outlaw. The editors of the Journal and 

the Federal authorities wrote and spoke constantly of the outlaws, brigands, murderers, and 

bushwhackers who roamed the hills of Kentucky. As has been shown in the preceding pages, 

some of the guerrillas that were active in Kentucky were actually Confederate soldiers and 

others were war-rebels who, at least in their own perceptions, fought for the Confederate cause 

and not simply the personal aggrandizement for which an outlaw strives.

A portion of the guerrillas reported in the Bluegrass State were simply what the 

authorities said they were — outlaws. Towns were sacked and people murdered without any 

30
consideration as to their political allegiance or geographical sympathies. As in any violent 

society, a faction arose that held no concern for human life and used the war as an excuse to 

either settle old debts or seek personal gain. These men were similar to other groups found 

throughout the border states during the war, but in Kentucky they were particularly evident in 

the months and years that followed the war. As the war closed, the partisans and war-rebels 

surrendered and sought the protection of the amnesty oath. This third category of men, not 

constrained by the failure of the Confederate effort, continued their depredations upon the 

people of Kentucky. A letter written to General D. W. Lindsey, the State Adjutant General, 

in October 1865 indicates the extent of the problem in Breathitt County. In it, two prominent 

citizens request the presence of state troops to “preserve law and order and assist the Civil 

Officers of said county in the execution of the laws.” These men exhibit significant dismay with 

the state of Breathitt County and close the letter by indicating that “there are still lawless bands 

and ill disposed men in said county who resist the arrest of men indicted for various crimes 

and the Civil Officers are unable to make the necessary arrests and do their official duties 

generally...”39

Though it is impossible to identify the individuals to whom the Breathitt County 

citizens refer, it would be hard to justify their actions under the auspices of support for the 

Confederate cause. It is possible that some of the men who are here classified as war-rebels 

crossed the line after the war’s end and deserve the label of outlaws. The categorization of these 

men has been done arbitrarily and as such is imperfect. Clear-cut lines of demarcation between 

the second and third groups are hard to find, and even harder to support. 

The final goal of this portion of the study must be a discussion of the legitimacy of 

each of these groups in respect to their connection to the Confederate Government. The first 

and third groups are easily dealt with on this subject. The rangers were, by the admission of the 

Confederate authorities, regularly enlisted soldiers in the Provisional Army of the Confederate 

States of America. Their leaders carried valid commissions from the Confederate Congress 

and had been assigned the specific mission in which they were involved. There can be little 

argument as to the legitimacy of their claim and their entitlement to be treated as prisoners of 

war. The Union authorities, who at first treated them as outlaws, later admitted their actual 

status and accorded them those rights and privileges.40 The outlaws who made up the final 

group obviously fall outside the purview of any legitimacy from the Confederacy and were 

rightfully treated under the rules set down in Article 82 of General Orders No. 100.

The category that allows bountiful room for discussion and disagreement is that of 

the war-rebels. These men were perceived as outlaws by the Union authorities and hanged as 

such when they were captured. They were ignored in their pleas that they were Confederate 

soldiers and should have received the same privileges as the partisan rangers. They perceived 

themselves, or maintained that they did, as serving the Confederacy against its enemies and in 

large part were former soldiers of the Confederate army who had, for one reason or another, 

found themselves in Kentucky during the latter stages of the war. Could they have been 

expected to remain idle while surrounded by Federal soldiers and martial law? In a time in our 

history when violence was not an aberration, but the normal condition of society, who could 

be surprised that these fighting men chose to continue their fight against the North? After all, 

31
had not the fire brands of the secession movement painted a picture of military rule and the 

terror of black soldiers policing the South? In Kentucky, this was exactly the situation that the 

returned Confederate soldiers found. Martial law was in effect and though the Emancipation 

Proclamation did not apply to slaves in Kentucky, blacks were being enlisted into the Federal 

service to police the state. It would be hard to imagine a harder pill to swallow for men who 

clung to the Southern mentality, and believed in the institutions that characterized the South 

prior to the war. 

Whether or not these men were legitimately fighting for the Confederate cause or 

simply blood-thirsty outlaws is totally a matter of perceptions. The Union authorities perceived 

them as bearing no legitimacy and thus treated them as outlaws. They professed to be soldiers 

and apparently perceived themselves as more than outlaws, but patriots of the Confederacy. 

To the historian it is a hard decision to make as to how they should be classified. As this 

study has chosen to deal with these individuals as a separate category, it should be easy for 

the reader to identify the bias of the author. Relying on the more modern definition of the 

guerrilla and the legitimate role of guerrilla warfare in society, the author believes these men 

to have been Confederate soldiers by the spirit of General Orders No. 100, if not by the letter 

of it. The historical evidence indicates that their actions were, for the most part, directed at 

the Federal authorities and Union sympathizers who they believed to be their enemies. Their 

burning of crops, destruction of trains, interruption of commerce, and killing of soldiers bears a 

remarkable similarity to the actions of Sherman in his march to the sea or Sheridan’s campaign 

of destruction in the Shenandoah Valley. Though not a proponent of counter-factual history, 

the author found himself constantly wondering how these men would have been treated if the 

South had emerged intact after the war. Would they have been treated as criminals, as they were 

by the Union authorities, or would they have been hailed as heroes by the people for whom they 

professed to be fighting? 

As with any story, the guerrilla war in Kentucky had more than one side. In the preceding 

pages we have categorized the Confederate guerrillas, identified some of the more important 

leaders, and examined the causes and impacts of guerrilla war in the Commonwealth. Now we 

must turn our attention to the Union side of the conflict. The subject has been broached in broad 

terms during the discussion of the petty war’s impact upon the politics of the state, but there is 

much more that must be said.

The old saying that “violence breeds violence,” is borne out very clearly in the 

response of the Union officials in Kentucky to the continual crisis in which the state found 

itself from 1863-1865. The larger war had been in the Bluegrass State and left the state in a 

disorganized condition. A Confederate government had been installed in Frankfort and then 

forced to flee at the double-quick. The joy of secessionist sympathizers was short-lived, for 

the Federal Government was quick to return the state to the status quo. State officials such as 

Governor Bramlette must have breathed a sigh of relief when the invaders left, anticipating a 

much calmer time with the war gone from the Commonwealth’s borders. But this calmer time 

was not to be for the people of Kentucky. 

32
While it was true that the grand armies had left the state and would not return in 

earnest for the remainder of the war, Kentucky was far from peaceful. The guerrilla bands 

identified earlier were, in many cases, just beginning to hit their stride in damaging the Union 

war effort. It was in the latter part of 1863, after the disastrous raid by Morgan into Indiana and 

Ohio, that the number of guerrillas in the state began to increase dramatically. Adam Johnson 

brought his cadre to the Bluegrass State and began recruiting, and soon Jacob Bennett and 

his contemporaries were hard at work on the state’s rivers and railroads. The State officials, 

particularly Governor Bramlette, were confident that the State and Federal forces would be 

able to handle the guerrilla challenge without problem. He and the other Union authorities were 

overcome by the “arrogance of ignorance,” mentioned earlier. Possessing superior numbers 

and firepower they saw the defeat of these small bands as a simple numerical equation — 

something which it was not.

Though the guerrillas were relatively few in number, they were at home in the territory 

where they operated. The units sent to deal with them lacked the leeway to chase them wherever 

necessary and if they were Federal troops, rarely knew the country. A newspaper’s complaint 

that “Federal cavalry, unacquainted with the country, lose all of their effectiveness when sent 

in pursuit of these bold marauders,”41 was representative of problems that regular cavalry had 

in dealing with the elusive irregulars. An additional problem, possibly more significant to the 

Governor, was the infrastructure of supporters that the guerrillas had throughout the state.

With a large group of supporters, guerrillas could obtain shelter, food, and information 

whenever they needed. The guerrillas were viewed by most of the state as fighting the 

Confederate fight, a perception that led many a Kentucky family to harbor or feed the irregulars. 

The problem was emphasized in many newspaper accounts throughout the state and editors 

like Prentice complained that “the guerrillas are shielded by many of the citizens, and it is next 

to impossible to surprise and capture them, as they are informed of all of our movements by 

their sympathizing friends.”42

These problems, the guerrilla’s knowledge of the ground he selects to haunt, and the 

existence of a support structure within society, are trademarks of the guerrilla war that exist to 

this day.43 Bramlette grew frustrated by his inability to stop the depredations of these irregulars 

through normal military means. Feeling the need for more drastic action, the Governor 

determined to strike at that portion of the guerrilla menace most available to them — their 

support structure. On January 4, 1864, he published a proclamation that began an escalation 

of the guerrilla war that would not end until many men had been hanged without benefit of 

trial and many families had been deprived of their possessions and homes. The Governor’s 

purpose, and his target, is clear from the text of the statement. He identified the level of 

guerrilla depredations that he perceived in the Commonwealth and complained that much of 

it “can, in a large degree, be traced to the active aid of rebel sympathizers in our midst...” He 

believed these sympathizers to be guilty of providing aid and intelligence to Southern guerrillas 

and maintained that by “giving them information, affording them shelter, supplying them with 

provisions, and otherwise encouraging and fomenting private raids are in criminal complicity 

with all the outrages perpetrated by the marauders whom they secretly countenance.” His 

answer to dealing with that portion of the population that he perceived to be disloyal was 

33
simple, he instructed state and local officials that “in every instance where a loyal citizen is 

taken off by bands of guerrillas, immediately arrest at least five of the most prominent and active 

rebel sympathizers in the vicinity of such outrage for every loyal man taken by guerrillas.” He 

particularly instructed the officials to concentrate on relatives of known guerrillas, commenting 

that if the disloyal citizens of Kentucky chose not to aid authorities in policing these guerrilla 

bands then “they must expect to reap the just fruits of their complicity with the enemies of our 

State and people.”44

The Governor’s attempt to eliminate the support structure aiding the guerrillas opened 

up a number of touchy questions concerning the legitimacy of the guerrillas and the means of 

identifying rebel sympathizers. Bramlette’s methods, while not as radical as General Ewing’s 

Order No. 11 (see Appendix B) in Missouri, begged for retaliation from the irregular warriors. 

Repeatedly, the Governor and others referred to those who aided these irregular soldiers 

as “rebel sympathizers” and supporters of the rebellion. Though these people were hard to 

identify, what would this mean if he was correct? By recognizing the supporters of the guerrilla 

war as true believers in the Confederate cause, the Governor by inference aligned the guerrillas 

themselves with the Confederacy. Though inferring this through his identification of their 

supporters, he and the Federal officials later maintained that the guerrillas were not supporters 

of the rebellion — a position which might elevate their actions in the eyes of many — but 

simply outlaws, devoid of political conviction or passionate beliefs. The dichotomy represented 

by the Governor’s actions is readily apparent. Though convinced that the support structure was 

firmly based on a belief in the rebellion, he was unable to admit that the guerrillas whom these 

citizens supported were fighting based on that same belief. If, in fact, these guerrillas were 

simply outlaws with no political or social goals, they would hardly have spared the Confederate 

sympathizers while depredating against the Unionists. Some of the wealthiest families of the 

Bluegrass State were supporters of the rebellion and they would have made tempting targets for 

these shadowy warriors. An objective look at the situation, a perspective that one could hardly 

expect the Governor to have had, would reveal that the authorities could not have it both ways. 

If the method of identifying the guerrilla’s supporters was their loyalty to the Confederate 

cause, then it must follow that the guerrillas were in general tied to the same belief. If the 

guerrillas were not true believers, but the unprincipled outlaws of whom Prentice wrote, then 

it was unjust to lay the whole blame for their support upon the heads of those perceived to be 

rebel sympathizers. By identifying the guerrilla’s supporters with the rebellion, the officials of 

Kentucky gave these irregulars a form of legitimacy, which cannot be denied. Though whether 

or not many of them were Confederate soldiers can be debated, the Governor’s actions moved 

them up the ladder to a point where they were, at the least, considered to be patriots of the 

Confederacy. 

Additionally, another outcome of the proclamation was possible. By identifying those 

of southern sympathies with the guerrillas, Governor Bramlette greatly enlarged the support 

network that was available to these bands. It would be hard to measure the number of families 

identified as supporters, but what was the reaction of sympathizers, who in no way supported 

the guerrillas, after they were punished for something they had not done? The State authorities 

34
ran a very high risk of turning many rebel sympathizers, who looked upon the guerrillas as 

outlaws, into their supporters because of this alignment of the two groups.45

Another problem area that the proclamation posed was how the Government went 

about identifying these citizens who possessed sympathies for the Confederacy. It would have 

been easy if all of those who believed in the “cause” had worn a badge or lived together in 

one community, but that was not the case. Every town was inhabited by supporters of both 

sides and even families were split by the question of secession, which underlies the rebellion. 

George Prentice could hardly have been considered to be a sympathizer with the rebellion, 

but his wife was a known secessionist and his sons served in the Confederate Army. With this 

intermingling of politics and personalities, it would have been difficult at best to identify rebel 

sympathizers. Unfortunately, the question came down to the perceptions of loyalty, as it did 

all along the border. In Texas, men were hanged for being thought to support the Union and 

jailed for refusing to accept southern currency. Any possible inkling that a man was not “right” 

was enough to place him under suspicion and thus in danger.46 In Kentucky, things were not 

much better. When a guerrilla raid occurred, and they occurred regularly, the area was scoured 

for perceived sympathizers, regardless of their actual complicity or innocence. The fact that 

a man had a son in the Confederate Army or supported George B. McClellan for president 

was ample proof that he was guilty of supporting the rebellion and thus the guerrillas. The 

old adage, “if you’re not with us, you’re against us,” came into play time and time again, as 

State and Federal officials made the determination of who was loyal and who was not, in line 

with their information and feelings. How many people were wrongly denied their civil rights 

(even though martial law was not declared until July 1864) cannot be measured, but it would 

appear to be significant. An additional complication, which will be discussed later, was the 

questionable caliber of a few of the military men who were given the authority to determine 

who was loyal and who was a sympathizer.

Governor Bramlette’s proclamation failed to slow the tide of guerrilla violence, though 

it is hard to determine whether it was because of ineffective enforcement or targeting the wrong 

segment of the population. The year that followed his decree included the worst guerrilla 

depredations of the war and led the Federal authorities to take matters into their own hands by 

the summer of 1864.47 The Union army officers who were given the power to police the state 

by Lincoln’s proclamation of martial law were operating under the legal framework of General 

Order No. 100. The order severely limited the possibility of legitimacy being accorded to any 

irregular fighter, regardless of his background and circumstances. The men who were placed 

in power to carry out the order gave the guerrillas even less opportunity to be recognized as 

soldiers. Beginning with General W. T. Sherman, the Union commanders in the West took the 

view that the only way to deal with guerrillas was swift and violent action. This action was not 

to be limited to locating guerrillas and killing them on the field of battle, but would extend to 

the depopulation of their perceived supporters and summary executions in reprisal for raids. 

In a letter to General Leslie Coombs shortly after the declaration of martial law, General 

Sherman confided that he knew “that families of hitherto great respectability in Lexington and 

Frankfort, blind to the interests of the industrious classes of your State, have and do continue to 

encourage the public enemy in every way in their power.”48 Recognizing the need for someone 

35
to subdue the guerrilla forces in Kentucky and believing that Governor Bramlette’s actions 

were inadequate, General Sherman was prepared to act.

Sherman’s determination to solve this problem and get on with the business he deemed 

necessary is evident throughout his correspondence. His representative in Kentucky, Brig. Gen. 

Burbridge, was given great leeway in dealing with the guerrilla menace; so much leeway that he 

was repeatedly accused of abusing his power and the people of Kentucky. It is hard to imagine 

how General Burbridge could have overstepped the bounds of his authority when one reads the 

instructions sent to him by General Sherman in June of 1864. Sherman begins by providing 

explicit guidance on the legitimacy of guerrillas in Kentucky, indicating that they are “are not 

soldiers but wild beasts unknown to the usages of war.” His description of what constitutes a 

soldier, rather than a guerrilla, is standard for the time and involves the need for a soldier to be 

“enlisted, enrolled, officered, uniformed, armed, and equipped by some recognized belligerent 

power, and must, if detached from a main army, be of sufficient strength, with written orders 

from some army commander, to do some military thing...” It is interesting that Adam Rankin 

Johnson’s Partisan Rangers meet this description, but Sherman never bothered to make a 

distinction amongst any irregular warriors in Kentucky. After his instructions to Burbridge 

concerning the legitimacy of guerrilla warriors in Kentucky, Sherman goes on to deal with the 

issue of sympathizers by ordering his subordinate to “arrest all males and females who have 

encouraged or harbored guerrillas and robbers...and when you have enough, say 300 or 400, 

I will cause them to be sent down the Mississippi through their guerrilla gauntlet, and by a 

sailing ship send them to a land where they may take their negroes and make a colony with laws 

and a future of their own.”49

Seldom in the history of our country has a military officer been given such official leeway 

to deal with armed men and noncombatants alike. Burbridge was authorized to take whatever 

actions were necessary to rid Kentucky of these “wild beasts,” an authority he did not hesitate 

to use. Of just as much interest is General Sherman’s reference to sending southern supporters 

down the Mississippi. As stated before, one of the important characteristics of guerrilla warfare 

is the existence of a support infrastructure. Governor Bramlette had recognized this and 

attempted to deal with it in his January 1864 proclamation. General Sherman chose to take the 

idea one step farther, determining that the best way to break-up the support network that made 

the guerrillas so hard to deal with was to depopulate the areas where these supporters lived. 

As in the Missouri counties affected by Order No. 11, by simply removing the populace the 

Union army hoped to destroy the irregulars’ ability to hide, refurbish, and gather information. 

It is interesting, in light of General Sherman’s concept, to observe the guerrilla war that once 

raged against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In the latter part of 1985, the American news media 

reported that the Soviet army was carrying out a forced depopulation of those areas under the 

nominal control of the guerrilla forces. The villagers were being forced to move out of the 

country, into neighboring Pakistan. Apparently, the Soviet army also believed that the lessons 

of history showed depopulation to be an extremely effective means of delivering a blow to 

irregular fighters, regardless of country or century.

General Burbridge took the instructions from his commander seriously, and on July 

16, 1864, issued his edict to the people of Kentucky. This edict took the form of General 

36
Orders No. 59 (see Appendix C), which was directed at the guerrilla problem point blank and 

contained some extremely drastic measures to combat these irregulars. His orders directed that 

sympathizers “living within five miles of any scene of outrage committed by armed men...will be 

arrested and sent beyond the limits of the United States...” Not only were individuals perceived 

to be of Southern loyalties deported from Kentucky if they lived too close to a guerrilla raid, 

but his order also caused their property to be seized and used to pay the government or citizens 

who had incurred damage. His order did not stop at deportation or economic penalty, but also 

contained a final provision requiring that “whenever an unarmed Union citizen is murdered, 

four guerrillas will be selected from the prisoners in the hands of the military authorities and 

publicly shot to death in the most convenient place near the scene of the outrage.”50

The first two passages of the General Order are simply restatements of the directions 

of General Sherman on June 21st, with all of the attendant problems of identification of 

sympathizers and alienation of the populace. The last passage, that dealing with the summary 

execution of four “guerrillas” for every Union man murdered by the irregular soldiers, must be 

credited to Burbridge himself. Nowhere in his orders was he instructed to take such action, and 

it can be argued that the summary execution of men in such a manner went well beyond the 

“discretion” with which General Sherman had called upon him to utilize.51

Some discussion on the administration of the first two passages will follow later, but 

for now we must examine the requirement for reprisal killings. Two possible problems existed 

in following this course of action; how to identify guerrillas and what would be the reaction 

of the people of Kentucky. The first problem was very easy to solve if one chose not to worry 

about executing men whose status as guerrillas was questionable. Confederates captured in 

the Commonwealth of Kentucky during the summer and fall of 1864 could count on being 

incarcerated under the charge of conducting guerrilla operations. Written authorization from 

the Richmond Government (the recognized belligerent of Sherman’s letter), the wearing of a 

Confederate uniform, or the size of the unit had no bearing on Burbridge’s determination of who 

was a soldier and who was a guerrilla. Union authorities took the easiest way out at the time, 

they simply designated everyone suspected of armed conflict with the Federal Government 

in Kentucky to be a guerrilla and dealt with them accordingly. Though the number of men 

actually executed under Burbridge’s decree is hard to pin down, it undoubtedly exceeded 30 

in the months that followed. The newspapers consistently carried references to the executions 

conducted under this order. In one, a Union lieutenant was ordered to select four guerrillas under 

his control and have them executed in retaliation for the murder of a local Unionist. In carrying 

out this order, he selected four prisoners at random from the military prison and executed them, 

including John Brooks, Robert Brooks, and J. Bradis. At this point, the newspaper finished the 

article by indicating that “Bradis claimed to be a soldier of the 2d Kentucky rebel cavalry, a 

member of Company L...”52

Bradis’ contention that he was a soldier in the 2d Kentucky cannot be verified, a 

contention, which if true, would place him squarely in the category of war-rebel. Though 

Bradis may have been the outlaw he was made out to be, two of the men cited in the newspaper 

article can be positively identified as members of the partisan ranger organization under the 

overall command of Adam Johnson. Robert Brooks appears on the roster of Jacob Bennett’s 

37
unit, Company A, 10th Kentucky Cavalry,53 and John Brooks is listed as a First Lieutenant 

in Company C of the 10th Kentucky.54 The latter Brooks is eulogized in Partisan Rangers as 

“John Brooks, of Hopkins county. Murdered by General Steve Burbridge’s order at Louisville, 

1864.”55 Other evidence of the execution of Confederate soldiers without trial can be found 

throughout the newspapers of Louisville. In November 1864, after Johnson’s men were finally 

recognized as soldiers and accorded the benefits allotted to prisoners of war, the Journal noted 

that “they established to the satisfaction of the authorities that they were Confederate soldiers, 

and not outlaws, and had a right to demand that they no longer be treated as guerillas...Capt. 

L. D. Buckner, of the same command, was executed some weeks since, by order of General 

Burbridge, as a guerilla...”56

While it is true that the perceptions of the Union officials entered into the determination 

of who was executed, it is incumbent upon any military officer, regardless of time and 

circumstances, to safeguard legitimate prisoners of war. Similar incidents in Texas and Missouri 

have long been considered to be massacres, incidents that bear remarkable similarities to those 

in Kentucky. They were carried out under martial law authority, without the benefit of trial, 

and with little concern for the guilt or innocence of the people executed.57 In this matter, the 

author is dangerously close to criticizing General Burbridge, who is obviously unable to defend 

himself. The decisions of historical figures must be studied in the context of the environment 

in which they were made, and it is extremely difficult for the historian to fully understand 

the pressures under which an official such as Burbridge had to act. In this case, however, 

Burbridge must be brought to task for errors made by his command. It was at his express 

order that guerrillas, or suspected guerrillas, were executed. He was, in essence, the judge 

and jury for these individuals, but no personal guilt was established prior to execution. The 

execution of Sue Mundy can be understood, as he was specifically charged with certain crimes, 

but Burbridge’s orders to his subordinates contained no specific names of guilty parties, he 

simply instructed them to “take four guerrillas from the prisoners in your hands,” and execute 

them in the streets.58

The names of men executed publicly can be derived from the newspapers and secondary 

accounts of Kentucky history. It is reasonable to believe, however, that these were not the only 

executions carried out under the orders of General Burbridge. In his report to the Confederate 

Senate in March 1865, Colonel J. D. Morris, C.S.A., detailed his capture and subsequent 

detention in the prison at Lexington. Morris had been sent into Kentucky to gather information 

and had been captured by Union soldiers. His report indicated that other prisoners, not just 

those publicized by the media, were executed during Burbridge’s command. He detailed the 

process whereby the officer-in-charge came into the confinement facility and “looking over the 

men picked out fifteen. They were carried downstairs. In a short time five of them returned. 

They had drawn lots for their lives and escaped; the other ten were taken out and shot.” The 

depiction of this incident illustrates the random nature of the executions carried out under 

Burbridge’s orders. It appears to have been a common occurrence and, while the exact number 

of Confederate soldiers who were wrongfully executed will never be known, Colonel Morris’ 

report goes on to give a rough accounting in his experience when he closed by indicating that 

“three men who were brought in and belonged to Jessee’s command, within four hours after 

their arrival were carried from the prison and hung, and this thing went on until twenty-eight 

38
of our number, almost invariably Confederate soldiers, had fallen victim to this unheard of 

barbarity.”59

While there is considerable leeway for argument concerning the validity of Burbridge’s 

action, it is difficult not to condemn him. Later in the fall of 1864 he gave orders to take 

no guerrilla prisoners, officially sanctioning the no-quarter technique that had been used in 

Missouri for a number of years. Though equally violent, the practice of giving no quarter 

appears to the author to be far more humane and much closer to the letter of General Orders No. 

100. Based on the General Order, the military had the right to summarily execute guerrillas, but 

upon capturing suspected guerrillas and imprisoning them, it would appear that greater care in 

the determination of their guilt was incumbent prior to their execution. No requirement of time 

clamored for their death, and the Federal authorities could have looked into individual guilt at 

their leisure.

The reaction of Kentuckians to Burbridge’s General Orders No. 59 was, as could 

have been anticipated, dissatisfaction and elevated violence. Shaler wrote that the interference 

with the people took the form of “taxing of so-called rebel sympathizers for the damage done 

by the guerrillas...the outrages which the so-called Confederate sympathizers were forced 

to make good were utterly beyond their control.”60 Federal officials required payments from 

communities based on their belief that the inhabitants were supporters of the rebellion, without 

specific evidence.61 These drastic economic reprisals did little to stop the guerrilla escapades 

of the numerous bands in Kentucky. Unfortunately, it provided a vehicle to drive the wedge in 

Kentucky society even deeper. Federal officials were advised by the good Union men of the 

area, and the advice of these men was constantly colored by vindictive feelings and avarice. 

The question of loyalty was utilized as an economic weapon by many, as one had only to cast 

dispersions upon the competition’s politics to ruin his business entirely.

The reprisal killings were characterized by a familiar lack of effectiveness. Rather 

than discouraging the irregulars from their activities, the order simply prompted a renewal of 

guerrilla violence at an even higher level. It was in the fall of 1864 and spring of 1865 that 

Mundy, Magruder, and Colonel Jessee were the most active, indicating that the edict had little 

effect. Published accounts show that the guerrillas specifically threatened to match execution 

with execution, as in a September newspaper article which indicated that “the guerillas say all 

deserters are their friends, and they took an oath that they would kill four Union men for him 

(one of the partisan rangers killed on September 6th); and also say they will kill four for every 

rebel shot by the Federals, or Yanks, as they call them.”62

As with most of the measures used by the Federals in their attempt to deal with the 

guerrillas, General Orders No. 59 probably did more harm than good. The edict, and the manner 

in which it was carried out, produced little relief from the petty war, while creating further 

animosity between the military and the populace. One commander, General E. A. Paine, did 

particular damage in his application of the order.

Paine took command of Paducah in July 1864 at the request of the Union League 

of America, a request based on the belief by Unionist residents that “rebels are doing all the 

39
business, and they are reaping all the advantages of trade.”63 Paine’s command was shortlived, a total of fifty-one days, but he made the most of the time that he had in punishing 

anyone who he deemed to be of Confederate sympathies. He levied taxes, seized rents, and 

confiscated the wealth of many citizens whom he decided were not “loyal.” In addition to his 

economic depredations, Paine jailed a great number of people and carried out the execution 

of nearly forty.64 Coulter describes Paine’s tenure as a “military extortion” and characterizes 

his actions as an “insane course.” Complaints of Paine’s conduct were so widespread that 

Governor Bramlette called upon President Lincoln for relief,65 and General Ulysses S. Grant 

was moved to write General Halleck that “he will do to put in an entirely disloyal district to 

scourge the people, but even then it is doubtful whether it comes within the bounds of civilized 

warfare to use him.”66

General Grant’s opinion was shared by many, both in and out of the military, and 

Paine was removed from command, a removal punctuated by his flight to Illinois to avoid the 

military investigators. Considerable disgust was evident in Kentucky when, in January 1865, 

a court-martial hearing on the charges resulted in no more than a reprimand for the inept and 

unprincipled general officer.67

Actions such as Paine’s and the ill-advised violence that Burbridge’s order condoned 

were of no help to the Union cause in Kentucky. They had little negative effect upon the actions 

of the guerrillas they were intended to combat, and had serious impact upon the attitude of 

the people of Kentucky towards the Federal Government.68 As 1864 came to a close and 1865 

opened, relations between Governor Bramlette and General Burbridge reached an impasse 

that threatened violence between State and Federal troops. Faced with these circumstances, 

President Lincoln decided to remove Burbridge from command. On February 10, 1865, the 

Louisville Daily Journal printed an announcement reveling in the fact that, “Maj. Gen. John 

M. Palmer of Illinois has been appointed to command in Kentucky. Thank God and President 

Lincoln.”69 It was now left to General Palmer to deal with the guerrilla problem his predecessor 

had been unable to solve.

For nearly two years, the State and Federal troops had tried, without much luck, to run 

down and capture the numerous guerrilla bands roaming the State. The infantry units assigned 

to the mission had proved to be utterly worthless because the guerrillas were invariably 

mounted. The conventional cavalry units had experienced a bit more success, but the continued 

rise of guerrilla raids and violence proved the limits of these troops. As noted earlier by George 

Prentice, the Federal troops were often from outside of the state or from another county and they 

seldom had adequate knowledge of the countryside for their mission. The guerrilla bands knew 

every trail and hiding place, and combined with the possibility of help from their supporters, 

they were nearly impossible to find.

To combat these disadvantages, General Palmer authorized a new technique against 

the irregulars. He recognized that the only way to beat the guerrilla was to defeat him at his own 

game. Regular units had too many restrictions on their actions and were tied down to supply 

bases and communications lines. Palmer sought to overcome these shortcomings by organizing 

small units of state troops and civilians (who would have better knowledge of the area) along 

40
the same organizational lines as the guerrillas that they would chase. They were given the 

leeway to stay with a guerrilla band wherever they went, not restricted by artificial lines of 

jurisdiction or logistics. They were empowered to impress horses and supplies from citizens 

when necessary, enabling them to stay with the guerrillas and literally run them to ground.

Many of these Union anti-guerrilla units were formed, but the most successful seem to 

have been those commanded by Captain Ed Terrell and Captain James Bridgewater. These two 

men became the scourge of the guerrilla units in central Kentucky, establishing a considerable 

reputation among the people of the State. Their methods worked, and they did much to slow 

the guerrilla violence, but their violent means and impressments of horses alienated many of 

the citizens, Unionist and Secessionist alike.

Ed Terrell was a native Kentuckian and had recruited his scouts from the Shelby and 

Spencer County areas. He was twenty-years old when he signed on as a Union guerrilla-fighter 

and had already had considerable experience in the war. Terrell had enlisted in the Union army 

earlier and upon his return to the state, he had joined the militia. Terrell’s early career is marked 

with shadows and violence, but it appears that he deserted the Union army at least once, and 

may have served in the Confederate service prior to that.70 Terrell was a violent young man and 

eventually died a violent death after the war. He was accused of murder numerous times during 

the war, but his orders from the Government were virtually a “license to kill” and that is exactly 

how he used them. Terrell’s fame was mainly derived from his capture of the Civil War’s most 

hated and feared guerrilla — William Clarke Quantrill. 

When news of a guerrilla column came to Terrell, he followed the trail until he found 

guerrillas or the trail ended, nothing else could draw him off. In May 1865, Terrell picked up the 

trail of a party of guerrillas near Bloomfield and began to track them. Though the Civil War was 

virtually over, General Lee having surrendered over a month earlier, Kentucky’s petty war was 

not finished. Terrell and his men found the band of guerrillas in a barn near Wakefield Station 

and attacked. In the barn were Quantrill and his band of irregulars. Quantrill was wounded in 

the exchange and captured. Those men of his band who escaped from Wakefield surrendered to 

authorities in late July 1865.71

The other man who epitomized the Union guerrilla-fighters was Captain James 

Bridgewater. Bridgewater had been active in the State service well before Palmer’s assumption of 

command, and had already established himself as a fighter. A prominent resident of Bloomfield, 

Kentucky, wrote to Bramlette requesting protection. Her request went on to say that “a threat...

would be all sufficient, I presume, it would probably never require to be executed, especially if 

Bridgewater should be named as executioner-for his name is a terror through this community.”72

A review of the Quartermaster and Adjutant General’s Papers at the Kentucky Military History 

Museum reveals that Bridgewater was extremely active in the spring of 1865. From the number 

of horses that he and his men impressed during the performance of their missions, they could 

rarely have had time to sleep. Months after the end of hostilities, citizens of Kentucky were 

still complaining to the Adjutant General that their horses had been wrongfully impressed and 

desiring their return.73

41
Terrell and Bridgewater are representative of the men who Palmer used successfully 

to combat the guerrilla menace. Though it is hard to ascertain whether they would have been 

as effective if the war had not ended in the spring of 1865, it appears that the Union authorities 

had finally stumbled onto the only method that would work against the guerrillas. They 

had unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the base of support from which the guerrillas received 

sustenance and had been unable to deal with these bands using regular infantry and cavalry. 

The Union guerrilla-fighters were given a blank check in their effort to deal with the irregulars. 

They utilized the same tactics of terror, speed, and violence that were the trademarks of their 

adversaries. It was only by becoming guerrillas, with all the attendant rough edges, that the 

Union soldiers were able to meet the guerrillas on even terms. Reports of outrages by State 

troops can be found throughout the literature of the period, but these appear to have been isolated 

instances of lawless violence. The guerrilla-fighters that were used in 1865 were violent and 

their methods unusual, but they operated under orders, which had only one important clause — 

stop the guerrilla outrages — and this they did well.

If the earlier contention that one of the objectives of the guerrilla war in Kentucky 

was to affect the civilian administration of the state, then the guerrillas who worked the 

Commonwealth must be given great credit for accomplishing that mission. It is obvious that 

they dictated the Union response to their violence, and forced the Government to consider acts 

that were drastic and at times detrimental to their own political well-being. The Union response 

was repeatedly over-zealous and aimed at the wrong part of the populace. It was not until the 

military recognized that conventional tactics would not eliminate the menace that an adequate 

plan emerged from the State and Federal authorities.

42
Notes

1. Louisville Daily Journal, September 2, 1864.

2. Louisville Daily Journal, September 29, 1865.

3. Thomas Shelby Watson, The Silent Riders, (Louisville, Ky.: Beechmont Press, 1971), p 43. 

4. Col. Thomas Campbell to General D. W. Lindsey. July 8, 1865. The Quartermaster and Adjutant 

General’s Papers, Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, Kentucky.

5. Robert R. Mackey, The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865, pp. 123-154.

6. Mackey, p. 46.

7. Bennett H. Yount, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle: Being Reminiscences and Observations of 

One Who Rode with Morgan, (Boston: Chapple Publishing Company, 1914; Reprinted., Dayton, OH.: 

Morningside Bookshop, 1979), p. 369.

8. Louisville Daily Journal, March 19, 1864.

9. Louisville Daily Journal, July 6, 1864.

10. Louisville Daily Journal, March 8, 1864.

11. Louisville Daily Journal, July 1, 1864.

12. William J. Davis, ed., The Partisan Rangers of the Confederate States Army, (Louisville, Ky.: 

George G. Fetter Company, 1904; Reprinted., Hartford, Ky.: Cook & McDowell Publications, 1979), 

Chapter XI. This appears in Johnson’s memoir, and as such is embellished. It is, however, believable in 

light of other officers who were sent into Kentucky during the war with the same mission.

13. Louisville Daily Journal, October 29, 1864.

14. The War of Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols., (Washington: 1880-1901), Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, P. 817.

15. Davis, p. 100.

16. Davis, pp. 363-384.

17. Davis, pp. 277-279.

18. Davis, p. 278.

19. Louisville Daily Journal, March 29, 1864.

20. Louisville Daily Journal, April 29, 1864.

43
21. Louisville Daily Journal, May 2, 1864.

22. Louisville Daily Journal, July 12, 1864.

23. Davis, p. 341.

24. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 263.

25. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 7, pp. 926-927.

26. Louisville Daily Journal, July 15, 1864.

27. Louisville Daily Journal, April 30, 1864.

28. Watson, pp. 21-23. 

29. Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865. 

Baton Rouge, LA; Louisiana State University Press, 1958, Louisiana Paperback Edition, 1984, p. 99.

30. The reference to no-quarter indicates that the combatants did not recognize the more subtle rules of 

war in respect to each other, but were inclined to whatever form of violence that suited them should they 

be captured. Summary execution was the common result of capture in a no-quarter environment.

31. Louisville Daily Journal, October 11, 1864.

32. Watson, pp. 26-27.

33. Watson, pp. 36-37.

34. Louisville Daily Journal, March 16, 1865.

35. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 8, p. 384.

36. Louisville Daily Journal, September 2, 1864.

37. Louisville Daily Journal, July 15, 1864.

38. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 49, Part 2, pp. 355-356.

39. D. K. Butter and James Lyndon to General John W. Finnell. October 4, 1865. The Quartermaster and 

Adjutant General’s Papers, Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, Kentucky.

40. Louisville Daily Journal, November 24, 1864.

41. Louisville Daily Journal, July 11, 1864.

42. Louisville Daily Journal, August 23,1865.

44
43. Examples of this issue are evident in any examination of recent wars in Iraq or Afghanistan. Particularly along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (artificially drawn by the British years ago) the 

Taliban retains a great advantage in their knowledge of the mountains and the support of different Pashtun tribes which occupy these areas. Their tribal affiliations provide them access to aid and intelligence 

which is difficult for NATO troops to overcome. To make this problem worse, most Western nations are 

rotating troops in and out of country on tours which are six months to one year in length. This makes it 

incredibly difficult to create relationships or gain intimate knowledge of terrain in such a short period 

of time.

44. This policy of making hostages out of family members of suspected insurgents continues today, as 

units of the US Army used this same tactic in operations in Iraq. It would appear that the tactic is no more 

successful today than it was in the 1860s.

45. This problem also still exists in the military’s operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan. When units 

punish community members for things they did not do, rather than stemming the flow of the insurgency, 

they merely add recruits to the enemy force.

46. Alwyn Barr, “Records of Confederate Military Commission in San Antonio, July 2 – October 10, 

1862,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70 (July 1966): p. 95.

47. Barr, pp. 345-346.

48. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, pp. 240-241.

49. Official Records, pp. 135-136.

50. Official Records, p. 174.

51. Official Records, pp. 144-145.

52. Louisville Daily Journal, September 1864.

53. Davis, p. 309.

54. Davis, p. 315.

55. Davis, p. 341.

56. Louisville Daily Journal, November 24, 1864.

57. R.H. Williams and John W. Sansom, The Massacre on the Nueces River: The Story of a Civil War 

Tragedy, (Grand Prairie, TX.: Frontier Times Publishing Company, ca. 1911), pp. 11-23.

58. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 172.

59. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 8, pp. 383-389.

60. Nathaniel S. Shaler, Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 

1897, pp. 333-334.

45
61. E. Merton Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, Chapel Hill, NC: The University 

of North Carolina Press, 1926; reprint ed., Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966, pp. 221-222.

62. Louisville Daily Journal, September 7, 1864.

63. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 171.

64. Coulter, Civil War, pp. 220-222.

65. Coulter, p. 222.

66. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 342.

67. Coulter, p. 222.

68. Organized cruelty rarely has a positive long-term effect unless the society that supports the military 

force is openly willing to support it. In most democracies, this tactic works as long as it is not common 

knowledge in the public sphere, but rarely meets with general approval. Beginning the use of this tactic 

is rarely useful, unless the military is willing to utilize it to the final conclusion of extermination. If not, 

eventually the society will be repulsed by its use and the military will be held accountable for its actions.

69. Louisville Daily Journal, February 10, 1865.

70. Watson, pp. 45-47.

71. Watson, pp. 45-66.

72. Mrs. Glasscocke to Governor Bramlette, January 2, 1865, The Quartermaster and Adjutant General’s 

Papers, Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, Kentucky.

73. Mrs. Glasscocke to Governor Bramlette, January 2, 1865; John Davis to General Lindsey, August 

10, 1865.

46
Chapter 2

Kansas-Missouri

On August 21, 1863, William Clarke Quantrill led approximately 450 irregular warriors 

into the streets of Lawrence, Kansas, in what has been the most publicized event in the history of 

the border warfare. Unexpectedly, he and his guerrilla followers struck this town of nearly two 

thousand in search of plunder, revenge, and blood. The story of Lawrence is well documented 

in the literature of the border and won’t be retold in detail here. The guerrillas came to town 

with a death list, drawn up to insure that none of their intended targets were forgotten in the 

excitement. They eventually killed nearly 200 people, most were innocent male residents of 

Lawrence who happened to be living in the wrong town on the wrong day. The mixture of 

revenge, grief, and alcohol became a violent brew that turned the raid into a massacre, shocking 

the entire nation. Even many Confederate sympathizers found it hard to justify the actions 

of these Missouri raiders, as the raid was too violent even for the population of the borderlying states, which was used daily to exact death and destruction. With this act of barbarism, 

the guerrillas stepped over a line that they had been close to for some time. It galvanized the 

Union populace and leadership along the border and prompted a response that nearly ended the 

career of Quantrill and his band. As the smoke was still billowing from homes in Lawrence, 

the guerrillas came under pursuit from troops and civilians alike, determined to ride down the 

animals that had attacked the fair city and take so many lives. Much of this was accomplished, 

as many of the men who rode in the raid never lived to enjoy the plunder they took. The 

countryside between Lawrence and the Missouri border swarmed with armed Unionists and 

only a skillful rearguard fight by the guerrilla forces prevented the total destruction of the 

raiders. Making the Missouri line, the group split up and the men went to ground to hide from 

their pursuers.1

The raid on Lawrence, Kansas, by Confederate irregulars epitomizes the violence that 

was pervasive throughout the border counties of western Missouri and eastern Kansas. In this 

small geographical area, a guerrilla war raged for nearly 10 years. The violence along this 

part of the border is probably better known by Civil War historians than any other portion of 

the border conflict. The bulk of volumes written on this subject center in the counties around 

Kansas City and examine the conflict between Missouri southerners and Kansas unionists. 

This is not merely a story of the Civil War though, for the violent roots reach deeper into the 

historical soil of the area. The guerrilla violence of the Civil War period did not just rise up 

in 1861, but was marked by an evolutionary process that began in “Bleeding Kansas” in the 

1850s. To lay the proper groundwork this story must begin in the pre-Civil War era.

Bleeding Kansas

The conflict that eventually led to the beginnings of the Civil War had its roots in the 

soil of Kansas. Compromise after compromise had been reached on issues such as slavery 

at the national political level for many years. With the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 

of 1854, the stage was set in Kansas for a contest that would lead to intrigue, violence, and 

47
murder. Missouri was by every test a southern state. It had been settled by southerners and was 

fully inculcated with the cultural heritage of the lower south. While it was not a largely slaveowning population, slaves were common and bondage was an accepted practice for the white 

population. The burning desire to control the popular election in Kansas rested on the dread 

of an anti-southern state on the western border of Missouri. Though the central and western 

portions of Kansas were not well suited for the small farming endeavors that were common 

in Missouri, many vocal members of the Missouri electorate believed that Kansas had to be a 

slave state to protect their culture. 

Map 3. Kansas Area of Operations.

On the other side of the state line, in Kansas Territory, was a mixture of New Englanders, 

New Yorkers, and settlers from the middle states in the Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois area. Though 

the contemporary press painted Kansans to be ardent abolitionists, the average farmer or store 

owner was probably anti-Negro, but not particularly anti-slave. The most vocal political leaders 

of the Territory were against the institution of slavery and used this as a political club as often 

as possible to further their ambitions. 

As the vote approached to determine the future of Kansas as a state, groups of men 

from western Missouri (derisively known as Border Ruffians) crossed the border into Kansas 

Territory and voted in many of the border towns, skewing the vote count in favor of the proslavery ticket. These groups also rode about the countryside of eastern Kansas, impressing 

upon the population their intent to control the election. This low-level violence was nothing 

near what would occur on the border in the years of the Civil War, but it laid the foundation 

of hatred that would later result in the “Jayhawking” that sparked the all-out guerrilla war of 

1861-1865.

In May of 1856, Rueben Randlett was sent by leaders of the Free State Movement to 

Leavenworth in an attempt to determine the intentions of a group of Border Ruffians gathering 

48
there. Randlett infiltrated the group and verified that they were bound for Lawrence, with the 

mission of punishing the occupants of the town for being at the center of the Territory’s antislavery movement. Randlett was able to escape from the group of ruffians as they began their 

circuitous march towards Lawrence. He warned the occupants of the targeted town, allowing 

them the opportunity to prepare for the attack. Another man had been detailed to accompany 

Randlett, John E. Cook, but he fell ill during the journey and returned to Leavenworth. Cook 

would later be hanged with John Brown for his actions at Harper’s Ferry. 

Days before the attack on Lawrence, Randlett was sent with Cook and Charles Stewart 

to check into a reported murder by the Border Ruffians. While enroute to the reported site of the 

murder, Blanton’s Bridge, they encountered two mounted men who they stopped to question. 

The incident ended in gunfire between the two groups and the death of Stewart. The mounted 

men escaped, though without their horses or firearms. While this incident is a far cry from 

the death and mutilation that would have occurred eight or nine years later out of a similar 

encounter, it was violent for a part of the country that was not at war. The violence learned here 

would breed far more brutal acts in the years to come.2

On May 21, 1856, the group Randlett infiltrated, numbering 600-800 ruffians, 

entered Lawrence with a red banner inscribed with the words “South Carolina” on one side 

and “Southern Rights” on the other, bent on destroying the Free State Hotel and two local 

newspapers that sided with the Free Staters. The assembled manpower of the Free Staters was 

around 150, a difference that resulted in the defenders opting not to put up a defense and they 

withdrew out of town. The Missourians came to the center of town, destroying the newspaper 

offices of the Herald of Freedom and the Free State. The newspaper offices out of the way, they 

tried to knock down the hotel with their three-pound brass cannons, but found them not up to 

the task. Finally, after placing their flag on the roof of the hotel for a time, a barrel of pitch was 

rolled into the hotel and with the aid of the furnishings was set on fire, gutting the structure. At 

least two witnesses indicated that the only casualty that the Missourians suffered was a man 

killed by a brick falling from the chimney to which the flag was attached.3

While the average soul in Kansas during the latter part of the 1850s was just trying to 

eke out a living, a number of individuals who would have great parts to play in history were 

living here on the edge of civilization. John Brown, soon to provide a deadly spark to the 

sectional controversy, operated with the Free State forces in many small skirmishes throughout 

Kansas, before embarking on at least one massacre of slave owners prior to the attack on 

Harper’s Ferry. One of his companions in Kansas, Jim Lane, would become a dominant figure 

in Kansas for the next 10 years and be involved in much of the Jayhawk violence that set off the 

guerrilla campaign. Another Kansan, James Montgomery, led raids into southwestern Missouri 

to free slaves there and bring them to freedom in Kansas. 

Many of these staunch Unionists lived for a time in the same town as one young 

man whose name would soon become a household name in America. He was William Clarke 

Quantrill and had come to Kansas from Canal Dover, Ohio. He made his living for some 

time as a schoolteacher, but eventually fell in with some bad company. He made a slight 

reputation with the anti-slavery community in Kansas, operating with them to liberate slaves 

49
from Missouri. This thin young man soon found his loyalties on the other side of the border 

and began a career that made him one of the most reviled men in Civil War history. While still 

living in Kansas, he wrote a letter to his mother that clearly identified which side of the coming 

conflict he would support. Quantrill alluded to the fact that pro-slavery forces were condemned 

for their violence, “but when one once knows the facts they can easily see that it has been the 

opposite party that have been the main movers in the troubles & by far the most lawless set of 

people in the country. They all sympathize for old J. Brown, who should have been hung years 

ago, indeed hanging was too good for him.”4

As noted earlier, Lawrence had been attacked in May 1856 and some offending 

establishments destroyed by the Missourians. Little could anyone know the future place that 

Lawrence would have in the history of Kansas and the Civil War. Skirmishing between the Free 

Staters and Border Ruffians would continue through the latter years of the 1850s. John Brown, 

mentioned in the Quantrill letter above, would contribute to this bloodletting with his butchery 

of five proslavery men along the banks of Pottowatomie Creek on May 24, 1856. His violent 

attack was a harbinger to his raid on Harper’s Ferry and an excellent example of the volatile 

nature of the border in the pre-Civil War period. It was in this environment that bitter hatreds 

and personal feuds were begun. Men who would soon be on opposite sides in a true war were 

pitted against each other in what would prove to be merely a precursor to the most violent 

episode in American History.

Civil War

With the coming of secession and the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the inhabitants of 

the Kansas Territory looked with apprehension to the east. Their relationship with their Missouri 

neighbors was barely a speaking arrangement and many feared that the new state could be 

totally cut off from the Union if Missouri went “out with the South.” Many men remembered 

the violence and outrages of “Bleeding Kansas,” and while most of the population consisted 

of reasonable, law-abiding citizens, there was an element in Kansas that sought revenge on 

the Missourians. A number of these men were hard-core abolitionists, with a burning desire to 

free Missouri slaves and rid the world of this “peculiar institution.” Just as many were bandits, 

lawless men who saw the outbreak of war as an opportunity to plunder and rob at their leisure, 

possibly with the sanction of the State or Federal Governments. Concern about military affairs 

in Missouri, as Sterling Price began operations, led to a clamor for militia units in Kansas.

Jim Lane, an opportunistic politician, sought permission to raise a brigade to protect 

Kansas, though the real reason appears to be the strengthening of his power base in Kansas 

politics. Through skillful maneuvering, he received permission to muster in this organization 

and assumed command of it at Fort Scott in August 1861.5

 The unit, known as the “Kansas 

Brigade” or more accurately “Lane’s Brigade,” gathered at Fort Scott and anticipated action 

after the defeat of General Nathaniel Lyons at Wilson’s Creek. The leadership of Lane’s Brigade 

was a mixed lot, who would receive much press coverage in the ensuing years. 

50
Map 4. Missouri Area of Operations.

James Montgomery had been commissioned a Colonel by the Governor of Kansas and 

was appointed second-in-command. Other members of his raiding parties from before the war, 

like Charles Jennison, were also appointed as officers over organizations that more closely 

resembled bandit hordes than military units. These men were as much interested in personal 

gain as they were in the protection of the law-abiding citizens of Kansas. 

A scouting expedition from Sterling Price’s army made contact with the Brigade and 

called for assistance from the main body. With the approach of Price’s superior force, Lane fell 

back and Price turned his attention to more important quarry. Lane had no desire to attempt 

open combat with a regular force and thus left the field while he could. In a portent of what 

was to come, the detachment of Jennison’s command, which had been left to guard Ft. Scott, 

looted the town after it had been evacuated by its occupants. Lane’s Brigade never missed the 

opportunity to turn a profit on any military mission. 

51
On September 10, 1861, Lane opted to start north along the Missouri border to clear 

out the secessionist element that inhabited the western counties that adjoined Kansas. His force 

of about 1,500 men set out to burn and plunder everything in their way, destroying anything of 

value to Price’s army and to the secessionists who lived in that part of Missouri. How exactly 

they decided who was a secessionist and who was a unionist is still a mystery and one that 

plagued warriors on the border for the next four years. Lane’s raid was the beginning of a policy 

of slash and burn that ran rampant between the western counties of Missouri and the eastern 

counties of Kansas for the remainder of the war. Ostensibly, the raid was to protect Kansas, 

but revenge for the actions of Border Ruffians in previous years was a much more prevalent 

motive. The Kansans now had the Federal Government behind them and they intended to give 

Missourians a taste of their own medicine.

Lane’s Brigade continued their march through the Osage Valley and finally, on 

September 23d, reached the city of Osceola. Finding supplies for Price’s army there, Lane 

allowed his men to loot the town and then burn it almost completely. The quantity of liquor 

consumed by the Brigade appears to have been excessive and the lack of control by their 

officers led to the destruction of an innocent town. The valuables from Osceola were piled 

in wagons before the destruction and most of the goods from this Missouri city were to end 

up in the homes of Kansans in the days that followed. This destruction of a barely defended 

city would fan the flames on the border and though Lane would try to defend his actions as 

being militarily justified, it served only to increase the level of violence on the border. Albert 

Castel, an active historian during this Kansas period, maintained that “Lane’s Brigade was an 

irresponsible mob which looted and burned Osceola out of a wanton lust for plunder and a selfrighteous desire to injure the Missourians.” This was not a military expedition in the vein of 

Lyon and Price’s meeting at Wilson’s Creek, but a raid intended to punish and rob the Missouri 

populace for perceived wrongs of the territorial period. Lane wanted to strike not at Price, but at 

the people of Missouri and their society, to include their slaves. Its effect was to drive a greater 

wedge between these two types of people and stir the hatred of Kansas in the hearts of Missouri 

youth.6

The raid on Osceola was Lane’s final act of consequence in command of his Brigade. 

While Lane no longer played an active role in field operations, other units of the Brigade 

continued this form of warfare against the people of the Missouri border counties. The most 

infamous of them was undoubtedly Charles Jennison and his Seventh Kansas Regiment, known 

more popularly as Jennison’s Jayhawkers. The term “jayhawker” became the most commonly 

used and popular term for Unionist raiders coming out of Kansas. While it originated with 

Jennison and Montgomery some years earlier, it came into common use to mean any band 

of Kansan raiders who happened to ride into a Missouri or Indian Territory city bent on its 

destruction and plunder. While plunder and arson were the mode of operation for Lane’s 

Brigade, Jennison would take the theme to much higher levels, adding murder to the list of 

approved activities whenever his Jayhawkers were dealing with any people he deemed to be 

disloyal. Jennison had been liberating slaves for many years on the Kansas-Missouri border and 

the conditions on the border now allowed him to perform his violence with an air of legitimacy. 

His raiders descended upon Jackson County, Missouri, and proceeded to burn and steal their 

52
way from one end to the other. Individual farms and small towns alike found Jayhawkers in 

their midst, taking what they wished and punishing anyone who tried to stand in their way. 

Jennison had been commissioned by Governor Robinson in an attempt to control his 

outrages, but it became obvious in a very short period of time that nothing would ever control 

his lust for plunder. The Seventh Kansas included a unit commanded by the son of John Brown, 

a unit that was every bit as driven as the elder Brown, and they set out to punish slaveholders 

wherever they found them. Other officers in Jennison’s regiment were equal to the commander 

himself in their zeal to punish and steal. Marshall Cleveland and D.R. Anthony (brother of 

Susan B. Anthony) commanded portions of the undisciplined organization in the field, and 

whether because of a total lack of moral fiber or a zealous commitment to abolitionism, these 

men were equally as quick with the torch on the possessions of Missourians. Some of the most 

zealous arsonists in these bands were actually unionist Missourians themselves.

As the war broke out, unionists and secessionists lived side-by-side in Missouri, held 

together by the bond of statehood and common social backgrounds. It was only when the firing 

on Fort Sumter forced individuals to take sides that problems became evident in Missouri 

society. Many unionist residents of the western counties were forced to move to Kansas by 

the actions of their secessionist neighbors, particularly after the success of Sterling Price at 

Wilson’s Creek. These people had very personal scores to settle and many of them flocked 

to the Kansas regiments as an opportunity to even some of these scores and serve the Union 

they supported. In an interview with a victim of Jennison’s violence, William E. Connelly 

commented that while Kansans had for years been abused by Missouri border ruffians, with 

the change in national administration the Jayhawkers had seized their opportunity to even the 

ledger and had taken the violence to a new level. While sounding almost proud of the violent 

accomplishments of the Jayhawkers, Connelly did admit that “the most deplorable result of 

both the border ruffian and the Jayhawker was the suffering entailed upon the innocent and 

those who had no desire to engage in lawlessness in either Kansas or Missouri...”7

While Connelly is an apologist for the actions of the Jayhawkers in his history of the 

border wars and the guerrilla violence during the Civil War, he adequately captured the essence 

of the irregular violence of the border. Missourians had preyed upon Kansans in the 1850s and 

now Kansans were preying on Missourians in the opening months of the Civil War. Action had 

brought reaction and the border would not be the same for many years to come. Perceived and 

actual wrongs were avenged and in a society filled with this type of personal violence, a vicious 

breed of man rose to the top. On the Union side, the type is best evidenced by Charles Jennison, 

but on the Confederate side it would soon be epitomized by the man most associated with the 

guerrilla violence in the Trans-Mississippi West, William Clarke Quantrill.

Jennison and the other members of Lane’s Brigade fall under the category of Partisan 

Rangers, as their actions were officially sanctioned by the Federal Government and they were 

a duly constituted unit. On the other side, Quantrill and most of the Confederate guerrillas 

must be classified as war-rebels at best. While he claimed a commission from the Confederate 

Government and often acted in concert with the Confederate army, the Richmond Government 

did not claim his actions as their own at anytime. That he, and other guerrillas in Missouri, 

53
fought on behalf of the Confederacy is difficult to dispute, but they had no official claim to 

legitimacy in their actions.

Biographies on Quantrill have been the standard guerrilla fare for Civil War readers 

for over 100 years. His legend is one of the best known, and yet least understood, in the annals 

of this purely American war. A variety of authors each gave him their own slant, and while the 

work of Albert Castel has given us a more balanced view of his life, he is still a central figure 

in any discussion of guerrilla warfare in America. The truth is that while Quantrill is the best 

known and most storied practitioner of this violent military art form, he was one of many in 

Kansas-Missouri and the other states on the border. His story does lead the reader through the 

violence in this region better than any other and for that reason he will be at the center of this 

study on the Confederate efforts at irregular warfare.

Quantrill burst onto the scene as an active player in the deadly warfare on the border in 

March 1862. He and his band of bushwhackers burst into the Johnson County, Kansas, town of 

Aubrey at about dawn. They were looking for Jayhawkers and apparently left three dead in their 

wake. The story lives on largely for two reasons: Quantrill himself saw someone looking out 

the frost-covered upper window of the town’s hotel and fired a round at the face. It struck the 

onlooker, but the glancing blow only stunned him for a short time. Upon the man’s recovery, he 

was brought before Quantrill and turned out to be Abraham Ellis, the superintendent of schools 

in Miami County, Kansas, where Quantrill had once taught. Quantrill liked Ellis and after 

insuring that he was all right, allowed him to retain his possessions with the exception of some 

money that had already been taken from him by the bushwhackers. 

The other interesting issue deals with Lieutenant Reuben Randlett, who was mentioned 

earlier as a scout for the Free Staters in the territorial period. Randlett was enroute back to his 

regiment from a leave of absence and was staying in the same room as Abraham Ellis when 

the raid began. He surrendered to Quantrill’s men and after being threatened with a gun in his 

mouth and one to his ear, was taken to see Quantrill himself. The guerrilla chieftain had plans 

for Randlett and spared his life and that of the other regular Union soldiers who were present 

in Aubrey.8

Randlett would remain Quantrill’s prisoner for eleven days, as the guerrilla leader 

attempted to exchange him for a bushwhacker who had been captured and was sentenced to be 

executed at Leavenworth. Quantrill was attempting to act as a regular soldier in this instance; at 

least to the extent that he had paroled the Union soldiers captured at Aubrey and was attempting 

to exchange Randlett. The Union authorities would have nothing to do with the attempted 

exchange and, even though Randlett was released to try and reason with the Union leaders, 

Quantrill’s man was executed at Leavenworth. Randlett never returned to Quantrill’s control 

after his attempt to be exchanged, but also never returned to Union service. His interview with 

William E. Connelley revealed a dissatisfaction that the Union authorities, apparently General 

Sturgis, refused to do what Randlett believed to be the honorable thing. Randlett could not 

understand why Sturgis would not exchange the soldiers. It was a common practice in the Civil 

War at this point and he would have received the life of an officer for that of a bushwhacker; 

by Randlett’s estimation it was more than a fair trade. However, Sturgis would not exchange 

54
the guerrilla because he could not deal with Quantrill as though he were a regular officer. To 

have done so would have afforded Quantrill recognition as a combatant, rather than the outlaw 

that the Federal Government believed him to be. Sturgis’ actions were in keeping with the legal 

opinions mentioned earlier from Halleck and Lieber and certainly met the letter of the law 

under General Orders No. 100, though that order was yet to be published.

With the appointment of Major General Halleck to command of the Department of 

the Mississippi on March 13, 1862, the unofficial rules of warfare on the border dramatically 

changed. The second act that Halleck took, after publishing his assumption of command order, 

was to issue General Order 2 of the Department of the Mississippi, which officially placed 

irregulars outside of the law and required them to be treated as outlaws. This meant that if 

captured, they would not be accorded protection as Confederate soldiers, but executed as 

common criminals.9

 Quantrill and his men had regularly paroled Union prisoners and it had 

not been unusual for Union officers to parole or exchange bushwhackers, though the informal 

rules of warfare forbade it. But with the official no-quarter order issued and abided by in the 

Kansas-Missouri area, the scene was set for violence of such proportions that many modern 

scholars find it suspect. There would be no more prisoners on either side, just a body count to 

see how many could be killed or executed. The raid on Aubrey had once again caused the tide 

of violence to ebb across the Kansas border, a trend that would occur more often in the months 

to follow. After the Aubrey raid, Quantrill and his men went “to ground” back in their haunts 

in Jackson County, Missouri, and the Sni-a-Bar Hills. The geography of this part of Missouri 

made it perfect to hide small bodies of men for extended periods of time, and as many of the 

men that rode with Quantrill had grown up here, it was nearly impossible to capture them. 

Many of the families of the guerrillas lived on this land and provided food and intelligence 

to the band as they avoided the Federal patrols. This was a key element in guerrilla warfare 

along the border, with the help of the population being an important ingredient in the recipe for 

guerrilla success in Missouri and other states.

A key element, if not the key element, in any guerrilla conflict is the population that is 

caught between the regular and irregular forces. On the Kansas-Missouri border, this included a 

mixed population of unionists and secessionists, living together in far less than harmony. With 

the advent of an unrestricted, no-quarter policy on both sides, violence accelerated against the 

entire population. Where plunder and murder had existed to this point, there was no longer 

any compelling reason, beyond whatever personal morals the participants exhibited, to deal 

anything but death to the enemy. Regular army units and Jayhawkers alike were permitted, in 

fact expected, to execute irregulars when captured. 

Faced with this prospect, Confederate irregulars and bandits had no reason to confine 

their warfare to any limits of decency. General Halleck’s decision, while being within the laws 

of war as he saw them, had the impact of exponentially increasing the pain and suffering felt 

by the civilian population along the border. From this point on, the violence would continue 

to increase in frequency and barbarity, running the gamut from murder of innocent civilians, 

on both sides, to the forced depopulation and wholesale pillaging of entire counties, to the 

final barbarous acts of Bill Anderson around Centralia, Missouri, in 1864. The restraints that 

generally confined traditional nineteenth century soldiers had been loosened, as they had been 

55
in Napoleon’s Spanish Campaign, and normally moral men from both sides acted in a manner 

unheard of in American History since the French and Indian Wars.

One of the central questions surrounding this violence was how to identify people as 

unionist or secessionist. What part of the population would be held responsible for the acts of 

Confederate guerrillas? Who would the guerrillas hold responsible for the atrocities committed 

by those claiming the protection of the Federal Government? These questions held true in 

Kentucky, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. The population of the entire border was caught 

between two armed forces, and faced danger from both sides. If you failed to assist the military 

you were of questionable loyalties and if you wouldn’t assist the guerrillas that roamed the 

woods, you were a dreaded unionist and might well forfeit your life. The people of the border 

were trapped between two warring parties and there was very little that they could do to solve 

their problem. Inevitably, people were held accountable not for their actions, but also for their 

politics, and merely being perceived as a secessionist or a unionist could be reason enough to 

win a bullet or noose if you were at the wrong place at the wrong time.

Death was not the only problem for secessionists along the border. Union commanders, 

like General John M. Schofield, took whatever steps they believed necessary to combat the 

irregular violence they found in Kansas and Missouri. In the summer and fall of 1862, Schofield 

lacked the troops he needed to deal with the widespread guerrilla raids and had no chance of 

obtaining them from the Federal Government. His solution was to ask the Governor of Missouri 

to enroll the militia of the state to fight these shadowy enemies. What might seem to have 

been a simple and effective solution to this problem, turned out to cause Schofield even more 

problems. The population of Missouri was a diverse mix of southern and northern men who, 

left alone on their farms, could live in relative harmony. But with the general calling for the 

state militia, secessionist sympathizers of military age were asked to take sides against a cause 

in which they believed. While their personal beliefs allowed them to stay home and not help the 

Union, they could not bring themselves to openly fight against the Confederacy. The result was 

that they had only two viable choices: they could go south into Arkansas or Texas and join the 

regular Confederate armies operating there or take to the bush and join the irregular warriors 

that carried on the battle against the Union in Missouri. As a result, the Union commanders now 

faced an increased number of guerrilla bands throughout the state and a greater pool of local 

citizens willing to assist these guerrillas with food, shelter, and intelligence.10

In a report to higher headquarters, Schofield also discussed the growing involvement 

of the militia. His ability to equip and arm these units was severely limited and his search for 

a way to accomplish this finally came to rest with the idea of making the disloyal members of 

the state pay the cost. He imposed the cost of policing the guerrilla bands on the secessionists 

of the state. He specifically started in Saint Louis County and proceeded to raise $500,000 

to support the active militia. Unfortunately, the determination of one’s political sympathies 

was very subjective and rarely accurate. Determining who must pay the assessment was an 

inaccurate science and in Saint Louis County the method used was the appointment of a 

five-man committee to determine who was disloyal and would be assessed. This economic 

retaliation, while possibly necessary in Schofield’s mind, served to drive a wedge into the 

population.11 Committees such as this throughout the border area could be counted upon to 

56
settle old grudges and be utilized to legitimize the harassment and ruin of personal and political 

opponents. While assessments may have been effective in raising necessary monies, they 

simply served as another reason for families to turn against the Union.12

In the wake of mobilization of the militia and assessment of “disloyal” members of 

society, questionable deaths occurred with consistency across the border, sanctioned by Union 

authorities with little regard for anything resembling a burden of proof. One such incident 

occurred in Missouri in the fall of 1862 and serves to illustrate the violence of the region and 

clumsy way it was often utilized by Union officials. It is particularly interesting in light of 

the issue of how to classify units, in this case a Confederate army organization specifically 

assigned to perform activities consistent with the actions of Partisan Rangers but treated by the 

Union authorities with the same disdain normally reserved for Quantrill’s unit.

Following a raid on the town of Palmyra, Missouri, by Confederates under the command 

Colonel Joseph C. Porter, an elderly unionist named Andrew Allsman was reported missing and 

presumed kidnapped by Porter’s command. Evidently, this was correct and Allsman had been 

taken unknown to Porter and murdered by members of his command. Palmyra is in northeast 

Missouri, distant from the Kansas border and the haunts of Quantrill and the more well-known 

guerrillas of the border. Porter was a commissioned Confederate officer operating under the 

command of General Hindman, who had sent forces behind Union lines specifically to disrupt 

communications and command. In this way, Porter’s mission was very similar to that of Colonel 

Benjamin Grierson during his famous raid into the Confederacy. Regardless of how Porter was 

perceived by General Hindman and the Confederate Government, he was merely a guerrilla 

in the eyes of the Union Army with no more official protection than the groups operating with 

Quantrill.13 

In retaliation for the kidnapping and presumed death of Allsman, the provost marshal 

of the district that included Palmyra, W. R. Strachan, informed Colonel Porter that he would 

execute 10 men who were supposedly members of the offending command. Whether or not these 

men were actually members of Porter’s unit is in dispute. Obviously, the Union correspondence 

maintains that they were, but no attempt was made to insure that they were anything but 

secessionists living in the wrong location.14 Regardless of their true affiliation, Strachan 

marched them to a predetermined location and forced the 10 men to sit on their own caskets 

and had them shot. The deaths were neither clean nor quick and this poor performance of an 

already questionable action caused the killings to be viewed as murder by secessionists and the 

Confederate Government alike. President Jefferson Davis demanded the delivery of General 

McNeil, Strachan’s superior, to the Confederacy to answer for what his government considered 

an atrocity. Failing this, he ordered Confederate commanders to execute the next 10 Union 

officers captured in the Trans-Mississippi.15 Dedicated Unionists within Missouri believed that 

the men had gotten what they deserved and wrote to President Lincoln, maintaining that not 

only was the action legal, but necessary. Referring to Allsman’s death and the execution of 

the 10 Confederates, they indicated that it was not just about justice, but “was, additionally, to 

vindicate the power and authority of law and the Government; to strike terror into the hearts of 

those whom no sentiments of right, honor, or justice could reach. It was to give safety and peace 

to this distracted country, and to assure the now almost incredulous people that the Government 

57
was not utterly powerless for their protection.” They further expressed their satisfaction with 

the actions of Mr. Strachan, claiming that “the act has achieved its desired purpose. The law 

and the supremacy of our Government are vindicated.”16

Writing this letter in January 1863, little could these men know that the action of General 

McNeil and Strachan had not put an end to the violence on the border, but was merely one of 

many actions which would cause it to accelerate. Confederate violence may have temporarily 

subsided in the northeastern counties of Missouri, but the spring and summer of 1863 would 

see an increase in the frequency and brutality of the irregular war.

The late winter and spring of 1863 saw a steady stream of reports of guerrilla activity 

along the border. Brigadier General Ben Loan, Missouri State Militia, communicated regularly 

with the commander of the Department of the Missouri, Major General Samuel Curtis, concerning 

problems with bands of irregular warriors. On January 19, he conveyed that intelligence reports 

had identified a guerrilla band of between 200 and 500 operating near Warrensburg, Missouri. 

The information indicated that the organization was under the command of Quantrill, but most 

likely it was simply well populated with former members of Quantrill’s organization, many of 

whom had come home from serving with Jo Shelby in Arkansas.17 At this point, almost any 

guerrilla band was believed to be headed by Quantrill. A February 26th letter from Loan to 

Curtis would outline the continuing problems Loan was encountering in trying to calm down 

the border area. In a discussion of his decisions to reorganize his troops for defense of his area 

of responsibility he reiterated the ever present problem that occurs when differing groups live 

in close proximity. Admitting that the Union population was torn, he wrote Curtis that they 

were often targets of guerrilla depredations from the Missouri side of the border, but also that 

“the citizens here require as much protection from the Red Legs of Kansas as they do from the 

bushwhackers of Missouri.”18

Loan’s comments reflect clearly the sentiment amongst Missourians of the border at 

this time, that they had as much or more to fear from uncontrolled Kansans as from Missouri 

guerrillas. These were the people that were caught in the middle and the true victims of irregular 

warfare.

Irregular violence would continue throughout the spring, with a growing belief on 

the Union side that they must somehow curtail the support given to the guerrillas by the local 

populace. In a clear expression of his guidance on the problem, Halleck wrote Major General 

E. V. Sumner at St. Louis, indicating that as the entire state of Missouri was under martial 

law, anyone who was in the state or came into it and either took up arms against the Union 

or provided support to those in rebellion were “military insurgents or military traitors.” He 

directed that people falling into this category forfeited their property and possibly their lives.19

This guidance gave the commanders in Missouri considerable latitude in arresting persons they 

believed to be aiding southern guerrillas, a common practice among secessionists in many of 

the counties along the border. Utilizing this guidance, family members of known guerrillas 

were arrested and confined, or banished from the area.

58
Union commanders in Missouri began to take an even harder line with the activities of 

guerrillas, as indicated in the following telegraph from General Loan to Curtis:

I write this now to say that there can no longer be any question but that the 

contest for the supremacy in this State must be made a war of extermination; 

that is, one party, either the loyal or the disloyal, must be permitted to hold 

exclusive possession of the country. It is utterly impossible for both parties 

longer to dwell together. The guerrillas and the rebel sympathizers are waging 

a relentless, cruel, and bloody war upon our unarmed and defenseless citizens, 

and are determined to continue it until the last loyal citizen is murdered or is 

driven from his home to escape being murdered.20

Loan goes on to say that Washington believed his actions to have been too extreme and 

seeks guidance from Curtis on what would be the proper response. He outlines his preference 

by allowing that if ordered he could do enough damage to guerrillas in his district that “in 

forty days an honest man can ride from one end of it to the other without question or being 

harmed...”21 Loan and other commanders along the border had begun to seek a more permanent 

solution to the guerrilla problem. The no-quarter edict issued earlier by Halleck did not go far 

enough for them, and they desired to divest western Missouri of all secessionists, leaving the 

countryside safe for loyal Union citizens. Curtis had also become more intent on upholding the 

no-quarter edict and reiterated the Union policy in a telegram to General Bartholow, pointing 

out that “Death to bushwhackers is the order. Have a commission always ready to try, determine, 

and execute immediately, if they are unfortunately taken alive.”22 Similar orders from General 

James Blunt, the commander of the District of Kansas, instructed the commander of the Ninth 

Regiment Kansas Volunteers that “when such persons are taken prisoners, which should as 

much as possible be avoided, they will be summarily tried by a military commission...and, if 

found guilty, must be executed by hanging or shooting, without delay”.23 

Commanders on both sides of the Kansas-Missouri border had obviously gotten the 

message and were intent on diligently imposing the no-quarter rule on suspected guerrillas. The 

most colorful statement of this intent was written by General Curtis, who advised General Loan 

that “We must not allow the vipers to make their nests, or, if they do, we must crush the eggs 

before they hatch.”24 This was the mood of the border as the summer of 1863 came to a close, 

in an August that would never be forgotten.

Against this specter of officially sanctioned extermination, William Clarke Quantrill 

planned his most notorious operation. Having returned from a trip to Richmond, supposedly in 

search of a commission as a colonel of partisan rangers, Quantrill decided the time was right 

to seek revenge on Kansans for all the evils of the territorial period and the early years of the 

war. The prospect of revenge, combined with a hearty desire to increase the weight of his men’s 

pocketbooks, focused him on the obvious target of Lawrence. While well inside the bounds of 

Kansas, Lawrence had been the center of radical abolitionist sentiment since the early days of 

the territorial conflict and was very familiar to Quantrill. That James Lane lived in Lawrence 

made it all the more appealing as a target. Quantrill began planning the raid in the summer and 

59
held a final council of war with his lieutenants on 10 August, where he laid out his plans for the 

daring raid.25 

Three days later, a building being used in Kansas City to house female sympathizers 

of the guerrillas, arrested under the guidance from Halleck, collapsed. A number of the women 

were killed and many others injured severely. Prominent in the list of dead and injured were 

the sisters of Bill Anderson, one of Quantrill’s lieutenants, and a young lady who was related to 

both John McCorkle and Cole Younger. The news of this accident caused extreme anger in the 

guerrilla camp. Rumors spread that the building was deliberately sabotaged, but no evidence 

exists of such a plot. The collapse apparently was an accident, but one that would have effects 

well outside of Kansas City. The citizens of Lawrence, Kansas, would feel the anger of the 

members of Quantrill’s band in less than two weeks. While some documents have indicated 

that the Lawrence raid was in revenge for these deaths, Quantrill’s council of war held days 

earlier indicates that it was not. What it would do, however, is impact the mood of the guerrillas 

when they rode into Lawrence, insuring that they would do far more than just sack the town and 

loot it. Instead of simply destroying the town and pillaging it, these irregular warriors would 

visit death on the male members of this Kansas town, leaving only a few alive when they were 

finished.26

The level of violence displayed on August 21, 1863, during the second Lawrence 

made the first look like a skirmish by comparison and changed the dynamics of the war on the 

Kansas-Missouri border with a single stroke. 

The reaction to this Lawrence raid by the citizens of Kansas and the Union authorities 

in the border area was predictable. Outrage at this violence caused a cry against all Missourians, 

with even the Governor of Kansas placing the blame squarely on their shoulders in a letter to 

Major General Schofield. Governor Carney informed Schofield that “I must hold Missouri 

responsible for this fearful, fiendish raid....such people cannot be considered loyal, and should 

not be treated as loyal citizens...”27 Carney called on Schofield to take drastic actions against 

the border counties of Missouri, surmising that Quantrill could not have effectively staged 

the raid without more than just a few Missourians knowing of the force’s plans. Carney’s 

rage was augmented by the embarrassment of the commander of the District of the Border, 

Brigadier General Thomas Ewing. Having command over the area around Lawrence and the 

border counties from which the raid was staged, Ewing came under significant political and 

public pressure because of this event. An inquiry into his actions was demanded by the civilian 

leaders in Kansas and Ewing personally requested a board of inquiry be appointed to deal 

with the blight on his reputation. Union soldiers had two missions in the weeks following the 

raid; first to hunt down the guerrillas responsible for the atrocity, and second, to prevent armed 

Kansans from overwhelming the border counties of Missouri in personal revenge.

Knowing that he had to act to appease the people of Kansas and to settle the guerrilla 

issue on the border, General Ewing issued General Orders No. 11 on August 25, 1863. For 

some time Unionists along the border had maintained that the guerrilla force could not be 

dealt with as long as it was allowed the sanctuary of secessionist support. As with any guerrilla 

movement, support of the local populace was a key ingredient and the border of Missouri was 

60
no exception. General Orders No. 11 required everyone living in Jackson, Cass, and Bates 

Counties and a portion of those living in Vernon County to leave their homes within fifteen 

days. If they were able to prove their loyalty to the closest Union commanding officer they 

could move to a military installation anywhere in the state, with the exception of the St. Louis 

area. Those that could not be certified as loyal would have to move out of the district with the 

presumption that they were disloyal.28 The intent of the order was clearly the depopulation of 

the power base of Quantrill’s band and the resulting loss of effectiveness for the guerrillas, 

opening the door for the war of extermination that General Loan had called for, months before. 

General Orders No. 11 has been the subject of considerable controversy and was the 

inspiration for George Caleb Bingham’s celebrated painting of the same name. Albert Castel 

compared it to the confinement of Japanese-Americans during World War II and called the 

execution of Order No. 11, “the harshest treatment ever imposed on United States citizens 

under the plea of military necessity in our nation’s history.”29 These counties would come 

to be known as the “Burnt District” because of the violent execution of this plan. While 

General Schofield attempted to soften the call for the destruction of these counties, with the 

movement of supposedly disloyal families, their homes and barns were burned, crops either 

stolen or destroyed, and families financially destroyed because of the location of their homes or 

slightest possibility that they were in support of Quantrill’s guerrilla forces. This act of reprisal 

exemplifies the true victim in the guerrilla warfare of the American Civil War — the populace 

of the affected area. General Ewing maintained in a letter to General Schofield that virtually 

all the families remaining in these counties were disloyal and that the loyal families affected 

would be fewer than twenty.30 While many of the citizens displaced were clearly loyal to the 

Confederacy and undoubtedly helped the guerrillas, there was no way of measuring it. Even 

the determination of loyalty was no clear assumption, as it was done by men advised by locals 

who had personal issues and fights to resolve. 

While Ewing was confident of the nature of the people he displaced, General Schofield 

was not quite as definite in his report to Washington. Noting that the idea had come up between 

he and Ewing previously and was not just a reaction to Lawrence, he went on to lament the 

“utter impossibility of deciding who were guilty and who were innocent” and the fear of 

reprisal by the guerrillas on any who were left in the counties. Schofield also recognized the 

role that the historical hatred between Kansas and Missouri, dating from the territorial period, 

had in the violence here. He blamed the “old border hatred intensified by the rebellion” for the 

problems in these counties and those surrounding them. 31 There was no telltale sign to identify 

the disloyal people in this instance, no racial, ethnic, or religious delineation that could be used. 

Hundreds of families were sent into exile, with the resulting effect that many young men would 

have to once again decide whether to go south to the regular Confederate forces or cast their lot 

with the guerrillas in the bush. This order created a further division between the Union and the 

occupants of the border and left a legacy of hatred and mistrust. 

The early fall passed in Missouri with less irregular activity, largely because of the 

continuing efforts to ferret out those responsible for the Lawrence raid. With the effects of 

Order No. 11 beginning to show in the loss of support structure and the falling of the leaves so 

valuable for concealment, many of the guerrilla warriors gathered under Quantrill and began 

61
the trek south to winter in northern Texas. The trip would take them through parts of Kansas, 

Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. Those events, which occurred south of Kansas will be 

covered in later chapters, but Quantrill would make one more mark on the Kansas-Missouri 

border region before entering winter quarters in Texas. 

On October 6, 1863, Quantrill’s advance party reported finding a Union camp, busily 

engaged in building a fort near Baxter Springs, Kansas. The guerrillas had not known of its 

existence, which was not surprising as the instructions to construct the fort as a way station for 

an express route between Fort Scott, Kansas, and Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, had only been 

given on August 26, 1863.32 Quantrill laid out a plan to attack the fort utilizing an enveloping 

force of cavalry. The initial attack on the fort met with resistance from Captain James Pond 

and the few troops assigned on work detail. The force at the site was small as they had just 

recently sent out most of the men on a foraging expedition. Having some cover in the partially 

completed fort and a single artillery piece, these soldiers defended themselves credibly. 

Quantrill’s enveloping force had gone a bit too wide and came out beyond the clearing where 

the fort sat, only to find a larger column of wagons and cavalry. This column turned out to 

be the personal escort of Brigadier General James Blunt, enroute to Fort Smith. His escort 

consisted of companies of the Third Wisconsin and Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, numbering 

approximately 100 men. As the guerrillas emerged from the wood line and organized into 

battle lines, Blunt thought them to be an honor guard from the fort that had come to escort 

him. Dismounting the carriage in which he was riding and mounting his horse, he realized that 

these were not Union soldiers and called his escort forward. His Adjutant, Major H.Z. Curtis, 

formed the units in battle lines and had them prepared when the guerrillas charged. The Union 

cavalry wavered and, when the first volley of fire erupted from the guerrilla ranks, the cavalry 

line broke and ran for cover. The guerrillas pressed on, chasing individual soldiers down and 

killing them, including Major Curtis. The General’s personal band was in their band wagon, 

horns out to play for Blunt’s arrival, and sought to escape the attack. Their attempt failed and 

as a guerrilla rode up alongside the wagon, one of the bandsmen shot the Confederate. This 

was an unfortunate decision for the band members, as the guerrilla’s friends observed the event 

and killed everyone in the wagon, setting fire to it and bodies in retaliation for the perceived 

brutality. General Blunt escaped death, as did a few members of his escort, and an officer’s wife 

who was traveling with him to Fort Smith.33 

In all, General Blunt was only able to rally 15 soldiers after the melee, indicating 

that approximately 85 were killed during the conflict. Much has been made of the conflict at 

Baxter Springs, often referring to it as a massacre with the same kind of anger that is reserved 

for events like the Lawrence raid or the Alamo. The basis for these accusations is the fact that 

almost all of the Union soldiers found dead had received a bullet to the head, as if they had been 

executed. With the burning of the bandwagon as additional grist, the irregular force was painted 

with the same brush as the one that sacked Lawrence. This was not an accurate assessment of 

the event, however. Blunt and his men were part of a force that had sworn a no-quarter oath 

against the men who rode with William Clarke Quantrill, and based on the guidance from Blunt 

himself and other leadership, they would have been required to execute any of the guerrillas 

they took prisoner. Therefore, the irregular warriors were also engaged in a similar campaign of 

extermination, just as was called for by General Ben Loan. Article 62 of General Order No. 100 

62
indicates that “all troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to 

any portion of the Army, receive none.”34 Based on their own general order, the Union soldiers 

or high command should not have expected anything but a no-quarter action from the irregular 

warriors at Baxter Springs. General Blunt was merely the victim of the orders of Henry Halleck 

and every other Union general officer on the border. The picture that Blunt would paint in his 

reports after the conflict was colored by his own embarrassment at losing his escort, his flags, 

and his general officer’s commission. Quantrill would indicate in a rare communication with 

Major General Sterling Price that he had taken some prisoners at Baxter Springs and on the trip 

through the Indian Territory, but had “brought none of them through.”35 This should have been 

considered acceptable to a Union army that was given guidance by the father of Major Curtis 

(Major General Samuel Curtis) that “death to bushwhackers is the order.”36

Quantrill and his men would spend the winter of 1863-1864 in Texas, causing problems 

for the Confederate authorities there. While in Texas the group began to splinter and Quantrill 

lost control of large portions of the irregulars. Upon their return to Missouri in the spring 

and summer of 1864, the principal groups were led by George Todd and Bill Anderson, with 

Quantrill out of the limelight. Todd and Anderson’s actions became gradually more violent 

and less controlled, and though they were ostensibly operating in conjunction with the regular 

Confederate force under Sterling Price in an effort to cause confusion behind Union lines, their 

excesses would go beyond even the violence of Lawrence.

Union communications concerning the efforts of these guerrilla bands certainly 

indicate that they had the attention of the militia and regular forces in central and north central 

Missouri. Included with the bands of Todd and Anderson was one led by Major John Thrailkill, 

whose group rode under a Confederate flag and conducted themselves quite differently from 

the former Quantrill men. Numerous entries relating to Thrailkill can be found in the Official 

Records, but the most telling deals with his efforts in the town of Keytesville, Missouri. On 

September 20, 1864, Thrailkill rode into Keytesville under the Confederate battle flag and 

demanded the surrender of the garrison there, promising parole for the soldiers. In a very 

controversial decision, the commander of the garrison surrendered his blockhouse and 35 men 

to Thrailkill, apparently from pure fear and lack of military ardor. The Confederate response to 

this action was markedly different from that expected of Todd or Anderson. Thrailkill paroled 

the entire garrison, with some men joining his band, and burned the fortified courthouse. While 

two Union men were killed, they were not amongst the soldiers who surrendered and thus 

not protected by Thrailkill’s guarantee to the commander. Again the difference between the 

Quantrill’s guerrillas and other irregular Confederate forces was visible, but totally lost on 

Union authorities. Thrailkill’s actions would indicate he was operating as a partisan ranger 

and within the laws of war as he knew them, but the Union reports clearly indicate he was 

considered the equivalent of Anderson.37 Information on Thrailkill shows that he was guilty 

of what Michael Fellman termed “guerrilla double-mindedness,” as he operated with the 

guerrillas, yet often acted as a regular Confederate officer. Thrailkill was captured in July 1863 

and after a court-martial in St. Louis was determined to be a combatant rather than a guerrilla. 

Though Fellman’s sources indicate Thrailkill was imprisoned for the remainder of the war, he 

was active once again in September 1864. The “double-mindedness” to which Fellman referred 

63
is obvious in Thrailkill’s parole of soldiers at Keytesville and subsequent activities with Todd 

and Anderson.38

The culmination of this reign of terror came at Centralia, Missouri, in late September, 

1864. Anderson’s band, with their trademark of scalps affixed to their bridles, rode into 

Centralia for information about Sterling Price. Alcohol flowed steadily and they stopped the 

train coming through from St. Louis. Approximately 20 soldiers were on the train and forced to 

dismount. After looting the train, the soldiers were “paroled” with the help of the Navy Colts of 

Anderson’s men. The Union reports vary from 20 to 30 soldiers killed, but the closest number 

appears to be 20. Anderson and his bushwhackers left town and returned to the nearby camp to 

join the groups of Todd and apparently Thrailkill. Close behind them were portions of two Union 

companies commanded by Major Johnson of the 39th Regiment, Missouri Volunteers. Johnson 

had his men form a line of battle and dismount in an attempt to make best use of the range 

of their muskets. While Todd and Thrailkill’s forces circled to the left and right of the Union 

position, Anderson’s men charged in a frontal assault. The volunteers were no match for the 

fast riding guerrillas, armed with multiple pistols and greater firepower. The Union command 

was decimated with the official reports stating approximately 130 killed. What followed was a 

battle cry for Union forces in Missouri, similar to Lawrence, Kansas. Anderson’s men killed all 

prisoners and then proceeded to begin to mutilate the bodies. Heads were cut off and switched 

to other bodies, noses and ears cut off for souvenirs, and even genitals were torn off and stuffed 

in the mouths of the corpses. This disgusting conduct marked the low point of guerrilla actions 

in Missouri during the war, going far beyond the killing of the enemy in self-defense or even 

for revenge. For Anderson, the conflict had degenerated into barbarism and even if it was 

fueled by his anger over the death of a sister and crippling of another, he had crossed the line 

from hardened guerrilla fighter to psychopath.39

Todd and Anderson were dead within thirty days of the Centralia affair and Sterling 

Price’s invasion failed to bring the state of Missouri under Confederate control. The worst 

season of guerrilla war in Missouri and Kansas was over and most of the big names in the 

guerrilla ranks were gone, either dead or moved out of the state. As mentioned earlier, Quantrill 

went east, eventually meeting his demise in Kentucky. The legacy that these violent men left 

behind, along with the legacy of the Union officers who so violently sought them, was that of 

death, misery, and hatred. 

The grudges and hatred that had existed between Missouri and Kansas before the war 

were not gone with the end of guerrilla war. The violence between the two sides had been 

too deadly and progressed too far. Small bands would continue to be active along the border 

for some time to come, ending the violence only when most of the irregular warriors were 

allowed to come out of the bush to pardons after the war. Even with the pardons, violence 

would continue as men settled old scores from the war in the post-war period. Many of those 

who rode in irregular bands would move on, finding their lives destroyed in the border area 

and no safety in their homes. Many had come from the “Burnt District,” which offered no hope 

at the end of the war, because all that was left standing were stone chimneys. The people of 

Kansas and Missouri would rebuild and continue on, however, no longer caught between two 

forces conducting absolute war.

64
Notes

1. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part I, pp. 572-593; Leslie, pp. 245-255; Connelly, pp. 398-420.

2. Rueben Randlett interview, William E. Connelly Collection, Western Historical Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman.

3. Randlett interview; William Crutchfield interview, William E. Connelly Collection, Western Historical Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman.

4. William E. Connelly, Quantrill and the Border Wars, (Ottawa, KS: Kansas Heritage Press, 1992), p. 

90.

5. Albert Castel, A Frontier State at War: Kansas 1861-1865, (Lawrence, KS: Kansas Heritage Press, 

1992), pp. 49-50.

6. Castel, pp. 54-55.

7. John P. Duke interview, William E. Connelly Collection, Western Historical Collection, University 

of Oklahoma, Norman.

8. Thomas Goodrich, Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border, 1861-1865, (Bloomington, 

IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp.29-30; Randlett interview, Connelly Collection, pp.14-17.

9. Official Records, Series I, Volume 8, pp. 611-612.

10. Official Records, Series I, Volume 13, pp. 10-11.

11. This type of division and the problems it can cause military forces when trying to deal with irregular 

warfare is evident in the recent war in Iraq. The Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations of this country 

were already at odds with each other and opportunities for one group to gain at the expense of the other 

two were far too common. American Forces that must deal with a split in society like this must be careful 

to make deliberate decisions so as to avoid inflaming tensions in the area unnecessarily. 

12. Official Records, Series I, Volume 8, p. 12; Series I, Volume 22, Part II, pp. 17-18.

13. Official Records, Series I, pp. 12,13, 33, and 45.

14. Official Records, Series I, p. 719; Edward E. Leslie, The Devil Knows How to Ride: The True Story 

of William Clarke Quantrill and His Confederate Raiders, (New York, Random House, 1996), pp. 150-

151.

15. Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume II, (New York: De Capo 

Press, Inc., 1990), p. 600; Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part 1, pp. 816-819.

16. Official Records, Series I, Volume 13, p. 5.

17. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part I, p. 63; Leslie, p. 160-163.

65
18. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 125.

19. Official Records, p. 159.

20. Official Records, p. 183.

21. Official Records, p. 183. 

22. Official Records, p. 184.

23. Official Records, p. 222.

24. Official Records, p. 279.

25. Connelly, p. 311.

26. Connelly, pp. 301-304; Leslie, pp.196. Leslie’s version of what happened appears to be the most 

sensible. The plans to raid Lawrence had been made well before the building’s collapse and, while it 

may have caused the violence level to be increased during the Lawrence Raid, it was not the proximate 

cause of it.

27. Connelly, p. 576.

28. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 473. 

29. Albert Castel, “Order No. 11 and the Civil War on the Border,” Missouri Historical Review, vol. 57 

(1963), p. 357.

30. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part I, p. 584.

31. Official Records, p. 575.

32. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 478.

33. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part I, pp. 688-700.

34. Official Records, Series III, Volume 3, p. 155.

35. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part I, pp. 700-701.

36. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 125. 

37. Official Records, Series I, Volume 41, Part I, pp. 424-426.

38. Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War, 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 107, 206n.

39. Leslie, pp. 319-329; Official Records, Series I, Volume 41, Part III, p. 488. 

66
Chapter 3

Indian Territory-Arkansas

As the armies of the Confederacy and Union surged back and forth across Arkansas, 

depredations from irregular forces were common against sympathizers of both sides. It 

is difficult to draw definitive timelines on the violence in any specific area, as the amount 

of guerrilla activity was often linked to the number of troops assigned to an area and their 

allegiance. On March 27, 1863, Colonel William Phillips reported to General Curtis that the 

“guerrillas have been pretty well driven out of this section.”1

 Four days later, Colonel William 

Weer reported to General Schofield that in the vicinity of Carrollton, Arkansas, the Union 

population was having significant trouble and, in some cases, individuals were forced to flee to 

avoid attack. Finally, he advised Schofield that “the guerrillas who traverse the country shoot 

every Union man they see mercilessly...The operations of the enemy’s guerrillas in Arkansas 

are far more vindictive and remorseless than anywhere else under my observation.”2

Colonel Weer’s problems with guerrillas appear to have gotten worse as time passed. 

On April 2, 1863, he reported to General Schofield that he was “enveloped in a cloud of 

guerrillas.” Weer lamented that he could not control the area around his encampment due to the 

boldness of the guerrillas and the secessionist leanings of the surrounding population.3

The irregular war in the Indian Territory and Arkansas has not had the well publicized 

history of the Kansas-Missouri area just to the north. These two entities, a territory and a state, 

had been reasonably quiet in the 1850s. While the political tension in the Indian Territory 

had been palpable, the civilization on this portion of the border had been able to avoid open 

violence to solve political issues. 

Just as the adjoining states of Kansas and Missouri were dealt with together, so will 

the Indian Territory and Arkansas be joined. The violence that beset them was very similar and, 

because of their ill-defined border, it surged from one to the other without even the participants 

knowing for sure whether they were committing depredations in the Indian Territory or 

Arkansas. Indians and Whites alike populated these two areas and both were the victims of the 

sometimes random violence that permeated the border. 

Indian Territory

Few American students have not at least heard the outlines of the story of the “Trail of 

Tears.” It is part of an ugly episode in American History, where members of the Indian tribes 

that had occupied the southeastern portion of the United States for many years were forcibly 

evicted and consigned to a new home farther west. The reasons for their being compelled to 

move were simple, white men wanted the land on which they lived and were concerned with 

the social implications of having these Indians within their midst. That is the basic story taught 

to school children, but from the perspective of at least one of the tribes involved there is a 

67
deeper, more divisive tale. That tale is at the root of much of the violence that beset Oklahoma 

during the years of the Civil War.4

Map 5. Oklahoma Area of Operations.

As white settlers moved westward, they inevitably came into contact and conflict with 

Indian tribes that already occupied the land. One of these tribes, the Cherokee, was a resilient 

group who ceded lands to the encroaching settlers in an attempt to save at least part of what had 

been theirs. Early on, some members of the tribe opted to move to the west, occupying lands 

in Arkansas that provided better hunting and farming opportunities than their home lands in 

Georgia or Mississippi. Thus, the Cherokee Nation was divided into two geographical groups: 

the “Cherokee West,” constituted by the early settlers in Arkansas, and the more populated 

“Cherokee East” that was made up of those who had opted to stay put in the southeast, on the 

lands they had historically occupied. 

Problems were not far away though. Based on an agreement between the State of 

Georgia and the United States Government, known as the “Georgia Compact of 1802,” the 

United States agreed to remove the Indians from the lands of the State of Georgia. By the 

middle part of the 1820s, Georgia wanted this agreement carried out and the leaders of the 

Cherokee Nation foresaw the coming storm. Though the Nation reorganized in an attempt to 

avoid displacement, setting up a government more like that used by the White governments 

around them, they found that by 1830 the chances of staying on their lands were slim.

It was in this timeframe that the seeds of violence in Oklahoma were planted. As with 

any group of people, different attitudes towards the displacement were evident within the 

Cherokee Nation. The Principal Chief, John Ross, was opposed to removal from the traditional 

68
tribal lands and was apparently supported in this position by the majority of the Cherokee 

people. A smaller group, led by a quartet of men; Major Ridge, his son John, Elias Boudinot, 

and Stand Watie believed that the removal was inevitable and the best way to avoid the problems 

attendant to living in an area while surrounded by a hostile populace was to cede their lands and 

move to those occupied by the Cherokee West. By now the West tribe had been coerced into 

leaving Arkansas and relocate to the Indian Territory. It was to this land that the Ridge-WatieBoudinot group wished to move the Cherokee East Nation.

To affect this move, the supporters of removal signed the Treaty of New Echota with 

the US Government, and though they were not the elected representatives of the Cherokee 

Nation, the Congress of the United States quickly ratified the treaty, sentencing the Cherokee to 

a westward movement. From this signing in 1835, the Ridge-Watie-Boudinot group would be 

known as the “Treaty Party” and would be the opposition party in Cherokee politics. As should 

be expected, many of the Cherokee Nation believed these men to be traitors, who sold out the 

heritage of the tribe. They had allowed their people to be forcibly pushed to the Indian Territory 

on a march that cost the lives of many of the weaker Indians. This hatred would simmer for 

years to come, occasionally rising into a bubbling pot of violence and discord that would mar 

the peaceful existence in the Territory. 

The first such episode occurred in 1839, when three of the quartet who orchestrated the 

Treaty of New Echota were murdered on the same day. Only Stand Watie avoided death and 

ascended to the leadership of the Treaty Party in a Cherokee Nation that was now permanently 

divided into hostile camps, which centered around the issue of removal. The majority faction 

was headed by Chief John Ross, still the elected Principal Chief of the Nation. While it may 

appear that this violence was nothing more than a local political squabble, its effects were felt 

in the upper echelons of national politics. Watie and members of his faction wrote to important 

Americans to enlist their assistance, including Andrew Jackson. 

Jackson informed Watie on October 9, 1839, that he had written— 

a letter to the president of the United States in as strong language in your 

behalf & that of your friends as the facts and the outrageous & tyrannical 

conduct of John Ross & his self created council would authorize, & I trust the 

president will not hesitate to employ all his rightfull power to protect you and 

your party from the tyranny & murderous schemes of John Ross.5

He continued to give his counsel to Watie, enjoining him to “appeal & resort to all 

peacfull means to obtain justice...” before allowing violence to rule the day. In the final lines of 

his correspondence, Jackson advised the Treaty Party leaders that if they found peaceful means 

within the bounds of the legal establishment insufficient to bring the murderers of their leaders 

to justice “then and not until then will the great and good Spirit smile upon your exertions 

by force to obtain justice by freeing yourselves & people from oppression.”6

 Jackson had 

counseled patience and the use of peaceful means to solve the dispute between the Watie and 

Ross Factions, but left the door open to the use of force if peaceful means were inadequate.

69
The period that followed the murders of the Ridges and Boudinot indicates that Watie 

was apparently unable to deal with the issues that confronted him through peaceful means. 

Violence followed this incident and blood flowed on both sides of the argument. Murder 

was the reply to murder and the hatreds that were the result of personal vendettas created 

a worsening situation in the Cherokee Nation. This violence merely set the stage for what 

was to come in later years. When the “white men” to the east could not control their political 

processes and solve their problems without violence, they engaged in civil war. The smoldering 

conflict that plagued the Indian Territory was fertile for such violence, even 21 years later. The 

Cherokee Nation, and those of the Creeks and Seminoles, split along historical and political 

lines when the war came, plunging the Indian Territory into an irregular battle involving Indian 

and “white” guerrillas that rivaled the violence in Kansas to the north.

As the United States became a divided nation, beset by a civil conflict between the 

Union and Confederate forces, decisions had to be made within the Indian Nations. They were 

located between Union Kansas and Confederate Texas, a geographical location that would 

obviously put them in contact with forces of both sides. The Five Civilized Tribes had come 

to the Indian Territory from the Deep South and had brought many of its institutions along on 

the trip. Most of the Nations kept black slaves and, though slavery was not totally accepted in 

the Territory, it was just another part of the southern culture that tied the Indian Nations to the 

South. Chief John Ross, seeing the dangers of alienating either of the governments (Union and 

Confederate), counseled neutrality for the people of the Cherokee Nation in an effort to spare 

them from the violence and possible future retaliation that could come with taking sides. 

John Ross’ efforts to keep his people out of the American Civil War were relatively 

short-lived. He would, by August of 1861, lead his people into an alliance with the Confederate 

States that would further tear apart the Cherokee Nation. It is not hard to understand John 

Ross and his desire for neutrality. All of the border states, which were part southern and part 

northern, had similar problems maintaining peaceful coexistence between the politically 

disparate portions of their populations. The Indian nations had the additional problem of not 

being “white,” a fact that would undoubtedly slow the reaction of the Union Government to any 

calls for assistance. Washington was unable to protect the Unionist people of Missouri from 

the Confederate army or guerrillas who soon possessed the southwestern portion of the state. 

Surely John Ross had to see the difficulty of maintaining a position of neutrality when only one 

side in the conflict was truly interested in possession of the Indian Territory. The Confederate 

Government appointed a commissioner for the Indian Territory, Albert Pike, who oversaw 

the creation and administration of treaties with the Indian nations on behalf of the Richmond 

government.7

Ross was undoubtedly sympathetic to the Union cause, as his actions in the years that 

followed confirmed, but the situation in the Indian Territory left him little choice but to lead his 

people into the Confederate fold. The earlier mentioned interest on the part of the Confederacy 

meant that the military forces in Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri were a true threat to Ross if 

he chose to side with Washington or even maintain neutrality. These forces nearly surrounded 

his tribal lands and the possibility of reinforcement from Kansas was slim, as the Union forces 

there were occupied with Missouri raiders and the Army led by Sterling Price. Throughout the 

70
spring of 1861, Confederate emissaries met with John Ross in attempts to convince him to align 

his nation with that of the Confederacy. 

Significantly, in July, the Union forces were defeated at the Battle of Bull Run and 

just over a month later Sterling Price claimed victory at Wilson’s Creek, a battle virtually “just 

up the road” from the home of the Cherokee people. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations 

had severed their relations with the United States Government and tossed their lot in with 

the Confederacy earlier.8

 John Ross was faced with the option of opposing the Confederacy, 

either openly or through continued neutrality, or joining with the government that appeared to 

be on the verge of winning its independence from the Union. His position as Principal Chief 

was firm, but the members of the Treaty Party were already committed to the Confederacy and 

failing to go with the South would have led to armed conflict between the rival factions and, 

possibly, with the Confederate forces poised in and around the Indian Territory. On August 21, 

1861, John Ross succumbed to the mounting pressures and withdrew his objections to joining 

the Confederacy. The Cherokee Nation had joined the Choctaws and Chickasaws in looking to 

the South for their future.9

While Chief John Ross and the Cherokee had chosen to ally themselves with the 

Confederacy rather than risk intratribal warfare, the leader of the Creek Nation, Opoth-le-yohola, chose to continue his loyalty to the Union. He sent a messenger to the US Commissioner 

for the Creeks and Seminoles, requesting assistance from the Union Government. The 

Commissioner, E. H. Carruth, was able to send only his assurances of Union support and a 

future movement of Union forces south from Kansas to support the Creek leader.10 The Creeks, 

like the Cherokee, were divided in their loyalties and a faction of the tribe was determined to 

sever their treaty ties to the Union and join the Confederacy. 

Throughout the fall of 1861, Confederate leaders in the Indian Territory attempted 

to bring Opoth-le-yo-hola to an agreement that would align the entire Creek Nation with 

Richmond, but to no avail. In November, Confederate forces consisting of Indian troops from 

the Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Cherokee Nations, along with Confederate-aligned troops 

from Texas, set out to force the Creek leader to surrender his resistance or bring him to battle. 

The Unionist Creek forces fought a running battle with the Confederates in late November and 

into December, finally losing so many supplies and warriors that they were forced to retire into 

the safety of southern Kansas. This defeat cleared the Indian Territory of Union forces and left 

the Confederacy in tentative control. 

The spring of 1862 would demonstrate, however, that no one was in control of the 

Cherokee Nation or, for that matter, most of the Indian Territory. As has been written about 

extensively in Kansas and Missouri, areas on the border in which believers from both sides of 

the question resided, were seldom controlled. The feud between the conservative elements of 

Cherokee society and the Treaty Party had been only thinly veiled since the Ridge-Boudinot 

murders, and the coming of the “white man’s war” to the Nation merely provided the excuse 

to engage in more open warfare. The Union-leaning conservatives, who were largely fullblooded Cherokee, had formed an organization known as the “Pins” in the pre-war years, an 

organization that espoused the importance of the tribe’s old customs and was substantially anti71
slavery. While the southern portion of the Cherokee Nation organized home guard companies 

and, eventually, the regiment of mounted riflemen commanded by Colonel John Drew, the 

conservative elements either moved north to join the Unionist Indians in southern Kansas or 

formed irregular companies to beset the southern sympathizers in the Nation.11

While Stand Watie and Drew were supporting the Confederate army in the ArkansasMissouri-Indian Territory vicinity, the residents of the major towns of the Cherokee Nation, 

Tahlequah and Park Hill, were experiencing the kind of violence and terror that would beset 

innocents everywhere along the border. Reverend Stephen Foreman, a self-proclaimed 

half-breed minister in Park Hill and a strong supporter of secession and Stand Watie, wrote 

extensively of the problems that plagued he and his family during the spring and summer of 

1862. He was distraught over the unsettled state of the Cherokee Nation, fearing at anytime that 

either Pin Indians or Jayhawkers from Kansas would visit Park Hill and exact a heavy price on 

the residents for their support of the Confederacy. 

In April 1862, he wrote Reverend L. S. Wilson in Columbia, South Carolina, complaining 

that “on account of the unsettled state of affairs in the Nation...I have not been able to preach...I 

have made two appointments...which I failed to fill on account of the jay-hawkers who were 

expected among us, to rob and to commit other depridations.”12 Rev. Foreman continued his 

lament, revealing to Rev. Wilson the concern that he harbored for the future of the Cherokee 

Nation. Now that the Cherokees had cast their lot with the Confederacy, the issue was settled 

for him and his only worry was whether or not the South could successfully prosecute the war. 

He showed some concern over the Union victory at the Battle of Elk Horn and what it meant 

for southern sympathizers in the Indian Territory. If this was the beginning of a negative trend 

for the Confederacy, he worried that “the Cherokee Nation shall be in constant dread, not 

knowing what moment the Jay-hawkers may be among us, robbing and killing.” His concern 

was evidently not just Jayhawkers from Kansas, but the previously mentioned Creek Indians 

who had followed their leader into southern Kansas and the service of the Union Army. In his 

closing line, Rev. Foreman summarized the fears of many in the Territory, correctly identifying 

that “if the Northern army comes into the Nation, those of us who stand up for the South expect 

but little mercy shown to them.”13

Foreman is an articulate spokesman for the supporters of the Confederacy in Park Hill 

and the overall Cherokee Nation. The proximity of Kansas and the existence of the Indians 

who openly sided with the Union created an atmosphere that violence was always just a hoof 

beat away, only awaiting the arrival of an irregular Union warrior, Indian, or “white man,” who 

would bring death, destruction, or robbery to the Southern sympathizers. Foreman’s concern in 

April was well-founded, as his later letters and those of others clearly indicate. In July, Foreman 

received news of the murder of his brother, Alex, and another Park Hill resident, Abijah Hicks. 

They were murdered in separate incidents and Foreman indicates that initial reports showed 

that Hicks was killed by men associated with Stand Watie. The motive for Hicks murder was 

murky, as Foreman indicates that he was an “inoffensive man” and must have been killed for 

his property or his “abolitionist sentiments.” Either motive is credible, as Foreman lamented 

that “no one who has a good horse or any good property is safe, though I have heard of no one 

being killed yet for his sentiments, still I should not be surprised if it came to that.”14

72
Rumors that Chief John Ross and other members of the Cherokee leadership were 

attempting to contact the Union, supposedly to renew the recently severed treaties, were 

evident in the Nation. Southerners among those at Park Hill and Tahlequah were concerned that 

a plot was underway to turn the towns and the Cherokee Nation over to the Federals. Stephen 

Foreman was concerned about these rumors and sought an audience with John Ross to inquire 

about his intentions. He went to Ross’ home on July 7th and spoke with the Chief about his 

apprehensions. He pointed out to Chief Ross that he had heard reports that portions of Drew’s 

regiment would soon be defecting to the Union Army and that the leadership must take steps 

to insure that the Nation was united. Foreman was unconvinced by the answers he received 

from John Ross and indicated so in his diary. He perceived the Ross Party and Pins as one and 

believed the evidence strongly indicated that “a plan was on foot for the whole Pin Regiment 

and all others of the same stripe to join the Northern Army and that the time was now at hand...” 

Foreman was convinced that Ross was no longer loyal to the Southern cause and would soon 

openly be reunited with the Federal Government.15

From mid-July on, Foreman’s diary is filled with tales of the Pin Indians and the fear 

and depredations that they brought to “Watie men” like Rev. Foreman. Foreman’s frustration 

at being singled out amongst other leaders who were also supposedly of southern sympathies 

is evident in his words. He admits to being a Southern man, but maintains that Chief Ross and 

other Baptist preachers professed to be Southern men. Finally, he reaches the conclusion that 

the issue is more than just being a Southern man. As mentioned earlier, the Pins grew from their 

support of the old customs of the Cherokee Nation and they stood with the pure blood Indians 

of the Nation. His concern was obviously about his blood line, stating that “they themselves 

had drawn a line of distinction between themselves and the half-breeds, and being a half-breed, 

I naturally fell on the Watie side.”16

The importance of the old feuds, stretching back to New Echota, is evident once more. 

Much of the division within the Cherokee Nation continued to be based on long-smoldering 

problems, which the Civil War had rekindled, causing additional suffering and destruction 

amongst the Indians. Foreman was not just a southern sympathizer, but a Treaty Party man. 

While the Jayhawkers from Kansas would rob him and conceivably kill him for that allegiance, 

the Pins would make another distinction and abuse him for his ties to that portion of the 

Cherokee Nation that had brought about removal.17 

Reverend Foreman had early on been a vocal opponent of the Pin organization and by 

mid-July 1862 was beginning to fear for his life because of this opposition. He mentioned the 

organization regularly in his diary and equated it and its ideals to the party of Chief John Ross 

and the National Council.18 The diary is filled with references to the violence committed by 

Pin raiding parties, who “pass about in the neighborhood hunting Negroes, horses and Watie 

men.” He detailed the creation of a Pin headquarters, at the Ross home, and assumed that the 

raiding parties were extremely effective as “they have quite a lot of Negroes and horses at Chief 

Ross’s.” Rev. Foreman summed up his opinion of the situation on July 1862, when he wrote 

that “all who do not belong to their party, and who have not fled to them for protection are 

robbed of everything and shot down whenever met with. So to be a Watie man or an anti-pin is 

to be under sentence of death.”19

73
Foreman’s fear and bitterness is obvious in the pages of his diary, along with a 

frustration at the state of affairs in the Park Hill area. He related a concern for the people of the 

area and what appears to be a sincere desire for peace, regardless of the cost. Though a devout 

Southerner, he continued to seek intervention to bring peace to the Nation. He wrote that “It 

does seem to me that either the North or the South ought immediately to take possession of the 

country and control affairs, so as to stop this killing and robbing which is carried on so boldly 

in different parts of the Nation.” He carefully notes for posterity that this comment does not 

indicate that he is uncaring about the Southern cause and that he has for some time been an 

ardent foe of Northern principles and the attitudes of abolitionists. He reiterates his support for 

the Confederacy and his desire to see them victorious. His fear and concern seem to compel 

him to believe that “It is from considerations of humanity alone that I wish for some authority 

to interfere and control affairs here.”20

Foreman was a man, like many others along the border, who was tired of the random 

violence that beset areas that were alternately occupied by the North and South. These areas saw 

the ebb and flow of the war and were exposed to violence from every quarter. No one was safe 

from this violence, depending on which force was in control of their town on that particular day. 

Also in Park Hill were many Northern sympathizers, as Foreman clearly portrayed Chief John 

Ross. One such individual was Hannah Hicks, the widow of Abijah Hicks, of whom Foreman 

wrote earlier. She was a woman of Northern sympathies, as it appears was her husband, and 

though acquainted with Foreman, had many differences of opinion with him on loyalty issues. 

Hannah was not as vocal as Rev. Foreman, probably because a widow along the border without 

the protection of a husband had little choice but to quietly try and make it through each day. 

Even though she was not a Southern woman, her fear of the Pins was also evident. Often it 

mattered not whether someone was Northern or Southern, as it was not until after the violence 

was over that their true sympathies were revealed. Information came to Mrs. Hicks that “my 

poor husband was killed by the ‘Pins,’ but through mistake intending to kill another man. If 

it was a mistake ‘twas a terrible one for me. It is strange, very strange anyway.”21 Later that 

month, Hannah Hicks would lose her home to a fire, apparently set by Pins who believed it to 

be the home of a Watie man and wished to punish him.22 The lines of allegiance all along the 

border blurred as they obviously did in Park Hill, with the innocent suffering right along with 

the guilty. 

The proximity of Northerner and Southerner in the Cherokee Nation is clearly shown 

in the relationship between Rev. Foreman and Hannah Hicks. Foreman indicated in his diary 

on July 19, 1862, that rumors were around Park Hill that he had something to do with the death 

of Abijah Hicks, but was content that Mrs. Hicks knew the rumors to be false. His relationship 

with Hannah Hicks appeared to be friendly and on July 20th he wrote of hiding in her garret 

to escape capture and murder by the Pins. His relationship with Mrs. Hicks is illuminated 

later in that entry when he referred to Hannah’s father as a dear old friend, submitting that his 

relationship with her father was the reason that she hid him from his own people, who were 

now out to kill him.23 A check of Mrs. Hicks’ diary indicates circumstances that are perceived 

much differently. Her entry of September 19, 1862, indicates that Rev. Foreman and his family 

had left Park Hill for the Creek Nation and allowed that she hoped he found better friends there. 

Her notes went on to reveal some strong feelings towards Foreman that weren’t obvious to the 

74
Reverend. She indicates how happy everyone was to see Foreman depart and how bitterly he 

treated those who disagreed with him. She laments having provided him shelter and food in her 

garret for a number of days, but at the end of that time found him to be just as bitter to those 

who protected him as he was before. Evidently those who sought him believed that he had a 

hand in the murder of her husband, Abijah Hicks, and intended to make him pay a price for 

that involvement. Her feelings towards Rev. Foreman are solidified when she shares that “I do 

believe that his influence helped to cause the murder of my husband, and the arrest of brother 

D.D. You will think this dreadful, Ann Eliza, but, believe me, we have sufficient cause. Oh the 

fearful things that were spoken by him and his.”24

Both Rev. Foreman and Hannah Hicks lived in Park Hill during the summer and early 

fall of 1862, but their perceptions of what happened and who was to blame are markedly 

different. Their opinions were obviously determined by what side of the conflict they supported, 

which should not be surprising. The amazing thing is that while they supported different sides 

in the violence around them, they were so closely connected and had such intimate contact. 

While enemies deep inside, they had to live side-by-side and did what was necessary to keep 

life going until relief came in one form or another. This relationship is at the heart of the 

uniqueness of the irregular warfare that permeated the border region in the West. The lines of 

battle weren’t clearly drawn and easily definable, as they were on the fields of Gettysburg or 

Antietam, but blurred into a violent haze that put enemies into daily contact. The question each 

day was which side would apply the violence that all had to look forward to and fear. Many 

would die because they met the wrong side on a particular day and were unable to convince 

them of their true loyalties. It is hard to imagine that kind of fear and how it had to affect 

adults and children. The animosity that Hannah Hicks felt for Stephen Foreman is obvious in 

her diary, but she dared not express it openly as tomorrow could be the day that his side held 

temporary sway and she could not afford to alienate a man who could bring her such violent 

problems. 

The violence in the Indian Territory was not confined to the Park Hill and Tahlequah 

area. Interviews with survivors of the war and their descendants are filled with tales of 

wanton killing and robbery at the hands of bushwhackers from both sides of the conflict. One 

interviewee admitted that his father was a bushwhacker and that “in other words he was one of 

the men that played both sides in the War.”25 This belief among descendants of the victims of 

the war in Arkansas and the Indian Territory, that the bushwhackers were not representatives 

of any particular side, is evident in the interview with William L. Cowart. He indicated that his 

father was a Confederate soldier and that his family suffered at the hands of bushwhackers, but 

that they were not members of the Union forces. He described the bushwhackers as men who 

“took out their spite on the helpless non-combatants and robbed and burned and committed 

crimes, as there were no civil officers and no law in the Cherokee Nation at that time, and the 

Bushwhackers operated unmolested, where and when they pleased.”26 These men often had 

no political side in the conflict or just changed sides as the situation suited them. One such 

combatant, named Jesse Russel, was originally with the Pin Indians, but chose to leave them 

and join with the Southern forces. The Pins waited what they believed to be an acceptable 

period of time for him to return to them and when he didn’t they hunted him down and killed 

75
him.27 Apparently, changing sides was not uncommon, but could be deadly if those that you left 

were still in the immediate area. 

Much of the violence that has been portrayed thus far was committed by the Pin 

Indians, ostensibly in support of the Union forces in the War. Violence of this type was not 

restricted to the Northern side or to Indians. Stand Watie’s men also conducted raids of this sort 

and, while they could be considered regular soldiers in some instances, their warfare in general 

lends them to the classification of irregulars. Watie’s adjutant described the force that Colonel 

Watie commanded in October 1863 as “a crowd of Cherokee, Creeks, Chickasaws, and white 

vagabonds and Border Ruffians.” This is apparently the force that Watie had with him when he 

was at Park Hill in November 1863. He wrote his wife, Sarah, about his scout there explaining 

that they “killed a few Pins in Tahlequah. They had been holding council. I had the old council 

house set on fire and burnt down, also John Ross’ house. Poor Andy Nave was killed. He 

refused to surrender and was shot by Dick Fields. I felt sorry as he used to be quite friendly 

towards me before the war but it could not be helped.”28

While the preceding pages have painted the picture of the violence that went on between 

Union and Confederate Indians, these were not the only irregular warriors active in the Indian 

Territory during the war. Jayhawkers from Union Kansas rode into the Cherokee Nation and 

exacted a price from those they perceived to be Confederate sympathizers. Rev. Foreman’s 

diary indicated his fear of these raiders and placed them in bands with the Pin Indians that 

raided their fellows in the towns of Park Hill and Tahlequah. These men were constant threats 

to the population of the Cherokee Nation, creating a pall of unrest that hung over the country 

like a dangerous cloud. 

An even more violent threat entered the Indian Territory on the evening of October 6, 

1863, in the form of William Clarke Quantrill. After the infamous raid on Lawrence in August 

1863, Quantrill’s men had gone to ground for a period of time. Reorganizing and setting out 

on a renewed campaign, Quantrill came upon Brigadier General Blunt’s command near Baxter 

Springs, Kansas, on the 6th and decimated the Union force. From Baxter Springs, Quantrill set 

off south down the Texas Road into the Indian Territory, apparently in the belief that Union 

reinforcements would soon follow after the fight at Baxter Springs. As usual, his entry into any 

area was bloody and savage, with his official report citing the capture of about 150 Indians 

and Negroes, none of which apparently lived to relate their experience with the king of civilwar-era guerrillas.29 One of Quantrill’s guerrillas accounts for some of these 150 when he 

details an attack on Indians in the early days of that movement through the Indian Territory. 

Quantrill’s band came upon a wagon train of Pin Indians on the second evening of the trip and 

charged the column, apparently killing them all, as the author points out that “in a short time, 

they were all good Indians.”30 Quantrill and his band would continue to raid into the Indian 

Territory for the next six months, operating either on their own or loosely in concert with 

larger Confederate raids organized by Stand Watie or other southern forces. While his forces 

provided a hard-fighting company of men to the Confederacy, they were uncontrollable and 

left destruction and bloodshed wherever they went. Obviously, those individuals in the Indian 

Territory aligned with the Federal Government were given no-quarter when they fell into the 

hands of this guerrilla leader, but the pain that he inflicted was never limited to the enemy. 

76
In February 1864, Quantrill and his band stopped in the town of Colbert, situated in the 

Chickasaw Nation, close to the border with Texas. Here he forced the occupants of the Isaac 

Albertson farm to serve dinner to him and his soldiers. The women of the house, apparently 

Confederate sympathizers, prepared the guerrillas food and drink and gave them the hospitality 

of their home. Quantrill returned the favor from these southern women by taking all the 

livestock on the farm with him when he left. Shortly after this episode, Quantrill’s men killed 

a Confederate officer, Major Butts, in the Chickasaw Nation.31 While it was to be expected that 

the enemy would have much to fear from the guerrilla violence of William Clarke Quantrill, it 

is obvious that no one was safe in his presence. Things grew so bad between Quantrill and the 

Confederate leadership, in the late winter and early spring of 1864, that Quantrill was forced to 

flee back to Missouri, where he ultimately lost control of his guerrilla band. 

Obviously, classification of these irregular warriors is complex, with units like Stand 

Watie’s operating as regularly enrolled soldiers while using guerrilla tactics. Others can be 

defined, by their actions, as falling into the category of war-rebels, while some certainly merited 

the term of outlaw that was applied to all guerrillas by the Union authorities. While some areas 

of the border held more of one category or another, they all generally possessed many of the 

same characteristics.

Arkansas

As was the case all along the border area, the day-to-day war in northern Arkansas was 

a scene of terror and depredation. While the battles of Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove are the part 

of the Civil War that appears in most histories of Arkansas, the people of the state had to deal 

with the petty war continually. The war was not restricted to the battlefields, but was evident 

in the streets of most towns and in the barnyard of most farms. War on a mass scale tends to 

be impersonal, but the irregular war, on the other hand, is one of personal violence and terror. 

The story of one woman in Arkansas is illustrative of this point; while Confederate soldiers had 

to worry about minnie balls and cannon shot, Mrs. Sallie Jordan’s mother had her right foot 

placed into a bed of hot coals by Federal soldiers, bent on forcing her to reveal the hiding place 

of the family’s money.32 This is not the type of violence that was found on the battlefields of Pea 

Ridge or Shiloh or even Franklin, but it had a tremendous effect on the people that it touched.

The war ebbed and flowed across northwestern Arkansas, however, and at any given 

time the area could be controlled by either the North or the South. Within such a turbulent 

environment, and with the total lack of uniformity in military dress, citizens often were unable 

to determine the politics and military allegiance of a visitor until they questioned him. It was by 

no means unusual for Confederate soldiers to wear Union blue that they had captured, as their 

own government was unable to provide them with adequate protection against the elements. 

The noncombatants, caught in the middle between two rival armies, wondered constantly 

whether they would live to see another day or whether they would lose everything they owned 

to the next group of riders to come galloping up the lane.

One writer, a retired schoolteacher named Robert Mecklin, remained at home in 

northwestern Arkansas throughout the war and his letters revealed how families survived in 

77
this violent atmosphere. In a letter, dated August 30, 1863, Mecklin explained the exploits of 

a Confederate officer named Captain Buck Brown, who, with about 120 men, operated in the 

vicinity of Fayetteville, Arkansas, hitting exposed Union patrols and supply trains. With the fall 

of Little Rock only ten days away, Captain Brown was operating many miles in the rear of the 

main Union force, utilizing the classic tactics of the guerrilla to cause as much consternation as 

possible among the Federals.33 Mecklin goes on to talk of the quality of Brown’s organization 

and that of another Confederate officer, noting that “better officers and braver soldiers could not 

be left us.”34 Obviously, Mecklin believed these irregulars to be Confederate soldiers, involved 

in a fight to protect the southern sympathizers of the area from Federal troops. 

Map 6. Arkansas Area of Operations.

These men, which southern sympathizers regarded as soldiers of the southern cause, 

were perceived as renegades by the Union authorities and failed to recognize the legitimacy 

of irregular warfare anywhere along the border. Based on General Order No. 100, they were 

78
defined as outlaws, bushwhackers, and brigands, and stood to forfeit their lives if they were 

captured under arms against the Federal authorities. To be recognized by the Federals as 

partisans, a term which provided for treatment as prisoners of war, the soldier had to be part 

of a force detached from a main body and wearing the uniform of his army. In the fall of 

1863, it was difficult to determine if there was a main Confederate army in Arkansas and the 

armed men of southern sympathies were treated under Article 82 of the General Order, which 

deemed them to be pirates and highway robbers, and were liable to summary execution.35 A 

resident of the ravaged area showed how tense the situation was in a letter in which he detailed 

meeting Federal soldiers while he was out chopping wood. He did not at first recognize them as 

Federals, but knew as soon as he heard them speak. They passed him by, but he confided to his 

correspondent that “had [I] been found with a gun instead of an axe, trying to shoot a hawk for 

carrying off our chickens...or a turkey to get a little meat for my family, I would have perhaps 

been shot down as a bushwhacker.”36 In this environment of fear and violence, families could 

not even perform the tasks that were natural to their everyday existence, the hunting of food, 

or the protection of their belongings. Weapons were hidden, for discovery with arms was an 

admission of guilt and a ticket to prison or death. 

While the most active area of guerrilla activity was northern Arkansas near the Missouri 

border, other areas of the state were affected also. General Blunt, in command of the District 

of the Frontier in July 1863, informed Schofield that guerrilla bands were extremely numerous 

in southwestern Arkansas hunting down Union men who had fled there for the protection of 

the mountains.37 The problem in Arkansas was that the Union forces were never able to fill the 

state with adequate troops to truly control the countryside. Major General Frederick Steele, 

commander of the Arkansas Expedition, indicated this when he wrote to the Sixteenth Army 

Corps Commander, Major General Stephen Hurlbut, informing him that as soon as his troops 

departed an area the guerrillas would flow back in and control the terrain and his lines of 

communication.38 More open proof of this conscious decision on the part of Washington is 

found in correspondence from General Halleck to Schofield. Halleck expressed his displeasure 

that Steele continued to retain forces in Arkansas, directing that since “only guerrilla bands will 

be left in Arkansas” Steele’s forces are not to “be parceled out to merely to protect the country.” 

Halleck wanted these troops for operations with General Nathaniel Banks along the Red River 

and apparently saw no pressing need to protect the Union citizens of Arkansas.39

The communications between headquarters involved in operations in Arkansas paint a 

picture of a sea of guerrilla manpower that parted as the Union forces moved through an area, 

then surged back as the end of the Union columns disappeared over the last hill. General McNeil, 

who enamored himself to the Confederacy by his actions at Palmyra, Missouri, attempted to 

use the Union First Arkansas Cavalry to police their home state, imploring them to get off of 

the main roads and seek out the guerrillas along the mountain paths that were known only to 

local men.40 Other Union commanders sought and received permission to raise local Federal 

militias to fight the specter of irregular violence, believing that the locals would be much more 

motivated and adept at combating the guerrillas.41

The Union commanders weren’t the only ones concerned with irregular warfare in 

Arkansas. Confederate leaders indicated similar problems from irregular Union forces operating 

79
in their midst. Brigadier General William Steele, a division commander in the Trans-Mississippi 

Army, complained of a guerrilla force that was cutting off his line of communications following 

the retreat of General Hindman’s forces south. He blamed rogue Texans and local Unionists 

for the problems, citing the common problems of trying to bring to battle irregular forces 

when they are well mounted and working in rugged terrain. Just as the Union forces gave 

irregulars no military standing, Steele referred to these forces as “lawless bands of robbers 

and murderers,” further indicating that they were committing countless depredations on the 

local Confederate population.42 Indications from Confederate correspondence show that the sea 

analogy is consistent for them also, with Steele’s adjutant informing his higher headquarters 

that “it has been impossible to leave this portion of the country up to the present time without 

abandoning all this country to our enemies, or rather that which would prove more destructive 

than an organized enemy – bands of traitors who are about in this vicinity.”43

Even Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon expressed concern over the impact 

of this guerrilla violence in Arkansas in a letter to Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith. The 

letter asked Smith to take a personal role in the state of affairs in Arkansas, lamenting that the 

people are represented to him by good sources as being without basic subsistence and nearing 

starvation, with what little they have being plundered by “gangs of lawless marauders and 

deserters.”44

While guerrilla activity in Arkansas never reached the levels of intensity and violence 

that was found in Kansas and Missouri, the violence of the border spilled south. As Confederate 

and Union forces roamed the countryside, they preyed on citizens they considered disloyal 

to their cause. Quite often the Confederate guerrillas would take the opportunity to serve 

with Jo Shelby or John Marmaduke conducting raids into Missouri.45 These irregular soldiers 

moved in and out of the Confederate service as suited their needs, rarely under control of 

their commanding officers. In addition to these forces nominally working under command of 

Union or Confederate officers, the problem of desertion, raised earlier by General Steele and 

Secretary Seddon, contributed significantly to the unrest in the countryside. As soldiers, tired 

of war or simply seeking plunder, left the control of regular forces they tended, all along the 

border, to turn to murder as their mode of operation. Though hard to pin down, complaints of 

these “lawless bandits” were commonly heard.

Both while the Confederate army was in the state and after they had departed, the 

people of northern Arkansas were besieged by violence from both sides and victimized by 

lawless individuals who fought for no cause except their personal aggrandizement. The fear 

and tension are evident in the words of Robert Mecklin, who indicated that if he was caught 

away from home he would likely be killed and if he was to avoid such an end, his lot would be 

time in the guard house. He shared that he was convinced that he would stay in the guard house, 

unable to help his family, until such time as he bowed to the lewd comments of his captors and 

took “the oath of loyalty to Mr. Lincoln’s government.”46 As a man of Southern sympathies, he 

feared Union supporters around every corner.

This violence in Arkansas continued throughout the course of the war and contributed 

not only to the death toll, but to the unrest amongst the civilian populace of the state. Guerrillas 

80
attacked a Union officer in February 1865 on the road from Fort Smith to Van Buren. He was 

lucky and all they did was threaten him and take everything he had, to include his pride. Not as 

fortunate was a Union Private named Williams, who was killed by partisans within half a mile 

of his unit’s camp.47 These soldiers were victims of painful encounters with irregular warriors 

late in the war in Arkansas, but as seen earlier it was more often the civilian population that 

suffered the most. The population around Fort Smith was unable to effectively grow the crops 

necessary to feed themselves because of the presence of guerrillas in the area. They petitioned 

the Federal Government for protection and arms with which to defend themselves. While no 

established Confederate army threatening Arkansas, the specter of violence from sympathizers 

and partisans continued to create fear and tension in the populace.48

The Indian Territory and Arkansas were not critical battlefields in the grand scheme 

of Civil War history. What happened there did little to affect the final outcome of the war 

and the collapse of the Confederacy. The events in these areas were, however, critical to the 

Americans who populated the towns and farms there. They lived in fear of violence for years 

and many encountered that deadly violence first-hand. Even the families of the guerrillas faced 

these dangers, because while Quantrill on the Confederate side or many of the Union soldiers 

were not from Arkansas or the Territory, most of the irregulars that fought here were members 

of the communities in the local border area. Some of their families were left at home to take 

their chances, while others were displaced to Texas to live a camp life that was itself a great 

psychological burden. With the end of the war, all these families were losers in one way or 

another and the small war in the Territory and Arkansas solved little, but caused immense pain. 

81
Notes

1. Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 181.

2. Official Records, p. 186.

3. Official Records, pp. 189-190.

4. Much of the information for this introduction concerning the historical background of the Cherokee 

Nation was drawn from Edward E. Dale and Gaston Litton, Cherokee Cavaliers: Forty Years of Cherokee History as Told in Correspondence of the Ridge-Watie-Boudinot Family, (Norman, OK: University 

of Oklahoma Press, 1996).

5. Cherokee Cavaliers, p. 17.

6. Cherokee Cavaliers, p. 17.

7. Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, (Ottawa, KS: Kansas Heritage Press, 

1922), p. 25.

8. Britton, pp. 25-26.

9. Britton, pp. 28-29.

10. Britton, p. 34.

11. Britton, p. 33.

12. Stephen Foreman to L.S. Wilson, April 2, 1862. Stephen Foreman Collection, Western Historical 

Collection, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK.

13. Stephen Foreman to L.S. Wilson, April 2, 1862.

14. Foreman Diary, July 6, 1862.

15. Foreman Diary, July 7, 1862.

16. Foreman Diary, July 16, 1862.

17. This dual threat to Foreman as both a Southern sympathizer and a Treaty Party man points out the 

importance of understanding the culture of a populace in the midst of irregular violence. Union soldiers 

from the north would not have understood this dynamic, but it was apparent to members of his cultural 

community. US Army forces have just recently begun to take an interest in the culture of the populace in 

which they operate, after seeing its importance displayed so prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Professional military education institutions in the Army are focusing much more clearly on the importance 

of culture and language so as to better understand the civilians and irregular warriors with whom they 

have to deal.

18. Foreman Diary, July 16, 1862.

82
19. Foreman Diary, July 17, 1862.

20. Foreman Diary, July 18, 1862.

21. The Diary of Hannah Hicks, (Tulsa, OK: The Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and 

Art, 1972), p. 8.

22. Hicks Diary, p 8.

23. Foreman Diary, July 20, 1862.

24. Hicks Diary, p. 9 and note #5.

25. John Silk interview #6005, Oklahoma Indian Project, Oklahoma Historical Society, p. 492.

26. William L. Cowart interview #7901, Oklahoma Indian Project, Oklahoma Historical Society, p. 69.

27. Hicks Diary, p. 4.

28. Cherokee Cavaliers, pp. 142-145.

29. Official Records, Series. I, Volume 22, Part 1, 700-1.

30. John McCorkle, Three Years with Quantrill: A True Story Told by his Scout John McCorkle, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), p. 142.

31. LeRoy Fischer and Lary C. Rampp, “Quantrill’s Civil War Operations in Indian Territory;” found in 

the John W. Morris Collection, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma.

32. Belser, “Military Operations,” p. 643.

33. W.J. Lemke, ed., The Robert Mecklin Letters, (Fayetteville, AR.: Washington County Historical 

Society, 1955), p. 11.

34. Lemke, p. 13.

35. Hartigan, pp. 60-61.

36. Lemke, p. 25.

37. Lemke, p. 411.

38. Lemke, p. 444.

39. Lemke, pp. 709-710.

40. Lemke, p. 518.

41. Lemke, p. 533.

83
42. Lemke, pp. 774-775.

43. Lemke, p. 778.

44. Lemke, pp. 802-803.

45. Lemke, p. 219.

46. Lemke, p. 13.

47. Fort Smith New Era, Feb. 11, 1865.

48. “General Bussey Takes Over at Ft. Smith;” found in the A. M. Gibson Collection, Western Historical 

Collection, University of Oklahoma.

84
Chapter 4

Texas

In his work on the Great Hanging at Gainesville, Texas, Richard McCaslin observed 

that few of the approximately 42 prisoners who were executed at Gainesville in 1862 were 

guilty of the treason or insurrection with which they were charged. Southern leaders in this 

north Texas city and county were striving for a level of security for their citizens and did not 

hesitate to use the rope and the hanging tree to try and cut out what they viewed as a potentially 

dangerous part of society. Their actions were bred of fear; fear of what could happen if Union 

sympathizers were able to operate in the county and create unrest among the population and 

slaves. In the end, their actions were accepted by the people of the county, though they were, in 

most cases, not within the bounds of existing law.1

The state of affairs in Texas during the war was at once similar and different from the 

other border states in this study. Violence on a low, personal level was common throughout the 

state, driven by political perspectives and a simple desire for personal enrichment. Conversely, 

the violence in Texas was not exactly that found in Kansas or in Kentucky. Organized or semiorganized guerrilla bands opposing the government in power were not a common problem 

anywhere in Texas. Most of the violence driven by political perspectives was based on the 

perception of disloyalty and the fear of actions, rather than on concrete actions by Union 

guerrillas. This subtle distinction, while important, does not make the violence in Texas any 

less bloody or dangerous. A continuing focus on the border population and the impact of this 

violence on that society is just as important in a society filled with violence based on perceptions 

or misperceptions, as one filled with guerrillas. The Texans who were hanged at Gainesville 

died as surely as if they carried a Union battle flag, the distinction as to whether they were 

trying to engage in the Union fight mattered not to them.

Civil wars are by their very nature bloody and personal. Baron de Jomini characterized 

this type of war as a “war of opinion.” In discussing the violent nature of such wars, Jomini 

wrote that these type of wars “...result either from doctrines which one party desires to 

propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it desires to crush, in both cases leading 

to intervention. Although originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most 

deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, 

and terrible.”2

It was the propagation of doctrines and dogmas amongst the population of Texas, 

perceived or real, that brought on the violence examined in this chapter. Jomini’s contention 

that these wars are particularly cruel and vindictive was born out in the Civil War experience 

in Texas. It was very hard for citizens to remain quiet and at ease when they perceived a threat 

in close proximity to them. This type of fear was rampant whenever the group in power, be 

they Union or Confederate, believed that the population, or a portion of it, was disloyal to 

their cause. Disloyalty covers a broad scope of offenses and feelings. A German citizen of 

Fredericksburg or Comfort had only to be “soft” on slavery or secession to be considered 

85
disloyal, and therefore dangerous to the public good. Non-Germans around Gainesville found 

the same to be true in another section of the state. Overt acts were not necessary to bring 

the weight of “justice” down upon the heads of the offenders. Any accusation or suspicion 

was enough to warrant arrest, incarceration, or hanging from the nearest tree. Some of those 

considered disloyal to the Confederate cause were afforded the luxury of due process, but they 

were the lucky ones. Others were left hanging over the road, swinging from a tree limb, or were 

shot and thrown into the nearest stream. 

Map 7. Texas Area of Operations.

This type of violence and the fear that it breeds does not die out quickly. Men who 

died on the field of battle did so in a rather impersonal way. They seldom knew the individual 

soldier in the other uniform — he was just another Yankee or Reb — so their scars healed a 

little quicker when the war was behind them. Unfortunately, the type of personal violence, 

which is detailed here, creates scars that take generations to go away. The scars are healed now, 

86
but the wounds are not covered as deeply as 147 years of history would suggest. The violence 

that occurred in these counties had a lasting effect upon the history of Texas and many of those 

who lived through it went on to serve in positions of importance in Texas government. How 

could perceived unionists such as Jacob Kuechler and Edward Degener, who suffered physical 

attack, incarceration, and the loss of loved ones, easily forget the men whom they knew were 

responsible for these acts? Radical reconstruction in post-war Texas eventually offered these 

men the power that they needed to even the score with their antagonists.

The counties in the area between Austin and San Antonio were not inhabited by strong 

secessionists. In fact, 10 counties voted against secession and five more proved to have nearly 

50 percent of their voters in opposition to the ordinance.3

 The agriculture of much of this 

area did not readily support slave labor and the Germans who inhabited a great deal of the 

land opposed the institution. Many had fled Europe for political reasons and felt a continuing 

allegiance to the Union that had accepted them when they were homeless. They were not a firm 

part of the southern mentality that was so prevalent in the states of South Carolina, Alabama, 

or Georgia. They were a predominantly well-educated group that had no desire to leave the 

Union, but if that was the route Texas chose, they wanted to be left alone, hoping to avoid an 

active role in the war that was inevitable. In June of 1861, a group of men from the counties 

of Gillespie, Kimble, Kendall, and Kerr felt the need to band together, for the defense of their 

homes on the frontier. They formed an organization called the Union Loyal League whose—

“...objects and purposes were, not to create or encourage strife between 

Unionist and Confederate sympathizers, but to take such action as might 

peaceably secure its members and their families from being disturbed and 

compelled to bear arms against the Union, and to protect their families against 

hostile Indians.”4

As 1861 progressed, the group continued its campaign to avoid bearing arms against 

the Union, increasing its numbers to nearly 500 Unionists by the summer of 1862.5 Though this 

group was, ostensibly, not intended as a threat to the Confederate authorities, they came to view 

it as such and took action against it.

Apparently, the group came to the attention of the authorities in San Antonio because 

of recruiting irregularities in the frontier company that was being organized by Captain Jacob 

Kuechler. In a petition to the Governor, members of the Fredericksburg community, who held 

secessionist views, bitterly complained that Kuechler was only recruiting men he knew to be 

unionists and that the organization would not be willing to fight for the Confederate cause.6

Similar meetings occurred in other parts of central and southern Texas, some for the purpose 

of joint protection and others merely to discuss opposition to the conscription laws, or petition 

the governor for relief. While not all of the participants were German, they were generally 

identified as such.7

So much were those in opposition to the conscription laws identified with the German 

community that General J. B. Magruder issued instructions to the Superintendent of Conscripts 

in Austin County, Texas, to “cause all persons of foreign birth who exhibit opposition to the 

87
enforcement of the conscript law to be sent from this state...” The superintendent was cautioned 

to do it quietly, however, to avoid creating a group mentality towards the Germans. The 

commanding general was concerned that “difficulties from this cause also may arise between 

our native-born citizens and those of foreign birth.” Magruder’s concerns were valid; a line 

between the German residents and the rabid Confederates had already been drawn and was 

regularly being crossed with violent results.8 One report indicates the crossing of the line, 

with references to a petition to General Magruder from the women of Austin County. The 

report indicated that the officer responsible for enrolling conscripts went to the households 

of German citizens for the apparent purpose of enrolling the men. Led by some disreputable 

members of the community, who were obviously anti-German, the squads reportedly struck 

women and children at will during their attempts to locate and take into custody the German 

men. The Confederate government did not condone these excesses, at least not the commanders 

at Magruder’s level and up, but that does not reduce the violence suffered by the German 

community of central Texas.9

During the loyalty trial of Philip Braubach, a potential Lieutenant in Kuechler’s 

company, Charles Nimitz was sworn in to testify. Nimitz was the individual in charge of 

conscription and enrollment in Gillespie County, and one of the originators of the petition, 

which was forwarded to the Governor. During Nimitz’s testimony, he stated that Braubach 

had raised men in secret, though customarily such companies were raised by public notice. He 

further indicated that the company took actions that he believed were intended to hide their 

meetings from public scrutiny. Finally, as the individual in charge of enrollment, he indicated 

that “I never had a list of men in my hands showing the progress made by the accused in raising 

the Company. I call myself loyal...I call all those loyal who worked to break up that Co. by 

petition to the Governor.”10

It was this type of suspicion that prompted the disbanding of the Frontier company 

that Kuechler had been authorized to enroll. No tangible evidence was presented before the 

Military Commission beyond the testimony of Nimitz and other secessionist members of the 

Fredericksburg community. Heresay and supposition were the standard fare for the Military 

Commission during its period of justice. Another witness, Frederic Fresenius, added to the 

comments of Nimitz by restating the accusations that the members of this company were raised 

in secret and worked diligently to disguise their meeting times and places. He further provided 

his opinion that “He is now considered as disloyal by the loyal people of the town, the others 

may consider themselves as loyal to Lincoln. One of the young men who joined the Co, said 

that their object was to join and when the Yankees come they would lay down their arms. I take 

it that those men were disloyal from the fact that as soon as Martial law was declared, they all 

put out, and have not shown themselves since. Those men have shown their disloyalty ever 

since Secession, but after that Co.was broken up, they have shown their disloyalty and insulted 

us.”11

Obviously, the loyal secessionist men of Gillespie County and Fredericksburg perceived 

these Texans with unionist sentiments as a distinct threat. Confederate military authorities, such 

as Colonel H. E. McCulloch, voiced the opinion that this sentiment would have “to be crushed 

out, even if it has to be done without due course of law...”12 As with the rest of the country 

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during this trying time, there was no middle ground allowable on the question of slavery or 

secession. The mere inference that a man was soft on the secession question, or unwilling to 

fight actively for the Confederacy, was enough to brand him as a Black Abolitionist and open 

him to attack from all quarters. The environment became one in which a man had to take a stand, 

neutrality was not an option. Most of the members of the Union Loyal League were unwilling 

to bear arms against the Federal Government, but they had no firm intentions of bearing arms 

against the Confederacy. A prominent story of this period concerns a group of men who started 

for Mexico and were caught by Partisan Rangers on the banks of the Nueces River. The exact 

sequence that led to the death of many of these men is a subject of debate. Some maintain they 

were simply running from conscription, while others are convinced that they were enroute to 

join the Union forces in New Orleans. While it is true that some of the survivors did join the 

Union army, others did not.13 Men like Jacob Kuechler stayed in Mexico, and though they 

disagreed with the Confederacy and its ambitions, they did not put on a uniform and take the 

field of battle against the South. 

This discussion of the Nueces group will continue later, but more important is the fact 

that of the nearly 500 members of the Union Loyal League, only 61 attempted to flee to Mexico 

in this group.14 The remaining Unionists either slipped into Mexico unnoticed, in smaller 

groups, or took to the hills as was alluded to in the testimony of Fresenius. The actions of these 

men who took to the bush tended to be more in line with the ideas of the League as stated by 

John Sansom. They appear to have been much more interested in avoiding conscription into 

the Confederate service than in carrying on a war against the secessionist element. Almost 

without exception, the reports of violence that can be found concern attacks upon Unionists or 

suspected Unionists by Confederate soldiers and their sympathizers. In the rest of the TransMississippi the violence was two-sided as both the Unionists and Secessionists carried on 

campaigns of violence against the other. Violence by one side was sure to bring on a reprisal 

by the other. In Gillespie and surrounding counties, there was considerable fear and violence, 

but it was remarkably one-sided. While researching the irregular violence in central Texas, no 

record of an unprovoked attack by Unionists was ever found. These German and American 

Unionists didn’t attack railroad lines or Confederate garrisons; they appear to have been too 

busy trying to stay out of the path of Partisan Rangers like Captain James Duff.

In response to the Union Loyal League, and the complaints of loyal secessionists such 

as Nimitz, the Commander of the Sub-Military District of the Rio Grande, Brigadier General 

Hamilton P. Bee, declared martial law to be in effect in the area under his jurisdiction. The 

order, dated April 28, 1862, included the counties mentioned earlier.15 Just over a month later, 

on May 30, 1862, Brigadier General P. O. Hèbert, the Commander of the Department of Texas, 

extended the martial law order over the whole of the State of Texas.16 

This martial law edict took the law in Gillespie County, and others, out of the hands 

of the civil officials and turned loose a rule of military violence that had lasting effects on the 

German community. The same day the proclamation took effect, Captain James Duff rode into 

Fredericksburg to begin his duties as the Provost-Marshal for the area.17 Duff had been born 

in Scotland in 1828 and later emigrated to the United States. The best information regards him 

as a soldier of fortune and maintains that upon his arrival he enlisted in the Federal Army. He 

89
was apparently charged with a rather serious offense and dishonorably discharged. He came 

to San Antonio in 1860, making his living as a merchant. Whether or not his previous military 

record was concealed is still in question, but he was able to secure a commission as a Captain 

in command of a partisan ranger unit known as Duff’s Partisan Rangers.18 

Ordinarily, the imposition of martial law upon a community which, in name, was 

loyal to the Confederate cause was onerous enough, but by placing James Duff in charge of 

military justice, General Bee sentenced a large number of citizens to incarceration or death. 

Historians have not treated Captain Duff well, often referring to him as a mercenary or 

murderer. One young historian wrote that, “According to various descriptions of his character 

and conduct, Duff must have been a military ‘hero’ beside whom Santa Ana would look pale by 

comparison.”19 Others, many of whom were contemporaries of Duff, have been no less critical 

in their description of the man who held absolute sway over Gillespie County. R. H. Williams, 

a member of Duff’s partisan ranger unit remembered him as a man “who on foot resembled 

a bullfrog, and on horseback Sancho Panza.” As to Duff’s performance in policing Gillespie 

County, Williams wrote that “he exercised [his martial law powers] to their fullest extent, 

committing atrocities that even his superiors in San Antonio would not have sanctioned.”20

The diary of another Confederate soldier, assigned to Fort Martin Scott (Camp Davis), just 

outside of Fredericksburg, has numerous entries that betray his feelings toward James Duff. 

On August 5, 1862, Desmond Hopkins wrote “As our regular scout came in today they found 

a man hanging right over the trail, with his throat cut from ear to ear, later learned his name 

was Sewell — hung over our trail by some of Duffs men, for the purpose, first to leave the 

impression, that our boys done it — and second we would have to bury him, d--d scoundrels 

— and sure enough the order came from old Duff...”21

Five days later Hopkins again commented on Duff, this time lamenting the fact that his 

unit had been placed under his control. “No inspection today, in fact we have had no inspection 

since we were placed under command of old Jim Duff, he keeps our men on the jump, while he 

and his men lay in camp and drink good whiskey, and smoke the best cigars.”22

It is evident that this Scotsman, Captain James Duff, was a hard man with whom to 

deal. He sent the summons to all men over 16 years of age to come to Fredericksburg to take 

the loyalty oath and register, but few of these men appeared. To counter this problem, Duff sent 

out two parties of rangers to scour the hills and bring in those who had refused to answer the 

summons. These groups reportedly ransacked homes of suspected Unionists to the point that 

they were no longer habitable. They brought in a few men and eight women and children who 

were placed under guard in the camp and Fredericksburg.23

About a month before Desmond Hopkins was writing in his diary about Duff, a 

group of men who were members of the Union Loyal League met on July 4th to expand the 

organization. They organized three companies, for the purpose of self-defense, with Major Fritz 

Tegener being elected to command the battalion. This meeting brought the relations between 

the German Unionists and the military government to a critical point. On July 20, 1862, Major 

Tegener learned that his county and the others that composed the Union Loyal League were 

considered to be in open rebellion, and that Captain Duff had been given orders to do whatever 

90
was necessary to deal with the situation.24 Knowing full well what measures Duff would take, 

Tegener and others determined the best course of action to be a departure from the area. Sixtyone members of the League started from Kerr County, enroute to Mexico, on August 1, 1862.25

Though they have been portrayed as dangerous and violent by the men who pursued them, a 

close reading of the literature indicates that most of them desired only to cross the border into 

Mexico and stay there until it was safer for them to return home. They were armed with rifles 

and some handguns, but this was not unusual for men living on the frontier of Texas. If these 

men were expecting trouble, they did a very poor job of preparing for it. Their camp ground 

was in an area lending itself to an easy ambush; they failed to post an adequate guard force, and 

had done nothing to ascertain whether they were being followed. Their actions resemble those 

of men on a hunting trip more than those of a military unit.26 

The story of what happened on the tenth of August in 1862 has been written many times 

in Texas history. The Confederates, under command of Lieutenant C. D. McRae, attacked the 

Unionist position, routing the Germans from their encampment. The best information indicates 

that 33 of the Germans escaped, 19 were killed, and nine were wounded so badly that they 

could not flee.27 This action in itself was not a violation of the rules of war, or decency, though 

a more compassionate commander might have given the party the opportunity to surrender. 

The term “massacre” can only be applied to what was to follow during the day of the tenth. 

Numerous sources indicate that the Confederates, with the express knowledge of Lieutenant 

McRae, executed the wounded prisoners they held.28 Though McRae’s official report indicates 

only that there were no prisoners, even the Confederate authorities and soldiers knew something 

was not exactly right.29 Desmond Hopkins’ diary again provides a different perspective on the 

actions of the rangers. “Today our big scout got in from the bushwhacker fight, on the Newases 

river the men in the fight on our side were made up from different companies of our regiment...

there were two men killed and eighteen wounded on our side, and thirty on the other side, and 

a number of prisoners taken, but the prisoners all managed to make their escape, so the boys 

said, and I know they would not lie about a little thing like that.”30

The incident at the Nueces River was a violent act, set in a very violent time. There 

is no excuse for the murder of wounded men, but it would be hard to fault the Confederates 

for their pursuit of the armed group. Most of the literature has treated the incident in isolation 

from the violence that preceded it, and would follow it. In reality, the massacre was simply one 

link in a chain of violent, terrible events that occurred during the war. Just 12 days after the 

massacre occurred, and prior to the return of McRae’s unit, more violence was felt in the hill 

country around Fredericksburg. Hopkins, while noting that the scout had just returned, wrote 

that “we are having a tough time in this neck of the woods just now, I counted seven dead 

men, all hung on one limb...cut down, and thrown over a bluff in to Spring Creek, one old gray 

headed man named Nelson, was over eighty years old. After he had rose to the top of the water 

some woman came up, and lifted him out in a sheet, and buried him.”31

Hopkins’ mention of an elderly man named Nelson is particularly interesting in light 

of the report which Captain Duff filed with his headquarters in San Antonio on June 23, 1862. 

In this report he noted that he found the people of the area to be “shy and timid” and reported 

that “In Kerr County there are a few men who are bitterly opposed to our Government. These 

91
men are headed by an old man by the name of Nelson. I took care that he and his party should 

be notified in good time to report to the provost-marshal. This they failed to do and Nelson sent 

me a defiant message. I then sent a detachment of State troops kindly placed at my disposal to 

arrest him, but he had taken to the cedar brakes and escaped.”32

It appears that although Captain Duff’s troops missed Nelson in their June attempt, 

they were finally able to lay their hands upon him in late August. If this case can be used as an 

example of Duff’s prevailing brand of justice, it is understandable why suspected Unionists 

chose to stay in the cedar brakes.

The problems of Gillespie and other counties did not culminate in the Nueces River 

Massacre, but continued through the war’s end. One outstanding example, to support the 

conclusion that the Massacre did not happen in a vacuum, can be found in the “Records of 

the Confederate Military Commission in San Antonio, July 2-October 10, 1862,” which were 

edited by Alwyn Barr in the late 1960s. Taken by themselves, the transcripts of these loyalty 

trials are interesting examples of martial law justice, but taken in conjunction with the Massacre 

and the hangings about which Hopkins wrote, they are further evidence of the physical and 

mental terror that the people of these counties must have felt. The commission was convened 

by Brigadier General Paul O. Hèbert, and was in session from July 2d until martial law was 

ordered rescinded by President Jefferson Davis on October 10, 1862.33 The commission sat in 

judgment on at least 15 cases, mainly involving German and American citizens from Gillespie 

and surrounding counties.34 The record of the trial, as edited by Professor Barr, reveals a 

community in Fredericksburg where everyone was constantly looking over their shoulder or 

worrying about who might overhear what they said. The owner of a bookstore, William Gamble, 

was charged with the crime of “Keeping and circulating Abolition books.” His crime stemmed 

from a single book in his store, a British book entitled Hochelaga, or England in the New 

World, which contained about six passages that could be construed to be in opposition to the 

institution of slavery. For this crime Gamble was sentenced to three months confinement and 

banishment from the Confederacy.35 No other books were found in his store of an Abolitionist 

nature, though according to the defense counsel the “vigilant acting Provost Marshal...whose 

duty it has been to examine and report any Abolition Books found in the collection and yet 

zealous and prompt in his detective duties as he is known to be he has been able to produce no 

other book, pamphlet or paper ...of an objectionable nature.”36

Other defendants, such as William McLane, were placed on trial for disobeying 

the martial law stipulation against not accepting Confederate currency.37 One of the truly 

outstanding cases was that of Julius Schlickum, who had been arrested by Captain Duff in June, 

1862, reportedly because he had been in touch with the Hill Country Unionists and the North. 

He was accused of disloyalty and singing Yankee songs while drunk. No testimony actually 

linked him with any dangerous persons, but his overall conduct was discussed through heresay 

and implication. For this dastardly crime, Schlickum was sentenced to imprisonment for the 

duration of the war because “in his general deportment he is calculated to create discontent and 

dissatisfaction with this Government and its currency.”38 Others were tried for similar crimes, 

but this type of justice is not unusual during martial law and military rule. It is not the inequity 

of the justice in this case, but the effect that justice of this sort had upon the community. 

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Knowing that they were being watched and that, possibly, their actions and language were 

subject to the close scrutiny of a man of Duff’s caliber, was enough to create fear and mental 

duress in anyone. If a man had a few too many beers in the local drinking establishment and 

said things that could be construed as Unionist, or at the very least not totally in support of the 

Confederate cause, he had to fear trial before such a court in San Antonio or the fate of the 

venerable Nelson. Living on the frontier of Texas was not an easy life in peacetime, but how 

could a man of conscience risk being taken off to jail in San Antonio and leaving his family to 

fend for themselves? 

Thus far, this study has examined the physical violence, fear, and mental anguish with 

which the inhabitants of the Hill Country had to contend with from the Confederate authorities. 

With the abolishment of martial law on October 10, 1862, Captain Duff’s brand of violence 

and terror no longer reached into these settlements.39 This might have been the end of problem, 

but for a group of lawless men who continued to prowl the area until after the war. This group, 

led by J. P. Waldrip, was commonly known as the Haengerbande, and consisted of extremely 

violent men who, though not officially affiliated with the Confederate Government, were 

rabidly anti-Unionist in their thinking.40 At another time and place, these men would have been 

considered common criminals; many had been just that before the war, but they now formed a 

vigilante organization to terrorize the German community for many years.

It is ironic that one of the dominant members of the Haengerbande, a former Lieutenant 

with Duff’s Rangers, William Banta, chose to dedicate his life story to “The women of the 

Frontier of Texas, exposed to every danger from ruthless savage and wild beast, suffering 

untold hardships in an uninhabited wilderness, brave as lions when in danger, yet tender, loving 

and true...”41 The irony lies in the fact that, although Banta is referring to Indian depredations 

when he speaks of savages and wild beasts, there were many of these frontier women who 

would quickly classify him and his cohorts in the same way. The Haengerbande, whose given 

name actually means band of hang men, took what they wished and hung whom they wished for 

the next few years.42 They developed a sophisticated spy network, enabling them to determine, 

at least in their own minds, who was a Unionist or who had uttered treasonous statements.43

Upon arriving at a suspect’s name they would then ride out and mete out the justice they 

saw fit — usually with a rope or gun.44 They were actively pursuing these “bushwhackers,” 

as the Unionists who had fled to the bush were called, and when they found men that they 

suspected to be bushwhackers, they gave no-quarter. Banta describes such a raid in which his 

German friend, Joe Freece, was killed: “The scout came up where they were camped as day 

was breaking, and the bushwhackers made their way into a thicket and the scout surrounded 

them, and at daylight the bushwhackers fired from the brush, killing two men and wounding 

two others. Poor Joe Freece was one of the killed. But the bushwhackers paid dearly for it, as 

there was not one of them left to tell the tale.”45

The reference to no one living to tell the tale appears to have been the rule with this 

vigilante organization, not the exception. In his narrative, Banta provides a chilling description 

of the state of affairs in Gillespie County during this time. He describes the terror and violence, 

but maintains that it was the work of the Union bushwhackers. Of these groups he wrote: “The 

object of these outlaw gangs was not to assist the North; their object was to murder and rob the 

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almost unprotected citizens of that vicinity; and many a poor woman had to stand out in the 

chilly night and watch the little house, a few moments before they had called home, burn to the 

ground, while her husband was in the army or ranger camp, or lay stiff and fast growing cold at 

the feet of his murders. Reader, this is no idle dream, but a terrible reality. Such was the work 

of the German and American bushwhackers.”46

Banta’s narrative gives further shape to the picture of violence and terror, but it does 

not agree with other available sources as to the perpetrators. All the other accounts of the 

happenings in Gillespie County show these same events to be occurring, but they uniformly 

portray the violence to be against the Unionist element. Even R. H. Williams, a member of 

Duff’s Rangers, and Desmond Hopkins, the Confederate soldier who kept such a valuable 

diary, indicate that the men who were hanged and shot were Unionist. There is not a single 

incident recorded in Hopkins’ diary of an attack by bushwhackers against Confederate troops 

or sympathizers. A careful reading of the Official Records supports this judgment. In Kansas, 

the Union correspondence was filled with tales of the death meted out by the guerrillas, but 

the references by the Confederate officials in central Texas are focused on opposition to 

conscription or Unionist sympathies, not violence directed against southerners. Based on the 

historical record, Banta is correct in his account of what happened, but somewhat misguided as 

to who was responsible.

In 1865, the Civil War came to an end, but a final chapter in the violence of the 

Hill Country was still being written. In the fall of 1865, 25 men were indicted for outrages 

committed during the war. Included in these were Waldrip, Banta, and Cadwell.47 Only seven 

of the fugitives were taken into custody, including Banta and Cadwell. While these seven were 

in jail awaiting trial, the violence they had left so free flowing in Fredericksburg came back to 

haunt them. A group of citizens, estimated by Banta to be about 200, stormed the jail where 

they were being held and began to fire into their cells. Before the mob could murder all of the 

men, the Sheriff arrived with another group of men and dispersed the crowd. In the mob scene, 

three of the prisoners were killed, along with one member of the attacking mob. Two of the 

other prisoners were seriously wounded and the two that escaped unhurt “owe[d] their escape 

to Providence, the darkness and the powder smoke.”48 Banta and his fellows were released for 

their own safety and never brought to trial. 

It has been written that violence tends to breed violence. Though this was true in the 

fall of 1865 in Gillespie County, the amazing story is that it had not been true earlier. The record 

depicts a community that was terrorized for many years because of their Unionist tendencies. 

While it was true that the county had voted overwhelmingly against secession (398-16),49 it 

does not constitute Unionism. There were other places in the South where a large portion 

of the population did not favor secession, but once the vote was counted they supported the 

Confederacy. The vote in Gillespie County, used as a barometer of loyalty, could well have been 

misleading. A number of historians, including Egon Richard Tausch and Hubert Heinen, have 

made strong cases showing that the labeling of all Germans as Unionists was a misconception.50

Many Germans served in the Confederate armies, and those that didn’t were not necessarily 

Unionists. Many simply chose to stay at home to protect their families from the Indians and 

vigilante violence raging across the frontier. This vigilante violence, whether done outside the 

94
law or cloaked in the veil of authority, was present farther north in Texas along the border with 

the Indian Territory. Here the victims were not of any particular national group, but identified 

only by their perceived views on secession.

The land in north Texas would see as much or more violence than the hill country of 

central Texas. The victims here were members of the Peace Party, an organization originally 

planned to provide for the families of men sent off to war and insure their safety. The fear and 

uneasiness of Confederate sympathizers and particularly rabid secessionists led to killings with 

both the gun and the rope more widespread than anywhere outside of the Kansas-Missouri 

border. Fueled largely by one man, James G. Bourland, these border counties would be home 

to violence on a scale far beyond that inflicted on the Germans around Fredericksburg. 

The violence in this part of Texas began as vigilantism in the early months of the war. 

As in most other border states, this part of Texas was populated with citizens from the north 

and south, and with these differing roots normally came differences of opinion on issues such 

as slavery and secession. The conservative element of this population was the slave-owning 

southern man. These men were the more stable, long-time residents of the counties and many 

of those they feared were relative newcomers. The conservatives saw a border society that was 

filled with violence to the point of anarchy and sought to impose order upon it. Unfortunately 

for those whose politics differed from these conservatives, the methods of imposing order were 

extralegal and deadly.

As in the hill country of central Texas, the issue that most divided the society was 

conscription. While the newcomers who did not support the Confederacy could stand to remain 

on their farms if left alone, they were unable to bring themselves to fight against the Union. 

Some of the reluctance was based on the uncertainty for their families’ welfare while they 

were gone, after all this was basically the frontier and life was more dangerous than in the east. 

The same conscription notices that were in effect in the German hill country were enforced in 

north Texas. Officials attempted to lighten some of the problems by getting reassurances that 

soldiers raised in this area would not be sent east of the Mississippi, but the assurances were not 

binding. Many soldiers chose desertion rather than resign themselves to stranding their families 

in the midst of chaos.

By the winter of 1861-62, these northern counties were filled with deserters, draft 

dodgers, and other individuals who were perceived as dangerous by the conservative element. 

Contributing to the unrest in the area was its proximity to the Indian Territory, which caused 

intense fear of raids by Union Indians or Jayhawkers. This unrest provoked increased violence 

as the spring approached in 1862, varying in severity from the knife slaying of a saloon owner 

in Cooke County and the subsequent lynching of the killers in retaliation, to a rash of fires that 

occurred in north Texas during the spring. Responding to the unrest and to enforce conscription, 

General Hebert imposed martial law on May 30, 1862.51 This imposition of martial law and 

its requisite appointment of a provost marshal provided the catalyst necessary to ignite the 

growing sparks in the border counties. Just as Captain James Duff had policed central Texas 

with an iron and bloody hand, so too did James Bourland. Though the martial law edict made 

it clear that provost marshals were not to interfere with the normal pursuit of civil justice or 

95
inflict their violence upon loyal citizens, the areas outside of the cities of Texas were controlled 

almost totally by their provost marshals. Under Bourland’s tutelage, Cooke County and those 

around it would be filled with violence and murder through the end of the war.

By the end of summer 1862, this area had become a maelstrom of turmoil over the 

issues of secession and conscription. Those favoring the Union saw Bourland and his supporters 

as a threat to their well-being, which was patently true, and formed the Peace Party. The more 

conservative element saw the threat very differently and classified all who were even perceived 

as soft on secession as traitors, deserving only of punishment. In September 1862, information 

came to Bourland and the conservative element that a secret organization existed and included 

in its designs were plans for violent actions against the Confederates. This threat provoked the 

violence that would come to be called The Great Hanging and put Gainesville, Texas, on the 

Civil War map for good.

The story of The Great Hanging is masterfully told by McCaslin and needn’t be repeated 

here in detail. The importance for this study is that just as in central Texas and the other border 

states of the Trans-Mississippi, citizens were killed in an effort to preserve order through fear 

and violence. Many of those convicted by the Citizen’s Court were guilty of conspiring to 

commit violent acts, but they were punished by a court that had no legal right to pass judgment. 

Beyond the nine men sentenced by the Citizen’s Court were at least 33 others who were hanged 

by mob decree, without even the semblance of due process. Remembering Henry McCulloch’s 

missive to crush out this dissent, even if it had to be done without due process, this should not 

be a surprise.52

Men who are fearful will resort to any means for their self-preservation and the 

conservatives of north Texas believed that these means were justified. The vigilante methods 

of disposing of dangers to their society were outside the law and often punished men who were 

no danger to them, but they were condoned by the Confederate leaders in Texas and ignored by 

President Davis.53 The same fear that allowed Union commanders in Missouri to enforce a noquarter policy towards secessionist threats, allowed James Bourland and his followers to hang 

men in Gainesville for not believing in the Confederacy.

The violence in north Texas did not begin or end with the Great Hanging. Bourland’s 

rule would become even more tyrannical, culminating in accusations that he had many prisoners 

murdered while in custody, rather than allow them to go to trial in a civil court.54 His violent 

actions did not bring order to north Texas, anymore than the violent retaliations by Union 

generals in Missouri did. Violence normally leads to more violence and this was the case in 

Texas. While the Germans of central Texas rarely fought back, the men who escaped the noose 

at Gainesville and the many deserters in the area remained a threat to secessionists through the 

end of the war. While the violence here was nothing like that farther north, the population that 

remained in these counties had to spend their nights wondering when a knock would come 

at the door and which side would be coming to visit. Chaos and near anarchy reigned as a 

succession of Confederate commanders tried to use Bourland as their bludgeon to beat north 

Texas into line.

96
Adding to the chaos and violence in this part of Texas in the years after the Great 

Hanging was the arrival of William Clarke Quantrill and many of his followers. Following the 

Lawrence Raid and the destruction of Blunt’s forces at Baxter Springs, Quantrill and his men 

continued into Texas to spend the winter. They bivouacked in these same north Texas counties 

and, though ostensibly amongst friends, caused considerable problems. McCulloch attempted 

to use them to capture deserters, but found that their prey rarely came in alive. This was merely 

an example of the inability of the regular Confederate army to control Quantrill and his men. 

Finally, following the murder of a Confederate officer by a member of Quantrill’s band, the 

guerrillas would head back to Missouri to escape the wrath of McCulloch and Bourland.

The participants in the irregular violence in Texas were mainly a mixture of Confederate 

Partisan Rangers and vicious outlaws, as evidenced by Duff’s unit and the members of the 

Haengerbande. While Quantrill’s war-rebels spent time in north Texas, their part of the story 

is a brief one. Texas was the only state along this border region that would remain in the 

Confederacy throughout the war. The irregular violence that was perpetrated in the Lone Star 

State was not the work of Union armies that chased down secessionists protecting their farms 

and families. This violence was perpetrated by secessionists and the Confederate government 

upon Texans who were perceived as not totally supporting the Confederate cause. Once again 

a population along the border was forced to endure four years of violence, misery, and death, 

though the war between the main regular armies was far away. In Texas the post-war period 

would be different, as the winners would get their opportunity for retribution in the days of 

reconstruction. After all, in this case, the portion of the population that felt the biggest sting 

during the war turned out to be the winners in the end. 

97
Notes

1. Richard B. McCaslin, Tainted Breeze: The Great Hanging at Gainesville, Texas 1862, (Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana State University Press, 1994), pp. 1-8.

2. Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, quoted in Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in 

History, vol. 1, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975), p. 149.

3. Alwyn Barr, “Records of the Confederate Military Commission in San Antonio, July 2-October 10, 

1862,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 71 (October 1967), p. 93.

4. R.H. Williams and John W. Sansom, The Massacre on the Nueces River: The Story of a Civil War 

Tragedy, (Grand Prairie, TX: Frontier Times Publishing House, ca. 1911), p. 25.

5. Williams and Sansom, p.25. 

6. Barr, p. 263.

7. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 15, pp. 887, 925-929, 945-946. 

8. Official Records, p. 890.

9. Official Records, pp. 981-982, 989-990.

10. Barr, p. 263.

11. Barr, p. 264.

12. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 9, pp. 704-705.

13. Williams and Sansom, p. 36.

14. Williams and Sansom, p. 25.

15. Barr, p. 94.

16. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 4, p. 785.

17. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 4, p. 785.

18. Don H. Bigger, German Pioneers in Texas, (Fredericksburg, TX.: Fredericksburg Publishing, 1925; 

reprinted., Austin, TX: Eakin Publications, 1983), p. 59; Eldon Stephen Branda, ed., The Handbook of 

Texas: A Supplement, Volume III, (Austin, TX: The Texas State Historical Association, 1976), p. 255.

19. Gerald Gold, “Gillespie County in the Civil War,” Junior Historian 25 (January 1965): 30.

20. Williams and Sansom, pp. 6-7.

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21. Hopkins Diary 1862-1865, Desmond Pulaski Hopkins Papers, p. 74, Barker Texas History Center, 

Austin, TX.

22. Hopkins Diary 1862-1865.

23. Williams and Sansom, p. 8.

24. Williams and Sansom, p. 25.

25. Egon Richard Tausch, “Southern Sentiment Among the Texas Germans During the Civil War and 

Reconstruction,” M.A. Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 1965, p. 13.

26. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 9, pp. 614-616; Williams and Sansom, p. 14.

27. Williams and Sansom, p.14.

28. Williams and Sansom, pp. 18-19, 34.

29. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 9, pp. 614-616.

30. Hopkins Diary, p. 81.

31. Hopkins Diary, pp. 81-82.

32. Official Records, Series 2, Volume 4, pp. 785-787.

33. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 9, p. 735.

34. Barr, p. 95.

35. Barr, p. 301.

36. Barr, p. 297.

37. Barr, pp. 247-250.

38. Barr, pp. 253-258.

39. Barr, p. 95.

40. Corinne Cameron, “Haenger Bande,” Paper found in the Gillespie County Collection, Pioneer Memorial Library, Fredericksburg, TX: undated, p. 2; Meyer, Verdie, “Buergerkrieg Terror in Gillespie 

County,” Junior Historian 22 (November 1961): 23.

41. Banta and Cadwell narrative, dedication page, Barker Texas History Center, Austin, TX.

42. Cameron, p. 1.

43. Meyer, p. 23.

99
44. Pioneers in God’s Hills: A History of Fredericksburg and Gillespie County People and Events, Vol. 

II, (Fredericksburg, TX: Gillespie County Historical Society, 1974), p. 39.

45. Banta and Cadwell narrative, p. 181.

46. Banta and Cadwell narrative, pp. 223-224.

47. The name, Cadwell, is derived from the primary source. Most of the secondary sources identify this 

individual as J. W. Caldwell, Jr.

48. Banta and Cadwell narrative, pp. 227-230.

49. Frank H. Smyrl, “Unionism, Abolitionism, and Vigilantism in Texas, 1856-1865,” (M.A. Thesis, 

The University of Texas, 1961), p. 85.

50. Tausch, “Southern Sentiment Among the Texas Germans During the Civil War and Reconstruction.”

51. McCaslin, Tainted Breeze, p. 55; Official Records, Part 1, Volume 9, pp. 715-716.

52. Official Records, Part 1, Volume 9, pp. 704-705.

53. McCaslin, p. 113.

54. McCaslin, pp. 143-146. 

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Chapter 5

The Impact of Irregular Warfare

The recurring theme throughout this study has been the effects of the irregular violence, 

the Third War, which daily occurred along the border against the population that inhabited these 

states. All of the Border States were beset with similar problems, though the two with the most 

in common were Missouri and Kentucky. Both nominally Union states, they had Confederate 

governments in exile and were represented by stars in the Confederate flag. Of the states in 

this study, Kentucky received the least attention by scholars of irregular warfare. The effects 

upon the local society that appeared in the Trans-Mississippi were invariably repeated in the 

Bluegrass State. In examining the fear and violence that afflicted all of the Border States, this 

chapter focuses on Kentucky, using it as a thread of continuity to accent the problems along the 

western border. 

It is within a framework of national violence that the guerrilla war must be examined. 

Violence tends to breed violence, and it is unimaginable that the death and destruction of a 

conflict such as the American Civil War could have been confined to the fields of battle on 

which massive conventional armies faced each other. Violence was the norm along the border, 

a state-of-being expected by the residents.

Kentucky was by no means unique in the homespun violence with which she was 

beset. Conventional battles filled Virginia, Missouri, and Tennessee with the same struggles 

and outrages that characterized the war years in the Bluegrass State. These states were the 

battlefields of the war, as they lay in the precarious position of border areas. As the buffers 

between the North and the Deep South, they bore the brunt of the combat in the early stages of 

the war. The most heralded of these must, of course, be Virginia. Here was where the headliners, 

Generals Grant and Lee, faced each other and the conclusion of the war was finally determined. 

The other border areas, which have taken a back-seat to Virginia for many years, were each 

touched in their own way by the war. 

Bruce Catton captured the essence of the border conflicts the best when he wrote “Here 

it was a battle in which ill-equipped armies learned their trade in blundering action; there it was 

a matter of shadows in the dusk, neighbor ambushing neighbor, hayrick and barn blazing up at 

midnight with a drum of hoofbeats on a lonely lane to tell the story, or a firing squad killing a 

bridge-burner for a warning to the lawless.”1

The war along the border, just as Catton maintains, took its own peculiar twist in 

the different states and areas. The thread of continuity that exists among all of these areas is 

the awful violence that pervaded society at every level. In Texas it was marked by disloyalty 

trials in both Gainesville and San Antonio, run by the Confederate authorities, and lynchings 

in both the hill country northwest of San Antonio and north Texas.2

 The Texans, like the other 

inhabitants of the border, were simply unable to deal with the mix of Unionist and Secessionist 

in a non-violent fashion. In Missouri and Kansas, the actions of Jennison’s Jayhawkers and 

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Quantrill’s sacking of Lawrence is representative of the violent nature of the war away from the 

formal battlefield.3

 The much heralded rules of war gave way to hatreds and personal vendettas 

that proved too powerful to control.

During the war, newspapermen from both the North and South chastised Kentuckians 

for not flocking to their flags in large enough numbers. To these contemporaries the lack of 

Kentuckians in northern or southern armies was a mark of cowardice or lack of spirit for the 

cause. Some modern day historians have perpetuated many of these same feelings, making 

much of the spirit of compromise that has long embodied the Kentucky heritage. They point 

out the failure of Bragg’s army in 1862 and the lack of the support, which John Hunt Morgan 

had assured him the Confederates would find. While researching this volume, another reason 

for Kentuckians who decided not to join one of the main armies became apparent.

Shortly after the initial invasion of Kentucky soil by the Confederate army in 1861, 

the Bluegrass State found itself inundated with fighting men of both sides. For a time the state 

was divided geographically, with the Union holding much of the northeast and the Confederacy 

the southwest. Federal and Confederate units alike were formed and sent off to join the main 

armies. The state supplied many troops in these earlier days, some choosing to go with the 

blue and some with the grey. After these initial enlistments, when it became obvious that the 

war would not bring quick success for either side, recruiting slowed. Men began to take stock 

of the situation and ask questions as to what would be the fate of their families if they chose 

to go off to war. With the imposition of martial law upon the Bluegrass State, the decision 

became even tougher. The people of New York or Alabama would find it hard to comprehend, 

for when their men went off to war; they could feel certain that the families they left behind 

would be safe. It is true that the rigors of war caused economic hardship in states north and 

south, but it was in the Border States that men had to fear for the very lives of their loved ones 

at home. A Union man in Kentucky in 1861-1865 could look around his beloved state and see 

it filled with Confederate guerrillas, striking out at Unionists and the Federal authorities with 

impunity. To leave for the front meant exposing his family to these dangers without the benefit 

of protection. This could not have been an easy decision for a man to make. On the other side 

of the coin, the secessionists in Kentucky — and there were many — faced a state under the 

martial law powers of the dreaded Yankees. Civil rights had been suspended and meetings of 

the Democratic Party were broken up by military units.4

 Even worse, in the latter stages of 

the war, the troops used to police the state were predominately black. Though it is often hard 

for modern students to comprehend, for a man who still believed in the image of the southern 

cavalier there could be nothing as awful visited upon a people. The number of men who failed 

to enlist for these reasons cannot be accurately numbered, but it was undoubtedly substantial.

This problem is mirrored in the State of Missouri. Sterling Price repeatedly attempted 

invasions of his home state, convinced that he had only to show the Confederate banner to raise 

a strong Missouri force. While Bragg was trying to recruit in Kentucky, Price was doing the 

same in Missouri. For most of the reasons stated in regards to Braxton Bragg, Price too was 

unsuccessful.

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For these same reasons, and others associated with the war itself, many men from both 

sides deserted and returned to the Bluegrass State. These men, who had faced each other in 

mortal combat on other fields, could hardly be expected to forget all the passions that led them 

to enlist in the first place. The close proximity of people whom they considered the enemy 

presented another means of carrying forth the war. This question of proximity was a common 

problem throughout the border areas, for just as they were the meeting place of the two foes 

geographically, they were also the location of a mixing of the societies and politics of the two 

areas. Men of the northern persuasion and others of the southern lived side-by-side, often times 

a part of the same family. Geography and fate had placed these states in the middle of the 

largest conflict in America’s history, and they paid dearly for this distinction.

Likewise, deserters filled the border areas of the Trans-Mississippi, most notably in 

Texas. Their presence in these states fueled the irregular war by placing armed veterans in the 

midst of already flaring violence. The effect was similar to pouring gasoline on a small fire.

The imposition of martial law is onerous in any democratic society, but few other actions 

carry as dark a name in the American psyche. Our nation was founded upon certain principles, 

which have been considered virtually sacred down through the years. In the nineteenth century 

these principles were not mere rhetoric, but carried close to the heart of most Americans. One 

of these basic ideals was the subordination of the military to the civil authority. The standing 

army had been a dreaded fear for many years in this country and when it was finally organized 

in the first decade of the nineteenth century its position as the servant of the people was loudly 

stressed.

It is of little surprise that the people of Kentucky reacted as they did to the imposition of 

martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. On June 25, 1864, General Henry 

Halleck informed the Union commander in Kentucky, Brigadier General Stephen Burbridge, 

that “It has been represented that disloyal persons in Kentucky...are giving aid and assistance 

to armed rebels...The Secretary of War directs that...you arrest and send to Washington, under 

proper guards, all persons so inciting insurrection or aiding and abetting the enemy...You are 

expected in this matter to act with discretion, but at the same time promptly and energetically.”5

Shortly after this sweeping instruction, on July 19, 1864, President Lincoln suspended 

the writ and proclaimed martial law to be in effect in the Bluegrass State. The reasons given for 

this action were similar to those found in Halleck’s instruction to Burbridge. The proclamation 

maintained that the guerrillas had been assisted by “disaffected and disloyal citizens of the 

United States residing therein” and that the insurgent forces had “overborne the civil authorities 

and made flagrant civil war, destroying property and life in various parts of that State.”6

Lincoln and his advisers recognized that the petty war in Kentucky was getting out 

of hand and the imposition of martial law was intended to stem this tide. In this way martial 

law appears to be a direct result of the guerrilla war, not a cause, but it only contributed to a 

further worsening of the war in Kentucky. Men who would have remained at home prior to this 

suspension of their rights and held even the mildest of southern views turned away from the 

103
Union. As if General Burbridge did not have enough problems in the state, he soon faced even 

greater troubles.

As stated above, the imposition of martial law upon the people of Kentucky was not 

well received. If its imposition had been effective in the suppression of the guerrillas, the 

people of Kentucky might have been able to overlook the suspension of their rights. After all, 

warfare brings with it certain unpleasant aspects even to those not directly involved in combat. 

Unfortunately, martial law and the men who carried it out were ineffective in dealing with the 

problems that had worried the President. George Prentice, the outspoken editor of the Louisville 

Daily Journal, complained of this ineffectual performance in an October 1864 editorial, “What 

is martial law good for in Kentucky when it offers not a shadow of security against all-sweeping 

depredations and other outrages constantly going on throughout our State? We are to a great 

extent deprived of our civil rights, and what do we get to compensate us for the deprivation?”7

Martial law had been declared much earlier in the Trans-Mississippi and by both 

Union and Confederate officials. The people of Missouri or Texas could certainly empathize 

with the Kentucky newspaper’s lament about its lack of effect. Martial law did little to stop 

irregular warfare and, in fact, normally had the opposite effect. When the men given the power 

to supervise martial law were of the caliber of James Blunt, W. A. Strachan, or James Bourland, 

little good could come of it. Their actions penalized the population far more than the actual 

irregular warriors. Acting with inadequate information, normally based on accounts of men 

who stood to profit, these men used and abused their martial law powers to settle scores and 

stifle dissent, while providing precious little protection.8

The inability of the martial law government to deal with the guerrilla problem in 

Kentucky and elsewhere accomplished the opposite of what the edict was intended to do. With 

enlistments down, the Union resorted to the draft in order to fill the quotas that had been 

imposed upon Kentucky. The draft in Kentucky, just as martial law, was a failure. Very few of 

the men drafted ever made it into the Union armies, some providing substitutes, but an even 

greater number choosing to go with the South if they had to fight. The ranks of the guerrilla 

bands swelled greatly as a result of the Union draft. After all, service with the partisan rangers 

or the likes of Sue Mundy allowed men with Southern proclivities to remain in the area of their 

homes and still take the war to the Federal Government. In Owen County, 1,360 men were 

drafted in October of 1864, but according to the Deputy Provost Marshal, only 200 reported 

for service. Newspaper accounts of this county’s condition maintained that “unquestionably 

the guerillas will get three times as many of the drafted men as the Federal Government will.”9

The lack of success from martial law and the manner in which Union authorities carried it out 

caused the ranks of guerrilla units to grow and simply reinforced the infrastructure of support 

for these warriors, which already existed in the Bluegrass State.10

This problem of getting adequate troops from Border States through conscription was 

particularly keen in Texas. The most common complaint from Confederate commanders in 

Texas was their inability to get the residents to register as required by the conscription laws. 

The Great Hanging at Gainesville began with an instance of this resistance to conscription, as 

did the violence in the Texas hill country. As in Kentucky and Missouri, where men became 

104
guerrillas rather than join Union forces, many Texans who were not in agreement with secession, 

or refused to leave the family alone on the border, sought ways to escape the draft.

From the time of the Emancipation Proclamation, the Unionists of Kentucky had begun 

to wane in their devotion to the Union at all costs. Kentucky was a slave state, and although the 

Proclamation had no legal effect in states not in rebellion, many intelligent men saw the writing 

on the wall as to the future of their slaves. Though the institution of slavery had lost importance 

in Kentucky during the 1850s, it was still a part of the economic landscape. As freed slaves 

from the Deep South fled through Kentucky they found themselves returned to bondage in the 

Bluegrass State. These actions were as much based on the fears of racial problems as on the 

need for slave labor. Large numbers of blacks living free in Kentucky was considered to be an 

untenable situation, just as it was in Indiana or Illinois. This influx of blacks into the border 

areas caused much disgust and consternation among the citizens of the states that experienced 

it.11

Though the Civil War would end slavery in the United States forever, it was unable to 

stem the racial prejudice that accompanied the institution. This change in the structure of the 

southern fabric added to the unrest already felt in Kentucky, and provided a fertile recruiting 

ground for guerrilla soldiers.

In 1897, one of the great Kentucky historians, Nathaniel Shaler, wrote that “Although 

there was a certain amount of disgust when the Emancipation Proclamation came out, it did 

not make an enduring impression on the minds of the Union men; but when, in 1864, the 

government began to enlist negro troops in Kentucky, the people became greatly excited over 

the matter.”12

Shaler wrote of the Union people of Kentucky, those who had supported Lincoln 

and the Union against the Richmond Government. Even these men and women, loyal to the 

northern position and desiring to maintain the Union, found it difficult to contend with the 

order to enlist black troops. That order was conveyed to Brigadier General Burbridge in a 

July 5, 1864, communication from Secretary of War Stanton, which directed the Kentucky 

commander to “protect loyal citizens, and carry into effect the enlistment of troops, white or 

black, and suppress treasonable and disloyal practices...”13 This decision, to utilize black troops 

in the Union army and in Kentucky, had lasting effects upon the state and its people. As with 

other decisions made by the Union command in the state, it served to swell the ranks of the 

Confederate units operating in or around Kentucky. Many men, who might have remained 

at home peacefully or supported the Union cause, could not live with blacks being placed in 

positions of power and authority. The thought of slaveholders or other white Kentuckians being 

arrested by black troops or guarded by them in the Lexington prison, was unconscionable to 

many citizens. Two young men from Henry County, William Martims and William Pollard, 

displayed the mood of many of their contemporaries. They joined Colonel Jessee’s band of 

guerrillas in September 1864, citing as the reason “that they could not remain quietly at home 

and be forced to submit to the insults frequently offered by negro soldiers.”14

105
The violence of the war, the social and political turmoil which Kentucky’s geographical 

position demanded, and the volatile questions of martial law and race created in Kentucky, as in 

the other Border States, an atmosphere that fed guerrilla warfare. The Union people of Kentucky 

grew concerned because the authorities could not protect them and those who supported the 

Confederacy often provided open support to the guerrillas who sought to do as much damage 

to Unionists as possible. John Jeffries, a Kentucky merchant, summed up the situation in his 

home state quite well when he wrote his friend Mick and confided that “the feeling in Kentucky 

is getting more and more bitter everyday; if pretty soon the men of the State do not take up the 

Confederate Cause, the women will shed their hoops and go at it themselves.”15

In assessing the impact of the guerrilla war on the border, scholars of the Civil War have 

long dismissed the petty war as a sideshow, without military importance or legitimacy. These 

historians have dismissed the guerrilla activities entirely or at best given them scant mention, 

largely because this type of combat bears so little resemblance to the main body of the war. The 

relationship that guerrilla activities bore to the bloody battles of Franklin or Gettysburg had 

no bearing on the impact they visited upon the people of Kentucky or Missouri. Although the 

eventual insurgent violence in Iraq bore little or no resemblance to the conventional war that 

led to the fall of Baghdad, both conflicts inflicted pain and suffering upon the people who lived 

through them.16 True, the Great War was gone from Kentucky soil by the spring of 1864, and 

that is the war of which these scholars wrote, but another war — more personal and perhaps 

more deadly — lived on in the Bluegrass State until well after the surrender of the main armies 

of the Confederacy. Shaler placed a bit more emphasis on the guerrilla violence, if not more 

space. He wrote that “The desperation to which the people were brought by the system of 

guerrilla raids can hardly be described. In the year 1864, there was not a county in the State 

that was exempt from their ravages. The condition of the Commonwealth reminds the historical 

student of that which came with the Thirty Year’s War in Germany and with the latter stages of 

the war between the King and Parliament in England.”17

The majority of historians of the American Civil War in Kentucky have not recognized 

the impact that these bands of irregular warriors had upon the state. It would be hard to dismiss 

the voluminous evidence that shows what the guerrillas accomplished, so this lack of recognition 

can only be attributed to what a noted historian perceives as their “lack of relationship to 

military operations.”18 The questions that spring to mind are, why must they resemble the 

grand armies of the war in order to have an impact on the border? Is it not possible that the 

operations of Adam Johnson, conducted in the heart of Kentucky, had more far-reaching effects 

upon the people of Kentucky than did the march of Sherman’s army to the sea? And weren’t 

the operations of Johnson, and even some of those guerrillas categorized here as war-rebels, 

conducted along the lines of military operations? The fact that Quantrill or Anderson were not 

treated as regular soldiers did not keep them from having a more vivid effect on Kansas and 

Missouri than any regular Confederate forces. 

For many years the history of military activities was written in a vacuum. It was a 

dry recitation of flanking movements and thrusts. It dealt only with soldiers and armies, not 

with the effects that these individuals had upon the societies around them. Similarly, historians 

have shied away from looking at the society’s impacts on the military. Since the mid-1950s, 

106
some historians have approached military history in a different way, attempting to place the 

experiences and actions of military men in the context of their effect on society. In dealing with 

the Border States in this vein, the historian can look into the impact of regular battles such as 

Wilson’s Creek and Perryville, or delve into the smaller war of guerrilla warfare. 

Guerrilla warfare is by its nature very personal. It is a one-on-one exchange, devoid of 

cannon fire and mass assaults, primarily characterized by personal violence. It has tremendous 

effects on the people it touches in both a psychological and social sense. While it is true 

that a Union soldier, standing behind the battlements at Franklin, Tennessee, may have been 

psychologically affected by the murderous fire that he and his fellow soldiers poured into the 

attacking Confederates, this is part and parcel of being a soldier. More striking and devastating 

to society in general are the psychological implications of war and death being brought into 

the streets of one’s hometown, or into a man’s home itself. When a family cannot feel safe 

in their own home and citizens do not believe that they can safely travel in an area that is 

supposedly under the control of the government, and insulated from the battlefields, this places 

a psychological burden on the populace.

In a letter from a friend, identified only as C.Q.L., Richard Herndon of Meade County, 

Kentucky, was informed that his friend could not bring himself to visit due to the guerrilla 

problem. “While my heart yearns for the quiet home and pleasant companionship of your 

family circle, my excitable temperament shrank from daily shocks, occasioned by depredating 

bands.” The letter goes on to lament the writer’s inability to travel the approximately 100 miles 

from Fayette County to Meade County, because the worries of the guerrilla menace simply 

weigh too heavily upon his mind.19 Countless other letters testify to the same predicament, 

Union citizens unsafe in their own homes and threatened by these guerrillas. Thomas Truitt, of 

Crittenden County, wrote to the Governor confiding that “guerrillas...are robbing stores taking 

arms and ammunition, taking horses and money from Loyal and peaceable citizens and have 

hung some worthy citizens till they were almost dead..they [the guerrillas] have threatened that 

Loyal citizens will have to cross the Ohio or be killed...”20

In yet another part of the state, similar threats were directed at specific individuals, 

not just to the loyal Unionist citizens in general. Dr. Glasscocke, a well-known Unionist in the 

small town of Bloomfield, was made to fear for his life by members of Sue Mundy’s band. His 

wife wrote to Governor Thomas Bramlette in January of 1865, appealing for troops to protect 

her husband and citing the background for her request. She relayed an incident in which Dr. 

Glasscocke answered the door of his home and was confronted by what he thought were Union 

soldiers. Upon warning them of guerrillas in the area, he discovered them to be Confederate 

guerrillas and had to make a hasty escape to save his life. With him gone, Mrs. Glasscocke now 

feared for her life and their property as “they have threatened me also, that I cannot remain 

here, and they will ‘wipe his habitation from the face of the earth,’ if I do not insist on my 

husband’s return.”21

The Civil War that raged through this country threatened the lives of many men, but 

the type of threatened violence represented by Mrs. Glasscocke’s letter strikes much closer 

to home. Not only was her husband forced to abandon his home, in the heart of Union-held 

107
territory, but his wife’s life was threatened in his absence. This scene is reminiscent of the 

problems encountered by Reverend Foreman in the Indian Territory. Though his portion of the 

Cherokee Nation was supposedly controlled by Stand Watie’s troops, the Reverend had to spend 

his nights hiding in the fields to avoid a probable death. It is part of a soldier’s responsibility to 

deal with the threat of death, but the effect upon a society from threats to civilians is far greater. 

This psychological impact was not restricted by the artificial limits of the Civil War. 

As Professor Harrison notes, the war “left some permanent cracks in the community solidarity 

that remained a bitter legacy of the Civil War.” Many historians have noted the inability of 

Kentuckians, who had been on different sides during the war, to deal with each other when 

it was over, but seldom mention the role of the small war on this phenomenon.22 If the fact 

that a man had fought for the Confederacy on the battlefields of Virginia made it difficult for 

Unionists to live and work with him, how hard must it have been for the Unionist people of 

Kentucky to live with Jacob Bennett after the war. After all, the first had been in the war — 

but in a faraway place and against unnamed faces — while Bennett had worked at his trade in 

the heartland of the state and could be personally identified with the death of many a person’s 

father or brother. Taking this thread even farther, what of the families who had openly aided 

these guerrillas? Widespread guerrilla warfare cannot continue over an extended period of 

time, as it did in Kentucky and Missouri, without a support infrastructure among the populace. 

Families of secessionist beliefs provided aid and comfort to many of these irregular soldiers 

and were made to pay a heavy price for their support after the imposition of martial law. Could 

they and their Unionist neighbors simply forget the bloody violence of the war when their very 

presence served as a reminder of the bloodshed?

Obviously, the State of Missouri, which had endured irregular warfare for a longer 

period than Kentucky, had to experience similar or worse post-war problems than the Bluegrass 

State. The rebuilding of Bates, Cass, and Jackson counties alone was a momentous undertaking, 

both physically and psychologically. Families had been destroyed financially, with many 

sustaining multiple deaths. The scars from the Unionist-Secessionist split would take years 

to heal, if ever. In Texas it would be more pronounced, as those who had been the subjects of 

government-sponsored violence had come out on the winning side. More than one score would 

be evened by Unionists during Reconstruction.23

As with any event that affects the life of people in a nation, the Civil War had effects 

upon the economy of Kentucky. Economies are not artificial entities that carry on unrelated 

to events occurring around them. They are a part of the national fabric and as such respond to 

pressures from the forces within and outside the country. The big war had tremendous economic 

effects upon Kentucky and many historians have argued that one of the prime reasons for 

Kentucky staying in the Union was the possibility of economic enrichment.24 There appears to 

be a great amount of truth in this conclusion. Situated in the middle of the two foes, with the 

Louisville and Nashville Railroad running north and south, and the Ohio River bordering the 

state to the north, Kentucky was in a perfect position to carry on a lucrative trade with both 

belligerents. But how did the guerrilla bands with which this volume deals figure into this 

economic question? They carried on no trade and were unable to establish anything permanent 

enough to contribute. While the guerrillas of Kentucky contributed nothing to the economy of 

108
the state, they did a great deal to restrict its effectiveness on a local scale. Figures are unavailable 

for the econometrician to accurately chart their impact, but the primary sources reveal the force 

they exerted on the agricultural industry in the state and the routes of commerce that led in and 

out of Kentucky.

In January 1865, Governor Bramlette admitted the economic problems that beset the 

Commonwealth in an address to the State Legislature. He lamented that “Our fields had been 

devastated by the sweep of armies, and homes desolated by rebel raids and guerilla depredations, 

to such an extent that a large portion of our productive labor had been driven from the State, 

and the arm of industry was greatly paralyzed by the destruction which menaced its labors...”25

Certainly, the whole of Kentucky’s problems were not caused by the bands of irregulars 

that roamed her hills, the armies had long been gone by 1864, and no large scale rebel raids 

were carried out that could have had an economic effect. Another observer, the ever-watchful 

George Prentice, commented that “the outlaws are preying upon her [Kentucky’s] vitals, and 

if a remedy is not soon applied, the disease will become hopeless. Lands are fast depreciating, 

property is going to destruction, and everywhere stacks the form of ruin...”26 So how were 

these relatively small bodies of men creating such a negative impact on the economy of such a 

powerful state as Kentucky and what methods were being used to cause so many problems?

One answer had to be the psychological terror the guerrillas spread throughout the 

state. Men did not feel safe at home or on the road, and the normal pursuits of industry and 

agriculture became secondary to the protection of life and property. Farmers in the fields had 

more to worry about than just getting the ground broken or the planting finished. In June 1864, 

another letter to the State Adjutant General lamented the plight of farmers who were distracted 

from their work by the presence of guerrilla bands. Otho Miller wrote that “Robt. Cochran 

and his friends carry their pistols hanging to the harness of their plough horses” in order to 

protect themselves and their families.27 In July 1864, the New Albany Ledger wrote that “it is 

useless to attempt to farm, as the scoundrels will be sure to destroy the crop.”28 Six months later 

things had not improved as guerrillas still terrified the farmers who attempted to raise crops in 

support of the commissary of the Union armies. A December newspaper article reported that 

“the guerillas along the Ohio River in the vicinity of Cloverport have threatened to burn all the 

hay that farmers may deliver upon the banks of the river for Government use. A great many 

farmers are afraid to move their hay from the barns, and those who were baling large quantities 

have ceased operations on that account.”29

The states of Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky were the breadbasket of the Union army. 

These states contributed agricultural goods in large quantities for the armies that were pushing 

south into the Confederacy. These Confederate bands sought to disrupt the supply of goods to 

those armies by cutting them off at the grower. Whether or not this tactic had much impact on 

the armies of the Union is hard to determine, but its effect in Kentucky is easy to see. Every 

farm in a county could not be guarded, and in large parts of Kentucky the guerrillas were more 

in control than the Federal Government.30 Crops in the field were not the only target of these 

roving bands of Confederates. Kentucky has long been noted as center of the horse industry and 

this period of time was no exception. Guerrilla bands took horses for their own use and even 

109
more to send south to the Confederate Army. Forced to live in this environment, many Unionists 

chose to leave the state temporarily or shut down their businesses until after the depredations 

ceased. Entire towns began to feel the pressure of the guerrilla forces, such as the tiny town 

of Boston in central Kentucky. The Louisville Daily Journal commented in August 1864 that 

“the merchants of Boston have determined to abandon their business, as for the present there 

is no safety in property of any kind. The stores are being closed, and the village begins to wear 

a sad desolate look.”31 This terror and the reaction that it brought was not limited to the central 

portion of the state. Earlier, a letter from Hopkins County indicated that “our citizens a number 

of them are leaving the state & the time is coming when all the Union men will leave this part 

of the State.”32 With large numbers of Unionists leaving the state or their homes, the economy 

was affected at least by the disorganization that was evident throughout the state.

In addition to the farms and businesses disrupted by the guerrilla menace, the commerce 

of the rivers and railroads were particular targets of these small bands. Morgan showed the 

effectiveness of tearing up track and burning railroad bridges in his many forays into the 

Bluegrass State. The guerrillas who carried on his form of warfare in his absence proved to 

be equally adept at these skills. Sue Mundy, Jacob Bennett, and Henry Magruder were regular 

visitors to the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville — burning bridges, tearing up track, and 

firing into trains as they passed. All of these actions were intended to incite terror, disorganize 

the government support systems, and discourage commerce on the fragile situation of the rail 

lines.33 Though unable to stop the flow of supplies south to Sherman’s army, they were able 

to shut down the railroads for short periods of time and cause much uncertainty among the 

officers responsible for feeding and supplying the troops of the Union armies.34 James Guthrie, 

the President of the Louisville & Nashville was concerned enough by the daily raids on his 

rail lines to communicate with Federal authorities demanding arms and ammunition to arm his 

trains. As it was put in a letter to the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, “the increase of guerrilla 

bands has been such that unless those engaged in running the trains are armed it will not be 

possible much longer to retain them in service.”35 In addition to these raids on the rail lines 

leading to the Union armies, the guerrillas regularly preyed on the riverboats that steamed up 

and down the Ohio River and the smaller streams in the interior of Kentucky. Boats that had 

utilized these waterways to move commerce for many years, found the rivers to be unsafe in the 

heyday of the guerrilla war. In July 1864, newspapers carried a story that was repeated many 

times during the year — “The guerillas are again on Green River committing depredations...

Some fears are entertained as to the safety of the Dunkerson and R.B. Speed, as the guerillas 

are said to have declared their purpose to wait for the latter.”36

While the R.B. Speed appears to have survived the war, other steamers were not as 

lucky. The steamer, Levi, was burned at Winfield after a band of thirteen guerrillas captured her 

with 40 Union soldiers aboard.37 The only protection that could be afforded the river people was 

the presence of small gunboats from the “mosquito fleet,” which patrolled the Mississippi and 

Ohio Rivers. Unfortunately, these gunboats could not be everywhere at once, and when they 

were called away to support combat operations or attend to guerrillas in a particular area, the 

remainder of the river became fair game for the guerrillas. A Kentucky merchant, John Jeffries, 

wrote to his friend William and confessed his concern over the safety of stores he had recently 

dispatched to Vicksburg on the river: “I have felt a little uneasy on the subject, for the new 

110
advance by Sherman’s Corps up Red River is accompanied by all the gunboats; the Mississippi 

is now left open for the guerrillas.”38 Others were even more vehement about the problems the 

river commerce was experiencing. The Journal editorialized that “...the entire river border of 

Kentucky swarms with outlaw bands, and the citizens, left without protection...the trade of the 

river is ruined. No business can be transacted under the existing state of affairs...It was thought 

that when martial law was proclaimed in Kentucky, guerilla bands would be expelled from the 

State, and the people would be allowed to repose in quiet. Time has furnished a result entirely 

different. The State was never so fearfully disorganized as now.”39

It would be imprudent to place too great an importance on the impact these guerrillas 

had on the economic portion of the Union war effort. Their effect on the armies, which were 

taking the war to the heart of the Confederacy, was probably minimal, but their effect on the 

people of Kentucky was not. As with every other aspect of life on the border, the day-to-day 

uncertainty about life and property took a heavy toll on the economy of the rivers and the 

farmlands of the western border.

Any discussion of the impact of the irregular military forces that inhabited the border 

would be incomplete without an examination of their affects on the military effort in the west 

and the war in general. Despite the problems that some historians have with the differences 

between the operations of these irregular groups and those of the regular armies, the guerrillas 

dictated the military situation on the border and had an impact on the general war situation far 

out of proportion to their numbers. W.T. Sherman recognized the problem that was coming for 

the invading Union armies. He characterized the situation in the west as one in which “though 

our armies pass across and through the land, the war closes in behind and leaves the same 

enemy behind,” he continued noting that the Union would have to begin in “Kentucky and 

reconquer the country from there as we did from the Indians.”40

The armies in the west were dependent on very fragile lines of communication, lines 

that could be easily cut by rebel raiders or the ever-present threat of guerrilla bands. Though 

guerrilla warfare is inherently afflicted with a limitation — an inability to seize and use, 

rather than destroy41 — this limitation had no ill effects on the guerrillas’ mission to interdict 

communications and supplies. Along with the destruction of rail bridges and steamboats, 

the guerrillas of Kentucky specialized in tearing down telegraph lines and destroying the 

instruments that carried the messages for the Union armies. To counteract this unlimited threat 

presented by Morgan, Forrest, and their less famous cousins, the Union high command was 

required to station large numbers of troops along these vulnerable lines of communications. 

Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, in their book, How the North Won, appear to 

have grasped the importance of the petty war better than most historians of the Civil War. They 

additionally examined the effects of these additional garrison troops on the Union war effort. 

They observed that “the impact of rebel raids and guerrillas caused a tremendous dispersion 

of Federals. Although the Union moved on the offensive with its main armies, it stood on the 

defensive in protecting its communications and its conquered territory...fifty-six thousand men 

were guarding Kentucky, West Virginia, and the line of the Baltimore and Ohio...”42

111
These thousands of troops were busy defending territory nominally under the control of 

the Federal Government. They were not contending with a Confederate army for the areas, but 

trying to hold onto them against elusive groups of shadow “soldiers,” who continually harassed 

their communications and logistics. During his service in the West, General Don Carlos Buell 

was so impressed with the dangers of these raids and guerrilla bands that he recommended 

Kentucky be garrisoned by a force of 30,000 Federal troops.43 In a war that was marked by 

high casualty rates and immense attrition, this large number of garrison troops had a significant 

impact on the outcome of the war. This is not to say that the outcome would have been different 

if these guerrillas had not existed, but how much quicker could Grant have forced Lee out of 

Richmond, or Sherman dealt with Generals Joseph E. Johnston and John Bell Hood, if they 

had been able to draw 20,000 more troops into their commands? By creating such havoc in the 

rear of the main armies, irregular soldiers effectively tied down the equivalent of an entire field 

army, relegating them to missions as policemen and security guards. Going further, Hattaway 

and Jones have determined that the force left to guard these rear areas numbered as high as 30 

percent of the entire Union armies east of the Mississippi. By subtracting this 30 percent from 

the Union strength, they conclude that the relative strength of the Confederate armies to those 

of the Union was 80 percent. Considering the overwhelming superiority in population that the 

North enjoyed, the authors cite two reasons for the disparity in efficient use of the available 

assets. First was the Confederacy’s superior mobilization, and second was the “Union’s need 

to guard its communications from the guerrillas and from the very effective Confederate 

policy of cavalry raids.”44 The problem was of such significance that it preyed on the mind of 

Union leaders all the way to Washington. In a discussion with General William S. Rosecrans, 

President Lincoln confided that “In no other way does the enemy give us so much trouble, at 

so little expense to himself, as by the raids of rapidly moving small bodies of troops (largely, 

if not wholly mounted) harassing, and discouraging loyal residents, supplying themselves with 

provisions, clothing, horses, and the like, surprising and capturing small detachments of our 

forces, and breaking our communications.”45

A less quantifiable impact of this type of warfare on the larger war is pointed out by 

Gerald F. Linderman in his study of the combat experiences of soldiers during the war. He found 

that the “desire to inflict punishment on Southerners” by Union soldiers in the years following 

1862 grew much faster than could be controlled by the authorities. He attributes this growth 

of violence directly to the appearance of irregulars, not just along the border, but in the rear of 

Union armies as they continued to advance. The occurrences of irregular violence in the rear 

of these armies increased as they moved south, an increase that had significant psychological 

impact on the Union soldiers. His discussion of the difference in perception of irregulars in 

Union and Confederate minds is illustrative of the thorny issue of how irregulars were treated 

when captured. While a farmer shooting at a passing Union column was a murderer and 

bushwhacker to the Union troops, to his neighbors he was simply a man protecting his home 

from invaders. This may seem a hazy distinction, unless you are the farmer whose smokehouse 

is being raided and whose chickens are tied to the saddle of a looter. This impact on the war is 

intangible, but guerrilla warfare obviously generated retaliation during the war on the border 

and that retaliation took more individual forms when the Union army entered the South.46

112
While it is readily apparent that the guerrilla activity along the border had a serious affect 

on the communications, supplies, and manpower requirements of the Union armies operating 

elsewhere in the war, what of the effect within the bounds of the individual states? Historians 

are split on the military significance of the guerrilla units operating in the Commonwealth of 

Kentucky. While most appear unimpressed with their activities from a military perspective, 

one historian, Nathaniel Shaler, concluded that “the hundreds of skirmishes with guerrillas 

and raiding parties within the State were even more fatal than the regular warfare.”47 In the 

spring and summer of 1864, the military commander of Kentucky was forced to implement 

martial law and utilize troops to police the countryside as there were no regular Confederate 

troops operating in the Commonwealth and there had not been for quite awhile. These actions 

were taken specifically to combat the military necessities caused by the guerrillas and their 

sympathizers. Regardless of the editorials of George Prentice and the proclamations of 

politicians, these guerrilla bands operated as military units to a large degree and caused the 

same problems that similar sized forces from Wheeler or Forrest’s divisions would have 

caused. To maintain that they had no military significance because they were not part of a large 

body of troops is folly. Though some were engaged in plunder and robbery, they also took 

action, on a regular basis, against the troops that occupied Kentucky. It is not characteristic 

of outlaws and highwaymen to take prisoners and administer paroles, but the irregular forces 

in the Commonwealth did just that. One of the many guerrillas, who fall into the war-rebel 

category, a man named Hamilton, captured a force of 150 men of the 48th Kentucky in January 

1864. Contrary to the rhetoric of the day, the soldiers were paroled as required by the laws of 

war and they and their commander, Captain Gillum, were allowed to proceed to Union lines.48

When the steamer, Levi, was captured (and eventually burned beyond use), a Union general 

officer, named Scammon, and 40 other Union soldiers and officers were onboard. Instead of 

following the no-quarter tactics, the guerrillas paroled the bulk of the Union soldiers. The 

Union general and three of his officers were mounted and sent off towards Confederate lines.49

These acts are in keeping with the mission of a military force, not the senseless plunder of 

outlaws. It would appear evident that outlaws and those guerrillas who cared nothing for the 

Confederate cause would have avoided confrontations with large bodies of Union soldiers. 

They had nothing to gain and their lives to lose from such exchanges, but repeatedly, reports are 

found of troop columns being attacked by guerrilla units, resulting in capture or being chased 

back to their lines with their tails between their legs.50

Not only did the guerrillas engage in these hit and run tactics so reminiscent of John 

Hunt Morgan, but they were also capable of brazen acts of military force. A history of the war 

in Owensboro, Kentucky, contains a story of how “with only a few months until the war would 

be over, guerrilla leader Captain William Davidson burned the courthouse in January 1865. 

Enraged that black troops had been quartered there, Davidson marched into town with 300 

men, captured the building, allowed records to be removed, and then burned the six-year-old, 

$100,000 building.”51

Though a relatively non-violent incident, this story has all the markings of a military 

operation and none of an outlaw raid. Few outlaw gangs rode in groups as large as 300 and 

moved with the evident discipline of Davidson’s unit. The mere act of allowing the records 

to be removed from the courthouse indicates an element of respect for the law, which would 

113
not be an element of the outlaw psyche. The scenario lends itself to an irregular military unit, 

similar to those earlier operations under the control of Adam Johnson, conducting a reprisal 

raid for a perceived injury — the use of black soldiers. While it cannot be refuted that a 

lawless group existed on the border whose only goal was personal enrichment and vengeance, 

indisputable evidence exists that large numbers of Confederate soldiers, some authorized 

and others acting on their own, operated in Kentucky and Missouri for the specific purpose 

of conducting military operations against Union forces and their civilian supporters. Their 

legitimacy in regards to prisoner of war status can be vehemently argued, but their military 

importance cannot. Regardless of uniform or rank or legitimacy, they did significant injury to 

the Federal Government and occupied troops far out of proportion to their own numbers. For 

this reason, these irregular soldiers deserve a place in the military history of the war.

As evidenced by the American experience in Afghanistan, a principal mission of 

guerrilla warfare is the destabilization of civil authority.52 Though it would be presumptuous 

to conclude that this mission was one which was thought through by the border irregulars, 

they nevertheless were extremely successful in accomplishing it. In Afghanistan, the Taliban 

consistently attempt to accentuate the government’s inability to protect citizens and property, 

thus eroding support for the regime at the grassroots level. Adam Johnson, William Quantrill, 

Sue Mundy, and many others in the guerrilla ranks accomplished this same objective through 

their operations in 1861-1865. So successful were they that these Confederate irregulars 

controlled much of the countryside and traveled throughout the border with impunity. State 

officials were unable to contend with their activities, and as a result, significant question arose 

as to whom was truly in control in parts of the affected states. So bad was the environment, 

that it prompted President Lincoln and various military commanders to declare martial law, 

removing control of the state from the hands of its elected officials and placing it with the 

military commanders.

This single act, the imposition of martial law, is ultimately important in assessing the 

political importance of the petty war and its supporters on the border. Lincoln’s proclamation 

had specifically cited the fact that insurgent forces had “overborne the civil authorities,” 

a statement that could only be taken as an indication of impotence on the part of the State 

officers.53 As in any society where the elected officials prove to be unable to handle the tasks at 

hand, border residents questioned their elected leaders and the military officers who followed 

them. In September 1864, two months after the declaration of martial law, the editor of the 

Louisville Daily Journal, a staunch supporter of the Union (though no friend of Abraham 

Lincoln) complained that “still we must say that the long series of guerilla successes in 

Kentucky are either very creditable to the management of the guerillas or not very creditable to 

the management of much better men.”54 Richard Collins, in his Annals of Kentucky, was more 

specific in his disgust for the inability of the civil officials to deal with the problem and their 

willingness to turn it over to the military. He complained that “The proclamation delegates an 

assumed absolute power over the personal liberty of citizens to irresponsible military officers, 

and leaves them to select their victims; it provides no form of trial, requires no proof of guilt, 

indicates no redress nor relief, establishes no safeguards against personal vindictiveness and 

petty tyranny.”55

114
All the states of the border experienced martial law, whether controlled by the 

government in Washington or Richmond. Its relative ineffectiveness is demonstrated by the 

persistence of irregular violence throughout the war years. Border residents were willing to pay 

the price for security and peace, but never got the expected return for their sacrifices.

If the actions of these guerrillas did not bring down the civil government entirely, they 

showed its inadequacy every day. State and Federal officials were unable to perform their jobs 

without the protection of troops. Sheriffs were unable to arrest felons or hold those that they 

did arrest, post offices were ransacked and postmasters threatened if they continued to perform 

their duties; even military officers, such as the Provost Marshal of the 5th Congressional 

District, Captain Womack, were bullied and threatened by guerrillas in order to exact oaths not 

to serve the Federal Government further.56 When it became evident that the Government was 

unable to provide protection for its own officials in the Border States, support was eroded. The 

imposition of Federal or Confederate martial law and the violent occupation that accompanied 

it also contributed to the alienation of many residents well after the war was over. 

The Americans who inhabited the Border States during this most violent period in our 

history bore the brunt of this war. On many a farm in any number of states, men and women 

lived a fearful existence awaiting the arrival of violent men who would ruin their lives. No other 

period in American History has so taken war into the streets and barnyards of this country and 

been felt so closely by our citizens at home. That is the issue that differs this war from others 

in our history, as non-combatant Americans suffered violence at home that was specifically 

directed at them and not just an accidental spilling over from a nearby battlefield.

115
Notes

1. Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 9-10.

2. Alwyn Barr, “Records of the Confederate Military Commission in San Antonio, July 2-October 10, 

1862,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70(1966), 71 (1967), 73(1969); Hopkins Diary 1862-1865, 

Desmond Pulaski Hopkins Papers, p. 74, Barker Texas History Center, Austin, TX.

3. Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865. 

Baton Rouge, LA; Louisiana State University Press, 1958, Louisiana Paperback Edition, 1984, p. 110-

127.

4. Merton E. Coulter, The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky, (Chapel Hill: The University of 

North Carolina Press, 1926; Reprinted, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), p. 171.

5. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, pp. 144-145.

6. Official Records, pp. 180-181.

7. Louisville Daily Journal, October 21, 1864. The problems created by the authorities’ inability to 

maintain security for the people of the border areas served to fuel the guerrilla organizations and continually increase the pressure on the populace, government, and economy. Unable to feel safe in their own 

streets and homes, citizens turned away from the occupying Union forces and government; questioning 

where their loyalties should lie in the conflict raging around them. Aggressive measures taken by Union 

commanders often reaped few benefits, but contributed to the alienation of the more moderate forces in 

Border State society. It was this moderate portion of society that was necessary to stabilize the Border 

States; and reprisal killings and draconian measures (such as the use of black soldiers to police Border 

States and unsuccessful martial law) served often to drive them, if not into the guerrilla camps, at least 

out of active support of the governing body. These same problems were evidenced in Iraq and point out 

the requirement in a counterinsurgency environment to provide for the security of the population as a 

method of slowing the insurgent movement. As the American Army was unable to provide for the security of the streets and homes of Iraqi citizens, the problems of the insurgency grew.

8. No other lesson can be so clearly drawn from the study of guerrilla warfare on the border, and 

particularly in Missouri, than the importance of quality intelligence in the struggle with guerrillas. 

These irregular organizations had a natural network in the towns and countryside and only solid, timely 

intelligence allowed opposing forces the ability to effectively engage them. When that intelligence 

was faulty, often information inspired by an attempt to settle old scores amongst the population, antiguerrilla operations was universal failures. This same problem is common in the historical literature 

of counterinsurgency warfare and the importance of intelligence is stressed in much of the present day 

writings of military scholars and leaders. 

9. Louisville Daily Journal, October 18, 1864.

10. This same problem is reflected in the American experience in Iraq. Countless sources lament the 

fact that without the ability to consistently secure villages and towns in Iraq, the insurgent power in an 

area waited until American forces no longer posed a threat and then flowed back into virtual control of a 

town or province. As martial law failed to provide security on the border, our efforts in Iraq often failed 

to provide adequate security to the Iraqi population.

116
11. George C. Wright, Life Behind a Veil: Blacks in Louisville, Kentucky, 1865-1930, (Baton Rouge, LA: 

Louisiana State University Press, 1985), pp. 16-20.

12. Nathaniel S. Shaler, Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1897), p. 349.

13. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 163.

14. Louisville Daily Journal, September 5, 1864.

15. John Jeffries to his friend Mick, July 17, 1864, Jeffrey Family Papers, Special Collections and Archives, University of Kentucky Libraries, Lexington, KY.

16. It has been argued that civilian leadership during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom did not 

fully comprehend the problems inherent in a potential insurgency after conventional combat ended. If 

this is the case, their thoughts were merely reflective of the historians mentioned whose tendency is to 

slight or ignore irregular warfare because it is not neat and easily understandable.

17. Shaler, p. 345.

18. Lowell H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 

1975), p. 75.

19. C.Q.L. to Richard Herndon, August 18, 1864, Herndon Family Papers, Special Collections and Archives, University of Kentucky Libraries, Lexington, KY.

20. Thomas Truitt to Governor Thomas Bramlette, June 13, 1864, The Quartermaster and Adjutant General’s Papers, Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, KY.

21. Thomas Truitt to Governor Thomas Bramlette, June 13, 1864; Mrs. Glasscocke to Governor Bramlette, January 2, 1865.

22. Harrison, p. 102.

23. An issue that became clear in this study was that when competing groups are mixed together in close 

proximity, be they political, social, or religious, there will be violence if adequate social and governmental structures are not maintained. Just as loosing unionists against their secessionist neighbors created a 

level of personal violence for which the leadership on the border was not prepared, religious groups in 

Iraq and elsewhere must be restrained by common social and governmental structures to avoid a level of 

violence that is uncontrollable. The disagreements over slavery had gone on for many years, but maintained a peaceful veneer until war damaged the social and governmental structures that served to control 

the population. Similarities are evident in the violence raging in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite groups as 

the structures that kept these long-held animosities in check were dissolved.

24. Wright, p. 16.

25. Louisville Daily Journal, January 7, 1865.

26. Louisville Daily Journal, January 5, 1865.

117
27. Otho Miller to General Finnell, June 4, 1864, The Quartermaster and Adjutant General’s Papers, 

Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, KY.

28. Louisville Daily Journal, July 18, 1864.

29. Louisville Daily Journal, December 13, 1864.

30. Louisville Daily Journal, October 29, 1864.

31. Louisville Daily Journal, August 9, 1864.

32. Col. Thomas Campbell to General D.W. Lindsey. July 8, 1865, The Quartermaster and Adjutant 

General’s Papers, Kentucky Military History Museum, Frankfort, KY.

33. These efforts to disrupt the economy of Border States is similar in many ways to the efforts by insurgents in Iraq to disrupt the flow of oil and the daily transactions of commerce, in order to incite terror 

and disorganize governmental systems. These passages reemphasize the importance of security to the 

economic climate of an area. If the government or authorities cannot provide adequate security for the 

progress of commerce, the population will question their legitimacy.

34. Louisville Daily Journal, November 19, 1864.

35. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, p. 198.

36. Louisville Daily Journal, July 16, 1864.

37. Louisville Daily Journal, February 8, 1864.

38. John Jeffries to his friend William, February 13, 1864, Jeffrey Family Papers, Special Collections 

and Archives, University of Kentucky Libraries, Lexington, KY.

39. Louisville Daily Journal, October 19, 1864.

40. Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won, p. 250.

41. Hattaway and Jones, p. 356.

42. Hattaway and Jones, p. 357.

43. Hattaway and Jones, p. 263.

44. Hattaway and Jones, p. 721.

45. Hattaway and Jones, p. 356.

46. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage, pp. 196-199. The problems of retaliation are evident 

today in Iraq. The stress of continued combat and the pressures of dealing with a constant drumbeat 

of insurgent violence can be argued to have prompted random violence aimed at civilians who may or 

may not deserve to be singled out. This random violence can have negative effects on the relationship 

118
between the populace and the government (or occupying force). The use of retaliation killings against 

insurgent forces can merely be a pretext for a spiral of violence from which the government (or occupying force) will gain little.

47. Shaler, p. 356.

48. Louisville Daily Journal, January 30, 1864.

49. Louisville Daily Journal, February 8, 1864.

50. Louisville Daily Journal, July 16, 1864.

51. Aloma Williams Dew, “Between the Hawk and the Buzzard: Owensboro during the Civil War,” The 

Register 77(Winter 1979): 10.

52. These attempts to destabilize authority can be seen repeatedly today in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 

pointing out to the population that the government is not in control of the cities or countryside, insurgents 

prevent open support of the government and occasionally generate support for the insurgency.

53. Official Records, Series 1, Volume 39, Part 2, pp. 180-181.

54. Louisville Daily Journal, September 26, 1864.

55. Lewis and Richard Collins, Annals of Kentucky, vol. 1, (Covington, KY: Collins & Co., 1874), p. 

130.

56. Louisville Daily Journal, July 29-30, 1864.

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Chapter 6

Epilogue

The Civil War has long been a pinnacle of study for those interested in battles between 

grand and glorious armies. It has been called the last “gentlemen’s war” and regarded as a test 

of chivalry. Books about the war, both scholarly and popular history, have been published on 

endless numbers of battles through the last 100 years. Unfortunately, most of these books have 

looked past the people who were not in uniform during the war. The men and women, who 

lived through the war at home, whether in the North or South, were all affected by the bloody 

conflict. Their story is yet to be told in adequate measure.

In the Border States, those unfortunate lands trapped between the adversaries, the war 

brought damage and destruction. These were the lands on which most of the war was fought 

and though the armies may have left them from time to time, the violence of war never did. 

Throughout the border, violence became a regular occurrence; before, during, and after the war. 

Kentucky, as a Border State, echoed many of the problems this nation had in general during the 

war. She was divided politically and socially along lines supporting North or South, with much 

of her populace supporting the Union while others believed in the justness of the Confederate 

cause. The brother-against-brother litany that fills Civil War literature is wholly true in the case 

of the Border States. Men from the same family often went in different directions and fought in 

different uniforms.

Unlike those states away from the border, the violence and fear in Kentucky, Kansas, 

or Missouri was not restricted to periods of organized combat between major armies. The men 

and women of the border had to deal with this violence and terror whether or not the main 

armies were anywhere near their state. For them the war was not a far-off battle in the valleys 

of Virginia, but a day-to-day happening in the streets of their hometowns, complete with pain 

and death. These people, and the war that so affected them, deserve to be studied because the 

history of America is, by definition, the history of her people.

The guerrillas who fought and died on the western border have long been dismissed 

as outlaws and bushwhackers. For this reason, legitimate scholars have not recognized their 

contribution to the history of the war; but does their legitimacy affect the importance of their 

contribution? The mere fact that these people “lived and fought,” makes their contribution 

important. The men they killed are just as dead as if they were shot by members of the Stonewall 

Brigade or some equally famous unit. The fact that thousands of irregular warriors roamed the 

hills of Kentucky or Missouri, carrying out a shadow war against the Federal Government and 

its supporters cannot be argued. Their mere existence and their impact on the people of those 

states demand that their story be told.

These irregular soldiers might have been accorded more legitimacy by historians if 

they had operated under the command of Generals Nathan B. Forrest or John Hunt Morgan. 

The troops of these men, and other cavalry leaders, utilized much the same form of warfare 

as the guerrillas, and have been considered regular soldiers throughout the literature of the 

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war. The facts show that Morgan was the father of guerrilla warfare in Kentucky. Exactly how 

many of the guerrillas learned their trade under his tutelage cannot be ascertained, but the list 

is impressive. Adam Johnson, Jacob Bennett, Colonel George Jessee, Sue Mundy, One-Armed 

Berry, Henry C. Magruder, and others served with Morgan before beginning their personal war 

in Kentucky. No other man can boast of a record like this. He believed in the “small war” and 

brought it to a new level of refinement.

The subject of legitimacy has taken up considerable space in this study. The dichotomy 

which has existed for years in the way that historians treated men like William Clarke Quantrill 

and John Mosby is well-represented in this study. In the large pool of irregulars who fought 

the fight in the west, there were groups that should be accorded differing degrees of legitimacy. 

Johnson and his troops were undeniably regularly enrolled soldiers of the Confederate Army. 

They were, however, treated as outlaws and murderers by the Union people of Kentucky and 

the historians who followed. They were thrown into the same category with men who had no 

identifiable connection with the Confederacy, and were not afforded the benefits or recognition 

that their status as prisoners of war should have gained them. The execution of members of 

the unit, without the benefit of trial, might well have been called a war crime if the South had 

been victorious. These Confederate soldiers played a large part in the Civil War history of 

Kentucky, but they have been relegated by scholars to the back pages of history. Quantrill and 

his followers in Missouri have received considerably more attention, but rarely in an objective 

evaluation. Their acts and the retaliation that they elicited have created a cult following around 

these men that often defies objectivity. Regardless of the bias found in the volumes on their 

war, each speaks to the same fact — these violent men lived on the border in very violent times. 

Their warfare and the responses by the Union forces had a pervasive effect on the population of 

the Border States in the Trans-Mississippi West.

Interestingly, the Union officials finally turned to their own version of these partisan 

rangers in an attempt to deal with the guerrilla problem. How did Captains Ed Terrell and 

James Bridgewater differ from Johnson and Bennett? They all operated separately from a main 

army, without the benefit of written orders for their specific actions. Both groups utilized the 

same method of horse resupply, but what was called theft when practiced by Johnson was 

termed impressment when it was done by Bridgewater. The joking remark in Kansas that a 

horse might be “out of Missouri by Jennison” was only a bit of levity, as many a horse in 

Kansas today can have its lineage traced to a stable in Missouri during the war. There was little 

difference between the tactics and actions of the Union and Confederate rangers, but there has 

been considerable difference in the way that history has treated them.

Other men, not part of the partisan rangers, also fought the war against the Union 

authorities. Though their legitimacy as southern soldiers can be questioned, their effects on the 

people of the border cannot. These war rebels and outlaws created an environment of fear and 

disorganization that forced the Federal and State authorities to take action to deal with them. 

Considerable time, money, and energy were expended by the authorities in their efforts to stop 

the actions of these small bands.

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The delineation of outlaws versus war rebels is difficult, as they share many 

characteristics. The one possible factor that can be used to separate them is public support. In 

discussing this question over a century after the American Civil War, Che Guevara wrote that 

“...They [bandits] have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army, homogeneity, respect for their 

leader, valor, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even a good understanding of the tactics to 

be employed. The only thing missing is the support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs 

are captured and exterminated by the public force.”1

On the Civil War border, as in Che Guevara’s Cuba, the guerrilla fighter required an 

infrastructure of support amongst the population. Without this support, the guerrillas would 

have been left without a safe place to go, and eventually would have been caught and punished. 

The fact that a support structure did exist, and that many guerrillas stayed active until the war’s 

end, makes a statement in itself. If Che’s model is accepted, it gives much greater credence to 

the war rebel’s perception of themselves as Confederate soldiers. 

What caused the growth of guerrilla warfare during the Civil War is a hard question to 

definitively answer. The mixing of people with different political and social leanings is always 

confusing, but during the Civil War the disagreements, which would have caused arguments 

at another time, brought charges of disloyalty and even death. In this environment of distrust, 

men chose to fight back against the enemies they perceived in their state. With the major armies 

gone, the best way to carry out the fight was the petty war. Capitalizing on this disorganization, 

the Confederate Government sent recruiters and cadre into Kentucky and Missouri to further 

stir up trouble for the Federal authorities. The imposition of martial law that followed, and 

the subsequent recruitment of black soldiers, served only to drive more Kentuckians into the 

service of these irregular bands. The Federal Government came to represent many of the things 

southern radicals had predicted years before. Free people do not easily submit to the restriction 

of their rights without just compensation, and the sacrifices that border residents were forced 

to endure at the hands of men like General E.A. Paine or General Ewing brought little or no 

respite from the guerrilla terror.

To deal with the growth of irregular warfare in America, we must refer to a modern 

proponent of guerrilla war, as Che questions; “...Why does the guerrilla fight? We must come 

to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms 

responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that he fights in 

order to change the social system...”2

 Though Che’s words reflect the ideological flavor of 

his writings, his argument rings true. The guerrillas on the border were, in the main, fighting 

the Federal Government over political and social issues. Their violence was not intended to 

quench a bloodthirsty desire, but to preserve a social system that was being forcibly changed. 

Looking at the irregular war from this angle, these guerrillas fit well into a social-bandit 

scenario. Operating in an extra-legal manner, they strived for what they perceived as right and 

just against those whom they believed to be society’s enemies. 

Though accepting the possibility that Sue Mundy in Kentucky or Major John Thrailkill 

in Missouri might have been social-bandits is quite a departure from the prevailing wisdom, 

the evidence available can easily lend itself to Che Guevara’s model of the guerrilla fighter. By 

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accepting the war rebels in this light, the causes of the guerrilla war on the border become much 

more apparent to the historian. 

Though the causes of the guerrilla war cannot be fully enumerated, the impacts from 

this petty war are apparent. The imposition of martial law and the drastic measures taken by 

Union commanders were openly based on the problems created in the state by these insurgent 

forces. Regardless of their legitimacy, these bands forced the Federal and, in the case of Texas, 

Confederate authorities to supersede the civil power and take actions that would later serve 

to alienate the populace from the administration. The military impact of this little war on the 

major conflict lies in the troops who were bled off from the field armies. Though not of major 

importance in the big picture, these irregular warriors dictated everything that the military 

authorities in the Trans-Mississippi and Kentucky did during 1864 and 1865. The actions 

of those authorities were consistently reactive to guerrilla actions, instead of conducting the 

proactive effort that was necessary.

The irregular war on the border, like irregular war anywhere, was accented by its 

psychological and social effects upon the people of the individual states. The residents of the 

border had to live with fear and uncertainty for nearly four years, based almost solely on the 

violence brought forth by the petty war. Additionally, this fear and uncertainty may well have 

caused the numbers of recruits these states provided to both armies to be diminished, as men 

hesitated to leave their families in such an unsafe environment.

Guerrilla wars can be waged independently or as part of a greater conflict. In Vietnam, 

the petty war was the main concern of the military, but in the Civil War the guerrillas represented 

only a sideshow. The study of this small war is an examination of a “Third War.” Though the 

larger conflict raged to the south and the east, most border residents were far more concerned 

with what happened between Federal forces and guerrillas in the next county. People deal first 

with the closest threat, and the armies of Generals John B. Hood and Robert E. Lee were much 

farther removed from the Border than the troops of Johnson, Quantrill, or Charles R. Jennison. 

Kentucky Unionists had little to fear from the Army of Tennessee, but their very lives 

were endangered daily by the likes of Mundy and Magruder. These men were realities in 

Kentucky, as other guerrillas were across the border region, and most of the people of the state 

had to deal with their terror in one way or another.

The guerrilla war on the border left a legacy for the months and years that followed. 

In Kentucky, lawless gangs of men continued to roam the hills for many months, causing 

disorganization and fear well after the war’s end. These men learned their trade in wartime 

service, and whether they were connected to the Confederacy during the war or not, continued 

to practice that trade well after the Richmond Government ceased to exist. Kentucky was not 

alone in this legacy. The men who rode with Quantrill included names like Frank and Jesse 

James and the Younger Brothers; men who would make a reputation for themselves in the 

violent aftermath of the war. The life they led in Missouri after the war was an extension of 

that which they had grown used to during the war years. Linderman maintains that the irregular 

“was to soldierly combat what lice, fleas, and rats were to prisoner-of-war stockades, and to 

124
be dealt with as vermin.”3

 Again Professor Linderman’s evaluation is very accurate, as these 

men would not receive the same kind of hero’s recognition in the post-war years that could be 

expected by regular soldiers. Viewed as “wild beasts” by Union generals and other officials, 

many were left with little choice but to continue their old habits to the end. 

The underlying theme of this study is the importance of violence, on whatever scale, 

upon the minds and lives of the people who lived through it. Terror and the fear for one’s 

life have serious effects on society’s organization and the way in which men deal with each 

other. The terror and violence, with which the people of South Vietnam and Cambodia endured 

decades ago and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan endure today, are brought home to us by 

the news media and our returning soldiers. This exposure to the ugly side of irregular war has 

served to awaken a new understanding of the importance of this petty war in many scholars, 

prompting an increased investigation into the phenomenon. One such scholar, Phillip Shaw 

Paludan, went to the heart of the question when he noted that this type of war “involves primary 

emotions that are less a part of a certain moment in history and more a part of the human 

personality.”4

 The study of irregular warfare is more than just an exercise in military history; 

it contains insights into the whys and hows of men and the way they deal with others. Though 

the study of combat is involved in the story, it is the residual fear that such random violence 

creates that has the greatest impact on society. On the border, that violence existed in the streets 

where children played and people traveled. Just as terrorist leaders have threatened to bring 

more violence to the streets of the United States, these Confederate soldiers brought fear and 

violence to the streets of the Border States. Though almost 150 years separates these events, the 

fear of physical violence and the emotional strain caused by irregular warfare is the same today 

as it was during the American Civil War. The American attack in Iraq during Desert Storm 

was a distant event to the American people, just as Gettysburg was to border residents, but the 

introduction of terrorism into this country in 2001 brought effects and impacts similar to those 

created by the irregular terror in the American Civil War.

To appreciate the mental effect that these threats and the operations of the guerrillas 

had on the border, the modern student has only to look around. Our world is currently afflicted 

with a form of irregular war on a global scale. Terrorism is the petty war, taken to a level of 

violence (or threatened violence) that exceeds the irregular warfare of the Civil War in both 

scale and impact. Though not located anywhere near the seat of the war, Kentuckians had to 

deal with the day-to-day realities that at anytime and in anyplace they could be brought to 

answer for their political allegiances. Civil authorities were unable to curb the depredations 

of the violent segment of the population, just as present day governments find themselves 

struggling to deal effectively with international terrorists. Americans today find themselves 

frustrated and frightened by this continuing threat, just as the residents of the border did 140-

plus years ago.

As a professional soldier, this research has also raised the question of how modern 

military leaders can profit from knowledge of the irregular warfare during the American Civil 

War. While there is no magical answer in this knowledge, it is in searching to answer this 

question and to use historical context to inform military judgment that this study is closed with 

an examination of what might be learned. 

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First, no other lesson can be so clearly drawn from the study of guerrilla warfare on 

the border, and particularly in Missouri, than the importance of quality intelligence in the 

struggle with guerrillas. These irregular organizations had a natural network in the towns and 

countryside and only solid, timely intelligence allowed opposing forces the ability to effectively 

engage them. When that intelligence was faulty, often information inspired by an attempt to 

settle old scores amongst the population, anti-guerrilla operations was universal failures. This 

same problem is common in the historical literature of counterinsurgency warfare and the 

importance of intelligence is stressed in much of the present day writings of military scholars 

and leaders. 

Second, a lesson that became clear in this study was that in unstable environments 

that include irregular violence, when competing groups are mixed together in close proximity, 

be they political, social, ethnic, or religious, there will be violence if adequate social 

and governmental structures are not maintained. Just as loosing unionists against their 

secessionist neighbors created a level of personal violence for which the leadership on the 

border was not prepared, religious groups in Iraq and elsewhere must be restrained by common 

social and governmental structures to avoid a level of violence that is uncontrollable. The 

disagreements over slavery had gone on for many years, but maintained a peaceful veneer 

until war damaged the social and governmental structures that served to control the population. 

Similarities are evident in the violence that raged in Iraq between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish 

groups as the structures that kept these long-held animosities in check were dissolved. It appears 

to be critical for military forces engaged in such an environment to do everything within their 

power to keep these social and governmental structures in place. Allowing a vacuum to be 

created, for even the shortest period of time, will open the door and potentially allow social and 

cultural disagreements to turn into violence.

Both of the last two lessons point to a third lesson — the importance of understanding 

culture when dealing with a populace under pressure. Conventional forces in the US Army 

did very little in the study of culture prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. This military force did not 

see the importance of understanding the populace within which it operated, as it had long been 

focused on tank battles and air wars. When soldiers have to be placed on the ground in close 

proximity to the populace, it is of critical importance that they understand the people they are 

dealing with and their customs. The American tendency is to think the rest of the world is like 

us, but that is not true across the globe and it is easy to make mistakes that will cause strained 

relationships or violence by not paying adequate attention to their cultural norms. It is one thing 

to create conflict because a military leader understood what the response to a specific action 

would be and anticipated the reaction, but to damage vital relationships or bring on violence 

that was unnecessary due to a lack of knowledge of the populace is unprofessional and does not 

reflect a quality-risk assessment. In Civil War Kentucky, one such example was the decision to 

enlist black soldiers to police the Commonwealth. While the Union leadership knew that the 

response from Confederate sympathizers would be negative, and in all probability chose to take 

this path partly as a slap in the face to its enemies, it is apparent from the historical record that 

they badly underestimated how Unionists or those who were more moderate would react. The 

action did not have the positive consequences that the leadership expected and instead resulted 

in a violent response across the board in Kentucky.

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Fourth, the problems created by the authorities’ inability to maintain security for the 

people of the border areas served to fuel the guerrilla organizations and continually increase the 

pressure on the populace, government, and economy. Unable to feel safe in their own streets 

and homes, citizens turned away from the occupying Union forces and government; questioning where their loyalties should lie in the conflict raging around them. Aggressive measures 

taken by Union commanders often reaped few benefits, but contributed to the alienation of the 

more moderate forces in the Border State society. It was this moderate portion of society that 

was necessary to stabilize the Border States; and reprisal killings and draconian measures (such 

as the use of black soldiers to police Border States and unsuccessful martial law) served often 

to drive them, if not into the guerrilla camps, at least out of active support of the governing 

body. These same problems were evidenced in Iraq and point out the requirement in a counterinsurgency environment to provide for the security of the population as a method of slowing the insurgent movement. As the American Army was unable to provide for the security of 

the streets and homes of Iraqi citizens, the problems of the insurgency grew. Countless media 

sources lamented the fact that without the ability to consistently secure villages and towns in 

Iraq, the insurgent power in an area waited until American forces no longer posed a threat and 

then flowed back into virtual control of a town or province. Once Americans returned to their 

forward operating bases, the insurgents once again operated in the towns and villages. Only actions such as the stationing of troops in smaller outposts amongst the civilian population finally 

led to a consistently secure environment for Iraqi citizens and the reduction of insurgent violence. As martial law failed to provide security on the border, our efforts in Iraq initially failed 

to provide adequate security to the Iraqi population. Without this security, as was evidenced in 

all the Border States examined in this study, there is little chance to break the cycle of irregular 

violence and build a firm base for peaceful conditions.

Fifth, a recurring theme in irregular warfare environments is the problem created by 

the brutality that is so often present. The back and forth violence between General Burbridge 

and the Kentucky irregulars merely served to up the ante and led to the murder of unionists 

and irregulars alike in retaliation for previous violence. This eventually led to the execution 

of regularly enrolled Confederate partisan rangers by Union authorities without trial or due 

process. In Missouri, this violence spiraled until it was so out of control that at Centralia, William T. Anderson and George M. Todd’s forces engaged in incomprehensible body mutilation. 

Through history, spiraling brutality has not led to solutions, but has led to even greater brutality 

and a breakdown in order and discipline in society and military forces. The problems of retaliation were evident in Iraq. The stress of continued combat and the pressures of dealing with 

a constant drumbeat of insurgent violence can be argued to have prompted random violence 

aimed at civilians who may or may not deserve to be singled out. The use of retaliation killings 

against insurgent forces can merely be a pretext for a spiral of violence from which the government (or occupying force) will gain little. The uncontrolled actions of a few US soldiers at Abu 

Ghraib probably did more to recruit young men to the insurgent cause than anything else during 

the war. Brutality of this nature is counter-productive in combating insurgency and only serves 

to worsen the environment that conventional forces face in trying to reduce the violence. Not 

only retaliation against irregular warriors must be considered, but the retaliation on the civilian 

populace for the actions of irregulars. Just as the retaliation by Union authorities in Kentucky 

against perceived southern sympathizers did little or nothing to combat the irregular violence, 

127
there is no evidence that such retaliation against more modern populations is any more effective. The determination of who is a “good guy” and who is a “bad guy” is so difficult in the 

fluid environment of irregular warfare, that conventional forces fighting against local irregulars 

run the risk of defeating their own cause by harming civilians either physically, emotionally, 

or economically. A heavy hand may feel good when responding to irregular violence, but if it 

is used in the wrong way against the wrong people it will only exacerbate the overall problem. 

This links back to the previous discussion on intelligence. The need to know where to apply the 

heavy hand to have the desired effect without alienating moderate parts of the population is a 

key competency in combating irregular forces.

Sixth, another lesson that modern leaders and soldiers can take from the experiences 

in the American Civil War revolves around how leadership responds to insurgent warfare. 

Military and civilian leaders have historically shown an inability to come to grips with the 

unique nature of irregular warfare and have tended to approach it with what Robert B. Asprey 

identified as the “arrogance of ignorance.”5

 Because they do not take it seriously or do not view 

it as a legitimate form of warfare, they exhibit a tendency to inadequately plan to combat it or 

fail to recognize its existence at all. It has been argued that civilian leadership during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom did not fully comprehend the problems inherent in a potential 

insurgency after conventional combat ended. If this is the case, their thoughts were merely 

reflective of the historians mentioned earlier whose tendency is to slight or ignore irregular 

warfare because it is not neat and easily understandable. Press interviews with national leaders 

showed a denial when it came to the early stages of the Iraq insurgency. Because they did not 

understand it or granted it no place in the spectrum of warfare, they simply denied its existence 

and preferred to see just isolated instances of violence by individual criminals. Because of this 

arrogance of ignorance, the US leadership was slow in responding to the insurgency and it 

contributed to an environment where the momentum of irregular violence exceeded that which 

the ground forces could control. 

Violence in any form is important for its psychological effects upon people. Though the 

size of the armies and the number of casualties make for good reading, and provide historians 

or statisticians with impressive numbers, they are often less important to a group of people 

than some smaller event. That insight is not limited to the study of the Civil War or Iraq or 

Afghanistan, as the conflict between the European-Americans and the North American Indians 

during the 1870s and 1880s contain many of these same attributes. It is important for the student 

of history to remember that larger events do not have to be more important to the understanding 

of people. Along the border that served to separate North from South from 1861 to 1865, this is 

particularly true and though the survey texts on the American Civil War make for good reading, 

the legacy of the region is not of great battles. It is a history of violent, unrelenting irregular war 

that destroyed families and communities in an attempt to win this internecine conflict.

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Notes

1. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p. 50.

2. Cuevara, p. 50.

3. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War, 

New York: The Free Press, 1987, p. 196.

4. Philip Shaw Paludan, Victims: A True Story of the Civil War (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1981), p. xv.

5. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 165.

129

Glossary

abolitionist An individual who believes in the elimination of slavery.

Bluegrass State The nickname for the State of Kentucky.

Border Ruffians Pro-slavery activists from the State of Missouri, who in 

1854 to 1860 crossed the border into Kansas to force the 

acceptance of slavery through violent acts.

bushwhacker Bushwhacking was a form of guerrilla warfare common 

during the American Civil War. It was particularly prevalent 

in rural areas where there were sharp divisions between those 

favoring the Union and Confederacy. The perpetrators of the 

attacks/raids during this time were called bushwhackers.

Cherokee East Members of the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Nation who 

did not participate in the “Trail of Tears” in 1838 to the 

Indian Territory (now known as the State of Oklahoma) and 

remained in their native lands of southeastern US (primarily 

in the State of North Carolina).

Cherokee West Members of the Cherokee Nation who were forcibly 

relocated to the Indian Territory (Oklahoma) in the 1830s 

under the provisions set forth by the US Government under 

the Indian Removal Act. 

combatant One that is engaged in or ready to engage in combat.

Commonwealth A reference attached to some of the states (such as Kentucky 

or Virginia) of the United States.

depredation To lay waste, ravage, or plunder.

double-mindedness A concept by Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard. A 

failure to exhibit goodness for its own sake, but instead 

make decisions or take action based on insincerity or fear of 

punishment.

131
guerrilla A member of an irregular, usually indigenous military or 

paramilitary unit operating in small bands in occupied 

territory to harass and undermine the enemy, as by surprise 

raids.

Haengerbande Loosely translated meaning “hanging bands.” This was the 

name of a group of outlaws who rode the Texas hill country, 

hanging resident German settlers and stealing their property 

in the name of the Confederacy. 

half-breed Anyone of mixed Native American and white European 

parentage.

highwayman A thief who preyed on travelers. This type of outlaw usually 

travelled and robbed by horse. Some robbed individually, but 

others operated in pairs or in small gangs.

impressment The act or policy of seizing people or property for public 

service or use.

Indian Territory A geographical region west of Arkansas with general borders 

that was initially set by the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834. 

This area was later declared the State of Oklahoma in 1907 

and the designation “Indian Territory” ceased to exist. 

irregulars Men and women who fought irregular warfare during the 

Civil War.

irregular warfare Favors indirect and asymmetric warfare approaches, 

though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 

influence, and will. Frequently used to describe guerrilla 

warfare; essentially violent conflict between a formal 

military and an informal, poorly-equipped, but resilient 

opponent.

Jayhawker Pro-Union guerrilla fighters in Kansas using tactics similar 

to bushwhackers and border ruffians by conducting crossborder raids into the State of Missouri. 

132
martial law The imposition of military rule by military authorities 

over designated regions on an emergency basis (usually 

temporary) when order and security, and essential services, 

cannot function effectively. 

noncombatant An individual who does not actively engage in war as a 

military service member.

no-quarter The term originates from an order by the commander of a 

victorious army that they “will not quarter (house)” captured 

enemy soldiers. Therefore, none can be taken prisoner and 

all enemy combatants must be killed.

partisan A fervent, sometimes militant supporter or proponent of 

a party, cause, faction, person, or idea. A member of an 

organized body of fighters who attack or harass an enemy, 

especially within occupied territory; a guerrilla. 

Red Legs A member of a secret organization formed in Kansas in 1862 

that engaged in guerrilla activities during the Civil War.

small war/petty war Reference to the irregular warfare that was conducted in the 

Trans-Mississippi border states during the Civil War.

The Five Civilized Tribes The five Native American nations — the Cherokee, 

Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole — that were 

considered civilized by Anglo-European settlers during the 

colonial and early federal period because they adopted many 

of the colonists’ customs and had generally good relations 

with their neighbors.

Trans-Mississippi The geographic area west of the Mississippi River during the 

19th century, consisting of the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, 

Missouri, Texas, and the Indian Territory (now known as 

Oklahoma).

Yankee A term used by Confederate soldiers or sympathizers when 

referring to a Union soldier or citizen of the Northern United 

States during the Civil War. 

133

135

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APPENDIX A

General Orders No. 100

General Orders War Dept., Adjt. General’s Office

No. 100 Washington, April 24, 1863

The following “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” 

prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised by a board of officers, of which Major General 

E.A. Hitchcock is president, having been approved by the President of the United States, he 

commands that they be published for the information of all concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.D. Townsend

Assistant Adjutant-General

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES 

OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD.

Section I. Martial law – Military jurisdiction – Military necessity – Retaliation. 

1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of 

the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying army, whether any 

proclamation declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued 

or not. Martial law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or 

conquest.

 The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.

2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special 

proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief, or by special mention in the treaty of 

peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the 

conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of the same.

3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension by the occupying military 

authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in 

the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, 

as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, 

substitution, or dictation.

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and 

penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise 

ordered by the military authority.
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4. Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and 

usages of war. Military oppression is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which 

that law confers. As martial is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who 

administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity — virtues 

adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power 

of his arms against the unarmed.

5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and 

fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual 

hostilities exist or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed 

— even in the commander’s own country — when face to face with the enemy, because of 

the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against 

invasion.

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy’s places 

and territories under martial law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying 

military power; but all the functions of the hostile government — legislative, executive, or 

administrative — whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under martial law, 

or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier 

or invader.

7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the 

enemy or aliens to that government.

8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not diplomatic agents. 

Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be subjected to martial law in cases of urgent 

necessity only; their property and business are not exempted. Any delinquency they commit 

against the established military rule may be punished as in the case of any other inhabitant, 

and such punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.

9. The functions of ambassadors, ministers, or other diplomatic agents, accredited by 

neutral powers to the hostile government, cease, so far as regards the displaced government; 

but the conquering or occupying power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to 

itself.

10. Martial law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, 

whether imposed by the expelled government or by the invader, and refers mainly to the 

support and efficiency of the Army, its safety, and the safety of its operations.

11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith concerning 

engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations 

solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in 

force in case of war between the contracting powers.
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It disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; all acts of private 

revenge, or connivance at such acts.

Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by 

officers.

12. Whenever feasible, martial law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by 

military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed only with the approval of the chief 

executive, provided the urgency of the case does not require a speeder execution, and then 

only with the approval of the chief commander. 

13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by 

statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under 

the statute law must be tried in the manner therein directed; but military offenses which do 

not come within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The 

character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each 

particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courts-martial; while cases 

which do not come within the Rules and Articles of War, or the jurisdiction conferred by 

statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.

14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the 

necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and 

which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.

15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, 

and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of 

the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance 

to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction 

of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communications, 

and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation 

of whatever an enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the 

Army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively 

pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law 

of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this 

account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty — that is, the infliction of suffering 

for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of 

torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the 

wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, 

in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to 

peace unnecessarily difficult.
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17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, 

armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.

18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the non-combatants, in order to lessen 

the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme 

measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard 

a place, so that the non-combatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed 

before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to 

omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments. 

It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live in political, continuous societies, 

forming organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, 

advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war.

21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents 

of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war.

22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise 

steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual 

belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The 

principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in 

person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit. 

23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and 

the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the 

hostile troops can afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

24. The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with barbarous 

armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation 

of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with 

uncivilized people, the exception.

25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descendants in other portions of 

the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule; privation and 

disturbance of private relations are the exceptions.

26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile 

country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious 

government or rulers, and they may expel everyone who declines to do so. But whether they 

do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they 

hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives.
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27. The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of 

nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest 

feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing 

himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.

28. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only 

as a means of protective retribution, and moreover cautiously and unavoidably — that is to 

say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence and the 

character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from 

the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine 

wars of savages.

29. Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the existence at one and the 

same time of many nations and great governments related to one another in close intercourse.

Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all 

modern war is a renewed state of peace.

The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are 

brief.

30. Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and ever since wars 

have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, 

but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no 

conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but 

the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and 

honor.

Section II. Public and private property of the enemy – Protection of persons, and especially 

of women; of religion, the arts and sciences – Punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of 

hostile countries.

31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public movable property 

until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its 

government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or nation. 

The title to such real property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until the 

conquest is made complete.

32. A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, may suspend, change, 

or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the relations which arise from the services 

due, according to the existing laws of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native 

of the same to another.
A-6

The commander of the army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of peace to settle the 

permanency of this change.

33. It is no longer considered lawful — on the contrary, it is held to be a serious breach 

of the law of war — to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the victorious 

government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the 

hostile country or district, that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently 

as its own and make it a portion of its own country.

34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other 

establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or 

foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies 

of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character — such 

property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may be 

taxed or used when the public service may require it.

35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such 

as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, 

even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

36. If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation 

or government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering state or nation 

may order them to be seized and removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate 

ownership is to be settled by the ensuring treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the armies of the United 

States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, 

religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially 

those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be 

rigorously punished.

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people 

or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially 

houses, lands, boats or ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses.

38. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be 

seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the Army or of the 

United States.

If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, 

which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain indemnity.

39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded 

territory, and continue the work of their office, and can continue it according to the 
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circumstances arising out of the war — such as judges, administrative or political officers, 

officers of city or communal governments — are paid from the public revenue of the invaded 

territory until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue it. 

Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped.

40. There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, 

except that branch of the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usages of war 

on land.

41. All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or of the countries to 

which they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the field.

42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property (that is, of a thing), and 

of personality (that is, of humanity), exists according to municipal or local law only. The law 

of nature and nations has never acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the 

early dictum of the pagan jurist, that “so far as the law of nature is concerned, all men are 

equal.” Fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, villains, or serfs, into 

another country, have, for centuries past, been held free and acknowledged free by judicial 

decisions of European countries, even though the municipal law of the country in which the 

slave had taken refuge acknowledged slavery within its own dominion.

43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent which admits of 

slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive 

under the protection of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately 

entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. To return such person into slavery would 

amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under their 

authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is 

under the shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the law of 

postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction 

of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, 

even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such 

inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may 

seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.

A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a 

superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.

45. All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of war, primarily to the 

government of the captor.

Prize money, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under local law.

46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the 

hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. 
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Offenses to the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be punished with 

cashiering or such other punishment as the nature of the offense may require; if by soldiers, 

they shall be punished according to the nature of the offense.

47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, 

highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American 

soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in 

all cases in which death in not inflicted the severer punishment shall be preferred.

Section III. Deserters – Prisoners of war – Hostages – Booty on the battlefield.

48. Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service of the enemy, suffer 

death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by capture or being 

delivered up to the American Army; and if a deserter from the enemy, having taken service in 

the Army of the United States, is captured by the enemy, and punished by them with death or 

otherwise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, requiring redress or retaliation.

49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active 

aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in 

the hospital, by individual surrender or by capitulation.

All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en masse 

of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the Army for its efficiency and promote 

directly the object of the war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or 

officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms 

and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as 

entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war.

50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, 

editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners of war and 

be detained as such.

The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female, the chief, 

and chief officers of the hostile government, its diplomatic agents, and all persons who 

are of particular and singular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, are, if 

captured on belligerent ground, and if unprovided with a safe-conduct granted by the captor’s 

government, prisoners of war.

51. If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not yet occupied by 

the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of a hostile army, rise, under a duly 

authorized levy, en masse to resist the invader, they are now treated as public enemies, and, if 

captured, are prisoners of war.

52. No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every captured man in arms of 

a levy en masse as a brigand or bandit.
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If, however, the people of a country, or any portion of the same, already occupied 

by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the laws of war and are not entitled to their 

protection.

53. The enemy’s chaplains, officers of the medical staff, apothecaries, hospital nurses, 

and servants, if they fall into the hands of the American Army, are not prisoners of war, unless 

the commander has reasons to retain them. In this latter case, or if, at their own desire, they 

are allowed to remain with their captured companions, they are treated as prisoners of war 

and may be exchanged if the commander sees fit.

54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfillment of an agreement 

concluded between belligerents during the war, or in consequence of a war. Hostages are rare 

in the present age.

55. If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a prisoner of war, according to rank and 

condition, as circumstances may admit.

56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any 

revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel 

imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

57. So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath 

of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are no individual 

crimes or offenses. No belligerent has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, 

color, or condition, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public 

enemies.

58. The law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an enemy of the United 

States should enslave and sell any captured persons of their Army, it would be a case for the 

severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint.

The United States cannot retaliate by enslavement; therefore death must be the 

retaliation for this crime against the law of nations.

59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the captor’s 

army or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has not been punished 

by his own authorities.

All prisoners of war are liable to the infliction of retaliatory measures.

60. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to give no 

quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and therefore will not 

expect, quarter; but a commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter, in great 

straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners.
61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on the 

ground, or prisoners captured by other troops.

62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any 

portion of the Army, receive none.

63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking, and 

uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter.

64. If American troops capture a train containing uniforms of the enemy, and the 

commander considers it advisable to distribute them for use among his men, some striking 

mark or sign must be adopted to distinguish the American soldier from the enemy.

65. The use of the enemy’s national standard, flag, or other emblem of nationality, for the 

purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which they lose all claim to 

the protection of the laws of war.

66. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, under a misapprehension 

of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be ordered to suffer death if, within three days 

after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quarter.

67. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another 

sovereign State, and, therefore, admits of no rules or laws different from those of regular 

warfare, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the army of 

a government which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust assailant.

68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. 

The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to 

obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.

Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.

69. Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon, except to drive them in, or 

when a positive order, special or general, has been issued to that effect.

70. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly 

excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and 

usages of war.

71. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly 

disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer 

death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy 

captured after having committed his misdeed.

72. Money and other valuables on the person of a prisoner, such as watches or jewelry, 

as well as extra clothing, are regarded by the American Army as the private property of the 

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prisoner, and the appropriation of such valuables or money is considered dishonorable, and is 

prohibited.

Nevertheless, if large sums are found upon the persons of prisoners, or in their 

possession, they shall be taken from them, and the surplus, after providing for their own 

support, appropriated for the use of the Army, under the direction of the commander, unless 

otherwise ordered by the Government. Nor can prisoners claim, as private property, large 

sums found and captured in their train, although they have been placed in the private luggage 

of the prisoners.

73. All officers, when captured, must surrender their side-arms to the captor. They may 

be restored to the prisoner in marked cases, by the commander, to signalize admiration of his 

distinguished bravery, or approbation of his humane treatment of prisoners before his capture. 

The captured officer to whom they may be restored cannot wear them during captivity.

74. A prisoner of war, being a public enemy, is the prisoner of the Government and not 

of the captor. No ransom can be paid by a prisoner of war to his individual captor, or to any 

officer in command. The Government alone releases captives, according to rules prescribed 

by itself.

75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as may be deemed 

necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or 

indignity. The confinement and mode of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity 

according to the demands of safety.

76. Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, whenever practicable, 

and treated with humanity. 

They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor’s government, according 

to their rank and condition.

77. A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed, in his flight; but 

neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for his attempt to 

escape, which the law of war does not consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be 

used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape.

If, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a united or general 

escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished, even with death; and capital punishment 

may also be inflicted upon prisoners of war discovered to have plotted rebellion against the 

authorities of the captors, whether in union with fellow-prisoners or other persons.

78. If prisoners of war, having given no pledge nor made any promise on their honor, 

forcibly or otherwise escape, and are captured again in battle, after having rejoined their own 

army, they shall not be punished for their escape, but shall be treated as simple prisoners of 

war, although they will be subjected to stricter confinement.

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79. Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated, according to the ability of 

the medical staff.

80. Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information 

concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any 

violence against prisoners in order to extort the desired information, or to punish them for 

having given false information.

Section IV. Partisans – Armed enemies not belonging to the hostile army – Scouts – Armed 

prowlers – War-rebels.

81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging 

to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into 

the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured they are entitled to all the privileges of the 

prisoner of war.

82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads 

for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part 

and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but 

who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional 

assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character 

or appearance of soldiers — such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and 

therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated 

summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

83. Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, or in the uniform of 

the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking 

about the lines of the captor, are treated as spies, and suffer death.

84. Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or persons of the enemy’s 

territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or 

of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the 

telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war.

85. War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who rise in arms against the 

occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the same. If captured, 

they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether called 

upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. They are not prisoners of war; 

nor are they if discovered and secured before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising 

or to armed violence.

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Section V. Safe-conduct – Spies – War-traitors – Captured messengers – Abuse of the flag of 

truce.

86. All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent armies, whether by 

traffic, by letter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. This is the general rule, to be observed 

without special proclamation.

Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct or permission to trade on a small or 

large scale, or by exchanging mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take 

place only according to agreement approved by the Government or by the highest military 

authority.

Contraventions of this rule are highly punishable.

87. Ambassadors, and all other diplomatic agents of neutral powers accredited to the 

enemy may receive safe-conducts through the territories occupied by the belligerents, 

unless there are military reasons to the contrary, and unless they may reach the place of their 

destination conveniently by another route. It implies no international affront if the safeconduct is declined. Such passes are usually given by the supreme authority of the state and 

not by subordinate officers.

88. A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks information 

with the intention of communicating it to the enemy.

The spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether or not he succeed 

in obtaining the information or in conveying it to the enemy.

89. If a citizen of the United States obtains information in a legitimate manner and 

betrays it to the enemy, be he a military or civil officer, or a private citizen, he shall suffer 

death.

90. A traitor under the law of war, or a war-traitor, is a person in a place or district under 

martial law who, unauthorized by the military commander, gives information of any kind to 

the enemy, or holds intercourse with him.

91. The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offense consists in betraying to the 

enemy anything concerning the condition, safety, operations, or plans of the troops holding or 

occupying the place or district, his punishment is death.

92. If the citizen or subject of a country or place invaded or conquered gives information 

to his own government, from which he is separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his 

government, he is a war-traitor, and death is the penalty of his offense.

93. All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them if they cannot obtain 

them otherwise.

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94. No person having been forced by the enemy to serve as guide is punishable for 

having done so.

95. If a citizen of a hostile and invaded district voluntarily serves as a guide to the enemy, 

or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-traitor and shall suffer death.

96. A citizen serving voluntarily as a guide against his own country commits treason, and 

will be dealt with according to the law of his country.

97. Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have misled intentionally, may be put to 

death.

98. All unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy is considered treasonable 

by the law of war.

Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory or foreign visitors in the same 

can claim no immunity from this law. They may communicate with foreign parts or with 

the inhabitants of the hostile country, so far as the military authority permits, but no further. 

Instant expulsion from the occupied territory would be the very least punishment for the 

infraction of this rule.

99. A messenger carrying written dispatches or verbal messages from one portion of 

the army or from a besieged place to another portion of the same army or its government, if 

armed, and in the uniform of his army, and if captured while doing so in the territory occupied 

by the enemy, is treated by the captor as a prisoner of war. If not in uniform nor a soldier, the 

circumstances connected with his capture must determine the disposition that shall be made 

of him,

100. A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by the 

enemy to further in any manner the interests of the enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the 

privileges of the prisoner of war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances of the 

case.

101. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility, and is 

consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war allows even capital punishment 

for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, 

and it is so difficult to guard against them.

102. The law of war, like the criminal law regarding other offenses, makes no difference 

on account of the difference of sexes, concerning the spy, the war-traitor, or the war-rebel.

103. Spies, war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged according to the common 

law of war. The exchange of such persons would require a special cartel, authorized by the 

Government, or, at a great distance from it, by the chief commander of the army in the field.

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104. A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, and afterward 

captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he 

may be held in closer custody as a person individually dangerous.

Section VI. Exchange of prisoners – Flags of truce – Flags of protection.

105. Exchanges of prisoners take place — number for number — rank for rank — 

wounded for wounded — with added condition for added condition – such, for instance, as 

not to serve for a certain period.

106. In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of persons of inferior rank may be 

substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may be agreed upon by cartel, which 

requires the sanction of the Government, or of the commander of the army in the field.

107. A prisoner of war is in honor bound truly to state to the captor his rank; and he is not 

to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to cause a more advantageous exchange, 

nor a higher rank, for the purpose of obtaining better treatment.

Offenses to the contrary have been justly punished by the commanders of released 

prisoners, and may be good cause for refusing to release such prisoners.

108. The surplus number of prisoners of war remaining after an exchange has taken place 

is sometimes released either for the payment of a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, 

of provision, clothing, or other necessaries.

Such arrangement, however, requires the sanction of the highest authority.

109. The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of convenience to both belligerents. If no 

general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be demanded by either of them. No belligerent is 

obliged to exchange prisoners of war.

A cartel is voidable as soon as either party has violated it.

110. No exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete capture, and after an 

accurate account of them, and a list of the captured officers, has been taken.

111. The bearer of flag of truce cannot insist upon being admitted. He must always be 

admitted with great caution. Unnecessary frequency is carefully to be avoided.

112. If the bearer of a flag of truce offer himself during an engagement, he can be admitted 

as a very rare exception only. It is no breach of good faith to retain such flag of truce, if 

admitted during the engagement. Firing is not required to cease on the appearance of a flag of 

truce in battle.

113. If the bearer of a flag of truce, presenting himself during an engagement, is killed or 

wounded, it furnishes no ground of complaint whatever.

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114. If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been abused for 

surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer of the flag thus abusing his sacred 

character is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its sacredness, that 

while its abuse is an especially heinous offense, great caution is requisite, on the other hand, 

in convicting the bearer of a flag of truce as a spy.

115. It is customary to designate by certain flags (usually yellow) the hospitals in places 

which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may avoid firing on them. The same has been 

done in battles when hospitals are situated within the field of engagement.

116. Honorable belligerents often request that the hospitals within the territory of the 

enemy may be designated, so that they may be spared.

An honorable belligerent allows himself to be guided by flags or signals of protection 

as much as the contingencies and the necessities of the fight will permit.

117. It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the 

enemy by flags of protection. Such act of bad faith may be good cause for refusing to respect 

such flags.

118. The besieging belligerent has sometimes requested the besieged to designate 

the buildings containing collections of works of art, scientific museums, astronomical 

observatories, or precious libraries, so that their destruction may be avoided as much as 

possible.

Section VII. The parole.

119. Prisoners of war may be released from captivity by exchange, and, under certain 

circumstances, also by parole.

120. The term parole designates the pledge of individual good faith and honor to do, or to 

omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his parole shall have been dismissed, wholly or 

partially, from the power of the captor.

121. The pledge of the parole is always an individual, but not a private act.

122. The parole applies chiefly to prisoners of war whom the captor allows to return 

to their country, or to live in greater freedom within the captor’s country or territory, on 

conditions stated in the parole.

123. Release of prisoners of war by exchange is the general rule; release by parole is the 

exception.

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124. Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is 

captured again.

Accurate lists, therefore, of the paroled persons must be kept by the belligerents.

125. When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange of two written 

documents, in which the name and rank of the paroled individuals are accurately and 

truthfully stated.

126. Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and they can give it only 

with the permission of their superior, as long as a superior in rank is within reach.

127. No non-commissioned officer or private can give his parole except through an officer. 

Individual paroles not given through an officer are not only void, but subject the individuals 

giving them to the punishment of death as deserters. The only admissible exception is where 

individuals, properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement without 

the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

128. No paroling on the battle-field; no paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle; 

and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are 

paroled, is permitted, or of any value.

129. In capitulations for the surrender of strong places or fortified camps the commanding 

officer, in cases of urgent necessity, may agree that the troops under his command shall not 

fight again during the war unless exchanged. 

130. The usual pledge given in the parole is not to serve during the existing war unless 

exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active service in the field against the paroling 

belligerent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. These cases of breaking the parole 

are patent acts, and can be visited with the punishment of death; but the pledge does not refer 

to internal service, such as recruiting or drilling the recruits, fortifying places not besieged, 

quelling civil commotions, fighting against belligerents unconnected with the paroling 

belligerents, or to civil or diplomatic service for which the paroled officer may be employed.

131. If the government does not approve of the parole, the paroled officer must return into 

captivity, and should the enemy refuse to receive him he is free of his parole.

132. A belligerent government may declare, by a general order, whether it will allow 

paroling and on what conditions it will allow it. Such order is communicated to the enemy.

133. No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to parole himself, and no 

government is obliged to parole prisoners of war or to parole all captured officers, if it paroles 

any. As the pledging of the parole is an individual act, so is paroling, on the other hand, an act 

of choice on the part of the belligerent.

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134. The commander of an occupying army may require of the civil officers of the enemy, 

and of its citizens, any pledge he may consider necessary for the safety or security of his 

army, and upon their failure to give it he may arrest, confine, or detain them.

Section VIII. Armistice – Capitulation.

135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period agreed between 

belligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing and duly ratified by the highest authorities of 

the contending parties.

136. If an armistice be declared without conditions it extends no further than to require a 

total cessation of hostilities along the front of both belligerents.

If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and must be rigidly 

adhered to by both parties. If either party violates any express condition, the armistice may be 

declared null and void by the other.

137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of the belligerents; or 

special — that is, referring to certain troops or certain localities only.

An armistice may be concluded for a definite period of time; or for an indefinite time, 

during which either belligerent may resume hostilities on giving the notice agreed upon to the 

other.

138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, 

whether it be expected to be preliminary to a treaty of peace, or to prepare during the 

armistice for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, does in no way affect the character of 

the armistice itself.

139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the agreed 

commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible from the day only when they 

receive official information of its existence.

140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district 

over which their command extends, but such armistice is subject to the ratification of the 

superior authority, and ceases so soon as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is 

not ratified, even if a certain time for the elapsing between giving the notice of cessation and 

the resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for.

141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to stipulate what 

intercourse of persons or traffic between the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the 

hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.

If nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during actual hostilities.

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142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military 

operations to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the army besieging it, 

it is agreed by all the authorities on this subject that the besieger must cease all extension, 

perfection, or advance of his attacking works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists whether the besieged 

have a right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defense within the place during an 

armistice, this point should be determined by express agreement between the parties.

144. So soon as a capitulation is signed the capitulator has no right to demolish, destroy, 

or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammunition in his possession, during the time which 

elapses between the signing and the execution of capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in 

the same.

145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties the other party is released 

from all obligation to observe it.

146. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be treated as prisoners of war, 

the officer alone being responsible who gives the order for such a violation of an armistice. 

The highest authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an 

armistice.

147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met 

to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace; but plenipotentiaries may meet without a 

preliminary armistice; in the latter case the war is carried on without any abatement.

Section IX. Assassination.

148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the 

hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain 

without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international 

outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow 

the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. 

Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as 

relapses into barbarism.

Section X. Insurrection – Civil war – Rebellion.

149. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or a portion of 

it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the government. It 

may be confined to mere armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in view.

150. Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each contending 

for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government. The term is 

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also sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the 

state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government.

151. The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war 

between the legitimate government of a country and portions of provinces of the same who 

seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their own.

152. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels, 

whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way whatever imply a partial or 

complete acknowledgment of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an 

independent or sovereign power. Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of 

war by the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of 

the revolted people as an independent power.

153. Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, concluding of 

cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; addressing officers of a rebel 

army by the rank they may have in the same; accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand, 

proclaiming martial law in their territory, or levying war taxes or forced loans, or doing any 

other act sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages of public war between sovereign 

belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people, or of 

the government which they may have erected, as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the 

adoption of the rules of war toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond 

the limits of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future 

relations between the contending parties.

154. Treating in the field the rebellious enemy according to the law and usages of war has 

never prevented the legitimate government from trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief 

rebels for high treason, and from treating them accordingly, unless they are included in a 

general amnesty.

155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes — that is to say, into 

combatants and non-combatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of rebellion, 

distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the country and the 

disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those citizens known to 

sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking 

up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being bodily forced 

thereto.

156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect 

the manifestly loyal citizens in revolted territories against the hardships of the war as much as 

the common misfortune of all war admits.

The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, 

on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter 

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police than the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in regular war; and if he deems it 

appropriate, or if his government demands of him that every citizen shall, by an oath of 

allegiance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity to the legitimate government, he 

may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves 

anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government.

Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance can be placed upon such oaths, 

the commander or his government have the right to decide.

157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful 

movements of their troops is levying war against the United States, and is therefore treason.*

*Official Records, Series III, Volume 3, pp. 148-164.

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APPENDIX B

General Orders No. 11

General Orders Headquarters, District of the Border

No. 11 Kansas City, Mo., August 25, 1863

I. All persons living in Jackson, Cass, and Bates Counties, Missouri, and in that 

part of Vernon included in this district, except those living within 1 mile of the limits of 

Independence, Hickman Mills, Pleasant Hill, and Harrisonville, and except those in that 

part of Kaw Township, Jackson County, north of Brush Creek and west of the Big Blue, are 

hereby ordered to remove from their present places of residence within fifteen days from 

the date hereof. Those who, within that time, establish their loyalty to the satisfaction of 

the commanding officer of the military station nearest their present places of residence will 

receive from him certificates stating the fact of their loyalty, and the names of the witnesses 

by whom it can be shown. All who receive such certificates will be permitted to remove to 

any military station in this district, or to any part of the State of Kansas, except the counties 

on the eastern border of the State. All other shall remove out of this district. Officers 

commanding companies and detachments serving in the counties named will see that this 

paragraph is promptly obeyed.

II. All grain and hay in the field or under shelter in the district from which the inhabitants 

are required to remove within reach of military stations after the 9th day of September next 

will be taken to such stations and turned over to the proper officers there, and report of 

amount so turned over made to district headquarters, specifying the names of all loyal owners 

and the amount of such produce taken from them. All grain and hay found in such district 

after the 9th day of September next not convenient to such stations will be destroyed.

III. The provisions of General Orders, No. 10, from these headquarters will be at once 

vigorously executed by officers commanding in the parts of the district and at the stations 

not subject to the operation of Paragraph I of this order, and especially in the towns of 

Independence, Westport, and Kansas City.

IV. Paragraph III, General Orders, No. 10, is revoked as to all who have borne arms against 

the Government in this district since the 21st day of August, 1863.*

By Order of Brigadier-General Ewing:

H. HANNAHS,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General

* Official Records, Series I, Volume 22, Part II, p. 473.

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APPENDIX C

General Orders No. 59

General Orders Headquarters, District of Kentucky and

No. 595th Division, 23d Army Corps

Lexington, Ky., July 16, 1864

The rapid increase in this district of lawless bands of armed men engaged in 

interrupting railroad and telegraphic communications, plundering and murdering peaceful 

Union citizens, destroying the mails, &c., calls for the adoption of stringent measures on the 

part of the military authorities for their suppression. Therefore, all guerrillas, armed prowlers, 

by whatever name they may be known, and rebel sympathizers are hereby admonished 

that in future stern retaliatory measures will be adopted and strictly enforced, whenever the 

lives or property of peaceful citizens are jeopardized by the lawless acts of such men. Rebel 

sympathizers living within five miles of any scene of outrage committed by armed men, 

not recognized as public enemies by the rules and usages of war, will be arrested and sent 

beyond the limits of the United States, in accordance with instructions from the major-general 

commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi. So much of the property of rebel 

sympathizers as may be necessary to indemnify the Government of loyal citizens for losses 

incurred by the acts of such lawless men will be seized and appropriated for this purpose. 

Whenever an unarmed Union citizen is murdered four guerrillas will be selected from the 

prisoners in the hands of the military authorities and publicly shot to death in the most 

convenient place near the scene of outrage.*

By command of Bvt. Maj. Gen. S. G. Burbridge:

J. BATES DICKSON,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General

*Official Records, Series I, Volume 39, Part II, p. 174.

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