Cover

This perspective aerial view of Newport,

Rhode Island, drawn and published by

Galt & Hoy of New York, circa 1878, is

found in the American Memory Online

Map Collections: 1500–2003, of the

Library of Congress Geography and Map

Division, Washington, D.C. The map

may be viewed at http://hdl.loc.gov/

loc.gmd/g3774n.pm008790.

Inside Front.ps

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Monday, January 11, 2010 12:33:08 PM
Piracy and Maritime Crime

Historical and Modern Case Studies

Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, a

David Rosenberg, Editors

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Newport, Rhode Island THE UNITED STATES

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

VIR

A

IBUS M RI VICTORIA

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Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Thirty-five

January 2010

President, Naval War College

Rear Adm. James P. Wisecup, USN

Provost

Amb. Mary Ann Peters

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@usnwc.edu

Web: www.usnwc.edu/press

Twitter: http://twitter.com/NavalWarCollege

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Director, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Director of the Naval War College Press.

To request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions

to the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing are subject to the Copyright Act

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that

reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

ISBN 978-1-884733-65-9

To Charles W. Koburger, Jr., scholar and friend

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Contents

Foreword, by Bruce A. Elleman 

Introduction, by Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and

David Rosenberg 

CHAPTER ONE A Modern History of the Internationa

Legal Definition of Piracy 

by Penny Campbell

PART ONE: PIRACY IN EAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

CHAPTER TWO Piracy on the South China Coast thro

Modern Times 

by Robert J. Antony

CHAPTER THREE The Taiping Rebellion, Piracy, and the

Arrow War 

by Bruce A. Elleman

CHAPTER FOUR Selamat Datang, Kapitan:

Post–World War II Piracy in the Sout

China Sea 

by Charles W. Koburger, Jr.

CHAPTER FIVE The Political Economy of Piracy in th

South China Sea 

by David Rosenberg

PART TWO: PIRACY IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

CHAPTER SIX The Looting and Rape of Vietnamese

Boat People 

by Bruce A. Elleman

CHAPTER SEVEN Piracy and Armed Robbery in the

Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved? 

by Catherine Zara Raymond

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by Samuel Pyeatt Menefee

CHAPTER NINE Confronting Maritime Crime in

Southeast Asian Waters: Reexamining

“Piracy” in the Twenty-first Century 

by Sam Bateman

PART THREE: PIRACY IN AFRICA

CHAPTER TEN President Thomas Jefferson and the

Barbary Pirates 

by Robert F. Turner

CHAPTER ELEVEN The Limits of Naval Power:

The Merchant Brig Three Sisters,

Riff Pirates, and British Battleships 

by Andrew Lambert

CHAPTER TWELVE Guns, Oil, and “Cake”: Maritime

Security in the Gulf of Guinea 

by Arild Nodland

CHAPTER THIRTEEN Fish, Family, and Profit:

Piracy and the Horn of Africa 

by Gary E. Weir

Conclusions, by Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and

David Rosenberg 

Bibliography 

About the Contributors 

Index 

The Newport Papers 

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Foreword

Piracy is a basic and fundamental concern for all navies.1

From almost the beginn

state-sponsored navies, piracy suppression has been one of their major responsib

ties—when Julius Caesar was captured by pirates in 76 BCE, the first thing he did 

paying the pirates’ ransom and being released was to fit “out a squadron of ships 

take his revenge.”2

Despite piracy’s importance and the continued frequency of p

attacks, however, relatively few scholarly works have been written analyzing cases 

modern piracy and piracy suppression in terms of varying strategic, policy, and o

tional decisions. This edited collection of case studies attempts to fill this gap.

There have been a number of important historical studies that have dealt with th

jects of piracy and piracy suppression. Books written from the point of view of th

wishing to end piracy have tended to focus on legal issues, including the rights of 

tims, the procedures and decisions of Admiralty courts in punishing pirates, and 

capture of piracy ships as prizes. Others have looked at the existence of piracy in 

of one particular place or time period, with the Barbary Coast and the Caribbean 

claiming disproportionate shares of attention. Pirates are often romanticized; Fo

magazine has recently listed history’s top-earning pirates, including Samuel “Bla

Sam” Bellamy at US$120 million (2008 dollars), Sir Francis Drake at US$115 mil

and Thomas Tew at US$103 million. More famous pirates, like Edward Teach

(“Blackbeard”), came in far down the list, at tenth place, with only US$12.5 milli

One of the first books to examine both sides of the piracy issue appeared in 1724

of the Most Notorious Pirates. Many have suspected that Daniel Defoe was the aut

writing under the pen name “Captain Charles Johnson.” In addition to discussin

exploits of many famous pirates, the author openly blamed various European go

ments for piracy’s creation, since state-sponsored privateering often led to piracy

one solution, he advised the British government to establish a public fishery to en

piracy: “Wherefore, if there was a public spirit among us, it would be well worth 

while to establish a national fishery which would be the best means in the world 

vent Piracy, employ a number of the poor, and ease the nation of a great burthen 

lowering the price of provision in general, as well as of several other commoditie

At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Royal Navy was primarily responsible f

using force to suppress piracy. British privateers continued to roam the seas, prey

Spanish gold. However, several changes in British maritime legal practice made a

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of the High Court, revised Admiralty law so that pirates could be punished anywhere:

“Now piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery committed within the

jurisdiction of the Admiralty. If any man be assaulted within that jurisdiction, and his

ship or goods violently taken away without legal authority, this is robbery and piracy.”5

Antipiracy reforms were not enacted rapidly, but by the 1720s the Royal Navy had made

it easier for its officers to prosecute pirates anywhere in the world: “Vice-Admiralty

courts were established in the colonies with powers to act against pirates,” where “seven

naval warrant officers, sitting as a court, could hold a trial for piracy, and ships and

goods captured from pirates were treated as prize, giving the navy a financial incentive

to hunt for pirates.”6

During this period, Newport, R.I. (pictured on the front cover),

was used by Thomas Tew to trade in pirate cargo, with one cargo alone valued at

£100,000.7

The Royal Navy attacked pirates in the Caribbean, along the coast of North

America, and as far away as the Indian Ocean. With the creation of new bases, such as

at Antigua in the West Indies, the Royal Navy gradually extended its range as far as the

northwest Pacific and Australia: “Naval stations and cruising areas gradually covered

the shipping zones of the world and made possible the Pax Britannica.”8

For many people, it appeared that piracy had been destroyed for good. Even fairly

recent books focusing on the nineteenth century have included chapters entitled “An

End to Piracy.”9

However, piracy never entirely disappeared during the twentieth century, and during the last quarter of that century events turned out far differently than

even the most pessimistic observer could have predicted. Beginning in the early 1980s,

commercial shipping became a prime target of pirates, first off West Africa and then

slowly spreading into Southeast Asia.10 Throughout the 1990s, and especially after the

Soviet Union’s collapse, piracy increased dramatically. Reports of piracy tripled during

1991–2001: of 335 reported cases in 2001, ninety-one were in waters claimed by Indonesia, twenty-seven by India, twenty-five by Bangladesh, nineteen by Malaysia, eight by

Vietnam, and eight by the Philippines; another seventeen reported attacks occurred in

the Malacca Strait, bordering on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.11

Recent naval operations by the world’s major navies show a clear revival of interest in

piracy and piracy suppression. The present work of collaborative scholarship, completed as a project in the Maritime History Department at the U.S. Naval War College,

demonstrates that historical insights from a selection of piracy case studies over the

past two centuries have potential relevance to current and future thinking about

antipiracy operations. The conclusions and views expressed by the contributors and

editors of this volume do not in any way reflect any official view of the Naval War

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ment of the United States of America.

This monograph is intended as a contribution to both scholarship and profession

naval thinking; it is an academic and comparative examination of twelve selected 

studies from maritime history used to illuminate a range of concepts and uses of 

suppression. The twelve case studies provide the basis for the conclusions, an app

that provides a more thorough understanding of the uses and limitations of nava

antipiracy operations in the context of new maritime technologies and within a w

range of modern national policy goals than might otherwise be achievable. Abov

this collection provides a sound basis for comparative analysis of varying histori

experiences that can stimulate new and original thinking about a basic but often

overlooked naval duty.

Many people assisted in the making of this volume. The editors would like to tha

particular Mr. Pelham Boyer and Professor Carnes Lord at the NWC Press (and t

anonymous readers); Ms. Melissa Cameron, Ms. Susan Meyer, and Ms. Shannon 

in the Desktop Publishing department; Ms. Alice Juda, Mr. Wayne Rowe, and Mr

ert Schnare at the NWC Library; and Professor John B. Hattendorf, Ms. Kelly Fol

and Mr. Bob Cembrola at the Maritime History Department/NWC Museum. In C

berra, Australia, a special thanks to Australia National University and to the Sea P

Centre–Australia. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the s

port of Mr. Andy Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessment.

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN

Research Professor

Maritime History Department

Notes

1. Robert C. Ritchie, “Piracy,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, ed. John B.

Hattendorf (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,

2007), vol. 3, pp. 296–300.

2. Cyrus H. Karraker, Piracy Was a Business

(Rindge, N.H.: Richard R. Smith, 1953), pp.

17–18.

3. Matt Woolsey, “Top-Earning Pirates,”

Forbes.com, 19 September 2008.

4. Captain Charles Johnson, Lives of the 

Notorious Pirates, ed. Christopher Ll

(London: Folio Society, 1962), p. 18.

5. Owen Rutter, The Pirate Wind: Tales 

Robbers of Malaya (New York: Oxfor

Press, 1987), p. 25.

6. Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and 

against the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass

vard Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 127–59.

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(Newport, R.I.: Newport Historical Society,

1992), p. 14.

8. David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga,

and J. A. de Moor, Pirates and Privateers:

New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the

Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Exeter,

U.K.: Univ. of Exeter Press, 1997), p. 12.

9. Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (New York:

St. Martin’s, 2003), pp. 229–53.

Tanker Traffic (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1992), p. 5

11. Klaus Hympendahl, Pirates Aboard! Forty

Cases of Piracy Today and What Bluewater

Cruisers Can Do about It (New York:

Sheridan House, 2003), pp. 315–16; statistic

from the International Maritime Bureau.

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Introduction

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN, ANDREW FORBES, AND DAVID ROSENBERG

Piracy, or “robbery on the high seas,” has existed for as long as people and comm

have traversed the oceans. The ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese all complain

it, and all created naval forces to fight pirates. The word “piracy” comes from the 

pirata, “sea robber,” and before that from the Greek peirates—“brigand,” or “one 

attacks.” Piracy, however, has evolved over time, and this volume examines how p

and ocean governance have changed from 1608, when the Dutch jurist Hugo Gro

published his Mare Liberum [The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs 

Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade]. As modern nation-states emerged fr

feudalism, privateering for both profit and war supplemented piracy at the marg

national sovereignty. More recently, an ocean enclosure movement under the aeg

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 has granted states acc

maritime resources far beyond their territorial limits. This in turn has given state

more responsibility for providing safe passage through their waters. This monog

provides case studies on how these developments have changed the ways in which

nations deal with piracy.

Who owns the sea? Who has rights of navigation through its waters? Who is resp

ble for protecting ships at sea? For most of human history, the high seas were see

vast, dangerous, uncharted regions filled with demons and dragons. In premoder

times, the sea was a space apart from society. ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, a seventh-century A

military leader who was responsible for the conquest of Egypt in 640, observed, “

sea is a boundless expanse, whereon great ships look tiny specks; nought but the 

ens above and waters beneath; when calm, the sailor’s heart is broken; when temp

ous, his senses reel. Trust it little, fear it much. Man at sea is an insect on a splinte

engulfed, now scared to death.”1

Throughout much of human history, therefore, it was assumed that the seas coul

be owned, occupied, or governed. Fighting pirates at sea, although desirable, was

beyond the jurisdiction and ability of most “states,” whether feudal or national. A

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that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of

all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.”2

Grotius’s view was developed to counter the activities of, in particular, Spain and Portugal, who were using their navies to assert their global maritime spheres of influence.

The Dutch and other Europeans also wanted to pursue maritime interests. In this fashion, Grotius’s “freedom of the seas” doctrine became a widely accepted foundation of

modern international law.

Historically, a state’s sovereignty stopped at the shoreline. The world’s oceans remained

open-access, “common pool” resources. “How can a country control the seas?” asked

the ruler of Macassar in the early seventeenth century, when the Dutch were attemptin

to monopolize the spice trade: “God has made the earth and the sea, has divided the

earth among mankind and given the sea in common. It is a thing unheard of that anyone should be forbidden to sail the seas.”3

As commercial trade expanded, coastal communities over time evolved maritime practices to earn money from passing merchantmen. These practices ranged from the piloting and provisioning of ships, to extortion, to outright pirating. In these early years,

piracy was not just an enterprise of criminals but a widespread practice of some seafar

ing communities, including the Bugis and Riau in the Malay world, Iban raiding and

pirating communities on the west coast of Borneo, the Iranun around Jolo and the Sulu

Sea, and others in Vietnamese and Chinese coastal areas.4

Lured by the spice trade, and later by the tea trade with China, Western European

powers competed with each other to expand their trade networks and overseas colonies in these regions. Grotius provided an ideological justification for the Dutch to use

their own growing naval power to break up other European countries’ trade

monopolies.

Maritime Piracy in Historical Perspective

As maritime trade increased, so did piracy. Many navies were created in the fourteenth

and fifteenth centuries to protect their shipping and trade from piracy, which was then

widespread. However, absent a navy, a state had only limited means of redress or protection. Three distinct but complementary legal concepts evolved by which states without strong navies could attempt to control attacks on their commerce: letters of

marque, commissions for privateering, and prize law. The first two provided for the

issuance of “letters of marque” or commissions as privateers, conferring limited

authority upon individuals to capture ships and cargoes, for which service they would

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the value and distribution of captured ships and goods.

How did the letters of marque work? Generally, if a merchant lost ships or goods

through the hostile actions of another state or countrymen of that state, he woul

seek direct restitution. This attempt would usually be made through the legal sys

the offending state. If no compensation was forthcoming, the merchant could pe

his own sovereign for assistance. If no solution was reached through diplomatic c

nels between monarchs, the merchant’s sovereign could, as a last resort, issue a le

marque giving the merchant the right to attack the commerce of the offending st

obtain full restitution for his original losses. The letter of marque was directed n

the individuals who had committed the original theft but against any goods orig

from the offending country.

The earliest known letter of marque issued in England dates to 1295, when Berna

Dongresilli was given a letter against Portugal, the people of Lisbon in particular

letter was valid for five years. It allowed the recipient to regain his losses plus the 

of gaining restitution. If he died before this was achieved, the right of restitution 

passed on within his family. If the recipient of a letter took more than had been l

plus expenses, he would have to answer to his king. If restitution was received, re

were to cease.

Thousands of such letters were issued in England. For example, in 1414, King He

of England granted letters of marque against the property of the town of Leydon 

Leiden, in the Netherlands) to the value of the debt owing to John de Waghen; pr

English kings had sought legal restitution for de Waghen’s losses without respons

1569, Queen Elizabeth I granted letters of marque to the Winter brothers against 

Portuguese in recompense for losses, but unlike under previous letters, the broth

were specifically required to surrender the letters when the losses were satisfied.6

letter of marque allowed what today might be considered minor acts of war whil

anteeing the maintenance of a general state of peace between states.7

To ensure th

farers acted appropriately and did not precipitate open conflict, letters of marqu

became more regulatory in nature. The Crown could take legal action against let

holders who acted outside the prescribed terms.

Thus, in 1484, the king made a proclamation against piracy, specifying that all sh

leaving English ports must leave behind sureties for their behavior. Similarly, in 1

English ships were required to carry letters signed by the Admiralty before they c

leave English ports.8

Initially the issuance of letters of marque in England was the 

rogative of the Lord Chancellor, but from 1357 they were issued by the Lord Hig

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actions were acceptable and which were not. A “captor”—that is, the holder of a letter

of marque who captured a foreign ship or goods—now had legal sanction within his

own country for attacking the shipping of another state. Without this protection, his

actions would have been considered piracy.

In 1652, the Admiralty judges published an opinion stating that before a letter of

marque could be issued, a demand for reparation had to be made and proof of the leve

of loss provided. This would establish that the applicant had been wronged and had

sought legal redress without success and would prove the extent of his losses. A letter

could then be issued in good faith for a just cause. However, not all captors operated

within the bounds of their letters. In 1595, a letter was revoked because a captor recovered more than he had lost.10

Privateering, as distinct from attacking shipping under letters of marque, was evident

as early as the eleventh century; by the seventeenth century it was widespread in the

evolving global economic system. By the end of the seventeenth century, the issuing of

letters of marque was widely considered a belligerent act, and so they were used less

often, replaced by commissions for privateering. Personal seeking of restitution for pri

vate losses through authorized theft at sea disappeared, in favor of privateering in time

of war—in effect, guerre de course under contract. There were a number of reasons why

a sovereign might commission privateers. Most important, it offered a way to destroy a

rival’s shipping and create economic turmoil at virtually no cost to the issuing state.11

Large professional navies were expensive and often nonproductive; privateering

represented a cheap form of naval warfare.

There are numerous examples of English sovereigns commissioning privateers. In 1543

the king licensed as many ships as possible against the Scots and the French; the privateers could keep all spoils and acted under the protection of their sovereign.12 But the

British government did not want to lose all control—in 1563 instructions were issued

condemning piracy and privateering without commissions. Suspected perpetrators

were to be arrested, and all armed ships had to pay securities before sailing to ensure

their good behavior.

For a state that had no navy or only a small one, privateers often constituted the only

way to conduct naval warfare. Early examples are the three Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–

54, 1665–67, and 1672–74), which were among the first great oceanic wars fought over

trade. England actively sought war, on the assumption that by taking another state’s

trade it would be able to increase its own wealth. In the first war, English privateers

wreaked havoc on Dutch shipping, although toward the end the Dutch responded in a

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for the English and about 1,250 for the Dutch. In the second war, shipping losses

appear to have been about the same, but since England’s merchant fleet was smal

losses were proportionally greater. In the third war, the Dutch kept their own ves

harbor and used privateers to attack English shipping. The resulting losses under

business confidence in England, leading eventually to withdrawal from the war.13

In England, numerous sets of “instructions to privateers” were issued between 16

and 1780. In general, prospective privateers had to fulfill the requirements in the

instructions before appearing in the High Court of the Admiralty to request com

sions. The claimant would have to provide a list of ships and crews to be used, a b

for reimbursable costs, and a sufficient bond. Prizes had to be kept whole and be

brought into English ports, and there be assessed by the High Court of the Admi

A key issue for captors, whether holders of letters of marque or commissions as p

teers, was their rights over the ships and goods they took as prizes. It was through 

regulation of prizes—how they were valued, who received shares—that the state 

controls on privateering.

However, the use of private ships to harass one’s enemies has a long history, pred

letters of marque and commissions for privateering. Many early documents show 

the English king could lay claim to all or part of the value of prizes under the con

of the “droits,” or rights, of the Crown. This tradition maintained that all prizes

belonged to the sovereign, who might give them in full or in part to the captor. F

example, in 1205, the king granted a captor half of the captures taken from the k

enemies. The sovereign could be fickle. In 1337 the king directed the bailiffs at G

Yarmouth to give all the ships and goods taken to the captors but in 1341 reclaim

these prizes. In 1544, King Henry VIII issued a blanket authorization against Fra

privateers, allowing privateers to keep all of their prizes.14

In 1563, the Lord High Admiral required inventories and bail for prizes so that th

courts would know precisely what had been captured and its exact value. Private

to promise not to break up their prizes and sell them, to turn in their prizes to th

ernment, and to pay the Admiralty a tenth of the value. In 1603 a ship captured w

out proper letters was condemned and confiscated by the Lord High Admiral.15 T

became a precedent, whereby prizes taken illegally would go to the Lord High Ad

while the captor could be considered a pirate and treated as such.

A number of other regulations were issued to control the distribution of prizes. I

1589, an order of council was issued requiring all captures to be brought for

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demnation of a lawful prize appears in the records for that year. In 1590, the Lord High

Admiral instructed the High Court of the Admiralty that all prizes should be fully

inventoried. In 1649, a distinct Prize Division was created in the High Court of the

Admiralty to handle prize cases. Thereafter the High Court of the Admiralty dealt with

peacetime captures, the Prize Court with wartime captures.16

In 1665 and 1677 the king issued a number of rules to be observed by the High Court

of the Admiralty in adjudicating prizes. In 1692 the first Prize Act was passed, containing provisions for the sharing of proceeds. Before this act was passed, shares had been

apportioned by agreement, custom, or the Crown. The sale of prizes in neutral countries was common in early times but discouraged later, probably due to the difficulty o

the king and the Lord High Admiral in getting their shares—a tenth and fifteenth,

respectively. The Prize Act gave captors a statutory right to their prizes, which had previously been at the pleasure of the Crown.

Over time, national prize courts were authorized to act for the Crown, without its

direct control. For example, in 1702, the High Court of the Admiralty was empowered

to judge prize cases. In 1708 under the Cruiser’s Act, Queen Anne waived her rights to

droits of the Crown; captors would receive all the value of their prizes. In 1709, a regulation provided that all prizes of holders of commissions or letters must be brought

before the High Court of the Admiralty. Finally, in 1739, the lords of the Admiralty

required that the judge of the High Court of the Admiralty hear all prize cases.17

One major cause for the sudden rise in piracy during the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries was the passage of the British Navigation Acts in 1651. These directed that

goods could be brought into England or English possessions only by English ships or

by ships of the countries where the goods originated.18 As a result, foreign tobacco and

other agricultural products imported on English ships could be sold in England and its

colonies at low prices. The same goods imported on non-English ships were charged

with additional duties.

Rejecting this monopoly, many merchants in the American colonies traded with privateers, often with the knowledge and tacit support of local officials. Undoubtedly, many

privateers could really be considered pirates, since they did not take their spoils back to

England to be divided, as they were required to do. In cities and towns all along the

Atlantic coast, privateer loot was “imported” in defiance of the Navigation Acts: “Very

often the same merchants and officials who furnished the illegal market for privateer

plunder also outfitted expeditions in exchange for guaranteed shares in a ship’s loot.”19

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land’s coastline that one official described the region as being in a “state of war.”2

A second reason behind the upsurge in piracy was the War of the Spanish Succes

(1702–13), between England and Spain. During that conflict privateering was leg

long as the privateer had a valid commission. If it was lost, privateers could expe

be treated as pirates. This was the cause of William Dampier’s sojourn in a Dutch

prison as an accused pirate.21 In May 1720, Captain Shelvocke risked drowning to

reboard his sinking ship Speedwell to retrieve his “commission scroll and the che

taining eleven hundred dollars of the owners’ money.”22

Spain and England signed a peace treaty in 1713, but thousands of privateers refu

quit and instead became pirates. There was especially stiff competition to contro

lucrative resources of the Caribbean. By 1715 an estimated two thousand pirates 

ated out of Nassau, preying on Spanish galleons carrying gold and silver back to

Europe. The profits that could be made from even one successful attack were eno

mous. Piracy reached a peak during the ten years between 1716 and 1725, a perio

called “the Golden Age of Piracy.” It was “during those decades [that] the world e

enced the most intense outbreak of seaborne banditry ever recorded.”23

Many pirates began to focus on the lucrative trade between England and its Nort

American colonies. James Logan, colonial secretary of Pennsylvania, estimated in 

that “there were at least fifteen hundred pirates cruising at any one time off the c

North America and that no one could travel safely by ship.”24 During this period, 

reached new heights, including the infamous exploits of Edward Thatch (or Teac

alias Blackbeard the Pirate, who was finally killed in 1718, and Captain Bartholom

Roberts, who reportedly pirated some four hundred ships during just “three year

looting and burning” before he was finally captured and executed.25

The Royal Navy responded to the piracy threat by setting up convoys to protect m

chant ships, or even offering—for a hefty fee—to transport cargo on its warships

ertheless, it proved extraordinarily difficult to track down and eliminate the pira

There was simply too much money in piracy, and “the profit to be made from su

convoy duty made many Royal Navy captains less than zealous to destroy the pir

who were the indirect source of their profits.”26 It took a concerted effort by nava

authorities to suppress piracy; only by 1725 had the most infamous pirates been 

tured and hanged.

Competing colonial powers continued to use privateers to supplement their nava

forces against enemies. Weak governments often turned to privateers. For examp

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2,500 privateers, and “the Americans captured 2,300 prizes from the British, losing

fewer than half that number to the enemy.” Later still, during the War of 1812, American privateers played a major role; the “U.S. brig Yankee, for example, was credited with

destroying or capturing some five million dollars’ worth of English shipping and cargo

during that time.”27 Sometimes privateering and blockade could work hand in hand:

from 1793 to 1796, some 2,100 British ships were seized by French privateers even

while the British fleet blockaded France.

Once a state could build up and maintain its own navy, it was very dangerous for the

government to allow “independent” armed naval forces to persist. In such circumstances, as Lord Nelson put it, “all privateers are no better than pirates.”28 Governments

began to justify the use of naval force against pirates. By this time Western European

countries had largely established their global spheres of influence, and suppressing

piracy was now in their economic interest. By the nineteenth century, with superior

firepower, better charts, and steam-powered ships, governments would be better able to

police the seas and curb piracy.

Privateering, for its part, continued during the 1700s but slowly petered out after the

final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, as neutral countries took greater exception to the

prospect of their own trade being attacked in war. By the mid-1800s, privateering was

no longer practiced by the major naval powers. With the growth of the Industrial Revo

lution, colonial empires, and global trade, most states agreed that attacks on commerce

should be a last resort of states and should not be undertaken at all by private individu

als for personal profit. In the 1856 Declaration of Paris, major naval powers—with the

United States a notable exception—agreed that privateering should be outlawed.

Piracy in International Law and Practice

Another factor influencing the ability of states to respond to piracy comprised efforts

to limit the freedom of the seas. This trend began in the late 1700s, when the newly

founded United States of America became the first nation-state to extend its claim as

sovereign territory to three miles offshore. Thomas Jefferson, as secretary of state,

argued in 1793: “The greatest distance [of the outer boundary of territorial waters] to

which any respectable assent among nations has at any time been given is the extent of

human sight, estimated upward of twenty miles, and the smallest distance, I believe,

claimed by any nation whatever, is the utmost range of a cannon ball, usually stated at

one sea league.”29 The “cannon-shot rule” declared that the ability to exert naval power

over a coastal area was sufficient to establish a property interest in its marine resources

such as fish stocks or pearls.30 The area within the three-mile limit, however, was not

private property but would be administered by each state as a common natural

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considered maritime crime, not piracy.

Many countries followed the American lead. The three-mile limit largely remain

effect worldwide until 1945, when President Harry Truman issued a unilateral pr

mation that natural resources in the waters, the subsoil, and the seabed of the co

nental shelf adjacent to the United States were subject to its jurisdiction and con

Truman’s decision was motivated by the discovery of offshore oil deposits and th

anticipated surge in postwar resource demands. It was unlikely that private comp

would invest if mineral rights were disputed or rich fishing grounds could not be

secured.

The United States having established a new standard for enclosing the seas, sever

countries rapidly followed suit. In 1946, Argentina claimed control of its contine

shelf, which extends beyond two hundred miles, and of the seas above it. In 1947

and Peru extended their jurisdictions to two hundred miles, as did Ecuador in 19

1948, Iceland declared conservation zones beyond its three-mile limit out to the 

of its continental shelf and then in 1949 unilaterally invoked a “headland to head

rule, which in 1958 became a self-declared twelve-mile territorial sea. In 1976, Ic

adopted a two-hundred-mile limit on maritime resources.

The process of increasing state jurisdiction continued around the oceans of the w

In an attempt to negotiate a single international standard for the continental she

1958 the United Nations convened in Geneva the First Conference on the Law of 

Seas. Amid growing concerns over the possible privatization or militarization of 

seabed, the UN General Assembly in 1968 established the Committee on the Pea

Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdicti

1970, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the committee’s Declaration o

ciples, which states that “the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, bey

the limits of national jurisdiction . . . as well as the resources of the area are the c

mon heritage of mankind,” and should be reserved for peaceful purposes, not to 

subjected to national appropriation, explored, or exploited except in accordance 

an international regime to be established.31

The UN, recognizing that the many problems of ocean space were interrelated an

needed to be considered as a whole, also decided to convene a new conference to 

pare a single, comprehensive treaty. This new treaty was to encompass all aspects 

establishment of a regime and machinery for the high seas and seabed, the contin

shelf, and territorial sea. Adding pressure to the diplomatic efforts, a series of “C

Wars” between Britain and Iceland ensued after Iceland adopted a fifty-mile terri

sea limit in 1972. British warships rammed Icelandic coast guard vessels and shot 

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broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

In 1974, the UN convened the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. By 1982, it had

produced a treaty for international ratification. Among its many provisions, the treaty

grants coastal states the right to declare sovereign rights and resource control over an

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up to two hundred nautical miles off their coastlines.

In the case of countries bordering semienclosed seas, like the South China Sea, in such

a way that their EEZ claims overlap, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea 1982 calls for establishing joint resource-management areas and provides guidelines for doing so, even where conflicting territorial claims are unresolved. The treaty

entered into force in November 1994.32 To date, 155 countries have signed this agreement. Also to date, the U.S. Senate has declined to ratify it, although the U.S. Navy

largely adheres to its provisions.

In accordance with the principles of the 1982 convention, many coastal countries

have asserted greater management control over their newly acquired EEZs.33 Most

recently, in April 2008, the UN agreed to the proposed outer limits of Australia’s

continental shelf, increasing the size of that shelf from 8,200,000 square kilometers to

over 10,700,000. By the early twenty-first century, the early tradition of the freedom of

the seas had been thoroughly circumscribed by an ocean enclosure movement sanctioned by the United Nations. This in turn has substantially affected how states deal

with piracy.

Data on piracy are often limited to statistics on attacks on commercial shipping, as

recorded by the international shipping industry. Sea robbery and violence toward fishing boats, yachts, and recreational ships are usually excluded. Given these reporting

limitations, one must view the figures on frequency and trends in piracy with consider

able caution.

The two major methodologies used in reporting piracy reflect the various priorities of

international organizations and commercial enterprises. The International Maritime

Organization (IMO) is an agency of the United Nations, while the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce and repre

sents the shipping industry. Their divergent definitions of piracy are summarized in

table 1.34 The existence of two approaches to defining and reporting piracy often causes

confusion about the scale and types of attacks. Further, it inhibits the development of

effective policy responses.

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Of the two, the IMO methodology conforms more closely to the international le

view about piracy; nonetheless, the most widely used source of data on piracy is 

IMB. For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and armed robbery as 

act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to co

theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in 

furtherance of that act. This definition thus covers actual or attempted attacks

whether the ship is berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded unless t

thieves are armed.”35

A compilation of Asian piracy attacks is detailed in table 2. Notably, the 2007 IM

annual report finds that “over the last five years, there has been a significant drop 

incidents reported in Indonesia, where in 2003, there were 121 reported incident

in 2007, there have been only forty-three incidents.”36

However, when the summary data are disaggregated, there is significant volatility 

piracy from year to year and from place to place. Many factors might explain the

anomalies. IMB director Eric Ellen once estimated that half or more of all incide

piracy go unreported: “The problem is that the industry does not want incidents

reported,” he said. “They don’t want their reputations scarred. Shippers fear that 

cial investigations will delay shipments, increase insurance premiums, prompt

demands for higher pay by nervous crews, and raise questions about their credib

among clients who can switch carriers at a moment’s notice.”37

The IMB also estimates that these statistics do not include more than half of all p

attacks on commercial vessels generally. For instance, attacks on fishing boats an

IMO IMB

Piracy must be committed on the high seas or in a place

outside the jurisdiction of any state. A criminal attack with

weapons on ships within territorial waters is an act of

armed robbery and not piracy.

Distinctions do not exist between attacks on the high 

and in territorial waters.

Piracy necessitates a “two ship” requirement. Pirates need

to use a ship to attack another ship. This excludes mutiny

and privateering from acts of piracy.

A “two ship” requirement is abolished. Attacks from 

even from the quay are acts of piracy.

Piracy is committed for private ends. This excludes acts of

terrorism and environmental activism.

Piracy may not only be committed for private ends. A

on a ship for political or environmental reasons quali

piracy.

Because pirate attacks have to be committed by the crew or

passengers of privately owned vessels, attacks by naval

craft fall outside the bounds of piracy.

The acts of government naval craft can be deemed a

in certain circumstances.

Contrast between the IMO and IMB Definitions of Piracy

Source: Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Introduction: Southeast Asian Piracy: Research and Developments,” in Piracy, Ma

Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 20

p. xiii.

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small craft are “rarely reported.”38 Additionally, many kidnappings of crew members of

commercial vessels also are kept secret.39 Shipmasters may be reluctant to report piracy

attempts because they might reflect poorly on them. An investigation would take time

and disrupt the ship’s schedule, thus incurring substantial costs of delay. The data are

further confounded by the IMB practice of reporting both attempted and actual attack

and of failing to distinguish between attacks at sea and theft from ships at anchor.

For all of these reasons, it has been extremely difficult to detect and measure piracy,

calculate its true costs, and determine how best to prevent it. The existing piracy data

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

China* 28 18 38 13 13 6 2 – 2

Indonesia 49 10 22 33 57 47 60 115 119

Malacca Strait 7 5 3 2 3 0 1 2 75

Malaysia†

2 0 4 5 5 4 10 18 21

Myanmar 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 5

Philippines 5 0 5 24 39 16 15 6 9

Singapore 0 0 3 2 2 5 1 14 5

Thailand 0 0 0 4 16 17 2 5 8

South China Sea 6 31 6 3 2 6 5 3 9

Vietnam 0 0 2 4 0 4 0 2 6

TOTAL 97 64 83 90 138 107 96 166 259

Piracy Reports, South China Sea Region, 1992–2008

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

China* – – 1 3 4 1 0 0

Indonesia 91 103 121 94 79 50 43 28

Malacca Strait 17 16 28 38 12 11 7 2

Malaysia†

19 14 5 9 3 10 9 10

Myanmar 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

Philippines 8 10 12 4 0 6 6 7

Singapore 7 5 2 8 7 5 3 6

Thailand 8 5 2 4 1 1 2 0

South China Sea 4 0 2 8 6 1 3 0

Vietnam 8 12 15 4 10 3 5 11

TOTAL 165 165 188 173 122 88 78 65

Source: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Reporting Centre, Piracy and Armed Robbery against

Ships, Annual Reports, Actual and Attempted Attacks.

* Includes Hong Kong, Macau, Hainan; excludes East China Sea.

† 1995–2002 Malaysia data from J. N. Mak, Incidents at Sea: Shipjacking, Maritime Muggings, Thefts

and Illegal Migration in Southeast Asia (Maritime Institute of Malaysia), available at http://www

.southchinasea.org/docs/JMMak-piracy.pdf.

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based upon them. This makes evaluation of piracy and maritime crime through 

of historical case studies particularly useful.

Comparative Historical Analysis

As we have seen, sovereign nations have sought to extend their maritime territor

claims as population growth, market demand, and technology extended their eco

and political interests at sea. Today, however, major naval powers and commercia

ping stakeholders are at the same time attempting to preserve the freedom of the 

and free access to archipelagic waterways, to benefit commercial vessels, free trad

warship transit. Between these two policy domains, piracy has continued to flour

The historical case studies presented in this work investigate nineteenth- and twent

century piracy in East Asia and the South China Sea, South and Southeast Asia, a

Africa to gain a greater understanding of how best to counter the piracy threat.

The first chapter, “A Modern History of the International Legal Definition of Pir

preliminary to the three sets of essays that follow, is devoted to a legal analysis of 

various definitions of piracy. Commander Penny Campbell, Royal Australian Nav

argues that whereas the accepted international definition of piracy has changed v

little over time, various international organizations’ working definitions of pirac

been altered, the better to combat the threat. As a result, the maritime communit

seems destined to have to balance several conflicting definitions of piracy, makin

choices that can often mean the difference among “marine insurance coverage, su

ful prosecution in a domestic court, or international cooperation in such things 

piracy patrols through the Malacca Strait.”

Part 1 examines piracy in East Asia and the South China Sea. Robert J. Antony op

this investigation in “Piracy on the South China Coast through Modern Times.” 

nese history, the execution of pirates was commonplace; during the late eighteen

tury officials along the coast could summarily execute pirates immediately after t

Today in China, most of the large-scale professional piracy syndicates have move

southward to the waters around Indonesia and the Malacca Strait, although “man

dicate bosses still hail from Hong Kong and Macau.”

Bruce A. Elleman evaluates in “The Taiping Rebellion, Piracy, and the Arrow War

Chinese piracy threatened to undermine British trade, especially during the early 

when the Taiping Rebellion broke out in China. The origins of the Arrow War (1

60) revolved around piracy suppression; new treaties signed after the war obtaine

nese cooperation in suppressing piracy and granted the British expanded rights “

operate in Chinese waters against pirates.”

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the wake of World War II, when the traditional European security providers had been

sapped by six years of constant warfare, piracy rapidly increased throughout the region

In particular, during the period of decolonization new countries were not overly concerned with suppressing piracy, which they all too often saw as a “patriotic reaction

against global commerce. So the international machinery for suppressing piracy

became largely impotent, and cases of piracy soared.”

In chapter 5, David Rosenberg examines the political economy of piracy in the South

China Sea. Piracy in the South China Sea has increased substantially in the past two

decades, accounting for approximately half of the world’s incidents since the 1990s.

Due to continuing territorial disputes, however, no durable burden-sharing system

exists. To date, “regional states and shippers have yet to put aside their individual stake

holder interests and then negotiate and implement an effective regional maritime

antipiracy security system. Unfortunately, it may take an event equivalent to the 11

September 2001 attacks on the United States, a spectacular collision, or a devastating

oil spill to overcome contending stakeholder interests and institutional inertia and to

galvanize the political will needed for effective antipiracy security measures.”

Part 2 presents four case studies examining piracy in South and Southeast Asia. In the

sixth chapter, Bruce Elleman examines the looting and rape of Vietnamese “boat people.” Beginning soon after the end of the Vietnam War, approximately three million

people—many of Chinese heritage—fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Those who

fled by sea became known as “boat people.” Many Southeast Asians felt threatened by

this influx and looked the other way when local pirates began to prey on “boat people.”

However, piracy was allowed to get out of control, at which point it “was no longer the

realm of occasional pirates but of professionals, many of whom now preyed as well on

unsuspecting international shipping, thereby dramatically increasing overall cases of

piracy within the region.”

Catherine Zara Raymond analyzes piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Strait in

chapter 7. Once the most pirate-infested area in the world, with seventy-five reported

attacks in 2000, in 2007 the Malacca Strait saw only three successful and four attempted

attacks by pirates out of the ninety thousand vessels transiting the strait that year.

While antipiracy measures already in place should keep pace with the changing nature

of piracy in the waterway, at the same time: “Lessons learned in the fight against piracy

in the Malacca Strait should be applied to other regions to make these waters more

secure. . . . [I]t is time for it to be held up as an example to the rest of the world of how

piracy can successfully be reduced.”

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lems in Bangladesh, Chittagong was recently labelled by the IMB as the “most da

ous port in the world,” a characterization that produced little international react

because Chittagong does not sit astride major sea-lanes. In fact, Bangladesh is aff

by varying types of piracy; in some areas pilfering ship supplies—including rope 

zinc anodes—predominates, while in others stealing fishing boats or kidnapping 

men is more common. Over time, however, both the number of attacks and the l

violence have generally increased. Piracy in Bangladesh might one day impact int

tional trade throughout the region: “Attacks on simple fishing boats in Banglade

might in time grow to piracies against supertankers.”

In the final case study in part 2, Sam Bateman discusses maritime crime in South

Asian waters. Changes in the nature of maritime crime have occurred over the ye

due in part to declines in fish stocks and loss of access to traditional fishing grou

which have led to unemployment and loss of income in coastal villages througho

Southeast Asia. Piracy and sea robbery should be viewed not in isolation, therefo

as part of a continuum of maritime crime that also includes smuggling, illegal fis

and unlawful pollution of the marine environment. In that light, “there remains 

damental need for international cooperation to redress the underlying causes of 

and maritime criminality in the region, such as depressed social conditions, pove

and unemployment.”

Part 3 offers four cases connected to African piracy, starting with Robert F. Turne

study “President Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates.” While Jefferson was 

nature a peaceful man, when faced with the threat of uncontrolled piracy against

American ships his response was to use the nation’s new naval forces to face dow

destroy the pirates. Two-thirds of the American navy was sent to attack from the 

addition, General William Eaton’s bold invasion against Tripoli over land forced 

Karamanli to abandon his attempts to extract tribute from the United States. Follo

the American victory, European governments quickly announced their own refusa

continue paying tribute, and “centuries of terror on the high seas soon came to an 

Andrew Lambert’s chapter, “The Limits of Naval Power: The Merchant Brig Thre

ters, Riff Pirates, and British Battleships,” shows how fifty years after the U.S. war

against the Barbary pirates, Britain faced a similar threat from Riff pirates preyin

major Mediterranean trade route. The Riff pirates could have been stopped only 

substantial deployment of naval forces and troops ashore, which, however, would 

risked complex and dangerous frictions connecting Britain, France, and Spain wi

Morocco, Algeria, and Gibraltar. Instead of attacking the pirates, therefore, the B

helped the Moroccan state to assert greater control. An effective Moroccan custo

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piracy. One enduring lesson of this case study is that “because pirates—like all other

people—must live on the land, it is on the land that they must often be stopped; naval

power alone is not sufficient to fight piracy.”

Arild Nodland, in “Guns, Oil, and ‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea,”

addresses contemporary piracy in Nigeria. Since 1990, oil firms have invested more

than US$20 billion in exploration and production activity in Africa, with another $50

billion on the way. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has a serious and

growing piracy problem over the control of “cake,” government-owned resources. Loca

initiatives to fight piracy include a proposed “Gulf of Guinea Guard Force,” while the

recent establishment of AFRICOM, the U.S. Africa Command, is a clear sign of American interest in fighting piracy. However, Nigeria’s systemic problems can only be solved

by “balanc[ing] its security needs and U.S. courtship with the interests of other significant players—notably China, the country’s large Muslim population, and other states

that might resent American meddling in the region’s internal and regional affairs.”

In chapter 13, Gary Weir evaluates piracy in the Horn of Africa. The recent increase in

piracy off the coast of Somalia is directly linked with the inability of local fishermen to

preserve their traditional fisheries, which are threatened by foreign fishing fleets, and

by the constant civil wars that serve to undermine domestic authority. On 22 April

2008, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States called for a United Nations

resolution to support nations determined to fight piracy off Somalia, and on 2 June

2008 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816 allowing international patrols

in Somali waters. But naval patrols merely address the symptoms of piracy, not the

cause. For Somalia, the real “solution to piracy is as local as the lost livelihood of a

pirate recruit in one of the Harardhere camps along the Somali coast, and as global as

Admiral Mullen’s international city at sea. If we can see the connection and act on it,

the region can once again find both the rule of law and a way to sustain itself.”

In a concluding chapter, the editors review all the historical cases studies in terms of

factors encouraging piracy, international shipping, and multilateral naval responses to

piracy. They evaluate the uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations with new

maritime technologies and within a wider range of modern national policy goals. A

comparative analysis of historical cases of piracy and maritime crime can stimulate

new and original thinking about an overlooked naval duty—the suppression of piracy.

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1. George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval

Times (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), pp. 54–55,

quoting W. Muir, The Caliphate: Its Rise,

Decline and Fall, rev. T. H. Weir (Edinburgh:

n.p., 1924), p. 205.

2. Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum: The Freedom of

the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs to the

Dutch to Take Part in the East Indian Trade,

trans. Ralph Van Deman Magoffin (New

York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1916), p. 28, published in the original Latin in 1608.

3. Ram P. Anand, Origin and Development of

the Law of the Sea (The Hague: Nijhoff,

1983), p. 83.

4. For the Iranun, Eduardo Ma. R. Santos, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the

Philippines,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism

and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham

Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 38. For the

Vietnamese and Chinese, Adam J. Young,

Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast

Asia: History, Causes and Remedies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

2007), chap. 2.

5. Reginald G. Marsden, Documents Relating to

Law and Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, 1205–1648

(London: Navy Records Society, 1915), pp.

38–41.

6. Ibid., pp. 126–27; 184–89.

7. David J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, U.K.:

Univ. of Exeter Press, 1990), p. 20.

8. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law and

Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, pp. 136–38, 221–22.

9. P. Kemp, The Oxford Companion to Ships and

the Sea (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,

1988), pp. 86, 615.

10. Reginald G. Marsden, Documents Relating to

Law and Custom of the Sea, vol. 2, 1649–1767

(London: Navy Records Society, 1916), pp.

13–14, 289.

11. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the

Eighteenth Century, pp. 13, 20.

12. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law and

Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, p. 19.

13. J. R. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Longman,

1996), p. 29.

14. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law 

Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, p. 19; Janice 

Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and S

eigns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni

1994), p. 23.

15. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law 

Custom of the Sea, vol. 1, p. 20.

16. Ibid.; Starkey, British Privateering En

in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 22–23;

P. K. Kemp, Prize Money: A Survey of 

tory and Distribution of the Naval Pri

(Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 19

p. 9.

17. Marsden, Documents Relating to Law 

Custom of the Sea, vol. 2, pp. 191–92, 

287–88; Nicholas Tracy, Attack on M

Trade (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Pre

1991), p. 11.

18. E. B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval H

2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti

Press, 1981), p. 17.

19. Frank Sherry, Raiders and Rebels: Th

Age of Piracy (New York: Hearst Mar

Books, 1986), pp. 24–25.

20. Cyrus H. Karraker, Piracy Was a Busi

(Rindge, N.H.: Richard R. Smith, 195

21. Christopher Lloyd, William Dampier 

don: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 21.

22. Kenneth Poolman, The Speedwell Vo

Tale of Piracy and Mutiny in the Eigh

Century (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Inst

Press, 1999), p. 82.

23. Sherry, Raiders and Rebels, p. 7.

24. Ibid., p. 212.

25. Karraker, Piracy Was a Business, p. 21

26. Sherry, Raiders and Rebels, p. 216.

27. Ibid., p. 360.

28. A. G. Course, Pirates of the Western S

(London: Frederick Muller, 1969), p. 

29. Anand, Origin and Development of th

of the Sea, p. 139.

30. John Joy, “The Cannon-Shot Rule an

clusive Economic Zones,” Navigator 

available at www.wob.nf.ca/ (accesse

vember 2005).

31. “Declaration of Principles Governing 

Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the

Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits o

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and Policy, www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/LOS

-Resolution-2749.pdf.

32. “United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea 1982,” available at www.un.org/Depts/

los/index.htm.

33. J. N. Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,”

in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing

the Malacca Straits, ed. Ong-Webb, p. 140.

34. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in

Southeast Asia.

35. International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual

don: International Maritime Bureau, 2007),

p. 3.

36. Ibid., p. 24.

37. Phillippe Moulier, “Pirates? What Pirates?”

US News & World Report, 23 June 1997.

38. Carolin Liss, “Private Military and Security

Companies in the Fight against Piracy,” in

Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the

Malacca Straits, ed. Ong-Webb.

39. Stefan Eklöf, “Political Piracy and Maritime

Terrorism: A Comparison between the

Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines,” in ibid., p. 55.

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A Modern History of the International Lega

Definition of Piracy

PENNY CAMPBELL

The definition of piracy is discussed at length. . . . It suffices here 

advance warning of the great variety of opinions as to the scope o

term and to emphasize the important difference between piracy i

sense of the law of nations and piracy under municipal law.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 

This cautious introduction to the Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy, written i

by some of America’s most eminent jurists, shows just how important they thoug

varying definitions of piracy could be.1

This warning holds as true today as it did 

For example, the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Cente

reported a total of 263 acts or attempted acts against shipping in 2007, an overall

increase of approximately 10 percent over the previous year.2

Over the same repo

period, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) received 282 reports of a

or attempted attacks, which was a 17 percent increase over the previous year.3

Me

while, the more Asia-focused group Regional Cooperation Agreement on Comba

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) reported “that the pi

and armed robbery situation in Asia had improved significantly in the last year w

reduction in the total number of reported incidents from 135 in 2006 to 100 in 2

Which report is correct? Could they all be correct? Given piracy’s obvious impor

it is surprising that there remains little or no agreement on how many attacks oc

every year. Different definitions also produce different estimates of losses due to 

While many contemporary sources would appear to agree that piracy costs the in

tional shipping community many billions of dollars per year, it has been extreme

ficult to identify or capture all costs associated with this illegal activity; for exam

the International Chamber of Commerce loosely estimates the cost of piracy to w

trade at US$16 billion annually, of which four billion is attributable solely to atta

the Malacca Strait.5

CHAPTER ONE

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losses, not the least of them that many piratical acts are simply never reported to

authorities. However, another key reason, and the focus of this chapter, is that arriving

at a common definition of piracy under international law can sometimes present just

as much a challenge as combating it in the first place. As a result, acts of piracy and

armed robbery at sea can be reported very differently, depending on the legal

definitions applied.

Piracy as a Universal Crime Sui Generis

Pirates “are peculiarly obnoxious because they maraud upon the open seas, the great

highway of all maritime nations. So heinous is the offence considered, so difficult are

such offenders to apprehend, and so universal is the interest in their prompt arrest and

punishment, they have long been regarded as outlaws and the enemies of all mankind.”

Because of this link between a violent act committed on the “great highway of all maritime nations” and the view that the seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any one state,

piracy has long been regarded as a universal crime—that is, as sui generis.

In the Lotus decision in 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice recognized

that piracy was a crime against the law of nations. The Permanent Court had been

asked to adjudicate on whether Turkey could exercise criminal jurisdiction over the

Lotus’s French officer of the watch for a collision with a Turkish steamer on the high

seas. In seeking to deny Turkey jurisdiction over the matter, France argued that the

flag state of the vessel had exclusive jurisdiction over the incident.7

The Permanent

Court rejected this argument but reaffirmed the “elemental” principle that all

nations—and hence their flagged vessels—have equal rights to the “uninterrupted use

of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation,” a view harking back to

the seventeenth-century Grotian dictum of the freedom of the high seas. The only

exception to this freedom in peacetime was in the case of piracy or extraordinary cases

of self-defense: “Piracy by law of nations,” noted the court, “in its jurisdictional

aspects, is sui generis.”8

While some aspects of the court’s decision were controversial at the time, no eminent

jurist challenged its characterization of piracy as sui generis—an offense against the

law of all nations. The reasoning behind this characterization dates back to 1608, when

the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius published Mare Liberum [Freedom of the Seas]. In it he

argued that as the seas are vast and fluid, they cannot be controlled or defended by any

state against another in the same way that land territory can be. As a state generally has

the means to defend its immediate coastal waters, it thus has the ability to exercise

jurisdiction over a narrow coastal belt of sea. But beyond that limited range, Grotius

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diction over them.9

Accordingly, any illegal acts such as piracy committed on the high seas must likew

beyond the jurisdiction of one state. Instead, jurisdiction over a piratical act is ve

all states. This notion of universal jurisdiction is a unique concept in internation

International law usually allows states to exercise jurisdiction over their own terr

or over crimes committed by their own nationals wherever committed. In all oth

cases, a state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over another state’s territory or nati

is extremely limited.

Piracy, however, is an exception by which the jurisdiction of a state’s municipal la

permitted to extend over the high seas and over any national, because by engagin

act of piracy the pirate has placed himself beyond the protection of any state. As 

perpetrator of an act contrary to international law, a pirate will find himself trea

an outlaw, an enemy of all mankind, hostis humani generis. Thus, for both practic

theoretical reasons, any state may, “in the interest of all,” take appropriate action

against that perpetrator. However, defining exactly what constitutes a “piratical a

never been easy, and it was centuries before a single definition was accepted.

Moving Toward a Single Definition of Piracy

In the early years of the twentieth century, when the international community w

moving toward codifying aspects of international law, piracy was just one of a nu

of subjects that seemed worthy of international regulation. In 1927, the same yea

the Lotus case, a subcommittee report of the League of Nations found that the un

tled state of the concept of piracy was due to failure to distinguish between pirac

international legal sense and piracy as proscribed under the municipal laws and

statutes of individual states.

Agreeing to an international definition of piracy meant limiting each and every s

jurisdiction over piracy, as a universal crime, to that conduct reflecting all—and 

those elements. The problem with maritime crimes on the high seas as defined b

international law is that international law has no means of trying or punishing th

That body of law merely provides a generally accepted definition under which on

may act to suppress or punish piracy without condemnation from another state 

acting out of turn. Of course, there is nothing to prevent states from incorporati

international-law definition into their municipal criminal codes, including any v

tions they might desire from that internationally agreed definition, provided they 

not then exercise that municipal jurisdiction within an international setting.

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the seas for private ends without authorization from the Government of any State with

the object of committing depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons.” Nevertheless, despite this fairly concise view, the report concluded that “it would

be preferable for the Committee to adopt a clear definition of piracy applicable to all

States in virtue of international law in general.”10

Though it had now been established in an international tribunal that piracy constitutes

a crime against the law of all nations, it was usually under municipal law that a piratica

act would be prosecuted. Sometimes a domestic court was asked to consider the international, rather than the domestic, legal position on piracy. This was the case when in

1934, following a superior—and ultimate—Hong Kong Supreme Court decision, the

United Kingdom’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was asked whether “actual

robbery” formed an essential element of the offense of piracy in international law.11

The Hong Kong Court had concluded it did.

In arriving at the opposite conclusion, the Privy Council conceded that in embarking

upon international law it had been “to a great extent in the realm of opinion” and permitted itself “to select what appear to be the better views upon the question.”12 Their

lordships canvassed earlier judgments, including the “sheet anchor” decision of

Dawson, for those that considered sea robbery as piracy. Equating sea robbery with

piracy, however, results in a definition both too wide and too narrow. Too wide, because i

would be ludicrous to contemplate a situation where, the court suggested, one cruiseline passenger committing a petty theft against another could be guilty of a crime carrying the death penalty; such an act would not be considered piracy under the modern

definition in any event, as the act was committed within the one ship, and not by one

vessel against another. Too narrow, because many a heinous crime could be committed

on the high seas, and it would be an anathema to the law of nations if such an act were

considered piracy only if the perpetrator “stole, say, an article worth sixpence.” The

Privy Council ultimately concluded that the definition of piracy had gradually widened

over the centuries, in part because international law is a “living and expanding code.”13

At about the same time that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council determined

that actual robbery is not an essential element of piracy, the Supreme Court of the

Philippines arrived at a contrary view. In People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, the Court found

that piracy was robbery and that because piracy had no jurisdictional limits, it could be

committed within the jurisdictional three-mile limit of a coastal state. Such a conclusion was based more on an interpretation of the Spanish penal code than on a proper

examination of international law.14 In any event, the Court referred to the opinion of

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and he [Grotius] has never been disputed.”15

Obviously, a state’s domestic law would seek to extend the principle of territorial 

diction over its nationals, and this has often had the effect of broadening the inte

tional law definition of piracy. For example, in English common law until the mi

fourteenth century, piracy was punishable as a petit treason if committed by a sub

and as a felony if committed by a foreigner. Likewise, the Slave Trade Act of 1825 

vided that British subjects who carried or conveyed a person on board a ship for 

purpose of bringing him or her as a slave to any place would be guilty of piracy.16

It is entirely appropriate for the municipal interpretation of piracy in its internat

sense to incorporate these other elements, but those laws would only be valid as a

the state’s own nationals or against foreigners committing the wider category of 

cal acts within that state’s territory. It would not enable a state to seek to exercise 

universal jurisdiction of piracy sui generis on the high seas against a foreigner.

From the early twentieth century onward, there was no common understanding 

nations on the basic definition of piracy at the domestic level. The only thing tha

tually all nations agreed on was that piracy was an international crime granting t

universal jurisdiction. In 1932, a committee put together by Harvard University t

resolve these fundamental differences in definition.

The Harvard Draft

In 1932, the Harvard Research Group, a group of American academics headed by 

fessor Joseph Bingham of Stanford University, met to address these weighty pirac

questions. In a voluntary undertaking, they produced a draft convention, widely

referred to as simply “the Harvard Draft,” that contained nineteen articles on pir

with associated commentary.17 The Harvard Draft is noteworthy for two main re

First, it was an impressive undertaking, analyzing the contemporary views of pir

espoused by numerous municipal courts and eminent jurists. It thus provides an 

lent snapshot of the concept of piracy at that time. Second, and perhaps more im

tant, the Harvard Draft became a foundational text for the piracy provisions ulti

agreed to in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For thes

sons, it is illuminating to consider it carefully.

The first article of the Harvard Draft deals with jurisdiction. Article 1 sets the fra

work for the draft convention, affirming that in this context “jurisdiction” is that

granted to states by international law, not by states to themselves in a domestic sp

Article 1 also defines the “high seas” as any part of the sea not included in the ter

rial waters of any state.

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Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any

state:

1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison, or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends without bona

fide purposes of asserting a claim of right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or

from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an attack which starts from on

board ship, either that ship or another ship which is involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character.

2. Any act or voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts which make

it a pirate ship.

3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2

of this article.18

There are some important elements in this definition of piracy. First, it should be noted

that the Harvard Group agreed with the Privy Council that an intention to rob (animu

furandi) is not an essential element of the offense. However, if an act at sea is to constitute piracy, it must involve some element of violence or depredation.

Second, an act of violence at sea can only be considered to be piracy if it is committed

for “private ends.” This requirement has caused much debate and continues to have

repercussions for states seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction over particular acts at

sea. The term “private ends” is not defined, but it seems in this context that the Harvard Research Group intended to draw a distinction between acts committed by

“unrecognized insurgents against a foreign government who have pretended to exercise

belligerent rights on the sea against neutral commerce or privateers whose commissions violated the announced policy of the captor” and those by offenders acting for

private ends only.19 In the modern context, the phrase “for private ends” is usually

interpreted to distinguish piracy from state-sponsored violence or from terrorism,

which is considered to have ideological, not private, ends.

Third, piracy occurs only when the act is committed on or from the sea or in or from

the air against a ship. Thus, an uprising by a crew against its own ship and master cannot be considered piracy, as it is not directed from one ship against another. This would

be classified as the crime of mutiny, which would not qualify as a crime against mankind, punishable by all states. The label of piracy, however, would attach if “the success

ful mutineers then set out to devote the ship to accomplishment of further acts of

violence or depredation.”20 The requirement that more than one ship be involved is due

to “the insistence on some international factual element in the definition of piracy” in

order to exclude from the definition those offenses that “involve only ships and territory under the ordinary jurisdiction” of a single state.21

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cially noting the long association of piracy as a maritime crime. Often, internatio

law is criticized for not keeping up with the changing needs of states or reflecting

developments in technology. Conscious of the requirement to look to the future, 

Harvard Research Group noted that “with rapid advance in the arts of flying and 

sailing, it may not be long before bands of malefactors, who now confine their ef

to land, will find it profitable to engage in depredations in or from the air beyond 

torial jurisdiction.” Thus, attacks from the air were included for reasons of foresi

the Harvard Draft was not necessarily to reflect “only cases raised by present con

of business, the arts, and criminal operations.”22

However, perhaps because blimps and zeppelins never caught on, the article has 

condemned as a “virtually useless provision”; when applied to fixed-wing aviatio

practicalities involved in committing an act of violence from one aircraft against

another make it “something which defies the imagination unless one of the aircr

totally destroyed.”23 In the modern context, violent acts by one aircraft against an

aircraft would probably be dealt with under relevant aviation conventions and no

treated under the rubric of piracy.

Finally, and perhaps most important in the current geopolitical environment, un

this legal definition piracy can only occur on the high seas. The importance of th

erence to “high seas” has particular relevance in article 101 of the 1982 UN conve

because areas that were deemed high seas in 1932 had ceased to be characterized 

such some fifty years later. A casual read of any IMO piracy or armed-robbery re

will reveal that many more violent acts against shipping are committed in intern

territorial waters than on the high seas. The legal definition of piracy, therefore, c

determine which nation has the relevant jurisdiction or obligation to act to preve

and punish those acts.

Modern Definition under Law of the Sea Conventions

During the early 1950s, the International Law Commission was tasked by the UN 

eral Assembly to review the customary international law of the sea with a view to 

posing conventions to the international community. In preparing the articles on 

the commission was greatly assisted by the work of the Harvard Research Group 

was generally able to endorse the findings of that research.24

The International Law Commission drafted four conventions on various aspects 

law of the sea. These and the piracy articles ultimately agreed to in the 1958 Gen

Convention on the High Seas introduced some new elements into the definitio

the term.25

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Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by th

crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board

such ship or aircraft;

(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of

facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (1) or subpara

graph (2) of this article.

The first part of the definition of piracy was slightly more simple than the Harvard

Draft, requiring only that the act constitute any “acts of violence, detention or any act

of depredation.” These acts were not further defined.

Subparagraph (1) introduced two new concepts. The first was that piracy could only be

committed by the crew or passengers of a “private ship or private aircraft”—excluding,

therefore, acts committed by a government ship or warship or government aircraft or

warplanes. The International Law Commission was firmly of the view that piracy could

be committed only by private vessels and that to “assimilate unlawful acts committed

by warships to acts of piracy would be prejudicial to the interests of the international

community.”26 Indeed, article 16 of the 1958 convention stresses the point that acts of

piracy as previously defined, if “committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft[,] are

assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.”27

By removing piratical mutineers from the main definition of piracy and placing the

definition in article 16, the convention strengthened the two-ship—or two-aircraft—

requirement. Piracy will only occur when the relevant violent act originates in one vessel and is directed at another. An act of mutiny in itself would not qualify as piracy,

unless those mutineers go on to take action, for private ends, against another ship.

The second new concept in subparagraph (1) was the introduction of the “illegal.” The

word, which necessarily could be taken to imply that there existed acts of legalized violence on the high seas, was highly controversial. It is difficult to envisage “legal” forms

of violence committed by private ships. Of course, the laws of armed conflict permit

warships to exercise belligerent rights in times of conflict, but stricter limits on the

methods and means of warfare could render some belligerent acts “illegal.”

The commentary in the report of the International Law Commission noted the existence of the 1937 Nyon Arrangement, which condemned the sinking of a merchant

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change to the legal position that piracy could be committed only by private ships

commission noted the complexity of dealing with violent acts committed by war

or “rival governments” in a civil war, suggesting that there was no need to go bey

granting all states a general right to repress piracy perpetrated by private ships.28

Nevertheless, it seems clear that the introduction of the word “illegal” was intend

preserve the illegality of some naval acts of violence characterized as such under 

ent treaties, such as the Nyon Arrangement. Attempts to have the word “illegal”

removed in the negotiating conferences for the 1982 Convention on the Law of t

were defeated.29 The term “illegal” remains to this day.

There are few duties imposed in the 1958 convention. Notably, article 14 of the c

tion calls on all states to “co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repressio

piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State

Note, however, that the duty on states is to co-operate, not to act, in the prosecu

or prevention of piratical acts. Such a duty would be too onerous and would ru

risk that another state might seek to initiate proceedings if the first failed to act i

positive manner.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982

Although the International Law Commission contended that it had to consider c

controversial points, the definition of piracy it ultimately drafted was adopted, v

word for word, in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982

(UNCLOS). UNCLOS was opened for signature in 1982 and came into force on 

November 1994.

While the contemporary legal definition of piracy as expounded in article 101 of

UNCLOS is arguably representative of the position in international law, it is not 

out its difficulties. It has been argued that some of the limiting features of UNCL

have been derived from bias or errors contained in the Harvard Draft.30 For exam

the definition in article 101 mirrors article 15 in the 1958 Geneva Convention on 

High Seas, which relied in turn mainly on the Harvard Draft. While that definitio

the result of much compromise and debate in the negotiating conferences of the 

convention, it seems to have received little attention during the Third Conferenc

the Law of the Sea, which produced the draft text of UNCLOS.

Indeed, of the sixty declarations or reservations made by states parties to UNCLO

none dealt with piracy. However, other important law of the sea concepts debate

ing the three conferences did influence the effect of the piracy definition. As note

above, piracy can be considered as such only if it occurs on the high seas. Confus

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ward limits of a coastal state’s territorial sea—that is, typically beyond twelve nautical

miles from a coastal state’s baselines. The other, supported by article 86 of the convention, is that “high seas” refers to “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the

archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”31

This ambiguity arises because certain so-called high-seas freedoms are enjoyed by all

states in other states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs)—such as to exercise freedom of

navigation and to lay submarine cables. This potential legal vacuum covering piratical

acts on certain parts of the high seas is resolved by article 58(2), which states that articles 88 to 115, which cover piracy, and other pertinent rules of international law apply

to the exclusive economic zone insofar as they are not incompatible with Part V of

UNCLOS, which deals with the exploration and exploitation of resources. Thus, piracy

is a relevant act committed on the high seas as measured from the seaward limit of a

state’s territorial sea, now generally recognized as twelve nautical miles from shore.

The importance of the definition of high seas lies in the historical and legal lessening o

the high-seas area. The increasing demands of coastal states over their adjacent waters

led UNCLOS to recognize exclusive economic zones extending up to two hundred nautical miles from a coastline. The area of high seas available for the freedom of all was

vastly shrinking. Arguably, the stage on which pirates could act was likewise diminishing. The jurisdiction of coastal states over violent acts committed against shipping near

their coastlines was extending to a degree directly proportional to the decreasing spher

of international jurisdiction over those sui generis acts.

The import of this definition is that certain acts against shipping that had previously

been in the jurisdiction of all states now became mere criminal or civil offenses under

the coastal state’s municipal laws. The obligation on other states to cooperate in the

repression of piracy would not lead automatically to an obligation to assist in maritime

law enforcement tasks within territorial waters.32

As of 1 January 2008, 155 countries were parties to the 1982 convention, giving it near

universal ratification. Notably, the United States is not a party;33 recent government

announcements (in the previous and current administrations) suggest that this may

soon change.34 Nevertheless, the sheer weight of numbers now provides strong support

to the view that the convention’s provisions are representative of the customary international law of the sea and definition of piracy. However, it is not the only definition in

common use in the international shipping community.

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There is no organization under UNCLOS that is dedicated to monitoring or prev

piracy. In some UNCLOS provisions, though not in those relating to piracy, there 

mention of a “competent international organization.”35 It is widely accepted that 

a reference to the IMO, a UN specialized agency that predates UNCLOS. In its re

tory role of shipping, maritime security, and safety, the IMO has also taken an in

in piracy.

The IMO refers to both piracy and sea robbery in its reports. It uses the UNCLO

nition of piracy, but it defines “armed robbery against ships” as “any unlawful ac

violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an 

‘piracy,’ directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship

within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.”36 The IMO has urged governmen

cooperate with each other and the IMB with a view to combating maritime fraud 

coordinated manner.37

The International Maritime Bureau, in turn, is a specialized division of the Intern

tional Chamber of Commerce. It thus has a very commercial focus, and as mariti

crime can have a huge financial impact on the world’s shipping community, in 1

created a dedicated Piracy Reporting Center. For statistical purposes the IMB cho

not to use the relatively narrow UNCLOS definition of piracy. Instead, it speaks co

tively of “Piracy and Armed Robbery,” which it defines as “an act of boarding or

attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any oth

crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance o

act.”38 It is clear that this definition will cover any act of violence against a ship, w

that vessel is berthed in internal waters or under way on the high seas. The defini

thus crosses the jurisdictional boundary of international and domestic law.

Commercial interests affect the definition of piracy in yet another way. Various c

decisions seem to indicate that the international and relevant municipal legal def

tions of piracy are not applicable to cases involving the interpretation of marine 

ance provisions. In a United Kingdom decision in 1909, for example, the court h

that an attack on a government vessel transiting up the Amazon River was not pi

From a strictly international-law position, one would have to agree. But in findin

the particular marine insurance policy did not cover this attack, the court held th

word “pirates . . . must be construed in the popular sense and in a way businessm

would generally understand it.”39

The cumulative effect of the various “legal” definitions of piracy—both in intern

tional treaties and domestic legislation—and of the “working” definitions adopte

international agencies and marine insurers has been the broadening of both the

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are a large number of commercial and political reasons for this broadening, including

to pressure certain nations to improve their law enforcement efforts, especially in harbors and ports. However, the plethora of competing definitions of piracy has also

obfuscated the true extent of the problem, often making piracy look worse than it

really is.

Conclusions

The accepted international legal definition of piracy has changed little from the Harvard Draft of 1932. Even recent Security Council Resolutions dealing with piracy and

armed robbery off the coast of Somalia have not changed the accepted legal definition

of piracy as it is understood in UNCLOS. But as the maritime commercial environmen

and the modus operandi of sea bandits, however defined, have changed, the international community has responded by adopting various working definitions of these

threats against shipping, the better to combat them. Changing a definition in an international document like UNCLOS is an onerous and protracted business.

From a legal perspective, an international convention “codifying the international law

of piracy is not to unify throughout the various municipal laws of piracy, nor to provide uniform measures for punishing pirates, but to define this extraordinary basis of

state jurisdiction over offences committed by foreigners against foreign interests outside the territorial and other ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state.”40 Neverthe

less, the maritime community seems destined to have to balance several definitions of

piracy. Choice of a definition can mean the difference between the ability to obtain

marine insurance coverage, successful prosecution in a domestic court, or internationa

cooperation in such things as piracy patrols through the Malacca Strait. As the following case studies show, context will determine whether the courts (either domestic or

international), the boardroom, the Security Council, or the popular media will

ultimately prevail in this ongoing process.

Notes

1. “Part IV: Piracy,” American Journal of International Law 26, Supplement: Research in

International Law (1932) [hereafter Harvard

Draft], p. 749.

2. International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2007 (London:

International Maritime Bureau, 2008).

3. International Maritime Organization [hereafter IMO], First Quarterly Report, MSC.4/

Circ.105, 20 August 2007; Second Quarterly

Report, MSC.4/Circ.106, 18 September 2007

Third Quarterly Report, MSC.4/Circ.110, 7

December 2007; Fourth Quarterly Report,

MSC.4/Circ.114, 28 January 2008; all available at www.imo.org/.

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www.recaap.org/.

5. “The Shipping News: Combating Pirates and

the Threat of Terrorism,” APEC Currents

(September 2006).

6. Edwin Dickinson, “Is the Crime of Piracy

Obsolete?” Harvard Law Review 28 (1925), p.

358.

7. Lotus Case, Publications of the Permanent

Court of International Justice (1927), Series

A, no. 10.

8. Ibid., p. 62.

9. While the United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) recognized

the growing jurisdiction of coastal states

over their contiguous maritime zones, the

underlying Grotian philosophy is still preserved in articles dealing with high-seas

freedoms.

10. Report of the Sub-committee of the League of

Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, quoted

in Harvard Draft, p. 749.

11. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, In

re Piracy Jure Gentium 1934, reprinted in

American Journal of International Law 29

(1935), p. 141.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. The Penal Code of Spain, 1870, applied to

the Philippines (with minor amendments—

but none to the provisions dealing with piracy) and remained in force after the transfer

of the Philippines to the United States in

1898. It was thus the applicable municipal

law at the time.

15. The People of the Philippine Islands v. Lol-Lo

and Saraw, GR no. L-17958, 27 February

1922, as per Malcolm, J.

16. Stanley Morrison, “Part V: A Collection of

Piracy Laws of Various Countries,” American

Journal of International Law 26, Supplement:

Research in International Law (1932), p. 911.

17. Harvard Draft.

18. Ibid., art. 3.

19. Ibid., p. 798.

20. Ibid., p. 810.

21. Ibid., p. 807.

22. Ibid., p. 809.

Sea Piracy (Leiden, Neth.: E. J. Brill, 

52.

24. “Report of the International Law Co

sion to the General Assembly,” docum

2934, reprinted in United Nations, Y

of the International Law Commission 

York: International Law Commission

vol. 2, p. 25.

25. Entered into force 30 September 196

26. “Report of the International Law Co

sion to the General Assembly.”

27. “Convention on the High Seas,” 1958

United Nations Treaty Series 450, art

28. “Report of the International Law Co

sion to the General Assembly.”

29. Alfred Rubin, “Notes and Comments

racy Illegal?” American Journal of Int

tional Law 70 (1976), p. 93.

30. See, for example, Goldie’s argument 

Bingham’s policy choice to remove r

from universal jurisdiction saw the d

tion of piracy limited to acts for “pri

ends.” L. F. E. Goldie, “Terrorism, Pir

the Nyon Agreements,” in Internation

at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Hon

Shabtai Rosenne, ed. Yoram Dinstein 

Mala Tabory (Boston: Nijhoff, 1989)

31. “United Nations Convention on the 

the Sea 1982,” art. 86.

32. The 2007 IMB Piracy and Armed Rob

against Ships annual report records a 

decrease in the incidents reported in 

Malacca and Singapore straits, comm

“This welcome reduction has been th

mulative result of increased vigilance 

patrolling by the littoral states.” How

because of the restrictions of the def

of piracy under UNCLOS, this form 

ternational cooperation cannot be st

ascribed to the legal obligation to co

under article 100.

33. President Reagan refused to sign the 

because Part XI of UNCLOS, which 

the deep-seabed-mining regime and 

ternational Seabed Authority, was co

ered to be contrary to U.S. national i

(see President Ronald Reagan, “State

on United States Ocean Policy,” 10 M

1983, available at Oceanlaw.org). Th

Agreement Relating to the Implemen

of Part XI of the United Nations Law 

Sea repealed the convention’s manda

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U.S. concerns.

34. See “President’s Statement on Advancing

U.S. Interests in the World’s Oceans,” 15 May

2007, available at www.whitehouse.gov/.

“That starts with the Law of the Sea Convention, which President Obama and I are committed to ratifying . . . .” Hilary Clinton,

“Remarks at the Joint Session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Arctic Council, 50th Anniversary of the

Antarctic Treaty” (Washington, D.C., 6 April

2009).

35. See, for example, convention article 22, dealing with traffic separation schemes through

the territorial sea; article 60, dealing with

safety zones around artificial islands; article

119, dealing with exchange of scientific

high-seas fish stocks; article 208, dealing

with marine pollution; and so forth.

36. IMO, “Code of Practice for the Investigation

of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery

against Ships,” Resolution A.922(22), annex

para. 2.2.

37. IMO Resolution A.504 (XII), adopted 20

November 1981.

38. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.

39. Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company Limited [1909] 1 KB

785, in Donna Sinopoli, “Piracy: A Modern

Perspective,” Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 14 (1998), p. 25.

40. Harvard Draft, p. 760.

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PART ONE

Piracy in East Asia and the South China Sea

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Japan

CHINA

JAPAN SOUTH

KOREA

NORTH

KOREA

VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

TAIWAN

PHILIPPINES

EAST CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINE SEA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

EAST SEA

YELLOW SEA

WEST SEA

SEA OF JAPAN

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Piracy on the South China Coast through

Modern Times

ROBERT J. ANTONY

Piracy in China has deep historical roots, and it has continued through modern t

For example, on 28 January 2000, in Shanwei, a grisly sight, but one not uncomm

China, unfolded as thirteen men, hands bound, feet shackled, drunk, and singing

wildly, were led off by armed policemen to the execution ground—in this instanc

vacant field packed with gawking villagers, fishermen, soldiers, women, and child

At the designated spot the prisoners were lined up in single file and forced to kne

down. Then the executioners shot each man, one by one, once in the back of the 

and then again in the chest. Spectators gasped; some cried. Later, relatives came t

claim the blood-soaked bodies. As was the custom, officials charged them for the 

lets that had killed their family members.

The thirteen executed men were pirates. In November 1998, in the Taiwan Strait, 

had hijacked Cheung Son, a ten-thousand-ton bulk carrier loaded with furnace sl

bound for Malaysia. The pirates had brutally murdered the twenty-three crew m

after holding them hostage for ten days. Afterward, the corpses, weighted with en

parts, had been thrown overboard. After extensive police investigations in China

fifty persons were arrested. It is unclear why they had hijacked the ship; the cargo 

furnace slag was almost worthless, and the twenty-one-year-old ship was itself of 

value. It has been speculated that Cheung Son may have been used for smuggling 

nese weapons or perhaps illegal emigrants. After the hijacking, the ship was given 

identity and sold, first in China for US$36,000 and later to an unknown buyer in

Singapore for $300,000.

The court in Shanwei found thirty-eight men guilty of the piracy and sentenced 

teen of them to death. After sentencing, the local authorities duly noted, “Doom

arrives for ‘evil monsters’ of the sea,” and police immediately led the condemned 

off for execution. Among the condemned was one Weng Siliang, a Chinese busin

man who was said to have ordered the hijacking and killings. Also, an Indonesian

CHAPTER TWO

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Indonesian tycoon with close connections to the former Indonesian president Suharto.

No further arrests followed, however, and the case was closed.1

In Chinese history, the execution of pirates has been commonplace. In imperial China,

beheading was the chief form of capital punishment for piracy; in the most serious

cases—those involving the murder of officials or foreigners—the sentence was death by

slicing, the “lingering death.” So relentless had piracy become by the late eighteenth

century that the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–95) took the extraordinary step of allowing officials along the coast to execute pirates summarily, immediately after trial. As an

explicit warning to others, the severed heads were afterward displayed in public, usually

in port towns and fishing villages in the vicinity where the pirates had committed their

crimes. Hundreds, usually thousands, of convicted pirates were disposed of each year in

this manner. Today in China several thousand people annually receive the death penalty, but few have been convicted for involvement in piracy; in fact, piracy is no longer

a specific crime in China. In recent years piracy has not been as pervasive in Chinese

waters as it was a hundred or even just fifty years ago.

In China’s comparatively recent history—starting from the seventeenth century—we

can discern three major forms of piracy along the South China coast: opportunistic,

professional, and sanctioned. Opportunistic, or petty, piracy always has been by far the

most common. This form of piracy has been perpetrated mostly by small gangs,

generally working independently in a restricted, relatively small, local area. Attacks

have normally been sporadic and spontaneous, and the motive has usually been immediate, personal economic gain. Professional piracy, as the name suggests, has historically been well organized, the heists well planned and carried out on a much larger

scale than opportunistic piracy. Pirates have been associated with large pirate leagues o

criminal syndicates, such as in the Cheung Son case mentioned above. For the individu

als involved, piracy has been a business and a livelihood. Sanctioned piracy—usually

referred to in the West as privateering—historically involved maritime raiding that was

approved and supported by a state or political regime. These three forms of piracy,

however, have not been necessarily exclusive. Sanctioned piracy, such as occurred during the Taiping Rebellion, has often merged with professional piracy, and opportunistic

piracy has continued even when the other forms of piracy were flourishing.

Examples of all of these types of piracy can be found in a number of major cycles of

piracy along the South China coast. First, in the middle of the seventeenth century,

during the tumultuous Ming–Qing transition, huge syndicates, particularly one led by

the Zheng family of Fujian, took advantage of the anarchy to carve out a piratical

empire in the South China Sea. The second cycle occurred during the late eighteenth

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Sao, Zhang Bao, and Cai Qian organized formidable leagues that vied with the Q

state for control over the southern littoral. This cycle was soon followed by resur

in piracy between 1840 and 1890, in the wake of the Opium War, the Taiping Reb

and China’s other foreign wars. Then, after a respite of about twenty years, a new 

of piracy flared up during the chaotic years between the revolution of 1911 and t

Nanking Decade, ending in 1937. Finally, in recent years there has been a resurge

all forms of piracy in the South China Sea.

Early Modern Chinese Piracy

Piracy is as ancient as China itself. The earliest official mention of pirates dates fr

the Han dynasty (106 BCE–220 CE), but surely it existed before that time. Thereaf

piracy tended to rise and fall with changes in regimes and fluctuations in the eco

Whenever opportunities arose—during wars, natural disasters, and economic de

sions, and the like—piracy occurred. It increased when governments were weak a

either unable or unwilling to cope with the problem; it also increased when comm

was vibrant.

In the mid-seventeenth century, piracy arose out of the anarchy produced by the 

Qing dynastic wars. Without a strong government to control the coastal populati

large numbers of seafarers took to their boats to engage in piracy and smuggling

first competition was fierce between the various pirate leaders, but gradually, thr

force and intrigue, one man, Zheng Zhilong, defeated his rivals to become the m

of the southern coast. The ailing Ming dynasty was powerless to stop him and so 

fied” him by incorporating him and his pirates into the imperial navy. He receive

admiral’s rank and thereafter levied “water fees” (baoshui) on all junks sailing alo

southern coast. According to Shao Tingcai (1648–1711), “All of the merchant jun

passing through the South China Sea had to have Zhilong’s safe conduct pass.” M

local and court officials were also on his payroll. From bases in and around Amo

Zheng syndicate openly levied duties on all fishing and merchant vessels, as well 

fishing villages and ports in Fujian and Zhejiang. Those unfortunate few who ref

to pay his tolls were ruthlessly attacked and murdered.2

By the mid-1640s, with Ming defeat imminent, Zheng Zhilong switched sides an

joined the rising Manchus. But he was quickly arrested and brought to Beijing, w

he lived out the rest of his life in confinement.3

The arrest of Zhilong, however, d

mean the end of the Zheng piratical empire. In fact, it grew even stronger over th

several decades under his son Zheng Chenggong (better known in the West as

Koxinga). Raising the banner of Ming loyalism, he gained the support of tens of 

sands of people all along the southern coast. Through a combination of trade an

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to Southeast Asia. With a retreat to Taiwan in 1661 and his untimely death later that

year, the Zheng syndicate began to unravel, finally collapsing in 1683, when the Manchus conquered Taiwan.4

During the forty years between 1644 and 1684, the new Manchu rulers paid close atten

tion to the unruly southerners. Exterminating Zheng Chenggong and other lawless

bands of pirates was a priority. The new government not only continued to enforce the

earlier Ming bans on overseas trade but also initiated a drastic scorched-earth policy

whereby the entire coastal population was forced to relocate ten to twenty miles inland

Soldiers torched the empty villages and towns, and anyone caught trying to return

home was beheaded.

The results were mixed. In the short run, these draconian measures alienated large

numbers of people and did not eliminate but actually ignited further piracy and dissent. In 1650 in the Chaozhou area, Wang Huizhi; in 1653 in the Zhengzhou area,

Huang Ting; in 1656 in the Funing area, Zhang Mingzhen; and in 1663 in the Canton

area, Zhou Yu—all became pirates and rebels.5

In the long run, however, these domestic policies, in combination with governmentsponsored naval campaigns, eventually succeeded in wearing down the pirates and pac

ifying the coastal population. Once Taiwan was conquered in 1683, the Kangxi empero

(r. 1662–1722), now convinced that national security depended on the prosperity of

the southern littoral, quickly reversed earlier policies and opened ports to trade. With

the government stabilized and the economy prosperous, piracy for a time diminished.

Chinese Piracy in the Mid-Qing Dynasty

After a lull of nearly a century, by the last decades of the eighteenth century piracy was

once again on the rise in South China. In fact, between 1780 and 1810 piracy reached

heights unprecedented in China and unmatched anywhere else in the world. This

period, often depicted by scholars as the start of the decline of the Qing dynasty, was a

time of rising crime and disorder throughout the southern provinces—banditry, feuds

secret-society disturbances, and urban riots, as well as piracy. Distracted by several

major rebellions—the Lin Shuangwen Rebellion on Taiwan (1787–88); the Miao uprisings in Sichuan, Hubei, and Guizhou (1795); the White Lotus Rebellion in central

China (1795–1804); and the Triad Uprising in Guangdong (1802–1803)—the Qing

dynasty at first paid little attention to the resurgence of piracy on the periphery. By the

time officials turned their attention to the pirates, several powerful leagues had developed that took many years to subdue.

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uted. Despite the burgeoning economy, population pressure intensified competit

and kept wages low for most seafarers. What is more, the 1780s and 1790s witnes

unusually large number of natural disasters that threw many sailors out of work.

hardly surprising, given these circumstances, that tens of thousands of fishermen 

sailors readily engaged in occasional piracy to survive in a harsh and competitive 

Opportunity and desperation were at work here in the upsurge in piracy.

Between 1780 and 1810 South China was plagued by several competing pirate lea

each with its self-contained fleet. Petty gangs of pirates operated in the shadows 

larger, better organized pirate leagues. Large-scale piracy reappeared in the South

China Sea in the 1780s, when Tâyson rebels in Vietnam sanctioned raids into Ch

waters to bolster their revenues and increase their manpower with Chinese pirate

Pirate fleets set out each spring and summer from bases on the Sino-Vietname

border to plunder vessels and villages between Guangdong and Zhejiang. With th

defeat in 1802 of the Vietnamese Tâyson, however, the Chinese pirates fled back 

China. After a brief bloodbath between gangs, several chieftains consolidated the

power and organized themselves into three major associations: Cai Qian in Fuj

Zhu Fen on the Fujian–Guangdong border, and Zheng Yi and others, who led the

Guangdong Confederation.

At the height of power in 1806, Cai Qian, who commanded over five thousand p

in several hundred ships, called himself the “Majestic Warrior King Who Subdue

Sea” (Zhenhai weiwu wang). His capable and courageous wife, known to us only 

Qian Ma (“Wife of Cai Qian”), was said to have commanded her own junks with 

of women warriors (niangzijun) and to have died fighting off the coast of Taiwan 

1804.7

After several attempts to take Taiwan, Cai Qian himself was killed in a n

battle on the Zhejiang coast in 1809. Zhu Fen, for his part, had a smaller but still 

dable fleet, with several thousand followers who were active on the waters around

Fujian, Guangdong, and Taiwan until his death, also in 1809.

By far the most impressive group of pirates in Chinese history was that of the

Guangdong Confederation between 1802 and 1810. At its height in 1809 the con

tion was composed of hundreds of vessels and anywhere from forty to sixty thou

followers. Until his death in 1807, Zheng Yi—who hailed from a family of profes

pirates—led the confederation, which was divided into seven, later six, well arme

highly organized fleets.

In China, as elsewhere, people became pirates for many reasons—survival, adven

wealth, greed, or power. They came from all walks of life and races; pirate gangs

included men, women, and children. Most pirates, however, were just ordinary p

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they grew up they were expected to become pirates. After Zheng Yi’s death, leadership

passed into the hands of his widow, Zheng Yi Sao, and of the capable, young Zhang

Bao. They jointly commanded the largest of the Guangdong pirate fleets, the so-called

Red Banner fleet, numbering nearly twenty thousand followers.

If some inherited the pirate trade and some volunteered, a large number of others were

coerced into joining pirate gangs. Sometimes chiefs would induce men to join with

offers of money, boats, weapons, positions of authority, and even sexual favors from

among the captive women.8

A number of people joined gangs of their own free will

after having first been abducted by them; that was the case with Zhang Bao. Sometimes

bandits, murderers, and rebels fleeing from the law on land ended up at sea and among

the pirates.

But there were also many reluctant pirates, who had been forced to join gangs against

their will. Sometimes hostages who could not pay their ransoms were obliged to turn

pirate. In the early nineteenth century, Richard Glasspoole described witnessing the

capture of nine rice boats. Since the captives put up no resistance, they were allowed

the choice of becoming pirates. When four of them refused, they were tortured until

they either “died or complied with the [pirates’] oath.”9

Occasionally seamen were

tricked into becoming outlaws. One popular method was to hire sailors on false preten

ses, disclosing the true situation only after the ship left port and the sailors had little

choice but to submit.

Pirate gangs were not only transient but also often ethnically diverse. Oceans by their

very nature were transnational spaces, and ships were melting pots.10 Like crews on

merchant ships, pirate gangs were often racially and linguistically mixed. In the midseventeenth century it was not uncommon to find Chinese pirate ships crewed by Japanese, Southeast Asian, European, and Chinese sailors; in the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries, Vietnamese pirates often worked alongside Chinese counterparts

From lairs along the Guangdong coast and offshore islands the pirates extended their

domination over most of the fishing and coastal trade, as well as over many towns and

markets, through a formal protection racket. By 1805 the confederation had virtual

control over the state-monopolized salt trade, and even Western merchants had to pay

“tribute” to the pirates to protect their ships. Zhang Bao and other chieftains defiantly

established “tax bureaus” in cities, towns, and villages along the coast where their

agents collected protection money and ransom fees.

The confederation, in fact, operated a sophisticated and efficient protection racket. Its

tentacles stretched outward from headquarters in Macau and Canton throughout

coastal Guangdong to Fujian in the north and Vietnam in the south. The entire system

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compiled registration certificates, issued safe-conduct passes, kept account book

collected ransom and protection payments. Agents collected duties semiannually 

annually; the pirates even had installment plans. The Chinese pirates not only att

Chinese junks who had not paid them off but also Western merchant ships en ro

Canton. John Turner in 1806 and Richard Glasspoole in 1809 were kidnapped fo

ransom when their vessels were attacked near Macau.

In particular, Wushi Er, one of the confederation’s leaders, oversaw a huge operat

centered on Hainan and the Leizhou Peninsula but extending to southern Fujian

Because each year his fleet collected several thousand taels of silver from extortio

soms, and robberies, he had to employ a small bureaucracy to write blackmail let

and keep accounts of the loot, weapons, and provisions.11 At the height of the con

ation’s power in 1809, Bai Ling, the viceroy in Canton, observed that the pirates w

“like ants attaching themselves to honeycombs.”12

By 1805 to 1809 the confederation had extended its activities from water to the s

Protection rackets were not only the confederation’s chief means of income but a

basis of regional domination. Through them the pirates were able to penetrate th

structure of local society. Through systematic extortion, bribery, and terror, the p

gained a firm hold over coastal villages, towns, and markets, as well as over fishin

shipping enterprises. The Guangdong Confederation became a state within a stat

exercising over maritime society a control independent of, and even overshadow

that of the government and local elites. Piracy therefore became a significant and 

vasive force in South China’s coastal society in the early nineteenth century.

At the height of its power in 1809, within a year the confederation collapsed. The 

navy, even with the aid of Portuguese warships from Macau, had been unable to 

the pirates. The Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820) now offered the pirates pardons 

rewards for their surrender, and the confederation began to fall apart as rogue ga

returned their allegiance to the state. Finally, in April 1810, Zheng Yi Sao and Zh

Bao surrendered. The government quickly rewarded Zhang Bao with money and 

naval commission and then sent him and his fleet to fight the remaining pirates i

western Guangdong. The confederation quickly and completely collapsed.13

Late Nineteenth-Century Chinese Piracy

Never again would Chinese waters see such huge pirate leagues. But piracy persis

with a marked upsurge between 1840 and 1890, prompting one foreign shipmast

describe the period as a piratical “reign of terror.”14 Once again political distress—

brought on by the Opium War (1839–42), the Taiping Rebellion (1850–65), and 

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sanctioned piracy. The piracy threat even prompted foreign intervention, notably the

Arrow War during the 1850s (see the next chapter, which examines the Arrow War in

greater detail).

During the first Opium War numerous Chinese junks acted as privateers, and once the

war ended many of them became outright pirates. Actually, the first several years of the

new British colony at Hong Kong (formally ceded in 1842) witnessed a marked

increase in pirate activity, resulting in part from the corruption and inefficiency of the

Hong Kong government and from the increase in Chinese and foreign trade. It was said

that pirates easily purchased all the firearms they needed in Hong Kong and Singapore

Many opportunistic and well armed gangs of Chinese pirates regularly plied the

waters between Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, attacking both native craft and foreign

merchantmen.15 One such instance was the capture in October 1854 off Macau of the

Chilean ship Caldera bound for California. Among the passengers taken prisoner and

held for ransom was a French woman, Fanny Loviot, who later wrote about her harrowing experience in a popular adventure book, A Lady’s Captivity among Chinese

Pirates (1859).

The two most notorious Chinese pirates at that time were Shap-ng-tsai and Chu-apoo.

The former commanded a gang of three thousand men and over sixty junks, and the

latter 1,800 men and about twenty junks. In the years following the Opium War, they

repeatedly pillaged ships and villages between Hong Kong and Hainan Island. Fishing

and trading vessels paid them regular protection fees. They gained notoriety when in

February 1849 Chu-apoo’s gang killed two British officers serving in Hong Kong and,

that summer, Shap-ng-tsai’s robbed a junk registered to a British subject. Later that

same year, in two separate campaigns, the Royal Navy nearly destroyed the two armadas; Shap-ng-tsai escaped, but Chu-apoo was captured and committed suicide in jail.

Despite these naval successes, opportunistic piracy continued to flourish in the South

China Sea, and new pirate fleets quickly replaced those that had been destroyed.16

Adding to the turmoil of Chinese piracy was the reappearance of foreign pirates along

the China coast. American and European renegades, “Manila-men,” and escaped African slaves served on the same ships with Chinese pirates throughout the nineteenth

century.17 After 1840 an increasing number of British, American, French, and other for

eigners worked with Chinese merchants in Hong Kong, Macau, and other treaty ports

to organize piratical syndicates. In the 1850s, an American sailor, Eli Boggs, was the

most notorious of these men, so much so that the Hong Kong government offered a

$1,000 bounty for his capture. In 1857, Boggs was finally apprehended near Shanghai

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smuggling opium and illegal emigrants.

There were also gangs of Portuguese sailors, working in conjunction with several

Macau merchants; under the pretence of providing convoy services for coastwise 

pers, these gangs extorted protection fees that brought them between fifty thousa

and two hundred thousand U.S. dollars annually. They openly robbed and murd

anyone who did not comply with their demands. According to George Cooke, th

Times correspondent in China, the crews of these “convoys” committed the “mos

frightful atrocities,” burning down villages, kidnapping the women and murderin

men. “They became infinitely greater scourges than the pirates they were paid to re

To rid themselves of this foreign menace, Chinese officials in Ningbo hired their 

pirates. Their leader was a Cantonese man known as A’Pak. This pirate was now s

tioned—much like Captain William Kidd—to hunt down and destroy other pira

and, in particular, those Portuguese gangsters. A’Pak was “made a mandarin of th

third class” by Ningbo officials in 1856, and he responded by building up his own 

tection racket under official sanction.19 Many of the fishing and merchant vessels 

had previously paid tribute to the Portuguese convoys shifted their allegiance to 

Several American, French, and British deserters joined A’Pak’s gang, which numb

about five hundred men by 1857. After a bitter fight the Portuguese pirates were

soundly defeated, and A’Pak became the undisputed master of the South China c

for the time being.20 However, the British and French took action later that year, i

Arrow War, to put an end to A’Pak’s piratical activities.

In most cases, piracy was not a lifelong vocation or relied upon as a sole or even 

source of income. Rather, piracy was a sideline, turned to when opportunity aros

in time of need. While the men involved made piracy an important part of their 

survival strategies, they also engaged at least part of the time in lawful activities, 

ors, fishermen, laborers, and so forth. They either joined gangs to supplement ho

wages or went on sprees of criminality between periods of legitimate work. One 

ern observer remarked in 1899 that most of the gangs that he had seen were com

of individuals “who do perhaps a little fishing or occasional agriculture for their 

but combine illegal courses with their more legitimate occupations, and plunder 

passing junk or wealthy pawnshops in the neighboring towns.”21 For the occasion

pirate, piracy was typically a seasonal job.

“Occasional pirates” were not only the major source of recruits for opportunistic

piracy but an important source of recruits for professional piracy. Membership i

gangs was never fixed; around a core of career criminals there were always part-t

Many gangs, as noted previously, were transient in nature; they formed, splintere

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of men. For many people piracy was just another job, and jumping ship and switching

gangs were common.

Gradually, with the increasing presence of the Royal Navy in the region, and especially

after Hong Kong became the headquarters of the China station, old-style piracy began

to recede. In 1847, the Hong Kong government also enacted its first antipiracy legislation, and the Royal Navy began to take a more active role in suppression. By the Treaty

of Tianjin in 1860, British warships were for the first time allowed to pursue pirates

into Chinese harbors. But it was the steam warship, which first appeared on the China

station in the mid-nineteenth century, that was to become the most effective weapon in

the fight against pirates. Fleets of sailing junks were no match for the heavily armed

and more maneuverable steamers. By the 1860s, most of the foreign coasters were

steamers as well, and a new age of piracy was dawning. “The steamship, more than the

Royal Navy,” A. D. Blue explains, “was responsible for the decline in the old-fashioned

style of piracy, in which a fleet of junks had an overwhelming advantage over a sailing

ship becalmed in coastal waters.”22

But pirates quickly adapted to the new circumstances, switching their tactics from

direct attacks to hijacking. Gangs boarded steamers as passengers and once under way

took control of the vessel. The pirates would rob the passengers and crew and sometimes take hostages for ransom.

One of the first recorded incidents of the new-style piracy was the attempted hijacking

of the steamer Iron Prince in 1862. A more successful heist occurred twelve years later,

when pirates hijacked the river steamer Spark as it sailed from Canton to Macau. But

the first major incident to gain public attention was the hijacking of the British coastal

steamer Namoa in December 1890. The vessel had left Hong Kong bound for Shantou

with five European passengers in first-class cabins and roughly 250 deck passengers.

Only a few hours into the voyage, shots rang out: forty or fifty pirates, who had come

aboard as deck passengers, quickly seized the bridge and engine room and rounded up

the Europeans, who were having lunch with Captain Pocock in the saloon. In the scuffle that ensued, the pirates mortally wounded Pocock and a Danish man. They then

forced the Chinese pilot to sail the ship to Bias Bay, where six small junks came alongside to off-load the booty (later valued at US$55,000). Once the pirates departed, the

Namoa’s officers and passengers regained their ship and returned to Hong Kong.

Chinese local authorities sent a punitive force to Bias Bay. Soldiers rounded up ten suspects, quickly tried them, found them guilty, and summarily executed them. Later

another twenty-three men were arrested, of whom thirteen were found guilty of piracy

On 17 April 1891, these thirteen pirates were beheaded, together with six other men, on

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part, of these draconian measures to quell piracy, many Chinese pirates withdrew 

China’s inland rivers and into the waters of Southeast Asia. Of course, coastal pir

did not end, but it did decrease for about twenty years.

Chinese Piracy in the Early Twentieth Century

In the early twentieth century, once again, turmoil—the revolution of 1911, warlor

and the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists—provided oppo

ties for a resurgence in piracy along the southern coast. Despite the disorder, ther

still a flourishing sea trade out of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and other Chinese ports

opportunistic and professional piracy flourished under these new circumstance

Isolated harbors, bays, and offshore islands became pirate retreats, from which ga

sallied forth to raid villages and plunder coastal shipping, and to which they fled 

These no-man’s-lands formed states within a state. Successive Chinese governme

were too weak or corrupt to curb piracy, and foreign governments were often rel

to get involved, because of the sensitive issue of Chinese sovereignty.

Between the two world wars there were fifty-one reported cases of piracy against 

ern coastal steamers, most of which were British ships. The worst years were 192

1927, and 1928, when there were five, six, and eight piracies, respectively.24 These 

the “Bias Bay piracies,” named after the haven out of which the pirates operated.2

ing the 1920s, “buccaneering was quite a natural means of livelihood among a ce

class of the seafaring gentry” in the Pearl River Delta. “The pirate chiefs of to-day 

inherited their junks and property from their fathers and forefathers.”26 As might 

expected, most pirate chieftains were professional criminals who made piracy a w

life. It provided their main incomes.

What was particularly important about these piracies was that they all involved p

sional gangs and what was still a relatively new modus operandi, hijacking. Pirate

already adapted to the modern world of steamships, and now they adapted to mo

shipping practices. In the Pearl River Delta, pirates worked in syndicates and spen

weeks in preparation for heists. During that time pirates traveled back and forth 

sengers on the steamers they planned to rob, reconnoitering and smuggling firea

board. Ultimately the pirates would embark as ticketed passengers, and once ever

was set the leader gave the signal to attack. One group stormed the bridge and to

control of the ship, another stormed the engine room, and a third kept the passen

at bay. Rich passengers, both Westerners and Chinese, would be taken ashore in B

Bay and held for ransom. While relatively few foreign ships were affected by pira

number of plundered Chinese vessels remains unknown.

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and Hong Kong.27 Professional crime syndicates controlled most piracy, which was but

one of several illegal activities in which they were involved; syndicates also engaged in

prostitution, gambling, money laundering, loan-sharking, and drug trafficking. These

syndicates, which were organized by tycoons in Hong Kong and Macau, were established “along sound business lines, replete with boards of directors.” The foreign press,

perhaps in an attempt to sensationalize an otherwise dull story, claimed that attractive

Chinese women headed several of the syndicates.28

During those same years there was also a more traditional form of piracy, involving

robbery, kidnapping, and extortion. The American journalist Aleko Lilius vividly

described several encounters with this variety of pirate from firsthand experience. One

of the most unforgettable was a woman named Lai Choi San (Lai Caishan), whom he

dubbed the “Queen of Macau pirates.” She apparently had inherited the business and

ships from her father, a pirate who had been granted refuge in Macau in return for pro

tecting the colony’s enormous fishing fleets. He had owned seven heavily armed junks

when he died. Lai Choi San had taken over the business, added five more junks to her

fleet, and soon had complete control over the fishing trade. According to Lilius, she wa

cunning, ruthless, and cruel; she had “barrels of money, and her will is law.” She owned

a house in Macau and had close connections with important men in that city. This

pirate queen maintained her power over rival gangs through murder, kidnapping, and

blackmail.29 Lai Choi San also received official recognition, when an official in Macau

gave her the title of “inspector,” which gave her operations the appearance of legality.30

This meant Lai could lead her fleet in the waters around Macau collecting tribute from

local fishermen.

Those who paid were protected from rival gangs in the area, but as in previous eras,

those who refused were either murdered or kidnapped for ransom. This sort of extortion, which was common throughout this period, was in fact a major source of pirate

income. To avoid being attacked, merchant junks and fishing craft paid large sums of

money to the pirates, who then issued passports guaranteeing safe passage.31

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, piracy in Chinese waters began

to decline; at least, there were fewer reported cases. It picked up for a time during the

Chinese Civil War (1945–49) and during the first few years of communist rule, but by

late 1950s piracy seemed almost a thing of the past along the south coast of China. One

of the last major acts of piracy against a foreign vessel occurred in 1952, when pirates

hijacked Hupeh, brought their hostages to Bias Bay, and held them for ransom.32 During the 1990s, piracy once again revived in Chinese waters.

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Conclusions

Historically, Chinese pirates were outlaws who committed a multiplicity of crime

both sea and shore. They robbed, killed, raped, committed kidnapping and extor

burned down villages, and scuttled ships. They bribed and colluded with soldiers

cials, and merchants. On water they attacked any vessel, large or small, that appea

easy prey. On shore they raided villages and markets, plundering them of valuabl

food, even carrying off women and children as hostages. They also became deepl

involved in such organized crimes as prostitution, gambling, and opium smuggli

the late nineteenth century, pirates had added hijacking to their repertoire, and t

type of piracy increased rapidly after the collapse in 1911 of the Qing dynasty.

Today, although most of the large-scale professional piracies have moved southw

the South China Sea, and also around Indonesia and the Malacca Strait, many sy

bosses still hail from Hong Kong and Macau.33 Pirates depend upon friendly port

secure bases, since they need confederates ashore for food and supplies, as well as 

handling booty, providing information, and finding new recruits. Also, inns and 

erns were traditionally important oases of merriment and rest where pirates cou

spend their earnings freely and wildly.

It is important to reiterate, therefore, that Chinese pirates built strongholds not o

remote islands but also in and around such key commercial and political hubs as 

ton, Macau, Chaozhou, Shantou, Amoy, Ningbo, and Shanghai. In those cities an

smaller port towns they set up “tax bureaus” to collect tribute and ransom paym

and to conspire with soldiers, yamen underlings, and officials who were on their 

rolls. Lantau and Cheung Chau islands, near Hong Kong, and Taipa and Coloane

islands, near Macau, were for centuries home to thriving populations of pirates, 

glers, and fishermen. In the twentieth century, Bias Bay (Daya Wan) and Mirs Ba

(Dapeng Wan), which are only about fifty kilometers northeast of Hong Kong, w

important pirate retreats, and they had served the same purpose since at least the

seventeenth century.

It made good sense for pirates to locate their lairs near major trade routes and co

nient sources of supply. The close proximity of pirate lairs to economic and polit

centers throughout South China has historically been a clear indication of how d

entrenched piracy is in China’s maritime society. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 

recent upswing in piracy is also focused in these same areas. In 1993, for example

Hong Kong Morning Post reported the murder of local fishermen by mainland pi

The Cheung Son case of 1998, of course, was another famous example of piracy i

ing hijacking, but in this case the crew was murdered, not held for ransom.

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on in legends, folklore, movies, and popular imagination. Often ignoring the facts,

writers, journalists, and tour guides have used and misused pirates in many interesting

ways. In China, as in the West, pirates have been depicted variously as treacherous villains, swashbuckling heroes, champions of the poor, and avengers against injustice. For

example, even before Zheng Chenggong’s death in 1661 and Zhang Bao’s surrender in

1810, both men had become folk heroes in South China. In fact, in Taiwan, Zheng

Chenggong was deified; today there are several temples dedicated to the pirate-hero,

the largest one in Tainan.35 Throughout the Pearl River Delta, every schoolchild knows

stories about Zhang Bao. For some, he is a Chinese Horatio Alger figure—a downtrodden boy who achieves fame, wealth, and success against all odds in a cruel and oppressive society. For others—especially in more recent Chinese historiography—he is a

primitive rebel in the vanguard of the revolution that overturned the alien Manchu

dynasty in 1911.36

The female pirates of South China are perhaps not as famous as their male counterparts, but several have not been forgotten. Lai Choi San, the pirate queen, was the only

daughter in a family with four male siblings, who had all died before she reached adult

hood. She grew up on ships: “Her father used to take her with him on his trips along

the coast. . . . And now she loved the sea.” What is more, she had no ambition to settle

down to a peaceful life on shore.37 Lai Choi San is still remembered as a feminine Robin

Hood who robbed the rich and gave to the poor. In 1935, she was immortalized as the

archetypical “Dragon Lady” in the American comic strip Terry and the Pirates.

38

Zheng Yi Sao and Cai Qian Ma were other female pirates able to survive in a man’s

world by proving themselves more capable than their male counterparts. After her surrender in 1810, Zheng Yi Sao continued to receive some notoriety in the Canton

region, where she is said to have opened a successful brothel and gambling den. She

died of old age in her home. Another female pirate, the sister of a Ming dynasty chieftain named Wu Ping, was killed on Nan’ao Island, where today she is worshipped as the

“Treasure Protecting Goddess.” People come from all around the vicinity to pray to her

for good luck and good fortune.

One of the most persistent pirate legends concerns buried treasures. In fact, dozens of

caves in the Pearl River Delta are said to be genuine sites where Zhang Bao hid his

booty. On Longxue (Dragon Cave) Island, in Dongguan County, there is a “Gold Cave”

that today displays a small painted statue of Zhang Bao. Another cave, on Cheung Chau

Island, has been a popular tourist attraction for Hong Kong visitors for decades. Even

Hong Kong schoolchildren go on “treasure hunting” field trips to the cave on Cheung

Chau Island.39 Along the Nan’ao coast there is a speck of land called “Gold-Silver

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statue of the Treasure Protecting Goddess overlooking the sea. These monument

pirates have become staple tourist sites.

While few people today remember much about the thirteen pirates who were exe

in Shanwei in 2000, the front page of the 29 January 2000 South China Post publi

an unforgettable photo of Yang Jingtao, dressed in a suit and tie as he was led off 

firing squad. Drunk, defiant, and cursing the Chinese government and the Comm

Party, Yang went to his death singing a popular Ricky Martin song.40 The irony of 

event, of course, is that a society that has worked so diligently to eliminate piracy 

the end immortalized the condemned pirates as folk heroes. Even in death, pirate

Beijing’s attempt to assert unchallenged authority over all forms of maritime act

Notes

The author wishes to thank Bill Guthrie and Kit

Kelen for helpful comments and suggestions, and

the Faculty Research Committee at the University

of Macau for a generous grant that has enabled

the author to do this research.

1. Bertil Lintner, Blood Brothers: The Criminal

Underworld of Asia (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2003), pp. 1–2; Stefan Eklöf,

Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of

Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies

Press, 2006), pp. 78–79.

2. Xiamen zhi ([1832] 1961), pp. 665–67; the

quote is cited in Robert J. Antony, Pirates in

the Age of Sail (New York: W. W. Norton,

2007), p. 113.

3. Leonard Blussé, “Minnan-jen or Cosmopolitan? The Rise of Cheng Chih-lung alias

Nicolus Iquan,” in Development and Decline

of Fukien Province in the Seventeenth and

Eighteenth Centuries [hereafter Fukien Province], ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden, Neth.: E. J.

Brill, 1990), pp. 245–64.

4. Patrizia Carioti, “The Zhengs’ Maritime

Power in the International Context of the

17th Century Far Eastern Seas: The Rise of a

‘Centralized Piratical Organization’ and Its

Gradual Development into an Informal

‘State,’” Ming Qing Yanjiu (1996), pp. 29–67;

Cheng K’o-ch’eng, “Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s

Maritime Expansion and Early Ch’ing

Coastal Prohibition,” in Fukien Province, ed.

Vermeer, pp. 228–44.

5. Quanzhou fuzhi (1870), pp. 73/32a–3

Xiapu xianzhi (1929), pp. dashi/16b–

and Shantou dashiji (1988), pp. 2/38–

6. See Robert J. Antony, Like Froth Floa

the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seaf

Late Imperial South China, Institute 

Asian Studies China Research Mono

(Berkeley: Univ. of California, 2003)

7. Maxiang tingzhi (1893), addendum 1

57a.

8. Gongzhongdang [Palace Memorials] 

JQ 3.2.29 and (3728) JQ 3.2.19; Xing

[Routine Memorials] (136) QL 46.3.

(147) JQ 14.4.23.

9. Richard Glasspoole, “A Brief Narrativ

Captivity and Treatment amongst th

Ladrones,” in History of the Pirates, e

Charles Neumann (London: Orienta

lation Fund, 1831), pp. 114–15.

10. Some writers have described today’s 

syndicates as huge multinational cor

tions. For example, see Jack Hitt, “Ba

the Global Shipping Lanes,” New Yor

Magazine, 20 August 2000; and Eklöf

in Paradise, p. 83.

11. Gongzhongdang (3728) JQ 3.2.19 and

(10138) JQ 13.3.2.

12. Gongzhongdang (14804) JQ 14.7.15.

13. On the demise of the Guangdong Co

ation see Robert Antony, “State, Com

nity, and Pirate Suppression in Guan

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Friday, January 08, 2010 8:36:27 AM
27, no. 1 (June 2006), pp. 1–30.

14. Ralph Reid, “Piracy in the China Sea: Some

Aspects of Its Influence upon the History of

the Far East” (MA thesis, University of Hawaii, 1938), p. 244.

15. C. R. Boxer, “Piracy in the South China Sea,”

History Today 30 (December 1980).

16. Grace Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832–1869 (Westport: Hyperion,

1973), pp. 107–109.

17. See the Zhang Rensheng case in Liu Fang,

ed., Qingdai Aomen zhongwen dang’an

huibian [Collection of Chinese Archives

from the Qing Dynasty in Macau] (Aomen:

Aomen jijinhui chuban, 1999), vol. 1, p. 344.

The so-called Manila-men was a catchall category that included Malays, Chinese,

Oceanians, and mixed races of Asian sailors.

18. Donald Pittis and Susan Henders, comps.,

Macao: Mysterious Decay and Romance

(Hong Kong: Oxford Univ. Press, [1940]

1997), pp. 139–40.

19. Ibid., p. 140.

20. Ibid., pp. 140–42; Fox, British Admirals and

Chinese Pirates, p. 128.

21. Ernest Alabaster, Notes and Commentaries on

Chinese Criminal Law and Cognate Topics

(London: n.p., 1899), p. 469.

22. A. D. Blue, “Piracy on the China Coast,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 5 (1965), p. 75.

23. John Kleinen, “De Kaping van de Namoa,”

Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift 25

(1998), pp. 99–103; Harry Miller, Pirates of

the Far East (London: Robert Hale, 1970),

pp. 151–55. Because Bias Bay was under the

jurisdiction of the Kowloon submagistrate,

the execution was carried out there.

24. Blue, “Piracy on the China Coast,” p. 79.

25. Bias Bay lies just outside Hong Kong territorial waters. J. M. Sheridan’s fictionalized account The “Shanghai Lily”: A Story of Chinese

Pirates in the Notorious Regions of Bias Bay

and the 1935 American film China Seas

rates for Western audiences. Today on the

shore of Bias Bay is a French-built nuclear

power plant, the largest in China and perhaps a symbol of the government’s destruction of the pirate threat.

26. Aleko E. Lilius, I Sailed with Chinese Pirates

(Hong Kong: Oxford Univ. Press, [1930]

1991), p. 27.

27. Ibid., pp. 15–22.

28. Blue, “Piracy on the China Coast,” p. 77.

29. Lilius, I Sailed with Chinese Pirates, pp. 37–

57.

30. Ibid., pp. 39–40.

31. On the protection rackets in the early

nineteenth century see Antony, Like Froth

Floating on the Sea, pp. 118–21.

32. Blue, “Piracy on the China Coast,” p. 85.

33. Hitt, “Bandits in the Global Shipping

Lanes”; Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 73.

34. B. J. Lofland, “Piracy: A Selective Historical

Account,” Boletim de Estudos de Macau 3

(November 1995), p. 36.

35. Ralf Croizier, Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth and the Hero (Cambridge

Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1997); Gao

Zhihua, Zheng Chenggong xinyang (Hefai:

Huangshan shushe, 2006).

36. Xiu Guojian, Yuedong mingdao Zhang Baoza

(Hong Kong: Xiandai jiaoyu yanjiu she

chuban, 1992). For an earlier popularization

about Zhang Bao see Ye Linfeng, Zhang

Baozai de chuanshuo he zhenxiang (Hong

Kong: Shanghai shuju, 1970).

37. Lilius, I Sailed with Chinese Pirates, pp. 53–

54.

38. See Wikipedia.org, s.v. “Dragon Lady

(character).”

39. Personal communication from Prof. Joseph

Lee, 16 October 2007.

40. Christopher Kelen, “In China, the Last Picture of Yang Jingtao,” Peace Review 13, no. 4

(2001), pp. 553–59.

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The Taiping Rebellion, Piracy, and the

Arrow War

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN

Piracy can sometimes lead to war. The Taiping “Rebellion” (1851–64) was in fact 

nese civil war that sparked the Second Opium War (1856–60), also known as the

“Arrow War.” This conflict was named after the Chinese-owned ship Arrow, whic

given permission by Hong Kong authorities to fly the British flag as part of an an

piracy convoy. When Chinese authorities violated the flag, the British governmen

this provocation to force China to agree to a number of trade revisions, includin

closer cooperation in eliminating piracy. Thus, an increase in piracy in Chinese w

resulting from the Taiping Rebellion eventually led to a major foreign war and eq

dramatic changes in Sino-British relations.

The early nineteenth century witnessed an enormous expansion in the British Em

In addition to establishing the Sydney (Australia) naval base in 1788, the British 

key trading bases in Penang in 1786, in Singapore in 1819, and finally in Hong K

1842, all with the goal of increasing trade. To support its maritime trade routes, B

established naval bases at crucial geographic locations, including the Cape of Good 

in 1806, in Mauritius in 1810, in the Falkland Islands in 1833, in Aden in 1839, an

Karachi in 1842. During this process of empire building, the Royal Navy actively 

piracy throughout the world; in 1856 the Declaration of Paris even outlawed priv

ing, which by this point was often seen as little better than state-sanctioned pirac

Not too surprisingly, the origins of the Arrow War with China were closely link

with Britain’s “suppression of piracy” policies, since the Taiping Rebellion aggrav

piracy in Chinese waters. Protecting trade from the Chinese pirates required trea

revision, and Great Britain and France—with the tacit support of Russia and the

United States—launched a successful war to obtain that revision. While the new 

achieved greater trade privileges and rights from China generally, this chapter wi

show that one of the Arrow War’s prime strategic goals was to ensure the safety o

eign trade from pirates.

CHAPTER THREE

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A leading cause of the First Opium War (1839–42) was not the opium trade per se but

the injurious effects of the illegal trade on China’s overall foreign trade. The Opium

War was not a war about drugs, therefore, so much as a war about trade. In 1852, a former governor and commander in chief of the colony of Hong Kong, Sir John Francis

Davis, even wrote that “at no time was the [opium] traffic deserving of the full load of

infamy with which many were disposed to heap it,” since the “worst effect” of the

opium trade was the “piracy it engendered.” Further, “Of the war it [the illegal trade]

certainly was mainly the cause.”1

As the previous chapter discussed, piracy was common throughout all of East Asia and

in the South China Sea specifically. Asian waters saw a dramatic increase in piracy that

“dated from the early 1840s when, no doubt, it was stimulated by the disorders of the

Opium War in China.” Although this type of piracy, referred to as “junk piracy,”

because the pirates used traditional Chinese junks, was much reduced when the British

instituted antipiracy measures during the late 1840s, it revived in the 1850s.2

In those

years there were reports of a pirate raid near Hong Kong almost every day, and many

others went unreported. Opium was the major commodity sought by the pirates, who

then smuggled it into China. The Royal Navy was tasked with suppressing pirates, but

“there were too few ships and too many responsibilities for the Royal navy in the China

seas for continuous protection to be given to any one place.”3

The spark that eventually resulted in the Arrow War was struck by the Taiping Rebellion. The founder of the Taiping movement, Hong Xiuquan, was a Chinese of the

Hakka ethnicity, born and raised in Guangdong Province.4

Growing up just thirty mile

north of Canton, Hong saw firsthand how easily British forces defeated the Manchus

during the First Opium War. Failing to pass the imperial civil service examinations in

1828, 1836, and 1837, Hong appears to have blamed himself, but after a fourth failure

in 1843 he blamed China’s Manchu leaders of the Qing dynasty and vowed to overthrow them.5

The British victory in the First Opium War gave Hong hope that the Qing

empire had finally lost its “Mandate of Heaven” by proving the Manchus’ “military and

political decadence.”6

In preparation for his fight with the dynasty, Hong converted to Christianity in June

1843, perhaps equating Britain’s recent military victory with its philosophical and religious foundation. In 1846, he formed a group known as the Society of God-Worshiper

(Pai-Shang-ti Hui). Based at Mount Thistle, in Guangxi Province, this group gradually

grew during the late 1840s. By 1851 Hong was ready, and on 11 January he declared

himself “Heavenly King” and announced an anti-Manchu revolution.7

The “Great

Peace,” or Taiping, he declared, had begun.

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on the upper Yangzi River, in December 1852.8

From there it crossed the Yangzi R

and laid siege to Wuchang, capturing it on 12 January 1853. The Taipings now co

trolled the upper Yangzi River and its trade, thus cutting off China’s interior from 

coastal regions. Beginning in February 1853, the Taiping army floated downstrea

(that is, generally northeasterly) in approximately twenty thousand boats. After a 

of brilliant military victories it reached Nanjing, which the Taipings captured and 

their capital in late March.

Soon afterward, the Taiping forces also took the terminus of the Grand Canal, wh

connected the seaport of Hangzhou, 110 miles south of Shanghai, with Beijing, t

controlling “the great medium of communication between the southern provinc

the capital, and the route by which all of the grain supplies were conveyed to the

north.”9

These victories convinced the Manchus that the Taiping drive to the nor

would eventually take Beijing, and they ordered all future provincial tax revenue

delivered directly to the Manchu palace at Jehol.10 However, in a last-ditch effort, 

brought in additional troops and cavalry from Manchuria and Mongolia; on 5 Fe

ary 1854 the Taipings’ northern expedition failed and began a retreat to the south

Although unable to take Beijing, the Taipings held out against imperial troops fo

next ten years. From their capital in Nanjing, the Taipings quickly opened trade w

Shanghai on the coast. In return for tea and silk, foreign merchants provided bas

necessities, luxury goods, and also such black-market items as weapons and amm

tion. The Taipings coined their own money and set up customhouses along the Y

to collect duties from boats transporting goods. By 1856 the Taipings held the he

the Yangzi Valley, which gave them ultimate control over China’s inland trade.

The volume of international trade grew gradually every year during the Taiping r

The Taipings and Western merchants quickly clashed, however, over the sale of o

Although the Taipings were pro-trade, their laws forbade the drinking of alcohol

bling, and the smoking of opium. British authorities protested the Taipings’ high

duties, arguing that according to their agreements with Beijing such duties were 

In addition, there was a rapid increase of pirates, who regularly attacked foreign 

ping, many claiming to be associated with the Taipings. “By 1854 the civil disturb

in China added rebels who were alternately pirates to the usual supply of maraud

the waterway between Hong Kong and Canton. The Canton River became impas

for Chinese vessels, foreign ships were attacked, and ‘trade was at a standstill.’”11

In fact, the pirates, although not necessarily Taiping members, were clearly sanct

by the government in Nanjing. By January 1856 the British had formed a squadro

ten ships to protect Hong Kong, and they instituted a system of scheduled north–

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in China, on 16 April 1856 the Declaration of Paris affirmed that “privateering is and

remains abolished.”12 Although not specifically binding on China, which was not a signatory, the Paris declaration validated Britain’s goal of eliminating Taiping-related

piracy, in that many of the pirates were thought to be privateers, acting on behalf of the

Taipings.

Chinese-owned ships registered in Hong Kong were allowed to join the convoys and

given permission to fly the British flag for the purpose. This decision, however, quickly

led to increased tension with Manchu authorities, who considered all Chinese-owned

ships to be under their administrative authority. On 8 October 1856 Canton police

boarded a Chinese-owned, but Hong Kong–registered, ship, Arrow. This ship had a

British captain but a Chinese crew. After lowering the British flag, the police arrested

twelve crew members. Immediately, Harry Parkes, the British consul, demanded that Ye

Mingchen, the imperial commissioner in Canton, apologize for this “insult” to the Brit

ish flag. Ye offered to release nine of the arrested sailors but insisted that the other thre

were “wanted on charges of piracy,” and he refused to apologize.13 He also disputed the

British practice of registering Chinese ships and allowing them to fly British flags.

This incident gave the governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring, a long-sought-for

opportunity to demand treaty revisions from China. Under the threat of naval shelling

Commissioner Ye returned all twelve sailors, but he still refused to apologize for violating the British flag.14 Tensions peaked during late May 1857, and on 1 June 1857 the

Royal Navy defeated seventy to eighty Chinese war junks protecting Canton. Although

it was a clear victory, Great Britain’s position, according to Admiral Michael Seymour,

remained precarious.15 Thus, a relatively minor Sino-British disagreement over whethe

a Chinese vessel could legally fly the British flag while part of an antipiracy convoy had

precipitated a major international war.

Resolution of the Arrow Dispute

During the spring of 1857, the government of Prime Minister Lord Palmerston

appointed James Bruce, the eighth Earl of Elgin, to be Her Majesty’s High Commissioner and Plenipotentiary to China. His task was to lead a naval and military expedition first to Canton but ultimately to the mouth of the Bai River, near Beijing, to

demand reparations for past injuries, diplomatic representation in Beijing, and treaty

revisions that would grant Britain greater access to China’s river trade and help quell

the piracy threat for good.

The arrival of Sans Pareil, the Royal Navy’s newest screw-propelled battleship, allowed

Admiral Seymour’s naval force to blockade Canton on 3 August. A British-French

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and over five thousand troops had been assembled. Elgin issued a final ultimatum 

12 December to Ye, who refused to accept it; on 15 December British troops took

Honam Point, and the British warships Nimrod, Hornet, Bittern, Actaeon, and Ac

moved within range of Canton. Shelling commenced on 28 December, and on th

lowing day the combined British and French forces scaled Canton’s southeastern 

The troops took control of the city; British casualties numbered ninety-six and th

French thirty-four.

The next task was to find and capture Commissioner Ye. The wise thing for Ye w

have been to move into the “hinterland to carry on the campaign,” but Qing law 

that “any official who lost his city should lose his head.”16 Unable therefore to flee

was captured on 5 January 1858 and was removed on board the warship Inflexibl

life imprisonment in a villa outside Calcutta, India. The remaining Qing troops i

ton were soon disarmed.

With Canton safely in allied hands, the next goal was Beijing. The expedition was

delayed while, in mid-April 1858, Elgin sailed northward aboard Furious for nego

tions. Eleven weeks later the talks with Beijing failed, but due to this delay the siz

the British forces had gradually increased. By 20 May everything was ready. A sie

the Dagu forts on the Bai River, protecting Tianjin, eighty miles southeast of the 

tal, met with light opposition, and after an hour and a half the fighting was over. 

ish casualties were five killed and seventeen wounded; the unexpected explosion 

Chinese magazine had killed six and wounded sixty-one Frenchmen. With the ta

the Dagu forts, the road to Beijing was open; foreign ships docked for the first tim

Tianjin, on 26 May.

Rather than fighting this foreign force, the Manchu emperor quickly sent imperi

commissioners to Tianjin. On 26 June 1858 the fifty-six-article Treaty of Tianjin 

signed with Great Britain; at almost the same time, separate treaties were signed 

France, Russia, and the United States.17 By means of this treaty, England received 

indemnity of more than a million pounds for its losses in Canton, tariff revision

opening of five new treaty ports, and freedom of the Yangzi River as far inland as

Hankou (which was at that point under sporadic Taiping control). Most importa

Beijing was now open to a British representative, who would be treated by the Ch

officials as an envoy of an equal nation—not a tributary, as in the past. (Elgin lat

agreed to modify this clause by locating the British residence outside of Beijing s

help prop up the Qing dynasty against the Taipings.)

Fighting piracy had been the underlying factor that had triggered warfare, and fo

articles of the Treaty of Tianjin (18, 19, 52, and 53) pertained to it. These articles 

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of British subjects, whenever these shall have been subjected to insult or violence. In all case of incendiarism or robbery the local authorities shall at once take the necessary steps for the recovery

of the stolen property, the suppression of disorder and the arrest of the guilty parties, whom they

will punish according to the law.

19. If any British merchant vessel, while within Chinese waters, be plundered by robbers or pirates, it

shall be the duty of the Chinese authorities to use every endeavour to capture and punish the said

robbers or pirates, and to recover the stolen property, that it may be handed over to the consul for

restoration to the owner....

52. British ships of war coming for no hostile purpose, or being engaged in the pursuit of pirates, shal

be at liberty to visit all ports within the dominion of the Emperor of China, and shall receive ever

facility for the purchase of provisions, procuring water, and, if occasion require, for the making of

repairs. The commanders of such ships shall hold intercourse with the Chinese authorities on

terms of equality and courtesy.

53. In consideration of the injury sustained by native and foreign commerce from the prevalence of

piracy in the seas of China, the high contracting parties agree to concert [discuss] measures for its

suppression.

These antipiracy articles were a major boon to British efforts to eliminate the threat of

piracy in Chinese waters. Many of these pirates were linked to the Taipings and so

opposed China’s central government in Beijing. The Treaty of Tianjin accordingly mad

the pirates a common enemy of the foreigners and the Manchus. Elgin had already

formed a negative opinion of the Taipings, having encountered their forces along the

Yangzi River and learned from locals that “the rebels were even more unpopular in the

Yangzi than the Imperial forces because of the destruction which they inflicted.”19

But it was not a forgone conclusion that the foreigners and the Manchu court in

Beijing would join together against the Taipings. In fact, it would take the final ratification of the antipiracy articles agreed at Tianjin—the treaty had stipulated that ratification should occur within a year of signing—to form a solid basis of cooperation.

Obtaining China’s ratification of these treaty provisions was to prove more difficult

than the British and French had thought.

Sino-British Conflict and the “Dagu Repulse”

Following what appeared to be an almost complete diplomatic victory with the signing

of the treaty, the British and French fleets withdrew to the south, and Lord Elgin

returned home. However, with the immediate threat to Beijing over, the Manchus did

their best to ignore the provisions of the treaty. In June 1859, the final month by when

ratifications of the Treaty of Tianjin could be exchanged, the Manchus once again

attempted to treat the British and French envoys as representing tributaries of China.

This attempt to return to the status quo ante quickly led to a resumption of conflict.

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sent a sizable naval expedition. The fleet tried to enter the Bai River beginning on 

morning of 25 June, but it was unexpectedly rebuffed by a strong Chinese force. 

nightfall, five allied ships had been either sunk or disabled, and Admiral James H

had been wounded twice. A final attempt, meant to take one of the Dagu forts by 

also failed, resulting in British casualties of sixty-four killed and 252 wounded or 

ing, while four Frenchmen were killed and ten wounded. During the entire battle

known as the “Dagu Repulse,” a total of 519 British were killed and 456 were

wounded.20

After this unexpected defeat, Elgin was once again made Britain’s plenipotentiary 

China. His new goal was to lead an expedition to Beijing to force the Manchus to 

the Treaty of Tianjin, apologize for the recent attack, and provide an additional i

nity. But Elgin had no intention of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty; he warned 

there was no satisfactory alternative to that dynasty and that accordingly it would 

best for British trade to avoid creating even greater anarchy in China.

Palmerston agreed and authorized action to occupy Beijing in these terms: “The 

pation by a barbarian army of a capital into which even a barbarian diplomatist 

to be admitted, would go further to proclaim our power, and therefore to accomp

our ends, than any other military success, and I must own I have no belief whatev

the supposition that such an occupation would overthrow the Chinese Empire. D

upon it, that occupation would bring the Emperor to reason.”21 A British ultimat

was sent to Beijing in March 1860. The Manchu response was to insist that all ne

tions take place away from Beijing; this reply made conflict inevitable. Elgin left L

don on 26 April 1860 for China.

Thirteen thousand British troops, commanded by General Hope Grant, were join

seven thousand French troops under General Cousin de Montauban. It took tim

numerous transport vessels to move these troops to China. On 12 August 1860, a 

ing maneuver aimed at the Dagu forts began, with six thousand troops. On 20 Au

the British offered terms of surrender, but the Qing official in charge reportedly

became abusive and replied “that if the Allies wanted the forts they had better co

and take them.”22 On 21 August, storming parties were organized, with the Frenc

the right flank and the British on the left. By nightfall the forts had fallen, with to

British casualties numbering 201; the French had 158. Although the figure was d

to determine, it was estimated that the Chinese had sustained approximately two 

sand casualties.23

Beginning on 22 August the British ships began to make their way upriver to Tia

and on the 25th Elgin himself arrived in the city. He was met by three imperial

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China accede unconditionally to the March ultimatum. The commissioners agreed to

all of Britain’s demands, but they questioned and delayed decision on the indemnity

payment. This prompted Elgin on 8 September to order a march to within twelve miles

of Beijing.

An unexpected Chinese ambush and the capture of thirty-nine members of the

advance party (thirteen French, twenty-six British) led to battles on 18 and 21 September, which the better-equipped allied forces easily won. Splitting into two columns, the

British in the north and the French in the west, the allied forces reached Beijing on 5

October. The hostages were returned on 8 October, but thirteen British soldiers and

seven Frenchmen had either been murdered or died during their imprisonment.

Beijing’s Anding Gate fell to the British on 13 October. On the 18th the Summer Palace

just north of the capital, was burned at Lord Elgin’s orders; several British prisoners

had been tortured at that site, and he wanted to leave a permanent reminder, aimed

specifically at the Manchus, of Western strength.

The final stage of the Arrow War was reached on 24 October 1860 for the British, and

the next day for the French, when the Beijing Convention and ratifications of the

Treaty of Tianjin were exchanged between China and its two opponents. By 9 November 1860 all the British and French troops had evacuated Beijing, although five thousand troops were stationed in Tianjin, and smaller garrisons were left to guard the

Dagu forts. According to the now ratified Treaty of Tianjin, a British diplomatic mission could be located in Beijing. More to the point, the British had now secured greater

trading rights throughout China, especially along the Yangzi River.

In the aftermath of this conflict, the treaty signed at Tianjin ensured Chinese cooperation in suppressing piracy. In particular, it granted the British expanded navigation

rights, as “ships of the Royal Navy had complete liberty to operate in Chinese waters

against pirates.”24 Similar agreements signed with France, Russia, and the United States

furthered international cooperation against Chinese pirates.

Taiping Piracy and the Abortive Lay-Osborn Fleet

As stated in the Treaty of Tianjin, the British and Chinese agreed to discuss measures

for the suppression of piracy. The pirate and Taiping threats, between them, led to a

British plan to sell China modern naval ships. This proposed force would have been

China’s first modern navy. Unfortunately for China, it was to be canceled, due to disagreement over how the ships would be used and which Chinese government agency

would be in charge of them.

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ment began to negotiate with Western countries to purchase foreign technology—

including military technology—to support its effort to put down the Taipings. A

of this reform, the position of “Inspector General of the Imperial Maritime Cust

was given to a British civil servant, Horatio Nelson Lay. One of his main goals wa

create China’s first modern naval force to be used to quell pirates, many of whom 

linked to the Taiping rebels. On 2 September 1862, during a visit by Lay to Britai

Queen Victoria gave permission for China to buy British vessels and hire crews.

During 1863, Lay and a British naval officer working for China, Sherard Osborn,

helped to negotiate the purchase of seven modern steamships and one supply ves

from Britain. According to Lay’s original plan, control over the ships would rema

with the Imperial Maritime Customs, not the central Chinese government. To th

on 16 January 1863 Lay appointed Captain Osborn as commander of the Chines

fleet—referred to as the “Lay-Osborn fleet”—for a term of four years.

These ships were intended to be used mainly for protecting foreign trade from Ta

supported piracy. Queen Victoria had instructed that these “vessels should fly a r

nized ensign in order to avoid any risk of capture and imprisonment” by Chinese 

foreign ships; Lay proposed an ensign with a green field charged with a yellow sa

colors that were not in widespread use in China at the time.25 China’s first moder

was canceled, however, when a dispute arose between the Chinese Customs Servi

mainly staffed by British civil servants (like Lay), and the Chinese government, o

which agency would actually control the navy. When the fleet was ready for deliv

the Chinese insisted that they should be able to appoint a Chinese commander in 

Osborn would be his assistant, with authority only over the foreign naval officers

On 18 October 1863, Osborn refused to work under the direct supervision of a C

officer, claiming that his agreement with Lay specified that he would take orders 

from the Chinese emperor, as transmitted to him directly by Lay. This point was 

sidered crucial, since the ships, intended for antipiracy patrols, could also be used 

bolster the Chinese military. The British government undoubtedly feared that a t

modern and Westernized Chinese fleet might one day be directed against British 

ings in China. When it appeared that the ships might fall completely under Chin

authority, the plan was halted. The ships turned back en route and returned to Eng

The British had every reason to fear that the Lay-Osborn fleet might one day be t

against them. Since the money to pay for the ships was from customs revenue, pa

the foreign countries, they had a clear self-interest in how that money was spent. 

incident was quickly condemned by China, however, as yet one more example of 

poor treatment by the West. As one Chinese naval historian was later to commen

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the right to command its own fleet.26

The ships of the Lay-Osborn fleet were sold to a variety of foreign buyers. As a result,

the creation (by purchase) of China’s first modern navy was delayed by more than ten

years. Lay was held responsible for this debacle by Beijing and was dismissed. Soon

afterward, Beijing hired Robert Hart as inspector general of its customs. Hart would

soon begin a long and distinguished career as one of the most famous foreigners in

Chinese service.

End of the Taiping Rebellion and the Final Suppression of Piracy

Although the British and French had handily defeated the Manchus, they did not

attempt to overthrow the dynasty, for fear that (as Elgin had warned) an even worse

government might take its place. The military success of the Taipings continued, and

the threat to Shanghai was particularly great. The ratification of the Treaty of Tianjin

and the Beijing Convention gave foreigners a compelling reason to back the Manchus,

in particular since the Taipings refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of any treaty

signed by the Manchu government concerning trade.

A Taiping eastern expedition in 1861 was initially very successful. With the bloodless

capture of Ningbo on 9 December 1861, and a bloodier siege of Hangzhou that ended

with victory on 31 December 1861, the Taipings finally had direct access to the sea.

While this success promised increased trade with Western merchants, mainly in modern weapons and ammunition, it also opened the possibility of Taiping fleets attacking

and destroying cities along China’s seaboard.

This seaborne threat prompted foreigners to side more closely with the Manchu

dynasty. When Taiping troops surrounded Shanghai (for the second time) during early

January 1862, British and French forces under the command of Admiral Hope undertook to defend the city. On 1 March 1862, Hope’s five hundred foreign troops and 750

Chinese and Western troops under the American mercenary Frederick Townsend Ward

routed the Taiping force of about five thousand, inflicting about a thousand casualties

and capturing three hundred prisoners.

From early April to May 1862, the foreign troops cleared out the most important

Taiping strongholds within a thirty-mile radius of Shanghai. British steamships transported from Anqing to Shanghai a new imperial army, called the Huai Army, commanded by a Han Chinese official, Li Hongzhang. In mid-May, however, about ten

thousand Taiping troops engaged these combined forces and forced them to retreat to

Shanghai. By mid-June the Taipings had gathered a force fifty to sixty thousand strong;

they approached Shanghai in twelve columns but were beaten back.

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late August. Opposed by the Huai Army, Ward’s “Ever Victorious Army,” and Brit

and French troops, the Taipings were pushed back. In a series of battles during 22

October 1862, about 2,200 British and French soldiers, 1,500 of Ward’s mercenar

and a division from the Huai Army defeated the Taipings.27 This battle ended the

Taiping threat to Shanghai, and it was the last engagement of the campaign in wh

British and French troops participated.

Although the Taipings launched a final, and ultimately futile, expedition to the n

take Beijing, their hold over the Yangzi Valley became ever more tenuous. With th

of Suzhou in 1864 and the death of Hong on 1 June of that year, the Taiping mov

was doomed. Nanjing’s walls were finally breached on 19 July 1864, and the city s

fell to the imperial forces. Isolated groups of Taipings continued to resist for the 

year and a half, but on 9 February 1866 the last Taiping detachment was finally

defeated.

Simultaneous with the Taiping defeat, the final step in Britain’s fight against East 

piracy was taken, when in 1866 the British government adopted new laws that all 

entering Hong Kong harbor had to buy licenses and all ships leaving the port had 

obtain clearance permits. Strict penalties were adopted for anyone helping, armin

protecting pirates or dealing in stolen goods. Finally, fishing and trading vessels w

prohibited from carrying arms.28

If the Qing victory guaranteed the survival of the Manchu government in Beijing

price China paid included giving foreign merchants unimpeded access to the Yan

River basin. Granting foreigners direct naval access to China’s interior violated o

the nation’s oldest and most important coastal-defense traditions. The Lay-Osbo

fleet project, though abortive, showed that China was at last willing to consider mo

izing its naval forces. Its primary reason had been to gain foreign assistance in 

ting down the Taipings, but the government soon realized the necessity of buildi

indigenous, modern navy to patrol China’s coastline against pirates.

Conclusions

The Qing dynasty narrowly survived the Taiping Rebellion. In return for trade co

sions along the Yangzi River, foreign powers sided with the Manchus and used th

superior military might to oppose the Taipings. By playing the two sides against 

other, the Manchus were able to defeat the Taipings while granting to the Wester

nations only nominally greater trade advantages than they had held before, main

areas that were under Taiping control at the time. However, the trading system p

force following the Arrow War would continue unchallenged for the next half a

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had seemed on the verge of collapse.

As a direct result of the Arrow War, new treaties were signed at Tianjin and Beijing

obtaining Chinese cooperation in suppressing piracy. These agreements allowed British

ships to fight pirates not only within China’s territorial seas along its lengthy coastline

but also far inland on the Yangzi. In 1866 the British government invited other nations

to assist in halting piracy in China; “Prussia, Russia, Austria, Holland, the United

States, Portugal, France, Spain and Italy pledged support.” For the first time, China also

succeeded in purchasing modern steamships and organizing them against the pirates

“under one distinguishing flag—a yellow flag with a red dragon on it.”29

On its own initiative, China began to sign bilateral treaties with foreign nations to control piracy: “Between 1861 and 1869 China negotiated agreements with six [sic] other

Western nations, Prussia, 1861, Denmark, 1863, the Netherlands, 1863, Spain, 1864,

Belgium, 1865, Italy, 1866, and Austria-Hungary, 1869, each of which dealt in some

measure with the problem of Chinese pirates.” By exposing merchants who bought

pirate spoils, the 1866 “ordinance, amended in 1867 and restated in 1868, was the

greatest blow ever struck at piracy as it brought within legal restriction the haunts and

stores of the robbers and the native dealers in marine supplies.” Meanwhile, the registration of Chinese ships, which began in 1869, meant that vessels caught assisting

pirates could be impounded and that piracy losses were spread to the other “members

of the same tything and shipping division in proportion to the degree of their responsi

bility.”30 This mutual responsibility system exerted real social pressure within China to

halt piracy, and it proved an extremely effective deterrent until the very last years of the

Qing empire in the early twentieth century.

Notes

1. Sir John Francis Davis, China, During the

War and Since the Peace (Wilmington, Del.:

Scholarly Resources, 1972), pp. 18–19.

2. Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the

Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism

in Nineteenth-Century South-East Asia (Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire, 1963),

p. 214.

3. Grace Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates, 1832–1869 (Westport, Conn.:

Hyperion, 1973), pp. 118–22.

4. For a discussion of the Hakka’s military

prowess, see Mary S. Erbaugh, “The Hakka

Paradox in the People’s Republic of China:

Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence,” in

Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and

Abroad, ed. Nichole Constable (Seattle: Univ

of Washington Press, 1996), pp. 211–14.

5. C. A. Curwen, Taiping Rebel: The Deposition

of Li Hsiu-ch’eng (London: Cambridge Univ

Press, 1977), p. 79.

6. The Taiping Revolution (Peking: Foreign

Languages, 1976), p. 16.

7. C. A. Curwen, “Taiping Relations with Secre

Societies and with Other Rebels,” in Popular

Movements and Secret Societies in China,

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Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 65–84.

8. Jen Yu-wen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,

1973), pp. 45–48.

9. Augustus Lindley, Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh: The

History of the Ti-Ping Revolution (New York:

Praeger, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 137–38.

10. Ssu-yü Teng, New Light on the History of the

Taiping Rebellion (New York: Russell and

Russell, 1966), p. 61.

11. Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates,

p. 123.

12. Available at Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman

Law Library—The Avalon Project, Documents

in Law, History, and Diplomacy, www.yale

.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/decparis.htm.

13. Douglas Hurd, The Arrow War: An AngloChinese Confusion, 1856–1860 (London: Collins, 1967), p. 21.

14. Gerald S. Graham, The China Station: War

and Diplomacy 1830–1860 (Oxford, U.K.:

Clarendon, 1978), p. 303.

15. Ibid., p. 317.

16. J. Y. Wong, Yeh Ming-ch’en, Viceroy of Liang

Kuang, 1852–8 (London: Cambridge Univ.

Press, 1976), p. 187.

17. For a detailed description of these negotiations, see Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The

Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 46–70.

18. Sr. M. Pampson, “Piracy in China,” confidential memorandum to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 29 November 1927, Australian National

Archives, Canberra, series A981 (A981/4),

Control: CHIN 28, China-Piracy.

20. Graham, China Station, pp. 375–77.

21. Ibid., p. 383.

22. Michael Mann, China, 1860 (Londo

chael Russell, 1989), p. 80.

23. Graham, China Station, p. 400.

24. Harry Miller, Pirates of the Far East (

Robert Hale, 1970), p. 151.

25. For an example of the Lay-Osborn fl

Flags of the World, www.fotw.net/flag

cn~lo.html. Although the origins are 

clear, apparently green and yellow we

colors of Charles George “Chinese”

Gordon’s family tartan; perhaps he h

choose them. Since China did not ha

tional flag, Prince Gong ordered that 

gular flag bearing a dragon design sh

flown by all Chinese warships. For ea

amples of Chinese naval flags, see fla

.net/flags/cn-dragn.html#1844 (whic

to the Flags of the World site noted ab

26. Yu Zufan, Zhongguo Jiandui Shi Lu [T

Record of the Chinese Fleet] (Shenya

Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1997), p

cited in Bruce A. Elleman, “The Neg

Nadir of Chinese Maritime Policy un

Qing,” in China Goes to Sea: Maritim

Transformation in Comparative Histo

Perspective, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, L

Goldstein, and Carnes Lord (Annapo

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp

317; p. 303.

27. Jen, Taiping Revolutionary Movement

28. Miller, Pirates of the Far East, p. 152.

29. Ibid., pp. 151–52.

30. Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pir

145–82.

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Selamat Datang, Kapitan

Post–World War II Piracy in the South China Sea

CHARLES W. KOBURGER, JR.

For well over a century,* from at least the mid-nineteenth century, East Asian wa

were policed by European nations, including at various times Spain, Portugal, th

Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. Britain had arguably done the lion’s shar

during the Pax Britannica maritime piracy almost became a thing of the past. All 

this changed after the end of World War II, with the traditional European securit

viders sapped by six years of constant warfare. As a result, piracy rapidly increase

throughout the region.

During the Pax Britannica, British sloops and gunboats fought pirates whenever 

were found, often pursuing, attacking, and capturing pirate ships, and when this 

not possible, sending landing parties to destroy the coastal villages that supporte

pirates, driving the men into the jungle, burning the houses, breaking up boats, a

destroying nets. The theory of “hot pursuit” allowed the British ships to follow su

pected pirates into territorial waters, even up a country’s internal rivers. Nowher

seemed out of reach of the Royal Navy.

After World War II, however, this all changed, as newly created nations througho

Far East began to assert their rights, including their right to deny foreign access i

their sovereign waters. Certain areas remained under direct foreign control, inclu

that of the United States in the Philippines; of the British in Malaya, Singapore, a

Borneo; of the Dutch in the East Indies; and of the French in Indochina. But ove

even these countries gained greater autonomy, many of them full independence. 

new countries were not usually much concerned with suppressing piracy, which 

too often seen as a patriotic reaction against global commerce. So the internation

machinery for suppressing piracy became largely impotent, and cases of piracy so

The South China Sea and adjoining waters, in particular, saw an enormous grow

* Selamat datang, Malay for “good morning,” is often heard on the waterfront in Singapore.

CHAPTER FOUR

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otism, traditional family or clan practices, or simply the urge to make a quick buck.

South China Sea Piracy

On first examination, the South China Sea looks like a large, unbroken expanse of

water. However, it is actually full of small islands, shoals, reefs, and rocks, many of

them marked on charts as “dangerous waters.” Although the islands are small in size,

there are many island groupings, including the Tambelans, the Karimatas, the Rious,

the Linggas, the Natunas, the Anambas, the Tawis, the Paracels, the Poulo Condores,

and the Spratlys, to name just a few.

In terms of geography, Hong Kong and Manila lie at the top of the South China Sea,

cities like Saigon and Bangkok inhabit the middle, and the island nation of Singapore i

at the farthest western extreme. From Hong Kong it is 1,460 miles to Singapore, from

Manila 1,330 miles. The waters between are claimed, either entirely or in part, by many

countries, including China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. China, in particular, has claimed the entire South

China Sea, as has Taiwan; China has occupied the Paracel Islands and several atolls in

the Spratlys, but Taiwan controls the Pratas Islands and Itu Aba (Taiping Island), the

largest island in the entire South China Sea. In addition to land disputes, there are constant arguments over fishing and mineral rights.

During the interwar years, the British kept piracy to a minimum, but during World

War II the entire region was once again full of petty pirates; the Japanese and the Allies

were too busy fighting each other to patrol the sea-lanes. Most ships transiting the

South China Sea from the north came by way of Hong Kong or Manila, while those

from the south came by way of Singapore. Unlike the Malacca Strait and waters near

Singapore, which are relatively crowded, the nearly empty South China Sea lacked

enforcement by strong regional governments, so there was virtually no established law

and order in those waters. During the immediate post–World War II period much of

the South China Sea was a violent, scarcely regulated no-man’s-land, in which pirates

could operate with relative impunity.

Soon after the war ended, the United States and the Philippines jointly turned against

the Moro pirates, and the British tried to reassert their control over Singapore and the

Malacca Strait, as did the French over Indochina and the Dutch over the East Indies.

However, the trend toward decolonization undermined many of these countries’

antipiracy efforts. With the formal independence of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,

and the Philippines, piracy flourished; it took a decade or more for these newly created

states to return the region to some degree of equilibrium. In particular, local authority

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ber of small but fast boats rapidly grew—“Already after World War II, the availab

of American surplus outboard engines in the Sulu region gave pirates there the m

and equipment with which to overtake their victims at sea.”1

Spurred by these innovations, by 1950 the Moros in the Philippines became activ

again. Isabelo “Beloy” Montemayor even became a local hero of sorts. From his b

Cebu he carried on a successful smuggling and raiding organization for almost tw

decades before his capture in 1975: “During night-time raids, Montemayor and h

accomplices attacked and raided fish carrier boats and other inter-island vessels,

including passenger vessels.”2

There were many more attacks in the 1980s, includ

one in August 1981 on the 135-ton Nuria 767.3

Australian Involvement against Piracy

North Borneo also saw a particularly rapid increase in piracy. Between 1959 and 

British officials recorded 232 pirate attacks, and many more probably went unrep

In addition to attacking ships, these pirates would raid coastal towns: “In 1962 al

there were 20 armed raids on the coast of British North Borneo which left at leas

people dead and many more injured.” The ethnic background of the pirates, kno

“Tawi-tawi,” was unclear, but they may have been descended from “the Samal pir

who settled there after the Spanish in 1848 sacked their strongholds on the island 

Balangingi east of Jolo in the heart of the Sulu Archipelago.”4

Beginning in 1957, the Australian government became concerned about piracy in 

immediate neighborhood, in particular to the near north, “on account of the gro

chaos in Indonesia.” The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) agreed to conduct antipir

operations off North Borneo, as requested by the Commander in Chief, Far East 

tion, in December of that year. But to “avoid the probability of becoming involve

incidents with Indonesia, we should not carry out antipiracy patrol duties in the 

nal and Territorial waters claimed by Indonesia. Antipiracy protection, should ho

be given to registered British Ships about whose identity there can be doubt, whi

the High Seas as recognized by us; that is, up to the 3 mile limit of Territorial wat

An “appendix” to the RAN directive, furthermore, made it clear that the intentio

to protect “British merchant ships only.”6

However, a supplementary directive wa

debated that would have authorized RAN ships to oppose pirates off of Borneo. O

December 1959, D. W. Nichols, Esq., of the Australian Commission, Singapore,

reported on a recent compilation of fifty-odd piracy cases: “The general picture 

it is one of piracy purely for profit with no political motive or significance, and i

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this kind of menace.”7

Piracy rates were high in this area. Between 1 November 1958 and October 1959, fiftyfour piracies were reported (see table 1). Only three led to arrests and conviction.

Eighty-three percent were from May to August, since this is “the period of fair weather

in the Sulu and Celebes Seas which gives way to the boisterous northeast monsoon in

the last quarter of the year.” Almost all of the victims were Indonesian vessels on voyages to Tawau, and most piracies took place east of the island of Si-Amil (04°18' north,

118°53' west). Lost cargo was mainly copra (dried coconut) but also some nutmeg and

spices. Total losses exceeded US$200,000. Most of the pirates—a total of thirty-two—

were described as using Filipino or Suluk motor kumpits, or speedboats. All cases in

this list appeared to be carried out by Suluk natives of the southern Philippines.8

The pirates were well armed. In twenty-eight cases they showed weapons or ammunition, in fourteen they used firearms or bombs, and in only nine were no arms visible

(although that does not necessarily mean the pirates did not have them). Weapons

included “shotguns, Garrand rifles, carbines, Sten guns, Bren guns, pistols, and fish

bombs (i.e., homemade bombs for stunning fish, illegal in North Borneo but traditional in the area).”9

Territorial disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia made piracy suppression difficult.

To counter the piracy threat, during spring 1960 HMAS Tobruk was assigned to carry

out patrols of the Sulu Archipelago, followed by HMAS Anzac in June, HMS Crane in

1958 November 1

1959 January 2

April 1

May 12

June 12

July 2

August 19

September 4

October 1

Total 54

“Proposed Use of RAN Ships on Anti-piracy Operations off North Borneo,” supplementary directive of February 1958

on conduct of HMA ships in Indonesian waters, rescinded on 2 August 1960, Australian National Archives,

Canberra, series A1838 (A1838/369).

TABLE 1

Piracy Reports between 1 November 1958 and October 1959

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trade, what “in the Indonesian eyes would be deemed to be the protection of illeg

traffic conducted by dissidents in armed revolt against their Government.” Also, 

Australian government was concerned that its ships not become involved in an in

with Indonesia over the latter’s sovereign waters. For this reason, all such patrols 

be on the high seas or in British waters, not in sea territory claimed by Indonesia

After Crane finished its final patrol, Australian antipiracy patrols were disconti

It was envisioned that if future patrols were ever carried out, “it might be desirab

enlist the cooperation both of the Philipinos [sic] and the Indonesians.” But, th

would not “in any way [have] implied recognition of Indonesia’s claim in relation 

her territorial waters.” Piracy had occurred on high seas and “also outside the arc 

Indonesia’s claim.”11

Another group of modern pirates in the area were the Tausug, from Jolo. These y

men considered piracy a traditional practice that allowed them to demonstrate “

regarded virtues such as bravado, honour, masculinity and magnanimity.” Instea

taking slaves, as their forefathers had, the modern Tausug pirates focused on “cat

money, jewellery, weapons, brass work and gongs,” plus “shoes, watches, transisto

radios and sewing machines.” One name given to local pirates was “jump buddie

because they often forced victims to jump overboard, presumably to drown. The 

ippine Archipelago, in particular, was considered a dangerous region.12

In terms of the levels of violence and human suffering, however, the Sulu region 

out in the 1960s as probably the most dangerous in the world. Not only are pirac

maritime raiding culturally sanctioned among some maritime communities, but 

lence is triggered by a proliferation of firearms, including modern automatic wea

since World War II. Moreover, many of the Muslim groups who traditionally inh

the Sulu Archipelago are only weakly integrated into, and are even marginalized 

Philippine nation. Piratical activity, in this context, may even be seen as a histori

and religiously justified means of resistance against the attempts by Christians—

whether Spanish, American, or Filipino—to control and dominate.

In fact, piracy has been a growing problem throughout the South China Sea sinc

1950s, and it has often appeared to be linked to government actions. During deco

zation, for example, it seemed as if government-sponsored privateering in Indon

had returned: “Echoes of privateering continued well into the twentieth century. 

raiding, thought to be condoned by Indonesia, was a factor that the Commonwe

naval forces had to take into account during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960

Sukarno’s subsequent policy of Confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the newly cr

Malaysian Federation between 1963 and 1966.”13 Accordingly, the “piratical activ

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nesian regular and irregular forces and linked to international maritime and political

disputes.”14

South China Sea Piracy during the 1970s and 1980s

Small-time pirates in the South China Sea and adjoining waters operated during the

1970s and 1980s in junks, prahus (outrigger sailboats), and dhows, many of them large

enough for the high seas, but the vast majority suitable only for coastal attacks. Often

pirates would board a ship, loot its safe and crew, and disappear before they could be

captured by local authorities. Rape and murder were not uncommon, and there were

many cases of kidnapping and holding of victims for ransom.

Larger pirate organizations, also present in these waters, would hijack ships and sell

their cargoes, usually on the black market. Once a cargo was disposed of, the ship

might be sold or be used to smuggle drugs or illegal emigrants. Referred to as “phantom ships,” they were given new names, different paint schemes, and bogus registrations. Such ships might then be used to conduct legitimate trade or to smuggle, until

the new owners sold them for scrap or scuttled them.

As noted above, pirates were able to obtain a wide range of weapons, mainly army surplus, manufactured in Japan, Britain, or the United States. These included automatic

weapons of all types, and even modern field guns. During one incident, a British submarine surfaced next to a suspicious boat, which then fired on it with a British-made

twenty-five-pounder howitzer. Fortunately the untrained crew missed, and the submarine used its own four-inch deck gun to retaliate, but the danger was real. During May

1975, the U.S.-flagged containership Mayaguez, out of Hong Kong en route to Sattahip

Thailand, was fired on and boarded by a Cambodian gunboat. It was escorted into the

port of Wai and then the next day to Koh Tang. Four days later, the U.S. Air Force,

Navy, and Marines conducted a “cutting out” operation that freed the ship.15

There are many other well known cases of piracy. In August 1981, the ferry Nuria 767

mentioned above was about five hundred miles south of Manila en route to Sabah

when it was hijacked by two stowaway pirates and two crew members. A total of eleven

people were shot, and another twenty-five were drowned. The pirates escaped with

US$380,000 in cash and about $126,000 in cargo. The same year, a Thai pirate group

was reportedly robbing Malay fishermen, holding them and their boats for ransom.

Since the boundary between the two countries was unclear, it was difficult for the

Malay fishermen to avoid capture by pirates. Fortunately, Malay and Thai police were

able to break up the ring.16

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of that year the 29,960-ton tanker Corsicana was boarded at the same place; pirat

armed with machetes and knives forced the captain to open his cabin safe. Durin

tember, the captain of the forty-thousand-ton Mammoth Monarch left the bridge 

visit his cabin, only to find “his cabin ransacked, the safe gone, and a length of ro

(cut from a convenient reel) hung over the stern.”17

A total of twenty-one pirate attacks were recorded in this area during 1981 alone

incidents tended to be armed robberies, and the pirates did not attempt to hijack 

ships or sell their contents. In a typical instance, a small number of pirates, perha

half a dozen at the most, would sneak up behind a ship, grapple it, and then boar

rob it. These attacks took place at night; often the pirates could board, steal what 

could find, and then depart again without ever being detected. In extreme cases, 

pirates forced the captain to open the ship’s safe or stole the safe outright if they 

not open it. Such attacks were rapid: “The whole attack will normally not last for 

than 15–20 minutes, after which the pirates leave even if they fail to come across 

booty. They may then move on to other targets, attacking up to three ships or eve

more in a single night’s raiding.”18

Piracy syndicates displayed the most organization when it came to hijacking ship

Reportedly, for as little as US$300,000 a client could point to any ship in the Man

harbor from the rooftop bar at the Pan Pacific Hotel, and a local syndicate would 

arrange for it to be stolen. The ship would be given a new name and registration 

delivered to a predetermined location.19

Shipping Coming from Singapore

In the waters of Southeast Asia, where the Malacca Strait and the South China Se

meet, Singapore is the pivot around which all maritime communication revolves

of the shipping through the South China Sea stops at Singapore, which is the ma

East–West hub and has been for almost two hundred years. Aside from considera

legitimate trade, it has been comparatively easy to choose any rusting, old hulk

anchored along the Phillip Channel, buy papers for it on the Singapore waterfron

crew it from Indonesia, and go into business.

While approximately a third of the world’s trade passes through the Malacca Stra

certain commodities the percentages are much higher; for example, Japan and Ch

obtain most of their crude oil from the Persian Gulf, and virtually all of it must t

that strait. Ships could travel on the southwest side of Sumatra and then pass thr

the Sunda Strait, but that would involve a much more circuitous route, through m

small islands; the other alternative route, through the Lombok Strait and then up

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the Persian Gulf to Japan.

Historically, piracy has been worst for the South China Sea traffic coming from Singapore, since the Malacca Strait acts like a funnel, pushing commercial ships into a small

area. For example, during the nineteenth century pirates preyed on opium being

shipped from India via Singapore. South China Sea piracy syndicates, with representatives in Jakarta, Hong Kong, Nha Be, Bangkok, or Dubai, as well as Singapore, have

access to data on ship routes, cargoes, and departure times. Using this information for

planning purposes, the syndicates can often place their own men on board ships they

want to take over or pay crew members to assist them.

The Phillip Channel, in particular, provides a convenient location to stage an attack.

Although the far end is six hours’ sailing from Singapore, the channel there is full of

merchant ships. Usually twenty-five or more merchantmen pass through every hour;

some are forced to anchor there to conduct repairs or wait their turn at Singapore’s

busy docks. The coastline is mainly mangrove swamps, which provide the perfect cover

and hiding places for fast boats.

The Royal Malaysian Marine Police regularly patrols this area, but it is very difficult to

distinguish the pirates from groups carrying out legitimate business; often pirates are

also fishermen or have some other cover, which makes it even harder to identify them.

In fact, for many centuries piracy was a time-honored way to supplement a fisherman’s

normal income, which is often adversely affected by weather, such as frequent monsoons. Pirates coming from the Indonesian side of the strait make law enforcement

even more difficult, since they can quickly leave Malaysian waters and return to their

own, where the Malaysian authorities cannot follow them.

When the goal is to take control of a ship, the pirates can often seize it before the crew

is even aware that it is being attacked. Once on board, pirates split up; different groups

take control of the bridge, engine room, and radio room. One of the obvious ways to

combat piracy, therefore, is to keep all essential areas locked up, but this is generally no

easy while the ship is under way. Once pirates take control of a ship, their goal is usually to steal money from the ship’s safe, in the captain’s cabin. Depending on the circumstances, the bridge of the ship—which is often sailing at between twelve and

sixteen knots down one of the world’s busiest waterways—is left unattended while they

do so, for many minutes, an hour, or even longer. The danger of a collision, grounding,

or some other disaster is high.

While most of the pirates are simply after a quick profit, others are connected to religious or nationalist organizations. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) fundamentalists in

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eration Front in the Muslim-dominated southern islands in the Philippines. The

terrorist groups and might welcome an international incident as a way of adverti

their causes. One good example of a near disaster involved the French-flagged tan

Chaumont, en route through the Malacca Strait to the Philippines. Passing throu

Phillip Channel, it was boarded by pirates from small boats. While they were con

ing their raid, Chaumont was left to steam out of control for an estimated thirty-

minutes. It was pure chance that the ship did not run aground or collide with

another ship.20

During an incident in September 1992, the ships involved were not so lucky: as a 

of a pirate attack, the twenty-seven-thousand-ton containership Ocean Blessing

rammed the oil tanker Nagasaki Spirit. Although details are hard to discern, it wo

appear that Nagasaki Spirit was under the control of pirates at the time; four mo

later, ten charred corpses, later identified as probably from Nagasaki Spirit, were

located in a cargo vessel, Hai Sin, that was being broken up at the Guangdong Sh

yard in southern China. Hai Sin proved to be the ex–Erria Inge, a missing Austra

flagged bulk carrier that had been pirated the year before.21 These cases were argu

bad enough, but the number of piracy attacks increased even further during the 

1990s, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Piracy after the End of the Cold War

In the years after the Cold War, Southeast Asia experienced some of its most dram

increases in piracy. There are many possible reasons, but one of the most easily id

able was the sudden decrease in the number of warships operating in the region: 

end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR as the second superpower brou

about a general withdrawal of warships, especially so in the Asia-Pacific and the 

Ocean. A lower interest in maritime affairs and a lower number of warships on p

means lower security for licit forms of trade and higher security for illicit activiti

A particularly horrible instance of piracy involved the Panamanian-flagged bulk 

Cheung Son, discussed in chapter 2. In November 1998, it was hijacked in the Sou

China Sea on its way from Shanghai to Malaysia. The twenty-three members of i

were eventually lined up, hooded, clubbed, shot, and stabbed, before being throw

the sea. The ship’s manifest stated that it was carrying furnace slag, which is of lit

commercial value; perhaps the pirates wanted the ship to smuggle other goods.

Another example was Inabukwa, a 980-ton cargo ship registered in Indonesia.

Although almost worthless—the ship was valued at less than US$100,000—it wa

rying a cargo of tin ingots, zinc, and white pepper valued in excess of two million 

lars. After being seized and its crew marooned, the ship steamed for the Philippin

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ship that did not have proper registration. The ship had a newly given name, which no

ship registry carried. Apparently, the pirates had been preparing to off-load the goods

at sea when they had had to put into port for repairs. The coast guard seized the ship.

The pirate syndicate tried and failed to regain it. Eventually, the owner of the cargo

paid fifty thousand U.S. dollars for its return.

The Fu Tai incident occurred in August 1998. The ship was at anchor off Batam Island,

across from Singapore, when pirates boarded it and took control. They gathered the

crew and ordered all overboard but the chief engineer, whom they needed to tend the

engines; many drowned. Fu Tai was reportedly given a new identity and set to running

drugs, from Bangkok across the South China Sea to the Philippines and back again.

According to reports, it rarely went into port, stopping only long enough to off-load

drugs and to take on new supplies.23

Tankers that are attacked are usually carrying refined petroleum, not crude oil, since

the market for crude is highly controlled. A seized tanker is reflagged, given false

papers, and repainted, and then the product is sold. Sometimes the ship is ransomed

back to the owner. If not, after the cargo is sold off the vessel might become a phantom

ship, carrying other petroleum supplies of suspect origin. Eventually, it would be sold

for scrap. Petro Concord—a small, handy, twelve-thousand-ton tanker that usually carried jet fuel, diesel, fuel oil, or gasoline—was one such ship. This ship was hijacked a

remarkable four times in three years.

Efforts to fight pirates can be simple or elaborate. For example, simply waiting for daylight before transiting some of the most dangerous areas has dramatically decreased th

number of attacks. Other solutions have involved installing electrified fences to make it

more difficult for pirates to board. Pirates who do board but find the bridge, engine

room, and radio room locked often leave without taking anything of real value.

Shipowners advise crew members not to try to fight pirates. This is one reason why

most ships do not carry weapons, including firearms. On petroleum tankers, in

particular, any spark can start a fire; even such common household items as mobile

telephones, cigarette lighters, radios, and unauthorized flashlights are usually

prohibited. However, it is “common knowledge that Israeli and Russian ships do carry

firearms and they are seldom declared to port officials. . . . Word gets around. In 2001

not one Russian or Israeli ship was attacked, compared to twenty-seven ships from the

U.S. and the UK.”24

The number of attacks fluctuates from year to year, but in recent years the numbers of

ships attacked in port and at sea have increased. In 2001, for example, the Indonesianflagged tanker Tirta Niaga IV was boarded and robbed while anchored off Aceh’s

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tain’s case for thirty thousand U.S. dollars. Following this incident there was a ra

increase of similar crimes in the area.25

Fear of terrorist attacks has also increased, especially after reports suggested that 

2003 terrorists had hijacked Dewi Madrim, a small tanker, to practice navigation 

Malacca Strait; the ship’s owner claimed, however, that it had been simply a pirat

attack and that the captors had maneuvered the ship to “stop it colliding with oth

ships or running aground while they stole what they could from it.”26 Elsewhere t

pirates have been more brutal, as in the 5 January 2004 hijacking of the Indonesi

tanker Cherry 201, in which four of the sixteen crew members were eventually ki

However, despite the potential for a maritime terrorist attack, all “evidence that

Islamist terrorists are plotting a maritime terrorist attack in Southeast Asia is mo

circumstantial.”27

While it is difficult to know for sure, pirates at the northern entrance to the Mala

Strait may be connected to the Free Aceh Movement. Whereas pirates in the sout

region of the Malacca Strait seem to take care not to attack Indonesian ships, in t

north a large proportion of the victims are Indonesian-flagged, which may reflec

separatist goals of the pirates. Following the 26 December 2004 earthquake and t

mis, however, piracy cases plummeted for several months. This was due not only 

destruction of the pirates’ equipment but also to the large number of foreign mil

vessels in the region providing humanitarian aid. The U.S. Navy, for example, sen

fifteen thousand sailors and some twenty-five warships into the region, which co

not help but have an impact on security in the region.28

Unfortunately, as the foreign ships left the piracy once again began to increase: “

the end of February 2005, piratical activity resumed off the Acehnese coast, still c

terized by shootings, kidnappings and generally high levels of violence.” On 15 A

2005, however, GAM and Indonesia signed a peace treaty and piracy attacks cont

which has led some scholars to suspect that local pirates could be posing as GAM 

might be its supporters acting independently of higher authority.29

Conclusions

In recent years, piracy in the South China Sea has been on the increase. Singapor

authorities have taken steps to halt piracy in their region, with some success. How

the surrounding waters remain unsafe, in particular in areas adjacent to Indones

which pirates can retreat and where they can easily hide. To add to the problems 

ent in controlling piracy, only an estimated 30–40 percent of pirate attacks on co

cial ships are reported. There are many reasons for this reluctance, including the 

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police while they are investigating the crime, but the end result is that the true extent o

the piracy is difficult to gauge accurately.

Although international shippers are the most important single group of users of the

South China Sea, they are by no means alone. Numerous junks, prahus, sampans,

dhows, coastal freighters, and barges also use these waters. Some are local craft, many

of them fishing boats, while others carry commercial goods strictly within the region.

Because of the large number of vessels, as well as their almost infinite variety, it is

impossible to tell a pirate ship from a legitimate fisherman or small commercial vessel.

As a result, the number of piracies carried out against small craft, including fishermen,

regional shipping, and local boats involved in “barter trade,” is almost surely greater

than that of pirates carried out against commercial ships.

The biggest single problem with patrolling these waters effectively arises from the continued disputes over sovereignty, discussed at greater length in the next chapter; most

of the South China Sea is claimed by more than one country. The lack of defined borders makes locating and capturing pirates extremely difficult, especially if the pirates

flee into an unfriendly country’s waters. Until international efforts can be organized to

halt piracy attacks, there is no reason to believe that they will end. In particular, the

international maritime rules of engagement must be changed to allow police to enter a

neighboring country’s sea territory in “hot pursuit.” Until then pirates will always enjoy

a clear advantage.

Notes

1. Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern

History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian

Studies, 2006), p. 59.

2. Ibid., p. 37.

3. Roger Villar, Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980 (London: Conway

Maritime, 1985), p. 32.

4. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 38–39.

5. “Proposed Use of RAN Ships on Anti Piracy

Operations off North Borneo,” 1 October

1959, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australia, Series number A1838, Control Symbol 682/23/1/2, Secret (declassified

9 December 2004).

6. 17 July 1959, Australian National Archives,

Canberra, Secret 682/23/1/2.

7. “Proposed Use of RAN Ships on Anti-piracy

Operations off North Borneo,” supplementary directive of February 1958 on conduct

of HMA ships in Indonesian waters, rescinded on 2 August 1960, Australian National Archives, Canberra, series A1838

(A1838/369).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. “Anti-piracy Patrols off North East Borneo,

Memorandum by C-in-C Far East Station,

24 August 1959,” 27 August 1959, Australian

National Archives, Canberra, Secret

DCC(FE)(59)207.

11. Ibid.

12. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 40–44.

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racy in Southeast Asia,” in A Cooperative

Monitoring Regime for the South China Sea:

Satellite Imagery, Confidence-building Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes, ed.

John C. Baker and David G. Wiencek

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 165, citing

Michael Pugh, “Piracy and Armed Robbery

at Sea: Problems and Remedies,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2, no. 1

(1993), p. 2.

14. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 61 note 26.

15. Roy Rowan, The Four Days of Mayaguez

(New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).

16. Villar, Piracy Today, p. 140.

17. Ibid., p. 140, 25.

18. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 46–47.

19. John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern

Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (New

York: Dutton, 2002), pp. 225–26.

20. Ibid., pp. 146–48.

22. Peter Lehr, ed., Violence at Sea: Piracy 

Age of Global Terrorism (London: Ro

2007), p. viii.

23. Burnett, Dangerous Waters, pp. 216–2

24. Ibid., p. 88.

25. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 51–53.

26. Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Pi

Maritime Terrorism: The Threat of In

tional Security, IISS Adelphi Paper 38

don: Routledge, 2007), p. 8, citing Ch

Cragonette, “Maritime Legends,” Bul

the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 5 (Septem

October 2006), p. 18.

27. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 117–24

28. See Bruce A. Elleman, Waves of Hope

U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami i

Northern Indonesia, Newport Paper 2

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College P

February 2007).

29. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, pp. 53–57.

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The Political Economy of Piracy in the

South China Sea

DAVID ROSENBERG

Piracy is an ancient, persistent, and elusive phenomenon in the South China Sea. 

past two decades it has increased substantially, leading to a renewed interest in pi

and its possible nexus with maritime terrorism, especially after the 11 September 

attacks on the United States. Although it has been widely reported and investigat

piracy remains difficult to understand and to control. The oceans are “a domain

increasingly beyond governmental control,” says William Langewiesche. They are 

and wild, where laws of nations mean little and where the resilient pathogens of 

and terrorism flourish.”1

In the Asia-Pacific region, “maritime disorder prevails,”

observes Sam Bateman. “This includes unregulated pollution of the marine

environment, over-fishing, marine environmental degradation and widespread 

activities at sea.”2

This chapter attempts to analyze piracy through the perspective of political econ

with an emphasis on state and market stakeholders and on the economic, techno

cal, and institutional factors affecting ocean governance of piracy. The major are

concern here is the South China Sea, where approximately half of the world’s rep

incidents of piracy have taken place since the 1990s. Following the usage of the In

tional Maritime Bureau (IMB), this estimate includes instances of both piracy as

defined under international law—theft on the high seas—and armed robbery or 

in the territorial waters or ports of coastal states.3

This chapter will examine the scope and trends in piracy in the South China Se

well as the factors that motivate this form of maritime crime. It continues with a

ysis of the factors that impede antipiracy efforts, including uncertainties over def

tions and legal jurisdiction, the underlying dynamics of piracy, and uncoordinate

efforts at detection, pursuit, arrest, and conviction of pirates as well as recovery o

cargo, or ships. It concludes with an analysis of the limited progress made by stat

CHAPTER FIVE

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South China Sea.

Maritime Trade and Shipping Traffic

The most important factor affecting piracy and government efforts to interdict pirates

is the dramatic increase in shipping traffic. Maritime trade through the South China

Sea has expanded rapidly in recent years, due to three major, long-term trends: the high

growth rates of regional economies and increasing trade flows among them, rising energy

demand and energy imports, and the automation of cargo handling in hub ports.

Seaborne trade has doubled every decade since 1945, and shipbuilding tonnage worldwide has doubled since 1990. It is estimated that 80 percent of all world trade, or about

5.7 billion tons of cargo, is transported by sea. This maritime superhighway in the

world economy is supported by a massive infrastructure, including ninety-three thousand merchant vessels with 1.25 million seamen bound for eight thousand ports.4

Intra-Asian trade is growing more quickly than transpacific trade. For example, in 2003

South Korea’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the United States for the first

time. In 2004, Japan’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the United States for

the first time. More and more Asian states are reorienting their trade flows toward

China. The several explanations for this trend include the recovery of Asian economies

from the 1997 economic crisis, the dynamic China market, and trade-opening agreements between China and Southeast Asia.5

Asian countries had the largest share of the total tonnage of seaborne world exports in

2006, at 38.8 percent. Exports of crude oil from western Asia and manufactured goods

from China and other countries of East and Southeast Asia contributed to this result.

European countries accounted for 21.8 percent of world export tonnage, with the

major share coming from countries belonging to the European Union. Industrialized

countries in North America and developing countries in the Americas made up 21.1

percent of world export tonnage; the latter accounted for about two-thirds of the total

tonnage for the hemisphere, owing to their considerable exports of crude oil, iron ore,

coal, and grains. Africa’s and Oceania’s shares of overall world tonnage exported were

8.5 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively.6

Of the world’s twenty busiest container-handling ports in the past five years, Asian

ports accounted for the top six: Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Busan,

and Kaohsiung. The top twenty busiest global ports generally also include Port Klang

and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, Tanjungpriok in Indonesia, Laem Chabang in Thailand, and Manila in the Philippines.7

The rapid growth of maritime trade has created

enormous pressures for hub ports and shipping companies to speed up shipping traffic

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including containerization, automation of cargo handling, and increased ship siz

Oil tanker traffic—already high—will increase substantially with the projected in

in Chinese oil imports. Almost all of this additional Asian oil demand, as well as 

oil needs, will be imported from the Middle East and Africa. Most tankers pass th

the strategic Malacca Strait into the South China Sea. About sixty-five thousand 

of all types passed through the Malacca Strait in 2005.

This rise in shipping has also created a corresponding increase in the risks of con

tion and delay, collision, and crime, including in particular all forms of piracy, es

cially in the narrow and shallow choke points of the South China Sea. Clearly, th

growing concern among coastal states and user states to ensure speedy and safe p

through the shipping lanes of the South China Sea. Efforts to halt piracy have be

mied, however, by differing views of what constitutes piracy and as to which cou

should have jurisdiction over stopping it in highly disputed waters.

The Detection, Cost, and Prevention of Piracy

Despite the problem of defining piracy and determining which stakeholder shou

responsible for stopping it, several widespread generalizations about piracy set it 

from other maritime activities. These include the link between growing shipping 

ume and piracy, economic drivers (such as poverty), the role of organized crime, 

the role that law enforcement agencies on land can play in stopping piracy.

First, the more the shipping, all things being equal, the more the opportunities for 

As shipping volume and velocity increase, targets of opportunity increase for pirate

seize valuable and accessible cargo from ships in port or at sea. Globalization has n

only accelerated world trade. It has also seen a move to the use of flag-of-conven

shipping and a privatization of port cargo-handling services. It is increasingly di

for port officials to distinguish legal from illegal trade, especially among the cont

of millions of containers passing through their ports. All these factors enhance th

opportunities for illegal trade in pirated goods.

Second, “piracy is largely driven by poor economic conditions.”8

“The vast maj

of lower-end piracy . . . is largely motivated by poverty and disenfranchisement t

afflicts vulnerable targets like fishermen and local traders.”9

Sudden and severe im

erishment, especially among marginal coastal seafaring communities, makes pira

viable way to meet basic needs. For example, the big increase in the number of pi

attacks in Indonesia’s waters and ports in the past ten years may be attributed to 

sharp economic downturn and domestic instability in the wake of the 1997 curre

crisis. Eric Frecon has interviewed one poor migrant from a poor Indonesian kam

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poor. So, we went to pillage the areas [around] Singapore.”10

In times of economic hardship piracy is still viable for some traditional maritime peoples. This helps to explain why most acts of piracy involve petty theft from ships in

ports or anchorages. According to one study, in 2002, 77 percent of all attacks occurred

in ports.11 Economic duress also makes impoverished fishermen more vulnerable to

and available for recruitment by entrepreneurial criminal organizations. Piracy will

continue as long as poverty and unemployment persist.

Third, there is a small but increasing amount of piracy by organized criminal groups.

This may be attributed in large part to the increasingly lucrative cargoes created by the

economic dynamism of the region. There has been some increase in the kidnapping of

crew members for ransom and in theft of bulk cargo. More attackers are armed, more

crew members are injured, and more vessels are being hijacked. The role of organized

crime in large-scale piracy is indicated by the sophisticated equipment, skilled labor,

and managerial infrastructure necessary to transfer commodities on a global scale.

Fourth, all maritime piracy begins and ends on land. Whether they are poor seafarers

or criminal gangsters, pirates are recruited and based on shore. Ultimately, their booty

must be “fenced” on land. Whatever is taken at sea eventually arrives at a port. This

requires official documentation. In the case of pirated goods, this means reliable false

documentation. Officials have to be persuaded to look the other way; their corruption

is essential to the routine transfer of contraband. Hence, effective antipiracy measures

need more than maritime security measures; they also need close coordination with

national law enforcement authorities and anticorruption agencies.

How costly is the piracy threat to shipping through the South China Sea? James Warren

of the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore has claimed that

piracy in the (Southeast Asia) region has cost the world economy a staggering twentyfive billion U.S. dollars a year.12 Stanley Weeks notes that “piracy raises insurance rates,

restricts free trade, increases tensions between the affected littoral states, their neighbors and the countries whose flagged ships are attacked or hijacked.”13

Coastal states have been under considerable pressure from user states to provide safe

and secure navigation through the South China Sea, especially in narrow choke points

such as the Malacca Strait. The coastal states, particularly Indonesia, have been

described in the media as not doing enough to suppress piracy. Also, despite the clear

threat that piracy appears to offer, shipowners have not taken much action to stop it.

This is perhaps explained by the high cost of preventive measures. The Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, has stated that

new security measures to counter the threat of terrorist attacks will require an initial

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ing costs by US$730 million.14

In economic terms, however, the relatively low cost of piracy may not warrant su

expensive preventive measures. A closer examination of the data on piracy shows 

the problem might not be as alarming as sometimes portrayed by the media, at le

not in economic terms. For example, in 2005 over sixty-three thousand ships sail

through the Malacca and Singapore straits. In the same year, the IMB reported on

twelve cases of actual and attempted attacks on ships in the straits. Hence, the pr

ity of attack in 2005 was a relatively low 0.019 percent, or nineteen out of a hund

thousand. In 2003, in the heavily trafficked Malacca Strait—frequently referred t

one of the most “pirate infested” seas of the world—the risk of a transiting ship b

attacked was less than 0.001 percent.

Moreover, many of these reported piracy attacks were little more than cases of pe

theft against ships at anchor in port, and most piracy victims are themselves poo

ermen and traders. Considering the relatively minor costs, many shipowners may 

be reluctant to report pirate attacks to the authorities or otherwise assist in the in

gation of pirate attacks. Apart from reflecting badly on the company’s image, rep

a pirate attack may cause the victim vessel to be detained in harbor for investigat

The cost of such delays—varying from five to twenty-five thousand U.S. dollars p

day—may easily exceed the losses incurred by a pirate attack. If suspected pirates 

arrested, crew members of the victim ship may be unable or unwilling to bear th

expense or risk of testifying at the trial.

Many low-cost antipiracy measures are available, such as equipping the superstru

with proper locks and providing antipiracy training. However, shipowners and in

ance companies have little economic incentive to implement antipiracy measures

trary to the popular impression from news media reports, most shipowners have 

seen piracy as a menace to international shipping. Ultimately, “repelling intruder

becomes a cost-benefit analysis for ship-owners.”15 Shipowners and shipping com

nies don’t adopt antipiracy measures because they don’t find it worth the cost.

Arrest and Conviction of Pirates

Piracy is related to other criminal activity in and around ships and ports, and it o

overlaps other crimes. The arrest and conviction of pirates, smugglers, drug runn

and terrorists—both politically and economically motivated—are in many ways 

connected. In particular, the proceeds from all of these crimes eventually end up 

land, which means that responsibility for stopping piracy must ultimately includ

enforcement authorities on land.

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illicit import of illegal drugs, contraband, stowaways and aliens, restricted or prohibited merchandise, and munitions. Metropolitan areas near major seaports often have

the highest rates of motor vehicle theft. Stolen cars and computers are reported among

the most lucrative illegal trade from rich countries to poor countries.16 Smuggling may

also be a precondition for piracy, by providing the essential goods and services of weap

ons, speedboats, port access, and illegal markets to dispose of pirated goods. Hence,

piracy may represent only one aspect of criminality. Widespread poverty around the

Malacca Strait also generates smugglers, procurers, prostitutes, and other criminals.

Port authorities are understandably more concerned about smuggling and illegal

imports—the most common maritime crimes—than about piracy. Smuggling and illegal importation occur whenever ships unload goods illegally, in areas where they are

prohibited, thereby violating states’ embargo or import quotas. Hence, embargoed Iraq

oil found its way to energy importers in Asia, and black-market Marlboro cigarettes

evade import duties in many porous ports. It is possible that a shipper may be unaware

of an illegal cargo; that is the responsibility of the cargo owner or customs broker.

Given the rapid speed and volume of trade flows, it is extremely difficult to detect and

detain prohibited shipments. On the contrary, there are substantial pressures on port

authorities to expedite shipments across their borders, especially in large, hub ports.

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, links between terrorism and

piracy have been extensively examined.17 However, maritime terrorist attacks or

threats—that is, politically or ideologically motivated attacks against ships—have been

scarce around the South China Sea. Those few that have occurred were within the terri

torial waters of coastal states. For example, Singapore foiled a terrorist plot in 2002 to

hit visiting U.S. Navy vessels using a small boat rigged with explosives. The most notable maritime attack to date was carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on

Superferry 14 in Manila Bay in February 2004; 116 people were killed or missing and

presumed dead. However, it is not clear whether the attack was primarily motivated by

ASG in pursuit of its political objectives. ASG was later found to have sent an extortion

letter prior to the bombing, suggesting that it had been motivated by economic factors

There are some notable obstacles to staging a successful terrorist attack in the South

China Sea. Targets are less accessible at sea. A maritime terrorist attack would require

very complex and expensive coordination of efforts. An attack, even if successful, could

be much less visible than a terrorist attack on land. So far, there have been no terrorist

attacks or hijacking attempts in the South China Sea, compared with dozens of terrorist attacks against churches, hotels, and other land-based targets. Overall, the probability of a maritime terrorist attack appears low. However, the total costs of a major

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been scarce, terrorist attacks on a ferry or cruise ship might have dramatic public

impacts: the low probability times the high possible cost still makes maritime ter

a substantial risk. To date, there has not been a clear relationship between piracy 

terrorism.

Arresting and convicting pirates in the South China Sea is a major concern for

nonregional countries with major shipping and naval interests, such as the Unite

States, Japan, India, and Australia. They want to maintain freedom of navigation

through the straits and sea-lanes of the South China Sea for oil tankers, containe

and naval vessels. The South China Sea is the main thoroughfare between the Pac

Ocean and the Indian Ocean and is therefore of great strategic significance. The 

States sends its warships, including aircraft carriers from its Pacific Fleet, through 

South China Sea in support of military missions in the Arabian Sea and Persian G

The South China Sea is the vital artery that connects America’s prime Asian ally, 

with its Middle East energy suppliers.

Coastal states with extensive coastlines, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, an

China, mainly want to protect their recently declared sovereign rights and resour

control over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) up to two hundred nautical miles 

their respective coastlines, as provided by the United Nations Convention on the 

of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). They have also taken on the political responsibility f

controlling piracy along with their claims of economic control in their EEZs. For

example, Indonesia will not allow any country or private security firm to guard i

national ships passing through the Malacca Strait on its side of the waterway. Ibn

Hadi, the Director for Asia Pacific and Africa Inter-Regional Cooperation at the 

nesian Foreign Ministry, has said, “Indonesia will strongly object to any security 

escorting ships in its waters. Indonesia cannot accept foreign ships escorted by fo

security guards.”18

Coastal countries also want to assert their sovereign rights to protect tourism, fis

and other environmental resources in their territorial waters and EEZs. However

coastal Southeast Asian nations want to share with international shippers the bu

providing safety of navigation. Overall, this situation presents a dilemma for use

with high concerns over piracy as to whether and how to demand accountability 

the coastal states with political responsibility for maritime security where interna

sea-lanes traverse their territorial waters. The dilemma is complicated by other p

concerns for countries bordering the South China Sea, such as smuggling, traffic

poaching, and pollution.

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concern for coastal states. For centuries, the South China Sea has provided abundant

fisheries offering food security and employment opportunities for coastal countries.

However, as coastal urban populations have grown and as fishing technology has

improved, competition for shared fish stocks has intensified considerably.

There is massive illegal fishing, in the form of unregistered foreign vessels who “pirate”

the seas. Foreign fishing boats intruding in rich regional fishing grounds are especially

vulnerable and attractive targets for pirates. Eduardo Santos asserts that pirates in the

southern Philippines prey more on marginal fishermen than on tankers, barges,

containerships, or other commercial shipping vessels. They may not only seize the fish

catch; they may also rob ships of their engines, equipment, cash, and other valuables.19

In May 2004, the director of the North Sumatra Fishery Office estimated that eight

thousand fishing boats, or two-thirds of the province’s fishing fleet, were not operating

because of the threat of piracy.20 The Indonesian government has estimated that the

country loses four billion U.S. dollars each year due to illegal fishing alone—several

times more than the estimated cost of all pirate attacks worldwide.21

For some South China Sea coastal states, any proposed international coordination to

combat terrorism or piracy is of lower priority than other pressing issues. These

include protecting and maintaining control over newly acquired ocean resources, protecting national security, or protecting bureaucratic interests. In Indonesia, all three

issues may coexist. With a coastline twice as long as the circumference of the earth, and

with no more than a few dozen operating vessels to patrol its territorial waters, the

Indonesian navy and marine police face a wide range of problems, including illegal

fishing, illegal migration, drug trafficking, smuggling, and marine pollution.

To put this in perspective, there were only 103 incidents of piracy in Indonesian waters

reported to the IMB in 2002, compared with 1,687 murders, nine thousand cases of

violent theft, and eleven thousand serious assaults on land.22 This means that piracy

makes up less than 0.05 percent of Indonesia’s cases of reported crime. As a direct

result of these competing demands, antipiracy measures not surprisingly receive limited funding.

Recent Developments in Antipiracy Measures and Burden Sharing

Stakeholder priorities changed substantially after July 2005, when the Joint War Committee (JWC) of the Lloyd’s Market Association listed the Malacca Strait and certain

areas in the southern Philippines (together with areas such as Iraq, Lebanon, and

Somalia) as “prone to hull war, strikes, terrorism and related perils.” As a result, marine

insurance premiums were increased for vessels transiting these areas despite very stron

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August 2006 after regional governments—with the assistance of international or

zations and user states—instituted several security measures.

The JWC listing was a catalyst for several antipiracy developments. In 2003, the t

sixth Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting had i

a “Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Secu

but had taken little action. Subsequently, the ASEAN Regional Forum convened a

meeting of maritime specialists to coordinate coast-guard action, information

exchange, and investigation of piracy reports. Japan’s Anti-piracy Coast Guard Pr

provided additional antipiracy technologies and training.

The IMB Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur and the International Mariti

Organization’s (IMO’s) Piracy Reporting Center in London stepped up monitori

compliance efforts. The IMO made it mandatory for all oceangoing vessels of thr

hundred gross tons or more to be equipped with an Automatic Identification Sys

(AIS) by the end of 2004. The AIS automatically sends and receives such ship inf

tion as identity, position, course, speed, and cargo information to and from othe

aircraft, and shore installations, all integrated by satellite links. The IMB has end

antipiracy measures like the Secure-Ship electric fence and ShipLoc, an inexpen

satellite tracking system designed to locate ships at sea or in port by a tiny transm

concealed on board. This would permit long-range identification and tracking o

by anyone with authorized Internet access.

Singapore has implemented the most forceful measures to address maritime secu

threats. It was the first Asian port to join the U.S.-sponsored Container Security 

tive and has provided sea security teams to escort selected vessels transiting the S

pore Strait. It has restricted circulation of small craft and ferries within the port 

and increased surveillance efforts by installing tracking devices on all Singap

registered small boats to identify their locations, courses, and speeds. Together w

Indonesia, it operates a radar tracking system on Batam Island to identify, track, 

exchange intelligence on shipping in the Singapore Strait.

In 2003, Malaysia and Thailand started coordinated naval patrols along their join

itime frontier. Following this, in 2004, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia began 

dinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait, under the code name MALSINDO. In

September 2005, the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative began, with coordinated air patr

over the strait by the three coastal states. The Philippines, meanwhile, has propos

building on its maritime border patrol exercises with Malaysia and Indonesia by 

malizing a tripartite agreement to exchange information and intelligence. The in

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ernize regional naval and coast-guard capabilities.

Representatives of the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have frequently asked

shipping companies and the international community to share the costs of policing the

Malacca Strait against pirates. Their requests, however, are received with little enthusiasm by most international actors involved—with the notable exception of Japan, which

has funded a number of initiatives to provide training and resources to the law enforce

ment authorities in the region. Regrettably, the states that are most adversely affected

by piracy—Indonesia, Myanmar, Bangladesh—can hardly afford to suppress it,

whether financially, militarily, or politically. In September 2005, Indonesia and the

IMO convened a meeting in Jakarta to discuss safety, security, and environmental protection in the Malacca and Singapore straits. This assembly recognized the role of burden sharing between coastal and user states, especially in the use and maintenance of

international straits pursuant to article 43 of UNCLOS (“Navigational and Safety Aids

and Other Improvements and the Prevention, Reduction and Control of Pollution”).

Following on from this, in February 2006 the United States hosted a meeting in

Alameda, California, that assembled representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South

Korea, and the United Kingdom. (China was invited but did not attend.) While the

meeting’s objective was to coordinate potential user-state contributions to assist the

Malacca/Singapore Strait littoral states, little progress was made on burden sharing. On

the one hand, the littoral states want burden sharing to include the cost of providing

safety and environmental protection services. On the other hand, international user

states view burden sharing as a means of becoming more directly involved in maritime

security measures to address piracy and terrorism threats.

In September 2006, Malaysia and the IMO organized a meeting in Kuala Lumpur of

coastal states, major shipping nations, and shipping companies. Working groups on

safety of navigation and maritime security were established to undertake projects on

such issues as the removal of shipwrecks, the establishment of a hazardous and noxioussubstance response center, the installation of AIS transponders on small ships, and the

placement of tide, current, and wind measurement systems.

Substantial voluntary contributions have been made by China and Japan for these

projects. Some have advocated toll-road or user-pays systems to help fund pollution

cleanup and navigational aids. The United States and many shippers, however, oppose

strongly the introduction of any fees. They prefer to see greater transparency and

accountability in any use of funds for maritime safety and security. They would also

like to see Malaysia and Indonesia ratify the International Convention on Maritime

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against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (known as the SUA Convention)

In addition, these countries are also considering becoming members of the Regio

Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 

Asia (ReCAAP), which was initiated by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Jap

2001. Its Information Sharing Center was established in Singapore during Septem

2006. Malaysia and Indonesia indicated their willingness to participate in this eff

have not yet ratified the agreement, due to sensitivities over national sovereignty.

Persistent Problems in Controlling Piracy

Despite the recent developments in antipiracy efforts and the recent decline in pi

reports in several areas of the South China Sea, there are some persistent problem

combating piracy. Long-standing concerns include many unresolved overlapping

claims and jurisdictional disputes. For example, the Spratly Islands are claimed b

countries and occupied by three of them. These territorial claims are especially im

tant as anchors for assertions of exclusive economic zones around the disputed is

and the oil and natural gas resources they are thought to contain. With few agree

upon boundaries in the South China Sea, countries act largely in their own se

interest. Hence, “the lack of agreed jurisdiction complicates maritime enforceme

leads to unchecked degradation of the marine environment and facilitates illegal 

ties at sea, including possible maritime terrorism.”23

Second, international user states themselves have divergent security priorities. Fo

example, recent policy of the United States in the region has been primarily drive

its global war on terrorism. It aims to achieve “maritime domain awareness”—th

development of a comprehensive picture of everything that moves on the world’

oceans. American security officials want to “wire” ships so that their locations, co

speeds, cargoes, registrations, ports of departure, and ports and times of arrival c

tracked with precision, as in an air traffic control system.24 Japan, on the other ha

primarily interested in antipiracy measures, reflecting its acute vulnerability to a

ruption of its trade and raw materials flows.

A third reason for limited progress is that many coastal states give top priority 

protecting national sovereignty and controlling their recently acquired EEZ

resources. The declaration of EEZs by coastal states has led to numerous overla

and multiplying jurisdictional claims and to legal confusion over the right to e

innocent passage through territorial seas by warships, the right to conduct mili

surveillance activities in the EEZ of a coastal state, and the arrest authority of s

in hot pursuit of pirates in contested waters. There is general agreement that th

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fere with the rights of the coastal state. However, there is still disagreement about

when overflights become intrusive eavesdropping missions to scout the defenses of

potential rivals. One tragic symptom of this disagreement was the collision between 

U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet over Chinese EEZ waters near

Hainan Island on 1 April 2001, after which a political crisis ensued.

Fourth, antipiracy efforts are also greatly hindered by the “flags of convenience” system of ship registration. It is extremely easy and convenient to reregister and reflag a

ship. According to former IMB director Captain Jayant Abhyankar, “One simply has

to fax information as to a ship’s name, ownership, tonnage, and dimensions, and a

registration will be granted. The information given is not checked. Once registered, i

is free to be hired for trade transport.”25 It is a system of “managed anarchy,” according to Stephen Flynn, former commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and a writer on

maritime security.26 According to the International Transport Workers Federation,

the flags of convenience condone poor safety, pay, and training standards. A 2001

IMO survey found over thirteen thousand cases of falsified documents of seafarers,

most of whom were from Indonesia and the Philippines.27 This provides an easy

opportunity for pirates or hijackers to infiltrate a ship’s crew. Having hijacked a ship,

they can elude detection by reregistering it at sea for a nominal fee, thus imposing a

layer of obfuscation against the search for the attackers.

Piracy carried out by organized-crime groups sometimes employs “phantom ships,”

operating under false identities. They may be hijacked or bought in the salvage market.

They can be registered and reflagged after unloading illegal cargo. Reregistration and

safety inspections are cheap, fast, and cursory in several jurisdictions. Adding to the

problem is the widespread practice of most maritime shipping services to require payment in hard currency on delivery. The cash-based, fast-paced, transient nature of

shipping makes it an ideal medium of exchange and money laundering for criminal

entrepreneurs. At one time there were thought to be twelve phantom ships operating in

Southeast Asia; all but one of them were registered in Panama or Honduras.28

There are some simple solutions for preventing smuggling or fraudulent sale of contra

band from phantom ships. Every ship has an IMO identification number, based on its

original Lloyd’s registry. That number could be engraved permanently in a prominent

place, so that any cargo dealer can quickly determine whether or not a suspicious vesse

is in fact a phantom ship. This solution is simple, cheap, and likely to be highly effectiv

in locating phantom vessels.

Shipowners and shipping companies are responsible for adopting antipiracy security

measures, including relatively cheap physical-security measures like “safe rooms” and

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positioning systems to track their shipments around the globe. Some shipping co

nies have invested in antipiracy devices like ShipLoc or Secure-Ship, or even chea

methods, such as high-pressure water hoses or security lights. But most do not, a

ently because they calculate that the risk of loss is not worth the cost of preventio

Shippers have long-established norms of working outside national boundaries. T

have to contend with import quotas, embargoes, and restrictions imposed by stat

political reasons, to the commercial detriment of the shipper. Shippers may even 

bigger profits in making prohibited goods available. In these restricted areas, it m

convenient to shipowners for their vessels to be out of radio contact or undetecta

Another persistent problem for combating piracy is institutional insularity. A go

deal of useful information about piracy is contained in the computers and files o

police, coast-guard, customs, immigration, military, intelligence, and other natio

authorities. However, even within one national government, “information is read

available but it is locked away in ‘silos’ or ‘stovepipes’—institutional frameworks 

distribute critical information vertically but not horizontally.”29 Sharing informa

horizontally among governments is much more difficult. Doing so very quickly—

example, when a suspect ship is first sighted—is even more difficult.

Hence, a number of factors impede coordinated antipiracy efforts: uncertainties 

legal jurisdiction, disputed sovereignty, and uncoordinated efforts at the recovery 

crews, cargoes, or ships. Even when pirates are detected, hot pursuit across nation

boundaries has seldom been attempted. When coordinated surveillance (like the 

MALSINDO patrols) has reduced piracy attacks, pirates have generally responde

increasing their attacks in less protected areas of the region. State and market sta

holders have made only limited progress in coordinating and sustaining antipira

security measures for the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea.

Conflicting Claims, Overlapping Interests

Piracy is often dramatized by the news media, spreading the impression that it is 

of a problem than it really is. Piracy is difficult to define and measure. It appears 

related to other forms of crime, on land and at sea. Hence, any antipiracy respon

must be a coordinated effort—on land and at sea. But this coordination is difficu

achieve. As a result, there is still no effective governance, or burden sharing in the 

vision of security, of the sea-lanes transiting the South China Sea. Coastal states 

want to give up any sovereign controls. Shippers don’t want to impose restriction

costs on their operations. Major user states have not offered sufficient support to 

lish the necessary measures. The current situation is far from the highly ambitiou

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to construct a “Marine Electronic Highway,” a shipping traffic control system similar to

the global air traffic control arrangement, with comprehensive, integrated electronic

information, navigation, and control systems.

Whatever their conflicting claims and mutual suspicions may be, political leaders in th

coastal states are beginning to understand that they must cooperate in order to manage

the increase in shipping traffic, to use the resources of the South China Sea sustainably

and to address maritime security threats, including piracy. While some progress has

been made, there is as yet no durable agreement on how to share the burden for providing safety and security from piracy in the region. The nation-states of Southeast

Asia that have only recently extended their sovereignty and resource claims to EEZs in

the South China Sea are in no rush to negotiate them away, and shippers who traverse

the busiest sea-lanes in the world are reluctant to impose any stringent or expensive

security measures.

All these regional and international stakeholders share many overlapping interests—fo

example, in promoting safe navigation for commercial shipping. On antipiracy or antiterrorist enforcement measures, however, they have had conflicting views. Littoral

states are insistent that the process of achieving regional maritime security should be

locally initiated and led. They are willing to accept external assistance, but they contend

that ultimately they must have the authority and capability to provide that security. Fo

example, Tokyo’s financial contributions, technical assistance, and joint training are

welcomed by the littoral states. These measures not only increase the pool of available

resources for maritime security but also diversify sources of assistance, avoiding sole

reliance on the United States. However, regional states and shippers have yet to put

aside their individual stakeholder interests and then negotiate and implement an effective regional maritime antipiracy security system. Unfortunately, it may take an event

equivalent to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, a spectacular collision, or a devastating oil spill to overcome contending stakeholder interests and institu

tional inertia and to galvanize the political will needed for effective antipiracy security

measures.

Notes

1. William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea: A

World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime (New

York: North Point, 2004), p. 1.

2. Sam Bateman, “Maritime ‘Regime’ Building,”

in The Best of Times, the Worst of Times:

Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific, ed.

Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond

(Singapore: World Scientific, 2005), p. 259.

3. International Maritime Bureau [hereafter

IMB], Piracy and Armed Robbery against

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2007 (2008).

4. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, “Introduction—

Southeast Asian Piracy: Research and Developments,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and

Securing the Malacca Straits [hereafter Piracy], ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

2006), p. xviii.

5. James Boutilier, “The Best of Times, the

Worst of Times: The Global Maritime Outlook 2004,” in Best of Times, the Worst of

Times, ed. Ho and Raymond, pp. 15–16.

6. United Nations, Review of Maritime Transport 2006 (New York: Conference on Trade

and Development, 2007), p. 3.

7. Ibid., pp. 4–5, 76.

8. Mark Valencia, “The Politics of Anti-piracy

and Anti-terrorism Responses,” in Piracy, ed.

Ong-Webb, p. 98.

9. Adam J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes, and

Remedies (Singapore: Institute of Southeast

Asian Studies, International Institute for

Asian Studies, 2007), p. 9.

10. Eric Frecon, “Piracy and Armed Robbery at

Sea along the Malacca Straits,” in Piracy, ed.

Ong-Webb, p. 71.

11. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security

Outlook for Southeast Asia,” in Best of Times,

the Worst of Times, ed. Ho and Raymond, p.

61.

12. “Asia Piracy Costs $25 Bln a Year, Says Expert,” Reuters, Singapore, 11 December 2002.

13. Stanley Weeks, “Piracy and Regional Security,” in Combating Piracy and Ship Robbery:

Charting the Future in the Asia Pacific Waters,

ed. Hamzah Ahman and Akira Ogawa (Tokyo: Okazaki Institute, 2001), p. 100.

14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development, Price of Increased Maritime Security Is Much Lower than Potential

torate for Science, Technology and In

21 July 2003), available at www.oecd

15. Young, Contemporary Maritime Pirac

Southeast Asia, p. 93.

16. Karen Kvashny, “Modern Maritime P

Asia: A Case Study of Transnational 

nized Crime” (dissertation, Universit

California, Irvine, 2003), p. 70.

17. For example, see Martin N. Murphy, 

temporary Piracy and Maritime Terro

The Threat to International Security (

don: International Institute for Strat

Studies, 2007).

18. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery agai

Annual Report, 1 January–31 Decemb

p. 39.

19. Eduardo Santos, “Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in the Philipp

in Piracy, ed. Ong-Webb, pp. 38, 46.

20. Stefan Eklöf, “Political Piracy and M

Terrorism: A Comparison between th

Straits of Malacca and the Southern 

pines,” in Piracy, ed. Ong-Webb, p. 52

21. Ibid., p. 45.

22. Young, Contemporary Maritime Pirac

Southeast Asia, p. 86.

23. Bateman, “Maritime ‘Regime’ Buildi

260.

24. Boutilier, “Best of Times, the Worst o

Times,” p. 23.

25. Kvashny, “Modern Maritime Piracy i

p. 61.

26. “Brassed Off,” Economist, 16 May 200

27. Young, Contemporary Maritime Pirac

Southeast Asia, p. 59.

28. Kvashny, “Modern Maritime Piracy i

p. 61.

29. Boutilier, “Best of Times, the Worst o

Times,” p. 23.

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PART TWO

Piracy in South and Southeast Asia

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C H I N A

MALAYSIA

PHILIPPINES SOUTH

CHINA

SEA

LAOS

THAILAND

BURMA

Chittagong TAIWAN

SOUTH

KOREA

NORTH

KOREA

BAY

OF

BENGAL

MALACCA

STRAIT

EAST

CHINA

SEA

YELLOW

SEA

WEST

SEA

PHILIPPINE SEA

JAVA

SEA

CELEBES

SEA

SULU

SEA

VIETNAM

I N D O N E S I A

CAMBODIA

BANGLADESH

Arunachal

Pradesh

BHUTAN

INDIA

NEPAL

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The Looting and Rape of Vietnamese

Boat People

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN

Soon after the end of the Vietnam War and the reunification of North and South 

nam, large numbers of Vietnamese began to leave the country, often by boat. The

part of a movement by which from the mid-1970s onward approximately three m

people fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Of this number, most were eventually 

tled, “including 1.4 million in the United States, 260,000 in China, 200,000 in Ca

185,000 in Australia, and 130,000 in France.” Perhaps half a million eventually re

to Vietnam.1

Many of these refugees fled by sea, and in particular from 1975 onward there was 

huge maritime exodus—including many people of Chinese heritage, called the

“Hoa”—from Vietnam. These maritime refugees were generally referred to as the 

people.” Soon incidents of piracy against them began to be reported in the press, 

rates that grew slowly throughout the late 1970s. However, as political tension be

China and Vietnam led to war early in 1979, the boat-people problem increased 

idly, and the number of boats fleeing Vietnam continued to grow through the ea

1980s; for example, from May 1982 through April 1983, a total of 463 refugee bo

landed in Malaysia and Thailand.2

The Southeast Asian countries bordering on Vietnam clearly felt threatened by th

exodus. Many of the acts of piracy against the boat people appear to have been p

cally motivated, at least politically sanctioned, as an indirect method of deterring 

flood of refugees. However, piracy of this type did not end with the diminishing 

exodus in the middle to late 1980s. By that time piracy was no longer the realm o

sional pirates but of professionals, many of whom now preyed as well on unsusp

international shipping, thereby dramatically increasing overall cases of piracy wi

the region.

CHAPTER SIX

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The history of Chinese immigrants in Vietnam is long, dating back thousands of years.

Since Annam claimed its independence from China in 939, after a thousand years as a

Chinese colony, the loyalty of the Hoa, or ethnic Chinese, has often been called into

question. During the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the Vietnamese government took

many steps to mitigate what it considered the Hoa threat, although it has been pointed

out that “the actions the Vietnamese admit to have taken toward the Hoa, they assert,

compare favorably with those the United States took with regard to Americans of Japanese descent when America considered itself threatened by far-away Japan.”3

Many of

Hanoi’s actions exacerbated the boat-people phenomenon, however, indirectly fuelling

the enormous increase in piracy throughout the region.

Piracy has been a major concern in Vietnamese waters for many centuries. During the

early nineteenth century, for example, pirates preyed on the mainly Chinese-owned

and -operated ships conducting trade between southern Vietnam (Cochin China) and

Singapore. Between 1780 and 1810 (as mentioned in chapter 2), when South China was

plagued by several competing pirate leagues, Tâyson rebels in Vietnam sanctioned raid

into Chinese waters. Before their final defeat in 1810, pirate fleets set out each spring

and summer from bases on the Sino-Vietnamese border to plunder vessels and villages

between Guangdong and Zhejiang. Unable to defeat them militarily, China adopted a

political solution, recruiting many of the pirates into the Chinese navy.

Often, pirates operating in the South China Sea preyed on Chinese ships involved in

the lucrative Southeast Asia and East–West trade. In 1843, immediately after the end of

the First Opium War in China, there was a huge surge in attacks. Perhaps confident

that China was too weak to respond, Malay pirates attacked a large number of Chinese

ships. Among fifty Chinese ships passing near Malaya on one occasion, “the havoc was

dreadful, probably not less than twenty boats were taken and their crews (140 men at

least) either murdered or sold into slavery by Malays residing under British rule.”4

During the early 1880s, China tried and failed to halt efforts by France to turn its Vietnamese tributary into a colony. Chinese troops, under the banner of the “Black Flag,”

fought French troops from bases in northern Vietnam. While China’s June 1885 defeat

meant that control of Vietnam was ceded to France, ethnic Chinese, Hoa, who had

moved there over the preceding centuries, remained. Many of these were merchants

and continued to play important roles in Vietnam’s economy. Such “overseas” Chinese

traditionally retained Chinese citizenship, however, and the Chinese government had

always insisted on a “traditional posture of extraterritoriality, by which it had asserted

the right to intervene to protect the interests of its overseas citizens.”5

The political

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of the U.S. war.

Since the 1950s, Chinese in South Vietnam had been pressured to adopt Vietnam

citizenship, and many of them did so. But in North Vietnam, the Hoa could legal

retain Chinese citizenship even while they enjoyed equal rights as Vietnamese: “W

the best of both worlds. . . . The Hoa in the north had all the rights and privileges 

Vietnamese citizenship and none of its disadvantages. From about 1970 the Vietn

had been trying to get us to become citizens, but few of us regarded it to be in ou

interests. We could even vote in their elections. We were regarded as Vietnamese 

respects, except that we were not subject to the military draft.”6

There is a long history of Southeast Asian states using pirates as political weapon

practice was revived in the mid-1970s with the beginning of the exodus. As noted

many of the refugees were ethnic Chinese attempting to flee from Vietnamese rep

sion; the number of ethnic Chinese involved surpassed 85 percent in some camp

These statistics suggest that the Vietnamese government “singled out” the Hoa fo

secution. In fact, beginning in 1977, Hanoi tried to convince Hoa living along the 

der with China, who previously had been considered Chinese, to adopt Vietname

citizenship. For those who would not declare themselves Vietnamese, the choices 

stark: “Those who refused were forced to choose between returning to China or m

ing inland away from the border. Many of the poor preferred to return to China 

than become Vietnamese citizens.”7

In November 1976, as Vietnam was putting pressure on the Hoa in the north, loc

pirates far to the south threatened boat people fleeing on the Vietnamese fishing 

PK 504. Turned away from Singapore, the refugees had headed north again towar

Thailand and were off Songkhla when “their boat was boarded by a group of me

brandishing guns. They were not in uniform but identified themselves as policem

The refugees, who had heard of plundering and rape by pirates, defended themse

with the only ammunition available to them: the pirates got the last of the gold, w

$20,000.”8

Fortunately, these boat people eventually reached Darwin, Australia—

an eight-thousand-kilometer journey—and the refugees were allowed to remain 

country, but the “pirates” had succeeded in keeping them from landing in Thaila

Background to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict

The boat-people exodus was closely linked to political events. A particular examp

China’s 1974 decision to dispute Vietnam’s claim to the Paracel Islands, one of th

signs of increasing Sino-Vietnamese tension. In 1978, Hanoi asked to become a m

ber of Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (better known as Com

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sources soon reported that by August 1978 as many as four thousand Soviet advisers

had been sent to Vietnam. In addition, during September 1978 the Soviet Union began

sending increased arms shipments to Vietnam, both by air and by sea, including “aircraft, missiles, tanks, and munitions.”9

This dramatic improvement in Soviet-Vietnamese relations at China’s expense came to

fruition on 2 November 1978, when Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty was clearly aimed at China, since the sixth

clause stated that the two countries would “immediately consult each other” if either is

“attacked or threatened with attack . . . with a view to eliminating that threat.”10 Report

edly, this treaty also included a secret protocol granting Soviet military forces access to

Vietnam’s “airfields and ports.”11 Soon after a 15 December 1978 announcement that

Sino-American relations would be normalized, Vietnam attacked Cambodia. By 7 Janu

ary 1979, Vietnamese forces had secured Phnom Penh.

An early indicator of Beijing’s concern over the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty was voiced by

Renmin Ribao, which warned that Moscow was using Vietnam against China as it had

earlier tried (and failed) to use Cuba to exert diplomatic pressure against the United

States. Beijing also warned that Moscow’s ultimate goal was to bring the whole of

Indochina under its control. From China’s perspective, the Soviet Union could use its

military relations with Vietnam to outmaneuver and outflank China.12

During this period of heightened tensions, the Hoa people, living primarily along the

Sino-Vietnamese border but also in Vietnam’s large cities in the south, became stuck in

the middle. There is evidence that the Chinese government urged, perhaps even

ordered, the Hoa to leave Vietnam. According to one account: “It was a big secret, but

the Vietnamese were not behind it [Hoa leaving Vietnam]. They had much to lose if we

left. China had much to gain and [the Chinese] were the likely instigators.” Beginning

in 1978, rumors were spread that if the Hoa did not return to China they would be

treated “as traitors and killed when the Chinese troops arrived.” That China was tacitly

supporting the exodus was best shown in June 1978, when it sent ships to Haiphong

and Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) to repatriate Chinese citizens.13

Recalling the Hoa back to China was arguably a form of economic warfare, since they

were important to Vietnam’s economy. The leaders of Vietnam appear to have understood this and sought to retain valuable resources represented by the large numbers of

Chinese fleeing the country. As a result, Vietnam’s “navy could apparently attack the

refugee boats with impunity even before they had left Vietnamese waters.”14

In preparation for war, Beijing normalized relations with Washington on 1 January

1979. Reportedly, President Jimmy Carter even gave the visiting Deng Xiaoping

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nam.”15 The United States and China hoped to test Soviet resolve as to whether it 

stand by its treaty with Vietnam. In fact, to put pressure on the Soviet Union’s str

alliance with Vietnam, Deng reportedly told Carter in January 1979 that a war be

China and Vietnam might be used to “disrupt Soviet strategic calculations.”16

On 15 February 1979, Deng declared that China planned to conduct a limited wa

against Vietnam. To prevent Soviet intervention on Vietnam’s behalf, Deng warn

Moscow the next day that China was prepared for a full-scale war; in preparation 

such a conflict, China put all of its troops along the Sino-Soviet border on emerg

war alert, set up a new military command in Xinjiang, and evacuated an estimate

three hundred thousand civilians from the border. In addition, the bulk of China

active forces—as many as a million and a half troops—were stationed along Chin

border with the Soviet Union.17

China’s military offensive against Vietnam began on 17 February 1979, when an 

mated thirty thousand People’s Liberation Army troops crossed the 480-mile-lon

Sino-Vietnamese border at fourteen points. By 25 February, the incursion had gr

to seventy-five thousand Chinese troops out of a total of 180,000 deployed along 

border. Finally, by early March, an estimated 120,000 Chinese were facing an equ

number of Vietnamese.18 After three weeks of intense fighting, China could claim 

it captured the capitals of three provinces—Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai—o

six that bordered on China. When Beijing announced a troop withdrawal on 5 M

1979, the primary goals of its offensive had yet to be achieved, and Vietnam’s mil

potential had not been seriously damaged. As a result, the Sino-Vietnamese bord

remained tense.

To most outsiders, China’s military action appeared to have been a failure. But as 

had announced, from the very beginning China’s action against Vietnam had bee

ited, to test Soviet resolve. Not only were many of China’s best troops stationed a

the Sino-Soviet border, but Beijing decided not to use the estimated five hundred 

ers and bombers it had stationed near Vietnam. Claims that China’s effort was no

complete military success generally overlook the fact that China allocated only a 

fraction of its resources to the task.19

By December 1979, however, Sino-Soviet tensions had increased, as a result of th

Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, which outflanked China’s ally Pakistan. O

January 1980, Beijing warned Moscow that the invasion threatened “world peace

“Chinese security.” On 20 January Beijing announced that further Sino-Soviet ne

tions would be halted.20 These events corresponded with a massive Hoa exodus fr

Vietnam, during which thousands of people attempted to leave by boat.

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With the outbreak of war between Vietnam and China in 1979, the boat-people exodus

increased, to include many Hoa who were party members and former officers in Vietnam’s military. Hanoi’s concern about Hoa loyalties grew as China prepared for war,

and many Vietnamese no longer trusted their erstwhile Chinese compatriots. According

to one Hoa officer who had fought alongside Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap: “But

all the same, at a time when Vietnam was being threatened by China, the Vietnamese

no longer dared have Hoa people in their military. After China’s invasion they feared a

second attack, this time with Hanoi as its objective, and so on February 18 (one day

after China’s invasion) began expelling us overseas.”21

Of course, many non-Hoa fled Vietnam as well, primarily from southern Vietnam.

Often, they were businessmen who opposed Vietnam’s decision in March 1978 to crack

down on black-marketeering and to centralize the economy under government control

Others left because they rejected communism and sought greater political freedom

overseas. Finally, many other boat people fled Vietnam because of government repression. Often the ethnic Vietnamese refugees had little money and so were generally

ignored by local fishermen and were not attacked by pirates. Sometimes locals even

gave them food and water to help them reach their destinations.

As the numbers of people fleeing Vietnam increased, however, so did the flow of Hoa

wealth out of the country. The cost of leaving Vietnam became very high; many Vietnamese officials eagerly sought bribes in exchange for exit visas. If a person was caught

trying to leave illegally, the authorities would confiscate everything he owned. Eventually, between July 1978 and June 1979, set fees were established of about two thousand

U.S. dollars per adult and $1,200 per child for permission to leave Vietnam.22

The first wave of boat people was accepted and assimilated by neighboring countries.

However, many in those countries saw the Hoa exodus as a “mass invasion” supported

by the Vietnamese government, in that it had refused to halt the flow of immigrants.

Beginning in 1979, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore

and Thailand—that is, virtually the entire Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN)—stated that they would not accept any more Indochinese refugees. Piracy

rates began to increase at the same time.

Piracy as a Tool of State Policy

As earlier chapters have explained, privateers are, in effect, pirates sanctioned by state

governments. While it is difficult to prove that the pirates preying on the boat people

were working hand in hand with the governments of Vietnam’s neighbors, certainly the

increase in Southeast Asian piracy during the Hoa exodus appeared to correspond with

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note, therefore, that pirate attacks off Thailand increased in 1978, as the Hoa flee

Vietnam began to outnumber the Vietnamese. By deterring mainly the Hoa boat 

ple from coming to Thailand, the pirates might “form a first line of defence for t

Thais against Vietnam.” What the 1979 ASEAN announcement did, in effect, was 

protection for the boat people, thus making it “open season” for pirates to attack 

Hoa. The early piratical incidents were referred to as “opportunistic attacks,” but 

1982 it was estimated that “some 300 Thai fishing boats—two per cent of the Th

ing fleet—were engaged in piracy.”23

However cruel by Western standards, this policy of using pirates to stem the tide 

Hoa refugees was quite successful: “Between 1981 and 1982, boat refugee arrivals 

Thailand dropped by 62 per cent, from over 15,000 to less than 6,000, and the nu

of arrivals continued to decline in the following years.”24

In 1975, refugees could often travel undisturbed. However, as more boats appear

became obvious to the local fishermen that many carried gold and other valuable

The prospect of acquiring great wealth was as important a motive as the withdra

protection by the ASEAN governments, if not more. By the late 1970s, rumors w

spreading that Hoa refugees leaving Vietnam were trying to smuggle their wealth 

the country in the form of gold or diamonds. For example, in 1978 a Chinese me

from Cholon reached Malaysia with US$1.2 million in uncut diamonds, hidden i

can of lubricating oil, and declared them when departing on a plane for the Unit

States. Another Chinese businessman declared US$200,000 in gold and $350,000 

currency. Finally, an “Indo-Chinese woman, when asked to declare her assets [on

arrival in Australia], unbuttoned her blouse and proudly displayed a special cors

taining $250,000 in cash, jewellery and gold.”26

Lust for gold led to a rapid increase in piracy. Approximately one-third of the eth

cally Chinese boat people—seventy-seven thousand out of 292,315—decided to 

for Hong Kong, which was safer because they were “not beset with pirates” along 

way. However, of those who went south, the vast majority of those who left Vietn

small boats were attacked, some by ships marked as belonging to the Vietnam na

Many refugee boats were attacked more than once. One statistic from 1981 indic

that 349 boats, or fully 77 percent of all of the boats that arrived in Thailand, had 

attacked at least once on the way.28 Boat attacks averaged 3.3 times per boat in 19

and a total of “454 people were killed by pirates, 571 women were raped and 228 

ple, mostly girls and young women, were abducted.”29 Although no accurate figur

those drowned or otherwise killed are available, one estimate of losses, in the 10–

percent range, would mean thirty to forty thousand people.30

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the border between Vietnam and China, either on foot or by boat along the coastline.31

Little information exists on whether these immigrants encountered problems similar to

those of the boat people, but the shorter distances involved gave less chance for opportunistic attacks. Also, there were not the same ethnic tensions as existed to the south,

where the Vietnamese immigrants were treated as unwelcome invaders.

Shift from Amateur to Professional Pirates

Over time, Southeast Asian piracy shifted from individual fishermen working alone to

professional pirates working in unison. In the Gulf of Thailand, piracy quickly became

a highly organized business, with several fishing boats, working in teams, surrounding

and attacking a refugee craft. Initially they simply demanded “money, gold, earrings or

bracelets,” but over time the number and frequency of attacks increased: “In the ’80s,

refugee boats crossing the Gulf of Thailand were attacked by pirates almost two thirds

of the time and each boat was boarded at least twice.”32

Pirate attacks, especially after 1978, occurred most frequently off of Thailand, by small

fishing boats that might have been attracted by what appeared to be easy pickings. Several such attacks were repulsed with guns or knives. In one such instance, “As pirates

attacked his boat [referring to a noted heart surgeon named Cung], he directed the

defense by encouraging the escapees to fight back with courage and persistence. The

pirates finally gave up and the boat successfully landed at Pulau Bidong with only two

casualties.”33

However, the boat people did not usually have the means to repel large groups of

pirates. When attacked by one set of pirates after another, before long they had nothing

left to hand over. According to one account, a “fourteen-metre boat with 183 passengers was raided ten times by pirates. Women were forced to strip naked. Their clothes

and bodies were thoroughly searched for gold, necklaces and other jewelry. In the second attack, the pirates used a derrick to remove the pump engine from the refugee

boat. By the tenth attack, nothing of value remained, so all those wearing jeans were

ordered to hand them over.”34

There are no accurate statistics on piracy rates prior to 1981. A more critical analysis of

1981 reported that the majority of the Vietnamese boats arriving in Thailand had been

attacked, most of them repeatedly: “A total of 571 deaths were reported, along with 599

rapes and 243 abductions.”35 Most of those abducted were young women and girls, who

were forced to work as prostitutes. Unlike earlier attacks, however, this new wave of

piracy appeared to be by professional pirates, often linked to organized crime.

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means of stopping their attacks on the boat people, so that more booty would be 

able for the professional pirates—and in 1982 it was reported that five Thai fishin

trawlers were lost to pirates every month; over a two-year period some “500 Tha

erman had been killed by pirates.”36 Although it is difficult to determine exactly w

this shift took place, clearly the “opportunistic” attacks of the late 1970s had shif

“organized” ones by the early 1980s.

This development threatened to interfere with commercial shipping, however, an

brought more international attention to the problem. Prompted by the rapid rise 

attacks, which local officials seemed incapable of halting, in February 1981 the U

government funded a two-million-dollar antipiracy program by the Thai govern

involving a Thai cutter and two spotter aircraft. This program assisted 180 ships 

attack and arrested a handful of pirates, but it was only a drop in the bucket.

International Efforts to Halt Piracy

In 1982, a larger international effort, called the Anti-Piracy Arrangement, began, 

total funding of £3.6 million from a dozen countries—Australia, Canada, Denma

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United 

dom, and the United States. “The anti-piracy unit consists of no more than three 

metre fast patrol craft, about 5 surveillance aircraft, 3 special operation task traw

and roughly 130 naval personnel.”37 Although the percentage of boats attacked

dropped, the number of dead and missing increased on those ships that were atta

so there was little improvement.38

All U.S. Navy ships in the vicinity were required to assist boats in distress, and fro

1983 through June 1989 they picked up a total of 1,380 boat people. Rear Admira

James E. Taylor assured the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Imm

tion, Refugees, and International Law that “having experienced the perils and rig

sea, I’d like to assure you that naval personnel have great compassion and empath

refugees encountered on the high seas attempting to flea [sic] Southeast Asia. Th

Navy’s policies have resulted in what we consider to be an outstanding record of

responsiveness, swift compassion to sea rescues in the South China Sea.”39

Navy ships were not required to determine before providing aid if refugees were 

from Vietnam; “With regard to a ship encountered at sea [their duty] is to make 

that the people are not in distress, that the boat is seaworthy, that they have all th

equipment that they need, that they are medically sound, and provide them what

assistance is necessary.”40 While supporting an antipiracy policy, however, the U.S

ernment did not necessarily want it to be too effective, since “an effective anti-pi

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land.”41 Clearly, the existence of piracy was preventing an even greater number of

people from fleeing Vietnam by sea.

Even with the continuing efforts of foreign nations, too many piracy incidents during

this period went unreported. One especially egregious incident, in March 1984,

involved a refugee boat holding sixty people, in which “only two twelve-year-old girls

and five males survived Thai pirates’ savagery.”42 Still, the overall number of piracy

attacks dropped by 67 percent during one year alone, from 1,122 in 1981 to 373 in

1982, and then further to only eighty-seven in 1986. Moreover, the percentage of boats

attacked dropped from 77 percent to 64, and then to 13, during these same years, and

the average number of attacks per boat dropped from 2.5 to 1.7 to 1.5. Total deaths also

dropped dramatically, with zero deaths in 1987 due to piracy.43 Unfortunately, there

was a temporary resurgence in 1988 and 1989, with over five hundred and 750 people

killed during each year, respectively, before the Hoa exodus virtually ended in the early

1990s.44

One reason for the sudden increase in the number of piracy incidents during the late

1980s could have been ongoing territorial disputes between China and Vietnam. In

1988, these tensions broke into open conflict, as Chinese naval forces clashed with Viet

namese troops on the Spratly Islands. The connection may have been that in that

period the Chinese and Vietnamese navies were too busy to concentrate on piracy suppression. Also, increased piracy attacks might have helped to keep ships and people out

of the area, which perhaps simplified matters for the government forces in their

primary tasks.

Beginning in 1989 and during the early 1990s, as well, China was heavily criticized by

Western governments over the Tiananmen Square massacre; Beijing had its hands too

full with internal dissent to pay much attention to Vietnam. In addition, the collapse of

the Soviet empire in 1989 induced the Vietnamese government to adopt pro-business

legislation during the early 1990s, producing a sudden economic upsurge. As a result o

these rapid changes, many Hoa decided to remain in Vietnam. Thus, just as political

events clearly had an enormous role in the origins of the boat-people exodus, political

changes may have also contributed to its ultimate end.

Conclusions

Unlike the many types of profit-motivated piracy mentioned in the previous chapters,

one prime motivation—at least in the beginning—for piracy against the boat people

seems have been a desire to halt an unwanted flow of refugees. Once it became clear

that Hoa refugees were carrying gold and other valuables, opportunistic pirates were

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dus can be linked to political events, the end of the boat-people phenomenon co

sponded almost exactly with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet 

which had been one of Vietnam’s major allies, forced the Vietnamese governmen

reorient the nation away from state socialism and toward a market-driven econo

This timing shows that piracy can be influenced by politics. According to Stefan 

“political factors go a long way to explain the outbreak of piracy in the Gulf of Tha

from the end of the 1970s. In the eyes of the Vietnamese government, the refugee

traitors, or at least lacking in patriotism.” On the other side of the Gulf of Thaila

however, the Thai government was “more concerned about the social and econom

strain that the large flow of refugees caused, and it was not a high priority to pro

these refugees, especially not in international waters where most attacks occurred

This series of political changes in the early 1990s, plus Vietnam’s economic refor

meant that the skills of the Hoa, who were primarily from Vietnam’s former mer

class, were suddenly in demand once again in Vietnam. The repression against 

Hoa ended, and they were allowed to open businesses again. For these reasons, m

Hoa decided to remain in Vietnam. The pirates, without an easy target, either qu

focused on other maritime groups, including fishermen, yachtsmen, or commerc

vessels. Without a doubt, this transition during the early 1990s had a direct impa

the spectacular growth of piracy in other areas of Southeast Asia, including the

Malacca Strait.

Notes

1. W. Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The

Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (London: Zed Books, 1998), p. 2.

2. Roger Villar, Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea since 1980 (London: Conway

Maritime, 1985), p. 34.

3. Charles Benoit, “Vietnam’s ‘Boat People,’” in

The Third Indochina Conflict, ed. David W. P.

Elliott (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), p.

139.

4. Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the

Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism

in Nineteenth-Century South-East Asia (Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire, 1963), p.

207.

5. Benoit, “Vietnam’s ‘Boat People,’” pp. 140–

44.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Bruce Grant, The Boat People: An “Ag

vestigation (New York: Penguin Book

1979), p. 18.

9. Robert S. Ross, The Indochina Tangle 

York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1988), p

10. Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Union, 6 November 1978, pp. 6–9.

11. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, 

Relations with India and Vietnam (N

St. Martin’s, 1992), p. 61.

12. William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam

Roots of Conflict (Berkeley, Calif.: Ins

East Asian Studies, 1986), p. 80.

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52.

14. Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern

History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders, (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian

Studies, 2006), p. 30.

15. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–

1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp.

309–10.

16. Ross, Indochina Tangle, p. 225.

17. Robert A. Scalapino, “Asia in a Global Context: Strategic Issue for the Soviet Union,” in

The Soviet Far East Military Buildup, ed.

Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka

(Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), p. 28.

18. Michael Clodfelter, Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772–

1991 (London: McFarland, 1995), pp. 287–

88.

19. John Blodgett, “Vietnam: Soviet Pawn or Regional Power?” in Emerging Powers: Defense

and Security in the Third World, ed. Rodney

W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth (New York:

Praeger, 1986), p. 98. The decision not to use

airpower followed a pattern set during the

1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts, when the

two sides apparently agreed that an air war

might too easily escalate into a nuclear

confrontation.

20. Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation

since Mao Zedong: Dispute, Detente, or Conflict? (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,

1987), p. 52.

21. Benoit, “Vietnam’s ‘Boat People,’” p. 140.

22. Ibid., p. 157.

23. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 19, citing the

Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982), p. 62.

24. Eric Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC,

1989), p. 282.

25. Nghia M. Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People,

1954 and 1975–1992 (London: McFarland,

2006), pp. 143–44.

26. Grant, Boat People, p. 63.

28. Ellen, Piracy at Sea, pp. 282–83.

29. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 21, citing Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 84.

30. Grant, Boat People, p. 81.

31. Benoit, “Vietnam’s ‘Boat People,’” p. 140.

32. Vo, Vietnamese Boat People, pp. 143–44.

33. Ibid., p. 119.

34. Grant, Boat People, p. 65.

35. Robinson, Terms of Refuge, p. 61, quoting

U.S. Committee for Refugees, Vietnamese

Boat People: Pirates’ Vulnerable Prey (Washington, D.C.: February 1984), p. 6.

36. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 24, citing Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 69.

37. Villar, Piracy Today, p. 36.

38. Robinson, Terms of Refuge, pp. 167–68.

39. House Committee on the Judiciary, Orderly

Departure Program and U.S. Policy Regarding

Vietnamese Boat People: Hearing before the

Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and

International Law, 101st Cong., 1st sess.

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 June 1989), p. 39.

40. Ibid., p. 89.

41. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 33, quoting

Richard Vine, director of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Refugee Programs, remarks to the House Committee on Foreign

Affairs (1982), pp. 5, 13–14, 71.

42. G. O. W. Mueller and Freda Adler, Outlaws o

the Ocean: The Complete Book of Contemporary Crime on the High Seas (New York:

Hearst Marine Books, 1985), p. 316, quoting

“53 Missing after Attack on Boat from Vietnam,” New York Times, 3 March 1984, p. 9.

43. Ellen, Piracy at Sea, pp. 282–83.

44. Robinson, Terms of Refuge, p. 170.

45. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 30.

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Piracy and Armed Robbery in the

Malacca Strait

A Problem Solved?

CATHERINE ZARA RAYMOND

The Malacca Strait is a narrow waterway that extends nearly six hundred nautica

from the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea, between Malaysia and Indonesia

strait provides a vital shipping lane for vessels sailing from Europe and the Midd

to East Asia, as well as smaller vessels on local voyages. Unfortunately, when we t

the Malacca Strait, images of a waterway infested with pirates often spring to min

While this image could arguably have been justified in the past, it is now rather out

According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which produces quarterly 

annual reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships, there were only three su

ful and four attempted attacks by pirates on shipping in the Malacca Strait in 2007

low level of piracy has continued into 2008, with the Half Yearly Report issued by t

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery again

Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Center in Singapore listing only one 

cessful attack on a vessel in the Malacca Strait and three attempted ones.2

Consider

that around ninety thousand vessels transit the strait on an annual basis, the propo

of ships being attacked in the waterway is extremely small.

With statistics such as these, one might wonder why we are still seeing the public

of articles such as one appearing in a recent issue of National Geographic Magazi

whose cover declares, “The Strait of Malacca, Dark Passage: Pirates Haunt It. Sail

Fear It. Global Trade Depends on It.”3

There seems to be a failure, particularly ou

the region, to keep pace with the change in the frequency of pirate attacks and th

of the problem. While piracy has certainly been a concern in the waterway in the 

with reported attacks reaching seventy-five in 2000, the number of cases has been 

ing since 2005, largely as a result of a number of countermeasures introduced by 

three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. This decrease in attack

achieved despite a 10 percent increase in cases worldwide.

CHAPTER SEVEN

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the attacks themselves have changed over the last decade. The measures attributed to

the reduction will then be discussed, as well as the underlying principles and attitudes

that have shaped these initiatives. Particular attention will be given as to how the issue

of sovereignty, a principle of utmost importance in Southeast Asia, has impacted multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts to address the transnational problem of piracy

including a series of International Maritime Organization (IMO) meetings convened to

tackle pressing issues affecting the safety and security of shipping in the Malacca Strait

The conclusions will make recommendations regarding issues that require further action

The Changing Nature of Piracy in the Malacca Strait

Piracy has occurred in the Malacca Strait for hundreds of years. The October 1992 creation in Kuala Lumpur of the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC), which was tasked

with, among other things, collecting data on pirate attacks around the world, started to

highlight the scale of the problem in Southeast Asia. However, it was not until the late

1990s that the issue came to the attention of the international community.

This occurred primarily for two reasons. First, in 1997 the Asian financial crisis had a

harsh impact on the region. It is believed that the deteriorating economic situation

forced many people living in coastal areas in Indonesia and Malaysia to turn to piracy

to supplement their incomes. The economic collapse also caused widespread political

instability, in particular in Indonesia, making it easier for people to pursue illegal

methods of income generation. Second, in the late 1990s several high-profile pirate

attacks took place in the region, among them the attack on the Petro Ranger in 1998.

This may have led to an increased tendency among shippers to report attacks, particularly attempted attacks or more minor cases.

As a result of these factors, by the late 1990s the annual number of reported pirate

attacks in the strait had gone from virtually zero to seventy-five.4

Piracy was now seen

as a significant problem that required urgent attention. One year after piracy incidents

peaked in the Malacca Strait, al-Qa‘ida launched its attack on the Twin Towers in New

York, demonstrating that ordinary means of transportation can be utilized to carry out

large-scale attacks on economically important targets.

This incident prompted a reassessment of the vulnerability of the maritime sector to

attack by terrorists; in Southeast Asia, the presence of pirates operating seemingly

unchecked highlighted how insecure the maritime domain was. Speculation soon

began as to the likelihood that the region’s pirates would cooperate with regional or

international terrorist groups to carry out a devastating attack on shipping.

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Malacca Strait.5

These included robbery of vessels at sea, the hijacking of vessels, 

kidnap-for-ransom attacks. Another common type of piracy takes place against v

berthed in harbors or at anchor. However, this type of attack is unlikely to affect 

on international voyages through the strait. The most common targets in this cas

would be smaller vessels that transit the coast of Indonesia or those on local voya

from, for example, Malaysia’s Port Klang to the port of Belawan in Indonesia.

The robbery of a vessel by pirates usually takes place while the ship is under way, 

at night, and most often between one and six o’clock in the morning. The pirates 

the vessel using grappling hooks and then take any cash and valuables from the s

safe and crew, including high-tech navigation equipment or whatever else they ca

seize quickly. In this type of attack the value of the stolen goods can be between t

twenty thousand U.S. dollars.6

The ship can be taken over for up to a few hours b

five to ten pirates, although many incidents are over within half an hour.7

It is in 

type of piracy that the most significant reduction has taken place since 2000. Thi

be partially due to an increased awareness on the part of crew members followin

introduction of new maritime security requirements for vessels.8

If a vessel is hijacked, it is usually seized for a significant length of time, perhaps 

several days, while the cargo is unloaded at a port selected by the pirates or trans

to another vessel. Hijacking has been less common than the former type, simple 

bery, because good intelligence gathering and careful planning prior to the attack 

required to ascertain the cargo and route of the vessel. A secure port to unload th

len cargo is also needed, not to mention a willing buyer.

A variation of this latter kind of piracy is the permanent seizure of a vessel by pir

who turn the vessel into a “phantom ship”; the key difference is that once the pir

have disposed of the vessel’s cargo, they do not abandon the vessel itself. The ship 

repainted and the crew dumped or killed. The ship then sails to a new port with 

name and forged documentation.9

In recent years tugs have been favorite targets 

pirates, perhaps because they do not usually have Automatic Identification System

(AIS) equipment installed and yet are very valuable ships. Also, they are easier to 

given their low freeboards. Once taken, they may be used in various maritime cri

activities, which would favor a small vessel of kinds commonly seen in ports and 

national waterways.

Kidnapping is the most serious form of piracy taking place in the Malacca Strait 

2001. During a kidnap, armed attackers take over the vessel and abduct two or th

senior crew members, who are then held ashore pending ransom negotiations. T

napped crew members are usually released unharmed following payment by thei

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the sum of money eventually paid to the attackers following negotiations is usually

substantially lower, somewhere between ten and twenty thousand U.S. dollars.10

Of the three 2007 attacks deemed successful by the IMB in the Malacca Strait, one was

a boarding of a containership under way northwest of Pulau Perak: crew members

spotted flashlights on the deck of their vessel, and when they raised an alarm a small

boat was seen moving away from the ship. Another incident took place when several

unlit fishing boats approached a containership while it was under way. The ship’s master took evasive action to deter the suspected pirates; two were still able to board. However, the pirates were unarmed; they were detained by the ship’s crew and handed over

to the authorities in Singapore. The third incident was a kidnapping; according to the

IMB report documenting the attack, “ten pirates armed with firearms boarded the tug

towing the barge laden with steel billets. The pirates damaged all communications

equipments and stole crew personal belongings and ship’s documents.” The pirates kid

napped the master and the chief engineer, whom they took ashore. A ransom was

demanded, and eleven days after they were kidnapped, following payment of the ransom, the two were released.11

The details of the three incidents from 2007 reveal that two were essentially unsuccessful. Although they were classified by the IMB as “actual attacks” rather than “attempted

attacks,” the pirates were able neither to steal anything nor attack anyone during the

incidents. Meanwhile, in the only successful case of piracy documented in the first half

of 2008 in ReCAAP’s Half Yearly Report, pirates reportedly attacked two fishing trawlers in the early hours of the morning while the vessels were under way. All the crew

members were thrown overboard off a nearby island in Indonesia. The crews were rescued, but the trawlers have yet to be located.12 It is likely that the vessels and their cargoes were sold on the black market.

If the overall frequency of pirate attacks in the Malacca Strait has been significantly

reduced in recent years, however, kidnapping remains a worrisome threat, especially

given the great danger it poses to crew members. The continued occurrence of this

form of piracy, even at low levels, necessitates a reexamination of the various countermeasures that have been implemented to improve security in the Malacca Strait. The

current practice is for the employers of kidnapped crews to pay ransoms for their

release. It is widely acknowledged by experts in this field that not only does paying ransom encourage further kidnappings, but the ransom money often goes to finance

weaponry to be used in future attacks. A policy of no negotiation with kidnappers mus

be adopted to make kidnapping a nonprofitable industry.

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International pressure has been exerted on the littoral states, in particular on Ind

and Malaysia, to address the problem of piracy.13 This effort began in 2000, when 

attacks peaked in the Malacca Strait, and increased even more following the even

11 September 2001 and the subsequent conclusions drawn about the possible ins

rity of the maritime domain. At this time, both Japan and the United States indic

desire to participate in enhancing security in the waterway. However, it was not u

2004 that real steps toward securing the strait were made.

There were several stumbling blocks. Malaysia and Indonesia saw the issue of pir

purely as a domestic concern to be addressed internally by each state as it saw fit. 

repeatedly emphasized their desire to uphold the sovereignty of their territorial w

which make up most of the waterway. Singapore was more willing to cooperate, o

both the regional and extraregional levels. Its stand on the issue was voiced by th

deputy prime minister Tony Tan at a 2004 conference on maritime security in Sin

pore, during a discussion on the issue of patrolling the strait: “It is not realistic to 

laterally confine such patrols only to countries in this part of the world. . . . [W]e 

do more if we galvanize the resources of extra-regional players.”14

The concerns of Malaysia and Indonesia were heightened when Admiral Thomas 

Fargo, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, outlined a proposal by the

United States called the Regional Maritime Security Initiative in a speech to the U

Congress on 31 March 2004. In his statement he remarked that “we’re looking at 

like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels t

duct effective interdiction in, once again, these sea lines of communication wher

rorists are known to move about.”15 In response to the suggestion by Fargo, the

Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, remarked, “I think we can l

after our own area.”16

Another disagreement that stalled cooperation was in the level of priority that sh

be given to addressing the problem of piracy over other, more pressing domestic 

This applied particularly to Indonesia, which was still recovering from the Asian 

cial crisis of 1997, and it manifested itself in a public denial of the reported scale 

piracy problem in Indonesian waters. Another reason why Indonesia was relucta

address the problem of piracy may have been that only 25–30 percent of the mili

expenditure was covered by the military budget following the financial crisis, wit

remaining funds believed to be coming from illegal activities, such as piracy.17

Even today, inadequate resources and a lack of funding prevent Indonesia from f

addressing the problem; according to the navy chief of staff, Admiral Slamet Soebij

the country is still in need of another 262 patrol ships to make up a total of 376, 

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addition, of the 114 vessels that the Indonesian navy currently has, only 25 percent are

believed to be serviceable at any given time.19

Even in its ports, Indonesia is struggling to enforce regulations that have now become

an international norm: in September 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard issued a warning to

the Indonesian transport ministry stating that it had found seven port terminals that

did not fully comply with the ISPS Code (a set of measures designed to enhance the

security of ships and port facilities that were made mandatory under the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, of which Indonesia is a signatory).

New Maritime Security Initiatives

Despite these problems, several maritime security initiatives were introduced in the

Malacca Strait between 2004 and 2007. Although significant, they have arguably been

constrained in their scope and capability by both the unwillingness of some of the littoral states to cooperate fully and a lack of resources. The first multilateral measure to

be introduced by the three littoral states was the Trilateral Coordinated Patrol, or

MALSINDO.

MALSINDO was launched in July 2004 and involved the navies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore patrolling in a coordinated fashion in their respective territorial

waters. Following the introduction of this new measure, however, there was no

immediate reduction in the number of pirate attacks taking place in the strait. The

lack of a provision for cross-border pursuit into each of the participating states’ territorial waters has been cited as the main flaw in this measure. However, cross-border

pursuit would have been viewed by the participating states as an infringement of

their sovereignty.20

Five months after the introduction of MALSINDO, an earthquake occurred off the

west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The earthquake triggered a series of devastating tsunamis that affected most coastlines bordering the Indian Ocean. However, the areas

worst hit were in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, an

area in which many pirates were believed to be based. Some coastal villages in Aceh are

thought to have lost more than 70 percent of their inhabitants, while 44 percent of the

people lost their livelihoods.21

Reports received by the IMB in the weeks after the tsunami indicated that piracy

attacks in the Malacca Strait had ceased. Even unaffected areas recorded zero attacks

immediately following the disaster.22 The significance of the impact that the tsunami

seems to have had on pirate incidents in the waterway is evident in a comparison of the

total attacks in 2004 with those in 2005, which show a more than 60 percent reduction,

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continued decline in piracy from 2005 to 2007. It was predicted that “once life resu

normally in North Sumatra crime will return and with it attacks against ships.”24 Ye

years on from the disaster, when life has certainly returned to some measure of nor

in the affected areas, the frequency of pirate attacks has not returned to its 2004 lev

One explanation could be the changing political situation in Aceh. Before the tsu

the province had been the site of a bitter twenty-six-year conflict between the Fre

Aceh Movement (known by its Indonesian abbreviation, GAM) and the Indonesi

authorities. Around thirty-five thousand Indonesian troops and 14,700 police ha

stationed in the area in an effort to suppress the GAM independence movement. 

ever, following the tsunami both parties were brought to the negotiating table in 

to discuss the disaster relief operation. This paved the way for a peace deal that w

signed in August 2005.

Under the terms of the settlement, the GAM agreed to decommission its weapon

dissolve its armed wing, while the Indonesian authorities agreed to withdraw mo

than half of their forces from the area. As a result, around eight hundred weapon

handed in by the rebels and more than twenty-five thousand Indonesian troops l

Given that both GAM rebels and Indonesian troops had been accused of carrying 

piracy, this development may well have played a part in the reduction in the num

attacks in the Malacca Strait.

The introduction in September 2005 of joint air patrols over the strait by the litto

states may have been another factor contributing to the decline in the number of 

dents. The three states each donate two planes for the patrols, known as the “Eye

the Sky” (EiS) plan. The plan permits aircraft to fly for up to three nautical miles 

the twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters of the participating states; it was hope

this measure would provide a valuable supplement to the trilateral coordinated s

patrols, which were limited to their own territorial waters.

Politically, EiS was significant because it was the first time the littoral states had b

willing to put aside concerns over the sovereignty of their territorial waters and a

foreign forces across the border. This compromise included the agreement that e

patrolling aircraft would have on board a representative from each of the three li

states. Later, in April 2006 both MALSINDO and EiS were brought together und

umbrella of the Malacca Strait Patrols.

Despite its political success, EiS has been criticized as superficial and a mere refle

of the desire of the littoral states to be seen to be doing something in the face of i

national pressure. It is estimated that seventy sorties per week need to be carried 

the aerial patrols in order to monitor the strait effectively, 24/7. However, curren

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interdiction, if necessary, following the sighting of a suspect vessel by the aerial

patrols.25 It would seem that EiS’s apparent success in helping to prevent any resurgence

in attacks may be a function more of its deterrent effect than of its actual, practical

application.

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy

The most recent antipiracy initiative to be implemented is ReCAAP, which came into

force in 2006. The agreement, which encompasses the whole region, was drafted in

2004 and required the signature and ratification of ten of the participating countries—

all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus Japan, China,

Korea, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—in order to enter into force. The aim of the

initiative, which is the first antipiracy measure to be implemented on a government-togovernment level, is to foster multilateral cooperation to combat the threat of piracy

and armed robbery against ships. Its activity takes the forms of information sharing,

capacity building, and cooperative arrangements.

A total of fourteen countries have now signed and ratified the agreement, and an Infor

mation Sharing Center, or ISC, has been set up in Singapore to facilitate communication and information exchange between member countries and to produce regular

reports on pirate attacks in the region.26 Information is exchanged between designated

points of contact, or “focal points,” in the member countries via a secure Web-based

information-network system, on a 24/7 basis. In addition to acting as a point of information exchange, these focal points manage piracy incidents within their territorial

waters, facilitate their respective countries’ law enforcement investigations, and coordinate surveillance and enforcement with neighboring focal points.27

Nonetheless, the agreement has not yet been signed or ratified by Malaysia or Indonesia; the two countries have signaled a willingness to cooperate with the ISC, but to date

no progress has been made toward securing their formal acceptances of the agreement.

The lack of participation by Malaysia and Indonesia cannot help but cast doubt on its

effectiveness, particularly given Indonesia’s status as the most pirate-prone country in

the world and both countries’ strategic positions along the Malacca Strait.28

Although these antipiracy measures suffer from obvious and sometimes serious flaws,

the continued decline in the number of pirate attacks in the waterway is testimony to

their collective success, even if that success has been more in terms of improving security awareness on the part of the shippers and in deterring perpetrators. However, if

piracy is to be completely eradicated in the strait—an important task, given that organized criminals are still able to carry out successful kidnappings in the waterway—

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works of pirates need to be disrupted; without these, the pirates cannot launch e

attacks on the water.

The International Maritime Organization Meetings

During this period of increased multilateral activity among the littoral states, ano

process has been under way at the international level, in cooperation with the IM

The initiative was conceived by the IMO in 2004 with the aim of promoting a co

hensive approach to security, safety, and pollution control in critical sea-lanes ar

the world. Known as the “Protection of Vital Sealanes” initiative, it takes as its cu

focus the straits of Malacca and Singapore. A series of meetings was convened un

the title “Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Envir

mental Protection,” the first of them in Jakarta in 2005. This was followed by ano

meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2006 and then one a year later in Singapore.

These meetings are significant with regard to piracy in the Malacca Strait less for 

they produced than for what they did not produce. At the start of this process th

speculation that these meetings would result in some sort of organized burden sh

of the maintenance of security in the waterway, with at least some involvement o

user states, in the form of financial or resource donation. This assumption seeme

be borne out when during the Jakarta meeting it was agreed that “a mechanism b

established by the three littoral States to meet on a regular basis with user States, 

shipping industry and other stakeholders with an interest in the safe navigation

through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (the Straits) . . . to discuss issues re

to the safety, security and environmental protection of the Straits.”29

However, it was later stated, at the Singapore meeting, that “the scope of t

Co-operative Mechanism focuses on safety of navigation and environmental pro

in the Straits.”30 That is, the word “security” had been dropped from the discussio

Indeed, this more narrow focus on safety of navigation and environmental prote

was reflected in the list of six projects, outlined by the littoral states during the K

Lumpur meeting, that are to be addressed under the framework of the Co-operat

Mechanism:

(i) Removal of wrecks in the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Straits;

(ii) Cooperation and capacity building on Hazardous and Noxious Substance (HNS) prepare

and response in the Straits;

(iii) Demonstration project of class B automatic identification system (AIS) transponder on sm

ships;

(iv) Setting up a tide, current and wind measurement system for the Straits to enhance naviga

safety and marine environment protection;

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(vi) Replacement of aids to navigation damaged by the tsunami incident.31

The outcome of this process shows once again that the littoral states, in particular

Indonesia and Malaysia, are unwilling to share the responsibility of maintaining security in the straits with the user states. While ad hoc contributions from user states on a

bilateral basis have been accepted in the past for improving security in the waterway,

there seems to be a desire at present to avoid any long-term institutionalization of the

process—which, according to the Indonesian state secretary, Hatta Radjasa, would provide an opportunity for the involvement of foreign forces in securing the waterway.32

The outcome of the meetings also reflects the view that improving navigational safety

in the straits and the protection of their marine resources is of the greatest regional

concern. Although completely eradicating the piracy threat is considered a laudable

goal, piracy still poses very little risk to the majority of vessels passing through the

straits, while navigational safety and environmental concerns affect them all equally.

In the short term, it would seem that low levels of piracy will continue to occur in the

Malacca Strait until countermeasures are developed that address the root causes of the

problem and not just the symptoms. Economic development must be encouraged

among the coastal areas of Indonesia and Malaysia in order to reduce unemployment,

and corruption of local officials also needs to be addressed. However, antipiracy measures already in place should not be neglected; they need to be continuously developed

to keep pace with the changing nature of piracy in the waterway.

It is clear from events over the past few years that maintaining the security of the strait

and dealing with the problem of piracy will remain the responsibility of the three littoral states. The role of the user states will continue to be limited to ad hoc financial or

resource contributions, supplemented by diplomatic pressure. Whether or not this is to

the detriment of the fight against piracy in the Malacca Strait, it is most likely to

remain the status quo for many years to come.

What is needed now is greater attention to regions that are considerably more insecure than the Malacca Strait. According to one maritime security expert, “while

international attention was focused on the Strait of Malacca . . . the security situation

in the sea lanes linking the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia [was] allowed to deteri

orate.”33 The areas referred to are the Sulu and Celebes seas—the first of which is

located in southwest Philippines, while the Celebes Sea is bordered by the Phillipine

island of Mindanao to the north, Sabah and Kalimantan to the west, and Indonesia’s

Sulawesi Island to the south. Largely as a result of the separatist conflict taking place in

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smuggling, piracy, and trafficking in illegal narcotics, guns and people.”34

While the claim that the situation in these areas has been allowed to deteriorate f

due to the current focus on the Malacca Strait may be to some extent unwarrante

clearly these areas have been insecure for some time and this should be addressed

Meanwhile, other parts of the world, including Bangladesh, discussed in the next 

ter, are experiencing sharp increases in piracy. Lessons learned in the fight agains

piracy in the Malacca Strait should be applied to other regions to make these wat

more secure. No longer should there be a false perception that the Malacca Strait 

“Dark Passage.” Rather, it is time for it to be held up as an example to the rest of 

world of how piracy can successfully be reduced.

Notes

1. International Maritime Bureau [hereafter

IMB], Piracy and Armed Robbery against

Ships Annual Report, 1 January–31 December

2007 [hereafter Annual Report, 2007] (2008),

available at www.icc-ccs.org/. The IMB’s definition of the Malacca Strait does not include

the coastal waters of Malaysia and Indonesia.

These are classified separately under the appropriate country.

2. ReCAAP is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy; see below for further

details. ReCAAP ISC, Half Yearly Report for

1st January 2008–30th June 2008, available at

www.recaap.org/.

3. Peter Gwin, “Dangerous Straits,” National

Geographic Magazine (October 2007).

4. IMB, Annual Report, 1 January–31 December

2002 [hereafter Annual Report, 2002] (2003),

p. 5, available at www.icc-ccs.org/. Figures

include both attempted and successful

attacks.

5. Given that most attacks in the Malacca Strait

take place within the territorial waters of the

littoral states, the correct term to use for the

crime is “armed robbery,” not piracy. However, for the purposes of this chapter, “piracy” will be used to mean both armed

robbery against ships and pirate attacks.

6. Anthony Davis, “Piracy in Southeast Asia

Shows Signs of Increased Organization,”

Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 2004), p. 2.

7. See Catherine Zara Raymond, “Pirac

Waters of Southeast Asia,” in Maritim

rity in Southeast Asia, ed. Chong Gua

and John K. Skogan (London: Routle

2007), p. 66.

8. In 2004 the International Ship and P

cility Security (ISPS) Code came into 

and introduced worldwide a range o

security requirements for vessels and 

facilities.

9. See Raymond, “Piracy in the Waters 

Southeast Asia,” p. 67.

10. See ibid.

11. IMB, Annual Report, 2007, p. 41.

12. ReCAAP ISC, Report for May 2008, a

at www.recaap.org.

13. Pressure was greater on Malaysia and 

nesia rather than Singapore, because 

was thought to originate from these 

countries. Malaysia and Indonesia w

luctant to acknowledge that they had 

lems with piracy in their waters.

14. “Singapore Seeks Joint Patrols of Ma

Straits, involving Japan,” Asian Politi

News, May 2004.

15. David Rosenberg, “Dire Straits: Com

Security Priorities in the South Chin

ZNet, 13 April 2005, www.zmag.org/

16. Sudha Ramachandran, “Divisions ov

ror Threat in Malacca Straits,” Asia T

June 2004, available at www.atimes.c

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Southeast Asia and the Role of Australia,”

Austral Policy Forum, 07-19A, Global Collaborative, 25 October 2007, www.globalcollab

.org.

18. “Navy Needs 262 More Warships to Safeguard Indonesian Waters,” Anatara News, 18

September 2007.

19. Liss, “Challenges of Piracy in Southeast Asia

and the Role of Australia.”

20. Raymond, “Piracy in the Waters of Southeast

Asia,” p. 73.

21. BBC News, available at news.bbc.co.uk/. For

the American reaction, see Bruce A. Elleman,

Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to

the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, Newport

Paper 28 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College

Press, February 2007), available at www

.usnwc.edu/press/newportpapers/documents/

28.pdf.

22. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2003

[hereafter Annual Report, 2003] (2004), p.

25.

23. IMB, Annual Report, 2007, p. 5.

24. IMB, Annual Report, 2004, p. 25.

Southeast Asia,” pp. 73–74.

26. Reports are available at ReCAAP’s website,

www.recaap.org.

27. “ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre,”

Intertanko, www.intertanko.com/.

28. See Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy in

Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 9, no. 4

(Fall 2005), p. 17.

29. IMO/SGP 2.1/1, 16 August 2007, p. 1 [emphasis supplied]. Available at www.mpa

.gov.sg/.

30. Ibid, p. 3.

31. “Fact Sheet on the IMO-Singapore Meeting

and the Co-operative Mechanism,” Maritim

and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), www

.mpa.gov.sg/.

32. “RI Rejects Any Effort to Internationalize

Malacca Strait,” Antara News, 29 August

2007.

33. Ian Storey, “The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia’s Ungoverned Space,”

Jamestown Foundation 5, no. 19 (2007), p. 2.

34. Ibid.

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Piracy in Bangladesh

What Lies Beneath?

SAMUEL PYEATT MENEFEE

Little research has been done on piracy in Bangladesh, even though in 2006 the I

national Maritime Bureau (IMB) labelled Chittagong the “most dangerous port i

world.” Vijay Sakhuja, of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, surmises that “

in Bangladesh waters has not attracted international attention primarily due to t

that geographically, it does not sit astride any major sea-lane” and suggests that “

factor may explain the piracy problem.”1

Densely populated and with a high rate of poverty, Bangladesh was part of India 

Pakistan before achieving independence in 1971. Generally low lying, much of B

desh is occupied by the Ganges Delta, the confluence of the Padma (or Ganges),

Jamuna (or Brahmaputra), and Meghna rivers. The floodplain sediments are loca

known as chars. In the west of the country is the Sundarbans, a marshy jungle co

tuting one of the world’s three largest mangrove forests. Some six thousand squa

kilometers of this forest lie in Bangladesh, with another four thousand in India.

Bangladesh is divided governmentally into six administrative divisions, three of

which—Chittagong, Barisal, and Khulna—lie along the coast, running from Mya

in the east to India in the west. Because of space constraints, they will be the focu

this chapter. Representative examples will show how each of these divisions is aff

by piracy of varying type and intensity.2

The Chittagong Division

Chittagong, a city of some 3.9 million on the banks of the Karnaphuli River, is th

country’s major seaport and a transit point for most of the country’s exports and

imports. The port possesses extensive facilities suitable for oceangoing vessels an

enjoys a large regional and local trade. However, due to inadequate warehousing 

poor transportation facilities, many ships are forced to wait many days before the

goes are loaded or off-loaded. Over the past quarter-century, night attacks have

CHAPTER EIGHT

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unguarded but valuable items, such as mooring lines, zinc anodes (protecting the ship’s

propellers and rudder from corrosion), and ship’s stores.

The history of petty theft against merchant ships visiting Chittagong goes back to at

least the early 1980s. Most took place against ships already moored. For example, at

around 12:30 AM on 27 October 1983, an East German vessel in the roads was robbed

of four mooring lines, despite patrols by the crew. On 26 May 1986, about thirty armed

intruders boarded a Danish vessel at 10:05 PM, wounding one crewman and stealing

ship’s stores and property. Further attacks occurred on 9 October and on 23 October,

when five boats holding as many as a hundred “pirates” raided the British Benvalla. Th

intruders used poles and long hooks to board and then stole three mooring lines before

the crew repelled them with pressure hoses.3

Over time, these attacks became more aggressive and began to take place against vessels

still under way. On 5 May 1992, Liberty Spirit was approaching the anchorage at the

mouth of the Karnaphuli when pirates armed with knives were twice repelled from the

vessel’s stern.4

On 11 January 1994, Moon Bird was boarded by seven pirates armed

with machetes; several crewmen were attacked, and ropes and equipment were stolen.5

On 21 August 1994, Young II was boarded and ropes and other materials were stolen.

The vessel’s chief engineer and from ten to twelve of the crew were injured in the attack

and had to be taken to a local hospital.6

On 26 July 1997, at around eleven o’clock in

the evening, the Danish Star Bird was anchored in Chittagong Roads when armed

intruders boarded from two boats, forward and aft, stole three mooring ropes, one heaving line, a fire hose and nozzle, a wrench, three raincoats, and six pairs of boots.7

Over time, thieves became less cautious and attacked even during the day. In 1999 the

Indonesian Karya Sentosa, which had been waiting for a berth and developed a leak,

was being moved to safety when it grounded; the ship was pirated and set ablaze by

individuals from the village of Gaheia.8

At nine in the morning of 22 November 1999, a

Panamanian bulk carrier was approached by a wooden boat carrying machete-wielding

men, who cut a mooring line and threw it into the water.9

Eight people in a boat

approached the stern of the Thai Laemthong Glory off Chittagong on 17 November

2000 and boarded, stole stores, and threatened the crew when confronted.10

While mooring lines and ship’s stores appeared in this period to be favored targets, per

haps because they were portable and extremely easy to resell, since about 1998 zinc

anodes have become targets. On 16 July 1998, the Danish Arktis Crystal, a cargo vessel,

was attacked twice from beneath the pier. Initially, the pirates fled when the crew fired 

distress flare. On the second occasion, they jumped into the water alongside the vessel

and attempted to remove its zincs. The men escaped, though police were able to

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Mawar had zinc anodes stolen from its rudder about 11:15 PM. The duty enginee

heard a knocking sound at the vessel’s stern; the robbers fled when the crew was 

and mustered on deck.12

Occasionally these attacks have been combined with more conventional pilfering

May 2000, there were three attacks against the one Panamanian liquefied petrole

(LPG) tanker Gaz Lion, anchored in the port. At two o’clock that morning small 

were seen approaching the tanker, but the deck watch repelled them. An hour lat

robbers boarded, pursued and threatened the deck watch with knives, and stole a

mooring line. At 4:00 AM there was a third assault, in which two or three zinc ano

were stolen from the rudder: “The Master reported the attacks to port control bu

naval vessel observed patrolling did not respond.”13

The year 2000 was one of the worst years on record for maritime crime against sh

visiting Chittagong. On 25 January 2000, for example, the Slovenian tanker Daih

was boarded by armed intruders;14 there were other attacks on 10, 13, and 25 May

early morning of 20 June 2000 saw the Indian bulk carrier Chettinad Glory board

2:45 by six armed men, who threatened the duty seaman and broke open the rop

before fleeing.16 There were five attacks in July, six in August, three in September, 

five in October.17

Ships visiting Chittagong adopted more rigorous security measures. On 1 August 

at thirty minutes after midnight, six pirates attempted to board a containership f

motorboat but desisted when searchlights were shone on them. On 25 November

around 3:15 AM, twelve men with long knives boarded a tanker anchored off Kut

Island but escaped when the alarm was sounded and the crew mustered. On 14 D

ber, men with knives boarded a chemical tanker, cut three mooring lines, and low

them into the water, but then fled in their boats when the watch sounded the alar

shore personnel fired warning shots.18

Since ships had become so successful in fighting off attacks, the thieves adopted a 

ferent technique. On 12 June 2002, a party of line handlers assisted a chemical ta

pay out more line fore and aft. When the vessel was fast, its crew observed that hun

meter lengths had been cut out of both lines, which had then been respliced so th

theft would not be immediately noticed. Other thieves did not attack the ships bu

waited to attack crew members on shore. On 8 July, the third officer of a cargo sh

Berth 3 was assaulted when he left the vessel at ten in the evening to check its dra

“Seven persons armed with long knives attempted to grab the mates [sic] gold ch

and watch and dislocated his arm requiring him to be hospitalized. Master repor

was the third robbery attempt since his arrival at Chittagong.”19

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(CPA) showed that there were fifty-eight petty thefts in the port in 2003.20 After years

of ignoring these attacks, the local police and coast guard finally began to pay attention

to the problem. On 14 July, when Chilean Express and Blue Sea were raided in the Oute

Anchorage near Patenga Point, the coast guard dispatched two vessels, causing the

pirates to throw their goods and arms overboard and sink their boat; seven thieves wer

arrested and turned over to the Patenga police.21

The next year, fifty-two petty thefts were reported at the port, a slight improvement.22

However, on 4 July 2004, a cargo ship was boarded at 1:30 in the morning. The crew

mustered, and the pirates fled empty-handed; the coast guard and port control were

unable to respond to the incident due to bad weather. On 7 November, about seven

in the evening, a gang of a hundred looted the South Korean cargo vessel Amazon,

which had arrived at the port to be scrapped; only five people were arrested. The same

day, a gang of about a dozen thieves armed with knives and swords boarded a bulk carrier at 11:30 PM. Despite distress rockets fired at them by the crew, they were able to

steal ship’s stores and escaped in a motorboat.23

In 2005, the number of petty thefts dropped again, to twenty-eight.24 That year, on

9–10 August at about nine o’clock in the morning, the coast guard and navy seized five

high-powered boats filled with alleged pirates. The men had attacked the tug Radwan

as it was towing a tanker in for scrapping at Sitakundu. Looted electronic items and

cables were later recovered from the pirates, forty-four of whom were apprehended

aboard by the coast guard, with another ten picked up by the navy as they fled.25

According to Shahadat Hossain of the CPA, during the first six and one-half months of

2006 a total of twenty-seven petty thefts occurred in the port, representing an increase

over the previous year.26 No further incidents were reported in August, but there were

eight in September and seven in October. On 24 November, a bulk carrier was robbed

at about 4:00 AM, when fifteen pirates with knives boarded the vessel and bound two of

the crew: “Three watchmen broke into the bosuns store.” Once an alarm was raised, the

thieves jumped overboard with ship’s stores, walkie-talkies, and cell phones.27

Attacks continued during 2007, but some ships successfully fought back. For example,

on 1 June 2007: “Approximately 40 robbers armed with long knives and steel bars

boarded the vessel. The alarm was raised; and the crew mustered and closed all access

doors. The master fired rocket flares, picked up the anchor, and [proceeded] at full

speed to open sea. The crew caught two robbers and the others jumped overboard and

escaped in their speedboats with the ship’s stores. The port control and coast guard

were informed. A coast guard patrol boat arrived for investigation and took the two

robbers for interrogation.”28

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was boarded by a dozen pirates armed with knives and a revolver: “The robbers

overpowered the deck watchman, took over his intercommunications microph

and tied him to the winch. They . . . unlocked the aft mooring stores, and stole tw

mooring ropes and two lifebuoys. They also broke open the CO2 room and dry p

sion store. . . . When the robbers tried to open the general deck store, they were s

by a deck watch keeper who raised the alarm and alerted the bridge.”29

In addition to attacks on foreign vessels, thieves also have targeted local fishing b

and trawlers. On 6 February 2003, the Bangladesh Observer’s correspondent note

many cases piracy was not reported to the police. The miscreants are active in the 

belt of the Megha stretching from Satnal to Haimchar.”30 On 7 April 2003, robber

looted goods from a trawler in the Meghna River, seriously injuring three boatm

An attack on eight fishing boats on 27 July 2003 at Compagnionj upazila (subdis

in Noakhali District resulted in twelve injuries.32 On 4 August, fifteen to twenty t

in a speedboat attacked a fishing vessel near Char Ababil; six fishermen were bea

and stabbed.33 On 19 August, eight boats on the Meghna were looted, causing loc

ermen to call for “deployment of river police in the Meghna from Satnal to [the]

Haimchar area where the pirates are active now-a-days.”34

A particularly gruesome incident involved the fishing boat Kawsar on 27 Octobe

allegedly as a punishment for the crew’s having reported an earlier robbery. The 

attacked the trawler near Sonadia Island, forced the fishermen into the ship’s ice 

ber and nailed it shut. Nurul Haque, the sole survivor, hid in a barrel. The police 

quently seized the trawler, a speedboat used in the piracy, and the boat’s driver; t

“municipal chairman of Maheshkhali Island was identified to be the owner of bo

boats, police said.”35 The police arrested five pirates, who then led the police to th

weapons, at Jhilanga. The police and pirates exchanged at least forty gunshots, an

of the arrested pirates, named Kalu Mia, died in “cross fire” as he tried to escape.

Cox’s Bazar police superintendent, Toufiq Uddin, told the press that those seized 

fessed that they were “professional sea robbers.” After taking the Kawsar they had 

ported the looted fish to Kastrurighat and sold them the next day for ninety-two

thousand taka (BDT).37

As this short account indicates, the number and intensity of pirate attacks in and

around Chittagong have increased over time. Many of the petty thefts at the port 

focused on removable equipment, like mooring lines and zinc anodes, that is not 

immediate use to the thieves but has resale value, suggesting the existence of a ne

of buyers. These operations coexist with attacks on fishing vessels, which are also 

in other divisions, such as Barisal.

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The Barisal Division

The numerous forested areas near Bhola and Hatia in the Barisal Division are perfect

hideouts for pirates. There are many small inlets surrounded by dense jungles where

pirates can take refuge. Local fishermen stay away from these areas, since even the

“coast guard patrols cannot fully protect them.” The rise of piracy here mirrors an

increase in local fishing, with most attackers operating at night and targeting lone

trawlers. The fishermen are aware of the danger but have little choice: “‘They sneak up

on our vessels, often while we sleep,’ says Ratan, whose nets and equipment had been

stolen on the water. ‘At least fifteen or twenty of them jumped out of their boat,

against only eight of us. We know that if we’re quiet and cooperative, they may only

beat us, but they will let us go. If we try to be brave, then we won’t stand a chance at

surviving.’”38

In the past, local fishermen were hesitant to report piracy attacks; indeed, many cooperated with the robbers out of fear, while others became paid informants. “‘In

Shonapur, even the imams are involved with dacoits [robbers],’ says fish trader

Mohammad Selim. ‘For nearly all of us, we would have to leave this area if we wanted

to openly talk about Mizan [a group of pirates].’” The lack of cooperation from locals

has been a continuous hindrance to the police and coast guard operations in the area.39

Most commonly, fishing nets, which can cost up to Tk 1.5 lakh (that is, 150,000 taka,

about two thousand U.S. dollars), are stolen at gunpoint and sold to delals (middlemen) in Bhola. Gangs also steal fishing boats and sell them back through delals at a

fraction of their original cost. Occasionally, the delals steal the money and do not

return the boat; Mohammad Shahjahan had four vessels stolen this way. “There are

hundreds of people involved in these things and they are backed by powerful political

leaders; we have no defense against them. . . . Coast guard patrols come now and then,

but it’s nowhere near enough.”40

Piracy is seasonal, preying on fishing boats during the height of the fishing season.

For example, on 3 November 1994, pirates boarded a loaded trawler off the coast of

Patuakhali in the Bay of Bengal, bound the thirteen crew members, threw them into

the bay, and stole the vessel.41 In early December, four speedboats with about thirty

pirates aboard surrounded the fishing boat Aliya and two other fishing boats near

Barguna. The pirates, armed with automatic weapons, made the fishermen jump into the

sea, blew up the engines of two of their own boats, and escaped with Aliya and its catch,

valued at fifty thousand U.S. dollars. At least fourteen fishermen drowned, according to

two survivors.42

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ers on the Agunmukha River before vanishing in a speedboat.43 Fishermen aboar

FB Mayer Doa returning from their fishing grounds at night on 10 March were a

near Rumparchar by pirates who stole nets and valuables.44 On 2 April 2003, “a d

trawler dacoity was committed in 3 fishing trawlers in the Bay near Pathergata. . 

gang of pirates with firearms attacked them and looted fishing nets and other val

worth about Tk 500,000. The pirates also beat up the fishermen.”45 On 7 May, som

twenty-seven trawlers in the bay were boarded by armed pirates off Andar Char, 

their catch, nets, and other valuables. Eleven fishermen who attempted to resist w

thrown into the sea; seven drowned, and four were rescued by other fishermen.46

On 6 July 2003, pirates who had previously taken four fishermen hostage exchan

gunfire with police on the Chora Meghna Arpangsia River. Two of the criminals 

killed, and their captives were rescued from two trawlers abandoned when the ro

fled into the forest.47 On 14 July there occurred attacks against two fishing vessels 

Bay of Bengal near Barolbaria of Patharghata upazila by a gang of from twenty to

thirty; eight fishermen were seriously injured in the attack, in which fish, valuabl

cash were looted.48

As a result of this surge of attacks, the Phorghata trawler owners association “com

plained that for the last few months piracy in the Bay has been increased in an al

proportion due to [an] absence of Coast Guard.”49A similar attack was reported b

Trawler Owners Association on 18 July 2003, near Laldiarchar, with fish and the 

engine being stolen and four fishermen injured.50 On 19 July 2003, police interce

gang as it moved toward a trawler grounded near Molongchora. A gun battle resu

about eighty rounds were fired over the next hour before six of the eight robbers 

captured.51 However, sometimes the police cooperate with the thieves; in Septem

2003, five policemen were arrested during naval operations against pirates on the

Meghna for “allegedly collecting tools from fishermen in association with pirates

Even when police are not trustworthy, the thieves do not always escape. During O

ber 2003 it was reported that “four alleged pirates were caught by people at Mirz

Bazar in Charfession upazila while they were selling goods looted from fishermen

When the local police tried to release them, “Some local people led by local Unio

Parishad Chairman Jasim informed higher police officials. Borhanuddin thana th

arrested the pirates and lodged a case.”53

These events led to a police crackdown, and on or about 18 November 2003 Faru

Sarder, the leader of the Faruk Bahini gang, was allegedly killed during a gun bat

with police on the Meghna River; his body was washed away downstream.54 On th

night of 30 November, Abdus Salam Kahn and other local fishermen surrounded 

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Galachipa police to arrest eleven pirates from various villages in Kalapara upazila.55

Faced with increased police patrols, the pirate gangs are becoming better equipped. As

the Daily Star (Chittagong) noted in August 2004, a group called Shiraj Bahini would

attack “fishermen and traders, loot their cash and valuables. . . . After committing the

crime the pirates fled away towards Lalmohon with the booty by a white colour speedboat.” Apparently, “police fail to catch them due to the absence of speed-boats” and

“cannot take action against them because of their location outside the district.”56

In response to the increased threat of robbery, the fishermen have banded together for

safety. Nonetheless, eight fishing trawlers seeking shelter from a storm on 4 October

2004 were attacked by about forty pirates in three fast trawlers a hundred kilometers

south of Patharghata. In a two-hour fight, some seventy fishermen were injured, four

with gunshot wounds.57 On the night of 1–2 November, “more than 100 trawlers were

reported looted . . . on the Meghna River estuaries of Manpura, Tazmuddin,

Daulatkhan of Bohia, and Dhal Char. In one case, a fisherman fought back and

detained some of the pirates, whereupon 20 pirate boats responded with a looting

spree. About 50 local fishermen have been reported abducted for ransom.”58 Similarly,

on 23 April 2005, a dozen fishing trawlers were attacked in the Meghna estuary near

Burhanuddin upazila, injuring at least eleven fishermen: “Police and fishermen report

that over 50 fishing trawlers have been looted, 15 trawlers hijacked, and at least 100

fishermen injured in such attacks over the past month. The recent increase in attacks

corresponds to the approaching fishing season. Sources state the pirates mainly belong

to two rival gangs.”59

Police attempts to halt maritime crime are temporary at best, Sisyphean at worst. As

one gang is arrested, others move in and take its place. In July 2004, for example, it was

reported “that, despite recent high-profile arrests of river pirate gangs preying on local

traders and fishermen, other gangs rapidly move into areas where arrests have been

made. In the Meghna River estuary 183 trawlers have collected red flags as tokens that

they have paid ‘tolls’ to local bandits, who effectively rule the area. At least 10 fishermen

have been killed, 60 injured, and 120 abducted while 110 trawlers have been hijacked

for non-payment of the tolls during the past year.”60

In February 2006, police conducted an operation against the pirate Bachchu Majhi and

his group, the Bachchu Bahini. A raid on a relative’s house in Chittagong eventually led

to the pirate’s apprehension at the Chittagong port labor colony. “Upon his arrest,

Bachchu told the police that he would hand over his arms cache, which was hidden in a

char [Boyar Char shoal]. ‘When we went to recover the arms, other members of his

group attacked us. Bachchu got away from us and was killed in the crossfire.’”61

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tion with fifteen incidents of murder or piracy. On 15 August 2006, police receive

that he was robbing fishing trawlers in the Meghna River off Boyar Char. They fo

from thirty to thirty-five pirates boarding a trawler, and during a firefight the pir

fired about 250 rounds and the police about seventy-five. The gang fled into the j

leaving Alauddin mortally wounded: “Hundreds of people, mostly fishermen, br

out jubilant processions on the riverbanks . . . on hearing about the death of one 

was a dread to them.”62

By 2008, there were at least three major groups of pirates in the Bhola region. Th

Mizan group took its name from the alleged leader, a “tea-stall owner hailing fro

Shonapur. . . . Local police have raided his home several times to no avail.”63 The 

group was damaged by a police and coast guard operation on 4 February 2008, w

resulted in a gun battle on Bashongbhanga Char and the capture of ten pirates.

Although Kamal, the leader, escaped, it was noted that “piracy operations have al

stopped in the region[;] . . . this is usually the case after a group has been arrested

Invariably, the pirates return to work as soon as they feel safe again.” In fact, Mof

Keramat of Shonapur, one of those arrested, claimed they were scapegoats, set up 

the ex–union parishad (UP) chairman Mintu of Dholigournagar upazila. The acc

tion of UP chairmen being involved in piracy is not a new one in the area. Local 

nalists claim that at least ten current and former chairmen are involved in collect

tolls from the pirates in exchange for protection: “The arms on the boats belonge

Chairman Mintu. If you bring him here, I can accuse him to his face,” said Mofiz

The Khulna Division

Khulna Division, to the west, includes the port of Mongla, through which 20 per

the country’s trade passes.65 Many of the attacks here mirror those taking place in 

near Chittagong. On 27 January 1996, for example, the tug Dynamic was towing 

waterman lash barges from the anchorage when thieves boarded and stole eleven

mooring lines.66 On 18 September two years later, the cargo ship Ots Uranus, from

Cyprus, was raided in the anchorage by fifty pirates armed with long knives. The

intruders threatened the crew and stole ship’s equipment and supplies.67

The year 2000 was particularly bad. On 4 January the Vietnamese bulker Ariel wa

boarded by armed pirates and a crewman held hostage while equipment was stol

The Russian general cargo vessel Ardeal was boarded on 1 May 2000, and six arm

intruders from a wooden boat held a watchman hostage before fleeing.69 On 12 N

ber, from twenty to twenty-four thieves from four wooden boats tried to board t

Saudi Arabian cargo vessel Ibn Qutaibah. The crew and shore guards prevented t

but zinc anodes were stolen from the ship’s hull.70 On 23 December, the Panaman

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and sixty meters of pipe.71

There were at least seven incidents in the port over the course of 2001. On 17 April, for

example, a bulk carrier at mooring buoy six was boarded in the early hours by thieves

who broke open the manhole cover into the steering-gear flat and stole engine spares,

mooring lines, and vessel stores. A cement carrier was hit at 8:00 PM on 31 May; ten

robbers with knives assaulted a watchman when he found them lowering mooring line

into a small boat.72

On 15 March 2002, a bulk carrier anchored in the Pusur River suffered two attacks.

At 7:55 that morning, armed pirates stole a wire rope. Slightly over an hour later,

three armed robbers boarded from a small boat by means of the anchor chain and

tried to steal mooring lines. They attacked the chief officer with knives but jumped

overboard and escaped when assistance came. A cargo vessel was robbed of zinc anode

welded to its stern on 29 July while waiting at the mooring buoy; the same crime

occurred on another vessel there on 20 August. On 22 August 2003, an LPG carrier was

obstructed in its passage of the Pusur River by ten men in small fishing boats who

attempted to board, even after the master increased the ship’s speed. On this occasion,

the coast guard responded within thirty minutes and escorted the carrier the rest of the

way to port.73

The resource-rich mangrove forests of the Sundarbans are also found in Khulna. These

consist of many small islands and mudflats, separated by a network of tidal waterways

that are particularly difficult to patrol. The Forestry Department controls fishing activities, which generally take place between about mid-October and mid-February. Fisher

men from Chittagong and other areas of the country catch fish and dry them on the

beaches. The bawalis, woodcutters of the area, “collect Nipa Palm (golpata), which is

used for making roofs and mats” from November to January. “During this period they

live in groups on large boats as [a] precaution against pirates.”74

Not surprisingly, here too the fishing season corresponds closely with piratical activities. Forestry “Department officials and employees work in a very insecure environment as the ill-equipped forest guards are no match for the 15 or more organized

groups of heavily armed pirates and bandits who rule the roost in the forest.”75

Although pirates initially focused on petty theft, they have branched out into kidnapping fishermen or hijacking trawlers and holding them for ransom. The 28 November

2000 kidnapping of sixty-five Indian fishermen from thirteen trawlers at the mouth of

the Thakurani River, in the Indian Sundarbans, may have been carried out by

Bangladeshi pirates. The captives were taken to an isolated island in the Bay of Bengal;

five were released, and a ransom of 500,000 rupees (US$11,000) was demanded for the

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trawler to be captured and held for ransom repeatedly.

On the evening of 18 December 2002, “Forest guards and Indian pirates traded g

for over two hours . . . at Harindanga canal of the Sundarbans. . . . [The] guards c

tured five Indian pirates including their ringleader Kanai Mondol.”77 A Banglades

Observer article of 23 February 2003 discussed the serious violence in the Sundar

border region: “Over 15 armed groups of pirates[,] both local and outside the bo

[ten were reported to be Indian], control the entire Satkhira forest range of the

Sundarbans subjecting thousands of fishermen and bawalis for extortion, loot an

harassment.”78 Between 4 January and 14 February 2003, some 150 individuals w

kidnapped for ransom.79

On 3 March 2003, passengers aboard a salt-laden trawler on the Chittagong–Khu

route were assaulted by a gang that stole salt, fuel, and cash, stabbing five peopl

the process—one of whom was thrown in the river;80 the Daily Star reported in 

July that “hardly a day goes by” in the Sundarbans “without incidents of piracy

bery or poaching.” In response to this threat, the government launched Operatio

GOLDEN TIGER on 12 July 2003 with a six-hundred-man task force composed of 

sonnel from the coast guard, navy, the Bangladesh Rifles and Ansars (both param

forces), police, and the Village Defence Party (an auxiliary force under the Minis

Home Affairs). “Ten ships and a number of speedboats have been requisitioned t

carry out the joint operation,” the purpose of which was to flush out pirates an

smugglers.81

Attacks continued during the summer months, long after the fishing season was 

In July 2003, five fishing trawlers were “suddenly attacked by the pirates near

Narikelbaria of Pathergata upazila of the district.” A dozen fishermen were injure

Locals reported in August that “ten groups of pirates were engaged in plunder. T

groups often engaged in infighting for domination in the area.”83 On 23 Decembe

Marabhola police killed Ali Ahmed, alleged leader of a pirate gang that had attem

to loot the outpost.84

On 2 January 2004, ten Bengalis who “went to the Sundarbans for a trip by engin

boat” were kidnapped at gunpoint near Pashurrola by Indian pirates. “Later, the 

released two boatmen . . . on condition that they would come back to the Malonc

River . . . with the ransom money within three days.”85 On 13 March, pirates belo

to Motaleb Bahini kidnapped two fishermen from Kalichchar Canal. A ransom o

lakh (100,000 taka) was demanded within two days, or the hostages would be kil

Three fishermen abducted on 13 August from the Firingi area by the Baro Bhai g

had a Tk 7.5 lakh ransom set, payable within a week. On the 22nd, a rescue attem

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could not enter the forest in the face of heavy firing of the pirate gang.”87

Several subsequent police drives were launched. One involving the Bangladesh Rifles

was scheduled for late August, but the threat of a major attack apparently led to the

hostages’ release, and they reached the Munshiganj police outpost on 30 August 2004.88

Although these efforts had some impact, New Age reported in August 2005 that pirates

kidnapped ninety-eight Borguna fishermen from seven trawlers in the Shala Canal,

Sundarbans, where they were riding out a storm in the Bay of Bengal. Nets and valuables worth Tk 10 lakh were looted, and a Tk 5 lakh ransom was demanded.89

Clashes between local pirates and coast guard have continued to intensify. On 5 July

2006, a patrol vessel challenged a boat carrying fifteen or sixteen people at Nakelbaria,

near Dublar Char. Without stopping, the craft opened fire on the coast guard patrol

vessel. Two pirates were killed and four injured in the hour-long gunfight that ensued.9

On 1 December, “a joint team of Rab [properly RAB, for Rapid Action Battalion] and

Coastguard clashed with the members of Sumon Bahini on the estuary of the Pashur

near Mongla Port . . . leaving three—a coastguard, a Rab member and a pirate—dead.”

Four days later, Jamal, the second in command of the group, was captured in Barisal,

and on the basis of his statement, RAB members raided the Sukuchi area in the

Sundarbans, recovering arms and ammunition.91

During 2007, the number of robberies continued, and the percentage of kidnap-forransom attacks appeared to increase. On 8, 11, and 12 July 2007, “pirates looted fishing

nets and fish worth over Tk 5 million from twenty-eight trawlers and kidnapped over a

hundred fishermen for ransom.” Later that month, they kidnapped four and wounded

five others from two trawlers in Kotar Kadar Canal. One of the boats was hijacked

along with hilsa fish worth Tk 300,000.92 As recently as 29 December 2007, eleven men

fishing in the Bay of Bengal were abducted by pirates of Baki Billah Bahini, who took

them to their hideout in the Sundarbans and demanded a Tk 1 million (US$1,500) ran

som. On 1 January 2008, the Bangladesh Rifles, acting on a tip, chased the kidnappers

in the Kalindi River and encircled their boats near Kalir Char about an hour before

noon. An hour-long gun battle ensued, in which about 450 rounds were expended. Five

pirates were killed and two others wounded, and all eleven captives were freed.93 One of

the wounded pirates disclosed “that pirates belonging to Masum Bahini, Raju Bahini,

Motaleb Bahini and Baki Billah Bahini are regrouping again to increase their strength

in the Sundarbans to counter law enforcers’ drive.”94 In early April 2008, Sundarbans

forest officials acknowledged the problem was worsening but also claimed that “some

484 pirates and smugglers along with arms and ammunition” had been arrested in the

region during the preceding four years alone.95

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Conclusions

There is very little empirical data regarding Bangladeshi piracy, but press accoun

reveal a richer vein of attacks than might be suggested by the published maritime

reports of thefts from vessels at Chittagong and Mongla. The type and intensity o

these activities vary widely within this fairly small region, from the pilfering of sh

supplies and fittings, such as mooring lines and zinc anodes, to the theft of fish a

nets, and finally to the hijacking of trawlers and the kidnapping of fishermen for 

som. Maritime crime appears to be part of Bangladesh’s social and political fabri

overattention to attacks on international shipping has perhaps masked both the s

ity and extent of the domestic problem throughout that country’s coastal region

Bangladesh does not sit astride a major international shipping route, as Indonesi

but if local piracy remains unchecked, it could easily mushroom and lead to incr

national and regional instability. Attacks that affect international trade arise in m

in which local piracy is viewed as a successful business. Attacks on simple fishing 

in Bangladesh might in time grow to piracies against supertankers, as happened 

recently with piracy off Somalia.

For years, piracy and maritime crime in and around Bangladesh have been grossl

underreported. Information is now appearing for the first time about the pirates

nization, politics, methods, and motivations, but much additional research is nee

understand their impact. If the international community does not educate itself 

localized occurrences of maritime and riverine crime, it will remain unprepared 

hidden shoals and reefs around it—“what lies beneath.”

Notes

1. Vijay Sakhuja, “Chittagong: A Pirate’s Paradise,” Opinion Asia, www.opinionasia.org/

Chittagong.

2. Rajshahi and Dhaka are “inland” but have

major rivers running through them. Sylhet is

less relevant.

3. Eric Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC,

1989), pp. 258–68.

4. Anti-Shipping Activity Message [hereafter

ASAM] 1992-22, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/.

5. ASAM 1994-3, available at www.fas.org/.

6. ASAM 1994-38, available at www.fas.org/.

7. ASAM 1997-63, available at www.fas.org/.

8. ASAM 1999-91, available at www.fas

9. ASAM 1999-120, available at www.fa

10. ASAM 2000-395, available at www.16

.12.145/; International Chamber of Sh

International Shipping Federation [he

ICS/ISF], www.marisec.org/.

11. ASAM 1998-46, available at www.fas

12. ASAM 2000-396, available at www.16

.12.145/; www.marisec.org/.

13. ASAM 2000-69, available at www.164

.12.145/.

14. Individual Country Reports: Reported 

2000, ICS/ISF, www.marisec.org/.

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www.164.214.12.145/.

16. “SIS: Recent Incidents of Piracy,” Euronet/

Internet, www.euronet.nl/; Reported Attacks

2000; ASAM 2000-117, available at www.164

.214.12.145/.

17. Reported Attacks 2000; ASAM 2000-337,

available at www.164.214.12.145/.

18. ASAMs 2001-230, -315, -343, available at

www.164.214.12.145/.

19. ASAMs 2002-168, -188, available at www.164

.214.12.145/.

20. “CPA to Protest Ranking of Ctg [Chittagong]

Port as Most Dangerous,” Daily Star (Chittagong), 28 July 2006.

21. “Merchant Vessel Attacked by Pirates near

Patenga: 7 Held,” Bangladesh Observer, 16

July 2003, p. 16. See also “7 Pirates Held by

Coast Guards,” Bangladesh Observer, 18 July

2003, p. 3.

22. “CPA to Protest Ranking of Ctg Port as Most

Dangerous.”

23. ASAMs 2004-178, -184, -212, -274, and

2005-9, -28, available at www.164.214.12

.145/.

24. “CPA to Protest Ranking of Ctg Port as Most

Dangerous.”

25. “54 Pirates Arrested,” New Age (Dhaka), 10

August 2005, www.newagebd.com/; ASAM

2005-258, available at www.nga.mil/portal/.

26. “CPA to Protest Ranking of Ctg Port as Most

Dangerous.”

27. ASAMs 2006-59, -61, -98, -126, -156, -157,

-189, -210, -245, -283, available at www.nga

.mil/portal/.

28. ASAMs 2007-43, -147, -274, available at

www.nga.mil/portal/.

29. ASAM 2008-95, available at www.nga.mil/

portal/.

30. “Piracy in Fishing Boats at Meghna River

Rampant,” Bangladesh Observer, 6 February

2003, p. 6.

31. “Villager Shot to Death, 25 Injured by Dacoits in Mymensingh: Pirates Attack Trawler

in Meghna at Char Jabbar, Tk 5 Lakh

Looted,” Bangladesh Observer, 10 April 2003,

p. 6.

32. “Murder, Rape, Looting, Dacoity, Snatching

Common Affair: Anarchism Created by

Bangladesh Observer, 1 August 2003, p. 6.

33. “Govt Blamed for Failing to Check Terrorism: Dacoity at Fish Depot in Raipur, Tk

70,000 Looted,” Bangladesh Observer, 10 Au

gust 2003, p. 6.

34. “Pirates Active at Patherghata, Satnal to

Haimchar,” Bangladesh Observer, 25 August

2003, p. 6.

35. Roland Buerk, “‘Pirates’ Kill Bangladesh

Crew,” BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/.

36. “3 including Constable Injured, Arms Recov

ered: Pirate Killed in Gun Battle with Police

in Cox’s Bazar,”News from Bangladesh, 6 No

vember 2004, www.bangladesh-web.com/.

37. Ibid.; “‘Pirate’ Gang Lord Killed in ‘Crossfire,’” Daily Star Web Edition, 4 November

2004.

38. Naeem Huque, “Pirates of the South,” New

Age (Dhaka), www.newagebd.com/.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. ASAM 1995-6, available at www.fas.org/.

42. ASAM 1995-84, available at www.fas.org/.

43. See “Piracy Loot Cash, Valuables from 12

Trawlers in Patuakhali,” Bangladesh Observer, 22 January 2003, p. 6.

44. “4 Fishermen Thrown into Sea, Tk 5 Lakh

Looted: Dacoity in Fishing Trawlers Rampant in Bay,” Bangladesh Observer, 17 April

2003, p. 6.

45. “Trawler Dacoity in Bay,” Bangladesh Observer, 4 April 2003, p. 16.

46. International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Re

port, 1 January–31 December 2003 (London:

International Maritime Bureau, 2004);

ASAM 2003-164, available at www.164.214

.12.145/.

47. “Dacoity on Highways, in Rural Areas Rampant in Country-side,” Bangladesh Observer,

10 July 2003, p. 6.

48. “Dacoity in 2 Fishing Trawlers, Tk. 2.50 Lak

Looted near Barguna,” Bangladesh Observer,

19 July 2003, p. 6; “Dacoits Loot Worth Tk 5

Lakh in Barguna,” Bangladesh Observer, 25

July 2003, p. 6.

49. “Dacoits Loot Worth Tk 5 Lakh in Barguna,

p. 6.

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Bangladesh Observer, 27 July 2003, p. 6.

51. “Police, Robbers Trade Fire in Narsingidi,

Ctg: Engineer, Dacoit Shot Dead, Several Injured,” Bangladesh Observer, 24 July 2003,

p. 6.

52. “4 Pirates Caught by People in Bhola,” Daily

Star Web Edition, 20 October 2003.

53. Ibid.

54. “Notorious Pirate Gang Leader Faruk

Killed?”Daily Star Web Edition, 24 November

2003.

55. “Bid to Commit Robbery Foiled: Eleven

Held,” Daily Star Web Edition, 1 December

2003.

56. “Tk 50,000 Fish Looted by Pirates,” Daily

Star Web Edition, 15 August 2004.

57. ASAM 2004-250, available at www.164.214

.12.145/.

58. ASAM 2005-10, available at www.164.214

.12.145/.

59. ASAM 2005-145, available at www.nga.mil/

portal/.

60. ASAM 2004-188, available at www.164.214

.12.145/.

61. “Pirate Gang Leader Killed in ‘Crossfire,’”

New Age (Dhaka), 27 February 2006.

62. “Pirate Killed, 7 Cops Hurt in Mid-river

‘Gunfight’ in Bhola,” New Age (Dhaka), 16

August 2006.

63. Huque, “Pirates of the South.”

64. Ibid.

65. The other 80 percent goes through Chittagong. Mongla is about eight kilometers from

Khulna, the third-largest city.

66. ASAM 1996-1, available at www.fas.org/.

67. ASAM 1998-58, available at www.fas.org/.

68. Reported Attacks 2000.

69. Ibid.; ASAM 2000-37, available at www.164

.214.12.145/.

70. ASAM 2000-397, available at www.164.214

.12.145/; Reported Attacks 2000.

71. Reported Attacks 2000.

72. ASAMs 2001-126, -168, available at www.164

.214.12.145/.

73. ASAMs 2002-74, -216, -217, and 2003-236,

available at www.164.214.12.145/.

.search.com.bd/.

75. “Coast Guard in Action to Flush Out 

nals from Sundarbans,” Daily Star W

tion, 14 July 2003.

76. ASAM 2001-3, available at www.164.

.12.145/; “Pirates Kidnap 65 Fisherm

Eastern India,” Independent Online, 2

vember 2000.

77. Sustainable Development Network Pro

21 December 2002, www.sdnbd.org/

78. “Coast Guard in Action to Flush Out 

nals from Sundarbans.”

79. “Abduction of Fishermen, Bawalis Ra

Indian Pirates Create Reign of Terror 

Sundarbans,” Bangladesh Observer, 2

ruary 2003, p. 6.

80. “Dacoity on Dhaka–Ctg Road Ramp

Cash of Bus Passengers Looted near

Chandina,” Bangladesh Observer, 11 

2003, p. 6.

81. “Coast Guard in Action to Flush Out 

nals from Sundarbans.”

82. “Tk 1.50 Lakh Looted from 5 Trawle

Barguna,” Bangladesh Observer, 30 Ju

p. 16.

83. “4 Dead in Clash among Sundarbans 

rates,” Bangladesh Observer, 9 August 

p. 6.

84. “Pirate Killed in Gunfight with Cops

Star Web Edition, 25 December 2003

85. “Indian Pirates Kidnap 10 Banglades

from Sundarbans,” Daily Star Web Ed

3 January 2004.

86. “Tiger Kills Fisherman, 2 Others Abd

by Pirates in Sundarbans,” Daily Star 

Edition, 15 March 2004.

87. “Pirates Release Abducted Fishermen 

Sundarban,” News from Bangladesh, 

tember 2004, www.bangladesh-web.c

88. Ibid.

89. “Pirates Kidnap 98 Fishermen,” New 

(Dhaka), 10 August 2005.

90. “2 Pirates Killed, Four Injured in

Sundarban,” New Age (Dhaka), 7 July 

91. “13 Firearms Seized from Sundarban

Star Web Edition, 6 December 2006. 

count is slightly different from “Coa

Killed after Encounter with Pirates,” 

Star Web Edition, 3 December 2006. 

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rates,” Bangladeshnews.com, 3 December

2006; and “Encounter with Pirates: Rab

Member’s Body Recovered from Pashur,”

Daily Star Web Edition, 5 December 2006.

92. “Pirates Kidnap Fishermen, Loot Their Hilsa

Catch from Sundarbans,” Financial Express

(Dhaka), 25 July 2007.

Daily Star (Chittagong), 2 January 2008.

94. “Pirate Gangs in Sundarbans Unite against

BDR Drive,” Daily Star Web Edition, 26 January 2008.

95. “Timber, Valuables Worth Tk 250m Seized,”

Financial Express (Dhaka), 3 April 2008.

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Confronting Maritime Crime in Southeast

Asian Waters

Reexamining “Piracy” in the Twenty-first Century

SAM BATEMAN

There is nothing new about maritime crime in Southeast Asia. It has a long histo

the maritime criminals of today are mainly descendants of the marauders, pirate

bandits of yesteryear. However, changes to the extent and nature of maritime crim

have occurred over the years. The decline in fish stocks and loss of access to tradi

fishing grounds, along with general economic problems, have led to unemploym

and loss of income in coastal villages throughout the region. This has, in turn, fo

some villagers to turn to piracy, sea robbery, and other forms of maritime crime. 

ever, these villagers are often just “foot soldiers” organized by opportunistic

businessmen or criminal gangs.

Most criminal groups—including so-called pirates—engage in several different t

of criminal activity. There is no strict demarcation between people involved in pi

and those involved in other forms of maritime crime. Many are nonprofessional 

nals, such as fishermen and traditional barter traders, making money in such low

crime as smuggling cigarettes from Indonesia to Malaysia to avoid paying excise 

The networks involved are not large, and they tend to be family or village oriente

Smuggling has been going on for generations and continues to the present day, e

cially where people on both sides of modern borders share ethnic and family ties

Transnational organized crime has also increased across Southeast Asia. Processe

globalization, convenient international travel, information processing, electronic 

fers of funds, and ready access to secure communications have facilitated transna

crime just as much in Southeast Asia as they have elsewhere in the world. Due to 

archipelagic geography of the region and the difficulties of policing sea routes an

maritime borders, the sea is the main medium for the illegal movement of peopl

CHAPTER NINE

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dimension.

“Legitimacy” for maritime crime is sometimes provided by political or religious causes

as well as by the developments in globalization that might facilitate transnational collu

sion between radical groups and separatist movements. What might have been purely

local causes in the past can now more readily take on global dimensions. In many

instances also, colonial lines of demarcation cut across traditional family and ethnic

groupings. Much of today’s illegal activity at sea, particularly smuggling and the illegal

movement of people, is “illegal” only by virtue of contemporary, rather than traditional, border controls and trade regulations.

Recent concerns with maritime crime in Southeast Asia have been with piracy and

armed robbery against ships. Such activities have provoked international interest as

they are assessed as threats to the free movement of shipping and seaborne trade. They

have also led to speculation that because piracy and sea robbery occur in the region,

there could be a higher risk of maritime terrorist attack. However, there are few

grounds to conflate piracy and maritime terrorism.1

Also, in hindsight, it may be

argued that the risks posed by piracy and sea robbery to international shipping in the

region have been exaggerated.

The focus on measures to reduce risks of piracy and sea robbery in the region has

served to distort the picture with maritime crime more generally. It ignores the links

between different kinds of maritime crime and the fact that the perpetrators of different criminal activities at sea are often one and the same. It has also led to a concentration on patrolling at sea, which at best is a deterrent measure, rather than on policing

on shore. This chapter examines the “bigger picture” by examining all forms of maritime crime in Southeast Asia, rather than just focusing on piracy and sea robbery, and

suggests some possible actions to deal with the entire range of maritime crime.

Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia

People in the coastal villages of Sumatra, Java, Malaysia, the Riau Islands, and the Sulu

Archipelago have a tradition of what is regarded by modern standards as maritime

criminality. They have long been involved in piracy, smuggling, and trafficking in commodities and people. International borders in these areas were unknown in the past,

although there would have been long-standing recognition of where limits of traditional lands, waters, or rights existed.

The practices of smuggling, trafficking, and seeking employment away from home

areas have not stopped merely because colonial and postcolonial administrations have

established national borders. In addition, in many areas, the people on both sides of a

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Sabah and the southern Philippines—may be closely related, speak the same lang

and have far more in common with each other than with administrations in fara

national capitals.

There is still a tradition of unregulated cross-border movement by local people w

ever border demarcation is uncertain and means of enforcing it are weak. For exa

a family group wishing to visit relatives across the sea may not bother about the f

mality of border controls, and it may, understandably, take “gifts” along. Much o

activity is generally harmless, but it can assume more dangerous proportions, pa

larly when drugs or arms are involved.

Smuggling and the movement of people both have long histories in Southeast As

They are frequently regarded as extensions of historical trading arrangements be

neighbors that are still conducted through the barter system. They are particular

prevalent in the Sulu Sea area and the Malacca Strait. Effective bilateral or trilate

cooperation in the area appears limited. There are difficulties in intercepting and

arresting people engaged in smuggling and illegal border crossings.

Smuggling in the Sulu Sea has been increasing rapidly, particularly from the Phil

side. It involves cigarettes, illegal immigrants, sex trafficking, drugs, and other va

commodities. There is also widespread smuggling of subsidized diesel fuel and ke

sene from Malaysia to Indonesia, particularly through Penang.2

Other smuggled 

include alcohol and motorcycles. Traditional fishermen might undertake the smu

gling, but the real masterminds are located on shore and keep themselves at arm’

length from illegal activity.

Illegal people movement in the region may be either short-term (for family reun

other social visits) or long-term, mainly to seek work. Malaysia is particularly co

cerned about illegal migration by sea across the Malacca Strait from Indonesia an

down the strait from Thailand, Myanmar, or Bangladesh.3

People with strong and 

standing traditional family links across the Malacca Strait and the Sulu Sea movi

across colonial boundaries do not regard themselves as illegal immigrants. There 

much traditional movement of people by sea between the southern Philippines a

Sabah, as well as between Sumatra, Malaysia, and southern Thailand. These move

may be exploited by both criminal and terrorist groups.

Registration of aliens is a significant problem in the Philippines, where there are 

Indonesians, particularly on islands around Mindanao. There are known links be

these people and smuggling and terrorist activities. The Philippines also has illeg

immigrants from China and India who may be involved in the sale of smuggled g

financial crimes, and other forms of criminality. All types of smuggling in the

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traffic), particularly in the Sulu Sea region, is weak. People move illegally into the

Philippines from East Kalimantan through Sandakan and the Sulu Archipelago to

Zamboanga and elsewhere in Mindanao, and from Manado in North Sulawesi through

the Greater Sunda Islands to General Santos and Cotabato in Mindanao.

Drug and Arms Trafficking

Trafficking in drugs by sea remains a major source of income for many transnational,

organized criminal groups. Myanmar remains the major source country for opiates—

principally heroin—in Southeast Asia, but small amounts are also produced in Laos.4

Cannabis is trafficked in the region, especially to Malaysia. Sometimes this has involved

land routes but more frequently transfers at sea or simply floating the product ashore.

Cannabis is also widely smuggled in the Philippines. The New Peoples’ Army is active

in cultivating cannabis, especially in the northern Philippines.

There is an increasing problem in the region with the manufacture and trafficking in

methamphetamines (“ice”) and other amphetamine-type stimulants (ATSs) from

Myanmar and other Asia-Pacific countries, including China, India, and North Korea.

“Ice” has replaced heroin as the most lethal drug in the region, and its manufacture and

use are increasing. Shabu (crystalline methamphetamine hydrochloride or, also, “ice”)

is the major drug of choice in the Philippines, with factories in the central Philippines,

mainly resourced from China or Taiwan. This is a worrying trend, because the physiological impact of “ice” is far more serious than those of heroin, cocaine, cannabis,

ecstasy, or other ATSs. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which are major precursor

chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines and other ATSs, are manufactured in China and India and are moved mostly by sea.

Small-arms trafficking in Southeast Asia is “an integral part of broader transnational

crime that includes terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, piracy and human

trafficking.”5

Small arms are widely available in the region, and trafficking by sea is

the preferred means of movement. Past conflicts in Indochina have provided major

sources of small arms and light weapons. Thefts of weapons from military bases and

police stations are common, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, and small

arms are manufactured both legally and illegally in the region, particularly in the

Philippines.

Due to its geographical characteristics, its role in the Cambodian conflict, and its relatively open society, Thailand is “an ideal point of origin and transit in the trafficking of small arms.”6

Because of the troubles in Aceh, GAM was a major recipient of

small arms and light weapons smuggled across the Malacca Strait from Thailand.

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land.7

A former Indonesian military officer was arrested in the United States in 2

connection with arms smuggling to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.8

Sri Lanka remains co

cerned about Indonesia as a conduit for the smuggling of firearms from southern 

land to the LTTE.

The Philippines has plenty of weapons available. These include domestically prod

small arms and weapons stolen or “sold” from the armed forces of the Philippine

domestic arms-manufacturing industry produces weapons both legally and illega

with some illegal exports to criminal groups in Japan and Korea. The trade is ma

by criminal syndicates and is largely carried by sea in containers rather than by sm

boat. A common route for terrorists, firearms, and explosives coming into Indones

from the Philippines, through Sabah, is via Palu in Central Sulawesi and then to Su

in Java (probably by boat) or onward to Jakarta or other destinations in Indonesia.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major factor underpinnin

incidence of maritime crime in Southeast Asia. Illegal trafficking occurs across th

Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea from southern Thailand into Aceh, Banglad

India, and Sri Lanka, and it is also prevalent into and out of the Philippines. Mea

to control trafficking in small arms might assist in reducing the violence of acts o

piracy and sea robbery. Given the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 

Southeast Asia, it is not surprising to find that pirates and armed robbers are ma

greater use of them.9

The Threat of Illegal Fishing

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing has become a serious problem in the

region, especially for Indonesia. With the depletion of fish stocks in the region, m

coastal villagers have lost their basic means of livelihood and are tempted into ill

activity. The devolution of powers to regional governments in Indonesia has redu

central oversight of fisheries enforcement.10

The fishing industry in Malaysia is more developed than that in Indonesia. As t

fish stocks in the area are depleted, Malaysian fishermen are tempted to cross in

Indonesian-claimed waters to exploit the fish stocks there, using their larger ve

and more sophisticated techniques. This exposes them to harassment, extortion, 

arrest by Indonesian law-enforcement officials, who may be acting corruptly, ev

engaging in “bush justice.” The experience of the Hutan Melintang fishing com

nity suggests that the rate of these predations, robbery and informal detention

Malaysian fishermen and fishing vessels by Indonesian law-enforcement person

has not declined.11

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Chinese (Hokkien dialect) word for “boss” or “business proprietor.” Within each

kampong (village or settlement), there is a recognized business leader, and the taukes

manage the local fishing and other production sharing systems in Malaysia, Indonesia,

and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including Aceh and the Riau Islands. Taukes are

invariably of Chinese ethnicity, reflecting the long involvement of ethnic Chinese in

managing fishing activities in the Malacca Strait.12 The masterminds behind smuggling

and other illegal maritime operations are usually taukes; they use the local villagers as

“foot soldiers,” thus keeping themselves at arm’s length from the illegal activity.

While the tauke is not necessarily the headman of the kampong, he effectively controls

the “business” activities undertaken in the kampong. Some—but certainly not all—

taukes have criminal associations, and they become the links through which more

sophisticated organized crime might operate in, for example, people smuggling, cigarette or diesel-fuel smuggling, illegal fishing, or piracy. It is very difficult to counter the

criminal role of a tauke, who has a very powerful position in the kampong and acts as

the link between the poor and the wealthy, the fishermen and the businessmen, and

possibly the criminals and the military.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

Many types of maritime crime may be increasing, including smuggling of goods and

people, but piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia have actually

gone down significantly in recent years. For example, the “phantom ship” phenomenon—when a ship is hijacked, given a false identity and documentation, and sold or

used for further trading—has been largely solved with the introduction of “ship identi

fication numbers” and “continuous synoptic records” by the International Maritime

Organization (IMO). Because of these international reforms, it has become much more

difficult to give a ship a false identity.

As mentioned above, the number of reported piracy attacks in the region has trended

steadily downward from 2004 to the present. The table shows the number of attacks

(actual and attempted) in Southeast Asia for each year from 2001 to 2008. The large

number of attacks in the earlier years in the table may be attributed to two main factors. First, it may have been a consequence of the economic downturn of the late 1990s

with more people turning to sea robbery for income. Second, several high-profile pirat

attacks in the late 1990s might have drawn increased attention to piracy, which in turn

may have led to increased reporting of incidents.

Reservations should be noted about the statistics from the International Maritime

Bureau (IMB). On the one hand, there could be some underreporting of attacks. Both

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the IMB and the IMO have noted reluctance by some shipmasters and shipowner

report incidents, due to concern that an investigation might disrupt the ship’s sch

and increase insurance premiums. Also, attacks on local craft, such as fishing boa

barges, and small barter vessels, may not be reported to the IMB.13 This underrep

might, for example, partly explain the lack of reported attacks in the Philippines 

2005, as shown in table 1.

On the other hand, overreporting is also possible. Many incidents constitute eith

unsuccessful attempts to board or petty theft—of such small items as paint, moo

lines, or outboard motors—from vessels in port or at anchor. These may previou

have gone unreported but are later reported due to the publicity given to this for

maritime crime and greater awareness of the reporting channels available. The IM

statistics may also be inflated by the propensity of ships to report any close appro

a small craft as an “attempted attack” and by the lack of follow-up by the IMB to 

mine whether an attack was in fact actual.14

There are several reasons for the improved situation. National and regional respo

including increased patrolling and surveillance, have been important, although o

tions at sea have a mainly deterrent effect; few pirates or sea robbers are actually 

at sea. Tighter government control and local policing ashore are other factors tha

contributed to the improved situation. In addition, there is greater awareness gen

in the shipping industry of the importance of security, following the introductio

the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code by the IMO in 2002, and i

coming into force in 2004.

LOCATION 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 T

Cambodia/

Vietnam

8 12 15 4 10 3 5 11 

Indonesia 91 103 121 94 79 50 43 29 

Malacca Strait 17 18 28 38 12 11 7 2 

Malaysia 19 14 5 9 3 10 9 10 

Philippines 8 10 12 4 0 6 6 7 

Singapore Strait 7 5 2 8 7 5 3 6 

Thailand 8 5 2 4 1 1 2 0 

Myanmar/Burma 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 

South China Sea 4 0 2 8 6 1 3 0 

TOTAL 165 167 187 170 118 87 78 66 

Source: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Reports 2008; ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, An

Report 2008.

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or leaving a harbor. For example, of the seventy-eight actual and attempted attacks in

2007, fifty-two were against vessels that were not at sea. These attacks are usually of a

minor nature and are best countered by more effective policing by port authorities,

including active patrolling of ports and anchorages. Some international involvement,

through assistance with building the capacity of local authorities, may be useful.

Most high-value seaborne trade in Southeast Asia is carried in larger vessels transiting

the region, whereas the majority of successful attacks occur almost entirely on small

vessels. In fact, most attacks are on smaller, more vulnerable vessels carrying trade

within the region or on local fishing and trading vessels, or cruising yachts. Larger vessels gain considerable protection from their size and speed. Most modern merchant

ships engaged in international trade travel in excess of fourteen knots, and it is both

difficult and dangerous for small craft to attempt to approach them at such speeds.

With the exception of insecurity in some ports and anchorages, such as in Bangladesh, piracy and sea robbery in the region appear to be under control. The measures

taken by regional countries both at sea and on shore have largely been effective—

again, with exceptions, and although policing generally against maritime crime could

still be improved. There are no grounds for the operational involvement of

nonregional countries in providing security at sea against piracy and sea robbery in

Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, contributions from nonregional countries would assist in

building the capacity of regional countries to provide security in ports, anchorages,

and littoral waters.

Maritime Terrorism

In Southeast Asia, the vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack by terrorists has

been of concern due to the economic importance of the sector, the incidence of piracy

and sea robbery in the region, and the presence of terrorist groups with either histories

of attacking maritime targets or intent to launch such attacks. Also, as target hardening

occurs on land, maritime targets might become more attractive to terrorist groups.

Possible scenarios in Southeast Asia range from the highly speculative and most

unlikely to the credible.15 The more spectacular scenarios tend to be based on inadequate knowledge of the operating environment. Most commonly postulated is the

notion that the Malacca and Singapore straits could be physically blocked. The traffic

separation scheme (TSS) is 0.6 nautical miles wide in the vicinity of One Fathom Bank

off Port Klang in the Malacca Strait, and this is often identified as an area where the

strait could be blocked. However, the distance from coast to coast outside the TSS is

much greater and would still allow the passage of most vessels. The most likely cause of

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community that the straits were insecure, which in turn would be more likely du

threat like sea mining than to the physical blocking of passage.

The more catastrophic scenarios highlight possible attacks on liquefied natural g

liquefied petroleum gas tankers, either through the planting of devices on board 

the use of a tanker as a mobile weapon to strike secondary targets. Such attacks s

improbable, due to the technical complexities involved and the opportunity and 

tise required. Notwithstanding, its potential is given disproportionate focus, due 

results such an attack might produce.

The main maritime terrorist threat in the region is usually seen as coming from a

Qa‘ida and its associated groups in Southeast Asia, particularly Jemaah Islamiyah 

the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). These groups have camps in the southern Philippi

where they train together and share expertise. Group members routinely move b

Sabah, Indonesian Borneo, and these camps by speedboat, local craft, and ferries

ASG in the Philippines has already shown that it can conduct bomb attacks again

ships. It claimed responsibility for the Superferry 14 attack;16 it was also blamed f

bomb attack on the ferry Dona Ramona in August 2005, as the ship was about to 

from Zamboanga.17

These attacks show that ferries, and potentially cruise liners, are vulnerable to att

With passenger ships and ferries, it is not so much the bomb that might do the d

but rather the fire and panic that could follow an explosion among so many peop

confined space.18 Measures to defeat attacks against ferries are a national respons

involving, for example, better screening of passengers and their luggage and enha

security on board.

The potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists is often overstated in 

ings that emphasize possible linkages between pirates and terrorists.19 Piracy and 

time terrorism might involve a similar modus operandi by the attackers, but pira

conducted for private ends, while terrorism has political motives. In assessments 

risk of maritime terrorism, pirates have been seen as having skills and expertise t

might be attractive to a terrorist group, but these are not particularly specialized

they are readily available. There are many former naval personnel, fishermen, and 

mercial seafarers in Southeast Asia with knowledge and experience that could be 

by a terrorist group.

Regional Solutions to Maritime Crime

Rather than seeing in isolation each of the different types of maritime crime men

tioned in the preceding sections, the real challenge is to understand their root cau

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time crime in the region should not be focused solely on piracy prevention or the risks

of maritime terrorism. Measures should recognize the interests of all stakeholders and

encompass other illegal activities at sea, such as the prevention of trafficking in arms,

drugs, and people, as well as the operational dimensions of maritime safety, search and

rescue, and marine environmental protection.

There are relatively few agreed maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia. Of the nearly

sixty maritime boundaries in the region, less than 20 percent have so far been settled.

Indonesia is one regional country that has very assiduously pursued agreements on

maritime boundaries with its neighbors. In sharp contrast, the Philippines has no

agreed maritime boundaries with any of its neighbors. Very few exclusive economic

zone (EEZ) boundaries have been drawn in the region. The lack of maritime boundaries complicates enforcement against crimes at sea generally, while the lack of EEZ

boundaries specifically makes enforcement against illegal fishing difficult.

Little progress is being made. Reaching agreement on outstanding maritime boundaries is both necessary and difficult. Trilateral, perhaps multilateral, negotiations are

required, because some end points must be agreed among three or more countries.20

Regional countries should move expeditiously to resolve existing maritime boundary

disputes to ensure that jurisdiction can be exercised properly at sea. If boundaries cannot be resolved, countries should be prepared to enter into provisional arrangements

for the maintenance of law and order in disputed areas without prejudice to their positions in the boundary negotiations. In particular, bilateral agreements between neighboring countries are essential for the reduction of illegal migration and smuggling.

Because most likely maritime boundaries lack historical bases, local cultural, social, and

economic circumstances must also be recognized in border areas. Freedom of traditional

movement and trade should be respected in agreed border-control arrangements, rather

than simply classifying these activities as smuggling or illegal people movement.

National Maritime Law Enforcement

Maritime jurisdiction and enforcement are extremely complex issues, particularly

where maritime boundaries are not agreed upon. This is a special problem in key

regional hot spots for maritime crime, such as the Malacca and Singapore straits and

the Sulu and Celebes seas. Crimes at sea are often transnational, with more than one

national jurisdiction involved. A state’s criminal jurisdiction can vary with the ownership of the vessel and the exact location of the crime. This might be as a flag state over

vessels flying its flag, as a coastal state over waters under national jurisdiction, as a port

state over vessels in its internal waters, as an archipelagic or straits state, as a state of

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ing jurisdiction on the high seas as permitted by international law.

Regional countries face difficulties in combating illegal activities at sea, due to a 

age of trained personnel, a lack of modern equipment, the obsolescence or inade

of much national legislation, and the weak maritime law-enforcement capability 

national agencies.21 Problems also arise from the lack of interagency coordination 

duplication of effort between agencies; some regional countries, notably Indones

the Philippines, have a number of different agencies dealing with some areas of m

time security without adequate arrangements for coordination. Last, any form of 

tigation or intelligence collection in the coastal areas where criminal networks ex

be fraught with difficulties, including personal risk to the police involved.

Indonesia, as the largest archipelagic state in the world, is very much aware of the

extent of its maritime interests and of the needs to protect its maritime sovereign

maintain law and order at sea. However, its efforts have been thwarted by the lack 

capacity to conduct security operations and by the lack of coordination between 

various government agencies that have responsibility for various aspects of mari

enforcement. At least ten agencies have been identified as involved in maritime s

management, nine of them authorized to conduct law enforcement at sea.22 The 

tion has been further complicated since the collapse of the Suharto government b

ernment reforms, including the autonomy laws that involve devolution to provin

governments of authority, including some responsibility for law enforcement a

J. N. Mak considers that “the Indonesian decentralization process has led not onl

more autonomy for agencies such as the military and the police, but also to a gre

lack of accountability.”23

Malaysia has been most successful in recent years in dealing with piracy and sea r

bery. It has largely overcome the difficulties of maintaining law and order in a lar

diverse maritime area that includes parts of the Malacca Strait, the South China S

and the Sulu and Celebes seas around east Malaysia. Unresolved obstacles to Mal

security efforts include the lack of a full suite of maritime boundaries around ea

Malaysia and of an EEZ boundary with Indonesia in the Malacca Strait. The lack 

latter boundary means that what Indonesia might regard as enforcement against 

fishing by Malaysian vessels might be seen as piracy by Malaysia.

The Philippines is a large archipelagic country, one that faces major problems in 

viding and maintaining control in its more remote island groups, particularly in 

south. Numerous small inlets and islands and a weak navy and coast guard add t

difficulties of providing an acceptable level of maritime security. The Philippines 

particularly concerned about the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, il

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cursor chemicals for narcotics and explosives.24 Fighting maritime crime is a task

mainly for the Philippine coast guard, although that service suffers in the competition

for resources with other elements of the armed forces.

Multilateral Law Enforcement

Considerable progress has been made in Southeast Asia over recent years in developing

regional responses to the threats of piracy and sea robbery, although cooperative measures to deal with other forms of maritime crime are less well developed. Cooperative

operational arrangements in the Malacca and Singapore straits, such as MALSINDO

(Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia) to coordinate naval patrols, the “Eyes in the Sky” proj

ect to provide cooperative air surveillance, and a joint coordinating committee to oversee these arrangements, are well established. However, the littoral states, especially

Indonesia and Malaysia, remain firm that user states are to have no roles in patrolling

the straits.25 Embryonic operational cooperation is also developing in the Sulu and

Celebes seas among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. However, problems of

governance, interagency coordination, and the lack of resources remain, especially in

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Another significant development is the IMO-sponsored meeting process on security,

safety, and environmental protection arrangements in the Malacca and Singapore

straits. This began with the Jakarta meeting in September 2005 and continued with

meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 2006 and in Singapore in September 2007.

The process provides a regular forum for dialogue among stakeholders, comprising the

littoral countries, the user states, relevant international organizations, and the international shipping industry. A recent meeting, in Singapore, agreed to establish a “Cooper

ative Mechanism” for navigational safety, security, and environmental protection in the

straits—a forum for regular dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage specific

projects, and a fund to receive and manage voluntary financial contributions from the

shipping industry and user states.26

The ASEAN Chiefs of National Police meetings deal with the preventive, enforcement,

and operational aspects of cooperation against transnational crime, including piracy

and all forms of smuggling, as well as matters relating to terrorism. However, the

sharing of information and joint operational policing activity against maritime

crime in the region remain underdeveloped. This is partly due to a lack of trust and

common accord between ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners, especially

where issues of sovereignty or domestic sensitivities over organized crime and corruption may be involved. This is often the case, as transnational crime investigations can

easily conflict with the ASEAN principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs

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dering of sovereignty. Also, in some countries, corrupt officials are directly or ind

involved in the criminal activities and will be reluctant to risk exposure through 

ries by external investigators. The lack of extradition treaties between regional co

tries is another fundamental problem.

Despite much rhetoric, there has been some hesitancy at the “Track One” level in 

ing too specifically with transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia. At the 

Two” level, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) ha

working groups and study groups dealing with various aspects of transnational c

These groups have produced at least two memorandums dealing with transnatio

crime that have helped in drawing attention to particular issues.28

Problems of Securitization and Governance

Piracy and sea robbery have largely been “securitized” in the region, tending to b

matters of national security.29 The threats have become the medium for new initi

for collective and common security. But in effect, securitizing the problems of tr

tional crime has elevated them to the political level, where grand statements can 

made but little action occurs. As Ralf Emmers has observed, ASEAN “has failed t

upon the issue of transnational crime due to domestic factors, including the role 

corruption, vested interests and a lack of resources, but also because of its own co

sus model and inbuilt resistance to institutional reforms.”30 The ASEAN principle

already mentioned, of mutual noninterference might be added to this list of facto

Securitizing the threat has also led to an environment of increased military spend

whereby capabilities are acquired ostensibly to fight terrorism and piracy but act

for purposes more purely military. Developing countries in the region should be 

ing programs to drive down poverty and social unrest and to remove root causes 

piracy and terrorism, but they are being pressed instead to increase defense spen

provide greater security, especially at sea. These militarized approaches have high

opportunity costs and set back development initiatives that might alleviate root c

of criminal activity and social unrest. A law-enforcement response to maritime c

preferable to one based on the projection of military power.

Lack of good governance is evident both in the causes of a breakdown in law and 

at sea and in the inability of governments to deal with disorder when it occurs. It 

that the farther away the seat of national government, the greater the problems o

ernance, including graft and corruption. These factors lead to increased maritim

crime. For example, the barter trade between the southern Philippines and neigh

countries is unregulated; considerable quantities of dutiable goods are smuggled 

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islation and regulations are not in place; and there is no effective national system for

tracking small vessels used for criminal activity or stolen from other jurisdictions.

Levels of governance over particular areas prone to criminal activities are other factors

that have influenced the extent and nature of maritime crime in Southeast Asia. For

example, between the world wars American authorities appear to have exercised fairly

effective control in the Sulu Archipelago. More recently however, lower standards of

governance have led to an apparent upsurge in maritime crime in this area, notably

armed robbery, kidnappings, and smuggling. Social unrest, nationalism, and political

extremism, as well as porous and inadequately controlled maritime borders, add new

dimensions to the situation.

Conclusions

A reexamination of the contemporary situation with piracy and sea robbery in Southeast Asia has often shown that the same people are involved in piracy and other illegal

activity at sea, however different the offenses involved. They range from local fishermen

or unemployed villagers to the onshore criminal infrastructure supporting piracy and

maritime crime, to the offshore financiers, facilitators, and beneficiaries of such activities. Countries outside the region, like the United States, have tended to promote military solutions to the problems of piracy and sea robbery when more emphasis should

probably be placed on civil law enforcement against maritime crime generally.

Rather than seeing piracy and sea robbery in isolation, these crimes should be regarded

as part of a continuum of maritime crime that also includes the various types of smuggling, illegal fishing, and unlawful pollution of the marine environment. For this reason, the prevention of maritime crime is primarily a matter of civil law enforcement

onshore rather than one requiring a military response at sea. Piracy and sea robbery

attacks should be subject to the same criminal investigation procedures as other forms

of criminal activity.

Of course, greater efforts are required to promote cooperation to deal with transnational organized crime in the region. Some areas that need attention are

• Improvement in security in ports, anchorages, and port approaches, where the vast

majority of incidents of sea robbery occur

• Adoption of stronger measures to control trafficking in small arms and light

weapons in the region

• Governance and interagency coordination, particularly in Indonesia, the

Philippines, and Thailand

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the financing, facilitation, and beneficiaries of maritime crime

• Resolution of maritime boundaries within the region as soon as possible, to e

that jurisdiction can be exercised at sea.

If sea boundaries cannot be resolved, provisional arrangements for law enforcem

the disputed areas should be entered into on a bilateral basis and without prejud

the boundary negotiations.

The developing countries of the region, particularly the large archipelagic states 

Indonesia and the Philippines, lack the capacity to deal with maritime crime in t

extensive waters under their national jurisdictions, including in ports and ancho

They have other priorities of poverty alleviation and development and should no

encouraged to increase expenditure on military forces at the expense of other for

development. They require assistance in building their capacities to deal with ma

crime, but this should be directed more toward civilian agencies concerned with 

time crime and port security than toward the military. Finally, there remains a fu

mental need for international cooperation to redress the underlying causes of pir

and maritime criminality in the region, such as depressed social conditions, pove

and unemployment.

Notes

Some parts of this chapter are based on field research and interviews in Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta,

Manila, and Singapore in October–November

2006, conducted by the author and Mr. John

McFarlane, visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Mr. McFarlane’s input is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast

Asia: Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary

Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (August 2003), pp.

269–83.

2. Diesel fuel is a very profitable commodity to

smuggle from Malaysia to Indonesia. At this

stage, due to subsidies, the price of diesel in

Malaysia is about an eighth that in Indonesia.

As a result, there is a healthy diesel-smuggling

operation from Peninsular Malaysia to Sumatra. Malaysian-based Taiwanese fishing boats

and Malaysian fishing vessels are believed

also to refuel other fishing vessels at sea.

3. Sumathy Permal, “Trafficking in the 

Malacca,” Maritime Studies 156 (Sept

October 2007), p. 6.

4. Some 90 percent of the world’s opium 

grown in Afghanistan, mainly in Hel

Province. However, most of this prod

the form of heroin, is trafficked thro

Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 

Middle East into Russia and Europe. 

pears that very little Afghan heroin i

ficked into Southeast Asia and beyon

5. Rizal Sukma, “The Problem of Small 

in Southeast Asia: An Overview,” in S

(Not) Beautiful: The Problem of Smal

in Southeast Asia, ed. Philipe Jusario

Vermonte (Jakarta: Center for Strate

International Studies, 2004), p. 9.

6. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Small Arm

ficking in Southeast Asia: A Perspect

Thailand,” in Small Is (Not) Beautifu

Vermonte, p. 60.

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8. Brian White, “Six Indicted in Arms Brokering for Tamil Tigers and Indonesia,” Associated Press, 29 September 2006.

9. See Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond,

and Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the

Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agenda for

Action (Singapore: Institute of Defence and

Strategic Studies, May 2006), pp. 25–26.

10. Dirhamsyah, “Maritime Law Enforcement

and Compliance in Indonesia: Problems and

Recommendations,” Maritime Studies 144

(September/October 2005), p. 9.

11. J. N. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: Reassessing the Dynamics of Maritime

Piracy in the Malacca Straits,” in Australia

and Its Maritime Interests: At Home and in

the Region, ed. Andrew Forbes (Canberra:

Sea Power Centre–Australia, 2008) pp. 161–

180.

12. John G. Butcher, The Closing of the Frontier:

A History of the Marine Fisheries of Southeast

Asia, c. 1850–2000 (Singapore: Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 80–83.

13. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen.”

14. According to the IMB, the feeder containership Sinar Merak was attacked on 22 January

2007 in the Malacca Strait after leaving

Belawan for Singapore. However, subsequent

investigations by Singapore security agencies

revealed that the two persons found on

board the Sinar Merak were actually innocent Indonesian fishermen, survivors of a

small craft that had been run down by the

containership as it maneuvered aggressively

to avoid a suspected attack. Nevertheless, the

IMB continues to show this incident as an

actual attack in the Malacca Strait. ReCAAP

Information Sharing Centre, Report for January 2007 (Singapore), p. 11.

15. See Sam Bateman, “Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific,” Security Challenges

2, no. 3 (October 2006), pp. 77–92.

16. Superferry 14 sank in February 2004 near

Manila after a bomb explosion and fire on

board. It constitutes the most serious act of

maritime terrorism so far in terms of loss of

life, with 116 people killed or missing. Other

attacks on ferries in Southeast Asia include

the February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed

forty people, and the December 2001 bombing of the Indonesian ferry Kalifornia, which

Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” Naval War College

Review 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 67.

17. “Ferry Blast Injures 30 in Southern Philippines,” New York Times, 28 August 2005.

18. See Sam Bateman, “Ferry Safety: A Neglected Aspect of Maritime Security?” IDSS

Commentaries 31/2006 (Singapore: Institut

of Defence and Strategic Studies, 3 May

2006).

19. For example, Graham Gerard Ong, “Ships

Can Be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy

and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s Maritime

Security Framework,” in Piracy in Southeast

Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, ed. Derek

Johnson and Mark Valencia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005),

pp. 45–76.

20. When several countries are opposite or adja

cent to each other, a boundary between any

two of them will inevitably intersect the

claim of another country. This is the situation in most seas of Southeast Asia and in

the Gulf of Thailand. A commonly applied

principle is to terminate the agreed boundary near the point of intersection (a theoret

ical tripoint), leaving the precise position of

the point to subsequent trilateral negotiations. Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield,

The Maritime Political Boundaries of the

World, 2nd ed. (Leiden, Neth.: Nijhoff,

2005), p. 312.

21. The situation in Indonesia is discussed in

detail in Dirhamsyah, “Maritime Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia.”

22. Ibid., table 1, p. 3.

23. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen.”

24. Jesse M. Pascasio, “Developing a Subregional Maritime Security Arrangement”

(paper, Fourth Meeting of CSCAP Study

Group on Capacity Building for Maritime

Security Cooperation, Kuala Lumpur, 27–28

May 2006), p. 3.

25. Ary Hermewan, “Malacca Coast Patrol to

Stay Local,” Jakarta Post, 26 August 2007.

26. “Milestone Agreement Reached on Cooperation over the Straits of Malacca and

Singapore,” IMO Briefing 29/2007, 18 September 2007.

27. Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy:

Concept, Theory and Strategy,” in The Next

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Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed.

Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 131

(Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies

Centre, Australian National Univ., 1999),

p. 106.

28. “The Relationship between Terrorism and

Transnational Crime,” CSCAP Memorandum 7, July 2003; and “Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific Region: The Way

Ahead: Building on Regional Cooperation,”

CSCAP Memorandum 9, May 2004. Track

One encompasses formal intergovernmental

activities, involving ministers and

officials, while Track Two activities are

nongovernmental, involving academics,

private sector representatives, and

are often involved in Track Two activ

but they do so under the polite fictio

they are acting in a private or nonoff

capacity.

29. The process of securitization has its o

in the Copenhagen School of Strateg

ies and the writings of such people a

Buzan and Ole Waever. It relates secu

survival and establishes five categori

comprehensive security: military, env

mental, economic, societal, and polit

Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the Secur

tion of Transnational Crime in South

Asia,” Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (2003)

419–38.

30. Ibid., p. 420.

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PART THREE

Piracy in Africa

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EGYPT LIBYA

ALGERIA

NIGER

CHAD

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

KENYA

MALI

NORTH

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

CENTRAL

AFRICAN REPUBLIC

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

SAUDI ARABIA

YEMEN

GULF OF

GUINEA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

GULF OF ADEN

IND

OC

Red Sea

NIGERIA

GABON

TANZANIA

SPAIN TURKEY

IRAN IRAQ

SYRIA

G

ARABIAN

GULF

MOROCCO

MAURITANIA

GUINEA

CÔTE

D’IVOIRE

BURKINA

FASO

CAMEROON

CONGO

UGANDA

SOUTH

AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

BOTSWANA

NAMIBIA

ANGOLA

MADAGASCAR

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

GHANA

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President Thomas Jefferson and the

Barbary Pirates

ROBERT F. TURNER

Thomas Jefferson was fundamentally a man of peace, known for his observation 

“if there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other in the mind of ever

American, it is, that we should have nothing to do with conquest.”1

In 1823, Presi

Jefferson denounced “the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the inte

ence of any one in the internal affairs of another.”2

This was radical thinking for the time; for example, when war with England seem

imminent near the end of Jefferson’s tour as secretary of state, he proposed what 

would be termed “economic sanctions” as an alternative to force. In a letter to Te

Coxe, he wrote: “As to myself, I love peace, and I am anxious that we should give 

world still another useful lesson, by showing to them other modes of punishing i

than by war, which is as much a punishment to the punisher as to the sufferer. I l

therefore, . . . [the] proposition of cutting off all communication with the nation 

has conducted itself so atrociously. This, you will say, may bring on war. If it doe

will meet it like men; but it may not bring on war, and then the experiment will h

been a happy one.”3

However, when facing the threat of uncontrolled piracy along the Barbary Coast

reacted very differently. Jefferson’s problem with the Barbary pirates during the e

nineteenth century was exacerbated by a long history of European weakness duri

which payments of tribute and ransoms promoted a growth industry of terrorism

Barbary regencies had preyed upon European commerce—and were generously

rewarded for having done so—for two centuries before the United States arrived 

scene as an independent actor.4

The revolutionary victory deprived American shi

the protection of the British flag—like other European powers, the British were p

tribute to secure unmolested transit on the high seas. This lack of protection, com

with the increase in American commerce and the fact that American merchant sh

“carried not an ounce of shot” to defend themselves, made the new nation’s com

CHAPTER TEN

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the nation’s new naval forces to face down and destroy the pirate threat.

The Barbary Threat

So long as the American colonies were a part of the British Empire, their commercial

vessels were protected from attack by the annual tribute London was paying the Barbary states. However, ratification of the 1783 Treaty of Paris recognizing America

brought that protection to an end. In October 1784, the American merchant brig Betsy

was seized on the high seas and taken with its crew of eleven to Morocco.6

Lacking both a naval force to protect American commerce and the ability to compel th

American states to furnish the necessary funds to provide for a navy, the Continental

Congress, deciding to follow the European lead, authorized eighty thousand U.S. dollars to “negotiate peace” with Morocco to obtain the release of the prisoners.7

Not surprisingly, two weeks after a ransom was paid and the crew of Betsy was freed, cruisers

from Algiers seized two other American vessels, with twenty-one hostages. More soon

followed. The conditions of imprisonment were such that by the time peace was purchased in 1796, only eighty-five of the 131 American hostages imprisoned in Algiers

remained alive.8

As word spread across the North African coast that the Americans had signed a treaty

to pay tribute to Algiers, the other Barbary states quickly threatened to prey upon

American vessels unless they received equally generous treatment.9

Particularly trouble

some in this regard was Yusuf Karamanli, pasha (or bashaw) of Tripoli, who had seized

power upon the death of his father in 1796. Six years earlier, Yusuf had murdered his

older brother Hasan, and he now held the family of his eldest brother Hamet—who

had been out of the country at the time of their father’s death—as hostages to dissuade

the rightful heir from returning and asserting his claim to power.10

The few surviving historical accounts suggest that Yusuf Karamanli was “feared and

hated” in Tripoli;11 one American diplomat who dealt with him extensively described

him as “a large, vulgar beast,” “a bully,” and “a cur who can be disciplined only with the

whip.”12 One of Yusuf ’s first acts as bashaw was to sign with the United States on 4

November 1796 a treaty of “firm and perpetual peace and friendship,” which was ratified with the unanimous (23–0) advice and consent of the Senate on 7 June 1796.13Arti

cle 10 of this treaty specified that no “periodical tribute or farther payment is ever to b

made by either party.”14 Article 12 provided that in the event of a dispute neither party

would resort to arms but that the dispute would be submitted to the dey of Algiers for

binding resolution.15

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forty thousand Spanish dollars, assorted watches, rings, and fancy cloth.16 Additi

there was a “note” in which the U.S. government promised that each new consul

appointed to represent the United States in Tripoli would bring twelve thousand 

ish dollars and specified quantities of artillery, anchors, pine and oak boards (wo

being scarce in the desert), and other valuable commodities.17 This, of course, pro

a strong incentive for the bashaw to quarrel with any American diplomat, as an e

to declare him persona non grata and set the stage for a successor with a new

installment of treasure.

In July 1797, James Leander Cathcart was appointed American consul to Tripoli, 

William H. Eaton became consul at Tunis. Despite the clear provisions of the trea

bashaw expressed displeasure that other Barbary leaders received nicer gifts. He s

gested that if further tribute were not forthcoming, he would find it necessary to

declare war. The threats intensified during the summer of 1799 and continuing int

In January 1801, the bashaw again threatened to cut down the flagpole in front o

American house—the method by which war was formally declared—and in Febr

he formally repudiated the “perpetual” treaty of 1796 and demanded as an altern

to war a new treaty accompanied by US$250,000 plus an annual tribute of $50,00

Soon thereafter, Cathcart was informed by a messenger, “The door of the palace 

closed to you until you pay the Bashaw his due.”18 The bashaw wrote personally t

American president lamenting the absence of new gifts and stating that “if only f

ing words are meant without performance, every one will act as he finds conveni

Finally, on 10 May 1801, the bashaw announced that he was declaring war agains

United States, and four days later the flagpole at the U.S. consulate was chopped 

ground. Washington did not learn of the declaration of war for more than a mon

there was no wireless radio, intercontinental telegraph, or air transportation to r

such information. However, as the bashaw would soon learn, the election of 1800 

not a positive development for the future of piracy along the Barbary Coast.

Thomas Jefferson: A New Sheriff in Town

The problem of the Barbary pirates was not new to Thomas Jefferson, who took 

as the nation’s third president on 4 March 1801. He had dealt with it as George 

ington’s first secretary of state (1790–93); even before that, under the Articles o

Confederation, as minister to France (1784–89), he had listened to shocking acco

of the barbaric treatment of American merchant seamen enslaved in North Afric

ferson had been frustrated that nothing could be done to help them, and while in 

he had exchanged several letters with Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay, the U

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letter to Jay, however, Adams argued that those who thought “it would be more

manly to fight them” had “more spirit than prudence.”20 In another letter, he reasoned that it was not “good economy” to spend “a million annually to save one gift o

two hundred thousand pounds.”21

Jefferson too took an economic approach but understood there was more involved than

money. He explained: “The question is whether their peace or war will be cheapest? Bu

it is a question which should be addressed to our Honor as well as our Avarice? Nor

does it respect us as to these pyrates only, but as to the nations of Europe. If we wish

our commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must let these nations see that we have an

energy which at present they disbelieve. The low opinion they entertain of our powers

cannot fail to involve us soon in a naval war.”22

On several occasions Adams suggested that he might prefer Jefferson’s approach were it

possible to protect American commerce by force, but, as he noted, the new nation had

no navy and probably lacked the political will to persevere in such a policy. On 3 July

1785, he wrote Jefferson: “The policy of Christendom has made cowards of all their

sailors before the standard of Mahomet. It would be heroical and glorious in us to restore

courage to ours. I doubt not we could accomplish it, if we should set about it in earnest;

but the difficulty of bringing our people to agree upon it, has ever discouraged me.”23

These debates continued into the Washington administration, when Jefferson called for

a military response.24 As early as 1786, he had favored trying to “effect a peace” with the

Barbary pirates “through the medium of war,” arguing that paying tribute was beneath

the dignity of the new nation and would contribute to disrespect by others that might

ultimately lead to war with a European power. In Jefferson’s view, both “justice and

honor” favored a military response.25

Washington agreed with Adams that it was wiser simply to follow the European practices. But as the years passed, it became increasingly clear that the problem could not b

solved by buying “perpetual” treaties of peace, as these adversaries lacked honor and

would merely respond to payoffs with increased demands. Jefferson believed that givin

presents to the Barbary powers was “money thrown away,” as “there is no end to the

demand of these powers, nor any security in their promises.”26

In 1786, Jefferson proposed a collective treaty with European states as a means of deter

ring or defeating armed aggression by the Barbary pirates against international commerce.27 He explained that “the object of the convention shall be to compel the piratica

States to perpetual peace, without price”—that is to say, without paying ransom—and

“to guarantee that peace to each other.”28

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Versailles to participate in a committee for effecting the treaty, with decisions to 

made by majority vote. He suggested further that the group first direct its joint a

against Algiers, the strongest of the Barbary regencies: “When Algiers shall be red

to peace, the other piratical States, if they refuse to discontinue their piracies, sha

become the objects of this convention either successively or together, as shall seem

best.”29 Although the scheme was well received in parts of Europe, it ultimately fa

because under the Articles of Confederation the American Congress lacked the le

power to compel the states to supply the necessary funds to sustain such a comm

ment. Indeed, it was in part to rectify shortcomings in the Articles that the Philad

Convention was convened in 1787 to write the Constitution.

Jefferson, like so many of his contemporaries, believed that a nation wishing to b

and live in peace had to be able to defend itself and be willing to protect its right

issue was not whether we preferred war or peace but whether we would have the 

of peace, lacking a credible ability and willingness to defend our rights. In a 1793 

to James Monroe, he wrote: “I believe that through all America there has been bu

single sentiment on the subject of peace and war, which was in favor of the form

Executive here has cherished it with equal and unanimous desire. We have differe

haps as to the tone of conduct exactly adapted to the securing it.”30

Like President Washington, Jefferson believed that “the power of making war oft

vents it, and in our case would give efficacy to our desire of peace.”31 He understo

that war could result both from our own wrongs and from the wrongs of other s

and emphasized to President Madison that “it has a great effect on the opinion o

people and the world to have the moral right on our side.”32

His strategy was set forth eloquently in a 1785 letter to John Jay, now secretary of 

for the Continental Congress: “Justice . . . on our part, will save us from those wa

which would have been produced by a contrary disposition. But how to prevent t

produced by the wrongs of other nations? By putting ourselves in a condition to 

them. Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition to punish it often

prevents it. This reasoning leads to the necessity of some naval force, that being the 

weapon with which we can reach an enemy. I think it to our interest to punish the 

insult: because an insult unpunished is the parent of many others. We are not at th

moment in a condition to do it, but we should put ourselves into it as soon as poss

Jefferson’s Decision to Use the U.S. Navy to Defeat the Barbary Pirates

Jefferson’s success in the election of 1800 gave him the opportunity to try the pol

“peace through strength” that he had been advocating throughout his governmen

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was devoted to a discussion of whether two-thirds of the new American navy—created

by Congress during the Adams administration—should be sent to the Mediterranean

to protect American merchant ships. The cabinet unanimously concurred in the desirability of the expedition and also agreed that if, upon arrival at Gibraltar its commander, Captain Richard Dale, learned that war had been declared against the United

States, he was to distribute his forces “so as best to protect our commerce & chastise

their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & Vessels wherever you

shall find them.”34

Captain Dale was a superb choice to head the squadron sent to the Mediterranean,

having distinguished himself as first lieutenant to John Paul Jones aboard Bonhomme

Richard. Tasked with the assignment on 20 May 1801, he departed Hampton Roads on

1 June and reached Gibraltar a month later. (Captain Dale was given the honorary title

of “commodore,” because he commanded more than one vessel at the same time.)

Reflecting Jefferson’s strong commitment to morality and enhancing the rule of law in

international relations, Dale was given strict orders to treat any prisoners with compas

sion, “humanity,” and “attention.”35 Shortly thereafter, Cathcart was instructed by Secretary of State Madison to refrain from initiating any negotiations, so that the bashaw

would have to make the first move. Madison thought this would discourage any expectations of obtaining “the smallest contribution . . . as the price of peace.”36

Historians report that the squadron “made a good impression on the Barbary Coast.”37

When it appeared off Tripoli on 24 July “the Pasha was a good deal disturbed and anxious to treat for peace.”38 One week later, the American schooner Enterprise, commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett, won a decisive victory in a three-hour battle

with a larger Tripolitan cruiser without a single American casualty.39

Unfortunately, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this chapter, when Jefferson

reported on Lieutenant Sterrett’s engagement in his first annual report to Congress

he misrepresented the facts and gave the impression that the absence of congressional authorization for the mission left the squadron with only the power to fend off

attacks on American ships.40 The consensus view of Jefferson’s cabinet was that the

president needed no specific statutory authority to fight a war initiated or declared

by a foreign state.41

Indeed, Congress does not appear to have even been formally notified of the dispatch

of two-thirds of the nation’s navy into harm’s way for more than six months, although

there is no evidence of any effort to keep the mission a secret and it was widely reported

in the press. Nor, for that matter, is there evidence that Congress was unhappy about

not having been asked to authorize the initial deployment. While Congress did

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ferson, few members seemed to view this minor confrontation against pirates as 

ing a formal declaration of war. The primary effect of Jefferson’s misstatement to

Congress has been to mislead future generations of scholars.42

The “Two Years’ Sleep” and General William Eaton

A very important lesson to be drawn from Jefferson’s war with the Barbary pirate

the importance of strong military leadership. After some initial successes, Comm

Dale returned to Washington in April 1802, just prior to the end of the enlistmen

period of his crew, and a new squadron—under the command of Captain Richar

Morris—was dispatched to the Mediterranean with orders to wage war against T

Morris had all the social graces and ran a happy ship, but he had no stomach for 

North Africa. Indeed, he did not even set eyes on Tripoli for more than a year, th

he had been instructed to blockade the state.

Finally, on 7 June 1803, Morris went ashore under a white flag to talk with the ba

Yusuf demanded US$250,000 plus twenty thousand a year and reimbursement fo

of the costs of the war. Lacking any authority to negotiate, Morris returned to Gi

tar, where he learned that the frustrated Jefferson had relieved him of command. 

board of inquiry later found Morris guilty of gross negligence and recommended 

he be court-martialed. Rather than approving the recommendation of the board

president—who referred to the period as the “two years’ sleep”—simply fired Mo

and replaced him with William Eaton.43

If Captain Richard Morris showed little courage or initiative, William Eaton mad

for it in spades. The forty-one-year-old protégé of Timothy Pickering—who had 

as secretary of state during the Adams administration—had served as consul at T

from 1798 until 1803. He was, to say the least, not disposed to kowtow to Yusuf

Karamanli or any other Barbary tyrant. Indeed, he viewed his negotiating instruc

under the Adams administration as so offensively weak that he wrote the secr

of state and suggested that his role might be better filled by a slave: “If we will 

peace at such a price, recall me, and send a slave, accustomed to abasement, t

resent the nation.”44

More than a century before the more famous British army lieutenant Thomas Ed

Lawrence—“Lawrence of Arabia”—achieved legendary status promoting revolut

Iraq and Saudi Arabia, William Eaton learned the languages and culture of North

Africa and attired himself in flowing Arab robes, inspiring those who served und

to follow him and making converts of people who at first dismissed him as an im

tical dreamer. One biographer reports that Eaton “spoke at least four Arab dialec

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ment that followed “General” Eaton (as he was hereafter known, though his highest

actual army commission, before his consulship had been as a captain) into war, wrote:

“Wherever General Eaton leads, we will follow. If he wants to march us to hell, we’ll

gladly go there.”46

When in early 1801, as noted above, the bashaw of Tripoli sent his army commander, a

renegade Scotsman named Lisle, to inform Consul Cathcart that the door of the palace

was closed to him until the bashaw was given “his due,” Eaton had been present, and

what happened next has been described by one of his biographers: “The bullying was

more than William could tolerate. ‘Lisle,’ he said, addressing him in English, ‘if any

harm comes to Mr. Cathcart, I give you my solemn, personal word of honor that I shall

hunt you down, put a noose around your neck and hang you from the nearest palm

tree. If I can, I shall do it with the aid of the United States Army and Navy. If possible, I

shall also enlist the services of the Royal Navy, which has grown tired of the blustering

of a traitor. But, if necessary, I shall do it alone!’”47

On 1 August 1802—a year to the day after Lieutenant Sterrett won his naval victory—

William Eaton achieved a similar success without a single ship under his command by

simply announcing in Tunis, without the slightest authority, that Tripoli was in a state

of blockade. Afraid of a run-in with American warships, merchant shipmasters simply

refused to accept cargo bound for Tripoli. When Commodore Dale, who had returned

to the United States, learned of this initiative he strongly approved. Eaton later wrote

the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Washington: “I kept the enemy three

months in a state of blockade when we had not a ship of war within three hundred

leagues from his port; his chief commerce and whole supplies of provisions depending

on Tunis.”48

Forming Alliances with Your Enemy’s Enemy

Eaton’s greatest achievement was originally suggested by James Cathcart—an incredible land attack against Tripoli, to be led by Yusuf ’s exiled elder brother Hamet. It

reflects an important understanding about incentive structures: if one wants to get the

bashaw of Tripoli to make concessions, success is more likely if the bashaw perceives

that he has something valuable at risk should the quarrel go badly. Cathcart and Eaton

proposed to locate the bashaw’s elder brother, Hamet Karamanli, and signal Yusuf that

if he did not immediately make peace and release all American hostages he risked losing his job and perhaps his life to the rightful heir to the throne.

Eaton first raised the idea of using Hamet to put pressure on Yusuf with Secretary of State

Madison in a letter dated 5 September 1801. In 1803, he returned to the United States to

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making some use of Hamet, at least in general terms, but they apparently sought 

keep what in a more recent era would be called “plausible deniability” and so left 

of the detail to Eaton’s discretion. Historians who have examined the record are d

over whether Jefferson or Madison knew of and actually approved what ultimate

occurred. While several writers assert that the Hamet expedition was specifically

approved by Washington, Jefferson’s biographer Merrill Peterson argues that the 

dent “refused to endorse” Eaton’s “audacious plan . . . to lead a motley insurrectio

army overland against Tripoli.”49 Historian Henry Adams may have captured the 

in noting that Eaton’s orders were “vague.”50

Whatever Jefferson’s intention, near the end of 1803 Eaton was appointed naval a

for the United States on the Barbary Coast and was promised forty thousand dol

further some sort of operation involving Hamet. In furtherance of Eaton’s plan, 

modore Barron instructed Lieutenant Isaac Hull to lead a group of Marines to ac

pany Eaton to Alexandria, Egypt, to try to locate Hamet. Hull and his party were

instructed to “disguise the true object” of their mission, pretending to be on leav

late February, Eaton made contact with Hamet and offered to assist him in regain

his throne, promising a sum of money as well to secure Hamet’s cooperation. Th

entered into a “convention” that provided in part: “The government of the Unite

States shall use their utmost exertions so far as comports with their own honor a

interest, their subsisting treaties and the acknowledged law of nations, to reestabl

said Hamet Pasha in the possession of his sovereignty of Tripoli.”51

While some historians have observed that this agreement exceeded Eaton’s instru

it is difficult to interpret the actual language used as committing the United State

do anything it did not conclude to be in its “interest.” In addition to initiating a c

operation with Hamet, to gain the cooperation of Tunis Eaton quietly promised 

chief minister a payment of ten thousand dollars if the operation succeeded. Thi

too apparently originated with James Cathcart.

The dozen Americans then put together a motley band of roughly five hundred A

and Greek mercenaries from about a dozen countries, and in early March 1805 th

party set out on a five-hundred-mile march across the Western Desert to Tripoli. 

traveled, the force grew to between six hundred and seven hundred fighting men, w

roughly another five hundred family members and “camp followers” bringing up t

Eaton’s leadership skills were frequently put to the test during the arduous trip. A

and water supplies dwindled and the heat took its toll, there were demands for ad

tional payments and threats of desertion. Eaton at one point cut off rations to th

Arabs to end a threatened mutiny, and when Hamet refused to continue Eaton m

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The situation worsened on 15 April, when the force arrived at Bomba to find that the

promised American warships had not arrived. However, Argus arrived early the next

morning, and the next day Hornet brought additional food and military supplies.

On 25 April the band completed the sixty-mile march from Bomba to Derne, the second

largest city in Tripoli, and learned that two-thirds of the city inhabitants were ready to

welcome Hamet as their rightful leader. Knowing that the town was defended by a forc

of eight hundred and that Yusuf ’s army was about to arrive from Tripoli, Eaton sent a

message to the governor under a flag of truce offering terms in the hope of avoiding

further bloodshed. Receiving in reply a message saying, “My head or yours,” Eaton’s

force commenced an attack.52 The governor fled, and Eaton’s army soon took the city.

Days later, Yusuf ’s army of twelve hundred arrived from Tripoli and attacked Eaton’s

army, but after Eaton’s men demonstrated the accuracy of American cannon fire,

Yusuf ’s men quickly lost their stomach for war. Eaton’s army was prepared to move on

Tripoli with the support of offshore American naval fire when his entire operation was

undermined from Washington.

From the start, one of the strongest critics of Eaton’s plan was Colonel Tobias Lear, the

U.S. consul in Algiers, who believed that Hamet was simply too weak to be a viable ally

against Yusuf and that the long march across the desert could not possibly succeed.

Government leaders in Washington had no way of following Eaton’s progress and did

not know that Commodore Edward Preble was doing a brilliant job of putting pressure

on Tripoli. Indeed, Preble’s blockade was so effective that the Barbary pirates had been

shut down completely for months. But at the end of October 1803, the frigate Philadelphia ran aground off Tripoli in strong winds and was captured by the pirates.

News of this setback was a shock to Jefferson and no doubt contributed to the decision

to authorize Lear to pursue a diplomatic solution in Tripoli. In fact, three months after

it was captured, Philadelphia was burned in a daring raid, led by Lieutenant (later

Commodore) Stephen Decatur, in which scores of pirates were killed without a single

American fatality and only one American sailor was slightly wounded. Professor Forrest McDonald notes: “Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson, the greatest sailor of the entire

era of fighting sail, called Decatur’s raid ‘the most bold and daring act of the age.’”53

But by the time news of Decatur’s heroic escapade reached Washington, Lear had

already been authorized to seek a negotiated peace.

On 11 June 1805, Constellation arrived off Derne with a message from Commodore

Rodgers informing Eaton that a peace treaty had been signed on 5 June by Lear and

Yusuf. Eaton was ordered to withdraw all the Christians and Hamet’s party immediately; the Arab mercenaries were to be left ashore, abandoned to their fate. Historians

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home, but this aspect of the operation was hardly a high point of American honor

Even though his operation was terminated before achieving total victory, Eaton’s 

adventure had a great influence on the outcome of the war. Two days passed betw

the arrival of Hornet with authorization for Lear to begin negotiations and Yusuf

Bashaw’s signing of a peace treaty aboard Constitution. Six months earlier, before

Eaton’s expedition with Yusuf ’s brother, the Spanish consul in Tripoli had sent w

Lear that the United States could probably negotiate a favorable treaty. By the tim

Yusuf learned of Eaton’s expedition, Yusuf was genuinely concerned and therefor

more willing to negotiate. When Lear presented a draft peace treaty, Yusuf agreed

immediately to sign it, asking only the addition of one article promising that Eat

would be withdrawn immediately and would no longer provide any support to Y

domestic enemies.54

The treaty was unprecedented in the relations of Western nations with the Barba

pirates. Even before Lear’s arrival, the bashaw had reduced the price of peace from

three million dollars to sixty thousand, but when Lear presented him with a draf

provided for no payment and no annual tribute it was promptly accepted. The tr

provided for the immediate exchange of all prisoners; since the bashaw held thre

dred Americans while the Americans had only one hundred Tripolitans, Lear agr

a payment of sixty thousand dollars for the difference.55 The treaty further provid

that in the event of future war, prisoners would be exchanged rather than enslave

that the party holding more prisoners would be compensated at a fixed rate, dep

upon each prisoner’s rank.56

Additional provision was made for the punishment of Tripolitan ship command

who subjected any American to abuse or plundered property.57 On 12 April 1806

hours before President Jefferson’s sixty-third birthday celebration—the Senate ga

consent to ratification by a vote of twenty-one to eight. President Thomas Jeffers

quickly ratified the treaty.

Conclusions

In retrospect, Jefferson and Madison may have erred in undermining Eaton’s bol

adventure, although any difference in the final outcome probably would not have 

fied the additional loss of life that might have accompanied an attack on Tripoli. 

ars have speculated that Lear could have had a treaty without paying Yusuf sixty

thousand dollars for the release of the three hundred American prisoners, and th

quite possibly right. Had President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison been 

possession of more timely and accurate information about the situation in the

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Eaton and Lear, perhaps they would have taken a firmer stand.

Although bitter and feeling betrayed, Eaton returned to the United States as a hero and

for many months was feted at receptions around the nation. The Massachusetts legislature granted him ten thousand acres in what is now Maine, and Congress voted to settle his account equitably and to grant a small sum as well to Hamet. When Congress

learned of the details of the covert operation that contributed to the peace, the only

criticism voiced was that Hamet had been treated shabbily—although he had obtained

the release of his wife and family from Yusuf pursuant to the treaty of peace—and that

the abandonment of the Arab mercenaries might make it more difficult to recruit such

forces in the future should that ever become desirable.

But it is noteworthy that no one in Congress criticized the administration for sending

two-thirds of the American navy to attack foreign ships without notifying Congress.

More broadly, this American venture sent shock waves across Europe and throughout

the other Barbary states. Later in the Second Barbary (or Algerine) War, Stephen

Decatur was sent back to the Mediterranean with a squadron to demand that Algiers

abandon its efforts to extract tribute from the United States. When the dey asked for

time to consider the demand, Decatur responded: “Not a minute.” The dey thereupon

accepted the American demand—his concession was quickly followed by those of the

other Barbary states. Emboldened European leaders quickly announced their own

refusal to continue paying tribute, and centuries of terror on the high seas soon came

to an end.58

Jefferson was correct that deterrence should be the ultimate goal, but he also observed,

“An insult unpunished is the parent of many others.”59 If there is one lesson to be

learned from Jefferson’s success against the state-sponsored Barbary pirates, it is the

importance of creating appropriate disincentives. In this case, persuading Yusuf

Karamanli that his own interests were at stake made a crucial difference. In the final

determination, deterring pirate leaders is the only way to ensure the end of piracy.

Notes

This chapter is based in part upon an earlier essay

by the author that appeared under the title “State

Responsibility and the War on Terror: The Legacy

of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates” in

Chicago Journal of International Law 4 (2003), pp.

121–40.

1. Jefferson to William Short, 28 July 1791, in

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P.

Boyd and Ruth W. Lester (Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton Univ. Press, 1982), vol. 20, pp.

686–88.

2. Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823

in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh

(Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson

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477–78.

3. Jefferson to Tench Coxe, 1 May 1794, in ibid.,

vol. 9, pp. 284–85. Later, as president, Jefferson sought to stave off war by persuading

Congress to enact the Embargo Act of 1807.

4. Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the

New Nation (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,

1970), pp. 310–11.

5. For increase in American commerce, Ray W.

Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United

States with the Barbary Powers, 1776–1816

(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press,

1931), p. 101. For “ounce of shot,” Stanley

Lane-Poole, The Story of the Barbary Corsairs

(New York: G. P. Putnam, 1890), p. 274.

6. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, pp. 310–11.

7. Ibid., p. 311.

8. Joel S. Sorkin, “The Piratical Ensigns of Mahomet,” National Review, 28 March 1986, pp.

50, 52.

9. Lane-Poole, Story of the Barbary Corsairs, p.

275.

10. For useful background on this period, see

Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary

Corsairs (New York: Houghton Mifflin,

1905), pp. 88–89, and Francis Rennell Rodd,

General William Eaton: The Failure of an Idea

(n.p.: Minton, Balch, 1932), p. 59.

11. Donald Barr Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary:

Arab Piracy and the Birth of the United States

Navy (New York: Crown, 1971), p. 60.

12. Samuel Edwards, Barbary General: The Life of

William H. Eaton (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 84.

13. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” art. 1, 8

Stat 154, 154 (1797). Also, see Journal of the

Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the

United States of America, 1789–1805 (7 June

1797), available at memory.loc.gov/.

14. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” art. 10.

15. “In case of any dispute arising from the violation of any of the articles of this treaty, no

appeal shall be made to arms; nor shall war

be declared on any pretext whatever. But if

the consul residing at the place where the

dispute shall happen, shall not be able to settle the same, an amicable reference shall be

made to the mutual friend of the parties, the

Dey of Algiers, the parties hereby engaging

to abide by his decision.” Ibid., art. 12.

Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Pr

Documents in Law, History, and Diplo

avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/

bar1796t.asp.

17. Note available at Avalon Project, aval

.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1796t

18. Edwards, Barbary General, p. 86.

19. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations of the Un

States with the Barbary Powers, p. 97.

20. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Cor

35.

21. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations of the Un

States with the Barbary Powers, p. 46.

22. Jefferson to John Page, 20 August 178

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Ju

Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Elizabeth 

Hutter (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U

Press, 1953), vol. 8, pp. 417–19.

23. John Adams to Jefferson, 3 July 1785

in Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary C

pp. 36–37.

24. See, for example, Thomas Jefferson, R

[to Congress] on American Trade in th

terranean (28 December 1790), in Th

of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boy

W. Lester, and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Pre

1971), vol. 18, p. 423.

25. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of th

States With the Barbary Powers, p. 47

Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 178

The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Ju

Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Fredrick A

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Pre

1954), vol. 10, p. 123.

26. Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 1

1801, in The Writings of Thomas Jeffe

Paul Leicester Ford (New York: G. P.

Putnam, 1897), vol. 8, pp. 62–63.

27. See William Kirk Woolery, The Relat

Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign 

(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Uni

1927), pp. 29–33.

28. Thomas Jefferson, “Proposals for Co

Operation among the Powers at War 

the Piratical States of Barbary,” Nove

1786, in Writings of Thomas Jefferson

Lipscomb and Bergh, vol. 17, pp. 145

29. Ibid., pp. 147–48.

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The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. John

Catanzariti and Eugene R. Sheridan

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,

1995), vol. 26, p. 392.

31. Jefferson to George Washington, 4 December

1788, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed.

Julian P. Boyd, William H. Gaines, Jr., and

Joseph H. Harrison, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton Univ. Press, 1958), vol. 14, p. 328.

This letter was mistakenly dated 4 November

1788 by Jefferson, who corrected his error in

a subsequent letter of 5 December 1788

(ibid., p. 336). See also Jefferson to James

Monroe, 11 July 1790, reprinted as “Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our

peace” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed.

Julian P. Boyd and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr.

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,

1965), vol. 17, p. 25.

32. Jefferson to James Madison, 19 April 1809, in

Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Lipscomb

and Bergh, vol. 12, pp. 273–74.

33. Jefferson to John Jay, 23 August 1785, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Boyd, Bryan,

and Hutter, vol. 8, pp. 426–27.

34. Samuel Smith to Richard Dale, 20 May 1801,

in Naval Documents Related to the United

States Wars with the Barbary Powers, ed.

Claude A. Swanson (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1939), vol. 1,

pp. 465–67.

35. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs,

p. 93; Rodd, General William Eaton, p. 73.

36. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations of the United

States with the Barbary Powers, p. 113.

37. Rodd, General William Eaton, p. 77.

38. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs,

p. 95.

39. This encounter was at the heart of Jefferson’s

8 December 1801 report to Congress in his

first annual message, but Jefferson’s portrayal of Lieutenant Sterrett’s orders was

both at odds with the decision of his cabinet

the previous March and clearly contrary to

the actual orders found in naval records. See

Robert F. Turner, “War and the Forgotten

Executive Power Clause,” Virginia Journal of

International Law (1994), vol. 34, p. 903.

40. For a general discussion of Jefferson’s reasons, see ibid., pp. 910–15. See Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress (8

December 1801), quoted in ibid., pp. 910–11.

tive Power Clause,” pp. 912–13.

42. Among the dozens of scholars who have relied upon Jefferson’s first annual message to

Congress as evidence that Commodore Dale

sailed to the Mediterranean with very limited authority, see generally Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson

(Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1976),

p. 61; Rodd, General William Eaton, p. 80;

Lane-Poole, Story of the Barbary Corsairs,

p. 276; and Chidsey, Wars in Barbary, p. 75.

43. Henry Adams, History of the United States of

America during the First Administration of

Thomas Jefferson (New York: Scribner’s,

1889), vol. 2, p. 137; Peterson, Thomas Jeffer

son and the New Nation, pp. 798–99;

Chidsey, Wars in Barbary, pp. 83–84.

44. Chidsey, Wars in Barbary, p. 68.

45. Edwards, Barbary General, p. 5.

46. Ibid., p. 3; Eaton’s highest government rank

had been captain in the Army, but he acquired the “courtesy” title as a result of his

exploits in North Africa.

47. Ibid., p. 86.

48. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations of the United

States with the Barbary Powers, p. 110.

49. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, p. 799. But compare Irwin, Diplomatic

Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, p. 143.

50. Henry Adams, The Formative Years: A History of the United States of America during

the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison

(London: Collins, 1948), vol. 1, p. 283.

51. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs,

p. 231.

52. Rodd, General William Eaton, p. 233.

53. McDonald, Presidency of Thomas Jefferson,

p. 78.

54. Irwin, Diplomatic Relations of the United

States with the Barbary Powers, p. 152. According to Adams: “Immediately upon hear

ing that his troops had failed to retake

Derne, he entered into negotiations with

Tobias Lear, the American consul-general at

Algiers, who had come to Tripoli for the

purpose; and on this occasion the Pasha negotiated with all the rapidity that could be

wished. [On] June 3, 1805, he submitted to

the disgrace of making peace without being

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Years, vol. 1, p. 285).

55. “Treaty of Peace and Amity,” art. 2, 8 Stat 214

(1805).

56. Ibid., art. 16.

57. Ibid., art. 6.

58. John W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy: Being a Brief Review of the Foreign

(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1900)

207–208; Lane-Poole, Story of the Ba

Corsairs, p. 291.

59. Jefferson to John Jay, 23 August 1785

pers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Boyd, Br

and Hutter, vol. 8, pp. 426–27.

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The Limits of Naval Power

The Merchant Brig Three Sisters, Riff Pirates, and

British Battleships

ANDREW LAMBERT

This chapter examines a nineteenth-century British response to piracy on a majo

Mediterranean trade route. While the Riff pirates were only a minor irritant, Brit

could not stop them without deploying a significant naval and military force ash

option that risked opening the complex and dangerous issues connecting Britain

France, and Spain with Morocco, Algeria, and Gibraltar—issues the British prefe

leave alone. The only other naval response, catching the pirates red-handed and a

istering local chastisement, proved inconclusive.

Between 1846 and 1856, eight ships were attacked off the Moroccan Mediterrane

coast—six British, one French, and one Prussian: Ruth, 30 March 1846 (crew esc

Three Sisters, 2 November 1848 (crew escaped); Violet, 5–6 October 1851; Flora (

sian), December 1852; Cuthbert Young, 21 June 1854 (crew escaped); Jeune Diepp

(French), 8 April 1855; Lively, 2 May 1855 (crew escaped); and Hymen, 14 May 

In addition, a large number of Spanish coasters and boats were taken. A simil

surge of piracy in 1834–35 had been ended by the military intervention of the

Moroccan sultanate.1

The British, French, and Prussian governments considered a range of naval and m

tary options, but the problem was ultimately resolved once again by Moroccan fo

In part this outcome reflected mutual forbearance by London and Paris, for who

Morocco served as a vital buffer between French-occupied Algeria and the strate

British base at Gibraltar. One enduring lesson of this case study is that because

pirates—like all other people—must live on the land, it is on the land that they m

often be stopped; naval power alone is not sufficient to fight piracy.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

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The Riff coast—the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, roughly between Ceuta and

Melilla, on Cape Tres Forcas—was an obvious location for pirates, since it was isolated

extremely poor, and yet close to attractive markets. Most Riff (Berber) tribes found

smuggling more attractive than piracy, and the governor of Gibraltar was only too

pleased to welcome the cargoes they carried.2

Many of the small sailing vessels that

worked along the shore were smuggling weapons into Algeria or tobacco and other lux

ury goods into Spain. They hugged the shore to evade Spanish coast guards and the

French navy.3

Not a few of these ships were owned by and operated out of Gibraltar, as

Spain and France recognized. Even late in the nineteenth century the Riffs were happy

to seize the occasional Spanish smuggler.4

Riff fishing boats, forty feet by six feet, rowing up to sixteen oars, were large enough for smuggling and localized piracy. Sailing

ships passing the Strait of Gibraltar to enter the Mediterranean were liable, if they did

not keep north of the island of Alboran, to find themselves taken up by a southerly cur

rent and becalmed close by the Guelaya Peninsula, within easy range of Bu Gafar rowing boats and the heavily armed men who owned them. The Banu Bu Gafar depended

on fishing and coastal trade for their livelihood. In the 1830s the French occupied Alge

ria, disrupting coastal trade, and the Spanish stepped up their attacks on Riff coastal

shipping. This removed an obvious outlet for commerce and threatened the seafaring

population. The Spanish attacks would be extended to fishing boats and small craft in

1854, paralyzing the Moroccan coast. Half the piratical attacks occurred at this time.

Although there was no direct link between Spanish activity and piracy, the seized vessels were not owned by the Bu Gafar; nonetheless, the Spanish presence remained a sig

nificant factor. Cut off from opportunities for legitimate trade, they found temptation

hard to resist.

The Bu Gafar who attacked the ship Ruth were one of many tribes on this coast collectively known as Riff pirates. They towed their prizes to one of the narrow beaches

between Cape Tres Forcas and Azanen Bay before stripping them of cargo, equipment,

and recoverable metals and burning the hulks. If a crew was taken, so much the better,

since its members could be ransomed through the European representatives at Tangier—

rather than the distant Moroccan government. However, as noted, the crews from four

of the six British ships taken between 1846 and 1856 did not wait to be attacked but

escaped by boat. Together with the essentially commercial nature of the ransom process, this suggests that other factors might have been operating, that perhaps the crews

colluded with the pirates.

When the inevitable naval vessel turned up to recover a captured ship or simply bring

down righteous indignation upon the locals, it soon discovered an uncomfortable

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charts. The Bu Gafar villages were almost impossible to locate, often out of sight 

invulnerable to bombardment, as were their boats, which the Riff buried in the s

hid in caves. The coast was dominated by cliffs, a marked advantage for the defen

in a firefight.5

The same vantage point enabled the Riffs to spot approaching war

with their excellent telescopes and then to use signal fires to communicate orders

Once they had spotted a likely target, the Riff pirates had sufficient arms to captu

their prize. In particular, they possessed the locally manufactured long-barrel Rif

ket.6

A rather chastened naval report of 1846 noted: “The Reef [Riff] musket will 

half as far again as an English musket and the Reefians are good marksmen & kn

be the most warlike and daring race in Morocco.”7

Nor were their weapons restri

muskets: in 1848, the steam sloop HMS Polyphemus came under fire from a well 

dled cannon, which the sultan of Morocco had sent for use against the Spanish.

While the depredations of the Riff pirates were on the whole small in scale and 

ular, the sultan proved unable to deal with them. Britain preferred not to press th

issue, having no desire to add to Morocco’s problems or to give France an excu

act on a coast close to Gibraltar. Consequently, the standard British response to i

dents of piracy in the strait was to send a warship, recover the prize, and chastise 

insolent barbarians.

In May 1846, when the Riff captured the British merchant brig Ruth, the governo

Gibraltar dispatched the brig HMS Fantome, under the command of Commande

Frederick Nicolson. On 12 May 1846, Nicolson located the pirates near Cape Tre

Forcas, where they had dragged the ship ashore to plunder the cargo. Nicolson la

drove the pirates off the beach, and recovered Ruth, along with part of the cargo. 

eral pirates were killed, while the British lost one dead and eight wounded.

Nicolson’s zeal was rewarded; he was promoted to captain, his first lieutenant bec

commander, and prize money was distributed among the crew. However, his com

mander in chief on the Mediterranean station, Admiral Sir William Parker, was n

impressed. The operation had been brave and resolute, but as Ruth was a “valuele

wreck . . . I cannot but regret that a conflict for the possession of it was risked, as 

habits of the Moors were not only known, but the consequences of attempting it 

pated.” It would have been far better, he was convinced, to have demanded restitu

through the proper authorities.8

The contrast between Nicolson’s bloody action and Parker’s cautious reserve was 

icant. An old hand on the international stage, Parker understood that armed forc

a tool of limited utility in such situations. Whatever Nicolson might have though

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ing retained most of their ill-gotten gains.

When pressed for compensation for Ruth, the sultan professed his inability to punish

the Riffs. The British were anxious not to put pressure on Morocco while the French

war with Abd al Qadir in Algeria was still in progress. Then the local Moroccan governor intervened, inflicting enough “punishment” to satisfy John Drummond Hay, the

British consul at Tangier. However, the sultan was officially warned that should any

more such acts occur the British would take measures into their own hands.9

Basing a

steam warship at Gibraltar provided the navy with a superior instrument to meet the

pirate challenge. Steamers could ignore wind and tide, approach the coast at speed,

and select the best position for coastal bombardment or use their large paddle-box

boats for amphibious warfare.

The Capture of the Brig Three Sisters

On 31 October 1848, the Liverpool-registered merchant brig Three Sisters left Gibraltar

for Malta, loaded with baled fabrics and a large quantity of gunpowder. The Canadianbuilt, 134-ton vessel was owned by the master, mate, and other small investors. Normally engaged in the Liverpool–Demerara trade, Three Sisters was out of its normal

routine.10 Furthermore, it was not insured. The consignee was the Gibraltar firm of

James Glasgow and Company.

On 2 November 1848, Three Sisters was attacked by several boats from the Riff coast.

When the pirates opened fire, the crew tumbled into a boat and rowed out to sea. The

pirates towed Three Sisters ashore. The crew, picked up by a passing merchant ship the

next morning, reached Gibraltar on the 7th. Significantly, the governor’s first concern

was to establish that their cargo had been legitimate. Once that had been attested by th

consignees, General Sir Robert Wilson, the governor of Gibraltar, referred the case to

Drummond Hay, expecting him to make representations to the Moroccan government

and requested Commander James McCleverty of Polyphemus to convey that message to

Tangier.

McCleverty refused, instead proceeding immediately to the scene of the crime.11 Early

the following morning Polyphemus ran into Al Khoyamich Bay, then cruised east

toward Cape Tres Forcas. On the morning of 8 November 1848, as he cleared Cala

Tramontana, McCleverty sighted the prize, pulled up on the beach and surrounded

by seven Riff boats, below prominent cliffs occupied by an estimated five hundred

armed men.

Polyphemus steamed into range, and the pirates opened fire, only to be driven from

their positions by well directed grapeshot, canister, and musketry. When the Riffs fell

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tow it out to sea. The Riffs opened fire with a small cannon, which the sloop cou

counter, and renewed musketry. Five sailors were wounded. In the face of a nume

well armed enemy, McCleverty abandoned his original intention of landing to bu

pirate boats, determining that they were not worth the inevitable loss of life, and 

ried on with his prize to Gibraltar.12

The brig had been stripped “of all her sails, running ropes and in fact every porta

thing on deck. The hold was broken open and a large part of the cargo . . . taken 

On arrival at Gibraltar, it was discovered that the pirates had unloaded 850 kegs o

powder and a considerable quantity of cloth. They had not troubled themselves w

four hundred barrels of herring, fifteen hogsheads of tobacco, two tons of cocoa, 

twenty tons of coal.

The news of the Three Sisters affair found Admiral Parker tied up by the intermin

distressing politics of Naples and Sicily. He had no ships to spare and knew that h

next move would be eastward to the Aegean, to support Turkey, not westward to 

tise a few Riff plunderers. From the Ruth incident he knew that the sultan would 

claim responsibility, and he rejoiced that Three Sisters had been recovered. He pr

Commander McCleverty for ignoring the governor’s orders to contact Drummo

and for deciding not to land.14 As this incident showed, the British, with a steam slo

stationed at Gibraltar, could respond quickly, catching culprits red-handed befor

other power could act. The last thing they wanted was French military “help” to c

Moroccan pirates, as the pretext for an invasion of the sultanate.

Napier’s Mission to Resolve the Trade Dispute

The foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, was anxious to read the Riffs a lesson.15 H

took advantage of the fact that the Admiralty had ordered the Royal Navy’s West

Squadron south to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet, in response to a French bu

Palmerston, who had directed Lord Auckland, First Lord of the Admiralty, to dep

the squadron to support his demands in the claims of a British trading firm, Red

Brothers, now belatedly added the pirate question to the mission.16 The Three Sis

incident only complicated the situation: the trade dispute might be resolved by b

ading major ports, like Mogador (modern Essaouira, on the Atlantic coast) and 

gier, but Riff piracy required local action.

The Admiralty had a good understanding of this coast, and Auckland evinced no

enthusiasm for offensive operations: “The season of the year is not favourable to 

attack upon Mogador, and the Riff coast is scarcely under the control of the Emp

[sultan], and operations there as likely to be profitless and dangerous; but perhap

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they are amenable to punishment.”17 As Auckland informed the commander of the

Western Squadron, Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier:

1st You must endeavour to sweep the coast with light craft from Tetuan to Melilla, and destroy all

boats. I fear, however, that from the nature of the coast this would be a very difficult and hazardous

operation, and it would be probably very unprofitable

2nd You might attempt the blockade of the ports on the Western Coast. I fear at this season of the

year it would be impossible to do this effectually.

3rd You might knock Tangiers or Mogador to pieces; but this would be violent, and not to be though

of for a first proceeding.

Auckland favored applying pressure by sending a powerful force to Mogador, but this

would not solve the Riff question.18 Little wonder the official orders were vague: Napier

was left to chastise the pirates, if he thought it possible and the means at his disposal

adequate. His discretion was carefully constrained by the overriding political imperative to avoid war or any occasion for other powers to act. In the course of a moraleboosting endorsement of Napier’s abilities, longtime friend and supporter Palmerston

demonstrated that the obscure mission statement had originated in the Foreign Office.

Indeed Palmerston was “perfectly content” to “wait till the spring brings better

weather” rather than run any risks with Napier’s warships.19

For the moment, the squadron was trapped at Spithead by southerly gales. Napier saw

an opportunity to reinforce his claim to the prestigious Mediterranean command,

which would soon be vacant.20 There was an opening for his preferred methods of

rapid, decisive action, and there was danger in prolonged routine: “I hope to be allowed

to make short work with the Moors if they are saucy and refuse satisfaction. Blockadin

is slow punishment at this season of the year, and an uncertain one.”21

Although obliged to rein in Napier’s enthusiasm, Auckland took care to be positive: “I

am satisfied that you could and would bring the Moors to reason with strong means,

but we must try gentle means in the beginning, backed by strong appearances.”22 Napie

was quickly in his stride, requesting charts of Tangier and Mogador to supplement offi

cial reports.23 Auckland warned that the Atlantic coast was too dangerous for sustained

operations between November and April, while the inhospitable Riff coast, in the

Mediterranean, could only be approached by steamers (which could readily escape

the danger of embayment or grounding on a lee shore) and offered few obvious points

for an attack.24

Arriving at Lisbon on 4 January 1849, Napier opened communications with

Drummond Hay at Tangier. From the information sent by the Admiralty he concluded

“It appears to me best to leave the Line of Battle Ships at Gibraltar, take all the small

craft and marines and destroy every boat on the Riff coast. . . . I don’t much like

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time to prepare against an attack.”25 Rather than risk a long, boring, and forgettab

blockade, Napier would have his powerful flagship towed up to the walls of Moga

and with its guns batter them down. He asked Drummond Hay for information 

defenses of Tangier. This was not the approach Drummond Hay favored; he repo

that the sultan would give way to an appropriate show of force.26

Unfortunately for Napier, Lord Auckland died suddenly just before the New Year

left the Admiralty to be administered by the First Naval Lord, Vice Admiral Sir Ja

Dundas, a desk admiral whose limited seagoing experience was compensated for 

central role in Liberal party politics. Auckland’s planned drive for overall econom

was pursued after his death without much thought for the wider consequences. T

reduce three thousand men from the estimates Napier’s squadron was to be aboli

before the end of March—so much for operations on the Riff coast in May. The 

down began on 11 January, when the battleship HMS Rodney was ordered home 

off “immediately.”27 It was in question whether Napier could do anything before 

force evaporated. Sir Francis Baring was appointed First Lord on 16 January but 

control only after being reelected to his seat in the House of Commons on 6 Febr

In the meantime, the Admiralty remained devoted to routine—not that Napier a

pated much when Baring returned, the two men having been electoral rivals at

Portsmouth fifteen years before.

Depressed by the loss of his patron Auckland, Napier sailed for Gibraltar on 18 J

1849. He arrived on the 27th after a rough passage that mirrored his mood. The n

mail brought worse news. The Admiralty had canceled a projected visit to Santa 

de Tenerife, directing him to call at Madeira and then return to Lisbon “without 

A private letter from Dundas came as a hammer blow: Admiral Parker would be 

second tour as commander in chief in the Mediterranean. To make matters wors

added, “You will not attempt anything against Morocco without further orders a

I know is the wish of Sir F Baring and the Government.”29 Baring, the new First L

would continue his predecessor’s cautious approach—he had no intention of ord

Napier to act—and he had far less tact. Reappointing Parker was highly unusual 

was perfectly logical; the Mediterranean remained tense, and Parker had shown a

remarkably astute touch.

On the 31st Napier opened a private correspondence with Baring, reporting that

Drummond Hay was to call upon him in Gibraltar and that when he did, they wo

concert plans for operations on the Riff and Atlantic coasts.30 He sent another let

Baring and Palmerston, asking for the Mediterranean command.31 Napier and

Drummond Hay met on the flagship, after which Drummond Hay departed in th

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Laraiche to settle the Redman affair. Aware of the alarm spreading through the Moroccan ports, Napier happily stoked up these fears, ostentatiously retaining two battleships

returning home from the Mediterranean. Not that he intended to act—the passage to

Gibraltar had cemented his conviction that an effective blockade of the Moroccan

Atlantic ports would be impossible. Once Sidon returned from Laraiche, he would see

what could be done against the Riff. So far he had kept his cards close to his chest; “I

do not believe it is thought here that we have any designs upon them, so much the

better.”32 Clearly the Admiralty had other ideas; on 1 February Napier was ordered to

“repair forthwith to Spithead.”33

With the Admiralty utterly uninterested in Moroccan issues, Napier would have to be

quick.34 Fortunately, his ostentatious display of armed might brought the Moroccans to

heel within a week. Their consul boarded the flagship at Gibraltar on 4 February,

accepting binding arbitration of the Redman claim; Napier noted “he evidently appear

in a very great fright and the arrival here of the Rodney and Vanguard [the homebound

units he had held in the theater] has not tended to tranquilize him.” Anxious to secure

a quick settlement, Napier rejected the governor of Gibraltar’s attempt to get involved

and sent a ship to Tangier to get Drummond Hay’s opinion.35 The Admiralty approved

his detaining the battleships, “under the peculiar circumstances.”36 The sudden shift in

Tangier’s policy, as it proved, reflected French anxieties: fearing the British might seize

Moroccan territory, especially on the Riff coast close to Algeria, Paris had urged the

sultan to concede. Napier was equally anxious to settle, the Atlantic coast in winter

offering precious few openings for punitive action.

Hoping for further enlightenment, Napier told Baring he would send one, perhaps two

battleships back to Britain and soothed any fears of costly campaigns: “To do that it

must be done properly and effectually and with a good force so as to make one busines

of it from one end of the coast to the other. They are a bad set and deserve severe chastisement.”37 He shared another intelligence coup about the Riffs with Dundas: “I hear

they are a warlike set and good shots, if they take prisoners they murder the aged and

R—— the young, so I have no chance of the latter operation.” At least a new governor

of Gibraltar had replaced the “much detested” Wilson.38

The same day, the Admiralty demanded he send the planned reinforcements to Parker’s

overstretched Mediterranean fleet and return home with the rest of his squadron.

Dundas revealed the reasons why in his private letter: “Reduction is the master now. . . 

We are anxious to cut down our numbers of men . . . and relieve other ships.”39 On the

10th Napier reported that the Redman affair had been resolved and apologized to

Parker the following day for detaining Prince Regent to support his own diplomacy. Th

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reduced Redman’s claim from US$17,000 to $10,000, criticizing his calculation

his paperwork. Napier surmised that “the Moors knew the merchants very well a

having many transactions with them they most probably would favour the Moor

Government.”40

The Napier Mission and the Riff Pirates

Having resolved the primary issue, the trade dispute, Napier felt he could, notwit

standing his impending return to Portsmouth, focus on the secondary question, 

piracy. It was a complex problem, since the Riff pirates were numerous, well arm

and resourceful. Even with his extensive experience of amphibious warfare and s

operations, Napier could see few opportunities. He agreed with Parker that the jo

required a powerful force of steamers and troops, and he hoped the new governo

General Sir Robert Gardiner, would lend some troops. Even so, the weather was t

rough and changeable for significant coastal operations, and he found nothing to 

his spirits in the latest Admiralty dispatches: “They expect I am gone to Madeira 

Dundas says we will be in England by April and do not mention one word about 

Redman or the Riffs.”41 Little wonder he took care to seek the foreign secretary’s

endorsement, and Palmerston was happy to oblige: “You have acted in this matte

perfect good judgement.”42

Everything depended on the weather, since he would need a light westerly wind f

amphibious operations on the pirate coast.43 On the evening of 17 February 1849

embarked five hundred soldiers of the 34th Regiment on Sidon, a paddle-wheel f

he had designed specifically for amphibious warfare. Royal Marines from the bat

ships St. Vincent, Vanguard, and Powerful boarded the paddle steamers Stromboli

iator, and Polyphemus, accompanied by the screw steamers Reynard and Plumper

his flag in Sidon, Napier led the squadron to sea at eight that evening, making for 

Tres Forcas.

Napier went more in hope than expectation, but ready to act if it proved possible 

attack the pirates. Delayed by a minor collision, the squadron arrived off the cap

2:00 PM the following day but could not find anything to attack: “The only way I 

see of punishing these people is by landing in the long days when the corn is ripe 

setting fire to it and seizing the cattle if you can find them (their huts are not wo

destroying) and informing them why you have done so. . . . When I went to the R

country I did expect to have found something tangible to attack, but whether kn

that we were [from] Gibraltar they had removed their boats into the country or n

really do not know, and where their towns or even great villages [are] I do not kn

either, but suppose they must be in the interior.”44

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the habits of mountain dwellers from his time in the Lebanon to entertain any such

plan.45 Well aware that he was responsible for the safety of his men, the ships under his

command, and the reputation of his country, Napier had the moral courage to resist

the temptation to take risks. Heavily equipped British troops stood no chance of getting to grips with the Riffs in such hostile terrain. It was better not to run the risk of

defeat, the moral and political consequences of which would have been very embarrass

ing. Parker backed his decision.46

The Admiralty was delighted: “You exercised a sound discretion in abstaining from any

aggressive act upon the Riff coast.” Palmerston agreed: “You have acted, on this occasion, with your usual good judgement.”47 Yet the following day, the Board of Admiralty

criticized his decision to wait for an east wind rather than use steamers to tow the fleet

into the Atlantic, “as their Lordships had expressed their anxiety to have the squadron

home.”48 As Dundas admitted, “It is very desirable we should pay off all the ships

ordered home before the 31st March otherwise we shall be much bothered with our

estimates, the reduction to 40,000 men commencing that day.”49

Having assessed the possibilities, Napier prepared to bring his squadron home.50

Although it approved his handling of the Redman negotiations, the Admiralty was desperate to pay off the battleships before the end of March and send the smaller ships to

relieve foreign stations.51 Before leaving he discussed future operations with

Drummond Hay, along with the recommendation that Polyphemus should visit the Riff

coast more often and might be replaced with a more discreet screw steamer.52 He was

still waiting for an east wind to leave Gibraltar when the governor of Melilla sent word

late on 26 February that the Riff tribes wanted to make reparation for Three Sisters.

Once again, it seemed, the presence of a powerful force had hastened the diplomatic

process. Napier put little faith in such protestations, but the Riffs were evidently “much

alarmed,” so he decided to discuss the matter with Drummond Hay at Tangier.53

The Riffs offered to pay compensation of twenty thousand U.S. dollars through the

governor of Melilla, if the sultan approved. Napier asked Drummond Hay to seek the

sultan’s endorsement, but Drummond Hay refused, claiming he had no authority and

arguing that requiring the sultan’s approval was merely a device to waste time. Napier

disagreed, but he had to leave the Mediterranean, thereby handing the Riff question to

Drummond Hay.54 This was not what Drummond Hay wanted to hear. He needed

Napier’s fleet at Gibraltar to provide leverage with the Moroccan authorities, and he

suddenly produced new information on the pirates.55 The governor of the province, he

reported, had provided details of the local boat fleet and of where the pirates hid their

craft. This time it was Napier’s turn to be unimpressed, fearing the communication had

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remain.56 Drummond Hay responded with news of an engagement between a Sp

steamer and some Riff boats off the Zaffarine Islands. Eleven pirates had been ki

The Riffs, he observed, were always promising to keep the peace, but their promi

were never fulfilled. The Bu Gafar were responsible, they had from fifteen to twen

boats at Wad Garet (Ras Baraket), the entire coast contained between eighty and 

dred. Drummond Hay ended with the brief, telling observation: “The crops have 

this year from want of water.”57

In his official report Napier stressed that he had more confidence than Drummo

Hay did that the Riffs meant to pay compensation; he implied that the consul wa

concerned to control negotiations than to advance British commercial interests, 

Sir Robert Wilson had made the previous month.58 If Drummond Hay trusted th

Moroccan governor, Napier did not. He believed the governor and the Moroccan 

sul at Gibraltar were in league, the latter buying large quantities of gun flints “an

probably wish[ing] to lure me into a snare.” His views were based on a new intell

source, a Gibraltarian smuggler who had been a prisoner of the pirates. Napier cl

an increasingly testy working relationship by informing Drummond Hay that he 

not refer any future Riff offers to him, “as you have declined interfering.”59

The following day, 16 March 1849, Napier left Gibraltar for Britain, because “Mr 

did not think proper to make any communication to the Sultan, my staying any l

was therefore useless so that I will not be an Ambassador yet.”60 This was no idle 

ter. Napier had settled a far larger diplomatic question, the Syrian crisis of 1840, 

satisfaction of his friend Palmerston. Napier understood the linkage between for

coercion, and diplomacy as well as any living man, and with more time and bette

weather he might have made a difference in this instance. As it was, economic pr

sures, adverse weather, and Napier’s report persuaded Palmerston “that if negotia

have failed demonstrations would best be postponed till the season would enable 

do whatever might be useful or necessary.”61 The same day the Admiralty turned 

thoughts into orders: “I am to acquaint you that my Lords approve of the steps y

have taken, but that as some months must elapse before any retaliatory measures 

taken they desire that you will not delay your return to England, unless there is a 

tainty of bringing the negotiations to an immediate close.”62

On reflection, Palmerston supported Drummond Hay’s decision not to seek go

ment endorsement of the Riff compensation offer. He believed the only options 

to hold the sultan responsible and make him pay or to punish the Riffs without r

ence to the sultan, and “under present circumstances the first of these courses d

not seem to be expedient.”63

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Napier struck his flag on 9 April, soon after arriving at Spithead. The squadron was

broken up. The demands of economy and the dictates of common sense had closed a

chapter in the history of Riff piracy. The only time the Royal Navy had a force on the

coast capable of punishing the pirates, it had been denied the opportunity to act. Britain now preferred to look for a diplomatic or commercial solution to the pirate problem. The cost and risk attached to the alternatives were simply too high.

The rationale for this apparently pusillanimous policy lay far from the Riff coast or the

Moroccan court. As Napier and Parker emphasized, chastising the Riffs would require a

significant amphibious force, at least a thousand troops and six or eight large, steam

warships, and it would take time. Under existing circumstances the British simply did

not have the time, or the ships, to do the job. The international scene remained compli

cated and unsettled: no one knew what would become of post-Orléans France, or postrevolutionary Italy, while the growing menace of Russian pressure on Turkey drew the

focus ever eastward. These factors explained why Napier had been sent to deal with an

issue on Sir William Parker’s station. Beyond the Mediterranean, Britain faced more

problems. The Schleswig-Holstein conflict of 1848–50 threatened another vital interest

access to the Baltic; Palmerston threatened to send Napier’s squadron to raise the Danish blockade of the German coast.64

In addition, Britain’s dire economic situation forced the ministers to cut the navy by

three thousand men and pay off Napier’s ships. When set against such problems, small

scale piracy was hardly a priority, especially as the Moroccans had already given way on

the trade dispute, and the French threat had receded with the fall of the Orléans

dynasty. Palmerston’s long-term policy was to enhance the power of the Moroccan gov

ernment, leaving the sultan to impose order in the Riff, keep the country independent,

and ultimately enter Britain’s informal empire of trade and capital.

While the empire was a valuable segment of the nineteenth-century British economy, it

was never dominant. The empire accounted for approximately 25 percent of the marke

in most sectors. The most dynamic sector of the economy was the export of capital, by

1890 almost £100 million annually, much of it invested outside the empire. This sector

was intimately linked to the financial services and commercial support systems of the

City of London. The preeminence of the City of London in world finance was reflected

in British dominance of world shipping and related services.65 Morocco joined this system in the 1850s.

Evidence of Morocco’s value came in the form of an offer of space at the 1851 Great

Exhibition, an offer the sultan politely declined. However, within three years frequent

changes in the Moroccan tariffs, the sultan’s attempt to pay an indemnity levied by

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prompted further complaints from the British merchants at Gibraltar. British im

had been halved by changes in the Moroccan tariff, from £300,000 in 1848 to £14

in 1850, and although they had recovered by 1852 Morocco remained in breach o

Anglo-Moroccan Treaty. In August 1853, Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell ref

to accept a Moroccan ambassador until the issue had been resolved.66 Russell’s im

threat, one that he scarcely troubled himself to veil, was to leave Morocco expose

French and Spanish predation. Against this backdrop—powerful naval forces lay 

beyond the horizon—Drummond Hay drew up the draft for a commercial treaty

In 1854, new tariffs were established to the satisfaction of Britain. By this stage M

co had earned British goodwill. When the Crimean War had broken out in 1854, 

sultan had promptly barred Russian warships, privateers, and prizes from his por

agreed to supply an additional thousand bullocks at a low export duty to feed the 

ish troops passing through Gibraltar. Significantly, he had not extended this favo

French Algeria. Morocco was also an important link in British trade with sub-Sa

Africa, although this was in decline.67 However, British trade was hampered by hi

duties levied at home on the main Moroccan export, wax. Also, reliance on Jewis

dlemen provided obstacles, since the status of Moroccan Jews frequently changed

After interminable delays, Drummond Hay’s treaty, suitably amended, was signed o

December 1856. Morocco abandoned monopolies and barriers to imports and fixe

maximum export duty of 10 percent. These terms provided greater stability and se

for British capitalists and merchants. In this way, Morocco joined Britain’s informa

empire only months after the Riff pirates seized what proved to be their last British 

The Resolution of 1856

Although the pirates escaped retribution in 1849, long-term economic developm

and the growth of British informal control meant their days were numbered. Yet 

did not choose to go quietly. In April 1850 Palmerston returned to the charge, ur

the Admiralty to send a punitive expedition, but there were more pressing issues 

no spare ships.70 On 5 October 1851, Riff boats captured the brigantine Violet off 

Botoya on Azanen Bay. The cargo of maize was plundered, some of the crew were

killed, others ransomed. General Gardiner dispatched HMS Janus, a small paddle 

under the command of Lieutenant Richard Powell, from Gibraltar on 17 Octobe

Powell arrived off the Riff coast the following day. At two o’clock that afternoon, 

found the Spanish vessel Joven Emilia hauled up the beach and entirely stripped i

deep bay some four miles west of Cape Tres Forcas, probably Cala Tramontana. P

rowed ashore under heavy musketry fire, dispersing the locals and destroying som

their boats, while ten-inch shells from his main battery guns proved to be particu

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ered the charred frames of Violet on a beach three miles farther to the west. Once again

the Riff opened fire. Powell landed for a second time, intending to destroy their boats,

only to find himself heavily outnumbered. The landing party was driven back to its

boats with eight wounded, Powell among them. Although two pirate boats had been

destroyed, he saw many more hidden in the sand or drawn up in caves.71

Despite Palmerston’s anxiety to send a large expedition, Sir Francis Baring did not

think anything could be done.72 The Royal Navy was, as ever, spread very thin, and ther

were more pressing tasks than punishing past acts of piracy, especially after the French

had once again bombarded Tangier, threatening the balance of power at the strait.

When Admiral Parker detached a powerful steamer he did so to uphold British interest

should the French seize Moroccan territory.73 Captain Henry Giffard, in command of

HMS Dragon, retrieved four survivors from Violet’s crew while Powell recovered from

his wounds. Then Dragon and Janus returned to survey the pirate coast. Predictably,

they were fired at.74

In 1852, Admiral Parker reflected on the Riff problem as he left the station for the last

time: “I presume it would be difficult to raze villages, or burn crops, without involving

a period of more than one day on shore. Whatever is attempted should be done effectu

ally, and a little well executed would, perhaps, produce a better result than an attack on

a larger scale, whereby we might be subjected to much loss of life; but I really think

they ought to be punished in some degree.”75 This would be a major undertaking for

any fleet. In truth, as a late-Victorian historian of the navy admitted, “it does not

appear that any adequate reprisals were ever carried out against the offenders.”76

Instead Foreign Secretary Lord Malmesbury preferred to coerce the Moroccans into

solving the problem, following a line that his friend Palmerston had laid out, threatening to treat the area as independent.

The British did not employ a large force against the Riff, because that would open the

door to other powers.77 Nor were the British alone in their frustration. In 1852, the Riff

plundered the Stettin merchant ship Flora after it ran aground, but the German Navy

was unable to respond at the time. Finally, on 7 August 1856, Admiral Prince Adalbert

anchored the large paddle-wheel corvette Danzig off Cape Tres Forcas and landed a

sixty-man punitive expedition. In a four-and-a-half-hour engagement he learned a

painful lesson, one his British friends would have recognized only too well. Adalbert

was one of seventeen wounded; another seven were killed. Naval vessels could not

command the respect of the locals, absent the manpower and equipment to control

the beach.78

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decisive action. The sultan sent an army of eight thousand troops, led by Abd el M

the tough and determined local governor, into Bu Gafar territory. He burned the

boats and their villages, imposed fines, seized livestock, and took hostages for fut

good behavior.

This assertion of authority meant the sultan would have to take responsibility fo

piracy, and the French demanded seven thousand dollars in compensation for th

plundered vessel Jeune Dieppois. In a local initiative of April 1856, Consul Drumm

Hay met Riff chieftains on the Melilla border, conducting the meeting in Arabic, 

second language of both parties (the Riff spoke a Berber dialect). Although they

exchanged handshakes, Drummond Hay had no illusions. This was wise. The seiz

yet another British vessel, Hymen, on 14 May 1856 led Drummond Hay to deman

action, and the Moroccan army returned, inflicting further punishment on the B

Gafar. The sultan also paid compensation for Hymen.

That was the end of significant Riff piracy until, late in the century, central autho

collapsed yet again and the Riffs returned to their old trade.79 As a late-nineteen

century British chronicler of the Sharifian Empire confessed, the Riff were happy 

plunder any weak vessel that came close enough, and as long as Moroccan and fo

governments preferred to pay ransom and accept cash settlements, they would co

tinue to do so. “All the good excuses in the world about upsetting the balance of 

or fear of embroiling Europe in war, will not, in the eyes of the Moors, explain th

supine policy adopted with this ‘sick man of the West.’”80

Conclusions

While Riff piracy was a nuisance, any heavy-handed attempts by the British to su

the pirates risked inviting the French to take further action—action that would e

ger British strategic interests in the Strait of Gibraltar and the commercial and p

dominance that was to be enshrined in the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty of 1856. Brit

informal empire could deliver improved trade and influence only if a relatively p

ful Moroccan central government imposed order on the provinces and ensured t

“Open Door” commercial treaty was carried into effect.81

Above all, the cost of dealing with the pirates directly would have been excessive. 

impose order on a numerous, well armed, and dangerous population reduced to 

erty, rendered violently anti-Christian by decades of colonial warfare with Spain

not infrequently starving would have required a major military expedition suppo

by a large naval squadron. The human cost would have been high and the diplom

problems grave. Such an operation would be, in effect, an invasion and conquest

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British subjugated the Riff coast on the promise of subsequent withdrawal. After all,

that was precisely what the French had promised the British when they landed in Algeria in 1830! The alternative naval response, instituting regular patrols, would have been

uneconomical. Instead, the British responded to attacks by sending warships to recover

seized ships and punish the pirates for specific incidents.

It suited British interests to support and encourage the Moroccan government to deal

with the problem by increasing central control over the turbulent tribesmen. That

some of these “piratical” captures may have been collusive, part of a smuggling network that linked Spain, Algeria, Gibraltar, and Morocco, made any other response inap

propriate. An effective Moroccan customs system, with low tariffs and adequate

policing, would ultimately be the best solution to Riff piracy.

1. C. R. Pennell, “Dealing with Pirates: British,

French and Moroccans, 1834–56,” Journal of

Imperial and Commonwealth History 22,

no. 1 (1994), pp. 54–83.

2. C. R. Pennell, “The Maritime Trade on the

Northern Moroccan Coast in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Morocco 1 (1996), pp. 86–

88.

3. C. R. Pennell, “The Geography of Piracy:

Northern Morocco in the Mid-nineteenth

Century,” Journal of Historical Geography 20

(1994), p. 275.

4. Budgett Meakin, The Moorish Empire (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1899), p. 271–72.

5. Morocco, Geographical Handbook Series BR

505 (London: Naval Intelligence Division,

December 1941 [vol. 1]; October 1942 [vol.

2]). See vol. 1, pp. 73–76, for a thorough description of this coast.

6. Pennell, “Geography of Piracy,” p. 276.

7. Pennell, “Dealing with Pirates,” p. 63.

8. Parker to Drummond Hay, 5 June 1846, reprinted in Augustus Phillimore, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir William Parker (London:

Harrison, 1880), vol. 3, p. 59.

9. Pennell, “Dealing with Pirates,” p. 60.

10. Lloyd’s Register of [British and Foreign] Shipping, the annual London publication describing, classifying, and registering all

merchant ships according to physical

structure and equipment, meant to enable

underwriters, ship brokers, and shipowners

to assess commercial risk more accurately

and thereby negotiate marine insurance

rates. The 1848, 1849, and 1850 entries give

the same ownership and route.

11. Secretary to the governor of Gibraltar to

Consul Drummond Hay, 7 November 1848;

Messrs. Glasgow to Sir Robert Wilson, 7 No

vember 1848; McCleverty to Sir Robert Wilson, 7 November 1848; all Foreign Office

[hereafter FO] 174/58.

12. William L. Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History (London: S. Low, Marston, 1901), vol. 6

pp. 361–62.

13. McCleverty to Drummond Hay, 9 Novembe

1848, FO 174/58.

14. Parker to Lord Auckland, 11 December 1848

in Phillimore, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir

William Parker, vol. 3, p. 441.

15. This section is largely based upon G. ElersNapier, The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir

Charles Napier (London: n.p., 1862), vol. 2,

pp. 200–204.

16. Auckland to Lord John Russell, 13 September 1848, Russell MS Public Records Office

[hereafter PRO] 30/20/7D f57-8, The National Archives [hereafter TNA]; Auckland

to Napier, 1 November 1848, Napier MS

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[hereafter Add.] MS 40,023 f320. Redman

Brothers was a British trading firm in

Mazagan that suffered extensive trading

losses when its grain export licenses were

suddenly withdrawn, leaving it with wheat

that it could not sell.

17. Auckland to Parker, 13 December 1848, in

Phillimore, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir

William Parker, vol. 3, p. 443.

18. Auckland to Napier, 25 November 1848, in

Elers-Napier, Life and Letters of Admiral Sir

Charles Napier, vol. 2, p. 196.

19. Palmerston to Napier, 5 December 1848, in

ibid., pp. 197–98.

20. Napier to Lord John Russell, 23 October

1848, PRO 30/20/7D f172-3, asking for the

prime minister’s support on naval and party

grounds.

21. Napier to Auckland, 25 November 1848,

Add. 40,041 f150.

22. Auckland to Napier, 26 November 1848, Add.

40,023 f348.

23. Napier to Auckland, 27 November 1848,

Add. 40,041 f150.

24. Auckland to Napier, 28 November 1848, Add.

40,023 f352 and 354.

25. Napier to Auckland, 9 January 1849, Lisbon,

Add. 40,041 f169.

26. Napier to Captain Hamilton (Admiralty Secretary), 16 January 1849, and Napier to Baring, 31 January 1849, in Elers-Napier, Life

and Letters of Admiral Sir Charles Napier,

vol. 2, pp. 199–200; Napier to Drummond

Hay, 19 January 1849, Add. 40,041 f174.

27. Admiralty to Napier, 11 January 1849, Admiralty [hereafter ADM] 2/1607, p. 242.

28. Dundas to Napier, 16 January 1849, Add.

40,041 f171; Dundas to Napier, 6 February

1849, Add. 40,041 f177.

29. Admiralty to Napier, 22 January 1849, ADM

2/1607, pp. 154–55; Dundas to Napier, 22

January 1849, Add. 40,041 f172.

30. Napier to Baring, 31 January 1849, Add.

40,041 f174.

31. Napier to Baring and Palmerston, 31 January

1849, Add. 40,041 f175-6.

32. Napier to Dundas, 31 January 1849, Add.

40,041 f176.

2/1607 f280.

34. Napier to Drummond Hay, 6 Februa

Add. 40,041 f181.

35. Napier to Drummond Hay, 4 Februa

Add. 40,041 f179; Napier to Admiral

February 1849, received 15 February

1/5596, papers on the Redman negot

36. Admiralty to Napier, 16 February 18

ADM 2/1607, p. 339.

37. Napier to Baring, 6 February 1849, A

40,041 f183.

38. Napier to Dundas, 6 February 1849, 

40,041 f184.

39. Admiralty to Napier, 6 February 184

2/1607, p. 297; Dundas to Napier, 6 F

1849, Add. 40,041 f177.

40. Napier to Admiralty, 10 February 18

ceived 23 February, ADM 1/5596; Na

Parker, 11 February 1849, Add. 40,04

Napier to Drummond Hay, 11 Febru

1849, Add. 40,041 f189.

41. Napier to Parker, 11 February 1849, A

40,041 f186.

42. Napier to Palmerston, 11 February 1

Add. 40,041 f188; Admiralty to Napi

March 1849, ADM 2/1607, pp. 262–6

ing Foreign Office to Admiralty, 28 F

1849, regarding Napier’s 10 February 

report on the Redman claim.

43. Napier to Dundas, 16 February 1849

40,041 f191.

44. Napier to Palmerston, 21 February 1

Add. 40,041 f195.

45. Napier met Drummond Hay off Beir

1840, during those operations. John 

A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay

time Minister of the Court of Morocco 

don: J. Murray, 1896), p. 30.

46. Parker to Napier, 9 March 1849, Add

f380.

47. Admiralty to Napier, 6 March 1849, A

1607, p. 369. The dispatch reached N

on 9 March 1849, ADM 50/251.

48. Admiralty to Napier, 7 March 1849, A

1607, p. 376.

49. Dundas to Napier, 9 March 1849, Ad

40,041 f203.

50. Napier to Baring, 20 February 1849, 

40,041 f197.

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ADM 2/1607, pp. 348–49; Dundas to Napier,

25 February 1849, Add. 40,041 f192; Napier

to Baring, 25 February 1849, Add. 40,041

f201.

52. Napier to Drummond Hay, 26 February

1849, still at Gibraltar, Add. 40,041 f205;

Napier to Dundas, 4 March 1849, Add.

40,041 f207.

53. Napier to Baring, 27 February 1849, Add.

40,041 f206.

54. Napier to Drummond Hay, 4 March 1849,

Add. 40,041 f208.

55. Napier to Dundas, 9 March 1849, Add.

40,041 f209.

56. Napier to Drummond Hay, 11 March, Add.

40,041 f211.

57. Drummond Hay to Napier, 14 March 1849,

ADM 1/5596.

58. Napier to Admiralty, 15 March 1849, received 25 March, ADM 1/5596; Wilson to

Napier, 6 February 1849, Add. 40,041 f181.

59. Napier to Drummond Hay, 15 March 1849,

Add. 40,041 f212.

60. Napier to Baring, 16 March 1849, ADM 50/

251; Napier to Baring, 17 March 1849, Add.

40,041 f215.

61. Palmerston to Baring, 19 March 1851, Baring

MS N13. 10.

62. Admiralty to Napier, 19 March 1849, ADM

2/1607, p. 397.

63. Foreign Office to Admiralty, 31 March 1849,

ADM 1/5599.

64. Holger Hjelholt, British Mediation in the

Danish-German Conflict 1848–1850 (Copenhagen: Munksgarrd, 1966), vol. 2, p. 82.

65. The standard account of this process is P. J.

Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism:

Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914 (London: Longman, 1993), see esp. pp. 125–77.

Relations to 1900 (printed in London but

unpublished), pp. 162–63.

67. J. B. Williams, British Commercial Policy and

Trade Expansion 1750–1850 (Oxford, U.K.:

Clarendon, 1972), pp. 91, 93.

68. Ibid., pp. 304–305.

69. Meakin, Moorish Empire, pp. 399–414, provides an interesting late-nineteenth-century

perspective.

70. Palmerston to Admiralty, 17 April 1850,

TNA FO 17456.

71. Powell to Sir William Parker, 22 October

1851, FO 174/56.

72. Baring to Palmerston, 13 November 1851,

Palmerston MS Southampton University

GC/BA 305.

73. B. Greenhill and A. Giffard, Steam, Politics

and Patronage: The Transformation of the

Royal Navy 1815–54 (London: Conway Mar

itime, 1994), pp. 187–91.

74. Giffard’s report to Parker, 11 January 1852,

FO 174/56.

75. Parker to Drummond Hay, 7 April 1852, in

Phillimore, Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir

William Parker, vol. 3, p. 707.

76. Clowes, Royal Navy, vol. 6, pp. 361–62.

77. Rogers, History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations

to 1900, p. 161.

78. L. Sondhaus, Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power before the Tirpitz Era

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,

1997), p. 57.

79. Pennell, “Geography of Piracy,” p. 280.

80. Meakin, Moorish Empire, pp. 272–73.

81. D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics in

British Foreign Policy 1815–1914 (Oxford,

U.K.: Clarendon, 1968), p. 86.

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Guns, Oil, and “Cake”

Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea

ARILD NODLAND

Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is at the center of an unprecedente

in piracy and maritime crime. During 2007, for example, the International Marit

Bureau (IMB) reported forty-two attacks against international shipping and of

installations.1

Nigeria illustrates better than anywhere else in Africa that financ

good times have a downside. The vast riches brought by oil have not benefited la

segments of the population, especially in the oil-producing region of the Niger D

Corruption, theft, pollution, maladministration, unemployment, and bad govern

have created levels of frustration and aggression that increasingly have resulted in

attacks on shipping and offshore petroleum activities. Those who have been left

stranded by decades of oil bonanza have lost patience and have decided to take m

into their own hands.

Nigeria is a focal point of international attention because in terms of maritime 

rity it is in a league of its own. Africa’s largest oil producer has the dubious hon

topping the Gulf of Guinea’s list of acts of piracy and armed robbery against sh

Out of 178 reported attacks between 2003 and 2007, 137 took place in or just o

Nigeria (see figure 1).2

Altogether some 237 foreigners and dozens of Nigerians w

kidnapped in sixty-seven separate incidents in the coastal states of the delta regio

2006 and 2007 alone;3

of these, ninety-eight were foreign sailors or rig workers 

napped at sea.4

As a direct result of these attacks, in December 2007 Liberia a

Norway raised their International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 

rity levels from I to II for ships operating in Nigerian coastal waters and ports; 

Panama Maritime Authority followed suit on 22 January 2008. To date, no other 

try in the Gulf of Guinea has been given quite the same treatment by internation

maritime authorities.

As capital continues to pour into Nigeria and other gulf states, security must incr

for foreign as well as domestic investments. Current maritime surveillance and se

CHAPTER TWELVE

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provisions are not efficient, in large part due to the lack of strength, unity, or cohesion

of Nigerian and other naval forces in the region. In the words of one African affairs

specialist: “No country on the Gulf has a naval force worthy of the name.”5

In response

local and regional arrangements, such as cooperation among naval commanders of cer

tain gulf states, have been initiated to address the growing security challenge. A more

recent proposal is the “Gulf of Guinea Guard Force,” the brainchild of Nigeria’s president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, who envisages a regional naval force built and trained

with American assistance.6

In addition, the establishment of AFRICOM, the U.S. Africa

Command, is a clear sign that interest in the continent, especially the Gulf of Guinea,

reaches far beyond African borders.

Nigeria: A Blessed Country

Nigeria is the largest country on the Gulf of Guinea, a stretch of water defined by

Cape Palmas in Liberia to the west and Cape Lopez in Gabon in the south. In

between are a number of coastal countries, including the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo,

Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. In the gulf itself is the small island

republic of São Tomé and Príncipe. These ten countries are commonly called the

“gulf states.”

In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea has increasingly become an important supplier of

fossil fuels. International demand, especially from the United States and China, for a

steady flow of oil and gas is rapidly changing the region’s—in fact all of Africa’s—

geostrategic significance. The “scramble for Africa’s oil” has put the continent back on

the map, and since 1990 oil firms have invested more than US$20 billion in exploration

and production activity in Africa. Another fifty billion dollars, it was estimated in 2007

Gulf of Guinea: Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 2003–2007

Source: International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 1 January–31 December

2007 (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2008), pp. 5–6.

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comes a steady flow of foreign firms wanting to reap the benefits of the economi

boom. Bankers, oil executives, restaurateurs, furniture dealers, and commodity in

tors are all investing in the Gulf of Guinea. Most of them rely on shipping to carr

goods to and from gulf ports.

Thousands of men and women also work on oil rigs off the gulf ’s coastline, espe

that of Nigeria, which is the country most affected by the security problems of th

kinds that have often followed similar booms in developing nations. A web of pip

stretches thousands of kilometers across the mangrove swamps of the delta, inter

rupted here and there by gas flares sending orange flames into the air. The pipelin

sometimes burst; sometimes they are plundered by gangs of youths trying to get 

fast in the lucrative oil-theft trade, locally known as “illegal bunkering.” Either w

large quantities of crude are spilled into the swamps, rivers, and creeks, where loc

lagers are trying to eke out meager livings from fishing and farming. In October 

the World Wildlife Fund reported that up to 1.5 million tons of oil had been spil

the delta over the past fifty years—the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez disaster eve

twelve months.8

Ken Saro-Wiwa, the former leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogon

ple (MOSOP), once stated, “Nigeria was full of inflation, corruption, injustice, ar

robbery, maladministration, drug-trafficking, hunger, knavery, dishonesty and pl

stupidity . . . [b]ut it is still a blessed country.”9

This one, brilliant sentence sums 

hopes and potential of a great nation, while at the same time recognizing its man

obvious flaws and shortcomings. It also reflects the people’s view that they have b

shortchanged and polluted long enough—a conviction that, as we shall see, is a k

son why so many ships are attacked and why so many oil workers have been abdu

especially in the Niger Delta.

Trying to understand, much less explain, the complexity of the roots of the confl

the Niger Delta could easily become the work of a lifetime, but as John Ghazvini

put it, “as with most human conflict, its causes can be boiled down to money, lan

ethnic rivalry.”10 Big egos, pollution, and poor governance are also factors. There 

plenty of just causes for political activism in the delta, but the line between griev

and greed is thin. Crime, community activism, and political militancy often go 

in hand.

The Niger Delta is made up of nine states, with 185 local government areas, and 

population of twenty-seven million (see figure 2). It has forty ethnic groups, spe

some 250 dialects spread across five to six thousand communities and settlement

About 1,500 of those communities play host to oil-company operations of one k

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But others do not, thus creating constant friction not only between the communities

and the petroleum multinationals but also among neighboring villages and different

ethnic groups—or “tribes,” in Nigerian parlance.

Injustice, real or imagined, becomes a fact of life when the bounty of oil is doled out.

Since oil exploration started in the late 1950s, hundreds of billions dollars have been

squandered, mismanaged, or plundered by corrupt government officials at all levels.

The rewards for holding political office are huge. Politicians for decades have jockeyed

for positions, power, access to federal and state budgets, and lucrative local business

deals. Meanwhile, local constituents have had to make do with mud huts and Stone Age

squalor in Ogbainbiri, Fishtown, and other villages in Nigeria’s southeastern corner.

Although the delta produces all of the nation’s oil and gas and generates 80 percent of

federal revenue, its people live without electricity or clean, running water. Roads have

fallen in disrepair, due to decades of neglect; education and access to medical services

are patchy at best.

Hopes were once high that the oil

industry would benefit the communities of the Niger Delta, but

the oil business is a practical—

some say cynical—as well as a

high-tech one. Rather than

training a local workforce, international oil firms have found it

cost-effective to bring in foreign

professionals and, with them,

modern air-conditioned facilities

tennis courts, and swimming

pools, all surrounded by razor

wire and armed guards. The

resulting contrast between riches

and staggering poverty is a recipe

for disaster.

Unemployment numbers in the petroleum heartland are formidable, and the Nigerian

government gives them as the main reason why there is so much crime and militancy.

Unemployment is, of course, another significant factor of underlying instability. Frustrated and marauding young men roam the streets of Port Harcourt or cruise the

FIGURE 2

Nigeria: The States of Delta Region

1. Abia 4. Cross River 7. Imo

2. Akwa Ibom 5. Delta 8. Ondo

3. Bayelsa 6. Edo 9. Rivers

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tling with guns, scouting for the next easy target.

But the core of the problem goes beyond joblessness and relates to such fundame

issues as the question of who owns the oil, endemic corruption, and the never-en

political tugs-of-war between political elites in the capitals of the oil-producing s

and the faraway federal center, Abuja. By March 2005 the country’s problems had

become serious enough to prompt the U.S. National Intelligence Council to iden

the possibility of an “outright collapse of Nigeria.”11

Luckily, it has not come to that quite yet. If Saro-Wiwa’s cautious optimism is an

to go by, Nigeria will muddle through, as it has done many times before. No one 

the stomach for another civil war like the one that ravaged Biafra from 1967 unti

However, the growing maritime security challenge of piracy in the Niger Delta is 

enormous contemporary concern, and it is forcing Nigeria to respond.

Nigeria’s Maritime Security Challenges

Mariners and petroleum workers in Nigerian waters labor under difficult, somet

dangerous, circumstances and must be constantly concerned about being kidnap

for ransom. Oyibos—foreigners—are, however, not the only ones concerned abo

insecurity on the seas. According to Nigeria’s director of fisheries, Mr. Akinshola 

piracy attacks on Nigerian fishing vessels have steadily increased from four repor

attacks in 2003 to more than 107 in 2007; fifty attacks were recorded in January 2

alone, of which twenty took place within a week, resulting in the deaths of ten sa

(see figure 3).12

The Nigerian government is well aware of these problems and struggles to cope w

the increasing maritime crime rate. At least fifteen soldiers attached to the Niger 

FIGURE 3

Attacks on International Shipping and Offshore Oil Facilities, 2007–2008

Source: Bergen Risk Solutions, “Maritime Security in Nigeria,” Quarterly Review, no. 4 (April 2008), p. 6.

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alone while attempting to maintain peace and security along the creeks and waterways

of the state.13 Many Nigerian police officers have become increasingly reluctant to serve

in the delta, and many marine police stations have been looted and sacked by bandits

or suspected militants.14 In Lagos, where security of the water channels is the sole

responsibility of the Nigerian Ports Authority and the marine police, lack of adequate

equipment and logistics tend to impede effective policing.15

Maritime workers are becoming increasingly impatient. In December 2007, the Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria (AAWUN) condemned the increasing attacks

on members’ fishing vessels by pirates and called on both the federal and Lagos State gov

ernments to protect them. “No fewer that 44 members of our union have been killed dur

ing such attacks,” said an AAWUN official in December 2007. Stolen goods were

estimated to be valued at about N120 million (US$960,000) over a two-year period.16 As 

result of such losses, the Nigerian Trawler Owners Association went on strike in February

2008, withdrawing over 170 fishing boats off the fisheries in protest.17

International shipping and offshore facilities have also felt the consequences of the

increase in maritime crime. Bergen Risk Solutions, a Norwegian risk-management con

sultancy, recorded twenty-two attacks on foreign marine assets in the first three

months of 2008, which is a clear increase over the previous year, when the fifty-three

attacks were carried out during the entire year, at that point an all-time high.18 While

far from reassuring, greater information about these attacks will allow seafarers to mitigate the risk of attack by avoiding the most dangerous areas or by employing greater

deterrence if they have to venture into high-risk zones.

Fortunately, the attacks appear to follow distinct geographical patterns and so should

be reasonably easy to avoid. Lagos, the area off Escravos and Benin River (Delta State),

and Bonny River (the stretch of water leading from Bonny Island to Port Harcourt in

Rivers State) are the three areas worst affected recently by maritime attacks. Bonny

River has seen a drastic increase in robbery and armed assault since October 2007,

partly because many criminals have been chased out of Port Harcourt, the oil capital,

by a government security offensive launched in August 2007.

There are also significant differences in the nature of acts of piracy in the Lagos area

and the Niger Delta. Whereas Lagos incidents clearly are executed by small-time bandits motivated purely by financial gain—many attacks hardly qualify as piracy, and

many would-be robbers go back overboard at the sight of a sturdy sailor—maritime

raids in the delta often have more determined, political, and violent dimensions. Also,

while kidnap for ransom has been commonplace in the delta, it is virtually nonexistent

in Lagos. Attacks in the Niger Delta are also better coordinated and often entail the use

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machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

From the pirates’ perspective, the chance of success is higher in the delta than in 

to date only one attack has occurred outside the thirty-five-nautical-mile mark in 

delta, none more than twenty nautical miles off Lagos.19 In addition, most attack

especially in Lagos, take place at night. The most popular targets are berthed or 

ing vessels, barges, fixed installations (like oil rigs), or floating production storag

offloading vessels (FPSOs) and floating storage and offloading vessels (FSOs)—

converted oil tankers serving as storage/drilling ships.

Many of the attacks in the Niger Delta have been attributed to politically motivat

militants, but Nigeria also has more than its fair share of criminals. This dangero

cocktail of political activism and crime has led to a sustained string of attacks tha

posed a constant, indeed increasing, risk over the last five years. In August 2007, 

Harcourt, home of the petroleum industry and capital of the oil-rich Rivers State

the worst fighting in years as criminal gangs went on a rampage. The situation w

defused only after Nigerian government forces launched a massive counteroffens

and rebels and politicians agreed to open talks. So far the talks have yielded few r

other than driving attackers from their normal hunting grounds on shore toward 

more vulnerable and easy targets at sea, a transition that has helped to blur even 

ther the lines between true insurgents and simple criminals.

The Niger Delta Insurgency

Attacks on international firms in Nigeria’s petroleum heartland can broadly be d

into three categories: attacks by political militants, by criminal thugs, and by com

nity activists. The lines between these groups are thin, often overlapping. An atta

may one day kidnap an oil worker to buy a nice car, the next day he may join a ra

militant group, and on the third he might hijack an oil rig to generate cash for hi

tribal chief—or to get jobs, a new hospital, or a generator for his village.

Although banditry and community-related issues are assessed to be the main dri

forces behind attacks, over the last couple of years the political insurgents have re

the most attention (see figure 4). Among the main groups are the Movement for 

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Joint Revolutionary Council, the 

Delta Vigilante, and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF).20 These

groups—or better, networks—have not only carried out their fair share of attack

have done so with great fanfare.

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MEND, the most notorious of the groups, first appeared on 10 January 2006, when it

simultaneously kidnapped four foreign oil workers at gunpoint from Shell’s offshore

EA oil field and blew up the Trans Ramos crude-oil pipeline in Bayelsa State, cutting

supplies to the Forcados export terminal by a hundred thousand barrels per day. In the

year that followed, MEND was especially astute in combining armed action and a skillful media campaign that drew international attention to the group’s cause. By using

armed force but justifying its actions as legitimate grievances of the delta’s impoverished population, MEND became—and still is, some argue—the leading factor in

guerrilla war in the area.

The group has fragmented since it first appeared, but “the cause” is very much alive and

well. The core demands are the release of jailed militant leaders, including MEND

leader Henry Okah, who was arrested in Angola on 3 September 2007; the demilitariza

tion of the Niger Delta; the immediate payment of US$1.5 billion compensation from

Shell—approved by the Nigerian National Assembly—covering four decades of environmental degradation; and local control of resources, up to and including secession

from the Nigerian federation.21

In a media statement on 24 June 2007, shortly after his release from jail, NDPVF leader

Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari said, “My next move is that I will continue the agitation

for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference which I believe is the only

Attacks on Foreign Firms in the Niger Delta, 2007

Used by permission.

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and fraud. How can such a nation stand?”22 Asari’s demand for independence for 

Ijaw ethnic group—the largest in the delta—is, of course, unlikely to be granted, 

it might result in civil war. Ijaw control of oil revenues is in direct conflict with th

ambitions and wishes of most other peoples and states of the Nigerian federation

to mention the Nigerian federal government, which gets the lion’s share of its rev

from the delta’s oil.

Asari’s hostile rhetoric subsided after he was invited to be part of an eighteen-ma

peace-broker team appointed by the federal government in September 2007.23 As 

came under the wing of Yar’Adua’s administration, the previously vocal militia le

denounced kidnapping of foreign workers and dismissed MEND leader Jomo Gb

as a common thug. In retaliation, Jomo called Asari a sellout and a traitor.

The squabble among the major leaders of the delta’s militant movements reveals 

flaws in their collective quest for the betterment of “their” people. The delta’s arm

struggle is, at best, fragmented. At worst, it is a hodgepodge of conflicting interes

which personal feuds, ulterior motives, and enormous egos stand in the way of a

meaningful progress toward peace. Couple all this with greed and criminal agend

and any real attempt at bringing prosperity and stability to the region remains a 

way off.

Short of independence and war, the more realistic aims of the Niger Delta’s polit

activists are to retain larger shares of revenues so that local living conditions can 

improved. Better roads and medical services, more jobs, lower pollution, less cor

tion, more clean running water, and a steady supply of electricity are among thei

and understandable, demands. Any improvements in this situation will be especi

felt by sailors and oil workers, who have had to face a constant risk of being robb

or—if they are particularly unlucky—being taken hostage and held for ransom.

The federal government has made several strategic and tactical efforts to come to 

with the delta’s unrest. Ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo was lauded by internatio

observers for his credible anticorruption campaign and his 27 March 2007 launc

“Long Term Master Plan” to address the delta’s problems. However, it will take co

erable time before any such plan can hope to have a significant impact.

Obasanjo’s efforts have been followed up by the current regime of President Yar’A

who took office on 29 May 2007. Yar’Adua, immediately after his inauguration,

announced that he would convene a Niger Delta Summit on 4 June 2007 to addr

delta’s problems once and for all. As of early August 2008, however, the summit h

still not been held, and responses to government peace and prosperity initiatives 

been, unsurprisingly, mixed. As a sign of initial goodwill, MEND and other grou

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they abandoned the cease-fire after only one month, unimpressed with achievements to

that point.

Despite countless cease-fires since then, attacks on international assets have not only

continued but increased, especially at sea. One possible explanation for this rapid

increase can be found in the following passage from the Nigerian Tribune: “21-year-old

Ekene Ibebuka, a Port Harcourt–based secondary school drop-out . . . disclosed that he

received N2.4 million [US$20,000] in one of the kidnapping operations in Port

Harcourt, where two expatriates were abducted by his late Prince Igodo–led militant

group. When asked if he was into kidnapping of expatriates to express his disgust at

the neglect of the Niger Delta region, Ekene retorted, ‘No! (In pidgin English) Nothing

concern me for that side. I do [sic] everything (kidnapping) to help myself and to

live fine.’”24

Criminality and get-rich-fast attitudes will remain significant challenges to shipping

and other international operations and investments until Nigerian security forces, perhaps with the help of loyal militias, can crack down on the criminal gangs. Or until the

fundamental causes of unrest—unemployment, corruption, pollution, etc.—are

addressed. These things will probably not happen any time soon. In the meantime, the

Nigerian navy has had to shoulder the burden of trying to restore order.

The Nigerian Navy on the Spot

Faced with such daunting social, economic, and political problems, the Nigerian

navy—the country’s main provider of maritime security, along with the Niger Delta

Joint Task Force and the marine police—is clearly struggling to maintain law and order

in the nation’s territorial waters. Pressure to improve Nigeria’s maritime security comes

from the very top echelons of the Nigerian government, and there is certainly no lack

of determination or good intentions within the security forces themselves.

The Nigerian navy command structure consists of the Naval Headquarters in Abuja

and two operational commands, headquartered in Lagos and Calabar.25 Two other

operational bases are at Warri and Port Harcourt. In addition, five to seven “forward

operating bases” have been established to cope with piracy and the militant threat.

When the navy celebrated its fifty-first anniversary in 2007, Rear Admiral Peter Shola

Adeniyi (Commanding Officer, Eastern Naval Command) said in a speech that “the

Navy has done its utmost and lived up to expectation despite some constraints. With

the limited resources at our disposal, we’ve been able to work as expected of us. We

have been policing and securing our resources in the deep sea effectively.” Realizing,

perhaps, that this did not reassure anyone, he argued that if the navy were given more

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concerns were echoed by Admiral Ekpenyong Okpo (retired), who stated that “th

Navy is on course, but the problem . . . is that it does not have enough boats to pa

the Niger Delta.”26

The admirals have a point. The navy is seriously underresourced. The fleet consis

some fifteen vessels, six helicopters, and a number of small inshore patrol crafts—

too few for the daunting task of stabilizing the Niger Delta. The service’s perform

and operational capability is described by an anonymous international maritime 

rity consultant in this way: “Due to a combination of the following the Nigerian 

cannot offer a credible deterrent: Lack of planned and preventive maintenance, l

spare parts, lack of adequate training (such as coxswain and seamanship skills); l

fuel; weapon systems are not well maintained and ammunition can be in short su

badly maintained.”27

To increase maritime security in the Niger Delta, President Yar’Adua convened o

June 2007, soon after his inauguration, a meeting in Warri, in the western delta. T

governors of the three main oil-producing states—Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers—m

with the top brass of Nigeria’s security forces, including the commander of the N

Delta Joint Task Force, Brigadier General Lawrence Ngubane, and navy captain

Mufutau Ajibade, commanding officer of Warri Naval Base, to determine how be

ensure the early return of the oil multinationals to abandoned oil fields. Yar’Adu

Governor Timipre Silva-Sam of Bayelsa State, Dr. Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta 

and Mr. Celestine Omehia of Rivers State that the country could not survive the

endless closure of the facilities.

Good intentions alone, however, simply will not solve the problem. Despite effor

negotiating with local armed groups and sending security forces after those who 

cooperate, attacks have increased, not decreased. Nigerian as well as foreign nava

rity experts agree on one thing: the country’s security forces are not ready to offe

credible maritime deterrent in the face of increasingly confident waterborne crim

and militants.

As a result of the security crisis in the Niger Delta, the International Maritime O

zation (IMO) issued on 10 February 2008 a warning that if the safety of Nigeria’s 

torial waters continued to be threatened, no foreign vessels would be allowed to l

crude oil or gas.28 To make things worse, there has been reliable evidence of collu

between criminals and senior navy commanders, especially in the trade of stolen 

President Yar’Adua and his administration need all the help they can get to impr

situation. Foreign countries, including the United States, are the most likely sour

this help.

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In its last few years, the George W. Bush administration, in seeking to diversify American energy supplies, purposefully labored to reduce American dependence on Middle

Eastern oil. The U.S. focus on the Gulf of Guinea has increased significantly for that

reason, as well as in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequen

invasion of Iraq. On 6 February 2007, the Bush administration announced its intention

to create a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM.

Its aim is to promote American national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters.

The military involvement of the United States on the continent was previously divided

among the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM),

and Pacific Command (PACOM). The new command’s area of responsibility includes

all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was launched as a subunified command

under EUCOM on 1 October 2007 and was made fully operational as a stand-alone

command on 1 October 2008.

The justification for AFRICOM is Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests, as noted by analysts and American policy makers in recent years. Among those

interests, according to Congressional Research Service, are “Africa’s role in the Global

War on Terror and potential threats posed by uncontrolled spaces; the growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources; and ongoing concern

for Africa’s many humanitarian crises and armed conflicts.”29 Several African nations

have been courted with aid and training programs, with one objective in mind: to

encourage them to welcome an increased U.S. presence on the continent. According to

official U.S. sources “the President’s intent is to have AFRICOM located on the African

continent where it can best interact with partner nations.”30

The problem is that only a few countries—among them, Liberia—want American mili

tary bases on their soil, even though many, in security terms, could use a helping hand.

Currently, AFRICOM is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. On 19

November 2007, Nigeria formally announced that it would not host AFRICOM.31 The

government made its position official as President Yar’Adua met with state governors

and federal lawmakers. Nigeria is also, at least publicly, against the U.S. command’s bas

ing its headquarters anywhere in West Africa.

Nigeria’s rejection of AFRICOM is grounded in its desire to appear independent of

outside influence, even though cooperation with the United States on many levels is

desired, required, and already implemented. For example, Exercise MARITIME SAFARI–

LAGOS 2008, a joint maritime surveillance training exercise involving the Nigerian navy

and air force and the U.S. Navy, was held 22–28 February 2008.32 According to Nigerian

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nance, and best practices in improving maritime safety.

Another sign of Nigeria’s willingness to accept American presence, short of bases

participation in the African Partnership Station, a naval assistance program unde

AFRICOM rubric. An agreement was reached at the beginning of November 200

granted Washington a naval presence in this strategically important region for th

pose of training and humanitarian aid.33

Notwithstanding Nigeria’s need for, indeed welcome of, U.S. support, Yar’Adua’s 

ernment has to balance its maritime security needs with the country’s other dom

interests and with its obligations to other important partners, like China, which 

supporter and financier of federal government projects. In addition, Nigeria’s lar

Muslim population could find U.S. “interference” hard to accept. Also, U.S. invol

ment in Nigerian affairs can be interpreted as meddling and as a sign of Nigerian 

ness and caving into foreign ambitions, which touches upon the issue of nationa

One illustration of how sensitive this latter issue can be appeared in a December 

editorial in the Vanguard, a widely read Lagos newspaper: “Recently, the America

pompously expressed their interest in establishing a military base in Nigeria to p

its interests, especially stable crude oil supply. Its efforts at total control of Nigeri

security could not have been better put. These actions demonstrate U.S. governm

contempt for Nigeria.” Some Nigerian military leaders have stated that they “wou

finished as a force” if they let U.S. forces roam freely.34 In early May, following pr

from Africans, Washington publicly dropped its plans for a new headquarters on 

continent. Instead, the United States will place staff there as needs arise. AFRICO

already uses thirteen offices of defense cooperation at American embassies in Afr

capitals. The offices will be renamed “offices of security cooperation,” according 

itary newspaper Stars and Stripes.

35

In the face of African resentment, President Bush worked hard to convince the co

nent’s leaders of the nation’s good intentions. In addition to a much-publicized t

Africa in February 2008, the Bush administration spent billions of dollars on hum

tarian assistance. For example, by the end of its first five-year phase, in Septembe

the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, better known as PEPFAR, had sp

US$18.8 billion, mainly in Africa. President Bush asked Congress for another thi

lion for the next five years. This silent campaign of humanitarian assistance is, ac

ing to the newspaper the Economist, “doing good, quietly.”36 Still, the U.S. govern

not handing out something for nothing. There is a strategy behind the expandin

erosity of the United States toward Africa, and a central goal of this strategy is to 

U.S. access to energy resources.

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assessment of the Director of National Intelligence: “Persistent insecurity in Nigeria’s

oil-producing region, the Niger Delta, poses a direct threat to U.S. strategic interests in

sub-Saharan Africa.”37 AFRICOM’s greatest challenge is to balance the need for access

to oil with a policy that does not offend Nigeria and other countries in the Gulf of

Guinea. Statesmanship, tact, persistence, and wisdom are required on both sides of the

Atlantic in order to address constructively the security dilemma in Nigerian waters and

the wider Gulf of Guinea. Just maintaining the status quo—or worse, letting Nigeria

slip even farther into chaos—is in no one’s interest.

Conclusions

“To understand politics in Nigeria,” writes Marvin Zonis of the University of Chicago,

“you have to know about ‘cake.’” “Cake” refers to resources controlled by the government: revenues, jobs, infrastructure projects, access to universities, public-sector

employment.38 Cake is what the criminal gangs, community pressure groups, and polit

ical militants in the Niger Delta are after, and also, to a far lesser extent, Lagos smalltime bandits. Cake is what corrupt government officials have been unscrupulously

shoving by the truckload into their foreign bank accounts—or dishing out to loyal sup

porters and friends. Many gangs and militant groups have been used to intimidate

opponents by cynical political thugs in their quests for power, position, and more cake.

In turn, these politicians have looked the other way when the gangs have committed

their shady deeds. “Political connections have helped these gangs to commit criminal

offenses with near-total impunity,” writes Human Rights Watch in a recent report;39

“While Nigeria’s military intervened in August [2007] to halt the escalating inter-gang

bloodletting, Nigeria’s federal government and the police have completely failed to

address the root causes of the violence—not one Rivers State politician has been

investigated or held to account for directly fomenting the state’s epidemic of gang

violence.”40 On 5 April 2008, a notorious gang leader stated to the Niger Delta Standard, “I, Ateke Tom, made Dr. Peter Odili [former Rivers State governor] and Mr.

Rotimi Amaechi [the current governor] in 1999 when they were nobody.”41

Against this backdrop, there is little reason for optimism with regard to Niger Delta

security. The problems of the delta, indeed of Nigeria, are mainly systemic—including

corruption, bad governance, rampant poverty, unemployment, and criminal connections far into the offices of senior politicians and naval commanders.42 All of these

problems contribute to an environment that is less than conducive, to put it mildly, to

stability and prosperity. In addition, there has recently appeared an unhealthy penchan

for getting rich fast, avoiding the tedium of patient effort and hard work. This attitude

seems to have overwhelmed too many young men in the delta. Even the patient Ogonis

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The current MOSOP leader, Ledum Mitee, during October 2007 was particularly 

cerned that his followers were beginning to emulate the violent behavior of the I

The true causes of insecurity in Nigerian waters have to be considered at three le

of which will contribute to a continuing poor security environment in the near t

tant future. At the micro level, there are the scores of frustrated and testosterone

young men who, as mentioned above, simply want to “help [themselves] and to l

fine.” At the national level, there are the many systemic shortcomings. At the mac

level, that of international politics and law, Nigeria needs to balance its security n

and U.S. courtship with the interests of other significant players—notably China

country’s large Muslim population, and other states that might resent American 

dling in the region’s internal and regional affairs. None of these three parameters 

likely to change significantly in the near term. Meanwhile, until these problems a

solved, foreign as well as Nigerian mariners and oil workers will be left to juggle 

own security risk management as best they can.

Notes

Additional research was contributed by Ms. Ingrid Mellingen and Mr. Odin Hjellestad.

1. Bergen Risk Solutions [hereafter BRS], a

Norway-based risk management firm, reported fifty-three attacks during the same

period. The numbers compiled by BRS are

higher than IMB’s, as some attacks are, for

various reasons, not reported to the bureau.

BRS numbers also include attacks on such

fixed offshore objects as oil rigs and FPSOs,

barges, and FSOs.

2. International Chamber of Commerce, Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 1 January–31 December 2007 (London:

International Maritime Bureau, 2008), pp.

5–6.

3. BRS, “Niger Delta Security: Monthly Report,” 11 January 2008. The four coastal

states most affected are Delta, Bayelsa,

Rivers, and Akwa Ibom. Rivers State is by far

the worst.

4. BRS, “Maritime Security in Nigeria,” Quarterly Review, no. 1 (July 2007), p. 14, and

“Maritime Security in Nigeria,” Quarterly

Review, no. 3 (January 2008), p. 11.

5. Quoted in Daniel Morris, “The Othe

Rich Gulf,” National Interest Online,

www.nationalinterest.org/.

6. This Day (Lagos), 2 February 2008, a

at www.thisdayonline.com/.

7. John Ghazvinian, Untapped: The Scra

for Africa’s Oil (Orlando, Fla.: Harco

2007), p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 19.

9. Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: 

tory of Fifty Years of Independence (Lo

Free Press/Simon & Schuster, 2006), 

10. Ghazvinian, Untapped, p. 19.

11. National Intelligence Council, Mapp

Saharan Africa’s Future: Conference S

(Washington, D.C.: March 2005), p. 

12. Daily Sun (Lagos), 13 March 2008, av

at www.sunnewsonline.com/.

13. Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), 5 January 

available at www.tribune.com.ng/.

14. The Punch, 5 January 2008, www.pun

.com/.

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cer (PFSO) Forum (Lagos, Nigeria: Lagos

Maritime Security Zone, 6 December 2007).

16. Vanguard (Lagos), December 2007, available

at www.vanguardngr.com/.

17. This Day (Lagos), 13 February 2008, available at allafrica.com/stories/200802130730.

html/.

18. BRS, “Maritime Security in Nigeria,” Quarterly Review, no. 4 (March 2008). The trend

of increasing attacks continued in the second

quarter. As of 30 June 2008 BRS had recorded forty maritime security incidents that

year.

19. BRS, “Maritime Security in Nigeria,” Quarterly Review, no. 5 (July 2008). On 19 June

2008 armed men in three boats attacked

Shell’s deepwater Bonga field, approximately

sixty-five nautical miles off the coast of

Bayelsa State. The attackers, probably associated with MEND—a militant group—

opened fire on a drilling ship (FPSO) and

three supporting vessels.

20. The NDPVF was most active in 2004 and

2005, when its leader, Alhaji Mujahid

Dokubo-Asari, declared war on the federal

government and foreign oil firms. Asari was

arrested in September 2005 and charged with

treason. He was released on 14 June 2007 as

a peace gesture by recently elected President

Yar’Adua. MEND, which had been demanding Asari’s release from the day it first

emerged, on 10 January 2006, may be considered a successor organization to the

NDPVF. There is also a myriad of smaller

groups throughout the region.

21. Michael Watts, “Petro-insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the

Niger Delta,” Review of African Political

Economy 34, no. 14 (December 2007), p. 646;

Jomo Gbomo (MEND spokesman), e-mail

to author, 21 October 2007.

22. Daily Champion (Lagos), 24 June 2007, available at allafrica.com/.

23. Nigerians-abroad.com.

24. Nigerian Tribune (Ibadan), 20 June 2007,

available at intellibriefs.blogspot.com/.

25. Nigerian Navy Official Website, www

.nigeriannavy.gov.ng/.

allafrica.com/.

27. E-mail to author, 2 July 2007.

28. Guardian (Lagos), 11 February 2008, available at www.guardiannewsngr.com/.

29. U.S. Library of Congress, Africa Command:

U.S. Strategic Interests, and the Role of the

U.S. Military in Africa (Washington, D.C.:

Congressional Research Service, 7 Decembe

2007), available at www.fas.org/.

30. United States Africa Command, www.africom

.mil/.

31. International Herald Tribune, 19 November

2008, available at www.iht.com/.

32. Nigerians-abroad.com.

33. Reuters (Dakar), 12 November 2007, available at africa.reuters.com/.

34. Vanguard (Lagos), 3 December 2007, available at allafrica.com/.

35. Charlie Coon, “AFRICOM Halts HQ Plan;

Will Phase In Staff,” Stars and Stripes,

Mideast edition, 4 May 2008, available at

www.stripes.com/.

36. “Doing Good, Quietly,” Economist, 16 Febru

ary 2008, p. 44.

37. Available at www.fas.org/.

38. Marvin Zonis, Dan Lefkovitz, and Sam

Wilkin, The Kimchi Matters: Global Business

and Local Politics in a Crisis-Driven World

(Chicago: Agate, 2003), p. 19.

39. “Politics as War: The Human Rights Impact

and Causes of Post-election Violence in

Rivers State, Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch

20 (March 2008), no. 3, p. 57.

40. Ibid.

41. OyibosOnline: The Expat’s Guide to Nigeria,

www.oyibosonline.com/.

42. “Conviction of Admirals Confirms Navy

Role in Oil Theft,” IRIN News Agency, UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 6 January 2005, available at

www.irinnews.org/.

43. Ledum Mitee, interview by author, Port Har

court, 3 October 2007.

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Fish, Family, and Profit

Piracy and the Horn of Africa

GARY E. WEIR

The frightening increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia since the turn of the p

century demonstrates just how fast this kind of threat can emerge and how sever

difficulties involved in understanding and subduing it can be. Since 1992, in fact, 

have been 3,583 piratical attacks worldwide. According to the United Kingdom’s 

of Commons Transport Committee: “This represents an increase from 1993 to 2

168%. In the same period, 340 crew members and passengers died at the hands of p

and 464 received injuries. In 2005 alone piracy resulted in over 150 injuries and ass

and over 650 crew members were taken hostage or kidnapped.”1

Recent assaults on 

nese and French vessels near Somalia and the military response by the latter in Apr

demonstrate the lasting significance of this problem and the complexity of its root

Given the definition of piracy crafted in the United Nations Convention on the L

the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), most activity characterized by that name over the past 

actually comes far closer to armed robbery than actual piracy.3

In Malaysia and

Indochina, traditional hotbeds of this practice, most incidents reported by the In

tional Maritime Bureau (or IMB, a division of the International Chamber of Com

merce, or ICC) actually take place at the pier, while the ship rests at anchor, or in

territorial waters, a distinction often not made in gathering the statistics.

The nature of this definitional problem in its Somali form presents a contrast wi

historical Asian paradigm. Pursuit, seizure, and deprivation at sea in waters bord

the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean fall more clearly than the Asian events 

the UNCLOS definition of piracy. This kind of lawlessness has always presented p

cal and international complexities, made more difficult by national jurisdictions

porate motives, and the scattered geography of the broader Asian region. In the H

of Africa, part of the considerable expanse patrolled by U.S. Naval Forces, Centra

Command and Combined Task Force 150, the geography and the jurisdictional d

culties, while not simple, do not present the same level of complexity.

CHAPTER THIRTEE

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both cause of and permission for armed robbery or piracy at sea.4

The northeast and

eastern coasts of Somalia, at the Horn of Africa, have caught the attention of the IMB,

which reported a very “alarming rise” in what it called piracy beginning in midsummer

2005. Somalia’s internal unrest, its lack of government control, and the authority of

local clan warlords have created a favorable climate for maritime crime, one that often

gives thieves and pirates permission to act freely.

The IMB has called for a combined response and solution—that is, international naval

assistance, especially along the Somali coast. It also initially encouraged merchant masters and navigators to observe a coastal approach limit of at least fifty nautical miles.

The threat to international commerce extends to cargo and container ships, oil tankers

and even United Nations food and medical supply ships. In the Gulf of Aden, in the

Indian Ocean, and off the Somali coast, the uncontrolled activity of maritime criminal

also presents a threat to the traffic that supports American forces in Iraq. However, in

evaluating the event statistics collected by the IMB, one needs to remember that profitability and the safety of business interests drives the ICC, making it eager both for

peace and for someone to bear most of the cost for piracy countermeasures.

In September 2001, a group of nations agreed to form Combined Task Force (CTF) 150

in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which committed them to

regional patrols as part of the global war on terrorism. The task force members include

the United States, Pakistan, Australia, Great Britain, France, and Netherlands, among

others. The French very early began escorting UN World Food Program ships into

Mogadishu.5

Background to Piracy in Somalia

Historically, the IMB request for combined assistance resonates with the nineteenthcentury American experience against privateers and pirates based in northern Africa

and the Caribbean Sea. Two hundred years ago, the United States needed logistical

bases so that its armed forces could operate in the Mediterranean, thousands of miles

from home. As the nineteenth century dawned, British-held Gibraltar became an essen

tial logistical base for U.S. operations during the Barbary Wars. In that same conflict,

the loan of shallow-draft vessels from the Kingdom of Sicily also enabled the U.S. Navy

to operate in shallow waters to enforce a blockade of Tripolitan ports. In this war,

cooperation with local authorities and collaboration with allied navies made success

possible. This formula brought success once again when the U.S. Navy worked closely

with the Royal Navy in the 1820s against Caribbean piracy.6

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British controlled the Horn of Africa. The latter nation took the lead, due to the

authority of the Royal Navy and the proximity of both imperial India and the pr

of a British resident authority in Aden. Thus, the United Kingdom effectively exe

control over the strategically significant Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden, at th

southern entrance to the Red Sea. A formal protectorate emerged as British Som

with the governing authority in nearby Aden administering British interests thro

1905.

British authority in the area survived World War I, and the presence of significan

and naval power through the 1920s permitted the United Kingdom to sustain its 

tion there. Losing control for just a short time to Italy during the East African ca

paign in 1940 and 1941, British forces once again asserted imperial authority and

retained control of the region until both independence and unification with Itali

Somaliland gave birth to the Somali Republic in 1960. This infant democracy las

only nine years before succumbing to a coup and the dictatorship of General Mu

mad Siad Barre, who initially established very close ties with the Soviet Union wi

the context of the Cold War. His loyalties later shifted when neighbor and traditi

enemy Ethiopia allied itself with the Soviet Union.

Control over local waters provided a foundation for the local economy and the o

hope of prosperity. Siad Barre maintained a small maritime force to protect the e

mously rich fisheries in Somali waters, to sell (at a profit) fishery licenses to forei

companies, and to monitor access to regional ports that served the import and ex

trade through this strategic region south of the Red Sea and Suez. The humble So

maritime force guarded these resources and also restricted the traditional region

dency toward piracy and maritime crime. But when the Siad Barre regime collap

1991, everything changed.

The evaporation of the Siad Barre regime opened the door to a period of instabil

The naval task force associated with United Nations peacekeeping operations in S

lia (UNOSOM I and II) between 1991 and 1995 managed to monitor effectively t

considerable maritime traffic through the important lanes of passage off the Hor

Africa. These routes historically cater to ships moving from Africa into the Gulf 

Aden–Red Sea area. In most cases ships passed fairly close to the Somali coast to 

more economical passages. For each large modern merchant bottom that plies th

waters one can also find many more ships traditional to the region carrying carg

along routes regularly employed for centuries. Many of these vessels are the large 

dhows so common in those waters.

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ularly played host to ships moving through this portion of the Indian Ocean. These

included Kismaayo, El Aolde, Merca, and El Maan. Mogadishu played this role as well

until it was closed to foreign vessels in 1995. When the United Nations forces left in

1995, Somalia had no effective government, could not continue monitoring the waters

off its coast, and descended into a period of clan warfare.7

Piracy and Economic Survival

The chaotic situation ashore and the damage inflicted on the country’s economy and

infrastructure had a very significant effect at sea. For many of the coastal village communities, offshore fishing represented a regular and significant livelihood. These small

businessmen and their families depended completely on the rich fishing off the Somali

coast as a source of treasure going back generations. In these cases the fishermen operated from small dhows, wooden canoes or boats, or more recently modern small boats,

such as motorized fiberglass skiffs. They would use traditional techniques, for the most

part gathering their catch using nets and then off-loading the take for sale upon return

ing to shore.8

The collapse of the Somali central government in 1995 opened the region to uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Large commercial fishing vessels began working off the

Somali shoreline and very often inside the country’s territorial waters and traditional

domestic fishing areas. These large-scale fishing ships dwarfed the boats of the local

fishing fleet and placed in danger a coastal subsistence economy based on traditional

fishing practices.9

The high-seas piracy problem emerged from this context.

When violence first erupted between these conflicting interests in 1995, it came as a

surprise to no one. Many pirates armed themselves with weapons, which were easily

available due to the struggle for power among the Somali clans. Somalia’s 2,060-milelong coastline was soon considered to be one of the “world’s most dangerous stretches

of water because of piracy.”10 By 2002, the IMB was reporting that the number of

attacks had jumped from 335 in 2001 to 370 in 2002 and had increased its rating for

the risk of attack from “possibility” to “certainty.”11

Piracy and the Absence of Government Authority

The first incidents between 1995 and 2000 occurred when Somali fishermen boarded

foreign vessels and accused them of fishing illegally. The local fishermen sought

immediate compensation for catches taken in their traditional fishing areas. These

actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local clan militias seeking to control

their neighborhoods ashore and to coordinate actions against the foreign interlopers

at sea. Many groups who boarded foreign vessels in this manner frequently referred

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cases this self-proclaimed coast guard took the vessels in question back to Som

ports, holding their cargoes and crews for ransom in compensation for lost rev

Foreign interests responded not by withdrawing but by arming the crews of their 

hiring security forces, or bargaining with the local warlords or clan leaders for fis

“licenses.” The latter came at prices high enough to make those documents a rath

lucrative source of income for the clans ashore. Of course, the clans had no legal

authority to offer licenses of any kind, but no central government existed to set t

entire problem in a national context with legal agreements and effective enforcem

power.12

In the months immediately after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, both the Repub

Somaliland in the northern, formally British imperial, territory, and the Puntlan

Autonomous Region, formed in 1998, attempted to exert control and supervision 

fishing and territorial waters. Both had rudimentary coast guards and dabbled in 

lucrative business of fishing licenses.

To the south the internal strife and the offshore issues produced a different result

clans fought over the right to control Mogadishu and took over the basic revenue

sources usually reserved for central governments. Some clan warlords controlled 

airports, others the maritime facilities and customs revenue, and still others focu

the profitable business of selling fishing licenses of dubious legality. Piracy, as an 

pendent and openly illegal enterprise, developed only slowly, because clan leader

not wish to have their licensing businesses interrupted.

Central Somalia has produced the most aggressive forms of piracy—well organiz

clan related, and determined. In this region, traditionally called the Mugdug, pov

has reigned as long as memory serves, and the region’s lack of resources has perm

it to escape the attention of the other regional clan warlords. For this area, the fis

industry provides virtually the only means of income.13 Thus the people of the M

suffered most from the foreign exploitation of the coastal fishing grounds. When

clashes began between local fishermen and the commercial fishing ventures, no c

interests or presumptive central authority intervened to prevent uncontrolled

escalation.

In the dangerous environment of the Mugdug, legitimate efforts to limit both fo

exploitation of Somali resources and the growth of various related, profitable, bu

illicit businesses collectively transformed themselves into a full-fledged venture i

modern piracy. The developing piracy ring, initially acting under the direction o

Habir Gedir subclan of the Hawiye clan, emerged as a major threat to Horn of A

commercial interests in 2004 under the leadership of Mohamed Abdi Afweyne. U

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ring’s headquarters and gave its name to this potent enterprise. In spite of the transition to piracy, an important part of the justification, openly trumpeted by those

involved, remained the need to protect from foreign exploitation Somali resources and

the popular livelihood of coastal communities. The ring, portraying any fees collected

or cargoes expropriated as legitimate products of the defensive effort, used the nationa

turmoil and economic suffering as political and cultural cover for its illicit activities.14

When the Harardhere ring made the leap to high-seas piracy and much larger commer

cial vessels as victims, it naturally used the traditional tools available to Somali fishermen, with a bit of tactical refinement. Its skiffs, frequently seen in international press

coverage, were employed because of the availability of small motorized boats of fiberglass construction with styrofoam cores. These boats litter the coastline, and the local

fishermen, from among whom the Harardhere ring recruited its members, knew how

to use them.

By 2004 the pirates began to use multiple skiffs in their work. A larger skiff provided

room for provisions that might sustain a pirate crew, just as it would a fishing party, fo

up to two weeks, and at a range of two hundred nautical miles. It could also carry food

and water, as well as providing the means and space for storing and repairing fishing

nets, reflecting the more traditional occupational habits of the crew. In looking for targets, these fishermen-turned-pirates identified their prey visually. Thus, a patrol vessel

or potential victim could hardly tell the difference at distance between a pirate and a

legitimate fisherman.

In approaching any vessel two smaller skiffs, each with a crew of four or five, would

place themselves astride the vessel, one to starboard and the other to port, with the

larger skiff astern in pursuit. The pirates then placed one or more of their number on

board the target vessel to intimidate the crew and clear the way for the rest of the

boarding party, which would bring the captured vessel to port with the skiffs in tow. (In

many recent cases CTF 150 patrols intercepting seized ships have first destroyed the

towed skiffs to make sure the pirates remained on board and could not slip away.)15

Implemented in early 2005, this technique has resulted in some failures but also in some

disturbing successes. The latter include the capture of MV Feisty Gas, a compressed-gas

transport, in April 2005 and MV Torgelow the following October.16 These major attacks

as well as an attempt to take the cruise ship Seabourne Spirit in November 2005 drew

international media attention, a warning to mariners from the IMB, and a response

from international naval forces in the area. The IMB advised all merchant masters to

keep their vessels two hundred nautical miles away from the Somali coast. The merchantmen most vulnerable tended to operate at ten knots or less, in daylight, with no

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territorial waters proved especially dangerous, since the American component of 

150 could not operate within the twelve-mile limit.

All three episodes also brought up the legal and tactical issue of onboard armed 

rity. Seabourne Spirit carried Gurkhas, former military personnel, as security, and 

fact played a role in the vessel’s ability to resist seizure. The masters and shipping 

panies did not favor arming the crew, however, and professional onboard securit

added expense. For many shipowners these measures also seemed to increase the 

hood of more violent clashes with pirates. The only other option seemed increas

size of the crew to enable more effective ship security, enhance lookout capability

reduce the debilitating effect of fatigue. The latter had become a critical factor, b

the crew had to perform security functions in addition to its regular duties.17

Enter Combined Task Force 150

The presence of CTF 150, especially after the Seabourne Spirit incident, prompte

change in pirate habits. The Harardhere group began using captured low-value v

as mother ships for the skiffs. In this they sought the advantage of surprise, by ap

ing to be part of the normal commercial traffic of the region.

In one case the U.S. Navy responded to an alert from the IMB in Kuala Lumpur t

pirates had in this way (unsuccessfully) assaulted MV Safina Al Bisarat, a bulk ca

outside the two-hundred-nautical-mile safety zone off Somalia’s central eastern c

U.S. Central Command responded by sending the guided-missile destroyer USS

Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) to investigate. The warship located the dhow resp

ble for the attack, chased it down, and boarded it, after firing some warning shot

way of persuasion. The boarding party detained sixteen Indian nationals and ten

Somali men. The Indians claimed that the Somalis had seized their dhow six day

before near Mogadishu and had used it since to surprise and capture victims. Th

investigated the incident and discussed with international authorities the proper 

sition of the men taken from the dhow.18

Ships assigned to the patrol area of Somalia had repeated encounters with pirate

USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) assisted the North Korean crew of MV Dai Hon

in regaining control of its vessel after pirates seized its bridge in October 2007. T

Koreans had kept control of both the steering gear and the engines, and with the 

tance of the American vessel they successfully assaulted the pirates on the bridge

same time another American destroyer pursued a Japanese vessel reportedly hija

by pirates off Somalia. As if to demonstrate the extent of the danger in these wat

destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS Porter (DDG 78) responded to 

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Archipelago near the Horn of Africa on 28 October 2007. When the destroyers drew

near the captured ship, Porter used its main battery to destroy the skiffs being towed

astern. Arleigh Burke then received permission from the tenuous transitional government of Somalia to enter territorial waters to subdue the ship. The Navy continued to

track Golden Nori until the pirates abandoned it on 12 December.20

Somali national instability, of which maritime crime is one of the worst by-products,

inevitably came into direct contact with the war in Iraq. In 2005, the IMB reported a

rise in maritime lawlessness in the Arabian Sea. In spite of the proximity of warships,

the ICC reported two attacks off the Basra oil terminal, two more at buoy anchorages,

and another five in Iraqi waters on 19 and 20 November. In each case the perpetrators

injured and robbed the crew and made away with arms, cash, personal property, and,

occasionally, some rather advanced technologies.21 In some Somali episodes the IMB

and other sources have reported the use of fast pursuit craft against commercial targets

as far as a hundred nautical miles out to sea. Virtually all reports confirm the use of

sophisticated small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as crude weapons. This

activity represents a threat to life, property, and free navigation of the sea at the southern end of an area of great concern to the U.S. Navy Central Command and Combined

Task Force 150.

The advent of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006, capable of confronting the

clans and warlords, presented the prospect of Somalia as a haven for terrorists but not

for pirates. While some of the more radical members of the courts supported al-Qa‘ida

and had little love for the United States, they had even less love for high-seas piracy,

which they declared immoral. This produced a challenge to Somali pirates when during

2006 the CIC briefly managed to reopen the port of Mogadishu without pirate interfer

ence to gather port-entry fees and other profits. However, the CIC’s influence over

piracy lasted only a very short time. A transitional-national-government force and the

Ethiopian National Defense Force brought the brief reign of the council to a close and

introduced uncertainty once again.

The Way Ahead

On 22 April 2008, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States called for a

United Nations resolution to support the nations determined to fight piracy off Somalia. Only one week before, the French armed forces had captured six Somali pirates who

had seized the French-owned luxury yacht Le Ponant and held the crew of twenty-two

for a week, hoping for ransom. The French government had the pirates taken to France

for interrogation. Apparently undeterred, another contingent of pirates took a ship

moving through the region from Dubai on 21 April; in addition, the Spanish navy wen

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Somalia coast. The French ambassador to the United Nations, Jean-Maurice Ripe

commented to the press that his country had no desire to endanger the law of th

the French, Americans, and the British, he said, simply wanted a mandate from t

United Nations to take action against piracy in the name of the international com

nity.22 He explained, “The idea is to give a mandate, to call on states of the U.N. t

tackle piracy by organizing patrols, reacting to acts of piracy, to take as many pre

tive measures as possible.”23

In response to the increased threat of piracy off Somalia, on 2 June 2008 the UN 

rity Council adopted Resolution 1816, with the consent of Somalia—which, the 

tion observed, “lacks the capacity to interdict pirates or patrol and secure its terr

waters.” This resolution authorized foreign naval vessels to enter Somali territori

waters for an initial period of six months, which could later be lengthened by mu

agreement. This resolution also allowed foreign naval vessels to use “all necessary

means” to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, consistent with releva

existing provisions of international law.24

This resolution may result in stopping the pirates, but it does not address the und

ing factors that created them in the first place. In looking for a solution, we need 

recall the history of the problem. The Somali situation emerged from the exploit

of traditional fisheries and the inability of local fishermen to preserve their resou

and livelihood. Thus, the long-term solution to this problem must go beyond tra

tional coalitions, formal alliances, the power of regional neighbors, and the destr

of individual targets. An international framework of common applicable law, com

enforcement, and common policy must extend beyond regional boundaries and 

cal borders.25

Rather than reinventing the wheel, building upon existing successful civilian fish

agreements might present the best model for not only strengthening those agreem

but also extending them to provide greater security against maritime crime.26 De

oped in this way, the collaboration would feel inclusive, mostly civilian, and milit

only in a minimal sense. In Asia, the forms of cooperation developed by the Sout

Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, whose members have already agreed to enforcem

collaboration, would certainly provide the basis for a framework that would add

piracy and armed robbery at sea.27

In the immediate region of Somalia, concerned nations might look to the Region

Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI). This association counts among its member

rain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirat

objectives include the development, conservation, and management of marine

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regulate fishing methods and gear as well as the seasons for fishing and the extent of

the catch.

Many of RECOFI’s primary concerns and goals address the issues of central control

and national sovereignty that triggered the so-called coast-guard actions off Somalia by

local fishermen. The lack of such control has generated a pool of unemployed and desperate candidates ripe for recruitment into the pirate crews that have turned the Horn

of Africa and the Gulf of Aden into such dangerous places. RECOFI has also embraced

the need “to keep under review the economic and social aspects of the fishing industry.” Regardless of its present nature, large-scale and increasingly deep-ocean piracy in

Somalia originated from the desire of poor communities to save their livelihoods. In its

present form RECOFI cannot entirely address the problem at hand, but it can certainly

provide a framework upon which to build. Many other agreements exist that might

serve the same purpose, and they touch every part of the world ocean.29

For their part, navies can inform and support locally enforced regional frameworks

built upon agreements like RECOFI and upon the progress made in previous years by

the Piracy Reporting Center in Malaysia, and its supporting organizations, created in

1992. Any framework must include all nations affected, regardless of political perspective or bilateral commitments. The same common civilian and commercial interests

that lead nations to agree on fisheries management will help to address maritime

crime.

More practical policy responses might include enabling both local authorities and corporate countermeasures. Naval forces can provide mine countermeasure vessels, should

criminals lay mines in choke points or ports. Navies should also offer to increase or

enhance exercises, training, and cooperation to assist regional or secondary maritime

forces in undertaking these tasks. Naval experience with unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs) and ship security systems can help the spread of best practices in the use of

methods suggested by the International Maritime Organization, such as the Inventus

UAV, ShipLoc, and Secure-Ship. These measures would dovetail well with the strategy

of supporting a regional framework.

Any effort to explore a more global framework would obviously require more multinational naval involvement. Addressing the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium on 21 September 2005 at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island,

Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, then the Chief of Naval Operations, began to

explore the possibilities open to global navies: “As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities o

all freedom-loving navies of the world. . . . This 1,000-ship Navy would integrate the

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tional city at sea.”30 For some naval historians the admiral’s statements seemed tim

indeed. The Combined Operations Project led in 2005–2006 by the Contempora

tory Branch of the U.S. Naval Historical Center had examined the nature of effec

naval coalitions and their ability to address the varied threats on the high seas. In 

of the case studies, conducted by American, Canadian, Australian, and British hi

ans, communication and trust emerge as paramount. Without the trust engender

effective, well trained liaison officers, and frequent collaborative exercises at sea, 

bined operations can quickly become exercises in futility.

Deliberate, frequent, and regular contact allowed his commanding officers to bro

the mutual understanding that served Vice Admiral Lord Nelson so well two cen

ago. This dynamic has become even more necessary today, given the potential co

porary barriers of language, culture, technology, and operational experience. The 

tory of recent combined operations repeatedly speaks to these critical but often

overlooked personal aspects. In short, history suggests that in naval operations a

as in international, civilian maritime policy, “you cannot surge trust.”31

Human relations emerge strongly as the primary asset or resource needed to brin

peace and enforcement to the maritime commons, including the Horn of Africa. 

modore James Stapleton, Royal Australian Navy, the naval component command

the international military response to violence in East Timor in 1999, once made 

very point in reflecting on the reasons for success in that operation. The naval co

nent of the multinational United Nations task force supporting Operation STABI

achieved a very high level of interoperability. Effective communication and divis

labor brought to the effort in East Timor the kind of success currently sought off 

Somali coast.

In a 2004 oral interview by the author, referring to the commanding officers of th

ships under his temporary command for Operation STABILISE, Stapleton recalled 

“they’d all come from a major exercise that was called off, the one that I was goin

go to. So they’d had time in company and they’d worked with [USS] Mobile Bay b

they’d worked with [HMS] Glasgow . . , they’d worked with [HMNZS] Te Kaha. . 

worked with these ships before, I knew the COs, I knew the capabilities of each o

ships. So we’d worked together pretty much for a lot of the time.”32 Combining p

relatively easy, as the relationships remained fresh and current and drew on stron

common experience: “It was very much a one-on-one . . . with every country, bu

way I spoke to them and the operation order for communications, the operation 

for the flying program . . . , was the standard NATO signal which they all have.”33

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network among ships and people, a relationship that cannot have the flavor of a single

nation alone: “[I had people] from each country on my staff. . . . I had a Frenchman on

my staff, I had a Canadian or two, engineers. I had New Zealanders. This became a

problem for me then about classification, and what I could leave lying around . . .

[i]ssues like that. And what was privileged information, and what wasn’t. . . . It does

make problems, but if you don’t manage it, and I didn’t have those guys and girls on

my staff, for sure, then the coalition thing doesn’t work.”34

All this had to become as natural as the first cup of coffee in the morning, a fit so well

engineered over time, socially and professionally, that it could become second nature:

You hear people say, “I’m an Australian,” but people in Australia still know what you mean when you

say “I’ll have a brew,” a coffee, “I’ll have a NATO standard” (that’s white and two [sugars]). Maybe

that’s because that reflects my age . . . and I did a lot of training in the UK. So I knew NATO, and I

know the publications. But if you’re using ATP, the tactical publications, you can talk to any navy in

the world, because everyone’s got Allied Tactical Publications. You can also use international codes.

So it was never really an issue about integration. . . . Everybody just fitted in.35

History strongly suggests that very often, ignoring these experiences, we have placed

our emphasis elsewhere or viewed naval personnel simply as extensions of platforms

and technologies. We must recognize that the cultural expectations shaping naval

careers have long militated against the role the international community needs many

officers to play—the very role that can make combined action against Somali piracy

most effective.36

As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to an end, the Horn of Africa

needs more than ever officers who can play these roles. A three-million-dollar ransom

was paid in early January 2009 to free the Saudi supertanker Sirius Star from Somali

pirates;37 in response to that event, on 8 January Vice Admiral William Gortney, the

commander of Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command, and of the Combined Maritime

Force, announced the creation of Combined Task Force 151, dedicated exclusively to

antipiracy operations.38 Four days later Commodore Stapleton’s homeland announced

that it would join other international forces, including those of the United States and

China, in the new mission against pirates in the Gulf of Aden and near the Horn of

Africa.39 A force adequate to address the symptoms of piracy seems near. What will the

cure look like?

If navies intend to help keep the ocean open in an age of regional instability, piracy,

and terrorism, combined operations regularly informed by professional historical perspective must become a permanent and essential part of naval practice. Addressing

piracy in a way that goes beyond simple retaliation has proved very difficult. Recent

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maritime crime, a solution that while naturally displaying the difficulties of craft

working formula, shows promise.

Malaysia and China have traditionally opposed combined antipiracy patrols in th

Asia-Pacific region, and their unsuccessful effort to collaborate raises a significan

question. Are patrols the answer to piracy? Given that Asian maritime crime mos

occurs at the pier or at anchor, many navies openly question the efficacy of patro

Royal Malaysian Navy recently noted that ships, on average, actually report attack

about ten hours after the event. By that time, a responding patrol cannot help, as 

criminals might be anywhere.40

Patrols address the symptoms but not the cause. If regional agreements on fisher

management form the basis for comprehensive security agreements to protect

resources and regional economies, navies will have to play a variety of high- and 

profile roles to enable the agreements to take hold. Not all of the measures taken 

ensure a safe, healthy, and shared ocean will take the form of overt naval action. S

still await definition and may recall times past when a modest naval presence dir

advanced local economic interests in many and varied ways.41 In the end, the solu

to piracy is as local as the lost livelihood of a pirate recruit in one of the Harardh

camps along the Somali coast, and as global as Admiral Mullen’s international cit

sea. If we can see the connection and act on it, the region can once again find bot

rule of law and a way to sustain itself.

Notes

1. United Kingdom, House of Commons Transport Committee [hereafter Transport Committee], “Piracy,” Eighth Report of Session

2005–06, HC 1026, 6 July 2006, p. 3.

2. “Somali Pirates Seize French Yacht,” BBC

News, 4 April 2008, available at www.bbc.co

.uk. The French armed forces pursued the pirates during the second week of April 2008,

seized them, and released the hostages; the

pirates will shortly go on trial for the act.

Since this seizure, the French have captured

fifty-seven pirates in the waters off Somalia.

Most are still awaiting trial in France. Some

journalists have reported that the French released an undetermined number to Somali

authorities in Puntland. In recent days, at

this writing, the United States has entered

into an agreement with Kenya to turn over

for trial any pirates it seizes. Daniel Sekulich,

“France Captures Pirates as Kenya A

Prosecute Suspects,” Modern Day Pir

Tales: Notes on the World of Piracy f

Journalist Daniel Sekulich, posted 28 

ary 2009, piratebook.blogspot.com/.

3. The United Nations Convention on t

of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), and arti

defining piracy, can be found at www

.net/treaties/losc7.htm.

4. Transport Committee, “Piracy,” p. 15

5. UN Security Council Resolution 137

available at www.state.gov/; “CTF 150

Naval Forces Central Command–U.S. 

Fleet–Combined Maritime Forces, ww

.navy.mil/.

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the United States Navy,” Naval Historical

Center, www.history.navy.mil/wars/.

7. “Somalia: UNOSOM I” and “Somalia:

UNOSOM II,” United Nations, www.un

.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/.

8. “Global and Marine Ecosystems: Somalia,”

World Resources Institute: EarthTrends Environmental Information, earthtrends.wri.org/.

9. Transport Committee, “Piracy,” pp. 15–17.

10. Jeni Bone, “Piracy Costs Maritime Industry

$16bn+,” Seabreeze.com.au.

11. “Pirate Warning for Somalia’s Coastline,”

Somaliland Times, 3 February 2003, available

at www.somalilandtimes.net/.

12. People’s Daily, english.people.com.cn/; Transport Committee, “Piracy,” p. 17, para. 53; Ali

M. Koknar, “Terror on the High Seas,”

Securitymanagement.com, June 2004; “The

Ship Security Plan,” MaritimeSecurity.com.

13. For conditions in the Mugdug see, for example, ReliefWeb, www.reliefweb.int/.

14. Andrew McGregor, “The Leading Factions

behind the Somali Insurgency,” Jamestown

Foundation, www.jamestown.org/; “ONI

Civil Maritime Analysis Department,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, www

.nga.mil/; Donald J. Puchala, “Of Pirates and

Terrorists: What Experience and History

Teach,” Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 1

(April 2005), pp. 1–5.

15. For example, see the action of Porter in 2007

near the Horn of Africa: “U.S. Destroyer

Pursuing Hijacked Ship in Somali Waters,

Military Says,” www.cnn.com/; also, “Pirates

Attack UAE Ship off Somalia,” asia.news

.yahoo.com/. Many such instances can be

found on the websites of the major international news organizations, such as CNN and

BBC; Puchala, “Of Pirates and Terrorists,”

p. 5.

16. Most of the episodes mentioned here can be

explored in greater depth by searching on

the term “piracy” at www.imo.org, the site of

the International Maritime Organization

(IMO), and by reviewing the regular piracy

warnings of the International Chamber of

Commerce, at www.icc-ccs.org/imb/overview

.php.

17. Koknar, “Terror on the High Seas”; “The

Ship Security Plan”; Puchala, “Of Pirates and

racy,” pp. 20–22.

18. Jim Krane, “U.S. Navy Seizes Pirate Ship off

Somalia,” Associated Press, available at

www.boston.com.

19. “U.S. Navy Ships Return Fire on Suspected

Pirates,” Navy.mil, 18 March 2006, story

NNS060318-01.

20. “Crew Wins Deadly Pirate Battle off Somalia,” Cnn.com, 30 October 2007.

21. International Maritime Bureau, Weekly Piracy Report for 15–22 November 2005, www

.icc-ccs.org/.

22. “France, U.S., UK Draft Somalia Piracy Resolution,” Reuters, 22 April 2008, available at

www.reuters.com; “Pirates on French Yacht

Captured,” Aljazeera.net, 11 April 2008.

23. “France, U.S., UK Draft Somalia Piracy

Resolution.”

24. “Security Council SC/9344,” United Nations,

www.un.org/.

25. Sam Bateman, “Regional and International

Frameworks for Maritime Security Coopera

tion,” APAN: Asia-Pacific Area Network, 29

November 2005, www.apan-info.net/.

26. Ibid.

27. Prof. M. J. Peterson, University of Massachu

setts, Amherst, e-mail to author, 30 November 2005.

28. “Regional Fisheries of the World,” Food and

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, www.fao.org/.

29. “RECOFI Objectives,” International Fisheries

Law and Policy Portal, www.intfish.net/.

30. Adm. Michael Mullen, USN, “Remarks as

Delivered for the 17th International

Seapower Symposium, Naval War College,

Newport, RI,” Navy.mil, 21 September 2005

31. Dr. Steven Harris of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Forces senior

historian, coined this phrase during one of

the Combined Operations Project’s analytical sessions in Canberra, Australia, in July

2005.

32. Commodore James R. Stapleton, RAN, inter

view with Gary E. Weir, 14 December 2004,

copy in author’s possession. USS Mobile Bay

(CG 53) is an Aegis guided-missile cruiser,

HMS Glasgow (D 88) a guided-missile destroyer, and HMNZS Te Kaha (F 77) a

frigate.

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34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. While a 21 July 2008 report in USA Today

describes recently successful collaborative arrangements between the U.S. Navy and local

authorities to restrict piracy and maritime

crime in Asian waters, it notes the difficulty

of implementing similar solutions in Africa,

because of the absence of a legitimate, empowered Somali government. Citing the

IMO, reporter Donna Leinwand states, “African waters account for 56% of all pirate attacks, spiking from 27 attacks in the first half

of 2005 to 64 attacks since January.” If order

does not return to Somalia in the near future, it may be that only a regional arrangement can provide the authority to bring

enforcement to the Horn of Africa.

2009, available at news.bbc.co.uk/.

38. “New Counter-piracy Task Force Est

lished,” Navy.mil.

39. “Australian Warship Could Be Sent t

Ocean in Piracy Purge,” Australian, 1

ary 2009.

40. Andrew Forbes, Deputy Director (Re

Sea Power Center–Australia, e-mail t

thor, 28 November 2005.

41. “France, U.S., UK Draft Somalia Pira

olution”; “Pirates on French Yacht C

tured.” Piracy figures were up 20 per

the first quarter of 2008: “Piracy Figu

by 20% for First Quarter of 2008,” IC

mercial Crime Services, www.icc-ccs.o

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Conclusions

BRUCE A. ELLEMAN, ANDREW FORBES, AND DAVID ROSENBERG

Piracy has deep historical and cultural roots; it has flourished for millennia. Whe

high-value sea robbery by organized criminal groups or low-value petty theft by

impoverished seafarers, piracy is related both to changing economic conditions, 

poverty, industrialization, and urbanization, and political conditions, including a 

ernment’s legitimacy and ability to maintain law and order.

There are many different types of piracy: simple robbery at sea; absconding with 

cargo; and even taking control over a ship, reflagging it, and then attempting to s

vessel intact, as a “phantom ship.” Sometimes pirates actively seek out specific sh

attack, while in other instances they wait for unsuspecting vessels to approach wi

striking distance.

Pirates seek opportunities to exploit differences in the value of goods from one r

to another. This happened during Britain’s eighteenth-century attempts to regula

trade with its colonies in North America and during the nineteenth-century opiu

trade between India and China. Organized criminal groups resort to piracy when 

more profitable than such other means of enrichment as drug trafficking or smu

In the thirteen American colonies, many people were eager to buy cheap goods fr

privateers. This was also the case among early Southeast Asian pirates, who preye

the lucrative West–East opium trade and then sold the higher-quality Indian opi

local buyers.

Piracy can thrive in the waters off land areas where law and order is absent. Anot

causal factor is economic or political upheaval, such as the end of a war. This hap

after the First Opium War, World Wars I and II, and the Cold War; in each case e

nomic activity increased, but naval patrols by the major belligerents decreased. T

of the U.S. war in Vietnam led to another predatory form of piracy, aimed at the 

migration of people from Vietnam. These pirate attacks were largely ignored by

regional governments, which hoped to stem the flow of refugees.

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early nineteenth centuries; the Barbary pirates, accordingly, preyed on Mediterranean

shipping. The Asia-Pacific region has now become the driver of global economic

growth, and as a consequence, the South China Sea and adjoining waters, including the

Malacca Strait, have assumed greater importance. Pirates working from locations like

Somalia can also take advantage of sea routes running along their coastlines to attack

commercial ships.

Piracy hot spots have included East Asia and the South China Sea, South and Southeast

Asia, and Africa. Some of these hot spots, such as the Sulu region, have long histories o

local piracy; others, like the Gulf of Thailand, do not. This suggests that history and

culture are not the only major determinants of piracy. In general, rather, as targets of

opportunity increase, piracy increases. Once opportunistic piracy has proved highly

profitable, organized criminal groups may move in, push out the original perpetrators,

and attempt to make even greater profits. Eklöf observes that “the relationship between

the opportunistic local pirates in the southern Malacca Strait region and the (criminal)

syndicates thus seems to be symbiotic rather than competitive, thereby perpetuating

piracy in the region and adapting it to changing external circumstances.”1

In other cases, pirates have been associated with active political rebellions against central governments, as in the case of the Taiping pirates in China. Somali pirates have

claimed nationalist motives; they say they are fighting to defend the nation’s fishing

interests. Nigerian pirates have claimed to be standing up against the oil companies and

the Nigerian government to reclaim long-lost tribal rights.

This concluding chapter is structured around four distinct but interrelated themes:

factors that encourage piracy, issues related to the international shipping industry,

the roles of shipowners, and the responses of multilateral naval forces. It ends with an

examination of how navies might be better used in the future to manage this growing

problem.

Factors Encouraging Piracy and Maritime Crime

The location of a criminal attack determines whether it is an act of piracy or simply a

maritime crime, within the jurisdiction of a particular country. This legalistic distinction, of course, is meaningless to the victim. Traditionally, piracy included almost any

theft on the water, even along a country’s coastline or on its rivers, which explains why

many medieval cities were located far inland. From the eighteenth century onward,

however, “maritime crime” was considered to take place in territorial waters out to

three nautical miles, with piracy occurring beyond three nautical miles on what was by

then called the “high seas.” Territorial waters progressively extended outward to the

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Convention on the Law of the Seas 1982, twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters a

two-hundred-nautical-mile “exclusive economic zones” were codified, with some 

tries arguing that international waters—or high seas—had decreased correspond

Notwithstanding this new codification of ocean usage and sovereign rights, many

countries make boundary claims or attempt to enforce security requirements tha

exceed what is allowed under international law.3

Historically, pirates have most often operated from small islands or archipelagoe

immediately adjacent to major shipping lanes; indeed, they may originally have b

legitimate members of local maritime communities. Pirates value the geographic

importance of access to ports, straits, and the sea lines of communication throug

them. Although located close to shipping activity, pirate havens on land can be

extremely hard to find and therefore to police. One response of the international 

munity to the general difficulties of locating, identifying, and prosecuting pirates 

land, especially if local governments decline to act, is to use navies to catch pirate

the act of committing crimes at sea. When pirates have been captured by interna

forces, it has usually been at sea, and most often during piratical raids gone wron

However, such a policy is expensive; the most cost-effective approach remains

improving police work ashore.

As several of the case studies have emphasized, ports and adjacent waters are the 

likely places for maritime crime. The widespread petty theft in the port of Chitta

Bangladesh, is a case in point. Such acts might be perpetrated by a variety of indi

als or groups on an opportunistic basis. Thefts in waters farther removed from th

imply a familiarity with boats and navigation, skills usually associated with sea

or fishermen.

Pirates may also scout targets in ports. For example, in China during the 1920s, p

leaders would select targets in port and even travel in the ships they planned to

attack—often paying first-class fares—so they could observe their workings. Suc

detailed preparations could result in pirates’ hijacking the entire ship, robbing th

sengers of their valuables, and ransoming the ship and passengers for huge sums

practice became so widespread that some ships were pirated many times.

Other danger areas are shipping lanes through international straits. Several case 

included here show how pirates take advantage of narrows to attack ships, especi

the Malacca Strait and the Strait of Gibraltar. Pirates also take advantage of ambi

of jurisdiction, waters where boundaries have not been delimited or where naval 

maritime forces—such as coast guards or marine police—do not normally opera

The piracy attacks against the Vietnamese “boat people” during the 1970s and 19

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also afford opportunities for piracy. For example, in early June 2008 there was an

attempted pirate attack on a cattle transport steaming from the Philippines to Australia. It took place in Indonesian waters about seventy miles south of Balut Island, an

area that was not routinely patrolled.4

Motivations for piracy or maritime crime are most often related to economic deprivation, in the case of opportunistic crime, or a cultural or lifestyle choice, in the case of

organized criminal gangs acting for material gain. Sudden and severe impoverishment,

especially among marginal seafaring communities, makes piracy a viable way to meet

basic needs. For example, the rapid increase in the number of piracy attacks in Indonesian waters and ports after 1997 may be attributed to that nation’s sharp economic

downturn and domestic instability in the wake of the regional currency crisis. Similarly, decline in global fisheries and encroachment on local grounds may lead to unemployment in the fisheries sector and thus a turn to opportunistic maritime theft.

The decline and impoverishment of traditional coastal villages also motivates unemployed seafarers to turn to sea robbery. Eklöf notes, “The roots of contemporary piracy

in the southern Malacca Strait region can be found in the rapid social and economic

change, due to the expansion of global capitalism that over the past decades has

affected the region and which is particularly obvious in the spectacular growth of

Batam on the southern side of the Singapore Strait.”5

This helps to explain why most

acts of what is called piracy actually involve petty theft from ships in ports or anchorages. Economic duress also makes impoverished fishermen more vulnerable to and

available for recruitment by entrepreneurial criminal organizations. In some instances,

captured sailors have been forced to become pirates.

Piracy can flourish when maritime commerce grows faster than government’s ability to

protect it. This was dramatically shown in the early eighteenth century, when privateer

ignored peace treaties to continue preying on Spanish and Portuguese “treasure ships”

coming from the New World. In Southeast Asia, it was common for political leaders to

hire mercenaries to raid shipping and enemy villages; such raids were considered integral parts of warfare. In China, by contrast, pirates wanted the state to be “strong

enough to provide sufficient order for the flourishing of commerce and yet weak

enough to preclude close administrative control along every inch of the coast. This situation may have afforded an ideal backdrop to their activities.”6

During the 1990s, a

similar phenomenon reoccurred in China, which became the “world’s biggest market

for smuggled goods” until the government began to “crack down on pirate activity in

order to be regarded as a legitimate trading nation.”7

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tion of the nation-state and the modern international-relations system. As some 

earlier historical examples show, a rudimentary international system and the exis

of colonial empires made internal control within some countries problematic, th

allowing piracy to occur and restricting solutions to piracy in other countries to 

action. The dissolution of empires from the end of World War I to the 1960s and 

creation of the United Nations after World War II, combined with the growing re

tion of the nation-state and the state’s “right” to self-defense, have all impacted h

international community responds to piracy.

Clearly, a law-enforcement response to opportunity attacks caused by poverty is 

a long-term nor a viable solution. Where seafarers, fishermen, or farmers are une

ployed, long-term solutions are antipoverty programs and policies that encourag

nomic growth and development. If the local government is unable to fund such

programs, the international community can provide aid on a bilateral or multila

basis. If economic motivation for opportunistic attacks can be alleviated thereby

residual piracy can be more easily managed by law enforcement.

Against organized criminal gangs, a law-enforcement response is warranted but

requires political will to act, sufficient funding to staff law-enforcement agencies 

enough trained personnel, and an adequate legal system under which alleged per

tors can be brought to justice. Again, if the local government is unable to respond 

this way, the international community can assist through financial support, train

and equipment.

However, there will be situations where local governments do not wish to act or p

posed solutions will require considerable time to take effect. The international co

nity might then commit naval forces to assist local forces or act unilaterally, in an

attempt to “solve” the problem. As shown in certain case studies, such interventio

have generally occurred on land, destroying bases and exterminating pirates. Now

days, such actions run counter to international law, limiting what external power

do. Furthermore, it should be recognized that any action by external navies is by 

tion a response to the symptom and not the underlying cause.

The International Shipping Industry

As many of the case-study authors have noted, the solutions to piracy and mariti

crime are land based and involve law-enforcement agencies. This is because of th

obvious fact that pirates and criminal gangs operate and live on land and sell the

len goods on land. There are no simple solutions: different policies are required t

match the differing motivations of those committing acts of piracy or maritime 

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piracy and maritime crime also increase. Since it is predominantly international shipping that is being attacked, it is useful to outline the size of the industry, the regulatory

framework within which it operates, and actions being taken by shipowners to protect

their ships from attack.

Over 80 percent of the world’s merchandise trade by volume moves by sea; in 2007 this

trade reached 8.02 billion tons, carried in 1.12 billion deadweight tons of shipping. The

majority of the world merchant fleet in that year was made up of oil tankers and carriers. Oil tankers accounted for about 408 million tons (36 percent), bulk carriers about

391 million tons (35 percent), containerships about 145 million tons (13 percent), general cargo carriers about 105 million tons (10 percent), and other ships about 69 million tons (6 percent).8

The regulatory regime relating to international shipping has evolved over time, with a

broad framework of five major stakeholders (and categories of stakeholders): the Inter

national Maritime Organization (IMO), the shipping industry, flag states, port states,

and coastal states. The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible

for maritime issues, in charge of conventions and binding treaties, codes, advisory reso

lutions (some countries, but by no means all, have adopted these into their domestic

legislation), and nonbinding guidelines. The IMO provides regulatory oversight of

international shipping in maritime safety, marine pollution, liability and compensation, cargoes, marine technology, marine environment, navigation, lifesaving, search

and rescue, radio communications, and training and certification.

Prior to World War I, only maritime states granted flags to shipping, but article 273 of

the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 allowed landlocked states to have “flags,” as well, and

this concession was carried on, through the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958

into the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS). The

flag state is that in which the ship has been registered, and it has primary responsibility

for the conduct of the ship. The IMO requires flag states to check regularly all ships

under their registries, ensuring that all carry appropriate charts and navigational

instruments and that their crews are adequately trained.

Over the past forty years there has been an increasing tendency for shipowners to move

their ships to “open registries” (that is, open to owners of any nationality) or “flags of

convenience,” rather than their own national flags. Shipowners may use four criteria to

determine which flag to choose:

• What crewing levels and conditions are required by the flag state?

• What are the individual tax, commercial tax, and financial laws in the flag state?

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• What level of naval protection can it offer?

The answers to the first two questions in particular can affect operating costs and

therefore profits. But poor enforcement of safety conventions by some flag states 

rise in the number of flags of convenience have led to increased control by port s

Accordingly, in 1982 the European Economic Community, concerned about failu

comply with maritime conventions, developed and signed the Paris Memorandu

Understanding on Port State Control. Port states are concerned with the conditio

ships calling at their ports, the possibility of accidents, the risk that incompetent 

might endanger ships or ports, and the living conditions of foreign crews. UNCL

allows coastal and port states to make laws for the good conduct of ships in their 

torial seas, and these states increasingly have used articles relating to safety and p

tion to develop strong control regimes.

At the instigation of the United States, the international community, through the 

began considering in November 2001 how to improve the security of maritime tr

port worldwide. The result, in December 2002, after twelve months of deliberatio

a set of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS) 1974. A new chapter was added (SOLAS chapter XI-2, “Special Measure

Enhance Maritime Security”), and the International Ship and Port Facility Secur

(ISPS) Code was introduced, coming into effect on 1 July 2004. The ISPS Code e

lished a framework of preventive security for ships and ports, involving security 

ments and port- and ship-security plans. Other chapters of SOLAS were revised 

focus on seafarer training and screening to improve the physical security of inter

tional trade.

Finally, the coastal state, through whose waters vessels transit en route to destina

in other nations, is emerging as a stakeholder in international shipping. At a min

a coastal state must provide for the safety of shipping in its waters by providing n

tional aids and charts, but it is unclear whether it must also protect shipping tran

its EEZ. This is the nub of the argument over the “security” of the Malacca Strait

between the littoral (coastal) states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, on the 

hand, and on the other, “user countries” like Japan and the United States. These c

states have undertaken a number of initiatives that user states have been generall

reluctant to support (though Japan has been funding navigational aids and the li

the region since the late 1960s, and the United States has funded twelve radar sta

along the Malacca Strait).9

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to coordinate antipiracy patrols in the Malacca Strait, in an arrangement known by the

acronym “MALSINDO.” On 11 November 2004, eight out of the ten members of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri

Lanka, and Bangladesh, adopted the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).10 This entity differs from

the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center (discussed below), in that

it is not connected with shipping companies or insurance firms. ReCAAP allocated

funds to set up an independent reporting agency in Singapore to monitor piracy

attacks.11 Further, in September 2005 Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia initiated “Eye

in the Sky,” coordinated air patrols over the strait.

Such multilateral initiatives require the fusing of seldom-standardized information

from diverse sources. Admiral Harry Ulrich, U.S. Navy, as commander of NATO Naval

Forces Europe in 2006, showed how that can be accomplished successfully. Admiral

Ulrich began stitching together a network of shore-based sensors ringing the

Mediterranean and the International Maritime Organization’s Automatic Identification System (or AIS, discussed below): “Almost overnight, NATO went from tracking

dozens of ships on the Mediterranean to thousands, and instead of getting the data

sometimes up to 72 hours late, now the contacts were being tracked in 1 to 5 minutes—

to an accuracy within 50 feet on the Earth’s surface.” By the time Ulrich retired at the

end of 2007, he had enlisted in the effort thirty-two countries throughout the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, along the west coast of Africa, around the Black Sea, and in

the Pacific.12

Such a system’s strength is a function of its reach: the more countries that join, the

larger the shared operational picture. A sea-traffic-control regime of this type can give

local coast guards and naval patrols the information they need to monitor suspected

pirates and deter them. However, it cannot possibly deter all pirate attacks; shipowners

and shipmasters must also intensify their efforts.

The Roles of Shipowners and Shipmasters

Given this regulatory environment, what actions have the shipowners taken to protect

their ships, crews, and cargoes? The most concrete measure against piracy undertaken

by the shipping industry was the creation by the IMB of the Piracy Reporting Center

(PRC) in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia in 1992. The PRC was meant to be the first point

of contact for a shipmaster wishing to report an actual or attempted attack, or suspicious activity; the IMB could then initiate a response. A stated aim of the PRC is to

raise awareness within the shipping industry of piracy, and it works closely with

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information.

The IMB also provides practical advice to shipmasters transiting pirate-infested w

or entering ports where criminal activity is known to occur. Masters are advised 

brief their crews before heading into dangerous waters and tell them what measu

will be taken (as contained in the ship-security plans required under the ISPS Co

Such steps might be lighting all blind spots and dark areas, patrolling the weathe

regularly and in pairs, adopting a timetable for reports, and exerting increased vi

when watches change. The IMB recommends that ships noting suspicious activit

“increase speed,” “commence evasive manoeuvres,” and “use bow wave and stern 

to prevent the small boats approaching close to the ship.” If a pirate “mother ship

sighted, a vessel should “move away from it,” “steam away from land,” and “head 

the sea,” which “makes it more difficult for boats to come alongside.”13

In practice, however, the best way for a ship to counter piracy is to avoid areas wh

pirates are operating. Masters advised by shipowners or the IMB that particular a

are dangerous, especially at night, do best to avoid them altogether or transit onl

ing the day. However, this can be costly, and shipowners may refuse to authorize 

detour or delay. If pirates do attack, the master and crew need to know what to d

that requires planning and training. Also, however useful the IMB’s advice, the tr

the international shipping industry toward minimum crew sizes militates against 

effective implementation.

Most attacks in Southeast Asia, and in the Malacca Strait in particular, occur aga

ships that are berthed or at anchor. Hence, port authorities have a major respons

to improve physical security in their ports, as the ISPS Code requires. The code a

requires that all people working in a port undergo security vetting and carry spec

identification, to hinder pirates from scouting for targets.

At sea, maintaining a constant watch is the most important means of keeping pir

from boarding unnoticed. A ship that detects pirates before they board can try to 

maneuver them. Physical barriers, barbed wire or even electric fencing, can slow 

ers down. (An example of electric fencing is the IMB-recommended Secure-Ship

nonlethal electrified barrier, with a nine-thousand-volt pulse, surrounding the w

ship.)14 Crew members can use water hoses or “sonic boom” guns to try to keep b

bay or cut thrown grapnel lines to prevent pirates from boarding. In addition, “s

simple weapons have also been found to be most effective, particularly the use of 

signal cartridges and very light pistols. Empty beer bottles filled with sand which 

be stacked on deck ready to hurl at intruders are also extremely effective.”15

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doors, especially to the bridge, engine room, communications room, and steering

machinery room. However, most ships have many doors and hallways leading to the

most important areas of the ship, and it is difficult to double-lock them all. Ordinary

padlocks usually do not last long in salt air, and can be cut open with a pair of wire cut

ters; electronic key-card systems might help. If the pirates do gain access to the control

areas, the master and crew are usually instructed by the owners not to resist further.

This applies especially to the use of firearms; pirates are probably better armed, and the

crew might be injured or killed if they fight back. Shipowners are also concerned that if

a pirate is killed during an attack, revenge attacks on that line might result.

Before that point, however, as soon as pirates board the ship, the crew can activate the

ship’s security-alert system, a silent alarm that sends a message warning the shipowner

and other authorities that something has happened. A well known example is ShipLoc,

a cheap satellite-based tracking system that shipping companies can access via the

Internet to monitor the locations of their ships. The device is a small, waterproof unit

with a transmitter, GPS receiver, battery pack, and flat antenna. If activated, it cannot

be detected by anyone on board the ship or vessels nearby.16

But the shipowner, receiving the warning (possibly relayed by some other nation), mus

verify that an attack is under way before advising the flag state, and the flag state must

then advise the coastal state, which would take action. There may be long delays. More

important, there is no guarantee that any relevant authority will receive the signal; or

that if received it will be recognized as valid among thousands of false signals that are

sent; or that if a signal is received and verified, the coastal state will respond with adequate naval forces.17

The last point above raises a key issue. However effective the performance of the crew,

the owners, alarm systems, information-sharing centers, and the like, in a given

instance, the question remains: Is there a naval, coast guard, or police vessel in the

vicinity that is able to respond in a timely and meaningful manner? Often there is not.

One option is the use of private security guards. A number of firms, usually staffed by

retired soldiers or seamen, offer security services. But putting guards on all merchant

ships is very expensive. Captain Jayant Abhyankar, the former deputy director of IMB,

sounded a cautionary note: these security personnel, he observed, “are well

intentioned, eager, dedicated, aggressive, and very sharp—but we tell them not to

expect to make a living on it. Shipowners just cannot afford them. And if someone

gets shot and killed, all hell would break loose; it’s a nonstarter, except in extremely

rare circumstances.”18

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Keith Winstanley, Royal Navy, has urged owners to be proactive in the security 

their ships:

We’re not ceding the waters of the Gulf of Aden to pirates, and where we can be there and give 

port, we are doing that. But we can’t be everywhere at once and I would ask and urge the inter

tional shipping community just to check and verify that they are content that they are taking e

possible action themselves to reduce the chances of piracy. That might mean something that c

money, such as private security. Ultimately, that’s a question for the individual companies, as 

ever instructions they give to their masters in the event of coming across piratical attacks. But 

manoeuvre and communication rather than stopping at the first shot would be my advice.19

That said, and in part because the use of private security guards to repel pirates m

under certain circumstances be illegal—they have no legal authority to act in ano

country’s waters—it will frequently be up to navies to respond to the piracy thre

Naval Responses to Piracy

Many of the case studies here show how difficult it is for individual ships, or even

states, to fight piracy effectively, as it is a transnational crime. One of the most co

effective options is to get help from the international community. Illustrations in

Britain’s efforts to assist Morocco and U.S. assistance to Nigeria. A more recent e

ple of bilateral naval cooperation was the short-term agreement in 2002 between 

U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy to guard American merchant ships carrying “high

value” goods through the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean: “According to the 

eral arrangement, U.S. naval ships patrolled the seas in Southeast Asia, while the 

Navy concentrated on the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.” 20 However, it is

extremely unlikely that such a bilateral arrangement could be maintained for ver

over the objections of coastal states.

The historical examples in this work show quite clearly that international cooper

is the best way to manage a piracy threat if it cannot be contained on land. This c

done in a variety of ways, from state building to international naval patrols, to co

But international participation is crucial, since pirates can otherwise exploit nati

and sea boundaries to evade pursuit and capture. Naval forces need first of all to 

dinate their surveillance and patrol efforts to detect and capture pirates and ultim

to deter piracy.

Presuming the existence of at least fragmentary maritime surveillance systems in 

maritime jurisdictions at the national level, if a ship security alert is received, wh

pens? In theory, the coastal state makes an appropriate response, with a coast gua

vessel, its marine police, or its navy. But in practice this does not always occur.

Shipmasters often do not report attacks for up to ten hours, by which time, from 

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ship so long after the fact might waste time and resources.

If the coastal state learns of an attack in progress and is willing to respond, can its vessels get to the merchant ship in time? Unless the ship is being hijacked, the pirates will

be on board only a short time, and again, responding by sending a ship may achieve lit

tle. The coastal state would have to base its forces near piracy hot spots, but if it did, it

is more than likely that pirates would attack shipping even farther away. The final theo

retical option is to keep response vessels always at sea, but this is very expensive.

If a response vessel is dispatched and comes upon the merchant ship while the attack is

under way what can it do? If it is a warship, it will have to dispatch sailors in a fast boat

either to seize the pirate vessel or retake the merchant ship. Helicopters might also be

used to rappel sailors onto the deck of the captured ship. The sailors would have to be

armed and be given explicit rules of engagement, so they know the bounds within

which they can proceed. In contrast, if the response vessel belongs to a coast guard or

marine police force, it may be small enough to put its party on board the pirate vessel

or merchant ship directly.

Personnel of any response vessel must operate under the domestic law of the coastal

state, so that they can take the alleged pirates into custody and return them to shore to

face legal action. This aspect is often forgotten in debates about external forces intervening in another state’s waters—they have no legal jurisdiction there and may

therefore be committing a crime themselves. Increased awareness of the maritime

domain is required.

Increasing Maritime Domain Awareness

How serious is piracy? The U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael

Mullen, has asserted that “piracy is a global threat to security because of its deepening

ties to international criminal networks, smuggling of hazardous cargoes, and disruption of vital commerce.”21 But most regional countries affected by piracy do not see it

as a major criminal or terrorist threat, especially if it is international shipping that is at

risk, not their own. Consequently, their efforts to halt piracy have to date been limited.

For many coastal states, the annual cost of controlling piracy outweighs direct

economic losses from it.

Global trade is predicted to increase over the next decade, so there will be a requirement for greater levels of maritime safety and security. This especially applies to the

rapidly growing seaborne trade of developing countries now joining the export-led

industrial revolution in Asia. If the international community commits its collective

navies to antipiracy operations, a number of operational issues will need to be

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surveillance system, agreed rules of engagement for intercepting and boarding su

vessels, and legal powers to apprehend suspected pirates for eventual court action

Clearly, maritime surveillance is the key to gaining a better understanding of wha

happening on the oceans, but currently, systems are not integrated within each c

let alone at regional or global levels. A country’s navy may have a “common oper

picture” (to use the U.S. term) of where its forces are at sea, and, if tasked with th

responsibility, may have an idea where merchant ships are; if further tasked with

coastal surveillance, it may know what other types of vessels are in its waters. Dep

ments of transport or shipping should know what international shipping is in th

waters or proposes to enter their nations’ ports; flag states should know the locat

all vessels in their registries. To generate a comprehensive maritime surveillance p

ture, all these disparate “inputs” must be integrated.

Such integration is not easy. Naval information is often classified, while internati

shipping data are often held as confidential. Reporting protocols invariably use d

ent computer systems, with incompatible software. Then there are issues of priva

What, if any, information can be released to third parties? Who might be allowed 

to consolidated data? How are countries grappling with these issues? Canada and 

tralia operate joint intelligence centers that fuse information from a variety of so

into one comprehensive picture. Canada does this in two “marine security opera

centres,” while in Australia the Border Protection Command’s Australian Maritim

Information Fusion Centre, using the Australian Maritime Identification System

lects, collates, stores, analyzes, and redistributes information related to the detect

tracking, and threat assessment of vessels operating in or approaching Australian

waters. The center tracks ship identity, crew, cargo, location, course, speed, and

intended port of call. Both the Canadian and Australian systems are constrained 

disclosure of information by national privacy legislation.

The United States has promulgated a “maritime domain awareness” (MDA) polic

ing to “wire” every ship so that it can be identified and tracked throughout its jou

as is done in global air traffic control.22 MDA aims to require each ship at sea to e

signal identifying its name, country of origin, and route. This would permit “sur

lance of activities at sea” and “intelligence-gathering on the background to the m

ments and presences identified.”23 When a ship is attacked by pirates, an emergen

signal would report its location and what kind of danger it faced.

The 2005 U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security had as its stated goal to “p

mote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while preventing 

or illegal acts within the maritime domain,” including the Taiwan and Malacca st

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“piracy, international criminal activities such as illegal immigration and drug

trafficking, and environmental degradation.”24 In 2007, all three U.S. sea services

issued A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which calls for “significantly

increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA)” with the goal

of “promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation,

drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”25

While these statements concern domestic American national and maritime security

issues, the long-term goal of MDA is to expand its capacities to numerous countries.

What the United States proposes in these policies is not new to the international shipping industry, which has been monitoring the locations of its vessels for many years.

For example, under SOLAS, international ships of greater than five hundred gross tons

must be fitted with an Automatic Identification System, which allows for the identifica

tion and tracking of these vessels. Equipped ships can exchange information—including identification, position, course, and speed—with other nearby ships and traffic

systems in congested waters and ports. However, the security benefits of AIS are mixed

In theory, a hijacked ship could be traced anywhere in the world using AIS; in practice,

however, because the signal is transmitted to everyone, any vessel nearby can locate the

transmitting ship. There have been instances in the Malacca Strait, and possibly off

Somalia, where pirates have used a ship’s AIS signal to locate it; accordingly, some ships

switch off their AISs in dangerous waters, defeating the whole purpose.

In further development of the ISPS Code, in 2008 the IMO introduced the Long Range

Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system. When fully implemented this satellitebased system, to be fitted on all SOLAS-compliant ships, will enable countries to identify and locate all vessels transiting their waters, particularly those intending to enter

port. It has already been accepted that flag states will be able to access the data from

their ships anywhere in the world, while port states will be able to do so following declaration by a ship of intention to enter an LRIT-designated port. Debate continues as to

whether and when a coastal state would be given access to this information for ships

transiting its waters but not intending to enter one of its ports.

It is important to remember that these automated systems and the plethora of stations

monitoring them and sharing their data will generate information only on legitimate,

convention-compliant shipping; they will not be recording the locations of pirate vessels. Therefore, other means are required to identify pirates. Often, this is managed by

fusing data from coastal radars or aerial surveillance, sometime satellites, with those on

legitimate shipping; the anomalies are suspicious vessels and need to be monitored. Bu

even so, very small craft cannot generally be “seen” by satellite or be detected by coastal

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sary or achievable. Should instead the aim be to encourage the creation of robust

regional systems, linking countries under IMO arrangements or port-state memo

dums of understanding? Such an approach would necessarily increase the monit

roles of port and coastal states.

Given some adequate arrangement for tracking and monitoring international sh

the next problem is appropriate multinational response to reported pirate attack

2006, Admiral Mullen announced a plan to create a “thousand-ship navy,” subseq

renamed the “Global Maritime Partnership,” to promote global maritime securit

cooperating to confront common problems such as arms smuggling and terroris

piracy, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and other organized criminal activity

not clear that the rest of the world agrees with this “threat assessment,” however 

evident from an American perspective. But this reluctance does not negate the ge

thrust of increased naval cooperation and the benefits that may accrue from it.

The priority now given to naval cooperation is actually nothing new; it is a conti

tion of the practice evolved over centuries, and it is based on existing, long-term

regional arrangements.27 Various structures already exist for naval cooperation, r

from bilateral arrangements to such regional, multilateral protocols as the Five P

Defence Arrangements, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and the newly cre

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, as well as formal treaty obligations under NATO

Implicit in many of these arrangements are harmonization or standardization of 

cedures, interoperability where possible, joint exercises and training, personnel

exchanges, and visits. All these activities serve to enhance naval capacity and skill 

while encouraging countries to operate together.

However, asymmetry of forces could be a problem. Historically, pirates and priva

were likely to have ships of the same sizes and capabilities as the merchant vessel

were attacking and the naval forces that responded to them. But now there are m

disparities in characteristics among merchant vessels, warships, and the craft—o

very small, fast boats—commonly used by pirates. It is not clear that naval vessel

any longer the appropriate platforms for response; in many cases they are too lar

their weapons are inappropriate to the situation. Warships (which can stay on sta

longer than other vessels and have superior firepower) may be more appropriate 

deterrence of piracy than interception. Perhaps for this reason, many states are cr

coast guards to protect their rights and interests in their EEZs. The recent focus o

piracy off Somalia shows what can happen when a “failed” state loses control ove

sovereign waters.

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The Situation off Somalia

The current situation off Somalia shows how complex antipiracy suppression operations can become. Hijackings are frequent in these waters, one of the world’s busiest

and most important sea-lanes. During 2008, Somali pirates reportedly attacked 111

ships and were able to seize forty-two.28 In June 2008, the United Nations Security

Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against pirates in Somalia’s

territorial waters. It gave warships the power to intervene in piracy attacks on the high

seas under UNCLOS, but warships must work with local law enforcement—Somali

authorities, in this case—for subsequent prosecution.

The need for this multinational force was dramatically illustrated in September 2008

when pirates hijacked the Ukrainian cargo ship Faina off the central coast of Somalia.

What commanded international attention was not the ship’s crew but its cargo: thirtythree Russian battle tanks and other heavy weapons, nominally intended for the Kenyan army but probably destined for southern Sudan. U.S., Russian, and British warships surrounded the Ukrainian vessel, and NATO antipiracy patrols escorted UN food

aid shipments.

Since Resolution 1772, adopted on 20 August 2007, the Security Council has passed

many resolutions dealing with piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. On 7

October 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1838, calling upon states

interested in the security of maritime activities to “fight piracy on the high seas off the

coast of Somalia by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft.”29

The Security Council has not traditionally drawn a clear distinction between piracy

and armed robbery, condemning both activities. Yet in Resolution 1816 it decided that

states cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia may enter the

territorial waters of Somalia for “repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in

a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy

under relevant international law,” and “use, within the territorial waters of Somalia[,] . . . all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.”30 States acting within territorial waters to combat piracy could draw their lawful authority from

this resolution, even though such action is not supported by UNCLOS.

It is also notable that Resolution 1838 calls upon states “interested in the security of

maritime activities to take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas.”31 By

contrast, article 101 of UNCLOS states that it is a “duty to co-operate in the repression

of piracy” and requires “all states,” not just those with particular commercial interests,

to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy. The Security

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stakes in maritime security to fight piracy off Somalia actively.

To date, the Security Council resolutions have been ineffective. Even as an intern

armada surrounded Faina, pirates attacked three other vessels in Somali waters. I

ticular, on 16 November 2008 pirates seized the very large crude carrier (VLCC) 

Star, releasing it only after receiving a three-million-dollar ransom. This incident

caused quite a shock to the shipping industry, since this was the first VLCC hijac

ransom and had reportedly been located by the pirates through its AIS signal. Sir

Star sat off the Somali coast surrounded by warships, but no navy had the author

recapture the ship. The ship was released in January 2009, only after the owners p

the ransom. The inadequacy of international laws regulating piracy means that c

tured alleged Somali pirates have either been set free or sent to Kenya for trial, sin

there is no legal system in Somalia that can try them.

Embarrassingly, the Sirius Star attack occurred when a large number of warships 

in those waters precisely to prevent such a thing. These naval forces are acting un

UN Security Council resolution, but there is no unified command plan. In early 

ary 2009 it was announced that Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) would be c

to conduct antipiracy operations. It has been given authority to act in Somali wa

no fewer than four Security Council resolutions, plus agreements with Kenya to p

cute any pirates captured.32

Somali piracy has created an unprecedented international response, including sh

from the United States, Europe, India, Australia, Japan, Russia, China, and Malay

For example, on 8 April 2009, Somali pirates hijacked the U.S.-flagged ship Maer

bama and took ship captain Richard Phillips hostage. Four days later, Navy SEAL

sharpshooters from the USS Bainbridge killed three pirates in a successful nightti

rescue.33 The Somali pirates were clearly not deterred by the U.S. Navy, and on 18

November 2009 attacked Maersk Alabama again, but this time were fought off by 

vate guards armed with guns and a high-decibel sonic emitter. China has also sen

Frigates and a supply ship to the Horn of Africa, and has pledged to regain contr

the cargo ship De Xin Hai, which was seized by Somali pirates on 19 October 200

According to the International Maritime Bureau, of the 359 reported attacks or

attempted attacks so far this year, 195 could be attributed to Somali pirates.34 The

developments show the pressing need for a Global Maritime Partnership.

However, patrol areas are vast, and the fundamental question remains: Should th

waters be patrolled, or should the merchant ships be convoyed? That is, should th

ships themselves be protected, not the ocean? Under international law, warships 

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gives approval; it was this very issue that resulted in the 1856–60 Sino-British Arrow

War. At present, some shipping lines have decided to reroute their traffic away from the

Somali coast by sending them around the Cape of Good Hope, adding considerably to

costs and causing extensive delays in delivery.

While external powers are deciding on whether to commit navies to the Gulf of Aden,

shipowners are reportedly negotiating ransoms. Most often, shipowners bargain with

the pirates over their ransom demands and then eventually pay—meaning the pirates

win. This success merely motivates others to join their ranks. The root problem—a

lawless state, in the case of Somalia—not only continues but may grow worse.

Responding to Maritime Crime and Piracy in the Twenty-first Century

Piracy has existed for as long as people have used the sea. National navies were initially

created as a method for managing piracy. Today, coast guards and marine police may

also be involved.

Ultimately, successful antipiracy measures require flag states and coastal/port states to

be willing and able to take action. A crime against a ship on the high seas is subject to

the jurisdiction of the flag state, according to its own criminal laws. An attack on a ship

exercising the right of passage in territorial seas is a crime under the laws of the coastal

state, which needs to seize the attacking vessel and arrest the offenders. Meanwhile, an

attack against a ship alongside in port, at anchor in port, or anchored in internal water

is within the jurisdiction of the port state, even if a foreign ship is involved.

Almost every country has made maritime piracy and sea robbery a crime, and numerous intergovernmental and industry initiatives have urged states to adopt antipiracy

measures. Criminalization alone, however, has not solved the problem. States have been

reluctant to search for pirates for numerous reasons, including the cost of antipiracy

patrols, the suspicions of neighboring countries, and the persistence of unsettled territorial claims. By contrast, modern pirates may be highly mobile, and can be equipped

with sophisticated navigational equipment and powerful weapons.

Despite these difficulties, several antipiracy measures are in place, including improved

ship registration and identification systems (such as ShipLoc); the IMB’s Piracy

Reporting Center, which has been supplemented by such regional antipiracy agreements as ReCAAP; and coordinated antipiracy patrols like MALSINDO. In many

regions, such as the Malacca Strait, coastal states have made fighting piracy a priority

and have achieved substantial progress.

Success in piracy suppression will ultimately require coordinated efforts by states and

shipowners. Almost all the many proposals for international cooperation are voluntary

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foreseeable future, therefore, maritime security advocates will need to remain fir

their commitments to a comprehensive range of policies—national and multinat

on land and at sea—if they hope to control piracy.

The international community can increase cooperation in a number of areas to m

age piracy. It can ensure that the ISPS Code is enforced by flag states and port sta

can create a global surveillance system for international shipping. It can ensure t

ships can alert authorities if attacked. It can ensure that piracy alerts are promptl

reported to the appropriate flag-state and port-state authorities. It can ensure th

maritime forces have the legal authority to respond and are prepared to do so wh

necessary. It can encourage affected countries to enact domestic legislation unde

which pirates can be tried. However, when these efforts fail, as they clearly have o

Somalia, naval force will inevitably be called upon as the weapon of last resort.

Notes

1. Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern

History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian

Studies, 2006), p. 159.

2. The United States holds the view that a

country’s EEZ is still “international waters,”

but not all countries agree with this interpretation. The 1 April 2001 collision of a U.S.

EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese

fighter jet is just one example of how these

differing views can lead to tension.

3. Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the

Indo-Pacific Region, Papers in Australian

Maritime Affairs (Canberra: Sea Power

Centre–Australia, 2008).

4. Warwick Stanley, “Pirates Attack Cattle

Ship Bound for Western Australia,”

Couriermail.com, 11 June 2008, available at

www.news.com.au/.

5. Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise, p. 58.

6. Dian H. Murray, Pirates of the South China

Coast, 1790–1810 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford

Univ. Press, 1987), p. 154.

7. Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and

Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, IISS Adelphi Paper 388 (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 39.

8. United Nations, Review of Maritime 

port 2008 (New York: Conference on 

and Development, 2008), pp. xiii, 33

9. Richard Halloran, “Pirates Off, Perch

Washington Times, 23 November 200

10. Indonesia and Malaysia have not rati

ReCAAP.

11. Guo Xinning, Anti-terrorism, Maritim

rity, and ASEAN-China Cooperation: 

nese Perspective, Trends in Southeast 

Series 15 (2005), p. 18.

12. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “To Make Sea 

Transparent,” Washington Times, 30 S

ber 2008, p. 19.

13. “Advice to Masters,” ICC Commercia

Services, www.icc-ccs.org/.

14. Ibid., “Securing Your Ship.”

15. Roger Villar, Piracy Today: Robbery a

lence at Sea since 1980 (London: Con

Maritime, 1985), p. 67.

16. “Securing Your Ship.”

17. Thomas Timlin, The Use of SOLAS S

curity Alert Systems, Working Paper 

(Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of 

national Studies, 2008), pp. 3, 4, 11, 

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Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (New

York: Dutton, 2002), pp. 106–107.

19. David Osler, “‘We Are Not the Solution’ to

Piracy, Says Somalia Coalition Navy Chief,”

Lloyd’s List, 25 September 2008.

20. Vijay Sakhuja, “Sea Piracy in South Asia,”

in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global

Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 32.

21. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime

Terrorism, p. 85, citing Admiral Mullen’s remarks to the Seventeenth International

Seapower Symposium.

22. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., The National

Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness

(Washington, D.C.: October 2005), available

at www.dhs.gov/. For MDA generally, see

Steven C. Boraz, “Maritime Domain Awareness: Myths and Realities,” Naval War College

Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 137–46.

23. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime

Terrorism, p. 74.

24. Bernard D. Cole, “Clipper Ships to Carriers:

U.S. Maritime Strategy in Asia,” in Asia Looks

Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy, ed.

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 60–62.

25. Reprinted in Naval War College Review 61,

no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 7–19, available at

www.usnwc.edu/press. The quoted phrases

are found on pages 17 and 13, respectively,

of the document as reprinted (emphasis

original).

Terrorism, p. 74.

27. Chris Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership: Implications for the Royal Australian

Navy, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs

24 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre–Australia,

2008), p. 7.

28. “Pirates Seize Two Ships off Somalia,” Boston

Globe, 27 March 2009.

29. UN Security Council Resolution 1838, 7 Oc

tober 2008, S/RES/1838 (2008).

30. UN Security Council Resolution 1816,

2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008).

31. In Resolution 1816, the language used by th

Security Council was “States interested in

the use of commercial maritime routes off

the coast of Somalia.”

32. Cdr. James Kraska and Capt. Brian Wilson,

“Fighting Piracy: International Coordination Is Key to Countering Modern-Day Free

booters,” Armed Forces Journal, available at

www.armedforcesjournal.com/.

33. Coincidentally, Bainbridge was named after 

veteran of both Barbary wars. Jay Bahadur

has concluded that off Somalia “there were

68 successful pirate hijackings in 2009, com

pared with 49 one year earlier.” “Heroes in a

Land of Pirates,” New York Times, 4 January

2010.

34. Walter Saltmarsh, “Pirates Widen Range,

Straining Naval Patrols,” New York Times, 19

November 2009.

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About the Contributors

Robert J. Antony: PhD in Chinese history, University of Hawai‘i (1988); associate 

fessor of Asian and maritime history, University of Macau. Author of Like Froth F

ing on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China

(University of California, Berkeley, Institute for East Asian Studies, China Monog

Series, 2003) and Pirates in the Age of Sail (W. W. Norton, 2007). He is currently w

ing on a book on the origins of modern piracy on the South China coast from 18

1937 and on a documentary history of the pirate Zhang Baozai in the Canton De

Sam Bateman: Senior fellow, Maritime Security Program, S. Rajaratnam School o

International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Author or e

of numerous publications, including Rothwell and Bateman, eds., Navigational R

and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (2000); Bateman and Bergin, Future

Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Security (2005); Bateman, 

and Raymond, Safety and Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: An Agend

Action (2006); and Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, eds., Lloyd’s MIU Handbo

Maritime Security (2008).

Penny Campbell: Commander, Royal Australian Navy, and currently Command L

Officer to Border Protection Command, Australia. Author of “Indonesian Archip

Sealanes” in Australian Maritime Issues 2005, edited by Gregory P. Gilbert and Ro

Davitt; and “Hot Pursuit and Australian Fisheries Law” in Australian Maritime Is

2006, edited by Andrew Forbes and Michelle Lovi.

Bruce A. Elleman: Research professor, Maritime History Department, U.S. Naval 

College, with an MA (1984) and PhD (1993) from the History Department, Colu

University; MS (1985) in international history, London School of Economics; an

in national security and strategic studies, with distinction (2004), U.S. Naval War 

lege. Recent books include Modern Chinese Warfare: 1795–1989 (New York: Rout

2001); Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective, edit

with Christopher Bell (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Naval Blockades and Seapowe

Strategies and Counter-strategies, 1805–2005, edited, with S. C. M. Paine (London

Routledge, 2006); Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Nor

Indonesia, Newport Paper 28 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007); and 

Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom, edited, w

Sarah Paine (London: Routledge, 2008).

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Master’s degrees in defense studies (1989), maritime policy (1998), and public adminis

tration (2001). Visiting senior fellow at the Australian National Center for Ocean

Resources and Security at the University of Wollongong and research fellow at the Cen

ter for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada. Author of Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia’s Exclusive

Economic Zone (2002) and editor of The Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and

Shipping (2003); Australian Maritime Issues 2006 (2007), Australian Maritime Issues

2007 (2008); Sea Power: Challenges Old and New (Sydney: Halstead, 2007); Asian Energy

Security: Cooperation in the Malacca Strait (Canberra: Sea Power Centre–Australia, 2008)

and Australia and Its Maritime Interests: At Home and in the Region (Canberra: Sea

Power Centre–Australia, 2008).

Charles W. Koburger, Jr.: Captain, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (Ret.), master’s degrees in

history (Niagara) and political science (Oregon) and graduate of the Armed Forces

Staff College. Research fellow at London Polytechnic (navigation systems) and a forme

captain of infantry. Author since retirement of over fifty articles for professional journals and sixteen books on maritime affairs, including Sea Power in the Falklands

(Praeger, 1983) and The Cyrano Fleet: France and Its Navy, 1940–42 (Praeger, 1989),

which was translated into French.

Andrew Lambert: Laughton Professor of Naval History, Department of War Studies,

King’s College London, with an MA in war studies (1979) and PhD (1982) from King’s

College London. Recent books include The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy agains

Russia 1853–1856 (Manchester, 1990); The Last Sailing Battlefleet: Maintaining Naval

Mastery 1815–1850 (London, 1991); The Foundations of Naval History: Sir John

Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession (London, 1998); War at Sea in

the Age of Sail (London, 2000); Nelson: Britannia’s God of War (London, 2004); Admirals: The Men Who Made Britain Great (London, 2008); and Franklin: Tragic Hero of

Polar Navigation (London, 2009).

Samuel Pyeatt Menefee: Senior associate, Center for National Security Law; Maury Fellow, Center for Oceans Law and Policy; and adjunct professor, World Maritime University. Author of Contemporary Piracy and International Law (Institute of Marine Law,

University of Cape Town, 1995) and Trends in Maritime Violence (Jane’s Information

Group, 1996). IMB Fellow of the International Chamber of Commerce–International

Maritime Bureau (London), fellow of the Regional Piracy Center (Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia), and formerly chair of the Maritime Law Association’s Working Party on

Piracy and rapporteur of the Comité Maritime International’s Joint International

Working Group on Uniformity of the Law of Piracy and Maritime Violence.

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European Union with ten years of work experience in global conflict areas. Offic

the Norwegian military in numerous NATO and UN peacekeeping missions. Mas

degrees (1993 and 2006) from the Graduate School of International Studies at th

versity of Birmingham, one specializing in defense and security and one specializ

political risk analysis and religions’ role in global politics. Founder and chief exec

of Bergen Risk Solutions, a risk-management consultancy, which publishes the

monthly Niger Delta Security Report and quarterly Nigeria Maritime Security Rev

Author of several articles on the Gulf of Guinea security situation for Scandinavi

and Gas Magazine and presenter on shipping and geopolitical risk at Oslo Mariti

Security Seminar (October 2007) and Oslo Shipping Forum (June 2008).

Catherine Zara Raymond: Associate at the Corbett Center for Maritime Policy St

based at the Defence Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff Co

Shrivenham. PhD student at King’s College London, writing her thesis on Islami

calization in the United Kingdom. Previously worked as an analyst for the securi

sultancy Control Risks in Singapore and as an associate research fellow at the Ins

of Defence and Strategic Studies, also in Singapore. Coeditor and contributing au

of the volume Best of Times, Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

(World Scientific, 2005) and a policy paper, Safety and Security in the Malacca an

gapore Straits (IDSS, 2006). Articles published in the Harvard Asia Quarterly, Ma

Studies Journal, Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Journal of the Austra

Naval Institute, Straits Times, and a number of other publications. Latest papers w

published in the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence and in an edited volum

Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge).

David Rosenberg: Professor of political science, Middlebury College, Vermont, an

iting fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change in the Research Sch

Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra. Regi

editor for the South China Sea in the WWW Virtual Library of Asian Studies, www

.southchinasea.org/. Recent publications include “Dire Straits: Competing Secur

orities in the South China Sea,” Japan Focus (March 2005); “Managing the Resou

the China Seas: China’s Bilateral Fisheries Agreements with Japan, South Korea, a

Vietnam,” Japan Focus (August 2005); “ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Pr

pects,” review, China Journal (July 2006); “Maritime Security in the South China 

Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities,” coauthored with Christopher Ch

Center for Defence and Strategic Studies, Research School of Pacific and Asian St

Australian National University, Ocean Development and International Law 39, no

(January–February, 2008); and “Fisheries Management in the South China Sea,” 

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Sea (Routledge, 2008).

Robert F. Turner: Cofounder and associate director of the Center for National Security

Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, where he teaches seminars in advanced

national security law. Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the

Naval War College and distinguished lecturer at the U.S. Military Academy at West

Point. Author or editor of more than fifteen volumes, including the law school casebook National Security Law (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic, 2005); The Real Lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-five Years after the Fall of Saigon, edited,

with John Norton Moore (Carolina Academic, 2002); To Oppose Any Foe: The Legacy of

U.S. Intervention in Vietnam, edited, with Ross A. Fisher and John Norton Moore

(Carolina Academic, 2006); and The Jefferson-Hemings Controversy: Report of a Commission of Scholars (Carolina Academic, forthcoming).

Gary E. Weir: Chief Historian, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda,

Maryland. Specialist in undersea warfare, intelligence tradecraft and collection, and

related technologies. Author of Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and

American Submarine Construction, 1940–1961 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998); An

Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment

(Texas A&M University Press, 2001); and Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian

Submarines That Fought the Cold War, with Walter Boyne (Basic Books and Perseus,

2003). Founder and editor of the International Journal of Naval History.

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Index

11 September 2001 14, 79, 84, 92, 110, 113, 202

Abd al Qadir 176

Abd el Malek 187

Abhyankar, Captain Jayant 90, 232

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 72, 84, 145

Abuja 195, 200

Aceh 74–75, 114–15, 141–42

Acorn 55

Actaeon 55

Adalbert, Admiral Prince 186

Adams, John 160, 162–63, 165, 170n54

Aden 51, 209

Aden, Gulf of 156, 207–209, 216, 218, 233, 240

Adeniyi, Rear Admiral Peter Shola 200

Admiralty See Royal Navy

Admiralty courts v–vi, 3–6

Aegean Sea 177

Afghanistan 101, 151n4

Africa vi, 13, 15–16, 42, 80–81, 85, 155–221

passim, 224, 230, 239

See also East Africa; North Africa; West Africa

Africa Command (AFRICOM) See United

States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

African Partnership Station 203

Afweyne, Mohamed Abdi 211–12

Agricultural and Allied Workers Union of

Nigeria (AAWUN) 196

agriculture See farmers

Ajibade, Captain Mufutau 201

Alauddin Bahini Gang 129

Alboran Island 174

Alger, Horatio 48

Algeria 15, 156, 173–74, 176, 180, 185, 

Algiers 158, 161, 166, 168–70

Aliya 126

al-Qa‘ida 110, 145, 214

Amazon 124

Amazon River 29

Amile, Akinshola 195

Amoy 37, 47

amphetamine-type stimulants (ATSs) 

methamphetamines

‘Amr ibn al-‘As 1

Anambas Islands 66

Andaman Sea 109, 141

Anding Gate 58

Anglo-Dutch Wars 4

Anglo-Moroccan Treaty (1856) 185, 18

Anqing 60

Antigua vi

Anti-piracy Coast Guard Program 87

Anzac 68

A’Pak 43

Arabian Gulf 156

See also Persian Gulf

Arabian Sea 85, 156, 214

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Argentina 9

Argus 166

Ariel 129

Arktis Crystal 122

Arleigh Burke 213–14

Arrow 51, 54

Arrow War 13, 42–43, 51–63, 240

See also Opium War, Second

ASEAN Chiefs of National Police meetings

148

Asia 19, 50n17, 52, 80–81, 84–85, 87, 113, 207,

215, 219, 221n36, 234

See also Central Asia; East Asia; South Asia;

Southeast Asia

Asia Pacific and Africa Inter-Regional

Cooperation 85

Asia-Pacific 73, 79, 140, 219, 224

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) 87, 102–103, 116, 148–49, 230

Atlantic Ocean 6, 156, 177–80, 182, 204, 240

Auckland, First Lord of the Admiralty 177–79

Australia vi–vii, 10, 51, 67–70, 73, 85, 88, 97,

99, 103, 105, 208, 217–18, 226, 235, 239

Austria 62

Austria-Hungary 62

Automatic Identification System (AIS) 87–88,

111, 117, 230, 236, 239

Azanen Bay 174, 185

Badawi, Abdullah Ahmad 113

Bahrain 215–16

Bai Ling 41

Bainbridge 239, 242n33

Baki Billah Bahini Gang 132

Baltic Sea 184

Bangkok 66, 72, 74

139, 141, 144, 225, 230

Barbary Coast v, 157–71

Barbary pirates v, 157–71, 208, 224

Baring, Sir Francis 179–80, 186

Barisal Division 121, 125–29, 132

Barre, General Muhammad Siad 209, 211

Bashshu Bahini Gang 128

Basra 214

Batam Island 74, 87, 226

Bayelsa 194, 196, 198, 201, 205n3, 206n19

Beijing 37, 49, 53–58, 60–62, 100–101, 106

Beijing Convention 58

Belgium 62

Bellamy, Samuel “Black Sam” v

Bengal, Bay of 96, 126–28, 130–32, 233

Benin 192

Benin River 196

Benvalia 122

Bergen Risk Solutions 196, 205n1

Betsy 158

Bhola 126, 129, 131

Biafra 195

Bias Bay 44–47, 50n25

Bittern 55

Black Flag 98

black market 53, 70, 84, 102, 112

Black Sea 230

blimps 25

Blue Sea 124

“boat people” 14, 97–108, 225–26

Boggs, Eli 42

Bomba 166

Bonaparte, Napoleon 8

Bonhomme Richard 162

Bonny River 196

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Borneo 2, 65, 67–68, 76, 145

Botoya Point 185

Bowring, Sir John 54

Britain See Great Britain

Bruce, James (Lord Elgin) 54

Brunei 66

Bu Gafar 174–75, 183, 187

Bugis pirates 2

Bunga Mawar 123

Burma 96, 143

See also Myanmar

Busan 80

Bush, George W. 202–203

Caesar, Julius v

Cai Qian 37, 39

Cai Qian Ma 39, 48

Cala Tramontana 76, 185

Calabar 200

Calcutta 55

Caldera 42

California 42, 88

Cambodia 14, 34, 66, 70, 96–97, 100, 140, 143

Cameroon 156, 192

Canada 97, 105, 235

cannabis 140

Canton 38, 40–41, 43–44, 47–48, 52–55

Cao Bang 101

Cape Lopez 192

Cape of Good Hope 51, 156, 240

Cape Palmas 192

Cape Tres Forcas 174–76, 181, 185–86

Caribbean Sea v–vi, 7, 208

Carter, Jimmy 100–101

Cathcart, James Leander 159, 162, 164–65

Celebes Sea 68, 96, 118, 146–48

Central Asia 151n4

Central Command (CENTCOM) See U

States Central Command (CENTCOM

Ceuta 174

Ceylon See Sri Lanka

Chaozhou 38, 47

Chaumont 73

Cherry 201 75

Chettinad Glory 123

Cheung Chau Islands 47

Cheung Son 35–36, 47, 73

Chief of Naval Operations 216, 234

Chile 9, 42

Chilean Express 124

China 2, 12–13, 16, 34–63, 66, 71, 73, 8

88, 96–108, 116, 139–40, 143, 192, 203, 

218–19, 223–26, 230, 239, 241

Chittagong 15, 96, 121–36, 225

Chittagong Port Authority (CPA) 124

choke points 81–82, 216

Cholon 103

Christians 52, 69, 166, 187

Chu-apoo 42

cigarette smuggling 84, 137, 139, 142

civil war 16, 27, 45–46, 51–63, 195, 199

Clinton, Hillary 32n34

coalitions See naval coalitions

cocaine 140

“Cod Wars” 9–10

Cold War 73, 209, 223

Coloane Island 47

Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 207–

212–14

Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 218, 

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157–58, 160, 162, 164, 174, 208, 220n16, 226,

234

Communism 45–46, 49, 102

Congress (U.S.) 113, 161–63, 168, 169n3,

170n39, 170n42, 203

Constellation 166

Constitution 167

consulate (U.S.) 159

Container Security Initiative (CSI) 87

Continental Congress 8, 158, 161

continental shelf 9–10

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

(SUA) 89

convoy system 7, 43, 51, 54, 233, 239–40

Cooke, George 43

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, A

236

Copenhagen School of Strategic Studies

153n29

Corsicana 71

Cotabato 140

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Comecon) 99

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia

Pacific (CSCAP) 149, 152–53

Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) 214

Crane 68–69

Crimean War 185

Cruiser’s Act 6

Cuba 100

Cuthbert Young 173

Cyprus 129

Dagu Repulse 56–57

Dai Hong Dan 213

Daihung 123

Dampier, William 7

Danzig 186

Darwin 99

Davis, Sir John Francis 52

Dawson legal case 22

De Xin Hai 239

Decatur, Lieutenant Stephen 166, 168

Declaration of Paris 8, 51, 54

decolonization 14, 66, 69

Defoe, Daniel v

Deng Xiaoping 100–101

Denmark 62, 105

Derne 166, 170n54

Dewi Madrim 75

dhows 70, 76, 209–10, 213

diesel smuggling 139, 142, 151n2

Dokubo-Asari, Alhaji Mugahid 198–99,

206n20

Dona Ramona 145

Dongresilli, Bernard 3

Dragon 186

Drake, Sir Francis v

droit 5, 6

drug running 46, 70, 74, 83–84, 86, 139–41,

146, 193, 223, 236–37

Drummond Hay, John 176–80, 182–83, 185,

187

Dubai 72

Dundas, Vice Admiral Sir James 179–82

Dutch See Netherlands, The

Dynamic 129

East Africa 209

East Asia 61, 224

East Indies 65–66

East Timor 217

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economic sanctions 157

ecstasy 140

Egypt 1, 156, 165, 202

El Aolde 210

El Mann 210

Elgin, Lord See Bruce, James (Lord Elgin)

Elizabeth I, Queen 3

Ellen, Eric 11

England See Great Britain

Enterprise 162

environment 11, 15, 25, 85, 88–89, 117, 146,

236

ephedrine 140

Equatorial Guinea 192

Erria Inge 73

Escravos 196

Essaouira See Mogador

Ethiopia 156, 209, 214

Europe v, 2, 7–8, 14–15, 40, 42, 44, 65, 80, 109,

151n4, 157–58, 160–61, 168, 174, 187, 202,

223–24, 239

See also Western Europe

European Command (EUCOM) See United

States European Command (EUCOM)

European Economic Community 229

European Union 80

“Ever Victorious Army” 61

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 10, 28, 85, 89–

90, 92, 146–47, 225, 229, 237, 241n2

Exercise MARITIME SAFARI–LAGOS 2008 202

extraterritoriality 98

Exxon Valdez 193

“Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) patrols 87, 115–16,

148, 230

Faina 238–39

Falkland Islands 51

Far East 67

farmers 193, 227

Faruk Bahini Gang 127–28

Feisty Gas 212

firearms 11, 35, 40–42, 45, 53, 60, 67–7

99, 112, 115, 125–27, 140–41, 145, 147, 

161, 174–75, 197, 201, 210, 214, 231–32

38, 240

fisheries v, 2, 8–11, 15–16, 32, 35–37, 3

46–47, 61, 66–68, 70, 72, 76, 79, 81–83, 

99, 102–105, 107, 112, 125–37, 139, 141

150, 152n14, 174, 193–96, 207–21, 224–

Fishtown 194

Five Power Defence Arrangements 237

floating production storage and offload

vessels (FPSOs) 197, 205n1, 206n19

floating storage and offloading vessels (

197, 205n1

Flora 173, 186

Forbes v

Forcados Export Terminal 198

France 5, 8, 15–16, 20, 51, 55, 58, 62, 65

98, 105, 159, 173–75, 184–85, 188, 208, 

219n2

Free Aceh Movement 72, 75, 115, 140

free trade 82

French Indochina See Vietnam

Fu Tai 74

Fujian Province 36–37, 39–41

Funing 38

Furious 55

Gabon 156, 192

Ganges River 121

Gardiner, General Sir Robert 181, 185

Gaz Lion 123

Gbomo, Jomo 199

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Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea 9,

25, 27, 228

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) See Free Aceh

Movement

Germany 88, 105, 122, 184, 186, 190, 202

Ghana 156, 193

Giap, No Nguyen 102

Gibraltar 15, 162, 173–83, 185, 208

Gibraltar, Strait of 174–75, 187, 225

Giffard, Captain Henry 186

Gladiator 181

Glasgow 217, 220n31

Glasspoole, Richard 40–41

Global Maritime Partnership 237, 239

Global War on Terror (GWOT) 89, 202, 208

globalization 81, 137–38

Golden Age of Piracy 7

Golden Nori 214

Gordon, Charles 63n25

Gortney, Vice Admiral William 218

Grand Canal 53

Grant, General Hope 57

Great Britain v, 3–10, 13, 15–17, 22–23, 42–45,

51–63, 65–67, 69–70, 88, 98, 107, 122, 157–58,

160, 163–64, 173–90, 208–209, 211, 214–15,

217, 238

Great Exhibition (1851) 184–85

Great Yarmouth 5

Greater Sunda Islands 140

Greece 1, 165

Grotius, Hugo 1–2, 20, 23, 31n9

Guangdong Confederation 39–41, 49n13

Guangdong Province 38–41, 52

Guangxi Province 52

Guangzhou See Canton

Guelaya Peninsula 174

Guinea, Gulf of 16, 191–93, 204, 251

Guizhou Province 38

Gulf of Guinea Guard Force 16, 192

Gurkha 213

Habir Gedir subclan 211

Hadi, Ibnu 85

Hai Sin 73

Hainan Island 12, 41–42, 90

Haiphong 100

Hakka 52, 62n4

Han dynasty 37

Hangzhou 53, 60

Hankou 53, 55

Hanoi 98–99, 102

Haque, Nurul 125

Harardhere 16, 212–13, 219

Harris, Steven 220n32

Hart, Robert 60

Harvard Draft Convention on Piracy 19, 23–

27

Hawiye clan 211

Hayes, Bully 43

Hedges, Sir Charles vi

Henry V, King 3

Henry VIII, King 5

heroin 140, 151n4

high seas 1, 9, 11, 15, 21–23, 25–28, 31, 67–69

77, 105, 108, 147, 168, 217, 220, 224–25, 228,

240

Ho Chi Minh 102

Ho Chi Minh City See Saigon

“Hoa” Chinese 97–108

Holland 62

See also Netherlands, The

Honam Point 55

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61, 72, 103

Hong Xiuquan 52, 61

Hope, Admiral James 57, 60

Horn of Africa (HOA) 16, 207–21, 239

Hornet 55, 166–67

Hossain, Shahadat 124

House of Commons 179

Huai Army 60–61

Huang Ting 38

hub ports 71, 80, 84

Hubei Province 38

Hull, Lieutenant Isaac 165

Human Rights Watch 204

Hupeh 46

Hutan Melintang 141

Hymen 173, 187

Iban pirates 2

Ibebuka, Ekene 200, 205

Ibn Qutaibah 129

“ice” See methamphetamines

Iceland 9–10

Ijaws 199, 205

Ilocos Sur 74

Inabukwa 73

India vi, 55, 72, 85, 88, 96, 116, 121, 123, 130–

31, 139–41, 209, 213, 223, 230, 233, 238

Indian Ocean vi, 73, 85, 114, 156, 207–208,

210, 233, 237

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 237

Indonesia vi, 11–13, 35–36, 47, 66–75, 80–82,

85–90, 102, 109–20, 122, 133, 137, 139–43,

145–48, 151n2, 152n14, 152n16, 152n21, 226,

229–30

Industrial Revolution 8, 234

Inflexible 55

International Chamber of Commerce (

10, 207–208, 214, 220n16

International Convention for the Safety 

at Sea (SOLAS) 114, 229

international law 2, 8, 19–32, 105, 108, 

215, 225, 227, 239

International Law Commission (UN) 2

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 

15, 19, 29, 79, 83, 86–87, 90, 109–10, 11

121, 142–43, 152n14, 191, 205, 207–208

212–14, 220, 230–32, 239–40, 250

International Maritime Organization (

10–11, 19, 25, 29, 87–88, 90, 92, 110, 11

43, 148, 201, 216, 220n16, 221n36, 228–

236–37

International Seapower Symposium XV

International Ship and Port Facility Sec

(ISPS) Code 119n8, 143, 191, 229, 231

International Transport Workers Federa

Inventus UAV 216

Iran 151, 156, 215–16

Iranun pirates 2, 17n4

Iraq 84, 86, 156, 163, 202, 208, 214–16

Iron Prince 44

Israel 74

Italy 62, 105, 184, 209

Itu Aba Island 66

Ivory Coast 192

Jakarta 72, 88, 117, 141, 148, 151

Jamaah Islamiah 73, 145

James E. Williams 213

Janus 185–86

Japan 34, 38, 46, 66, 70–72, 80–81, 85, 

98, 105, 113, 116, 141, 213–14, 229–30, 

Java 96, 138, 141

Jay, John 159, 161

Jefferson, Thomas 8, 15, 157–71

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Jiaqing emperor 41

Johnson, Captain Charles v, vii

Joint Revolutionary Council 197

Joint War Committee (JWC) 86–87

Jones, John Paul 162

Joven Emilia 185

“junk piracy” 52

junks 37, 39, 41–46, 52, 54, 61, 70, 76

Kalifornia 152n16

Kalimantan 118, 140

Kampong 81–82, 142

Kangxi emperor 38

Kaohsiung 80

Karachi 51

Karamanli, Hamet 158, 164–66, 168

Karamanli, Yusuf 15, 158, 163–64, 166–68

Karimata Islands 66

Karnaphuli River 121–22

Karya Sentosa 122

Kawsar 125

Kelley Barracks 202

Kenya 156, 219, 229

Khulna Division 121, 129–31, 135

Kidd, William 43

Kismaayo 210

Koei 71

Koh Tang 70

Koizumi, Prime Minister Junichiro 89

Korea 34, 116, 141, 213

See also North Korea; South Korea

Kota Tegap 125

Kowloon 45, 50

Kuala Lumpur 87–88, 110, 117, 148, 151, 213,

230

Kuwait 215–16

Lady’s Captivity among Chinese Pirates, A 42

Laem Chabang 80

Laemthong Glory 122

Lagos 196–97, 200, 202–204

Lai Choi San 46, 48

Lang Son 101

Lantau Island 47

Lao Cai 101

Laos 14, 96–97, 140

Laraiche 180

Lawrence, Thomas Edward (a.k.a. “Lawrence

of Arabia”) 163

Lay, Horatio Nelson 58–60

Lay-Osborn Fleet 58–61, 63n25

Le Ponant 214–15

League of Nations 21–22

Lear, Colonel Tobias 166–67, 170n54

Lebanon 86, 182

Leiden (Leydon) 3

Leizhou Peninsula 41

letters of marque and reprisal 2–6

Li Hongzhang 60

Liberia 71, 191–92, 202

Liberty Spirit 122

Libya 156

Liem Sioe Liong 36

Lilius, Aleko 46

Lin Shuangwen Rebellion 38

Lingga Islands 66

Lively 173

Lloyd’s Market Association 86

Logan, James 7

Lombok Strait 71

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Long Range Identification and Tracking

(LRIT) 236

Lotus legal case 21

Loviot, Fanny 42

Macassar 2

Macau 9, 12–13, 40–44, 46–47

Madeira 179, 181

Madison, James 161–62, 164–65, 167

Maersk Alabama 239

Maheshkhali Island 125

Maine 168

Makassar Strait 72

Malacca Strait vi, 12–14, 19, 30, 31n32, 47, 66,

71–73, 75, 81–88, 96, 107, 109–20, 139–44,

146–48, 152n14, 224–26, 229–31, 233, 235–36,

240

Malay pirates 98

Malayan Emergency 69

Malaysia vi, 12, 35, 66, 68–69, 72–73, 80, 85,

87–89, 96–97, 102–103, 109–20, 137–43, 147–

48, 151n2, 207, 216, 219, 229–30, 239, 241n10

Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO)

patrols 87, 91, 114–15, 148, 230, 240

Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary Lord 186

Malta 176

Malvinas See Falkland Islands

Mammoth Monarch 71

Manado 140

Manchuria 53

Manchus 37–38, 48, 51–63

“Mandate of Heaven” 52

Manila 66, 70–71, 80, 84, 151, 152n16

Manila-men 42, 50

Marblue 130

Mare Liberum 1–2, 20

“Marine Electronic Highway” 91–92

maritime domain awareness (MDA) 23

Martin, Ricky 49

Massachusetts 168

Masum Bahini Gang 132

Mauritius 51

Mayaguez 70

Mayer Doa 127

McCleverty, Commander James 176–7

Mediterranean 15, 156, 162–63, 168, 1

173–75, 177–80, 182, 184, 208, 224, 230

Meghna River 121, 125, 127–29

Melilla 174, 178, 182, 187

Merca 210

methamphetamines 140

Mia, Kalu 125

Miao Uprising 38

Middle East 81, 85, 151n4

Mindanao 118–19, 139–40

Ming dynasty 36–38, 48

Mirs Bay 47

Mitee, Ledum 205

Mobile Bay 217, 220n32

Mogadishu 208, 210–11, 213–14

Mogador 177–79

money laundering 46, 90, 140

Mongla 132

Mongolia 53

Monroe, James 161

Montauban, General Cousin de 57

Montemayor, Isabelo 67

Moon Bird 122

Moro Liberation Front 73

Moroccan Jews 185

Morocco 15, 156, 158, 173–90, 233

Moros 67

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Moscow 100–101

Motaleb Bahini Gang 131–32

Mount Thistle 52

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND) 197–99, 206nn19–20

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni

People (MOSOP) 193, 205

Mugdug 211, 220n13

Mullen, Admiral Michael 16, 216, 219, 234,

237, 242n21

multinationals 58, 194, 201

Muslims 16, 69, 73, 203, 205

mutiny 11, 24, 26, 165

Myanmar 12, 88, 121, 139–40, 143

See also Burma

Nagasaki Spirit 73

Namoa 44

Nan’ao Island 48

Nanjing 53, 61

Nanking Decade 37

Napier, Sir Charles 177–85

Naples 177

National Geographic 109

National University of Singapore 82

Nationalist Party 45

Natuna Islands 66

naval coalitions 217

Navigation Acts (1651) 6

Nelson, Horatio 8, 166, 217

Netherlands, The 1–5, 7, 17, 20, 62, 65–66, 88,

105, 208

See also Holland

New People’s Army 140

New Zealand 218

Ngubane, Brigadier General Lawrence 201

Nichols, D. W. 67

Nicolson, Commander Frederick 175

Niger Delta 193–95, 197–201, 204

Niger Delta Joint Task Force 200–201

Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force

(NDPVF) 197–98, 216n20

Niger Delta Summit 199

Niger Delta Vigilante 197

Nigeria 16, 156, 191–206, 224, 233

Nigerian National Assembly 198

Nigerian Navy 200–201

Nigerian Trawler Owners Association 196

Nimrod 55

Ningbo 43, 47, 60

North Africa 159, 170n46, 223

North America vi, 7, 80, 223

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

217–18, 230, 237–38, 251

North Korea 213

North Sulawesi 140

North Sumatra Fishery Office 86

North Vietnam 99

Norway 88, 105, 191, 205n1

Nuria 767 67, 70

Nyon Arrangement (1937) 26–27

Obama, Barack 32n34

O’Bannon, First Lieutenant P. N. 164

Obasanjo, Olusegun 199

Odili, Peter 204

Ogbainbiri 194

Ogoni 204–205

Okah, Henry 198

Okpo, Admiral Ekpenyong 201

Oman 215–16

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Omehia, Celestine 201

“Open Door” commercial treaty 187

Operation GOLDEN TIGER 131

Operation STABILISE 217

opium smuggling 43, 47, 52–53, 72, 151n4, 223

Opium War, First (1839–42) 37, 41–42, 98, 223

Opium War, Second (1856–60) 51

See also Arrow War

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) 82

Osborn, Sherard 59–60

Ots Uranus 129

Pacific Ocean vi, 85, 230

Pakistan 101, 121, 208

Palau Bidong 104

Palmerston, Foreign Secretary Lord 54, 57,

177–79, 181–86

Pan Pacific Hotel 71

Panama 73, 90, 122, 129–30, 191

Paracel Islands 66, 99

Paris 159, 173, 180

Paris Declaration 8, 51, 54

Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port

State Control 229

Parker, Admiral Sir William 175, 177, 179–82,

184, 186

Parkes, Harry 54

Patenga Point 124

Pax Britannica vi, 65

Pearl River 45, 48

Penang 51, 139

people smuggling 70, 84–85, 119, 138–39, 142,

146, 237

People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw legal case 22

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 101

Permanent Court of International Justi

31

Persian Gulf 71–72, 85

See also Arabian Gulf

Peru 9

Petro Concord 74

Petro Ranger 110

Philadelphia 161

Philadelphia 166

Philippines vi, 12, 22, 31n14, 34, 65–69

74, 80, 86–88, 90, 96, 102, 118, 139–41, 

145–51, 226

Phillip Channel 71–73

Phillips, Richard 239

Phnom Penh 100

Pickering, Timothy 163

piracy and

aircraft 24–26

bribery 41

coastal states 10, 22, 28, 31, 81–82, 

146, 228–29, 232, 234, 236–37, 240

cruise ships 22, 85, 145, 212

extortion 2, 38, 41, 43, 46–47, 84, 1

flag states 20, 51, 54, 70–71, 73–75, 

90, 146, 157, 223, 228–29, 232, 235–

240–41

globalization 81, 137–38

hijacking 35, 44–47, 70–71, 73–75, 

90, 111, 128, 130, 132–33, 142, 197, 

225, 234, 236, 238–39

“hot pursuit” 65, 76, 89, 91

insurance 11, 13, 29–30, 75–76, 82–

87, 90, 143, 188n10, 230

international shipping vi, 2, 4–5, 8, 

14, 16, 19, 25, 28–30, 41, 45, 53, 62, 

80–83, 85–88, 90–92, 97, 105, 109–1

133, 138, 143, 145, 148, 184, 191, 19

96, 200, 213, 224–37, 239–41

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kidnap for ransom 12, 15, 41, 43, 46–47,

70, 75, 82, 111–12, 116, 130–33, 148, 150,

191, 195–200, 207

law enforcement 28, 30, 70, 72, 76, 81–83,

86, 88, 91, 116, 122, 124–29, 131–32, 141,

146–51, 196, 200, 204, 225, 227, 231–34,

238, 240

liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carriers

123, 145

littoral states 31n32, 82, 88, 92, 114, 117,

119

maritime crime 9, 11, 13, 15–16, 19–32, 79,

84, 123, 128, 133, 137–53, 196, 208–209,

214–16, 219, 221n36, 224–28, 240–41

multilateral naval response 16, 110, 114,

116–17, 146, 148–49, 216–17, 224, 227, 230,

237–38, 241

murder 7, 24, 35–37, 39–40, 42–43, 46–48,

70, 75, 84, 86, 98, 103, 105–106, 111, 127–

29, 131–32, 152n16, 158, 166, 175, 180, 183,

185–86, 196, 232, 239

occasional pirates 14, 39, 43, 97

opportunistic pirates 36–37, 39, 42–43, 45,

81, 90, 93, 104–107, 137, 145, 174, 223–28

phantom ships 74, 90, 111, 142, 223

port states 146, 228–29, 236, 241

professional pirates 13, 14, 36, 39, 43, 45–

47, 97, 104–107, 125

prostitution 46–47, 84, 104

ransom v, 40–42, 44–47, 70, 74–75, 82,

111–12, 128, 130–33, 157–58, 160, 174, 185,

187, 195–96, 199, 211, 214, 218, 225, 239–

40

rape 14, 24, 47, 70, 97, 99, 103–104, 115

sanctioned piracy 4, 36, 39, 42–43, 51, 53,

69, 97–98, 102

shipmasters 12, 41, 143, 164, 230–33

shipowners 7, 56, 70, 74–75, 82–83, 87, 90–

91, 127, 143, 146, 188n10, 196, 213, 224,

228, 230–33, 239–41

71–72, 74, 141, 224

terrorists 11, 15, 24, 41, 73, 75, 79, 82–86,

88–89, 110, 113, 138–41, 144–46, 148–49,

152n16, 157, 168, 202, 208, 214, 218, 234,

236–37

three-mile territorial limit 8–9, 22, 115,

224

twelve-mile territorial limit 9, 28, 115, 213

225

Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) 12, 87, 110,

216, 230

PK 504 99

Plumper 181

poaching 85–86, 131

pollution 15, 32, 79, 85–86, 88, 117, 150, 191,

193, 199–200, 228

Polyphemus 175–77, 181–82

Port Harcourt 194, 196–97, 200

Port Klang 80, 111, 144

Porter 213–14

Portugal 3, 41, 43, 62, 65, 226

Poulo Condore Islands 66

poverty v, 15, 48, 81–84, 121, 149, 151, 174,

194, 204, 211, 216, 223, 227

Powell, Lieutenant Richard 185–86

Powerful 181

prahus 70, 76

Pratas Islands 66

Preble, Commodore Edward 166

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

(PEPFAR) 203

Prince Regent 180

privateers v, 1–17 passim, 24, 36, 42, 51, 54,

69, 102, 185, 208, 223, 226, 237

Privy Council 22, 24

Protection of Vital Sealanes initiative 117

Prussia 62, 173

pseudoephedrine 140

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Pulau Perak 112

Puntland Autonomous Region 211, 219n2

Pusur River 130

Qatar 215–16

Qianlong emperor 36

Qing dynasty 36–38, 41, 47, 52, 55, 57, 61–62

Radjasa, Hatta 118

Radwan 124

Raju Bahini Gang 132

Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) 132

Reagan, Ronald 31n33

Red Banner fleet 40

Red Sea 209

Redman legal claim 177, 180–82, 189n16

Regional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI)

215–16

Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against

Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 19, 89, 109, 112, 116,

119, 230, 240, 241n10

Regional Maritime Security Initiative 113

Renmin Ribao 100

Revolution of 1911 (China) 37, 45, 47–48

Reynard 181

Riau Islands 2, 66, 138, 142

Riff musket 175–77, 185

Riff pirates 15–16, 173–90

Ripert, Jean-Maurice 215

Robert, Bartholomew 7

Rodney 179–80

Romans 1

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 13, 67–68, 217

Royal Malaysian Marine Police 72, 219

Royal Malaysian Navy 219

68, 164, 177, 184, 186, 208–209, 233

Russell, Foreign Secretary Lord John 1

Russia 51, 55, 58, 62, 74, 129, 151n4, 18

238–39

See also Soviet Union

Ruth 173–77

Sabah 70, 118, 139

Sabinagi 74

Safina Al Bisarat 213

Saigon 66, 110

Samal pirates 67

Sandakan 140

Sans Pareil 54

Santa Cruz de Tenerife 179

São Tomé and Príncipe 192

Saro-Wiwa, Ken 193, 195, 205

Sattahip 70

Saudi Arabia 129, 156, 215–16

Schleswig-Holstein conflict (1848–50) 

Scotland 4, 164

sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 2

Seabourne Spirit 212–13

sea-lanes 15, 66, 85, 91–92, 117, 121, 23

Second Barbary (Algerine) War 168

Secure-Ship 87, 91, 216, 231

Security Council (UN) 30

Security Council resolutions (UN) 26, 

208, 239

Seymour, Admiral Michael 54

“shabu” See methamphetamines

Shanghai 42, 45, 47, 53, 60–61, 73, 80

Shanwei 35, 49

Shap-ng-tsai 42

Shell Oil Company 198, 206n19

Shenzhen 80

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Si-Amil Island 68

Sichuan Province 38

Sicily 177, 208

Sidon 180–81

Silva-Sam, Governor Timipre 201

Sinar Merak 152n14

Singapore vi, 12, 31n32, 35, 42, 51, 65–67, 71–

75, 80, 82–84, 87–89, 98–99, 102, 109–20

passim, 148, 151, 152n14, 226, 229–30

Singapore Strait 31n32, 83, 87–88, 143–44,

146, 148, 226

Sinkiang See Xinjiang

Sino-American relations 100

Sino-British relations 51, 54, 66, 240

See also Arrow War; Opium War, First; Opium

War, Second

Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) 46

Sino-Soviet border 101

Sino-Soviet war (1969) 108n19

Sino-Vietnamese border 39, 101

Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) 98–100, 102

Sirius Star 218, 239

Sitakunda 124

Slave Trade Act (1825) 23

Slovenia 123

Society of God-Worshipers 52

Socotra Archipelago 214

Soebijanto, Admiral Slamet 113–14

Somalia 16, 30, 86, 133, 156, 207–21, 224, 236,

238–41

Somaliland 209, 211

“sonic boom” gun 231, 239

South Asia 14, 224

South China Sea 10, 12, 14, 36–37, 47, 65–77,

79–93, 105, 143, 147, 224

South Korea 34, 80, 88, 96, 124, 230, 251

South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 215

Southeast Asia 11–12, 14–15, 17, 38, 40, 42,

49, 71, 73, 75–77, 82, 85, 87, 90, 93, 99, 105,

108, 110, 116, 119–20, 138–39, 141–42, 144–

46, 149–50, 151n4, 152n16, 152n20, 223, 226,

230–31

Soviet Union vi, 73, 100–101, 107, 209

Soviet-Vietnamese relations 100

Spain 2, 7, 15, 22, 31n14, 62, 65, 67, 69, 156,

167, 173–75, 183, 185, 187–88, 214–15, 226

Spark 44

Special Operations Forces (SOF) 105, 113

Speedwell 7

Spithead 178, 180, 184

Spratly Islands 66, 77, 89, 106

Sri Lanka 116, 141

St. Bridges Bay 69

St. Vincent 181

Stapleton, Commodore James 217–18

Star Bird 122

Sterrett, Lieutenant Andrew 162, 164, 179n39

Stromboli 181

Stuttgart 202

submarine cables 28

submarines 27, 70

Sudan 156, 238

Suez Canal 209

sui generis 20, 23, 28

Sukarno, President 69

Sulawesi Island 118, 141

See also North Sulawesi

Sulu region 67–69, 138–39, 146, 150, 224

Sulu Sea 2, 96, 139, 146–47

Sumatra 71, 73, 86, 114–15, 138–39

Summer Palace (Beijing) 58

Sunda Strait 71

Sundarbans mangrove forest 121, 130–32

Superferry 14 84, 145, 152n16

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Suzhou 61

Switzerland 105

Sydney 51

Syria 156, 183

Taipa Island 47

Taiping Island See Itu Aba Island

Taiping Rebellion 13, 36–37, 41, 51–63, 224

Taiwan 34, 38–39, 48, 66, 96, 140, 151n2, 235

Taiwan Strait 35

Tamelan Islands 66

Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 141, 152

Tan, Tony 113

Tanjung Pelepas 80

Tanjungpriok 80

tauke 142

Tausug pirates 69

Tawau 68

Tawi Islands 66

Taylor, Rear Admiral James E. 105

Tâyson pirates 39, 98

Te Kaha 217, 220n31

Teach, Edward “Blackbeard” v, 7

technology vii, 13, 16, 25, 32, 59, 79, 86–87, 93,

214, 217–18, 228

Tetuan 178

Tew, Thomas v–vi

Thailand 12, 66, 70, 87, 96–97, 99, 102–104,

107, 139–41, 143, 148, 150

Thailand, Gulf of 152n20, 224

Thakurani River 130

thirteen colonies vi, 6–7, 158, 223

Three Sisters 15, 173–90

Tiananmen Square massacre 106

Tianjin 55–58, 62

Tobruk 68

Togo 192

Tokyo 92

Torgelow 212

Transitional Federal Government of So

238

Trans-Ramos crude-oil pipeline 198

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

Treaty of Paris (1783) 158

Treaty of Tianjin 44, 55–58, 60

treaty ports 42, 55

Triad Uprising 38

Trilateral Coordinated Patrol See Mala

Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO) pa

Tripoli 15, 158–59, 162–67, 170, 208

Truman, Harry S. 9

tsunami 75, 77, 114, 118

Tunis 159, 163–65

Turkey 20, 156, 177, 184

Turner, John 41

Uduaghan, Emmanuel 201

Uganda 156

Ukraine 238

Ulrich, Admiral Harry 230

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (US

See Russia; Soviet Union

United Arab Emirates (UAE) 215–16

United Kingdom See Great Britain

United Nations (UN) 9–10, 16, 92, 208–

214–15, 217, 227–28

United Nations Convention on the Law 

Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) 1, 10, 23, 27–30, 3

31n33, 85, 88, 207, 225, 228–29, 238

United Nations Development Program 

United Nations Operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM I and II) 209

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Council (UN)

United Nations Security Council resolutions

See Security Council resolutions (UN)

United Nations World Food Program 208

United States (U.S.) vi–vii, 8–10, 14–16,

21n33, 28, 31n14, 55, 58, 70, 74–75, 77, 84, 87–

90, 92, 99–101, 105, 108n41, 113–14, 141, 150,

157–71, 192, 195, 201, 203–208, 213–14, 216–

20, 221n36, 223, 229–30, 233–36, 238–39,

241n2

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)

16, 192, 202–204

United States Central Command

(CENTCOM) 202

United States Coast Guard 90, 114

United States Department of Defense vii

United States EP-3 incident 90, 241n2

United States European Command (EUCOM)

202

United States National Intelligence Council

195

United States National Strategy for Maritime

Security 235–36

United States Naval Historical Center 217

United States Naval War College vi, 216

United States Navy vii, 10, 75, 84, 105, 161–63,

208, 213–14, 216, 221n36, 230, 234, 239

United States Pacific Command (PACOM)

202

Vanguard 180–81

Versailles, court of 161

Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) 228

Vietnam vi, 2, 12, 14, 17n4, 34, 39–40, 66, 85,

96–108, 129, 143, 223, 225–26

See also North Vietnam; South Vietnam

Vietnam War 14, 98–99, 223

Violet 173, 185–86

Wad Garet 183

Wai 70

Wang Huizhi 38

War of 1812 8

War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) 7,

226

Ward, Frederick Townsend 60–61

Warri 200–201

Warri Naval Base 201

Washington, D.C. 100, 159, 163–64, 166, 203

Washington, George 159–61, 165

weapons See firearms

Wei Suoni 36

Weng Siliang 35

West Africa vi, 202

West Indies vi

Western Europe 2, 8

Western Pacific Naval Symposium 237

White Lotus Rebellion 38

Wilson, General Sir Robert 176, 180, 183

Winstanley, Commander Keith 233

Winston S. Churchill 213

World Bank 92

world trade 19, 80–81, 228

World War I 45, 150, 209, 223, 227–28

World War II 14, 45, 65–67, 69, 150, 223, 227

World Wildlife Fund 193

Wu Ping 48

Wuchang 53

Wushi Er 41

Xinjiang 101

yachts 10, 107, 144, 214

Yang Jingtao 49

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Yankee 8

Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa 192, 199, 201–203,

206n20

Ye Mingchen 54–55

Yellow Sea 34, 96

Young II 122

Zaffarine Islands 183

Zambia 156

Zamboanga 140, 145

zeppelins 25

Zhang Mingzhen 38

Zhejiang Province 37, 39, 98

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 37–38, 4

Zheng Yi 36–37, 39–40

Zheng Yi Sao 41, 48

Zheng Zhilong 37

Zhengzhou 38

Zhou Yu 38

Zhu Fen 39

zinc anodes 15, 122–23, 125, 129–30, 1

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The Newport Papers

Somalia . . . From the Sea, by Gary Ohls (no. 34, July 2009)

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

Peter M. Swartz (no. 33, December 2008).

Major Naval Operations, by Milan Vego (no. 32, September 2008).

Perspectives on Maritime Strategy: Essays from the Americas, edited by Paul D. Tay

(no. 31, August 2008).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

30, September 2007).

Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron (no. 29, September 2

Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, by 

A. Elleman (no. 28, February 2007).

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendor

27, September 2006).

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited b

Carnes Lord (no. 26, February 2006).

The Regulation of International Coercion: Legal Authorities and Political Constrain

James P. Terry (no. 25, October 2005).

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader, edi

Peter Dombrowski (no. 24, July 2005).

The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William

Hopkinson (no. 23, May 2005).

China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S.

Erickson (no. 22, April 2005).

Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and Sou

edited by Paul D. Taylor (no. 21, 2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert Gile (no. 20, 2004).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John Hattend

(no. 19, 2004).

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Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross (no. 18, 2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs,

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (no. 17, 2003).

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Sub

marines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (no. 16, 2003).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen

(no. 15, December 2000).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component Commander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (no. 14, August 1998).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, with David G. Freymann (no. 13,

March 1998).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myron H.

Nordquist (no. 12, August 1997).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (no. 11, April 1997).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James,

U.S. Air Force (no. 10, October 1996).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (no. 9

December 1995).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(no. 8, December 1994).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (no. 7, June 1994).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 6, October 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 5, August 1993).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (no. 4, June 1993).

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Robertson, Jr. (no. 3, October 1992).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for 

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 2, April 1

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombing

Christopher C. Harmon (no. 1, December 1991).

Newport Papers from 16 on are available online (Acrobat required) at www.usnw

press/newportpapers/newportpapers.aspx.

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