FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P E ALS E LE V EN T HC IRC U IT NOV 15 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 12387 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C . D ocketN o. 04 -019 51 -C V -M H S -1 W A N D A S P A N N , P la in tif f - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s C O B B C O U N T Y P R E T R I A L C O U R T S E R V I C E S A G E N C Y , C O B B C O U N T Y J U D I C I A L C I R C U I T , e t a l., D e f e n d a n ts - A p p e lle e s .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e N o r th e rn D is tr ic t o f G e o r g ia

_________________________ ( N ove m b e r 15, 2006) B efo re A N D E R S O N , B IR C H an d B L A C K , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M:Although Spann a rgues in her reply

brief thedistrict court er

red in de cidingthe issue of 1 retaliation, Spann waived this argument by failingto raise the issue in her initial brief. United States v. Dicter , 1 98 F .3 d 1 28 4, 12 89 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 9) (i ssu e s raise d f or thefirs t timein a

reply brief a re de emed waived). Additionally, beca use Cobb County

was the prevailingparty, the district court did not err

in awarding c osts under F ed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).

2 W a nda S pa nn, a n A f

r i c a n- A m e r i c a n f

e m a l e appe a r i ng p ro se , appe a l s the d is tr ic t c o u r t’s d is m is s a l o f th e C o b b C o u n ty S u p e r io rC o u r t J u d g e s C o u n c il ( J u d g e s C o u n c il) , th e C o b b C o u n ty P r e tr ia l C o u r t S e r v ic e s A g e n c y ( C o b b C o u n ty P C S ) , a nd C hi e f

M a gi s tr a t e J udge F r a nk C ox a s de f e nda nt s f r om he ra c t i on a l l e gi ng r a c i a l di s c r i m i na t i on i n vi ol a t i on of T i t l e V I I of

the C i vi l R i ght s A c t s of 1964 ( T i t l e V I I ) , 42 U . S . C . § 2000e - 2. S pa nn a l s o appe a l s the di s tr i c tc our t ’ s gr a nt of s um m a ry j udgm e ntt o C obb C ounty , a s s e r t i ng s he pr e s e nt e d e vi de nc e the pr of f e r e d r e a s ons f

orhe rt e r m i na t i on w e r e pr e t e xtua l . T he di s tr i c tc our tdi d not 1 e rr , a n d w e a f

f ir m . I . DI S C US S I ON A. C o b b C o u n ty P CS

, J u d g e C o x, a n d

J u d g e s C o u n c il

“ We r e v i e w de no vo the di stri ctcourt ’ s gra ntof a m ot i on t o d i sm i ss un der [ F e de r a l R ul e of

C i vi l P r oc e dur e ] 12( b) ( 6) f orf a i l ur e t o s t a t e a c l a i m , a c c e pt i ng the a lle g a tio n s in th e c o m p la in t a s tru e a n d c o n s tru in g th e m in th e lig h t m o s t f a v o r ab le to th e p la in tif

f .” Hill v . W

h ite , 32 1 F . 3d 13 34 , 13 35 (11th C i r. 20 03 ). “ A di sm i ss al f orf a i l ur e t o s t a t e a c l a i m i s e rr one ous unl e s s i tappe a r s be y ond doubttha ttheWe review de novo a dis tric t c ourt ’sgra

nt o f summ ary

judgment a

nd view all f

a c ts in 2 the light most favorable to the non- moving pa rty . Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace , Fla. , 267 F.3d 1197, 1199 ( 11th Cir. 2001). “Summary judgment is only

proper if thereareno g enuine disputed issues of material fac t, and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. , 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 ( 11th Cir. 2001). 3 p la in tif f c a n p r o v e n o s e t o f

f a c ts in s u p p o rt o f

h is c la im w h ic h w o u ld e n title h im t o rel i ef . ” C r y de rv . Ox e ndi ne , 24 F . 3d 175, 176 ( 11th C i r . 1994) ( quot a t i ons a nd ci t at i on om i tt ed). “ U nde r12( b) ( 6) , w he the ra pl a i nt i f f f a i l e d t o s t a t e a c l a i m upon w hi ch re l i ef

ca n b e gra nt ed m ustbe as ce rt ai ned from the fa ce of the com pl ai nt . ” Ga r c i a v . Co

p e n h a v e r, Be l l

& As s o c s . , M. D. ’s P. A. , 104 F . 3d 1256, 1266 n. 11 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) . T he di stri ctcourtconsi dere d an aff i davi tou t si de of the com pl ai ntw hen grant i ng the Judg es C ou nci l ’ s m ot i on t o d i sm i ss , thu s, w e w i l l construe the Judg es C o u n c il’s m o tio n to d is m is s a s a c o n v e r te d m o tio n f o rs u m m a ry ju d g m e n t. See 2 T radem ark I

ns. C o. v. E SL U

, Inc. , 2 9 9 F .3 d 1 2 6 5 , 1 2 6 7 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 2 ) . W e n o te the m agi stra t e j ud ge gave S pann suff i ci entno t i ce the m ot i on w ou l d b e t aken un der a d v is e m e n t a n d in f

o r m e d S p a n n o f

th e ap p r o p r ia te m a te r ia ls to f ile in o p p o s itio n . See M as s e y v . C ongr e s s L i

f e I ns . C o. , 1 1 6 F .3 d 1 4 1 4 , 1 4 1 7 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) . U nde rT i t l e V I I , i ti s unl a w f ul “ f ora n em pl oyerto f

a il o rr e f u s e to h ir e o rto d is c h a r g e a n y in d iv id u a l, o ro th e rw is e to d is c r im in a te a g a in s t a n y in d iv id u a l w ith r e s p e c t to h is c o m p e n s a tio n , te r m s , c o n d itio n s , o rp r iv ile g e s o f e m p lo y m e n t,4

b e c a u s e o f

s u c h in d iv id u a l’s r a c e . . . .” 4 2 U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 e - 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( e m p h a s is added). “ Indi vi du al capaci ty s ui t s und erT i t l e V II ar e . . . i napp ropri at e. ” B usby v. C i t y of O r lando , 9 3 1 F .2 d 7 6 4 , 7 7 2 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 1 ) . T h e d is tr ic t c o u r t d id n o t e rrin d is m is s in g th e s u it a g a in s t J u d g e C o x in h is u n o ffi ci al cap aci ty b ecau se T i t l e V II d o es n o tp ro v i d e rel i ef ag ai n sti n d i v i d u al s. B us by , 931 F . 2d a t772. A ddi t i ona l l y , S pa nn s t a t e d s he w a s “ e m pl oy e d by C obb C ou nty G ov ernm ent . ” A tno t i m e i n h ercom pl ai ntdi d she al l ege s he w as ever em p l o yed b y Ju d g e C o x , C o b b C o u n ty P C S , o r th e Ju d g es C o u n ci l . A cco rd i n g l y, the di s tr i c tc our tdi d note rri n di s m i s s i ng J udge C ox, C obb C ounty P C S , orthe J u d g e s C o u n c il a s d e f

e n d a n ts . B . C o b b C o u n ty W here a pl ai nt i ff

supp ort s herT i t l e V II cl ai m w i th ci rc um st ant i al evi dence, thi s C our ta na l y z e s he rc l a i m us i ng the f r a m e w or k s e tf

or th i n McD onne l l

D ouglas C orp. v. G re en , 9 3 S . C t. 1 8 1 7 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . W i l son v. B / EA er ospa ce, Inc. , 376 F . 3d 10 79 , 10 87 (11th C i r. 20 04 ). U nd erthe McD onne l l D ouglas f

r a m e w or k, the pl ai nt i ff m ustfi rs tes t abl i sh a p r i ma fa c ie case o f d i scri m i n at i o n , w h i ch creat es a p r e s u m p tio n o f

d is c r im in a tio n . W

i l s on , 37 6 F . 3d at10 87 . O nce the pl ai nt i ff es t abl i shes a p r i ma fa c ie c a s e , th e e m p lo y e rth e n h a s th e b u r d e n o f p r o d u c tio n to e s tab lis h a le g itim a te , n o n d is c r im in a to ry r e a s o n f o rits a c tio n s . I

d. If the em pl oyer5

sa t i sf i es i t s burden, thu s r ebut t i ng the pres um pt i on of di sc ri m i nat i on , the pl ai nt i ff m u s t th e n d e m o n s tr a te th e e m p lo y e r ’s r e a s o n is a p r e te x t f o rd is c r im in a tio n . I

d. T o e s t abl i s h pr e t e xt , a “ pl a i nt i f f m us tde m ons tr a t e tha tthe pr of f e r e d r e a s on w as no tthe true r ea son for the em pl oym entdeci si on . . . . [T he pl ai nt i ff ] m ay s uc c e e d i n thi s e i the rdi r e c t l y by pe r s ua di ng the c our ttha ta di s c r i m i na t ory r e a s on m o re li k ely m o ti v ated th e e m p lo ye r o r in d irec tl y b y s h o w in g th at th e e m p lo ye r’s proffe re d exp l anat i on i s unw orthy of cr edence. ” J a c k s o n v . S ta te o

f A la . S ta te T enure C om m ’n , 405 F . 3d 1276, 1289 ( 11th C i r . 2005) ( quot a t i ons a nd c i t a t i on om i tt e d) . “ C onc l us ory a l l e ga t i ons of di s c r i m i na t i on, w i thoutm or e , a r e not suff i ci entt o rai se an i nfer ence of pret extor i nt ent i on al di sc ri m i nat i on w here [a n em pl oyer ] has off

er ed . . . ext ensi ve evi dence of l egi t i m at e, no n-di sc ri m i nat ory re as on s f or i t s a ct i on s. ” M

ay f i e ld v . P at te rs on P um

p C o. , 101 F . 3d 1371, 1376 ( 1 1 th C ir . 1 9 9 6 ) ( q u o ta tio n s a n d c ita tio n o m itte d ) . W h e n a n e m p lo y e rs in c e r e ly be l i e ve s a n e m pl oy e e c om m i tt e d rul e i nf r a c t i ons orpoorpe r f

or m a nc e oc c urr e d, tha tbe l i e f

, a nd thus the l e gi t i m a t e , non- di s c r i m i na t ory r e a s on f ort e r m i na t i on, ca nn otbe re bu tt ed by an em pl oyee ’ s a rgum entthatthe i nfra ct i on s di d n otoccur, b u t m u s t b e r e b u tte d w ith e v id e n c e th e e m p lo y e r ’s b e lie f o f th e o c c u rr e n c e s is in s in c e r e o ru n w o r th y o f c r e d e n c e . See V

essel s v. A t la n ta In dep . Sch o o l S ys. , 408 F .3 d 7 6 3 , 7 7 1 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 5 ) .6

T he di stri ctcourtfoun d S pann es t abl i shed a p r i ma fa c ie c a s e of d is c r im in a tio n a n d C o b b C o u n ty p r o f f e r e d f o u rr e a s o n s f

o rte r m in a tin g S p a n n . S pa nn w a s unabl e t o s how a tl e a s ttw o of the r e a s ons w e r e pr e t e xtua l . F i r s t , S pa nn fa i l ed t o sho w the deci si on t o t erm i nat e herfor f ai l i ng t o turn o ver pers on nel re cords t o the m agi stra t e c ou rtadm i ni stra t or w as m er el y apret ext . S pann adm i tt ed i n he rde pos i t i on s he “ unde r s t ood f ul l y ” the i ns truc t i ons c ont a i ne d i n a M a r c h 5, 20 03 , m em orandu m fr om Judg e C ox i nstruct i ng her t o turn al l pers on nel fi l es ov er i m m e di a t e l y t o the m a gi s tr a t e c our ta dm i ni s tr a t or . A f t e rr e c e i vi ng the m e m o, S pann re m ov ed the pers on nel fi l es fr om the C ob b C ou nty P C S offi ce and p l ac ed the m i n he rhom e , i n di r e c tc ontr a ve nt i on of J udge C ox’ s i ns truc t i ons . S e c ond, S pa nn c om m i tt e d y e ta nothe ra c tof i ns ubor di na t i on by f

i r i ng a n e m pl oy e e w i thout J udge C ox’ s pe r m i s s i on. S pa nn f a i l s t o s how w hy t e r m i na t i ng he rf orthi s r e a s on i s m er el y pre t ext . Inst ea d, S pann as se rt s “ C ox pu tbo th P l ai nt i ff and [the fi re d em pl oyee ] i n a no -w i n si tuat i on . Judg e C ox se t[the fi re d em pl oyee ] up t o b e f i re d a s a m e a n s o f

c o rn e r in g th e P la in tif

f .” T h is c o n c lu s o ry a lle g a tio n is n o t e n o u g h to s h o w p r e te x t. S pa nn’ s a c t i ons c oul d r e a s onabl y be i nt e rpr e t e d a s i ns ubor di na t i on, C obb C ounty ha d a l e gi t i m a t e non- di s c r i m i na t ory r e a s on f ort e r m i na t i ng S pa nn. T he d is tr ic t c o u r t d id n o t e rrin g r a n tin g C o b b C o u n ty ’s m o tio n f o rs u m m a ry ju d g m e n t.Spann raises numerous arguments about Judg e Cox ’s supervisory authority over her. 3 Even if JudgeCoxdid not have the a uthority to terminate Spann, this would not afford Spann a reme dy un der T itl eVII . Theiss ueof wh e ther C ox had th ea

uth ority to t e rminateSpa

nn falls outside the scope of

the protec tions of Title VII . Havingdismiss ed all fe deral claims, the district court did not err

in decliningto exercise supplemental jurisdiction for a state c ause of action. See R aney v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 370 F.3d 1086, 1088- 89 (11th Cir. 2004). 7 I I . C ON C L US I ON T he di s tr i c tc our tdi d note rri n ( 1) di s m i s s i ng the J udge s C ounc i l , the C obb C o u n ty P C S , o r Ju d g e C o x , o r (2 ) g ran t i n g su m m ary j u d g m en tt o C o b b C o u n ty. 3 AF F I R ME D.