This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 1 Plaintiff-Appellee, 2 v. No. 34,754 3 SERINA AGUILERA, 4 Defendant, 5 and 6 TIMOTHY YOUNG, 7 Surety-Appellant. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY 9 Jennifer E. Delaney, District Judge 10 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 11 Santa Fe, NM 12 John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellee 15 Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC 16 Joseph P. Kennedy 17 Albuquerque, NM 182 for Appellant 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION 2 HANISEE, Judge. 3
{1} Timothy Young (Surety) appeals the forfeiture of $25,000 he had posted as a 4 cash bond on behalf of Defendant Serina Aguilera. When released, Aguilera 5 absconded to Mexico, and while there violateda condition of release that required her 6 to attend an August 18, 2014 hearing in distri ct court. The distri ct court issued a 7 default judgment on April 21, 2015, ordering that the bond be forfeited. 8
{2} On appeal, Surety challenges only whether the district court properly forfeited 9 the $25,000 cash bond that Surety posted. Fo llowing the completion of briefing, this 10 Court issued an order of limited remand sua sponteon October 3, 2016. The order 11 stated that the parties’ “interpretation[ s] of the underlying facts in the case [are] 12 starkly different,” and instructed the districtcourt to enter “detailed findings of fact” 13 based on only “the existing record[.]” On Oc tober 24, 2016, the district court filed its 14 findings of fact on bail forfeiture [and] default judgment. We now affirm. 15 FACTS AND BACKGROUND 16
{3} Aguilera was initially arrested pursuant to a warrant stemming from a criminal 17 information that charged her with aggrav ated battery, aggravated assault, and 18 possession of a firearm or destructive de vice by a felon. Surety posted the $25,000 19 cash bond for her release. Thereafter, Aguilera apparently “fled” to Mexico. While in 203 Mexico, Aguilera failed to appear for a scheduled court hearing on August 18, 2014, 1 which resulted in the issuance of a bench warrant for her arrest . Thereafter, Surety 2 apparently traveled to Mexico to convince Aguilera to return to the United States. On 3 September 24, 2014, upon reentry to the United States, authorities detained both 4 Aguilera and Surety at the Columbus, New Mexico, port of entry for reasons unrelated 5 to her case in district court. Afterward, A guilera remained in custody, and as a result 6 missed additional court hearings. 7
{4} On December 5, 2014, on the State’s motion, but possibly then without 8 knowledge of Aguilera’s detainment, the district court entered a notice of forfeiture 9 and order to show cause, which stated that should Aguilera fail to appear at a January 10 22, 2015 hearing, a default judgment woul d be entered ordering that the bond be 11 forfeited. On January 29, 2015, the districtcourt entered another notice of forfeiture 12 and order to show cause, this time serving both Surety and Aguilera, stating that in 13 order to avoid a default j udgment Surety and Aguilera were required to attend a 14 rescheduled hearing on February 9, 2015. S hortly thereafter, Surety, through counsel, 15 filed a motion to release the bond, explaining that Aguilera had been arrested and in 16 custody since September 24, 2014. The bond forfeiture hearing was nonetheless held 17 on February 9, 2015. On April 21, 2015, default judgment on the cash bond was 18 entered, stating that Aguilera had “failed to appear” in violation of her signed 194 condition of release agreeing that she “would appear at such times and places as may 1 be required by [the district] c ourt.” The district court also concluded that Aguilera was 2 not “surrendered into custody[,] and good cause [was] not . . . shown [as to] why 3 default judgment should not be entered.” U ltimately, Aguilera was returned to the 4 jurisdiction of the district court where sh e entered into a repeat offender plea and 5 disposition agreement on March 4, 2015, and an amended plea and disposition 6 agreement on May 4, 2015. 7
{5} Briefing by Surety and the State painst two completely different pictures of 8 Aguilera’s return from Mexico. While Surety concedes that he and Aguilera were both 9 detained upon their reentry into the United States at the Columbus, New Mexico, port 10 of entry, and that Aguilera was discovered to be “trave ling with false documents[,]” 11 he maintains that “by traveling back from Mexico into New Mexico [Surety] 12 effectively surrendered Aguilera into custody.” The State, on the other hand, cites to 13 the record from the February 9, 2015 show cau se hearing, and accuses Surety of being 14 complicit in Aguilera’s then-ongoing effort not to be taken into custody. Specifically, 15 the State maintains that Surety first “crossed into Mexico alone witha stolen I.D.” and 16 then “accompanied Aguilera the next day when authorities caught Aguilera using the 17 same stolen I.D. to re-enter from Mexico through the port of entry.” Indeed, the Luna 18 County Sheriff’s Department Criminal Inves tigator Michael Brown participated in the 195 investigation of Surety and Aguilera, and “charged . . . Aguilera with concealing 1 identity and identity theft and charged [Surety] . . . with identity theft[,] and aiding or 2 harboring a felon.” Additionally, the State argues that whatever happened or did not 3 happen regarding Aguilera’s return, based upon her prior “undisputed breach of the 4 bond condition, the district co urt did not improperly declare that the bail had been 5 forfeited.” 6
{6} On limited remand, the district court provided factual findings that both explain 7 the basis for its bond revocation and support th e State’s version of the facts. Initially, 8 the court observed that Surety “provide[d no] evidence at the h earing; for example, 9 he did not testify or provide any witne sses.” Regarding the State’s evidence, the 10 district court found that Mr. Brown’s uncontradicted testimony established that 11 “[w]hen [Surety] entered Mexico, [he] had a New Mexico [d]river’s [l]icense 12 belonging to [another woman, which] had previously been reported as stolen.” The 13 district court also found that when Aguilera “attempted to cross into the United States 14 from Mexico[,] . . . [she] tried to use [theother woman’s stolen] driver’s license[.]” 15 Following the bond forfeiture hearing, the distri ct court reiterated: “If [Surety’s] real 16 intent was to turn [Aguilera] over to authorities, then that’s what would have been 17 done . . . at the port of entry.” The court found instead that Aguilera “attempt[ed] to 18 enter as opposed to surrender[] herself[.]” 196 DISCUSSION 1
{7} Surety appeals, primarily claiming that the district court misapplied the law of 2 bond forfeiture because “Aguilera was placed in custody prior to the [district] court’s 3 default judgment” forfeiting Surety’s bond. Disputing the contention that he was 4 helping Aguilera elude authorities, Surety argues that the “more likely explanation for 5 [Surety’s] presence atthe border” was that he was “accompanying Aguilera back to 6 New Mexico to fulfill his duties as a bondsman.” He contends thatAguilera’s arrest 7 was due to the fact that he surrendered her into custody. Surety secondarily contends 8 that the State “failed to produce any ev idence regarding the bail contract between 9 [Surety] and the State.” 10
{8} In the context of a district court’s order revoking bond, our Supreme Court has 11 employed an abuse of discretion standard of review. See State v. Amador , 1982- 12 NMSC-083, ¶ 16, 98 N.M. 270, 648 P.2d 309 (concluding under the circumstances 13 before it that “it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order the total 14 forfeiture of the bond”). “A [district] c ourt abuses its discretion when a ruling is 15 clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the ruling 16 is contrary to the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions that may be drawn from 17 the facts and circumstances.” State v. Pacheco , 2008-NMCA-055, ¶ 25, 143 N.M. 18 851, 182 P.3d 834 (concluding that the “word ‘may’ indicates that the district court 197 has discretion, but is not re quired, to declare a bond forfeiture”). A district court’s 1 findings of fact are generally re viewed for substantial evidence. See State v. Urioste , 2 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. 3
{9} Rule 5-406(C) NMRA states that “[i]f there is a breach of condition of a bond, 4 the court may declare a forfeiture of the bail.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, NMSA 5 1978, Section 31-3-2(B)(2) (1993), states that, if a person “fails to appear at the time 6 and place fixed by the terms of his bail bond, the court . . . may declare a forfeiture of 7 the bail.” (Emphasis added.) Not dissimilar to the discretionary language regarding 8 forfeiture of bonds in circumstances of breach , Rule 5-406(D) similarly states that the 9
court may set aside the forfeiture upon a showing of good cause or if the defendant is 10 surrendered by the surety into custody prior to the entry of a judgment of default on 11 the bond. However, Section 31-3-2(F) rids the court of discretion in one specific 12 circumstance, requiring that, 13 [w]hen a judgment has been rendered ag ainst the defendant or surety for 14 the whole or part of the penalty of a forfeited recognizance, the court 15 rendering such judgment shall remit the amount thereof when, after such 16 rendition, the accused has been arre sted and surrendered to the proper 17 court to be tried on such charge or to answer the judgment of the court, 18 provided that the apprehension of th e accused in some way was aided by 19 the surety’s efforts or by in formation supplied by the surety

. 20 (Emphases added.) 218 {10} Surety relies heavily on Amador , a 1982 case in which our Supreme Court 1 declared that “[c]onsidering the purposes of bail and the policy to encourage 2 bondsmen to enter into bail contracts, it is unjust to enrich the state treasury when a 3 bondsman has been diligent in his efforts to apprehend and bring back for trial a 4 defendant but has been thwarted by the ac tions of another sovereign jurisdiction.” 5 1982-NMSC-083, ¶ 14. The court in Amador held that because “[t]he bondsman did 6 all he could to secure th e defendant’s presence and insure the state against its 7 monetary loss” and because “[t]he [s]tate [was] not unduly prejudiced by the 8 defendant’s failure to appear because he [could have been] returned to New Mexico 9 for trial once he [was] released[,] . . . jus tice [did] not require the forfeiture of the 10 entire amount of the bond [and] . . . it was an abuse of discretion for the [district] court 11 to order the total forfeiture of the bond.” Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Thus, although Rule 5-406 12 utilizes language that is discretionary, Amador limits the district court’s discretion in 13 circumstances where a bondsman exerts suffici ent efforts, but the defendant is unable 14 to appear for court due to the defendant be ing held by another jurisdiction, in which 15 case the bond should bereturned. See1982-NMSC-083, ¶ 14. This language is not 16 dissimilar to the guiding inquiry set forth in the mandatorily worded Section 31-3- 17 2(F), which in this instance would operateto foreclose forfeiture if Aguilera’s 189 apprehension was “aided by [Surety’s] efforts or by information supplied by 1 [Surety].” Id. 2
{11} Unlike the defendant in Amador , Aguilera was not already in custody when she 3 missed the first hearing—she was, apparently, by then in Mexico. Indeed, Amador 4 was addressed by this Court in Pacheco , where we stated that, “[u]nlike the situation 5 in Amador , in the present case [the d]efendant is not in custody in another jurisdiction, 6 nor was he in custody at the time he was scheduled for trial.” Pacheco , 2008-NMCA7 055, ¶ 28. We explained: 8 [the defendant] failed to appear for trial . . . and [was] still at large. It was 9 not until one year later, . . . after six hearings, at the last three of which 10 [the surety] itself was present, that the district court entered a judgment 11 ordering forfeiture. The district court entertained [the surety]’s motion 12 to reconsider forfeiture[,] . . . gi ving [the surety] two more months to 13 locate and apprehend [the d]efendant. We fail to see how the district 14 court, in considering [the surety]’s motion to reconsider and giving [the 15 surety] one year from the failure to appear, abused its discretion in 16 entering judgment on forfeiture of the bond. 17 Id. Although dissimilar in some factual respects, like in Pacheco Aguilera was not yet 18 arrested and could be deemedto have been “at large” wh en she missed her first court 19 appearance. 20
{12} But our inquiry here is guided by f acts quite different from those in Amador and 21 Pacheco . That is because other than being present with Aguilera when she was 22 arrested, Surety was more an impediment to her surrender thana facilitator of it. 2310 Uncontradicted evidence in the record—presented by the State and which supported 1 the default judgment issued by the district court and formed the basis of its ensuing 2 findings of fact—was that Surety carried a stolen New Mexico driver’s license to 3 Aguilera in Mexico. The district court found on remand that Aguilera then falsely 4 presented that method of identification wh en attempting to return, alongside Surety, 5 to the United States. By Aguilera doing so, border officials were therefore uninformed 6 (by her or Surety) of Aguilera’s true id entity, or of the outstanding warrant for her 7 arrest. In other words, her e ffort at the time of her arre st, embraced by Surety from the 8 standpoint of facts available to the districtcourt, was directed toward remaining free 9 from custody, not surrendering to it. As to Surety, rather than turning Aguilera into 10 authorities at the port of entry when he had an opportunity to do so, he too was 11 detained and charged with criminal acts when Aguilera’s plan failed and she was 12 arrested for crimes stemming from her posse ssion and misuse of the stolen driver’s 13 license supplied by Surety. The inescapable conclusion is that not only did Surety’s 14 efforts not aid Aguilera’s apprehension, they appear to have been directed toward her 15 failed effort to avoid apprehension. Likewise, prior toAguilera’s arrest, Surety 16 provided no information regarding the circ umstances Surety then knew to exist on 17 which the arresting officer c ould have arguably relied in detecting that Aguilera was 18 not whom she was pretending to be, the very fact (wholly unrelated to the pending 1911 case with which Surety claims to have assisted) that le d to her being arrested and 1 ultimately returned to Luna County for prosecution. 2
{13} Under these circumstances, applying the applicable rule and statute is a 3 straightforward proposition. On the record before it, the district court was not only 4 within its discretion to conclude that A guilera was not “surrendered [by Surety] into 5 custody,” seeRule 5-406(D), it was not afoul of Section 31-3-2(F). Thus, under Rule 6 5-406(C), the district court was permitted to “declare a forfeiture of the bail.” We 7 observe also that Amador contains an additionally instructive sentence: “Here the 8 bondsman did not connive with the defe ndant to avoid justice.” 1982-NMSC-083, 9 ¶ 15. Such cannot be said about Surety on the record befo re us despite what may have 10 begun as a well-intentioned effort by Surety to effectuate Aguilera’s return to the 11 United States. 12
{14} Surety lastly argues that the State faile d to present the contract between itself 13 and Surety, and that therefore the district court was precluded from forfeiting the bond 14 posted by Surety. Our review of the record, however, indicates that this argument was 15 not preserved. See Rule 12-216(A) NMRA (recompiled and amended as 12-321(A) 16 NMRA, effective Dec. 31, 2016) (“To preservean issue for revie w, it must appear that 17 a ruling or decision by the [district] court was fairly invoked.”). “In order to preserve 18 an issue for appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection that specifically 1912 apprises the trial court of the nature of the claimed error and invokes an intelligent 1 ruling thereon.” State v. Montoya , 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 45, 345 P.3d 1056 (internal 2 quotation marks and citation omitted). “We generally do not consider issues on appeal 3 that are not preserved below.” State v. Leon , 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 33, 292 P.3d 493 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). Consequently, we will not consider 5 the merit of Surety’s assertion that the bond contract must have been made a part of 6 the record proper. 7
{15} Based on the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 8
{16} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

_________________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11

WE CONCUR: 12

_________________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 14

_________________________________ 15 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 16