TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 

Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been 

Stolen to Commit Refund Fraud Do Not 

Receive Quality Customer Service 

May 3, 2012 

Reference Number: 2012-40-050 

This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process 

and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document. 

Phone Number | 202-622-6500 

E-mail Address | TIGTACommunications@tigta.treas.gov

Website | http://www.tigta.gov 
HIGHLIGHTS

MOST TAXPAYERS WHOSE IDENTITIES supporting identity documents. However, the 

HAVE BEEN STOLEN TO COMMIT IRS has been processing these tax returns using 

REFUND FRAUD DO NOT RECEIVE standard processing procedures. 

QUALITY CUSTOMER SERVICE Identity theft guidelines and procedures are 

Highlights dispersed among 38 different Internal Revenue 

Manual sections. These guidelines are 

inconsistent and conflicting, and not all functions 

have guidelines on handling identity theft issues. Final Report issued on May 3, 2012 

The IRS uses little of the data from the identity Highlights of Reference Number: 2012-40-050 theft cases to identify any trends, etc., that could to the Internal Revenue Service Deputy be used to detect or prevent future refund fraud. Commissioner for Operations Support.

WHAT TIGTA RECOMMENDED IMPACT ON TAXPAYERS 

TIGTA recommended that the IRS: 1) establish The Federal Trade Commission reported that accountability for the Identity Theft Program; identity theft was the number one complaint in 2) implement a process to ensure that IRS Calendar Year 2011, and government notices and correspondence are not sent to the documents/benefits fraud was the most common address listed on the identity thief’s tax return; form of reported identity theft. As of 3) conduct an analysis of the letters sent to December 31, 2011, the IRS’s Incident Tracking taxpayers regarding identity theft; 4) ensure Statistics Report showed that 641,052 taxpayers taxpayers are notified when the IRS has have been affected by identity theft in Calendar received their identifying documents; 5) create a Year 2011. The IRS is not effectively providing specialized unit in the Accounts Management assistance to victims of identity theft, and current function to exclusively work identity theft cases; processes are not adequate to communicate 6) ensure all quality review systems used by IRS identity theft procedures to taxpayers, resulting functions and offices working identity theft cases in increased burden for victims of identity theft. are revised to select a representative sample of 

WHY TIGTA DID THE AUDIT identity theft cases; 7) revise procedures for the 

Correspondence Imaging System screening 

This audit was initiated because the number of process; and 8) ensure programming is adjusted identity theft cases in the IRS has grown so that identity theft issues can be tracked and significantly over the last few years, analyzed for trends and patterns. 

overwhelming IRS resources and burdening 

taxpayers. Taxpayers testifying before The IRS agreed with all our recommendations. 

Congress stated that they had to talk to multiple It has established a governance structure to 

IRS employees and were provided conflicting oversee the enterprise-wide identity theft 

instructions. initiatives and plans to expand its identity theft 

indicator codes identifying claims of identity 

WHAT TIGTA FOUND theft. It plans to review its suite of identity theft 

letters and to update its guidance instructing Identity theft cases are not worked timely and employees to notify taxpayers acknowledging can take more than a year to resolve. receipt of documentation. The IRS currently has Communications between the IRS and victims specialized units in the Accounts Management are limited and confusing, and victims are asked function working only identity theft cases. multiple times to substantiate their identity. Finally, the IRS plans to create a specific quality 

When taxpayers call the IRS to advise it that review for identity theft cases and is currently 

their electronic tax return was rejected because evaluating options for enhancing its ability to 

it appears another individual has already filed a track and analyze the fraudulent identity theft 

tax return using their identity, the IRS instructs information removed from a taxpayer account. 

them to mail in a paper tax return with the 

Form 14039, Identity Theft Affidavit, attaching 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL 

FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 

May 3, 2012 

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR OPERATIONS SUPPORT 

FROM: Michael R. Phillips 

Deputy Inspector General for Audit 

SUBJECT: Final Audit Report – Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been 

Stolen to Commit Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer 

Service (Audit # 201140042) 

This report presents the results of our review to evaluate whether the Internal Revenue Service is 

effectively providing assistance to victims of identity theft. This audit is included in our Fiscal 

Year1

 2012 Annual Audit Plan and addresses the major management challenges of Taxpayer 

Protection and Rights, Fraudulent Claims and Improper Payments, Tax Compliance Initiatives, 

and Providing Quality Taxpayer Service Operations. 

Management’s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix VIII. 

Copies of this report are also being sent to the Internal Revenue Service managers affected by the 

report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or 

Michael E. McKenney, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Returns Processing and Account 

Services), at (202) 622-5916. 

 

1

 A 12-consecutive-month period ending on the last day of any month, except December. The Federal 

Government’s Fiscal Year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30. 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Table of Contents 

Background .......................................................................................................... Page 1 

Results of Review ............................................................................................... Page 5 

The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Effectively 

Providing Assistance to Victims Who Have Had Their 

Identities Stolen to Commit Tax Refund Fraud ............................................ Page 5 

Recommendation 1: ........................................................ Page 20 

Recommendations 2 through 4: ......................................... Page 21 

Recommendations 5 through 7: ......................................... Page 22 

Data From Identity Theft Cases Are Not Being Used to 

Prevent Refund Fraud ................................................................................... Page 23 

Recommendation 8: ........................................................ Page 24 

Appendices 

Appendix I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology ........................ Page 25 

Appendix II – Major Contributors to This Report ........................................ Page 27 

Appendix III – Report Distribution List ....................................................... Page 28 

Appendix IV – Outcome Measure ................................................................ Page 29 

Appendix V – Identity Theft Indicators ........................................................ Page 30 

Appendix VI – Number of Identity Theft Incidents and Taxpayers 

Affected in Calendar Year 2011 ................................................................... Page 31 

Appendix VII – Assistor Job Titles and Duties ............................................ Page 33 

Appendix VIII – Management’s Response to the Draft Report ................... Page 34 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Abbreviations 

IPSU Identity Protection Specialized Unit 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

IRSN IRS Number 

ITAAG Identity Theft Assessment and Action Group 

PGLD Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure 

TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Background 

The Federal Trade Commission reported that identity theft was the number one complaint in 

Calendar Year 2011. Government documents/benefits fraud was the most common form of 

reported identity theft. 

 Government documents/benefits fraud 

increased 11 percentage points since Calendar 

Year 2009. 

 Florida is the State with the highest per capita 

rate of reported identity theft complaints, 

followed by Georgia and California.1

Identity theft affects the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and tax administration two ways—with 

fraudulent tax returns and misreporting of income. Both can potentially harm taxpayers who are 

victims of the identity theft. Figure 1 provides an illustrative description of both refund fraud 

and employment-related fraud. 

Figure 1: Description of Refund and Employment Refund Fraud

Source: TIGTA analysis of the identity theft process as it affects the IRS and taxpayers. 

Employment-related identity theft can affect taxpayers when the IRS attempts to take 

enforcement actions for allegedly unreported income. Refund fraud adversely affects innocent 

 

1 Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book (March 2011).

Page 1 

Identity theft was the number one 

consumer complaint for 

Calendar Year 2011 

Government documents/benefits 

fraud was the most common form 

of reported identity theft. 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

taxpayers’ ability to file their tax returns and timely receive the tax refunds they are due, often 

imposing significant financial and emotional hardship on victims. 

In July 2005, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported and the 

IRS agreed that it needed a corporate strategy to address the growing challenge of identity theft.2

 

www.idtheft.gov

The IRS stated that it had developed an 

Enterprise Identity Theft Strategy. 

However, in March 2008, the TIGTA 

reported that the IRS has not placed 

sufficient emphasis on employment-related 

and tax fraud identity theft strategies.3 The 

IRS lacked the comprehensive data needed 

to determine the impact of identity theft on 

tax administration. It was recommended 

that the IRS develop and implement a 

strategy to address employment-related and 

tax fraud identity theft that includes 

coordinating with other Federal agencies 

such as the Federal Trade Commission and 

Social Security Administration to evaluate 

and investigate identity theft allegations 

related to tax administration. Another recommendation focused on improvements in the use of 

identity theft closing codes in the IRS compliance functions. 

Since Calendar Year 2009, the number of tax-related identity theft incidents (primarily refund 

fraud or employment related) reported by the IRS has increased. 

The IRS developed and implemented identity theft indicator codes to centrally mark and track 

identity theft incidents. Each indicator is input on affected taxpayers’ accounts using 

Transaction Code 971 with any of six different action codes.4

 The IRS currently uses these 

identity theft indicators to gather IRS-wide identity theft data for reporting taxpayers affected 

and identity theft incidents. For example, the IRS inputs Transaction Code 971 with the 

following action codes: 

 Action Code 501 – used when the taxpayer reported the identity theft. It is input after the 

IRS confirms a taxpayer is a victim of identity theft and resolves the case. 

 

2 TIGTA, Ref. No. 2005-40-106, A Corporate Strategy Is Key to Addressing the Growing Challenge of Identity 

Theft (July 2005). 3

 TIGTA, Ref. No. 2008-40-086, Outreach Has Improved, but More Action Is Needed to Effectively Address 

Employment-Related and Tax Fraud Identity Theft (March 25, 2008). 4

 The IRS uses transaction codes to identify a transaction being processed and to maintain a history of actions posted 

to a taxpayer’s account on the IRS’s main computer system. Action codes are used with certain transaction codes to 

place indicators on taxpayers’ accounts. 

Page 2 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

 Action Code 506 – used when the IRS identifies and confirms a taxpayer who is an 

identity theft victim. 

 Action Code 522 – used when the IRS receives a taxpayer’s identifying documentation.5

Although the IRS acknowledges that it does not know the number of identity theft open or closed 

cases, Figure 1 shows the number of taxpayers the IRS reported as affected by identity theft and 

the number of incidents since Calendar Year 2009.6

Figure 2: Identity Theft Incidents 

Calendar Years 2009–2011 

Calendar 

Action 

Code 501 

Action 

Code 506 Totals 

Year Taxpayers Incidents7 Taxpayers Incidents Taxpayers Incidents 

2009 60,048 90,542 194,031 365,911 254,079 456,453 

2010 69,142 101,828 201,376 338,753 270,518 440,581 

2011 87,322 110,750 553,730 1,014,884 641,052 1,125,634 

Source: IRS Identity Protection Incident Tracking Statistics Reports. 

Additionally, the IRS reported that 176,353 taxpayers (222,752 incidences) had Transaction 

Code 971 with Action Code 522 input to their accounts in Calendar Year 2011.8

Not all of these taxpayers filed tax returns or had filing requirements. Some individuals do not 

have taxable income and therefore do not have a filing requirement. 

The Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure Office 

In Fiscal Year9

 2007, the IRS established the Privacy, Information Protection, and Data Security 

Office, which in Fiscal Year 2011 was renamed the office of Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and 

Disclosure (PGLD). One of the PGLD’s four functions is the Privacy and Information 

Protection function, which oversees the Identity Protection Program. 

 

5

 See Appendix V for a list of identity theft indicators with their descriptions.

6

 See Appendix VI for a list of identity theft incidents by IRS function or office and the number of taxpayers 

affected. 

7 The number of incidents of identity theft is higher than the number of taxpayers because a taxpayer can have more 

than one incident of identity theft. 

8

 The taxpayers with accounts reflecting a Transaction Code 971, Action Code 522, may be duplicated in accounts 

reflecting Transaction Code 971, Action Codes 501 and 506; therefore, Action Code 522 counts were not included 

in calculating the total volume of incidents and taxpayers affected. 9

 A 12-consecutive-month period ending on the last day of any month, except December. The Federal 

Government’s fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 30.

Page 3 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

The Identity Protection Program provides oversight and coordination of identity theft at the IRS. 

The Identity Protection Program office works closely with the Identity Protection Specialized 

Unit (IPSU) located in the IRS’s Wage and Investment Division. 

Identity Protection Specialized Unit 

As part of the IRS’s strategy to reduce taxpayer burden caused by identity theft, the IPSU opened 

October 1, 2008, dedicated to resolving tax issues incurred by identity theft victims. The intent 

of this unit is to enable victims to have their questions answered and issues resolved quickly and 

effectively. Victim assistors handle taxpayer inquiries from multiple sources, including a 

dedicated identity theft telephone line. Victims can call a dedicated toll-free number, 

(800) 908-4490, Monday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. local time. The unit was formed 

to reduce taxpayer burden by providing individualized assistance, including: 

 A single customer service representative to work with each identity theft victim to answer 

questions and help resolve his or her issues. 

 A new and simplified process to verify taxpayer identity and identity theft. 

 A place for taxpayers to self-report identity theft before it impacts their tax accounts. 

 A place for taxpayers to self-report incidents where they may be at risk for identity theft 

because their Personally Identifiable Information has been compromised (for example, a 

stolen purse/wallet). 

In addition, the unit assists taxpayers who have already had their tax accounts affected by 

identity theft but have not yet had their issues resolved. The unit refers taxpayers to the IRS area 

that is working the identity theft issue and also collaborates with that area to monitor the case 

through resolution. 

This audit was performed in the Wage and Investment Division Customer Account Services 

function in the Fresno, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Andover, Massachusetts; and Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, campuses10 and in the Operations Support Division in the PGLD office in 

Washington, D.C., during the period June 2011 through January 2012. We conducted this 

performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objective. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and 

methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in 

Appendix II.

 

10 Campuses are the data processing arm of the IRS. They process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, 

and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.

Page 4 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Results of Review 

The Internal Revenue Service Is Not Effectively Providing Assistance 

to Victims Who Have Had Their Identities Stolen to Commit Tax 

Refund Fraud 

Refund fraud victimizes innocent taxpayers by impeding their ability to file tax returns and 

receive tax refunds. Our testing included: 

 A review of a judgmental sample11 of 17 unique taxpayer cases classified as identity theft. 

 Data analysis of approximately 1.1 million identity theft cases. 

 Interviews with and surveys of more than 200 IRS employees involved in different 

aspects of identity theft. 

 Reviews of identity theft guidelines and processes. 

Identity theft cases are not worked timely. Communications between identity theft victims and 

the IRS were limited and confusing, and victims were asked multiple times to substantiate their 

identity. 

These taxpayers would potentially benefit from improved customer service based on one or 

more of the recommendations contained in this report. We calculated the taxpayers affected 

annually using the PGLD Identity Protection Incident Tracking Statistics Reports as of 

December 31, 2011, which showed 167,619 affected taxpayers during that period.12 The annual 

total was extended for five years, for a total of 838,095 taxpayers expected to be burdened 

without the recommended corrective actions. 

Due to privacy and disclosure laws, examples of specific identity theft cases cannot be provided. 

However, the following timeline illustrates a composite of the 17 case reviews. 

 

11 A judgmental sample is a nonstatistical sample, the results of which cannot be used to project to the population. 

12 The 167,619 potential taxpayers burdened were calculated using the IRS’s Identity Protection Incident Tracking 

Statistics Reports reflecting Transaction Code 971, Action Codes 501 and 506. The IRS determined that 473,433 of 

the 641,052 taxpayers reflected in the reports as taxpayers affected were not burdened. These taxpayer accounts 

may be subject to a fraud scheme and/or the taxpayers may not have a tax return filing requirement. These 

taxpayers are not included in the calculation of the 167,619 taxpayers burdened. In addition, the taxpayers reflecting 

a Transaction Code 971, Action Code 522, may be duplicated in Transaction Code 971, Action Codes 501 and 506, 

and thus Action Code 522 counts were not included separately in the volume of taxpayers burdened. These figures 

also do not include the Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance taxpayers affected. 

Page 5 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

February 

2009 

The identity thief files a fraudulent tax return and obtains a tax refund. Subsequently, 

the lawful taxpayer attempts to electronically file his tax return, for which he is due a 

tax refund. He receives an IRS rejection notice stating that his Social Security Number 

cannot be used more than once on the tax return or on another tax return. 

The taxpayer calls the IRS toll-free telephone line and explains the situation to the 

customer service assistor. The assistor, after authenticating the taxpayer, researches 

his tax account and determines a tax return has already been filed using that name 

and Social Security Number. The assistor advises the taxpayer to file a paper tax 

return, attaching a Form 14039, Identity Theft Affidavit, or a police report and a valid 

government-issued document such as a copy of a Social Security card, passport, or 

driver’s license to the tax return, and mail it to the IRS. 

The IRS receives the paper tax return in one of its processing sites and a technician 

enters the data into the IRS’s computer system.13 It is not processed. A technician 

determines it is a duplicate tax return and inputs the appropriate transaction code. The 

duplicate return case is received in the Duplicate function, where an assistor identifies 

this as a possible identity theft case. The assistor requests the paper tax return. The 

case is set aside in a queue to be ultimately worked after April 15, when the filing 

season14 has ended.15

April The taxpayer calls the IRS toll-free line again and asks when he will receive his tax 

refund. The assistor researches the taxpayer’s account, determines a duplicate tax 

return has been filed, and advises the taxpayer that there will be processing delays 

and he may receive correspondence requesting additional information. The assistor 

also advises the taxpayer to visit the IRS’s website at IRS.gov for additional 

information and links related to identity theft.

July The taxpayer’s tax return is worked in the Duplicate function and determined to be an 

identity theft case. The duplicative tax return is transferred to another unit to an 

assistor whose responsibilities also include answering IRS toll-free telephone calls. 

The case is scanned into a management information system and queued. 

September The assistor begins working the case, orders copies of original tax returns, and sends 

letters to the alleged identity thief and the taxpayer to attempt to determine who the 

legitimate taxpayer is. The legitimate taxpayer responds, confirming that he did not file 

the first tax return the IRS received.

October The taxpayer calls the IPSU and asks when he should expect his tax refund. The 

assistor researches the case and advises him his case is being worked. The customer 

service representative sends a referral to the assistor working the case. 

 

13 The paper tax return with all attachments is sent to the Files unit, which is a repository where paper tax returns 

and related documents are stored. 

14 The filing season is the period from January to April 15 when most individual taxpayers file their tax returns. 15 There are no procedures requiring that a tax return be set aside until the filing season is over. Cases are to be 

worked when resources become available.

Page 6 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

November The assistor determines which is the legitimate taxpayer, requests adjustments to the 

taxpayer’s account, and sends a letter to the identity thief providing him or her with a 

temporary tax identity number and a letter to the legitimate taxpayer advising him he 

has been a victim of identity theft and his account has been flagged.

December The legitimate taxpayer receives the letter from the IRS and calls the IPSU to inquire 

when he will receive his tax refund. The assistor advises him that it has been 

scheduled. 

January The adjustments post to the legitimate taxpayer’s account and the refund is released. 

He receives another letter advising him he has been a victim of identity theft and his 

account has been flagged. A tax account for the person who committed the identity 

theft is also established.16

Identity theft cases can be more complex and can present considerable challenges throughout the 

resolution process. For instance, it can be difficult to determine who is the legitimate taxpayer or 

if the case is actually a case of identity theft. Taxpayers sometimes transpose digits in Social 

Security Numbers, but do not respond to the IRS when it requests information to resolve the 

case. As a result, the IRS may not be able to determine who the legitimate taxpayer is. 

Additionally, the Social Security Administration can inadvertently issue two taxpayers the same 

Social Security Number. 

In other instances, taxpayers attempt to claim they have been a victim of identity theft when the 

IRS examines their tax returns and questions credits, deductions, and/or expenses. For example, 

a taxpayer initially filed a tax return and received a tax refund. However, after the IRS examines 

the tax return, the taxpayer claims not to have filed it, stating he or she has been a victim of 

identity theft and therefore is not liable for any taxes owed as a result of the examination. 

The growth of identity theft presents considerable challenges to tax administration. Although the 

IRS has an identity theft strategy and has established several programs and key initiatives over 

the past few years, it has not been able to keep pace with the rapidly growing inventories of 

identity theft cases. Identity theft case processing is decentralized throughout the IRS, with 

limited coordination and oversight. Standard IRS processes and resource constraints have 

hindered timely and effective case resolution. 

In August 2011, the IRS completed an assessment of the current state of its Identity Theft 

Program and is planning changes to improve the Program 

In April 2011, the IRS decided to contract with an outside contractor and conduct an 

enterprise-wide assessment of the Identity Theft Program. The goal was to assess the current 

state of the IRS’s Identity Theft Program and develop a plan to address the growing identity theft 

inventory, to include developing metrics for identity theft cases and tools to reduce taxpayer 

 

16 Even though a tax return is fraudulent, the IRS retains a record of the tax return by creating a tax account under a 

tax identification number that the IRS creates. The identity thief’s tax return is subsequently posted to this account.

Page 7 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

burden and increase processing efficiencies. The Identity Theft Assessment and Action Group 

(ITAAG) first met in June 2011. 

The ITAAG also presented its IRS Identity Theft Program Future State Report,

17 which provides 

its vision for the future state of the Identity Theft 

The Future State Report provides 

high-level recommendations and a 

strategic approach for the overall 

future state operating model of the 

IRS’s Identity Theft Program.

Program and supporting recommendations to obtain 

that vision. 

The IRS Identity Theft Program will provide clear, 

seamless, and timely service to legitimate taxpayers 

while barring fraudulent filers from gaining access to 

refunds and information. 

Many of the recommendations have already begun to be implemented. The Identity Theft 

Program will remain decentralized, but with dedicated identity theft employees in each business 

function. Every IRS division will make identity theft cases a higher priority in their work. The 

IRS is implementing new procedures and processes intended to resolve cases faster and 

minimize the disruption to innocent taxpayers. It is also planning to create a way to timely and 

accurately track and report on the status of all identity theft cases. 

The ITAAG’s assessment was comprehensive and identified many of the same issues and 

concerns identified during this review. Its recommendations are far reaching and designed to 

improve the current state of the Identity Theft Program. However, the recommendations do not 

address all concerns identified in this audit and may not be sufficient to significantly reduce the 

burden identity theft has on tax administration and taxpayers who have had their identities stolen 

to commit refund fraud. 

Identity theft cases can take more than a year to resolve 

A review of a judgmental sample of 17 unique taxpayer cases classified as identity theft and 

originating in five functions showed: 

 Case resolution averaged 414 days; cases were open from three to 917 days. Time was 

calculated from the date a taxpayer’s case(s) was first opened until the last day when the 

case(s) closed.18 This does not include the additional time after a case is closed for the 

taxpayers to receive any applicable tax refunds. 

 Inactivity on cases averaged 86 days; inactivity ranged from 0 to 431 days. 

 The 17 taxpayers had 58 different cases opened and multiple assistors worked their cases. 

The IRS does not have standard criteria for how long it takes to work identity theft cases. Each 

function and office that works identity theft cases sets its own criteria. 

 

17 IRS, IRS Identity Theft Program Future State Report (August 11, 2011). 18 Some taxpayers had multiple cases open involving more than one tax year.

Page 8 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

A substantial volume of identity theft cases involving refund fraud and duplicate filing issues are 

worked in the Accounts Management function.19 The Accounts Management function stated that 

it takes from 45 to 365 days for assistors to work an identity theft case, depending on the 

category code (source of the case). However, these time frames are merely indicators of when a 

case is considered over age, have not been used to establish a baseline against which to measure 

quality, and are not based on historical data. 

The ITAAG estimated that Accounts Management function assistors only spend an average of 

1.3 hours actually working an identity theft case. The additional time is spent while the assistor 

waits for taxpayer responses or other documents needed to work the case (e.g., copies of tax 

returns or account transcripts), works the telephones or other cases, or waits for adjustments to 

be made on the cases. Assistors working the cases do not make the adjustments; the requests for 

adjustments are sent to other IRS employees. 

Identity theft cases have not been prioritized during the standard filing process 

When taxpayers call the IRS to advise it that their electronic tax return was rejected because it 

appears another individual has already filed a tax return using their identity, the IRS instructs 

them to mail in a paper tax return with the Identity Theft Affidavit attaching supporting identity 

documents. However, the IRS has been processing these tax returns using standard processing 

procedures. After the tax returns are determined to be duplicates, they are queued with other 

types of cases to be worked. This can add three to five months to the time a taxpayer must wait 

to have his or her identity theft case resolved.

The IRS plans to update tax return processing procedures by June 2012 to include a special 

processing code to recognize identity theft documentation provided with a paper-filed tax return. 

The tax return will then be forwarded to the Accounts Management function to be assigned to an 

assistor, rather than continuing through the standard duplicate tax return procedures. 

Resources have not been sufficient to work identity theft cases dealing with refund fraud 

Identity theft has grown significantly, but resources 

have not kept pace. Assistors in the Accounts 

Management function also work other types of cases 

and respond to taxpayers’ calls to the IRS’s various 

toll-free telephone lines.20 The IRS has a limited 

number of resources and must allocate those resources 

between answering toll-free telephone lines and 

working correspondence and adjustments to taxpayer 

accounts. 

 

19 The Accounts Management function in the Wage and Investment Division provides assistance to individual 

taxpayers with tax and account-related inquiries via telephone, correspondence, and e-mail. 20 See Appendix VII for assistor job titles and duties.

Page 9 

When 61 assistors who work identity 

theft cases were asked if they also 

answer the telephone, 53 (87 percent) 

responded yes. 

32 of those (60 percent) stated that 

they worked the toll-free line exclusively 

during the 2011 Filing Season and did 

not work identity theft cases. 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

During the filing season when call demand is usually at its highest, more resources are shifted to 

the telephones to answer calls, and correspondence and adjustment inventory processing is 

placed on hold until call demand subsides. Taxpayer demand for telephone services has grown. 

During the 2011 Filing Season, the IRS received 80 million attempts to call the toll-free 

telephone lines, up from 54 million (48 percent) during the 2007 Filing Season. 

Correspondence inventory (which includes identity theft cases) has also increased. As shown in 

Figure 3, the volume of identity theft cases worked in the Accounts Management function has 

grown more than 300 percent since Fiscal Year 2010. 

Figure 3: Identity Theft Cases in the 

Accounts Management Function 

for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 

Change From 

Fiscal Year 

2010 2011 2010–2011 

Beginning Inventory 13,528 39,005 188% 

Receipts 222,827 434,393 95% 

Closures 197,350 304,558 54% 

Ending Inventory 39,005 168,840 333% 

Source: Accounts Management function management information reports. 

The optimal inventory level of cases assigned to each assistor is 100 to 125 cases, but assistors 

have had inventory exceeding 300 cases. The excessive inventory levels results in lapses in 

casework. 

The IRS acknowledges that resources are not sufficient to process the current volume of identity 

theft cases and that without additional resources it is unlikely the upward trend in inventory 

levels will be reversed. The ITAAG identified an inventory of more than 228,000 identity theft 

cases that have been carried over from Fiscal Year 2010 to 2011 and estimated that it will require 

287 staff years to resolve these cases.21 This inventory does not include cases that were currently 

in the Duplicate Filing inventory. As of August 11, 2011, there were more than 500,000 cases in 

the Duplicate Filing inventory. Assistors stated that over half of their cases are identity theft 

cases. The IRS stated that it estimates that about 22 percent of the cases are identity theft cases. 

Effects of untimely case resolution 

Taxpayers affected by identity theft who are expecting a tax refund will experience delays in 

receiving their refunds. Most taxpayers receive tax refunds and generally can expect to receive 

 

21 One staff year is approximately 2,080 hours. 

Page 10 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

them within a few weeks of filing their tax returns. Taxpayers are also burdened when they have 

to make multiple contacts with the IRS trying to either resolve or determine the status of their 

cases. 

In addition, taxpayers could be further burdened if the address on the tax return filed by the 

identity thief is used by the IRS instead of the address of the legitimate taxpayer. Many 

taxpayers do not notify the IRS when they move, but just use their new/current address when 

they file their tax returns. When the IRS processes a tax return with an address different from 

the one it has on its systems for the taxpayer, it systemically updates the taxpayer’s account with 

the new address. It does not notify the taxpayer that his or her account has been changed with 

the new address. 

While the IRS resolves the identity theft case, the identity thief’s address is the address on the 

taxpayer’s record. Any IRS correspondence or notices unrelated to the identity theft case will be 

sent to the most recent address on record. The legitimate taxpayer (the identity theft victim) will 

be unaware the IRS is trying to contact him or her. 

This situation can also create disclosure issues. For example, if the legitimate taxpayer’s prior 

year tax return has been selected for examination, the examination notice will be sent to the 

address of record—the address the identity thief used on the fraudulent tax return. The identity 

theft victim is now at risk at having his or her personal and tax information disclosed to an 

unauthorized third party (whoever resides at that address).

Identity theft indicators are to be placed on a taxpayer’s account when the IRS receives 

substantiation from the taxpayer that he or she has been a victim of identity theft. However, the 

indicators do not prevent systemic notices or correspondence from being issued. 

Identity theft cases are not always resolved effectively 

Case reviews show that identity theft cases were not 

appropriately classified and identity theft indicators 

were not always input correctly or timely. Taxpayers 

were asked numerous times to prove their identities, 

although they had previously followed IRS 

instructions and sent in an Identity Theft Affidavit and 

copies of identification. Multiple closing letters were 

sent to victims at different times, possibly confusing 

the victims. 

 

22 Three different but similar surveys of 178 assistors in five IRS offices involved in working identity theft issues 

were conducted. The survey results include interviews with assistors and one formal survey conducted by the IRS. 

Not all assistors were asked the same questions and not all assistors responded to all questions.

Page 11 

Results of surveys showed that 114 of 

178 (64 percent) assistors expressed 

concerns about identity theft guidelines, 

commenting that the guidelines: 

 Are unclear, conflicting, confusing, 

unorganized, or difficult to find. 

 Do not address all situations and 

need specific examples. 

 Should be condensed.22 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Guidance is dispersed throughout the IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual and has been inconsistent 

and confusing 

Identity theft guidelines and procedures are dispersed among 38 different Internal Revenue 

Manual sections. These guidelines and procedures are not arranged for efficient access and are 

inconsistent and conflicting. Additionally, not all functions have written guidelines on how to 

handle identity theft issues. 

The ITAAG reported that it has analyzed the identity theft processes and procedures of 

28 functions and identified 50 gaps that have been addressed or elevated for remediation. For 

example, the ITAAG determined that current guidance regarding the input of Action Code 501 

and 522 is unclear, which causes employees to mark accounts improperly.23 Functions also lack 

efficient processes and communication regarding working cases referred from other functions.

Assistors are not receiving sufficient training to work and resolve identity theft cases 

Training is inconsistent or nonexistent. Instructors 

develop local training based on the Internal Revenue 

Manual and other documents that they decide to 

incorporate into their training package. For 

example, training material at one office showed 

training guidelines deviated from the Internal 

Revenue Manual with respect to the critical timing 

of the identity theft marker Action Code 501. 

When auditors asked assistors questions about identity theft indicators: 

 18 (69 percent) of 26 assistors could not provide a correct answer on when to input 

Action Code 501. 

 14 (67 percent) of 21 assistors did not know the correct use of Action Code 522. 

 35 (57 percent) of the 61 assistors could not provide the proper definitions needed to 

correctly categorize the types of identity theft cases. 

Communications with victims of identity theft is inconsistent and confusing 

 The IRS does not advise taxpayers when it has received their documents substantiating their 

identity and opened their case. When taxpayers do not hear from the IRS, they may call 

again to determine if the IRS has the requested documents and/or if they need to resend them. 

In cases reviewed, it appeared that taxpayers sent the documents more than once because 

they did not hear from the IRS that it received them. 

 

23 See Appendix V for a list of identity theft indicators with their descriptions. 

Page 12 

Survey results of 178 assistors showed 

that almost half of the assistors believe 

training is not sufficient to provide 

effective customer service. In two offices, 

insufficient training was the leading issue 

frustrating assistors. In another office, 

29 (48 percent) of 61 assistors indicated 

that their identity theft training was not 

sufficient; eight (13 percent) had received 

no identity theft training. 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

 Taxpayers are not provided realistic time frames for how long it will take to resolve their 

cases. It can take over a year to resolve a taxpayer’s account. However, when taxpayers 

contact the IRS to report that a tax return has already been filed using their Social Security 

Number, assistors are instructed to just advise taxpayers that there will be processing delays 

while the situation is resolved and they may receive correspondence requesting additional 

information. If a time frame is provided, the time frame is usually 90 days, which has not 

been realistic. Assistors we surveyed expressed frustration with the time frames they are to 

use when advising taxpayers on how long it will take to resolve their cases.

 Taxpayers may be requested to provide documents substantiating their identities more than 

once. 

 Letters sent to taxpayers are repetitive and contain errors. Assistors use the Correspondex 

system to generate letters to taxpayer.24 Case reviews showed letters reflecting incorrect tax 

years, incorrect IRS telephone numbers, typographical errors, and repetitive paragraphs. 

 The IRS sends taxpayers two different letters advising them that their identity theft case is 

resolved. Assistors working an identity theft case send a letter to a taxpayer when they have 

completed actions taken on the case. A second letter is systemically generated two to 

12 weeks later advising the taxpayer again that their case has been resolved. Neither letter 

advises when the taxpayer should expect to receive his or her tax refund. 

 Taxpayers often do not speak directly with the assistors who are working their identity theft 

cases. They call the IPSU to discuss the status of their case. However, IPSU assistors do not 

resolve identity theft cases and have limited information about a taxpayer’s identity theft 

case. Taxpayers testifying before Congress stated that they had to talk to multiple IRS 

employees and were provided conflicting instructions. 

 The IRS’s current structure has provided limited oversight to ensure that identity theft cases 

are timely and effectively worked. 

Identity theft case processing is highly decentralized and coordination and oversight has been 

limited. The different systems used by the various functions have prevented accurate tracking 

and reporting of identity theft workloads and their affect on tax administration. Because there is 

no effective way to track and report on identity theft, the IRS has also not been able to determine 

the quality of customer service provided. 

Case processing is dispersed among 16 IRS functions and offices. Yet the PGLD office within 

the Operations Support Organization is responsible for driving identity theft policy and processes 

 

24 The Correspondex System provides over 400 letters to fit specific situations, one of which is identity theft. The 

letters give IRS assistors the flexibility to choose from up to 73 selective paragraphs and create numerous “fill-ins” 

to communicate information to taxpayers. 

Page 13 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

across the IRS. It implements new identity protection measures and works closely with the 

IPSU, but does not: 

The PGLD office oversees the 

Identity Theft Program but does 

not work identity theft cases 

and has no authority over the 

functions that work and resolve 

identity theft cases. 

 Oversee the functions and offices that work and 

resolve identity theft cases. 

 Periodically review the offices and functions or 

their processes to ensure that policy and 

procedures are being followed. 

The PGLD office’s inability to track and monitor 

identity theft cases has also hindered its effectiveness. Offices and functions may be reluctant to 

share negative data, and the PGLD office cannot pull reports to determine if cases are being 

timely resolved in all the offices and functions involved in identity theft case processing. PGLD 

office officials noted that obtaining accurate and comprehensive statistical data from the 

functions when no line authority exists has been problematic. 

IRS-wide identity theft reports have not been accurate or complete 

Identity theft data are captured on 22 different systems throughout the IRS. These systems are 

not integrated and data must be manually compiled, hindering the IRS’s capability of producing 

accurate and reliable identity theft reports. 

 Not all identity theft cases are counted. 

o Identity theft incidents reported on Forms 3949A, Information Referral, are often not 

considered when tracking identity theft. In some instances, taxpayers report identity 

theft on Forms 3949A and mail them to the IRS Fresno, California, campus. The 

Fresno campus office should forward the Forms 3949A to the appropriate office(s). 

Tests showed these cases were not all worked and/or considered identity theft cases. 

o Not all identity theft cases are counted because employees are not consistently 

inputting identity theft indicators on taxpayer accounts. 

 Not all cases counted are actually identity theft cases. Cases other than identity theft are 

reported as identity theft cases when identity theft indicators are input and are not 

removed after the IRS determines identity theft has not occurred. From a judgmental 

sample of 17 unique taxpayer cases, five (29 percent) were not identity theft, but identity 

theft indicators had not been removed from the accounts. 

As of June 2011, the PGLD office estimated the number of unmarked accounts that should have 

identity theft indicators in the range of 240,000 to 280,000 cases. 

On December 23, 2011, the IRS implemented interim procedures requiring the identity theft 

indicators be reversed once a case is determined not to be identity theft. Most indicators are not 

Page 14 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

input to the account until all actions on the case have been taken. However, Action Code 522 is 

to be input when the identity theft documentation has been received from the taxpayer. 

The IRS acknowledges that it does not know the exact number of identity theft incidences or the 

number of taxpayers affected by identity theft. It also has not been able to quantify the amount 

of improper payments resulting from identity theft. 

Complete identity theft workload data have not been available 

Reports on the volume of open identity theft cases, i.e., cases in process, are nonexistent or 

inaccurate. 

 Not all functions and offices have identifiers to track identity theft cases. 

There are no reports that capture 

the total number of identity theft 

cases open and closed and the 

status of the open cases.

 Functions and offices working identity theft cases 

do not accurately track the amount of revenue lost 

or protected. 

 There are no reports to track the total number of 

employees working identity theft cases or the 

amount of time it takes the employees to work 

and resolve the cases. 

 Cases may be counted more than once. 

The ITAAG determined that it was not possible to identify the overall volume and type of 

identity cases related to each specific business unit. It is working with each business unit to 

identify the current open inventory and the staff needed in each individual specialized unit to 

work identity theft cases. 

Sufficient data have not been collected to properly monitor the quality of assistance 

provided 

The IRS does not administer customer satisfaction surveys to identity theft victims, and the 

quality review systems used by different IRS functions do not select a sufficient number of 

identity theft cases to measure the quality of customer service provided to taxpayers who have 

been affected by identity theft. 

Customer satisfaction surveys are used to develop performance measures that balance customer 

needs with IRS operational needs. Taxpayers who receive specific kinds of services from the 

IRS are asked to rate the service. Quality reviews of IRS products and services are part of an 

integrated service-wide system of balanced performance measures that includes Customer 

Satisfaction, Employee Satisfaction, and Business Results. 

Both customer satisfaction surveys and the National Review Quality System use statistical 

sampling to gather information on various IRS product lines—generally interactions between 

IRS employees and taxpayers involving either the telephone or casework. However, neither 

Page 15 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

focus on identity theft cases and neither include a sufficient number of identity theft cases to 

measure customer satisfaction or quality. 

ITAAG recommendations address many but not all of the challenges identity theft 

presents to tax administration and taxpayers 

Many of the problems impeding the timely and effective resolution of identity theft cases are 

caused by the growth of identity theft and the decentralization of the Identity Theft Program 

throughout the IRS. The ITAAG addressed many of the problems with the following 

recommendations: 

 Reorganize to have an Identity Theft Program Specialized Group within each of the 

business units and/or functions where dedicated employees work the identity theft 

portion of the case. 

o Implement a Specialized Group and develop and/or revise processes within each function 

for referring, receiving, working, monitoring, and closing/adjusting identity theft cases. 

o Develop a training course for employees interacting with identity theft victims and 

working identity theft cases. 

o Update procedures in various sections of the Internal Revenue Manual. 

 Strengthen roles and responsibilities of the PGLD office to include, for example:

o Program reviews of functions and periodic review of Internal Revenue Manual sections 

to verify consistency and identify breakdowns in processes. 

o Establishing an Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee to provide governance 

related to identity theft IRS-wide. 

o Tracking and reporting. This is to be facilitated by the development of a centralized 

repository to store and retrieve identity theft documentation efficiently. 

 Begin collecting IRS-wide identity theft data to assist in tracking and reporting the 

affect identity theft has on tax administration.

The IRS reports that it has already begun revising the guidelines and providing training for 

employees who interact with identity theft victims and work identity theft cases. It also has 

determined how many more resources (staffing) are needed by each of the Specialized Groups to 

work identity theft cases and plans to have them in place by August 2012. It has established an 

Identity Theft Steering Committee and has begun developing mechanisms to collect data 

regarding taxpayer satisfaction and quality reviews. Finally, in Fiscal Year 2012, the IRS plans 

to begin collecting IRS-wide identity theft data to be used to oversee the Identity Theft Program 

and report to stakeholders. 

Page 16 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Additionally, the ITAAG recommended that the IRS revise its current Strategic Plan to include 

identity theft and provide specific goals and objectives to address issues related to identity theft. 

However, there is no one office or one executive accountable for achieving those goals and 

objectives. The PGLD office’s role is being strengthened to include governance, oversight, and 

coordination. However, identity theft cases will still be dispersed to various IRS business units 

and functions, each with their own priorities, goals, and objectives.

The above recommendations and planned actions are extensive. TIGTA will be conducting an 

audit in Fiscal Year 2013 to evaluate the corrective actions the IRS has taken to improve its 

Identity Theft Program. 

The IRS needs to reassess how identity theft cases in the Accounts Management 

function are worked 

Although the IRS has far-reaching plans that, when implemented, should improve the Identity 

Theft Program, it needs to assess the process it currently uses to work cases of victims who 

cannot file their tax returns because an identity thief has used their stolen identities to file 

fraudulent tax returns and receive tax refunds. These cases interfere with the victim’s ability to 

file tax returns and receive tax refunds. If cases are not worked effectively, the taxpayer’s tax 

return is affected in subsequent years and identity thieves are able to continue to defraud the 

Government. 

Cases involving individual duplicate tax returns are worked by the Accounts Management 

function. The Internal Revenue Manual states: 

The Accounts Management function is responsible for taxpayer relations by answering tax 

law/account inquiries and adjusting tax accounts. In addition, it is responsible for providing 

taxpayers with information on the status of their returns/refunds and for resolving the majority 

of issues and questions to settle their accounts. 

IRS employees who work in the Accounts Management function are assistors referred to as 

customer service representatives. They are trained to communicate with taxpayers and to be 

knowledgeable of tax law and related IRS operational procedures. The duties of an assistor are 

varied. Many hours are spent working the telephones responding to taxpayer requests as well as 

working paper cases. Paper cases include both incoming taxpayer correspondence and internally 

generated cases—from working changes of taxpayer addresses to making adjustments to 

taxpayer accounts. 

Accounts Management function assistors are not examiners and are not trained to conduct 

examinations 

However, identity theft cases, like examination cases, can be complex and present considerable 

challenges, requiring skills and tools beyond those of assistors. For example, it may be difficult 

to determine which taxpayer is the legitimate taxpayer or if the case is actually a case of identity 

theft. Cases can be complex, involving multiple years and tax situations. 

Page 17 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Case reviews showed that assistors did not conduct in-depth research to identify the legitimate 

taxpayer. For example, there were no indications in the case notes that the assistor researched 

the addresses, filing and employment histories, etc., on the apparent identity thief or taxpayer. 

Auditors could not determine the resolution of a number of cases or why the cases were still 

open. In most cases, auditors had to reconstruct the cases to determine if all actions had been 

appropriately taken to resolve them. 

Case histories did not include information on the issues of the case (facts gathered) or the actions 

taken or the conclusions drawn to resolve the case. Limited case histories prevent anyone, 

including the assistor assigned to a case, from understanding the taxpayer’s situation and what 

actions have been taken on a case or still need to be taken to resolve the case. This increases the 

need to spend additional time when assistors are pulled away to work other assignments. This 

also hinders quality reviewers from determining if the case was resolved timely and 

appropriately. 

Examiners are required to prepare workpapers to: 

 Document the actions taken on the case to include evidence or information gathered, 

procedures and techniques applied, tests performed, documentation of actions taken, and 

conclusions. 

 Assist in planning, including the analysis of internal documents, and record the evidence 

gathered, procedures completed, tests performed, and analyses conducted during the 

examination. 

 Provide a basis for review, for purposes such as managerial and technical or quality 

review. 

The Correspondence Imaging System was implemented as an inventory control system, not to 

track taxpayer correspondence cases or to manage and control complex identity theft cases 

 It does not capture the time the assistor takes to actually work the case; it only tracks the 

time a case is open on the system. 

 One taxpayer may have multiple identity theft cases open on the Correspondence 

Imaging System. When documents are scanned into the system and a case is already 

open for a taxpayer, the documents should be linked to the open case. However, this 

does not always happen in practice. Instead a new case is opened and assigned to a 

different assistor, making it difficult (1) for the IRS to track a taxpayer’s cases, (2) to 

determine how long a case took to be resolved, and (3) to determine how many identity 

theft cases are actually in process. 

Identity theft cases require a considerable number of documents, for example, copies of 

tax returns or tax account transcripts, the Identity Theft Affidavit, and copies of 

identifying documents. This increases the risk that a separate case will be opened. 

Page 18 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

 Multiple assistors may work one taxpayer’s identity theft case. This can burden 

taxpayers when they are asked numerous times to prove their identities or respond 

to IRS correspondence. Currently there is no report for assistors to identify all open 

cases at sites other than their own. Cases were closed and reopened to change identity 

theft categories.25 In some instances, new cases were opened when the IRS received 

documentation from the taxpayer (rather than associating the documentation with the 

taxpayer’s open case). 

Assistors’ training can be revised to include procedures on how to better work identity theft 

cases and document case histories. This will ensure cases are worked appropriately. It will also 

allow quality reviewers to effectively review identity theft cases worked by Accounts 

Management function assistors. 

Screening procedures can also be improved to ensure research is completed on a document 

before scanning it into the Correspondence Imaging System. Employees do not always screen 

documents appropriately to determine if they belong to an open case or if a new case should be 

opened. This results in multiple cases opened for one taxpayer or one taxpayer’s case or cases 

being assigned to more than one assistor. 

The IRS has dedicated 400 additional employees to the Accounts Management function to work 

identity theft cases. However, because of limited resources and the high taxpayer demand for 

telephone assistance, the IRS plans to continue to have assistors who work identity theft cases 

also work the telephones on Mondays (and any Tuesday following a Monday holiday). 

This presents a considerable challenge in overcoming the backlog of identity theft cases. 

Additionally, if controls the IRS plans to implement in the future do not decrease identity theft 

incidences and identity thieves continue to prevent taxpayers from filing their tax returns, 

inventory could remain significant. 

The IPSU does not resolve identity cases more quickly or effectively 

The IPSU does not resolve identity theft cases. 

Instead it monitors victims’ accounts. It has 

attempted to coordinate with the 16 different 

functions to ensure identity theft cases are being 

effectively worked. IPSU assistors take telephone 

calls from taxpayers reporting identity theft or 

inquiring about their identity theft cases. 

To determine the status of an identity theft case, IPSU assistors generally do not contact assistors 

working the cases to determine the statuses of cases, but instead research the status of cases on 

 

25 A four-digit code that denotes the type or source of an adjustment or correspondence case. 

Page 19 

Survey results showed that 73 (60 percent) 

of 121 assistors could not provide callers 

with the accurate dates on when their 

identity cases would be resolved. Not 

being able to provide callers with clear 

time frames was a source of significant 

frustration for the assistors, along with 

unclear, conflicting information. 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

IRS systems. However, the histories of cases are limited, and IPSU assistors cannot determine 

when the caseworkers will have the time to work or resolve the cases. 

IPSU assistors could issue Form 14103, Identity Theft Assistance Request, to other IRS functions 

to treat the case as a priority, but generally there is no follow-up to ensure this priority 

designation is followed, and when assistors need additional time to work the case, the time is 

automatically extended. Additionally, the IPSU does not have procedures for what to do if the 

functions do not respond to an Identity Theft Assistance Request. 

The IRS formed the IPSU to reduce taxpayer burden by providing individualized assistance, 

including a single customer service representative to work with each identity theft victim to 

answer questions and resolve his or her issues. In reality, this is not how the IPSU has been 

working. 

The IRS should reassess the role of the IPSU since it is not meeting its original purpose of 

providing taxpayers with a single assistor to work with each identity theft victim to answer 

questions and resolve his or her issues. The new Identity Theft Program needs to ensure that 

each identity theft victim is provided a contact number for the IRS employee who is working his 

or her case and who can answer questions and resolve issues. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: The IRS Commissioner should establish accountability for the Identity 

Theft Program by ensuring all expectations, goals, and objectives for employees, functions, and 

offices involved are updated to include the Identity Theft Program. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed that with the significant increase 

in identity theft cases in the IRS over the past few years, it is important that the IRS set 

common goals and expectations for the offices and employees working these cases. The 

ITAAG also recognized this need, and the PGLD Office of Identity Protection has 

incorporated it into the Identity Theft Future State Plan. Based on this recommendation, 

the IRS established a governance structure consisting of an Executive Steering 

Committee and an Advisory Council comprised of operating division senior executives. 

This two-tier governance process oversees the implementation of enterprise-wide identity 

theft initiatives within the IRS organizations, collaborates on identity theft issues or 

concerns, and assesses overall program delivery. 

Concurrently, the IRS anticipates that the IRS’s strategic plan for 2014–2018 will include 

and emphasize identity theft-related content. Once the overall IRS plan is completed and 

distributed, IRS operating divisions and functions will use it to build their individual 

plans around the objectives contained in the IRS’s plan. It is expected that these 

objectives will then be used to develop individual office work plans as well as 

commitments for executives, managers, and management officials, thus establishing 

Page 20 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

accountability for the Identity Theft Program from the Commissioner to individual 

employees responsible for carrying out the Program’s goals. 

The Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support should: 

Recommendation 2: Implement a process to ensure that while an identity theft case is being 

resolved, IRS notices and correspondence are not sent to the address listed on the identity thief’s 

tax return. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and is 

exploring options in this area. In January 2012, the IRS expanded its identity theft 

indicator codes that annotate when there is a claim of identity theft. The IRS developed 

tracking indicators to mark taxpayer accounts when the identity theft incident is initially 

alleged or suspected and will explore leveraging this new indicator to suspend certain 

correspondence. The IRS is currently establishing specialized groups to process all 

identity theft cases within each operating division. Once these groups are established, the 

IRS will conduct a study to determine the feasibility of expanding notice suspension or 

suppression to all functions that work identity theft cases. 

Recommendation 3: Conduct an analysis of the letters sent to taxpayers regarding identity 

theft, including Correspondex letters, to ensure the letters are still relevant, provide sufficient 

information, and are consistent, clear, and complete. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation. The 

IRS will review its existing suite of identity theft letters to determine if the information 

contained therein is accurate and applicable to the taxpayer’s identity theft circumstance. 

The IRS will leverage technology to move towards automation to reduce manual 

processing of identity theft victim notification letters and improve the content and clarity 

of the notifications to improve communications with taxpayers affected by identity theft. 

The IRS has already taken steps in this direction. In Fiscal Year 2011, the IRS modified 

and reformatted one of its victim notification letters, making it more user-friendly and in 

plain language. 

Recommendation 4: Ensure taxpayers are notified when the IRS has received their 

identifying documents and/or it has opened their identity theft cases. The notification should 

provide victims with contact information and a clear understanding of the time frame and process 

to resolve their cases. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation. The 

IRS is updating its Internal Revenue Manual to instruct employees to notify taxpayers 

and acknowledge receipt of their documentation. The actual implementation dates will 

vary since in some business units a systemic process will be developed. As each business 

function handling identity theft cases develops a plan to establish a specialized group to 

Page 21 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

process all identity theft cases, the IRS will conduct a study to determine the feasibility of 

developing new processes for taxpayer notification, to include resolution time frames. 

Recommendation 5: Until controls are in place to prevent identity thieves from filing tax 

returns using others’ identities, create a specialized unit in the Accounts Management function to 

exclusively work identity theft cases. These assistors should be provided additional training to 

include the importance of documenting case actions and histories on the Correspondence 

Imaging System. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with the recommendation. The 

Accounts Management function currently has specialized units working only identity 

theft cases throughout the year, except for providing minimal phone assistance during the 

peak filing season. Additionally, the Accounts Management function is currently 

reviewing Correspondence Imaging System case notes for consistency and will provide 

updated guidance upon completion. 

Recommendation 6: Ensure all quality review systems used by IRS functions and offices 

working identity theft cases are revised to select a representative sample of identity theft cases 

for quality review. This will allow the IRS to track the quality of the cases and measure its 

progress in timely and effectively resolving identity theft cases. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with the recommendation. The 

IRS previously developed and implemented a suite of key performance measures to assist 

in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the Identity Theft Program. The IRS 

will create a specific quality review dedicated to identity theft cases. The IRS is currently 

working with the Centralized Quality Review System to identify necessary steps to 

develop a Specialized Product Review Group for identity theft. The quality review 

metrics will enable the IRS to develop enhanced performance measures and evaluate the 

overall quality of identity theft casework. 

In Fiscal Year 2012, the IRS began processes to enhance the quality of identity theft 

casework. The IRS developed a reporting process to capture and consolidate IRS-wide 

identity theft data that tracks and identifies inventory workload. The IRS will perform 

compliance reviews of identity theft cases to determine if case actions adhere to policy 

guidelines. 

Recommendation 7: Revise procedures for the screening process for the Correspondence 

Imaging System used to control Accounts Management function identity theft cases to ensure 

accounts are researched before correspondence and documents are scanned into the system. This 

will reduce the number of multiple open cases for one taxpayer and improve inventory tracking 

and will also help limit the number of cases assistors are required to review. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with the need to decrease 

multiple open cases. The Accounts Management function is piloting processes associated 

Page 22 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

with research products requiring an upload to the Correspondence Imaging System. 

Specifically targeted are the additional requests for returns and transcripts that are often 

associated with multiple controls. The IRS anticipates that the processes tested during 

the pilot will reduce the number of multiple controls. Additionally, as the identity theft 

process continues to evolve, case resolution time frames will decrease, leading to a 

reduction in the number of multiple cases. 

Data From Identity Theft Cases Are Not Being Used to Prevent Refund 

Fraud 

The IRS uses little of the data from the identity theft cases worked in the Accounts Management 

function to identify any commonalities, trends, etc., that could be used to detect or prevent future 

refund fraud. This includes, for example: 

 How the tax return was filed—by electronic filing or on paper, using a preparer or 

software package. 

 The preparer’s name and Preparer Tax Identification Number if prepared by a preparer. 

 The address on the tax return. 

 Income information from applicable Forms W-2, Wage and Income Statement. 

 The amount of the tax refund, whether it was issued, and how it was issued—by paper 

check, debit card, or direct deposit. 

 The account or debit card number used to issue the tax refund. 

A key aspect of the IRS’s redirection of its Identity Theft Program is stepping up outreach to and 

educating taxpayers so they can prevent and resolve tax-related identity theft issues quickly. The 

ITAAG report also recommends developing widespread outreach programs directed at enhancing 

taxpayer awareness of identity theft tactics, preventative measures, and resolution options. 

However, the current systems do not capture the data needed to support these efforts. 

After resolving the identity theft case, the information from the identity thief’s tax return is 

deleted from the legitimate taxpayer’s account and moved to a temporary account. A special 

account is created for the identity thief using a temporary IRS Number (IRSN). However, the 

account is not flagged as an identity theft account, and IRSNs are used for other purposes. 

Therefore, the IRS is unable to determine which accounts were created because of identity theft. 

If the IRS could identify IRSN accounts as identity theft accounts, that would allow it to use the 

information from the tax return to identify patterns and trends among perpetrators of identity 

theft. This would assist the IRS in establishing accurate data with respect to revenue lost due to 

identity theft and in better understanding the “look” of potential identity theft cases. This 

Page 23 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

information would aid in development of other treatments and approaches to identity theft tax 

fraud. 

Recommendation 

Recommendation 8: The Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support should ensure 

programming for IRSN processing is adjusted so that IRSNs related to identity theft and 

associated account data can be tracked and analyzed for trends and patterns. 

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with the recommendation. The 

ITAAG also recommended that the IRS develop a mechanism to pull metrics from 

IRSNs. This would enable the IRS to identify account attributes, as well as give them a 

better estimate of the revenue loss, though not a complete picture. 

The IRS is currently evaluating options for enhancing its ability to track and analyze the 

fraudulent identity theft information removed from a taxpayer account; however, IRSN 

enhancement is only one of the options being considered. The IRS is assessing the 

viability of these options using factors including impact to the operating divisions and 

statutory requirements. Until a universal tracking mechanism can be developed, the IRS 

is working to develop processes within the specialized groups to collect lost revenue data 

regarding identity theft using available data and metrics. 

Page 24 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix I 

Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

Our overall objective was to evaluate whether the IRS is effectively providing assistance to 

victims of identity theft. To accomplish our objective, we: 

I. Assessed whether the IRS maintains timely and complete identity theft case workload 

data. 

A. Evaluated how the IRS identifies, categorizes, and tracks identity theft cases. 

B. Determined whether the process the IRS follows for tracking identity theft ensures 

that all functions and offices that control and work identity theft cases are considered 

in overall inventory tracking. 

II. Determined reporting requirements related to identity theft. 

A. Obtained and reviewed IRS reports concerning identity theft for the last three years. 

B. Determined how the IRS uses available data to oversee the Identity Theft Program. 

III. Assessed whether the IRS timely and effectively resolves identity theft cases. 

A. Reviewed a judgmental sample of 17 open and closed identity theft cases from a 

population of 1.36 million. To select the sample, we identified the taxpayer accounts 

with Action Codes1

 501 and 506 and judgmentally selected cases from the 

Examination and Accounts Management functions. A judgmental sample was 

selected because we did not plan to project our sample to the population. 

B. Reviewed the cases to determine if they were timely and effectively resolved. 

IV. Based on the case review results, related any deficiencies with possible training voids in 

either the quality or completeness of training provided. 

A. Assessed the IRS’s process to ensure complete training is provided to all employees 

who handle identity theft cases, including those employees who worked the cases in 

our case review samples. 

B. Reviewed any training surveys and interviewed randomly selected employees to 

assess whether they believe there is a need for improvements in identity theft training. 

 

1

 The IRS uses transaction codes to identify a transaction being processed and to maintain a history of actions posted 

to a taxpayer’s account on the IRS’s main computer system. Action codes are used with certain transaction codes to 

place indicators on taxpayers’ accounts. 

Page 25 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

V. Evaluated the IRS’s oversight process for ensuring that identity theft cases are timely and 

effectively worked. We identified the performance measures of the Identity Theft 

Program and how the IRS is using the measures to improve the program. 

VI. Assessed the processes for ensuring that IRS communications with taxpayers provides 

consistent, accurate guidance on how to report and resolve identity theft and presents the 

least burden to taxpayers and tax administration. 

VII. Determined whether the IRS is effectively reducing identity theft that affects tax 

administration to reduce fraudulent tax returns, improve customer service, and reduce 

taxpayer burden. 

VIII. Determined whether the IRS Identity Theft Program is organizationally configured within 

IRS operations so that the IRS’s ability to meet program objectives and goals is best 

ensured. 

IX. Identified any potential or planned changes (e.g., legislative and organizational) that may 

better position the IRS to assist taxpayers who may have been victims of identity theft. 

Internal controls methodology

Internal controls relate to management’s plans, methods, and procedures used to meet their 

mission, goals, and objectives. Internal controls include the processes and procedures for 

planning, organizing, directing, and controlling program operations. They include the systems 

for measuring, reporting, and monitoring program performance. We determined the following 

internal controls were relevant to our audit objective: the IRS’s internal guidelines used by the 

functions that process identity theft cases and the management information systems used to 

control identity theft cases. We evaluated controls by interviewing management and reviewing 

policies and procedures. We also selected and reviewed a judgmental sample of 17 cases. 

Page 26 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Michael E. McKenney, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Returns Processing and Account 

Services) 

Augusta R. Cook, Director 

Lena Dietles, Audit Manager 

Robert Howes, Lead Auditor 

Jerry Douglas, Senior Auditor 

Tracy Harper, Senior Auditor 

Patricia Jackson, Senior Auditor 

Kathy Coote, Auditor 

Nelva Usher, Auditor 

Page 27 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix III 

Report Distribution List 

Commissioner C 

Office of the Commissioner – Attn: Chief of Staff C 

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE 

Chief, Criminal Investigation SE:CI 

Chief Financial Officer OS:CFO 

Chief Technology Officer OS:CTO 

Deputy Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division SE:W 

Director, Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure OS:P 

Director, Compliance, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CP 

Director, Customer Account Services, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CAS 

Director, Customer Assistance, Relationships and Education, Wage and Investment Division 

SE:W:CAR 

Director, Privacy and Information Protection OS:P:PIP 

Director, Strategy and Finance, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:S 

Senior Operations Adviser, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:S 

Director, Accounts Management, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CAS:AM 

Director, Field Assistance, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CAR:FA 

Director, Joint Operation Center, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CAS:JOC 

Chief, Program Evaluation and Improvement, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:S:PEI 

Director, Stakeholder Partnership, Education, and Communication, Wage and Investment 

Division SE:W:CAR:SPEC 

Director, Submission Processing, Wage and Investment Division SE:W:CAS:SP 

Chief Counsel CC 

National Taxpayer Advocate TA 

Director, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LA 

Director, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O 

Office of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC 

Audit Liaison: Chief, Program Evaluation and Improvement, Wage and Investment Division 

SE:W:S:PEI 

Page 28 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix IV 

Outcome Measure 

This appendix presents detailed information on the measurable impact that our recommended 

corrective actions will have on tax administration. This benefit will be incorporated into our 

Semiannual Report to Congress. 

Type and Value of Outcome Measure: 

 Taxpayer Burden – Potential; 167,619 taxpayers, projected to 838,095 taxpayers over 

five years (see page 5). 

Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit: 

The outcome was determined based on the number of taxpayers affected by identity theft in 

Calendar Year 2011. These taxpayers would potentially benefit (i.e., from improved customer 

service) based on one or more of the recommendations contained in this report. We calculated 

the taxpayers affected annually based on the PGLD Identity Protection Incident Tracking 

Statistics Reports as of December 31, 2011. The annual total was extended for five years, for a 

total of 838,095 taxpayers expected to be burdened without the recommended corrective actions. 

The 167,619 potential taxpayers burdened were calculated using the IRS’s Identity Protection 

Incident Tracking Statistics Reports reflecting Transaction Code 971, Action Codes 501 and 506. 

The IRS determined that 473,433 of the 641,052 taxpayers reflected in the reports as taxpayers 

affected were not burdened. These taxpayer accounts may be subject to a fraud scheme and/or 

the taxpayers may not have a tax return filing requirement. These taxpayers are not included in 

the calculation of the 167,619 taxpayers burdened. In addition, the taxpayers reflecting a 

Transaction Code 971, Action Code 522, may be duplicated in Transaction Code 971, Action 

Codes 501 and 506, and thus Action Code 522 counts were not included separately in the volume 

of taxpayers burdened. 

Page 29 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix V 

Identity Theft Indicators 

The IRS developed and implemented identity theft indicator codes to centrally mark and track 

identity theft incidents. Each indicator is input on affected taxpayers’ accounts using 

Transaction Code 971 with six different action codes.1

 The PGLD office currently uses these 

identity theft indicators to gather IRS-wide identity theft data for reporting taxpayers affected 

and identity theft incidents. One indicator, Action Code 522, is input to the taxpayer’s account 

while the case is open. The remaining indicators are to be input only after all actions have been 

taken on an identity theft case. 

Action 

Code Description 

501 The taxpayer identifies himself or herself as a victim of identity theft. For example, 

the taxpayer receives an IRS notice of underreported income. 

504 The taxpayer identifies himself or herself as a victim of identity theft. For example, 

the taxpayer loses his or her wallet. 

505 The IRS identifies a taxpayer whose Personally Identifiable Information was lost or 

disclosed because of an IRS data loss incident. For example, the IRS loses a 

paper case file that contains the taxpayer’s Personally Identifiable Information. 

506 The IRS identifies and confirms a taxpayer who is an identity theft victim. For 

example, the IRS identifies the taxpayer from a tax refund scheme. 

522 This indicator is input by the IRS when the identity theft documentation has been 

received from the taxpayer. Action Code 522 was not implemented until Calendar 

Year 2010. 

524 This indicator identifies a locked tax account because the taxpayer does not have 

a current filing requirement, does not qualify for a refund of withholding or other 

credits, and does not expect to qualify in the near future. 

Source: IRS Internal Revenue Manual. 

 

1

 The IRS uses transaction codes to identify a transaction being processed and to maintain a history of actions posted 

to a taxpayer’s account on the IRS’s main computer system. Action codes are used with certain transaction codes to 

place indicators on taxpayers’ accounts. 

Page 30 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix VI 

 

Number of Identity Theft Incidents and 

Taxpayers Affected in Calendar Year 20111

IRS Function or Office 

Number of 

Taxpayers 

Affected 

Number of 

Incidents 

Appeals Office: Attempts to resolve tax controversies, 

without litigation. 68 80 

Automated Collection System Program: Contacts 

taxpayers by telephone to collect and resolve delinquent 

tax cases. 811 1,355 

Automated Substitute for Return Program: Enforces 

filing compliance on taxpayers who have not filed 

individual income tax returns but owe a significant income 

tax liability. 3,105 6,721 

Accounts Management Function: Provides assistance 

to individual taxpayers with tax and account-related 

inquiries via telephone, correspondence, and e-mail and

works to resolve cases of duplicate tax returns. 69,745 83,043 

Accounts Management/Taxpayer Assurance 

Function: Utilizes the Electronic Fraud Detection 

System to screen and verify the accuracy of wages and 

withholding reported on paper and electronically filed tax 

returns. 545,074 967,945 

Automated Underreporter Function: Matches income 

reported by third parties to income reported on individual 

tax returns. 42,695 49,146 

Compliance Service Collections Operations: Contacts 

taxpayers by correspondence to collect and resolve 

delinquent tax cases. 1,245 3,026 

Correspondence Examination Function: Conducts 

audits of individual tax returns by mail. 577 606 

 

1

 As of November 26, 2011. 

Page 31 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

IRS Function or Office 

Number of 

Taxpayers 

Affected 

Number of 

Incidents 

Criminal Investigation: Investigates questionable 

refunds and fraudulent refund schemes. 3,471 3,522 

Field Assistance Office: Provides face-to-face 

assistance to taxpayers at 401 walk-in offices called 

Taxpayer Assistance Centers. 2,423 3,099 

Field Collection Function: Collects delinquent taxes 

and tax returns through the fair and equitable application 

of tax law. 161 353 

Field Examination Function: Conducts face-to-face 

audits of tax returns. 43 55 

Submission Processing Function: Processes tax 

returns. 1,467 1,600 

Taxpayer Advocate Service: Assists taxpayers who are 

experiencing economic harm or seeking help in resolving 

tax problems that have not been resolved through normal 

channels. 449 518 

Other: Identity theft which cannot be identified as related 

to any existing Tax Administration Source types. 4,565 4,565 

Total * 641,052 1,125,634 

Source: IRS Identity Protection Incident Tracking Statistics Report. 

*An individual taxpayer account may have more than one Action Code 501 and/or 506 incident present. 

These codes may have been entered for different tax years and tax administration sources and may have 

been input by different IRS offices and functions. Therefore, aggregating or summing the data provided 

in the Number of Taxpayers Affected column will not yield an accurate total.

Page 32 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix VII 

Assistor Job Titles and Duties 

Assistors, referred to as IRS customer service representatives, include (but are not limited to) the 

following named positions: 

Contact Representative. Tax Examiner. 

Individual Taxpayer Advisory Specialist. Tax Law Specialist. 

Office Collection Representative. Tax Specialist. 

Senior Taxpayer Advisory Specialist. Tax Technician. 

Tax Account Representative. Taxpayer Service Representative. 

The duties of an assistor include, but are not limited to: 

o Adjusting tax return accounts. 

o Answering tax law questions. 

o Assisting taxpayers directly or by transferring to the appropriate application. 

o Preparing original and substitute returns. 

o Proposing additional assessments. 

o Securing delinquent returns. 

o Resolving delinquent accounts. 

o Responding to correspondence. 

o Providing functional support (i.e., other duties as assigned). 

Taxpayer inquiries include telephone calls, correspondence, and personal contacts about: 

o Accounts. 

o Notices and letters. 

o Payments. 

o Refunds. 

o Requests for forms, publications, and public use documents. 

o Requests for Installment Agreements and Direct Debit Agreements. 

o Requests for Payroll Deduction Authorizations. 

o Requests for tax account adjustments. 

o Requests for transcripts of accounts and account information. 

o Tax law. 

o Requests for addresses to mail returns, payments, and/or correspondence. 

Page 33 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Appendix VIII 

Management’s Response to the Draft Report 

Page 34 
Page 35 

Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Page 36 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Page 37 
Page 38 

Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Page 39 
Most Taxpayers Whose Identities Have Been Stolen to Commit 

Refund Fraud Do Not Receive Quality Customer Service 

Page 40