Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

VANGUARD OF VALOR

Volume II

General Editor 

Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

Vanguard of Valor

Volume II

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

General Editor 

Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Afghan Study Team Authors

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D.

Michael J. Doidge

Scott J. Gaitley

Kevin M. Hymel

Matt M. Matthews

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph. D.

Editing and Layout

Terry D. England

Carl W. Fischer

Deborah J. Seed

Graphics

Robin D. Kern
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Vanguard of Valor II : Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan / general editor, 

Donald P. Wright ; Afghan Study Team, Anthony E. Carlson ... [et al.].

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Afghan War, 2001---Campaigns. 2. Counterinsurgency--Afghanistan. 

3. United States. Army--History--Afghan War, 2001- 4. Afghanistan--

History, Military--21st century. I. Wright, Donald P., 1964- II. Carlson, 

Anthony E. 

 DS371.412.V362 2012

958.104’742--dc23

 2012014877

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications 

available for downloading can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

Beginning in 2009, the United States and many of its NATO-ISAF 

partners dramatically raised their levels of effort in Afghanistan. The 

“Afghan Surge,” as it came to be known, was most evident in the number 

of additional US and allied troops that arrived in Afghanistan in 2009 

and 2010. Their mission was clear: To reverse the Taliban’s momentum 

and deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and to strengthen 

the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they 

could assume lead responsibility for their nation’s future. 

For US Army units, the ways of creating stability and furthering the 

reach of the Afghan Government took several forms. First and foremost, 

US Soldiers executed complex and difficult offensive operations to seize 

territory that had often been held by insurgents for years. These combat 

actions were often complemented by civic action projects that were carried 

out together with US diplomats and development specialists. Additionally, 

US Soldiers formed close partnerships with Afghan Army and Police units 

to accelerate the growth of the Afghan security forces’ capabilities.

At the heart of all of these efforts were the men and women who served 

in front line units during what has become longest war in our Nation’s 

history. In my time as the senior US commander in Afghanistan and as US 

Ambassador to that country, I recognized that the success of the campaign 

depended greatly on the skill, valor, and grit of our Army Soldiers. This 

was true especially of the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who make 

critical decisions under stressful combat conditions and interact on a 

regular basis with Afghan Soldiers and civilians.

The present volume, Vanguard of Valor II, offers six accounts of US 

Soldiers at the tip of the spear during the Afghan campaign. The Combat 

Studies Institute’s Vanguard of Valor series is intended to document small 

unit actions in Afghanistan. These books play an equally important role by 

offering insights to Soldiers who may find themselves in the years ahead 

under similar conditions, whether in Afghanistan or in some other troubled 

land where they have been deployed to conduct the dangerous business of 

defending the national interest in a theater of war.

 Karl W. Eikenberry 

Ambassador and Lieutenant General

 US Army (Retired)

 Stanford University

v

Acknowledgements

This volume of the Vanguard of Valor series continues the Combat 

Studies Institute’s effort to document small unit actions in Afghanistan. 

The study of these actions afford leaders the opportunity to better prepare 

themselves for continued operations in Afghanistan and for future conflicts 

yet to be determined by our nation’s interests.

Mr. Robert J. Dalessandro, Chief of Military History, and Dr. Richard W. 

Stewart, Chief Historian of the Army, were instrumental in the production 

of this book. Their continued vision and support of CSI as a publisher 

of contemporary military history allowed us to complete this volume. I 

also wish to acknowledge the numerous Command Historians, Military 

History Detachments, and the Operational Leadership Experiences’ oral 

history interviewers for their collection efforts over the past decade; 

without them this volume would not have been possible. I extend special 

acknowledgement and thanks to the Soldiers who provided interviews and 

first-hand accounts of the events about which these writings document.

The Afghan Study Team continues its work on the study of operations 

and unit actions in Afghanistan. Future volumes will focus not only on 

small units actions but will expand to examine battalion, brigade, and 

divisional level operations. We will continue telling the story of Soldiers 

serving on distant and difficult battlefields.

CSI – The Past is Prologue!

 

 Roderick M. Cox

Colonel, US Army

Director, Combat Studies Institute

vii

Contents

Foreword.................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements ................................................................................. v

Contents................................................................................................. vii

List of Figures......................................................................................... ix

Geographical Key to Operations Recounted in this Work................. xi

Chapter 1. Toe to Toe with the Taliban

 Bravo Company Fights in Makuan

 by Kevin M. Hymel .............................................................................. 1

Chapter 2. Gaining the Initiative in Musahi

 Using CERP to Disrupt the Taliban in Kabul Province

 by Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D............................................................. 29

Chapter 3. Partnership in Paktika Province, 2010-2011

 by Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D. .................................................................... 55

Chapter 4. Leading the Charge

 A Cavalry Platoon’s Fight in Badghis Province

 by Matt M. Matthews.......................................................................... 79

Chapter 5. Combat Multipliers

 Tactical Female Engagement Teams in Paktika Province

 by Michael J Doidge ......................................................................... 105

Chapter 6. Securing Dan Patan

 A US Infantry Squad’s Counterinsurgency Program in an Afghan

 District

 by Scott J. Gaitley............................................................................. 125

Glossary ............................................................................................... 147

About the Authors............................................................................... 151

ix

List of Figures

Chapter 1.

Figure 1. The Makuan Operation, 14-18 September 2010................. 4

Figure 2. Assault Breacher Vehicle cuts through grape field.............. 5

Figure 3. IEDs lay partially concealed ............................................... 6

Figure 4. Soldier conducts a bomb damage assessment................... 12

Chapter 2.

Figure 1. Kabul Province and the Musahi District.......................... 32

Figure 2. The Musahi valley............................................................ 33

Figure 3. ANP Officer Distributes HA Supplies in Mushai valley.. 39

Figure 4. Musahi Child Clutches a Blanket Received during HA... 40

Figure 5. Musahi Taliban Weapons Cache ...................................... 44

Figure 6. Wreckage of the Musahi District Government Center..... 45

Chapter 3.

Figure 1. Map of Paktika Province................................................... 58

Figure 2. Team building dinner for the US and ANA RCPs ........... 67

Chapter 4.

Figure 1. Badghis Province and Bala Morghab District................... 80

Figure 2. Red Platoon Operations, 3-4 April, 2011.......................... 86

Figure 3. Conducting SLE in Kamusari 4 April 2011...................... 88

Figure 4. Forward observer secures a sector of Kamusari Village.. 90

Figure 5. Engage the enemy from OP Reaper 4............................... 94

Figure 6. Air Force B-1 Lancer drops a guided bomb..................... 98

Chapter 5.

Figure 1. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza with Afghan children.......113

Figure 2. Staff Sergeant Ferniza instructs in combat medicine.......119

Figure 3. Sergeant Ashley Dixon on an engagement ..................... 120

Figure 4. Sergeant Major Joseph Singerhouse with FETs.............. 121
x

Chapter 6.

Figure 1. Afghan Local Police sites................................................ 128

Figure 2. Dan Patan district geographical reference map .............. 133
xi

Geographical Key to Operations Recounted in this Work.

1

Toe to Toe with the Taliban

Bravo Company Fights in Makuan

by

Kevin M. Hymel

Confusion reigned. An improvised explosive device (IED) had just 

detonated beneath the boot of an American lieutenant, tearing through the 

men of 2d Platoon. Soldiers screamed and yelled. Those not tossed into the 

air were thrown to the ground. The device had exploded only 15 minutes 

after two other IEDs ripped through 3d Platoon, which 2d Platoon was 

attempting to support. The blasts rendered both platoons ineffective. The 

Afghan town of Makuan was proving itself a deadly place for the men of 

Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (1-502d IN), 2d 

Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Bravo Company had entered Makuan the previous day to clear the 

area of IEDs, bomb-making facilities, and insurgents. On this night of 17 

September 2010, the Soldiers conducted a clearing operation before they 

were to head south toward the Arghandab River, one kilometer away. Most 

of Bravo’s noncommissioned officers (NCOs) hated moving through an 

area strewn with IEDs at night, but they had their orders. Now, in only a 

few minutes, a clearing operation had become a company commander’s 

nightmare: a mass casualty situation.

The Plan

Bravo Company’s mission in Makuan was part of Operation DRAGON 

STRIKE, a brigade-sized operation designed to clear the Taliban out of 

Kandahar Province’s Zhari District in southeastern Afghanistan. The town 

of Makuan was located approximately 24 kilometers west of Kandahar, one 

kilometer south of Highway One, and a kilometer north of the Arghandab 

River. As the main east-west route between Kandahar to the east and 

Gereshk to the west, Highway One proved a favorite Taliban target. The 

Taliban used Makuan as an IED factory, a bed-down area for insurgents 

moving in and out of Kandahar, and a consolidation position for attacks 

on Highway One traffic. Protected from the north by a series of IED belts, 

Makuan contained an active enemy who had driven the civilians out of 

the area.1

 

Makuan consisted of a series of mud compounds and grape huts 

surrounded by grape rows, marijuana fields, and pomegranate orchards—

some of which were separated by mud walls. The dense terrain resembled 

the hedgerow country of 1944 Normandy, France. Grape vines stood as 
2

tall as a Soldier. “When you step into them, you just disappear,” said 

Captain James “Brandon” Prisock, Bravo Company’s commander. A canal 

ran east-to-west just north of the town, with numerous wadis—dry river 

beds—running through the area.2

To drive the enemy out of Makuan, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Davis, 

the 1-502d IN commander, tasked Charlie Company, on the battalion’s 

right flank, with attacking an area eight kilometers northeast of Makuan, 

east of the city of Senjaray and pushing down to the Arghandab River. 

Simultaneously, he ordered Alpha Company to attack south out of Senjaray. 

With these shaping operations distracting the enemy, Bravo Company, a 

company of US Army Rangers, and an Afghanistan National Army (ANA) 

company would air-assault south of Makuan. The combined force would 

advance north, clearing the town of insurgents and IEDs. The surprised 

enemy would have nowhere to run but north, into the battalion’s Delta 

Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, positioned along 

Highway One. The air assault was set for 12 September 2010.3

Bravo Company had been fighting the Taliban along Highway One 

since late May 2010, engaging the enemy two or three times a day. “We 

lost a lot of guys in the beginning,” said Specialist Jason Leigh, the 

company radio telephone operator (RTO). “We had a lot of casualties.”4

The company had been split between two Combat Out Posts (COPs) in the 

village of Pashmul, approximately four kilometers southwest of Makuan. 

When Bravo transferred to FOB Wilson, northwest of Makuan, the whole 

unit reunited and received a new commander. Captain Prisock took over 

Bravo on 5 September, seven days before DRAGON STRIKE’s expected 

kick-off date. He had served a tour in Iraq and helped plan DRAGON 

STRIKE as a member of the battalion’s operations staff. The arrival of a 

new commander and the unit’s consolidation had a profound effect on the 

men. “Morale changed,” explained Captain Luke Rella, the company’s 

executive officer (XO). “People started actually feeling like they were part 

of a team again, and they really cared about the unit.”5

Captain Prisock had studied the enemy’s tactics. He read The Other Side 

of the Mountain, a book about mujahideen attacks on Soviets during the 

Soviet-Afghan War, specifically the section on ambushes along Highway 

One, north of Makuan. “[The Taliban] were fighting from the exact same 

positions that [the mujahideen] fought [the Soviets],” explained Prisock. 

“We noticed that they were fighting in the exact same way.”6

Captain Prisock’s command included three rifle platoons: First 

Lieutenant Charles Ragland’s 1st Platoon, First Lieutenant Taylor 
3

Murphy’s 2d Platoon, and First Lieutenant Nicholas Williams’ 3d 

Platoon. All three platoon leaders were on their first combat tour, but 

their noncommissioned officers were combat veterans. Prisock also had 

extra assets for his mission: a squad of engineers, an Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) team, a Human Intelligence Collection Team, and the 

battalion’s Advanced Trauma Life Support unit. He also received an 

Assault Breacher Vehicle platoon from the US Marine Corps; Seabees 

(engineers) from the US Navy; and bomb-sniffing dogs from both the US 

Air Force and the Navy. The extra units swelled Bravo Company to the 

equivalent of nine platoons.7

Charlie Company launched its attack on 7 September, “and boy, did 

they bring out the enemy,” said Lieutenant Colonel Davis, “and that set up 

the conditions for us to push Bravo Company.”8

 While Charlie Company 

engaged the enemy, the men of Bravo Company rehearsed the air assault 

at FOB Wilson. They were ready, but as the 12 September date drew 

near, the Rangers were committed to a different mission and a storm front 

threatened to ground the assault helicopters. The date was pushed back 

twice until 14 September at 2230, when the men were told to stand down 

for 48 hours. An hour later, as the Bravo men bedded down, orders came 

that the operation would kick off in about eight hours. Most of the soldiers 

were awakened out of their first sleep in days and scrambled to get ready.9

The air assault had been cancelled, but with the larger operation already 

underway, Lieutenant Colonel Davis needed Bravo Company to conduct 

a ground attack. The men now had eight hours to get themselves to an 

Afghan National Police (ANP) station five miles northeast on Highway 

One for the jump-off. “It was a mess,” said the company’s First Sergeant 

Nathan Stone, “but we moved.” Stone organized the men into chalks, just 

as he would for an air assault. “We just used our vehicles like helicopters,” 

he explained.10 Stone placed milk crates where the trucks would arrive. 

Men lined up and counted off as they mounted the trucks, which then 

whisked them down Highway One. The trucks then made round trips 

to pick up other chalks. Some of the soldiers worried that the massive 

movement would alert the insurgents. “We’re definitely tipping our hand 

[to the enemy] at that point,” commented Lieutenant Nicholas Williams.11

First Sergeant Stone boarded the last truck and arrived at the ANP station 

just as the company began moving south toward Makuan. “That’s how 

hard we pushed it,” he said.12
4

Breaching by MICLIC

Bravo Company did not attack alone. Three US Marine Corps Assault 

Breacher Vehicles (ABVs), M1 tank chassis fitted with a mine plow and 

M58 Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLICs), would breach the enemy 

lines and eliminate any IEDs awaiting the infantry. Accompanying the 

ABVs were two M88 Tank Recovery Vehicles, armed with .50-caliber 

machine guns and IED plows, and a number of Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Captain Prisock positioned Bravo Company 

behind the ABVs. Once the ABVs started rolling forward, the men would 

advance and protect their flanks. 

Figure 1. The Makuan Operation, 14-18 September 2010.

As the sun rose on 15 September, one of the ABVs fired a MICLIC, 

commencing the operation. Like a spider shooting a web, the MICLIC 

rocket shot out of the ABV as the line charge uncoiled behind it. The 

rocket arced over the IED-strewn grape field and landed 100 meters away. 

The line charge then detonated, shaking the earth and raising a huge, long 

cloud of dirt. Sympathetic detonations added to the power of the explosion. 

When the dust settled, an eight-meter-wide path had been cut through 
5

the IEDs in the grape rows. Everyone remembered the power of the 

MICLIC. “You can see the earth move in front of you,” said Sergeant Zac 

McDonald.13 “Those are the loudest things you’ll ever hear in your life,” 

added Air Force Staff Sergeant Brent Olson, one of Bravo Company’s dog 

handlers.14 “Everything feels tight for a minute,” explained Staff Sergeant 

Nicholas Christensen, “[your] ears are ringing, and the dust. It’s almost too 

much to bear, but then it ends quickly.”15 Staff Sergeant Joseph Roberts 

may have explained the effect best when he said, “It’s like a precursor to 

the things to come.”16 Insurgents began running away from a wadi line just 

south of the breach. A Soldier in the ANP station’s tower, manning a Mark 

19 40mm grenade launcher, fired rounds at the exposed enemy while the 

Marine ABVs opened up with their .50-caliber machine guns.17

Figure 2. An Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) cuts through the grape field en route 

to Makuan.

Photo courtesy of Captain Nicholas Williams

Ten minutes after the first MICLIC fired, the ABV rolled through the 

initial breach point, shot a second MICLIC into the sky, and again clanked 

forward. But when it fired a third MICLIC, the line charge failed to explode. 

A Marine ran out of the vehicle, attached hand-held charges and detonated 

it himself.18 “That guy right there deserves a medal,” said First Sergeant 

Stone. After the third explosion, Bravo’s men moved to the ABV’s flanks, 

providing security. “We were worried that [the enemy] would try and take 
6

it out,” explained Stone.19 Unfortunately, the MICLIC’s devastating effects 

made the bomb-sniffing dogs paranoid and edgy. According to Lieutenant 

Murphy, walking though an area blasted by a MICLIC “kind of messed 

up their noses because you have 2,000 pounds of explosive ordnance out 

there. So having them out during the initial breach is what really screwed 

them up for the whole operation.”20

The Bridge at the Canal

At 1000 Bravo Company reached a bridge over a canal running east 

to west across the direction of attack. Homemade explosive bags were 

stuffed beneath the bridge and a 10-foot pipe was buried across it. On the 

other side of the bridge, an IED hung from a tree. It was a clever ploy. 

Anyone disarming the IEDs on the bridge would expose themselves to the 

tree-borne IED. A waiting insurgent could detonate them both. “Anybody 

exposed is going to get hit by shrapnel,” said Prisock. The Marines fired 

a MICLIC over the bridge, but the resulting explosion failed to ignite the 

explosives on the bridge. The EOD men explained to Prisock that they 

could not blow the bridge without first securing the other end. The threat 

of enemy attack by direct and indirect fire was simply too great.21

Figure 3. Two IEDs lay partially concealed on the far bank of the bridge over the 

canal (inside circle).

Photo courtesy of First Lieutenant Taylor Murphy
7

Captain Prisock called in an airstrike. Two A-10 Thunderbolt II 

ground-attack aircraft swooped in and dropped two 500-pound Guided 

Bomb Units (GBUs), destroying the bridge and detonating approximately 

nine IEDs. Prisock then ordered two MICLICs to fire east and west of 

the bridge, parallel to the canal, detonating seven IEDs and clearing out 

a wider avenue of approach. The Seabees began plowing mud with their 

D7 bulldozers, creating an impromptu bridge, but they failed to transport 

a collection of large steel pipes that would have served as the base for 

the mound, allowing water to flow through the new bridge. By 1600, 

with nowhere for the water to go, the area flooded. Prisock explained 

to the Seabees what needed to be done and oversaw their work. “It was 

just weird,” said Lieutenant Williams, “having infantry guys telling the 

Seabees, whose job it is to build stuff, how to build the bridge.”22 Stalled 

at the bridge, Bravo Company could no longer keep driving the enemy in 

front of it. Replacing the bridge seriously delayed the push to Makuan.23 

Lieutenant Ragland’s 1st Platoon and Lieutenant Murphy’s 2d Platoon 

pulled security along the canal’s north bank, east and west of the bridge, 

respectively. Ragland deployed behind a dirt berm when one of his soldiers, 

Specialist Mark Baidinger, told Sergeant Nicholas Christensen he had to 

see the medic. Christensen agreed but told him to walk behind him and not 

up on the berm, where he would be exposed. “Roger, Sergeant,” Baidinger 

said, but stepped on top of the berm anyway.24 Suddenly, the enemy opened 

fire from across the canal with a B-10 82mm recoilless rifle. The round hit 

a tree above Baidinger, raining shrapnel and lacerating his left arm, leg and 

back, and breaking his femur. A piece of shrapnel caught Sergeant Derek 

Dodd in the neck. Several Soldiers carried Baidinger to the rear while 

Captain Prisock called for a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Sergeant 

Dodd stayed in the fight.25

The enemy then opened up with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 

machine guns, and AK47 assault rifles from behind a mud wall. Both 

platoons returned fire with small arms and an M240 medium machine gun. 

Soon 60mm and 120mm mortars, along with 155mm artillery, added to 

the fight. “[We] could see them moving in the wood line,” explained Staff 

Sergeant Zac McDonald. “They weren’t static.” With the canal separating 

the enemy from the two platoons and the bridge unusable, the Americans 

could only return fire. “We weren’t in a situation where we could chase 

them,” McDonald added.26 Instead of firing from cover, the untrained ANA 

soldiers stood up while shooting from the hip. They simply lacked the 

Americans’ level of training and did not have enough time in the field.27
8

When Prisock’s 60mm mortars ran out of ammunition, Captain Rella 

sent for resupply, and a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) sped 

down the dirt road to the mortar position. Soldiers threw green smoke 

grenades to cover the mortar crews running back to retrieve the ammo. 

Unfortunately, the smoke served an unintended purpose: the MEDEVAC 

HH-60 Black Hawk helicopter pilot, misinterpreting the smoke as a 

landing zone, swooped in and tried to land within range of the enemy 

fire. Specialist Leigh tried to raise the pilot on the radio, but could not 

find his frequency. He then contacted the battalion headquarters, hoping 

they would relay his directions to the HH-60 before it landed. First 

Sergeant Stone threw clods of dirt at the helicopter, trying to get the pilot’s 

attention. Other Soldiers stopped firing, ran over to the landing helicopter, 

and waved it off. The helicopter then circled and tried to land again. The 

men repeated the process. Finally, the Black Hawk left the firefight and 

landed in 3d Platoon’s rear perimeter. “He basically landed right on top 

of me,” explained Staff Sergeant Joseph Jackel, who told the MEDEVAC 

crew chief, “Get the hell out here! We’ve already got the casualty up on 

the road.”28

The mortars made the difference. The suppression provided by the high 

explosive rounds and the smoke provided by the white phosphorous rounds 

eventually gave the Americans fire superiority over their well-entrenched 

enemy. When the insurgents broke contact, Lieutenant Williams led his 

platoon splashing across the canal, where they found a big mud wall from 

where the enemy had fired. Holes were dug under the wall for hideouts and 

weapons storage. Bravo Company encountered more of these mud walls 

throughout the operation. “The area where we were was almost built for 

trench warfare,” explained Lieutenant Charles Ragland.29

Makuan

After the initial confrontation, the company cleared the final 200 meters 

south into Makuan. With the sun setting, Lieutenant Williams wanted to 

move quickly, but refused to rush his men in an IED-infested area. In the 

darkness, the men secured two compounds on the town’s northeast corner, 

designated Strong Point One and Strong Point Two. Bravo Company’s 

Headquarters and 1st and 2d platoons occupied Strong Point One, while 

3d Platoon and most of the ANA occupied Strong Point Two. Using white 

lights attached to their rifles and mine detectors, the men cleared the 

buildings. “If we saw something,” explained Lieutenant Williams, “we 

tied 550 [cord] to it, we backed out of the room and we’d pull it in case 

it was some kind of tamper.”30 For security, Lieutenant Murphy’s mortar 

crews emplaced their weapons and fired off a few illumination rounds to 
9

set their base plates into the ground. During this part of the operation, the 

men of Bravo Company encountered no one.31

The exhausted men finished clearing the strong points by 0130 the 

next morning. Some Soldiers set up security positions while others bedded 

down. Unfortunately, everyone’s assault packs were north of the canal, 

leaving the men to curl up on the floor without their blankets or coldweather gear as the temperature dropped. Many Soldiers were still wet 

from the canal crossing. Making matters worse, Army engineers began 

blowing up a nearby tree line to provide better fields of fire and deprive 

the enemy of cover and concealment. The engineers attached blocks of 

C4 to the trees and ignited the fuses.32 Some white phosphorous from the 

day’s battle set off one of the fuses early. An engineer smelled the burning 

fuse and told everyone to get inside the compound, which they did as the 

charge detonated. “No one was injured,” said Murphy, “but that was a 

close call.”33

The engineers’ work proved dangerous for Bravo’s men. Lieutenant 

Ragland was talking to one of his team leaders inside Strong Point One 

when an explosion erupted outside. “A huge fireball comes in the room,” 

recalled Ragland. “We thought we were getting attacked.”34 Other nearby 

detonations lifted sleeping men off the floor and slammed them back down. 

Sergeant Christensen was sleeping in a sheep hut when a huge explosion 

woke him. He thought an RPG had hit. Grabbing his rifle, he escaped 

as the roof caved in. Once out, he ran into Prisock, who asked “Are you 

okay?”35 He was, but the engineers continued their work until daylight, 

making sleep difficult for the men.36

First Day in Makuan

By 0300 that morning, the tired Soldiers of Bravo Company began 

clearing Makuan. Lieutenants Murphy and Williams’ platoons cleared 

compounds, while Ragland’s 1st Platoon leveled the trees lines along the 

wadis. With all their heavy support vehicles north of the canal, the men 

used C4 explosives to blow holes in mud walls surrounding pomegranate 

orchards and fired anti-personnel obstacle breaching systems (APOBs), a 

smaller two-man version of the MICLIC, to clear paths along trails and 

roads. IEDs infested the area. Whenever the Soldiers fired an APOB, there 

were numerous sympathetic detonations. The men even found two IEDs 

just outside Strong Point Two.37

Inside Makuan’s various buildings, the men found cartons and 

wrappers for 82mm recoilless rifle boosters, RPG rounds, and other 

Soviet-era ammunition. They also discovered parts of land mines. The 
10

buildings contained fresh fruits and vegetables and plenty of bedding but 

no personal items.38 It was, according to Lieutenant Murphy, “just a beddown location.”39 All of the compounds were empty, but the men knew 

Makuan was no ghost town. “We pretty much had that feeling most of the 

time that they were watching us,” explained Specialist Leigh, “that there 

was somebody out there.”40

The enemy had not abandoned the area. Providing security for 

engineers blowing up trees, Lieutenant Murphy’s 2d platoon deployed 

along a chest-high wall across from a pomegranate orchard. Suddenly, 

an enemy recoilless rifle round exploded against the wall. Specialist 

Christopher Tolintino, although protected by the wall, was caught in the 

blast. He stumbled backwards and doubled over. Murphy ran over to him, 

but Tolintino was okay. “He got his bell rung pretty good,” remembered 

Specialist Leigh.41

The platoon fired into the pomegranate orchard but the shooter did not 

return fire. Approximately a half-hour later, the enemy opened up again, 

this time with AK47s. Lieutenant Murphy’s men spotted two individuals 

running through the orchard and opened fire. “They were running pretty 

fast,” said Murphy, “and if we did hit them, it didn’t slow them down.” 

Murphy called in mortars, and while adjusting fire, another recoilless 

rifle round exploded in the distance, followed by accurate PKM machinegun fire.42 “I never felt machine-gun fire in that amount of mass before,” 

explained Sergeant Zac McDonald. “It was a massive roar...and they had 

to have multiple PKMs in multiple positions to be able to match that fire.”43

Murphy stood behind the wall, holding his M4 rifle against his chest 

with his right hand when he felt something impact on his chest plate. 

He reflexively stuck his hand under the plate to see if he had been hit. 

Seeing no blood, he continued to call in rounds and fire his rifle. As rounds 

smacked around Murphy’s head, he had his machine gunner set up a 

firing position at a gap in the wall, then reported the situation to Prisock, 

and called in aerial support fire from the on-station AH-64 Apache and 

OH-58 Kiowa helicopters. Staff Sergeant McDonald asked Murphy if he 

was okay and began checking his body when he noticed blood dripping 

from Murphy’s right glove. Murphy had, in fact, been hit in the wrist. 

McDonald applied a tourniquet to Murphy’s arm as a precaution.44 When 

Staff Sergeant Jaime Newman heard what happened, he brought up the 

medic, Specialist Michael Babinski, who loosened the tourniquet and 

wrapped a Kerlix bandage on the wound.45 Everyone kept telling Murphy 

to get his wrist examined, but he just brushed them off. “I’m good, I’m 

good,” he insisted.46
11

Two Delta Company MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs), which 

had crossed the now-completed bridge, added to Murphy’s return fire 

with Mark 19 grenade launchers and .50-caliber machine guns, but, in 

the confusion, also fired at Williams’ 3d Platoon on Murphy’s right flank. 

Captain Prisock called the Delta Company commander and told him to 

cease fire. It took two tries before the Delta Company men stopped firing. 

Prisock’s Air Force Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) directed 

helicopter gunships firing 2.75mm rockets and 30mm cannons at selected 

targets. Then Prisock brought his 60mm mortar men forward, who fired 

all their rounds in hand-held mode. Prisock added A-10s to the collective 

effort, which flew gun runs along the pomegranate field and dropped 

bombs, flushing out the enemy.47

While Lieutenant Murphy coordinated fire suppression on the northern 

section of the orchard, Lieutenant Williams maneuvered his 3d Platoon 

to the west side of the orchard. While Williams’ men prepared to breach 

a compound wall, a recoilless rifle round slammed into the compound. 

The Soldiers took cover. A-10s bombed the orchard, and Williams’ men 

breached the wall and entered the compound. They climbed onto the 

roof where they exchanged fire with insurgents in a wadi line until Staff 

Sergeant Heneghan shouted, “Cease fire! Cease fire!”48

An insurgent fired at Williams’ men and ran into the pomegranate 

orchard. The men opened fire but failed to hit him.49 An Apache helicopter 

pursued, firing its 30mm chain gun. The A-10s spotted another insurgent 

in a wadi line 400 meters from William’s men and strafed the area. “We 

saw part of his torso fly through the air,” recalled Williams.50 The JTACs 

continued to guide A-10s bombing missions on enemy strong points. 

Prisock followed up the airstrikes with 120mm mortars. All the while, 

Williams’ platoon remained in the compound, providing overwatch for 

Murphy. “It was one of the more intense firefights I’ve been in,” explained 

Staff Sergeant Joshua Reese, one of Williams’ squad leaders.51

With the enemy suppressed, Lieutenant Murphy led his platoon into 

the pomegranate orchard, using APOBs to clear a path. They found empty 

enemy firing positions, brass casings, and a bloodstain on the ground. 

Murphy led his men further south, looking for insurgents and conducting a 

bomb damage assessment (BDA) on a compound levelled by a 500-pound 

bomb. As night fell, the Soldiers, not finding anything, returned to Strong 

Point One.52

In the dark, a sergeant from Lieutenant Williams’ platoon spotted two 

insurgents, and instead of firing at them, asked Williams what he should do. 
12

By the time Williams said “engage,” the two took off running toward two 

structures. Captain Prisock called the A-10s to bomb the structures. The 

bombing required a BDA, so Williams led his men, in the dark, to the area 

where they found evidence of one bomb, but not the other. “You’d think it 

would be easy to find a 500-pound bomb drop,” explained Williams, “but 

it went right through the ceiling and no debris had come into the clearing, 

so we really can’t find it.”53

Figure 4. A Bravo Company Soldier conducts a bomb damage assessment on a 

Makuan compound.

Photo courtesy of Captain Nicholas Williams

As the men prepared to bed down for the night, some could hear the 

enemy reoccupying the village and digging holes for more IEDs. “You 

knew they were out there,” explained First Sergeant Stone.54 Staff Sergeant 

Reese admitted, “It was a really sickening feeling. I personally heard them 

digging.” Captain Prisock could hear prayers from a nearby mosque.55

Captain Prisock met with Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Davis, the 

battalion commander, and explained the futility of checking every empty 

compound in an area that included, according to Prisock, “tons of IEDs.” 

The results were not worth the effort, or, as Captain Prisock told Davis, 

“The juice is not worth the squeeze.”56 Davis agreed, but pointed out 

the battalion’s limited window on its ABVs and air assets to complete 

DRAGON STRIKE. He expressed confidence that Prisock had enough 
13

support elements to clear Makuan. “Brandon, I think you can do it,” said 

Davis. “I think we can clear this and get to the next wadi line, so that we 

can cut this facilitation zone in half because remember, we’re just one part 

of the Dragon Strike.”57 The two officers agreed to build up the strong 

points, destroy the tree lines, clear the trails around the strong points and 

improve the bridge and roads. The ultimate goal became creating a combat 

outpost in Makuan and preventing the enemy from returning.58

Around midnight, Lieutenant Murphy finally had a chance to take off 

his body armor. He found a bullet lodged in it. “I was pretty pissed off 

because it had actually shattered my camera.” He brought his armor plate 

to the ANP station and switched it with a new one. An ANP officer pried 

the bullet out of Murphy’s chest plate and explained he needed to keep the 

bullet for forensic evidence. Murphy would have no souvenir.59 

Second Day in Makuan

Before sunrise on 16 September, Bravo’s three platoons headed out 

once again, searching for IEDs and clearing tree lines. They engaged the 

enemy twice during the day: first, against a lone teenager with an AK47 

who fled at the sight of the Americans; second, when insurgents fired at 

some Delta Company trucks. In both cases, the Soldiers opened fire with 

small arms and called for fire support from orbiting A-10s.60

That night, around 1930, orders came down from battalion that 

Lieutenant Colonel Davis needed Makuan entirely cleared by 1200 the 

next day. Davis wanted Bravo Company to push down to a wadi line south 

of the town, enabling his other companies to continue their operations on 

Bravo’s flanks. To meet this deadline, Prisock needed to send his Soldiers 

out at night, the most dangerous time to search for IEDs.61 “He was kind of 

between a rock and a hard place,” explained Specialist Leigh. “Everybody 

knew that doing this at night was a bad idea.”62 The company had already 

come across numerous IEDs. “The town was rigged,” said Captain Rella, 

the XO, “it’s got nothing but anti-personnel mines all over the place and 

[IEDs in buildings].”63 Staff Sergeant Jackel was more blunt, “You don’t 

patrol at night because of the IED threat. You can’t see [anything].”64

As the sun set, Lieutenant Williams led 15 Americans, six ANA 

Soldiers, and a bomb-sniffing German Shepherd named Blek, out of Strong 

Point One. All of the men wore night vision goggles (NVGs). In the town, 

the Soldiers climbed to the roof of a compound where they had conducted 

the previous night’s BDA and worked their way down into the rooms, 

finding bomb-making materials. Some of Williams’ men returned to the 

compound where they had provided overwatch for Lieutenant Murphy the 
14

day before and set up security posts on the roof, while Williams and the 

rest of the men searched a nearby two-story grape hut.65

The ANA soldiers refused to walk up the grape hut’s exterior stairs, so 

an American swept the stairs with a mine detector. Air Force Staff Sergeant 

Brent Olson sent Blek sniffing up and down the stairs. Convinced that the 

stairs were safe, the ANA soldiers headed up. The first Soldier made it up 

the stairs, but as the second reached the third step, he triggered an IED. 

There was a flash, and smoke blinded everyone. The ANA Soldier’s legs 

were nearly blown off. He screamed in pain, joined by others who had 

been hit by shrapnel. Staff Sergeant Jackel shouted “IED! IED!” as Staff 

Sergeant Heneghan rolled on the ground, shouting that he could not hear 

anything. Other Soldiers fell wounded. Staff Sergeant Olson stumbled 

around the base of the stairs as Blek whimpered from shrapnel wounds. 66

Staff Sergeant Olson reeled in Blek’s leash and checked him for 

wounds. “While I was doing that,” recalled Olson, “I felt my right arm 

start to go numb and it just fell.” He felt under his right armpit with his left 

hand and found blood. “I’m hit,” he called out. In the smoke and confusion, 

others shouted back “Who’s hit?” “The dog handler!” Olson replied. He 

dropped to a knee and was falling backwards when the platoon medic 

caught him. Olson suffered a broken right arm, a burn on his left arm, a 

piece of metal sticking out of his leg above the knee, and shrapnel wounds 

throughout his upper body.67 Lieutenant Williams flipped up his NVGs 

and turned on the blue light attached to his rifle, looking for blood on the 

ground and on his soldiers. Other men turned on their white lights. Staff 

Sergeant Jackel ordered the uninjured men to stand still, face out, and pull 

security. “Don’t move!” he yelled, not wanting to set off another IED.68

Back at Strong Point One, the Soldiers, hearing the explosion, donned 

their gear and put on their NVGs. Staff Sergeant Newman told Staff 

Sergeant Roberts to organize a fire team and set up a helicopter landing 

zone (HLZ) for Williams’ position. As Roberts led his team out the door, 

Sergeant McDonald rushed over to Lieutenant Murphy and told him his 

men were ready. “Stand by,” explained Murphy, “let’s see what happens.”69

At the blast site, Lieutenant Williams dragged the injured ANA Soldier 

to a casualty collection point (CCP) in the compound where his men stood 

overwatch. “I could see his femur sticking out,” said Williams, “and his 

other leg is real mangled.” But when Williams reached the compound’s 

wall, he found fresh IEDs inside. “I guess they had seen us earlier and had 

to infil behind us from a back door once we left,” said Williams. “[We] 

either interrupted them or they didn’t have time [to arm the IEDs].” As 
15

Williams sought a new place to bring the ANA Soldier, three other ANA 

Soldiers came running up the road to him. “I’m trying to tell them to stop,” 

said Williams, not wanting people to move around excessively. Just then, 

one of the ANA Soldiers stepped on an IED five feet from Williams.70

Williams found himself on the ground with his ears ringing. He felt 

nauseous. He got up and checked the ANA soldiers. One was fine, one 

had lost a leg, and the third had lost both legs below the knees. Williams 

began placing tourniquets on the men’s arms and legs. “I think I used 

six tourniquets,” he said. Staff Sergeant Heneghan, already injured in the 

first blast, was sitting nearby when the second IED detonated. “After the 

second one, he was done,” explained Williams. “He literally was lying 

on the ground yelling at people.” Williams set up a new CCP about ten 

meters away in another compound’s courtyard and moved Heneghan 

there, bleeding from the ears.71 Several Soldiers helped Staff Sergeant 

Olson walk to the CCP. Olson refused to be placed on a poleless litter. 

“There’s no support structure,” Olson said of the flimsy device that relied 

on straps instead of poles. But Olson’s condition worsened. Feeling light 

headed, he asked his comrades to help him get down on his knees. He 

called to Blek and started petting him. “[Blek] didn’t even realize I was 

there,” Olson recalled.72

Williams assessed his situation. Altogether, he had 11 casualties on his 

hands: seven Americans, three ANA, and one dog. Two men were urgent 

surgical: the ANA Soldier who stepped on the first IED and Staff Sergeant 

Olson, who was bleeding profusely. In a span of five minutes, two IEDs 

had cut Williams’ unit strength in half. He realized the enemy had lined the 

whole road with IEDs. The uninjured ANA Soldiers panicked. Screaming 

and yelling, they pointed their M16 rifles at the Americans. Williams’ 

translator forgot every word of English he knew and sat on the ground. 

The ANA soldiers picked up their wounded comrades and carried them 

back to Strong Point One.73 

Lieutenant Murphy’s Reaction Force

Back at Strong Point One, everyone heard the second explosion. They 

listened as Staff Sergeant Jackel reported, “I need help, I’ve got more 

casualties than I can secure or move.”74 The ANA at the strong points 

were anxious. They demanded permission to leave but Captain Prisock 

did not want them going outside. “The ANA were relatively untrained, 

[had] very poor discipline [and] no night vision devices,” he explained.75

First Sergeant Stone was able to calm the ANA at Strong Point One but 

at Strong Point Two the ANA were more forceful. When Staff Sergeant 
16

Joshua Reese blocked the door, ANA Soldiers pointed their M16s at him. 

He let them leave. As the ANA ran out in a disorganized manner, one fired 

into the air, sending tracers over the heads of Lieutenant Williams and his 

men. “That put everyone on edge,” said Williams.76 Seeing the tracers and 

the unidentified ANA soldiers rushing around, Jackel called back to Strong 

Point One, “I think we’re going to get overrun.”77

Captain Prisock contacted Battalion Headquarters and reported that 

he had a mass casualty situation (MASCAL) alerting the MEDEVACs. 

He told Lieutenant Murphy to get down to Lieutenant Williams’ position 

and help set up an HLZ. Murphy ran outside and told Sergeant Roberts 

that he now needed his whole squad as a reaction force to head towards 

Williams.78 Everyone wanted to head out. Sergeant Christensen organized 

his squad until First Sergeant Stone told him to recharge his hand-held IED 

jammers.79 As Christensen changed his batteries, Staff Sergeant Newman 

approached him and said, “Hey, man, I‘ve got a set that works right now, 

my guys are ready to go. Let me take this.” Christensen agreed and told 

him, “All right brother, I’ll be right behind you, as soon as they let me 

go.”80

Lieutenant Murphy, now with a whole squad, reviewed the route with 

Sergeant McDonald, who led the unit. Captain Prisock had planned to 

go out with Murphy, but was delayed as Lieutenant Eric Yates, the Fire 

Support Officer, prepared his gear. Murphy led his force out to Williams’ 

position, soon followed by Prisock and a handful of his headquarters 

Soldiers. As Prisock’s team crossed through a marijuana field, they noticed 

an ANA Soldier pass by with a wounded comrade on his back, headed to 

Strong Point One.81

The two ANA soldiers approached the front gate where Sergeant Scot 

Gerwitz stood guard. Gerwitz tried to help them but one pointed his M16 

rifle in Gerwitz’s face. Gerwitz grabbed the weapon, tossed it aside and 

helped the injured ANA Soldier to Strong Point One’s CCP, which First 

Sergeant Stone had established, along with a second HLZ. Lieutenant 

Ragland’s men laid out infrared chemical lights to guide the helicopters. 

When the first Black Hawk landed, the men loaded the ANA soldiers with 

missing legs. Trucks from the ANA and Delta Company also arrived to 

take more wounded north. As more ANA Soldiers drifted into the strong 

points, the men inside ripped up shirts for bandages and broke up a ladder 

to create splints. When they ran out of tourniquets, the men fashioned their 

own.82

Lieutenant Murphy’s team continued south toward Williams. When 

Murphy told Sergeant McDonald to push forward, Staff Sergeant Newman 
17

preached caution, “Lieutenant, would you think about this a little bit and 

make sure we’re doing the right thing?” Murphy took his advice, stopped, 

and sent McDonald to find the best way to Williams. McDonald pushed 

through a marijuana field and made contact with a few of Williams’ 

men. “They were spread real thin because they had been hit with those 

IEDs,” said McDonald, who reported back to Murphy that the link was 

established.83

Meanwhile, Captain Prisock’s team made it through the marijuana 

field and caught up with Murphy’s men on a trail along a wall. In the 

darkness, Lieutenant Yates, following behind Sergeant Newman and 

Prisock, stepped on another IED. The powerful blast knocked everyone 

down. Debris flew through the air, peppering the soldiers. The heat was 

intense. “It felt like all of a sudden somebody opened an oven right behind 

you,” said Prisock who dropped to one knee as something large flew by his 

right side.84 Specialist Babinski, the medic, was thrown up against a wall. 

Screams again filled the air. Weapons and equipment littered the ground.85

In the blinding dust, Sergeant McDonald grabbed Lieutenant Murphy 

and asked him if he was okay. “I’m all right, I’m all right,” Murphy 

replied. Both had been hit in the back with shrapnel.86 Everyone who 

could flipped up their NVGs and turned on their red, white, or blue lights. 

“The threat of casualties bleeding out overwhelmed our fear of the enemy 

seeing our lights,” explained Murphy. “They already knew where we were 

anyway.”87 Murphy and McDonald assessed the casualties, trying to find 

out the severity of the injuries and figure out who was healthy enough to 

pull security. Murphy found Yates first, mortally wounded but conscious. 

He reassured Yates that he was going to be okay. “Yeah,” said Yates, “I’ll 

be okay. I know you got me.”88 Soldiers moved Yates into the blast hole—

the safest place after an IED attack. Specialist Babinski shook Yates. He 

did not respond. Babinski asked for some light so he could assess Yates 

wounds. Other soldiers were shouting “Medic!” so he instructed the men 

around Yates to apply tourniquets while he assessed the other casualties.89

Babinski checked everyone near the blast site. Some were cut from 

shrapnel, others from rocks. Most were dazed. “Luckily, they were in the 

prone [position] so they didn’t catch [much] shrapnel,” explained Babinski. 

Pieces of shrapnel lodged above Sergeant Roberts’ Adam’s apple and his 

cheek.90 Babinski returned to Yates, checked the tourniquets and stuffed 

combat gauze into his wounds. Yates opened his eyes and asked Babinski 

how he was doing. “Pretty good,” Babinski replied and asked Yates how 

he was feeling. “Tired,” was his only reply as he closed his eyes.91 Captain 

Prisock showed up and told Yates, “Hey, stick with us, hang in there, stay 
18

with us.” Yates opened his eyes again. “Hey, I’m with you,” said Prisock. 

The two men then said a prayer together.92 

Lieutenant Murphy told Prisock he had 12 wounded and only five or 

six combat-effective Soldiers. Prisock raised Lieutenant Colonel Davis on 

the radio and told him he had a second MASCAL and needed multiple 

MEDEVACs.93 Now there would be three HLZs: one for Williams’ 3d 

Platoon, one for Murphy’s 2d, and one for the strong points. First Sergeant 

Stone organized all three from Strong Point One and coordinated the 

MEDEVACs. Staff Sergeant Christensen, watching Stone’s actions, was 

impressed with how smoothly he ran the three MASCALS. “He did an 

outstanding job,” Christensen recalled.94

Lieutenant Murphy established security while Sergeant McDonald set 

up a CCP in the middle of the marijuana field. Those uninjured helped the 

wounded and set up an HLZ in a wheat field on the edge of the marijuana 

rows. Murphy and several men carried Lieutenant Yates on a poleless 

litter, but he kept sliding off in the rough terrain and the men kept stopping 

or slowing down to put him back on. Soldiers took turns holding his hand 

as they brought him to the CCP. While they waited for the helicopters, 

Murphy made his way to 3d platoon’s area, found Lieutenant Williams and 

told him there was no way 2d Platoon could assist him. Williams said his 

men were capable of evacuating their own wounded. Murphy then asked 

Williams if he had seen Staff Sergeant Newman, saying “I can’t find him.” 

Williams said he had not. His mission completed, Murphy returned to his 

platoon.95

Approximately seven MEDEVAC helicopters circled above Makuan. 

At Lieutenant Williams’ position, Williams and Staff Sergeant Jackel spun 

chemical lights on strings, making a glowing propeller called a “buzz 

saw.” The pilots were taking things slow, not risking a mid-air collision by 

coming in too fast. At Lieutenant Murphy’s position, the first helicopter 

landed and the men rushed Lieutenant Yates to it. Specialist Babinski 

briefed the flight medic on Yates’ condition. As the Bravo men gathered 

other casualties, the flight medic jumped back into the helicopter as it took 

off. Yates was an emergency case and the crew wanted to get him to help 

quickly. When Prisock had difficulty contacting other Army MEDEVACs, 

his JTACs called in Air Force Pararescue Jumper helicopters. They 

landed at both Murphy and Williams’ positions and loaded the wounded 

Americans but the ANA were nowhere to be found. They had all left on 

foot.96

At Lieutenant Murphy’s location, the men had finished loading the last 

wounded when Specialist Babinski brought Murphy a list of names of those 
19

evacuated. Staff Sergeant Newman’s name was not on the list. Someone 

suggested that Newman had walked back to the strong points. Sergeant 

McDonald could not raise Newman on the radio. “My initial worry was 

that he was hurt, couldn’t defend himself, and [the enemy was] a lot closer 

to us than we imagined,” he said.97 The rest of the men returned to the blast 

site, seeking to avoid IEDs. They found Newman’s ID card, pieces of his 

uniform, and his ammo pouch in a tree. They noticed a bloodstain on the 

mud wall about 20 meters from the blast site.98

While Sergeant McDonald checked the other side of the wall, 

Lieutenant Murphy discovered Newman’s body in a ditch. They deduced 

that the blast threw Newman backward into the wall, before he rolled 

forward into the ditch. It was Newman who flew past Captain Prisock’s 

right side at the moment of the explosion.99 The men put Newman into a 

body bag and placed it onto a litter. Four men, including Murphy, picked 

up the litter and carried it back to Strong Point One until Murphy asked 

the men if he could change hands, since he was holding the litter handle 

with his wounded hand. “We kind of felt like idiots for not remembering 

his wrist was all messed up,” recalled Specialist Babinski. “But he didn’t 

stop at all. He kept going.”100

During the search for Staff Sergeant Newman, Specialist Leigh became 

disoriented and dropped to a knee. He also had trouble breathing. As the 

men carried Newman’s body back to Strong Point One, Leigh vomited. He 

told Captain Prisock he felt fine, trying to reassure his commander that he 

had not suffered a concussion, but his words were disjointed and confused. 

He vomited again.101 Other soldiers were doing the same, suffering the 

delayed effects of over-pressure sickness and traumatic brain injury (TBI). 

Soldiers from 1st Platoon arrived from Strong Point Two and brought the 

men all the way back to the canal bridge where they rendezvoused with 

an MRAP to bring them to the ANP station for treatment.102 As Leigh 

climbed into the MRAP, he turned to Captain Rella, “Well, at least I’m 

going to get my Purple Heart, Sir.” Rella agreed.103 In all, 26 American and 

ANA soldiers were evacuated that night.104

First Sergeant Stone conducted an equipment check on all the Soldiers 

and discovered that Lieutenant Yates’ Advanced Special Improvement 

Program (ASIP) radio was missing. Soldiers from Lieutenant Ragland’s 

1st Platoon relieved Murphy’s 2d Platoon and searched for the radio, which 

could not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. After searching around the 

blast area, Ragland called for the engineers, who used APOBs to blast 

paths through the fields or knock down walls. “[We] saw the blood all 

over,” said Lieutenant Ragland, “but [we] couldn’t really find anything to 
20

bring back.”105 After almost an hour-long search, Captain Prisock decided 

the mission was not worth the risk and ordered the men to return.106

Lieutenant Williams and the rest of his men finally arrived at Strong 

Point One after taking a circuitous route, making sure not to follow the 

same path they used on the way out. Everyone was checked for signs of 

hearing loss and TBI. Some were evacuated by trucks. Sergeant Gerwitz, 

now Lieutenant Murphy’s acting platoon sergeant, told his returning men 

to go sit by the fire. “Try to get warm,” he told them, “try to get some 

rest.”107 Many men suffered from headaches and swollen limbs. Then 

word then reached the men that Yates had died. “They were shaken up,” 

said Lieutenant Ragland.108 Some of the men removed equipment off 

Sergeant Newman’s body in preparation for the trip to the ANP station. 

The last piece they lifted was a document in several Afghan languages 

which began, “I am an American Soldier.”109

Captain Prisock radioed Lieutenant Colonel Davis and the two 

officers agreed to bomb the area where Lieutenant Yates lost his radio. 

Now convinced that Makuan held no civilians, Davis changed the mission 

from clearing the town for an outpost to eliminating the settlement. They 

planned to hit the area with Guided-Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(G-MLRS) artillery. If Yates’ radio was still in the area, the G-MLRS 

would blast it to bits, along with any insurgents and IEDs.110

The next morning at sunrise, most of the men retreated into the strong 

points as 40 to 50 G-MLRS rockets flew over and exploded in the IED blast 

area. Prisock described the rockets flying overhead as “black telephone 

poles, just descending.”111 “Everything was rock, rattle and shake,” said 

Staff Sergeant Roberts.112 “It was pretty phenomenal,” added Lieutenant 

Murphy.113 Lieutenant Williams did not think so. The explosions woke him 

out of a dead sleep. “I’m scrambling,” said Williams, “I’m trying to grab 

my M4, my helmet, and I’m like ‘What’s going on? Not again!’” The 

explosion lifted the men’s spirits after a difficult operation. “It made their 

hearts happy,” said Staff Sergeant Roberts. “[It] made them feel better to 

have some sort of retaliation.”114

Within days, Bravo Company departed the area. Other elements of 

1st Battalion, 502d IN moved in and leveled the remaining structures 

and destroyed additional tree lines. By the time they were done, they 

had, according to Staff Sergeant Jackel, “turned it into a parking lot.”115

When Sergeant McDonald returned to the town almost a week later with 

Alpha Company, he did not recognize the area. “From the time that I 

first saw it to when it was completely finished was pretty much night and 
21

day,” said McDonald. “There was nothing there.”116 Makuan eventually 

became a combat outpost and never again supported enemy operations as 

a bed-down area, a bomb-producing facility, or a consolidation area for 

ambushes on Highway One. An objective of DRAGON STRIKE had been 

accomplished, but Bravo Company paid a heavy price to deprive Makuan 

from the enemy.117

Conclusion 

Bravo Company overcame numerous obstacles to return Makuan to 

government control. The Soldiers used their training and assets to clear 

IEDs, destroy fighting positions, and eliminate IED-making facilities. 

“The threat was killing not only us, but the ANA, the ANP, and the local 

civilians,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Davis. When the operation ended, 

local farmers returned to the area south of Highway One and thanked the 

Soldiers, telling them “this area has been the Taliban’s area, we just wanted 

to be farmers again.”118

The Makuan operation also proved the utility of joint operations. The 

Marine Corps breached the IED belts south of Highway One. Navy Seabees 

worked on the front line to build (and rebuild) the bridge over the canal 

and Navy bomb-sniffing dogs added to the company’s capability. The Air 

Force provided combat air support, pararescue helicopters, JTACs, as well 

as bomb-sniffing dogs. Throughout the operation, the services collectively 

coordinated their efforts for the best possible result. Captain Prisock 

praised the joint effort, “Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors alike 

constantly faced and overcame great danger, maintaining their composure 

and commitment to both the mission and one another,” he explained.119

Advanced weapons systems, such as MICLIC-firing ABVs and APOBs, 

also gave the Americans a distinct advantage over the enemy embedded in 

a safe haven that dated back to the Soviet-Afghan War.

Captain Prisock considered the destruction of the bridge on 15 

September the key to the operation. If Bravo had kept the bridge intact, 

or had a portable bridge readily available, they would have been able to 

advance south faster, bringing in MRAPs and other heavy vehicles, and 

quickly push all the way down to the Arghandab River. They also would 

have had more daylight to identify and remove IEDs. As it was, Bravo 

ended up stalled at the bridge on the first day, giving the enemy time to 

recover and attack Lieutenant Ragland’s 1st Platoon, inflicting casualties. 

Some of Bravo Company’s assets did not achieve the expected results. 

Most of the men grew distrustful of their bomb-sniffing dogs, feeling 

they only provided a false sense of security. The dogs got off to a poor 
22

start when the MICLICs first breached the enemy line.120 First Sergeant 

Stone explained that the dogs panicked every time an explosive detonated, 

adding “nobody really trusted them.”121 Lieutenant Williams thought both 

the dogs and their trainers were very professional, but the dogs could not 

handle the Afghan heat. The dog handlers would often tell him “He’s done, 

he’s not going to be very effective anymore.”122 Staff Sergeant Roberts 

saw some benefit, “I’m not going to walk out there without a dog if the dog 

is available.”123 While the dogs had been trained to detect odors specific to 

IEDs, the enemy often masked those odors. In addition, the dog handlers 

found it difficult to read their dogs at night while wearing NVGs. This 

might explain why Blek failed to detect the IED in the staircase. Staff 

Sergeant Olson stressed that “there’s no odor in a pressure plate,” adding 

“I can’t say that I really saw anything in my dog that could have prevented 

it.”124

Other factors proved a challenge to the Soldiers. Almost everyone in 

the company admitted how exhausted they were when DRAGON STRIKE 

kicked off, and they caught little sleep on the following days. “We had 

already been up for two days [prior to DRAGON STRIKE],” explained 

First Sergeant Stone.125 “We were so run down, and just barely making it,” 

recalled Staff Sergeant Christensen.126 Specialist Leigh remembered that 

exhaustion tested everyone. “We were running on no sleep, and bad food, 

and it tested the Soldiers probably more than [anything else].”127 Most men 

stressed they were more fatigued on this operation than any other time in 

their military careers.128

Bravo Company’s officers and NCOs agreed that going into a built-up 

area at night invited trouble. “We had seen the IEDs,” said Staff Sergeant 

Roberts, explaining that the enemy had already placed IEDs all over 

Makuan before they pulled out. “They go back and hook up the batteries 

before you come, so when you come through there, it’s hot, and at nighttime, 

you can’t see anything.”129 Staff Sergeant Jackel called operations at 

night misguided. “That was one of my platoon’s tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. We don’t patrol at night,” he said.130 Lieutenant Williams felt 

that it was easiest to spot IEDs visually, in daylight, where anything that 

looked odd usually revealed an IED. “[The enemy] kicks some rocks over 

[the IEDs] or a rock with a wire sticking out, because they know they don’t 

have all day to do it, so they got to rush.”131 First Sergeant Stone defended 

the night maneuver, despite the heavy IED infestation, “From a tactical 

viewpoint we knew that if we were going to catch them bedded down, the 

best time to do that was at night.”132
23

Also, by operating during the day and returning to the strong points at 

night, the company allowed the enemy to reoccupy compounds previously 

cleared. The air assault originally planned for Makuan would have solved 

this problem by trapping the enemy between two forces. When Bravo 

instead attacked on the ground, the enemy was able to retreat and return. 

Staff Sergeant Heneghan explained the unit’s frustration about revisiting 

areas already cleared the previous day. “We had already been down there... 

and they wanted us to go back down there again at this time, at night.”133

Bravo Company did have the benefit of excellent leadership. Captain 

Prisock commanded Bravo Company for only 10 days prior to DRAGON 

STRIKE, but he led from the front and shared his men’s burdens. He called 

in the A-10s to destroy the bridge over the canal, brought support fire 

when Lieutenant Murphy engaged the enemy, and went out with Murphy’s 

unit when the ANA Soldier stepped on the IED. He also made sure his 

men knew how to use any asset available to them, from fire support to 

heavy weapons. “We had the assets at the time and he wanted to make sure 

the soldiers knew how to employ those assets,” explained First Sergeant 

Stone.134 “That decision to place Brandon in [command of Bravo Company] 

was certainly the right decision,” said Lieutenant Colonel Davis, “and he 

really... did well, Brandon Prisock took it to the next level.” Prisock’s 

lieutenants and NCOs also performed their duties despite wounds, little 

sleep, and a tenacious enemy.135

Despite the hardships and delays, Bravo Company performed 

professionally and bravely, clearing IEDs and engaging the enemy. 

When Lieutenant Murphy and Sergeant Dodd were wounded, they stayed 

in the fight. During the subsequent battle, the men managed to reroute 

a MEDEVAC helicopter from inadvertently landing on the battlefield. 

During the first IED incident, every Soldier wanted to leave the strong 

points and help their comrades, and when the ANA panicked, the American 

Soldiers kept their composure and followed procedures. And despite the 

confusion of three IED blasts, First Sergeant Stone orchestrated three 

MASCALs and evacuated 26 casualties out of the area. 

In clearing Makuan, the company suffered heavy casualties. Men were 

killed, others received severe wounds and even more suffered TBI. Yet they 

pressed on after the delay at the bridge and again following the firefights at 

the canal and Makuan. After the three IED explosions, they evacuated the 

wounded and searched for Lieutenant Yates’ missing equipment. Prisock 

was proud of his men. “Without fail, everyone gave 100 percent,” he said. 

“Their efforts and sacrifice counted.”136
24

Notes

1. Carl Forsberg, “Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 

Hamkari Campaign” Institute for the Study of War, December 2010, Afghanistan 

Reports, 25, 26.

2. Captain James Prisock, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 October 2011, 14.

3. Prisock, interview, 4, 5, 7, 87; Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Davis, 

interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 

December 2011, 25, 26.

4. Specialist Nicholas Leigh, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 October 2011, 2, 3.

5. Captain Luke Rella, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 November 2011, 6.

6. Prisock, interview, 9, 10, 11; Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau, The Other 

Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 2010), 42-48.

7. Prisock, interview, 26, 27.

8. Davis, interview, 25.

9. Lieutenant Taylor Murphy, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 October 2011, 5, 6; First Sergeant Nathan 

Stone, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 8 November 2011, 4.

10. Stone, interview, 5.

11. Captain Nicholas Williams, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 October 2011, 7.

12. Staff Sergeant Nicholas Christensen, interview by Kevin Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 November 2011, 10; Davis, 

interview, 26; Stone, interview, 6.

13. Sergeant Zac McDonald, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 October 2011, 6.

14. Staff Sergeant Brent Olson, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 October 2011, 6.

15. Christensen, interview 11.

16. Staff Sergeant Joseph Roberts, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 November 2011, 7.

17. Prisock, interview, 12; Lieutenant Charles Ragland, interview by Kevin 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 October 2011, 17; 

Murphy, interview, 13. 
25

18. John Hoellward, “ABV to Protect Combat Engineers,” Marine Corps 

Times, 9 June 2007, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_

engineer_vehicle_070609/, accessed 10 December 2011; Prisock, interview, 20.

19. Stone, interview, 9.

20. Murphy, interview, 7, 8, 30.

21. Prisock, interview, 17, 18.

22. Williams, interview, 21.

23. Prisock, interview, 21, 28. 

24. Christensen, interview, 14.

25. Staff Sergeant Ryan Heneghan, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 October 2011, 18; Stone, interview, 

14.

26. McDonald, interview, 13.

27. Sergeant Scott Gerwitz, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 November 2011, 10; Prisock, interview, 40, 41.

28. Prisock, interview, 37, 40, 41; Rella, interview, 16; Leigh, interview, 13; 

Sergeant Joseph Jackel by interview, Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 25 October 2011, 10; Stone, interview, 12.

29. Ragland, interview, 25; Staff Sergeant Joshua Reese interview by Kevin 

Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 October 2011, 9.

30. Williams, interview, 19, 20, 22, 23.

31. Murphy, interview, 21.

32. Leigh, interview, 16, 17; Olson, interview, 10; Gerwitz, interview, 17, 

18.

33. Murphy, interview, 22.

34. Ragland, interview, 31.

35. Christensen, interview, 21, 22.

36. Reese, interview, 10; Heneghan, interview, 33.

37. Gerwitz, interview, 19; Ragland, interview, 33; Prisock, interview, 34, 

35; Murphy, interview, 23; Williams, interview, 28, 29.

38. Williams, interview, 30; Heneghan, interview, 29.

39. Murphy, interview, 25.

40. Leigh, interview, 24, 25.

41. Leigh, interview, 21.

42. Murphy, interview, 32, 33, 34.

43. McDonald, interview, 24.
26

44. McDonald, interview, 26.

45. Specialist Michael Babinski, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 October 2011, 13. 

46. Murphy, interview, 35, 36, 37, 41, 61; 

47. Prisock, interview, 49, 51, 52, 53.

48. Olson, interview, 13.

49. Leigh, interview, 21;

50. Williams, interview, 36, 37.

51. Reese, interview, 14, 15.

52. Murphy, interview, 44, 45, 46; McDonald, interview, 27; Roberts, 

interview, 24.

53. Williams, interview, 37, 38.

54. Stone, interview, 21.

55. Reese, interview, 17.

56. Prisock, interview, 43.

57. Davis, interview, 43.

58. Prisock, interview, 44. 

59. Murphy, interview, 38.

60. Olson, interview, 15; Heneghan, interview, 47.

61. Davis, interview, 44.

62. Leigh, interview, 25, 26.

63. Rella, interview, 23.

64. Jackel, interview, 21. 

65. Williams, interview, 42.

66. Williams, interview, 43, 44; Olson, interview, 20.

67. Olson, interview, 22.

68. Williams, interview, 62.

69. McDonald, interview, 29; Robert, interview, 30, 31.

70. Williams, interview, 44, 45.

71. Williams, interview, 46.

72. Olson, interview, 21, 22.

73. Williams, interview, 48, 50.

74. Christianson, interview, 30.
27

75. Prisock, interview, 72.

76. Williams, interview, 51.

77. Stone, interview, 23. 

78. Leigh, interview, 28.

79. Glen Goodman, “Dismounted Counter-IED: Size, Weight & Power 

Limits,” Soldier Mod, January 2009, www.soldiermod.com/volume-2/pdfs/.../

dismounted-jamming.pdf, (accessed on 13 December 2011).

80. Christianson, interview, 30, 31.

81. Prisock, interview, 71; McDonald, interview, 31, 32.

82. Gerwitz, interview, 33; Stone, interview, 25.

83. McDonald, interview, 32, 33.

84. Prisock, interview, 63, 64, 76.

85. Murphy, interview, 59; Babinski, interview, 20.

86. McDonald, interview, 34.

87. Lieutenant Taylor Murphy, e-mail to Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 2012.

88. Murphy, interview, 56.

89. Babinski, interview, 20, 21.

90. Roberts, interview, 36.

91. Babinski, interview, 22.

92. Prisock, interview, 65.

93. Prisock, interview, 72.

94. Christensen, interview, 38.

95. Murphy, interview, 57, 58; Williams, interview, 52.

96. Prisock, interview, 74; Olson, interview, 26; Ragland, interview, 45; 

Williams, interview, 51.

97. McDonald, interview, 38, 39.

98. Murphy, interview, 59, 60.

99. McDonald, interview, 38.

100. Babinski, interview, 27, 33. 

101. Leigh, interview, 38, 40.

102. Murphy, interview, 63; Babinski, interview, 25, 30.

103. Rella, interview, 45.

104. Stone, interview, 27. 
28

105. Ragland, interview, 56.

106. Prisock, interview, 77; Stone, interview, 29.

107. Gerwitz, interview, 37.

108. Ragland, interview, 59.

109. Babinski, interview, 29.

110. Davis, interview, 51, 52.

111. Prisock, interview, 80.

112. Roberts, interview, 43.

113. Murphy, interview, 67.

114. Williams, interview, 57. 

115. Jackel, interview, 33.

116. McDonald, interview, 46.

117. Williams, interview, 59.

118. Davis, interview, 56.

119. Captain James Prisock, e-mail to Kevin M. Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 January 2012.

120. Ragland, interview, 27; Murphy, interview, 30; Leigh, interview, 42; 

Gerwitz, interview, 44.

121. Stone, interview, 3.

122. Williams, interview, 25.

123. Roberts, interview, 49.

124. Olson, interview, 27.

125. Stone, interview, 16.

126. Christensen, interview, 27.

127. Leigh, interview, 46.

128. Gerwitz, interview, 18.

129. Roberts, interview, 29.

130. Jackel, interview, 40.

131. Williams, interview, 72. 

132. Stone, interview, 20.

133. Heneghan, interview, 48.

134. Stone, interview, 39.

135. Davis, interview, 14. 

136. Davis, interview, 59; Prisock, e-mail.
29

Gaining the Initiative in Musahi

Using CERP to Disrupt the Taliban

in Kabul Province

by

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D.

In October 2010, Taliban insurgents controlled the Musahi valley in 

east-central Afghanistan. Nestled between Logar Province to the south 

and the Afghan capital of Kabul to the north, the valley was a strategic 

Taliban corridor. Located 25 kilometers southeast of Kabul, the Musahi 

District had a population of 44,000 residents scattered throughout 22 

villages.1 Waging a ruthless campaign of intimidation and violence, the 

Taliban terrorized the Musahi population, established a string of weapons 

caches, assassinated and kidnapped members of the Afghan National 

Police (ANP), bribed local government officials, and detonated roadside 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) throughout the valley. The Musahi 

ANP proved incapable of protecting the population or ending the Taliban’s 

reign of terror. Outmanned, undersupplied, inexperienced, and crippled by 

desertions, the ANP seldom ventured away from their security checkpoints. 

As a result, the Taliban controlled the valley with little resistance. Eleven 

years after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the deteriorating security 

situation on the doorstep of the national capital defied simple solutions.2

In late 2010, the daunting task of professionalizing the valley’s ANP 

fell to the Musahi Police Mentor Team (PMT). Under the direction of First 

Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., the PMT, comprised of 13 Soldiers from the 

Nebraska Army National Guard’s Alpha Troop, 1st Squadron, 134th Cavalry 

Regiment (A/1-134 CAV), arrived at Camp Dubbs in Kabul in November 

and assessed Musahi’s grave security situation. Frey decided to launch a 

large-scale humanitarian aid (HA) mission funded by the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP). A Department of Defense (DOD) 

program, CERP distributed humanitarian and reconstruction money to US 

military commanders with minimal bureaucratic interference. Although 

CERP generally provided support to humanitarian and reconstruction 

initiatives, Frey expanded the program’s role in Musahi. The objective of 

his CERP-funded HA mission was twofold. First, Frey hoped that a surge 

of humanitarian and medical assistance might win the hearts and minds 

of Musahi residents and turn them against the Taliban. Second, given the 

PMT’s limited manpower, the HA deliveries required the participation 

of ANP personnel. Frey thus envisioned the HA deliveries as on-the-job 
30

training for untrained and beleaguered local policemen. In conducting the 

deliveries, the Musahi PMT mentored the ANP on how to establish inner 

and outer security cordons, detain insurgents, and conduct mounted and 

dismounted patrols. The combined HA and police mentoring missions 

yielded immediate dividends. Emboldened by a resurgent and engaged 

police force, Musahi residents rose up against Taliban oppression. Villagers 

provided intelligence about the location of weapons caches, identified 

smuggling routes, confronted armed bands of Taliban insurgents, and 

invited Alpha Troop Soldiers into their homes. For the first time in the 

war, the Taliban were on the defensive in the Musahi valley.3

As Alpha Troop’s nine-month deployment concluded in the summer of 

2011, First Lieutenant Frey’s creative and improvised use of CERP funds 

transformed the Musahi ANP into a functional police force, galvanized 

the valley’s population against the insurgency, and tilted the balance of 

power in favor of coalition forces. The PMT’s mentoring and security 

achievements testified to Frey’s ambitious leadership and initiative, 

helping disrupt a Taliban stronghold without the firing of a single bullet. 

CERP proved a valuable weapon in confronting an elusive, ruthless, and 

determined adversary.

The Genesis and Evolution of CERP

CERP originated due to an unlikely discovery during Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM. Shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 

the spring of 2003, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Soldiers discovered 

sealed stacks of $100 bills in the palaces of former Ba’athist party officials. 

Over the next few weeks, US Soldiers discovered additional cash stashes 

in dog kennels and other locations that increased the stockpiles’ value to 

more than $700 million (USD). Accountants and auditors later concluded 

that the money had been embezzled from the United Nations’ (UN) Oil for 

Food program. Given the unclear legal status of the seized cash, the US 

Central Command (CENTCOM) reserved the money as the property of 

Iraqi citizens.4

US Commanders identified the cash hoards as a key enabler to build 

a new Iraq. Predictably, the 2003 invasion of Iraq disrupted basic utility 

and sanitation services, prompted food and water shortages, wrecked 

the country’s already dilapidated infrastructure, and led to a deepening 

humanitarian crisis. After toppling the Hussein regime, US Army 

commanders had no funds at their disposal to initiate urgent humanitarian, 

reconstruction, or infrastructure projects. Recognizing these shortcomings, 

Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the Combined Joint Task Force-7 
31

(CJTF-7) commander, asked Ambassador Paul Bremer to release the 

sequestered funds to the commander of Coalition Forces. On June 16, 

2003, Bremer complied, empowering the commander to “take all actions 

necessary to operate a Commanders’ Emergency Response Program.” 

Within sixteen months, Coalitions forces had spent $578 million in CERP 

funds to underwrite agriculture, cleanup, education, electric, health care, 

irrigation, rule of law, sanitation, telecommunication, transportation, and 

water projects throughout Iraq.5

US Commanders in Iraq celebrated CERP’s responsiveness, flexibility, 

and adaptability to diverse local conditions. The program enabled tactical 

units to complete urgent, targeted, and low-level projects with minimal 

bureaucratic delays. Indeed, a handful of early reports suggested a link 

between secure Iraqi communities and high levels of CERP funding.6

CERP’s popularity and track record of promoting local stability led 

Congress, in late 2003, to extend the program to Afghanistan and begin 

making annual appropriations. As of 30 September 2011, Congress 

had appropriated a total of $3.04 billion for CERP projects in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.7 

CERP emerged as a critical weapon in the counterinsurgency (COIN) 

campaign in Afghanistan. Revised in February 2011, Money as a Weapon 

System – Afghanistan, a United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) 

publication, defined the objectives, purpose, intent, and standard operating 

procedure (SOP) of CERP. The CERP SOP stipulated that “the purpose of 

the CERP is to enable US commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian 

relief and reconstruction requirements within their Area of Responsibility 

(AOR) by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the 

indigenous population.”8

 The SOP defined “urgent” as “any chronic or 

acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that, in the judgment 

of the local commander, calls for action.”9 Low-level projects that 

provided “urgent humanitarian relief” or afforded “significant employment 

opportunities” deserved priority. The SOP directed commanders to confirm 

that funding from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

(GIRoA), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), donor nation, or other 

humanitarian aid sources was unavailable before initiating a funding 

request.10

In Afghanistan, CERP’s quick-impact philosophy supported coalition 

force’s effort to deepen and expand GIRoA’s influence. Encouraging 

US commanders to initiate projects that could be rapidly completed, 

enjoyed high visibility, cost less than $500,000, addressed chronic 

unemployment, and were sustainable by local or provincial governments, 
32

CERP constituted a non-lethal weapon system dedicated to winning the 

hearts and minds of Afghan citizens. Seeking to increase the tempo of 

Afghan reconstruction, the CERP SOP prohibited funding in many 

circumstances: providing funds, goods, or services to US military 

personnel; weapons buy-back programs; reward programs; removal of 

IEDs or other unexploded ordinance; paying bonuses, salaries, or pensions 

of Afghan civil or military personnel; equipping or training ANP or Afghan 

National Army (ANA) units; conducting psychological or information 

operations; directly supporting Afghan individuals or private businesses 

(notwithstanding condolence payments, battle damage, or former detainee 

reparations). Urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs remained 

CERP’s paramount objective.11

Figure 1. Kabul Province and the Musahi District.

The Musahi Valley in 2010

Given CERP’s goals, Alpha Troop Soldiers identified the Musahi 

valley as an ideal funding candidate. Early in their deployment, the Soldiers 

diagnosed multiple economic and social problems. By the end of 2010, the 

valley’s stagnant rural economy, chronic poverty, widespread illiteracy, 

lack of living necessities (such as winter clothing and food staples), 

dilapidated infrastructure, and absence of economic and educational 

opportunities fueled an acute humanitarian crisis. Recent environmental 

disasters magnified the impoverished populace’s suffering. During the 

previous spring, rapid snowmelt overwhelmed the tributaries of the Logar 

River, the major watercourse dissecting the Musahi district, submerging 

wheat and barley fields. Since most residents cultivated small irrigated 

plots, the flooding constituted a significant economic hardship.12
33

Figure 2. The Musahi valley.

The Musahi district government proved unresponsive to the economic 

and security crises. Villagers told Staff Sergeant Christopher Marcello, 

the Musahi PMT’s noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), that 

local police or security forces had not conducted mounted or dismounted 

patrols south of the Logar River in more than two decades. Logistical and 

professional shortcomings hampered the ANP’s effectiveness. Distant from 
34

government supply warehouses, which catered to urban police elements, 

the Musahi ANP was undersupplied, underequipped, and untrained. The 

Taliban exploited these structural weaknesses by targeting local policemen 

for kidnappings, assassinations, and ambushes. An ANP Lieutenant named 

Sanayee, a company commander in the Police Battalion responsible for 

the Musahi region, stated in early 2011 that “I’ve been attacked six times 

by explosives and five times through ambushes. [Musahi] is the worst 

place I have worked.”13 Alleged drug use and a lack of professionalism 

undermined the ANP’s morale and confidence. Unwilling to stray from 

checkpoints, the Musahi ANP seldom interacted with local residents. The 

valley’s notoriety as a hotbed of Taliban activity spread, making it difficult 

for the ANP to recruit new officers, curb desertions, and engage the 

population. Although the Musahi ANP was on paper staffed at 120 police 

officers, it seldom employed more than 40-50 full-time policemen at any 

given time. Even more alarming were intelligence reports suggesting 

that 90 percent of the local police force sympathized with or were on the 

Taliban payroll.14

Poverty and dysfunctional governance intensified the Taliban 

insurgency. Moving unfettered throughout Musahi, the Taliban established 

weapons caches, planted roadside bombs, transformed the valley into a 

smuggling “gateway” and “alleyway” from Logar Province into Kabul, 

and unleashed a hostile propaganda campaign. The negligible police 

presence allowed the Taliban to show up at villagers’ homes and demand 

safe haven after sundown. The Taliban also intimidated government 

officials and cultivated a network of local informants. Each passing day of 

inaction worsened the grim security situation, jeopardizing stability in the 

national capital.15

CERP in Musahi: A Lesson in Creative and Independent 

Leadership

On 27 July 2010, General David H. Petraeus, the commander of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and USFOR-A, issued 

the COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. In the document, Petraeus 

argued that “the Taliban are not the only enemy of the [Afghan] people. 

The people are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption, and 

abuse of power—the Taliban’s best recruiters ... Work with our Afghan 

partners to help ... protect the people from malign actors as well as from 

terrorists.”16 Musahi was a case study in the social and political ills 

that Petraeus described. The Taliban capitalized on Musahi’s ineffective 

governance, corruption, and economic calamities at the expense of the 

local population.
35

In late 2010, the 1-134 CAV, christened Task Force Fury, took 

responsibility for fortifying security in Kabul Province. Arriving 

in Afghanistan on 13 November, Task Force Fury was a Cavalry 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Squadron that had approximately 

370 Soldiers and fell under USFOR-A’s Regional Command Capital 

(RC-Capital). The R&S squadron consisted of A, B, and C Troops and a 

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT). In preparing to conduct its 

primary mission of mentoring the ANP and ANA, the task force divided 

Kabul Province into four separate “police zones.” Each 1-134 CAV troop 

was assigned to an individual police zone. Zone 1, encompassing three 

ANP precincts in Kabul City and the volatile Musahi district, belonged to 

Alpha Troop.17

The Musahi PMT welcomed their daunting assignment. Composed 

of 13 Alpha Troop Soldiers, a medic, and two interpreters, the PMT was 

a hybrid, ad hoc entity. First Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., was the PMT’s 

officer in charge (OIC). As a Nebraska State Patrolman at the time of Alpha 

Troop’s deployment, Frey was the perfect candidate to lead the PMT, 

bringing to the team valuable civilian experience in search procedures, 

report protocols, patrol techniques, arrest and detainment skills, and 

other police-related activities. Subordinates described Frey, a veteran of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, as an assertive, diligent, purposeful, and 

adaptive leader who excelled at mediating conflicts and communicating 

with diverse groups. Staff Sergeant Marcello, a veteran of the Kosovo 

intervention and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, was the PMT’s NCOIC. 

Staff Sergeant Michael Belleci served as the senior scout and Sergeant 

Randall Barnason was the “squad leader,” responsible for the remaining 

enlisted Soldiers. The PMT traveled on three Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs), armed either with 

M240B or M2 .50 caliber machine guns. During initial patrols in the Musahi 

valley, Frey’s PMT discovered no police presence outside of isolated 

checkpoints. Furthermore, he immediately recognized that proper police 

instruction was useless as long as ANP personnel sequestered themselves 

behind security checkpoints and in the district police headquarters (HQ) 

compound. The ANP needed to earn the respect and trust of the local 

population before they could become an efficient police organization.18

Frey seized the initiative by immersing himself in Musahi tribal 

politics. Cultural awareness was a prerequisite for US company grade 

officers to spearhead successful police mentoring, HA, and COIN missions. 

Understanding the importance of the local culture and Afghan tribal 

politics, Frey attended his first Musahi shura in December 2010. In Afghan 
36

tribal culture, shuras were periodic council meetings that arbitrated local 

conflicts and oversaw issues related to agriculture, humanitarian needs, 

infrastructure, justice, law and order, reconstruction, and security.19 In 

Frey’s apt description, shuras resembled “open town hall forums” where 

village elders made routine governance decisions.20 Winning the hearts 

and minds of Musahi residents and fortifying police protection began at 

the village level.

Frey’s unannounced attendance at a December shura with the local 

ANP chief made tribal elders uncomfortable and apprehensive. Isolated, 

impoverished, and suspicious of outsiders, Musahi leaders had minimal 

contact with GIRoA, NGOs, US Soldiers, the ANP, or other international 

aid organizations. Looking to defuse the tense encounter, Frey removed 

his body armor and remained silent. As the shura continued, Frey 

observed, through his interpreter, that a “common theme” of discussion 

was a “lack of jobs, a lack of education, a lack of food, [and] a lack of 

warm clothing.”21 Besieged by a cruel insurgency and lacking basic living 

supplies, Musahi women and children required basic necessities just to 

survive the harsh winter months. Tribal elders also bemoaned the fact that 

overcrowded schools, few educational supplies, and ramshackle school 

buildings deprived their children of the possibility of a prosperous future. 

For Frey, CERP provided an opportunity to address these humanitarian 

and social shortcomings. Rather than viewing HA as an entitlement for 

destitute Afghan villagers, Frey touted the program as a motivational tool 

capable of choking off Taliban influence at the grassroots. Small wonder 

Frey believed that Musahi’s short-term stability depended as much on a 

surge of humanitarian assistance as an efficient police force.22

After the shura, Frey met with his commander, Captain Zachary 

Labrayere, about Musahi’s humanitarian crisis. Surprised by his 

subordinate’s initiative, Labrayere encouraged Frey to do everything 

possible to alleviate the valley’s suffering, broaden the coalition’s presence, 

and improve the ANP’s tactical awareness and proficiency. Frey promoted 

the valley as an ideal CERP candidate. Coordinating with Captain Jeremy 

Syznskie, the 1-134 CAV’s civil-military officer (S9), Frey learned the 

process of requesting and procuring CERP funding. The first step in the 

process was for Musahi government officials to fill out documentation 

requesting humanitarian assistance stamped with the local government’s 

seal. At a subsequent shura, Frey presented the paperwork to village 

elders. A week later, the elders submitted a stamped request for basic food 

staples (rice, beans, sugar, flour, cooking oil) and winter clothing (coats, 

blankets, gloves, and so forth). The positive response pleased Frey. If 
37

awarded money to buy HA supplies, he intended to use the humanitarian 

mission as an opportunity to cultivate goodwill with valley residents and 

mentor the ANP in standard police procedures.23

According to Captain Szynskie, the Musahi humanitarian mission fit 

the CERP funding criteria. Once Frey notified Syznskie of his intention to 

request CERP funding, the proposal went through the standard nominating 

process. The first step involved completing a project nominating form. On 

this form, Frey listed the grid location, village names, type of project, and 

sponsoring local elder. Frey then submitted the paperwork to the squadron 

S9 section. At this point, Szynskie took the nominating form before the 

squadron Project Review Board (PRB). Convening every two to three 

weeks, the PRB evaluated CERP nominations from all four 1-134 CAV 

police zones. Composed of squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel 

Thomas Rynders, Syzenskie, the S9 section, the squadron executive 

officer (XO), and PMT leaders, the PRB made final CERP decisions. 

Although Rynders exercised exclusive authority over project selections, 

the PRB generally endorsed Syznskie’s recommendations, which adhered 

to the CERP SOP guidelines: addressing urgent humanitarian crises and 

providing employment opportunities to Afghan citizens.24

After the selection of a CERP project, the 1-134 CAV’s four 

program managers (each responsible for one of the four police zones) 

initiated the requisite documentation and solicited bids. This process 

required completing a project letter of justification (LOJ) and filling 

out a Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) report. 

Among other functions, CIDNE was a DOD database that tracked CERP 

projects and stored uploaded documents. The signing of both documents 

by the commander, in Szynskie’s words, was “kind of like receiving the 

order to go ahead and move forward” with the project.25 At that point, 

the project manager completed a “statement of understanding,” signed 

by the squadron commander and the appropriate Afghan ministry, and a 

“statement of work,” which explained what a contractor needed to do as 

part of the project. Once the forms were collected and compiled, the project 

went out for bid. The S9 office maintained a specific e-mail account that 

disseminated projects to local contractors. E-mail notifications generally 

identified the project location, requirements listed in the statement of 

work, and the bidding deadline. Prior to the bid closing date, contractors 

delivered their bids, in sealed envelopes, to security guards at the front 

gate of Camp Phoenix in Kabul. The guards then placed the sealed bids 

in a secure mailbox. After the deadline passed, the squadron S9 collected, 

evaluated, compared, and awarded the “best value” bid. After notifying 
38

the winning contractor, the CERP project commenced, supervised by the 

appropriate project manager.26

As Frey anticipated, the Musahi HA CERP request received early 

approval. Because many HA supplies were donated through the US-based 

Operation Outreach Afghanistan (OOA), CERP did not fund the entire 

HA package. Nevertheless, the PMT leader began to plan for the HA 

deliveries using a needs-based distribution strategy. Consulting with the 

Musahi police chief, Frey identified the five poorest villages to receive 

the deliveries. He always intended for the HA deliveries to serve a dual 

purpose. First, they were the initial step in winning the trust of Musahi 

residents and disrupting the Taliban’s stranglehold. In the long run, Frey 

hoped that the HA distributions might encourage residents to provide 

actionable intelligence on Taliban informants living amidst the population, 

weapons stockpiles, roadside IEDs, and potential ambushes.

Second, the HA deliveries also constituted a police training exercise. 

CERP SOP prohibited funds from equipping, training, or underwriting the 

costs associated with ANP operations but the HA deliveries did require 

security. Using the ANP to establish security perimeters, search incoming 

vehicles, conduct foot patrols, and distribute goods as part of the HA 

deliveries served the broader purpose of the PMT mission. After selecting 

the delivery locations, Frey emphasized to the police chief that the PMT 

intended to take a “backseat” during the deliveries. “We really wanted the 

Afghan police chief to take ownership of the mission,” Frey explained, “to 

set this thing up and to really run with it.”27

The PMT’s innovative approach broadened CERP’s functional utility 

beyond traditional reconstruction and humanitarian emphases. Indeed, 

CERP’s streamlined and decentralized framework liberated company 

grade officers to make decisions that allowed them to gain the initiative 

during low-level tactical operations. In the hands of creative and innovative 

officers, money in the form of CERP assistance became a powerful enabler 

for localized COIN and police mentoring efforts.

Operation UNITED FRONT I

The HA deliveries served as on-the-job training for the ANP. Upon 

selecting the time and location of the HA drops, Frey coordinated security 

and manpower requirements with the police chief. According to the 

PMT leader, the HA drops were “where we really made our money with 

mentoring the police.”28 On the mornings of the scheduled drops, the 

PMT showed up at the district police headquarters, rounded up available 

ANP officers, formed a vehicle convoy, and traveled to the predetermined 
39

drop destinations. After arriving at the site, Staff Sergeant Marcello and 

Alpha Troop Soldiers mentored the ANP in setting up outer and inner 

security cordons, placing concertina wire, conducting foot patrols, 

searching vehicles, and patting down villagers. Frey also insisted that the 

ANP take the lead in distributing the HA supplies. It was critical that the 

local population perceive the drops as evidence of a newly engaged and 

generous local government committed to their welfare. Attempting to 

bolster security, Staff Sergeant Belleci operated a Raven unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) to provide overhead surveillance. The Raven UAV had a 

wingspan of nearly five feet and transmitted color video images over a 

range of seven miles.29

Figure 3. An ANP Officer Distributes HA Supplies in the Mushai valley.

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Sean Polson

Ensuring that the HA goods made it into the hands of impoverished 

villagers was crucial for mission success. Sometime during 2010, 

Soldiers from the Massachusetts Army National Guard 101st Field 

Artillery Regiment had arranged an HA delivery for the Musahi district. 

Rather than distributing the supplies throughout the valley, corrupt ANP 

personnel allegedly stole the items for their own families. The abortive 

delivery eroded the ANP’s credibility and trustworthiness and was a 

repeated topic of discussion in Musahi shuras. Committed to avoiding 

a replay of the previous year’s scandalous and counterproductive HA 

delivery, the PMT provided maximum security, exercised strict oversight, 

and demanded accountability from ANP officers. The PMT intended to 
40

rebuild trust between villagers and the ANP. Since any security incidences 

or rumors of police graft would further alienate the population from the 

local government, corruption was not tolerated.30

The HA deliveries commenced on 27 December 2010 at Qal’eh-ye 

Abd. Codenamed Operation UNITED FRONT I, the deliveries distributed 

at least 25 tons of humanitarian goods to the Musahi valley’s five poorest 

villages (Qal’eh-ye-Abd, Qeshlaqe Ul’ya, Qal’eh-ye Janan, Shadkbaneh, 

and Katasang).31 Families received a blanket, a tarp, jackets, gloves, 

socks, shoes, underwear, a portable iron stove, charcoal, a 4-liter bottle 

of cooking oil, sugar, salt, and 5-pound sacks of beans, flour, and rice. 

The PMT also passed out personal hygiene items: shaving cream, soap, 

tooth brushes, and toothpaste. Children were given candy and basic school 

supplies. Afghans praised the deliveries. Sardar Mahammad, a Musahi 

unskilled laborer whose family participated in a 6 February distribution, 

observed that “it would take me five days of work to earn enough money 

to buy what we were given today.”32

Figure 4. A Musahi Child Clutches a Blanket Received during an HA Delivery.

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Sean Polson

Villagers’ attitude towards coalition forces improved following the 

HA deliveries. In the past, valley residents either retreated into their 

homes if they observed approaching US Soldiers or hurled rocks and 

insults. Terrified of Taliban retribution, villagers avoided any contact with 
41

US soldiers. Nevertheless, during the HA deliveries, villagers temporarily 

overcame their fear of Taliban reprisals, deciding that the reward of 

free supplies outweighed the risk of insurgent violence. Ultimately, it 

was difficult to assess whether Musahi villagers’ newfound conciliatory 

disposition towards coalition forces reflected narrow opportunism or an 

unequivocal rejection of Taliban ideology. In the short-term, however, the 

results of the HA deliveries met Frey’s expectations. Rather than pelting 

passing M-ATVs with stones or hurling invective at coalition and ANP 

personnel, Musahi children now rushed to greet them with smiles and 

open arms.33

The HA deliveries were only part of a broader effort to improve 

short- and long-term social conditions in the valley. In conjunction with 

the HA drops, the PMT orchestrated the CERP-funded construction and 

improvement of two schools. By paying local contractors to renovate 

existing schools and build new structures, the PMT created temporary 

construction jobs and permanent opportunities for unemployed Musahi 

educators. Built in the spring of 2011, the Shad-e-Kana School contained 

eight classrooms, a new drinking water well, and two five-stall open 

pit latrines. Located near the Musahi police HQ, the completed school 

educated 1,000 Afghans at a total construction cost of $200,000. CERP 

also funded the renovation of the Khuwajah Dalil village school. The 

project replaced a failing roof with corrugated sheet metal, constructed 

two new latrines, and erected a second eight-classroom building. Once 

completed, the renovations totaled $250,000.34

The PMT also launched two medical air drops during the winter. 

Funded by CERP, the drops occurred about five miles south of the Musahi 

Police HQ. The PMT purchased the supplies, which totaled $19,600, from 

a Kabul pharmacy based on a list submitted by the Afghan Ministry of 

Health to the squadron’s S9. Consisting mostly of non-prescription items, 

the drops delivered IV bags, upper respiratory medication, powdered milk, 

infant medication, cough syrup, Tylenol, antibiotics, and other medical 

supplies. The medical drops corrected a vital medical supply shortage 

and met an urgent humanitarian need. According to First Lieutenant Dain 

Miller, the Zone 1 CERP project manager, the medical supply distributions, 

along with Operation UNITED FRONT I, had a “positive impact” with the 

local population and gave them a reason to rise up against the Taliban’s 

heavy-handed tactics.35

Prevailing US COIN doctrine cast robust indigenous insurgencies as 

a product of quantifiable economic and social imbalances. The infusion of 

HA and medical supplies into Musahi sought to correct these imbalances 
42

and, as a positive consequence, disrupt the Taliban’s hold over valley 

communities. An isolated incident suggested that the Musahi PMT’s 

humanitarian emphasis led to measurable security improvements. During 

one of the final HA deliveries, a band of Taliban insurgents, armed with 

rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and RPK machine guns, planned to 

assault US Soldiers and ANP personnel. Learning about the imminent 

attack, a group of Musahi villagers banded together and collectively 

confronted the armed insurgents. Villagers demanded that the insurgents 

throw down their weapons, leave the area, and allow the distribution to 

proceed. Jolted by the angry mob’s assertiveness, the insurgents departed 

without incident. The PMT and ANP had started to turn the tide against 

the Taliban.36

Securing the Musahi Valley

The results of the HA deliveries now exceeded Frey’s expectations. 

As the distributions continued, crowds grew in size and enthusiasm. 

Attendance at shuras also increased. Grateful for the assistance, Musahi 

residents invited Alpha Troop Soldiers into their homes and welcomed 

their presence as a bulwark against Taliban persecution. Since hospitality 

was an indispensible part of Afghan culture, Frey and his Soldiers never 

refused an opportunity to build solidarity with villagers. By the middle 

of February, routine PMT patrols often ended with Alpha Troop Soldiers 

sipping tea and eating bread inside of villagers’ homes. Once despised as 

unwelcome intruders and occupiers, Alpha Troop relished the population’s 

new friendly and accommodating disposition.37

Operation UNITED FRONT I was the catalyst for beginning to 

clear the Taliban from Musahi. Given the PMT’s limited manpower and 

resources, Frey realized that it was a pipedream to completely eliminate the 

Taliban’s influence and freedom of movement over such a wide geographic 

area. The PMT only intended to disrupt the insurgency’s stranglehold 

and limit insurgent mobility. By March 2011, Frey worked to translate 

the goodwill and credibility generated by the humanitarian deliveries into 

tangible security gains. During a March luncheon attended by key tribal 

elders and hosted by the police chief, Frey implored attendees to strike 

a fatal blow against the insurgency by proving information about the 

location of Taliban IED factories, weapons caches, and informants. The 

elders met Frey’s challenge. On 14 March, an elder identified the location 

of a weapons stockpile that contained RPGs, mortars, and various other 

munitions. After securing and cordoning off the cache, the 1-134 CAV’s 

route clearance team seized the munitions, transported them to a remote 

location, and detonated them.38
43

Intelligence also flowed into the 1-134 CAV’s public affairs element 

about Taliban sympathizers. According to First Lieutenant Sean Polson, 

the squadron CERP purchasing officer, the tightening bonds between 

the Musahi population and coalition forces led to the identification of 

a local religious leader that regularly assisted the Taliban. The PMT 

questioned the Malik about his role within the insurgency and scanned his 

fingerprints, photograph, and retinal data into the Biometric Automated 

Toolset (BAT) System, a DOD database that stores the biometric data of 

suspected insurgents. Although the Malik was not arrested since his name 

did not appear in the BAT database, Polson expounded on the episode’s 

significance. “Just being able to get that kind of information out of the 

community,” he insisted, “was a positive step in the right direction.”39

Unfortunately, the Taliban, weary about losing their stranglehold over a 

key smuggling corridor into the national capital, planned a savage reprisal. 

The ANP’s budding resolve and professionalism would soon be tested.40

The Taliban Strike Back

On the morning of 14 April, a Taliban insurgent slammed a dump 

truck loaded with 600 to 1,000 pounds of homemade explosives (HME) 

into the Musahi District Government Center and adjacent ANP HQ. The 

explosives detonated and leveled the compound. Flying shrapnel sliced 

through the building and rendered it uninhabitable. Polson compared the 

damaged compound to a block of “Swiss cheese” or the Alfred P. Murrah 

Federal Building in the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. 

Fortunately, the brazen suicide attack claimed but a single fatality: the 

suicide bomber. A safety barrier wall absorbed much of the blast and 

shielded the police HQ, saving the lives of countless sleeping Afghan 

policemen.41

Ironically, at the time of the attack, Alpha Troop Soldiers were taking 

a scheduled physical fitness exam in Kabul. After learning about the 

explosion, Soldiers quickly donned their gear, drove to the site of the blast, 

established a security perimeter, and commenced the initial recovery. The 

timing of the suicide attack surprised no one. Over the previous weeks, the 

Taliban had issued a steady stream of verbal and written threats directed 

against the police chief and ANP for cooperating with coalition forces. 

“The Taliban’s attack on the Musahi District Government Center,” Miller 

argued, was a “direct result of their perceived loss of power [within] the 

communities throughout Musahi.”42 The fact that the HME load, concealed 

in the dump truck by a pile of firewood, navigated through security and 

observation checkpoints undetected revealed the limited nature of the 
44

Figure 5. Musahi Taliban Weapons Cache.

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Sean Polson
45

Figure 6. The Wreckage of the Musahi District Government Center.

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Sean Polson

ANP’s improved professionalism and situational awareness. The Taliban 

retained the ability to launch spectacular attacks intended to hamper the 

local government’s ability to function.43

The attack marked a pivotal moment. Having felt the force of the 

explosion and witnessed billowing smoke clouds, Musahi residents 

assumed that the blast cut the entire ANP force to pieces. Taliban 

propaganda portrayed the blast as a decisive victory. Indeed, the valley’s 

lack of telecommunication networks made the population vulnerable to 

such exaggerated claims. Cut off from the flow of information, most Musahi 

villagers received news from neighbors, friends, or relatives. Frightened 

residents now concluded that the price of cooperating with coalition forces 

or the ANP was death. To make matters worse, the explosion led a sizable 

number of ANP personnel to desert. The Musahi valley teetered on the 

brink of a Taliban resurgence.

Unless the ANP established an immediate presence throughout the 

valley, the PMT worried that the suicide attack might reverse the limited 

security gains. Seizing the initiative, Frey and Marcello implored the police 

chief to dispatch policemen throughout the valley. The chief responded 

with resolute determination. Before the end of the day, the ANP, backed 
46

by PMT Soldiers, conducted patrols, manned security checkpoints, and 

established a police presence throughout the valley. The sight of the ANP 

patrolling astonished Musahi residents, who thought the entire police force 

was slaughtered or, at the very best, cowering behind observation posts. The 

suicide attack on the district government center proved counterproductive 

because the ANP demonstrated its growing resolve and commitment to 

protecting the population in the face of violence. The police chief’s quick 

response and forceful leadership nullified the effects of the blast.44

Operation UNITED FRONT II

The suicide attack triggered Operation UNITED FRONT II. Following 

the three-month conclusion of Operation UNITED FRONT I, Frey and 

Captain Labrayere discussed strategies to expand the coalition force’s 

reach and further marginalize the Taliban. They conceived of a plan to 

go door-to-door through every Musahi village, collecting demographic, 

religious, and economic information from the head of each household. 

Since US Soldiers had never conducted a census of Afghans in the isolated 

valley or ventured south of the Logar River, they knew precious little about 

the valley’s population, ethnicity, or religious preferences. Gathering such 

information was critical to meeting the future humanitarian needs and 

determining appropriate numbers of school classrooms or medical clinics. 

The door-to-door contacts also allowed Musahi villagers to interact with 

coalition and ANP personnel. When Frey proposed the plan in March to 

the police chief, he was apprehensive and hesitant. As Frey recalled, the 

chief did not want to have “coalition soldiers in the middle of all these 

villages on foot, doing foot patrols and going door to door, and really 

getting in the weeds with all of the village members.”45 He feared that the 

PMT, by venturing too far into isolated and inward looking villages, might 

present the faulty impression that the local government was a puppet of 

the US military. Since Frey intended for the ANP to spearhead the door-todoor mission, the police chief’s reluctance led the PMT to shelve the plan.

The police chief reversed course after the leveling of the district 

government center. Intelligence reports indicated that the suicide attack 

constituted an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the chief. Fearful of 

the Taliban’s tenacity and resilience, he acquiesced and provided Frey with 

the manpower and resources to carry out Operation UNITED FRONT II. 

In late April, the ANP and PMT divided into three teams and executed 

the three-week operation. Each team conducted mounted and dismounted 

foot patrols in every Musahi village during the census. Assisted by ANP 
47

personnel and interpreters, the PMT Soldiers knocked on doors, spoke to 

the heads of households, and then asked standard demographic questions: 

occupation, ethnic affiliation, religious background, number of children, 

identity of local religious leaders, and place of worship. In general, the 

door-to-door visitations proceeded without any violence. Villagers 

answered the questions and sometimes even welcomed Soldiers into their 

homes for tea. On a few isolated occasions, residents threatened Soldiers 

or pointedly offered to feed them “poisoned” food. Despite these isolated 

threats, Operation UNITED FRONT II succeeded in completing the first 

comprehensive census ever taken in the Musahi district.46

The ANP’s broadened presence yielded other security triumphs. 

During Operation UNITED FRONT II, which lasted until mid-May, locals 

provided ANP and Alpha Troop Soldiers intelligence about or discovered 

the location of eight previously unknown Taliban weapons caches. In 

sum, 640 pounds of HME, 13 RPGs, 12 anti-personnel mines, and other 

ordnance were taken into US custody. In the aftermath of the suicide blast, 

Musahi residents remained resolute.47

Prior to Alpha Troop’s departure in July, Frey requested a final CERP 

project. During shuras, elders complained that the valley’s low literacy 

rate hampered residents’ employment opportunities in Kabul, made the 

population vulnerable to Taliban propaganda, and inhibited the ANP from 

effective written communication with one another. Indeed, in 2002, the 

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

estimated that barely one in five Musahi residents were literate.48 Written 

records were a precondition for establishing and maintaining a functional 

system of law and order. Seeking to boost the indigenous literacy rate, 

Frey requested the construction of a CERP-funded adult literacy center 

next to the police HQ to teach Dari and Pashto. Captain Szynskie initially 

hesitated to authorize the undertaking since “the location was near Police 

Headquarters and I was concerned that only the police would be able to 

attend classes. CERP is to be used exclusively for the civilian populace, 

not the Army or Police units.”49 After Frey secured assurances from 

district elders that the literacy center was to serve the entire district, and 

not just the ANP, Szynskie approved the project on 19 June. The Musahi 

government donated land near the leveled district government compound 

for the literacy center. As Alpha Troop Soldiers left Afghanistan, contractors 

commenced the initial dirt and leveling work at the construction site.50
48

Aftermath

The US Army’s doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations guided the 

Soldiers of Alpha Troop. As explained in Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 

full spectrum operations were the combination of “offensive, defensive, 

and stability ... operations [conducted] simultaneously as part of an 

interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, 

accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.”51

In these operations, individual Soldiers bore responsibility for gaining the 

initiative. “Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative,” the manual 

emphasized, “depend[ed] on individual initiative—the willingness to act 

in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or 

when unforeseen opportunities ... arise.”52 In Afghanistan, opportunistic 

officers had many lethal and non-lethal opportunities to seize and hold 

the initiative. As Lieutenant Frey discovered, one of the most promising, 

and often overlooked, opportunities involved humanitarian assistance 

missions.

In the Musahi valley, CERP funds empowered Alpha Troop to gain 

the initiative from an entrenched and elusive opponent. Alpha Troop’s 

police mentoring mission revealed that CERP served broader purposes 

than simply building schools, wells, or roads. CERP enabled creative and 

resourceful officers to address an urgent humanitarian crisis. It additionally 

provided invaluable hands-on training for a corrupt, incompetent, and 

unprofessional police force. Within months, CERP-funded projects 

rehabilitated the ANP’s tarnished reputation and improved its overall 

efficiency. Free from excessive bureaucratic oversight, the CERP permitted 

rapid, responsive, and autonomous decision-making at the tactical level. 

Directed by a highly motivated junior officer, the PMT’s use of CERP and 

humanitarian assistance funds revealed that money, if used properly, could 

marginalize and separate an entrenched insurgency from a population. 

Alpha Troop’s eight-month police mentoring mission disrupted 

the Taliban’s stranglehold on a key smuggling corridor and turned the 

population against a ruthless, brutal, and dedicated foe. The surge of 

humanitarian and medical assistance, enhanced educational opportunities, 

expanded police presence, and door-to-door interaction with the populace 

emboldened Musahi residents to push back against the Taliban. To be sure, 

the security gains were fragile, limited, and reversible. It remains difficult 

to measure the long-term effectiveness of Operations UNITED FRONT I 

and II in impeding the flow of weapons into Kabul or forcing insurgents to 

shift their bases of operations. Yet, if securing actionable intelligence from 

the populace about weapons caches, the identity of suspected insurgents, 
49

and the location of smuggling routes constitute legitimate performance 

metrics, the Soldiers of Alpha Troop succeeded in seizing the initiative 

from the Taliban. In this case, CERP assistance cash was a weapons system 

just as effective as rifles, artillery, and airpower.

Alpha Troop Soldiers marveled at their different wartime experiences 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Staff 

Sergeant Marcello served on a brigade quick reaction force (QRF) in Al 

Anbar Province from 2005-2006. In conventional fighting, he recalled, 

“you prepped the battlefield with artillery and air support and then you go 

in with ground forces. [In Afghanistan,] we prepped that battlefield with 

earning the trust [of the population] and getting the people ... what they 

needed.”53 CERP proved vital in winning non-kinetic engagements. The 

program provided the “leeway” and autonomy for Soldiers to meet unique 

local needs and challenges.54 Frey argued that CERP was the “most 

influential and best tool” for winning the hearts and minds of Musahi 

residents “ever put ... into our toolbox.”55 Not only did the program allow 

the PMT to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs, it 

provided on-the-job training for the local ANP. The HA deliveries and 

door-to-door demographic surveys enabled the PMT to instruct the ANP 

in mounted and dismounted patrolling techniques, security perimeter 

placement, vehicle searches, establishing inner and outer cordons, detention 

procedures, filing reports, and interrogation techniques. Previously isolated 

on security observation posts and unwilling to engage the population, the 

Musahi ANP by the summer of 2011 led regular patrols, gained tactical 

proficiency, and interacted with valley residents. According to Frey, by the 

time Alpha Troop Soldiers departed Kabul, the ANP’s professionalization 

was still in its “infancy stages,” but their short-term improvements were a 

testament to effective mentorship and well-focused HA distributions. For 

the first time in the war, the Taliban’s iron grip on the Musahi valley, if 

only temporarily, had been loosened.56
50

Notes

1. First Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 January 2012. Lieutenant Frey’s 

population figures, based on a 2011 census conducted by US Soldiers, are larger 

than the 2002 estimate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR). See UNHCR, UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region 

DISTRICT PROFILE, 29 April 2002, http://www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/

unhcr_district_profiles/central/kabul/mussahi.pdf (accessed 4 January 2012).

2. First Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., interview by Anthony E. Carlson, 

Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 November, 2011, 6-7, 16; Staff 

Sergeant Michael D. Belleci, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies 

Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 28 November 2011, 3-5, 7-8, 19; Staff Sergeant 

Christopher Marcello, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, 

Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 22 November 2011, 8-10, 14-15, 25; Second Lieutenant 

Sean Polson, “Operation UNITED FRONT; A Focus on Musahi Valley,” Task 

Force Fury Tribune 1 (January 2011): 11.

3. Operation UNITED FRONT I will be described in the text. For an 

overview of the operations, see, First Lieutenant Michael Hoffman, “Clearing the 

Musahi Valley,” Task Force Fury Tribune 1 (May 2011): 9.

4. Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: 

Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, May 2003-January 2005 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2008), 375; Major Jason W. Condrey, The Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program: A Model for Future Implementation (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 

School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 11-12

5. Wright and Reese, 375-77.

6. Wright and Reese, 33, 375-77; Condrey, 13.

7. Wright and Reese, 376-77; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 30 October 

2011, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/oct2011/Lores/Oct2011Web.pdf 

(accessed 8 December 2011), 50.

8. Emphasis in original. Headquarters, United States Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A), Money as a Weapon System Afghanistan (MAAWS-A): USFOR-A 

Pub 1-06, Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) SOP (Kabul, 

Afghanistan: USFOR-A, 2011), 10. (Hereafter cited as MAAWS-A.)

9. Emphasis in original. MAAWS-A, 10.

10. MAAWS-A, 11.

11. MAAWS-A, 17-18.

12. Belleci, interview, 8-9, 19; Frey, interview, 33-34; Marcello, interview, 

8-11, 20.
51

13. Quoted in Staff Sergeant Jordan Jones, “Nebraskans Involved in 

Successful Mission,” United States National Guard, 7 February 2011, http://

www.nationalguard.com/news/2011/feb/07/nebraskans-involved-in-successfulmission (accessed 9 November 2011).

14. First Lieutenant Sean Polson, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 25 October 2011, 7-9, 17; Belleci, 

interview, 3-8; Marcello, interview, 15, 25; Frey, interview, 15-16.

15. Belleci, interview, 7-8, 19; Marcello, interview, 8-10; Frey, interview, 

16.

16. General David H. Petraeus, COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, 

27 July 2010.

17. First Lieutenant Sean Polson, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 December 2011; Frey, interview, 5-6.

18. First Lieutenant Dane Miller, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 2011; Marcello, interview, 

19; Belleci, interview, 6-7, 31; Frey, interview, 14.

19. On the history of Afghan shuras, see Lynn Carter and Kerry Connor, A 

Preliminary Investigation of Contemporary Afghan Councils (Peshwar, Pakistan: 

Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, 1989), 2-10; and Ali Wardak, 

“Jirga – A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan,” United 

Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance, 2003, unpan1.

un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../apcity/unpan917434.pdf (accessed 17 August 

2011).

20. Frey, interview, 35.

21. Frey, interview, 18.

22. First Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2011.

23. Frey, interview, 17-19.

24. Captain Jeremy Szynskie, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9 November 2011, 8-10.

25. Szynskie, interview, 16.

26. Szynskie, interview, 12-21.

27. Frey, interview, 20.

28. Frey, interview, 22.

29. Frey, interview, 22, 24; Belleci, 25-6; John David Blom, Unmanned 

Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2010), 112.

30. Belleci, interview, 28-9.
52

31. Staff Sergeant Chris Marcello, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 2012.

32. Jones, “Nebraskans Involved in Successful Mission”; Second Lieutenant 

Sean Polson, “Nebraska National Guardmembers [sic.] Make Inroads into Taliban 

Stronghold,” National Guard News, 8 February 2011, http://www.ng.mil/news/

archives/2011/02/020811-Nebraska.aspx (accessed 14 October 2011); Miller, 

e-mail, 12 December 2011.

33. Jones, “Nebraskans Involved in Successful Mission”; Polson, interview, 

11-13; First Lieutenant Dennis Frey, Jr., e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 December 2011.

34. Miller, e-mail, 12 December 2011.

35. Miller, e-mail, 12 December 2011.

36. Belleci, interview, 22-23.

37. Frey, interview, 25; Jones, “Nebraskans Involved in Successful Mission.”

38. Frey, interview, 39-40; Second Lieutenant Sean Polson, “Discovered 

Weapons Cache,” Task Force Fury Tribune 1 (March 2011): 4.

39. Polson, interview, 24.

40. Polson, interview, 23-24.

41. Polson, interview, 27-28; First Lieutenant Sean Polson, “Operation 

UNITED FRONT II: Afghan Freedom Fighters,” Task Force Fury Tribune 1 

(May 2011): 4.

42. First Lieutenant Dain Miller, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 December 2011.

43. Polson, interview, 27; Polson, “Operation UNITED FRONT II”; 

Marcello, interview, 30.

44. Marcello, interview, 31-32; Belleci, interview, 36-37; Frey, interview, 

30.

45. Frey, interview, 27-28, quote at 28.

46. Polson, “Operation UNITED FRONT II,” 5; Frey, interview, 30-34.

47. Polson, “Operation UNITED FRONT II,” 6.

48. UNHCR Sub-Office Central Region DISTRICT PROFILE, 2.

49. Captain Szynskie, “CPT Szynskie Top Five Projects,” unpublished 

paper in author’s possession, 3 November 2011, 1-2.

50. Captain Szynskie, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 December 2011; Frey, interview, 37-38.

51. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations 

(Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington, DC: 2008), 3-1.
53

52. Emphasis in original. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, 

page 3-3.

53. Marcello, interview, 35.

54. Marcello, interview, 17.

55. Frey, interview, 17.

56. Frey, interview, 42.

55

Partnership in Paktika Province

2010-2011

by

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D.

In September 2010, the people of Afghanistan prepared to take part in 

only the second parliamentary elections in the country’s modern history. 

Lieutenant Colonel Donn Hill, commander, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry 

Regiment (2-506 IN) – designated Task Force White Currahee - knew 

that election polling sites represented a rich target for insurgent forces 

attempting to delegitimize the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIRoA). Two days before the elections, elements of Hill’s 

battalion and their partners from the Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) established a checkpoint in the village of Tamira approximately 

five kilometers from Orgun-e, the economic hub of Paktika Province. The 

two units worked in concert to prevent insurgents from Pakistan traveling 

through Paktika Province to Kabul and other major Afghan cities. This 

partnership helped re-establish a Coalition presence in the countryside, 

and, most importantly, successfully interdicted the insurgents hoping to 

disrupt the parliamentary elections. As Hill put it, the enemy “was pissed 

off, because that’s how he was going to bring in a bunch of stuff to interfere 

with the elections. [We] totally got inside his decision cycle two days out.”1

This example of partnership allowed the elections to proceed unimpeded 

and set back the insurgency’s attempts to influence public participation in 

the election. 

Background

From summer 2010 until summer 2011, units of the 4th Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) of the 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault – designated Task 

Force Currahee – worked to extend Coalition influence throughout Paktika 

Province in eastern Afghanistan. The deployment to Paktika included two 

combat battalions, including 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (1-

506 IN) – designated Red Currahee – and 2-506 IN. These two battalions 

received support from their brigade’s 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion 

(4th BSTB) which contained military police, intelligence, administration, 

and engineering units within a single battalion. During the year, Soldiers 

from the 4th BCT conducted numerous operations throughout the 

province, but one of their most important involved partnering with ANSF 

units from the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Border Police 

(ABP), and the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP, also known as the Afghan 
56

National Police, or ANP). “Partnering” lacked a single, clear definition 

among the Soldiers tasked with implementing it. In practice, it called for 

American units to work closely with the ANSF to conduct operations, but 

also with an expectation that the Americans would mentor and train their 

partners. Typically, an American unit found itself partnered with at least 

one, if not more, unit of equivalent size from the three branches of the 

ANSF. In a larger context, partnership was crucial as a means to build 

up ANSF capabilities, a factor crucial to those military forces waging a 

counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign against indigenous and foreign 

fighters attempting to destabilize a nation. Improving the Afghans’ 

security capabilities was also essential because the pending reduction 

in the number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops 

present in Afghanistan meant that the Afghans needed to assume more 

of their own security burden. Partnering between ISAF and ANSF forces 

aimed simultaneously to improve the security situation in Afghanistan and 

prepare for the day in which foreign troops would leave the country.2 

Coalition and insurgent forces operated in Paktika Province as early 

as the first year of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In 2002, US and 

British forces cleared the area around Orgun-e of insurgents as part of 

Operation MOUNTAIN LION. Later that year, a permanent military 

presence was established in the province with the construction of Camp 

Harrimann, later renamed Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-e. By 

2006, the province came under the jurisdiction of Regional CommandEast (RC-East) as al Qaeda and Taliban forces began using Paktika as 

a base of operations against the Coalition. Typically, the American 

presence in Paktika consisted of a single infantry battalion because US 

forces were spread thin throughout RC-East. In 2007, as the numbers of 

US troops began to increase, a second infantry battalion was added to 

Paktika Province. The need for two infantry battalions in Paktika remained 

unchanged by the time Red Currahee and White Currahee deployed to the 

province in summer 2010.3

 

In the campaign to bring security to the whole of Afghanistan, the 

location of Paktika province made it an important focal point for Coalition 

operations. First, the province’s position in the middle of the long border 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan allowed it to be used by Pakistanibased insurgent networks and foreign fighters as an entry point into Afghan 

territory. Paktika’s border location made it a potential infiltration point, but 

the lack of both natural resources and a large population (approximately 
57

400,000 in a province approximately the size of New Jersey) meant 

that Paktika served more as a way point and staging area for insurgents 

attempting to reach more strategically important provinces to the north, 

such as Kabul, or Highway One that circled the entire country. Influence 

in the province was divided between its two largest cities; Sharana, in west 

Paktika, served as the political center of the province while Orgun-e was 

the economic hub. Furthermore, the province’s remoteness and poverty 

caused GIRoA and its predecessors to place a relatively low priority on 

economic infrastructure development in the area.4 

The terrain within Paktika also had a significant effect on Coalition 

operations. Western Paktika province, under the control of Red Currahee, 

was largely flat and possessed some infrastructure. As a result, the western 

half of the province was relatively well-connected to GIRoA governance 

and economic development initiatives. A north-south ridgeline running 

through the center of the province culturally and economically isolated 

the eastern half of Paktika from these positive aspects. Lieutenant Colonel 

Hill, commander of White Currahee and a native of Kentucky, saw many 

similarities between the population of east Paktika and the Appalachia 

region of the United States because “the people in Appalachia don’t 

want you to care about them, they want to be left alone. Welcome to East 

Paktika.” 5 In fact, the people of eastern Paktika did not believe themselves 

residents of Afghanistan but rather part of Waziristan, the Pashtundominated area along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When 

questioned by a US Soldier on patrol, a resident of Paktika stated that he 

had visited Afghanistan before, indicating that he did not consider himself 

an Afghan.6

Paktika’s strategic importance and its deficiency in natural resources 

made partnership vital to the Coalition’s effort to extend government 

control. Greater unity of US and Afghan forces was viewed as a bridge 

from the Coalition-dominated campaigns to the assumption of security by 

the ANSF. Yet, partnering was a concept whose definition could change 

depending on who one asked, and whose implementation could be affected 

by any number of factors. These difficulties, however, did not diminish 

the importance of partnership for the US forces in Afghanistan intent on 

turning over the security operations to the Afghan government. This study 

shows how junior officers and NCOs in Task Force Currahee attempted to 

work with their Afghan allies to further the Coalition’s goals. 
58

Figure 1: Map of Paktika Province.

Factors Shaping Partnerships 

In interviews conducted in 2011, Soldiers from Task Force Currahee

highlighted several important problems that they thought made forming 

effective partnerships difficult. First, Americans found that the poor 

training standards of ANSF units radically affected the Afghans’ 

capabilities. Few Soldiers expected the ANSF to undergo the same costly 

and exhaustive training they had received, but they discovered that the 

ANSF troops were poorly prepared to conduct even routine patrols and 

other operations. Captain Jared Wagner, commander of Red Currahee’s 

Able Company, tried to balance his belief that his battalion’s desired 

outcome in Paktika required him to fight the enemy with the realization 
59

that the ANSF eventually needed to secure the entire country on its own. 

As a result, when Able Company was not conducting patrols or operations 

against the enemy, its Soldiers devoted their time toward informally 

training their ANSF partners. Unfortunately, the ANSF units in Wagner’s 

area of operations (AO) lacked even basic knowledge of their small arms 

and marksmanship to say nothing of their inexperience with the tactics 

of patrols and other core missions. The training done by Able Company 

afforded Wagner and his Soldiers the opportunity to interact and bond with 

their ANSF counterparts, but the need to bring the Afghans up to speed 

in almost every basic military function limited the Americans’ ability to 

increase the security presence in their districts .7

Several Soldiers also found a culture of corruption and indifference to 

the rule of law endemic to many elements of the ANSF. These problems 

undermined efforts at partnership and it interfered with attempts to 

persuade the residents of Paktika to accept and embrace a stronger 

GIRoA presence. First Lieutenant James Hyman, the 1st Platoon Leader 

for Easy Company, White Currahee, learned from his ANA partners that 

the AUP in Ziruk would charge a fee for passing though checkpoints if 

drivers could not produce vehicle registrations. As Hyman said, “No one 

in that area has a vehicle registration. They don’t have DMV like we 

do.”8

 Staff Sergeant Billy Weiland, the platoon sergeant for 1st Platoon, 

Able Company, Red Currahee, noticed that members of the AUP unit he 

partnered with frequently went to the town bazaar to steal from the shops. 

He compared the situation to an American police officer “going into Best 

Buy or something and just taking what he wanted because he’s a cop.”9

Such criminal activities indicated the absence of discipline and fostered 

mistrust and resentment among the local population.

The rampant corruption observed in Afghanistan also denied ANSF 

elements the logistical support necessary to conduct effective security 

operations. Americans reported that Afghan Soldiers and policemen 

looked on the efficient supply networks of the Coalition forces with 

envy and often attempted to requisition supplies as a precondition for 

participating in operations. Afghan units did so because their own supply 

system functioned inconsistently and failed to provide them with even 

basic military necessities, leading to significant losses in confidence and 

morale among their Soldiers and policemen. Sergeant First Class Marco 

Osuna, the S4 Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) for the 4th 

BSTB, noted that the ANSF often kept close tabs on serial-numbered items 

such as weapons and vehicles, but ammunition, food, fuel, and any other 

bulk asset became fodder for corruption as those items moved through the 

logistical networks.10 Staff Sergeant Lucas Kudrna of the Headquarters 
60

and Headquarters Company (HHC), 4th BSTB, said that if an ANSF unit 

ordered a thousand rounds of ammunition, “by the time it got down to 

the people that need it, they had a hundred rounds left.”11 By decreasing 

the operational effectiveness of the ANSF and straining on American 

logistics, the corruption in the Afghan supply network inhibited effective 

partnerships.

American Soldiers frequently lamented the poor leadership that 

plagued many of the ANSF units they partnered with. The success or 

failure of partnership rested on the desire of commanders on both sides to 

work with one another. While some American officers and NCOs found 

well-trained and eager partners, others reported that their counterparts 

were grossly incompetent, opposed to working with Americans, or some 

combination thereof. The ANSF had yet to evolve into a true meritocracy 

where officers received promotions based solely on their abilities. Instead, 

many officers could thank political or familial connections for their status, 

meaning that failure for an ANSF officer did not mean dismissal or a 

reduction in responsibilities.12 

The internal hierarchy of the ANSF also indirectly contributed to the 

challenge of finding willing partners. Long after the end of the Soviet 

occupation, the Afghans still used the Soviet model for unit organization 

where company commanders and platoon leaders both led and executed 

all major directives and failed to delegate significant responsibilities 

to their senior NCOs. The Afghan system, intended to foster political 

reliability within the officer corps, differed radically from US practice in 

which senior NCOs carried out the orders of their commanding officers 

and were also expected to offer counsel to officers making important 

decisions. The Afghan system marginalized their senior NCOs from both 

decision-making and the execution of orders. First Lieutenant Joe Wright 

from White Currahee’s Fox Company reported that when he discussed 

upcoming missions with his ANA counterpart, the decision to proceed 

rested solely in the hands of the Afghan officer without any input from his 

senior NCOs. Dog Company’s First Lieutenant James Lee recounted that 

ANSF platoon leaders set the tone for the competence and aggressiveness 

of their units regardless of the strengths or assets that the other Soldiers 

or policemen brought to the table. With the Soviet system in place, the 

success of a partnership between entire American and ANSF units often 

rested on the shoulders of a very few.13

US Army officers sometimes found that forging closer ties with 

ANSF units compromised their operational security (OPSEC). Lieutenant 

Colonel Hill did not have a consistent ANA presence in his Tactical 
61

Operations Center (TOC) due to strong suspicions that the Afghan Liaison 

and Observer (L&O) assigned to his headquarters was feeding information 

to the enemy. Most other concerns about OPSEC arose from the indirect 

transfer of information to insurgent forces. Companies assigned to partner 

with AUP and ABP units – those most likely to recruit personnel from 

Paktika – quickly learned that they could not provide much advance 

warning about the targets and objectives of upcoming missions for fear 

of the information leaking. Such leaks led to search operations sometimes 

referred to as “catastrophic successes” that uncovered no significant caches 

of weapons or suspicious military-age males. As Captain Dale Marrou, 

commander of Baker Company, Red Currahee, stated, “every time they 

knew about something more than literally 12 hours in advance, word got 

out and the people in whatever village we were going to when we got there 

said ‘oh yeah, we heard you were coming, we expected you.’ So of course, 

you didn’t find anything, nothing of consequence.”14

Some of these failures stemmed not from malice but rather information 

filtering through the Afghan kinship networks or casual conversations with 

locals. Even innocuous discussions by an Afghan soldier or policeman 

of his current whereabouts or future destinations could filter through 

the population quickly. To combat this, Soldiers from White Currahee’s 

Weapons Company withheld the objectives of their missions until they 

were under way, or, in some instances, deliberately misled the Afghans 

about their destination until the last possible moment. As could be expected, 

such methods proved unworkable in the long term and created friction 

in the partnering relationship. Instead, Lieutenant Wright reported that 

Fox Company’s leadership found a less polarizing solution by describing 

operations to their Afghan counterparts only in the vaguest of terms until 

the missions began. US Soldiers from Able Company, 4th BSTB, gathered 

all personal communications devices during mission briefs and did not 

return them until after completing the mission.15 

Perhaps the biggest hindrances to forming effective partnerships were 

the ANSF deployment schedules. Because of eastern Paktika’s ruggedness 

and isolation, ANSF leaders considered the area a hardship deployment 

and often rotated units through these districts every two or three months. 

Even in a poverty-stricken and war-torn country such as Afghanistan, 

many Afghan Soldiers and policemen found Paktika an unpleasant 

location. Thus, the platoons and companies of White Currahee rarely 

had the opportunity to build up the longer-term relationships that made 

partnering possible. This problem appeared in ANSF units which hailed 

from the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated northern regions of Afghanistan 
62

and who found the Pashtun-dominated Paktika Province especially alien. 

ANSF soldiers from other parts of Afghanistan that spoke Dari also had 

to overcome a significant language barrier because the Pashtuns speak 

Pashto. Both languages are part of the Iranian language subfamily and 

share some similarities, but the two diverged a millennium ago and thus 

evolved quite differently. As a result, units comprised primarily of nonPashtuns encountered difficulty communicating with the Paktikans and, 

like their American counterparts, often relied upon interpreters when 

patrolling. As expected, the communication barrier undercut the ANSF’s 

ability to endear itself to Paktikans skeptical of GIRoA influence.16

The diverse ethnic and tribal origins of units also led to strong 

interservice rivalries and, at times, outbreaks of violence between the ANA, 

AUP, and ABP. Multiple officers and NCOs reported witnessing gunfights 

between ANA soldiers and AUP policemen. As Captain Hank Hansen, 

commander of White Currahee’s Easy Company, recalled, “My first day 

when I came to do the relief in place (RIP) with the outgoing commander, 

there was a gunfight between the ANA and the AUP... just a shootout, old 

west style shootout where nobody gets shot.”17 While this was an extreme 

example of internal strife, it demonstrated the lack of cohesion within the 

ANSF. Such tensions resulted from ethnic strife, jealousy over perceived 

favoritism of one branch of the ANSF over another, and the frequent lack 

of clear delineation of responsibilities between the three services. 

Out in the field, US soldiers sometimes found their ANSF partners 

unreliable in combat situations. For combat units in Paktika, typical 

missions involved patrolling nearby villages, clearing homes occupied 

by suspected insurgents of weapons and bomb-making materials, and 

manning checkpoints to keep Afghan roadways safe. In the Yusof Kheyl 

and Yahya Kheyl districts, Red Currahee’s Able Company found that the 

ANSF proved very aggressive when they could achieve quick success 

against a suspected insurgent cell. On the other hand, the same units rarely 

wanted to conduct patrols necessary to keeping their outposts relatively 

safe from insurgent attack.18 This situation only exacerbated when Able 

Company turned responsibility for the Yahya Kheyl outposts over to the 

ANSF in mid-2011. The ANSF frequently took fire on their compounds 

because, in Captain Wagner’s analysis, they were “not alert, not attentive, 

not patrolling, not pulling guard.”19 First Lieutenant Daniel Stevens, 1st 

Platoon leader in White Currahee’s Weapons Company, noted that the 

Afghans willingly led patrols to gain that experience, but that they showed 

little regard for the positions of other Soldiers when firefights erupted. 

Stevens recounted that when they made contact with the enemy, he always 
63

asked his Soldiers, “‘Where are you in relation to the Afghans?’ Because... 

sometimes you just don’t know what they’re going to do.”20 The inability 

of the ANSF to successfully execute all of the combat roles assigned to 

them cast doubts on whether US Soldiers could trust them to shoulder 

more of the security burden. 

These obstacles certainly hampered efforts to create effective 

partnerships and frequently frustrated US Soldiers who worked with the 

Afghans regularly. In spite of these challenges, these same US Soldiers 

readily acknowledged that their ANSF counterparts in Pakitka brought 

unique skills to the table that Americans could never learn, and that these 

traits served as useful starting points from which to build partnerships. 

First and foremost, Americans singled out the hardy, adaptable nature of 

their Afghan partners. While 30 years of incessant war in Afghanistan 

has brought untold physical and psychological devastation to the Afghan 

people, it also infused them with a survivor’s mentality that Americans 

found admirable. As Captain Hansen said of the Afghans, “They’re just 

very resourceful people because they have to be. They’re survivalists.”21

Afghans often lived in more Spartan conditions than their American 

counterparts and received only a fraction of the training and support 

from their government than that expected by US Soldiers. The practical 

experience they had gained through three decades of war, however, often 

made up for these deficiencies. At times, the Afghans operated with a 

fearless bravado, such as when ANA Route Clearance Package (RCP) 

Soldiers simply fired a round from an M-16 to destroy a roadside IED 

rather than using the safer procedures developed by American sappers.22

The other significant asset Americans found helpful in their Afghan 

partners was their knowledge of the country’s physical and human terrain. 

By the time of the 4th BCT’s deployment to Paktika Province in 2010, the 

United States had been fighting in Afghanistan for nearly 10 years. Yet, 

despite the US Soldiers’ years of accumulated experience, they remained 

relative outsiders to the intricacies of Afghan life. According to Captain 

Marrou, the ANSF “had a very good feel for the place. And a lot of people 

would say, ‘oh, they’re lackadaisical, they’re not security conscious.’ But 

they had a pretty good feel for the way things were.”23 In fact, the spread 

of information through kinship networks and informal conversations with 

locals worked both ways; information spreading out among ANSF units 

could lead to a breach in OPSEC, but information could flow into ANSF 

forces and provide intelligence on insurgent activities. This knowledge 

often had limits because US company commanders often reported that the 

information they received from their partners rarely contained actionable 

intelligence, meaning that it lacked specificity or enough factual basis to 
64

initiate immediate action. Even if this knowledge had limits, it still gave 

the ANSF an advantage in understanding their AO.24

Partnership in Practice

When the 4th BCT deployed in the summer of 2010, it possessed 

two essential ingredients that gave its Soldiers a greater chance of success 

with partnership. First, there was a brigade-wide commitment to seeing 

effective partnerships created. The brigade commander, Colonel Sean 

Jenkins, understood the value of working with the ANSF and desired that 

the units under his command maintain “constant contact” 25 with their 

Afghan counterparts. The brigade-wide commitment meant that multiple 

units often worked to solve key problems that hampered the development 

of partnerships. Second, many of Task Force Currahee’s Soldiers had 

prior experience and knowledge of Paktika Province. The brigade had 

previously deployed there during 2008-2009, and more than half the 

Soldiers continued to serve in Task Force Currahee by 2010. Obviously, 

knowledge of the physical and human terrain was vital to the COIN 

campaign, but this knowledge also gave the Soldiers some prior working 

knowledge of the ANSF units that they expected to work with.26 

No discussion of partnerships between US and ANSF forces a decade 

after the fall of the Taliban could escape mention of the phrase “Afghan 

right” or “Afghan good.” Soldiers at all levels recognized the unlikelihood 

that the ANSF could meet or surpass the level of operational effectiveness 

attained by the US and other military forces deployed to Afghanistan. 

The Americans recognized that they and the Afghans differed on what 

standards needed to be met to effectively secure the country. In the 

estimation of the US Soldiers in Paktika, many of the units they initially 

partnered with were not up to the “Afghan good” standard. Instead, many 

believed that improving the ANSF to the level of “Afghan good” would 

still allow the Afghans to secure their own country even if some problems 

persisted. For instance, Americans could tolerate some corruption, such as 

Afghan Soldiers and policemen taking tolls at checkpoints from passersby, 

so long as it remained on the margins and had no effect the Coalition’s 

larger mission goals.27 Obviously, the danger of this approach was that 

the Coalition could potentially sacrifice long-term stability for shortterm security. This process of cultural compromise, however, allowed 

the Afghans to discover their own solutions to problems plaguing their 

nascent nation. 

If partnership’s ultimate goal was to improve the ANSF so that its 

units could eventually assume the security burden, then US units felt 

obligated to eliminate the ANSF’s deficiencies. Members of the 4th 
65

BSTB stationed at FOB Sharana worked to improve the administrative 

capabilities of their ANSF counterparts. First Lieutenant Ron Keplinger, 

the S1 Personnel Officer, partnered with several AUP officers in charge of 

finances and various aspects of personnel administration. Keplinger found 

that his partners had previously performed administration duties without 

the help of computers and instead haphazardly maintained written records. 

First Lieutenant Heidi Dailey, the battalion’s S6 Communications Officer, 

set about improving the ANSF’s communications systems and training 

their personnel how to use them. Dailey believed that while Afghans 

adapted quite easily to different combat situations, they had little previous 

experience in building and maintaining an efficient communications 

system. Surprisingly, Dailey detected virtually no hostility from her 

partners because of her gender, and she quickly endeared himself to the 

Afghans by informally learning Pashto and becoming somewhat fluent 

in the language by the end of her deployment. Because of the combined 

efforts of Keplinger and Dailey, their Afghan partners had a rudimentary 

internet system called MOI-Net up and running by spring 2011, and their 

personnel began to quickly adapt to the new system and more efficient 

methods of administration.28 

The best partnerships in Paktika occurred when American and Afghan 

units forged close ties, both on and off duty. To bridge the cultural gulf 

between Americans and Afghans, time and patience became prized 

qualities. As Major Tim Hoch, the S3 of the 4th BSTB observed, “95 

percent of partnership is giving a s---.” Indeed, the Soldiers of the 4th 

BSTB’s RCP took this to heart. The RCP’s mission in Afghanistan was to 

keep the roadways in Paktika clear of Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs) 

using specialized vehicles and equipment. For the first several months of 

their deployment, the American RCP worked to clear the roads in western 

Paktika province. Beginning in January 2011, the RCP began partnering 

with an ANA company fresh from basic training in Kabul with the intent 

of building an equivalent route clearance capability in the ANA from 

scratch. Given the constant threat posed by insurgents placing IEDs along 

Afghan roadways, the ANA needed its own ability to clear Afghanistan’s 

road network and keep lines of communication open.29

First, the American RCP made significant preparations in advance of 

their partners’ arrival. The American RCP had sent a small team to Kabul 

to meet the ANA personnel before their relocation to FOB Sharana and 

learned their partners’ strengths and weaknesses. Through these meetings, 

the American RCP learned that their ANA counterparts had an experienced 

core of officers and NCOs, but most of its personnel lacked experience 

with this particular mission. Captain Mark Gillman, the commander of 
66

Able Company (Sappers), 4th BSTB, which included the RCP, studied 

past partnership experiences to determine the strengths and weaknesses of 

previous approaches. He determined that a one-to-one relationship would 

be crucial to avoiding problems such as desertion because past situations 

where ANSF units outnumbered the Americans caused the Afghan units 

not consistently partnered with to quickly become ineffective. The 

incoming ANA company had three platoons, but Gillman only had two 

organic route-clearance platoons at his disposal. So that both companies 

had the same number of platoons and to ensure a one-to-one pairing, 

Gillman persuaded his superiors to relocate a US Army National Guard 

route-clearance platoon to Sharana. ANA soldiers occasionally went 

AWOL over the next several months, but the desertion rate remained quite 

low and never adversely affected the operational effectiveness of the three 

ANA RCP platoons. The American Sappers regarded their ANA partners’ 

sustainment of manpower strength as a significant accomplishment.30 

Gillman encouraged his subordinates to partner with the ANA and 

to not view partnership as an unnecessary chore. Gillman’s enthusiasm 

filtered down to his subordinates. Platoon leader First Lieutenant Bryan 

Bogenschutz found several ways to make his partnership with a new ANA 

route clearance unit successful. First, he took steps to establish a friendly 

relationship with his counterparts by hosting a barbecue for US and ANA 

Soldiers within the first week of their arrival. This simple gesture fostered 

goodwill between the Americans and the Afghans, and it opened up a 

tradition of shared meals that recurred throughout the rest of the BSTB’s 

deployment. Next, the two units also met frequently during off-duty hours 

to play sports, including American-rules football and volleyball, or “wallyball” as the Afghans pronounced it.31

This investment of off-duty time certainly helped create an atmosphere 

conducive to effective partnership, but Bogenschutz found other means of 

improving the relationship between the two units. Soon after the partnership 

began, he created a “face book” that showed pictures and names of each 

Afghan Soldier in the ANA route clearance platoon and circulated copies 

to everyone in the American RCP. This book also included photos of each 

Afghan Soldier in uniform manning his designated post in their vehicles 

so that US Soldiers could associate an Afghan with a particular position 

or task when preparing for or conducting operations. Memorizing this 

information made it easier for the Americans to quickly identify their 

counterparts and helped build a greater sense of trust between the two 

units.32
67

The efforts made by Gillman and Bogenschutz paid off handsomely 

over the course of their deployment. The ANA route-clearance unit 

made dramatic improvements in its operational effectiveness during the 

four months that they partnered with Gillman’s men. By April, the ANA 

RCP began conducting security patrols without US assistance and, by 

all accounts, worked successfully to diminish the IED threat in western 

Paktika province. As Bogenschutz said, “it got to the point when we 

wouldn’t even have to go out with them.... They said, ‘You know, we got 

this one.’ We’re like, ‘OK’. They’d go out and, they’d find something, 

they’d disable it, or they’d bring [an IED] back and we would take care of 

it.” The ANA still needed some of the equipment that Americans deemed 

essential for engineering work, particularly demolition explosives, but 

their eagerness to assume more of the operational burden signaled that the 

partnership had proven fruitful in establishing an entire new ANA mission 

capability.33

Figure 2: Weekly team building dinner for the US and ANA RCPs at FOB 

Sharana, 27 February 2011.

Photo courtesy of Captain Mark Gillman
68

One recurring challenge was ensuring that gains made while US and 

ANSF units worked together carried over once the deployments ended. 

Again, the unit rotations hampered the ability of American Soldiers to 

establish good working relationships with their ANSF partners. New units 

brought new commanders with different styles and mission priorities, 

and the relationships often needed to be rebuilt from scratch. The RCP, 

however, took steps to ensure that whatever gains made by the ANA 

during their six months together would stick. During the final weeks of his 

deployment, Bogenschutz worked to introduce his successor to his ANA 

counterparts in order to breed familiarity and trust between them so that 

the professional, if not the personal, partnership could continue.34 

The MP platoon attached to the HHC, 4th BSTB, also worked directly 

and indirectly to improve the partnering relationship between American 

units and the AUP. When the MPs first arrived in the summer of 2010, their 

initial duties included partnering with an AUP unit, but, after a few months, 

circumstances forced a change in the MP’s mission. Observations made by 

Soldiers in the field suggested that the quality of AUP units assigned to 

the different district police stations in Paktika varied widely both in the 

amount of training and standards of discipline. Also, in many areas, the 

AUP functioned as a paramilitary organization and an adjunct to the ANA 

rather than one devoted to policing and security missions. As a result, 

AUP officers often had a rudimentary understanding of military tactics 

but knew little of policing methods. These problems were confirmed when 

a survey conducted among the residents of Paktika uncovered extremely 

high dissatisfaction with the AUP detachments.35 

Prior to the MP’s arrival, US contractors trained the AUP in Paktika 

with varying degrees of success. The combined effect of the negative reports 

on the AUP led the brigade leadership to employ the MP platoon to solve 

this problem. To carry out this mission, the MPs established the Currahee 

Focused Police District Mentoring Program (CFPDM) in September 2010. 

Much like the RCP’s work with the ANA, the MPs attempted to tailor the 

training program based on specific deficiencies in the AUP units. The first 

step of the program involved US Soldiers observing and partnering with 

AUP units to determine what areas of training needed to be emphasized. 

Then, the bulk of the AUP from a district center – usually numbering 

between 30 and 60 policemen – would rotate to FOB Sharana in western 

Paktika Province to begin the training cycle.36 

Under normal circumstances, moving such large numbers of 

policemen out of their districts could have caused significant security 

risks, but two developments made the transfer possible. First, the CFPDM 
69

began in September 2010 just as the fighting season came to a close. The 

harsh winters and rugged terrain made fighting difficult and often led to 

protracted lulls in insurgent attacks. For the Coalition, winter presented 

an ideal period to conduct extended training and to refit Afghan personnel 

for the next fighting season. Second, the first group of graduates from the 

CFPDM rotated to fill any gaps at a district police station while the local 

personnel trained at Sharana which minimized the impact of the transfers. 

This first group, known as the Shaheen (Eagles), numbered 80 policemen 

and was the largest class ever admitted into the program. Once the MPs 

completed training one AUP unit, the policemen returned to their station 

and the Shaheen moved on to the next district in the training rotation. The 

Shaheen’s numbers gradually fell to approximately 25 policemen due to 

attrition and desertion by mid-2011, but the group continued to function as 

the replacement unit for the entirety of the CFPDM’s existence.37 

First Lieutenant Michael Rasmusson, the MP Platoon Leader, insisted 

that the CFPDM’s training regimens allowed the AUP to “crawl, walk, 

[and then] run.”38 One of the first priorities was to bring the AUP up to 

speed on law enforcement. Instead of enforcing the laws passed by 

Afghanistan’s National Assembly, AUP units often enforced the unwritten 

mandates passed down by local shura councils that allowed locals to meet 

informally and negotiate solutions to their problems. The MPs tried to 

break the AUP of the habit of deferring to local pressures when performing 

their duties. In many areas, the AUP had been observed bending their 

responsibilities at the whim of either local citizens or prominent leaders. 

Both of these issues often led to the inconsistent enforcement of law from 

district to district.39

As the training progressed, the MPs attempted to address each of 

the AUP’s shortcomings and bring them up to a uniform standard. This 

included training on standards and discipline to make the AUP more 

distinct and easily recognizable to the local populace, tactical training 

that kept officers safe while appearing non-threatening to citizens, and 

learning policing skills. Some of this training occurred in the classroom, 

but the MPs also included scenario-based training to give more of a handson approach, including one exercise where they sent their students out to 

the local bazaar and recorded their interactions with the public for later 

critiquing. To keep the trainees stimulated, the instructors interspersed 

classroom sessions with exercises throughout the day. The trainees took 

to the program well, especially because many enjoyed the respite that the 

CFPDM provided from the relative isolation and danger that they faced in 

their districts.40 
70

The CFPDM worked extremely well during the winter months, and 

those who interacted with the program’s graduates were pleased with the 

results. American officers who partnered with CFPDM graduates witnessed 

a noticeable uptick in their effectiveness and discipline. Lieutenant Hyman 

from Easy Company said of the graduates that, “I think they knew their job 

better and I think the biggest thing was an understanding of the ethics that 

were expected out of them. I think that training was valuable because before 

that I don’t think they really understood what was expected of them.”41

The Soldiers of Red Currahee’s Able Company successfully used CFPDM 

graduates to create an informal special reaction team (SRT) capable of 

conducting aggressive search and clearing operations.42 Sergeant Kudrna 

noted that the graduates of the program itself realized it had improved their 

skills, and, as a result, graduates who passed through FOB Sharana on 

official business for their district stopped at the training center to greet and 

thank the trainers. The public also noticed a difference in the AUP after 

they completed the training. Locals related to Kudrna that, “These guys 

are polite. They don’t yell at kids, they’re not mean to women, they’re not 

mean to people – they’re actually out saying hello, talking to shopkeepers, 

getting involved.”43

Unfortunately, not every American unit partnered with the AUP could 

benefit from the CFPDM. Captain John Rascher, the commander of India 

Company, White Currahee, recalled that he needed air assets to move large 

numbers of men in and out of his AO in Gowmal District. With helicopter 

transportation stretched thin throughout Afghanistan, any AUP unit that left 

for training often had to wait some time before getting transportation back 

to Gowmal. Additionally, the Afghan policemen believed that rotation out 

of Gowmal entitled them to take leave back to their homes and families. 

As Rascher described, “So we’d get them to a school, and they wouldn’t 

come back for months, if at all.”44 In this case, the need for a consistent 

security presence in Gowmal outweighed any potential benefits the AUP 

might have received from the CFPDM. 

The CFPDM proved short-lived because the warming weather of 

spring 2011 signaled the start of a new fighting season. A rise in the 

number of potential insurgent attacks made local district chiefs reluctant to 

part with so many policemen at one time. As a result of this feedback, the 

MPs adapted the CFPDM into a new training program named Ten for Ten. 

As its name indicated, ten AUP officers received a condensed version of 

the CFPDM training in both classroom and scenario-based training over a 

period of ten days. Ten for Ten tried to compromise between the intensive 

training of the older program with reduced numbers of men taken from 
71

each police district and the length of the training period to address the 

concerns of the district chiefs. The Ten for Ten program remained in 

place for the remainder of the MPs deployment and proved a successful 

compromise in balancing the need for additional training with the security 

situation in the province.45 

All of the successes achieved by the 4th BSTB’s RCP, staff, and MPs 

in helping to establish new capabilities within the ANSF and enhancing 

partnerships throughout Paktika occurred at FOB Sharana, the province’s 

administrative center. While Soldiers at Sharana faced serious dangers – a 

pair of suicide bombers attacked the police headquarters at the FOB in 

November 2010 and killed a dozen Afghan policemen – and the corruption 

and dysfunction common in Afghan institutions, the situation at Sharana 

was far more secure than that faced by infantry companies and platoons in 

the smaller outposts scattered throughout Paktika.46 At these posts, some 

of which saw daily contact with the enemy, forming effective partnerships 

became even more difficult because some of the techniques did not easily 

carry over to platoons partnered in isolated COPs. For instance, the need 

for security in the more contested areas prevented American officers and 

NCOs from traveling to meet their new partners as the US RCP did. The 

lack of proper facilities inhibited Americans from subjecting their ANSF 

partners to the same rigorous training and mentoring that Afghans at 

Sharana received. Additionally, American Soldiers found that the short 

overlaps between deployments cut down on the amount of time available 

to get to know their ANSF partners and made it difficult to bridge 

relationships. According to Captain Marrou: 

You know in a ten-day RIP (Relief in Place) process, the unit 

coming in, in addition to having to sign for a property book which 

was twice the size of a property book you have back in the rear, 

and he’s got to do all that in ten days, and, oh, by the way, you’d 

better make sure your shortage annexes are straight and all this 

other crap, well, then he’s also got to try and learn a little bit of 

something about the AO. And learn about the personalities, and 

that’s ten days. It’s a fire hose effect to the umpteenth.47

With these hurried timetables, American Soldiers could only devote a 

small portion of their time to meeting their partners during these brief and 

hectic rotations. 

 In spite of all of these constraints, however, combat units still found 

ways to bond with the ANSF. White Currahee’s Weapons Company, for 

example, found its ANSF partners difficult to work with early in their 
72

deployment. Sergeant First Class William Allen thought the Afghans 

deliberately underplayed their own capabilities in order to shift more of the 

operational burden onto the Americans. Even worse, US Soldiers discovered 

the Afghans stealing their personal property from the joint TOC, and the 

ANSF leadership virtually ignored the accusations made by the Americans. 

After some heated exchanges, the Americans and Afghans began operating 

out of separate TOCs, but the separation allowed the relationship to mend 

and flourish. The US and ANA Soldiers began working on a driver’s 

education program that many Afghans completed, and the planning and 

coordination of operations also improved dramatically. In fact, Weapons 

Company’s 3d Platoon became informally attached to an ABP platoon and 

began operating together frequently because the two units began trusting 

one another. While members of the Weapons Company believed that 

their partners still needed improvements to function more efficiently and 

effectively, they had successfully overcome a rocky beginning.48 

Many Americans discovered that simply conducting business with 

their ANSF partners in a more relaxed, informal way often won the 

Afghans over. American Soldiers prided themselves on the efficiency and 

briskness with which they conducted their business, but they learned that 

Afghans interpreted such behavior, particularly with strangers, as curt and 

rude. Based on personal experience and knowledge of Afghan culture, 

some Americans achieved positive results by altering their approach to 

personal interactions. Lieutenant Hyman from White Currahee’s Easy 

Company built up his relationship with his AUP partner by listening to the 

police chief’s stories about his service in the mujahedeen under Ahmed 

Shah Masoud during the Soviet occupation. At some point during their 

interactions, Hyman’s counterpart would ask what he could do for Hyman, 

indicating that the altered approach yielded success. Hyman’s company 

commander, Captain Hansen, also learned through his personal experience 

that “getting officers and senior NCOs to be involved with [the Afghans], 

sit, drink and have chai and try to get to know them better I think is one 

of the best things to do.” 49 Building up these personal ties eventually gave 

Hansen more leeway in demanding greater accountability from his ANSF 

partners.50

Other officers in Paktika used their relationships with ANSF partners 

for multiple positive endeavors. Lieutenant Sean Peloquin, 1st Platoon 

leader in Red Currahee’s Baker Company, got to know his AUP partner 

through regular conversations over chai, watching TV together (even 

though Peloquin found local programming incomprehensible), and eating 

dinner together at least twice a week. These interactions sometimes 
73

involved Peloquin’s entire platoon, and this bond allowed the American to 

improve their partner’s effectiveness. Thanks to the solid rapport between 

Peloquin and his AUP partner, their combined efforts allowed the AUP 

and the sub-governor in Mata Khan District to begin coordinating their 

activities for the first time. Peloquin also initiated a cross-training program 

with his AUP partners whereby the US and AUP units learned each other’s 

tactics. His partner proved extremely capable and, over the course of 

Peloquin’s deployment, the AUP began collecting intelligence and leading 

joint US-AUP operations in the district.51 

India Company’s Captain Rascher likewise learned that getting to 

know his Afghan partners through personal interactions yielded large 

operational benefits. When Rascher and his Soldiers first arrived in 

Gowmal District, they found the Afghan Border Patrol contingent charged 

with guarding the Pakistan border operated out of COP Curry, nearly 50 

kilometers from the border. Making matters worse, the ABP conducted 

patrols only with great reluctance because they lacked reliable vehicles. 

Eventually, the time that the Soldiers of India Company invested in their 

relationship, combined with the timely transfer of some HMMWVs from 

US to ABP control, led to a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of the 

ABP. In late April 2011, Soldiers from India and Whiskey Companies 

participated in Operation DRAGOON in which the Americans helped the 

ABP create a new checkpoint only 20 kilometers from the border in the 

village of Niamatabad (see Figure 1). Once the ABP unit established itself, 

the Americans returned to their COPs and the new checkpoint became the 

sole responsibility of the Afghans. The ABP also became self-sufficient 

and staged its own supply runs to and from COP Curry.52 As Rascher said 

of his ABP partners, “When they saw that we were willing to help them 

out, they became a lot more willing to lead from the front, and a lot quicker 

to acknowledge that it was their country, and their job. And some of their 

officers would say, you know, in front of the others, ‘We should be the 

ones in the front, the Americans should be behind us.’”53 

Conclusions

The deployment of Task Force Currahee to Paktika Province in 

summer 2010 brought its staffs, companies, and platoons into a variety of 

different settings and each with its own mission to perform. These units 

faced the challenges of partnership with ineffective ANSF units limited by 

poor training, cultural and institutional rivalries, deficiencies in leadership 

and organization, corruption, and poor logistics. Among the components 

of the ANSF, only the ABP received regular praise from their American 

partners, while opinions of the ANA and AUP fluctuated wildly and 
74

indicated massive inconsistency in the quality of those units. The poor 

quality of the ANSF units meant that a wide gulf persisted between the 

capabilities of Afghan and American units. In a COIN campaign such as 

the one waged in Afghanistan, the absence of competent indigenous forces 

could negatively affect the Coalition war effort.

In spite of those high stakes and immense challenges, the Soldiers 

of Task Force Currahee found paths to forging successful partnerships 

with the ANSF. For many junior officers and NCOs within Task Force 

Currahee, training up their ANSF partners, either formally or informally, 

proved very successful. Many Soldiers noted that the ANSF lacked even 

the most basic of training when they arrived in Paktika. Without adequate 

training of the ANSF, American officers and NCOs could not rely upon 

their partners to carry their weight and perform the missions required of 

them. Informal programs in everything from marksmanship to driving 

implemented at the COPs and FOBs introduced essential skills to the 

ANSF. Meanwhile, the CFPDM and its successor program Ten for Ten 

brought about a noticeable increase in the skill-sets possessed by the AUP. 

Training had a multiplicative effect because the better-trained units not 

only learned to perform missions better but also became more cohesive 

and disciplined in the process. The training process itself bonded the 

ANSF Soldiers and policemen to each other and their American trainers, 

and vastly improved the chances of successful joint operations, such as the 

effort by White Currahee Soldiers and the ANSF to prevent disruption of 

the 2010 elections. 

The integrated nature of the brigade’s approach to partnership merits 

mention. Throughout Task Force Currahee’s deployment, Soldiers from 

both combat and noncombat units of the brigade worked to remove the 

obstacles to successful partnership. For instance, the implementation of the 

CFPDM by the MPs at FOB Sharana helped remedy the deficiencies of the 

Afghan police force. Similarly, combat units deployed to smaller outposts 

likewise sought to train up their partners and improve their effectiveness. 

The BSTB staff officers partnered with Afghans worked to improve the 

creaky and dysfunctional logistical network that hampered the operational 

effectiveness of many ANSF units in Paktika, although the observations 

made by American Soldiers in the field suggests that much more needed 

to be done in this area. This integrated effort demonstrated the brigade’s 

commitment to partnership and the willingness to devise multiple solutions 

to eliminate common shortcomings found in Afghan units. 

Finally, the common link between all of the successful partnerships 

established between Task Force Currahee and the ANSF in Paktika 
75

involved frequent one-on-one interaction between Soldiers and policemen 

from different nations. Regardless of whether these relationships formed 

through training programs or in the field during operations, some of the 

best partnership successes came about through shared experiences and 

forging closer ties. American Soldiers accepted the different culture and 

expectations of their partners and modified their own conduct to suit the 

more relaxed and informal ways of the Afghans. Conversations over chai, 

shared meals, athletics, or even watching television together during offduty hours brought Americans and Afghans closer together. In at least 

one case, a Soldier learning one of Afghanistan’s major languages broke 

through the cultural barrier. Sometimes, as in the case of 3d Platoon from 

White Currahee’s Weapons Company, the US and ANSF forged closer 

ties through repeated joint operations. By building up these relationships, 

the Americans showed more concern for the Afghan effort against the 

destabilizing forces of the insurgency and the Afghans responded favorably 

to these overtures. 

Lieutenant Colonel David Womack, commander of Red Currahee, 

told his commanders that because of the hard work involved, “partnership, 

if done right, should hurt very much.”54 Womack’s observation rings true 

as the best examples of partnership resulted from strenuous efforts by both 

American and Afghans to work with one another. To the credit of the US 

Soldiers in Paktika during 2010 and 2011, they viewed “Afghan good” 

as the minimum acceptable standard and often successfully trained their 

partners to conduct complex operations. The time and resource investment 

in partnering was considerable, but the payoffs, such as the joint operation 

preventing disruption of the 2010 elections, were incalculable. 
76

Notes

1. Lieutenant Colonel Donn Hill, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 November 2011, 7-8.

2. Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA: 

RAND Corporation, 2008). http://www.rand.

org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf 

[accessed 11 January 2012], 15-8. 

3. Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, 

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and 

Dennis F. Van Wey, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001-September 2005 (Ft. 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 185, 216. 

4. Hill, interview (Wadle), passim; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 

Central Statistics Organization, Statistical Yearbook, 2009-2010, http://cso.gov.

af/Content/files/Population.pdf [accessed 11 January 2012], p. 5. 

5. Lieutenant Colonel Donn Hill, interview by Ginger Shaw, Center for 

Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 24 June 2011, 23. 

6. Hill, interview (Shaw), 24-5. 

7. Able Company, 1-506 IN (Air Assault), group interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 November 2011, 13-

4. 

8. First Lieutenant James Hyman, quoted in Easy Company, 2-506 IN 

(Air Assault), group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 16 November 2011, 13.

9. Staff Sergeant Billy Weiland, quoted in A/1-506, group interview, 46. 

10. Staff, 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, group interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2011, 17. 

11. Staff Sergeant Lucas Kudrna, quoted in Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, group interview 

by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 November 

2011, 5. 

12. A/1-506, group interview, 13-5, 25; Baker Company, 1-506 IN (Air 

Assault), group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2011, 15-6; E/2-506, group interview, 24. 

13. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 10; India Company, 2-506 IN 

(Air Assault), group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2011, 11-3. 

14. Captain Dale Marrou, quoted in B/1-506, group interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2011, 16. 

E/2-506, group interview, 14. 
77

15. Weapons Company, 2-506 IN (Air Assault), group interview by Ryan 

Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 November 2011, 

25-7; I/2-506, group interview, 25-6; Route Clearance Package, Able Company, 

4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 November 2011, 30-1. 

16. E/2-506, group interview, 32-3; W/2-506, group interview, 10-1. 

17. Captain Hank Hansen, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 33. 

18. Captain Jared Wagner, quoted in A/1-506, group interview, 17-8. 

19. Captain Jared Wagner, quoted in A/1-506, group interview, 19. 

20. First Lieutenant Daniel Stevens, quoted in W/2-506, group interview, 

10. 

21. Captain Hank Hansen, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 27. 

22. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 9, 28. 

23. Marrou, quoted in B/1-506, group interview, 31. 

24. A/1-506, group interview, 20. 

25. Colonel Sean Jenkins, interview by Ginger Shaw, Center for Military 

History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 24 June 2011, 17. 

26. Jenkins, interview, 13-8. 

27. Hill, interview (Shaw), 43-4; Lieutenant Colonel David Womack, 

interview by Ginger Shaw, Center for Military History, Fort McNair, 

Washington, DC, 23 June 2011, 8.

28. 4th BSTB Staff, group interview, 3-6, 8-9, 11-2, 36-7. 

29. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 20. 

30. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 10-2

31. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 12, 24

32. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 19, 22

33. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, Quote on 35. 

34. RCP/A/4th BSTB, group interview, 31-6.

35. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 1-3. 

36. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 1. 

37. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 1-3, 14-5; Lieutenant Colonel 

Ivan Beckman, interview by Ginger Shaw, Center for Military History, 

Fort McNair, Washington, DC, 22 June 2011, 17; First Lieutenant Michael 

Rasmusson, telephone conversation, Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 12 January 2012. 

38. Rasmusson, quoted in HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 3. 
78

39. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 4. 

40. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 9-13

41. Hyman, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 9. 

42. A/1-506, group interview, 43-4. 

43. Kudrna, quoted in HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 24. 

44. Captain John Rascher, quoted in I/2-506, group interview, 20. 

45. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 14-5. 

46. Indo-Asian News Service, “Suicide bombers storm police HQ, 

kill 12,” Hindustan Times, 27 November 2010, http://www.hindustantimes.

com/world-news/Afghanistan/Suicide-bombers-storm-police-HQ-kill-12/

Article1-631653.aspx (accessed 30 December 2011). 

47. B/1-506, group interview, 41. 

48. W/2-506, group interview, 4-7. 

49. Hansen, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 22. 

50. E/2-506, group interview, 21. 

51. B/1-506, group interview, 17-8, 31-3. 

52. I/2-506, group interview, 17-20. 

53. Rascher, quoted in I/2-506, group interview, 19. 

54. Womack, interview, 4.
79

Leading the Charge

A Cavalry Platoon’s Fight in Badghis Province

by

Matt M. Matthews

Early signs of spring brought little relief to Red Platoon. Led by First 

Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, the unit was formally designated 1st Platoon, 

Bravo Troop, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment (1/B/7-10 CAV) of the 

US Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 4th Infantry Division (4ID). 

Throughout the blistering summer of 2010 and the frigid winter of 2010-

11, Red Platoon had relentlessly conducted combat missions in northern 

Murghab District, Badghis Province, in northwest Afghanistan. For Law’s 

platoon, operations intensified in April 2011, as they expanded security 

in northern Murghab. On 4 April, the platoon’s Soldiers experienced the 

most intense firefight of their entire tour.1

Background

Lieutenant Colonel C. Scott Mitchell’s 7-10 CAV arrived in 

Afghanistan in the summer of 2010. Tasked with providing security to two 

provinces with only 513 Soldiers, his Alpha, Charlie, Delta, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Troops (HHT) occupied positions in Herat Province. 

Bravo Troop (christened Bulldog Troop) established positions in Badghis 

Province. By occupying the Bala Murghab Valley in the Murghab District, 

Bulldog Troop was isolated from the rest of the Squadron, a situation that 

created a formidable logistical challenge. “The way that they received 

supplies primarily was by CDS (Container Delivery System) drop,” Major 

Jonathan Lauer, the Squadron Operations Officer (S3) pointed out. “They 

would get two or three CDS drops a week,” he explained, most of which 

were dropped by United States Air Force C-17 Globemaster IIIs. Lauer 

recalled that it took “a significant amount of effort just to keep them resupplied up there [because] there was no secured, reliable ground route...

up to Bala Murghab at all.” Law also described the situation as “a logistical 

nightmare.”2

Command and Control (C2) also presented challenges for 7-10 CAV. In 

Herat Province, units from 7-10 CAV colocated with a Spanish Task Force, 

while the Bulldog Troop Headquarters in Badghis Province colocated with 

an Italian army regiment located in the town of Bala Murghab on Forward 

Operating Base (FOB) Todd. “We fell in on what was a very, very complex 

C2 structure,” Lauer emphasized. While 7-10 CAV still belonged to 

1BCT, 4ID, stationed in Kandahar, they conducted operations on territory 
80

assigned to the Italian and Spanish armies. Furthermore, while both the 

Italians and the Spanish forces fell under Regional Command-West (RCWest), 7-10 CAV did not. The thorny C2 situation created significant 

tension between 7-10 CAV and its NATO allies.3

Figure 1. Badghis Province and Bala Morghab District.

Conflicting national rules of engagement (ROE) worsened the tense 

relationship between 7-10 CAV and its Italian and Spanish allies. “They 

were not prosecuting the war, necessarily, to the degree that it really 

demanded out there,” Lauer declared. Indeed, Italian and Spanish units, 

along with their Afghan counterparts, performed few patrols or operations 

into suspected Taliban locations. “Because the Italians and Spanish didn’t 

go [to] a lot of places, didn’t actively patrol a lot of places...there was 

a lot of area that was relatively ungoverned, or under what was fully 

acknowledged to be [under] Taliban control. So there were areas you just 

didn’t go,” Lauer noted.4

By late March 2011, Bravo Troop, commanded by Captain Tyrek 

Swaby, occupied FOB Todd in the town of Bala Murghab. At the same 

time, Swaby’s 2d Platoon (White Platoon), commanded by First Lieutenant 

Nick Costello, occupied a Combat Outpost (COP) south of Bala Murghab.5

Law’s Red Platoon and an Afghan National Army (ANA) platoon manned 

COP Metro north of the town. All three positions were within what was 

referred to as the security bubble. “That bubble was really the village of 

Bala Murghab...our cav[alry] platoon on the north side and our cav[alry] 

platoon on the south side, were sort of the northern and southern boundaries 

of that security bubble,” Lauer stated. The Squadron Operations Officer 

also pointed out that areas outside the security bubble were impenetrable. 

“If you [ventured outside the bubble] you were guaranteed to get into a 

fight,” Lauer explained. He then referred to the large number of improvised 
81

explosive devices (IEDs) in the area, stating, “It was heavily IEDed to the 

north and south. Inside the security bubble, it was relatively secure.”6

Law bluntly decried the security situation around COP Metro. “It was 

trench warfare is what it was,” he stated. “They were set up [north of Bala 

Murghab] in the valley...it was no man’s land pretty much. And anybody 

that went up there was going to be shot at. Any kind of...coalition forces, 

or anything that represented the government, was going to get shot at.” 

While there were brief lulls, the Taliban attacked Law’s Platoon almost 

every day with small arms fire. Red Platoon regularly encountered 

Taliban insurgents planting IEDs. Law’s Soldiers also faced a dedicated, 

entrenched and well-supplied enemy.7

With the approaching spring and improved weather conditions, 

7-10 CAV intended to bolster counterinsurgency operations. “What we 

really wanted to do is start to connect the Afghan provincial and district 

governance with more...of its population,” Lauer explained. In order to 

carry out this ambitious mission, Bulldog Troop needed to make contact 

with the small villages north and south of FOB TODD. The Squadron 

anticipated a fierce fight since improved weather also brought increased 

enemy activity. Soon however, White Platoon found success in the south. 

In what was described as a series “of fortuitous events,” the platoon killed 

8 to 12 Taliban fighters using a combination of close air support (CAS), 

and direct and indirect fire. The 7-10 CAV staff also indentified two distinct 

Taliban cells, one operating in the south and the other in the north. 8

 White Platoon’s actions proved so successful they stood up new, 

temporary positions, conducted a series of patrols designed to upset enemy 

operations, and reestablished coalition control south of FOB TODD. “We 

were having a good deal of success in the south,” Lauer stated, so “we 

wanted to try to apply that pressure to that Taliban zone in the north, 

because we did get a lot of indications that those two cells were working 

together, asking each other for help.” The squadron determined to keep 

the enemy on its heels and pressed Bulldog Troop to conduct an operation 

north of COP Metro. The mission took Red Platoon further north than 

coalition forces had ventured since the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan.9

Planning the Mission

First Lieutenant Law, a native of Moultrie, Georgia, had served three 

years in the US Army as an enlisted military intelligence specialist. Upon 

completing his enlistment, he attended Georgia Southern University under 

the US Army’s Green to Gold program, returning to active duty as a Scout 

Platoon Leader. Law’s Platoon contained a diverse group of Soldiers. 
82

Almost all of his men were veterans of the Iraq war, but none had deployed 

to Afghanistan. Law admitted, that the deployment “was something we 

believed we were ready for, but when we got there, we quickly realized 

that there were some things we were going to have to learn very, very 

quickly.” The platoon had trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center 

(JRTC) prior to deployment. Law was thankful for the JRTC training in 

COP defense, particularly since the enemy attempted to overrun his COP 

several times during his platoon’s first months in Badghis.10 

According to the platoon leader, gaining the trust of the local population 

and working with the ANA proved a daunting task. Locals observed Red 

Platoon’s activities and reported them to the Taliban. Law’s Platoon also 

initially endured abysmal living conditions. “We had generators that 

barely worked most days, living in dirt houses where any animal could 

make its way inside, we had to figure out ways to cool our drinking water, 

hand washing clothes and gear, [and] living about three to four kilometers 

away from support,” Law lamented. With the construction of COP Metro 

in October 2010, conditions improved. However, their isolated position, 

combined with their limited numbers, made the platoon highly vigilant, 

knowing full well they could be easily ambushed from numerous locations 

north of COP Metro.11

To help defend against enemy attacks, Law built a small observation 

post (OP) about 500 meters northeast of COP METRO. The new position 

was called (OP) Liberty. Seven Soldiers of the platoon, rotating with each 

other every three to four days, manned OP Liberty.12

 Captain Swaby, the Bulldog Troop Commander, and Law planned 

for an operation north of COP Metro in the last weeks of March 2011. 

Law and Swaby spoke via radio and both men used their FBCB2 (Force 

XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System) to discuss the enemy 

situation and a possible course of action. With Bulldog troop spread out, 

Law pointed out that this was “pretty much how we had to communicate 

with the Troop Commander, because...he couldn’t get out there to us all 

the time.” Both officers wanted to intensify operations north of COP 

Metro and they intended to take a patrol right up to the enemy’s doorstep. 

Swaby and Law set their sights on the small villages of Kamusari and Joy 

Gange. Law recalled that they wanted to go there, “basically [into] what 

[the Taliban] considered their comfort zone.” Joy Gange was an important 

village because it afforded the enemy access to the valley from the north 

and the population provided support to the Taliban.13

Over the course of the next few days, Law’s Platoon conducted 

night reconnaissance missions north of COP Metro. Creek beds provided 
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exceptional cover and concealment for Law’s reconnaissance missions. 

“I used a creek bed, because we could move north and south and not be 

detected,” he recalled. “Nobody could ever see you moving in the creek 

bed, because the creek bed was maybe seven or eight feet below the 

ground level. It was completely dried up.” Law soon located a vacant 

compound about 400 meters south of Kamusari Village and determined it 

made a suitable Observation Post (OP) for the upcoming mission. Petty 

Officer 1st Class John Pearl, a US Navy videographer, accompanied Law’s 

Platoon on the mission, describing the compound as “ruins.” He recalled 

that the building had no roof and only three rooms. “All the rooms were 

interconnected by a passageway down the middle. It looked like it was 

made of mud. I think it had one or two entry points.” Law’s Platoon named 

the compound OP Reaper.14 

Although Law’s Soldiers were highly motivated and welcomed the 

upcoming mission, the platoon leader worried about several issues. First, 

OP Reaper needed to be fortified, but the platoon was short on sand bags. 

Law recalled having only a limited number to strengthen the OP. Second, 

Law was missing his key Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). His 

Platoon Sergeant, Senior Scout, Bravo Team Section Sergeant and two 

other key sergeants were all on leave. So, I was basically having junior 

E-5 Sergeants doing the jobs of senior staff sergeants.” Yet the manpower 

shortage did not deter Red Platoon.15

On the night of 3 April, Law gave his operations order to the platoon. 

He named the mission Operation RED SAND, based on their designation 

as Red Platoon. Law told his platoon that its mission was to observe the 

area around Kamusari village for enemy activity and conduct a Senior 

Leader Engagement (SLE) with village leaders in Kamusari. He hoped the 

meetings promoted greater cooperation between the villagers and the local 

government. The platoon also intended to conduct patrols throughout the 

area. Law’s intent was to observe activity and “interdict enemy offensive 

operations.” Phase one of the mission consisted of a night move from COP 

METRO to OP Reaper. Once OP Reaper was cleared, the platoon planned 

to fortify the outpost. After OP Reaper was established, the plan called 

for several night reconnaissance missions around Kamusari. At daybreak, 

Law decided to head straight into Kamusari village to conduct Senior 

Leader Engagements (SLEs) with the local population.16

As part of the move to OP Reaper, Law designated Sergeant Jeff 

Sheppard as his NCOIC (Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge). Other 

Red Platoon members included Sergeant Peter Nalesnick, Forward 

Observer (FO) Specialist Dewayne Sims-Sparks, Medic Specialist Kellen 
84

West, Specialist William Newland, and Private First Class Ben Bradley. 

Additionally an ANA squad was attached to the force. US Navy Petty 

Officer 3d Class Ryan Lee and his Explosive Detection Dog Valdo also 

accompanied Law on the operation. Both Lee and Valdo had worked 

with the Squadron in the past. Days earlier, Captain Swaby and Bulldog 

Troop First Sergeant Mike Dempsey introduced United States Air Force 

Technical Sergeant Kevin P. Wallace and Untied States Navy Petty Officer 

1st Class John A. Pearl to Law. Both men were members of a Combat 

Camera Team. Another section of the platoon, commanded by Staff 

Sergeant Matthew Fletcher, at OP Liberty, would provide supporting fire 

if Law made contact with the enemy.17

A final attachment rounded out Law’s team. Major Lauer, the squadron 

S3, arrived at COP METRO only hours before Law gave his operations 

order. Lauer was visiting units, making the rounds across the squadron’s 

area of operations (AO). Lauer recalled talking with Law, “to kind of help 

him understand why we had directed a mission like this from the squadron 

level, and how he fit into that larger squadron mission. Because, again, 

it was a very spread out, dispersed kind of squadron layout, and it was 

difficult to understand how all these missions impacted each other. For 

him, it was difficult...to even understand, necessarily, how his operations 

in the north of the Bela Murghab River Valley were impacting operations 

in the south.” Lauer decided to accompany Red Platoon on the mission, 

but made it clear that this was Law’s operation. “I was merely there as part 

of battlefield circulation to try to...help explain to them where their role 

on the larger battlefield was, as well as gather significant understanding for 

myself, so I could bring it back to the staff, as to what they were facing in 

that AO.”18

As part of Law’s plan, a Red Platoon Quick Reaction Force (QRF) 

consisting of two M-ATVs “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain 

Vehicles” remained at COP METRO under the command of Staff Sergeant 

Ray Mundo. Law could also rely on Bulldog Troop’s QRF located at 

FOB TODD and commanded by First Sergeant Dempsey if his Platoon 

encountered serious resistance. The Red Platoon Leader also coordinated 

indirect fires and Close Air Support (CAS) with the Bulldog Troop Tactical 

Operations Center (TOC) and the Italian Army located at FOB TODD. 

In concluding his operations order, Law reiterated the key objectives of 

Operation RED SAND. A covert movement to the observation post was 

of paramount importance, as was clearing and establishing OP Reaper. 

The night area reconnaissance around Kamusari village also remained of 

upmost significance and required great stealth. Finally, Law accentuated 
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the platoon’s paramount goal, “the defeat of all enemy [dismounted] teams 

in [the] AO.” Turning to his men, Law told them, “Hey, it’s going to 

be really cold, and we’re going to be getting there at night, we’re going 

to have to dig in. We’re going to be up there for at least 24 to 48 hours 

minimal.” The Platoon Leader also advised his men that contact with the 

Taliban was “expected.”19

The Mission

At 2300 on 3 April, Law and Red Platoon departed COP METRO 

on foot. According to Private First Class Ben Bradley, the platoon moved 

north on Route BRONZE before turning west on a small road toward 

Kobali village. The patrol moved quickly through Kobali village and 

then headed north, using the creek bed for cover and concealment. Upon 

emerging from the creek bed, the patrol worked its way northeast through 

a field and arrived at OP Reaper at 0001, 4 April.20

Upon arriving at OP Reaper, Law’s men strengthened the mud and dirt 

structure. “We fortified the position throughout the night, stood watch, did 

all those types of typical routine tasks,” Combat Camera Team member 

John Pearl remembered. “I didn’t have any night equipment with me, and 

certainly we were using light and sound discipline,” he stated. “So there 

was really nothing for me to do, except to just go ahead and integrate with 

the platoon at that point. To be honest with you, this was well outside 

of my previous experiences. So I was pretty jacked up.” Fellow Combat 

Camera Team member Kevin Wallace helped fill sandbags and placed 

them in open doorways, of the roofless structure with two to five foot tall 

walls. “It was just kind of the ruins of a house once upon a time,” Wallace 

pointed out. “There was three distinct doorways to the north that were 

probably anywhere from two to three feet wide, so we tried to fill those 

with sandbags the best we could.” The men also dug into the floor in an 

effort to create more space and improve their position.21

While the Soldiers fortified the building and stood watch, Law initiated 

the first of two night patrols into Kamusari village at approximately 0200. 

“I took a four-man patrol, and we started probing in the village, just 

identifying routes in and routes out; and just looking for signs of life,” 

Law stated. Valdo and his handler Lee accompanied the patrol. Air Force 

Technical Sergeant Wallace remembered Valdo sniffing out the village for 

booby traps, bombs, and IEDs. Law saw few signs of life as his small 

team crept through the village. Making their way back to OP Reaper, the 

patrol team managed to catch about an hour of sleep before Law roused his 

Soldiers for another patrol. At roughly 0400, Law moved his patrol back 
86

toward Kamusari village. “Usually, the locals will come out for prayer 

around four o’clock, for cooking and things like that,” Law recalled. 

Concealed by darkness, the team listened for any signs of activity. The 

platoon leader remembered trying to gauge “the activity there, looking to 

see if there’s kids, or if you hear laughing, or if you hear women talking, 

[any] signs that there’s actual normal activities, and not just military age 

males in that village.” From the observations, the team concluded that only 

military-age males were in the village. After a last, quick survey of the 

village, the patrol headed back to OP Reaper. Major Lauer accompanied 

this second patrol. Valdo and Lee returned with the team and the bomb dog 

“didn’t hit on anything the whole time.” Lauer also pointed out that they 

were able to walk in and around Kamusari village without any trouble. 

“We certainly didn’t hear anybody. Very few lights [were] on at all.” Lauer 

concluded there was no electrical power inside the village. 22

Figure 2. Red Platoon Operations, 3-4 April, 2011.

Upon returning to OP Reaper, Law’s Soldiers prepared their positions 

and watched for signs of the enemy. As the sun came up, the platoon leader 

saw two males walking out of Kamusari. Wallace reported that they stopped 
87

the men and questioned them. “We tried to assess any information. Is there 

any Taliban activity going on in the village, or are Taliban present now? 

We were getting negative responses out of the two people we grabbed. We 

let them both go and just kind of kept an eye on them, and they headed 

south across the field down towards where our COP [METRO] was.”23

Meeting the Village Elders

After daybreak, Law decided to conduct a SLE with Kamusari elders. 

He promptly gathered a new patrol team consisting of Major Lauer, 

Sheppard, Sims-Sparks, Pearl, Wallace, 3 ANA Soldiers and an ANA 

interpreter. The patrol headed out of OP Reaper north toward Kamusari. 

“We crept up right on them...we set up a cordon and started doing tactical 

questioning, talking to some of the older men,” Law recollected. Wallace 

recalled that in the daylight, the village looked like “a waste land.”24

The SLE did not go well. “It was bad, and very defiant,” Law reported. 

“It goes back to the traditional ways of thinking that they have, that they’re 

not going to change. They’re pretty much set on being anti-government...

it’s something that’s really difficult to counter with a group of Americans. 

They don’t have any adult leaders to be...pro-government or...proanything different than what they’ve done for the past thousands of years.” 

Law tried to convince the elders that the Afghan government could help 

them, but it was to no avail. “The more and more I spoke with them, the 

more I realized that there was nothing I could tell them that was going to 

change their mind,” Law insisted. Lauer later stated that Law “did a good 

job of just approaching them and telling them who he was [and] what they 

were doing. I would say you didn’t get the feeling they were happy to see 

us there, but you certainly didn’t get the feeling that they were hardcore 

Taliban that were out for our destruction. They certainly talked about the 

Taliban being there. They said, ‘oh they all left when you guys came.’” As 

the conversation continued, more villagers joined the small group.25

As Red Platoon members pulled security around Law’s conference, 

a middle-aged Afghan male appeared. He instructed the Americans and 

ANA that they should leave. Law asked why it was not safe and the Afghan 

responded, “There’s Taliban everywhere.” Law replied, “Well, where’s the 

Taliban? Well, they’re not here now, but they come all the time. Well, 

if the Taliban comes all the time, why don’t you tell them they’re not 

welcome here?” The Afghan man was growing more and more upset. He 

emphasized that the Taliban told the villagers that they were the future 

of Afghanistan and that the Afghan government would lose the fight and 

the Taliban would be resurgent. Law asked the man if he had been to the 
88

district center so he could see what the government had to offer. “When 

you look around here,” Law told the man, “this is what the Taliban can 

offer.”26

Figure 3. First Lieutenant Joseph Law, Red Platoon Leader, Bulldog Troop 

(7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment) conducting SLE in Kamusari 4 April 2011. 

Law is on the right.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

At this point, the Afghan encouraged Law to follow him into the 

village because it was not safe to stay where they were. With Shepherd and 

Sims-Sparks providing security, safety did not appear to be a problem. The 

villager, however, claimed that they were being watched. Following him 

into the center of the village, Law and his team were confronted by four 

or five other male villagers. Law immediately engaged the oldest Afghan 

of the group in conversation. “I’ve been around several Afghans, but I’ve 

not seen them act like these guys were,” Wallace later stated. “They were 

angry! They were spitting as they talked, which in their culture is a sign of 

disrespect, so you rarely ever see them spit in public, but they were spitting 

when they were talking to Lieutenant Law and our ANA Sergeant, so it 

was obvious that the conversations weren’t going in a positive direction.” 

Wallace concluded that the Afghans were disturbed by the fact that the 

Americans and the ANA had come into their village and penetrated the 

northern line of the security bubble. “We were in their backyard, and they 

weren’t happy about it,” Wallace emphasized. By this time, Wallace had 

no doubt that these men were Taliban insurgents.27
89

After about 45 minutes, Law realized the discussions were going 

nowhere and that the patrol was in a precarious situation. He decided to 

return to OP Reaper. “I knew as soon as we left, that something was going 

to go down,” Law explained. The platoon leader gave the villagers his 

contact information and told them that he understood their concerns and 

would bring them to the Afghan security forces and the Afghan government 

officials in the district.28

Within minutes, the patrol headed south through the village, back toward 

OP Reaper. As they proceeded through the village, an Afghan villager 

approached Law’s ANA Sergeant and warned him of an IED directly in the 

patrol’s path. The ANA Sergeant then relayed the information to Law. “No 

we can’t go that way, there’s an IED over there,” he told the platoon leader. 

Wallace thought this was strange as Lee had just taken Valdo through the 

area in search of IEDs. However, Wallace stated that Law did not want to 

take any chances and “brought us around to the other side of the building, 

so we left in the opposite direction that we came in.” As the patrol headed 

south out of Kumusari, Wallace noticed an ominous sign. As the patrol 

tramped through the open field back to OP Reaper, Wallace observed 

about 12 Afghan villagers gathering on top of a two story compound in 

the village. He watched in horror as other Afghans handed weapons to 

the men on the roof. Law also saw another portentous sign. While he had 

not noticed any women or children in the village during the SLE, he now 

observed at least a dozen running out of the village toward the west. In an 

instant, the patrol picked up the pace. “We weren’t tactically moving...We 

weren’t even scanning for mines, we were pretty much just getting the hell 

out of there,” Wallace recalled.29

The Fight at OP Reaper

Law did not know if the Taliban in Kamusari were aware of OP Reaper 

and he decided to move toward the creek bed and enter the OP from the 

south. Hastily moving into the OP, Law’s men took up defensive positions 

and waited. In the western room of the OP, Wallace, Pearl, Shepherd and 

Bradley also took up defensive positions. They were soon joined by Lee 

and Valdo. Major Lauer, Law, an ANA Sergeant and Sergeant Nalesnick 

occupied the center room, along with Red Platoon Medic Kellen West. 

At the same time, FO Sims-Sparks, Newland, the interpreter and the 

three ANA Soldiers prepared their fighting positions in the eastern room 

of the OP. “So we got into our respective rooms, and we were talking 

about basically what had just happened, and anticipating contact,” Wallace 

maintained. As they prepared for a possible attack, West observed Sheppard 

and Nalesnick walking “the line to police up the guys and ordering them 
90

to be on high alert for [a] possible attack.” Sims-Sparks then moved into 

the center room to coordinate with Law to send pre-plotted targets for the 

mortars at FOB TODD.30

Figure 4. Specialist Dewayne Sims-Sparks, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry 

Regiment forward observer, secures a sector of Kamusari Village, 4 April, 2011 in 

northern Bala Murghab Valley, Badghis Province, Afghanistan.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

Inside the west room, the Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors scanned their 

sectors for any sign of an attack. As their anxiety increased, Lee told the 

others in the room, “They’re not going to do anything. There’s no way. 
91

Nothing’s going to happen.” As soon as he uttered the last few words, 

enemy bullets smashed into OP Reaper. “It was just so funny, one tiny line 

like that, as soon as he said ‘Nothing’s going to happen’ all of a sudden, 

we have incoming rounds,” Pearl declared. At first the OP received only 

sporadic fire, but soon enemy fire from Kamusari, Joy Gange and the 

creek bed intensified. “It quickly evolved beyond anything I had ever 

experienced,” Pearl stated. “The magnitude of the rounds, the proximity 

of the RPGs, [rocket propelled grenades] the accuracy – all those things 

put me more and more out of my comfort zone. I took a defensive position 

to make sure that I wasn’t struck by any rounds,” Pearl remarked. “I 

continued shooting video, because this was exactly the scenario that you 

kind of want in my role. So I went ahead, got my camera, and got right to 

work. As the engagement continued, it became evident we might be in a 

difficult position, and it may be time to put my camera down, grab my rifle 

and help the OP defend itself.”31

In the west room, Wallace watched three enemy rounds slam into the 

wall inches from Pearl’s face. Sergeant Sheppard ordered the cameraman 

to find a better position and Pearl moved into the center room of the OP. 

“During breaks in [the] fire we actually laughed and joked about it,” 

Wallace explained. “We were taking extremely heavy and accurate fire 

from the compound to the north, the canal to the east and the canal to the 

west.” Except for the interpreter, Law’s team returned a blistering volley, 

firing small-arms and grenades. Armed with RPGs, the ANA fired rockets 

into the enemy positions 400 meters away. Wallace recalled that Specialist 

Newland and the ANA were “heavily engaged” with the enemy in the 

eastern creek bed, while the men in the center room were engaging dozens 

of insurgents in Kamusari. From the western room, Wallace and the others 

laid down a withering fire into the enemy positions in Kamusari and the 

eastern creek bed. Wallace also continued to check the southern approach 

to the OP for enemy fighters.32

In the center room, enemy bullets barely missed Nalesnick’s head as 

they slammed into the mud wall. Unfazed by the insurgent fire, Nalesnick 

laid down suppressive fire on enemy positions in the western creek bed. A 

torrent of Taliban bullets finally forced him to find better cover. As enemy 

rounds continued to slice into the OP, Kellen West grabbed his M-14. “I 

picked up the M-14 and started peeking up over a small groove in the 

northern wall,” he wrote. “I was observing the north calling out enemy 

locations. I saw enemy dismounts shifting positions and I fired at the 

moving dismounts as well as the enemies firing in the windows.”33
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As the fight grew more intense, Law and Sims-Sparks requested 

mortar fire on their pre-plotted targets. At the Bulldog Troop TOC, the 

Italians refused to fire the mission. Law explained “that was something we 

had a problem with, because the Italian mortars – well, it’s different than 

using the American mortars. Because, as the commander on the ground, if 

I said...I want you to bring it closer, you know, you can bring it in danger 

close, [and] the Americans will do it, but the Italians won’t do it, because 

they can actually be tried in a civilian court if something goes bad.” As the 

battle raged conflicting rules of engagement hindered the effectiveness of 

the coalition Soldiers’ fire.34

 In the western room of the OP, Sheppard and Bradley engaged enemy 

fighters in the nearby creek bed while Major Lauer provided cover fire for 

Nalesnick in the center battle position. From his position on the west side 

of the OP, Sheppard used his M203 to drop 40mm grenades onto enemy 

positions in the creek bed. From the east room Newland also put effective 

M203 fire on the insurgents firing from the creek bed east of the OP. In the 

midst of the barrage of bullets and incoming RPGs, Law and Sims-Sparks 

began working up new fire missions for the Bulldog Troop TOC. “At this 

point,” West recalled, “the RPGs started flying over the building originating 

from the creek bed. Sims threw me the rangefinder and compass and told 

me to find a target to the west of Kam[u]sari [approximately] 500[meters] 

out.”35 Incredibly, the Italians still refused to engage the Taliban.

Even though we were out of danger close range, I mean I’m 

looking at the target, I’m trying to hit it, and they refuse to fire on 

it...Basically, the mortars finally started firing, but they were way 

off to the west, because they didn’t want to [have] any casualties. 

So, basically... when I’m sitting there telling them where I want 

it, they refused to take our word...I mean, it was a Taliban squad 

that we had up in that village, and anybody who was friendly, or 

innocent, had already left the village.

It took the Italians approximately 15 minutes to shoot the first fire mission.36

Lauer contended that some of the difficulties with the indirect fire 

stemmed from the dispersed nature of the American and Italian TOCs. He 

stated that when a fire mission came into the Bulldog Troop TOC, an Italian 

Soldier would have to run over to the Italian Regimental Headquarters 

and locate the Regimental Commander. The Italian Soldier “let him know 

what was going on [and brought] him over to the American [TOC], and 

then they would...do the fire deconfliction and get the fire mission from 

the Italians there. The difficult part to it was the accuracy of the Italian 
93

mortars, especially when it was rocket-assisted,” Lauer recalled. While 

the Italian rocket-assisted 120mm mortars could range from FOB TODD, 

Lauer criticized their precision, noting it was “pretty bad.” Some of the first 

rounds to land, exploded uncomfortably close to OP Reaper. “Initially,” 

Wallace reported, “they were hitting right next to us.”37

In the end, Law was able to “work around” the indirect fire issues. 

He requested fire for effect on several targets and pointed out that the 

“mortars [were] not working exactly like we wanted.” With the mortars 

finally in action, Law directed his ANA First Sergeant to fire RPGs at the 

enemy positions around the OP. Law recalled him “putting them...spot 

on to where we were taking fire from.” The platoon leader also directed 

his M240 machine gun and M203s on to enemy targets in Kamusari. The 

combined firepower appeared to be holding the enemy at bay. About this 

time, Law called for CAS and coordinated with Staff Sergeant Matthew 

Fletcher and his team at OP Liberty to establish a base of fire with their 

heavy machine guns on the creek bed to the east of OP Reaper in order 

to repulse enemy attempts to maneuver through the ravine. Fletcher’s 

Soldiers also engaged enemy targets in Kamusari.38

The firefight had been underway for some time when the insurgents 

began hitting the OP with RPGs launched from the enemy occupied building 

in Kamusari. “They initially hit the ground in front of the center room,” 

Wallace remembered. “Next they hit the front wall between the center and 

western room, and then directly hit the wall on the western room.” At this 

point, Lauer, who was helping Law direct fires, told the Platoon Leader, 

“we probably need to move out of this position.” As Law’s men redoubled 

their efforts to suppress the enemy fire, an RPG slammed directly into the 

west room. The explosion wounded almost everyone in the room. West 

heard screams and Sheppard and Bradley yelling “Medic! Medic!” West 

shouted for cover fire and ran into the room. “Upon my initial sweep, 

all US personnel were still returning fire. Then Sergeant Sheppard began 

to shout ‘get the dog.’” West crawled over to Valdo and Lee and found 

that the dog was severely injured. “The rest of the US personnel,” West 

noted, “called their wounds out to me...Sheppard shrapnel to the arm...

Bradley shrapnel to the leg; Wallace with grazing shrapnel to the neck...

Lee claimed no injuries at the time.”39

With casualties mounting, and a strong recommendation from Major 

Lauer to leave OP Reaper, Law decided to move back to COP METRO. “We 

had to get out of there,” the platoon leader exclaimed. The men gathered 

their equipment, prepared to exit the OP, and treated the wounded. West 

was concerned about bleeding from Sheppard’s arm, and quickly made a 

tourniquet for the wounded Soldier.40
94

Figure 5. Private First Class Ben Bradley (left), and fellow scout Sergeant 

Jeff Sheppard, engage the enemy from OP Reaper 4 April 2011.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

Law’s plan called for the platoon to head for the cover and concealment 

of the east side creek bed. Once in the creek they moved south, in the 

direction of COP METRO. With enemy bullets zipping over their 

heads, Lauer and Nalesnick ran for the creek bed. As they were leaving 

OP Reaper, a couple of ANA Soldiers fired their RPGs into an enemy 

occupied building in Kamusari. “Having always been on the receiving end 

of the RPG, never having been on the outgoing RPG, for me, was fairly 

interesting,” Lauer remarked. “Pretty loud boom as that thing goes out, 

and then it has a pretty significant morale-boosting effect, to be honest.” 

Wallace was awed by the actions of Lauer and Nalesnick. “They got into 

contact, when they came down the [creek bed] but they cleared the way 

for us,” Wallace explained. “I was impressed. I mean, this officer kind 

of running with a scout...to clear the [creek bed]...I haven’t seen many 

things like that in my career!”41

 As the RPGs fired by the ANA decimated the enemy positions, CAS 

and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arrived over Kamusari. An ISAF 

fighter jet came in low, but instead of dropping bombs, the aircraft popped 

flares. Enemy fire stopped briefly, but within a minute OP Reaper was 

once again under a hail of gunfire. Predictably, Wallace and others in Red 

Platoon did not think the CAS produced the desired effects.42
95

Lauer and Nalesnick jumped into the creek bed and cleared the 

surrounding area. Next, the S3 radioed Law, informing him that the area 

was clear. Law’s Platoon bolted out of OP Reaper and headed for the creek 

bed. Eluding sporadic gunfire, the men and Valdo slid down the steep 

embankment.43

With Nalesnick on point, Red Platoon headed south toward COP 

METRO. As they began to move, Pearl noticed that Valdo could not make 

the trek on his own. Pearl stated that Valdo was “as much a part of the 

team as anyone else,” and he rushed to help him. “I don’t know if it was 

clear to Petty Officer Lee the extent of the dog’s injuries,” Pearl remarked. 

“I think he tried to get the dog to walk through the ditch, and I think the 

dog actually did that. Quickly it became clear the dog was not going to 

be able to leave under his own power.” As enemy bullets continued to 

crack overhead, Pearl grasped Valdo and threw him over his shoulders, 

determined to carry the dog back to COP METRO.44

As they hurriedly moved south, Red Platoon remained under constant 

fire. Lauer worried that the insurgents were maneuvering around them and 

putting Red Platoon at a “disadvantage.” However, Law’s Platoon did not 

realize at the time that they had already accomplished one of their main 

objectives. As the enemy maneuvered out of Kamusari and Joy Gange, 

they were spotted by the UAV and CAS. “The CAS was starting to identify 

people firing at us,” Lauer reported. “Not just from where we had initially 

taken fire, but from the village of Joy Gange out to the east, where we 

knew there was [a] significant enemy stronghold.”45

As the platoon continued its trek, Law coordinated with the QRF on 

standby. After taking the casualties at OP Reaper, the QRF, consisting of 

two M-ATVs commanded by First Sergeant David Dempsey and Staff 

Sergeant Ray Mundo, another member of Red Platoon, advanced swiftly 

out of COP METRO. The M-ATVs headed northwest in the direction of 

the creek bed. Private First Class Joshua Kukosky explained that Mundo 

gave the order to “prepare the M-ATVs” as soon as Law called with the 

casualty report. As they advanced closer to the creek bed, they received 

enemy fire. In response, they laid down a blistering cover-fire as Law’s 

team emerged from the ravine. The Red Platoon Soldiers at OP Liberty also 

engaged insurgent targets as the patrol exited the creek bed. “Climbing out 

of the canal was pretty intense, because you’re climbing up and the sides 

of the canal just break apart as you climb,” Wallace recalled. “But, one by 

one we got the hell out! As I got top side, one of the first things I saw was 

an RPG bounce off the hood of one of the [M-ATVs] that came to rescue 
96

us. It bounced off the hood and flew right over us.” Law remembered the 

weight of his equipment as well as two radios and Mundo jumping out 

of his M-ATV to help his fellow platoon members. “I got guys bleeding 

and screaming behind me, and we get up, and we have to crawl out of this 

creek bed. I look up, and all I see is Sergeant Mundo standing there, and I 

hear rounds going through the trees, and he’s screaming at the guys to start 

throwing bags up there, to get them out...They had to...physically help us 

under fire, to get out of the creek bed.”46

As the men came up out of the ravine, the wounded, including Valdo, 

were loaded into Mundo’s vehicle. West also squeezed in and began caring 

for the injured. Not all of the Soldiers fit into the M-ATVs, so Law and a 

portion of his team moved out on foot. “We had to run the whole way,” 

Law stated. “The trucks tried to stay in front of us as much as they could.” 

As they ran, RPGs flew past the M-ATVs and bullets rained down on 

them. After running about one mile, they finally reached COP METRO. At 

COP METRO, Sheppard, Lee and Valdo were placed on the MEDEVAC 

aircraft and taken to FOB TODD. While the rest of the Platoon caught 

their breath and reflected on the narrow escape from OP Reaper, Captain 

Tyrek Swaby, the Bulldog Troop Commander radioed Law. “Hey, right 

now is the best time to go back in there, and really get at them, because we 

know where they are now.”47

The Counterattack

Although Law was apprehensive about the new mission, he planned 

the counterattack immediately with help from Lauer. “It was difficult,” 

Law explained, “I’m missing so many key players...but we’ve got to put 

something together right now, because if we’re going to get [them], this is 

the best time to do it.” The platoon’s reaction to the new order was mixed. 

Some quipped that the mission was “bullshit,” while others were eager to 

return to the fray. One of Law’s men responded “Hell yeah. Let me get my 

stuff.”48

 As Law, Dempsey and Lauer formulated the plan, the other Red 

Platoon Soldiers prepared their M-ATVs for the return north. Based on 

the Bulldog Troop Commander’s guidance, the plan called for an assault 

of Joy Gange. As the planning conference ended, Law turned and yelled, 

“Hey who’s getting in the truck with me.” Private First Class Kukosky 

was the first to respond. Other platoon members followed his lead and 

piled into the trucks. As the M-ATVs sped north on Route BRONZE, CAS 

strafed enemy fighters they had identified around Joy Gange. Lauer stated 

that this “kept the enemy fixed, and...it gave us that breathing space to 
97

assemble this force and then push north again towards the village of Joy 

Gange.”49

The two M-ATVs swiftly pushed north. Arriving on the outskirts of 

Joy Gange, Law, Dempsey and Kukosky dismounted from their trucks 

and moved toward a compound near the road. “Basically, they dropped 

us off right there behind the compound,” Law explained. “We jumped 

the wall, all three of us...into this compound not knowing what the hell 

was in it.” As they scaled the wall, the M-ATVs engaged Taliban targets 

inside Joy Gange with .50 caliber machineguns. Climbing to the top of 

an outhouse, Law and Dempsey spotted a host of enemy targets in the 

village. As the trucks laid down blistering gunfire on the targets, Law and 

Dempsey remained unobserved by the enemy. “They didn’t know we were 

in the compound,” Law boasted. “We were basically spotting everything 

that they were doing, and calling up the trucks.” Law recalled that this was 

one of the first times he had ever witnessed the enemy maneuver against 

US forces. While the two M-ATVs continued to pound Taliban fighters, 

Staff Sergeant Mundo arrived on the scene from COP METRO with his 

M-ATV and joined in the fight. Taking concentrated fire from a building 

he called the “mechanic’s bay,” Law called in an airstrike. In no time a jet 

responded by dropping a bomb on the building and its occupants. As the 

smoke rose from the building, Law abandoned the compound and moved 

directly into Joy Gange.50

Moving out of the compound, Dempsey radioed his truck, ordering 

them back to the drop off point. When the M-ATV arrived, the three 

dismounted Soldiers found that they could not fit into the vehicle because 

there were already too many people in it. Undeterred, the dismounted 

Soldiers used the M-ATV as a shield against enemy fire as they approached 

the western side of Joy Gange. After they had walked about 200 meters, 

another truck, with open seats, arrived and the Soldiers jumped inside. As 

all three M-ATVs advanced into the village, some of the Taliban fighters 

fled north out of Joy Gange.51 

During the firefight, Law observed enemy fire coming from a large 

compound to the east. While Mundo and a truck commanded by Sergeant 

James Smith placed suppressive fire on the building, Dempsey’s M-ATV 

careened toward the complex. As the truck jerked to a halt, Dempsey, Law 

and Lauer dismounted the vehicle and began to clear the compound. By 

the time they entered, the enemy had already fled. As the Soldiers scanned 

the complex they found a vast array of IED making material. They also 

confirmed that the compound was being used for remotely detonating 

IEDs. “It was wild,” Law remarked. “It was like...some crazy professor’s 

lab.” The compound would have to be destroyed.52
98

Figure 6. An insurgent compound explodes after an Air Force B-1 Lancer 

drops a guided bomb on the facility in northern Bala Murghab Valley, Badghis 

Province, Afghanistan 4 April, 2011.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

With Lauer present, the team took swift action. Law made clear that, 

“Major Lauer is the S3...he has a lot of pull with the Squadron, so he 

can pretty much make the call on the ground that this place needs to be 

demolished.” Lauer lobbed a smoke grenade onto the top of the building 

as a marker for a circling Air Force B-1 Lancer, and then the three Soldiers 

quickly mounted Dempsey’s M-ATV. As the smoke swirled upward from 

the roof, all three Red Platoon vehicles sped away from the Joy Gange. As 

they drove to the east side of Route BRONZE, a 2,000 pound bomb from 

the B-1 destroyed the IED-making facility.53

Although the 2,000 pound bomb leveled the building, it failed to 

demolish other structures in the compound. When Lauer and Red Platoon 

returned to Joy Gange to conduct a battle damage assessment (BDA), they 

discovered another building with IED making material inside and requested 

that the B-1 reengage. As the team moved back across Route BRONZE, 

another 2,000 pound bomb fell on the target, completely destroying the 

structure. Returning to the village, Red Platoon conducted another BDA. 

This time, however, they encountered sporadic gunfire from north of Joy 

Gange. Law’s Platoon returned fire, and called in CAS, which quickly 

ended the firefight. Law remembered that, “it went from total chaos [to] 
99

probably the quietest I’d ever seen the area.” As the Taliban melted away 

into the hills north of Joy Gange, Red Platoon and its attachments returned 

to COP METRO.54

Aftermath

The tactical impact of Operation RED SAND was truly impressive. 

Lauer declared that after the fighting in Joy Gange, “the enemy was 

unwilling to engage us, as well as unwilling to stay in those positions of 

disadvantage. Just the amount of firepower that we were able to bring to 

bear during the engagement, it bolstered the confidence of the Afghans, it 

bolstered the confidence of the population, that we were able to take the 

fight to the Taliban and win.”55

Indeed, Bulldog Troop ultimately cleared all the Taliban from Joy 

Gange. Shortly after the mission, Red Platoon participated in a village 

shura and connected the population with the district government. “We 

even got to the point where we were doing some projects. They were 

working with the platoon. We were able to get some projects started to 

help them for working closely with us, and get them some better basic 

services,” Lauer recalled. Clearly, victory in combat had translated into 

opportunities in governance and reconstruction.56

 Although Law and his Soldiers fought without their senior NCOs 

and faced significant challenges with indirect fire, they performed 

professionally and with valor. Reluctant to sit idly inside the security 

bubble, the squadron sought opportunities to enlarge its counterinsurgency 

(COIN) campaign. Despite being shorthanded and saddled with passive 

coalition partners, the squadron and troop persisted in expanding security 

and governance within the province. Without doubt, their persistence laid 

the groundwork for success. The squadron and troop decision to launch 

Law’s counterattack proved decisive. Law’s counterattack into Joy Gange 

seized the initiative from the enemy and led to complete victory. 

The ANA Soldiers attached to Law’s platoon also performed well and 

fought bravely in defending OP Reaper. After enemy RPG fire inflicted 

casualties on Red Platoon, Law’s decisive and composed leadership 

helped restore order. The platoon leader explained that it was:

The hardest moment in my life, and as a leader, to deal with 

that, and hear those Soldiers screaming, and then to hear NCOs 

screaming, and you don’t know if they’re OK. You don’t know 

which one’s dead. At the same time, you must be able to maintain 

your composure. And, it was so, so difficult. Try as I might, I can’t 

describe that moment to full effect, to anyone who’s never been 

in that position.
100

In the end, all of Law’s injured personnel returned to duty. Valdo, the most 

seriously wounded, was medically retired. 57

When Law announced his plans for the counterattack into Joy Gange, 

he displayed tenacious and inspired leadership. While not everyone in the 

Platoon was enthusiastic about the mission, no one stayed behind. During 

the counterattack, Red Platoon, First Sergeant Dempsey and Major Lauer 

exhibited great courage as they fought into the village. During the fight at 

OP Reaper and the counterattack into Joy Gange, Red Platoon killed 7-12 

enemy fighters. Law emphasized that, “The men of Red Platoon took the 

fight to the enemy and represent the finest of fighting men in America.”58

Extremely proud of his Soldiers, Law reflected on the fight at OP 

Reaper and the counterattack into Joy Gange. “The true test of leadership 

is the willingness of others to follow you into what could possibly be 

[their] final hours,” Law wrote:

The pride I keep from the accomplishments of my Soldiers will 

always be with me. Operation RED SAND broke the backs of the 

Taliban in north Bala Murghab and paved the way for coalition 

forces to advance further than we had ever gone. The credit is not 

due to the general officer or the politician. The credit is due to the 

Soldiers who [faced] off with the enemy every day. Every victory 

in Afghanistan is earned on the sweat and blood of the Soldiers.

Victory on that day was not elusive.59
101

Notes

1. First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2011. 

2. Major Jonathan Lauer, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 October 2011, 12; First Lieutenant 

Joseph C. Law, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 26 October 2011, 4.

3. Lauer, interview, 8.

4. Lauer, interview, 11-12.

5. Law, interview, 2; Lauer, interview, 15; Law, e-mail, 14 December 2011.

6. Law, interview, 2; Lauer, interview, 15; Law, e-mail, 14 December 2011.

7. Law, interview, 5.

8. Lauer, interview, 20-22.

9. Lauer, interview, 22-23.

10. Law, interview, 1-2; Law, e-mail, 15 December 2011.

11. Law, e-mail, 15 December 2011.

12. Law, e-mail, 15 December, 3 January, 2011; Lauer, interview, 27-28.

13. Law, interview, 6-8; Lauer, interview, 24.

14. Law, interview, 8-9; Petty Officer 1st Class John Pearl, interview by 

Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 October 

2011, 5.

15. Law, interview, 9-11.

16. Law, interview,7; First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, Operations Order for 

Operation RED SAND, no date, copy author’s collection; DA Form 2823, Sworn 

Statement, Private First Class Ben William Bradley, 4 April 2011, 1.

17. List of Red Platoon members, locations and weapons systems, no date, 

author’s collection; Lauer, interview, 37; Pearl, interview, 2.

18. Lauer, interview, 33-34.

19. List of Red Platoon members, locations and weapons systems, no 

date, author’s collection; First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, Operations Order for 

Operation RED SAND, no date, copy author’s collection; Law, interview, 9-10. 

20. Sworn Statement, Bradley, 1; Law, interview, 11-12.

21. Pearl, interview, 7-8; Technical Sergeant Kevin P. Wallace, interview by 

Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 August 

2011, 6-7.

22. Wallace, interview, 7-8; Law, interview, 12.
102

23. Wallace, interview, 8-9; Law, 12-13.

24. Sworn Statement, Specialist Kellen West, 4 April 2011, 1; Law, 

interview, 12-13; Wallace, interview, 9.

25. Law, interview, 13-14; Lauer, interview, 41-43. 

26. Wallace, interview, 11-12.

27. Wallace, interview, 12-13.

28. Law, interview, 14; Lauer, interview, 44.

29. Wallace, interview, 13-14; Law, interview, 14.

30. Wallace, interview, 15; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, Specialist 

Kellen Gordon West, 4 April 2011, 1.

31. Pearl, interview, 15-16.

32. Wallace, interview, 16.

33. Sworn Statement, West, 1.

34. Law, interview, 15.

35. Sworn Statement, West, 1.

36. Law, interview, 17-18.

37. Lauer, interview, 46, 48; Wallace, interview, 17.

38. Law, interview, 17-18; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, First 

Lieutenant Joseph Cecil Law, 4 April 2011, 1; Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 

3 January 2001. 

39. Wallace, interview, 18; Lauer, interview, 49; Sworn Statement, West, 1.

40. Law, interview, 18; Sworn Statement, West 1-2; Wallace, interview, 23

41. Law, interview, 18; Sworn Statement, West 1-2; Wallace, interview, 23.

42. Lauer, interview, 50-51; Lauer thought the first CAS to arrive was a 

French Mirage. Lauer, interview, 48; Wallace, interview, 23

43. Lauer, interview, 52; Wallace, interview, 24.

44. Sworn Statement, Bradley, 2; Pearl, interview, 21-22.

45. Lauer, interview, 54.

46. DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, Private First Class Joshua Travis 

Kukosky, 4 April 2011, 1; Wallace, interview, 25-26; Law, interview, 22.

47. Sworn Statement, Kukosky, 1; Law, interview, 23-25.

48. Law, interview, 26.

49. Law, interview, 26; Lauer, interview, 57.

50. Sworn Statement, Kukosky, 1; Law, interview, 28-29.
103

51. Law, interview, 29-30.

52. Law, interview, 31; Lauer, interview, 62-63.

53. Lauer, interview, 63.

54. Lauer, interview, 63-64; Law, interview, 33.

55. Lauer, interview, 64-65.

56. Lauer, interview, 64-65.

57. Law, interview, 20.

58. Lauer, interview, 65; Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 3 January 2012.

59. Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 3 January 2012.

105

Combat Multipliers

Tactical Female Engagement Teams in Paktika Province

by

Michael J. Doidge

Before arriving in Afghanistan in August of 2010, the phrase “You 

will never leave the Forward Operating Base” may as well have been Staff 

Sergeant Denise Ferniza’s mantra. She lost count of how many times 

she had heard it. In addition to being a Military Intelligence Systems 

Maintainer and a Staff Sergeant, Ferniza is a woman. She thought she was 

going to become what US Soldiers colloquially referred to as a “Fobbit,” a 

reference to J.R.R. Tolkien’s “The Hobbit,” meaning a Soldier who served 

overseas but never left the Forward Operating Base (FOB). A month into 

Ferniza’s tour she learned that her unit, the 4th Brigade Combat Team (4th 

BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), was standing up a Tactical 

Female Engagement Team (TAC-FET). TAC-FETs were designed to 

assist maneuver units with Afghan women in a number of ways, including 

the questioning and searching of females during missions that targeted 

specific insurgents for capture. Comprising ten members at its height and 

engaging Afghan women in groups of two, those teams would become a 

4th BCT asset. Excited and eager, Ferniza volunteered for the team. This 

was an opportunity to get off the FOB, to get outside the wire, she thought. 

Within months, the success of the 4th BCT’s FET program transformed 

her mission from a secondary to a primary duty. In fact, by October 2011, 

she became the team’s NCOIC.

In April of 2011 Ferniza and fellow FET member Sergeant Ashley 

Dixon found themselves on a mission to an isolated qalat, a mud-brick 

compound in which Afghan families lived. Thirty fear-stricken Afghan 

women huddled inside. One unruly woman refused to be searched. Dixon 

yanked up the woman’s shirt, revealing what appeared to be a suicide vest 

underneath. The Afghan women screeched, Ferniza kicked the woman 

in the chest and she and Dixon bolted out the door. In retrospect, Ferniza 

flatly stated “I should have shot her. Honestly, I should have shot her. 

That’s what we’re trained to do.”1

She was a long way from the FOB. 

Background 

Ferniza’s journey outside the wire began a year before 4th BCT 

arrived in Afghanistan when, on 31 May 2010, International Security 

Assistance Force Headquarters (ISAF-HQ) directed all troop-contributing 

nations to standardize their engagements with Afghan females. The 

directive instructed ISAF units to engage Afghanistan’s female population 

in a respectful manner in order to build confidence and support for the 
106

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and ISAF. 

It stated:

Afghan females account for nearly half of the Afghan population 

and their influence on Afghan society is considerable even 

when considering local social norms. Therefore, it is important 

that we conduct engagements with Afghan females to support 

the battlespace owners’ priorities, including, but not limited to, 

comprehensive understanding of the operating environment, civilmilitary operations, medical capabilities visits, and educational 

programs.2

The message was clear: winning in Afghanistan’s difficult human and 

physical terrain required a comprehensive approach toward engaging all 

of Afghanistan’s population. 

Afghanistan’s cultural customs prevented men from directly 

interacting with unrelated women. Since most Coalition Soldiers were 

male, engaging the Afghan female proved challenging. The FET concept 

inserted female Soldiers into a role that Afghan custom dictated male 

Soldiers could not perform. Without engaging females, FET member 

Sergeant Karina Malone warned “[that is] half the society we’re not 

touching;” Coalition forces risked surrendering influence and control over 

half of Afghanistan’s population.3

 FET enabled the US Army to influence 

an otherwise overlooked portion of Afghanistan: the Afghan female.

To gain greater access to the Afghan female, US Army units created 

ad-hoc FETs to engage the female population through social, cultural, 

economic, political, and military means. FET tasks generally fell into 

two categories, tactical (TAC-FET) and operational (OP-FET), although 

Afghanistan’s cultural complexity necessitated that most FETs fluidly 

shift between the two. The better-known and more common OP-FETs 

held meetings known as shuras with Afghan females to facilitate political, 

economic, and social opportunities for Afghan women.4

 OP-FETs used 

shuras as a locally sanctioned platform to educate and assist Afghan 

women and their leaders in family health, community politics, education, 

and to make them aware of economic opportunities in their area. Whereas 

OP-FETs buttressed villages against enemy influence by helping Afghan 

women build and maintain a self-sustaining political, economic, and social 

support structure, TAC-FETs removed threats to those same villages by 

assisting maneuver units in combat operations, especially those directed 

at capturing insurgent leaders. FETs were important during these missions 

because insurgents commonly hid contraband and intelligence on Afghan 

women, knowing that US male Soldiers would respect custom and only 

question and search Afghan males.5

 Moreover, Afghan women were not 

naïve to the goings on in their villages, and they could serve as a vital 
107

resource to Coalition forces.6 OP-FETs and TAC-FETs both contributed 

to the Coalition’s counterinsurgency (COIN) approach by contesting the 

enemy’s use of the Afghan female. Denying her use to the enemy aided 

in building infrastructure, creating security, and establishing effective 

governance in Afghanistan. With OP-FET embracing local governance 

and nation building and TAC-FET directly assisting in the elimination of 

enemy threats, FET as a whole contributed to both the lethal and nonlethal aspects of the Coalition’s COIN approach. 

4th BCT’s TAC-FET often served as an enabler to the brigade’s 

Focused Targeting Force (FTF), an ad hoc unit designed to execute the 

capture-kill missions focused on known insurgent leaders. Based around 

the scout platoon from 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (1-506 IN), the FTF 

was often augmented by intelligence specialists, explosive ordinance 

disposal, military working dogs and their handlers, snipers, a mortar 

platoon, interpreters, and the FET.7

 Though their composition and purpose 

was not unlike a Quick Reaction Force, rather than react to combat 

contingencies, the FTF responded to the fluid intelligence environment 

in Paktika.8

 When 4th BCT’s intelligence specialists became aware that a 

person of interest or a high value target was in the area, the FTF would act. 

When Sergeant Ferniza took on the role of NCOIC of 4th BCT’s TACFET, the greatest challenge facing the team was the need to increase the 

proficiency of its members’ Soldier skills. The FET needed better Soldier 

proficiency to be an effective enabler for the FTF. The unit that trained 

the FTF and FET was comprised of civilian, retired military, and currently 

serving intelligence, weapons, communications, and medical specialists.9

The original FET members’ excitement was palpable, “I knew that an 

opportunity to be attached to an infantry scout platoon was completely 

unique for a woman... It was exciting.”10 Moreover, “[The group of 

training specialists] were the pebble that kind of got the boulder rolling 

because they were the ones who said [the FTF] needed a FET team,” 

Ferniza said.11 The original FET members subsequently underwent three 

weeks of training in October of 2010. Ferniza said:

We began with very, very basic Soldiering tasks, weapons systems, 

optics, lasers, night vision. From that point, we began doing 

position shooting, barricade shooting, walk and shoots, run and 

shoots, buddy shooting. We did helicopter landing zone (HLZ), 

and pick-up landing zone operations as far as how to get on and 

off helicopters, whether it’s a Chinook or a Black Hawk.12

For the FET members, the training was eye opening. “The skills were 

basic infantry skills, just ones that we had never been exposed to...all of 

this was completely new to me.”13 Though the FET members agreed the 

initial training served them well, Ferniza believed that more was needed. 

“Basic is more than three weeks long!” she said.14 
108

FET’s initial challenges with training were compounded by equipment 

shortages. “We needed NODs (Night Observation Device). We needed 

batteries [and] chem lights,” Ferniza said.15 Ferniza’s First Sergeant, First 

Sergeant Brandon Perry, empathized, stating, “The body armor that we 

give to those guys so they can be lighter and faster...I just -- I physically 

did not have it...I didn’t even have M-4s for all of [the FETs]. Some of 

them would have...an M-16, or they just had a SAW (Squad Automatic 

Weapon)...We just didn’t have [M-4s].”16 

Once the FETs became more proficient in Soldier tasks, Ferniza 

initiated a self-training regimen to expand FET’s capabilities. With it, FET 

also added potential mission roles. Ferniza stated, “The issue that I saw with 

FET initially...is we had such a pigeonholed role that we weren’t worth 

our weight on these missions. Because if we got to an objective and there 

were no females, then what?”17 Ferniza’s concerns with the FTF were not 

unfounded. Though not openly hostile to the FET’s presence, at first, the 

FTF remained wary of the FET’s value. To that end, Ferniza insisted FET 

members conduct combat drills. When Ferniza discovered that the Scouts 

did not want FET members pulling security, she responded by having FET 

perform battle and security drills so that they would be prepared for the 

role if required. “I started doing training on security and battle drills, [to 

get] us up to par with [the FTF] so we could actually be useful for pulling 

security,” she said.18 The broadest expansion of FET’s mission role 

came when, drawing from her civilian experience as a nurse’s assistant, 

Ferniza trained her FET members in combat medicine. She believed that 

a woman’s voice could keep a wounded Soldier calm.19 Where dominant 

western norms held that men protected caregiving women, Ferniza turned 

the norm on its head by holding fast to the belief that a female Soldier could 

protect the male Soldier; in the case of a wounded Soldier, Ferniza argued 

that a woman’s voice on the battlefield helped the male Soldier maintain 

his calm, protecting him from fear, panic, and exacerbating his wound in 

the process. When FET did not obtain a medical trainer on the FOB, they 

used ingenuity by training themselves. Ferniza recalled with pride, “We 

did a lot of the first training on the actual scouts. We poked them so many 

times...we’re all great at IVs now. We can do those blindfolded.”20 The 

end result of FET’s efforts was greater medical coverage for the entire 

unit.21

Yet their efforts did not stop at combat medical training; Ferniza also 

strengthened FET’s humanitarian aid role by educating her FET members 

on women’s and children’s health. Characteristic of her resourcefulness, 

Ferniza contacted her daughter’s pediatrician. “I just talked to her a lot,” 

she said.22 “I sent her a ton of e-mails...Malnutrition was rampant. We 

only have so many multivitamins to hand out.”23 She recalled asking the 

pediatrician ‘What’s the minimum amount of multivitamins that they 

can take a week where it’s effective?’ ”24 But the distribution of vitamins 
109

generated additional tasks, specifically, instruction to illiterate Afghan 

women on how to properly take vitamins. Again, Ferniza found a solution: 

she marked the vitamin bottles by prayer schedule. Thrust into a position 

where their value was not immediately apparent to all in the 4th BCT, the 

FET carved out a battlefield role and proved their worth as a combat asset.

4th BCT’s FET also trained for specific female engagement tasks, 

creating a standard operating procedure in the field. Where possible, 

they would interact with Afghan females in a secure environment, most 

commonly inside the qalat. There they removed their helmet, eyewear, 

and gloves to put the Afghan women and children at ease.25 Many female 

Soldiers, especially those that engaged Afghans on a regular basis, 

were issued a head scarf for use in creating a cultural connection during 

engagements, and FETs were given some measure of autonomy in their 

use. Ferniza’s team rarely wore theirs, preferring instead to use the removal 

of their helmet, eyewear, and gloves as the primary means of forging a 

human connection with the Afghans.26 She believed that revealing the 

human underneath the Soldier, combined with empathy and sincerity, was 

the best means to create successful engagements. 

Nevertheless, proficiency remained a constant source of frustration 

throughout the FET’s deployment. Continuous personnel turnover 

challenged FET’s capability to keep and maintain highly qualified Soldiers. 

New FET members received training when Ferniza could provide it, 

and to 4th BCT’s credit, the FET gained a reputation for success. Their 

success became so great that six months and dozens of FET missions later, 

2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (2-506 IN) requested a FET accompany 3d 

Platoon, Whiskey Company, with their clearance mission during Operation 

OVERLORD.

Operation OVERLORD

Sharing a border with Pakistan, Paktika Province was extremely poor 

even by Afghanistan’s standards. In the provincial capital of Sharana, 

electricity came by way of private generators, and only to those Afghans 

wealthy enough to afford them. In the rural areas, goat herding, firewood 

gathering, livestock feeding, and mud-clay brick-making dominated 

local commerce. To the east, the province’s harsh terrain and minimal 

infrastructure permitted travel solely to farmers and their livestock. The 

Taliban and Haqqani insurgent networks took full advantage of eastern 

Paktika’s rugged terrain to traffic drugs and weapons through areas where 

US forces rarely ventured. When asked what the conditions were like in 

east Paktika, Ferniza responded flatly: “Old Testament.”27

To address these challenges, 4th BCT planned Operation OVERLORD 

for April 2011 with the purpose of clearing insurgents out of the Naka 

District in eastern Paktika Province. The bulk of Naka District belonged 

to 2-506 IN. Naka bordered Sar Hawza District, which was located in 
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1-506 IN’s area of operations. Naka District was small in total area, but 

possessed a daunting landscape, replete with mountains that towered 

12,000 to 13,000 feet in height. Clearing it necessitated the combined 

efforts of 1-506 IN and 2-506 IN. The combined sweeps were designed to 

squeeze enemy resistance between the two battalions, and the operation 

built upon previous US-led efforts to press enemy cells further away from 

Afghanistan’s political and geographic center. In the high peaks of Paktika 

Province, the Taliban and Haqqani networks assumed that they maintained 

a permanent sanctuary; the sight of US forces moving through terrain the 

enemy believed impregnable served as a simple rebuttal. Working with 

Afghan National Army (ANA) and local Afghan National Police (ANP), 

the US-led operation planned to remove the insurgent networks, and build 

ties between the locals and GIRoA.28

Naka District was home to a sprawling village settlement of a 

couple thousand Afghans; clearing it required OVERLORD planners to 

break the district into sectors and task elements of 1-506 IN and 2-506 

IN accordingly. 3d Platoon, Whiskey Company, 2-506 IN drew as their 

objective a particularly large number of qalats. As noted earlier, 4th BCT 

leaders knew insurgent males planted incriminating evidence—including 

weapons, explosives, contraband, and intelligence items—underneath 

female villagers’ clothes. To counter this tactic, 2-506 IN requested a FET 

as an attachment to its 3d Platoon. Staff Sergeant Ferniza and Sergeant 

Dixon, both original FET members, were attached to 3d Platoon for the 

mission.29

On 11 April, Staff Sergeant Ferniza and Sergeant Dixon began their 

ascent to their mission objectives with 3d Platoon, Whiskey Company. 

After contacting a settlement friendly to 3d Platoon, the unit’s movement 

to their next objective—a nearly unreachable village—slowed to a crawl. 

At times, the herculean climb took 30 minutes to move 250 meters. 

Ferniza joked, “Who would build there?”30 The entire platoon knew this 

area harbored insurgents. She stated the platoon entered the village “one 

person at a time...literally pulling yourself up to get up to this place.”31 

When Ferniza entered the village, the silence was palpable. The distinct 

lack of women and children alarmed her, as an empty village was a sure 

sign of an imminent attack. Ferniza wanted to find the women and children 

as quickly as possible. 

As if in response to her thoughts, she spotted a little girl scurrying 

across the village. The settlement was small, and she knew the girl could 

not get far. Ferniza, Dixon, five US Soldiers and some ANA soldiers took 

off after the girl when they saw her duck into a qalat where 30 Afghan 

women huddled together. These situations were problematic to FET 

members. “The issue, and I always preach this to the girls,” said Ferniza, 

“is you never, ever let the women bunch up like that if you can prevent it, 
111

because then you don’t know where they live, you don’t know who their 

husbands are, you don’t know what they’re hiding.”32 Determined not 

to allow FET’s duties to degenerate into crowd control, the pair calmed 

tensions and established a presence to begin searching.33

Ferniza and Dixon went to work while the male Soldiers waited 

outside. Dixon searched the women while Ferniza collected and took 

pictures of items that might have intelligence value. The FET moved 

searched women into a separate room, which prevented them from talking 

and passing materials between each other. Eventually, Dixon came upon 

a mother desperately cradling her child. She refused to let herself and her 

baby be searched. “At that point, red flags started just popping,” Ferniza 

said.34 When, in spite of the team’s insistence, the woman refused to yield, 

Ferniza threatened, “If you don’t do this, the ANA are going to come in 

here and they’re going to search you. We will leave. We’ll let the men 

come in here.”35 In the past, the threat convinced recalcitrant Afghan 

women to comply. This time it was equally effective. The other Afghan 

women ripped the baby from the mother’s hands and pushed her toward 

Ferniza and Dixon. The mother stubbornly wrapped her arms across her 

chest and pressed them to her body. Dixon yanked up the woman’s shirt 

and saw what looked like a suicide vest. The Afghan women screeched, 

Ferniza kicked the woman, and she and Dixon bolted from the building.36 

Once outside, Ferniza demanded the ANA enter the qalat to assess the 

potential suicide threat. Meanwhile, the ANA and US Soldiers gathered 

all the men in the village for questioning. The village’s children milled 

about idly. Upon entering the room, the ANA discovered the woman 

was wearing a bandolier of ammunition. Ferniza and Dixon returned to 

complete their search, ordering all the women to remove foreign objects 

immediately. Not surprisingly, after the excitement, all of the remaining 

women were happy to oblige. No other items of interest were found, and 

the Afghan women were grateful to Ferniza and Dixon for removing the 

source of potential harm. 

Under Ferniza’s direct questioning, the recalcitrant mother claimed 

she found the bandolier in the woods. Ferniza knew she was lying 

and asked the Afghan woman’s husband’s whereabouts. The woman 

responded that he was dead. Having heard this story many times, Ferniza 

knew how best to approach the situation. After threatening to send the 

woman to prison for possession of illegal materials, Ferniza went outside 

to the woman’s three-year-old son and gently asked “Where’s your papi?” 

The boy pointed at and went running to his father, who was among the 

men gathered for questioning.37 Ferniza had discovered the owner of the 

ammunition bandolier without firing a single shot. Moreover, because 

Afghanistan’s conservative culture favored the male, even though the 

ammunition was found on the wife’s body, it was considered the husband’s 
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possession. Third Platoon then destroyed the bandolier and the husband 

was questioned further.38

As 3d Platoon moved to the next part of the village, they intercepted 

insurgent radio messages that spoke of the unit’s movement. Realizing the 

enemy had identified 3d platoon, the platoon leader halted the movement 

just as the insurgents attacked with small arms fire. 3d platoon and its 

attachments returned fire on the enemy positions and, toward the end of 

the firefight, directed artillery on the enemy’s location. Shortly before 

the rounds hit, enemy fire ceased. Members of the platoon thought the 

enemy dead; the artillery rounds crashing on the enemy’s position assured 

the US Soldiers that all enemy were killed. The platoon then split up to 

conduct specific assignments. While some of the men went 300 meters 

up the hill to perform a battle damage assessment (BDA)—where they 

found the remnants of several men—Ferniza and Dixon stayed behind 

and moved inside a qalat to prepare the structure for Whiskey Company’s 

consolidation, bed-down, and eventual extraction from the area. Inside, 

they were surprised to find a woman and her children. Ferniza and Dixon 

removed their helmet, eyewear, and gloves.39

As noted earlier, FET standard operating procedure was to remove 

their helmets, and to that 4th BCT’s FET added the removal of their gloves 

and eyewear. One of the most significant acts a FET member could take 

was to remove her helmet. As all US Soldiers do, FET members risked 

their lives in a combat environment which recognized no safe havens. 

They further increased that risk by removing their helmets. Their doing 

so was to serve the greater mission requirement of creating meaningful 

engagements with Afghan females. In order to mitigate the risk both to 

FET members and Afghan women, Ferniza always preached that FET 

members must perform these engagements in the safest environments 

possible, those that assure the Afghan female’s safety while permitting 

her whatever creature comforts reasonably available. At the same time, 

where possible FETs attempted engagements in as safe an environment 

as possible for the Soldier. Should the engagement produce the desired 

effect, the rewards justified the FET member’s risk. Dr. LisaRe Brooks, 

the FET training curriculum developer stated: “whether it’s taking off the 

helmet, or putting on a scarf...being mindful of your defensive stance in 

carrying a weapon, by the Soldier doing that, and then having the reward, 

as it were, of the Afghan female [lifting] the burqa and [engaging] with 

you. I think it was a very powerful moment for the Soldiers, because they 

realize that’s the first step.”40 

When Ferniza and Dixon entered the qalat following the firefight, 

they found the mother and children oblivious to the heavy gunfire that 

occurred 300 meters from their doorstep. After removing their helmets, 

Ferniza and Dixon implored the woman to leave, but the woman refused. 
113

“She was in the middle of making her bread,” Ferniza remarked, “so I 

helped her finish that.”41 To keep the woman calm, Ferniza assured her 

that the male Soldiers would remain outside. The bread took time to 

make. With firewood hard to come by in the region, Ferniza understood 

that this woman would be unwilling to walk away from a working fire. 

After the woman finished making her bread, she and her children left the 

qalat. Ferniza’s method was the simplest and most efficient means to 

accomplish 3d Platoon’s mission. Since the platoon was already present, 

and with the rest of Whiskey Company making its way to the bed-down 

site for consolidation, by taking the time to help the woman make her 

bread, Ferniza aided in mission success with minimal friction and hostility 

between US forces and local Afghans. 

Ferniza’s act assisted the Soldiers in a tangential way as well. The 

fireplace was akin to many others in Afghanistan, built underground 

with pipes running underneath the mud floors to the outside. By keeping 

the fires going, the floors were still warm when the Soldiers eventually 

bedded down. The next day, 3d Platoon moved to a helicopter landing 

zone for movement back to its base. Unfortunately, the aircraft was 

seven hours late, forcing the unit to remain in a location that was a known 

insurgent safehaven. Staff Sergeant Ferniza and Sergeant Dixon joined 

the platoon in securing the landing zone and safely returned with their 

infantry counterparts. The TAC-FET had made a significant contribution 

to Operation OVERLORD. 

Figure 1. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza with Afghan children.

Photo courtesy of Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza
114

Bagram: Building on Success

Ferniza’s success as a TAC-FET practitioner filtered its way through 

the U.S. Army’s FET community. Following her participation in Operation 

OVERLORD, she was contacted by the US Army’s FET coordinator 

for Regional Command-East, Lieutenant Colonel Kristine Petermann, 

who wanted her to teach a training course at Bagram Airfield on TACFET operations to about fifty female US Army FET members. Ferniza 

accepted.42 She made arrangements to bring with her First Lieutenant 

Nicole Myers, a fellow FET member and 4th BCT’s FET Officer in 

Charge, to aid and participate in the training.43

Ferniza stated that her working relationship with Lieutenant Nicole 

Myers was symbiotic. The two could not be more different, yet they 

complimented each other perfectly. Where Ferniza was idealistic and 

prone to overextending herself, Myers placed Ferniza’s concepts into 

actionable plans. Always professional, detail-oriented, and meticulous, 

Myers helped legitimize the FET concept, serving as an advocate with 

both other female Soldiers and senior leaders. If Ferniza was the heart and 

soul of 4th BCT’s FET program, Myers was its energy and face.44

The two arrived at Bagram in June 2011 and became primary 

instructors, delivering seventy-five percent of the teaching during the five 

day course.45 Ferniza focused her instruction on the basic soldier skills that 

she knew from experience had translated into success during Operation 

OVERLORD and other missions in Paktika Province. Ferniza spoke to 

the female Soldiers about procedures for conducting the various types 

of searches, how to participate in flight, vehicle, and convoy operations, 

and how to set up and properly use their assigned equipment. Later, she 

moved into FET specific training, where she discussed how to search 

women and what to expect when encountering Afghan females.46 The 

Soldiers praised Myers and Ferniza, and wrote in their after action reports 

that their soldiering was strengthened as result of the training. Ferniza and 

Myers felt they had aided FETs from other units to better survive outside 

the wire.47 They believed their efforts built a sense of community, as well 

as esprit de corps within FET. For her part in the training, Myers greatly 

appreciated the classes in the Pashto language, believing it would add to 

her tactical competency and ability to contribute to FET.48 She would 

have the opportunity to use her language skills soon after returning to FOB 

Sharana. 

Mission to Dila

In late June 2011, First Lieutenant Myers returned from the training 

course at Bagram to FOB Sharana, where shortly thereafter the FTF leader 

asked if she and another FET member could serve on a twelve hour mission 

focused on a person of interest in a small settlement in the Dila District in 

eastern Paktika Province. Myers was the only FET member available at 

the time, yet she remembered that Captain Yakena Douglas had previously 
115

expressed interest in serving on a FET mission. Captain Douglas served 

as the Company Commander for 4th BCT Headquarters Company (HHC), 

and though the demands of command had prevented her from participating 

in any FET missions, her eagerness to learn and to see firsthand how FETs 

operated beyond the wire led her to accept and accompany Myers on this 

mission.49 

4th BCT’s FET program combined a mix of female Soldiers with 

differing specialties and rank. Each brought their own skillset to the 

team, but in the interest of keeping everyone safe, the FETs assumed that, 

when on mission, the person with the most FET experience would lead 

and give the orders, regardless of rank. Myers summed up the 4th BCT’s 

FET’s standard operating procedure succinctly, stating, “We had a ‘rank 

is immaterial’ kind of attitude... The FET team leader is the team leader, 

and that was based on experience and abilities.”50 Therefore, even though 

Captain Douglas outranked Lieutenant Myers, Myers was the FET team 

leader for this mission, and it was from her that Douglas would learn. 

The team members understood that this was their most effective way 

to operate, as Ferniza stated, “coming home alive was our number one 

priority, so good experience will always trump rank.”51 

For the air assault to Dila, the FTF was comprised of a scout platoon, an 

attached multifunction team of human and signal intelligence specialists, a 

military working dog team, and the FET, a force of roughly fifty Soldiers in 

total. Those fifty Soldiers were assigned a single helicopter for transport, 

but their numbers surpassed its carrying capacity, thus necessitating two 

lifts to travel from FOB Sharana to FOB Kushmond, and two more lifts 

to travel from FOB Kushmond to Dila. Arriving at the landing zone after 

dark, the Soldiers turned on their NODs and began moving. Traveling in 

single file, the FTF traversed four kilometers to the three qalats located on 

their mission objective.52 

Myers stressed to Captain Douglas that long dismounted movements, 

especially those at night, were about endurance, careful foot placement, 

and awareness. In April, Myers witnessed a FET member tax her body 

so greatly on a mission that the Soldier required medical evacuation.53

Though eastern Paktika was relatively flat, the ground was uneven and 

the NODs hampered the Soldiers’ depth perception. With kit, rifle, and 

assault pack bringing Douglas’ load to 65 lbs, and Myers’ heavier assault 

pack bringing hers to near 90 lbs, Myers did not want a wrong step or too 

great a strain on her fellow FET member to bring a halt to the mission.54

However, Myers recalled that the multiple lifts caused the FTF to fall 

behind schedule; therefore, when the movement to the mission objective 

began, the FTF leader increased the speed of the movement, thus Myers’ 

talk of endurance for the long slow march gave way to keeping up with 

the FTF’s tempo. Fortunately, Douglas and Myers were well-conditioned 

for the movement’s accelerated pace, and suffered no ill-effects. The FTF 

arrived at the mission objective at 0200.55 
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At 0230, the FTF moved into the village. The FTF leader began 

conducting tactical site exploitations (TSE) and questioning at each qalat. 

The FET was tasked with visiting each qalat where they would question 

and search the women and children present. Though Myers later observed 

that the entire village seemed poor even by Afghanistan standards, she 

noted that the first compound was by far the worst of the three; the 

ten women and children who lived there looked frail, sickly, and wore 

threadbare clothes.56

Before the FET entered the qalat, Sergeant Scott of the FTF’s scout 

platoon assigned one of his scouts to temporarily assist Captain Douglas in 

pulling security for Myers while she performed her searches. In addition to 

the scout, the FET also had a male interpreter with them. Before beginning, 

Myers placed her weapon with Douglas and turned on her red light lens to 

assist her search. She removed her helmet, eyewear, and gloves and gently 

stated in Pashto “aaraam sha” (be calm) to put the women and children at 

ease.57 This was important; the Afghan women and children were terrified. 

Ferniza warned against letting fear take hold within groups of Afghan 

women and children, who might become unresponsive or bunch up, thus 

mitigating FET’s effectiveness. “Once they start getting en masse like 

that...FET ends up being crowd-control versus actually doing anything 

meaningful. I can’t hand out medicine...I can’t triage. I can’t talk to 

them. It’s too hard to deal with that many women,” Ferniza stated.58

Even in ideal circumstances, the physical requirements of performing 

searches were enormous. FET members often carried a rucksack weight 

of between 40 to 70 pounds, while their kit and body armor weighed an 

additional 40 pounds. To conduct a search, FET members removed their 

rucksacks, slung their rifles, and squatted low to the ground with each 

woman and child searched. Complications arose when, as Myers recalled, 

“You have 50 women lined up to search and your back is killing you and 

then when they have babies, a lot of the time you’re wearing your armor, 

your full kit, you [often] have your weapon, you’re trying to soothe the 

woman and show them that you’re a female, but still remain tactical.”59 

As was commonly the case, in the qalat in Dila, Myers discovered 

several Afghan women holding their infants at the first compound. In 

order to search them, she first searched the infant before taking it in her 

arm. Next she squatted twice, searching the woman first with her free 

arm before shifting the baby to the other and completing the search.60 The 

village in Dila also fit the standard for Afghan villages in that it held only a 

handful of males for the Scouts to search and question but dozens of women 

and children for the FET. The FET’s searches were time consuming, 

and they scolded more than a few Scouts who tried to rush them. Myers 

found nothing of importance. Following completion of the search, and 

in preparation for the next mission phase, the FTF leader pulled the scout 
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from security, leaving Myers, Douglas, and the male interpreter to search 

and question the women and children at the second compound.61

The eight women and twelve children were friendlier and calmer at 

the second qalat. While Douglas again pulled security, Myers removed 

her helmet, eyewear, and gloves while again gently stating “aaraam sha” 

(be calm).62 Here again Myers found nothing. At the conclusion of the 

search, and in preparation for the next move, the FTF leader removed the 

male interpreter. 

It was not uncommon for the FTF to order the collection of the 

Afghan women and children into a single area. Therefore, Myers was 

not surprised when Sergeant Scott came over to assist her and Douglas 

in moving the twenty women and children from the second compound 

into the third, where Myers and Douglas would perform their final FET 

duty for the mission. Moving the women and children into a centralized 

location helped the FTF maintain tactical control of the area; it also kept the 

women and children from disrupting the mission, or worse, endangering 

their lives or those of the US Soldiers. For their part, the Afghans disliked 

being moved into the homes of their neighbors, they preferred to be in 

their own homes.63

Sergeant Scott’s plan was to lead the women and children to the third 

qalat in a single file line with Myers and Douglas bringing up the rear. In 

doing so, Scott would move the line past a structure where elements of the 

FTF were conducting a TSE. When Sergeant Scott asked in Pashto for the 

Afghans to follow him, they acted as if they did not hear him. Sergeant 

Scott repeated the phrase, but again the Afghans did nothing.64 Finally, 

Myers spoke, “pa maa pase raaza” (follow me), and immediately the 

Afghans moved in a single file line behind her.65 During the movement, a 

young Afghan teenage girl broke away from the group and began running 

toward the qalat where elements of the FTF were performing their TSE. 

Sergeant Scott called out in Pashto for the girl to stop but she did not listen. 

When he implored, she continued to run. In Pashto, Myers commanded, 

“Wadarega!” (stop).66 The girl froze. Myers then stated “Delta raasha,” 

(come here) and the girl moved back toward the group.67 Finally, Myers 

implored “pa maa pase raaza” (follow me).68 The line was restored. 

At the third and final compound Myers spoke in Pashto for the women 

and children from the second compound to sit down and remain calm. She 

then pulled security while monitoring Douglas as she performed searches 

on the fifteen remaining Afghan women and children. As with the first 

and second compounds, the FET found nothing of interest. Following 

completion of their FET duties, Myers and Douglas assisted the FTF in 

securing and searching the area. 

The time spent on the objective lasted three to four hours. Afterward, 

the FTF traveled four kilometers to a helicopter landing zone, where 
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it again departed in two lifts. Myers was glad for Captain Douglas’ 

presence, arguing that given the sheer number of women and children on 

this mission, without Douglas’ aid, Myers would have had a lot of trouble 

managing her duties. She stated that Douglas “handled herself very well, 

it was her first mission, she was very eager to learn... She used her training 

and her abilities to the best of her knowledge to help out.”69

In Afghanistan’s culturally conservative climate, 4th BCT’s FET 

admirably demonstrated the US Army’s capability to navigate the 

unfamiliar human terrain, as well as unforeseen challenges common to 

COIN in Afghanistan. Myers never believed the Afghan girl was in any 

great danger, yet the girl’s actions carried the potential to disrupt the FTF’s 

TSE, and with it, the mission objective. Using her training as FET, her quick 

thinking, and the advantages afforded to her gender in that circumstance, 

Myers was able to successfully retake control of a potentially disruptive 

situation in order to assist the FTF in completing its assigned task. Myers 

viewed this mission as another milestone in the development of the FET in 

4th BCT, stating, “I saw that we were able to use our more advanced FET 

skills in combination with our soldier skills and help secure and control a 

situation in a way that the men couldn’t have done on their own.”70

Conclusion 

The team’s mission successes paid dividends. By the end of their 

tour, the Scouts used their downtime to teach the FET members some 

advanced infantry skills, joking that they would make “infantrymen of 

[them] yet.”71 In another candid moment, Ferniza was standing outside the 

shower waiting for the male Soldier inside to finish when one of the men 

she served with saw her waiting and “was confused why [Ferniza] wasn’t 

going in the shower.”72 Epiphany struck the male Soldier, and he laughed 

as he realized why Ferniza was waiting for the shower to be vacant, 

sheepishly admitting “forgot you were a girl.”73 He now saw Ferniza as 

a fellow Soldier. Toward the end of the deployment, Ferniza joked that 

the FET wished the FTF didn’t need the FET so much. However, because 

the FTF saw their value, “We started going on so many missions. Every 

single mission we went on, even if it was in the middle of nowhere with 

no women, we went on it, just in case. Because at that point, we weren’t 

a burden; we were an asset.”74

However, one challenge 4th BCT’s FET never overcame was the issue 

of competing duty assignments. Ferniza’s FET members maintained two 

lives in Afghanistan, a duty assignment on the FOB and a FET assignment 

off the FOB. FET member Sergeant Karina Malone stated, “It would’ve 

helped immensely in Afghanistan if I didn’t have a different full-time 

[duty] that I also had to do.”75 Ferniza echoed Malone’s sentiments, stating 

“If I got back at seven o’clock in the morning, I’d be up around 8:30, 9:00 

[a.m. to perform my duty].”76 Myers agreed, adding a sharp point to her 

statement, “It’s nice to say yeah, you can take the day off, but we couldn’t. 
119

Especially the positions we were in, we couldn’t take the day off. We’d go 

into work, and it was just constant cycle.”77

Figure 2. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza, front, instructs Sergeant Karina Malone, 

center, and Private Kasey Anauo in combat medicine.

Photo courtesy of Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza

Nevertheless, by the end of their year-long deployment, FET’s 

achievements were no small feat. Through 125 missions, 4th BCT’s FET 

aided in the capture of 25 high value individuals, earning in the process three 

Combat Action Badges, three Bronze Stars, four Army Commendation 

Medals, and suffering no enemy-related injuries.78 Ferniza’s FET also led 

the first TAC-FET conference in Afghanistan, where Sergeant Ferniza 

and Lieutenant Myers instructed a multi-day class for 50 future Army 

TAC-FET Soldiers. The FETs built inroads to the women it engaged, 

diminishing tension between villagers and Coalition forces. She said of 

the lessened tensions, “I think they felt like our men were less of a threat 

with women there. Word would get around really fast that women were 

with the US men. You could just feel it de-escalate.”79 One of the chief 

conceptual architects of the FET program, Dr. LisaRe Brooks, explained 

that diminishing tensions encapsulated the end result of what FET was 

designed to achieve. Quoting an Afghan adage, she stated, “Your women 

are here to help us; your men are here to fight,” but she was only half right: 

Ferniza and her Soldiers could fight.80

4th BCT’s FETs were Soldiers first and foremost; and they admirably 

represented the US Army as cultural ambassadors. Ferniza and Dixon’s 
120

experiences epitomized this dichotomy; immediately following their 

firefight with the insurgents, the two FET members enmeshed themselves 

in Afghan domesticity, helping an Afghan woman to bake her bread. 

Ferniza stated of those interactions, “If you can just get people talking, 

you can glean a lot from what they’re just conversing about. It doesn’t 

always have to be, ‘who’s the bad guy?’ Just being genuine and nice 

and helpful...I always brought a picture of my husband and daughter on 

missions. [I would say,] ‘This is my husband, this is my daughter.’ ”81 

Ferniza removed her helmet to show her gender, but in displaying images 

of her family to Afghan women, she was emerging from her armor to make 

a human connection that transcended culture: Ferniza too was a wife and 

mother. FETs humanized the US-led effort in Paktika to improve quality 

of life. They engaged in a cultural exchange where the stakes were high, 

but the potential rewards were higher. The 4th BCT Operations Sergeant 

Major, Sergeant Major Joseph Singerhouse, stated that FETs’ work would 

foster long-term benefits. “Not only is the mother going to remember...

but the kid is going to remember...and that’s what the culture over there 

is. You can give them money all day long, but if they don’t trust you they 

don’t care. It’s trust. And the [TAC-FET] did that.”82

Figure 3. Sergeant Ashley Dixon, 4th Brigade FET, on an engagement.

Photo courtesy of Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza

FET’s success had made an impression on the brigade’s key leaders. 

Ferniza recalled being told by her chain of command that her FET had 
121

“made a lot out of nothing, [and] done an exceptional job.”83 The FET’s 

achievements led to a presentation by Lieutenant Myers to Colonel Valery 

Keaveny, the brigade commander, and he agreed to add a platoon to the 

brigade whose sole mission was to perform FET missions.84 Located 

within Charlie Company, 4th BSTB, the new ad-hoc FET platoon was 

the first of its kind, and were slotted positions for 28 female Soldiers. In 

addition to language and FET specific cultural awareness and sensitivity 

training, Ferniza and Myers designed a twelve week training program that 

will refresh female Soldiers on basic Soldier skills, as well as serve as predeployment training for FETs who must be prepared to serve in a combat 

role if need be.

The success of 4th BCT’s FET was primarily based on several factors: 

Staff Sergeant Ferniza, Lieutenant Myers, and the entire FET’s willingness 

to always place the mission first, and the support from key members of the 

chain of command in the 4th BCT. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza faced 

continual challenges with a fierce determination and an ingrained “cando” spirit. She overcame challenges that would have seriously reduced her 

program’s effectiveness or eliminated it altogether, and the team flourished 

as result. To marshal her strength, Ferniza drew inspiration from many 

sources, including noted 19th century leader Mary Harris “Mother” Jones, 

who married a mother-hen temperament with an innate pugnacity; Staff 

Sergeant Denise Ferniza embodied her hero. Jones famously opined that 

she “prayed for the dead but fought like hell for the living.” As it turned 

out, those were the words that became Ferniza’s mantra. 

Figure 4. The women of 4th BCT who comprised the FET, with Sergeant Major 

Joseph Singerhouse, Brigade Operations Sergeant Major.

Photo courtesy of Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza
122

Notes

1. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 November 2011, 39.

2. Commander, ISAF, US Forces-A Directive, Engagement with Afghan 

Females, 31 May 2010.

3. Sergeant Karina Malone, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 November 2011, 5.

4. Doctor LisaRe Brooks, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 November 2011, 10-12.

5. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 40.

6. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 August 2012, 15.

7. Malone, interview, 5; First Lieutenant Nicole Myers, interview by 

Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 August 

2012, 7.

8. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 2.

9. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 1-2.

10. Malone, interview, 7.

11. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 1.

12. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 4.

13. Malone, interview, 6-7.

14. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 70.

15. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 76.

16. First Sergeant Brandon Perry, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 November 2011, 13.

17. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 5.

18. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 6.

19. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 5.

20. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 5.

21. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 5.

22. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 58.

23. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 58.

24. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 58.

25. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 16.
123

26. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 61; Ferniza, interview, 22 

August 2012, 16.

27. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 59.

28. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 7; Myers, interview, 2 

November 2011, 1.

29. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 16; Myers, interview, 2 

November 2011 2-3.

30. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 37.

31. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 37.

32. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 38.

33. Meg Prior, Documentarian, Outside the Wire, archival footage 

provided to Michael Doidge, 2012.

34. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 38.

35. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 38.

36. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 38-39.

37. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 40.

38. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 41.

39. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 25-27.

40. Brooks, interview, 18.

41. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 28.

42. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 5,10.

43. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 1.

44. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 10-12.

45. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 4.

46. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 6-7.

47. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 9.

48. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 1-2.

49. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 3.

50. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 4.

51. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 13.

52. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 5-6.

53. Myers, interview, 2 November 2011, 2.

54. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 8-9.

55. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 9.
124

56. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 12.

57. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 12.

58. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 38.

59. Myers, interview, 3 November 2011, 51.

60. Myers, interview, 3 November 2011, 51-52.

61. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 12-13.

62. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14.

63. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 17.

64. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14-15.

65. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14-15.

66. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14-15.

67. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14-15.

68. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 14-15.

69. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 4.

70. Myers, interview, 22 August 2012, 24.

71. Sergeant Karina Malone, e-mail to Michael Doidge, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 December 2011.

72. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza, e-mail to Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2011.

73. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza, e-mail to Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 December 2011.

74. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 6.

75. Malone, interview, 34.

76. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 71.

77. Myers, interview, 3 November 2011, 57.

78. First Lieutenant Nicole Myers, e-mail to Michael Doidge, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 January 2012.

79. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 67.

80. Brooks, interview, 35.

81. Ferniza, interview, 2 November 2011, 58.

82. Command Sergeant Major Joseph Singerhouse, interview by Michael 

Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 November 2011, 27.

83. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 25.

84. Ferniza, interview, 22 August 2012, 20-21.
125

Securing Dan Patan

A US Infantry Squad’s Counterinsurgency Program in an 

Afghan Village

by

Scott J. Gaitley

After following the trail from Pakistan, the insurgents decided to pay 

an unexpected visit to the Afghan village of Sharkay where they planned 

to extort money, weapons, and place vicious demands on the unsuspecting 

villagers. They had done this many times without challenge. This time, 

however, the villagers refused the demands. The insurgents responded by 

kidnapping the son of an elder. The village, for the first time, met the attack 

with force: a group of trained village policemen immediately confronted 

the insurgents. After a small firefight ensued, the insurgents broke contact, 

climbed into a vehicle, and departed the area without the elder’s son. The 

village policemen lacked a vehicle and so could not give chase but they 

retrieved the elder’s son.1

 The villagers in Sharkay had grown tired of 

playing the role of innocent victims of the insurgency, and had welcomed 

the idea of a local police force. On this day, that decision had made all of 

the difference.

From 15 January to 29 December 2011, twelve Soldiers from 1st 

Squad, 4th Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (1-16 

IN) “Iron Rangers,” operated under the mentorship of six elite special 

operations Soldiers at Combat Outpost (COP) Dandah Patan, in Paktia 

Province located in eastern Afghanistan (see Figure 2).2

 From here these 

Soldiers conducted Village Stability Operations (VSO) in conjunction 

with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program to establish security within 

20 to 25 villages in the region. Historically, Afghan villages defended 

themselves from harm and potential attacks from outsiders. However, 

in the face of a virulent insurgency, many Afghan villages in the period 

between 2001 and 2010 had allowed that tradition to decline. The ALP 

program encouraged the villagers to revive the practice and win back their 

independence from the insurgency. 

Prior to 1st Squad’s arrival, corruption festered within the villages 

of Dan Patan District and insurgents freely smuggled contraband from 

Pakistan into the province using the district as a pathway. However, these 

activities were curtailed once the men of 1st Squad received training 

from the Special Operations Forces (SOF), gained familiarity with the 

VSO program, and established close relationships with the neighboring 
126

villagers. By the time of their redeployment in late 2011, 1st Squad had 

successfully trained approximately 350 to 400 local Afghan policemen.3

The ALP successfully breathed life into a civic tradition, allowing the 

village populace to stand up for themselves against outside threats, and 

maintain internal law and order. 

Background

The VSO was a bottom-up program that employed United States 

Special Operation Forces (USSOF) teams to include US Special Forces 

(USSF) Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), US Naval Special 

Warfare (NSW) Sea Air Land (SEAL) Platoons, and US Marine Special 

Operations Teams (MSOTs). The VSO program established security, 

enabled economic development, and promoted governance from the 

village level up through district and province governments. In addition, 

VSO strategically focused on Afghan communities resisting the Taliban 

and other insurgent groups through grass-roots initiatives (local efforts to 

strengthen communities), especially in areas with limited Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF) and NATO-led International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) presence.4

 As noted earlier, VSO was grounded in a tradition 

of rural Afghan villages providing basic self-defense and community 

security, with the support of the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA). These were not militias, a term often used in 

Afghanistan to refer to large forces under the command of individual 

warlords. Instead, VSO relied heavily on small, defensive, village-level 

policing entities under the supervision of local shuras (decision-making 

councils comprised of village elders).5

 

The VSO initiative developed into a four-phase process: shape, 

hold, build, and transition.

6

 The shape phase began with an assessment 

of the village and surrounding area and ended with the establishment of 

a US Special Operations VSO site within the village. This phase “may be 

the most critical,” claimed Lieutenant Colonel Olivier Wache, Advisory 

and Assistance Team VSO officer-in-charge, and was characterized by 

building rapport, trust, and relationships with the Afghan villagers, a 

three-month long process.7

 During the hold phase, VSO personnel focused 

on protecting the rural population and laying the foundation for follow-on 

development and self-governance efforts. The build phase linked villages 

to district and provincial governments through institutional arrangements, 

such as district and provincial shuras, and carefully designed and managed 

development projects using Commanders Emergency Response Program 

(CERP) funds and other resources. CERP projects were designed to 

promote civil infrastructure in Afghanistan by providing money to tactical 
127

forces, enabling them to meet emergency civilian needs, such as irrigation 

projects, road refurbishing, and school construction.8 Finally, the transition 

phase expanded village stability to other areas throughout a district, while 

transitioning responsibility for security, development, and governance to 

the Afghan government.9

Many factors were considered before determining a VSO location: 

force protection, logistics, the population’s assent, population density, 

tribal compositions, security and economic effects and the likelihood of 

being able to expand influence beyond the initial site.10 Often, village 

elders requested police or military forces to increase security. However, 

tribal and ethnic dynamics played a big part in deciding where SOF 

chose to embed. The program had to be sure that VSO sites would not 

aggravate existing prejudices against a certain tribe or ethnic group. Tribal 

differences in the various locales played a crucial role in regulating the 

distribution of power, money, and resources.11 Lieutenant Colonel Wache 

stated, “It’s always easier when the population was from one ethnicity, 

because there are less struggles.”12 Afghan villagers throughout the Dan 

Patan District were of the Pashtun ethnic group and often accepted the 

VSO program with enthusiasm. Still, many villages remained under the 

influence of the insurgency.

The Role of Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Village Stability 

Operations

After considering the recommendations of General David H. Petraeus, 

Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), 

Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai approved the establishment of the 

ALP program in mid-August 2010 to improve Afghan security in select 

locations.13 The ALP facilitated counterinsurgency (COIN) operations 

by further expanding and extending security through village stability 

operations in remote areas. Operating at the village level, ALP provided 

public protection in communities that lacked ANSF.14 The ALP had no 

arresting authority nor did they earn as much pay as the ANP. However, 

the program found success. By 31 March 2011, approximately 4,518 ALP 

members had completed training with another 282 Afghans in the process 

of becoming operational members (see Figure 1).15 By 17 June 2011, 

the Ministry of Interior (MoI) reported 41 validated districts with 6,400 

community-selected ALP members. Continued expansion and success of 

the ALP program faced several challenges. The Taliban and other insurgent 

groups countered ALP growth and success with a campaign of targeted 

assassinations, nighttime threat letters, intimidation, and kidnappings. 

In several areas, intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions prevented ALP 
128

expansion. The ALP was just one part of a comprehensive VSO program 

and was not the only component of VSO success; on occasion, the ALP 

operated independently from the VSO program. 

Figure 1. Afghan Local Police sites (as of 31 March 2011).16

Those ALP personnel who had completed their required training 

organized village watch teams, served as an early warning and initial 

village defense elements against insurgent activity, and provided a pool of 

qualified personnel to join the ANA or ANP. On average, it took almost six 

months before an ALP unit was operational. However, the district of Dan 

Patan was an exception to this policy; their ALP program was successfully 

operational in a matter of weeks. Longevity of a particular ALP unit 

was dependent on the situation at each location, the effectiveness of the 

element, their interaction with other Afghan forces, and the prevention of 

developing militias.17 

The rising concern about militias and warlord-type entities encouraged 

ALP sites to develop in a deliberate manner, ensuring sufficient time for 

assessment of local area dynamics, structured training, arrangement of 

an oversight system, and implementation of remote support procedures 

in coordination with USSOF and ISAF tactical units responsibility for a 

particular area. Once the number of ALP sites expanded at a pace congruent 
129

with Afghan government capacity for oversight and USSOF and/or ANA 

SOF capacity for partnering, some sites with greater potential transitioned 

from SOF to GIRoA control and oversight.18

By late 2010, the ALP program had reached a turning point. 

Additional forces were needed to continue the expansion of ALP sites 

in Afghanistan, and SOF capacities were at their limit. Conventional 

forces were considered as the necessary work force required to attain the 

ALP objectives. Recognizing this, in December 2010, General Petraeus 

placed a conventional US Army infantry battalion, the 1-16 IN from Fort 

Riley, Kansas, under the operational control of special operation forces in 

Afghanistan; its mission was the expansion of the VSO and ALP programs. 

Task Force Iron Ranger

Between 2006 and 2008, the Iron Rangers conducted COIN and 

advisor training to Foreign Service personnel and advisor teams preparing 

for deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. In May 2009, the battalion 

discontinued its COIN training mission and formed into a combined 

arms (heavy brigade combat team) unit. Many enlisted instructors (E-6 

and above) assumed new duties as squad leaders and platoon sergeants.19

Scheduled for a deployment to Iraq in September 2010, the battalion

conducted training on basic battle drills, convoy tactics, counter improvised 

explosive device (IED) techniques, combat life saving courses, and 

weapons qualification.20 Twenty-two days prior to their expected departure 

date, the orders to Iraq were canceled. Shortly thereafter, the battalion was 

informed of their forthcoming VSO and ALP mission in Afghanistan. 

The Iron Rangers living up to their unit’s motto Semper Paratus (Always 

Ready) were anxious for the new challenge. 

In preparation for VSO/ALP in Afghanistan, the Soldiers received 

basic pre-deployment and combat skills training for their new role, which 

included language instruction. With Arabic no longer required, they learned 

one of several Afghan languages. Captain Joseph Frego, a platoon leader 

in Delta Company, explained, “The language program used depended on 

what site you were going to, and introduced the Soldiers to Dari, Farsi, or 

Pashtu.”21 The Iron Rangers received reference pamphlets for language 

and basic communication with the Afghans along with computer-based 

training on Afghan culture. However, nothing prepared them for the total 

immersion into Afghan society. The most fortunate Soldiers received an inbrief with SOF personnel after arriving in-country and prior to departing to 

various locations throughout Afghanistan. SOF team members discussed 

their personal experiences with the Afghan villagers, culture, community 
130

relations, and explained some of the most prevalent obstacles that the Iron 

Rangers might experience during their tenure.22

Approximately 689 Soldiers from the 1-16 IN, under the command of 

Lieutenant Colonel James J. Smith, deployed to Afghanistan on 15 January 

2011.23 Their area of operations extended throughout many of Afghanistan’s 

34 provinces. The battalion distributed Soldiers to 52 different sites. One 

of the battalion’s units, Alpha Company, sent four platoons (174 men) 

to 17 isolated locations in four different provinces, where they operated 

independently. The company had 138 Soldiers assigned, however, Alpha 

Company’s First Sergeant Danny R. Conley, requested 36 additional men 

(mostly mechanics, medics, and cooks) to enhance the VSO mission at 

several sites that lacked the necessary support facilities and personnel. 

The largest sized unit in one location was a 44-man platoon, whereas 

the smallest was a three-man fire-team.24 These elements often found 

themselves isolated and without assistance from the battalion. 

Alpha Company’s 4th Platoon was primarily comprised of “tankers,” 

crewmembers who operated M1A2 Abrams tanks. This unnerved First 

Sergeant Conley, who stated that “Tankers, rarely are seen on patrols...doing 

movements to contacts, kicking down [doors] and clearing buildings.”25

Conley knew that in order for these men to survive in Afghanistan that 

they needed some “trigger pullers” or infantrymen. Therefore, “I put my 

best infantry squad with them and it paid off significantly,” he said.26 That 

unit, designated 1st Squad, consisted of 10 assigned infantrymen and two 

attached Soldiers. 

The 1st Squad benefitted from the presence of smart and experienced 

leaders who had once instructed advisor teams in COIN operations. Staff 

Sergeant Shawn Goggins, Squad Leader; Staff Sergeant Mathew Carson 

(who assumed the duties of squad leader on 1 July 2011, when Goggins 

returned to the States); and Sergeant Kenneth Eunice, A-Team Leader were 

tactically sound and proficient in everything they did. In fact, Goggins 

was the epitome of an Army infantry leader and his Soldiers followed 

his example. “Goggins was the most stellar soldier in the brigade,” said 

Conley.27 When Conley had first met Goggins nearly six years earlier, 

Goggins was a private but still stood out among the new enlisted Soldiers 

in the battalion. Since that first introduction, Goggins had earned the title 

of honor graduate for the Warrior Leader Course and regularly achieved 

perfect scores on his Army physical fitness tests and earned a Bachelor’s 

Degree in Criminal Justice. In September 2006, he deployed to Iraq as part 

of Charlie Company, 1-16 IN. As a squad leader, Goggins was responsible 

for his Soldiers daily activities and performance and ultimately, became an 
131

adviser, trainer, role model, and supervisor to his Soldiers. His mentoring 

capabilities and leadership qualities ensured that 1st Squad was ready for 

the challenging aspects of its ALP duties. “We were looking forward to 

it...it was a different mission than what we were used to...we knew there 

was going to be a multitude of challenges...but overall everybody was 

pretty excited for the specialized mission,” stated Goggins.28

Alpha Company arrived in Afghanistan in mid-January 2011. After 

spending nearly 30-days at Bagram Airfield receiving training and 

instructions from SF members on VSO/ALP operations, three squads from 

4th Platoon convoyed for two days to their final destinations. Sergeant 

Daniel Taylor, 1st Squad’s Forward Observer, explained that, “Each squad 

drove a total of three mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles that were 

assigned to them for the duration of their deployment.”29 Sergeant Goggins 

and his squad arrived at Dandah Patan and joined 6 ODA members from 

20th Special Forces Group (SFG) (US Army National Guard), 2 US Civil 

Affair Team (CAT) personnel, and 12 Afghan National Army Special 

Forces (ANASF) that collectively conducted VSO duties. 30 In March the 

20th SFG was replaced by the 3rd SFG. Dandah Patan was a rural agrarian 

community adjacent to the Pakistan border (see Figure 2). Dandah and 

Patan were two separate villages divided by the Daryā-ye Chamkanī 

Stream; however, the Afghans considered them one collective location.

The ODA in Dandah Patan had concluded the shape phase within the 

VSO initiative, and now more Soldiers were required for implementing 

the next two phases. 4th Platoon would assist the ODA and separate into 

three squads and a headquarters element. Each squad would then operate 

in separate districts within Paktia Province. The platoon’s three squads 

focused on protecting the rural population and laying the foundation for 

follow-on development, as part of the hold phase. 1st Squad operated from 

Combat Outpost (COP) Dandah Patan. 3rd Squad and the headquarters 

element were located 10 to 12 kilometers away at Chamkani district center. 

And 2nd Squad operated from COP Herrera, roughly 20 to 25 kilometers 

northwest of Dandah Patan in extremely mountainous terrain.31

The Village of Dandah Patan

In mid-2008, due to the lack of Coalition Forces in the district and 

the easily traversable terrain, the insurgency began using the Dandah 

Patan area for their supply lines (rat lines) originating in the third largest 

arms bazaar – Teri Mangel Post – inside Pakistan. From this location, 

approximately 20 kilometers to the north of Dandah Patan, the insurgents 

smuggled weapons and other vital supplies into Afghanistan.32 An Afghan 
132

villager named Khalid working as an electrician for the US Military at 

Firebase Chamkani, first mentioned the insurgent movement in this remote 

area to USSOF team members. 

Shortly thereafter, SF personnel dispatched an ODA to talk with the 

Dandah Patan villagers to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a VSO 

within the region.33 The insurgent smuggling operations continued unabated 

until the fall of 2010, when an ODA from the 20th SFG began conducting 

ALP operations in the region. These SF Soldiers instructed the ALP training 

course and visited Dandah Patan daily. Afghan workers constructed COP 

Dandah Patan less than one kilometer west of the Pakistani border. This 

strategically-placed COP hindered insurgent operations and forced them 

to move their rat lines further south into treacherous mountainous terrain, 

making it more difficult for them to transport supplies. However, more 

Soldiers were needed to assist the ODA with establishing close relations 

with the Afghan villagers and training ALP. This was the mission of Staff 

Sergeant Goggins’ squad.

Upon their arrival at COP Dandah Patan 1st Squad found only sparse 

accommodations. The Soldiers began constructing latrines, a dining 

facility, a storage area for dry food, and sleeping quarters for themselves 

and their newly appointed teammates. It took several months to establish 

the base, but the Soldiers began conducting joint patrols immediately and 

meetings with village elders – known as key leader engagements (KLE) 

– followed shortly thereafter. Goggins and his men integrated with SF 

personnel, they conducted joint patrols, shared meals, and bedded down in 

the same quarters. The ODA “provided guidance when we needed it, but 

were very good about not micro-managing us while we completed daily 

tasks,” said Sergeant Kenneth Eunice.34 The 1st Squad and ODA Soldiers 

worked harmoniously. Other squads from 1-16 IN were not so fortunate, 

enduring caustic relations with their SF counterparts. 

Hold Phase Operations

Sergeant Goggins explained that as part of the hold phase, their initial 

mission of supporting the ODA included providing physical security 

during village KLEs, assisting in the training of ALP personnel, and 

personally visiting neighboring villages. Goggins knew that the Soldiers 

would be working closely with the Afghans; he just did not expect it to 

happen “every single day.”35 But the Iron Rangers attempted to overcome 

any obstacles in order to achieve their mission as they averaged two to 

three weekly village visits. During the course of its deployment, 1st Squad 

made regular visits to approximately 20 to 25 villages in four different 
133

districts (Dan Patan, Chamkani, Sabari, and Akmhad Kheyl) and in two 

adjoining provinces (Paktia and Khost).36

Figure 2. Dan Patan district geographical reference map.

Sergeant Goggins’ management style, skills, and techniques enabled 

effective communication and organization, while his demeanor encouraged 

positive relationships between his Soldiers and the members of ODA. 

The ODA mentored the Soldiers of 1st Squad and instructed them on 

firing mortars and other special operation skills unfamiliar to the average 
134

infantryman. 1st Squad eventually formed a mortar team that effectively 

engaged targets in the district. As 1st Squad gained proficiency in its VSO 

duties, responsibility was irreversibly transferred from ODA personnel 

to members of the squad. Goggins wrote the program of instruction for 

the ALP training course and maintained military order within the COP. 

Sergeant Eunice assumed the duties of pay agent for the ALP graduates. 

Sergeant John Friedman, B-Team Leader, was in charge of the rifle range 

and basic marksmanship. Sergeant Taylor was lead instructor for ALP 

trainees. Specialist Gene Larue, Assistant A-Team Leader, traveled by 

CH-46 Chinook helicopter routinely to Forward Operating Base (FOB) 

Gardez where he picked up weapons and ammunition for the ALP training 

course and implemented accountability procedures among the Afghans 

for these items. Specialist Antoine Waters, a mechanic, ensured that all 

32 vehicles at COP Dantah Patan operated safely for daily missions, 

and used his civilian culinary training to provide the COP with hot food. 

Specialist Zachary Guynn, a Rifleman, coordinated the advanced training 

for the ANASF who assisted in the ALP program, but required their own 

remedial training when an ALP course was not in session. Specialist 

Michael Shepard, Squad Radio Telephone Operator, learned the intricate 

art of radio satellite communications and how to operate and repair all 

types of communication devices at the COP. He ensured connectivity with 

Alpha Company headquarters, patrols, and other coalition assets. Private 

First Class John Miller, a combat medic, conducted more direct patient 

care and emergency services than he witnessed on television growing up 

in the United States. Private First Class Travis Barrett, Squad Designated 

Marksman, monitored the base defenses and used his weapons skills to 

educate ALP trainees on the rifle range.37

The 1st Squad executed its mission in such a professional manner that 

if First Sergeant Conley did not hear from them for some time, he was 

not concerned. “Out of all of the squads in the company, I didn’t have to 

worry about them.”38 Conley concluded that if ODA departed the district, 

1st Squad could take over the mission singlehandedly. The ODA Team 

Sergeant informed Conley that if not for Goggins, 1st Squad would have 

been nowhere near as effective. As the deployment progressed, 1st Squad 

conducted patrols as an organic infantry squad without any assistance 

from the ODA. These patrols included trips to Ghunday, Karoto Kalay, and 

Kematay (see Figure 2). Conley believed that if the ODA went into an area 

to implement the VSO shape and hold that his conventional forces could 

build and prepare for the transition, providing that the Afghans facilitated 

this process as well as they would in the villages of Stya, Kagina, and 
135

Dandah Patan (see Figure 2). The ALP from these three villages conducted 

security patrols as far north as Sharkay and voluntarily projected Afghan 

security throughout the district.

Relations between the Soldiers and the Afghans differed depending on 

a number of factors including personality conflicts between Afghans and 

Americans, insurgent influences in the specific region, and elder opinions 

of the ALP program. Goggins never felt his Soldiers were in any imminent 

danger while working with the Afghans.39 He felt that the Pashtunwali, the 

Pashtun code of behavior that ensured protection for guests, provided for 

their safety.40 Sergeant Friedman, a team leader in 1st Squad, was actually 

surprised at the high amount of support the local population gave the 

Soldiers, and how tranquil and considerate most of them were.41

Further south of Dandah Patan, the VSO program faced challenges in 

the village of Hasan Kheyl, Marikhel, and Surak (see Figure 2), where the 

insurgency had significant influence and contributed to the failed attempt 

at ALP operations there. The code of Pashtunwali was not as apparent to 

the American Soldiers as in other locations. In an attempt to encourage 

positive relations with the inhabitants of Dan Patan District and establish 

the build phase of VSO, members of 1st Squad and ODA set-up a medical 

civil assistance program (MEDCAP) and visited the district center and 

various villages where they provided medical service to many Afghans. 

Working with a civil affairs physician and a SF trained medic provided 

Private First Class Miller with the rare opportunity to provide direct care 

including advanced care of wounds for scores of patients. Often, the 

villagers walked great distances to the COP, carrying their loved ones for 

medical treatment. Miller recalled that a significant number of the Afghan 

children suffered from cancer and other long-term ailments.42 Other 

humanitarian efforts such as CERP projects were used to win over the 

villagers and open their minds to the possibilities of the VSO program. 

The use of CERP funds for development projects was a contested part 

of VSO. Due to villager demands and tribal conflicts, the SF had to learn 

how to harness the effectiveness of money to foster community relations 

rather than encouraging corruption. In the village of Ghunday (see Figure 

2), CERP funds contributed to the population’s quality of life, such as 

the construction of a bridge that enabled local children to cross a river, 

shortening their walk to school and the renovation of the district center, 

a project that encouraged economic prosperity after a major insurgent 

attack.43 Throughout Afghanistan, the VSO utilized CERP projects – 

humanitarian aid, medical and veterinarian assistance, improved farming 
136

technique classes, hydro-electric generator installation, road building 

and improvements, and basic village repairs – to benefit the population.44

However, there are instances when the use of CERP did not guarantee a 

village’s support in the ALP program or strengthen security in the region 

as proven by the persistent influence of the insurgency in the village of 

Hasan Kheyl, where the ALP never gained a foothold. 

ALP Trainees and Graduates

The district governors, sub-governors, and village elders were 

essential in recruiting their own ALP candidates, a critical component in 

the successful build phase.

45 The applicants that met specific requirements 

for enrollment needed to be between the ages of 18 and 45, live in the 

village they intended to secure, and be nominated and validated by a local 

and district Shura member. They had to have a valid tazkera (Afghan 

identification document), pass a health screening, and drug test, pass a 

district chief of police screening and interview process, and complete 

three-weeks of training before being validated by MoI.46 Finally, they 

had to undergo an extensive two-week vetting process conducted by the 

ODA. At Dandah Patan, the ODA communications sergeant handled all 

the vetting and background checks. This process included fingerprinting 

and photographing each potential candidate before they could join the 

training program. Shortly after 1st Squad gained familiarity with the 

vetting process, Specialist Shepard assisted with the identification cards, 

interviews, and ALP in-processing.

To build rapport between the US Soldiers and their ALP counterparts, 

the ODA and 1st Squad made certain accommodations in their program.

Since the vast majority of the trainees walked to their ALP courses, class 

times varied throughout each course in accordance with the distance 

traveled by its attendees. A typical class scheduled for those in the Dandah 

Patan area began at 0800 or 0900 hours. Allowing for an hour for lunch 

and mid-day prayer, the class might conclude for the day at 1500 or 1600 

hours. Providing allotments for prayer time enhanced cultural relations 

between US Soldiers and Afghans. During routine remedial instruction 

upon graduation, the ALP remained overnight for two or three days of 

training. Prior to the commencement of each initial ALP training course, the 

district governors attended, demonstrating their support for the program.47

During their training, the ALP was instructed on the laws of armed 

conflict and various military subjects that included marksmanship, radio 

communications, first-aid, IED detection, vehicle checkpoint security, 

search and detection, and drug interdiction. Initially, ALP marksmanship 
137

training was conducted using the Samopal Vzor SA Vz-58 assault rifle, 

but the ALP trainees complained about this weapon. Specialist Larue 

explained, “It kicked too hard and was far too difficult for the Afghans to 

zero in.”48 He then swapped out the SA Vz-58s and obtained 125 AK-47 

assault rifles. Approximately 24 to 28 hours was spent on the rifle range 

over a three to four day period during the initial ALP course.49 While on 

the rifle range, Larue taught the prone, kneeling, and standing rifle firing 

positions to the trainees. Sergeant Friedman had set-up three-inch targets 

at 25 meters for the Afghans to shoot, all with mixed results. Training 

not only enhanced the skills of the ALP personnel, but also boosted their 

confidence to the point that if they came under attack, they could defend 

themselves. 

Trainees were provided with every opportunity to graduate from 

the ALP course. However, some of the selected villagers failed to take 

the course seriously, did not grasp the mental or technical challenges, or 

invariably made mistakes. Many trainees lacked the ability to read and 

write, but Afghan interpreters ensured that each student understood the 

classroom principles preceding the field training. Prior to the graduation 

ceremony, a panel of ANASF, ALP Commanders, ODA, and 1st Squad 

instructors reviewed each trainee and discussed their progression and 

limitations. Ultimately, this panel decided on those who passed, those that 

needed to retake the course, and those that failed.50 

Upon successful completion of the three-week training program, the 

district governors and sub-governors held a graduation ceremony for the 

ALP trainees. Each graduate then visited Sergeant Larue and received an 

AK-47 assault rifle, six 30-round magazines, uniform vest (weapons rack), 

medical kit, sleeping bag, an all-purpose utility tool, a personal hydration 

system, a set of desert camouflaged rain gear, and thermal underwear. Upon 

receipt of their gear, the ALP graduates reported to the ALP commander 

for their assigned duties.51

ALP graduates assisted SOF and 1st Squad in expanding “white 

space,” those areas inhospitable to the insurgents and thus hospitable 

to the establishment and solidification of legitimate local governance.52

For example, “white space” included the areas surrounding villages – a 

strategic road or hilltop that ALP and US Soldiers patrolled on a routine 

bases – denying these areas to the insurgency. The village elders and ALP 

created the defense plan for their communities, Guynn recalled.53 ALP 

personnel conducted outer security for neighboring communities, directed 

vehicle checkpoints, organized route security, and assisted with improvised 

explosive device (IED) recovery. 1st Squad had carefully trained ALP 
138

for the dangerous IED mission because the threat in the district was so 

serious. Sergeant Friedman noted, “We would build makeshift IEDs out 

of whatever we could find. We’d dig them on the inside of the compound 

or training area for them.”54 If an IED was discovered, “They established 

a 360-degree perimeter and cordoned off 100-meters distance away from 

the suspected device, then finally called it in via cell phone to the COP via 

interpreters,” elaborated Specialist Larue.55 The ODA engineer sergeant 

was then dispatched to the designated location for the destruction of the 

IED. 

Every two months, between March and December, Sergeant Eunice 

flew to FOB Salerno in neighboring Khost Province and obtained the 

Paktia Province CERP funded ALP payroll. Each ALP member was 

paid 9,000 Afghani ($203), while the commanders were paid 12,500 

Afghani ($284).56 ALP members returned to the COP and presented their 

weapons to Specialist Larue for accountability (serial numbers and names 

matched to each weapon) and then they received pay from Eunice. Salary 

disbursements were based on the proof that the ALP member had their 

weapon and the ALP Commander attended to verify that a weapon was 

missing. “No weapon, no pay” was the policy. First time offenders received 

a warning and were denied pay until a weapon was available. The second 

time they were dismissed from the ALP program. Denial of pay and other 

disciplinary measures were handled by the ALP commanders. Sergeant 

First Class Travis Hutt, Platoon Sergeant for 3rd Platoon, Charlie Company, 

explained that in the village of Kushkadir, Uruzgan Province, “Weapons 

were inevitably sold to insurgents and sometimes the ALP commanders 

had to round-up the weaponry whenever possible.”57 Although this was 

not a common occurrence in Dandah Patan, the leaders of the ALP sought 

to ensure that no ALP member in the village even considered the sale of 

his weapon. 

Periodically, Soldiers from 1st Squad held three-day refresher training 

sessions for the ALP graduates. Initially, this was done in conjunction with 

payday, with the Afghans receiving their salary on the first day and the 

training continuing for two additional days. However, “We realized that 

they’re not going to come in on the second and third days. So we separated 

it. They’d come in three days, train, and then later on they’d get paid that 

month,” explained Eunice.58 Towards the end of the deployment, refresher 

training decreased due to the increased number of missions to outlying 

villages.

The ALP in the Dan Patan District was more successful than programs 

in other districts. For example, in the Maruf District of Kandahar Province, 
139

Sergeant Andrew Blascyzk, a Team Leader for 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, 

Delta Company, had difficulties convincing Afghan villagers to join the 

ALP. He recalled what the locals told him, “We don’t need to protect 

ourselves, it’s your job, that’s what you’re here to do, so you figure it 

out, you protect us.”59 Often, the ALP participants threatened to quit if 

things were not in their favor. This was especially true when pay was late. 

There were times when funding was not readily available, and the trainees 

had to wait an extra month for their salaries, but they were eventually 

compensated.60 Sergeant Goggins felt that the ALP trainees in Dandah 

Patan and its neighboring villages of Stya, Kagina, and Sharkay believed 

in what they were doing. It was apparent to 1st Squad which ALP members 

were motivated by pay and those who desired a better way of life. 

Transitioning

Fifteen village elders from the most active villages in the district 

typically participated in the program as ALP commanders. As part of the 

transitioning phase, the village assumed control over the training program 

at Dandah Patan. In the fall of 2011, “Elders came in to take over the 

training of new recruits and did so very well,” claimed Sergeant Eunice.61

The elders and commanders facilitated all types of training except on the 

rifle range, which remained under the direction of the ODA and 1st Squad. 

The elders also conducted physical training and various types of tactical 

training, allowing the Afghans a chance to train one another.

In late fall, 1st Squad traveled 15 to 20 km south into Khost Province, 

where they conducted KLEs with villagers and attempted reestablish 

relations that had been allowed to languish. Sergeant Eunice was pleasantly 

surprised at the warm and friendly reception in the village of Kot Kalay (see 

Figure 2).62 This extensive eight hour trip was only made possible with the 

arrival of additional Alpha Company Soldiers at COP Dandah Patan, who 

then assumed control of 1st Squad’s duties in their absence. 3d Squad, 3d 

Platoon, relocated from FOB Lilly after several 107mm insurgent rockets 

struck the base, destroying a 5,000 gallon fuel bladder and nearly the entire 

FOB in the fire that ensued. 3d Squad remained at COP Dandah Patan until 

December. While Kot Kalay in fact had ALP personnel, its numbers were 

insufficient for any meaningful security operations. 

Still, visits to distant villages like Kot Kalay had value. Eunice 

explained the benefits of engaging the Afghan populace with “boots on 

the ground,” instead of projecting military power in armored vehicles. 

He recalled villagers telling him, “How can you trust someone who tells 

you to do this, but they hide in their vehicles.”63 With this in mind, the 

Soldiers parked their vehicles off in the distance and walked into the 
140

villages they visited. Members of the 1st Squad reiterated the importance 

of interacting with the villagers at the lowest level. The amount of personal 

integration with the villagers surprised many of the Soldiers, and Sergeant 

Larue stated, “It was a great experience for me and I would love to do 

it again.”64 The Afghans appreciated how the VSO Soldiers talked with 

them attempting to understand their requirements for a healthy, stable, 

and peaceful livelihood. As Afghans and US Soldiers routinely conducted 

“boots on the ground” patrols that deterred insurgents from returning to 

once-contested areas, the ALP instituted local security, enabled economic 

development, and promoted governance. Immediate engagement with 

the newly “liberated” villagers and the establishment of “white space” 

demonstrated the benefits of rejecting insurgent influence and cooperating 

with the GIRoA. 

Sergeant Friedman recalled from his Dandah Patan experience, “I’ve 

witnessed some ALP members come forward and show great potential 

in retaining information that we have taught them, and also reassert 

themselves in front of their fellow ALP members.”65 Friedman hoped 

that the successful training of ALP members ensured the continuation 

of a successful program, one that made a real difference in the security 

and safety of their respected villages. When working with the Afghans, 

Soldiers often wondered if what they did mattered in the grand scheme of 

things, and Specialist Waters was no different.

Specialist Waters, in his spare time, trained the ANASF on proper 

vehicle preventative maintenance and basic repairs. One of his proudest 

accomplishments was instructing them – without an interpreter – on 

changing a battery in a Humvee. After completing his class, each 

Afghan could complete the task. The ANASF Team Sergeant realized 

the advantages of American vehicle maintenance procedures and began 

following their example. Whenever his men completed a mission they 

refueled the vehicles, removed personal articles and weapons, and 

conducted preventative maintenance on each vehicle. “What I taught 

them, actually worked,” proudly exclaimed Waters.66 

One negative outcome during Sergeant Goggins tenure was the planned 

transfer of US military equipment including ammunition, magazines, field 

gear, sleeping bags, vests, and four Polaris Ranger all-terrain vehicles, 

to the district police who were to distribute it to the ALP.67 Apparently, 

this transaction never occurred, because ALP members from the northern 

areas visited Dandah Patan requesting the equipment selected for transfer. 

Later, the vehicles were found near the district center. Because of this 

incidents like this, when the locals needed anything, they would go to the 
141

COP and ask 1st Squad for assistance, bypassing the district government 

representatives. This showed that while the VSO/ALP program made great 

strides in fostering Afghan villagers’ capacity to protect their communities, 

there remained a lack of confidence and a disconnect between the villagers 

and their respective GIRoA representatives.

Conclusion

At the village level, the ALP program within VSO worked effectively 

at Dandah Patan, Stya, and Sharkay, but failed because of the insurgent 

influence at other Dan Patan district villages, such as Hasan Kheyl, 

Marikhel, and Sultak. The VSO methodology of shape, hold, build, and 

transition worked as more Soldiers trained, supported, and empowered the 

tribes to do the right thing and protect themselves. However, the level of 

success could vary widely. The program introduced ALP to 20 to 25 villages, 

but only three had effective and functioning programs implemented by the 

collective efforts of the ODA and 1st Squad from COP Dandah Patan. The 

effect of these three successful programs was magnified as ALP members 

from Dandah Patan, Stya, and Kagina patrolled throughout many of the 

neighboring villages. Each VSO had its own peculiarities and was only 

as successful as the investment of the Afghans. Frequently, whenever 

the Soldiers suggested a change to the ALP, it was well received and 

emphatically carried out. Members of 1st Squad periodically conducted 

random patrols to certain villages to see which ones were conducting their 

ALP duties properly, and as soon as the Soldiers entered the villages, they 

were offered Chai tea and the ALP members automatically joined the US 

Soldiers in donning their vests, grabbing their weapons, and providing 

security. 

Building relationships of rapport and trust with the Afghans was crucial 

for a successful shape phase and the final transformation to the transition 

phase within the VSO/ALP program. Based on his personal experience 

and relationships with the Afghans, Sergeant Goggins believed that “We 

could have gone on a mission and walked in villages north of our area 

with nobody ever armed. We felt completely safe.”68 First Sergeant Conley 

added, “I probably wouldn’t have been afraid to put on my PTs on and run 

through the village on PT, because that’s how quiet it was. If something was 

going on, ALP would let the teams know.”69 Sergeant Eunice, added that 

the Squad’s relationships with the Afghans, “Grew over time and became 

very strong.”70 In many other districts where the Iron Rangers trained ALP 

members, the Afghans refused to do anything under their own initiative 

without an American presence for motivation and guidance. “It was like 

pulling teeth to get them to help defend themselves,” explained Sergeant 
142

Hutt 71 This same frustration reverberated throughout the battalion. Still, 

1st Squad had enjoyed more than a little success in the villages of Dandah 

Patan, Stya, and Kagina whose populace saw it as their duty to protect 

themselves from insurgents. These were the Afghans who would take the 

initiative to do what was needed without direction from the Soldiers. 

The key to VSO and the successful implementation of ALP members 

in Dandah Pata was the face-to-face relationships based upon mutual 

respect. A positive relationship between the population and their security 

forces was one of the most effective counterinsurgency efforts. With a 

mobilized populace, the villages of Dandah Patan, Stya, and Kagina were 

able to stand up for themselves to project physical security in outlying 

communities against outside threats, while maintaining internal law and 

order. 
143

Notes

1. Staff Sergeant Sean K. Goggins, e-mail to Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 January 2012, 1.

2. CPT Jacob K. Moulin. E-Mail to author, 16 November 2011, 1:28 p.m. 

Subject: RE: VSO, Afghanistan. Combat studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

 3. First Sergeant Danny R. Conley, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2012, 11; Carson, interview; 

Sergeant Zackery K. Guynn, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012, 2.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Olivier Wache, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Brian 

White, ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, 24 June 2011; 2-3; Report to Congress. “Report 

on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” November 2010, 67.

5. Report to Congress. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan.” November 2010, 67; Sean D. Naylor. “Program has Afghans as 

First Line of Defense.” Army Times, 20 July 2010.

6. Captain Rory Hanlin. “One Team’s Approach to Village Stability 

Operations.” Small Wars Journal, 4 September 2011, 1.

7. Wache, interview, 5.

8. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit. “The Fight for the Village: Southern 

Afghanistan, 2010.” Military Review, May-June 2011, 29; Captain Neiman C. 

Young. “4th and Long: The Role of Civil Affairs in VSO.” Special Warfare, 24, no. 

3 (July-August-September 2011): 18.

9. Colonel Ty Connett and Colonel Bob Cassidy. “Village Stability Opera..

tions: More than Village Defense.” Special Warfare, 24, no. 3 (July-AugustSeptember 2011): 24-27; Captain Neiman C. Young. “4th and Long: The Role of 

Civil Affairs in VSO.” Special Warfare, 24, no. 3 (July-August-September 2011): 

19-20.

10. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Stephen N. Rust. “The Nuts and Bolts of Village 

Stability Operations.” Special Warfare, 24, no. 3 (July-August-September 2011): 

30.

11. Rory Hanlin. “One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations,” 

6; Wiebke Lamer and Kathleen Hughes. “Village Defense: Understanding the 

Afghan Local Police (ALP).” Civil Military Fusion Center, Afghanistan Monthly 

Report, July 2011, 1; Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit. “The Fight for the Village: 

Southern Afghanistan, 2010.” Military Review, May-June 2011, 29.

12. Wache, interview,16.

13. Sean D. Naylor. “Karzai Says He Will Back Locally Based Forces.” 

Military Times, 14 July 2010, 1-2; Sean D. Naylor. “Program has Afghans as First 

Line of Defense.” Army Times, 20 July 2010, 1-5.
144

14. Wiebke Lamer and Kathleen Hughes. “Village Defense: Understanding 

the Afghan Local Police (ALP),” 1.

15. Wiebke Lamer and Kathleen Hughes. “Village Defense: Understanding 

the Afghan Local Police (ALP),” 2.

16. US Department of Defense. “Report of Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces, April 2011, 62.

17. Wache, interview, 6-7.

18. Report to Congress. “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan.” November 2010, 69.

19. Staff Sergeant Mathew J. Carson, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012, 7.

20. Sergeant Andrew E. Blasczyk, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 October 2011, 3. 

21. Captain Joseph C Frego, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 October 2011, 3.

22. Staff Sergeant Robert N. Conley, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 October 2011, 3.

23. Moulin, E-Mail, 16 November 2011.

24. First Sergeant Danny R. Conley, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2012.

25. Conley, interview, 9.

26. Conley, interview, 7.

27. Conley, interview, 10.

28. Goggins, interview, 3.

29. Sergeant Daniel Taylor, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012.

30. Goggins, interview, 4.

31. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Afghanistan Country Atlas 

Series Volume 3: Ghazni, Kabul, Khost, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktika, 

Paktiya 1:50,000. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 2009, M1779; Staff 

Sergeant Sean K. Goggins, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 October 2011, 5.

32. Goggins, interview, 4 & 10.

33. Goggins, interview, 10.

34. Sergeant Kenneth Eunice, e-mail interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 January 2012, 3.
145

35. Goggins, interview, 5.

36. Carson, interview, 5.

37. Conley, interview, 9; Sergeant Kenneth Eunice, interview by Scott 

J. Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012; 

Sergeant John Friedman, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012; Sergeant Gene D. Larue, interview by 

Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 

2012; Sergeant Daniel Taylor, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012; Specialist Antoine Waters, 

interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

26 January 2012; Private First Class John Miller, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2012; Guynn, 

interview.

38. Conley, interview, 10.

39. Goggins, interview, 5.

40. Seth G. Jones. “It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change From Below in 

Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, 3.

41. Sergeant John Friedman, e-mail interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 January 2012, 1.

42. Private First Class John Miller, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2012.

43. Specialist Antoine Waters, e-mail interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 January 2012, 1.

44. Captain Scott J. Weeman, e-mail interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 December 2011, 5.

45. Carson, interview, 5.

46. HQ, CJSOTF-A. “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: 

Bottom-up Counterinsurgency.” 1 April 2011, 38.

47. Carson, interview; Sergeant Zackery K. Guynn, interview by Scott J. 

Gaitley, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012.

48. Sergeant Gene D. Larue, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 January 2012, 4.

49. Friedman, interview, 3.

50. Specialist Travis Barrett, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 January 2012, 7.

51. Larue, interview, 4.

52. HQ, CJSOTF-A. “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police: 

Bottom-up Counterinsurgency.” 1 April 2011, 52.
146

53. Guynn, interview.

54. Friedman, interview, 6.

55. Larue, interview, 8.

56. Eunice, interview.

57. Sergeant First Class Travis D. Hutt, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 October 2011, 9.

58. Eunice, interview, 4.

59. Sergeant Andrew B. Blasczyk, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 October 2011, 7.

60. Goggins, interview, 5.

61. Eunice, e-mail interview, 3.

62. Eunice, interview, 1.

63. Eunice, interview, 7.

64. Larue, interview, 12.

65. Friedman, e-mail interview, 2.

66. Waters, interview, 10.

67. Goggins, interview, 7 & 11. 

68. Goggins, interview, 12.

69. Conley, interview, 11.

70. Eunice, e-mail interview, 2.

71. Hutt, interview, 5.
147

Glossary

ABP Afghan Border Police

ABVs Assault Breacher Vehicles

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police 

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AO Area of Operations

APOB Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System

ARF Aerial Reaction Force

ASIP Advanced System Improvement Program radio

ASR Alternate Supply Route

ATPIAL Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Light

AUP Afghanistan Uniformed Police

AWG Asymmetric Warfare Group

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BSTB Brigade Special Troops Battalion

C2 Command and Control

CAT Civil Affairs Team

CAV Cavalry

CCA Close Combat Attack 

CCP Casualty Collection Point

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CFPDM Currahee Focused Police District Mentoring (Program)

CFSOCC Combined Forces Special Operations Component 

Command

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

COIN Counterinsurgency

COP Combat Outpost 

CP Command Post 

CROWS Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FA Field Artillery
148

FET Female Engagement Team

FO Forward Observer 

FOB Forward Operating Base

FTF Focused Targeting Force

GBUs Guided Bomb Units

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

G-MLRS Guided-Multiple Launch Rocket System

HHC Headquarters Company

HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone

HVT High Value Targets

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IJC International Joint Command - ISAF Joint Command

IN Infantry

IOTV Improved Outer Tactical Vest

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JDAMS Joint Direct Attack Munitions System

JLENS Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 

Netted Sensor System

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller

KIA Killed In Action

L&O Liaison and Observer

LMTV Light Medium Tactical Vehicle

LP Listening Post

LZ Landing Zone

MASCAL Mass Casualty Situation

M-ATV Mine Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain Vehicle

M-ATVs MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles

MEDCAP Medical Civic Assistance Programs

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 

MGS Mobile Gun System

MICLIC Mine Clearing Line Charge
149

MOLLE Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment

MP Military Police

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected

MREs Meals Ready to Eat

MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

NAIs Named Area of Interest 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NCOIC Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge

NGO Nongovernmental Organizations

NODs Night Observation Devices

NVGs Night Vision Goggles

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

OP Observation Post

OP-FET Operational FET

OPSEC Operational Security

PCI Pre-Combat Inspection

PRTs Provincial Reconstruction Teams

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RC Regional Command

RCP Route Clearance Package

RIP Relief in Place

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenades

RTO Radio Telephone Operator 

SAW Squad Automatic Weapon

SOF Special Operations Forces

SRT Special Reaction Team

TAA Tactical Assembly Area

TAC-FET Tactical FET

TBI Traumatic Brain Injury

TF Task Force

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
150

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WIA Wounded in Action

XO Executive Officer
151

About the Authors

Anthony E. Carlson holds a Ph.D. in History from the University 

of Oklahoma. He currently serves as an historian on the Afghan Study 

Team at the Combat Studies Institute and an adjunct Assistant Professor 

of History for the US Army Command and General Staff College. His 

publications include works on Progressive Era US water and flood control 

policy, public works, and the antebellum Army Corps of Topographical 

Engineers.

Michael J. Doidge is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of 

Southern Mississippi, where he co-edited Triumph Revisited: Historians 

Battle for the Vietnam War. In addition to writing his dissertation, Michael 

currently serves as an Army historian on the Afghan Study Team at the 

Combat Studies Institute and an adjunct Assistant Professor of History for 

the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Scott J. Gaitley holds a MA in Military History from Norwich 

University. He is the author of Ambushing the Taliban: A US Platoon in 

the Korengal Valley published in volume one of Vanguard of Valor: Small 

Unit Actions in Afghanistan. Before serving on the Afghan Study Team at 

the Combat Studies Institute, he served as an Air Force Wing Historian in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan and more recently as a staff historian at the Air 

Force Reserve Command Headquarters. 

Kevin M. Hymel holds an MA in History from Villanova University. 

He is the author of Patton’s Photographs: War As He Saw It and coauthor 

of Patton: Legendary World War II Commander, with Martin Blumenson. 

Before serving on the Afghan Study Team at the Combat Studies Institute, 

he worked for a number of military and military history magazines as a 

researcher, editor, and writer. 

Matt M. Matthews has worked at the Combat Studies Institute since 

July 2005 and is currently a member of the Afghan Study Team. He is the 

author of numerous CSI publications. Mr. Matthews has also co-authored 

various scholarly articles on the Civil War in the trans-Mississippi. He 

is a frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables and the former Mayor of 

Ottawa, Kansas.

Ryan D. Wadle received a Ph.D. in History from Texas A&M 

University. He currently serves as an historian on the Afghan Study Team 

at the US Army Combat Studies Institute. In addition to his official duties, 

he is currently working on an article-length study of joint Army-Navy 

training and doctrine in the interwar period. 


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