COMPARATIVE U.S.-ISRAELI 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

by 

Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 34 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

June 2006 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 34 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 34 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

About the Authors...................................................................................... iii 

Acknowledgements......................................................................................v

Foreword....................................................................................................vii 

Executive Summary....................................................................................ix

I. Introduction.........................................................................................1 

II. Threats to U.S. and Israeli Homeland Security ................................11 

III. Responding to the Threat: 

Comparative Organizational Structures............................................25 

IV. Preventing Terrorist Attacks.............................................................45 

V. Responding to an Attack...................................................................71 

VI. Analysis: Observations from Israeli Experience .............................85 

Notes..........................................................................................................99 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Authors 

Dr. Jeffrey A. Larsen is president of Larsen Consulting Group in 

Colorado Springs, Colorado, a senior policy analyst with Science 

Applications International Corporation, and an adjunct professor of 

international studies at the University of Denver. He is also serving as 

NATO’s 2005-06 Manfred Wörner Fellow. A retired Air Force 

Lieutenant Colonel, he was a command pilot, Air Force Academy 

professor, and director of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security 

Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University, an MA in 

national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a BS in 

Soviet area studies from the U.S. Air Force Academy. In recent years he 

has served as senior editor for the official Air Force studies of the air 

campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, led the effort to create a 

strategic vision for U.S. Northern Command, and worked as a consultant 

to Air Force Space Command and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. 

Larsen’s publications include Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. 

Nuclear Doctrine (2005), Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia 

of Worldwide Policy, History, and Technology (2005), Historical 

Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament (2005), Emerging Missile 

Challenges and Improving Active Defenses (2004), Arms Control: 

Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment (2002), Rockets’ Red 

Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics (2001), 

Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities

(2001), and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (1999). He is a 

research associate with the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

Major Tasha L. Pravecek, USAF, BSC, PhD, (selected for promotion 

to Lieutenant Colonel) is the Chief of CBRNE Education, Research and 

Analysis at the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

Previously, Maj Pravecek was a student at Air Command and Staff College. 

She also served as the 354th Medical Group, Bioenvironmental Engineering 

Commander at Eielson AFB, AK. Other previous positions include Chief, 

Chemistry and Toxicology Branch, Air Force Center for Environmental 
iv 

Excellence, Brooks AFB, TX; Instructor of Chemistry, USAF Academy; and 

Chief Cell and Tissue Culture Section and Research Toxicologist, 

Toxicology Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Maj Pravecek has a 

doctorate in environmental science and engineering from the University of 

North Carolina at Chapel Hill and MS degrees in biological chemistry from 

Wright State University and military operational art and science from Air 

Command and Staff College. She received her Bachelor of Science degree 

from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO. 
v 

Acknowledgements 

The authors would like to thank the sponsors of this USAF 

Counterproliferation Center (CPC) project for providing the resources that 

allowed us to conduct the research reflected in this report. In particular, 

we want to acknowledge the support of Michael Evenson, Director of the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Operations Enterprise (formerly the 

Combat Support Directorate). Additionally, we would like to thank 

Colonel (ret.) Dr. Jim Davis, former deputy director of the CPC, who 

began the initial planning and preparation for this project. 

This publication would not have been possible without the 

development of some of the subject matter in papers by students and staff 

of the Air War College and the CPC. These contributors include former 

Air War College students Lt Colonel Consuella Pocket, Lt Colonel Jeffrey 

Jackson, and Colonel Robert Miller, and CPC staff members Major Chris 

Whitmire and Lt Colonel Trevor Noel. Colonel Brian Noland, U.S. 

Northern Command, also contributed details of Northern Command’s 

organizational structure and mission. We thank these contributors for their 

quality inputs to this project. 

We also extend our appreciation to Mrs. Jo Ann Eddy and Mrs. 

Abbey Plant of the CPC staff for their help and patience regarding 

requests for editing, researching, writing, administration, and publishing 

support. Thanks, as well, to Mr. Alan Reid for his editorial contributions 

to this project, and to our anonymous outside reviewers from the 

Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. Without their 

commitment, this product would not have the quality, accuracy, or 

professional appearance that it does. 

vii 

Foreword 

This report compares United States and Israeli homeland security 

practices. Its purpose is to determine whether there are lessons from 

Israeli experience that might enhance U.S. homeland security efforts. 

The research for this study included a literature review as well as field 

interviews with American and Israeli elites in Washington, D.C., and 

Israel during the summer of 2005. The principle investigator met with key 

Israeli homeland security and counterterrorism experts in Jerusalem, Tel 

Aviv, Ramla, and Hertzilya. 

This report sets the stage for a comparison of United States and Israeli 

homeland security issues and policies by addressing the common and 

unique threats facing each state. It then looks at how each state has 

organized its governmental response to those threats, its policies for 

preventing terrorist attacks, and its response capabilities should an attack 

occur. In the final section it lists lessons from Israeli experience that 

might be considered by the United States, along with a discussion of the 

reasons the United States will likely be unable or unwilling to implement 

those lessons. 

Unless otherwise noted, all photographs in this report were taken by 

Jeffrey Larsen in Israel, June 2005. The manuscript was completed in 

June 2006, prior to Israel’s military incursion into Lebanon. 

ix 

Executive Summary 

Purpose and Research Method 

This report examines the premise that there are lessons from Israeli 

experience that might enhance United States homeland security efforts. 

The research for this study included a literature review and field 

interviews with American and Israeli elites in Washington, D.C., and 

Israel during the summer of 2005. 

Organization and Content of this Report 

This report addresses the common and unique threats facing each 

state and related homeland security issues and policies. It begins with the 

threats experienced by each nation, examining the respective homeland 

security organizational structures and ways of preventing attacks and 

responding to attacks that do occur. The report then compares each 

country’s homeland security program. Where appropriate, personal 

observations derived from the authors’ interviews in each country are 

included. The final section addresses a series of lessons the United States 

might consider in its efforts to improve its homeland security, as well as 

some discussion of where it might not be advantageous or feasible to 

follow the Israeli model. 

Threats to U.S. and Israeli Homeland Security 

The United States and Israel each face a number of threats to their 

homeland—some shared, some unique to each state. Some threats 

common to both the United States and Israel include: 

• Terrorism and the Global War on Terror 

• State Aggression by Sovereign Powers 

• Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Trans-Border Issues 
x 

The United States was protected throughout most of its history by two 

great oceans, far from the great powers that could threaten its existence. 

This situation changed during the Cold War with the threat of nuclear 

weapons, strategic long-range bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) delivery systems. While ICBM attacks from a few countries 

remain a concern today, other more immediate issues plague the United 

States. Today, the United States is concerned with protecting itself from 

international terrorist attacks and the threat from a small number of rogue 

states, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Additionally, illegal drug 

transport across U.S. borders remains a significant worry. However, the 

threat to the United States is still less, day to day, than it is in Israel. 

Israel is a nation at arms, a situation reflected in its robust military forces, 

its emphasis on homeland defense, and its willingness to give up some civil 

liberties for the sake of security. Israel’s Home Front Command describes 

four primary threats to Israeli territory: ballistic missile attack, mass disaster, 

air attack, and terrorist actions. Israel is plagued almost daily by Palestinian 

terror attacks, and lives under the threat of medium-range ballistic missiles 

from neighbors such as Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 

Responding to the Threat: Comparative Organizational Structures 

The global events of the past two decades have shaped the security 

strategies found in U.S. and Israel homeland security programs. Israel 

undertook significant organizational changes in response to the SCUD 

missile attacks of the 1991 Gulf War. The United States progressively 

began to reshape its national homeland security strategy in response to 

terror attacks after the bombings at the World Trade Center (1993), 

Khobar Towers (1996), the U.S. Embassies in East Africa (1998), and the 

USS Cole (2000). However, it did not adopt truly sweeping policy 

changes until the devastating September 11, 2001, attacks. 

The United States and Israel have developed organizations designed 

to protect their respective homelands from attack and to aid recovery after 

an incident occurs. In the United States, the primary agencies addressed 

are the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command. 

In Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces and Home Front Command serve 

complementary roles in protecting their homeland. 
xi 

Additionally, the United States and Israel have developed policies and 

strategies directing homeland security. The primary document that guides 

the United States’ homeland security is the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security. This report instituted revolutionary changes to 

emergency response, including the National Response Plan and the 

National Incident Management System. In Israel, the Home Front 

Command directs its civilian population through a comprehensive 

brochure: “In the Event of a Genuine Alert, Information on Civil Defense 

for the Family.” The brochure provides precise instructions for actions to 

take before, during, and after a conventional or unconventional attack.

Preventing Terrorist Attacks 

Organizational initiatives are not the only approach to preventing 

terrorist attacks. Both countries have developed parallel approaches to 

preventing, or at least reducing, the possibility of terrorist attack on their 

homelands. In the United States, the plans and programs designed to 

prevent terrorist attacks are derived from the 2003 National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, the 2002 National Security Strategy, and the 2002 

National Strategy for Homeland Security. Domestic counterterrorism 

initiatives are undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 

Northern Command, the Department of Defense, and other federal 

agencies. Some specific initiatives undertaken by the Department of 

Homeland Security are focused on: 

• Intelligence and Warning 

• Border and Transportation Security 

• Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Much of the U.S. effort focuses on improved intelligence capabilities to 

identify threats, and preemptive military measures to intervene when 

possible to stop an attack. 

Israeli efforts are headed by the Israeli Defense Forces and the Home 

Front Command. Israel’s security initiatives include a focus on borders 

and transportation security and international cooperation. These programs 

are further enhanced by inputs from the Israeli Armament Development 

Authority, which is engaged in the fields of border defense, defense of 
xii 

public transport on land, sea and air, combating domestic crime and 

terrorism, preparing for a state of emergency, and dealing with national 

disasters. Other specific Israeli homeland security initiatives are focused 

on borders and transportation security. 

Responding to an Attack 

Very little, if any, anti-terrorism training is conducted in U.S. schools or 

the population at large. In Israel, on the other hand, there is a much greater 

focus on the citizen’s responsibility to prepare for, and respond, should a 

terror attack or natural disaster occur. Specific areas of focus in the United 

States include the National Incident Management System, National Disaster 

Medical System, Strategic National Stockpile, Citizen Corps, Emergency Alert 

System, sheltering in place, and the Ready Campaign. The complementary 

Israeli programs include Israel’s layered response, Magen David Adom, 

volunteer opportunities, Home Front Command’s emergency notification 

system, protected spaces, personal protection, and readiness education. 

Analysis: Observations from Israeli Experience 

The research and field interviews conducted have led the authors to 

identify several lessons of Israeli experience. Those highlighted include 

the following: 

• Know Your Adversary—Local knowledge enables an in-depth 

understanding of one’s neighbors and potential adversaries. This 

knowledge allows the Israeli intelligence and security apparatuses 

to prepare appropriately and pre-position its defensive forces 

accordingly to minimize such threats. When a state knows its 

adversary it can tailor its strategy to maximize its chances of 

dissuading, deterring, or defeating the threat. 

• Interagency Cooperation—Israeli practices that the United States 

may wish to copy include realistic practices, drills, and scenarios, 

minimizing compartmentalization of information, and developing a 

process that ensures all organizations talk to one another more 

regularly. Israel has achieved a coordinated network-centric 

intelligence effort.
xiii 

• Tight Internal Security—All public buildings, including 

shopping malls and bus and train stations, have armed guards and 

metal detectors at their gates. Israel feels like a police state to 

foreign visitors, one in which security concerns are omnipresent. 

This internal security provides a deterrence measure not seen in the 

United States.

• Profiling—Israel admits that it uses profiling of individuals in its 

efforts to uncover terrorists. Security personnel look at a number 

of indicators to determine whether a person is perceived to be a 

threat, including a color-coded license plate system that 

differentiates between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and Palestinians.

• Protected Spaces—Every new home and public building in Israel 

is required to have a protected space—a room built of reinforced 

concrete with blast door and window that is designed to provide 

overpressure protection against bombs and chemical or biological 

weapons attack. 

• Barriers—Israel uses physical barriers to prevent illegal infiltration. 

This can be accomplished by walls or fences, making liberal use of 

sensors. 

• Information Sharing Between the Two States—Ties between the 

United States and Israel should be close to maximize cooperative 

ventures and allow each country to benefit from the lessons of the 

other in the fight against terrorism and ensuring homeland security. 

• Public Education—Israel has undertaken major measures to 

explain realistic threats, provide clear information in the form of 

civil defense booklets and warning sirens, and distribute personal 

protection kits to its population. 

• Offensive Military Action—Israel has proven its willingness to 

pursue offensive actions whenever necessary, relying on preemptive 

acts, preventive wars, and targeted assassinations to dissuade or 

deter an adversary from attacking its homeland. 

• Security Decision-Making—Israel’s national security establishment 

is much smaller than that in the United States, making it easier for a 
xiv 

small group of senior leaders to make consensual decisions more 

efficiently and quickly. 

• Compromise and Appeasement—Israel has attempted to ensure 

the harmonious coexistence of an Israeli state in an Arabdominated land to ensure its homeland security. 

• Advanced Technology—Modern technologies, especially sensors, 

are extensively used in Israel, particularly in border control and 

noninvasive surveillance methods. 

Despite the benefits that may accrue from adopting some of these 

lessons, the United States is unlikely to adopt many of them. Differences 

in country size, culture, attitudes toward security, historical experiences, 

and bureaucratic design contribute to the propensity of the United States to 

continue developing a homeland security strategy with the least impact on 

individual civil liberties and its population’s accustomed way of life. 

Conclusion 

The United States and the entire international community can learn 

much from Israel’s efforts in the homeland security arena. Coordinated 

teamwork between government agencies, the military, and emergency 

responders is imperative. Peacetime training with all emergency response 

entities goes a long way towards smoother operations during actual 

incidents. 

Israel does an excellent job of teaching its civilian population how to 

be self sufficient in the event of an incident. The brochure distributed by 

the Home Front Command is very explicit in its content, providing a stepby-step format to follow in the event of an incident. Hopefully, the 

preparedness function of the United States National Incident Management 

System will be influential in ensuring a means for educating the general 

public regarding appropriate actions in the event of an incident. 

The Israeli people live in a perpetual state of concern due to the 

constant threat of terrorism. If such a situation becomes the norm in 

American or other Western states, then U.S. counterterrorism policy has 

failed. The United States may benefit from lessons learned through hard 

experience by our Israeli allies. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 1 

Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

I. Introduction: U.S. and Israeli Homeland Security1

“We are today a Nation at risk to a new and changing threat.” 

– President George W. Bush 

National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 20022

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon were shocking and dramatic experiences for the 

United States and the world. These terror attacks emphasized that no 

nation, however powerful, is immune from attack on its homeland. As a 

result, many nations began to meticulously review the state of their 

homeland security programs in order to ensure adequate protection of their 

people. Israel, due to its experience with SCUD missile attacks during the 

1991 Gulf War, frequent terror attacks, and daily threats to its security, has 

developed a premier homeland security organization in the Israeli Defense 

Forces (IDF) and its subordinate Home Front Command (HFC). United 

States practices could be enriched through the study and adoption of some 

of the ideas, policies, and organization of Israel’s homeland security 

forces. 

Why Study Israel? 

There are certainly lessons the United States can learn from Israel’s 

nearly 60-year battle against terrorism and attacks from its neighbors. 

Some key factors have enabled or forced Israel to develop a superior 

homeland security organization and capabilities. First, Israel is more 

practiced in dealing with constant threats and attacks, and thus has had to 

develop an effective and efficient method of response before and after 
2 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

attack. Israel’s small geographic size and population compared to the 

United States simplifies the Israeli homeland security organization and 

response plans. The population of Israel is more accepting of the 

restrictions that come with increased homeland security because of the years 

of violence and bloodshed they have experienced. Israel requires a robust 

and effective homeland security program due to Israel’s geopolitical 

situation and its need for both defenses and credible deterrence. 

These differences between the United States and Israel demonstrate 

why it is somewhat easier for homeland security to be successful in Israel. 

However, the price for this expertise has been costly in terms of lives lost, 

property damaged, and entire lifetimes spent in a state of constant 

readiness to respond appropriately to terrorist attack. 

Figure 1. Old City of Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives (Larsen) 

Israeli Experience 

Since declaring statehood on May 14, 1948, the people of Israel have 

endured regular attacks on their homeland. In addition to fighting five 

major wars, attacks from Israel’s enemies have posed a persistent 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 3 

Figure 2. Map of Israel (CIA) 

challenge. For instance, during 

the 1991 Gulf War, 39 Iraqi 

SCUD missiles hit Israeli cities, 

resulting in 74 deaths (although 

all but one of those were only 

indirectly related to the attacks).3 

This war moved the combat line 

from the country’s border to its 

home front and exposed 

weaknesses in the civil defense 

system.4

 The second Intifada, or 

“time of troubles,” began on 

September 29, 2000. Palestinians 

believe the Intifada to be a war of 

national liberation against foreign 

occupation, but Israelis consider 

Intifada to be a terrorist 

campaign.5 Between September 

2000 and December 2005 Israel 

endured over 22,400 terror 

attacks causing 7,250 casualties 

and over 1,000 deaths.6 Almost 

half of these deaths were caused 

by suicide bombings. Through 

all of the attacks in the past 

decade, the Israeli Defense 

Forces and Home Front 

Command have demonstrated 

their expertise in first response. 

After the Iraqi SCUD 

attacks in 1991, the Israeli 

Defense Forces determined that the entire emergency response system 

needed to be revamped to protect the civilian population from future 

conventional and non-conventional attacks. This realization led to the 

creation of the Home Front Command in February 1992.7

 The HFC 

became a component of the IDF and replaced the Civil Guard, which had 

been formed after the 1973 war.8

 The HFC was given the daunting task of 
4 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

coordinating 260 local authorities throughout Israel in the event of a 

national emergency.9 Home Front Command is now a well-established 

organization, although some Israelis still question its necessity. 

Comparative Size 

Israel is a small country, approximately the size of the state of New 

Jersey, consisting of roughly 20,770 square kilometers (by comparison, 

the United States is 9.6 million square kilometers).10 The population of 

the United States is almost 300 million, while Israel has just over 6 million 

people.11 It may be argued that a coordinated, centralized homeland 

security system is easier to implement and sustain in a smaller country like 

Israel. If true, many of Israel’s security initiatives may not be practical or 

feasible for implementation within the United States. However, emulating 

appropriate aspects of Israel’s capability may be a goal worth pursuing. 

Israel’s Security Culture 

Israeli civilians have paid a high price for the Home Front 

Command’s expertise and world-class homeland security organization. 

The Israeli people have repeatedly experienced large-scale attacks, and are 

therefore willing to accept some limits to their freedom in return for 

greater protection. Israelis are born into the threat. Most citizens 

appreciate the need for a heightened state of readiness and support 

homeland security initiatives. It is a way of life much different than the 

history and experience of the United States. 

Nevertheless, society learns to adjust to security measures. For 

instance, in the United States today, few question why only passengers are 

allowed to pass through the airport security checkpoint. The days of 

watching passengers walk off aircraft and greeting your family and friends 

at the gate are a distant memory. This security change occurred after only 

one major terrorist attack on the United States. The citizens of Israel have 

the unfortunate disadvantage of frequent reminders why homeland 

security is critical to their continued existence. Israelis possess a different 

mindset, and their degree of support for Home Front Command reflects 

more than simple nationalism. Israelis depend on Home Front Command 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 5 

and civil defense measures because they know that they need it in order to 

survive and recover after the next attack. 

Israel’s Credible Deterrence and Defense 

Israel recognizes the necessity of developing an ability to survive 

despite any attack, conventional or unconventional. Thus, Israel is 

prepared for any type of weapon coming from multiple directions. Israel 

maintains a significant military capability, demonstrates a willingness to 

conduct preemptive strikes, and maintains a credible deterrence capability 

based ultimately on an opaque nuclear capability. Credible deterrence has 

been their primary focus for thwarting an attack by a weapon of mass 

destruction (WMD). However, given the uncertainty of deterrence, 

especially in the current environment where the rationality and regard for 

the consequences of weapons of mass destruction by international actors is 

suspect, Israel has developed extensive civil defenses and passive 

defensive capabilities, as well. 

Israel’s defensive posture against chemical and biological threats, for 

example, is a combination of passive systems, such as protective gas 

masks and sealed rooms. Israel was the first and remains the only country 

to develop and implement measures to protect its entire civilian population 

against a full-scale chemical attack.12 The Israelis began to address 

response options for dealing with chemical attacks in the mid-1960s, after 

Egypt used chemicals on Yemen. In the 1970s, as Iraq, Syria, and Libya 

began to develop chemical weapons capabilities, Israel continued to 

enhance its capability to respond to such an unconventional attack.13

United States Progress 

Since September 11, 2001, U.S. local, state, and federal agencies have 

made exceptional progress in improving their ability to defend against 

catastrophic threats through the enactment of laws, development of 

sensors and detection equipment, and initiation of many disaster relief and 

threat-related programs. The National Strategy for Homeland Security 

called for expanded capabilities and improved coordination among federal 

agencies. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), established 

in 2002, has made noteworthy advances in creating a more effective 
6 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

disaster response and reinforcing the security of the United States 

homeland. 

It is important to note that the United States may never fully be able 

to prevent a terrorist attack on the homeland. Nevertheless, the United 

States is more prepared today to defend against and react to catastrophic 

attacks. To enhance U.S. preparedness, it should look to other nations for 

potential capabilities to emulate. The success of the HFC has resulted in 

Israel being recognized as an expert in homeland defense and antiterrorism strategies. Although valuable interaction between homeland 

security officials from the United States and Israel has already occurred, 

the United States has much to learn from the Israeli experience.14

Purpose of this Project and Report 

This report provides a comparative analysis of the United States and 

Israel homeland security programs, policies, and organizations. It presents 

an overview of the homeland security programs in both the United States 

and Israel. The study addresses similarities and differences in the policies, 

techniques, and lessons learned by these two nations, as well as recent 

initiatives within each country, and the modest collaborative efforts between 

the United States and Israel in support of homeland security. The purpose 

of the project and resulting report was to identify homeland security 

programs and ideas which could be adopted in whole or part by the United 

States to strengthen its homeland security. The report illustrates that while 

both nations have made great strides in their homeland security efforts, 

there is still much that needs to be done. Furthermore, the United States 

may be reticent to adopt some Israeli practices for reasons of cultural or 

geographical differences between the two states. 

Organization and Content of this Report 

The report begins with the threats faced by each nation, examining 

the respective homeland security organizational structures and ways of 

preventing attacks and responding to attacks that do occur. The report 

then compares each country’s homeland security program. Where 

appropriate, personal observations derived from interviews in each 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 7

country are included. The final section addresses a series of lessons the 

United States might consider in its efforts to improve its homeland 

security, as well as some discussion of where it might not be advantageous 

or feasible to follow the Israeli model. 

Threats to U.S. and Israeli Homeland Security 

The United States and Israel each face a number of threats to their 

homeland—some shared, some unique to each state. This section reviews 

some of those threats to each country’s homeland. Shared threats include 

terrorism and the global war on terror, state aggression, weapons of mass 

destruction, and trans-border issues. 

The United States has been protected throughout most of its history 

by two great oceans, far from the great powers who could threaten its 

existence. This situation changed during the Cold War with the threat of 

nuclear weapons, strategic long-range bombers, and intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery systems. While ICBM attacks from a 

few countries remain a concern today, other more immediate issues plague 

the United States. Today, the United States is concerned with protecting 

itself from international terrorist attacks and the threat from a small 

number of rogue states, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. 

Additionally, illegal drug transport across U.S. borders remains a 

significant worry. However, the threat to the United States is still less, day 

to day, than it is in Israel. 

Israel is a nation at arms, a situation reflected in its robust military 

forces, its emphasis on homeland defense, and its willingness to give up 

some civil liberties for the sake of security. Israel’s Home Front 

Command describes four primary threats to Israeli territory: ballistic 

missile attack, mass disaster, air attack, and terrorist actions. More 

specifically, Israel is plagued daily by Palestinian terror attacks, and lives 

under the threat of medium-range ballistic missiles from neighbors such as 

Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Responding to the Threat: Comparative Organizational Structures 

The global events of the past two decades have shaped the security 

strategies found in U.S. and Israeli homeland security programs. Israel 
8 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

undertook significant organizational changes in response to SCUD missile 

attacks during the 1991 Gulf War. The United States progressively began 

to reshape its national homeland security strategy in response to terror 

attacks after the bombings at the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar 

Towers (1996), U.S. Embassies in East Africa (1998), and the USS Cole 

(2000). However, the United States did not adopt truly sweeping policy 

changes until the devastating September 11, 2001, attacks on the nation. 

This section briefly reviews the major U.S. and Israeli organizations 

designed to protect their respective homelands from attack and to aid 

recovery after an incident occurs. In the United States, the primary 

agencies addressed are the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. 

Northern Command. In Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces and Home Front 

Command serve complementary roles in protecting their homeland. 

Preventing Terrorist Attacks 

Organizational initiatives are not the only approach to preventing 

terrorist attacks. Both countries have developed parallel approaches to 

preventing, or at least reducing, the possibility of terrorist attack on their 

homelands. In the United States, the plans and programs designed to 

prevent terrorist attacks are derived from the 2003 National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, 

and the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security. Domestic 

counterterrorism initiatives are undertaken by the Department of 

Homeland Security, U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Defense, 

and other federal agencies. Much of the U.S. effort focuses on improved 

intelligence capabilities to identify threats, and preemptive military 

measures to intervene when possible to stop an attack. 

Israeli efforts are headed by the Israeli Defense Forces and the Home 

Front Command. Israel’s security initiatives include a focus on borders 

and transportation security and international cooperation. These programs 

are further enhanced by inputs from RAFAEL, the Israeli Armament 

Development Authority. RAFAEL is engaged in the fields of border 

defense, defense of public transport on land, sea and air, combating 

domestic crime and terrorism, preparing for a state of emergency, and 

dealing with national disasters. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 9 

Responding to Attack 

It is important to understand each state’s anti-terrorism program and 

doctrine. Very little, if any, anti-terrorism training is conducted in U.S. 

schools or the population at large. In Israel, on the other hand, there is a 

much greater focus on the citizen’s responsibility to prepare for, and 

respond, should a terror attack or natural disaster occur. Specific areas of 

focus in the United States include the National Incident Management 

System, National Disaster Medical System, Strategic National Stockpile, 

Citizen Corps, Emergency Alert System, sheltering in place, and the 

Ready Campaign. The complementary Israeli programs include Israel’s 

layered response, Magen David Adom, volunteer opportunities, Home 

Front Command’s emergency notification system, protected spaces, 

personal protection, and readiness education. 

Comparative Analysis: Lessons from the Israeli Experience 

The research and field interviews conducted have led the authors to 

identify several lessons of Israeli experience. Those highlighted in this 

section include: knowing one’s adversary, tightening internal security, 

profiling, preparing protected spaces, constructing barriers, promoting 

information sharing between organizations, conducting public education, 

pursuing preemptive actions, making adequate security decisions, and 

adopting advanced technologies. 

Despite the benefits that may accrue from adopting some of these 

lessons, the United States is unlikely to adopt many of them. Differences 

in attitudes toward security, historical experiences, government structure, 

and bureaucratic design contribute to the propensity of the United States to 

continue developing a homeland security strategy with the least impact on 

individual civil liberties and its population’s accustomed way of life. 

Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 11 

II. Threats to U.S. and Israeli Homeland Security 

The United States and Israel each face a number of threats to their 

homelands: some shared, some unique to each state. This section reviews 

those threats to homeland security in each country. 

The United States has been protected during much of its history by 

the barriers of two great oceans and friendly neighbors. The rivalry with 

the Soviet Union, equipped with long-range nuclear and biological 

weapons threatened the existence of the United States. But, as the Cold 

War ended, so too did that threat. Today, as the 2002 U.S. National 

Security Strategy states, “the gravest danger the nation faces lies at the 

crossroads of radicalism and technology, as rogue state and non-state 

adversaries openly pursue weapons of mass destruction.” 

In the Holy Land, promised to the Israelites by Jehovah in the 3rd 

millennium B.C. and to the Muslims by Allah in the 8th century A.D., we 

find the most fought-over piece of real estate in the world. It lies between 

the Mediterranean Sea and the River Jordan, with its capital in Jerusalem, a 

city sacred to the three great monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, 

and Islam. Born in war and beset by adversaries ever since, Israel lies at the 

junction of the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, with links to 

the Arabian Peninsula. Invaders have come to and through this region 

throughout recorded history. And because it is at the crossroads where 

Muslims, Jews, and Christians intersect, it has been the site of numerous 

religious wars as well. 

Today, while peace occasionally punctuates the long-simmering 

dispute between the Jewish state of Israel, its Arab neighbors, and its 

internally displaced Palestinian population, the multiple parties holding 

claims to the territory of the Israeli state remain locked in a bitter longterm conflict. Israel considers its very existence threatened. As such, it 

remains in a status of constant threat, with the peaceful periods between 

conflicts known as “dormant war.” In many ways Israel is a garrison 

state, a nation at arms, a situation reflected in its robust military forces, its 

emphasis on homeland defense, and its willingness to give up some civil 

liberties for the sake of security. 

Official Israeli briefings often use three overlapping circles of threat 

to demonstrate their levels of concern and preparedness, as shown in 
12 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Figure 3. The first and largest circle encompasses most of the Middle 

East, including the eastern Mediterranean, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. 

The countries within this arc represent traditional state threats to the 

existence of Israel, using multiple means to deliver conventional and 

WMD warheads. 

Figure 3. Three Circles of Threat15

The second circle surrounds Israel’s immediate neighbors: Egypt, 

Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. These are the proximate state threats to the 

sovereignty and survival of Israel, states with which Israel has fought 

numerous conventional wars over the past 60 years, and despite a recent 

quiet period, the states against which it must be ready to defend on a daily 

basis. 

The third and smallest circle includes only Israel and the occupied 

territories—Gaza and the West Bank. This represents the terrorist threat 

from within the country and its territories gained in the 1967 war. The 

threat here is Palestinian-inspired terrorism, as well as attacks from any 

source inside the country, potentially including disgruntled elements of 

Israeli society. This smallest circle reminds the reader that Israel cannot 

5

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV' 2000

Planning Branch

Main Tiers of Threats Main Tiers of Threats
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 13 

simply focus on foreign threats, nor solely on its Arab neighbors – it has 

an equally important concern on a daily basis with internal security. 

Common Threats 

Terrorism and the Global War on Terror 

Both the United States and Israel face the global threat of violent nonstate terrorism from multiple sources. This has been a predominant 

feature of Israeli security concerns since its recognition as a country in 

1948, and it came to the forefront for the United States as a result of the 

attacks on September 11, 2001. Many of the adversarial organizations 

with which the two states are concerned come from the Middle East 

region, including the most powerful and deadly of those groups, Al Qaeda. 

The United States and Israel have both felt it necessary to increase their 

security awareness and preparedness as a result of 9/11 and the imminent 

threat posed by such groups. In addition, some nation-states actively 

sponsor or condone terrorism; these include Israel’s neighbors Syria, 

Lebanon, and until recently, Iraq, as well as regional threats such as Iran, 

Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Home-grown terrorism, whether from 

Palestinian Arabs, Arab Israelis, or right wing orthodox Jewish 

conservatives, remains a concern to Israel that is without parallel in the 

United States. 

The Al Qaeda terrorists are relentless and patient, as evidenced by 

their persistent targeting of the World Trade Center towers over the years. 

They are also opportunistic and flexible, learning from experience and 

willing to modify their tactics and targets to exploit perceived 

vulnerabilities while avoiding observed strengths. As we increase security 

around more predictable targets, they, in turn, shift focus to less protected 

assets. Basically as we strengthen our countermeasures for any one 

terrorist tactic or target, they shift their tactic and targets to avoid detection 

and capture. Likewise, we must understand their intent if we are to 

effectively counter their efforts.16

Terrorists’ pursuit of their long-term strategic objectives includes 

attacks on critical infrastructures and key assets to achieve three general 

types of effects: 
14 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

• Direct infrastructure effects: Cascading disruption or arrest of the 

functions of critical infrastructures or key assets through direct 

attacks on a critical node, system, or function. 

• Indirect infrastructure effects: Cascading disruption and financial 

consequences for government, society, and economy through 

public- and private-sector reactions to an attack. 

• Exploitation of infrastructure: Exploitation of elements of a 

particular infrastructure to disrupt or destroy another target.17

State Aggression 

While less of a threat than it was during the Cold War, the United 

States also faces the potential of attacks by a sovereign power. For the 

United States, the greatest concern today is the set of “rogue” states 

including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. That grouping used to include 

Iraq and Libya as well, but neither of those states poses a direct threat any 

longer as a result of recent changes to their internal situations. In addition, 

the United States must remain cognizant of the existential threat posed by 

nuclear powers Russia and China, both of which have nuclear–tipped 

ICBMs that can reach North America. 

Israel faces a more specific threat from some of its regional neighbors, 

although much of that threat has been mitigated in the past two decades by 

peace treaties with former enemies Egypt and Jordan, and general 

improvement with respect to the situation in Lebanon. As a result, the 

borders established between Israel and its neighbors during conflicts in 

1948, 1967, and 1973, as modified in some cases by peace agreements, are 

now fairly stable and accepted by nearly all parties. The likelihood of state 

aggression against Israel appears to be less than it has been at any other time 

in its history. The exceptions to this generalization come in the form of the 

medium-range missile threat posed by Iran (as well as its emerging nuclear 

weapons program) and potentially from Saudi Arabia, and the shorter range 

threat from Syria due to the unresolved Golan Heights dispute – although 

the conventional military threat from Syria today is extremely low. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 15 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Both countries face the possibility that the next attack against their 

homeland may involve some form of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). 

This could include nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or 

radiological dispersal devices. The United States is most concerned with a 

weapon being smuggled into the country through its porous borders or 

through an unsearched trade vehicle, such as a shipping container. Of the 

weapons of concern, for various reasons the United States is most 

concerned with, and potentially least prepared to deal with, an attack from 

a virulent and contagious biological pathogen. 

Israel is equally concerned with such weapons, but the delivery means 

of nuclear weapons are more likely to be medium range ballistic missiles 

(MRBM) or aircraft. Israel has much better border controls and security 

than does the United States. It also has neighbors that are within range of 

tactical missiles, artillery, and aircraft, any of which could deliver a WMD 

package, without warning, to the populated sections of Northern and 

Central Israel. Iraq had an extensive research and development program 

in all types of WMD; Iran is actively pursuing nuclear power and, 

presumably, a nuclear weapons capability; and Syria has long been 

suspected of possessing chemical weapons and perhaps biological 

weapons as well. 

Trans-Border Issues 

Both states face a number of trans-border issues that spill over from 

neighboring states, or are simply a fact of modern life that each must deal 

with. The first of these “threats” is unchecked illegal immigration. The 

United States is particularly concerned with this threat along its southern 

border with Mexico, a 2,000 mile no-man’s land that is virtually 

uncontrolled. Across this border each year travel tens of thousand of illegal 

immigrants, potentially including international terrorists bent on more than 

simply finding a job and sending money home. The border is also porous 

for transshipment of illegal drugs and counterfeit or unregistered goods. 

Israel is less concerned with this immigration issue. They have 

worried more about these problems for a longer period of time and have 

developed a stronger national consensus, which allows them to build 
16 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

physical barriers, provide stronger customs and immigration policies, and 

generally insulate their territory from outside influence. 

One reason for the difference in perception is the economic benefit 

that the United States receives from such a porous border in the form of 

inexpensive guest labor. Taking this argument a step further, one could 

argue that immigration has been vital to the development and growth of 

both states. Both continue to benefit from the influx of new citizens 

seeking economic prosperity and increased freedoms found only in 

capitalist democracies like Israel and the United States. America, for 

example, is currently benefiting from the large-scale movement of Latinos 

and Asians into the United States. Similarly, Israel’s population has 

ballooned in the past decade with the arrival of a wave of Russian Jews 

escaping the Former Soviet Union (this group now makes up 1 of every 6 

Israelis). Neither country would be as strong, as large, or as economically 

powerful as it is without the help of such new residents. The influx of 

Russian immigrants has been particularly valuable to Israel since 2000, 

when it determined that the threat from the flow of inexpensive Palestinian 

labor across the border had become too great to allow it to continue. 

Figure 4. Israeli Arab Mosque near Nazareth (Larsen) 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 17

A final threat is cyber attack. The potentially immense impact on a 

society and its economy from an electronic cyber attack has only recently 

become understood. For example, cyber attack would be impossible to 

prevent using traditional military means such as deterrence or defense, yet 

it could potentially bring down a nation’s entire economic, transportation, 

or communication infrastructure. 

Country Unique Threats 

United States 

The United States is primarily concerned with a small number of socalled “rogue” states: North Korea, Iran, and Syria. In particular, North 

Korea and Iran pose the greatest immediate threats to the United States 

with their nuclear weapons programs, their constant saber-rattling, and 

their avowed anti-American foreign policies. In addition to nuclear 

weapons, both states have developed medium-range ballistic missiles, and 

are on their way to having the capability of reaching North America and 

Europe with intercontinental range missiles. 

Another state of concern to the United States is China. China is the 

state with the largest population in the world, is the globe’s fifth nuclear 

power, and poses a perpetual threat to a United States ally, Taiwan. While 

the United States would prefer to see China continue its momentum toward 

becoming a capitalist state, and eventually a democracy, it cannot ignore its 

security obligations to Taiwan or fail to consider the consequences of a 

more militaristic and adventurous China arising in the future. 

The greatest concern to the United States in terms of weapons 

delivery vehicles remains the ICBM. Only half a dozen states have ICBM 

capabilities today, including Russia and China, but others, such as North 

Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan are seen as moving toward that capability 

in the future, as well. In addition, many states possess or are seeking 

cruise missiles, which can be launched against their targets from shorter 

ranges from ships or aircraft. 

A final threat of major concern to the United States, one which is not 

normally considered a purely military threat, is illegal drugs finding their 

way into American society. Most of these come across the southern border, 

but others undoubtedly are smuggled into the country in shipping 
18 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

containers, tourists’ luggage, and traditional smuggling drops on the 

seacoasts and northern border—which is even less guarded than the border 

with Mexico. The negative economic and societal impact of illegal drug 

use in the United States has an incalculable impact on the country’s 

productivity. 

Israel 

Tel Aviv also faces a number of discrete threats that are not found in 

the security literature of the United States. This is not to imply that the 

United States does not care about these issues. America’s long-standing 

commitments to Israel, including the guarantee of Israel’s survival as a 

nation, ensure that Israel’s problems are, if only indirectly, also American 

problems. Nonetheless, there are certain country specific issues that we 

can ascribe to Israel. Home Front Command lists four primary threats to 

Israeli territory: ballistic missile attack, mass disaster strikes, air attacks, 

and terrorist actions. 

The foremost immediate threat to Israel is that posed by terrorist 

attacks, primarily from the nearby Palestinian population. The ongoing 

conflict with the Palestinians has caused immeasurable suffering to the 

Jewish population, who moved into the Holy Land over the past 100 years. 

While the two groups had problems living together prior to World War II, 

once Palestine was partitioned by the United Nations in 1947 the differences 

and hatred grew considerably. 

There are several million displaced Palestinians living in the occupied 

territories of Israel or in refugee camps in neighboring states. How best to 

deal with this Palestinian-Israeli problem—permanent removal from the 

Jewish state of Israel, granting some level of autonomy within their 

territories (the two state solution), or living together as two nations in one 

state—is a matter that no one has yet devised. As a result, the Israeli people 

have faced daily attacks from Palestinian terrorists for decades. Only 

recently has the pace subsided, perhaps due to physical barriers and a more 

aggressive military campaign to find and capture or kill the leaders of the 

Palestinian cause. However, the occasional suicide bombing or rocket 

attack proves that the issue has not been permanently resolved. 

In addition to the Palestinian cause, Israel faces additional threats 

from within its own society. Extreme right wing or orthodox groups 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 19 

oppose any compromise with the Palestine Authority. These groups 

believe that God gave the Holy Land to the Jews, that their mission is 

continual expansion of their territory and their security buffer, and that it 

would be morally wrong to give any territory back or agree to other 

concessions with Arabs. Such hard-liners were responsible for the 

assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and 

opposed the withdrawal of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank 

in 2005. 

Figure 5. Burned Disco on Tel Aviv’s Ocean Front (Larsen) 

Today, Iran poses the greatest near-term state threat to Israel. 

Throughout 2005 and early 2006, the Iranian president ratcheted up the 

level of anti-Israeli rhetoric. Meanwhile, Iran appears to be inching closer 

to its own nuclear weapons capability despite its Non-Proliferation Treaty 

pledges. In response, Israeli statements have made it clear that it will not 

allow Iran to achieve nuclear status. It proved its willingness to undertake 

military action against an enemy state nearing nuclear weapons capability 

in its June 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. Israel might 

be tempted to interrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons program in the same 

way if the international community can not convince Iran’s leadership to 

stop the program. 
20 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Another potential military threat to Israel comes in the form of 

medium-range ballistic missiles in the inventories of several neighbors, 

including Egypt, Syria, and Iran. While not seen as an immediate concern, 

such formidable capabilities would present a serious threat if a future 

conflict were to arise between Israel and the Arab world. 

Underlying much of this regional virulent anti-Israeli view is radical 

Islam. Similar in its views in many ways to the Zionist right wing Israeli 

groups, this branch of Islam is responsible for much of the anti-Jewish and 

anti-American rhetoric and terrorist attacks in the Middle East. There is 

not much either side can do to counter this extremist position, other than 

long-term efforts to improve relations with the Islamic states that harbor 

these groups. 

Responses 

United States 

United States efforts to respond to and defend against threats to its 

security are enumerated in national security documents, such as the 

National Security Strategy (2002 and 2006), Quadrennial Defense Review 

(2001 and 2006), Nuclear Posture Review (2002), National Strategy to 

Combat WMD (2002), National Military Strategy (2004), National 

Defense Strategy (2005), and related publicly released documents. The 

latest National Security Strategy emphasizes the threats from terrorism, 

weapons of mass destruction, and unfair economic practices. The 

document highlights the need for alliances, cooperation with other states 

and international organizations, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, 

nonproliferation, consequence management, better intelligence and 

intelligence sharing, and pushing the spread of free market economies. 

The National Security Strategy (2002) specifically addresses 

America’s firm commitment to Israel, while calling for greater efforts to 

find peaceful solutions to the Palestinian situation and other problems in 

the Middle East. It makes clear, however, that the foremost responsibility 

of government in the wake of 9/11 is to “disrupt and destroy terrorist 

organizations of global reach,” especially those pursuing WMD.18

As part of its transformation to the new world of global terrorism, the 

United States has undertaken the greatest reorganization of its government 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 21 

bureaucracy since the end of World War II. This included the creation of 

two new organizations dedicated to homeland security and homeland 

defense: the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security and a new 

military unified command, U.S. Northern Command. 

The United States has also put into place a modest national missile 

defense system to provide some protection to the continent against ICBM 

threats from Northeast Asia. The layered defensive system being 

implemented is a scaled-down descendent of ballistic missile defense 

research and development that began in the late 1950s, was rejuvenated by 

President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative begun in 1983, and 

modified but continued by each president since. The present system 

includes both sea- and land-based mid-course and terminal defensive 

missiles. The United States has developed some of these systems 

cooperatively with Israel. 

Israel 

Perhaps the strongest defensive system in Israel’s favor is the sense of 

a unique “security culture” within its citizenry. As one writer has put it, 

“there is no other democratic country in which the problem of security 

occupies as central a place in and of itself as is the case of Israel. 

Moreover, both in the national consciousness and in the considerations of 

the government, security occupies a central qualitative position that makes 

it unique in comparison with other democratic countries.”19

The assumption is that the threat to Israel’s existence is very real. 

The issue is not one of borders, nor of sovereignty, but of the physical 

existence of Jews in Palestine. This view was frequently highlighted in 

speeches by neighboring Arab heads of state in years past, and most 

recently by the Iranian president. 

In response to this threat, which has led to several large scale wars 

and constant smaller-scale attacks on the state of Israel in its 58-year 

history, nearly the entire population has participated in military service, 

including extended time in the reserve forces. Many citizens keep 

automatic weapons close at hand in their homes. A pervasive air of a 

highly militarized and security conscious society is obvious to visitors. As 

a result, despite the existence of a security elite at the decision-making 
22 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

levels, the borders between the military and civilian sectors of society are 

quite permeable. 

Security has first place in the view of most Israelis, ahead of 

democratic considerations and civil liberties. This consensus has eroded a 

bit in recent years due to questionable military moves by the Israeli 

Defense Forces (IDF) into Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, and the 

influx of new citizens that have not shared the same war-time experiences 

of the first generation of Israeli leaders. Nonetheless, the security 

community still carries a disproportionate weight in determining national 

security policy.20 Still, Israel has not developed into a Spartan military 

state. It is more like the Athenian model, which “despite its involvement 

in wars, perhaps no less than that of Sparta, maintained a democratic 

society and fostered a civilian way of life in times of calm.”21

Figure 6. Couple carrying automatic weapon while shopping in Jerusalem (Larsen) 

In a parallel reorganization to that in the United States after 9/11, the 

IDF recognized a shortfall in its ability to respond to ballistic missile 

attack after the 1991 Gulf War. In response, it created IDF Home Front 

Command to provide early warning, public education, and improved 

responses to attacks and better consequence management following an 

attack. HFC is responsible for ensuring the construction of mandatory 

secure zones in every home and public building in Israel, as well as for the 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 23 

distribution of chemical weapon defensive kits to each citizen (containing 

a gas mask and atropine injector). Given Israel’s geographic location and 

its past experience, passive defenses are necessary to protect citizens from 

the actual threats. 

Active defenses have also received increased emphasis. Theater 

missile defenses include a layered approach employing land-based 

weapons, including the American-made Patriot PAC III and the jointly 

developed Arrow anti-missile missile. 

Conclusion 

The United States and Israel face multiple threats to their borders, 

their societies, and their ways of life. Some of these are common threats 

that both countries share; others are specific to their homelands. The two 

states have a commitment to the protection of liberal democratic 

capitalism, and have worked together on several joint projects to defend 

against the threats they face. Some of those responses to these threats are 

highlighted in the next two sections. 

Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 25 

III. Responding to the Threat: 

 Comparative Organizational Structures 

The global events of the past two decades have reshaped the security 

strategies of many nations. The United States and Israel have developed 

noteworthy homeland security programs, responsive to each country’s 

perceived and actual threats. Israel underwent significant organizational 

changes in response to the SCUD missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf 

War. The United States progressively began to reshape its national 

homeland security strategy toward response to terror attacks after the 

bombings at the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), U.S. 

Embassies in East Africa (1998), and the USS Cole (2000). The United 

States adopted more sweeping policy changes after the devastating 

September 11, 2001, attacks on the nation. 

This section briefly reviews the major U.S. and Israeli organizations 

designed to protect their respective homelands from attack, and to recover 

should an incident occur. In the United States, the primary agencies 

addressed are the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern 

Command. In Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces and Home Front 

Command serve parallel roles to protect their homeland. 

United States 

Department of Homeland Security 

In response to terrorist attacks on the United States homeland, 

President George W. Bush and the U.S. Government took many bold 

actions, including the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security 

and publication of focused strategic guidance in the National Security 

Strategy. President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security 

within the Executive Office of the President by executive order on 

October 8, 2001. This office published the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security in July 2002 to mobilize and organize the nation and 

secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks.22

The National Security Strategy release was delayed by the terrorist 

attack of September 11, 2001. This event was the greatest impetus 
26 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

causing two major variations from previous security strategies. The major 

differences included a heavy focus on terrorism and the use of weapons of 

mass destruction in acts of terrorism. In the 2000 National Security 

Strategy there was already an emphasis on WMD; however, after 9/11 the 

emphasis was much greater.23 The strategic guidance in the 2002 National 

Security Strategy led to the development of the Homeland Security Act 

which, in turn, directed the creation of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). 

With its mission, “preserving our freedoms, protecting America...we 

secure our homeland,” the Department of Homeland Security was 

established to unify the extensive national network of organizations and 

institutions involved in efforts to secure the nation.24 It brought together 22 

entities with critical security missions, with a primary task of protecting the 

homeland against terrorist threats.25 DHS consists of eight directorates: 

Management, Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness 

and Response, Science and Technology, Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services. 

After the events of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 and general 

experience since the establishment of DHS, many have proposed a DHS 

re-organization to a more “flat” organizational structure which would 

allow for more efficient and effective accomplishment of the 

Department’s ability to prepare, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks or 

other emergencies.26 This realignment of DHS organization is also 

proposed in the Department’s “Six-Point Agenda,” published in July 2005. 

The agenda was a result of the second stage review of the DHS in order to 

recommend ways that they could better manage threat, vulnerability, and 

consequence risks; prioritize policies and operational missions; and 

increase security at multiple levels. The agenda will guide the department 

in the near term and result in changes that will:27

1. Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events; 

2. Create better transportation security systems to move people and 

cargo more securely and efficiently; 

3. Strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform 

immigration processes; 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 27

4. Enhance information sharing with partners; 

5. Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, 

procurement, and information technology; and 

6. Realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance. 

DHS has accomplished significant steps in fortifying its response and 

recovery should a terrorist attack or major accident or natural disaster 

occur. On September 30, 2003, DHS rolled out its Initial National 

Response Plan (NRP) as directed by the President in Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). The Initial National Response Plan 

identified DHS as the lead federal agency responsible for coordination and 

development of a unified incident response plan. The Initial National 

Response Plan was a significant first step towards integrating federal 

domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a 

single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.28 On January 6, 2005, Secretary 

Ridge announced the final National Response Plan. The NRP established 

a unified and standardized approach for protecting citizens and managing 

homeland security incidents. Its goal was as follows: 

All federal departments and agencies that may be required 

to assist or support during a national incident will use this 

Plan, whether from threats or acts of terrorism, major 

natural disasters, or man-made emergencies. The National 

Response Plan standardizes federal incident response 

actions by integrating existing and formerly disparate 

processes. The Plan uses the National Incident 

Management System to establish standardized training, 

organization, and communications procedures for multijurisdictional interaction and clearly identifies authority and 

leadership responsibilities. The Plan also provides a 

comprehensive framework for private and non-profit 

institutions to plan and integrate their own preparedness 

and response activities, nationally and within their own 

communities.29

The NRP established multi-agency coordinating structures to 

accomplish emergency response execution. The keystone national-level 

organization which coordinates this execution, providing situational 
28 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

awareness, is the Homeland Security Operations Center. On July 8, 2004, 

the Department of Homeland Security stood up the state-of-the-art 

Homeland Security Operations Center to serve as the primary, nationallevel nerve center for real-time threat monitoring, domestic incident 

management, and vertical and horizontal information sharing efforts.30 

The Homeland Security Operations Center dramatically increased the 

vertical coordination between federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and 

private sector partners. The Center continuously collects and integrates 

information from a variety of intelligence sources to help detect and 

prevent terrorist acts. 

The information gathered by the Homeland Security Operations 

Center is communicated to all levels of government, the private sector, 

and the American public through the Homeland Security Advisory 

System, which was established in March 2002. The Homeland Security 

Advisory System provides threat conditions and protective measures that 

can be taken by DHS partners to reduce United States vulnerability to 

attack. Through the use of this coordinated national advisory system, 

DHS provides warning and situational awareness to the American public, 

giving them the opportunity to personally take steps to further safeguard 

themselves, their families, and their communities. 

National Strategy for Homeland Security 

On July 16, 2002, President Bush unveiled the U.S. National Strategy 

for Homeland Security.31 The strategy implemented the many proposed 

changes to the national system for emergency response. These changes 

ranged from developing and implementing the National Incident 

Management System to developing a common communication 

infrastructure for the over 87,000 jurisdictions throughout the United States. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security assumes that terrorists 

wish to attack the United States and that the United States must work to 

prevent such attacks and respond if an attack occurs. The three objectives 

outlined in the strategy are: 1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States, 2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 3) minimize the 

damage and recover from attacks should they occur.32 In order to 

accomplish these objectives, the strategy addresses multiple vulnerabilities 

and response and recovery assets of the nation. It states that “a national 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 29 

strategy requires a national effort,” and identifies six critical mission 

areas:33

• Intelligence and Warning 

• Border Transportation Security 

• Domestic Counterterrorism 

• Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 

• Defending Against Catastrophic Threats 

• Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Each of these mission areas includes detailed initiatives to be undertaken. 

In all, there are 43 initiatives defined for the 6 critical mission areas. 

Figure 7. Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Funding by Critical Mission Area 

(dollar amounts in millions)34
30 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Significant funding will be required to accomplish the tasks set out in 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security. According to data from the 

Office of Management and Budget, over $47 billion was proposed for 

fiscal year 2005, allocated as shown in Figure 7. While that funding level 

would provide adequate resources to address the initiatives in the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security, the United States still faces significant 

challenges in implementing the strategy in a coordinated and integrated 

manner.35 Nevertheless, integrating the initiatives detailed in the strategy 

into existing U.S. capabilities will make the nation better able to meet the 

challenge of larger and more complex incidents. 

United States General Disaster Response 

Local and State. In a disaster, the first line of defense is at the local 

and state levels. A local government responds, supplemented by 

neighboring communities and volunteer agencies, as needed. If 

overwhelmed, the local government turns to the state for assistance. The 

state responds with resources such as the National Guard and other state 

agencies. The state may also request assistance from nearby states under 

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts. This requires that losses 

and recovery needs be determined through damage assessment by local, 

state, federal, and volunteer organizations. 

For incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 

high-yield explosive agents (CBRNE), the National Guard employs 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. The mission of these 

teams is to support the governor and the local incident commander in 

response to a local WMD event. The WMD-Civil Support Team may be 

employed as a reserve or reinforcing element for other WMD-Civil 

Support Teams, or as unilateral military support in a state without a 

WMD-Civil Support Team. 

The WMD-Civil Support Team has the ability to identify agents, 

assess consequences, advise on response measures, and assist with 

requests for state support. If the incident is determined to be of national 

impact, these Civil Support Teams work as part of the overall national 

response with the Joint Task Force for Civil Support or another Joint Task 

Force commander, both U.S. Northern Command assets. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 31 

The National Guard provides a third level of security for the 

American people, after first responders and the WMD-CST teams. These 

are the 12 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) teams 

that have been stationed in each FEMA region since August 2004. They 

provide rapid, effective additional capabilities in a WMD situation when 

requested by a governor.36

National. If it is determined that state resources are insufficient to 

mitigate the disaster, the governor may request a major disaster 

declaration through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

based on the damage assessment, and an agreement to commit state funds 

and resources to the long-term recovery. FEMA evaluates the request and 

recommends action to the White House based on the disaster, the local 

community, and the state’s ability to recover.37

The Department of Defense may become involved in any disaster 

response at several levels or functions. Local base commanders are 

authorized to respond locally for a limited period of time, usually on a 

reimbursable basis, to “save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate 

great property damage.”38 The governor may also activate the National 

Guard under state control and state funding. In the event that a 

Presidential Disaster Declaration is made, and state and federal resources 

are overwhelmed, longer-term DoD assistance may be requested. 

The procedure for requesting DoD assistance is detailed in Figure 8. 

The Principle Federal Official (PFO),39 usually FEMA, initiates a Mission 

Assignment. If a Joint Field Office has been established, a Defense 

Coordinating Officer will evaluate the Mission Assignment and determine 

whether the resources requested are available elsewhere. If the Defense 

Coordinating Officer determines the additional resource request is 

warranted, he sends the Mission Assignment to the DoD Executive 

Secretary and later to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense for validation. If validated, the Joint Director of Military Support 

processes the order and a copy is sent to NORTHCOM for mission 

analysis. The Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense approve the order and the Joint Director of Military 

Support issues the order. The Services may then be tasked directly for 

resources, and Joint Forces Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the 

National Guard Bureau, or other unified commands may be tasked to 

support the desired requirements. Once federal DoD assets arrive in the 
32 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

area of operations, NORTHCOM assumes operational control of these 

forces. 

Figure 8. Defense Coordinating Officer Deployment Process 

U.S. Northern Command 

The National Security Strategy stated the need for the military to 

provide a broad portfolio of military capabilities which include the ability 

to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure United 

States access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and 

assets in outer space. One of the key results of this demand for 

transformation was the creation of Northern Command for the purpose of 

homeland defense. 

NORTHCOM is a unified combatant command responsible for 

establishing liaison with other federal agencies to provide disaster 

response capabilities during emergencies. NORTHCOM was established 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 33 

on October 1, 2002, to ensure the military defense of the United States. 

NORTHCOM announced full operational capability on September 11, 

2003. Its purpose is to ensure national security against domestic threats 

and assists in the response to natural and man-made disasters. 

NORTHCOM is responsible for the defense of the continental United 

States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Gulf of Mexico, 

and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans within 500 miles of North America. 

NORTHCOM is also responsible for defending over 5,000 miles of 

coastline and 6,000 miles of land borders between Canada, Mexico and 

the United States. Canada and Mexico are also included in 

NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility because their close cooperation and 

coordination is critical to the defense of North America.40

Figure 9. USNORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs (Larsen) 

The NORTHCOM mission focus is two-fold: to conduct operations to 

deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United 

States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of 

responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to 

provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence 

management operations. 

NORTHCOM’s mission is homeland defense, not homeland security. 

Homeland defense is defined as the protection of United States territory, 

sovereignty, domestic population and critical infrastructure against 
34 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

military attacks. Homeland defense, however, is only one piece of the 

national homeland security effort. Homeland security is defined as a 

national effort that includes individuals and organizations working 

together to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the 

vulnerability to terrorism, and, if terrorist attacks should occur, to 

minimize damage and recover from them.41 One of NORTHCOM’s 

primary missions is to provide military assistance to civil authorities 

involved in disaster response and recovery operations, control of civil 

disturbances, and law enforcement activities. 

NORTHCOM is the principal operational command responsible for 

planning and executing Defense Support to Civil Authorities within the 

continental United States. NORTHCOM fulfills this mission by 

establishing liaison and planning for support with many different 

government agencies and departments. NORTHCOM may be asked to 

support the response to natural disasters, CBRNE events, National 

Security Special Events, and other contingencies within its area of 

operation. NORTHCOM has coordinated and provided military support to 

California wildfires, the space shuttle disaster, hurricanes in the Southeast, 

and national security events such as political conventions, the G-8 summit, 

the Reagan funeral, and presidential elections. 

Military forces must be requested by local, state, or federal agencies 

and approved by the President or Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM 

provides assistance after it is tasked by DoD, and the military forces are 

subject to the limits of the Posse Comitatus Act.42 Normally, military 

support to civil authorities is provided only after the resources available to 

local, state, and federal agencies have been exhausted or are inadequate or 

unavailable.43 Once activated by the President or the Secretary of 

Defense, NORTHCOM would most likely be in a supporting44 role to 

DHS as the lead federal agency. 

As the unified commander for North America, NORTHCOM is 

normally the supported command during a national crisis, including 

terrorist emergencies. NORTHCOM possesses few organic resources. 

During an emergency, the military services, Joint Forces Command, and 

others will provide resources to NORTHCOM as approved by the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Joint Task Force Civil Support is a standing joint task force 

comprised of active, reserve, and National Guard members from each of 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 35 

the military departments, including the Coast Guard. The stated purpose 

of Joint Task Force-Civil Support is “to save lives, prevent injury and 

provide temporary critical life support during a chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive situation in the United States 

or its territories and possessions.” Joint Task Force-Civil Support is the 

only military organization dedicated solely to planning and integrating 

forces for consequence management support to civil authorities. This 

support would most likely be to FEMA, the federal agency under DHS in 

charge of managing the consequences of a WMD incident. The 

deployment of Joint Task Force-Civil Support would occur only after a 

governor requests federal assistance from the President, and the President 

issues a Presidential Disaster Declaration. In any domestic setting, Joint 

Task Force-Civil Support remains in support of the lead federal agency 

throughout the consequence management operation. 

Israel Defense Forces 

The military is one of the most respected institutions in Israeli society 

and has long been a unifying agent for the many groups comprising 

Israel’s diverse population.45 The mission of the Israel Defense Forces 

(IDF) is “To defend the existence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of 

the state of Israel. To protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all 

forms of terrorism which threaten the daily life.”46 In order to accomplish 

the IDF mission, Israel has defined some basic points of IDF doctrine:47

• Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. 

• Conduct strategic level defense with no territorial ambitions. 

• Avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture. 

• Prevent escalation. 

• Determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively. 

• Combat terrorism. 

• Maintain a very low casualty ratio. 

Nearly the entire nation serves in the IDF, which is made up of career 

servicemen, a regular army of conscripts, and a large reserve force.48 Since 
36 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Israel is a small country compared with its Arab neighbors, it relies heavily 

on a reserve force, and most of the population is called up in time of war. 

There is compulsory military service for both men and women at age 18, 

which lasts 3 years for men and 21 months for women.49 Israel’s first prime 

minister, David Ben-Gurion, saw the IDF “not only as the means to defend 

the country, but also as a framework for integrating Israeli society.”50

Over the years, Israel has provided aid to countries requiring 

assistance. The IDF has been at the center of humanitarian operations in 

Macedonia, India, Rwanda, and Kosovo, and has made an important 

contribution towards saving lives in foreign countries, such as Mexico, 

Armenia, Romania, Georgia, Kenya, Turkey, and Bosnia. After Hurricane 

Katrina devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005, Israel sent 80 tons of 

supplies to the United States. In addition, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz 

ordered the IDF to assemble a team of expert personnel, including search 

and rescue teams, medical staff, psychologists, and experts in identifying 

bodies.51 Despite their outward looking capabilities, the IDF’s single 

defense goal is to ensure the existence of Israel and the security of its 

citizens. Therefore, it is a natural fit for Israel’s Home Front Command to 

fall under the IDF. 

Israel Home Front Command 

Seventy-four Israelis died and an additional 228 were wounded when 

39 Iraqi El-Hussein SCUD missiles were launched against Israeli cities 

during the 1991 Gulf War.52 While most of those casualties were the 

result of indirect causes, such as heart attacks or suffocation from 

improper use of gas masks, missiles destroyed 28 buildings and 

structurally damaged some 4,100. Home Front Command was established 

in February 1992 as a subordinate organization of the IDF to respond to 

issues that emerged during the 1991 Gulf War and the constant terrorist 

attacks upon Israel. HFC replaced the Civil Guard, formed after the 1973 

war, which was ineffective at coping with the 1991 attacks on Israel.53 

The vision of the HFC is to be the “National leader of civil protection for 

lives saving, worthy of population trust, and a knowledge center in 

different subjects in Israel and abroad.”54

There were three main reasons providing the impetus for the creation of 

HFC. First, leadership wanted to free the three regional commands 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 37

(Northern, Central and Southern) to deal primarily with the front line. 

Second, they needed to improve cooperation between emergency services, 

local authorities, and government ministries (police, emergency medical 

service and fire). Finally, they hoped to unite responsibility with authority.55

The goals of the Home Front Command are to: 

• Define the civilian defense concept; 

• Steer, direct, and prepare the civilian population for a state of 

emergency; 

• Direct and guide all civilian systems, auxiliary organizations, the 

Israeli police, and the military systems; 

• Prepare the home front for a state of emergency, according to the 

Civil Defense Law; 

• Serve as the primary professional authority in the IDF for civil 

defense; and 

• Serve as a territorial command in its area.56

Figure 10. First Responders after 1991 SCUD Attack on Tel Aviv57
38 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

One challenge for Israeli leadership in building an effective HFC was 

to develop comprehensive doctrine to cover conventional threats, WMD 

and terrorist threats, and natural disasters. A second challenge was to 

implement this doctrine by training the military, civil organizations, and 

the civilian population. The HFC doctrines developed to date include 

guidance on how to handle bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, earthquakes, 

conventional events, and unconventional events.58

There exists within Israel a sub-culture that disagrees with the value 

of Home Front Command. This group finds fault with military control of 

civil defense matters, or its bureaucratic difficulties, or even the rationale 

for its existence. Some feel that the military could do this job without a 

separate command; others think that civil defense should be a civilian 

responsibility. There was a debate underway prior to the Gulf War about 

these issues, but the SCUDs landing on Israeli territory made a military 

command the easy choice. Those who disapprove of the HFC structure 

are clear in their advice to the United States to not use HFC as a model for 

America’s organizational efforts to protect the homeland. 

On the other hand, supporters of Home Front Command raise several 

points in response. First, the fact that the IDF created an entire command to 

tackle this job, rather than making it an additional duty for a combat 

command, shows the value and importance that the Israeli government 

places on the mission of civil defense. Second, having these responsibilities 

under a military command brings a number of benefits, such as round-theclock availability and a large pool of assets on which it can call if necessary. 

Finally, the argument goes, HFC represents a unique blend of military and 

civilian forces that works; why consider changing it?59 

HFC Responsibilities. Home Front Command, headquartered in the 

Ramla area, is ultimately responsible for protecting the civilian 

population.60 HFC has authority over the majority of Israel’s rear area 

civil, police, and medical services during national emergencies.61 More 

specifically, the responsibilities of the Home Front Command are to: 

• Command and coordinate all forces involved in the incident, in 

order to optimize the national response; 

• Develop a combined doctrine for all the forces involved in the 

incident; 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 39 

• Carry out combined training at all levels of command; 

• Inform and instruct the civilian population in personal and 

collective protection issues; 

• Plan and deploy warning systems; and 

• Be in continuous readiness to help police forces during terrorist 

incidents.62

Figure 11. Home Front Command Headquarters, Ramla (Larsen) 

HFC Organization. Home Front Command is divided into six 

national districts: North, South, Central, Dan, Haifa, and Jerusalem.63 

Mapping of districts was based on the distribution of people in the 

country, with major urban areas such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv (Dan), and 

Haifa given their own district. Each district has an active duty staff 

commanded by an officer with the rank of colonel.64 These six districts 

are further divided into 27 sub-districts and then into battalions. There are 

six types of battalions within the Home Front Command: Rescue, National 

Rescue, Salvage, Nuclear/Biological/Chemical, Light Infantry, and 

Military Police.65 All battalions are composed of reserve forces.66 In 

addition, there are five other types of units available to help protect the 
40 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Israeli home front: observation companies, medical units, fire brigade 

units (combined military and civilian), warning and alarm systems, and 

information, instruction, and civilian care departments.67

The organizational effectiveness of Home Front Command reflects a 

commonly heard truism in Israel: that it is a much smaller country than the 

United States, small enough that everyone in the same business knows 

everyone else, and can call the right person directly when necessary due to 

less bureaucratic rigidity in its government. Given the number of attacks 

since the second Intifada began in 2000, Israeli organizations are now 

working in concert, cutting through the bureaucracy, and communicating. 

The fact that first responders, HFC personnel, command and control nets, 

the media, psychologists, and the government are all talking brings 

bonuses in all areas, not just homeland defense.68 They are living with 

immediate threats, so homeland security is a real day to day concern. 

HFC Protection of the Israel Civilian Population. In January 2003 

Home Front Command published a comprehensive 52-page brochure titled 

“In the Event of a Genuine Alert, Information on Civil Defense for the 

Family.” (See Figure 12.) The foreword, signed by Major-General Yosef 

Mishlev, commanding general of the HFC, states, “This brochure is 

intended to help you and your family prepare for a state of emergency and 

make it easier to deal with possible events.”69 The brochure, distributed to 

every home in Israel, describes both conventional and unconventional 

threats.70 It outlines precise instructions for action during an attack, 

including procedures to be taken during an attack, how to cope with a state 

of emergency, a review of the civilian protection package, preparation of 

the standard protected space, installation of ventilation and filter systems, 

use of the protective kit, procedures for accessing the health system, 

general first aid instructions, and information on select emergency 

organizations.71

In addition, a national public awareness campaign is ongoing using a 

variety of media sources. Complete emergency guides are placed in readily 

available telephone books.72 Trained HFC soldiers visit schools to instruct 

children how to protect themselves, and teachers attend seminars to learn 

how best to prepare their students for attacks.73 The goal for these and 

other educational programs is to reduce anxiety so people can continue 

their daily routines without experiencing constant fear of an attack. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 41 

Figure 12. Home Front Command Civil Defense Brochure 

The civilian population is also supplied with a government funded 

civilian protection program. The civilian protection program consists of 

warnings and sirens, a medical response kit, a protective kit, protected 

spaces, and public information with guidelines on how to cope with a state 

of emergency. Israel uses a rising and falling alert siren as a signal for 

citizens to take protective action, and this is also broadcast on the 

television with specific instructions.74 The medical response kit includes 

antibiotics, and atropine to be used in the event of a chemical nerve gas 

attack.75 Citizens are instructed when to use this medication through the 

media. The protective kit contains a personal gas mask and filter. 

Children up to age 3 receive a “babysitter” kit which covers the upper 

torso of a child, children ages 3 to 8 receive a protective hood, and 

individuals age 8 and up receive youth or adult-size gas masks that are 
42 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

personally fitted to the size of the person’s face.76 Distribution of 

protective kits is carried out by the HFC at centers throughout the country 

during times of need.77

General Disaster Response. During times of high threat, the HFC 

operates a “silent” radio channel.78 The radio remains silent, allowing 

people to sleep, until an attack occurs. In the event of an attack, a 

declaration of a state of emergency is issued. This initiates a national 

warning system that consists of sirens, radio, and television broadcasts. 

Upon declaration of a state of emergency, individuals are directed to 

go to a protected space with their personal protection kits. If an attack 

occurs, the police are responsible for the initial management of an event. 

Command shifts to the HFC by request of the police or during wartime.79 

In the event of a missile attack, specialized HFC teams are deployed to 

examine and identify the contents of the warhead. If the warhead is 

identified as unconventional with chemical or biologic agents, the HFC 

manages the rapid evacuation of the population from the contaminated 

area.80 The goal is to save lives, and success is dependent on coordination, 

training, and responsiveness of key personnel. 

Four phases or responses are coordinated by the HFC. An 

“immediate response” within 30 minutes of a missile attack includes 

police control of the area, identification of any chemical agents, first aid 

and medical treatment for the injured, and evacuation of casualties to the 

closest hospital.81 This is followed by an “initial response” after 30 

minutes has passed which includes providing further guidance to the 

population, arrival of additional rescue forces, continued medical 

treatment of the injured, and organization of the site for rescue tasks.82 

The next stage is entitled “completing response” and involves finishing 

rescue tasks, expanding medical treatment, clearing blocked roads, 

providing additional population guidance, securing the area, and 

identifying the deceased.83 The final stage, “restoration,” entails storing 

assets, demolishing dangerous buildings, clearing wreckage, and fixing 

damaged buildings and infrastructure.84 Command and control is critical 

throughout this process to orchestrate a timely response. 

A key piece of the HFC’s response to an attack involves medical 

capability. Israel has an expansive medical system with an infrastructure 

which allows hospitals to readily accommodate injured people following 

an attack. The primary medical facilities throughout the country include 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 43 

general hospitals, geriatric hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, health fund 

clinics, and public health offices.85 The key players in the process are the 

Magen David Adom (emergency medical service) workers who are 

responsible for transporting victims to facilities that will provide definitive 

care. 

The emergency medical system is set up around 11 regional dispatch 

centers with a national dispatch center in Tel Aviv.86 Clear direction has 

been provided to workers so that the first ambulance that arrives at the 

scene immediately takes a command position.87 Staff from this ambulance 

report to the HFC on the scope of the incident with approximate casualty 

numbers so that adequate resources can be directed to the site. Victims are 

triaged, and immediate attention is given to those who are unable to sit or 

stand. A “scoop and run” approach is implemented by Magen David 

Adom personnel for these victims.88

Patients are quickly transferred to the closest medical facility for lifesaving procedures and additional triage as appropriate. Israeli police play 

a key role in providing crowd control and restricting access to newly 

created one-way roads for ambulances that are transporting patients to 

medical facilities. Israeli medical personnel take great pride in being able 

to move people quickly and efficiently to an appropriate care setting. 

Twenty minutes is an unofficial goal for completely clearing a terrorist 

site of all victims.89

Conclusion 

The global events of the past two decades have shaped the security 

strategies found in U.S. and Israel homeland security programs. Israel 

undertook significant organizational changes in response to SCUD missile 

attacks during the 1991 Gulf War. The United States did not begin to 

seriously reshape its national homeland security strategy until the 

devastating September 11, 2001, attacks. 

The major organizations designed to protect the homeland from attack 

and to aid recovery after an incident occurs in the United States include 

the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command. In 

Israel, the Israeli Defense Forces and Home Front Command serve 

complementary roles in protecting their homeland. To safeguard any 

civilian population from present and future threats, the most effective 
44 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

homeland security programs of both states must be studied, adopted, and 

modified in light of enduring and evolving world threats.
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 45 

IV. Preventing Terrorist Attacks 

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism defined 

terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 

against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 

agents.” Terrorism is carried out by those who “strive to subvert rule of 

law and effect change through violence and fear.” The United States, 

according to this document, “will not allow itself to be held hostage by 

terrorists. Combating terrorism and securing the homeland from future 

attacks are our top priorities.”90 Further, on September 17, 2002, 

President George W. Bush released the National Security Strategy. The 

National Security Strategy clearly stated for the first time that the United 

States would use preemption as a strategic response to the threat of 

terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Similarly, 

the Israeli government has made it clear, through its statements and 

actions, that it will not abide terrorists or their attempts to influence Israeli 

policies through violence.91

Preventing terrorist attack requires a proactive approach anchored on 

the pillars of domestic counterterrorism, intelligence and warning, and 

border and transportation security. This approach must strive to eliminate 

terrorist surprise with actionable intelligence and predictive warning. It 

must also endeavor to stop terrorists and their means of destruction from 

entering the country with layered defenses that extend beyond one’s 

homeland. Terrorism prevention demands a robust domestic 

counterterrorism mechanism that honors the delicate balance between 

freedom and security while protecting the population. Security of the 

homeland is any nation’s number one priority. 

U.S. Efforts 

America’s concern over terrorism grew as a result of the 1993 

terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and Alfred P. 

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the 1995 sarin nerve gas 

attack in Tokyo, and the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998. 

At the time the United States lacked a clear, comprehensive, and truly 
46 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

integrated national domestic preparedness strategy and was incapable of 

responding effectively to a serious terrorist attack. 

In 1998 the federal government established the first of three 

commissions to study the problem of WMD and terrorism. The Gilmore 

Commission, an independent advisory panel created to study, analyze, and 

report to the President and Congress, recommended courses of action to 

address United States inabilities to plan for and respond effectively to 

terrorist attacks.92 The 2000 National Commission on Terrorism, also 

known as the Bremer Commission, approached the issue of terrorism with 

an evaluation of America’s laws, policies, and practices for preventing and 

punishing terrorism directed at American citizens. The Commission 

concluded that although American strategies and policies were basically 

on the right track, significant aspects of implementation were seriously 

deficient.93

The third pre-9/11 commission was the U.S. Commission on National 

Security in the 21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman 

Commission. It was chartered to review U.S. national security 

requirements for the next century. The commission described the future 

security environment the nation should anticipate, delineated a strategy to 

address that future, and focused on necessary changes to the national 

security apparatus, structures, and processes, with an aim toward 

redesigning them to succeed in the future security environment.94 The 

committee’s conclusion was that the primary national security challenge 

the United States would face in the next 20 years would be an attack by an 

adversary on the American homeland which could produce thousands of 

casualties.95 That prediction came true only seven months later. 

National Strategy for Homeland Security 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, published in 2002, 

emphasized six critical mission areas. Domestic counterterrorism was one 

of the three critical mission areas that focused on preventing terrorist 

attacks. As a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the missions of 

all federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities were redefined. In 

addition to their normal investigation and prosecution of criminal 

activities they now put priority on preventing and interdicting terrorist 

activities within the United States.96 The strategy focuses on the 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 47

application of all law enforcement offices to confront the direct threat of 

terrorism. To effectively reorient law enforcement organizations to focus 

on counterterrorism, the strategy called upon those organizations to 

improve intergovernmental law enforcement coordination; facilitate 

apprehension of potential terrorists; restructure the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation to emphasize prevention of terrorist attack; identify and 

freeze sources of terrorist financing; and track foreign terrorists and bring 

them to justice.97

Laws have always been the key means of safeguarding and ensuring 

America’s liberties. It is within this context that the government is 

evaluating and, where necessary, rewriting laws that will provide the 

mechanism to act while defining the appropriate limits of those actions. 

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act was 

the major post-9/11 effort to adjust U.S. laws to better deal with domestic 

terrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act provisions: 

• Gave federal law enforcement and intelligence officers greater 

authority to gather and share evidence, particularly with respect to 

wire and electronic communications; 

• Amended federal money laundering laws, particularly those 

involving overseas financial activities; 

• Created new federal crimes, increased the penalties for existing 

federal crimes, and adjusted existing federal criminal procedure, 

particularly with respect to acts of terrorism; 

• Modified immigration law, increasing the ability of federal 

authorities to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the United 

States, to detain foreign terrorist suspects, and to deport foreign 

terrorists; and 

• Authorized appropriations to enhance the capacity of immigration, 

law enforcement, and intelligence agencies to more effectively 

respond to the threats of terrorism.98
48 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security 

From the strategic guidance laid down in the National Security 

Strategy, President Bush encouraged Congress to establish and pass the 

Homeland Security Act (HSA). On November 23, 2002, the President 

signed into law the HSA, which directed the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security. Its mission includes: 

• Preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; 

• Reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 

• Minimizing the damage, and assisting in the recovery from 

terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States; 

• Carrying out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, 

including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade 

crises and emergency planning; 

• Ensuring that the overall economic security of the United States is 

not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at 

securing the homeland; and 

• Monitoring connections between illegal drug trafficking and 

terrorism, coordinating efforts to sever such connections, and 

otherwise contributing to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking. 

Once Congress passed the Homeland Security Act the President 

encouraged lead Federal agencies to join the fight against terrorism. In 

February 2003 he placed special emphasis on domestic counterterrorism 

efforts in his Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. HSPD5 focused on the management of domestic incidents; its key purpose was 

to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents 

by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management 

system and a National Response Plan. 

DHS Homeland Security Operations Center. In 2004 the 

Department of Homeland Security introduced a new state-of-the-art 

Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) to serve as the primary 

national-level nerve center for real-time threat monitoring, domestic 

incident management, and vertical and horizontal information sharing 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 49 

efforts. HSOC provides situational awareness and monitoring of the 

homeland. Working in conjunction with the DHS Office of Information 

Analysis, the HSOC coordinates incidents and response activities, issues 

advisories and bulletins to homeland security partners, and provides 

protective and counter measure guidance. 

The HSOC dramatically increased the vertical coordination between 

federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners. It 

collects and fuses information from a variety of sources to help deter, 

detect, and prevent terrorist acts. Information on domestic incident 

management is shared with Emergency Operations Centers at all levels 

through the Homeland Security Information Network. 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate. The Directorate of 

Science and Technology within DHS focuses on the two core 

competencies of research and technology. It leads the procurement and 

standardization of CBRNE countermeasures, focusing on catastrophic 

terrorism—threats that could result in large-scale loss of life or major 

economic impact.99

Two examples of initiatives spearheaded by the DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate are the BioWatch program and Project Bio Shield. 

DHS established the BioWatch program to protect many large U.S. cities 

by monitoring the air for biological agents that could be released by 

terrorists. Additionally, DHS has teamed up with the Department of 

Health and Human Services with funding for Project BioShield, through 

which America is able to develop and acquire more advanced vaccines 

and treatments for biological agents. 

U.S. Northern Command 

U.S. Northern Command was deemed necessary because of the 

physical size of the United States and the openness of its borders to nonU.S citizens. These apparent vulnerabilities made it necessary to give top 

priority to the homeland defense missions and put it under a single 

command. 

Terrorism targeted against the United States is fundamentally a 

homeland security matter that is usually addressed by law enforcement 

agencies. NORTHCOM’s roles in support of homeland security are 
50 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

limited to defense against military threats emanating from outside the 

United States, and civil support. DHS and NORTHCOM have a 

cooperative relationship focused on preventing and defending against 

terrorist attacks on the United States. 

Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team 

Forming the core of the federal military response to domestic WMD 

terrorism is the Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT). 

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenci Act in 1996 set the stage for this team by 

proposing a standing DoD response force for chemical and biological 

terrorism comparable to the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency 

Search Team (NEST) for nuclear emergencies. The C/B-RRT provides a 

graduated response ranging from pre-positioning prior to high-profile 

events, to assisting civil authorities with hazardous materials, to 

responding to a WMD terrorism incident. C/B-RRT’s membership is 

drawn from multiple military organizations, each of which has its own 

specialty. This allows the C/B-RRT commander to tailor the deployed 

team to the needs of the situation and the requirements of the joint force 

commander. This structure enables a rapid start to the consequence 

management efforts that will then receive necessary follow-on support 

from other agencies. 

Nuclear Emergency Search Team 

NEST teams were created in 1975 by President Gerald Ford. This 

group of more than 1,100 men and women from a wide range of 

backgrounds work for the Department of Energy. Most work at the 

nation’s weapons plants, but when alerted to a NEST call-up, they can be 

delivered, fully equipped, to any place in the country within four hours. 

The heart of the NEST operation is the security force. Highly trained, 

they are well armed and equipped with a collection of radiation detectors. 

If necessary, the security teams can fight their way into a terrorist 

stronghold and secure a nuclear device. NEST members carry belt-clip 

detectors and multiple sensors in vehicles, and they try to do their work 

unobtrusively.100
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 51 

Intelligence and Warning 

Terrorism depends on surprise and the opportunity to strike at a time 

and place of a terrorist’s choosing. Today’s terrorist is armed with a broad 

arsenal of weapons ranging from conventional means to weapons of mass 

destruction. In the future, one can anticipate that they will also employ 

cyber attack and new and unexpected tactics. Preventing terrorist attack 

requires proactive, predictive, and preventive intelligence and warning. 

Such an approach depends on an essential commodity: information. To 

date, the greatest challenge to attack prevention is a lack of information 

sharing between and within the major federal intelligence agencies. 

To address this shortcoming, elements of the Department of 

Homeland Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the Director of 

Central Intelligence’s Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of 

Defense formed the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to fuse and 

analyze all-source information related to terrorism. The goal of the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center is to make the analysis of foreign and 

domestic intelligence on terrorism seamless, and to ensure that all 

members of the federal government’s Intelligence Community have access 

to the same information. 

Another multi-agency facility, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), 

was established to consolidate terrorist watchlists and numerous terrorist 

screening mechanisms into a single, comprehensive anti-terror watch list. 

The goal is to provide “one-stop shopping” so that every federal antiterrorist screener is working off the same page. The FBI will administer 

the TSC. The center includes CIA, FBI, and Department of Defense, 

State, and Homeland Security personnel along with other agencies.101 It 

maintains a top-secret database of known and suspected international 

terrorists—information that is available to 2,600 users who can search 3.5 

million documents and over 100,000 names. 

Currently, the White House, Congress, and two independent 

commissions are contemplating wholesale reform of the nation’s 

Intelligence Community. Motivation for reform stems not only from 9/11, 

but also from the perceived inaccuracies surrounding Iraq’s weapons 

programs prior to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.102 Furthermore, the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Act 

both call for interagency cooperation and information sharing.103 
52 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

However, attempts at reform have proven counterproductive in the past 

and involve inevitable political controversy and turf battles. 

One proposed reform involves streamlining the entire Intelligence 

Community under a single national intelligence director with overall 

budgetary and operational authority over the entire structure. Proponents 

argue that such a change would make collection and dissemination of data 

more efficient and hence augment information sharing. Opponents say 

that such a measure would harm the military and undermine the director’s 

overall effectiveness.104 The ultimate objective is proactive, predictive, 

preventive, and actionable intelligence for all homeland security agencies 

to use as needed to secure the homeland.105

Border and Transportation Security 

The United States is a nation built on immigration with a free and 

open society. Given the ease of global travel, securing the nation’s air, 

land, and sea borders from terrorists is a difficult but critical task. Couple 

the offensive launched by Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Al 

Qaeda against the United States with 7,514 miles of border with Canada 

and Mexico and 95,000 miles of coastline, border security is crucial. 

Without tight security, sleeper cells can penetrate the border and disappear 

into the shadows of a 3.4 million square mile exclusive economic zone 

and hide among nearly 300 million Americans. Once in place, they enjoy 

civil liberty protection as they prepare to attack the American way of 

life.106 

In light of America’s dependence on global trade and travel, the 

United States cannot isolate itself and close its borders. The efficient flow 

of lawful traffic and commerce is essential to a healthy economy, while 

prevention of terrorist entry is paramount. This is the Department of 

Homeland Security’s first priority. To accomplish this mission, the DHS 

Border and Transportation Directorate is creating a “border of the future,” 

a concept that leverages international partnerships, integrated intelligence, 

technology, and a coordinated national effort to provide greater security 

while ensuring the efficient flow of people, goods, and conveyances.107 

This includes managing the 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars 

that enter the United States annually, along with 7,500 foreign flagships 

that make 51,000 calls to more than 300 American ports.108 A series of 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 53 

initiatives is meant to create a layered defense and effectively extend 

America’s borders outward. The end result will be a border that is nearly 

transparent, yet protects against terrorists, their instruments of destruction, 

and other international threats such as illegal drugs, illegal migrants, and 

organized crime.109

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The CBP unifies 

numerous border related agencies that existed under various departments 

of the federal government before the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Its 

priority is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the 

United States, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA was created 

shortly after 9/11 and has statutory responsibility for protecting the 

nation’s maritime and surface transportation systems from terrorist and 

other intentional disruptions. Historically, approximately one-third of 

terrorist attacks worldwide have targeted transportation systems. TSA 

uses intelligence, regulation, enforcement, inspection, screening, and 

education of carriers, passengers, and shippers to balance public 

convenience and security.110

U.S. Coast Guard. Operating in concert with the DHS border and 

transportation security agencies is the U.S. Coast Guard, the federal 

government’s principal maritime law-enforcement agency. The Coast 

Guard became part of DHS with the passage of the Homeland Security 

Act. It fulfills several vital homeland security functions by securing the 

nation’s shoreline and inland waterways while ensuring the reliable 

operation of the nation’s ports. Specific Coast Guard homeland security 

missions includes: protecting ports, commerce, and marine transportation 

from terrorism; providing maritime border security against illegal drugs, 

aliens, firearms, and WMD; protecting against illegal fishing and 

destruction of marine resources, preventing and responding to accidental 

and intentional oil and hazardous material spills; and coordinating its 

efforts and intelligence with federal, state, and local agencies.111 The 

Coast Guard relies on information sharing from federal, state, local, and 

private agencies to maintain maritime domain awareness—the continuous 

understanding of commercial shipping on a global basis so high interest 

vessels can be identified and tracked before entering the country.112
54 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

National Targeting Center. The National Targeting Center is a 

Customs and Border Patrol establishment that came into existence in 

October 2001 and provides a centralized coordination center for all 

antiterrorism operations. It fuses intelligence, information sources, 

targeting systems, and analytical expertise to develop actionable 

passenger, conveyance, and cargo targets for examination by CBP 

inspectors nationwide. It shares information with multiple agencies 

including the Transportation Security Administration’s Terrorism 

Screening Center, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Food and Drug 

Administration, the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence services. 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Efforts 

to emphasize partnerships between government agencies and foreign and 

private sectors include the C-TPAT and the Free and Secure Trade 

program, a cooperative program between the United States, Canada, and 

Mexico. It is designed to enhance security and bolster trade at commercial 

ports along the Canadian and Mexican borders. 

Container Security Initiative (CSI). Another mutually beneficial 

measure that counters terrorism and greatly reduces the potential for 

catastrophic loss is the Container Security Initiative. CSI was launched in 

January 2002 to increase security against terrorist manipulation of 

containerized cargo. The Container Security Initiative allows inspection 

of shipping containers at foreign ports by Customs and Border Control 

officials before they are loaded and shipped to American ports. This is a 

critical undertaking since containerized shipping accounts for 

approximately 90 percent of the world’s cargo. Annually, almost seven 

million cargo containers are offloaded at U.S. seaports.113

Seaport security at home provides additional layers of defense against 

organized crime and terrorist threats. Currently, the top 30 U.S. seaports 

handle 99 percent of the imported goods that arrive into the United States and 

have security funding priority.114 Concerns over this issue were sharpened in 

early 2006 when the U.S. Government suggested turning over seaport 

operations at six of the largest U.S. East Coast ports to a company based in 

the United Arab Emirates, leading to a major public debate over security. 

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 provided landmark 

legislation designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 55 

terrorism. The U.S. Coast Guard enforces key provisions of this act which 

require high risk sectors of the maritime industry to complete security 

assessments, develop security plans, and implement security procedures 

that collectively provide a layered strategy to protect America’s ports and 

waterways.115

Critical Infrastructure Protection

The United States began a more systematic review of ways to protect 

its critical infrastructure as a result of the events of 9/11. Many of these 

concepts can be found in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

The strategy describes critical infrastructure as the “fabric that holds 

together our society and modern way of life.” The United States has a 

modern society with a progressive way of life dependent on networks of 

infrastructure—both physical networks such as energy and transportation 

systems and virtual networks such as the Internet. An attack on one or 

more pieces of that infrastructure may disrupt the entire system and cause 

significant damage to the nation.116 Certain aspects of America’s 

infrastructure make it vulnerable to attacks that could have a catastrophic 

and lasting impact. 

America’s critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of 

components, including systems and functions vital to national security, 

governance, public health and safety, economy, and national morale.117 

Figure 13 lists the categories of systems and functions specifically 

identified by the strategy. 

Critical Infrastructure Sectors118

Agriculture Government 

Food Energy 

Water Transportation 

Public Health Banking and Finance 

Emergency Services Chemical Industry 

Defense Industrial Base Postal and Shipping 

Information and Telecommunications 

Figure 13. Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
56 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Key Assets. Key assets are individual structures which, if targeted, 

may not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or 

profoundly damage the nation’s morale or confidence. Key assets include 

symbolic or historical attractions, such as prominent monuments and 

icons. In some cases, these include quasi-public symbols that are 

identified strongly with the United States, and fall completely under the 

jurisdiction of state and local officials or even private foundations.119 In 

addition, the United States will also be concerned with protecting its large 

urban centers and key leaders from attack. 

The Bush administration has identified eight major initiatives on 

which federal, state, and local governments and the private sector are to 

focus in an effort to deny terrorists the opportunity to attack the United 

States’ critical infrastructure. These include building and maintaining a 

complete and accurate assessment of America’s critical infrastructure and 

key assets; enabling effective partnerships with state and local 

governments and the private sector; developing a national infrastructure 

protection plan; securing cyberspace; harnessing the best analytic and 

modeling tools to develop effective protective solutions; guarding 

America’s critical infrastructure and key assets against “inside” threats; 

and partnering with the international community to protect the 

transnational infrastructure. 

The vast critical infrastructure of the United States presents a daunting 

task requiring prioritization and resources if it is to succeed. DHS is 

charged with leading this task and ensuring unity of command and effort. 

See Figure 14 for other key participants in the business of infrastructure 

protection. 

The White House also developed a national strategy specifically 

focused on protecting critical infrastructures. The National Strategy for 

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (NSPPCI 

& KA) is designed to provide clear goals and objectives and an outline of 

all national efforts to protect critical infrastructure. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 57

Figure 14. Critical Infrastructure Protection Lead Federal Agencies 

The NSPPCI serves as a critical bridge between the National Strategy 

for Homeland Security and a national protection plan to be developed by 

the Department of Homeland Security. The strategic objectives that 

underpin the national infrastructure and key asset protection effort include: 

• Identifying and assuring the protection of those infrastructure and 

assets deemed most critical; 

Federal Government Organization to 

Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets

President

Secretary of Homeland Security

Federal, state, local, and private sector coordination and integration

Comprehensive national infrastructure protection plan

Mapping threats to vulnerabilities and issuing warnings

Sector

Agriculture

Food: 

Meat and poultry 

All other food products

Water

Public Health

Emergency Services

Government: 

Continuity of government 

Continuity of operations

Defense Industrial Base

Information and Telecommunications

Energy

Transportation

Banking and Finance

Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials

Postal and Shipping

National Monuments and Icons

Lead Agency

Department of Agriculture

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Health & Human Services

Environmental Protection Agency

Department of Health & Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security 

All departments and agencies

Department of Defense

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Energy

Department of Homeland Security*

Department of the Treasury

Environmental Protection Agency

Department of Homeland Security

Department of the Interior

* Under the President’s proposal, the Transportation Security Administration, responsible for 

securing our Nation’s transportation systems, will become part of the Department of Homeland 

Security. The new Department will coordinate closely with the Department of Transportation, 

which will remain responsible for transportation safety.
58 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

• Providing timely warning and assuring the protection of those 

infrastructures and assets that face a specific, imminent threat; and 

• Assuring the protection of other infrastructures and assets that may 

become targets over time by pursuing specific initiatives and 

enabling a collaborative environment between the public and 

private sector.120

As important as the NSPPCI is to the protection of critical 

infrastructure and key assets, the most important point it makes is that this 

effort involves the entire nation working together. Because of the 

enormity in scale and scope of U.S. critical infrastructure and key assets 

and the ubiquitous nature of the terrorist threat, it will take the federal, 

state, local, and the private sector working together closely for these 

efforts to be successful. 

Private Sector Responsibilities. The lion’s share of most critical 

infrastructures and key assets are owned and operated by the private 

sector. Normally, private sector firms establish their own risk 

management planning and safety and security measures necessary to 

function as a profitable business while maintaining customer confidence. 

In the present threat environment, the private sector retains the 

responsibility as the first line of defense for its own facilities. However, 

due to the nature of the threat—particularly the potential use of weapons 

of mass destruction—the private sector will need the support of federal, 

state, and local governments in their security effort. 

Key Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Since September 11, 2001, local, state, and federal agencies have 

made exceptional progress in defending against catastrophic terrorist 

threats through the enactment of laws, development of sensors and 

detection equipment, and initiation of many disaster- and threat-related 

programs. The National Strategy for Homeland Security called for 

expanded capabilities and improved coordination among federal agencies. 

Progress over the past five years reflects notable expansion and 

improvement. As first responders field and employ novel technologies 

currently under development, the U.S. homeland defensive posture will 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 59 

improve. It is important to note, however, that the United States may 

never fully be able to prevent a terrorist attack on its homeland. 

Intelligence Integration. The 9/11 Commission was chartered to 

assess vulnerabilities and failures to predict and prevent the terrorist 

attacks on the United States in September 2001. It made a number of 

recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of 

Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director who 

would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest 

across the U.S. Government, manage the national intelligence program, 

oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing, and 

budgetary authority over the Intelligence Community’s 15 agencies. The 

Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive 

Office of the President and that a deputy NID be established to oversee the 

day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. This position 

was created in February 2005. 

Better Nuclear Sensors and Procedures. The primary areas of 

concern regarding the detection of nuclear materials is finding these 

materials at shipping ports and in major cities. Multiple companies are 

developing sensors and equipment to support these requirements. In 

addition, many first responders in the Department of Energy, Department 

of Defense, and Environmental Protection Agency are obtaining and using 

new detectors for all types of radiological hazards.121

There are a number of potential whole cargo container detection 

devices and solutions to prevent radiological/nuclear material from 

entering the U.S. through shipping ports. A second method to prevent 

shipment of nuclear/radiological material in cargo containers is the use of 

the “smart box” program. The shipping companies install electronic 

tamper sensors and use reinforced metal seals on cargo containers to avoid 

extensive customs inspections at U.S. ports.122 However, no 

comprehensive national strategy exists to control nuclear or radiological 

material transport through air and seaports. 

All DHS Customs and Border Protection inspectors are armed with 

radiation pagers to alert them of the presence of radioactive material. 

Authorities hope to be able to detect or stop terrorists attempting to 

transport nuclear or radiological material into major cities through a 
60 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

network of detection devices. Currently, sensors have been deployed in 

New York and Washington.123

The best method of protection against terrorist attack by nuclear 

weapons is to control the materials at their source. In 1995, remote 

sensors and video cameras were installed in enriched uranium storage 

vaults in Russia and Idaho as part of a pilot program. Activity in the 

vaults is transmitted to DOE for review.124 In the U.S. Air Force, the 

Dispersed Integrated Security System (DISS), in development since the 

early 1990s, allows for relocatable sensors with wireless signals. The 

DISS kits create a layered detection zone and a secure area. The DISS 

systems can also be deployed to provide security for nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems.125

Harness Scientific Knowledge and Tools to Counter Terrorism. The 

National Strategy for Homeland Security has called for a DHS National 

Biological Weapons Analysis Center. The center would research 

infectious disease prevention and treatment, forensic epidemiology, and 

microbial forensics and conduct risk assessments to determine the highest 

priority threat agents. DHS initiated a Regional Technology Integration 

Initiative (RTI)126 and the CDC/ATSDR published a “National Public 

Health Strategy for Terrorism Preparedness and Response 2003-2008.”127

The DHS’ RTI initiative serves as a principal mechanism to align the 

Science and Technology’s assessments and expertise with the needs of the 

first responders. The initiative facilitates transition of innovative 

technologies and organizational concepts to regional, state, and local 

jurisdictions. The initiative gives the science and technology researchers a 

realistic environment to test their tools and concepts. 

In 2004 President Bush approved the creation of a common 

surveillance system to collect and analyze information about bioterrorist 

threats. The plan calls for the DHS to conduct a national risk assessment 

every two years on new biological threats.128

Israeli Efforts 

The people of Israel have endured multiple threats to their homeland 

since their declaration of statehood in 1948. In addition to fighting five 

major wars, terrorist attacks from Israel’s enemies have been a persistent 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 61 

challenge. SCUD attacks during the 1991 Gulf War “moved the combat 

line from the country’s border to its home front” and exposed weaknesses 

in the civil defense system.129 The Israeli Defense Forces decided that the 

entire system needed to be revamped to protect the civilian population 

from future conventional and non-conventional attacks, and this led to the 

creation of the Home Front Command in February 1992.130 The various 

intelligence and homeland security agencies within Israel—Home Front 

Command, Mossad, Shin Bet, local police, border police (MAGAV), and 

military intelligence—seem to work well together. While there remains 

some compartmentalization of information, the problem is not as 

pervasive as it is in the United States interagency community. And when 

it comes to terrorism, according to Israeli participants in the process, there 

are no secrets between agencies. In cases involving terrorist attacks on 

Israel, the interagency process works smoothly as an integrated, cohesive 

team that shares information and seeks practical, immediate solutions.131

Overall, actions in preparation for an attack or to limit the likelihood 

of a terrorist event have become a way of life in the Israeli culture and are 

not looked upon as a major inconvenience, as is often the case in the 

United States. This provides reassurance to citizens who realize that an 

attack may occur at any moment due to an ever-present threat. 

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 

Israel uses active and passive forms of response to protect itself. 

Active responses, provided by the Air Force, include a theater missile 

defense system which includes the Arrow and Patriot anti-missile missiles. 

Theater missile defense is a layered system primarily designed to protect 

Tel Aviv, with Patriot providing close-in terminal defense, and the joint 

U.S.-Israeli Arrow II providing middle tier protection. The IDF hopes to 

get American Aegis cruisers to provide upper tier defenses, although given 

Israeli’s budgetary situation this appears quite unlikely in the near term.132 

Passive response, provided by the Home Front Command, includes a siren 

system, search and rescue forces, protective kits, medical response teams, 

and protected spaces.133 Home Front Command is responsible for the 

overall readiness of Israel’s home front during a state of emergency and is 

prepared to deal with threats. 
62 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

The targeted killing of terrorist leaders is an area of great success 

from the Israeli point of view. It has been an effective counterterrorism 

tactic that may also deter future acts of violence. The Israeli Air Force has 

led a joint campaign in recent years to find, fix, and attack terrorist leaders 

in the occupied territories. As a result, some 25% of the Hamas leadership 

has been killed. This success reflects a very aggressive counterterrorism 

program that has relied on local knowledge of the area, extensive 

intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities, and less 

restrained rules of engagement than most Western countries apply to the 

use of military forces, all underlain by a ruthless determination to stamp 

out terrorism.134

Israeli Homeland Security Initiatives 

The Israeli government has developed a highly-trained and multilayered response infrastructure to protect its citizens from the daily 

terrorist threat. The military and other security and intelligence forces 

provide the outer layer of protection through offensive operations against 

terrorist activities. Defensive measures are deployed at the inner layer of 

response in an effort to disrupt and thwart attempts by terrorist groups to 

carry out operations against Israeli targets.135 Disaster rescue teams, 

including special security elements, police crowd control and forensic 

units, bomb dispersal experts, body handlers, and paramedics, who usually 

arrive only minutes after an attack, are responsible for responding to 

terrorist attacks. Security is created by a series of early warning systems 

that alerts the public, provides information and protective kits, establishes 

procedures for creating “protected spaces,” and deploys search and rescue 

teams and medical response teams to safeguard the population under 

attack. 

Borders and Transportation Security. Because of the relatively good 

control Israel has over its borders, plus strong military defenses against 

conventional attack, the public faces more mundane concerns over daily 

attacks on restaurants, clubs, and buses. This has led to a focus on tactical 

measures for better warning and quicker response to potential attacks. 

Internal security forces regularly set up road blocks and check driver 

and passenger ID cards. The fact that Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 63 

have different colored license plates gives the security forces advance 

notice about who is in the vehicle. Internal security is seen everywhere in 

Israel: from the private guard waving an electronic wand over guests 

entering a restaurant or shop, to the joint foot patrols in the Old City of 

Jerusalem by police and army troops, to the nine separate checkpoints a 

passenger has to go through between the entrance to Ben Gurion Airport 

until he or she is on the airplane, to the wall going up around Jerusalem, to 

traffic stops on the road to the Mount of Olives—not to mention along the 

roads coming from the West Bank. 

Figure 15. Israeli checkpoint along Highway 90 to the Dead Sea (Larsen) 

Israel feels little restriction on its willingness to apply “profiling” in 

its attempt to ferret out terrorists. Given its past experience, Israel is 

willing to discriminate against certain groups.136 Restrictions, particularly 

at the borders and upon entry to public transportation nodes, are noticeably 

geared toward certain races, ethnicities, and age groups. Israel does not 

have the constitutional constraints on its action, nor the history of civil 

liberty that the United States is built upon. From colored license plates to 

color-coded identification cards, racial profiling is a part of daily life in 

Israel as people try to identify the potential threats among them. 
64 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

A new and advanced security system aimed at stopping suicide 

bombers from boarding public buses was released by Israel’s 

Transportation Ministry and the Israel Military Industries in January 2004. 

The new system gives the bus driver control over the front door barrier 

which contains electronic explosive detectors, and allows him to prevent 

anyone suspicious from boarding the bus by hitting a red button that will 

automatically close the turnstile. A device on the bus sounds an 

immediate warning if explosives are detected. In addition, the front of 

buses will be armor-plated below the windshield to lessen the impact of 

shrapnel from a bomb that is detonated outside the bus. Five buses were 

outfitted with the new technology in the pilot study. Israel plans to 

eventually market the technology worldwide.137

Walls along roads that face nearby Palestinian settlements are 

common, as are electronic fences and sensors around Israeli settlements in 

the West Bank. Certain neighborhoods housing Israeli families have been 

back-fitted with bulletproof glass in windows that face Palestinian 

neighborhoods. 

On a much larger scale, Israel has begun building a security barrier 

around much of its border with the West Bank and Gaza. The concept of 

physical separation of the two major groups in Palestine has been in 

existence for some time, but a physical barrier of this magnitude is a new 

step. The Sharon government carefully defined the security fence as a 

temporary barrier rather than a marking of Israel’s international border. 

But the Ehud Ohlmert government has publicly stated its determination to 

unilaterally establish final borders, making the security fence likely to 

become that border.138

Israel decided to proceed with building a security barrier in April 

2002 following a spate of suicide bombings during the second Intifada. 

Originally designed to block three primary infiltration routes, it was later 

expanded to protect isolated Jewish communities in the West Bank as well 

as Jerusalem. When complete, the barrier will be approximately 500 

kilometers long. Its construction has sparked considerable controversy on 

both sides of the fence, Jewish and Palestinian.139 The United Nations has 

condemned the barrier and demanded that it be torn down, and the 

European Union has expressed its opposition, as well. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 65 

Figure 16. Security fence in Jerusalem viewed from the Old City (Larsen) 

In response to these criticisms, Israel responds with statistics that 

prove that the wall has been effective in keeping suicide bombers out of 

Israel. In addition to providing a barrier, it also channels terrorists to 

certain areas that allow the Israel military to respond appropriately.140 On 

the other hand, while incidents of suicide bombings have decreased 

dramatically since the wall was built, the number of indirect attacks (such 

as by mortars and rockets) has risen, and Hezbollah has even flown an 

unmanned aerial vehicle from Lebanon into Israeli airspace on several 

occasions. This may show that terrorist groups have simply changed 

tactics in response to the new barrier.141

Research and Development. RAFAEL, the Israeli Armament 

Development Authority, known primarily for the military systems it has 

developed, has begun to direct its focus towards homeland security over 

the past two years. RAFAEL has concentrated its efforts on several of the 

topics President Bush listed as focus areas for the United States’ war on 

terrorism following the 9/11 attacks. A leading research and development 

authority in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, RAFAEL is engaged in the 
66 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

fields of border defense, defense of public transport on land, sea and air, 

combating domestic crime and terrorism, protection of sensitive facilities 

such as energy installations and military bases, preparedness for a state of 

emergency, and national disasters.142

Other areas of particular tactical interest, investment, and progress 

include unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors of multiple types, tethered 

balloons, non-invasive search techniques, and enhanced measures for 

indicators and warning. These reflect a much quicker research, 

development, and testing cycle than is found in the United States, and 

faster application of lessons learned on the battlefield that become realworld responses. Again, this emphasis on speed reflects the hard realities 

and experiences Israel has faced in dealing with terrorism.143

International Cooperation 

The Washington, D.C., police department has engaged in extensive 

training with Israeli counterterrorism experts and bomb technicians. D.C. 

police leaders and FBI counterterrorism experts traveled to Israel in 

December 2002 for training in the prevention and response to suicide 

bombings. The Capitol Police force has begun training in Israeli 

counterterrorism techniques. The head of the Israeli bomb squad has 

traveled to Washington at least twice to meet with Capitol Police 

officers.144

Thirty-three North American law enforcement officials participated in 

a four-day trip to Israel in January 2003 to attend a seminar on “Law 

Enforcement in the Era of Global Terror.” Workshops included 

identifying terrorist cells, enlisting police support for the fight against 

terrorism, and coping with the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Boston 

Police Commissioner Paul E. Evans, who attended the workshops, said, 

“We went to the country that’s been dealing with the issue for the past 30 

years. The police are the front line in the battle against terrorism. We 

were there to learn from them – their response, their efforts to deter it. 

They touched all the bases.”145

A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 2, 

2004, to establish the United States-Israel Homeland Security Foundation 

to make grants to joint business ventures between United States and Israeli 

private corporate entities to develop products and services with 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 67

applications related to Homeland Security, and other purposes.146 The bill 

(House Rule 3871) was referred to the Select Committee on Homeland 

Security, and subsequently to the House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Science, Research and Development for consideration. 

Despite these low-level efforts to share tactical experiences, there is 

minimal high-level cooperation between the two countries. In particular, 

according to interviews, Israel is somewhat frustrated by the seeming lack 

of interest on the part of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to 

pursue cooperative efforts. It is uncertain why the United States would 

block these attempts.147 Nor is there any direct relationship with the U.S. 

Border and Customs Patrol or with FEMA since 9/11. HFC has better 

relations with DoD, in particular the Office of Homeland Defense within 

OSD, and U.S. Northern Command.148 But apparently DHS has not yet 

taken advantage of the opportunity to learn from Israeli experiences. Even 

cooperative efforts through such programs as military-to-military relations 

go through the ups and downs of a close political relationship between the 

two countries. Concerns over illegal technology transfer from Israel to 

China in 2005, for example, led to strained relations for several months. 

The relationship is also personality dependent. 

On the other hand, U.S. intelligence cooperation with Israel is closer 

than with any other state except the Anglo countries (Britain, Canada, and 

Australia). There are multiple black world information exchanges and, 

presumably, cooperative tactical programs underway that are not publicly 

known. The Defense Intelligence Agency says that its largest account in 

terms of exchange conferences is with Israel, primarily in the fields of 

counterterrorism and counterproliferation.149 The United States recognizes 

Israel’s experience and skills in the fields of counterterrorism and the 

development of intelligence sources. 

Conclusion 

The United States is decades behind Israel in coming to terms with 

terrorism, and accepting the need for enhanced security measures on a day 

to day basis. One could argue that this is not a bad thing—the fact that the 

United States has not had the experience necessary to create the frame of 

mind in its citizenry to accept such measures as are found in Israel today 

reflects both luck and a predisposition on the part of the American people 
68 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

to covet and safeguard their civil liberties. We will return to this theme in 

the final section. Nonetheless, should the United States come under 

increasing terrorist attacks, it will need to turn to Israel for help and 

suggestions on preventing and countering those attacks. 

In Israel today people are more worried about small attacks on small, 

everyday targets like restaurants. Americans, on the other hand, worry 

about their porous borders and the potential for a large-scale WMD attack 

on a major city or national symbol. This difference in concern may reflect 

a mindset driven in part by Israel’s tight border controls and fatalism 

regarding conventional military attack by its Arab neighbors. Since there 

isn’t much the average citizen can do about the latter, and since Israel’s 

borders are pretty much sealed, the biggest threat at the moment comes 

from those random bombings of shops and buses. 

Home Front Command is much like U.S. Northern Command, but it 

has more freedom of movement since Israel doesn’t have state-level 

political structures interposed between the federal level and the military 

command. As a result, HFC can act without a formal request from 

anyone, as its procedures are established in advance of an attack. It can 

also deal more directly with hospitals since Israel is a socialist country, 

with no private medical centers. This allows HFC to dictate the 

requirement for chemical and biological decontamination capabilities to 

Israeli hospitals, something NORTHCOM could never do in the United 

States. On the other hand, Israel has much to learn from the United States 

when it comes to police and fire departments, with their attached 

emergency services and hazardous materials teams, all of which are more 

powerful and better trained than is the case in Israel. 

There is little evidence that the United States is focusing much 

emphasis on the physical protection of its people or buildings—an area 

ripe for cooperation and learning from Israeli experiences, since this is 

what they’ve been dealing with day-by-day for decades. 

Finally, Israel’s success at preventing and countering terrorism is 

based on several case-specific factors that do not apply to the United 

States. Israel is a small country, the size of New Jersey, with a police 

force for the entire country the size of New York City’s police department. 

Their bureaucracy is smaller, less rigid, and less ideological than the 

United States’. They are also a more homogenous population than the 

diversity found in the United States. The combination of those factors 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 69 

means that “everyone knows everyone” in the homeland security field, 

and they work together toward a common goal more easily. They occupy 

their main enemy’s territory, and can see inside the occupied territories 

with ease. They can also use their native or regional immigrants to exploit 

human intelligence in those areas. Finally, compared to Israel, the U.S. 

populace is naïve about security, and quickly forgets the last threat to its 

freedoms. In this regard Israel is, sadly, much more experienced, much 

more practical, and more willing to sacrifice some individual liberty for 

the sake of security in the face of a known and immediate threat. 

Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 71 

V. Responding to an Attack 

Attitudes toward response after an attack or natural catastrophic event 

demonstrate one significant difference between the United States and 

Israel. In Israel there is a much greater focus on the citizenry’s 

responsibility to prepare for and respond should a terror attack or natural 

disaster occur. By contrast, very little anti-terrorism training is conducted 

in U.S. schools or in the general population. The days of individual 

Americans being thoroughly prepared for a nuclear attack are a distant 

memory... No longer is “duck and cover” taught in schools, nor are signs 

posted for bomb shelters. Although information is available in the United 

States regarding how to protect against chemical, biological, and 

radiological events, it is usually only those who are viewed as alarmists 

who put the information into practice. In Israel, on the other hand, 

virtually every person is prepared to respond to multiple types of attack. 

Education regarding response to terror attacks is provided from 

elementary grades through high school. Overall, Israel appears to be 

much better prepared to respond to an attack—and presumably to recover 

more quickly as a result. 

This section presents a broad overview of the doctrine, plans, medical 

systems, and citizen’s responsibilities in both the United States and Israel. 

The purpose is to provide background information to better understand the 

response organizations and assets of both countries and more clearly detail 

United States strengths and areas of improvement. 

Response Plans 

Both countries have developed robust incident response plans in 

reaction to attacks on their nations. The United States modified its response 

plans significantly following September 11, 2001. Israel has developed and 

practiced its response plans regularly since the 1991 missile attacks on Tel 

Aviv. The centerpiece of the U.S. response is the National Incident 

Management System. Meanwhile, the Israeli government uses a highly 

trained and multi-layered response infrastructure to protect its citizens from 

daily terrorist threats and less frequent, yet potentially highly destructive 

attacks by other countries. 
72 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

U.S. National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

The tragedy of September 11, 2001, forced the United States 

government to examine how first responders react to catastrophic events. 

Responses could be more effective and efficient with major changes to U.S. 

response planning and structure. Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary Tom Ridge announced approval of NIMS on March 1, 2004. 

NIMS, the nation’s first standardized management plan, created a unified 

structure for federal, state, and local governments to use when responding to 

incidents.150 The NIMS framework allows incident management 

organizations to respond in an all-hazard context, including acts of 

terrorism, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, 

nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, 

typhoons, and war-related disasters.151 NIMS employs common doctrine, 

terminology, concepts, principles, and processes to ensure consistent and 

seamless response execution during incidents. 

There are five key elements of NIMS. 

• Incident Command System. The Incident Command System is a 

standardized incident management organization with five 

functional areas: command, operations, planning, logistics, and 

finance/administration. The Incident Command System applies a 

standardized, scaleable organization and common terminology to 

its approach to management of a crisis situation. If followed 

correctly, it will allow units from different jurisdictions and 

organizations to become essentially “plug-and-play” building 

blocks of an effective emergency response unit.152

• Preparedness. The preparedness function of NIMS recognizes that 

responder readiness to manage and conduct incident actions is 

enhanced considerably when professionals have worked together 

before an incident occurs. NIMS defines advance preparedness 

measures such as planning, training, exercises, qualification and 

certification, equipment acquisition and certification, and 

publication management. It also incorporates public education, 

enforcement of building standards and codes, and preventive 

measures to minimize the loss of life or property. Preparedness also 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 73 

includes measures to educate the public and ensure compliance with 

local standards and codes, and to enforce acceptable practices. 

• Communications and Information Management. Because 

standardized communications are critical in the event of an incident, 

NIMS stipulates interoperable communications systems for incident 

and information management. Universally incorporated into NIMS 

is the concept of unified command which provides for and assures 

joint decisions on objectives, strategies, plans, priorities, and public 

communications. Anyone who has been at a major accident or 

hazardous materials scene where interagency coordination was 

required can attest to command and control shortcomings. Each 

jurisdiction, state, tribe, county, or city has a unique communication 

system that often is not compatible with other agencies. And, within 

a local area, often the basic first responders, such as police and 

medical personnel, do not have interoperable communication 

systems.153 RapidCom 9/30 is one solution introduced by DHS in 

July 2004 to allow first responders in ten high-threat urban areas to 

communicate with each other during a large scale emergency.154

• Joint Information System. At large multi-jurisdiction incidents 

public communication and information are always valid concerns. 

Joint Information System gives the public timely and accurate 

information and unified public messages. By utilizing Joint 

Information Centers, the federal, state, tribal, and local levels of 

government release the same information in the event of an incident. 

• NIMS Integration Center. The NIMS Integration Center provides 

strategic direction and oversight to the NIMS. It assesses 

proposals for changes to the NIMS, captures and evaluates lessons 

learned, and employs best practices. NIMS Integration Center also 

creates and oversees the implementation of national standards for 

NIMS education and training, first responder communications and 

equipment, and qualification and credentialing of incident 

management and responder personnel.155
74 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Israeli Layered Response 

Israel’s response philosophy is based on preparations in a series of 

concentric circles of increasing protection that operate daily among the 

populace, in peacetime and war. The military, security, and intelligence 

forces provide the outer layer of protection through offensive operations 

against terrorist activities. Defensive measures are deployed at the inner 

layer of response in an effort to disrupt and thwart attempts by terrorist 

groups to carry out operations against Israeli targets.156 Disaster rescue 

teams are responsible for responding to terrorist attacks. The individual 

citizen is located at the center of this concept and has very specific 

responsibilities.157 The individual citizen must establish and maintain 

protected spaces, understand how to effectively use protective kits, and 

assist as requested in an emergency response situation.

Medical Systems 

The United States and Israel each have extensive emergency medical 

systems. In a large scale emergency situation, the United States employs 

the National Disaster Medical System, while Israel utilizes the Magen 

David Adom. Both systems of medical management appear to be 

effective in conducting medical responses. Should additional 

pharmaceuticals be required, both countries have a system in place to 

address the elevated needs. 

U.S. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 

Under the National Response Plan, the lead federal agency for 

medical response is the National Disaster Medical System section within 

FEMA. It has the responsibility for managing and coordinating the federal 

medical response to major emergencies and federally declared disasters.158 

There are three distinct but inter-related components of NDMS. The first 

component is medical response to a disaster area and includes medical 

teams, medical supplies, and equipment. The second component is patient 

movement from the disaster site to unaffected areas. The final component 

is definitive medical care at participating hospitals in unaffected areas of 

the nation.159
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 75 

The National Disaster Medical System is comprised of six teams.160

• Disaster Medical Assistance Team is a group of professional 

medical personnel designed to provide medical care during a 

disaster or event. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams deploy to 

disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain 

themselves for a period of 72 hours while providing medical care 

at a fixed or temporary medical care site. 

• Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team provides victim 

identification, temporary mortuary facilities, forensic dental 

pathology, forensic anthropology methods, processing, 

preparation, and disposition of remains. Once activated, team 

members work under the direction of local authorities, providing 

technical assistance and personnel to help recover, identify, and 

process deceased victims.161

• Veterinary Medical Assistance Team provides assessment of 

medical needs, treatment, and stabilization of animals, animal 

disease surveillance, zoonotic disease surveillance and public 

health assessments, technical assistance to assure food and water 

quality, hazard mitigation, animal decontamination, biological and 

chemical terrorism surveillance. Veterinary Medical Assistance 

Teams are composed of private citizens who work under the 

guidance of local authorities.162

• Federal Coordinating Centers recruit hospitals and maintain local nonfederal hospital participation in the National Disaster Medical System, 

and coordinate exercise development and emergency plans with 

participating hospitals and other local authorities in order to develop 

patient reception, transportation, and communication plans.163

• National Pharmacy Response Teams assist in chemoprophylaxis or 

the vaccination of Americans. These teams are located in each of 

the ten DHS regions. 

• National Nurse Response Teams assist in chemoprophylaxis, mass 

vaccination programs, or scenarios that overwhelm the nation’s supply 

of nurses in responding to a weapons of mass destruction event. 

Each team is composed of approximately 200 civilian nurses.164
76 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Gas Masks. Unlike the practice in Israel, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security recommends against purchasing gas masks for family 

members, citing safety concerns due to improper use of masks and hoods as 

well as a false sense of security against chemical and biological agent 

exposure that masks may provide.165

Israeli Emergency Medical Services 

The Emergency Medical Service of Israel is called Magen David 

Adom (MDA) or the Red Shield of David. The Magen David Adom is a 

group of professional medical and volunteer personnel whose duty is to 

save lives. The system was founded in 1930 in Tel Aviv by a group of 

volunteer doctors in response to the 1929 riots; their purpose was to 

provide emergency medical services to the Hagana (the Jewish SelfDefense Force) and private citizens. In 1950, MDA was officially 

recognized by the Knesset and has provided medical services during all 

Israeli wars and during times of terrorist crisis.166

Magen David Adom employs a highly organized and structured 

approach to emergency medical services. All activities are coordinated 

from a National Dispatch Center that oversees the activities of eleven 

regional dispatch centers. The system is designed and operated in three 

tiers: dispatch, ambulance services, and first responders. Over 9,000 

emergency medical technicians, dispatchers, paramedics, blood bank 

operators, and volunteers staff the system and operate over 500 emergency 

medical service vehicles throughout the country.167

Use of the nationwide emergency call-in system also aids in quick 

and efficient response. Similar to the U.S. 911 system, all calls made to 

the 101 number are immediately connected to an emergency dispatcher in 

the National Dispatch Center. This center pages all Magen David Adom 

personnel to relay the emergency information, and notifies all hospitals 

within the emergency medical system that an incident has occurred. The 

dispatch center also directs the movement of large quantities of blood 

from Magen David Adom blood banks into the hospitals of the effected 

area.168 All this takes place while the first responders are making their 

way to the scene. 

In January 2004, Magen David Adom deployed a new Supervision 

and Control System. This system outfitted every emergency vehicle with 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 77

global positioning system trackers and computerized communication 

devices to allow two-way, real-time data transmission between dispatch 

and the crews. This system allows dispatchers to track the vehicles and 

patients in real-time to aid in response and better patient tracking. 

Additionally, the Supervision and Control System contains coordinated 

inter-region and inter-service (police, ambulance, and fire) modules that 

increase overall incident management communication and coordination.169

Personal Protective Kits. Home Front Command has protective kit 

distribution centers throughout the country capable of distributing kits to 

thousands of Israeli citizens each day.170 The protective kits contain an 

appropriately sized and age-specific gas mask with filter and an instruction 

manual.171 Home Front Command advises that the protective kits should 

not be opened until they have issued a specific broadcast telling the Israeli 

public to do so.172 HFC periodically invites the public to refresh and 

replenish the kits.173 In 2001, it cost the Israeli government $8.50 per 

person to distribute and maintain gas masks.174

The Israeli medical response kit includes a gas mask and filter as well 

as antibiotics, a syringe, and a dose of atropine to be used in the event of a 

chemical nerve gas attack. Citizens will be instructed when to use this 

medication through the media.175

Personal Firearms. Another form of personal protection is one 

which mirrors the history of America’s “wild west.” Israel is a state in 

which many, if not most, citizens own weapons, both personal and 

military, and many people carry them on the street—and are ready and 

willing to use them when necessary. In settlements of greatest threat, such 

as those in the West Bank and (formerly) in the Gaza Strip, the IDF 

actually provides training and weapons to the citizens so they can serve as 

their own first response protection in case of attack.176

Stockpile Programs 

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Program 

Congress charged the Department of Health and Human Services and 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the 

establishment of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile in 1999.177 The 
78 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile became the Strategic National Stockpile 

on March 1, 2003, and is now managed jointly by the U.S. Departments of 

Homeland Security and the Health and Human Services. This stockpile is 

a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, IV administration, 

airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items.178

The Strategic National Stockpile has 12-hour “push packages” 

positioned in strategically located warehouses ready for deployment to 

designated sites within 12 hours of the federal decision to deploy Strategic 

National Stockpile assets. These packages are configured for immediate 

loading onto trucks or aircraft for the most rapid transport. When Strategic 

National Stockpile supplies arrive in a disaster stricken state or community, 

a Technical Advisory Response Unit accompanies the shipment. The U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security transfers authority for the Strategic 

National Stockpile supplies to the state or local authorities once they 

arrive at the receiving sites. State and local authorities are then 

responsible for the breakdown and distribution of the packages.179

Israeli “Strategic National Stockpile Program” Equivalent 

According to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center the 

Home Front Command has, in addition to the atropine auto-injectors 

included in the protective kits, Pyridostigmine bromide tablets for the 

civilian population in the event of attacks by adversaries using chemical 

nerve agents.180 The Home Front Command also stockpiles and can 

readily distribute broad-spectrum antibiotics.181 In times of emergency, 

high school students can be recruited to assist the Home Front Command 

and rescue forces in the distribution of medications, rendering assistance 

to the population in shelters, and assisting in hospitals.182

Citizen Responsibilities During and After Attack 

Citizen responsibilities regarding preparation for and response to 

attack are treated very differently in the United States and Israel. The 

United States has recommended that individual citizens undertake many 

actions in preparation for a natural disaster or terror attack. By contrast, 

the Israeli government has mandated that its citizens be adequately 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 79 

prepared. By ensuring appropriate preparation prior to attack or major 

disaster, the Israelis reduce potential casualties. 

Both countries use volunteers to enable more efficient disaster response 

through the U.S. Citizen Corps or the Israeli Magen David Adom volunteer 

program. However, because attacks in Israel occur more frequently and the 

terrorist threat is perceived to be more pressing, Israeli citizens appear to 

demonstrate a greater commitment to volunteer activities. 

U.S. Citizen Corps 

The Citizen Corps was established by the White House in 2002 as 

part of the USA Freedom Corps. On October 1, 2003, the Citizen Corps 

Program was transferred to the Office of Domestic Preparedness.183 Their 

charter asks members to “embrace the personal responsibility to be 

prepared; to get training in first aid and emergency skills; and to volunteer 

to support local emergency responders, disaster relief, and community 

safety.”184 There are four main Citizen Corps programs: Community 

Emergency Response Team, Medical Reserve Corps, Neighborhood 

Watch, and Volunteers in Police Service.185 There are currently more than 

1,200 Citizen Corps Councils nationwide which serve approximately 50 

percent of the population of the United States.186 Despite its sponsors’ 

hopes however, the initiative is still new and has not yet achieved national 

level buy-in by the public. 

The Citizen Corps offers potential benefits to the community such as a 

greater sense of security, responsibility, and personal contributions that 

build community pride. Additionally, this initiative is meant to develop 

unity and patriotism, promote risk reduction, enhance preparedness 

practices within the community, and prepare citizens for helping others in a 

crisis. The Citizen Corps program creates better informed and better 

prepared citizens that can take care of themselves and others during times of 

crisis, allowing first responders to address the most critical needs.187

Israel’s Magen David Adom Volunteer Initiatives 

The Magen David Adom depends on a large volunteer force to 

conduct its daily operations. Magen David Adom operates with 

approximately 1,000 paid employees and about 6,000 volunteers.188 Many 
80 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

volunteers are 15-18 years old, serving as assistant medics, dispatch center 

workers, and first aid instructors. Volunteers receive extensive training 

and are required to work for the Magen David Adom for a minimum of 

two years. Often, volunteering becomes a tradition, with multiple 

generations of the same family volunteering at the same station.189

Notification Systems 

United States 

The Emergency Alert System is intended to be an all-hazard warning 

system for American citizens. The Emergency Alert System was built on 

top of the Emergency Broadcast System infrastructure that was initiated in 

1951 as way to warn of a nuclear ballistic missile attack. The original 

Emergency Broadcast System was limited to federal use, only at the 

authorization of the President. In 1963 the system was expanded and 

access was provided to state and local authorities to warn local 

populations about other threats or hazards, such as tornados, hurricanes, 

and other potential disasters. 

The Emergency Alert System retains many of the original design 

standards. The system uses public radio, television, and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration radio as the primary 

communication methods. Its messages can incorporate elements of 

broader and more detailed information including the type of hazard, 

location, and actions to take. The Emergency Alert System broadcast is 

mandated on public systems at the direction of the President, but is only a 

voluntary transmission for local or state level emergencies.190

Israel 

Communication with the population is a high priority for the Israeli 

government to minimize the “fog of war.” During periods of imminent 

threat, the outer circle of the Home Front Command defensive response is 

initiated. The government provides general warnings of a possible attack. 

After an attack has occurred, a national system of warning sirens and all 

Israeli radio and television stations transmit the issued declaration of 

emergency. The Home Front Command broadcasts attack information, 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 81 

such as where missiles landed, types of missile (including conventional or 

unconventional warhead), and extent of casualties.191

Protected Spaces 

U.S. Shelter in Place Program 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security identifies three key steps 

individuals and families should take in preparation for unexpected 

emergencies. These key steps are: assemble an emergency kit, make a 

family communication plan, and learn more about readiness.192 DHS 

advises that citizens should be able to survive comfortably on their own in 

their homes for at least three days in the event of a chemical, biological, or 

radiological attack. 

Since the 2001 attacks, various public and private organizations have 

developed sheltering guides for use in homes, businesses, schools, and 

vehicles. Three such sheltering guides are available from the Department 

of Homeland Security, the American Red Cross, and the Center for 

Disease Control. These organization’s sheltering guides provide web 

accessible, in-place sheltering information detailing different types of 

incidents, a step-by-step planning process, and implementation actions if 

disaster strikes. All three guides identify the facility user as the 

responsible person to prepare the shelter plan.193

Israel’s Protected Space 

After the Gulf War, changes were made in civil defense regulations 

that required all new buildings to have a built-in protected space made of 

reinforced concrete with sealed blast-resistant windows.194 Rooms are 

designed to protect against conventional and non-conventional attack with 

chemical and biological weapons. Communal shelters are made available 

for those citizens who do not have a home shelter or may not be able to 

reach their homes during an attack. 

All new homes, hotels, and commercial buildings are required to have 

a protected space large enough for all people likely to be using that 

facility. This is an airtight, sealed room of reinforced concrete with blast 

doors and metal covers over blastproof windows that will allow the people 
82 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

inside to survive nearby blasts or WMD use for several hours. The 

regulations call for stronger spaces in the north of the country, which faces 

a more direct threat from Syrian or Hezbollah artillery and rocket fire. All 

personnel must be able to reach a protected space within three minutes of 

warning—the amount of time Tel Aviv had in 1991 when Iraqi SCUDs 

began falling.195

Some of the technological challenges that Israel is facing include 

developing a protective window or glazing that will work sufficiently 

without requiring a metal cover; dealing with ceilings; and creating and 

enforcing building codes for commercial structures so they can withstand 

attack.196 

Since 1992 Israeli law has required that every new building or 

building addition must be constructed with an Apartment Protected Space 

or a Floor Protected Space.197 The protected space is designed to provide 

protection to its occupants against conventional and unconventional 

attacks for several hours. Shelters can be found in private, joined 

buildings; private houses; and dual-purpose, public buildings. The 

ventilation and filtering system creates an over-pressure inside the shelter 

which allows people to remain in the protected spaces for an unlimited 

period of time without the need for wearing gas masks.198 Examples of 

protective space requirements include concrete envelopes, stable concrete 

towers, blast doors and windows, sealed envelopes, air filtering systems, 

internal finishing layers, and communication means.199 On March 17, 

2003, the Home Front Command announced that the public must obtain 

the necessary materials and complete preparations for their sealed rooms 

as detailed in a widely distributed booklet.200

Some Israelis oppose the whole concept of mandatory protected 

spaces, largely because they resent the government telling them how to 

build their homes. Incorporating a concrete protected space inside a home 

complicates the building process and adds to the cost. This is a minority 

viewpoint, however; there is a general societal acceptance of the necessity 

for such measures based on harsh experience.201
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 83 

Figure 17. Protected space in basement of Tel Aviv Hilton Hotel (Larsen) 

Readiness Education 

U.S. Ready Campaign 

The Ready Campaign, a national public service advertising campaign 

geared to educating and empowering American citizens to prepare for and 

respond to potential terrorist threats and other emergencies, was 

introduced by the Department of Homeland Security in February 2003. 

The Ready Campaign offers one-stop-shopping for citizen preparation for 

a terrorist attack at its website, www.Ready.gov. Additionally, the Listo 

Campaign, the Spanish-language version of the Ready Campaign, was 

launched in December 2003.202 Despite these initiatives, most Americans 

are not aware of, nor have they accepted, the need for such preparations. 

Israeli Readiness Education 

One of the more proactive methods of preparing their country for an 

unconventional attack is the education of Israeli youth. Today, Israeli 

Defense Force soldiers can be seen in public schools teaching children 

ages 4 to 18 about the possibility of being attacked by weapons of mass 

destruction.203 In coordination with the Education Ministry, Home Front 
84 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Command launched this program knowing that the children cannot avoid 

hearing about the possibility of attacks in the media. Their aim is to curb 

the childrens’ fears and anxieties through better understanding, which 

includes how to properly don protective gear. They believe that the more 

familiar children are with the concept, the less anxiety they will feel. 

Conclusion 

The organizations and assets employed by the United States and 

Israel to respond to a catastrophic event are based on past experiences and 

perceived future threats. While both countries appear to have 

complementary organizations and capabilities, the Israeli system is more 

experienced due to the constant attacks they suffer. Additionally, the 

Israeli people appear to be more prepared and cognizant of attacks and 

response assets and responsibilities after an event. While the United 

States continues to develop its response capabilities, it should take lessons 

from its more experienced ally. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 85 

VI. Analysis: Observations from Israeli Experience 

Research and field interviews have identified several successful 

tactics, techniques, and procedures from Israel’s experience that might be 

considered for the United States to emulate. Whether the United States 

chooses to adopt any of these “lessons” is still to be determined. 

Nonetheless, these concepts have proven to work in Israel. 

The United States has much to learn from Israel’s experience in 

providing homeland security through the Home Front Command. However, 

to put this in proper perspective, several key differences between Israel and 

the United States must be appreciated before discussing lessons learned. 

These differences make it easier for homeland security initiatives to be 

successfully applied in Israel. Israel’s populace has been in a constant state 

of alert since the founding of the country given its unique geography, 

history, demographics, and adversarial neighborhood. 

Most U.S. citizens appreciate the need for a heightened state of 

readiness and support homeland security initiatives. Yet this implies 

changing to a way of life much different than the history and experience of 

the United States. Although it may seem impossible to most Americans 

that homeland security will ever take a lesser role following the events of 

9/11, it is human nature to forget or minimize tragic events with the 

passage of time. Some in the United States would suggest that key lessons 

from 9/11 have already been lost. The citizens of Israel, on the other 

hand, have the unfortunate disadvantage of having frequent reminders why 

homeland security is critical to their continued existence, thus creating a 

different mindset and level of support for the HFC throughout the nation. 

It is also true that a coordinated, centralized homeland security system is 

easier to implement and sustain in a smaller country like Israel. 

Potential Lessons from Israel 

Following are a number of thematic lessons from Israeli experience 

that may prove helpful in America’s fight against terrorism. These appear 

in no particular order or priority. 
86 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Know Your Adversary 

Israel does a particularly good job understanding its neighbors and 

adversaries. This knowledge allows its security apparatus to prepare 

appropriately and pre-position its defensive forces accordingly to 

minimize such threats. When a state knows its adversary it can tailor its 

strategy to maximize its chances of dissuading, deterring, or defeating the 

threat. Israel’s success is due to a number of factors. For one thing, it 

places much more emphasis on cultural and regional studies than does the 

United States. This is obviously made easier by the fact that Israel 

controls much of the territory of its adversaries, and because it has closer 

linguistic, racial, and territorial ties to its neighbors—which also happen to 

be its adversaries. As a result, it can draw covert agents from a large pool 

of native or immigrant area specialists. There is no doubt that the United 

States has neglected human intelligence for several decades. 

Figure 18. Street scene in the Muslim Quarter, Jerusalem (Larsen) 

Interagency Cooperation 

Israel is also way ahead of the United States in its practice of sharing 

information between bureaucratic organizations, in cooperation between 

response agencies, and in requesting and sharing responsibility for civil 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 87

defense. Its major intelligence organizations, for example, act as an 

integrated team. The Mossad, Shin Bet, and local police units share a 

common intelligence pool, and work together closely when necessary. 

Israeli practices that the United States may wish to copy include realistic 

practices, drills, and scenarios, minimizing compartmentalization of 

information, and developing a process that ensures all organizations talk to 

one another more regularly. Israel has, in short, achieved a coordinated 

network-centric intelligence effort. This is a goal for the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, but it has a long way to go before it achieves that level of 

cooperation. 

The support of the IDF and HFC by the Israeli people is the 

cornerstone that creates a cooperative environment for an effective 

response by emergency personnel. This cooperation needs to be present 

not only after a crisis, but during planning and exercises, which is a clear 

weakness in the United States. This is not to suggest that there are no 

problems in Israel regarding a cooperative response. In fact, some have 

expressed concerns that when the HFC activates its reserves during a 

crisis, the Israeli economy suffers due to a shortage of manpower in 

critical places, such as the electric company.204 Unlike the situation in the 

United States, manpower is a problem for Israel. 

Some Israelis also worry that fighting terrorism will come at the 

expense of fighting crime. This has been refuted as being a 

misconception, since the fight against terrorism should theoretically help 

police and other security forces do their regular functions.205 In fact, the 

Israeli experience has shown that for fighting terror, it is best to use 

existing infrastructure.206 Once again, it is less important to spend money 

on creating new initiatives, but to place the effort and funds in making the 

best use of existing resources. Cooperation is always a challenge in any 

bureaucracy with multiple organizations vying for limited funds, and the 

Israeli political system is certainly not unique with its many competing 

factions. Yet the overall success of Israel’s defensive efforts in homeland 

security has been based on enhanced cooperation between government 

agencies, the military, emergency response providers, and the public at 

large. 
88 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Tight Internal Security

A visitor to Israel is immediately struck by the presence of armed 

military and police forces on the street, in public places. Reserve military 

members carry their automatic weapons openly with them when in 

uniform. Nearly every upscale restaurant has private security at the door, 

including metal detectors and bomb sniffing sensors. All public buildings, 

including shopping malls and bus and train stations, have armed guards 

and metal detectors at their gates. In short, the country feels like a police 

state, one in which security concerns are omnipresent. 

Figure 19. IDF and Israeli Police patrol, Via Dolorossa, Jerusalem (Larsen) 

Profiling 

Unlike the United States, which has a longer and stronger tradition of 

individual liberties, Israel is proud to admit that it uses profiling of 

individuals in its efforts to uncover terrorists. This is not just racial 

profiling; security personnel look at a number of indicators to determine 

whether a person is perceived to be a threat. For instance, there is a colorcoded license plate system that differentiates between Israeli Jews, Israeli 

Arabs, and Palestinians. On approaching a checkpoint the security guards 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 89 

will first check the license plate of an approaching car, then see whether 

the driver is alone or has passengers, whether the passengers include 

children, then check the identification card to see if the driver is an Israeli 

Jew, before making a decision on the physical look and demeanor of the 

driver herself. While this may be done in the United States by local police 

forces, FBI, and border patrol agents, it is not publicly acknowledged due 

to concerns over personal liberties and political correctness. To better 

protect against terrorist infiltration and terrorist acts, the United States 

may want to give profiling a higher profile. 

Protected Spaces 

Every new home and public building in Israel is required to have a 

protected space—a room built of reinforced concrete with blast door and 

window that is designed to provide overpressure protection against bombs 

and chemical or biological weapons attack. Older buildings must be 

retrofitted to include a protected space for each family or all workers or 

customers in a public building. All plans require the approval of the 

military (Home Front Command). A protected space is meant to be an 

integral part of the home that is used in a day to day fashion, but can be 

quickly converted to a bomb shelter and protective living space in a few 

minutes. It should contain the essentials for survival for several hours: 

water, food, and a portable radio. 

Some places in the United States also have protected spaces and 

warning systems. These are primarily located in communities near 

nuclear power plants, or downwind from chemical weapons storage 

facilities, biological laboratories, or industrial chemical facilities. In those 

cases there is, for the most part, public acceptance of the need for such 

shelters and a good level of interagency cooperation. But to date there has 

not appeared to be much need for such measures on a national level, 

because there does not appear to be a proximate threat facing the general 

population. Nor are North American homes typically built of concrete, 

making the addition of a protected space an expensive proposition. 
90 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Barriers 

Another technique which has proven quite successful in Israel is the 

use of physical barriers to prevent illegal infiltration. This can be 

accomplished by walls or fences, making liberal use of sensors. The most 

well-known of these barriers is the wall Israel is building around Jerusalem, 

but the Gaza Strip has been completely surrounded by a barbed wire fence 

and border security, and there are plans to eventually surround most of the 

West Bank and the Jewish settlements that were established there. 

Technology plays a major role in thwarting infiltration and terrorist attacks. 

The United States is considering similar barriers in crucial locations, such as 

the border with Mexico. The American concern is more about stemming 

illegal immigration and countering drug smuggling than counterterrorism 

per se, although preventing terrorists from entering the United States across 

that border would be a welcome secondary benefit of such a barrier. 

Figure 20. Security fence under construction, east side of Jerusalem (Larsen) 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 91 

Information Sharing Between the Two States 

Ties between the United States and Israel should be very close in order 

to maximize cooperative ventures and allow each country to benefit from 

the lessons of the other in the fight against terrorism and ensuring homeland 

security. Yet this relationship has not been as close or as beneficial as it 

could be. For example, while Home Front Command and U.S. Northern 

Command have an ongoing relationship, and with occasional lapses the IDF 

and OSD have been close, there is as yet no known linkage between Home 

Front Command the Department of Homeland Security. While there was a 

memorandum of understanding between Home Front Command and FEMA 

prior to 9/11, that MOU was allowed to lapse. 

Public Education 

Israel takes public education very seriously. It undertakes major 

measures to explain realistic threats to its population. By doing so it can 

achieve public buy-in for its policies. In return, the public can help identify 

threats and often acts as first responders until the police or military arrive. 

This assumes, correctly, a substantial amount of military training on the part 

of the general population, and an equally substantial set of pre-positioned 

weapons in the hands of that population. In some of the more isolated 

settlements, in fact, the military has actually provided small arms and 

training to the local population in order to prepare them for first responder 

responsibilities. 

In training the population, the military has chosen to keep things as 

simple as possible. For example, every household has received a civil 

defense booklet, “In the Event of a Genuine Alert: Information on Civil 

Defense for the Family.” In addition, there is only one type of warning 

siren notifying people to move to their protected spaces, used only in case 

of ballistic missile attack. In the case of other types of attack, Home Front 

Command has the ability to override commercial media transmissions and 

broadcast emergency notifications and provide information on the threat, 

actions for the public to take, and, when appropriate, all clear notifications. 

Finally, the government has also provided every citizen in Israel with a 

personal protection kit, consisting of an appropriately sized gas mask and 

filter, an atropine injector, and an instruction book. 
92 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Offensive Military Action 

An imperial approach to foreign policy can keep adversaries at arm’s 

length. Taking the fight to the enemy, or pursuing “an away game,” can 

reap enormous benefits for homeland defense. Israel has proven its 

willingness to pursue such actions whenever necessary, relying on 

preemptive acts or preventive wars when necessary to dissuade or deter an 

adversary from attacking its homeland. To successfully accomplish such 

an act it helps to reduce the rules of engagement on offensive military 

actions. This may include accepting the value of targeted killing of an 

adversary’s leaders, something the Israeli military has learned to do quite 

successfully. This requires the exquisite intelligence that the United States 

has called for in future capabilities, as well as a responsive offensive 

infrastructure that can tackle such missions. 

Security Decision-Making 

Security decisions are made quickly in Israel. Its national security 

establishment is much smaller than that in the United States, making it 

easier for a small group of senior leaders to make decisions more efficiently 

and quickly. Furthermore, there is little public debate over security issues; 

nor is there involvement to any degree in the security decision-making 

process by the media or by interest groups, as in the United States. As a 

result, decisions are easier and faster to make—albeit in a less democratic 

fashion than that to which American citizens are accustomed. 

One could argue that in the United States the national security 

community has made decisions about the nature of the threat and the best 

means to meet it in the future—and those means are a continuation of 

present trends in weaponry and organization. By the very fact that little 

has changed since the end of the Cold War, despite the psychological 

impact of the 9/11 attacks, one could surmise that the United States does 

not really think the terrorist threat is that serious. The bulk of the military 

and homeland defense budgets are still going to conventional military 

forces, rather than to civil defense. This may also, of course, reflect the 

Bush administration’s perspective that “the best defense is a good 

offense,” in line with Israel’s views as expressed in the previous section. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 93 

Compromise and Appeasement 

Israel has had mixed success in its efforts to ensure the harmonious 

coexistence of an Israeli state in an Arab-dominated land. In recent years 

it has bequeathed large portions of territory to its Palestinian minority 

under the nominal control of the Palestinian Authority. These moves, 

which some have called appeasement, have not necessarily led to a safer 

security environment. The most well-known examples are the Gaza Strip, 

the West Bank, and Southern Lebanon. In all of these cases, opponents of 

granting the Palestinians home rule or returning conquered territory to the 

Lebanese (and, by extension, Syria and Hezbollah) argue that this has 

simply given the radical elements of Palestinian population a secure base 

from which to carry out attacks on Israel. Security has seen little if any 

improvement, according to this view. On the other hand, in the Golan 

Heights, Israel refused to return that territory to Syria since taking it in the 

1967 Six Day War. By keeping those strategic highlands overlooking the 

Sea of Galilee, the people in that part of Northern Israel are much more 

secure than they were previously. 

Figure 21. Ferry crossing the Sea of Galilee, from Tiberias, 

with Golan Heights in the background (Larsen) 
94 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

Advanced Technology 

Modern technologies, especially sensors, are extensively used in 

Israel, particularly in border control and noninvasive surveillance 

methods. These help identify infiltration attempts and thwart attacks. 

Such modern methods as noninvasive search techniques, unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and high-tech balloons are real-world solutions to the security 

dilemma of having adversaries on one’s borders as well as within society. 

Reasons the United States is Unlikely to Adopt These Measures 

Differences in Size 

Israel is a small state, about the size of New Jersey. At its narrowest 

point the distance from the Mediterranean Sea to the West Bank is only 8 

miles. The population of six million is the size of an average U.S. state. 

The entire police force in Israel numbers the same as the New York City 

police department. 

The advantage of such a small community is that everyone in the 

homeland security business knows everyone else. Israel also lacks the 

intermediate level of federal states, so it can pass decisions directly from 

the federal decision-makers to local authorities. This makes coordination 

much simpler than in a country as large, diverse, and far-flung as the 

United States. Israel’s small size means that its population has a more 

communal feel, and is in general more willing to accept security policies 

that the U.S. population would not, given its diversity, size, and stronger 

commitment to personal freedoms and individual liberty.

Differences in Culture 

In addition to being larger, the United States has a different attitudinal 

approach to running government. For example, as some Israeli analysts 

pointed out to our study team, “in Israel everyone wants responsibility; in 

American nobody does.” This differing perspective as to being in charge 

has direct implications for first responders and for taking the initiative to 

ensure preparations are in place to prevent or respond to attacks. In 

addition, many Israeli analysts believe that “Israelis will do what is 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 95 

necessary first and ask where the money will come from later.” This again 

reflects a different, more proactive approach that Israeli officials take, as 

opposed to those in the United States. While such anecdotal comments 

are, of course, just that, they nonetheless may hold some truth that 

explains the more robust approach to civil defense taken by the Israelis.

Differences in Attitudes toward Security 

Israeli citizens, whether born in Israel or immigrants, are immediately 

inculcated into a society permeated by violent attacks by numerous 

adversaries. This creates a state of mind in which security is foremost. 

Some Israelis say that their country is still fighting for its independence, 

surrounded as it is by hostile and often threatening neighbors and facing a 

shadowy enemy within. As a result, Israel is a fully mobilized society. It 

subscribes to universal military service for males and females, and most 

older generations remain in the reserve forces. Americans, on the other 

hand, still view conflict as an aberration to the norm of peacetime. 

Differences in Experience 

Israel’s short modern history is replete with stories of war, terrorism, 

and the requirement for continual watchfulness. It is, in short, a series of 

bad experiences. The United States does not share that dark background, 

despite a much longer history. Israeli citizens grow up with a visible 

security threat, so they are more willing to accept security measures and 

adapt to that situation. Americans, on the other hand, are less likely to 

relinquish many personal freedoms for the sake of improved homeland 

security until there is a better defined threat, and/or more direct attacks on 

its society. As one Israeli analyst told the authors, “The United States has 

not suffered enough yet to adopt the same measures we have taken.” 

Differences in Bureaucratic Design 

The organizational framework of the United States government is 

much larger and more complex than that of Israel, especially as regards 

national security decisions. It is therefore easier to make quick security 

decisions in Israel because of its smaller decision-making cohort, all of 
96 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

whom know one another and have participated in joint exercises. In 

addition, the Intelligence Community in Israel shares a common central 

repository of intelligence information, something that the U.S. Intelligence 

Community lacks. This also precludes information sharing and the 

intelligence that is needed to make snap decisions properly.

Conclusion 

The United States and the entire international community can learn much 

from Israel’s efforts in the homeland security arena. Coordinated teamwork 

between government agencies, the military, and emergency responders is 

imperative. Peacetime training with all emergency response entities goes 

a long way towards smoother operations during actual incidents. To date, 

despite the best of intentions, the United States has not been very 

successful in conducting coordinated peacetime training efforts. It seems 

there is always some “real world” event that prevents the emergency 

responders from following through with plans to conduct mass casualty 

training scenarios. Training must be a priority. The preparedness function 

of the National Incident Management System should help in this endeavor. 

Israel does an excellent job of teaching its civilian population how to 

be self sufficient in the event of an incident. Again, there is much the 

United States can learn in this arena. The brochure distributed by the Home 

Front Command is very explicit in its content, providing a step-by-step 

format to follow in the event of an incident. The United States Department 

of Homeland Security’s public website also contains good information. But 

this begs two questions: Who knows the public website exists? How do we 

reach those Americans without access to the Internet? A recent survey by 

Mediamark Research Inc. found that 63 percent of the American adult 

population are regular Internet users.207 Prior to the deployment of the 

National Incident Management System on March 1, 2004, the United States 

had no provision for a unified program comparable to that of Israel for 

training its civilian population. It will likely be years before education for 

the general public is widely available. 

Arguably, it is not realistic, due to logistics and cost constraints, to 

equip 293 million plus Americans with personal gas masks and atropine 

injectors. The United States can, however, train its population in basic 

self-aid procedures. It can also provide classes on procedures to be 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 97

followed in the event of an incident. But it will have a tough time getting 

people to attend these classes voluntarily. Hopefully, the preparedness 

function of the National Incident Management System will be influential 

in ensuring a means for educating the general public regarding appropriate 

actions in the event of an incident. 

Americans are, in general, very complacent. They have not been 

subjected to terrorism acts to the same extent as have the Israelis. 

September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call for America, but the events of that 

day are already beginning to fade from its consciousness. As the former 

Secretary of Homeland Security said, “Homeland security must be a priority 

in every city, every neighborhood, and every house across America.”208 

But it is not. 

Figure 22. Security outpost overlooking Jerusalem on the campus of Hebrew 

University (Larsen) 

The set of observations in this section regarding Israeli homeland 

security should give us pause as we debate the future of American 

homeland security. The fact that Israel has adapted so many successful 

techniques, tactics, and procedures is not to imply that these were 

necessarily “good” for Israel. They may have been expedient, and they may 

have achieved some measure of success in the short term, but in some cases 
98 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

they may feed the vicious cycle that causes the regular flare-ups of domestic 

terrorism by the Palestinians. Similarly, one could argue that Israel’s 

supposed nuclear weapons program actually decreases its security by 

pushing its Islamic neighbors toward procuring their own WMD capability. 

Does Israel provide the model for future U.S. homeland security 

requirements? Let us hope not. The Israeli people live in a perpetual state 

of concern due to the constant threat of terrorism. If such a situation 

becomes the norm in American or other Western states, then U.S. 

counterterrorism policy has failed. The United States may indeed benefit 

from lessons learned through hard experience by our Israeli allies. But 

let’s hope we don’t have to implement many of those lessons until 

absolutely necessary. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 99 

Notes

1. Thanks to several students and staff members at the Air War College who 

contributed ideas to this section, including Major Chris Whitmire, Lt Colonel Consuella 

Pockett, Lt Colonel Jeffrey Jackson, Lt Colonel Robert Miller, and Lt Colonel Trevor 

Noel. 

2. National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 

2002. 

3. Joshua Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” The Journal of 

Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 

www.iacsp.com/latest_article.html. 

4. Home Front Command, In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil 

Defense for the Family, (Ramla, Israel: January 2003), 4. 

5. On-line, Internet, available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa_Intifada. 

6. Terrorism Statistics from the IDF Homepage, On-line, Internet, 16 December 

2005, available from www.idf.il. 

7. Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” 1. 

8. John Pike, “Home Front Command,” Global Security.org, 15 July 2002, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/homefront.htm.

9. Col Gilad Shenhar, “Structure and Aim of the HFC,” lecture notes, Kirya, Israel, 

13 March 2002. 

10. CIA, The World Factbook, 2004-2005, On-line, Internet, available from 

www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 

11. CIA, The World Factbook, 2004-2005. 

12. Gerald Steinberg, “Israeli Responses to the Threat of Chemical Warfare,” Fall 

1993, On-line, Internet, available from www.faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/chem.htm, 9-

10. 

13. Steinberg, “Israeli Responses to the Threat of Chemical Warfare,” 3. 

14. David Brinn, “Global Democracy – Maryland and Washington DC rely on 

Israel’s homeland security expertise,” ISRAEL21c, 8 August 2004, On-line, Internet, 

available from www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enZone=Democracy&enDisplay=view& 

enPage=Blan; also see “Enhancing Homeland Security,” Jewish Virtual Library, 3 March 
100 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

2003, On-line, Internet, available from www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/USIsrael/homeland.html. 

15. From Home Front Command briefing, “IDF Home Front Command: Structure 

and Aims of the HFC.” 

16. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Assets, February 2003, vii. 

17. Ibid. 

18. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The 

Whitehouse, September 2002), 5. 

19. Yeherzkel Dror, Memorandum for the Prime Minister: II. To Build a State 

(Jersualem, Akademon, 1989), 25. 

20. Interview with Reuven Pedhatzur, Tel Aviv, June 2005. 

21. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, “Democracy and National Security,” in 

Modern Judaism, Vol. 4 (1988).

22. National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington: The White House Office 

of Homeland Security, July 2002), vii, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/. 

23. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002). 

24. “The DHS Strategic Plan – Securing our Homeland,” U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, On-line, Internet, 14 December 2005, available from 

www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0413.xml.

25. National Strategy for Homeland Security, 13. 

26. “DHS Organization,” 14 December 2005, On-line, Internet, available from 

www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHSOrgChart.htm. 

27. “DHS Organization: Department Six-point Agenda,” 14 December 2005, Online, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_ 

0646.xml. 

28. Initial National Response Plan Fact Sheet, 14 December 2005, On-line, Internet, 

available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=1936. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 101

29. “Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Announces 

Completion of the National Response Plan,” 6 January 2005, On-line, Internet, available 

from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0582.xml. 

30. Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), 14 December 2005, 

On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=30&content= 

3813. 

31. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

32. Ibid., 3. 

33. Ibid.

34. “Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security,” 6. 

35. Government Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Agency Plans, 

Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security,” January 2005, GAO-05-33, 3. 

36. Lt Colonel Ken Franklin, “National Medical Response,” PPT presentation, 30 

November 2004. 

37. National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, December, 2004, 

46. 

38. Department of Defense Directive 3025.1 (DODD 3025.1), Military Support to 

Civil Authorities (MSCA), Department of Defense, January 15, 1993, 8. 

39. PFO designates a staff or agency, not an individual person. 

40. U.S. Northern Command’s Strategic Vision (Colorado Springs: U.S. Northern 

Command, 11 September 2003), 2. 

41. Major Don Gillich, “USNORTHCOM 101,” 19 November 2004, Power Point 

Presentation. 

42. U.S. Northern Command’s Strategic Vision, 15. 

43. Ibid., 16. 

44. “Supported Command” refers to the command that prepares operations plans or 

operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

“Supporting Command” refers to the command that provides augmentation forces or 
102 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

other support to a supported command or develops a supporting plan. Joint Publication 

1-02 (JP 1-02), DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Department of 

Defense, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005, 515-516. 

45. Department of State, “Welcome to Israel” (Tel Aviv, Israel: Embassy of the 

United States of America, 2002), 8. 

46. Israel Defense Forces, “Doctrine: IDF Mission,” accessed 15 December 2005, 

www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&srch=&id=31&clr=1. 

47. Israel Defense Forces, “Doctrine: Main Doctrine,” accessed 15 December 2005, 

www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=3. 

48. Israel Defense Forces, The Israel Defense Forces: Looking to the Future (Tel 

Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1998), 11. 

49. Ibid., 11. 

50. Ibid., 12. 

51. Allison Kaplan, “Israelis launch aid efforts for Katrina victims,” 4 September 

2005, On-line, Internet, available from www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enDispWho= 

Articles^l1084&enPage=BlankPage&enDisplay=view&enDispWhat=object&enVersion

=0&enZone=Democracy. 

52. Ina Friedman, “No Panic, Yet, on the Home Front,” The Jerusalem Report.com, 

22 October 2001, www.jrep.com/Israel/Article-58.html. 

53. “Home Front Command,” GlobalSecurity.org, 15 July 2002, On-line, Internet, 

available from 9 November 2004, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/ 

homefront.htm. 

54. Colonel Nitzan Nuriel, Home Front Command Doctrine and Development 

Department, “IDF Home Front Command, Structure and Aim of the H.F.C.”, Power 

Point Presentation, 31 July 2003. 

55. Ibid. 

56. Ibid. 

57. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the Family. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Interviews in Tel Aviv and Hertzilya, June 2005. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 103

60. Leonard J. Marcus, “Israel’s Preparedness for Responding to the Health 

Requirements of Its Civilian Population In the Event of Deployment of a Nuclear, 

Biological or Chemical Weapon of Mass Destruction,” 27 October 2002, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.calhealthofficers.org/Documents/Marcus_Israel_WMD_ 

Report.doc 

61. Friedman, “No Panic, Yet, on the Home Front.” 

62. Nuriel. 

63. Ibid. 

64. Ibid. 

65. Ibid. 

66. Interview with Jay Fawcett, NORTHCOM J-5, Doctrine and Legislative 

Liaison, 10 November 2004. 

67. Nuriel. 

68. Interviews in Tel Aviv, June 2005. 

69. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the Family, 

4. 

70. “Home Front Command Commences National Distribution of Educational 

Pamphlets,” Israel Defense Forces, the Official Website, 29 January 2003, 

www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id=7&docid=16606. 

71. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the Family. 

72. Joshua Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” The Journal of 

Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 

www.iacsp.com/latest_article.html. 

73. “Israel Defense Forces – The Official Website – News,” 2 December 2003, 

www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl+EN&id=7&docid=17271. 

74. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the Family, 

20. 

75. Ibid., 20 and 38. 

76. Ibid., 36-37. 
104 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

77. “Israel Defense Forces – The Official Website – News,” 29 January 2003, 

www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl+EN&id=7&docid=16606. 

78. Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security.” 

79. Col Gilad Shenhar, “Structure and Aim of the HFC,” lecture notes, Kirya, 

Israel, 13 March 2002. 

80. Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security.” 

81. Home Front Command, “Conventional Event Doctrine – International Disaster 

Site Management Course,” power point presentation, Israel, 2002.

82. Ibid. 

83. Ibid. 

84. Ibid. 

85. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the Family, 

40. 

86. Leonard Marcus, “Israel’s Preparedness for Responding to the Health 

Requirements of its Civilian Population in the Event of Deployment of a Nuclear, 

Biological or Chemical Weapon of Mass Destruction,” (A Report on Meetings and 

Interviews from Sept 29-Oct 4, 2002), 25. 

87. Ibid., 22.

88. Ibid. 

89. Ibid., 23. 

90. National Security for Combating Terrorism (Washington: The White House, 

February 2003). 

91. Thanks to several students and staff members at the Air War College who 

contributed ideas to this section, including Major Chris Whitmire, Lt Colonel Consuella 

Pockett, and Lt Colonel Robert Miller. 

92. James S. Gilmore, III, Chairman, “Assessing the Threat,” First Annual Report 

to The President and Congress. Advisory panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 15 December 1999. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 105

93. Paul Bremer III, “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,” 

Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, 7 June 2000, 

www.mipt.org/bremerreport.asp. 

94. Available at www.nssg.gov/addedum/Implementation_Plans.pdf. 

95. Ian Roxborough, “The Hart-Rudman Commission and Homeland Defense,” 

January 2001. 

96. National Strategy for Homeland Security, Executive Summary, ix. 

97. Ibid. 

98. Charles Doyle “Terrorism: Section by Section Analysis of the USA Patriot 

Act,” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31200, Dec10, 2001; see Z:\CPC HLS 

data\USA PATRIOT Act\rl31200.pdf. 

99. Department of Homeland security, www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home5.jsp. 

100. Andrew Schneider, “Elite U.S. Team Works to Keep Nuclear Bombs from 

Terrorists,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 21 Oct 2001, www.cdi.org/terrorism/nest-pr.cfm. 

101. Terrorist Screening Center “Fact Sheet” On-line, Internet, available from 

www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/tscfactsheet091603. 

102. Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Reform Will Not Be Quick,” Washington Post, 3 

May 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A63926-2004May3.html. 

103. Wikipedia online encyclopedia, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Homeland_Security. 

104. Pincus. 

105. Tabassum Zakaria, “Terrorist Threat Center Tackles Technology, Privacy,” 

Reuters On-line, Internet, available from http://homelandsecurity.osu.edu/ 

focusareas/intelligence.html. 

106. Department of Homeland Security website, 12 May 04, On-line, Internet, 

available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=50&content=875. 

107. Ibid. 

108. Ibid. 
106 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

109. National Strategy for Homeland Security and Department of Homeland 

Security website, 13 May 04, On-line, Internet, available from 

www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=50&content=875. 

110. On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme= 

50&content=875, 20 May 04. 

111. On-line, Internet, available from www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/ 

Factcards/Homeland.htm, 26 May 04. 

112. On-line, Internet, available from www.uscg.mil/deepwater/pdf/CRSreport.pdf, 

26 May 04. 

113. CBP briefing 6 Nov 03 presented by Chief Inspector Robert Galloway and 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection website, 14 May 04 On-line, Internet, available from 

www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/enforcement/international_activities/csi/csi_in_brief.xml). 

114. Robert Galloway, CBP briefing to Air War College, 6 November 03; also see 

Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, 95-

111. 

115. On-line, Internet, available from www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/ 

Factcards/AIS.html, 21 May 04. 

116. National Strategy for Homeland Security, Executive Summary, vii. 

117. Ibid., ix. 

118. National Strategy for Homeland Security, 30. 

119. Ibid., 31. 

120. White House website, On-line, Internet, available from www.whitehouse.gov/ 

pcipb/physical.html. 

121. Christopher Helman, “Stopping Porta-Nukes,” Forbes, vol 168, no. 16 (2001), 

97. 

122. Philip Shenon, “U.S. Plans to Toughen Rules for Cargo Shipping Industry,” 

New York Times, 19 Nov 2003, A25. 

123. James Glanz, “Despite New Tools, Detecting Nuclear Material is Doubtful,” 

New York Times, 18 March 2002, A13. 

124. “U.S. and Russia Unveil Remote-Control Checks of Nuclear Sites,” New York 

Times, 2 Apr 1995, 21. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 107

125. Hughes, 62-63. 

126. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Regional Technology 

Integration Initiative,” On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic. 

127. CDC, 1-44. 

128. Judith Miller, “Bush Issues Directive to Bolster Defense against Bioterrorism,” 

New York Times, 28 April 2004. 

129. Home Front Command, In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on 

Civil Defense for the Family (Ramla, Israel, January 2003), 4. 

130. Sinai, 1. 

131. Interviews in Tel Aviv and Hertzilya, June 2005. 

132. Interviews, March 2006. 

133. In the Event of a genuine alert, Information on Civil Defense for the Family, 4. 

134. Interviews in Tel Aviv, June 2005. 

135. Sinai. 

136. This comment is in no way meant to pass judgment on the Israeli people; it is 

simply an observation heard regularly in both Washington and Israel during interviews 

for this study, one that undoubtedly reflects the tough reality that this country has faced 

since its beginnings. 

137. Sinai. 

138. Richard Kilroy, Jr., “Do Fences Make Good Neighbors? A Case Study on 

Israel’s Security Policy Choices,” paper presented at the annual ISSS/ISAC conference, 

Denver, CO, 29 October 2005, 18-19. 

139. Kilroy, 20. 

140. Interviews in Tel Aviv and Hertzilya, June 2005. 

141. Kilroy, 23. 

142. Zvika Rubins, “Experience Tells,” Homeland Security, May 2004, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.fafael.co.il/web/rafnew/products/brochures/HLS%20% 

20Globes%200504.pdf. 
108 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

143. Interviews in Tel Aviv, June 2005. 

144. David Brinn, “Maryland and Washington, D.C. Rely on Israel’s Homeland 

Security Expertise,” ISRAEL21c, 8 August 2004, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.israel21c.org/bin/en.jsp?enZone=Democracy&enDisplay=view&enPage=Blan. 

145. “Enhancing Homeland Security,” Jewish Virtual Library, 3 March 2003, Online, Internet, available from www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/homeland. 

html. 

146. “United States-Israel Homeland Security Foundation Act,” The Orator.com 

News and Information, On-line, Internet, available from www.theorator.com/bills108/ 

hr3871.html. 

147. Interviews in Washington, May 2005. 

148. Interview at Ramla, June 2005. 

149. Interviews in Washington, May 2005. 

150. “Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Approves National 

Incident Management Systems (NIMS),” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1 

March 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 

dispaly?theme=15&content=3255&print=true. 

151. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004, “National Incident Management 

System,” 1 March 2004, 1. 

152. National Incident Management System website, On-line, Internet, available 

from www.fema.gov/nims. 

153. Interview with Michael Petrie, Administrator of the EMS and Operations 

Section of the Department of Public Health for the City and County of San Francisco, 5 

October 2004. 

154. “Emergencies and Disasters, Planning and Prevention, Fact Sheet: A Better 

Prepared America: A Year in Review,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1 March 

2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme= 

14&content=3855. 

155. NIMS website. 

156. Joshua Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” The Journal of 

Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, vol. 10, no. 1 (Summer 2004), Online, Internet, available from www.iacsp.com/latest_article.html. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 109

157. Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” 2. 

158. National Disaster Medical System, On-line, Internet, 16 Sep 2004, available 

from www.ndms.dhhs.gov. 

159. “Welcome to NDMS,” National Disaster Medical System, 2004, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.ndms.dhhs.gov/index.html. 

160. National Disaster Medical System. 

161. “What is A Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT)?”, 

National Disaster Medical System, On-line, Internet, 9 November 2004, available from 

www.ndms.dhhs.gov/ dmort.html. 

162. “What is a Veterinary Medical Assistance Team (VMAT)?,” National Disaster 

Medical System, On-line, Internet, 9 November 2004, available from 

www.ndms.dhhs.gov/vmat.html. 

163. “What are Federal Coordinating Centers?,” National Disaster Medical System,

On-line, Internet, 9 November 2004, available from www.ndms.dhhs.gov/fcc.html. 

164. “National Nurse Response Team (NNRT),” National Disaster Medical System,

On-line, Internet, 9 November 2004, available from www.ndms.dhhs.gov/nnrt.html. 

165. “Frequently Asked Questions About Citizen Preparedness,” U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, On-line, Internet, 5 October 2004, available from 

www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/dispaly?theme=47&content=473.

166. M. Drucker, “Magen David Adom – Saving Worlds,” 20 September 2004, Online, Internet, available from www/jewish-holiday.com/mdaorg.html. 

167. Michael Petrie, Administrator of the EMS and Operations Section of the 

Department of Public Health for the City and County of San Francisco, address to San 

Francisco EMS Training, San Francisco, CA., 29 June 2003. 

168. Drucker, 2. 

169. Petrie, address to San Francisco EMS Training. 

170. “Home Front Command Commences National Distribution of Educational 

Pamphlets,” Israel Defense Forces, the Official Website, 29 January 2003, On-line, 

Internet, available from www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id=7& 

docid=16606. 
110 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

171. In the event of a genuine alert, Information on Civil Defense for the Family,

(Ramla: Home Front Command, January 2003), 36. 

172. “Home Front Command Commences National Distribution of Educational 

Pamphlets.” 

173. “Home Front Command, GlobalSecurity.org, 15 July 2002, On-line, Internet, 

available from www.globalsecurity .org/military/world/israel/homefront.htm. 

174. Ina Friedman, “No Panic, Yet, on the Home Front,” The Jerusalem 

Report.com, 22 October 2001, On-line, Internet, available from www.jrep.com/Israel/ 

Article-58.html. 

175. “Israel Defense Forces, “The Official Website – News,” 29 January 2003, Online, Internet, available from www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl+EN&id= 

7&docid=16606. 

176. Interviews in Tel Aviv, June 2005. 

177. “Strategic National Stockpile,” CDC Emergency Preparedness and Response. 

11 August 2003, file://C:\DOCUME~1\Owner\LOCALS~Temp\MBQJNAJ9.htm. 

178. Ibid. 

179. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003, “Strategic National 

Stockpile,” 11 August 2003, On-line, Internet, 15 June 2004, available from 

www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/index.asp. 

180. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), 24 November 2004, Online, Internet, available from www.admic.dia.smil.mil/intel/afmic/is/isa042304/ 

isa042304.html. 

181. Ibid. 

182. “Home Front Command, GlobalSecurity.org.

183. “Citizen Corps Program,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Domestic Preparedness, 25 October 2004, On-line, Internet, available from 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/odp_citizencorps.htm. 

184. Citizen Corps, Uniting Communities – Preparing the Nation, 12 December 

2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.citizencorps.gov. 
Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security . . . 111

185. Citizen Corps: Supporting the Community and Our First Responders,” and 

Citizen Corps, “Programs and Partners,” On-line, Internet, 14 June 2004, available from 

www.citizencorps.gov/programs. 

186. “Emergencies and Disasters, First Responders, Fact Sheet: RapidCom 9/30 and 

Interoperability Progress,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 9 November 2004, 

On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/dispaly?theme=63&content= 

4092. 

187. “Citizens Corps: Uniting Communities and Preparing the Nation,” Citizens 

Corps, September 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.citizencorps.gov/ppt/cc_ 

overview_060804.ppt, 14. 

188. On-line, Internet, available from www.magendavidadom.org/volunteering.asp. 

189. Ibid. 

190. Congressional Research Service, “Report for Congress on Emergency 

Communications: The Emergency Alert System and All-Hazard Warnings,” On-line, 

Internet, 1 March 2006, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/index.html. 

191. Sinai, “How Israel Approaches Homeland Security,” 2. 

192. “Three Key Steps that Individuals and Families Should Take to be Properly 

Prepared for Unexpected Emergencies,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 6 

October 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 

display?theme=14&content=462&print=true. 

193. Department of Homeland Security: Ready America, “Terrorism Forces Us to 

Make a Choice. Don’t Be Afraid...Be Ready,” On-line, Internet, available from 

www.ready.gov/index.html; American Red Cross, “Get Prepared,” On-line, Internet, 

available from www.redcross.org/services/prepare/0,1082,0_239_,00.html; and Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, “Radiation Emergencies,” On-line, Internet, 

available from www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/. 

194. In the Event of a Genuine Attack – Information on Civil Defense for the 

Family, 22. 

195. Interviews in Tel Aviv and Ramla, June 2005. 

196. Interview in Ramla, June 2005. 

197. “Home Front Command, GlobalSecurity.org. 

198. Ibid. 
112 . . . Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security

199. Colonel Nitzan Nuriel, Home Front Command Doctrine and Development 

Department, “IDF Home Front Command, Structure and Aim of the H.F.C.”, Power 

Point Presentation, 31 July 2003. 

200. “The Home Front Command Calls Public to Complete Purchases of Necessary 

Materials,” Israel Defense Forces, the Official Website, 17 March 2003, On-line, 

Internet, available from www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id= 

7&docid=21256. 

201. Interviews in Tel Aviv and Ramla, June 2005. 

202. “Emergencies and Disasters, Planning and Prevention, Fact Sheet: A Better 

Prepared America: A Year in Review,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1 March 

2004, www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/dispaly?theme=14&content=3855. 

203. Julie Stahl, “Israel Preparing Children for Possibility of Non-Conventional 

War,” CNS News.com, December 23 2002, On-line, Internet, available from 

www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBurueaus.asp?%5CforeignBurueaus%5archive, 1-2. 

204. “Israel Defense Forces – The Official Website – News,” 28 December 2002, 

On-line, Internet, available from www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr= 

1&sl+EN&id=7&docid=15819. 

205. Assal Heffetz, “Homeland security and the public budgets – the Israel 

experience,” 26 August 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.gsa.gov/gsa/ 

cm_attachments/GSA_DOCUMENT/13-TIXGroup1-Israel_R2G. 

206. Ibid. 

207. “U.S. Internet growth flattens with 63% online,” inq7.net, 26 June 2004, Online, Internet, 6 October 2004, available from www.inq7.net/2004/jun/27/inf-3-1.htm. 

208. Tom Ridge, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at the 

Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management,” U.S Department of Homeland 

Security, 30 July 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.dhs.gov/ 

dhspublic/dispaly?theme=63&content=3868&print=true.