BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

____________________________________ 

 ) 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for ) 

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest ) Docket No. FAA-2009-1093 

Requirements ) 

____________________________________) 

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL’S RESPONSE TO 

THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION’S PETITION 

TO CONSIDER LATE-FILED COMMENTS 

 Captain Don Wykoff 

 Chairman, ALPA National Flight Time/Duty Time 

 Committee 

 Air Line Pilots Association, International 

 1625 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. 

 Washington, D.C. 20036 

 (703) 689-2270 

October 4, 2011 
2 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

____________________________________ 

 ) 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for ) 

Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest ) Docket No. FAA-2009-1093 

Requirements ) 

____________________________________) 

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL’S RESPONSE TO 

THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION’S PETITION 

TO CONSIDER LATE-FILED COMMENTS 

 The comment period on this Docket regarding Flight and Duty Limitations and Rest 

Requirements for flightcrew members closed on November 15, 2010. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (“FAA”) stated: 

“...it will consider comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring expense or delay.” 

The Air Transport Association (“ATA”) filed its late comment knowing that the rule 

which is in a final form is under review by the Office of Management and Budget. What the 

ATA is seeking is to essentially go back to square one and start the process over in hopes that 

pilot fatigue will ultimately not be addressed in any substantive way. This is not a routine FAA 

rulemaking. It is being done because the Congress of the United States mandated that the FAA 

publish a final rule by August 2011 to address the concerns about pilot fatigue. Congress made 

this rulemaking a priority as a result of the Colgan Air crash. The ATA’s comments should not 

be allowed to further delay the publication of a final flight limitations rule, which is overdue by 

two months. 

Additionally, the ATA is speculating that this rule will impact jobs in an effort to further 

the commercial interests of their members. Neither the ATA nor any other non-government 

entity knows what changes the FAA made to the proposed rule which may negate the ATA’s 

entire speculation regarding costs and jobs. As ALPA has previously pointed out, by ATA’s 

own expert, 93.6% of their estimated cost would be alleviated if three items were adjusted, 1) 

schedule reliability; 2) flight duty period extensions and, 3) flight time limits. 

If these provisions have been modified from the proposal then ATA’s comments are 

essentially moot. We will not know that until the final rule is published. 
3 

Once the rule is published the ATA, if they believe portions of the rule need revisions, 

can always petition the FAA in the normal rulemaking process to change the rule to address any 

concerns they may have. 

For the above reasons, the late comments submitted at this time should not be allowed to 

delay the issuance of a final flight limitations rule as mandated by Congress. 

 In ALPA’s view, the issuance of a modern science-based flight limitation rule is critical. 

The issue of pilot fatigue and its impact on flight safety has been a matter of concern 

beginning in the 1930’s. Since the mid-1980’s when the domestic flight time rules were 

modified this concern has been increasingly urgent as aircraft became faster and more complex. 

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has determined that air crewmember fatigue is a 

fundamental factor of flight safety and acknowledged that for several years the flight time rules 

have needed to be updated. 

 Since 1985 when the last modification occurred, there have been 17 accidents where 

fatigue was identified and discussed as a factor, (see attached list). The accidents caused the 

National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) to call for the modernization of the flight time 

rules of which many are over 60 years old. Human fatigue has been one of the NTSB’s most 

wanted aviation safety improvements since the inception of the list in 1990. Since that time, 

there have been at least 14 high profile aircraft accidents where fatigue was identified or 

discussed as a factor or concern in the accident. Most of these high profile accidents involved 

passenger carrying airlines. These high profile fatigue accidents continue to occur at an average 

rate of about one every two years. The most recent of these was the Colgan crash in February, 

2009, where 50 people were killed. 

The Colgan accident energized Congress to enact the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 

Administration Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-216 (the Act), which directed the FAA among 

other things to: 

“. . . issue regulations no later than August 1, 2011 to “specify limitations on the hours of 

flight and duty time allowed for pilots to address problems relating to pilot fatigue.” 

The Act directed the FAA to consider several factors that could impact pilot alertness 

including time of day, number of takeoffs and landings, crossing multiple time zones, and 

the effects of commuting. In addition, the agency was directed to review the available 

research on fatigue, sleep and rest requirements recommended by the NTSB and NASA, 

and applicable international standards. Finally, the agency was to explore alternate 

procedures to facilitate alertness in the cockpit, air carrier scheduling and attendance 

policies (including sick leave), and medical screening and treatment options.” 

 The FAA in response convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (“ARC”) that was 

comprised of all segments of the airline industry. As a result of this effort the FAA issued a 

proposed flight limitations rule based on industry advice and the latest sleep science. 
4 

 The FAA’s proposed rule is designed to increase the margin of safety for passengers 

traveling in Part 121 air carrier flights. The FAA has conducted cost benefit analyses and 

concluded that the safety benefit outweighs the modest increased costs. 

 The ATA, as they have consistently done in the past, chooses to attempt to derail the 

rulemaking on the ground “it costs too much” and to ignore the needed safety improvements this 

proposed regulation will provide. The ATA’s suggestions as to the projected costs of safety 

regulations have been shown to have been exaggerated in the past and its current efforts are more 

of the same. Congress has already directed that an improved rule should have been in place no 

later than August 1, 2011. There is no good reason to further delay this important safety measure 

and to continue to expose the traveling public and airline employees to an increased risk of a 

fatigue related accident. 

 We note that just recently the ATA has jumped on the “jobs bandwagon” asserting that 

the proposed rule will result in a net job loss. (ATA OMB filing, Sept. 17, 2011). 

 Oliver Wyman’s analysis, which was paid for by ATA, suggests that the change in 

flightcrew member duty and rest requirements will cost the mainline and cargo carriers an 

additional $1.96 billion dollars annually and approximately 26,700 jobs (over 4.5% of the 

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (“BTS”) stated scheduled passenger, charter and cargo 

airlines employee as of July 2011). Ignoring for the moment that $1.96B increase is likely 

grossly overstated (fifteen times higher than the FAA estimate), the jobs impact seems highly 

suspect as well. 

 To put the estimated jobs impact in perspective, reviewing what happened with fuel costs 

and employment numbers over the last few years can be very helpful. Consider in 2010 that the 

industry (US based passenger and all cargo airlines) spent approximately $6.5 billion dollars 

more on fuel than in 2009, yet in that same year BTS employment actually increased by .9% as 

revenue rebounded throughout the year. Looking at the year ending July 2011, the same trend is 

evident as fuel costs are up $7.4 billion, yet employment is up 2.3%. Even if you consider the 

extreme spike in 2008 where fuel costs increased $15.9 billion compared to 2007, employment 

decreased 5.5%. In other words, it took an approximately eight times bigger cost increase to get 

similar job reduction to ATA’s forecast. 

 To further the point, consider that it would require an approximate $4.50/bbl change in 

the price of fuel to equate to Oliver Wyman’s $2B per year estimated increase in costs (again 

ignoring that fact the number is likely significantly overstated). A quick analysis of fuel prices 

over the last several years shows changes of that magnitude are very common and have even 

occurred daily on multiple occasions, yet the industry has added jobs over the last two years. 

 
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US Carrier Accidents where pilot fatigue was discussed

l2ll2l85 Newfoundland, Canada, Arrow Air Flight 12S5 (DC-SXMilitary charter crashed on

takeoff after refueling stop killing all285 on board. Troops were members of the

U.S. l.01" Airborne Division returning home for Christmas after performing

intemational peacekeeping duties in Sinai)

01172189 Utah, Ports of Call Air (707)(Jnscheduled flight with 194 aboard collided with

terrain on landing, aircraft damaged, NTSB probable cause included discussion of

pilot fatigue due to disrupted circadian rhythm)

fin8189 Hawaii, Aloha IslandAir Flight l7n QA fahlities including I from high school

teams)

04105191 Georgia, Atlantic Southeast X'Iight 23tl Q3 fatalities including Sen. John Tower)

02115192 Ohio, Air Transport International (3 fatalities, aircraft destroyed, crashed on 2od

attempt to land)

04129193 Arkansas, Continental Express Flight 2733 (aerodlynamic stall arising from in-flight

mismanagement by fatigued flight crew resulted in substantial engine damage and

subsequent crash landing)

08118193 Guantanamo Bay, American International Cargo (Kalitta Air) (3 serious injuries,

aircraft destroyed)

02116195 Missouri, Air Transport International Cargo (3 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)

04111196 Wyoming 2 fatalities resulted when a Cessna single engine airplane piloted by a7:

year old girl and her father crashed in an attenpt to set a coast to coast record

05111196 Florida, Valujet Flight 952 (DC9X110 fatalities, aircraft destroyed))

06101199 Arkansas, American Airlines Flight 1420 (MDSZ)(LLfatahties, 105 injuries, aircraft

destroyed)

07126/02 Florida, FedEx Flighr 1478 (8727)(3 injured, aircraft desfroyed)

10124104 California, MedFlight Learjet (5 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)

10119104 Missouri, American Connection Ftight 5966 (15 fatalities, aircraft destroyed)

021L8107 Ohio, Delta Connection Ftight 6488 (3 injuries, substantial damage)

04t12//07 Michigan, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 4712 (substantial damage)

02112109 New York, Coþan Flight 3407 (50 fatzl, zircraft destroyed)